CJcrn^U IGam i>rljonl IGibtarg Cornell University Library KF5313.M17 A treatise on the law of municipal ordin 3 1924 019 959 109 Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924019959109 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES BY EUGENE McQUILLIN OF THE ST. LOUIS BAR 1904 CALLAGHAN & COMPANY CHICAGO Entered, accordinp; to the Aft of Congress, in the year 1904 By EUGENE ^[cQUILLIN In the office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. KF ^3/3 DEDICATION. To my friend, EOBEKT E. McJIATH, Member A. S. C. E., President Board of Public Improvements (1893 to 1901) of tlie Citj of St. Louis, Mo., this work is in- scribed, as a tribute to his accurate Icnowledge of public improvement ordinances and matters relating to municipal work, also as a token of many years of beneficial friendship of its author. PREFACE Municipal administration is more closely associated with the daily life of the urban citizen than either federal or state administration : the taxpayer and property owner are more directly and vitally concerned. In the usual American municipal organization the council or governing legislative body is created directly by the electors, and is, therefore, the popular branch; and it is through this depart- ment that the will of the inhabitants as rightful participants in the local civil government is manifested. This is done by corporate acts, legislative or quasi legislative in character. These acts when duly completed and promulgated become ordinances, if of a permanent nature, or resolutions, if designed for a tem- porary purpose. Chiefly by ordinance or resolution all money exaction from urban citizens for state or local purposes are levied and collected; public revenue distributed; streets, public ways, fcewers, drains, water, lighting and public improvements of all kinds provided ; the peace, good order and health of the local community preserved; and its trade and commerce advanced. To municipal oiHcers and their legal advisers, and to those interested in municipal government, for years, the value of a satisfactory treatise dealing exclusively with the subject of Municipal Ordinances has not been doubted. Practicing lawyers who have been called upon to investigate legal questions wherein municipal legislation was directly or indirectly involved have felt the need of such work. Such has been the experience time and time again of the author. While much valuable matter appears in standard text books on the general subject, notably in the excellent commentaries of the eminent Judge Dillon on the Law of Municipal Corporations (1890), no work has been issued, as far as the author knows, which attempts to deal exclusively with the entire subject. The small volume on Municipal Police Ordinances prepared by Messrs. I-Iorr and Bemis (1887) is limited, as its title indicates, to local police regulations. Moreover, since the works mentioned and others treating of certain branches of the general subject have appeared, marked developments in the legislative powers of VI PREFACE. municipal councils and boards have occurred. These develop- ments have been wrought by changes in state constitutions, statutes, and municipal charters, and judicial decisions construing such laws, in the light of the rapid progress made, particularly during the past decade, in municipal government. Municipal charters of the present day differ materially from those of earlier origin. True, the latter form the basis for the former, but the meager and sometimes vague ex23ressions of the older charters have been exchanged for more precise and elaborate provisions. The needs and conveniences of crowded modern unban centers have resulted in due recognition of the desirability and, indeed necessity of entrusting such local governmental organs with broader and more efficient powers for local self-government. President Eoosevelt in his message to the Congress, December 3, 1901, timely observed that "the growth of cities has gone on beyond comparison faster tlian the growth of the country;" that "the most vital problem with which this country, and for that matter the whole civilized world, has to deal" relates to the "social conditions, moral and physical, in large cities;" but that "under our constitution there is much more scope for such action hy the state and the municipality than by the nation." The last census (1900) shows that 35 per cent of the entire population of the Bepublic dwell in cities having 8,000 or more population. When it is considered that there are hundreds of urban centers of smaller size, containing a papulation of from 1,000 to nearly 8,000, which have been excluded in the estimate, it may be conservatively stated that the city population is at least 40 per cent, or two-fifths. The population of these centers is rapidly increasing, and the inhabitants thereof are subjected con- stantly to ordinance and local police regulations. The importance of the legal phase of municipal legislation, of which this work treats exclusively, is thus manifest. The numerous judicial decisions dealing with every phase of the important subject of municipal ordinances have been studied, analyzed and compared, and the principles deduced therefrom, together with the reasons supporting them, wrought into text and notes in a form which it is believed will prove convenient and easily accessible. Nearly nine thousand cases have been cited. Besides the official reports, parallel references are made to the National Eeporter System, American Decisions, American Eeports and State Reports, and the Lawyers' Reports Annotated. The cross-references are numerous and specific. For greater con- PREFACE. , vii Tenience catcli-words have been freely employed in text and notes. An index has been provided which gives specific information of the contents. It will be of great satisfaction to the author if the exacting labor required in the preparation of this work (covering as it has over a period of some, ten years — labor given at such times as could be spared from professional duties) should prove of material assistance to his legal brethren and othei-s seeking information on the subject of Municipal Ordinances. Acknowledgment is due to William S. Campbell, Esq., of the St. Louis Bar, for intelligent assistance on various parts of the work and for his painstaking and laborious task in verifying the cases. Eugene McQuillin. St. Louis, January, 1904. CONTENTS BY CHAPTERS, CHAPTER I. Of General Nature a^d Requisites of Valid Municipal Ordi- nances. II. Or THE Power to Enact Ordinances; and herein, the nature ol' Municipal Corporations, and the Source, Construction and Exercise of General Corporate Powers. III. Of Enactment of Ordinances. 1. Meetings and proceedings of council or governing legis- lative body — Records. IV. Of Enactment of Ordinances (Continued). 2. The ordinance and its passage. V. Of Penalties. VI. Of Reasonableness of Ordinances; and herein Ordinances in Restraint of Trade. VII. Of Amendment and Repeal of Ordinances. VIII. Of Constitutionality of Ordinances. 1. In general. 2. Ordinances impairing the obligation of contracts. 3. Ordinances interfering with or attempting to regulate foreign or inter-state commerce. IX. Of Consideration of Validity of Ordinances; and herein Pro- cedure to Test and Rules of Construction. X. Of Actions to Enfokce Police Ordinances. 1. The Court and Its Jurisdiction. 2. The Action — Its Form, Nature and Institution. 3. The Statement, Complaint or Information. 4. The Trial — Summary or Jury — Proceedings. 5. The Evidence for the Corporation. 6. Defenses. 7. The Judgment, Record and Execution. 8. Review. XI. Of Pleading Ordinances in Civil Proceedings. XII. Of Evidence of Ordinances. XIII. Of Ordinances Relating to Taxation and License Tax. XIV. Op Ordinances Relating to Municipal Police Powers; and herein nuisances, public health, safety and convenience. 1. General nature, scope and exercise of police power. 2. Health and sanitary regulations — nuisances. 3. Public safety — streets — buildings. 4. Offenses against public morals and decency. 5. Markets — weights and measures. 6. Miscellaneous regulations. XV. Of Municipal Control of Offenses Against State. XVI. Of Public Improvement Ordinances. XVII. Of Franchise Ordinances. ix CONTENTS BY SECTIONS. CHAPTEK I. OF GENERAL NATURE AND REQUISITES OF VALID MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES. SECTION Ordinances defined 1 Difference between ordinance and resolution a Illustrations as to when ordinance necessary 3 Same — Creating offices and situations 4 When action may be taken by resolution — Illustrations 5 How ordinances differ from regulations, orders, resolutions, etc. . . 6 How ordinances differ from rules of procedure 7 Classification of ordinances 8 Same — General and special 9 Same — Penal and non-penal — General and special 10 Ordinance may combine contractual and police regulations 11 Force and effect of ordinances 12 Do ordinances differ as to force and effect from charter or statute?. 13 Requisites of a valid ordinance stated 14 Ordinances must conform to charter . . •: 15 Ordinances must not be inconsistent with the general laws of the state 16 Same — Exception 17- Ordinances must harmonize with the public policy and common law of the state 18 Ordinances must be enacted in good faith 19 Ordinances must be definite and certain 20 Ordinances of cities of same class may vary 21 Notice to be taken of ordinances 22 Who bound by ordinances 23 Ordinances operative upon property within the corporate limits. . . 24 Same — Rule as applied to licenses 25 Territorial operation of ordinances 26 Places within municipal jurisdiction 27 Same — Wharves — Private property 28 Same — Regulating speed of trains 29 Judicial limitation of operation of ordinances 30 Ordinances operating in public or particular places only 31 Ordinances applying to part of city valid 32 Same — Improvement ordinance 33 When ordinances to take effect 34 Same — Illustrative cases ' 35 Same sutject — Contingency 36 Expiration and suspension of ordinances 37 xi xii CONTENTS BY SECTIONS. OHAPTEK II. OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES; AND HEREIN, THE NATURE OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, AND THE SOURCE, CONSTRUCTION AND EXERCISE OF GENERAL CORPORATE POWERS. SECTION Public corporation empowered to pass ordinances 38 Corporate as distinguished from private affairs 39 Ordinance regulating civil rights and liabilities 40 Same — Civil action for breach of ordinance 41 Same — Limitation — Duty to public 42 The municipal charter — Its nature and purpose 43 Same subject 44 Usual municipal powers 45 General rule as to municipal powers stated 46 Powers of New England towns 47 Rules of construction 48 Same subject 49 Effect of specific enumeration of powers 50 Construction of power "to regulate" 51 Construction of charter 52 IMPLIED POWERS. Implied power to enact ordinances 53 General doctrine as to implied or incidental powers 54 Implied powers confined to municipal affairs 55 Implied powers respecting offices and officers , 56 Implied power to acquire and hold property 57 Same — Property beyond corporate limits 58 Implied power to dispose of property 59 Same — Property held for particular purposes 60 Implied power to transfer, donate or dedicate property for particu- lar uses 61 Implied power to mortgage or pledge property 62 Implied powers as to police and sanitary regulations 63 Implied power to supply water 64 Implied power to purchase engines, etc., to prevent and suppress fires -. 65 Implied power as to lighting 66 Same — Implied power to regulate price of light 67 Appropriations as donations forbidden 68 Appropriations for celebrations, entertainments, etc., void 69 Bounties to soldiers 7q Expenditures to obtain or oppose legislation 71 Exercise of powers by virtue of usage or custom 72 Same subject ^q Miscellaneous illustrations of implied powers 74 CONTENTS BY SECTIONS. xiii EXECUTION OF POWEKS. SECTION Method of exercise of powers 75 Judiciary will not control exercise of discretionary powers 76 Same subject 77 Limitation of rule of non-judicial interference 78 When ordinance necessary to exercise power 79 Same subject — Legislative or executive powers 80 Same subject — Self-enforcing charter provisions 81 Distinction between mandatory and discretionary powers 82 Same subject 83 Public powers cannot be surrendered or delegated 84 Powers and duties imposed upon particular departments or officers cannot be delegated 85 Legislative authority cannot be delegated 8ii Same — Illustrations 87 Same subject 88 Ministerial duties may be delegated 89 CHAPTER III. OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 1. MEETINGS AND PRO- CEEDINGS OF COUNCIL OR GOVERNING LEGISLATIVE BODY— RECORDS. Municipal organization — Where corporate authority vested 90 Corporate meetings required 91 Kinds of corporate meetings stated — Notice 92 New England town meetings — Notice or warning indispensable. ... 93 Sufficiency of notice or warning 94 What the notice or warning must specify 95 Legal governing body — De facto councils and officers 96 Conflicting councils — Injunction 97 Presiding officer — Mayor as member 98 Signing of bills by presiding officer 99 When mayor's approval of proceedings necessary 100 Mayor's approval must be in writing 101 Casting vote by presiding officer 102 QUOEtTM AND MAJOEITY. Quorum defined 103 Quorum and majority at common law 104 Quorum and majority of definite body 105 Same — When definite vote required 106 Vote necessary in suspending rules 107 How quorum affected by Interest of members 108 Quorum of joint assemblies of definite bodies 109 XIV CONTENTS BY SECTIONS. PROCEEDINGS. SECTION Special meetings — Notice H^* Power to adjourn meetings Ill Business that may be transacted at adjourned meetings 112 Council as continuous body ._ 113 Action of legislative body consisting of two branches 114 Rules for conducting business — Parliamentary law 115 Form of corporate action — Mandatory and directory provisions. . . . 116 Taking yeas and nays • 117 Reasons for requiring yeas and nays 118 Reading bills on three different days 119 Ratification of void acts 120 Reconsideration — General powers respecting 121 Power to rescind prior acts 122 Committees 123 RECORDS. Record of proceedings 124 Who to keep municipal records 125 Sufficiency of record — Presumptions 126 Same — Taking yeas and nays 127 Municipal records as evidence 128 Parol evidence to prove rfecord 129 Parol evidence to show omissions ' 130 Same subject — Imperfect record — Rights of creditors 131 Amendment of record 132 Method of amending 133 Court may order amendment — Mandamus 134 Amendment after lapse of time — Estoppel— Ex post facto 135 CHAPTER IV. OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES— Continued. 2. THE ORDINANCE AND ITS PASSAGE. Charter method of enactment exclusive 136 Form of ordinance 137 The formal parts of an ordinance enumerated 138 Recital of authority to enact not required ... 139 Ordinance need not recite necessity of enactment j^. 140 One subject and title 141 Same — Illustrative cases 142 Title in revision of ordinances 143 Preamble 144 Ordaining or enacting clause 145 Time of introduction and passage 146 Same — Double board 147 Reference to and report by committee 14S Signing and approval of ordinance by mayor 143 Veto of mayor jgO CONTENTS BY SECTIONS. \v SECTION Return of bill or ordinance by mayor 151 Ordinances passed and approved by electors 152 Recording ordinances 153 Deposit and custody of ordinances 154 Publication of ordinances and notice of pendency 155 Time and frequency of publication 156 Method of publication 157 Amendment on passage 158 Publication of amendments on passage 159 Consideration of mayor's veto 160 Courts will not inquire into legislative motive 161 Same — Rule limited — Ministerial act 162 Injunction to restrain passage of ordinance 163 Validating void ordinance by municipality 164 Curative power of legislature over void ordinances 165 Same — Proceedings to subscribe for railroad stock 166 Same — To collect taxes 167 CHAPTER V. OF PENALTIES. Power to enforce ordinances by penalties 168 Charter method of enforcing ordinances exclusive 169 Power to inflict penalty of forfeiture 170 Same — Proceedings 171 Same — Animals running at large 172 Penalty by imprisonment 173 Other penalties— Costs 174 Penalty must be certain 175 Same — New Jersey Doctrine 176 Same — North Carolina doctrine 177 Penalty must be reasonable — Limit 178 Limit of fine — Continuous or separate offense 179 Heavier fine for second offense authorized 180 CHAPTER VI. OF REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES; AND HEREIN ORDI- NANCES IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE. Express power to pass 181 Implied or incidental powers 182 iviode of exercise of express power must be reasonable 183 Same — Uniform rule necessary 184 Reasonableness a question of law for the court 185 Rules as to reasonableness under implied powers 186 Same — English cases — Customs and usage 187 Same — Illustrative cases 188 XVI CONTENTS BY SECTIONS. SECTION Ordinances in restraint of trade 189 Same — Monopoly and exclusive privileges 190 Water and gas franchises as monopolies — Perries 191 Exclusive market privileges 192 Ordinances must not unreasonably discriminate — Classification .... 193 Same — Illustrative cases 194 CHAPTER VII. OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. Amendment — Method of making 195 Void ordinance cannot be amended 196 Amendment of franchise and contract ordinances 197 Amendment of improvement ordinances 198 Power to repeal ordinances 199 Same — Franchise and contract ordinances 200 Same — Illustrative cases 201 Repeal of improvement ordinances 202 Implied repeals 203 Same subject — General and special ordinances 204 Effect of repeal — Revival 205 Same — Penal ordinances 206 Same— Improvement ordinances 207 Effect of repeal and re-enactment 208 Effect of revision of ordinances as to repeal 209 Repeal of ordinance by ordinance only 210 When ordinances superseded by charter amendments 211 Rule relating to repeals of charter and ordinance provisions by general laws 212 Same subject — Question of intent 213 When charter provisions supersede general laws 214 When ordinances supersede general laws 215 Effect on ordinances by surrender of special charter — Change in class or grade 216 Same — Dissolution and re-organization 217 Same — By consolidation or change of corporate limits 218 CHAPTEE VIII. OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 1-. In general. 3. Ordinances interfering with 2. Ordinances impairing the or attempting to regulate foreign obligation of contracts. or inter-state commerce. 1. IN GENERAL. Ordinances must be constitutional — Enumeration 219 Ordinances in derogation of common rights 220 CONTENTS BY SECTIONS. xvii SECTION Same — Use of private property 221 Same — Use of public property — Streets : 222 Taking or damaging private property 223 Oppressive regulations 224 Relating to individual liberty 225 Discriminating on account of class, race, religious seit, etc 22(i Same — The San Francisco Queue ordinance 227 Regulating personal association, employment, etc 22S Personal liberty — Drunkenness 229 Mode of trial 230 OflScer has no vested right in office — Office may be changed or abolished 231 2. ORDINANCES IMPAIEING THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS. Ordinances cannot impair the obligation of contracts 232 Ordinance as "Law" 233 Ordinances as contracts 234 The "Obligation" of the contract 235 Question is for decision of United States Supreme Court 236 Taxation by municipal corporation of its own bonds, etc 237 Ordinances granting franchises as contracts 238 Same — Imposing additional burdens 239 Same — Exclusive privileges 240 Franchise contracts authorized by state 241 Reservation of right to alter, amend or repeal franchise contracts. . 242 Contracts of contractors for public work 243 Same — Rights vested in the contractor 244 Same subject — Illustrative cases 245 Interest on special tax bills as part of obligation 246 When new remedy controls 247 When old law to be followed 248 3. ORDINANCES INTERFERING WITH OB ATTEJIPTINQ TO REGT'LATE INTER- STATE OR FOREIGN COMJIERCE. Ordinances cannot interfere with or regulate interstate or foreign commerce 249 Meaning of term "commerce" 250 No analogy between the power of taxation and the regulation of commerce 251 License tax on those engaged in exporting and importing 252 License tax for privilege of selling goods, etc 253 Same — Discrimination is not the test 254 Same — Where goods sold are in the state 255 Same — Same — Peddlers 256 Personal contracts — Occupation tax 257 License tax on brokers, agents, etc., engaged in interstate commerce 258 Discriminating license tax void 259 License tax under police power 260 2. xviu CONTENTS BY SECTIONS. SECTION Same — Telephone and telegraph poles in streets 261 Taxation of property employed in interstate or foreign commerce. . 262 License tax on foreign corporations 263 Cannot regulate or tax operations or objects of interstate or foreign commerce 264 Same — Property in transit 265 License for privilege of navigation 266 License and taxation of ferries, etc 267 Wharfage charges 268 Wharfage distinguished from tonnage 269 Local police regulations 270 Same — Scope of police power 271 Same^ — Quarantine laws 272 Same subject 273 Harbor or local police regulations 274 CHAPTER IX. OP CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY OP ORDINANCES, AND HERE- IN PROCEDURE TO TEST AND RULES OF CONSTRUCTION. Courts may determine validity of ordinances 275 Method of consideration of validity 276 How the exercise of the police power may be questioned 277 Estoppel 278 Collateral attack denied 279 Enumeration of proceedings in which validity may be questioned. . 280 Who may question validity 281 Citizens and tax payers may question validity of ordinances 282 Same — When court will not interfere at instance of tax payer or citizen 283 Same — Mandamus 284 Injunction to restrain enforcement 285 Injunction to prevent violation of ordinances 286 Certiorari 287 Quo warranto 288 Rules of construction 289 Same subject 290 Title in construction 291 Contemporaneous construction 292 Construction of penal ordinances 293 Construction of words and terms 294 Construction where ordinance void in part 295 Construction of ordinance — Illustrative cases 296 Same subject 297 Same — Who liable — Landlord and tenant 298 CONTENTS BY SECTIONS. xix CHAPTER X. OF ACTIONS TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 1. The Court and its jurisdic- 5. The evidence for the cor- tion. poration. 2. The acftion— ^Its form, nature „ .^^ „ , . ^., ^. 6. Defenses, and institution. 3. The statement, complaint or 7. The judgment, record and information. execution. 4. The trial — Summary or jury 8. Review. — Proceedings. 1. THE COURT AND ITS JURISDICTION. SECTION Establishment and continuance of local courts 299 Jurisdiction of local courts 300 Territorial limlLs of jurisdiction 301 Who authorized to act as judges, jurors and witnesses 302 2. THE ACTION ITS FORJt, NATTRB AND INSTITUTION. How ordinances enforced — Form of action 303 How far the proceedings are criminal or quasi criminal 304 Institution of proceedings — Notice — Appearance 305 Arrest without warrant 306 Sufficiency of summons or warrant 307 Bail bond 308 Name in which action should be brought \ 309 3. THE STATEMENT, COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION. Formar parts of complaint or information 310 Allegation of notice of ordinance unnecessary — Jurisdiction 311 Averment of power to pass ordinance 312 Requisites of statement, complaint or information — Substance 313 Form of complaint — Verification — Conclusion 314 Pleading ordinance violated — Judicial notice 315 Same — Reference to ordinance violated required 316 Negativing exceptions 317 Several offenses- — Joinder 318 Same — ^ Joint liability 319 Statement or information for penalty for second offense 320 Sufficiency of complaint or statement — Illustrative cases 321 Sufficiency of report of police 322 Amendment of statement or information 323 How defective statement or information cured 324 4. THE TRIAL — SUMMARY OR ,TURY PROCEEDINGS. Arraignment and plea 325 Mode of conducting trial — Civil or criminal 326 XX CONTENTS BY SECTIONS. SECTION Pleading the defense 327 Summary trial — Origin 328 Summary jurisdiction of municipal offenses — Enumeration 329 Constitutional right of trial hy jury does not apply to municipal offenses 330 When jury trial allowed 331 Same — Crimes — Criminal prosecution 332 Same — Crime, misdemeanor and municipal offense distinguished. . . 333 Same — Misdemeanor 334 Jury trial on appeal 335 Application for jury — Conditions — Waiver 336 Method of Conducting jury trial 337 Technical rules of procedure disregarded — Practice 338 Costs 339 5. THE EVIDENCE FOR THE CORPORATION. Proof of ordinance 340 Proof of offense 341 Same — Illustrative cases 342 Proving the intent 343 Liability of participants, keepers, subordinates, servants, etc 344 Liability of principal for acts of employes, servants, etc 346 Burden of proof — Negative averment 346 Variance 347 6. DEFENSES, Defenses enumerated 348 Corporate existence cannot be questioned as a defense 349 No defense because prosecution under validated ordinance 350 Former acquittal or punishment 351 Estoppel as a defense 352 When defendant estopped from pleading unreasonableness of ordinance 353 Defensesr— Miscellaneous 354 Defenses — Illustrative cases 355 7. THE JI'DGltEXT, RECORD AND EXECI'TION. The verdict 356 The judgment 357 Record of conviction ■ 358 Execution 359 8. REVIEW. Right of review 3g0 Review by appeal .- 381 Same — Time and Method of Taking 362 Same — Trial de novo on appeal 303 Review by certiorari 3g4 Record on certiorari 355 CONTENTS BY SECTIONS. xxi SECTION Same — Writ of error 366 Habeas corpus 3G7 Injunction 368 Prohibition 369 Sufficiency of record for review 370 CHAPTER XL OF PLEADING ORDINANCES IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS. Pleading ordinances when cause of action is founded thereon 371 Same — Illustrative cases 372 Judicial notice of ordinances ■ 373 Pleading substance of ordinance 374 Pleading ordinance by title and date of passage 375 Pleading negligence in violation of ordinances 376 Same — Proof of acceptance of ordinance by defendant 377 Same — Relating to public safety 378 Same — Relating to operation of railroad trains and street cars 379 Same — Relating to the removal of snow and ice 380 Pleading in action on special tax bill for improvements 381 CHAPTER XII. OF EVIDENCE OF ORDINANCES. Proof of authority to enact 382 Proof of existence of ordinance when required 383 Burden of proof 384 Judicial notice — Appeal from municipal courts 385 Proof of formal steps in enactment when required 386 Proof of record of ordinance 387 Proof of publication of ordinance when required 388 How proof of publication made 389 How ordinances proved 390 Same — Ordinances published by authority 391 SameT— When original record required -. 392 Same— Proof by copy 393 Same — SuflSciency of authentication 394 Same — Proof in actions for penalty 395 Admissibility of parol testimony to prove 396 Proof of violation of ordinances as evidence of negligence 397 Proof of violation by plaintiff in actions for civil liability 398 xxu CONTENTS BY SECTIONS. CHAPTER XIII. OF ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION AND LICENSE TAX. SECTIOX General nature of taxes 399 Taxation limited to municipal or corporate purposes 400 Power to levy taxes 401 Method of levying taxes 402 Municipal power to license and regulate trades, occupations, etc. . . 403 Mode of delegation — How power construed 404 Same — Enumeration followed by general words 405 Power "to regulate" as power to license 406 Power "to regulate" as power to prohibit 407 Distinction between license to regulate and tax to raise revenue. . . 408 License taxes distinguished from general taxes 409 License tax as a contract 410 License for municipal purpose 411 Power to license non-residents 412 License tax to be levied by ordinance 413 Delegation of power to license forbidden 414 Same — Consent of property owners 415 Same — Permit to parade streets 416 License fee or tax must be uniform — Discrimination forbidden. . . . 417 Reasonableness of amount of license 418 Application for license — granting 419 Revocation of license or permit 420 Method of enforcement of payment of license 421 License on dogs 422 License on lawyers 423 Vehicle license — Double taxation 424 License on saloons and liquor selling 425 Same subject — Conditions 426 License on street railways and cars 427 License on miscellaneous trades, occupations, avocations, etc 428 CHAPTER XIV. OP ORDINANCES RELATING TO MUNICIPAL POLICE POWERS AND HEREIN NUISANCES, PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY AND CONVENIENCE. 1. General nature, scope and 4. Offenses against public exercise of police power. morals and decency. 2. Health and sanitary regu- 5. Markets — Weights and lations — Nuisances. measures. 3. Public safety — Streets — 6. Miscellaneous regulations. Buildings. 1. GESERAL NATURE, SCOPE A^'D EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. General nature and scope of the police power 429 Same — Basis of police power 430 CONTENTS BY SECTIONS. xxiii SECTION Same — Extends to destruction of property 431 Limitations of the police power 432 Exercise of the police power by municipal corporations 433 Same — Power under general welfare clause 434 Exercise of police power within and without corporate limits 435 Municipal liability for failure to enact and enforce police regu- lations 436 Same subject — Exception — Nuisances 437 General requisites of valid police regulations 438 2. HEALTH AND SANITAKY REGULATIONS — NUISANCES. Health and sanitary regulations — Power to make and enforce 439 What constitutes a nuisance? 440 Municipal power to declare and define nuisances 441 Same — Illustrative cases 442 Same — Doubt as to nuisance 443 Power to abate nuisances 444 Contagious diseases, etc — Quarantine 445 Burial of the dead — Cemeteries 446 Nuisances arising from trades, manufactures, etc 447 Slaughtering of animals — Slaughter houses 44S Dairies and cow stables 449 Livery stables 450 Hogs and hog pens 451 Dead animals, garbage, offal, etc 452 House dirt, rubbish, privy vaults, etc 453 Drains, sewers, ponds, stagnant water, pollution of water supply, etc 454 Wells 455 Emission of dense smoke as a public nuisance 456 Regulating sale of cigarettes 457 3. PUBLIC SAFETY — STKEETS — BUILDINGS. Regulating use of streets, etc., and keeping same free from ob- struction 458 Obstructions in public streets and highways as nuisances 459 Power to remove obstructions and nuisances exists 460 Awnings, signs, etc 461 Regulation of lamp posts, poles, electric wires, underground con- duits, gas pipes, etc 462 Bill boards and structures for advertising 463 Riding and driving on streets 464 Regulation of bicycles and velocipedes 465 Regulating street parades 466 Distribution of handbills, circulars, advertising matter, etc 467 Animals at large — Regulating driving of, through streets 468 Regulating dogs 469 Fire limits — Wooden buildings 470 Same — Building regulations — Permits 471 xxiv CONTENTS BY SECTIONS. SECTION Gunpowder and explosives — Blasting 472 Power to regulate operation of locomotives, trains and cars in streets 473 Same — Enumeration of regulations 474 4. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS AND DECENCY. Lewd conduct — Bawdy houses — Prostitution, etc 475 Gambling, gaming houses, lotteries, bowling alleys, billiard halls, etc 476 Regulating sale of intoxicating liquor 477 Public drunkenness 478 Observance of the Sabbath 479 Regulating hours of business 480 5. MARKETS — WEIGHTS AND MEASURES. Markets — Establishment and regulation 481 Confining sales and purchases to public markets — Forbidding pri- vate markets 482 Regulation of hucksters, hawkers, etc 483 Milk inspection and adulteration 484 Weights and measures ' 485 6. MISCELLANEOrS REGULATIONS. Offenses affecting the public order and peace 486 Same — Disturbing the peace -. 487 Same — Carrying concealed weapons 488 Cruelty to animals 489 Vagrancy 490 Regulations of various occupations 491 Pawnbrokers 492 Regulation of private property — Trespassing 493 Regulation of tenement houses, etc 494 Limiting day's work — Eight-hour laws 495 Miscellaneous 496 CHAPTER XV. OF MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF OFFENSES AGAINST STATE. State laws and municipal ordinances distinguished 497 Municipal and state offenses 498 Source of municipal power to legislate on offenses against the state 499 The same act may be made an offense against the state and the muuicipal corporation 500 Same — California — Connecticut 501 Same — Georgia ; . 502 Same — Illinois ^ 503 Same — Kentucky 504 Same — Missouri 505 Same — North Carolina 506 CONTENTS BY SECTIONS. xxv SECTION Same — Rhode Island — Indiana 507 Same — 1 exas 508 Offenses that may be made both state and municipal, enumerated . . 509 Can there be two punishments? 510 CHAPTER XVl. OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. Nature and purposes of public improvements 511 Municipal power to make public improvements 512 Public improvements outside of corporate limits 513 Nature of power — Where vested — State control 514 Same subject 515 Only officers duly authorized can provide for improvements 516 Same — Delegation of power forbidden 517 Improvement by property owners 518 Discretion of municipal authorities as to improvements 519 Boulevards 520 Improvements interfering with franchise rights 521 Special assessments or taxation for local improvements 522 Uniformity and equality of special assessments 523 Purposes of special assessments 524 Preliminary proceedings 525 Petition or consent of property owners aJEfected 526 Opening and establishment of streets 527 Establishment of street grade 528 Recommendation of ordinance by board 529 Water and gas pipes in advance of improvement 530 Estimate of cost of improvement 531 Submission to, and approval of, electors 532 Preliminary resolution or ordinance 533 Declaration of necessity of improvement 534 Providing for improvement-ordinance, resolution or order 535 Sufficiency of order for improvement 536 Ordinance for each distinct improvement 537 Procedure in passage of ordinance 538 Recital of authority to pass 539 Description of the improvement 540 Sufficiency of description in street Improvement ordinances 541 Sufficiency of description in sewer construction ordinances 542 Same — joint district sewer 543 Specification of material 544 Description by reference 545 Matters of detail need not be specified in the improvement ordi- nance 546 Ordinance must provide method of payment 547 Sufficiency of ordinance relating to payment in installments 548 Sufficiency respecting basis of apportionment of tax 549 XXVI CONTENTS BY SECTIONS. SECTION Improvement ordinance must be reasonable 550 Certainty — validity 551 Agreements of citizens and property owners 552 Ordinances restricting competition — union labor 553 Ordinances authorizing patented and monopolized articles 554 Ordinances providing for maintenance of street for a term of years 555 Validating void improvement ordinances ■ ■ 556 Same — Curative power of the legislature 557 Construction of improvement ordinances 558 Parol evidence of terms used in improvement ordinances 559 CHAPTER XVII. OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. Highway defined 560 Street defined 561 Sidewalk defined 562 Alley defined 563 Distinction between rural and urban ways — uses of streets 584 "Franchise" as applied to grants and privileges of municipal cor- porations 565 Same subject — franchise defined 566 Same subject 567 Legislative control of highways and streets 568 Municipal control of streets 569 Street railroad tracks, gas and water pipes, poles and wires as nuisances 570 Use of street must be public 571 Same — right of abutters 572 Ordinance necessary to grant right to use streets 573 All mandatory requirements imposed by law must be duly observed 574 The grantee — existence of corporation 575 Conditions imposed on grantee 576 Paving, repairing, etc., of streets by railway companies 577 Exclusive privileges and monopolies 578 Acceptance of franchise ordinance 579 Right to occupy streets, etc., as contract 580 Change in location of water mains — injunction to prevent 581 Police regulations — grade crossings 582 Power to regulate rates or charges 583 Same — under general power — estoppel 584 Reasonableness of water rates 585 Regulating price of gas and light 586 Regulating street car fares 587 Reasonableness of street car fares 588 Discrimination in street car rates forbidden 589 Place of sale of street car tickets — transfers 590 Duration of privileges or franchises to use streets, etc 591 Forfeiture of franchise 592 TABLE OF CASES. (The referencts are to pages.) Aaron v. Broiles (64 Tex. 316), 675, 694. Abbeville v. Leopard (61 S. C. 99), 487, 771. Abbott V. Omaha Smelting etc. Co. (4 Neb. 416), 879. Abel V. Pembroke (61 N. H. 357), 114. Abendroth v. Greenwicli (29 Conn. 356), 74. Abram, ex parte (34 Tex. Cr. Rep. 10), 759. Achley's Case (4 Abb. Pr. 35), 9 158, 241. Ada Jones, In re (90 Mo. App. 318), 482, 530. Adams v. Albany (29 Ga. 56), 24, 672, 784. Adams v. Brenan (177 111. 194), 302, 432, 862. Adams, In re (165 Mass. 497), 805. Adams v. Lindell (72 Mo. 198), 824, 851. Adams v. Memphis & L. R. Ry. Co. (2 Coldw. 645), 96. Adams v. Pratt (109 Mass. 59), 209.' Adam v. Rome (59 Ga. 765), 96. Adams v. Saratoga R. R. (11 Barb. 414), 883. Adams v. Shelbyville (154 Ind. 467), 821. Adams v. Somerville (39 Tenn. 363), 621. Adams County v. Quinf-y (130 111. 566), 213, 215, 843. 818, 851. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio (166 U. S. 185), 408. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio (165 U. S. 194), 408. Adams Exp. Co. v. Owensboro (85 Cal. 265), 655. Aderhold v. Annlston (99 Ala. 521), 568. Adkins v. Richmond (98 Va. 91). _ 400. Adley v. Reeves (2 M. & S. 60), 272. Administrator of Chambers v. Ohio Life Ins, Co. (1 Disney 327), 61. Aetna Fire Ins. Co. v. Reading (119 Pa. St. 417), 660. Agnew v. Brail (124 111. 312), 76, 102, 112. Agua Pura Co. v. Las Vegas (N. Mex. 1900, 60 Pac. Rep. 208), 905. Ah Lung, In re (45 Fed. Rep. 684), 683. Ah Kow V. Nunan (5 Sawyer 552), 353, 361, 363, 447. Ah Troy, In re (45 Fed. Rep. 795), 450. Ah You, In re (88 Cal. 99), 24, 69, 283, 285, 341, 755, 784, 788. Alberger v. Baltimore (64 Md. 1), 859. Albers v. Merchants' Exchange of St. Louis (138 Mo. 140), 474. Albert v. Bleecker Street Ry Co. (2 Daly 389), 604. Albertson v. Wallace (81 N. C. 479). 403. Albia v. O'Harra (64 Iowa 297), 247, 624, 802. Albright v. Fisher (164 Mo. 56), 160, 261. Albrittin v. Huntsville (60 Ala. 486), 582. Alcorn v. C. & A. Ry. Co. (108 Mo. 81), 743. Alderman v. People (4 Mich. 414), 524. Aldrich v. Howard (7 R. I. 199), 57. Alexander v. Bennett (60 N. Y. 204), 464. Alexander v. Big Rapids (70 Mich. 224), 335. Alexander v. Greenville (54 Miss. 659), 487. 553, 735. XX vu XXV 111 TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Alexander v. O'Donnell (12 Kan. ' 608), 25. Alexander v. State (86 Ga. 246), 656. Alexander v. Tolletson Club (110 111. 65), 90. Alexandria v. Bethlehem (29 N. J. L. 375), 480, 481. Alexandria v. Mandeville (2 Cranch. C. C. 224), 840. Alexandria Canal Co. v. Swann (5 How. 83), 113. Alger V. Lowell (3 Allen 402), 713. Alford V. Dallas (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, 35 S. W. Rep. 816), 827, 841. Alma V. Guaranty Savings Bank (19 U. S. App. 622), 4, 6, 12. Almy V. California (24 How. 169), 411. Allegheny's Appeal (Pa. 1887, 11 Atl. Rep. 658), 884. Allegheny City v. Millville etc. Street Ry. Co. (159 Pa. St. 411), 897. Allegheny v. Ohio & P. Ry. Co. (26 Pa. St. 355), 96. Allegheny v. Zimmerman (95 Pa. St. 287), 716, 717. Allen V. Boston (159 Mass. 324), 714. Allen V. Cerro Gordo County (34 Iowa 54), 113. Allen V. Clausen (114 Wis. 244), 429. Allen V. Davenport (107 Iowa 90), 239, 245, 246, 251, 326, 338, 592, 822, 833, 866. Allen V. Drew (44 Vt. 174), 819, 858. Allen V. Duluth Gas & W. Co. (46 Minn. 290), 907. Allen V. Gray (11 Conn. 95), 492. Allen V. Jersey City (53 N. J. L. 522), 882. Allen V. Rogers (20 Mo. App. 290), 177. Allen V. Salem (10 Ind. App. 650), 831. Allen V. Somers (68 Me. 247), 468, 469. Allen V. State (51 Ga. 264), 524. Allen V. Taunton (19 Pick. 485), 98, 99. Allen County Comrs. v. Simons (Ind., 13 L. R. A. 512), 3. AUentown v. Grim (109 Pa. St. 113), 241, 243. AUentown v. Gross (132 Pa. St. 319), 633. AUentown v. Western Union Tel. Co. (148 Pa. St. 117), 300, 406, 407, 722. Alley V. Edgecomb (53 Me. 44B), 75. Allison V. Richmond (51 Mo. App. 133), 688, 693, 738. Allerton v. Chicago (6 Fed. Rep. 555), 652. Alpers V. Brown (60 Cal. 447), 705. Alpers V. San Francisco (32 Fed. Rep. 503), 260, 261, 706. Altamont v. B. & 0. S. W. R. R. (184 111. 47), 5. Alter v. Dodge (140 Mass. 594), 638. Altgeld V. San Antonio (81 Tex. 436), 440. Altman v. Dubuque (111 Iowa 105), 237, 239, 240. Alton V. Foster (74 111. App. 511), 449, 866. Alton V. Hartford Ins. Co. (72 111. 328), 589. Alton V. Kirsch (68 111. 261)' 492, 566, 567, 568. Alton V. Middleton's Heirs (158 111. 442), 853, 855. Alton V. Mulledy (21 111. 76), 12, 136, 195. Altoona v. Bowman (171 Pa. St. 307), 186, 234,-589, 591. Alves Executors v. Henderson (16 B. Mon. 131), 92. Amboy v. Sleeper (31 111. 499), 285. 771. Ambrose v. State (6 Ind. 351), 794. American Furniture Co. v. Bates- ville (139 Ind. 77), 124, 311, 686. American Harrow Co. v. Shaffer (68 Fed. Rep. 750), 397. American Live Stock Com. Co. v. Chicago Live Stock Exchange (143 111. 210), 304. American Print Works v. Law- ence (23 N. J. L. 9), 668. TABLE OF CASES. XXIX (The references are to pages.) American Refrigerator Transit Co. V. Hall (174 U. S. 70), 409. American Waterworks Co. v. State (46 Neb. 194), 905. American Union Express Co. v. St. Joseph (66 Mo. 675),408, 630, 655. Americus v. Mitchell (79 Ga. 807), 686, 707. Amesbury v. Bowditch M. F. Ins. Co. (6 Gray 596), 452. Amey v. Allegheny City (24 How. 364), 245, 592. Ampt V. Cincinnati (17 Ohio Cit. Ct. 516), 128. Amyx V. Taber (23 Cal. 370), 731. Amite City v. Holly (50 La. Ann. 627), 513, 520, 791. Andrews v. Boylston (110 Mass. 214), 209. Andrews v. Chicago (57 111. 239), 848. Andrews v. Insurance Co. (37 Me. 256), 2L Andrews v. National Foundry & Pipe Works (61 Fed. Rep. 782), 798. Andrews v. People (158 111. 477), 849. Andrews v. People ex rel (164 111. 581), 857. Andrew Co. ex rel v. Schell (135 Mo. 31), 444. Anderson, Matter of (60 N. Y. 457), 249. Anderson v. Byrnes (122 Cal. 272), 334. Anderson v. Camden (58 N. J. L. 515), 7, 49, 189. Anderson v. Com. (13 Bush. 485), 648. Anderson v. De Urioste (96 Cal. 404), 829. Anderson v. East (117 Ind. 126), 680. Anderson v. Endicutt (101 Ind. 539), 803. Anderson v. Equitable Gas Light Co. (12 Dailey 462), 196. Anderson v. Hamilton County Comrs. (12 Ohio St. 635), 830. Anderson, In re (60 N. Y. 457), 252, 829. Anderson v. O'Connor (98 Ind. 168), 4, 112, 694. Anderson v. O'Donnell (29 S. C. 355), 513, 566, 583. Anderson v. Santa Anna (116 U. S. 356), 266. Anderson v. Schubert (158 111. 75), 532. Anderson v. State (22 Ohio 305), 541. Anderson v. Wellington (40 Kan. 173), 294, 628, 728. Angel V. Spring City (Tenn. 1899, 53 S. W. Rep. 191), 547. Angle V. C. St. P. M. & C. R. Co. (151 U. S. 3), 260. Angerhoffer v. State (15 Tex. Grim. App. 613), 26, 784. Antoni v. Greenhow (107 U. S. 769), 382. Anthony v. Adams (1 Mete. 284), 75. Anna v. Leird (36 111. App. 49), 529. Anne Arundel Co. Comrs. v. Duck- ett (20 Md. 468), 258. Anniston v. Davis (98 Ala. 629), 213. Apitz V. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (17 Mo. App. 419), 583, 584. Archie v. State (99 Ga. 23), 569. Argenti v. San Francisco (16 Cal. 255), 829. Argus Co. V. Albany (55 N. Y. 495), 188. Arkadelphia v. Clark (52 Ark. 23), 685, 698. Arkadelphia Lumber Co. v. Arka- delphia (56 Ark. 370), 12, 590, 597. 624. Arkansas v. McGinnis (37 Ark. 362), 402. Arkell and Town of St. James, Re (38 Up. Can. Rep. 594), 443. Arkenburgh v. Wood (23 Barb. 360), 94. Armatage v. Fisher (74 Hun. 167), 158, 171. 183. Armstrong v. Brown (106 Ky. 81), 732. Armstrong v. Brown (20 Ky. Law Rep. 1766). 276. Armstrong v. Building Inspectors (4 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 477), 736. Armstrong v. Brunswick (79 Mo. 319), 6,75, 677, 680. 683, 692. XXX TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Armstrong v. Ft. Edwards (84 Hun. 261), 9. Armstrong v. Ogden City (12 Utah 476), 830. Armstrong v. Ware (20 Pa. St. 519), 737. Arnaud v. Executor (3 La. 337), 381. Arnold v. Hawkins (95 Mo. 569), 430. Arnold v. Stanford (Ky. 1902, 69 S. W. Rep. 726), 676. Arnold v. Stanford (24 Ky. Law Rep. 626), 677. Arnold v. Weiker (55 Kan. 510), 428. Arnold v. Yanders (56 Ohio St. 417), 404, 405. Aron V. Wausau (98 Wis. 592), 676. Aronheimer v. Stokley (11 Phila. 283), 738. Asberry v. Roanoke (91 Va. 562), 822. Ash V. People (11 Mich. 347), 616, 629, 634, 656, 763. Ashbrook v. Com. (1 Bush. 139), 697. Ashbrook v. Dale (27 Mo. App. 649), 751, 752. Ashby V. Hall (119 U. S. 526), 883. Asher v. Hutchinson Water L. & P. Co. (Kan. 1903, 61 L. R. A. 52), 903. Asher v. Texas (128 U. S. 129), 395, 400. Ashland v. Wheeler (88 Wis. 607), 323. Ashland & C. St. R. Co. v. Falkner (106 Ky. 332), 892. Ashland Water Co. v. Ashland (87 Wis. 209), 327. Ashley v. Board (60 Fed. Rep. 55), 546. Ashley v. Newark (25 N. .J. L. 399), 239. Ashton V. Ellsworth (48 111. 299). 123, 284, 646. Ashton V. Rochester (60 Hun. 372), 193, 337. Ashton V. Rochester (133 N. Y. 187), 256. Aspen Water & L. Co. v. Aspen (5 Colo. App. 12), 896. Associates of Jersey Co. v. Jersey City (8 N. J. Eq. 715), 800. Astor, In re (50 N. Y. 363), 252. Astor V. New York (37 N. Y. Super. Ct. 539), 818, 821. Astor V. New York (62 N. Y. 567), 845. Astor V. New York (62 N. Y. 580), 869. Atchison v. King (9 Kan. 550), 593. Atchison Board of Education v. DeKay (148 U. S. 591), 6, 11. Atchison & Neb. Ry. Co. v. Ma- quilkin (12 Kan. 301), 268. Atchison St. Ry. Co. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (31 Kan. 661), 902. Atchison St. R. Co. v. Nave (38 Kan., 744), 913, 916. Athearn v. Independent District (33 Iowa 105), 145. Athearn v. Millersburg (33 Iowa 105), 213. Athens v. Georgia R. R. Co. (72 Ga. 800), 435, 454, 550, 668. Atkins V. Fraker (32 Wis. 510), 461, 463, 468, 469. Atkins V. Kinnan (20 Wend. 241), 828. Atkins V. Phillips (26 Fla. 281), 169, 172, 183, 189, 281, 461, 616. Atkinson v. Asheville Street Ry. 113 N. C, 581), 896. Atkinson v. Atlanta (81 Ga. 625), 680. Atkinson v. Goodrich Transp. Co. (60 Wis. 141), 297, 301, 740. Atkinson v. New Castle & G. Wa- terworks Co. (L. R. 6 Exch. 404), 56. Atkinson v. Newcastle Water- works Co. (L. R. 2 Exch. Div. 441), 57. Atkinson v. Wykoff (58 Mo. App. 86), 263, 883. Atlanta v. Stein (111 Ga. 789>, 302, 431, 862. Atlanta v. The Gate . City Gas Light Co. (71 Ga. 106), 436, 902. Atlanta v. White (33 Ga. 229), 761. Atlanta Ry. & Power Co. v. Atlan- ta Rapid Transit Co. (113 Ga. 481), 194. TABLE OF CASES. XXXI (The references Atlanta & W. P. R. R. v. Wyly (65 Ga. 120), 601. Atlantic City v. Goldstein (67 N. J. L. 517), 537, 653. Atlantic City v. Turner (67 N. J. L. 520), 538. Atlantic City Waterworks Co. v. Atlantic City (39 N. J. Bq. 367), 902. Atl. & Pac. R. R. Co. v. St. Louis (66 Mo. 228), 90, 882, 886, 915. A. & P. R. R. Co. V. St. Louis (3 Mo. App. 315), 884. Atlantic & Pacific Tel. Co. v. Phil- adelphia (23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 817), 406. Atlantic, S. R. & G. Ry. Co. v. State (Fla. 1900, 29 So. Rep. 319), 750. Atty Gen. v. Board (64 Mich. 607), 119. Atty Gen. v. Boston (142 Mass. 200), 808. Atty. General v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (35 Wis. 425), 67. Attorney General v. Crocker (138 Mass. 214), 199. Atty. Genl. v. Detroit (71 Mich. 92), 762. Atty. General v. Eau Claire (37 Wis. 400), 798. Atty. Gen. v. Foster (10 Ves. 335), 108. Atty. Gen. v. Heldorn (74 Mo. 410), 245, 336. Atty. Gen. v. Jochim (99 Mich. 358), 366, 367. Atty. Gen. v. Leicester (9 Beav. 546), 348. Atty. General v. Norwich (2 Mylne & Cr. 406), 115. Atty. Gen. v. Oakland Bank (Walker Ch. 90), 498. Atty. Gen. v. Salem (103 Mass. 138), 441. Atty. Gen. v. Shepard (62 N. H. 383), 166, 167, 169. Atty. Genl. v. Steward (20 N. J. Eq. 415), 704. Atty. Gen. v. Simonds (111 Mass. 256), 178. are to pages.) Atty. General v. Utica Ins. Co. (2 Johns Ch. 371), 154. Auburn Comrs. of Excise v. Burtis (103 N. Y. 136), 488. Auburn Comrs. of Excise v. Mer- chant (103 N. Y. 143), 488. Auditor General v. Chase (Mich. 1903, 94 N. W. Rep. i78), 831. Augusta V. Burum (93 Ga. 68), 722. Augusta V. Leadbetter (16 Me. 45), 75, 112. Augusta V. McKibben (22 Ky. Law Rep. 1224), 821. Augusta V. Perkins (3 B. Mon. 437), 92, 93. Augusta V. Sweeney, (44 Ga. 463), 365, 367. Aull V. Lexington (18 Mo. 401), 694. Aurora v. Fox (78 Ind. 1), 208. Aurora v. Lamar (59 Ind. 400), 610. Aurora v. McGannon (138 Mo. 38), 632, 651, C57. Aurora Water Co v. Aurora (129 Mo. 540), 84, 87, 112, 122, 157, 172, 175, 176, 190, 197, 201, 244, 845. Austin V. Allen (6 Wis. 134), 212. Austin V. Austin City Cemetery Assn. (87 Tex. 330). 296, 297, 435, 442, 544, C90. Austin V. Coggeshall (12 R. I. 329), 103. Austin V. McCall (95 Tex. 565), 431. Austin V. Murray (16 Pick. 121), 27, 283, 296, 299, 667, 697. Austin V. Nalle (85 Tex. 520), 798. Austin V. Seattle (2 Wash. St. 667), 824. Austin V. State (10 Mo. 591), 646. Austin V. State (101 Tenn. 563), 397, 712. Austin V. Walton (68 Tex. 507). 328, 583, 584. AverlU v. Perrott (74 Mich. 296), 468. Avery v. Stewart (1 Gush. 496), 151. Avoca V. Pittston, J. & A. R. Co. (7 Kulp. 470), 198. Aycock V. Martin (37 Ga. 124), 381, 383. xxxu TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Ayer v. Norwich (39 Conn. 376), Bailey v. Philadelphia (184 Pa. St. 717. 594), 298. Ayeridge v. Com'rs (60 Ga. 404), Bailey v. State (30 Neb. 855), 247, •225. 450. Ayers v. Schmohl (86 Mo. App. Bailey v. Trumbull (31 Conn. 581), 349), 809. 472. Baileyville v. Lowell (20 Me. 178), B. 112. Bain V. Mitchell (82 Ala. 304), 469, Baader v. Cullman (115 Ala. 539), 560. 337. Bainbridge v. Reynolds (111 Ga. Baar v. Kirby (118 Mich. 392), 237, 758), 577. 243. Baisch v. Grand Kapids (84 Mich. Bab V. Clerk (Moore 411), 277. 666), 837. Babbage v. Powers (130 N. Y. 281), Baker v. Bohannan (69 Iowa 60), 716. 688. Babbidge v. Astoria (25 Or. 417), Baker v. Boston (12 Pick. 184), 237, 240, 242. 356, 667, 682, 707. Babbitt V. Savoy (3 Cush. 530), 114. Baker v. Lexington (21 Ky. Law Babcock v. Buffalo (56 N. Y. 268), Rep. 809), 136, 283, 284, 334, 449, 121. 641. Babcock v. Helena (34 Ark. 499), Baker v. NefE (73 Ind. 68), 90. 328. Baker v. Normal (81 111. 108), 449. Babcock v. New Jersey Stock Baker v. Port Huron (62 Mich. Yards (20 N. J. Eq., 296), 704. 327),' 8. Bachelder V. Epping (28 N. H. 354), Baker v. Portland (58 Me. 199), 75, 107. 20. Backus V. Depot Co. (169 TJ. S. Baker v. St. Louis (7 Mo. App. 557), 882. 429), 890. Backus V. Detroit (49 Mich. 110), Baker v. Shephard (24 N. H. 208), 799. 152. Baokhaus v. People (87 111. App. Baker v. State (27 Ind. 485), 258. 173), 337. Baker v. Washington (7 D. C. 134), Bacon v. Nanny (55 Hun. 606), 831. 114. Bacon v. Savannah (105 Ga. 62), Baldwin v. Chicago (68 111. 418), 812. 479, 535, 564. Bacon v. Savannah (86 Ga. 301), Baldwin v. Green (10 Mo. 410), 25, 854. 344, 346. Badgley v. St. Louis (149 Mo. 122), Baldwin v. Ensign (49 Conn 113) 85. 602. Badkins v. Robinson (53 Ga. 613), Baldwin v. Murphy (82 111. 485), 765. 285, 343, 481, 786. Bagley v. People (43 Mich. 355), Baldwin v. North Branford (32 718, 875. Conn. 47), 151. Bagwell V. Lawrenceville (94 Ga. Ball v. Fagg (67 Mo. 481) 46 127 654), 754. 209, 600. Bailey v. Com. (23 Ky. Law Rep. Ball v. Tolman (135 Cal. 375), 334. 1223), 443. Ball v. Woodbine (61 Iowa 83)', 676 Bailey v. Com. (22 Ky. Law Rep. Ballard v. McCartv (11 111 501) 512), 465. 482. Bailey v. Culver (84 Mo. 531), 64. Ballentine v. Pulaski (83 Tenn. Bailey v. Culver (12 Mo. App. 175), 633), 608. 875, 887. Baltimore v. Clunet (23 Md. 499), Bailey v. Joy (132 Mass. 356), 528. 49, 443. TABLE OP CASES. xxxui (The references are to pages.) Baltimore v. Eschbaek (18 Md. 276), 831. Baltimore v. Gorter (93 Md. 1), 243. Baltimore v. Horn (26 Md. 194), 192, 869. Baltimore v. Hughes (1 Gill & J. 480), 442. Baltimore v. Porter (18 Md. 284), 83, 115, 192, 801, 841, 869. Baltimore v. Poultney (25 Md. 18), 145. Baltimore v. John Hopkins Hos- pital (56 Md. 224), 808. Baltimore v. John Hopkins Hos- pital (56 Md. 1), 839. Baltimore v. Johnson (62 Md. 225), 248. Baltimore v. Keyser (72 Md. 106), 861. Baltimore v. Little Sisters ol the Poor (56 Md. 400), 248. Baltimore v. Marriott (9 Md. 160), 676, 679, 682. Baltimore v. Radecke (49 Md. 217), 79, 295, 428, 435, 627, 654, 655, 681, 687, 740. Baltimore v. Reitz (50 Md. 574), 805. Baltimore v. Scharf (54 Md. 499), 133, 134, 435, 827, 900. Baltimore v. Stewart (92 Md. 535), 227. Baltimore v. Ulman (79 Md. 469), 222, 264, 353, 867. Baltimore City Pass Ry. v. Mc- Donnell (43 Md. 534), 603. Baltimore Gas Light Co. v. Colli- day (25 Md. 1), 897. Baltimore & O. S. W. Ry. Co. v. Altamont (84 111. App. 274), 5. B. & 0. R. R. Co. V. State (33 Md. 542), 604. Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. Reaney (42 Md. 117), 883. B. & 0. R. R. Co. V. State (36 Md. 366), 604. Baltimore Trust & Guarantee Co. V. Baltimore (64 Fed. 153), 316, 321, 913. Bambrick v. Campbell (37 Mo. App. 460), 836, 860, 861. Bamford v. Turnley (113 Bng. C. L. 66), 684. Bamberger v. Terry (103 U. S. 40), 527. Bambrick Construction Co. v. Geist (37 Mo. App. 3), 121, 509. Bancroft v. Cambridge (126 Mass. 438), 671, 708. Bancroft v. Lynnfield (18 Pick. 566). 114. Bangor v. Lansil (51 Me. 521), 810. Bangor v. Smith (83 Me. 422), 422. Bangs V. Snow (1 Mass. 181), 71. Bank of Augusta v. Earle (13 Pet. 519), 878. Bank of Commerce v. Granada (10 U. S. App. 692), 199. Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee (161 U. S. 134), 374. Bank of Michigan v. Nlles (1 Doug. 401), 76. Bank of II. S. v. Dandridge (12 Wheat. 64), 148, 211. Banta, In re (60 N. Y. 165), 830. Baptist Church v. Schenectady & T. Ry. Co. (5 Barb. 79), 696. Barbier v. Connolly (113 U. S. 27), 44, 312, 356, 361, 672, 773. Barbour v. Camden (51 Me. 608), 104. Barbour v. Ellsworth (67 Me. 294), 675. Barbery. Chicago (152 111. 37), 852. Barber, A. P., Co. v. Edgerton (125 Ind. 455), 829, 839, 841. Barber, A. P., Co. v. French (158 Mo. 534), 812, 821. Barber Asphalt P. Co. v. Gaar (24 Ky. Law Rep. 2227), 836, 854, 855, 866. Barber, A. P., Co. v. Gogreve (41 La. Ann. 251), 838, 864. Barber, A. P., Co. v. Hezel (76 Mo. App. 135), 813, 837, 862, 866. Barber, A. P., Co. v. Hezel (155 Mo. 391), 851. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Hunt (100 Mo. 22), 159, 190, 200, 242, 865. Barber, A. P., Co. v. New Orleans, etc.. R. R. Co. (49 La. Ann. 1608), 898. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Ull- man (137 Mo. 543), 326, 854, 855, 866. 3 XXXIV TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Barclay v. Com. (25 Pa. St. 503), 718. Barclay and Township of Darling- ton, In re (12 Up. Can. Q. B. 86), 28. Barhite v. Home Tel. Co. (50 N. Y. App. Div. 25), 258, 722, 885. Barker v. Bates (13 Pick. 255), 4. Barker v. Dixmont (53 Me. 575), 75. Barker v. Fogg (34 Me. 392), 207. Barker v. Hartman Steel Co. (129 Pa. St. 551), 890. Barker v. Smith (10 S. C. 226), 330. Barling v. West (29 Wis. 307), 27, 83, 302, 718. Barnert v. Paterson (48 N. J. L. 395), 114, 165, 166. Barnes v. Ackroyd (26 L. T. (N. S.) 692), 710. Barnes v. Chapin (4 Allen 444), 602. Barnes v. Dist. of Columbia (91 U. S. 540), 800. Barnes v. Gottschalk (3 Mo. App. 222), 578. Barnes v. Hawthorn (54 Me. 124), 696, 697. Barnes v. Mobile (19 Ala. 707), 446. Barnes v. State (19 Conn. 398), 541. Barnes v. Suddard (117 111. 237), 90. Barnett v. Newark (28 111. 62), 248. Barney v. Keokuk (94 U. S. 324), 881. Barney v. Washington (1 Cranch. C. C. 248), 48, 485. Barnitz v. Beverly (163 U. S. 118), 382. Barr v. Auburn (89 111. 361), 168, 187, 205, 206, 590. Barr v. New Brunswick (58 N. J. L. 255), 200, 249, 895. Barrett v. New Orleans (32 La. Ann. 101), 365. Barron v. Baltimore (7 Pet. 243), 365. Barron v. Krebs (41 Kan. 338), 841. Barrow v. Nashville & C. T. Co. (9 Hump. 304), 90. Bartemeyer v. Rohlfs (71 Iowa 582), 610. Barter v. Com. (3 Pa. 253), 231, 273, 278, 475, 476. Barter v. Com. (3 Pen. & W. 253), 875. Barthet v. New Orleans (24 Fed. Rep. 563), 295, 435, 626, 681. Bartlett v. Bangor (67 Me. 460), 873. Bartlett v. Clarksburg (45 W. Va. 393), 676. Bartlett v. Kinsley (15 Conn. 327). 200. Bartlett v. Kurg (12 Mass. 545). 339. Barto v. Himrod (8 N. Y. 483), 50.. Barto V. San Francisco (135 Cal. 494), 438. Barton v. Gadsen (79 Ala. 495) 327, 334. Barton v. La Grande (17 Oreg. 577) 501, 574. Barton v. Pittsburg (4 Brewst 373), 172, 190, 198, 212, 226, 245 438. Bass V. State (34 La. Ann. 494) 665. Bassett v. El Paso (88 Tex. ICS) 371. Bassett v. El. Paso (Tex. Civ. App 1894; 28 S. W. Rep. 554), 450. Batchelor v. U. S. (156 U. S. 426). 491. BateT. Sheets (64 Ind. 209), 390. Bates V. District of Columbia (1 MacArthur 433), 687, 688. Bates V. Bassett (60 Vt. 530), 75, 608, 609, 797. Bates v. Mobile (46 Ala. 158), 623. Bathurst v. Course (3 La. Ann. 260), 245. Baton Rouge v. Cremonine (36 La. Ann. 247), 313. Baton Rouge v. Cremonini (35 La. Ann. 366), 566, 578. Baton Rouge v. Dearing (15 La. Ann. 208), 465. Batsel V. Blaine (4 Tex. App. 195), 244. Batsel V. Blaine (Tex. 1901, 15 S. W. Rep. 283), 681. Batters v. Dunning (49 Conn. 479), 722. Baugh V. Sheriff (7 Phila. 82), 698. Baumgartner v. Hasty (100 Ind. 575), 84, 99, 140, 221, 224, 248, 671, 691, 734, 735, 738. Bautsch V. Galveston (27 Tex. App. 342), 487. TABLE OF CASES. XXXV (The references are to pages.) Bayard v. Baker (76 Iowa 220), 171, 187. 189, 204, 227, 251, 499, 593, 594, 598. Bayonne v. Herdt (40 N. J. L. 264), 280, 531. Baxter, Petitioner (12 R. 1. 13), 790. Baxter v. Seattle (3 Wash. St. 352), 735, 738. Baxter v. Thomas (4 Okla. 605). 402. Beach v. Haynes (12 Vt. 15), 91, 92. Beach V. People (157 111. 659), 844, 849. Bean v. Barton County Court (33 Mo. App. G35), 646. Bean v. Jay (23 Me. 117), 112, 113. Bearce v. Fassett (34 Me. 575), 8 Bearden v. Madison (73 Ga. 1S4), 4, 17, 270, 686. Beardstown v. Virginia (76 111. S4), 446. Beasley v. Beckley (28 W. Va. 81), 485, 570. Beatrice v. Edminson (117 Fed. Rep. 427), 223, 244. Beaver Creek v. Hastings (52 Mich. 528), 147, 176. Beaudrias v. Hogan (16 N. Y. App. Div, 38), 559. Beaudry v. Valdez (32 Cal. 269), 846. Beaufort v. Ohlandt (24 S. C. 158), 509, 518, 563. Beaumont v. Wllkes-Barre (142 Pa. St. 198), 247, 823, 832. Beck V. Carter (6 Hun. 604), 717. Beck V. Hanscom (29 N. H. 213), 175. Becker v. Henderson (100 Ky. 450), 214. Becker v. Schutte (85 Mo. App. 57), 61, 601, 732. Beclcer v. Washington (94 Mo. 375), 247, 581, 854, 855. Beckley v. Skroh (19 Mo. App. 75). 685. Beckham v. Nacke (56 Mo. 546), 539. Bedell, ex parte (20 Mo. App. 125), 239, 245, 250, 252, 283. Bedford v. Rice (58 N. H. 227), 510. Beecher v. Detroit (92 Mich. 268), 839. Beecher v. People (38 Mich. 289), 875. Beekmans' Case (11 Abb. Pr. 164), 180, 182, 235, 316. Beekman v. Third Ave. R. Co. (153 N. Y. 144), 881, 894. Beesman v. Peoria (16 111. 484), 468. Beeson v. Chicago (75 Fed. Rep. 880), 895. Begein v. Anderson (28 Ind. 79), 673, 695, 696. Behan v. New Orleans (34 La. Ann. 128), 24. Belling v. Evansville (144 Ind. 644), 289, 671, 701. Belatti v. Pierce (8 S. D. 456), 51S. Belcher v. Farrar (8 Allen 325). 697. Belcher Sugar Refining Co. v. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co. (101. Mo. 192)., 92, 93, 94, 130, 742, 889. Belcher Sugar Refining Co. v. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co. (82 Mo. 121), 94, 130, 709, 888. Belfast V. Morrill (65 Me. 580), 175. Belknap v. Louisville (93 Ky. 444), 802. Belknap v. Miller (52 111. App., 617), 168, 186, 187, 214. Belmar v. Barkalow (67 N. J. L. 504), 284, 353, 642. Bell V. Dole (11 John, 173), 545. Bell, ex parte (32 Tex. Cr. Rep. 308), 753. Bell V. Tp. Manvers (2 Up. Can. Com. PI. 507), -55. Bell V. McKinney (63 Miss. 187), 473. Bell V. Pike (53 N. H. 473), 206, 208. Bell V. Platteville (71 Wis. 139), 72. Bell V. Quinn (2 Sandf. 146), 19, 63. Bell V. .Rochester (58 Hun. 602), '707. Belleville v. Citizens' Horse Ry. (152 111. 171), 377, 450, 879. Bellevue v. Peacock (89 Ky. 495), 868. Bellinger v. Gray (51 N. Y. 610), 611. Bells' etc. Co. R. R. v. Pennsyl- vania (134, U. S. 232), 821. Xi'XVl TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Belton V. Baylor Female College (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, 33 S. W. Rep. 680), 707. Belton V. Central Hotel Co. (Tex. Civ. App., 1895), 33 S. W. Rep. 297), 707. Benjamin v. Met. St. Railroad Co. (133 Mo. 274), 64. Benjamin v. Webster (100 Ind. 15), 70, 132. Benjamin v. Wheeler (8 Gray 409), 118. Bennington v. Park (50 Vt. 178), 74. Bennington v. Smith (29 Vt. 254), 803. Bennett v. Birmingham (31 Pa. St. 15), 35, 294, 633. Bennett v. People (30 111. 389), 343, 794. Bennett v. New Bedford (110 Mass. 433), 170, 183, 189, 853. Bennett v. Pulaski (Tenn. 1899, 47 L. R. A. 278), 757, 758, 761. Bennett v. Seibert (10 Ind. App., 369), 827. Benoist v. St. Louis (19 Mo. 179), 610. Benoist v. St. Louis (15 Mo. 668), 608. Benoit v. Conway (10 Allen 528), 108. Benson v. Carrollton (96 Ga. 761), 567. Benson v. Waukesha (74 Wis. 31), 814. Benton Harbor v. St. Joseph, etc. St. Ry Co. (102 Mich. 386), 899. Benwood v. Wheeling Ry. Co. (W. Va. 1903, 44 S. E. Rep. 271), 894. Bequette v. Patterson (104 Cal. 282), 717. Bessonies v. Indianapolis (71 Ind. 189), 683, 798. Bethalto v. Conley (9 111. App. 339), 567. Bethune v. Hughes (28 Ga. 560), 765. Berg V. Grace (1 N. Y. St. Rep. 418), 814. Bergen v. Clarkson (1 Halst. 352), 177. Bergen v. Clarkson (6 N. J. L. 352), 273. Bergen v. State (32 N. J. L. 490), 866. Bergen v. Van Home (32 N. J. L. 490), 810. Bergin, in re (31 Wis. 383), 522. Bergman v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (88 Mo. 678), 748. Bergman v. St. Paul M. B. Asso- ciation (29 Minn. 275), 67. Bergman v. St. Louis, Iron Moun- tain & Southern R. R. Co. (88 Mo. 678), 225, 228, 601. Berka v. Woodward (125 Cal. 119), 172. Berry v. People (36 111. 423), 343, 344, 789, 794. Berry-Horn Coal Co. v. Scruggs- McClure Coal Co. (62 Mo. App., 93), 889. Bertholf V. O'Reilly (74 N. Y. 509), 351. Bickerstaff, in re (70 Cal. 35), 626, 638, 648. Bidleson v. Whytel (3 Burrow 1545), 388. Bigelow V. Hillman (37 Me. 52), 195. Bigelow V. Perth Amboy (25 N. J. L. 297), 11, 212. Bigelow V. West Wisconsin Rail- road Co. (27 Wis. 478), 442. Bills V. Belknap (36 Iowa 583), 687. Bills V. Goshen (117 Ind. 221), 3, 240, 248, 294, 625. Billings V. Dunnaway (54 Mo. App. 1), 546, 596. Biloxi V. Borries (78 Miss. 657), 636. Binghampton Bridge (3 Wall 51), 306, 378. Binghamton v. Binghamton & Port Dickinson Ry. Co. (61 Hun. 479), 901. Birdsall v. Clark (73 N. Y. 73), 134, 435, 808. Birdsall v. Phillips (17 Wend. 464), 570. Birge V. Gardiner (19 Conn. 507), 717. Birmingham v. Alabama G. S. R. Co. (98 Ala. 134), 449. Birmingham v. Rumsey & Co. (63 Ala. 352), 100. TABLE OF CASES. XXX vn (The references are to pages.) Birmingham v. Tayloe (105 Ala. 170), 596. Birmingham & P. M. St. Ry. Co. V. Birmingham St. Ry. Co. (79 Ala. 465), 913. Blshofl! V. State ex rel. Tampa Waterworks Co. (Fla. 1901, 30 So. Rep. 808), 544, 622. Bishop V. Banks (33 Conn. 118), 688. Bishop V. Cone (3 N.,H. 513), 214, 216. Bishop V. Tripp (15 R. I. 466), 823. Bitzer v. Dinwiddle (20 Ky. Law Rep. 298), 450. Bizzle, ex parte (112 Ala. 210), 449. Blanchard v. Bissell (11 Ohio St. 965), 161, 186, 610. Blancliard v. Bristol (100 Va. 469), 639, 641. Blanchard v. State (30 Fla. 223), 641. Blackburn v. Oklahoma City (1 Okla. 292), 348. Blackburn v. Walpole (9 Pick. 97), 151. Blake v. McClung (172 U. S. 239), 354. Blake v. P. & Co. R. R. (39 N. H. 435), 125. Blake v. St. Louis (40 Mo. 509), 897. Blakemore v. Dolan (50 Ind. 194), 327, 336. Blackett v. Blizard (9 Barn & C. 851), 164. Blackford t. State (8 Heisk. 538), 656. Blackpool L. B. of Health v. Ben- nett (4 H. & N. 138), 450. Blair v. Forehand (100 Mass. 136), 640, 667, 734. Blair v. Williamson (4 Litt. 34), 372. Bla*n V. Bailey (25 Ind. 165), 329. Blanton v. Merry (116 Ga. 288), 430. Blaschko v. Wurster (156 N. Y. 437), 912. Blatchley v. Moser (15 Wend, 215), 792, 794. Blazier v. Miller (10 Hun. 435). 768. Bledsoe v. Gary (95 Ala. 70), 468. Blessing v. Galveston (42 Tex. 641), 631. Bliss V. Chicago (156 111. 584), 849. Bliss V. Kraus (16 Ohio St. 54), 707, 708. Bliss's Petition (63 N. H. 135), 403. Block V. Jacksonville (50 111. 39), 646. Block V. Jacksonville (36 111. 301), 599, 689. Blocker v. State (72 Miss. 720), 803. Bloom V. Xenia (32 Ohio St. 461), 170, 186, 189. Bloomfleld v. Charter Oak Bank (121 U. S. 121), 149, 151. Bloomfleld v. Trimble (54 Iowa 399), 42, 758, 782, 786, 792. Bloomington v. Bourland (137 111. 534), 402. Bloomington v. Chicago & A. R. Co. (134 111. 451), 825. Blooihington v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co. (154 111. 539), 582. Bloomington v. Pollock (141 111. 346), 835. Bloomington v. Richardson (38 111. App. 60), 537, 729, 770. Bloomington v. Wahl (46 111. 489), 765. Bloomington Cemetery Assn. v. People (129 111. 16), 802. Blount v. Munroe (60 Ga. 61), 411. Bluedorn v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (131 Mo. 258), 748. Bluedorn v. Mo. Pac. R. R. (108 Mo. 439), 601, 744. Bluflton V. Studabaker (106 Ind. 129), 99. Board v. Pritchard (36 N. J. L. 101), 366. Board v. Reynolds (44 Ind. 509), 91. Board of Commissioners, etc. v. Ruckman (57 Ind. 96), 390. Board of Comrs. of Allen County V. Silvers (22 Ind. 491), 840. Board of Education v. Fowler (19 Cal. 11), 95. Board, etc. v. Moore (17 Minn. 412), 208. XXXVIU TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Board, etc. v. Norman (51 La. Ann. 736), 687. Board of Health, In re (14 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 116), 143. Board of Health v. Maglnnis Cot- ton Mills (46 La. Ann. 806), 707. Board of Liquidation v. Louis- iana (179 U. S. 622), 374. Board of Liquidation of City Debt V. New Orleans (32 La. Ann. 915), 894, 895. Board of Police v. Giron (46 La. Ann. 1364), 787. Board of Rapid Transit Railroad Comrs., in re (18 N. Y. Suppl. 320), 201. Board of Richmond County v. El- lis (59 N. Y. 620), 861. Board of Supervisors v. Horton (75 Iowa 271), 175, 176. Board of Supervisors v. Judges 106 Mich. 166), 177, 201. Board of Water Com'rs of Clin- ton V. Dwight (101 N. Y. 9), 225, 226, 229. Bode V. Cincinnati (9 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 382), 845. Bodine v. Trenton (36 N. J. L. 198), 808. Boehm v. Baltimore (61 Md. 259), 86, 638, 668, 670, 682, 706. Boehme v. Monroe (106 Mich. 401), 47, 185, 243, 246, 247, 855. Boehni & Loeber v. Baltimore (61 Md. 259), 655. Boenninghausen, ex parte (91 Mo. 301), 574, 576, 794. Bogart V. New Albany (1 Ind. 38), 482, 492, 563. Bogert V. Indianapolis (13 Ind. 134), 695. Boggero v. Southern Ry. Co. (64 S. C. 104), 744. Bohan v. Weekawken Tp. (65 N. J. L. 490), 50. Bohen v. Waseca (32 Minn. 176), 721. Bohle V. Stannard (7 Mo. App. 51), 118, 223, 425, 446, 814, 869. Bohmy v. State (21 Tex. Crim. App. 597), 26. Bolles V. Brimfield (120 U. S, 759), 266. Bollig, ex parte (31 111. *88), 277. Boiling V. Mayor (8 Leigh 224), 92. Bolte V. New Orleans (10 La. Ann. 321), 272, 475. Bolton V. Gilleran (105 Cal. 244), 847. Bolton V. New Rochelle (84 Hun. 281), 680. Bolton V. Vellines (94 Va. 393), 269, 731. Bond V. Kenosha (17 Wis. 284), 824. Bond V. Smith (44 Hun. 219), 716. Bonds of Madera Irrigation Dist., in re (92 Cal. 296), 822. Bonnell v. Smith (53 Iowa 281), 684. Bonner v. McPhail (31 Barb. 106), 469. Bonsall v. Lebanon (19 Ohio 418), 823. Booker v. Young (12 Gratt. 303), 166, 167. Boom v. Utica (2 Barb. 104), 694. Boonville v. Trigg (46 Mo. 288), 315. Booraem v. N. H. C. R. R. (44 N. J. Eq. 70), 110. Boorman v. Santa Barbara (65 Cal. 313), 842. Booth V. Bayonne (56 N. J. L. 268), 190, 237, 238. Booth V. Carthage (67 111. 102), 327, 336. Booth V. State (4 Conn. 65), 737. Booth V. Woodbury (32 Conn. 118), 74, 104. Boothe V. Georgetown (2 Cranch. C. C. 356), 485, 558. Borough V. Hoagland (3 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 283), 465. Borthwick and City of Ottawa, in re (6 Ontario Rep. 401), 442. Boscobel V. Bugbee (41 Wis. 59), 479. Boston V. Baldwin (139 Mass. 315), 471. Boston V. Brazer (11 Mass. 447), 113. Boston V. Gray (144 Mass. 53), 457. Boston V. Richardson (13 Allen 146), 880. Boston V. Schafter (9 Pick. 415), 615, 616, 634, 659. TABLE OF CASES. xxxix (.Tlie refex'ences are to pages.) Boston V. Shaw (1 Met. 130), 294, 296. Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts (97 U. S. 25), 129, 320, 323, 419, 665, 666, 743. Boston Iron Co. v. U. S. (118 U. S. 37), 113. Boston & M. R. Co. v. Lawrence (2 Allen 107), 813. Boston S. D. & T. Co. v. Salem Water Co. (94 Fed. Rep. 238), 120, 433. Boston Turp. Co. v. Pomfret (20 Conn. 590), 213, 214, 215. Bossidy v. Branniff (135 Mass. 290), 467. Bosworth V. Swansey (10 Met. 363), 605. Bott V. Pratt (33 Minn. 323), 17, 32, 59, 61, 603. Boucher v. Moberly (74 Mo. 113), 22. Bouldin V. Baltimore (15 Md. 18), 831. Bourgeois, ex parte (60 Miss. 663), 787. Bousquet v. State (78 Miss. 478), 162. Bowen v. Lease (5 Hill. 221), 329, 339. Bowers v. Barrett (85 Me. 382), 808. Bowler, ex parte (16 Mo. App. 14), 574, 576. Bowlin V. Furman (28 Mo. 427), 91, 92. Bowling Green v. Carson (10 Bush. 64), 765. Bowling Green v. C, H. & D. R. Co. (10 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 63), 428. Bowie V. Kansas City (51 Mo. 454), 583. Bowman's Case (67 Mo. 146), 578. Bowman v. St. John (43 111. 337), 284. Boyce v. Peterson (84 Mich. 490), 610. Boyd V. Alabama (94 U. S. 645), 129, 131, 742. Boyd V. Chambers (78 Ky. 140), 463, 464. Boyd V. Chicago, B. & Q. R. & R. Co. (103 111. App. 199), 183. Boyd V. Farm Ridge (103 111. 408), 717. Boyd V. Milwaukee (92 Wis. 456), 840, 865. Boiyd V. Montgomery (117 Ala. 677), 700. Boyer v. Yates City (47 111. App. 115), 597. Boylan and City of Toronto, in re (15 Ontario Rep. 13), 36. Boylan v. Newark (58 N. J. L. 133), 367. Boyle V. Hazleton (171 Pa. St. 167), 894. Boylston Market Association v. Boston (113 Mass. 528), 113. Bozeman v. Cadwell (14 Mont. 480), 313. Bozant v. Campbell (9 Rob. 411), 312, 314. Braceville v. Doherty (30 111. App. 645), 294, 313. Braceville Coal Co. v. People (147 111. 66), 778. Braddy v. Milledgeville (74 Ga. 516), 535, 753, 788. Bradford v. Fox (171 Pa. St. 343), 846. Bradley v. Baldwin (5 Conn. 288), 488. Bradley v. Fisher (13 Wall. 335), 472. Bradley v. People (56 Barb. 72), 741. Bradley .v. Rochester (54 Hun. 140), 626, 632. Bradley v. West Duluth (45 Minn. 4), 831. Bradley-Ramsay Lumber Co. v. Perkins (La. 1903) 33 So. Rep. 351), 49. Bradshaw v. Camden (39 N. J. L. 416), 17, 367. Brady v. Brooklyn (1 Barb. 584), 113, 208. Brady v. Moulton (61 Minn. 185), 67. Brady v. New York (20 N. Y. 312), 861. Brady v. Northwestern Insurance Co. (11 Mich. 425), 734, 737. Brady v. Supervisors, etc. (2 Sandf. 460), 140. .xl TABLE OF CASES. (Ttie references are to pages.) Brambrick v. Campbell (37 Mo. App.), 460, 861. Bramtree Board of Health v. Boy- ton (52 L. R. 99), 698. Branahan v. Hotel Co. (39 Ohio St. 333), 354. Brand v. San Antonio (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, 37 S. W. Rep. 340), 4. Brandon v. Avery (22 N. Y. 469), 470. Brandt v. Milwaukee (69 Wis. 386), 803. Branham v. San Jose (24 Cal. 585), 96. Brannock v. Elmore (114 Mo. 55), 601. Branson v. PMl'a. (47 Pa. St. 329), 875. Brant, in re Corporation of (19 Up. Can. Q. B. 450), 113. Brassford, Matter of (50 N. Y. 509), 249. Brasington v. South Bound Ry Co. (62 S. C. 325), 582, 585, 587, 601. Braun v. Chicago (110 111. 186), 613, 629, 630. brazil v. McBride (69 Ind. 244), 7, 581. Breaux's Bridge v. Dupuis (30 La. Ann. 1105), 219, 220, 236, 237, 252, 590. Bregguglia v. Vineland (53 N. J. L. 168), 277, 776. Breitenberger v. Schmidt (38 111. App. 168), 524. Breninger v. Belvidere (44 N. J. L. 350), 25, 290, 756. Brenham v. Brenham Water Co. (67 Tex. 542), 72, 304, 308. Brennan v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans (La. 1902, 32 So. Rep. 563), 438. Brennan v. Titusville (153 XJ. S. 289), 395, 396, 400. Brennan v. Wheatherford (54 Tex. 330), 547. Brewer v. Otoe County (1 Neb. 373), 386. Brewster v. Davenport (51 Iowa 427), 201, 205, 208. Brewster v. Hyde (7 N. H. 206), 149, 15L Brewster v. Peru (180 111. 124), 855. Brewster v. Syracuse (19 N. Y. nC), 226, 832. Brevoort v. Detroit (24 Mich. 322), 867. Brice, appeal of (89 Pa. St. 85), 737. Brickerdike v. Chicago (185 111. 280), 853. Brick Prs. Church v. New York (5 Cow. 538), 321, 345, 695. Bridgeford v. Tuscumbia (16 Fed. 910), 98, 212. Bridgeport v. Housatonuc R. R. Co. (15 Conn. 475), 78, 117, 266. Bridgeport v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co. (36 Conn. 255), 879. Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken (1 ' Wall. 116), 306, 379. Brieswick v. Brunswick (51 Ga. 639), 225, 277. Briggs V. A Light Boat (7 Allen 287), 768. Briggs V. Matsell (2 Abb. Pr. 156), 196. Briggs V. Whitney (159 Mass. 97), 825. Bright V. McCullough (27 Ind. 223), 629. Brimmer v. Boston (102 Mass. 19), 113. Brink's Chicago City Exp. Co. v. Kinnare (168 111. 643), 61. Brinkley v. Swicegood (65 N. C. 626), 33L Brinkman v. Eisler (40 N. Y. S. R. 865), 721. Bristol V. Burrow (5 Lea 128), 478, 485. Broadway Baptist Church v. Mc- Atee (8 Bush. 508), 234, 828. Broadway & S. A. R. R. Co. v. New York (49 Hun. 126), 450, 751. Brockman v. Creston (79 Iowa 587), 96, 431. Brockway v. Carter (25 Wis. 510), 469. Brodie and Town of Bowmanville, in re (38 Up. Can. Q. B. 580), 28, 304. Brohead v. Milwaukee (19 Wis. 624), 104, 105. Brome v. Cuming County (31 Neb. 362), 339. Bronson v. Kinzie (1 How. 311), 390. TABLE OF CASES. xli (The references are to pages.) Brookbank v. JeSersonville (41 Ind. 406), 168, 202. Brookfield v. Kitchen (163 Mo. 546), 81, 398, 657. Brookline v. Mackintosh (133 Mass. 215), 707. Brooklyn v. Breslin (57 N. Y. 591), 290, 296, 626. Brooklyn v. Cleves (Hill & Denio Supp. 231), 44, 304, 476, 499, 700. Brooklyn v. Furey (9 Misc. Rep. 193), 79, 83, 739. Brooklyn, in re (143 N. Y. 596), 308. Brooklyn Elevated R. R. Co., in re (125 N. Y. 434), 915. Brooklyn Winfield & Newtown Ry. Co., in re (72 N. Y. 245), 916. Brooklyn v. Meserole (26 Wend. 132), 806. Brooklyn v. Patchen (8 Wend. 47), 831. Brooklyn v. Toynbee (31 Barb. 282), 287, 787. Brooklyn Central Ry. Co. v. Brooklyn City Ry. Co. (32 Barb. 358), 321. Brooklyn Crosstown R. R. v. Brooklyn (37 Hun. 413), 743. Brooklyn Park Comrs. v. Arm- strong (45 N. Y.~234), 93, 94. Brooklyn Steam Transit Co. v. Brooklyn (78 N. Y. 524), 742. Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Hebron (51 Conn. 22), 151. Brooks V. Cotton (48 N. H. 50), 779. Brooks V. Fischer (79 Cal. 173), 11, 82. Brook V. Horton (68 Ca!. 554). 884. Brooks V. Mangan (86 Mich. 576), 473, 630, 637. Brooks V. Memphis (U. S. Cir. Ct. W. D. Tenn.), 4 Federal Cas. No. 1, 954), 391. Brookville v. Arthurs (130 Pa. St. 501), 63. Brookville v. Gagle (73 Ind. 117), 466, 476, 492, 506. Brophy v. Landman (28 Ohio St. 542), 836. Brophy v. Hyatt (10 Colo. 223), 161, 187, 188, 200, 204, 276, 731. Brown v. Asbury Park (44 N. J. L. 162), 279. Brown v. Atlantic Ry. & Power Co. (113 Ga. 462), 330. Brown v. Barstow (87 Iowa 344), 813. Brown v. B. & S. L. R. R. Co. (22 N. Y. 191), 56. Brown v. Carpenter. (26 Vt. 638), 733. Brown v. Catlettsburg (11 Bush. 435), 437. Brown's Case (152 Mass. 1), 466. Brown v. C. G. W. Ry. (137 Mo. 529), 888, 889. Brown V. Com'rs. (21 Pa. St. 37), 330. Brown V. Denver (7 Colo. 305), 444, 829, 840. Brown, ex parte (42 S. C. 184), 563. Brown V. Foster (88 Me. 49), 163. Brown v. Gates (15 W. Va. 131), 140. Brown v. Guyandotte (34 W. Va. 299), 675. Brown v. Houston (114 U. S. 622), 396, 400, 412. Brown v. Hunn (27 Conn. 332), 737. Brown v. Jenks (98 Cal. 10), 866. Brown v. Langlois (70 Mo. 226), 481. Brown v. Lutz (36 Neb. 527), 16, 170, 189. Brown v. Maryland (12 Wheat 419), 352. 392, 400, 408. Brown v. Mobile (28 Ala. 722), 509, 529. Brown v. Murdock (140 Mass. 314), 694. Brown v. New York (63 N. Y. 239), 868. Brown v. Piper (91 U. S. 37), 447. Brown v. Social Circle (105 Ga. 834), 789. Brown v. Turner (70 N. C. 93), 366. Brown v. Vinalhaven (65 Me. 402), 675. Brown v. White (202, Pa. St. 297), 456. Brown v. Winterport (79 Me. 305), 149, 152, 191. 195. Browne v. Boston (166 Mass. 229), 852. Browne v. New Orleans (38 La. Ann. 517), 437. xlii TABLE OF CASES. (The references Browne v. Selser (106 La. 691), 630, 659. Brownell v. Palmer (22 Conn. 107), 150. Browning v. Chicago (155 111. 314), 849. Brownville v. Cook (4 Neb. 101), 486, 487, 775, 787, 793. Brownback v. North Wales (194 Pa. St. 609), 658. Bruce v. Schuyler (9 III. 221), 329. Bruner v. Marcum (50 Mo. 405), 528. Bruner v. Stanton (102 Ky. 459), 639. Brunswick v. King (91 Ga. 522), 807. Brush V. Carbondale (78 111. 74), 118. Brush Elec. L. Co. v. Jones, etc., Co. (5 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 340), 882. Bryan v. Bates (15 111. 87), 483. Bryan v. Chicago (60 111. 507), 808. Bryan v. Page (51 Tex. 532), 7, 116, 123, 124, 132. Bryant v. Robbins (70 Wis. 258), 707. Buchan v. Broadwell (88 Mo. 31), 389, 882. Buck V. Danzenbacker (37 N. J. L. 359), 558. Buckland v. Conway (16 Mass. 395), 113. Buckley v. Tacoma (9 Wash. 253), 12, 841. Buckley v. Tacoma (9 Wash. 269), 842, 846. Budd V. Camden Horse R. Co. (63 N. J. Eq. 804), 330. Budd V. New York (143 U. S. 517), 910. Buell V. Ball (20 Iowa 282), 258, 810, 811. Buell V. Buckingham (16 Iowa 284), 164, 165. Buell V. State (45 Ark. 336), 222, 360. 672, 752. Buesching v. St. Louis (Jas Light Co. (73 Mo. 219), 64. Buffalo V. Chadeayne (134 N. Y. 163). 49, 337, 737. Buffalo V. Chadeayne (134 N. Y. 173), 739. are to pages.) Buffalo V. Chadeayne (7 N. Y. Suppl. 501), 639. Buffalo, in re City of (78 N. Y. 362), 201, 846. Buffalo, in re (68 N. Y. 167), 88. Buffalo V. Marion (13 Misc. Rep. 639), 761, 772. Buffalo V. Mulchady (Sheld. 431), 535. Buffalo V. New York, etc. R. Co. (6 Misc. 630), 744. Buffalo V. I'J. Y., etc., R. R. Co. (23 N. Y. Supp. 303), 313. Buffalo V. Reavey (55 N. Y. Supp. 792), 400, 403. Buffalo V. Schleifer (Buffalo Sup. Ct. General Term 2 Misc. Rep. 216), 766. Buffalo V. Webster (10 Wend. 99), 31, 32, 296, 764, 766. Buffalo & N. Y. R. R. Co. v. Buf- falo (5 Hill. 209), 592, 747. Buffington Wheel Co. v. Burnham (60 Iowa 493), 172. Buhler, in re (32 Barb. 79), 832. Bull V. Quincy (9 111. App. 127), 124, 625. Bull V. Southfield (14 Blatch. 216), 349. Bullen V. Higgins (115 111. 155), 886. Bullitt V. Paducah (8 Ky. Law Rep. 870), 630. Bullitt V. Selvage (20 Ky. Law Rep. 599), 866. Bullitt County v. Washer (130 U. S. 142), 195. Bullock V. Geomble (45 111. 218). 274, 275. Bunyan v. Citizens' Ry. Co. (127 Mo. 749). Burckholter v. McConnellsville (20 Ohio St. 308), 26, 670. Burdett v. Allen (35 W. Va. 347), 275, 732. Burditt V. Swenson (17 Tex. 489), 703. Burford v. Grand Rapids (53 Mich. 98), 676, 679. Burg V. C , R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (90 Iowa 106), 42, 745. Burger v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (112 Mo. 238), 746. TABLE OF CASES. Xllll (The references are to pages.) Burgess v. Fennel (3 Del. Co. R. 354), 631. Burgess v. Jefferson (21 La. Ann. 143), 864. Burgess v. Pue (2 Gill. 254), 175. Burghard v. Fitch (24 Ky. Law Rep. 1983), 859. Burhans v. Norwood Park (138 111. 147), 818. Burk V. Baltimore (77 Md. 469), 855. Burke v. State (5 Lea 349), 331. Burkley v. Eisendrath (58 111. App. 364), 581. Burlington v. Bumgardner (42 Iowa 673), 615. Burlington v. Burlington Street Ry. Co. (49 Iowa 144), 318, 324, 378. Burlington v. Dennison (42 N. J. L. 165), 5, 11, 137, 195, 238. Burlington v. Estlow (43 N. J. L. 13), 327, 328. Burlington v. Kellar (18 Iowa 59), 24, 271, 272, 277. Burlington v. Lawrence (42 Iowa 681), 346, 616. Burlington v. Putnam Ins. Co. (31 Iowa 102), 12, 614, 624, 635. Burlington v. Quick (47 Iowa 222), 843. Burlington v. Scliwartzman (52 Conn. 181), 717. Burlington v. Stockwell (5 Kan. App. 569), 269, 551, 554, 684, 704. Burlington v. Stockwell (56 Kan. 208), 563. Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Spear- man (12 Iowa 112), 813. Burlington Water Works Co. v. Burlington (43 Kan. 725), 798. Burmeister v. Howard (1 Wash. Ty. 207), 4, 31. Burnett v. Craig (30 Ala. 135), 437. Burnett, ex parte (30 Ala. 461), 278, 559, 617, 648. Burnett v. Sacramento (12 Cal. 76), 823, 830. Burnham v. Chicago (24 111. 496), 901. Burnham v Hotchkiss (14 Conn. 311), 716. Burns, ex parte (7 Mo. App. 563), 560. Burns v. State (104 Ga. 544), 225. Burns v. LaGrange (17 Tex. 415), 518, 570, 793. Burnstein v. Cass Ave. & F. G. Ry. Co. (56 Mo. App. 45), 749. Burr V. Newcastle (49 Ind. 322), 832, 834, 849. Burrton v. Harvey County Savings Bank (28 Kan. 390), 100. Bush V. Seabury (8 Johns 418), 764, 765. Bushey, in re (105 Mich. 64), 505, 575, 770. Business Men's League v. Waddill • (143 Mo. 495), 436. Bussey V. Gilmore (3 Me. 191), 75. Butchers v. Bullock (3 Bos. & P. 434), 492. Butcher v. Camden (29 N. J. Eq. 478), 367. Butcher's Co. v. BuUach (3 Bos. & Pul. 434), 288. Butchers Co. v. Morey (1 Bla. 370), 32. Butchers' Union Slaughter House, etc. Co. V. Crescent City Live Stock, etc. Co. (Ill U. S. 746), 313, 665, 699, 760. Butman v. Fowler (17 Ohio 101), 803. Butin, ex parte (28 Tex. App. 304), 397. Butler V. Charleston (7 Gray 12), 108, 145. Butler V. McLean County (32 111. App. 397), 114. Butler V. Milwaukee (15 Wis. 493), 70. 84, 114. Butler V. M. A. L. & I. Co. (94 Ga. 562), 467. Butler V. Passaic (44 N. J. L. 171), 11. Butler V. Robinson (75 Mo. 192), 582. Butler V. Sullivan County (108 Mo. 630), 133. Butner v. Boifeuillett (100 Ga. 743), 225. Butolph V. Blust (5 Lans. 84), 483. Button V. Kremer (24 Ky. Law Rep. 1194). 822. Buttrick v^ Lowell (1 Allen 172), 345. xliv TABLE OF CASES. (The re£erences Butz V. Cavanaugh (137 Mo. 503), 64, 601, 677. Byars v. Mt. Vernon (77 111. 467), 252, 528, 534. Bybee v. Smith (22 Ky. Law Rep. 467), 166, 436. Bybee v. State (94 Ind. 443), 718. Byer v. New Castle (124 Ind. 86), 206. Byers v. Com. (42 Pa. St. 89), 513, 515, 558. Byers v. Olney (16 111. 35), 646. Byington v. St. Louis Ry. Co. (147 Mo. 673), 586, 749. Byrd, ex parte (84 Ala. 17), 24, 449, 764. Byrne v. Chicago General Ry. Co. (63 111. App. 438), 650. Byrne v. Parish of East Carroll (45 La. Ann. 392), 838. Byrnes v. Riverton (64 N. J. L. 210), 248, 249. Cabot V. Britt (36 Vt. 349), 209. Cadmus v. Farr (47 N. J. L. 208), 165. Cady V. Barnesville J4 Weekly Cin. Law Bui. 101),*364, 753. Cady V. Ilinken (Mich. 1902, 89 N. W. Rep. 72), 199. Cahill, in re (110 Pa. St. 167), 461. Cahill V. Kalamazoo Mut. Ins. Co. (2 Doug. 124), 164. Cahoon y. Com. (21 Gratt. 822), 463. Cain V. Davie County Comrs. (86 N. C. 8), 823. Cain V. Goda (84 Ind. 209), 265. Cain V. Syracuse (95 N. Y. 83), 716. Cairo v. Adams Express Co. (54 111. App. 87), 643. Cairo v. Bross (101 111. 475), 79, 347. Cairo v. Coleman (53 111. App. 680), 763, 769. Cairo v. Feuchter (159 111. 155), 864. Caldwell, ex parte (138 Mo. 233), 284, 771, 787. Caldwell v. Alton (33 111. 416), 302, 761, 765. are to pages.) Caldwell v. Carthage (49 Ohio St. 334), 839. Caldwell v. Lincoln (19 Neb. 569), 617, 637. Caldwell v. North Carolina (187 U. S. 622), 392, 395. Caldwell v. Rupert (10 Bush. 179), 822. Caldwell v. State (55 Ala. 133), 280. Calhoun v. Little (106 Ga. 336), 269, 278, 473. California v. Central Pac. Ry Co. (127 U. S. 1), 878. California Steam Nav. Co. v. Wright (6 Cal. 258), 304. Call Pub. Co. V. Lincoln (29 Neb. 149), 172. Callaghan v. Alexandi-ia (52 La. Ann. 1013), 224. Callahan v. New York (66 N. Y. 656), 462. Callam v. Saginaw (50 Mich. 7), 806. Callan v. Wilson (127 U. S. 540), 516, 517, 518, 521, 523, 526, 577. Callanan v. Oilman (107 N. Y. 360), 716. Callender v. Marsh (1 Pick. 418), 807. Callon V. Jacksonville (147 111. 113), 802, 855. Callopy V. Cloherty (95 Ky. 330), 581. Cambria Iron Co. v. Union Trust Co. (154 Ind. 291), 897. Cambridge v. Monroe (126 Mass. 496), 708. Cambridge v. Railroad Comrs. (153 Mass. 161), 801. Camden v. Bloch (65 Ala. 236), 482, 531, 532, 562, 564, 566, 570, 571, 572, 573. Camden v. Mulford (26 N. J. L. 49), 260, 427, 429, 439, 571. Camden v. Varney (63 N. J. L. 325), 108. Cameron and Tp. of East Missouri, re (13, Up. Can. Q. B. 190), 222, 442. Cameron v. Kenyon-Connell C. Co. (22'Mont. 312), 741. Cameron v. Middough (57 Mo. App. 312), 646. TABLE OF CASES. xlv (The references are to pages.) Cameron v. North Hero (43 Vt. 507), 209. Cameron v. Stephenson (69 Mo. 372), 643. Camp V. Minneapolis (33 Minn. 461), 349. Campau v. Detroit Board of Public Works (86 Mich. 372), 807, 875. Campau v. Langley (39 Mich. 451), 276. Campbell v. Cincinnati (49 Ohio St. 463), 170, 172, 187, 189, 845. Campbell v. Hale (25 N. J. L. 324), 803. Campbell v. Kansas City (102 Mo. 326), 696. Campbell v. Seaman (63 N. Y. 568), 685. Campbell v. Thompson (16 Me. 117), 489, 493. Campbell v. Tp. of Elma (13 Up. Can. Com. Pleas 296), 102. Campbell v. Wainright (50 N. J. L. 555), 546. Campbell v. Wolfender (74 N. C. 103), 155. Campbell v. Wyandotte (105 Mich. 1), 837. Campion v. Buffalo (8 N. Y. St. Rep. 329), 736, 737. Canadian Atlantic R. W. Co. v. Ot- tawa (8 Ont. Rep. 183), 181. Canajoharie v. Buel (43 How. Pr. 155). 310. Canandaigua v. Foster (156 N. Y. 354), 457. Canepa v. Birmingham (92 Ala. 358), 734. Canlff V. New York (4 E. D. Smith 430), 176. Cannon v. New Orleans (20 Wall. 577), 39, 416, 417. Canova v. Williams (41 Fla. 509), 451. Canthorn v. State (43 Ark. 138), 486. Canto, ex parte (21 Tex. App. 61), 596. Canton v. Dawson (71 Mo. App. 235), 755. Canton v. LIgon (71 Mo. App. 407), 277, 597. Canton v. Nist (9 Ohio St. 439), 26, 759. Cantril v. Sainer (59 Iowa 26), 229, 451, 453, 757. Cape Girardeau v. Campbell (26. Mo. App. 12), 39, 416. Cape Girardeau v. Fougeu (30 Mo. App. 551), 4, 6, 21, 237, 251. Cape Girardeau v. Houck (129 Mo. 607), 847. Cape Girardeau v. Riley (72 Mo. 220), 292, 425, 656. Cape Girardeau v. Riley (52 Mo. 424), 232. Cape May v. Cape May, etc. Ry Co. (60 N. J. L. 224), 230, 248, 720, 747. Cape May v. Cape May Transp. Co. (64 N. J. L. 80), 581. Cape May, etc., Ry Co. v. Cape May (35 N. J. Eq. 419), 121, 260, 435. Capital City L. & F. Co. v. Talla- hasse (Fla. 1900, 28 So. Rep. 810), 304. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof (174 U. S. 1), 526. Carbondale v. Vail (2 Del. Co. Ct. R.), 387, 613. Carleton v. People (10 Mich. 250), 140, 158. Carleton v. Rugg (149 Mass. 550), 691. Carleton v. Washington (38 Kan. 726), 98, 100. Carlln v. Cavender (56 Mo. 286), 854. Carline v. Shallenberger (13 Pa. County Ct. Rep. 145), 155. Carlinville v. McCIure (156 111. 492), 835, 849, 855. Carlson v. Segog (60 Minn. 498), 467. Carlyle v. Carlyle Water L. & P. Co. (52 111. App. 577), 906. Carlyle v. Clinton County (140 111. 512), 840, 841. Carlyle. W. L. & P. Co. v. Carlyle (31 111. App. 325), 305. Carney v. Marseilles (136 111. 401), 346. Carondelet v. Wolfert (39 Mo. 305), 237. Carpenter v. Capital Electric Co. (178 111. 29), 893. Carpenter v. Mills (29 How. Pr. 473), 483. Carpenter v. Nixon (5 Hill 260), 523. xh TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Carpenter v. People (8 Colo. 116), 338. Carr v. Conyers (84 Ga. 287), 279. Carr v. Doley (122 Mass. 255), 813. Carr v. Northern Liberties (35 Pa. St. 324), 126, 676. Carr v. St. Louis (9 Mo. 191), 25. Carrington v. St. Louis (89 Mo. 208), 675. Carroll v. Campbell (110 Mo. 557), 309. Carroll v. Campbell (108 Mo. 550), 450. Carroll v. Irvington (50 N. J. L. 361), 803, 811. Carroll v. Lynchburg (84 Va. 803), 737. Carroll v. St. Louis (12 Mo. 444), 9, 133, 531. Carroll v. St. Louis (4 Mo. App. 191), 692. Carroll v. Tuskaloosa (12 Ala. 173), 440, 611, 653. Carroll v. Wall (35 Kan. 36), 158, 163. Carrollton v. Bazzette (159 111. 284), 396, 403, 532, 636. Carrolton v. Clark (21 111. App. 74), 156, 157, 158, 163, 168. Carrollton v. Rhomberg (78 Mo. 547), 531. Carron v. Martin (26 N. J. L. 594), 72, 571, 831. Carskadden v. South Bend (141 Ind. 596), 315. Carson v. Bloomington (6 111. App. 481), 277, 352, 556. Carson v. Forsythe (94 Ga. 617), 644. Carter v. Dow (16 "Wis. 298), 640, 733. Carter v. McFarland (75 Iowa 196), 179. Cartersville v. Lanham (67 Ga. 753), 34, 275. Carthage v. Buckner (4 III. App. 317), 691. Carthage v. Carthage Light Co. (97 Mo. App. 20), 837, 887. Carthage v. First Nat. Bank (71 Mo. 508), 613. Carthage v. Frederick (122 N. "5^ 268), 17, 670, 691, 715. Carthage v. Rhodes (101 Mo. 175), 640, 733. Carey v. Washington (5 Cranch C. C. 13), 672. Gary v. North Flainfield (49 N. J. L. 110), 643. Garvin v. St. Louis (151 Mo. 334), 64. Casby v. Thompson (42 Mo. 133), 434. Cascaden v. Waterloo (106 Iowa 673), 7, 11, 50, 51, 116, 315, 337. Case V. Cayuga County (88 Hun. 59), 896. Case V. Hall (21 111. 632), 276, 504. Case V. Johnson (91 Ind. 477), 827, 830. Case V. Mobile (30 Ala. 538), 496, 582. Casinello, ex parte (62 Cal. 538), 706. Caskell v. Bayley (30 L. T. 516), 710. Caspary v. Portland (19 Oreg. 496), 674. Cass V. Bellows (31 N. H. 501), 217. Cass V. People (166 111. 126), 847. Cass Co. Conrs. v. Ross (46 Ind. 404), 145. Cassell V. Lexington H. & P. Turn- pike Rd. Co. (10 Ky. Law Rep. 486), 332. Cass Farm Co. v. Detroit (181 U. S. 396), 821. Cass Farm Co. v. Detroit (124 Mich. 433), 821. Cassidy v. Bangor (61 Me. 434), 180, 839. Cassin v. Zavalla County (70 Tex. 419), 176. Cassville v. Jimerson (75 Mo. App. 426), 477, 509. Castleton v. Langdon (19 Vt. 210) 92. Caswell V. Bay City (99 Mich. 417), 256. Caswell V. Worth (5 El. & B. 848), 56. Gate V. Martin (70 N. H. 135), 241. Catholic Church v. Tobbein (82 Mo. 418), 546. Cavanaugh v. Boston (139 Mass. 426), 708. TABLE OF CASES. xlvii (The references are to pages.) Cedar Rapids, In re (85 Iowa 39), 812. Cedar Rapids Water Co. v. Cedar Rapids (Iowa 1902, 91 N. W. Rep. 1081), 264. Cedar Rapids Water Co. v. Cedar Rapids (117 Iowa 250), 877, 905. Centerville v. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (118 Fed. Rep. 332), 244. Centerville v. Miller (57 Iowa 56), 271, 771. Centerville v. Miller (51 Iowa 712), 486, 487, 674. Centerville v. Woods (57 Ind. 192), 718. Central v. Sears (2 Colo. 588), 4, 6, 7, 9, 237, 249. Central Bridge Corporation v. Lowell (15 Gray 106), 142, 145. Central Crosstown Ry. Co. v. Met- ropolitan Street Ry. Co. (16 App. Div. 229), 894. Central Georgia Ry. Co. v. Bond (111 Ga. 13), 32, 551, 595, 601. Central Irrigation Dist. v. De Lappe (79 Cal. 351), 54, 245. Central R. & B. Co. v. Brunswick & W. R. Co. (87 Ga. 386), 31. Central R. R. v. Smith (78 Ga. 694), 601. Central R. R. v. Thompson (76 Ga. 770), 601. Central Savings Bank v. Baltimore (71 Md. 515), 591. Chad V. Tilsed (5 J. B. Moore 185), 108. Chaddock v. Day (75 Mich. 527), 636, 656. Chafin V. Waukesha County (62 Wis. 463), 478, 486. Chaffee v. Granger (6 Mich. 51), 237, 238. Chahoon v. Com. (21 Graft 822), 467. Challiss v. Parker (11 Kan. 384, 394), 834, 874. Chamberlain v. Dover (13 Me. 466), 149, 178, 210, 214. Chamberlain v. Evansville (77 Ind. 542), 289, 337. Chamberlain v. Hoboken (38 N. J. L. 110), 252. Chamberlain v. Kansas City (125 Mo. 430), 9. Chamberlain v. Litchfield (56 111. App. 652), 529, 594, 731. Chamberlain of London v. Cromp- ton (7 D. & R. 597), 292. Chambers v. Barnsville (89 Ga. 739), 270, 567. Chambers v. Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. (1 Disney Ohio 327), 721. Chambers v. St. Joseph (33 Mo. App. 536), 368. Chambers v. St. Louis (29 Mo. 543),. 89, 90, 120, 432, 546. Champaign v. Forrester (29 111. App. 117), 679. Champaign v. Harmon (98 111. • 491), 89. Champer v. Greencastle (138 Ind. 339), 71, 289, 758. Chandler v. Lawrence (128 Mass. 213), 235, 368. Chapline v. Robertson (44 Ark. 202), 528. Chapman v. Albany & S. Ry. (10 Barb. 360), 883. Chariton v. Barber (54 Iowa 360), 271, 751, 754. Chariton v. HoUiday (60 Iowa 391), 171, 183, 828, 852. Chariton v. Simmons (87 Iowa 226), 729. Charity Hospital v. De Bar (11 La. Ann. 385), 658. Charity Hospital v. Stickney (2 La. Ann. 550), 615, 658. Charles v. Hackman (133 Mo. 634), 564. Charles v. Marlon (98 Fed. Rep. 166), 820. Charleston v. Ahrens (4 Strobh 241), 355. Charleston v. Ashley Phosphate Co, (34 S. C. 541), 475, 505, 580, 583, 591. Charleston v. Benjamin (2 Strobh L. 508), 759. Charleston v. Blake (12 Rich. Law 66), 458. Charleston v. Chur (2 Bailey 164), 552, 583, 593. Charleston v. Corleis (2 Bailey 186), 549. Charleston v. Elford (1 McMullan 234), 40, 231, 686. xlviii TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Charleston v. England (3 Hill Law 56), 542. Charleston v. Feckman (3 Rich. L. 385), 549. Charleston v. Goldsmith (12 Rich. Law 470), 653, 773. Charleston v. Heisembritte (2 Mc- MuUen 233), 646. Charleston v. King (4 McCord L. 487), 32. Charleston v. Oliver (16 S. C. 47), 611. Charleston v. Palmer (1 McCord 342), 542. Charleston v. Pepper (1 Rich. Law 364), 33, 35, 471, 478, 615, 623. Charleston v. Pinckmey (3 Brev. 217), 808. Charleston v. Reed (27 W. Va. 681), 72, 449, 551, 735, 736. Charleston v. Rodgers (2 McCord. L.), 495, 768. Charleston v. Schmidt (11 Rich. 343), 482, 549. Charleston v. Schroeder (4 Rich. Law 296), 544. Charleston v. Seeba (4 Strob. 319), 485. Charleston v. State ex rel Adger (2 Speers 719), 35, 73. Charleston v. Wentworth Street Baptist Church (4 Strob. Law. 306), 80, 319, 696. Charlestown v. Stone (15 Gray 40), 810. Charlotte C. & A. R. R. v. Gibbes (142 U. S. 386), 910. Chase v. City Treasurer (122 Cal. 540), 128. Chase v. Oshkosh (81 Wis. 313), 717, 720. Chase v. Springfield (119 Mass. 556), 846. Chattanooga v. Norman (92 Tenn. 73), 44, 731. Cheatham v. Shearon (1 Swan 213), 740. Cheek v. Aurora (92 Ind. 107), 718. Chenango Bank v. Brown (26 N. Y. 467), 319. Cheney In re (90 Cal. 617), 283, 360, 771. Cheny v. Shelbyville (19 Ind. 84), 562, 647. Cherokee v. Fox (34 Kan. 16), 493, 657. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (5 Pet. 1), 261. Cherry v. Keyport (52 N. J. L. 544), 803. Chesney v. McClintock (61 Kan. 94), 461. Chester v. Black (132 Pa. St. 568), 823. Bullock (187 Pa. St. Chester & D. R. R. Co. (3 Rep. 389), 818. Eyre (181 Pa. St. 642), W. U. Tel. Co. (154 Pa. 406, 407. Bartee (100 111. 57), 766. Blair (149 111. 310), 826. Brownell (146 111. 64), Chester v. 544), 224 Chester v. Del. Co. Chester v. 264, 860. Chester v. St. 464), Chicago V. Chicago V. Chicago V. 44. Chicago V. Brownell (41 111. App. 70), 756, 786. Chicago V. Chicago Union Traction Co. (199 111. 259), 750. Chicago V. Chicago Western & Ind. R. R. Co. (105 m. 73), 916. Chicago V. Collins (175 111. 445), 435, 437, 612, 644. Chicago V. Crosby (111 III. 538), 716, 810. Chicago V. Evans (24 111. 52), 260, 262, 882. Chicago V. Eraser (60 111. App. 404), 186, 807. Chicago V. Ferris Wheel Co. (58 111. App. 625), 735. Chicago V. Habar (62 111. 283), 848. Chicago V. Kenney (35 111. App. 57), 277, 476, 482, 483, 486, 487, 493, 501, 509. Chicago V. Law (144 111. 569), 797. Chicago V. McCoy (136 111. 344), 5, 252. Chicago V. McKechney (91 111. App. 442), 11, 117. Chicago V. Netcher (183 111. 104), 354, 774. Chicago V. Nichols (177 111. 97), 812. Chicago V. O'Brennan (65 111. 160), 457. TABLE OF CASES. xlix (The references are to pages.) Chicago V. O'Brien (111 111. 532), 63, 715. Chicago V. Phoenix Ins. Co. (126 111. 276), 660. Chicago V. Rumpffi (45 111. 90), 21, 265, 302, 304, 310, 447, 697, 699. Chicago V. Rumsey (87 111. 348), 799. Chicago V. Sheldon (9 Wall 50), 378. Chicago V. Silverman (156 111. 601), 849. Chicago V. Singer (202 111. 75), 837, 854, 859. Chicago V. Stratton (182 111. 494), 44, 134, 313, 627, 703. Chicago V. Trotter (136 111. 430), 136, 294, 628, 728. Chicago & Western Ind. R. R. Co. V. Dunban (95 111. 571), 879. Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. Carlinville (103 111. App. 251), 443. Chicago B. & Q^ R. R. Co. v. Qiiincy (139 111. 355), 818. Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Quincy (136 111. 563), 93, 817, 851. Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Hag- erty (67 111. 113), 686, 744. Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Iowa (94 U. S. 155), 54, 909. Chicago & E. I. R. R. Co. v. Beaver (96 111. App. 558), 31. Chicago & G. T. Ry. Co. v. Well- man (143 U. S. 339), 910. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota (134 U. S. 418), 910. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minn. Cent. Ry. Co. (14 Fed. 525), 318. C. & N. Pac. R. R. V. Chicago (174 111. 439), 5, 50, 315, 319, 337, 834. Chicago & N. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Chicago (172 111. 66), 835. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co. v. Cicero (154 111. 656), 812. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co. v. Peo- ple ex rel Elgin (91 111. 251). 875. C, R. I. & P. R. R. Co. v. Council Bluffs (109 Iowa 425), 5. Chicago. R. I. & P. R. R. Co. v. Joliet (79 111. 25), 548. C. & R. I. R. R. Co. V. Whipple (22 III. 105), 558. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Co. v. Young (96 Mo. 39), 572. Chicago & St. Paul R. R. Co. v. Ackley (94 U. S. 179), 54. Chicago, S. F. & C. Ry. Co. v. Mc- Grew (104 Mo. 288), 93. Chicago, W. D. Ry. Co. v. Klauber (9 111. App. 613), 586, 587, 602. Chicago & W. I. R. R. Co. v. Dun- bar (100 111. 110), 894. Chicago, etc., Co. v. Chicago (88 111. 221), 36. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Chicago (124 111. 439), 11. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chicago (176 111. 253), 426. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chicago (166 U. S. 226), 819. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Council Bluffs (109 Iowa 425), 237. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hines (82 111. App. 488), 232. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kennedy (2 Kan. App. 693), 61. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. People (79 111. App. 529), 32, 34. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. State (47 Neb. 549), 671. Chicago Board of Trade v. People ex rel (91 111. 80), 879. Chicago City Ry. Co. v. People ex rel., (73 111. 541), 549 877, 879, 902, 914. Chicago Dock Co. v. Garrity (115 111. 155), 81, 168, 186, 202, 329, 340, 346, 886, 887. Chicago Municipal Gas Light Co. v. Lake (130 111. 42), 879. Chicago Packing & P. Co. v. Chi- cago (88 111. 221). 615. 616, 624, 673, 909. Chicago Terminal R. R. Co. v. Chi- cago (184 111. 154), 849. Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Chi- cago (199 111. 484), 579, 909, 911, 912. Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Chi- cago (202 111. 576), 836. Chicago Telephone Co. v. North- western Telephone Co. (199 111. 324), 203, 234, 429, 896, 901. TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Chicago Tel. Co. v. N. W. Tel. Co. (100 111. App. 57), 190. Chicago T. T. Co. v. Chicago (178 111. 429, 224). ■Chicago, W. & V. Coal Co. v. Glass (34 111. App. 364), 741. Child V. Bemiis (17 R. I. 230), 626, 638. Child V. Hudson Bay Co. (2 P. Wm. 207), 79, 83. Childress v. Nashville (3 Sneed 347), 485, 752, 754. Chillicothe v. Brown (38 Mo. App. 609), 133, 299, 311, 627, 774. Chillicothe v. Logan Natural Gas, etc., Co. (11 Ohio Dec. 24), 50. Chillicothe v. Logan Natural Gas, etc., Co. (8 Ohio N. P. 88), 255. Chillicothe v. People (11 Hun. 390), 793. Chillicothe v. Raynard (80 Mo. 185), 65. Childs V. Nelson (69 Wis. 125), 717. Childs V. Shower (18 Iowa 261), 333. Chilson V. Wilson (38 Mich. 267), 209, 834. Chilvers v. People (11 Mich. 43), 415, 621, 634, 659. Chin Yan, ex parte (60 Cal. 78), 277, 290, 313, 557. Chipman v. Bowman (14 Cal. 157), 470. Christensen, In re (43 Fed. Rep, 243), 626, 649. Christensen, ex parte (85 Cal. 208), 252, 253, 451, 757. Christensen v. Fremont (45 Neb. 160), 798. Christian v. St. Louis (127 Mo. 109), 891. Christie v. Maiden (23 W. Va. 667), 72. Christman v. Phillips (58 Hun. 282), 120. Chouquette v. Southern Blec. Ry. Co. (152 Mo. 257), 749. Chy Lung v. Freeman (92 U. S. 275), 411. Chytraus v. Chicago (160 111. 18), 848, 849, 859. Church V. People (179 111. 205), 812. Churchill v. Marsh (2 Abb. Pr. 219), 332. Cicero Lumber Co. v. Cicero (176 111. 9), 436, 815. Cincinnati v. Anderson (52 Ohio St. 600), 845. Cincinnati v. Bickett (26 Ohio St. 49), 16, 168, 190, 252. Cincinnati v. Bryson (15 Ohio 625), 615, 616, 634. Cincinnati v. Buckingham (10 Ohio 257), 616, 656, 761, 762. Cincinnati v. Corry (7 Ohio Dec. 415), 843. Cincinnati v. Craft (8 Ohio Dec. 672), 544. Cincinnati v. Gwynne (10 Ohio 192), 25, 117, 477. Cincinnati v. Johnson (17 Ohio Cir. Ct. 291), 189. Cincinnati v. McMicken (6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 188), 95. Cincinnati v. Mathers (6 Ohio Dec. 755), 839. Cincinnati v. Miller (29 Ohio L. J. 364), 710. Cincinnati v. Penny (21 Ohio St. 499, 875). Cincinnati v. Rice (150 Ohio 225, 759). Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. Co. v. Bowling Green (57 Ohio St. 336), 750. Cincinnati Incline PI. Ry. Co. v. Cincinnati (52 Ohio St. 609), 650. Cincinnati Ry. Co. v. Tel. Assn. (48 Ohio St. 390), 305. Cincinnati St. Ry. Co. v. Cincinnati (8 Ohio N. P. 80), 651, 653. Cincinnati St. Ry. Co. v. Smith (29 Ohio St. 291), 263. Cincinnati Water Co. v. Cincinnati (4 Ohio 443), 584. Citizens' Electric Light & Power Co. V. Sands (95 Mich. 551), 896. Citizens' Gas Co. v. Elwood (114 Ind. 332), 3, 304, 313, 897. Citizens' Gas Light Co. v. Wake- field (161 Mass. 432), 837. Citizens' Sav. Bank v. Owensboro (173 U. S. 636), 374. Citizens' Street Ry. v. Jones (34 Fed. Rep. 579), 894. TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages. ) Citizens' St. Ry Co. v. Memphis (53 Fed. 715), 316. Citizens' Water Co. v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. (55 Conn. 1), 308, 379. City Council v. Ashley P. Co. (33 S. C. 25), 462. City Council v. Dunn (1 McCord 333), 533, 534, 552, 726. City Council v. King (4 McCord 487), 471. City Council v. Truchelut (1 Nott & McCord 227), 547. City Imp. Co. v. Broderick (125 Cal. 139), 861. City Pub. Co. v. Jersey City (54 N. J. L. 437), 252. City Ry. Co. v. Citizens' St. Ry. Co. (166 U. S. 557), 902. City Sewerage U. Co. v. Davis (8 Phil. 625), 194. City & Suburban Ry. Co. v. Savan- 'nah (77 Ga. 731). 34, 312, 751. Claflin V. Hopkinton (4 Gray 502), 103. Clamp, ex parte (9 Ohio Dec), 672, 575. Clapp V. Spokane (53 Fed. Rep.). 515, 817. Clapton V. Taylor (49 Mo. App. 117), 861. Clare v. State (5 Iowa 509), 504. Clarence v. Patrick (54 Mo. App. 462), 493, 596. Clark, In re (9 Wend. 212), 522. Clark's Case (5 Co. 64), 277. Clark and Tp. of Howard Re (10 Up. Can. Com. Pleas 576), 272. Clark V. Bynum (3 McCord L. 298), 446. Clark V. Davenport (14 Iowa 494), 75, 186. Clark V. Denton (B. & A. 92), 108. Clark V. Elizabeth (61 N. J. L. 565), 168. Clark V. Holdridge (58 Barb. 61), 473. Clark V. Janesville (10 Wis. 136), 249. Clarke v. Jennings (Cal. 1893, 32 Pac. Rep. 1049), 236, 846. Clark V. LeCrew (9 B. & C. 52), 108. Clark V. Le Gren (9 B. & C. 52), 292. Clark V. Lewis (35 111. 417), 275. Clark V. Lyon (68 N. Y. 609), 804. Clark V. Mobile (67 Ala. 217), 660. Clark V. New Brunswick (43 N. J. L. 175), 484. Clark V. People (12 Am. Dec. 178), 465. Clark V. Providence (16 R. I. 337), 94. Clark V. South Bend (85 Ind. 276), 99, 734, 741. Clark V. Titusville (184 U. S. 329), 632. Clark V. Tucker (2 Vent. 183), 273. Clark V. Washington (12 Wheat., 40), 128. Clark County v. Lawrence (63 111. 32), 105. Clarke v. Rochester (28 N. Y. 605), 66. Clarke v. Rochester (14 How. Pr. 193), 140. Clarksburg Electric Light Co. v. Clarksburg (47 W. Va. 739), 72, 896, 901. Claser v. Cincinnati (31 Wkly. Law Bui.), 243, 637. Clason V. Milwaukee (30 Wis. 316), 297, 552. Clay, ex parte (98 Mo. 578), 574. Clay V. Mexico (92 Mo. App. 611), 6, 842. Clayton v. Chicago (44 111. 280), 610. Clayton v. Henderson (20 Ky. Law Rep. 87), 680. Clementine v. State (14 Mo. 112), 752. Clements v. Casper (4 Wyo. 494), 634. Cleveland v. Clements Bros. Const. Co. (67 Ohio St. 197), 778, 864. Cleveland v. Lenze (27 Ohio St. 383), 736. Cleveland v. Main (7 Ohio Dec. 124), 687. Cleveland City Ry. Co. v. Cleve- land (94 Fed. Rep. 385), 378, 436, 909. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. R. R. Co. V. Dunn (61 111. App. 227), 546. lii TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co. v. Har- rington (131 Ind. 426), 289, 744. Clevenger v. Rushville (90 Ind. 258), 580, 791. Clifford V. Dam (81 N. Y. 52), 715. Cline V. Seattle (13 Wash. 444), 168. Clinton v. Cedar Rapids Ry. Co. (24 Iowa 455), 890. Clinton v. Henry County (115 Mo. 557), 824. Clinton v. Howard (42 Conn. 294), 717. Clinton v. Norwich (39 Conn. 376), 717. Clinton V. Phillips (58 111. 108), 359. Clinton v. Portland (26 Oreg. 410), ^ 830, 839. Clinton v. Walliker (98 Iowa 655), 867. Clintonville v. Keeting (4 Denio 341), 645. Cloherty, In re (2 Wash. 137), 69, 462. Cloqiiet Lumber Co. In re (61 Minn. 233), 610. Coal Float v. Jeffersonville (112 Ind. 15), 82, 290. Coast Co. V. Spring Lake Borough (56 N. J. Eq. 615), 348, 806. Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Savannah (30 Fed. Rep. 646), 322, 378. Coates V. New York (7 Cow. 585), 352, 353, 475, 494, 697. Coble V. Boston (109 Mass. 438), 70S. Cochran v. McCleary (22 Iowa 75), 155, 156, 15-8. Cochran v. Park Ridge (138 111. 295), 801, 852. Cochran v. U. S. (157 U. S. 286), 491. Cochrane v. Darcy (5 S. C. 125), 372. Cochrane V. Frostburg (81 Md. 54), 76, 731. Coe V. Errol (62 N. H. 303), 411. Coe V. Schultz (47 Barb. 64), 687, 699. Coffin V. Nantucket (5 Gush. 269), 145. Coffin V. Portland (43 Fed. Rep. 411), 187. Coghlll V. State (37 Ind. Ill), 327. Cohen v. Goldsboro (77 N. C. 2), 437. Cohen v. New York (113 N. Y. 532), 677, 716, 717. Cohen v. Wright (22 Cal. 293), 383. Cohens v. Virginia (6 Wheat. 264), 415. Coker v. Blrge (10 Ga. 336), 703. Coker v. Birge (9 Ga. 425), 704. Coldwater v. Tucker (36 Mich. 474), 673, 801. Cole v. Hall (103 111. 30), 640. Cole V. Newburyport (129 Mass. 594), 678. Cole V. Skrainka (105 Mo. 303), 870. Cole V. Skrainka (37 Mo. App. 427), 110. Coles V. Williamsburg (10 Wend. 659), 166, 173, 659, 828. Coles County v. Allison (23 111. 437), 546. Coll V. Board (83 Mich. 367), 119. Collier v. Territory (2 Okla. 444), 525. Collins V. Chicago (175 111. 445), 645. Collins V. Hall (92 Ga. 411), 555, 771. Collins V. Hatch (18 Ohio 523), 23, 26, 76, 79, 731. Collins V. Holyoke (146 Mass. 298), 196, 808. Collins V. Kinnare (89 111. App. 236), 570. Collins V. Louisville (2 B.. Mon. 134), 768. Collins V. Savannah (77 Ga. 745), 676. Collins v. State (88 Ala. 212), 525. Collins V. Waltham (151 Mass. 196), 799. Collins V. Welch (58 Iowa 72), 115. Collinsville v. Cole (78 111. 114), 643. Colon V. IJsk (153 N. Y. 188), 669. Collopy V. Cloherty (95 Ky. 330), 86. Colorado Springs v. Smith (19 Colo. 554), 714. Columbia v. Beasly (1 Humph. 232), 510, 630, 757. Columbia v. Harrison (2 Mill's Const. Rep. 213), 475, 534. TABLE OF CASES. liii (The references are to pages. J Columbia v. Johnson (72 Mo. App. 232), 506. Columbia Bottom Levee Co. v. Meier (39 Mo. 53), 164, 166. Columbia Co. v. King (13 Fla. 451), 382. Columbus V. Arnold (30 Ga. 517), 481, 530, 555. Columbus V. Columbus St. R. R. Co. (45 Ohio St. 98), 899. Columbus V. Goetchius (7 Ga. 139), 472. Columbus V. Hartford Ins. Co. (25 Neb. 83), 661. Columbus V. Jaques (30 Ga. 506), 716, 762. Columbus V. Ogletree (96 Ga. 177), 601. Columbus Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Columbus (50 Ohio St. 65), 817. Combs V. Lippincott (35 N. J. L. 481), 737. Commercial Bank v. Chambers (8 S. & M. 9), 383. Comer v. Folsom (13 Minn. 219), 105. Comrs. V. King (13 Fla. 451), 145. Comrs. V. Silvers (22 Ind. 491), 12. Comrs. of Highways v. Willard (41 Mich. 627), 803. Comrs. of Louisburg v. Harris (7 Jones Law 281), 283. Comrs. of Lowndes County v. Hearne (59 Ala. 371), 213. Commissioners of Northern Liber- ties V. Northern Liberties Gas. Co. (12 Pa. St. 318), 296, 300. Com. V. Abbott (160 Mass. 282), 839, 853. Com. V. Abrahams (156 Mass. 57), 360, 770. Com. V. Alden (143 Mass. 113), 704. Com. V. Alger (7 Cush. 53), 664. Com. V. Allen (128 Mass. 308), 8. 9. Com. V. Angle (14 Pa. County Ct, Rep. 538), 158. Com. V. Barrett (108 Mass. 302), 491, 492. Com. V. Bean (Thacher Cr. Cas. 85), 488. Com. V. Bean (14 Gray 52), 506, 508, 731. Com. V. Bearce (132 Mass. 542), 664. Com. V. Beatty (1 Watts. 382), 390. Com. V. Bennett (108 Mass. 27), 648. Com. V. Borden (61 Pa. St. 272), 480. Com. V. Brooks (109 Mass. 355), 47, 360, 763, 766. Com. V. Burke (114 Mass. 261), 540. Com. V. Calhane (154 Mass. 115), 405. Com. V. Carter (132 Mass. 12), 768. Com. V. Carey (12 Cush. 246), 483. Com. V. Chase (6 Cush. 248), 733. Com. V. Chittenden (2 Pa. Dist. 804), 585. Com. V. Churchill (2 Met. 118), 332. Com. V. Comrs. (6 Pick. 501), 383. Com. V. Cooley (10 Pick. 37), 327, 332. Com. V. Crogan (155 Pa. St. 448), 22. Com. V. Crowell (156 Mass. 215), 404. Com. V. Curtis (9 Allen 266), 505, 536, 554, 732. Com. V. Cutter (156 Mass. 52), 29, 297, 491, 492, 505, 554, 706. Com. V. Cutter (Thatcher Cr. Cas. 137), 506. Com. V. Dailey (12 Cush. 80), 527. Com. V. Dava (2 Met. 329), 768. Com. V. Davis (11 Pick. 432), 488. Com. V. Davis (140 Mass. 485), 43, 47, 50, 200, 237, 245, 250, 360, 485, 770. Com. V. Davis (162 Mass. 510), 360. Com. V. Dean (110 Mass. 357), 648. Com. V. Dean (21 Pick. 334), 501. Com. V. Dejardln (126 Mass. 46), 81. Com. V. Dennison (24 How. 66), 522. Com. V. Dow (10 Met. 382), 442, 451, 455, 474, 738. Com. V. Dowling (114 Mass. 259), 540. Com. V. Drew (3 Cush. 279), 540. Com. V. Eastern Ry. Co. (103 Mass. 254), 317. Com. V. Elliott (121 Mass. 367), 299. Com. V. Ellis (158 Mass. 555), 299, 714. Com. V. Ellis (11 Mass. 462), 570. liv TABLE OF CASES. Com. V. Emmons (98 Mass. 6), 539. Com. V. Emsley (5 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 476), 553. Com. V. Essex Co. (13 Gray 239), 317, 322. Com. V. Evans (132 Mass. 11), 767. Com. V. Pahey (5 Cush. 408), 222, 488, 695. Com. V. Farrell (8 Gray 463), 530. Com. V. Farren (9 Allen 489), 767. Com. V. Penton (139 Mass. 195), 506, 552, 713. Com. V. Fltler (136 Pa. St. 129), 242, 243, 434. Com. V. Forrest (170 Pa. St. 40), 43, 727, 732. Com. V. Gingrich (21 Pa. Super Ct. 286), 103. Com. V. Gage (114 Mass. 328), 714. Com. V. Gannett (1 Allen 7), 540. Com. V. Gay (5 Pick. 44), 493. Com. V. Getchell (16 Pick. 452), 331. Com. V. Gillam (8 Serg. & R. 50), 341, 769. Com. V. Goodnow (117 Mags. 114), 24, 30, 715, 787, 793. Com. V. Goodrich (13 Allen 545), 312, 695. Com. V. Hamilton Mfg. Co. (120 Mass. 383), 779. Com. V. Hargest (7 Pa. Co. Ct. 333), 174. Com. V. Harmel (166 Pa. St. 89), 397, 404. Com. V. Hart (11 Cush. 130), 498. Com. V. Hastings (16 P'a. Co. Ct. Rep. 425), 143. Com. V. Hawkes'(123 Mass. 525), 472. Com. V. Haynes (107 Mass. 194), 489. Com. V. Hill (12 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 559), 558. Com. V. Hillenbrand (96 Ky. 407), 196. Com. V. Howard (149 Pa. 302), 145. Com. V. Hubley (172 Mass. 58), 773. Com. V. Hunt (4 Met. Ill), 524. Com. V. Hutz (Brightly 75), 704. Com. V. Ingraham (3 Bush. 106), 564. Com. V. Ipswich (2 Pick. 70), 149, 164. (The refcrfnces are to pages.) Com. V. Kempsmith (13 Pa. County Ct. Rep. 667), 157. Com. V. Kepner (10 Phila. 510), 158. Com. V. Kepner (30 Leg. Int. 312), 241. Com. V. Kidder (107 Mass. 188), 697, 704. Com. V. Kimball (105 Mass. 465), 540. Com. V. Kimball (7 Met. 304), 543. Com. V. Kinsley (133, Mass. 578), 638. Com. V. LaBar (7 North C. C. R. 85), 226. Com. V. Lagorio (141 Mass. 81), 237, 508, 552, 567, 713, Com. V. Lancaster (5 Watts. 152), 171, 183. Com. V. Leonard (140 Mass. 473), 772. Com. V. Louisville (5 B. Men. 293), 338. Com. V. Lynch (6 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 536), 512. Com. V. McCafterty (45 Mass. 384), 47, 249, 301, 730. Com. V. McChmg (3 Clark), 413, 733. Com. V. McHale (97 Pa. St. 83), 522. Com. V. Mann (4 Gray 213), 540. Com. V. Markham (7 Bush. 486), 640. Com. V. Marshall (11 Pick. 350), 332. Com. V. Marshall (69 Pa. St. 328), 246, 265. Com. V. Matthews (122 Mass. 60), 251. Com. V. Maxwell (2 Pick. 138), 497. Com. V. Miller (139 Pa. St. 77), 684, 697. Com. V. Mitchell (82 Pa. St. 343), 862. Com. V. Milton (12 B. Mon. 212), 655, 671. Com. V. Moir (199 Pa. St. 534, 367). Com. V. Morrisey (157 Mass. 471), 43, 758. Com. V. Mott (21 Pick. 492), 331. Com. V. Mulhall (162 Mass. 496), 299, TABLE OF CASES. Iv; (The references are to pages.) Com. V. Newhall (164 Mass. 338), 404. Com. V. Nichols (10 Met. 259), 541. Com. V. Nightingale (Thatcher Crim. Cas, 251), 491. Com. V. N. & L. R. Corp (2 Gray 54), 887. Com. V. Odenweier (156 Mass. 234), 495. Com. V. Omensetter (9 Phila. 489), 143. Com. V. Page (155 Mass. 227), 642. Com. V. Painter (10 Pa. St. 214), 49. Com. V. Parks (155 Mass. 531), 742. Com. V. Passmore (1 Serg. & R. 217), 717. Com. V. Patch (97 Mass. 221), 44, 298, 699, 704. Com. V. Perry U55 Mass. 117), 778. Com. V. Perry (139 Mass. 198), 704. Com. V. Phillips (16 Pick. 211), 502. Com. V. Pindar (11 Met. 539), 467. Com. V. Pittsburg (183 Pa. St. 202), 103. Com. V. Pittsburgh (14 Pa. St. 177), 9, 195. Com. v.'Plaisted (148 Mass. 375), 135, 143, 297, 362, 615, 628, 629, 671. Com. V. Putnam (4 Gray 16), 541. Com. V. Randolph (146 Pa. St. 83), 522. Com. V. Raymond (97 Mich. 567), 539. Com. V. Reed (1 Gray 472), 471. Com. V. Reed (34 Pa. St. 275), 707. Com. V. Reese (16 Ky. Law Rep. 493), 367. Com. V. Reid (175 Mass. 325), 506, 508, 763. Com. V. Rice (9 Mete. 253), 505. Com. V. Ringold (182 Mass. 308), 6r,3. Com. V. Roark (8 Cush. 210), 467. Com. V. Roberts (155 Mass. 281). 707. Com. V. Robertson (5 Cush. 438), 298, 428, 448, 690. Com. V. Roxbury (9 Gray 451), 113. Com. V. Rowe (141 Mass. 79), 506, 713. Com. V. Roy (140 Mass. 432), 25, 30, 726. Com. V. Rumford Chemical Works (16 Gray 231), 697. Com. V. Rush (14 Pa. St. 186), 719. Com. V. Ryan (5 Mass. 90), 471. Com. V. Silfer (25 Pa. St. 23), 366. Com. V. Snyder (182 Ea. St. 630), 403. Com. V. Sotkley (12 Phila. 316), 626. Com. V. Steffee (7 Bush. 161), 301, 733. Com. V. Stevens (153 Mass. 421), 541. Com. V. Stodder (2 Cush. 562), 71, 83, 297, 300, 302, 615, 634, 726. Com. V. Tewksbury (11 Met. 55), 735. Com. V. Thompson (12 Met. 231), 689. Com. V. Thompson (110 Pa. St. 297), 466. Com. V. Thurlow (24 Pick. 374), 542. Com. V. Torrey (13 Pa. Co. Ct. 362), 585. Com. V. Tucker (2 Pick. 44), 799. Com. V. Turner (1 Cush. 493), 2 231, 784. Com. V. Tryon (99 Mass. 442), 540. Com. V. Van Sickle (Brightly 69), 704. Com. V. Vermont and Mass. R. Corp. (4 Gray 22), 887. Com. V. Vrooman (164 Pa. St. 306), 669. Com. V. Wachendort (141 Mass. 270), 541. Com. V. Waite (11 Allen 264), 539, 767. Com. ex rel v. Warwick (185 Pa. St. 623), 723. Com. V. Watson (97 Mass. 562), 458. Com. V. Webb (6 Rand Va. 726), 707. Com. V. Weiss (139 Pa. St. 247), 767. Com. V. Weller (14 Bush 218), 49. Com. V. Wentworth (118 Mass. 441), 539. Com. V. Wentworth (Brightly 318), 718. Com. V. Wetherbee (153 Mass. 159), 767. Ivi TABLE OF CASES. (The relcreuces are to pages.) Com. V. Whitney (108 Mass. 5), 525. Com. V. Wilkins (121 Mass. 356), 284, 286. Com. V. Wilkinson (16 Pick. 175), 720. Com. V. Williams (11 Pa. St. 61), 49. Com. V. Worcester (3 Pick. 462), 32, 50, 296, 471, 486, 493, 496, 529, 532, 536, 552, 726, 744. Com. V. Young (135 Mass. 526), 704. Com. V. Young Men's Christian Association (169 Pa. St. 24), 93. Compagnie Francaise, etc. v. Louisiana State Board of Health (186 U. g. 380), 421, 422. Compton V. Van Volkenburg (34 N. J. L. 134), 12. Compton V. Waco Bridge Co. (62 Tex. 715), 95, 719. Conboy v. Iowa City (2 Iowa 90), 161, 245, 248, 562, 583. Concord v. Boscawen (17 N. H. 465), 75. Concordia v. Hagaman (1 Kan. App. 35), 172. Concordia Cemetery Assn. v. Min- nesota & N. W. R. R. C6. (121 111. 199), 695. Conde v. Schnectady (164 N. Y. 258), 82L Conery v. New Orleans Water- works Co. (39 La. Ann. 770), 428. Conger v. Comrs. (Idaho 1896), (48 Pac. Rep. 1064), 145. Congregational Society of Bethany V. Sperry (10 Conn. 200), 148, 150. Conley v. Sup'rs Calhoun Co. (2 W. Va. 416), 327, 330. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Al- bert (39 Mo. 181), 445. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Smith (117 Mo. 261), 89. Connolly v. Beverly (151 Mass. 437), 107. Connolly v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. (114 N. Y. 104), 605. Connelly v. State (60 Ala. 89), 527. Connor v. C. R. I. & P, R, R, (59 Mo. 285), 870. Connor v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y. (1 Selden 285), 366. Connor v. Paris (87 Tex. 32), 223, 840. Connors v. Gorey (32 Wis. 518), 463, 464, 469. Connersville v. Merrill (14 Ind. App. 303), 588, .856. Consolidated Traction Co. v. Eliza- beth (58 N. J. L. 619), 297. Consumers' Gas, etc. Co. v. Con- gress Spring Co. (61 Hun. 133), 427. Contiental Construction Co. v. Al- toona (92 Fed. Rep. 822), 128. Conway v. Rochester (157 N. Y. 33), 898. Conway v. Taylor (66 U. S. 603), 306, 414. Conwell V. Emrie (2 Ind. 35), 667. Cook V. Johnson (58 Mich. 437), 54. Cook V. Memphis (94 Tenn. 692), 654. Cook V. Pennsylvania (97 U. S. 566), 397, 400. Cook V. Portland (20 Oregon 580), 823. Cook V. Slocum (27 Minn. 509), 839. Cook County v. McCrea (93 111. 236), 71, 76. Cook & Rathborne Co. v. Sanitary Dist. (177 111. 599), 328. Cooley v. Port Wardens (12 How. 299), 39. Coolidge V. Brookline (114 Mass. 592), 75, 106. Coombs, ex parte (38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 648), 462, 466. Coombs V. Mac Donald (43 Neb. 632), 6, 705. Cooney v. Southern Elec. Ry. Co. (80 Mo. App. 226), 749. Coonley v. Albasny (132 N. Y. 145), 475. Coonley v. Albany (57 Hun. 327), 676. Cooper, ex parte (3 Tex. App. 489), 640, 733. Cooper V. Alden (Har. 72), 93. Cooper V, -Detroit (42 Mich. 584), 762. TABLE OF CASES. ivii (The references are to pages.) Cooper V. District of Columbia (11 Dis. of Col. 250), 451, 635. Cooper V. People (41 Mich. 403), 486, 487. Coopers v. San Jose (55 Cal. 599), 95. Coosa River Steamboat Co. v. Bar- clay (30 Ala. 120), 383. Copcutt V. Yonkers (82 Hun. 178), 851. Copeland v. St. Joseph (126 Mo. 417), 333. Copenhaver, In re (54 Fed. Rep. 660), 385. Corbett v. Duncan (63 Miss. 84), 570. Corby v. C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (15& Mo. 457), 888. Cordell v. State (22 Ind. 1), 335. Cordes v. Miller (39 Mich. 581), 737. Corn V. Cameron (19 Mo. App. 573), 643. Cornell v. New Bedford (138 Mass. 588), 845. Cornell v. Guilford (1 Denio 510), 103. Cornell v. People (107 111. 372), 128. Cornish v. Pease (19 Me. 184), 151. Correll v. B. C. R. & M. Ry. Co. (38 Iowa 120), 601. Corrigan v. Gage (68 Mo. 541), 118, 291, 425, 814, 858. Corry v. Campbell (25 Ohio St. 134), 840. Corry v. Gaynor (22 Ohio St. 584), 830. Corry v. Corry Chair Co. (18 Pa. Super. Ct. 271), 205, 225. Corsicana v. Kerr (75 Tex. 207), 454. Corson v. Maryland (120 U. S. 502), 401. Cortis V. Kent Waterworks (7 Barn & C. 314), 164. Corvallis v. Carlile (10 Oreg. 139), 72, 75, 83, 759, 784. Cosgrove v. Augusta (103 Ga. 835), 354, 671. Costello V. State (108 Ala. 45), 718. Cotter V. Doty (5 Ohio 393), 274, 346, 741. Cotting V. K. C. Stock Yards (183 U. S. 79), 910. Cotton V. Davis (1 Strange 53), 164. Cottonwood Falls v. Smith (36 Kan. 401), 770, 771. Couch V. Steel (3 El & B. 402), 56. Coulterville v. Gillen (72 111. 599), 568. County Court v. Griswold (58 Mo. 175), 450. Courter v. Newark B'rd of Health (54 N. J. L. 325), 143. Covington v. Bishop (10 Ky. Law Rep. 939), 811. Covington v. Boyle (6 Bush. 204), 165. Covington v. Casey (3 Bush. 698), 845. Covington v. Dressman (6 Bush. 210), 828. Covington v. East St. Louis (78 111. 548), 31, 36, 66, 311. Covington v. Ludlow (1 Mete. 295), 202, 209, 214, 590. Covington v. Nelson (35 Ind. 532), 830. Covington v. Woods (98 Ky. 344), 644. Covington v. Woods (3 Ky. Law Rep. 85), 235. Covington Gas Light Co. v. Cov- ington (84 Ky. 94), 610. Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. V. Sanford (164 U. S. 578), 910. Covington St. Ry. Co. v. Coving- ton (72 Ky. 127). 882, 894. Cowell V. Colorado Springs Co. (3 Colo. 82), 547. Cowein v. Hames (11 John. 76), 471. Cowen V. West Troy (43 Barb. 48), 25, 811. Cowen V. Wilderwood (60 N. J. L. 365), 254. Cowgill V. Long (15 111. 202), 266, 267. Cowley V. Rushville (60 Ind. 327), 315, 316. Cowley V. Spokane (99 Fed. Rep. 840), 820. Iviii TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Cox V. Maria tt (36 N. J. L. 389), 389. Cox V. Moss (53 Mo. 432), 528. Cox V. St. Louis (11 Mo. 431), 583, 591. Coy V. Detroit Y. & A. A. Ry. (125 Mich. 616), 909, 910. Craddock v. State (18 Tex. Crim. App. 567), 784, 791. Craig V. Burnett (32 Ala. 728), 559, 648. Craig V. First Presbyterian Church (88 Pa. St. 42), 165, 695, 697. Cram v. Bangor House (12 Me. 354), 164. Cram v. Chicago (138 111. 506), 813. Cramer v. Burlington (42 Iowa 315), 472. Cramer v. Charleston (176 111. 507), 850, 857. ^ Crampton v. Zabriskie (101 U. S. 603), 431. Crandell v. Nevada (6 Wall. 35), 402, 408, 410. Crane v. Siloam Springs (67 Ark. 30), 248. Crcusnaw v. Roxbury (7 Gray 374), 114. Cranston v. Augusta (61 Ga. 572), 571, 670. Craw V. Tolono (96 111. 255), 621. Crawford v. Hurd R. Co. (57 Minn. 187), 467. Crawford v. Topeka (51 Kan. 756), 295, 726. Crawfordsville v. Braden (130 Ind. 149), 6, 11, 101, 670, 682, 775, 798. Crebs v. Lebanon (98 Fed. Rep. 549), 6, 198, 244, 246. Creighton v. Manson (27 Cal. 613), 237, 241, 846. Creighton v. Toledo (18 Ohio St. 447), 386. Crepp V. Durden (Cowp. 640), 287. Crescent City L. S. & S. H. Co. v. Jefferson Police Jury (32 La. Ann. 1192), 260. Creston Waterworks Co. v. Cres- ton (101 Iowa 687), 907. Cribbin, In re and City of Toronto (21 Ontario Rep. 325), 298. Crockett v. Boston (5 Cush. 182), 864. Crocker v. Collins (37 S. C. 327), 93. Crocker v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. (92 N. Y. 652), 726. Crofut V. Brooklyn Ferry Co. (36 Barb. 201), 469. Crofut V. Danbury (65 Conn. 294), 114, 264, 738. Crome v. Steeper (46 Up. Can. Rep. 87), 29. Crommett v. Pearson (18 Me. 344), 197, 209. Crone v. Mallirickrodt (9 Mo. App. 316), 588, 851. Cronin v. People (82 N. Y. 318), 224, 478, 490, 700. Crook V. People (106 111. 237), 346. Croome, In re and City of Brant- ford (6 Ontario Rep. 188), 222, 290, 443. Crosby v. Montgomery (108 Ala. 498), 907. Crosby v. Warren (1 Rush. Law 385), 34, 276, 688, 689, 733. Cross V. Morristown (18 N. J. Eq. 305), 7, 803, 841. Cross V. Morristown (33 N. J. L. 57), 83. Cross V. St. L. K. & N. W. Ry. (77 Mo. 318), 891. Crowell V. Hopkinton (45 N. H. 9), 104, 106. Crowley v. B. C. R. & N. Ry Co. (65 Iowa 658), 40. Crowley v. Rucker (107 La. 213), 245. Crowder v. Tinkler (19 Ves. Jr. 617), 741. Croy V. Obion County (104 Tenn. 525), 397. Cruickshank v. Chicago (181 111. 415'), 850. Crutcher v. Kentucky (141 V. S. 47), 395, 419, Crutchfield v. Warrensburg (30 Mo. App. 456), 5, 6. 132, 237. Cudon V. Eastwick (Salk. 192), 54, 192, 304. CuUen, In re (119 N. Y. 628), 827. Cullen, In re (53 Hun. 534), 868. Cullinan v. New Orleans (28 La. Ann. 102), 633. Cullman v. Arndt (125 Ala. 581), 403. TABLE OF CASES. lix (The references are to pages.) Culver V. Third National Bank of Chicago (64 111. 528), 328. Cumberland Co. v. Poor Directors (7 Pa. Super. Ct. 614), 103. Cuming v. Grand Rapids (46 Mich. 150), 837. Cumming v. Savannah (R. M. Chart. 26), 402. Cummings v. St. Louis (90 Mo. 259), 91, 92, 94, 888. Cunningham v. Berry (17 Oreg. 622), 501, 574. Cunningham v. Griffin (107 Ga. 690), 789. Cunningham v. Peoria (157 111. 499), 813, 855, 870. Curnen v. Mayor, etc. (79 N. Y. 511), 194. Curry v. Elvlns Co. (32 N. J. L. 362), 225. Curry v. Mount Sterling (15 111. 320), 812. Curry v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 1893, 24 S. W. Rep. 516), 578. Curtis V. Gowan (34 111. App. 516), 191, 531. Gushing v. Boston (I2S Mass. 330), 715. Gushing v. Buffalo Board of Health (13 N. Y. St. Rep. 783), 143, 705. Cutcomp V. Utt (60 Iowa 156), 172, 180, 189. Cutler V. Board of Supervisors (56 Miss. 115), 267. Cutler V. Russellville (40 Ark. 105), 187, 205. Cutliff v. Albany (60 Ga. 597), 630. Czarniecki v. Ballman (Pa., 10 Cent. Rep. 96), 698. D. Dahbs V. State (39 Ark. 353), 753. DafHnger v. Pittsburgh, etc. T. Co. ' (31 Pittsb. Legal J. 37), 187. Daggett v. Colgan (92 Cal. 53), 609. Daggett V. State (4 Conn. 60), 737. Dahlstrom v. St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (108 Mo. 525), 601, 745, 748. Dailey v. New Haven (60 Conn. 314), 73, 236, 261. Daily v. Swope (47 Miss. 367), 823. Dallas V. Atkins (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, 32 S. N. Rep. 780), 837. Dallas v. Ellison (10 Tex. Civ. App, 28), 837. Dallon, In re (Gl Kan. 257), 779. Dalrymple v. Milwaukee (53 Wis. 178), 607. Daives v. Hightston (45 N. J. L. L. 127), 249. Daly V. Georgia Southern & F. I. Co. (80 Ga. 793), 718, 895. Damon v. Granby (2 Pick. 345), 149, 164, 194, 195, 197. Dana, In re (7 Ben. 1), 519, 526. Dancer v. Mannington (50 W. V. 322), 137. Dane v. Mobile (36 Ala. 304), 537. Danforth v. Hinsdale (177 111. 579), 857. Daniel v. Richmond (78 Ky. 542), 631. Daniel v. State (55 Ga. 222), 569. Daniels v. Clegg (28 Mich. 32), 726. Daniels v. New Orleans (26 La. Ann. 1), 830. Danner v. State (89 Md. 220), 512, 523. Danville v. Danville Water Co. (180 111. 235), 906, 909. Danville v, Danville Water Co. (178 III. 299), 905. Danville v. McAdams (153 111. 216), 851, 871. Danville v. Peters (8 Luz. L. Reg. 272), 766. Danville v. Shelton (76 Va. 325), 72, 219, 233, 633. Danville v. Weaver (17 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 17, 4 Pa. Dist. R. 768), 632. Danville H. & W. R. Co. v. Com. (73 Pa. St. 29), 882. Danville Water Co. v. Danville (180 U. S. 619), 72, 322, 324, 381, 445, 905. Daquin v. Coiron (3 La. 387), 381. Darcantel v. People's Slaughter House & R. Co. (44 La. Ann. 632), 237, 699. Darden v. State (74 Ga. 842), 467, 470. Darling v. St. Paul (19 Minn. 389), 136, 625. Ix TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Darlington v. Com. (41 Pa. St. 68), 211, 245, 600, 846. Darlington v. Ward (48 S. C. 570), 290, 704. Darrach v. Kenney (12 Pa. County Ct. Rep. 391), 156. Darst V. Griffin (31 Neb. 668), 800. Darst V. People (51 111. 286), 275, 757. Dart V. Bagley (110 Mo: 42), 245, 336, 445. Dartmouth v. Commissioners (153 Mass. 12), 165. Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat 518), 53, 73. 317, 321, 369, 372. Dausch V. Crane (109 Mo. 330), 369. Davenport v. Bird (34 Iowa 524), 487. Davenport v. Kelley (7 Iowa 102), 310, 763. Davenport v. Kleinschmidt (6 Mont. 502), 71, 304, 308, 431. Davenport v. Richmond (81 Va. 6:;6), 352, 741. Davenport, etc. Co. v. Davenport (13 Iowa 229), 352. Davidson v. Chicago (178 111. 582), 859. Davidson v. New Orleans (96 U. S. 97), 354, 444. Davidson v. Wight (16 Dist. of Columbia App. 371), 820. - Daviess v. Fairbairn (3 How. 636), 339. Davies v. Mann (10 M. & W. 545), 604. Davies v. Morgan (1 Cromp. & J. 587), 292. Davies v. Los Angeles (86 Cal. 37), 69, 342. Davies v. Saginaw Co. (89 Mich. 295), 881. Davies v. Saginaw (87 Mich. 439), 183, 839. Davis, ex parte (115 Cal. 445), 583. Davis V. Anita (73 Iowa 325), 302, 769. Davis V. Brace (82 111. 542), 610. Davis V. Caldwell (28 La. Ann. 860), 144. Davis V. Davis (40 W. Va. 464), 169, 698. Davis V. Fasig (128 Ind. 271), 438. Davis V. Jackson (61 Mich. 530), 198, 209, 799. Davis V. Litchfield (155 111. 384), 319, 840, 857. Davis V. Litchfield (145 111. 313), 812. Davis V. Los Angeles (86 Cal. 37), 806. Davis V. Lynchburg (84 Va. 861), 829. Davis V. Massachusetts (167 U. S. 43), 360. Davis V Mayor, etc. (14 N. Y. 506), 261. Davis V. Montgomery (51 Ala. 139), 677. Davis V. New York (14 N. Y. 506), 716, 880, 887, 901. Davis V. N. Y. (1 Duer 451), 259. Davis V. Read (65 N. Y. 566), 134. Davis V. Rome (89 Ga. 724), 567. Davis V. Smith (130 Mass. 113), 873. Davis V. State (7 Md. 151), 10, 11. Davis V. State (2 Tex. App. 425), 753. Davis & Co. V. Macon (64 Ga. 128), 631. Davison v. Otis (24 Mich. 23), 571. Davock V. Moore (105 Mich. 120). 694. Dawes v. N. R. Ins. Co. (7 Owen 462), 166. Day V. Citizens' Ry. Co. (81 Mo. Apt). 471), 601, 748. Day V. Clinton (6 111. App. 476), 334, 534. Day V. Green (4 Cush. 433), 371, 627, 714, 719. Dayton v. Quigley (29 N. J. Eq. 77), 293. Deady v. Townsend (57 Cal. 298), 851. Deam v. Paterson (47 N. J. L. 15), 829. Dean v. Borchsenlus (30 Wis. 236), 864. Dean v. Charlton (23 Wis. 590), 864. Dean v. Chicago General Ry. Co. (64 111. App. 165)^ 909. Dean v. Davis (51 Cal. 406), 54. Dean v. Madison (9 Wis. 402), 831. TABLE OF CASES. Ixi (The references are to pages.) Dean v. State (63 Ala. 153), 570, 572. Deane, ex parte (2 Cranch. C. C. 125), 280, 672. Deane V. Todd (22 Mo. 90), 119. Dearden v. Townsend (L. R. 1. Q. B. 10), 442. De Ben v. Gerard (4 La. Ann. 30), 313. Decatur v. Vermillion (77 111. 315), 10. Decatur v. Wilson (96 Ga. 251), 838. Decatur G. L. Co. v. Decatur (24 111. App. 544), 305. Decatur Gas Light and Coke Co. V. Decatur (120 111. 67), 427. Decker v. Gammon (44 Me. 322), 602. Decker v. McSorley (111 Wis. 91), 583, 602. Decorah v. Bullis (25 Iowa 12), 153. Decorah v. Dunstan Bros. (38 Iowa 96), 315, 327, 626. Decorah v. GlUis (10 Iowa 234), 545. Deehan v. Johnson (141 Mass. 23), 637. Deems v. Baltimore (80 Md. 164), 435, 666, 668, 766. De Ginther v. New Jersey Home, etc. (58 N. J. L. 354), 736. Deischel v. Maine (81 Wis. 553), 145. Deitz V. Central (1 Colo. 323), 285, 463, 471, 492, 530, 534, 549, 554, 555, 557, 565, 568. Delamater v. Chicago (158 111. 575), 847, 849, 856, 857. Delaney, ex parte (43 Cal. 478), 298. Delaney v. Kansas City Police Court (167 Mo. 667). 337, 476, 508, 509, 512, 517, 519, 523, 528, 563, 577. DeLano v. Doyle (120 Mich. 258), 326. Delany v. Washington (2 Cranch. C. C. 459), 485. Delaware & A. Tel. Co. v. Camden County (67 N. J. L. 91), 225. Delaware & Atl. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pensauken Tp. (67 N. J. L. 531), 230, 232. Delaware Co. Comrs. v. Sackrider (35 N. Y. 154), 145. Delaware & H. Canal Co., In re (60 Hun. 204), 831, 833, 869. Delcambre v. Clere (34 La. Ann. 1050), 612. Delione v. Long Branch (55 N. J. L. 108), 737. De Loge v. New York Central, etc. R. R. Co. (157 N. Y. 688), 247. DeLoge v. N. Y. Central & H. R. Ry. Co. (92 Hun. 149), 595. Delphi V. Evans (36 Ind. 90), 12, 124, 186, 203, Demarest v. New Barbadoes (40 N. J. L. 604), 108. Demarest v. Wickham (63 N. Y. 320), 154, 155. Dement v. Rokker (126 111. 174), 861. Dempsey v. Burlington (66 Iowa 687), 227. Denison & Pac. Sub. Ry. Co. v. James (20 Tex. Civ. App. 358), 834. Dennehy v. Chicago (120 111. 627), 615, 647. Denning v. Roome (6 Wend. 651), 207. Denning v. Yount (62 Kan. 217), 334. Denning v. Yount (9 Kan. App. 708), 442. Dennison v. Kansas City (95 Mo. 416), 424, 430, 435, 830. Dent V. State (42 Ala. 514), 531. Dent V. West Virginia (129 U. S. 114), 405. Denton v. Jackson (2 Johns. Ch. 320), 89, 673. Densmore v. Erie City (7 Pa. Dist. Rep. 355), 645. Denver v. Beede (25 Colo. 172), 437. Denver v. Knowles (17 Colo. 204), 823. Denver v. Mullen (7 Colo. 346), 686, 689. Ixii TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Denver Board of Public "Works v. Hayden (13 Colo. App. 36), 873. Denver City R. R. Co. v. Denver (21 Colo. 350), 269. Denver & R. G. Ry. Co. v. Olsen (4 Colo. 239), 442. Denver & S. Co. v. Denver City R. Co. (2 Colo. 673), 880, 881, 886. DePuy V. Wabash (133 Ind. 336), 832. Derby v. Modesto (104 Cal. 515), 234, 248. Derby & Co. v. Modesto (104 Cal. 513), 251. Desche v. Gies (56 Md. 135), 528. Des Moines v. Casady (21 Iowa 570), 594. Des Moines v. C. R. I. & P. R. Co. (41 Iowa 569), 318. Des Moines v. Des Moines Water- works Co. (95 Iowa 348), 907. Des Moines v. Gilchrist (67 Iowa 210), 735, 736. Des Moines v. Hillis (55 Iowa 643), 224, 314. Des Moines v. Keller (116 Iowa 648), 228, 312, 353, 728. Des Moines City Ry. Co. v. Des Moines (90 Iowa 770), 817. Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines (44 Iowa 505), 19, 117, 261, 262, 343, 379, 670, 875, 880. Des Moines St. R. R. Co. v. Des Moines B. G. St. Ry Co. (73 Iowa 513), 305. Desmond v. Jefferson (19 Fed. Rep. 483), 100, 111. Des Plaines v. Poyer (123 111. 348), 687, 689. Deslsatch Line v. Bellamy Mfg. Co. (12 N. H. 205), 165. De Soto V. Brown (44 Mo. App. 148). 787, 793. De Soto V. Merciel (53 Mo. App. 57), 565. De Soto, ex rel v. Showman (1903 Mo. App. 73 S. W. Rep. 257), 835, 837. Deters v. Renick (37 Mo. 597), 329. Detroit v. Beckman (34 Mich. 125), 799. Detroit v. Beecher (75 Mich. 454), 813. Detroit v. Blackeby (21 Mich. 84) 675. Detroit v. Detroit City Ry. (56 Fed. Rep. 867), 72, 378, 912. Detroit V. Ft. Wayne & Belle Isle Ry. Co. (95 Mich. 456), 17, 270, 313, 449, 897, 912. Detroit v. Hosmer Wayne Circuit Judge (79 Mich. 384), 260, 798. Detroit v. Parker (181 U. S. 399), 821. Detroit v. Putnam (45 Mich. 263), 873. Detroit v. Moran (46 Mich. 213), 239, 240. Detroit Citizens' St. Ry. Co. v. De- troit Ry. Co. (171 U. S. 48), 881. Detroit Citizens' Street Ry. Co. v. Detroit (64 Fed. Rep. 628), 882, 912. Detroit, etc. Ry. Co. v. Detroit (110 Mich. 384), 72, 305. Detroit St. Ry. Co. v. Mills (85 Mich. 634), 915. DeVignier v. New Orleans (16 Fed. Rep. 11), 375. Devlin v. Gallagher (6 Daly 494), 57. Devoy v. New York (36 N. Y. 449), 333. Dew V. Judges, etc. (3 Hen. & M. 1), 67. Dewey v. Des Moines (101 Iowa 416), 822. DeWitt V. Duncan (46 Cal. 342), 802. DeWitt V. San Francisco (2 Cal. 289), 88. Dey V. Lee (4 Jones L. 238), 193, 194. Dey V. Jersey City (19 N. J. Eq. 412), 6, 145, 24L Dexter & L. Plank Ry. Co. v. Allen (16 Barb. 15), 327, 339. Diamond State Iron Co. v. Giles (7 Houst. 453), 737. Dickson v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (104 Mo. 491), 585, 749, 750. Dickinson v. Poughkeepsie (75 N. Y. 65), 861. TABLE OF CASES. Ixiii (The references are to pages.) Dieckmann v. Sheboygan County (89 Wis. 571), 846. Dill V. Roberts (30 Wis. 178), 268, 868. Dillard v. Webb (55 Ala. 468), 131, 681. Dillingham v. Snow (5 Mass. 547), 75. Dimock v.'Suffield (30 Conn. 129), 717. Dingley v. Boston (100 Mass. 544), 708. Dingwall v. Detroit (82 Mich. 568), 165. Dinwiddie v. Rushville (37 Ind. 66), 153. Distilling Co. v. Chicago (112 111. 19), 629, 648. District of Columbia v. Waggaman (4 Mackey 328), 290. District of Columbia v. Washing- ton, etc. R. R. (4 Mackey 214), 898. District Township v. Dubuque (7 Iowa 262), 82, 125. Dively v. Cedar Falls (21 Iowa 565), 472. Dively v. Cedar Falls (27 Iowa 227), 801. Diveny v. Blmira (51 N. Y. 506), 472. Dixon V. People (168 111. 179), 3. Doane v. Omaha (58 Neb. 816), 448. Dobbin v. San Antonio (2 Tex. Un- rep. Cases 708), 559. Dobson V. Blackmore (9 Ad. & El. 991), 63. Dodge V. B. C. R. & M. R. R. Co. (34 Iowa 276), 603. Dodge V. Council Bluffs (57 Iowa 560), 440. Dodge V. Gridley (10 Ohio 173), 23, 34. Dodge V. People (113 111. 491), 546. Dodwell V. Oxford (2 Vent 33), 451. Doe V. Naylor (2 Black. 32), 331. Dolese v. McDougall (78 111. App. 629), 856. Dollar Sav. Bank v. Ridge (62 Mo. App. 324), 845. Donaghy v. Macy (167 Mass. 178), 367. Donahoe v. Kansas City (136 Mo. 657), 675, 799. Donahue v, Graham (61 Cal. 276), 341, 342. Donly V. Pittsburg (147 Pa. St. 348), 867. Donnaher v. State (8 Smedes & M. 649), 747, Donnelly, In re (30 Kan. 424), 556. Donohue v. St. Louis, L M. & S. Ry. Co. (91 ,Mo. 357), 749. Donough V. Dewey (82 Mich. 309), 176, 178. Donough V. Robbens (60 Mo. App. 156), 702. Donovan v. Huntington (24 Ind. 321), 562. Donovan v. Vicksburg (29 Miss. 247), 275, 354. Doran v. Camden (64 N. J. L. 666) , 451. Dorathy v. Chicago (53 111. 79), 326, 827. Dorgan v. Boston (12 Allen 223), 800. Dorey v. Boston (146 Mass. 336), 196, 807. Dorland v. Bergson (78 Cal. 637), 834. Dorman v. Lewiston (81 Me. 411), 808, 839. Doty V. Lyman (166 Mass. 318), 242, 846. Dow v. Beidelman (125 U. S. 680), 910. Downham v. Alexandria (10 Wall 173), 403. Downing v. Mijtonvale (3C Kan. 740), 177, 201, 552, 591, 594. Downing v. Rugar (21 Wend. 178), 175. Downs V. High Point (115 N. C. 182), 680. Doyle V. Bradford (90 111. 416), 568, 582. Doyle V. Continental Ins. Co. (94 U. S. 535), 257. Dougherty -v. Austin (94 Cal. 601), 135. Douglass, ex parte (1 Utah 108), 575, 788, 792. Douglass, In re (46 N. Y. 42), 219. Douglas V. Baker County (23 Fla. 419), 175. I XIV TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Douglass V. Com. (108 Pa. St. 559), 862. Douglass V. Com. (2 Rawle 262), 457, 735, 737. Douglass V. Kansas City (147 Mo. 428), 478. Douglas V. Placerville (18 Cal. 643), 70, 76. Drake v. Berry (42 N. J. L. 60), 572. Drake v. Hudson River Co. (7 Barb. 539), 13. Drake v. Lowell (13 Mete. 292), 295, 721. Drake v. Phillips (40 111. 388), 609. Drake v. Railroad Co. (7 Barb. 508), 6. Drain v. Railroad (86 Mo. 574), 586. Drew County v. Bennett (43 Ark. 364), 647. Dreyfus v. Lonergan (73 Mo. App. 336), 257. Driscoll V. New Haven (Conn. 1902, 52 Atl. Rep. 618), 94. Drisko v. Columbia (75 Me. 73), 151. Drott V. Riverside (4 Ohio Cir Ct. 312), 21L Dry Dock E. B. & B. R. Co. v. New York (55 Barb. 298), 816. Duane v. Chicago (198 111. 471), 853. Duanesburgh v. Jenkins (57 N. Y. 177), 266. Dubach v. H. & St. J. R. R. Co. (89 Mo. 483), 747, 884, 888, 890. Dubois V. Augusta" (Dudley Rep. 30), 79. Dubois V. Kingston (102 N. Y. 219), 719. Dubuque v. Maloney (9 Iowa 450), 714. Dubuque v. Rebman (1 Iowa 444), 562. Dubuque v. Stout (32 Iowa 47), 38. Dubuque v. Wooton (28 Iowa 571), 248, 252. Ducat V. Chicago (48 111. 172), 621. Duckwall V. New Albany (25 Ind. 283), 616. Dudley v. Frankfort (12 B. Mon. 610), 719. Dudley v. Grayson (6 T. B. Mon- roe 259), 208. Dugan V. Farier (47 N. J. L. 383), 158. Duggan V. Peoria D. & E. Ry. Co. (42 111. App. 536), 24. Duggen V. McGruder (Walker 112), 570. Dullam V. Willson (53 Mich. 392), 83. Duluth V. Bloom (55 Minn. 97), 653, 773. Duluth V. Krupp (46 Minn. 435), 177, 201, 226, 450, 636, 766. Duluth V. Mallett (43 Minn. 204), 540, 554, 714, 747. Dumars v. Denver (Colo. App; 1901, 65 Pac. Rep. 580), 249, 251, 252. Dumesnil v. Dupont (18 B. Mon. 800), 740. Dunbar v. Augusta (90 Ga. 390), 668. Duncan v. Lawrence, County Comrs. (101 Ind. 403), 195. Duncan v. Lynchburg (Va. 1900, 34 S. E. Rep. 964), 71, 582, 673. Duncan v. Missouri (152 U. S. 377), 354. Dunham v. New Britain (55 Conn. 378), 437, 707. Dunham v. Rackliff (71 Me. 345), 726. Dunham v. Rochester (5 Cow. 462), 296, 302, 589, 615, 657, 698, 766. Dunker v. Stiefel (57 Mo. App. 379), 813. Dunn, In re (9 Mo. App. 255), 25, 196. Dunn V. Austin (77 Tex. 139), 696. Dunn V. Burleigh (62 Me. 24), 517. Dunn V. Com. (20 Ky. Law Rep. 1649), 361, 753. Dunstan v. Imperial Gas Light, etc. Co. (3 Barn & Adol. 125), 219. Du Page County v. Martin (39 111. App. 298), 213. DuQuoin First National Bank v. Keith (84 111. App. 103), 320. Durach, In re (62 Pa. St. 491), 646, 864. Durand v. Ansonia (57 Conn. 70), 851. TABLE OF CASES. Ixv (The references are to pages.) Durango v. Reinsberg (16 Colo. 327), 491, 564. Durant, In re (60 Vt. 176), 489. Durant v. Jersey City (25 N. J. L. 309), 131, 201. Durkin, In re (10 Hun. 269), 253. Durr V. Howard (6 Ark. 461), 466, 523. Duryee v. New York (96 N. Y. 477), 452. Dutton V. Aurora (114 111. 138), 328, 330, 798. Bye V. Noel (85 111. 290), 570. Dyer v. Brogan (70 Cal. 136), 212. Dyer v. Hudson (65 Cal. 374), 833. Dyer v. Miller (58 Cal. 585), 830. E. Earnhart v. Lebanon (5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 578), 334, 475. Easley v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (113 Mo. 236), 750. East Jordan Lumber Co. v. East Jordan (100 Mich. 201), 838. East Louisiana R. R. v. New Or- leans (46 La. Ann. 526), 377. Eastman v. Chicago (79 111. 178), 653, 773. Eastman v. Meredith (36 N. H. 284), 675. Easton v. Covey (74 Md. 262), 735, 738. Easton City v. Easton Beef Co. (5 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 68), 63L Easton & A. R. Co. v. Greenwich Tp. (25 N. J. Eq. 565), 719. Easton, S. E. & W. E. P. R. Co. v. Easton, (133 Pa. St. 505), 720, 887. East River Bridge Co., In re (75 Hun. 119), 673. East St. Louis v. Albrecht (150 111. 506), 316, 319, 840, 841. East St. Louis v. Amy (120 U. S. 600), 341. East St. Louis v. Bux (43 111. App. 276), 538. East St. Louis v. Kase (9 111. App. 409), 22. East St. Louis v. East St. Louis G. L. & C. Co. (98 111. 415), 306. East St. Louis v. Thomas (11 111. App. 283), 132. East St. Louis v. Trustees of Schools (102 111. 489), 645. East St. Louis v. U. S. ex rel Zeb- ley (110 U. S. 321), 119. East St. Louis v. Wehrung (50 111. 28), 116, 135, 627. East St. Louis v. Wehrung (46 111. 392), 619, 621, 633. East Syracuse, In re (20 Abb. N. C. 131), 801. East Tennessee Tel. Co. v. Ander- son Co. Tel. Co. (22 Ky. L. Rep. 418), 233. East Tennessee University v. Knoxville (6 Baxt. 166), 21, 77, 97, 608. Eaton V. Kegan (114 Mass. 433), 738. Eberle v. St. Louis Public Schools (11 Mo. 247), 472. Eberlin v. Mobile (30 Ala. 548), 496. Echols, ex parte (39 Ala. 698), 160. Eddleston v. Barnes (1 Ex. Div. Law Rep. 67), 548. Eddy V. Board of Health (10 Phila. 94), 694. Eddy V. Wilson (43 Vt. 362), 209. Eden v. People (161 111. 296), 864. Edenton v. Capeheart (71 N. C. 156, 623), 34, 359. Edenton v. Wool (65 N. C. 379), 468. Edey v. Shreveport (26 La. Ann. 636), 96. Edgar v. State (45 Ark. 356), 540. Edgerly v. Concord (62 N. H. 8), 674, 677. Edgerly v. Emerson (23 N. H. 555), 168. •Edgerton v. Goldsboro Water Co. (126 N. C. 93), 869. Edgerton v. Green Cove Springs (19 Fla. 140), 823. Edina v. Brown (19 Mo. App. 672), 465. Edwards v. Ferguson (73 Mo. 686), 474. Edwards v. Kearzey (96 U. S. 595), 372, 381, 383, 387, 389. Edwards v. Vandemack (13 111. 633), 562. Edwards v. Watertown (61 How. Pr. 463), 137. TABLE OP CASES, (The references are to pages.) Edwards v. Watertown (24 Hun. 426), 196. Eels V. American T. & T. Co. (143 N. y. 133), 876. Egan V. Chicago (5 111. App. 70), 12. Egan V. Court (3 Har. & McH. 169), 641. Egbert v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (6 Ind. App. 350), 834. Egleston v. Charleston (1 Mill's Const. Rep. 45), 463. Eichenlaub v. St. Joseph (113 Mo. 395), 11, 236, 595, 596, 599, 625, 738. Eidemlller v. Tacoma (14 Wash. 376), 330, 385. Eldora v. Burlingame (62 Iowa 32), 201, 205, 451, 453, 499, 594. El Dorado v. Beardsley (53 Kan. 363), 229, 556. Electric Imp. Co. v. San Francis- co (45 Fed. Rep. 593), 722. Electric Light, etc. Co. v. San Ber- nardino (100 Cal. 348), 861. Blerman v. McMains (30 La. Ann. 190), 416. Elizabeth v. Burning (58 N. J. L. 554), 612. Elizabethtown v. Lefler (28 111. 90), 218, 248, 532, 552, 593. Elkhart v. Calvert (126 Ind. 6), 496. Elkhart v. Wickwire (121 Ind. 331), 813, 827. Elkins V. State (13 Ga. 435), 498. Elk Point V. Vaughn (1 Dak. 113), 345, 451, 529, 545, 786, 792. BUinwood v. Reedsburg (91 Wis. 131), 100, 798. Elliott V. Louisville (101 Ky. 262), 177, 224. Elliott V. Pittsburgh (6 Pa. Dist. Rep. 455), 302, 862. Ellis, ex parte (54 Cal. 204), 277, 557. Ellis V. Cleburne (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, 35 S. W. Rep. 495), 264. Ellis V. Comrs. of San Francisco (38 Cal. 629), 92. Ellis V. K. C. St. J. & 0. B. R. R. Co. (63 Mo. 131), 705. Ellis V. Paige (1 Pick. 43), 336. Ellison V. Washington Comrs. (5 Jones Eq. 57), 696. Elma V. Carney (9 Wash. 466), 838. Elmendorf v. Jersey City (41 N. J. L. 135), 113. Elmendorf v. New York (25 Wend. 693), 13, 186, 250. Elmwood V. Marcy (92 U. S. 289), 267. Elwood V. Bullock (6 Q. B. L. R. 383), 292, 451. Elwood V. Rochester (43 Hun. 102), 832, 839. Ely V. Campbell (59 How. Pr. 333), 716, 718. Elyria Gas, etc. Co. v. Elyria (57 Ohio St. 374), 189. Emerich v. Indianapolis (118 Ind. 279), 624. Emerson v. Babcock (66 Iowa 257), 718. Emert v. Missouri (156 U. S. 296), 396, 397. Emmerton v. Mathews (7 N. & N. 586), 763. Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co. (28 Cal. 345), 823, 843, 851. Emporia v. Gilchrist (37 Kan. 532), 810. Emporia v. Norton (13 Kan. 569), 265, 867. Emporia v. Norton (16 Kan. 236), 250. Emporia v. Shaw (6 Kan. App. 808), 31, 51, 224. Emporia v. Volmer (12 Kan. 622), 486, 490, 497, 525, 530, 563, 617. Emporia v. Wagoner (6 Kan. App. 659), 728. Enfield Toll Bridge v. H. & N. H. R. R. Co. (17 Conn. 40), 306. Engle V. Sohn (41 Ohio St. 691), 657. English V. Danville (150 111. 92), 390, 812, 837. English V. State (7 Tex. App. 171), 169. Enterprise v. State ex rel (29 Pla. 128), 802. Episcopal C. Soc. v. Episcopal Ch. (1 Pick. 372), 347. Episcopal School, In re (75 N. Y. 324), 122. TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Erie v. Brady (150 Pa. St. 462), 837. Brie v. Bier (10 Pa. Supr. Ct. 381), 862. Erie v. Griswold (184 Pa. St. 435), 329. Erie Academy v. Erie (31 Pa. St. 315), 337. Brie & N. B. R. R. v. Casey (26 Pa. St. 287), 351. Erie R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania (21 Wall. 492), 373, 374. Elscanaba v. Chicago (107 U. S. 678), 415. Esling, Appeal of (89 Pa. St. 205), 226. Bstes V. Owen (90 Mo. 113), 118, 424, 810, 812. Bstey V. Starr (56 Vt. 690), 194. Bswin V. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (96 Mo. 290), 749. Eubanks v. Ashley (36 111. 177), 246, 475, 482, 592. Bufaula v. McNab (67 Ala. 588), 71, 74, 76. Eureka v. Jackson (8 Kan. App. 49), 45L Eureka City v. Wilson (15 Utah 67), 450, 738, 739. Eureka Springs v. O'Neal (56 Ark. 350), 287, 451, 452. Eustace v. Jahns (38 Cal, 3), 63. Evans v. Hughes County (3 S. Dak. 580), 877. Evans v. U. S. (153 U. S. 584), 491. Evanston v. Gunn (99 U. S. 660), 346. Evansville v. Martin (41 Ind. 145), 294, 357. Evansville v. Miller (146 Ind. 613), 687, 689. Evansville v. State (118 Ind. 426), 10, 687. Evansville, I. & C. S. L. R. R. Co. V. Evansville (15 Ind. 395), 117, 137. Evening Journal Assn. v. Board of Assessors (47 N. J. L. 36), 654. Everett v. Council Bluffs (46 Iowa 66), 687. Everett v. Deal (148 Ind. 90), 213. Everett v. Grapes (3 L. T. 669), 704. Everett v. Marquette (53 Mich. 450), 713. Evison V. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. (45 Minn. 370), 297. Ewart V. Western Springs (180 111. 318), 855. Ewbanks v. Ashley (36 111. 177), 492, 509, 532, 533, 536. Bwing V. Filley (43 Pa. St. 384), 516. Ewing V. Hoblitzelle (85 Mo. 64), 68, 69, 225, 226, 342. Excelsior Brick Co. v. Haverstraw (62 Hun. 620), 831, 832. , Excelsior Paving Co. v. Leach (Cal. 1893, 34 Pac. Rep. 116), 866. Eyerman v. Payne (28 Mo. App. 72), 131, 587. Eyerman v. Blaksley (78 Mo. 145), 270. F. Faber v. St. Paul, M. &. M. Ry. Co. (29 Minn. 465), 585. Face V. Ionia (90 Mich. 104), 875. Facey v. Fuller (13 Mich. 527), 155. Fagg, ex parte (38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 573), 575, 784, 791. Pairbank v. U. S. (181 U. S. 283), 394, 656. Fairchild v. St. Paul (46 Minn. 540), 13, 250. Fairfield v. People (94 111. 244), 610. Fairmont v. Meyer (83 Minn. 456), 225, 230, 496, 501, 758. Falmouth v. Watson (5 Bush 660), 42, 673. Fanning v. 'Csborne (102 N. Y. 441), 890. Fanning v. Schammel (68 Cal. 428), 868. Fant V. People (45 111. 259), 535. Faribault v. Wilson (34 Minn. 254), 487, 494, 496, 594, 640. 733. Farmer v. St. Paul (65 Minn. 176), 672. Farmers' Jx)an & Trust Co. v. Ansonia (61 Conn. 76), 899. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Carroll (51 Barb. 33), 115. Ixviii TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Farmington v. Rutherford (94 Mo. App. 328), 660. Farnsworth v. Pawtucket (13 R. I. 82), 3, 270. Farnsworth Co. v. Rand (65 Me. 19), 211. Farr v. Brackett et al (30 Vt. 344), 327. Farrar v. Fessenden (39 N. H. 268), 206. Farrar v. St. Louis (80 Mo. 379), 118, 424, 810, 812, 824, 848, 851. Farrel v. Derby (58 Conn. 234), 74, 107. Farrell v. Cook (16 Neb. 483), 686. Farrell v. King (41 Conn. 448), 216. Farrell v. New York (22 N. Y. St. R. 469), 721. Farrell v. Rammelkamp (64 Mo. App. 425), 6, 827, 842. Farrell v. West Chicago Plark Comrs. (182 111. 250), 821. Farrell v. West Chicago (181 U. S. 404), 832. Farwell v. Chicago (71 111. 269), 615, 617. Farwell v. Rockland (62 Me. 296), 366. Fass V. Seehawer (60 Wis. 525), 119, 811. Fath V. Tower Grove & L. Ry. Co. (105 Mo. 537), 586, 601, 742, 745, 748. Faulkner v. Aurora (85 Ind. 130), 676. Faville v. Eastern Counties Ry Co. (2 Exch. 344), 113. Fay, petitioner (15 Pick. 243), 879. Fay V. Springfield (94 Fed. Rep. 409), 820. Fay V. Wood (65 Mich. 390), 611. Fayette v. Shafroth (25 Mo. 445), 465. Fayette County v. Chitwood (8 Ind. 504), 198, 209. Fayetteville v. Carter (52 Ark. 301), 119, 617, 634. Fazakerley v. Wiltshire (1 Stra. 469), 450. Fecheimer Bros. & Co. v. Louis- ville (84 Ky. 306), 402. Fehler v. Gosnell (99 Ky. 380), 234, 450, 844, 865. Felclin, ex parte (96 Cal. 360), 647. Fell V. State (42 Md. 71), 66, 274. Fennell v. Bay City (36 Mich. 186), 787. Feorth v. Anderson (87 Mo. 354), 565. Fergus Falls Water Co. v. Fergus Falls (65 Fed. Rep. 586), 798. Ferguson v. Crittenden Co. (6 Ark. 479), 165. Ferguson v. Selma (43 Ala. 398), 683. Ferguson v. Snohomish (8 Wash. 668), 547. Ferrenbach v. Turner (86 Mo. 416), 672, 708, 892. Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park (97 U. S. 659), 320, 323, 419, 665. Ficklen v. Shelby Co. Taxing Dist. (145 U. S. 1), 399. Fidelity Trust & G. Co.. v. Fowler Water Co. (113 Fed. Rep. 560), 88. Fiedler v. St Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (107 Mo. 635), 748. Field V. Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. (117 Fed. Rep. 925), 858. Field v. Des Moines (39 Iowa 575), 71. Field V. Field (9 Wend. 394), 165. Field V. Western Springs (181 111. 186), 424, 425, 438. Fields V. Cooby (102 Mich. 449), 873. Fields V. Stokley (99 Pa. St. 306), 668. Fietsam v. Hay (122 111. 293), 879. Fifield V. Phoenix (Ariz. 1894, 24 L. R. A. 430), 676. Findley v. Pittsburg (Pa. 1887, 11 Atl. Rep. 678), 810. Finegan v. Allen (46 111. App. 553), 438. Fink V. Milwaukee (17 Wis. 26), 496, 497, 531. Fire Department of New York v. Braender (3 N. Y. St. 580), 545. Fire Department v. Harrison (2 Hilt 455), 517. Fire Department v. Helfenstein (16 Wis. 136), 616. First Municipality v. Blineau (3 'La. Ann. 688), 698. TABLE OF CASES. Ixix (The references are to pages.) First Municipality v. Cutting (4 La. Ann. 336), 6, 30, 444, 448. First Municipality of New Orleans V. Pease (2 La. Ann. 538), 416. First Nat. Bank v. Randall (1 White & W. Civ. Cas. Ct. App. 971), 212. First Nat. Bk. v. Sarlls (129 Ind. 201), 439, 734, 737. First National Bank v. Tyson (133 Ala. 459), 719. First Parish v. Stearns (21 Pick. 148), 149, 164, 166. First Presbyterian Ch. v." Ft. Wayne (36 Ind. 338), 115. Fish V. Branin (23 N. J. L. 484), 340. Fishburn v. Chicago (171 111. 338), 863. Fisher v. Boston (104 Mass. 87), 675. Fisher v. Graham (1 Cincinnati Rep. 113), 238. Fisher v. Harrisburg (2 Grant's Cases 291), 121, 270, 281, 298, 622, 690, 769. Fisher v. McGirr (1 Gray 1), 275, 452. Fisher v. Thirkell (21 Mich. 1), 714. Fisher v. Tp. of Vaughan (10 Up. Can. Q. B. 492), 222. Fiske, ex p^rte (72 Cal. 125), 251, 735, 738. Fiske V. Hazard (7 R. I. 438), 104, 105, 106. Fiske V. People (188 111. 206), 863. Fitchburg Ry Co. v. Grand Junc- tion Ry Co. (4 Allen 198), 317. Fitzgerald v. Grand Trunk R. R. (63 Vt. 169), 372. Fitzgerald v. New Brunswick 47 N. J. L. 479), 340. Fitzgerald v. Pawtucket Av. Ry. (R. I. 1902, 52 Atl. Rep. 887), 154, 178. Fitzhugh V. Duluth (58 Minn. 427), 834. Flack V. Fry (32 W. Va. 364), 466. Flanagan v. Plainfield (44 N. J. L. 118), 572. Fleetwood v. Read (21 Wash. 547), 659. Fletcher v. Fuller (120 U. S. 534), 151. Fletcher v. Lowell (15 Gray 103), 9. Fletcher v. Peck (6 Cranch. 87), 322, 376. Fletcher v. Somerset R. R. Co. (74 Me. 434), 471. Fletcher v. State (7 Ohio Dec. 316), 512. Flewellyn v. Proetzel (80 Tex. 191), 387. Flint V. Pierce (99 Mass. 68), 13. Flint V. Russell (5 Dillon C. C. 151), 692. T'lood V. Atlantic City (63 N. J. L. 530), 234. Flood V. State (19 Tex. Crim. App. 584), 26, 784, 791. Flora V. Lee (5 111. App. 629), 543, 567. Flora V. Sachs (64 Ind. 155), 277. Florence, ex parte, in re Jones (75 Ala. 419), 449. Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Ocala St. & S. R. Co. (39 Fla. 306), 882. Floyd V. Eatonton (14 Ga. 354), 477, 514, 523. Flynn v. Canton Co. (40 Md. 312), 61, 62, 587, 603, 715. Foley V. Haverhill (144 Mass. 352), 182. Folmar v. Curtis (86 Ala. 354), 34, 275, 551, 732. Folsom Bros. v. New Orleans (16 Fed. Rep. 11), 376. Folts Street, In re (46 N. Y. Suppl. 43), 813. Fonda v. Louisville (20 Ky. Law Rep. 1652), 593. Foot, ex parte (70 Ark. 12), 576, 685, 686. Foot V. Stiles (57 N. Y. 399), 174. Foote V. New York Fire Dept. (5 Hill. 99), 741. Forbis V. Bradbury (58 Mo. App. 506), 830. Ford V. Clough (8 Me. 334), 115, 148. Ford V. Harbor Comrs. (81 Cal. 19), 8. Ford V. North Des Moines (80 Iowa 626), 546, 861. kx TABLE OP CASES. (The references are to pages.) Ford V. Thralkill (84 Ga. 169), 735. Forcheimer v. Mobile (84 Ala. 126), 436, 437. Forry v. Ridge (56 Mo. App. 615), 110, 176, 177. Ft. Scott V. Eads Brokerage Co. (117 Fed. Rep. 51), 75, 115. Ft. Scott V. Pelton (39 Kan. 764), 400. Ft. Smith V. Ayers (43 Ark. 82), 615. Fort Smith v. Dodson (46 Ark. 296), 276. Ft. Smith V. Scruggs (70 Ark. 549), • 449, 629, 644. Ft. Wayne v. Rosenthal (75 Ind. 156), 694. Ft. Wayne L. S. & M. S. Ry. (132 Ind. 558), 91, 172. Ft. Worth V. Crawford (74 Tex. 404), 680. Ft. Worth . V. Crawford (64 Tex. 202), 680. Ft. Worth Street Ry. Co. v. Rose- dale St. Ry. Co. (68 Tex. 169), 916. Forstall v. Consolidated Associa- tion (34 La. Ann. 770), 385. Forsyth v. Atlanta (45 Ga. 152), 676. Forsythe v. Baltimore & Ohio Tel. Co. (12 Mo. App. 494), 885. Foss V. Chicago (56 111. 354), 808, 863, 848, 855. Fossett V. Bearce (29 Me. 523), 150, 214. Foster v. Blount (18 Ala. 687), 81. Foster v. Board of Police Comrs. (102 Cal. 483), 313, 314. Foster v. Brown (55 Iowa 686), 783. Foster v. Davenport (22 How. 244), 410. Foster v. Fowler (60 Pa. St. 27), 53. Foster v. Kansas (112 U. S. 201), 419, 665. Foster v. Moore (4 Law Rep. Jr. Crown Cases Reserved 670), 29. Foster, Supervisor of Jamaica v. Rhoads (19 Johns 191), 33. Foster v. St. Louis (4 Mo. App. 191), 692. Foster v. Worcester (164 Mass. 419), 797. Fournier v. West Bay City (94 Mich. 463), 168. Fourth Street (19 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 488), 233. Fow v. Roberts (108 Pa. St. 489), 457. Fowle v. Alexandria (3 Pet. 398), 653, 676. Fowler, In re (53 N. Y. 60), 833. Fowler v. St. Joseph (37 Mo. 228), 447. Fox v. Ohio (5 How. 410), 795. Fox y. Winona (23 Minn. 10), 721. Fralich v. Barlow (25 Ind. App. 383), 168. Frame v. Felix (167 Pa. St. 47), 440, 861. Frank, ex parte (52 Cal. 606), 296, 302, 312, 615, 634. Frank v. Atlanta (72 Ga. 428), 692. Franke v. Paducah Water Supply Co. (88 Ky. 467), 627. Frankford & Phila. Ry Co. v. Philadelphia (58 Pa. St. 119), 652, 742. Frankfort v. Aughe (114 Ind. 77), 490, 510, 589, 590, 791. Frankfort v. Brawner (100 Ky. 166), 366, 367, 368. Frankfort v. Coleman. (19 Ind. App. 368), 874. Frankfort v. Murray (99 Ky. 422), 852. Frankfort v. Winterport (54 Me, 250), 75, 106. Franklin v. Hancock (204 Pa. St. 101), 822. Franklin v. Maberry (6 Humph. 368), 810. Franklin v. Westfall (27 Kan. 614), 338, 646. Frantz v. Jacob (88 Ky. 525), 610. Frazee, In re (63 Mich. 396), 282, 294, 297, 628, 687, 728. Frazer v. Chicago (186 111. 480), 680, 694. Frazier v. Draper (51 Mo. App. 163), 731. Frazier v. Warfield (13 Md. 279), 107. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxi (The references are to pages.) Frederick Street, In re (11 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 114), 831. Freeholders v. Barber (7 N. J. L. 64), 634. Freeland, ex parte (38 Tex. Crim. App. 321), 785, 791, 793, 795. Freeland v. Hastings (10 Allen 570), 75, 104, 105. Freeland v. People (16 111. 380), 786, 793. Freeman v. Boston (5 Mete. 56), 114. Freeport v. Marks (59 Pa. St. 253), 258. Freeport Water Co. v. Freeport (180 U. S. 587), 72, 322, 324, 381, 445, 905. French v. Barber A. P. Co. (181 U. S. 324), 821. French v. Quincy (3 Allen 9), 92. French v. Woodward (58 Mo. 66), 315. Fretwell v. Troy (18 Kan. 271), 611, 635. Friday v. Floyd (63 111. 50), 34, 276. Friesner v. Charlotte (91 Mich. 504), 120. Frommer v. Richmond (31 Gratt. 646), 623, 656. Frorer v. People (141 111. 171), 778. Frosh V. Galveston (73 Tex. 401), 837. Frost V. Belmont (6 Allen 152), 106. Fruin-Brambrick Const. Co. v. Geist (37 Mo. App. 509), 198, 206, 830, 859. Frye v. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. (73 111. 399), 446. Fulgum V. Nashville (76 Tenn. 635), 631. Fuller, In re (79 111. 99), 352. Fuller V. Atlanta (66 Ga. 80), 799. Fuller V. Heath (89 111. 296). 218. Fuller V. Redding (13 App. Div. 61), 72B. Fullerton v. Spring (3 Wis. 667), 335. Fulton V. Cummings (132 Ind. 453), 118. Fulton V. Dist. of Columbia (2 App. Cas. 431), 774. Fulton V. Lincoln (9 Neb. 358), 842. Fulweiler v. St. Louis (61 Mo. 479), 472. Furhman v. Huntsville (54 Ala. 2€3), 509, 567, 578, 591. G. Gabel v. Houston (29 Tex. 335), 21, 69, 443, 760. Gafney v. San Francisco (72 Cal. 146), 835. Gage V. Chicago (143 111. 157), 847. Gaiocchio v. State (9 Tex. App. 387), 541. Gaither v. Green (40 La. Ann. 362), 209. Galbreath v. Newton (30 Mo. App. 380), 132, 810. Galbraith v. Olivet (3 Pitts. 78), 685. Gale v. Kalamazoo (23 Mich. 344), 309, 761. Gale v. Mead (4 Hill 109), 331. Gale V. South Berwick (51 Me. 174), 114. Galesburg v. Hawkinson (75 111. 152), 140. Gall v. Cincinnati (18 Ohio St. 563), 762. Gallagher v. Goldfrank" (63 Tex. 473), 528. Gallagher v. Smith (55 Mo. App. 116), 810, 813, 855, 871. Gallaher v. Head (72 Iowa 173), 803. Gallatin v. Tarwater (143 Mo. 40), 43, 364, 365, 491, 500, 758. Gallemo v. Rochester (46 Up. Can. Q. B. 279), 252. Gallitzen Borough v. Gains (15 Pa. Ct. 337), 559. Galloway v. Corbitt (52 Mich. 460), 562. Gait v. Chicago (174 111. 605), 315, 319, 337. Galveston v. Galveston City Ry. Co. (46 Tex. 435), 901. Galveston v. Heard (54 Tex. 420). 811. Galveston v. Menard (23 Tex. 349), 799. Galveston v. Posnainsky (62 Tex. 118), 675. Ixxii TABLE OP CASES. (The references Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Har- ris (Tex. Civ. App. 1896), 36 S. W. Rep. 776, 232. Gamble v. Pettijohn (116 Mo. 375),. 891. Gannon v. Laclede Gas Light Co. (145 Mo. 502), 64, 725. Ganson v. Buffalo (2 Abb. Dec. 236), 831. Garden City v. Abbott (34 Kan. 283), 23, 35, 623, 641. Gardnier v. Johnson (16 R. L. 94), 835, 842. Gardner v. New Bern (98 N. C. 228), 170. Gardner v. People (20 111. 430), 343, 783, 789. Gardner v. Railway Co. (99 Mich. 182), 587. Garey v. Galveston (42 Tex. 627), 337. Gargan v. Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry Co. (89 Ky. 212), 83L Garland v. Denver (11 Colo. 534), 466, 583, 591. Garland v. Towne (55 N. H. 55), 64. Garnett v. Jacksonville, etc. R. Co. (20 Fla. 889), 886. Gamier v. St. Louis (37 Mo. 554), 9. Garrett v. James (65 Md. 260), 230, 737. Garrett v. St. Louis (25 Mo. 505), 818, 819, '825. Garrett v. State (49 N. J. L. 94), 698. Garrison v. Atlanta (68 Ga. 64), 436. Garrison v. Chicago (7 Bissell 480), 119. Garside v. Cohoes (34 N. Y. St. 234), 156. Gartside v. East St. Louis (43 111. 47), 261, 576, 643. Garvey, In re (77 N. Y. 523), 831. Garvin v. Wells (8 Iowa 286), 582, 591. Garza, ex parte (28 Tex. Crim. App. 381), 26, 72, 76, 345, 615. Gas Co. V. San Francisco (6 Cal. 190), 6. Gas & Water Co. v. Downington (175 Pa. St. 341), 799. are to pages.) Gass V. Greenville. (4 Sneed 62), 33, 443, 454, 768. Gast V. Buckley (23 Ky. Law Rep. 992), 655. Gastenau v. Com. (108 Ky. 473), 364. Gately v. Leviston (63 Cal. 365), 830. Gates V. Aurora (44 111. 121), 481, 530. Gates V. Kansas City B. & T. Ry Co. (Ill Mo. 28), 747, 891. Gatlin v. Tarboro (78 N. C. 119), 629, 633. Gault V. Wallis (53 Ga. 675), 436. Gaus & Sons Mfg. Co. v. St. L. K. & N. Ry Co. (113 Mo. 308), 891. Gay V. Mutual Union Telegraph Co. (12 Mo. App. 485), 885. Gearhart v. Dixon (1 Pa. St. 224), 198, 208, 213. Geeley v. Hammann (12 Colo. 94), 564. Geiger v. Pilor (8 Pla. 325), 887. Geiger v. Perkiomen & Reading Turnpike Road (167 Pa. St., 582), 645, 727. Geneva v. Cole (61 111. 397), 546, 145. Genoa v. Van Alstine (108 111. 555), 549. Gentle v. Atlas Savings & L. A. (105 Ga. 406), 467. George v. Wyandotte Electric Light Co. (105 Mich. 1), 837. Georgetown v. United States (2 Hayw. & H. 302), 801. Georgia Packing Co. v. Macon (60 Fed. 774), 403. Georgia Ry. & Banking Co. v. Smith (128 U. S. 174), 910. Geraty v. Reid (78 N. Y. 64), 470. Gerdes v. Iron & Foundry Co. (124 Mo. 347), 875, 876. German American Fire Ins. Co. v. Minden (51 Neb. 870), 452, 639, 660, 661. German Ins. Co. v. Manning (95 Fed. Rep. 597), 204. German P. & P. Co. v. Illinois S. Z. Co. (55 111. 127), 253. Gerry v. Stoneham (1 Allen 319), 103. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxiii (The references are to pages.) Gest V. Cincinnati (26 Ohio St. 275), 823. Gettysburg v. Zeigler (2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 326), 461, 618. Ghee v. Northern Union Gas Co. (158 N. Y. 510), 884. Gibbons v. Ogden (9 Wheat. 1), 392, 393, 422, 423. Gibbs V. Somers Point (49 N. J. U 515), 546. Gibson Re. & U. C. of H. & B. (20 Up. Can. Q. B. Rep 11), 222, 442. Gibson v. Bailey (9 N. H. 168), 214, 216. Gibson v. Coraopolis (22 Pittsb. L. J. N. S. 64), 32, 642. Gibson v. Donk (7 Mo. App. 37), 697. Gibson v. Kayser (16 Mo. App. 404), 827. Gibson v. Owens (115 Mo. 258), 818, 851, 866. Gibson v. Wyandotte (20 Kan. 156), 472. Giddings v. Cox (31 Vt. 607), 336. Gilbert v. New Haven (40 Conn. 102), 209. Gilberts v. Rabe (49 111. App. 418), 204, 213, 215, 217, 547, 598. Gilboy V. Detroit (115 Mich. 121), 675. Gilchrist v. Schmidling (12 Kan. 263), 276. Gildersleeve v. Board of Education (17 Abb. Pr. 201), 147, 174. Giles V. San Bornton (31 N. H. 304), 148, 150. Gilham v. Wells, (64 Ga. 192), 549. Gilkey v. Town of How. (105 Wis. 41), 348, 547. Gillespie v. People (188 111. 176), 864. Gillett V. Logan County (67 111. 256), 136, 195. Gilman v. Cutts (23 N. H. 376), 390. Gilman v. Milwaukee (61 Wis. 588), 72, 219, 233, 236, 845. Gilman v. Waterville (59 Me. 491), 75. Gilmore v. Hentig (33 Kan. 156), 837. Gilmore v. Holt (4 Pick. 258), 84, 37, 551. Gilmore v. Utica (131 N. Y. 26), 177, 195, 866, 901. Gilson, in re (34 Kan. 641), 10. Giltner^ v. CarroUton (7 B. Mon. 680), 93. Given v. Des Moines (70 Iowa 637), 835. Givens v. Daviess County (107 Mo. 603), 9. Givens v. Van Studiford (86 Mo. 149), 751, 752. Glaessner v. Anheuser Busch B. Assn. (100 Mo. 508), 747, 887, 888. Glasby v. Morris (18 N. J. Eq. 72), , 453, 890, 893. Glasgow V. Bazan (96 Mo. App. 412), 787, 790, 792. Glasgow V. LindeU's Heirs (50 Mo. 60), 329. Glasgow V. Rowse (43 Mo. 479), 606, 630. Glasgow V. St. Louis (107 Mo. 198), 883. Glasgow V. St. Louis (87 Mo. 678), 92, 94, 129, 742, 883, 887. Glasgow V. St. Louis (15 Mo. App. 112), 888. Glass V. Ashbury (49 Cal. 571), 116. Glass V. White (5 Sneed 475), 610. Gleasin v. Waukesha Co. (103 Wis. 225), 821. Gleason v. Barnett (22 Ky. Law Rep. 1660), 6. Gleason v. Barnett (20 Ky Law Rep. 1694), 857. Gleason v. Barnett (20 Ky. L. R*ep. 1865), 234. Gleason v. Peerless Mfg. Co. (37 N. Y. Sup. 267), 237, 239, 256. Glenn v. Baltimore (5 Gill. & J. 425), 737. Glentz V. State (38 Wis. 549), 335. Glenwood v. Roberts (59 Mo. App. 167), 534. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsyl- vania (114 U. S. 196), 911. Gloversville v. Howell (70 N. Y. 287), 17. Godcharles v. Wigeman (113 Pa. St. 431), 110, 667. Goddard, In re (16 Pick. 504), 44, 296, 343, 346, 486, 532, 715, 720. Ixxiv TABLE OF CASES. (The relerences are to pages.) Goddard, In re (94 N. Y. 544), 127. Goddard v. Boston (20 Pick. 407), 327. Goddard v. Jacksonville (15 111. 588), 688, 689, 646. Goddard v. Merchants Exchange (78 Mo. 609), 304. Goddard v. State (12 Conn. 448), 489, 523. Goebel v. Grosse Pointe Water Works (126 Mich. 307), 907. Goedgen v. Supervisors (2 Biss. C. C. 328), 176. Goetler v. State (45 Ark. 454), 756. Goff V. Nolan (62 How. Pr. 323), 174. Golden City v. Hall (68 Mo. App. 627), 477, 509. Goldsmith v. Huntsville (120 Ala. 182), 328, 641. Goldsmith v. New Orleans (31 La. Ann. 646), 647. Goldstraw v. Duckworth (5 Q. B. Div. 275), 721. Goldthwaite v. Montgomery (50 Ala. 486), 486, 496, 566, 611, 640. Goodale v. Fennell (27 Ohio St. 426), 346, 369, 384, 387. Goodel V. Baker (8 Cowen 286), 179. Goodenow v. Buttrick (7 Mass. 140), 344. Goodloe V. Fox (96 Ky. 627), 185. Goodno V. Oshkosh (31 Wis. 127), 332. Goodrich v. Brown (30 Iowa 291), 465, 467, 582, 591. Goodwillie v. Detroit (103 Mich. 283), 832, 837. Goodwin v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. (75 Mo. 73), 585, 745. Goodwin v. State (142 Ind. 117), 367. Goodyear Rubber Co. v. Eureka (135 Cal. 613), 204. Gordon v. Cornes (47 N. Y. 608), 226. Gordon v. Peltzer (56 Mo. App. 599), 715, 876. Gordon v. People (44 Mich. 485), 329. Gorman v. Boise Co. Comrs. (1 Idaho 553), 202. Goshen v. Crary (58 Ind. 268), 61. Goshen v. Croxton (34 Ind. 239), 490, 492, 565. Goshen v. Kern (63 Ind. 468), 496, 672. Gosling v. Veley (19 L. J. (N. S.), Q. B. Ill), 2. Gosling V. Veley (7 Q. B. 406), 164. Gosling V. Veley (4 H. of L. Cas. 679), 167. Gosling V. Veley (12 Q. B. 328), 292. Gosnell v. Louisville (14 Ky. Law. Rep. 719), 866. Gosselink v. Campbell (4 Iowa 296), 34, 36, 274, 276, 551. Gostin V. Brooks (89 Ga. 244), 163. Goszler v. Georgetown (6 Wheat. 593), 320. Gould V. Atlanta (55 Ga. 678), 435, 630. Gould V. Rochester (105 N. Y. 46), 707. Goundie v. Northampton Water Co. (7 Pa. St. 233), 90. Grace, Ex parte (9 Tex. App. 381), 575. Grace v. Newton (135 Mass. 490), 682, 707. Graff ty v. Rushville (107 Ind. 502), 402, 766. Graham v. Carondelet (33 Mo. 262), 240. Graham v. State (1 Ark. 79), 486. Grand Ave. Ry, Co. v. Citizens' Ry. Co. (148 Mo. 665), 18. Grand Ave. Ry. Co. v. People's Ry. Co. (132 Mo. 34), 888. Grand Island Gas Co. v. West (28 Neb. 852), 440. Grand Rapids v. Bateman (93 Mich. 135), 529, 539, 753. Grand Rapids v. Board of Public Works (87 Mich. 113), 813. Grand Rapids v. Brandy (105 Mich. 670), 636, 654, 773, 774, 775. Grand Rapids v. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. (66 Mich. 42), 814. Grand Rapids v. Hughes (15 Mich. 54), 79, 271, 719. Grand ' Rapids v. Norman (110 Mich. 544), 326. TABLE OP CASES. Ixxv (The relereaces are to pages.) Grand Rapids v. Weiden (97 Mich. 82), 699. Grand Rapids Bridge Co. v. Prauge (35 Mich. 400), 877. Grand Rapids etc. Co. v. Grand Rapids, etc. Co. (33 Fed Rep. 659), 901. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v. Heisel (38 Mich. 62), 887. Grand Rapids N. & L. S. R. R. Co. V. Gray (38 Mich. 461), 465, 469, 550. Granger v. Syracuse (38 How. Pr. 308), 832. Granger's Life Ins. Co. v. Kamper (73 Ala. 325), 67. Grant v. Erie (69 Pa. St. 420) 126. Grant v. Moone (128 Mo. 43), 890. Grant v. Reese (82 N. C. 72), 528. Grant County Comrs. v. Bradford (72 Ind. 455), 114. Gratiot v. Mo. Pac. Railroad (116 Mo. 450), 585, 601, 745, 748. Graubner v. Jacksonville (50 111. 87), 534, 552. Graves v. Shattuck (35 N. H. 257), 716. Gray v. Cicero (177 111. 459), 856, 860. Gray v. Bourgeois (107 La. 671), 244. Gray v. Burr (128 Cal. 109), 829. Gray v. Delaware (2 Harrington 76), 466. Gray v. State (2 Harrington 76), 461, 463. Grayson v. Gas Co. (4 Lane. Law Rev. 41), 553. Great Central R. Co. v. Gulf, etc., R. Co.' (63 Tex. 529), 913. Great Western Ry. Co.-, in re. (23 Up. Can. C. P. 28), 319. Gregory, Ex pirte (1 Tex. Ct. App. 753), 575. Gregory, Ex parte (20 Tex. App. 210), 76, 223, 231, 445, 617, 634, 642. Gregory v. Bridgeport (41 Conn. 76), 136. Gregory v. Lincoln (13 Neb. 352), 527, 528. Gregor v. Lovington (48 111. App. 211), 771. Gregory v. New York (40 N. Y. 273), 77, 688. Gregory v. Jersey City (34 N. J. L. 390), 173. Gregsten v. Chicago (145 111. 451), 876. Greeley v. Hamman (17 Colo. 30), 171, 183, '201. Greeley v. Hamman (12 Colo. 94), 476, 515, 523. Greeley v. Jacksonville (17 Fla. 174), 319, 328. Greely v. Passaic (42 N. J. L. 87), 501, 543, 562. Greeley v. Quimby (22 N. H. 335), 206. Green, Ex parte (94 Cal. 387), 277, 278. Green v. Briggs (1 Curtis 311), 527. Green v. Cape May (41 N. J. L. 45), 6, 11, 98. Green v. D. H. Canal Co. (38 Hun. 51), 41. Green v. Durham (1 Burr. 131), 158, 304. Green v. Eastern Ry. Co. (52 Minn. 79), 750. Green v. Indianapolis (25 Ind. 490), 224, 490, 496, 509, 593, 596, 598. Green v. Indianapolis (22 Ind. 192), 490, 582. Green v. Jersey City (42 N. J. L. 505), 830. Green v. Lake (60 Miss. 451), 685. Green v. Lake (54 Miss. 540), 697. Green v. Reading (9 Watts 382), 882. Green v. Savannah (6 Ga. 1), 356, 688, 689, 698. Green v. Weller (32 Miss. 650), 169. Green Bay v. Brauns (50 Wis. 204), 6, 12, 185, 187, 194, 202. Greenburg v. Young (53 Pa. St. 280), 810. Green City v. Holsinger (76 Mo. App. 567), 43, 364, 501, 758. Greenfield v. Camden (74 Me. 56), 207. Greenfield v. Mook (12 111. App. 281), 285, 479, 564. Greenough v. Wakefield (127 Mass. 275), 103. Ixxvi TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Greensboro v. Bhrenrelch (80 Ala. 579), 24, 296, 298, 425, 695, 773. Greensboro v. MuUins (13 Ala. 341), 330. Greensboro v. Shields (82 N. C. 532), 490. Greensboro v. Shields (78 N. C. 417), 496. Greensburg v. Corwln (58 Ind. 518), 476, 492, 505, 509. Greenville v. Eichelberger (44 S. C. 351), 579. Greenville v. Kemmis (58 S. C. 427), 283, 569, 787, 792. Greenville Waterworks Co. v. Greenville (Miss 1900, 7 -So. Rep. 409), 798. Greenvfood v. Freight Co. (105 U. S. 13), 317, 321, 322, 380. Greenwood v. State (6 Baxter 567), 783, 788, 792, 795. Greer, In re (58 Kan. 268), 461. Grenada v. Wood (Miss 1903, 33 So. Rep. 173), 355. Grenada Co. v. Brodden (112 U. S. 261), 267. Grenville v. St. Louis Ry. Co. (51 Mo. App. 629), 744. Greystock, In re, and Township of Otonabee (12 Up. Can. Q. B. 458), 28. Gridley v. Bloomington (88 111. 554), 63, 715. Gridley v. Bloomington, (68 111. 47), 457. Griffin v. Appleby (69 Ala. 409), 469. Griffin v. Gloversville (73, N. Y. St. 684), 17. GrifCen v. Lewiston (Idaho 1898 55 Pac. Rep. 545), 874. Griffin v. Messenger (114 Iowa 99), 157, 166, 171, 189. Griffin v. New York (9 N. Y. 456), 713. Griffith V. McCullum (46 Barb. 561), 716. Griggs V. Macon (103 Ga. 602), 733. Grills V. Jonesboro (8 Baxt. 247), 761. Grim v. Weissenberg School Dis- trict (57 Pa. St. 433), 105. Grimes v. Hamilton County (37 Iowa 290), 113. Grimmell v. Des Moines (57 Iowa 144), 5, 187, 841. Grimmett v. Askew (48 Ark. 151), 178. Griswold v. Bay City (35 Mich. 452), 95. Griswold v. Hepburn (63 Ky. 20), 383. Groesch v. State (42 Ind. 547), 648, 627. Grossman v. Oakland (30 Oreg. 478), 428, 574, 687, 696. Grove v. Ft. Wayne (45 Ind. 429), 718. Grover v. Huckins (26 Mich. 476), 83, 276, 732. Grube v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co. (98 Mo. 330), 601, 744, 749. Grumley v. Webb (44 Mo. 444), 448. Guerrero, Ex parte (69 Cal. 88), 241, 252, 253, 647, 648. Guilford v. Clark (2 Vent. 247), 451. Guillotte V. New Orleans (12 La. Ann. 432), 275, 466, 769. Guillotte's Heirs v. New Orleans (12 La. Ann. 479), 435. Gulf City St. Ry. v. Galveston (69 Tex. 660), 898. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Calvert (11 Tex. Civ. App. 297), 748. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. v. Ellis (165 U. S. 150), 354, 910. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. v. Riordan (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, 22 S. W. Rep. 519), 808. Gulf Sea & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Calvert (11 Tex. Civ. App. 297), 596. Gulf & Ship Island R. R. Co. v. Hewes (183 U. S. 66), 374. Gulick V. New (14 Ind. 93), 465. Gundling v. Chicago (176 111. 340), 611, 615, 626, 659, 712. Gunmakers' Co. v. Fell (Wiles 390), 450. Gunn V. Macon (84 Ga. 365), 623. Gunnarssohn v. Sterling (92 111. 569), 646. Gunning Gravel & P. Co. v. New Orleans (45 La. Ann. 911), 813. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxvii (The references are to pages.) Gunning System v. Buffalo (62 App. Div. 497), 725. Gurley v. New Orleans (41 La. Ann. 75), 133. Gustafson v. Hamm (56 Minn. .334), 890. Guthrie v. Territory ex rel Losey (1 Okla. 188), 349, 806. Guthrie Nat. Bank v. Guthrie (173 U. S. 528), 348, 806. Guy V. Baltimore (100 U. S. 434), 402, 911. H. Haag V. Vanderburgh Co., Comrs., (60 Ind. 54), 683. Hackensack Water Co. v. Hoboken (51 N. J. L. 220), 798. Hackman v. Staunton (42 111. App. 409), 186, 187. , Hackney v. State (8 Ind. 494), 698. HadHeld v. New York (2 Abb. Prac. N. S. 95), 385. Hadley v. Chamberlain (11 Vt. 618), 214. Hadley v. Dague (130 Cal. 207), 821. Hadsell v. Hancock (3 Gray 526), 114, 152. Hadtner v. Williamsport (15 Wkly. N. Cas. 138), 629. Hafford v. New Bedford (16 Gray 297), 675. Hafner v. St. Louis (161 Mo. 34), 89. Hagar v. Board of Supervisors (47 Cal. 222), 570. Hagar v. Reclamation District (111 U. S. 701), 820. Hagerstown v. Dechert (32 Md. 369), 341, 468. Hagerstown v. Startzman (93 Md. 606), 600. Hagerstown v. Witmer (86 Md. 293), 733, 734. Hagood V. Hutton (33 Mo. 244), 673. Haight V. Love (39 N. J. L. 14), 238. Haines v. Readfleld (41 Me. 246), 149. Hale V. Gushing (2 Me. 218), 211. Hale V. People (87 111. 72), 103. Hale V. Kenosha (29 Wis. 599), 818. Hale V. Lawrence (21 N. J. L. 714), 667. Hall, in re (10 Neb. 537), 319, 338. Hall's Case (1 Mod. 76), 719. Hall V. Baker (74 Wis. 118), 115. Hall V. Holden (116 Mass. 172), 194. Hall.v. Nixon (L. R. 10 Q. B. 152), 292. Hall V. Racine (81 Wis. 72), 241, 841, 846. Hall V. Street Com'rs of Boston (177 Mass. 434), 384. Hall V. Wisconsin (103 U. S. 5), 369. Halleck V. Boylston (417 Mass. 469), 209, 214. Hallenbeck v. Getz (63 Conn. 385), 775. Haller v. Sheridan (27 Ind. 494), 733. Halpin v. Campbell (71 Mo. 493), 824. Halsey v. Rapid Transit Co. (54 N. J. L. 102), 11. Halsey v. Rapid Transit R. R. Co. (47 N. J. Eq. 380), 145. Hamilton v. Carthage (24 111. 22), 270, 545, '546. Hamilton v. Fond du Lac (40 Wis. 47), 708. Hamilton v. McNeil (13 Gratt. 389), 802. Hamilton Co. v. Rape (101 Tenn. 222), 890. Hamilton v. State (3 Tex. Crim. App. 643), 791, 792, 793, 795. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Saxey (131 Mo. 212), 436. Hamilton Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Hamilton City (146 U. S. 258), 274, 371, 798. Hamilton Gas Light & Coke Co. V. Hamilton (37 Fed. Rep. 832), 305. Hamilton Tp. Board of Health v. Neidt (N. J. Ch. 1901, 19 Atl. Rep. 318), 688. Hammond v. N. Y. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., (5 Ind. App. 526), 239, 246, 476. Ixxviii TABLE OP CASES. {The references are to pages.) Hampstead v. Plaistow (49 N. H. 84), 206. Hancock's Appeal (115 Pa. St. 1), Y37. Hand v. Elizabeth (30 N. J. L. 365), 846. Handley v. Stutz (139 U. S. 417), 199. Handlin v. State (16 N. J. L. 96), 500. Handy v. - New Orleans (39 La. Ann. 107), 428. Hanger v. Des Moines (52 Iowa 193), 114. Hang Kie, in re (69 Cal. 149), 773. Hankins v. People (106 111. 628), 786, 794. Hanlon v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (104 Mo. 381), 585, 749. Hanna v. Kankakee (34 111. App. 186), 590. Hannibal v. Guyott (18 Mo. 515), 274, 622. Hannibal v. Marion Co. (69 Mo. 571), 226. Hannibal v. Mo. & K. T. Co. (31 Mo. App. 23), 297, 298, 299, 312, 451, 690, 720, 725, 885. Hannibal v. Price (29 Mo. App. 280), 643. Hannibal v. Richards (82 Mo. 330), 691, 692, 708. Hannibal v. Richards (35 Mo. App. 15), 692. Hannibal v. Winchel (54 Mo. 172), 799. Hannibal Bridge Co. v. Schau- bacher (57 Mo. 582), 708, 890. Hannibal & St. Joseph Ry. Co. v. Marion Co. (36 Mo. 294), 137. Hannibal & St. Joseph Ry. Co. V. State Board of Equalization (64 Mo. 294), 572. Hannon v. St. Louis County (62 Mo. 313), 876. Hansen v. Meyer (81 111. 321), 352. Hanson, In re (51 Me. 193), 803. Hanson v. Hunter (86 Iowa 722), 224, 895. Hanson v. Vernon (27 Iowa 28), 53. Hanson v. William A. Hunter Electric Light Co. (86 Iowa 722), 227. Harbaugh v. Monmouth (74 111. 367), 449, 543, 544, 568. Harbeck v. New York (10 Bosw. 366), 332. Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co. (103 Tenn. 421), 665. Harcourt v. Asbury Park (62 N. J. L. 158), 137. Hardenbrook v. Lingonier (95 Ind. 70), 277, 490, 492, 593. Hardin v. State (16 N. J. L. 96), 558. Hardin County v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. (92 Ky. 412), 145. Harding v. Bader (75 Mich. 316), 177. Harding v. Vanderwater (40 Cal. 77), 175. Hardy v. Waltham (3 Mete. 163), 75. Hark v. Gladwell (49 Wis. 172), 184. Harker v. New York (17 Wend. 199), 494, 583, 591. Harlem Gas Light Co. v. New York (33 N. Y. 309), 865. Harley v. Heyle (2 Cal. 477), 741. Harlow v. Tufts (4 Cush. 448), 81. Harman v. Chicago (147 U. S. 396), 414., Harman v. St. Louis (137 Mo. 494), 601, 676. Harmison v. Lewistown (153 111. 313), 686, 688, 691, 701. Harmon v. Chicago (110 111. 400), 66, 417, 582, 664, 670, 671, 709. Harmon v. Cummings (43 Pa. St. 322) 737. Harney v. Benson (113 Cal. 314), 812. Harney v. Heller (47 Cal. 15), 848. Harper, Appeal of (109 Pa. St. 9), 435, 827. Harper v. Elberton (23 Ga. 566), 610. Harpending v. Haight (39 Cal. 189), 243, 257. Harper v. Jonesboro (94 Ga. 801), 638, 739. Harper v. Milwaukee (30 Wis. 365), 680. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxi.N (The references are to pages.) Harrington v. Miles (11 Kan. 480), 640. Harrington v. Providence (20 R. I. 233), 691, 706. Harris, in re (47 Mo. 164), 574, 576. Harris re and City of Hamilton (44 Up. Can. Q. B. 641), 450. Harris v. Canaan School District (28 N. H. 58), 213. Harris v. Hamilton (44 Up. Can. Q. B. 641), 30. Harris v. LlTingston (28 Ala. 577), 84. Harris v. Nesblt (24 Ala. 398), 546. Harris v. School District (28 N. H. 58), 206. Harris v. Schaffer (92 N. C. 30), 528. Harrisburg v. Citizens' Pass. Ry. Co. (4 Pa. Dist. R. 687), 652. Harrisburg v. Bast Harrisburg Pass. Ry. Co. (4 Pa. Dist. R. 683), 652. Harrisburg v. McPherran (200 Pa. 343), 821. Harrisburgh v. Sheck (104 Pa. St. 53), 339.' Harrison v. Baltimore (1 Gill. 264), 682, 693. Harrison v. New Orleans (33 La. Ann. 222), 260, 262. Harrison v. N. 0. Pac. Ry. Co. C34 La. Ann. 462), 883. Harrison v. People (97 111. App. 421), 446. Harrison v. State (9 Mo. 530), 309, 344, 346. Harrison v. Walker (1 Ga. 32), 33L Harrison Bros. v. Chicago. (163 111. 129), 851. Harrisonburg v. Roller (97 Va. 582), 138. Harrodsburg v. Renfro (22 Ky. Law Rep. 806), 634, 639. Hart V. Albany (9 Wend. 571), 272, 285, 513, 719. Hart V. Gaven (12 Cal. 476), 810. Hart V. State (21 Tex. App. 318), 641. Hart V. Union County (57 N. J. L. 90), 679. Hartford v. Hartford Electric Light Co. (65 Conn. 324), 807. Hartford v. Talcott X48 Conn. 526), 61, 715. Hartman v. Greenhow (102 U. S. 672), 375. Hartwell v. Littleton (13 Pick. 229), 214. Harvard College v. Boston (104 Mass. 470), 113. Harvey v. Aurora & Geneva Ry. Co. (186 III. 283), 248, 879, 894. Harvey v. Dean (62 111. App. 41), 570, 571, 646. Harward v. St. Clair D. Co. (51 111. 130), 128, 804. Haskell, Ex parte (112 Cal. 412), 224, 313, 442, 449. Haskill V. Bartlett (34 Cal. 281), 251. Hassard v. Municipality, No. 2 (7 La. Ann. 495), 582. Hastings v. Aiken (1 Gray 163), 332. Hastings v. Columbus (42 Ohio St. 585), 252. Hasty V. Huntington (105 Ind. 540), 738. Hatch V. Pendergast (15 Md. 251), 763. Hathaway v. Addison (48 Me. 440), 201, 208, 211. Hatzung v. Syracuse (92 Hun. 203), 265. Haughawout v. Hubbard (131 Cal. 675), 137, 855. Hause v. Newel (60 Minn. 481), 467. Havana v. Biggs (58 111. 519), 486. Haven v. Lowell (5 Mete. 35), 145. , Haverty v. Bass (66 Me. 71), 694. Hawes v. Chicago (158 111. 653), 296, 425, 858. Hawk V. Marion County (48 Iowa 472), 114. Hawkins in re v. Municipal Coun- cil, etc., of Huron, et al (2 Up. Can. C. P. 72), 232. Hawkins v. Sanders (45 Mich. 491), 721. Hawkinsville v. Bthridge (96 Ga. 326), 574. Hawley v. Harrall (19 Conn. 142), 713, 718, 829. TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Hawthorne v. East Portland (13 Oreg. 271), 828. Hay V. Springneld (64 111. App. 671), 100. Hayden v. Noyes (5 Conn. 391), 150, 152, 357. Hayden v. State (69 Ga. 731), 569, 572. Hayes v. Appleton (24 Wis. 540), 291, 297. Hayes v. Mich. Cent. R. R. (Ill U. S. 228), 16, 57, 880. Hayes v. Oshkosh (33 Wis. 314), 677. Haynes v. Cape May (52 N. J. L. 180), 269, 450. Haynes v. Cape May (50 N. J. L. 55), 290. Hays V. Pac. Mail Steamship Co. (17 How. 596), 409, 415. Hays V. Vincennes (82 Ind. 178), 851. Hayward v. Davidson (41 Ind. 212), 90. Hayward v. North Bridgewater (2 Cush. 419), 151. Hayward v. People (145 111. 55), 346. Hayward v. School District (2 Cush. 419), 148. Haywood v. N. Y. Cent. & H. Ry. Co. (59 Hun. 617), 590. Haywood v. Savannah (12 Ga. 404), 21, 23, 329, 330, 339, 344, 352. Hazard Powder Co. v. Volger (58 Fed. Rep. 152), 741. Hazelgreen v. MoNabb (23 Ky. Law Rep. 811), 200. Heacock v. Hosmer (109 111. 245), 528. Heacock v. Lubukee (108 111. 641), 527. Health Department v. Knoll (70 N. Y. 530), 545. Health Dept. v. Purdon (99 N. Y. 237), 692. Heath v. Hall (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, 27 S. T. Rep. 160), 731. Hechinger v. Mayvllle (22 Ky. Law Rep. 486), 364. Hecht V. Coale (93 Md. 692), 156, 163. Heeg V. Licht (80 N. Y. 579), 740. Heeney v. Sprague (11 R. I. 456), 63, 64, 76, 587. Heer Dry Goods Co. v. Citizens' Ry. Co. (41 Mo. App. 63), 64. Heffron v. Detroit City R. Co. (92 Mich. 406), 751. Heidenwag v. Philadelphia (168 Pa. 72), 538. Heilbron, Ex parte (56 Cal. 609), 701. Heilbron v. Cuthbert (96 Ga. 312), 100, 250. Heinrich v. St. Louis (125 Mo. 424), 883, 892. Heins v. Lincoln (102 Iowa 69), 237. Heinssen v. State (14 Col. 228), 333. Heisembrittle v. Charleston (2 MacMullan 233), 757. Heiskell v. Baltimore (65 Md. 125), 163, 166. Heitzelman v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 1894, 26 S. W. Rep. 729), 774. Heland v. Lowell (3 Allen 407), 19, 31, 32. Hellen v. Noe t3 Ired. 493), 276, 732. Helena v. Dwyer (64 Ark. 424), 294. Heller v. Alvarado (1 Tex. Civ. App. 409), 600. Hellman v. Shoulters (114 Cal. 136), 247, 841. Helm V. Ptidgen (1 White & W. Civ. Cas. Tex. Ct. App. sec. 644), 382. Heman v. Allen (156 Mo. 534), 248. Heman v. Gilliam (171 Mo. 258), 821. Heman v. McLaren (28 Mo. App. 654), 131. Heman v. Ring (85 Mo. App. 231), 290, 298, 822, 851. Heman v. Schulte (166 Mo. 409), 117. Heman Construction Co. v. Loevy (64 Mo. App. 430), 50, 159, 200, 848, 860, 871. Heminger v. Cleveland (2 Ohio Dec. 428), 454. Hemmer v. Hustace (51 Hun. 457), 126. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxi (The references are to pages.) Heuderson v. Baltimore (8 Md. 352), 831. Henderson v. Central, etc. Ry. (21 Fed. Rep. 358), 380. Henderson v. Covington (14 Bush. 312), 107. Henderson v. Davis (106 N. C. 88), 546. Henderson v. Heyward (109 Ga. 373), 647. Henderson v. Marshall (22 Ky. Law Rep. 671), 642. Henderson v. New York (92 U. S. 259), 411. Henderson v. O'Haloran (24 Ky. Law Rep. 995), 680. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Hender- son (173 U. S. 592), 607. Hendersonville v. McMinn (82 N. C. 532), 490, 496. Hendrick v. Crowley (31 Cal. 471), 846. Henke v. McCord (55 Iowa 378), 71, 273, 473. Henkel v. Detroit (49 Mich. 249), 762. Hennepin County v. Robinson (16 Minnl 381), 128, 625. Hennessy v. Connolly (13 Hun. 173), 484. Hennessy v. St. Paul (37 Fed. Rep. 565), 686. Hennick, In i-e (5 Mackey 489), 400. Henry v. Pittsburgh & A. Bridge Co. (8 Watts & S. 85), 882. Henry County v. Slatter (52 Ind. 171), 90. Hensley Tp. v. People ex rel (84 111. 544), 608. Hensoldt v. Petersburg (63 111. 116, 157), 465, 499, 534. Hentig v. Gilmore (33 Kan. 234), 837. Hequembourg v. Dunkirk (49 Hun. 550), 100. Hercules Iron Works v. Elgin J. & E. Ry. Co. (141 111. 491), 468. Herford v. Omaha (4 Neb. 336), 127. Herman v. Oconto (100 Wis. 391), 249. Herman v. Payne (27 Mo. App. 481), 588. Herrick v. Smith (1 (Jray, 67 Mass.), 1, 575. Hershoffl v. Beverly (45 N. J. L. 288), 645. Herzo v. San Francisco (33 Cal. 134), 189, 235, 300. Hesketh v. Braddock (3 Burr 1847), 471, 476. Heslep V. Sacramento (2 Cal. 580), 10. Hess V. Lancaster (4 Pa. Dist. Rep. 737), 715. Hessler v. Drainage Com. (53 111. 105), 128. Hewison v. New Haven (37 Conn. 475), 721. Hewison v. Tp. of Pembroke (6 Ont. Rep. 170), 55, 172. Hexamer v. Webb (101 N. Y. 377), 714. Heydenfelt v. Hitchcock (15 Cal. 514), 95. Heylman, Ex parte (92 Cal. 492), 632. Hibbard v. Chicago (173 111. 91), 337. Hibbard v. Suffolk County (163 Mass. 34), 237, 238. Hibernia L. E. Co. v. Com. (93 Pa. St. 264), 296. Hickey v. Chicago & W. I. R. Co. (6 111. App. 172), 894. Hickman v. O'Neal (10 Cal. 292), 463, 467, 470. Hickman v. U. D. Ry. Co. (47 Mo. App. 65), 744. Hickok V. Shelburne (41 Vt. 409), 179, 208. Higginbotham v. Com. (25 Gratt. 627), 349. Higgins, Ex parte (14 Mo. App. 601), 560. Higgins V. Curtis (39 Kan. 283), 193. Higgins V. Northwich Union Guardians of the Poor (22 L. T. 753), 710. Highland Turnpike Co. v. McKean (11 Johns 98), 206. Higley v. Bunce (10 Conn. 436), 248, 253. Hight V. Monroe County Comrs. (68 Ind. 575), 114. Lxxxii TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Hilbish V. Catherman (64 Pa. St. 154), 104, 607. Hildreth v. Mclntyre (1 J. J. Marsh 206), 158. Hilgert v. Levin (72 Mo. App. 48), 775. Hill V. Boston (122 Mass. 344), 674, 675. Hill V. Charlotte (72 N. C. 55), 50, 676. Hill V. Dalton (72 Ga. 314), 501, 511, 514, 789. Hill V. Decatur (22 Ga. 203), 66. Hill V. East Hampton Selectmen (140 Mass. 381), 103. Hill V. Glasgow R. R. (41- Fed. Rep. 610), 381. Hill V. Godwin (56 N. H. 441), 206. Hill V. Kahoka (35 Fed. Rep. 32), 546. Hill V. New York (139 N. Y. 495), 680. Hill V. People (16 Mich. 351), 527. Hill V. People (20 N. Y. 363), 43. Hill V. St. Louis (159 Mo. 159), 83, 293, 812. Hill V. Thompson (16 Jones & Spencer 481), 356. Hill V. Wells (6 Pick. 104), 471. Hillhouse v. New Haven (62 Conn. 344), 810. Hilliard v. Asheville (118 N. C. 845), 823. Hillsboro v. Ivey (1 Tex. Civ. App. 653), 680. Himmelmann v. Hoadley (44 Cal. 213), 833. Hinchman v. Detroit (9 Mich. 103), 842. Hine v. Keokuk & D. R. R. (42 Iowa 636), •890. Hine v. New Haven (40 Conn. 478), 435, 438, 735, 737, 738. Hines v. Leavenworth (3 Kan. 186), 823. Hinsdale v. Shannon (182 111. 312), 224, 852, 857, 871. Hirshfield v. Dallas (29 Tex. App. 242), 637, 655. Hirst v. Ringen Real Estate Co. (169 Mo. 194), 60, 61, 64, 583, 585, 586, 602, 740. Hisey V. Charleston (62 Mo. App. 381), 7. Hisey v. Mexico (61 Mo. App. 248), 688, 721i 876. Hitchcock V. Galveston (96 U. S. 341), 138, 197, 808. Hitchcock V. St. Louis (49 Mo. 484), 69, 102, 434. Hixon V. Eagle River (91 Wis. 649), 610. Hoadley v. San Francisco (70 Cal. 320), 92. Hoadley v. San Francisco (50 Cal. 265), 92. Hoag V. Durfey (1 Aiken 286), 209, 214. Ho Ah Kow V. Nunan (5 Sawyer 552), 280. Hobart v. Detroit (17 Mich. 246), 864. Hobbs V. Hill (157 Mass. 556), 492, 506. Hoboken v. Chamberlain (37 N. J. L. 51), 813. Hoboken v. Gear (27 N. J. L. 265), 247, 250, 251, 366. Hoboken v. Harrison (30 N. J. L. 73), 86. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co. v. Ho- boken (35 N. J. L. 205), 842. Hodges V. Buffalo (2 Denio 110), 103. Hodges V. Nashville (2 Humph. 61), 616. Hodson v. New Orleans (21 La. Ann. 301), 630. Hoefling v. San Antonio (85 Tex. 228), 630. . Hoey V. Gilroy (129 N. Y. 132), 715, 721. Hogan V. Citizens' Ry. Co. (150 Mo. 36), 750. Hogan V. Indianapolis (Ind. 1902, 65 N. E. Rep. 525), 612, 618, 645. Hoge V. Railroad Co. (99 U. S. 348), 380. Hoggatt V. Bigley (6 Humph. 236), 36. Hoffman v. Jersey City (34 N. J. L. 172), 537, 635, 768. Hoffner v. Oberlin (8 Ohio Dec. 710), 521. Hoke V. Perdue (62 Cal. 545), 54. Holden v. Alton (179 111. 318), 302, 431, 863. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxiii (The references Holden v. Chicago (172 111. 263), 850. Holden v. Hardy (169 U. S. 366), 779. Holland v. Baltimore (11 Md. 186), 81, 437. Holland V. Bartch (120 Ind. 40), 727. Holland V. Isler (77 N. C. 1), 640. Holland v. San Francisco (7 Cal. 361), 115. Holland V. State (23 Fla. 123), 195. Hollwedell, Ex parte (74 Mo. 395), 277, 477, 512, 506, 522, 576, 787, 794. Holly Springs Bank v. Pinson (58 Miss. 421) 220. Holmes v. Fihlenburg (54 111. 203), 464, 469. Holmquist, Ex parte (Cal. 1901, 27 Pac. Rep. 1099), 451. Hoist V. Roe (39 Ohio St. 340), 640. Holt V. Somerville (127 Mass. 408), 170, 183, 189. Holwerson v. St. Louis and S. R. Co. (157 Mo. 216), 61. Holyoke Co. v. Lyman (15 Wall 500), 322, 323. Holzhauer v. Newport (94 Ky. 396), 823. Holzworth V. Newark (50 N. J. L. 85), 562. Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta (93 U. S. 116), 371, 660. Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta (50 Ga. 530), 629, 660. Home Ins. Co. v. Tierney (47 111. App. 600), 8. Homes v. Hyde Park (53 111. 79), 326. Homestead Street Ry v. Pittsburg, etc.. Street Ry (166 Pa. St. 162), 896. Homewood v. Wilmington (5 Houst. 123), 538. Hong Shen, ex parte (98 Cal. 681), 683. Hood V. Lynn (1 Allen 103), 103, 109. are to pages.) Hood V. Von Glahn (88 Ga. 405), 789. Hooksett V. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. (44 Nt H. 105), 719. Hooper v. California (155 U. S. 648), 398. Hoops V. Ipava (55 111. App. 94), 686. Hope V. Deaderick (8 Humph. 1), 609. Hope V. Johnson (2 Yerg. 123), 383. Hopkins v. Swansea (4 M. &. W. 621), 2, 18, 345, 348. Horan v. Lane (53 N. J. L. 275), 22. Horn V. Baltimore (30 Md. 218), 192, 264. Horn V. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (38 Wis. 463), 746. Horn V. People (26 Mich. 221), 56, 294, 775, 873, 881. Hornby v. Beverly (48 N. J. L. 110), 837. Horner v. Rowley (51 Iowa 620), 168, 172, 189. Horney v. Sloan (1 Ind. 266), 36. Homey v. Sloan (Smith 136), 32, 34. Horton v. Critchfield (18 111. 133), 558. Hornung v. State (116 ind. 458), 163. Horton v. Garrison (23 Barb. 176), 165. Horton v. Mobile, School (43 Ala. 598), 623. Horton v. Williams (99 Mich. 423), 814. Hottinger v. New Orleans (42 La. Ann. 629), 438. Hough, ex parte (69 Fed. Rep. 330), 400. Hough V. Bridgeport (57 Conn. 290), 845. Hough V. Cook County Land Co. (73 111. 23), 90. Houghton V. Burnham (22 Wis. 301), 828. Houghton V. Huron Copper M. Co. (57 Mich. 547), 88, 554. House V. Greensburg (93 Ind. 533), 830. Ixxxiv TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) House V. State (41 Miss. 737), 627, 648. Houston V. Houston City Ry Co. (83 Tex. 548), 913. H. & T. C. R. R. Co. V. Odum (53 Tex. 343), 201, 246. Houston V. Royston (7 How. 543), 463. Hovelman v. K. C. Horse R. R. (79 Mo. 632), 90, 120, 380, 432, 891, 915. Hovey v. Mayo (43 Me. 322), 116, 118. Howard v. Olyphant (181 Pa. St. 191), 259. Howard v. Robbins (1 Lans. 63), 716. Howard v. Savannah (Thos. U. P. Charlton 173), 352. Howe V. New Orleans (12 La. Ann. 481), 680. Howe V. Plainfleld (37 N. J. L. 145), 513, 792. Howell V. Stewart (54 Mo. 400), 538. Howeth V. Jersey City (30 N. J. L. 93), 238, 839. Howland v. Chicago (108 111. 496), 654. Howlett V. Turner (93 Mo. App. 20), 565. Hoyer v. Mascoutah (59 111. 137), 565. Hoyt V. East Saginaw (19 Mich. 39), 222, 223, 839. Hubbard v. Deming (21 Conn. 356), 717. Hubbard v. Goodrich (37 Wis. 84), 720. Hubbard v. Medford (20 Oregon 315), 735. Hubbard v. Norton (28 Ohio 116), 12, 346. Hubbard v. Paterson (45 N. J. L. 310), 736. Hubbard v. Preston (90 Mich. 221), 734. Hubbard v. Tauton (140 Mass. 467), 104. Hubbard v. Winsor (15 Mich. 146), 178, 179. Hubbell V. Goodrich (37 Wis. 84), 720. Huckenstine's Appeal (70 Pa. St. 102), 685, 698. Huddleson v. Ruffin (6 Ohio St. 604), 277, 768. Hudson V. Emigration Co. (47 Tex. 56), 306. Hudson V. ' Thorne (7 Paige Ch. 261), 296, 310, 439, 734, 735. Hudson County v. State (24 N. J. L. 718), 147, 180. Hudson Electric Co. v. Hudson (163 Mass. 346), 837. Hudson River Tel. Co. v. Water- vliet Turnpike, etc., Co. (135 N. Y. 393), 742. Hudson Tel Co. v. Jersey City (49 N. J. L. 303), 319. Huesing v. Rock Island (128 111. 465), 71, 79, 699. Hufesmith v. People (8 Colo. 175), 346. Hugg V. Camden (29 N. J. Eq. 6), 531. Huggans v. Riley (125 N. Y. 88), 900. Hughes V. People (8 Colo. 536), 794. Hughes V. Recorders Court (75 Mich. 574), 764, 766. Huidekoper v. Meadville (83 Pa. St. 156), 823. Hull V. Oliicago (156 111. 381), 851, 859. Hull V. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. (21 Neb. 371), 251. Hull V. Independent District (82 Iowa 686), 145. Hull V. West Chicago Park Com'rs (185 111. 150), 851. Humboldt V. McCoy (23 Kan. 249), 224. Hume V. New York (74 N. Y. 264), 721. Humes v. Ft. Smith (93 Fed. Rep. 857), 632, 659. Humphrey, ex parte (10 Wend. 612), 175. Humphrey v. Front Street M. E. Church (109 N. C. 132), 696. Humphreys v. Norfolk (25 Gratt. 97), 660. Hundley v. Lincoln Park Com'rs (67 111. 559), 823.. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxv (The references are to pages.) Hunneman v. Grafton (10 Met. 454), 194. Hunneman v. Fire District (37 Vt. 40), 99, 149. Hunsaker v. Borden (5 Cal. 288), 385. Hunt V. Hunt (72 N. Y. 217), 545. Hunt V. Jacksonville (34 Fla. 504), 512, 515, 520, 570, 786. Hunt V. Lambertville (45 N. J. L. 279), 4, 893. Hunt V. Norwich (14 Vt. 300), 151. Hunt V. School District (14 Vt. 300), 149. Hunter v. Nockolds (1 McN. & Cord. 651), 445. Huntington v. Attrill (146 U. S. 657), 375. Huntington v. Cheesbro (57 Ind. 74), 490, 657. Huntington v. Mahan (142 Ind. 695), 397, 401. Huntington v. Pease (56 Ind. 305), 490, 496. Huntsville v. Phelps (27 Ala. 55), 281. Hurber v. Baugh (43 Iowa 514), 273. Hurford v. Omaha (4 Neb. 336), 116, 125. Hurl, ex parte (49 Cal. 557), 611, 629, 645, 647. Hurley v. Texas (20 Wis. 634), 335. Huron v. Carter (5 S. D. 4), 477, 509, 562. Huron Waterworks Co. v. Huron (7 S. D. 9), 95. Hurst V. Jones (10 Lea 8), 774. Hurst V. Warner (102 Mich. 238), 693. Huse V. Glover (119 U. S. 543), 414, 416. Hutcheson v. Storrie (92 Tex. 685), 820. Hutcheson v. Storrie (Tex. Civ. App. 1898, 48 S. W. Rep. 785), 183. Hutchings v. Scott (9 N. J. L. 218), 467, 468. Hutchinson v. Beckman (U. S. C. C. A.), 118 Fed. Rep. 339, 435, 437, Hutchinson v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (161 Mo. 246), 586, 748, 750. Hutchinson v. Pratt (11 Vt. 402), 206, 211. Hutchinson Tp. v. Filk (44 Minn. 536), 719. Hutchison v. Mt. Vernon (40 111. App. 19), 248, 552, 593. Huthsing v. Bousquet (2 McCrary 152), 114. Hutton V. Camden (39 N. J. L. 122), 693. Hutton V. Camden (29 N. J. L. 122), 687. Hyatt V. McMahon (25 Barb. 457), 322. Hyatt V. Myers (73 N. C. 237), 697. Hyde Park v. Borden (94 111. 26), 853. Hyde Park v. Carton (132 111. 100), 853. Hyde Park v. Corwith (122 111. 441), 321. Hyde Park v. Ingalls (87 111. 11), 609. Hyde Park v. Spencer (118 111. 446), 853. Hyde Park v. Thatcher (13 111. App. 613), 856. Hydes v. Joyes (67 Ky. 464), 808. Hynes v. Briggs (41 Fed. 468), 397. Hynes v. Chicago (175 111. 56), 852. I. Illinois V. Illinois Central R. Co. (33 Fed. Rep. 730), 346. Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Chi- cago (141 111. 586), 813. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Chicago (144 111. 392), 848. Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. De- catur (147 U. S. 190), 818. Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. De- catur (154 111. 173), 825. Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Gal- ena (40 111. 344), 456. Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Gil- bert (157 111. 354), 597. Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. God- frey (71 111. 500), 602. Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Illinois (146 U. S, 387), 93, Ixxxvi TABLE OP CASES. (The references are to pages.) Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Peo- ple (161 111. 244), 15, 45, 248, 451. Illinois Conference Female Col- lege V. Cooper (25 111. 148), 352. Illinois, etc. Co. v. St. Louis (2 Dillon C. C. 70), 38, 304. Illinois & M. Canal Co. v. Chi- cago (14 111. 334), 334. Illinois Mutual Fire Ins. Co. "v. Peoria (29 111. 180), 621, 660. Illinois & St. L. R. & Canal Co. v. St. Louis (2 Dillion C. C. 70), 95. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank v. Ar- kansas City (40 U. S. App. 257), 377. Illinois Trust and Sav. Bank v. Arkansas City (76 Fed. 271), 308. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank v. Arkansas City Water Co. (67 Fed. Rep. 196), 798. Imler v. Springfield (55 Mo. 119), 675. Independence v. Cleveland (167 Mo. 384), 72, 613. Independence v. Gates (110 Mo. 374), 825. Independence v. Moore (32 Mo. 392), 278, 787, 792. Independent School District v. Wirtner (85 Iowa 387), 145. Indianapolis v. Bieler (138 Ind. 30), 403, 405, 450, 630. Indianapolis v. Blythe (2 Ind. 75), 684, 786. Indianapolis v. Consumers' Gas & Trust Co. (140 Ind. 246), 183, 553. Indianapolis v. Consumers' Gas Trust Co. (140 Ind. 107), 352, 897. Indianapolis v. Fairchild (1 Ind. 315), 476, 794. Indianapolis v. Gas Co. (66 Ind. 396), 17 79, 308. Indianapolis v. Higgins (141 Ind. 1), 790. Indianapolis v. Huegele (115 Ind. 581), 448, 79L Indianapolis v. Imberry (17 Ind. 175), 12, 840, 841. Indianapolis v. Miller (27 Ind. 394), 6, 717, 841, 893. Indianapolis & L. Ry. Co. v. Zim- merman (158 Ind. 189), 904. Indianola v. Jones (29 Iowa 282), 186. Information v. Oliver (21 S. C. 318), 530, 533, 543, 611, 621, 630. Inhabitants v. New Orleans (14 La. Ann. 452), 118, 119. Inhabitants, etc. v. Fox (84 Mo. 59), 546. Inhabitants of Quincy v. Kennard (151 Mass. 563), 43. Inman v. Chicago (78 111. 405), 302. In re Butler Street (6 Kulp. 488), 801. In re Callowhill St. (32 Pa. St. 361), 803. In re Carlton St. (16 Hun. 497), 186, 202, 205, 209, 210. In re Central Park Comrs. (51 Barb. 277), 804, 829. In re Chestnut Street (118 Pa. St. 593), 815. In re Condemnation of Independ- ence Ave. Boulevard (128 Mo. 272), 813, 836. In re Eight Hour Law (21 Colo. 29), 311. In re Front Street (24 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 88), 239. In re Fulton Street (29 How. Pr. 429), 827. In re House Bill No. 203 (21 Colo. 27), 777, 778. In re House Bill No. 165 (15 Colo. 593), 805. In re Jackson Street (83 Pa. St. 328), 803. In re Market Street (49 Cal. 546), 825, 827. In re Opening of Albany St. (6 Abb. Pr. 273), 331. In re Opening of First Street (66 Mich. 42), 129, 742, In re Opening Robin Street (1 La. Ann. 412), 179, 256. In re Osage Street (90 Pa. St. 114), 803. In re Public Road (54 N. J. L. 539), 803, TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxvii (The references are to pages.) In re Road (14 Serg. & R. 447), 803. In re Road Sterrett Tp. (123 Pa. St. 231), 803. In re Twenty-eighth St. (102 Pa. St. 140), 803. In re Vacation of Henry St. (123 Pa. St. 346), 803. In re Vacation of Union St. (140 Pa. St. 525), 803. Insurance Co. v. Sortwell (8 Al- len 217), 165. Interocean Pub. Co. v. Associated Press C184 111. 438), 54. Inwood V. State (42 Ohio St. 186), 512, 515, 519. Iowa City v. Newell (115 Iowa 55), 635, 653. Iowa Homestead Co. v. Webster County (21 Iowa 221), 442. Ireland v. Globe Milling, etc. Co. (19 R. I. 180), 79. Iron Mountain R. R. v. Bingham (87 Tenn. 522), 890. Iron M. R. Co. v. Memphis (96 Fed. Rep. 113), 19, 369, 886. Irvin V. Devors (65 Mo. 625), 5, 236, 237, 588, 846. Irvine v. Wood (51 N. Y. 224), 717. Irving V. Ford (65 Mich. 241), 118. Isbell V. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. (25 Conn. 556), 151, 207. Iske V. Newton (54 Iowa 586), 428, 440. Israel v. Jacksonville (2 111. 290), 475, 476, 485, 486. J. Jack V. Ontario S. & H. R. W. Co. (14 Up. Can. Rep. 328), 29. Jackson v. Boyd (53 Iowa 536), 465, 499. Jackson v. Gilchrist (15 John 89), 446. Jackson v. Grand Ave. Ry. Co. (118 Mo. 199), 17, 31, 345, 743. Jackson v. K. C, Ft. S. & M. Ry. Co. (157 Mo. 621), 586, 598, 601, 671, 744, 749. Jackson v. Newman (59 Miss. 385), 642. Jackson v. People (9 Mich. Ill), 561, 572, 716. Jackson v. People (9 Mich. 119), 573. Jackson v. Rochester (43 Hun. 635), 680. Jackson v. Shawl (29 Cal. 267), 775. Jackson County H. R. R. Co. v. Interstate Rapid Transit Co. (24 Fed. Rep. 306), 121, 305. Jacksonville v. Allen (25 111. App. 54), 22. Jacksonville v. Block (36 111. 507), 568. Jacksonville v. Headen (48 111. App. 60), 537. Jacksonville v. Holland (19 111. 271), 500, 567. Jacksonville v. Ledwith (26 Fla. 163), 242, 294, 452, 616, 762, 763, 764. Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Ry. Co. (67 111. 540), 720. Jacksonville Electric Light Co. v. Jacksonville (36 Fla. 229), 798. Jacksonville Ry. Co. v. Jackson- ville (114 111. 562), 840, 848, 854. Jacksonville R. Co. v. Jacksonville (114 in. 560), 855. Jacksonville, Tampa & K. W. Ry. Co. V. Boy (34 Fla. 389), 570. Jacobs, In re (98 N. Y. 98), 313, 667, 669, 682, 687, 864. Jacobs V. San Francisco (100 Cal. 121), 158, 238, 241. Jacobs V. Smallwood (63 N. C. 112), 372. Jahn, In re (55 Kan. 694), 519, 523, 526, 574, 757, 786. James v. Darlington (71 Wis. 173), 831. James v. Dubois (16 N. J. L. 285), 331, 333. James v. Harrodsburg (86 Ky. 191), 713. James v. Pine Bluff (49 Ark. 199), 715, 810. James v. Ptortage (48 Wis. 677), 874. James v. Putney (Cro. Car. 498), 490. James v. Stull (9 Barb. 482), 389. Ixxxviii TABLE OF CASES. (The references Janesville v. Dewey (3 Wis. 245), 46, 247, 249. Janesville v. Milwaukee & M. R. R. Co. (7 Wis. 484), 466, 490, 496, 713. Jaquith v. Royce (42 Iowa 406), 465, 478. Jansen v. Atchison (16 Kan. 358), 63, 587. Janvrin v. Exeter (48 N. H. 83), 114. Jarvis v. Fleming (27 Ont. Rep. 309), 102. Jarvis v. New York (49 How. Pr. 354), 24. Jefferson v. Slagle (66 Pa. St. 202), 145. Jefferson City v. Courtmire (9 Mo. 692), 128. Jefferson County v. Lewis (20 Fla. 980), 472. Jeffreys v. Defiance (11 Ohio Dec. 144), 500. Jelliff V. Newark (48 N. J. L. 101), 827, 832. Jelly V. Pieper (44 Mo. App. 380), 60, 64. Jenkins v. Ballantyne (8 Utah 245), 734. Jenkins ^v. Charleston (96 U. S. 449), 375. Jenkins v. Cheyenne (1 Wyo.'Ter. 287),' 478, 487, 565. Jenkins v. Stetler (118 Ind. 275), 119. Jenkins v. Thomasville (35 Ga. 145), 782. Jenks V. Chicago (56 111. 397), 808. Jennings County v. Verharg (63 Ind. 107), 862. Jett V. Richmond (78 Ind. 316), 791. Jetter v. New York & H. R. R. Co. 2 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 458), 56, 603. Jersey City v. Jersey City & B. R. Co. (20 N. J. Eq. 360), 305, 884. Jersey City v. State (30 N. J. L. 521), 192. Jersey City H. & P. St. Ry. v. Passaic (N. J. L. 1902, 52 Atl. Rep. 242), 224, 234. are to pages.) Jersey City Brewery Co. v. Jersey City (42 N. J. L. 575), 830. Jersey City Gas Co. v. Dwight (29 N. J. Eq. 242), 379, 880. Jessing v. Columbus (1 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 90), 831. Jex V. New York (103 N. Y. 536), 831. John V. State (1 Ala. 95), 571. Johnson v. Americus (46 Ga. 80), 471, 472, 483. Johnson v. Asbury Park (58 N. J. L. 604), 621. Johnson v. Barclay (16 N. J. L. 1), 492, 499, 505, 512, 556, 559. Johnson v. Board of Com'rs of Wells County (107 Ind. 15), 867. Johnson v. Cincinnati (Ohio, 26 Wkly. Law Bui. 223), 360. Johnson v. Dodd (56 N. Y. 76), 145. Johnson v. Dow (53 Mo. App. 372), 275. Johnson v. Finley (54 Neb. 733), 47, 250, 596. Johnson v. Hahn (4 Neb. 139), 326. Johnson v. Higgins (3 Mete. 566), 372. Johnson v. Hilton & D. L. Co. (103 Ga. 212), 469, 470, 574. Johnson v. Macon (114 Ga. 426), 642. Johnson v. People (202 111. 306), 859. Johnson v. Philadelphia (60 Pti. St. 445), 442, 652. Johnson v. School District (67 Mo. 319), 192. Johnson v. Simonton (43 Cal. 242), 17, 20, 672, 767. Johnson v. St. Paul D. R. R. (43 Minn. 222), 311. Johnson v. Smith (11 Humph. 396), 774. Johnson v. State (59 Miss. 543), 787. Johnson v. State (7 Mo. 183), 522. Johnson v. Winfleld (48 Kan. 129), 502. Johnston v. District of Columbia (118 U. S. 19), 799. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxix (The references are to pages.) Johnston v. Macon (62 Ga. 645), 611, 633, 644. Johnston v. Oshkosh (21 Wis. 184), 811. Johnston v. Wilson (2 N. H. 202), 191. Jolly V. P. N. I. & C. Ry. Co. (25 Pittsb. Leg. J. 259), 174. Joliet V. Alexander (194 111. 457), 438. Joliet V. Petty (96 111. App. 450), 337. Joliet V. Petty (97 111. App. 450), 330. Joliet V. Verley (35 111. 58), 127. Jonas V. Cincinnati (18 Ohio 318), 609. Jonas V. Gilbert (5 Sup. Ct. of Canada 356), 312. Jones V. Andover (9 Pick. 146), 150, 197. Jones V. Andover (10 Allen 18), 587, 605. Jones V. Belt (8 Houton 562), 603. Jones V. Boston (104 Mass. 461), 847. Jones V. Detroit Water Com'rs (34 Mich. 273), 824. Jones V. Duncan (127 N. C. 118), 731. Jones V. Estis (2 John 379), 545. Jones V. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (2 Daly 307), 19, 32, 63, 371. Jones V. Gilbert (5 S. C. 356), 631. Jones V. Grady (25 La. Ann. 586), 647. Jones V. Great Southern, etc., Hotel Co. (86 Fed. Rep. 370), 669. Jones V. Hilliard (69 Ala. 300), 627, 648. Jones V. Hutchinson (43 Ala. 721), 209. Jones V. Lake View (151 111. 663), 582. Jones V. Loving (55 Miss. 109), 258. Jones V. McAlpine (64 Ala. 511), 7, 203, 315. Jonesboro v. McKee (2 Yerg. 167), 47J. Jones V. Millsaps (71 Miss. 10), 457. Jones V. Page (44 Ala. 657), 641. Jones V. Pendleton County (Ky. 1902, 19 S. W. Rep. 740), 120. Jones V. Port Arthur (16 Ont. Rep. 474), 102. Jones V. Richmond (18 Gratt. 517), 759. Jones V. Robbins (8 Gray 329), 522, 527. Jones V. Schuykill L. H. & P. Co. (202 Pa. St. 164), 237. Jones V. South Omaha (Neb. 1902, 94 N. W. Rep. 957), 830. Joplin V. Leckie (78 Mo. App. 8), 72, 76, 82, 614. Jordan v. School District (38 Me. 164), 149, 191. Jordon v. Nicolin (84 Minn. 367), 505, 535. Joslyn V. Dickerson (71 111. 25), 469. Joy v. St. Louis (138 U. S. 1), 16. Joyce V. East St. Louis (77 111. 156), 617. Joyce V. Barron (67 Ohio St. 264), 829. Joyce V. Woods (78 Ky. 386), 693. Joyes V. Shadurn (11 Ky. Law. Rep. 892), 833, 847. Judd V. Hartford (72 Conn. 350), 675. Judd V. W. St. L. & P. Ry. Co. (23 Mo. App. 56), 581, 585. Judson V. Plattsburg (3 Dill. C. C. 181), 546. Judson V. Reardon (16 Minn. 431), 359, 484. Julia Building Assn. v. Bell Tele. Co. (13 Mo. App. 477), 885. Julia Building Assn. v. Bell Tele. Co. (88 Mo. 258), 892, 893. Julienne v. Jackson (69 Miss. 34), 733. Junction City v. Webb. (44 Kan. 71), 336. Jussen V. Commissioners (95 Ind. 567), 177. K. Kaime v. Harty (4 Mo. App. 357), 319, 325, 334, xc TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Kalamazoo v. Kalamazoo, etc., Co. (124 Mich. 74), 885. Kamerick v. Castleman (21 Mo. App. 587), 245, 336. Kamrath v. Albany (53 Hun. 206), 196. Kanouse v. Lexington (12 111. App. 318), 278, 567. Kankakee v. K. I. R. R. Co. (115 111. 88), 143. Kankakee v. Potter (119 111. 324), 848, 853, 856. Kahn v. Macon (95 Ga. 419), 537, 784. Kansas v. Young (3 Kan. 445), 461. Kansas City v. Am. Surety Co. (71 Mo. App. 315), 588. Kansas City v. Bacon (147 Mo. 259), 136, 821, 824. Kansas City v. Baird (163 Mo. 196), 694. Kansas City v. Butt (38 Mo. App. 237), 657. Kansas City v. Clark (68 Mo. 588), 334, 436, 477, 564, 565, 755, 794. Kansas City v. Cook (38 Mo. App. 660), 133, 292, 299, 311, 627. Kansas City v. Corrigan (86 Mo. 67), 318, 376. Kansas City v. Corrigan (18 Mo. App. 206), 618, 651, 655. Kansas City v. Dickey (76 Mo. App. 437), 541. Kansas City v. Flanagan (69 Mo. 22), 115, 482, 485, 506, 531. Kansas City v. Flanders (71 Mo. 281), 648. Kansas City v. Gamier (57 Kan. 412), 774. Kansas City v. Grubel (57 Kan. 436), 786. Kansas City v. Grush (151 Mo. 128), 614, 657. Kansas City v. Johnson (78 Mo. 661), 583, 584, 657. Kansas City v. Hallett (59 Mo. App. 160), 25, 756, 787. Kansas City v. Hanson (8 Kan. App. 290), 865. Kansas City v. Lorber (64 Mo. App. 604), 69, 81, 614, 657. Kansas City v. McAleer (31 Mo. App. 433), 299, 688, 690, 698, 773. Kansas City v. McDonald (60 Kan. 481), 294.. Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co. (140 Mo. 458), 21, 68, 341, 804. Kansas City v. Muhlback (68 Mo. 638), 477, 564, 646. Kansas City v. Neal (49 Mo. App. 72), 466, 477, 563, 688, 772, 787, 793. Kansas City v. O'Connor (82 Mo. App. 655), 826. Kansas City v. O'Connor (36 Mo. App. 594), 482. Kansas City v; Richardson (90 Mo. App. 450), 313, 629, 644. Kansas City ex rel v. Scarrltt (127 Mo. 642), 68, 342, 805. Kansas City v. Smart (128 Mo. 272), 329, 34L Kansas City v. Smith (93 Mo. App. 217), 642. Kansas City v. Sutton (52 Mo. App. 398), 311, 313, 772. Kansas City v. Swope (79 Mo. 446), 71. Kansas City v. Vindquest (36 Mo. App. 584), 657. Kansas City v. Vineyard (128 Mo. 75), 582. Kansas City v. Ward (134 Mo. 172), 34L Kansas City v. White (69 Mo. 26), 320, 334, 755. Kansas City v. Whitman (70 Mo. App. 630), 497, 507. Kansas City v. Young (8B Mo. App. 381), 776. Kansas City v. Zahner (138 Mo. 453), 563. Kansas City v. Zahner (73 Mo. App. 396), 491, 756, 787. Kansas City Grading Co. v. Hol- den (32 Mo. App. 490), 824. Kansas City Ry. Co. v. Mower (16 Kan. 573), 750. K. C. St. J. & C. B. Ry. Co. v. St. J. T. Ry. Co. (97 Mo. 457), 888. Kansas City Transfer Co. v. Hull- ing (22 Mo. App. 654), 865. Karle v, K. C. St. Joseph & C. B. Ry. Co. (55 Mo. 476), 602. Karwisch v. Atlanta (44 Ga. 204), 758. TABLE OF CASES. XCl (The references are to pages.) Kassell v. Savannah (109 Ga. 491), 784. Katzenberger v. Aberdeen (121 U. S. 172), 266. Katzenberger v. Larvo (6 Pickle 235), 748. Katzenberger v. Lawo (90 Tenn. 235), 26. Kavanaugh v. Mobile & G. R. Co. 78 Ga. 271), 895. Kaufman v. Stein (138 Ind. 49), 439, 734, 737. Kaye v. Hall (13 B. Mon. 455), 846.' Kayser v. Bremen (16 Mo. 88)-, 546. Keane v. Gushing (15 Mo. App. 96), 46, 845, 860. Keane v. Klausman (21 Mo. App. 485), 583, 588, 861. Kearney v. Andrews (10 N. J. Eq. 70), 835, 851. Kearney v. Farrell (28 Conn. 317), 685. Kearney v. Woodruff (U. S. C. C. A., 115 Fed. Rep. 90), 244. Kearns v. Snowdew (104 Mass. 63), 605. Keating v. Skiles (72 Mo. 97), ' 209, 595, 860. Keck V. Gainsville (98 Ga. 423), 784. Keckely v. Road Com'rs (4 Mc- Cord 463), 251. Keek v. Cincinnati (4 Ohio Dec. 324), 566. Keel V. Board of Directors, etc., (59 Ark. 513), 829. Keeler v. Milledge (24 N. J. L. 142), 480, 484, 492, 496, 559, 566. Keeny v. Jersey City (47 N. J. L. 449), 131. Keese v. Denver (10 Colo. 112), 831. Keilkopf V. Denver (19 Colo. 325), 670. Keim v. Chicago (46 111. App. 445), 773. Keim v. Union Ry. & Transit Co. (90 Mo. 314), 745, 749. Keith V. Bingham (100 Mo, 300), 818, 823, 825, Keith V. Covington (22 Ky. L. Rep. 1414), 159. Keith V. Wilson (145 Ind. 149), 810. Keithsburg v. Frick (34 111. 405), 267. Kellar v. Savage (17 Me. 444), 199, 200. Keller v. Corpus Christi (50 Tex. 614), 667. Kelley v. Kennard (60 N. H. 1), 142. Kelley v. Milwaukee (18 Wis. 23), 118, 124, 125. Kelley v. New York (6 Misc. 516), 682, 707. Kelley v. Rhodes (7 Wyo. 237), 412. Kellny v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (101 Mo. 67), 586, 745, 748. Kellogg V. Carrico (47 Mo. 157), 252. Kelly v. Chicago (62 111. 279), 862. Kelly V. Meeks (87 Mo. 396), 65, 351. Kelly V. Milwaukee (18 Wis. 83), 676. Kelly V. Pittsburg (104 U. S. 78), 140. Kelly V. St. Paul M. & M. Ry. Co. (29 Minn. 1), 585. Kelsey v. King (32 Barb. 410), 813, 828, 832. Kemp V. Monett (95 Mo. App. 452). 21, 22. Kemper v. Burlington (81 lows; 354), 720. Kempinger v. St. Louis & Iron M. Ry. Co. (3 Mo. App. 581), 744. Kemper v. Louisville (14 Bush. 87), 472. Keokuk v. District of Keokuk (53 Iowa 352), 61. Keokuk v. Dressell (47 Iowa 597), 279, 451, 557, 617. Keokuk v. Fort Wayne Electric Co. (90 Iowa 67), 895. Keokuk v. Keokuk N. L. Packet Co. (45 Iowa 196), 38. Keokuk v. Scroggs (39 Iowa 447), 79, 734, 735. Keokuk, etc. Co. v, Quincy (81 111. 422), 448, xcn TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to -pages.) Keough V. St. Paul (66 Minn. 114), 834. Kendig v. Knight (60 Iowa 29), 47, 845. Kennard v. Burton (25 Me. 39), 726. Kennebec Water Dist. v. Water- ville (97 Me. 185), 905. Kennedy v. Board of Health (2 Pa. St. 366), 688. Kennedy v. Miller (97 Cal. 429), 70. Kennedy v. Phelps (10 La. Ann. 227), 682, 691, 693, 698. Kennedy v. Philadelphia (2 Pa. St. 366), 682. Kennedy v. Newman (3 N. Y. Super. Ct. 187), 596. Kennedy v. Sowden (1 McMullan Law 323), 32, 276, 552, 688, 689. Kensington v. Glenat (1 Phila. 393), 499. Kent V. Dithridge & Smith Cut Glass (10 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 629), 96. Kenyon v. Stewart (44 Pa. St. 179), 383. Kepner v. Com. (40 Pa. St. 124), 3, 5, 11, 13, 14, 237, 238, 241, 244. Kerlin Bros. Co. v. Toledo (20 Ohio Cir. Ct. 603), 189. Kernitz v. Long Island City (50 Hun. 428), 253. Kerr v. Corsicana (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, 35 S. W. Rep. 694), 839. Kerr v. Hitt (75 111. 51), 251. Kerr v. Seaver (11 Allen 151), 640. Kerr v. Trego (47 Pa. St. 29), 154. Kerrigan, in re (33 N. J. L. 344), 465. Kesler v. Smith (66 N. C. 154), 335. Ketchum v. Buffalo (21 Barb. 294), 88, 111. Ketchum v. Buffalo (14 N. Y. 356), 761. Kettering v. Jacksonville (50 111. 39), 449, 453, 534, 545, 546, 594, 646. Keyes v. Westford (17 Pick. 273), 195. Keyport v. Cherry (51 N. J. L. 417), 803. Kiburg, ex parte (10 Mo. App. 442), 277, 461, 512, 520, 560, 756, 787, 792. Kidd V. Pearson (128 U. S. 1), 419, 665. Kiley v. Cranor (51 Mo. 541), 214. Kiley v. Forsee (57 Mo. 390), 223, 257. Kiley v. Kansas City (87 Mo. 103), 19, 63, 371, 675, 677, 692. Kiley v. Oppenheimer (55 Mo. 374), 72, 214. Kilvington v. Superior (83 Wis. 222), 864. Kimball v. Brawner (47 Mo. 398), 111, 870. Kimball v. Connor (3 Kan. 414), 516. Kimball v. Lamprey (19 N. H. 215), 149, 178. Kimball v. Marshall (44 N. H. 465), 167, 175, 178, 179. Kimball v. People (20 111. 348), 535. Kimball v. Rosendale (42 Wis. 407), 869. Kimble v. Peoria (140 111. 157), 253, 847. Kimmel, in re (41 Fed. Rep. 775), 400. Kimmel v. State (104 Tenn. 184), 397. Kimmish v. Ball (129 U. S. 217), 422. Kimmundy v. Mahan (72 111. 462), 277, 627. Kincaid's Appeal (66 Pa. St. 411), 697. Kinder v. Gillespie (63 111. 88). 276, 731. Kinealy v. Gay (7 Mo. App. 203), 837. King V. Avering Atte Bower (5 Barn. & Aid. 691), 464. King V. Bower (1 Barn, and Cress. 492), 175. King V. Brooklyn (42 Barb. 627), 807. King V. Buller (8 Bast 389), 175. TABLE OP CASES. XClll (The references are to pages.) King V. Burdett (12 W. Va. 688), 528. King V. Chicago (111 III. 63), 241. King V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. (98 111. 376), 738. King V. Davenport (98 111. 305), 691, 735, 738. King V. Derby (Skinner 370), 125. King V. Dixon (10 Mod. 335), 540. King V. Greet (8 Barn. & Cress. 363), 164. King Y. Hastings (5 Barn. & Aid. 692), 464. King V. Hunter (65 N. C. '603), 366. King V. Inhabitants of Essex (4 T. R. 591), 115. King V. Jacksonville (3 111. 305), 475, 487. King V. Jacksonville (2 Scam. 305), 645. King V. Miller (6 Durnf. & Bast 268), 164, 175. King V. Morris (18 N. J. Eq. 397), 684. King V. Portland (2 Oreg. 146), 823. King V. Reed (43 N. J. L. 186), 806. King V. Thompson (2 Durnf. & East 18), 558. King V. Williams (2 Maule & Sel. 141), 175. King-Hill Brick Mfg. Co. v. Ham- ilton (51 Mo. App. 120), 132, 809. Kingman, in re (153 Mass. 566), 806. Kingman v. Berry (40 Kan. 625), 506. Kingsbury v. Centre School Dist. (12 Met. 9d), 179. Kinsbury v. Quincy School Dis- trict (12 Met. 99), 152. Kings County Ins. Co. v. Stevens (101 N. y. 411), 91. Kinney v. Koopman (116 Ala. 310), 740. Kinsel, in re (64 Kan. 1), 512. Kinsella v. Auburn (54 Hun. 634), 846. ^ Kinsley v. Chicago (124 111. 359), 615, 616, 635, 671. Kip V. Paterson (26 N. J. L. 298), 490, 496, 616, 634. Kiphart v. Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (7 Ind. App. 122), 829. Kirchgraber v. Lloyd (58 Mo. App. 59), 553, 685, 698. Kirby v. Boylston Market Associa- tion (14 Gray 249), 62, 587, 603, 715. Kirby v. Citizens' Ry. Co. (48 Md. 168), 817. Kirk V. Nowell (1 Term Rep. 118), 272. Kirk V. Nowill (1 Term Rep. 125), 475. Kirkham v. Russell (76 Va. 956), 8, 9, 28, 66, 72, 76, 81, 121, 142, 293. Kirkland v. Indianapolis (142 Ind. 123), 830. Kirkman v. Handy (30 Tenn. 406), 704. Kirkpatrick v. State (5 Kan. 673). 547. Kirkpatrick v. United Presby- terian Ch. (63 Iowa 372), 13. Kirkwood v. Autenrelth (11 Mo. App. 515), 541, 564. Kirkwood v. Cairns (44 Mo. App. 88), 477, 692, 707, 715. Kirkwood v. Meramec Highlands Co. (94 Mo. App. 637), 72, 304, 309, 451. Kitchell V. Commissioners (123 Ind. 540), 120. Kitson V. Ann Arbor (26 Mich. 325), 635, 646. Kittinger v. Buffalo Traction Co. (160 N. Y. 377), 182, 240, 241, 257, 260, 880. Kittle V. Shervin (11 Neb. 65), 824. Klais v. Pulford (36 Wis. 587), 246. Kline v. Tacoma (12 Wash. 657), 842. Klinesmith v. Harrison (18 111. App. 467), 437. Klingler v. Bickel (117 Pa. St. 326), 735, 738. Klipper v. Coffey (44 Md. 117), 604. Klock V. People (2 Park Cr. Rep. 676), 522. XCIV TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Klockenbrink v. St. Louis & M. Riv. Ry. Co. (81 Mo. App. 351), 749. Klotz V. Winona & St. P. Ry. Co. (68 Minn. 341), 585. Knapp V. Kansas City (48 Mo. App. 485), 72, 76, 103, 115, 430. Knapp, Stout & Co. v. St. Louis (i56 Mo. 343), 425, 428, 814, 883. Knapp, Stout & Co. v. St. Louis Transfer Co. (126 Mo. 26), 873, 874, 884, 888, 889, 891, 892. Knaust, in re (101 N. Y. 188), 841. Knauss v. Brua (107 P!a. St. 85), 456. Kneedler v. Norristown (100 Pa. St. 368), 273, 296, 734, 735. Kneeland v. Milwaukee (18 Wis. 411), 828. Kneib v. People (50 How. Pr. 140), 249. Knell V. Buffalo (54 Hun. 80), 239. Knight V. Eureka (123 Cal. 192), 128. Knight V. K. C, St. J. & C. B. R. R. Co. (70 Mo. 231), 209, 212, 238, 241, 243, 599, 915. Knight V. Thompsonville (74 111. App. 550), 186. Knight V West Union (45 W. Va. 194), 327. Kniper v. Louisville (7 Bush. 599), 612, 618, 635. Knupfle V. Knickerbocker Ice Co. (84 N. Y. 488), 56, 6L Knoblach v. C. M. & St. Paul Ry. Co. (31 Minn. 402), 745. Knot V. Gay (1 Root 66), 483. Knowles v. Muscatine (20 Iowa 248), 803. Knowles v. Seale (64 Cal. 377), 833. Knowles v. Wayne City (31 111. App. 471), 564. Knowlton v. Williams (174 Mass. 476), 609. Knox, ex parte (Tex. Crim. App. 1897, 39 S. W. Rep. 670), 462, 468. Knox City v. Thompson (19 Mo. App. 523), 72, 448, 614, 620. Knox City v. Whitaker (87 Mo. App. 468), 32. Knoxville v. Bird (12 Lea 121), 44, 257, 369, 715. Knoxville v. C. B. & Q. R. R. (83 Iowa 636), 83, 271, 686. Knoxville v. King (7 Lea 441), 34, 276, 552, 731. Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co. (107 Tenn. 647), 176, 252, 906. Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co. (189 U. S. 434), 907. Kobbe V. New Brighton (20 Misc. 477), 699. Koeppen v. Sedalia (89 Mo. App. 648), 134. Kokomo V. Mahan (100 Ind. 272), 799. Kolff V. St. Paul Fuel Exchange (48 Minn. 215), 304. Kolkmeyer v. Jefferson City (75 Mo. App. 678), 192, 840. Konrad v. Rogers (70 Wis. 492), 91. Koppersmith v. State (51 Ala. 6), 538. Korah v. Ottawa (32 111. 121), 270, 328. Kosciusko V. Slomberg (68 Miss. 469), S02, 693. Krafte v. Springfield (86 Mo. App. 530), 834. Kreis v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (148 Mo. 321), 749. Krickle v. Com. (1 B. Mon. 361), 447, 754. Krieseler v. Le Valley (122 Mich. 576), 143. Kroffe V. Springfield (86 Mo. App. 530), 6, 842. Krumberg v. Cincinnati (29 Ohio St. 69), 825, 839. Kruse v. Johnson (2 Q. B. 91), 292, 443. Kuback, ex parte (85 Cal. 274), 780. Kuester v. Chicago (187 111. 21), 871. Kuhn V. Chicago (30 111. App. 203), 654, 774. Kunkle v. Franklin (13 Minn. 127), 105. Kundinger v. Saginaw (59 Mich. 355), 829. Kyle V. Malin (8 Ind. 34), 77. TABLE OF CASES. xcv (The references are to pages.) L.. Lacey, ex parte (108 Cal. 326), 24, 354, 703, 773. Lacey v. Marshalltown (99 Iowa 367), 898. Lacey v. Palmer (93 Va. 159), 665, 682. Lackland v. N. Mo. Ry. Co. (31 Mo. 180), 708, 888, 890. Ladd V. East Portland (18 Oreg. 87), 237. Ladd V. Jones (61 111. App. 584), 798. Lafayette v. Fowler (34 Ind. 140), 831. Lafayette v. Timberlake (88 Ind. 330), 676. Lafterranderie v. New Orleans (3 La. 246), 643. Laflin & Rand Powder Co. v. Tearney (131 111. 322), 740. Lafon V. Dufrocq (9 La. Ann. 350), 462, 563. Lalng V. Americus (86 Ga. 756), 716, 718. Lake v. Aberdeen (57 Miss. 260), 124. Lake v. Decatur (91 111. 596), 835, 848, 855. Lake Co. Water & Light Co. v. Walsh (Ind. 1902, 65 N. E. Rep. 530), 95. Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Nobles- ville (16 App. 20), 593. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Chicago (144 111. 391), 848. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Chicago (56 111. 454), 808, 848, 855. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Dunkirk (65 Hun. 494), 163. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Pro- beck (33 111. App. 145), 744. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Smith (173 U. S. 684), 911. Lake View v. LeBahn (120 111. 92), 717. Lake View v. Letz (44 111. 81), 294, 697. Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. (70 111. 191), 668, 687, 696. Lake View v. Tate (130 111. 247), 45, 310, 744. Lamar v. Adams (90 Mo. App. 35), 611, 618. Lamar v. Gunter (29 Ala. 324), 545. Lamar v. Hewitt (60 Mo. App. 314), 502. Lamar v. Weidman (57 Mo. App. 507), 291, 297, 298, 452, 762, 768. Lamar W. & E. L. Co. v. Lamar (128 Mo. 188), 824. Lamarque v. New Orleans (1 Mc- Gloin 28), 671, 763. Lamb v. S. L. C. & W. Ry. Co. (33 Mo. App. 489), 742. Lambertville v. Thornton (1 Ld. Raym. 91), 82. Lamkin v. Sterling (1 Idaho 92), 385. Lamm v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co. (45 Minn. 71), 244, 838. Lammert v. Lidwell (62 Mo. 188), 133. Lammert v. Lidwell (62 Mo. 188), 49. Lancaster v. Baer (5 Lane. Bar. 606), 558. Lancaster v. Edison Electric Il- luminating Co. (8 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 178), 287, 407, 510. Lancaster v. Fulton (Pa., 24 W. N. C. 401), 9. Lancaster v. Hirsh (1 Lane. Law Rev. 209), 488, 558. Lancaster v. R. R. Co. (12 Lan- caster Bar 99), 498, 531. Land V. Coffman (50 Mo. 243), 90, 546. Land Co. v. Jellico (103 Tenn. 3"20), 176. Lander v. School District (33 Me. 239), 148. Lander v. Smithfield (33 Me. 239), 151. Landers v. Staten Island R. R. Co. (53 N. Y. .450), 465. Landers v. Staten island R. R. Co. (13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 338), 469. Landis v. Landis (39 N. J. L. 274), 329. Landis v. Vineland (54 N. J. L. 75), 21, 23, 285, 451. Lang V. Brookston (79 Ind. 183), 508. xevi TABLE OP CASES. (The references are to pages.) Landon v. New York (39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 467), 24. Lane v. Atlantic Works (111 Mass. 136), 602, 603. Lane v. Burdick (17 Wis. 92), 469. Laney v. Garbee (105 Mo. 355), 481. Langdon v. Castleton (30 Vt. 285), 142. Langdon v. New York Fire Dept. (17 Wend. 234), 736. Langhorne v. Robinson (20 Gratt. 661), 35, 36. Langon v. Barnardston (1 Lev. 16), 490. Langdale v. Bonton (12 Ind. 467), 717. Langston, in re (55 Neb. 310), 269. Languille v. State (4 Tex. App. 312), 640. Lane v. Concord (70 N. H. 485), 292. Lanfear v. New Orleans (4 La. 97), 274, 275. Lanier v. Savannah (70 Ga. 760), 641. Lansing v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (85 Iowa 215), 466. Lansing v. Lansing City Elect. Ry. Co. (109 Mich. 123), 900. Lansing v. Toolan (37 Mich. 152), 799. Laporte City v. Goodfellow (47 Iowa 572), 583. Laramie County v. Albany County (92 U. S. 307), 67. Laredo v. International Bridge & T. Co. (66 Fed. Rep. 246), 306. Largen v. State ex rel (76 Tex. 323), 546. Larkin v. Burlington, etc., R. R. Co. (91 Iowa 654), 247, 594. Larkin v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co. (85 Iowa 492), 251, 315, 593. Larkin v. Saginaw County (11 Mich. 88), 675. Lamed v. Briscoe (62 Mich. 393), 198, 209. Larney v. Cleveland (34 Ohio St. 599), 500, 557. Latham v. Wilmette (168 111. 153), 850, 857, 866, 871. Latta V. Williams (87 N. C. 126), 614. Laude v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (33 Wis. 640), 335. Lauenstein v. Fond du Lac (28 Wis. 336), 132. Launder v. Chicago (111 111. 291), 297, 359, 427, 551, 653, 654, 774. Laundry License Case, in re (22 Fed. 701), 616, 634. Laundry Ordinance Case (7 Saw- yer 526), 135. Launtz v. People (113 111. 137), 8, 158, 163, 167. Laurens v. Elmore (55 S. C. 477), 401. Lavery v. Hannigan (20 Jones & S. 463), 713, 718. Law V. People ex rel (87 111. 385), 103, 233, 252. Lawrence, in re (69 Cal. 608), 645. Lawrence v. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co. (94 U. S. 164), 54. Lawrence v. Ingersoll (88 Tenn. 52), 8, 163, 166, 185. Lawrence v. Traner (136 111. 474), 176. Lawrence v. Webster (167 Mass. 513), 708. Lawson v. Gibson (18 Neb. 137), 251. Lawton v. Steele (119 N. Y. 226), 691, 692. Lawton v. Stelle (152 U. S. 133), 668. Lawyers' Tax Cases, in re (55 Tenn. 565), 641. Layton v. New Orleans (12 La. Ann. 515), 67. Leach v. Cargill (60 Mo. 316), 72, 811. Leach v. State (36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 248), 462, 466, 561, 791, 795. Lead v. Klatt (13 S. D. 140), 280, 477, 491, 499, 510. Lead v. Klatt (11 S. D. 109), 477. Leadville v. Matthews (10 Colo. 125), 222. Leake v. Philadelphia (150 Pa. St. 643), 898. Leathers v. Aiken (9 Fed.' Rep. 679), 415. Leavenworth v. Booth (15 Kan. 627), -269, 620, 629, 660. ' TABLE OP CASES. xcvu (The references are to pages.) Leavenworth v. Douglass (3 Kan. App. 67), 240, 247. Leavenworth v. Weaver (26 Kan. 392), 564. Leavenworth County Com'rs v. Sellew (99 U. S. 624), 145. Leavenworth & D. M. R. R. Co. v. Platte County (42 Mo. 171), 126. Leavey v. Preble (64 Me. 120), 693. Leavitt v. Oxford, etc., Silver Min. Co. (3 Utah 265), 165. Lebanon Light & Water Co. v. Lebanon (163 Mo. 254), 598, 600. LeClaire v. Davenport (13 Iowa 210), 310, 763. Lecoup V. Mobile (127 U. S. 640), 399. Le Couteulx v. Buffalo (33 N. Y. 333), 85, 87, 88. Lee V. Smyley (16 Ala. 773), 531. Lee V. Thomas (49 Mo. 112), 608. Lee V. Wallis (1 Ken. 295), 450. Leeds v. Richmond (102 Ind. 372), 118, 799. Leep V. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. (58 Ark. 407), 779. Lee Tong, in re (9 Sawyer 333), 756. Lehigh Coal & Iron Co. v. Cape- hart (49 Minn. 539), 768. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. Inter - County Street Railway (167 Pa. St. 126), 430, Lehigh County v. Schock (113 Pa. St. 373), 522. Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton (121 U. S. 388), 369. Lehman v. McBride (15 Ohio St, 573), 225. Leighton v. Walker (9 N. H. 59), 339. Leisy v. Hardin (135 U. S. 100), 403. Leloup V. Port of Mobile (127 U. S. 640), 396, 410. Lemington v. Blodgett (26 Vt. 210), 202. Lemington v. Blodgett (37 Vt. 210), 211. Lemmon v. Guthrie Center (113 Iowa 36), 738. Lemoine v. St. Louis (120 Mo. 419), 9. Lemoine v. St. Louis (72 Mo. 404), 15, 330. Lemoine v. St. Louis (5 Mo. App. 583), 15. Lemon v. Reidel (1 Lane. Law Rev. 3), 487, 509. Lennon v. N. Y. City (55 N. Y. 361), 869. Lenox v. Grant (8 Mo. 254), 474. Lent V. Portland (Oregon 1903, 71 Pac. Rep. 645), 611. Lent V. Tillson (72 Cal. 404), 805. Lenz V. Sherrott (26 Mich. 139), 327, 731. Leominister v. Conant (139 Mass. 384), 841, 846. Leonard v. Canton (35 Miss. 189), 76, 614. Leoni Tp. v. Taylor (20 Mich. 148), 675. LesBois v. Bramell (4 How. 449), 92. Lessley v. Phipps (49 Miss. 790). 383. Lester v. Baltimore (29 Md. 415), 192. Lester v. Jackson (69 Miss. 887), 89. Lesterjelle v. Columbus (30 Ga. 936), 481, 530, 555. LeTourneau v. Duluth (Minn. 1902, 88 N. W. Rep. 529), 244. LeTourneau v. Duluth (85 Minn. 219), 430. Levi V. Louisville (97 Ky. 394), 621. Levis V. Newton (75 Fed. Rep. 884), 723, 913. Levy, Matter of (4 Hun. 501), 249. Levy V. Chicago (113 111. 650), 111, 848, 870, 871. Levy V. New York (1 Sandf. 465), 676. Levy V. Salt Lake City (3 Utah 63), 72. Levy V. Shreveport (27 La. Ann. 620), 437. Levy V. State (6 Ind. 281), 482, 485, 492, 781, 794. Lewis V. Cumberland (56 N. J. L. 416), 440. Lewis V. Denver City Waterworks (19 Colo. 236), 260. XCVlll TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Lewis V. Dodge (17 How. Pr. 229), 686. Lewis V. New York (35 How Pr. 162), 234. Lewis V. St. Louis (4 Mo. App. 563), 218. Lewis V. State (21 Ark. 209), 467. Lewiston v. Fairfield (47 Me. 481), 496, 582, 591. Lewiston v. Proctor (27 111. 414), 486. Lewiston v. Proctor (23 111. 533), 532. Lewisville Natural Gas Co. v. State (135 Ind. 49), 101. Lexington v. Curtin (69 Mo. 626), 508. Lexington v. Lafayette Co. Bk. (165 Mo. 671), 98. Lexington v. Headley (5 Bush. 508), 168, 201, 202, 592, 600, 846. Lexington v. Thompson (24 Ky. Law Rep. 384), 805. Lexington v. Wise (24 S. C. 163), 466, 509, 518, 530, 563. Lexington & Ohio R. R. v. Apple- gate (8 Dana 289), 883. L'Hote V. New Orleans (177 U. S. 587), 44, 358, 680, 753. L'Hote V. New Orleans (51 La. Ann. 93), 753. Liberman v. State (26 Neb. 464), 513, 759. License Cases (5 How. 504), 419, 422. Liddy v. St. Louis Ry. Co. (40 Mo. 506), 742, 744. Liebman v. San Francisco (24 Fed. Rep. 705), 830. Ligare v. Chicago (139 111. 46), 444, 799. Lightburne v. Taxing Dist. (4 Lea. 219), 400, 618. Lightfoot V. Krug (35 Pa. St. 348), 737. Lightner v. Peoria (150 111. 80), 813. Lilly V. Indianapolis (149 Ind. 648), 257. Lima Gas Co. v. Lima (4 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 22), 903. Lincoln v. Grant (38 Neb. 369), 385. Lincoln v. Prince (2 Mass. 544), 471. Lincoln v. Smith (27 Vt. 328), 515. Lincoln v. Sun Vapor Light Co. (19 U. S. App. 431), 12. Lincoln v. Sun Vapor Street Light Co. (59 Fed. Rep. 756), 841. Lincoln St. Ry. Co. v. Lincoln (61 Neb. 109), 11, 117. Linden Land Co. v. Milwaukee Blec. R. R. Co. (107 Wis. 493), 428. Lindsay v. Anniston (104 Ala. 257), 289, 714. Lindsay v. Chicago (115 111. 120), 168, 206, 597, 599. Linehan, in re (72 Cal. 114), 702, 704. Linkenhelt v. Garrett (118 Ind. 559), 490, 646. Liningston v. Paducah (80 Ky. 656), 644. Linn v. Chambersburg Borough, a60 Pa. St. 511), 112. Linneus v. Dusky (19 Mo. App. 20), 771, 787. Lippman v. South Bend (84 Ind. 276), 492, 504, 698. Liquor Cases (25 Kan. 751), 310. Lisbon v. Clark (18 N. H. 234), 220, 224, 334, 335, 338. Litchfield v. Parker (64 N. H. 443), 93. Little, in re (60 N. Y. 343), 252. Little V. Madison (42 Wis. 643), 678. Little V. Merrill (10 Pick. 543), 148, 15L Little Falls Electric & W. Co. v. Little Falls (102 Fed. Rep. 663), 377. Littlefleld v. State (42 Neb. 223), 83, 425, 636, 766. Little Miami R. R. Co. v. Green County Commissioners (31 Ohio St. 338), 717. Little Rock v. Barton (33 Ark. 436), 665. Little Rock v. Board of Improve- ments (42 Ai-k. 152), 145, 805. Little Rock v. Fitzgerald (59 Ark. 494), 810. TABLE OF CASES. XCIX (The references are to pages.) Little Rock v. Parish (36 Ark. 166), 802. Livingston v. Albany (41 Ga. 22), 24. Livingston v. Pippin (31 Ala. 542), 798. Livingston v. Wolf (136 Pa. St. 519), 25, 30, 291, 715. Livingston County Supervisors v. Welder (64 111. 427), 608. Llano V. Llano County (5 Tex. Civ. App. 132), 718. Lloyd v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y. (5 N. Y. 369), 674. Lobban v. Garnett (9 Dana 389), 774. Locke's Appeal (72 Pa. St. 491), 49, 648. Lockett v. Usry (28 Ga. 345), 383. Lockhart v. Troy (48 Ala. 579), 226, 867. Lockwood V. Mechanic's Nat. Bk. (9 R. I. 308), 166. Lockwood V. St. Louis (24 Mo. 20), 119, 819. Lockwood V. Wabash R. R. Co. (122 Mo. 86), 129, 742, 747, 876, 884, 887, 888, 891, 894. Loeb V. State (75 Ga. 258), 540. Loeb V. Trustees Columbia Tp. (91 Fed. Rep. 37), 820. Loeb & Co. V. Duncan (63 Miss. 89), 570. Logan V. Pyne (43 Iowa 524), 71, 76, 304, 613. Logan V. Tyler (1 Pitts 244), 200, 245. Logan Co. Supervisors v. Lincoln (81 111. 156), 548. Logansport v. Crockett (64 Ind. 319), 187, 210, 213. Logansport v. Dick (70 Ind. 65), 718. Logansport v. Dykeman (116 Ind. 15), 188. Logansport v. Legg (20 Ind. 315), 165, 168, 202, 845. Logansport v. Wright (25 Ind. 512), 842. London v. Vanacre (12 Mod. 272), 179. London v. Venacie,(12 Mod. 269), 31. London v. Wood (12 Md. 686), 277. London Assn., etc., v. London & India Docks Joint Com. (3 Ch. 252), 2, 32. Lonergan v. Louisiana (83 Mo. App. 101), 22, 24, 468. Long V. Brookston (79 Ind. 183), 557. Long V. Doxey (50 Ind. 385), 533. Long V. Duluth (49 Minn. 280), 305. Long V. Jersey City (37 N. J. L. 348), 442. Long V. Shelby County Taxing Dist. (7 Lea 134), 359, 763. Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn (166 U. S. 685), 819. Longworth v. Cincinnati (23 Wkly. Law Bui. 100), 836, 839. Lorain Plank Road v. Cotton (12 Ohio St. 263), 327. Lord V. Annoka (36 Minn. 176), 176. Lord V. Chadbourne (42 La. 429), 383. Lord V. Governor, etc. (2 Phill. 739), 155. Lord V. Oconto (47 Wis. 386), 93, 135. Lorenzen, ex parte (128 Cal. 431), 751. Lorenzen v. Woods (1 McGloin 373), 693. Los Angeles v. Hollywood Ceme- tery Assn. (124 Cal. 344), 297, 695, 696. Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co. (177 U. S. 558), 378, 906. Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Water Co. (61 Cal. 65), 378, 385. Los Angeles v. Waldron (65 Cal. 283), 581, 841. Los Angeles County v. Eikenberry (131 Cal. 461), 46, 645, 647. Los Angeles City Water Co. v. Los Angeles (88 Fed. Rep. 720), 436, 906. Los Angeles County v. Eikenberry (Cal. 1901, 63 Pac. Rep. 766), 442, 444. Los Angeles County v. Eikenberry (131 Cal. 461), 222. TABI.E OF CASES. {The references are to pages.) Los Angeles Lighting Co. v. Los Angeles (106 Cal. 156), 830. Lostutter v. Aurora (126 Ind. 436), 875. Loughbridge v. Huntington (56 Ind. 253), 248, 251, 811. Louisburg v. Harris (7 Jones L. 281), 770. Louisburg v. Harris (53 N. C. 281), 671. Louisiana v. Hardin (11 Mo. 551), 465. Louisiana v. Jumel (107 U. S. 711), 382. Louisiana v. Miller (66 Mo. 467), 841. Louisiana v. New Orleans (109 U. S. 285), 371, 389. Louisiana v. New Orleans (102 U. S. 203), 372, 373, 385. Louisiana v. Pilsbury (105 U. S. 278), 324. Louisiana v. Police Jury, etc. (Ill U. S. 716), 372. Louisiana v. Texas (176 U. S. 1), 261, 421. Louisville v. Bannon (99 Ky. 74), 814. Louisville v. Com. (1 Duval 295), 263. Louisville v. Hyatt (2 B. Mon. 177), 168, 592. Louisville v. Henderson (5 Bush. 515), 866. Louisville v. Louisville University (15 B. Mon. 642), 95. Louisville v. McKegney (70 Ky. 651), 200. Louisville v. Roupe (6 B. Mon. 591), 298. Louisville v. Selvage (106 Ky. 730), 234. Louisville v. Webster (108 111. 414), 738. Louisville v. Wible (84 Ky. 290), 130, 706. Louisville City R. R. Co. v. Louis- ville (8 Bush. 415), 66, 742. Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co. (115 U. S. 683), 379. Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co. (115 U. S. 683), 307. Louisville Home Tel. Co. v. Cum- berland Tel. Co. (Ill Fed. Rep. 663), 429, 725. Louisville N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Shires (108 111. 617), 547, 599. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. East St. Louis (134 111. 656), 119, 813. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mobile, etc., R. R. (124 Ala. 162), 429, 881. Louisville Natural Gas Co. v. State ex rel Reynolds (135 Ind. 49), 908. Louisville Water Co. v. Clark (143 U. S. 1), 380. Love V. Raleigh (116 N. C. 296), 676. Love V. Recorders' Court (128 Mich. 545), 360. Loveland v. Detroit (41 Mich 367), 114. Lovingston v. Wider (53 111. 302), 607. Low v. Evans (16 Ind. 486), 278. Low V. Marysville (5 Cal. 214), 797. . Low V. Pettengill (12 N. H. 337), 215, 216. Low V. Pilotage Com'rs (R. M. Charlt. 302), 185. Low V. Printing Co. (41 Neb. 127), 311. Low V. Rees Ptg. Co. (41 Neb. 127), 777. Lowber v. New York (5 Abb. Pr. 325), 140. Lowe, in re (54 Kan. 757), 306, 655, 705. Lowe V. Prospect Hill Cemetery Assn. (58 Neb. 94), 696. Lowell V. Boston (111 Mass. 454), 71. Lowell V. Gathright (97 Ind. 313), 640. Lowell V. Oliver (8 Allen 247), 104. Lowell v. Short (4 Cush. 275), 717. Lowell V. Simpson (10 Allen 88), 895. Lowell V. Spaulding (4 Cush. 277), 718. Lowell V. Wheeloek (11 Cush. 391), 855. TABLE OF CASES. CI (The references are to pages.) Lowrey v. Central Falls (23 R. I. 354), 158. Lowrey v. Lexington (24 Ky. L. Rep. 516), 86, 128, 229, 231. Lowry v. City of Lexington (24 Ky. Law Rep. 516), 316, 336, 442. Loze V. New Orleans (2 La. 427), 219, 252. Lozier v. Newark (48 N. J. L. 452), 25. Lucas V. Macomb (49 111. App. 60), 630. Lucas V. San Francisco (7 Cal. 463), 116. Lucas V. Tippecanoe (44 Ind. 524), 607. Lucker v. Com. (4 Bush. 440), 582. Luehrman v. Taxing District (2 Lea 425), 140. Lufkin V. Galveston (56 Tex. 522), 708. Lufkin V. Haskell (3 Pick. 355), 471. Lumber Co. v. Columbia (62 N. H. 286), 411. Lumsden v. Cross (10 Wis. 282), 824. Luques v. Dresden (77 Me. 186), 74. Lusk V. Chicago (176 111. 207), 859. Luske V. Hotchkiss (37 Conn. 219), 779. Lutterloch v. Cedar Keys (15 Fla. 306), 762. Lyddy v. Long Island City (104 N. Y. 218), 531, 861. Lynch v. Forbes (161 Mass. 302), 132. Lynch v. Murphy (119 Mo. 163), 225, 226. Lynch v. People (16 Mich. 472), 498, 505, 572, 760. Lynchburg & R. St. Ry. Co. v. Dameron (95 Va. 545), 72. Lyng V. Michigan (135 U. S. 161), 395. Lynn v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. R. Co. (75 Mo. 167), 587, 745. Lyon V. Elizabeth (43 N. J. L. 158), 607. Lynch v. People (16 Mich. 472), 537. Lyon V. Jerome (26 Wend. 485), 128. Lyon V. Tonawanda (98 Fed. Rep. 361), 820. Lyons v. Cooper (39 Kan. 324), 617. Lyons V. Cooper (39 Kan. 334), 635. Lyons v. Wellman (56 Kan. 285), 564. Lyth V. Buffalo (48 Hun. 175), 131, 240. M. McAlister v. Clark (33 Conn. 91), 537, 751, 752, 753. McAllister v. Tacoma (9 Wash. 272), 866. McAndrew v. St. Louis & S. Ry. Co. (88 Mo. App. 97), 601. McAndrews v. CoUerd (42 N. J. L. 189), 741. McBean v. Chandler (9 Heisk. 349), 819. McBride v. Newlin (129 Cal. 36), 438. McCain v. State (62 Ala. 138), 884. McCall V. California (136 U. S. 104), 401. McCann v. Otoe County (9 Neb. 324), 113. McCarthy, ex parte (72 Cal. 384), 506. McCarthy v. Chicago (53 111. 38), 716, 894. McCarthy v. New York (96 N. Y. 1), 778. McCaskell v. State (53 Ala. 510), 641. McCauley v. Brooks (16 Cal. 11), 386. McChesney v. Chicago (161 111. 110), 335. McChesney v. Chicago (171 111. 253), 425. McChesney v. Chicago (159 111. 223), 599. McChesney v. Chicago (152 111. 543), 827. McChesney v. People, ex rel (200 111. 146), 780. McClain, ex parte (134 Cal. 110), 756. McClaughry v. Hancock County (46 111. 356), 136. cu TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pa^es.) McClellan v. Pettigrew (44 La. Ann. 356), 630. McCless V. Meekins (117 N. C. 34), 382. McCloskey v. Kreling (76 Cal. 511), 65, 439, 735, 736. McCormack's Appeal, In re Shiloh Street (165 Pa. St. 386), 834. McCormack v. Patchin (53 Mo. 33), 118, 223, 424, 692, 810, 812, 819, 864. McCormick v. Bay City (23 Mich. 457), 203, 204, 212. McCormick v. Calhoun (30 S. C. 93), 788. McConologue v. McCaffrey (29 Misc. 139), 467. McConvill V. Jersey City (39 N. J. L. 38), 29, 30, 79, 282, 447, 732. McCortle v. Bates (29 Ohio St. 419), 145. McCoull V. Manchester (85 Ya. 579), 679. McCoun V. N. Y. Cent. R. R. (50 N. Y. 176), 388. McCourt V. Beam (Oregon 1902, 69 Pac. Rep. 990), 163. McCoy V. Briant (53 Cal. 247), 116, 218. McCoy V. Philadelphia W. & B. Ry. Co. (5 Houst 599), 746. McCracken v. Hayward (2 How. 608), 381. McCracken v. Moody (33 Ark. 81), 386. McCracken v. San Francisco (16 Cal. 591), 115, 166, 168, 170, 264. McCready v. Guardians (9 Serg. & R. 94), 166. McCready v. Virginia (94 U. S. 391). McCready v. State (73 Ala. 480), 452. McCrowell v. Bristol (5 Lea 685), 680. McCrowell v. Bristol (89 Va. 652), 808. McCulley v. Elizabeth (66 N. J. L. 555), 7, 116. McCulloch V. Maryland (4 Wheat 316), 352. McCulloch V. State (11 Ind. 424), 257. McCuUough V. Com. (67 Pa. St. 30), 483. McCullough V. Virginia (172 U. S. 102), 382. McCune v. Norwich City Gas Co. (30 Conn. 521), 897. McCutchon and City of Toronto, Re (22 Up. Can. Q. B. 613), 272, 292. McCutcheon v. People (69 111. 601), 540. McDade v. Chester (117 Pa. St. 414), 676, 680. McDermott v. Kenny (45 N. J. L. 251), 237, 238. McDermott v. Miller (45 N. J. L. 251), 165, 238. McDonald v. Dodge (97 Cal. 112), 236, 846. McDonald v. Hearst (95 Fed. Rep. 656), 478. McDonald v. Lane (80 Ga. 497), 591. McDonald v. Louisville (24 Ky. Law Rep. 271), 806. McDonald v. Newark (42 N. J. Eq. 136), 762. McDonald v. New York (68 N. Y. 23), 861. McDonald v. State (81 Ala. 279), 655. McDonald v. Toledo Consolidated R. R. Co. (43 U. S. App. 79), 16. McElhaney v. McHenry (26 Mo. 174), 274, 622. McEneney v. Sullivan (125 Ind. 407), 832, 845. McFarlain v. Jennings (106 La. 541), 83. McFarlan v. Tritton Ins. Co. (4 Denio 392), 206. McFarland v. Gordon (70 Vt. 455), 142. McGahey v. Virginia (135 U. S. 622, 685), 373, 382. McGarty v. Deming (51 Conn. 422), 562. McGavock v. Omaha (40 Neb. 64), 6. McGear v. Woodruff (33 N. J. L. 213), 498, 516. McGee, Appeal of (114 Pa. St. 470), 883, 895. TABLE OF CASES. cm (The references are to pages.) McGhee v. State (92 Ga. 21), 630. McGinness v. New York (26 Hun. 142), 102. McGinnis v. St. Louis (157 Mo. 191), 832. McGrath v. Chicago (24 111. App. 19), 351. McGrath v. Clemens (49 Mo. 552), 819. McGraw v. Marion (98 Ky. 673), 82. McGraw v. Whitson (69 Iowa 348), 1-6, 181, 183, 190. McGregor v. Lovington (48 IlL App. 202), 247, 565, 568, 597. McGuinn v. Peri (16 La. Ann. 326), 831. McGuire v. Brockman (58 Mo. App. 307), 818. McGulgan v. Belmont (89 Wis. 637), 647. McGunnigle v. Washington (2 Cranch. C. C. 460), 485. McGurn v. Board of Education (133 111. 122), 225. Mclnerney v. Denver (17 Colo. 302), 3, 274, 277, 468, 517, 520, 526, 786. McKean County v. Young (11 Pa. Super. Ct. 481), 103. McKee v. McKee (8 B. Mon. 433), 34, 273, 433, 551, 671. MoKeesport v. McKeesport Pass. Ry. (158 Pa. St. 447), 900. McKeesport v. M. & R. P. Ry Co. (2 Sup. Ct. 242), 130. McKenna, ex parte (126 Cal. 429), 302, 313, 632, 659. McKenna v.' St. Louis (6 Mo. App. 320), 675, 677. McKenzie v. Wooley (39 La. Ann. 944), 238. McKnight v. Toronto (3 Ont. Rep. 284), 702, 704. McKibbin v. Ft. Smith (35 Ark. 352), 737. McKinney v. Alton (41 111. App. 508), 660. McKinsey v. Bowman (58 Ind. 88), 390. McKissick v. Mt. Pleasant Tp. (48 Mo. App. 416), 192. McKune v. Weller (11 Cal. 49), 828. McKusick V. Stillwater (44 Minn. 372), 251. McLaughlin v. South Bend (i26 Ind. 471), 400. McLaughlin v. Stephens (2 Cranch. C. C. 148), 788, 792. McLauren v. Grand Forks (6 Dak. 397), 839. McLoud and Town of Kincardine, Re (38 Up. Can. Q. B. 617), 272. McMahon v. Savannah (66 Ga. 217), 66. McManus v. People ex rel (183 111. 391), 855. McMath V. Parson (26 Minn. 246), 489, 493. McMichael v. Inter-County Ry. Co. (167 Pa. St. 126), 239. McMillan v. Portage La Prairie (11 Manitoba Rep. 216), 28. McMillan v. Sprague (4 How. 647), 390. McMillen v. Boyles (6 Iowa 304), 266. McMillen v. Terrell (23 Ind. 163), 492. McMillian v. Sun Life Assurance Co. (4 Scots L. T. 98), 727. McMullen v. Hoffman (174 U. S. 639), 862. McNair, ex parte (13 Neb. 195), 37. McNaughton v. Elkhart (85 Ind. 384), 717. McNulty V. Conners (50 Ind. 569), 466. McNulty V. Wilson (4 Strob. 231), 465. MePherson v. Chebanse (114 111. 46), 24, 79, 670, 759, 775, 786, 792. MePherson v. Nichols (48 Kan. 430), 97, 582. McPhearson v. State (22 Ga. 478), 538. McQuiddy v. Brannock (.70 Mo. App. 535), 861. McQuiddy v. Vineyard (60 Mo. App. 610), 131, 132, 177. McRea v. Americus (69 Ga. 168), 783, 794. McRickard v. Flint (114 N. Y. 222), 603. McWerthy v. Aurora Electric L. CIV TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) &. P. Co. (202 111. 218), 885, 895, 896. McVey v. Barker (92 Mo. App. 498), 732. McVey v. McVey (51 Mo. 406), 329. Machine Co. v. Gage (100 U. S. 676), 397. Mackenzie v. Wooley (39 La. Ann. 944), 255. Mackin v. Wilson (20 Ky. L. Rep. 218), 188, 234. Macomber v. Nichols (34 Mich. 212), 747. Macon v. First Nat. Bank (59 Ga. 648), 613. Macon v. Hughes (110 Ga. 795), 225. Macon v. Patty (57 Miss. 378), 715, 808, 810, 819. Madden v. Smeltz (2 Ohio Cir Ct. 168), 180, 183, 184, 575. Madison Ave. Baptist Church v. Baptist Church (5 Robt. 649), 165. Madison v. Hatcher (8 Blatchf. 341), 465, 786. " Madison County Bank v. Suman (79 Mo. 527), 48L Madison Turnpike Co., ex parte (62 Ala. 93), 56, 572. Maddox v. Graham (2 Mete. 56), 145. Magneau v. Fremont (30 Neb. 843), 153, 176, 177, 179, 451, 611, 618, 630, 639. Maher v. Atlantic & Pac. R. R. Co. 64 Mo. 267), 749. Mahoney v. Dankwart (108 Iowa 321), 585. Mahoney v. Detroit Street R. Co. (93 Mich. 612), 751. Main v. Ft. Smith (49 Ark. 480), 855. Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (142 tJ. S. 217), 410, 415, 650. Maine v. McCarty (15 111. 441), 483. Maine Water Co. v. Waterville (93 Me. 586), 74. Mairs v. Manhattan Real Estate Assn. (89 N. Y. 498), 56. Malcom v. Rogers. (5 Cow. 188), 125. Malloy V. Board of Education (102 Cal. 642), 170. Manayunk v. Davis (2 Pars Eq. Cas. 289), 559. Manchester v. Smyth (64 N. H. 380), 439. Manhattan Mfg. & F. Co. v. Van Keuren (23 N. J. Bq. 251), 698. Manhattan Trust Co. v. Dayton (59 Fed. Rep. 327), 50. Manice v. New York (8 N. Y. 120), 827. Mankato v. Arnold (36 Minn. 62), 491, 512, 513, 794. Mankato v. Fowler (32 Minn. 364), 618, 620. Manker v. Faulhaber (94 Mo. 430), 329, 342, 344. Mann v. Jersey City (24 N. J. L. 662), 851. Mann v. Lemars (109 Iowa 244), 183), 215. Mann v. Richardson (66 111. 481). 113, 129. Manning v. Gen. (90 Cal. 610), 811. Manning v. Gloucester (6 Pick. 6), 209, 212. Mansfield, In re (106 Cal. 400), 451, 645. Mansfield v. People (164 111. 611), 850. Manson v. South Bound R. Co. (64 S. C. 120), 430. Manufacturing Co. v. Schell City (21 Mo. App. 175), 6. March v. Com. (12 B. Mon 25), 25, 344, 566, 578, 786. Marietta v. Fearing (4 Ohio 427), 23, 26, 33, 34, 552. Marion v. Chandler (6 Ala. 899), 84, 296, 440, 570, 571. Marion v. Robertson (84 111. App. 113), 736. Marionville to use v. Henson (65 Mo. App. 397), 118, 425, 813. Mark v. State (97 N. Y. 572), 343, . 346. Mark v. West Troy (69 Hun. 442), 9. Markle v. Akron (14 Ohio 586), 19. 25, 66, 117, 477, 513, 647. Markley v. Mineral City (58 Ohio St. 430), 797. TABLE OF CASES. tv (The references are to pages.) Marmaduke, ex parte (91 Mo. 228), 83, 112, 576. Marmet v. State (45 Ohio St. 63), 611, 616, 773. Marquis v. Santa Ana (103 Gal. 661), 366. Marron, In re (60 Vt. 199), 525. Marshall, ex parte (64 Ala. 266), 619, 635. Marshall v. Cadwalader (36 N. J. L. 283), 143. Marshall v. Com. (59 Pa. St. 455), 246, 249. Marshalltown v. Forney (61 Iowa 578), 814. Marshall v. Guion (4 Denio 581), 811. Marshall v. Guion (11 N. Y. 461), 799. Marshall v. Leavenworth (44 Kan. 459), 830. Marshall v. Nashville (Tenn. 1903, 71 S. W. Rep. 815), 353, 862. Marshall v. Silliman (61 111. 218), 267. Marshal v. Smith (L. R. 8 C. P. 416), 286. Marshall v. Standard (24 Mo. App. 192), 477, 502, 513, 522, 787. Marshalltown v. Blum (58 Iowa 184), 403. Marshall Field & Co. v. Chicago (44 111. App. 410), 536, 709. Martin, In re (62 Kan. 638), 635. Martin v. Gleason (139 Mass. 183), 707. Martin v. Mott (12 Wheat 19), 224, 490, 689. Martin v. Rosendale (130 Ind. 109), 401. Martin v. State (23 Neb. 371), 201. Martin v. Swift (120 111. 488), 446. Martindale v. Martindale (10 Ind. 566), 335. Martindale v. Palmer (52 Ind. 411), 160, 161, 186, 241, 245, 445, 846, 850. Martineau v. Rochester Ry. Co. (81 Hun. 330). Martini, ex parte (23 Fla. 343), 278, 279. Martinowsky v. Hannibal (35 Mo. App. 70), 680. Martinsville v. Frieze (33 Ind. 507), 498. Martel v. Bast St. Louis (94 111. 67), 548. Martens v. People ex rel (186 111. 314), 627. Marvin Safe Co. v. New York (38 Hun. 146), 436. Mary Maguire, In re (57 Cal. 604), • 364. Marx, ex parte (86 Va. 40), 512. Mashburn v. Bloomington (32 111. App. 245), 715. Mason v. Cumberland (92 Md. 451), 623, 635, 636, 644. Mason v. Pearson (9 How. 248), 125, 126. Mason v. Lancaster (4 Bush. 406), 633, 635. Mason v. Shawneetown (77 111. 533), 3, 18, 116, 260. Mason v. Spencer (35 Kan. 512), 867. Mason City v. Barngrover (26 111. App. 296), 42. Masonic Bldg. Assn. v. Brownell (164 Mass. 306), 842. Massachusetts v. Western Union (141 U. S. 40), 408. Massinger v. MlUville (63 N. J. L. 123), 269, 282. Massoth V. D. & H. Canal Co. (64. N. Y. 524), 56. Masters v. McHolland (12 Kan. 17), 182, 193. Mastin v. Sloan (98 Mo. 252), 578. Mather v. Ottawa (114 111. 659). Mathews v. Tripp (12 R. I. 256), 516. Mathie v. Mcintosh (40 Wis. 120), 463, 465, 468, 469. Matthews v. Alexandria (68 Mo. 115), 92, 93, 129, 130, 133, 742. Matthews v. Associated Press (136 N. Y. 333), 304. Matthews v. Westborough (134 Mass. 555), 102, 115. Mattingly v. District of Columbia (97 U. S. 687), 867. Mauldin v. Greenville (33 S. C. 1), 100, 798. CVl TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Maulding v. Greenville (42 S. C. 293), 824. Maupin v. Franklin Co. (67 Mo. 327), 192. May, In re (82 Fed. 422), 398. May V. Holdridge (23 Wis. 93), 867. May V. People (1 Colo. App. 157), 294, 310, 313, 698. Maybin v. Biloxi (77 Miss. 673), 244. Maybury v. Mutual Gas Light Co. (38 Mich. 154), 880. Mayhew v. Gay Head (13 Allen 129), 140, 209. Mayhew v. Norton (17 Pick. 357^, 4. Mayo V. Com'rs of Hampden Co. (141 Mass. 74), 862. Mayo V. Dover and F. C. Village Fire Co. (96 Me. 539), 84. Mayor, ex parte of Birmingham (3 Ellis & E. 222), 156. Mayor v. Broadway, etc. Ry Co. (97 N. Y. 275), 318. Mayor of Detroit v. Park Comrs. (44 Mich. 602), 89. Mayor, etc. of Guthrie v. Territory, ex rel. Losey (1 Okla. 188), 348. Mayor, etc. of New York v. D. D. E. B. & B. R. Co. (133 N. Y. 104), 299. Mays V. Cincinnati (1 Ohio St. 268), 25, 612, 766. Mayson v. Atlanta (77 Ga. 662), 4S2, 535, 591, 650, 789. Maywood Co. v. Maywood (140 111. 216), 801. Maxmillian v. New York (62 N. Y. 160), 674, 675. Maxwell v. Durkin (86 111. App. 257), 603. Maxwell v. Jonesboro (11 Heisk. 257), 76L Maxwell v. Tumlin (79 Ga. 570), 569. Mazet V. Pittsburg (137 Pa. 548), 431, 863. Mead v. Acton (139 Mass. 341), 105, 106. Mead v. Boston (3 Cush. 404), 114. Mead v. Chicago (186 111. 54), 850. Mead v. New Haven (40 Conn. 72), 654. Meadowcroft v. People (154 111. 416), 849. Meadow Dam Co. v. Gray (30 Me. 547), 322. Meagher v. Storey County (5 Nev. 244), 9, 467. Meaher v. Chattanooga (1 Head 74), 474, 483, 533. Meadville v. Dickson (129 P!a. St. 1). 869. Mechanics' and Farmers' Bank, appeal of (31 Conn. 63), 383. Mechanicsburg v. Koons (18 Pa. Super. Ct. 131), 630. Meday v. Rutherford (65 N. J. L. 645), 75. Meech v. Buffalo (29 N. Y. 198), 113. Megowan v. Com. (2 Mete. 3), 504, 534, 760. Meissner v. Boyle (20 Utah 316), 367. Melick v. Washington (47 N. J. L. 254), 134, 282. Memphis v. Bing (94 Tenn. 644), 624. Memphis V. Cornell (3 Shan. Cas. 477), 733. Memphis v. O'Connor (53 Mo. 468), 477, 491. Memphis v. Schade (12 Heisk. 579), 566. Memphis v. Winfield (8 Humph. 707), 362. Memphis v. Wright (6 Yerg. 497), 95. Memphis Brokerage Assn. v. Cul- len (79 Tenn. 75), 656. Memphis, etc. v. Nolan (14 Fed. 532), 399. Memphis Gayoso Gas Co. v. Wil- liamson (9 Heisk. 314), 379. Memphis & Little Rock R. R. Co. V. R. R. Comrs. (112 U. S. 609), 877. Mendel v. Wheeling (28 W. Va. 233), 675, 676. Mendenhall v. Burton (42 Kan. 570), 546. Mendenhall v. Clugish (84 Ind. 94), 844. TABLE OF CASES. evil (The references are to pasesO Menken v. Atlanta (78 Ga. 668), 789. Mendota v. Thompson (20 111. 197), 546. Menser v. Risdon (36 Cal. 239), 128. Merced County v. Fleming (68 Ga. 816), 647. Merced County v. Fleming (111 Cal. 46), 590. Mercer v. Corbin (117 Ind. 450), 727. Mercer v. Pittsburg, etc. Ry. Co. (36 Pa. St. 99), 890. Merchants v. Memphis (9 Baxter 76), 610. Merchants National Bank v. Jaff- ray (36 Neb. 218), 758. Merchants' Union Barb-wire Co. v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (70 Iowa 105), 893. Meredith v. Sayre (32 N. J. Bq. 557), 262. Merkee v. Rochester (13 Hun. 157), 278, 481. Merkle v. Bennington (68 Mich. 133), 336. Merriam v. New Orleans (14 La. Ann. 318), 444, 448, 658. Merriam v. People ex rel. (160 111. 555), 390. Merriam v. Yuba Co. (72 Cal. 517), 261. Meriden v. Camp (46 Conn. 284), 827. Meriwether v. Garrett (102 U. S. 472), 370, 371. Merrill v. Abbott (62 Ind. 549), 851. Merritt v. Portchester (29 Hun. 619), 808. Merrill v. St. Louis (83 Mo. 244), 527. Merz V. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (88 Mo. 672), 40, 744, 745. Merz V. Mo. Pac. R. R. (14 Mo. App. 459), 601, 748. Meservey v. Webster County (46 Iowa 702), 610. Messerole v. Brooklyn (8 Paige 198), 806. Metcalf V. People (2 Colo. App. 262), 465. Metcalf V. St. Louis (11 Mo. 103), 66, 694. Methodist Protestajit Church v. Baltimore (6 Gill. 391), 118, 222. Metropolitan Board of Health v. Heister (37 N. Y. 661), 144. Metropolitan Board of Health v. Schmades (3 Daly 282), 741. Metropolitan City Ry. Co. v. Chi- cago (96 111. 620), 720, 894. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Dar- enkamp (23 Ky. Law Rep. 2249), 444. Metropolitan Street R. R. Co. v. Johnson (90 Ga. 500), 208, 596, 598. Metzger v. Beaver Falls (178 Pa. St. 1), 377. Meuser v. Risdon (36 Cal. 239), 809. Meyer v. Bridgeton (37 N. J. L. 160), 496, 497. Meyer v. Kalkmann (6 Cal. 582), 469, 470. Meyer v. Fromm (108 Ind. 208), 248. Meyer v. Tentopolis (131 111. 552), 257, 814. Meyers v. Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co. (57 Iowa 555), 42, 452, 744, 7'46. Michigan Central R. Co. v. Huehn (59 Fed. Rep. 335), 839. Michigan Tele. Co. v. Benton Har- bor (121 Mich. 512), 8, 904. Michigan Telephone Co. v. St. Joseph (121 Mich. 502), 376, 904. Middle Savings Bank v. Dubuque 15 Iowa 394), 96. Middlesex R. R. Co. v. Wakefield (103 Mass. 261), 900. Middleton v. Ames (7 Vt. 166), 472. Middleton v. Robins (53 N. J. L. 555), 440. Middleton v. N. J. West Line Ry Co. (26 N. J. Bq. 269), 335. Miles City v. Kern (12 Mont. 119), 491. Miles V. Chamberlain (17 Wis. 446), 272, 275, 731. Milford v. Holbrook (9 Allen 17), 63. eviii TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Mllford V. Orono (50 Me. 529), 105, 125. Milford Borough v. Milford Water Co. (124 Pa. St. 610), 173. Milford School Town v. Powner (126 Ind. 528), 197. Milhau V. Sharp (15 Barb. 194), 263. Milhau V. Sharp (17 Barb. 435), 901, 913. Milhau V. Sharp (27 N. Y. 611), 321, 880. Miller, In re (89 Cal. 41), 283. Miller, In re (44 Mo. App. 125), 279, 477, 530, 532. Miller v. Amsterdam (149 N. Y. 288), 831. Miller v. Anheuser (2 Mo. App. 167), 223, 839. Miller v. Bellefountaine (2 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 139), 574. Miller v. Burch (32 Tex. 208), 21, 668, 684. Miller v. Com. (88 Va. 618), 523. Miller v. Horton (152 Mass. 540), 691, 693. Miller v. Milwaukee (14 Wis. 642), 84, 799. Miller v. New York & Erie Ry. Co. (21 Barb. 513), 317, 322. Miller v. O'Reilly (84 Ind. 168), 565. Miller v. State (15 Wall. 478), 322, 323. Miller v. Trustees (88 111. 26), 571. Miller v. Webster City (94 Iowa 162), 812. Millerstown v. Bell (123 Pa. St. 151), 642. Millett V. People (117 111. 294), 667. Milliken v. Weatherford (54 Tex. 388), 360. Mllloy, Re and Tp. of Onondaga (6 Ontario Rep. 573), 290. Miln V. New Orleans (13 La. 69), 802. Milne v. Davidson (5 Martin N. S. 409), 19, 80, 683. Mills, ex parte (135 U. S. 263), 561. Mills V. Charleton (29 Wis. 400), 864, 867. Mills V. Detroit (95 Mich. 422), 829. Mills V. Gleason (11 Wis. 470), 111, 155, 170. Mills V. San Antonio (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, 65 S. W. Rep. 1121), 116, 177, 192. Mills County v. B. & M. R. R. Co. (47 Iowa 66), 113. Milton Borough v. Hoagland (3 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 283), 233, 482, 765. Miltonvale v. Lanoue (35 Kan. 603), 277. Milwaukee v. Gross (21 Wis. 243), 79. Milwaukee v. Gross (21 Wis. 241), 300, 304, 699. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co. V. Milwaukee (95 Wis. 39), 914. Milwaukee Elec. Ry & Light Co. V. Milwaukee (87 Fed. Rep. 577), 909. Milwaukee Fire Department v. Heifenstein (16 Wis. 136), 660. Minden v. Silverstein (36 La. Ann. 912), 362, 541, 760. Minneapolis Brewing Co. v. Mc- Gillivray (104 Fed. Rep. 258), 402. Minneapolis Gas Light Co. v. Minneapolis (36 Minn. 159), 134, 196, 807. Minnesota Linseed Oil Co. v. Pal- mer (20 Minn. 468), 609. Miners' Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach (37 Cal. 543), 53. Mlnersville Borough v. Schuylkill Electric Ry. Co. (Pa. 1903, 54 Atl. Rep. 1050), 897, 914. Minot V. West Roxbury (112 Mass. 1), 75, 106. Minturn v. Larue (23 How. 435), 75, 309. Mintzer v. Schilling (117 Cal. 361), 141. Mirande, ex parte (73 Cal. 365), 145, 1^78, 644. Mississippi v. Johnson (4 Wall. 475), 261. Missouri City v. Hutchinson (71 Mo. 46), 506. Missouri ex rel Laclede Gas Light TABLE OJF CASES. CIX (The references are to pages.) Co. V. Murphy (170 U. S. 78), 722. Missouri K. & T. Ry Co. v. Haber (169 U. S. 613), 392. Missouri, Kansas & T. Trust Co. V. Smart (51 La. Ann. 416), 324. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Chicle (6 Kan. App. 481), 593. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Wyandotte (44 Kan. 32), 218, 225, 229. Mitchell, ex parte (104 Mo. 121), 574, 575. Mitchell V. Brown (18 N. H. 315), 194. Mitchell V. Lemon (34 Md. 176), 484. Mitchell V. Rockland (45 Me. 496), 672. Mitchell V. Rockland (41 Me. 363), 675, 694. . Mitchell V. William (27 Ind. 62), 640, 733. Mixer v. Manistee Co. Supervisors (26 Mich. 422), 487. Moale V. Baltimore (61 Md. 224), 814. Moberly v. Hogan (131 Mo. 19), 583, 588, 822. Moberly v. Hoover (93 Mo. App. 663), 443, 658. Moberry v. Jeffersonville (38 Ind. 198), 168, 202. Mobile V. Allaire (14 Ala. 400), 345, 786, 784, 794. Mobile V. Barton (47 Ala. 84), 565, 566. Mobile V. Leloupe (76 Ala. 401), 399. Mobile V. Louisville and N. R. Co. (84 Ala. 115), 377, 435, 880, 885. Mobile V. Moog (53 Ala. 561), 74. Mobile V. Richardson (1 Stewart & P. 12), 113. Mobile V. Rouse (8 Ala. 515), 509, 786. Mobile V. Yuille (3 Ala. 137), 24, 82, 270, 273, 281, 283, 298, 634, 656, 769. Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Tennessee (153 U. S. 486), 374. Moir V. Munday (Sayer 181), 428. Monaghan v. Randall (38 Wis. 100), 208, 209. Monett V. Beaty (79 Mo. App. 315), 337. Mongenais v. Corporation of Ri- gand (Quebec Rep. 11 Sup. Ct. 348), 28. Monk v. Packard (71 Me. 309), 696. Mono County v. Flanigan (130 Cal. 105), 659. Monongahela v. Monongahela El- ectric Light Co. (3 Pa. Dist. Rep. 63), 817. Montpelier v. Elmore (71 Vt. 193), 75. Montpelier v. Huron (62 Fed. Rep. 778), 546. Monroe v. Gerspach (33 La. Ann. 1011), 682, 706. Monroe v. Hardy (46 La. Ann. 1232), 512, 520, 787, 792, 794. Monroe v. Hoffman (29 La. Ann. 651), 734. Monroe v. Lawrence (44 Kan. 607), 79, 304, 758. Monroe v. Meuer (35 La. Ann. 1102), 511, 528. Montgomery, ex parte, In re Knox (64 Ala. 463), 278, 279, 575, 611, 640. Montgomery v. Belser (53 Ala. 379), 562, 571. Montgomery v. Foster (54 Ala. 62), 482, 531. Montgomery v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (84 Ala. 127), 435, 737. Montgomery v. Montgomery & W. Plank Road Co. (31 Ala. 76), 671, 801. Montgomery v. Parker (114 Ala. 118), 712, 714, 884. Montgomery v. Shoemaker (51 Ala. 114), 611. Montgomery Gaslight Co. v. Mont- gomery (87 Ala. 245), 260, 262. 379. Montreal Street Ry Co. v. Mon- treal (23 S. C. 259), 653. Montrose v. State (61 Miss. 429), 462. Mooney v. Kennett (19 Mo. 551), 580, 583. ex TABLE OF CASES. (The references Moor V. Newfield (4 Me. 44), 148, 151, 209. Moore, ex parte (62 Ala. 471), 276, 277, 279, 546. Moore v. Cape Girardeau (103 Mo. 470), 18, 892. Moore v. Chicago (60 111. 243), 808. Moore v. Cincinnati (26 Ohio St. 582), 346. Moore v. Crenshaw (1 White & W. Civ. Cas. Ct. App. Tex. sec. 264), 455, 552. Moore v. District of Columbia (12 App. D. C. 537), -544, 727. Moore v. Fairport (11 Misc. Rep. 146), 811. Moore v. Haddonfield (62 N. J. L. 386), 257. Moore v. Illinois (14 How. 13), 795. Moore v. Indianapolis (120 Ind. 483), 646. Moore v. Kenockee (75 Mich. 332), 335. Moore v. New York (73 N. Y. 238), 249. Moore v. People (14 How. 13), 788. Moore v. Perry (Iowa, 1903, 93 N. W. Rep. 510), 176, 180, 240, 241, 244, 245. Moore v. St. Louis Transit Co. (95 Mo. App. 728), 587, 744. Moore v. St. Paul (61 Minn. 427), 631. Moore v. St. Paul (48 Minn. 331), 631. Moore v. State (11 Lea 35), 276, 733. Moore v. Strickling (46 W. Va. 515), 366. Mootry v. Danbury (45 Conn. 550), 679. Moran v. Atlanta (102 Ga. 840), 784. Moran v. Lindell (52 Mo. 229), 813, 833, 854. Moran v. New Orleans (112 U. S. 69), 408, 413. Moran v. Pullman Palace Car Co. (134 Mo. 641), 61, 675. are to pages.) Moran v. Thompson (20 Wash. 525), 355. Morano v. New Orleans (2 La. 217), 763. Moreland v. Millen (126 Mich. 381), 82. Morey v. Brown (42 N. H. 373), 734. Morford v. Unger (8 Iowa 82), 225. Morgan, In re (26 Colo. 415), 666, 668. Morgan v. Johnson (106 Fed. Rep. 452), 12. Morgan v. Louisiana (118 U. S. 455), 419. Morgan v. Nolte (37 Ohio St. 23), 575. Morgan v. Orange (50 N. J. L. 389), 630. Morgan v. Parham (16 Wall. 471), 409. Morgan v. State (Neb. 1902, 90 N. W. Rep. 108), 625, 658. Morgan v. Wilfley (71 Iowa 212), 211. Morgan & Co. v. Cincinnati (9 Ohio Dec. 280), 705. Morgan Park v. Wiswall (155 111. 262). 825. Morgan's Steamship Co. v. Louis- iana (118 U. S. 455), 422. Morley v. Lake Shore and Michi- gan Southern Ry (146 U. S. 162), 388. Morley v. Weakley (86 Mo. 451), 854. Morrill v. State (38 Wis. 428), 629. Morris v. Columbus (102 Ga. 792), 670, 693, 694. Morris Canal & B. Co. v. Jersey City (12 N. J. Eq. 252), 435, 575, 576. Morris, etc. R. R. v. Ayres (29 N. J. L. 393), 13. Morrison v. Lawrence (98 Mass. 219), 104, 186, 209, 676. Morrison v. McAvoy (Cal. 1902, 70 Pac. Rep. 626), 457, 536. Morrison v. McDonald (21 Me. 550), 465. Morrison v. Morey (146 Mo. 543), 819. Morrison v. St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (96 Mo. 602), 315. TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Morse v. Westport (136 Mo. 276), 121, 290, 858, 860. Morse v. We^t Port (110 Mo. 502), 690, 813, 866. Morton and City of St. Thomas, In re (6 Ontario App. Rep. 323), 55. Morton v. Broderick (118 Cal. 474), 238, 343. Morton v. Comptroller Gen. (4 S. C. 430), 169. Morton v. Macon (111 Ga. 162), 617. Morton v. Moore (15 Gray 573), 707. Moser v. White (29 Mich. 59), 198, 209. Moses V. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. R. R. Co. (21 111. 516), 875. Moses V. Risdon (46 Iowa 251), 120. Moses V. United States (16 App. Cases. D. C. 428), 313, 536, 712. Moss V. Averell (10 N. Y. 449), 199. Moss V. Oakland (88 111. 109), 251, 252, 568, 594, 595. Mott V. Pa. R. R. Co. (30 Pa. St. 9), 130, 743. Mott V. Reynolds (27 Vt. 206), 214, 215. Mott V. Rush (2 Hill. 472), 832. Moultrie v. Patterson (109 Ga. 370), 436, 437. Moynier, ex parte (65 Cal. 33), 361. Moundsville v. Fountain (27 W. Va. 182), 513. Moundsville v. Velton (35 W. Va. 217), 509, 583, 591. Mount, ex parte (66 Cal. 448), 361. Mt. Carmel v. Shaw (155 111. 37), 720. Mt. Carmel v. Wabash County (50 111. 69), 617. Mount Holly v. Peru (72 Vt. 68), 75. Mount Hope Cemetery Assn. v. Boston (158 Mass. 509), 695, 806. Mount Morris Square, In re (2 Hill. 14), 186. Mt. Olive V. Hozelbart (26 Pittsb. L. J. 400), 643. Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith (100 U. S. 514), 67, 349. Mt. Pleasant v. Breeze (11 Iowa 399), 271, 671, 754, 755. Mt. Pleasant v. Clutch (6 Iowa 546), 656. Mt. Sterling (Newport) v. Holly (108 Ky. 621), 770. Mt. Sterling v. Holly (22 Ky. Law Rep. 358), 518. Mt. Vernon First Nat. Bk. v. Sarlls (129 Ind; 201), 670. Mowry v. Providence (16 R. I. 422), 94. Mozley v. Alston (1 Phill. 790), 155. Mueller v. Egg Harbor City (55 N. J. L. 245), 168, 169. Mueller v. Milwaukee St. Ry. Co. (86 Wis. 340), 602. Mugler V. Kansas (123 U. S. 623), 419, 665, 668, 691. Muhlenbrinck v. Long Branch Comrs. (42 N. J. L. 364), 572, 698. Muhler v. Hedekln (119 Ind. 481), 260. Mulcahy v. Newark (57 N. J. L. 513), 341, 612. MuUarky v. Cedar Falls (19 Iowa 21), 96, 128. Mulligan v. Smith (59 Cal. 206), 830. Mulliken v. Bloomington (72 Ind. 161), 547. Mulrein v. Kalloch (61 Cal. 522), 864. Muncie Natural Gas Co. v. Mun- cie (Ind. 1903, 66 N. E. Rep. 436), 908. Municipality v. Blineau (3 La. Ann. 688), 310, 313. Municipality v. Cutting (4 La. Ann. 335), 762. Municipality No. 1 v. Barnett (13 La. 344), 763. Municipality No. 1. v. Wilson (5 La. Ann. 747), 751. Municipality No. 1 v. Young (5 La. Ann. 362), 801. Municipality No. 2 v. Bubois (10 La. Ann. 56), 630, 654. Municipality No. 2 v. McDonough (16 La. 553), 825. CXll TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Municipality No. 2 v. Orleans Cot- ton Press (18 La. 122), 95. Munn V. Illinois (94 U. S. 113), 323, 665, 909. Munn V. People (94 U. S. 113), 54. Murdock v. Memphis (20 Wall. 590), 336, 339. Murfin V. Detroit & Erie Plank Road Co. (113 Mich. 675), 645. Murnane v. St. Louis (123 Mo. 479), 68, 342, 804. Murphy v. Chicago (29 111. 279), 875, 883, 887. Murphy v. Com. (1 Met. 365), 528. Murphy v. East Portland (42 Fed. Rep. 308), 260, 261. i:urphy V. Jacksonville (18 Fla. 318), 114. Murphy v. Lamhert (59 Ind. 477), 492. Murphy v. Lindell Ry. (153 Mo. 252), 601. Murphy v. Louisville (9 Bush. 189), 33, 235, 845. Murphy v. People (120 111. 234), 823. Murphy v. People (2 Cow. 815), 512, 523. Murphy v. Peoria (119 111. 509), 813, 843. Murphy v. San Luis Obispo (119 Cal. 624), 17. Murphy v. Waycross (90 Ga. 36), 798. Murphy v. Wilmington (5 Del. Ch. 281), 708. Murray, ex parte (9g Ala. 78), 401. Murray v. Charleston (96 U. S. 432), 368, 369, 370, 375. Murray v. Kansas City (47 Mo. App. 105), 368. Murray v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (101 Mo. 236), 748. Murray v. Railroad (101 Mo. 236), 585. Murray v. Tucker (73 Ky. 240), 808. Murtaugh v. St. Louis (55 Mo. 479), 675. Muscatine v. Hershey (18 Iowa 39), 38. Muscatine v. Keokuk Packet Co. (45 Iowa 185), 124. Muscatine v. Steck (7 Iowa 505), 559, 562. Musgrove v. Catholic Church (10 La. Ann. 431), 320, 696. Musgrove v. Vicksburg & N. R. Co. (50 Miss. 677), 383. Mutual Union Tel. Co. v. Chicago (11 Biss. C. C. 539), 722. Myers v. Carr (12 Mich. 63), 498. Myers v. Croft (13 Wall. 291), 90. Myers v. Hinds (110 Mich. 300), 727. Myers v. Malcolm (6 Hill. 292), 741. Myers v. People (26 111. 173), 466, 530. Myrick v. Lacross (17 Wis. 442), 811, 828. N. Naegely v. Saginaw (101 Mich. 532), 194, 839. Naegle v. Centralia (81 111. App. 334), 135. Nalle V. Austin (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, 21 S. W. Rep. 375), 798. Napa v. Easterby (76 Cal. 222), 13, 221, 232, 241, 250, 253, 832, 833, 840. Napa V. Easterly (61 Cal. 509), 594, 833. Napman v. People (19 Mich. 352), 56, 83, 506, 595, 714. Naschold v. Westport (71 Mo. App. 508), 883. Nashville v. Althrop (5 Cold. 554), 312, 631, 632. Nashville v. Linck (12 Lea 499), 79, 83, 671, 759. Nashville v. Ray (19 Wall. 468), 55. Natal V. Louisiana (139 U. S. 621), 353, 513, 517, 764. Nathan v. Louisiana (8 How. 73), 394, 401, 656. National Bank v. Matthews (98 U. S. 621), 90, 547, 915. Nat. Bk. V. Mayor, etc. (8 Heisk. 814), 613. Nat. Bk. V. Sebastin Co. (5 Dillon 414), 38L National Bank v. Whitney (103 U. S. 99), 915. TABLE OF CASES. CXlll (The references are to pages.) National Bank v. Winston (5 Baxt. 685), 774. National Bank of Commerce v. Grenada (44 Fed. Rep. 262), 3, 16, 46, 249. National Fertilizer Co. v. Lambert (48 Fed. Rep. 458), 705. National Foundry & P. Works v. Oconto Water Co. (52 Fed. Rep. 29), 798. National Subway Co. v. St. Louis (169 Mo. 319), 886. National Tube Works v. Chamber- lain (5 Dak. 54), 841. National Waterworks Co. v. Kan- sas City (28 Fed. Rep. 921), 816. National Waterworks Co. v. Kan- sas City (20 Mo. App. 237), 128, 817. Natoma W. & M. Co. v. Clarkin (14 Cal. 544), 90. Naylor v. Galesburg (56 111. 285), 327, 334, 479. Nazworthy v. Sullivan (55 111. App. 48), 51, 685, 689. Neal V. Delaware (103 U. S. 370), 354. Nealis v. Hayward (48 Ind. 19), 30, 359, 483, 726. Neblett v. Nashville (12 Jleisk. 684), 680. * Neenan v. Smith (60 Mo. 292), 848. Neenan v. Smith (50 Mo. 525), 819. Neff V. Bates (25 Ohio St. 169), 346, 347. Neff V. Paddock (26 Wis. 546), 717, 720. Negus V. Brooklyn (62 How. Pr. 291), 261. Nehr v. State (35 Neb. 638), 734. Neier v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co. (12 Mo. App. 25), 529, 744, 745, 749. Neill, ex part (32 Tex. Crim. App. 275), 354. Neill v Gates (152 Mo. 585), 133, 352. Neitzel v. Concordia (14 Kan. 446), 523, 563. Nelson v. Campbell (28 Pa. St. 156), 737. Nelson v. Eaton (26 N. Y. 410), 148. Nelson v. La Porte (33 Ind. 258), 798. Nelson v. Milford (7 Pick. 18), 114, 115, 194. Nelson v. New York (5 N. Y. Suppl. 688), 861. Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish (111 U. S. 716), 320, 324. Nelson v. Troy (11 Wash. 435), 10. Nelson Lumber Co. v. Loraine (22 Fed. Rep. 54), 412. Neosho Water Co. v. Neosho (136 Mo. 498), 309, 450. New Albany v. Bndres (143 Ind. 192), 846. New Albany Gas Light, etc. Co. v. Crumbo (10 Ind. App. 360), 187, 204. New Albany & S. R. Co. v. O'Daily (12 Ind. 551), 887. Newark v. Bonnell (57 N. J. L. 424), 865. Newark v. Elliott (5 Ohio St. 113), 90. Newark v. Murphy (40 N. J. L. 145), 482. Newark v. Watson (56 N. J. L. 667), 696. Newark & 0. H. C. Ry. Co. v. Hunt (50 N. J. L. 308), 668, 693. Newaygo County Mfg. Co. v. Ech- tinaw (81 Mich. 416), 177. - Newberry v. Fox (37 Minn. 141), 811. Newburgh Turnpike v. Miller (5 John Chan. 100), 127. Newby v. Platte (25 Mo. 258), 819. Newcastle v. Electric Light Co. (16 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 663), 230. New Castle v. Raney (130 Pa. Sy. 546), 720. New Decatur v. Barry (90 Ala. 432), 71, 694. New England T. & T. Co. v. Bos- ton Term. Co. (182 Mass. 397), 723. New Hampton v. Conroy (56 Iowa 498), 79. 271, 273, 451, 453, 757. New Haven v. N. H. & D. R. R. Co. (62 Conn. 252), 113, 895. New Haven v. New Haven Water Co. (44 Conn. 105), 634, 636. CXIV TABLE OP CASfiS.. (The references are to pages.) New Haven Local Board v. School Board (30 Ch. Div. 350), 164. New H. & W. R. R. v. Chatham (42 Conn. 465), 151, 217. New Iberia v. Miques (32 La. Ann. 923), 612, 641. New Jersey v. Yard (95 U. S. 104), 305, 317, 376. New Jersey R. & Transp. Co. v. Jersey City (29 N. J. L. 170), 439. Newland Ave., In re (38 N. Y. St. Rep. 796), 178. Newland v. Aurora (14 111. 364), 248, 532. New London v. Brainard (22 Conn. 552), 70, 71, 103. Newman v. Ashe (9 Baxt. 380), 89, 95. Newman v. Chicago (153 111. 469), 851. Newman v. Emporia (32 Kan. 456), 4, 11. Newmeyer v. Mo. & Miss. R. R. Co. (52 Mo. 81), 430. New Orleans, In re (20 La. Ann. 497), 823. New Orleans v. Boudro (14 La. Ann. 303), 567. New Orleans v. Brooks (36 La. Ann. 641), 172, 179, 233. New Orleans v. Chappuis (105 La. 179), 444. New Orleans v. Clark (95 U. S. 644), 265. New Orleans v. Clark (15 La. Ann. 614), 654. New Orleans v. Comptoir National d'Escompte de Paris (104 La. 214), 659. New Orleans v. Collins (52 La. Ann. 973), 787. New Orleans v. Costello (14 La. Ann. 37), 279, 751. New Orleans v. Dubarry (33 La. Ann. 481), 633. New Orleans v. Elliott (10 La. Ann. 59), 823. New Orleans v. Graffina (52 La. Ann. 1082), 764. New Orleans v. Graves (34 La. Ann. 840), 612. New Orleans v. Great Southern Tel. Co. (40 La. Ann. 41), 378, 660, 723. New Orleans v. Guillotte (12 La. Ann. 818), 310. New Orleans v. Home Mut. Ins. Co. (23 La. Ann. 449), 631. New Orleans v. Hop Lee (104 La. 601), 774. New Orleans v. Kaufman (29 La. Ann. 283), 772. New Orleans v. Labatt (33 La. Ann. 107), 582. New Orleans v. Lagman (43 La. Ann. 1180), 656. New Orleans v. Lambert (14 La. Ann. 247), 697. N. 0. & L. R. Co. V. Louisiana (157 U. S. 219), 383. New Orleans v. L. & N. R. R. Co. (109 U. S. 221), 115. New Orleans v. Lozes (51 La. Ann. 1172), 762. New Orleans v. McDonough (9 Rob. 408), 825. New Orleans v. Mechanics and Traders Ins. Co. (25 La. Ann. 389), 351. New Orleans v. Mechanics & T. Bank (15 La. Ann. 107), 610. New Orleans v. Morris (3 Woods 103, 115), 385, 761. New Orleans v. Miller (7 La. Ann. 651), 784. N. 0. M. & C. R. Co. V. New Or- leans (26 La. Ann. 577), 882. New Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks Co. (142 U. S. 79), 374. New Orleans v. O'Neil (43 La. Ann. 1182), 656. New Orleans v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. (106 La. Ann. 31), 655. New Orleans v. Peyroux (6 Mart. (N. S.) 155), 676. New Orleans v. Phillippi (9 La. Ann. 44), 25, 79, 83, 613. New Orleans v. Pontchartrain R. Co. (41 La. Ann. 519), 629. New Orleans v. Railroad Co. (40 La. Ann. 587), 650, 652. New Orleans v. St. Louis Church (11 La. Ann. 244), 320, 321, 695, 697. New Orleans v. Southern Bank (15 La. Ann. 89), 338. TABLE OF CASES. CXV (The references are to pages.) New Orleans v. Stafford (27 La. Ann. 417), 764. New Orleans v. Staiger (11 La. Ann. 68), 630. New Orleans v. Steinhardt (52 La. Ann. 1043), 886. New Orleans v. Turpin (13 La. Ann. 56), 658. New Orleans v. Wllmot (31 La. Ann. 65), 38. New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louis- iana Light Co. (115 U. S. 650), 305, 308, 379, 665, 880. New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Hart (40 La. Ann. 474), 665, 682, 719, 720. New Orleans Gas Light & B. Co. V. Paulding (12 Rob. 378), 897. New Orleans E. R. Co. v. New Orleans (39 La. Ann. 127), 236, 261. New Orleans, etc. R. Co. v. Wat- kins (48 La. Ann. 1550), 894. New Orleans S. F. & L. R. Co. v. New Orleans (La. 1902, 33 So. Rep. 192), 915. New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana S. R. Co. (125 U. S. 18), 370, 371, 879. New Orleans W. W. Co. v. Rivers (115 U. S. 674), 307, 379. New Orleans Waterworks v. New Orleans (164 U. S. 471), 18, 260, 345, 438. Newport Charter, In re (14 R. I. 655), 143. Newport v. Batesville & B. Ry. Co. (58 Ark. 270), 799. Newport v. Bridge Co. (90 Ky. 193), 437. Newport v. Newport Light Co. (84 Ky. 166), 101, 305, 379, 798, 880. Newport News & 0. P. Ry & B. Co. V. Newport News (100 Va. X 157), 650. New Rochelle v. Clark (65 Hun. 140), 707. New Rochelle v. Lang (75 Hun. 608), 439. Newson v. Galveston (76 Tex. 559), 764. Newton v. Atchison (31 Kan. 151), 611. Newton v. Belger (143 Mass. 598), 25, 295, 626, 681, 736, 738. Newton v. Joyce (166 Mass. 83), 704. Newton v. Lyons (11 App. Div. 105), 705. New York v. Broadway and 7th Ave. (97 N. Y. 275), 322, 331. 650, 651, 652. New York v. Corlies (2 Sandf. Sup. Ct. Rep. 301), 458. New York v. Dry Bock, etc. R. R. Co. (133 N. Y. 104), 72, 223, 295, 670, 751. New York v. Eighth Ave. Ry Co. (118 N. Y. 389), 651. New York v. Eisler (10 Daly 396), 485. New York v. Furze (3 Hill 612), 126. New York v. Heft (13 Daly 301), 61. New York v. Hyatt (3 E. D. Smith 156), 787. New York v. Nichols (4 Hill 209), 24, 25. New York v. N. H. & H. R. Co, 19 N. Y. Supp. 67), 899. New York v. Ordrenan (12 Johns 122), 273, 287. New York v. Reesing (79 N. Y. Suppl. 331), 643. New York v. Sands (105 N. Y. 210), 9. New York v. Second Ave. R. R. Co. (102 N. Y. 572), 900. New York v. Second Ave. Ry. (32 N. Y. 261), 318, 545, 652. New York v. Slack (3 Wheeler Cr. Cas. 237), 695. New York v. Third Ave. Ry. Co. (33 N. Y. 42), 318), 545, 652. New York v. Twenty-third Street Ry. Co. (79 N. Y. Suppl. 323), 651, 652. New York v.- Williams (15 N. Y. 502), 740. New York v. Wood (15 Daly 341), 330. New York v. Workman (35 U. S. App. 201), 676. N. Y. E. R. Co., In re (70 N. Y. 327), 305. cxvi TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) N. Y. Public School, In re (47 N. Y. 556), 252. N. Y. P. E. Public Schools, In re (46 N. Y. 178), 806. New York Fire D. v. Braender (14 Daly 53), 554. N. Y. Fire Depart, v. Buffum (2 E. D. Smith 511), 736. New York Fire Dept. v. Buhler (1 Daly 391), 737. New York Fire Dept. v. Chapman (10 Daly 377), 736. N. Y. Fire Department v. Sturte- vant (3 Hun. 407), 132. New York Fire Dept. v. Wendell (13 Daly 427), 736. New York Health Department v. Knoll (70 N. Y. 530), 13, 143. New York Health Department v. Trinity Church Rectors, etc. (145 N. Y. 32), 776. New York Xife Ins. v. Cravens (178 U. S. 389), 398. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Prest. (71 Fed. Rep. 815), 826. New York, etc. R. R. Co. v. Bris- tol (151 U. S. 556), 380. New York & N. E. R. Co. v. Wat- erbury (55 Conn. 19), 161, 240. Nevada v. Eddy (123 Mo. 546), 4, 6, 71, 115, 838, 840, 841. Nevada v. Hutchins (59 Iowa 506), 42, 271, 686. Nevada Co. v. Hicks (50 Ark. 416), 388. Nevin v. Roach (86 Ky. 492), 172, 189, 201, 224, 846. Niagara Falls v. Salt (45 Hun. 41), 537. Nichols, In re (48 Fed. Rep. 164. 401, 405. Nichols V. Bridgeport (23 Conn. 189), 818. Nichols V. Walters (37 Minn. 264), 311. Nicholson v. Detroit (Mich. 1902), 88 N. W. Rep. 695), 675. Nicolson Fav. Co. v. Painter (35 Cal. 699), 864. Nicoulin v. Lowrey (49 N. J. L. 391), 42, 297, 490, 496. Nightingale, In re (11 Pick. 168), 30, 657, 763. Niver v. Bath-on-the-Hudson (27 Misc. Rep. 605), 835. Nixon v. Bolioxi (Miss. 1889, 5 So. Rep. 621), 717. Noble V. Durell (3 T. R. 271), 110. Noble V. Kansas City (95 Mo. App. 167), 85. Noblesville v. Noblesville Gas & Imp. Co. (157 Ind. 162), 897. Nodine v. Union (13 Oreg 587), 496. Noecker v. People (91 111. 494), 540. Noel v. San Antonio (11 Tex. Civ. App. 580), 841. Nohrden v. North Eastern Ry Co. (54 S. C. 492), 585. Nolin v. Mayor, etc. (4 Yerg. 163), 686. Noonan v. People (183 111. 52), 321, 325. Norfolk v. Chamberlain (89 Va. 196), 824. Norfolk V. Ellis (26 Gratt 224), 121. Norfolk City v. Chamberlain (29 Gratt 534), 719. Norfolk Ry Co. v. Pennsylvania (136 U. S. 114), 410. Norris v. Crocker (13 How. 429), 327. Norris v. Staps (Hob. 210), 22. Norris v. Wurster (23 App. Div. 124), 912. Norristown v. Fitzpatrick (94 Pa. St. 121), 676. Norristown v. Norristown Pass. Ry. (148 Pa. St. 87), 900. North V. Gary (4 Thomp. & C. 357), 148, 238. Northampton v. Abell (127 Mass. 507), 828. Northern Central Ry Co. v. Bal- timore (21 Md. 93), 49, 133, 137, 809. North Baptist Church v. Orange (54 N. J. L. Ill), 249. North Birmingham St. R. Co. v. Calderwood (89 Ala. 247), 31, 32. North Braddock v. Second Ave. Tract Co. (20 Pittsb. L. J. 27), 652. North Chicago City R. R. v. Lake TABLE OF CASES. CXVll (The references are to pages.) View (105 111. 207), 299, 687, 691, 747, 895. North Hempstead v. Hempstead (2 Wend. 109), 89. North Hudson Ry Co. v. Hoboken (41 N. J. L. 71), 615, 620, 652. North Platte v. North Platte Wat- er Works Co. (56 Neb. 403), 171. Northern Liberties v. Northern Liberties Gas Co. (12 Pa. St. 318), 714. Northern Liberties v. O'Niell (1 Phila. 427), 538, 573. North Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Stone (3 Phila. 421), 817. North Plainfield v. Gary (50 N. J. L. 176), 643. North River Meadow Co. v. Shrewsbury Church (22 N. J. L. 424), 389. Northern Central Ry Co. v. Bal- timore (21 Md. 93), 884. Northville v. Westfall (75 Mich. 603), 564. Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park (97 U. S. 659), 682, 698. Northwestern Packet Co. v. St. Paul (3 Dill C. C^ 454), 416. North W. Telephone Exch. Co. v. Minneapolis (81 Minn. 140), 723. Northwood v. Barrington (9 N. H. 369), 149, 150. North Whitehall Tp., In re (47 Pa. St. 156), 253. Norton v. Beckman (53 Minn. 456), 467. Norton v. St. Louis (97 Mo. 537), 587, 897. Norwick v. Breed (30 Conn. 535), 717. Norwich v. Hubbard (22 Conn. 587), 810. Norwich v. Story (25 Conn. 44), 329, 803. Norwich Gas Light Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co. (25 Conn. 19), 304, 379, 880. Norwood V. Baker (172 U. S. 269), 353, 819, 820, 821, 826, 858. Norwood V. Gonzales County (79 Tex. 218), 803, Norton v. St. Louis (97 Mo. 537), 61. Nottage V. Portland (35 Or. 539), 265, 867. Nugent v. Jackson (72 Miss. 1040), 830, 811. Nugent V. State (18 Ala. 521), 463, 562. Nugent v. Wrinn (44 Conn. 273), 179. Nute v. Boston, etc. Co. (149 Mass. 465), 810. O. Oak Grove v. Juneau (66 Wis. 534), 15, 48, 248. Oakland v. Carpentier (13 Cal. 540), 70, 128, 131, 148, 154, 166. Oakland v. Oakland Water F. Co. (118 Cal. 160), 3. Oakland Pav. Co. v. Rier (52 Cal. 270), 805. Oakland R. R. Co. v. Oakland, B. & P. V. R. R. Co. (45 Cal. 365), 916. Oakley v. Atlantic City (63 N. J. L. 127), 193. Oakley v. Williamsburgh (6 Paige 262), 576. O'Brien v. Cleveland (1 Cleveland Law Rep. 100), 530, 753. O'Brien v Cleveland (4 Ohio Dec. 189), 485, 493. Ocean Springs v. Green (77 Miss. 472), 224. O'Connor v. Memphis (6 Lea 730), 140. O'Connor v. Pittsburg (18 Pa. St. 187), 881. O'Connor v. Shahbona (49 111. App. 619), 591. Oconto County Supervisors v. Hall (47 Wis. 208), 172. O'Dea V. Winona (41 Minn. 424), 207. Odell V. Atlanta (97 Ga. 670), 755. Odell V. Reynolds (40 Mich. 21), 528. Odell V. Schroeder (58 111. 353), 560, 676. Ogden, ex parte (Tex. Cr. App. 1902, 66 S. W. Rep. 1100), 23., Ogden V. Lake View (121 111. 422), 852, 855, CXVlll TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Ogden V. McLaughlin (5 Utah 387), 752. Ogden V. Madison (111 Wis. 413), 513, 520, 753, 792. Ogdensburgh v. Lyon (7 Lans. 215), 222, 423, 691. Ogg V. Lansing (35 Iowa 495), 675. Ogilvie V. Crawford County (7 Fed. Rep. 745), 411. O'Hara v. State (112 N. Y. 146), 867. O'Hare v. Park River (1 N. D. 279), 249. Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v De- bolt (16 How. 416), 447. Ohio & M. R. R. R. Co. v. Mc- Cutchin (27 111. 9), 482. Oil City V. Oil City Boiler Works (152 Pa. St. 348), 813. Oil City V. Oil City Trust Co. (11 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 350), 635. O'Keefe, In re (19 N. Y. Supp. 676), 269. Old Colony T. Co. v. Atlanta (83 Fed. Rep. 39), 909. Oldham v. Birmingham (102 Ala. 357), 367. Olds V. Erie City (79 Pa. St. 380), 249. Oldstein v. Fireman's Building Assn. (44 La. Ann. 492), 65. O'Leary v. Board (79 Mich. 281), 675. O'Leary v. Cook (28 111. 534), 646. O'Leary, ex parte (65 Miss. 80), 687, 704. Olin V. Meyers (55 Iowa 209), 187, 205. Oliver, In re (21 S. C. 318), 486. Oliver v. Worcester (102 Mass. 489), 263. Olp V. Leddick (59 Hun. 627), -113. Olsen V. Citizens' Ry. Co. (152 Mo. 426), 745. Olympia v. Mann (1 Wash. St. 389), 735, 738. Omaha v. Harmon (58 Neb. 339), 425, 452. Omaha v. Olmstead (5 Neb. 446), 472. Omaha Horse Ry. Co. v. Cable Tramway Co. (30 Fed. Rep. 324), 378, O'Maley v. Dorn (7 Wis. 236), 726. O'Maley v. Freeport (96 Pa. St. 24), 302, 769. O'Malia v. Wentworth (65 Me. 129), 583. O'Mally V. McGinn (53 Wis. 353), 201, 207, 239. O'Meara and City of Ottawa, In re (11 Ontario Rep. 603), 298. O'Meara v. Green (16 Mo. App. 118), 827. O'Neil v. Ins. Co. (166 Pa. St. 72), 49. O'Neil v. Tyler (3 N. D. 47), 187, 205, 316, 610. O'Neil v. Vermont (144 U. S. 323), 354. Opelousas v. Andrus (37 La. Ann. 699), 161, 238. Opelousas v. Giron (46 La. Ann. 1364), 285, 360, 512, 520, 792. Opinion of Justices (150 Mass. 592), 798. Opinion of Justices (58 Me. 590), 606), Opinion of Justices (52 Me. 595), 75, 104. Opp V. Ten Eyck (99 Ind. 345), 221. Ord V. Nash (50 Neb. 335), 874. O'Reilly v. Kingston (114 N. Y. 439), 832. Oren v. Bolger (128 Mich. 355), 805. Organ v. Toronto (C. P., 24 Ont. Rep. 318), 457. O'Rourke v. Citizens Street R. Co. (103 Tenn. 124), 751. O'Rourke v. Hart (9 Bosw. 301), 807. O'Rourke v. Hays (^3 Pa. St. 72), 264. Osborn v. Bank of U. S. (9 Wheat 738), 261. Osborne v. Detroit (32 Mich. 282), 829. Osborne v. Florida (164 U. S. 650), 410. Osborne v. Mobile (16 Wall. 479), 399, 408. Osburn v. Lyons (104 Iowa 160). 866. Oskaloosa v. Tullis (25 Iowa 440), 79. Oshkosh V. Schwartz (55 Wis. 483), 478, 532, TABLE OF CASES. CXlX (The references are to pages.) Osbkosh Waterworks Co. v. Osh- kosh (U. S. 1903, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234), 382, 385. Osterhoudt v. Rigney (98 N. Y. 222), 430. Oswald V. Gosnell (21 Ky. L. Rep. 1660), 233, 234, 235. Ottawa V. Carey (101 U. S. 110), 75, 84. Ottawa V. LaSalle County (12 111. 339), 339. Ottawa V. People ex rel. (48 111. 233), 127, 225. Ottawa V. Rohrbough (42 Kan. 253), 803. Ottawa County Com'rs v. Nelson 19 Kan. 234), 823. Otis V. Chicago (161 111. 199), 847. Otoe Co. V. Baldwin (111 U. S. 1), 266. Otsego Lake v. Kirtsen (72 Mich. 1), 113. Ottumwa V. Chinn (75 Iowa 405), 692. Ottumwa V. City Water Supply Co. (U. S. C. C. A., 119 Fed. Rep. 315),. 438. Ottumwa V. Schaub (52 Iowa 515), 565, 599. ' Ottumwa V. Zekind (95 Iowa 622), 614, 632, 634, 637. Ouachita Packet (Jo. v. Aiken (121 U. S. 444), 415, 417. Ould V. Richmond (23"Gratt. 464), 618, 641. Ouray v. Corson (Colo. 1900, 59 Pac. Rep. 876), 8. Cutwater v. Borough of Carlstadt (66 N. J. L. 510), 25, 165, 170. Overall v. Ruenzi (67 Mo. 203), 430. Overhouser v. American Cereal Co. (Iowa, October 3, 1902, 92 N. W. Rep. 74), 601. Overton v. Vicksburg (70 Miss. 558), 401. Owens V. Crossett (105 111. 354), 717. Owens V. Farm Ridge (103 111. 408), 717. Owens V. Kinsey (7 Jones Law 245), 774. Owensboro v. Simms (99 Ky. 49), 466. Owensboro v. Simms (17 Ky. Law Rep. 1393), 271, 753. Owensboro v. Sparks (99 Ky. 351), 672, 755. Owensboro v. Sparks (18 Ky. Law Rep. 269), 271, 284. Owings v. Jones (9 Md. 108), 58. Owings V. Speed (5 Wheat. 420), 207. Owosso V. Richfield (80 Mich. 328), 838. Oxford V. Benton (36 N. H. 395), 206. P. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Terre Haute (98 Fed. Rep. 330), 404, 405. Packard v. Bergen Neck Ry. Co. (48 N. J. Eq. 281), 842. Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg (105 U. S. 599), 416. Packet Co. v. Keokuk (95 U. S. 80), 39, 415, 417. Packet Co. v. St. Louis (100 U. S. 423), 416. Packet Co. v. St. Louis (100 U. S. 423), 38, 39, 416. Pacific V. Seifert (79 Mo. 210), 447. Pacific Junction v. Dyer (64 Iowa 38), 403, 631, 632, 911. Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cass County (53 Mo. 17), 329. Pacific R. R. Co. v. Governor (23 Mo. 353), 46, 187, 209. Padavano v. Fagan (66 N. J. L. 167), 239. Piaducah v. Allen (20 Ky. Law Rep. 1342), 680. Paducah v. Allen (23 Ky. Law Rep. 701), 680. Page, ex parte (49 Mo. 291), 575. Page V. Baltimore (34 Md. 558), 429. Page V. Chicago (60 111. 441), 808. Page V. Hardin (8 B. Mon. 648), 366. Page V. St. Louis (20 Mo. 136), 119. Page V. Symonds (63 N. Y. 17), 695. Page V. Weeks (13 Mass. 199), 83. Paige V. Fazackerly (36 Barb. 302), 769. Paine v. Boston (124 Mass. 486), 258. cxx TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Palaquemines v. Roth (29 La. Ann. 261), 79. Palestine v. Barnes (50 Tex. 538), 310, 761. Palmer v. Danville (166 111. 42), 384. Palmer v. Hicks (6 Johns 132), 38. Palmer v. Larchmont Electric Co. (158 N. Y. 231), 892. Palmer v. Tingle (55 Ohio St. 389), 669. Palmer v. Way (6 Colo. 106), 810, 819, 823. Palmyra v. Morton (25 Mo. 593), 31. Pancoast v. Troth (34 N. J. L. 377), 803. Paola, etc. R. R. C. v. Commis- sioners (16 Kan. 302), 175. Pap worth v. Fitzgerald (106 Ga. 378), 278. Paralee v. Camden (49 Ark. 165), 361, 752. Parchen v. Ashby (5 Mont. 68), 883. Paret v. Bayonne (39 N. J. L. 559), 113. Paris V. Berry (2 J. J. Marsh. 483), 810. Paris V. Graham (33 Mo. 94), 25. Parish of Orleans v. Cochran (20 La. Ann. 373), 633. Park Ecclesiastical Soc. v. Hart- ford (47 Conn. 89), 832, 838. Parker v. Astoria (25 Oreg. 425), 240. Parker v. Baker (1 Clarke Ch. 223), 76. Parker v. Bernard (135 Mass. 116), 57. Parker v. Buckner (67 Tex. 20), 385. Parker v. Catholic Bishop of Chi- cago (146 111. 158), 187, 845. Parker v. Concord (71 N. H. 468), 430, 438. Parker v. Macon (39 Ga. 725), 716. Parker v. New Brunswick (30 N. J. L. 395), 835. Parker v. Saratoga County (106 N. Y. 392), 105. Parker v. Zeisler (73 Mo. App. 537), 244. Parkersburg v. Brown (106 U. S. 487), 431. Parkersburg Gas Co. v. Parkers- burg (30 W. Va. 435), 72, 305, 308. Parkey v. Concord (71 N. H. 468), 196. Parkhurst v. Capital City R. Co. (23 Oreg. 471), 882. - Parkinson v. State (14 Md. 185), 274. Plarks V. Boston (8 Pick. 218), 260, 861. Parlin v. Mills (11 111. App. 396), 880. Parr v. Greenbush (72 N. Y. 463), 198. Parry v. Berry (Comyns. 269), 158. Parsons v. District of Columbia (170 U. S. 45), 821. parsons V. Goshen (11 Pick. 396), 75. Parsons v. Monmouth (70 Me. 262), 74. Partridge v. Hyde Park (131 111. 537), 321. Partridge v. Snyder (78 111. 519), 486. Passenger Cases (7 How. 283), 411. Paterson v. Barnet (46 N. J. L. 62), 4, 5, 220. Paton V. People (1 Colo. 77), 617. Patterson v. Detroit, etc., Ry. (56 Mich. 172), 57. Patterson v. Kentucky (97 U. S. 501), 418. Patterson v. Vail (43 Iowa 142), 687, 716. Patterson Gas Light Co. v. Brady (27 N. J. L. 245), 897. Patton V. Stephens (14 Bush. 324), 114. Paul V. Coulter (12 Minn. 41), 761. Paul V. Detroit (32 Mich. 108), 874. Paul V. Gloucester County (50 N. J. L. 585), 648. Paul V. Virginia (94 U. S. 391), 410. Paul V. Virginia (8 Wall. 168), 398, 410. Paulk V. Syracuse (104 Ga. 24), 577. TABLE OF CASES. CXXl (The references are to pages.) Paulk V. Sycamore (104 Ga. 728), 789. Paulsen v. Portland (149 U. S. 30), 819. Paulson V. Portland (16 Oreg. 450), 813. Paulterers Co. v. Phillips (6 Bing- ham's N. C. 314), 442. Paxson V. Sweet (13 N. J. L. 196), 296, 690, 810. Paxton V. Borardus (201 111. 628), 845. Payne v. Com. (14 Ky. Law Rep. 302), 562. Payne v. South Springfield (161 111. 285), 844. Payne v. Springfield (161 111. 285), 853. Pearce v. Atwood (13 Mass. 324), 471. Pearce v. Hyde Park (126 111. 287), 848, 852, 853, ^55. Pearson v. Chicago (162 111. 383), 851. Pease v. Chicago (21 111. 500), 827. Peay v. Schenck (1 Woolw. C. C. 175), 147. Peck and Town of Gait, in re (46 Up. Can. Q. B. 211), 55. Peck V. Booth (42 Conn. 271), 150. Peck V. Elder (3 Sandf. 126), 699. Peck V. Powell (62 Vt. 296), 463. Peck V. Rochester (3 N. Y. Supp. 872), 256. Pedrick v. Bailey (12 Gray 161), 295, 721. Peed V. Millikan (79 Ind. 86), 610. Peete v. Morgan (19 Wall. 581), 422. Pegram v. Cleveland County Com'rs (64 N. C. 557), 145. Pegues V. Ray (50 La. Ann. 574), 400. Pekin v. Smelzel (21 111. 464), 271, 285. Pells V. Boswell (8' Ontario Rep. 680), 55.. Pemberton v. Doley (43 Mo. App. 176), 890. Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsyl- vania (125 U. S. 181), 410. Pendergast v. Peru (20 111. 51). 535, 558. 597. Pennoyer v. Saginaw (8 Mich. 534), 679. Pienrose v. Erie Canal Co. (56 Pa. St. 46), 381. Pensacola v. Sullivan (23 Pla. 1), 337. Pensacola Gas. Co. v. Provisional Municipality (33 Fla. 322), 903. Pennsylvania Co. v. Frana (13 111. App. 91), 441, 529. P|ennsylvania Co. v. James (81 Pa. St. 194), 41. Pennsylvania Co. v. Stegemeier (118 Ind. 305), 750. Pa. Globe Gas Light Co. v. Scran- ton (97 Pa. St. 538), 242. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Jersey City (47 N. J. L. 286), 452. Penn. R. R. Co. v. Riblet (66 Pa. St. 164), 130, 742. Pennsylvania G. G. Co. v. Scran- ton (97 Pa. St. 538), 239. Pentecost v. Stiles (5 Okla. 500), 315. People V. Albany (4 Hun. 675), 93. People ex rel v. Albertson (55 N. Y. 50), 66, 260. People V. Adams (9 Wend. 333), 206. People 488), People 351. People 288), 730. People 119. Pieople 818. People People R. R. People 343), People 144. .People V. Bartlett (67 Cal. 156), 805. People 128), People 176. V. Amsterdam (90 Hun. 237. V. Angle (109 N. Y. 564), V. Armstrong (73 Mich. 21, 292, 298, 301, 450, 715, V. Auditors (13 Mich 233), V. Austin (47 Cal. 353), V. Ayhens (85 Cal. 86), 489. ex rel Kimball v. B. & A. Co. (70 N. Y. 569), 321. ex rel v. Bagley (85 Mo. 69. V. Bailcache (52 Cal. 310), v.. Batchelor (22 N. Y. 147, 157, 179. V. Batchelor (28 Barb. 310), exxii TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) People ex rel v. Beck (30 N. Y. Supp. 473), 780. People ex rel Shumway v. Bennett (29 Mich. 451), 140, 143. People ex rel v. Board of Excise of N. Y. (3 N. Y. St. Rep. 253), 464, 567. People V. Board of Health (33 Barb. 344), 19, 143, 249. People V. Board of Supervisors (131 N.'Y. 468), 120. People V. Board of Supervisors (73 N. Y. 173), 434. People V. Board of Supervisors, etc., (45 N. Y. 196), 434. People V. Bresler (171 N. Y. 302), 163. People V. Brill (120 Mich 42), 338. People V. Brooklyn (149 N. Y. 215), 367. People V. Brown (2 Utah 462), 771, 784. People V. Buchanan (1 Idaho 681), 580, 582, 591. People V. Bunker (128 Mich. 160), 401. People V. Bussell (59 Mich. 104), 329. People V. Carpenter (24 N. Y. 86), 546. People V. Chicago (51 111. 17), 267, 805. People V. Chicago Gas Trust Co. (130 111. 268), 863.' People V. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (118 111. 113), 376. People V. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (118 111. 520), 803. People V. C. W. D. Ry. Co. (18 111. App. 125), 322. People V. Cipperly (101 N. Y. 634), 767. People V. Clark (70 N. Y. 518), 546. People ex rel v. Coffey (66 Hun. 160), 899. People V. Cole (70 Cal. 59), 245, 248. People ex rel v. Coler (166 N. Y." 1), 778, 864. People V. Coleman (4 Cal. 46), 611, 629. People V. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (107 U. S. 59), 411. Pieople ex rel v. Coon (25 Cal. 635), 112, 145. People v. Counts (89 Cal. 15), 13. People ex rel v. Court of Special Sessions Justices (7 Hun. 214), 19, 144. People ex rel v. Cox (76 N. Y. 47), 509, 519. People V. Cregier (138 111. 401), 44, 257, 258, 298, 428. People V. Crotty (93 111. 180), 4, 124, 625. People V. Cunningham (1 Denio. 524), 717. People ex rel v. Curley (5 Colo. 412), 461. People V. Davie (114 Cal. 363), 367. People V. Davis (61 Barb. 456), 331, 332. People V. Deehan (153 N. Y. 528), 903. People ex rel v. Detroit (28 Mich. 228), 66, 607, 805. People V. Detroit Citizens', etc., R. R. Co. (116 Mich. 132), 269. People V. Detroit White Lead Works (82 Mich. 471), 697, 710, 787, 792. People V. De Wolf (62 111. 253), 209. People V. D'Oench (111 N. Y. 359), 736, 737, 739. People V. Draper (15 N. Y. 532), 66, 144. People V. Dupuyt (71 111. 651), 84. People ex rel v. Dutcher (83 N. Y. 240), 512, 523. People V. Dwyer (90 N. Y. 402), 261. People V. Bast Saginaw (33 Mich. 164), 609. People V. Bberspacher (79 Hun. 410), 484. People V. Eddy (59 Hun. 615), 767. People ex rel v. Evans. (18 111. 361), 469. People ex rel v. Fairbury (51 111. 149), 178. People V. Farnham (35 111. 562), 802. TABLE OF CASES. CXXlil (The references People V. Fisher (20 Barb. 652), 524. People V. Fitchie (76 Hun. 80), 238. People ex rel v. Fleming (10 Colo. 53), 546. People ex rel Detroit v. Fort Street & E. Ry. Co. (41 Mich. 413), 900. People ex rel v. French (102 N. Y. 583), 43, 522, 758. People V. Frost (36 111. App. 242), 176. People V. Furman (85 Mich. 110), 341. People V. Garehed (20 Misc. Rep. 127), 770. People ex rel Hughes v. Gillespie (1 Cal. 342), 465. People V. Gillson (109 N. Y. 389), 669, 864. People V. Gleason (121 N. Y. 631), 861. People V. Goodwin (5 Wend. 251), 528. People V. Goosemann (80 Mich. 611), 468. People V. Gordon (81 Mich. 306), 705. People ex rel v. Grant (126 N. Y. 473), 772. People V. Green (58 N. Y. 295), 467. People V. Hanrahan (75 Mich. 611), 224, 272, 280, 329, 339, 345, 518, 522, 671, 752, 753, 787, 792. People V. Harris (4 Cal. 9), 797. People V. Harrison (185 111. 307), 329, 330. People V. Harrison (191 111. 257), 349. People ex rel v. Harshaw (60 Mich. 200), 157. People V. Haverstraw (137 N. Y. 88), 808. People ex rel v. Henshaw (76 Cal. 436), 69, 341, 463. People ex rel v. Hillsdale & Chat- ham Turnpike Co. (2 Johns. 190), 441. People ex rel v. Holly (119 Mich. 637), 114. People V. Holladay (25 Cal. 300), 268. are to pages.) People ex rel v. Holladay (93 Cal. 241), 720. People V. Hurlbut (24 Mich. 44), 66, 70, 82. People V. Hurst (41 Mich. 328), 529. People V. Ingham (20 Mich. 95), 881. People V. Iverson (14 N. Y. Critn. Rep. 155), 484, 513. People V. Jackson (8 Mich. 110), 562, 578. People V. James (16 Hun. 426), 518. People V. Jenkins (1 Hill. 469), 423. Pieople ex rel v. Jobs (7 Colo. 475), 341. People V. Johnson (2 Parker Cr. Rep. 322), 522. People V. Jones (6 Mich. 176), 881. People V. Judge of Recorders Ct. of Detroit (40 Mich. 64), 831. People ex rel v. Justices (74 N. Y. 406), 486, 512, 515. People V. J. & M. P. R. Co. (9 Mich. 285), 669. People V. Keir (78 Mich. 98), 43, 48, 232, 248, 453, 714, 762, 764, 766. People V. Kerr (27 N. Y. 188), 886, 890. People V. Kingman (24 N. Y. 559), 873. People V. Kipley (167 111. 638), 366. Pteople V. LaRue (67 Cal. 526), 54. People V. Lathrop (3 Colo. 428), 606. People V. Lawber (7 Abb. Pr. 158), 761. People V. Lawrence (36 Barb. 177), 825. People ex rel v. Lawrence (41 N. Y. 137), 226. People V. Leavitt (41 Mich. 470), 471. People ex rel v. Lee (112 111. 113), 232, 610. People V. Lewis (86 Mich. 273), 44, 312, 710. People V. Linden (107 Cal. 94), X3. CX.MV TABLE OF CASES. (Tlie references are to pages.) People V. Liscomb (6 Thomp. & C. 258), 489. People V. Little (86 Mich. 125), 744. People V. Lowber (28 Barb. 65), 88. People V. Lynch (51 Cal. 15), 265, 868. People V. McCarthy (45 How. Pr. 97), 513, 559, 572. People ex rel v. McClintock (45 Cal. 11), 88. People V. McCreery (34 Cal. 432), 606. People V. McWethy (165 111. 222), 335. People ex rel v. Madison Co. (125 111. 334), 209. People V. Maher (56 Hun. 81), 865. People V. Mangold (71 Mich. 335), 468. People V. Manhattan Gas Light Co. (45 Barb. 136), 897. People V. Marley (2 Wheeler Cr. Cas. 74), 737. Heople ex rel v. Martin (5 N. Y. 22), 179. People V. Marx (99 N. Y. 377), 669, 763. People V. Mather (4 Wend. 229), 524. People ex rel v. Matteson (17 111. 157), 449. People V. Mattimore (45 Hun. 448), 715. People V. Maynard (15 Mich. 463), 440. People V. Mayor, etc. (21 111. 17), 607. People V. Maxon (139 111. 306), 427. People V. Maxton (38 111. App. 152), 168. People V. Medberry (39 N. Y. Supp. 207), 647. People ex rel v. Mellen (32 111. 181), 225, 226. People V. Miller (38 Hun. 82), 481, 530, 533, 559, 753. People ex rel v. Minck (21 N. Y. 539), 208. People ex rel v. Mitchell (35 N. Y. 551), 74, People V. Mount (87 111. App. 194), 329. People ex rel v. Mount (186 111. 560), 5, 7, 11, 21, 50, 156, 315, 337, 624. People V. Mulholland (82 N. Y. 324), 765. People ex rel v. Mutual Gas Light Co. (38 Mich 154), 441. People ex rel v. Murphy (67 111. 333), 469. People V. Murray (57 Mich. 396), 207, 232, 590, 596. People V. Naglee (1 Cal. 232), 629. People V. New York (11 Abb. Pr. 114), 126. People V. New York (32 Barb. 35), 260. People V. New York (32 Barb. 35), 435. People V. New York (7 How. Pr. 81), 580, 584. People V. New York (18 Abb. N. C. 123), 718. People V. New York Board of Health (33 Barb. 344), 688. People V. New York Fire Com'rs (23 Hun. 317), 87. People V. New York Gas Light Co. (64 Barb. 55), 698. People ex rel v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R. Co. (11 Hun. 297), 474. People V. N. H. & H. R. Co. (45 Barb. 73), 883. People V. Niles (35 Cal. 282), 415. People V. Nyland (41 Cal. 129), 463, 562. People V. O'Brien (111 N. Y. 1), 321, 323, 380, 912. People ex rel v. Pease (27 N. Y. 45), 185. People V. Peoria (166 111.' 517), 441. People ex rel v. Peoria D. & E. R. R. Co. (116 111. .410), 46, 609. People V. Phalen (49 Mich. 492), 468. People V. Police Board (24 How. Pr. 481), 276. People V. Port Jervis (100 N. Y. 283), 832. People V, Potter (35 Cal, 110), 487. TABLE OP CASES. exxv (The references are to pages.) People V. Pratt (129 N. Y. 68), 290, 696. People V. Queens County Super- visors (62 Hun. 619), 803. People ex rel v. Queens Co. Super. (153 N. Y. 370), 260. People V. Reclamation Dist. (130 Cal. 607), 441. Pjeople V. Reclamation Dist. (53 Cal. 346), 54. People ex rel v. Rector, etc. (48 Barb. 603), 162, 163, 165. People V. Rich (54 Cal. 74), 894. People V. Roby (52 Mich. 577), 539, 542. People ex rel v. Rochester (5 Lans. 11), 148, 178, 193, 829. People V. Rochester (45 Hun. 102), 768. People ex rel v. Rochester (44 Hun. 166), 770. People V. Rochester (21 Barb. 656), 830. People V. Roff (2 Parker Cr. Rep. 216), 693. People V. Rosenberg (138 N. Y. 410), 351, 447, 687, 688, 699. People V. Rosenberg (67 Hun. 52), 667. People V. Russell (74 Cal. 578), 253. People V. Russell (49 Mich. 617), 636. People V. Sacramento (6 Cal. 422), 270. People V. St. Louis (10 111. 351), 716. People V. Salomon (46 111. 415), 838. People V. Sands (1 Johns. 78), 741. People ex rel v. San Francisco (27 Cal. 655), 112, 253. People ex rel v. San Francisco (36 Cal. 595), 812, 883. People V. Scannell (62 N. Y. Suppl. 930), 367. People V. Schroeder (12 Hun. 413), 8. People V. Schroeder (76 N. Y. 160), 236, 237, 239. People V. Slaughter (2 Doug. 334), 464. People V. Smith (Mich. 1902, 90 N. W. Rep. 666), 546. People V. Smithville (85 Hun. 114), 9. People V. Spring Valley (129 111. 169), 546. People ex rel v. Starne (35 111. 121), 200. People V. Starr (50 111. 52), 534. People V. Steele (94 Mich. 437), 527. People V. Stein (80 N. Y. Suppl. 847), 512, 523. People V. Stephens (71 N. Y. 527), 862. People V. Stevens (13 Wend. 341), 792, 795. People V. Stowell (9 Abb. N. C. 456), 14S. People V. Strack (1 Hun. 96), 158. People V. Stratton (28 Cal. 382), 10. People V. Sturtevant (9 N. Y. 263), 261, 262. Pfeople ex rel v. Suburban R. R. Co. (178 111. 594), 879. People V. Superior Court (19 Wend. 68), 145. People V. Supervisors (3 Mich. 475), 119. People ex rel v. Supervisors (112 N. Y. 585), 881. People V. Supervisors Queens Co. (131 N. Y. 468), 118. People V. Supervisors of City and County of San Francisco (27 Cal. 655), 252. People ex rel v. Sutter Street Ry. Co. (117 Cal. 604), 880, 914. People ex rel v. Terry (108 N. Y. 1), 470. •People V. Toal (85 Cal. 333), 462. People ex rel v. Thompson (155 111. 451), 3. People ex rel v. Throop (12 Wend. 183), 296, 301. People V. Thurber (13 111. 554), 398, 620, 621. People ex rel v. Utica Ins. Co. (15 John 358), 76, 155, 879. People V. Van Houten (35 N. Y. Supp. 186), 478, 482, 515, 516, 517, 551. People V. Van Houten (13 Misc. Rep. 603), 770. CXXVl TABLE OP CASES. (The references are to pages.) People V. Van Houten (69 N. Y. St. 265), 479, 484, 513, 536. People V. Van Nort. (64 Barb. 205), 339. People ex rel Trundy v. Van Nort. (65 Barb. 331), 865. People V. Van Tassel (135 N. Y. 638), 196. People V. Vinton (82 Mich. 39), 531, 568. People V. Wagner (86 Mich. 594), 224, 769. People V. Walker (23 Barb. 304), 145, 176. People V. Walsh (96 111. 232), 883. People V. Weber (89 111. 347), 8. People V. Weiss-Chapman Drug Co. (5 Colo. App. 153), 532. People V. West (106 N. Y. 293), 351, 767. People V. White (24 Wend. 520), 158. People ex rel v. Whitney's Point (32 Hun. 508), 833, 846. People V. Williams (64 Cal. 87), 13. People V. Williams (56 Cal. 647), 54. People ex rel v. Wilson (15 111. 388), 472. People V. Wilson (50 Hun. 606), 867. People V. Wintermute (1 Dak. 63), 331. People V. Wong Wang (92 Cal. 277), 467. People V. Wright (68 Hun. 264), 609. People V. Yonkers (39 Barb. 266), 844. People ex rel v. Zeyst (23 N. Y. 140), 206, 209. People's Gas Light Co. v. Jersey City (46 N. J. L. 297), 893. People's Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Hale (94 111. App. 406), 444. Peoria v. Calhoun (29 111. 317), 289, 296, 529. Peoria v. Gugenheim (61 111. App. 374), 632, 636. Peoria v. Simpson (110 111. 294), 457. Perdue v. Ellis (18 Ga. 586), 17. Pereria v. Wallace (129 Cal. 397), 885. Perkins v. Corbin (45 Ala. 103), 461, 463, 464. Perkins v. Fielding (119 Mo. 149), 153. Perkins v. Slack (86 Pa. St. 270), 607. Perkins v. Watertown (5 Biss. 320), 383. Perkinson v. Partridge (3 Mo. App. 60), 828, 845. Perry v. Keene (58 N. H. 40), 142. Perry v. New Orleans, M. & C. Ry. Co. (55 Ala. 413), 580, 882, 885, 892. Perry v. State (37 Neb. 623), 506, 752. Perry v. State (41 Tex. 488), 574. Perry v. Stowe (111 Mass. 60), 94. Perry v. Washburn (20 Cal. 318), 606. Perryman v. Greenville (51 Ala. 507), 207, 582. Pesterfield v. Vickers (3 Coldw. 205), 26, 359, 484. Peters v. Chicago (192 111. 437), 853. Petersburg v. Cooke (94 Va. 244), 641. Petersburg v. Mappin (14 111. 193), 73, 102, 112. Petersburg v. Metzker (21 111. 205), 24, 70, 72, 284, 285. Petersburg v. Whitnack (48 111. App. 663), 531, 539. Peterson v. New York (17 N. Y. 449), 111, 123, 137. Petsch V. Biggs (31 Minn. 392), 467, 468. Pettibone v. Hamilton (40 Wis. 402), 831. Pettibone v. U. S. (148 U. S. 197), 524. Pettis V. Johnson (56 Ind. 139), 358, 913. Pettit V. Duke (10 Utah 311), 826. Hetty V. Jones (1 Ired. 408), 570. Peyton v. Morgan Park (172 111. 102), 425. Pfirrman, ex parte (134 CaL 143), 607. Pfleger v. Groth (103 Wis. 104), 695. Phelps V. Hawley (52 N. Y. 23). ^TABLE OF CASES. CXXVll (The references are to pages.) Phelps V. New York (112 N. Y. 216), 808, Phelon V. Granville (140 Mass. 386), 9. Philadelphia v. American U. Tel. Co. (167 Pa. St. 406), 406, 407. Philadelphia v. Atl. & P. Tel. Co. (42 C. C. A. 325), 407. Philadelphia v. Atlantic & P. Tel. Co. (109 Fed. Rep. 55), 639. Pliiladelphia v. Bowman (175 Pa. St. 91), 318. Philadelphia v. Brahender (201 Pa. St. 574), 231, 301, 313 719, 730. Philadelphia v. Donath (13 Phila. 4), 811. Philadelphia v. Duncan (4 Phila. 145), 559. Philadelphia v. Eastwick (35 Pa. St. 75), 813. Philadelphia v. Edwards (78 Pa. St. 62), 811. Phila. V. Empire, etc., Ry. (3 Brewst. 570), 900. Philadelphia v. Empire Pass. Ry. Co. (177 Pa. St. 382), 650, 897, 900. Philadelphia v. Evans (139 Pa. St. 483), 814. Philadelphia v. Field (58 Pa. St. 320), 806. Philadelphia v. Hughes (4 Phila. 148), 558. Philadelphia v. Hestonville R. R. (177 Pa. St. 371), 900. Philadelphia v. Houseman (2 Phila. 349), 143. Philadelphia v. Kitchen (2 Phila. 44), 556. Philadelphia v. Lea (5 Phila. 77), 831. Philadelphia v. Linnard (97 Pa. St. 242), 815. Philadelphia v. Meighan (159 Pa. St. 495), 811. Philadelphia v. Michener (10 Phila. 30), 736. Philadelphia v. Nell (3 Yeates 475), 487, 534, 559. Philadelphia v. P. & R. R. R. Co. (58 Pa. St. 253), 719. Philadelphia v. Philadelphia, etc., Ry Co. (177 Pa. St. 379), 900. Philadelphia v. Postal Tel. Cable Co. (21 N. Y. Supp. 556), 406, 407. Philadelphia v. Provident Life, etc., Co. (132 Pa. St. 224), 682, 706. Philadelphia v. Ridge Ave., Pass. Ry. Co. (143 Pa. St. 444), 898, 899. Philadelphia v. Roney (2 Phila. 43), 559. Philadelphia v. Spring Garden, etc., R. Co. (161 Pa. St. 522), 898. Philadelphia v. Thirteenth & Fif- teenth Streets P. R. Co. (8 Phila. 648), 719. Philadelphia v. Thirteenth, etc., Ry. Co. (169 Pa. St. 269), 898. Philadelphia v. Thirteenth St. Ry. Co. (3 Pa. Dis. Ct. Rep. 468), 899. Philadelphia v. Trust Co. (132 Pa. St. 224), 691. Philadelphia v. Tyron (35 Pa. St. 401), 831, 832. Philadelphia v. Wards (1 Phila. 517), 536. Philadelphia v. W. U. Tel. Co. (11 Phila. 327), 445. Philadelphia y. W. U. Tel. Co. (89 Fed. Rep. 454), 406, 407. Philadelphia v. W. U. Tel. Co. (82 Fed. Rep. 797), 406. Philadelphia v. W. U. Tel. Co. (40 Fed. Rep. 615), 406, 407, 634. Philadelphia Assn. v. Wood (39 Pa. St. 73), 606. Philadelphia Co. v. Freeport (167 Pa. St. 279), 884. Philadelphia Fire Assn. v. New York (119 U. S. 110), 410. Philadelphia & Reading R. R. Co. v. Ervin (89 Pa. St. 71), 65. Phila. Steamship Co. v. Pennsylva- nia (122 tJ. S. 326), 410. Philadelphia Steam Supply Co. v. Philadelphia (41 Leg. Int. 252), 885. Philadelphia & T. E. Co.'s Case (6 Whart. 25), 882. Phillips, in re (60 N. Y. 16), 252. Phillips V. Allen (41 Pa. St. 481), 273, 768, 769. Phillips V. Atlanta (87 Ga. 62), 556. Phillips V. Atlanta (78 Ga. 773), 573, 653, 774. CXXVUl TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Phillips V. Denver (19 Colo. 179), 21, 26, 31, 71, 289, 292, 703. Phillips V. Stone Mountain (61 Ga. 386), 436. Phillipsburg v. Central Penn. Tel. & Sup. Co. (22 Wkly. Notes Gas. 572), 660. Phillips Semmer Glass Co. v. Nas- sau Show Case Co. (28 Miss. 577), 469. Pickering v. Pickering (11 N. H. 141), 206. Picket V. State (22 Ohio St. 405), 557. Pickett V. School District (25 Wis. 551), 172. Pickford v. Lynn (98 Mass. 491), 845. Pickles V. McLellan Dry Dock (38 La. Ann. 412), 671. Pickton V. Fargo (10 N. D. 469), 205. Pidgeon v. McCarthy (82 Ind. 32), 802. Pierce v. Bartrum (Cowp. 269), 31, 33, 704. Pierce v. Emery (32 N. H. 484), 879. Pierce v. Kimball (9 Me. 54), 769. Pierce v. Richardson (37 N. H. 306), 201, 216. Pieri v. Shieldsboro (42 Miss. 493), 295, 668. Piermont v. Crouch (10 Cal. 315), 327, 339. Pike V. Megoun (44 Mo. 491), 259, 474. Pillsbury v. Brown (47 Cal. 477), 486, 524, 531. Pirn V. Nicholson (6 Ohio St. 176), 225. Pimental v. San Francisco (21 Cal. 351), 4, 95, 115, 166, 168, 170. Pine V. St. Paul City R. Co. (50 Minn. 144), 751. Pine River School Dist. v. Union School Dist. (81 Mich. 339), 211. Pineville v. Burchfield (19 Ky. L. Rep. 984), 213. Pingree v. Snell (42 Me. 53), 336. Piper V. Boonville (32 Mo. App. 138), 787. Piper V. Chappell (14 Exch. 649), 282. Piper V. Pearson (2 Gray 120), 465. Piqua V. Zimmerlin (35 Ohio St. 507), 450. Pirie and Town of Dundas, In re (29 Up. Can. Q. B. 401), 310. Pitts V. District of Opelika (79 Ala. 527), 47, 249, 510, 568. Pitts V. Vicksbiirg (72 Miss. 181), 619, 773. Pittsburgh's Appeal (115 Pa. St. 4), 884. Pittsburg V. Cluney (74 Pa. St. 262), 209. Pittsburg V. Coyle (165 Pa. St. 61), 631. Pittsburg V. Craft (1 Pitts. 77), 35. Pittsburg V. Grier (22 Pa. St. 54), 676. Pittsburg V. Keech Co. (21 Pa. Su- per. Ct. 548), 444. Pittsburg V. Reynolds (48 Kan. 360), 247, 249, 251. Pittsburg V. Walter (69 Pa.. St. 365), 831. Pittsburg V. Young (3 Watts 363), 461. Pittsburgh & B. Pass. Ry. Co. v. Pittsburgh (80 Pa. St. 72), 901. Pittsburg, -C, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. V. Hays (17 Ind. App. 261), 839. Pittsburg, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Hood (94 Fed. Rep. 618), 17. Pittsburg, etc., Ry. v. Backus (154 U. S. 421), 409. I^ittsburgh, etc., R. W. Co. v. Crown Point (146 Ind. 421), 289. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co. v. Crown Point (150 Ind. 536), 168. Place v. Providence (12 R. I. 1), 121. Placerville v. Wilcox 35 Cal. 21), 21. Placke V. U. D. Ry. Co. (140 Mo. 634), 891, 892. Plaquemine v. Roth (20 La. Ann. . 261), 642. Piatt V. Harrison (6 Iowa 79), 576. Platte & D. Canal & M. Co. v. Lee (2 Colo. App. 184), 435. Platte, etc., C. & M. Co. v. Dowell (17 Colo. 376), 604. Platteville v. Bell (43 Wis. 488), 478. Platteville v. McKernan (54 Wis. 487). 479, 564, 788. TABLE OF CASES. CXXIX (The references are to pages.) Plattsburg 1. Riley (42 Mo. App. 18), 292, 299, 690. Plattsburg v. Trimble (46 Mo. App. 459), 756, 787, 792. Player v. Archer (2 Sid. 121), 273. Plimpton V. Somerset (33 Vt. 283), 366, 516. Plumey v. Massachusetts (155 U. S. 461), 420. Plymouth v. Pettijohn (4 Devereux 591), 33, 34, 231, 455, 552. Plymouth v. Schultheis (135 Ind. 339), 682, 687. Plymouth Borough v. Penkok (7 Kulp. 101), 573. Plymouth Tp. v. Chestnut Hill & N. R. Co. (168 Pa. St. 181), 897, 914. Pocock V. Toronto (27 Ontario Rep. 635), 222, 263. Poe V. Machine Works (24 W. Va. 517), 570, 571, 572. Poillon V. Brooklyn (101 N. Y. 132), 117. Polack V. Trustees, etc. (48 Cal. 490), 884. Poland V. Connolly (16 Ohio St. 64), 30. Pollard, ex parte (40 Ala. 77), 452. Pollasky v. Schmid (128 Mich. 699), 170. Polinsky v. People (73 N. Y. 65). 19, 143, 767. Polinsky v. People (11 Hun. 390), 793. Pollock V. San Diego (118 Cal. 593), 237, 593, 611. Pomeroy v. Lappens (9 Oreg. 363), 580, 584. Pond V. Negus (3 Mass. 230), 195. Pontiac v. Axford (49 Mich. 69), 609. Pooley V. Bufealo (122 N. Y. 592), 828. Pope V. Savannah (74 Ga. 365), 437. Poppen V. Holmes (44 111. 360), 274, 275. Popper V. Broderick (123 Cal. 456), 343. Port Clinton Borough v. Shafer (5 Pa. Dist. Ct. 583), 400. 9 Porter v. Shields (200 Pa. St. 241), 806. Porter v. Waring (69 N. Y. 250), 591. Porter v. Water Valley (70 Miss 560), 765. Port Gibson v. Moore (13 Smed. & M. 157), 347. Port Huron v. Jenkinson (77 Mich. 414), 810. Port Huron v McCall (46 Mich. 565), 77. Port Jervis v. Close (6 N. Y. Supp. 211), 551, 653. Port of Mobile v. L. & N. R. R. Co. (84 Ala. 115), 377. Portland v. Bangor (42 Me. 403), 517. Portland v. Bangor (65 Me. 120), 517. Portland v. Meyer (32 Oreg. 368), 701. Portland v. Portland Bituminous P. & I. Co. (33 Oreg. 307), 866. Portland v. Richardson (54 Me. 46), 717. Portland v. Rolfe (37 Me. 400), 482. Portland v. Schmidt (13 Oreg. 17), 332, 445. Portland v. Terwilliger (16 Oreg. 465), 696. Postal Telegraph Co. v. Adams (155 U. S. 688), 408. Postal Tel. Co. v. Baltimore (79 Md. 502), 407. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Charles- ton (153 U. S. 692), 399, 406. Postal Tel. & Cable Co. v. Nor- folk (Va. 1903, 43 S. E. Rep. 207), 399. Potter V. Collis (156 N. Y. 16). 881, 882. Pottsville & Marburger (1 Leg. Chron. 60), 482. Potwin V. Johnson (108 111. 70), 582. Powell V. Bentley & G. Furniture Co. (34 W. Va. 804), 697. Powell V. Com. (114 Pa. St. 265), 669, 763. Powell V. Pennsylvania (127 U. S. 678), 419, 420. exxx TABLE OP CASES. (The references are to pages.) Powell Y. People (47 Mich. 108), 572. Powell V. State (69 Ala. 10), 452. Powelton Avenue, In re (11 Phila. 447), 841, 842. Power V. Athens (99 N. Y. 592), 306. Powers V. Decatur (54 Ala. 214), 487. Poyer v. Des Plaines (123 111. Ill), 437, 449. Poyer v. Des Plaines (22 111. App. 576), 636, 659. Poyer v. Des Plaines (20 111. App. 30), 576. Pound V. Chippewa Co. Super- visors (43 "Wis. 63), 837. Pratt V. Litchfield (62 Conn. 112), 314, 320, 735. Prather v. People (85 111. 36), 549, 554, 637. Pratt V. Swanton (15 Vt. 147), 149. Preble v. Plortland (45 Me. 241), 196, 237. Predu V. Ellis (18 Ga. 586), 66. Prell V. McDonald (7 Kan. 426), 483, 485, 492, 493, 590. Prendergast v. Richards (2 Mo. App. 187), 213. Presbyterian Church v. New York (5 Cowen 538), 18, 130, 742. Prescott's Case (2 N. Y. City Hall Record 161), 710. Preston and Manvers (21 U. C. Q. B. 626), 160. Preston v. Cedar Rapids (95 Iowa 71), 186, 204, 595. Preston v. Finley (72 Fed. Rep. 850), 393, 404. Pretz's Appeal (35 Pa. St. 322), 737. Pi-ewltt v. M., K. & T. Ry. Co. (134 Mo. 615), 585, 744, 748. Prezinger v. Harness (114 Ind. 491), 177. Price V. Beale (5 Pa. County Ct. Rep. 491), 156. Price V. People (193 111. 114), 613. Price V. R. R. (13 Ind. 58), 165. Price V. Thompson (48 Mo. 361), 92, 708, 890. Priestly v. Watkins (62 Miss. 798), 386. Prince and City of Ottawa, in re (25 Up. Can. Q. B. 175). 298. Prince v. Crocker (166 Mass. 347), 838, 883. Prince v. Skillin (71 Me. 361), 367. Primm v. Carondelet (23 Mo. 22), 367. Prindiville v. Jackson (79 111. 337), 811, 827. Prior V. Buehler & Cooney Con- struction Co. (170 Mo. 439), 851. Pritchard v. Magoun (109 Iowa 364), 609. Pritz, ex parte (9 Iowa 30), 225. Protestant Episcopal Public School, In re (40 How. Pr. 198), 813. Prout V. Pittsfleld Fire Dist. (154 Mass. 450), 112. Providence v. Union R. R. Co. (12 R. I. 473), 329, 330, 336. Pryor, In re (55 Kan. 724), 908. Pi-uden v. Alden (23 Pick. 184), 208. Pruden v. Love (67 Ga. 190), 721. Public Ledger Co. v. Memphis (93 Tenn. 77), 262. Public School Trustee v. Taylor (30 N. J. Eq. 618), 341. Pugh V. Little Rock (35 Ark. 75), 598, 599. Pullen V. Raleigh (68 N. C. 451), 612. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Penn- sylvania (141 U. S. 18), 409. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. State (64 Tex. 274), 631. Pundman v. St. Charles County (110 Mo. 594), 876. Purdy V. Sinton (56 Cal. 133), 649. Purrington v. People (79 111. 11), 609. Pye v. Mankato (36 Minn. 373), 799. Pye v. Peterson (45 Tex. 312), 734. Q. Quartlebaiim v. State (79 Ala. 1), 617. ' Queen v. Jarvies (3 F. & F. 108), 763. Queen v. Osier (32 Up. Can. Q. B. 324), 31. Queen v. Waterhouse (26 L. T. [N. S.] 761), 710. TABLE OP CASES. CXXXl (The references ape to pages.) Qnlgley v. Aurora (50 Incl. 28), 476, 477, 562. Quimbo Appo v. People (20 N. Y. 531), 577. Quincy v. Ballance (30 111. 185), 532. Quincy v. Bull (106 111. 337), 324, 452, 625, 875, 879. Quincy v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. (92 111. 21), 11, 593, 594. Quincy v. Kennard (151 Mass. 563), 704. Quincy v. O'Brien (24 III. App. 591), 285, 731. Quincy v. Quimby (38 111. 274), 287. Quinette v. St. Louis (76 Mo. 402), 21, 338, 442. Quinn v. Cumberland County (162 Pa. St. 55), 86. Quinn v. Heisel (40 Mich. 576), 483. Quinn v. Middlesex Electric Light Co. (140 Mass. 109),, 622,' 638. Quint V. Merrill (105 Wis. 406), 219, 249, 597, 598. Quintini v. Board, etc. (64 Miss. 483), 687. Quong Woo, In re (13 Fed. Rep. 229), 613, 617, 627. Quong Woo, In re (7 Sawyer 526), 681, 773. B. Raborn v. Mish (12 Wash. 167), 233. Radereaugh v. Plain City (11 Ohio Dec. 612), 630. Rackliff V. Greenbush (93 Me. 99). 74. Rae V. Flint (51 Mich. 526), 97. Raffery v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (91 Mo. 33), 748. Ragan v. McElroy (98 Mo. 349), 90. Rahrer, In re (140- U. S. 545), 405, 418. Rahway Gas Light Co. v. Rahway (58 N. J. L. 510), 42, 452. Railroad Co. v. BUerman (105 U. S. 166), 371. Railroad v. Engle (76 111. 317), 594. Railroad Co. v. Georgia (98 U. S. 359), 879. Railroad Co. v. Husen (95 U. S. 465), 421. Railroad v. Jacksonville (67 111. 37), 687. Railroad Co. v. Maine (96 U. S. 499), 323, 380. Railroad Co. v. Marion Co. (36 Mo. 294), 197. Railroad Co. v. Peniston (18 Wall. 5), 406. R. R. Co. V. Pennsylvania (State tax on foreign-held bonds, IE Wall 300), 375. R. R. Co. V. Philadelphia (101 U. S. 528), 652. Railroad Co. v. Richmond (96 U. S. 521), 44, 324, 747. Railroad Co. v. Veazie (39 Me. 571), 322. Rains v- Oshkosh (14 Wis. 372), 582. Raker v. Maquon (9 111. App. 155), 247, 251, 252, 532, 593, 594, 598. Raleigh v. Dougherty (3 Humph. 11), 771, 785. Raleigh v. Peace (110 N. C. 32), 223, 823, 839. Raleigh v. Sorrell (1 Jones 49), 157, 768. Raley v. Umatilla County (15 Oreg. 172), 90. Ralls County v. Douglass (105 U. S. 72g), 546. Ramsey County v. Heenan (2 Minn. 330), 232. Ramsey County v. Robt. P. Lewis Co. (Minn. 1901, 86 N. W. Rep. 611), 821. Raiid V. Wilder (11 Cush. 294), 148,. 150. Randall v. Brigham (7 Wall. 523), 472. Randle v. Pac. Ry. Co. (65 Mo. 325), 747. Randolph v. Bayue (44 Cal. 366), 170. Randolph v. Wood (49 N. J. L. 85), 311. Ranken v. McCallum (25 Tex. Civ. App. 83), 348. Rankin v. Henderson (9 Ky. Law Rep. 861), 633. c.XXiU TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Rankin v. Jauman (Idaho 1895, 39 Pac. Rep. 1111), 145. Ranney v. Bader (67 Mo. 476), 430. Ransom v. Boal (29 Iowa 68), 92. Rash V. Farley (12 Ky. Law Rep. 913), 405. Rathbun v. Acker (18 Barb. 393), 252, 811. Rau V. Little Rock (34 Ark. 393), 451. Ravenna v. Pennsylvania Co. (45 Ohio St. 118), 743, 750. Rawson v. Chicago (185 111. 87), 836, 851. Raymond v. Cleveland (42 Ohio St. 522), 346. Raymond v. Fish (51 Conn. 80), 697. Raynor v. Nugent (1 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 271), 697. Read v. -Atlantic City (49 N. J. L. 558, 440. Read v. Cambridge (126 Mass. 427), 708. Read v. Camden (54 N. J. L. 347), 440, 859. Read v. Mississippi (69 Ark. 365). 388. Reading v. Bitting (167 Pa. St. 21), 642. Reading v. Consumers Gas. Co. (41 Leg. Int. 428), 885. Reading v. Heppleman (61 Pa. St. 233), 341. Reading v. O'Reilly (1 Woodw. Dec. 408), 573. •Reading v. O'Reilly (169 Pa St. 366), 848. Reading v. Savage (120 Pa. St. 198), 868. Reading City v. Reiner (167 Pa. St. 41), 456. Reagan v. Farmers' L. & Trust Co. (154 U. S. 362), 910. Reardon v. St. Louis County (36 Mo. 555), 876. Rector v. State (6 Ark. 187), 466, 523. Rector, etc., of Trinity Church v. Higgins (4 Robertson 1), 223. Red v. Augusta (25 Ga. 386), 193. Redden v. Covington (29 Ind. 118), 466, 546. Reddick v. Amelin (1 Mo. 5), 414, 659. Redell v. Moores (63 Neb. 219), 805. Redersheimer v. Flower (52 La. Ann. 2089), 854. Redlands L. & C. Domestic Water Co. V. Redlands (121 Cal. 312), 907. Red Star Steamship Co. v. Jersey City (45 N. J. L. 246), 313, 907. Red Wing y. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (72 Minn. 240), 750. Redwood City v. Grimmenstein (68 Cal. 512), 368. R6ed V. Conway (20 Mo. 22), 474. Reed v. Erie (79 Pa. St. 346), 873. Reed v. Lancaster (152 Mass. 500), 145. Reed v. Louisville (22 Ky. Law Rep. 1636), 127, 250. Reed v. Orleans (1 Ind. App. 25), 9. Reedy v. St. Louis Brewing Asso- ciation (161 Mo. 523), 64. Reeves v. State (96 Ala. 33), 527. Regina v. Aberdeen Canal Co. (14 Ad. & E. 854), 174. Reg. V. Charlesworth (16 B. Q. B. 1012), 876. Reg. V. Flory (17 Ontario Rep. 715), 310. Reg. V. Gravelle (10 Ontario Rep. 735), 290. Reg. V. Howard (4 Ont. Rep. 377), 737. Reg. V. Huntingdon (4 Q. B. Div. 522), 252. Reg. V. Jim Sing (4 British Co- lumbia Rep. 338), 450.. Reg. V. Johnson (38 Up. Can. Q. B. 549), 310. Reg. v. Justin (24 Ont. Rep. 327), 727. Reg. v. Listers (3 Jur. 572), 740. Reg. V. Longton Gas Co. (2 El. & El. 651), 876. TABLE OF CASES. CXXXlll (The references are to pages.) Reg. V. Longton Gas Co. (29 L. J. Mag. Cas. 118), 887. Reg. V. Lundie (8 Jur. N. S. 640), 450. Regina v. Mines (25 Ont. Rep. 577), 555. Reg. V. Paramore (10 Ad. & El. 286), 140. Reg. V. Parker (59 J. P. 793), 727. Regina v. Parnell (14 Cox Cr. Cas. 508), 524. Reg. V. Petersky (4 British Co- lumbia Rep. 384), 298. Reg. V. Pipe (1 Ont. Rep. 43), 312, 543, 681. Reg. V. Plumber (30 Up. Can. Q. B. 41), 727. Reg. V. Robinson (17 Q. B. Eng. Law Rep. 46), 451. Reg. V. Stevenson (3 P. & F. 106), 762. Regina v. Williams (1 Salk 384), 540. Rehberg v. New York (99 N. Y. 652), 207. Reich V. State (53 Ga. 73), 466, 784. Reid V. Wood (102 Pa. St. 312), 573. Reiff V. Conner (10 Ark. 241), 195. Reighard v. Flinn (189 Pa. St. 355), 93, 431. Reilly, Ex parte (85 Cal. 632), 462. Reilly v. Racine (51 Wis. 526), 239. Reinken v. Fuehring (130 Ind. 382), 826. Reis V. GrafE (51 Cal. 86), 71. Remington v. Harrison County Court (12 Bush. 148), 113. Repaying Fulton Street, In re (29 How. Pr. 429). 900. Respublica v. Dallas (3 Yeates 300), 472. Respublica v. Duquet (2 Yeates 493), 735. Reuting v. Titusville (175 Pa. St.- 512), 808, 832. Rex V. Abingdon (1 Salk. 432), 498. Rex V. Ashwell (12 East. 22), 319. Rex V. Atkyns (3 Mod. 23), 156. Rex V. Barlow (2 Salkeld 609) 126. Rex V. Bellringer (4 Term Rep. 810), 146, 156, 164, 175. Rex V. Bird (13 East. 367), 319. Rex V. Bower (1 Barn & Cress 492), 156, 164. Rex V. Bumstead (2 Barn & Ad. 704), 450. Rex V. Carter (Cowp. 59), 156. Rex V. Commissioner (2 Keeble 43), 561. Rex V. Coopers of Newcastle (7 Term Rep. 547), 498. Rex V. Corry (5 East. 379), 156. Rex V. Croke (Cowp. 26), 158, 275. Rex V. Dawes (4 Bur. 2279), 156. Rex V. Devonshire (1 Barn & Cress 609), 164. Rex V. Favershan (8 Term Rep. 356), 450. Rex V. Gaborian (11 East. 87), 164. Rex V. Hall (1 Q. B. 767), 525. Rex V. Harrison (3 Burrows 1322), 223, 428. Rex V. Hartford (1 Ld. Raym. 426), 155. Rex V. Head (4 Burr 2513), 158. Rex V. Headley (7 Barn & Cress 496), 164. Rex V. Hebden (Andr. 391), 156. Rex V. Hill (4 Barn. & Cress. 441), 147. Rex V. Ipswich (2 Ld. Raym. 1237), 156. Rex V. Killet (4 Burr. 2063), 559. Rex V. Liverpool (2 Burr. 723), 177, 480. Rex V. London (2 Lev. 201), 280. Rex V. Macdaniell (19 St. Tri. 746), 525. Rex V. Mashiter (6 A. & E. 153), 108. Rex V. Mitchell (10 East. 511), 140. Rex V. Monday (Cowp. 539), 156, 164. Rex V. Moreley (2 Burr. 1040), 561. Rex V. Morris (4 East. 26), 146. Rex V. Neil (2 Car. & P. 483), 699. Rex V. Newdigate (Comb. 10), 269. Rex V. Powell (2 Barn & Adol. 75), 525. Rex V. Selway (9 B. & C. 424), 108. Rex V. Smart (4 Burr. 2243), 156. Rex V. Spencer (3 Burr. 1839), 21. cxxxiv TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Rex V. Sturgeous (2 Burr. 892), 304. Rex V. Taylor (2 Strange 1167), 741. Rex V. Thornton (4 East. 308), 156. Rex V. Trew (2 Barnard 370), 156. Rex V. Turner (5 M. & Sel. 206), 543. Rex V. University of Cambridge (1 Str. 567), 480. Rex V. Varlo (Cowp. 250), 156, 164, 175. Rex V. Vipont (2 Burr. 1163), 559. Rex V. Walker (L. R. 10 Q. B. 355), 525. Rex V. Wells (4 Bowling 562), 464. Rex. V. Westwood (4 Barn. & Cress. 799), 158. Rex V. Williams (1 Burr. 402), 155. Rex V. Woodfall (5 Burr. 2667), 538. Rex. V. York (5 Term Rep. 72), 156. Reymann Brewing Co. v. Brister , (179 U. S. 445), 406. Reynolds, Ex parte (87 Ala. 138), 280. Reynolds, In re (21 N. Y. Supp. 592), 806. Reynolds v. Baldwin (1 La. Ann. 162), 163, 444. Reynolds v. Harris (27 Weekly Law Bui. 229), 15, 48. Reynolds v. Hindman (32 Iowa 146), 603. Reynolds v. New Salem (6 Mete. 340), 148, 150. Reynolds v. Schweinefus (27 Ohio St. 311), 836. Reynolds v. Schultz (34 How. Pr. 147), 698. Reynolds v. U. S. (98 U. S. 145), 518. Reynolds v. Waterville (92 Me. 292), 74. Reynolds' Heirs v. Stark County Commrs. (5 Ohio 204), 91. Rhines v. Clark (51 Pa. St. 96), 383, 516. Rhodes v. Dunbar (57 Pa. St. 274), 688, 740. Rhodes v. Iowa (170 U. S. 412), 406, 412. Rice V. Detroit, Y. & A. A. Ry. (122 Mich. 677), 912. Rice V. Foster (4 Harr. 479), 319! Rice V. Jefferson (50 Mo. App. 464), 692. Rice V. State (3 Kan. 141), 285, 568, 783, 793. Rice V. Watts (71 Ala. 593), 469. Rich, In re (10 Kan. App. 280), 464, 525, 563. Rich V. Chicago (152 111. 18), 808, 852. Rich V. Chicago (59 111. 286). 168, 187, 202. Rich V. Flanders (39 N. H. 304), 383. Rich V. Naperville (42 111. App. 222), 729. Richards v. Clarksburg (30 W. Va. 491), 75, 142. Richardson v. Danvers (176 Mass. 413), 727. Richardson v. Heydenfeldt (46 Cal. 68), 808. Richmond v. Dudley (129 Ind. 112), 294, 681, 740. Richmond v. Henrico County (83 Va. 204), 89, 694. Richmond v. Long (17 Gratt. 375), 674. Richmond v. McGirr (78 Ind. 192), 71, 111. Richmond v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. (85 Fed. 19), 322, 325. Richmond & A. R. R. Co. v. Lynchburg (81 Va. 473), 823. Richmond & Danville Ry. Co. v. Reidsville (101 N. C. 404), 650. Richmond Mayoralty Case (19 Gratt. 673), 463. Richmond, etc.. Railroad v. Rich- mond (96 U. S. 521), 313. Richter v. Harper (95 Mich. 221), 248, 251, 585. Rickcords v. Hammond (67 Fed. Rep. 380), 853. Ricketts v. Hyde Park (85 111. 110), 827, 843. Ridenbaugh, In re (Idaho, 1897, 49 Pac. Rep. 12), 23. Ridenour v. Saffin (1 Handy. 464), 823. Rideout v. Dunstable (1 Allen 232), 151. TABLE OP CASES. CXXXV {The references are to pages.) Ridge Ave. Ry. Co. v. Philadelphia (124 Pa. St. 219), 900. Rider v. Clark (132 Gal. 382), 451. Ridgway v. Hinton (25 W. Va. 554), 570, 574. Ridgway v. West (60 Ind. 371), 124, 273. Ridler v. Seaboard & R. R, Co. (118 N. C. 996), 887. Rienken v. Fuehring (130 Ind. 382), 823. Rieser v. Parker (27 Misc. 205), 469. Riley v. K. C. (31 Mo. App. 439), 9. Riley v. Rochester (9 N. Y. 64), 89. Riley v. Trenton (51 N. J. L. 498), 133, 649. Riley v. The W. St. L. & P. Ry. Co. (18 Mo. App. 385), 585. Rio Grande R. Co. v. Brownsville (45 Tex. 88), 719. Ripley County Commrs. v. Ward (69 Ind. 441), 114. Ritchie v. Boynton (114 Mass. 431), 768. Ritchie v. People (155 111. 98), 777, 778. Ritchie v. South Topeka (38 Kan. 368), 347. Ritteuhouse's Estate (140 Pla. St. 172), 145. Ritter v. Kunkle (39 N. J. L. 259), 572. Ritterskamp v. Stifel (59 Mo. App. 510), 6, 80, 827, 842. River Rendering Co. v. Behr (77 Mo. 91), 353, 358, 689, 705. Rivers v. Augusta (65 Ga. 376), 676. Roach, Ex parte (104 Cal. 272), 645. Roach V. Suiter (54 Ga. 458), 574. Road in Borough of Easton, In re (3 Rawle 195), 803. Roanoke Gas Co. v. Roanoke (88 Va. 810), 129, 817. Robb V. Indianapolis (38 Ind. 49), 36, 752. Roberson v. Lambertville (38 N. J. L. 69), 646. Robert v. Coco (25 La. Ann. 199), 383. Roberts, In re (89 N. Y. 618), 807. Roberts v. Cincinnati (5 Ohio Dec. 361), 676. Roberts v. Formhalls (46 111. 66), 482, 568. Roberts v. Louisville (92 Ky. 95), 263. Roberts v. Paducah (95 Fed. Rep. 62), 6, 234. Roberts v. Ogle (30 111. 459), 26, 551, 670, 689, 731. Robertson v. Breedlove (61 Tex. 316), 111. Robertson v. Lambertville (38 N. J. L. 69), 497, 501. Robertson v. Omaha (55 Neb. 718), 865. Robertson v. W. St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. (84 Mo. 119), 585, 602, 745. Robbins v. People (95 111. 175), 285, 792, 794. Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District (120 U. S. 489), 392, 395, 396, 400. Robinson, ex parte (12 Nev. 263), 629. Robinson, ex parte (30 Tex. App. 493), 686. Robinson v. Baltimore (93 Md. 208), 319, 367. Robinson v. Benton County (49 Ark. 49), 469. Robinson v. Dodge (18 Johns. 351), 611. Robinson v. Greenville (42 Ohio St. 625), 676. Robinson v. Magee (9 Cal. 21), 386. Robinson v. Franklin (1 Humph. 156), 3, 23. Robinson v. Walker (45 Mo. 117), 565. Robison v. Miner & Hoag (68 Mich. 549), 649. Robison v. State (38 Ark. 641), 540. Roby V. Chicago (64 111. 447), 548. Roche V. Jersey City (40 N. J. L. 257), 327, 349. Rochester v. Collins (12 Barb. 559), 687, 707. Rochester v. Rood (Hill & D. Supp. 146), 763. CXXXVl TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Rochester v. Simpson (134 N. Y. 414), 537, 708. Rochester v. Upman (19 Minn. 108), 496, 618. Rochester v. West (164 N. Y. 510), 726. Rochester White Lead Co. v. Ro- chester (3 N. Y. 463), 260. Rock Creek Tp. v. Codding (42 Kan. 649), 211. Rockford v. Hilderbrand (61 III. 155), 20. Rockford City Ry. Co. v. Mat- thews (50 111. App. 267), 580. Rockland Water Co. v. Rockland 83 Me. 267), 817. Rockville v. Mjerchant (60 Mo. App. 365), 185, 189, 203, 450, 597, 763, 764. Roderick v. Whitson (51 Hun. 620), 17, 628, 729, 770. Rodgers v. Kent Circuit Judge (115 Mich. 441), 403. Rodgers v. McCoy (6 Dak. 238), 402. Rodgers v. People (9 Colo. 450), 752. Rogers, ex parte (7 Cowen 526), 176. Rogers v. Barker (31 Barb. 447), 688, 694, 705. Rogers v. Jones (1 Wend. 237), 345, 356, 450, 787. Rogers v. Milwaukee (13 Wis. 610), 811. Rogers v. People (9 Colo. 450), 343. Rogers v. St. Paul (22 Minn. 494), 797, 854. Rogers v. Slonaker (32 Kan. 191), 175. Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus (180 U. S. 624), 318, 322, 324, 381, 445, 624, 905. Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fer- gus (178 111. 571), 906, 909. Rohland v. St. Louis (89 Mo. 180), 464. Rohr V. Gray (80 Md. 274), 621. Rohtbacher v. Jackson (51 Miss. 735), 648. Rolfs, In re (30 Kan. 758), 525, 575, 704. Rollins, ex parte (80 Va. 314), 575. Rolph V. Fargo (7 N. D. 640), 822. Rome y. Cabot (28 Ga. 50), 98, 798. Rome V. McWilliams (52 Ga. 251), 611, 629. Romero v. Chapman (2 Mich. 179), 487. Re Tp. of Rommey and Tp. of Mersea (11 Ontario App. Rep. 712), 55. Ronan v. People (193 111. 631), 600. Roodhouse v. Johnson (57 111. App. 73), 47. Root V. Erdelmeyer (37 Ind. 225), 609. Root V. Shields (Woolw. 340), 87. Roper V. Laurinburg (90 N. C. 427), 114. Rose V. Bstud'ille (39 Cal. 270), 386. Rose V. Hardie (98 N. C. 44), 34, 276, 551, 731. Rose V. St. Charles (49 Mo. 509), 472. Rosebaugh v. Saffin (10 Ohio 31), 274, 275. Rosenbaum v. Newborn (118 N. C. 83), 438, 630, 694, 773. Rosenblatt, ex parte (19 Nev. 439), 400. Rosenbloom v. State (Neb. 1902, 89 N. W. Rep. 1053), 630. Rosenheim, ex parte (83 Cal. 388), 277. Ross y. Madison (1 Ind. 281), 212. Ross V. Stackhouse (114 Ind. 200), 194, 822. Ross . V. United Counties of York and Peeland, Town of Belleville (30 Up. Can. Q. B. 81), 450. Ross V. Wimberly (60 Miss. 345), 347. Rost V. New Orleans (15 La. 129), 274. Rotenberry v. Supervisors (67 Miss. 470), 120. Roth V. State ex rel (158 Ind. 242), 355. Rothrock v. School District (133 Pa. St. 487), 9. Rothchild v. Darien (69 Ga. 503), 24, 759, 788. Roulo V. Valcour (58 N. H. 347), 596. TABLE OP CASES. CXXXVll (The references are to pages.) Rounds V. Alee (116 Iowa 345), 656. Rounds V. Mumford (2 R. I. 154), 448, 808. Roundtree v. Galveston (42 Tex. 612), 823. Roush V. Momson (47 Ind. 414), 390. Rowland v. Greencastle (157 Ind. 591), 593, 594, 757. Rowlett V. Shepherd (4 La. 86), 383. Rowzee v. Pierce (75 Miss. 846), 92. Roxbury v. Boston & Providence Ry. (6 Gush. 424), 317. Royall V. Virginia (116 U. S. 572), 386. Rozelle, In re (57 Fed. Rep. 155), 400. Rubey v. Shain (54 Mo. 207), 430. Rude V. St. Louis (93 Mo. 408), 891. Rudolph, In re (6 Sawyer 295), 402. Rudolph V. New Orleans (11 La. Ann. 242), 675, 693. Ruell V. Alpena (108 Mich. 290), 337. Ruggles V. Collier (43 Mo. 353), 25, 66, 115, 133, 809, 810. Ruggles V. Illinois (108 U. S. 526), 909. Ruggles V. People (91 111. 256), 909. Rumford School District v. Wood 13 Mass. 193), 75. Rumsey Mfg. Co. v. Schell (21 Mo. App. 175), 248. Rund V. Fowler (142 Ind. 214), 289, 701. Rundle v. Baltimore (18 Md. 356), 562. Runyon v. Bordine (14 N. J. L. 472), 717. Ruohs V. Athens (91 Tenn. 20), 547. Ruschberg v. Southern Electric R. Co. (161 Mo. 70), 81, 331, 746. Rushville v. Rushville Natural Gas Co. (132 Ind. 575), 50, 101, 435, 897, 898, 908. Rushville Gas C^.. v. Rushy^ille (121 Ind. 206), 163, 167, 168. Russel V. Cage (66 Tex. 428), 128. Russel V. Columbia (74 Mo. 480), 63. Russel V. Filmore (15 Vt. 130), 774. Russel V. Hamilton (3 111. 56), 472. Russel V. Providence (7 R. I. 566), 104. Russel v. Willington (157 Mass. 100), 176. Russelville v. White (41 Ark. 485), 616. Ruth, In re (32 Iowa 250), 310. Ruth V. Abingdon (80 111. 418), 534. Rutgers' College A. A. v. New Brunswick (55 N. J. L. 279), 249. Rutherford v. Hamilton (97 Mo. 543), 122, 179, 201, 595, 859. Rutherford v. Swink (96 Tenn. 564), 332, 334. Rutherford v. Swink (90 Tenn. 152), 596. Rutherford v. Taylor (38 Mo. 315), 91, 708, 890. Ruthven, ex parte (17 Mo. 541). 575. Rutland Electric Light Co. v. Marble City Electric Light Co. (65 Vt. 377), 723. Ryan v. Lynch (68 111. 160), 186, 202, 232. Ryan v. Thompson (6 Jones & S, 133), 60. Ryce V. Osage (88 Iowa 558), 50, 337. Ryder Estate v. Alton (175 111. 94), 214, 853, 857. Ryers, In re (72 N. Y. 1), 174, 682. S. Sabatier v. Creditors (6 Mart. N. S. 585), 372. Sackett, In re (74 N. Y. 95), 827. Sackett v. State (74 Ind. 486), 180. Saco V. Wentworth (37 Me. 165), 527. Sacramento v. Bird (15 Cal. 294), 328. Sacramento v. California Stage Co. (12 Cal. 134), 611, 613, TABLE OF CASES. (Tile references are to pages.) Sacramento v. Crocker (16 Cal. 119), 611, 633. Sacramento v. Dillman (102 Cal. 107), 249. Sacramento v. Steamer New World (4 Cal. 41), 38. Safety Insulated W. & C. Co. v. Baltimore (25 U. S. App. 166), 377. Safford v. Detroit Board of Health (110 Mich. 81), 693. Sage V. Dillard (15 B. Mon. 340), 322. Saginaw v. Circuit Judge (106 Mich. 32), 630. Saginaw Gas Light Co. v. Saginaw (28 Fed. Rep. 529), 324, 379. St.- Charles v. Eisner (155 Mo. 671), 83, 769. St. Charles v. Hackman (133 Mo. 634), 274, 622, 637,' 787. St. Charles v. Meyer (58 Mo. 86) 428, 453, 770, 792. St. Charles v. Nolle (51 Mo. 122), 35, 353, 359, 623, 643. St. Charles v. O'Mailey (18 111. 407), 206, 213, 214, 532, 556, 598. St. Clair County Turnpike Co. v. 111. (96 U. S. 63), 912. St. Cloud V. Water, Light & P. Co. (Minn. 1903, 92 N. W. Rep. 1112), 915. San Joaquin & K. R. Co. v. Stan- islaus County (113 Fed. Rep. 930), 381. St. John V. East St. Louis (136 111. 207), 326. St. Johns V. MoFarlan (33 Mich. 72), 438. St. Johns V. New York (3 Bosw. 483), 762. St. Johnsbury v. Thompson (59 Vt. 300), 17, 72, 343, 344, 345, 540, 615. San Jose v. S. J. & S. C. Ry. Co. (53 Cal. 475), 611, 615, 742. San Jose Imp. Co. v. Auzerias (106 Cal. 498), 838. St. .Joseph V. Dye (72 Mo. App. 214), 506, 214. St. Joseph V. Ernst (95 Mo. 360), 660. St. Joseph to use of Gibson v. Parrell (106 Mo. 437), 122, 818, 825. St. Joseph V. Harris (59 Mo. App. 122), 364, 365, 500, 506, 531, 758. St. Joseph V. Landis (54 Mo. App. 315), 853, 855, 871. St. .Joseph V. Levin (128 Mo. 588), 477, 490, 491, 492, 503, 654, 775. St. Joseph V. Lung (93 Mo. App. 626), 613, 654. St. Joseph V. Owen (110 Mo. 445), 809, 824, 852, 855. St. Joseph V. Porter (29 Mo. App. 605), 657. St. Joseph V. Vesper (59 Mo. App. 459), 25, 787. St. Joseph V. Wilshire (47 Mo. App. 125), 132, 808, 809. St. Joseph & Denver City R. R. Co. V. Buchanai) County (39 Mo. 485), 127. St. Joseph Tp. V. Rogers (16 Wall. 644), 164, 266. St. Louis V. Alexander (23 Mo. 483), 49, 245, 329, 336, 346. St. Louis V. Allen (53 Mo. 44), 389. St. Louis V. Allen (13 Mo. 400), 67. St. Louis V. Babcock (156 Mo. 148), 505, 772, 775. St. Louis V. Bell Telephone Co. (96 Mo. 623), 425, 885, 906. St. Louis V. Bentz (11 Mo. 61), 278, 345, 346, 672, 772, 787, 793. St. Louis V. Bircher (76 Mo. 431), 607, 611, 654. St. Louis V. Boatmen's Ins. & Trust Co. (47 Mo. 150), 618, 620, 622, 660. St. Louis V. Boffinger (19 Mo. 13), 18, 117, 422, 693. St. Louis V. Bowler (94 Mo. 630), 39, 613, 614, 630, 658. St. Louis Brewing Assn. v. St. Louis (140 Mo. 419), 907. St. Louis V. Cafferata (24 Mo. 94), 25, 278, 345, 346, 672, 759, 787, 792. St. Louis V. Clemens (52 Mo 133), 49, 133, 809. St. Louis V. Clemens (43 Mo. 395), 49, 66, 115, 808. St. Louis V. Clemens (36 Mo. 467), 832. TABLE OF CASES. CXXXLX (The references are to pages.) St. Louis V. Close (8 Mo. App. 599), 363. St. Louis V. Coffee (76 Mo. App. 318), 476, 563. St. Louis V. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. (107 Mo. 92), 63, 587. St. Louis V. Consolidated Coal Co. (158 Mo. 342), 414. St. Louis V. Consolidated Coal Co. (113 Mo. 83), 39, 630. St. Louis V. Davidsoii (102 Mo. 149), 560. St. Louis V. Dorr (145 Mo. 466), 21, 68, 342, 447, 739, 782, 804, 815. St. Louis V. Ernst (95 Mo. 360), 651. St. Louis V. Fischer (167 Mo. 654), 670, 703. St. Louis V. Fitz (53 Mo. 582), 363, 365, 506. St. Louis V. Flynn (128 Mo. 413),^ 481, 693. St. Louis V. Foster (52 Mo. 513), 17, 21, 185, 186, 210, 232, 245, 336, 597. St. Louis V. Frein (9 Mo. App. 590), 490, 698. St. Louis V. Freivogal (95 Mo. 533), 656, 763. St. Louis V. Gleason (89 Mo. 67), 581. St. Louis V. Gleason (15 Mo. App. 25), 808, 859. St. Louis V. Green (7 Mo. App. 468), 225, 299, 620. St. Louis V. Green (6 Mo. App. 591), 644. St. Louis V. Green (70 Mo. 562), 274, 639, 644, 651. St. Louis V. Goebel (32 Mo. 295), 447. St. Louis V. Griswold (58 Mo. 175), 299, 690. St. Louis V. Grone (46 Mo. 574), 643. St. Louis V. Gurno (12 Mo. 414), 675. St. Louis V. Hardy (35 Mo. 261), 588. St. Louis V. Heitzberg P. & P. Co. (141 Mo. 375), 25, 294, 687, 689, 709. St. Louis V. Herthel (88 Mo. 128), 71, 442, 448, 614, 654. St. Louis V. Hill (116 Mo. 527), 815. St. Louis V. Hoblitzelle (85 Mo. 64), 340. St. Louis V. Howard (119 Mo. 41), 49, 135, 535, 700, 701, 703. St. Louis V. Independent Ins. Co. (47 Mo. 146), 329, 660. St. Louis V. Jackson (25 Mo. 37), 763, 665. St. Louis V. Juppier (16 Mo. App. 557), 827. St. Louis V. Kaime (2 Mo. App. 66), 443, 457. St. Louis to use of Duff y. Karr (85 Mo. App. 608), 561. St. Louis V. Knox (74 Mo. 79), 476, 491, 505, 508, 794. St. Louis V. Knox (6 Mo. App. 247), 654, 656. St. Louis V. Krentz (12 Mo. App. 591), 535, 700. St. Louis V. Lang (131 Mo. 412), 582. St. Louis V. Lauglilin (49 Mo. 559), 49, 81, 445. 448, 64L St. Louis V. Lee (8 Mo. App. 599), 363, 507, 787. St. Louis V. Life Assn. of Am (53 Mo. 466), 329, 447, 660. St. Louis V. McCann (157 Mo. 301), 650. St. Louis V. McCoy (18 Mo. 238), 422, 694. St. Louis V. Mfrs. Saving Bank (49 Mo. 574), 18. St. Louis V. Marchel (99 Mo. 475), 564. St. Louis V. Melville (3 Mo. App. 597), 493, 751. 753. St. Louis V. Meyrose Lamp Co. (139 Mo. 560), 434, 627, 637, 654, 740. St. Louis V. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (114 Mo. 13), 92. St. Louis V. Deters (36 Mo. 456), 832, 836, 853. St. Louis V. Pahl (114 Mo. 32), 464. St. Louis V. Priesmeyer (12 Mo. App, 592), 768. St. Louis V. Regina Flour Milling Co. (141 Mo. 389), 709. St. Louis V. Robinson (135 Mo. 460), 706. cxl TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) St. Louis V. Roche (128 Mo. 541), 363, 582. St. Louis V. Rotliscliild (3 Mo. App. 563), 732. St. Louis V. Russell (116 Mo. 248), 49, 133, 134, 313, 627, 700, 713. St. Louis V. Russell (9 Mo. 507), 66, 67. St. Louis V. St. Louis Gas Light Co. (70 Mo. 69), 95. St. Louis V. St. Louis Gas Light Co. (5 Mo. App. 484), 93. St. Louis V. St. Louis R. R. Co. (89 Mo. 44), 304, 450, 742, 751. St. Louis V. St. Louis R. R. Co. (50 Mo. 94), 848. St. Louis V. St. Louis R. Co. (14 Mo. App. 221), 452. St. Louis V. St. Louis Ry. Co. (12 Mo. App. 591), 583. St. Louis V. St. Louis & N. 0. Trans Co. (84 Mo. 156), 39, 416. St. Louis V. Sanguinet (49 Mo. 581), 331. St. Louis V. Schefe (167 Mo. 666), 703. St. Louis V. Schnuckelberg (7 Mo. App. 536), 685, 687, 692. St. Louis V. Schoenbusch (95 Mo. 618), 87, 111, 278, 477, 672, 771, 787, 792. St. Louis V. Schulenburg & Boeck- ler Lumber Co. (13 Mo. App., 56), 38, 39, 417. St. Louis V. Sealy (8 Mo. App., 599), 363. St. Louis V. Shields (62 Mo. 247), 623. St. Louis V. Shields (52 Mo. 351), 67, 607. St. Louis V. Smith (10 Mo. 438), 477, 490, 491. St, Louis V. Smith (2 Mo. 113), 646. St. Louis V. Spiegel (90 Mo. 587), 39, 634. St. Louis V. Spiegel (75 Mo. 145), 618, 634. St. Louis V. Spiegel (8 Mo. App., 478), 300, 690. St. Louis V. Steele (12 Mo. App., 570), 688, 692. St. Louis V. Stern (3 Mo. App., 48), 185, 513, 688, 691, 692, 693, 704. St. Louis V. SLernberg (69 Mo. 289), 274, 277, 477, 682, 639, 640, 641, 655, 657. St. Louis V. Stoddard (15 Mo. App., 173), 584. 588. St. Louis V. Sullivan (8 Mo. App., 455), 755. St. Louis V. Tamm Bros. Glue Co. (139 Mo. 572), 654. St. Louis V. The R. J. Gunning -Co. (138 Mo. 374), 565. St. Louis V. Tiefel (42 Mo. 578), 226, 466. St. Louis V. Vert (84 Mo. 204), 360, 477, 506, 507, 672, 771, 78'7. St. Louis V. Waterloo-Carondelet Turnpike Co. (14 Mo. App., 216), 414, 659. St. Louis V. Weber (44 Mo. 547), 72, 119, 300, 311, 425, 529, 690, 763. St. Louis V. Weitzel (130 Mo. 600), 229, 331, 448, 476, 491, 492, 543, 637, 638, 642, 643, 644, 655, 787, 794. St. Louis V Wennecker (145 Mp. 230), 430. St. Louis V. W. U. Tel. Co. (149 U. S. 465), 892. St. Louis V. Western Union Tele- graph Co. (148 U. S. 92), 29, 316, 406, 407. St. Louis V. Western Union Tel. Co. (39 Fed. Rep. 59), 614. St. Louis V. White (99 Mo. 477), 564. St. Louis V. Wiley (8 Mo. App., 597), 754. St. Louis V. Withaus (90 TWo. 646), 177. St. Louis V. Woodruff (71 Mo. 92), 642. St. Louis Agr. and Mech. Assn. v. Delano (108 Mo. 217), 445. St. Louis Brewing Association v. St. Louis (140 Mo. 419), 110. St. Louis Gas Light Co. v. St. Louis (84 Mo. 202), 207. St. Louis Gas Light Co. v. St. Louis (46 Mo. 121), 36, 349. St. Louis & Meramec R. R. v. Kirkwood (159 Mo. 239), 886, 897. St. Louis Quarry &. Cent. Co. v. Frost (90 Mo. App., 677), 302, 863. 865. TABLE OF CASES. cxli (Tlie references are to pages.) St. Louis Quarry & C. Co. v. Van Versen t81 Mo. App., 519), 302, 863. St. Louis, etc. R. R. v. Belleville (122 111. 376), 894. St. Louis & S. F. Ry Co. v. Gill (156 U. S. 649), 131, 742, 910, 911. St. Louis & T. H. R. R. Co. v. Eggmann (161 111. 155), 50. St. Louis T. Ry. Co. v. St. L. M. B. Ry Co. (Ill Mo. 606), 888. St. Martinsville v. Steamer "Mary Lewis" (32 La. Ann., 1293), 38, 799. St. Lukes' Ch. v. i^Iathews (4 Des. 578), 295. St. Paul V. Briggs (85 Minn. 290), 79, 612, 657. St. Paul V. Byrnes (38 Minn. 176), 701. St, Paul V. Colter (12 Minn 41), 25, 250. 290, 635, 656, 671, 764. St. Paul V. Dow (37 Minn. 20), 616. St. Paul V. Gilflllan (36 Minn. 298), 687, 710. St. Paul V. Johnson (69 Minn. 184), 710. St. Paul V. Laidler (2 Minn. 190), 21, 25, 76, 302, 589, 682, 765. St. Paul V. Lytle (69 Minn. 1), 654, 774, 775. St. Paul V. Smith (27 Minn. 364), 39, 296, 714. St. Paul V. Smith (25 Minn. 372), 538, 699. St. Paul V. Stultz (33 Minn. 233), 658. St. Paul V. Traeger (25 Minn. 248), 79, 616, 617, 698, 750. St. Peters v. Bauer (19 Minn. 327), 482, 483, 517, 562, 568, 579. St. Peters Episcopal Ch. v. Wash- ington (109 N. C. 21), 696. St. Vincent Female Orphan Asy- lum V. Troy (76 N. Y. 108), 814. Salem v. Eastern R. R. Co. (98 Mass. 431), 683. Salem v. Maynes (123 Mass. 372), 735, 736. Salena v. Neosho (127 Mo. 627), 98, 160, 240, 242, 309. Salina v. Walt (56 Kan. 283), 564. Saline v. Seitz (16 Kan. 143), 24. Salisbury v. Herchenroder (106 Mass. 458), 58. Salisbury v. Patterson (24 Mo. App., 169), 579. Salisbury v. Pome (51 N. C. 134), 693. Salmon v. Haynes (50 N. J. L. 97), 196, 197. Salt Lake City v. Wagner (2 Utah 400), 42, 647. Salvin v. North Brancepeth Coal Co. (L. R. 9 Ch. App. 705), 685. Samis v. King (40 Conn. 298), 206, 215, 216, 246. Sam Kee, In re (31 Fed. Rep., 680), 353. Samuiels v. Nashville (3 Sneed 298), 713, 717. San Antonio v. Mackey (14 Tex. Civ. App., 210), 680. San Antonio v. Micklejohn (89 Tex. 79), 6, 367. Sanborn v. Machias Port (53 Me. 82), 105. Sanborn v. School District (12 Minn. 17), 208. Sanders v. Southern Elec Ry Co. (147 Mo. 411), 20, 61, 586, 601, 671, 732, 748, 749, 750. San Diego v. San Diego & L. A. R. Co. (44 Cal. 106) 95, 173. San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City (174 U. S. 739), 907, 911. San Diego Water Co. v. Flume Co. (108 Cal. 549), 308. San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego (118 Cal. 556). 906. Sands v. Edmunds (116 U. S. 585), 386. Sands v. Manistee Improvement Co. (123 U. S. 288), 414. Sands v. Richmond (31 Gratt. 571), 810, 823. San Francisco v. Beideman (17 Cal. 443), 92. San Francisco v. Buckman (111 Cal 25), 219, 248, 719. San Francisco v. Certain Real Es- tate (42 Cal. 513), 866. San Francisco v. Hazen (5 Cal. 169), 166. 170. San Francisco v. Insurance Co. (74 Cal. 113), 661. TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) San Francisco v. Itsell (80 Cal. 57), 92. San Francisco v. Spring Valley Waterworks (48 Cal. 493), 886. San Francisco Gas Co. v. San Francisco (6 Cal. 190), 12, 237. San Francisco Pioneer Woolen Factory v. Bickwedel (60 Cal. 166), 31. San Francisco, etc. R. R. Co. v. Oakland (43 Cal. 502), 116. Sang V. Duluth (38 Minn. 81), 834. Sanitary R. Works v. California R. Co. (94 Fed. Rep., 693), 206, 693. Sank V. Philadelphia (4 Brews. 133), 193, 256, 430, 435. Sank V. Philadelphia (8 Phila. 117), 222. San Luis Obispo v. Fitzgerald (126 Cal. 279), 17, 443. San Luis Obispo v. Pettit (87 Cal. 499), 451, 609, 610. San Luis Obispo County v. Greens- berg (120 Cal. 300), 449. San Luis Obispo Co. v. Hendricks (71 Cal. 242), 145, 153, 251. *San Mateo County v. Pac. R. R. Co. (8 Sawyer 238), 444. San Pedro v. Southern Pac. R. Co, (101 Cal. 333), 799. Sargent v. Evanston (154 111. 268). 851. Sargent v. Webster (13 Mete. 497), 164, 166. Sasser v. State (99 Ga. 54), 225. Santa Ana Water Co. v. San Buenaventura (56 Fed. Rep., 339), 906. Santa Barbara v. Eldred (95 Cal. 378), 332, Santa Barbara v. Sherman (61 Cal. 57), 486. Santa Barbara v. Stearns (51 Cal. 499), 464, 617. Santa Clara County v. So. Pac. R. R. Co. (118 U. S. 394), 354, 910. Santa Cruz v. Santa Cruz R. R. Co. (56 Cal. 143), 475. Santa Cruz Rock Pavement Co. v. Heaton (105 Cal. 162), 828, 841. Santa Rosa v. Central St. Ry. Co. (Cal. 1895, 38 Pac. Rep. 986), 590, 593. Santa Rosa City R. Co. v. Central St. R. Co. (Cal. 1895, 38 Pac. Rep. 986), 594, 896. Satterlee v. San Francisco (23 Cal. 314), 166, 170. Santo v. State (2 Iowa 165), 319, 451, 453, 757. Saunders v. Lawrence (141 Mass. 380), 8, 175. 182, 203. Savage v. Gulliver (4 Mass. 171), 574. Savannah v. Charlton (36 Ga. 460), 612, 620. Savannah v. Hartridge (8 Ga. 23), 613. Savannah v. Hines (53 Ga. 616), 640, 641. Savannah v. Hussey (21 Ga. 80), 24, 351, 785. Savannah v. Steamboat Co. (R. M. Chant. 342), 95, 348. Savannah v. Weed (96 Ga. 670), 843. Savannah v. Wilson (49 Ga. 476), 888. Savannah, etc. R. R. v. Savannah (45 Ga. 602), 882.890. Savings and Loan Society v. Mult- nomah County (169 U. S. 421), 375. Sawyer, in re (124 U. S. 200), 155. Sawyer v. M. & K. R. R. (62 N. H. 135), 194, 198. 206, 209. Sawyer v. San Francisco (50 Cal. 370), 92. Sawyer v. State Board of Health (125 Mass. 182), 699. Saxton v. Beach (50 Mo. 488) 5, 141, 236, 237, 846. Saxton V. Nimms (14 Mass. 315) 209, 214. Saxton V. Peoria (75 111. App 397), 775. Saxton V. St. Joseph (60 Mo. 153) 5, 115, 236, 237, 692, 813, 828, 845 Sayre v. Louisville Union Benevo- lent Assn (1 Duv. 143), 304. Sayre Borough v. Phillips (148 Pa 482), 97, 302, 403, 404,' 630, 765 Scammon v. Scammon (28 N. H 419), 202, 214. Schachan and County of Fron- tenac, Re (41 Up. Can. Q. B, 175), 102. TABLE OF CASES. exliii (The references Schafer v. Atlantic City (58 N. J. L. 131), 502. Schanck v. New York (69 N. Y. 444), 118. Schank v. New York (10 Hun. 124), 183. Schattner v. Kansas City (53 Mo. 162), 675. Schaul V. Charlotte (118 N. C. 733), 774. Scheftels v. Tabert (46 Wis. 439), 335. Schenectady v. Furman (61 Hun. 171), 249. Schenectady v. Union College (66 Hun. 179), 814, 865. Schenley v. Com. (36 Pa. St. 29), 213, 246, 265, 814. Schiifman v. St. Paul (Minn. 1902, 92 N. W. Rep. 503), 431. Schlereth v. Mo. Pac. Ry Co. (115 Mo. 87), 745. Schlereth v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (96 Mo. 509), 748. Schmalzried v. White (97 Tenn. 36), 327, 458, 736. Schmidt, ex parte (24 S. C. 363), 512, 570. Schmidt v. Lewis (63 N. J. Eq. 565), 339. Schmidt v. St. Louis R. R. Co. (163 Mo. 645), 749. Schmidt v. St. Louis R. R. Co. (149 Mo. 269), 746. Schmulbach v. Speidel (50 W. Va. 553), 175. Schoen v. Atlanta (97 Ga. 697), 705. Schoff V. Bloomfleld (8 Vt. 472), 113, 151. Schofield V. Hudson (56 111. App. 191), 168, 202, 205, 206. Schofield V. Tampico (98 111. App. 324), 176, 202, 204, 222, 224, 230, 232, 246, 451, 453, 598. School Dist V. Atherton (12 Met. 105), 209.' School District v. Blakeslee (13 Conn. 227), 206. Schoop V. St. Louis (117 Mo. 131), 718, 747, 876, 885, 889, 891. are to pages.) Schott V. People (89 111. 195), 441!, 552, 589, 592, 593, 594, 595. Schreiber, in re (53 How. Pr. 359), 846. Schreiber, in re (3 Abb. N. C. 68), 839. Schriber v. Langdale (66 Wis. 616), 349, 547. Schroder v. Overman (61 Ohio St. 1), 821. Schroeder v. Charleston (3 Brev. 533), 23, 285, 461, 472, 785, 787. Schroeder v. Lancaster City (15 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 467), 338. Schulenburg & B. Lumber Co. v. St. L. K. & N. W. R. R. Co. (129 Mo. 455), 888, 892. Schultes, in re (33 N. Y. App. DiV. 524), 465, 469, 470. Schumacher v. St. Louis (3 Mo. App. 297), 331. Schumaker v. Toberman (56 Cal. 508), 868. Schumm v. Seymour (24 N. J. Eq. 143), 145, 813. Schwab V. Madison (49 Ind. 329), 576. Schwartz v. Oshkosh (55 Wis. 490), 200, 242, 246, 249, 316, 594. Schweitzer v. Beottcher (84 111. 289), 482. Schweitzer v. Liberty (82 Mo. 309), 48, 250, 251, 597, 646. Schwuchow V. Chicago (68 111. 444), 550, 638, 654. Scircle V. Neeves (47 Ind. 289), 359, 483. Scoettgen v. Wilson (48 Mo. 253), 474. Scofleld V. Lansing (17 Mich. 437), 808. Scott V. Paulen (15 Kan. 162), 176. Scott V. Sandford (19 How. 393), 447. Scott V. Smith (121 N. C. 94), 437. Scott V. Toledo (36 Fed. Rep. 385), 821. Scott V. Union County (63 Iowa 583), 176. Scott's Executors v. Shreveport (20 Fed. Rep. 714), 96. (■xliv TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Scotten V. Detroit (106 Mich. 564), 833. Scovill V. Cleveland (1 Ohio St. 126), 842. Scovill V. McMahon (62 Conn. 378), 696. Scranton v. Danenbaum (109 Iowa 95), 583, 591. Scranton v. McDonough (1 Lack. Leg. N. 177), 841. Scranton, etc Co.'s Appeal (122 Pa. St. 154), 901. Scudder v. Hinshaw (134 Ind. 56), 642. Scwartz, ex parte (2 Tex. Ct. Ap. 74), 574. Seaboard Nat. Bank v. Woesten (147 Mo. 467), 851, 861, 866. Seacord v. People (121 Til. 623), 684, 699, 705. Scale V. Mitchell (5 Gal. 401), 467. Seanor v. Whatcom County Comrs. (13 Wash. 48), 805. Searcy v. Yarnell (47 Ark. 269), 546. Sears v. Boston (173 Mass. 71), 350, 820, 821, 826. Sears v. Street Commissioner (173 Mass. 350), 383. Sears v. Warren County Comrs. (36 Ind. 267), 402. Seattle v. Barto (Wash. i903, 71 Pac. Rep. 735), 228, 230, 636. Seattle v. Columbia & P. S. R. Co. (6 Wash. 379), 818, 913. Seattle v. Doran (5 Wash. 482), 201, 239, 594, 600. Seattle v. Let (19 Wash. 38), 756, 788. Seattle v. Pearson (15 Wash. 575), 450. Second Ave. Methodist Episcopal Church, In re (66 N. Y. 395), 609. Second Municipality v. Morgan (1 La. Ann. Ill), 451. Second Nat. Bk v. Caldwell (13 Fed. Rep. 429), 613. Seele v. Deering (79 Me. 343), 680. Selbert v. Lewis (122 U. S. 284), 372, 382, 385, 390. Seibert v. Tiffany (8 Mo. App. 33), 118, 425, 814. Seibold v. People (86 111. 33), 344, 786, 792. Seifert v. Brooklyn (101 N. Y. 136), 799. Seifried v. Hays (81 Ky. 377), 684. Seiger v. Cleveland (3 Ohio Nisi Prius 119), 709. Seitzinger v. Tamaqua (187 Pa. St. 539), 130, 250, 259. Selma v. Stewart (67 Ala. 338), 510, 531, 565, 567. Selleck v. Tallman (93 Wis. 246), 457. Semmes v. Columbus (19 Ga. 471), 91, 141. Senn v. Southern Ry Co. (124 Mo. 621), 225, 228, 743, 748, 749. Sentell v. N. 0. & C. R. R. Co (166 U. S. 698), 733. Sewart v. Com. (10 Watts. 306), 736. Severin v. People (37 111. 414), 786. Seymour v. Tacoma (6 Wash. 138). 837. Shackford v. Newington (46 N. H. 415), 104, 106. Shafer v. Mumma (17 Md. 331), 361, 462, 511, 513, 752, 787, 792, 794. Shamokin v. Flannigan (156 Pa. St. 43), 631. Shamokin v. Shamokin St. Ry. Co. (178 Pa. St. 128), 901. Shanfelter v. Baltimore (80 Md. 483), 591. Shank v. Ravenswood (43 W. Va. 242), 201. Shanklin v. Madison (21 Ohio St. 575), 113. Shannon v. Hinsdale (180 111. 202), 812, 813, 850, 851, 854, 855, 859. 869, 871. Shannon v. O'Boyle (51 Ind. 565), 91. Shapleigh v. San Angelo (167 TJ. S. 646), 347, 348, 546. Sharon v. Hawthorne (123 Pa. St 106), 766. Sharp V. Contra Costa Co. (34 Cal. 284), 385. Sharp V. New York (40 Barb. 256), 196. Sharpless v. Philadelphia (21 Pa. St. 147), 72, 105, TABLE OF CASES. cxlv (The references are to pages.) Shattuck V. Smith (6 N. D. 56), 868. Shaub V. Lancaster City (156 Pa. St. 362), 5, 51, 114, 259. Shaver v. Salisbury Commission- ers (68 N. C. 291), 94. Shawneetown v. Baker (85 111. 563). 113, 192. Shea V. Milford (145 Mass. 528), 145: Shea V. Muncie (148 Ind. 14), 30, 245, 290, 476, 533, 757. Sheaf e v. People (87 111. 189), 873. Sheehan v. Citizens' Ry Co. (72 Mo. App. 524), 586, 749. Sheehan v. Gleeson (46 Mo. 100), 133, 808, 809, 850, 854, 856. Sheehan v. Owen (82 Mo. 458), 597. Sheffield, In re (64 Fed Rep. 833), 403. Sheffield v. O'Day (7 111. App. 339), 277. Sheffield Waterworks Co. v. Bing- ham (25 Ch. Div. 443), 908. Sheidley v. Lynch (95 Mo. 487), 88, 111. Shelby v. Miller (114 Wis. 660), 131. Shelby County v. Union and Plant- ers' Bank (161 U. S. 149), 373, 374. Shelbyville v. Cleveland, etc. R. W. Co. (146 Ind. 66), 289. Sheldon v. Kalamazoo (24 Mich. 383), 717. Sheldon Poor House Asn. v. Shel- don (72 Vt. 126), 75. Shelton v. Hill (33 Mich. 171), 485. Shelton v. Mobile (30 Ala. 540), 304, 356, 451, 766. Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co. (6 Wis. 539),- 897. Shepherd v. Hees (12 Johns. 433), 40, 732. Shepherd v. Municipality No. 3 (6 Rob. 349), 799. Sherbourne v. Yuba Co. (21 Cal. 113), 675. Sheridan v. Colvin (78 III. 237), 367. Sherlock v. K. C. B. Ry Co. (142 Mo. 172), 129, 305, 742, 884, 888. 10 Sherlock v. Winnetka (59 111. 389), 260, 263. Sherman v. Carr {S R. I. 431), 114. Sherrell v. Murray (49 Mo. App. 233), 73L Sherwin v. Bugbee (16 Vt. 439), 107, 149, 150, 210. Shewalter v. Pirner (55 Mo. 218), 90, 546. Shields v. Ohio (95 U. S. 319), 317, 322, 380. Shields v. Ross (158 111. 214), 803. Shields v. Savannah (20 Ga 57), 458. Shillito v. Thompson (L. R. 1 Q. B. Div. 12), 762. Shilo Street (165 Pa. St. 386), 264. Shimmins v. Saginaw (104 Mich. 511), 813. Shinkle v. Covington (83 Ky. 420), 258, 311. Shinner v. Merchants Bank (4 Al- len 290), 587. Shipley v. Fifty Associates (101 Mass. 251), 63, 64. Shippy v. Mason (90 Mich. 45), 611. Shiras v. Olinger (50 Iowa 571), 703, 704. Shirk V. People (121 111. 61), 81. Shivers v. Newton (45 N. J. L. 469), 768. Shoemaker v. Entwisle (3 D. C. App. Rep. 252), 535. Shoemaker v. Harrisburg (122 Pa. St. 285), 823. Shook V. Thomas (21 111. 87), 482. Shrader, ex parte (33 Cal. 279), 699. Shreve v. Cicero (129 111. 226), 801. Shreveport v. Levy (26 La. Ann. 671), 313, 362. Shreveport v. Roos (35 La. Ann, 1010), 30, 271, 296, 752, 753. Shriedley v. State (23 Ohio St. 130), 169. Shrober v. Lancaster (6 Lane. Bar. 201), 50. Shrum v. Salem (13 Ind. App. 115), 811, 831. Shuford V. Lincoln County Comrs. (86 N, C. 552), 823. Shultz V. Cambridge (38 Ohio St. 659), 448, 456, 758. exlvi TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Shuman v. Ft. Wayne (127 Ind. 109), 653, 774. Shumate v. Heman (181 U. S. 402), 821. Sic, In re (73 Cal. 142), 24, 784, 788. Siebenbauer, ex parte (14 Nev. 365), 612. Siemers v. Eisen (54 Cal. 418), 603. Sikes V. Hatfield (13 Gray 347), 145. Slkes V. Manchester (59 Iowa 65), 716. Slloam Springs v. Thomson (41 Ark. 456), 24. Silshy Mfg. Co. v. Allentown (153 Pa. St. 319), 865. Simis V. Brookfleld (13 Misc. 569), 718, 721. Simmons v. De Barre (8 Abb. Pr. 269), 559. Simmons v. Gardiner (6 R. I. 255), 811. Simmons v. Mailing Rural District Council (13 Times L. R. 447), 290. Simmons v. State (12 Mo. 268), 641. Simmons Hdw. Co. v. McGuire (39 La. Ann. 848), 400. Simms, ex parte (40 Fla. 432), 447. Simon v. Atlanta (67 Ga. 618), 716. Simon v. Northrup (27 Greg. 487), 806, 883. Simpson v. McGonegal (52 Mo. App. 540), 845. Simpson v. Savage (1 Mo. 359), ■344, 653. Simrall v. Covington (90 Ky. 444), 25, 27, 428, 631, 660. Sinclair v. State (69 N. C. 47), 403. Sinking Fund Cases (99 U. S. 700), 323. Singer v. Philadelphia (112 Pa. 410), 551, 553, 736. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright (97 Ga. 114), 396. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright (33 Fed. Rep. 121), 405, 630. Sing Lee, ex parte (96 Cal. 354), 135, 773. Sinnot v. Davenport (22 How. 227), 410. Sioux City & P. R. R. v. Washing- ton County (3 Neb. 30), 113. Sioux City Street Ry. Co. v. Sioux City (138 U. S. 98), 380, 880, 899. Sioux Falls v. Kirby (6 S. D. 62), 477, 562. Sipe V. Murphy (49 Ohio St. 536), 637. Sira v. Wabash Ry. Co. (115 Mo. 127), 743. Sitzinger v. Tamaqua (187 Pa. St. 539), 121. Skaggs V. Martinsville (140 Ind. 476), 289, 715. Skakel v. Roche (27 111. App. 423), 437. Skaneateles W. W. Co. v. Skan- eateles (161 N. Y. 154), 380. Skidmore v. Brlcker (77 111. 164), 786. Skinker v. Heman (148 Mo. 349), 822, 851. Skinker v. Heman (64 Mo. App. 441), 118, 29], 297, 424, 812. Skyes v. Columbus (55 Miss. 115), 85. Slack V. Maysville & Lexington R. R. Co. (13 B. Mon. 1), 77, 117. Slaren, ex parte (3 Tex. App. 662). 575, 636, 643. Slattery, ex parte (3 Ark. 484), 277, 466,. 469, 771. Slattery v. Naylor (13 App. das, 446), 696. Slattery v. St. Louis (120 Mo. 183), 892. ' Slaughter v. Columbus (61 Ohio St. 53), 574. Slaughter v. O'Berry (126 N. C, 181), 445, 860, 869. Slaughter v. People (2 Doug. 334), 523. Slaughter House Cases (16 Wall. 36), 310, 354, 667, 699. Slessman v. Crozier (80 Ind. 487), 115, 274, 732. Slight V. Gutzlaff (35 Wis. 675), 698. Sloan V. Beebe (24 Kan. 343), 841. Sloane v. People's El. Ry. Co. (7 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 84), 896. Slocum V. Brookline (163 Mass. 23), 827. Smiley V. MacDonald (42 Neb. 5), 705. Smith, In re (146 N. Y. 68), 693. TABLE OF CASES. cxlyii (The references are to pages.) Smith, In re (99 N. Y. 424), 831. Smith, In re (65 Barb. 283), 252. Smith, ex parte (38 Cal. 702), 298. Smith, ex parte (135 Mo. 233), 363, 538, 576. Smith and City of Toronto, In re (10 Up. Can. Com. Pleas. 225), 443. Smith & Keating, ex parte (38 Cal. 702), 758. Smith V. Adrain (1 Mich. 495), 486), 500, 537, 543, 546. Smith V. Alabama (124 U. S. 465), 399. Smith V. Albany (61 N. Y. 444), 172. Smith V. Barrett and Clifford (1 Siderfin 161), 91. Smith V. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (104 Ala. 315), 907. Smith V. Buffalo (90 Hun. 118), 267. ■Smith V. Cheshire (13 Gray 318), 107. Smith V. Clinton (53 N. J. L. 329), 269, 570,»572. Smith V. Columbus L. & S. Ry. Co. (8 Ohio 1), 189. Smith V. Columbus & L. S. Ry Co. (8 Ohio N. P. Rep. 1), 16, 181, 190, 249. Smith V. Com. (41 Pa. St. 335), 7, 9. Smith V. Duncan (77 Ind. 92), 851. Smith V. Eastend St. R. R. (87 Tenn. 626), 890. Smith y. Eau Claire (78 Wis. 457), 249. Smith V. Emporia (27 Kan. 528), 224, 228, 492, 494, 502, 566, 732. Smith V. Gouldy (58 N. J. L. 562), 269, 556. Smith V. Hazard (110 Cal. 145), 829. Smith V. Hoyt (14 Wis. 252), 331, 332. Smith V. Hudson Tp. Commission- ers (150 111. 385), 570. Smith V. Jackson (103 Tenn. 673), 398. Smith V. Janesville (52 Wis. 680), 582. Smith V. Kingston Borough (120 Pa. St. 357), 810. Smith V. Knoxville (3 Head 245), 761. Smith V. Law (21 N. Y. 296), 167, 179. Smith V. Los Angeles I., etc. Assn. (78 Cal. 289), 164. Smith V. Louisville (9 Ky. Law. Rep. 779), 633. Smith V. McCarthy (56 Pa. St 359), 49, 261. Smith V. McConathy (11 Mo. 517), 698, 704. Smith V. McDowell (148 111. 51), 719, 814. Smith V. Madison (7 Ind. 86), 77, 346, 616, 756. Smith V. Marston (5 Tex. 426), 487. Smith V. Milwaukee B. & T. Exch. (91 Wis. 360), 602, 739. Smith V. Moore (38 Conn. 105), 216. Smith V. Morse (2 Cal. 524), 86. 133, 348, 383. Smith V. Newbern (70 N. C. 14), 72, 761. Smith V. New York (37 N. Y. 518), 367. Small V. Orne (79 Me. 78), 163. Smith V. People (154 111. 58), 34G. Smith V. Philadelphia (13 Phila. 177), 113. Smith V. Proctor (N. Y. 1891) (li L. R. A. 403), 166. Smith Y. San Antonio (17 Tex. 643), 518, 528. Smith V. Sheeley (12 Wall. 358), 90. Smith V. Sherry (50 Wis. 210), 67. Smith V. Silsbe (53 N. Y. App. Div. 462), 467. Smith V. Smith (2 Pick. 621), 63. Smith V. Tobener (32 Mo. App. 601), 145, 177, 845. Smith V. Utica (53 Hun. 638), 238. Smith V. Westerly (19 R. I. 437), 901. Smith V. Worcester (182 ' Mass. 232), 823. Smither v. Blanton (1 Met. 44), 467, 468. Smyrk v. Sharp (82 Md. 97), 325, 328, 335. cxlviii TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Smyth V. Ames (169 U. S. 466), 910. Snell, In re (58 Vt. 207), 343, 616, 756. Snell and Town of Belleville, In re (30 Up. Can. Q. B. 81), 272, 298, 453, 673. Snell V. Ft. Dodge (45 Iowa 564), 610. Sneller v. Belleville (30 Up. Can. Q. B. 81), 36. Snoddy v. Bolen (122 Mo. 479), 890. Snyder, ex parte (64 Mo. 58), 153, 575. Snyder, ex parte (29 Mo. App. 256), 574. Snyder v. North Lawrence (8 Kan. 82), 79, 448. 456. Snyder v. Rockport (6 Ind. 237), 799. Society for Savings v. New Lon- don (29 Conn. 174), 151, 217. Society of Scriveners v. Brooking (3 Q. B. 95), 292. Soloman v. Denver (12 Colo. App. 179), 653. Soloman v. Hughes (24 Kan. 211), 205, 495, 566, 583, 591. Solomon, ex parte (91 Cal. 440), 24, 285, 755, 784, 788. Sommercamp v. Kelly (Idaho 1902, 71 Pac. Rep. 147), 177. Somerset v. Smith (20 Ky. Law. Rep. 1488), 166. Somerville v. Dickerman (127 Mass. 272), 76, 113.. Somerville v. Middlesex County Comrs. (122 Mass. 292), 842. Somerville v. Wood (129 Ala. 369), 7. Sonora v. Curtin (137 Cal. 583), 334, 641. Soon Hing v. Crowley (113 U. S. 703), 44, 258, 311, 312, 356, 361, 672, 691, 773. Soule V. Passaic (47 N. J. Bq. 28), 799. South Covington, etc. Ry. Co._v. Berry (93 Ky. 43), 437, 732, 747. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Richmond (98 Fed. 671), 320, 321, 322, 325. South Bend v. Martin (142 Ind. 31), 396, 397, 658. Southern Express Co. v. Bnsley (116 Fed. Rep. 756), 435, 655. Southern Express Co. v. Tusca- loosa (Ala. 1902, 31 So. Rep. 450), 655. South Florida R. R. Co. v. Rhodes (25 Fla. 40), 296. South Highland Land & Imp. Co. V. Kansas City (172 Mo. 523), 853, 854. South Market St., In re (76 Hun. 85), 187, 204. South Pasadena v. Los Angeles, etc. R. Co. (109 Cal. 315), 36, 673, 910. Southport V. Ogden (23 Conn. 128), 24, 344, 788. Southport V. Stanley (125 N. C. 464), 90. South Royalton Bank v. Suffolk Bk. (27 Vt. 505), 684. South School District v. Blakeslee (13 Conn. 227), 151. Southwark v. Neil (3 Jeates 54), 38, 83. Southwest Mo. Light Co. v. Jop- lin (101 Fed. 23), 377. Southworth v. P. & J. R. R. 2 Mich. 287), 169. Soutier v. Kellerman (18 Mo. 509), 110. Sower v. Philadelphia (35 Pa. St. 231), 6, 84i: Spring Valley W. W. v. San Fran- cisco (82 Cal. 286), 436. Spain, In re (47 Fed. 208), 397, 402. Spangler v. Jacoby (14 111. 297), 187, 202. 205. Sparks, ex parte (120 Cal. 395), 462, 464. Sparks v. Stokes (40 N. J. L. 487), 573. Sparling v. Dwenger (60 Ind. 72), 803. Sparr v. St. Louis (4 Mo. App. 572), 678. Sparta v. Lewis (91 Tenn. 370), 534. Spaulding v. Lowell (23 Pick. 71), 70, 71, 74, 75, 79, 109, li7, 762. TABLE OF CASES. cxlix (The references are to pages.) Spaulding v. Peabody (153 Mass. Springfield v. Ford (40 Mo. App. 129), 101, 798. Spaulding v. Wesson (84 Cal. 141), 832. Speakership of the House of Rep- resentatives, In re (15 Colo. 520), 158. Spear v. Robinson (29 Me. 531), 152. Spears v. Modoc County (101 Cal. 303), 334. Spears v. New York (72 N. Y. ^ 442), 127. Specht V. Louisville (22 Ky. L. Rep. 699), 235. Spect V. Arnold (52 Cal. 455), 455. Speer v. Athens (85 Ga. 49), 823. Speer v. School Directors (50 Pa. St. 150), 104. Speir V. Brooklyn (139 N. Y. 6), 677, 678. Spencer v. Andrew (82 Iowa 14), 718. Spencer v. Clihe (28 Ind. 51), 466. Spencer v. Merchant (125 U. S. 345), -353, 820. Spengler v. Trowbridge (62 Miss. 46), 799. Spiegel V. Gansburg (44 Ind. 418), 435, 830. Spies V. Illinois (123 U. S. 131), 354. Spitler V. Young (63 Mo. 52), 34, 276, 552, 553, 731. Spitzer v. Runyan (113 Iowa 619), 96. Spokane v. Robison (6 Wash. 547), 483, 487, 506, 544, 701. Spokane v. Williams (6 Wash. 376), 337. Spokane Falls v. Browne (3 Wash. 586), 490, 491, 492, 646. Springfield v. Green (120 111. 269), 843. Springfield v. Knott (49 Mo. App. 612), 4, 6, 842. Springfield v. Mathus (124 111. 88), 852. Springfield v. Robberson Ave. R. R. (69 Mo. App. 514), 887. Springfield v. Sale (127 111. 359), 852. Springfield v. Smith (138 Mo. 645), 607, 612, 651, 652. Springfield v. Starke (93 Mo. App. 70), 271, 291. Springfield v. Walker (42 Ohio St. 543), 113. Springfield v. Weaver (137 Mo. 650), 845, 848, 860, 861. Springfield, etc. Ins. Co. v. Kee.s- ville (148 N. Y. 46), 674, 677. Springfield R. R. Co. v. Springfield (85 Mo. 674), 368, 425, 743, 883. Sprigg v. Garrett Park (89 Md. 406), 298. Spring Garden Bank v. Hurlings Lumber Co. (32 W. Va. 357), 896. Spi-ing Garden Comrs. v. Wistar (18 Pa. St. 195), 832. Spring Valley v. Henning (42 111. App. 159). 445, 534, 542. Spring Valley v. Spring Valley Coal Co. (71 111. App. 432), 786. Spring Valley Coal Co. v. People (157 111. 543), 609, 610. Spring Valley Waterworks v. Bart- lett (8 Sawyer 555), 262. Spring Valley Waterworks v. San Francisco (82 Cal. 286), 31, 907. Spring Valley Waterworks v. Schottler (110 U. S. 347), 905, 906. St. 84), 824. Spokane Street Ry. Co. v. Spokane Springville v. Fullmer (7 Utah (5 Wash. 634), 817. 450), 798. Sprague v. Coenen (30 Wis. 209), Spry Lumber Co. v. Sault Savings Bank (77 Mich. 199), 668. Stack V. East St. Louis (85 111. 277), 358. 115. Spring V. Hyde Park (137 Mass. 554), 694. Springfield v. Connecticut River Stadiford. In re (5 Mackey 549), R. Co. (4 Cush. 63). 719. 241. Springfield V. Edwards (84 111. 626), Stadler v. Detroit (13 Mich. 346), 431. 23. cl TABLE OP CASES. (The references are to pages.) Stadler v. Fahey (87 111. App. 411), 430, 446. Stadler v. Roth (59 Mo. 400), 213, 214. Stafe, In re (63 Wis. 285), 527. Stafford v. Chippewa Valley Elec- tric R. Co. (110 Wis. 331), 443. Stamford v. Studwell (60 Conn. 85), 737. Standard v. Industry (55 111. App. 523), 46, 248, 250, 251. Standard Oil Co. v. Danville (199 111. 50), 298, 510, 740. Standard Underground Cable Co. V. Attorney General (46 N. J. Eq. 629). Standeford v. Wingate (2 Duvall Ky. Rep. 440), 366. Staudiford, In re (5 Mackey 5-19), .161. Stange v. Dubuque (62 Iowa 303), 265. Stanley v. Davenport (54 Iowa 463), 678. Stanton v. Chicago (154 111. 23), 847, 849, 853. Starks v. State (38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 233), 597. Staples V. Plymouth (62 Iowa 364), 694. Starr v. Burlington (45 Iowa 87), 4, 248. Starr v. Rochester (6 Wend. 564), 562. State V. Able (65 Mo. 357), 299, 690. State V. Acuff (6 Mo. 54), 448. State V. Adams (108 Mo. 208), 491. State ex rel. Pittman v. Adams (44 Mo. 570), 322. State V. Addington (77 Mo. 110), 351, 669, 763. State V. Agee (83 Ala. 110), 396, 401. State V. Albright (20 N. J. L. 644), 262. State ex rel. v. Alexander (107 Iowa 177), 163, 211. State ex rel. v. Aloe (152 Mo. 466), 155. State ex rel. Fox v. Alt (26 Mo. App. 673), 158. State ex rel. v. Anderson (26 Fla. 240), 47, 449. State V. Anderson (63 Minn. 208), 274. State V. Anderson (84 Mo. 524), 565. State V. Andrews (27 Mo. 267), 646. State v. Andrews (20 Tex. 230), 336. State V. Andrus (11 Neb. 523), 648. State V. Angelo (71 N. H. 224), 636. State V. Applegarth (81 Md. 293), 394, 633, 659. State V. Archibald (5 N. D. 359), 183. State V. Armstrong (54 Minn. 457), 163, 237, 840, 845, 846. State V. Asking (33 La. Ann. 1253). 527. State ex rel. v. Associated Pres3 (159 Mo. 410), 53. State V. Atlantic City (34 N. J. 1.. 99), 137, 591. State V. Austin (^114 N. C. 8r,r)), 25, 758. State ex rel. v. Babcock (22 Ncli, 614), 111. State V. Bacon (40 Vt. 456). nil. State ex rel. v. Badger (90 Mi,:. App. 183), 161, 200, 208. State V. Baker (44 La. Ann. 79). 491, 505. State ex rel, v. Baker (74 Mo. 394), 490. State V. Baker (71 Mo. 475), 541. State ex rel. v. Baker (32 Mo. App. 98), 274, 320, 622, 637. State V. Baker (38 Wis. 71), 489. State V. Baldwin (45 Conn. 134), 335. State V. Baltimore & 0. R. R. Co. (3 How. 534), 67, 277. State ex rel. v. Barbour (53 Conn. 76), 185. State ex rel. v. Barker (116 Iowa 96), 140, 805. State V. Barker (18 Vt. 195), 498. State ex rel v. Barlow (48 Mo. 17), 828, 845. State v. Barnet (46 N. J. L. 62), 6. State v. Barthe (41 La. Ann. 46), 764. TABLE OF CASES. cli (The refereaces are to pages.) State ex rel. v. Baton Rouge (40 La. Ann. 209), 277. State (Booth) v. Bayonne (56 N. J. L. 268), 181. State V. Bayonne (54 N. J. L. 474), 842. State V. Bayonne (54 N. J. L. 125), 169. State V. Bayonne (35 N. J. L. 335), 4, 5, 6. State V. Bean (21 Mo. 267), 752. State V. Bean (91 N. C. 554), 270, 544, 622. State V. Becker (3 S. Dak. 29), 10. State ex reL v. Beatie (16 Mo. App. 131), 134, 292, 299, 627, 703. State V. Bell (116 Ind. 1), 367. State ex rel. v. Bell (119 Mo. 70), 341. State ex rel. v. Bell (34 Ohio St. .194), 134, 894. •State V. Bell (91 Wis. 271), 609. State e.x rel. v. Belt (161 Mo. 371), 836. State V. Bemis (45 Neb. 724), 176. State V. Beneke (9 Iowa 203), 498, 525. State V. Bennett (19 Neb. 191), 639, 645. State V. Berdetta (73 Ind. 185), 716, 874. State (Ackerman) v. Bergen (33 N. J. L. 39), 7, 233, 254, 832. State V. Bergen County (46 N. J. Eq. 178), 707. State V. Bergman (6 Oreg. 341), 787. State V. Bermuda (12 La. 352), 381. State V. Bernard (64 Mo. 260), 752. State ex rel. v. Berseh (83 Mo. App. 657), 613. State (Hershoff) v. Beverly (45 N. J. L. 288), 228, 446, 543. State (Hershoff) v. Beverly (43 N. J. L. 139), 469, 474, 485, 57L State V. Bill (13 Ired. 373), 566, 571. State V. Binder (38 Mo. 451), 49, 164, 345, 646. State V. Birkhauser (37 Neb. 521), 831. State V. Bishop (128 Mo. 373), 311, 539. State ex inf. v. Bland (144 Mo. 534), 155. State V. Blaser (36 La. Ann. 363), 774. State V. Blauvelt (34 N. J. L. 261), 571. State ex rel. v. Board of Education (141 Mo. 45), 607. State V. Boardman (93 Me. 73), 296. State V. Board of Public Works (27 Minn. 442), 12L State (West Jersey Traction Co.) V. Board of Public Works (56 N. J. L. 431), 143, 174, 260, 439. State V. Bockstruck (136 Mo. 335), 527, 541. State ex rel. v. Bogard (128 Ind. 480), 367. State v. Boll (59 Mo. 321), 702. State ex rel. v. Bolt (151 Mo. 362), 160. State V. Boneil (VJ, La. Ami. 1110), 269, 279, 284. State ex rel v. Bonnell (119 Ind. 494), 274. State V. Boogher (71 Mo. 631), 333, 334. State V. Botkin (71 Iowa 87), 752. State ex rel. v. Bowerman (40 Mo. App. 576), 578, State ex rel. v. Boyd (63 Neb. 829), 618. State V. Bracco (103 N. C. 349), 400. State V. Bradford (32 Vt. 50), 547. State V. Brigantine Borough (54 N. J. L. 476), 842. State V. Branin (23 N. J. L. 484), 339. State V. Bright (38 La. Ann. 1), 271. State ex rel. v. Bringier (42 La. Ann. 1095), 279. State V. Brittain (89 N. C. 574), 23, 790. State (Kean) v. Bronson (35 N. J. L. 468), 263, 428. State V. Brown (5 Harr 505), 483. State V. Brown (19 Fla. 563), 648. State V. Brown (109 N. C. 802), 554. State V. Brown (72 Vt. 410), 506, 640. clii TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) State V. Bruce (23 Wash. 777), 645. State V. Bruckhauser (26 Minn. 301), 771. State V. Bruder (35 Mo. App. 480), 539. State V. Bruner (17 Mo. App. 274), 756. State (Parker) v. Brunswick (30 N. J. L. 395), 37. State V. Bryant (90 Mo. 534), 445, 447. State V. Bryson (44 Ohio St. 457), 8. State V. Burgoyne (7 Lea 173), 665. State V. Burnham (15 N. H. 396), 524. State V. Burns (45 La. Ann. 34), 25, 772. State V. Butler (17 Vt. 145), 495. State (Marshall) v. Cadwalader (36 N. J. L. 283), 698. State ex rel. v. Cahaba (30 Ala. 66), 440. State V. Cainan (94 N. C. 880), 283, 485, 700. ' State V. Caldwell (3 La. Ann. 435), 23. State V. Camden (53 N. J. L. 322), 832. State V. Camden (50 N. J. L. 87), 23, 25, 340. State ex rel. v. Campbell (120 Mo. 396), 546. State V. Campbell (64 N. H. 402), 767. State V. Camp Sing (18 Mont. 128), 654. State V. Cantieny (34 Minn. 1), 226, 228, 280, 281, 450, 531, 758, 770. State (Tomlin) v. Cape May (63 N. J. L. 429), 269. State V. Capital City Dairy Co. (62 Ohio St. 350), 682. State ex rel. v. Carbondale School District (29 Iowa 264), 546. State V. Carey (4 Wash. 424), 683. State V. Carman (63 Iowa 130), 527. State V. Carpenter (60 Conn. 97) 29, 284, 448, 491, 754. State V. Carpenter (68 Wis. 165), 716. State ex rel. v, Carr (67 Mo. 38), 239, 242. State V. Carreau (45 La. Ann. 1446), 465. State V. Carrigan (39 N. J. L. 35), 411. State V. Carter (129 N. C. 560), 630. State (McClosky) v. Chamberlin (37 N. J. L. 388), 452. State V. Chambers (70 Mo. 625), 315. State V. Champlin (16 R. I. 453), 143. State V. Charles (16 Minn. 474), 707. State ex rel. Adger v. Charleston (2 Speers 719), 623. State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Charles- ton (2 Speers 623), 35, 362, 623, 764. State V. Charleston (1 Mill's Const. Hep. 36), 440. State V. Charleston (12 Rich. Law. 480), 25, 461, 464. State V. Chase (3 La. Ann. 287), 285, 787. State V. Cincinnati (8 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 523), 249, 252. State V. Cincinnati Gas Co. (18 Ohio St. 262), 28, 102, 259, 379, 875, 880. State ex rel. v. Circleville (20 Ohio St. 362), 104. State ex rel. v. Circuit Court (97 Wis. 1), 260. State V. Citizens' Bank (52 La. Ann. 1086), 617. State V. Clarke (69 Conn. 371), 721, 722. State V. Clarke (54 Mo. 17), 72, 291, 343, 345, 450, 792, 883. State V. Clark (28 N. H. 176), 646. 757, 760. State V. Clarke (25 N. J. L. 54), 343, 346. State V. Clay (118 N. C. 1234), 780. State V. Clesi (44 La. Ann. 85), 567, 569, 578. State ex rel. v. Cleveland (15 Ohio Cir. Ct. 517), 195, 215, 216. State V. Cleveland (3 R. I. 117), 269. TABLE OF CASES. cliii (The references State V. Clevenger (20 Mo. App. 626), 565. State V. Clifford (45 La. Ann. 980), 787. State (Smith) v. Clinton (53 N. .J. L. 329), 282, 475, 477. State V. Close (35 Iowa 570), 686. State ex rel. v. Coffee (59 Mo. 59), 546. State V. Collins (16 R. I. 371), 727. State V. Columbia (27 S. C. 137), 802. State V. Columbia (6 S. C. 1), 612, 630, 644. State ex rel. Heise v. Columbia (6 Rich Law. 404), 273, 285, 787, 792. State V. Conkling (19 Cal. 501), 328. State V. Conlin (27 Vt. 318), 513, 547. State V. Conlon (65 Conn. 478), 294, 306. State V. Cooke (24 Minn. 247), 274. State V. Corbett (57 Minn. 345), 399. State ex rel. v. Corrigan St. Ry. Co. (85 Mo. 263), 317, 318, 827, 884, 900. State ex rel. v. County Court (128 Mo. 427), 226. State ex rel. v. County Court (102 Mo. 531), 225, 351. State ex rel. v. County Court (11 Wis. 50), 333. State V. Court (36 N. J. L. 72), 648. State ex rel. v. Covington (29 Ohio St. 102), 225. State V. Cowan (29 Mo. 330), 344, 346, 671, 787, 793. State ex rel. v. Cowgill, etc. Mill- ing Co. (156 Mo. 620), 6. State V. Cozzens (42 La. Ann. 1069), 314. State V. Craig (80 Me. 85), 471, 537. State V. Cram (84 Me. 271), 462. State ex rel. v. Cramer (96 Mo. 75), 309, 450. State (Winans) v. Crane (36 N. J. L. 394), 173. are to pages.) State V. Crenshaw (94 N. C. 877), 270, 283, 544. State ex rel. v. Crete (32 Neb. 568), 433. State V. Crosley (36 N. J. L. 425), 193. State V. Crummey (17 Minn. 72), 787, 792. State V. Cunningham (21 Iowa 433), 543. State ex rel. Kellogg v. Currens (111 Wis. 431), 311. State V. Curry (134 Ind. 133), 203. State V. Dakota County (41 Minn. 518), 237, 240. State V. Darrow (65 Minn. 419), 237, 249. State V. Davenport (12 Iowa 335), 610. State V. Davidson (50 La. Ann. 1297), 257, 765. State V. Davis (117 Mo. 614), 768. State V. Davis (108 Mo. 666), 768. State V. Davis (70 Mo. 467), 491. State ex rel. v. Davis (44 Mo. 129), 365. State V. De Bar (58 Mo. 395), 333, 792. State V. Deering (84 Wis. 585), 353, 629, 757. State V. Deffes (45 La. Ann. 658), 762. State V. Deliesseline (1 McCord 52), 165, 166. State ex rel. v. Denny (118 Ind. 449), 66. State V. Denny (118 Ind. 382), 10, 805. State V. Dickie (47 Iowa 629), 167. State V. Dillon (Fla. June 5, 1900, 28 So. Rep. 781), 24. State ex rel. v. Dimond (44 Neb. 154), 441. State V. Dinnissee (109 Mo. 434), 445. State V. District Court (44 Minn. 244), 834. State V. District Court (41 Minn. 518). 237. State V. District Court (33 Minn. 295), 121. 843, cliy TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) State V. District Court (29 Minn. 62), 843. State ex rel. v. Dodge City, etc. Ry. Co. (53 Kan. 329), 899. State V. Dodge County Court (8 Neb. 124), 800. State ex rel. v. Dolan (93 Mo. 467), 329, 345. State V. Douglas (26 Wis. 428), 367. State ex rel. v. Dover (62 N. J. U 138), 546. State V. Downing (22 Mo. App. 504), 398. State V. Draper (50 Mo. 353), 22. State ex rel. v. Draper (47 Mo. 29), 315, 329. State V. Dubarry (46 La. Ann. 33), 763. State V. Dubarry (44 La. Ann. 1117), 762. State V. Dudley (56 Mo. App. 450), 752. State V. Dugan (110 Mo. 138), 49. State V. Dulaney (43 La. Ann. 500), 702. State V. Duluth (53 Minn.- 238), 238. State V. Dunbar (43 La. Ann. 836), 491. State ex rel. v. Dunson (71 Tex. 65), 546. State V. Dupaquier (46 La. Ann. 577), 767. State V. Duval County (23 Fla. 483), 225. State V. Dwyer (21 Minn. 512), 343. State y. Dyson (39 Mo. App. 297), 755. State V. Earnhardt |(107 N. C. 789), 451, 770. State ex rel. v. East 5th St. Ry. Co. (140 Mo. 539), 880, 888, 913, 914. State (Delaware, L. & W. R. Co.) V. East Orange (41 N. J. L. 127), 292, 313, 750. State (Consolidated Traction Co.) V. East Orange Tp. (61 N. J. L. 202, 713. State V. Edens (85 N. C. 522), 490, 496, 716. State ex rel. v. Edwards (136 Mo. 360). 329, 344. State V. Ehrmantraut (63 Minn. 104), 67. State (Smith) v. Elizabeth (46 N. J. L. 312), 573. State V. Elizabeth (37 N. J. L. 432), 12. State V. Elizabeth (30 N. J. L. 176), 573. State V. Elofson (86 Minn. 103), 632. State V. Bmert (103 Mo. 241), 398. State V. Engle (34 N. J. L. 425), 411. State V. Endom (23 La. Ann. 663), 633. State V. Epperson (4 Mo. 90), 565. State V. Evans (3 Ark. 585), 441. State V. Evans (161 Mo. 95), 483. State V. Everett (14 Minn. 439), 527. State ex rel. v. Farr (47 N. J. L. 208), 158. State ex rel. Dugan v. Farrier (47 N. J. L. 383), 153. State V. Fay (44 N. J. L. 474), 79. State V. F. C. Coal & Coke Co. (33 W. Va. 188y 667. State V. Fellows (12 La. Ann. 344), 64L State V. Ferguson (33 N. H. 424), 79, 271. State (Ahrens) v. Fiedler (43 N. J. L. 400), 242. State ex rel. v. Field (99 Mo. 352), 68, 341, 804, 805. State V. Field (17 Mo. 529), 133. State ex rel. v. Finn (8 Mo. App. 341), 225. State (Clark) v. Fire Department of Elizabeth (43 N. J. L. 172), 550. State V. Fisher (52 Mo. 174), 303. State V. Fisher (33 Wis. 154). State V. Fiske (9 R. I. 94), 131, 135, 625, 626, 714. State V. Pitzporter (17 Mo. App. 271), 329. State V. Flack (24 Mo. 378), 755. State ex rel. Bell Telephone Co. v. Plad (23 Mo. App. 185), 885. State ex rel. v. Fleming (147 Mo. 1), 441. State V. Flinch (78 Mich. 118). 643. TABLE OP CASES. clv (The references are to pages.) State V. Flint (63 Conn. 248), 29, 506, 754, 788. State ex rel. v. Forest Co. (74 Wis. 610), 547. State V. Foster (7 N. J. L. 101), 192. State V. Fountain (14 Wash. 236), 232, 233, 486. State V. Fourcade (45 La. Ann. 717), 513, 683, 762, 766, 787. State V. Fox (158 Incl. 126), 805. State ex rel. v. Fox (85 Mo. 61), 575. State V. Francis (26 Kan. 724), 177. State ex rel. v. Francis (95 Mo. 44), 49, 133, 433, 434, 646. State ex rel. v. Franklin (40 Kan. 410), 673. State V, Freeman (38 N. H. 426), 79, 757, 759, 760. State ex rel. Toi v. French (17 Mont. 54), 312, l.i29, 632. State V. French (109 N. C. 722), 611. State V. Frost (103 Tenn. 685), 547. State V. Fuller (96 Mo. 165), 546. State V. Furbush (72 .Me. 493), 400. State V. Gallagher (72 Conn. 604), 506. State V. Gallagher (42 .Minn. 449), 226. Slate V. Galloway (5 Coldw. 326), 465. State V. Garibaldi (44 La. Ann. 809), 762. State V. Garrett (80 Iowa 589), 42. State V. Gazley (5 Ohio 14), 611, 641. State V. Geise (39 Mo. App. 189), 543. State V. Geneva (107 Wis. 1), 131. State V. Georgia Med. Soc. 38 Ga. 608), 24. State V. Gerhardt (145 Ind. 439), 758, 905. State V. Geuing (1 McCord 573). 543. State V. Gibbs (60 S. C. 500), 225. State V. Oilman (33 W. Va. 146), 667. State V. Gilmore (98 Mo. 206), 755. State V. Gisch (31 La; Ann. 544), 764. State V. Glavin (67 Conn. 29), 634. State V. Glenn (54 Md. 572), 511, 515, 530, 574, 576. State (Paul) v. Gloucester County (50 N. J. L. 585), 135, 144, 787, 792. State V. Goodenow (65 Me. 30), 538. State V. Goodwill (33 W. Va. 179), 667, 779. State V. Gordon (60 Mo. 383), 671. State ex rel. v. Gosnell (Wis. 1903, 93 N. W. Rep. 542), 907. State V. Goulding (44 N. H. 284), 491. State V. Graftmuller (26 Minn. 6), 486, 530, 579. State V. Graves (19 Md. 351), 320. State ex rel. v. Gray (23 Neb. 365), 153, 155, 157, 169. State V. Green (27 Neb. 64), 639, 661. State ex rel. v. Green (37 Ohio St. 227), 166, 167, 184, 185, 186. State V. Grimes (83 Minn. 460), 512, 559, 754. State V. Crimes (49 Minn. 443), 271, 75.-). State V. Gritzner (134 Mo. 512), 447. State. V. Grove (77 Wis. 448), 480. State V. Groves (15 R. I. 208), 767. State ex rel. v. Guiney (26 Minn. 313), 147. State v. Cumber (37 Wis. 298), 335. State V. Gurney (37 Me. 156), 527. State V. Gutierrez (15 La. Ann. 190), 513, 517. State V. Hackfath (20 Mo. App. 614), 539, 772. State V. Hale (15 Mo. 606), 527. State V. Hamilton (47 Ohio St. 52), 798. State V. Hammond (40 Minn. 43), 79, 83, 753. State V. Hammonton (38 N. J. L. 430), 114. State ex rel. Morris v. H. & St J. Ry. Co. (86 Mo. 13), 433. State V. H. & St. J. Ry Co. (75 Mo. 208), 651. State V. Hardy (7 Neb. 377), 25, 2.51. ISO. 648. clvi TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) State V. Harmon (60 Mo. App. 48), 756. State V. Harper (58 Mo. 530), 278, 792. State V. Harrington (68 Vt. 622), 635, 636. State V. Harris (50 Minn. 128J, 513. State V. Harris (52 Vt, 216), 185. State V. Harrison (67 Ind. 71), 180. State V. Harrison (46 N. J. L. 79), 308. State ex rel. v. Hauser (63 Ind. 155), 137, 208. State V. Hawkins (44 Ohio St. 98), 366, 367. State V. Hay (29 Me. 457), 756. State V. Hayne (4 S. C, 403), 611. State V. Hayes (67 Iowa 27), 541. State V. Hayes (61 N- H. 264), 78. State ex rel. v. Haynes (72 Mo. 377), 133, 143, 145. State ex rel. Blakeman v. Hays (49 Mo. 604), 257. State V. Heckler (81 Mo, 417), 541. State ex rel. v. Heege (135 Mo. 112), 226. State ex rel. v. Heege (39 Mo. App. 49), 578. State V. Heidenliain (42 La. Ann. 483), 231, 294, 688, 689. State ex rel v. Heidorn (74 Mo. 310), 329, 344. State V. Helfrid (2 Mott & McCord 233), 461, 463, 469. State V. Henderson (38 Ohio St. 644), 238. State ex rel. v. Hennepin County Dis. Court (33 Minn. 235), 191. State V. Hennessey (44 La. Ann. 805), 569. State V. Henshaw (76 Cal. 436), 464. State ex rel. v. Hermann (84 Mo. App. 1), 294. State V. Hermann (11 Mo. App. 43), 365. State V. Herod (29 Iowa 123), 650, 651. State V. Herryford (19 Mo. 377), 755. State V. Hiawatha (53 Kan. 477), 798. State ex rel. v. Higgins (125 Mo 364), 341. State V. Higgs (126 N. C. 1014), 30, 464, 722. State (Dawes) v. Hightstown (45 N. J. L. 501), 719. State ex rel. Cream City R. Co. v. Hilbert (72 Wis. 184), 652. State V. Hill (126 N. C. 1139), 360, 670, 682. State V. Hindman (4 Mo. App. 582), 756. State V. Hoboken (52 N. J. L. 88), 241. State (Bayer) v. Hoboken (44 N. J. L. 131), 252. State (Chamberlain) v. Hoboken (38 N. J. L. 110), 251, 450. State (Benson) v. Hoboken (33 N. J. L. 280), 622, 634. State V. Hoffman (50 Mo. App. 585), 398. State V. Hoffman (35 Ohio St. 435), 805. State V. Hohn (50 La. Ann. 432), 563. State (Cedar Rapids) v. Holcomb (68 Iowa 107), 704. State ex rel. v. Holladay (67 Mo. 64), 9. State V. Holt (90 N. C. 749), 527. State ex rel. v. Holt Co. Ct. (39 Mo. 521), 646. State V. Hope (100 Mo. 347), 351. State V. Hord (122 N. C. 1092), 704, 705. State ex rel. v. Hostetter (137 Mo. 636), 444, 448. State V. Houghton (6 La. Ann. 783), 623. State V. Hoyt (2 Oreg. 246), 183. State V. Hudson (13 Mo. App, 61), 646. State V. Hudson (37 N. J. L. 254), 114. State V, Hudson (29 N. J. L. 475), 241, 249. State (Ogden) v. Hudson (29 N. J. L. 104), 830. St^te ex rel. v. Hughes (104 Mo. 459), 436. State V. Hughes (72 N. C. 25), 729. TABLE OF CASES. clvii (The references are to pages.) State V. Hunter (106 N. C. 796), 295. State V. Hutchinson (39 N. J. Eq. 218), 707. State ex rel. Indianapolis v. In- dianapolis Union Ry. Co. (Ind. 1903, 66 N. E. Rep. 163), 904. State V. Intoxicating Liquors (54 Me. 564), 471. State V. Itzcovitch (49 La. Ann. 366), 71, 774. State V. Jackson (39 Mo. 420), 755. State V. Jacksonville St. R. R. (29 Fla. 590), 882, 898, 899. State V. Jacobs (38 Mo. 379), 657. State V. Jaeger (63 Mo. 403), 329, 447. State V. Jamison (23 Mo. 103), 646. State ex rel. v. Jenkins (25 Mo. App. 484), 546. State ex rel. v. Jennings (57 Ohio St. 415), 367, 368. State (Kennelly) v. Jersey City (57 N. J. L. 293), 125, 290, 439, 720. State y. Jersey City (54 N. J. L. 49), 828. State ex rel. Schermerhorn v. Jer- sey City (53 N. J. L. 112), 169. State V. Jersey City (52 N. J. L. 490), 832. State V. Jersey City (52 N. J. L. 65), 888. State (Hudson Telephone Co.) v. Jersey City (49 N. J. L. 303), 723. State (Pennsylvania R. R.) v. Jer- sey City (47 N. J. L. 286), 42, 297. State (Long) v. Jersey City (37 N. J. L. .348), 296, 746. State V. Jersey City (35 N. J. L. 404). 145, S29. State (Gregory) v. Jersey City (34 N. J. L. 429), 87. 189, 233, 254. State (Gregory) v. Jersey City (34 N. J. L. 390), 263, 429. State v. Jersey City (34 N. J. L. 31), 263, 429. State V. Jersey City (30 N. J. L. 148), 238. State (Howeth) v. Jersey City (30 N. J. L. 93), 241. State v. Jersey City (29 N. J. L. 170), 25, 41, 429, 571, 686, 687. State (Malone) v. Jersey City (28 N. J. L. 500), 832. State V. Jersey City (27 N. J. L. 536), 192, 829. State (Van Vorst) v. Jersey City (27 N. J. L. 493), 11, 197. 841. State (Townsend) v. Jersey City (26 N. J. L. 444), 255. State (Durant) v. Jersey City (25 N. J. L. 309), 145, 146, 179, 180, 238, 800, 829, 830. State (Mann) v. Jersey City (24 N. J. L. 662>, 832. State V. Johns (124 Mo. 379), 538. State V. Johnson (17 Ark. 407), 352, 456. State V. Johnson (41 Minn. Ill), 732. State ex rel. v. Johnson (123 Mo. 43), 22. State V. Johnson (114 N. C. 846), 736. State V. Jones (18 Tex. 874), 803. State V. Jordon (39 Iowa 387), 557. State ex rel. Walker v. Judge (39 La. Ann. 132), 669. State ex rel. v. Judge (37 La. Ann. ' 583), 467. State ex rel. v. Judges, etc. (11 Wis. 50), 468. State V. Judges of District Court 51 Minn. 539), 833, 834. State V. Julow (129 Mo. 163), 778. State V. Justice (24 N. J. L. 413), 193. State V. Kantler (33 Minn. 69), 147, 316, 451, 648. State V. Karstendiek (La., 39 L. R. A. 520), 752. State V. Raster (35 Iowa 221), 704. State V. Kaufman (51 Iowa 578), 527. State V. Kearney (25 Neb. 262), 738. State V. Keenan (57 Conn. 286), 478. State V. Keith (94 N. C. 933), 784. 790. State V. Kempf (69 Wis. 470), 561. clviii TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) State V. Kemple (27 Mo. App. 392), 507. State ex rel. v. Kennan (25 Wash. 621), 512, 577. State V. Kennon (7 Ohio St. 546), 7, 10. State V. Kent (65 N. C. 311), 331. State V. Kesslering (12 Mo. 595), 492. State ex rel. v. Kiichli (53 Minn. 147), 158, 183. •State V. Kinne (41 N. H. 238), 280, 53i; State V. King (37 Iowa 462), 487, 499, 504, 543, 568, 590, 593, 597. State V. King (21 La. Ann. 201), 641. State ex rel. v. King (136 Mo. 309), 127. State V. King (86 N. C. 603), 539. State ex rel. Harty v. Kirk (46 Conn. 395), 147, 159, 175, 176. State V. Kirkley (29 Md. 85), 49, 442. State V. Knowles (16 Pla. 577), 53. State ex rel. v. Kramer (150 Mo. 89), 163. State V. Labatut (39 La. Ann. 513), 344. State ex rel. v. Laclede Gaslight Co. (102 Mo. 472), 102, 352, 909, 913. State V. La Crosse (107 Wis. 654), 79. State V. Lafferty (5 Harr. 491), 483. State (Arnett) v. Lambertville (N. J. L. 1886, 6 Atl. Rep. 432), 828. State (Hunt) v. Lambertville (15 N. J. L. 279), 12, 122, 842. State V. Langston (88 N. C. 692), 23, 790. State ex rel. Whitely v. Lansing (27 Mich. 131), 385. State V. Larger (45 Mo. 510), 527. State V. Larkins (44 S. C. 362). 518. State V. Laverack (34 N. J. L. 201), 762. State ex rel. v. Lawrence (38 Mo, 535), 440. State V. Leatherman (38 Ark. 81), 546. State V. Leaver (62 Wis. 387), 716, 718. State V. Lederer (52 N. J. Eq. 675), 699. State V. Ledford (3 Mo. 102), 79^. State V. Lee (29 Minn. 445), 787, 792, 794. State V. Leiber (11 Iowa 407), 583. State ex rel. v. Levens (32 Mo. App. 520), 577. State V. Lewis (5 Mo. App. 465), 332, 752. State V. Lichtenstein (44 W. Va. 99), 40L State ex inf. v. Lindell Ry. Co. (151 Mo. 162), 418, 884. State V. Lindsay (34 Ark. 372), 24. State ex rel. v. Linn (44 Mo. 504), 67. State V. Liverpool, etc. Ins. Co. (40 La. Ann. 463), 631. State V. Lochte (45 La. Ann. 1405), 271, 466. State V. Lockwood (43 Wis. 403), 465. State V. Long Branch Comrs. (54 N. J. L. 484), 249. State (Leland) v. Long Branch Com'rs (42 N. J. L. 375), 282, 439. State V. Loomis (115 Mo. 307), 311, 778, 864. State V. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. (86 Ind. 114), 716, 887. State (Nicoulin) v. Lowery (49 N. J. L. 391), 706. State V. Luce (9 Houst. 396), 97, 684, 698. State V. Ludwig (21 Minn. 202), 285, 787, 792. State ex rel. v. Lyons (31 Iowa 432), 441. State ex rel. Stark v. McArthur (13 Wis. 383), 463," 470. State V. McBride (4 Mo. 303), 169. State V. McCance (110 Mo. 398), 539, 541. State V. McCoy (116 N. C. 1059), 25. State V. McCulla (16 R. I. 196). 545, 707, 790. State V. McGinnis (38 Mo. App. 15), 541. State ex rel. v. McGrath 91 Mo. 386), 862. State V. McGrath (73 Mo. 181), 541. TABLE OF CASES. clix (The references are to pages.) State V. McKee (20 Or. 120), 199. State ex rel. v. McMahon (69 Minn. 265), 575, 706. State V. McMahon (14 R. I. 285), 455. State V. McNally (48 La. Ann. 1450), 232, 780, 784. State V. McNinch (87 N. C. 567), 758. State V. Mack (41 La. Ann. 1079), 466. State ex rel. v. Macon County (41 Mo. 453), 329. State V. Madison Council (15 Wis. 30), 145. State ex rel. v. Madison Street Ry. Co. (72 Wis. 612), 880. State V. Mahner (43 La. Ann. 496), 627, 681, 702. State V. Main (69 Conn. 123), 665. State V. Mainey (65 Ind. 404), 803. State V. Manley (107 Mo. 364), 539. State V. Mannessier (32 La. Ann. 1308), 27L State V. Mansfield (41 Mo. 470), 528. State ex rel. v. Martin (27 Neb. 441), 115. State ex rel. v. Martindale (47 Kan. 147), 779. State ex rel. v. Mason (155 Mo. 486), 159, 254. State ex rel. Hawes v. Mason (153 Mo. 23), 10, 607. State V. Mason (3 Lea 649), 788, 795. State V. Massey (103 N. C. 356), 328, 332. State V. Mathews (44 Mo. 523), 225, 226. State V. Mathis (21 Ind. 277), 874. State ex rel. v. May (106 Mo. 488), 86. State ex rel. v. Maynard (14 111. 419), 468. State ex rel. v. Mead (71 Mo. 266), 159, 190, 225, 226, 243, 703. State ex rel Bownes v Meehan (45 N. J. L. 189), 153. State ex rel. v. Meier (143 Mo. 439), 160. State V. Merrill (37 Me. 329), 6, 671, 713, 776. State V. Merrit (35 Conn. 314), 716, 717. State V. Merritt (83 N. C. 677), 485, 490. State V. Merry (3 Mo. 278), 345. State V. MetcaU (65 Mo. App. 681), 754. State ex rel. v. Meyers (80 Mo. 601. 646. State V. Miller (41 La. Ann. 53), 744. State ex rel. v. Miller (100 Mo. 439), 226, 315. State ex rel. v. Miller (66 Mo. 328), 67. State V. Miller (45 Mo. 495), 226. State (Gorum) v. Mills (24 N. J. L. 177), 343. State ex rel v. Milwaukee (25 Wis. 122), 609. State ex rel. v Milwaukee Co. Super. Ct. (105 Wis. 651), 262, 880. State V. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co. (39 Minn. 219), 200. State ex rel. v. Minnesota Thresh- er Mfg. Co. (40 Minn. 213),- 879. State ex rel. v. M. K. & T. R. R. Co. (164 Mo. 208), 83, 112. State ex rel. v. Mo. Pac. R. R. (92 Mo. 137), 351. State ex rel. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (71 Mo. App. 385), 727. State V. Mobile (5 Port 279), 762. State V. Mohr (55 Mo. App. 329), 755. State V. Moody (24 Mo. 560), 527. State V. Moore (107 Mo. 78), 49. State V. Moore (113 N. C. 697), 631. State V. Moores (55 Neb. 480), 66, 805. State V. Morris (47 La. Ann. 1660), 295, 358, 705. State V. Morris (47 La. Ann. 1660), 544. State (Vanatta) v. Morristown (34 N. J. L. 445), 249, 260, 439, 829, 850. State V. Morristown (33 N. J. L. 57), 340, 343, 346. State V. Mosby (53 Mo. App. 571), 754, 755. clx TABLE OF CASES. (The references are ta pages.) State V. Moss (2 Jones Law 66), 512, 519, 525, 526. State ex rel v. Mote (48 Neb. 683), 441. State V. Mott (61 Md. 297), 31, 79, 80, 698. State V. Mott (111 Wis. 19), 156, 163. State ex rel Truesdale v. Moultrie- ville (1 Rice Law 158), 286, 502. State V. Muir (164 Mo. 610), 794. State V. Mumford (73 Mo. 647), 757. State ex rel v. Municipal Court (89 Wis. 358), 520. State ex rel v. Murphy (134 Mo. 548), 71, 129, 133, 724, 742, 886. State ex rel Laclede Gas Light Co. V. Murphy (130 Mo. 10), 724, 884. State ex rel Underground Service Co. V. Murphy (34 L. R. A. 369), 723. State V. Namais (49 La. Ann. 618), 764. State V. Nashville (83 Tenn. 697), 21, 26. State V. Natal (39 La. Ann. 439), 353, 513, 517. State V. Natal (39 La. Ann. 439), 513. 517. State V. Neel (48 Ark. 283), 570. State V. Neidt (N. J. Eq. 1890, 19 Alt. Rep. 318, 682, 699. State V. Nelson (66 Minn. 166), 767. State V. Nelson (19 Mo. 393), 755. State V. Newark (54 N. J. L. 102), 893. State V. Newark (54 N. J. L. 62), 808. State (Volk) v. Newark (47 N. J. L. 117), 8, 22, 25, 132. State (Trowbridge) v Newark (46 N. J. L. 140), 4.50. State (Agens) v. Newark (37 N. J. L. 415), 819, 820. State V. Newark (34 N. J. L. 264), 707. State V. Newark (34 N. J. L. 236), 866. State V. Newark (31 N. J. L. 360)'. 829. State (Doyle) v. Newark (30 N. J. L. 303), 191, 255, 439. State V. Newark (25 N. J. L. 399), 161, 240. State ex rel v. Newark (57 Ohio St. 430), 441. State ex rel v. Newman (96 Wis. 258), 450, 520, 754, 788. State v. New Brunswick (30 N. J. L. 395), 850. State ex rel v. New Orleans & C. R. Co. (37 La. Ann. 589), 19, 371. State V. New Orleans (32 La. Ann. 493), 385. State ex rel v. New Whatcom (3 Wash. 7), 225. State V. New York (10 N. Y. Super. Ct. 119), 913. State V. Noble (20 La. Ann. 325), 513. State V. Noblesville (157 Ind. 31), 46, 247, 250. State V. Nohl (113 Wis. 15), 232. State ex rel v. Noonan (59 Mo. App. 524), 398, 424, 657. State V. Norman (44 Mo. App. 302), 756. State V. Northern Bell M., etc., Co. (12 Nev. 89), 492. State V. Noyes (30 N. H. 279), 25, 671, 756. State V. O'Brialn (68 Mo. 153), 153. State ex rel v. O'Brien (89 Mo. 631), 608. State V. Ochsner (9 Mo. App. 216), 756. State V. Oddle (42 Mo. 210), 582, 584, 58S. State V. Oleson (26 Minn. 507), 787. State ex rel v. Omaha (14 Neb. 265), 716. State V. Omaha & C. B. Ry. Co. (113 Iowa 30), 3, 16, 249, 252, 894, 911. State ex rel v. Omaha & C. B. Ry. & B. Co. (91 Iowa 517), 899. State V. O'Neil (49 La. Ann. 1171), 269, 735. State (North Baptist Church) v. Orange (54 N. J. L. Ill), 253, 861. TABLE OF CASES. clxi (The references are to pages.) State (Morgan) v. Orange (50 N. J. L. 389), 403. State (Woodruff) v. Orange (32 N. J. L,. 49), 851, 852. State V. Orr (68 Conn. 101), 705, 706. State V. Orr (61 Ohio St. 384), 166, 170. State V. Overton (24 N. J. L. 435), 13, 32, 296. State ex rel v. Owsley (122 Mo. 68), 340, 607, 609, 782. State V. Painfield (38 N. J. L. 95), 850. State V. Painter (67 Mo. 84), 538. State V. Pamperin (42 Minn. 320), 757. State V. Parker (26 Vt. 357), 49. State V. Paris Ry. Co. (55 Tex. 76), 600. State V. Parsons (124 Mo. 436), 398, 543. State (Greely) v. Passaic (42 N. J. L. 429). 477, 487, 512, 518, 542. State V. Patamia (34 La. Ann. 750), 271. State (Youngster) v. Paterson (40 N. J. L. 244), 829. State (Danforth) v. Paterson (34 N. J. L. 163), 132, 262, 263, 429. State V. Paterson, etc., R. R. Co. (45 N. J. L. 310), 79. State ex rel v. Paterson (35 N. J. L. 190), 169, 174. State V. Patrick (65 Mo. App. 653), 133. State V. Payne (4 Mo. 377), 344, 346. State V. Payson (37 Me. 361), 704. State V. Payssan (47 La. Ann. 1029), 289, 705. State ex rel Storts v. Peabody (63 Mo. App. 378), 465. State V. Peel Splint Coal Co. (36 W. Va. 802), 768, 779. State V. Pender (66 N. C. 313), 468. State V. Pendergrass (106 N. C. 664), 682. State (Del. & Alt. Tel. & Tel. Co.) V. Pensauken Tp. (67 N. J. L. 91), 231, 233, 720. State V. People's Slaughterhouse 11 & R. Co. (46 La. Ann. 1031), 762. State ex rel v. Perkins (139 Mo. 106), 112. State V. Perkins (24 N. J. L. 409), 469. State ex rel v. Perpetual Ins. Co. (S Mo. 330), 440.' State V. Perth Amboy (51 N. J. L. 406), 493. State V. Peters (67 Ohio St. '494), 469. State ex rel v. Phillips (102 Mo. 664), 214. State V. Pierce (65 Iowa 85), 43. State V. Pierce (35 Wis. 93), 13. State ex rel v. Pinkerman (63 Conn. 176), 163, 173. State V. Pitts (58 Mo. 556), 538. State (Flanagan) v. Plainfield (44 N. J. L. 118), 501, 557. State (Boice) v. Plainfield (38 N. J. L. 95), 219, 249, 850, 866. State V. Piatt (2 S. C. 150), 209. State V. Plunkett (18 N. J. L. 5), 787, 793. State V. Pollard (6 R. I. 290), 25, 336, 338, 790. State V. Pond (93 Mo. 606), 49, 133, 299, 351. State V. Portage (12 Wis. 562), 813. State V. Porter (113 Ind. 79), 166. State V. Powell (100 N. C. 525), 630, 654. State V. Powell (97 N. C. 417), 478, 525. State V. Pratt (59 Vt. 590), 401. State V. Prescott (27 Vt. 194), 515. State V. Preston (Idaho 1894, 38 Pac. Rep. 694), 506. 555, 786. State V. Priester (43 Minn. 373), 168, 172, 646. State ex rel Vastine v. Probate Court (38 Mo. 529), 329. State V. Proctor (90 Mo. 334), 333, 334, 873. State ex rel v. Public Schools (134 Mo. 296), 433, 434. State ex inf. v. Racklilfe (164 Mo. 453), 368. State (Rahway Gas Light Co.) V. Rahway (58 N. J. L. 510), 428. clxii TABLE OP CASES. (The references are to pages.) State V. Railroad Commissioners (37 N. J. L. 228), 67. State ex rel v. Ramsey (48 Minn. 236), 310, 311. State V. Ramsey County District Court (38 Minn. 295), 835. State V. Ramsey Co. Dlst. Ct. (33 Minn. 164), 901. State V. Rankin (11 S. Dak. 144), 400. State ex rel v. Ranson (73 Mo. 78), 245, 336. State V. Ray (131 N. C. 814), 357, 760. State ex rel v. Read (50 La. Ann. 445), 526. State V. Real Estate Banks (5 Ark. 595), 879. State ex rel v. Village of Reads (76 Minn. 69), 331. State V. Rebassa (9 La. Ann. 305), 630. State V. Reckards (21 Minn. 47), 496, 506. State V. Redmon (43 Minn. 250), 626. , State V. Reis (38 Minn. 371), 797, 826. State ex rel v. Renick (157 Mo. 292), 52, 558, 560. State Y. Rice (97 N. C. 421). 283. State V. Richards (32 W. Va. 348), 405. State V. Richardson (34 Minn. 115), 489, 493. State V. Rielly (4 Mo. 392), 538. State V. Riley (49 La. Ann. 1617), 449, 544. State V. Robbins (54 N. J. L. 566), 440. State V. Robertson (45 La. Ann. 954), 71, 682, 740. State V. Robinson (42 Minn. 107), 642. State V. Robitshek (60 Minn. 123), 482, 794. State V. Roby (142 Ind. 168), 665. State V. Roche (37 Mo. App. 480), 539, 772. State V. Ross (49 Mo. 416), 320, 333, 334. S(ate ex rel v. Ross (136 Mo. 259), 578. State V. Rothschild (19 Mo. App. 137), 756. State V. Rouch (47 Ohio St. 478), 564. State V. Rowley (12 Conn. 101), 524. State V. Rucker (24 Mo. 557), 653 State V. Ruff (30 La. Ann. 497), 278, 482. State ex rel v. Ruhe (24 Nevada 251), 512, 515. State ex rel v. Rusk (55 Wis. 465), 81. State V. Russell (88 Mo. 648), 507. State V. Russell (17 Mo. App. 16), 756. State (Meday) v. Rutherford (52 N. J. L. 499), 834, 841. State ex rel v. St. Joseph (37 Mo. 270), 49. State ex rel Belt v. St. Louis (161 Mo. 371), 225. State ex rel v. St. Louis (loS Mo. 505), 127, 812. State ex rel v. St. Louis (169 Mo. 31), 230, 578. State ex rel v. St. Louis (56 Mo. 277), 828, 845, 853. State ex rel v. St. Louis Board of Health (16 Mo. App. 8), 537, 553. 698. State ex rel Subway Co. v. St. Louis (145 Mo. 551), 376, 723, 725. State ex rel v. St. Louis County (34 Mo. 546), 67, 607. State V. St. Louis County Dist. Ct. (61 Minn. 542), 823. State ex rel v. St. Louis Court of Appeals (99 Mo. 216), 577, 578. State ex rel Rutledge v. St. Louis School Board (131 Mo. 505), 433. State ex rel v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. (117 Mo. 1), 340. State V. St. Paul (32 Minn. 329), 25, 763. State V. Sarradal (46 La. 700), 763. State V. Savannah (1 T. IT. P. Charl. 235), 480, 523. State V. Scaggs (33 Mo. 22), 755. TABLE OF CASES. clxiii (The references are to pages.) State V. Schemmer (42 La. Ann. 1166), 669, 708. State V. Schlenker (112 Iowa 642), 539, 767. State V. Schmidt (41 La. Ann. 27), 764. State ex rel v. Schoenlg (72 Minn. 528), 452. State ex rel v. School Board (131 Mo. 505), 430, 433. State V. Scott (98 Tenn. 254), 401. State V. Scougal (3 S. D. 55), 682. State V. Schuchardt (42 La. Ann. 49), 734, 737. State V. Schuchmann (133 Mo. 11]), 145, 613. State ex rel v. Schweickardt (109 Mo. 496), 304, 646, 672. 805. State V. Seavey (22 Neb. 454), 66, 805. State V. Segel (60 Minn. 507), 773. State ex rel St. Louis v. Seibert (123 Mo. 424), 683. State V. Sellner (17 Mo. App. 39), 756. State V. Severance (Me., 2 New Bng. Rtp. 425), 471. State ex rel v. Severance (55 Mo. 378). 329, 340. State ex rel v. Severance (49 Mo. 401), 110, 446. State V. Sevier (117 Ind. 338), 43, 758. State ex rel Karr v. Shelby Co. Taxing Dist. (16 Lea. 240), 575, 788, 795. State V. Sheriff (48 Minn. 236), 710. State V. Sherrard (117 N. C. 716), 771. State V. Shorten (93 Mo. 123), 541. State V. Shroeder (51 Iowa 197), 674. State V. Sickmann (65 Mo. App. 499), 309, 414, 659. State V. Silva (130 Mo. 440), 538. State ex rel v. Simmons Hdw. Co. (109 Mo. 118), 351. State V. Simonds (3 Mo. 414), 66, 344, 346, 794. State V. Sinks (42 Ohio St. 345), 452. State V. Slaughter (70 Mo. 484), 382. State ex rel v. Slover (134 Mo. 10. 607), 329, 344. State V. Sly (4 Oreg. 277), 787, 795. State V. Small (31 Mo. 197), 646. State V. Smith (67 Conn. 541), 24, 76, 451, 614, 616. State V. Smith (8 Blackf. 489), 522. State V. Smith (31 Iowa 493), 660. State ex rel Parker v. Smith (22 Minn. 218), 148, 176, 178, 183, 252. State ex rel v. Smith (150 Mo. 75), 81. State ex rel v. Smith (101 Mo. 174), 572. State ex rel v. Smith (89 Mo. • 408), 338. State V. Smith (44 Ohio St. 348), 805. State V. Smith (Or. 1890, 25 Pac. Rep. 389), 199. State V. Smith (10 R. I. 258), 541. State V. Smith (3 Heisk. 465), 43, 758. State V. Smith (72 Vt. 140), 640. State V. Smith (52 Wis. 134), 478. State V. Smithson (106 Mo. 149), 398, 405. State V. Smyth (14 R. I. 100), 767. State V. Snoddy (128 Mo. 523), 398. State V. Snyder (44 Mo. App. 429), 539. State V. Society, etc. (42 N. J. L. 504), 717. State V. Soragan (40 Vt. 450), 501, 591. State V. South (136 Mo. 673), 445. State ex rel v. Southern Ry. Co. (100 Mo. 59), 578. State V. Spaude (37 Minn. 322), 340. State V. Speyer (67 Vt. 502), 693. State V. Starkey (49 Minn. 503), 224, 265, 735. State V. Steamship Constitution (42 Cal. 578), 422. State V. Stearns (31 N. H. 106), 480, 532. State V. Stephens (4 Tex. 137), 611. clxiv TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) State V. Stevenson (109 N. C. 730), 403. State V. Stone (46 La. Ann. 147), 767. State ex rel v. Stone (120 Mo. 428), 160. State ex rel v. Stone (25 Mo. 555), 440. State ex rel v. Stratton (136 Mo. 423), 329, 344. State V. Summerfield (107 N. C. 895), 682, 713. State V. Superior Court (105 Wis. 651), 257, 260. State V. Sutton (100 N. C. 474), 332. State V. Swearingen (12 Ga. 23), 120. State V. Sweeney (93 Mo. 38), 448. State V. Swindell (146 Ind. 527.), .3, 337. State V. Taff (37 Conn. 392), 150. State V. Taft (118 N. C. 1190), 687, 695. State ex rel v. Tappan (29 Wis. 664), 104, 106. State V. Taylor (29 Ind. 517), 707. State V. Taylor (107 Tenn. 455). 93, 890. State V. Taylor (21 Wash. 672). 329. State V. Tenant (110 N. C. 609), 295, 357, 452, 738, 739. State V. Terrell (73 Conn. 407), 788. State V. Thomas (118 N. C. 1221), 357. State V. Thomaston & Rockland (74 Me. 198), 802. State V. Thornton (37 Mo. 360), 792, 793. State (Clarke) v. Thornton (49 N. J. L. 349), 8. State V. Threadgill (76 N. C. 17), 466, 589. State V. Thurston (92 Mo. 325), 315. State ex rel Mitchell v. Tolan (33 N. J. L. 195), 153. State V. Topeka (36 Kan. 76), 25, 353, 512, 513, 516, 733. State V. Tosney (26 Mich, 262), 582. State ex rel v. Tracy (94 Mo. 217), 433, 657. State V. Traders' Bank (41 La. Ann. 329), 633. State (Wilson) v. Trenton (61 N. J. L. 599), 866. State (Wilson) v. Trenton (60 N. J. L. 394), 866. State (Trenton Horse R. Co.) v. Trenton (53 N. J. L. 132), 292, 299, 690, 747. State (Riley) v. Trenton (51 N. J. L. 498), 135, 144, 513, 787, 792. State (Hankinson) v. Trenton (51 N. J. L. 495), 144, 509, 533. State (Montgomery) v. Trenton (36 N. J. L. 79), 263, 428, 880, 882, 888, 890. State V. Tryon (39 Conn. 183). 4, 17. State V. Tsni Ho (47 La. Ann. 50), 569. State V. Tweedy (115 N. C. 704), 731. State V. Tyrrell (73 Conn. 407), 506. State V. Tyson (111 N. C. 687), 768. State V. Ulm (7 Ohio N. P. 659), 787. State V. Union (33 N. J. L. 350), 866. State (Pope) v. Union (32 N. J. L. 343), 200. State V. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. (Idaho 1902, 67 Pac. Rep 647), 607. State V. Vail (57 Iowa 103), 564. State V. Vail (53 Iowa 550), 172, 201, 205. State ex rel v. Valle (41 Mo. 29), 365. State V. Van Buskirk (40 N. J. L. 463), 145. State ex rel v. Van Every (75 Mo. 530), 610. State V. Van Matre (49 Mo. 268), 528. State V. Vanosdal (131 Ind. 388), 166, 180. State V. VanSachs (45 La. Ann. 1416), 773. State V. Van Winkle (1 Dutch. 73), 206. TABLE OF CASES. clxv (The references are to pages.) State V. Vic De Bar (58 Mo. 395), 18. State ex rel v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. (83 Mo. 144), 751. State ex rel Beek v. Wagener (77 Minn. 483), 404. State ex rel v. Walbridge (119 Mo. 383), 18, 25, 78, 83, 87, 112, 117, 278, 328, 329, 342, 344, 345, 672, 787. State ex rel v. Walsh (69 Mo. 408), 365. State V. Wapies (12 La. Ann. 343), 641. State V. Ward (9 Heisk. 100), 113. State (Staates) v. Washington (45 N. J. L. 318), 179, 274, 288, 450, 761. State (Staates) v. Washington (44 N. J. L. 605), 180, 191, 234, 255, 282, 440, 638, 639, 761. State ex rel v. Weatherby (45 Mo. 17), 877. State V. Webber (107 N. C. 962), 72, 76, 79, 295, 450, 752. State V. Weber (111 Mo. 204), 541. State V. Welch (36 Conn. 215), 24, 451, 788, 792, 793. State V. Welch (21 Minn. 22), 507. State V. Wells (46 Iowa 662), 228. 365, 471, 530, 535, 537. State V. Welton (55 Mo. 288), 398. State V. Wentworth (65 Me. 234), 541. State V. West (34 Mo. 424), '657. State ex rel v. Western Irrigating Co. (40 Kan. 96), 879. State ex inf. v. West. Side Street Ry. Co. (146 Mo. 155), 894. State V. Wheeler (33 Neb. 563), 661. State V. Wheeler (44 N. J. L. 88), 707. State V. Wheelock (95 Iowa 577), 404. State ex rel v. Whitaker (48 La. Ann. 527), 279. State V. Whittaker (33 Mo. 457), 657. State V. Whitaker (114 N. C. 818), 525, 578. State ex i-el v. Whitcomb (55 111. 172), 441, State V. White (33 La. Ann. 1218), 527. State V. White (64 N. H. 48), 628, 729. State V. White (76 N. C. 15), 466. State ex rel v. Whitehead (67 N. J. L. 405), 163, 173. State V. Whitney (41 Neb. 613), 546. State V. Wiggin (64 N. H. 508), 403. State V. Wilcox (42 Conn. 364), 648. State ex rel v. Wilcox (45 Mo. 458), 49, 65. State V. Winkelmeier (35 Mo. 103), 49, 646. State V. Wilkesville (20 Ohio St. 288), 164, 165. State V. Williams (30 Me. 484), 472. State V. Williams (25 Me. 561), 150. State V. Williams (44 Mo. App. 302), 756. State V. Williams (35 Mo. App. 541), 445. State V. Williams (40 S. C. 373), 515, 518. State ex rel v. Williams (11 S. C. 288), 17, 518, 754, 787. State V. Williard (39 Mo. App. 251), 646. State V. Willingham (9 Wyo. 290), 629. State ex rel v. Willis (66 Mo. 131), 333, 334. State V. Willis (37 Mo. 192), 657. State V. Wilson (43 N. H. 415), 336. State V. Wilson (106 N. C. 718), 505. State V. Wish (15 Neb. 448), 335. State V. Wister (62 Mo. 592), 278, 753, 792. State ex rel v. Withrow (108 Mo. 1), 578. State V. Wood (94 N. E. 855), 465. State V. Woodward (23 Vt. 92), 92, 93. State V. Wordin (56 Conn. 216), 24, 694. State V. Worth (95 N. C. 615), 283. clxvi TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) State V. Wray (72 N. C. 253), 541. State ex rel v. Yates (19 Mont. 239), 163, 167. State V. Yopp (97 N. C. 477), 296, 665, 666, 668, 728. State V. Young (17 Kan. 414), 24, 343. State ex rel v. Young (29 Minn. 474), 49, 133, 385. State V. Zeigler (32 N. J. L. 262), 79, 83, 134, 282, 468, 475, 508. State V. Zophy (14 S. Dak. 119), 402. State V. Zurich (49 La. Ann. 447), 738. State Board of Education v. Ab- erdeen (56 Miss. 518), 339. State Board of Health v. Roy (22 R. I. 538), 516. State Center v. Barenstein (66 Iowa 249), 135, 294, 626. State Freight Tax Case (15 Wall. 232), 395, 406, 408. State Tax on Railway Gross Re- ceipts (15 Wall. 284), 408, 412. State Hospital v. Flaherty (134 Cal. 315), 334. Stater v. Riley (49 La. Ann. 1617), 756. Staude v. Board of Election Com'rs (61 Cal. 313), 340. Steamboat Northern Indiana v. Milliken (7 Ohio St. 383), 468. Steam Navigation Co. v. Morrison (13 Com. Bench N. S. 581), 56. Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens (6 Wall. 31), 39, 417. Stearns County v. St. Cloud, M. & A. R. Co. (36 Minn. 425), 719. Stebbins v. Mayer (38 Kan. 573), , 229, 276. Stebbins v. Merritt (10 Cush. 27), 200. Steckert v. East Saginaw (22 Mich. 104), 173, 188, 204, 206. Steele v. Burkhardt (104 Mass. 59), 604, 605. -Steele v. River Forest (141 111. 302), 853. 855, 869, 870. Steffin V. St. Louis (135 Mo. 44), 368. Steffen v. Fox (124 Mo. 630), 828, 851, 870, 871. Steffy V. Monroe City (135 Ind; 466), 289, 757. Stehmeyer v. Charleston (53 S. C. 259), 665. Stein V. Mobile (49 Ala. 362), 611. Steines v. Franklin County (48 Mo. 167), 126, 675. Steinlein v. Halstead (52 Wis. 289), 828. Steinmuller v. Kansas City (3 Kan. App. 45), 831. Steinmeyer v. St. Louis (3 Mo. App. 256), 692. Stephan v. Daniels (27 Ohio St. 527), 836, 839. Stephani v. Brown (40 111. 428), 716. Stephens v. Ballou (27 Kan. 594), 333. Stephens v. People ex rel (89 111. 337), 547. Stephenson v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (68 Mo. App. 642), 888, 891. Sterling v. Camden (65 N. J. L. 190), 451. Sterling v. Gait (117 111. 11), 848, 855. Sternberg v. State (36 Neb. 307), 895. 911. Stetson v. Faxon (19 Pick. 147), 63. Stetson V. Kempton (13 Mass. 272), 71, 73, 75, 104. Steuart v. Baltimore (7 Md. 500), 525. ' Stevens v. Chicago (48 111. 498), 532. Stevens v. Com. (6 Met. 241), 499. Stevens v. Dimond (6 N. H. 330), 51, 493. Stevens v. Kansas City (146 Mo. 460), 478, 522, 565. Stevens v. Merchantville (62 N. J. L. 167), 896. Stevens v. Muskegon (111 Mich. 72), 915. Stevens v. St. Mary's T. School (144 111. 336), 260, 431. Stever v. McConnell (10 Ohio Dec. 573), 450. Stevenson v. Bay City (26 Mich. 44), 15, 46, 160, 206, 208, 212, 245, 592, 600. TABLE OF CASES. clxvii (Tile relerences are to pages.) Stevenson v. Joy (152 Mass. 45), 457. Stewart v. Clinton 179 Mo. 603), 115, 581, 598, 600, 675, 828, 845. Stewart v. Council BlufEs (58 Iowa 642), 195. Stewart v. Hood (10 Ala. 600), 531. Stewart v. Kehrer (115 Ga. 184), 623, 629. Stewart v. Otoe County (2 Neb. 177), 113. Stewart v. Stringer (41 Mo. 400), 481. Stier V. Oskaloosa (41 Iowa 353), 582. Stifel V. McManus (74 Mo. App. 558), 848, 851. Stifel V. Southern Cooperage Co. (38 Mo. App. 340), 131, 132. Stiles V. Jones (3 Yeates 491), 610. Still V. Lansingburgh (16 Barb. 107), 92. Stillwater v. Moor (Okla. 1893, 33 Pac. Rep. 1024), 249. Slinson v. Browning (L. R. 1 C. P. 321), 44. Stockard v. Morgan (185 U. S. 27), 400. Stockdale v. School Dis. (47 Mich. 226), 194. Stockton, ex parte (33 Fed. Rep. 95), 400. Stockton V. Powell (29 Fla. 1), 178. Stockton V. Skinner (53 Cal. 85), 855. Stoddard v. Gilmann (22 Vt. 568), 150, 194, 320. Stoddard v. Johnson (75 Ind. 20), 177. Stokes V. New York City (14 Wend. 87), 567, 769. Stone V. Bank of Commerce (174 U. S. 412), 374. Stone V. Cambridge (6 Cush. 270), 855. Stone V. Graves (8 Mo. 149), 474. Stone v. Hamilton (8 Cush. 592), 151. Stone V. Mississippi (101 U. S. 814), 321, 419, 665. Stone V. School Dist. (8 Cush. 592), 148. Stone V. Small (54 Vt. 498), 8. Stone V. State (12 Mo. 400), 653. Stone V. Wisconsin (94 U. S. 181), 54. Storm V. Odell (2 Wend. 287), 570. Story V. Bayonne (35 N. J. L. 335), 842. Story V. New York Elevated R. Co. (90 N. Y. 122), 96. Stoutenburgh v. Hennick (129 U. S. 141), 66, 395, 400, 622. Stoughton V. Atherton (12 Met. 105), 148, 151, 212, 214. Stowe V. Wyse (7 Conn. 214), 175. Strahl, ex parte (16 Iowa 369), 155. Stratford v. Montgomery (110 Ala. 619), 401. Stratman, ex parte (39 Cal. 517), 463. Stratton v. Lowell (181 Mass. 511), 207. Straub v. Pittsburgh (138 Pa. St. 356), 238. Strauder v. West Virginia (100 U. S. 303), 354. Strauss v. Cincinnati (24 Wkly. Law Bui. 422), 839. Strauss v. Pontiac (40 111. 301), 36, 123, 646, 672. Strauss v. Waycross (97 Ga. 475), 784. Street v. Francis (3 Ohio 277), 562. Street v. Verney Electrical Supply Co. (Ind. 1903, 61 L. R. A. 154), 864. Street Ry. Co. of Grand Rapids v. West Side Street Ry. Co. (48 Mich. 433), 916. Street Opening & Improvement Board, in re (133 N. Y. 436), 830. Street Opening Board, in re (82 Hun. 580), 830. Stretch v. Hoboken (47 N. J. L. 268), 835. Striker v. Kelly (7 Hill 9), 187, 188, 846. Strohm v. Iowa City (47 Iowa 42), 169. clxviii ■Table op cases. (The references are to pages.) Stromburg v. Earick (6 B. Mon. 578), 538. Strong V. Brooklyn (68 N. Y. 1), 93. Strong V. tJistrict of Columbia (4 Mackey 242), 145. Strosser v. Ft. Wayne (100 Ind. 443), 140. Stroud V. Consumers' Water Co. (56 N. J. L. 422), 173, 440. Strowbridge v. Portland (8 Oreg. 67), 839, 841. Stryker v. New York (19 Johns. 179), 674. Stuart V. Havens (17 Neb. 211), 717. Stuart V. Palmer (74 N. Y. 183), 444. Stuhr V. Hoboken (47 N. J. L. 147), 48, 248, 252. Stull V. De Mattos (23 Wash. 71), 631, 653. Stutsman v. McVicar (111 Iowa 40), 237, 242. Stuyvesant v. New York, etc. (7 Cow. 588), 224, 257, 356, 490. Stuyvesant v. Pearsall (15 Barb. 244), 895. Suell V. Belleville (30 Up. Can. Q. B. 81), 442. Sullivan v. teadvllle (11 Colo. 483), 187, 210. Sullivan v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (117 Mo. 2.14), 748. Sullivan v. Pausch (5 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep, 196), 186, 187. Sullivan v. People (15 111. 233), 332. Sullivan v. Phillips (110 Ind. 320), 118. Summerville v. Pressley (33 S. C. 56), 231, 671, 689, 698. Sumter v. Deschamps (4 S. C. 297), 83. Supervisors v. Gorrell (20 Gratt. 484), 577. Supervisors of Schuyler Co. v. People ex rel (25 111. 181). 186, 190, 203. Surber v. MoClintic (10 W. Va. 236), 774. Sutton V. McConnell (46 Wis. 269), 478, 528, 537. Swain v. Comstock (18 Wis. 463), 582. Swain v. Fulmer (135 Ind. 8), 829. Swan V. Colville (19 R. I. 161), 810. Swann, ex parte (96 Mo. 44), 49, 576. Swann v. Buck (40 Miss. 268), 385. Swann v. Cumberland (8 Gill. 150), 183. Swarth v. People (109 111. 621), 626, 637, 638, 647. Swartz V. Page (13 Mo. 603), 92. Sweeney v. K. C. Cable Ry. Co. (150 Mo. 385), 749. Sweet V. Wabash (41 Ind. 7), 647. Swenson v. Lexington (69 Mo. 157), 891. Swigert, in re (119 111. 83), 81. Swingley v. Haynes (22 111. 214), 482. Swift V. Klein (163 111. 269), 36, 298. Swift V. People (162 111. 534), 135, 703. Swift V. Topeka (43 Kan. 671), 442, 538, 727, 728. Swift V. Wayne Circuit Judges (64 Mich. 479), 569. Swindell v. State ex rel Maxey 143 Ind. 153), 171, 189, 314, 337. Swineford v. Franklin County (73 Mo. 279), 876. Sylvester Coal Co. v. St. Louis (130 Mo. 323), 436, 477, 768. T. Taber v. Grafmiller (109 Ind. 206), 856. Taber v. New Bedford (177 Mass. 197), 639. Taber v. New Bedford (135 Mass. 162), 808. Tacoma v. Lillis (4 Wash. 797), 8. Tacoma Gas & Electric Light Co. V. Tacoma (14 Wash. 288), 102, 342. Tacoma, etc., Co. v. Tacoma (14 Wash. 700), 908. Tainter v. Worcester (123 Mass. 311), 677, 798. TABLE OF CASES. clxix (The references are to pages.) Taintor v. Morristown (33 N. J. L. 57), 812. Talbot Co. V. Queen Anne Co. (50 Md. 245), 806. Talbutt V. State (39 Tex. Crim. App. 64), 400. Talcott V. Buffalo (125 N. Y. 280), 259, 260. Talmage v. Fire Department of New York (24 Wend. 235), 550. Tampa v. Salomonson (35 Fla. 446), 232, 449. Tamaqua, etc. Co. v. Inter-County Street Ry. Co. (167 Pa. St. 91), 895. Tanner v. Albion (5 Hill 121), 756. Tarkio v. Cook (120 Mo. 1), 185, 224, 232, 284, 425, 570, 597, 672, 756, 761. Tash V. Adams (10 Cush. 252), 103. Tate V. M. K. & T. Ry. Co. (64 Mo. 149), 891. Tatham v. Philadelphia (11 Phil. 276), 103. Taunton v. Taylor (116 Mass. 254), 697. Tax Collector v. Dendinger (3S La. Ann. 261), 76. Taylor, ex parte (87 Cal. 91), 719. Taylor v. Americus (39 Ga. 59), 36, 534, 571, 572. Taylor v. Boyd (62 Tex. 533), 823. Taylor v. Carondelet (22 Mo. 105), 17, 257, 273, 276. Taylor v. Goodwin (42 Q. B. Div. 228), 727. Taylor v. Griswold (14 N. J. L. 222), 22, 27, 292. Taylor v. Henry (2 Pick. 397), 179, 210, 212, 214. Taylor v. L. S. & M. S. R. R. Co. (45 Mich. 74), 54, 57, 62. Taylor v. Lambertville (43 N. J. Eq. 107), 3, 842. Taylor v. McFadden (84 Iowa 262), 118, 243, 609, 610, 838. Taylor v. Owensboro (98 Ky. 271), 23, 285, 544, 786, 789, 793. Taylor v. Palmer (31 Cal. 241), 237, 241, 251, 846. Taylor v. Pine Bluff (34 Ark. 603), 83. 576, 768. Taylor v. Porter (4 Hill 140), 77.7. Taylor v. Reynolds (92 Cal. 573), 520. Taylor v. St. Louis (14 Mo. 20), 675, 839. Taylor v. State (35 Wis. 298), 284. Taylor v. Tacoma (8 Wash. 174), 8. Taylor v. Union Traction Co. (184 Pa. St. 465), 727, 728. Taylor, Cleveland & Co. v. Pine Bluff (34 Ark. 603), 655. Teass v. St. Albans (68 W. Va. 1), 721. Teegarden v. Racine (56 Wis. 545), 118. Teft V. Size (10 111. 432), 246, 594. Telegraph Co. v. Texas (105 U. S. 460), 408. Telephone Co. v. Oshkosh (62 Wis. 32), 7!>. Tell V. Fonda (4 Johns. 304), 498. Temperance Hall Assn. v. Giles (33 N. J. L. 260), 717. Temple v. Sumner (51 Mass. 13), 658. Templeton v. Tekamah (32 Neb. 542), 639, 661. Ten Eyck v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co. (18 N. J. L. 200), 53. Ten Eyck v. Pontiac R. R. etc. Co. (74 Mich. 226), 164. Tennant v. Crocker (85 Mich. 328), 119 168, 202, 846. Tenny v. Lenz (16 Wis. 566), 640, 733. Terre Haute v. Kersey (Ind. 1902, 64 N. B. Rep. 469), 630, 643. Terre Haute v. Lake (43 Ind. 480), 50, 320, 337, 581. Terre Haute v. Terre Haute Water- works Co. (94 Ind. 305), 91. Terre Haute v. Turner (36 Ind. 522), 719. Terre Haute, etc., R. R. v. Mc- Corkle (140 Ind. 613), 533. Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Voel- ker (129 111. 540), 238, 595, 599. Terrell, ex parte (40 Tex. Cr. App. 28), 613. Terry v. State (22 Ohio Cir. Ct. 16), 527. / Tesh V Com. (4 Dana 522), 463, 464. Teter v. Clayton (71 Ind. 237), 332. clxx TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Texas Banking & Ins. Co. v. State (42 Tex. 636), 631. Texas & N. 0. R. R. v. Syfan (91 Tex. 562), 526. Textor v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. (59 Md. 63), 750. Thamm, ex parte (10 Mo. App. 595), 560. Thatcher v. Toledo (19 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 311), 189. The Binghamton Bridge (3 Wall. 51), 306, 378. The Canadian Atlantic R. W. Co. V. Ottawa (8 Ont. Rep. 183), 181. Theilan v. Porter (14 Lea. 622), 706. Theisen v. McDavid (34 Pla. 440), 513, 520, 759, 786. The Laundry License Case (22 Fed. Rep. 701), 616, 634. The Phillip Semmer Glass Co. v. Nassau Show Case Co. (28 Misc. 577), 469. Third Muncipality of New Or- leans V. Blanc (1 La. Ann. 385), 731. Third Municipality of New Or- leans V. Ursuline Nuns (2 La. Ann. 611), 128. Themanson v. Kearney (35 Neb. 881), 834. Thomas, ex parte (71 Cal. 204), 401, 402. Thomas, in re (53 Kan. 659), 228, 786. Thomas v. Ashland (12 Ohio St. 124), 519, 576. Thomas v. Citizens' Horse R. R. Co. (104 111. 462), 176. Thomas v. Gain (35 Mich. 155), 444. Thomas v. Grand Junction (13 Colo. App. 80), 49, 224, 227. Thomas v. Hot Springs (34 Ark. 553), 79, 356. Thomas v. Hunt (134 Mo. 392), 890, 891. Thomas v. Mason (39 W. Va. 526), 693. Thomas v. Mead (36 Mo. 232), 577. Thomas v. Mt. Vernon (9 Ohio 290), 471. Thomas v. Richmond (12 Wall. 349), 23, 72. Thomas v. Snead (99 Va. 613), 613, 657. Thomas v. State (5 How. 20), 463. Thomas v. State (6 Mo. 457), 508. Thomason v. Ashworth (73 Cal. 73), 69, 329, 340, 342. Thomason v. Ruggles (69 Cal. 465), 805. Thompson, in re (117 Mo. 83), 576, 772. Thompson v. Alameda County Suprs. (Ill Cal. 553), 895. Thompson v. Camp Meeting Assn. (55 N. J. L. 507), 630. Thompson v. Carroll (22 How. 422), 21, 23. Thompson v. Citizens' St. Ry. (152 Ind. 461), 32, 352. Thompson v. Dodge (58 Minn. 555), 727. Thompson v. Evans (49 111. App. 289), 738. Thompson v. Highland Park (187 111. 265), 224, 329. Thompson v. Hoge (30 Cal. 179), 846. Thompson v. Jackson (93 Iowa 376), 472. Thompson v. Lee County (3 Wall. 327), 72, 74, 186. Thompson v. Milwaukee. (69 Wis. 492), 225, 226. Thompson v. Mt. Vernon (11 Ohio St. 688), 26. Thompson v. Pittston (59 Me. 545), 106. Thompson v. Richmond (12 Wall 349), 21. Thompson v. Schermerhorn (6 N. Y. 92), 83, 134, 809. Thompson v. Schei'merhorn (9 Barb. 152), 808. Thompson v. State (45 Ind. 495), 541. Thompson v. State (17 Tex. App. 253), 404. Thompson v. Summer (9 Wash. 310), 838, 847. Thompson-Houston Electric Co. v. TABLE OF CASES. clxxi (The references are to pages.) Newton (42 Fed. Rep. 723), 117, 798, 837. Thomson v. Boonville (61 Mo. 282), 4, 5, 115, 133, 236, 237, 808. Thomson v. People (184 111. 17), 326. Thorn v. Atlanta (77 Ga. 661), 650. Thornhill v. Stephany (66 N. J. L. 171), 255. Thornton, ex parte (12 Fed. Rep. 538), 402, 632. Thornton v. Campton (18 N. H. 20), 207. Thornton v. The National Ex- change Bank (71 Mo. 221), 90. Thornton v. Sturgis (38 Mich. 639), 247, 250, 253. Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt. 140), 666. Thrift V. Elizabeth City (122 N. C. 31), 308, 902. Thurston v. St. Joseph (51 Mo. 510), 708, 799, 890. Tibbetts V. West & S. T. Street R. Co. (153 111. 147), 895. Tiedke v. Saginaw (43 Mich. 64), 499. Tie Loy, in re (26 Fed. Rep. 611), 294. 312. Tiernan v. Rinker (102 U. S. 123), 402. Tierney v. Brown (65 Miss. 563), 177, 179. Tierney v. Dodge (9 Minn. 166), 562, 569, 570. Tiffit V. Buftalo (65 Barb. 460), 428. Tiit V. Buffalo (82 N. Y. 204), 867. Tift V. Jones (77 Ga. 181), 601. Tilleny v. Knoblauch (73 Minn. 108), 467. Tillman v. Otter (93 Ky. 600), 178. Tims V. State (26 Ala. 165), 333, 516. Tingue v. Port Chester (101 N. Y. 294), 900. Tinkham v. Greer (11 Kan. 299), 13. Tippecanoe County Comrs. v. Chis- son (7 Ind. 688), 476, 482. Tipton V. Norman (72 Mo. 380), 6, 245, 250, 270, 294, 597. Tipton V. State (2 Yerg. 542). 758. Tisdale v. Minonk (46 111. 9), 247, 251, 545, 546, 567. Tissot V. Great Southern T. & T. Co. (39 La. Ann. 996), 682. Title Guarantee, etc., Co. v. Chi- cago (162 111. 505), 859. Tocci V. New York (25 N. Y. Supp. 1089), 806. Toledo V. Edens (59 Iowa 352), 36, 37, 283, 349, 674. Toledo V Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co. (2 Ohio Cir. Ct. Dec. 450), 368, 845. Toledo Consolidating St. Ry. Co. v. Toledo Blec. St. Ry. Co. (6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 362), 596. Toledo P. & W. Ry. Co. v. Chenoa (43 111. 209), 270. Tombaugh v. Grogg (146 Ind. 99), 176. Tomlin v. Cape May (63 N. J. L. 429) 134, 282, 765. Tomlinson v. Jessup (15 Wall 454), 323. Tonnage Tax Cases (12 Wall. 204), 39. Tonawanda v. Lyon (181 U. S. 389), 821. Topeka v. Boutwell (53 Kan. 20), 561, 780. Topeka V. Huntoon (46 Kan. 634), 174. Topeka v. Raynor (61 Kan. 10), 224. Topliff V. Chicago (196 111. 215), 851. Toppan V. Young (9 Daly 357), 128. Torbert v. Lynch (67 Ind. 474), 279. Torpedo Co. v. Clarendon (19 Fed. Rep. 231). 437. Torr V. Corcoran (115 Ind. 188), 177. Torrent v. Muskegon (47 Mich. 115), 797, 838. Torrey v. Millbury (21 Pick. 64), 99, 150, 152. Tower v. Moore (52 Mo. 118), 528. Tower v. Tower (18 Pick. 262), 640. Town of Barton v. Hamilton (18 Ontario Rep. 199), 36. Towns V. Tallahassee (11 Fla. 130), 638. cixxii TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Townsend v. Hoadley (12 Conn. 541), 488, 736. Townsend v. Hoyle (20 Conn. 1), 223. Townsend v. Jersey City (26 N. J. L. 444), 817. Township of Nissouri v. Horse- man (16 Up. Can. Q. B. 583), 180. Tracey v. People (6 Colo. 151), 3, 13, 187, 202, 204, 592, 593. Tracy v. Williams (4 Conn. 107), 492. Trading Stamp Co. v. Memphis (101 Tenn. 181), 260, 262. Train v. Boston Disinfecting Co. (144 Mass. 523), 668, 691, 693. Transportation Co. v. Chicago (99. U. S. 635), 880. Transportation Co. v. Parkersbiirg (107 U. S. 691), 415, 416, 438. Transportation Co. v. Wheeling (99 U. S. 273), 409, 415. Traphagen v. Jersey City (52 N. J. L. 65), 305. Traphagen v. Jersey City (29 N. J. Bq. 206) 875. Travers, ex imrte (3 La. Ann. 693), 563. Treasurer v. Wygall (46 Tex. 447), 383. Trenton v. Clayton (50 Mo. App. 535), 83, 626. Trenton v. Coyle (107 Mo. 193), 4, 5, 236, 237, 828, 845. Trenton v. Devorss (70 Mo. App. 8), 491. •Trenton Horse Ry. Co. v. Trenton (53 N. J. L. 132), 590. Trezvant v. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1892, 20 S. W. Rep. 582), 641. Tribune Association v. New York (48 Barb. 240), 385. Trigally v. Memphis (6 Coldw. 382), 26, 270, 516, 670. Trimble v. Chicago (168 111. 567), 319, 849. Trinity Church v. Higgins (4 Rob. 1), 839. Troy V. Atchison & N. R. R. Co. (11 Kan. 519), 212, 596, 600. Troy V. Cheshire R. Co. (23 N. H. 83), 719. Troy V. Winters (4 Thomp. & C. 256), 553, 735, 739. Troy V. Winters (2 Hun. 63), 734. Truchelut v. Charleston (1 Nott. & M. 227), 250, 252, 265, 465. Truesdale v. Rochester (33 Hun. 574), 241. Truman v. San Francisco (110 Cal. 128), 610. Trumbull v. White (5 Hill 46), 611. Trustees of Union College, in re (129 N. y. 308), 869. Trustees v. People (87 111. 303), 301. Trustees, etc., v. Brie (31 Pa. St. 515), 185, 245, 347. Trustees Presby. Ch. v. State Board, etc. (55 N. J. L. 436), 894. Tuck V. Waldron (31 Ark. 462), 79, 757. Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. Railroad Co. (11 Leigh. 42), 304. Tucker v. Aiken (7 N. H. 113), 152. Tucker v. Iredell Co. Justices (13 Iredell 434), 193, 194. Tudor V. Chicago & South Side Rapid. Transit R. Co. (154 HI. 129), 17. Tuerman, in re (48 Fed. 167), 401. Tufts V. Charlestown (98 Mass. 583), 811. Tugman v. Chicago (78 111. 405), 21, 292, 310, 699. Tulare v. Hevren (126 Cal. 226), 584. Tulloss V. Sedan (31 Kan. 165), 611. Tunkhannock Borough, In re (3 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 480), 246. Turley v. Logan County (17 111. 151), 213. Thurlow Medical Co. v. Salem (67 N. J. L. Ill), 135. Turner v. Detroit (104 Mich. 326), 134. Turner v. Maryland (107 U. S. 38), 768. Tuskaloosa v. Halezstein (134 Ala. 636), 656. Tuskaloosa v. Wright (2 Porter 230), 207. TABLE OF CASES. clxxiii (The reteiences are to pages.) Tuttle, ex parte (91 Cal. 589), 756. Tuttle V. State (4 Conn. 68), 737. Tuttle V. Weston (59 Wis. 151), 115, 149, 151. Twelfth Street Market v. Phila- delphia, etc., Ry. Co. (142 Pa. St. 580), 761. Twilley v. Perkins (77 Md. 252), 728. Tylee v. County of Waterloo (9 Up. Can. Q. B. 588), 222. Tyler v. Columbus (6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 224), 845. Tyler v. Lawson (30 N. J. L. 120), 488, 503. Tyra v. Com. (2 Mete. 1), 528. Tyroler v. Gummersbach (28 Misc. 151), 469. Tyson v. Halifax Tp. School Dis- trict (51 Pa. St. 9), 105. Tyson V. Postlethwaite (13 111. 728), 329. U. Udall V. Brooklyn (19 Johns 175), 674. Uffert V. Vogt (65 N. J. L. 377), 22. Ulman v. Baltimore (72 Md. 587), 353. Ulrich V. St. Louis (112 Mo. 138), 270, 561. Underwood, in re (30 Mich. 502), 575. Underwood v. Green (42 N. Y. 140), 705. Union Depot Co. v. St. Louis (76 Mo. 393), 894, 895, 903. Union Depot Co v. St. Louis (8 Mo. App. 412), 887. Union Depot Railway Co. v. Smith (16 Colo. 361), 22. Union Depot Ry. Co. v. Southern R. R. Co. (105 Mo. 562), 17, 345. Union Elevator Co. v. K. C. S. B. Ry. Co. (135 Mo. 353), 890. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cheyenne (113 U. S. 516), 340. Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. McNally (54 Neb. 112), 248, 251. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Montgomery (49 Neb. 429), 46, 248, 251. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ruzicka (Neb. 1902, 91 N. W. Rep. 543), .jS9, 599. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ryan (2 Wyo. 391), 117. Union Ry. Co. v. Cambridge (11 Allen 287), 715. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch (177 U. S. 149), 40i;. Union Trust Co. v. Richmond City R. Co. (154 Ind. 291), 897. Union Trust Co. v. Trumbull (137 111. 146), 327. Unionville v. Martin (95 Mo. App. 28), 116, 124, 133, 192, 581. United Brethren Church v. Van Dusen (37 Wis, 54), 172. United Hebrew Assn. v. Benshl- mol (130 Mass. 325), 335. United Railway & B. Co. v. Hayes (92 Md. 490), 337. U. S. V. American Waterworks Co. (37 Fed. Rep. 747), 907. U. S. V. Ballin (144 U. S. 1),167. U. S. V. B. & 0. R. R. Co. (17 Wall. 322), 67. U. S. V. Chouteau (102 U. S. 603), 478. U. S. V. Claflin (97 U. S. 546), 339. United States v. Conway (Hemp. 313), 372. United States v. Cruikshank (92 U. S. 542), 410. U. S. V. Des Moines N. & R. Co. (142 U. S. 510), 260. U. S. V. Gates (148 U. S. 134), 779. U. S. V. Green (19 D. C. 230), 511. United States v. Hart (Peters C. C. 390), 418. United States v. Holly (3 Cranch. 656), 788, 792. U. S. V. Jelferson Co. (5 Dill. 310), 371. United States v. Martin (94 U. S. 400), 779. U. S. V. Maurice (2 Brock. 96), 9. United States v. New Orleans (98 U. S. 381), 370, 607, 609. U. S. V. Perkins (116 U. S. 483), 7. elxxiv TABLE OF CASES. (Tlie references are to pages.) United States v. Philbrick (120 U. S. 52), 331, 332. U. S. V. Shanks (15 Minn. 369), 577. United States v. Tynen (11 Wall. 88), 328,- 334, 339. United States v. Union Pac. R. Co. (98 U. S. 569), 382. U. S. V. Wells (2 Cranch C. C. 45), 788. United States Distilling Co. v. Chicago (112 111. 19), 635. United States Illuminating Co. v. Grant (55 Hun. 222), 722. United States Mortgage Co. v. Gross (93 111. 483), 265, 266. Updegraff v. Crans (47 Pa. St. 103), 154, 155. Upington v. Oviatt (24 Ohio St. 232), 190, 198, 245, 592, 830. JUpper Hanover Road (44 Pa. St. 277), 253. Uridias v. Morrill (22 Cal. 473), 461, 463, 464, 468. Urquhart v. Ogdensburgh (97 N. Y. 238), 549. V. Vail V. K. C. C. & S. Ry. (28 Mo. App. 372), 731. Vail V. Owen (19 Barb. 22), 258. Valle V. Ziegler (84 Mo. 214), 430. Valparaiso v. Gardner (97 Ind. 1), 121, 140, 260, 431. Valverde v. Shuttuck (19 Colo. 104), 141. Van Alstine v. People (37 Mich. 523), 46, 48, 221, 247, 250. Van Antwerp, in re (56 N. Y. 261), 805. Van Baalen v. People (40 Mich. 258), 635, 654, 774. Van Brunt v. Platbush (128 N. Y. 50), 831. Van Buren v. Wells (53 Ark. 368), 24, 360, 552, 590, 593, 786. 792, 794. Van Busklrk v. Newark (26 Ohio St. 37), 574. Vance v. Hadfleld (22 N. Y. St. 858), 43, 770. Vance v. Little Rock (30 Ark. 435), 24. Vance v. Vance (108 U. S. 514), 382. Vancouver v. Wintler (8 Wash. 378), 233, 234. Van Denburgh v. Greenbush (66 N. Y. 1), 332. Vanderbeck v. Hendry (34 N. J. L. 467), 718. Vanderbeck v. Jersey City (44 N. J. L. 626), 830. Vanderbllt v. Adams (7 Cow. 349), 356. Vandersliee v. Philadelphia (103 Pa. St. 102), 680. Van de Vere v. Kansas City (107 Mo. 83), 680, 686, 697. Vandewater v. New York ( 2 Sandf . Sup. Ct. 258), 38. Vandine; in re (6 Pick. 187), 33, 35, 297, 299, 303, 488, 655, 705, 706. Van Doran v. New York (9 Paige 388), 807. Van Dyke v. Cincinnati (1 Disney 532), 62, 587, 720. Van'e v. Evanston (150 111. 616), 850. Van Hastrup v. Madison City (1 Wall. 291), 110. Van Hoffman v. Quincy (4 Wall. 535), 381, 382. Van Hook v. Selma (70 Ala. 361), 298, 590, 611, 624, 634. Van Horn v. People (46 Mich. 183), 640, 733. Van Meter v. People (60 111. 168), 522. Vann v. Pipkin (77 N. C. 408), 366. Van Nest v. New York (113 N. Y. 652), 808. Vansant v. Harlem Stage Co. (59 Md. 330), 637. Van Sicklen v. Burlington (27 Vt. 70), 99. Van Swartow v. Com. (24 Pa. St. 131), 486, 513, 516, 559. Van Tine v. Nims (3 Abb. Pr. 39), 196. Van Vert v. Brown (47 Ohio St. 477), 564. Van Wormer v. Mayor, etc. (15 Wend. 262), 688. TABLE OF CASES. elxxv (The references Varden v. Mount (78 Ky. 86), 273, 274, 732. Vashon & Tp. of Hawkesbury, in re (30 Up. Can Com. Pleas Rep. - 194), 173. Vason V. Augusta (38 Ga. 542), 22, 126, 366, 464, 466, 514, 706, 784. Vassault v. Auston (36 Cal. 691), 467, 559. Vason V. South Carolina R. R. Co. (42 Ga. 631), 747. Vaughn v. Scade (30 Mo. 600), 512. Vaughn v. Thompson (15 111. 39), 482. Veazie v. China (50 Me. 518), 105, 125. Veazie v. Mayo (45 Me. 560), 894, 895. Veneman v. Jones (118 Ind. 41), 714. Venine v. Archibald (3 Colo. 163), 528. Verdin v. St. Louis (131 Mo. 26), 81, 111, 450, 830, 854, 862, 865, 866. Verona, Appeal of Borough of (108 Pa. St. 83), 246. Verree v. Hughes (11 N. J. L. 91), 389. Vicksburg v. Briggs (102 Mich. 551), 771. Vicksburg v. Briggs (85 Mich. 502), 4S6, 505. Vicksburg v. Tobin (100 U. S. 430), 416. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. R, Co. v. Monroe (48 La. Ann. 1102), 232, 425, 720. Vidal V. Girard's Execu. (2 How. 127), 90. Villavaso v. Barthet (39 La. Ann. 247), 257, 499, 451, 700. Vincennes v. Citizens' Gas Light Co. (132 Ind. 114), 121, 379. Vincent v. Nantucket (12 Cush. 103), 75. Vincent v. Pacific Grove (102 Cal. 405), 252, 595. Vines v. State (67 Ala. 73), 402, 452. Vionet v. First Municipality (4 La. Ann. 42), 97, 672, 823. are to pages.) Virginia v. Smith (1 Cranch. C. C. 47), 36. Virgo V. Toronto (22 Can. Sup. Ct. 447), 766. Von Baumback v. Bade (9 Wis. 559), 390. Von der Leith v. State (60 N. J. L. 46), 327. Von Schmidt v. Widber (105 Cal. 151), 88. Von Steen v. Beatrice (36 Neb. 421), 831. Voorhees, in re (32 N. J. L. 141), 522. Vosse V. Memphis (9 Lea. 294), 763. W. Wabash R. R. Co. v. Defiance (52 Ohio St. 262), 802, 817. Wabash Ry. Co. v. Hughes (38 111. 174), 203. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. V. Illinois (118 U. S. 557), 410. Waco V. Powell (32 Tex. 258), 731. Waco V. Prather (90 Tex. 80) 840, 841. Waddingham v. St. Louis (14 Mo. 190), 38. Wade V. Newbern (77 N. C. 460), 88, 761. Wade V. Nunnelly (19 Tex. Civ. App. 256), 437. Wade V. Oakmont (165 Pa. St. 479), 798. Wade V. Richmond (18 Gratt. 583), 349. Wadleigh v. Oilman (12 Me. 403), 734, 735, 737. Wadsworth v. Maysville (24 Ky. ,Law. Rep. 312), 355. Waggoner v. South Gorin (88 Mo. App. 25), 693. Wagner v. Garrett (118 Ind. 114), 490, 646. Wagner v. Rock Island (146 111. 139), 438. Wahle V. Reinbach (76 111. 322), 706. Waite V. Garston Local Board of Health (L. R. 3 Q. B. 5), 292. clxxvi TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Wakefield v. Phelps (37 N. H. 295), 336. Wakeman v. "Wilbur (147 N. Y. 657), 717. Walden v. Dudley (49 Mo. 419), 608. Waldo V. Wallace (12 Ind. 569), 465, 786, 794. Waldraven v. Memphis (4 Coldw. 431), 367. Walker v. Aurora (140 111. 402), 853. Walker v. Burlington (56 Vt. 131), 610. Walker v. Chicago (202 111. 531), 852, 857. Walker v. Chicago R. I. & P. R. R. Co. (71 Iowa 658), 741. Walker v. Cooke (163 Mass. 401), 467. Walker v. Evansville (33 Ind. 393), 7. Walker v. Jameson (140 Ind. 591), 670, 687, 691, 705. Walker v. Kansas City (99 Mo. 647), 897. Walker v. Morgan Park (175 111. 570), 425. Walker v. New Orleans (31 La. Ann. 828), 636, 643, 644. Walker v. People (170 111. 410), 451. Walker v. Rogan (1 Wis. 597), 165. Walker v. Springfield (94 111. 364), 621, 660, 661. Walker v. Sauvinet (92 U. S. 90), 517. Walker v. Towle (156 Ind. 639), 634, 733. Walker v. Whitehead (16 Wall. 314), 372, 381, 385. Wall, ex parte (48 Cal. 279), 49, 66, 133. Wallace v. Richmond (94 Va. 204), 668. Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Wa- ter Co. (172 V. S. 1), 19, -308, 352, 377. Waller v. Everett (52 Mo. 57), 328, 329, 344. Walling V. Michigan (116 U. S. 446), 402, 405. Wain V. Philadelphia (99 Pa. St. 330), 6, 236, 238, 241, 244, 249. Walnut Tp. v. Rankin (70 Iowa 65), 113. Walsh V. Johnston (18 R. I. 88), 183. Walsh V. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (102 Mo. 582), 745. Walsh V. Union (13 Oreg. 589), 771, 785. Walter, in re (83 N. Y. 538), 832. Walter, in re (75 N. Y. 354), 843. Walter, in re (84 Hun. 457), 694. Walters v. Duke (31 La. Ann. 668), 629. Walton V. Augusta (104 Ga. 757), 396, 398, 655. Walton V. Canon City (13 Colo. App. 77), 476, 530. Walworth Bank v. F. L. & T. Co. (16 Wis. 629), 172. Wan Yin, in re (22 Fed. Rep. 701), 617, 636. Wapella v. Davis (39 111. App. 592), 596, 597. Ward V. Greenville (8 Baxt. 228), 761. Ward V. Little Rock (41 Ark. 526), 686. Ward V. Maryland (12 Wall. 418), 402, 618. Ward V. Murphysboro (77 111. App. 549), 736, 738. Ward V. People (13 111. 635), 562. Ward V. Washington (4 Cranch. C. C. 232), 698. Warden of St. Peter's B. Ch. v. Washington (109 N. C. 21), 437. Ware v. Rutherford (55 N. J. L. 450), 834. Waring v. Mobile (24 Ala. 701), 338. Warner v. Knox (50 Wis. 429), 828. Warner v. Mower (11 Vt. 385), 179. Warner v. Porter (2 Doug. 358), 569. Warnock v. Lafayette (4 La. Ann. 419), 164, 169. Warren v. Barber A. P. Co. (115 Mo. 572), 822, 866. Warren v. Charleston (2 Gray 84), 452. TABLE OF CASES. clxxvii (Tlie references are to pages.) Warren v. Greer (117 Pa. St. 207), 356, 658. Warren v. Henly (31 Iowa 31), 811, 823, 901. Warren v. Hunter (1 Phila. 414), 684. Warren v. Lyons City (22 Iowa 351), 93, 94. Warren v. People (3 Parker Cr. Rep. 544), 523. Warren v. Wausau (66 Wis. 206), 831. Warren County v. Patterson (56 in. Ill), 91. Warrensburg v. McHugh (122 Mo. 649), 646. Warsop V. Hastings (22 Minn. 437), 248, 371, 437. Wartman v. Philadelphia (33 Pa. St. 202), 762, 764. Warwick v. New York (28 Barb. 210), 260. Wasem v. Cincinnati (2 Cin. Supr. Ct. 84), 252, 253. Washburn v. Chicago (202 111. 210), 853. Washburn v. Chicago (198 111. 506), 829, 858. Washington, George, ex parte (10 Mo. App. 495), 506. Washington v. Eaton (4 Cranch. C. C. 352), 770. Washington v. Fisher (43 N. J. L. 377), 803. Washington v. Frank (46 N. C. 436). 485. Washington v. Frank (1 Jones 436), 529, 537. Washington v. Hammond (76 N. C. 33), 785, 790. Washington v. Lynch (5 Cranch. C. C. 498), 485, 733. Washington v. Meigs (8 Dist. of Columbia 53), 733. Washington v. Meigs (1 McArther 53), 640. Washington v. Nashville (1 Swan. 177), 810, 819, 824. Washington v. Wheat (1 Cranch. C. C. 410), 537. Washington v. Wheaton (29 Fed. Cas. No. 17, 239), 642. 12 Washington Ice Co. v. Chicago (147 111. 327), 835, 851. Washington Electric Vehicle Transportation Co. v. District of Columbia (19 App. D. C. 462), 643. Washington, etc., R. Co. v. Alex- andria (98 Va. 344), 750. Washingtonian Home v. Chicago (157 111. 414), 54. Wasmer v. D. L. & W. R. R. Co. (80 N. Y. 212), 604. Wasson v. McCook (80 Mo. App. 483), 749. Water Com'rs of Springfield v. People (137 111. 660), 346. Waterloo v. -Union Mill Co. (72 Iowa 437), 719. Waterloo W. Mfg. v. Shanahan (128 N. Y. 345), 260. Waters v. Gilbert (2 Cush. 27), 208, 211. Waters v. Leech (3 Ark. 110), 301, 672. Waters v. Townsend (65 Ark. 613), 693. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. New Ibe- ria (47 La. Ann. 863), 304, 354, 688, 740. Watertown v. Cowen (4 Paige 510), 719. Watertown v. Sawyer (109 Mass. 320), 736. Water Valley v. Davis (73 Miss. 521), -562. Waterworks Co. v. Atlantic (39 N. J. Eq. 367), 97. Watkins v. Griffith (59 Ark. 344), 831. Watkins v. Hillerman (73 Hun. 317), 221, 247. Watkins v. Milwaukee (55 Wis. 335), 692. Watson V. Chicago (115 111. 78), 827, 844. Watson v. Plainfield (60 N. J. L. 260), 572. Watson v. Robertson Ave. Ry. Co. (69 Mo. App. 548), 876, 892. Watson V. Thomson (116 Ga. 546), 760. Watt V. Jones (60 Kan. 201), 582. ckxviJi TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Watts V. Scott (1 Dev. 291), 488. Weightman v. Clark (103 U. S. Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall 256), 84. River (147 Mass. 5#), 4. Weil v. Ricord (24 N. J. Eq. 169), Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Macken- 695, 698. zie (132 Mass. 71), 708.v Weil 'v. Schultz (33 How. Pr. 7), Waukesha Hygeia M. S. t^ v. 699. Waukesha (83 Wis. 475), 4ffi^ Weill v. Kenfield (54 Cal. Ill), Waupun V. Moore (34 Wis. 450), igg 439. ~ . Weith v. Wilmington (68 N. C. Wayne Co. v. Detroit (17 Mich. \ 24), 25, 206. 390), 787. |Velch v. Bowen (103 Ind. 252), Weaver v. Devendorf (3 Denio. ] 319. 117), 259. Welch v. Hotchkiss (39 Conn. Weaver v. Mt. Vernon (6 Ohio 140), 612, 738. 436), 255, 450. Welch v. Mastin (Mo. App. 1903, Weaver v. State (89 Ga. 639), 629, 71 S. W. Rep. 1090), 588. 658. Welch v. Ste. Genevieve (1 Dil- Webb V. Albertson (4 Barb. 51), l"" C. C. 130), 140, 153, 160. 3j^ Welch V. Stowell (2 Doug. 332), Webb V. Board (116 Mich. 516), ^Srv^'potter (18 Ohio St. 85). 219 836 Webb V. Demopolis (95 Ala. 116), welker v! Toledo (18 Ohio St. 716, 799. 452), 386. Webb City, etc.. Waterworks Co. weller v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. V. Webb City (78 Mo. App. 422), r. co. (164 Mo. 180), 586, 748, 98, 99. 749. Webber v. Chicago (148 111. 313), welles v. Battelle (11 Mass. 477), 81, 445, 659. 214, 216. Weber v. Gill (98 Col. 462), 841. "Wells v. Atlanta (43 Ga. 67), 807. Webber v. Virginia (103 U. S. Wells v. Burbank (17 N. H. 393), 344), 400. 140. Weber v. Johnson (37 Mo. App. Wells v. Burnham (20 Wis. 112) 601), 25, 225, 227, 833. 828 Webster v. Fargo (181 U. S. 394), ^^u^ ^ McLaughlin (17 Ohio 99), '22- 803. ^^ofr J« Lansing (47 Mich, -^gu^ ^ ^^ p^^ ^ ^ ^^^^ ^^ 192} f 579. 2Sfi ^ '^^1 Webster v. People (98 111. 343), ^^u^ '^ ^^^^^^ ^.^^^ ^^ ^^g j^ °^^- J. Eq. 402), 166. Webster v. People (14 111. 365), Wells v. Weston (22 Mo. 384), 35, 486. 36, 643. Webster v. Rose (6 Heisk. 93), Welsh v. Beaver Falls (186 Pa. 372. St. 578), 377. Webster V. Town of Harwin ton (32 Welsh v. St. Louis (73 Mo. 71), Conn. 131), 73. 63. Weckler v. Chicago (61 111. 142), Walton v. Missouri (91 U. S. 275), 843. 393, 400. Weeks v. Forman (16 N. J. L. Wendler v. People's House Fur- 237), 115, 461, 468. nishing Co. (165 Mo. 527), 60, Weeks v. Galveston ( 21 Tex. Civ. 586, 602, 740. App. 102), 90. Werth v. Springfield (78 Mo. 107), Weid v. People (149 111. 257), 827. 581, 828, 845, 892. TABLE OP CASES. (The references are to pages. J Wertheimer v. Boonville (29 Mo. 254), 562, 576. "Wertheimer v. Howard (30 Mo. 420), 474. Wesson v. Collins (72 Miss. 844), 446. West V. Bancroft (32 Vt. 367), 875. West V. Columbus (20 Kan. 633), 233, 487, 495, 503, 583. West V. Mt. Sterling (23 Ky. Law Rep. 1670), 658. West V. New York (10 Paige 539), 437, 576. Westberg v. Kansas City (64 Mo. 493), 365. Westbrook v. Deering (63 Me. 231), 74, 106. West Chicago Comrs. v. Western Union Tel. Co. (103 111. 33), 803. West Chicago Masonic Assn. v. Cohn (192 111. 210), 456. West Chicago Park Comrs. v. Far- ber (171 111. 146), 855. West Chicago St. R. R. Co. v. People (155 111. 299), 849. Westcott V. Middleton (43 N. J. Eq. 478), 684. Western & A. R. R. v. King (70 Ga. 261), 601. Western & A. R. Co. v. Young (83 Ga. 512), 134. Western & A. R. R. Co. v. Young 81 Ga. 397), 601, 744, 750. Western Paving & Supply Co. v. Citizens' Street R. Co. (128 Ind. 525), 896, 900. Western Sav. Fund Soc. v. Phila- delphia (31 Pa. St. 175), 130, 308, 352, 369, 742, 805. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Fre- mont (39 Neb. 692), 399, 659. W. U. Tel Co. V. Guernsey & Scud- der E. Light Co. (46 Mo. App. 120), 885, 892, 893. W. U. Tel. Co. V. Massachusetts (125 U. S. 530), 407, 408. W. U. Tel. Co. V. Mayer (28 Ohio St. 521), 399. Western U. Tel Co. v. New York (23 Fed. Rep. 552), 418. W. U. Tel. Co. V. Pendleton (122 U. S. 347), 410, 418. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Phila- delphia (Pa. 1888, 12 Atl. Rep, 144), 636. W. U. Tel Co. V. Richmond (26 Gratt. 1), 399, 659. W. U. Tel Co. V. State (55 Tex, 314), 399. W. U. Tel. Co. V. Taggart (163 U. S. 1), 408. Westfield v. Coventry (71 Vt. 175), 75. Westfield Borough v. Tioga Coun- ty (150 Pa. St. 152), 873. Westgate v. Carr (43 111. 450), 500, 786, 793. AVest Jersey Traction Co. v. Shiv- ers (58 N. J. L. 124), 893, 895. Westliche Post Assn. v. Allen (26 Mo. App. 181), 893. Westminister v, Bernardston (8 Mass. 104), 150. West Mo. Land Co. v. K. C. & S. B. R, R, (161 Mo. 595), 547. Weston V. Sampson (8 Cush. 347), 4. Weston V. Syracuse (158 N. Y, 274), 259, 368, 430. West Pittston v. Dymond (8Kulp. 12), 569, 631. Westport V. Kansas City (103 Mo. 141), 346. Westport V. Mulholland (159 Mo. 86), 714. West River Bridge Co. v. Dix (6 How. 507), 306. Wetherell v. Devine (116 111. 631), 128, 609. Wethington v. Owensboro ( 21 Ky. Law Rep. 960), 326, 338. Wetmore v. Campbell (2 Sandf. 341), 827. Wetmore v. Story (22 Barb. 414), 108, 180, 181, 182, 235. Wettengel v. Denver (20 Colo. 552), 529, 730. Wetumpka v. Wetumpka Wharf Co. (63 Ala. 611), 55. Wewell V. Cincinnati (45 Ohio St. 407), 837. Whalen v. Keith (35 Mo. 87), 710. clxxx TABLE OF CASES. (The references are to pages.) Whalin, Appeal of (16 Pitts. Leg. Journ. 113), 140. Whalin v. Macomb (76 111. 49), 128, 231, 245, 592.. Wheeling v. Black (25 W. Va. 266), 583. Wheeler v. Boone (108 Iowa 235), 727. Wheeler v. Com. (98 Ky. 59), 183. Wheeler v. People (153 111. 480), 849. Wheeler v. Philadelphia (Pa. 23 Leg. Int. 75), 260. Wheeler v. Plymouth (116 Ind. 158), 676. Wheeler v. Roberts (7 Cow. 536), 332. Whipple V. Mclntyre (69 Mo. App. 397), 704. Whitcomb v. Springfield (2 Ohio Cir. Dec. 138), 698. White, ex parte (67 Cal. 102), 773, White, in re (43 Fed. Rep. 913), 402. White, in re (43 Minn. 25.0), 636. White V. Bayonne (49 N. J. L. 311), 25. White V. Fleming (114 Ind. 560), 176. White V. Kent (11 Ohio St. 550), 304, 483, 653, 719, 761. White V. Mayor, etc. (2 Swan. 364), 45. White V. Meadville (177 Pa. St. 643), 377. White V. Neptune City (56 N. J. L. 222), 477, 480, 485, 572, 573. White V. Redfern (L. R. 5 Q. B. Div. 15), 762. White V. Saginaw (67 Mich. 33), 839. White V. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. (44 Mo. App. 540), 745. White V. Tallman (26 N. J. L. 67), 9, 86, .273, 275, 282. White V. Washington (2 Cranch. 337), 485. Whitehall v. Meaux (8 111. App. 182), 498. Whiteside v. People (26 Wend. 634), 174, 176. Whitfield V. Carrollton (50 Mo. App. 98), 680. Whitfield V. Longest (6 Iredel. 268), 33, 34, 276, 552, 732. Whiting V. Doob (152 Ind. 157), 506, 727, 790. Whiting V. Mt. Pleasant (11 Iowa 482), 225. Whitlock Y,. West (26 Conn. 406), 276, 443, 444, 732. Whitmier v. Buffalo (118 Fed. Rep. 773), 725. Whitney v. Blanchard (2 Gray 208), 327. Whitney v. Hudson (69 Mich. 189), 162, 168, 169, 184, 194, 202, 861. Whitney v. New Haven (58 Conn. 450), 143, 177, 195, 437. Whitney v. New York (28 Barb. 233), 262. Whitney v. New York (6 Abb. N. C. 329), 129. Whitney v. Pittsburgh (147 Pa. St. 351), 867. Whitney v. Port Huron (88 Mich. 268), 240. Whitney v. Van Buskirk (40 N. J. L. 463), 192. Whitsett V. Union Depot & R. Co. (10 Colo. 243), 814. Whitson V. Franklin (34 Ind. 392), 40, 496, 497, 553, 744. Whitten v. Covington (43 Ga. 421), 648. Whittier v. Varney (10 N. H. 291), 213. Whitton v. State (37 Miss. 379), 541. Whitwell, ex parte (98 Cal. 73), 683, 697. Whyte V. Nashville (2 Swan. 364), 131, 808. Wichita & W. R. Co. v. Fech- heimer (36 Kan. 45), 886. Wier's Appeal (74 Pa. St. 320), 741. Wiggin V. Freewill Baptist (8 Met. 301), 175. Wiggin V. New York (9 Paige 16), 118, 245, 846. TABLE OP CASES. clxxxi (The references Wiggins V. Chicago (68 111. 372), 465, 479, 482, 550, 555, 557, 567, 635, 638, 654. Wiggins V. St. Louis (135 Mo. 558), 64. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis (107 U. S. 365), 409, 415, 659. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis (102 111. 560), 615. Wight V. Davidson (181 U. S. 371), 822. Wightman v. State (10 Ohio 452), 513, 547, 787, 792. Wilbur V. Springfield (123 111. 395), 843. Wilbur V. Tobey (16 Pick. 177), 716. Wilcox V. Hemming (58 Wis. 144), 274, 276, 450, 732. Wilcox V. Rodman (46 Mo. 322), 365, 367. Wildner v. Ferguson (42 Minn. 112), 81. Wiles V. Hoss (114 Ind. 371), 810. Wiley V. Owens (39 Ind. 429), 617, 647. Wiley V. Seattle (7 Wash. 576), 531. Wiley V. Silliman (62 111. 170), 267. Wilhelm v. Defiance (58 Ohio St. 56), 822. Wilkie V. Chicago (188 111. 444), 437, 612, 617, 620. Wilkie V. Hall (15 Conn. 32), 215. Wilkes Barre v. Garebed (9Kulp. 273), 770. Wilkin V. Houston (48 Kan. 584), 832. Wilkins v. Waynesboro (116 Ga. 359), 244. Wilkinson v. Leland (2 Peters 627), 777. Willard v. Killingsworth (8 Conn. 247), 74, 150, 151, 152, 358. Willard v. Newburyport (12 Pick. 227), 71, 74, 75, 108. Willcocks, ex part? (7 Cow. 402), 165. are to pages.) Williams' Appeal (72 Pa. St. 214), 371, 385, 389. Williams, ex parte (31 Tex. Cr. App. 262), 630, 641. Williams v. Augusta (111 Ga. 849), 466. Williams v. Augusta (4 Ga. 509), 79, 477, 514, 740. Williams v. Brace (5 Conn. 190), 165. Williams v. BrufCy (96 U. S. 176), 370. Williams v. Corcoran (46 Cal. 553), 818. Williams v. Davidson (43 Tex. 1), 21, 69, 72. Williams v. Eggleston (170 U. S. 304), 67, 820, 882. Williams v. Ellis (5 Q. B. Div. 175), 645. Williams v. Gloucester (148 Mass. 256), 185. Williams v. Hinton (1 Ala. 297), 510. Williams v. Lunenburg School Dis- trict (21 Pick. 75), 149, 132, 164. Williams v. McDonald (58 Cal. 527), 846. Williams v. Mutual Gas Co. (52 Mich. 499), 897. Williams v. Plank Road Co. (21 Mo. 580), 892. Williams v. State (18 Ohio St. 46), 557. Williams v. Warsaw (60 Ind. 457), 506, 537, 786. Williams v. Weaver (94 N. C. 134), 383. Williams v. West Point (68 Ga. 816), 625, 647. Williams v. Williard (23 Vt. 369), 31, 219. Williamson v. Com. (4 B. Mon. 146), 461, 475, 487, 574. Williamson v. Keokuk (44 Iowa 88), 225. Williamsport v. Com. (90 Pa. St, 498), 84, 85. Williamsport v. Com. (84 Pa. St 487), 111, 800. clxxxii TABLE OF CASES. (The refereuies Williamsport v. Hughes (21 Pa. Super. Ct. Rep. 443), 866. Williamsport v. Kent (14 Ind. 306), 610. Williamsport v. Wenner (172 Pa. St. 173), 633. Willis Ave., in re (56 Mich. 244), 824. Willis V. Legris (45 111. 289), 274, 275. Willis V. IVIiller (29 Fed. Rep. 239), 386. Willow Springs v. Withaupt (61 Mo. App. 275), 32, 298, 352,739. Wills V. Boonville (28- Mo. 543), 466. Wilmington v. Davis (63 N. C. 582), 468. Wilmington v. Macks (86 N. C. 88), 618, 640. Wilmington v. Roby (8 Ired. 250), 35. Wilmington Bank v. Wollaston (3 Harr. 90), 13. Wilmington & Weldon R. R. v. Alsbrook (146 U. S. 279), 374. Wilson, in re (32 Minn. 145), 133, 569, 571, 627, 648. Wilson, ex parte (14 Tex. Grim. App. 592), 791. ' Wilson V. Allegheny (79 Pa. St. 272), 825. Wilson V. Beyers (5 Wash. 303), 731. Wilson V. Cunningham (3 Cal. 241), 882. Wilson V. Eureka (173 U. S. 32), 360. AVilson V. McKenna (52 111. 43), 467. Wilson V. Marsh (13 N. J. Eq. 289), 389. Wilson V. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (18 R. I. 598), 442. Wilson V. Philippi (39 W. Va. 75), 810. Wilson V. Phoenix Powder Mfg. Co. (40 W. Va. 413), 741. Wilson V. Southern Ry. Co. (64 S. C. 162), 601. Wilson V. Trenton (61 N. J. L. 599), 862. are to pages.) Wilson V. Trenton (56 N. J. L. 469), 252. Wilt V. Redkey (Ind. App. 1902, 64 N. E. Rpp. 228), 9. Wiltse V. State (8 Heisk. 544), 656. Winants v. Bayonne (44 N. J. L. 114), 79, 649. Winchester v. Corinna (55 Me. 9), 75. Winchester v. Redmond (93 Va. 711), 72, 75, 86, 114. Winnsboro v. Smart (11 Rich. Law 551), 765. Winona v. Burke (23 Minn. 254), 494, 582, 591. Winooski v. Gokey (49 Vt. 282), 269, 270, 491, 49S, 510, 582, 616. Winslow V. Bloomington (24 111. App. 647), 699. Winslow V. People (117 111. 152), 389. Winter v. Kinney (1 N. Y. 365), 131. Winter v. Thristlewood (101 IH. 450), 156. Winterport Water Co. v. Winter- port (94 Me. 215), 74. Winthrop v. Farrar (11 Allen 398), 698. Wirt V. McEnery (21 Fed. 233), 170. Wisconsin Central R. R. v. Ash- land County (81 Wis. 1), 184. Wisner v. People (156 111. 180), 849. Wistar v. Addicks (9 Phila. 145), 688. Wistar v. Philadelphia (111 Pa. St. 604), 858. Wistar v. Philadelphia (80 Pa. St. 505), 819, 858. Wither v. State ex rel Posey (36 Ala. 252), 509. Witheril v. Mosher (9 Hun. 412), 99. Withers v. Coyles (36 Ala. 320), 772. Withers v. State ex rel (36 Ala. 252), 509. Withington v. Harvard (8 Cush. 66), 194. TABLE OF CASES. clxxxiii (The references arc to pages.) Witkouski v. Witkouski (16 La. Woodlawn Cemetery Assn. v. Ev- Ann. 232), 332. erett (118 Mass. 354), 695. "Wolf, ex parte (14 Neb. 24), 178, Woodruff v. Elizabeth (30 N. J. 179, 316, 326, 328, 761. L. 176), 831. Wolf V. Lansing (53 Mich. 367), Woodruff v. N. Y. & N. E. R. R. 646. Co. (59 Conn. 63), 172. Wolf V. Keokuk (48 Iowa 129), Woodruff v. Parham (8 Wall. 123), 582. 400. Wolff V. Campbell (110 Mo. 114), Woodruff v. Stewart (63 Ala. 206), j^^j^_ 156, 184, 239, 240, 532, 545. Wolters, ex parte (65 Cal. 269) 361. Woodruff V. Trapnall (10 How. 190), 371. Woods V. Chicago (135 111. 582), Wolters V. St. Louis (132 Mo. 1), 347^ 35^ ^^^- Woods V. Kansas City (58 Mo. Wong V. Astoria (13 Oreg. 538), ^pp 272), 676. 466, 513, 516, 520, 752, 787, 792, ^oods v. Prineville (19 Oreg. ■^SS. 108), 532, 584. Wong Hane, in re (108 Cal. 680), Woodson v. Skinner (22 Mo. 13), 355, 533. 92. Wong Yang Quy, in re (6 Sawy. Woodward v. Boscobel (84 Wis. 442), 697. 226), 810. Wood V. Brooklyn (14 Barb. 425), Wooster v. Mullins (64 Conn. 340), 24, 25, 435, 477, 484. 163. Wood V. Election Court (58 Cal. Worcester v. Georgia (6 Pet. 515), 561), 339. 261. Wood V. Jefferson County Bank Worchester v. Norwich Ry. Co. (9 Cow. 194), 206. (109 Mass. 103), 317. Wood V. Kansas City (162 Mo. Work v. State (2 Ohio St. 296). 303), 24. 515. Wood V. McGrath (150 Pa. St. worrell v. State (12 Ala. 732). 451), 832. 448. Wood V. Mears (12 Ind. 515), 338, works v. Lockport (28 Hun. 9), 716. 831. Wood V. Quimby (20 R. I. 482), worthington v. Boston (152 U. S. 820. 695), 861. Wood V. San Francisco (4 Cal. Worthington v. Covington (6 Ky. 190), 888. Law Rep. 237), 236, 812, 845. Wood V. Seattle (23 Wash. 1), Worthington v. London G. & A. 248, 249, 257, 258, 306, 897, 915. Co. (164 N. Y. 81), 469. Wood V. Simons (110 Mass. 116), Wragg v. Penn. Tp. (94 111. 11), 209. 17, 786, 793, 794. Wood V. Wood (14 Rich. 148), Wreford v. People (14 Mich. 41), 372 687, 699. Woodall V. Lynchburg (100 Va. Wrieht, in re (29 Hun. 357), 575, 318), 611, 612. ^'^^• Woodbridge v. Cambridge (114 Wright v. Bishop (88 111. 302), Mass. 483), 807. 431. Woodbury v. Brown (101 Tenn. Wright v. Boston (9 Cush. 233), 707), 547. 839. Woodlawn v. Cain (135 Ala. 369), Wright v. Chicago (60 111. 312), 244. 808. clxxxiv TABLE OF CASES (The references are to pages.) Wright V. C. & N. W. Ry. Co. ( 27 111. App. 200), 538. Wright V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. (7 111. App. 438), 17, 60, 446, 454, 740. Wright V. Defrees (8 Ind. 298), 257. Wright V. Forrestal (65 Wis. 341), 187, 202, 233, 252, 841, 844, 845. Wright V. Hill (54 Ga. 645), 640. AVright V. Mailer. & M. Ry. Co. (4 Allen 283), 602, 603. Wright V. Nagle (101 U. S. 791), 317. Wright V. People (87 111. 582), 610. Wright V. Victoria (4 Tex. 375), 83, 95, 96. Wrought Iron Range Co. v. Car- ver (118 N. C. 328), 405. Wrought Iron Range Co. v. John- son (84 Ga. 754), 401. Wunder v. McLean (134 Pa. St. 334), 457. Wyandotte Electric Light Co. v. Wyandotte (124 Mich. 43), 885, 904, 912. Wyalt V. Benson (4 Abb. Pr. 182), 90. Wygant, ex parte (39 Oreg. 429), 687, 696. Wygant v. McLauchlan (Oreg. 1901, 64 Pac. Rep. 867), 42, 687. WykofE V. Healy (57 Minn. 14), 450. Wyley v. Wilson (44 Vt. 404), 152. Wyman v. Mitchell (1 Cowen 318), 388. Wynehamer v. People (13 N. Y. 378), 517, 522. Wy9ming v. Wilkesbarre W. S. Ry. Co. (8 Luz. Leg. Reg. 113), 241. Y. Yale College v. New Haven (57 Conn. 1), 810. Yanish v. St. Paul (50 Minn. 518), 835. Yankton v. Douglas (8 S. Dak. 440), 788, Yardley v. Borough (22 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 179), 225. Yarnell v. Los Angeles (87 Cal. 603), 431. Yates V. Batavia (79 111. 500), 437, 576. Yates V. Milwaukee (12 Wis. 673), 768. Yates V, Milwaukee (10 Wall. 497), 291, 685, 686, 689. Yates V. Warrenton (84 Va. 337), 717, 720. Yesler v. Seattle (1 Wash. St. 308), 227, 593, 837, 838. Yick Wo, in re (68 Cal. 294), 361, 442, 773. Yick Wo V. Hopkins (118 U. S. 356), 294, 296, 311, 312, 354, 361, 649, 672, 681, 864. York V. Forscht (23 Pa. St. 391), 114. Yonkers Board of Health v. Cop- cutt (140 N. Y. 12), 143, 250, 707. Yonkers Excise Comrs. v. Glen- non (21 Hun. 244), 488. Young, Petition of (11 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 209), 143. Young V. Flower (3 Misc. Rep. 34), 693. Young V. Kansas City (27 Mo. App. 101), 81, 810, 853. Young V. People (155 111. 247), 849. Young V. Rushsylvania (8 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 75), 145, 177. Young V. St. Louis (47 Mo. 492), 7, 202, 223. Young V. Thomas {17 Fla. 169), 640. Younglove, in re (80 Hun. 246), 204. Young & McShea A. Co. v. Atlantic City (60 N. J. L. 125), 282. Ysleta V. Babbitt (8 Tex. Civ. App. 432), 798. Zabriskie v. H. & N. Y. Ry. Co. (18 N. .1. Eq. 178), 322. Zalesky v. Cedar Rapids (Iowa 1902, 92 N. W. Rep, 657), 812. 840. TABLE OF CASES. clxxxv (The references are to pages.) Zane v. Rosenberry (153 Pa. St. 38), 157. Zanesville v. Muskingum Co. (5 Ohio St. 590), 346. Zanone v. Mound City (103 111. 552), 21^ 313. Zanone v. Mound City (11 111. App. 334), 549, 554, 631. Zborowski, in re (68 N. Y. 88), 804. Zelle V. McHenry (51 Iowa 572), 513, 517. Zeiler v. Central Ry. Co. (84 Md. 304), 165, 169, 171, 189. Zeiler v. Crawfordsville (90 Ind. 262), 791. Ziegler v. People (156 111. 133), 849. Zigler V. Menges (121 Ind. 99), 707. Zimmerman v. Saam (6 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 318), 736. Zitske V. Goldberg (38 Wis. 216), 463. Zorger v. Greensburgh (60 Ind. 1), 442, 448. Zottman v. San Francisco (20 Cal. 96), 115. Zumault V. K. C. & I. Air Line (71 Mo. App. 670), 296, 744, 745. Zumstein v. Mullen (67 Ohio St. 382), 142. Zylestra v. Charleston (1 Bay 382), 284, 464, 577, 698. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES, CHAPTER I. OF GENERAL NATURE AND REQUISITES OP VALID MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES. § 1- Ordinance defined. §16. Ordinances must not be in- 2. Difference between ordinance consistent with the general and resolution. laws of the state. 3. Illustrations as to wlien or- 17. Same-^exception. dinance necessary. 18. Ordinances must harmonize 4. Same — creating offices and with the public policy and situations. common law of the state. 5. When action may be taken 19. Ordinances must be enacted by reioluti.-;n — illustrations. in good faith. 6. How ordinances differ from 20. Ordinances must be definite regulations, orders, resolu- and certain. tions, etc. 21. Ordinances of citfes of same 7. How ordinances differ from class may vary. rules of procedure. 22. Notice to be taken of ordi- 8. Classification of ordinances. nances. 9. Same — general and special. 23. Who bound by ordinances. 10. Same — penal and non-penal — 24. Ordinances operative upon general and special. property within the corpor- 11. 12. Ordinance may combine con- tractual and police regula- tions. Force and effect of ordi- 25. 26. ate limits. Same — rule as applied to licenses. Territorial operation of or- dinances. 13. nances. Do ordinances differ as to force and effect from char- ter or statute? 27. 28. Places within municipal ju- risdiction. Same — wharves — private property. 14. Requisites of a valid ordi- 29. Same — regulating speed of nance stated. trains. 15. Ordinances must conform to 30. Judicial limitation of opera- charter. tion of ordinances. NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. [§1 31. Ordinances operating in pub- 34. When ordinances take effect. lie or particular places only. 32. Ordinances applying to part of city valid. 33. Same — improvement ordi- nance. 35. Same — illustrative cases. 36. Same — contingency. 37. Expiration and suspension of ordinances. § 1. Ordinance defined. Local laws of a municipal corpo- ration, duly enacted by the proper authorities, presci'ibing general, uniform and permanent rules of conduct, relating to the corporate affairs of the municipality, are, in this country, generally designated as ordinances. "By-la^s" or "bj^e- laws" was the original designation. In England and in a few states such local laM-s are so named, the jjrelix "by" or "bye" signifying the place of habitation or local community with de- fined limits. 1 'A UY-LAW is a rule obligatory over a particular district. Any rule of a permanent character reasonably definite and consistent with the charter and general laws is a by-law. Per Parke. B. in Gos- ling V. Veley, 19 L. .J. (N. S.) Q. B. Ill; Hopkins v. Swansea, 4 M. & AV. 620. The word originally meant a law made in and for a "by" or "burh" (i. e., any fortified town or vill) ; regulations issued by the local authority for the regulation of a borough. But the word has now attained a wider significance, and includes all orders, ordinances, regulations, rules and statutes made by any authority subordinate to Parliament. 2 Encyc. of the Laws of England, 315. "All regulations made by a cor- porate body, and intended not only to bind themselves and their offi- . cers and servants, but members of the public who come within the sphere of their operation, may be properly called a by-law." Per Lindley, L. J. in London Assn., etc., V. London & India Docks Joint Com., 3 Oh. (1892), p. 252. "By" was the Scandinavian word lor town, and a by-law was hence a town law. 1 Thompson, Corp. § 938. In the shires, where the Danes acquired a firm foothold, the town- ship was often called a "by," and it had the power of enacting its own "by-laws," or town-laws, as New England townships have to- day. J. Fiske, Amer. Pol. Ideas, p. 46. By-l.uv l\ New England. — The term by-law "has a peculiar and limited signification; being used to designate the orders and regula- tions, which a corporation, as one of its legal incidents, has power to make, and which is usually exer- cised to regulate its own action and concerns, and the rights and duties of its members amongst themselves. This has been some- what extended in the case of municipal and other quasi corpor- ations; but a broad distinction has always been made between the authority of a corporation to make by-lawB and the general power of making laws." Per Shaw, C. J. in Com. v. Turner, 1 Cush. (Mass.), 493, 496. Ordinance means "a local law. §1] NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. The words "by-laws" and "ordiiianee.s" are often used in- terchangeably in statutes and charters, as that upon "the pas- sage of any by-law or ordinance," the yeas and nays shall be called and recorded.- Occasionally the general term ordinance is used in a broad sense, so as to embrace municipal charters and statutes relat- ing to the government of the municipality. However, such use is inaccurate, for ordinances are not, in the constitutional sense, public laws, but mere local regulations or by-laws, oper- ating in a particular locality.-'' prescribing a general and perma- nent rule." Per Elliott, J. in Citi- zens' Gas and M. Co. v. Elwood, 114 Ind., 332, 336; 16 N. E. Rep., 624. "An ordinance is the law of the inhabitants of the municipality." Mason V. Shawneetown, 77 111., 533, 537. For other definitions, see Oak- land V. Oakland Water F. Co., 118 Cal., 160; State v. Swindell, 146 Ind., 527; 45 N. E. Rep., 700; 58 Am. St. Rep., 375; State v. Omaha, etc., R. R. Co., 113 Iowa, 30; 84 N. W. Rep., 983; Farnsworth v. Paw- tucket, 13 R. I., 82; Kepner v. Com., 40 Pa. St., 124; Robinson v. Franklin, 1 Humph. (Tenn.), 156; 34 Am. Dec, 625. 2 Tracey v. People, 6 Colo., 151. 153; 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 373; National Bank of Commerce v. Grenada, 44 Fed. Rep., 262; Bills V. Goshen, 117 Ind., 221, 225; 20 N. E. Rep., 115; Taylor v. Lam- bertville, 43 N. J. Eq., 107, 112; 10 Atl. Rep., 809. 3 Mclnerney v. Denver, 17 Colo., 302; 29 Pac. Rep., 516. VARIOTJS USER OF THE TERM ORDI- .\,\XCE. Ordinance of Parliament, a tem- porary act of parliament. Ordinance of the Forest, an Eng- lish statute relating to the forest. Ordinance of the Saladin Tithe, an English law of 1188, levying a particular tax, and one of the earli- est attempts to tax personal prop- erty. Self-denying Ordinance, an early English ordinance passed in 1645, lequiring members of parliament holding military or civil office to vacate such positions at the ex- piration of forty days. Northwest Ordinance, or the or- dinance of 1787, being the law for the territorial government of the Northwestern territory. People, ex rel., V. Thompson, 155 111., 451, 473; Dixon V. People, 168 111., 179; 39 L. R. A., 116; Allen County Comrs. V. Simons (Ind.), 13 L. R. A., 512. Ordinance of Nullification, an ordinance passed by a state conven- tion of South Carolina, November 24, 1832, declaring void certain acts of the Congress levying duties and imposts on imports and threaten- ing withdrawal of the state from the Union in case of attempt to enforce such acts except in the courts of that state. This ordi- nance was repealed by the state convention March 16, 1833. Ordinance of Secession. — The term ordinance was applied to the various acts of secession adopted by the Confederate states. In this relation it was used in the sense of organic provisions, although in the main they were mere enact- 4 NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. [§2 § 2. Difiference between ordinance and resolution. As the tei'jiis are ordinarily used in charters, there is a distinction between an ordinance and. a resolution. The corporation can- not accomplish by an order or resolution that which, under its charter, can be done only by an ordinance.* Whether th'j particular thing should be done by ordinance or resolution depends upon the proper construction of the charter and the forms observed in doing the act. An ordinance prescribes a permanent rule of conduct or government, while a resolution is of a temporary eharucter only. It may be stated as a gen- eral rule that, matters upon which the municipal corporation desires to legislate must be put in the form of an ordinaneo, while all acts that are done in its ministerial cajjacity and for a temporary purpose may be put in the form of resolu- tions.5 ilunicipal charters generally prescribe that an ordinance ments by the legislatures of these several states, but in some in- stances the people were supposed to have given their consent. Colony Ordinance of 16^/7, a law enacted by the Massachusetts Colony under which the legisla- ture has the right to appropriate, or to grant to a city or town the right to appropriate, the waters of great ponds for domestic purposes, for the extinguishment of fires, and f- other like municipal or public uses. The ordinance is still in force in a modified form. Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Pall River, 147 Mass., 548, 556; 18 N. E. Rep., 465. Notes as to, 5 L. R. A.. 179, and 13 L. R. A., 255. Massachusetts colony ordinance of lii.'il, fixing the right of property upon salt water. Barker v. Bates, 13 Pick. (Mass.), 255; Mayhew v. N(fk-ton, 17 Pick. (Mass.), 357, 359; Weston V. Sampson, 8 Cush. (Mass.), 347. * Calif orn'a — Pimental v. San Francisco, 21 Cal., 351. Colorado — Central v. Sears, 2 Colo., 588. Connecticut — State v. Tryon, 39 Conn., 183. Georgia — Bearden v. Madison, 73 Ga., 184. Illinois — People v. Grotty, 93 111., 180. Indiana — Anderson v. O'Connor, 98 Ind., 168. loioa — Starr v. Burlington, 45 Iowa, 87. Kansas — Newman v. Emporia, 32 Kan., 456; 4 Pac. Rep., 815. Missouri — Nevada-, to use, v. Eddy, 123 Mo., 546; 27 S. "W. Rep., 471; Trenton v. Coyle, 107 Mo., 193: 17 S. W. Rep., 643; Thomp- son V. Boonville, 61 Mo., 282; Springfield v. Knott, 49 Mo. App., 612; Cape Girardeau v. Pougeu, 30 Mo. App., 5.51. A'e»' Jersey — Paterson v. Barnet, 46 N. .1. L., 62, 66; Hunt v. Lam- bertville, 45 N. J. L., 279; State V. Bayonne, 35 N. J. L., 335. Texas — Brand v. San Antonio (Tex. Civ. App., 1896), 37 S. W. Rep., 340. Washington — Burmeister v. How- ard, 1 Wash. Ty.. 207. 5 Alma V. Guaranty Savings Bank, 19 U. S. App., 622, per Thayer, J.; §2] NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. must be signed by the mayor, unless passed over his veto, while, ordinarily, a resolution need not be, as the passage of the latter is usually not a legislative act." Where the mayor is a constituent part of the legislative power his approval of all legislative acts is necessary to their validitj'.'^ Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St., 96, 103; State v. Bayonne, 35 N. J. L., 335; Grlmmell v. Des Moines, 57 Iowa, 144. "A municipality may only legis- late through the passage of an ordinance and not by the passage of mere resolutions." People ex ret. V. Mount, 186 111., 560, 571; 58 N. B. Rep., 360. Acts of leglslatijjn which pre- scribe a permanent rule of conduct of government and which are to have a continuing force and effect must be established by ordinance. C. & N. Pac. R. R. V. Chicago, 174 111., 439; 51 N. E. Rep., 596; Alta- mont V. B. & O. S. W. R. R., 184 111., 47; 56 N. E. Rep., 340; Balti- more & O. S. W. Ry. Co. V. Alta- mont, 84 111. App., 274, 277; Naz- worthy v. Sullivan, 55 111. App., 51; C. & N. P. R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 174 III., 455. A resolution is designed to reach special and individual cases, 1 Thompson, Corp., § 937. "An order forbidding fireworks in the streets is an ordinance, one appropriating money for celebrat- ing a holiday is a resolution." Century Diet. & Cyc, tit. "Ordi- nance." "Every legislative act * * * shall be by ordinance." Charter of Consolidated City and County of San Francisco, art. 11, sec. 8; Paterson v. Barnet, 46 N. J. L., 62, 66; Chicago v. McCoy, 136 111., 344, 351. A charter provision "that it shall not be necessary for any order or resolution of either branch, or to which the concurrence of both branches of the council may be required, to be presented to the mayor for his approval, but the same shall be binding for all pur- poses, the councils may transact business by order or resolution; and every such order or resolution shall be filed in the archives of the city, and shall be evidence for the purposes therein contained," does not authorize legislation by order or resolution, but merely refers to such current business as may be properly done by order or resolu- tion. Shaub V. Lancaster City, 1 56 Pa. St., 362, 365; 26 Atl. Rep., 1067; 21 L. R. A., 691. » Burlington v. Dennison, 42 N. J. L., 165; disapproving Kepner v. Commonwealth, 40 Pa. St., 124, saying that it is contrary to all other adjudged cases, and can only be sustained on the peculiar and ambiguous phraseology of the charter of the city of Harrisburg. People ex rel. v. Mount, 186 111., 560, 574; 58 N. E. Rep., 360. ^ C. R. I. and P. R. R. Co. v. Council Bluffs, 109 Iowa, 425; 80 N. W. Rep., 564; Saxton v. Beach, 50 Mo., 488; Saxton v. St. Joseph, 60 Mo., 153; Thompson r. Boon- ville, 61 Mo., 282; Irvin v. Devors, 65 Mo., 625; Trenton v. Coyle, 107 Mo., 193; 17 S. W. Rep., 643; Crutchfield v. Warrensburg, 30 Mo. App., 456. A general ordinancs canno': legal- ly provide that legislative power may be exercised by resolution, for G NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. [§3 Where the resolution is passed with all the formality of an ordinance, it therebj' becomes a legislative act, and it is im- material whether called an ordinance or resolution.^ § 3. Illustrations as to when 6rdinance necessary. Under particular charter provisions, ordinances have been held neces- sary in performing the following legislative acts: Providing for the issuing of bonds for the construction of sewers;" or- dering the grading a street;'" changing grade of street ;i^ street improvements ;'- reconstruction of street ;i^ altering the an ordinance cannot change the charter. Cape Girardeau v. Pougeu, 30 Mo. App., 551. A resolution may be ratified by an ordinance. State ex rel. v. Cow- gill, etc., Milling Co., 156 Mo., 620; 57 S. W. Rep., 1008. Where a charter requires every resolution affecting the interests of the city to be presented to the mayor for his approval a resolu- tion authorizing the removal of night soil from the city must be preaented to the mayor for his signature. Dey v. Jersey City, 19 N. J. Eq., 412, 416. « California — roliock v. San Ui- ego, 118 Cal., 593; Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 6 Cal., 190. Kentucky — Gleason v. Barnett, 22 Ky. Law Rep., 1660; 61 S. W. Rep., 20. Indiava — Crawfordsville v. Bra- den, 130 Ind., 149; 30 Am. St. Rep., 214. Louisiana — First Municipality V. Cutting. 4 La. Ann., 336. Missouri — Tipton v. Norman, 72 Mo., 380; Springfield v. Knott, 49 Mo. App., 612; Manufacturing Co. V. Schell City, 21 Mo. App., 175. Xehraska — McGavock v. Omaha, 40 Neb., 64. New Jersey — Green v. Cape May, 41 N. J. L., 45. New York — Drake v. Railroad Co., 7 Barb. (N. Y.), 508. Texas — San Antonio v. Mickle- john, 89 Tex., 79. WJscorasira^Green Bay v. Brauns, 50 Wis., 204. United States — Atchison v.Board of Education, 148 U. S., 591; Crebs V. Lebanon, 98 Fed. Rep., 549; Al- ma V. Guaranty Sav. Bank, 19 U. S. App., 622; Roberts v. Paducah, 95 Fed. Rep., 62. A resolution not approved by the mayor has not the effect of an ordinance. Central v. Sears, 2 Colo., 588 ; Crutchfield v. Warrens- burg, 30 Mo. App., 456; Wain v. Philadelphia, 99 Pa. St., 330, 337. A joint resolution of councils, directing the opening of a street laid down on one of the public plans of the city, held in Pennsyl- vania to be of same force as an ordinance for that purpose. Sower V. Philadelphia, 35 Pa. St., 231, 23i). A by-law may be enacted in the form of a resolution. Thompson Corp., § 936. n State V. Barnet, 46 N. J. L.. 62. 10 Clay V. Mexico,' 92 Mo. App., 611; State v. Bayonne, 35 N. J. L., 335. 1 1 Kroffe V. Springfield, 86 Mo. App., 530. 1-' Indianapolis v. Miller, 27 Ind., 394; Nevada to use v. Eddy, 123 Mo., 546; 27 S. W. Rep., 471. 1^ Ritterskamp v. Stifel, 59 Mo. App., 510; Farrell v. Rammelkamp, 64 Mo. App., 425. H] NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. width of a sidewalk;!* making contracts for the employment of legal counsel ;i^ appointing a commissioner to assess dam- ages ;!® fixing the permanent compensation of municipal of- ficers;*" changing salaries fixed by ordinance ;i* changing ward lines ;i° amending or repealing an ordinance ;2'' and exer- cising the power of licensing.^! § 4. Same— creating offices and situations. Under some charters every office or situation under the municipal govern- ment or its departments must be created by ordinance, except where the charter itself or some legislative act applicable, cre- lates the office or position.-- Ordinarily the officer possesses no constitutional or charter prerogative to appoint subordinates, independent of the action of the legislative authority, and by all authorized legislation relating thereto he must be governed, not only in making the appointment but in all that is incident to the exercise of the power.2^ Generally the power to create offices and situations is vested in the council or governing legislative body,--* and, of course, 14 Crpss V. Morristown, 18 N. J. Bq., 305. 1"' Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex., 532. 16 State V. Bergen, 33 N. J. L., 39, 72. "Central v. Sears, 2 Colo., 588; Walker v. Evansville, 33 Ind., 393; Brazil v. McBride, 69 Ind., 244; Smith V. Com., 41 Pa. St., 335. 18 Hisey v. Charleston, 62 Mo. App., 381. 19 McCulley v. Elizabeth, 66 N. J. L., 555; 49 Atl. Rep., 686; Cas- caden v. Waterloo, 106 Iowa, 673; 77 N. W. Rep., 333. 20 Cascaden v. Waterloo, 106 Iowa, 673; 77 N. W. Rep., 333; Young V. St. Louis, 47 Mo., 492. "An ordinance cannot be amend- ed, suspended or repealed by a res- olution. The acts which amend, modify or repeal a law should be of «qual dignity with the act which enacts or establishes the law. A resolution or order is not a law, but merely the forin in which the legislative body ex- presses an opinion.' People ex rel. V. Mount, 180 HI., 560, 578, 579; 58 N. E. Rep., 360; Jones v. McAlpine, 64 Ala., 511. 21 This is a subject which, in its nature, requires legislation of a permanent character and of con- tinuing force and effect. The fact that the license, under the general law, can only extend for a limited time, as, for example, one year, can not change the rule. People ex rel. v. Mount, 186 111., 560; 58 N. E. Rep., 360. 22 See State v. Kennon, 7 Ohio St., 546. 23 See U. S. V. Perkins, 116 U. S., 483, affirming 20 Ct. of 01., 438. 24 Somerville v. Wood, 129 Ala., 369; 30 So. Rep., 280; Anderson v. Camden, 58 N. J. L., 515; 33 Atl. Rep., 846. Where the charter authorizes the city council to fix the compensa- NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. [§^ the charter method in this respect, as well as the mode therein prescribed for the election or appointment of officers and per- sons to public positions, must be observed.-" An office or po- sition which must continue to exist until abolished by ordi- nance can only be created by the exercise of a power essen- tially legislative— a power which the council or governing legislative body alone possesses under the charter, which can- not, as pointed out elsewhere, -•* be delegated. It has been held that "the legislature cannot commit to the discretion of others the important function of creating public offices in unlimited or indefinite number— offices which the power creating them is incompetent to abolish."-'' But day laborers, of course, arc not included, and under some charters this class of employes is the only exception.-- Sometimes ordinary clerical assist- tion of its members this may be done by ordinance although no provision for compensation existed at the election of the councilmen. Tacoma v. Lillis, 4 Wash., 797; 18 L. R. A., 372; 31 Pac. Rep., 321. When salary cannot be fixed by ordinance under particular provi- sions. Taylor v. Tacoma, 8 Wash., 174; 35 Pac. Rep., 584. The board of supervisors "when authorized to do so by ordinance," may appoint additional clerks. Charter San Francisco, Art. II, Ch. 1, § 4; Statutes and Amend, to Codes of Cal. (1899), pg, 244. 2-j Illinois — Launtz v. People, 113 111., 137; People v. Weber, 89 111., 347; Home Ins. Co. v. Tjerney, 47 111. App., 600. Massachusetts — Com. v. Allen, 128 Mass., 308; Saunders v. Law- rence, 141 Mass., 380; 5 N. B. Rep., 840. Maine — Bearce v. Fassett, 34 Me., 575. Michiffan — Baker v. Port Huron, 62 Mich., 327; 28 N. W., 913. New Jersey— Sta.te (Clarke) v. Thornton, 49 N. J. L., 349; 8 Atl., 509, Ohio — State v. Bryson, 44 Ohio St., 457; 8 N. B. Rep., 470. Tennessee — Lawrence v. Inger- soll, 88 Tenn., 52, 62; 6 L. R. A., 308; 17 Am. St. Rep., '870; 12 S. W. Rep., 422. Yermont — Stone v. Small, 54 Vt., 498. Ordinance creating office, as city scavenger need not specify manner in which his work shall be done. Ouray v. Corson (Colo. 1900), 59 Pac. Rep., 876. Vote required in creating under particular charter. Kirkham v. Russell, 76 Va., 956, 959. Where the law requires a reso- lution employing a clerk to be signed by the mayor, failure nulli- fied the act. People v. Schroeder, 12 Hun (N. Y.), 413. Where power to appoint is vest- ed by charter in the council, an or- dinance is void which confers such power on the mayor and council. State (Volk) v. Newark, 47 N. J. L., 117. See § 15 post. -« Sec. 86 et seq. post. 27 Ford V. Harbor Commissioner, 81 Cal., 19, 37. 28 Municipal Code of St. Louis, p. 385, sec. 98, §i] NATURE AND REQUISITES OP ORDINANCES. ants and other miscellaneous employes may be appointed with- out the creation by ordinance of the positions which they oc- cupy. However, this question must be determined by the pro- visions of the particular charter.^^ The wise and salutary rule, rigidly enforced by the courts, which forbids the payment of a salary or compensation to the officer unless the law so expressly provides and title is secured in accordance with law,^" and which denies extra compensa- tion, without express legal provision being made therefor,^! 29 Sometimes council may elect or appoint. AcMey's Case, 4 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 35; Com. v. Pitts- burgh, 14 Pa. St., 177, 182; Kirk- ham V. Russell, 76 Va., 956. Can not appoint officer, as pound keeper, unless expressly authorized by charter. White v. Tallman, 26 N. J. L., 67. The appointment of an agent of fortifications by the Secretary of war, there being no act of Con- gress conferring that power upon that officer, is Irregular. U. S. v. Maurice, 2 Brock. (U. S.), 96. Town trustee may employ broker, to sell bonds. Reed v. Or- leans, 1 Ind. App., 25; 27 N. E. Rep., 109. Likewise, city comp- troller. New York v. Sands, 105 N. Y., 210; 11 N. E. Rep., 820. Com- pare Armstrong v. Ft. Edwards, 84 Hun (N. Y.), 261; 32 N. Y. Supp., 433; People v. Smithville, 85 Hun (N. Y.), 114; 32 N. Y. Supp., 668. Agent may be employed, without formal ordinance, by-law or reso- lution, unless so required by law. Wilt V. Redkey (Ind. App., 1902); 64 N. E. Rep., 228. Without express charter or ordi- nance authority neither the mayor nor city solicitor can employ an attorney. Fletcher v. Lowell, 15 Gray (81 Mass.), 103. So, to em- ploy an attorney, the president of a village must have express au- thority. Mark v. West Troy, 69 Hun (N. Y.), 442; 23 N. Y. Supp., 422. 30 Fatal defects in the election or appointment of the officer may deprive him of compensation. Rothrock v. School District, 133 Pa. St., 487; 19 Atl. Rep., 483; Phe- lon v. Granville, 140 Mass., 386; 5 N. E., 269; Commonwealth v. Al- len, 128 Mass., 308. It has been held that an officer can not recover compensation for services rendered under a statute held unconstitutional. Meagher v. County, 5 Nev., 244; Central v. Sears, 2 Colo., 588; Lancaster v. Pulton (Pa.), 24 W. N. C, 401; Smith V. Commonwealth, 41 Pa. St., 335. No implied promise or liability to pay officers will arise. Riley v. K. C, 31 Mo. App., 439; Garnier v. St. Louis, 37 Mo., 554. For a pub- lic officer is not entitled to com- pensation by virtue of a contract express or implied. The right of compensation can only exist, if at all, as a creation of law and as an incident to the office. Givens v. Daviess County, 107 Mo., 603, 608, 609; 17 S. W. Rep., 998. 31 EXTKA COMPENSATIO^T DeXIED. Carroll v. St. Louis, 12 Mo., 444. Chamberlain v. Kansas City, 125 Mo., 430; 28 S. W. Rep., 745; State ex rel. v. Holladay, 67 Mo., 64; Le- moine v. St. Louis, 120 Mo., 419; 25 S. W. Rep., 537. 10 NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. [§ i is often applied to deputies, assistants and subordinates in the municipal service. The ordinance may confer authority upon the ofSce'r to ap- point such additional help as may be required for the efficient working of his department, or, as may be necessary, where the chftracter of such help is specified by naming in terms the po- sitions, and designating the compensation for each situation. Such ordinance does not constitute a delegation of legislative power. The ordinance itself creates the situation, and whether it be technically an office or a mere place, the officer by filling it simply supplies an incumbent or person (as in his judgment the demands of the public service may require) for a position already created by legal authority.^^ ^^ office or position may exist without an incumbent. ^^ Sometimes the legislative power to provide situations under the city government and to create new officers does not of it- self include the power to appoint,''' but oftentimes the power of appointment is an exclusive prerogative of the mayor in case of an officer, or of an officer in case of an assistant or subordinate. This rule results from express charter or legislative provisions applicable, ^^ and is an exception to the The fact that the salary Is inad- as if done by the officer, does not equate does not change the rule, confer the power to create a new A promise to pay the officer extra office. State v. Becker, 3 S. Dak., fees beyond that established by 29; 51 N. W. Rep., 1018. So, a stat- law will not bind the corporation, ute which provides that whenever Decatur v. Vermillion, 77 111., 315; the county attorney of any county Heslep V. Sacramento, 2 Cal., 580. shall be unable or shall neglect or 32 State ex rel. v. Mason, 153 Mo., refuse to enforce the provisions of 23; 54 S. W. Rep., 524, in applica- certain laws in his county, the at- tion of rule to policemen, provided torney general "may appoint as by state statute. many assistants as he shall see An act conferring on county fit," to enforce such laws, has been commissioners the pov.-er to au- sustained. In re Gilson, 34 Kan., thorize the employment of addi- 641; 9 Pac. Rep., 763. tional help in certain offices does ss People v. Stratton, 28 Cal., not constitute a delegation of legis- 382. lative power. Nelson v. Troy, 11 si state v. Denny, 118 Ind., 382; Wash., 435; 39 Pac. Rep., 974. So, 21 N. E. Rep., 252; Evansville v. a statute conferring on the attor- State, 118 Ind., 426; 21 N. B. Rep., ney general the authority to ap- 267; State v. Kennon, 7 Ohio St., point some reputable attorney for 546; Davis v. State, 7 Md., 151; 31 the performance of certain duties Am. Dec, 331. appertaining to the office of the ss Municipal Code of St. Louis, p. attorney general, with like effect 384, sec. 97. §5J NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. 11 rule sometimes laid down that, where a public office is of legis- lative creation the legislature can modify, control or abolish it, and within these powers is embraced the right to change the mode of appointment to office.^^ § 5. When action may be taken by resolution— Illustra- tions. The general rule is that, where a charter commits the decision of the matter to the council or legislative body alone, and is silent as to the mode of its exercise, ordinarily the de- cision may be evidenced by resolution.^^ But it does not neces- sarily follow that, because the charter does not, in express terms, require an act to be done by an ordinance it may, there- fore, be effected by a mere resolution. On the contrary, where the requirement that the corporate act should be done by ordi- nance is implied by necessary inference (as where it is a clear legislative act), a resolution is not sufficient, but an ordinance is indispensable. 3* Under particular charter provisions, resolutions have been held sufficient in the following instances: For the purchase of fire department apparatus ;39 construction of a sewer;*" ac- 61 30 Davis v. State, 7 Md., 151; Am. Dec, 331. ■^■^ Eichenlaub v. St. Joseph, 113 Mo., 395, 402; 21 S. W. Rep., 8; Halsey v. Rapid Transit Co., 54 N. J. L., 102; 20 Atl. Rep., 859; Butler V. Passaic, 44 N. J. L., 171; Green v. Cape May, 41 N. J. L., 45; State V. Jersey City, 27 N. J. L., 493; Pollok v. San Diego, 118 Cal., 593; 50 Pac, 769; Crawfordsville V. Braden, 130 Ind., 149; 28 N. E. Rep., 849; Burlington v. Dennison, 42 N. J. L., 165; Bigelow v. Perth Amboy, 25 N. J. L., 297; Kepner V. Commonwealth, 40 Pa. St., 124; Lincoln St. Ry. Co. v. Lincoln, 61 Neb., 109; 84 N. W. Rep., 802; Chi- cago, etc., R. R. Co. V. Chicago, 124 III., 439; Chicago v. McKech- ney, 91 111. App., 442. Where a state constitution re- quires the legislature to approve or reject a municipal charter as a whole, without power of altera- tion, held approval may be by joint resolution and need not be by bill, signed by the governor. Brooks v. Fisher, 79 Cal., 173; 21 Pac. Rep., 652. A resolution will be sufficient for the performance of a minister- ial act. Quincy v. C, B. & Q. Rail- road Co., 92 111., 21. Mayor need not approve resolution, when. Bur- lington V. Dennison, 42 N. J. L., 165. 38 People ex rel. v. Mount, 186 111., 560, 573; 58 N. E. Rep., 560; Atchison Board of Education v. DeKay, 148 U. S., 591, 599; New- man V. Emporia, 32 Kan., 456; 4 Pac. Rep., 815. Where the charter requires a resolution to be adopted by a ma- jority vote such vote must be given to render the resolution le- gal. Cascaden v. Waterloo, 106 Iowa, 673; 77 N. W. Rep., 333. 3» Green v. Cape May, 41 N. J. L., 45. *o State V. Jersey City, 27 N. J. L., 493. 12 NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. [§ (J ceptance of a dedication ;*i prescribing salary of officer ;*2 fixing the amount of a license previously authorized to be imposed ;*3 fixing a license fee from time to time, under general ordinance;** ordering street improvements ;*5 directing city agents to make named contracts and to appoint municipal agents;*® confirming prior corporate acts;*^ directing convey- ance of property;*^ and for waiving time of performance of contract.*^ The question whether the particular act is to be taken by or- dinance or resolution is considered in appropriate places throughout this work. § 6. How ordinances differ from regulations, orders, reso- lutions, etc. Sometimes the word ordinance is used inter- changeably with by-laws, resolutions, regulations, orders, ete."*^ But there is a distinction in these words in ordinary usage. Regulation is the most general of them all, meaning a rule of order prescribed by a superior or competent authority, re- lating to the actions of those under its control; a governing direction; precept; law (as police regulation); any rule for the ordering of affairs, public or private. In this sense it becomes the generic term from which all others are defined, si)ecified or differentiated. More specifically, a regulation is ii rule prescribed by a municipality, corporation or society for the conduct of third persons dealing with it, as distinguished from a by-law or ordinance. '"'^ By-law, as above stated, was the original designation for ordinance, is the word employed in the English law, and to a 41 state V. Elizabeth, 37 N. J. L , is Morgan v. Johnson, 106 Fed. 432. Rep., 452; 45 C. C. A., 421. 42 Green Bay v. Brauns, 50 Wis., lo Hubbard v. Norton, 28 Ohio 204. St., 116. 43 Burlington v. Insurance Co., so state (Hunt) v. Lambertville, 31 Iowa, 102. 45 N. J. L., 279, 282; Alma v. 44 Arkadelphia Lumber Co. v. Guaranty S. Bank, 19 U. S. App.. Arkadelphia, 56 Ark., 370; 19 S. 622; Lincoln v. Sun Vapor Light W. Rep., 1053. Co., 19 U. S. App., 431. 45 Commissioners v. Silvers, 22 "Every legislative act of the mu- Ind., 491 ; Indianapolis v. Imberry, nicipal assembly shall be by ordi- 17 Ind., 175; Delphi v. Evans, .36 nance or resolution." Charter Ind., 90; Buckley v. Tacoma, 9 Greater New York, ch. 1, §39; Wash., 253. Laws of N. Y. (1897), p. 14. 40 Alton V. Mulledy 21 111., 76; si Century Diet. & Cyc, tit, Egan V. Chicago, 5 111. App., 70. "Regulation;" Compton v. Van 4T San Francisco Gas Co. v. San Volkenburg, 34 N. J. L., 134; State Francisco, 6 Cal., 190. § 6] NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. 13 limited extent, in this country. But the term is also applied to standing rules, adopted by public or private corporations, societies, or associations, relating to their own internal organi- zation and the conduct of their officers and members.^^ Ordinance, although sometimes used in a broad sense so as to include all forms of regulations by civil authority, even acts of Parliament, in this country is usually confined to legislation of municipal corporation. The term is sometimes applied to all sorts of rules and by-laws of the municipality.^^ Resolution is said to be only a less solemn or less usual form of an ordinance. "It is an ordinance still if it is anything intended to regulate any of the affairs of the corporation." Ordinance, then, according to the Supreme Court of Penn- sylvania, is the generic term for all acts of council affecting the affairs of the corporation, and no distinction cm be made between them founded on the difference of degree in which they affect those affairs.^* Order. Sometimes the word resolution or order to enter into contracts is used in a restricted sense."''' Thus an order of the council that certain street work be done was held, under a particular charter, not to be an ordinance respecting the necessity of following the charter style and form and publica- tion.'" V. Overton, 24 N. J. L., 441 ; 61 153 ; 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 373. Am. Dec, 671 ; Morris, etc., R. R. se Napa v. Easterby, 76 Cal., 222, V. Ayres, 29 N. J. L., 393; 80 Am. 228; 18 Pac. Rep., 253; People v. Dec, 215; Wilmington Bank v. Linden, 107 Cal., 94; 40 Pac. Rep., Wollaston, 3 Harr. (Del.), 90. 115; People v. Counts, 89 Cal., 15; =-' By-law and regulation distin- 26 Pac Rep., 612. gulshed by Judge Thompson, 1 Differences as to "ordinances," Thompson, Corp., § 937. "resolutions" and "orders" as to By-law defined. — Kirkpatrick v. publication. Fairchild v. St. Paul, United Presbyterian Ch., 63 Iowa, 46 Minn., 540; 49 N. W. Rep., 325; 372; Flint v. Pierce, 99 Mass., 68; Elmendorf v. New York, 25 Wend. 96 Am. Dec, 691; Drake v. Hudson (N. Y.), 693. / River Co., 7 Barb. (N. Y.), 539. "Order" defined. Tinkham v. 53 "Ordinary usage shows this, Greer, 11 Kan., 299 ; People v. and it may be found illustrated in Williams, 64 Cal., 87; 27 Pac. Wlllcock on Corporations, 73;" Rep., 939. Kepner v. Commonwealth, 40 Pa. "Order" of board of health. New St., 124, 129, 130. York Health Dept. v. Knoll, 70 N. ■'^ Kepner v. Commonwealth, 40 Y., 530. Pa. St., 124, 130. Order to be published, when. '■' Tracy v. People, 6 Colo., 151, State v. Pierce, 35 Wis., 93. 14 NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. [§ 8 § 7. How ordinances differ from rules of procedure. Rules of procedure or rules of council are mere rules of practice of the counciJ or governing legislative body itself in its delibera- tions; passed by virtue of an authority inherent in all asso- ciated functionaries, and implied when not expressly given; and establishing the forms under which it acts in the process of passing ordinances, and expressing the corporate will in all matters within the scope of its legitimate powers. These rules cannot be considered ordinances, but are merely forms of procedure for passing ordinances, and exercising the powers of the corporation.''^ § 8. Classification of ordinances. Ordinances may be classi- fied under four general heads: First, ordinances enacted by virtue of the police power, prescribing penalties for specified commissions and omissions, which may be designated as police ordinances.^^ Second, ordinances granting franchises, special privileges, etc., which may be termed franchise or contract ordinances.^^ Third, ordinances providing for public work, usually called improvement ordinances. Of this kind, there are three general classes, namely, (1) those providing for public improvement.s to be paid for by special assessment or special taxation (some- timoB termed), levied on property assumed to be benefited because of the improvement; (2) those directing the abate- ment of specified public nuisances at the expense of the prop- erty owner, either by special assessment, or destruction of the property; and (3) those ordering public work at the expense of the general municipal revenue.*'* Fourth, ordinances (1) of a permanent character, made for the guidance and regulation of municipal officers and business, . and (2) those of a temporary nature, enacted for specific pui'- poses, which authorize and direct particular officers to do certain things, as to purchase, sell, lease, etc., property, borrow money, mal^e contracts, and, generally, to do anything within the range of municipal competence, where the execution of the given power is not elsewhere vested. These may be termed administrative ordinances. ■'' Kepner v. Commonwealth, 40 ss Chapter XIV. Pa. St., 124, 130. Rules are less so Chapter XVII. binding, may be ignored, etc. See to Chapter XVI. section 115 post. § 10] NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. 15 § 9. Same — general and special. As regards their opera- tion, ordinances are spoken of as general and special. All ordinances of a general nature having an obligatory force on the community and upon the administration of the municipnl government may be denominated general. Those granting franchises and special privileges to persons or corporations, providing for public work and improvement, as entablishiiig sewer districts, ordering the construction of sewers, streets and sidewalks, fixing the grade of streets, authorizing the city to borrow money, empowering officials to do certain things, as the leasing of property, the laying of water distribution pipes, etc., are usually special. In view of the language of certain charter provisions and the construction adopted re- specting repeals, this distinction is important.''^ § 10. Same — penal and non-penal — general and special. Relating to the time of taking effect or publication after pas- sage, ordinances are sometimes classified as penal and non- penal, and as general and special. Thus under a charter pro- viding that ordinances imposing penalties or forfeiture shall not take effect until ten days after their adoption, an ordinance providing for the construction of a sidewalk and authorizing a special assessment to pay for the same is not such an ordi- nance.82 go^ under a charter providing that, "no ordinance subjecting any person to fine or imprisonment shall take effect until it shall have been published for at least one week in a newspaper published in said city," an ordinance authorizing the controller to negotiate and dispose of city bonds need not be so published.^-'' In one case an ordinance providing fire limits within a compai'atively small portion of territory was held to be a general ordinaxice respecting the time of taking effect.^* "By-laws of a general or permanent nature," as used 61 Where a section of a general ea Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. ordinance refers exclusively to one People, 161 111., 244 ; 43 N. E. Rep., subject, such section is not for that 1107. reason a special ordinance. Le- p^^^^_ q^^ ^^^^^ ^_ j^^^^^^^ gg Wis., 534; 29 N. W. Rep., 644. moine v. St. Louis, 5 Mo. App., 583. Under some charters, a general ordinance must be repealed by ex- ^^ Stevenson v. Bay City, 26 press terms. Lemolne v. St. Louis, Mich., 44, 49. 72 Mo., 404, 1 c. 406. See § 204, 64 Reynolds v. Harris, 27 Weekly post. Law Bui. (Ohio), 229. 16 NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. [§ 11 in the Iowa Code relating to publication, includes a city ordi- nance granting a franchise. t^^ Respecting the mode of procedure in passage, ordinances may be general or special. Thus it has been held that a reso- lution awarding a contract is not of a "general or permanent nature," within the meaning of a charter provision requiring a two-thirds vote."^ But a franchise ordinance granting the right to construct and operate a street railway,®''^ one relating to impounding animals found running at large,^^ or one regulat- ing the license and sale of liquor, "^ is an ordinance of a general or permanent nature within the meaning of charter provisions requiring reading on three different days. § 11. Ordinance may combine contractual and police regu- lations. It is no objection to an ordinance that it combines contractual and police regulations. Thus an ordinance grant- ing a railway company a right to construct a railroad upon a public landing under condition forbidding the use of the track during specified hours, combines contractual as well as police provisions, but is not void, for that reason. "In so far as the ordinance granted the right or franchise to construct and operate a railway upon the public ground, it became, when accepted, a contract; but the provision by which the use of the track was prohibited during the time was, in its nature and effect, a municipal police regulation, operating in the interest of public safety.^** This police provision having been enacted i:)ursuant to clear legislative authority, the fact that it is found in an ordinance which also contains contract provi- sions does not change the result or affect the essential char- acter of the power exercised ; and this police provision, being thus specially authorized and duly enacted, unquestionably As to when ordinances take <■^^ Smith v. Columbus, L. & S. Ry. effect, see section 34, post. Co., 8 Ohio N. P. Rep., 1. 65 State V. Omaha & C. B. Ry. & es McGraw v. Whitson, 69 Iowa, B, Co., 113 Iowa, 30; 84 N. W. Rep., 348. 983. 69 Brown v. Lutz, 36 Neb., 527 ; Ordinance providing for loan is 54 N. W. Rep., 860. of general nature. National Bank to McDonald v. Toledo Consoli- of Commerce v. Grenada, 44 Fed. dated R. R. Co., 43 U. S. App., 79; Rep., 262, overruling 41 Fed. Rep., 20 C. C. A., 322 ; 74 Fed. Rep., 104 ; 87. Hayes v. R. R. Co., Ill U. S., 228;' 60 Cincinnati v, Bickett, 26 Ohio Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S., 1, 42. St., 49, §12] NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. has, within the corporate limits, the force of a law enacted by the legislature of the state. "'^ §12. Force and effect of ordinances. Valid ordinances of municipal corporations are as binding on the corporators 0n"AKtE.S. California — Ordinance to be con- strued as if its terms had been in- corporated in the statute. San Luis Obispo V. Fitzgerald, 126 Cal., 279; Murphy y. San Luis Obispo, 119 Cal., 624; Johnson v. Simon- ton, 43 Cal., 242. Connecticut — State v. Tyron, 39 Conn., 183. Georglu — Bearden v. Madison, 73 Ga., 184, 186; Perdue v. Ellis, 18 Ga., 586. Illinois — Tudor v. Chicago and South Side Rapid Transit R. Co., 154 111., 129 (locating railroad); Wragg V. Penn Tp., 94 111., 11; 34 Am. Rep., 199 (stock at large); Wright v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 7 111. App., 438, 446. Indiana — Indianapolis v. Indian- apolis Gas Light Coke Co., 66 Ind., 396 (authorizing contract). Michigan — Detroit v. Ft. Wayne and Belle Isle Ry. Co,, 95 Mich., 456; 35 Am. St. Rep., 580 (regu- lating street railways). Minnesota — Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn., 323; 53 Am. Rep., 47 (pro- hibiting leaving horse unhitched). Missouri — Jackson v. Grand Ave- nue Ry. Co., 118 Mo., 199, 218, 219; 24 S. "W. Rep., 192; Union Depot, Ry. Co. V. S. Ry. Co., 105 Mo., 562, 575; 16 S. W. Rep., 920; St. Louis V. Foster, 52 Mo., 513. yew Jersey — Bradshaw v. Cam- den, 39 N. J. L., 416, 419, per Van Syckel, J. Xeic York — Carthage v. Fred- erick, 122 N. Y., 268, 271; 19 Am. St. Rep., 490 (removal of snow and ice from sidewalk) ; Griffin "v. Gloversville, 73 N. Y. St., 684; 67 App. Div., 403; Gloversville v. Howell, 70 N. Y., 287 ; Roderick v. Whitson, 51 Hun. (N. Y.), 620. South Carolina — State ex rel. v. Williams, 11 S. C, 288 (forbidding bawdy houses). Vermont — St. Johnsbury v. Thompson, 59 Vt., 300, 305, by-laws have force of, special laws of the legislature (regulating victualing shops). 73 Per Scott, J., in Taylor v. Car- ondelet, 22 Mo., 105. 1« NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. [§13 of the state which speaks in both."'* "The passage of an ordinance is, of course, a legislative act."'' § 13. Do ordinances differ as to force and effect from char- ter or statute? In an early Ohio case it is said that the making of ordinances and by-laws Ijy a town corporation is not the exercise of legislative power in the sense as exercised 7* Per Lewis, J., in State v. Vic. De Barr, 58 Mo., 395, 1. c, 397. t:< Per Sherwood, J., in Moore v. Cape Girardeau, 103 Mo., 1. c. 476; St. Louis V. Mfrs. Saving Bank, 49 Mo., 574. "When an ordinance is passed * * * it is in force by the au- thority of the state, and is to be interpreted and executed as if it had been passed by the general assembly." Per Gamble, J., in St. Louis V. Boffinger, 19 Mo., 13, 1. c. 15. "Au ordinance * * * has the same force and effect of a law passed by the legislature." , Mason V. Shawneetown, 77 111., 533, 537. Lord Abinger said: "The by-law has the same effect within its limits, and with respect to the persons upon whom it lawfully operates, as an act of parliament has upon the subjects at large." Hopkins V. Swansea, 4 M. & W. 621. After approvingly quoting tte above, Sherwood, J., in State ex rel. V. Walbridge, 119 Mo., 1. c. 39 1 ; 24 S. W. Rep., 457; 41 Am. St. Rep., 663, adds: "It is hardly necessary to say that this is the Keneral view," citing 1 Dill, on Mun. Corp. (4th ed.), sec. 308. The Supreme Court of the United , States announces the same rule in New Orleans Waterworks v. New Orleans, 164 U. S., 471, 481. "The authority to enact by-laws is dele- gated to the city by the sovereign power and the exercise of the authority gives to such enactments the same force and effect as if they had been passed directly by the legislature. They are public laws of a local and limited operation, designed to secure good order and to provide for the welfare and comfort of the inhabitants." The ordinance has precisely the same effect as a legislative act, as it "is expressly authorized by the legislature, and whether it be their act or the act of the local city legislature, makes no difference." Per Savage, Ch. J., in Presbyterian Ch. V. New York, 5 Cow. (N. Y.), 538, 541. The Supreme Court of Missouri said: "A charter adopted by .direct grant of the constitution itself has all the efficacy of a legislative enactment, and that if * * * a power be given to a city by charter framed and enacted by the legislature itself, ordi- nances passed in obedience to such charters are laws of the state within the municipality, and are binding upon all persons who coine within the scope of their operation, unless they conflict with, and are not in harmony with the constitution and general laws of the state." Grand Ave. Ry. Co. V. Citizens' Ry. Co., 148 Mo., 665, 671, 50 S. W. Rep., 305. The most recent utterance of the Supreme Court of the United States supports this view. That court holds that an ordinance is a law of the state which may im- pair the obligation of a contract within the mpatiing of the federal constitution (14th amendment), § l^J NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. li) by the legislature of the state ; that the latter prescribes a rule of action which operates upon all— the willing and un- willing. "It comes from a superior, and the inferior is bound to obey it. The charter to a municipal corporation is the exer- cise of legislative authority. It permits the establishment of by-laws and ordinances; but these are a matter of compact and agreement among the corporators. They do not act upon others, but only upon themselves, and, by mutual consent either directly or indirectly expressed, through the city or town council. These ordinances so made are not the power vested exclusively in the General Assembly. "^ As affects the liability of citizens inter sese, it has been de- clared in a JMissouri case that ordinances differ from charter provisions and legislative acts ; that laws controlling the liabil- ity of citizens inter sese must emanate from the legislature, in whom alone such power is vested by the constitution; that a charter of a city, adopted by the people, is as much a law of the state, as if it had been enacted by the legislature, and a so as to give the federal courts jurisdiction to enjoin its enforce- ment. Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S., 1. See sec. 232 et seq. post. A resolution will have the same effect. Iron M. R. Co. v. Memphis, 96 Fed. Rep., 113. Sec. 232, post. Contracts which are in contra- vention of a municipal ordinance have been held void. Milne v. Davidson, 5 Martin, N. S. (La.), 409; 16 Am. Dec, 189; Heland v. Lowell, 3 Allen (Mass.), 407; 81 Am. Dec, 670. "Within the sphere of their dele- gated powers municipal corpor- ations have as absolute control as the general assembly (of the state) would have if it never had delegated such powers and exer- cised them by its own laws." Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 44 Iowa 505, 509; 24 Am. Rep., 756. An ordinance does not partake of the nature of a contract between the corporation and its inhab't- ants, and therefore the city is not liable for its non-enforcement. Kiley v. Kansas City, 87 Mo., 103; 56 Am. Rep., 443; The Municipal Code of St. Louis, p. 397, sec. 116. An ordinance authorizing a cer- tain contract and prescribing its terms does not give the contract the force of law or ordinance. State ecc rel. v. New Orleans & C. R. Co., 37 La. Ann., 589. Ordinance is a "law" as used in insurance policy. Jones v. Fire- man's Fund Ins. Co., 2 Daly (N. Y.), 307. Ordinances of boards of health have the force of laws within the limits of their territorial jurisdic- tion. Polinsky v. People, 73 N. Y., 65; People ex rel. v. Court of Special Sessions Justices, 7 Hun. (14 Sup.Ct.), 214; People v. Board of Health, 33 Barb. (N. Y.), 344. - Markle v. Akron, 14 Ohio, 586, 590. Examine, Bell v. Quinn, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.), 146, 151. 20 NATURE AND REQUISITES OP ORDmANCBS. [§ 14 provision of sucli charter is a valid regulation and bindinjj; upon citizens both in their relation to the city and among themselves. "The reason is that the people— the source of all power— conferred the right, by the constitution, upon the city to so legislate bj' its organic law, just as they granted the legislative power generally to the general assembly, oi" the judicial power to the courts. "^ The difference between charter and ordinance will farther appear in treating of the regulation of civil rights and liabili- ties.^ § 14. Requisites of a valid ordinance stated. The general requisites of a valid municipal ordinance, one legally binding upon all whom it is designed to operate, may be thus briefly summarized : 1. It must be promulgated by a public, or municipal, cor- poration, duly created and legally existing. 2. It must emanate by virtue of power inherent in the corporation, or power either expressly or impliedly delegated to it by the state. 3. It must relate to a subject within the scope of the cor- poration. 4. It must be in harmony with the constitution of the United States and the sfeite, the laws of the United States and the state, the municipal charter and general principles of the common law in force in the state. 5. Unless it originates by virtue of express delegated power by the state, it must be reasonable in its terms. 6. It must be adopted by the authorized tribunal, legallj' convened. 7. It must be in form as provided. 8. It must be precise, definite and certain in expression. 9. It must be passed in the manner prescribed. 2 The action was for alleged s see Sees. 40 to 42, post; Baker negligence, charging violation of v. Portland, 58 Me., 199; 10 Am. an ordinance regulating the care- Law Reg. (N. S.), 559, note hy ful movement of street cars and Judge Redfleld ; Johnson v. Simon- designed to protect the public, ton, 43 Cal., 242. Sanders v. Southern Electric Ry. Charter may create civil lia- Co., 147 Mo., 411, 427; 48 S. W. bllity. Rockford v. Hilderbrand, Rep., 855. 61 111., 155. §15] NATURE AND REQUISITES OP ORDINANCES. 21 10. It must be enacted in good faith, in tiie public interest alone, and designed to enable the corporation to perform its true functions as a local governmential organ.* § 15. Ordinances must conform to charter. The charter of the city is the organic law of the corporation,'' and it bears the same general relation to the ordinances of the city that the constitution of the state bears to the state statutes.® The proposition is self-evident, therefore, that an ordinance can no more change or limit the effect of the charter than a legis- lative act can modify or supersede a provision of the consti- tution of the state.' Thus charter power to remove an ' ' officer at pleasure" cannot be limited by ordinance to removal "for cause."® So charter power of the council to appoint and * "A good by-law should be (a) clearly and definitely expressed, (b) positive, general and equal in its operation as a law, and (c) reasonable in its terms. It must be (d) within the express or necessarily implied powers of the corporation, (e) consistent with, not repugnant to, the general law of the land, and (f) made bona flde^in the interests of the corpor- ation, not to serve those of some other person or body of persons." Biggar, Mun. Manual of Canada, p. 327; Phillips v. Denver, 19 Colo., 179; 41 Am. St. Rep., 230; 34 Pac. Rep., 902; Zanone v. Mound City, 103 111., 552, 556; Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 111., 90, 97; Tugman v. Chicago, 78 111., 405. 5 Bast Tennessee University v. Knoxville, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.), 166, 170; Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., 140 Mo., 458, 471; 41 S. W. Rep., 943; St. Louis v. Dorr, 145, Mo., 466, 478; 46 S. W. Rep., 976; St. Louis V. Foster, 52 Mo., 513; Peo- ple ex rel. v. Mount, 186 111., 560; 58 N. E. Rep., 360; Williams v. Davidson, 43 Tex. 1, 35; Gabel v. Houston, 29 Tex., 335, 343; Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th Ed.), 227. 6 Quinette v. St. Louis, 76 Mo., 402. See sec. 43, post. 7 A city ordinance which does not comply with the charter is as invalid as a statute which does not conform to the requirement of a state constitution. People ex rel. v. Mount, 186 III., 560, 568, 58 N. E. Rep., 360. "Corporations cannot make by- laws contrary to their constitution. If they do so they act without authority." Per Yates, J., In Rex v. Spencer, 3 Burr., 1839; Placer- ville V. Wilcox, 35 Cal., 21; Hay- wood V. Savannah, 12 Ga., 404, 409 ; Andrews v. Insurance Co., 37 Me., 256; People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich., 288; 16 Am. St. Rep., 578; St. Paul V. Laidler, 2 Minn., 190; 72 Am. Dec, 89; Cape Girardeau V. Fougeau, 30 Mo. App., 551; Hisey v. Charleston, 62 Mo. App., 381; Kemp v. Monett, 95 Mo. App., 452; 69 S. W. Rep., 31; Landis v. Vineland, 54 N. J. L., 75; 23 Atl. Rep., 357; State v. Nashville, 83 Tenn., 697, 54 Am. Rep., 427; Miller v. Burch, 32 Tex., 208, 5 Am. Rep., 242; Gabel v. Houston, 29 Tex., 335, 343; Thompson v. Car- roll, 22 How. (U. S.), 422; Thomp- son V. Richmond, 12 Wall. (U. S.), 349. 8 An ordinance providing that the appointment of a city officer 32 NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. [§ 16 remove certain officers cannot be transferred by ordinance to the mayor and council.^ So where like charter power is vested in the mayor and council, an ordinance cannot confer such power in the council alone.i° So an ordinance which abridges the term fixed by charter," or which confers greater powers on an offieer, e. g., the mayor, than those given by charter or legislative act/^ will be held void in accordgjice with the principle stated. Some charters confer upon the officer or head of a department full authority to select all of his sub- ordinates, deputies, clerks and employes, and where such charter power exists the officer cannot be deprived of this power of selection on the part of the legislative body.i^ The rule is that the power of appointment conferred by charter or statute cannot be taken away by ordinance.^* Power to pass ordinances is not only limited by the express terms of the charter, but they must not conflict in any degree with its object or the purposes for which the local corporation is organized.15 § 16. Ordinances must not be inconsistent with the general laws of the state. Ordinances must not be inconsistent with the statutes or general laws of the state, for if they are they will be null and void, unless they emanate by virtue of express grant of the state.i'' The circumstances under which the shall continue until removed "for 12 Union Depot Railway Co. v. cause" is of no effect, where the Smith, 16 Colo., 361; 27 Pac. Rep., city charter (St. Joseph) author- 329. Izes the appointment by the coun- is The Municipal Code of St. cil during "its pleasure." State ex Louis, p. 385, sec. 89. rel. V. Johnson, 123 Mo., 43, 50; i' Horan v. Lane, 53 N. J. L., 275; 27 S. W. Rep., 399. To same effect, 21 Alt. Rep., 302. Horan v. Lane, 53 N. J. L., 275 ; 21 i"' Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N. J. L. Atl. Rep., 302; Uffert v. Vogt, 65 (2 Green), 222; Mt. Pleasant v. N. J. L., 377, 621; 48 Atl. Rep., Breeze, 11 Iowa, 399. 574; 47 Atl. Rep., 225. See State Ordinances regulating compen- v. Draper, 50 Mo., 353. sation and fee of city attorney. 9 State (Volk) v. Newark, 47 N. Boucher v. Moberly, 74 Mo., 113; J. L., 117. Lonergan v. Louisiana, 83 Mo. 10 Com. V. Crogan, 155 Pa. St., App., 101; Kemp v. Monett, 95 Mo. 448; 26 Atl. Rep., 697. App., 452; 69 S. W. Rep., 31. 11 Vason V. Augusta, 38 Ga., 542; is "All by-laws must ever be sub- Stadler v. Detroit, 13 Mich., 346 ; ject to the general law of the realm East St. Loilis V. Kase, 9 111. App., and subordinate to It." Norris v. 409; Jacksonville v. Allen, 25 III. Staps, Hob., 210. App., 354. By-laws or ordinances which in- §16] NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. 23 ordinajice may supersede general laws of the state upon the same subject are discussed elsewhere.^" The adjudieatious afford many illustrations of this doctrine. Thus an ordinance imposing upon a municipal officer the duties which are re- quired by statute to be performed by a state officer is un- authorized and void.is So where the mayor is empowered by statute "in his discretion * * * to impose a fine not ex- ceeding $20" for a particular offense, an ordinance prescribinj4' a fine of not less than $3 nor more than $20 for the same offense, was held vqid, as limiting the discretion of the mayor conferred by state statute. i" The rule of law seems to be firmly established that, without express grant on the part of the state, that which is allowed by the general laws of the state cannot be prohibited by ordinance.-" Thus where the sale of intoxicating liquor or pool selling is licensed by state statute, an ordinance forbidding such sales altogether within the corporate limits is void.-i So without express legislative grant, an ordinance cfinnot authorize what the statutes forbid.^^ fringe the common or statute law of the state, or particular statutes relating to the corporation (pro- vided these particular statutes do not impair the obligation of the charter) are void. Haywood v. Savannah, 12 Ga., 404, 409. Ordinances which conflict with the constitution or statutes of the state or charter of the local cor- poration are void. Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wall. (U. S.), 349; Thompson v. Carroll, 22 How. (U. S.), 422. I'' Chapter VII, Of Amendment and Repeal of Ordinances. Chap- ter XV, Of Municipal Control of Offenses Against the State. IS State (Reed) v. Camden, 50 N. J. L., 87 ; 11 Atl. Rep., 137. 19 Landis v. Vineland, 54 N. J. L., 75; 23 Atl. Rep., 357. Ordinance prescribing greater penalty than state law is void. Schroder v. Charleston, 3 Brev. (S. C), 533. The penalties must be the same (by constitution) . Taylor v. Owens- boro, 98 Ky., 271; 56 Am. St. Rep., 361; 32 S. W. Rep., 948. But see Chapter V, Of Penalties, sec. 178. =0 Collins V. Hatch, 18 Ohio, 523; 51 Am. Dec, 465. -1 Sale of liquor. Robinson v. Franklin, 1 Humph. (Tenn.), 156; 34 Am. Dec, 625; State v. Brittain, 89 N. C, 574; State v. Langston, 88 N. C, 692. Pool selling. Ex parte Ogden (Tex. Cr. App., 1902), 66 S. W. Rep., 1100. Ordinances relating to animals running at large cannot conflict with state estray laws. Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio^ 427, 431. Such laws supersede municipal charters granted after their passage. Dodge V. Gridley, 10 Ohio, 173, per Lane, C. J. 22 /» re Ridenbaugh (Idaho, 1897), 49 Pac, Rep.', 12. Gambling. State v. Caldwell, 3 La. Ann., 435. Selling hay without inspection. 24 NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. [§17 The numerous cases in the notes will show the circumstances under which ordinances have been held void because incou: sistent with the laws of the state.^^ § 17. Same— Exception. By virtue of special power con- ferred by the state the municipal corporation may enact ordinances contrary to the general state policy, as expressed New York v. Nichols, 4 Hill (N. Y.). 209. Selling liquor on Sunday. Wood V. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. (N. Y.), 425. When ordinance and state stat- ute need not correspond. Regula- tion of bay windows. Common- wealth V. Goodnow, 117 Mass., 114. Selling liquor on Sunday. McPher- son V. Chebanse, 114 111., 46; 28 N. E. Rep., 454. Salary or fees of city oflficer fixed by state law cannot be changed by ordinance. Behan v. New Orleans, 34 La. Ann., 128; Wood v. Kansas City, 162 Mo., 303; 62 S. W. Rep., 433; Lonergan v. Louisiana, 83 Mo. App., 101. City authorities cannot change salaries of state olEcer, without ex- press power. Jarvis v. New York, 49 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 354; Landon V. New York, 39 N. Y. Super. Ct., 467. 23 Ordinances Must Not Be In- consistent With the State Laws. Alabama — Ex parte Byrd, 84 Ala., 17; 4 So. Rep., 397; 5 Am. St. Rep., 328; Greensboro v. Bhren- reich, 80 Ala., 579; 60 Am. Rep., 130 (quarantine regulations) ; Mobile V. Yuille, 3 Ala., 137; 36 Am. Dec, 441. Arkansas — Van Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark., 368; 14 S. W. Rep., 38; 22 Am. St. Rep., 214 (carrying con- cealed weapons) ; Siloam Springs V. Thomson, 41 Ark., 456, 461 (li- quor selling) ; State v. Lindsay, 34 Ark., 372 (licensing gambling) ; Vance v. Little Rock, 30 Ark., 435 (taxation). California — Carpet beating ma- chine, Ex parte Lacey, 108 Cal., 326; 41 Pac. Rep., 411; 49 Am. St. Rep., 93. Selling lottery tickets. Ex parte Solomon, 91 Cal., 440; 27 Pac. Rep., 757. Visiting house of ill fame. In re Ah You, 88 Cal., 99; 25 Pac. Rep., 974; 22 Am. St. Rep., 280. Opium smoking, etc. In re Sic, 73 Cal., 142, 148; 14 Pac. Rep., 405. Connecticut — State v. Smith, 67 Conn., 541; 35 Atl. Rep., 506; 52 Am. St. Rep., 301 (licensing) ; State V. Welsh, 36 Conn., 215 (liquor selling); South Port v. Ogden, 23 Conn., 128 (taking oys- ters) ; State v. Wordin, 56 Conn., 216 (report by physicians). Florida — State v. Dillon (Fla., June 5, 1900), 28 So. Rep., 781. Georgia — Rothschild v. Darien, 69 Ga., 503; Savannah v. Hussey, 21 Ga., 80; 68 Am. Dec, 452; State V. Georgia Med. Soc, 38 Ga., 608; Adams v. Albany, 29 Ga., 56; Liv- ingston V. Albany, 41 Ga., 22. Illinois — Petersburg v. Metzker, 21 111., 205 (fine); Duggan v. Peoria, D. & E. Ry. Co., 42 111. App., 536 (regulating railways). Iowa — Burlington v. Kellar, 18 Iowa, 59, 65. Kansas — Garden City v. Abbott, 34 Kan., 283; 8 Pac. Rep., 473 (license on lawyers). Ordinances to be valid must observe the re- quirements of the state statute on the same subject. State v. Young, 17 Kan., 414, distinguishing Em- poria v. Volmer, 12 Kan., 622; Saline y. Seitz, 16 Kan., 143; §17] NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. 25 in general statutes. It is no ground of objection to the valid- ity of prohibitory ordinances, or ordinances regulating the vending of liquor, bawdy houses, and local police matters gen- erally which are peculiarly municipal offenses, that the general laws of the state do not extend the power of prohibition or regulation to all municipal corporations and parts of the state. Alexander v. O'Donnell, 12 Kan., 608; State ex rel. v. Topeka, 36 Kan., 76; 12 Pac. Rep., 310. Kentucky — March v. Common- wealth, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.), 25; Sim- rail V. Covington, 90 Ky., 444; 29 Am. St. Rep., 398. Louisiana — New Orleans v. Phll- Ippi, 9 La. Ann., 44; State v. Burns, 45 La. Ann., 34; 11 So. Rep., 878. Massachusetts — If ordinance is broader than statute it is void. Newton v. Belger, 143 Mass., 598 10 N. E. Rep., 464 (fire protec- tion) ; Commonwealth v. Roy, 140 Mass., 432; 4 N. B. Rep., 814 (fast riding). Minnesota — State v. St. Paul, 32 Minn., 329; 20 N. W. Rep., 243 (sales of vegetables); St. Paul v. Laidler, 2 Minn., 190; 72 Am. Dec, 89 (sale of meat) ; St. Paul v. Colter, 12 Minn., 41; 90 Am. Dec, 278 (licensing butchers, etc). Missouri — State v. Walbridge, 119 Mo., 383; 41 Am. St. Rep., 663 (removal of oflScers) ; Ruggles v. Collier, 43 Mo., 353, 363; Kansas City V. Hallett, 59 Mo. App., 160; St. Joseph V. Vesper, 59 Mo. App., 459; In re Dunn, 9 Mo. App., 255; Carr v. St. Louis, 9 Mo., 191; St. Louis V. Cafferata, 24 Mo., 94; Paris V. Graham, 33 Mo., 94; St. Louis V. Heitzeberg, P. & P. Co., 141 Mo., 375; 64 Am. St. Rep., 516; 39 L. R. A., 551 (smoke ordinance) ; Weber v. Johnson, 37 Mo. App., 601 ; Baldwin v. Green, 10 Mo., 410. Nelraska — State v. Hardy, 7 Neb., 377 (liquor selling). New Hampshire — State v. Noyes, 30 N. H., 279. New Jersey — White v. Bayonne, 49 N. J. L., 311; 8 Atl. Rep., 295; Lozier v. Newark, 48 N. J. L., 452; 2 Atl. Rep., 815; Outwater v. Borough of Carlstadt, 66 N. J. L., 510; 49 Atl. Rep., 533; State (Volk) v. Newark, 47 N. J. L., 117; Breninger v. Belvidere, 44 N. J. L., 350; State (Bowyer) v. Camden, 50 N. J. L., 87; 11 Atl. Rep., 137; State V. Jersey City, 29 N. J. L., 170. New York — Wood v. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. (N. Y.), 425; Cowen v. West Troy, 43 Barb. (N. Y.), 48; New York v. Nichols, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 209. North Carolina — State v. Austin, 114 N. C, 855; 19 S. E. Rep., 919; 41 Am. St. Rep., 817 (forbidding minors in saloons) ; Weith v. Wilmington, 68 N. C, 24; State v. McCoy, 116 N. C, 1059; 21 S. B. Rep., 690 (gambling, when cov- ered by statute, cannot be regu- lated by ordinance). Ohio — Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St., 268 (hucksters) ; Markle v. Akron, 14 Ohio, 586 (sale of liquor) ; Cincinnati v. Gwynne, 10 Ohio, 192 (collection of special tax by action of debt). Pennsylvania — Livingston v. Wolf, 136 Pa. St., 519; 20 Atl. Rep., 551; 20 Am. St. Rep., 936 (use of sidewalk, bay windows, etc.). Rhode Island — State v. Pollard, 6 R. I., 290 (disorderly conduct). South Carolina — State v. Charles- ton, 12 Rich. Law (S. C), 480 26 NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. [§18 "Morality and good order, the public convenience and wel- fare, may require many regulations in crowded cities and towns, which the more sparsely settled portions of the country find unnecessary. And it is for legislative discretion to de- termine, within the limitations of the constitution, to what extent city or town councils shall be invested with the power of local legislation."-* The circumstances under which ordinances supersede or repeal general state statutes are treated elsewhere.^^ § 18. Ordinances must harmonize with the public policy and common law of the state. A municipal corporation cannot, without special authority, prohibit what the policy of a general statute of the state permits.-" Thus under a general grant of power, a municipal corporation cannot adopt ordinances '■' which infringe the spirit, or are repugnant to the policy, of the state as declared in its legislation. "^7 The rule has often been declared that ordinances must be in harmony with the (establishing a court forj, trial of free persons of color, valid). Tennessee — Katzenberger v. La wo, 90 Tenn., 235; 16 S. W. Rep., 611; 25 Am. St. Rep., 681; 13 L. R. A., 135; State ex rel. v. Nashville, 15 Lea (83 Tenn.), 697; Pesterfleld v. Vickers, 3 Coldw. (Tenn.), 205. Texas — Bohmy v. State^ 21 Tex. Grim. App., 597; 2 S. W. Rep., 886; Flood V. State, 19 Tex. Grim. App., 584; Angerhoffer v. State, 15 Tex. Grim. App., 613; Ex parte Garza, 28 Tex. Grim. App., 381; 13 S. W. Rep., 779; 19 Am. St. Rep., 845. Wisconsin — State v. Fisher, 33 Wis., 154 (liquor selling). 24 Per Scott, C. J., in Burckholt- er V. McGonnellsville, 20 Ohio St., 308, 315. "The modes of procedure cus- tomary and suitable in the rural districts, to prevent and punish offenses against person and prop- erty, are utterly inadequate to the purpose where men are aggregated in the dense masses of the cities. Hence the necessity and sanction for an efficient organization of police. *■ " These laws, though peculiar to the municipality which enacts and enforces them, and though different from the general laws of the state applicable to all the people of the state, have never, for such reasons, been supposed to be invalid. They have not been deemed obnoxious to the objection of being partial laws, or not laws of the land." Trigally v. Memphis, 6 Goldw. (Tenn.), 382, 388, 389. 25 See Chapters VII and XV. 2ii Canton v. Nist, 9 Ohio St., 439. An ordinance is void if it is against the policy of the general statute of the state, as one relating to the sale of liquor. Thompson v. Mt. Vernon, 11 Ohio St., 688. 27 Durango v. Reinsberg, 16 Colo., 327; Phillips v. Denver, 19 Colo., 179; 41 Am. St. Rep., 230; 34 Pac. Rep., 902; Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427; Collins v. Hatch, 18 Ohio, 523. Contra, Roberts v. O^le, 30 111., 459. § 19] NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. 27 principles of the common law in force in the state. ^^ This principle is copiously illustrated in cases relating to nuisances. The rule is uniformly adhered to that a municipal corporation cannot arbitrarily declare that to be a nuisance, without proof, which is not so in fact, or recognized as such by the general principles of the common law, or by state statute.^^ § 19. Ordinances must be enacted in good faith. The dec- laration is often encountered, especially in the earlier cases, that the ordinance must be passed in good faith. The estab- lishment of this fact, of course, is difficult, and sometimes im- possible. In many instances, the requirement that ordinances should be made bo}ia fide is synonymous, or used interchange- ably, with the declaration that the ordinance should be en- acted in the interest of the corporation and public, as dis- tinguished from private interests.^" Thus in the exercise of the police power, "the law will not allow the right of property to be invaded, under the guise of a police regulation for the preservation of health, when it is manifest that such is not the object and purpose of the regulation. ' '^i So in the legitimate exercise of the power to remove dead animals the cprporatioii will not be permitted to confer such right arbitrarily upon one firm or individual to the exclusion of all others by pre- venting competition, imperatively required by the charter, and thereby create a monopoly to the detriment of the inhabit- ants.^* So under charter power to limit the number of inns or houses of entertainment, and, with assent of the electors, to prohibit the sale of spirituous liquors, a by-law limiting the number of licenses to one in a township ten miles square and containing 6,000 inhabitants (besides those of a large village situated within the township) was set aside as unreasonable. 28 Simrall v. Covington, 90 Ky., poration, and not at variance with 444; 29 Am. St. Rep., 398; Bar- the general law of the land, may- ling v. West, 29 Wis, 307, 315; 9 be set aside if it be shown that in Am. Rep., 576; Mt. Pleasant v. passing them the council have not Breeze, 11 lowa^ 399; Taylor v. exercised bona ;?(ie the powers con- Griswold, 14 N. J. L. (2 Green), f erred upon them by the legisla- 222. ture." Biggar, Mun. Manual of 29 See Chapter XIV. of ordi- Canada, p. 332. nances relating to police powers. si per Wilde, J. Austin v. Mur- Ch. XV, Of Municipal Control of ray, 16 Pick. (Mass.), 121, 126. Offenses Against State. ^^ See Chaps. VI. and VIII., sub- so "By-laws, even though reason- division 1, ably within the powers of the cor- 38 NATURE AND REQUISITES OP ORDINANCES. [§ 19 "It was not a bona fide exercise of the discretion of limiting the number of licensed taverns. * * * it was in reality a prohibitory measure * * * and Was intended to give the go-by to a legislative enactment which gave the inhabitants of the township a direct voice upon the question of prohibi- tion."^^ In regulating, by ordinance, the price of commodi- ties, as, for example, gas, the price must be fixed at a reasonable rate ; but if it is fraudulently placed at a rate which would inevitably entail loss on the part of the company required to furnish it, the ordinance will be held not to have been passed in good faith.^* As a violation of the rule of good faith, a by-law for the division of territory into electoral districts, passed to favor the majority of the members of the council to the prejudice of the minority, and to thus control the election, was set aside as unjust, partial and oppressive.*^ In a Canadian ease power was conferred to enact by-laws ' ' for regulating or prohibiting the passage of traction engines, threshing machines or other heavy vehicles over highways or bridges upon highways," etc. A by-law providing that no traction engine, steam engine, threshing machine or water tank should pass or be transported over any of the highways of the municipality, "except at the sole risk of the owner of such engines," etc., was set aside as not being a bona fide exercise of the power conferred, because it neither regulated nor prohibited the passage of the engines, etc., but was merely an attempt to escape the liability to keep highways in repair as required by law and the consequences of neglecting to do so. The court said: "It does seem that the by-law is rather a refusal by the municipality to exercise the power conferred by the act, than a bona fide exercise of it."*^ As the corporation is not designed to promote private in- terests, ordinances favorable alone to corporations and indi- viduals or classes of individuals, in contravention of the public 33 Per Robinson, C. J., in re Bar- 34 State v. Cincinnati Gas Co., 18 clay and Township of Darlington, Ohio St., 262. 12 Up. Can. Q. B., 86, followed in ss Mongenais v. Corporation of re Greystock and Township of Oto- Rigand, Quebec Rep., 11 Sup. Ct., nabee, 12 Up. Can. Q. B., 458. To Canada, 348. To same effect. Kirk- same effect. Re Brodie and Town ham v. Russell, 76 Va., 956, 961. of Bowmanville, 38 Up. Can. Q. B., so McMillan v. Portage, LaPairie, 580, 11 Manitoba Rep., 216, 219. §30] NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. 39 rights, are unwarranted. Likewise ordinances passed in bad faith and intended to discriminate unreasonably against cer- tain persons or classes, as negroes,^'' Chinese laundrymen,^^ etc., will be condemned by the courts.*^ The question as to how far the motives of the members of a municipal body will be inquired into by the court is dis- cussed elsewhere.** §20. Ordinances must be definite and certain. Every or- dinance must be clear, precise, definite and certain in its terms.*! jf ^jig ordinance is so vague that its precise meaning cannot be ascertained it will be declared void.*^ An ordinance providing that no occupant of land abutting on a private way shall suffer any filth to remain on that part of the way adjoin- ing his land is not open to objection of indefiniteness because it does not fix a time beyond which it shall not be allowed to remain.*^ So an ordinance directed against the game of "policy" is not void for uncertainty because it does not set out the particular facts which constitute the game.^* So an ordinance declaring it an offense to "conduct a house of ill- fame in an indecent manner ' ' was sustained as sufficient, with- out specification of the various acts of indecency.*^ 37 § 227, post. from ambiguity in its language. 38 §§ 193, 194, post. Jack v. Ontario, S. & H. R. W. Co., 39 As to ordinance fixing municl- 14 Up. Can. Rep., 328; Crome v. pal charge for use of streets by Steeper, 46 Up. Can. Rep., 87. This poles, etc., of telegraph company, applies especially to those which see dissenting opinion of Mr. Jus- create a new office. Foster v. tice Brown in St. Louis V. Western Moore, 4 Law Rep. (Ir.), Crown U. Tel. Co., 148 U. S., 92, 105. Cases reserved, 670. Chapters VI. and VIII. -is Commonwealth v. Cutter, 156 10 §§ 161, 162, post. Mass., 52; 29 N. E. Rep., 1146. ■41 "It has been well said that a ** The court will take notice of by-law ought to be expressed in the fact that the term "policy play- such manner as that its meaning ing" was in current use when the may be unambiguous, and in such ordinance was passed. State v. language as may be readily under- Carpenter, 60 Conn., 97, 102. Keep- stood by those upon whom it is to ing place for playing policy. State operate." Per Woodhull, J., in v. Flint, 63 Conn., 248. McConvill V. Jersey City, 39 N. J. *^ "It could scarcely be expected L., 38, 42, citing Grant on Corp., 86. that an ordinance affecting houses As to certainty of penalty, see of this kind should specify the Sec. 175, et seq. post. particular acts of indecency which 12 In order to vary or alter the will render its inmates obnoxious common law, a by-law ought to be to the law's denunciation. These reasonably clear, definite and free acts may be so various in kind and 30 NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. [§20 An ordinance will not be held void for indefiniteness because of diiSeulty in applying or construing its provisions. Thus an ordinance passed by virtue of express legislative grant, and foUovping the words of the statute, forbidding the sale of in- toxicating liquors in the "residence portion," and permitting such sales in the "business portions" of the city, was held sufficiently definite without defining the boundaries of either district.*^ So the words ' ' small ware, ' ' as used in the statute conferring the power, may be employed in the ordinance, without definition or farther description.*'' So an ordinance prohibiting driving or riding an animal on the street "faster than an ordinary trot" was held not too vague or uncertain.'** But an ordinance prohibiting riding or driving a horse on the street "at an immoderate gait so as to endanger or expose to injury any person" was held blad, as not indicating what was meant by the use of the term "immoderate gait."*® For tlie same reason an ordinance simply forbidding the driving of any "drove or droves" of horned cattle through the streets, etc., was pronounced void for vagueness.^** Farther illustra- tions appear in the note.^^ so differing in degree, and withal so numerous, as to defy specifica- tion. The experience of the city fathers in that domain is doubtless so limited that in drafting an ordinance which should compre- hend all the indecent convolutions of lascivious cyprlans they would he forced to put fancy on the wing, and imagine postures they never beheld. This would he dangerous occupation. * * This ordinance, prohibiting a bawdy house being kept in an indecent manner, clothes the magistrate necessarily with discretion to determine whether the particular acts proved are in- decent." Shreveport v. Roos, 35 La. Ann., 1010. *!! Shea V. Muncie, 148 Ind., 14, 20; 46 N. E. Rep., 138. The maxim "falsa demonstratio non nocet," applied and false part of descrip- tion rejected in Poland v. Connolly, 16 Ohio St., 64. As to description of boundaries, etc., in improve- ment ordinances, see Oh. XVI. *" Harris v. Hamilton, 44 Up. Can. Q. B., 641. *8 The court said that "an ordi- nary trot is easily shown by proof, and is well understood by any man who has seen horses exercise or trot" Nealis v. Hayward, 48 Ind., 19, 21. <» Commonwealth v. Roy, 140 Mass., 432; 4 N. E. Rep., 814. 50 McConvill V. Jersey City, 39 N. J. L., 38. 51 REGin.ATiNo Markets. First Municipality v. Cutting, 4 La. Ann., 335. In re Nightingale, 11 Pick. (Mass.), 168. Signs. State v. Higgs, 126 N. C, 1014. Bat Windows. Commonwealth V. Goodnow, 117 Mass., 114. Liv- ingston V. Wolf, 136 Pa. St., 519; 20 Am. St. Rep., 936, §32] NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. 31 The rules respecting the certainty of improvemefit ordi- nances are considered elsewhere.^^ § 21. Ordinances of cities of same class may vary. Cities, although of the same class and organized under the same general laws, need not adopt uniform ordinances. The ordi- nances may be as variant as the varying municipal necessities, conveniences and sense of public policy in those who exercise the legislative authority may require.^* The same rule applies to ordinances of cities adopting their own charters under constitutional provisions, and to cities under special legislative charters. § 22. Notice to be taken of ordinances. Notice of the ex- istence of ordinances is required to be taken by all upon whom they have a binding efifect,^* as the inhabitants of the munici- pal corporation which enacted them.^^ So railroad companies and their employes, using railways within the city, must take notice of all valid ordinances relating to the operation of the road and the cars thereom^® So strangers coming within the corporate limits, upon whom ordinances are binding, are chargeable with notice thereof.^^ As all persons upon whom they are binding are charged with constructive notice of valid BuBNiNG OF Lime. State v. Mott, =3 Covington v. Bast St. Louis, 61 Md., 297. 78 111., 548. The Speed of Tbains. Chicago ^4 North Birmingham Street R. & B. I. R. R. Co. V. Beaver, 96 111. R- Co. v. Calderwood, 89 Ala., 247; App., 558. 18 Am. St. Rep., 105; Heland v. Location of Livert Stables. L°^^"' ^ ^"^'^ ^^^^-^^ ^°''' ^1 Phillips V. Denver. 19 Colo., 179; ^'"- °«'=- ^^°: Palmyra v. Morton, 25 Mo., 593; Buffalo v. Webster, 10 41 Am. St. Rep., 230; 34 Pac. Rep., 902. Fixing Water Rates. Spring Valley Water Works v. San Fran- Wend. (N. Y.), 99: Burmeister v. Howard, 1 Wash. Ter., 207 ; Glover, Mun. Corps, 290. 3-' Mather v. Ottawa, 114 111., 659, CISCO, 82 Cal., 286; 16 Am. St. Rep., „„■, t , n i a r> . ■ ^63 ; Jackson v. Grand Ave. Ry. 116; San Francisco Pioneer Wool en Factory v. Brickwedel, 60 Cal., 166. Co., 118 Mo., 199, 218, 219; 24 S. W. Rep., 192; London v. Venacie, 12 Mod., 269. Establishing Boundaries. Wil- m Central R, & B. Co. v. Bruns- liams V. WiUiard, 23 Vt., 369. ^igk & W. R. Co., 87 Ga., 386, 13 Exceptions in Ordinance does S. B. Rep., 520. not render Its operation unreason- ■'•' Pierce v. Bartrum, Cowp., 269; _ able. Emporia v. Shaw, 6 Kan. Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend. (N. App., 808. Y.), 99; Queen v. Osier, 32 Up. 52 Ch. XVI Can. Q. B., 324, 333. 32 NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. L§23 ordinances, no one when prosecuted for violation of an ordi- nance will be permitted to show that he did not know of its existence.^® § 23. Who bound by ordinances, A by-law of a public or municipal corporation is not an agreement but a law, binding on all persons to whom it applies, whether they agree to be bound by it or not.^^ Therefore the law seems to be well settled in this country and in England that, in the absence of special charter or legislative restraint, local by-laws and ordinances of a general nature are binding upon all persons within the corporate limits, whether residents or not.®" The principle is that whoever comes to reside in any place for however short a duration of time^ is an inbabitant pro hac vice, and consequently bound by the same regulations as the other 58 Central Georgia Ry. Co. v. Bond, 111 Ga., 13; 36 S. B. Rep., 299. 59 Per Lindley, L. J., in London Association, etc., v. London India D. J. Co., 3 Ch. (1892), p. 252. An ordinance is not retrospeo. tive, of course. Willow Springs v. Witliaupt, 61 Mo. App., 275. As to binding effect on street railroad not in existence when or- dinance enacted, see Thompson v. Citizens' Street R. Co., 152 Ind., 461; 53 N. E. Rep., 462. When railroad accepts an ordi- nance it is thereby bound by its provisions. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. People, 79 111. App, 529. By-laws of a private corporation bind the members only by virtue of their assent, and do not affect third persons. State v. Overton, 24 N. J. L., 435, 440. 60 Glover, Mun. Corp., 289, 290; Willcock, Mun. Corp., 105, 107. Butchers Co. v. Morey, 1 Bla., 370. The people having the power of local government, their by-laws therefore bind strangers coming within the limits. Cuddock v. Eastwick, 1 Salk., 192. Alahama—'N. B. St. R. R. Co. v. Calderwood, 89 Ala., 247; 18 Am. St. Rep., 105. Indiana — Horney v. Sloan, Smith (Ind.), 136. Missouri — Knox City v. Whit- aker, 87 Mo. App., 468. Massachusetts — Com. v. Worces- ter, 3 Pick. (Mass.), 462; Heland V. Lowell, 3 Allen (Mass.), 407; 81 Am. Dec, 670. Minnesota — Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn., 323; 53 Am. Rep., 47; 23 N. W. Rep., 237. New York — Jones v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 2 Daly (N. Y.), 307; Buffalo V. Webster, 10 Wend. (N. Y.), 99. Pennsylvania — Gibson v. Cora- opolis, 22 Pittsb., L. J. N. S. (Pa.), 64., South Carolina — Kennedy v. Sowden, 1 McMillan (S. C), 323; Charleston v. King, 4 McCord, L. (S. C), 487. By-laws of private corporations. "Those dealing with the corpora- tion through its offlcers are bound to take the same notice of its by- laws and ordinances that a citizen of the State is with reference to legislative enactments. These or- dinances are not such by-laws as § 24] NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. 33 members of the corporation are.®^ "The by-laws which are made by corporations having a local jurisdiction are to be observed and obeyed by all who come within it, in the same manner as aliens and strangers within the commonwealth are bound to know and obey the laws of the land, notwithstand- ing they may not know the language in which they are writ- ten. "^^ ^s stated by the Supreme Court of Ohio, in an early case, "these principles prevail in all well-organized govern- ments, and the experience of ages has proved their practical utility. "83 Many expressions of like import are found in judicial decisions.** § 24. Ordinances operative upon property within the cor- porate limits. Ordinances are not only binding on persons, but upon property conveyed or coming within the corporate apply to private corporations, where none are Interested except the individual members, and the rules and regulations by which they are governed are kept subject alone to their own custody and within their own knowledge." Murphy v. Louisville, 9 Bush (Ky.), 189, 196. 61 Pierce v. Bartrum, Cowp., 269 ; Plymouth v. Pettijohn, 4 Dev. Law (15 N. C), 591, per Ruffin, C. J. 62 Per Putnam, J., in re Vandine, 6 Pick. (23 Mass.), 187, 190; 17 Am. Dec, 351. 63 Marietta v. Fearing, i Ohio, 427, 431. 6* "A non-corporator and non- resident is liable for a breach of the city ordinance, and may be sued and convicted thereof, in the city court." Charleston v. Pepper, 1 Rich. Law (S. C), 364, 366. "All who bring themselves with- in the limits of the corporation are, while there, citizens so as to be governed by its laws." White- field V. Longest, 6 Ired. (N. C), 268, per Nash, J. In the absence of special grant, "the powers and jurisdiction of the 3 local corporation are confined to its own limits and its own internal concerns;" therefore, "its by-laws and ordinances are binding upon none but its own members and those properly within its jurisdic- tion." Gass V. Greenville, 4 Sneed (Tenn.), 62. Contra. A town cannot impose a penalty by ordinance on a stran- ger for cutting grass on the "salt meadows" or "common lands" of the town, but must resort to the common law remedy, to recover damages for the alleged trespass. Here it was merely held that a penalty could not be imposed by the town on any person as a tres- passer; that the powers given to the town "extend only to regula- tions for the enjoyment of their common lands, as between those who have a right to enjoy them as commons. * * * The Legisla- ture never intended to delegate to any person or body corporate the power of imposing penalties for injuries to their own lands by tres- passers." Foster, Supervisor of Jamaica v. Rhdads, 19 Johns (N. Y.), 191, 193. 34 NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. [§25 limits."^ Thus an ordinance forbidding animals, as hogs, from running at large, operates as well on non-residents who suffer their hogs to run at large within the prohibited limits, as upon those who are actually residents.®'^ But where the state law forbids, such ordinances cannot be made to apply to the stock of non-residents running within the city.'^^ Notwithstanding a railroad company does not formally submit itself to the police regulations and ordinances of a city upon entering it, under the principle stated, such company is subject to such regulations nevertheless.^* § 25. Same— Rule as applied to licenses. A license tax im- posed on all persons who packed and shipped fish, etc., from the local corporation was held, in a North Carolina case, bind- ing on residents and non-residents alike. ^^ So it has been held 65 Gosselink v. Campbell, 4 Iowa, 296; McKee v. McKee, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.). 433. 00 Cartersville v. Lanham, 67 Ga., 753; Whitfield v. Longest, 6 Ired. (N. C), 268; Friday v. Floyd, 63 111., 50; Crosby v. Warren, 1 Rich. Law (S. C), 385; Folmar v. Cur- tis, 86 Ala., 354; 5 So. Rep., 678; Horney v. Sloan, Smith (Ind.), 136. "It is the hog that is not per- mitted to run at large, and wheth- er it be the property of a resident or non-resident, the mischief is the same and there can be no differ- ence." Rose V. Hardie, 98 N. C. 44, 47; 4 S. B. Rep., 41, approving Whitfield V. Longest, 6 Ired. (N. C), 268; Spitler v. Young, 63 Mo., 42, holding that the ordinance did not apply to a case where the escape of the hogs was unavoidable — as a result of a flood — where it appears that the owner used due diligence in attempting toi recover them. Vote ot a town to restrain cattle from going at large, applies to a non-resident. Gilmore v. Holt, 4 Pick. (Mass.),. 258, 264. Particular ordinance requiring cattle to be penned at night to keep them off the street, held not to apply to cattle of a non-resident, not kept in the city. Per Ruffin, C. J., in Plymouth v. Pettijohn, 4 Dev. Law (N. C), 591. 07 Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427, 431. Held to apply to munici- pal charters granted after the pas- sage of the Estray Act. Dodge v. Gridley, 10 Ohio, 173. Where the charter expressly pro- vided that ordinances shall not be obligatory on persons or property of non-residents of the corpora- tion, who are citizens of the state, "unless in case of intentional vio- lation," the stock of a non-resident may be forfeited under an ordi- nance when it appears that he has knowledge of such ordinance, and knew or had reason to believe that his animals when let loose would go into the city. Knoxville v. King, 7 Lea (75 Tenn.), 441. 08 City & Suburban Ry. Co. v. Savannah, 77 Ga., 731; 4 Am. St. Rep., 106. See Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. V. People, 79 111. App., 529. 08 Edenton v. Capeheart, 71 N. C, 156. § 26j NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. 3S that a tax on all traders applies to non-residents.*'^''^^ So a by- law prohibiting any person not duly licensed therefor from re- moving house dirt and offal from the city was held to apply to a non-residentJ** So ordinances imposing fines for failure to take out licenses by non-residents who employ wagons for hire within the city have been sustainedJ^ But such ordinances, to be valid, must not discriminate against non-residents J ^ in Missouri an ordinlance exacting a license tax for wagons used for pay was held not applicable to wagons of outside residents engaged in hauling in and out of the city. Here it was said that the authority to enact such ordinance cannot be conferred, since the tax being upon outside residents land for the benefit of those living in the city would be, in effect, taking property for private use ; that is, for the use of a particular community of which the outside citizen forms no part.'^* Power to enact such ordinances must exist. Thus where the charter power is restricted to imposing licenses upon attorneys who reside within the city, the ordinance cannot be made ap- plicable to a non-resident attorney who maintains an office and does business within the city.'^* Likewise, where the charter power to tax is limited to taxable property within the city of non-residents, an ordinance imposing a license tax on carriages used by non-residents going to and from their places of busi- ness in the city is unauthorized. But where a slave is expressly placed under the police reguljations of the corporation, under such power, the slave becomes taxable property within the city.'^« § 26. Territorial operation of ordinances. Municipal ordi- 69% "It is settled that by coming '2 Bennett v. Birmingham, 31 within the town and acting there. Pa. St., 15. a person becomes liable as an in- '3 St. Charles v. NoUe^ 51 Mo., habitant and member of the cor- 122. poration." Wilmington v. Roby, 8 The legislature cannot authorize Ired. (N. C), 250. a municipal corporation to tax, for License held to apply to non-resi- dent butchers doing business in the city. State ex rel. Wilkinson v. its own local purposes lands lying beyond the corporate limits. Wells V. Weston, 22 Mo., 384. Compare, Charleston, 2 Speers (S. C), 623. Langhorne v. Robinson, 20 Gratt (Va.). 661. 70/jire Vandine, 6Pick. (Mass.), 74 Garden City v. Abbott, 34 187. Kan., 283; 8 Pac. Rep., 473. 71 Charleston v. Pepper, 1 Rich. 's Charleston v. State ex rel. Law (S. C), 364, 367; Pittsburg v. Adger, 2 Speers (S. C), 719. See Craft, 1 Pitts. (Pa.), 77. Chapter Xlir. 36 NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. [§ 37 nances are necessarily local in their application. Usually they operate only in the territory of the municipality by which they are enacted and can have no force beyond it.''® Of course, it is entirely competent for the legislature to confer power to pass ordinances which will operate beyond the corporate boundaries. This may be done for the purpose of suppressing or preventing nuisances, which affect the inhabitants- of the corporation.''^ Sometimes the power is conferred to regulate, prohibit and license the sale of intoxicating liquor for a speci- fied distance beyond the municipal boundaries.'^* A municipal ordinance designed for the city at large oper- ates throughout its boundaries, whatever their change.''^ Thus a by-law forbidding the keeping of a slaughter house within the limits of a town will apply to a subsequent addition to the town.*" So a penal ordinance relating to the sale of liquor, which, in terms, applies to ' ' any territory over which the town may have jurisdiction for that purpose, ' ' operates in territory over which the town is given jurisdiction by subsequent legis- lative act.*i § 27. Places within municipal jurisdiction. Speaking gen- erally, the police jurisdiction of the municipality extends ^to ^eTaylor V. Americus, 39Ga., 59; § 45; Biggar Mun. Manual of Strauss v. Pontiac, 40 111., 301; Canada, p. 327. See Chapter on Robb V. Indianapolis, 38 Ind., 49; Municipal Police Powers. Homey v. Sloan, 1 Ind., 266; Gosse- 's Toledo v. Edens, 59 Iowa, 352; link V. Campbell, 4 Iowa, 296; 13 N. W. Rep., 313. Regulation of Hoggatt V. Bigley, 6 Humph, hucksters one mile beyond. Snell (Tenn.), 236; Town of Barton v. v. Belleville, 30 Up. Can. Q. B., 81. Hamilton, 18 Ontario Rep., 199, 79 St. Louis Gas Light Co. v. St. 202; In re Boylan and City of Louis, 46 Mo., 121. Toronto, 15 Ontario Rep., 13. so Virginia v. Smith, 1 Cranch C. Ordinance cannot regulate fares C, 47; Fed. Cas., No. 16,967. of a street car company to be Application of ordinances to charged beyond the city limits, annexed territory. Swift v. Klein, South Pasadena v. Los Angeles, 163 111., 269; 45 N. E. Rep., 219; etc., R. Co., 109 Cal., 315; 41 Pac. Covington v. East St. Louis, 178 Rep., 1093. 111., 548. Cannot tax land beyond limits si "if an ordinance be enacted for municipal purposes. Wells v. and afterwards the city limits be Weston, 22 Mo., 384. Compare extended by adding adjacent terri- Langhorne v. Robinson, 20 Gratt tory, no one would contend that a (Va.), 661. new ordinance must be passed in 77 Chicago, etc., Co. v. Chicago, order to be operative in the newly 88 111., 221, 30 Am. Rep., 545; 1 acquired territory. We can see no Starr & Curtis, 111. Stat., p. 685, difference between that case and § 27] NATURE AND REQUISITES OP ORDINANCES. 37 every part of its territory, and, as a rule, a violation of a valid ordinance at any place within such territory constitutes an oifense against its authority. Thus a camp-meeting conducted w^ithin the limits of the local corporation, although authorized by state laws, is subject to its ordinances. This rule was ap- plied to one duly licensed by the municipal authorities to sell food and drink within the corporate limits, and it was held that such person was thereby authorized to sell such articles at the camp-meeting.82 g^ where a town is duly authorized to prohibit animals from running at large within its limits the force of its ordinances for this purpose is co-extensive with the territorial limits of the town, and includes a turnpike road passing through it.** And for police purposes a turnpike road within the corporate limits, although the fee of the soil thereof " is in the turnpike company, is subject to such reasonable regu- lations as may be deemed expedient.®* In an early New York case it was held that a legislative act extending the bounds of the town over the adjacent navigable waters did not thereby grant the land covered by the waters to the town; but the authority was merely for the purposes of civil and criminal jurisdiction. Hence, an ordinance prohibit- ing the raking of clams within the boundary lines of the town, under penalty, was declared void as applied to such navigable waters. In the opinion of the court, the town "must show a ri(j]it of property to the lands * * * in the bay * * * this. By this law (legislative act) ss "And we think a turnpike road the extension of the power and passing through a town is as much jurisdiction is absolute. It does a highway, for the purposes of the not depend on any act or ordinance act, as a road laid out by authority of the city specially adopting or of the Court of Sessions or of the invoking the power. If the ordi- town. The mischief is the same." nance had been passed after the Gilmore v. Holt, 4 Pick. (Mass.), law went into force it would not 258, 264. have been necessary that it should «* Question related to paving and specify that its operation extended grading turnpike road, and assess- two miles beyond the city limits, ing abutters for expense thereof. It so extended by the express pro- Held, the fact the city has no char- vision of the law." Toledo v. ter right to compel the company Edens, 59 Iowa, 352, 353; 13 N. W. to grade or pave its road, did not Rep., 313. invalidate the assessment therefor. 82 ^a; parte McNair, 13 Neb., 195, State (Parker) v. Brunswick, 30 197; 13 N. W. Rep., 172. N. J. L., 395. 38 NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. [§38 in order to entitle them to make rules to regulate the use of those lands. "85 § 28. Same— Wharves— Private property. Certain police ordinances must be limited in their operation to public places, or to such places over which the municipal corporation has control. Thus an ordinance imposing penalties in respect of the using or obstructing the public wharves, docks, piers and slips was held not to apply to wharves, etc., of private citi- zens.*" The basis upon which wharfage and levee charges are authorized to be made is that, by the expenditure on the part of the municipal corporation of money and labor, works are constructed and maintained which facilitate discharging and receiving the cargoes and afford to vessels the means of moor- ing and remaining in security. Hence, ordinances imposing such charge at a point where the city had constructed no works and expended no money are uniformly held to be be- yond the power of the local corporation.*^ 85 Palmer v. Hicks, 6 Johns (N. Y.), 132. 88 It appears that in state and municipal legislation a distinction was made between public and pri- vate wharves, etc. Vandewater v. New York, 2 Sandf. Sup. Ct. (N. Y.), 258. Power to regulate sale of wood restricted to public landings. South wark v. Neil, 3 Yeates (Pa.), 54. ST New Orleans v. Wilmot, 31 La. Ann., 65; Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S., 423; Illinois, etc., Co. v. St. Louis, 2 Dill. C. C, 70; Wad- dingham v. St. Louis, 14 Mo., 190. BIGHT TO COLLECT WHARFAGE. Ordinarily, improvements of some kind are necessary to author- ize collection of wharfage. Du- buque v. Stout, 32 Iowa, 47, 80; 7 Am. Rep., 171; Keokuk v. Keokuk N. L. Packet Co., 45 Iowa, 196; Muscatine v. Hershey, 18 Iowa, 39. Right to collect sustained in ab- sence of expenditures for improve- ments. Sacramento v. Steamer New World, 4 Cal., 41. The right to charge and collect wharfage is said to be a right of property and not a right of sover- eignty. St. Louis V. Schulenburg & B. Lumber Co., 13 Mo. App., 56. But the power to erect wharves, landings, etc., on navigable waters and charge toll for the use thereof is a franchise which can only come from the state. The act incor- porating the town does not alone confer such right. St. Martins- ville V. Steamer "Mary Lewis," 32 La. Ann., 1293. "Providing a wharf to which vessels may make fast, or at which they may conveniently load or un- load, is rendering them a service. The character of the service is the same whether the wharf is built and offered for use by the state, a municipal corporation, or a private individual; and when compensa- tion is demanded for the use of the wharf, the demand is an assertion, not of sovereignty, but of a right of property. A passing vessel may use the wharf or not at its election, and thus may incur a liability for §28] NATURE AND REQUISITES OJ Or.D_NANCES. 39 Ordinances regulating liackmen, etc., wliile they are in and about landings, depots and stations, aj^e valid although the property of such places is not that of the city, or, strictly speaking, public property of any kind. "The fact that it is commonly used by liackmen in their business for the purposes mentioned in the ordinance is sufficient. "^ It cannot be ques- tioned that the city has power to provide reasonable regula- tions respecting the use of private property in order to prevent such property, or the use thereof, from being annoying or detrimental to the life or limb or health of any who may be in the city. Its jurisdiction in this respect may be extended to any place within its limits. Hence, an ordinance forbidding the throwing from the second or upper floors of any building, etc., or from lowering out of such place, cotton in bales, goods wharfage or not, at the choice of the master or owner." Per Mr. Justice Strong in Packet Co. v. Keokulc, 95 U. S., 80, 85. "The sums paid by the plaintiff in error were exacted and paid as compen- sation for the use of the improved wharf, and not for the mere privi- lege of entering and stopping at the port of Saint Louis, or for landing at the shore in its natural condition where there were no con- veniences which could he called a wharf." Per Mr. Justice Harlan in Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S., 423, 429. The following decisions of the United States Supreme Court support this view: Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall., 577; Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall., 204; Steam- ship Co. V. Port Wardens, 6 Wall., 31; Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How., 299. City cannot impose a duty or tonnage tax on vessels landing on the natural hank of a river. Cape Girardeau v. Campbell, 26 Mo. App., 12, although such landing he made within the wharf limits established by ordinance, lb. The landing place becomes a wharf when it is improved — des- ignating it as such by ordinance is insufficient. lb.; Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S., 423; Tobin v. Vicksburg, 100 U. S., 430. A license fee is a tax within the meaning of Sec. 3, Art. 10, of the constitution of Missouri, and must be uniform on the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying it. St. Louis V. Consolidated Coal Co., 113 Mo., 83; 20 S. W. Rep., 699; St. Louis V. Spiegel, 90 Mo., 587; 2 S. W. Rep., 839; St. Louis v. Bowler, 94 Mo., 630; 7 S. W. Rep., 434. The city may make a classifica- tion of boats for wharfage tax; therefore it may make a higher rate for all not returned and as- sessed for taxation during a desig- nated year. St. Louis v. St. Louis & N. 0. Trans. Co., 84 Mo., 156; 12 Mo. App., 570; St. Louis v. Con- solidated Coal Co., 113 Mo., 83; ~ 20 S. W. Rep., 699. The city cannot collect wharfage for goods landed beyond its wharf in times of high water. St. Louis V. Schulenburg & Boeckler Lumber Co., 13 Mo. App., 56. 1 St. Paul V. Smith, 27 Minn., 364, 366; 7 N. W. Rep., 734. 40 NATURE AND RjLQUISIT^S OF ORDINANCES. [§29 or any other article, ' ' without a good and sufficient tackle and rope," is a proper police regulation, and such ordinance oper- ates in all parts of the city, and its violation may occur on private property. ^ The territorial police jurisdiction is well illustrated in an early New Yoi-k case. The ordinance provided that "all hogs shall be kept up." It was held to have no application to an action of trespass, supported by proof that the hogs went into complainant's cornfield through a partition fence which di- vided his farm from the farm of the owner of the hogs. Manifestly, the ordin'ance was intended to forbid hogs from going at large, which, in the language of the court, "means that they shall not be free commoners upon the highways. It was not intended by this by-law to interfere with the interior economy or management of every man's farm. It could not reasonably have been intended to compel every farmer to keep his swine in a close pen. The power of the town for such interior regulation may well be doubted." Therefore, as the hogs did not enter through the outer fence adjoining a highway or common, but through an inner or partition fence between two neighbors, the ordinance could not be applied to Such case.^ § 29. Same— Regulating speed of trains. Municipal terri- torial jurisdiction is farther illustrated in cases arising under ordinances regulating the speed of street cars and railroad trains within the corporate limits. The general rule is that such ordinances apply equally to all territory within the cor- porate limits over which the road runs, including that not laid off into lots, streets or alleys or occupied with buildings, as well as land and property owned by the railroad company,* as switchyards.^ In one ease such ordinance was held not to apply to engines used in moving cars and making up trains at places within the yards of the company and in and about their own stations, which were not within the limits of any 2 The point was made, which was * Whitson v. Franklin, 34 Ind., denied by the court, that the locus 392; Merz v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co., 88 in quo being a close was not with- Mo., 672; 14 Mo. App., 459. in the penalty of the ordinance. s Crowley v. B., C. R. & N. Ry. Charleston v. Elford, 1 McMullan Co., 65 Iowa, 658, 663; 20 N. W. (S. C), 234. Rep., 467, 22 N. W. Rep., 918. 3 Sheppard v. Hees, 12 Johns. (N. Y.),433. § 29] NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. 41 public street or thoroughfare. But the ordinance involved, in terms, limited its application to engines and cars "while pass- ing through the city." The opinion concedes power in the city to regulate the speed at all places within its limits, even in places outside of the limits of public streets.^ "Where a railroad passes through a populous city, crossing its streets at various points, the exercise of the police power would be of little service to the public, if it could be only at the street crossings. "It may be said that the public has no right to inhibit the speed of trains within the company's own domain, provided the company checks up and crosses the street at the leg'al rate of speed. But in the exercise of police power sucli as this, the actual state of affairs must be taken into account; thus not only the difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of reducing a speed at the rate of twenty-five miles per hour to four or five miles an hour in the short space of three or four hundred feet, but also the fact that (though without right) many per- sons are found walking upon the tracks of the railroads at all hours. Now as a matter of police regulation it will not do to answer, Let the people, who go where they have no right, take care of themselves. The police power is enacted not only for those who exercise a proper degree of reflection, but for those who may not. Life is too sacred to place its security on a basis so uncertain. * * * The safety of a dense popula- tion is to be guarded by the police power in a great city, even though in doing this the power may be called into exercise within the dwellings, the lots and private ways of citizens. We see not that the railroad company has greater rights within the city than others.'"^ Sometimes it appears reasonable to the courts to limit the operation of such ordinances and thus deny their application to certain parts of the road, although within the corporate limits. Thus an ordinance, limiting the speed of railway trains to four miles an hour where the road passed through agricultural lands, fenced on both sides for three miles, after entering the limits of the city and before reaching the inhab- ited portion thereof, was held to operate as a restraint upon 6 Green v. D. H. Canal Co., 38 power. State (N. J. R. & T. Co.) Hun. (N. Y.), 51. v. Jersey City, 29 N. J. L., 170. Regulating speed of trains con- ^ Pennsylvania Co. v. James, 81 fined to streets, squares and public Pa. St. (32 P. F. Smith), 194, 202, grounds under particular charter 203. 42 NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. [iol commerce, and, therefore, as to such portion of the road, un- reasonable and inoperative.* § 30. Judicial limitation of operation of ordinances. Courts sometimes also limit the operation of other classes of ordi- nances. Thus the general power conferred by charter "to license, regulate and restrain" the sale of liquor, within the city, was held not to authorize a license tax from one engaged in selling liquor at a place two or three miles remote from the settled portion of the city. Here it was said that, to authorize such tax "the benefits to the parties must be re- ciprocal." It was also held that the city by reason of its general police powers had no right to exact such tax where it appeared that no police supervision was ever taken over such place other than to demand and collect such license fee. The court remarked: "A municipal government is one investing the people of a place with the local govermnent thereof. The 'local government' cannot be said to include that which is not local, nor in any way concerns the 'local' affairs. "^ § 31. Ordinances operating in public or particular places only. Certain police regulations are confined to public or particular places, as streets, alleys, etc., or to acts committed in view of the public, or to specified localities. Thus ordi- nances relating to drunkenness, for instance, usually restrict such offense to the streets or' sidewalks or other public places. Such regulations merely seek to prohibit public drunkenness.^* s "The ordinance in question not wtiole subject is fully treated in only places an unreasonable re- the chapter on Police Regulations, striction upon the railways them- » Salt Lake City v. W-agner, 2 selves, but it unreasonably im- Utah, 400, 403, distinguishing Pal- pedes the whole travelling public." mouth v. Watson, 5 Bush. (Ky.), Meyers v. C, R. I. & P. R. Co., 57 660, which was put upon the ground Iowa, 555; 42 Am. Rep., 50. that "the vending of ardent spirits Ordinance may be held unrea- was in such proximity to the town sonable as applied to one or two as to render its exercise liable to streets, but valid as a whole. State affect the good order or peace of (Pennsylvania R. R.) v. Jersey the local community." See Sec- City, 47 N. J. L., 286 ; Burg v. tion 186 post. Chicago, etc., R. R., 90 Iowa, 106; lo Drunkenness or intoxication, Nicoulin v. Lowery, 49 N. J. L., in itself, in a public place, is held 391; Rahway Gaslight Co. v. Rah- to be an offense. Bloomfield v. way, 58 N. J. L., 510. Contra, Trimble, 54 Iowa, 399; Nevada v. Wygant v. McLauchlan (Oregon), Hutchins, 59 Iowa, 506; 13 N. "W. 64 Pac. Rep., 867; Mason City v. Rep., 634; State v. Garrett, 80 Barngrover, 26 111. App., 296. The Iowa, 589 ; 46 N. W. Rep., 748; State § 31] NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. 43 In Missouri, an ordinance was sustained which forbade drunk- enness "upon any street or sidewalk or in any business house within the corporate limits. "^^ So an ordinance prescribing a fine agg,inst any one who should be "found intoxicated on the streets" of the village was sustained.'^ The following common instances may be mentioned where ordinances are intended to have merely a limited and local application: Regulations respecting the sale of refreshments in markets; forbidding the sale of farm products, meat, fish, vegetables, etc., on particular streets or at places other than markets or other designated places ;i^ lounging about markets and other public places ; intoxication at market places ; dis- allowing dogs or unruly animals in market places during market hours; forbidding the delivei'ing of addresses, dis- courses, etc., in public parks and on commons without permis- sion ;i"' the riding or driving of any animal upon a sidewalk ;^^ the throwing or placing upon any sidewalk or cross-walk fruit or vegetable or other substance which, when stepped upon by any person, is liable to cause him or her to slip or fall; the throwing or casting upon the street or sidewalk articles which will obstruct it, as wires, ashes or animal, vegetable or any substance whatever; distributing advertising matter so as to litter the public streets, etc. ; noise on streets or sidewalks, as beating a tambourine ;i8 restricting the establishment of ceme- teries and burial places; confining dairies and cow stables, slaughter houses, soap factories, brick kilns, quarries, the storing of gunpowder and other explosives to particular lo- V. Pierce, 65 Iowa, 85; 21 N. W. is inhabitants of Quincy v. Ken- Rep., 195; Commonwealth v. Mor- nard, 151 Mass., 563; 24 N. B. Rep., risey, 157 Mass., 471; 32N. E. Rep., 860; People v. Keir. 78 Mich., 98; 664; State v. Sevier, 117 Ind., 338; 43 N. W. Rep., 1039, § 482, post. 20 N. E. Rep., 245; People v. i^ Com. v. Abrahams, 156 Mass., French, 102 N. Y., 583; Hill v. Peo- 57; 30 N. E. Rep., 79; Com. v. Da- ple, 20 N. Y., 363; State v. Smith, vis, 140 Mass.. 485; 4 N. B. Rep., ,3 Heisk. (Tenn.), 465; 1 Cooley's 577. Blackstone (3d Ed.), Book 1, p. i" Commonwealth v. Forrest, 170 123; 2 Cooley's Blackstone (3d Pa. St., 40; 32 Atl. Rep., 652, re- Bd.), Book 4, p. 63; Tiedeman's versing 3 Pa. Dist. Rep., 797, where Lim. Police Power, 302; 1 Bishop's it was held that a bicycle was an Crim. Law (7th Bd.), sec. 403. "animal" within the meaning of 11 Gallatin v. Tarwater, 143 Mo., the law. 40; 44 S. W. Rep., 750. " Vance v. Hadfleld, 22 N. Y. St., 12 Green City v. Holsinger, 76 858. Mo. App., 567. 44 NATURE AND REQUISITES OP ORDINANCES. [§ 33 calities; compelling railroad companies to station switchmen at certain public crossings. § 32. Ordinances applying to part of city valid. Where ordinances are designed to apply only to certain districts or designated parts of the territorial limits of the authority en- acting them, to be valid, it must appear that such districts are so situated as to require peculiar and exceptional provisions. The following ordinances of this character have been sustained as reasonable : Forbidding propelling cars by use of steam or locomotive power on certain streets ;i'' limiting bookmaking and poolselling to certain localities ;i^ the keeping of swine within particular districts ;i9 forbidding animals from running at large within designated limits j^" washing and ironing in public laundries and wash houses in certain sections ;2i livery stables in residence districts ;22 requiring the removal of snow and ice by owners or occupants of houses bordering upon specified streets f^ designating limits in which prostitutes shall dwell ;2* exempting from the operation of an ordinance di- rected against the emission of dense smoke, resident dis- tricts ;^^ forbidding saloons f^ killing of animals ■,^'' and wooden buildings in designated districts.^® So ordinances (provided the corporation possesses the nec- essary grant of power) may prohibit heavy hauling on certain streets which may be established as boulevards, and forbid the use of wagons, drays or trucks carrying coal, lumber, hay, iron, machinery, ice, merchandise, farmers' produce, stone, 17 R. R. V. Richmond, 96 U. S., by-laws as to the removal of snow 521. and ice and define certain areas 18 Chicago V. Brownell, 146 111., or streets within the municipality, 64; 34 N. E. Rep., 595, reversing 41 within or upon which the by-law III. App., 70. shall be operative. Biggar, Munic. 19 Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Manual, p. 663 ; Stinson v. Brown- Mass., 221. ing, L. R., 1 C. P., 321. 20 Chattanooga v. Norman, 92 2* L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U. Tenn., 73; 20 S. W. Rep., 417. S., 587; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 788. 21 Per Mr. Justice Field in Bar- 25 People v. Lewis, 86 Mich., 273 ; bier v. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27, ap- 49 N. W. Rep., 140; 37 Am. & Eng. proved in Soon Hing v. Crowley, Corp. Cas., 481. 113 U. S., 703. 26 People ex rel. v. Cregier, 138 22 Chicago v. Stratton, 162 111., 111., 401; 28 N. E. Rep., 812. 494; 53 Am. St. Rep., 325. 27 Brooklyn v. Cleves, Hill & De- 23 In re Qoddard, 16 Pick, nio, Supp. (N. Y.), 231. (Mass.), 504, per Shaw, C. J. 28 Knoxville v. Bird, 12 Lea In Canada the council may pass (Tenn.), 121; 47 Am. Rep., 326. § 34] NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. 45 brick, sand, dirt or earth, building material, etc., or forbid driving cattle, horses, mules, hogs, sheep, etc., on such boule- vards, or prohibit the establishment of business houses border- ing thereon. So, under proper grant of power, ordinances may establish on certain streets, building lines and provide that a certain class or character of buildings shall be erected in such district, and may forbid fiats, apartment houses, etc. All these and like regulations are general in the larger and more important cities of the country. Like restrictions may be made respect- ing awnings, signs, bill boards, etc. Farther illustrations of ordinances of this nature appear in the chapters on the Reasonableness of Ordinances and Police Regulations.^^ § 33. Same— Improvement ordinance. In the exercise of the power to open, construct and otherwise improve highways, streets, alleys, etc., the ordinance providing therefor must necessarily apply to districts or parts of the city. Such ordi- nances will not be declared void for this reason. "What dis- tricts are to be embraced and what parts of streets, etc., improved, whether the entire length of the street, or one block or part of a block, depend upon the desirability or necessity of the improvement and the local laws controlling such mat- ters. Partial improvements and improvement by sections are often permitted. Under some charters improvement or benefit districts are established for the construction of streets, sewers, etc. In an early Tennessee case it was held that the ordinance coukl not select individuals by name and compel improvements and omit others in the same district, without reason therefor.^o The subject of improvement ordinances is fully treated in a subsequent chapter.^ i § 34. When ordinances to take effect. Many charters pre- scribe that no ordinance except the general appropriation ordinance shall take effect or go in force until a certain time 29 Chs. VI. and XIV, v. Tate, 130 111., 247; 22 N. E. Rep., Ordinance dividing municipal 791, affirming 33 111. App., 78. limits into railroad districts and ■"> White v. Mayor, etc., 2 Swan. limiting the rate of speed of trains (Tenn.), 364. in one only, held void. Lake View "i Ch. XVI Of Public Improve- ment Ordinances. 46 NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. [§ 34 (usually ten days) after its approval, unless otherwise pro- vided in the ordinance, or in case of an emergency, etc., the body enacting it, by designated vote, ordinarily two-thirds, otherwise directs ; and frequently such vote is required to be taken by yeas and nays and entered upon the record.^^ The provision is in the nature of a limitation upon the legislative and ministerial power. It is intended to enable the public to acquire knowledge of the ordinance before it shall become operative for any purpose.^^ "Where persons are made liable to penal consequences it is a hardship if they are not season- ably informed. The attestation of the date of the mayor's approval of an ordinance is usually conclusive and cannot be contradicted by parol evidence. The rule in this respect ap- plicable to acts of the legislature is also applicable to ordi- nances.2* Some charters provide that before an ordinance shall take effect it must be published in a manner provided. Such provisions are generally applicable to police and penal ordi- nances.85 The publication of ordinances is considered else- where.^8 "The common rule in regard to legislation is, that it shall take immediate effect unless otherwise provided. "^^ This rule is applied to ordinances. Thu's where publication is not re- quired and there is no time specified either in the charter or 32 Charter of St. Louis, art. III., proving Pacific Railroad Co. v. § 21; Mun. Code of St. Louis, p. Governor, 23 Mo., 353. 207; 2 R. S. of Mo.(1899), p. 2483, 3= State v. Noblesvllle, 157 Ind., § 21; Charter of San Francisco, art. 31; 60 N. E. Rep., 704; Union Pac. II., ch. 1, § 15; Stat, and Amend, to R. Co. v. Montgomery, 49 Neb., Codes of Cal. (1899), p. 246; 429; 68 N. W. Rep., 619. Standard v. Industry, 55 111. App., "The people are to be informed 523; Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. of the regulations which are to People, 161 111., 244; Nat. Bk. of govern them, and time as well as Commerce v. Grenada, 44 Fed. publication is material. The legis- Rep., 262, reversing 41 Fed. Rep., lature wisely put stress both upon 87; People ex ret. v. Peoria, D. & the mode of promulgation and E. R. R. Co., 116 111., 410; Los An- upon the length of time to be geles Co. V. Eikenberry, 131 Cal., allowed, and it would be wrong to 461; Warsop v. Hastings, 22 Minn., abridge this time by construction." 437; Janesville v. Dewey, 3 Wis., Per Graves, J., In Van Alstine v. 245. People, 37 Mich., 523, 525. 33 Keane v. Gushing 15 Mo. App., so Section 155 et seq. post. 96, 101. 37 Per Campbell, J., in Stevenson Si Ball V. Fagg, 67 Mo., 481, ap- v. Bay City, 26 Mich., 44, 49. i 35] NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. 47 ordinance, the ordinance takes ett'ect from the date of its passage.^^ § 35. Same— Illustrative cases. State constitutions provide that no person shall be punished but by virtue of a law established and promulgated prior thereto and legally applied. This provision has been applied to municipal ordinances pre- scribing penalties. Where the constitution does not prescribe the mode and time of promulgation, but leaves these matters to the discretion and determination of the law-making power, the implied restriction is that the promulgation shall be reason- ably sufficient to accomplish the humane and just purpose of the constitution. This discretion cannot be arbitrarily exer- cised. A reasonable opportunity must be given to the people within the corporate limits to be informed as to the ordinances they are commanded to obey before they can be punished for their violation. A promulgation that may be insufficient in one community may be sufficient in another, differently cir- cumstanced. In one case the charter did not prescribe the length of time ordinances should be promulgated before they became operative. But it appeared that the ordinance in question had been published seven days. In sustaining the ordinance, in view of the above constitutional provision, it was said : ' ' The presumption is in favor of the reasonableness of the promulgation, which must prevail in the absence of proof of countervailing facts and circumstances. We cannot affirm, as matter of law, thiat, on the facts disclosed by the record, the ordinance was not in force at the time of its violation. "^^ Where the charter expressly prescribes that an ordinance shall become a law upon its approval by the mayor, a further charter requirement that all ordinances shall be pro- mulgated by posting or publication for a period of not less than four weeks, does not postpone the operation of an ordi- nance until after its promulgation.*" Under a charter pre- scribing that every ordinance shall specify the time when it 38 Com. V. McCafferty, 145 Mass., Time fixed liy ordinance. Kendlg 384; 14 N. E. Rep., 451; Com. v. v. Knight, 60 Iowa, 29; Boehme v. Davis, 140 Mass., 485; 4 N. B. Rep., Monroe, 106 Mich., 401; Roodhouse 577; Com. V. Brooks, 109 Mass., 355. v. Johnson, 57 111. App., 73. Unless restrained by law, the or- so pitts v. District of Opelika, 79 dinance may provide that it take Ala., 527. effect upon its passage. Johnson *" State v. Anderson, 26 Pla., V. Finley, 54 Neb., 733. 240, 250; 8 So. Rep., 1. 48 NATURE And requisites op ordinances. [§ o5 shall take effect, and that no ordinance shall take effect until it has been published for two successive weeks, an ordinance passed, ordained and ordered published on May 5th, which contained a provicion that it shall take effect May 16th, and which is publisheJl for two weeks, is void, for the ordinance could not, under the charter, be made to take effect May 16. Hence the time of its taking effect was not prescribed.*^ A charter providing that all ordinances shall be published for three days successively and shall take efl'ect within ten days after their enactment (provided, however, that the council may fix a different period), and that no ordinance shall take effect before one publication thereof, was construed to "mean that no ordinance can be enforced and violation thereof pun- ished until the public have been informed of its enactment by at least one publication. The matter of publication is only essential before enactment." Therefore, an ordinance which provided that it should take immediate effect, which was ap- proved August 2nd, was in force on August lOth.'*^ Under a charter providing that all ordinances of a general nature shall take effect within ten days after their publication, an ordinance providing fire limits within a comparatively small portion of teri-itory was held to be such ordinance.*^ •*i "It was indispensable that the the provision is not consistent with ordinance should express the time any such construction." Per when it would take effect. It was Graves, J., in Van Alstine v. Peo- also indispensable that two weeks pie, 37 Mich., 523, 525. should be given for notice previ- *'^ People v. Keir, 78 Mich., 98, ous to its taking effect. Both condi- 101; 43 N. W. Rep., 1039, per tions were required. It appears. Long, J. however, conclusively that the *3 Reynolds v. Harris, 27 Weekly time set for the ordinance to take Law Bui. (Ohio), 229. effect was too short to enable the Ordinance relating to the sale required notice to be given, and, of intoxicating liquors under par- hence, that the course taken in car- ticular charter provision. Schweit- rying out one necessary condition zer v. Liberty, 82 Mo., 309, 315. made compliance with the other Salary ordinances. Stuhr v. absolutely impossible. This was a Hoboken, 47 N. J. L., 147. violation of the charter. * * * Penal ordinances in case where It cannot be admitted that the re- the penalty was imposed by state quirement that two weeks for no- statute. Oak Grove v. Juneau^ 66 tice shall elapse before an ordi- Wis., 534; 29 N. W. Rep., 644. nance shall take effect may be sat- Publication construed as used in isfled by publication for two weeks ordinance. Waukesha Hygeia M. successively, when less than two S. Co. v. Waukesha, 83 Wis., 475. weeks intervene. The purpose of §3G] NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. 41) § 36. Same subject— Contingency. By virtue of the mu- nicipal charter and general maxims applicable to municipal administration, the prohibition against delegation of power applies to the several departments and officers of the munici- pality, as stated and illustrated elsewhere.*-* It thus follows that when an ordinance leaves the legislative body, to be valid, it must be complete.*^ On the question of expediency of the particular ordinance, the body must exercise its own judgment definitely and finally. Where the law is made to take effect on the occurrence of some specified event, which will not of itself render it invalid,*® the legislative body must declare it ** Ch. II, § 84 et seg., post. *5 Lammert v. Lidwell, 62 Mo., 188; O'Neill v. Ins. Co., 166 Pa. St., 72, 77; 30 Atl. Rep., 943; Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal., 279; St. Louis V. Clemens, 52 Mo., 133; St. Louis V. Russell, 116 Mo., 248; 22 S. W. Rep., 470; 20 L. R. A., 721; St. Louis V. Howard, 119 Mo., 41; 24 S. W. Rep., 770. "It is a principle not questioned that, except where authorized by the Constitution, as in respect to municipalities, the legislature can- not delegate legislative power; cannot confer on any body or per- son the power to determine what shall be the law. The legislature only must determine what it shall be. The courts only must authori- tatively determine what it is." Therefore, a legislative act which leaves it to be determined by the courts that such act, or any part of it, shall take effect and become law, is void. In such case it does not matter that the act does not profess in terms to confer such power on the courts, if such power is given in substance and 'effect. State ex rel. v. Young, 29 Minn., 474, 551, 552; 9 N. W. Rep., 737. *8 The- legislature may pass a law to take effect or go into oper- ation upon the happening of a future event or contingency. St. Louis V. Alexander, 23 Mo., 483 State V. Winkelmeier, 35 Mo., 103 State ex rel. v. St. Joseph, 37 Mo 270; State v. Binder, 38 Mo., 451 State ex rel. v. Wilcox, 45 Mo., 458 Township Organization Act, 55 Mo., 295; State ex rel. v. Pond, 93 Mo., 606; 6 S. W. Rep., 469; State ex rel. v. Francis, 95 Mo., 44 ; 8 S. W. Rep., 1; Ex parte Swann, 96 Mo., 44; 9 S. W. Rep., 10; State V. Moore, 107 Mo., 78; 16 S. W. Rep., 937; State v. Dugan, 110 Mo., 138; 19 S. W. Rep., 195; Common- wealth V. Weller, 14 Bush. (Ky.), 218; 29 Am. Rep., 408, 411; Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. St., 491; Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St., 359 ; Com. v. Williams, 11 Pa. St., 61; Common- wealth V. Painter, 10 Pa. St., 214; State V. Parker, 26 Vt, 357; Cooley Const. Lim., 117. This rule has been applied to municipal ordinances. Anderson v. Camden, 58 N. J. L., 515; 33 Atl. Rep., 846; Bradley- Ramsay Lumber Co. v. Perkins (La., 1903), 33 So. Rep., 351; Nor. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Baltimore, 21 Md., 93; State v. Kirkley, 29 Md., 85; Baltimore v. Clunet, 23 Md., 499; Thomas v. Grand Junction, 13 Colo. App., 80; 56 Pac. Rep., 665; Buffalo V. Chadeayne, 134 N. Y., 163. An ordinance for an improve- OO NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. [§37 expedient if that event shall happen, but inexpedient if the event shall not happen. The members can appeal to no other man or men to judge for them in relation to its present or future propriety, or necessity, but they must exercise that power themselves, and thus perform the duty imposed upon them by the charter.*' § 37. Expiration and suspension of ordinances. A law may be promulgated to continue in force for a specified time only and when such time expires the law ceases as a regulation.*'* But when by-laws or ordinances are not limited as to the time of their operation they never become obsolete, but continue in force until legally repealed or superseded.*^ The fact that the ordinance is not enforced and is repeatedly violated has no effect whatever on its force as law.^*' The corporate authorities have no power to suspend an ordinance nor to authorize a violation of it.^^ ment which provided that it shall not take effect unless within twen- ty days from its approval a stated sum is deposited with the city treasurer does not contravene the charter, for an ordinance may be made to depend upon the happen- ing of a future event within a rea- sonable time after its approval. Heman Constr. Co. v. Loevy, 64 Mo. App., 430, 432, 433. The fact that certain provisions of an ordinance are not to take effect until a specified time in the future does not affect the validity either of the entire ordinance or the particular provisions. Rush- ville v. Rushville Natural Gas Co., 132 Ind., 575; 15 L. R. A., 321; 28 N. E. Rep., 853. 47 See Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y., 483, 490. 48 Chillicothe v. Logan Natural Gas, etc., Co., 11 Ohio Dec. 24; 8 Ohio N. P., 88. 49 Cascaden v. Waterloo, 106 Iowa, 673; Ryce v. Osage, 88 Iowa, 558; Commonwealth v. Davis, 140 485; 4 N. E. Rep., 577; Bohan v. Weekawken Tp., 65 N. J. L., 490; Manhattan Trust Co. v. Dayton, 59 Fed. Rep., 327; 8 U. S. Cir. Ct. Rep., 140, affirming 55 Fed. Rep., 181; Shrober v. Lancaster, 6 Lane. Bar. (Pa.), 201. Ordinance duly passed, presumed to be in force. St. Louis & T. H. R. R. Co. V. Eggmann, 161 111., 155; 60 111. App., 291. 50 Commonwealth v. Davis, 140 Mass., 485; 4 N. E. Rep., 577; Ryce V. Osage, 88 Iowa, 558. 51 Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. (20 Mass.), 462. An ordinance cannot be suspend- ed by resolution. People ex rel. v. Mount, 186 111., 560, 578; 58 N. B. Rep., 360; C. & N. P. R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 174 111., 439; 51 N. E. Rep., 596; Terre Haute v. Lake, 43 Ind., 481. City may suspend an ordinance by ordinance, as one relating to use of fire works. Hill v. Charlotte, 72 N. C, 55; 21 Am. Rep., 451. Suspending an ordinance, as one § 31'] NATURE AND REQUISITES OF ORDINANCES. 51 The limitation of time in which a law is to apply is very different from the limitation of time it is to continue in force as a law. When by-laws inflicting penalties expire by their own limitation, or are repealed or superseded, they cease to be law in relation to the past as well as the future, and can no longer be enforced in any case. To use the language of an early New Hampshire case : ' ' No case is, however, to be found in which it was ever held before that they thus ceased to be law, unless they expired by express limitation in themselves, or were repealed. It has never been decided that they cease to be law merely because the time they were intended to regulate had expired. JMany laws have been passed which were limited in their operation to particular seasons of the year. This was the case with the slJatutes which regulated the hunting of deer, and the taking of fish in rivers and ponds. But it is imagined that no one ever supposed that those laws expired by their own limitation every time the season they were intended to regulate expired and revived again with the return of the season. The same is the case with the statutes regulating the observance of the Sabbath. The statutes apply only to one day of the week. But we im- agine no person will contend that they remain in force only during Sunday. ' ' In accordance with these views, it was held that a penalty incurred under a by-law of a town made to prohibit horses from going at large during certain seasons of the year, might be enforced after the expiration of the year.^^ A resolution, adopted for a particular and temporary pur- pose, continues, as a rule, for a reasonable period only, and in such case a formal repeal, of course, is not required to ter- iTiinate its operation. But if the resolution is in effect an ordinance, and has the force of a local law, it continues to operate until legally rescinded.^* forbidding the discharge of fire- 52 Stevens v. Dimond, 6 N. H., works, creates no municipal lia- 330. bility, Ch. XIV, § 436, post. 53 shaub v. Lancaster, 156 Pa. Exceptions in ordinance. Em- St., 362; Cascaden v. Waterloo, 106 poria V. Shaw, 6 Kan. App., 808. Iowa, 673. CHAPTER II. OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES And Herein, the Nature of Municipal Corporations and thh Source, Construction and Exercise op General Corporate Powers. ] 38. Public corporation empow- ered to pass ordinances. 39. Corporate as distinguished from private afEairs. 40. Ordinance regulating civil rights and liabilities. 41. Same — civil action for breach of ordinances. 42. Same — limitation — duty to public. 43. The municipal charter — its nature and purpose. 44. Same subject. 45. Usual municipal powers. 46. General rule as to municipal powers stated. 47. Powers of New England towns. 48. Rules of construction. 49. Same subject. 50. Effect of speciiic enumeration of powers. 51. Construction of power "to regulate." 52. Construction of charter. IMPLIED POWERS. 53. Implied power to enact ordi- nances. 54. General doctrine as to im- plied or incidental powers. 55. Implied powers confined to municipal affairs. 56. Implied powers respecting offices and officers. 57. Implie'd power to acquire and hold property. 58. Same — property beyond cor- porate limits. § 59. Implied power to dispose of property. 60. Same — property held for par- ticular purposes. 61. Implied power to transfer, donate or dedicate property for particular uses. 62. Implied power to mortgage or pledge property. 63. Implied powers as to police and sanitary regulations. 64. Implied power to supply water. 65. Implied power to purchase engines, etc., to prevent and suppress fires. 66. Implied power as to lighting. 67. Same — implied power to reg- ulate price of light. 68. Appropriations as donations forbidden. 69. Appropriations for celebra- tions, entertainments, etc., void. 70. Bounties to soldiers. 71. Expenditures to obtain or oppose legislation. 72. Exercise of powers by virtue of usage or custom. 73. Same subject. 74. Miscellaneous illustrations of implied powers. EXECUTION OF POWERS. 75. Method of exercise of powers. 76. Judiciary will not control ex- ercise of discretionary pow- ers. 77. Same subject. 52 § 38] • OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 53 § 78. Limitation of rule of non- § 84. Public powers cannot be sur- judicial interference. rendered or delegated. 79. When ordinance necessary to 85. Powers and duties imposed exercise power. upon particular departments 80. Same subject — legislative or or officers cannot be dele- executive powers. gated. 81. Same subject — self-enforcing 86. Legislative authority cannot charter provisions. be delegated. 82. Distinction between manda- 87. Same — illustrations. tory and discretionary pow- 88. Same subject. ers. 89. Ministerial duties may be 83. Same subject. delegated. § 38. Public corporation empowered to pass ordinances. By-laws, ordinances or local laws are enacted by bodies politic and corporate, duly constituted and existing by public law. For all practical purposes, corporations in this country may be considered under tbree general classes: First, public cor- porations—variously styled public, political, civil and munici- pal—created by the sovereign power for public or political purposes, as counties, townships, parishes, school, road, levee, drainage, reclamation, irrigation, sanitary and taxing districts, cities, towns, villages and boroughs, and other public boards or bodies invested with certain specified subordinate powers to be exercised for local purposes, connected with and de- signed to promote the public good. Second, corporations technically private but yet of quasi-public character, having in view some public enterprise in which the public interests are involved to such an extent as to justify conferring upon them important governmental powers, as, for example, the exercise of the right of eminent domain. Such corporations include railroad, street railway, turnpike, canal, telegraph, telephone, gas, water, etc., companies. Third, corporations strictly private, the direct object of which is to promote private interests.^ But those created to conduct the local civil 1 Miners' Ditch Co. y. Zellerbach, public and private corporations. 37 Cal., 543, 577. Ten Eyck v. Delaware and Raritan Judge Dillon adopts the usual Canal Co., 18 N. J. L., 200, 203, 204; division of corporations into pub- Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28; lie and private. 1 Dillon Mun. Foster v. Fowler, 60 Pa. St., 27, 30, Corp. (4 Ed.), sees. 52-56. 31; Dartmouth College v. Wood- Judge Thompson refers to the ward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.), 518; State three general classes mentioned in v. Knowles, 16 Fla., 577; State ex the text. 1 Thompson, Corp., sec- rel. v. Associated Press, 159 Mo., tlon 22 et seq. 410; 60 S. W. Rep., 91; Interoceau 54 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. | § 39 government of specified inhabitants and territory are usually classified as municipal corporations, which, in a strict sense, only embrace incorporated cities, towns, villages and bor- oughs, and to this class is given the power to pass ordinances of various kinds, to better enable the inhabitants thereof to provide all necessary and desirable police regulations, con- veniences and comforts. The distinction between the designa- tion "municipal corporations," as here employed, and other public corporations, as those usually called quasi-corporations or corporations sub mode, is marked, but for the purposes of this work farther classification, description or definition of corporations in general need not be given. § 39. Corporate as distinguished from private affairs. ' ' The primary object of municipal ordinances is public, and not private, and their violation is redressed by the legal penal- ties. "^ The municipal corporation is strictly of political in- stitution; it is but a p'art of the internal government of the state. All its purposes and objects are public, and the powers it exercises, if not inherent in it, or delegated to it by the state, would reside in the state. The legal view is that, as created, the corporation falls precisely within the definition of a municipal corporation given in an early English case, ' ' an investing the people of the place with the local government thereof. ' '^ "Private gain, trading, speculation, or the derivation of pecuniary profit, are not purposes or objects within the con- Publishing Co. V. Associated Press, v. Perdue, 62 Cal., 545; People v. 184 111., 438; 56 N. E. Rep., 822; Williams, 56 Cal., 647; People v. Munn V. People, 94 U. S., 113, Reclamation Dist., 53 Cal., 346; affirming 69 111., 80; Chicago B. Dean v. Davis, 51 Cal., 406. & Q. R. R. Co. V. Iowa, 94 U. S., So are Ibkigating Districts, in- 155; Lawrence v. Chicago & N. W. tended to render the land fit for R. R. Co., 94 U. S., 164; Chicago N. use by removing the excess of & St. Paul R. R. Co. V. Ackley, 94 water. Central Irrigation Dist. v. U. S., 179; Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 De Lappe, 79 Cal., 351; 21 Pac. U. S., 181; Washingtonian Home Rep., 825. V. Chicago, 157 111., 414; 41 N. E. 2 Per Campbell, J., in Cook v. Rep., 893; 29 L. R. A., 798. Johnson, 58 Mich., 437; 25 N. W. Reclamation Districts, designed Rep., 388; Taylor v. Lake Shore to make large bodies of land fit for and Michigan Southern Ry. Co., 45 cultivation by distributing water Mich., 74; 7 N. W. Rep., 728; 9 over them, are held to be public Am. & Eng. Ry. Cas., 127. corporations. People v. LaRue, 67 s Cudon v. Eastwlck, Salk., 192. Cal., 526; 8 Pac. Rep., 84; Hoke §39] OP THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 55 teniplation of the charter; and no powers are conferred to stimulate, encourage or advance such purposes, further than the incidental encouragement and advancement which may follow a prudent exercise of the powers of local govern- ment."* xVs a local governmental institution it merely exists for the benefit of the people within its corporate limits. All its rights, franchises, property and offices belong to its in- habitants for their use and benefit as a compactly settled community ; and its officers are merely temporary trustees, solemnly charged with the duty for the time being of ad- ministering such rights, franchise, property and offices, not to subserve the interests of some private person or class of persons, nor as a private business corporation for pecuniary profit either to themelves or the, city as a corporation, but wholly for the benefit of the public in supplying such munici- pal needs, conveniences and comforts as will advance the prosperity of the whole community. Therefore a by-law will be held bad when it appears to have been passed not to subserve the interests of the corporation, that is, the public, but those of some private person or class of persons.^ Thus an ordinance designed to preserve private property is beyond the province of the municipal corporatiou ; * Wetumpka v. Wetumpka Wharf dividual. In re Morton & City of Co., 63 Ala., 611, 624. St. Thomas, 6 Ontario App. Rep., It has none of the peculiar char- 323. acteristics of a trading company, A by-law provided for the drain- instituted for purposes of private age of lands, but it appeared that gain, except that of acting in a the corporation intended to remedy corporate capacity. Its objects, its a private grievance, and hence the responsibilities and its powers are by-law was held bad. Re Tp. of different. Nashville v. Ray, 19 Romney and Tp. of Mersea, 11 Wall. (U. S.), 468, 475. Ontario App. Rep., 712, 723. It is organized not to make By-law to indemnify a council- money, but to spend it. Matthews, man for the expenses of an election City Government of Boston, p. 189. contest, held not in public interest. = In re Peck and Town of Gait, 46 Re Bell v. Tp. of Manvers, 2 Up. Up. Can. Q. B., 211, 220. Can. Com. Pleas, 507; 3 Up. Can. Not in Public Interest. Local Com. Pleas, 400. improvement by-law held not in Where the by-law depended upon public Interests and void. Pells v. the vote of a member of a council Boswell, 8 Ontario Rep., 680. who was interested, it was set By-law opening a lane held not aside. Hewison v. Tp. of Pem- passed in public interest, but sim- broke, 6 Ontario Rep., 170. See ply to sub'-erv? interest of an in- Seq. 108 post, 6G OP THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§40 that protection must be enforced under the laws of the iand." "In no instance can a municipal corporation delegate power to private individuals to be exercised for their own private benefit, to do injury to the property of their neighbors, and relieve them from responsibility for the damages they may occasion, or reduce their liability to such as may result from want of proper care. ' '^ So an ordinance cannot interfere with arrangements made by a railroad company with an omnibus company for the delivery of passengers and their baggage, which arrangements are not unlawful in themselves, ami which relate to the cars of the company on its own premises.^ § 40. Ordinances regulating civil rights and liabilities. In a New York case it is declared to be an axiomatic truth that every person while violating *an express law, whether statute or ordinance, is a wrong-doer, and, as such, ex necessitate negligent in the eye of the law, and every innocent party whose person is injured by the act which constitutes a viola- tion of the law is entitled to a civil remedy for such injury, notwithstanding any redress the public may have.^ Prior to this declaration many cases had affirmed that where a person is required by statute to do a named act, and fails, any person specially injured by the neglect is entitled to recover his dam- ages in an action on the case, if no other remedy is given, and that, too, even when the statute imposes a penalty for its violation.!'" Whether such action can be maintained must 6 To preserve property from en- whether the violation of a munici- croachment in case of wharves, pal ordinance is negligence per se. Horn V. People, 26 Mich., 221, per In Knupfle v. Knickerbocker Ice Camphell, J. Co., 84 N. Y., 488, the New York 7 Mairs v. Manhattan Real Estate cases are considered and the con- Assn., 89 N. Y., 498, 506, per elusion stated: "The result of the Rapallo, J. decisions, therefore, is, that the 8 Napman v. People, 19 Mich., violation of the ordinance is some 352. evidence of negligence, but not " This rule was declared in Jetter necessarily negligence." V. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 Abb. lo Couch v. Steel, 3 El. & B. (77 Ct. App. Dec. (N. Y.), 458, 464; 2 Eng. C. L. Rep.), 402, 411, per Lord Keyes, 154, in overruling Brown v. Campbell, C. J. ; Steam Navigation B. & S. L. R. R. Co., 22 N. Y., 191. Co. v. Morrison, 13 Com. Bench— This case is limited by later N. S. — (76 Eng. C. L. Rep.), 581, New York cases. Massoth v. D. & 594, per Williams, J.; Caswell v. H. Canal Co., 64 N, Y., 524, after Worth, 5 El. & B. (85 Eng. C. L. reviewing the cases, concludes that Rep.), 848, 855, 856, per Coleridge, it is an open question in New York J. ; Atkinson v. New Castle & G-, §40] OP THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 57 depend on the "purview of the legislature in the particular statute, and the language which they have there employed. "^^ "The nature of the duty and the benefits to be accomplished through its performance, must generally determine whether it is a duty to the public in part or exclusively, or whether individuals may claim that it is a duty imposed wholly or in part for their especial benefit. "^^ In a case of an ordinance passed by virtue of a special legislative grant, requiring rail- roads to fence their tracks within the corporate limits, it is said: "The duty it due, not to the city as a municipal cor- poration, but to the public, considered as composed of indi- vidual persons; and each person specially injured by the breach of the obligation is entitled to his individual compen- sation and to an action for its recovery, "i^ In actions for common law negligence, evidence that plain- tiff violated a statute or ordinance is admissible for the pur- pose of showing negligence on his part. Likewise in such actions, the cases hold, with few exceptions, that for the pur- pose of showing defendant's negligence it is competent to introduce in evidence the stlatute or ordinance and prove that the same was violated by defendant. The application of these well-established rules is considered in a subsequent chapter.i^^ Failure to observe an ordinance requiring certain precau- tions in blasting rock has been held sufficient evidence to sup- port an action in behalf of one damaged because of such violation.!^ In an action for damages resulting from plain- tiff falling into a hole in the street, it appeared that defendant had failed to comply with the requirements of an ordinance Waterworks Co., L. R., 6 Bxch., " Per Lord Cairns in Atkinson 404. v. Newcastle Waterworks Co., L. Failure to protect hatchway as R., 2 Bxch. Div., 441. required by statute. Parker v. 12 Taylor v. L. S. & M. S. R. R. Bernard, 135 Mass., 116. Co., 45 Mich., 74; 40 Am. Rep., Obstruction of highway by rail- 457; 9 Am, & Eng. Ry. Cas., 127; road in violation of statute. Pat- 7 N. W. Rep., 728, per Cooley, J. terson v. Detroit, etc., Ry., 56 is Per Mr. Justice Matthews in Mich., 172; 22 N. W. Rep., 260. Hayes v. Mich. Cent. R. R., Ill U. Rule applied where statute re- S., 228, 240. lated to erection of wooden build- 13% ch. XII, Of Evidence of Or- ings in a city and which was dinances. violated to special injury of plain- i^ Devlin v. Gallagher, 6 Daly tiff. Aldrich v. Howard^ 7 R. I., (N. Y.), 494. 496. 199, 213. 58 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§40 relating to the mode in which vaults in streets should be protected. The court, in holding that this circumstance af- fected the defendant, said: "The doing of any unlawful act subjects the doer to every consequence that falls from it. This is the principle of universal operation and founded on good sense and public justice. "^^ In an action for damages occasioned by the blowing down of a sign by the wind in an extraordinary gale, which sign had been suspended over a street with due. care as to its construction and fastenings, but in violation of an ordinance which subjected its owner to a penalty for placing and keep- ing it there, it was held that this illegal act contributed to plaintiff's injury.^^ While the ground of such liability is negligence, it seems that the act of defendant in wrongfully placing the sign, in the opinion of the court, alone rendered him liable. This act was in violiation of the rule of conduct in such cases which had been established by ordinance. If no municipal regulation had existed on the subject, and the view- had been adopted that the sign had been rightfully placed where it was, the only question would have been presented, whether defendant had used due care in securing it. If he had done so, the damage would have been caused, without his fault, by the extraordinary and unusual gale of wind, and thus, having been produced by the vis major, plaintiff would have had no remedy. To adopt the illustration of the court: A chimney or roof properly constructed and secured with reasonable care may be blown off by an extraordinary gale and injure a neighbor's building; but this is not a ground of action.^ ^ Hence, in determining the question whether in these and like cases the ordinance creates the liability, it is impor- tant to consider whether, in the absence of the ordinance, what was done or omitted by defendant constituted a want of due care. Here the wrongful act of suspending the sign 15 Owings V. Jones, 9 Md., 108, and kept it there illegally, and this 117. illegal act of his has contributed 16 Salisbury v. Herchenroder, 106 to the plaintiff's injury. The gale Mass., 458. would not of itself have caused the 1' "But the defendant's sign was injury if the defendant had not suspended over the street in viola- wrongfully placed this substance tion of a public ordinance of the in its way." Salisbury v. Hercli- city of Boston, by which he was enroder, 106 Mass., 458, subject to a penalty. He placed §41] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 59 over the street was the proximate cause of the damage, and, therefore, the specific negligent act of defendant. If such act was in itself wrongful and in violation of the legal rights of plaintiff, it is clear that the cause of action does not rest upon the ordinance. But if, on the other hand, it was wrongfui only because prohibited by a reasonable police regulation, admittedly within the jurisdiction of the local corporation, it follows that the ordinance created a new civil liability §41. Same— Civil action for breach of ordinance. Some cases assert that the breach of duty arising from the violation of the statute in one case, and the ordinance in the other, is of the same nature, and the consequences the same, as relating to the duty which the defendant owes to individuals, as, for example, their safety in using the streets. Thus an ordinance requiring teams attached to vehicles to be fastened or hitched when left standing unattended in the streets, has been held "to impose a legal duty, such that a civil action for damages might be maintained for a breach thereof as in the case of like statutory duty."*® As respects the point under consid- eration, some cases have extended the analogy between stat- utes and ordinances farther. In support, the well-established principle is invoked that an ordinance which a municipal corporation is authorized to make is as binding on all persons within the corpor^ate limits as a statute or other law of the state, and all persons bound thereby are required to take notice of its existence. Thus a petition was held good, on demurrer, which founded the cause of action for damages for destruction of property upon an ordinance relating to the keeping of crude petroleum, naphtha, etc., which defendant had violated, and which breach of duty caused the loss.i^ 18 Bott V. Pratt, 33 Minn., 323, cases, where a man has temporal 328; 23 N. W. Rep., 237, sustain- loss or damage by the injury of ing an instruction which charged another, he may have an action on the jury, in substance, that if they the case." Com. Dig. tit., Action should find that defendant left his on the Case, A. The court then horse unhitched in the street, in said: "This injury may be caused violation of the ordinance, and the by the unlawful act of another, or damage to the plaintiff was occa- from the careless and negligent sioned thereby the liability of the manner in which a lawful act is defendant was established. performed." * * "It cannot be 10 The court quoted, as follows : doubted that it is competent for "It is founded," says Chief Baron the legislature of this state to dele- Comyns, . "upon a wrong. In all gate to municipal corporations, 60 OP THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§42 In an action to recover damages for personal injuries sus- tained by plaintiff in falling through an elevator opening in defendant 's establishment, an instruction was approved -which declared that it was the duty of defendant to provide a gate or railing to the elevator hatchway, as required by an ordi- nance, and that a failure to do so was negligence.^" Subse- quently the same court, in affirming the principle of the last dase, that an ordinance could afford a basis for a civil action, sustained a petition against a demurrer in an action for dam- ages for the death of a child, occasioned by falling into a hatchway on premises owned by defendant, wherein it appeared that defendant had failed to comply with the pro- visions of an ordinance which required that the hatchway should be protected so as to prevent any one from falling into it. The theory of the petition was that the ordinance pre- scribed a rule of conduct for the violation of which a defend- ant could be held in damages to a third person.^^ §42. Same— Limitation—Duty to public. It is clear that ordinances of this character cannot be extended beyond the proper limits of municipal jurisdiction. In so^ far as they arc like Chicago, tlie power to pass ordinances ; and it is well settled that such ordinances, when within the legislative authority given, have the force, as to all persons bound by them of laws passed by the legislature of the state." Wright V. C. & N. W. R. R. Co., 7 111. App., 438, 445, 446. 20 While it was stated that the ordinance was valid, the defend- ant was obliged to obey it, and was liable for failure to do so, the "whole ordinance might have been dropped out of this case entirely without affecting its merits." Wendler v. People's House Fur- nishing Co., 165 Mc, 527, 540; 65 S. W. Rep., 737. (In a court composed of seven judges, three dissented.) 21 Hirst V. Ringen Real Estate Co., 169 Mo., 194; 69 S. W. Rep., 368. Failure to observe ordinance as to guarding hatchway constitutes negligence. Ryan v. Thomson, 6 Jones & S. (38 N. Y. Sup. Ct.), 133. An ordinance of the City of St. Louis required every person, who made an excavation in or adjoin- ing any pubic street, to fence the same with a substantial fence not less than three feet high, etc. Held that such an ordinance can only be made the basis of a civil liability when It rests upon, and has for its object, the enforcement in a particular way of an obligation imposed by the general law; and held, further, that the ordinance came within this principle, in that an obligation to guard such an ex- cavation existed at common law, and the ordinance merely pre- scribed that this obligation should be discharged in a certain manner. Jelly V. Pieper, 44 Mo. App., 380, per Biggs, J. §42] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 61 designed to preserve the life and limb of those within the corporate limits, they will be sustained as proper police regu- lations, and where individuals suffer damage by reason of the violation of certain of such ordinances, as we have seen, some cases hold that the one in default is subject to civil action on the theory that the duties enjoined by such regulations are due not alone to the public in its corporate capacity, but also to individuals as such. On the other hand, where the duty imposed is due alone to the corporation as a legal entity, an ordinance passed in pursuance of the police power and carry- ing its own punishment, as for a misdemeanor, for its viola- tion, cannot create a civil liability. Such ordinance does not constitute a rule of conduct binding third persons inter sese, and therefore cannot create a civil liability against a person violating it and in favor of one damaged by such violation. The only liability for infraction is the penalty imposed.-^ Thus owners of land abutting on streets are held liable to the corporation alone for breach of ordinances requiring the re- moval of snow and ice from the sidewalk within a specified time after the fall thereof. The ground is that it is the sole 22 Connecticut. Hartford v. Tal- cott, 48 Conn., 526; 40 Am. Rep., 189. Illinois. Brink's Chicago City Exp. Co. V. Kinnare, 168 111., 643; 67 111. App., 498. Iowa. Keokuk v. District of Ke- okuk, 53 Iowa, 352; 5 N. W. Rep., 503. Kansas. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. V. Kennedy, 2 Kan. App., 693. Maryland. Flynn v. Canton Co., 40 Md., 312; 17 Am. Rep., 603. Minnesota. Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn., 323, 327; 23 N. W. Rep., 237. Missouri. Hirst v. Rlngen Real Estate Co., 169 Mo., 194, 200; 69 S. W. Rep., 368; Saunders v. So. Electric R. R. Co., 147 Mo., 411, 427; 48 S. W. Rep., 855 ; Moran v. Pull- man Palace Car Co., 134 Mo., 641, 650; 36 S. W. Rep., 659; 56 Am. St. Rep., 543; Holwerson v. St. Louis and S, R. Co., 157 Mo., 216; 57 S. W. Rep., 770; 50 L. R. A., 850; Becker v. Schulte, 85 Mo. App., 57; Norton v. St. Louis, 97 Mo., 537 ; 11 S. W. Rep., 242. New Yorlc. Moore v. Gadsden, 93 N. Y., 12. Ohio. Administrator of Cham- bers V. Ohio Life Ins. Co., 1 Dis- ney (Ohio), 327, 336. Breach of ordinance is merely evidence of negligence to be con- sidered with other facts in the case. Knupfle v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 84 N. Y., 488. Ordinance cannot authorize en- croachment in streets, and thus re- lieve those erecting or maintain- ing them from civil liability. New York v. Heft, 13 Daly (N. Y.), 301. An ordinance cannot give the city a right of action on account of damages to private property, as ornamental shade trees. Goshen v. Crary, 58 Ind., 268, 62 OP THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§43 duty of the city to keep its streets in condition for travel, and not the duty of private persons.^* The owner of property fronting on a street is not liable to the corporation for dam- ages recovered of the latter by one for injuries received, by falling on the ice on the sidewalk in front of such property, notwithstanding an ordinance required the owner to keep his sidewalk free from ice and snow, and prescribed a penalty 23 The remedy is exclusively against the Inhabitants of the city in their corporate capacity. Kirby V. Boylston Market Association, 14 Gray (Mass.), 249; 74 Am. Dec, 682. "The ordinance was not intend- ed for the benefit of the plaintiff, as an individual, or as one of a particular class, but for the public at large." Flyun v. Canton, 40 Md., 312, 323; 17 Am. Rep., 603, 614. "In this case the duty was to keep the sidewalk free from ob- struction. It will not be claimed that this was not a duty to the whole public of the city, and the disputed question is whether it is also a duty to each individual mak- ing use of the walk." "The duty to build the walk is only a pub- lic duty, and the duty to keep it in a condition for use is also a public duty." Per Cooley, J., in Taylor v. L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co., 45 Mich., 74, 77; 77 N. W. Rep., 728; 9 Am. & Eng. Ry. Cas., 127; 40 Am. Rep., 457. In Van Dyke v. Cincinnati, 1 Disney (Ohio), 532, the action was against one H., the abutter, and the city. In denying liability of the property owner, the court said : "As the owner of adjacent property there was no common law duty upon the defendant H. to remove the obstruction (snow and ice). It is not claimed that he is a pub- lic officer charged with the per- formance of this particular duty, and no statutory liability is shown. * * * So far as it is claimed that the enactment of such an ordinance creates a positive duty on the part of the owners of the property to clear their sidewalks of the obstructions named, the neg- lect of which is to make them an- swerable for the consequences to such as may suffer therefrom, no matter to what extent, we deny that the city council has the power to impose any such obligation. * * * The ordinance imposed upon H. a duty to the public alone which can only be enforced by the penalty prescribed, and the non- compliance of which does not sub- ject him to a civil action at the suit of a private person." After commenting on the Eng- lish cases, sustaining liability by virtue of statutes, it is said in a Rhode Island case: "But even if the liability had its origin in the common law, we do not find that it has ever been held to extend to a neglect of duty enjoined sim- ply by a municipal ordinance and we think there are reasons why it should not extend it. The pow- er to enact ordinances is granted for particular local purposes. It includes or is coupled with a power to prescribe limited punish- ments by fine, penalty, or impris- onment for disobedience. No power is given to annex any civil liability. The power, being delega- ted, should be strictly construed. It would seem, therefore, that the §i^J Of the power to enact ordinances. ()3 for its violation.2* Individuals are liable for any injuries they may do by interfering with the safety and convenience of travelers.2^ If what they do constitutes a nuisance or tort, and actionable as such at common law, they may be held liable for all resulting damages, irrespective of ordinance regulation on the subject. Thus where one creates a nuisance or obstruction in a public highway ,2^ or suffers snow and ice to accumulate upon an awning placed by him over a sidewalk, and the awning being insufficient to hold the snow and ice, gives way and damages a pedestrian,^^ he is responsible in damages for any injury in consequence thereof. The liability in these and like cases rests alone on negligence, the defendant in each instance being the author of the illegal act, and the tort consists in the violation of the legal rights of the one who suffers damages — rights recognized under the general princi- ples of lav/ and not created by ordinance.^* But the failure of the abutting property owner to remove snow, which has mere neglect of a duty prescribed in the exercise of such a power should not be held to create as a legal consequence, a liability, which, within its power, could not be directly imposed." Heeney v. Sprague, 11 R. I., 456, 462; 23 Am. Rep., 502, distinguishing Jones v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 2 Daly (N. Y.). 307, and Bell v. Quin, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.), 146. City cannot impose duty on abutter to keep sidewalk free from obstruction by snow, ice, etc. Gridley v. Bloomington, 88 111., 554 ; Chicago V. O'Brien, 111 111., 532. 2* St. Louis V. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 107 Mo., 92; 17 S. W. Rep., 637. The lot owner is not liable un- less he has been negligent by ob- structing the sidewalk or excava- ting under it. Jansen v. Atchison, 16 Kan., 358, 384, per Brewer, J, Where the. corporation is, by statute or charter, exempted from liability for defective sidewalks, streets, etc., the abutting property owner cannot be held liable for damages to one injured. Eustace V. Jahns, 38 Cai., 3, 21. Agreement to keep sidewalk in repair, held sufficient to render property owner liable to city for failure to do so. Brookville v. Arthurs, 130 Pa. St., 501; 18 Atl. Rep., 1076. It is the duty of the city to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition for persons travel- ling thereon. Kiely v. Kansas City, 87 Mo., 103. This duty cannot be evaded, sus- pended or cast upon others by any act of the corporation. Russell v. Columbia, 74 Mo., 480 ; Welsh v. St. Louis, 73 Mo., 71. 25 Shipley v. Fifty Associates, 101 Mass., 251, 252. 28 Smith v. Smith, 2 Pick. (Mass.), 621; Stetson v. Faxon, 19 Pick. (Mass.), 147; Dobson v. Blackmore, 9 Ad. & El., 991. 27 Milford V. Holbrook, 9 Allen (Mass.), 17. 28 Owner of building liable for damages from sliding mass of ice and snow from roof upon travel- 64 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. LH3 fallen on the sidewalk, has never been recognized as a ground of action for damages for resulting injuries at common law. The snow is not created by the 9,ct of the defendant, nor is it placed upon the pavement by his 'act or by the act of any agency over which he has control. Under the rule of the common law there is no obligation imposed upon him to re- move it. As stated in a Rhode Island case : ' ' We do not suppose that the creation of a civil liability between individ- uals was any part of the object for which the power to enact ordinances was granted. "^^ The principle involved is well illustrated in a Pennsylvania lers. Shipley v. Fifty Associates, 101 Mass., 251. A building so erected that its roof overhangs the street is a nui- sance and snow and ice falling therefrom creates a liability. Gar- land V. Towne, 55 N. H., 55. Abutting property owner, who turns water from his building onto the sidewalk by means of gutters or spouts, is jointly liable with the city if he fails to exercise reason- able care to guard pedestrians from injury resulting from the forma- tion from such water of ice upon the sidewalk. Reedy v. St. Louis Brewing Association, 161 Mo., 523, 533; 61 S. W. Rep., 859. . Making a manhole for the re- ception of coal by abutter renders him liable, where the same is left unguarded and one falls therein. Benjamin v. Met. St. Railroad Co., 133 Mo., 274; 34 S. W. Rep., 590. Making and maintaining an open- ing or area in a lot at the street line. Buesching v. St. Louis Gas Light Co., 73.JVIO., 219. Excavation which renders high- way unsafe. Butz v. Cavanaugh, 137 Mo., 503; 38 S. W. Rep., 1104; Wiggins v. St. Louis, 135 Mo., 558 ; 37 S. W. Rep., 528; Jelly v. Piper, 44 Mo. App., 380. Any act which renders the street hazardous creates liability. Heer Dry Goods Co. v. Citizens Ry. Co., 41 Mo. App., 63 ; Bailey v. Culver, 84 Mo., 531; Carvin v. St. Louis, 151 Mo., 334; 52 S. W. Rep., 210. Liability for electric wires along public streets. Gannon v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 145 Mo., 502; 46 S. W. Rep., 968 ; 47 S. W. Rep., 907. 29 Heeney v. Sprague, 11 R. I., 456, 461; 23 Am. Rep., 502. "Speaking for myself alone, my views have not changed in the least, and I am still of opinion that such ordinances do not con- stitute a rule of conduct binding third persons inter sese, but are mere police regulations carrying their own punishment for their vi- olation, and that punishment a fine, and that they are not admis- sible in evidence at all in an action based upon common law neg- ligence, for no utterance of a mu- nicipal assembly can be evidence of common law negligence. But as the majority of this court, in lane, holds otherwise, as to such ordinance affording the basis for a civil action, the proper adminis- tration of the law requires that such decision shall be obeyed and followed by all the members of the court until the court otherwise rules." Per Marshall, J., in Hirst V. Ringen Real Estate Co., 169 Mo., 194, 200; 69 S. W. Rep., 368. §43] OF THE POWER TO EiSTACT ORDINANCES. 65 case. An ordinance of Philadelphia required the owners of wharves on the Schuylkill and Delaware Rivers to put in and maintain cap-logs upon them to a height of not less than eight inches. A narr declared upon the ordinance as raising a duty which defendant company was bound to observe, and laid the damages resulting from the loss of a horse and cart as a con- sequence of the neglect of such duty. In holding that then- was no cause of action, the court observed : ' ' Let us suppose that these wharves were so constructed that extra ordinance, no charge of negligence could arise, and hence no common law action would lie; would disobedience to this regulation, of itself, subject the company to such charge and action? This question would seem almost to answer itself; for if it be af- firmed, then may civil duties and civil remedies be given or taken away by ordinances; a power as yet quite beyond the reach of municipal legislation. The national or state legis- lature may do this, for it is the supreme power, and as such can make that immoral which was before indifferent, and that neglect which was before prudence, but the city of Philadel- phia has no such power. Its ordinances are but police regu- lations enforceable by penalties, recoverable by actions of debt or otherwise, as may be prescribed, but if not so enforced they come to nothing. An ordinance may forbid the main- tenance by my neighbor of a cesspool upon his premises, and it may, by penalty, compel him to abate it, but whether it does so or not, I may, if I am damaged thereby, have my common law action against him; but if I am not damaged I am without remedy. In this the ordinance neither helps nor hinders."^" §43. The municipal charter— Its nature and purpose. In this country, the theory is that the state antedates the munici- pal corporation, and hence the charter is, in theory, a delega- tion of a portion of the state's powers for local self-govern- ment.^^ The state has all necessary power for the protection 30 Per Gordon, J., in Phlladel- Pac. Rep., 433; Oldstein v. Fire- phia and Reading R. R. Co. v. Er- man's Building Assn., 44 La. Ann., vln, 89 Pa. St., 71, 75, 76; 33 Am. 492; 10 So. Rep., 928. Rep., 726. Where licensed porter loses lug- As to right of action to enjoin gage, action will lie on his bond, continuance of wooden building Chilllcothe v. Raynard, 80 Mo., 185. forbidden by ordinance. McClos- si Kelly v. Meeks, 87 Mo., 396 ; key V. Kreling, 76 Cal., 511; 18 State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo., 458; Rug- 66 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [H3 of the property, health and comfort of the public, and it may delegate this power to its municipal corporations in such measure as may be deemed desirable for the best interests of the public:*^ and the state may resume it again when deemed expedient.-''^ In legal language, we say the state, through its legislature, delegates its power relating to civil government or local administration to counties, cities, towns and other forms of public corporations, which delegation is regarded as a qualification of the fundamental maxim of government that the legislature cannot delegate its powers to make laws.S'' And while true in theory, the fact is, accurately speaking, the state cannot be considered as delegating authority which it never possessed, since the management of local affairs was never a state duty or power.^-' However, the courts regard charters as instruments conferring privileges or recognizing- rights emanating from the state, the paramount authority.^" gles V. Collier, 43 Mo., 353; St. Louis V. Clemens, 43 Mo., 395; St. Louis V. Russell, 9 Mo., 507; State V. Simonds, 3 Mo., 414. 32 Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S., 141, 147; Covington v. East St. Louis, 78 111., 548. 33 Harmon v. Chicago, 110 111., 400, 409. Si In re Wall, 48 Cal., 279; Hill V. Decatur, 22 Ga., 203; Predu v. Ellis, 18 Ga., 586; Harmon v. Chi- cago, 110 111., 400, 408; Louisville City R. R. Co. v. Louisville, 8 Bush. (Ky.), 415; State v. Merrill, 37 Me., 329; Fell v. State, 42 Md., 71; Metcalf v. St. Louis, 11 Mo., 103; Markle v. Akron, 14 Ohio, 586 ; Clarke v. Rochester, 28 N. Y., 605. "Municipal corporations form an exception to the rule which for- bids the legislature to delegate any of its powers to subordinate divi- sions." McMahon v. Savannah, 66 Ga., 217, 224. 35 The American system of gov- ernment "Is one of complete de- centralization, the primary and vi- tal idea of which is that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities and general affairs only by the central authority." Cooley's Const. Lim., 223; People v. Hurl- but, 24 Mich., 44; 9 Am. Rep., 103; People V. Detroit, 28 Mich., 228; 15 Am. Rep., 202; People v. Dra- per, 15 N. y., 532, 561; People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y., 50; State ex rel. V. Denny, 118 lad., 449; 21 "N. E. Rep., 274; 24 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 223; Kirkham v. Russell, 76 Va., 956; State v. Moores, 55 Neb., 480; 76 N. W. Rep., 175, overruling State V. Seavey, 22 Neb., 454; 35 N. W. Rep., 228; articles by the author, "Limitation of Legislative Control," etc., 34 ; Am. Law Re- view, p. 505 et seq.; "Constitution- al Right of Local Self Government of Municipalities and Principles Applicable to Central Control," 35 Am. Law Review, p. 510 et seq.; Andrews' Am. Law, § 450 et seq. 36 Governmental Charters — de- scriptions and definitions. Bur- rill's Law Dictionary, title "Char- ter;" Anderson's Law Dictionary, title "Charter;" Bouvier's Law Die. (Rawl's Ed.1, title "Charter;" §43] OP THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 67 Neither is the charter nor any legislative act regulating the use of property held by a municipal corporation for govern- mental purposes a contract within the meaning of the consti- tutional prohibition of laws impairing the obligation of con- tracts.*^ Therefore, the general doctrine, supported by an unbroken line of authorities, is that political powers conferred upon a corporation for the local government of a place are not vested rights as against the state, and where there is no constitutional restriction, either express or implied, upon the action of the legislature, it has absolute power to create, change or modify them at pleasure.** The theory deducibl'.e Black's Law Dictionary, title "Charter;" Bergman v. St. Paul M. B. Association, 29 Minn., 275, 278; 13 N. W. Rep., 120; Granger's Life Ins. Co. v. Kamper, 73 Ala., 325; State V. Railroad Commission- ers, 37 N. J. L., 228, 238; Dew v. Judges, etc., 3 Hen. & M. (Va.), 1, 22. As to nature of charter govern- ment among the early American Colonies, see 1 Story, sec. 161. Municipal Chaeteks. State v. Bhrmantraut, 63 Minn., 104; 65 N. W. Rep., 251; Smith v. Sherry, 50 Wis., 210, 214, 215; 6 N. W. Rep., 561. "CoKPOBATE Powers." The phase in a constitution "to grant corpor- ate powers or privileges," held to mean "in prineipio donationis" and equivalent to the phrase "to grant corporate charters." Atty. General v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 35 Wis., 425, 460; Brady v. Moulton, 61 Minn., 185, 186; 63 N. W., 489. 37 State V. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 3 How. (U. S.), 534, affirming 12 Gill. & J. (Md.), 399; Layton v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann., 515. "Legislation impairing the obli- gation of contracts." 25 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.), 81, 83, 84. "Legislative power to amend charters." 11 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.), 1; Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th Ed.), 229; Black on Const. Prohi- bition, sec. 45, 46; 1 Hare's Am. Const. Law, p. 627, et seq. 38 Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S., 514; Williams v. Eggle- ston, 170 U. S., 304, 310; Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U. S., 307; U. S. v. B. & O. B. R. Co., 17 Wall. (U. S.), 322, 329; St. Louis v. Russell, 9 Mo., 507; St. Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo., 400; State ex rel. v. St. Louis Coun- ty, 34 Mo., 546; State ex rel. v. Linn County, 44 Mo., 504; St. Louis V. Shields, 52 Mo., 351; State ex rel. V. Miller, 66 Mo-., 328. "Legislative control of Munici- pal Corporations," 8 Cent. L. J., 3; Black on Constitutional Pro- hibitions, sec. 47; Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th Ed.), 228. The doctrine is carried to the extreme limit by Sharswood, J., in Philadelphia v. Pox, 64 Pa. St., 169, 180, 181, where he says the state may continue the city's corporate existence, "and yet assume or re- sume the appointment of all its officers and agents into its own hands; for the power which can create and destroy can modify and change." This is a type of many judicial assertions on this subject. Judge Dillon doubts this conclu- sion and adopts the observations of Judge Cooley, contained in his 68 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§44 from the authorities miay be thus broadly stated : The legisla- ture creates municipal corponations, defines and limits their powers and enlarges and diminishes them at will, points out the agencies which are to exercise them, and possesses such general supervision and control of them as it shall deem proper and needful for the public welfare.^^ § 44. Same subject. The charter creates the body politic and corporate, contains the municipal powers and gives the form of municipal organization, locates the corporate bound- aries and wards or other subdivisions, classifies and distrib- utes the powers amd duties of the various departments, boards and officers, and provides the manner in which the several powers shall be exercised. All of these matters should be definitely established. The precise limits of power that may be conferred by charter are impossible of definition. They will be sustained in so far as they relate to matters of local self-government and administration.*" Special legislative charters necessarily vary in the powers conferred and in the rights recognized in them. So charters adopted by virtue of constitutional provisions will be unlike in many respects, and this is clearly within the contemplation of the constitution.*^ work on Taxation ( 2nd Ed. ) , ch. pleasure of the state, and the same 21, p. 678, where he says, that "in voice which speaks them into ex- the general framework of our re- istence can speak them out." Ew publican governments nothing is ing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo., 64, 77. more distinct and unquestionable Compare this statement with the than that they recognize the exist- following later decisions: St. ence of local self-government and Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo., 466; 41 S. contemplate its permanency. Some W. Rep., 1094; 46 S. W. Rep., 976; state constitutions do this in ex- Kansas City ex rel. v. Scarritt, 127 press terms, others by necessary Mo., 642; 29 S. W. Rep., 845; 30 implication." He admits that the S. W. Rep., Ill; State ex rel. v. legislature has usually a large au- Field, 99 Mo., 352; 12 S. W. Rep., thority in determining the extent 802; Murnane v. St. Louis, 123 of local powers and the frame- Mo., 479; 27 S. W. Rep., 711, work of local government; "but which properly declares that "the while it may shape the local insti- important business of municipal tutions, it can not abolish them, rule" is a local and not a state and, without substituting others, matter. take all authority to Itself." 1 *» Cooley's Con. Lim. (6th Ed.), Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.), note 227. 1, p. 127. 41 State ex rel. v. Field, 99 Mo., 30 "Public corporations are the 352; 12 S. W. Rep., 802; Kansas auxiliaries of the state in the im- City v. Marsh Oil Co., 140 Mo., portant business of municipal rule, 458; 41 S. W. Rep., 943. and are called into being at the § 44] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 69 Under the general incorpomtion laws of most of the states there is uniformity in the rights and powers in so far as they relate to classes and grades. Hence, where classification is mandatory all municipal corporations of the same class or grade possess the same rights and powers and are subject to the same restrictions. In this country, municipal charters are either granted by legislative authority of the state by general or special act, or framed and adopted by the people of the particular commu- nity by virtue of the state constitution. But it must be borne in mind that in every instance the particular charter contains the municipal powers, rights and obligations, points out the manner in which they are to be exercised and must be con- strued in the light of the constitution and laws of the state. The constitutional charter stands on no higher legal plane than a legislative, for all charters are subject to and controlled by the general law of the state.*^ A municipal charter, when acted on, is more than an ordinary law of the state, "for it constitutes a sort of organic law, a constitution for a local self-government, within its territorial limits, extending in its scope to the extra regulations required for the good govern- ment of a city or town, to be enacted and carried into effect by its municipal officers."*^ The charter is the power of at- torney which defines and limits the objects and powers with which the municipal authorities are entrusted.** "The cor- poration," remarked the Supreme Court of California in an early case, "owing its existence to the law, is precisely what the law makes it. * * * The general legislative powers residing in the state government may delegate to a municipal 42 Kansas City v. Lorber, 64 Mo. the mandatory organic law. Peo- App., 604. pie ex rel. v. Bagley, 85 Mo., 343, General laws supersede provi- distinguishing Ex parte Ah You, sions of charter, when. Ewing v. 82 Cal., 339; 22 Pac. Rep., 929; Hoblitizelle, 85 Mo., 64; Davies v. People ex rel. v. Henshaw, 76 Cal., Los Angeles, 86 Cal., 37; 24 Pac. 436; 18 Pac. Rep., 413; Thomason Rep., 771; Ira re Cloherty, 2 Wash., v. Ashworth, 73 Cal., 73; 14 Pac. 137, 139, 140; 27 Pac. Rep., 1064. Rep., 615. A charter framed by constitu- 43 Williams v. Bavidson, 43 Tex., tional provisions will supersede the 1, 35 ; Gabel v. Houston, 29 Tex., former charter of the particular 335, 343. municipal corporation whether 44 per Wagner, J., in Hitchcock granted by general or special stat- v. St. Louis, 49 Mo., 484, 488. ute, and after its adoption becomes '70 Of The poweb to enact Ordinances. [§45 government some portion of its own powers; but these grants are held in subordination to the general power, and are not construed as taking from that government any other power or rights than those clearly granted. "^^ § 45. Usual municipal powers. When a particular place and the inhabitants thereof become a body politic and cor- porate, there is thereby constituted, in contemplation of law, a legal personality or artificial person; and the usual powers conferred and recognized and which may be exercised as a municipal corporation are : to acquire a name, and by that name shall have perpetual succession; power to sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, defend and be defended in all courts of law and equity and in all actions whatsoever ; author- ity to purchase, receive, hold and manage property, real and personal, for municipal purposes and power to dispose of the same for the benefit of the corporation; and authority to adopt a common seal which may be altered at pleasure. The various statutes differin phraseology in enumerating the general powers of municipal corporations, and many of them confer special or particular powers. The Minnesota statute, after enumerating the general municipal powers, provides that incorporated cities "shall have the general powers possessed by municipal corporations at common law. "*'^ The Supremo Court of Michigan early declared that the cities and towns of that state were municipal corporations ' ' of common law origin and having no less than common law franchises. "^^ The laAv generally recognizes the common law origin of municipal cor- porations proper and permits the exercise by them of certain incidental or implied powers in order to enable them to fulfil 4s Per Baldwin, J., in Oakland All city charters are limited by V. Carpentier, 13 Cal., 540, 545 ; the operation of the general law. Douglas V. Placerville, 18 Cal., 643, Kennedy v. Miller, 97 Cal., 429; 647; New London v. Brainard, 22 32 Pao. Rep., 558. Conn., 552; Benjamin v. Wehster, *7 Laws of Minn., 1899, p. 51. 100 Ind., 15 ; Spaulding v. Lowell, The charter of Milwaukee contains 23 Pick. (Mas.), 71, 74. the same provisions. Butler v. "The powers of all corporations Milwaukee, 15 Wis., 493, 497. are limited by the grants in their is People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich., charter and cannot extend beyond 44; 9 Am. Rep., 103. them." Petersburg v. Metzker, 21 111., 205. §46] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 71 the purposes of their creation in supplying local needs and conveniences. §46. General rule as to municipal powers stated. A mu- nicipal corporation may exercise, first, all powers granted in express terms, consistent with the federal constitution and laws, and the state constitution; second, certain implied or incidental powers, in harmony with the federal and state con- stitutions and laws, and the municipal charter, (a) growing out of those expressly granted, or (b) those which belong tcS it because it is a municipal corporation, or (c) those which are essential or reasonably proper, to give effect to powers expressly granted, or recognized, as pertaining to municipal existence.""* J" The general rule as to the POWERS POSSESSED and which may- be exercised, adopting Judge Dil- lon's statement (1 Dillon, Mun. Corp., 4th Ed., sec. 89), is thus given in a Virginia case: "First, powers granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those es- sential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, — not simply convenient but indispensa- ble." Duncan v. Lynchburg ( Va., 1900) ; 34 S. E. Rep., 964; 48 L. R. A.. 331. This statement is either liter- ally or in substance contained in the following cases: Alabama — Eufaula v. McNab, 67 Ala., 588; New Decatur v. Barry, 90 Ala., 432; 24 Am. St. Rep., 827. California — Reis v. Graff, 51 Cal., 86. Colorado — Phillips v. Denver, 19 Colo., 179; 41 Am. St. Rep., 230. Connecticut — New London v. Brainard, 22 Conn., 552. Illinois — Huesing v. Rock Is- land, 128 111., 465; 21 N. E. Rep., 558; Cook County v. McCrea, 93 111., 236. Iowa — Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa, 378; 7 N. W. Rep., 623; Field V. Des Moines, 39 Iowa, 575 ; Logan V. Pyne, 43 Iowa, 524; 22 Am. Rep., 261. Indiana — Champer v. Greencas- tle, 138 Ind., 339; 46 Am. St. Rep., 390; Richmond v. McGirr, 78 Ind., 192. Louisiana — State v. Itzcovitch, 49 La. Ann., 366; 62 Am. St. Rep., 648; State v. Robertson, 45 La. Ann., 954; 40 Am. St. Rep., 272. Massachusetts — Lowell v . Bos- ton, 111 Mass., 454; 15 Am. Rep., 39, 62; Spaulding v. Lowell, 23 Pick. (Mass.), 71, 74, 75, per Shaw, C. J.; Williard v. Newburyport, 12 Pick. (Mass.), 227; Bangs v. Snow., 1 Mass., 181; Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass., 272; Com. v. Stodder, 2 Cush. (Mass.), 562; 48 Am. Dec, 679. Montana — Davenport v. Klein- schmidt, 6 Mont, 502; 13 Pac. Rep., 249; 16 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 30l! Michigan — Detroit, etc., Ry. Co. V. Detroit, 110 Mich., 384; 68 N. W. Rep., 304; 64 Am. St. Rep., 350. Missouri — Nevada V. Eddy, 123 Mo., 546 ; 27 S. W. Rep., 471 ; State ex rel. v. Murphy, 134 Mo., 548; 31 72 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§46 As relates to the exercise of powers, it is generally regarded that corporations have none of the elements of sovereignty; that they cannot go beyond the powers granted them, and that they must exercise such granted powers in a reasonable man- ner. These are legal propositions that cannot be disputed.^" "A corporation being a mere cre(ature of the law, possesses S. W. Rep., 784; 34 S. W. Rep., 51; 35 S. W. Rep., 1132; St. Louis v. Herthel, 88 Mo., 128; Kansas City V. Swope, 79 Mo., 446; Leacli v. Cargill, 60 Mo., 316; Kiley v. Op- penheimer, 55 Mo., 374; State v. Clark, 54 Mo., 17; Knapp v. Kansas City, 48 Mo. App., 485; Joplin v. Leckie, 78 Mo. App., 8; Knox City V. Thompson, 19 Mo. App., 523; Kirkwood v. Meramec Higlilands, 64 Mo. App., 637; 68 S. W. Rep., 761; Independence v. Cleveland, 167 Mo., 384; 67 S. W. Rep., 216. New York — New York v. Dry Dock, etc., R. R. Co., 133 N. Y, 104 ; 28 Am. St. Rep., 609. North Carolina — Smith v. New- hern, 70 N. C, 14; 16 Am. Rep., 766; State v. Wehber, 107 N. C, 962; 22 Am. St. Rep., 920. New Jersey — Carron- v. Martin, 26 N. J. L., 594; 69 Am. Dec, 584. Oregon — Corvallis v. Carlile, 10 Oreg., 139. Pennsylvania — Sharpless v. May- or, 21 Pa. St., 147; 59 Am. Dec, 782-790. Texas — Ex parte Garza, 28 Tex. App., 381; 19 Am. St. Rep., 845; Williams v. Davidson, 43 Tex., 1, 33; Brenham v. Brenham Water Co., 67 Tex., 542; 20 Am. & Bng. Corp. Cas., 207. Utah — Levy v. Salt Lake City, 3 Utah, 63; 1 Pac. Rep., 160. Vermont — St. Johnsbury v. Thompson, 59 Vt, 300, 305. Virginia — Lynchburg & R. St. R. Co. v. Dameron, 95 Va., 545, 548; 28 S. E. Rep., 951; Kirkham V. Russell, 76 Va., 956; Danville v. Shelton, 76 Va., 325; Winchester V. Redmond, 93 Va., 711; 57 Am. St. Rep., 822. West Virginia — Parkersburg Gas Oo. V. Parkersburg, 30 W. Va., 435; 4 S. E. Rep., 650; Charleston V. Reed, 27 W. Va., 681; 55 Am. Rep., 336; Christie v. Maiden, 23 W. Va., 667; Clarksburg Electric Light Co. V. Clarksburg, 47 W. Va., 739; 50 L. R. A., 142, 149; 35 S. E. Rep., 994. Wisconsin — Bell v. Platteville, 71 Wis., 139; 36 N. W. Rep., 831; 20 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 177; Gil- man V. Milwaukee, 61 Wis., 588, 592; 21 N. W. Rep., 640. United States — Thomas v. Rich' mond, 12 Wall. (U. S.), 349; Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. (U. S.), 327; Detroit v. Detroit City Ry. Co., 56 Fed. Rep., 867; Freeport Water Co. v. Freeport, 180 U. S., 587, affirming 186 111., 179, 57 N. E. Rep., 862; Danville Water Co. v. Danville, 180 U. S., 619, affirming 186 111., 326, 57 N. E. Rep., 1129. 50 Per Bliss, J., in St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo., 547: "The powers of all corporations are limited by the grants in their charters and cannot extend beyond them." Per Breese, J., in Peters- burg V. Metzker, 21 111., 205, 206. In referring to the powers of towns, in Massachusetts, Parker, C. J., observed: "Their corporate powers depend upon legislative charter or grant; or upon prescrip- tion where they may have exercised the powers anciently without any §^6] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 73 only those properties which the charter confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its very existence, "^i Much difficulty arises in the application of the general doe- trine relating to what powers may be exercised by municipal corporations because of the miscellaneous and sometimes in- particular act of incorporation." Stetson V. Kempton, 13 Mass., 272, 278. "A corporation being merely a political institution, it can have no other capacities than such as are necessary to carry into effect the purposes for which it was estab- lished." Kyd on Corp., 70. SI Dartmouth College v. Wood- ward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.), 518, 578; Green's Brice's Ultra Vires, p. 28; Cooley's Const. Lim., p. 235. "It is a rule of great public util- ity and courts should recognize and enforce it as a safeguard against the tendency of munici- palities to embark in enterprises not germane to the objects for which they are incorporated. Even towns, which, under our peculiar political history and policy, it was strongly urged in Webster v. Town of Harwinton, 32 Conn., 131, pos- sessed, because of their independ- ent character, large original pow- ers, were held to have no original or inherent powers whatever, but only such as are either expressly granted by the legislative power of the state or are necessary to the performance of their duties as ter- ritorial and municipal corpora- tions." Dailey v. New Haven, 60 Conn., 314, 320; 22 Atl. Rep., 945. If olBcers transcend the charter's powers their acts are neither bind- ing on the corporation nor third persons. "The trustees of a town possess only such powers as are specifically conferred by the act of incorpo- ration, or are necessary to carry into effect the powers expressly granted. They must keep within the limits prescribed by the char- ter. If they transcend the author- ity conferred thereby, their acts are not binding on the town or third persons. They have no power to give away the funds of the town, or appropriate them to purposes not warranted ■ by the charter. They must faithfully apply the corporate property to the uses and objects specified in the charter. As they cannot directly dispose of it by way of gratuity, so they cannot accomplish the result by device or indiscretion. They cannot under color of a sale transfer the prop- erty of the corporation without consideration; nor can they under pretense of satisfaction discharge a debt due the corporation without payment." Petersburg v. Mappin, 14 111., 193; 56 Am. Dec, 501. "The powers vested in a corpo- rate body or chartered association of men, are for a public purpose, and consist, not in a restriction of powers before vested, but in a dele- gation of new and particular pow- ers which cannot be extended be- yond the letter of the act of incor- poration, unless the implication of some power beyond the letter be unavoidable, and necessarily fol- low the powers expressly given. And then the obvious aim and sense of the law cannot but be the very law; and we have the true construction in allowing such im- plied powers." Per Richardson, J., in Charleston v. State ex rel. Adger, 2 Speers (S. C), 719, 729. 74 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§ 4^ definite purposes for which these public corporations are con- stituted.52 § 47. Powers of New England towns. New England towns, like other corporations, can exercise no powers except such as are expressly granted to them, or such as are necessary to enable them to discharge their duties and carry into effect the objects and purposes of their creation.^* They act not by any inherent right of legislation, like the legislature of the state, but their authority is delegated.^* "It is quite too late," as observed in a Connecticut case, "to urge for them the possession of any inherent or prescriptive rights or powers, or any rights or powers not expressly or impliedly delegated to them by the legislative power of the state, "'^s In Vermont it has been held that the towns in existence in that state when the state constitution was adopted have no reserved sover- eignty not possessed by all other towns in the state.^® The corporate powers of towns depend upon legislative charter or grant; or upon prescription, where they may have exercised the power anciently without any particular act of incorpora- tion. What powers the New England towns may exercise are fully stated in the cases in the note.^^ Denying inherent legislative turyport, 12 Pick. (Mass.), 227; powers. People ex rel. v. Mitchell, Bufaula v. McNab, 67 Ala., 588. 35 N. Y., 551, relying on Thomson 53 Ahendroth v. Greenwich, 29 V. Lee County, 3 Wall. (U. S.), 327. Conn., 356, 363. "Sovereignty resides only in the 54 Willard v. Borough of Killing- entire state. In the municipal or worth, 8 Conn., 247. other local communities thereof, 55 Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn., or in their magistracies, there is 118, 125. no such thing as an inherent and se Bennington v. Park, 50 Vt., independent authority or right to 178. govern, by which the communities '>? Connecticut — Farrel v. Derby, themselves or any of the members 58 Conn., 234; 20 Atl. Rep., 460. thereof must be legally bound. Maine — Winterport Water Co. v. Submission is due to the obliga- Winterport, 94 Me., 215; 47 Atl. tions which such bodies undertake Rep., 142, 1045; Maine Water Co. to impose only so far as the state, v. Waterville, 93 Me., 586; 45 Atl. in the exercise of its sovereign Rep., 830; Rackliff v. Greenbush, powers for the general good, 93 Me., 99; 44 Atl. R«p., 375; Rey- has delegated authority to create nolds v. Waterville, 92 Me., 292; them." Per Manning, J., in Mobile 42 Atl. Rep., 553; Luques v. Dres- V. Moog, 53 Ala., 561, 564, 565. den, 77 Me., 186; Parsons v. Mon- 52 Spaulding v. Lowell, 23 Pick, mouth, 70 Me., 262 ; Westbrook v. (Mass.), 71, 75; Willard v. New- Deering, 63 Me., 231; Gilman v. §48] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 76 § 48. Rules of construction. The policy of the law is to require of municipal corporations a reasonably strict observ- ance of their powers. Therefore, the courts incline to adopt a strict rather than a liberal construction, thus applying sub- stantially the same rule which is applied to charters of private corporations.^® As a general proposition, only such powers and rights can be exercised under grants of the legislature to corporations, whether public or private, as are clearly com- prehended within the terms of the act or derived therefrom by necessary implication, regard being had to the objects of the grants. ' ' Any ambiguity or doubt arising out of the terms used by the legislature must be resolved in favor of the pub- lic. "^® Charters are special grants of power from the sover- Waterville, . 59 Me., 491; Opinion of Justices, 58 Me., 590; Winches- ter V. Corinna, 55 Me., 9; Frank- fort V. Winterport, 54 Me., 250; Alley V. Edgecomb, 53 Me., 446; Barker v. Dixmont, 53 Me., 575 ; Opinion of Justices, 52 Me., 595; Augusta V. Leadbetter, 16 Me., 45, 47, 48; Bussey v. Gilmore, 3 Me., 191. Massachusetts — Coolidge v. Brookline, 114 Mass., 592; Minot V. Roxbury, 112 Mass., 1; 17 Am. Rep., 52; Per Parker, C. J., Stet- son V. Kempton, 13 Mass., 272; 7 Am. Dec, 145; Rumford School District v. Wood, 13 Mass., 193; Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass., 547; Bangs V. Snow, 1 Mass., 181, 187; Spaulding v. Lowell, 23 Pick. (Mass.), 71, per Shaw, C. J.; Wil- lard V. Newburyport, 12 Pick. fMass.), 227; Parsons v. Goshen, 11 Pick. (Mass.), 396; Vincent v. Nantucket, 12 Cush. (Mass.), 103; Hardy v. Waltham, 3 Mete. (Mass.), 163; Anthony v. Adams, 1 Mete. (Mass:), 284; Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen (Mass.), 570. Neio Hampshire — Bachelder v. Epping, 28 N. H., 354; Concord v. Boscawen, 17 N. H., 465. Vermont — Mount Holly v. Peru, 72 Vt, 68; 47 Alt. Rep., 103 ; Shel- don Poor House Assn. v. Sheldon, 72 Vt, 126; 47 Atl. Rep., 542; West- Held V. Coventry, 71 Vt., 175; 44 Atl. Rep., 66; Montpelier v. El- more, 71 Vt, 193; 44 Atl. Rep., 71; Bates V. Bassett 60 Vt., 530, 534; 15 Atl. Rep., 200. 58 Cooley's Const Lim., 195; Cor- vallis V. Carlile, 10 Oreg., 139, 141; 45 Am. Rep., 134. 59 Per Mr. Justice Nelson in Min- turs V. Larue, 23 How. (64 U. S.), 435, 436; Meday v. Rutherford, 65 N. J. L., 645; 48 Atl. Rep., 529; Ft Scott V. Eads Brokerage Co. (U. S. C. C. A.), 117 Fed. Rep., 51. "To the extent of their authority they can bind the people and the property subject to their regulation and governmental control by what they do, but beyond their corporate powers their acts are of no effect." Per Waite, C. J., in speaking of power to issue bonds, in Ottawa v. Carey, 108 U. S., 110, 121; Clark V. Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494; Rich- ards v. Clarksburg, 30 W. Va., 491; 4 S. E. Rep., 774; 20 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., Ill; Winchester v. Redmond, 93 Va., 711, 714; 25 S. B. Rep., 1001 ; Kirkham v. Russell, 76 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§49 eign authority, and ordinarily they mjist be strictly construed. Whatever is not given expressly, or as a necessary means to the execution of expressly given powers, is vrithheld."" "It is only by such grants that the government povsrer can sur- render its just authority. Nor, as a general rule, can any evil ever arise from such construction, since the inhabitants of the corporation are not deprived of that protection which the state extends to her citizens in general. The power of the corporation is merely something added, as to the particular locality, to the general powers of government; or in other words, it is a special jurisdiction, created for specified pur- poses, and, like all such jurisdictions, it must be confined to the subjects specially enumerated. "^^ §49. Same subject. As it is a well established principle that a municipal corporation may exercise such powers as are reasonably proper to give effect to powers expressly granted, the rule stated in the last paragraph does not confine the con- 76 Va., 956, 961; Tax Collector v. Dendinger, 38 La. Ann., 261, 263; Joplln V. Leckie, 78 Mo. App., 8, 12; Knapp v. Kansas City, 48 Mo. App., 485; Cook Co. v. McCrea, 93 111., 236; Somerville V. Dickerman, 127 Mass., 272; Agnew v. Brail, 124 111., 312; 16 N. E. Rep., 230; Eufaula V. McNab, 67 Ala., 588. "In determining on the extent of such power (to hold real estate In a particular instance, under a char- ter), we are to look at the grant and the restrictions; and, unless the power is found in the charter, it cannot be considered as pos- sessed. The very grant of specified powers, under restrictions, is an exclusion of other powers in refer- ence to the same subject matter, not granted by the charter." Bank of Michigan V. Niles, 1 Doug. (Mich.), 401, 404; People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 John (N. Y.), 357. 00 Douglass V. Placerville, 18 Cal., 643, 647. 01 Per Fisher, J., in Leonard v. Cantor, 35 Miss., 189, 190, 191. Hitchcock, J., in Collins v. Hatch, 18 Ohio, 523, 51 Am. Dec, 465, declares that should there be an error in construing municipal powers it is better to err in re- stricting than in extending theto. Parker v. Baker, 1 Clarke Ch. (N. Y.), 223, holding that nothing can be taken by intendment unless it obviously results from the grant as a necessary legal inference. Doubt as to existence of power is resolved against the city. Logan v.' Pyne, 43 Iowa, 524, 22 Am. Rep., 261; State v. Webber, 107 N. C, 962; 22 Am. St. Rep., 920; St. Paul v. Laidler, 2 Minn., 190, 72 Am. Dec, 89. Strict construction adopted. State V. Smith, 67 Conn., 541; 52 Am. St. Rep., 301 ; Heeney v. Sprague, 11 R. I., 456. Reasonable construction. Coch- rane V. Frostburg, 81 Md., 54; 48 Am. St. Rep., 479; Ex parte Garza, 28 Tex. App., 381 ; 10 Am. St. Rep., 845; Ex parte •Gregory, 20 Tex. App., 210; 54 Am. Rep., 516. §49] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 77 struction of the powers to the strict word and letter, but whatever is necessary and proper to carry into execution the granted powers, or the powers recognized as belonging to the municipal corporation, has always been conceded by the strict constructionists.'^^ The construction should not be so strict and literal as to defeat the whole machinery of municipal regu- lation. "The strictness then to be observed in giving con- struction to municipal charters should be such as to carry into effect every power clearly intended to be conferred on the municipality, and e^very power necessarily implied in order to a complete exercise of the powers granted. "^^ In speaking for the Supreme Court of Michigan, Cooley, J., observed: "There is a principle of law that municipal powers are to be strictly interpreted; and it is a just and wise rule. Municipalities are to take nothing from the general sover- eignty except what is expressly granted. But when a power is conferred which in its exercise concerns only the munici- pality, and can wrong or injure no one, there is not the slight- est reason for any strict or literal interpretation with a view of narrowing its construction. If the parties concerned have adopted a particular . construction not manifestly erroneous, and which wrongs no one, and the state is in no manner con- cerned, the construction ought to stand. That is good sense, and it is the application of correct principles in municipal affairs.""* While a corporation can do no act for which authority is 02 East Tenn. University v. follow, if they were not held strict- Knoxville, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.), 166, ly within the powers granted and 171. the means prescribed for the exe- 63 Smith V. Madison, 7 Ind., 86, cution of these powers." Kyle v. 87. Malin, 8 Ind., 34, 37. "Within the limits prescribed by "All power is subject to abuse, the charter or statute applicable A demonstration of the evil conse- municipal corporations are to be quences to flow from the abuse of favored by the courts. Powers a particular power does not demon- expressly granted, or necessarily strate the non-existence of that Implied, are not to be defeated or power." Slack v. Maysville & L. R. impaired by a stringent construe- R. Co., 13 B. Mon. (Ky.), 1, 15. tion. * * Possessing, as these ei per Cooley, J., in Port Huron municipal corporations do, the v. McCall, 46 Mich., 565, 574; Greg- power of assessment and sale of ory v. New York, 40 N. Y., 273, con- private property, often wielded by cerning liberal construction of the indiscreet or the selfish, the powers of board of health, grossest abuses would inevitably 78 Ot^ THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§ 50 not expressly given, or may not be reasonably inferred, "if we were to say," to employ the language of the Supreme Court of Connecticut, "that they can do nothing for which a warrant could not be found in the language of their charters, we should deny them in some eases the power of self-preservation, as well as many of the means which are necessary to effect the essential object of incorporation; and therefore it has long been an established principle in the law of corporations that they may exercise all the powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation, which are reasonably- proper to give effect to powers expressly granted. In doing this they must have a choice of means adapted to ends and are not to be con- fined to any one mode of operation. ' '®^ § 50. Effect of specific enumeration of powers. When the state delegates to municipal corporations the powers of local self-government, it also delegates the power to pass all needful rules and regulations in the form of ordinances for this pur- pose.^® Charters generally contain specific enumerations of the subjects upon which the municipal corporation may legis- late. This enumeration is usually followed by a general delegation of authority to pass all ordinances which may be necessary for the promotion of the police and sanitary affairs of the city, its good order, advancement of commerce and general welfare of the locality, which shall be consistent with the constitution and general laws of the state and the local charter. This latter grant is generally, though not always, considered to give authority to enact ordinances upon all other subjects within the scope of municipal jurisdiction which are not mentioned in the specific enumeration. Of- course, the passage of such ordinances must be reasonably necessary for the purpose of enabling the corporation to fulfil the objects of its creation. In other words, the detailed enumeration is not construed as denying the inherent power of the municipal corporation to make all proper or necessary ordinances re- , specting matters not specified, unless the intention to do so is clear. The limitation is that all such ordinances must be confined strictly to corporate or municipal purposes,®^ and be «5 Bridgeport v. Housatonue R. oe See Sec. 53 et seq. R. Co., 15 Conn., 475, 501; State ex ot Without special authorization, rel. V. Walbridge, 119 Mo., 383, 394; municipal ordinances cannot relate 24 S. W. Rep., 475, contains similar to state affairs. State v. Hayes, exprsssions. 61 N*. H., 264, 314. §51] Of the Power to enact ordinances. 79 in harmony with the charter, constitution, general laws and public policy of the state.^® § 51. Construction of power "to regulate." Ordinarily the power "to regulate" will not be construed to include the power to prohibit.®'' "A power simply to regulate does not embrace a power to prohibit or destroy a trade or occupn- tion."'^*' Therefore, ordinances to be valid cannot interfere with lawful employment. The cases respecting nuisances full\' The doctrine that municipal powers should he confined to cor- porate affairs, and the distinction between such and state matters is considered elsewhere. § 55 post. Ch. XV. 88 Compare the following cases with respect to particular facts. State V. Ferguson, 33 N. H., 424, 430; Monroe v. Lawrence, 44 Kas., 607; State v. Webber, 107 N. C, 962; 12 S. E. Rep., 598; Collins v. Hatch, 18 Ohio, 523; 51 Am. Dec, 465; State v. Freeman, 38 N. H., 426; Ireland v. Globe Milling, etc., Co., 19 R. I. 180; 32 Atl. Rep., 921; Clark V. South Bend, 85 Ind., 276; 44 Am. Rep., 13 ; Indianapolis v. Gas Co., 66 Ind., 396; McPherson v. Chebanse, 114 111., 46; 28 N. B. Rep., 454; Cairo v. Bross, 101 111., 475; Dubois V. Augusta, Dudley (Ga.), Rep., 30; Williams v. Augusta, 4 Ga., 509, 514; Milwaukee v. Gross, 21 Wis., 243. Power to enact is sometimes strictly construed. State v. Ham- mond, 40 Minn., 43; St. Paul v. Briggs, 85 Minn., 290; 88 N. W. Rep., 984; Huesing v. Rock Island, 128 111., 465, 476; 15 Am. St. Rep., 129. The power is confined to the things and objects specified in the charter. New Orleans v. Philippi, 9 La. Ann., 44; State v. Paterson, etc., R. R. Co., 45 N. J. L., 310; State V. Zeigler, 32 N. J. L., '262; Brooklyn v. Furey, 9 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.), 193; 30 N. Y. Supp., 349; State V. La Crosse, 107 Wis., 654; Child V. Hudson Bay Co., 2 P. Wm., 207. See Sec. 53, post. Ordinances may be enacted on subjects not enumerated. Nash- ville V. Linck, 12 Lea (80 Tenn.), 499. Necessary powers not excluded by enumeration. Spaulding v. Lowell, 23 Pick. (Mass.), 71. Maxim expressio unius est ex- cliisio alterius is sometimes ap- plied. Keokuk v. Scroggs, 39 Iowa, 447; State v. Fay, 44 N. J. L., 474; Telephone Co. v. Oshkosh, 62 Wis., 32. Trades not enumerated excluded. New Hampton v. Conroy, 56 Iowa, 498; Oskaloosa v. TuUis, 25 Iowa, 440; Palaquemines v. Roth, 29 La. Ann., 261; Winants v. Ba- yonne, 44 N. J. L., 114. Manner of enforcement. Grand Rapids V. Hughes, 15 Mich., 54. Ejusdem generis applied. Thom- as V. Hot Springs, 34 Ark., 553; Tuck V. Waldron, 31 Ark., 462; Snyder v. North Lawrence, 8 Kan., 82; St. Paul V. Traeger, 25 Minn., 248 ; St. Louis v. Laughlin, 49 Mo., 559. See § 52, supra, and notes. OS As power to regulate driving horned cattle through street. Mc- Conville v. Jersey City, 39 N. J. L., 38. TO State V. Mott, 61 Md., 297, 309; Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md., 217. 80 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§ 5S illustrate this principle. Thus an ordinance was condemned which made it unlawful to work, or use for the burning of oyster shells or stone lime, any kiln within the city. The court held that the mere burning of lime was not unlawful, since it was not a nuisance per se, irrespective of location, and hence, an ordinance could not so declare unless it be a nuisance in fact according to the common law or statutory definition.^! However, the judicial decisions respecting the power of mu- nicipalities to abate nuisances under the general powers are not uniform. Thus an ordinance forbidding the establishment of additional cemeteries or burial grounds within the limits of, the city was sustained in South Carolina. Here it was held that it was not necessary to the existence of the power to pass that there be a present occasion for its existence, the court holding that it is sufficient if there is a future emergency which may demand it, and such question was solely for the municipal authorities.''^ The construction of the poAver to regulate is treated in the chapters on License and Police Regu- lations.'^ § 52. Construction of charter. The existence and scope of the municipal powers are a matter of construction if claimed by virtue of legislative grant or charter authority, and the object will be to ascertain the legislative or charter intent; but if claimed as necessarily belonging to the corporation be- cause designed to conduct the local civil government and regulate the internal affairs of the place, the investigation will go bej'ond the terms of the charter or legislative grant and include a consideration of common law powers, or those inci- dental to such corporate existence, wliich have been enforced and recognized by the law, apart from express charter or legislative grant.'' In ascertaining the powers of the city, the words in the charter are to be given their ordinary mean- ing and effect and no rule of an official can aft'ect their inter- pretation.'^ The city cannot extend its powers by unauthor- '1 State V. Mott, 61 Md., 297. 73 Chapters XIII and XIV. 72 Charleston v. Wentworth Street 74 inherent or incidental munici- Baptist Church, 4 Strob. Law (S. pal powers are treated in the Sec- C), 306. tions which follow. Erection of private hospital for- 75 Ritterskamp v. Stifel, 59 Mo. bidden. Milne v. Davidson, 5 App., 510. Martin, La. (N. S.), 409; 16 Am. Dec, 189. §53] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 81 ized definitions of words in its charterJ" It is a cardinal rule of construction that words must be interpreted in the sense in which they are ordinarily used and understood, unless some other interpretation is clearly indicated by the charter J '^ All provisions of the charter bearing on the same subject should be construed together^* Certain rules or maxims of interpretation are invoked, but only for the purpose of ascertaining the true intent and mean- ing of the particular provision. ' ' In arriving at this intention, the whole and every part of the instrument or enactment must be taken and compared together. The real intention, when once accurately and indubitably ascertained, will prevail over the literal sense of the terms. When the words used are explicit, they are to govern, of course. If not, then recourse 76 Brookfield v. Kitchen, 163 Mo., 546; 63 S. W. Rep., 825; Kansas City V. Lorber, 64 Mo. App., 604. As to admissions of unconstitu- tional provisions of charter, see State ex rel. v. Smith, 150 Mo., 75 ; 51 S. W. Rep., 713. ^^ State ex rel. v. Rusk, 55 Wis., 465, 476; 13 N. W. Rep., 452; Wildner v. Ferguson, 42 Minn., 112; 43 N. W. Rep., 794; 18 Am. St. Rep., 495. 78 Kirkham T. Russell, 76 Va., 956, 967; Verdin v. St. Louis, 131 Mo., 26; 33 S. W. Rep., 480; 36 S. W. Rep., 52; Young v. Kansas City, 27 Mo. App., 101, 113; Hol- land V. Baltimore, 11 Md., 186. "A statute, it has been said, is to be so construed, if possible, as to give sense and meaning to every part, and the maxim was never more applicable than when applied to the interpretation of a statute." Brown's Legal Maxims (4th Ed.), pp. 419-420, approvingly quoted in Chicago Dock Co. v. Garrity, 115 111., 155, 165 ; 4 N. B. Rep., 448. "In adjusting these general pro- visions of the charter we are not called upon to construe them by any rigid technical rules, but must be governed by consideration of reason and justice." Ruschenberg V. Southern Electric R. Co., 161 Mo., 70; 61 S. W. Rep., 626. It is a well recognized rule of law that the meaning of a word is or may be known by the accom- panying words. There Is also a further kindred rule that where several particulars are named, fol- lowed by a more generic term, it is considered that the more generic term intends only other things ejusdem generis, or of the like kind. St. Louis v. Laughlin, 49 Mo., 559 ; Commonwealth v. De- jardin, 126 Mass., 46; Harlow v. Tufts, 4 Cush. (Mass.), 448. Compare In re Swigert, 119 111., 83; Shirk v. People, 121 111., 61 Webber v. Chicago, 148 111., 313 Foster v. Blount, 18 Ala., 687 Bishop, Contracts, § 409 ; Endlich, Interp. Stat., § 405. A city authorized by its charter to levy and collect a license tax on several kinds of business trades and avocations enumerated, includ- ing "manufacturing and other cor- porations or institutions," is not empowered to levy such tax on natural persons in the raanufactur- S2 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§53 is had to the context, the occasion and necessity of the pro- vision, the mischief felt, and the remedy in view. ' '''"■' In ascertaining the meaning of the particular provision, not only should the instrument be considered as a v^hole, but it is also sometimes important to look into the provisions of the prior charters, if any, bearing on the subject, 'the policy of local laws respecting corporations, and the legislative history of the state. It is elementary law that an invalid part of a charter or statute does not invalidate the whole act.**> Implied Powers. § 53. Implied powers to enact ordinances. If neither ex- press nor implied power exists in the municipal corporation to deal with the subject matter, a by-law or ordinance relating thereto is clearly ultra vires the corporation.*^ The right of a corporation to make by-laws for the regulation of its affairs appears to be as old as the Twelve Tables of the Roman Civil liHwA^ It has always been the law that municipal as well as private corporations possess the incidental or implied power to enact such by-laws in harmony with charter provisions and the generar rules of law as will better enable them to. carry out the purposes of their creation.®* It has been said that the mere creation of a corporation carries with it power to make by-laws which are reasonable and not contrary to general law.®* The restrictions on the power of the corporation to ing business, the court holding Hurlbut, 24 Mich., 44; Brooks v. that neither the rule ejusdem gen- Fisher, 79 Cal., 173 ; 29 Am. & Eng. eriSy nor noscitur a sociis were Corp. Cas., 9; 21 Pac. Rep., 652. applicable ; that the words "other si Liability for arrest and im- corporations or institutions" did prisonment under void ordinances. not comprehend any class of cor- McGraw v. Marion, 98 Ky., 673; 34 porations that do not fall within S. W. Rep., 18; 47 L. R. A., 593. the previous designation of "man- 82 Taylor on Corporation, sec. 7. ufacturing corporations;" and a In England the power to pass license tax could only be levied by-laws exists by usage and cus- "on corporate entities engaged in torn. Lambertville v. Thornton, 1 manufacturing." Joplin v. Leckie, Ld. Raym., 91. 78 Mo. App., 8. See § 50, supra. ss Coal Float v. Jefferson, 112 79 Per Wright, C. J., in District Ind., 15; 13 N. E. Rep., 115; Cham- Township V. Dubuque, 7 Iowa, 262, berlain v. Evansville, 77 Ind., 542. 275. S4 Mobile -v. Yuille, 3 Ala., 137, 80 Moreland V. Millen, 126 Mich., 143; 36 Am. Dec, 441. 381; 85 N. W. Rep., 882; People v. Compare Commonwealth v. Stod- §54J OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 83 pass by-laws is limited, of course, to the powers conferred by its charter, and to certain implied and incidental powers in- dicated in subsequent sections.*^ § 54. General doctrine as to implied or incidental powers. The familiar maxim that the grant of power takes within all the jiecessary incidents to make that grant effectual, applies to municipal corporations with respect to the powers and authority exercised by them.^'' It thus follows that the city may do many things, by ordinance and otherwise, not in der, 2 Cush. (Mass.), 562, 575; Napman v. People, 19 Mich., 352; Barling v. West, 29 Wis., 307; Tay- lor V. Pine Bluff, 34 Ark., 603. 85 In Child V. Hudson Bay Co., 2 P. Wm., 207, it is declared that a corporation has an implied power to make by-laws; "but when the charter gives the corporation pow- er to make by-laws, they can only make them in such cases as they are enabled to do by the charter, for such power given by the char- ter implies a negative that they shall not make by-laws in other cases." Judicial expressions exist to the effect that the power to pass ordi- nances is limited to the cases and objects specified in the charter. Iowa — Knoxville v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 83 Iowa, 636; 32 Am. St. Rep., 321. Louisiana — New Orleans v. Phil- ippi, 9 La. Ann., 44. Maryland — Baltimore v. Porter, 18 Md., 284; 79 Am. Dec, 686. Minnesota — State v. Hammond, 40 Minn., 43. Missouri — Trenton v. Clayton, 50 Mo. App., 535. jVeftrasfca— Littlefleld v. State, 42 Neb., 223; 47 Am. St. Rep., 697. New Jersev—StaXe v. Zeigler, 32 N. J. L., 262. New York — Brooklyn v. Furey, 9 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.), 193; 30 N. Y. Supp., 349; Thompson v. Scher- merhorn, 6 N. Y., 92; 9 Barb. (N. Y.), 152. Oregon — Corvallis v. Carlile, 10 Oregon, 139; 45 Am. Rep., 134. Pennsylvania — Southwark v. Neil, 3 Yeates (Pa.), 54. South Carolina — Sumter v. Des- champs, 4 S. C, 297. Texas — Wright v. Victoria, 4 Tex., 375. May pass ordinance on subjects not enumerated, Nashville v. Linck, 80 Tenn. (12 Lea.) 499. Grant to pass ordinances is in addition to incidental power to make by-laws. Cross v. Morris- town, 33 N. J. L. 57. See Sec. 50, supra. 86 Ex parte Marmaduke, 91 Mo. 228, 262; 4 S. W. Rep., 91; State ex rel. v. M., K. & T. R. R. Co., 164 Mo., 208; 64 S. W. Rep., 1801; Hill V. St. Louis, 159 Mo., 159; 60 S. W. Rep., 116; St. Charles v. Eisner, 155 Mo., 671; 56 S. W. Rep., 291; State ex rel. v. Wal- bridge, 119 Mo., 383, 394; 24 S. W. Rep., 457 ; Grover v. Huckins, 26 Mich., 476; Dullam v. Willson, 53 Mich., 392; 19 N. W. Rep., 112; Page V. Weeks, 13 Mass., 199. When power is expressly grant- ed, all necessary power to carry out the specific grant is implied. McFarlain v. Jennings, 106 La., 541; 31 So. Rep., 62. 84 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§54' terms expressly authorized by its charter or the general stat- utes of the state applicable. There are many implied powers which attach themselves to municipal corporations, inherent powers, which belong to them because they are municipal cor- porations, just as certain powers are inherent in courts and other public agencies because of the very nature and attri- butes of their organization.*'' But no powers can be implied except such as are essential to the objects and purposes of the corporation as created and established.** In other words, the power must relate to some corporate purpose, some purpose which is germane to the general scope of the object for which the corporation was created, or such as has a legitimate con^ neetion with that object and a manifest relation thereto.*" "Implications of authority in bodies corporate, more espe- cially those created for municipal purposes, should be clear and undoubted, and the party claiming through them should be able to point them out with certainty and precision. The fact that he cannot, is conclusive that they do not exist. Mere general arguments drawn from the convenience of possessing a power under certain circumstances in case of an emergency — conclusions that, if possessed, it might be beneficially exer- cised, are very dangerous sources of corporate authority. * * * Implications spring from the necessities of some power actually conferred, and not from notions of what would be convenient or expedient under particular circumstances."^" Therefore, where a municipal corporation undertakes that which does not necessarily appertain to the municipality, it must have express power to do so. This is a well established rule.si Generally, implied powers include all such as are necessary to carry out the objects of the corporation. This is 87 Per Sherwood, J. in Aurora 577; Marion v. Chandler, 6 Ala., Water Co. v. Aurora, 129 Mo., 540, 899. 576; 31 S. W. Rep., 946. oo per Dixon, C. J. in Butler v. May exercise powers Incidental Milwaukee, 15 Wis., 493, 497. dis- and essential. Mayo v. Dover and tinguishing Miller v. Milwaukee, F. Village Fire Co., 96 Me., 539; ^* '^'^- ^*^- 53 Atl Rep 62 Implied power to prescribe fire limits and prevent the erection of 88 Ottawa V. Carey, 108 U. S., of wooden buildings therein. Bum- 110, 120. gartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind., 575; '■^Weightman v. Clark, 103i U. 50 Am. Rep., 830. S., 256; People v. Dupuyt, 71 111., si Williamsport v. Common- 651; Harris v. Livingston, 28 Ala., wealth, 90 Pa. St., 498. §55] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 85 a cardinal rule, applicable to all corporations. "That there may be a difference in even the implied powers of municipal corporations is possible. An implied power springs from necessity. That which may be necessary for a large city, may not be necessary for a small city, or borough. That which is not necessary cannot be implied. "^^ § 55. Implied powers confined to municipal affairs. Mu- nicipal powers are to be construed with reference to the object contemplated by the state in the grant of the charter, and the extent of the power it confers is to be measured and limited by the purposes for which the corporation was created. Bear- ing in mind that the municipal corporation is created primarily to regulate and administer the local and internal affairs of the place incorporated, in contradistinction to those matters which are common to and concern the people of the state at large, it may be stated as a general proposition that, unless expressly authorized, the niunicipal corporation may only exercise such powers as pertain to the local and internal affairs of the municipality. Every power usually granted to munici- pal corpoi"ations points to an object local and domestic, purely miuiicipal in character and such as is necessary to enable it to fulfil its municipal existence. ^^ Within this sphere much latitude may be allowed corporate authorities if in the exer- cise of the power no injury or harm is done. Where a general and indefinite power is added to those given in express words, such power is to be confined in its exercise to the ordinary objects and purposes of municipal corporations, and is not to be construed to comprehend a matter which is given to the state and affects its people at large. The courts have experi- enced much difficulty in ascertaining the precise limits. The point may be illustrated by a Virginia case. The municipal 82 Williamsport v. Common- os Skyes v. Columbus, 55 Miss., wealth, 90 Pa. St., 498. 115, 138, 139. A municipal corporation "is not Cannot regulate practice in limited to the exercise of the pow- state courts where the city is an ers specifically granted, but pos- ordinary litigant, by substituting sesses, in addition, all such pow- the state code of procedure for one ers as are either necessarily in- of its own. Badgley v. St. Louis, cident to those specified, or essen- 149 Mo., 122; 50 S. W. Rep., 817; tial to the purposes and objects of Noble v. Kansas City, 95 Mo., App. its corporate existence." LeCou- 167. teulx V. Buffalo, 33 N. Y., 333, 336. 86 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§ 5() charter authorized the city "to do all such things as it may deem proper for the prosperity, quiet and good order of the city." The court, considering that this grant of power was intended to be confined to ordinary purposes of municipal corporations, held that the power did not authorize the city to offer rewards for the detection, apprehension or conviction of offenders against the criminal laws of the state, since this was a state matter.^* The power of municipal corporations to exercise control over subjects embraced in state statutes by legislation or otherwise is considered elsewhere."^ § 56. Implied powers respecting offices and officers. It has been held that a municipal corporation cannot, without express authority, create an office and select an incumbent and clothe him with the power of a municipal officer,^ as the office of pound keeper." But officers may be created to at- tend to municipal functions, although not specifically men- tioned in the charter.^ This power may be implied. Thus, where the city is given charge of streets, the office of street commissioner may be created.* So, under the power to pre- serve the health, a board of health may be created by ordi- nance.^ So, a charter providing that it shall be the duty of the city clerk, "in person or by deputy," to attend all meetings of the council, gives implied power to create the office of dep- uty clerk.8 But the power to grant, hold, lease, and dispose of property has been held not to authorize the creation of the office 'of fund commissioner as a department of the city goA^- ernment.''' So it has been held that express power is neces- 94 Winchester v. Redmond, 93 = Boehm v. Baltimore, 61 Md., Va., 711; 25 S. E. Rep., 1001; 57 259. Am. St. Rep., 822; 44 Central Law Authority to establish is some- Journal, 57. times authorized by law. Quinn 95 Chapter XV. v. Cumberland County, 162 Pa. St., iHoboken v. Harrison, 30 N. J. ^^' ^^ ^^^- ^^P- ^^^■ L rjg s Lowrey v. Lexington, 24 Ky., '' ' L. Rep., 516; 68 S. W. Rep., 1109. Right to create, under reorgani- zation and adoption of new char- 3 Collopy V. Cloherty, 95 Ky., ter in particular case. Lowrey v. 330; 25 S. W. Rep., 497. ' Lexington, 24 Ky., L. Rep., 516; ■* State ex rel v. May, 106 Mo., 68 S. W. Rep., 1109. 488; 17 S. W. Rep., 660. r Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal., 524. 2 White V. Tallman, 26 N. J. L 67. § 57] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 87 sary to authorize the creation of new bureaus in city depart- ments.® A general provision that the aldermen shall have power to fix the compensation of ' all officers ' ' of the corpora- tion, does not confer implied or incidental power upon the board of aldermen to provide by ordinance salaries for theru- selves.8 At common law it is an established principle in England that a municipal corporation may, by virtue of its inherent or incidental power, pass a by-law imposing a penalty upon such as refuse, without legal cause, an office to which they have been duly- elected. i" Judge Dillon intimates that, even in this country, under the usual general welfare clause, or un- der their incidental powers, municipal corporations may, by ordinance, impose a reasonable fine because of a similar re- fusal.^i A municipal corporation has a right to the services of any of its members, and may enforce such service by suit- able ordinance. 1- It was a common law incident of all cor- porations to remove a corporate officer from office for rea- sonable and just cause.^^ § 57. Implied power to acquire and hold property. At common law a municipal corporation, unless restrained by its charter or some statute applicable, possesses power to pur- chase and hold all such real estate as may be necessary to the proper exercise of any power specifically conferred, or es- sential to those purposes of municipal government for which it was created.!* One of the common law powers incident to corporations was to purchase and hold lands, chattels, etc.^^ Thus, the express charter power "to establish and regulate markets," carries with it the power to purchase market grounds on credit, whereon to erect and establish a market, 8 People V. New York Fire Willcock, Mun. Corp., 71; Angell Comrs., 23 Hun. (N. Y.), 317. & Ames on Corp., 352. estate (Gregory) v. Jersey is State ea; re? v. Walbridge, 119 City, 34 N. J. L., 429. Mo., 383; 24 S. W. Rep.. 457; St. 10 Willcock, Mun. Corp., 305, 588. ^""'^ ^- Schoenbusch, 95 Mo., 618; 8 S. W. Rep., 791. 11 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.) ^, ^e Couteulx v. Buffalo, 33 N. sec. 223, approved in Aurora Wa- ^ ^^^ ggg. ^^^^ ^ ^^.^^^^^ ter Co. v. Aurora, 129 Mo., 540, 576; 31 S. W. Rep., 946. Woolw. 340; 20 Fed. Cas. No. 12,- 038. 12 state (Gregory) v. Jersey lo Angell and Ames on Corp. 64, City, 34 N. J. L., 429, 431, citing 65; 2 Kent's Com. 277, 278. 88 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§58 where the general law does not forbid.^^ So the power to erect a court house gives the implied power to purchase the necessary land on which to erect the building where no suit- able site is possessed by the corporation.!'' Likewise the power to erect a court house and jail necessarily embraces the power to purchase lands on which to erect them.^* In an early case, the Supreme Court of California remarked that, the purchase of "any property" in connection with a given object includes the power to purchase property both real and personal neces- sary to the object.19 But the mere power to enter into a con- tract to supply the city with water and machinery and connect pipes for supplying the water does not authorize the purchase of a site upon which to erect waterworks.^" § 58. Same— Property beyond corporate limits. Un- less expressly authorized, the established rule is that, munici- pal corporations cannot acquire, hold and control real prop- erty beyond their corporate limits. ^^ Therefore the general power "to purchase, hold and convey an estate, real or per- sonal, for the public use of said corporation," does not au- thorize a municipal corporation to hold lands beyond its 16 Ketchum v. Buffalo, 21 Barb. (N. Y.), 294, affirmed in 14 N. Y., 356, where it was pertinently said: "Without the power to pro- cure a suitable place the first step could not be taken towards the es- tablishment or foundation of a market. The power to establish, therefore, must of necessity in- clude that of procuring the requi- site site." Power to build market house gives power to hire building for market purposes. Wade v. New- bern, 77 N. C, 460. Grant of charter powers relative to markets necessarily carries with it the right to purchase land on which to establish. People v. Lowber, 28 Barb. (N. Y.), 65. Wharf purposes. In re Buffalo, 68 N. Y., 167. Denied as to ac- quiring hospital site. Von Schmidt v. Widber, 105 Cal., 151; 38 Pac. Rep., 682. Power to establish and maintain a school, confers implied power to acquire school property. Le Cou- teulx V. Buffalo, 33 N. Y., 333. If city has no power to incum- ber its own property by mortgage it cannot purchase mortgaged property. Fidelity Trust & G. Co. V. Fowler Water Co., 113 Fed. Rep., 560. 17 Sheidley v. Lynch, 95 Mc, 487; 8 S. W. Rep., 434; 24 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 520. IS DeWitt V. San Francisco, 2 Cal., 289. 19 DeWitt V. San Francisco, 2 Cal., 289. 2» People ex rel v. McClintock, 45 Cal., 11. 21 Unless expressly authorized villages in Michigan cannot con- demn lands outside of their limits. Houghton V. Huron Copper M. Co., 57 Mich., 547, 554; 24 N. W. Rep., 830, 58] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. boundaries to be used as a highway, and a conveyancp of suet land for this purpose will be held void.22 This power is usual ly conferred by charter or statute.^^ Cooley, J., declares that the right to take possession, hold, improve and control and ex- tend its police authority over lands outside the corporate lim- its, as, for example, a public park, "is, beyond doubt, a fran- chise. It must come by sovereign grant and not otherwise. ' '2- The capacity of a municipal corporation to take a conveyance of land cannot, after the transfer has reached completion, be called in question ia a collateral way, but this may be con- tested only by the state.^^ 22 Riley V. Rochester, 9 N. Y., 64, 69, 71, approving Denton v. Jackson, 2 Jolins., Ch. (N. Y.), 320, 336; North Hempstead v. Hempstead, 2 Wend. (N. Y.), 109, 136, holding that a town's power "is confined to its own limits and without some special provision it cannot, as of course, possess any control or rights over lands lying within another town." 23 As power to hold land for a small-pox hospital. Richmond v. Henrico County, 83 Va., 204; 2 S. B. Rep., 26; 18 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 520. Judge Dillon expresses the opin- ion that there are purposes for which such a corporation may, without special grant, purchase {ind hold extra — territorial lands, as for a pest house, cemetery and the like objects of a municipal character. 2 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.), 565 and note. "Under a general grant of power to buy and hold real property, it is understood municipal corpora- tions may even buy and hold real estate beyond the corporate lim- its, for the location of cemeteries, pest houses and other purposes connected with the sanitary con- dition of the municipality." Champaign v. Harmon, 98 HI., 491, 494, 495. 24 Per Cooley, J. in Mayor of De- troit v. Park Commissioners, 44 Mich., 602, 605 ; 7 N. W. Rep., 180. Compare Lester v. Jackson, 69 Miss., 887; 11 So. Rep., 114. "Lands held by the city beyond her limits would he held by her as by an in- dividual proprietor, and her pow- ers over them would only be com- mensurate with those enjoyed by private owners. But, by authoriz- ing her to hold lands beyond her limits for objects, intimately con- nected with the purpose of the corporation and highly necessary for her prosperity and welfare, it was intended that, over such places she should exercise such police powers as would be required in order td make them answer the purposes for which they were de- signed." Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo., 543, 574, 575. Right to hold land beyond city limits for wharf purposes af- firmed, under particular charter. Hafner v. St. Louis, 161 Mo., 34; 61 S. W. Rep., 632. Land beyond limits for reser- voir. Newman v. Ashe, 9 Baxt. (68 Tenn.), 380. 25 Champaign v. Harmon, 98 111., 491, 496; Hafner v. St. Louis, 161 Mo., 34, 42; 61 S. W. Rep., 632; Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. 90 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§59 § 59. Implied power to dispose of property. In the ab- sence of legal restrictions, the general proposition has often been asserted that a municipal corporation possesses the power to dispose of any property which it has a right to acquire. ^^ "Independent of positive law, all corporations have the abso- lute jus disijonendi of lands and chattels, neither limited as to objects, nor circumscribed as to quantity. "^^ "A corporation is an artificial person, and by the terms of its creation it pos- sesses the same capacity to purchase or to sell that an individ- ual has who possesses the capacity to contract. This doctrine lias been long settled, and repeatedly recognized, from a very early period to the present time.^^ Indeed, so necessarily inci- dental is this power that it has been holden^" that a corpora- tion cannot be created possessing the power of holding, with- out the power of disposing; and that a clause in the charter, restricting the alienation of their property, without consent of the chancellor, is void. The statutes, restraining ecclesiasti- Smith, 117 Mo., 261, 289; 22 S. W. Rep., 623; Ragan v. McElroy, 98 Mo., 349; 11 S. W. Rep., 735; Thornton v. The National Ex- change Bank, 71 Mo., 221; Shewal- ter V. Pirner, 55 Mo., 218; Land V. Coffman, 50 Mo., 243; Cham- bers V. St. Louis, 29 Mo., 543, 576, 577; Vidal v. Girard's Execu. 2 How. (43 U. S.), 127; 11 L. Ed., 205. Question of abuse of corporate powers cannot be contested in suit of private citizen whose interests may be affected. Holvelman v. K. C. Horse R. R., 79 Mo., 632. State alone can object to a want of capacity in a corporation to hold lands which it was not authorized by its charter to purchase or take by devise. California — Natoma W. & M. Co. v. Clarkin, 14 Cal., 544. Illinois — Hough v. Cook County Land Co., 73 111., 23 ; Alexander v. ToUetson Club, 110 111., 65; Barnes V. Suddard, 117 111., 237; 7 N. E. Rep., 477. Indiana — Baker v. Neff, 73 Ind., 68; Hayward v. Davidson, 41 Ind., 212; Henry County v. Slatter, 52 Ind., 171. Missouri — Atlantic & P. R. R. v. St. Louis, 66 Mo., 228, 251. Oregon — Raley v. Umatilla Coun- ty, 15 Oregon, 172; 13 Pac. Rep., 890. Pennsylvania — Goundie v. North- ampton Water Co., 7 Pa. St., 233. Tennessee — Barrow v. Nashville & C. T. Co., 9 Humph. (Tenn.), 304. United, States — Smith v. Shee- ley, 12 Wall. (U. S.), 358; Na- tional Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S., 621, 628; Myers v. Croft, 13 Wall. (U. S.), 291. =8 Newark v. Elliott, 5 Ohio St., 113; Southport v. Stanley, 125 N. C, 464; 34 S. E. Rep., 641; Weeks V. Galveston, 21 Tex. Civ. App., 102; 51. S. W. Rep., 544. 27 Davies, J., in Wyatt v. Ben- ' son, 4 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 182, 187. 28 Co. Lit, 44, 300, 306; Sid., 162; Com. Dig. title "franchise." 1 Ves. & Bearne, 226. 2» 10 Rep. 1. § 59J OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 91 cal and eleemosynary corporations, are all the limitations im- posed by the laws of England, upon power to sell. ' '^^ All property of the municipal corporation of a private nature may be sold.^^ But the chief point of view from which this authority is regarded is the public interest. While it is a rec- ognized rule of the common law that, municipal corporations may, in so far as they possess private rights, dispose of their property without special authority from the state, this limita- tion exists : That property possessed and used by them as pub- lic agencies of the state for the purpose of governmental ad- ministration they cannot alienate without special authoriza- tion. All property held by the city in fee simple, without lim- itation or restriction as to its alienation, may be disposed of by the city at any time before it is dedicated to a public use.''- In other words, the city has the right to sell or dispose of prop- erty, real or personal, to which it has the absolute title and which is not affected by a public trust, in substantially the same manner as an individual unless restrained b\^ statute or charter; and this power is an incidental power inherent in all corporations, public or private.*^ Thus, land held by the city in full use and ownership— e. g., commons acquired by con- firmation under Act of Congress— may be sold when no longer needed for public use.^"' So land bought for a public purpose, if not actually so used, cannot be said to be affected by a public trust, and hence may be sold.^^ 30 Reynolds Heirs v. Stark Coun- cient origin in the English com- ty Comrs., 5 Ohio, 204, 205, 206, mon law and was declared dur- per Lane, J. ing the reign of Charles II. Smith May sell stock in water company v. Barrett and Clifford, 1 Siderfln, subscribed by it. The discretionary 161, 162. power of a municipal corporation 33 Semmes v. Columbus, 19 Ga., to sell or dispose of property will 471; see Board v. Reynolds, 44 not be interfered with by the Ind., 509; Shannon v. O'Boyle, 51 courts. Terre Haute v. Terre Ind., 565 ; Bowlin v. Furman, 28 Haute Waterworks Co., 94 Ind., 305. Mo., 427. 31 Ft. Wayne, L. S. & M. S. Ry., si Cummings v. St. Louis, 90 132 Ind., 558; 32 Am. St. Rep., Mo., 259, 264, 265; 2 S. W. Rep., 277; 18 L. R.' A., 367; 32 N. E. 130. Rep., 215. ^^ Kings County Ins. Co. v. Ste- 32 Ft. Wayne v. L. S. & M. S. Ry. vens, 101 N. Y., 411; 5 N. E. Rep., Co., 132 Ind., 558; 32 Am. St., 353; Konrad v. Rogers, 70 Wis., Rep., 277; 18 L. R. A., 367; 32 N. 492; 36 N. W. Rep., 261; Beach v. E. Rep., 215, 558. Haynes, 12 Vt., 15; Warren Coun- This rule is recognized as of an- ly v. Patterson, 56 111., 111. 92 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§60 § 60. Same— Property held for particular purposes. But the city cannot alienate property of a public nature in viola- tion of the trust upon which it is held, e. g., property dedicat- ed for public use as a common,^^ or property conveyed to be used as an ornamental park only.^^ In neither case does the city acquire an absolute title. In this sense all property is public which has been dedicated to public use, or which may be affected by a public trust, either general or special. Mu- nicipal corporations hold all property in which the public is interested, such as streets, alleys, public squares, commons, parks and wharves, in trust for the use of the public, and on principle, such trust property can no more be disposed of by the municipality than can any other trust property held by an individual.^* Thus, a city empowered to erect and regulate pub- 30 Where the conveyance is of such a character as to dedicate the property acquired to a specified purpose, the city takes it in trust for the public and cannot dispose of it in violation of such trust. Cummings v. St. Louis, 90 Mo., 259; 2 S. W. Rep., 130; Price v. Thompson, 48 Mo., 361; see Ruth- erford v. Taylor, 38 Mo., 316. Land purchased for a public common by the city may be sold. Beach v. Haynes, 12 Vt, 15. But this cannot be done after the pub- lic common has been actually ded- icated to public use. State v. Woodward, 23 Vt., 92, 99. In the case of Bowlin v. Purman, 28 Mo., 427, it was held that the city of Carondelet had the power to sell lands which were granted to it by the state for the benefit of its schools, and this, whether the pro- ceeds went for the benefit of its schools or not. See Woodson v. Skinner, 22 Mo., 13; Swartz v. Page, 13 Mo., 603; Castleton v. Langdon, 19 Vt., 210; San Fran- cisco V. Beideman, 17 Cal., 443; Ellis V. Comrs. of San Francisco, 38 Cal., 629; French v. Quincy, 3 Allen (Mass.), 9; Boiling v. Mayor, 8 Leigh. (Va.), 224; LesBois v. Bramell, 4 How. (U. S.), 449. 37 Rowzee V. Pierce, 75 Miss., 846; 65 Am. St. Rep., 625; 23 So. Rep., 307. 38 California — San Francisco v. Itsell, 80 Cal., 57; 22 Pac. Rep., 74; Hoadley v. San Francisco, 50 Cal., 265; Sawyer v. San Fran- cisco, 50 Cal., 370 ; Hoadley v. San Francisco, 70 Cal., 320; 12 Pac. Rep., 125, affirmed, 124 U. S., 639. Iowa — Ransom v. Boal, 29 Iowa, 68. Kentucky — Augusta v. Perkins, 3 B. Mon. (Ky.), 437; Alves' Exec- utors V. Henderson, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.), 131. Missouri — St. Louis v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 114 Mo., 13; 21 S. W. Rep., 202; Matthews v. Alexandria, 68 Mo., 115; Belcher Sugar Refining Co. V. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co., 101 Mo., 192; 13 S. W. Rep., 822; Glasgow V. St. Louis, 87 Mo., 678. New York — Still v. Lansing- burgh, 16 Barb. (N. Y.), 107; Brooklyn Park Comrs. v. Arm- strong, 45 N. Y., 234. I 60] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 93 lie wharves and fix the rate of wharfage thereat, cannot lease the wharf, farm out its revenue and delegate a person to fix the rates.^^ So, where a city condemned private property for use as a wharf it cannot, by ordinance or otherwise, lease it uncon- Vermont — State v. Woodward, 23 Vt., 92. Wisconsin — Lord v. Oconto, 47 Wis., 386; 2 N. W. Rep., 785. Streets, alleys, public grounds, squares, etc.: Warren v. Lyons City, 22 Iowa, 351 ; Augusta v. Perkins, 3 B. Mon- roe (42 Ky.), 437; Giltner v. Car- ollton, 7 B. Monroe (46 Ky.), 680; Cooper -v. Alden, Har. (Mich.), 72; People v. Albany, 4 Hun. (N. Y.)", 675; Commonwealth v. Young Men's Christain Association, 169 Pa. St., 24, 32; Atl. Rep., 121; Crocker v. Collins, 37 S. C, 327; 34 Am. St. Rep., 752; 15 S. B. Rep., 951. Cannot abdicate con- trol over streets. Chicago, etc., R. R. V. Quincy, 135 111., 563; 27 N. E. Rep., 192; 29 Am. St. Rep., 334. City holds public streets. In which it only has a mere easement (the fee being in abutters to the center) in trust for the public, and therefore cannqj; transfer streets or easement therein. Stat- ute authorizing a city "to sell and dispose" of streets, if deemed ex- pedient, applies only to streets in which the city owns the fee. The fee of the street is in abutters to the center thereof. This cannot be taken from abutters without com- pensation, as constitution forbids. State V. Taylor, 107 Tenn., 455, 464; 64 S. W. Rep., 766. Cannot dispose of books in- tended for benefit of officers. Litch- field V. Parker, 64 N. H., 443; 14 Atl. Rep., 725. "It may be seriously questioned, whether, after land has been ap- propriated to public uses it can be transferred unconditionally to an- other for a private use. The au thorities are against such right. C, S. F. & C. Ry. Co. v. McGrew^ 104 Mo., 288, 299; 15 S. W. Rep. 931, citing Mills' Eminent Domain sec. 57; Belcher Sugar Refining Co. V. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co., 101 Mo., 192; 13 S. W. Rep., 822; Strong v. Brooklyn, 68 N. Y., 1. No part of property dedicated by legislative act as a public landing can be leased by city to a private individual. Reighard v. Flinn, 189 Pa. St., 355; 42 Atl. Rep., 23. "The trusts devolving upon the states for the public, and which can only be discharged by the management and control of the property in which the public has an interest, cannot'be relinquished by a transfer of the property. * * * The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are in- terested ■* * * so as to leave the property entirely under the use and control of private parties * * * than it can abdicate its police powers in the administra- tion of government and the pres- ervation of the peace." Per Mr. Justice Field in 111. Cent. R. R. v. Illinois, 146 U. S., 387, 453. 39 Matthews v. Alexandria, 68 Mo., 115. See St. Louis v. St. Louis Gas Light Co., 5 Mo. App., 484. "A trust created for any public purpose cannot be assignable at the will of the trustee." Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th Ed.), 249. 94 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINAJSTCES. [§00 ditionally for a term of years to be used in the prosecution of private business and for private gain.*** All property purchased by the city or in which it has other- wise acquired the fee simple title, where the corporation is act- ing in its quasi private capacity, may be regarded as the abso- lute property of the city. All such property which has been conveyed to the city or dedicated to it or condemned by it for designated public purposes is held by the city for such pur- poses and no other. It is a well established principle that when private property is condemned or conveyed conditionally for one public use, it cannot be appropriated to another or different use. The restraint is that property held by the city for one public use cannot be disposed of in violation of the use for which it is held.^i 40 Belcher Sugar Refining Co. v. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co., 82 Mo., 121; Belcher Sugar Refining Co. V. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co., 101 Mo., 192; 13 S. W. Rep., 822. ■11 Belcher Sugar Refining Co. v. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co., 82 Mo., 121; 101 Mo., 192; 13 S. W. Rep., 822; Cummings v. St. Louis, 90 Mo., 259; 2 S. W. Rep., 130. "The fee of land taken for rail- road tracks without consent of the owner thereof shall remain in such owner, subject to the use for which it is taken." Missouri Const. 1875, Art. II., Sec. 21. The authorities of a city cannot lawfully appropriate to other uses land which has been dedicated by the donor as a street, nor can they divert it to uses foreign to those for which it was dedicated, and it has been questioned whether it is within the power of the legisla- ture to authorize such a diversion or disposal of it. Warren v. Ly- ons, 22 Iowa, 351, 356, 357; Glas- gow V. St. LO'Uis, 87 Mo., 678. Leg- islature may grant power to alien- ate lands acquired by condemna- tion and held in fee for park pur- poses. Driscoll V. New Haven (Conn. 1902) ; 52 Atl. Rep., 618. Legislature may authorize sale of land held for park purposes. Brooklyn Park Comrs. v. Arm- strong, 45 N. Y., 234; 6 Am. Rep., 70; Clark v. Providence, 16 R. I., 337; 15 Atl. Rep., 763; 1 L.'R. A., 725; Mowry v. Providence, 16 R. I., 422; 16 Atl. Rep., 511. I'OWEK TO DISPOSE OF PROPERTY HELD FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSES. Engine company cannot sell property given to it by the in- habitants. Perry v. Stowe, 111 Mass., 60. Land leased by city to religious corporation may be sold under a law forbidding sales of property held for public purpose, as this was not a public purpose. Arken- burgh V. Wood, 23 Barb. (N. Y.), 360. Town hall may be sold. Shaver V. Salisbury Commissioners, 68 N. C, 291. Waterworks property acquired by the city at its own expense to furnish water to its inhabitants and extinguish fires cannot be dis- posed of without legislative au- thority, as such property is held ■§6l] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 95 § 61. Implied power to transfer, donate or dedicate prop- erty for particular uses. Unless restricted by law, a munici- pal corporation may transfer, donate or dedicate property for particular public uses, especially if such purposes are calcu- lated to advance the governmental and municipal interests of the locality.^- as a public trust. Huron Water- works Co. V. Huron, 7 S. D., 9; 58»rAm. St. Rep., 817; 30 L. R. A., 848; 62 N. W. Rep., 975; 8 S. D., 169; 65 N. W. Rep., 816; Lake Co. Water & Light Co. v. Walsh (Ind., 1902) ; 65 N. E. Rep., 530. Land purchased by a city be- yond its limits for a reservoir, although never used for such pur- pose, may be sold. Newman v. Ashe, 9 Baxt. (68 Tenn.), 380. The power to sell any lands be- longing to the municipality does not authorize a dedication of cer- tain lalnds to the free and common use of its inhabitants, so as to prevent future sales by the proper authorities. Wright v. Victoria, 4 Tex., 375. Sales of property must be made on the conditions under which it is held. Compton v. Waco Bridge Co., 62 Tex., 715. Surplus or refuse soil remaining after grading street may be sold by city. Griswold v. Bay City, 35 Mich., 452. Public property cannot be dis- posed of for purposes different from the objects of its original appropriation. Savannah v. Steamboat Co., R. M. Charlt. (Ga.), ■342. Where law forbids, valid sale cannot be made. Heydenfelt v. Hitchcock, 15 Cal., 514; Pimental V. San Francisco, 21 Cal., 351. Discretionary power of sale vested in governing board. San Diego V. San Diego & L. A. R. Co., 44 Cal., 106; Coopers v. San Jose, 55 Cal., 599. Where a locus puiUous ceased, in whole or in part, to be appli- cable to its original destination, the state may direct its application to another public object. Munic- ipality No. 2 V. Orleans Cotton Press, 18 La., 122; 36 Am. Dec, 624. Right of city to purchase gas plant and works upon conditions specified in contract may be com- promised by city with gas com- pany and all the city's rights thereunder disposed of. Such dis- position is not ultra vires of the municipal charter. St. Louis v. St. Louis Gas Light Co., 70 Mo., 69, reversing 5 Mo. App., 484. City may sell public property and apply it to a different use from that originally contemplated. Memphis v. Wright, 6 Yerg. (14 Tenn.), 497; 27 Am. Dec. 489. ■i- Irrevocable dedication of property for the use of a public wharf. Illinois & St. L. R. & Ca- nal Co. V. St. Louis, 2 Dillon, C. C, 70; 12 Fed. Cas. No. 7,007. Reservation of land for school purposes held valid. Board of Ed- ucation v. Fowler, 19 Cal., 11; Cincinnati v. McMicken, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep.. 188. Conveyance of property to incor- porated university within city lim- its held valid and irrevocable. Lou- isville V. Louisville University, 15 B. Mon. (54 Ky.), 642. City may dedicate its own lands 96 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. L§63 S 62. Implied power to mortgage or pledge property. Without special charter power, as a rule, a municipal corpora- tion has no authority to mortgage or pledge municipal prop- erty. It is said that this power is not essential to the declared objects of the corporation.*^ Under a charter conferring power to hold real and personal property and convey the same in any manner whatever, and to make all contracts essential for the public welfare, a city was permitted to mortgage its waterworks.** But authority to construct a bridge gives no power to execute a deed of trust of the bridge to trustees, which empowers them to collect tolls, and pledges the bridge and the tolls for the payment of the debt incurred in its con- struction.*^ to use as streets, and may bind itself by covenant with its grant- ees of abutting lands that lands so dedicated shall be forever Itept as a public street. Story v. New York Elevated R. Co., 90 N. Y., 122; 43 Am. Rep., 146, reversing 3 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.), 478. Under general power to dispose of corporate property a city can- not, without special legislative au- thority, donate land and buildings to the county in which the city is situate, in order to induce a relo- cation of the county seat in such city. Brockman v. Creston, 79 Iowa, 587 ; 44 N. W., 822. Conveyance of municipal prop- erty for private uses, as for factory purposes, held illegal. Kent v. Dithridge & Smith Cut Glass, 10 Ohio, Cir. Ct. Rep., 629; 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. Dec, 107. When land may be granted to a railroad company for the bed of its road. Allegheny v. Ohio & P. Ry. Co., 26 Pa. St., 355. Power to sell and alienate all public lots or parcels of land with- in the city limits, held not to au- thorize a dedication of certain tim- ber lands to the common use of its citizens. Wright v. Victoria, 4 Tex., 375. Where the power is discretion- ary with the council, it may grant lands to railroad company in con- sideration of the company's aban- doning certain grade crossings by putting in viaducts and subways. Spitzer v. Runyan, 113 Iowa, 619; 85 N. W. Rep., 782. 43 Scott's Executors v. Shreve- port, 20 Fed. Rep., 714; Branham V. San Jose, 24 Cal., 585. 4* Adam v. Rome, 59 Ga., 765. Held property might be mort- gaged without assent of a major- ity of the legal voters required by the charter in sales of property. Middle Savings Bank v. Dubuque, 15 Iowa, 394. 45 Mullarky v. Cedar Falls, 19 Iowa, 21. In purchase of property, right to give mortgage and vendor's lien on the property in favor of the vendor recognized, under particu- lar charter. Edey v. Shreveport, 26 La. Ann., 636. Mortgaging property for the use and benefit of the city, held valid under particular city charter. Ad- ams V. Memphis & L. R. Ry. Co., 2 Coldw. (42 Tenn.), 645. §6-ij OF THE {"OWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 9"/ § 63. Implied powers as to police and sanitary regula- tions. The preservation of the public health is a legitimate corporate purpose, and to this end a municipal corporation may establish and maintain a supply of wholesome water from within or without the city; also public parks, hospitals and pest houses.*" So it has been held that a city may enact and enforce police ordinances without special authorization as a result of the fact of its being incorporated.*^ Ordinances re- lating to municipal police regulations are fully treated in a subsequent chapter.** § 64. Implied power to supply water. Where a city has power by its charter to provide for ^ supply of water it has been held that in this express grant there is implied the power to furnish the supply by contract.*® So the general grant, "the mayor and board of aldermen shall have power by ordi- nance to prevent and extinguish fires," and "to pass ordi- nances in maintaining the peace and good government, health and welfare of the city," etc., confers the implied power to contract with a water company to supply the city and its in- habitants with water, thus rendering the city liable on such contract for fire hydrant rents.^'' Charter power to purchase *6 East Tennesse University v. guish fires, without the power to Knoxville, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 166, procure water for this purpose, 173. the express grant would be Inef- Hospitals and pest houses. Kae ficacious ; that unless the power to V. Flint, 51 Mich., 526; 16 N. W. procure water be implied in the Rep., 887; McPherson v. Nichols, express grant, the latter must re- 48 Kan., 430; 29 Pac. Rep., 679; main vain and nugatory; that Vionet v. First Municipality, 4 La. whatsoever the law necessarily Ann., 42. implies in a statute is as much a Without express legislative au- part or parcel thereof as if ex- thority a municipal corporation pressly stated therein. Therefore, cannot legalize a common nui- the power to extinguish fires fair- sance. State v. Luce, 9 Houst. ly and necessarily implies the (Del.), 396; 32 Atl. Rep., 1076. power to effectuate the intent in- *7 Sayre Borough v. Phillips, 148 volved in the grant by the execu- Pa., 482; 24 Atl. Rep., 76; 33 Am. tion of its incidents. "Science, so St. Rep., 842. far as we know, has not yet sug- *8 Chapter XIV. gested any means of extinguishing 19 Waterworks Co. v. Atlantic great fires without the application City, 39 N. J. Eq., 367. of water. * * * A fire engine 50 The decision is put upon the without water would be quite a use- ground that, as the city was given less machine in the hands of a city the power to prevent and extin- government. Water is quite as in- 98 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§65 and construct waterworks is no authority to rent hydrants and tax the people therefor; but authority "to provide the city with water * * * for the extinguishment of fires and the convenience of the inhabitants generally," leaving the man- ner of such provision to the corporate authorities, is such power. As the water cannot be provided without expense, the power to incur the expense is implied, and as means to meet the expense can only come from taxation, the power to levy the tax is implied.®^ In Georgia the doctrine is broadly stated that a municipal corporation, having the usual powers express- ly granted by charter or legislative act, has the power to make all such contracts in its corporate capacity as the local author- ities may deem necessary for the welfare of the city which are not in conflict with the constitution and laws of the state or of the United States. In this case the city entered into a contract for the construction of a system of waterworks, and it was held that the grant of power was broad enough to cover the contraet.^^ § 65. Implied power to purchase engines, etc., to pre- vent and suppress fires. The rule of law is established that the grant of express power to suppress fires carries with it the right to purchase fire engines and other apparatus to accom- plish this purpose.s^ It has often been held that a municipal dispensable in extinguishing fires with it the power to procure wa- as a fire engine. When there is a ter. Salena v. Neosho, 127 Mo., system of waterworks having 627, 641; 30 S. W. Rep., 190. proper pressure, fire engines can 5i Lexington v. Lafayette Co. Bk., he dispensed with, but in no case 165 Mo., 671, 679; 65 S. W. Rep., can tTie grant of power be made 943. eificacious without a supply of wa- 52 Rome v. Cabot, 28 Ga., 50. ter. It is apparent that the rea- ss Charter authority to pass or- sons why the grant of power to dinances to suppress fires, appoint suppress fires should carry with it fire wardens, engineers, etc., and to the power to procure water to ex- levy a tax to support the fire de- tingulsh fires are much more co- partment imports a power to pur- gent than those which sustain the chase engines and apparatus, power to purchase the fire en- Green v. Cape May, 41 N. J. L., 45. gines." Webb City, etc., Water- If the expenditure be in fur- works Co. V. Webb City, 78 Mo. therance of some duty enjoined by App., 422, 427, 428. To same ef- a statute, a contract made in ref- feet, Bridgeford v. Tuscumbia, 16 erence thereto will be valid and Fed., 910 ; Carleton v. Washington, binding upon the town. Allen v. 38 Kan., 726; 17 Pac. Rep., 656. Taunton, 19 Pick. (Mass.), 485. Power to extinguish fires carries §65] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 99 corporation possesses inherent power to purchase fire en- gines for the protection of the property of its citizens from fire ; that this power does not of necessity depend on the ques- tion whether the charter has or has not expressly granted such power.^* Towns in their corporate capacity that own valuable property which is exposed to injury and destruction by fire may, in that capacity, take precautionary measures against such injury and destruction, either by the purchase of en- gines, hose, hooks and ladders, or by the appropriation of money in aid of engine and hook and ladder companies in their respective towns. ^' siBlufEton V. Studabaker, 106 Ind., 129; 6 N. E. Rep., 1; 13 Am. & Bng. Corp. Gas. 529, quoted with approval in Webb City, etc., Water- works Co. V. Webb City, 78 Mo. App., 422, 427. "It was long ago declared that the power to prevent danger from fire is an incidental one, belong- ing to all municipal corporations." Clark V. South Bend, 85 Ind., 276 ; 44 Am. Rep., 13. "The rule has always been that a municipal corporation has the inherent power to- enact ordinances for the protection of the property of its citizens against fire. * * * The exercise of such power is not the exercise of a new power, nor of one not connected with the pur- pose for which public corpora- tions are organized; on the con- trary, it is the exercise of a power long possessed by municipal cor- porations and closely connected with the purposes for which such corporations are organized." Baumgartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind., 575; 50 Am. Rep., 830; 8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 353. 55 Van Sicklen v. Burlington, 27 Vt., 70. Town may appropriate money for the repair of fire engines used for the purpose of extinguishing fires therein whether they belong to the town or were purchased by private subscription. Allen v. Taunton, 19 Pick. (Mass.), 485. In Torrey v. Millbury, 21 Pick. (Mass.), 64, a town voted to raise and appropriate a sum to purchase a fire engine, provided an equal amount was raised by individual subscription for the same pur- pose. It did not appear that the town had any corporate property to be benefited by that appropria- tion, but its legality was sus- tained upon a general duty rest- ing upon municipal corporations of that character, to provide what- ever shall be deemed "an object of common convenience and neces- sity." Approved by Isham, J., in Van Sicklen v. Burlington, 27 Vt., 70, 78. May purchase fire apparatus. Hunneman v. Fire District, 37 Vt., 40. Under statute which allows money to be raised by a village for "extraordinary expenditures," by submission of the proposition to a vote of the people of the village, money with which to purchase a fire engine, etc., may be so raised. Witheril v. Mosher, 9 Hun. (N. Y.), 412. General clause in charter, after enumerating certain things the city is empowered to do, recited, 100 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§66 § 66. Implied power as to lighting. It is generally held that a municipal corporation has the implied power to supply its inhabitants with light in streets and public places.^® The Supreme Court of Indiana has considerably extended the doc^ trine of implied power. The question at issue was whether the city had the right to establish an electric lighting plant, not only for the lighting of the streets and public places of the city, but also for the distribution of the electric light among its inhabitants for gain. There it was held that since, among the implied powers of a municipal corporation, is the power to enact and enforce reasonable by-laws or ordinances for the preservation of health, life and property, this general police power gave the power to light the streets and public places independently of any specific charter or statutory power to that effect, in any manner agreed upon by the local authorities. Having determined that such plant could be established for municipal purposes, the court said: "We can see no good rea- son why it may not also at the same time furnish it (electric "and to do every matter and thing which they may deem necessary for the good order and welfare of the city." In holding that the city has power to purchase appli- ances for extinguishing fires, the Court remarked: "Good govern- ment and good order and the wel- fare of the city imply much more than mere preservation of social order. Sanitary regulations and appliances for extinguishing fires, to an extent reasonably commen- surate with the city's wants, to be judged by the corporate authori- ties, are certainly within the pur- view of good city government. We do not wish to be understood as affirming that any specified grant of power is necessary to the per- formance of this very necessary po- lice function. We hold it is in-' herent in every city government, as one of its incidental powers, unless taken away by statute." Birmingham v. Rumsey & Co., 63 Ala., 352, 356. Where the charter empowers the city to organize a fire department and regulate the same and to adopt such other measures as should "conduce to the interest and welfare of the city," the city is thereby authorized to purchase a fire engine and to issue its ne- gotiable bonds therefor. Desmond V. Jefferson, 19 Fed. Rep., 483; Burrton v. Harvey County Sav- ings Bank, 28 Kan., 390; Carleton Co. V. Washington, 38 Kan., 726; 17 Pac. Rep., 656. esHeilbron v. Cuthbert, 96 Ga., 312; 23 S. B. Rep., 206; Hectuem- bourg v. Dunkirk, 49 Hun. (N. Y.), 550; 2 N. Y. Suppl., 447; Mauldin V. Greenville, 33 S. C, 1; 11 S. B. Rep., 434; Ellin wood v. Reeds- burg, 91 Wis., 131 ; 64 N. W. Rep., 885. Power includes power to pur- chase and construct plant, etc. Hay V. Springfield, 64 111. App., 671. |t)7j OF THE POWER XO BNAcT ORDINANCES. lOl light) to the inhabitants to light their residences and places of business. To do so is, in our opinion, a legitimate exercise of the police power for the preservation of property and health. "S'^ Clearly, such broadening of implied powers con- travenes the general rule, sometimes invoked, that the enumei'- ation of specific powers prevents a body to which such specific powers are granted from exercising other similar powers. If a city may exercise such powers because it is a municipal cor- poration, or because of the general grant to it of police powers, it is not easy to comprehend what powers of a municipal na- ture are not incidental or inherent. A contrary rule was an- nounced in Massachusetts, where it was held that power to erect and maintain works for the manufacture and distribution of electric lights for lighting the public streets and places and to furnish light to the inhabitants could not be implied as an incident to the power expressly granted to erect and maintain street lamps— at least where it has become the custom of tin; legislature to specifically define from time to time the purpose for which municipal corporations may raise money.^* Charter power "to construct, maintain and operate gas works and to pass all ordinances necessary to regulate the same," has been held to be, in effect, a general grant of power to have the city lighted with gas, and therefore conferred implied authority to contract with others to furnish gas and to grant to a corpora- tion the exclusive right to use the streets for that purpose for a term of years.^" § 67. Same— Implied power to regulate price of light. In Indiana it has been held that, the power to provide reason- able regulations for the supply and distribution of natural gas does not confer power to regulate the price thereof;^** in Missouri that, under a particular charter of a gas company, 57 Crawfordsville v. Braden, 130 5s Spaulding v. Peabody, 153 Ind., 149; 28 N. E. Rep., 849; 30 Mass., 129; 26 N. B. Rep., 421; 33 Am. St. Rep., 214. It may be noted Am. & Eng. Corp. Gas., 638; 10 L. that there existed a general statute R. A., 397. See Sees. 50, 53, supra. in Indiana giving cities power to '■s Newport v. Newport Light Co., light their streets, etc.; power to 84 Ky., 166, 175, 177. contract with individuals or cor- oo Lewisville Natural Gas Co. v. porations for this purpose and the State, 135 Ind., 49; 34 N. E. Rep., power to grant franchise, to sup- 702 ; 21 L. R. A., 734, overruling ply inhabitants with electric light, Rushville v. Rushville Natural Gas hut the decision does not rest upon Co._. 132 Ind., 575; 28 N. E. Rep., this statute. 853; 15 L. R. A,, 321. 10;; OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§(;8 granted by the legislature, neither the state nor the city had power to regulate the price of gas ;''i and in Washington that the power to regulate and control the use of light does not include the power to regulate the price of light furnished by private companies under franchise/'^ But a legislative act conferring upon a city the power to regulate the price of gas, was held, in an early Ohio ease, to give power to make reason- able regulations respecting the price thereof where the power to alter or repeal the gas companies' charter was expressly reserved.®* S 68. Appropriations as donations forbidden. Unless ex- pressly authorized by charter or statute, a municipal corpora- tion cannot appropriate or give away the public money as pure donations to any person, corporation or private insti- tution, not under the control of the city and having no con- nection with it."^ Thus, appropriations for national guards in 61 state ex rel. v. Laclede Gas- light Co., 102 Mo., 472; 14 S. W. Rep., 974; 15 S. W. Rep., 383; 22 Am. St. Rep. 789. 02 Tacoma Gas and Electric Light Co. v. Tacoma, 14 Wash., 288; 44 Pac. Rep., 655. 83 State V. Cincinnati Gas Light and Coke Co., 18 Ohio St., 262. 04 Petersburg v. Mappln, 14 111., 193; 56 Am. Dec, 501; Campbell V. Tp. of Elma, 13 Up. Can. Com. Pleas, 296; Jones v. Port Arthur, 16 Ontario Rep., 474; Jarvis v. Fleming, 27 Ontario Rep., 309; Re Schachan and County of Pronte- nac, 41 Up. Can. Q. B., 175. "They (council) have no power to squander or give away the funds or property of the incorporation, but all property within their con- trol, belonging to the corporation, must be honestly applied to the uses and purposes specified in the act of incorporation. The city council have no power to sell, or in any manner dispose of the property of the corporation with- out consideration." Per Craig, J., in Agnew v. Brail, 124 111., 312; 16 N. E. Rep., 230; 20 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 134. A municipal corporation cannot vote to pay a sum of money to one damaged while in the em- ploy of the corporation on account of his needy circumstances, though it may vote a sum in settlement of such claim, based on a legal lia- bility. Matthews v. Westborough, 134 Mass., 555, 562; 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 239. Compare McGin- ness V. New York, 26 Hun. (N. Y.), 142. In speaking for the Supreme Court of Missouri, construing the charter of the City of St. Louis, Wagner, J., in Hitchcock v. St. Louis, 49 Mc, 484, 488, observed that the members of the municipal assembly "in the discharge of their duties, do not act for themselves, but for the public. They are trus- tees clothed with a trust, not for the corporation as such, but the citizens and the public who have confided the authority to them. The charter is the power of at- torney which defines and limits the objects and powers with which §69J OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 103 the absence of express power are unauthorized.''^ So a vote of money for the purchase of uniforms for an artillery is void, without charter or statute authority .^^ § 69. Appropriations for celebrations, entertainments, etc., void. Without express authority, a municipal corpora- tion may not appropriate the public revenue for celebrations, entertainments, etc. Such power cannot be implied.'^'^ In Massachusetts it was early held that a town cannot appropri- ate money for a Fourth of July celebration. The court declined to support the authority on the ground of uniform practice and usage."* A like ruling was made in Connecticut."'-* Mu- nicipal appropriations for other celebrations have, for like rea- son, been declared illegal, as, for example, the anniversary of the surrender of Cornwallis.^" So municipal expenditures for entertainments of official visitors ;^^ or to provide a ball and banquet have been declared illegal.'^- By statute, towns in Mas- sachusetts are authorized to appropriate money "for the pur- pose of celebrating any centennial anniversary of its incor- poration."''* So in that state cities may appropriate limited sums for armories, for the celebration of holidays, "and for they are intrusted. The diversion of the money of the taxpayers for any purpose other than that which is expressed in the charter is a perversion of the trust and an ex- cess of authority. That there is no express power in the charter con- ferring authority to malie dona- tions, gifts or gratuities, is too clear to require argument." 65 Knapp V. Kansas City, 48 Mo. App., 485. 68 Claflin V. Hopkinton, 4 Gray (Mass.), 502. 67 Hodges V. Buffalo, 2 Denio (N. Y.), 110; Com. V. Gingrich, 21 Pa. Super. Ct., 286, distinguishing Com. V. Pittsburg, 183 Pa. St., 202; 38 Atl. Rep., 628; Cumberland Co. v. Poor Directors, 7 Pa. Super. Ct., 614; McKean County v. Young, 11 Pa. Super. Ct., 481. 08 Hood v. Lynn, 1 Allen (Mass.), 103; Gerry v. Stoneham, 1 Allen (Mass.), 319. no New London v. Brainard, 22 Conn., 552. TO Tash V. Adams, 10 Cush. (Mass.), 252. Ti Law V. People, 87 111., 385, but see contra, Tatham v. Philadelphia, 11 Phil. (Pa.), 276; 2 Weekly N. C. (Pa.), 564. 72 Austin V. Coggeshall, 12 R. I., 329; 34 Am. Rep., 648, where the charter recites: "Nothing in this charter shall be construed * » * as giving the power to vote money for any ordinary object except for the regular, ordinary and usual ex- penses of the city." Greenough v. Wakefield, 127 Mass., 275; Hale v. People, 87 111., 72; Cornell v. Guilford, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 510. 73 In such case the town may date its incorporation from the time of its incorporation as a dis- trict. Hill v. Bast Hampton Select- men, 140 Mass., 381; 4 N. B. Rep.. 811 ; 13 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.. 644. 104 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§70 other public purposes." Under such statute a city may fur- nish money for public concerts by a band.'^^ § 70. Bounties to soldiers. In the absence of legislative authority, a municipal corporation has no power to appro- priate money for gratuities, or to raise money by taxation, to give additional wages to the militia, or to men drafted for the military or naval service of the United States or for other purposes of defense, even in time of war and danger of hostile invasion."^ But that the legislature may confer upon cities, towns, villages and other public corporations, power to raise money by taxation to pay bounties to those who, in time of war, shall enlist in the military or naval service of the United States— in order to induce them to enlist— and also for the repayment of money which had been advanced by such public corporations, or by individuals by contribution to a public fund, for the purpose of procuring enlistment, has been set- tled by repeated decisions. The essential element of the doctrine is that the sums were authorized to be raised and expended for public purposes, namely, filling of the army and navy for the support and defense of the government.''® So Ji Hubbard v. Taunton, 140 Mass., 467; 5 N. E. Rep., 157. The statute permits the appro- priation on a two-thirds vote of the council, but the mayor or other municipal officers have no power to contract, etc. Morrison v. Law- rence, 98 Mass., 219, 221. '5 Booth V. Woodbury, 32 Conn., 118; Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H., 9, 12, where it is said that "it forms no part of the ordinary duties of towns to encourage the enlistment of soldiers by bounty or otherwise." Fiske v. Hazard, 7 R. I., 438 ; Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass., 272 ; 7 Am. Dec, 145. In Maine a town has no legal authority to assess taxes or raise money to pay the commutation of one who had been drafted in pur- suance of the act of Congress of' March 3, 1863. Barbour v. Cam- den, 51 Me., 608; Opinion of the Justices, 52 Me., 595. 76 Booth V. Woodbury, 32 Conn., 118; Lowell v. Oliver, 8 Allen (Mass.), 247; Preeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen (Mass.), 570; State ex rel. V. Circleville, 20 Ohio St., 362 ; Shackford v. Newington, 46 N. H., 415; Hilbish v. Catherman, 64 Pa. St., 154; Speer v. School Directors, 50 Pa. St., 150; Russell v. Provi- dence, 7 R. I., 566; Brohead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis., 624; 88 Am. Dec, 711. "It was so held upon the ground that claims for public services, or expenditures founded in equity and justice, in gratitude or charity, will support a tax, which is voluntarily imposed upon a municipality by a majority of the citizens thereof, or by the consent of the municipality, evidenced in some other manner." State ex rel. v. Tappan, 29 Wis., 664, 672; 9 Am. Rep., 622. Legislature may confer power on counties to borrow money on credit 70] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 105 the legislature has the power to ratify and validate bonds issued by municipal corporations of the state, without author- ity, to raise bounties which they were authorized to pay.''^ But the legislature has no power to authorize the appropria- tion or raising of money for the purpose of refunding sums paid by individuals for substitutes, since this is a private and not a public objectJ® For in no event can the legislature create a public debt or levy a tax or authorize a municipal corporation to do so, in order to raise funds for a mere private purpose. The object for which money is raised by taxation must be public, and such as subserves the common interest and well being of the community required to contribute.'^* Therefore, a legislative act authorizing a certain town to pay bounties to soldiers who re-enlisted in a particular regiment in 1864, and were credited to the town, is unconstitutional, as the direct primary object is to benefit individuals and not the public; hence, the payments contemplated are mere gratuities or gifts to individuals.*** An act authorizing towns to raise money to encourage en- listment will not be construed to allow towns to raise money to pay bounties to volunteers who would thereafter enlist in the mili- tary or naval service of the govern- ment. Parker v. Saratoga County, 106 N. Y., 392; 22 Am. & Bug. Corp. Cas., 254; Clark County v. Lawrence, 63 111., 32. Legislature may authorize school districts to pay bounties, etc. Grim v. Weissenberg School District, 57 Pa. St., 433; 98 Am. Dec, 237; Tyson v. Halifax Tp. School Dis- trict, 51 Pa. St., 9. 77 Comer v. Folsom, 13 Minn., 219; Kunkle v. Franklin, 13 Minn., 127; 97 Am. Dec, 226; Sanborn v. Machias Port, 53 Me., 82. Cities and towns may be required by legislative act to make suitable provision for the support of fami- lies of soldiers who, having a resi- dence therein, have enlisted in the service of the United States, when- ever such families shall stand in need of assistance. Veazie v. China, 50 Me., 518; Milford v. Orono, 50 Me., 529. An act which enables towns to raise money to assist needy and destitute families and dependents of those mustered from the State into the military or naval service of the United States to a limited amount is valid. Fiske v. Hazard, 7 R. I., 438. 78 Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen (Mass.), 570. 79 Brohead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis., 624, 652; 88 Am. Dec, 711; Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 21 Pa. St., 147, 168. 80 Mead v. Acton, 139 Mass., 341; 1 N. E. Rep., 413; 8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 545. Taxation to pay bounties to vol- unteers is not for a municipal pur- pose; neither is taxation to pay the costs and expenses of unsuc- cessful suits brought to enforce the payment of any such bounty, 106 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§n to bo paid to persons who have already enlisted. A vote to pay a bounty to those who have enlisted, or shall enlist, will be held invalid as to those who had enlisted at its passage, and valid as to those who afterwards enlist, notwithstanding the two objects are embraced in the same vote.^^ § 71. Expenditures to obtain or oppose legislation. Some courts have held that, without express authority, a municip;i] corporation has no power to expend the public revenue to obtain or oppose legislation before the state legislature or the congress.^- On the other hand, such expenditures have beeu whether against the town or indi- viduals, and therefore the legis- lature has no power to compel a town to pay any such bounty or such costs and expenses. State ex rel. V. Tappan. 29 Wis., 664, 688; 9 Am. Rep., 622. SI Crowell V. Hopkinton, 45 N. H., 9; Shaclcford v. Newington, 46 N. H., 415. A legislative act which attempts to ratify the action of towns in voting money for the payment of the commutation fees of individ- uals drafted into the public ser- vice, is beyond the sphere of con- stitutional legislation. Thompson v. Pittston, 59 Me., 545; Piske v. Hazard, 7 R. I., 438. 82 Westbrook v. Deering, 63 Me., 231, where it was held that a town cannot incur expenses in opposing before a legislative committee a division of its territory. In Frankfort v. Winterport, 54 Me., 250, it was held that, where a statute, after enumerating spe- cific purposes for which the town revenue may be used, recites "and other necessary charges," such words do not authorize a town to raise and expend money to send lobbyists to the legislature. In Massachusetts, prior to the statute of 1889, it was held that a town could not lawfully expend money in advocating or opposing before the legislature the annexa- tion of a whole or a part of its territory to another town. Minot V. West Roxbury, 112 Mass., 1; 17 Am. Rep., 52; Coolidge v. Brook- line, 114 Mass., 592. A town has no authority to ap- propriate money for the payment of expenses incurred by individ- uals, prior to its corporate exist- ence as a town in procuring the passage of its charter. Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen (Mass.), 152. Town cannot pay out of its rev- enues money to persons employed to obtain the passage by the leg- islature of an act authorizing cer- tain towns to pay bounties to sol- diers who re-enlisted in a certain regiment in 1864, and were cred- ited to the town, since such act is unconstitutional. Mead v. Acton, 139 Mass., 341; 1 N. E. Rep., 413; 8 Am. & Eng. Rep. Cas., 545. In Kentucky it has been held that a municipal corporation has no power to appropriate corporate revenue to pay the expenses of persons sent to the National and state capitals, in order to procure such legislation as might be neces- sary to authorize the construction of a bridge over a river although such enterprise may prove of great advantage to the city. "The con- struction of a bridge across the Ohio River to connect the city of 73] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. lo; judicially sustained.^^ Some state statutes authorize sucli expenditures. Under the Massachusetts statute authorizing the employment of counsel by "any town interested in a petition to the legislature," to represent it at hearings thereon, a town may employ and pay counsel to oppose its division before a committee of the legislature.®* § 72. Exercise of powers by virtue of usage or custom. Usage has been applied to the manner in which corporate powers are to be exercised, as where an inspector is charged with the duty of weighing and ascertaining the weight of all grain, he may perform this duty by weighing but One bushel in every sixty.**' But ordinarily courts are slow to invoke usage in considering corporate powers under the charter. This is especially true where its language is clear and free from ambiguity; but where the language is indefinite, un- certain or ambiguous, sometimes the courts will, in determin- ing the mode in which the particular power may be exercised, invoke a well established ancient and universal custom.**" In Covington with the neighboring city of Cincinnati, in the State of Ohio, was not, under the charter as it existed a part of the duty of the city council of Covington, nor was the legislation sought by the council necessary to enable it to perform its corporate duties, or to accomplish the purposes for which the corporation was created. .True, such an enterprise might be of very great advantage to the city by inviting population, enhancing the value of real estate, and in many other ways." Henderson v. Covington, 14 Bush (Ky.), 312,' 314. 83 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire permitted one to re- cover from a town for services money expended as a member of a committee before the legislature to secure the holding of one term of court a year in the town. Bachel- der V. Epping, -28 N. H., 354. So in Connecticut it has been held that a town has power to employ and pay counsel to oppose before the general assembly of the state a proposition to divide its territory, where such proposition is not made by the state for mo- tives of policy, but made by cer- tain individuals seeking to pro- mote their own interests. In such case the vote of the town is not necessary to authorize the select- men to employ counsel, and incur expense to oppose such a proposi- tion before the general assembly. Farrel v. Derby, 58 Conn., 234; 20 Atl. Rep., 460; 34 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 391, and note p. 397, rejecting the conclusions and rea- sons in the Maine and Massa- chusetts cases, supra. Si Connolly v. Beverly, 151 Mass., 437; 24 N. E. Rep., 404. ssFrazier v. Warfield, 13 Md., 279, 303. 88 Sherwin v. Bugbee, 16 Vt., 439; Smith v. Cheshire, 13 Gray (Mass.), 318. 108 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§ 73 this country, prescription as respects the existence of munici- pal powers is of but little importance, therefore usage is but a small factor or element in ascertaining the meaning of charter provisions.^^ But in England, prescription is of much more consequence in interpreting charter powers. There the long continued exercise of corporate rights, which, in theory, presupposes legal grant upon which such rights are based, is said to establish such powers by prescription, although in fact such rights were never legally granted and never could have been so granted.^* Under no circumstances will an officer be permitted to re- cover additional compensation for expenses incurred by him in the absence of express provision of law, on the ground of usage. ^9 So a city cannot ratify the unwarranted allowance of the payment of unusual salaries or fees or expenses, or for work done, whether provided by contract or ordinance, viola- tive of charter provisions. Thus where the charter provides that no contract shall be binding unless made by some author- ized agent and within some appropriation for the purpose, the city is not liable for legal services beneficial to the city per- formed by counsel retained by a majority of the members of the board of aldermen (the city council consisted of two boards, namely, the board of mayor and aldermen and the com- mon council) without any official action of the city council or of either branch thereof, notwithstanding the usage of the city has been to pay such bills approved, by the committee of either boards without any formal vote.^" 87 Lawson, Usages & Customs, Clark v. LeCrew, 9 B. & C, 52; sec. 224. Rex v. Mashiter, 6 A. & E., 153. Farther as to usage, see Willard ss Camden v. Varney, 63 N. J. V. Newburyport, 12 Pick. (Mass.), L., 325; 43 Atl. Rep., 889; Demar- 227; Benolt v. Conway, 10 Allen est v. New Barbadoes, 40 N. J. L., (Mass.), 528. 604, 607. Usage cannot control in the pas- ao Butler v. Charlestown, 7 Gray sage of a resolution or the exer- (Mass.), 12. Here it was sought cise of legislative power in viola- to prove the existence of a usage tion of implied provisions of the in committees and oiRcers of the charter as to procedure. Wetmore city government to make like con- v. Story, 22 Barb. (N. Y.), 414,492, tracts. Thomas, J., observed (pp. 493. 16 and 17) : ssAtty. Gen. v. Poster, 10 Ves., 1. "The first suggestion to be 335; Clark v. Denton, B. & A., 92 Chad V. Tilsed, 5 J. B. Moore, 185 Rex V. Salway, 9 B. & C, 424 made on this point is, that in cities where the corporation acts only through officers whose powers are K3j OP THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 109 § 73. Same subject. Usage may sometimes be invoked in ascertaining' municipal duties or powers, but "an unlawful expenditure of money of a town cannot be rendered valid by usage, however long continued. Abuses of power and viola- tions of right derive no sanction from time or custom. A casual or occasional exercise of a power by one of a few towns will not constitute usage. It must not only be general, rea- sonable and of long continuance, but, what is more important, it must also be a custom necessary to the exercise of some corporate power, or the enjoyment of some corporate right, or which contributes essentially to the necessities and con- veniences of the inhabitants."^^ "Communis error facit jus is a recognized maxim of the law, limited and defined by law, the court would be slow to sanction any usage enlarging those powers. 2. The power of towns and cit- ies, that have grown up from usage, are powers of the munici- pality itself, having their origin in the public exigencies, and be- ing measured by them. 3. To establish even such a usage, it is not sufficient to show a usage in a single town, but a general usage among like towns and cities, and reasonable in itself. 4. The usage here attempted to be established is in violation of general law, and the charter and ordinances of the city. The doing of one wrong does not excuse an- other. 5. There is nothing in the usage attempted to be established, from which an implied contract to pay the plaintiff could be in- ferred." 91 Hood V. Lynn, 1 Allen (Mass.), 103, 106. Relating to power of towns as to voting money under a sweeping clause, "other necessary charges," Shaw, C. J., remarked: "We think it referred to other provisions of law, and well established usage to ascertain what the object of town charges are, and to provide that towns might raise money for any purpose thus determined. But to bring any particular subject within the description of necessary town charges, it must appear to be money necessary to the execu- tion of some corporate power, the enjoyment of some corporate right, or the performance of corporate duty, as established by law or long usage. For instance, towns are authorized and required to hold meetings; as incidental there- unto they may hire, purchase or build a townhouse. They may pros- ecute and defend suits; as inci- dent to which, they may appropri- ate money to retain counsel, to pay costs and to meet and satisfy judgments, which may be recov- ered against them." He also said: "It is not a casual or occasional exercise of a power by one of a few towns which will constitute such usage, but it must be a usage, reasonable in itself, general amongst all towns of like situa- tion, as to settlement and popula- tion, and of long continuance." Spaulding v. Lowell, 23 Pick. (Mass.), 71, 76, 79. 110 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§73 but it is seldom applied in the administration of justice, and never without the exercise of the utmost caution. "^^ Ordi- narily the maxim will not be applied in an erroneous inter- pretation of a statute, injurious to the public interests, or to private rights, which has sprung up within a recent period."^ Sometimes the acquiescence on the part of the municipality respecting a particular construction of its charter powers, if adopted by third persons in good faith under which vested rights are acquired, will establish a precedent or amount to a usage which will close the mouth of the municipality from denying that this construction was a proper one. Of course, this rule is limited to the irregular exercise of corporate power, and cannot be extended to an enlargement of munici- pal powers so as to include authority which the city did not legally possess.""' A usage of trade defining the meaning of a term or expression need not be ancient; it is sufficient on the part of the contracting parties, to use the expression in the sense thus defined. This rule was applied to an ordinance for street improvements, which called for "a pavement of granite blocks, eight inches deep;" and it was held that the expression could be construed in the light of a custom pre- vailing at the time of the adoption of the ordinance which defined the dimensions of the granite blocks used.^^ 92 Booraem v. N. H. C. R. R., placed upon it which appears from 44 N. J. Bq., 70, 78; 14 Atl. Rep., the fact that an amendment was 106. deemed necessary." St. Louis Brew- Local custom at variance with ing Association v. St. Louis, 140 a general statute cannot control Mo., 419, 427; 37 S. W. Rep., 525; the statute even in that locality. 41 S. W. Rep., 911. Noble v. Durell, 3 T. R., 271; God- Contemporaneous construction Charles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St., placed upon an ordinance hy the 431, 437; 6 Atl. Rep., 354. parties themselves, and on which 93 See dissenting opinion of they have acted, and upon which Thompson, J., in Cole v. Skrainka, large and important interests have 37 Mo. App., 427, 443, where the vested, would not he controlling if question under consideration is the language was clearly the other fully treated. way, yet in doubtful cases it is en- 9* Van Hastrup v. Madison City, titled to and should receive weight. 1 "Wall. (U. S.), 291; Forry v. State exrel. v. Severance, 49 Mo., Bidge, 56 Mo. App., 615; Endlich 401. on Statutes, sec. 360. 95 Cole v. Skrainka, 37 Mo. App., "If any doubts could exist as to 427; affirmed in 105 Mo., 303; 16 the proper construction of this or- S. W. Rep., 491. See Soutier v. dinance they are put at rest by the Kellerman, 18 Mo., 509. evident construction the city itself Usage may be invoked in the §74] OF THE POWER To ENACT ORDINANCES. Ill § 74. Miscellaneous illustrations of implied powers. As a result of its power to enter into contracts and of the duty, either legally existing or self-imposed, of providing local needs and conveniences, a municipal corporation may nego- tiate loans and thereby incur indebtedness.^ But the power to borrow money on the faith and credit of the city is usually conferred in express terms by the charter, and ordinarily there is a defined limit in the state constitution or in general statutes as to the amount of municipal indebtedness that may be created. It has been held that where the power to par- chase real estate is given in general terms, a corporation may purchase on credit and issue negotiable bonds.^ Where a city has express charter power "to establish" markets, it possesses by implication authority to purchase market grounds on credit.^ So a city having the general power to build markets is authorized to employ an architect to prepare plans and specifications for their construction.* Under the general wel- fare clause the city may enact a valid ordinance imposing a penalty on all those who ci-uelly beat any dumb animal.^ The construction of improvement ordi- nances. Kimball v. Brawner, 47 Mo., 398. Settled meaning of words used among engineers and contractors will be adopted. Levy v. Chicago, 113 111., 650. In Verdin v. St. Louis, 131 Mo., 26, 135; 33 S. W. Rep., 480; 36 S. W. Rep., 52, the court said "the petition alleges that the board had verbally announced it, that no bid for maintenance would be consid- ered or recommended by the board, which would exceed fifty cents per square. This, it would seem, was well understood by all contractors, and, at least, there is no allegation that all proposed contractors were not fully aware of the existence of the rule. If so, such a rule well known and well understood, would be equivalent to the filing of the specifications in the office of the city clerk and then referring to them in the city ordinance." In Wolff V. Campbell, 110 Mo., 114; 19 S. W. Rep., 622, it was held "a custom or usage may be re- ceived in evidence to explain the meaning of the parties to a con- tract, written or parol, where the meaning is not definitely stated in the contract." 1 Desmond v. Jefferson, 19 Fed. Rep., 483; Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis., 470; Williamsport v. Com., 84 Pa. St., 487; State ex rel. v. Babcock, 22 Neb., 614; 35 N. W. Rep., 941; Robertson v. Breedlove, 61 Tex., 316. 2 Richmond v. McGirr, 78 Ind., 192; Ketchum v. Buffalo, 21 Barb. (N. Y.y, 294; affirmed in 14 N. Y., 356. 3 Ketchum v. Buffalo, 21 Barb. (N. Y.), 294; affirmed in 14 N. Y., 356. * Peterson v. New York, 17 N. Y., 449. See Sheidley v. Lynch, 95 Mo., 487; .8 S. W. Rep., 434; 24 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 520. 5 St. Louis V. Shoenbusch, 95 Mo., 618: 8 S. W. Rep., 791. 112 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§r4 power conferred upon a city to hold an election for authority to contract for the supplying of its streets with water, etc., and no election machinery for holding an election having been provided therefor, carries with it as "an inevitable and in- dubitable incident" the usual and customary means to put the power conferred into effect.'* Therefore, under such stat- ute the city has authority to employ the usual and necessary means to put in motion the power granted, namely, the passage of an ordinance and the holding of an election for the purpose of obtaining the assent of the voters to the creation of the indebtedness provided for therein.^ Charter power "to remove or confine persons having infec- tious or pestilential diseases, ' ' authorizes the renting and leas- ing of a house in which to confine smallpox patients.* The courts recognize certain other implied or incidental powers, as authority to compromise or settle disputed claims," submit <5 Ex parte Marmaduke, 91 Mo., 228, 251, 262; 4 S. W. Rep., 91; State ex rel. v. Perkins, 139 Mo., 106, 118; 40 S. W. Rep., 650; State ex rel. v. Walbridge, 119 Mo., 383, 394; 24 S. W. Rep., 457; 1 Kent Com., 463, 464; Sutherland, Stat. Construction, sec. 341. 7 "Where express power is given all the power necessary to carry it into effect is implied. That which is implied is as much a part of the statute as if written therein. The statute provides for an elec- tion, and requires a two-thirds ma- jority of the qualified voters to ratify the contract. Such contract necessarily involves the creation of indebtedness. The city could not get water without paying for it and the legislature could not have intended it to do otherwise." Per Sherwood, J., in State ex rel. Mil- ler V. M., K. & T. R. R. Co., 164 Mo., 208, 212, 213; 64 S. W. Rep., 187. Many illustrations of inherent or incidental powers are given in Aurora Water Co. v. Aurora, 129 Mo., 540, 577; 31 S. W. Rep., 946. In sustaining the power of the legislature to authorize a munici- pal corporation to supply electric- ity for illuminating streets and public places, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said: "It is a mistake to assume that municipal corporations should not keep abreast with the progress and im- provements of the age." Linn v. Chambersburg Borough, 160 Pa. St., 511; 28 Atl. Rep., 842. 8 Anderson v. O'Connor, 98 Ind., 168, 172. » Unless expressly forbidden by law a municipal corporation has power to settle disputed claims in its favor or against it. People ex rel. V. San Francisco, 27 Cal., 655; People ex rel. v. Coon, 25 Cal., 635; Augusta V. Leadbetter, 16 Me., 45, 47; Baileyville v. Lowell, 20 Me., 178; Bean v. Jay, 23 Me., 117; Prout V. Pittsfield Fire District, 154 Mass., 450. The capacity to sue and be sued gives such implied power. Peters- burg V. Mappin, 14 111., 193, 195; 56 Am. Dec, 501, approved in Ag- new v. Brail, 124 111., 312, 315 ; 16 N. E. Rep., 230; 20 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 134. §'ij OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 113 disputed controversies to arbitration,!" offer rewards for the apprehension and conviction of offenders against local or Power to release from oppress- ive contract. Bean v. Jay, 23 Me., 117; Meech v. Buffalo, 29 N. Y., 198, 210. County may compromise disput- ed claims. Mills County v. B. & M. R. R. Co., 47 Iowa, 66; Grimes v. Hamilton County, 37 Iowa, 290; Allen V. Cerro Gordo County, 34 Iowa, 54. Power to compromise. Otsego Lake v. Kirsten, 72 Mich., 1; 40 N. W. Rep., 26; 24 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 456; Olp v. Leddick, 59 Hun. (N. Y.), 627; 14 N. Y. Suppl., 41; Shanklin v. Madison, 21 Ohio St., 575; Boston Iron Co. V. U. S., 118 U. S. 37; article 55 Central Law Journal, 425, et seq. 10 ShawneetowD v. Baker, 85 111., 563; Brady v. Brooklyn, 1 Barb. (N. Y.), 584; Smith v. Philadel- phia, 13 Phila. (Pa.), 177; Faville V. Eastern Counties Ry. Co., 2 Bxch., 344; In re Corporation of Brant, 19 Up. Can. Q. B., 450. Town may submit claims to ar- bitration. Boston V. Brazer, 11 Mass., 447; Buckland v. Conway, 16 Mass., 395; Commonwealth v. Roxhury, 9 Gray (Mass.), 451. School district may arbitrate claim. Walnut Tp. v. Rankin, 70 Iowa, 65, 67; 29 N. W. Rep., 806. Corporation may be compelled to pay the award. Elmendorf v. Jer- sey City, 41 N. J. L., 135. Municipal corporation included in the term "persons" in a statute relating to arbitration. Spring- field v. Walker, 42 Ohio St., 543, 547. County court may submit to ar- bitration. Remington v. Harrison County Court, 12 Bush. (Ky.), 148. Canal company may arbitrate claim without special charter pow- er. Alexandria Canal Co. v. Swann, 5 How. (U. S.), 83. The state may divest itself of its sovereignty and its exemption from suit, and by legislative enactment submit claims against it in dis- pute to arbitrament. State v. Ward, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.), 100. Cannot arbitrate the question as to the value of lands taken or con- demned for public improvements. Somerville v. Dickerman, 127 Mass., 272, 275; Boylston Market Association v. Boston, 113 Mass., 528; Harvard College v. Boston, 104 Mass., 470; Brimmer v. Bos- ton, 102 Mass., 19; Paret v. Bay- onne, 39 N. J. L., 559. Question of damage of lands taken for highway cannot be sub- mitted to arbitration. Mann v. Richardson, 66 111., 481. Question of price of a bridge and damages for right of way across land for public road cannot be submitted to arbitration. McCann V. Otoe County, 9 Neb., 324; Sioux City & P. R. R. V. Washington County, 3 Neb., 30, 42; Stewart v. Otoe County, 2 Neb., 177. Contra, Schoff V. Bloomfield, 8 Vt, 472. When award of jury may be set aside and damages fixed by coun- cil, see Mobile v. Richardson, 1 Stewart & P. (Ala.), 12. Claim for damages on the part of property owners against a rail- road company cannot be submitted by the municipal corporation to arbitration. New Haven v. N. H. 6 D. R. R. Co., 62 Conn., 252; 25 Atl. Rep., 316. Respecting mode of submitting claims to arbitration, see article, 55 Central Law Journal, page 425 et seq. 8 114 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§74 municipal I'egulations,'^ and the right to indemnify municipal officers who incur loss for the benefit of the corporation,!^ all 11 People ex rel. v. Holly, 119 Mich., 637, 639, 640; 44 L. R. A., 677; 78 N. W. Rep., 665; Mead v. Boston, 3 Cush. (Mass.), 404; Freeman v. Boston, 5 Mete. (Mass.), 56; Shaub v. Lancaster City, 156 Pa. St., 362; 26 Atl. Rep., 1067; 21 L. R. A., 691; York v. Forscht, 23 Pa. St., 391, 393. But in the absence of express au- thority a municipal corporation may not offer rewards for infor- mation leading to the arrest and conviction of violators of state laws although committed within the municipal limits, for the rea- son that this is not a municipal power but a duty devolving upon the state. Crofut v. Danbury, 65 Conn., 294; 32 Atl. Rep., 365 ; Hawk V. Marion County, 48 Iowa, 472 ; Abel V. Pembroke, 61 N. H., 357, 359 ; Winchester v. Redmond, 93 Va., 711; 25 S. E. Rep., 1001; 57 Am. St. Rep., 822. Forbidden in cases involving homicide. Baker v. Washington, 7 p. C, 134, reward offered by the city of Washington for the capture of the assassin of President Lin- coln held void. Declared invalid in murder case. Gale V. South Berwick, 51 Me., 174; Hanger v. Des Moines, 52 Iowa, 193; 2 N. W. Rep., 1105; 35 Am. Rep., 266; 9 Cent. Law Journ., 478. Denied in crime of murder and arson in Murphy v. Jacksonville, 18 Fla., 318; 43 Am. Rep., 323. Reward offered for the apprehen- sion of one who, through forgery had embezzled city funds, de- clared unauthorized In Patton v. Stephens, 14 Bush, (Ky.), 324. Municipal corporation cannot employ counsel to aid in criminal prosecution on behalf of the state. Butler V. Milwaukee, 15 Wis., 493. Counties have no power to offer rewards for violators of state laws. Huthsing v. Bousquet, 2 McCrary (U. S. C. C), 152; Grant County Commissioners v. Bradford, 72 Ind., 455; Ripley County Commis- sioners V. Ward, 69 Ind., 441; Hight V. Monroe County Commis- sioners, 68 Ind., 575. In Illinois by statute counties have limited authority to offer re- wards. Butler V. McLean County, 32 111. App., 397. By statute in New Hampshire and Massachusetts municipal cor- porations may offer rewards. Jan- vrin V. Exeter, 48 N. H., 83; 2 Am. Rep., 185; Abel v. Pembroke, 61 N. H., 357; Cranshaw v. Roxbury, 7 Gray (Mass.), 374. The municipal charter of De- troit also authorizes the offering of such rewards. Loveland v. De- troit, 41 Mich., 367. The New York Consolidated Act (section 259) expressly authorizes the police board to offer reward for the apprehension and convic- tion of persons guilty of homicide and receiving stolen goods. In Canada power is given to councils to offer rewards. Biggar, Mun. Manual of Canada, pp. 803, 804, §§ 593-595, and notes. 12 Bancroft v. Lynnfield, 18 Pick. (Mass.), 566; Babbitt v. Savoy, 3' Cush. (Mass.), 530; Hadsell v. Hancock, 3 Gray (Mass.), 526 ; Nel- son V. Milford, 7 Pick. (Mass.), 18; Barnert v. Paterson, 48 N. J. L., 395; 6 Atl. Rep., 15; State v. Hudson, 37 N. J. L., 254; State v. Hammonton, 38 N. J. L., 430; Sher- man V. Carr, 8 R. I., 431, approved in Roper v. Laurinburg, 90 N. C, -§^5] OP THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 115 of which powers are usually required to be exercised by ordinances.!'* EXECUTION OF POWERS. § 75. Method of exercise of powers. Where the charter or statute under which the municipal corporation is created, or other legislative act applicable, directs in precise or definite terms the manner in which certain corporate acts are to be executed, and points out the departments, officers or agents who are to perform them, such specification must be substan- tially followed.!* "The mode in such eases constitutes the measure of their power. "i" "Where a corporation relies upon a grant of power from the legislature for authority to do any act, it is as much restricted to the mode prescribed by the statute for its exercise as to the thing allowed to be done, "i* In conferring the power, it is the intention that it shall be exercised by the body and in the mode prescribed, "and any 427 ; Attorney General v. Norwich, 2 Mylne & Cr., 406; King v. Inhab-- itants of Essex, 4 T. R., 591. 13 Methods of Compromise by municipal corporations proper. State ex rel. v. Martin, 27 Neb., 441; 43 N. W. Rep., 244; New Or- leans V. L. & N. R. R. Co., 109 U. S., 221; 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 156. Compromise by towns on town vote. Ford v. Clough, 8 Me., 334, 345; 23 Am. Dec, 513; Nelson v. Milford, 7 Pick. (Mass.), 18; Tut- tle V. Weston, 59 Wis., 151; 17 N. W. Rep., 12; 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 168; Matthews v. West- borough, 134 Mass., 555, 562; 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 239. Compromise by counties. Col- lins V. Welch, 58 Iowa, 72; 12 N. W. Rep., 121; 43 Am. Rep., Ill; Hall V. Baker, 74 Wis., 118; 42 N. W. Rep., 104. See article, 55 Cen- tral Law Journ., p. 425 et seq. A city charter which constitutes the city magistrates "justices of the peace ex officio" does not au- thorize the city to create an action of debt of which such magistrates as justices shall have jurisdiction Weeks v. Forman, 16 N. J. L., 237 1* McCrackeu v. San Francisco 16 Cal., 591; Holland v. San Fran- cisco, 7 Cal., 361; Pimental v San Francisco, 21 Cal., 351 ; Sless man v. Crozier, 80 Ind., 487; First Presbyterian Ch. v. Ft. Wayne, 36 Ind., 338; 10 Am. Rep., 35; Balti- more v. Porter, 18 Md., 284; 79 Am. Dec, 686; Nevada v. Eddy. 123 Mo., 546; 27 S. W. Rep., 471; Stewart v. Clinton, 79 Mo., 603; Kansas City v. Flanagan, 69 Mo., 22; Thomson v. Boonville, 61 Mo., 282; Saxton v. St. Joseph, 60 Mo., 153; St. Louis v. Clemens, 43 Mo., 395; Ruggles v. Collier, 43 Mo., 353; Knapp v. Kansas City, 48 Mo. App., 485 ; Sprague v. Coenen, 30 Wis., 209; Ft. Scott v. Eads Brokerage Co., 117 Fed. Rep., 51. 15 Per Field, J., in Zottman v. San Francisco, 20 Cal., 96; 81 Am. Dec, 96. le Per Welles, J., in Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Carroll, 51 Barb. (N. Y.), 33. il(i OP THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§ 7G departure from such authority or any attempt by the body Lo transfer their powers to others is unwarranted."^'^ Thus where the charter requires any sale or lease of its real estate to be made at public auction to the highest bidder, a lease of any of its property by ordinance at a fixed rental is unlaw- ful.i* So where a corporation is empowered to issue bonds "at such times as the board of trustees may, by resolution, direct," a legal issue can only be authorized by resolution.''^ So where the charter provides that a particular power shall be exercised by ordinance, its exercise in any other manner, as by contract or resolution, would not be legal. ^^ But where the city has general power to act by and through ordinanceiS, a special power to issue bonds for specified purposes may be exercised by ordinance, submitting the question to a vote of the people. 21 § 76. Judiciary will not control exercise of discretionary powers. Frequently powers are conferred upon municipal corporations, in general terms, without specification as to the time when, or manner in which, they are to be exercised. Obviously the execution of such powers involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, and therefore the general rule 17 East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 50 not executed as prescribed, the act 111., 28, 31. may be subsequently ratified. Lu- "To sanction a contrary doctrine cas v. San Francisco, 7 Cal., 463. would place the corporation above See Sec. 120, post. the law, and would, to say the 20 Unionville v. Martin, 95 Mo. least, be fraught with dangerous App., 28, 36; 68 S. W. Rep., 605; consequences. If such a doctrine Mills v. San Antonio (Tex. Civ. should prevail is there not rea- App., 1901), 65 S. W. Rep., 1121; son to fear that corporations Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex., 532; 32 might soon become intolerable Am. Rep., 637. nuisances?" Hurford v. Omaha, 4 See Sees. 2-6, supra, for distinc- Neb., 336, 350. tion between ordinance and reso- "It Is a well established prinoi- lution. pie that when a new power and the The power of correcting ward means of executing it are given limits must be exercised by ordi- by statute the power can be exe- nance as any ordinary act of legis- cuted in no other way." Hovey v. lation and not by resolution. Cas- Mayo, 43 Me., 322, 332; Glass v. caden v. Waterloo, 106 Iowa, 673; Ashbury, 49 Cal., 571. 77 N. W. Rep., 333 ; McCulIey v. 18 San Francisco, etc.. Railroad Elizabeth, 66 N. J. L., 555 ; 49 Atl. Co. V. Oakland, 43 Cal., 502. Rep., 686. 19 McCoy V. Briant, 53 Cal., 247. 21 Mason v. Shawneetown, 77 Where the power exists, but is 111., 533, 537. §76] OP THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 117 has obtained that, in tlie absence of collusion or fraud, courts will decline to interfere where an officer or an agent in the execution of the power is acting within the scope of his pre- scribed authority.-- In such case, any method which is fit and proper, with U due regard to the nature of the power, may be employed.^^ These corporations "must have a choice of means adapted to ends, and are not to be confined to any one mode of operation."-^ Thus in the absence of prescribed form, in certain oases the legislative or governing body may act by resolution instead of by ordinance. 2"' This subject is considered in prior sections.-" So where by law a city may erect an electric plant upon approval of a majority of its electors, and pay for the same by the issuance and sale of bonds, the entire jnatter of erection of plant and issuance of bonds may be submitted to vote in one proposition.^'^ So the power to construct water works, upon like majority vote, may be properly exercised by ordinance prescribing the character 22 Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 44 Iowa, 505; 24 Am. Rep., 756; St. Louis v. Boffinger, 19 Mo., 15. 23 Lincoln St. Ry. Co. v. Lincoln, 61 Neb., 109; 84 N. W. Rep., 802; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ryan, 2 Wyo., 391; 113 U. S., 516; Poillon v. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y., 132; Heman v. Schulte, 166 Mo., 409; 66 S. W. Rep., 163. 24 Bridgeport v. Housatonuc R. R. Co., 15 Conn., 475, 501, as to issue of bonds; Slack v. Maysville & Lexington R. R. Co., 13 B. Mon. (Ky.), 1; State ex rel. v. Wal- bridge, 119 Mo., 383, 394; 24 S. W. Rep., 457, removal of officer. Power given, without specifica- tion as to mode of its exercise, per- mits the adoption of a reasonable mode, and implies discretion in this respect. Cincinnati v. Gwynne, 10 Ohio, 192, relating to enforcement of a special tax by suit in the nature of an action for debt. Markle v. Akron, 14 Ohio, 586, as to regulating sale of liquor. Evansville, I. and C. S. L. R. R. Co. V. Evansville, 15 Ind., 395, mode of exercising power and time and mode of payment of subscrip- tion to railroad stock held to be discretionary with council; also, same as to power to borrow money. In Spaulding v. Lowell, 23 Pick. (Mass.), 71, where a town built a market house two stories high and appropriated the lower story for a market, which was hona fide the leading object in erecting the building, it was held that the ap- propriation of the upper story to other subordinate purposes was not such an excess of authority as to render the .erection of the building and the raising of money there- for illegal. 25 Chicago V. McKechney, 91 111. App., 442; Lincoln St. Ry. Co. v. Lincoln, 61 Neb., 109; 84 N. W. Rep., 802. 26 Sees. 2-5, supra. 27 Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Newton, 42 Fed. Rep., 723. 118 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§77 of such works and the tax to be levied to meet the cost of construction in advance of the election, and then submitting the matter to the voters.^^ So where a city council has power to make a lease of real estate at a "reasonable rent," in the absence of fraud or collusion, the council's determination as to rent will not be disturbed by the court.^* § 77. Same subject. Most municipal corporations possess a large discretion concerning local improvements, as in the opening, grading and repairing of highways, streets and side- walks, in respect to the time, manner and cost of the same, as well as in the establishment of sewers, drains or other sanitary regulations, and urban necessities and conveniences generally. In the exercise of such discretion the courts will decline to interfere, where the authorities are acting within the scope of their powers.''" 28 Taylor v. McPadden, 84 Iowa, 262; 50 N. W. Rep., 1070. 20 Schanck v. New York, 69 N. Y., 444. 30 Illinois — Brush v. Carbondale, 78 111., 74. Indiana — Fulton v. Cummlngs, 132 Ind., 453 ; 30 N. E. Rep., 949. Maine — Hovey v. Mayo, 43 Me., 322. Maryland — Methodist Prost. Ch. V. Baltimore, 6 Gill. (Md.), 391. Missouri — Skinker v. Heman, 64 Mo. App., 441; Estes v. Owen, 90 Mo., 113; 2 S. W. Rep., 133; Farrar V. St. Louis, 80 Mo., 379; McCor- mack V. Patchin, 53 Mo., 33. New York — Wiggin v. New York, 9 Paige (N. Y. Ch.), 16, 23; People V. Supervisors Queens Co., 131 N. Y., 468. Wisconsin — Teegarden v. Racine, 56 Wis., 545; 14 N. W. Rep., 614. Ordinarily courts will not inter- fere on the ground that a given Improvement is unnecessary and that the ordinance providing for it is, therefore, oppressive and unrea- sonable. Marionville to use v. Hen- son, 65 Mo. App., 397. The passage of the ordinance is usually conclusive as to the neces- sity of the work. Seibert v. Tiff- any, 8 Mo. App., 33; Bohle v. Stan- nard, 7 Mo. App., 51. But Corrigan v. Gage, 68 Mo., 541, holds that an ordinance for a sidewalk in an uninhabited por- tion of Lhe city and disconnected with any other street or sidewalk was unnecessary and oppressive; and such fact might be shown in an action on the special tax bill. Water course in highway. Ben- jamin V. Wheeler, 8 Gray (Mass.), 409. Repairs in roads and streets. Hovey v. Mayo, 43 Me., 322. Proceeding to compel city to cov- er open drain or canal of many years' standing, alleged to be a nuisance, denied. Inhabitants v. New Orleans, 14 La. Ann., 452. Had power, but neglected to abate nuisance; held private ac- tion against city would not lie. Kelley v. Milwaukee, 18 Wis., 83; Leeds v. Richmond, 102 Ind., 372; 1 N. E. Rep., 711; Sullivan v. Phil- lips, 110 Ind., 320; 11 N. E. Rep., 300; Irving v. Ford, 65 Mich., 241; 32 N. W. Rep., 601; Louisville, §77] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 119 The use of the municipal revenue, except that required for specified purposes, is usually subject alone to the discretion of the local authorities. ' " No court has a right to control that discretion, ' ' remarked the Supreme Court of the United States, "much less to usurp and supersede it. To do so in a single year would require a revision of the details of every estimate and expenditure, Ijased upon an inquiry into all branches of the municipal service; to do so for a series of years, and in advance, is to attempt to foresee every exigency and to pro- vide against every contingency that may arise to affect the public necessities."^! And, finally, it may be stated broadly that this immunity from judicial control embraces the exercise of all municipal powers, whether legislative or administrative, which are strictly discretionary. Ample illustration of the doctrine is contained in the cases in the notes and in other appropriate connections throughout the work.^^ The obser- vation of Lumpkin, J., is appropriate: "These municipal cor- etc, R. R. V. East St Louis, 134 111., 656. Extending time (when it is not of the essence of the contract) within which an improvement may be made is discretionary. Jenk- ins v. Stetler, 118 Ind., 275; 20 N. E. Rep., 788. So, what is "reason- able time." Fass v. Seehawer, 60 Wis., 525; 19 N. W. Rep., 533. "The city, as a corporation, has control over the public places and highways within its bounds and it is the province of the corporation, and not of a Judicial tribunal, to determine what improvements shall be made in the streets and canals of the city." Inhabitants v. New Orleans, 14 La. Ann., 452. Courts may restrain municipal officers from exceeding their juris- diction, and require them to per- form such specific duties as the law imposes upon them. Attorney General v. Board, 64 Mich., 607; 31 N. W. Rep., 539 ; Coll v. Board, 83 Mich., 367; 47 N. W. Rep., 227; People v. Supervisors, 3 Mich., 475; People v.' Auditors, 13 Mich., 233 ; Tennant v. Crocker, 85 Mich.^ 328; 48 N. W. Rep., 577. 31 Per Mr. Justice Matthews in East St. Louis v. U. S. ex rel. Zeb- ley, 110 U. S., 321, 324. 32 St. Louis V. Weber, 44 Mo., 547, regulating markets; Page v. St. Louis, 20 Mo., 136, involving illegal exemption by ordinance of special sewer tax; Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 Mo., 20, proceeding to enjoin sale of personal property for payment of taxes illegally as- sessed. Case explains Deane v. Todd, 22 Mo., 90. Fayetteville v. Carter, 52 Ark., 301; 12 S. W. Rep., 573; 6 L. R. A., 509 (and note), discretion as to fixing amount of license fee. Where city has no power to let a contract for lighting its streets and public buildings for a term of ten years, the courts will inter- fere. Garrison v. Chicago, 7 Bis- sell (U. S. Cir. Ct), 480. But held ,in Iowa that a contract for the use of certain rooms for city purposes for twenty years, to be paid by issuing scrip, in the ab- 120 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§78 porations are the germ and miniature models of free govern- ment; and their internal police and administration should not he interfered with for slight causes ; not unless some great ' right has been withheld, or wrong perpetrated. "^^ § 78. Limitation of rule of non-judicial interference. While the rule of non-judicial interference in the respects mentioned is well established, certain limitations are recognized. Al- though alluded to elsewhere, it m&y be again emphasized that every corporate duty is in the nature of a public trust and should be exercised for the general welfare. Moreover, pri- vate property and private rights will receive legal protection. Hence the universal rule : Wanton or unreasonable exercise of power, although discretionary, by corporate authorities, detrimental to public interest, or injurious to private rights, will be redressed by the judiciary, notwithstanding such powers clearly belonged to the municipal corporation and in sence of proof of fraud, would not be nullified by the judiciary, the court saying: "In the absence of actual fraud, courts cannot inter- fere with the judgment and discre- tion of city councils in determin- ing what are and what are not suitable rooms for the purposes of the city and its officers." Moses v. Risdon, 46 Iowa, 251, 253. Power to purchase land for a poor house, and make thp neces- sary improvements is not subject to judicial control at the suit of a tax payer. Jones v. Pendleton County (Ky., 1892), 19 S. W. Rep., 740. So discretion in determining who are paupers and furnishing needed aid is not subject to judicial review. Christman v. Phillips, 58 Hun., 282; 12 N. Y. Supp., 338. Whether a city being only au- thorized to purchase such lands as might be necessary for the pur- poses of the corporation, could take lands outside of her limits not necessary for such purposes, "is a question that can only arise in a proceeding instituted by the state against the city for abusing her right to purchase lands." Cham- bers V. St. Louis, 29 Mo., 543, 576. Suit of private citizen to com- pel forfeiture of franchise grant- ed by city denied. Hovelman v. K. C. H. R. R., 79 Mo., 632, 639. Failure of city to enforce con- tract as to sufficient pressure in water mains for fire purposes can- not be subject of private action. Boston S. D. & T. Co. v. Salem Water Co., 94 Fed. Rep., 238. Borrowing money and issuing bonds. People v. Board of Super- visors, 131 N. Y., 468. Power of local authorities as to authorizing special election. Fries- ner v. Charlotte, 91 Mich., 504; 52 N. W. Rep., 19. Authority as to erecting, main- taining and repairing public build- ings. Kitchen v. Commissioners, 123 Ind., 540; 24 N. E. Rep., 366; Rotenberry v. Supervisors, 67 Miss., 470; 7 So. Rep., 211. •13 State V. Swearingen, 12 Ga., 23, 25. §r8j OP THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 121 the exercise of them no corruption or fraud appears.^* Thus a power given to a municipal corporation to abate nuisances in any manner it may deem expedient is not an unrestricted power, for such means only are intended as are necessary for the public good. The abatement must be limited by its necessity, and no wanton or unnecessary injury to the prop- erty or rights of individuials must be committed.^'' Notwithstanding the grant conferring the power is silent as to the mode and time of its execution, the public interest and the law always require a reasonable exercise of municipal powers.*® While the acts of officials will be set aside on the ground of fraud or mistaJke, *^ every reasonable intendment of •>* See Vincennes v. Citizens Gas Light Co., 132 Ind., 114; 31 N. E. Rep., 573; Jackson County H. R. R. Co. V. Interstate Rapid Transit Co., 24 Fed. Rep., 306; 32 Am. & Bng. R. R. Cas., 21G; Sitzlnger v. Tamaqua, 187 Pa St., 539; 41 Atl. Rep., 454; Cape May, etc., R. Co. V. Cape May, 35 N. J. Eq., 419; Place V. Providence, 12 R. I., 1. Tlie power to supply a city with water is usually discretionary in so far as determining when the needs of the community require the supply, but in providing water the power cannot be so exercised as to create a corporate debt be- yond that limited by law, or to eurrender or suspend legislative powers. Here, it was held that the execution of such contracts is a ministerial act and may be en- joined, etc. Valparaiso v. Gard- ner, 97 Ind., 1, 3. 35 Babcock v. Buffalo, 56 N. Y., 268, where it was held that the fill- ing up of a canal was not a proper exercise of the power to abate nuisances, and the city could be restrained from so doing. Sheldon, J., elaborately discusses the doc- trine in 1 Buffalo Sup. Ct. Rep., 317, which opinion is affirmed. 30 Kirkham v. Russell, 76 Va., 956, 961, holding void an ordi- nance as to time of election of certain city officers, the effect of which was to deprive a new coun- cil of the right to make the selec- tion, the election having occurred only three days before the new council organized; distinguishing Norfolk V. Ellis, 26 Graft. (Va.), 224, and Fisher v. Harrisburg, 2 Grant's Cases (Pa.), 291. The court said (p. 967): "Such an ordinance is not only unreason- able; it is doubtless safe to say it is unprecedented. Surely, the leg- islature, had it intended Lo confer upon the council the power to adopt it, would have said so clear- ly and unmistakably. That such power was not conferred appears by the provisions of the charter in respect to the terms and election of officers generally." See dis- senting opinion on pp. 970-988. Compare § 19, supra. 37 See Morse v. Westport, 136 Mo., 276; 37 S. W. Rep., 932; Fru- in Bambrick Construction Co. v. Geist, 37 Mo. App., 509; State v. Board of Public Works, 27 Minn., 442; 8 N. W. Rep., 161; State v. District Court, 33 Minn., 295; 23 N. W. Rep., 222. 122 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§ 80 good faith and regularity will be indulged where they appear to have acted within the scope of their powers.*^ §79. When ordinance necessary to exercise power. By far most of the powers exercised by municipal corporations require either an ordinance or resolution, which, as a rule, is to all intents and purposes a legislative act. The legal entity, while' purely a governmental institution existing solely for the public good of the local community, is a corporation and may only legally act as such. All of its corporate and polit- ical powers, unless lodged elsewhere, are construed as being vested in the council or governing legislative body, which, under the prevailing system in the American municipality, is the most numerous and popular branch of municipal organi- zation. Such vesting of powers would seem to support the legal view that the municipal corporation in most of its im- portant functions is essentially an organ of government, and being such, the inhabitants of the corporation should be di- rectly represented, and through their representatives should direct the affairs of the corporation. In the performance, therefore, of its manifold duties, to validate its acts, ordinances are necessary unless the method of executing the power is sufficiently prescribed by charter or legislative act applicable, or is in the nature of a purely administrative duty. In case of doubt the authority for the act and the manner of its execution, should be directed by the council or governing legislative body in appropriate form. Where the charter re- quires the passage of an ordinance— a legislative act — by the council, to accomplish tlie object desired, an ordinance is in- dispensable;, the power cannot be delegated to others.^^ § 80. Same subject— Legislative or executive powers. Char- ters usually provide that the legislative powers of the corpo- ration shall be vested in the governing legislative body, gen- erally called the council or the common council or municipal 38 St. Joseph to use of Gibson v. so Sees. 86-88, post. Farrell, 106 Mo., 437; 17 S. W. Authority to private persons to Rep., 497; Aurora Water Co. v. build a sewer along a putlic street Aurora, 129 Mo., 540; 31 S. W. can only be granted by ordinance. Rep., 946; Rutherford v. Hamil- State (Hunt) v. Lambertville, 45 ton, 97 Mo., 543 ; 11 S. W. Rep., N. J. L., 279. 249 ; In re Episcopal School, 75 N. Y., 324. § 81] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 123 assembly, and the executive and administrative powers in the mayor and heads of designated departments and other officers created or to be created by law. Often charters provide either expressly or by implication that neither the legislative body nor any committee or member thereof shall perform any executive business whatever. Executive and administrative duties are such as concern the" execution of existing laws. , Acts which require the ordaining of new laws are legislative. Thus where it can be shown that the particular act could not have been done without a law or ordinance, such act is to be considered as legislative. Therefore, a resolution of a council, adopting certain plans and specifications directing a market to be built in accordance with them, and awarding the con- tract at a specific price, was sustained.*" § 81. Same subject— Self-enforcing charter provisions. That all corporate acts must be performed in the mode prescribed, is a general proposition firmly established. ^^ As we have seen, certain municipal powers can only be executed legally by the formal enactment of ordinances (as contradistinguished from mere resolutions),*- which is essentially a legislative act. Where the grant conferring the power is a complete enact- ment within itself, the provision, whether charter or statutorj% becomes self-enforcing, and therefore legislation by ordinance is not required. Thus where the oflfense is defined, the pen- alty and mode of prosecution prescribed, the charter provision may be executed without ordinance.*^ But where the provi- sion is merely a grant of power, as authority to license and *o "It is equally an act of local made by the appropriate heads of legislation to fix upon the form departments, the building of a new and dimensions of a public build- market (the subject of the resolu- ing. Indeed, anything which en- tion) not being among the duties ters into the idea of the plan of of any of the executive depart- an edifice may properly be deter- ments, could be provided for by mined by the authority to which resolution of the council. Peter- the law commits the duty of de- son v. New York, 17 N. Y., 449, 454. termining that one should be built. Employment of agents, as attor- * * * The adoption of the proj- neys. Is often a legislative act. ect of building a particular edi- Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex., 532, 535. fice according to a specified plan, *! § 75, supra. was the substantial part of the reso- 42 Sees. 2 to 5, supra. lution. The rest was modal." The 43 Strauss v. Pontiac, 40 111., 301, court found that, although the 303; Ashton v. Ellsworth, 48 111., charter required all contracts to be 299, 134 OP THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§ 83 regulate trades, occupations, professions, etc., to regulate or suppress or license the sale of liquor,** bawdy houses, gaming and gambling houses, to prohibit and destroy instruments and devices, etc., of gambling,*^ to abate nuisances,** to employ agents and attorneys,*'' to make public improvements,*^ to fix wharfage dues,*» to establish water works and public wells,^" and to exercise the delegated police power generally ,^1 the passage of proper ordinances or resolutions is required, to make the power effective. § 82. Distinction between mandatory and discretionary powers. The law recognizes a distinction between mandatory and discretionary powers. Imperative or mandatory duties imposed on the municipality imply no discretion and may be compulsorily required. Whether the duty is discretionary or mandatory is always a question of charter or legislative in- tention, and each case must be decided largely on its own circumstances and the intention gathered from the nature of the power and the whole law relating to the subject. The general rule, 'as declared by the Supreme Court of "Wisconsin, undoubtedly is that, where the power may be classed with the great mass of discretionary powers conferred upon municipal corporations to pass by-laws and ordinances relating to the government of the city, which powers are to be exercised ac- cording to the judgment of the authorities as to its necessity or expediency, it is not m'andatory.^^ -pj^g Supreme Court of Nebraska well says that it "sometimes becomes a very, grave question in the construction of statutes whether particular provisions are to be regarded as mandatory or directory. It is, however, a familiar principle that statutes relating merely to matters of convenience, or to the orderly and prompt con- *■! People V. Crotty, 93 111., 180; v. Batesville, 139 Ind., 77; 38 N. E. Bull V. Quincy, 9 111. App., 127; Rep., 408; 35 N. E. Rep., 682. Chapter XIII. 47 Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex., 532. ■15 Ridgway v. West, 60 Ind., is Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind., 90, 371; 22 Cent. L. J., 319. 101; Chapter XVI. io Lake v. Aberdeen, 57 Miss., 40 Muscatine v. Keokuk Packet 260. Co., 45 Iowa, 185. Power to declare and abate nui- so Unionville v. Martin, 95 Mo. sances can be exercised only by App., 28, 36; 68 S. W. Rep., 605. general ordinance applicable alike 51 Chapter XIV. to all property similarly circum- 52 Kelley'V. Milwaukee, 18 Wis., stanced. American Furniture Co, 83, 85. §83] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 125 duct of business, and not to the essence of the thing to be done, are generally considered as directory only; but this doctrine has been carried so far in some cases that it seems impossible to reconcile all the cases in which the question has been considered; and if equal force were given to each case found in the books, it would be a fruitless effort to attempt to fix any settled, discriminative point between a mandatory and a directory statute. "^^ § 83. Same subject. Where the law imposes the duty and gives the means of performing it, ordinarily its performance is compulsory.'^'' It has often been judicially declared that what a public corporation or officer is empowered to do, and it is beneficial to them to have it done, the law holds it should be done.^s Thus where the rights of third persons are in- volved or the public good requires it, the words "it shall be lawful" or "may," will be construed to mean "must" or "shall," and, therefore, the power mandatory.^^ But ordi- 53 Hurford v. Omalia, 4 Neb., 336, 349. "Affirmatives may, and often do, imply a negative of what is not af- firmed as strongly as if expressed. So, also, if by the language used, a thing is limited to be done in a particular form or manner, it in- cludes a negative that it shall not be done otherwise. Affirmative ex- pressions that introduce a new rule imply a negative of all that is not within the purview." Per Wright, C. J., in District Town- ship V. Dubuque, 7 Iowa, 262, 276. 5* Thus a city being by statute "authorized and empowered to make proper provision for the sup- port of the poor," etc., cannot re- fuse to do so, as the law is man- datory. Veazie v. China, 50 Me., 518; Milford v. Orono, 50 Me., 529. 55 Mason v. Fearson, 9 How. (U. S.), 248, 259; Malcom v. Rogers, 5 Cow. (N. Y.), 188. 56 "In some cases where an au- thority is conferred in permissive language merely, it is still held to be imperative if third persons have an absolute right to have it exer- cised. But it is obvious that this principle cannot be applied to dis- cretionary powers. For as soon as it is determined that it is discre- tionary whether to exercise the au- thority, or not, it follows that there are no persons who have the right to insist on its exercise. To deter- mine whether such a power is dis- cretionary or not, the nature of the power itself, and the rights of indi- viduals in respect to its exercise must be looked at." Kelley v. Mil- waukee, 18 Wis., 83, 85. Word "may" construed as "must" or "shall" when required. State (Kennelly) v. Jersey City, 57 N. J. L., 293; 30 Atl. Rep., 531; 26 L. R. A., 281; Blake v. P. & Co. R. R., 39 N. H., 435; King v. Derby, Skinner, 370. "May repair" a bridge held "shall" repair. Phelps v. Hawley, 52 N. Y., 23, 27. Same as to sewer, where a statute permissive in terms was construed as mandato- 126 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§83 narily where the language of the law is permissive in its nature and merely confers the power, unless the rights of third persons are involved or the public good requires it, the duty will be held discretionary. Many cases illustrating the general rules are given in the notes.''^ ry. New York v. Furze, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 612. Enabling statute held mandato- ry. People V. New York, 11 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 114. "It shall be lawful" and "may," construed as shall. Mason v. Fear- son, 9 How. (50 U: S.), 248, 259; Rex V. Barlow, 2 Salkeld, 609. Laws providing for submitting question to vote of the people of stock subscription to railroads. Steines v. Franklin County, 48 Mo., 167. "It is a power given to public officers, and concerns the public in- terests and the rights of third per- sons, who have a claim de jure, that the power shall be exercised in this manner for the sake of justice and the public good." Leavenworth & D. M. R. R. Co. v. Platte County, 42 Mo., 171, 175. The language "that the city council shall be, and they are here- by empowered to elect an officer to be known as 'Recorder,' " etc., held mandatory. Vason v. Augusta, 38 Ga., 542, 545. When whole law construed to- gether, held mandatory, relating to sale of property. Hemmer v. Hustace, 51 Hun. (N. Y.), 457. 57 Under an act empowering city to make sufficient number of reservoirs "to supply water in case of fire," it was held discretionary to construct, and, if constructed, also discretionary to maintain. Grant v. Erie, 69 Pa. St., 420, per Sharswood, J. Charter authority "to build and erect from time to time, as might become necessary, sufficient closed culverts in and over the common sewers established in the district," held discretionary. Carr v. North- ern Liberties, 35 Pa. St., 324. Power to remove obstructions and to widen, deepen and straight- en the Chicago River and its branches to their source, and to extend one mile into Lake Mich- igan, conferred by charter of Chicago, held discretionary. Good- rich V. Chicago, 20 111., 445. Caton, C. J., remarked (p. 447): "The courts cannot discriminate and say, you shall remove this wreck, but you need not remove that sand bar, or deepen the river in another place, or straighten it in another. The law has either left it to the discretion of the common council to say which of these acts the public good requires them to per- form, or it is imperative that they shall perform all. * * * The very extent of the power con- ferred, and the magnitude and ex- pense of the work which they are authorized to perform, in refer- ence to this harbor, show that it was never the intention of the leg- islature to impose the absolute ob- ligation upon the city to perform it all, and if not all, then no part was imperative; for no authority is vested anywhere except in the common council of the city to say what part it is necessary, ex- pedient and proper that they shall perform." Courts cannot compel cities to open streets, notwithstanding the power and political obligation ex- §«i] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 137 § 84. Public powers cannot be surrendered or delegated. The legal conception early obtained that the powers possessed by public and municipal officers "must be viewed as public trusts, not conferred upon individual members for their own emolument, but for the benefit of the community over which ists to open such streets as the convenience of the community may require. Joliet v. Verley, 35 111., 58, 63. Authority delegated to do cer- tain thing, as subscribe to stock of railroads, which is entirely per- missive, as where the language is •'shall have power," and no impera- tive injunction is contained in the law compelling action, held to be discretionary. St. Joseph & Den- ver City R. R. Co. v. Buchanan County, 39 Mo., 485, 490, per Wag- ner, J. An act authorizing a town to erect a bridge across a canal which provided that when constructed, the bridge should be maintained, repaired (and if pivot bridges should be built), opened for the passage of boats by the corpora- tion, was held imperative, and the performance of the duties imposed could be compelled by mandamus. Ottawa V. People ex rel., 48 111., 233. When "must" held discretionary, as applied to court. Spears v. New York, 72 N. Y., 442; Merrill v. Shaw, 5 Minn., 148. Provision as to publication of proceedings of council held direc- tory in Reed v. Louisville, 22 Ky. Law Rep., 1636; 61 S. W. Rep., 11. When "may" not used in the sense of "shall." Ball v. Fagg, 67 Mo., 481. The true rule is this: "If from the whole context we gather that the statute was designed to impose the act on the officer as a duty to -be performed, then the authority to do it is an obligation to do it. It has been said that when the public welfare demands it or pri- vate rights are affected then the power to act is a duty to act. But the private interests, for the pro- tection of which the power will be construed to be a duty, must be such as exist independent of the grant of the power." State ex rel. V. St. Louis, 158 Mo., 505, 506; 59 S. W. Rep., 1101. "In respect to statutes, the rule of construction seems to be, that the word 'may' means 'must' or 'shall' only in case where public interest and rights are concerned, and where the public or third per- sons have a claim de jure that the power should be exercised." Per Chancellor Kent in Newburgh Turnpike v. Miller, 5 John. Chan. (N. Y.), 100. When the word "may" construed as "shall" in statute relating to fees. State ex rel. v. King, 136 Mo., 309; 36 S. W. Rep., 681; 38 S. W. Rep., 80. When "may" as addressed to a public officer does not mean shall," see In re Goddard, 94 N. Y., 544. "The interest which entitled a private person to insist upon the execution by an officer of a power conferred upon him, must be a definite and absolute legal right ; a mere incidental benefit to accrue to him therefrom will not suffice." Throop, Public Officers, 549. In Herford v. Omaha, 4 Neb., 336, at page 350, the Supreme Court of Nebraska formulates cer- 128 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. L§84 they preside. ' ' ^^ Therefore, the principle is fuiidaiuenta] and of universal application that public powers conferred upon a municipal corporation and its officers and agents can- not be surrendered or delegated to others.^* Thus where the taxing power is committed to the "corporate authorities" it cannot be exercised by others."*' So the power to contract for the erection of public buildings cannot be surrendered to private individuals.^^ So a municipal corporation has no power to convey a bridge erected by it to trustee by deed of trust, authorizing the charging of toll thereon and pledging the bridge and toll collected thereon for the payment of the debt created for its construction.*'^ So a city authorized by its charter to erect, repair and regulate public wharves, and tain propositions in order to deter- mine whether the power is manda- tory or discretionary. Requirements as to time of re- vision of ordinances, and publica- tion of digest thereof, held direc- tory. "Whalin v. Macomb, 76 111., 49, 51; Lowrey v. Lexington, 24 Ky. L. Rep., 516; 68 S. W. Rep., 1109. •"■s Glover, Mun. Corp., pp. 1, 3. Cooley's Const. Lim., 204, 205. 50 California — Menser v. Rlsdon, 36 Cal., 239; Oakland v. Carpen- tier, 13 Cal., 540; Chase v. City Treasurer, 122 Cal., 540; 55 Pac. Rep., 414; Knight v. Eureka, 123 Cal., 192; 55 Pac. Rep., 768. Minnesota — Hennepin County v. Robinson, 16 Minn., 381. New Hampshire — Attorney Gen- eral V. Lowell, 67 N. H,, 198; 38 Atl. Rep., 270. New York — Lyon v. Jerome, 26 Wend. (N. Y.), 485, 498; Toppan V. Young, 9 Daly (N. Y.), 357. Ohio — Ampt v. Cincinnati, 17 Ohio Cir. Ct., 516. United States — Continental Con- struction Co. V. Altoona, 92 Fed. Rep., 822; 35 C. C. A., 27; Clark v. Washington, 12 Wheat. (25 U. S.), 40, 54. A city's legislative authority cannot be construed as conferring upon it power to enlarge, diminish or vary in any substantial manner its municipal functions by ordi' nance. Jefferson City v. Courtmire, 9 Mo., 692. A partial surrender of public powers is void. Third Municipality of New Orleans v. Ursuline Nuns, 2 La. Ann., 611. There is no presumption that the grant of a legislative power to a municipal corporation authorized its surrender. National Water- works Co. V. Kansas City, 20 Mo. App., 237. 60 The "corporate authorities" has been held to Include those who are either directly elected by the population to be taxed, or appoint- ed in some mode to which they have given their assent. Harward V. St. Clair D. Co., 51 111., 130; Hessler v. Drainage Com., 53 111., 105; Cornell v. People, 107 111., 372; Wetherell v. Devine, 116 111., 631; 6 N. B. Rep., 24. 61 Russell V. Cage, 66 Tex., 428, 1 S. W. Rep., 270. 62 Mullarky v. Cedar Falls, 19 Iowa, 21. § 84] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. lS9 to fix the rate of wharfage thereat, cannot lease its wharf, or farm out its revenue, or empower any one else to fix the rates of wharfage ; and a contract whereby a city undertakes to do these things is void-^^ In every case where the law imposes a personal duty upon an officer in relation to a mat- ter of public interest, he cannot delegate it to others, as by submitting it to arbitration.®* Contracts and ordinances relating to any municipal func- tion which embarrass in any way the power of regulation ol: public affairs are ultra vires; for the municipal eorpor'ation cannot in any manner divest itself of its power to control and regulate at all times everything within the domain of its juris- diction. The adjudications present numerous instances of ordinances and contracts in derogation of the police powers which are uniformly declared void under this principle. Such powers belong emphatically to that class of objects which demand the application of the maxim salus populi suprema est lex; and they are to be attained and provided for by such appropriate means as the discretion of those who officially represent and act for the municipal corporation may devise from time to time. ' ' The discretion can no more be bargained away than the power itself. ""^ Therefore, when the city, within its charter powers, grants franchises for the use of its streets, wharves, parks and other places for public purposes, the right of control and regulation on the part of the municipal authorities must be reserved so that it may be exercised at any time for the public good.®® 03 Matthews v. Alexandria, 68 Co., 142 Mo., 172; 43 S. W. Rep., Mo., 115. 629; State ex rel. v. Murphy, 134 Power to construct piers cannot Mo., 548; 31 S. W. Rep., 784; 34 be abrogated or restricted. Whit- S. W. Rep., 51; 35 S.W. Rep., 1132. ney v. New York, 6 Abb. N. C. (N. A contract that in the future a ' Y.), 329. street shall not be opened or ex- 6* Mann v. Richardson, 66 111., tended in a designated part of the 481. city has been adjusted to be an 65 Beer Company v. Massachu- abrogation of legislative powers setts, 97 U. S., 25, 33; Boyd v. and therefore ultra vires. In re Alabama, 94 U. S., 645. opening of First Street, 66 Mich. 66 The following cases well illus- 42; 33 N. W. Rep., 15. City can- trate the text: Glasgow v. St. not alienate power to improve Louis, 87 Mo., 678; 15 Mo. App., streets. Roanoke Gas Co. v. Roan- 112; Lockwood v. Wabash R. R. oke, 88 Va., 810; 14 S. E. Rep., Co., 122 Mo., 86; 26 S. W. Rep., 665. 698- Sherlock v. K. C. Belt Ry. Where a city has the right to 130 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§85 § 85. Powers and duties imposed upon particular depart- ments or ofiBcers cannot be delegated. The duties and powers imposed upon the mayor, designated departments and officers are considered in the nature of public trusts and cannot be lease a part of its wharf for tae purpose of a warehouse and grain elevator, it must reserve the right to terminate such lease whenever the public interest demand such action. Belcher Sugar Refining Co. V. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co., 101 Mo., 192, 13 S. W. Rep., 822. Henry, J., in Belcher Sugar Refining Co. v. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co., 82 Mo., at page 126, said: "In order to meet the de- mands of commerce, and the changed methods of handling grain and other products the city may license the erection of elevators and warehouses in connection with them, upon the unpaved portion of the wharf, without violating the rights of the owners of the fee, but she has no right to lease any por- tion of it for a term of years with- out a reservation of the right to cancel the lease, whenever it should become necessary to pave and extend the wharf so leased. No right to authorize the erection of such buildings as that which it is alleged the defendant is about to erect upon the wharf, without reserving a control over the build- ing, and the uses to which it may be applied." See Matthews v. Alex- andria, 68 Mo., 115. The imposition of a tax on poles erected or maintained in highways is a power of which a municipality cannot divest itself for any period of time by ordinance or contract. Seitzinger v. Tamaqua, 187 Pa. St., 539; 41 Atl. Rep., 454; McKees- port V. M. & R. P. Ry. Co., 2 Pa. Sup. Ct., 242. A city has no power to enter into a contract which interferes with its duties to preserve the health and morals of the city. Louisville v. Wible, 84 Ky., 290. It may, therefore, defeat the title of its own grantee when it becomes necessary to do so in order to abate a nuisance or preserve the public health. Western Sav. Fund. Soc. V. Phila., 31 Pa. St., 175, 182; Presbyterian Church v. New York, 5 Cowen (N. Y.), 538, 542. "If one portion of the legislative power may be sold, another may be disposed of in the same way. If the power to raise revenue may be sold to-day, the power to punish for crimes may be sold to-morrow, and the power to pass laws for the redress of civil rights may be sold the next day. If the legislative power may be sold, the executive and judicial powers may be put in the market with equal propriety. The result to which the principle must inevitably lead proves that the sale of any portion of govern- mental powers is utterly inconsist- ent with the nature of our free institutions, and totally at vari- ance with the object and general provisions of the constitution of the state. * * It is a question of constitutional authority, and not a case of confidence in the fidelity of the legislature. Limita- tions of power established by writ- ten constitutions have their origin in a distrust of the infirmity of men. That distrust is fully justi- fied by the history of the rise and fall of nations." Mott v. Pa. R. R. Co., 30 Pa. St., 9, 27, 28; Penn. R. R. Co. v. Riblet, 66 Pa, St., 164, §85] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 131 delegated or surrendered to other officers or departments.'^^ Thus, where the charter imposes upon the mayor the duty to examine and pass upon bills of the legislative branch, in order to decide whether they should be approved or vetoed, such duty cannot be delegated to another, as, for example, the clerk, for the duty calls for the exercise of judgment and experience.^* So the power to establish pounds and to ap- point pound keepers conferred upon commissioners cannot be delegated to another officer or person.^^ So where a charter prescribes that designated officer? ' ' shall authenticate all spe- cial tax bills," which duty requires the exercise of judgment and discretion, this duty cannot be performed by others.'^** Where the charter requires the concurrence of two designated boards for the making of any improvement or the doing of any work or procuring any materials, a ratification by one of the boards of an order for work done in repairing a public sewer by the street and sewer commissioner, by approval of the bill presented therefor, is not sufficient to bind the city.'^^ So where the mayor and aldermen must select the sites for 168; Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S., 645, 650. Hence, the state or its duly au- thorized municipality may compel a street railroad company to do whatever is required for the health, safety and welfare of the community, for the plain reason that the authority to enact meas- ures for this purpose can never pass from the sovereign no matter what grants it may make. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gill, 156 V. S., 649, 657; Elliott on Roads and Streets, 573. An agreement of an official to permit one to whom the city has granted a right to lay out a highway to lands owned by him, to defend an injunction suit growing out of the grant, in the lame of the offi- cers of city, provided he would save the city harmless, etc., is void as a delegation of discretionary power. Shelby v. Miller, 114 Wis., 660; 91 N. W. Rep., 86; State v. Geneva, 107 Wis. 1; 82 N. W. Rep., 550. Reasons for rule. Winter v. Kinney, 1 N. Y., 365; Webb v. Albertson, 4 Barb. (N. Y.), 51. 67 Oakland v. Carpentier, 13 Cal., 540, 545; State v. Fiske, 9 R. I., 94. Delegation of power to construct foot pavement, void. Whyte v. Nashville, 2 Swan. (Tenn.), 364. osLyth V. Buffalo, 48 Hun. (N. Y.), 175. City council cannot devolve a power conferred upon it on the clerk. Durant v. Jersey City, 25 N. J. L., 309. 00 Dillard v. Webb, 55 Ala., 468. 70 Stifel V. Southern Cooperage Co., 38 Mo. App., 340 ; McQuiddy v. Vineyard, 60 Mo. App., 610, 618; Eyerman v. Payne, 28 Mo. App., 72, 77; Heman v. McLaren, 28 Mo. App., 654. 71 Keeny v. Jersey City, 47 N. J. L., 449; 1 Atl. Rep., 511. 132 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§ 85 public markets, the architect and plans; and commissioners are required to make purchases and contracts, a resolution appointing the commissions to purchase a site and build a public market thereon is voidJ^ So where certain duties are conferred upon the council and chief engineer of the fire de- partment, they cannot be delegated by ordinance or otherwise to a fire board.^^ So the determination of the kind of mate- rial with which streets shall be paved or sewers constructed, and the manner and time in which such work shall be done, conferred upon particular officers, boards or departments, cannot be delegated.''* So where the law confers upon the council, in conjunction with the board of education, power to purchase a site for school purposes, such authority cannot be delegated to the board of public works.'^^ So where the organic law vests the power of appointment of an attorney in the council, it cannot be transferred to the mayor by ordi- nance or otherwise.'^* Mere ministerial duties may be delegated,'^'' but the general rule is that, if from the nature of things to be done, the officer is required to perform duties involving the exercise of discre- tion and judgment, he cannot in any manner delegate them.''* The question as to where the specific duty rests is one of con- struction. Usually, where the powers are conferred upon the municipal corporation, without particular designation, the power may be exercised by the corporation itself. Nor can 72 State (Danforth) v. Paterson, 'sEastSt. Louis v. Thomas, 11 34 N. J. L., 163. 111. App., 283; Bryan v. Page, 51 73 Benjamin v. Webster, 100 Ind., Tex., 532, 535. 15. Where the charter confers upon Power of flre department to the council the power to appoint compel the erection of fire escapes and remove certain subordinates cannot be delegated. N. Y. Fire by majority vote, the council can Department v. Sturtevant, 33 Hun. not by ordinance or otherwise de- (N. Y.), 407. prive itself of this power. State 74 King-Hill Brick Mfg. Co. v. (Volk) v. Newark, 47 N. J. L., 117. Hamilton, 51 Mo. App., 120, 125; tt See. 89, post. St. Joseph V. Wilshire, 47 Mo. App., 78 Crutchfield v. Warrensburg, 30 125; Galbreath v. Newton, 30 Mo. Mo. App., 456; Stifel v. Southern App., 380. This subject is more Cooperage Co., 38 Mo. App., 340; fully considered and illustrated McQuiddy v. Vineyard, 60 Mo. App., elsewhere. Chapter XVI, of Public 610; Lynch v. Forbes, 161 Mass., Improvements Ordinances. 302; 37 N. E. Rep., 437; 42 Am. 70 Lauensteln v. Fond du Lac, 28 St. Rep., 402; State (Danforth) v. Wis., 336. Paterson, 34 N. J. L., 163. § 87j OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 133 the city relieve its officers from discliarging their regular du- ties, as by contracting by ordinance or otherwise with another to perform part or all of such dutiesJ® § 86. Legislative authority cannot be delegated. The ad- judications present various illustrations of the rule every- where established that legislative authority cannot be dele- gated.*" Under state constitutions the power to make laws, conferred upon the legislatures, may not be delegated to the people of the state or any portion of them.^i The only ap- parent exception in this respect is the power of legislation possessed by the municipal corporation. In legal language this authority is said to be delegated by the state.^- "There is a clear distinction to be observed between legislative and ministerial powers. The former cannot be delegated; the latter may. Legislative power implies judgment and discre- tion on the part of those who confer it."*^ § 87. Same— Illustrations. In the construction of sewers, where the charter requires the dimensions to be determined by ordinance (the enactment of which is essentially a legis- lative act), an ordinance leaving this matter to be decided by a city officer is bad.** So where the charter imposes the duty upon the council to determine the manner in which an im- 79 Carroll "v. St. Louis, 12 Mo., leaving to court when act shall 444 ; Gurley v. New Orleans, 41 take effect, void. La. Ann., 75 ; 5 So. Rep., 659 ; But- si Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal., 279, ler v. Sullivan County, 108 Mo. 313. 630; 18 S. W. Rep., 1142. 82 Lammert v. Lidwell, 62 Mo., so Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal., 524; 188; State ex rel. v. Pond, 93 Mo., Baltimore v. Scharf, 54 Md., 499; 606; 6 S. W. Rep., 469; State ex Northern Central Ry. Co. v. Balti- rel. v. Francis, 95 Mo., 44; 8 S. W. more, 21 Md., 93; In re Wilson, 32 Rep., 1; State v. Patrick, 65 Mo. Minn., 145, 148; 19 N. W. Rep., App., 653; St. Louis v. Russell, 723; Riley v. Trenton, 51 N. J. L., 116 Mo., 248; 22 S. W. Rep., 470; 498; 18 Atl. Rep., 116; State v. Cooley's Constitutional Lim. (5th Field, 17 Mo., 529; 59 Am. Dec, Ed.), 139, 140. 275; State ex rel. v. Haynes, 72 ss Per Wagner, J., in Ruggles v. Mo., 377; State ex rel. v. Murphy, Collier, 43 Mo., 353, 365. 134 Mo., 548 ; Chillicothe v. Brown, Such powers cannot be vicari- 38 Mo. App., 609; Kansas City v. ously exercised. Matthews v. Alex- Cook, 38 Mo. App., 660; Union- andria, 68 Mo., 115; Thompson v. ville V. Martin, 95 Mo. App., 28, 36; Booneville, 61 Mo., 282. 68 S. W. Rep., 605. s^ St. Louis to use v. Clemens, 52 State ex rel. v. Young, 29 Minn., Mo., 133; 43 Mo., 395; Sheehan v. 474, 551, 552; 9 N. W. Rep., 737, Gleeson, 46 Mo., 100; Neill v. 134 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§ Si provement, as a street, shall be made, such duty cannot be delegated by ordinance to a city officer or the street committee of the council.ss So the power conferred by charter upon the _ council "to erect lamps, and to provide for lighting the city," and "to create, alter and extend lamp districts," cannot be delegated to a committee of the council, so that the determi- nation of the committee will be final, either as to erecting new lamps, or discontinuing those already established.*" The power to grant a franchise to construct and operate street railroads, conferred on the council, must be made by ordinance directly, hence such authority to make the grant cannot be delegated by the council to any officer or board. ^^ Under particular charters it is held that the power or discretion of fixing fines by money or imprisonment for violation of ordi- nances is a legislative power and cannot be delegated to the courts; it must be specified in the ordinance.** .Where the assessment and rating of taxes is required to be done by the council, an apportionment made by the clerk in pursuance of resolution of the council, in the absence of council confirma- tion thereof, is invalid. ^^ So an ordinance giving the prop- erty owners of a block the right to say whether a livery stable shall be located in such block— such power being imposed by charter up&n the legislative body— is void.^" So an ordinance Gates, 152 Mo., 585; 54 S. W. Rep., Minneapolis, 36 Minn., 159; 30 N. 460. W. Rep., 450. Power to grade street cannot be *' State ex rel. v. Bell, 34 Ohio delegated. Koeppen v. Sedalia, 89 St., 194. Mo. App., 648. *^ Tomlin v. Cape May, 63 N. J. 85 Thompson V. Schermerhorn, 6 L., 429; 44 Atl. Rep., 209; Melick N. Y., 92, 96, followed in Birdsall ^- Washington, 47 N. J. L., 254; V. Clark, 73 N. Y., 73 ; 29 Am. Rep., ^tate v. Zeigler, 32 N. J. L., 262. 105, reversing 7 Hun., 351; Haiti- ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^p. V, Of Penalties, more v. Scharf, 54 Md., 499. §§ ^^^ ^o 177 post. 80 Davis V. Read, 65 N. Y., 566. 00 St. Louis v. Russell, 116 Mo., 248; 22 S. W. Rep., 470; 20 L. R. A., 721, and note. Contra, State ex rel. V. Beattie, 16 Mo. App., 131. A city council may adopt a city jq Chicago v. Stratton, 162 111., code compiled by the city attorney, 494. 44 N. E. Rep., 853, an ordi- as the adoption, not the compila- n^nce forbidding the location in tion, is the legislative act. West- ^ny block in which two-thirds of em & A. R. Co. v. Young, 83 Ga., t^e buildings are residence unless 512 ; 10 S. E. Rep., 197. the owners of a majority of 80 Minneapolis Gas-Light Co. v. the lots consent in writine. was When park board may determine material for sidewalks, etc. Turn- er V. Detroit, 104 Mich., 326; 62 N. W. Rep., 405. § 88] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 135 making it a misdemeanor to operate a slaughter house within three hundred feet of a dwelling house, without the written consent of the occupant, is invalid, as attempting to substitute for the sanction of the law the written consent of one or more individuals.81 So where the charter, or law applicable, com- mits to the legislative body of the corporation the exclusive authority to provide, by ordinance, additional offices, situa- tions and places of employment in the municipal service and_ fix the compensation as in its legislative discretion the de- mands of the several offices or departments may require, such power cannot be delegated in whole or in part.^^ § 88. Same subject. Local police regulations are usually made by ordinance, and the power to enact such ordinances is vested in the legislative department. But in Massachusetts it has been held that the state legislature may authorize a city council to empower a police board to regulate the uses of streets in certain respects.^ So by authority of state law, the New Jersey courts hold that certain of the local police power may be delegated to the excise department of the city.^ Where the power to license and fix the rates therefor is vested in the council it cannot be delegated to the mayor or other officer.* held reasonable. The court dis- county officers cannot be delegated tingulshed the Russell case. The to the county supervisors. Dough- ordinance related only to certain erty v. Austin, 94 Cal., 601; 29 residence districts which are clear- Pac. Rep., 1092. ly defined "within such specified i Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 districts the city council undoubt- Mass., 375; 19 N. E. Rep., 224. edly has the power to prohibit or 2 State (Riley) v. Trenton, 51 N. forbid the location of livery stables, J. L., 498; 18 Atl. Rep., 116 ; State and having the power of total pro- (Paul) v. Gloucester County, 50 N. hlbition within these districts, it J. L., 585 ; 15 Atl. Rep., 272. may impose such conditions and 3 East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 50 restrictions in relation to these 111., 28; Naegle v. Centralla, 81 limited areas as it may see fit." 111. App., 334; State Center v. Swift v. People, 162 111., 534, re- Barenstein, 66 Iowa, 249; 23 N. W. versing 60 111. App., 395. Rep., 652 ; Thurlow Medical Co. v. Laundry ordinance case, 7 Saw- Salem, 67 N. J. L., Ill; 50 Atl. yer (U. S.), 526; Ex parte Sing Rep., 475; State'v. Piske, 9 R. I., Lee, 96 Cal., 354; 31 Am. St. Rep., 94; Lord v. Oconto, 47 Wis., 386; 218. 2 N. W. Rep., 785. 91 St. Louis V. Howard, 119 Mo., As to delegation to police board 41; 24 S. W. Rep., 770. of power to license itinerant 02 The power of the legislature musicians, see Commonwealth v. imposed by the state constitution Plaisted, 148 Mass., 375; .19 N. B. to regulate the compensation of all Rep., 224. 136 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. [§ 89 A provision in an ordinance that, "any person desiring to sell by sample in said city may, by paying to the city treasurer the sum of five dollars for every three days, obtain a license from the city clerk," etc., vpas held void because it delegates to the licensee the power to determine the time for vphich the license shall be granted.* An ordinance authorizing a city clerk to issue a license, provided that the applicant has com- plied with the law, and who shall not be in arrears for license for any previous year, was held valid against the objection that it conferred judicial powers upon the clerk.' The power vested in the council to regulate streets cannot be delegated, by ordinance regulating street processions, by conferring upon a police officer discretionary power as to issuing permit there- for.® A charter provision which requires a recommendation from a board of park commissioners prior to the establishment of a park by ordinance by the municipal council, does not delegate legislative power to such board. Such a provision confers no power on the board to legislate, but simply imposes a limita- tion on the council. Until the council acts no park can be established.'' Some charters limit the legislative power by prescribing that all improvement ordinances shall originate with certain boards or officers.* § 89. Ministerial duties may be delegated. The rule for- bidding the delegation of power, stated and illustrated in prior sections, does not apply to the performance of purely ministerial duties. Such duties may be delegated.'-' The law has always recognized and emphasized the distinction between instances in which a discretion must be exercised by the of- ficer or department or governing body in which the discretion '- Darling v. St. Paul, 19 Minn., 9 Gillett v. Logan County, 67 111., 389. 256, 258; McClaughry v. Hancock 5 Baker v. Lexington, 21 Ky. County, 46 111., 356; Alton v. Mul- Law Rep., 809; 53 S. W. Rep., 16. ledy, 21 111., 76. See Chapter XIII, taxation and Gregory v. Bridgeport, 41 Conn., license tax. 76; 19 Am. Rep., 485, involving an 6 Chicago V. Trotter, 136 111., 430; ordinance creating position of su- 26 N. E. Rep., 359. §§ 416, 466 vast, perintendent of wharves and giv- 7 Kansas City v. Bacon, 147 Mo., ing him "full power to order and 259, 283; 48 S. W. Rep., 860. See regulate * * * the mooring of dissenting opinion, pp. 301-309. vessels at such wharf," which was 8 See Ch. XVI, of public improve- held valid, ment ordinances. § 89] OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. 137 is vested, and the performance of merely ministerial duties by subordinates and agents. i" Therefore, the appointment of agents to carry out the authority of the council is entirely competent and does not violate the rule delegatus non potest delegare}^ Thus the council may create committees or other bodies to investigate given matters, to procure information, to make reports and recommendations, and not exceed its power in the manner under consideration,^" but the council alone must finally determine the subject committed to its discretion and judgment.^" To illustrate : Although the charter power imposed upon the council to issue, ne- gotiate and sell municipal bonds cannot be delegated to the city treasurer, or any other officer or person, either by ordinance, resolution or otherwise, if the sale of the bonds is negotiated by the city treasurer under proper ordinance, resolution or other appointment, designating him by name for that purpose, his acts are simply those of an agent of the council. ^^ So the council may authorize the mayor to make a contract which the council alone is authorized to make, and afterwards ratify such contract and take action, as in issuing bonds, in pursuance of it. In such case the mayor merely acts as the instrument or amanuensis of the council. It is through him that the contract is made. The council by ratification finally determines and thus fulfills the duty im- posed by law.i^ So where the council has sole power to cause sidewalks to be constructed, it may, by ordinance, authorize the mayor and chairman of committee on streets and alleys to make, in its behalf and pursuant to its directions, a con- 10 Harcourt v. Asbury Park, 62 case: "There can be no doubt that N. J. L., 158; 40 Atl. Rep., 690; his (Mayor's) act should be re- Edwards V. Watertown, 61 How. garded as that of the common Pr. (N. Y.), 463; Hannibal & St. J. council." Evansville, I. and C. S. R. R. Co. V. Marion Co., 36 Mo., 294. L. R. R. Co. v. Evansville, 15 Ind., 11 Northern C. Ry. Co. v. Balti- 395, 418 ; Peterson v. New York, 17 more, 21 Md., 93; State v. Atlantic N. Y., 449, per Denio, J. City, 34 N. J. L., 99, 108. Where the law requires an ordi- 12 Burlington v. Dennlson, 42 N. nance or resolution "describing the J. L., 165; Dancer v. Mannington, work," certain details of the work 50 W. v., "322; 40 S. E. Rep., 475. may be submitted to the superin- 13 Sec. 123, post. tendent of streets for approval. 1* State ex ret. v. Hauser, 63 Haughawout v. Hubbard, 131 Gal., Ind., 155, 178. 675; 63 Pac. Rep., 1078. 15 As stated by the court in this 138 OF THE POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES. L§S9 tract for doing the work, and afterwards approve and ratify such contract.i*^ So the council by ordering a sidewalk raised to a level, to correspond with the level established by work that had been completed on walks on the same street, does not by committing the execution of the work to the strei't committee delegate to such committee its discretionary power in the premises.^'' 16 "If the city council has lawful authority to construct the side- walks, involved in it was the right to direct the mayor, and the chair- man of the committee on streets and alleys, to make a contract on behalf of the city for doing the work. We spend no time in vindi- cating this proposition. It is true, the council could not delegate all the power conferred upon it by the legislature, but like every other corporation, it could do its minis- terial work by agents. Nothing more was done in this case. * * * There was no unlawful delega- tion of power. But, if there had been, the contract was ratified by the council after it had been made." Per Mr. Justice Strong, in Hitchcock V. Galveston, 96 U. S., 341, 348. 17 Harrisonburg v. Roller, 97 Va., 582; 34 S. E. Rep., 523. Work that may be done by coun- cil committees, the manner of do- ing it, reports, etc., is treated in §123. CHAPTER III. OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 1. Meetings and Pboceedings op Council ok Govebning Legisla- tive Body — Records. § 90. Municipal organization — where corporate authority vested. 91. Corporate meetings re- quired. 92. Kinds of corporate meetings stated — notice. 93. New England town meetings — notice or warning indis- pensable. 94. Sufficiency of notice or warning. 95. What the notice or warning must specify. 96. Legal governing body — de facto councils and officers. 97. Conflicting councils — in- junction. 98. Presiding officer — mayor as member. 99. Signing of bills by presid- ing officer. 100. When mayor's approval of proceedings necessary. 101. Mayor's approval must be in writing. 102. Casting vote by presiding officer. QUOEUJM AXD 3I.\J0RITY. 103. Quorum defined. 104. Quorum and majority at common law. 105. Quorum and majority of definite body. 106. Same — when definite vote required. 107. Vote necessary in suspend- ing rules. 108. How quorum affected by in- terest of members. 139 109. Quorum of joint assemblies of definite bodies. PROCEEDIXOS. 110. Special meetings — notice. 111. Power to adjourn meet- ings. 112. Business that may be trans- acted at adjourned meet- ings. 113. Council as continuous body. 114. Action of legislative body consisting of two branch- es. 115. Rules for conducting busi- ness — Parliamentary law. 116. Form of corporate action — mandatory and directory provisions. 117. Taking yeas and nays. 118. Reasons for requiring yeas and nays. 119. Reading bills on three dif- ferent days. 120. Ratification of void acts. 121. Reconsideration — general powers respecting. 122. Power to rescind prior acts. 123. Committees. records. 124. Record of proceedings. 125. Who to keep municipal rec- ords. 126. Sufficiency of record — pre- sumptions. 127. Same — ^taking yeas and nays. 128. Municipal records as evi- dence. 129. Parol evidence to prove rec- ord. 140 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§yu §130. Parol evidence to show omissions. 131. Same subject — imperfect record — rights of credit- ors. 132. Amendment of record. §133. Method of amending. 134. Court may order amend- ment — mandamus. 135. Amendment after lapse of time — estoppel — ex post facto. § 90. Municipal organization — Where corporate authority vested. "With respect to the enactment of ordinances and by-laws, in this country, corporations invested with the powers of local civil government may be classified under two heads: First, the New England town, in which the inhabitants thereof meet, act and vote as individuals clothed with the full powers of the corporation ; second, the municipal corporation proper, in which the inhabitants are represented in their corporate ca- pacity by certain officers or agents constituting the corporate authority. In the latter form these officers or agents are not the corporation, nor do they constitute a corporation of any character. They merely act as the servants and agents of the inhabitants of the place, who, in conjunction with the territory, constitute the corporation. ^ The inhabitants exercise their 1 United States — Kelly v. Pitts- burgh, 104 U. S., 78 ; Welch v. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dillon C. C, 130, 134, per Dillon, J. Illinois — Galesburg v. Hawkin- son, 75 111., 152, 156. Indiana — Baumgartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind., 575, 585; 50 Am. Rep., 830; Strosser v. Ft. Wayne, 100 Ind., 443, 449; Valparaiso v. Gard- ner, 97 Ind., 1, 6; 49 Am. Rep., 416. Iowa — State ex rel. v. Barker, 116 Iowa, 96; 89 N. W. Rep., 204, 206. Michigan — People ex rel. Shum- way V. Bennett, 29 Mich., 451; 18 Am. Rep., 107; Carleton v. People, 10 Mich., 250, 253. TSIetv Hampshire — Wells v. Bur- bank, 17 N. H., 393, 404. New York — Clarke v. Rochester, 14 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 193; 5 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 107; Lowber v. New York, 5 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 325, 329; Brady v. Supervisors, etc., 2 Sandf. (N. Y.), 460, 469. Pennsylvania — Appeal of Wha- len, 16 Pitts. Leg. Journ. (Pa.), 113. Tennessee — O'Connor v. Mem- phis, 6 Lea (Tenn.), 730, 736; Luehrman v. Taxing District, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 425. West Virginia — Brown v. Gates, 15 W. Va., 131. ISngland — Reg. v. Paramore, 10 Ad. & El., 286 ; Rex v. Mitchell, 10 East, 511. 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp., § 258; Grant, Corporations, 357; 1 Thomp- son, Corp., sec. 16; Biggar, Mun. Manual of Canada, p. 36. There is no legal identity be- tween the corporation and the in- habitants who compose it. The corporate body is a distinct legal entity. Mayhew v. Gayhead, 13 Allen (Mass.), 129, 134. While the mayor and members of the council are regarded as pub- lic trustees in a general sense, they are not so technically, so as § 90] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 141 corporate frtmchises by the selection of the officers who repru- seut theiu, and the latter constitute the corporate authorities in whom are vested, for the time being, the powers of the corporation. It is by and through such officers and agenls that the corporation acts in all things. The executive and administrative affairs are generally in the hands of a chief executive (commonly called a mayor) and other chief officers elected by the people at large or appointed, and in the larger cities usually specified functions, as education, sanitation, public charities, public work, etc., are committed to adminis- trative and executive boards and departments. The legisla- tive powers are conferred upon particular officers, elected by the voters at large, or by wards or municipal sub-divisions, variously designated as aldermen, delegates, eouncilmen, se- lectmen, trustees, supervisors, etc., who constitute the legisla- tive or governing body, commonly called the council or common council. This latter body is sometimes composed of two hoiises, branches or boards, and the concurrence of both is ordinarily required to complete any given corporate action, especially acts considered purely legislative, as in the passage of ordinances, or by-laws, regulations and resolutions of a permanent nature ; and to constitute the given act the legal action of the corporation, the approval of the maj-or is fre- quently required. Thus where the charter commits the powers of the corporation to the mayor and eouhcil, the latter may not exercise the corporate powers without the concurrence of the mayor in the manner prescribed.- Various forms of mu- nicipal organization, showing where corporate authority is vested, are indicated in the notes.* to subject them to chancery con- rate limits: Civil Code Ala., 1896, Lrol, as ordinary trustees. Semmes sec. 2951. V. Columbus, 19 Ga., 471. California — In San Francisco the 2 Saxton V. Beach, 50 Mo., 488. governing legislative body is de- See Sec. 149, post. nominated the board of supervis- 3 Alabama — In a few states, as ors. Charter of San Francisco, in Alabama, the corporate authori- art. II., ch. 1, § 1; Statutes and ty of towns is vested in an in- Amendments to Codes of Cal. tendant and aldermen (usually (1899), p. 244. The board of trus- five). Civil Code Ala., 1896, sec. tees is the legislative body of mu- 2942. The intendant has the pow- nicipal corporations of the sixth er and jurisdiction of a justice of class in California. Mintzer v. the peace in all matters, civil or Schilling, 117 Cal., 361 ; 49 Pac. criminal, arising within the corpo- Rep., 209. 143 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§90 Unless restricted by the constitution, the legislature may confer upon any department of the municipal government, as Colorado — It seems that the con- stitution of Colorado does not im- peratively require local aldermanic representation in towns or cities. Valverde v. Shattuck, 19 Colo., 104; 34 Pac. Rep., 947; 41 Am. St. Rep., 208. Massachusetts — In Massachusetts the mayor, aldermen and common council possess all powers of the city as a municipal corporation, except those specially reserved by charter to be exercised by the peo- ple. The body may accept a char- ter. Central Bridge Corporation V. Lowell, 15 Gray (Mass.), 106, 116. Missouri — In the City of St. Louis the governing legislative body is designated "The municipal assem- bly," and is composed of two houses, namely the council, elected by the electors at large, and house of delegates, elected by wards. Charter of City of St. Louis, an. III.; The Municipal Code of St. Louis (1901), p. 202° et seq. In Kansas City the common council is composed of two houses known as the upper and lower house. Charter Kansas City, art. New Hampshire — In New Hamp- shire, by express statutory pro- vision the administration of all fiscal, prudential and municipal af- fairs of a city, and the government thereof, are vested in the council, and all powers vested by law in towns, or in the inhabitants there- of, are exercised by the city coun- cils. Perry v. Keene, 58 N. H., 40. These provisions are not mod- ified by a general statute which re- quires the mayor and aldermen to call a general meeting of the in- habitants for any purpose not un- constitutional or otherwise illegal, when requested to do so in writing by one hundred legal voters. "And there is not sufficient ground for holding this section to be an im- plied qualification of the sections which transfer to city councils the power of municipal legisla- tion and administration." Kelley V. Kennard, 60 N. H., 1, 3. Even a vote concerning the construction of a highway, passed at a meeting of the inhabitants of a city does not control the action of the city council; it is merely advisory. J&. Ohio — In the principal cities of Ohio the legislative body is known as the house of legislation. Cincinnati — Under the New Mu- nicipal Code (Oct. 22, 1902) Cin- cinnati is entitled to 29 members in the city council, 24 elected by wards, and five at large. Zumstein V. Mullen, 67 Ohio St., 382; 66 N. E. Rep., 140. Virginia — Kirkham v. Russell, 76 Va., 956, 958. West Virginia — Richards v. Clarksburg, 30 W. Va., 491; 4 S. E. Rep., 774; 20 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 111. Town — In tbe towns of New England the legislative body is usually composed of selectmen, and in the New England cities, of ald- ermen. McFarland v. Gordon, 70 Vt., 455, 456; 41 Atl. Rep., 507. In Vermont a town agent may em- ploy legal services in behalf of the town. Langdon v. Castleton, 30 Vt, 285. Township — Under a statute con- ferring corporate powers in gen- eral upon "townships," the power of selecting a site for erecting a township hall thereon was held to be vested in the board of direct- ors and not in the citizens of the §90J OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 143 upon the mayor aud council, the council alone, or the board of health,* board of public works,' police board," excise com- township assembled en masse. State ex rel. v. Haynes, 72 Mo., 377, 379. Under the Illinois system of township organization there is no board representing the corporate authorities of the town, but the electors represent themselves as a corporation. Kankakee v. K. & I. R. R. Co., 115 111., 88, 90; 3 N. E. Rep., 741. Village — In villages in some states the chief officer is designa- ted the village president. State ex rel. Shumway v. Bennett, 29 Mich., 451; 18 Am. Rep., 107; Kriseler v. Le Valley, 122 Mich., 576; 81 N. W. Rep., 580. Aldermen and councilmen are civil officers under the constitu- tion of Rhode Island. In re New- port Charter, 14 R. I., 655. Under a charter which provides that the common council shall have power "to manage, regulate and control the property, real and per- sonal, of the city," the propriety of demolishing and removing or repairing a municipal building is a question exclusively for such con- trol. The fact that the question had been determined otherwise by a majority of the electors of the city upon the submission to them by action of a prior council does not take away the power. Whit- ney V. New Haven, 58 Conn., 450; 20 Atl. Rep., 666. The number of councilmen, ald- ermen, etc., is controlled by the law applicable, its proper construc- tion, etc. Com. V. Omensetter, 9 Phila. (Pa.), 489; Petition of Young, 11 Pa. County Ct. Rep., 209, Com. V. Hastings, 16 Pa. County Ct. Rep., 425 ; State v. Champlin, 16 R. I., 453; 17 Atl. Rep., 52. ■" BOAKDS OF HEALTH havc powcr to enact sanitary ordinances hav- ing the force of laws within the districts over which their jurisdic- tion operates. Polinsky v. People, 73 N. Y., 65; People v. Board ol Health, 33 Barb. (N. Y.), 344; Cushing V. Buffalo Board of Health, 13 N. Y. St. Rep., 783. Where the functions of a board of health are executive and admin- istrative, it has no power to pasj? resolution declaring nuisances. Marshall v. Cadwalader, 36 N. J. L., 283. May grant permit by resolution, when. Courter v. Newark Board of Health, 54 N. J. L., 325 ; 23 Atl. Rep., 949. Resolution declaring nuisance. Philadelphia v. Houseman, 2 Phila. (Pa.), 349; 14 Leg. Int. (Pa.), 316. Notice of passage, when not re- quired. Yonkers Board of Health V. Copcutt, 140 N. Y., 12; 35 N. E. Rep., 443. Veto on ordinance of. In re Board of Health, 14 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep., 116. Enforcement of "order" of board of health, to which is attached no penalty. New York Health De- partment V. Knoll, 70 N. Y., 530. 5 Boards of Public Works may pass ordinances granting fran- chises to lay tracks for street rail- ways. State (West Jersey Trac- tion Co.) V. Board of Public Works, 56 N. J. L., 431; 29 Atl. Rep., 163. Police board — In Boston the police board may be empowered by the legislature to regulate the use of streets in certain respects. Com. V. Plaisted, 148 Mass., 375; 19 N. E. Rep., 224. 144: OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§91 missioners,^ etc.,'' or upon other public bodies," the authority to enact and enforce ordinances. This necessarily results from, and is incidental to, the plenary power to create munici- pal and other public corporations. Such ordinances may be given the force of law in like manner as ordinances duly enacted by municipal corporations proper.^" § 91. Corporate meetings required. All of the public or corporate affairs of the municipal corporation must be trans- acted in substantially the manner pointed out by the law. In the representative form these matters must be done at a legal meeting of the council or governing body. Where the in- habitants themselves constitute the corporate authorities, as in the New England town, the municipal affairs must be con- ducted at a legal corporate meeting of such inhabitants. The fundamental principle is that the affairs of a corporate body can be transacted only at a valid corporate meeting. Its legislative and discretionary powers can be exercised only by the coming together of the members who compose it, or those who are its duly constituted representatives— the legal corpo- rate authorities— and its purposes or will can be expressed only by acts or vrttes embodied in some distinct and definite form.ii The existence of the council or governing body is as a board or entity, and the members thereof can do no valid ^ Excise department — Certain of lo Ordinances of board of health the local police powers may be have the force of law. People ex conferred by the legislature upon rel. v. Court of Special Sessions certain city departments, as the ex- Justices, 7 Hun. (14 Sup. Ct.), else commissioners. State (Riley) 214. See Sec. 12, supra. V. Trenton, 51 N. J. L., 498; 18 u A municipal corporation in Atl. Rep., 116; State (Paul) v. legal contemplation is an entity Gloucester, 50 N. J. L., 585; 15 possessing for many purposes the Atl. Rep., 272; State (Hankinson) attributes of individuality; and in V. Trenton, 51 N. J. L., 495; 17 the exercise of its legitimate pow- Atl. Rep., 1083. ers can only act by and through 8 Police jury may pass ordinan- its agents appointed- in the mode ces. Davis v. Caldwell, 28 La. prescribed by the law of its cre- Ann., 860. ation. The rights of individual County board of supervisors, corporators can only be enjoyed People V. Bailhache, 52 Cal., 310. by and through the agents con- State may create metropolitan stituted by law to exercise the cor- sanitary districts. Metropolitan porate powers. "A contrary doc- Board of Health v. Heister, 37 N. trine carried to its ultimate con- Y., 661. sequences would require the affirm- Police districts. People v. Dra- ative consent of each individual per, 15 N. Y., 532. corporator to every act done by S'91] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. l-io act except as a board/- and such act, if legislative in char- acter, must ordinarily be by ordinance, by-law or resolution, or something equivalent thereto.^* the corporate authorities affecting his interest before he could be- come bound by such act; the result of which would be to render entire- ly useless and nugatory the corpo- rate government." People ex rel. V. Coon, 25 Cal., 635, 649. 12 United States — Strong v. Dis- trict of Columbia, 4 Mackey (15 D. C), 242; 9 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 568; Leavenworth County Commissioners v. Sellew, 99 U. S., 624. Arkansas — Little Rock v. Board of Improvements, 42 Ark., 152. California — San Luis Obispo Co. V. Hendricks, 71 Cal., 242; 11 Pac. Rep., 682; Ex parte Mirande, 73 Cal., 365; 14 Pac. Rep., 888. Florida — Com'rs v: King, 13 Fla., 451. Iowa — Independent School Dis- trict V. Wirtner, 85 Iowa, 387; 52 N. W. Rep., 243 ; Hull v. Independ- ent District, 82 Iowa, 686; 46 N. W. Rep., 1053; Athearn v. Inde- pendent District, 33 Iowa, 105. Kentucky — Hardin County v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 92 Ky., 412; 7 S. W. Rep., 860; Maddox v. Graham, 2 Mete. (Ky.), 56. Maryland — Baltimore v. Poult- ney, 25 Md., 18. Massachusetts — Coffin v. Nan- tucket, 5 Cush. (59 Mass.), 269; Central Bridge Co. v. Lowell, 15 Gray (Mass.), 106; Reed v. Lan- caster, 152 Mass., 500; 25 N. E. Rep., 974; Butler v. Charlestown, 7 Gray (Mass.), 12; Sikes v. Hat- field, 13 Gray (Mass.), 347. Missouri — State v. Haynes, 72 Mc, 377; Smith v. Tobener, 32 Mo. App., 601. New Jersey — Schumm v. Sey- mour, 24 N. J. Eq., 143, 153; State V. Jersey City, 35 N. J. L., 404; State V. Van Buskirk, 40 N. J. L., 463; State v. Jersey City, 25 N. J. L., 309. New York — Delaware Co. Comrs. V. Sackrider, 35 N. Y., 154; People V. Walker, 23 Barb. (N. Y.), 304; Johnson v. Dodd, 56 N. Y., 76; People V. Superior Court, 19 Wend. (N. Y.), 68; People v. Stowell, 9 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.), 45*6. North Carolina — Pegram v. Cleveland County Com'rs, 64 N. C, 557. OAio— McCortle v. Bates, 29 Ohio St., 419; Young v. Rushsyl- vania, 8 Ohio Clr."Ct. Rep., 75. Pennsylvania — Rittenhouse's Es- tate, 140 Pa. St., 172, 176; 21 Atl. Rep., 254; Commonwealth v. How- ard, 149 Pa., 302; 24 Atl. Rep., 308; Jefferson County v. Slagle, 66 Pa. St., 202. Wisconsin — State v. Madison Council, 15 Wis., 30, 37; Deischel V. Maine, 81 Wis., 553; 51 N. W. Rep., 880. County commissioners can only bind the county for legal services when acting as a board, and not severally. Cass Co. Comrs. v. Ross, 46 Ind., 404; Rankin v. Jauman (Idaho, 1895), 39 Pac. Rep., 1111; Conger v. Commissioners (Idaho, 1896), 48 Pac. Rep., 1064. A committee chosen by a town for a particular purpose may act by agreement of the individual members separately obtained. Shea V. Milford, 145 Mass., 528; 14 N. E. Rep., 764; Haven v. Lowell, 5 Mete. (Mass.), 35. 13 Dey V. Jersey City, 19 N. J. Eq., 412, 416; Halsey v. Rapid Transit R. R. Co., 47 N. J. Eq., 380; 20 Atl. Rep., 859. 10 146 OF ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. [? 92 How the council or governing body sliall be constituted, its powers and the method of executing them are usually specified in the municipal charter. The functions of the governing body are chiefly legislative, but these bodies sometimes per- form administrative, ministerial and judicial duties. § 92. Kinds of corporate meetings stated— Notice. Corpo- rate meetings may be (1) regular or stated, (2) special or called, and (3) adjourned. Regular meetings are usually pre- scribed by charter. They are sometimes provided for by ordinance, resolution or motion, under legal authority. Special or called meetings are convened by the mayor or chief execu- tive of the corporation, the presiding officer of the corporate body, or in some other definite way, upon due notice to all of the members.!* A legal notice to all of those composing or representing the corporate body of every meeting is requisite, since it is not only the duty but the right of each member to be present and participate in the deliberations and proceedings. Thus where the law requires that the meeting be duly called and notified, omission to do this will invalidate the proceedings where the meeting is not attended by all of the members composing the body. The mere attendance of a quorum under such circum- stances does not make a legal meeting, but every member has 14 A stated meeting is one ap- mon council, but in fact the corn- pointed by the council. A special mon council became in almost ev- meeting is called by the mayor or ery instance a select body in which three aldermen. State v. Jersey the freemen had little or no inter- City, 25 N. J. L., 309, 311. est. This was denominated the By statute, in Illinois the coun- corporate assembly. The other cil may prescribe, by ordinance, was the select assembly and was the times and places of the meet- composed of one or more of the ings, and the manner in which governing class and of which the special meetings may be called. 1 largest became prior to the Munic- Starr & Curtis 111. Stat., p. 685, ipal Corporation Act of 1835 a sort par. 38. of common council. Willcock, CoKPOBATE MEETINGS AT COMMON Mun. Corp., 51, 52, 62, 63; Glover, LAW — According to the ancient Mun. Corp., 146, 147; Rex v. Mor- English law there were two kinds ris, 4 East, 26; Rex v. Bellringer, of corporate meetings: One con- 4 Term Rep., 823. sisted of the body at large or those By the early English law not of them who thought proper, or only the nature of the organiza- were considered by their fellow tion of the local corporation under freemen most proper, to attend. In its charter largely determined the legal supposition this was the com- validity of its corporate meetings, §92] OF ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. 147 a right to be present and participate in its action.i'^ The notice must be issued and served by the proper authority, giving the time and place of the meeting, unless held at the usual place. In ancient England the place of meeting was generally fixed, as at the guild hall; in this country, at the town or city hall. Whenever the meeting is held at an un- usual place, intimation of that circumstance must be contained in the notice, to prevent fraud or surprise.^'' Unless the meeting is convened for a special purpose, its object need not be specified in the notice." When required by law, per- sonal notice must be given where it can be done, but where a member of a board is absent from the state and beyond reach of actual notice, such notice is not necessary, but constructive notice will do.i^ If the charter or law fixes the time of the regular meetings, of course, notice is not necessary unless expressly required, as each member is charged with knowledge therefor.i^ If the charter makes no provision respecting the manner in which the time for the holding of a stated meeting shall be fixed, the council may, upon mere motion, prescribe such time, notwith- standing the time for holding such meetings had been pre- viously fixed by a formal resolution, approved by the mayor and published.-" So where the charter provides that the but prescription and usage were of great necessity or emergency." constantly invoked and the result Charter San Francisco, art. II., ch. was much uncertainty and confu- 1. § 6; Statutes and Amendments sion prior to the reforms wrought to Codes of Cal. (1899), p. 244. by the Municipal Corporation Act it Section 110, post. of 1835. 18 Where the mayor is ex offlcio 3 5 Beaver Creek v. Hastings, 52 a member of a board he must be Mich., 528; 18 N. W. Rep., 250; notified of a meeting. State ea; re». State ex rel. v. Guiney, 26 Minn., Harty v. Kirk, 46 Conn., 395, 398. 313 ; 3 N. W. Rep., 977 ; Peay v. As to notice at common law, see Schenck, 1 Woolw. C. C. (U. S.), Glover, Mun. Corp., 148, 151. 175, 187. i» People v. Batchelor, 22 N. Y., lowillcock, Mun. Corp., 51. 128, 146; Hudson County v. State, "All acts done at another than 24 N. J. L., 718; Rex v. Hill, 4 the usual place bear the stamp of Barn & Cress., 441, 443; Gilder- contrivancy, secrecy and fraud sleeve v. Board of Education, 17 and the court will suspect an im- Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 201, 208; Will- proper motive." Glover, Mun. cock, Mun. Corp., 42; Glover, Mun. Corp., 152. Corp., 148. "The board shall not adjourn to 20 state v. Kantler, 33 Minn., 69; any other place than to its regular 6 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 169; 21 place of meeting, except in case N. W. Rep., 856. 148 OF ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. L§^3 council shall meet at such time and place as it, by resolution, may direct, a meeting held at any other time than that fixed for a regular meeting, under a resolution of the council, is a legal meeting if all of the members actually attended and participated in the proceedings, and it is otherwise regular, there being nothing in the charter expressly or impliedly for- bidding such meeting.^i The charter prescribed that "stated" meetings should be held once each month. Pursuant thereto, by rule, the council appointed stated times for meetings. Here it was held such appointment continued in force in each succeeding council till duly changed.^^ § 93. New En^fland town meetings— Notice or warning in- dispensable. The rule of law is firmly established that a town may only legally act in its corporate capacity in town meeting duly notified or warned and holden. The notice or warning of the meeting cannot be legally waived even by unanimous consent.2^ Unless the meeting is legally convened, all votes 21 "The powers conferred, and the duties imposed, upon the com- mon council were obviously with the view of their being exercised whenever occasion required, and no limitation or restriction upon its right voluntarily to meet at any time for such purpose can be inferred from the fact that it is made obligatory upon it to pro- vide by resolution for a regular time and place of meeting, or the fact it may be convened at any time upon call of the mayor." State ex rel. Parker v. Smith, 22 Minn., 218, 222, 223. 22 North V. Gary, 4 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.), 357. Where a council meeting might have been regularly held, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the court will presume it to have been so held. People ex rel. v. Rochester, 5 Lans. (N. Y.), 11, 15. Acts done by a corporation which presupposes the existence of other acts to make them legally opera- tive, are presumptive proof of the latter. Bank of U. S. v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. (U. S.), 64, 70; Nelson V. Eaton, 26 N. Y., 410, 415. Where the charter provides that a majority "shall constitute a quorum to do business," a major- ity of those elected can organize and act at the first meeting, as well as at any subsequent meeting. Oakland v. Carpentier, 13 Cal., 540, 550. 23 Connecticut — Congregational Society of Bethany v. Sperry, 10 Conn., 200. Maine — Ford v. Clough, 8 Me., 334; 23 Am. Dec, 513; Lander v. School District, 33 Me., 239; Moor V. Newfield, 4 Me., 44. Massachusetts — Stoughton v. Atherton, 12 Mete. (Mass.), 105; Reynolds v. New Salem, 6 Mete. (Mass.), 340; Perry v. Dover, 12 Pick. (Mass.), 206; Little v. Mer- rill, 10 Pick. (Mass.), 543; Hay- ward V. School District, 2 Cush. (Mass.), 419; Stone v. School Dist., 8 Cush. (Mass.), 592; Rand V. Wilder, 11 Cush. (Mass.), 294. New Hampshire — Giles v. School District, 31 N. H., 304; Northwood § 94] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDlNANCEiS. 149 and acts done thereat are void.^* As stated by the Supreme Court of Vermont, the votes of a town meeting held on in- sufficient notice are no more binding upon the town than if the meeting had been held without notice, or had been a mere fortuitous assembling of any portion of the inhabitants of the town.2® "A town cannot make a contract, or authorize any officer or agent to make one in its behalf, except by vote in a town meeting duly notified and warned. "2"^ There cannot be a legal town meeting unless it be originally held at the time and in the place appointed in the warrant calling the meeting, and where a meeting is called at a school house it must be understood to mean within its walls.^^ Where the meeting is appointed in the basement of a building, and all of the voters and officers, by unanimous consent, but without a vote, go out into the open air, and in front of the place of the meeting, where they can more conveniently vote on a proposition, and there vote without objection on the part of any person, the action is legal.^* Following the rule of the common law applied to indefinite corporate bodies, where the meeting has been duly warned and called, those who attend. and participate in its proceedings, notwithstanding they may be less than a majority of all of the inhabitants legally qualified, have full power to act for and bind the town ; the absence of the others is equivalent in law to their consent to any legal action.^^ § 94. Sufficiency of notice or warning. The notice or warn- V. Barrington, 9 N. H., 369; Brew- ring to the towns of Connecticut, ster V. Hyde, 7 N. H., 206. In Bloomfield v. Charter Oak Bank, Vermont— Sherwin v. Bugbee, 17 121 U. S., 121, 129. Vt., 337; Hunt v. School District, =7 chamberlain v. Dover,. 13 Me., 14 Vt., 300; Hunneman v. Fire Dis- 466. trict, 37 Vt., 40. as Brown v. Winterport, 79 Me., Wisconsin — Rule applied to town 305 ; 9 Atl. Rep., 844. meetings in other states. Tuttle Declaring vote, polling, etc., of v. Weston, 59 Wis., 151; 17 N. W. town meetings — proceedings. Kim- Rep., 12; 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., ball v. Lamprey, 19 N. H., 215. 168. 29 Commonwealth v. Ipswich, 2 24 Haines v. Readfield, 41 Me., Pick. (Mass.), 70; Damon v. Gran- 246; Jordan v. School District, 38 by, 2 Pick. (Mass.), 345, 355; First Me., 164. Parish v. Stearns, 21 Pick. 25 Pratt V. S wanton, 15 Vt., 147, (Mass.), 148; Williams v. Lunen- 151. burg, 21 Pick. (Mass.), 75. 28 Per Mr. Justice Gray, in refer- 150 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§94 ing must be issued and served by the proper authority.*" Thus where the warrant for the meeting is required to be under the hands of the selectmen, or of a majority of them, a meeting held in pursuance of a warrant signed by one select- man only, "by order of the selectmen," is void.^^ So where the law requires that, in order to constitute a legal town meeting for the passing of by-laws, there must have been a notification in writing, signed by the selectmen and set upon the sign post five days before the meeting, specifying such by-laws among the objects of the meeting, all by-laws passed without such previous notification are void.^^ ^he object of the warrant is to give previous notice to the inhabitants of the subjects to be acted on, and, if this is done substantially, it is sufficient.^* The notice or warning is required to be served by posting or otherwise, returned and recorded in the cor- porate records as served. If it does not appear that the no- tices were not posted as required by law (as at three public places), usually they will be held sufficient, for, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption will be indulged that the law in this respect was followed.*^ The return of the warrant that the officer has "posted the within warrant ac- cording to law ' ' is sufficient, without specifying the manner of posting.*^ 30 Giles V. San Bornton, 31 N. H., 33 Per Shaw, C. J., In Torrey v. 304. Millbury, 21 Pick. (Mass.), 64, 68; Power given to the body to pre- Jones v. Andover, 9 Pick. (Mass.), scribe the mode of warning its 146. meetings does not enable it to si Stoddard v. Gilmann, 22 Vt., dispense with a warning. Congre- 568, 572. gational Society of Bethany v. ss Rand v. Wilder, 11 Gush. Sperry, 10 Conn., 200, 208. (Mass.), 294. Mandamus brought by Indlvldu- Amendment of return of service als to require the calling of a spe- allowed. Northwood v. Barring- clal meeting of a borough denied, ton, 9 N. H., 369, 376; Fossett v. the court holding that such action Bearce, 29 Me., 523. should be instituted by and in the Record of warning of meeting, name of the State. Peck v. Booth, Sherwin v. Bugbee, 17 Vt., 337. 42 Conn., 271. The return must be sufficient or 31 Reynolds v. New Salem, 6 the meeting will be illegal. State Mete. (Mass.), 340; Westminster v. Williams, 25 Me., 561. V. Bernardston, 8 Mass., 104. As to sufficiency of notice or 32 Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn., 391, warning and record of meeting, see 395, 396; Willard v. Killlngsworth, Brownell v. Palmer, 22 Conn., 107; 8 Conn., 247, 254. State v. Taff, 37 Conn., 392; Is- §95] OP ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 151 § 95. What the notice or warning must specify. The no- tice or warning must specify the matters to be acted on, in order that the inhabitants (whose property will be subject to be taken on execution to satisfy the obligations of the town) may know in advance what business is to be transacted at the meeting. If the subject of the vote is not specified in the notice or warning, the vote has no legal effect and binds neither the town nor the inhabitants.^'' Where a meeting is held for a special purpose, ordinarily it is sufficient if the notice is so expressed that the inhabitants concerned may fairly understand the purpose for which they are to be con- vened.^'' Hence, in order to render valid a vote of a town granting money for a particular object it is not necessary thai; the warrant for the meeting should state specifically that the inhabitants will be called to act on the question of granting money for that purpose, if the subject to be acted on is dis- tinctly stated, and it is one which will be likely to require a grant of money.*^ bell V. N. Y. & N. H. R. R., 25 Conn., 556; Society for Savings v. New London, 29 Conn., 174; Bald- win V. North Branford, 32 Conn., 47; N. H., M. & W. R. R. v. Chat- ham, 42 Conn., 465; Brooklyn Trust Co. V. Hebron, 51 Conn., 22, 29, 30; Fletcher v. Fuller, 120 U. S., 534; Avery v. Stewart, 1 Cush. (Mass.), 496. 36 "No one can rely upon a vote as giving him any rights against the town without proving a suffi- cient notice or warning of the meeting at which the vote was passed." Per Mr. Justice Gray, in Bloomfleld" v. Charter Oak Bank, 121 U. S., 121, 130. Connecticut — ^Willard v. Killing- worth, 8 Conn., 247, 254. Maine — Moor v. Newfleld, 4 Me., 44; Cornish v. Pease,, 19 Me., 184; Lander v. Smithfield, 33 Me., 239; Drisko v. Columbia, 75 Me., 73. Massachusetts — Stone v. Hamil- ton, 8 Cush. (Mass.), 592; Hay- ward V. North Bridgewater, 2 Cush. (Mass.), 419; Little v. Mer- rill, 10 Pick. (Mass.), 543; Stough- ton V. Atherton, 12 Met. (Mass.), 105 ; Rideout v. Dunstable, 1 Allen (Mass.), 232. New Hampshire — Brewster v. Hyde, 7 N. H., 206. Vermont — Hunt v. Norwich, 14 Vt, 300; Scho« v. Bloomfleld, 8 Vt, 472. 37 South School District v. Blakeslee, 13 Conn., 227. 38 Per Parker, C. J., in Black- burn V. Walpole, 9 Pick. (Mass.), 97. In Wisconsin under the general powers conferred by statute, the electors at a town meeting may vote to allow a certain sum in set- tlement of a claim for the support of a pauper, alttough no previous notice has been given that such claim will be presented or acted upon. Tuttle v. Weston, 59 Wis., 151; 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 168. 152 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§S6 Farther illustrations respecting the specification in the no- tice or warning appear from the cases in the note.^^ § 96. Legal governing body— De facto councils and officers. Unless corporate acts are done by the body of officers legally authorized to act, they will be declared invalid. The offices must be filled, the council or governing body constituted and the corporate acts performed as prescribed in the law appii- 38 Illustrative Cases as to Specification in Notice ok War- bant. A notice is sufficiently defi- nite which states the object of the meeting to be "to see what sum of money the town will vote to raise for the support of schools, of the poor, repairing bridges and highways, for the payment of the just debts of the town, and for other legal purposes." Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N! H., 113, 125. Under a warrant "to see if the town will make an appropriation towards purchasing a fire engine," the town may pass a vote "to raise and appropriate" a sum for that object. Torrey v. Millbury, 21 Pick. (Mass.), 64, 68. So, under a warrant "to see if the town will determine to build a town house and raise and appropriate money for the same," a vote to build a town house will be valid. Hadsell V. Hancock, 3 Gray (Mass.), 526, 530. So a warrant convening a meeting, to see if the town would vote to pay a number of town notes, which specifies each note and gives the name of the payee, amount and date, is sufficient. Brown v. Winterport, 79 Me., 305. A notice "to see if the town will accept and adopt the report of the committee to alter school districts" is sufficient, to authorize the mak- ing of such alteration as the com- mittee recommended and no other. "It would be an unwarranted con- struction, and in violation of all rules, to sever the last four words. 'to alter school districts,' from what precedes in the sentence, and hold that the alteration of school districts in any and every possible way was before the town for ac tion." Per Ross, J., in Wyley v. Wilson, 44 Vt., 404, 409. But where the annual meeting was warned, to choose town officers "and to do any other business then thought proper by said meeting," a by-law passed at such meeting to regulate the shell fisheries of the town is void, as this purpose was not specified in the warning. Hay- den v. Noyes, 5 Conn., 391, 395, 396; Willard v. Killingsworth, 8 Conn., 247, 254. Under an article in a warrant "to choose selectmen, assessors and all other officers that the law re- quires, or, may be thought neces- sary," at a legal meeting of the town a fish committee may be legally chosen. Spear v. Robinson, 29 Me., 531. So under a warrant "to choose all such town officers as the law directs," the town may lawfully pass a vote authorizing the sev- eral school districts to choose their prudential committees. Kingsbury V. Quincy School District, 12 Met. (Mass.), 99, 104; Williams v. Lunenburg School District, 21 Pick., 75. Article in the warrant "to choose all necessary town officers," is sufficient to authorize choice of an agent to build a road. Baker v. Shephard, 24 N. H., 208, 212, per Bell, J. 197] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 153 cable to the corporation.*" Thus a city organized and exist- ing under a special charter cannot elect its officers and consti- tute its governing body under the provisions of the general incorporation act of the state where the officers are different and are elected at different times than provided in its special charter. As applied to the particular corporation, the offices to which the officers were elected were held not to exist tZe jure, for the reason that there can be no office de facto where no officer de jure is provided for.*i But where offices de jure exist they may be filled by those whose official titles are defective. Hence, where a majority of the members of a council have been unlawfully elected and the council is thus illegally constituted, it is notwithstanding competent to exer- cise the functions of a lawful body.'*^ So the vote of one ineligible to legally act as a member of the council is never- theless valid as he is a de facto member.*^ § 97. Conflicting councils— Injunction. The Supreme Court *o San Luis Obispo v. Hendricks, 71 Cal., 242; 11 Pac. Rep., 682. 11 Decorah v. Bullis, 25 Iowa, 12; Ex parte Snyder, 64 Mo., 58, 62; State V. O'Brian, 68 Mo., 153, 154. To say that an officer is one de facto when the office itself Is not created or authorized is a political solecism, having no foundation in reason nor supported in law. Per Dillon, J., Welch v. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dillon, C. C, 130, 136. 42 Such body may legally elect or appoint city officers. State ex rel. Mitchell v. Tolan, 33 N. J. L., 195. De facto councilmen. State ex rel. V. Gray, 23 Neb., 365; 36 N. W. Rep., 577; Magneau v. Fremont, 30 Neb., 843; 27 Am. St. Rep., 436; 9 L. R. A., 786; 47 N. W. Rep., 280; Perkins v. Fielding, 119 Mo., 149; 24 S. W. Rep., 444; 27 S. W. Rep., 1100. De facto board of chosen free- holders. State ex rel. Bownes v. Meehan, 45 N. J. L., 189; State ex rel. Dugan v. Farrier, 47 N. J. L., 383; 1 Atl. ^ep.. 751. Acts of members of board of town trustees held illegal where they did not proceed to qualify as prescribed by charter. Dinwiddle V. Rushville, 37 Ind., 66. •13 In a New Jersey case an ordi- nance granting certain franchises to a street railway was passed by the vote of a disqualified member who had become Ineligible by rea- son of appointment to an office in the army. The charter provided that no one of the governing body "shall accept or hold any other place of public trust or emolument within the elective franchise, nor any appointment to public office unless he shall first resign his said office, and if he shall so accept, his office shall thereupon become va- cant." The validity of the ordi- nance was questioned on this ground. Here it was held: 1. That his term not having expired, and no successor having been appointed, and as he, in good faith, continued to perform the duties of his office^ he was an officer de facto. 154 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§97 of Pennsylvania restrained by injunction a body claiming to be the legally organized council at the instance of another body making a like claim and which proved to have the prima facie right to act for the corporation; the court saying that it was not necessary in such proceeding for the attorney gen- eral of the state to file the bill or be made a party, and that "it is right for those to whom public functions are entrusted to see that they are not usurped by others. Either of these bodies has the right to demand of the courts that it and the interest of the public, alleged to have been committed to it, shall be protected against usurpation of the others." The question of title between the conflicting bodies was not deter- mined. It appears that the injunction was awarded on the sole ground of public necessity, as the facts appeared to i the court.** The general rule is that injunction will not lie to determine the title to a public office.*' This jurisdiction be- longs exclusively to the courts of law, and is exercised either by certiorari^ error, or appeal, or by mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto or information in the nature of a writ of giuo 2. That his oiBcial acts were valid so far as third persons were concerned. 3. That upon acceptance of the second office his de jure title to the first ends, and his successor may be appointed at once. 4. That where the former occu- pant refuses to vacate the office his successor will he compelled to take the necessary legal steps to oust him. 5. Where an action is begun the object of which is only to de- termine the validity of an act or thing done by an officer, and not involving his integrity or want of good faith, the officer himself is not a necessary party to the suit. Oliver v. Jersey City, 63 N. J. L., 96, 634; 42 Atl. Rep., 782; 44 Atl. Rep., 709; 48 L. R. A., 412. Charter provided that council shall meet for organization on the first Monday of January at 10 a. m., and that all ofBcers shall hold their respective offices until their successors shall be elected and qualified. Held, old council had no authority to hold a meeting after time named for organization of new council, except to act in case the new members failed to qualify. Fitzgerald v. Pawtucket Av. Ry. (R. I., 1902) ; 52 Atl. Rep., 887. A charter providing that a ma- jority of the members of the coun- cil shall constitute a quorum, au- thorizes a majority to meet and organize the first time. Oakland V. Carpentier, 13 Cal., 540. •11 Kerr v. Trego, 47 Pa. St., 292, 296, et seg. See comments of Judge Dillon on this case, 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.), p. 354, n. 1 to sec. 275. *5 Updegraff v. Crans, 47 Pa. St., 103 ; Attorney General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns Ch. (N. Y.), 371; Demarest v. Wickham, 63 N. Y., 320, §98] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 155 warranto, according to the circumstances of the case and the mode of procedure established by the common law or by local statute.*" § 98. Presiding officer — Mayor as member. Municipal charters in this country, as formerly in England, do not al- ways agree in the constituents of the council or governing body. Whether the mayor shall be the presiding officer, or shall be regarded as a member, depends upon the proper con- struction of the charter, or the law under which the corpora- tion is organized.*'' Frequently the mayor or chief executive 46 "No English case has been, found of a bill for an injunction to restrain the appointment or removal of a municipal officer. In the courts of the several states such a power in a court of equity has been denied in many well-con- Sidered cases." Per Gray, J., in re Sawyer, 124 U. S., 200, 212. Equity has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the right to an office. State ex rel. v. Aloe, 152, Mo., 466; 54 S. W. Rep., 494. The right to preside cannot be determined by injunction. Coch- ran V. McCleary, 22 Iowa, 75, 86. But held that where one under- takes to preside, without color of right, to subserve public interests, injunction may prevent. Carline V. Shallenberger, 13 Pa. County Ct. Rep., 145; 23 Pittsb. Leg., J., 386. Injunction to restrain de facto mayor and aldermen from acting as such. Campbell v. Wolfender, 74 N. C, 103. Right of incumbent of an office cannot be tried in a collateral action between third persons. Facey v. Fuller, 13 Mich., 527. Special statutory provision. State ex inf. v. Bland, 144 Mo., 534; 46 S. W. Rep., 440. Where the incumbent of an offide holds it by color of right, though he is not an officer de jure, his right will not be inquired into on habeas corpus. Ex parte Strahl, 16 Iowa, 369. Quo warranto will lie to prevent officers illegally appointed or elect- ed from performing the duties of the office. Updegraff v. Crans, 47 Pa. St., 103; People ea; reZ. v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 John (N. Y.), 358. Rex V. Williams, 1 Burr., 402 Rex V. Haitford, 1 Ld. Raym., 426 Mozley v. Alston, 1 Phill., 790 Lord v. Governor, etc., 2 Phill, 739; Willcock, Mun. Corp., 456 par., 337. Councilmen superseded by oth- ers elected under void porceedings may be restored by due process of law, by action of quo warranto brought by de jure councilmen against de facto councilmen. State ex rel. v. Gray, 23 Neb., 365, 370; 36 N. W. Rep., 577; Demarest v. Wickham, 63 N. Y., 320. 4T Cochran v. McCleary, 22 Iowa, 75, where the observation is made by Dillon, J., that, "if it had been true that, in England mayors had, in virtue of their office a prescrip- tive or uniform right to preside at corporate meetings, it would not follow that they would necessarily have that right in this country." Mills V. Gleason, 11 Wis., 470. In England prior to the munici- pal coi'porations act of 1835, the right of the mayor to preside de- 156 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§98 officer of the corporation is made the presiding officer of the council or governing body, and oftentimes he is a member of it/8 and when such member he is to be regarded as a member pended upon the particular char- ter, usages and customs. The whole matter is now regulated there by statute. Per Dillon, J., in Cochran v. McCleary, 22 Iowa, 75, 81, 83; Ex parte Mayor of Bir- mingham, 3 Ellis & E., 222. At Common Law the legal head officer, although not required by the charter, must be present or the corporate assembly is incom- plete. The head officer must pre- side, to validate the corporate acts, and such officer must be the legal officer, that is, the officer de jure. Acts done at a meeting presided over by a de facto head officer who is subsequently ousted on a writ of quo warranto will be held void. "This is a common law privilege attached to his office, that no cor- porate acts done in his absence is valid." Willcock, Mun. Corp., 53, 54, 55; Glover, Mun. Corp., 153, 154, 155; Rex v. Carter, Cowp., 59; Rex v. Smart, 4 Bur., 2243; Rex V. Ipswich, 2 Ld. Raym., 1237; Rex V. Thornton, 4 East., 308; Rex V. York, 5 Term Rep., 72; Rex v. Dawes, 4 Bur., 2279; Rex v. Heb- den, Andr., 391. To convene and elect a principal officer in the absence of the mayor or head officer, and without his permission, is an offense indictable at common law. The court of the King's Bench will not only compel a mayor to convene the corpora- tion at any time when a sufficient cause is shown, by issuing the writ of mandamus, but will chastise him when his abuse of office tends to the hindrance of the administra- tion of justice in the municipality, or is otherwise detrimental to the public interest, by allowing a cnm- inal information to be filed against him. Willcock, Mun. Corp., 53, 54; Glover on Mun. Corp., 153, 154; Rex V. Atkyns, 3 Mod., 23; Rex v. Trew, 2 Barnard, 370. According to the doctrine of the ancient law, the presence of the mayor is not necessary at a select assembly, whether composed of one or more classes to whom a par- ticular kind of business is dele- gated, unless it is expressly re- quired. Willcock on Mun. Corp., 59 ; Rex V. Corry, 5 East, 379, 380; Rex V. Varlo, Cowp., 250; Rex v. Monday, Cowp., 539; Rex v. Bell- ringer, 4 Term Rep., 822; Rex v. Bower, 1 Barn. & C, 498. isHeeht v. Coale, 93 Md., 692; 49 Atl. Rep., 660; State v. Mott, 111 Wis., 19; 86 N. W. Rep., 569; Woodruff V. Stewart, 63 Ala., 206. In Illinois the mayor is the pre- siding officer. 1 Starr v. Curtis 111. Stat, p. 681, § 20. In San Fran- cisco the mayor is the presiding officer of the board of supervisors. In his absence the board appoints a presiding officer pro tempore from its own members, who has the same right to vote as other mem- bers. Charter of San Francisco, art. II,. Ch. 1, § 5; Statutes and Amend, to Codes of Cal. (1899), p. 244. The mayor is not a member in the sense in which an alderman is. Garside v. Cohoes, 34 N. Y. St., 234; 12 N. Y. Supp., 192, 195; Peo- ple V. Mount, 186 111., 560, 573 ; 58 N. E. Rep., 360; Winter v. Thris- tlewood, 101 111., 450, 452; Carrol- ton v. Clark, 21 111. App., 74 ; Price V.' Beale, 5 Pa. County Ct. Rep., 491; Darrach v. Kenney, 12 Pa. County Ct. Rep., 391; Com. v. §98] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 157 for all purposes, though only voting in event of a tie.*^ Under a charter providing "that the mayor, recorder and aldermen when assembled together and organized shall constitute the common council," etc., the mayor is thus made a member oJ: the council.^" In one case the charter recited that ' ' the mayor shall preside at all meetings of the city council, and shall have a casting vote when the council is equally divided, and none other," and also required "a concurrence of a majority of the whole number of members elected to the council, to pass any by-law, ordinance," etc. Here it was held that an ordinance required the concurrent vote of a majority of all of the eoun- cilmen elected. Thus where the council consists of four members and two vote yea and two fail to vote, and the mayor votes yea, this is not sufficient, the court saying that ' ' the vote of the mayor added nothing to the significance of the proceed- ing."^^ Under substantially the same charter provisions a contrarv conclusion has been reaehed.^^ The fact that the Kempsmith, 13 Pa. County Ct. Rep., 667; Zane v. Rosenberry, 153 Pa. St., 38; 25 Atl. Rep., 1086; 32 Wkly. Notes Cases, 73; 12 Pa. County Ct. Rep., 382. "In some cases there is a sepa- rate council which is only one of the parts of the legislature, and requiring the approval of another board, or of the mayor, acting separately, as the governor does, to complete their action. But most of our cities in their earlier stages, if not permanently, have had a council where the mayor sits in person and over whose action he has no veto. And in all such cases he has been deemed a member as clearly as the aldermen." Per Campbell, C. J., in People ex rel. V. Harshaw, 60 Mich., 200, 202, 26 N. W. Rep., 879. The minutes need not aflarmatively recite the mayor's presence at the council meeting. Aurora Water Co. v. Aurora, 129 Mo., 540, 578; 31 S. W. Rep., 946. *9 Griffin v. Messenger, 114 Iowa, 99; 86 N. W. Rep., 219; People v. Batchelor, 22 N. Y., 128. 50 People ex rel. v. Harshaw, 60 Mich., 200 ; 26 N. W. L. Rep., 879. Under a charter provision "that the intendent of police shall have a seat in the board of commission- ers, and when present shall pre- side therein; in his absence the board shall appoint a chairman pro tempore," held that the intend- ant is thus constituted a member. Raleigh v. Sorrell, 1 Jones (46 N. C), 49. 51 State ex rel. v. Gray, 23 Neb., 365, 369; 36 N. W. Rep., 577. 52 The charter provisions were: "The mayor shall preside at all meetings of the city council but shall not vote except in case of a lie, when he shall give the casting vote." "The . concurrence of a majority of all the members in the city council shall be necessary to the passage of any ordinance." Here it was held that the mayor is constituted a member of the council, and as such is entitled to vote in case of a tie on the ques- tion of the passage of an ordinance. Carrollton v. Clark, 21 111. App., 74. 158 OF ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. [§98 mayor is required to approve certain ordinances before they talie effect does not make him a member of the governing body.ss In some instances the council or governing body elects its own presiding officer.'^* In the absence of express provision a majority vote of a legal quorum will be sufficient to elect.'^^-' Where the body has the power to choose its own presiding officer from its own members, the office is held at the will and authority of a majority of the members, and hence the body has the inherent power to remove such officer at any time, unless prohibited by some express constitutional or statutory provision.^^ The presiding officer is not entitled to vote by virtue of his office, but of course if he is a member of the body he may vote as such member. He may also vote the second time in case of a tip if the charter confers this privilege.^^ The ordinary powers of a corporation do not vest until the body is organized by the selection of a presiding officer. But acquiescence of the members in the presidency of one who has color of right— a de facto officer— is tantamount to electing him pro hac vice, and so the actual organization is complete.^* 53 Jacobs V. San Francisco, 100 Cal., 121; 34 Pac. Rep., 630. 54 Cochran v. McCleary, 22 Iowa, 75, 81; Achley's Case, 4 Abb. Pr. (N. Yf), 35; Commonwealth v. Kepner, 10 Phila. (Pa.), 510. Where a board of aldermen had power to elect its own presiding officer and the power of removal is vested in the mayor and alder- men, an act removing a police officer by the board is not invalid because the mayor did not preside. Lowrey v. Central Falls, 23 R. I., 354; 50 Atl. Rep., 639. Election and term of presiding officer under particular provisions. People V. Strack, 1 Hun. (N. Y.), 96 ; 3 Thomp. & C, 165 ; Armatage V. Fisher, 74 Hun. (N. Y.), 167; Com. V. Angle, 14 Pa. County Ct. Rep., 538. 55 state ex rel. v. Farr, 47 N. J. h., 208. 56 State ex rel. Fox. v. Alt., 26 Mo. App., 673, 675, 676; State ex rel. V. Kiichli, 53 Minn., 147; 54 N. W. Rep., 1069; 19 L. R. A., 779, citing Cushing's Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, sees. 294 to 299, and In re Speakership of the House of Representatives, 15 Colo., 520; 25 Pac. Rep., 707; 11 L. R. A., 241. 57 Carleton v. People, 10 Mich., 250; Launtz v. People, 113 111., 137; 55 Am. Rep., 405; Carrolton V. Clark, 21 111. App., 74; Carroll V. Wall, 35 Kans., 36 ; 10 Pac. Rep., 1; Hildreth v. Mclntyre, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.), 206; People v. White, 24 Wend. (N. Y.), 520; Rex V. Westwood, 4 Barn. & Cress., 799 ; Parry v. Berry, Comyns., 269; Rex V. Croke, Cowp., 26; Green v. Dur- ham, 1 Burr., 131; Rex v. Head, 4 Burr., 2513. 58 Dugan V. Farier, 47 N. J. L., 383, 385 ; 1 Atl. Rep., 751, § 99] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 159 S 99. Signing of bills by presiding officer. Some charters provide that before a bill shall become an ordinance it shall be signed by the presiding ofiRcer of the council, or, where the legislative department consists of two branches, by the pre- siding officer of each house. Before the signature is affixed, the bill is read at length, and if no objections are made the presiding officer in the presence of the house in open session signs it and the fact is noted in the record.^^ Substantially the same provision exists in the constitutions of most of the states. The mere signature of the presiding officer must not be confounded with the approval of the legislation on the part of the mayor which is frequently required. This subject is considered in subsequent sections.^" An entry that the presiding officer signed the bill in open session is sufficient. "^ If no objections are noted in the jour- nal, the presumption will be indulged that all provisions were observed."- Where a bill has passed the body in accordance with charter provisions, the presiding officer must sign it, if no objections are made and sustained in the mode specified in the charter. The mere physical act of signing is simply min- isterial and not an exercise of legislative discretion, and mandamus will lie to compel its performance. To hold other- where a city charter provided President is "absent" when he that the mayor should be ex officio vacates his seat, and refuses to act, a member of the board of railroad and a president pro tempore may commissioners and preside at its be chosen to preside, though the meetings when present, but should regular president remains in the have no vote unless there be a tie, room. Keith v. Covington, "22 Ky. it was held that it was necessary L. Rep., 1414; 60 S. W. Rep., 709. to the legality of a meeting of the .^ charter St. Louis, Mo., art. board that the mayor should be jjj _ ^ 32- The Municipal Code of notified of the meeting, and there- g^. ^ouis, p. 207; 2 R. S. Mo. fore, that an officer appointed by n899) p 2483 S 22. the board at a meeting of which „„ „ ' „ ^. „ , 4. "" § 149, post. the mayor was not notified was not '' legally appointed, although there "' Heman Construction Co. v. was a majority of the votes of the Loevy, 64 Mo. App., 430. members in his favor, making a "^ Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. case in which the mayor would Hunt, 100 Mo., 22, 26; 13 S. W. have no vote. State ex rel. Harty Rep., 98; State ex rel. v. Mead, 71 V. Kirk, 46 Conn., 395. Mo., 266; State ex rel. McCaftery One not a member of a board v. Mason, 155 Mo., 486; 55 S. W. cannot preside and declare the Rep., 636. vote. State ex rel. Harty v. Kirk, 46 Conn., 395. 160 OP ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§ 100 wise would be practically to invest the presiding officer with a power of veto upon the legislation of the council, not grant- ed in the charter, or, in effect, reduce the membership of the body to one, namely, the presiding officer."-'' §100. When mayor's approval of proceedings necessary. The ancient common law doctrine that the head officer or mayor is an integral part of the corporation, and hence all corporate acts done in his absence, unless otherwise provided in the charter, are invalid, has never been applied to the office of mayor in this country."* Here the powers and duties of the mayor depend almost entirely upon the proper construc- tion of the charter, and the ordinances or by-laws and munici- pal regulations passed in pursuance of such authority. As pointed out by the Supreme Court of Indiana, properly and primarily the powers and duties of the mayor are executive and administrative and not judicial or legislative; but other powers may.be, and often are, conferred upon him."^ "Whether the mayor's signature is essential to the validity of the pro- ceedings depends upon the charter, but unless it is made essential it has generally been held merely directory. Charter provisions requiring ordinances to be recorded and the records signed by the presiding officer, mayor, recorder or clerk are generally held directory. This is regarded as a mere minis- terial duty, and hence its omission will not invalidate the proceedings."" 83 state ex rel. v. Meier, 143 Mo., is presiding he may be directed to 439, 447, 448; 45 S. W. Rep., 306, leave tlie chair, and the deputy- affirming 72 Mo. App., 618. Al- reeve may be directed to preside though this case appears entirely and sign and seal the by-law. Pres- sound it is criticised in a later de- ton and Manvers, 21 U. C. Q. B., cision by the same court and per- 626. haps overruled. Albright v. Pish- Ordinance held valid although er, 164 Mo., 56; 64 S. W. Rep., 106, not signed by the presiding officer with two judges dissenting. Com- as required by charter. Saleno v. pare ^ajporte Echols, 39 Ala., 698; Neosho, 127 Mo., 627; 48 Am. St. State ex rel. v. Stone, 120 Mo., Rep., 653; 27 L. R. A., 769; 30 S. 428; 25 S. W. Rep., 376; State ex W. Rep., 190. rel. v. Bolt, 151 Mo., 362; 52 S. 64 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4th W. Rep., 262. Ed.), 271; Welch v. Ste. Gene- Where a reeve of a township vieve, 1 Dillon C. C, 130. (Canada) refuses to sign, and put cs Martlndale v. Palmer, 52 Ind., the seal on a by-law duly passed 411. at a council meeting at which he se Stevenson v. Bay City, 26 § lOlJ OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. l(Ji V § 101. Mayor's approval must be in writing. The approval of the mayor must be in writing. It will not do to leave the validity to depend upon the uncertainty of parol evidence.^^ The Supreme Court of Connecticut held void the practice of treating votes of the council as approved unless disapproved. In this case the mayor testified that he was in favor of the resolution in question and would have approved it in writing had he deemed it necessary, but this was held immaterial, the court observing that the word "approve" means more than expressed mental acquiescence of the mayor in the propriety of what has been done; "it means that the officer in his offi- cial capacity as the guardian of the interest of the community, having in view its welfare, and not his personal wish or advantage, shall consider the proposed legislation and deter- mine that it is proper, and make that fact known to all men with absolute certainty, by some visible, unmistakable and enduring mark, to-wit, by written declaration attested by his signature. It is not enough that in the future when the ques- tion is made. Is such an act of * * * the common council binding upon the * * # municipality, that it should depend for decision on the memory and testimony of an officer as to what was his unexpressed thought, at a former time, concerning it. Such uncertainty would be unendurable, and therefore we must assume it to be outside of the meaning of any constitution or law.""'^ Mich., 44; Conboy v. Iowa City, 2 the mayor is not essential to the Iowa, 90; Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 validity of an ordinance properly Ohio St., 96, 103; Opelousas v. passed by the corporation, how- Andrus, 37 La. Ann.^ 699. ever necessary it may be to the au- Minutes of council need not be thentication of an ordinance in signed by the clerk who records its book of records. Martindale v. them unless so required by char- Palmer, 52 Ind., 411, 414. ter. State ex rel. v. Badger, 90 67 "Most mischievous results Mo. App., 183, 188; Brophy v. Hy- might follow from the adoption of att, 10 Colo., 223; 15 Pac. Rep., a contrary rule; large powers are 399. entrusted to these municipal cor- Where.the charter provides that porations, powers liable to abuse, "all by-laws and ordinances shall and often greatly abused and strin- within a reasonable time after gent rules should be applied to their passage, be recorded In a their proceedings." State v. New- book kept for that purpose, and ark, 25 N. J. L., 399, 408; In re shall be signed by the presiding Standiford, 5 Mackey, (16 D. C), officer of the city, and attested by 549. the clerk," and the mayor is the es per Pardee, J., in New York presiding officer, the signature of & N. E. R. Co. v. Waterbury, 55 11 162 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§102 § 102. Casting vote by presiding officer. Where the pre- siding officer or mayor is a member of the council or governing body, unless expressly forbidden by law, it is generally held that he may not only vote on all questions as a constituent member, but where the charter gives him a easting vote in event of a tie he may vote the second time.'^^ The Vice- President of the United States, not being a member of the Senate, as presiding officer of the Senate has no vote unless the vote be equally divided.'^" The same rule generally ap- plies to the lieutenant governors of the various states who are the presiding officers of the several state senates. But the speaker of the National House of Representatives, and also the speakers of the houses of representatives of the several state legislatures, have a vote as a member of the body over which they preside, and also, where the law so provides, a second or casting vote in event of equal division. Here, as in other proceedings of the council or legislative body, the casting vote must be given in such a way as to indicate clearly the intention of the presiding officer. Where no mandatory charter provision prescribing the form in which it shall be cast exists, any form clearly indicating the will of the mayor will suffice. Thus where the votes are equally di- Conn., 19, 23, 24; 10 Atl. Rep., officer, virtute officii, in the words, 162. 'he shall have the casting vote.' 60 Whitney v. Hudson, 69 Mich., What is the legal effect of the lat- 189; 37 N. W. Rep., 184; 30 Am. ter grant? By the common law, a & Eng. Corp. Cas., 453, n. casting vote sometimes signifies A statute relating to religious the single vote of a person who corporations required the rector to never votes; but in the case of an preside at every meeting of the equality, sometimes the double board of trustees, "and have the vote of a person who first votes casting vote." Held that the term witTi the rest, and then upon an "casting vote" is to be construed equality, creates a majority by as authorizing the chairman, after giving a second vote. 1 Bl. Com., having first voted with the rest, 181, n., 478, n." People ex rel. v. upon a tie occurring, to give a sec- Rector, etc., 48 Barb. (N. Y.), 603, end vote. Under the law the 606. chairman was made a member of Where the mayor is not a mem' the body corporate. The statute ber he cannot vote to make a tie, "first vests the power of election in and then give the casting vote, a body of which the chairman is Bousquet v. State, 78 Miss., 478; a constituent member of a right 29 So. Rep., 399. to vote. It then contains another ^o u. S. Constitution, Art. 1, grant of power to the presiding Sec. 3. §103] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 163 vided, a declaration by the presiding officer that a motion or resolution carried has been held to be a casting voteJi Like- wise if the presiding officer declares the motion or resolution as lost he will be deemed to have given the casting voteJ^ QUORUM AND MAJORITY. § 103. Quorum defined. The quorum of a body may be de- fined to be that number of the body which when legally as- sembled in their proper place will enable them to transact their proper business, or, in other words, that number that makes a lawful body and gives them power to pass a law or ordinance or do any other valid corporate act.^^ cannot be given to make a major- ity in favor of one candidate when the other votes are scattered among other candidates. State v. Mott, 111 Wis., 19; 86 N. W. Rep., 569. Where three vote yea, two do not vote and one votes for another, the latter three being recorded as voting no, and the mayor declares a tie^ and casts his vote with the three yea votes, there is no elec- tion. State ex rel. v. Alexander, 107 Iowa, 177; 77 N. W. Rep., 841. Where there are four votes for and four votes against, the mayor may give the casting vote. Mc- Court V. Beam (Oregon, 1902), 69 Pac. Rep., 990. Casting vote in deciding election. State ex rel v. Kramer, 1.50 Mo., 89; 51 S. W. Rep., 716 ; 47 L. R. A., 551. Casting vote by mayor to con- firm his own appointee. He may — State ex rel. v. Pinkerman, 63 Conn., 176, 191; 28 Atl. Rep., 110; Hecht V. Coale, 93 Md., 692; 49 Atl. Rep., 660; State ex rel. v. Yates, 19 Mont, 239; 37 L. R. A., 205; 47 Pac. Rep., 1004; Carroll V. Wall, 35 Kan., 36; 10 Pac. Rep., 1. Contra, State ex rel. v. Whitehead, 67 N. J. L., 405; 51 Atl. Rep., 472. 73 Heiskell v. Mayor of Balti- more, 65 Md., 125, 149; 4 Atl. Rep., 116. A Qt-orfm is such a number of 71 Launtz v. People, 113 111., 137 ; Rushville Gas Co. v. Rushville, 121 Ind., 206; 6 L. R. A., 315; 23 N. E. Rep., 72; 16 Am. St. Rep., 388; Small V. Orne, 79 Me., 78, 81; 8 Atl. Rep., 152. S. P. State v. Arm- strong, 54 Minn., 457; 56 N. W. Rep., 97. When not, see Hornung v. State, 116 Ind., 458; 19 N. B. Rep., 151; Lawrence v. Ingersoll, 88 Tenn., 52; 12 S. W. Rep., 422; 17 Am. St. Rep., 870; 6 L. R. A., 308. 72 People ex rel. v. Rector, etc., 48 Barb. (N. Y.), 603, 607. Mayor to cast vote in event of lie. Wooster v. MuUins, 64 Conn., 340; 30 Atl. Rep., 144; 25 L. R. A., 094; Gostin v. Brooks, 89 Ga., 244; 15 S. E. Rep., 361; CarroUton v. Clark, 21 111. App., 74. Mayor can only vote in case of tie. Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La. Ann., 162; Brown v. Foster, 88 Me., 49; 33 Atl. Rep., 662; 31 L. R. A., 116; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. V. Dunkirk, 65 Hun. (N. Y.), 494, affirmed 143 N. Y., 660; 39 N. E. Rep., 21. When president of council can- not vote even in case of tie, see People v. Bresler, 171 N. Y., 302; 63 N. E. Rep., 1093. In the election of officers the casting vote may be given only when there is an equal division of votes between the candidates. It 164 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§104 § 104. Quorum and majority at common law. At common law, in corporations consisting of an indefinite number, a major part of those who are existing at the time, when legally- convened, are competent to act for the corporation. This rule is applicable to New England towns."^* But when the body is definite there must be a major part of the whole number of members composing it, and not merely a major part of its existing members. When such body is legally assembled a majority thereof may do valid acts for the corporation.''^ members of a body as is compe- tent to transact business in the absence of the other members. State V. Wilkesville Tp., 20 Ohio St., 288. A word used to denote a certain number of persons whose presence is requisite at meetings of public or private bodies for the transac- tion of business. Burrill's Law Diet., tit. "Quorum;" Century- Diet. & Cyc, tit. "Quorum." Origin — The term arose from the Latin words, Quorum aliquem ves- trum * * * unum esse volu- Tnus (of whom we wish some one of you to be one), which were used in the commission formerly issued to justices of the peace in England, by which commission it was directed that no business of certain kinds should be done with- out the presence of one or more of certain justices specially desig- nated. 1 Bl. Com., 351; Burrill's Law Dictionary, title "Quorum;' Century Diet. & Cyc, tit. "Quo rum." 74 Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick, (Mass.), 345, 355; Com. v. Ipswich, 2 Pick. (Mass.), 70; -Williams v Luenburg, 21 Pick. (Mass.), 75; First Parish v. Stearns, 21 Pick (Mass.), 148. '6 English — Rex v. Varlow, Cowp., 250; Rex v. Monday, Cowp 530; Rex v. Bellringer, 4 Term Rep., 822; Gosling v. Veley, 7 Q. B., 406 ; New Haven Local Board V. School Board, 30 Ch. Div., 350 Rex v. Gaborian, 11 East., 87, note Cotton V. Davis, 1 Strange, 53 Cortis V. Kent Waterworks, 7 Barn & C, 314; Blackerr v. Bliz- ard, 9 Barn & C, 851; King v. Miller, 6 Durnf. & East (6 Term Rep.), 268, 278; Rex v. Bower, 1 Barn & Cress., 492; King v. Greet, 8 Barn & Cress., 363; Rex v. Dev- onshire, 1 Barn & Cress., 609; Rex V. Headley, 7 Barn & Cress., 496. United States — St. Joseph Tp. v. Rogers, 16 Wall. (U. S.), 644. California — Smith v. Los Ange- les I., etc., Assn., 78 Cal., 289; 12 Am. St. Rep., 53; 20 Pac. Rep., 677. Iowa — Buell v. Buckingham, 16 Iowa, 284; 85 Am. Dec, 516. Louisiana — Warnock v. Lafay- ette, 4 La. Ann., 419. Maine — Cram v. Bangor House, 12 Me., 354. Massachusetts — Sargent v. Web- ster, 13 Mete (Mass.), 497; First Parish v. Stearns, 21 Pick. (Mass.), 148. Michigan — Cahill v. Kalamazoo Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Doug. (Mich.), 124; 43 Am. Dec, 457; Ten Eyck V. Pontiac R. R., etc., Co., 74 Mich., 226; 16 Am. St. Rep., 633; 41 N. W. Rep., 905. Missouri — Columbia Bottom Levee Co. v. Meier, 39 Mo., 53; State V. Binder, 38 Mo., 450. §10oJ OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 165 § 105. Quorum and majority of definite body. Ordinarily municipal charters specify the number of votes required to constitute legal action of the council or governing body in any given case.''® In enacting ordinances or resolutions of a per- manent character a majority of the constituent members of the body is generally required, but in passing resolutions or motions of a temporary or mere ministerial nature a majority vote of a legal quorum is usually sufficient.''^ Following the rule of the common law, in the absence of charter or statutory provision applicable, a majority of the governing body of the corporation, as the board of directors, the board of aldermen, the council, etc., consisting of a definite number, when duly met, constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, and the vote of a majority of those present (there being a quorum) is all that is requisite for the adoption or passage of an ordi- nance or by-law or motion, or the doing of any other act which the body has power to do.'^ Where the law is silent New Hampshire — Despatch Line V. Bellamy Mfg. Co., 12 N. H., 205 ; 37 Am. Dec, 203. New Jersey — Barnert v. Pater- son, 48 N. J. L., 395; 6 Atl. Rep., 15; Cadmus v. Farr, 47 N. J. L., 208; McDermott v. Miller, 45 N. J. L., 251. New York — Madison Ave. Bap- • list Church v. Baptist Church, 5 Robt. (N. Y.), 649; Field v. Field, 9 Wend. (N. Y.), 394; Ex parte Willcocks, 7 Cow. (N. Y.), 402; 17 Am. Dec, 525. Pennsylvania — Craig v. First Presbyterian Church, 88 Pa. St., 42; 32 Am. Rep., 417. South Carolina — State v. Delies- seline, 1 McCord (S. C), 52. Utah — Leavitt v. Oxford, etc.. Silver Min. Co., 3 Utah, 265; 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 234. Wisconsin — Walker v. Regan, 1 Wis., 597, 614. This rule of the common law has often been declared by stat- ute. Horton v. Garrison, 23 Barb. (N. Y.), 176; People ex rel. v. Rec- tor, etc., 48 Barb. (N. Y.), 603, 606. 76 Cutwater v. Borough of Carl- stadt, 66 N. J. L., 510; 49 Atl. Rep., 533. '7 Acts done by less than a legal quorum will be held void. State v. Wilkesville, 20 Ohio St., 288; Logansport v. Legg, 20 Ind., 315; Price V. R. R., 13 Ind., 58; Fergu- son V. Crittenden Co., 6 Ark., 479. When de facto officer may be treated by less than quorum, see Dingwall v. Detroit, 82 Mich., 568; 46 N. W. Rep., 938. Presumption respecting quorum. Insurance Co. v. Sortwell, 8 Allen (Mass.), 217, which was a case re- lating to a private corporation. 78 Connecticut — Williams v. Brace, 5 Conn., 190. Iowa — Buell v. Buckingham, 16 Iowa, 284. Kentucky — Covington v. Boyle, 6 Bush. (Ky.), 204. Maryland — Zeiler v. Central Ry. Co., 84 Md., 304; 35 Atl. Rep., 932. Massachusetts — Dartmouth v. Commissioners, 153 Mass., 12; 26 166 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§106 on the subject the common law rule will prevail and cannot be changed by the council, as by fixing the quorum necessary for the transaction of its business at two-thirds of the members electedJ^ In determining a legal quorum, if the mayor is a member of the body, of course he is' to be counted.^" But if he is not a member he is not to be counted.*^ Ordinarily the whole membership of the body is to be counted. Thus where the seat of a member becomes vacant by resignation, or by removal of an alderman from the ward for which elected, it is error merely to count the remaining members in maJiing up the quorum.^- So where the charter provided that a majority of those elected should constitute a quorum, and eight mem- bers were elected of whom one was disqualified, it was held that five eligible members were indispensable to form a quorum.^^ In the absence of organic provision to the con- N. B. Rep., 425; Sargent v. Web- ster, 13 Met. (Mass.), 497; First Parish v. Stearns, 21 Pick. (Mass.), 148. Missouri — Columbia, etc., Co. v. Meier, 39 Mo., 53. New Jersey — Barnert v. Pater- son, 48 N. J. L., 395, 400; 6 Atl. Rep., 15 ; Wells v. Rahway River Co., 19 N. J. Bq. (4 C. E. Green), 402. New York, — Dawes v. N. R. Ins. Co., 7 Cowen (N. Y.), 462, 464. Ohio — State v. Green^ 37 Ohio St., 227. Rhode Island — Lockwood v. Me- chanic's Nat. Bk., 9 R. I., 308. South Carolina — State v. Delies- seline, 1 McCord (S. C), 52, 62. Virginia — Booker v. Young, 12 Gratt. (Va.), 303, 305. A majority may assemble, organ- ize and act. Oakland v. Carpen- tier, 13 Cal., 540. "In all matters of public con- cern, the voice of the majority must govern." Per Duncan, J., in McCready v. Guardians, 9 Serg & R. (Pa.), 94, 99. •"> Heiskell v. Baltimore, 65 Md., 125; 4 Atl. Rep., 116; 57 Am. Rep., 308; 12 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 347; Barnert v. Paterson, 48 N. J. L., 395; 6 Atl. Rep., 15; Coles v. Williamsburg, 10 Wend. (N.. Y.), 659; Blackett v. Blizard, 9 Barn. & Cress., 851. 80 GrifBn v. Messenger, 114 Iowa, 99; 86 N. W. Rep., 219. 81 Atty. Gen'l v. Shepard, 62 N. H., 383; 13 Am. St. Rep., 576; Somerset v. Smith, 20 Ky. L. Rep., "1488; 49 S. W. Rep., 456; State v. Porter, 113 Ind., 79; 14 N. B. Rep., 883. 82 Pimental v. San Francisco, 21 Cal., 351, 362; McCracken v. San Francisco, 16 Cal., 591; San Fran- cisco V. Hazen, 5 Cal., 169 ; State ■ V. Orr, 61 Ohio St., 384; 56 N. E. Rep., 14. As to what constitutes a quorum, see note to Lawrence v. Ingersoll, 6 L. R. A., 308; Smith v. Proctor (N. Y., 1891), 14 L. R. A., 403; State v. Vanosdal, 131 Ind., 388; 31 N. E. Rep., 79; 15 L. R. A., 832-. Particular case, Bybee v. Smith, 22 Ky. Law Rep., 467, 1684; 61 S. W. Rep., 15. ss Saterlee v. San Francisco, 23 Cal., 314. §106] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 167 trary, members present though not voting may be counted to constitute the quorum.** The Supreme Court of the United States has held this rule applicable to the National House of Representatives.^'^ While it is undoubtedly true that no legislative body can act legally without the presence of a quorum, a less number than a quorum have the power to adjourn.*'^ § 106. Same— When definite vote required. The law gov- erning the body often provides that certain acts may be done s^ State ex rel. v. Green, 37 Ohio St., 227, 234; Launtz v. People ex rel., 113 111., 137, 142; Booker v. Young, 12 Gratt. (Va.), 303, 307; State ex rel. v. Yates, 19 Mont., 239; 47 Pac. Rep., 1004; 37 L. R. A., 205; Rushville Gas Co. v. Rush- ville, 121 Ind., 206, 209; 23 N. B. Rep., 72; 16 Am. St. Rep., 388; 6 L. R. A., 315; Atty. Gen. v. She- pard, 62 N. H., 383; 13 Am. St. Rep., 576. s5 In February, 1890, the rule was adopted by the House, providing that, members present and not vot- ing should be counted in determin- ing a quorum. An act was passed by a majority vote of the members present, the quorum being counted in accordance with the rule. The validity of the act was questioned. Mr. Justice Brewer in delivering the opinion of the court observed: "All that the Constitution requires is the presence of a majority, and when that majority are present the power of the house arises. "But how shall the presence of a majority be determined? The con- stitution has prescribed no method of making this determination, and it is, therefore, within the compe- tency of the house to prescribe any method which shall be reasonably certain to ascertain the fact. It may prescribe answer to roll-call as the only method of determina- tion- or require the passage of members between tellers, and their count as the sole test ; or the count of the speaker or the clerk, and an announcement from the desk of the names of those who are present. Any one of these methods, it must be conceded, is reasonably certain of ascertaining the fact, and as there is no constitutional inhibition of any of those, and no violation of fundamental rights in any, it follows that the house may adopt either or all, or it may pro- vide for a combination of any two of the methods. That was done by the rule in question; and all that that rule attempts to do is to prescribe a method for ascertain- ing the presence of a majority and thus establish the fact that the house is in a condition to trans- act business. As appears from the journal, at the time this bill passed the house there was present a ma- jority, a quorum, and the house was authorized to transact any and all business." U. S. v. Ballin, 144 U. S., 1. Where majority present re- frain from voting, act held void. Gosling V. Veley, 4 H. of L. Cas., 679, 740. Majority and casting vote. 6 L. R. A., 308, note. sa Smith v. Law, 21 N. Y., 296; Kimball v. Marshall, 44 N. H., 465; 1 Starr & Curtis 111. Stat., p. 685, par. 37. 168 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§106 only by a majority of the members appointed or elected to the body. Under such provisions it is apparent that the acts specified may not be done legally by a bare majority of a quorum.*^ In the enactment of certain ordinances, as for the sale of corporate property, or for the creation of offices and positions, or improvement ordinances where the improvements are to be paid for by special taxation, especially in event of remonstrance or protest on the part of the property owners, or where the improvement ordinance does not originate on petition of the property owners, charters often require a two- thirds or three-fourths vote of the entire membership of the body. Of course, the vote of a less number than specified is insufficient, and the record of the proceedings must show that the measure received the vote prescribed.** Where any par- ticular act is required to be done by a specified vote, the SI Edgerly v. Emerson, 23 N. H., 555; 55 Am. Dec, 207; Pimental v. San Francisco, 21 Cal., 351; Mc- Cracken v. San Francisco, 16 Cal., 591 ; State v. Dickie, 47 Iowa, 629. A resolution purporting to fix the salary of an official, held to be a resolution for the appropriation of money under a particular char- ter requiring such resolution to be passed by a majority vote. Four- nier v. West Bay City, 94 Mich., 463; 54 N. W. Rep., 277. 88 Illinois — Carrollton v. -Clark, 21 Ill.App., 74; Schofield V. Hudson, 56 111. App., 191; People v. Maxton, 38 111. App., 152; Lindsay v. Chi- cago, 115 111., 120: 3 N. B. Rep., 443; Chicago Dock Co. v. Garrity, 115 111., 155; 3 N. E. Rep., 448; Belknap v. Miller, 52 111. App., 617; Rich V. Chicago, 59 111., 286; Barr V. Auburn, 89 111., 361. Indiana — Moberry v. Jelferson- ville, 38 Ind., 198; Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co. V. Crown Point, 150 Ind., 536; 50 N. E. Rep., 741; Brook- bank V. Jeffersonville, 41 Ind., 406 ; Rushville Gas Co. v. Rushville, 121 Ind.,' 206; 23 N. E. Rep., 72; 16 Am. St. Rep., 388; Logansport v. Legg, 20 Ind., 315; Fralich v. Bar- low, 25 Ind. App., 383. Iowa — Horner v. Rowley, 51 Iowa, 620; 2 N. W. Rep., 436. Kentucky — Lexington v. Headley, 5 Bush. (Ky.), 508; Louisville v. Hyatt, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.), 177; 36 Am. Dec, 594. Michigan — Whitney v. Hudson, 69 Mich., 189; 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 453; 37 N. W. Rep., 184; Ten- nant v. Crocker, 85 Mich., 328; 48 N. W. Rep., 577; Fournier v. West Bay City, 94 Mich., 463; 54 N. W. Rep. 277. Minnesota — State v. Priester, 43 Minn., 373; 45 N. W. Rep., 712. New Jersey — Mueller v. Egg Harbor City, 55 N. J. L., 245; 26 Atl., Rep., 89; Clark v. Elizabeth, 61 N. J. L., 565; 40 Atl. Rep., 616, 737. Ohio — Resolution awarding a contract is not of a "general or permanent nature," and therefore does not require a two-thirds vote. Cincinnati v. Bickett, 26 Ohio St., 49. Washington — Cline v. Seattle, 13 Wash., 444; 43 Pac. Rep., 367. §106] OP ENACTJiIENT OF ORDINANCES. 169 question has often arisen whether such provision means a majority or two-thirds or three-fourths of the whole number of members composing the body, or whether it means a majority or two-thirds or three-fourths of a legal quorum. The rule as applied to state legislatures is generally held to be that proportion of votes of those constituting the quorum to do business. Thus where the constitution requires the act to receive "the vote of two-thirds of each house," it is held to be two-thirds of the members present, there being a quo- rum. *° Adopting such construction, where the power of amotion was conferred upon a city council to be exercised "by a vote of two-thirds of that body, ' ' two-thirds of a legal quorum, and not two-thirds of the whole number of members composing the council, was considered to be meant.^" So ' ' unanimous consent of the council, ' ' as used in a council rule, was construed in like manner.^i But where the act must be done by a distinct proportion "of all the members elected," or ' ' of all of the members of the council, " it is manifest that the law, should be construed by counting the whole membership of the body in question.^^ Where vacancies occur the whole num- 88 State V. McBride, 4 Mo., 303, 308; South-worth v. P. & J. R. R., 2 Mich., 287; Whitney v. Hudson, 69 Mich., 189; 37 N. W. Rep., 184; 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 453, n.; Green v. Weller, 32 Miss., 650, 700; Morton v. Comptroller Gen., 4 S. C, 430, 463. 90 Warnock v. Lafayette, 4 La. Ann., 419. A charter provision requiring a two-thirds vote of the city council to do a specified act, held to im- port a two-thirds vote of a quorum present and voting. English v. State, 7 Tex. App., 171. !>i Atkins V. Phillips, 26 Fla., 281, 296; 8 So. Rep., 429; Zeiler v. Central R. R. Co., 84 Md., 304; 35 Atl. Rep., 932. 92 Floridor-Atkins v. Phillips, 26 Fla., 281, 298; 8 So. Rep., 429. J/e5)-osfca— State ex rel. v. Gray, 23 Neb., 365, 369; 36 N. W. Rep., 577. New Hampshire — Atty. Gen. v. Shepard, 63 N. H., 383; 13 Am. St. Rep., 576. New Jersey — State v. Bayonne, 54 N. J. L., 125; 22 Atl. Rep., 1006; Mueller v. Egg Harbor City, 55 N. J. L., 245; 26 Atl. Rep., 89; State ex rel. Schermerhorn v. Jersey City, 53 N. J. L., 112 ; 20 Atl. Rep., 829; State ex rel. v. Paterson, 35 N. J. L.. 190. West Virginia — Davis v. Davis, 40 W. Va., 464; 21 S. E. Rep., 906. "Concurrence of a majority of all of the trustees," construed (.ar- guendo) as a majority of all of the trustees of which the body was composed, but such was held not to be required in the passage of a resolution proposing a change In the corporate boundaries under an- other charter provision. Strohm V. Iowa City, 47 Iowa, 42, 45, 46. The punctuation employed was dis- regarded. Shrledley v. State, 23 170 OF ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. [§107 ber entitled to membership must be counted and not mereiy the remaining members.^^ Where the charter provides defi- nitely the number that shall constitute a quorum, this cannot be changed by the body."* Thus, where the charter prescribes that three councilmen and the mayor shall constitute a quorum, a resolution passed by a vote of three councilmen and the mayor, who had a vote in case of a tie, was held legally passed, although a by-law provided that no resolution should pass without the votes of two-thirds of all the members."^ § 107. Vote necessary in suspending rules. It is within tlie power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify or waive their own rules, as those requiring certain ordinances to be read on two or three different days, or that certain corporate acts shall receive a two-thirds or three-fourths vote.i In ac- Ohio St., 130, 139; Randolph v. Bayue, 44 Cal., 366. Where a street being vacated by ordinance, on condition, it was held that a subsequent resolution declaring the vacation absolute is sufficient notwithstanding such resolution was passed by a major- ity instead of two-thirds as re- quired in passing the ordinance. Wirt V. McEnery, 21 Fed., 233. Under a particular charter pro- vision it was held that, the re- quirement of a six-eighths vote on appropriations applied only to ex- penditures outside of the necessary expenses. Gardner v. New Bern, 98 N. C, 228; 3 S. E., 500. Under a charter providing that a tax must be voted by two-thirds of the members elected; held that a vote of eight aldermen in a coun- cil consisting of 12 would be suffi- cient. Mills V. Gleason, 11 Wis., 470; 78 Am. Dec, 721. 93 Pinaental v. San Francisco, 21 Cal., 351; McCracken v. San Fran- cisco, 16 Cal., 591; San Francisco v. Hazen, 5 Cal., 169; PoUasky v. Sohmid, 128 Mich., 699; 55 L. R. A., 614; 87 N. W. Rep., 1030; 8 De- troit Leg. N., 845. Contra, State ex rel. v. Orr, 61 Ohio St., 384; 56 N. E. Rep., 14. The vote of one, who is ineligi- ble to act as councilman, but who was elected and sworn into office, was counted in one case. Satter- lee V. San Francisco, 23 Cal., 314. oi Malloy V. Board of Education, 102 Cal., '642; 36 Pac. Rep., 948. 95 Cutwater v. Carlstadt, 66 N. J. L., 510; 49 Atl. Rep., 533. 1 Holt V. Somerville, 127 Mass., 408, 411; Bennett v. New Bedford, 110 Mass., 433, 437; Brown v. Lutz, 36 Neb., 527; 54 N. W. Rep., 860. Only one ordinance can be passed under a suspension of the rules. If two are enacted under one sus- pension, the second is void. Bloom V. Xenia, 32 Ohio St., 461; Camp- bell V. Cincinnati, 49 Ohio St., 463 ; 31 N. E. Rep., 606. Where a by-law required certain corporate acts to be done in a pre- scribed form and that amendment or repeal of such by-law should only be made by a vote of two- thirds of the members, it was held that a majority might repeal the by-law, or might, even without spe- cific repeal do valid acts not as required by the by-law, by a bare 107] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 171 cordance with the principle stated in the last section, the rule permitting suspension of rules on ' ' two-thirds vote of the mem- bers of the branch," (the council consisting of two branches), will be construed to mean two-thirds of those present, not be- ing less than a legal quorum and not two-thirds of the entire membership of the branch.- So a charter provision which pei-- mitted a suspension of the rule requiring ordinances to be read on three different days unless three-fourths of "the coun- cil" shall dispense with the rule, was held sufficiently complied with where there were present four councilmen, all of whom voted for the suspension — the entire council consisting of six members, of whom one had resigned and another was absent when the suspension took place.'* But where a charter re- quired ordinances levying special assessments to be read on three successive days unless three-fourths of the council shall vote to dispense with the rule, a vote of five members of the council composed of six councilmen and the mayor is insuffi- cient to suspend the rule and an ordinance so passed is void.* majority vote. Opinion of Gibson, C. J., in Commonwealtli v. Lancas- ter, 5 Watts (Pa.), 152. S. P. Chariton v. Holliday, 60 Iowa, 391; 14 N. W. Rep., 775. Rules adopted by the council it- self and not prescribed by any superior power, may be suspended by unanimous consent. Greeley v. Hamman, 17 Colo., 30; 28 Pac. Rep., 460. Council rule cannot be amended by a majority vote without pre- vious notice, when the law so re- quires. Armatage v. Fisher, 74 Hun. ( N. Y.), 167; 26 N. Y. Suppl. 364. 2 Zeiler v. Central Railroad Co., 84 Md., 304; 35 Atl. Rep., 932. An ordinance providing that all ordinances shall be read three times before being passed, and that no ordinance shall pass or be read the third time on the same day in which it was introduced unless the rule be suspended by a two-thirds vote, cannot be annulled or re- pealed by a mere majority vote. Swindell v. State ex rel. Maxey, 143 Ind., 153; 42 N. B., 528; 35 L. R. A., 50. 3 In the passage of ordinances a vote of a majority "of all mem- bers elected to the council" was required, but three-fourths of "the council," without the qualifying words had power to suspend the rule. North Platte v. North Platte Water Works Co., 56 Neb., 403; 76 N. W. Rep., 906. A charter provision which re- quired ordinances to be read on three different days unless the reading is "dispensed" with by a vote of three-fourths of the coun- cil, is observed by a three-fourths vote to "suspend" the rule, as there is no substantial difference between the words. Bayard v. Ba- ker, 76 Iowa, 220, 222; 40 N. W. Rep., 818; 23 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 126. * GriflSn v. Messenger, 114 Iowa, 99 ; 86 N. W. Rep., 219. m OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§108 So where the council consists of seven members, under like provision, the rules cannot be suspended by an affirmative vote of four members. ^ § 108. How quorum affected by interest of members. Many charters expressly provide that the officers of the corporation shall not be directly or indirectly interested pecuniarily in contracts of any character with the corporation." So mem- bers of the legislative body should not be permitted to act in matters before them, as a body, in which they are either directly or indirectly pecuniarily interested. Such persons are generally excluded in counting a quorum.'^ In a New Jersey case, four members of the city council were stockholders in a water company which the city council voted to purchase, and it was held that such purchase was unlawful. In this case it was aptly said: "The rule is one of policy, which, without regard to intention inexorably reaches all contracts 5 Horner v. Rowley, 51 Iowa, 620; 2 N. W. Rep., 436. Passage under suspension of rules in particular cases: Florida — Atkins v. Philips, 26 Fla., 281; 8 So. Rep., 429; 10 L. R. A., 158. Iowa — Cutcomp v.'Utt, 60 Iowa, 156; 14 N. W. Rep., 214. Eentucky — Nevin v. Roach, 86 Ky., 492; 5 S. W. Rep., 546. Louisiana — New Orleans v. Brooks, 36 La. Ann., 641. Minnesota — State v. Priester, 43 .Minn., 373 ; 45 N. W. Rep., 712. Missouri — Aurora Water Co., v. Aurora, 129 Mo., 540; 31 S. W. Rep., 946. Ohio — Campbell v. Cincinnati, 49 Ohio St., 463; 31 N. E. Rep., 606. Pennsylvania — Barton v. Pitts- burg, 4 Brewst. (Pa.), 373. Presumption that rule was le- gally suspended. State v. Vail, 53 Iowa, 550; 5 N. W. Rep., 709. 6 Contracts between the city and members of the council held void. Smith V. Albany, 61 N. Y., 444; Berka v. Woodward, 125 Cal., 119; 57 Pac. Rep., 777; 45 L. R. A., 420. 7 Ft. Wayne v. L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co., 132 Ind., 558; 32 N. B. Rep., 215; 18 L. R. A., 367, note; Wood- ruff V. N. Y. & N. E. R. R. Co., 59 Conn., 63; 20 Atl. Rep., 17; Oconto County Supervisors v. Hall, 47 Wis., 208; 2 N. W. Rep., 291; Uni- ted Brethren Church v. Van Du- sen, 37 Wis., 54; Pickett v. School District, 25 Wis., 551; Walworth Bank v. F. L. & T. Co., 16 Wis., 629; Hewison v. Tp. of Pembroke, 6 Ont. Rep., 170. Rule of council forbidding mem- bers to vote upon question in which they are interested, which is violated, held to Invalidate an ordinance. Bufflngton Wheel Co. V. Burnham, 60 Iowa, 493; 15 N. W. Rep., 282. Cases in which it was held that the prohibition did not apply to municipal officers. Concordia v. Hagaman, 1 Kan. App., 35;- 41 Pac. Rep., 133; Call Pub. Co. v. Lincoln, 29 Neb., 149; 45 N. W. Rep., 245. § 108] OP ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 173 which contravene the purposes of the law."'* In a Pennsyl- vania case, the majority of the members of the council were stockholders in a water company with which the council made a contract to supply the city with water and it was held void. After quoting the law forbidding members to be interested in contracts with the corporation, the court observed : " It is al- most needless to say that a contract so prohibited by law is utterly void, and there is no power that can breathe life into such a dead thing."" In a Michigan case, it was held that the fact that two of the aldermen who attended the meeting and who were necessary to form the quorum were signers of the petition for the improvement and owners of the land sub- ject to special assessment for the improvement, did not inval- idate the council proceedings in ordering the improvement.^" So it has been held that a member is not disqualified from voting on an ordinance establishing a sewer district because 8 Stroud V. Consumers' Water Co., 56 N. J. L., 422; 28 Atl. Rep., 578. To same effect is Gregory v. Jersey City, 34 N. J. L., 390. 9 Milford Borough v. Milford Water Co., 124 Pa. St., 610; 17 a.tl. Rep., 185. 10 Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich., 104, per Cooley.'J., who said that the proceedings would have been held invalid had the mem- bers of the council acted as com- missioners in determining the amount of the special assessment that each piece of property was to bear or as commissioners in con- firming the report. A vote of confirmation of an as- sessment passed at a meeting of a board consisting of five, at which only four members attended, and in which vote but two concurred, the others being interested declin- ing to vote, is not a valid act al- though the two who did not vote assented to the vote of their col- leagues. Coles v. Williamsburgh, 10 Wend. (N. Y.), 659, 666. S. P. State (Winans) v. Crane, 36 N. J. L., 394. Where a by-law related to a road and it appeared that C. was the only one interested; held where his vote was necessary to pass the by-law such by-law was void, as his interest, which was apart from that of the public, disentitled him from voting. In re Vashon & Tp. of Hawkesbury, 30 Up. Can. Com. Pleas Rep., 194. A member of a municipal board who is either a stockholder or di- rector in a corporation is disquali- fied to act in a transaction with such corporation. San Diego v. San Diego & L. A. R. Co., 44 Cal., 106. What constitutes interest that will disqualify according to Cush- ing's Law and Practice of Legis- lative Assemblies, see State v. Plnkerman, 63 Conn., 176; 28 Atl. Rep., 110. Member cannot vote to confirm his own appointment to office. State ex rel. v. Whitehead, 67 N. J. L., 405; 51 Atl. Rep., 472. Con- tra, cases in note to § 102, supra. 174 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§ 109 he owns property within the district." So the fact that a member would be benefited by the widening of a street does not disqualify him from voting on the proposition. i^ But a member is disqualified from voting for an ordinance, granting the use of streets to a corporation in which he is a stockholder or otherwise interested. In such case the member cannot re- move the disability by, in form, assigning the stock to a rela- tively The fact that the vote of the interested member is not necessary to pass an ordinance seems to be immaterial. Thus in a New Jersey case, a member of a board of public works voted for an ordinance, authorizing a railroad company, in which he was a stockholder, to lay its tracks in the streets and the ordinance was held voidable. It appeared that there was no necessity for the action of the interested member, for there were others who could act without him. "The fact that there were a sufficient number of votes, apart from his vote, to pass the ordinance, is no answer to the objection taken upon this point. The infection of the concurrence of the inter- ested persons spreads so that the action of the whole body is voidable."!* § 109. Quorum of joint assemblies of definite bodies. In order to constitute a legal meeting for the transaction of busi- ness of a body composed of two or more definite bodies it is necessary that a majority of each of the separate bodies should be present.! ° When the meeting has once been duly organized the identity of the component bodies forming it, in legal con- templation, disappears and the vote of the majority of those constituting the joint body who are present controls, even though one of the body should leave before the vote is taken.' " 11 Topeka V. Huntoon, 46 Kan., Broom Maxims, 111; Foot v. Stiles, 634; 26 Pac. Rep., 488. 57 N. Y., 399; Regina v. Aberdeen 12 Gofe V. Nolan, 62 How. Pr. (N. Canal Co., 14 Ad. & E. (N. S.), Y.), 323. 854; Matter of Ryers, 72 N. Y., 1, 13 Jolly V. P. N. I. & C. Ry. Co., 11, per Folger, J. 25 Pittsb. Leg. J. (N. S.), 259. is State ex rel. v. Paterson, 35 Personal interest — effect on vote. N. J. L., 190, 194 ; Gildersleeve v. 18 L. R. A., 367, note. Board of Education, 17 Abb. Pr. It State (West Jersey Traction (N. Y.), 201; Commonwealth v. Co.) v. Board of Public Works, Hargest, 7 Pa. Co. Ct., 333. etc., 56 N. J. L., 431, 440; 29 Atl. lo Gildersleeve v. Board of Edu- Rep., 163. cation, 17 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 201; The general rule is that no man AVhiteside v. People, 26 Wend. (N. can be a judge of his own case. Y.), 634, reversing 23 Wend. (N. §11UJ OF ENACTMENT OF ORDlNANCEiS. 1^5 The rule in England is otherwise. There a majority of each of the definite bodies must be present, to constitute a valid joint meeting, and remain until the business is finished. If one of the integral parts withdraws from the meeting while action is incomplete no further action thereon can be taken legally by those remaining.^'' PROCEEDINGS. § 110. Special meetings— Notice. Provision is usually made for calling special meetings. Generally this duty de- volves upon the mayor or the presiding officer, and sometimes such meetings may be convened at the instance of a certain number of the members of the body itself. i** In the absence of express provision a municipal corporation possesses the in- cidental or implied power to call special meetings of its legis- lative body.18 Unless the law otherwise provides notice to each member of the body is required.-" A special meeting will Y.), 9; Ex parte Humphrey, 10 Wend. (N. Y.), 612, per Savage, C. J. The two bodies voted to meet jointly on a specified day. On such day a minority of one body were present but those present consti- tuted a majority of both branches. The meeting was held legal. Beck V. Hanscom, 29 N. H., 213, 223, 226, per Gilchrist, C. J., reviewing the English cases. Election by joint ballot of two branches. Belfast v. Morrill, 65 Me., 580; Saunders v. Lawrence, 141 Mass., 380; 5 N. B. Rep., 840; Schmulbach v. Speidel, 50 W. Va., 553; 55 L. R. A., 922; 40 S. E. Rep., 424; Kimball v. Marshall, 44 N. H., 465, 468. "King V. Williams, 2 Maule ft Sel., 141; King v. Buller, 8 East, 389; King v. Miller, 6 Dumf. & East. (6 Term Rep.), 268, 278; King V. Bower, 1 Barn and Cress., 492; Rex v..Varlo, 1 Cowp., 248; Rex V. Bellringer, 4 Term Rep., 810; Willcock, Mun. Corp., 52, 53, 54; Glover, Mun. Corp., 148. 18 Special meeting held valid. Douglas v. Baker County, 23 Fla., 419; 2 So. Rep., 776; Board of Su- pervisors v. Horton, 75 Iowa, 271; 39 N. W. Rep., 394. In Illinois, the council may pre- scribe, by ordinance, the manner in which special meetings thereof may be called. 1 Starr & Curtis 111. Stat., p. 685, § 38. So the may- or or any three aldermen may call. 76., § 46. 1 Aurora Water Co. v. Aurora, 129 Mo., 540, 577; 31 S. W. Rep., 946. 20 California — Harding v. Van- dewater, 40 Cal., 77. Connecticut — Stowe v. Wyse, 7 Conn., 214; State v. Kirk, 46 Conn., 395. Kansas — Rogers v. Slonaker, 32 Kan., 191; 4 Pac. Rep., 138; Paola, etc., R. R. Co. V. Commissioners, 16 Kan., 302. Maryland — Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill. (Md.), 254. Massachusetts — Wiggin v. Free- will Baptist, 8 Met. (Mass.), 301. 'New Yorlc — Downing v. Rugar, 176 OF ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. t§110 be held invalid unless all of the members have been duly notified as required by law or unless they were all, or at least all who were not properly notified, present at the meeting.^i 21 Wend. (N. Y.), 178; Ex parte Kogers, 7 Cowen (N. Y.), 526. Texas — Cassin v. Zavalla County, 70 Tex., 419; 8 S. W. Rep., 97. Statutory requirements as to calling special meeting to be ob- served, to validate meeting. White V. Fleming, 114 Ind., 560; 16 N. B. Rep., 487; Board of Supervisors v. Horton, 75 Iowa, 271, 39 N. W. Rep., 394; Scott v. Union County, 63 Iowa, 583; 19 N. W. Rep., 667; Scott V. Paulen, 15 Kan., 162; Donough V. Dewey, 82 Mich., 309; 46 N. W. Rep., 782; Whiteside v. People, 26 Wend. (N. Y.), 634; People V. Walker, 23 Barb. (N. Y.), 304; Goedgen v. Supervisors, 2 Biss. C. C. (U. S.), 328. Failure of member of a board of fire and police commissioners to attend a meeting after reasonable notice thereof does not render the proceedings void. State v. Bemis, 45 Neb., 724 ; 64 N. W. Rep., 348. 21 Illinois — Thomas v. Citizens Horse R. R. Co., 104 111., 462; Scho- field V. Tampico, 98 111. App., 324, 326; People v. Frost, 32 111. App., 242 ; Lawrence v. Traner, 136 111., 474; 27 N. B. Rep., 197. Indiana — Tombaugh v. Grogg, 146 Ind., 99; 44 N. E. Rep., 994. Iowa — If all members are pres- ent, failure to give notice of meet- ing as required is immaterial. Moore v. Perry (Iowa, 1903), 93 N. W. Rep., 510. Michigan — Beaver Creek v. Hast- ings, 52 Mich., 528; 18 N. W. Rep., 250. Minnesota — Lord v. Annoka, 36 Minn., 176; 30 N. W. Rep., 550; State V. Smith, 22 Minn., 218. Missouri — Aurora Water Co. v. Aurora, 129 Mo., 540, 577; 31 S. W. Rep., 946. Nebraska — Magneau v. Fremont, 30 Neb., 843; 47 N. W. Rep., 280; 27 Am. St. Rep., 436; 9 L. R. A., 786. New York — People v. Batchfelor, 28 Barb. (N. Y.), 310. A special meeting where some of the members have not been noti- fied, and were not present is not valid, nor is any action taken thereat. Land Co. v. Jellico, 103 Tenn., 320; 52 S. W. Rep., 995. Where a member is absent from the state and his exact whereabouts are unknown and it is therefore impracticable to give him actual notice, such notice is not necessary. State ex rel. v. Kirk, 46 Conn., 395; Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 107 Tenn., 647; 64 S. W. Rep., 1075. Method of Calling. Under a charter providing that the mayor call special meetings of the coun- cil "by causing notice to be left at the usual residence of each mem- ber" personal notice to the mem- bers will be sufficient. Russell v. Wellington, 157 Mass., 100; 31 N. B. Rep., 630. Under a charter, authorizing special meetings to be convened by the mayor in pursuance of law, that the mayor shall call special sessions by proclamation, which shall be published as may be pro- vided by ordinance, it was held that in the absence of such ordi- nance, special meetings of the council called by proclamation of the mayor, and all acts of the council at such meetings were illegal. Forry v.- Ridge, 56 Mo. App., 615. As to sufficiency of notice under particular provision, see Caniff v. New York, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 430. §111] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. m Where the charter is silent as to stating the purpose of the special meetings, the judicial decisions present some conflict as to such requirement.-- If the charter requires that the no- tice shall specifically state the business for which the body has been convened, the special meeting may only act on sub- jects so stated.^^ § 111. Power to adjourn meetings. In the absence of pro- In one case the charter author- ized special meetings on notice to each member served personally or left at his usual place of abode. Here it was held that where each member of the council had actual notice of a special meeting and of certain adjournments of it, and of their purpose, ahd in good faith met and transacted public business, the meeting and ordinance passed thereat were valid though no writ- ten notice of such meeting and adjournments were served. Young V. Rushsylvania, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep., 75. Presumptions As to Regtjlakity of meeting. Indiana — Stoddard v. Johnson, 75 Ind., 20; Prezinger v. Harness, 114 Ind., 491; 16 N. E. Rep., 495; Torr V. Corcoran, 115 Ind., 188; 17 N. E. Rep., 286; Jussen v. Com- missioners, 95 Ind., 567. Kansas — State v. Francis, 26 Kan., 724; Downing v. Miltonvale, 36 Kan., 740; 14 Pac. Rep., 281. Kentucky — Elliott v. Louisville, 101 Ky., 262; 40 S. W. Rep., 690. Michigan — Board of Supervisors V. Judges, 106 Mich., 166; 64 N. W. Rep., 42; Newaygo County Mfg. Co. V. Echtinaw, 81 Mich., 416; 45 N. W. Rep., 1010; Harding v. Bader, 75 Mich., 316, 321; 42 N. W. Rep., 492. Minnesota — Duluth v. Krupp, 46 Minn., 435; 49 N. W. Rep., 235. Mississi-pv^ — Tierney v. Brown, 65 Miss., 563; 5 So. Rep., 104; 7 Am. St. Rep., 679. New Jersey — State (Staats) v. Washington, 45 N. J. L., 318; 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 39. 22 Magneau v. Fremont, 30 Neb., 843; 47 N. W. Rep., 280; 27 Am. St. Rep., 436; 9 L. R. A., 786; Whitney v. New Haven, 58 Conn., 450, 461; 20 Atl. Rep., 666; Gil- more V. Utlca, 131 N. Y., 26; 29 N. E. Rep., 841. The purpose of the meeting must be stated. Bergen v. Clarkson, 1 Halst. (6 N. J. L.), 352; Smith v. Tobener, 32 Mo. App., 601. 23 St. Louis V. Withaus, 90 Mo., 646; 3 S. W. Rep., 395; 16 Mo. App., 247; McQuiddy v. Vineyard, 60 Mo. App., 610; Forry v. Ridge, 56 Mo. App., 615; Allen v. Rogers, 20 Mo. App., 290; Mills v. San Antonio (Tex. Civ. App., 1901) ; 65 S. W. Rep., 1121. If the notice specifies a particu- lar purpose, any act of the meeting "wholly beside the special purpose of the meeting as stated" will be held void. Bergen v. Clarkson, 1 Halst. (6 N. J. L.), 352, citing Rex v. Liverpool, 2 Burr., 735. No vote shall be reconsidered or rescinded at a special meeting, unless there be present as large a number of aldermen as were pres- ent when such vote was taken. 1 Starr & Curtis 111. Stat., p. 685, par. 43. Business that may be transacted. Sommercamp v. Kelly (Idaho, 1902), 71 Pac. Rep., 147. 12 178 OF ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. [§ Hi vision to the contrary, when a regular or stated or called cor- porate meeting is once duly organized at the time and placo appointed it possesses the incidental power to adjourn to a fu- ture time. 2* And after such adjournment no legal action can be taken by the meeting.^^ In one case at a regular meeting a quorum was not present and all business, including an ordi- nance returned vetoed, was laid over until the next regular meeting to be held at 9 a. m. the next day. At 9 :35 a. m. the president declared the meeting adjourned for want of a quorum. At 10 a. m. all of the members of the council meet except the president and passed the ordinance over the may- or's veto. The action was held void, as no quorum had ap- peared within the hour named and hence the meeting expired by its limitation of adjournment. ^^ An adjournment beyond the time permitted by law is unauthorized. Tlius where the charter provides, in case of a double legislative board, that one board shall not adjourn without the concurrence of the other board for a longer period than twenty-four hours, and that if they cannot agree on adjournment, the mayor shall adjourn them to a day, not beyond the regular time of meet- ing. In event of disagreement the mayor adjourned one board beyond the time allowed. It was held that the adjournment was a nullity and that both boards were left in session with the right to meet next day.^^ Where the adjournment is legal the members are bound to take notice o^ the time to which 24 California — Ex parte Mirande, Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 153. 73 Gal., 365; 14 Pac. Rep., 888. New Hampshire — Kimha.U v. Florida— Stociiton v. Powell, 29 Marshall, 44 N. H., 465, 468. Fla., 1; 10 So. Rep., 688. New York— In re Newland Ave., Illinois — People ex rel. v. Pair- 38 N. Y. St. Rep., 796; People v. bury, 51 111., 149. Rochester, 5 Lans. (N. Y.), 142, Maine — Chamberlain v. Dover, 147. 13 Me., 466. Law may limit power of adjourn- Massachiisetts — Attorney Gen- ment. Grimmett v. Askew, 48 eral v. Slmonds, 111 Mass., 256, Ark., 151; 2 S. W. Rep., 707. 260. 25 Kimball v. Lamprey, 19 N. H., Michigan — Donough v. Dewey, 82 215. Mich., 309, 312; 46 N. W. Rep., ae pitzgerald v. Pawtucket St. 782; Hubbard v. Winsor, 15 Mich., Ry. Co. (R. I., 1902), 52 Atl. Rep., 146, 152. 887. Minnesota — State ex rel. v. 27 Tillman v. Otter, 93 Ky., 600; Smith, 22 Minn., 218, 223. 29 L. R. A., 110; 20 S. W. Rep., Nebraska — Ex parte Wolf, 14 1036. Neb., 24; 14 N. W. Rep., 660; 6 § 113] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 179 the meeting has been adjourned.^^ Provision is usually made in the organic law of the corporation for the place of meeting. Where the law provides that the meeting shall be at such place as shall be appointed by the voters from time to time the meetings may be adjourned to a different place within the discretion of those present.^s The adjournment may only be proved by the record.^" § 112. Business that may be transacted at adjourned meet- ings. If a regular meeting is adjourned, any business which would have been proper for the body to consider at that meeting may be considered and acted upon at the adjourned meeting, but if it is a special or called meeting which is ad- journed nothing can be done at such adjourned meeting unless it could have been considered and acted upon at the special or called meeting.^^ An adjourned meeting of either a regu- lar or stated or special or called is but a continuation of the same meeting.*^ The point is well illustrated in a New Jersey case where the charter provided that no ordinance should be enacted unless the same had been introduced at a previous meeting. An ordinance was passed, but it did not appear from the record whether the meeting at which it was passed 28 "The law holds members of A school district, after having deliberative bodies, parties attend- chosen one person as prudential ing courts of justice and public committee at its annual meeting meetings, bound to take notice of and adjourned, may choose addi- the time of adjournment, and to tional members of such committee be present at the time and place at the adjourned meeting. Kings- of adjournment without special bury v. Centre School Dist., 12 notice." Per Bell, C. J., in Kim- Met. (Mass.), 99, 105. ball V. Marshall, 44 N. H., 465, 468; 32 state (Staates) v. Washing- Nugent v. Wrinn, 44 Conn., 273; ton, 45 N. J. L., 318; 2 Am. & Eng. People V. Batchelor, 22 N. Y., 128, Corp. Cas., 39 ; Rutherford v. Ham- 146; London v. Vanacre, 12 Mod., ilton, 97 Mo., 543; 11 S. W. Rep., 272. 249; Tierney v. Brown, 65 Miss., 2oGoodel V. Baker, 8 Cowen (N. 563; 5 So. Rep., 104; 7 Am. St. Y.), 286; People ex rel. v. Martin, Rep., 679; Magneau v. Freemont, 5 N. Y., 22. 30 Neb., 843; 47 N. W. Rep., 280; 30 Taylor v. Henry, 2 Pick. 27 Am. St. Rep., 436; 9 L. R. A., (Mass.), 397; State v. Jersey City, 786; Smith v. Law, 21 N. Y., 296; 25 N. J. L., 309. People v. Martin, 5 N. Y., 22 ; War- 31 Ex parte Wolf, 14 Neb., 24, 29, ner v. Mower, 11 Vt., 385; In re 30; 14 N. W. Rep., 660; 6 Am. & opening Robin Street, 1 La. Ann., Eng. Corp. Cas., 153; Hickok v. 412; New Orleans v. Brooks, 36 Shelburne, 41 Vt., 409; New Or- La. Ann., 641; Hubbard v. Winsor, leans v. Brooks, 36 La. Ann., 641. 15 Mich., 146; Carter v. McPar- 180 OF ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. [§ 11<^ was an adjourned meeting of a special or regular meeting. "If it was the former," remarked the court, "the adjournment was but a continuance of the special meeting, and the ordi- nance being introduced at such special meeting was never legally before the council. This may seem like a very tech- nical exception; but bringing it to the test of the governing rules in these cases, it is nevertheless well taken. For it does not appear upon the face of the record, or in any other way, that the provision of the charter was complied with; it does not appear that the power has been strictly pursued. "^^ § 113. Council as continuous body. Under the usual mu- nicipal organization the members are elected to the council annually or biennally, and thus a part of the membership (one-third or one-half) is renewed at such times. Sometimes the entire legislative body is renewed at municipal elections. Frequently the question is presented whether the council is a continuous body or whether each new council is to be consid- ered a distinct legislative organization. The rule as applied to the English Parliament, the Congress of the United States, and the various state legislatures, (which bodies are composed of two houses), is that the newly constituted organization is incapable of carrying on proceedings initiated and not com- pleted by its predecessor, but all proceedings are required to be commenced de novo. This rule was early applied in New York in a case where the common council consisted of two boards.^* It obtained also in Canada until changed by stat- ute.^5 In an Iowa case a contrary rule was announced. The land, 75 Iowa, 196; 39 N. W. Rep., Ordinance passed at an adjourned 268 ; State v. Vanosdal, 131 Ind., meeting under a suspension of the 388; 31 N. E. Rep., 79; 15 L. R. rules Is valid, although at the A., 832 ; State v. Harrison, 67 Ind., prior regular meeting a proposi- 71; Sackett v. State, 74 Ind., 486; tion to suspend the rules respect- Cassidy v. Bangor, 61 Me., 434, ing this ordinance was voted down. 441; Hudson County v. State, 24 Madden v. Smeltz, 2 Ohio Cir. Ct., N. J. L., 718. Ordinance passed at 168, 173. an adjourned meeting held valid. Presumption as to presence of Cutcomp V. Utt, 60 Iowa, 156; 14 quorum. Moore v. Perry (Iowa, N. W. Rep., 214. 1903), 93 N. W. Rep., 510. 33 State v. Jersey City, 25 N. J. 34 Wetmore v. Story, 22 Barb. L., 309, 312; State (Staates) v. (N. Y.), 414, 3 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), Washington, 44 N. J. L., 605; 45 262; Beekman's Case, 11 Abb. Pr. N. J. L., 318; 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. (N. Y.), 164. Cas., 39; Hudson County v. State, ss Township, of East Nissouri v. 24 N. J. L., 718. Horseman, 16 Up. Can. Q. B., p. §114] OP ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. 181 charter required that ordinances of a general or permanent nature should be fully and distinctly read on three different days. One-half of the council was renewed every year. The bill in question received two readings before the election and a third reading after a new mayor and half of the council were officially installed. The ordinance was held valid. The court declined to "regard the analogy between a state legis- lature and a city council sufficiently strong to be of controlling importance. If there be a sense in which there is a succession of city councils (which we do not determine) there is such immediate succession as to involve a substantial continuity when taken with the fact that one-half of the aldermen hold over; and we have no doubt that a continuity was contem- plated by the legislature. We believe that the proper conduct of municipal affairs demands it. "^^ § 114. Action of legislative body consisting of two branches. Municipal legislative departments are frequently composed of council election and taken up again entirely anew, if at all." McGraw v. Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348; 28 N. "W. Rep., 632; 34 Alb. Law Journ., 59. No authorities at all are cited or referred to. The Iowa case was followed by a nisi prius judge in a case where- in the facts, in substance, were the same. Smith v. Columbus & L. S. Ry. Co., 8 Ohio N. P. Rep. 1. The case distinguishes Wetmore v. Story, 22 Barb. (N. Y.), 414 and Beekman's case, 11 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 164; approves Tiedman, Mun. Corp., sec. 148, and dissents from Horr and Bemis, Municipal Police Ordinances, sec. 47. TJie power of the council over streets is a continuing one, and bids for work thereon presented to the council may be acted on by that body notwithstanding an elec- tion had intervened in which one- half of the members thereof were to be voted for. State (Booth) v. Bayonne, 56 N. J. L., 268 ; 28 Atl. Rep., 381. 583; The Canadian Atlantic R. W. Co. V. Ottawa, 8 Ontario Rep., 183; 12 Ontario App. Rep., 234; 12 Sup. Ct. of Can., 365. Because of the delay and incon- venience of the old rule, it is now expressly provided by statute in Canada that, "a municipal council shall be deemed and considered as always continuing and existing, notwithstanding any annual or other election of the members com- posing the same, and, after any such election and the organization of the council for the current year, may take up and carry on to com- pletion all proceedings commenced but not completed prior thereto" Biggar, Mun. Manual of Canada, p. 338, sec. 327. 30 "All that the statute prescribes is three readings. The position that all the readings should be before the same persons is based upon an inference drawn from the supposed object of the provision. * * * We cannot think that it was intended that all unfinished business should be dropped at each 183 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§ 115 two houses or branches. Certain corporate acts are required to be done in joint session, but most of the legislative func- tions are performed by each house or branch, acting sepa- rately as in the case of the state legislatures. A concurrence of both branches in the enactment is required.^^ In a New York case, where the charter vested the legislative powers in a board of aldermen and board of assistant aldermen, who together formed the common council, it was held to have adopted by implication, so far as applicable, the universally recognized principle of legislative bodies consisting of two independent branches. Therefore, a resolution adopted by the board of assistants in one year, cannot be concurred in by the board of aldermen in another year so as to make it, with- out consulting the existing body of assistants, an ordinance of the common council, and thus a corporate act of the city. The court held that it must, as in the case of unfinished business in other legislative bodies, be taken up de novo.^^' § 115. Bules for conducting business— Parliamentary law. Where the charter or law applicable does not prescribe rules for the government of the proceedings of councils, the mu- nicipal boards etc., the body is at liberty to determine its own rules of proceedings from time to time as occasion may re- quire.39 Oftentimes the organic law provides that the council 37Kittinger v. Buffalo Traction hill, 144 Mass., 352; 11 N. E. Rep., Co., 160 N. Y., 377; 54 N. E. Rep,, 554; 17 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 604. 1081. sswetmore v. Story, 22 Barb. Where a charter provides that (N. Y.), 414, 489-495; 3 Abb. Pr. the board of aldermen and the (,N. Y.), 262; Beekman's Case, 11 common council "in their joint Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 164. capacity shall be denominated the Compare cases cited in previous city council;" requires all peti- section. tions to be first acted on by the Selection of officer by concur- mayor and aldermen, and gives rent vote of both branches under the right of appeal to "any person particular circumstances, see Saun- aggrieved by any proceeding of ders v. Lawrence, 141 Mass.^ 380, the mayor and aldermen or of the 384. city council," it will be held that 39 A county board may make the charter does not contemplate reasonable rules for its govern- action by the board of aldermen ment. Higgins v. Curtis, 39 Kan., and council in joint convention. 283; 18 Pac. Rep., 207. In the Here the action was first passed absence of proof to the contrary by the aldermen and then by the any action taken will be presumed common council in concurrence, to have been in conformity there- and not in joint convention. It with. Masters v. McHoUand, 12 was held legal. Foley v. Haver- Kan., 17, 24. §115] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 183 or representative body may adopt its own rules of action.*" However, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action when the requisite number of mem- bers have agreed to the particular measure.*^ So the council may abolish, modify or waive its own rules.*^ But of course it cannot disregard mandatory charter provisions.*"* Hence, where an ordinance is enacted in compliance with the charter it will not be held void because in its passage one of the parliamentary rules of the council was violated.** Where a parliamentary question has been determined by the council, ordinarily the courts will not reverse such ruling.*'' The action of municipal bodies exercising legislative functions should not be overthrown upon technical rules or strict con- struction of parliamentary law where the facts of such action can be gathered from the record ; however, it cannot be estab- lished from testimony of members as to their understanding of •10 Atkins V. Phillips, 26 Fla., 281; 8 So. Rep., 429; Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 98 Ky., 59; 32 S. W. Rep., 259; 1 Starr & Curtis 111. Stat., p. 684, par. 36; Boyd v. Chi- cago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 103 111. App., 199. Ordinarily, rules adopted by council are binding upon that body. State v. Hoyt, 2 Oreg., 246. *i Mann v. Lemars, 109 Iowa, 244, 251; 80 N. W. Rep., 327; State V. Archibald, 5 N. D., 359; 66 N. W. Rep., 234; Madden v. Smeltz, 2 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep., 168; Hutche- son V. Storrie (Tex. Civ. App., 1898); 48 S. W. Rep., 785. 42 Holt V. Somerville, 127 Mass., 408, 411 ; Bennett v. New Bedford, 110 Mass., 433, 437; Greely v. Hamman, 17 Colo., 30; 28 Pac. Rep., 460; Chariton v. HoUiday, 60 Iowa, 391; 14 N. W. Rep., 775; Commonwealth v. Lancaster, 6 Watts (Pa.), 152. *3 See Sections which follow. Council rules can be amended only on notice, when. Armatage v. Fisher, 74 Hun. (N. Y.), 167; 26 N. Y, Suppl., 364. ii McGraw v. Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348; 28 N. W. Rep., 632. "There are few, if any, branches of the law on which there is less to be found in the way of direct adjudications than on the law gov- erning representative or delibera- tive bodies which is usually de- nominated parliamentary law. Most of the decisions which have touched upon questions of this kind have been made in recent years." Note to State ex rel. v. Kiichli, 19 L. R. A., 779. 45 Davies v. Saginaw, 87 Mich., 439; 49 N. W. Rep., 667. Review of decisions of councils permitted. Swann v. Cumberland 8 Gill (Md.), 150; Walsh v. John- ston, 18 R. I., 88; 25 Atl. Rep., 849. Presumption in favor of legal action. State v. Smith, 22 Minn., 218. Council decision of discretionary matters is conclusive. Schank v. New York, 10 Hun. (N. Y.), 124; affirmed 69 N. Y., 444; Indianapo- lis V. Consumer's Gas Trust Co., 140 Ind., 246; 39 N. E. Rep., 943. 184 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§11G what was intended to be done." In reference to the action of county boards the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has timely observed: "It will not do to apply to the orders and reso- lutions of such bodies nice verbal criticism and strict parlia- mentary distinctions, because the business is transacted gen- erally by plain men not familiar with parliamentary law. Therefore their proceedings must be liberally construed in order to get at the real intent and meaning of the body."*^ In like manner liberal construction is often applied to the action of councils in enacting ordinances.** § 116. Form of corporate action— Mandatory and directory provisions. The general rule that, where the charter or law under which the corporation is organized specifies a particular manner in which the given action is to be taken, such manner must be substantially followed, is specially applicable to the proceedings of the council or governing legislative body.** But where no particular method of action is pointed out, as, for example, where the law confers the power and enjoins the 46 Whitney v. Hudson, 69 Mich., ]89; 37 N. W. Rep., 184; 30 Am. & Bng. Corp. Cas., 453. See § 292 post. i^ Hark v. Gladwell, 49 Wis., 172, 177; 5 N. W. Rep., 323; Wisconsin Central R. R. v. Ashland County, 81 Wis., 1; 50 N. W. Rep., 937. 48 "The mayor and councilman, or other officers of a municipal cor- poration, are not usually selected hecause of their learning in the law, their observance of its forms, or their instruction in fine distinc- tions. If their action is to be sub- jected to rigid criticism much of it done in good faith, and in the spir- it of their defined authority, would be avoided." Woodruff v. Stewart, 63 Ala., 206, 215. "It is not to be expected that the technical rules of parliamentary law, which are enforced for the convenience in governing and con- trolling legislative bodies, should be vigorously applied to the pro- ceedings of a village council." Medden v. Smeltz, 2 Ohio Cir. Ct., 168, 174, Where the charter is silent as to the mode of voting in the organi- zation of the council, any mode not forbidden by law which insures to each member the right- to vote and by which the will of the ma- jority can be fairly ascertained may be adopted. The vote may be either by yeas and nays on motion or by ballot. It is essential to a valid election that all who are present and are constituent mem- bers of the elective body shall have an opportunity to vote. They all in this respect stand upon equal footing. State ex rel. v. Green, 37 Ohio St., 227, 230. Compare § 116 and cases therein. *9 Where the law requires cer- tain acts to be done by ordinance they may only be done by ordi- nance and not by mere resolution, order or motion. State ex rel. v. Green, 37 Ohio St., 227, 230. This subject is fully considered in priior sections. Sees. 2 to 5, supra. §110] OP ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. 185 duty upon the council to fix the salaries of certain officers, any form of procedure which the council may adopt in ex- pressing its determination as to what the salaries shall be, will be a substantial compliance with the charter, if such action is made to appear in the record of the proceedings in some written permanent form, as by the record in the minutes of an oral motion on the vote thereon.^*' The council gener- ally acts by vote. In the absence of express provision, the vote may be given in any form which clearly expresses the will of the members. It may be by ballot, by resolution, by the adoption of a verbal motion or in any other manner.''^ "A vote is but the expression of the will of a voter; and whether the formula to give expression to such law be a ballot or viva voce the result is the same; either is a vote."^'^ De- parture from the form prescribed for corporate action, as in the passage of an ordinance, will not affect the validity of such action unless the charter or governing law makes such formality vital,^^ ^s by declaring the action or ordinance void unless the form prescribed be followed.^* It is to be observed that some courts seem disposed to hold municipal legislative bodies to a stricter course of regularity in proceedings, in so far as charter provisions are involved, 50 Green Bay v. Brauns, 5U Wis., loe v. Pox, 96 Ky., 627; 29 S. W. 204; 6 N. W. Rep., 503. Rep., 433. 51 state ex rel. v. Barbour, 53 Provisions as to election of offi- Conn., 76, 81; 55 Am. Rep., 65. cars by ballot sometimes only ap- .-)2 Per Davies, J., in People ex ply to principal officers. Williams rel. V. Pease, 27 N. Y., 45, 57, quo- v. Gloucester, 148 Mass., 256; 19 ted -with approval in State ex rel. N. E. -Rep., 348. V. Green, 37 Ohio St., 227, 230. Invalid election of officers by Where charter requires certain council cannot be ratified. Law- oflScers to be appointed by the rence v. Ingersoll, 88 Tenn., 52; council, this may be done by bal- 12 S. W. Rep., 422; 17 Am. St. lot, instead of a vote by ayes and Rep., 870; 6 L. R. A., 308. nays. Boehme v. Monroe, 106 Election by resolution held valid. Mich., 401 ; 64 N..W. Rep., 204. Low v. Pilotage Com'rs, R. M. Charter provided the election Charlt. (Ga.), 302. should be by ballot if called for. ss Rockville v. Merchant, 60 Mo. Ballot was requested but refused, App., 365, 371; St. Louis v. Stern, and a committee appointed who 3 Mo. App., 48; Tarkio v. Cook, reported names, which were de- 120 Mo., 1; 25 S. W. Rep., 202; clared accepted. Election held il- Trustees etc., v. Erie, 31 Pa. St., legal. State v. Harris, 52 Vt, 216. 515. Method of balloting, secret or 54 St. Louis v. Foster, 52 Mo., viva voce, in particular case. Good- 513, 186 OP ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§ 117 than state legislatures. This undoubtedly grows out of the fact that a municipal corporation has no inherent right of legislation, but acts wholly under delegated authority and can exercise no power which is not in express terms or fair implication conferred upon it.^^ The policy of the law is to concede power to the legislature and ordinarily to recognize that which has been done as rightly done, but the general principle applied to the municipal corporation is that it must make its powers apparent and show regularity, and a fair and substantial compliance with all mandatory legal provision.s" Therefore, the validity of any given corporate act, as the passage of an ordinance or resolution or the making of a contract for an improvement, depends upon the fact that it was regularly passed by the council.^^ § 117. Taking yeas and nays. Charters often provide that whenever a vote is taken on certain propositions, as in the passage of an ordinance, by-law, resolution, or contract for work, the yeas and nays shall be taken and recorded.^* As heretofore mentioned, frequently the word "shall" as em- ployed in a law is held to be directory merely, the essential requisite being the determination of the corporation, and not the form or manner of expressing that determination.^* This 55 Thomson v. Lee County, 3 52 Ind., 411, 413; Delphi v. Evans, Wall. (U. S.), 327, 330; Clark v. 36 Ind., 90; 10 Am. Rep., 12. Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494 ; Nlchol v. loioa — Indianola v. Jones, 29 Mayor, 9 Humph. (Tenn.), 252; Iowa, 282. Altoona v. Bowman, 171 Pa. St., Massachusetts — Morrison v. Law- 307; 37 Wkly. Notes Cas. (Pa.), rence, 98 Mass., 219. 102; 33 Atl. Rep., 187. New York— In re Carlton St., 16 56 Bloom V. Xenia, 32 Ohio St., Hun. (N. Y.), 497, 499. 461, 465. Oftio— State ex rel. v. Green, 37 57 Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio Ohio St., 227, 230 ; Sullivan v. St., 96, 101. ' Compare Sec. 115, Pausch, 5 Ohio C. C, 196. supra, and cases cited therein. General law not applicable to 58 Illinois — Chicago Dock Co. v. cities with special charters. Pres- Garrity, 115 111., 155; 3 N. E. Rep., ton v. Cedar Rapids, 95 Iowa, 71; 448; Ryan v. Lynch, 68 111., 160; 63 N. W. Rep., 577. Supervisors, etc., v. People, 25 111., ",9 Sees. 82 and 83, supra; St. 181; Hackman v. Staunton, 42 111. Louis v. Foster, 52 Mo., 513, per App., 409; Belknap v. Miller, 52 Wagner, J.; In re Mount Morris 111. App., 617; Knight v. Thomp- Square, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 14, 20; sonville, 74 111. App., 550, 555; Elmendorf v. New York, 25 Wend. Chicago V. Fraser, 60 111. App., (N. Y.), 693. 404, 409. The effect of mere departure Indiana — Martindale v. Palmer, from the prescribed form is elab-. §117] OF ENACTMENT OF OROINANCES. 187 doctrine has been applied to the charter requirement that votes on certain propositions shall be taken, by yeas and nays."" Where the law declares the action void if the yeas and nays are not taken and recorded, the provision is always construed as mandatory. However, notwithstanding the ab- sence of such declaration, the weight of the judicial view appears to be that such provision is mandatory and caimot be disregarded.®' A separate vote by yeas and nays for each specific corporate act is required usually. Hence it has been held that ordinances cannot be legally passed by voting for two or more at one and the same time."^ Although the charter provides in general terms that the vote in all cases shall be taken by ayes and noes, and every vote shall be entered at large on the journal, it has been held that it does not apply to a vote upon a motion to adjourn.®* So the vote on the pas- sage of a resolution, to carry out the provisions of a prior ordinance, need not be by yeas and nays, as required in case of an ordinance.®^ orately considered in Pac. Ry. Co. V. Governor, 23 Mo., 353. 00 Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 9, 24, affirmed 2 Denio (N. Y.), 323; Belknap v. Miller, 52 111. App., 617. See Barr v. Auburn, 89 111., 361. 61 United, States — Coffin v. Port- land, 43 Fed. Rep., 411. Arkansas — Cutler v. Russellville, 40 Ark., 105; 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 414. Colorado — Sullivan v. Leadville, 11 Colo., 483; 18 Pac. Rep., 736; Tracey v. People, 6 Colo., 151; 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 373; Bro- phy V. Hyatt, 10 Colo., 223; 15 Pac. Rep., 399. Illinois — Rich v. Chicago, 59 111., 286; Hackman v. Staunton, 42 111. App., 409; Spangler v. Jacohy, 14 III., 297; 58 Am. Dec, 571. Indiana — Logansport v. Crock- ett, 64 Ind., 319; New Albany Gas Light, etc., Co. v. Crumbo, 10 Ind. App., 360; 37 N. E. Rep., 1062. Iowa — Clin v. Meyers, 55 Iowa, 209; 7 N. W. Rep., 509. New York — In re South Market St., 76 Hun. (N. Y.), 85; 27 N. Y. Suppl., 843. North Dakota— O'Neil v. Tyler, 3 N. Dak., 47; 53 N. W. Rep., 434. Ohio — Campbell v. Cincinnati, 49 Ohio St., 463; 31 N. E. Rep., 606. 02 Sullivan v. Pausch, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep., 196; Campbell v. Cincin- nati, 49 Ohio St., 463; 31 N. E. Rep., 606; Wright v. Forrestal, 65 Wis., 341 ; 27 N. W. Rep., 52. Ex- amine Parker v. Catholic Bishop, 146 111., 158; 34 N. E. Rep., 473; Daflinger v. Pittsburgh, etc., T. Co., 31 Pittsb. Legal J. (Pa.), 37. Where five members of a council, composed of eight, are present, and voting in favor of the action, as record shows, it is immaterial that the nays do not appear to have been called. Bayard v. Baker, 76 Iowa, 220; 40 N. W. Rep., 818. 63 Green Bay v. Brauns, 50 Wis., 204, 208; 6 N. W. Rep., 503. 01 Grimmell v. Des Moines, 57 Iowa, 144 ; 10 N. W. Rep., 330. Restricted to certain class of or- 188 OF ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. [§ 119 § 118. Reasons for requiring yeas and nays. Two principal reasons may be suggested in favor of the requirement under consideration. First, the most important is to obtain a defi- nite and accurate record of the corporate action in order to determine whether all of the mandatory provisions of the charter have been observed. Only in this way may it be ascertained whether the particular act is legal or illegal. Second, another purpose is to make the members of the body feel the responsibility of their action and to compel each member to bear his share in the responsibility by making a permanent written record of his action which should not be afterwards open to dispute.®^ It is well known that men acting in a body, especially when under cover of corporate privilege, will often do what no one of them would be willing to do if acting alone and upon his individual responsibility; and they will sometimes say ' ' aye, ' ' or permit a matter to pass suh silentio when they would not venture to record their names in favor of the measure.'''^ The inhabitants of the mu- nicipality are, as of right, entitled to know clearly the act and vote of every member, of -their agents and servants, on every proposition relating to public duties, and a record of such acts and votes should be plainly made in a permanent form so that every inhabitant may have definite information."^ § 119. Reading bills on three different days. Many char- ters prescribe that certain, ordinances and resolutions shall be dinances. Mackin v. Wilson, 20 The language is imperative — the Ky. L. Rep., 218; 45 S. W. Rep., ayes and noes shall he called. 663; Argus Co. v. Alhany, 55 N. When the particular mode In Y., 495; 7 Lans. (N. Y.), 264. which the corporation is to act is 85 Per Cooley, J., in Steckert v. thus specifically declared hy its East Saginaw, 22 Mich., 104, 107, charter, I think it can only act in 108; Logansport v. Dykeman, 116 the prescribed form. The contrary Ind., 15, 18; 17 N. E. Rep., 587; doctrine wants the sanction of le- Brophy v. Hyatt, 10 Colo., 223, gal authority and is fraught with 226; 15 Pac. Rep., 399. the most dangerous consequences. 60 "To guard against such evils, It would place corporations above and protect the citizens against the law^ and there is reason to the impositions of unnecessary fear that they would soon become burdens it was provided * * * an intolerable nuisance." Dissent- that the ayes and noes should be ing opinion of Bronson, J., in Stri- called and published whenever a ker v. Kelly, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 9, 29. vote should be taken on any pro- 07 As to sufficiency of record of posed improvement involving a yeas and nays, see § 127, post, tax or assessment on the citizens, §119] OF ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. 189 read a certain number of times before passage ; the most usual provision being that they shall be read on three different days.^* Some charters permit the reading a specified number of times to be dispensed with on a two-thirds or three-fourths vote of the body.®^ In the absence of charter provision, coun- cil rules often require certain bills and resolutions to receive two or three several readings on different days before final passaged" The method of dispensing with the number of readings as prescribed by vote or suspension of rules is stated in another sectionJ^ Charter or statutory provisions of this character are generally held to be mandatory, and, hence, failure to observe them invalidates the action."- Where under the charter the council is a continuous body, an ordinance which had been read on two separate days before the regular 08 Florida — Atkins v. Phillips, 26 Fla., 281; 8 So. Rep., 429. Iowa — Bayard v. Baker, 76 la., 220; 40 N. W. Rep., 818; Cutcomp v. Utt, 60 la., 156; 14 N. W. Rep., 214; Horner v. Rowley, 51 la., 620; 2 N. W. Rep., 436. Kentucky — Nevin v. Roach, 86 Ky., 492; 5 S. W. Rep., 546. Nebraska — Brown v. Lutz, 36 Neb., 527; 54 N. W. Rep., 860. Ohio — Elyria Gas, etc., Co., v. Blyria, 57 Ohio St.. 374; 49 N. E. Rep., 335; Campbell v. Cincinnati, 49 Ohio St.. 463; 31 N. E. Rep., 606; Bloom v. Xenia, 32 Ohio St., 461; Cincinnati v. Johnson, 17 Ohio Cir. Ct, 291; 9 Ohio Cir. Dec, 736; Kerlin Bros. Co. v. Toledo, 20 Ohio Cir. Ct., 603; 11 Ohio Dec, 56; Smith v. Columbus L. & S. Ry. Co., 8 Ohio (N. P.), 1. Two readings suflScient. Zeiler V. Central R. R. Co., 84 Md., 304; 35 Atl. Rep., 932. The third reading of the ordi- nance may be by merely reading its title. Anderson v. Camden, 58 N. J. L., 515 ; 33 Atl. Rep., 846. 09 Bloom V. Xenia, 32 Ohio St., 461; GrifiBn v. Messenger, 114 Iowa, 99; 86 N. W. Rep., 219. 70 Holt V. Somerville, 127 Mass., 408; Bennett v. New Bedford, 110 Mass., 433. ■i^i Sec. 107, supra; Nevin v. Roach, 86 Ky., 492; 5 S. W. Rep., 546. ''^ California — Herzo v. San Fran- cisco, 33 Cal., 134; Weill v. Ken- field, 54 Cal., 111. Illinois — Ryan v. Lynch, 68 111., 160. Indiana — Swindell v. State, 143 Ind., 153; 42 N. E. Rep., 528. Iowa — GriflSn v. Messenger, 114 Iowa, 99 ; 86 N. W. Rep., 219. New Jersey — State (Gregory) v. Jersey City, 34 N. J. L., 429. Ohio — Campbell v. Cincinnati, 49 Ohio St., 463; 31 N. E. Rep., 606; Thatcher v. Toledo, 19 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep., 311 ; Bloom v. Xenia, 32 Ohio St., 461. Where the record reads: "Or- dinances No. concerning butchers and meat wagons passed to a third reading and put on its final passage," with a recital that all the members voted yes, it is sufiBciently shown that the ordi- nance was read a third time be- fore final passage. Rockville v. Merchant, 60 Mo. App., 365, 371. 190 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [ § 119 election for councilmen may,, after the annual organization of the council following such election, be read a third time and passed. The court was of the opinion that the unfinished business of the council should not be regarded as dropped with each council election.''^ Contrary to the current of authority, the rule of the Su- preme Court of Missouri is that, a charter provision that "all bills shall be read three times before their final passage," is directory merely. The court said: "It is to be observed that the above section does not declare a sentence of nullity against a bill which is not read three times before its final passage."'* It has been held that a charter provision requir- ing all ordinances or resolutions of "a permanent or general nature" to be read on three distinct days, does apply to a resolution awarding a contract for the improvement of a street,^^ nor to the preliminary resolution declaring a pro- posed improvement necessary.'^^ It is clear that the same bill or ordinance must be read the 73 McGraw v. Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348; 28 N. W. Rep., 632; 34 Alb. L. J., 59; Smith v. Columbus L. & S. Ry. Co., 8 Ohio (N. P.), 1. The new council can take up the proceedings where they were left off by the old council, as the body is continuous. Booth v. Bayonne, 56 N. J. L., 268; 28 Atl. Rep., 381. _ See § 113, supra. 74 "There are authorities to the contrary but we shall adhere to our own decisions." Per Sher- wood, J., Aurora Water Co. v. Au- rora, 129 Mo., 540; 31 S. W. Rep., 946; Rockville v. Merchant, 60 Mo. App., 365. Similar views were held in State ex rel. v. Mead, 71 Mo,. 266, and Barber Asphalt Pav- ing Co. v. Hunt, 100 Mo., 22; 13 S. W. Rep., 98; Barton v. Pitts- burgh, 4 Brewster (Pa.), 373. Presumption. It has been held in Illinois that it is not necessary that the journal should show that the bill was read the number of times prescribed by the constitu- tion, for this will be presumed to have been done unless the journal aifirmatively shows that it was not done. Here the constitution was silent as to the entry of reading on the journal. The court said: "It is then left to the discretion of either house to enter it or not, and the silence of the journal on the subject ought not to be held to afford evidence that the act was not done. In such case we must presume it was done, unless the journal affirmatively shows that it was not done." Per Caton, C. J., in Supervisors of Schuyler Co. v. People ex rel., 25 111., 181, 184. S. P. Chicago Tel. Co. v. N. W. Tel. Co., 100 111. App., 57. The above Illinois decisions re- late to the reading of bills in the State legislature; the requirement does not apply to municipal coun- cil in that State. 75 Cincinnati v. Bickett, 26 Ohio St., 49. 70 Upington v. Oviatt, 24 Ohio St., 232, 240. §120] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 191 number of times prescx'ibecl. Thus, where a charter requires certain ordinances, as those providing for improvements which are to be paid for by special taxation, to be published between their second and third readings, a material amendment (as, for example, changing the character of the proposed improve- ment or streets to be improved) cannot be made after the second reading, without the notice required.^' But an imma- terial change in the title or body of the ordinance will not invalidate itJ® § 120. Ratification of void acts. Irregular and void acts may be ratified or confirmed at a subsequent meeting.'^* Thus, where the action in allowing a claim is invalid because of a lack of a majority vote as required by law, it may be ratified at a subsequent meeting by resolution confirming such previous action.*" So a town may at a legal town meeting ratify acts of its selectmen in borrowing money and giving a note therefor in behalf of the town.''^ In a New Hampshire case, the court ex- pressed a doubt whether, where selectmen appoint one to an office without legal authority, a subsequent vote of the town to ratify their act is valid, but if valid the court held that it must only operate as a new appointment by the town and the officer, after such vote, must qualify.*^ In one case where all of the members of the council were not notified of a special meeting and certain corporate action was taken, it Avas held that, if at the next regular meeting the minutes of the special meeting are read and approved, this will be equivalent to a ratification of what was done at that meeting.*^ However, it 17 The court said that the charter W. Rep., 625; 7 Am. & Eng. Corp. contemplates that all amendments Cas., 206. should he made, and the proposed A school district, at a legal ordinance perfected on the second meeting, may ratify and confirm reading; and that the notice given proceedings of prevoius meetings between the second and third read- which were not strictly legal. Jor- ing will inform parties interest- dan v. School District, 38 Me., ed of the precise character of the 164. improvements intended. State so Curtis v. Gowan, 34 111. App., (Doyle) V. Newark, 30 N. J. L., 516. 303, 305. SI "A ratification after the act is 78 State (Staates) v. Washing- as potent as authority before the ton, 44 N. J. L., 605. act." Brown v. Winterport, 79 79 Act of park commissioners. Me., 305, 311; 9 Atl.'Rep., 844. State ex rel. v. Hennepin County 82 Johnston v. Wilson, 2 N. H., Dist. Court. 33 Minn., 235; 22 N. 202. 83 A municipal corporation may 192 OP ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§ 131 has been held that the mere approval of the minutes of suck meeting is not a complete ratification of the acts of the special meeting, but only an approval of the correctness of such meet- ing.** Where a particular action is confirmed by resolution, which resolution is afterwards duly rescinded, confirmation of the former action may take place legally only upon giving notice as required by law prior to the taking of the original action.*'^ There can be no legal confirmation or ratification of ultra vires acts,*^ nor of acts under a void law. So, where the char- ter conferred exclusive power upon the council to execute the particular act, and it was performed by an officer, such act can not be legally ratified.*^ Where the charter prescribes a method of doing the act, this mode must be observed in any act of ratification. Thus, where the act could only be done by ordinance, the ratification must be by ordinance.** § 121. Reconsideration— General powers respecting. Unless restrained by charter or statute applicable, the legislative body of a municipal corporation, like all deliberative bodies, pos- sesses the undoubted right to vote and reconsider its vote upon measures before it, at its own pleasure, and to do and un- do, consider and reconsider, as often as it may think proper, until by final vote or act, accepted as such by the body, a con- elusion is reached, and it is the result only which is done.*'' ratify all contracts not ultra vires, v. Baltimore, 29 Md., 415; Horn v. Shawneetown v. Baker, 85 111., Baltimore, 30 Md., 218, 222. 563. ssunionville v. Martin, 95 Mo. 84 Mills V. San Antonio (Tex. App., 28, 37; 68 S. W. Rep., 605. Civ. App., 1901), 65 S. W. Rep., 89 Whitney v. Van Buskirk, 40 1121. N. J. L., 463, 467. 85 State V. Jersey City, 27 N. J. "All deliberative assemblies, dur- L., 536. ing their sessions, have a right to 88 Shawneetown v. Baker, 85 111., do and undo, consider and recon- 563; Maupin v. Franklin Co., 67 sider, as often as they think prop- Mo., 327 ; Johnson v. School Dis- er, and it is the result only which trict, 67 Mo., 319; McKissick v. is done." State v. Foster, 7 N. J. Mt. Pleasant Tp., 48 Mo. App., 416; L., 101, 107. Kolkmeyer v. Jefeerson City, 75 "The right of reconsidering lost Mo. App., 678, 683; Unionville v. measures inheres in every body Martin, 95 Mo. App., 28, sf; 68 S. possessing legislative powers." W. Rep., 605. Jersey City v. State, 30 N. J. L., 87 Baltimore v. Porter, 18 Md., 521, 529. 284; 79 Am. Dec, 686; Baltimore May reconsider at subsequent V. Horn, 26 Md., 194, 204; Lester meeting vote by which a measure § 121] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 193 An ordinance after having been finally enacted over the veto of the mayor cannot be reconsidered.^'* So, after the mayor's veto of an ordinance is returned to the legislative body and the veto sustained, a subsequent reconsideration and passage of the ordinance over the veto is unauthorized. In such case the ordinance cannot be passed on a second reconsideration after the charter test had decided it in the negative.^^ The reconsideration must be in accordance vsrith the pro- visions of the charter, and the rules of procedure, if any, gov- erning the body. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, was lost and pass the ordinance. People ex rel. v. Rochester, 5 Lans. (N. Y.), 11. "All bodies, possessing a judi- cial capacity, have the competency to consult, resolve and reconsider, and they are not bound by their conclusions until such conclusions have been promulgated by their authority." State v. Crosley, 36 N. J. L., 425, 428. Freeholders to lay out a public road may reconsider a vote by which they have determined a mat- ter before them, and alter their determination if done before they separate. State v. Justice 24 N. J. L., 413. County court may legally revoke an order. Dey v. Lee, 4 Jones L. (N. C), 238; Tucker v. Iredell Co. Justices, 13 Iredell (N. C), 434. 00 Ashton V. Rochester, 60 Hun. (N. y.), 372; 14 N. Y. Supp., 855, affirmed 133 N. Y., 187; 30 N. E. Rep., 965; 31 N. E. Rep., 334; 28 Am. St. Rep., 619. 91 The charter provided thatwhen an ordinance is returned vetoed the council "shall proceed to re- consider it. If after such recon- sideration two-thirds" vote for it notwithstanding the veto it shall become a law, but upon failure to receive such vote the ordinance shall be lost. Sank v. Philadel- phia, 4 Brews. (Pa.), 133; 8 Phila. Rep., 117; People v. Rochester, 5 Lans. (N. Y.), 11. 32 Sank v. Philadelphia, supra. As to consideration of mayor's veto, see Sec. 160, post. A matter was reconsidered at a subsequent meeting. It did not appear that there was a rule of the council authorizing such action. It was presumed that there was such a rule. Red v. Augusta, 25 Ga., 386, 390. Who to move reconsideration. People V. Rochester, 5 Lans. (N. Y.), 11. In absence of proof to the con- trary a reconsideration of the ac- tion of a county board taken on a former day of the same session, on any matter properly before it, will be presumed to have been done in conformity with its rules and regulations. Higgins v. Cur- tis, 39 Kan., 283; 18 Pac. Rep., 207; Masters v. McHolland, 12 Kan., 17, 24. A resolution passed by the requi- site vote, after veto declaring that the ordinance stand, the objections ' of the mayor to the contrary not- withstanding, is a sufficient recon- sideration, though the resolution does not expressly declare that the body reconsiders the matter. Oak- ley V. Atlantic City, 63 N. J. L., 127 ; 44 Atl. Rep., 651. Notice of reconsideration some- 13 Idl OF ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. [§122 ordinarily courts will presume that the action was properly had.''2 A resolution authorizing a corporate act which requires a majority vote of all of the members of the body can be re- scinded only by a like vote."^ So, where the charter requires a two-third vote to adopt a resolution, the same vote is neces- sary on reconsideration.^* § 122. Power to rescind prior acts. In accordance with the doctrine of the last section, the legislative body of the corpora- tion, or any board or department thereof, possesses the un- questioned power to rescind prior acts and votes at any time thereafter until the act or vote is complete, provided vested rights are not violated, and such rescission is in conformity to the law applicable and the rules and regulations adopted for the government of the body."^ Thus, where a town has voted to raise a tax, but nothing has been done thereunder, the town has the power at a meeting legally warned for that purpose to rescind or reconsider the vote."® But where a town has in town times required. Atlanta Ry. & Power Co. v. Atlanta Rapid Tran- sit Co., 113 Ga., 481; 39 S. E. Rep., 12. "When a bill is put upon its final passage in the board and fails to pass, and a motion is made to reconsider, the vote upon such mo- tion shall not be acted upon before the expiration of twenty-four hours after adjournment." Charter San Francisco, art. II, eh. 1, § 12; Stat, and Amend, to Codes, Cal. (1899), p 245. s>3 Naegely v. Saginaw, 101 Mich., 532; 60 N. W. Rep., 46; Stockdale V. School Dist., 47 Mich., 226; 10 N. "W. Rep., 349. See City Sewer- age U. Co. V. Davis, 8 Phila. (Pa.), 625; Green Bay v. Brauns, 50 Wis., 204; 6 N. W. Rep., 503. ^t Whitney v. Hudson, 69 Mich., 189; 37 N. W. Rep., 184. In Illinois, by statute no vote shall be reconsidered or rescinded at a special meeting unless there be present as large a number as were present when such vote was taken. 1 Starr and Curtis 111. Stat., p. 685, par. 43. »5 Sawyer v. M. & K. R. R. Co., 62 N. H., 135, 153, 154; Mitchell V. Brown, 18 N. H., 315; Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick. (Mass.), 345; Nel- son V. Milford, 7 Pick. (Mass.), 18; Withington v. Harvard, 8 Cush. (Mass.), 66; Hunneman v. Grafton, 10 Met. (Mass.), 454; Hall V. Holden, 116 Mass., 172; Curnen v. Mayor, etc., 79 N. Y., 511; Ross V. Stackhouse, 114 Ind., 200; 16 N. E. Rep., 501. Vote to aid a railroad may be rescinded where nothing had been done under the vote. Estey v. Starr, 56 Vt.. 690. Prior act to pay over money may be rescinded. Dey v. Lee, 4 Jones L. (N. C), 238; Tucker v. Iredell Co. Justices, 13 Iredell (N. C.),'434. 96 Stoddard v. Gilman, 22 Vt., 568, 573, where it is said: "A vote to raise money for town purposes is a mere declaration, or resolu- tion, on the part of the town alone, and not in the nature of a grant, or contract between the town and an individual. * * * So long as this rests in mere resolution. §1^3J OF ENACTMENT Oi" ORDINANCES. M meeting, by vote, ratified the act of the selectmen in borrow- ing money and giving a note therefor in behalf of the town, such vote of ratification fully completes the act, and, there- fore, the town cannot at a subsequent meeting rescind such ratification so as to affect the validity of the contract.^^ § 123. Committees. Provision is usually made in the or- ganic law of the corporation, or by ordinance or other regula- tions, duly adopted in pursuance thereof, for the creation and constitution of committees, to assist the legislative body in the perf,ormance of its proper duties, as in the collection of facts and information which are generally embodied in reports. This method of performing portions of the public business is not forbidden and has often been sanctioned by judicial decisions.' The rule appears to be well established that certain municipal duties ma,y be performed by agents or committees.^ Thus, the and has not been acted upon, we think the town must have the power to rescind or reconsider it. Until something has been done un- der the vote, the town alone are interested in it, and may alter their resolve at their own pleas- ure." So a school district having voted to raise moneys for erecting a school house may afterwards and before the same are assessed, re- scind such vote at their discretion. Pond V. Negus, 3 Mass., 230; 3 Am. Dec, 131. 97 Brown v. Winterport, 79 Me., 305; 9 Atl. Rep., 844. Whether a vote of a town to discontinue a town way can he re- considered after rights of third parties have intervened, gi«iere. Bigelow V. Hillman, 37 Me., 52, 58. An order of a county court regu- larly made which vacates an old road and establishes a new public highway in lieu thereof cannot at a subsequent term be vacated so that the old road will be re-estab- lished, without the notice, petition and review prescribed by law. Reiffl V. Conner, 10 Ark., 241. After having rejected -all bids, a council may recohsider and award a contract to one of the original bidders without readver- tising. State ex rel. v. Cleveland, 15 Ohio Cir. Ct, 517; 8 Ohio Cir. Dec, 357. 1 Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh, 14 Pa. St., 177, 184. Towns may appoint committees for special purposes. Keyes v. Westford, 17 Pick. (Mass.), 273. 2 United States-^Bullitt County V. Washer, 130 U. s"., 142. Connecticut — Whitney v. New Haven, 58 Conn., 450; 20 Atl. Rep., 666. Florida — Holland v. State, 23 Fla., 123; 1 So. Rep., 521. Illinois — Gillett v. Logan Coun- ty, 67 111., 256; Alton v. Mulledy, 21 111., 76. Indiana — Duncan v. Lawrence County Comrs., 101 Ind., 403. Iowa — Stewart v. Council Bluffls, 58 Iowa, 642; 12 N. W. Rep., 718. Massachusetts — Damon v. Gran- by, 2 Pick. (Mass.), 345. New Jersey — Burlington v. Den- nison, 42 N. J. L., 165. New York — Gilmore v. Utica, 131 196 OP ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§123 council may refer applications for the location or alteration of streets to a committee to examine into the matter and report to the council.^ So, where the council is the sole judge of the election of its own members, upon the institution of a contest, a committee may be appointed to take testimony and report to the council.* A council may authorize the mayor and the chairman of a committee on streets and alleys to make in its behalf a contract for doing public work and afterwards con- N. Y., 26; 29 N. E. Rep., 841; Kam- rath V. Albany, 53 Hun. (N. Y.), 206; 6 N. Y, Suppl., 54; Edwards V. Watertown, 24 Hun. (N. Y.), 426. The doctrine forbidding the del- egation of powers upon the part of the council or other governing legislative body to boards, officers or other persons is fully stated elsewhere (§§ 84 to 89, supra). Council cannot delegate to a committee the power to contract, as for supply of gas. Minneapolis Gas Light Go. v. Minneapolis, 36 Minn., 159; 30 N. W. Rep., 450; Anderson v. Equitable Gas Light Co., 12 Daley (N. Y.), 462. 3 Preble v. Portland, 45 Me., 241. Council committee may build a sewer, when. Dorey v. Boston, 146 Mass., 336, 339; 15 N. E. Rep., 897. Make sewer assessments by third person. Collins v. Holyoke, 146 Mass., 298; 15 N. B. Rep., 908. Committee to purchase school lands. Parkey v. Concord, 71 N. H., 468 ; 52 Atl. Rep., 1095. * Salmon v. Haynes, 50 N. J. L., 97, 100; 11 Atl. Rep., 151, hold- ing committee may employ stenog- rapher. When representations of coun- cil committee will bind the city, see Sharp v. New York, 40 Barb. (N. Y.), 256; 25 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 389. Under a charter which vested legislative powers in a board of aldermen and a board of council- men and provided that each board shall Judge of the eligibility of its own members and punish or expel a member, a committee of alder- men authorized by a resolution of the general council (which was the designation of the two boards) to investigate charges of corruption of its members is illegal. Com- monwealth V. Hillenbrand, 96 Ky., 407; 29 S. W. Rep., 287. As to power of committee to is- sue attachments for witnesses, see Briggs V. Matsell, 2 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 156; In re Dunn, 9 Mo. App., 255. Under a charter authorizing the issuance of an attachment against the witnesses for refusing to an- swer any proper question those only are proper questions which are pertinent to the investigation and come within the subject re- ferred to and which relates to the matters of the power of the com- mon council to inquire about. Van Tine v. Nims, 3 Abb. Pr. (NY.), 39. Power to commit a witness who refused to attend when duly sum- moned or to be sworn or affirmed or to answer after being sworn, extends no authority to the com- mitment of witness who refused to produce books and accounts. People V. Van Tassel, 135 N. Y., 638; 32 N. E. Rep., 646. §133] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 197 firm such report.^ When the council ratifies the act of the committee in due and legal form it becomes the act of the council.*' The committee, being the sole creature of the council, is sub- ject at all times to the complete control of the council. Any committee may be reduced or enlarged in membership, or its powers entirely revoked, if not inconsistent with the charter or rules governing the body. Some charters require certain things to be done by committees, as that the engrossment of bills or ordinances shall be under the supervision of a committee which shall report that the bill is truly engrossed, and that no bill shall be considered for final passage unless the same has been reported upon by a committee.'' The rules as to quorums and majorities heretofore given re- specting councils and boards usually apply to the proceedings of committees.^ The major part of a committee appointed by a town for a particular purpose is necessary to constitute a quo- rum, and the act of a majority of a quorum is the act of the committee.^ However, this rule is only important in so far as the report of the committee is concerned. The final or corporate act is within the discretion of the body creating the commit- tee. 5 Hitchcock V. Galveston, 96 U. and the committee recommends S., 341. their acceptance, the receiving of 6 Milford School Town v. Pow- water from the works and the pay- ner, 126 Ind., 528; 26 N. E. Rep., ment of an installment due under 484; Railroad Co. v. Marion Co., the contract amounts to a ratifi- 36 Mo., 294; Salmon v. Haynes, 50 cation of the report of the commit- N. J. L., 97 ; 11 Atl. Rep., 151. tee and an acceptance of the works A favorable report of a commit- by the city. Aurora Water Co. v. tee appointed by a city council to Aurora, 129 Mo., 540; 31 S. W. inspect waterworks and recom- Rep., 946. mend action as to their acceptance, v Charter of the City of St. when approved by the board will Louis, art. Ill, sees. 13 and 15; constitute a complete acceptance, The Municipal Code of St. Louis, and the failure to pass an ordl- pp. 205, 206. nance of acceptance subsequently s Sees. 103 to 108, supra. proposed will not defeat it. Au- ^ Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick, rora Water Co. v. Aurora, 129 Mo., (Mass.), 345; State ("Van Vorst) 540; 31 S. W. Rep., 946. v. Jersey City, 27 N. J. L., 493. Where, after waterworks con- Majority of selectmen of a town tracted for by a city have been may act in laying out a road. Jones completed, the city council ap- v. Andover, 9 Pick. (Mass.), 146; points a committee to inspect them Crommett v. Pearson, 18 Me., 344. 198 0^' BiSiACtMENT OF ORDINANCES. inu RECORDS. § 124. Record of proceedings. Usually the law requires municipal corporations to make written records of their, trans- actions and proceedings. The keeping of such records by the legislative or governing body is generally required in express terms.i" The law requires a record to the end that those who may be called to act under it may have no occasion to look be- yond it; to avoid the mischief of leaving municipal corporate action to be proved by parol evidence ; to make it certain that rights which have accrued under such actions shall not be destroyed or affected by the always fallible and often wholly unreliable recollection of witnesses, however truthful and in- telligent they may be. For similar reasons the law requires' conveyances of lands, wills, certain contracts, records of courts and legislation to be in writing.^^ Ordinarily the validity of an ordinance or resolution is not affected by the fact that, through an oversight of the clerk, it is not copied upon the municipal records.^- But where the 10 1 Starr & Curtis 111. Stat., p. 685, par. 41. Proceedings of council meeting cannot be left In parol; they must be recorded. Moser v. White, 29 Mich., 59. Provision that all by-laws, reso- lutions and ordinances are to he recorded in a book kept for that purpose, held with respect to the particular book in which the rec- ord shall be made, directory mere- ly. "No negative words are used in connection with this require- ment." Upington v. Oviatt, 24 Ohio St., 232, 241. Law requiring records, held di- rectory. Barton v. Pittsburgh, 4 Brewst. (Pa.), 373. The unrecord- ed acts of a borough council if clearly proved, are valid. Avoca v. Pittston, J. & A. R. Co., 7 Kulp. (Pa.), 470. Township board bound to keep records. Fayette County v. Chit- wood, 8 Ind., 504. Boards and departments connect- ed with city governments required to keep full records of public trans- actions. Board of public works must keep records. Davis v. Jack- son, 61 Mich., 530; 28 N. W. Rep., 526. Advisable that records of public board should be kept. Gearhart v. Dixon, 1 Pa. St., 224, 228. Although not required in ex- press terms, the duty to keep rec- ords arises by implication. Fruin- Brambrick Const. Co. v. Geist, 37 Mo. App., 509, 515 ; Lamed v. Bris- coe, 62 Mich., 393, 396; 29 N. W. Rep., 22. 11 Per Carpentier, J., in Sawyer V. M. & K. R. R., 62 N. H., 135, 155, 156. 12 Crebs v. Lebanon, 98 Fed. Rep., 549, per Philips, D. J.; Parr v. Greenbush, 72 N. Y., 463. So failure to enter a vote of stockholders in a private corpora- tion in the corporation records at the time when it was adopted does not invalidate it. Here the reso- § 125] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 199 law, in express terms, requires ordinances to be recorded and published before going into effect, and this is not done, bonds issued in pursuance thereof are void.^* § 125. Who to keep municipal records. The law usually designates the officer or person authorized to make and keep the municipal records. The person so designated and no other is the only one legally authorized to keep them. In the ab- sence of the persons so named, charters often provide for the appointment of a clerk or secretary pro tem,i* but in the ab- sence of such provision it has been held that corporations have the incidental power to name a person for this purpose. Rec- ords kept by such person or records completed by the secretary or clerk from memoranda kept by the temporary clerk, duly appointed by the corporate authorities, are legal evidence of the transactions of the corporate meeting. There cannot be a legal record without one to keep it, as a clerk or secre- tary or one duly appointed for this purpose.^ ^ The appoint- ment of one to keep the records by the presiding officer without objection may be considered an appointment by the meeting.!® In one case the selectmen of a town without express authority appointed a temporary clerk, who acted without objection, and his record of the transactions of the meeting were held valid on the de facto principle.!^ The mere lution was adopted in 1886 and for- record them, but he must enter mally entered o£ record two years the proceedings, subject to the cor- thereafter when the omission was rection by the council. Cady v. discovered. Brown, J., observed: Ihnken (Mich., 1902), 89 N. W. "The failure to enter this resolu- Rep., 72 ; 8 Detroit Leg. N., 1033. tion at the time it was adopted is Attorney General v. Crocker, did not affect its validity, as most 138 Mass., 214. corporate acts can be proved as is State v. McKee, 20 Or., 120; well lay parol as by written en- 25 Pac. Rep., 292; State v. Smith tries." Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S., (Or., 1890), 25 Pac. Rep., 389. 417, 422 ; Moss v. Averell, 10 N. Y., it The court held that a protest 449, 454. by a voter after the meeting re- 13 Bank of Commerce v. Grana- specting the legality of the elec- da, 10 U. S. App., 692; 54 Fed. tion because the one named acted Rep., 100; 48 Fed. Rep., 278; 44 as clerk would not avail, but de- Fed. Rep., 262. clined to say what effect a protest i*Kellar v. Savage, 17 Me., 444. would have provided it had been When minutes are kept by a made at the time the meeting was clerk pro tern., where the clerk was being held. Attorney General v. absent, the clerk cannot decline to Crocker, 138 Mass., 214, 219. 200 OP ENACTMENT OF OaDINANCES. L§126 failure of the clerk to take the oath of office does not invalidate his record.i® § 126. Sufficiency of record— Presumptions. The record, to be complete, should show all of the essential or material facts respecting the corporate vote, act or transaction— that all of the mandatory charter provisions have been followed substantially.!^ It is a reasonable rule that courts will not re- quire the same exactness in keeping the records of a town as in case of court records.^** Where the record is silent as to the mode in which a corporate act was done, as for example, the election of officers, the presumption will be, without proof to the contrary, that they were chosen in the manner prescribed IS Stebbins v. Merritt, 10 Gush. (Mass.), 27; Bartlett v. Kinsley, 15 Conn., 327; Kellar v. Savage, 17 Me., 444. 19 People ex rel. v. Starne, 35 111., 121; Schwartz v. Oshkosh, 55 Wis., 490; 13 N. W. Rep., 450; State (Pope) V. Union, 32 N. J. L., 343. The minutes of the council need not be signed by the clerk who records them, unless so required by charter. State ex rel. v. Bad- ger, 90 Mo. App., 183. Recording ordinance. Com. v. Davis, 140 Mass., 485; 4 N. E. Rep., 577. Should record all acts and votes. Logan V. Tyler, 1 Pitts. (Pa.), 244. Interlineation of record does not invalidate, respecting appointment by council. Brophy v. Hyatt, 10 Colo., 223; 15 Pac. Rep., 399. 20 Hazelgreen v. McNabb, 23 Ky. Law Rep., 811; 64 S. W. Rep., 431. A memoranda, made by the clerk, of the proceedings which is intelligible to no one but himself, and from which he wrote out and had published what he understood to be the ordinance was held an insufficient record to show the passage of the ordinance. Louis- ville V. McKegney, 70 Ky. (7 Bush.), 651. A charter provision which pre- scribed that "before the presiding officer shall affix his signature to any bill he shall suspend all other business, declare that the bill shall now be read and that, if no objec- tion be made he will sign the same," is merely directory and where the record shows that the signature of the presiding officer was affixed in open session and that no objections are made, the ordinance is valid although the record fails to show that the other formalities were observed. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Hunt, 100 Mo., 22; 18 Am. St. Rep., 530; 8 L. R. A., 110; 13 S. W. Rep., 98; Heman Const. Co. v. Loevy, 64 Mo. App., 430. Where the charter requires no- tice to be given relating to the passage of an ordinance the giv- ing of such notice need not appear on the records. Barr v. New Brunswick, 58 N. J. L., 255; 33 Atl. Rep., 477. Sufficiency of record in particu- lar case. State v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 39 Minn., 219; 13 N. W. Rep., 153. Although the record may be in certain particulars incomplete if from it it appears that the pro- ceedings were regular and in sub- §136] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 201 by-law.-i So, in a proceeding where the record recites that the rules were suspended, but omits to state by what vote, it will be presumed that they were suspended by the vote re- quired, and hence oral evidence tending to show the contrary will be rejected.22 So, where the record shows that an ordi- nance is signed by the mayor and attested by the clerk, it will be presumed that the signature was rightfully made, and the minutes need not affirmatively show the mayor's presence at the meeting at which the ordinance was passed. ^^ So, a record that a public officer "took the oath of office," imports the oath stantlal compliance with the char- appointment of officers, see Pierce ter and law, presumptions will be indulged in favor of the sufficiency of the record and the validity of the corporate acts. The following cases illustrate this rule: Colorado — Greeley v. Hamman, 17 Colo., 30; 28 Pac. Rep., 460. Iowa — Brewster v. Davenport, 51 Iowa, 427; 1 N. W. Rep., 737; State V. Vail, 53 Iowa, 550 ; 5 N. W. Rep., 709; Eldora v. Burlingame, 62 Iowa, 32; 17 N. W. Rep., 148. Kansas — Downing v. Miltonvale, 36 Kan., 740; 14 Pac. Rep., 281. Kentucky — Lexington v. Head- ley, 68 Ky. (5 Bush.), 508; Nevin V. Roach, 86 Ky., 492; 5 S. W. Rep., 546. Minnesota — Duluth v. Krupp, 46 Minn., 435"; 49 N. W. Rep. 235. Missouri — Rutherford v. Hamil- ton, 97 Mo., 543; 11 S. W. Rep., 249. New Jersey — Durant v. Jersey City, 25 N. J. Law (1 Dutch.), 309. New York — In re City of Buffalo, 78 N. Y., 362; In re Board of Rapid Transit Railroad Com'rs, 18 N. Y. Suppl., 320. Washington — Seattle v. Doran, 5 Wash. St., 482; 32 Pac. Rep., 105, 1002. Wisconsin — O'Mally v. McGinn, 53 Wis., 353 ; 10 N. W. Rep., 515. 21 Hathaway v. Addison, 48 Me., 440. As to sufficiency of record in V. Richardson, 37 N. H., 306. After ordinance has been duly passed and recorded subsequent unauthorized alteration will not affect its validity. H. & T. C. R. R. Co. v. Odum, 53 Tex., 343, 352. 22 Eldora v. Burlingame, 62 Iowa 32, 37; 17 N. W. Rep., 148. 23 Aurora Water Co. v. Aurora, 129 Mo., 540; 31 S. W. Rep., 946. Sufficiency of record, showing presence of mayor at meeting. Martin v. State, 23 Neb., 371; 36 N. W. Rep., 554. Proof of notice of special meet- ing need not be recorded unless the law so requires, for it will be pre- sumed that notice was properly given. Board of Supervisors v. Judges, 106 Mich., 166; 64 N. W. Rep., 42. Where the facts essential to give jurisdiction to an inferior or special tribunal of limited author- ity are shown by its records, the same presumption prevails in favor of its jurisdiction as prevails in favor of the jurisdiction of su- perior courts of general jurisdic- tion, and the statement of jurisdic- tional fact cannot be denied upon a collateral attack, nor will its plain errors affect it. Rule applied to town council records. Shank -v. Ravenswood, 43 W. Va., 242; 27 S. E. Rep., 223. 203 OP ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§1)^6 prescribed by law.^"* But in the silence of the record no pre- sumption obtains that other proceedings than those mentioned in the record took place, as in the passage of an ordinance, that the yeas and nays Avere called and a majority of the members of the body voted in favor of it.^^ So, no presumption arises that an ordinance was passed from the recital of the fact in the record that it was reported, nor from the further fact that contracts were made and work performed under such ordi- nance.^8 So, where officers are to be elected by ballot and a majority vote, the record, to be complete, must show these facts.^'' And it is undoubtedly true that. where the charter requires particular corporate acts to be performed by a speci- fied vote, as a majority, two-thirds or three-fourths, the record of the proceedings must show affirmatively that the measure receii'ed the vote prescribed.^** Ordinarily this will not be presumed.-^ Where bills are required to be read a certain number of 2* Scammon v. Scammon, 28 N. H., 419; 429. It Is not necessary to show that the clerk who made the record was duly elected or appointed and sworn. Lemlngton v. Blodgett, 26 Vt., 210. 25 Tracey v. People, 6 Colo., 151, 155; 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 373; Ryan v. Lynch, 68 111., 160. 28 Covington v. Ludlow, 1 Mete. (Ky.), 295. Compare Lexington v. Headley, 5 Bush. (Ky.), 508. 27 Scammon v. Scammon, 28 N. H., 419, 429. 28 Tennant v. Crocker, 85 Mich., 328; 48 N. W. Rep., 577; Whitney V. Hudson, 69 Mich., 189; 37 N. W. Rep., 184; 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 453, n.; Chicago Dock Co. v. Garrity, 115 111., 155; 3 N. E. Rep., 448; Rich v. Chicago, 59 111., 286; Logansport v. Legg, 20 Ind., 315; Moberry v. Jeftersonville, 38 Ind., 198; Brookbank v. Jeffersonville, 41 Ind., 406. 2"7ra re Carlton Street, 16 Hun. (N. Y.), 497, 499; 78 N. Y., 362; Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 111., 297. See, Young v. St. Louis, 47 Mo., 492, 495. Where the statute in express terms requires a record, no pre- sumption arises as to regularity of proceedings not appearing on record, even though parties may have acted upon the supposed or- ders of county board. Gorman v. Boise Co. Com'rs, 1 Idaho, 553. Where several resolutions are passed together, separate vote on each not required. Wright v. For- restal, 65 Wis., 341; 27 N. W. Rep., 52. On motion to adjourn, the vote in detail need not be recorded. Green Bay v. Brauns, 50 Wis., 204; 6 N. W. Rep., 503. Recital in the record that all of the members of the body were present and the ordinance passed unanimously is sufficient. Scho- field V. Tampico, 98 111. App., 324. Sufficiency of record in showing the passage of an ordinance by the requisite vote. Schofield v. Hud- son, 56 111. App., 191. In one case the record stated § 127] OF ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. 303 times before passage the record should show that this has been done.-'" However, it has been held that it is not necessary that the record should show that the bill was read the num- ber of times prescribed, for this will be presumed to have been done unless the record affirmatively shows that it was not done.^i § 127. Same— Taking yeas and nays. In the taking of yeas and naj's, a record which recites plainly the vote of each mem- ber on the proposition is sufficient.^^ Any mode by which the that a particular resolution was introduced and read, that a motion was made that the vote upon the resolution be by ballot and that the motion was put and carried, — the record fails to show the adop- tion of the resolution. State v. Curry, 134 Ind., 133; 33 N. B., 685. When record incomplete in a particular case. Jones v. McAlpine, 64 Ala., 511. 30 Sufficiency of recital of third reading. Rockville v. Merchant, 60 Mo. App., 365, 371. 31 Supervisors of Schuyler v. People ex rel., 25 111., 181, 184. Where the charter required con- currence of the two branches of the council and the record of one branch states that a certain vote was in concurrence with the vote of the other branch, but the whole records of both branches show that the vote was only a vote of one branch, the erroneous state- ment will be disregarded. Saun- ders V. Lawrence, 141 Mass., 380; 5 N. E. Rep., 840. As TO Reading — Presumption. If journal recites that the ordinance was presented and "laid oyer under the rules," it will be pre- sumed that it was read as well as presented, where one of the rules adopted by the council requires that all ordinances, "after being presented and read, shall lie over one week" before final action. Chi- cago Telephone Co. v. Northwest- ern Telephone Co., 199 111., 324; 65 N. E. Rep., 325, affirming 100 111. App., 57. Where the law "does not require a fact to be recorded upon the journal, and it can be inferred from recital in the journal that such fact existed, or such step was taken, then the presumption will be indulged that such fact did exist, or such step was taken, in order to sustain the validity of the law, where the contrary does not appear from the journal itself." Per Magruder, C. J., in lb., p. 342. Wabash Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 38 111., 174. 32 Delphi V. Evans, 36 Ind., 90. Where it appears that nine out of ten of the aldermen were pres- ent at the submission of an ordi- nance, and the entry in the record declared it to have been "adopted by a majority vote," it will be pre- sumed that it received the major- ity vote required by the charter, and not a mere majority of a quorum. McCormick v. Bay City, 23 Mich., 457, 463. Where a council is composed of the mayor, recorder and six trus- tees and the record shows that the mayor and five trustees voted in favor of the ordinance and it did not appear that any other mem- bers of the council were present, held not necessary to call for the 204 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§m vote of each member is clearly and definitely ascertained for the purposes of the record is sufficient.-^^ In Michigan it has, been held that, the record of a vote reciting that it "was adopted unanimously on call," the names of those voting not otherwise appearing than by the statement of those present at the opening of the session, is not a compliance with the requirement. The ayes and noes must be entered at large on the minutes.^* This rule has been affirmed in other jurisdic- tions.^-'' If the charter expressly requires the yeas and nays nays. Bayard v. Baker, 76 Iowa, 220; 23 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 126 ; 40 N. W. Rep., 818. 33 Where the record recites that "upon the hallot being spread for its approval and adoption, the vote stood as follows: Ayes (names following). Noes, none," it is sufficient. "While the usual par- liamentary mode of taking such a vote is by a call of the roll, and it was doubtless contemplated by the law-makers, still it is not to be regarded as essential. Brophy V. Hyatt, 10 Colo., 223, 226, 227; 15 Pac. Rep., 399; Tracy v. People, 6 Colo., 151. Where the record shows that all of the members of the body voted for the proposition, it sufficiently shows the taking of the yeas and nays. Preston v. Cedar Rapids, 95 Iowa, 71; 63 N. W. Rep., 577. Record showed the members present, and recited: "All present voting in favor thereof (act in question) and no one against same." Held sufficient. Gtoodyear Rubber Co. v. Eureka, 135 Cal., 613; 67 Pac. Rep., 1043; German Ins. Co. V. Manning, 95 Fed. Rep., 597. Compare New Albany Gas Light Co. V. Crumbo, 10 Ind. App., 360; 37 N. E. Rep., 1062. 34 "We are of opinion that the record does not show with sufficient certainty that all the members present at roll-call, at the opening of the meeting in question, voted for the resolution; and if It does not show that all did, it does not shtjw that any particular one of them did. What it does show is, that at roll-call when the meet- ing was opened certain members named were present, and that afterwards, before the meeting ad- journed, certain resolutions were adopted unanimously on call. There is no legal presumption that all the members who were present at the call to order remained until adjournment, and that no others came in and took their seats after- wards, nor that every member voted on the resolution on roll- call." Per Cooley, J., in Steckert V. East Saginaw, 22 Mich., 104, 108. Compare McCormick v. Bay City, 23 Mich., 457; Gilberts v. Rabe, 49 111. App., 418; Scofield v. Tampico, 98 111. App., 324, 326. 35 Where the charter requires all votes on resolutions to be "by calling the roll, the members vot- ing aye or nay," and that the vote of each member shall be recorded in the minutes or journal of the proceedings, the record of a vote on a resolution reciting "all voting aye" is Insufficient. In re South Market St., 76 Hun. (N. Y.), 85; 27 N. Y. Suppl., 843 ; In re Young- love, 80 Hun. (N. Y.), 246; 29 N. Y. Suppl., 1030. Record showed that yeas and § 127] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 205 to tie recorded as well as taken, some courts declare the pro- vision mandatory."'' The essential thing is that, the record should show that the ordinance was passed as prescribed by law; that it received the necessarj' number of votes. The calling of the yeas and nays is a means of ascertaining this fact, and the recording of them furnishes a permanent record of such fact. To sus- tain a record which recites that, a sufficient number were pres- ent when the body convened, and other business was tran- sacted, and then the ordinance in question was passed unani- mously, necessarily requires the inference that all remained throughout the meeting or all reappeared when the ordinance was placed on its passage. The calling of the yeas and nays upon the final vote and the recording of the names of those voting for and against certainly is the best form in which to provide absolute proof that the ordinance received the vote prescribed. The best judicial opinions sustain this view. The calling of the ayes and noes and the recording of the names voting for and against should be required that it may affirma- tively appear who were present at the passage of the ordi- nance. "When the door for the surreptitious passage of ordi- nays were called and that a speci- The name of each member's vote fied number of votes were cast, but need not be recorded. State v. omits the names of those voting Vail, 53 Iowa, 550; 5 N. W. Rep., or how each voted. Held insuffi- 709; Brewster v. Davenport, 51 cient to show passage of ordinance. Iowa, 427 ; 1 N. W. Rep., 737 ; Pickton V. Fargo, 10 N. D., 469; Eldora v. Burlingame, 62 Iowa, 88 N. W. Rep., 90. 32; 17 N. W. Rep., 148; Solomon Record should show not only the v. Hughes, 24 Kan., 211 ; Barr v. number of votes cast and the fact Auburn, 89 111., 361. Compare that the yeas and nays were called, Schofield v. Hudson, 56 111. App., but likewise the names of the mem- 191. bers voting and how each, voted, ss in re Carlton Street, 16 Hun. whether yea or nay. Pickton v. (N. Y.), 497; 78 N. Y., 362; Spang- Fargo, 10 N. D., 469; 88 N. W. ler v. Jacoby, 14 111., 297; Cutler Rep., 90. V. Russellville, 40 Ark., 105; Olln Record showed majority of mem- v. Meyers, 55 Iowa, 209 ; 7 N. W. bers present, stating their names. Rep., 509. and that the ordinance was passed The requirements of a charter unanimously. Held suflScient, in that the ayes and nays be entered absence of charter provision re- upon the records, held mandatory, quiring names of those voting for and therefore a record failing to or against to be recorded. Corry show that they were so taken is V. Corry Chair Co., 18 Pa. Super, incomplete. O'Neil v. Tyler, 3 N. Ct. (Pa.), 271. D., 47; 53 N. W., 434. 206 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§128 nances has been closed by charter or statute it ought not t® be opened by judicial construction.^^ § 128. Municipal records as evidence. Municipal records properly authenticated or verified are competent evidence of the corporate proceedings of the legislative or governing body and of the transactions of officers and boards connected with the local government.^* Records imperatively required by law, made by the proper officers, are conclusive of the facts therein stated, not only upon the corporation, but upon all the world as long as they stand as records. Their accuracy can be contra- dicted or impeached only in proceedings instituted directly for the purpose, and to the end that the record may be corrected. So long as they are in existence and can be produced they are the only competent evidence of the acts of the corporation. If they are destroyed or lost secondary evidence may be re- ceived to prove them.^** While the original minutes, or, rec- "No bill shall become an ordi- nance, nor resolution be adopted unless finally passed by a majority of all the members of the board, and the vote be taken by ayes and noes and the names of the mem- bers voting for and against the same be entered in the journal." Charter San Francisco, art. II, eh. 1, sec. 9; Statutes and Amend, to Codes of Cal., p. 245. 37 See dissenting opinion in Barr V. Auburn, 89 111., 361, 363, and Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich., 104, 108, per Cooley, J. Compare Schofield V. Hudson, 56 111. App., 191. Burden of proof is on the one who denies the calling of the yeas and nays. Lindsay v. Chicago, 115 111., 120; 3 N. B. Rep., 443. As to admissibility of parol evi- dence to prove the taking of the yeas and nays, see § 129, post. 38 School District v. Blakeslee, 13 Conn., 227; St. Charles v. O'Mailey, 18 111., 407; Pruin- Brambrick Construe. Co. v. Geist, 37 Mo. App., 509, 515; "Wood v. Jefferson County Bank, 9 Cow. (N. Y.), 194, 205; Highland Turnpike Co. v. McKean, 11 Johns. (N. Y.), 98; McFarlan v. Tritton Insurance Co., 4 Denio (N. Y.), 392; State v. Van Winkle, 1 Dutch. (25 N. J. L.), 73; Weith v. Wilmington, 68 N. C, 24, 27; Hutchinson v. Pratt, 11 Vt, 402. 3s Sawyer v. M. & K. Ry., 62 N. H., 135, 153; Pickering v. Picker- ing, 11 N. H., 141, 144; Greeley v. Quimby, 22 N. H., 335; Harris v. School District, 28 N. H., 58, 66; Oxford V. Benton, 36 N. H., 395, 403; Farrar v. Fessenden, 39 N. H., 268; Hampstead v. Plaistow, 49 N. H., 84, 96; Bell v. Pike, 53 N. H., 473; Hill v. Godwin, 56 N. H., 441; Byer v. New Castle, 124 Ind., 86; 24 N. E. Rep., 578; Ste- venson V. Bay City, 26 Mich., 44: Samis v. King, 40 Conn., 298, 304; People V. Adams, 9 Wend. (N. Y.), 333; People V. Zeyst, 23 N. Y., 140. Books containing the minutes of the proceedings of a municipal corporation is the best and only evidence to prove whether or not a claim was allowed by the council. §128] OF ENACTMKNT OF ORDINANCES. 207 ords, constitute the primary evidence of the facts recited there- in, properly authenticated copies of the proceedings of a mu- nicipal corporation or other public body have frequently been V. Greenville, 51 Ala., Perryman 507, 511. Books of a corporation, estab- lished for public purposes, are evi- dence of its acts and proceedings. Owings V. Speed, 5 Wheat. (U. S.), 420. Books of account of a municipal corporation properly kept are ad- missible to charge the city. St. Louis Gas Light Co. v. St. Louis, 84 Mo., 202, affirming 11 Mo. App., 55. So books of a town, not kept with technical accuracy, are com- petent evidence of facts recited therein. Greenfield v. Camden, 74 Me., 56. So books kept by selectmen, con- taining accounts of the business and expense of the town, are evi- dence in a suit against the town. Thornton v. Campton, 18 N. H., 20. Contra. In an action of assump- sit to recover money allowed by resolution of the board of alder- men of a town, in settlement of his accounts as town marshal, the books of the town were produced to support the claim, from which it appeared that the sum demand- ed had been allowed. The town contended that the resolution had been passed by mistake, and of- fered to show by the same books the passage of a subsequent reso- lution by the board of aldermen, rescinding the first, and reducing the account. The second resolution was rejected on authority of the general rule, stated in 1 Starkie on Ev., 292, that the books of a corporation are evidence between the members of the body, or against the body, but they are not evidence for the corporation against a stranger. Tuskaloosa V. Wright, 2 Porter (Ala.), 230. This case is against the weight of authority. Recoeds or CouxciL in letting contract to grade, competent evi- dence. O'Dea V. Winona, 41 Minn., 424; 43 N. W. Rep., 97. Record of proceedings of town meeting, competent to show that the meeting was legally warned for the purpose of making a by- law. Isbell V. N. y;. & N. H. R. R., 25 Conn., 556. Records of board of health, when conclusive. Stratton v. Lowell, 181 Mass., 511; 63 N. E. Rep., 948. Ordinances are the best proof of municipal regulations. Hence, reg- ulations of departments cannot be proved by officers where the sub- ject-matter is covered by ordi- nances, or other records. Rehberg v. New York, 99 N. Y., 652; 2 N. E. Rep., 11. Official record admissible to show passage of ordinance. People v. Murray, 57 Mich., 396; 24 N. W. Rep., 118. Records of the location and alteration of streets admissible. Barker v. Fogg, 34 Me., 392. Original minutes of council, when verified, are admissible. O'Mally v. McGinn, 53 Wis., 353, 357; 10 N. W. Rep., 515. Original minutes competent witTi- out proof of their verity. Denning V. Roome, 6 Wend. (N. Y.), 651, 656. S08 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§1^9 admitted as evidence.*" But this subject is usually regulated by statute. § 129. Parol evidence to prove record. Ordinarily, acts or proceedings of municipal corporations, their officers and boards may only be proved by the record. The record is pre- sumed to contain the fundamental attribute of verity, and without which the first and most important definition of a rec- ord is not answered. Where it leaves the truth of what took place to be ascertained by an investigation of the antecedent facts upon which it purports to be based, as though nothing had been written, it is no record.*^ The general rule that parol evidence is inadmissible to supply omissions, contradict or ex- plain records, applies to proceedings showing corporate action of parishes, school districts and all forms of public or munici- Minutes of council as evidence — parol proof. State ex rel. v. Hauser, 63 Ind., 155. Original minutes taken at the meeting of a religious society held admissible. Waters v. Gilbert, 2 Cush. (Mass.), 27; Pruden v. Alden, 23 Pick. (Mass.), 184. District school book competent evidence. Gearhart v. Dixon, 1 Pa. St., 224; Monaghan v. Randall, 38 Wis., 100, 106. Record of secretary of school board admissible to show issuance of school bonds. Board, etc., v. Moore, 17 Minn., 412. Election returns are admissible. They are documents of a public nature. Where they are produced by the sworn custodian, the party offering them in evidence is not required to explain an erasure and alteration visible upon the face thereof which appears to have been made at the same time and by the same hand as the obliter- ated letters and figures. People ex rel. v. Minck, 21 N. Y., 539, 541. When persons other than town officers may identify books and town records, thus rendering them admissible as evidence, see Hath- away V. Addison, 48 Me., 440. Minutes of council meeting iden- tified by clerk who kept them as correct are competent. State ex rel. v. Badger, 90 Mo. App., 183. 40 Metropolitan Street R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 90 Ga., 500; 16 S. E. Rep., 49 ; Dudley v. Grayson, 6 T. B. Monroe (Ky.), 259, 261; Hic- kock V. Shelburne, 41 Vt., 409. Sufficiency of authentication. Sanborn v. School District, 12 Minn., 17. Proceedings of corporate meet- ing need not be authenticated by a corporate seal. Brady v. Brook- lyn, 1 Barb. (N. Y.), 584. "Bell V. Pike, 53 N. H., 473. Per Campbell, J., in Stevenson v. Bay City, 26 Mich., 44, 46. Parol proof of proceedings of a council and declaration of indi- vidual members thereof, in order- ing the grading of a street, is not admissible, until some valid reason is shown for not producing the record of such proceedings. Aurora V. Fox, 78 Ind., 1. Where the law requires a board of public works to keep a record of its proceedings, evidence of oral kUd] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 209 pal corporations, full and quasi.*- Thus, where the warning of a corporate meeting is required to be recorded, and the rec- ord fails to show that the hour of the day for the meeting was specified in the warning, it cannot be shown by parol evidence that in the original warning the hour for the meeting was instructions in open session to the commissioner is inadmissible. Davis V. Jackson, 61 Mich., 530, 539; 28 N. W. Rep., 526, distin- guishing Chilson V. Wilson, 38 Mich., 267. Parol proof that an ordinance was passed is inadmissible where the record only shows that it was reported. Covington v. Ludlow, 1 Mete. (Ky.), 295. *2 Connecticut — Gilbert v. New Haven, 40 Conn., 102. Illinois — People ex rel. v. Madi- son Co., 125 111., 334; 17 N. E. Rep., 802, affirming 23 111. App., 386. Louisiana — Gaither v. Green, 40 La. Ann., 362. Maine — Crommett v. Pearson, 18 Me., 344. Massachusetts — Halleck v. Boyls- ton, 117 Mass., 469; Andrews v. Boylston, 110 Mass., 214; Wood v. Simons, 110 Mass., 116;- Adams V. Pratt, 109 Mass., 59; Mayhew v. Gay Head, 13 Allen (Mass.), 129, approved in Morrison v. Lawrence, 98 Mass., 219, 221; Saxton v. Nimms, 4 Mass., 315 ; School Dist. V. Atherton, 12 Met. (Mass.), 105; Manning v. Gloucester, 6 Pick. (Mass.), 6. Michigan — Larned v. Briscoe, 62 Mich., 393; 29 N. W. Rep., 22; Moser v. White, 29 Mich., 59. Missouri — Keating v. Skiles, 72 Mo., 97. New York — People ex rel. v. Zeyst, 23 N. Y., 140. Pennsylvania— Pittsburg v. Clu- ley, 74 Pa. St., 262. Vermont— Eddy v. Wilson, 43 Vt., 362; Cabot v. Britt, 36 Vt., 349; Hoag V. Durfey, 1 Aiken (Vt.), 286. Wisconsin — Monaghan v. Ran- dall, 38 Wis., 100, 106. Parol held inadmissible to prove that the measure was carried by a two-thirds vote as required. This fact must distinctly appear from the record. In re Carlton Street, 16 Hun. (N. Y.), 497, 499. Parol evidence to prove the vote at a corporate meeting inadmissi- ble. School Dist. V. Atherton, 12 Met. (Mass.), 105; Sawyer v. M. & K. R. R. Co., 62 N. H., 135, 153. The legal effect of a vote cannot be explained away by parol evi- dence. Cameron v. North Hero, 43 Vt, 507, 510. Township board can only speak by its record. Fayette County v. Chitwood, 8 Ind., 504. Not admissible to prove trans- actions of school district meeting. Moor V. Newfield, 4 Me., 44, 46. Clerk's attestation of date of mayor's approval of ordinance can- not be contradicted by parol. Ball V. Fagg, 67 Mo., 481, 484, relying on Pacific R. R. Co. v. Governor, 23 Mo., 353. Some cases hold that acts of the legislature valid on their face may be impeached by the journal. State V. Piatt, 2 S. C, 150; Jones v. Hutchinson, 43 Ala., 721; People V. De Wolf, 62 111., 253, 255. Admissible to show mayor ap- proved ordinance, under circum- stances of particular case. Knight V. K. C, St. J. & C. B. R. R. Co., 70 Mo., 231. 2i0 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§1^^ uamed.*^' So, where the record of a town meeting held on the first of the month did not state that it was adjourned to the second, parol evidence of an adjournment is inadmissible.** But in a Maine case it was held that, where the record of a town meeting states that, "the inhabitants met in the highway and read the warning in the open air and adjourned the meet- ing" to a different place, parol evidence is admissible, at the instance of the inhabitants, to prove the time when and the place where the transactions took place, how many persons were present, and that others came afterwards to attend the meeting, and, finding no appearance of such meeting, went home.*3 The fact of the taking of the yeas and nays can only be shown by the production of the record.** § 130. Parol evidence to show omissions. While the de- cisions present some apparent conflict respecting collateral im- peachment of records of public or quasi public corporations which are required by express law to be kept in writing, they are reasonably uniform in admitting parol evidence to estab- lish the real facts of transactions or corporate acts, in the entire absence of all record, or where the record kept is so meager that the particular transaction, act, or vote is not dis- closed by it. This principle has been adopted in order to pre- serve the rights of creditors of the corporation or third per- sons who have performed work or services or expended money for the benefit of the corporation, relying in good faith upon the regularity and legality of the proceedings. It has also been 43 "To "allow parol proof of that have honest and intelligent men fact as a substitute for a fact that swearing to each side of the ques- should appear from the record tion. If a fact of this kind can be would be to substitute parol proof proved by parol evidence, it is for the record." Sherwin v. Bug- difficult to see why the election of bee, 17 Vt., 337, 340. officers may not be proved in the 44 Taylor v. Henry, 2 Pick, same manner. This goes to the (Mass.), 397, Parker, C. J., said foundation of our system of civil (p. 402) : "We do not find any case society." which authorizes the opinion that 45 Chamberlain v. Dover, 13 Me., an adjournment may be proved by 466. 473. parol. And it would be dangerous 46 Sullivan v. Leadville, 11 Colo., to admit such proof. Suppose a 483; 18 Pac. Rep., 736; Logansport town be very much divided; it v. Crockett, 64 Ind., 319; In re St. might be hard to decide, without Louis v. Foster, 52 Mo., 513; Carl- polling, whether a meeting was ton Street, 16 Hun. (N. Y.), 497, adjourned or not, and we should 499. 130] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 211 invoked in other instances.*^ Where the charter or statute ap- plicable declares in express terms that a record shall be kept and shall be the only evidence of corporate acts, the rule of strict construction would exclude parol evidence; but in the absence of such provision courts are more liberal in admitting *7 "When there is an omission to make records, the rights of other persons acting under or upon faith of a vote not recorded, ought not to be perjudiced." Per Williams, C. J. in Hutchinson v. Pratt, 11 Vt. 402, 421; Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. (U. S.), 64. A record of a. vote which shows on its face that three members voted yea and' three no, may be contradicted by parol showing that two of the latter did not vote at all where the record also shows that members not voting were counted as voting no. State ex rel. V. Alexander, 107 Iowa, 177, 181; 77 N. W. Rep., 841. School board record showed that a motion was passed, but failed to show what the motion was. The secretary who made the record was allowed to testify what the motion was. Here it was said : "The oral evidence did not im- peach, contradict, or vary the con- tents of the minutes. It simply supplied an evident omission, and thereby applied it to its proper subject, — the record of the vote of the directors." Morgan v. Wil- fley, 71 Iowa, 212, 213; 32 N. W. Rep., 265. In order t" show what the ac- tion of a township board was on a certain matter parol evidence is admissible, where there is only a brief synopsis of the proceedings entered of record. Here the law did not expressly require a record, nor make the proceeding or acts void unless recorded, nor make the record the only evidence. Rock Creek Tp. v. Codding, 42 Kan., 649, 651; 22 Pac. Rep., 741. Joint action of school boards of two townships in detaching cer- tain territory from one school dis- trict and attaching it to another may be shown by parol, in the absence of all record, after ac- quiescence for five years. Pine River School Dist. v. Union School Dist., 81 Mich., 339, 344; 45 N. W., 993. Where the law did not require a record and none had been made, parol evidence of a resolution was held competent. Darlington v. Com., 41 Pa. St., 68. In a suit for salary, an officer may show that a resolution au- thorizing its payment was duly passed, but through negligence it was not recorded. Drott v. River- side, 4 Ohio Cir. Ct., 312. Where there is no record, of- ficial oath may be proved by parol. Farnsworth Co. v. Rand, 65 Me., 19; Hale v. Cashing, 2 Me., 218; Hathaway v. Addison, 48 Me., 440. Where clerk pro tempore of re- ligious society, through inadver- tence, omits to record proceedings in record book, the testimony of the chairman of the meeting who also took minutes for such clerk was admitted as secondary evi- dence. Waters v. Gilbert, 2 Cush. (Mass.), 27, 31. Parol is admissible to show that the selectmen elected acted as such during the year. Lemington v. Blodgett, 37 Vt., 210. Proof by parol allowed that signers of petition for laying out 212 OF ENACTMENT OF OEDINANCES. [§131 oral testimony for the purposes and within the limitations stated.** § 131. Same subject— Imperfect record— Rights of credit- ors. Since the rights of creditors and third persons cannot be prejudiced by the entire absence of all record, as stated in the last section, so such rights will not be destroyed by the neglect of the corporate officers to keep a proper record.*^ As de- clared in a New Jersey case, the rights of creditors cannot be made to depend "upon the regularity with which the min- utes of the city council are kept, nor whether they are kept at all."^" Thus, where the records are kept in an imperfect manner, and there is no written evidence in existence to prove that certain work was done by authority of the council, parol evidence will be admissible to prove that faet.^i So the pas- sage and existence of an ordinance under which a contractor made large expenditures may be shown by parol testimony where the city fails to keep a record of its ordinances.^^ a highway were freeholders. Aus- orles." Per Campbell, J., in Ste- tin V. Allen, 6 Wis., 134. McCormick v. Bay City, 23 Mich., 457. "That which is not established by the written record, fairly con- strued, cannot be shown to vary them." Per Campbell, J., in Ste- venson V. Bay City, 26 Mich., 44, 47. Parol may be proper in proper proceedings to compel the clerk to amend his record according to the truth. Taylor v. Henry, 2 Pick. (•Mass.), 397, 402; Manning v. Gloucester, 6 Pick. (Mass.), 6, 16; Stoughton V. Atherton, 12 Met. (Mass.), 105, 113. 48 "When the law requires mu- nicipal bodies to keep records ot their official action in the legisla- tive business conducted at their meetings, the whole policy of the law would be defeated if they could rest partly in writing and partly in parol, and the true official his- tory of their acts would perish with the living witnesses, or fluc- tuate with their conflicting mem- venson v. Bay City, 26 Mich., 44, 46. *9 First Nat. Bk. v. Randall, 1 White & W. Civ. Cas. Ct. App. (Tex.), § 971. What the council in fact did may be shown by evidence alunde the record kept by it. Bridgeford v. Tuscumbia, 16 Fed. Rep., 910, 913; 4 Woods C. C, '611. 50 Per Green, C. J., in Bigelow v. Perth Amboy, 25 N. J. L., 297, 301. ■"■i Ross V. Madison, 1 Ind., 281, 284; 48 Am. Dec, 361. 52 Per Brewer, J., in Troy v. A. & N. R. R., 11 Kan., 519; 13 Kan., 70; Barton v. Pittsburgh, 4 Brew-, ster (Pa.), 373. Parol received respecting con- tents of an ordinance at time of its passage and subsequent alter- ations. Dyer v. Brogan, 70 Cal., 136; 11 Pac. Rep., 589. When parol admissible to show mayor approved ordinance, see Knight V. K. C, St. J. & C. B. R. R., 70 Mo., 231. Omission of school district to §l3-aj OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 213 § 132. Amendment of record. The courts are liberal re- specting amendments of corporate records. If through in- advertence or misapprehension the record has been defectively made it is competent to complete it according to the truth.^^ Thus, where the record fails to show that the yeas and nays were taken, it may be amended so that it will speak the truth.^* make a contract a matter of rec- ord is no defense to an action against the district on such" con- tract. Athearn v. Millershurg, 33 Iowa, 105. Defective school records may be explained, or omission supplied by parol evidence. Gearhart v. Dix- on, 1 Pa. St., 224. 53 "Courts have never adopted, and from their nature it would not be practicable to adopt, those strict, technical and peculiar rules as to their correction, which apply to the amendment of judicial records. On the contrary, it is deemed of so great importance to uphold the proceedings of our municipal cor- porations that courts are disposed to be as indulgent in allowing en- tries of their proceedings to be amended, as is consistent with the safety of those whose interests would be affected by them. From carelessness, on the part of the clerks of our towns and other mu- nicipal corporations, or their not sufficiently appreciating the impor- tance of fully and precisely de- scribing their proceedings, they are frequently entered in their rec- ords very loosely and irregularly; and it is not to be expected that those ofBcers will always be compe- tent to perform their duties in this respect with the correctness that is desirable. To hold, therefore, that their entries, as first made, are be- yond the reach of their subsequent correction, would produce the greatest confusion." Per Storrs, J., in Boston Turp. Co. v. Pomfret, 20 Conn., 590, 595, 596. "It is competent for any tribunal to correct its record so as to make it speak the truth." Everett v. Deal, 148 Ind., 90, 92; 47 N. E. Rep., 219; Anniston v. Davis, 98 Ala., 629; 39 Am. St. Rep., 94; 13 So. Rep., 331; Whittier v. Varney, 10 N. H., 291; Adams County v. Quincy, 130 111., 566; 22 N. E. Rep., 624 ; St. Charles v. O'Mailey, 18 111., 407 ; Turley v. Logan Coun- ty, 17 111., 151. Record of school districts. Har- ris V. Canaan School District, 28 N. H., 58. Tax bills. Stadler v. Roth, 59 Mo., 400; Prendergast v. Richards, 2 Mo. App., 187. Record has the same force and effect as though originally made as amended. Gilberts v. Rabe, 49 111. App., 418, 421; Du Page Coun- ty V. Martin, 39 111. App., 298. 54 Logansport v. Crockett, 64 Ind., 319; Pineville v. Burchfield, 19 Ky. L. Rep., 984; 42 S. W. Rep., 340. Allowed if there be matter of rec- ord which authorizes amendment by nunc pro tunc entry. Commis- sioners of Lowndes County v. Hearne, 59 Ala., 371, 376. Defect in passage of an ordi- nance may be cured by subsequent supplemental action, as by supply- ing omitted record, where there are no restrictions as to time of making record. Schenley v. Com- monwealth, 36 Pa. St., 29. Held to be substantial compli- ance with the requirement where the minutes gave the name of each councilman present, the number 314 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. L§133 The officer while in office may amend a record made by him.55 It has been held that one who was formerly town clerk, but who is no longer in office, cannot amend a town record made by him when town clerk.''® On the other hand, it has been decided that the person in office at the time the proceedings were had may make the amendment; that it is not necessary that he should hold the office when the amendment is made.^^ The records of councils or legislative bodies or departments or boards are generally controlled by the body as a- unit, and while the determination of what the record should set forth devolves upon the clerk or secretary in the first instance, as a rule, the propriety of amendments belongs to the body it- self.^* But where the charter required the clerk to keep a voting in the affirmative and the names of those voting in the nega- tive, and where, upon a correction of the minutes at the next regular meeting, and before the minutes were signed, the names of those voting in the affirmative were in- serted. Becker v. Henderson, 100 Ky., 450; 38 S. W. Rep., 857. 55 Connecticut — Boston Turnp. Co. V. Pomfret, 20 Conn., 590, 596. Illinois — Ryder Estate v. Alton, 175 111., 94, 97; 51 N. E. Rep., 821; St. Charles v. O'Mailey, 18 111., 407; Belknap v. Miller, 52 111. App., 617. Maine — Fossett v. Bearce, 29 Me., 523 ; Chamherlain v. Dover, 13 Me., 466; 29 Am. Dec, 517. Massachusetts — Halleck v. Boyl- ston, 117 Mass., 469; Saxton v. Nimms, 14 Mass., 315, 321; Welles V. Battelle, 11 Mass., 477. New Hampshire — Bishop v. Cone, 3 N. H., 513, 516; Scanimon v. Scammon, 28 N. H., 419, 429. Vermont — Hoag v. Durfey, 1 Ai- ken (Vt), 286. Where there is no proof of the election of one as town clerk such person cannot amend the records of a town meeting. Taylor v. Hen- ry, 2 Pick. (Mass.), 397. 56 Hartwell v. Littleton, 13 Pick. (Mass.), 229; Hadley v. Chamber- lain, 11 Vt., 618. The clerk of a school district after he is out of office and another chosen and sworn in his stead can- not amend the record of the dis- trict. Stoughton V. Atherton, 12 Mete. (Mass.), 105. Clerk may amend records made hy him, although in the meantime he is out of office, but is again re- stored. Mott V. Reynolds, 27 Vt., 206. An ordinance was reported to the council and no further action was had thereon. Nearly two years thereafter a new board came in, and, by order, caused the words "passed unanimously" to be added. This was held to be unauthorized. Covington v. Ludlow, 1 Met. (Ky.), 295. 57 Gibson v. Bailey, 9 N. H., 168, 176; Fossett v. Bearce, 29 Me., 523; Kiley v. Cranor, 51 Mo., 541. City engineer permitted to amend special tax bill after the expiration of his term of office. Stadler v. Roth, 59 Mo., 400 ; Kiley V. Oppenheimer, 55 Mo., 374; State ex rel. v. Phillips, 102 Mo., 664, 667 ; 15 S. W. Rep., 319. 58 Council has power to deter- mine whether the journal truly § 133] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 215 record of the proceedings of the council which should be re- ceived in all courts as evidence of the truth of the matters therein contained, it was held that it could not be amended by vote of the council, but only by the clerk or by order of court.^^ In one case the record showed the election of a street commissioner by a majority of one vote, resulting from a rul- ing of the presiding officer, sustained by the council, that a cer- tain member could not change his vote. At its next meeting, before approving the minutes, the council ordered them to be corrected so as to show that the member in question was al- lowed to change his vote, and, hence, "that there was no elec- tion." Here the charter prescribed that, the council "'shall determine the rules of their proceedings and keep a journal thereof," and required the clerk to make an accurate record of all proceedings. The amendment was sustained.®^ § 133. Method of amending. Amendments should only be made on evidence showing the truth of the facts.**! And it has been said that, ordinarily they should be made from original documents or minutes, and not upon the testimony of third persons, or upon the clerk's own recollection, unless in a very obvioiis case of omission or error.^^ jj;^ Qj^p case, amendments were sustained, made some years after the original entry, by the town clerk, on information from others and not on his own personal knowledge, the court observing : " It is sufficient that the fact recorded is ascertained by him, by whatever means, and that it is recorded by him, or by his authority. "^^ Some sets forth its proceedings. State sn Samis v. King, 40 Conn., 298, ex rel. v. Cleveland, 15 Ohio Cir. 305. Ct., 517; 8 Ohio Cir. Dec, 357. «» Mann v. LeMars, 109 Iowa, Where the record of the proceed- 251,255; 80 N. W. Rep., 327. ings of a council fails to show its ei Low v. Pettengill, 12 N. H., action in a particular matter, as 337. in approving the report of one of ea Mott v. Reynolds, 27 Vt., 206, its committees, the council, at a 208, per Redfield, C. J. subsequent meeting, may amend »3 Boston Turnpike Co. v. Pom- the record so as to show the fact, fret, 20 Conn., 590, 598, two judges Adams County v. Quincy, 130 111., dissented and applied the rule re- 566, 581; 22 N. E. Rep., 624. lating to court records, citing "A legislative body makes and Wilkie v. Hall, 15 Conn., 32. controls its own records, and de- Amendment sustained which cides for itself when it contains a was made by addition "from the true history of its proceedings." personal knowledge of the mem- Gilberts V. Rabe, 49 111. App., 418, bers of the board." Gilberts v. 420. Rabe, 49 111. App., 418, 421, 216 OP ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§135 courts hold that where the record is amended it should appear on the record when, how, and- why the amendment was made. It is only when this is done that the true character of the record appears, and all the facts connected with it which are essential to show its validity.^* "Where litigation has arisen involving rights existing under the amendment proposed it should be made on application to the court.^^ § 134. Court may order amendment — Mandamus. As stated, amendments may be compelled on order of court,^^ and mandamus will lie for this purpose. ®'' The writ will lie to com- pel a town clerk to amend the record so that it would show the true fact of the appointment of plaintiff to office in place of another. In such case neither the incumbent nor the city are necessary or proper parties. The fact that amending the rec- ord would prepare the way for the plaintiff to displace the in- cumbent was held to be no objection to granting the relief prayed.8* Where, under the law, the jurisdiction of the coun- cil in approving its journal, in the absence of any charge of fraud or bad faith, is final and conclusive, and the record of a previous meeting is read at a succeeding meeting under the rules adopted, and the council has corrected and disposed of the journal, the clerk has no further right, and there is no duty enjoined upon him by law to correct the same; man- damus, therefore, will not lie to compel him to do so. The court will not inquire into the accuracy of that record any more than it will into the motives which prompted members in voting as they did.^^ § 135. Amendment after lapse of time— Estoppel— Ex post facto. Amendments have been sustained made several years after the original entries.''*' Where a record, made 39 years previous, recites that the officer was "sworn into office," and it appeared that the town clerk was dead and the officer was chosen and acted as such, the record is competent to be sub- si Low V. Pettengill, 12 N. H., es Parrell v. King, 41 Conn., 448. 337, 340. See Smith v. Moore, 38 Conn., «5 Low V. Pettengill, 12 N. H., 105. 337, 340; Gibson v. Bailey, 9 N. H., en State ex rel. v. Cleveland, 15 168,176; Pierce V. Richardson, 37 Ohio Cir. Ct, 517; 8 Ohio Cir. Dec, N. H., 306, 311, per Bell, J. 357. 66 Bishop V. Cone, 3 N. H., 513. to Welles v. Battelle, 11 Mass., 67Samis v. King, 40 Conn., 298, 477, 481, 305. § 135] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 217 mitted to the jury, as tending to show that the officer took the oath of office as prescribed by lawJ^ Ordinarily courts apply the principles of estoppel as strictly and with as much reason to municipalities and their inhabitants as to individuals^^ In accordance with this principle, where a town record as orig- inally made showed that a town voted to guarantee certain bonds in aid of a railroad, and it appeared that the company, in good faith, relying on the legality of the guarantee, incurred large expenditures of money, after the lapse of three years the town will be estopped from availing itself of a correction of the record by the town clerk, showing that the vote had not been legally adopted, although the correction was made in pursuance of order of court.'^^ In one case the record of the village board did not show at the time the ordinance was violated that it had been legally passed. The record was subsequently amended so as to show the fact. Here it was contended that the defendant acquired some sort of vested right to immunity which could not be dis- turbed by the subsequent amendment, or that such subsequent amendment was ex post facto in its character and void as to him. But the court replied: "When defendant contemplated a violation of its provisions, ordinary prudence would require that he should ascertain whether it was in fact passed in the required mode. He is presumed to have known that the law authorized the board to amend its records by adding any omit- ted fact, and he could acquire no vested right that the prosecu- tion for his wrong doing should be governed by the record in its incomplete form. When he undertook to violate the ordi- nance, because he thought the village would not be able to prove its passage, he took the risk of such proof being made, ajid he had no right to insist that the proof should not be made. "7* 71 Cass V. Bellows, 31 N. H., 501, rs N. H. W. R. R. Co. v. Chatham, 511; 64 Am. Dec, 347. 42 Conn., 465, 479. 72 Per Pardee, J., in Society for 74 Gilberts v. Rabe, 49 111. App., Savings v. New London, 29 Conn., 418, 421. 174, 192. See § 352, post. CHAPTEK IV. OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES.— OonMwMed. 2. The Ordinance and Its Passage. § 136. Charter method of enact- ment exclusive. 137. Form of ordinance. 138. The formal parts of an ordinance enumerated. 139. Recital of authority to enact not required. 140. Ordinance need not recite necessity of enactment. 141. One subject and title. 142. Same — illustrative cases. 143. Title in revision of ordi- nances. 144. Preamble. 145. Ordaining or enacting clause. 146. Time of introduction and passage. 147. Same — double board. 148. Reference to and report by committee. 149. Signing and approval of ordinances by mayor. 150. Veto of mayor. 151. Return of bill or ordinance by mayor. 152. Ordinances passed and ap- proved by electors. § 153. Recording ordinances. 154. Deposit and custody of ordinances. 155. Publication of ordinances and notice of pendency. 156. Time and frequency of pub- lication. 157. Method of publication. •158. Amendment on passage. 159. Publication of amendments on passage. 160. Consideration of mayor's veto. 161. Courts will not inquire into legislative motive. 162. Same — rule limited — min- isterial act. 163. Injunction to restrain pas- sage of ordinance. 164. Validating void ordinance by municipality. 165. Curative power of legis- lature over void ordi- nances. 166. Same— proceedings to sub- scribe for railroad stock. 167. Same — to collect taxes. § 136. Charter method of enactment exclusive. To validate the ordinance, the mode prescribed by the charter for its enact- ment must be observed.^ Prior to the introduction for passage of ordinances relating to public work and improvement which are to be paid for by special assessinent or taxation (as some- times termed), certain preliminary steps are usually required, as notice by advertisement of the contemplated work; public hearing; establishment of benefit, assessment or taxing dis- ' McCoy V. Briant, 53 Cal., 247, Mo. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Wyandotte, 250; Fuller V. Heath, 89 111., 296 ; 44 Kan., 32; 23 Pac. Rep., 950; Elizabethtown v. Lefler, 23 111., 90; Lewis v. St. Louis, 4 Mo. App., 563; 218 §137] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES, 219 tricts; determination of protests or remonstrances; recom- mendation of the Tjroposed ordinances by a designated board or department and estimate of the cost of the work endorsed thereon. These and like requirenaents are regarded as condi- tions precedent to final action on the ordinance; they are jurisdictional in their nature and non-compliance with them leaves the council without power to adopt the ordinance.^ This doctrine is more frequently applied in the passage of ordinances, resolutions and orders authorizing and providing for street and sewer construction and reconstruction and other public improvements, and will be found fully treated in the chapter on improvement ordinances.^ § 137. Form of ordinance. Of course, the ordinance must be in writing as the legislative will can be expressed in no other manner. And it seems equally uimeeessary to state that the English language should be employed.* Welker v. Potter, 18 Ohio St., 85; Williams v. Willard, 23 Vt, 369; Danville v. Shelton, 76 Va., 325; Dunstan v. Imperial Gas Light, etc., Co., 3 Barn. & Add., 125 ; 23 Eng. Com. L., 42. 2 San Francisco v. Buckman, 111 Cal., 25; 43 Pac. Rep., 396; State V. Plainfield, 38 N. J. L., 95 ; In re Douglass, 46 N. T., 42; Oilman v. Milwaukee, 61 Wis., 588 ; 21 N. W. Rep., 640; Quint v. Merrill, 105 Wis., 406; 81 N. W. Rep., 664. 3 Chapter XVI. *Breaux's Bridge v. Dupuis, 30 La. Ann. (pt. 2), 1105, holding that the constitutional provision of Louisiana commanding that all laws and legislative proceedings shall be promulgated and pre- served in the English language applied to acts of town councils. Hence, an ordinance in the French language only was held void. In a case decided in 1831, an ordinance promulgated in French only was held valid, but this re- sulted from the construction of the Louisiana constitution of 1812, and is distinguished from the con- stitution of 1868 in the case above cited. The constitution of 1812 prescribed the use of the English language, in the promulgation and preservation of all laws passed by the legislature, the--public records of the state, the legislative and judicial written proceedings of the same. The court was of the opinioB that. that constitutional provision could not, without too forced a construction, be extended to the by-laws and ordinances of corpor- ations. "Whatever force and effect such by-laws and ordinances may have, they are not laws passed by the legislature of the state." Loze V. New Orleans, 2 La., 427. The "ordinance imposing the license * * * is a law, a legisla- tive proceeding, and though its promulgation in the language understood and spoken in the locality wherein it was adopted was proper and authorized, the 109th article of Constitution of 1868, which differs from sec. 15 of title VI of the state constitution of 1812, commands that all laws and legislative proceedings shall 220 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§137' Where no particular form is prescribed any form of expres- sion may be adopted which clearly signifies the corporate will that the ordinance or by-law exists and which plainly indicates its terms and the objects to which it is intended to apply. In an early New Hampshire case, the record of the town meeting showed that it was "voted, to collect fines of one dollar of all persons riding or driving across the village bridge or salmon- hole bridge, faster than a walk, agreeably to an act passed January 13, 1837." In sustaining the by-law, the court ob- served: "It is apparent from this record that the question came regularly before the town, whether they would adopt by- laws to impose fines, in pursuance of the statute, upon persons who should improperly ride or drive across the bridges de- scribed in the warrant, and that they voted to do so, in terms that can admit of no mistake or doubt. It would therefore seem that the by-law was by that vote adopted. No particular form was prescribed by the statute in which the law should be engrossed, and there seems to be no law or custom restrain- ing the towns from selecting such form of expression as suits them, provided enough be contained to signify their will that the by-law exists and to indicate the terms of it, and the ob- jects to which it should apply. * * * A great variety of forms inay be found in the historyof legislation for the expres- sion of the legislative will, th&,l have never been called in question, and that are as unlike to each other as the form used in this ease is to any of them."^ As we have seen, an ordinance in the form of a resolution is not necessarily invalid.*' However, if such resolution wants the solemnities of an ordinance it cannot be regarded as a legislative equivalent.^ Many charters adopt the usual constitutional requirement and provide that "no ordinance shall be passed except by bill. "8 be promulgated and preserved in 238, per Gilchrist, J. By-law of the English language.' * * * private corporation, held good, not Now, unless promulgated and pre- in writing. Holly Springs Bank v. served in the English language, no Pinson, 58 Miss., 421; 38 Am. Rep., law or ordinance, whether passed 330. by the legislature or town coun- e Sec. 5, supra. cil, can have any binding effect." 7 Paterson v. Barnet, 46 N. J. L., Breaux's Bridge v. Dupuis, 30 La. 62, 66. Ann. (pt. 2), 1105. a charter San Francisco, art. II, f' Lisbon v. Clark, 18 N. H., 234, ch. 1, sec. 8 ; Statutes and Amend- §138] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 221 An ordinance establishing grades of streets may properly re- fer to maps and books on file in a public office, as a part there- of." So a prior ordinance may be incorporated in a subsequent ordinance and be carried forward by appropriate language.^'' § 138. The formal parts of an ordinance enumerated. The formal parts of a complete penal ordinance are: 1. The title. 2. The preamble, or reason for passage (not usual) . 3. The ordaining or enacting clause. 4. The command to do (and sometimes the manner of doing it) or not to do, and designation of subjects and objects of operation. 5. The penalty. 6. Naming the time when to take effect ; in the absence of charter provision or in case of emergency, it should be de- clared.ii In administrative, franchise and improvement ordinances the form will vary with the subject-matter and the experience and taste of the framer. In franchise ordinances the reservation of the right of the municipal corporation to change, alter and repeal is usually incorporated. In pen'al ordinances, especially of towns and villages, formal- ity is not always observed and sometimes ail parts are thrown into one section or paragraph.^ ^ Where the ordinance is precise, definite and certain in its terms bad form will not invalidate it. While the law concerns itself more with substance than mere form, yet clear manner of expression and proper arrangement of the parts of the ordinance are the best and frequently the only guides in ascertaining the legislative intent. Every ordi- ments to Codes of Cal. (1899), p. Mich., 523; Watkins v. Hillerman, 245; Charter St. Louis, art. Ill, 73 Hun. (N. Y.), 317; 26 N. Y. sec. 13; Mun. Code of St. Louis, Suppl., 252. p. 205; 2 R. S. Mo., 1899, p. 2482, 12 (Relating to sale of intoxi- sec. 13. eating liquor.) "That whoever 9 Napa V. Easterby, 76 Cal., 222; not having a license to keep a 18 Pac. Rep., 253. dramshop, shall, by himself or 10 Baumgartner v. Hasty, 100 another, either as principal, clerk, Ind., 575, 586, per Elliott, J. or servant, directly, or indirectly, A statute may be carried forward sell any intoxicating liquor In any by reference to th^ general subject, quantity, shall be fined not less Opp. v. Ten Byck, 99 Ind., 345. than twenty dollars, nor more than 11 Van Alstine v. People, 37 one hundred dollars for each and 222 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§ 139 nauce should be so drawn as to successfully pass the test of judicial scrutiny.i^ § 139. Recital of authority to enact not required. Unless expressly required by the charter, the ordinance need not con- tain a recital of the power to enact it. This will be presumed until the contrary is shown. i* The established rule is thus aptly stated in an early Maryland case: "It is not essential to the validity of an ordinance, executing powers conferred by the legislature, that it should state, or indicate, the power in execution of which the ordinance was passed. If it state no particular power, as its basis, judicial courtesy requires that we should regard it as emanating from that power which would have warranted its passage. If two such powers exist, it may be imputed to either, in conformity to which its provisions and prerequisites show that it has been adopted. If, in these respects, in accordance with both, no incongruity or injustice can" result, in regarding it as the offspring of both, or either of the powers, "i-^ "Within the reason of this rule, it has been held that, the niisrecital in an ordinance of the source of power by which the ordinance is passed will not invalidate it if the power to enact it existed.^" every offense." Schofield v. Tampi- ron and Tp. of East Nissouri, 13 CO, 98 111. App., 324, 325; Buell v. Up. Can. Q. B., 190; Re Gibson and State, 45 Ark., 336. United Counties of Huron and 13 Failure to number the sub- Bruce, 20 Up. Can. Q. B., 11 ; Re divisions of the ordinance in proper Croome and City of Brantford, 6 order does not affect its validity. Ontario Rep., 188. Los Angeles County v. Eikenberry, There is no right of action 131 Cal., 461; 63 Pac. Rep., 766. against a city for attempting to Form of appropriation ordi- enforce a by-law ultra vires. Po- nances. Itemizing specific objects cock v. Toronto, 27 Ontario Rep., and purposes. Leadville v. Matth- 635. ews, 10 Colo., 125; 14 Pac. Rep., is Methodist Protestant Church 112 ; Sank V. Philadelphia, 8 Phila. v. Baltimore, 6 Gill. (Md.), 391, (Pa.), 117; 4 Brewster (Pa.), 133. 399; 48 Am. Dec, 540," per Dorsey, 14 Com. v. Fahey, 5 Cush. C. J. (Mass.), 408; Hoyt v. E. Saginaw, i a Baltimore v. Ulman, 79 Md., 19 Mich., 39; Ogdensburgh v. 469; 30 Atl. Rep., 43. Lyon, 7 Lans. (N. Y.), 215; Big- Preamble recited that ordinance gar, Mun. Manual of Canada, p. is adopted on the prayer of a ma- 334, citing Fisher v. Tp. of jority of the property owners. Vaughan, 10 Up. Can. Q. B., 492; Held not material whether true or Tylee v. County of Waterloo, 9 not, as power to proceed did not Up. Can. Q. B„ 588, 590 ; Re Came- depend upon request of property § 140] OF ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. 223 § 140. Ordinance need not recite necessity of enactment. Charters often provide that in certain ordinances, especially those relating to sanitary affairs, and street, sewer and other public work, the necessity of their passage be declared. The judicial view is that failure in this respect does not render the ordinance void, since its passage authorizing the act is equiv- alent to declaring the necessity .^" Necessity "is nearly synony- mous with expediency or what is necessary for the public good. The word necessary when applied to law, or taking private property, is constantly understood and acted upon in this sense, or as contradistinguished from unnecessary or inexpedient. The statute then, by the words of the power in question, 'if they find it necessary,' says no more than what is implied by every charter of incorporation, as directory to its members. 'You shall not pass by-laws which are unnecessary.' But be this as it may, some exigency should, in the nature of things, always exist, and in legal presumption does exist, to warrant the passage of a positive law. Yet, we believe, an adjudication or recital of such exigency in the law itself was never deemed requisite to its validity, whether it was one of absolute neces- sity or mere expediency. A recital is sometimes deemed proper and useful in the construction of a law, but not essen- tial to its constitutional existence. * * * It is of the na- ture of legislative bodies to judge of the exigency upon which owners, and, therefore, the matter New York — Rector, etc., of Trin- in the preamble was not jurisdic- ity Church v. Higgins, 4 Robert- tional. Bohle v. Stannard, 7 Mo. son (N. Y.), 1, 10; New York v. App., 51. Dry Dock, etc., R. R. Co., 133 N. A recital on the face of munici- Y., 104; 28 Am. St. Rep., 609; 30 pal bonds of a statute which does N. E. Rep., 563. not grant authority to issue them North Carolina — Raleigh v. is not fatal, provided the city pos- Peace, 110 N. C, 32; 14 S. E. Rep., sesses power to make the issue. 521. Beatrice v. Edminson (U. S. C. C. Texas — Connor v. Paris, 87 Tex., A.), 117 Fed. Rep., 427. See §539, 32; 27 S. W. Rep., 88; Ex parte post. Gregory, 20 Tex. App., 210; 54 Am. iT Connecticut — Townsend v. Rep., 516. Hoyle, 20 Conn., 1, 8. "It Is not necessary that all the Missouri — Young v. St. Louis, 47 leasons of the by-law should be Mo., 492; Kiley v. Forsee, 57 Mo., given in the preamble of it." Per 390, 395 ; McCormick v. Patchin, Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Harrison, 53 Mo., 33 ; Bohle v. Stannard, 7 3 Burrows, 1328. Compare Hoyt v. Mo. App., 51; Miller v. Anheuser, East Saginaw, 19 Mich., 39; 2 Am. 2 Mo. App., 167, 172. Rep., 76. 224 Of fiNACTMaNT OF OftDlNANCEg. L§141 their laws are founded ; and when they speak, their judgment is implied in the law itself. "** § 141. One subject and title. Following the provisions of most of the state constitutions, municipal charters sometimes provide that an ordinance shall embrace but one subject, which subject shall be clearly expressed in its title. General appro- priation ordinances are usually excepted which may embrace the various subjects and the accounts for and on account of which moneys are appropriated.^'' In the absence of such ex- press provision the constitutional requirement in this respect does not apply to the passage of municipal ordinances, as or- dinances are held not to be laws within its meaning.^" The 18 Stuyvesant v. New York, 7 ' Cow. (N. Y.), 588, 606, 607, fol- lowed m Cronin v. People, 82 N. Y., 318, 323. To same effect Mar- tin V. Mott, 12 Wheat. (U. S.), 19. 19 Charter of San Francisco, art. II, ch. 1, sec. 1; Statutes, and amendments to the Codes of Cal. (1899), p. 245; Charter of St. Louis, art. Ill, sec. 13; Mun. Code of St. Louis, p. 205; 2 R. S. of Mo., 1899, p. 2482, sec. 13. Colorado — Thomas v. Grand Junction, 13 Colo.App., 80; 56 Pac. Rep., 665. Illinois — Thompson v. Highland Park. 187 111., 265; 58 N. E. Rep., 328; Chicago T. T. Co. v. Chicago, 178 111., 429; 53 N. B. Rep., 361; Hinsdale v. Shannon, 182 111., 312; 55 N. B. Rep., 327. Iowa — Hanson v. Hunter, 86 Iowa, 722; 48 N. W. Rep., 1005; 53 N. W. Rep., 84; Des Moines v. Hillis, 55 Iowa, 643; 8 N. W. Rep., 638. Kansas — Bmporia v. Shaw, 6 Kan. App., 808; 51 Pac'. Rep., 237. Kentucky — Blliott v. Louisville, 101, Ky., 262; 40 S. W. Rep., 690; Nevin v. Roach, 86 Ky., 492; 5 S. W. Rep., 546. Minnesota — State v. Starkey, 49 Minn., 503; 52 N. W. Rep., 24. H — Ocean Springs v. Green, 77 Miss., 472; 27 So. Rep., 743. Pennsylvania — Chester v. Bul- lock, 187 Pa. St., 544; 41 Atl. Rep., 452. 20 California — Ex parte Haskell, 112 Cal., 412; 32 L. R. A., 527; 44 Pac. Rep., 725. Illinois — Schofield v. Tampico, 98 111. App., 324. Indiana — Baumgartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind., 575, 585; Green v. Indian- apolis, 25 Ind., 490. Kansas — Topeka v. Raynor, 61 Kan., 10; 58 Pac. Rep., 557; 55 Pac. Rep., 509; 8 Kan. App., 279; Smith V. Bmporia, 27 Kan., 528; Humboldt v. McCoy, 23 Kan., 249. Louisiana — Callaghan v. Alex- andria, 52 La. Ann., 1013; 27 So. Rep., 540. Michigan — People v. Wagner, 86 Mich., 594; 24 Am. St. Rep., 141; 13 L. R. A., 286; 49 N. W. Rep., 609 ; People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich., 611; 4 L. R. A., 751; 44 N. W. Rep., 1124. Missouri — Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Mo., 1; 41 Am. St. Rep., 678; 25 S. W. Rep., 202. 2few Hampshire — Lisbon v. Clark, 18 N. H., 234. New Jersey — Jersey City H. & P. St. Ry. V. Passaic (N. J. L., 1902), 52 Atl. Rep., 242; Delaware §141] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 32S provision as to title and subject-matter is generally held to be mandatory .21 The purpose of the provision is that neither the members of the legislative body nor the people should be misled by the title of an ordinanee.^^ It is intended to prevent the practice of joining in the same ordinance incongruous subjects, having no relation or connection with each other, and foreign to the subject embraced in the title. Matters germane to the general subject expressed in its title may be united.^^ Similar prohibitions contained in state constitutions are given like con- struction.^* The provision being restrictive, a liberal construc- & A. Tel. Co. V. Camden County, 67 N. J. L., 91, 531; 50 Atl. Rep., 452; 52 Atl. Rep., 482. Pennsylvania — Yard ley v. Borough, 22 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep., 179, 180; Corry v. Corry Chair Co., 18 Pa. Super. Ct., 271. South Carolina — State v. Gibbes, 60 S. C, 500; 39 S. B. Rep., 1. 21 Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Wyandotte, 44 Kan., 32; 23 Pac. Rep., 950; State ex rel. Belt v. St. Louis, 161 Mo., 371; 61 S. W. Rep., 658; Cooley's Const. Llm., sees. 82, 83. Contra, Pirn v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio St., 176; Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St., 573 ; State ex ret. v. Cov- ington, 29 Ohio St., 102. 22 Board of Water Com'rs of Clinton v. Dwight, 101 N. Y., 9, 11; 3 N. B. Rep., 782, per Danforth, J. 23 Bergman v. St. Louis Iron Mountain & Southern R. R. Co., 88 Mo., 678, 683; Senn v. Southern Ry. Co., 124 Mo., 621; 28 S. W. Rep., 66; Weber v. Johnson, 37 Mo. App., 601; Fairmont v. Meyer, 83 Minn., 456; 86 N. W. Rep., 457; St. Louis V. Green, 7 Mo. App., 468. 2* Florida — State v. Duval Coun- ty, 23 Fla., 483; 3 So. Rep., 193. Georgia — Macon v. Hughes, 110 Ga., 795; 36 S. E. Rep., 247; Burns V. State, 104 Ga., 544; 30 S. B. Rep., 815, distinguishing Sasser V. State, 99 Ga., 54; 25 S. E. Rep., 619; Butner v. Boifeuillet, 100 Ga., 743; 28 S. E. Rep., 464; Ayeridge V. Comrs., 60 Ga., 404; Brieswick V. Brunswick, 51 Ga., 639. Illinois — McGurn v. Board of Education, 133 111., 122; 24 N. E. Rep., 529; Ottawa v. People ex rel.. 48 111., 233; People ex rel. v. Mel- len, 32 111., 181. Iowa — Williamson v. Keokuk, 44 Iowa, 88; Whiting v. Mt. Pleasant, 11 Iowa, 482; Ex parte Pritz, 9 Iowa, 30; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82. Missouri — Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo., 64; State ex rel. v. Mead, 71 Mo., 266; State ex rel. v. County Court, 102 Mo., 531; 15 S. W. Rep., 79; State ex rel. v. Matthews, 44 Mo., 523; Lynch v. Murphy, 119 Mo., 163; 24 S. W. Rep., 774; State ex rel. v. Finn, 8 Mo. App., 341. New Jersey — Curry v. Elvins Co., 32 N. J. L., 362, 363, per Dalrimple, J. Washington — State ex rel. v. New Whatcom, 3 Wash., 7, 10; 27 Pac. Rep., 1020. Wisconsin — Thompson v. Mil- waukee, 69 Wis., 492; 34 N. W. Rep., 402. The title of an act is suflBcient if it does not mislead as to the chief topic of the act, and that the minor features of it have a reasonable and natural connection with the subject named in the title. State ex rel. v. County 220 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§141 tion is adopted. If the title shows the general character of the ordinance and thus prevents its enactment being inad- visedly or fraudulently accomplished, it vfIU be sufficient.^' Matters of detail need not be specified. The title need not be an index to the act; nor need it state a catalogue of all the powers intended to be bestowed.-" "An abstract of the law is not required in the title ; ' '^^ nor need the title state the mode in which the subject is treated, nor the means by which the end sought by the enactment is to be reached.^* So it is not required that every other law repealed by implication because of repugnancy or inconsistency shall be mentioned in the title of the new law.^** The fact that an ordinance violates the charter in that it contains a provision upon a foreign subject, disconnected from that expressed in the title, has been held not to invalidate the balance of the ordinance, properly embraced in the title.^" Special statutes will sometimes suspend charter restrictions relating to the title of ordinances. Thus where a special stat- ute authorized the council to submit to the voters a plan, by Court, 128 Mo., 427, 441; 30 S. sufficient. Commonwealtli v. La- Bar, 7 North (Pa.), C. C. R., 85. 2' Per Johnson, C. J., in Brew- ster V. Syracuse, 19 N. Y., 116, 117. 2s Board of Water Comrs. of Clinton v. Dwight, 101 N. Y., 9, 12 ; 3 N. E. Rep., 782; People ex ret v. Lawrence, 41 N. Y., 137, 139; Gor- don V. Comes, 47 N. Y., 608, 615, per Rapallo, J.; Barton v. Pitts- burg, 4 Brews. (Pa.), 373; Appeal of Esling, 89 Pa. St., 205. E. G., "an act for the relief of J. L.," need not state that the money is to be raised by taxation. Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y., 116. 29 State V. Gallagher, 42 Minn., 449; 44 N. W. Rep., 529. 3oDuluth v. Krupp, 46 Minn., 435; 49 N. W. Rep., 235. The charter of San Francisco provides that, "if any subject be embraced in an ordinance and not expressed in its title, such ordi- nance shall be void only as to so much thereof as is not expressed W. Rep., 103; 31 S. W. Rep., 23; State ex rel. v. Miller, 100 Mo., 439 ; 13 S. W. Rep., 677 ; Lynch v. Mur- phy, 119 Mo., 163; 24 S. W. Rep., 774; Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo., 64; St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo., 578; State v. Mathews, 44 Mc, 523; State V. Miller, 45 Mo., 495; State ex rel. v. Mead, 71 Mo., 266; Hanni- bal V. Marion Co., 69 Mo., 571; State ex rel. v. Heege, 135 Mo., 112 ; 36 S. W. Rep., 614. 25 State v. Cantieny, 34 Minn. 1, 6, 7; 24 N. W. Rep., 458. 26 Lockhart v. Troy, 48 Ala., 579, 584; People ex rel. v. Mellen, 32 111., 181. Compare Thompson v. Milwaukee, 69 Wis., 492; 34 N. W. Rep., 402. While the title need not be an index of the contents of the ordi- nance, it ought not to be mislead- ing, and if it fairly gives notice of the subjects so as to reasonably lead to inquiry into its body, it is §l■i•^J OF ENACTMENT OP OHDINAJSTCES. 327 ordinance, for the construction of water, light and sewerage systems, ' ' either or both, ' ' it was held that under such statute an ordinance on these subjects might be either single, double or triple.^* § 142. Same— Illustrative cases. Where the title, authoriz- ing the repairing of a street, declares that the paving shall be done with asphalt, while the body of the ordinance contains a proviso permitting the use of vitrified brick in lieu of asphalt in the gutters and such other portions of the street as, in the judgment of the city engineer, shall be necessary or desirable, the ordinance is valid.^- An ordinance which provided for the grading and paving of an alley was held valid against the objection that it contained two subjects in violation of the charter provision's.^* An ordinance, authorizing the ' ' purchase or construction" of Avater works, is not void on account of covering tM'o subjects, nor because it is in the alternative.^* So an ordinance controlling the keeping of certain animals, and also their use in public places, is not void as relating to more than one subject.*® An ordinance which in the first section vacates an alley and in the second grants the land over which it passed is valid, for both provisions relate to the same gen- eral subject, which is the grant.**' Where the ordinance is in the nature of grant, that which is incident thereto may be embraced. Thus v/here an ordinance grants the right to trans- mit electric light and power, the further grant therein of a privilege to conduct to the electric light plant water from a particular source is an incident to the object of supplying electricity.*^ Under the title "To prevent the establishment of tippling houses," an ordinance which prohibited any sale of lager beer, ale or other malt liquor, without a license, was sustained, the court remarking: "The title is unnecessary, and in its title." Recent Charter of 34 Thomas v. Grand Junction, 13 San Francisco, art. II, ch. 1, sec. Colo. App., 80; 56 Pac. Rep., 665. 12; Stat, and Amend, to Code of ss Bayard v. Baker, 76 Iowa, 220; Cal. (1899), p. 245. 40 N. W. Rep., 818. 31 Yesler V. Seattle, 1 Wash., 308; as Dempsey v. Burlington, 66 25 Pac. Rep., 1014. Iowa, 687; 24 N. W. Rep., 508. 32 Baltimore v. Stewart, 92 Md., 37 Hanson v. William A. Hunter 535; 48 Atl. Rep., 165. Electric Light Co., 86 Iowa, 722; 33 Weher v. Johnson, 37 Mo. App., 48 N. W. Rep., 1005; 53 N. W. Rep., 601. 84. 228 OP Enactment of ordinances. [§i43 cannot control the tenor of the enactment, "*^ " An ordinance to regulate and prohibit the running at large of animals" is sufficient to embrace a clause forbidding any person from breaking open the inclosure established as a pound, and un- lawfully taking and driving therefrom animals impounded therein.^® An ordinance entitled, "An ordinance relative to misdemean- ors, breaches of the peace, and disorderly conduct, ' ' imposing a penalty or fine and imprisonment upon "any person who shall make any noise, riot, disturbance or improper diversion, ' ' and on persons found in a state of notorious drunkenness in any street or public place in the city, and persons guilty of other offenses described, is valid.*" "An ordinance defining and prescribing punishment for certain offenses," and which in the body thereof defines and prescribes the punishment for twenty-six different offenses, was held valid.*i An ordinance to regulate the speed of trains may embrace provisions relating to the equipment of trains.*^ An ordinance with the title "Public carriers," may properly regulate street railway ears.*^ An ordinance entitled, "An ordinance regulating and keeping, storing and handling and licensing the removal of garbage, grease, offal and other refuse matter composed of either animal or vegetable matter," and to repeal a prior ordinance on the same subject, and prescribing penalties for the violation thereof, and fixing a license tax on vehicles used for the re- 38 state (HershofE) v. Beverly, eating liquors, except for medical, 45 N. J. L., 288, 291. scientific and mechanical purposes, 39 Smith V. Emporia, 27 Kan., and to regulate the manufacture 528, 530. and sale thereof for said except- 40 State V. Cantieny, 34 Minn., 1 ; ed purposes," held valid. In re 24 N. W. Rep., 458. Thomas, 53 Kan., 659; 37 Pac. 41 "The subject of the ordinance Rep., 171. is offenses against the city. The "An ordinance to regulate bicy- subject is composed of many cles," covering use of, on streets, parts." State v. Wells, 46 Iowa, is sufficient. Des Moines v. Keller, 662, 663, per Beck, J. 116 Iowa, 648; 88 N. W. Rep., Ordinance regulating several 827. trades and occupations, under *2 Bergman v. St. L. I. M. & S. general title held good. Seattle v. Ry. Co., 88 Mo., 678 ; 1 S. W. Rep., Barto (Wash., 1903), 71 Pac. Rep., 384. 735. «Senn v. So. Ry. Co., 124 No., "An ordinance to prohibit the 621; 28 S. W. Rep., 66. manufacture and sale of intoxi- § 142] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 229 moval of garbage, is valid.*-* "An act for the relief of the village of Clinton" is a good title.*^ The provisions of the ordinance must not be inconsistent with the title. Thus the title "Regulating the use and sale of intoxicating liquors, ' ' is insufficient where the substance of the ordinance is entirely prohibitory, with "no pretense at regula- tion." The charter required the subject to be clearly ex- pressed in the title.*® So where the title and body of the ordinance embraces two distinct subjects, namely, (1) extend- ing the limits of the city, and (2) making an appropriation to build a bridge, the ordinance is void, notwithstanding the pro- vision relating to the appropriation was null because of lack of power in the council to make it.*'' So an ordinance whose title is to prohibit animals from running at large, which, in addition, provides that no person shall keep a dog without paying a tax, and directing the city marshal to kill all dogs running at large whose owners have not complied with the regulation, and rendering such owners liable to criminal prose- cution, contains more than one subject and is void.** a St. Louis V. Weitzel, 130 Mo., 600; 31 S. W. Rep., 1045. Ordinance amending section re- lating to officers, their salaries and bonds, under title "An ordinance to amend sec. — , ch. — , of the city ordinance," held good, as the sub- jects are naturally connected. Lowry v. Lexington, 24 Ky. L. Ry., 516; 68 S. W. Rep., 1109. •*5 "It must be conceded that the words of the title are very general, but they are comprehensive and do express a single intent which the body of the act neither exceed nor contradicts. It has been held that the purpose of the provision was that neither the members of the legislature nor the public should be misled by the title of an act, and thereby various objects, having no necessary or- natural connection with each other, be united in one bill. There is here neither that danger nor that re- sult," Board of Water Com'rs of Clinton v. Dwight, 101 N. Y., 9, 11; 3 N. E. Rep., 7§2, per Danforth, J. ■16 "Instead of the title of this ordinance being a clear statement of its subject, it is wholly Incon- sistent with it, and states a wholly different subject as different as regulation is from prohibition. We cannot disregard this provision of the law. It is not unreasonable that when a village assumes to itself the functions of a municipal corporation it should be held to a reasonable compliance with the laws of the state in the enactment of its ordinances, and to that end employ legal counsel if necessary." Cantril v. Sainer, 59 Iowa 26; 12 N. W. Rep., 753. *'! Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Wyandotte, 44 Kas., 32; 23 Pac. Rep., 950. *8 Stebbins v. Mayer, 38 Kan., 573; 16 Pac. Rep., 745. Validitt op Titles in Particu- LAK Cases. El Dorado v. Beards- ley, 53 Kan., 363; 36 Pac. Rep., 230 OF ENACtMlEiSlt OF ORDINANCES. [§ 1-13 § 143. Title in revision of ordinances. Charters often re- quire a revision of the general ordinances at stated intervals. This is generally done by ordinance.*^ The ordinance in re- vision may embrace all of the existing ordinance provisions, classified according to titles, chapters, articles and sections, and be passed as one ordinance, under the general title "An ordi- nance in revision of the general ordinance of the City of (or Town of )." Sometimes, in addition, words are includ- ed in the title, as "to provide new ordinance provisions for the government of said city. ' ' It seems clear that under a charter requiring the title to clearly express the subject matter of the ordinance, such words would be insufficient to authorize the enactment of new ordinance provisions, but their incorporation would not invalidate the title; they may be treated as sur- plusage. It has been held in Maryland that, in the absence of statutory prohibition, it is entirely competent for the municipal legisla- ture by a single ordinance to declare any compilation of ordi- nances or proposed ordinances to be in force. The court remarked: "Such a power has been too generally exercised, with implied if not express recognition by the courts, to be now questioned.-"^" 746; Fairmont v. Meyer, 83 Minn., J. L„ 531, 532; 52 Atl. Rep., 482. 456; 86 N. W. Rep., 457; State ex "An ordinance providing for the rel. V. St. Louis, 169 Mo., 31; 68 licensing of telegraph, telephone S. W. Rep., 900. and electric light poles and wires The following titles have been and collecting of an annual tax held sufficient. "Ordinance No. — , therefor," is valid. Newcastle v. in relation to the sale of intoxi- Electric Light Co., 16 Pa. Co., Ct. eating liquor." Schofield v. Tarn- Rep., 663. pico, 98 111. App., 324, 325. "An ordinance to regulate cer- "An ordinance relating to the tain trades and occupations in the railroad encroachments and oh- City of Seattle, providing penalties structions in Beach Avenue." Cape for the violation thereof, and re- May V. Cape May, Del. Bay & S. P. pealing all ordinances inconsistent R. R. Co., 60 N. J. L., 224, 225; 37 therewith," held valid. Seattle v. Atl. Rep., 892; 39 L. R. A., 609. Barto (Wash., 1903), 71 Pac. Rep., "An ordinance directing the re- 735. moval of telephone and telegraph ^o Charter of St. Louis, art. Ill, poles placed in the sidewalks, sec. 29; The Mun. Code of St. streets, highways and public places Louis, 294 ; 2 R. S. of Mo., 1899, in the township of Pensauken, p. 2489, sec. 29. without the consent of the public so Garrett v. Janes, 65 Md., 260, authorities." Delaware & Atl. Tel. 265; 3 Atl. Rep., 597. & Tel. Co. V. Pensauken Tp., 67 N. Time of Revision. Under a §145] OP ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 231 § 144. Preamble. While, as we have seen, it is unnecessary that the ordinance should contain a recital of the authority^! or the necessity for its passage,^^ ^ preamble is sometimes adopted declaring the reasons and purpose of the ordinance.^^ The stately preamble beginning with the emphatic "where- as ' ' was the style of the early-day legislation ; but as it is not required it is less frequently employed at the present time, especially in municipal corporation legislation.^* § 145. Ordaining or enacting clause. In the absence of a preamble, the title is followed by the ordaining or enacting clause. The form is usually prescribed in the charter. The style varies in different charters.^^ Charter provisions pre- charter providing that the ordi- nances should be revised within one year from the time the charter took effect, it was held that a re- vision made after the expiration of the time was valid. Lowrey v. Lexington, 24 Ky. L. Rep., 516; 68 S. W. Rep., 1109. Statute requiring a publication of a digest of ordinances every five years, held directory. Whalen v. Macomb, 76 111., 49, 51. 51 Section 139, supra. 52 Section 140, supra. 53 Com. V. Turner, 1 Cush. (Mass.), 493; Barter v. Com., 3 Pa. (Penrose & Watts), -253; Ply- mouth V. Pettijohn, 4 Devereux (N. C), 591; Summerville v. Pressley, 33 S. C, 56, 59; 26 Am. St. Rep., 659; Charleston v. El- ford, 1 McMullan (S. C), 234; State (Delaware & Alt. Tel. & T. Co.), v. Pensauken Tp., Camden County, 67 N. J. L., 91, 531; 50 Atl. Rep., 452; 52 Atl. Rep., 482; Ex parte Gregory, 20 Tex. App., 210; 54 Am. Rep., 516. 5* Preamble of ordinance for- bidding smoking in street cars: "Whereas, The custom of permit- ting smoking in street cars of this city is a most vile and objectiona- ble one to a majority of our citi- zens, especially to the ladies, who are entitled to that courtesy and consideration due to their sex; and Whereas, This alone of all the cities in the Union allow such a discomfort to those of their citi- zens who ride in the public cars." The ordinance was sustained under general powers. State v. Heiden- hain, 42 .La. Ann., 483, 484, 485; 21 Am. St. Rep., 388. 55 Gbeatek New York: "Be it ordained by the Municipal Assem- bly of The City of New York, as follows." Charter, City of New York, ch. 1, § 38; Laws of N. Y. (1897), p. 14. Chicago: "Be it ordained by the City Council of Chicago." 1 Starr & Curtis 111. Stat., p. 717, par. 64. Philadelphia: "The Select and Common Councils of the City of Philadelphia do ordain." Philadel- phia V. Brabender, 201 Pa. St., 574-5; 51 Atl. Rep., 374. St. Louis. "Be it ordained by the Municipal Assembly of the City of St. Louis, as follows." Charter, art. III., sec. 12; Mun. Code of St. Louis, p. 205; 2 R. S. of Mo., 1899, p. 2482, sec. 12. San Francisco: "Be It or- dained by the people of the City and County of San Francisco, as 232 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§145 scribing the style of ordinances are generally held to be direc- tory, hence failure to observe the charter form,^** or even omission of the ordaining or enacting clause, although express- ly required, does not invalidate the ordinance, in the absence of provision of the charter to that effect.^^ In like manner as respects the title, as we have seen,^* a constitutional provision relating to the enacting clause of acts of the legislature, in the absence of express provision, has no application to municipal ordinanees.^^ A variance in stating the legal name of the corporation in a by-law is not material if it appears on the face of the by-law to be enacted by the corporation having power to pass it.^" So an immaterial variance from the prescribed form in the ordain- ing clause will not render the ordinance void, as where the follows." Charter, art. II., ch. 1, sec. 8; Statutes and Amendments to Codes of Gal., 1899, p. 245. New Orleans: "Be it ordained by the City Council of the City of New Orleans." State v. McNally, 48 La. Ann., 1450. Detroit: "It is hereby ordained by the people of the City of De- troit." People V. Keir, 78 Mich., 98, 100; 43 N. W. Rep., 1039. "Be it ordained by the City Council of the City of Tampa." Tampa v. Salomonson, 35 Fla., 446, 467; 17 So. Rep., 581. "Be it ordained by the Mayor and City Council of Monroe." Vicksburg, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mon- roe, 48 La. Ann., 1102, 1105; 20 So. Rep., 664. "Be it ordained by the President and board of trustees of the vil- lage of — ." Schofield v. Tampico, 98 111. App., 324, 325. "Be it ordained by the township committee of the township of Pen- sauken." Delaware & Atlantic Teleg. & Telep. Co. v. Pensauken Tp. Committee, 67 N. J. L., 531; 50 Atl. Rep., 452; 52 Atl. Rep., 482. 56 Napa V. Basterby, 76 Cal., 222, 228; 18 Pac. Rep., 253; State v. Fountain, 14 Wash., 236; 44 Pac. Rep., 270. 57 St. Louis V. Foster, 52 Mo., 513; People v. Murray, 57 Mich., 396; 24 N. W. Rep., 118; Ryan v. Lynch, 68 111., 160; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. V. Hines, 82 111. App., 488 ; Ramsey County v. Heenan, 2 Minn., 330. People ex rel v. Lee 112 111., at p. 121, contains a dictum to the ef- fect that omission of the ordain- ing clause of the ordinance may not be important. A like ruling has been made re- specting the enacting clause of a legislative act provided for by the constitution. Cape Girardeau v. Ri- ley, 52 Mo., 424; 14 Am. Rep., 427. Contra, Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. V. Harris (Tex. Civ. App., 1896), 36 S. W. Rep., 776. 58 Section 141, supra. 59Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Mo., 1, 7; 41 Am. St. Rep., 678; 25 S. W. Rep., 202. 60 In re Hawkins v. Municipal Council, etc., of Huron et al., 2 Up. Can. C. P., 72, 83, 84, rule as to misnomer In deed and conveyan' ces applied. §M6J OF ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. 233 words "common council" instead of "city council" are em- ployed ;®i or "The mayor and common council" instead of ' ' The common council of the city. ' '®^ § 146. Time of introduction and passage. Charter require- ments that ordinances shall be introduced at a meeting prior to their passage are generally held mandatory.^^ ^ charter provision reciting that, ' ' no ordinance and no resolution grant- ing any franchise for any pul-pose shall be passed * * * on the day of its introduction, nor within five days thereafter, nor at any other time than at a regular meeting, nor without being first submitted to the city attorney," has been held not to apply to ordinances other than those granting franchises.*" Under such provision a substituted ordinance which is, in 61 Law V. People ex rel., 87 111., 385, 403. 62 State V. Nohl, 113 Wis., 15; 88 N. W. Rep., 1004. Under a charter providing the enacting clause, as follows: "Be it ordained by the council of the Town of * * *," an ordinance is valid where the ordaining clause recites, "Be it ordained by the town council." State v. Fountain, 14 Wash., 236; 44 Pac. Rep., 270. A borough ordinance was held invalid which recited as enacted by the chief burgess and town council, when the corporate name is the chief burgess, assistant bur- gess and town council. Milton Borough V. Hoagland, 3 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep., 283. As to corporate name in partic- ular case, where there was a change in class. West v. Colum- bus, 20 Kan., 633, 635. 63 Oswald V. Gosnell, 21 Ky. L. Rep., 1660; 56 S. W. Rep., 165; East Tennessee Tel. Co. v. Ander- son Co. Tel. Co., 22 Ky. L. Rep., 418; 57 S. W. Rep., 457; State (Del- aware & A. Tel. & T. Co.) V. Pen- sauken Tp., Camden County, 67 N. J. L., 91, 531; 50 Atl. Rep., 452; 52 Atl. Rep., 482; State v. Bergen, 33 N. J. L., 39; State v. Jersey City, 34 N. J. L., 429; New Or- leans V. Brooks, 36 La. Ann., 641; Danville v. Shelton, 76 Va., 325; Gilman v. Milwaukee, 61 Wis., 588; 21 N. W. Rep., 640; Wright v. For- restal, 65 Wis., 341; 27 N. W. Rep., 52. An ordinance may be enacted on the day introduced, if the charter does not forbid. Fourth Street, 19 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep., 488. 64 '^any good and suflScient rea- sons might be given for imposing legislative restrictions upon city authorities in the granting of fran- chises that would not be applica- ble to their control of the ordinary affairs committed to their discre- tion." Raborn v. MIsh, 12 Wash., 167, 169; 40 Pac. Rep., 731, over- ruling dictum in Vancouver v. Wintler, 8 Washi, 378, 380; 36 Pac. Rep., 278, 685. "No bill for the grant of any franchise shall be put upon Its final passage within ninety days after its introduction, and no fran- chise shall be renewed before one year prior to its expiration." Charter San Francisco, art. II., ch. 1, sec. 12; Stat. & Amend, to Codes of Cal. (1899), 245. 234 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§14? effect, an amendment of the original ordinance, and which is clearly within the limits of the subject-matter of the original proposition, may be passed although five days did not elapse between its introduction and its passage.®^ An ordinance which cannot be passed at the same meeting at which it is introduced cannot be passed at an adjourned meeting thereof.®^ In one case an ordinance was taken up and laid over for thirty days, but on such thirtieth day there was no meeting of the council. It was held that the ordinance died on such day, and was not rendered valid by being taken up, read a third time and passed.®'^ A charter provision that, "no error in the proceedings of the general council shall exempt from payment after the work is done, as required by ordinance or contract," has been held curative, and therefore failure to vote upon the ordinance under which a public improvement was made, on two different days as required by charter, dotfs not invalidate it.®* § 147. Same— Double board. In a legislative municipal as- sembly, composed of two branches, a charter provision that, "no bill shall be passed finally in either branch upon the same day on which it was introduced or reported," prohibits the passage by one branch of an ordinance on the same day that it is reported to it by the other branch.'^^ So where the legis- lative department is composed of two boards, an ordinance passed by one board at one session, but not passed by the other 65 Vancouver v. Wintler, 8 Wash., dinances are required after being 378, 380 ; 36 Pac. Rep., 278, 685. presented and read to lie over one 66 State (Staates) v. Washing- week before final action. Chicago ton, 44 N. J. L., 605 ; 43 Am. Rep., Telephone Co. v. Northwestern 402; Flood v. Atlantic City, 63 N. Telephone Co., 199 111. 324; 65 N. J. L., 530; 42 Atl. Rep., 829. B. Rep., 329, affirming 100 111. 67 Jersey City H. & P. St. Ry. App., 57. Co. V. Passaic (N. J. L., 1902), 52 69 Altoona v. Bowman, 171 Pa. Atl. Rep., 242. St., 307; 33 Atl. Rep., 187; Fehler 68 Broadway Baptist Church v. v. Gosnell, 99 Ky., 380; 35 S. W. McAfee, 8 Bush. (Ky.), 508, 515. Rep., 1125; Oswald v. Gosnell, 21 When provision as to time of in- Ky. L. Rep., 1660; 56 S. W. Rep., troduction and vote on passage not 165 ; Louisville v. Selvage, 106 Ky., applicable. Derby v. Modesto, 104 730; 51 S. W. Rep., 447; Gleason v. Cal., 515; 38 Pac. Rep., 900; Mack- Barnett, 20 Ky. L. Rep., 1865; 49 in V. Wilson, 20 Ky. L. Rep., 218; S. W. Rep., 1060. See Lewis v. 45 S. W. Rep., 663; Roberts v. Pa- New York, 35 How. Pr. (N. Y.), ducah, 95 Fed. Rep., 62. 162. Sometimes by rule of council or- § 148] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 335 until the next session, is not duly passed and is voidJ" So in another case of a double legislative board, the express charter requirement that an ordinance which had passed one board should be published before being sent to the other, and which forbade an ordinance which had passed one board from being acted on by the other on the same day, except by unanimous consent, was held mandatoryji Mere failure to observe a provision of the joint rules and orders of a council composed of two boards, as one directing that an ordinance shall first be passed in the common council, does not invalidate the ordi- nance, provided it is shown that the charter hks been complied with in its passageJ^ § 148. Reference to and report by committee. Charter re- quirements that an ordinance shall not be considered for final passage unless the same has been referred to and reported upon by a committee are generally held mandatory. Ordinances authorizing the disbursements of money are, under some char- ters, required to be referred to certain fiscal officers, as the comptroller, and be endorsed to the effect that sufficient un- appropriated means stands to the credit of the fund therein named to meet the requirements of the ordinance ; and unless this is done it is unlawful to recommend its passage or pass it.'* Failure to observe a charter provision requiring all contracts for street improvements to be referred to a committee of the council, who should report thereon, has been held to invalidate the contract and not binding on the lot ow^iers.'''* "The manifest object was to prevent improvident legislation; to 70 /jt re Beekman, 11 Abb. Pr. certain ordinances under recent (N. Y.), 164; 19 How. Pr., 518; charter of Los Angeles,' Cal. Stat. Wetmore v. Story, 22 Barb. (N. & Amendments to Codes of Cal. Y.), 414; 3 Abb. (N. Y.), 262. (1903), p. 572, § 198a. In San 71 Herzo v. San Francisco, 33 Francisco electors may propose Cal., 134. certain ordinances. 72 Chandler v. Lawrence, 128 73 Charter of St. Louis, art. III., Mass., 213. sec. 3; Mun. Code of St. Louis, p. Where charter has been violated 205; 2 R. S. of Mo., 1899, p. 2482, as to time of passage, defect may sec. 13; Charter of St. Louis, art. be cured by reconsideration. Specht V., sec. 12; Mun. Code of St. Louis, v. Louisville, 22 Ky. L. Rep., 699; 247; 2 R. S. Mo., 1899, p. 2502; sec. 58 S. W. Rep., 607; Oswald v. Gos- 12. nell, 21 Ky. L. Rep., 1660; 56 S. 74 Covington v. Woods, 3 Ky. W. Rep., 165. Law Rep., 85. S. P. Murphy v. Initiative. Electors may propose Louisville, 9 Bush. (Ky.), 189. 236 OF ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. [§ 149 create a circumspect body that would stand between the street contractor and the city treasury, between the lot owner and the tax collector, between the citizen and the almost absolute power of the city council, and see that no wrong was commit- ted."'^ In a "Wisconsin case, the subject-matter of the reso- lution was the laying of permanent water mains. The charter provided that ordinances and resolutions "appropriating money or creating any charge against any fund of the city shall be referred to appropriate committees, and shall only be acted on by the council at a subsequent meeting not held on the same day, on the report of the committee to which the same was referred. ' ' In direct violation of it, the matter embraced in the resolution was never referred to any committee by the council, and was acted upon not only on the same day on whicli it was first presented, but also at the same meeting of the council. The resolution was held void, the court saying that, "the requisite steps and delay were . doubtless to aflEord notice to all the members of the council and the public. This action is expressly prohibitory. ' '^^ § 149. Signing and approval of ordinance by mayor. Where the mayor is a constituent part of the legislative power, his concurrence is essential to complete any given legislative act. This is as necessary to its validity as its passage by the coimcil or governing body, unless it should be passed over his veto in accordance with the law governing the corporation.'^'^ His consent is usually evidenced by his signature to the bill or ordinance.'® Whether the mayor's signature is indispensable to the validity of an ordinance or other corporate act will depend upon the language of the particular charter and its construction as compared with other provisions.'^ Under some 75 Per Holt, J., in Worthington v. 314; 14 L. R. A., 69; 22 Atl. Rep., Covington, 6 Ky. Law Rep., 237. 945. , 76 Oilman v. Milwaukee, 61 Wis., 78 Eichenlaub v. §t. Joseph, 588; 21 N. W. Rep., 640. 113 Mo., 395; 21 S. W. Rep., 77 Wain V. Philadelphia, 99 Pa. 8; Trenton v. Coyle, 107 Mo., St., 330; Breaux's Bridge v. Du- 193; 17 S. W. Rep., 643; Irvin puis, 30 La. Ann. (pt. 2), 1105; v. Devors, 65 Mo., 625 ; Thomson v. People v. Schroeder, 76 N. Y., Boonville, 61 Mo., 282; Saxton v. 160. St. Joseph, 60 Mo., 153; Saxton v. Injunction to restrain. New Or- Beach, 50 Mo., 488. leans E. R. Co. v. l>Iew Orleans, 39 7o California — Clarice v. Jen- La. Ann., 127; 1 So. Rep., 434; nings (Cal., 1893), 32 Pac. Rep., Dailey v. New Haven, 60 Conn., 1049; McDonald v. Dodge, 97 Cal., §149] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 237 charters it is held that without the mayor 's signature the legis- lative act, whether in the form of an ordinance or a resolution, is void.*" But unless this is made an express requirement, as 112; 31 Pac. Rep., 909; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal., 241; Creighton v. Manson, 27 Cal., 613. Iowa — Altman v. Dubuque, 111 Iowa, 105; 82 N. W. Rep., 461. Maine — Preble v. Portland, 45 Me., 241. Massachusetts — Hibbard v. Suf- folk County, 163 Mass., 34; 39 N. E. Rep., 285. Michigan — Baar v. Kirby, 118 Mich., 392; 76 N. W.-Rep., 754; Chaffee v. Granger, 6 Mich., 51. Minnesota — State v. Armstrong, 54 Minn., 457; 56 N. W. Rep., 97; State V. District Court, 41 Minn., 518; 43 N. W. Rep., 389. New Jersey — McDermott v. Ken- ny, 45 N. J. L., 251. New York — People v. Amster- dam, 90 Hun. (N. Y.), 488. Oregon — Ladd v. East Portland, 18 Ore., 87; 22 Pac. Rep., 533. 80 Mayor's Signature Required. California — PoUok v. San Diego, 118 Cal., 593; 50 Pac. Rep., 769; San Francisco Gas Co. v. San Fran- cisco, 6 Cal., 191. CoZorodo— Central v. Sears, 2 Colo., 588. Illinois— 1 Starr & Curtis 111. Stat., p. 686, par. 47. Iowa — Altman v. Dubuque, 111 Iowa, 105; 82 N. W. Rep., 461; Stutsman v. McVicar, 111 Iowa, 40; 82 N. W. Rep., 460; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. V. Council Bluffs, 109 Iowa, 425; 80 N. W. Rep., 564; Heins v. Lincoln, 102 Iowa, 69; 71 N. W. Rep., 189. Louisiana — Breaux's Bridge v. Dupuis, 30 La. Ann., 1105. Minnesota — State v. Darrow, 65 Minn., 419; 67 N. W. Rep., 1012; State V. Dakota County, 41 Minn., 518; 43 N. W. Rep., 389. Missouri — Saxton v. Beach, 50 Mo., 588; Saxton v. St. Joseph, 60 Mo., 153 ; Thomson v. Boonville, 61 Mo., 282; Irvin v. Devors, 65 Mo., 625; Trenton v. Coyle, 107 Mo., 119 ; 17 S. W. Rep., 643; Carondelet v. Wolfert, 39 Mo., 305; Crutchfield V, Warrensburg, 30 Mo. App., 456; Cape Girardeau v. Fougeu, 30 Mo. App., 551. New Jersey — Booth v. Bayonne, 56 N. J. L., 268; 28 Atl. Rep., 381. Neiv York — People v. Schroeder, 76 N. Y., 160. Oregon — Ladd v. East Portland, 18 Or., 87; 22 Pac. Rep., 533; Bab- bidge V. Astoria, 25 Or., 417; 42 Am. St. Rep., 796. Pennsylvania — Kepner v. Com- monwealth, 40 Pa. St., 124; Jones V. Schuylkill L. H. & P. Co., 202 Pa. St., 164; 51 Atl. Rep., 762. Ordinance determining the low- est bid for furnishing hose and awarding a contract therefor, held to be a "legislative act," requiring the mayor's signature. Gleason v. Peerless Mfg. Co., 37 N. Y. Supp., 267; 1 App. Div., 257. Certain ordinance relating to sanitary affairs required to be ap- proved by board of health, without power of amendment. The board may at first refuse and afterwards approve. Darcantel v. People's Slaughter-House & R. Co., 44 La. Ann., 632; 11 So. Rep., 239. Town by-laws to be approved by court or justice thereof, when. Does not apply to ordinances of Boston. Com. v. Lagorio, 141 Mass., 81; 6 N. E. Rep., 546; Com. V. Davis, 140 Mass., 485; 4 N. E. Rep., 577. 238 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§149 where the charter either expressly or b'y implication declares that the act will have no validity in the absence of such sig- nature, many cases hold that it may be dispensed with.^^ It has been held in Alabama that the mayor need not sign a revised code of ordinances which had been copied at length on 81 Mayor's appeoval not be- QUiEED. Jacobs V. San Francisco, 100 Cal., 121; 34 Pac. Rep., 630; Morton v. Broderick, 118 Cal., 474; 50 Pac. Rep., 644; Terre Haute & I. R. Co. V. Voelker, 129 111., 540; 22 N. E. Rep., 20; 31 111. App., 314; McKenzle v. Wooley, 39 La. Ann., 944; 3 So. Rep., 128; Hib- bard v. Suffolk Co., 163 Mass., 34 ; 39 N. E. Rep., 285; Burlington v. Dennison, 42 N. J. L., 165; Fisher V. Graham, 1 Cincinnati Rep. (Ohio), 113; State v. Henderson, 38 Ohio St., 644. If the legislative intent to the contrary is not clear an ordinance I^assed as the law requires, pub- lished and going into force is not void because not signed by the mayor or president of the council. McKenzie v. Wooley, 39 La. Ann., 944; 3 So. Rep., 128; Opelousas v. Andrus, 37 La. Ann., 699. Approval of resolution required. Charter of San Francisco, art. II., ch. 1, § 16; Chaffee v. Granger, 6 Mich., 51; Booth v. Bayonne, 56 N. J. U, 268; 28 Atl. Rep., 381; Wain v. Philadelphia, 99 Pa. St., 330 Kepner v. Com., 40 Pa. St., 124 Charter of New York, ch. 1, § 40 Laws of N. Y. (1897), p. 14. Approval of resolution not re- -quired. Smith v. Utica, 53 Hun. "(N. Y.), 638; "6 N. Y. Supp., 792. By charter of Jersey City only such resolutions and ordinances as are in their nature final need be approved by mayor. Resolutions relating to intermediate proceed- ings cannot be said to go into ef- fect, and therefore need not be ap- proved. Howeth V. Jersey City, 30 N. J. L., 93. A resolution of a council refer- ring a petition for a sewer to the committee on sewerage does not require mayor's signature. State V Jersey City, 30 N. J. L., 148. A resolution appointing commis- sioners to assess damages and ben- efits in street opening proceeding in place of others resigned need not be approved by mayor^ State V. Jersey City, 25 N. J. L., 309. Mayor need not approve appoint- ments to office by council although he must approve ordinances and resolutions. State ex rel. McDer- mott v. Miller, 45 N. J. L., 251. Not required in selection of offi- cers by council. Haight v. Love, 39 N. J. L., 14; McDermott v. Ken- ny, 45 N. J. L., 251 ; North v. Cary, 4 Thomp. &C. (N. Y.), 357. Where council has exclusive pow- er of removal, a resolution relat- ing thereto need not be approved by the mayor. State v. Duluth, 53 Minn., 238; 39 Am. St. Rep., 595; 55 N. W. Rep., 118. Mayor not required to approve bid of sale accepted by council res- olution. Straub v. Pittsburgh, 138 Pa. St., 356; 22 Atl. Rep., 93. As to approval in particular case, see Knight v. Kansas City, 70 Mo., 231. As to power of mayor to veto action of council in appointing offi- cers under particular charter, see People V. Fitchie, 76 Hun. (N. Y.), 80; 28 N. Y. Supp., 600. Signing by mayor will be pre- sumed, in the absence of evidence §149] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. asy the record, signed by him, and which record showed that he voted for it on its passage.*^ "Where the mayor's approval is required, a vetoed resolutioii returned by him and subsequently altered by the council, in order to meet the mayor's objections, which is again passed becomes a new resolution and must again be submitted to the mayor.*3 Charters vary respecting the time in which the mayor's approval is to be given.^^ One legally acting as mayor may approve the ordtnance.*^ In the absence of the to the contrary. Allen v. Daven- port, 107 Iowa, 90; 77 N. W. Rep., 532. Parol to prove signature. Se- attle v. Doran, 5 Wash., 482; 32 Pac, 105, 1002. 82 The court remarked: "The matter of substance is the approval of the ordinance by the mayor, and not the form or manner in which it may be manifested, so that it is plainly manifested in writing, as all corporate action of this char- acter must be manifested. Signing the ordinance, or an endorsement upon it, is not the only mode in which approval can be manifested. * * * All of the purposes of the statute are satified, when the ap- proval distinctly and affirmatively appears upon the corporate records or files which bear his signature, though the ordinance is not signed by him. The rule might be differ- ent if * * * the statute con- tained negative or restraining words." Woodruff v. Stewart, 63 Ala., 206, 214, 215. 83 Padavano v. Fagan, 66 N. J. L., 167; 48 Atl. Rep., 998. s4 Pennsylvania G. G. Co. v. Scranton, 97 Pa. St., 538; Detroit V. Moran, 46 Mich., 213; 9 N. W. Rep., 252; State ex rel. v. Carr, 67 Mo., 38; 1 Mo. App., 490; McMi- chael V. Inter-County St. Ry. Co., 167 Pa. St., 126; 31 Atl. Rep., 477; 36 Wkly. Notes Cas., 179; Reilly V. Racine, 51 Wis., 526; 8 N. W. Rep., 417. Ordinance passed by former ad- ministration cannot be approved by new mayor. Altman v. Du- buque, 111 Iowa, 105; 82 N. W. Rep., 461. Mayor cannot act after expira- tion of his term. In re Front Street, 24 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep., 88. A formal and literal presenta- tion to mayor must be shown — there can be no waiver of such re- quirement. Ashley v. Newark, 25 N. J. L., 399. Provision extends to all acts, legislative or otherwise. People v. Schroeder, 76 N. Y., 160. Evidence of presentation In par- ticular cases. Knell v. Buffalo, 54 Hun. (N. Y.), 80; 7 N. Y. Supp., 233; Gleason v. Peerless Mfg. Co., 1 App. Div., 257; 37 N. Y. Supp., 267. 85 O'Mally V. McGinn, 53 Wis., 353; 10 N. W. Rep., 515; Seattle v. Doran, 5 Wash., 482; 32 Pac. Rep., 105. If the charter so requires the ordinance must be signed by the mayor proper or pro tempore, oth- erwise it is void. Ex parte Bedell, 20 Mo. App., 125. Signing by presiding officer and attesting by clerk, held sufficient. Hammond v. N. Y., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 5 Ind. App., 526; 31 N. E. Rep., 817. 240 OP ENACTMENT OF ORDINA^fCES. tiiso mayor the presiding officer of the legislative body is generally authorized to approve or disapprove.*^ The requirement as to the approval is not satisfied by mere approval of the council journal.®'' The resolution or ordinance itself must be signed.*® Thus the mere signature of the mayor as president of the council to the minutes of the proceedings has been held not to constitute approval of a resolution forfeit- ing a lease made by the corporation.*^ The mayor's approval must be in writing notwithstanding the existence for many years of a custom to the contrary.*"* § 150. Veto of mayor. Charters often confer upon the mayor the power to disapprove all or certain legislation of the council or governing body, and, in event of veto, to give the act the force of law, it is required to pass the legislative body by 86 Saleno v. Neosho, 127 Mo., 627 ; 48 Am. St. Rep., 653; 27 L. R. A., 769; 30 S. W. Rep., 190; Babbidge V. Astoria, 25 Oregon, 417; 42 Am. St. Rep., 796; 36 Pac. Rep., 291; Parker v. Astoria, 25 Oregon, 425 ; 36 Pac. Rep., 293. When president of council can- not approve. Leavenworth v. Douglass, 3 Kan. App., 67 ; 44 Pac. Rep., 1099; Detroit v. Moran, 46 Mich., 213; 9 N. W. Rep., 252. Temporary chairman cannot ap- prove. Moore v. Perry, (Iowa, 1903), 93 N. W. Rep., 510. Mayor's clerk cannot. Lyth v. Buffalo, 48 Hun. (N. Y.), 175. S7 Whitney v. Port Huron, 88 Mich., 268; 26 Am. St. Rep., 291; 50 N. W. Rep., 316. But revised ordinances may be so approved. Woodruff v. Stewart, 63 Ala., 206. s8 Altman v. Dubuque, 111 Iowa, 105; 82 N. W. Rep., 461; State v. Dakota County, 41 Minn., 518; 43 N. W. Rep., 389. 89 Graham v. Carondeletj 33 Mo., 262, 268, 269. The presence of the mayor dur- ing the deliberations of the coun- cil, and an examination by him of the clerk's minutes, by which he is informed of the passage of certain resolutions, is not such a presenta- tion to him of the original resolu- tions as the charter requires. Whether the mayor's signature and approval to the copies record- ed in the minutes, is sufficient ev- idence of the presentation of the original resolutions, and a suflS- cient approval of them, is ques- tioned. State V. Newark, 25 N. J. L., 399, 408-411. DO New York, etc., R. R. v. Water- bury, 55 Conn., 19; 10 Atl. Rep., 162. Under a charter requiring ordi- nances to be signed by the pre- siding officer, and attested by the clerk, and to be recorded, the de- fects cannot be remedied by a mo- tion. Bills V. Goshen, 117 Ind., 221; 3 L. R. A., 261; 20 N. B. Rep., 115. Merely suggesting amendments to a resolution does not relieve the mayor of the duty to sign and re- turn the resolution. Kittinger v. Buffalo Traction Co., 160 N. Y., 377. Signature by the mayor, as such, and not by the mayor as ex officio §150] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 2-il a designated vote, usually two-thirds or three-fourths."^ In some charters the power of veto is denied.^^ The provision requiring the mayor's veto to contain his reasons therefor or objections to the proposed legislation has been held mandatory and hence a failure in this respect renders the disapproval unavailing.^3 Merely writing a letter suggesting amendments is not a compliance with the charter.^* Where a resolution is passed by the requisite majority over the mayor's veto, refusal on his part to sign the order for the money appropriated by the resolution may be compelled by mandamus. "To permit the mayor to again interpose the same objection would invest president of the board of aldermen, held valid. Becker v. Washington, 94 Mo., 375 ; 7 S. W. Rep., 291. As to method of designation of clerk where his signature is necessary to validate ordinances. Ex parte Guerrero, 69 Cal., 88; 10 Pac. Rep., 261. As to the proper authentication and signature of ordinances, see the following cases: Napa v. Easterby. 76 Cal., 222; 18 Pac. Rep., 253; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal., 241; Ceighton v. Manson, 27 Cal., 613; Martindale v. Palmer, 52 Ind., 411; Wain v. Philadelphia, 99 Pa. St., 330; Kepner v. Common- wealth, 40 Pa., 124; Dey v. Jersey City, 19 N. J. Eq., 412; State (How- eth) V. Jersey City, 30 N. J. L., 93; State V. Hudson, 5 Dutch. (29 N. J. L.), 475; State v. Henderson, 38 Ohio St., 644; Knight v. K. C, St. J. & C. B. R. R., 70 Mo., 231; In re Stadiford, 5 Mackey (16 D. C), 549. Meee mistake as to precise date of approval will not invalidate. Allentown v. Grim, 109 Pa. St., 113. Cabling an election by mayor to submit resolution extending cor- porate limits to voters does not constitute approval of resolution. Moore v. Perry (Iowa, 1903), 93 N. W. Rep., 510. 16 01 Starr & Curtis 111. Stat., p. 686, par. 47; State v. Hoboken, 52 N. J. L., 88; 18 Atl. Rep., 685; Charter New York, ch. 1, § 40; Laws N. y. (1897), pp. 14, 15. 92 Com. V. Kepner, 30 Leg. Int. (Pa.), 312; Achley's Case, 4 - Ab. Pr. (N. Y.), 35; Wyoming v. Wilkesbarre W. S. Ry. Co., 8 Luz. Leg. Reg. (Pa.), 113; Hall v. Ra- cine, 81 Wis., 72; 50 N. W. Rep., 1094. Under a charter providing that, the mayor "shall have a negative upon the action of the aldermen in laying out highways, and in all other matters; and no vote can be passed or appointment made by the board of aldermen over his veto, unless by a vote of two-thirds at least of all the aldermen elect- ed," the mayor is not authorized to veto the judicial action of a board of aldermen, sitting as a court, and determining the elec- tion of its members. Gate v. Mar- tin, 70 N. H., 135; 40 Atl. Rep., 54; 48 L. R. A., 613. Veto power discussed. Jacobs v. San Francisco,. 100 Cal., 121; 34 Pac. Rep., 630. 93 Truesdale v. Rochester, 33 Hun. (N. Y.), 574, 577. 94Kittinger v. Buffalo Traction Co., 160 N-. Y., 377. H-i OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§ 151 him with a power over appropriations not intended by the charter. "'•5 Charters generally provide that where the ordi- nance contains several items appropriating money the mayor may object to one or more items separately while approving other portions of the ordinance.®^ Sometimes this executive privilege is extended to ordinances containing several items fixing a tax levy.^^ § 151. Return of bill or ordinance by mayor. The method and time within which bills, after approval or veto, shall be returned by the mayor are usually prescribed by the charter. Unless the return is made within the time named, with the disapproval, the ordinance becomes a law.^ Where a charter provides that, if the municipal assembly shall finally adjourn within ten days after the bill has been presented to the mayor, the mayor shall, within ten days after such adjournment, return such bill to the city register, with his approval or reasons for disapproval, otherwise the bill shall become a law as if ap- proved; when after presentation of a bill to the mayor the municipal assembly adjourned sine die before the ten days expire and before the mayor signs the bill, it does not become a law, otherwise it would be in the power of the assembly by such adjournment to nullify the charter and dispense with the concurrence of the mayor.^ Under such charter an ordinance is not invalid because of its having been filed by the mayor in the city register's office instead of being returned to the house in which it originated, it appearing that both houses had »5 state (Ahrens) v. Fiedler, 43 Fla., 163; 23 Am. St. Rep., 558; 7 N. J. L., 400, 405. So. Rep., 885; Stutsman v. Mc- 06 Charter of St. Louis, art. Ill, Vicar, 111 Iowa, 40; 82 N. W. Rep., sec. 24; Mun. Code of St. Louis, p. 460; Doty v. Lyman, 166 Mass., 208; 2 R. S. of Mo., 1899, p. 2484, 318, 44 N. E. Rep., 337; Saleno v. sec. 24; King v. Chicago, 111 111., Neosho, 127 Mo., 627; 48 Am. St. 63. Rep., 653; 30 S. W. Rep., 190; 27 »■? Charter of San Francisco^ art. L. R. A., 769 ; Babbidge v. Astoria, II., ch. 1, sec. 14; Statutes and 25 Oregon, 417; 42 Am. St. Rep., Amendments to the Codes of Cal., 796; 36 Pac. Rep., 291; Com. v. p. 245. Fitler, 136 Pa. St., 129; 20 Atl. 1 Charter of San Francisco, art. Rep., 129 ; Pa. Globe Gas Light II., ch. 1, sec. 16; Stat. & Amend. Co. v.' Scranton, 97 Pa. St., 538; to Codes of Cal. (1899), 246; 1 Schwartz v. Oshkosh, 55 Wis., 490; Starr & Curtis 111. Stat., p. 686, 13 N. W. Rep., 450. par. 47 ; Charter of New York, ch. 2 State ex rel. v. Carr, 67 Mo. 1, sec. 40, Laws of N. Y. (1897). 38; 1 Mo. App., 490. p, 15 ; Jacksonville v. Ledwith, 26 §162] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 243 adjourned on the day it was presented to the mayor.^ But ad- journment from day to day is not such an adjournment as would prevent the return within the time prescribed.* Placing a veto in the hands of a clerk of the council on the evening of the last day on which it should be returned, after making an ineffectual attempt to gain admittance to the clerk's office in the afternoon, is sufficient.' Placing a bill beyond the execu- tive control constitutes a return of it.^ Failure of the clerk to certify the time on the ordinance when it was presented to and returned by the mayor will not invalidate it.^ Where the legislative department of the corporation is com- posed of two houses or branches, charters generally prescribe that the ordinance shall be returned by the mayor to the house or branch in which it originated.* In Pennsylvania it has been held that this requirement is directory merely, since no harm can follow from failure to observe it.® In one case the ordi- nance passed the second branch of the council first, but was returned by the mayor to the first branch. The ordinance had been drafted by the board of estimates and submitted by it to the council for approval. Here it was held that as the ordi- nance did not originate in either branch it might be returned to either.*" § 152. Ordinances passed and approved by electors. Under the recent charter of San Francisco certain franchise ordi- nances, as those to supply light or water, or for the lease or sale of any public utility, or for the purchase of land of more than $50,000 in value, are required to be submitted to the vote of the electors.! 1 And under the same charter any ordinance 3 Barber A. P. Co. v. Hunt, 100 error as to date of approval held Mo., 22, 27; 18 Am. St. Rep., 530; 8 Immaterial. AUentown v. Grim, L. R. A., 110; 13 S. W. Rep., 98; 109 Pa. St., 113. State ex rel. v. Mead, 71 Mo., 266; s Charter New York, ch. 1, § 40; Knight V. K. C, St. J. & C. B. R. Laws of N. Y. (1897), p. 14; Char- R Co., 70 Mo., 231. ter St. Louis, art. III., § 23; Mun. i Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal., Code of St. Louis, p. 208. 189; 2 Am. Rep., 432. s Com. v. Fitler, 136 Pa. St., 129; 5 Baar v. Kirby, 118 Mich., 392; 20 Atl. Rep. 129. 76 N. W. Rep., 7B4. lo Baltimore v. Gorter, 93 Md., 1; 6 Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal., 48 Atl. Rep., 445. 189; 2 Am. Rep., 432. ii Charter of San Francisco, art. T Boehme v. Monroe, 106 Mich.,, II., ch. 1, sec. 21 ; Stat, and Amend. 401; 64 N. W. Rep., 204. Mere to Codes of Cal. (1899), 247. Ui OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§153 may be passed by the electors by presenting a petition, signed by 15 per cent of the voters, to the election commissioners, who are required to submit the proposed ordinance to the people. Ordinances so passed cannot be repealed by the legislative body; this question is to be submitted to the eleetors.i^ Under some charters certain ordinances are required to receive the approval of the qualified electors of the local corporation by Vote before they take effect.^^ § 153. Recording ordinances. Charters often provide that after passage ordinances and resolutions shall be duly re- corded. i* The requirement is designed to furnish record evi- 12 Charter of San Francisco, art. II., ch. 1, sec. 20; Stat, and Amend, to Codes of Cal. (1899), 246, 247; Charter of Los Angeles, Cal.; Statutes & Amendments to Codes of Cal. (1903), p. 574, § 198b. 13 Crebs v. Lebanon, 98 Fed. Rep., 549. Establishment of a system of waterworks. Taylor v. McFadden, 84 Iowa, 262; 50 N. W. Rep., 1070; Centerville v. Fidelity & Guaraiity Co. (U. S. C. C. A.), 118 Fed. Rep., 332. After establishment, an ordi- nance increasing the number of hydrants need not be so approved. Aurora Water Co. v. Aurora, 129 Mo., 540; 31 S. W. Rep., 946. Vacation of street. Lamm v. Chicago, etc,, R. R. Co., 45 Minn., 71; 47 N. W. Rep., 455. Extension of municipal territory. Moore v. Perry (Iowa, 1903), 93 N. W. Rep., 510; Parker v. Zeis- ler, 73 Mo. App., 537. Ordinance forbidding animals from running at large not re- quired to be so approved. Batsel V. Blaine, 4 Tex. App., 195; 15 S. W. Rep., 283. Bonds. Kearney v. Woodruff, (U. S. 0. C. A.), 115 Fed. Rep., 90; Le Tourneau v. Duluth (Minn., 1902), 88 N. W. Rep., 529; Wilkins V. Waynesboro, 116 Ga., 359; 42 S. E. Rep., 767; Beatrice v. Edmin- son (U. S. C. C. A.), 117 Fed. Rep., 427. Two PROPOSITIONS — one for street paving and one for constructing a bridge — held valid. Maybin v. Hi- loxi, 77 Miss., 673; 28 So. Rep., 566. Where the tax is for two pur- poses, as for example, to pay in- terest on bonds and to provide for public improvements it is necessa- ry that these propositions should be separately submitted to the vot- ers. Woodlawn v. Cain, 135 Ala., 369; 33 So. Rep., 149. In Louisiana it has been held that in obtaining authority for electors to incur a debt it is not necessary that the debt to be in- curred for each particular purpose should be specially set out. Appli- cation of the special tax to be thus raised in detail, within the pur- poses authorized is committed to the discretion of the corporate au- thorities. If wrong application should be attempted an injunction will lie. Gray v. Bourgeois, 107 La., 671; 32 So. Rep., 42. " Resolutions to be recorded. Kepner v. Commonwealth, 40 Pa. St., 124; Wain v. Philadelphia, 99 § 153] OF ENACTMENT OF OHDINaNCBS. 245 dence of their existence. Whether failure to record will in- validate the ordinance or resolution depends upon the proper construction of the provisions of the particular charter. Under most charters the requirement is held directory merely.i^ n has been held that an ordinance passed for a special purpose in order to carry out an act of the legislature, outside of the charter, need not be recorded, in accordance with the charter provision.! "^ The act of recording is regarded as a mere clerical or ministerial duty and not essential to complete the legislative act unless made so by express legal provisions. ^'^ In a Penu- Pa. St., 330; Charter San Francis- co, art. II., eh. 1, sec. 17; Statutes and Amendments to the Codes of Cal. (1899), p. 246. Resolution need not be recorded unless required by charter. It may be proved by parol. Darling- ton V. Commonwealth, 41 Pa. St., 68. All acts and votes should be re- corded. Logan V. Tyler, 1 Pitts. (Pa.), 244. 15 People V. Cole, 70 Cal., 59; 11 Pac. Rep., 481; Central Irrigation District V. De Lappe, 79 Cal., 351; 21 Pac. Rep., 825; Whalin v. Ma- comb, 76 111., 49; Shea v. Muncie, 148 Ind., 14, 33; 46 N. E. Rep., 138; Martindale v. Palmer, 52 Ind., 411, 414; Moore v. Perry (Iowa, 1903), 93 N. W. Rep., 510; Allen V. Davenport, 107 Iowa, 90; 77 N. W. Rep., 532; Conboy v. Iowa City, 12 Iowa, 90; Crowley v. Rucker, 107 La., 213; 31 So. Rep., 629; Bathurst v. Course, 3 La. Ann., 260; Wiggin v. New York, 9 Paige (N. Y.), 16; Barton v. Pittsburg, 4 Brews. (Pa.), 373. In re-enactment of ordinances, recording may be omitted. Com- monwealth V. Davis, 140 Mass., 485; 4 N. E. Rep., 577; Tipton v. Norman, 72 Mo., 380. It is not necessary to repeat re- cording in each successive revision of the ordinances. Ex parte Be- dell, 20 Mo. App., 125, 130. When a former provision is in- cluded in a revised law, it is only thereby intended to continue its existence, not to make it operate as an original act, to take effect from the date of the revised law. The revision has not the effect of breaking the continuity of those provisions which were in force be- fore it was made. St. Louis v. Foster, 52 Mo., 513; St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo., 483, 509; Dart V. Bagley, 110 Mo., 42; Attorney- General V. Heidorn, 74 Mo., 410; State ex rel. v. Ranson, 73 Mo., 78, 93; Kamerick v. Castleman, 21 Mo. App., 587. Provision that all ordinances, by-laws and resolutions be record- ed in a separate book kept for that purpose, held directory with re- spect to the particular book in which the record shall be made. Upington v. Oviatt, 24 Ohio St., 232, 241. On change of a borough to a city by act of the legislature, contain- ing a provision that existing ordi- nances shall remain in force, pro- vided they be recorded within four months thereafter, the proviso was held merely directory, and noncompliance does not affect va- lidity. Trustees of Erie Academy v. Brie, 31 Pa. St., 515. le Amey v. Allegheny City, 24 How. (65 U. S.), 364, 374. 17 Stevenson v. Bay City, 26 346 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§154, sylvania case the charter provided that all ordinances "shall be recorded in a book to be kept at the office of the burgess, which shall be free to public inspection, and no ordinance * * * shall be carried into operation in less than two weeks after the same shall be so recorded. " "Such provision calls for no discussion whether it is mandatory or directory, for it plainly expresses the condition upon the performance of which, after two weeks, the ordinance shall be carried into operation, and no ingenuity can make the ordinance operative before, "i* § 154. Deposit and custody of ordinances. It is usual for charters to provide that all ordinances and resolutions shall be deposited with the clerk or other municipal officer.* ^ Produc- tion of the original ordinance by the clerk, the legal custodian of the instrument, is prima facie evidence to show that it was .deposited with that official-^" In one case the charter required all ordinances to be deposited in the office of the clerk before they became effective. An ordinance required all ordinances to be "filed" instead of deposited. It was held that an ordi- nance is in legal effect filed when it is delivered to the proper officer and by him received to be kept on file. "The deposit Mich., 44; Boehme v. Monroe, 106 corded its validity cannot be affect- Mich., 401; 64 N. W. Rep., 204. ed by subsequent unauthorized Failure through oversight to alteration or interlineations. H. & copy the ordinance or resolution T. C. R. R. Co. v. Odunij 53 Tex., on the city records does not affect 343, 352. its validity. Crebs v. Lebanon, 98 Amendment of record. Samis v. Fed. Rep., 549. King, 40 Conn., 298. Method of recording. Klais v. Subsequent ratification. Schen- Pulford, 3fi Wis., 587. Ordinances ley v. Conn., 36 Pa. St., 29; 78 Am. printed and posted in the record Dec, 359; Com. v. Marshall, 69 book of proceedings of the board Pa. St., 328. See Section 164 to of trustees is a sufficient recording. 167, posti Eubanks v. Ashley, 36 111., 177, is Per Turnkey, J., in Appeal of approving Teft v. Size, 10 111., 432. Borough of Verona, 108 Pa. St., 83, Publication of the ordinances in 89; Marshall v. Com., 59 Pa. St., book form, complies with the pro- 455; Schwartz v. Oshkosh, 55 Wis., visions requiring recording. Allen 490; 13 N. W. Rep., 450. V. Davenport, 107 Iowa, 90, 98; 77 id Charter San Francisco, art. II, N. W. Rep., 532. ch. 1, sec. 17; 1 Starr & Curtis, Sufficient compliance. Hammond 111. Stat., p. 686, par. 47 ; Charter, V N. Y. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 5 Ind. St. Louis, art. Ill, sec. 28; Mun. App., 526; 31 N. B. Rep., 817; In Code of St. Louis, 223; 2 R. S. of re Tunkhannock Borough, 3 Pa. Mo., 1899, sec. 28. Co. Ct. Rep., 480. 20 Schofield v. Tampico, 98 111. After an ordinance is duly re- App., 324, 326. § loo] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 247 with the proper officer is the thing essential, of which the filing is but evidence."^' Under a charter provision requiring all ordinances to be recorded in a book to be provided for that purpose and to be kept by the mayor, an ordinance duly en- acted, published and recorded was held valid although the book containing it was kept in the council chamber and not in the mayor's office.-- § 155. Publication of ordinances and notice of pendency. As all valid ordinances have the force of law within the mu- nicipal territory,23 are binding upon inhabitants and stran- gers,-* operative upon property within the corporate limits,-^ and all persons upon whom they are binding are bound to take notice thereof,-*' it would seem to be a reasonable requirement that notice of their existence should be given in some appro- priate manner before they are, permitted to take effect. In recognition of such necessity, publication of the ordinance after passage, or sufficient notice thereof before it takes effect, is generally expressly required,-" especially of police ordinances and those providing penalties and forfeitures.^* So charters frequently provide for the publication of certain kinds of ordinances or resolutions prior to passage, or notice that the ordinance or resolution is pending for passage. This is usually required in providing for improvements which are paid for in 21 McGregor v. Lovington, 48 111. 48 Kan., 360; 29 Pac. Rep., 757; App., 202, 207. Leavenworth v. Douglass, 3 Kan. 22 Beaumont v. Wilkes-Barre, 142 App., 67. Pa. St., 198, 218; 21 Atl. Rep., 888. Michigan — Boehme v. Monroe, 23 Section 12, supra. 106 Mich., 401; 64 N. W. Rep., 204; 24 Sec. 23, supra. Thornton v. Sturgis, 38 Mich., 639; 25 Sec. 24, supra. Van Alstine v. People, 37 Mich., 26 Sec. 22, supra. 523. 27 Provisions Relating to Pub- Nebraska — Bailey v. State, 30 LiCATiON. Neb., 855; 47 N. W. Rep., 208. California — Hellman v. Shoul- New Jersey — Hohoken v. Gear, ters, 114 Cal., 136; 44 Pac. Rep., 27 N. J. L., 265. 915; 45 Pac. Rep., 1057. New Yorfc — Watkins v. Hlller- IlUnois — Tisda.le v. Minonk, 46 man, 73 Hun. (N. Y.), 317; 26 N. 111., 9; Raker v. Maquon, 9 111. Y. Suppl., 252; De Loge v. New App., 155. York Central, etc., R. R. Co., 157 Iowa — Larkin V. Burlington, etc., N. Y., 688; 92 Hun. (N. Y.), 149. R. R. Co., 91 Iowa, 654; 60 N. W. Wisconsin — Janesville v. Dewey, Rep., 195; Albia v. O'Harra, 64 3 Wis., 245. Iowa, 297; 20 N. W. Rep., 444. 28 State v. Noblesville, 157 Ind., Kansas — Pittsburg v. Reynolds, 31; 60 N. E. Rep., 704; Union 348 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§155 whole or in part by special assessment or by the extraordinary exercise of the power of special taxation,^^ and all of thoise ordinances which directly affect the property rights of the citizen. Due notice of contemplated action upon the part of the municipal authorities is a wise and salutary rule, and is rigidly enforced by the courts as a fundamental constitutional right.^" Provisions respecting publication and sufficient notice are generally held mandatory, and hence failure to publish in substantially the manner prescribed renders the ordinance or resolution void.^i However, when such provisions are appli- cable and publication required, and when they are to be held directory merely, depends upon the proper construction of the particular charter or statute applicable, and sometimes largely upon the special facts of each case. When the matter relates Pac. R. Co. V. Montgomery, 49 Neb., 429; 68 N. W. Rep., 619; Stuhr V. Hoboken, 47 N. J. L., 147; Oak Grove v. Juneau, 66 Wis., 534; 29 N. W. Rep., 644. 29 Harvey v. Aurora, 186 111., 283 ; 57 N. E. Rep., 857; Byrnes v. River- ton, 64 N. J. L., 210; 44 Atl., Rep., 857; Cape May v. Cape May., etc., R. Co., 60 N. J. L., 224; 37 Atl. Rep., 892; Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo., 534; 57 S. W. Rep., 559; Wood V. Seattle, 23 Wash. 1; 62 Pac. Rep., 135. so Ch. XVI, Of Public Improve- ment Ordinances. 31 Arkansas — Crane v. Siloam Springs, 67 Ark., 30; 55 S. W. Rep., 955. California — People v. Cole, 70 Cal., 59; 11 Pac. Rep., 481; Derby V. Modesto, 104 Cal., 515; 38 Pac. Rep., 900; San Francisco v. Buck- man, 111 Cal., 25; 43 Pac. Rep., 396. Connecticut — Higley v. Bunce, 10 Conn., 436, 567. Illinois — Newland v. Aurora, 14 111., 364; Barnett v. Newark, 28 III., 62; Elizabethtown v. Lefler, 23 111., 90; Illinois Central R. R. V. People, 161 111., 244; 43 N. E. Rep., 1107; Standard v. Industry, 55 111. App., 523; Hutchison v. Mt. Vernon, 40 111. App., 19. Indiana — Bills v. Goshen, 117 Ind., 221; 3 L. R. A., 261; 20 N, E. Rep., 115; Meyer v. Fromm, 108 Ind., 208; 9 N. E. Rep., 84; Bum- gartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind., 575; 50 Am. Rep., 830; Loughridge v. Huntington, 56 Ind., 253. Iowa — Conboy v. Iowa City, 2 Iowa, 90; Starr v. Burlington, 45 Iowa, 87; Dubuque v. Wooton, 28 Iowa, 571. Maryland — Baltimore v. Johnson, 62 Md., 225; Baltimore v. Little Sisters of the Poor, 56 Md., 400. Michigan- — Richter v. Harper, 95 Mich., 221; 54 N. W. Rep., 768; People v. Keir, 78 Mich., 98; 43 N. W. Rep., 1039. Minnesota — Wai^sop v. Hastings, 22 Minn., 437. Missouri — Rumsey Mfg. Co. v. Schell, 21 Mo. App., 175. N.ehraska — Union Pac. R. R. Co. V. McNally, 54 Neb., 112; 74 N. W. Rep., 390; Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Montgomery, 49 Neb., 429; 68 N, W. Rep., 619, §155] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 2-1!) purely or mainly to form, courts usually adopt a liberal con- struction.*^ New Jersey — North Baptist Church V. Orange, 54 N. J. L., Ill; 22 Atl. Rep., 1004; State v. Long Branch Comrs., 54 N. J. L., 484; 24 Atl. Rep., 368; State v. Morris- town, 34 N. J. L., 445; Rutgers' College A. A. v. New Brunswick, 55 N. J. L., 279; 26 Atl. Rep., 87; State V. Plainfield, 38 N. J. L., 95 ; Daives v. Hightston, 45 N. J. L., 127; State v. Hudson, 29 N. J. L., 475; Byrnes v. Riverton, 64 N. J. L., 210; 44 Atl. Rep., 857. New York — Kneib v. People, 50 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 140; Moore v. New York, 73 N. Y., 238; 29 Am. Rep., 134; 4 Hun. (N. Y.), 545; Matter of Brassford, 50 N. Y., 509 ; 63 Barb. (N. Y.), 161; People v. Board of Health, 33 Barb. (N. Y.), 344; Schenectady v. Purman, 61 Hun. (N. Y.), 171; 15 N. Y. Suppl., 724; Matter of Anderson, 60 N. Y., 457; Matter of Levy, 4 Hun. (N. Y.), 501. North Dakota — O'Hare v. Park River, 1 N. D., 279; 47 N. W. Rep., 380. Oftio^Smith v. Columbus, etc., R. R. Co., 8 Ohio N. P., 1; State v. Cincinnati, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep., 523; 8 Ohio Cir. Dec, 689. Oklahoma — Stillwater v. Moor (Okla., 1893), 33 Pac. Rep., 1024. Pennsylvania — Marshall v. Com., 59 Pa. St., 455; Wain v. Philadel- phia, 99 Pa. St., 330; Olds v. Erie City, 79 Pa. St., 380. Washington — Wood v. Seattle, 23 Wash., 1; 62 Pac. Rep., 135. Wisconsin — Quint v. Merrill, 105 Wis., 406; 81 N. W. Rep., 664; Herman v. Oconto, 100 Wis., 391; 76 N. W. Rep., 364; Smith v. Eau Claire, 78 Wis., 457; 47 N. W. Rep., 830; Sch*artz v. Oshkosh, 55 Wis., 490; 13 N. W. Rep,, 450; Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis., 136; Janes- ville V. Dewey, 3 Wis., 245. United States — Nat. Bank of Commerce v. Grenada, 44 Fed. Rep., 262, reversing 41 Fed. Rep., 87; 10 U. S. App., 692, affirmed in 48 Fed. Rep., 278. 32 When publication required — Illustrative oases. — "By-laws of general or permanent nature," as used in Iowa Code relating to publication, includes a city ordi- nance granting a franchise. State V. Omaha & C. B. Ry. Co., 113 Iowa, 30; 84 N. W. Rep., 983. Ordinances for expenditure of money. Dumars v. Denver (Colo. App. 1901), 65 Pac. Rep., 580; Barr v. New Brunswick, 58 N. J. L., 255; 37 Atl. Rep., 477. Ordinances providing for loan. National Bank of Commerce v. Grenada, 44 Fed. Rep., 262, revers- ing 41 Fed. Rep., 87. Required — resolution. Central v. Sears, 2 Colo., 588; State v. Dar- row, 65 Minn., 419; 67 N. W. Rep., 1012. Provisions as to publication held directory. Sacramento v. Dillman, 102 Cal., 107; 36 Pac. Rep., 385; Commonwealth v. Mc- CafEerty, 145 Mass., 384; 14 N. E. Rep., 451. Statutory provision respecting publication held not to apply to a city created by special charter. Pitts V. District of Opelika, 79 Ala., 527; Commonwealth v. Mc- CafCerty, 145 Mass., 384; 14 N. E. Rep., 451. State laws requiring printing le- gal notices, etc., held not to apply to municipal ordinances. Pittsburg v. Reynolds, 48 Kan., 360; 29 Pac. Rep., 757. Contract, ministerial function. 350 OF ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. [§ 15G § 156. Time and frequency of publication. The time and frequency of publication is controlled by charter.^^ Compli- ance with the charter in this respect is necessary in order to render valid the ordinance.^* In the absence of charter speciii- eation, the time during which the publication is to be made must be fixed by the legislative body ; it cannot be designated by a mere ministerial officer.^^ ~ In one case where the charter prescribed no time it was held that publication five days after the passage of the ordinance was sufficient.^® Under a charter requiring publication for twenty days, publication once each week for three weeks successively is a suflScient compliance.-''^ Seitzinger v. Tamaqua, 187 Pa. St., 539; 41 Atl. Rep., 454. Does not apply to "orders" or "resolutions," when. Napa v. East- erby, 76 Cal., 222; 18 Pac. Rep., 253; Fairchild v. St. Paul, 46 Minn., 540; 49 N. W. Rep., 325; Elmendorf v. New York, 25 Wend. (N. Y.), 693. Ordinance by board of health de- claring a nuisance, notice of pass- age need not be given. Yonkers Board of Health v. Copcut, 140 N. Y., 12; 35 N. B. Rep., 443. Ordinance imposing a penalty or forfeiture for violation, required to be published. Held ordinance removing officer for drunkenness not such. State v. Noblesville, 157 Ind., 31; 60 N. E. Rep., 704. When ordinances may become a law without publication under spe- cial charter provisions, see Schweitzer v. Liberty, 82 Mo., 309. Providing for election. Heilbron V. Cuthbert, 96 Ga., 312; 23 S. E. Rep., 206. Publication of digest of ordi- nances held directory. Whalin v. Macomb, 76 111., 49. Not required in re-enactment or continuation of similar ordinances duly published. Commonwealth v. Davis, 140 Mass., 485; 4 N. E. Rep., 577; Tipton v. Norman, 72 Mo., 380, 385; Ex parte Bedell, 20 Mo. App., 125, 130. When re-enactment constitutes a new enactment, and not merely a continuation of the old law, see Emporia v. Norton, 16 Kan., 236. Where provisions as to publica- tion are directory, mere failure to publish will not invalidate an or- dinance. Reed v. Louisville, 22 Ky. Law Rep., 1636; 61 S. W. Rep., 11. Failure to publish as required by statute does not invalidate, where it has been duly approved and signed by the mayor, and a section thereof provided that the ordinance should be in force from and after its passage. Johnson v. Pinley, 54 Neb., 733; 74 N. W. Rep., 1080. Provision as to publication of council proceedings held directory. Reed v. Louisville, 22 Ky. Law Rep., 1636; 61 S. W. Rep., 11. 33 Time of publication. Stand- ard V. Industry, 55 111. App., 523; Hoboken v. Gear, 27 N. J. L., 265; Truchelut v. City Council, 1 Nott & McCord (S. C), 227. •"< Van Alstine v. People, 37 Mich., 523. 35 Thornton v. Sturgis, 38 Mich.. 639. se St. Paul V. Coulter, 12 Minn., 41; 90 Am. Dec, 278. ••- Hoboken v. Gear, 27 N. J. L., 265. § IfiT] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 251 So under a law directing publication to be for five successive days, the publication may be for five successive week days notwithstanding Sunday intervenes, on which there was no issue of the paper in which the publication was made.^* A publication for fourteen consecutive days complies with a provision requiring publication for "at least two weeks. "•'^ Three weeks means twenty-one days and not simply three in- sertions.*" Where the law requires publication in a newspaper of general circulation or ia a book or pamphlet, one publication in a Sunday newspaper of an ordinance will be sufficient.*^ § 157. Method of publication. The charter method of pub- lication of by-laws, ordinances and proceedings of the legisla- tive body should be followed.*^ Ordinances are promulgated in book or pamphlet form, printed in newspapers or posted in public places.*^ 38 Ex parte Fiske, 72 Cal.. 125; 13 Pac. Rep., 310. Sundays and holidays to be counted. Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal., 240. ss'Derby & Co. v. Modesto, 104 Cal., 515; 38 Pac. Rep., 900. 40 Loughrldge v. Huntington, 56 Ind., 253. Publication once a week. Commonwealth v. Mat- thews, 122 Mass., 60; Richter v. Harper, 95 Mich., 221; 54 N. W. Rep., 768; State v. Hardy, 7 Neb., 377. 41 Dumars v. Denver (Colo. App., 1901), 65 Pac. Rep., 580. Time and frequency of publica- tion under various charters. San Luis Obispo v. Hendricks, 71 Cal., 242; 11 Pac. Rep., 682; Richter v. Harper, 95 Mich., 221; 54 N. W. Rep., 768; Schweitzer v. Liberty, 82 Mo.. 309; Cape Girardeau v. Fongeu, 30 Mo. App., 551; Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. McNally, 54 Neb., 112; 74 N. W. Rep., 390; Lawson V. Gibson, 18 Neb., 137; 24 N. W. Rep., 447; Hull v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 21 Neb., 371; 32 N. W. Rep., 162; Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Mont- gomery, 49 Neb., 429; 68 N. W. Rep., 619. 42 State V. Hoboken, 38 N. J. L., 110, 113; Hoboken v. Gear, 27 N. J. L., 265. 43 Pamphlet or newspaper. Standard v. Industry, 55 111. App., 523. Book form or pamphlet. Allen v. Davenport, 107 Iowa, 90; 77 N. W. Rep., 532; Moss v. Oakland, 88 111., 109; Raker v. Maquon, 9 111. App., 155; Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Montgomery, 49 Neb., 429; 68 N. W. Rep., 619; Union Pac. R. R. Co. V. McNally, 54 Neb., 112; 74 N. W. Rep., 390. Newspaper notice of ordinances insufficient, when. Keckely v. Road Commissioners, 4 McCord (S. C), 463. Newspaper in which publication is to be made. San Luis Obispo v. Hendricks, 71 Cal., 242; 11 Pac. Rep., 682; Haskill v. Bartlett, 34 Cal., 281; Kerr v. Hltt, 75 111;, 51; Tisdale v. Minonk, 46 111., 9; Lar- kin v. Burlington, etc., R. R. Co., 85 Iowa, 492; 52 N. W. Rep., 480; Bayard v. Baker, 76 Iowa, 220; 40 N. W. Rep., 818; Pittsburg v. Rey- nolds, 48 Kan., 360; 29 Pac. Rep., 757; McKusick v. Stillwater, 44 Minn., 372; 46 N. W. Rep., 769; 252 OP ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. [§157 Usually the publication is required to be in the English language.** Where no language is specified in the law, Eng- lish is meant.^s Under a charter specifying that all ordinances State (Bayer) v. Hoboken, 44 N. J. L., 131; In re Astor, 50 N. Y., 363; Kellogg v. Carrico, 47 Mo., 157; Wright v. Porrestal, 65 Wis., 341; 27 N. W. Rep., 52; Gallerno V. Rochester, 46 Up. Can. Q. B., 279. Designation of newspaper, when directory, see In re Smith, 65 Barh. (N. Y.), 283. Posting. Reg. v. Huntingdon, 4 Q. B. Div., 522; 29 Moak, 61. In newspaper in which the or- dinances were usually published, is suflBcient promulgation. Truch- elut V. City Council, 1 Nott & Mc- Cord (S. C), 227, 230. Extra edition of newspaper and distribution of 50 or 100 copies of such edition is not a newspaper of general circulation. State v. Oma- ha & C. B. Ry. & B. Co., 113 Iowa, 30; 84 N. W. Rep., 983. Sunday publications held valid. Dumars v. Denver (Colo. App., 1901), 65 Pac. Rep., 580; Hastings V. Columbus, 42 Ohio St., 585; Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 107 Tenn., 647; 64 S. W. Rep., 1075. Publication with council pro- ceedings, held sufficient. Law v. People ex rel, 87 111., 385. Publication in book form, post- ing or newspaper. Moss v. Oakland, 88 111., 109; Raker v. Maquon, 9 111. App., 155; Chicago v. McCoy, 136 111., 344; 26 N. E. Rep., 363. Inaccurate print of certain words will not invalidate, if not misleading. Moss v. Oakland, 88 111., 109. So mistake of date of enactment is not material. Vincent v. Pa- cific Grove, 102 Cal., 405; 36 Pac. Rep., 773, Circulating ordinance with local paper, although printed elsewhere, is suificient. Ex parte Bedell, 20 Mo. App., 125, 130, 131. Mode op publication under par- ticular provision. People v. Su- pervisors of City and County of San Francisco, 27 Cal., 655; Vin- cent V. Pacific Grove, 102 Cal., 405; 36 Pac. Rep., 773; Ex parte Christensen, 85 Cal., 208; 24 Pac. Rep., 747; In re Guerrero, 69 Cal., 88; 10 Pac. Rep., 261; Byars v. Mt. Vernon, 77 111., 467; Raquer v, Maquon, 9 111. App., 155; Dubuque V. Wooton, 28 Iowa, 571; State v. Smith, 22 Minn., 218; State v. Ho- boken, 44 N. J. L., 131; Chamber- lain V. Hoboken, 38 N. J. L., 110; In re Phillips, 60 'N. Y., 16; In re Little, 60 N. Y., 343; In re Ander- son, 60 N. Y., 457; In re N. Y.' Public School, 47 N. Y., 556; Rath- bun V. Acker, 18 Barb. (N. Y.), 393; Wasem v. Cincinnati, 2 Cin. R. (Ohio), 84. Publication of ordinances re- lating to salaries, when to take effect. Stuhr v. Hoboken, 47 N. J. L., 147. 44 Chicago v. McCoy, 136 111., 344; 11 L. R. A., 413; 26 N. B. Rep., 363; 33 111. App., 576; Breaux's Bridge v. Dupuis, 30 La. Ann., 1105, distinguishing Loze v. New Orleans, 2 La., 427, holding publication in French only suffi- cient; City Pub. Co. v. Jersey City, 54 N. J. L., 437; 24 Atl. Rep., 571. 45 Wilson V. Trenton, 56 N. J. L., 469; 29 Atl. Rep., 183; Cincin- nati V. Bickett, 26 Ohio St., 49; State V. Cincinnati, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct, Rep., 523. § 157] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 353 shall be published in a German newspaper, in the absence of legal direction to the contrary, they must be printed in English, for an ordinance has no legal existence except in the language in which it is passed.*^ Publication of the ordinance alone is sufficient to give it validity, without a publication of the law authorizing it. All persons are charged with notice of a law upon which an ordi- nance is founded.*^ So where the ordinance establishing grades of streets refers to maps and books on file, the latter need not be published with the ordinance ; only that which is entered in the ordinance book need be published.** "Where the law allows alternate modes of publication of ordinances, as that they shall not be in force until published four M^eeks in a newspaper printed in the town, or in the town nearest to such town in which a newspaper is printed, or in some other newspapef generally circulated where such by-law is made as the town shall direct, the town must point out one of the three described newspapers in which the by-laws should be pub- lished, and a failure to so do will invalidate the by-law. Under such provision a publication made by order of the clerk without direction from the proper corporate authorities is void.*^ estate (North Baptist Church) 49 Higley v. Bunce, 10 Conn., V. Orange, 54 N. J. L., Ill; 14 L. 436. R. A., 62; 22 Atl. Rep., 1004; see Where the law does not pre- Wasem v. Cincinnati, 2 Cin. Super, scribe the time of publication it Ct. (Ohio), 84. must be fixed by the legislative German newspaper. Kernitz v. body and not by a mere ministerial Long Island City, 50 Hun. (N. Y.), officer. Thornton v. Sturgis, 38 428; Upper Hanover Road, 44 Pa. Mich., 639. St., 277; In re North Whitehall When clerk may designate the Tp., 47 Pa. St., 156; German P. & paper. If council fails, see In re P. Co. V. Illinois S. Z. Co., 55 111., Durkin, 10 Hun. (N. Y.), 269. 127. Oeder for publication may be *7 People ex rel. v. San Francis- embraced in the ordinance. In re CO, 27 Cal., 655. Guerrero, 69 Cal., 88; 10 Pac. Rep., The whole ordinance must be 261. published. People v. Russell, 74 Proof of publication, how made, Cal., 578; 16 Pac. Rep., 395. But and presumptions, see Section 388, other ordinances affected by the et seq., post.' new enactment need not be pub- Violating the law in exceeding lished. Ex parte Christensen, 85 debt limit to pay for publication Cal., 208; 27 Pac. Rep., 747. does not invalidate the ordinance. 4sNapa V. Easterby, 76 Cal., Kimble v. Peoria, 140 111., 157; 29 222; 18 Pac. Rep., 253. N. E. Rep., 723, 254 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§ 158 § 158. Amendment on passage. Charters provide, as state constitutions, that no ordinance shall be so amended on its passage as to change its original purpose.^o This purpose means the general purpose of the bill or ordinance, and not the mere details through which and by which that purpose is manifested or effectuated.^^ Usually amendments are required to be incorporated with the bill or ordinance by engrossment. And before final action is taken a report is made by a committee that the bill is truly engrossed and correct.^^ After amendment, under some charters, the ordinance must be laid over for a specified time, as one week, before its final passage.5^ A charter provision to the efi'ect that, no ordinance or by-law shall be enacted or passed unless the same shall have been introduced at a previous regular meeting operates as a limita- tion when amendments are made. In a New Jersey ease, at a regular meeting the ordinance was introduced. It provided for laying out and opening a public street, and contained the names of the commissioners for this purpose, who were required to be appointed by ordinance and not otherwise. At a subse- quent meeting the ordinance was taken up, the name of one of the commissioners stricken out and another inserted, and then adopted. The ordinance was held illegal because it materially varied from that introduced at the previous meeting. The court was of the opinion that the variance was in the most important part of the ordinance and that to permit such changes to be so made would defeat the precise object of the charter, which was to insure deliberation in every important proceeding.''* But a slight alteration of the title in no wise affecting the construction of the ordinance will be held imma- 50 Charter San Francisco, art. 206; 2 R. S. Mo. (1899), p. 2482, II., ch. 1, sec. 8; Statutes and sec. 16. Amendments to Codes of Cal. 53 Charter San Francisco, art. (1899), p. 245; Charter of St. II., ch. 1, sec. 13; Statutes and Louis, art. III., sec. 13; Mun. Code Amendments to Codes of Califor- of St. Louis, p. 205; 2 R. S. Mo. nia (1899), p. 245. (1899), p. 2482, sec. 13. s* State (Ackerman) v. Bergen, 51 Rule applied to act of legis- 33 N. J. L., 39; State v. Jersey lature. State ex rel. v. Mason, 155 City, 34 N. J. L., 429; Cowen v. Mo., 486; 54 S. W. Rep., 524. Wildwood, 60 N. J. L., 365; 38 Atl. 52 Charter of St. Louis, art. Ill, Rep., 22. sec. 16; Mun. Code of St. Louis, p. § IBOJ OF- ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 255 terial.""' Thus the title of an ordinance concerning inns and taverns and retailers of liquor may be amended on its passage by striking out the word "retailers" and inserting "dealers," since the change is immaterial.^® § 159. Publication of amendments on passage. Certain kinds of ordinances, as those providing for specific improve- ments, granting franchises or privileges, involving leases, ap- propriating or disposing of public property, expenditures of public money (except in small sums), levying a tax or assess- ment, providing for the imposition of a new duty or penalty, are, under some charters, required to be published before final action is taken thereon, and if amended during passage the ordinance, as amended, is to be advertised for a specified period before final action is taken thereon.^^ Where the charter requires an ordinance to be published be- tween its second and third reading, a material amendment can- not be made after the second reading, without the J)ublication and notice prescribed by the charter.^* But an ordinance ordering a vote of the tax payers supplemented by an amend- ment after the original was advertised is not rendered void, where it appeared that such amendment does not vary from the substance of the original.^^ §160. Consideration of mayor's veto. Charters differ some- what respecting the method and time of consideration of the bill or ordinance when it is returned with the mayor's objec- tions. Objections to appropriations and tax levies are usually required to be made by items, and each item so objected to is to be separately reconsidered.®" 55 state (Townsend) v. Jersey II., ch. 1, sec. 13; Statutes and City, 26 N. J. L., 444, 448. Amendments to Codes of Cal. 50 State (Staates) v. Washing- (1899), p. 245. ton, 44 N. J. L., 605, 610; 43 Am. •'■» State (Doyle) v. Newark, 30 Rep., 402; Thornhill v. Stephany, N. J. L., 303. 66 N. J. L., 171; 48 Atl. Rep., 573. so Mackenzie v. Wooley, 39 La. See Sec. 159, post. Ann., 944; 3 So. Rep., 128. See Amendments made during pass- Sec. 158, supra. age need not be read on different <"> Charter San Francisco, art. days, as required with respect to II., ch. 1, sec. 14; Statutes and the bill or ordinance. Chillicothe Amendments to Codes of Cal. V. Logan Natural Gas, etc., Co., 8 (1899), p. 246; St. Louis, art. III., Ohio N. P., 88 ; Weaver v. Mt. Ver- sec. 24 ; Mun. Code of St. Louis, p. non, 6 Ohio Dec, 436. 208; 2. R. S. Mo. (1899), p. 2484, 57 Charter San Francisco, art. sec. 24. 256 OP ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§161 Under some charters reconsideration cannot take place until after the expiration of five days and within thirty days frojii the return by the mayor.^i Under a charter which required reconsideration "at the next regular meeting thereafter" (after return), it was held that an ordinance passed over the veto at the meeting at which it was returned was void.*- Under a charter providing that, when the ordinance with the objections is returned, "and if two-thirds of the members then present * * * shall agree to said ordinance, notwithstand- ing such objections, then, but not otherwise, said ordinance shall have the force of law," etc., it was held that the recon- sideration must take place at such meeting and that it coulil not be adjourned to a subsequent meeting.^^ After the ordinance has been reconsidered and the vote taken, in accordance with the charter, it cannot again be reconsidered.^* § 161. Courts will not inquire into legislative motive. The general rule is well established that courts will not inquire into 61 Charter San Francisco, art. II., eh. 1, sec. 16; Statutes and Amendments to Codes of Cal. (1899), p. 246. 62 Gleason v. Peerless Mfg. Co., 37 N. Y. Suppl., 267; 1 App. Div. (N. Y.), 257; 163 N. Y., 574; Peck V. Rochester, 3 N. Y. Supp., 872. Under some charters every bill returned vetoed "shall stand as re- considered in the house to which it is returned," and after entering objections on the journal the house shall "proceed at its conven- ience to consider the pending ques- tion." Charter St. Louis, art. III., sec. 25; Mun. Code of St. Louis, p. 208; 2 R. S. Mo. (1899), p 2484, sec. 25. 63 In re Opening of Robin St., 1 La. Ann., 412. 64 Sections 121 and 122, supra; Ashton V. Rochester, 133 N. Y., 187; 60 Hun. (N. Y.), 372. "T^ie idea was suggested on ar- gument that there is no affirmative declaration that in event of fail- ure to overrule the mayor's veto by the constitutional number, that the ordinance would be a nullity. This was not necessary. The mode of testing the question be- ing prescribed, together with the result, in case of the overthrow of the veto, is the exclusion of all other modes and results. The maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, expresses the idea in such a contingency. Indeed, it has been said, and I think truly, that any- thing prescribed by constitution is a prohibition of all other modes that might be devised for doing it. All, after the constitutional meth- od is exhausted, is ultra vires the lawful power of the body, and of non-effect." Per Thompson, C. J., in Sank v. Philadelphia, 4 Brews. (Pa.), 133; 8 Phila., 117. When resolution, passed over veto in particular case. Caswell v. Bay City, 99 Mich., 417; 58 N. W. Rep., 331. §161] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. the motiveo of legislators where they possess the power to do the act and it has been exercised as prescribed by the organic law. In such case the doctrine is that the legislators are responsible alone to the people who elect them.''^ And this principle is generally applied to purely legislative acts of municipal corporations.^" In passing an ordinance legislative in character, relating to the police power and importing no private contract or right, "the members of the city council are entitled to the same privileges and prerogatives which belong to members of the state legislature."®'' Neither the motives of the members^ nor the influences under which they acted, can 65 United States — Doyle v. Con- tinental Ins. Co., 94 U. S., 535. California — Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal., 189; 2 Am. Rep., 432. Illinois — Meyer v. Teutopolis, 131 111., 552; 23 N. E. Rep., 651. Indiana — Lilly v. Indianapolis, 149 Ind., 648; 49 N. E. Rep., 887; McCulloch V. State, 11 Ind.,~ 424, 431; Wright v. Defrees, 8 Ind., 298, 302. Louisiana — State v. Davidson, 50 La. Ann., 1297; 69 Am. St. Rep., 478; 24 So. Rep., 324. Missouri — Kiley v. Forsee, 57 Mo., 390; Young v. St. Louis, 47 Mo., 492; Dreyfus v. Lonergan, 73 Mo. App., 336. New Jersey — Moore v. Haddon- field, 62 N. J. L., 386; 41 Atl. Rep., 946. New York — Stuyvesant v. New York, etc., 7 Cow. (N. Y.), 588; Kittinger v. Buffalo Traction Co., 160 N. Y., 377. Washington — Wood v. Seattle, 23 Wash., 1; 62 Pac. Rep., 135. Wisconsin — State v. Superior Court, 105 Wis., 651; 81 N. W. Rep., 1046. "The legislature is a co-ordinate branch of the state government, and in the enactment of laws is entirely independent of the judi- ciary; and ff the laws are otherwise legal, the courts have no power to annul or set them aside on the ground that the members acted from improper or unlawful views." Per Wagner, J., in State ex rel. Blakeman v. Hays, 49 Mo., 604, 607, 608. «« People V. Cregier, 138 111., 401; 28 N. E. Rep., 812; Knoxville v. Bird, 12 Lea (Tenn.), 121; 47 Am. Rep., 326. The council is a miniature gen- eral assembly, and its ordinances, duly authorized, have the force of laws passed by the state legisla- ture. Taylor v. Carondelet, 22 Mo., 105. O'Villavaso v. Barthet, 39 La. Ann., 247, 258; 1 So. Rep., 599. In considering a police ordi- nance, Mr. Justice Field said: "The rule is general with reference to the enactments of all legisla- tive bodies that the courts cannot inquire into the motives of the leg- islators in passing them, except as they may be disclosed on the face of the acts, or inferrible from their operation, considered with reference to the condition of the country and existing legislation. The motives of the legislators, con- sidered as the purposes they had in view, will always be presumed to be to accomplish that which fol- lows as the natural and reasonable 17 ioii OP ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§161 be shown to nullify an ordinance duly passed in legal form, within the scope of their corporate powers. "The legality of the acts of legislative or of corporate bodies cannot be tested by the motives of the individual members, or the adventitious circumstances they may lay hold of to carry their measures, provided they proceed regularly and act within the scope of their powers. If they be regularly convened, if the jjurpose be lawful, and if their acts are passed in due form of law and within the scope of their authority, persons who lend their money on the faith of such acts, or do other lawful~things in a just reliance upon their validity, cannot be affected by the secret springs of corporate action, and the public faith cannot be tarnished by the unseen influences surrounding it. "^^ Whenever the officers of a municipal corporation are vested with legislative powers, they hold and exercise them for the public good and are clothed with all the immunities of govern- ment, and are exempted from all liabilities for their mistaken use. They are not personally liable for the enactment of ordi- nances not authorized by the charter, nor are they liable upon a charge that they acted maliciously.®^ effect of their enactment. Their motives, considered as the moral inducements for their votes, will vary with the different members of the legislative body. The diverse character of such motives, and the impossibility of penetrating into the hearts of men and ascertaining the truth, precludes all such in- quiries as impracticable and fu- tile." Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S., 703, 710, 711. Charge of fraud. People v. Cre- gier, 138 111., 401; 28 N. E. Rep., 812; Shinkle v. Covington, 83 Ky., 420; "Wood v. Seattle, 23 Wash., 1; 62 Pac. Rep., 135; Barhite v. Home Telephone Co., 50 N. Y. App. Div., 25. An ordinance for improvement cannot be attacked in collateral proceedings by showing its pas- sage was obtained fraudulently. Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa, 382. 68 The chief burgess being ab- sent the assistant burgesses took advantage of the absence, convened and passed the ordinance. Per Agnew, J., in Freeport v. Marks, 59 Pa. St., 253, 257. In Paine v. Boston, 124 Mass., 486, 490, it is said: "For, although the circumstances surrounding and accompanying the passage of the order (to pay money) may be giv- en in evidence, it does not by any means follow that the motives, reasons and considerations which operated upon the minds of the members of the council to induce them to vote for an order which partakes so much of the character of legislation, are competent or proper." "3 Jones V. Loving, 55 Miss., 109, 111; Anne Arundel Co. Com'rs v. Duckett, 20 Md., 468; Baker v. State, 27 Ind., 485, 489. Assessors are not liable, as their acts are judicial. Vail v. Owen, § 163] OF ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. 359 § 162. Same— Rule limited— Ministerial act. Judicial deci- sions have limited this doctrine in its application to municipal legislative bodies. ' ' We suppose, ' ' says Judge Dillon, "it to be a sound proposition that their (municipal bodies) acts whether in the form of resolutions or ordinances, may be impeached for fraud at the instance of persons injured thereby."'"' As early as 1868 this rule was expressly declared in a case determined by the Supreme Court of Ohio.^^ The immunity from im- peachment for fraudulent motives on the part of the legislative body, or other abuses of power, under the decisions does not extend to all cases of such bodies, notwithstanding they may jissume the form of ordinances. Thus where the council was empowered to regulate the price of gas, and under the exercise of such power they, for a fraudulent purpose, passed the ordi- nance fixing the price of gas at a rate which they well knew could not be manufactured and sold without loss, it was held that the motives of the council could be properly inquired into.''- In such relation the members of the council act in a ministerial capacity. In New York it has been held that a city council in passing a resolution waiving a requirement of a contract for local improvement is not legislative in character, but administrative, and not being impressed with the character of sovereignty, the motives that induced it are the subject of judicial investigation.''^ Here it was ruled that the city may defend an action against the corporation on a contract as modified by resolution of the council, on the' ground that the resolution is void because corruptly procured.''* 19 Barb. (N. Y.), 22; Weaver v. 74 Weston v. Syracuse, 158 N. Y., Devendorf, 3 Denio (N. Y.), 117. 274; 53 N. E. Rep., 12; 43 L. R. A., Election of officers. Pike v. Me- 678. goun, 44 Mo., 491, per Wagner, J. In Pennsylvania it has been held T>1 Dillon Mun. Corp. (4th that the passage of a resolution Ed.), 311. by a council awarding a contract 71 State V. Cincinnati Gas Co., 18 for street lighting is not a legisla- Ohio St., 262, 300, citing Davis v. tive, but a ministerial act in the N. Y., 1 Duer (N. Y.), 451. nature of a business transaction 72 State v. Cincinnati Gas Co., 18 relating to the management of mu- Ohio St., 262, 300. nicipal affairs. Seitzinger v. Ta- 73 Weston V. Syracuse, 158 N. Y;, maqua, 187 Pa. St., 539, 542; 41 274; 53 N. E. Rep., 12; 43 L. R. A., Atl. Rep., 454; 43 W. N. C, 236; 678; see Talcott v. Buffalo, 125 N. Shaub v. Lancaster City, 156 Pa. Y., 280; 26 N. E. Rep., 263; Cool- St., 362; 26 Atl. Rep., 1067; How- ey's Const. Lim., sees. 186, 187, ard v. Olyphant, 181 Pa. St., 191; 208. 37 Atl. Rep., 258. 260 OP ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. [§163 § 163. Injunction to restrain passage of ordinance. Ordi- narily the passage of an ordinance is a legislative act which, as a rule, a court of equity will not enjoin.''^ Whether act in ordering public improvements and passing ordi- nance therefor is judicial or min- isterial, see Parks v. Boston, 8 Pick. (Mass.), 218; Camden v. Mulford, 26 N. J. L., 49, per Green, 0. J.; State (Vanatta) v. Morris- town, 34 N. J. L., 445; Rochester White Lead Co. v. Rochester, 3 N. Y., 463. The adoption of an ordinance by a board of public works, giving permission to a railroad company to lay tracks in the streets was held to be a judicial act and is therefore voidable because done without previous notice to the in- terested persons. State (West Jersey Traction Co.) v. Board of Public Works, 56 N. J. L., 431; 29 Atl. Rep., 163. 75 United States — New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. New Orleans, 164 U. S., 471, 481; Angle v. C, St. P., M. & C. R. Co., 151 U. S., 3; U. S. V. Des Moines N. & R. Co., 142 U. S., 510; Alpers v. San Francis- co, 32 Fed. Rep., 503; 12 Sawyer (U. S.), 631; Murphy v. East Port- land, 42 Fed. Rep., 308. Alabama — Montgomery Gaslight Co. V. Montgomery, 87 Ala., 245; 6 So. Rep., 113; 4 L. R. A., 616. Colorado — Lewis v. Denver City Waterworks, 19 Colo., 236; 41 Am. St. Rep., 248; 34 Pac. Rep., 993. Illinois — Stevens v. St. Mary's T. School, 144 III., 336; 18 L. R. A., 832; 32 N. E. Rep., 962; 36 Am. St. Rep., 438; Mason v. Shawnee- town, 77 III., 533; Chicago v. Ev- ans, 24 111., 52; Sherlock v. Win- netka, 59 111., 389. Indiana — Muhler v. Hedekin, 119 Ind., 481; 20 N. B. Rep., 700; Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind., 1; 49 Am. Rep., 416. Louisiana — Harrison v. New Or- leans, 33 La. Ann., 222; 39 Am. Rep., 272; Crescent City L. S. & S. H. Co; V. Jefferson Police Jury, 32 La. Ann., 1192. Michigan — Detroit v. Hosmer, Wayne Circuit Judge, 79 Mich., 384; 44 N. W. Rep., 622; Cape May & S. L. R. Co. V. Cape May, 35 N. J. Eq., 419. New York — Kittinger v. Buffa- lo Y. Co., 160 N. Y., 377; People ex rel. v. Queens Co. Super., 153 N. Y., 370; Talcott v. Buffalo, 125 N. Y., 280; 26 N. E. Rep., 263; Water- loo W. Mfg. V. Shanahan, 128 N. Y., 345; 28 N. E. Rep., 358; People ex rel. v. Albertson, 55 N. Y., 50, 54; Warwick v. New York, 28 Barb. (N. Y.), 210; People v. New York, 32 Barb. (N. Y.), 35; 10 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 144; 19 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 155. Ohio- — Johnson v. Cincinnati (Ohio), 26 Wkly. Law Bui., 223. Pennsylvania — Wheeler v. Phila- delphia (Pa.), 23 Leg. Int., 75. Tennessee — Trading Stamp Co. V. Memphis, 101 Tenn., 181; 47 S. W. Rep., 136. Wisconsin — State ex rel. v. Cir- cuit Court, 97 Wis., 1; 72 N. W. Rep., 193 ; State v. Superior Court, 105 Wis., 651; 81 N. W. Rep.,' 1046. The judicial department "has no will in any case. * * * Judi- cial power, as contradistinguished from the power of the laws, has no existence. Courts are the mere in- struments of the law, and can will nothing. When they are said to §163] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. •2G1 "The general assembly is a co-ordinate branch of the state gov- ernment, and so is the law-making power of municipal corpora- tions within the prescribed limits. It is no more competent for the judiciary to interfere with the legislative acts of the one than the other. But the unconstitutional acts of either may be annulled. "''^ " The exception to the rule would seem to be limit- exercise discretion it is a mere le- gal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and when that is discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the leg- islature; or, in other words, to the will of the law." Per Chief Jus- tice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. (U. S.), 738, 866. Courts will not restrain execu- tive and administrative officers. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. U. S., 1; Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. (U. S.), 515; Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall (U. S.), 475; Lou- isiana V. Texas, 176 U. S., 1. '« "A void law is no law, and this without doubt is true as to an or- dinance. No injury, much less one of an irreparable character, can be inflicted by such an ordinance." Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 44 Iowa, 505; 24 Am. Rep., 756, distinguishing People v. Sturte- vant, 9 N. Y., 263, and Davis v. Mayor, etc., 14 N. Y., 506; 1 Duer (N. Y.), 451, where a city council was restrained from passing an ordinance creating a public nuis- ance in the streets. "It never can be a rightful sub- ject of legislation to create a pub- lic nuisance and if the passage of an ordinance, without more, cre- ated the nuisance, the mischief re- sulting therefrom might be irre- parable." Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 44 Iowa, 505, 511; 24 Am. Rep., 756. Question of injunction raised, but ordinance held valid. Gartside V. East St. Louis, 43 111., 47. Injunction to restrain mayor from signing. New Orleans B. R. Co. V. New Orleans, 39 La. Ann., 127; 1 So. Rep., 434; Dailey v. New Haven, 60 Conn., 314; 14 L. R. A., 69; 22 Atl. Rep., 945. Council restrained by injunction from passing resolution over may- or's veto. People v. Dwyer, 90 N. Y., 402; 1 Civ. Proc. Rep. (N. Y.), 484; Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St., 359; Negus v. Brooklyn, 62 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 291; 10 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.), 180. Denied to prevent payment of alleged illegal claims. Merriam v. Yuba Co., 72 Cal., 517; 14 Pac. Rep., 137. Passage of ordinance prescribing payment of money will not be re- strained. Murphy v. East Port- land, 42 Fed. Rep., 308. Will not enjoin the passage of an ordinance granting franchise for street railway. Albright v. Fisher, 164 Mo., 56; 64 S. W. Rep., 106. Court declined to restrain pas- sage of ordinance giving exclusive privilege for 20 years of removing all dead animals not slain for food. Alpers v. San Francisco Co., 32 Fed. Rep., 503. Injunction re- fused to restrain passage of an or- dinance permitting company to lay S62 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§163 ed to cases where the governing body of the municipality has no power to act on the particular subject, legislatively, at all, or where the threatened act is not legislative, but purely minister- ial, or where such body is clothed with certain powers, but threatens to go beyond or outside of such powers, and thereby invade the property or property rights of complainant, or where such body threatens to squander or divert some fund or property held by it or some of its officials in trust for its tax. payers and citizens."^'' The rule of the English courts, that for the usurpation of authority by public bodies, the remedy, until the passage of their municipal corporation acts, was exclusively in the name of the attorney-general, acting in behalf of the public, and that the individual had no redress until his pei-sonal property was affected by enforcement of the illegal proceedings, has been so far modified by judicial decisions in New Jersey that the tax payer may resort to certiorari for his protection against gas pipes violative of prior exclu- sive right to another company. Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 44 Iowa, 505; 24 Am. Rep., 756; Montgomery Gas Light Co. v. Montgomery, 87 Ala., 245; 4 L. R. A., 616; 6 So. Rep., 113. Ordinance vacating street will not be enjoined in absence of bad faith. Meredith v. Sayre, 32 N. J. Eq., 557. , " Per Cassoday, C. J., in State ex rel. v. Milwaukee Co. Super. Ct, 105 Wis., 651, 677, 678; 81 N. W. Rep., 1046, reviewing and dis- tinguishing many cases. Courts may enjoin passage of an ordinance which is beyond scope of power of municipal corporation, where its passage would work ir- reparable injury. In such case the city has no authority of any kind, legislative,^ judicial or administra- tive, to deal with the question at all. Spring Valley Waterworks v. Bartlett, 8 Sawyer, 555; 16 Fed. Rep., 615; Trading Stamp Co. v. Memphis, 101 Tenn., 181; 47 S. W. Rep., 136; Public Ledger Co. v. Memphis, 93 Tenn., 77; 28 S. W. Rep., 51; People v. Sturtevant, 9 N. Y., 263; 59 Am. Dec, 536; State V. Patterson, 34 N. J. L., 163; State V. Albright, 20 N. J. L., 644. Where an ordinance would be void on its face by reason of its unconstitutionality, and no irre- parable injury could result from its mere passage, there being an adequate remedy at law against any attempt to enforce it after its passage, a court of equity will not enjoin its enforcement. Spring Valley Waterworks v. Bartlett, 8 Sawyer, 555; 16 Fed. Rep., 615. The passage of ordinances which confer no rights or authority are harmless until steps are taken to make them available. Chicago v. Evans, 24 111., 52, 57. Generally, when no damage can result injunction will be denied. Harrison v. New Orleans^ 33 La. Assn., 222; 39 Am. Rep., 272; At- § 164J OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 263 an illegal ordinance or resolution, without waiting until the assessment is actually imposed^* A municipal corporation has a dual character: one, govern- mental or public; the other, private or proprietary.'''' Hence, in a Kentucky case, it has been declared that, "the general proposition that a court of equity may not enjoin the passage of a municipal ordinance must be confined in its application to subjects over which the corporation in its governmental or public character has discretionary authority. And if it be conceded taxable inhabitants have a right to resort to equity at all, to restrain a municipal corporation and its officers from making an illegal or wrongful disposition of corporate prop- erty, whereby the plaintiffs will be injuriously affected, it reasonably follows the power exists to enjoin passage of the ordinance authorizing the act whenever irreparable injury will be done to the plaintiffs, and they have no adequate remedy at law; for, from its nature, a preventative remedy may be ap- plied at the inception of a wrongful act; in fact, when it is about to be done or threatened. ' '^^ § 164. Validating void ordinance by municipality. Irregu- lar proceedings may be validated by subsequent acts on the part of the council or governing legislative body which con- kinson v. Wykoff, 58 Mo. App., 86; ville, 92 Ky., 95, 107; 13 L. R. A., Whitney v. New York, 28 Barb. 844; 17 S. W. Rep., 216. With- (N. Y.), 233. drawal of an illegal ordinance 78 "Violated charter, State (Greg- after institution of action will not ory) V. Jersey City, 34 N. J. L., defeat the right to injunction 390, 398, et seq., per Depue, J.; against its enactment. Roberts v. State (Danforth) v. Paterson, 34 Louisville, 92 Ky., 95; 13 L. R. A., N. J. L., 163, 171; State v. Jersey 844; 17 S. W. Rep., 216. Compare City, 34 N. J. L., 31, 44. Sherlock v. Winnetka, 69 111., 389; Although ordinance is void, cer- Milhau v. Sharp, 15 Barb. (N. Y.), tiorari will not lie in favor of the 194. prosecutors who have sustained no Acceptance of an ordinance damage peculiar to themselves, granting franchise to street rail- State (Montgomery) v. Trenton, way company will be enjoined 36 N. J. L., 79, 86, relying on State where it constitutes an act ultra (Kean) v. Bronson, 35 N. J. L., vires. Cincinnati Street R. R. Co. 468. v. Smith, 29 Ohio St., 291. TS Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass., City not liable for attempting to 489 ; Louisville v. Commonwealth, enforce void by-law, resulting from 1 Duval (Ky.), 295. a misconception of its powers. Po- 80 Restraining passage of an or- cock v. Toronto, 27 Ontario Rep., dinance authorizing disposition of 635. wharf property. Roberts v. Louis- 264 OP ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES. [§ 165 stitute ratification of the former proceedings. This rule applies to the enactment of ordinances. Thus where an ordinance authorized the city to contract for curbing, and the work was done without a proper contract, the city council after the work was done can validate the action.^i So where the agent of the city in contracting for street improvement failed to comply with the ordinance under the provisions of which the contract should have been made, it was held that as the contract was one which the city could authorize, it could waive the irregu- larity and adopt the contract by subsequent ordinance.®^ go a change of grade of a street which was made by the officers of a municipality without authority of ordinance may by subse- quent ratification of the city council be validated.*^ But the municipality cannot by a subsequent act validate an unauthor- ized ordinance, one which is ultra vires, or beyond the scope of the municipal corporation to enact.^* Thus an ordinance au- thorizing the execution of a contract for water works, which was passed before a constitutional amendment took effect giving the city power to create the indebtedness, is void, and the contract being ultra vires at the time it was made cannot be ratified afterwards by a subsequent ordinance.^^ j^j^j ^^ render subsequent proceedings evidence of the ratification of the ordinance, it must appear that the latter proceedings were taken with a full knowledge of the invalidity of such ordinance and all steps, if any, taken thereunder.*^ § 165. Curative power of legislature over void ordinances. Acts done under and by virtue of ordinances passed by a mu- nicipal corporation, and proceedings entered into by it, within the scope of its power to act, which are void or defective b^'^ reason of some irregularity, omission or want of compliance with the law in the passage of the ordinance, may be cured and 81 Chester v. Eyre, 181 Pa. St., (Iowa, 1902); 91 N. W. Rep., 1081. 642; 37 Atl. Rep., 837. "If the act was void, because 82 O'Rourke v. Hays, 93 Pa. St., ultra vires, and they had no power 72. to authorize it before it was under- 83 shilo Street, 165 Pa. St., 386; taken and commenced, they cer- 30 Atl. Rep., 986. tainly had no power to adopt it 84 Crofut V. Danbury, 65 Conn., after it was done." Horn v. 294; 32 Atl. Rep., 365. Baltimore, 30 Md., 218, 222; Balti- 85 Ellis V. Cleburne (Tex. Civ. more v. Ulman, 79 Md., 469; 30 App., 1896); 35 S. W., 495; Cedar Atl. Rep., 43-. Rapids Water Co. v. Cedar Rapids so McCracken v. San Francisco, 16 Cal., 591. § 166] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 365 rendered valid unless there be a constitutional inhibition, by a subsequent act of the legislature, where the legislature orig- inally had power to authorize the thing done.*^ Thus where a city by ordinance authorized a contract with a gas company and the issue of bonds of the city, but failed to observe a provision of the legislature requiring that where a debt is created the means of paying its principal must be provided in the same ordinance, it was held that it was competent for the legislature to impose upon the city, by a curative act making the bonds valid, the payment of claims just in themselves, for which an equivalent has been received, but which for some irregularity or omission in the proceedings creating them can- not be enforced.^* But where the city passed a void ordinance because not authorized by its charter, and not originally within the power of the legislature to grant the power to enact the ordi- nance, a curative act to validate the ordinance would be void.^^ § 166. Same— Proceeding's to subscribe for railroad stock. Defects and irregularities in the passage of ordinances and in the proceedings to authorize an incorporated town to subscribe to the capital stock of a railroad company and to issue bonds for the same may be cured and ratified by a subsequent act of the legislature where the legislature had the power to authorize the act, or to impose or take away the conditions, the non- observance of which have caused the defects. However, this power is subject to the constitutional restrictions of the state, and cannot be exercised when it would interfere with vested rights.^" Thus in a case where bonds for a rail- s' Nottage V. Portland, 35 Or., passed subsequent to the passage 539; 58 Pac. Rep., 883; Emporia v. of a void ordinance, purporting to Norton, 13 Kan., 569; State v. empower the local corporation to Starkey, 49 Minn., 503; 52 N. W. enforce any regulation heretofore Rep., 24; United States Mortgage made upon a particular subject, Co. V. Gross, 93 III., 483; Schenley but not naming the ordinance in V. Com., 36 Pa. St., 29; 78 Am. Dec, question, is inadequate to render 359; Com. v. Marshall, 69 Pa. St., the ordinance valid. Chicago v. 328; Truchelut v. Charleston, 1 Rumpff, 45 111., 90; 92 Am. Dec, Nott. & M. (S. C), 227. 196. The legislature may conflrm ss New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. municipal ordinances and proceed- S., 644. ings irregularly adopted. Hatzfing s9 stange v. Dubuque, 62 Iowa, V. Syracuse, 92 Hun. (N. Y.), 203; 303; 17 N. W. Rep., 518; Cain v. 36 N. Y. Suppl.. 521. Goda, 84 Ind., 209. But an act of the legislature so people v. Lynch, 51 Cal., 15; 266 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§ 16C road had been issued and the stock subscribed for, and the objection was raised that the proof of the pre- liminary consent by tax payers was defective, it was held that the legislature had power to heal the defect and to sanction the action of the town commissioner in Ijond- ing the town. The court said: "The measure of consent on the part of the town and its tax payers or electors was fixable at the will of the legislature originally. If not, then the whole power must be denied, for the people of a locality cannot confer power upon the legislature, and if it originally rested with the legislature to fix the terms on which the towns might act, the same power will suffi-ce to remit a part of the conditions imposed, or to heal any defects which may have occurred in the performance by the town of those conditions."^} But where, by reason of a change in the constitution, a state has no power to authorize a municipal corpor'ation to issue nego- tiable bonds, it cannot validate an issue of bonds by such a corporation made before the change in the constitution, and when the legislature had such a power. ^- Where the voters of a city or county have expressed their consent by a requisite majority vote to subscribe for stock or issue bonds, which creates a debt upon the city, and the sub- scription is invalid either for the want of power to take the vote or some irregularity or defect in the proceedings, a cura- tive act of the legislature legalizing and making valid the bonds, in the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, is not void as being in conflict with that clause of a state constitution which prohibited the legislature from creat- ing a debt against a municipal corporation for municipal pur-, poses, without its consent.^^ Otoe Co. V. Baldwin, 111 U. S., 1, the first instance." United States 15; Bridgeport v. Housatonuc Ry. Mortgage Co. v. Gross, 93 111., 483, Co., 15 Conn., 475; McMlllen v. 484. Quoted with approval in Boyles, 6 Iowa, 304; St. Joseph Anderson v. Santa Anna, 116 U. S., Township v. Rogers, 16 Wall. (U. 356, 364, and Bolles v. Brimfield, S.), 644, 663. 120 U. S., 759. "Unless there be a constitutional ^i Duanesburgh v. Jenkins, 57 N. inhibition, a legislature has power, Y., 177, 194. when it interferes with no vested 02 Katzenberger v. Aberdeen, 121 right, to enact retrospective stat- U. S., 172, 177. utes to validate invalid contracts ss Anderson v. Santa Anna, 116 or to ratify and confirm any act it U. S., 356; Bolles v. Brimfield, 120 might lawfully have authorized in U. S., 759; Cowgill v. Long, 15 111., §167] OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. 267 In holding that the curative act of the legislature did not violate the constitution, the court, in Bolles v. Brimfield, said : "We do not disreg'ard those decisions of the state court which hold that the legislature cannot impose a debt, for local cor- porate purposes, upon a municipal body, against the will of its corporate authorities. For, as often held by the state court, the corporate authorities of a town like Brimfield are its legal voters, and they at the election gave their consent to the subscription and bonds in question. We do not see that the subsequent ratification by the legislature of what had been done by the voters can be regarded as imposing a debt upon them against their will. The legislature simply gave effect to the wishes of the people, as expressed in the customary mode of ascertaining the popular will. "^* § 167. Same— To collect taxes. The legislature has power to legalize proceedings to collect taxes where the law has not been strictly pursued, in cases where the taxes were not invalid for want of jurisdiction, and where no constitutional rights of the tax payer have been violated.^" But where a city, without power to do so, by ordinance extended its corporate limits, a tax levied by said city on real es- tate' within the extended limits was illegal and void, and an act of the legislature of a remedial nature, it was held, did not make the illegal tax valid. It was said that the remedial act could apply only to cases where the city attempting to annex property had the power to annex it, but exercised it irregularly, defectively or informally, but could not apply to cases where the city had no power to annex property. The 202; Keithsburg v. Frick, 34 111., subscribe to railroad stock was ir- 405; Grenada Co. v. Brodden, 112 regular and void, it was held that U. S., 261; Cutler v. Board of the legislature could not by a cur- Supervisors, 56 Miss., 115. But in ative act pass a law rendering the Elmwood V. Marcy, 92 U. S., 289, election and subscription valid, the United States court following The legislature being prohibited People V. Chicago, 51 111., 17, held by the constitution from creating the contra. In Elmwood v. Marcy a debt against a municipal cor- there was a dissenting opinion, poration for municipal purposes, holding the rule to be as declared without its consent. See also, in Cowgill v. Long, 15 111., 202, and Wiley v. Silliman, 62 111., 170. Keithsburg v. Frick, 34 111., 405. 9* 120 U. S., 759, 764. In Marshall v. Silliman, 61 111., 95 Smith v. Buffalo, 90 Hun. (N. 218, where an election and vote to Y.), 118; 35 N. Y. Suppl., 635. 368 OF ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES. [§167 tax iu this case was not void for irregularity, but because the city had no power to tax the property."* Held that the legislature of Call- ments for taxes may be cured by fornia had power to legalize de- an act of the legislature and a fective and invalid assessments of new levy made. Dill v. Roberts, delinquent taxes, and to provide 30 Wis., 178. for their collection. People v. Hoi- »6 Atchison & Neb. Ry. Co. v. laday, 25 Cal., 300. Maquilkin, 12 Kan., 301. Defects in the levy of assess- CHAPTER V. OF PENALTIES. i 168. Power to enforce ordinances by penalties. 169. Charter method of enforcing ordinances exclusive. 170. Power to inflict penalty of forfeiture. 171. Same — Proceedings. 172. Same — Animals running at large. 173. Penalty by imprisonment. 174. Other penalties — Costs. § 175. Penalty must be certain. 176. Same — New Jersey Doctrine. 177. Same — North Carolina doc- trine. 178. Penalty must be reasonable —Limit. 179. Limit of fine — Continuous or separate offense. 180. Heavier fine for second of- fense authorized. § IGS. Power to enforce ordinances by penalties. Power to enforce ordinances or by-laws by fienalties, as by fine or imprisonment, or both, and sometimes by forfeiture, is usually expressly conferred by charter, either in general or specific terms.' As stated in a Vermont ease, "since an ordinance without a penalty would be nugatory, "^ the general doctrine uniformly prevails that, a municipal corporation which has power to pass the ordinance has, as a necessary incident 1 Power to impose penalty nec- essary. Willcock, Mun. Corp., 180; Rex V. Newdigate, Comb., 10; Denver City R. R. Co. v. Denver, 21 Colo., 350; 52 Am. St. Rep., 239; 41 Pac. Rep., 826; Calhoun v. Lit- tle, 106 Ga., 336; 71 Am. St. Rep.. 254; 43 L. R. A., 630; 32 S. B. Rep., 86; Leavenworth v. Booth, 15 Kan., 627; Burlington v. Stock- well, 5 Kan. App., 569; 47 Pac. Rep., 988; State v. O'Neil, 49 La. Ann., 1171; 22 So. Rep., 352; State V. Boneil, 42 La. Ann., 1110; 21 Am. St. Rep., 413; 8 So. Rep., 298; People V. Detroit Citizens, etc., R. R. Co., 116 Mich., 132; 74 N. W. Rep., 520; In re Langston, 55 Neb., 310; 75 N. W. Rep., 828; In re O'Keefe, 19 N. Y. Supp., 676; Bol- ton V. Vellines, 94 Va., 393; 64 Am. St. Rep., 737; 26 S. E. Rep., 847. 2 Winooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt., 282, 286. "It is an appropriate legal sanc- tion which gives vitality and force to the ordinance and renders the prohibited act unlawful." State (Tomlin) v. Cape May, 63 N. J. L., 429; 44 Atl. Rep., 209; Massinger v. Millville, 63 N. J. L., 123; 43 Atl. Rep., 443; Smith v. Clinton, 53 N. J. L., 329; 21 Atl. Rep., 304; Smith V. Gouldy, 58 N. J. L., 562; 34 Atl. Rep., 748; Haynes v. Cape May, 52 N. J. L., 180; 19 Atl. Rep., 176; State V. Cleaveland, 3 R. I., 117. "An ordinance would be a dead letter if the corporation were left 269 270 OF PENALTIES. [§ 168 thereto, implied power to provide for its enforcement by ap- propriate and reasonable tines against those who break it.^ Thus the power to require all able-bodied male inhabitants to work the streets in such manner as, by ordinance, may be prescribed, implies power to enforce sueh ordinance by the imposition of penalties for failure to discharge the duty pre- scribed.3'''^ Ordinarily, municipal charters confer, either by gen- eral or particular enumeration, powers upon the local corpora- tion in order to enable it to fulfill its functions as a municipal government. Authority to enact ordinances, to carry into effect the povi'ers granted, is frequently expressed by the use of general terms. Thus general charter power to enact ordi- nances, etc., and particular poAver to open, widen, establish, grade and otherwise improve and keep in repair streets, etc., confers power to punish by fine any person who may obstruct a public highway within the corporate limits.* So power to suppress bawdy houses carries with it by implication the power to adopt necessary and reasonable means to accom- without any power to enforce its observance." Tipton v. Norman, 72 Mo., 380, 385. It is no offense to violate or dis- regard a void ordinance. State v. Crenshaw, 94 N. C, 877, approving State V. Bean, 91 N. C, 554. 3 Alabama — Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala., 137; 36 Am. Dec, 441. Georgia — Chambers v. Barns- ville, 89 Ga., 739; 15 S. E. Rep., 634. Illinois — Korah v. Ottawa, 32 111., 121; 83 Am. Dec, 255. Michigan — Detroit v. Ft. Wayne, etc, R. R. Co., 95 Mich., 456; 54 N. W. Rep., 958; 35 Am. St. Rep., 580. Missouri — Ulrich v. St. Louis, 112 Mo., 138; 34 Am. St. Rep., 372; 20 S. W. Rep., 466; Eyerman v. Blaksley, 78 Mo., 145, 152. Pennsylvania — Fisher v. Harris- burg, 2 Grant Cases (Pa.), 291, 296. Tennessee — Trigally v. Memphis, 6 Coldw. (Tenn.), 382. Vermont — Winooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt., 282, 286. "The right to make laws, neces- sarily implies the power of en- forcing the law by some sanction, otherwise the power would be nugatory." Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala., 137, 143; 36 Am. Dec, 441. 3% Tipton v. Nonnan, 72 Mo., 308, 385. Compare Farnsworth v. Paw- tucket, 13 R. I., 82, 87. Penalty for getting on and off engines and cars, if not passen- gers, sustained. Bearden v. Madi- son, 73 Ga., 184. Such fines must as a general rule be paid into the treasury of the city, town or other municipal corporation, unless the law specifi- cally directs otherwise. People v. Sacramento, 6 Cal., 422, 425. * T. P. & W. Ry. Co. V. Chenoa, 43 111., 209, 212; Hamilton v. Carth- age, 24 111., 22. § IGii] OF PENALTIES. '.n plisli such purpose, which includes the imposition of a fine.^ The general rule applied to municipal corporations is that charter power to restrain and prohibit a specific thing implies power to punish its commission/' § 169. Charter method of enforcing ordinances exclusive, The rule respecting enumerated powers has often been applied to penal provisions. Hence, where the charter specifically enumerates the various acts for which penalties may be im- posed, such enumeration, by implication, excludes the right to impose penalties not named. ^ In accordance with the general doctrine that where a power is conferred upon a municipal corporation, to be exercised in a manner particularly described, 5 Owensboro v. Simms, 17 Ky. held not to give power to prescribe Law Rep., 1393; 34 S. W. Rep., punishment by ordinance. Owens- 1085; Shreveport v. Roos, 35 La. boro v. Sparks, 18 Ky. Law Rep., Ann., 1010. 269; 36 S. W. Rep., 4; distinguish- « Pekin v. Smelzel, 21 111., 464, ing Owensboro v. Simms, 17 Ky. 468; State v. Grimes, 49 Minn., Law Rep., 1393; 34 S. W. Rep., 443, 445; 52 N. W. Rep., 42; Chari- 1085. Denied as to nuisance, ton v. Barber, 54 Iowa, 360; 6 N. Knoxvill'e v. C, B. & Q. R. R., 83 W. Rep., 528. Iowa, 636; 32 Am. St. Rep., 321; Authority to prevent authorizes 50 N. W. Rep., 61. Denied for non- a penal provision. Centerville v. payment of license. State v. Man- Miller, 57 Iowa, 56; 10 N. W. Rep., nessier, 32 La. Ann., 1308. Strict 293, questioning Mt. Pleasant v. construction of grant. State v. Breeze, 11 Iowa, 399, which holds Patamia, 34 La. Ann., 750. Grant that- power to suppress gambling should be in express terms. Bur- does not authorize an ordinance lington v. Kellar, 18 Iowa, 59, 65; providing for punishment. Com- State v. Lochte, 45 La. Ann., 1405; pare New Hampton v. Conroy, 56 14 So. Rep., 215; State v. Bright, Iowa, 498; 9 N. W, Rep., 417. 38 La. Ann., 1. Power to abate nuisances may Power to impose a fine for non- not support a penalty for the payment of inspection fee does not maintenance of one. The punish- usually arise from general grant ment Is by Indictment under the in the general welfare clause, statute. Where the statute makes Springfield v. Starke, 93 Mo. App., a thing an offense, it appears in 70. Iowa an ordinance cannot deal ' Grand Rapids v. Hughes, 15 with the subject under general Mich., 54, 58, per Cooley, J. grant of power. Nevada v. Hut- The maxim expressio unius ea;- chins, 59 Iowa, 506 ; 13 N. W. Rep., clusio alterius applied and the 634; approved in Knoxville v. Chi- doctrine exhaustively discussed by cago, etc., R. R. Co., 83 Iowa, 636, Sawyer, J., in State v. Ferguson, 638; 50 N. W. Rep.. 61. See ch. XV. 33 N. H., 424, 427, et seq. As to Terms of grant limits power power to levy license tax on busi- TO IMPOSE — Authority "to prohibit ness, etc., not named, see ch. and suppress all gambling houses" XIII. 273 OF PENALTIES. [§ 170 as heretofore explained,® it follows that where the charter or law applicable provides the manner in which the local laws or ordinances ai'e to be enforced, such provision is to be construed as^ excluding any other manner. The remedy of enforcement prescribed operates as a negative on any other manner." Thus power to make by-laws, to restrain animals from running at large, and enforce such by-laws by appropriate penalties, does not give authority to provide for the impounding and sale of animals found running at large in violation of the by-law.^** This rule is well illustrated in a leading English case deter- mined in 1786, the doctrine of which prevails in the courts of this country." The particular charter prescribed in what ^manner by-laws should be enforced, namely, by fine or amer- ciament. Under such grant of power Mr. Justice BuUer held that the local corporation was precluded by the act from in- nicting any other punishment, as by forfeiture of property, which was attempted. ^^ § 170. Power to inflict penalty of forfeiture. But the chief question discussed in the English case was, whether a corpo- ration which possessed a general power of making by-laws could make a by-law creating a forfeiture. Lord Mansfield held that no ^corporation possessed such extraordinary power, unless it was expressly given ; it being against Magna Charta; and Mr. Justice Buller also said that, considering it a by-law creating a forfeiture, the act of Parliament not having given tills corporation a power to make such a by-law, it was bad on that ground.i* Following this early English rule, the courts a Sec. 75, et seq., supra. 118, 124; Bolte v. New Orleans, 10 » "When a corporation is em- La. Ann., 321. powered to enforce its ordinance Penalties can only be enacted by line or in any other prescribed and applied as directed by charter manner, it is by implication pre- or statute. Burlington v. Kellar, eluded from adopting any other IS Iowa, 59, 65; People v. Hanra- method of punishing disobedience han, 75 Mich., 611; 42 N. W. Rep., to them." Hart v. Albany, 9 Wend. 1124; Re McCutchon and City of (N. Y.), 571, 598; 24 Am. Dec, Toronto, 22 Up. Can. Q. B., 613; 165. Re McLeod and Town of Kincard- 10 Miles V. Chamberlain, 17 Wis., ine, 38 Up. Can. Q. B., 617; Re 446. Snell and Town of Belleville, 30 11 Statement of Judge Dillon, 1 Up. Can. Q. B., 81 ; Re Clark and Dill. Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.), sec. Tp. of Howard, 10 Up. Can. Com. 339. Pleas, 576. 12 Kirk V. Nowell, 1 Term Rep., is Kirk v. Nowell, 1 Term Rep., 118, 124; Adley v. Reeves, 2 M. & § 1U)J OF PENALTIES. 373 of this country have generally held that, in the absence of express power given by charter or state law applicable, ordi- nances or by-laws of a municipal corporation cannot be en- forced by forfeiture of property of the offender.** Thus an ordinance, providing that baskets used for the sale of fruit and vegetables shall be marked and stamped in a particular man- ner, or they shall be forfeited with their contents, is void, where enacted in pursuance of power to impose fines or penal- ties or pecuniary forfeitures, which latter are simply penal- ties. ^^ So an ordinance merely authorizing the arrest and punishment of any person keeping or visiting an establishment for the purpose of gambling does not authorize the seizure and detention of instruments used for gaming.i^ It was earlj' held in South Carolina that, an ordinance can- not provide for the forfeiture of licenses as a penalty unless the power is expressly conferred upon the local corporation; that a license duly issued is property, and hence, under the power to impose fines^ the authority of forfeiture cannot be exercised.i^ However, it has been held subsequently by other courts that a license may be revoked as a penalty, since such revocation does not constitute a technical forfeiture of prop- erty.^^ "Where a license is regarded as a mere permit and not S., 60; Player v. Archer, 2 Sid., ristown, 100 Pa. St., 368; 45 Am. 121; Clark V. Tucker, 2 Vent., 183; Rep., 383; Barter v. Common- Wlllcock, Mun. Corp., 179, 180; 2 wealth, 3 Pa;, 253, 259, per Gibson, Kyd on Corp., 110; Angel and C. J. Ames, Corp., 200; 1 Dillon, Mun. The right to declare a forfeiture Corp. (4 Ed.), sec. 336; Grant, of property does not exist in this Corp., 84. country by usage. 1 Dillon, Mun. li Alabama— Mohile v. Yuille, 3 Corp. (4th Ed.), 345; Taylor v. Ala., 137, 144; 36 Am. Dec, 441. Carondelet, 22 Mo., 105, 124. Iowa — New Hampton v. Conroy, is Phillips v. Allen, 41 Pa. St., 56 Iowa, 498; 9 N. W. Rep., 417; 481; 82 Am. Dec, 486, citing 2 Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa, 378; 7 Kyd on Corp., 110, and Grant on N. W. Rep., 623. Corp., 84. Kentucky — McKee v. McKee, 8 is Ridgeway v. West, 60 Ind., B. Mon. (Ky.), 433; Varden v. 371, 376. Mount, 78 Ky., 86. it state ecc rel. Heise v. Town New Jersey — White v. Tallman, Council of Columbia, 6 Rich. Law 26 N. J. L., 67; Bergen v. Clark- (S. C), 404, 412, per Frost, J. son, 6 N. J. L., 352. „ Hurber v. Baugh, 43 Iowa, 514, New Torfc— New York v. Ordre- disapproving State eo; rel. Heise nau, 12 Johns (N. Y.), 122. v. Town Council of Columbia, 6 Pennsylvania— Kneedler v. Nor- Rich. Law (S. C), 404, 412. 18 2U OP tBNALTIES. [§171 a contract, it may be terminated by a repeal of the law under which it was granted.^" In Colorado, an ordinance providing that upon a second convietio'n for the offense of keeping a dramshop oijen at times forbidden, the license and the money paid therefor shall be forfeited and remain forfeited, though upon appeal and trial de novo an acquittal takes place, was held to be so oppressive and unreasonable as to be void in this respect.^" § 171. Same— Proceedings. Where the power to declare a forfeiture exists, the courts generally enforce the rule of due notice and legal inquiry.-^ Laws authorizing the divestiture of title of property by summary proceedings must be strictly pursued. The citizen may only be deprived of his property in accordance with law, and to do otherwise would not only 10 Fell V. State, 42 Md., 71, 89; 20 Am. Rep., 83; Parkinson v. State, 14 Md., 185; State ex rel. v. Bonnell, 119 Ind., 494; 21 N. E. Rep., 1101; State v. Cooke, 24 Minn., 247. A MUJS^ICIPAL OCCTJPATION TAX IS not a contract within the protec- tion of the state or federal con- stitution. Under the police power a municipality may prohibit the occupation during the term for which it was licensed. But wheth- er it may not then be under a duty to return the license fee is left an open question/ St. Charles v. Hackman, 133 Mo., 634; 34 S. W. Rep., 878. Although a license is a privilege yet it is equivalent to a contract right to the extent that it cannot be abrogated at any time without sufficient cause. State ex rel. v. Baker, 32 Mo. App., 98; Hannibal V. Guyott, 18 Mo., 515; McElhany v. McHenry, 26 Mo., 174. The ordinance may enforce the penalty of forfeiture for violating ordinances exacting licenses, etc. St. Louis V. Sternberg, 69 Mo. 289; St. Louis V. Green, 70 Mo., 562. 20 Mclnerney v. Denver, 17 Colo., 302; 29 Pac. Rep., 516. Compare State V. Anderson, 63 Minn., 208; 65 N. W. Rep., 265; State (Staates) v. Washington, 45 N. J. L., 318. 21 Illinois — Poppen v. Holmes, 44 111., 360; Bullock v. Geomble, 45 111., 218; Willis v. Legris, 45 111., 289. Indiana — Slessman v. Crozier, 80 Ind., 487, 489. Iowa — Gosselink v. Campbell, 4 Iowa, 296. Kentucky — Varden v. Mount, 78 Ky., 86. Louisiana — Rost v. New Orleans, 15 La., 129, approving Lanfear v. New Orleans, 4 La., 97. Ohio — Cotter v. Doty, 5 Ohio, 393, 398; Rosebaugh v. Saffin, 10 Ohio, 31. Wisconsin — Compare Wilcox v. Hemming, 58 Wis., 144; 15 N. W. Rep., 435; 46 Am. Rep., 625. An ordinance authorizing a sale, under orders of the mayor, of property which is suffered to re- main on the levee for a longer period than the police regulations of the city permit, held void. Here it was said that the power con- ferred by the ordinance "makes §172] OF PENALTIES. 27S be unjiiHl, but despotic. Hence, courts are rigid in requiring strict compliance with laws allowing such procedure.-- § 172. Same— Animals running at large. Without express authority, municipal corporations cannot provide in their ordi- nances for the forfeiture of animals found running at large, in violation of such ordinances. The power to impose penalties for infraction of such police regulations does not include the power to impound and sell.-^ In Georgia it has been held that general power over the subject, conferred authority on the local corporation to enact an ordinance requiring that stray cattle found within the corporate limits be impounded, and after being advertised for five days, sold, unless the owner should claim them and pay the charges.^* Similar ordinances have been sustained when passed under express charter power to imnose such forfeiture.-*' the corporation Judges and parties in the same cause and enables them to enforce a forfeiture and divest the owner of his property without trial in due course of law." It was declared that such power could not be conferred con- stitutionally. In the Judgment of the court, the authority exercised in removing nuisances was "wide- ly different," for such power is shared by the city in common with individuals, arises from necessity, and ceases with that necessity. Lanfear v. New Orleans, 4 La., 97, 98. Under power "to regulate every- thing which relates to bakers," an ordinance which provided for seizing, by officers, of bread un- stamped or deficient in weight, and conducting the offender be- fore the court, and in event of conviction, a forfeiture of the bread seized might be ordered, was held valid. Guillotte v. New Or- leans, 12 La. Ann., 432. 22 01ark v. Lewis, 35 111., 417, 421; Poppen v. Holmes, 44 111., 360; Bullock v. Geomble, 45 111., 218; Rex v. Croke, 1 Cowp., 26. Trial and Hearing Necessary. Mississippi — Donovan v. Vicks- burg, 29 Miss., 247; 64 Am. Dec, 143. Missouri — Johnson v. Dow, 53 Mo. App., 372. Ohio — Rosebaugh v. Saffin, 10 Ohio, 31. West Virginia — Burdett v. Allen, 35 W. Va., 347; 14 L. R. A., 337; 13 S. E. Rep., 1012. 23 Miles V. Chamberlain, 17 Wis., 446. Such ordinances contravene the constitutional provisions that no person can be deprived of property without due course of law, and the right of trial by Jury shall remain inviolate. Donovan v. Vicksburg, 29 Miss., 247, 249; 64 Am. Dec, 143, approving Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray (Mass.), 1, per Shaw, C. J.; White v. Tallman, 26 N. J. L., 67; Darst v. People, 51 111., 286; Willis v. Legris, 45 111., 289 ; Poppen v. Holmes, 44 111., 360. 2* Cartersville v. Lanham, 67 Ga., 753. 25 Alabama — Folmar v. Curtis, 86 Ala., 354; 5 So. Rep., 678. 2'tQ 6f PBiSTALTIBS. [§173 An ordinance providing for a notice of sale and the payment of thi proceeds thereof to the owner of the animal, after de- ducting ihe costs of the proceedings, was held, in Colorado, not to be a forfeiture of animals.-"* Ordinarily, courts of equity have no power to relieve against the valid forfeiture of property in pursuance of municipal ordinances.^'' § 173. Penalty by imprisonment. Unless the power is ex- pressly^ conferred, a municipal corporation cannot inflict the penalty by imprisonment of the offender, either in the first instance or for non-payment of a fine duly imposed for viola- Arkansas — Fort Smith v. Dod- son, 46 Ark., 296. Connecticut — Whitlock v. West, 26 Conn., 406. Illinois— FriAay v. Floyd, 63 111., 50. Kansas — Gilchrist v. Sehmidling, 12 Kan., 263. Kentucky — Armstrong v. Brown, 20 Ky. Law Rep., 1766; 50 S. W. Rep., 17. Michigan — Grover v. Huckins, 26 Mich, 476, per Cooley, J.; Cam- pau V. Langley, 39 Mich., 451. North Carolina — Rose v. Hardie, 98 N. C, 44; 4 S. E. Rep., 41, ap- proving Hellen v. Noe, 3 Ired. (N. C), 493; Whitfield v. Longest, 6 Ired. (N. C), 268. South Carolina — Crosby v. War- ren, 1 Rich. (S. C), Law, 385, dis- tinguishing Kennedy v. Sowden, 1 McMullan Law (S. C), 323. Tennessee — Knoxville v. King, 7 Lea (75 Tenn.), 441; Moore v. State, 11 Lea (79 Tenn.), 35. Wisconsin — Wilcox v. Hemming, 58 Wis., 144; 46 Am. Rep., 625; 15 N. W. Rep., 435. 26 Brophy v. Hyatt, 10 Colo., 223, 227; 15 Pac. Rep., 399. Similar ruling in Iowa. Gossel- ink V. Campbell, 4 Iowa, 296. What constitutes running at LARGE. Escape of horses from an enclosure against the will of the owner who immediately goes in search of them, is not a running at large. "There must be some guilty intention or wilful neglect before a party can be made liable to the penalties imposed by the ordi- nance. He must permit or suffer his stock to run at large." Kinder V. Gillespie, 63 111., 88, 89. "The knowledge and sufferance is the gist of the offense. The penalty is not to be enforced because the hogs were running at large but be- cause the owner suffered them to run at large." Case v. Hall, 21 111., 632, 636, per Breese, J. So the ordinance does not apply where the escape of the hogs was una- voidable — as a flood — and the own- er uses due diligence in attempt- ing to reclaim them. Spitler v. Young, 63 Mo., 52, per Wagner, J. Power to kill dogs. Stebbins v. Mayer, 38 Kan., 573; 16 Pac. Rep., 745; People v. Police Board, 24 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 481; 15 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 167. See § 469, post. 27 In Taylor v. Carondelet, 22 Mo., 105, 112, where a forfeiture of a lease was involved, it was said that "in giving the corporation powers on the subject of leases the general assembly must have neces- sarily intended that its ordinances § 1^3] OF PENALTIES. ^'il tion of its ordinance.2^ Thus power to impose a sentence to ' ' hard labor on the streets, ' ' does not authorize imprisonment.^" Such imprisonment is not in satisfaction of judgment, but merely a means of enforcing its payment. Therefore it con- stitutes no defense to an action of scire facias against the sure- ties on the appeal bond of the offender, to recover the amount of such judgment and costs.^" Generally, charters confer the power to imprison in express terms.-''^ The penalty of imprisonment imposed by charter for viola- tion of an ordinance is not a debt within the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt.^^ should operate as laws and not as contracts." The state may by subsequent law release a penalty incurred under former law. State v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 3 How. (44 U. S.), 534. 28^0; parte Moore, 62 Ala., 471; Ex parte Slattery, 3 Ark., 484; Klnmundy v. Mahan, 72 111., 462; State ex rel. v. Baton Rouge, 40 La. Ann., 209; 3 So. Rep., 541; Willcock, Mun. Corp., 181; Clark's Case, 5 Co., 64; Bab v. Clerk, Moore, 411; London v. Wood, 12 Mod., 686. Power to punish by fine or im- prisonment does not include au- thority to coerce the payment of a fine by imprisonment. "When the punishment inflicted is imprison- ment, that is the penalty to be en- forced. When the penalty, is a fine, that is the penalty to be en- forced in the manner provided by law." Brieswick v. Brunswick, 51 Ga. 639, 642; 21 Am. Rep., 240; S. P. Bregguglia v. Vineland, 53 N. J. L., 168; 11 L. R. A., 407; 20 Atl. Rep., 1082. A fine assessed may be collected either by commitment of the per- son upon whom the fine is imposed or by fieri facias. Huddleson v. Ruffln, 6 Ohio St., 604. Charter power to enforce ordi- nances "by a proper fine, imprison- ment or other penalty" does not permit the infliction of both fine and imprisonment as substantive punishment for the same offense. Mclnerney v. Denver, 17 Colo., 302; 29 Pac. Rep., 516. Under an ordinance permitting imprisonment only, in event there is no appeal, if upon conviction an appeal is taken, the defendant can- not be imprisoned. Carson , v. Bloomington, 6 111. App., 481. 29 Ordering the defendant into oflicial custody until the fine and costs duly imposed are paid is im- prisonment. Ex parte Moore, 62 Ala., 471, 475. 30 Shefiield v. O'Day, 7 111. App., 339. 31 .Ba; parte Green, 94 Cal., 387; 29 Pac. Rep., 783, distinguishing Ex parte Rosenheim, 83 Cal., 388; 23 Pac. Rep., 372; Ex parte Chin Yan, 60 Cal., 78; Ex parte Ellis, 54 Cal., 204; Ex parte Bollig, 31 111., 88; Flora v. Sachs, 64 Ind., 155; Miltonvale v. Lanoue, 35 Kan., 603 ; 12 Tac. Rep., 12. 32 Chicago V. Kenney, 35 111. App., 57; Hardenbrook v. Lin- gonier, 95 Ind., 70; Ex parte Holl- wedell, 74 Mo., 395; St. Louis v. Sternberg, 69 Mo., 289; Canton v. Ligon, 71 Mo. App., 407; Ex parte Kiburg, 10 Mo. App., 442. srs OF PENALTIES. [§173 The enforcement of ordinances by imprisonment depends upon the provisions of the particular charter. Usually it may only be exercised after trial and hearing.*^ And the judg- ment, sentence, or order of commitment is controlled by the law conferring the power to impose.^* Thus where the council is vested with the exclusive power to make direction respect- ing the duration of imprisonment of violators of ordinances, failure on its part to do so will not authorize the trial court to fix such time in the judgment or sentence.^^ So under a char- ter authorizing sentence to "hard labor on the streets * * * not exceeding thirty days," a sentence directing the marshal to take the offender "into custody and detain him until the fine and costs are fully paid," is void, because (1) it imposes "imprisonment," whereas the charter provides "hard labor," And this is true, although there be a general law of the state im- posing a fine for a like offense. St. Louis V. Schoenbusch, 95 Mo., 618; 8 S. W. Rep., 791; St. Louis V. Bentz, 11 Mo., 61; St. Louis v. Cafferata, 24 Mo., 94; Independ- ence V. Moore, 32 Mo., 392; State V. Wister, 62 Mo., 592; State v. Harper, 58 Mo., 530; State ex rel. V. Walbridge, 119 Mo., 383; 24 S. W. Rep., 457. See ch. XV. 33 Power to inflict imprisonment must be expressly conferred. Ex parte Montgomery; In re Knox, 64 Ala., 463; Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala., 461; Ex parte Green, 94 Cal., 387; 29 Pac. Rep., 783; Burlington V. Kellar, 18 Iowa, 59, 65; State v. Ruff, 30 La. Ann., 497; Barter v. Commonwealth, 3 Pa., 253; Low v. Evans, 16 Ind., 486. 3* Where the law limits impris- onment to six months, an order that defendant be imprisoned and remain until such time as would make the amount of such debt fl.50 per day when he should be discharged, is void. Kanouse v. Lexington, 12 111. App., 318. Provision that offender, on con- viction, shall be fined not exceed- ing $500, and may be imprisoned for a period not exceeding sixty days, or both, does not authorize a sentence "to pay a fine of flOO or perform sixty days work on the public streets" of the city. The sentence is void for uncertainty, being in the alternative. Ex parte Martini, 23 Fla., 343; 2 So. Rep., 689. Under charter authority to in- flict punishment by fine not to exceed flOO, or in default of the payment of the same by labor on the streets, an ordinance provid- ing a fine specifying the amount of imprisonment is invalid since it allows Imprisonment without first giving the offender an oppor- tunity to pay the fine. Calhoun V. Little, 106 Ga., 336; 71 Am. St. Rep., 254; 43 L. R. A., 630; 32 S. E. Rep., 86. Compare Papworth v. Fitzgerald, 106 Ga., 378; 32 S. E. Rep., 363. Where the charter authorizes imprisonment in the county jail only, a commitment to the county penitentiary is void. Merkee v. Rochester, 13 Hun. (N. Y.), 157. 35 Merkee v. Rochester, 18 Hun. (N. Y.), 157. § 174] OF PENALTIES. 279 and (2) is indefinite in duration, whereas the limit prescribed is thirty days.^® The duration of imprisonment cannot exceed the charter limit.°^ But an ordinance providing for a term of imprison- ment which might exceed that authorized by the state consti- tution but does not necessarily do so, is not void and may be enforced within the constitutional limit.^^ Imprisonment for 2,160 days in default of payment of fines aggregating $720 on conviction of 72 distinct violations of one ordinance within one hour and forty minutes is unusual and unreasonable pun- ishment.^* § 174. Other penalties— Costs. In accordance with the rule that the charter method of enforcing ordinances is exclusive, charter poAver to commit to the city prison, work house, or place of correction, does not authorize a sentence to perform labor on the public streets.^*'^ So a fine for violating an ordi- nance and a simple judgment of imprisonment until the fine and costs are paid, cannot be enforced by compelling the de- fendant to perform manual labor on the streets.*" But under express charter power, hard labor may be inflicted as a punish- ment.*^ In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Michigan, hard labor, in itself, is not infamous or degrading; on the contrary, it is ennobling and is the foundation upon which reposes all true progress in mental and moral development. 36 Ex parte Moore, 62 Ala., 471, the payment of fine and costs one 475. in custody does not entitle him- 37 Brown v. Asbury Park, 44 N. self to a release by merely ten- J. L., 162; Keokuk v. Dressell, 47 derlng sufficient property upon Iowa, 597; Ex parte Moore, 62 which to levy the execution. In Ala., 471, 475; New Orleans v. Cos- re Miller, 44 Mo. App., 125. See tello, 14 La. Ann., 37; State ex rel. sec. 178 post. V. Bringier, 42 La. Ann., 1095; 8 39^4^0; parte Martini, 23 Fla., So. Rep., 298; State v. Boneil, 42 343; 2 So. Rep., 689. La. Ann., 1110 ; 21 Am. St. Rep., 10 Torbert v. Lynch, 67 Ind., 474. 413; 10 L. R. A., 60; 8 So. Rep., Sentence to chain gang is void 298. without express charter power. 38 Keokuk V. Dressell, 47 Iowa, Carr v. Conyers, 84 Ga., 287; 20 597. ' Am. St. Rep., 357; 10 S. E. Rep., 39 State ex rel. v. Whitaker, 48 630. La. Ann., 527; 35 L. R. A., 561; 4i Keokuk v. Dressell, 47 Iowa, 19 So. Rep., 457. 597; Ex parte Montgomery, In re Where under the law one im- Knox, 64 Ala., 463. prisoned could be discharged on But power to impose must be ex- !38U OP PENALTIES. [§ 175 "The infamy and dtigradation consists in its being involuntary. The distinction is the diiference between liberty and slav- ery. "*2 Without express provision, costs of the proceedings form no part of the penalty.^^ Costs were unknown to the common law, and the power to impose must be found in the charter or legislative act applicable or it does not exist.** Thus where the charter authorizes the penalty, fine and imprisonment, an ordinance adding "costs of the prosecution" is void as to such clause.*^ § 175. Penalty must be certain. The fundamental rule re- quiring all ordinances to be precise, definite and certain in their terms is especially applicable to penal provisions. It is very common for penal ordinances to leave a margin to the discre- tion of the court so that the fine or imprisonment imposed may be graded in some proportion to the aggravation of the cir- cumstances. Where the power exists to inflict penalties for the violation of ordinances, and the charter does not forbid, the ordinance may specify a reasonable margin. Thus it may provide that the fine shall not be less than a named sum, nor greater than a specified amount; or that the imprisonment shall not be less than a specified time, nor greater than a time named; or that the fine shall not exceed a named sum, or the pressly given. Ex parte Reynolds, Corporal punishment denied. Ex 87 Ala., 138; 6 So. Rep., 335. parte Deane, 2 Cranch C. C, 125; Under chkrter power to provide 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3, 712. that those committed to jail shall The clipping of the hair of the be required to work at such labor offender is unreasonable punish- as their strength permits, an ordi- ment. Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 5 nance imposing imprisonment at Sawyer, 552; 12 Fed. Cas. No. 6, hard labor is. unauthorized. Lead 546 See sec 227 post V. Klatt, 13 S. D., 140; 82 N. W. .^ gayonne v. Herdt,'40 N. J. L.. Rep., 391. 264 42 Per Champlin, J., in People v. ,; g^^^^ ^ ^ 4^ ^^ Hanraha^, 75 Mich., 611, 621; 42 g^^^^ ^ Cantieny, 34 Minn., 1; 24 N. W. Rep., 1124, quoting: -ki T%r -n i. a^o t.-i. ^• ^ ' ^ " N. W. Ret)., 458 ; Bishop, Crim. "An angel's wing would droop if proc. sec. 1313. long at rest, 45 state v. Cantieny, 34 Minn., 1; And God himself, inactive, were no 24 N. W. Rep. 458. longer blest." go costs in criminal cases are Disfranchisement cannot be in- not within the provision. Cald- flicted as a punishment. Will- well v. State, 55 Ala., 133. See sec. cock, Mun. Corp.; Rex v. London, 339, post, 2 Lev., 201. §17G] OF PENALTIES. 281 imprisonment extend beyond a specified time.*^ Adopting the rule of the older English authorities that by-laws would be held void for uncertainty, unless the penalties therein named were fixed at a definite amount, the Supreme Court of Alabama early held that a by-law which provided a penalty in such sum, not exceeding $50, as the corporation court might think proper to impose as a fine, was too vague to be supported.*^ Subse- quently, this court departed from this doctrine and sustained a by-law which left the amount of the fine within fixed limits (e. g., not exceeding $50) to the discretion of the court.** The courts of this country generally sustain this rule.*^ § 176. Same — New Jersey doctrine. However, in New Jersey, where the penalty for the violation of ordinances is to be recovered by action of debt, the rule is that the ordinance must fix the precise penalty to be imposed, and where the amount is left to the discretion of the court, as that it shall not be less than $10, nor more than $50, or shall not exceed $50, *8 Per Lowrie, J., in Fisher v. Harrisburg, 2 Grant Cas. (Pa.), 291, 296; Atkins v. Phillips, 26 Fla., 281; 8 So. Rep., 429; State v. Cantieny, 34 Minn., 1; 24 N. W. Rep., 458, relying on 1 Dil. Mun. Corp., sec. 341 (275). 47 "The penalty must he a cer- tain sum, and cannot be left to the arbitrary assessment of the cor- poration courtj to be determined according to the nature of the of- fense." Fixing a limit beyond which the fine cannot extend does not remove the objection. "The reason assigned is that it permits the corporation to he a judge of its own cause." Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala., 137, 144; 36 Am. Dec, 441. 48Huntsville v. Phelps, 27 Ala., 55, overruling Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala., 137; 36 Am. Dec, 441, on this point. The court said (p. 58) : "A reasonable discretion is given to be exercised within certain limits, and we can see no objection which could be urged to such a by-law, which could not, with equal pro- priety, be made to any by-law in- vesting courts or juries with dis- cretion in apportioning the fine to the offense, being restricted with- in reasonable bounds. The lower power of making just discrimina- tion, so as to advance the ends of justice, and mete out to every vio- lator of the law a punishment pro- portioned to its demerits, should reside somewhere; and since the charter invests the corporation with the power to pass such by- law, and to create proper sanc- tions, we do not conceive that the law in question is at all unreason- able, or uncertain, in that sense which renders it void." Per Chil- ton, C. J. *9 Judge Dillon supports this doctrine as "just and reasonable," and observes that "the older Eng- lish authorities as far as they hold such a by-law void for uncertain- ty are regarded as unsound in principle, and ought not to be fol- lowed." 1 Dillon (4th Ed), 341, and n. 2, page 414. 282 OF PENALTIES. [§ l'<6 the ordinance will be held bad for uncertainty.^" The doctrine is that, the charter requirement that the penalty shall be recovered by action of debt is equivalent. to a declaration that the common council must prescribe a precise penalty so that the action of debt can be supported. It is argued that "an action of debt can only be maintained for a sum capable of being ascertained at the time of the action brought. "^^ So it has been held in New Jersey that where the power is given to enforce an ordinance or by-law by reasonable penalties which may be "imposed for revenue," the ordinance must fix the precise penalty. Here it was said that the singular provision that the penalty was to be "imposed for revenue" seems to invoke the exercise of the taxing power in conjunction with the police power and to require that the imposts should be gradu- ated, not so much by the circumstances of the particular case, as by the needs of the municipality within reasonable bonds. "The ascertainment of the sum to be charged for the latter ob.iect is not a judicial function. "^^ In one case in that state, where the charter involved did not require the penalty to be collected by action of debt, a con- viction was sustained under an ordinance providing a penalty not exceeding a stated sum (e. g., $50).^^ And in another case it was declared that the ordinance may confer upon the mag- istrate the power of adjusting the penalty within the statutory limit to the circumstances of each case, unless the statute evinced an intention that the governing body of the corporation should itself fix the precise limit."* The question of certainty of pen- Atlantic City, 60 N. J. L., 125, 126; alty in ordinances Is fully dis- 37 Atl. Rep., 444. cussed in Re Frazee, 63 Mich., 396 ; ss McConvill v. Jersey City, 39 30 N. W. Rep., 72, per Campbell, N. J. h., 38. C. J. 54 Young & McShea A. Co. v. At- 50 State V. Zeigler, 32 N. J. L., lantlc City, 60 N. J. L., 125, 126; 262, 269, distinguishing Piper v. 37 Atl. Rep., 444. Chappell, 14 Exch., 649; Massinger Where the charter authorizes V. Millville, 63 N. J. L., 123; 43 the penalty by fine or imprlson- Atl. Rep., 443; White v. Tallman. ment, an ordinance imposing a 26 N. J. L., 67 ; Melich v. Wash- penalty of fine or imprisonment or ington, 47 N. J. L., 254; Tomlin v. both, at the discretion of the mag- Cape May, 63 N. J. L., 429; 44 Atl. Istrate, held void. State (Leland) Rep., 209. V. Long Branch Comrs.. 42 N. J. L.. 51 State (Smith) v. Clinton, 53 375, approved in State (Staates) N. J. L., 329; 21 Atl. Rep., 304. v. Washington, 44 N. J. L., 605, 52 Young & McShea A. Co. v, 612. § 178] OF PENALTIES. 383 § 177. Same— North Carolina doctrine. The doctrine that the fine for the violation of the ordinance cannot be committed to the discrctiuu of the court is also supported by decisions in North Carolina. In Ihat state the fines must be definitely fixed in amount; therefore, ordinances prescribing a fine of not more than a named sum, or imprisonment not to exceed a speci- fied number of days, have been declared void for uncertainty .®® And the same court held that an ordinance is not void for uncertainty by reason of a provision giving the mayor discre- tion tv) impose a fine of $50, or imprisonment for thirty days, upon conviction, where the statute makes the violation of the ordinance a misdemeanor, and tlie constitution of the state makes exactly the same provision as to the punishment for misdemeanors.^^ § 178. Penalty must be reasonable— Limit. There must be a limitation in the amount of the penalty. This may be pro- vided either in the state statute or the charter authorizing the ordinance, or it m.ay be in the ordinance itself, and if in the latter, the courts may determine whether the amount so fixed is reasonable. The term reasonable, as used, means what is reasonable under the circumstances, taking into account the character of the offense. What would be a reasonable penalty cannot from the nature of things admit of a general rule applicable to all cases, but must in every case be determined by the nature of the offense intended to be prohibited.^^ Where 55 state V. Worth, 95 N. C, 615 ; scribed by ordinance, held not State V. Crenshaw, 94 N. C, 877; exorbitant. Baker v. Lexington, State V. Cainan, 94 N. C, 883; 21 Ky. Law Rep., 809; 53 S. W. State V. Rice, 97 N. C, 421; 2 S. Rep., 16. B. Rep., 180; Commissioners of A fine of ?250 for carrying con- Louisburg v. Harris, 7 Jones Law cealed weapons is reasonable. In (N. C), 281. re Cheney, 90 Cal., 617; 27 Pac. 56 State V. Higgs, 126 N. C, 1014, Rep., 436. 1020; 48 L. R. A., 446; 35 S. E. A fine of |50 for gambling is not Rep., 473. excessive punishment. Greenville "Mobile V. Yuille, 3 Ala., 137, v. Kemmis, 58 S. C, 427; 50 L. R. 144; 36 Am. Dec, 441; In re Ah A., 725; 36 S. E. Rep., 727. You. 88 Cal., 99; 25 Pac. Rep., 974; A fine not exceeding ?1,000 or Austin V. Murray, 16 Pick, imprisonment not exceeding six (Mass.), 121; Ex parte Bedell, 20 . months, or both, for uttering, etc.. Mo. App., 125. profane and obscene language and Penalty in forbidding sale of words having a tendency to create liquor. Toledo v. Edens, 59 Iowa, a breach of the peace, held reason- 352, 354; 13 N. B. Rep., 313. able. In re Miller, 89 Cal., 41; Penalty of ?15 for failure to pay 26 Pac. Rep., 620. license as attorney of $10, as pre- A fine of $100 or imprisonment 284 OF PENALTIES. [§ lt8 the penalty prescribed is reasonable, the ordinance will not be declared unconstitutional because the charter or statute authorizing its enactment does not limit the penalty the ordi- nance may impose.^* In the absence of legal restriction, it has been held that the penalty may be fixed at any sum within the jurisdiction of the municipal or police court, provided it be not unreasonable in view of the nature of the offense.^^ "Where the penalty is pre- cisely fixed by the organic law, of course, it cannot be exceeded by ordinance.*"* Thus where the law authorizes the infliction of such penalty as may be provided "for like offenses against the laws of the state," an ordinance fixing the fine for assault at from $5 to $50, is void, where the minimum fine for such offenses is $3 under the state law.^^ If the maximum fine is within the charter limits, its reasonableness cannot be ques- tioned.*'^ The decisions present some conflict respecting the question whether the penalty of the ordinance should exactly corre- spond with the penalty of the state statute where the unlawful act is made an offense against both the stat° auj the local corporation. By constitution in Kentucky the penalty must not be less than that provided by state statute for the same act.*'* In such case, if the penalty is not limited, decisions for 90 days for failure to obtain diction is void. Zylstra v. Charles- a license by drivers of stages used ton, 1 Bay (S. C), 382. for the transportation of pas- so state v. Boneil, 42 La. Ann., sengers, held not to be cruel and 1110; 8 So. Rep., 298; Common- unusual punishment. Belmar v. wealth v. Wilkins, 121 Mass., 356; Barkalow, 67 N. J. L., 504; 52 Atl. Zylstra v. Charleston, 1 Bay (S. Rep., 157. C), 382. 58 State V. Carpenter, 60 Conn., si Petersburg v. Metzker, 21 111., 97; 22 Atl. Rep., 497; Bowman v. 205. St. John, 43 111., 337; Ashton v. Where the law prescribes a fine Ellsworth, 48 111., 299. of not less than flO, the imposi- Changing penalty dueing prose- tion of a fine of only $5 is errone- cxjTioN. Where an ordinance is ous. Taylor v. State, 35 Wis., 298. passed mitigating the penalty dur- Contra — Ordinance cannot im- ing the prosecution, defendant can- pose a greater fine than that fixed not complain that the penalty im- by the charter, but may Impose posed by the original ordinance is less. Ex parte Caldwell, 138 Mo., so exorbitant as to invalidate the 233, 241; 39 S. W. Rep., 761. ordinance. Bakej v. Lexington, 21 02 xarklo v. Cook, 120 Mo., 1; Ky. L. Rep., 809; 53 S. W. Rep., 41 Am. St. Rep., 678; 25 S. W. 16. Rep., 202. 59 A fine beyond court's juris- f-" Owensboro v. Sparks, 18 Ky. § 179] OF PENALTIES. 285 exist to the effect that it may be greater than that provided in the state law.®* However, this proposition has been denied.®^ § 179. Limit of fine— Continuous or separate offense. The ordinance may impose a fine not exceeding the charter limit for each separate and distinct offense.^® Thus several distinct fines for separate acts, e. g., of retailing liquor on different days, may be imposed at one sitting of the council, notwith- standing the aggregate of the fines exceed the charter limit.®^ In one case the ordinance forbade, cutting down cedar and other trees, and imposed a penalty of $5 "for each and every offense;" in one proceeding and one judgment the offender was convicted of forty different offenses and fined $5 for each, making an aggregate of $200— each offense being supposed to consist in each tree by him cut down. Here it was held that the matter charged amounted to no more than a single offense, for, as the court observed, it may well be that every tree cut down of which the offender stood convicted was cut down in one day, and under the ordinance the cutting down of more trees than one at one time would be but one offense. The court held that but one offense had been committed, and as Law Rep., 269; 36 S. W. Rep., 4. Charter limit ?50, ordinance from ?20 to ?100, void as to ex- cess, but valid as to rest. Green- field V. Mook, 12 111., App., 281. , If within charter, valid.' Ope- lousas V. Giron, 46 La. Ann. (pt. 2), 1364; 16 So. Rep., 196. Charter, not exceeding $20, ordi- nance not less than $3, nor ex- ceeding 110, inconsistent and ordi- nance void. Landis v. Vineland, 54 N. J. L., 75; 23 Atl. Rep., 357. If penalty conflicts with general law of state it is void. Ex parte Solomon, 91 Cal., 440; 27 Pac. Rep., 757; In re Ah You, 88 Cal., Q9; 25 Pac. Rep., 974. 6* Deitz V. Central, 1 Colo., 323, 327; Pekin v. Smelzel, 21 111., 464, 469; Baldwin v. Murphy, 82 111., 485, 490; Quincy v. O'Brien, 24 111. App., 591; State v. Ludwig, 21 Minn., 202, 65 Taylor v. Owensboro, 98 Ky., 271; 56 Am. St. Rep., 361; 32 S. W. Rep., 948; Schroeder v. Charleston, 3 Brev. (S. C), 533. Assault and battery, ordinance penalty cannot be greater than state law. Petersburg v. Metzker, 21 111., 205. Ordinance penalty to be the same as that provided by statute. State V. Chase, 33 La. Ann., 287; Amboy v. Sleeper, 31 111., 499. Ordinance penalty less than stat- ute. Robbins v. People, 95 111., 175; Rice v. State, 3 Kan., 141, 164. Duration of imprisonment, see Section 173, supra. 66 Hart V. Albany, 9 Wend. (N. Y.), 571. 67 State ex rel. Heise v. Town Council of Columbia, 6 Rich. L. (S. C), 404, 386 OP PENALTIES. I § 1'''9 the aggregate fines exceeded the charter limit, the conviction was void.'^* In an English ease, one by-law required party walls to be of a prescribed thickness, under fixed penalty, and another by-law provided that if the ofi'ense should continue the offender should be liable to a further prescribed penalty for each day during which the offense should continue, after due written notice. Defendant was fined under the first by-law and afterwards again fined under the second by-law "for continuing the of- fense." On appeal, it was held that suffering the party wall to remain unaltered was not a "continuing offense" within the second by-law, or, if it was, that the by-law was unreason- able—the appropriate remedy being the removal of the struc- ture as authorized by law.*'^ In a Massachusetts case the organic law limited the penalty to $25 for each offense. The ordinance authorized the imposi- tion of a penalty of not less than $1, nor more than $5, for every hour that a person should keep his wagon in the market without legal permission, after notice to remove and until actual removal. Here it was said: "The offense thus pun- ished is a single continuous offense ; and the ordinance affixing a penalty which, computed according to its terms, may exceed $25 for a single offense upon one and the same day, is void. ' '^^ In an English case, defendant was convicted for exercising the trade of a baker on the Lord's Day and for selling hot loaves contrary to the statute, and fined for forty different sales of bread. On appeal, Lord Mansfield held that under the law but one offense for exercising his ordinary calling could be com- mitted on the same day.''* Where the charter limit is fixed at $100, an ordinance imposing a fine of $5 for every barrel of «s state ex rel. Truesdale v. shorter in point of duration, or Moultrieville, 1 Rice Law (S. C), wliether it consists of one or a 158. number of particular acts; that no Marshal v. Smith, L. R., 8 C. there was no idea conveyed by the P., 416. act that if a tailor sews on the TO Per Gray, C. J., in Common- Lord's day, every stitch he takes wealth v. Wilkins, 121 Mass., 356. is a separate offense, and (he 71 Lord Mansfield said: "The of- adds) there can be but one entire fense is exercising his ordinary offense on one and the same day; trade on the Lord's day, and, that killing a single hare is an offense, without any fraction of the day, but the killing of ten more on the hours or minutes; it is but one same day will not multiply the entire offense, whether longer or offense, or the penalty imposed § ISO] OF PENALTIES. 287 flour sold in violadon of the inspectio'ii regulation cannot be enforced beyond the limit. The transaction of sale was held to be but one offense, and the ordinance was construed to im- pose a fine of $5 for each barrel sold in violation of its provision until the sum reaches one hundred dollars in the same sale. The court said that any other construction would invalidate the ordinance.''^ go where the limit was $250 fine, an ordinance providing a fine of $125 for every one hundred pounds of gun- powder unlawfully kept in violation of its provisions, was held void, for a violation of the by-law in any one prosecution could not exceed the charter limit.'^^ For the offense of keeping a dramshop without a license, the ordinance cannot make each sale of liquor a separate and distinct offense.^^ So under an ordinance forbidding the sale and exposing for sale of certain commodities on Sundays, one single act of selling cannot be divided into two offenses, one exposing to sale and another sell- ing.^5 In one case the ordinance provided a license of 50 cents per pole per year on each electric pole within the city, required owners thereof to number and designate with initials each pole, and imposed a penalty of five dollars for each and every offense upon any person "who shall violate any of the provisions of any section thereof." It was held that a com- pany refusing to mark and number its poles and take out a license was guilty of but one offense and liable to but one penalty; that a penalty could not be imposed for failure as to each separate pole.'^^ § ISO. Heavier penalty for second offense authorized. A municipal corporation empowered to impose penalties for the violation of its ordinances, may distinguish between a first and second offense, and may provide for a heavier penalty for such for killing one." Crepp v. Durden, a bar to any future proceedings Cowp. 640. for tlie balance." Quincy v. 72 "This ordinance is repugnant Quimby, 38 111., 274, 279. to their charter so far as it oper- ^-^ New York v. Ordrenan, 12 ates to itapose a penalty beyond one Johns (N. Y.), 122. hundred dollars, and is to that ex- " Eureka Springs v. O'Neal, 56 tent inoperative. It being a single Ark., 350; 19 S. W. Rep'., 969. transaction, a recovery, if other- '■> Brooklyn v. Toynbee, 31 Barb, wise authorized, could only be had (N. Y.), 282. to the extent of one hundred dol- t" Lancaster v. Edison Electric lars, and as the penalty could not Illuminating Co., 8 Pa. Co. Ct. be split, such a recovery would be Rep., 178. OF PENALTIES. [§180 violation subsequent to the first, provided the penalty in no ease exceeds the limit fixed by the charterJ^ '■? The ordinance affixed two penalties, one of a general, and another and higher penalty for a second offense, but neither exceed- ed the charter limit. Held valid. State (Staat) v. Washington, 45 N. J. L., 318, 322. Gradation of penalties in by-law of a trade corporation sustained. Butcher's Co. v. Bullach, 3 Bos. & Pul., 434. CHAPTEE VI. OP REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES And Herein Ordinances in Restraint of Trade. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. Express power to pass. Implied or incidental pow- ers. Mode of exercise of express power must be reason- able. Same — uniform rule nec- essary. Reasonableness a question of law for the court. Rules as to reasonableness under implied powers. Same — Englisb cases — cus- tom and usage. §188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. Same — illustrative cases. Ordinances in restraint of trade. Same — monopoly and ex- clusive privileges. Water and gas franchises as monopolies — ferries. Exclusive market privi- leges. Ordinances must not un- reasonably discriminate — classification. Same — illustrative cases. § 181. Express power to pass. Ordinances may be passed, first, by virtue of express grant of power; second, under a grant of power general in its nature; or, third, under inciden- tal or implied municipal powers. Where passed by virtue of express power, not inconsistent with the federal constitution or laws or the state constitution, and such power is substan- tially followed, or is exercised in a reasonable manner, the ordinance will be sustained, regardless of the opinion of the court respecting its reasonableness.^ "Where the power to 1 Alabama — Lindsay v. Annis- ton, 104 Ala., 257; 53 Am. St. Rep., 44; 16 So. Rep., 545. Colorado — Phillips v. Denver, 19 Colo., 179; 41 Am. St. Rep., 230; 34 Pac. Rep., 902. Illinois — Peoria v. Calhoun, 29 III., 317, 320. Indiana — Pittsburgh, etc., R. W. Co. V. Crown Point, 146 Ind., 421; 45 N. E. Rep., 587; Shelbyville v. Cleveland, etc., R. W. Co., 146 Ind., 66 ; 44 N. E. Rep., 929 ; Belling v. Evansville, 144 Ind., 644; 42 N. E. Rep., 621; Rund v. Fowler, 142 19 289 Ind., 214; 41 N. E. Rep., 456; Skaggs V. Martinsville, 140 Ind., 476; 49 Am. St. Rep., 209; 33 L. R. A., 781; 39 N. E. Rep., 241; Cham- per V. Greencastle, 138 Ind., 339; 35 N. E. Rep., 14; StefCy v. Mon- roe City, 135 Ind., 466; 41 Am. St. Rep., 436; 35 N. E. Rep., 121; Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co. v. Har- rington, 131 Ind., 426; 30 N. B. Rep., 37; Chamberlain v. Evans- ville, 77 Ind., 542. Louisiana — State v. Payssan, 47 La. Ann., 1029; 49 Am. St. Rep., 390; 17 So. Rep., 481. 290 OF REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES. [§181 enact the particular ordinance is specifically conferred on the municipality, the question whether it is reasonable can no more be raised so as to affect its validity than could the same ob- jection be raised against the statute so as to affect its valid- ity. "^ "The power of a court to declare an ordinance un- reasonable and therefore void is practically restricted to cases in which the legislature has enacted nothing on the subject- matter of the ordinance, and consequently to cases in which the ordinance was passed under the supposed incidental power of the corporation merely. ' '^ This rule is well illustrated in a Missouri case where the charter of the City of St. Louis author- ized that city to regulate bawdy houses. Napton, J., said: "It is a naked assumption to say that any matter allowed by Missouri — Morse v. Westport, 136 Mo., 276; 37 S. W. Rep., 932; Heman v. Ring, 85 Mo. App., 231. Minnesota — St. Paul v. Colter, 12 Minn., 41; 90 Am. Dec, 278. New York — People v. Pratt, 129 N. Y., 68; 29 N. B. Rep., 7; Brook- lyn V. Breslln, 57 N. Y., 591, 596. New Jersey — Haynes v. Cape May, 50 N. J. L., 55; 13 Atl. Rep., 231; Breninger v. Belvldere, 44 N. J. L., 350. South Carolina — Darlington v. Ward, 48 S. C, 570; 26 S. B; Rep., 906. United States — District of Co- lumbia V. Waggaman, 4 Mackey (D. C), 328. ■Ex parte Chin Yan, 60 Cal., 78, 83, where it is said that this rule "is sustained by common law and authority. It is the outcome of a judicious application of legal prin- ciples." Where a statute expressly au- thorizes a municipal board to des- ignate the number of street rail- way tracks that shall be laid in any street, lane or avenue of the city, the court cannot set aside as unreasonable an ordinance which authorizes the laying of a double track. State (Kennelly) v. Jer- sey City, 57 N. J. L., 293; 30 Atl. Rep., 531; 26 L. R. A., 281. "It is now pretty generally con- ceded that if a statute gives power to any person or body of persons to make rules for a specific pur- pose, the reasonableness of such rules, provided they are strictly confined to the purpose for which they are authorized to be made, is not examinable by the judges." Biggar, Mun. Manual of Canada, p. 331, citing Simmons v. Mailing Rural District Council, 13 Times L. R., 447, per Wright, J. "The question, therefore, wheth- er a municipal by-law is or is not reasonable appears to be, as a rule, only a branch of the question whether it is or is not ultra vires," Biggar, Mun. Manual of Canada, p. 331; Reg. v. Gravelle, 10 Ontario Rep., 735. If the by-law simply follows the words of the statute it will not be held unreasonable. Re Croome and City of Brantford, 6 Ontario Rep., 188, 191, 192; Re Milloy and Tp. of Onondaga, 6 Ontario Rep., 573, 577. 2 Shea V. Muncie, 148 Ind., 14, 23; 46 N. E. Rep., 138. 3 Coal Fleet v. JefCersonville, 112 Ind., 15, 19; 13 N. B. Rep., 115. §182] OF REASONABLENESS OP ORDINANCES. 291 the legislature is against public policy. The best indication of public policy is to be found in the enactments of our legislature. To say that such a law is of immoral tendency is disrespectful to the legislature, who no doubt designed to promote morality, and it is altogether unwarranted to suppose that the object of the law or the ordinance is for any purpose but to promote the morals and health of the citizens. Whether the ordinance in question is calculated to promote the object, is a question with which the courts have no concern."* But where authority to tax land for a local improvement is not expressly granted, but is to be implied from the authority delegated, an ordinance involving the exercise of it may be declared invalid because unreasonable.^ And in a Missouri case, it was held that in a suit on a special tax bill for the building of a sidewalk, evidence was admissible to show that the ordinance authorizing its construction was unnecessary and oppressive, it being located in an xininhabited portion of the city and disconnected with any other street or sidewalk. This case may be said to be exceptional, for it appears that there was ample charter power to construct sidewalks by special taxation.^ § 182. Implied or incidental powers. Courts will review the question as to reasonableness of ordinances passed under a grant of power general in its nature or under incidental or implied municipal powers, and if any given ordinance is found unreasonable will declare it void as a matter of law.'^ The * State V. Clarke, 54 Mo., 17, 36. interest of the corporation are o Skinker v. Heman, 64 Mo. App., void." Angell & Ames on Corp., 441. Sec. 347. « Corrlgan v. Gage, 68 Mo., 541. "If by-laws (passed under an au- ' Yates V. Milwaukee, 10 Wall, thority conferred in general (U. S.), 497; Springfield v. Starke, terms) are found to be partial and 93 Mo. App., 70; Lamar v. Weid- unequal in their operation as be- man, 57 Mo. App., 507; Livingston tween different classes; if they V. Wolf, 136 Pa. St., 519; 20 Am. are manifestly unjust; if they dis- St. Rep., 936; 20 Atl, Rep., 551. close bad faith; if they involve Ordinances "must be such as such oppressive or gratuitous in- prudence and reason require, not terference with the rights of those necessarily prejudicial to private subject to them as can find no rights and interests." Hayes v. Ap- justification in the minds of rea- pleton, 24 Wis., 540. sonable men — the court may well "By-laws which are nugatory say 'Parliament never intended and vexatious, unequal, oppressive to give authority to make such or manifestly detrimental to the rules. They are unreasonable and 293 OF REASONABLENESS OP ORDINANCES. [§ 183 grounds upon which an ordinance may be declared void for unreasonableness have been said to be three : First, where it is oppressive, unequal and unjust ; second, when it is altogether unreasonable ; and third, when unreasonable.^ ' ' Whenever a by-law seeks to alter a well settled and fundamental principle of the common law, or to establish a rule interfering with the rights, or endangering the security of individuals or the public, a statute, or other special authority, emanating from the creat- ing power, must be shown to legalize it."** Where the ordi- nance is fairly within the incidental or implied powers of the municipal corporation, is positive, definite and certain in its terms, general, uniform and impartial in its operation, and is not in restraint of trade, oppressive or in contravention of common rights, it will not be declared unreasonable.^'' § 183. Mode of exercise of express power must be reason- able. The mode prescribed for the exercise of the power must be strictly followed,' ^ and where the ordinance provisions are more specific and detailed than the expression of general power conferred, the court will determine the reasonableness of such provisions.!^ And where the mode of the exercise of a power expressly granted is not prescribed, courts will assume to determine whether the provisions of the ordinance respect- ing the mode adopted is reasonable. Thus, notwithstanding ultra vires.' " ■ Per Lord Russell, s Cape Girardeau v. Riley, 72 C. J., in Kruse v. Johnson, 2 Q. Mo., 220; Plattsburg v. Riley, 42 B., 91; 14 Times L. R., 416; Da- Mo. App., 18; Kansas City v. Cook, vies V. Morgan, 1 Cromp. & J., 38 Mo. App., 660; State v. Beattie, 587; Chamberlain of London v. 16 Mo. App., 131. Crompton, 7 D. & R., 597 ; Clark » Per Hornblower, C. J., in Tay- V. Le Cren, 9 B. & C, 52; Gosling lor v. Griswold, 14 N. J. L., 222, V. Veley, 12 Q. B., 328; Society of 235. Scriveners v. Brooking, 3 Q. B., lo Phillips v. Denver, 19 Colo., 95; Blwood v. Bullock, 6 Q. B., 179; 41 Am. St. Rep., 230; 34 Pac. 383; Re McCutchon and City of Rep., 902; Tugman v. Chicago, 78 Toronto, 22 Up. Can. Q. B., 613; 111., 405. See Sec. 14, supra. Waite V. Garston Local Board of n Biggar, Municipal Manual of Health, L. R. 3 Q. B., 5; Hall v. Canada, p. 331; State (Delaware, Nixon, L. R. 10 Q. B., 152. L. & W. R. Co.) v. East Orange, 41 "It is elementary that ordlnan- N. J. L., 127; People v. Armstrong, ces other than those passed by vir- 73 Mich., 288; 16 Am. St. Rep., tue of express grant of power must 578; 2 L. R. A., 721; 41 N. W. be reasonable and not oppressive." Rep., 275. Lane v. Concord, 70 N. H., 485, 12 State (Trenton Horse R. Co.) 488; 49 Atl. Rep., 687, relating to v. Trenton, 53 N. J. L., 132; 20 nuisances. Atl. Rep., 1076. §183j OP REASOlsfABLBNfilSS OF ORDINANCES. '29^ the existence of express powei', an ordinance was held unrea- sonable in a Virginia case, which provided for the time of election of certain city officers by the council where the effect of which was to allow the expiring council to select such officers, who would serve during the incumbency of the new council, only three days before the council would go out of existence. Under the circumstances the court was of the opinion that the policy of the electors, as shown by the elec- tion of the new council, should not be set at naught by the action of the old council.^^ "Where the charter gave the city express authoritj'^ to construct and regulate the use of sewers, an ordinance was sustained in a Missouri case which denied permits to connect private sewers with the city's sewers until the applicant had paid a special tax bill due the contractor who built the sewer with which connection was sought.^* On the other hand, in a New Jersey case an ordinance was de- clared void which refused a supply of water from the city water works on proper application of the owner, because his tenant was in arrears for water furnished to him by the city, while such tenant rented another house, owned by another person. The court said that to refuse to furnish water to the tenant, unless the owner should pay a debt due from the tenant to the city for water furnished to him elsewhere on premises not belonging to the applicant, would obviously be to compel him to pay the tenant's debt as a condition precedent to obtaining the water for his premises while occupied by the tenant.'^ In the Missouri case, the court, in effect, compels the applicant to pay his debt, not due to the city, but to a contractor who built the sewer. The power to regulate sewers is entirely different from the power to enforce payment of valid indebtedness. Undoubtedly the city was authorized to make all reasonable regulations in order to secure and protect the public, but a regulation for the sole benefit of contractors, to enable them to collect special tax bills, could hardly be con- .sidered as a regulation for the benefit of the public. The contractor was fully protected. The city had issued him valid tax bills which were enforceable against the applicant's prop- erty.i® Under a charter authorizing the town to require all isKirkham v. Russell, 76 Va., is Dayton v. Quigley, 29 N. J. 956. Bq., 77. I* Hill V. St. Louis, 159 Mo., 159; ic The St. Louis Court of Ap- 60 S. W. Rep., 116. peals prior to the decision of the 294 OF REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES. [§184 male citizens between the ages of twenty-one and fifty to work on the streets, an ordinance imposing such duty on those be- tween twenty and forty-five years was held to be a reasonable exercise of the power, although those between forty-five and fifty were not included.!^ § 184. Same — - Uniform rule necessary. Notwithstanding express power may exist to enact, the ordinance must provide a uniform rule of action; it must contain permanent legal provisions, operating generally and impartially, for its en- forcement cannot be left to the will or unregulated discretion of the municipal authorities or any officer of the corporation.^* Where the ordinance, as, for example, regulates the use of steam boilers, which, in effect, commits to the unrestrained will of a public officer practically absolute power over the subject, Supreme Court made a contrary Geantinq or withholding li- ruling which appears to be en- tirely sound. State ex rel. v. Her- mann, 84 Mo. App., 1. CENSES. Yick Wo V. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 356; In re Tie Loy, 26 Fed. Rep., 611; State v. Conlon, 65 In authorizing the connection of Conn., 478; 33 Atl. Rep., 519; State private drains with city sewers Center v. Barenstein, 66 Iowa, where the apportionment of the 249; 23 N. W. Rep., 652. expenses is unequal the ordinance providing therefor will be held un- reasonable. Boston V. Shaw, 1 Met. (Mass.), 130. 17 Tipton V. Norman, 72 Mo., 380. IS An ordinance "cannot be sus- Smoking in street car. State V. Heidenhain, 42 La. Ann., 483; 21 Am. St. Rep., 388; 7 So. Rep., 621. Smoke ordinance — Dictum as to enforcing. St. Louis v. Heltze- berg P. & P. Co., 141 Mo., 375; 39 talned on the ground that the bor- L. R. A., 551; 64 Am. St. Rep., 516; ough officers understand it and 42 S. W. Rep., 954. will use it fairly. It does not de- serve to be called an ordinance at all, and especially a penal one, when it is so elastic in its provis- ions." (The ordinance related to Miscellaneous Instanoes. Arkansas — Helena v. Dwyer, 64 Ark., 424; 62 Am. St. Rep., 206; 42 S. W. Rep., 1071. Colorado — May v. People, 1 Colo. licensing wagons of non-resi- App., 157; 27 Pac. Rep., 1010. dents.) Per Lowrie, J., in Ben- nett V. Birmingham, 31 Pa. St., 15, 18. Regulation of street parades and permits therefor. In re Fra- zee, 63 Mich., 396, 407; 30 N. W. Rep., 72; Chicago v. Trotter, 136 111., 430; 26 N. E. Rep., 359; An- derson V. Wellington, 40 Kan., 173 ; Florida — Jacksonville v. Led- with, 26 Fla., 163; 23 Am. St. Rep., 558; 7 So. Rep., 885. Illinois — Lake View v. Letz, 44 111., 81; Braceville v. Doherty, 30 111. App., 645. Indiana — Bills v., Goshen, 117 Ind., 221; 20 N. E. Rep., 115; Ev- ansville v. Martin, 41 Ind., 145; 19 Pac. Rep., 719. See sees. 416 Richmond v. Dudley, 129 Ind., 112; and 466, post. 28 N. E. Rep., 312. Regulating navigation. Horn Kansas — Kansas City v. McDon- V. People, 26 Mich., 221, 226. §184] OF REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES. 295 it is unreasonable.!" But in Massachusetts, ordinances giving limited discretionary powers to public officers have been sus- tained, as an ordinance providing that awnings extending over the streets shall not be maintained without the consent of the mayor and alderman, and conferring power to forbid the use of awnings altogether respecting particular buildings.^" So an ordinance of St. Paul regulating cabs, hacks, and carriages, which provided that hackmen and drivers of hacks, etc., when at any railroad depot, station or theater, etc., shall obey the commands and direction of the police officer on duty at such place and shall take the places assigned them, was sustained as proper police regulations for the preservation of order, etc.^i aid, 60 Kan., 481; 57 Pac. Rep., 123; Crawford v. Topeka, 51 Kan., 756; 37 Am. St. Rep., 323; 33 Pac. Rep., 476. Louisiana — State v. Morris, 47 La. Ann., 1660; 18 So. Rep., 710. Massachusetts — Newton v. Bel- ger, 143 Mass., 598; 10 N. E. Rep., 464. Mississippi — Pieri v. Shields- boro, 42 Miss., 493. New York — New York v. Dry Dock, etc., R. R. Co., 133 N. Y., 104; 30 N. B. Rep:, 563; 28 Am. St. Rep., 609. North Carolina — State v. Web- ber, 107 N. C, 962; 12 S. B. Rep., 598; State v. Hunter, 106 N. C, 796; 11 S. E. Rep., 366; State v. Tenant, 110 N. C, 609; 14 S. E. Rep., 387. South Carolina — St. Luke's Ch. V. Mathews, 4 Des. (S. C), 578; 6 Am. Dec, 619. United States — Barthet v. New Orleans, 24 Fed. Rep., 563. 19 Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md., 217; 21 Alb. L. Journal, 117. 20 Pedrick v. Bailey, 12 Gray (Mass.), 161. By statute a city was made lia- ble to damages resulting from the fall of awnings dangerous to pe- destrians. Drake v. Lowell, 13 Mete. (Mass.), 292. 21 "It is a matter of common knowledge that at and about the hours of the arrival and departure of trains, confusion and disorderly howling and breaches of the peace are very apt to occur at and about depots and stations in considerable towns, especially among those who are engaged in carrying passen- gers and baggage from such de- pots and stations. The only eflB- cient preventive or remedy in the premises appears to be to put a police officer upon the spot, whose duty it shall be to enforce such applicable ordinances as the city council, in the exercise of char- tered powers, may have seen fit to adopt. This seems to be the gen- eral if not universal practice in all large cities and towns. As it is manifestly impracticable and impossible to define minutely ev- ery case of disorder or confusion it is proper — in fact, it is neces- sary — that the officer on duty should be invested with some gen- eral authority to preserve order, and thus determine on the emer- gency what acts are disorderly or likely to lead to disorder, though, of course, this authority would not justify him in arbitrary or unrea- sonable action. Upon these grounds we think the ordinance in ques- 396 OF REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES. [§185 § 185. Reasonableness a question of law for the court. The doctrine is uniformly supported that the question whether an ordinance is reasonable is one of law for the court. ^^ In pass- ing on the reasonableness of ordinances, the court will consider all of the circumstances, the necessity of such regulations, and will usually consider somewhat in detail the various provisions tion valid and justifiable. The as- signing of a particular place to each hackman would appear to be peculiarly and happily adapted to the preservation of order. By this practice every one is informed ex- actly where his proper place is, so that the strife and contention for particular places which would oth- erwise ensue is measurably, at any rate, prevented.. The authority thus to assign places must neces- sarily be committed to some po- liceman on duty at the depot or station." St. Paul v. Smith, 27 Minn., 364; 7 N. W. Rep., 734. Ordinance forbidding the con- ducting of a house of ill-fame in an "indecent manner," necessarily clothes the magistrate with dis- cretion in determining whether particular acts proved are inde- cent, but it is not void for that reason. Shreveport v. Roos, 35 La. Ann., 1010. Discretion may be vested in offi- der respecting enforcement of law, e. g., as to use of bicycle or tri- cycle or other non-horse vehicles, on highways, where the discretion is for the lawful purpose of effect- uating the just intent of the law. State V. Yopp, 97 N. C, 477, 482; 2 Am. St. Rep., 305; 2 S. E. Rep., 458. But arbitrary powers conferred upon officers cannot be sustained. Yick Wo V. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 356. 22 Alabama — Greensboro v. Ehr- enreich, 80 Ala., 579; 60 Am. Rep., 130. California — Ex parte Frank, 52 Cal., 606; 28 Am. Rep., 642, Illinois — Hawes v. Chicago, 158 111., 653; 42 N. E. Rep., 373. Maine — State v. Boardman, 93 Me., 73; 44 Atl. Rep., 118. Massachusetts — Austin v. Mur- ray, 16 Pick. (Mass.), 121; Boston V. Shaw, 1 Met. (Mass.), 130; In re Goddard, 16 Pick. (Mass.), 504; Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. (Mass.), 462. New Jersey — State (Long) v. Jersey City, 37 N. J. L., 348, 351; Paxson V. Sweet, 13 N. J. L., 196. New York — Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 N. Y., 591; Hudson v. Thome, 7 Paige Ch. (N. Y.), 261; Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow. (N. Y.), 462; Buffalo V. Webster, 10 Wend. (N. Y.), 100; People ex rel. v. Throop, 12 Wend. (N. Y.), 183, 186. Pennsylvania — Commissioners of Northern Liberties v. Northern Liberties Gas Co., 12 Pa. St., 318, 321; Kneedler v. Norristown, 100 Pa. St., 368; 45 Am. Rep., 383; Fisher v. Harrisburg, 2 Grant Cas. (Pa.), 291. Texas — Austin v. Austin City Cemetery Assn., 87 Tex., 330; 47 Am. St. Rep., 114; 28 S. W. Rep., 528. As to power to pass. Peoria v. Calhoun, 29 111., 317, 320. Private corporation. State v. Overton, 24 N. J. L., 435, 440; Ma- rion V. Chandler, 6 Ala., 899; South Florida R. R. Co. v. Rhodes, 25 Fla., 40; 5 So. Rep., 633; 23 Am. St. Rep., 506; Hibernia L. B. Co. V. Com., 93 Pa. St., 264. As to speed of train. Zumault v. K. C. & I. Air Line, 71 Mo. App., 670. §186] OF REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES. 297 of the ordinance.^* A few Wisconsin cases have held that, under particular circumstances, it was entirely proper to look into the facts and submit the question of reasonableness of the ordinances to the jury.^* § 186. Rules as to reasonableness tinder implied powers. It has been well said that, "the legal rule that by-laws must be reasonable is perhaps as definite as it can be made with safety. ' '^^ However, certain judicial expressions may serve as general guides. It must appear from the inherent character of the act, or by evidence of the operation of the ordinance, that it is unreasonable.^^ The reasonableness of the ordinance is not to be tested in all cases by its application to ex- treme illustrations.^'' "An ordinance, general in its scope, may be adjudged reasonable as applied to one state of facts and unreasonable when applied to circumstances of a different character. ' '^s Thus an ordinance regulating the use of streets by railroads, although unreasonable in its application to one or two streets, will not be vacated in its entirety on such account — the remedy is to resist its enforcement in such local- ity.^^ So an ordinance may be valid in its general purpose. Regualting pawnbrokers. Laun- der V. Chicago, 111 111., 291. 23 Los Angeles Co. v. Hollywood Cemetery Assn., 124 Cal., 344; 71 Am. St. Rep., 75; 57 Pac. Rep., 153; In re Vandine, 6 Pick. (Mass.), 187; Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 Cush. (Mass.), 562, 569; Bvison v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 45 Minn., 370; 48 N. W. Rep., 6; Lamar v. Weidman, 57 Mo. App., 507; Han- nibal V. Mo. & K. T. Co., 31 Mo. App., 23; Austin v. Austin City Cemetery Assn., 87 Tex., 330; 47 Am. St. Rep., 114; 28 S. W. Rep., 628. 24 Clason V. Milwaukee, 30 Wis., 316; Hayes v. Appleton, 24 Wis., 542; Atkinson v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 60 Wis., 141, 160; 18 N. W. Rep., 764. 23 Per Campbell, C. J., In re Fra- zee, 63 Mich., 396, 407; 30 N. W. Rep., 72. "The question whether a by-law Is reasonable or not usually de- pends upon whether it can reason- ably be considered as authorized by general words used in the char- ter or statute under the presumed authority of which it has been passed. In many of the earlier cases, thB Judges in determining upon the reasonableness of by-laws assumed a much larger jurisdic- tion in this respect than would at present be deemed proper." Big- gar, Mun. Manual of Canada, p. 330. 26 Consolidated Traction Co. v. Elizabeth, 58 N. J. L., 619; 32 L. R. A., 170; 34 Atl. Rep., 146. 27 Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass., 375, 382; 19 N. B. Rep., 224; Commonwealth v. Cutter, 156 Mass., 52, 56; 29 N. E. Rep., 1146. 28 Nicoulin v. Lowrey, 49 N. J. L., 391, 394; 8 Atl. Rep., 513; Skinkef V. Heman, 64 Mo. App., 441. 29 State (Pa, R. R. Co.) v. Jersey 298 OF REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES. [§186 but unreasonable and oppressive as applied to certain prop- erty.'"' The ordinance must be reasonable as applied to the particular subject matter.^i Judicial authority to declare an ordinance unreasonable is a power to be cautiously exercised.^^ The rule is generally recognized that municipal corporations are prima facie the sole judges respecting the necessity and reasonableness of their ordinances,*^ and hence the legal pre- sumption is in their favor, unless the contrary appears on their face or is established by proper evidence."* Thus, while an ordinance requiring street railways to run not less than one City, 47 N. J. L., 286, 289. See Sees. 29, 30, supra. 30 If an ordinance is oppressive as applied to certain property, the owner thereof may, by proper pro- ceedings, test its validity, if done within seasonable time. Heman-v. Ring, 85 Mo. App., 231. 31 Willow Springs v. Withaupt, 61 Mo. App., 275; People v. Arm- strong, 73 Mich., 288; 16 Am. St. Rep., 578; 41 N. W. Rep., 275; 2 L. R. A., 721. 32 Commonwealth v. Robertson, 5 Cush. (Mass.), 438. 33 Alabama — Greensboro v. Ehr- enreich, 80 Ala., 579; 60 Am. Rep., 130; Van Hook v. Selma, 70 Ala., 361; 45 Am. Rep., 85. California — Ex parte Delaaey, 43 Cal., 478; Ex parte Smith, 38 Cal., 702. Kentucky — Louisville v. Roupe, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.), 591. Maryland — Sprigg v. Garrett Park, 89 Md., 406. Massachusetts — Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass., 221. Missouri — Lamar v. Weidman, 57 Mo. App., 507; Hannibal v. M. & K. Tel. Co., 31 Mo: App., 23. Pennsylvania — Bailey v. Phila- delphia, 184 Pa. St., 594; 63 Am. St. Rep., 812; 39 Atl. Rep., 494. "As by-laws are the rules of action which the inhabitants of a place prescribe for their own government, there is a ■ peculiar propriety in permitting them to be the judges of what rules are necessary and proper, and such is the constant, the invariable practice." Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala., 137, 143; 36 Am. Dec, 441. "Where the municipal legisla- ture has authority to act it must be governed not by our, but by its own discretion; and we shall not be hasty in convicting them of being unreasonable in the exercise of it." Fisher v. Harrisburg, 2 Grant Cases (Pa.), 291, 296. "As a rule the municipality is the best judge of its own affairs; and it is probably an extreme case in which the court would inter fere." Per Wilson, C. J., In re O'Meara and City of Ottawa, 11 Ontario Rep., 603, 609; Re Prince and City of Ottawa, 25 Up. Can. Q. B., 175; Re Snell and Town of Belleville, 30 Up. Can. Q. B., 81; Re Cribbin and City of Toronto, 21 Ontario Rep., 325; Reg. v. Peter- sky, 4 British Columbia Rep., 384. 34 Standard Oil Co. v. Danville, 199 111., 50, 54; 64 N. E. Rep., 1110; Swift V. Klein, 163 111., 269; 45 N. E. Rep. 219; People v. Cregier, 138 111., 401; 28 N. E. Rep., 812. There is a legal presumption that the ordinance is reasonable and the burden is upon the one § 187] OF REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES. 299 ear every twenty minutes, between certain hours, will be pre- sumed to be reasonable, it may be avoided by proving that the convenience of passengers does not require the running of cars as specified.-'"' In questions of doubt, the courts are inclined to defer to the discretion and judgment of the municipal authorities.^" "To arrive at a correct decision whether the by-law be reasonable or not, regard must be had to its object and necessity.. Minute regulations are required in a great city which would be absurd in the country. "^'^ Likewise, a reason- able regulation, intended to operate in a densely populated part of a city, might be unreasonable as applied to parts of the same city sparsely populated.^* Therefore all of the sur- rounding conditions must be carefully considered. It is thus manifest that, as a rule, the municipal authorities are more competent to pass on such questions than judicial tribunals. In recognition of this fact, the rule is of universal application that a clear case should be made out to authorize the court to interfere with the exercise of the police powers of a municipal corporation on the ground of unreasonableness.^** § 187. Same— English cases— Custom and usage. It is im- portant to observe that the ancient English cases cannot always be taken as satisfactory precedents and guides in this country, "inasmuch as it is quite obvious that in many of them, and who denies its validity. State of the municipal legislature." (Trenton Horse R. Co.) v. Tren- Kansas City v. McAleer, 31 Mo. ton, 53 N. J. L., 132; 20 Atl. Rep., App., 433, 436. 1076. 2' Per Putnam, J., In re Van- 35 Mayor, etc., of New York v. dine, 6 Pick. (Mass.), 187, 191; 17 B. D. E. B. & B. R. Co., 133 N. Y., Am. Dec, 351. 104; 28 Am. St. Rep., 609; 30 N. B. ss Ordinance prohibiting inter- Rep., 563. ments in sparsely settled portion 36 North Chicago City R. R. v. of the city held unreasonable. Lake View, 105 111., 207; 44 Am. Austin v. Murray, 16 Pick. (Mass.), Rep., 788; Hannibal v. M. & K. Tel. 121. See Sec. 32, supra. Co., 31 Mo. App., 23; St. Louis v. 39 Com. v. Mulhall, 162 Mass., Green, 7 Mo. App., 468; 70 Mo., 496; 39 N. E. Rep., 183; 44 Am. St. 572; St. Louis v. Griswold, 58 Mo., Rep., 387; Com. v. Ellis, 158 Mass., 175, 192; Plattsburg v. Riley, 42 555; 33 N. B. Rep., 651; Com. v. Mo. App., 18; Kansas City v. Cook, Elliott, 121 Mass., 367; Plattsburg 38 Mo. App., 660; State v. Able, 65 v. Riley, 42 Mo. App., 18; State v. Mo., 357. Pond, 93 Mo., 606; Kansas City v. "In determining whether it is Cook, 38 Mo. App., 660 ; Chillicothe reasonable, the court should not v. Brown, 38 Mo. App., 609; State substitute its discretion for that v. Beattie, 16 Mo. App., 131; St. 300 OF REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES. [§ 188 particularly those where the ordinance seemed most question- able as not being within the ordinary exercise of municipal authority, the by-laws were sustained upon the ground of an- cient and long continued usage, ripening into a prescriptive right on the part of the municipal corporation. No such ground can be urged here."*** Therefore, when any given ordinance is objected to as being unreasonable, if it is to be sustained, as stated in a well considered Massachusetts case, it "must be sho-wn to be authorized by the express provision of the charter, or be derived as an incidental power resulting from its incorporation as a city, or be found in some general or special statute. "*i § 188, Same— Illustrative cases. An ordinance passed under general powers prohibiting the opening of streets for the pur- pose of laying gas mains during the winter season, as from December 1st to the following March, was held reasonable and binding on the gas eompanj', but Avhere such ordinance forbids the gas company from opening a paved street for the purpose of laying pipes from the main to the opposite side of the street it is unreasonable and void.''^ So, under general power, an ordinance forbidding the running of a steamboat unless pro- vided with a spark-catcher, screen or other device, "substan- tially attached in or upon the smoke-stack, * * * so as to prevent the escape of sparks or burning cinders- therefrom as effectually as the same can be prevented by any means known or in use for that purpose." was held unreasonable.*^ So, Louis V. Weber, 44 IVio., 547; St. each side of the street, instead of Louis V. Spiegel, 8 Mo. App., 478; one, thereby materially increasing Allen town v. Western Union Tel. the expense (p. 323) to the compa- Co., 148 Pa. St., 117; 23 Atl. Rep., ny, and consequently enhancing 1070; 33 Am. St. Rep., 820; Mil- the price of gas to the inhabitants waukee v. Gross, 21 Wis., 241; 91 of the district. This, we think, an Am. Dec, 472. unreasonable exercise of authority, 40 Per Dewey, J., in Common- and consequently not within the wealth V. Stodder, 2 Cush. (Mass.), power of the board. A by-law 562, 569; 48 Am. Dec, 679. must be reasonable and for the *i Per Dewey, J., in Common- common benefit; it must not be wealth V. Stodder, 2 Cush. (Mass.), in restraint of trade, nor ought It 562, 569 ; 48 Am. Dec, 679 ; Herzo to impose a burden without an ap- V. San Francisco, 33 Cal., 134, 145. parent benefit." Comrs. of North- *2 In this case it was said, per em Liberties v. Northern Liberties Rogers, J., "The effect of the ordi- Gas Co., 12 Pa. St., 318, 322, 323. nance is, to compel the company m "Under this ordinance every to construct two mains, one on steamboat owner, no matter how §188] OF REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES. 301 without special grant, a police regulation requiring the city constable to attend theater performances and requiring the proprietor to pay the constable, is unreasonable and void.** An ordinance making, the owner of a dog liable to a penalty if such dog bite any person on the street was held reasonable. Here it appears that the state law made the owner of the dog liable ' ' to the party injured for all damages done by such dog, ' ' without proof of scienter.*^ Under general power, an ordinance forbidding circulars, handbills, advertising matter, etc., from being distributed or circulated on the streets or public places was held unreasonable.*" But in Massachusetts it has been held that under the power to make all "such salutary and needful by-laws, ' ' etc., as deemed necessary, an ordinance pro- Jiibiting the carrying on the sidewalk of show boards, placards or signs, etc., for the purpose of display, was reasonable where passed for a populous city, as Boston.*^ Further illustrations appear in the cases in the notes,*^ in the chapters on Ordinances careful he had been to use the means of preventing the sparks from escaping from the smoke- stack of his boat while navigating the harbor, would still be liable for a violation of the ordinance if a jury could be satisfied that his device was not the best known or In use; and if the ordinance is to be strictly enforced he would be equally liable although the de- vice used was as effective for the purpose as any other, if it were not substantially attached in or to the smokestack. Amidst the hundreds of devices known or used it would be very difiBcult, indeed, for the steamboat owner to satisfy the requirements of the ordinance and more difficult to satisfy a jury that he had in fact adopted the best known one in use. A law which inflicts a penalty or punish- ment ought to be so plainly drawn as to clearly point out the act to be punished. This ordinance fails to do that, and is therefore, we think, unreasonable." Atkinson v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 60 Wis., 141, 160; 50 Am. Rep., 352; 18 N. W. Rep., 764. ** Waters v. Leech, 3 Ark., 110. 45 Commonwealth v. Steffee,' 7 Bush. (Ky.), 16L 46 People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich., 288; 16 Am. St. Rep., 578; 2 L. R. A., 721; 41 N. W. Rep., 275. Compare Philadelphia v. Brahen- der, 201 Pa. St., 574, 578; 51 Atl. Rep., 374. i^ Commonwealth v. McCafEerty, 145 Mass., 384; 14 N. B. Rep., 451. is Board of Directors of bank passed resolutions excluding one of its members from an inspection of its books; held unreasonable. "A by-law, to be entitled to the name, must be some regulation which operates on all alike." Per Savage, C. J., in People ex rel. v. Throop, 12 Wend. (N. Y.), 183, 186. Rule denying admission to pub- lic school on account of deficient knowledge of grammar held unrea- sonable. Trustees v. People, 87 111., 303. 303 OP REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES. [§189 Relating to Municipal Police Powers,'''-' and the Constitutional- ity of Ordinances.^" § 189. Ordinances in restraint of trade. All ordinances, having the effect of interfering with or restraining trade or commerce, are void."^ An ordinance requiring coal, grains and heavy products sold in the city to be weighed by city weigher, held not to be in restraint of traders So, one forbidding fast driving is not in restraint of trade.^^ But ordinances and con- tracts limiting or restraining competition for public work are generally held void, notwithstanding the charter may not expressly forbid them.^* Ordinances or by-laws which neces- sarily restrain competition and tend to create monopolies or confer exclusive privileges are generally condemned. Thus an ordinance, conferring the exclusive right on one firm to slaugh- ter animals, is void.^^ But in Missouri an ordinance was sus- tained as a proper police regulation against the contention that it was in restraint of trade and created a monopoly, which conferred upon certain persons therein named the exclusive privilege of removing all animals and allowing them to boil, steam and render the carcasses of the same on boats outside of the city, and prohibiting all other persons from in any *!> Chapter XIV. ice cream, cakes, nuts, fruits, etc.," 50 Chapter VIII. held to he in restraint of trade. 01 California — Ex parte Frank, Barling v. West, 29 Wis., 307, 315; 52 Cal., 606; 28 Am. Rep., 642; Ex 9 Am. Rep., 576. parte McKenna, 126 Cal., 429; 58 52 Davis v. Anita, 73 Iowa, 325; Pac. Rep., 916. 35 N. W. Rep., 244; O'Malley v. Illinois — Inman v. Chicago, 78 Preeport, 97 Pa. St., 24. See sec. 111., 405 ; Caldwell v. Alton, 33 111., 485, post. 416; 85 Am. Dec, 282. ss Sec. 464, post. Massachusetts — Com. v. Stodder, s* Atlanta v. Stein, 111 Ga., 789; 2 Cush. (Mass.), 562; 48 Am. Dec, 36 S. E. Rep., 932; Elliott v. Pitts- 679. burgh, 6 Pa. Dist. Rep., 455; St. Minnesota — St. Paul v. Laidler, Louis Quarry & C. Co. v. Van Ver- 2 Minn., 190; 72 Am. Dec, 89. sen, 81 Mo. App., 519; St. Louis Mississippi — Kosciusko v. Slom- Quarry & Cont. Co. v. Frost, 90 herg, 68 Miss., 469; 24 Am. St. Mo. App., 677; Adams v. Brenan, Rep., 281; 9 So. Rep., 297. 177 111., 194; 52 N. E. Rep., 314; New York — Dunham v. Roches- Holden v. Alton, 179 111., 318, 324; ter, 5 Cow. (N. Y.), 462. 53 N. E. Rep., 556, holding that re- Pennsylvania — Sayre v. Phillips, striction must increase cost of 148 Pa. St., 482; 24 Atl. Rep., 76. work, to render contract therefor Ordinances forbidding the sale void. See sec. 553, post. without license at temporary ss Chicago v. RumpfC, 45 111., 90, stands or tables of "any lemonade, 96; 92 Am. Dec, 196, § 189] OF REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES. 303 mannei' interfering or removing or using the carcasses except as specified in the legislative act under vs^hose express authority the ordinance was enacted.'^*' So, in a well considered Massa- chusetts ease, a by-law was sustained which prohibited those not duly licensed froin removing house dirt and offal from the city, against the contention that the regulation was in restraint of trade. Here it was observed: "Every regulation of trade is in some sense a restraint upon it ; it is some clog or impedi- ment, but it does not therefore follow that it is to be vacated. If the regulation is unreasonable, it is void; if it is necessary for the good government of society, it is good. ' ''^^ 58 The court, per Wagner, J., ob- served: "A law which unnecessa- rily and oppressively restrains a citizen from engaging in any traf- fic, or disposing of his property as he may see fit, although passed under the specious pretext of a preservative of the health of the inhabitants, would be void. Such a law would be unreasonable, and would deprive the people of the rights guaranteed to them by the organic law of the land. But if the regulation or prohibition con- tains nothing more than the neces- sary limitations, and is passed in good faith for the purpose of pre- serving the public health, and abating nuisances, it is not liable to objection. No man has an in- alienable right to produce disease, or trade in that which is noxious, and in every society some minor rights are surrendered for the gen- eral good. It is perfectly apparent that nothing can be more obnox- ious or offensive, or even detriment- al to the public health than the boiling, steaming and rendering the carcasses of dead animals. If the privilege of purchasing such animals was unrestricted and de- pended on the mere volition of the parties, then no absolute arrange- ment could be efifected by which the sanitary or police regulations could be carried out. Before they were sold, or the price agreed upon by the parties, they would lie and putrify, and produce infection and disease. Therefore the only safe and practicable mode of arresting and destroying the evil is to con- fine the removal to. persons who act under a license or contract, and who are bound to remove the carcasses promptly, and dispose of them In a way and at a place where the health of the inhabit- ants will not be interfered with or endangerd. The act does not mo- lest the owners of such dead ani- mals. They have a right to use the same if they choose to do so, and butchers and pork packers, when they possess the animals, either by purchase or consignment, are allowed the privilege of steam- ing, boiling and rendering them for their own purposes, and for their own account." State v. Fish- er, 52 Mo., 174, 177, 178. 57 In re Vandine, 6 Pick. (Mass.), 187, 190; 17 Am. Dec, 351. Com- pare this and other cases in this section on this subject with sec. 220, post. Miscellaneous iLLtisTKATioNS — Auction sales. Ordinance forbidding auction sales on streets, alleys, sidewalks and public grounds, held not to 304 OF REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES. i§ laO § 190. Same— Monopolies and exclusive privileges. Monop- olies may be created, but they can only be called into being by the sovereign power. Hence exclusive franchises or privileges in the nature of monopolies cannot be granted by a municipal corporation/'* even where no express prohibition is found in its charter or legislative act applicable; for in no instance will such power be implied.^" Thus a municipal corporation cannot grant, without authority from the legislature in direct and express terms, to any fuel or gas supply company a mo- nopoly of its streetSj^** nor can such exclusive authority be Minnesota— Kom v. St. Paul Fuel Exchange, 48 Minn., 215; 50 N. W. Rep., 1036. White V. 553, per be in restraint of. trade. Kent, 11 Ohio St., 550, Scott, C. J. Ordinance regulating the killing and bleeding of meats is not in restraint of trade. Brooklyn v. Cleves, Hill and Denio Supp. (N. "i.), 231, per Nelson, C. J. Regulating peddling meat, game, poultry, etc. Shelton v. Mobile, 30 Ala., 540; 68 Am. Dec, 143. Sale of cider. Monroe v. Law- rence, 44 Kan., 607; 27 Pac. Rep., 1113. Storage of petroleum, etc. Wat- ers-Pierce Oil Co. V. New Iberia, 47 La. Ann., 863; 17 So. Rep., 343. Reports of street car companies. St. Louis V. St. Louis R. R. Co., 89 Mo., 44; IS. W. Rep., 305; 14 Mo. App., 221; 58 Am. Rep., 82. Forbidding slaughtering within city. Milwaukee v. Gross, 21 Wis., 241; 91 Am. Dec, 472. By-laws of guilds, societies and PRIVATE coRroRATioNS in restraint of trade have always been con- demned. California — California Steam Nav. Co. V. Wright, 6 Cal., 258; 65 Am. Dec, 511. Illinois — American Live Stock Com. Co. V. Chicago Live Stock Exchange, 143 111., 210; 32 N. B. Rep., 274; 36 Am. St. Rep., 385. Kentucky — Sayre v. Louisville Union Benevolent Assn., 1 Duv. (Ky.), 143; 85 Am. Dec, 613. Missouri — Goddard v. Merchants' Exchange, 78 Mo., 609; 9 Mo. App., 290. New York — Matthews v. Asso- ciated Press, 136 N. Y., 333; 32 N. E. Rep., 981; 32 Am. St. Rep., 741. England — Green v. Durham, 1 Burr, 127; Rex v. Sturgeons, 2 Burr, 892; Cuddon v. Bastwick, 1 Salk., 193. 58 Logan V. Pyne, 43 Iowa, 524; 22 Am. Rep., 261; Brenham v. Brenham Water Co., 67 Tex., 542; 4 S. W. Rep., 143; Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 111., 90; 92 Am. Dec, 196; Re Brodie and Town of Bow- manville, 38 Up. Can. Q. B., 580; Biggar, Mun. Manual of Canada, p. 343, sec 330. 58 Kirkwood v. Meramec High- lands Co., 94 Mo. App., 637; Daven- port V. Kleinschmidt, 6 Mont., 502, 528; 13 Pac. Rep., 249; Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. Railroad Co., 11 Leigh (Va.), 42. But see State ex rel. v. Schwelckardt, 109 Mo., 496; 19 S. W. Rep., 47; Illinois, etc., Co. v. St. Louis, 2 Dillon C. C, 70. 60 Norwich G. L. Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn., 19; Capital City L. & F. Co. v. Tallahassee (Fla., 1900), 28 So. Rep., 810; Citi- zens' Gas Co. V. Elwood, 114 Ind., § 190] OF REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES; 305 granted to a railroad company to lay its tracks in the streets.''^ And while it has been held that the legislature may grant such exclusive privilege,®^ the weight of authority denies this power.6* Exclusive franchises in the nature of monopolies are not only presumed to be against public policy because preju- dicial to the public welfare, but the granting of them may have the eflEect, or at least a tendency, to impede or hamper the city in effectually executing its municipal functions, and if this results, all such grants would be void.^* While it is a settled maxim of the law that municipal corporations cannot grant a perpetual franchise, or exclusive privilege constituting a monopoly which will enable the grantee at some future time to take advantage of the necessities of the people by fixing exorbitant and oppressive rates, the view taken by the courts is that the circumstances of each case must largely determine the nature and effect of such grant.^^ "Courts of last resort have generally refrained from propounding an authoritative affirmative definition of the 'monopoly' so odious to the com- mon law and the genius of a free government. It would try the power of expression of most judges, if not human speech, to frame such a definition outside of which the grant or con- tract must wholly and clearly rest to escape the stroke of nul- lity. It has, therefore, been generally deemed wise and safe to use rather the process of exclusion, and determine what is 332; 16 N. B. Rep., 624; 20 Am. & and B. R. Co., 20 N. J. Eq., 360; Eng. Corp. Cas., 263; Parkersburg Cincinnati Ry. Co. v. Tel. Assn., 48 Gas Co. V. Parkersburg, 30 W. Va., Ohio St., 390; 29 Am. St. Rep., 435; 4 S. E. Rep., 650; Hamilton 559; Jackson County Horse Power Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Hamilton, Co. v. Interstate Rajjid Transit Co., 37 Fed. Rep., 832. Contra. New- 24 Fed. Rep., 306; 32 Am. & Eng. port V. Newport Light Co., 84 Ky., Ry. Cas., 216; New Jersey v. Yard, 166. 95 U. S., 104, 111. 61 Des Moines St. R. R. Co. v. sa In re N. Y. E. R. Co., 70 N. Y., Des Moines B. G. St. Ry. Co., 73 327. Iowa, 513; 33 N. W. Rep., 610; 35 oa Eliott on Roads and Streets, N. W. Rep., 602; Sherlock v. K. C. page 506 and cases.' B. Ry. Co., 142 Mo., 172; 43 S. W. 64 See New Orleans Gas Co. v. Rep., 629; Detroit C. S. Ry. v. De- Louisiana, 115 U. S., 650, 672; East troit, 110 Mich., 384; 68 N. W. St. Louis v. East St. Louis G. L. Rep., 304; 64 Am. St. Rep., 350, & C. Co., 98 IlL, 415; Carlyle W. L. note p. 359; 171 U. S., 48; Long v. & P. Co. v. Carlyle, 31 111. App., Duluth, 49 Minn., 280; 32 Am. St. 325; Decatur G. L. Co. v. Decatur, Rep., 547; Traphagen v. Jersey 24 111. App., 544. City. 52 N. J. L., 65; 18 Atl. Rep., 65 See 1 Eddy on Combinations, 586, 696; Jersey City v. Jersey City sees. 25 to 35; Beach on Monopo- 306 OF REASONABLENESS OP ORDINANCES. [§191 not a monopoly so far as the case in hand required."'^'' In Kansas an ordinance of Topeka provided that the mayor and council may appoint two or more persons as scavengers, who shall have the exclusive privilege of removing garbage from private premises, as well as public. This was held to be an attempt to create a monopoly, and therefore the ordinance was declared void.®'' § 191. Water and gas franchises as monopoly— Ferries. There are classes of exclusive privileges which are held not to be monopolies within the meaning of the common law, as ex- clusive right to erect a bridge and take tolls. ^^ Thus it ap- pears that exclusive privileges to supply water or gas are not considered monopolies according to the common law, because they do not deprive a class of persons of privileges of which they had anterior to the time of granting, been in possession.^^ At present this test of monopoly is certainly not applicable in lies and Industrial Trusts, sec. 117, et seg. C6 Laredo v. International Bridge & T. Co., 66 Fed. Rep., 246, 248. oT/re re Lowe, 54 Kan., 757, 762; 39 Pac. Rep., 710. As to contract giving exclusive privilege of receiving and cremat- ing garbage and authorizing the collection of a fixed charge there- for. Sanitary R. Works v. Cali- fornia R. Co., 94 Fed. Rep., 693. Giving power to a street railway to acquire the whole or part of any existing railway, by purchase or otherwise, held not to create a monopoly. Wood v. Seattle, 23 Wash., 1; 62 Pac. Rep., 135. License to sell goods as exclu- sive privilege. State v. Conlon, 65 Conn., 478; 33 Atl. Rep., 519. 08 Enfield Toll Bridge v. H. & N. H. R. R. Co., 17 Conn., 40; Power v. Athens, 99 N. Y., 592, 598; 2 N. E. Rep., 609; 10 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 54; Hudson v. Emigration Co., 47 Tex., 56; Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken, 1 Wall (U. S.), 116; Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall (U. S.), 51; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. (U. S.), 507; Conway v. Taylor, 1 Black. (U. S.), 603. 69 The common law definition, as given by Sir Edward Coke, who gave much study to the matter of monopolies, and who was chair- man of the committee of the House of Commons to which the bill was referred, which afterwards became the English "Statute of Monopo- lies" (21 James I, Ch. 3, A. D. 1624) under which monopolies in England were abolished, thus de- fines a monopoly : "A monopoly is an institution or allowance by the king (the sovereign power), by his grant, commission, or other- wise, to any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, of or for the sole buying, selling, mak- ing, working, or using of anything whereby any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, are sought to be restrained of any freedom or liberty that they had before, or hindered in their lawful trade." 3 Inst., 181. In the early English law this definition may have been technically correct, and §192] OF REASONABLENESS OP ORDINANCES. 301 all eases/" Howe-ver, the courts hold that such grant is a contract presumably conferred, not as a special favor upon the grantee, but for the public welfare. The main condition is to render the public a special service, and breach of this invali- dates the grant. As such grants are not void at common law, they are held not to be in contravention of public policy, but they are protected by the constitutional provisions . against impairing the obligations of contracts.'^i § 192. Exclusive market privileges. A contract with a vil- lage to build a market house and to put it under control of the village for ten years, in consideration that the rents thereof would be paid to the grantee, to appoint a person to superin- tend it, permit no other market house to be erected or used, nor articles specified sold elsewhere in the village during the ten years, was held void by the Supreme Court of Michigan as against public policy. The reasons for the doctrine are thus clearly given by Cooley, J., who delivered the opinion of the court: "If a municipal corporation can preclude itself in this manner from establishing markets whenever they may be thought desirable, or from abolishing them when thought un- desirable, it must have the right also to agree that it will not open streets, or grade or pave such as are opened, or introduce water for the supply of its citizens, except from some specified source, or buy fire engines of any other than some stipulated kind, or contract for any public work except with persons named; and if it might do these things, it is easy to perceive it may also harmonize with defini- For definition and elements of tions found in standard diction- monopoly in grants, etc., see 1 arles, and thus serve to puncture Eddy on Combinations, ch. I. the many careless descriptions of '» "The very essence of a monop- trusts and monopolies found oly is the grant of a power to con- everywhere; however, it is clear trol products and prices. The that the popular idea of a monop- existence of the monopoly is not oly is not that given by Coke, for affected by the manner in which that sort has been forgotten. The the power is exercised. If the monopoly fear is not granted; it power to control production and is usurped, and it is possible that prices arises from a grant of an a practical, absolute control of exclusive nature and is unre- products is obtained, and thereby stricted the monopoly is absolute." persons, etc., are "restrained of 1 Eddy on Combinations, sec. 27. any freedom or liberty that they 7i See sections 240 to 242, inclu- had before, or hindered in their sive, post. New Orleans W. W. lawful trade," as completely as if Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S., 674; Louis- an "allowance by the king." ville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co., 308 OF REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES. [§192 that it might not be long before the incorporation itself, instead of being a convenience to its citizens, would have been used in various ways to compel them to submit to innumerable incon- veniences, and would itself constitute a public nuisance of the most serious and troublesome description. Individual citizens, looking only to the furtherance of their private interest, might, in various directions, engage it in permanent contracts, which, while ostensibly for the public benefit, should impose obliga- tions precluding further improvements and depriving the town prospectively of those advantages and conveniences which the municipality was created to supply, and without which it is worthless. For if the village might bind itself to one market house for ten years, it might do so for all time to come ; and if it might agree that improvements and conveniences of one class ought to be confined by contract to one quarter of the town, a reckless or improvident board might agree with a greedy or 115 U. S., 683, 694; New Orleans Gas Co. V. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S., 650; Citizens' Water Co. v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 55 Conn., 1; 10 Atl. Rep., 170. Watee — Exclusive privilege to SUPPPLY. Thrift v. Elizabeth City, 122 N. C, 31; 30 S. E. Rep., 349; 44 L. R. A., 427; Re Brooklyn, 143 (N. Y.), 596; 26 L. R. A., 270; 38 N. E. Rep., 983; Illinois Trust and Sav. Bank v. Arkansas City, 76 Fed., 271; 34 L. R. A., 518; Bren- ham V. Brenham Water Co., 67 Tex., 542; 4 S. W. Rep., 143; Walla Walla V. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S., 1; 19 U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep., 77; State v. Harrison, 46 N. J. L., 79; San Diego Water Co. v. Flume Co., 108 Cal., 549 ; 41 Pac. Rep., 495; Davenport v. Kleinschmidt, 6 Mont, 502; 13 Pac. Rep., 249. • Gas conteacts and feanchises. Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Gas Light & C. Co., 66 Ind., 396; West- ern Sav. Fund Soc. v. Philadelphia, 31 Pac. St., 175; Parkersburg Gas Co. v. Parkersburg, 30 W. Va., 435 ; 4 S. E. Rep., 650. The power to regulate and con- trol the enjoyment of an exclusive privilege or franchise — a, power unquestioned as regards public life and health — should also extend to the protection of the public from extortion. 1 Eddy on Combina- tions, sec. 26. Certain state statutes seek to prevent extortion. Thus contracts for water and light in the various classes of Missouri cities may be granted by the local authorities, but the statutes provide a time limit, and usually permit the au- thorities to fix rates, and, in most instances, require a ratification by a two-thirds majority of the quali- fied voters. The purpose of such provisions is clearly intended to protect the public against monop- olies. Cities of the Second Class, R. S. 1889, sees. 1255, par. XIV, 1436, Laws ef Mo. 1899, sec. 1435, p. 82; Cities of the Third Class, Laws of Mo., 1893, p. 86; Cities of the Fourth Class, Laws of Mo., 1895, p. 80. An ordinance grant- ing an exclusive water right for twenty years held valid though a provision for an extension for an- § l'J2\ OP - REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES. 309 unscrupulous proprietor of town lots, that all improvements of every description should be so located or made as to conduce to his benefit, irrespective to the general good. * * * It is impossible to predicate reasonableness of any contract by which the governing authority abdicates any of its legislative powers, and precludes itself from meeting in the proper way the emergencies that may arise. Those powers are conferred in order to be exercised again and again, as may be found needful or politic, and those who hold them in trust today are vested with no discretion to circumscribe their limits or diminish their efficiency, but must transmit them unimpaired to their succes- sors. This is one of the fundamental maxims of government, and it is impossible that free government, with restrictions for the protection of individual or municipal rights, could long exist without its recognition. "'^^ In Iowa it has been held that a city has the power to author- ize an individual to erect a building upon private property and lease or rent the stalls therein for a market, regulate it and allow such person to exact rents, and may protect the owner in the exclusive privilege of such market.''^ other twenty years was Invalid, the grant for each period being distinct and severable. Neosho Water Co. v. Neosho, 136 Mo., 498; 38 S. W. Rep., 89; Saleno v. Neo- sho, 127 Mo., 627; 30 S. W. Rep., 190; R. S. Mo., sec. 1589. Without express charter power an attempt to grant an exclusive water privilege is void. Kirkwood V. Meramec Highlands Co., 94 Mo., App., 637. Exclusive fekry pRivn.EGES. A municipal corporation cannot grant exclusive ferry privileges. Thus, a city ordinance which granted an exclusive ferry privi- lege for the period of ten years was held void under the constitu- tion which forbids the granting of exclusive rights, privileges or monopolies. Carroll v. Campbell, 110 Mo., 557; 19 S. W. Rep., 809; Minturn v. Larue, 23 How. (U. S.), 435; see State ex rel. v. Cramer, 96 Mo., 75; 8 S. W. Rep., 788. Although the state may delegate the power to grant the right to establish a ferry to the city, the legislature may exercise super- visory control unless the state in conferring this power upon the city has by the terms of the grant surrendered such control. Harri- son v. State, 9 Mo., 530. Perry privileges may be granted on con- ditions. State V. Sickmann, 65 Mo. App., 499. 72 Gale V. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich., 344; 9 Am. Rep., 80. 73 The court stated that if the -lessee should establish or exact such rates as to operate as a re- straint upon the trade of the city, then it would be within the power of the city to interfere and pass the necessary ordinance for the protection of the public; but the possibility that the lessee might do this ought not to invalidate the 310 OF REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES. [§193 § 193. Ordinances must not unreasonably discriminate- Classification. Ordinances must be fair, impartial a^nd uniform in their operation.''* "Wliere privileges are granted by an ordinance, they should be open to the enjoyment of all upon the same terms and conditions."^" An ordinance cannot make a particular act penal when done by one person and impose no penalty for the same act done under like circumstances by another.''^ So an ordinance directing a named person to do specified acts, as, for example, to abate an alleged nuisance, caused by a building, and prescribing a penalty on failure to comply, is void.^^ All discriminations in ordinances against those of the same class are bad.''* The regulation must apply to all of a class.''^ No arbitrary distinction between different kinds and classes of business can be sustained, the conditions being otherwise simi- lar. s** Classification for legislative purposes is permitted, but it must be reasonable. Differences which would serve for clas- sification for some purposes do not always furnish classification for legislation. The difference which will support class legis- lation must be such as in the nature of things furnishes a ordinance, for the court would not presume that "he will so conduct his affairs as to conflict with those rules which experience has demon- strated are essential for the public welfare." The court would not frnd that the city had "clearly sur- rendered all control over the rents to be charged," nor that "the lessee could adopt such rates as to re- strain trade and thus injuriously affect the public interest." Le Claire v. Davenport, 13 la., 210, 212, 213, overruling Davenport v. Kelly, 7 la., 102. See Palestine v. Barnes, 50 Tex., 538; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.), 36; New Orleans v. Guillotte, 12 La. Ann., 818. Intoxicating Liquor Cases, 25 Kan., 751; 37 Am. Rep., 284; In re Ruth, 32 Iowa, 250. I* Sees. 82-84, supra. "!'> An ordinance regulating slaughtering of animals which confines such business to a small lot, or even a particular block of ground is unreasonable and tends to create a monopoly. Chicago v. Rumpflt, 45 111., 90, 97; 92 Am. Dec, 196; Hudson v. Thome, 7 Paige (N. Y.), 261. 76 Tugman v. Chicago, 78 111., 405; May v. People, 1 Colo. App., 157; 27 Pac. Rep., 1010. Ordinance dividing territory in- to two railroad districts, held void. Lake View v. Tate, 130 111., 247; 22 N. E. Rep., 791, affirming 33 111. App., 78. Ti Municipality v. Blineau, 3 La. Ann., 688. S. P. Canajoharie v. Buel, 43 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 155. 78 Reg. v. Plory, 17 Ontario Rep., 715; Reg. v. Johnson, 38 Up. Can. Q. B., 549. 79 Be Pirie and Town of Dun- das, 29 Up. Can. Q. B., 401. 80 State ex rel. v. Ramsey, 48 Minn., 236, 240, 241; 51 N. W. Rep., 112. § 194J OF REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES. 311 reasonable basis for separate laws and regulations.^^ Laws relating to persons and things as a class, and not to persons or things of a class, are common and usually sustained.®^ The law will be held valid if it operates equally upon all subjects within the class for whifeh the rule is applied.*^ It thus follows that local police regulations are not to be condemned because not specifically aimed at all persons in whatever business en- gaged, as they may have an express design of reaching certain classes in certain characters of work.** Where all persons engaged in the same business (as laundry) within the pre- scribed limits are treated alike and subject to the same restric- tions, the ordinance will be sustained. The rule is thus stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, per Mr. Justice Field: "The specific regulation for one kind of business, which may be necessary for the protection of the public, can never be a just ground of complaint because like restrictions are not imposed upon other business of a different kind. The discriminations which are open to objection are those where persons engaged in the same business are subject to different restrictions, or are held entitled to different privileges under the same conditions. It is onlj^ then that the discrimination can be said to impair that equal right which all can claim in the enforcement of the laws. ' '*^ § 194. Same— Illustrative cases. Ordinance regulations, re- specting the width of tires, etc., of vehicles which except cer- si State V. Loomis, 115 Mo., 307, J. L., 85 ; 7 Atl. Rep., 286 ; Low v. 314; 22 S. W. Rep., 350. Printing Co., 41 Neb., 127, 138; 59 82 State V. Bishop, 128 Mo., 373; N. W. Rep., 362; Johnson v. St. 31 S. W. Rep., 9; 29 L. R. A., 200; Paul & D. R. R., 43 Minn., 222; 45 St. Louis V. Weber, 44 Mo., 547; N. W. Rep., 156; In re Bight Hour Chillicothe v. Brown, 38 Mo. App., Law, 21 Colo., 29, 32; 39 Pac. Rep., 609; Kansas City v. Cook, 38 Mo. 328; American Furn. Co. v. Bates- A-Pp., 660. ville 139 Ind., 77; 38 N. E. Rep., 83 Nichols V. Walters, 37 Minn., 408; Shinkle v. Covington, 83 Ky., 264. 420; Covington v. East St. Louis, Such laws must embrace all and 78 111., 548; State ex rel. Kellogg exclude none whose conditions and v. Currens, 111 Wis., 431; 87 N. W. wants render such legislation nee- Rep., 561. essary or appropriate to them as 84 Kansas City v. Sutton, 52 Mo. a class. State ex rel. v. Ramsey, App., 398. 48 Minn., 236, 240; 51 N. W. Rep., ss Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. 112; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 703, 708, 709. S., 256; Randolph v. Wood, 49 N, 312 OF REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES. [§ 194 tain vehicles, as those transporting particular merchandise, are void.s® So ordinance regulations discriminating against par- ticular class of laundrymen, as Chinese, are void.*^ However, as stated, regulations may be validly made applicable only to a class, as, for example, those engaged in conducting laundries. Thus an ordinance was sustained which forbid, within certain defined limits, washing and ironing in public laundries and wash houses from 10 at night to 6 in the morning. The fact that the ordinance prohibited one kind of business only did not render it objectionable on the ground of discrimination.®* An ordinance providing different rates for license for the sale of goods is discriminating and void.*® So an ordinance will be held void which discriminates between residents and non-resi- dents respecting the license tax.*"' So an ordinance is void which discriminates between corporations respecting the loca- tion and use of telephone and telegraph poles.*^ An ordinance granting permission to certain persons to erect a private hos- pital was sustained in Louisiana, although there was a general valid existing ordinance forbidding such hospitals.*^ An ordinance requiring bicycles to carry lights after dark was held not to discriminate as to other riders of silently running vehicles.*^ An ordinance requiring railroad companies to keep their tracks watered so as to lay the dust is not partial, since "it embraces all who exercise the same right and work the same inconveniences to occupants of houses on the streets."®* A smoke law was held valid notwithstanding it exempted dwelling houses.®^ So such law exempting dwelling houses was held valid, although it did not cover steamboats and loco- s<5 Reg V. Pipe, 1 Ont. Rep., 43. XIII, Of Ordinances Relating to 87 Yick Wo V. Hopkins, 118 U. Taxation and License Tax. S., 356; 14 L. R. A., 584, note; In oi Hannibal v. Mo. & Kansas re Tie Loy, 26 Fed. Rep., 611; Telephone Co., 31 Mo. App., 23. State ex rel. Toi v. French, 17 12 Bozant v. Campbell, 9 Rob. Mont, 54; 30 L. R. A., 415; 41 (La.), 411. See Com. v. Goodrich, Pac. Rep., 1078. 13 Allen (Mass.), 545. 88 Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. sa Des Moines v. Keller, 116 S., 703; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 Iowa, 648; 88 N. W. Rep., 827. V. S., 27. 34 City & Suburban Ry. Co. v. sa Ex parte Frank, 52 Cal., 606; Savannah, 77 Ga., 731; 4 Am. St. 28 Am. Rep., 642. Rep., 106. »o Nashville v. Althrop, 5 Cold. "s People v. Lewis, 86 Mich., 273; (Tenn.), 554; Jonas v. Gilbert, 5 37 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 481; 49 Sup. Ct. of Canada, 356. See chap. N. W. Rep., 140. See sec. 32, supra. §194] OP REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES. 313 motives.^® Numerous illustrations of discriminating ordi- nances appear in the cases in the note.''^ 38 Moses V. United States, 16 App. Cases, D. C, 428; 50 L, R. A., 532. 87 Same class of business. May V. People, 1 Colo. App., 157; 27 Pac. Rep., 1010; In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y., 98; Butcher's Union v. Cres- cent City, 111 U. S., 746, 757; Braceville v. Doherty, 30 111. App., 645. Speed of trains. Buffalo v. N. y., etc., R. R. Co., 23 N. Y. Supp., 303, 309; 6 Misc. Rep., 630; 27 N. Y. Supp., 297. Fixing loads for teams, etc. Kan- sas City V. Sutton, 52 Mo. App., 398. Discrimination as to religion. Shreveport v. Levy, 26 La. Ann., 671; 21 Am. Rep., 553. In location of livery stable.. St. Louis V. Russell, 116 Mo., "248; 20 L. R. A., 721; 22 S. W. Rep., 470; Chicago V. Stratton, 162 111., 494; 44 N. E. Rep., 853, reversing 58 111. App., 539. Ordinance forbidding the casting of paper, hand bills and advertis- ing matter on streets and private hallways which excepted news- papers and addressed envelopes, held valid. Philadelphia v. Bra- bender, 201 Pa. St., 574, 578; 51 Atl. Rep., 374. Miscellaneous illustrations: California — Ex parte Haskell, 112 Cal., 412; 32 L. R. A., 527; 44 Pac. Rep., 725 ; Ex parte McKenna, 126 Cal., 429; 58 Pac. Rep., 916; Ex parte Chin Yan, 60 Cal., 78. Illinois — Zanone v. Mound "City, 103 III.. 552. Indiana — Citizens' Gas & Mfg. Co. V. Elwood, 114 Ind., 332; 16 N. E. Rep., 624. Louisiana — Baton Rouge v. Cre- monini, 36 La. Ann., 247; De Ben V. Gerard, 4 La. Ann., 30; Munici- pality V. Blineau, 3 La. Ann., 688. Missouri — Kansas City v. Rich- ardson, 90 Mo. App., 450. Montana — Bozeman v. Cadwell, 14 Mont., 480; 36 Pac. Rep., 1042. New Jersey — State v. East Or- ange, 41 N. J. L., 127; Red Star Steamship Co. v. Jersey City, 45 N. J. L., 246. United States — Richmond, etc., Railroad v. Richmond, 96 U. S., 521. An ordinance that applies to the entire city is not special legisla- tion. Foster v. Board of Police Comrs., 102 Cal., 483; 41 Am. St. Rep., 194; 37 Pac. Rep., 763. An ordinance requiring a par- ticular street car company to sell tickets on its cars does not con- travene the principle that ordi- nances shall be general and impar- tial in their operation, as such principle has no application to or- dinances originating by virtue of a reservation in a franchise which is in its essence a contract. De- troit V. Ft. Wayne & B. I. Ry. Co., 95 Mich., 456; 35 Am. St. Rep., 580; 20 L. R. A., 79; 54 N. W. Rep., 958. For farther illustrations, see ch. VIII, Of Constitutionality of Ordi- nances; ch.JCIII, License Tax, and ch. XIV, Relating to Police Powers. CHAPTEE VII. OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. •Method of cannot be § 195. Amendment - making. 196. Void ordinance amended. 197. Amendment of franchise and contract ordinances. 198. Amendment of improvement ordinances. Power to repeal ordinances. Same — Franchise and con- tract ordinances. Same — Illustrative cases. Repeal of improvement ordi- nances. 203. Implied repeals. 204. Same subject — General and special ordinances. 205. Effect of repeal— Revival. 206. Same— Penal ordinances. 207. Same — Improvement ordi- nances. 208. Effect of repeal and re- enactment. 199. 200. 201. 202. § 209. Effect of revision of ordi- nance as to repeal. 210. Repeal of ordinance by ordi- nance only. 211. When ordinance superseded by charter amendments. 212. Rule relating to repeals of charter and ordinance pro- visions by general laws. 213. Same subject — Question of intent. 214. When charter provisions supersede general laws. 215. When ordinances supersede general laws. 216. Effect on ordinances by sur- render of special charter — ■ Change in class or grade. 217. Same — Dissolution and re- organization. 218. Same — By consolidation or change of corporate limits. § 195. Amendment— Method of making. The power to enact ordinances, unless restricted, carries with it the power to make reasonable alterations and amendments.^ The courts generally hold that the method prescribed for amending ordi- nances must be followed substantially.^ Constitutional provi- sions as to the method of amending the state laws have no application to ordinances unless made so by express terms.* 1 Foster v. Board of Pol. Comrs., 102 Cal., 483; 41 Am. St. Rep., 194; 37 Pac. Rep., 763; Swindell V. State, 143 Ind., 153; 42 N. E. Rep., 528. Compare Pratt v. Litch- field, 62 Conn., 112; 25 Atl. Rep., 461. 2 Sometimes ordinances may be modified by subsequent legislation without direct amendment. Bozant V. Campbell, 9 Rob. (La.), 411. 314 A charter provision requiring that an ordinance revising or amending another shall contain a copy of the latter, held not to ap- ply to an ordinance which, being repugnant to a prior ordinance on the same subject, repeals it. Des Moines v. Hillis, 55 Iowa, 643; 8 N. W. Rep., 638. s State V. Cozzens, 42 La. Ann., 1069; 8 So. Rep., 268. § 195J OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. 315 An ordinance cannot be amended by mere resolution ; but, only by ordinance.* Charters, following like provisions in state constitutions, often provide that no ordinance shall be amended by providing that designated words thereof be stricken out, or that designated words be inserted, or that designated words be stricken out and others inserted in lieu thereof ; but the ordi- nance or section amended shall be set forth in full as amended.^ This provision is generally held to mean that where a part of an act only is amended, the amended part only need be set out.^ i Jones V. McAlpine, 64 Ala., 511; People ex rel. v. Mount, 186 111., 560, 578, 579; 58 N. E. Rep., 360; Cascaden v. Waterloo, 106 Iowa, 673; 77 N. W. Rep., 333. An ordinance cannot be amend- ed, repealed or suspended by an order or resolution, or other act by a council of less dignity than the ordinance itself. C. & N. P. Ry. Co. V. Chicago, 174 111., 439; 51 N. E. Rep., 596; Gait v. Chicago, 174 111., 605; 51 N. E. Rep., 653. A resolution that the mayor be instructed to purchase certain property cannot, in a suit for spe- cific performance, be amended by parol on the ground of mistake. Carskadden v. South Bend, 141 Ind., 596; 39 N. E. Rep., 667; 41 N. E. Rep., 1. For distinction between ordi- nance and resolution, see sec. 2, et seq., supra. 5 Charter, City of St. Louis, art. Ill, sec. 19; Mun. Code of St. Louis, p. 206; 2 R. S. of Mo., 1899, p. 2483, sec. 19; charter, San Fran- cisco, art. II, ch. 1, sec. 10; Stat. & Amend, to Codes of Cal., p. 245; Cowley V. Rushville, 60 Ind., 327. Morrison v. St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 96 Mo., 602; 9 S. W. Rep., 626; 10 S. W. Rep., 148; State v. Thurston, 92 Mo., 325; 4 S. W. Rep., 930; State v. Chambers, 70 Mo., 625; State ex rel. v. Draper, 47 Mo., 29; Boonvllle v. Trigg, 46 Mo., 288, An amended ordinance which does not attempt to amend the old by adding to or taking from one of its sections, but contains in full the section as it was designated to be when amended, sufficiently com- plied with a charter which re- quires that an amended ordinance shall contain the ordinance or parts thereof which it attempts to review or amend. Larkin v. Bur- lington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 85 Iowa, 492; 52 N. W. Rep., 480; Pen- tecost V. Stiles, 5 Okla., 500; 49 Pac. Rep., 921. Where the act undertakes to amend a former statute, it is not sufficient to say that certain words are stricken out or certain words are inserted, but that the section as amended must be set out in full; however, in addition to set- ting out the section in full, as amended, it is not required that the amendatory act should recite the designated words stricken out, or the others Inserted or both. State ex rel. v. Miller, 100 Mo., 439; 13 S. W. Rep., 677. Mere reference to a section, add- ing "the same is hereby amended so as to authorize," etc., is bad. French v. Woodward, 58 Mo., 66. When a section of an ordinance is amended, the section only, and not the entire ordinance in which it is contained, need be set out. Decorah v. Dunstan Bros., 38 Iowa, 96. 316 OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. [§ 197 § 196. Void ordinance cannot be amended. As void ordi- nances cannot be amended, an ordinance passed as an amend- ment to a previous ordinance which never took effect is in- valid.^'^ So where an ordinance is void, a subsequent ordinance purporting to amend a single section of the prior ordinance, and which cannot be enforced of itself, is also invalid.^ So where an ordinance is passed by one branch of the legislative body at one session, and is not passed by the other until the next session, it is void, and a later amendment cannot give it any validity.* But an ordinance which contains a provision conflicting with a former ordinance is not void as an amend- ment thereof, under a charter which provides that no ordi- nance shall be revised or amended without containing the entire ordinance as amended. Such ordinance merely operates as a repeal of so much of the former ordinance as is repugnant thereto.^ Where certain provisions of an ordinance have been declared unconstitutional, such ordinance may be amended by striking out such parts.*" § 197. Amendment of franchise and contract ordinances. If vested rights are not disturbed or the obligation of contracts impaired, franchise and contract ordinances are subject to reasonable amendment. Where the state or a municipality has lawfully granted rights and privileges to either a private or public corporation, which have been accepted and valuable improvements have been made on the faith of such grant, a contract has been thereby entered into, and the rights acquired by such act of the legislature or municipality cannot be im- paired or altered by a subsequent act, unless the right to alter or amend the franchise was expressly reserved.** The right to An amendment should be made 53 N. W. Rep., 434; Cowley v. by reference to the section and Rushville, 60 Ind., 327. chapter, and by setting out in full s in re Beekman, 11 Abb. Pr. (N. such section or chapter as it is Y.), 164. intended to read when amended. ^ Ex parte Wolf, 14 Neb., 24; 14 Lowry v. Lexington, 24 Ky. Law N. W. Rep., 660. Rep., 516; 68 S. W. Rep., 1109. lo State v. Kantler, 33 Minn., 69; 6% Schwartz v. Oshkosh, 55 Wis., 21 N. W. Rep,, 856. See sec. 198, 490; 13 N. W. Rep., 450. post. An improvement ordinance " Baltimore Trust & Guarantee merely defective may be amended. Co. v. Baltimore, 64 Fed., 153 ; Citi- East St. Louis v. Albrecht, 150 111., zens' St. R. Co. v. Memphis, 53 506; 37 N. E. Rep., 934. Fed., 715; St. Louis v. Western 7 0'Niel V. Tyler, 3 N. D., 47; Union Telegraph Co., 148 U. S., 92 ; § ler] OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. 317 alter, amend or repeal is usually expressly reserved by the state or municipality in the act granting the right or privilege, and when the franchise is accepted by the individual or corpo- ration, the reservation becomes a part of the contract, and the franchise may be amended by subsequent kgislation.^^ The right to alter or amend acts granting special privileges to in- dividuals or a corporation is not always expressed in the act itself, but is sometimes found in the constitution of the state.^* In New Jersey it is a question, in every case of a contract made by the legislature, whether that body intended that the right to change or repeal it should inhere in it, or whether, like other contracts, it was perfect, and not within the power of the legislature to impair its obligation.** Under a provision of the Ohio constitution that "no special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted that may not be altered, revoked or repealed by the General Assembly," it has been held that fran- chises granted after the adoption of the constitution are sub- ject to repeal and alteration, just as if they had been expressly declared to be so by the act granting the franchise.*^ Even where the power to alter and amend is reserved, the amend- ments made must be reasonable, and must be made in good faith, and be consistent with the scope and object of the act of incorporation.! 8 Such a reservation will not authorize the imposing of a serious burden upon the corporation which was of no benefit to it.*'' Where the statute under which a street Wright V. Nagle, 101 U. S., 791; Mass., 103; Commonweal th v. State ex rel. v. The Corrigan Eastern Ry. Co., 103 Mass., 254; Street Ry. Co., 85 Mo., 263. Roxbury v. Boston & Providence Such a grant is a contract with- Ry., 6 Gush. (Mass.), 424; Fitch- in the meaning of that clause of burg Ry. Co. v. Grand Junction the constitution of the United Ry. Co., 4 Allen (Mass.), 198; Corn- States which declares that no state monwealth v. Essex Co., 13 Gray, shall make any law impairing the 239. obligation of contracts. Dart- i7 Miller v. New York and Brie mouth College v. Woodward, 4 Ry. Co., 21 Barb. (N. Y.), 513. Wheat. (U. S.), 518. Although the right of a railroad 12 Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 company to construct its road U. S., 13. through a city was acquired under 13 Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S., 319. an ordinance which reserved the 14 New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U. S., right to alter and amend, such an 104. ordinance can not be amended or 15 Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S., 319. repealed so as to affect essential 16 Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S., 319; and vested rights, or to take away Worcester v. Norwich Ry. Co., .109 rights previously granted. Chi- 318 OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. [§ 198 railroad company was authorized to construct its road, pro- vides that the company shall be subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the council may, by ordinance, pre- scribe, and to the payment to the city of a license fee, an ordinance afterwards passed by the city fixing the amount of- lieense is valid.^^ But where the right to exact the payment of a license fee was not reserved or stipulated in the charter of the company, it was held that the city could not amend the charter and impose additional burdens by ordinances prescrib- ing a license duty on cars.^* Where a city grants to a railway company the right to lay tracks on the streets of the city, upon the condition that the company assumes the cost of paving the streets, the city may, by a subsequent ordinance, relieve the railway company of the conditions imposed in the original grant.20 § 198. Amendment of improvement ordinances. Subject to the constitutional provision forbidding the impairment of the obligation of contracts, as explained ^Isewhere,^! improvement ordinances •which are not wholly void may be amended, even after the contract is let and the work begun, in like manner as other ordinances.22 Thus an ordinance providing for street cago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minn. Ry. Co., 49 Iowa, 144; 31 Am. Rep., Cent. R. Co., 14 Fed., 525. 145. 18 Mayor v. Broadway, etc., Ry. An ordinance which grants to Co., 97 N. Y., 275. a horse railway company the priv- Reserved right in statute to fix ilege of using its streets, and pro- water rates. Power to regulate vides that such railway shall keep held to be a continuing one. Rog- portions of the street, on which it ers Park Water Co. v. Fergus, 180 operates, in good repair, the city U. S., 624, affirming 178 111., 571; cannot, by a subsequent ordinance, 53 N. E. Rep., 363. compel the company to pave such 19 New York v. Second Ave. Ry., portions of its streets with specific 32 N. Y., 261; New York v. Third materials. Kansas City v. Corri- Ave. Ry. Co., 33 N. Y., 42. gan, 86 Mo., 67; State ex rel. v. The grant by a city to a railroad Corrigan St. Ry. Co., 85 Mo., 263. company of the right to lay and 20 Philadelphia v. Bowman, 175 maintain its track over and along Pa. St., 91; 34 Atl., 353. See sec. a bridge belonging to the city, in 238, et seq. an ordinance which contains no 21 Chapter VIII. reservation respecting toll or other 22 An ordinance for paving a charges, cannot be amended by a street cannot be amended so as to subsequent ordinance imposing change the character of the paving such charges. Des Moines v. C, material by certain "orders" R. I. & P. R. Co., 41 Iowa, 569; passed by the council on motion. Burlington v, Burlington Street The amendment must be by ordi- §]99J OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. 319 improvements which proves to be defective and insufficient to support an assessment, if not absolutely void, may be amended, and a reassessment made thereunder. ^^ So a division of special assessments into installments may be authorized by amendment to the original ordinance providing for the improvement. ^^ But an ordinance providing that a pavement be laid to conform to the established grade of the street as shown by an ordinance fixing the grade of said street, now on file in the office of the city clerk, prima facie sufficient in its description of the grade, is fatally defective if it appears the ordinance so referred to was not then in existence, and the defect cannot be cured by the subsequent passage of an ordinance fixing the grade.^^ Under the Illinois statute the illegality of an amendment to a valid impi-ovoment ordinance in respect to the mode of assess- ment, and the setting aside of an assessment made thereunder, will not affect the validity of the original ordinance, so as to prevent the levy and collection under it of a special tax to pay the cost of the improvement in the manner provided therein.^" § 199. Power to repeal ordinances. The power to pass or- dinances or regulations affecting the government of a munici- pality carries with it, by implication, the power to modify or repeal such ordinances or regulations, unless the power is restricted in the law conferring the right.^'^ Thus an ordinance nance. Gait v. Chicago, 174 111., more, 93 Md., 208; 49 Atl. Rep., 4. 605 ; 51 N. E. Rep., 653. Sec. 195, Missouri— Kaime v. Harty, 4 Mo. supra. App., 357. 23 East St. Louis v. Albrecht, 150 Nebraska-In re Hall, 10 Neb., 111., 506; 37 N. E. Rep., 934. 537. ^ j^ ^ ^^^ gg^ New Jersey — Hudson Tel. Co. v. Jersey City, 49 N. J. L., 303; 8 Atl. Rep., 123; 60 Am. Rep., 619. 2i Trimble v. Chicago, 168 111., 567; 48 N. E. Rep., 416. 25 C. & N. P. Ry. Co. V. Chicago, 174 111., 439; 51 N. E. Rep., 596. See sec. 196, «Mpro. ^ew Torfc— Chenango Bank v.. 26 Davis V. Litchfield, 155 111., Brown, 26 N. Y., 467. 384; 40 N. E. Rep., 354. See sec. South Carolina — Charleston v. 243, et seq. Wentworth Street Baptist Church, 'i'' Delaware — Rice v. Foster, 4 4 Strob. (S. C), 306. Harr. (Del.), 479. Canada — In re Great Western Florida — Greeley v. Jacksonville, Ry. Co., 23 Up. Can. C. P., 28. 17 Fla., 174. England — Rex v. Bird, 13 East., /wdiana— Welch v. Bowen, 103 367; Rex. v. Ashwell, 12 East., 22. Ind., 252; 2 N. E. Rep., 722. Charter provisions vesting in Iowa — Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, the superior court power to "re- 165; 63 Am. Dec, 487. peal any by-law which it shall Maryland — Robinson v. Balti- deem unreasonable or contrary to 320 OF AMENDMENT AND REPEaL OF ORDINANCES. [§ 199 fixing the fiscal year of a municipal corporation is an adminis- trative measure and is subject to repeal.^* Generally speak- ing, all ordinances are subject to repeal. The corporation can- not abridge its own legislative povyers and pass irrevocable ordinances. The members of the legislative body are trustees of the public, and the tenure of their office impresses their ordinances with liability to change.^^ And where an ordinance granting rights to the streets expressly reserved the power of repeal, reasons which induced the passage of a repealing ordi- nance cannot be inquired into by the courts, to affect its validity.*" In repealing an ordinance the city may impose such conditions as it deems proper, but the conditions, of course, must not conflict with the charter, the constitution or laws of the state. Hence an ordinance to suppress gaming may be repealed except as to offenses committed and forfeitures in- curred prior thereto.^i The restrictions heretofore observed respecting the enactment of ordinances apply with equal force to the repeal of ordinances, and, indeed, to all legislative acts. Therefore changes cannot be made so as to affect any vested right lawfully acquired under an ordinance or regulation law- fully adopted.32 g^^ where it becomes necessary in order to protect the health of the city, or where the thing has become an actual nuisance, ordinances under which rights have become vested may be repealed, by authority of the city in the exercise of its police and governmental powers.*^ An ordinance may be repealed in part.** the laws or constitution of this 568; New Orleans v. St. Louis state or of the United States," does Church, 11 La. Ann., 244; Mus- not empower such court to amend grove v. Catholic Church, 10 La. a by-law. Pratt v. Litchfield, 62 Ann., 431; State v. Ross., 49 Mo., Conn., 112; 25 Atl. Rep., 461. 416; State ex rel. v. Baker, 32 Mo. 28 Du Quoin First National Bank App., 98; Terre Haute v. Lake, 43 V. Keith, 84 111. App., 103, affirmed Ind., 480; Nelson v. St. Martin's 183 111., 475; 56 N. E. Rep., 179. Parish, 111 U. S., 716. 29 State V. Graves, 19 Md., 351; as Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 81 Am. Dec, 639; Goszler v. 97 U. S., 659; Beer Co. v. Massa- Georgetown, 6 Wheat. (U. S.), 593. chusetts, 97 U. S., 25. 30 Southern Bell T. & T. Co. v. The city of New York conveyed Richmond, 98 Fed., 671, affirmed certain lands for the purpose of a by U. S. Circuit Ct. App., 103 Fed. church and cemetery, with a cove- Rep., 31. nant for quiet enjoyment; after- si Kansas City v. White, 69 Mo., wards acting under power granted 26. by the legislature the city passed 32 Stoddard v. Gilman, 22 Vt., a by-law prohibiting the use of the § 200] OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. SSl § 20C. Same— Franchise and contract ordinances. The au- thorities seem to be uniform to the effect that the reservation of the right to repeal, in a franchise granted to a private person or corporation, which is accepted by the grantee, enables the legislative body granting the franchise to repeal the same at any time it may see fit.^'' But where the right or privilege has been acquired by an individual or corporation from the com- mon council of the city under an act of the legislature autho- rizing the granting of such a privilege, it is in its nature a contract, and if the power to repeal has not been reserved, the right cannot be taken away .36 Such a contract, if within the power of the municipality to grant, it seems in the case of a franchise authorizing a private person to construct a railroad in the streets of a city without reserving the power of revoca- tion, or limitation as to time, would create in the grantee an immediate freehold interest in the streets, and the right to use them perpetually .*'' To guard against this absolute right. lands as a cemetery. It was held that the ordinance -was a repeal of the covenant, and that since the act was a necessary police regula- tion for the preservation of the lives of its citizens the city by repealing the covenant was not liable for a breach of it. Brick Pres. Church v. New York, 5 Cow. (N. Y.), 538. But in New Orleans v. Church of St. Louis, 11 La. Ann., 244, where an injunction brought by the city to restrain the defendant from using a certain piece of ground as a cemetery which use had been authorized by ordinance, which was afterwards repealed, the injunction was dissolved. 3*Noonan v. People, 183 111., 52; 55 N. E. Rep., 679; Partridge v. Hyde Park, 131 111., 537; 23 N. E. Rep., 345; Hyde Park v. Corwith, 122 111., 441; 12 N. B. Rep., 238. 35 People V. O'Brien, 111 N. Y., 1, 48 ; 18 N. E. Rep., 692 ; 7 Am. St. Rep., 684; People ex ret Kimball V. B. & A. R. R. Co., 70 N. Y., 569; Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Richmond, 98 Fed., 671; Green- wood V. Freight Co., 105 U. S., 13. An act granting a franchise which is a mere license to enjoy the privilege conferred for the time, and on the terms specified, is subject to future legislative con- trol and may be taken away by an act of the body granting it. Stone V. Mississippi, 101 U. S., 814. 38 Brooklyn Central Ry. Co. v. Brooklyn City Ry. Co., 32 Barb. (N. Y.), 358; People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y., 1, 42; 18 N. E. Rep., 692 ; 7 Am. St. Rep., 684. A legislative act ratifying ordi- nances and conferring the same power of repeal as in ordinances enacted under its general powers does not authorize the repeal of an ordinance which creates a contract in the absence of general power in the city to do so. Baltimore Trust and Guarantee Co. v. Balti- more, 64 Fed. Rep., 153. 37 Milhau V. Sharp, 27 N. Y., 611; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.), 518. 21 322 OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. [§ 300 many of the state constitutions contain a provision that, "no special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted that may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the general assembly ; ' ' legislatures in granting special charters to cities and public corporations, have reserved the right to alter, amend or repeal them, and municipalities, in granting special privileges under their charters, have reserved the same right.** Where a privilege or franchise containing a reservation of the right to appeal has been accepted by the grantee, it becomes a Contract and both parties are bound by its terms.*" But the power to alter and amend the charter of a private corporation under such a reservation is certainly not without limit. It is admit- ted that it cannot be exercised to take away or destroy rights acquired by virtue of such a charter, and which by a legitimate use of the powers granted have become vested in the corpora- tion.*" Such a reservation, it has been held, will not warrant the legislature in passing laws to change the control of an in- stitution from one religious sect to another,*^ or to compel sub- scribers to the stock, whose subscription is conditional, to waive any of the conditions of their contract,*^ or to change the vested rights acquired by the corporation under the char- ter, and to add new parties and managers without the consent of the corporations,** or to change the object of the incorpora- tio7 or to substitute another for it.** 38 Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S., 319; 363; Freeport Water Co. v. Free- Greenwood V. Freight Co., 105 U. port, 180 U. S., 587; Danville S., 13; Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Water Co. v. Danville, 180 U. S., Co. V. Richmond, 98 Fed., 671; 619. Miller v. State, 15 Wall. (U. S.), 40 Miller v. State, 15 Wall (TJ. 478; New York v. Broadway Ry. S.), 478, 498; Holyoke Co. v. Ly- Co., 97 N. Y., 275; Hyatt v. Mc- man, 15 Wall (U. S.), 500, 519; Mahon, 25 Barb. (N. Y.), 457, 467. Commonwealth v. Essex Co., 13 30 Richmond v. Southern Bell Gray (Mass.), 239, 253; Miller v. Tel. & Tel. Co., 85 Fed., 19 ; People Railroad Co., 21 Barb. (N. Y.), V. C. W. D. Ry. Co., 18 111. App., 513; Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Savan- 125; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch nah, 30 Fed. Rep., 646. (U. S.), 87; Zabriskie v. H. & N. ^i state ex rel. Pittman v. Ad- Y. Ry. Co., 18 N. J. Eq., 178; Mea- ams, 44 Mo., 570. dow Dam Co. v. Gray, 30 Me., 547. 42 Railroad Co. v. Veazie, 39 Me., Right to fix water rates, held 571, 581. under Illinois statute to be a con- 43 Sage v. Dillard, 15 B. Mon. tinning power. Rogers Park Water (Ky.), 340, 357. Co. V. Fergus, 180 U. S., 624, affirm- ^^ Zabriskie v.- H. & N. Y. Ry. ing 178 111., 571; 53 N. E. Rep., Co., 18 N. J. Eq., 178. § -iOl] OF AMENDMENT AND REfEAL 6P ORDINANCES. 323 "However, the reserved power may be exercised, and to almost any extent, to carry into effect the original purpose of the ^rant, or to secure the due administration of its affairs, so as to protect the rights of the stockholders and of creditors and for the proper disposition of its assets."*'' A reservation of the right to alter and amend confers power to pass all needful laAvs for the regulation and control of the domestic affairs of a corporation, freed from the restrictions imposed by the federal constitution upon legislation impairing the obliga- tion of contracts.*® As we have seen, all rights granted by a municipality are subject to the police power of the state, and if the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of any manu- facture or traffic which has been granted to an individual or corporation, it has power to provide for its discontinuance, even where no right has been reserved to alter or amend the charter of the corporation.*'^ § 201. Same— Illustrative cases. A franchise granted by ordinance to a corporation to furnish water for the use of the inhabitants is a contract which the city cannot repeal, alter or impair without the consent of the corporation ; hence an ordi- nance attempting to reduce the water rates, which the corpora- tion was authorized to charge, was held invalid where the right to change was not reserved in the original grant of the franchise.** So where the right to lay double tracks in the streets is granted to a railroad company and the company expends a large amount of money in the construction of its railway, the city cannot afterwards, by another ordinance, limit the company to a single track.*^ So where a city, by ordinance, grants the right to one to construct water works at his expense to supply the city and its inhabitants with water, with, the right to lay water pipes under the surface of the streets and alleys, for a period of years, which grant is accepted 45 Per Justice Clifford in Miller 1, 48; 18 N. E. Rep., 692; 7 Am. St. V. State, 15 Wall. (U. S.), 478, Rep., 684; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. 498. To the same effect, Holyoke S., 113, 125. Co. V. Lyman, 15 Wall. (U. S.), ^^ Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 500, 519; Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 U. S., 25; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Wall. (U. S.), 454; Railroad Co. v. Park, 97 U. S., 659. Maine, 96 U. S., 499, 510; Sinking *8 Ashland v. Wheeler, 88 Wis., Fund Cases, 99 U. S., 700, 720. 607; 60 N. W. Rep., 818. 46 People V. O'Brien, 111 N. Y., ■*" Burlington v. Burlington St. 32-1 OF AMENDMENT AND ftEPEAL OF ORDINANCES. [§ 301 and the work partially performed, the privilege of the use of the streets is not a mere license, revocable at the pleasure of the city council, but it is a grant under an express contract, for an adequate consideration, and is binding as a contract.®" And where a contract is made with a municipal corporation upon the faith that taxes will be levied, legislation repealing or modifying the taxing power of the corporation, so as to deprive the holder of the contract of all adequate and effica- cious remedy, is within the constitutional inhibition.^i Hence where a police jury having canvassed and compiled the returns of an election, proclaim the result of the same to have been in favor of a special tax in aid of a railway enterprise, and in accordance therewith thereafter passed an ordinance levying the tax, it is M'ithout legal capacity to subsequently pass an- other ordinance repealing the former and annulling the tax; the railway having been, in the meantime, completed and put in operation.''^ An ordinance which regulates the use of a certain street, upon which railroad tracks had been laid under a prior ordinance, by prohibiting the use upon it of any car or other vehicle drawn by steam, does not repeal or take away the former right, and does not destroy vested rights.®* And it has been held that an ordinance giving to a gas light company the exclusive right to light a city with gas for thirty years is not repealed nor the rights acquired under it "impaired" by a subsequent contract with another company to light the streets with electricity.®* Where a telephone company under the code of Virginia must obtain consent of the council of a city or town to authorize the use of its streets by a telephone or telegraph line, and the company acquired the right to erect and maintain its poles and wires in the streets of a city through an ordinance, the terms of which it accepted, it is bound by a provision of such ordi- Ry. Co., 49 Iowa, 144; 31 Am. Rep., oi Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 145. Ill U. S., 716; Louisiana v. Pils- 50 Quincy v. Bull, 106 111., 337. bury, 105 U. S., 278. Right to regulate water rates 52 Missouri. Kansas & T. Trust reserved by statute. Rogers Park Co. v. Smart, 81 La. Ann., 416; Water Co. v. Fergus, 180 U. S., 25 So. Rep., 443. 624, affirming 178 111., 571; 53 N. ss Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 96 E. Rep., 363; Freeport Water Co. U. S., 521. V. Freeport, 180 TJ. S., 587; Dan- 64 Saginaw Gas Light Co. v. Sag- ville Water Co. v. Danville, 180 U. inaw, 28 Fed. Rep., 529. See sec. S., 619. 240, post. J) 202] OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. 325 nance I'eserving to the council the right to repeal the same at any time, the condition being that the repeal take effect twelve months from its date, and its right to maintain its lines in the streets terminates at the expiration of a year from the date of the passage of the repealing ordinance.^^ § 202. Repeal of improvement ordinances. Unless the vio- lation of constitutional rights result, improvement ordinances may be repealed under like conditions and restrictions as other municipal legislation. Thus where no steps have been taken under an ordinance for paving a street, the city council may, by a later ordinance for paving intersecting streets with differ- ent kinds of pavement, repeal so much of the earlier ordinance as applies to the area covered by the street intersection, without otherwise affecting its validity.^® The rules hereinafter stated respecting repeals of ordinances by implication apply to those providing for improvements as shown by the cases in the notes. ^^ An ordinance for paving and curbing the middle por- tion of a street and for grading the space on each side of the pavement, is not repealed by a subsequent ordinance authoriz- ing a street railway company to lay its tracks on one side of the street, over the graded portion but outside the curb line fixed by the prior ordinance, even though the late ordinance requires the company at its own expense to pave the part of street 55 Southern Bell Telephone & repealing clause operates as a re- Telegraph Co. V. Richmond, 98 peal of the first," did not apply, Fed., 671. and that the last ordinance passed The company by accepting the did not repeal the prior ordi- privilege has placed itself within nances. Smyrk v. Sharp, 82 Md., the absolute dominion of the city 97; 33 Atl. Rep., 411. council. Richmond v. Southern After an injunction was granted Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 85 Fed., 19, 27. restraining a contractor and the 56 Noonan v. The People, 183 111., city from proceeding with the 52; 55 N. B. Rep., 679. opening and improvement of a 57 Repeals of Impkovement Ordi- proposed street, the ordinance di- NANCES BY IMPLICATION. recting the work to be done was Where successive ordinances ap- repealed, and upon motion to dis- propriating money for the paving solve the injunction it was held of different streets were passed, that the repeal of the ordinance and the aggregate sum appropri- was conclusive in favor of the in- ated exceeded the sum available junction. Kaime v. Harty, 4 Mo. for such purpose, it was held that App., 357. the rule "that where two acts are Where a new charter is adopted repugnant in any of their pro- which provides that all ordinances visions the latter act without any shall .continue in force until re- 32(J OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OP ORDINANCES. [§ 203 occupied by its tracks.^^ Where an ordinance for the improve- ment of a street is repealed in part by a subsequent one, or such ordinance is so changed as to provide for the construction of a viaduct in a certain part of the street, whereby a part of the improvement is abandoned, a special assessment for the •\vhole cost of the work as originally intended will not be sustained.s^ Any change by amendment, repeal or otherwise in the im- provement ordinance which contravenes the legal rights of the property owner, or which affects the method of payment for the work so as to subject the contractor to greater risk or requires him to accept less money than he contracted to receive, or otherwise affects the method of payment to his detriment, is within the constitutional provision prohibiting the impairment of the obligation of contracts. This principle is fully consid- ered and illustrated in the chapter on the Constitutionality of Ordinances.^" § 203. Implied repeals. Ordinances may be repealed by im- plication.®! Thus where an ordinance contains a provision plainly repugnant to a former ordinance, to the extent that there is a conflict, the former ordinance is repealed by impli- cation.^2 gg ^ subsequent ordinance fully covering the subject- pealed, and public work is let to A special assessment cannot be be done in the manner provided by levied to pay for a part of the im- a later ordinance, the latter re- provement required by an ordi- peals theold ordinances as to the nance, nor can a special assess- mode of letting such work. Bar- ment be levied to pay for the ber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Ullman, whole after a part has been aban- 137 Mo., 543 ; 38 S. W. Rep., 458. doned. St. John v. East St. Louis, A statute under which an ordi- 136 111., 207; 27 N. E. Rep., 543 nance authorizing street improve- Dorathy v. Chicago, 53 111., 79 ments was passed, was expressly Holmes v. Hyde Park, 121 111., 128 repealed and another statute sub- 13 N. ,E. Rep., 540. stituted therefor which contained «o Sections 243 to 248, 'post. similar provisions. It was held "i Wethington v. Owensboro, 21 that the ordinance authorizing the Ky. L. Rep., 960; 53 S. W., 644; improvements was not repealed, Grand Rapids v. Norman, 110 since it was not in conflict with Mich., 544; 68 N. W. Rep., 269; the new provisions. Allen v. City De Lano v. Doyle, 120 Mich., 258; of Davenport, 107 Iowa, 90, 95 ; 79 N. W. Rep., 188. 77 N. W. Rep., 532. «2Sx porfe Wolf, 14 Neb., 24, 30; 58 Thomson v. People, 184 111., 14 N. W. Rep., 660. 17 ; 56 N. E. Rep., 383. The ^ule relating to repeal of 59 St. John V. East St. Louis, 136 state statutes applies. Johnson v. 111., 207; 27 N. E. Rep., 543. Hahn, 4 Neb., 139, 146; Goddard ^ 203] OP AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. 327 matter of an earlier ordinance, being a substitute therefor, re- peals the former by implication, without words to that effect.®^ But an ordinance which is described in the caption as amending a former ordinance, but in fact amending only one section thereof, and making no reference to the subjects of the other sections of the original ordinance, does not repeal the latter sections by implication where there is no repugnancy between the section as amended and the others which were left un- V. Boston, 20 Pick. (Mass.), 407, 410; Whitney v. Blanchard, 2 Gray (Mass.), 208; Pierpont v. Crouch, 10 Cal., 315. 63 Indiana — Coghill v. State, 37 Ind., Ill; Blakemore v. Dolan, 50 Ind., 194. Iowa — Decorah v. Dunstan Bros., 38 Iowa, 96. Michigan — Lenz v. Sherrott, 26 Mich., 139. New Jersey — Burlington v. Est- low, 43 N. J. L., 13. New York — Dexter v. Allen, 16 Barb. (N. Y.), 15. Ohio — Lorain Plank Road v. Cotton, 12 Ohio St., 263. Tennessee — Schmalzreid v. White, 97 Tenn., 36; 32 L. R. A., 782; 36 S. W. Rep., 393. United States — Norris v. Crock- er, 13 How. (U. S.), 429. West Virginia — Knight v. West Union, 45 W. Va., 194; 32 S. E. Rep., 163. The rule that the later statute clearly intended to prescribe the only rule which should govern the case provided for should be con- strued to repeal the earlier has been applied to ordinances. Roche V. Jersey City, 40 N. J. L., 257. An ordinance prohibiting the sale of spirituous liquors under a penalty is repealed by a subse- quent ordinance prohibiting their sale without a license. Barton v. Gadsden, 79 Ala., 495. A subsequent ordinance revising the whole subject of selling or de- livering any spirituous liquors will be held to be a substitute for all prior regulations on the same subject although words of repeal are not used. Booth v. Carthage, 67 111., 102. And upon such repeal the gen- eral law immediately prevails un- less the subsequent ordinance pro- vides a penalty for such sale. Von Der Leith v. State, 60 N. J. L., 46; 37 Atl. Rep., 436. A subsequent ordinance provided that a former one "is hereby amended so as to read as follows," repeals all provisions of the for- mer ordinance not contained in the latter. Ashland Water Co. v. Ashland Co., 87 Wis., 209; 58 N. W. Rep., 235. When subsequent ordinance re- peals a prior one by implication in particular case, statute as to' repeals held not to apply to ordi- nances. Naylor v. Galesburg, 56 111., 285, 287. A statute perfect in itself may repeal another part "of a law by implication, although such repeal is not expressed in the title of the repealing statute. Union Trust Co. V. Trumbull, 137 111., 146; 27 N. E. Rep., 24. A statute is impliedly repealed by a subsequent one revising the whole subject matter of the first. Commonwealth v. Cooley, 10 Pick. (Mass.), 37, 39; Farr v. Brackett et al., 30 Vt., 344; Conley v. Sup'rs Calhoun Co., 2 W. Va., 416. 328 OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. [§ 203 amended.^* So a subsequent ordinance providing for a city attorney's salary and fees in specified eases, in addition to a percentage on sums of money collected by him for the city provided for in a prior ordinance, does not repeal by implica- tion the prior ordinance.^s Where there are two acts on the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible, but if the two are repugnant in any of their provisions, the latter act, without any repealing clause, operates to the extent of the repugnancy as a repeal of the first.^'' However, constructive repeals or repeals by implication are not favored.®^ "Re- peal by implication is never permitted if it can be avoided by any reasonable construction of the statute. If both acts can be given full force without conflicting with each other, or if the latter act is merely affirmative or cumulative or auxiliary, and not inconsistent, both must stand, and Where the later statute was clearly Intended to prescribe the only rule which should govern, it will be construed as repealing the original act. Sacramento v. Bird, 15 Gal., 294; State v. Conkling, 19 Cal., 501; United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. (U. S.), 88. 64 Goldsmith v. Huntsville, 120 Ala., 182, 188; 24 So. Rep., 509. 65 Austin V. Walton, 68 Tex., 507; 5 S. W. Rep., 70. 66 State V. Massey, 103 N. C, 356; 9 S. E. Rep., 632; Gfeeley v. Jacksonville, 17 Fla., 174; Waller v. Everett, 52 Mo., 57 ; State ex rel. V. Walbridge, 119 Mo., 383; 24 S. W. Rep., 457. But where the latter ordinance is not strictly on the same sub- ject, as where successive ordi- nances providing for the improve- ment of different streets are passed and the amount appropriated for the purpose is not sufiBcient to pay for all the work, the last ordinance passed will not be held to repeal the former by implication, and authorize the improvement of the street specified in the last ordi- nance. Smyrk v. Sharp, 82 Md., 97; 33 Atl. Rep., 411. To the extent of the conflict an existing ordinance is repealed, by implication, where a new ordi- nance contains a provision plainly repugnant to it. In re Wolf, 14 'Neb., 24; 14 N. W., 660; Burling- ton v. Estlow, 43 N. J. L., 13; Greeley v. Jacksonville, 17 Fla., 174. And this will follow although the two ordinances appear under different headings in the ordi- nance book. Cook & Rathborne Co. V. Sanitary Dist, 177 111., 599; 52 N. E. Rep., 870. Where two statutes are repug- nant, the latter repeals the former to the extent of the inconsistency. Dutton V. Aurora, 114 111., 138; 28 N. E. Rep., 461. Where two grants of power by the legislature are repugnant, the last expressed will must control. Korah v. Ottawa, 32 111., 121; Cul- ver V. Third National Bank of Chi- cago, 64 111., 528. 67 Arkansas — Babcock v. Helena, 34 Ark., 499, 503. § 203] OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. 329 the former is not repealed."*'* Thus 9. general statute will not impliedly repeal a prior local or special statute, unless there is such a positive repugnance between the two that they cannot stand together or be consistently reconciled.*'' Since the law does not favor a repeal by implication, it has accordingly been held that where two acts are seemingly repugnant, they must, if possible, be so construed that the latter may not operate as a repeal of the former.'^'" The earlier act remains in force, unless the two are manifestly inconsistent with and repugnant to each other.^i An act is not repealed by implication where the legislature had no intention to repeal it.''^ Connecticut — Norwich v. Story, 25 Conn., 44, 47. Georgia — Haywood v. Savannah, 12 Ga., 404, 409. Illinois — Thompson v. Highland Parle, 187 111., 265; 58 N. E. Rep., 328; People v. Harrison, 185 111., 307; 56 N. E. Rep., 1120. Michigan — Gordon v. People, 44 Mich., 485; 7 N. W. Rep., 69; Peo- ple V. Bussell, 59 Mich., 104, 109; 26 N. W. Rep., 306. Missouri — Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cass County, 53 Mo., 17; State y. Jae- ger, 63 Mo., 403; Glasgow v. Lin- dell's Heirs, 50 Mo., 60; State ex rel. V. Severance, 55 Mo., 378; St. Louis V. Independent Ins. Co., 47 Mo., 146; McVey v. McVey, 51 Mo., 406; St. Louis v. Life Assn., 53 Mo., 466; State v. Draper, 47 Mo., 29; State v. Fitzporter, 17 Mo. App., 271. New Jersey — Landis v. Landis, 39 N. J. L., 274. Pennsylvania — Erie v. Griswold, 184 Pa. St., 435; 39 Atl. Rep., 231. Rhode Island — Providence v. Union R. R. Co., 12 R. I., 473. Washington— StiLte v. Taylor, 21 Wash., 672; 59 Pac. Rep., 489. 68 People V. Hanrahan, 75 Mich., 611, 622; 42 N. W. Rep., 1124. e» St. Louis V. Alexander, 23 Mo., 483 ; Deters v. Renick, 37 Mo., 597 ; State ex rel. Vastine v. Probate Court, 38 Mo., 529; State ex rel. V. Macon County, 41 Mo., 453; St. Louis V. Independent Ins. Co., 47 Mo., 146; Kansas City v. Smart, 128 Mo., 272; 30 S. W. Rep., 773; Manker v. Faulhaber, 94 Mo., 430; 6 S. W. Rep., 372; Waller v. Ever- ett, 52 Mo., 57; State ex rel. v. Edwards, 136 Mo., 360; 38 S. W. Rep., 73; State ex rel. v. Heidorn, 74 Mo., 410; State ex rel. v. Dolan, 93 Mo., 467, 473; 6 S. W. Rep., 366; State ex rel. v. Walbridge, 119 Mo., 383; 24 S. W. Rep., 457; State ex rel. V. Slover, 134 Mo., 10; 31 S. W. Rep., 1054; 34 S. W. Rep., 1102; State ex rel. v. Stratton, 136 Mo., 423; 38 S. W. Rep., 83. If a conflict exists the general law will prevail, as a law regard- ing streets. Chicago Dock Co. v. Garrity, 115 111., 155; 3 N. B. Rep.. 448. Street improvements. Thom- ason V. Ashworth, 73 Cal., 73; 14 Pac. Rep., 615, where it is held that the repeal cannot act retro- spectively or disturb private rights vested thereunder. 70 People V. Mount, 87 HI. App., 194, affirmed in 186 111., 560; 58 N. E. Rep., 360; Bruce v. Schuyler, 9 111., 221; Blain v. Bailey, 25 Ind., 165. 71 Bowen v. Lease, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 221. 72 Tyson v. Postlethwaite, 13 111., 728. 330 OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. [§ 204 § 204. Same subject— General and special ordinances. Im- plied repeal of a general ordinance by a subsequent conflicting special ordinance follows, where the charter does not forbid.'^* Where a city by its special charter is limited in borrowing money to a sum not exceeding $5,000 in any one year, for which it may issue its bonds, but a subsequent general law gives all incorporated cities power to construct water works, without limit as to the cost, and to borrow money for such purpose on its bonds, the general law will operate to repeal the provision in the charter only in respect to indebtedness and borrowing of money for constructing and maintaining a system of water works, leaving the limitations in the charter in force as to the contracting of indebtedness for other purposes.'^* But where the charter prescribes that no special or general ordinance, which is in conflict or inconsistent with general ordinances of prior date, shall be valid or effectual until such prior ordi- nance, or the conflicting parts thereof, are repealed by express terms in the repealing ordinance, such provision must be ob- served.'^'' Hence, a general ordinance, imposing a license of one hundred dollars, and not in express terms repealing a general prior ordinance, imposing a license of fifty dollars, is. When a subsequent ordinance R. Co., 63 N. J. Eq., 804; 48 Atl. does not repeal a prior one by im- Rep., 1028. plication. New York v. Wood, 15 "* Dutton v. Aurora, 114 111., 138 ; Daly (N. Y.), 341; 6 N. Y. Suppl., 28 N. E. Rep., 461. 657; Martineau v. Rochester Ry. A later statute which is general Co., 81 Hun. (N. Y.), 263; 30 N. does not repeal a former one that Y. Suppl., 778; Eidemiller v. Ta- is particular. Haywood v. Savan- coma, 14 Wash., 376; 44 Pac. Rep., nah, 12 Ga., 404. 877. A general statute without nega- Two ordinances which are not in tive words, cannot repeal a pre- conflict with or repugnant to each vious statute which is particular, other, the later does not repeal the even though the provisions of one former. People v. Harrison, 185 be different from the other, unless 111., 307; 56 N. B. Rep., 1120; Bar- the two are irreconcilably incon- ker V. Smith, 10 S. C, 226. sistent. Brown v. Commissioners, What do not constitute implied 21 Pa. St., 37, 43; Providence v. repeals of ordinances. JoUet v. Union Ry. Co., 12 R. I., 473; Con- Petty, 96 111. App., 450; Greensboro ley v. Sup'rs Calhoun Co., 2 W. V. Mullins, 13 Ala., 341. Va., 416. 73 Brown v. Atlantic Ry. and ^o St. Louis Charter, art. Ill, sec. Power Co., 113 Ga., 462; 39 S. E. 28; The Municipal Code of St. Rep., 71; Budd v. Camden Horse Louis, p. 224; Lemoine v. St. Louis, 72 Mo., 404, 406. § 205] OF AMENDMENT AN.D REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. 331 under such provision, invalid.^''' Such -provision has no appli- cation where both ordinances are special. Hence, a special ordinance may, by implication, be repealed by the effect of a subsequent special ordinance in conflict with it.'^'^ Notwith- standing explicit charter language to the effect that all general ordinances shall be repealed by express terms, it has been held that the provision of a special ordinance, granting a franchise to construct and operate a street railroad, as to rate of speed of cars, supersedes a general ordinance on the same subject.'* § 205. Effect of repeal— Revival. It is a general rule of law that the repeal of a repealing act restores the law as it was before the passage of the latter act, without formal words for that purpose, unless otherwise provided either in the repealing act or by some general statute.''^ This rule has been modified '■6 St. Louis V. Sanguinet, 49 Mo., 581. "' Schumacher Mo. App., 297; St V. St. Louis, 3 , Louis V. Weitzel, 130 Mo., 600, 616, 617; 31 S. W. Rep., 1045, rules that a particular ordinance relating to garbage was not in conflict with prior ordi- nances on the same subject, not re- pealed by express terms. '8 Ruschenberg v. Southern Elec- tric R. R. Co., 161 Mo., 70; 61 S. W. Rep., 626. ^9 Dakota — People v. Winter- mute, 1 Dak., 63. Georgia — Harrison v. Walker, 1 Ga., 32. Indiana — Doe v. Naylor, 2 Black. (Ind.), 32. Massachusetts — Commonwealth V. Mott, 21 Pick. (Mass.), 492; Commonwealth v. Getchell, 16 Pick. (Mass.), 452. New Jersey — James v. Dubois, 16 N. J. L., 285. l^ew York — People v. Davis, 61 Barb. (N. Y.), 456; Gale v. Mead, 4 Hill (N. y.), 109. North Carolina — Brinkley v. Swicegood, 65 N. C, 626; State v. Kent, 65 N. C, 311. Vnited States — United States v. Philbrick, 120 U. S., 52. Where an act or rule of the com- mon law is repealed, and the re- pealing enactment is afterwards expressly or impliedly repealed by another, which manifests no in- tention that the first shall con- tinue repealed, the rule at common law was that the repeal of the second act revived the first, and, moreover, repealed it oft initio, and not merely from the time of the passage of the revived act. This rule still prevails where un- changed by statute. The doctrine that the repeal of a repealing statute revives the original act does not apply to spe- cial acts like a charter of incor- poration. Burke v. State, 5 Lea (Tenn.), 349; Smith v. Hoyt, 14 Wis., 252; State ex rel. v. Village of Reads, 76 Minn., 69; 78 N. W. Rep., 883. Where a municipal ordinance is repealed and subsequently the re- pealing ordinance is repealed the original ordinance continues in force. New York v. Broadway and 7th Ave., 97 N. Y., 275 ; In re Open- ing of Albany St., 6 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 273. And this is so where the repeal was only by implication. People 332 OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. [§ 205 by statutes in many states which provide that, in the absence of an express declaration to the contrary, the repeal of a repealing law shall not revive the original act.^" The rule has been declared by the Supreme Court of Cali- fornia that a special provision of the legislature, applicable to a certain city only, excepts the city from the effects of the general law upon the same subject, to the same extent as though it were a part of the general law, and when the pro- vision creating the exception is repealed, the operation of the general law is extended to that extent.^^ Thus when the sus- pension of a general law within a municipality results from a city ordinance passed in pursuance of a special charter, the repeal of the ordinance will leave the general law in force V. Davis, 61 Barb. (N. Y.), 456, 468; Van Denburgh v. Greenbush, 66 N. Y., 1, 4; Churchill v. Marsh, 2 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 219, 225; Wheeler v. Roberts, 7 Cow. (N. Y.), 536; Hastings v. Aiken, 1 Gray (Mass.), 163; Com. v. Chur- chill, 2 Met. (Mass.), 118, 122, per Shaw, C. J., explaining Com. v. Cooley, 10 Pick. (Mass.), 37, and Com. V. Marshall, 11 Pick. (Mass.), 350. The revival only takes place from the latter date and gives the ordinance no retroactive force. Rutherford v. Swlnk, 96 Tenn.* 564; 35 S. W. Rep., 554. An amended ordinance which is invalid cannot have the effect to repeal ordinances which conflict only with the void provision at the amended ordinance. Portland v. Schmidt, 13 Oregon, 17; 6 Pac. Rep., 221; Harbeck v. New York, 10 Bosw. (N. Y.), 366. 80 R. S. of Missouri, 1899, sec. 4177; United States v. Philbrick', 120 U. S., 52; Sullivan v. People, 15 111., 233; Teter v. Clayton, 71 Ind., 237; Cassell v. Lexington, H. & P. Turnpike Rd. Co., 10 Ky. Law Rep., 486; 9 S. W. Rep., 502; Wlt- kouski V. Witkouski, 16 La. Ann., 232; Smith v. Hoyt, 14 Wis., 252; Goodno V. Oshkosh, 31 Wis., 127. The repeal of a statute does not operate a revival of the common law. State v. Slaughter, 70 Mo., 484. The ordinances of the City of St. Louis provide that the repeal of the repealing ordinance does not revive the original ordinance. Mun. Code of St. Louis, sees. 1323 and 1333. Sees. 19 and 20, p. 502, of Wag- ner's Statutes of Mo. designed for the suppression, not regula- tion, of prostitution, was repealed as to St. Louis by the charter of the City of St. Louis of 1870, and the repeal of this charter pro- vision, in 1874, did not revive these sections. State v. Lewis, 5 Mo. App., 465. "If the legislature enacts a law in the terms of a former one, and at the same time repeals the for- mer, this amounts to a reaffirm- ance of the former law, which it does not, in legal contemplation, repeal." Bishop on Statutory Crimes, sec. 181; State v. Massey, 103 N. C, 356; 9 S. E. Rep., 632; State V. Sutton, 100 N. C, 474; 6 S. E. Rep., 687. 81 Santa Barbara v. Eldred, 95 Cal., 378; 30 Pac. Rep. 562. § 206] OP AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. 333 within the city.*^ But this rule has been denied in Missouri, where it is held that, while a charter amendment authorizing the corporation to "regulate or suppress" bawdy houses operated as a repeal within the city of a general law which prohibited the keeping of such houses, a subsequent charter amendment which repealed the former amendment did not thereby revive the general statute in the city.*^ An offense committed while the statute creating it is in force is not affected by the repeal of such statute, but may be tried and punished in all respects as if the statute had remained in full force.^* Thus the court continues to have jurisdiction over one charged on information with a misdemeanor, notwithstanding that the act authorizing such proceeding is repealed pending the trial.*® Although the amending act by its terms repeals all parts of former acts inconsistent with its provisions, it will not have the effect of repealing the section of a prior act where the latter section is unconstitutional.®® Where the repealing clause of an unconstitutional act is made applicable only to laws in- consistent with its operative provisions, then the former law is not repealed.*^ The repeal of a statute which is in the nature of a contract or a grant of power will not divest interest acquired, or annul acts done under it.*® § 206. Same— Penal ordinances. It is generally held that the repeal of an ordinance pending a prosecution under it oper- ates to release the defendant, unless it is otherwise provided in 82Heinssen v. State, 14 Col., 50; Tims v. State, 26 Ala., 165; 228; 23 Pac. Rep., 995, declining to Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261, follow State v. De Bar, 58 Mo., 272. 395. This case approves Judge S7 Devoy v. New York, 36 N. Y., Dillon's conclusion that the de- 449; Stephens v. Ballou, 27 Kan., cision of the De Bar case is erron- 594. eous. 1 Dillon, Munic. Corp. (4th ssjames v. DuBols, 16 N. J. L., Ed.), sec. 88, n. 2. 285. S3 state V. De Bar, 58 Mo., 395. "It cannot be drawn in question 8* State V. Proctor, 90 Mo., 334; as a general proposition, that the 2 S. W. Rep., 472; State v. repeal of a statute, by virtue of Boogher, 71 Mo., 631; State ex rel. which a by-law has been enacted, V. Willis, 66 Mo., 131. involves also the repeal of the by- 85 State V. Ross, 49 Mo., 416. But law itself, which is but a branch see next succeeding section, 206. or an emanation from it. What- 86 Copeland v. St. Joseph, 126 ever reason may be supposed to Mo., 417; 29 S. W. Rep., 281; State exist for the repeal of the statute, ex rel. V. County Court, 11 Wis., must also exist against the further 334 OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. [§ 307 the repealing ordinance.*^ In other words, the repeal of an ordinance under which a penalty has been incurred has the same effect given it as by the common law, and operates as a pardon of the offense, superseding the jurisdiction of the court in any suit pending to enforce such penalty.^" Statutes pro- viding that a pending prosecution is not abated by the repeal of the statute on which it is founded have been held to have no application to municipal ordinances unless expressly made so."^ But a contrary rule has been announced in Kansas®^ and Kentucky.'*^ The repeal of the repealing ordinance does not operate to restore the right to prosecute for past violations; neither does the enacting of an ordinance to the effect that the first shall not affect prosecutions for prior violations.^* § 207. Same— Improvement ordinances. The repeal of an ordinance for opening and improving a proposed street de- stroys all authority for proceeding with the improvement.^^ But the repeal of an ordinance for a special assessment for constructing and laying water supply pipes, pending an appeal duration of the by-law, which it was the special and sole object of the statute to bring into being and to sustain by legislative author- ity." Per Gilchrist, J., in Lisbon V. Clark, 18 N. H., 234, 239. 89 Sonora v. Curtin, 137 Cal., 583; 70 Pac. Rep., 674; Ball v. Tolman, 135 Cal., 375; 67 Pac. Rep., 339; State Hospital v. Flaherty, 134 Cal., 315; 66 Pac. Rep., 322; An- derson V. Byrnes, 122 Cal., 272; 54 Pac. Rep., 821; Spears v. Modoc County, 101 Cal., 303; 35 Pac. Rep., 869; Kansas City v. White, 69 Mo., 26; Kansas City v. Clark, 68 Mo., 588; Earnhart v. Lebanon, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct., 578; United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall (U. S.), 88; Naylor V. Galesburg, 56 111., 285, 287; Illi- nois & M. Canal Co. v. Chicago, 14 III., 334; Contra. State v. Proc- ter, 90 Mo., 334; 2 S. W. Rep., 472; State V. Boogher, 71 Mo., 631; State V. Willis, 66 Mo., 131; State V. Ross, 49 Mo., 416. 90 Rutherford v. Swink, 96 Tenn., 564; 35 S. W. Rep., 554; Suther- land, Stat. Const., sees. 162, 163; Endlich, Interp. Stat, sec. 478 and note. 91 Barton v. Gadsden, 79 Ala., 495; Rutherford v. Swink, 96 tenn., 564; 35 S. W. Rep., 554. 92 Denning v. Yount, 62 Kan., 217, affirming 9 Kan. App., 708; 61 Pac. Rep., 803. 93 The Kentucky statute, provid- ing that no new law shall be con- strued to repeal a former law as to any offense committed or pen- alty incurred thereunder, except that any provision mitigating a penalty may be applied to a judg- ment pronounced after the new law takes effect, applies to ordi- nances as well as to general laws. Baker v. Lexington, 21 Ky. Law Rep., 809; 53 S. W. Rep., 16. 0* Day V. Clinton, 6 111. App., 476. o'Kaime v. Harty, 4 Mo. App., 357. § 209] Qp AMfiNDMEN't AND UEPfiAL OP ORDINANCES. 333 from a judgment confirming the assessment, does not justify the court in vacating the judgment after several terms of court have passed.'"' § 208. Effect of repeal and re-enactment. Where a statute repealed is re-enacted in the same words by an act which takes effect at the same time as the repealing act, it is continued in uninterrupted operation.''^ The rule of construction appli- cable to acts which revise and consolidate another act or acts is, that when the revised and consolidated act re-enacts in the same words the provisions of the act or acts so revised and consolidated, such revision and consolidation shall be taken to be a continuation of the former acts, although such former acts may be expressly repealed by such revised and consolidated act.^8 The repeal of a general corporation law, where the manifest purpose of the repealing act is to substitute a new law extending the provisions of the old, cannot be construed, in the absence of express provisions, as intended to repeal the charters of corporations formed under it.^" A repealing stat- ute, without a saving clause, which substantially re-enacts the law repealed, will not affect pending suits.^ § 209. Effect of revision of ordinances as to repeal. When a former provision is included in a revised law, it is only thereby intended to continue its existence, not to make it operate as 98 McChesney v. Chicago, 161 111., Texas, 20 Wis., 634 ; Glentz v. 110; 43 N. E. Rep., 702; People v. State, 38 Wis., 549. McWethy, 165 111., 222; 46 N. E. os Scheftels v. Tabert, 46 Wis., Rep., 187. 439, 446; 1 N. W. Rep., 156. As to repeal by implication in The re-enactment of a former particular case. Smyrk v. Sharp, section of a statute in a later sec- 82 Md., 97; 33 Atl. Rep., 411. See tion, is not necessarily a repeal sec. 202, supra. of the former section. Martindale 97 (7o»«ec*icMi— State v. Baldwin, v. Martindale, 10 Ind., 566; Cordell 45 Conn., 134, 139. v. State, 22 Ind., 1. Nebraska — State v. Wish, 15 09 United Hebrew Assn. v. Ben- Neb., 448; 19 N. W. Rep., 686. shimol, 130 Mass., 325. New Jersey — Middleton v. N. J. The same has been held to be West Line Ry. Co., 26 N. J. Bq., true of the repeal and re-enactment 269. of laws, which authorize towns to North Carolina — Kesler v. Smith, exercise a municipal power. Lis- 66 N. C, 154. bon v. Clark, 18 N. H., 234. Wisconsin— State v. Gumber, 37 i Alexander v. Big Rapids, 70 Wis., 298; Fullerton v. Spring, 3 Mich., 224; 38 N. W. Rep., 227; Wis.! 667; Laude v. Chicago & N. Moore v. Kenockee, 75 Mich., 332; W. Ry. Co., 33 Wis., 640; Hurley v. 42 N. W. Rep., 944; Merkle v. Ben- 33 (i OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. [§509 an original act to take effect from the date of the revised law. The revision has not the effect of breaking the continuity of those provisions which were in force before it was made.^ A statute revising the whole subject-matter of a former one, and evidently intended as a substitute for it, will operate as a repeal of the former statute, although it contain no express words to that effect.' Where a statute is revised and parts of it are omitted in the revision, those provisions are not to be revived by construction.* Where a revised ordinance repealed ' ' all ordinances and parts of ordinances of a general nature not herein contained, '' ' and provided for summary trial of violators nington, 68 Mich., 133; 35 N. W. Rep., 846. 2 St. Louis V. Foster, 52 Mo., 513; St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo., 483, 509; Dart v. Bagley, 110 Mo., 42; 19 S. W. Rep., 311; Att'y Gen. V. Heidorn, 74 Mo., 410; State ex rel. v. Ranson, 73 Mo., 78, 93; Kamerick v. Castleman, 21 Mo. App., 587; Providence v. Union R. Co., 12 R. I., 473; State v. Pollard, 6 R. L, 290. The general ordinances of a city were revised and consolidated for publication In book form, and were thus adopted and re-enacted. An ordinance under which a prosecu- tion had been begun was re-enacted In substantially the same language, without any words of repeal, or any clause saving pending prose- tions. It was held that the effect of the re-enactment was to • con- tinue uninterruptedly in force the provisions of the original ordi- nance, and that the pending prose- cution was not abated. Junction City V. Webb, 44 Kan., 71; 23 Pac, 1073. A statute requiring that ordi- nances of cities of the second class should be revised by the general council within one year from the time the charter took effect, a re- vision made after that time was held valid. Lowry v. City of Lex- ington, 24 Ky. Law Rep., 516; 68 S. W. Rep., 1109. 3Giddings v. Cox, 31 Vt, 607; Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. (U. S.), 590, 617. Where it is apparent that the legislature intended to revise a statute, the former statutes upon the subject, so far as in conflict with the last are no longer in force, though not expressly repealed. Wakefleld v. Phelps, 37 N. H., 295, 304. Where a town adopted a subse- quent ordinance revising the whole subject of selling or dealing in spirituous liquors, it must be ta- ken as a substitute for all prior ordinances on the same subject, although the last contained no words of repeal. Booth v. Car- thage, 67 111., 102. 4 Pingree v. Snell, 42 Me., 53 ; State V. Wilson, 43 N. H., 415; El- lis v. Paige, 1 Pick. (Mass.), 43, 45. When an amendatory act of the legislature reads that a certain section of a. previous act shall thereafter read as follows, any provision of the previous act which is not found in the amendatory act is repealed. Blakemore v. Do- lan, 50 Ind., 194; State v. Andrews, 20 Tex., 230. § 211] OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. 337 of ordinances, it was held that it repealed a prior ordinance authorizing jury trials.^ § 210. Repeal of ordinance by ordinance only. An ordi- nance can be repealed only by ordinance, and not by resolution or order or motion of the legislative or governing body, not passed and published with the same formality of an ordinance.*' § 211. When ordinances superseded by charter amendments. In general, alterations in the charter do not affect existing ordinances, or by-laws, resolutions or other corporate rights and liabilities. All such ordinances and resolutions remain in force unless they conflict and are inconsistent with the charter provisions as revised or amended.'' A new charter, or amendment of the old, has the effect of repealing inconsistent 5 There was positive conflict. Delaney v. Kansas City Police Court, 167 Mo., 667; 67 S. W. Rep., 589. Backhaus v. People, 87 111. App., 173; Gait v. Chicago, 174 111., 605; 51 N. E. Rep., 653; Joliet V. Petty, 96 111. App., 450; Hibbard v. Chicago, 173 111., 91; 50 N. E. Rep., 256; State V. Swindell, 146 Ind., 527; 45 N. B. Rep., 700; 58 Am. St. Rep., 375; Ryce V. Osage, 88 Iowa, 558; 55 N. W. Rep., 532; Cascaden v. Water- loo, 106 Iowa, 673; 77 N. W. Rep., 333. "No ordinance shall be repealed except by ordinance." Charter San Francisco, Art. II., Ch. 1, Sec. 18; St. & Amend, to Codes of Cal., p. 246. An ordinance cannot be repealed by mere verbal motion to that ef- fect without reference to the title, number or date of passage of the ordinance to be repealed. Swindell V. State, 143 Ind., 153; 35 L. R. A., 50; 42 N. E. Rep., 528. An ordinance cannot be suspend- ed by resolution. People ex rel. V. Mount, 186 111., 560, 578, 579; 58 N. E. Rep., 360; Terr& Haute v. Lake, 43 Ind., 481; Chicago & N. P. Ry. Co. V. Chicago, 174 111., 439 ; 51 N. E., 596. A resolution provided that a par- ticular ordinance theretofore duly enacted "be reconsidered" is not a repeal of such ordinance. Ashton V. Rochester, 60 Hun. (N. Y.),372; 14 N. Y. Suppl., 855. A resolution rescinding a former resolution conditionally only is in- operative. Buffalo V. Chadeayne, 134 N. Y., 163; 31 N. B. Rep., 443. ' Alahama — Baader v. Cullman, 115 Ala., 539; 22 So. Rep., 19. Florida — Pensacola v. Sullivan, 23 Fla., 1; 6 So. Rep., 922. Indiana — Chamberlain v. Bvans- ville, 77 Ind., 542. Maryland — United Railway & E. Co. V. Hayes, 92 Md., 490; 48 Atl. Rep., 364. Michigan — Ruell v. Alpena, 108 Mich., 290; 66 N. W. Rep., 49. Missouri — Monett v. Beaty, 79 Mo. App., 315. Pennsylvania — Erie Academy v. Erie, 31 Pa. St., 515^ Texas — Garey v. Galveston, 42 Tex., 627. Washington — Spokane v. Will- iams, 6 Wash., 376; 33 Pac. Rep., 973. An amendment of the charter by S38 OP AMBNiDMENT A^fD IlBPEAL OF ORDINANCES. [§ 311 charter and ordinance provision.^ The rule applicable to state statutes where the constitution is changed, applies with like force to municipal ordinances and resolutions where the city charter is altered. Where a statute which does not in express terms annul a right or power given to a corporation by a for- mer act, but only confers the same rights and powers upon it under a new name, and with additional powers, the latter act does not repeal the former.^ A change in the organic law under which a city is organized does not r_epeal existing ordi- nances while the power to pass the same continues to exist.^** But if in the revised charter a provision of a prior charter, the legislature may relieve the city of an obligation created by stat- ute from the city to the state. Com. V. Louisville, 5 B. Mon. (Ky.-), 293. A statute expressly repealed un- der which an ordinance is passed, and substituting therefor a statute containing similar provisions does not affect the ordinance if not re- pugnant to the new statutory pro- visions. Allen v. Davenport, 107 Iowa, 90, 95; 77 N. W. Rep., 532. And so where an ordinance pro- viding for the issuing of license to sell liquors and for the punish- ment of all persons who should sell without license, where the charter was amended so as to prohibit cit- ies of the second class from issu- ing license for the sale of liquors, the remaining part of the ordi- nance was held to be in force. Franklin v. Westlall, 27 Kan., 614. Where a state statute provided that judges of an election should receive no pay and repealed all existing ordinances inconsistent with its provisions it was held that an ordinance then in force providing for the pay of judges and clerks of elections was repealed only so far as it related to the judges, and clerks were entitled to pay at the rate fixed by the ordi- nance. Quienette v. St. Louis, 76 Mo., 402. s Colorado — Carpenter v. PeoplC; 8 Colo., 116; 5 Pac. Rep., 828. Indiana — Wood v. Mears, 12 Ind., 515; 74 Am. Dec, 222. Kentucky — Wethington v, Owens boro, 21 Ky. Lew Rep., 960; 53 S W. Rep., 644. Louisiana — New Orleans v. South ern Bank, 15 La. Ann., 89. Nebraska — In re Hall, 10 Neb.^ 537; 7 N. W. Rep., 287. New Hampshire — Lisbon v. Clark, 18 N. H., 234. Pennsylvania — Schroeder v. Lan- caster City, 15 Pa. Co. Ct. R., 467 Rhode Island — State v. Pollard, 6 R. I., 290. Regulations relating to the aud iting and paying claims. State ex rel. V. Smith, 89 Mo., 408. An ordinance prohibiting the sale of unsound meat, and provid- ing a penalty for its violation be- comes inoperative on the taking effect of a charter provision au- thorizing the council to prevent the selling of such meat, and to pun- ish those who "knowingly" sell it, so far, at least, as the ordinance is broader than the charter. Peo- ple V. Brill, 120 Mich., 42; 78 N. W. Rep., 1013, Waring v. Mobile, 24 Ala., 701. lojm re Hall, 10 Neb., 537; 7 N. W. Rep., 287. § 213] OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. 339 which authorized an ordinance to permit a party wall to be built partly on the land of an adjoining owner without his consent, was omitted, an ordinance enacted by virtue of such power and existing at the time of the revision is repealed by the adoption of the revised charter .^^ § 212. Rule relating to repeals of charter and ordinance provisions by general laws. Where a contrary intention is not manifest, the general rules relating to repeals by general laws of charter and ordinance provisions and legislative acts appli- cable to municipal corporations, which, in effect, become con- stituent parts of their charters, may be thus summarized : 1. A later statute which is general does not repeal a former one that is particular.^^ Thus laws existing for the benefit of particular municipalities, ordinarily are not repealed by gen- eral laws relating to the same subject-matter.^* 2. Where there is a difference in the whole purview of two statutes, apparently relating to the same subject-matter, the former remains of force.^* 3. Where it is evident that a subsequent act seeks to revise the entire subject-matter, embracing all that was intended to be preserved in the old, and omitting what was not so intended, or where the last act covers the entire subject-matter embraced in the first and also contains additional provisions, the last act supersedes the former and repeals it by implication.^^ §213. Same subject— Question of intent. 4. Whether a prior law is repealed by a subsequent enactment is entirely a 11 Schmidt v. Lewis, 63 N. J. Eq., 3 How. (U. S.), 636; U. S. v. Ty- 566; 52 Atl., 707. nen, 11 Wall. (U. S.), 88. 12 Per Lumpkin, J., In Haywood California — Plerpont v. Crouch, V. Savannah, 12 Ga., 404, 409. 10 Cal., 315. 13 Harrlsburgh v. Sheck, 104 Pa. Massachusetts — Bartlett v. Kurg, St., 53; Ottawa v. La Salle County, 12 Mass., 545. 12 111., 339; State v. Branin, 23 N. Mississippi — State Board of Ed- J. L., 484; Wood v. Election Court, ucation v. Aberdeen, 56 Miss., 518. 58 Cal., 561. Nehraska — Brome v. Cuming 14 People V. Hanrahan, 75 Mich., County, 31 Neb., 362; 47 N. W. 611, 622; 42 N. W. Rep., 1124; Bow- Rep., 1050; 34 Am. & Bng. Corp. en V. Lease, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 221. Cas., 481. 15 Per Mr. Justice Miller, in Mur- New Hampshire — Leighton v. dock V. Memphis, 20 Wall. (U. S.), Walker, 9 N. H., 59. 590, 616. New York — People v. Van Nort, United States— V. S. v. Claflin, 64 Barb. (N. Y.), 205; Dexter & L. 97 TJ. S., 546; Daviess V. Fairbairn, Plank Ry. Co. v. Allen, 16 Barb. (N. Y.), 15. 340 OF AMENDMENT AnD REPEAL OP ORIJINANCES. [§ 213 question of legislative intention."' "Whenever the intent to repeal a special act by a general statute is apparent, the legis- lative intent will be effectuated. "^^ Thus a general statute relating to taxing railroads was held to repeal by implication prior special charter power of municipalities respecting the same subject. In this case it was said : "It is really a question of intention, and where the legislative intent is manifest or apparent it must prevail;" and the intention was regarded as manifest from the scope and purpose of the whole act, although negative words or words of repeal were not used.^^ A like ruling was afterwards made by the same court when it was held that a general law relating to the assessments and taxation of railroads, and providing a method for the entire state for extending and collecting taxes on railroad property, super- seded a charter provision covering the same subject-matter.^^ As a rule, general legislation supersedes inconsistent special legislation relating to the same subject although the latter is not expressly repealed.^** Thus a legislative act which in terms applies to all cities of the state will be construed as repealing inconsistent charter provisions. ^^ A law providing for a uniform system of registration of voters and election of municipal officers will supersede charter provisions covering the same subjeet.22 16 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Chey- San Francisco Ry. Co., 117 Mo., 1, enne, 113 U. S., 516; Fish v. Bran- 12; 22 S. W. Rep., 910. in, 23 N. J. L., 484. 20 state v. Morristown, 33 N. J. ,,_.. ,, XT " Tj ,•„!, Li-. 57; Thomason v. Ashworth, 73 17 Fitzgerald v. New Brunswick, ^ , ' , , „ „ „. ^ „, 47 M T T d7q 4S1 ^^1- ^^' 1* P**'- ^^P- 615; Chicago 47 N. J. 1.., 479, 481. ^^^^ ^ ^ ^^ ^ Garrity, 115 111., 18 Per Wagner, J., in State ea; reZ. 155; 3 n. E. Rep., 448. V. Severance, 55 Mo., 378, 386. The 21 state (Bowyer) v. Camden, 50 court observed: "There is no ques- n. J. L., 87; 11 Atl. Rep., 137; tion concerning the now generally state v. Spaude, 37 Minn., 322; admitted rule that a general affirm- 34 n. W. Rep., 164. ative statute will not repeal a for- 22 st. Louis v. Hoblitzelle, 85 mer one, which is special or partic- mo., 64, reversing 15 Mo. App., 441; ular in its nature, unless negative state ex rel. v. Owsjey, 122 Mo., words are used, or the acts be so gS; 26 S. W. Rep., 659; Staude v. entirely inconsistent that they can- Board of Election Commissioners, not stand together. In such case 61 Cal., 313. there is nothing but an implica- in California it has been held tion of repeal, and repeals in that that a general law providing for manner are not favored." police courts in cities and towns 19 State ex rel. v. St. Louis & will take the place of charter regu- §214] OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. 34l Within its constitutional powers the legislature may modify or repeal municipal ordinances. Such repeals need not be in express terms. If the intention to repeal clearly . appears, the ordinances must give way to the legislative act so far as they are in conflict with it.^^'''^ Hence a legislative act creating the office of excise commissioner and giving him control of city dramshops and licenses therefor, repeals conflicting ordinances on the same subject.^^ § 214. When charter provisions supersede general laws. The rule lias obtained in some jurisdictions that a municipal charter cannot be amended, even by general, or ' ' genuine general leg- islation," in matters of purely municipal and local concern, unless such legislation is necessary to carry out an express or implied constitutional provision. "Laws, though general they may be, which relate alone to the government of cities, must yield to the provisions of the adopted charter," as a law pro- viding for "assessing damages and benefits for grading and re-grading naturally falls within the dominion of municipal government." Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Missouri unanimously held that a constitutional charter provision on this subject suspended and took the place of the general law of the state relating to the same matter, in force when the charter was adopted.^* So a legislative act, empowering cities lations on the same sutoject. Peo- Conflict must esist, otherwise pie ex rel. v. Henshaw, 76 Cal., 436; special municipal charter stands. 18 Pac. Rep., 413; Ex parte Ah People ex rel. v. Jobs, 7 Colo., 475; You, 82 Cal., 339, 342; 22 Pac. Rep., 4 Pac. Rep., 798. 929. Prospective provisions in revls- 22% People V. Furman, 85 Mich., ing act. Reading v. Heppleman, 61 LIO, 48 N. W. Rep., 169; Mulcahy Pa. St., 233. v. Newark, 57 N. J. L., 513 ; 31 24 state ex rel. v. Field, 99 Mo., Atl. Rep., 226; Com. v. Gillam, 8 352; 12 S. W. Rep., 802. This case Serg. & R. (Pa.), 50. was approved in these words: "We 23 State ex rel. v. Bell, 119 Mo., think it was properly ruled that 70, 75; 24 S. W. Rep., 765; State the special charter superseded the ex rel. v. Higgins, 125 Mo., 364; general statutes where the two con- 28 S. W. Rep., 638. flicted as to a mere municipal reg- Subsequent constitutional amend- ulation, and we hold that the con- ments will repeal conflicting char- demnation proceedings to acquire ter provisions. Donahue v. Gra- land for streets, parks, water- ham, 61 Cal., 276; Bast St. Louis works, sewers and the like clearly V. Amy, 120 U. S., 600; Hagers- fall within municipal regulation." town V. Dechert, 32 Md., 369; Pub- Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., 140 lie School Trustees v. Taylor, 30 Mo., 458, 472; 41 S. W. Rep., 943. N. J. Eq., 618. See Kansas City v. Smart, 128 342 OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. [§ 214 organized, or which might thereafter be organized under the provisions of the constitution, allowing cities to frame or adopt their own charters, to establish and maintain a system of parks or boulevards, was declared unconstitutional, as an attempt to amend a municipal charter; the court holding that the act related "solely to matters of internal municipal govern- ment. "^^ So a charter section providing that any appointed municipal officer may be removed by the mayor or council for cause is not repealed by a legislative act providing for removal of any state, county or city of&cers, guilty of wilful and corrupt neglect of official duty, and for a trial by jury, if demanded.^" By constitution in Minnesota, general laws relating to affairs of cities, applying equally to all cities of a class, "shall be paramount while in force to the provisions relating to the same matter included in the local charter," authorized by the constitution. "But no local charter provision or ordinance Mo., 272; 30 S. W. Rep., 773; Kan- Field case, the subject involved sas City v. Ward, 134 Mo., 172; 35 S. W. Rep., 600; Tacoma Gas & E. L. Co. V. Tacoma, 14 Wash., 288; 44 Pac. Rep., 655. But in Swing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo., 64, at page 77, the court, auguendo, says a charter provision as to a hoard of police commission- ers would not have prevailed against a state law in force at the time the St. Louis Charter was adopted. This dictum thus broad- ly stated appears to antagonize the principle of the unanimous decis- ion in the Field case, which, brief- ly stated, is that a charter provis- ion may prevail against a state law on the same subject. But this distinction between the two cases is controlling: The St. Louis charter not only expressly provides "That no system of police shall be established or maintained other than the present metropolitan sys- tem as long as the same is estab- lished by law" (Art. IIL, Sec. 26, par. 2), but the matter of preserv- ing the public peace and order is usually regarded as a proper func- tion of the state, whereas, in the case, was purely local and municipal. 25 Kansas City v. Scarritt, 127 Mo., 642; 29 S. W. Rep., 845; 30 S. W. Rep., 111. In California it has been held that constitutional charter provis- ions in conflict with general laws passed after the adoption of the charter will be superseded. Davies v. Los Angeles, 86 Cal., 37; 24 Pac. Rep., 711. Thus a general law re- lating to street improvements ap- plicable to all the cities of the state, will supersede provisions of freeholder's charters on the same subject. Thomason v. Ashworth, 73 Cal., 73; 14 Pac. Rep, 615. Compare St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo., 466; 41 S. W. Rep., 1094; 46 S. W. Rep., 976; Murnane v. St. Louis, 123 Mo., 479; 27 S. W. Rep., 711. Charter provisions relating to streets inconsistent with provis- ions of a new or amended consti- tution are, of course, repealed. Donahue v. Graham, 61 Cal., 276. 28 state ex rel. v. Walbridge, 119 Mo., 383; 24 S. W. Rep., 457; Man- ker V. Faulhaber, 94 Mo., 430; 6 S. W. Rep., 372. § 215] OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. 343 passed thereunder shall supersede any general law of the state defining or punishing crimes or misdemeanors. "^^ A statute authorizing cities of a certain class to license particular things, such as the sale of intoxicating liquors, does not repeal the provisions of the general law on the subject.^* But if the city, acting under the power given by the general law, licenses the thing, one acting under a license cannot be punished under the general law.^" A general law applicable to the entire state will not modify or repeal, in whole or in part, a special act, unless by express words or by necessary implication.*" Where the constitution of the state, as in California, contains a pro- vision so as to except municipal affairs from being subject to and controlled by the operation of general laws, cities to which the provision applies are not affected by general laws relating to municipal affairs.^^ § 215. When ordinances supersede general laws. Sometimes ordinances authorized by charter will have the effect of special laws of the legislature and will supersede the general laws within the corporate limits relating to that particular subject.*^ Ordinances passed by a city council under a charter giving the city power to pass ordinances inconsistent with and repugnant to the general law, by necessary implication, repeal the general law upon the subject within the territorial limits of the city.*^ The Supreme Court of Louisiana invoked the same doctrine in holding that the provision of a municipal charter which con- 27 Laws of Minn., 1897, pp. 507- Broderick, 118 Cal., 474; 50 Pac. 509. Rep., 644. See Ch. XV. Of Munici- 28 State V. Young, 17 Kan., 414. pal Control of Offenses Against Where the constitution confers State. power upon the corporate author- 32 Rogers v. People, J Colo., 450; ities to impose fines or penalties 12 Pac. Rep., 843; In re Goddard, for the unauthorized sale of intox- 16 Pick. (Mass.), 504; State v. icating liquors, they are not lim- Dwyer, 21 Minn., 512; State v. ited or restricted to the same pen- Clarke, 54 Mo., 17 ; State v. Clarke, altles imposed by the general law. 25 N. J. L., 54; State v. Morris- Baldwin V. Murphy, 82 111., 485. town, 33 N. J. L., 57; Mark v. But see Sec. 178, supra. State, 97 N. Y., 572 ; In re Snell, 58 29 Berry v. People, 36 111., 423; Vt., 207; 1 Atl. Rep., 566. Gardner v. People, 20 III., 430. ss St. Johnsbury v. Thompson, 59 But see Ch. XV. Vt., 300; 59 Am. Rep., 731; 9 Atl. 30 State (Gorum) v. Mills, 24 N. Rep., 571; Bennett v. People, 30 J. L., 177. 111., 389; Des Moines Gas Co. v. 31 Popper V. Broderick, 123 Cal., Des Moines, 44 Iowa, 505; 24 Am. 456; 56 Pac. Rep., 53; Morton v. Rep., 756, 344 OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OP ORDINANCES. [§ 215 ferred power to pass and enforce ordinances to suppress and punish the sale of adulterated drinks was not superseded by a general statute providing for the prosecution of the same offense throughout the state.^* "In the absence of anything showing a different intent on the part of the legislature, general legislation upon a particular subject must give way to later inconsistent special legislation upon the same subject."*^ But vphere the charter does not confer upon the city authorities exclusive jurisdiction over the subject, ordinances passed by the city do not supersede the general law.^® Where a subse- quent general law and prior special law, or ordinance provi- sions, do not conflict, they both stand and will be construed accordingly.*^ But if the two acts are irreconcilably incon- sistent, or it appears that the legislature intended that the later act should supersede the earlier act, the former is repealed by implication."^ Where an amendatory act covers the subject of the qualifications of an officer, as mayor, in like manner as the original charter, but omits a proviso relating to certain disqualifications, it will be held that the proviso stands as part of the revised chai-ter, as it did not conflict -with the corre- 34 state V. Labatut, 39 La. Ann., 513; 2 So. Rep., 550. 35 St. Johnsbury v. Thompson, 59 Vt, 300; 9 Atl. Rep., 571; 59 Am. Rep., 731. 3« Berry v. People, 36 111., 423; Seibold v. People, 86 111., 33. See Ch. XV. Of Municipal Control of Offenses Against State. A by-law which a borough was authorized to make by its charter, which prohibited the taking of oys- ters from the water within said borough, during a certain period of the year, is abrogated by a gen- eral law of the state passed subse- quent to the granting of the char- ter, prohibiting the doing of the same acts. Southport v. Ogden, 23 Conn., 128. The passage of an ordinance by the city of Lexington, authoriz- ing a fine of 100 dollars for a breach of the peace, did not repeal the general law, which authorizes a fine at the discretion of a jury by the authority of the city court. Marsh v. Commonwealth, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.), 25. 37 Simpson v. Savage, 1 Mo., 359; Baldwin v. Green, 10 Mo., 410; State V. Simonds, 3 Mo., 414; State V. Payne, 4 Mo., 377; State v. Cow- an, 29 Mo., 330. As to the right of both city and state to license or tax the same subject or object: Perries — Harri- son V. State, 9 Mo., 530. Auction- eers— Haywood V. Savannah, 12 Ga., 404. 38 Manker v. Paulhaber, 94 Mo., 430; 6 S. W. Rep., 372; State ex rel. Walbridge, 119 Mo., 383; 24 S. W. Rep., 457; State ex rel. v. Slo- ver, 134 Mo., 607; 36 S. W. Rep., 50; State ex rel. v. Stratton, iSS Mo., 423; 38 S. W. Rep., 83; Waller v. Everett, 52 Mo., 57 ; State ex rel. V. Edwards, 136 Mo., 360; 38 S. W. Rep., 73; State ex rel v. Hei- § 215] OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. 345 sponding provision contained therein.^* Of course, the power granted by the charter to pass an ordinance which will super- sede a state statute may be subsequently revoked by the legislature.*^ As we have seen, authorized ordinances have the same force and effect within the corporate limits that acts of the legisla- ture have on the people throughout the state.** It therefore follows that whether an ordinance is in apparent or real con- flict with a general law, or whether it will supersede such law, must be determined by the same principles applicable to char- ter provisions.*^ dorn, 74 Mo., 411; State ex rel. v. Dolan, 93 Mo., 467, 473; 6 S. W. Rep., 366. 39 The court said that the point that the proviso was repealed might perhaps have been more suc- cessfully urged had it not been expressly provided in the amenda- tory act, "that all such parts of the act to which this is a supple- ment as are contrary to, or incon- sistent with the provisions of this act, be and the same are hereby repealed." State v. Merry, 3 Mo., 278, 280. The contrary rule is in- timated in Goodenow v. Buttrick, 7 Mass., 140, 143. 40 People V. Hanrahan, 75 Mich., 611; 42 N. W. Rep., 1124; Rogers V. Jones, 1 Wend. (N. Y.), 237; St. Louis V. Cafferata, 24 Mo., 94; St. Louis V. Bentz, 11 Mo., 61; Mo- bile V. Allaire, 14 Ala., 400; Elk Point V. Vaughn, 1 Dak., 113; 46 N. W. Rep., 577. *i St. Johnsbury v. Thompson, 59 Vt, 300; 9 Atl. Rep., 571; 59 Am. Rep., 731; Hopkins v. Mayor, 4 M. & W., 621; State ex rel. v. Wal- bridge, 119 Mo., 383, 394; 24 S. W. Rep., 457; Union Depot Ry. Co. v. Southern R. R. Co., 105 Mo., 562, 575; 16 S. W. Rep., 920; Jackson v. Grand Av. Ry. Co., 118 Mo., 199, 218; 24 S. W. Rep., 192; New Or- leans Water Works v. New Or- leans, 164 U. S., 471, 481; Buttrick V. Lowell, 1 Allen (Mass.), 172; Brick Pres. Church v. New York, 5 Cowen (N. Y.), 538, 541; Sec. 12, supra. 42 state V. Binder, 38 Mo., 451, held that a city ordinance, passed pursuant to authority conferred, upon the city, operated as a repeal of a general state law. state V. Clarke, 54 Mo., 17, holds that the power given St. Louis un- der the Charter of 1870, Art. III., Sec. 1, "to regulate bawdy houses," operated as a repeal of the general statute prohibiting them. In re- spect to the City of St. Louis. ( See Ex parte Garza, 28 Tex. App., 381; 13 S. W. Rep., 779; 19 Am. St. Rep., 845.) State v. De Bar, 58 Mo., 395, affirms this case and grounds judgment on the principle that where a special provision ap- plicable to a particular object or locality is inconsistent with the general law, the former must pre- vail. And this rule applies to a comparison of duly authorized or- dinances with state statutes, since both are from a common source of authority. Where the matter is committed by state statute to the exclusive ju- risdiction of the municipality — as to license, tax, restrain, prohibit the selling of intoxicating liquor, 346 OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. [§ 210 § 21G. Effect on ordinances by surrender of special charter —Change in class or grade. Unless otherwise provided by statute, when a city surrenders its special charter and elects to be governed by the general incorporation laws applicable, or advances to a higher class, or is reduced to a lower municipal grade, all its rights, liabilities, property, suits, etc., remain unaffected by the change. All rights and property vested in the former organization become vested in the new.** While the adoption of the general incorporation law by a city organ- ized under special charter repeals all inconsistent provisions of such charter, consistent provisions continue in force.** All ordinances and resolutions in force remain so, until altered or repealed, unless inconsistent with the law applicable to the new organization.*^ etc. — such express grant of power will be construed to supersede prior state laws conferring jurisdiction on the state over the subject. Huff smith v. People, 8 Colo., 175; 6 Pa" Rep., 157. • The rule is illustrated in numer- ous decisions. Smith v. Madison, 7 Ind., 86; Burlington v. Law- rence, 42 Iowa, 681; In re God- dard, 16 Pick. (Mass.), 504; St. Louis V. Alexander, 23 Mo., 483 St. Louis V. Cafferata, 24 Mo., 94 St. Louis V. Bentz, 11 Mo., 61 Baldwin v. Green, 10 Mo., 410 Harrison v. State, 9 Mo., 530 ; State V. Simonds, 3 Mo., 414; State v. Payne, 4 Mo., 377; State v. Cowan, 29 Mo., 330; Westport v. Kansas City, 103 Mo., 141; 15 S. W. Rep., 68; State v. Morristown, 33 N. J. L., 57; State v. Clarke, 25 N. J. L., 54; Mark v. State, 97 N. Y., 572. *3 California — General Laws of California (Deering), 1897, p. 607, provide that proceedings thereto- fore commenced shall, after such reorganization, be conducted in ac- cordance with the provisions of such general laws. Iowa — Iowa Code, of 1897, Sees. 631, 637. Illinois — 1 Starr & Curtis Anno. III. Stat. (2nd Ed.), pp. 678, 679; Illinois V. Illinois Central R. Co., 33 Fed. Rep., 730; Carney v. Mar- seilles,, 136 111., 401; 26 N. B. Rep., 491. Ohio — 1 Bate's Anno. Ohio Stat., Sees. 1539, 1633 to 1647; Corry v. Gaynor, 22 Ohio St., 584; Hubbard V. Norton, 28 Ohio St., 116; Good- ale V. Fennell, 27 Ohio St., 426; Raymond v. Cleveland, 42 Ohio St., 522. United States — Evanston v. Gunn, 99 U. S., 660. 4* Crook V. People, 106 111., 2S1 ; Chicago D. and C. Co. v. Garrity, 115 111., 155; 3 N. B. Rep., 448; Water Com'rs of Springfield v. People, 137 111., 660; 27 N. B. Rep., 698; Hayward v. People, 145 111., 55; 33 N. E. Rep., 885. Change does not affect city char- ter relating to school system. Smith V. People, 154 111., 58; 39 N. E. Rep., 319. 15 Moore v. Cincinnati, 26 Ohio St., 582; Cotter v. Doty, 5 Ohio, 393; Zanesville v. Muskingum Co., 5 Ohio St., 590; Hubbard v. Nor- ton, 28 Ohia St., 116 ; Neff v. Bates, 25 Ohio St., 169, § 217] OF AMENDME3NT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. 34'i' So on change of class or grade, all ordinances continue in force unless inconsistent with the powers relating to the class or grade which the city enters, until amended or repealed.'*® Thus a statute converting a borough into a city does not, of itself, and in the absence of express provisions to that effect, annul existing ordinances.*'^ § 217. Same— Dissolution and reoiganization. An absolute repeal of a municipal charter is effectual so far as it abolishes the old corporate organization; but when the same or sub- stantially the same inhabitants are erected into a new corpo- ration, whether, with extended or restricted territorial limits, such new corporation is treated in law as the successor of the old one, entitled to its property rights, and subject to its liabilties.** Since the new succeeds to all rights and assumes all obligations of the old corporate organization, it has the effect of continuing in existence all ordinances and franchises which constitute contracts and under which rights have become vested.*^ All ordinances, resolutions and by-laws in force in any city or town when it shall organize under general incorporation laws shall continue in force and effect until repealed or amended, notwith- standing such change of organi- zation, and the making of such change shall not he construed to effect, a change in the legal iden- tity, as a corporation, of such city or town. 1 Starr & Curtis III. Stat. (2nd Ed.), p. 679. The pro- vision is intended to continue in force ordinances adopted under special charters, which could law- fully be enacted under the gen- eral law. Cairo v. Bross, 101 111., 475, 479; 9 111. App., 406; Law v. People, 87 111., 385. 48 Code of Washington, 1896, Sec. 1132. NefC v. Bates, 25 Ohio St., 169; Hubbard v. Norton, 28 Ohio St., 116. Passing from one class to anoth- er, ordinances remain the same. Ritchie v. South Topeka, 38 Kan., 368; 16 Pac. Rep., 332. *7 Trustees Brie Academy v. Erie, 31 Pa. St., 515. A provision in such statute, that the existing ordinances shall re- main in force, provided they shall be recorded within four months thereafter, is merely directory; and a non-compliance therewith does not affect the validity of such ordinances. Trustees Erie Acade- my v. Erie, 31 Pa. St., 515. 18 Shapleigh v. San Angelo, 167 U. S., 646. Where a town is reincorporated with the same name and substan- tially the same powers as before but with some excision of popula- tion and territory, the effect is not to extinguish the debts of the original corporation, but to leave them subsisting as valid obliga- tions against the new one. Ross V. Wimberly, 60 Miss., 345, over- ruling Port Gibson v. Moore, 13 Smed. & M. (Miss.), 157. w Episcopal C. Soc. v. Episcopal 348 OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. [§ 218 Although a place may have no legal existence as a body politic and corporate, because not incorporated according to law, and which in proper proceeding is adjudged to be dis- solved as a municipal corporation, but is subsequently legally incorporated as a city, embracing the same territory as the illegal corporation, street improvement bonds issued while it existed as a de facto corporation are binding on the new corpo- ration; and the fact of legal disincorporation does not have the effect of avoiding subsisting contracts of the de facto municipal government.^*' § 218. Same — By consolidation or chajig-e of corporate limits. Where a municipal corporation is legislated out of existence and its territory annexed to other corporations, the latter, unless the legislature otherwise provides, become en- titled to all its property and immunities, and are severally liable for a proportional share of all its then subsisting legal Ch., 1 Pick. (Mass.), 372; Atty. Gen. V. Leicester, 9 Beav., 546. The effect of a new cliarter in reincorporation merely continues the old corporation and does not have the effect of extinguishing the debts of the city incurred un- der the former charter. Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal., 524, 554; Hopkins v. Swansea, 4 M. & W., 621. "It has never been disputed that new charters revive, and give ac- tivity, to the old corporation; where the question has arisen, in which there was any remarkable metamorphosis, it has always been determined that they remain the same as to debts and rights." Per Lord Mansfield, quoted in Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal., 524, 554. Question discussed as to effect of reorganizing a public corporation. Savannah v. Steamboat Co., R. M. Charlt. (Ga.), 342. 50 Shapleigh v. San Angelo, 167 U. S., 646; Ranken v. McCallum, 25 Tex. Civ. App., 83; 60 S. W. Rep., 975. So town orders duly issued after the attempted incorporation and organization of a town from cer- tain detached territory of two other towns are chargeable against such towns, where the ordinance creating the new town is Judicially vacated in a direct proceeding sub- sequent to the issuing of such or- ders. Gilkey v. Town of How, 105 Wis., 4f; 81 N. W. Rep., 120, rely- ing on Shapleigh v. San Angelo, 167 U. S., 646. But where the legal municipal corporations succeed to all the franchises, rights, property, public improvements, people and territo- ry of such de facto governments, it Is competent for the legislature to require the de jure governments to assume the obligations and pay the debts of their illegal unauthor- ized predecessors. Mayor, etc., of Guthrie v. Territory ex rel Losey, 1 Okla., 188; 31 Pac. Rep., 190; 21 L. R. A., 841; Guthrie Nat. Bank V. Guthrie, 173 U. S., 528; Coast Co. V. Spring Lake Borough, 56 N. J. Eq., 615; 36 Atl. Rep., 21; Blackburn v. Oklahoma City, 1 Okla., 292; 31 Pac. Rep., 782; 33 Pac. Rep., 708. § 218] OF AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES. 349 debts, and vested with the power to raise revenue wherewith to pay them by levying taxes on the property transferred and the persons residing therein.^i All franchise ordinances and ordinances resulting in contracts which have created a liability or obligation upon the part of the city and private persons or corporations, are not affected by the consolidation, but are continued in force, and the liability of the annexed town is assumed by the consolidated town, upon the principle that, hav-' ing received the benefits of the assets, this is a sufficient consid- eration for beiiig charged with the debts and liabilities of the territory annexed.^^ Where a consolidation of two or more to\i'ns is effected, each having its peculiar ordinance provisions, it is sometimes provided in the act of consolidation that the ordinances then in force . shall remain in force within the limits of the territory for which they were enacted, until re- pealed by the aldermen of the consolidated eity.^^ As stated elsewhere,^* a municipal ordinance, regulation or contract de- signed for the city at large operates throughout its boundaries whatever their change/" 51 Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwlth, 100 U. S., 514; Wade v. Richmond, 18 Gratt. (Va.), 583; Higginbotham V. Commonwealth, 25 Gratt. (Va.), 627, 633. Where the whole territory of a town is annexed to another, the annexed town is destroyed, and its assets and liabilities become assets and liabilities of the town to which it is annexed, unless otherwise pro- vided iu the statute, or ordinance making the annexation. Schriber V. Langdale, 66 Wis., 616; 29 N. W. Rep., 547, 554; Guthrie v. Ter- ritory, 1 Okla., 188; 31 Pac. Rep., 190; 21 L. R. A., 841. =2 Schriber v. Langdale, 66 Wis., 616; 29 N. W. Rep., 547, 554. 53 Roche V. Jersey City, 40 N. J. L., 257. An ordinance passed by the board of aldermen of the consoli- dated city was held to apply to the whole city and that it acted as a repeal of all ordinances in the re- spective cities forming the consol- idated city upon that subject. Roche V. Jersey City, 40 N. J. L., 257. Where a village corporation is created whose limits among other territory comprises parts of two towns, and the power to improve the streets of the new corporation is vested in a board of village trus- tees, it has the effect of repealing or superseding the power of the old towns to make improvements. Bull V. Southfield, 14 Blatch. (U. S.), 216; 4 Fed. Case, No. 2120. Special provisions as to force of ordinance where two cities consol- idate. Camp V. Minneapolis, 33 Minn., 461; 23 N. W. Rep., 845. Prior ordinances remain in force, when. People v. Harrison, 191 111., 257; 61 N. B. Rep., 99, affirming 92 111. App., 643. s4 Sec. 26, supra. 55 St. Louis Gas Light Co. v. St. Louis, 46 Mo., 121; Toledo v. Bdens, 59 Iowa, 352; 13 N. W. Rep., 313. CHAPTER VIII. OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 1. In general. 2. Ordinances impairing the obli- gation of contracts. 3. Ordinances interfering with or attempting to regulate foreign or inter-state commerce. 1. IN GENERAL. 219. Ordinances must be consti- tutional — Enumeration. 220. Ordinances in derogation of common rights. 221. Same — Use of private prop- erty. 222. Same — Use of public prop- erty — Streets. 223. Taking or damaging private property. 224. Oppressive regulations. 225. Relating to individual lib- erty. § 226. Discriminating on account of class, race or religious sect, etc. 227. Same — The San Francisco Queue ordinance. 228. Regulating personal associa- tion, employment, etc. 229. Personal liberty — Drunken- ness. 230. Mode of trial. 231. Officer has no vested right in office — Office may be changed or abolished. 2. ORDINANCES IMPAIRING THE § 232. Ordinances cannot impair § the obligation of contracts. 233. Ordinance as "Law." 234. Ordinances as contracts. 235. The "Obligation" of the con- tract. 236. Question is for decision of United States Supreme Court. 237. Taxation by municipal cor- poration of its own bonds, etc. 238. Ordinances granting fran- chises as contracts. 239. Same — Imposing additional burdens. 240. Same — Exclusive privileges. OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS. 241. Franchise contracts author- ized by state. 242. Reservation of right to alter, amend or repeal franchise contracts. 243. Contracts of contractors for public work. 244. Same — Rights vested in the contractor. 245. Same subject — Illustrative cases. 246. Interest on special tax bills as part of obligation. 247. When new remedy controls. 248. When old law to be fol- lowed. ?. ORDINANCES INTERFERING WITH OR ATTEMPTING TO REGULATE FOREIGN OR INTERSTATE COMMERCE. § 249. Ordinances cannot interfere § 250. Meaning of term "com- with or regulate inter-state merce." or foreign commerce. 350 §219] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 351 i 251. No analogy between the power of taxation and the regulation of commerce. 252. License tax on those en- gaged in exporting and im- porting. 253. License tax for privilege of selling goods, etc. 254. Same — Discrimination is not the test. 255. Same — Where goods sold are in the state. 256. Same — Same— Peddlers. 257. Personal contracts — Occupa- tion tax. 258. License tax on brokers, agents, etc., engaged in inter-state commerce. 269. Discriminating license tax void. 260. License tax under police power. 261. Same — Telephone and tele- graph poles in streets. § 262. Taxation of property em- ployed in inter-state or for- eign commerce. 263. License tax on foreign cor- porations. 264. Cannot regulate or tax oper- ations or objects of inter- state or foreign commerce. 265. Same — Property in transit. 266. License for privilege of nav- igation. 267. License and taxation of fer- ries, etc. 268. Wharfage charges. 269. Wharfage distinguished from tonnage. 270. Local police regulations. 271. Same — Scope of police power. -272. Same — Quarantine laws. 273. Same subject. 274. Harbor and local police regulations. § 219. Ordinances must be constitutional — Enumeration.^ The restrictions imposed by the constitution of the United States and that of the state which limit the power of the state, in like manner limit the authority of the municipal corporation. Therefore the local corporation cannot legally pass : First, an ex post facto ordinance, or one retrospective in its operation ; or,^ 1 An ordinance which conflicts with the constitution is void. Sa- vannah V. Hussey, 21 Ga., 80; 68 Am. Dec, 452; McGrath v. Chi- cago, 24 111. App., 19; New Orleans v. Mechanics and Traders' Ins. Co., 25 La. Ann., 389. The general proposition is well established that no law will be de- clared unconstitutional unless clearly so and every reasonable intendment will be made to sus- tain it. Wells V. Mo. Pac. R. R., 110 Mo., 286; 19 S. W. Rep., 530; State ex rel. v. Simmons Hdw. Co., 109 Mo., 118; 18 S. W. Rep., 1125; State ex rel. v. County Court, 102 Mo., 531; 15 S. W. Rep., 79; State ex rel. v. Mo. Pac. R. R., 92 Mo., 137; 6 S. W. Rep., 862; State v. Hope, 100 Mo., 347; 13 S. W. Rep., 940; State v. Pond, 93 Mo., 606, 618; 6 S. W. Rep., 469; Kelly v. Me ks, 87 Mo., 396; State v. Ad- dington, 77 Mo., 110; People v. Rosenberg, 138 N. Y., 410; 34 N. B. Rep., 285; People v. Angle. 109 N. Y., 564; 17 N. E. Rep., 413; People v. West, 106 N. Y., 293; 12 N. B. Rep., 610; Bertholf v. O'Reily, 74 N. Y., 509; Erie & N. B. R. R. v. Casey, 26 Pa. St., 287. 2 U. S. Const., art. I, sec. 10. Retrospective ordinances. "No 353 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§219 Second, an ordinance impairing the obligation of contracts; or,* Third, an ordinance laying imposts or duties on imports or exports ; or,* Fourth, an ordinance laying a ' ' duty of tonnage ; ' ' ov,^ Fifth, an ordinance regulating interstate or foreign com- merce ; or,^ laws can operate retrospectively unless they are explanatory of the statute, or declaratory of the com- mon law. With these exceptions, statutes and ordinances will al- ways be construed as applying their principles to cases in future, or subsequent to their enactment." Rule applied to an ordinance re- lating to assessment. Howard v. Savannah, Thos. U. P. Charlton (S. C), 173. Retroactive effect may be given to an ordinance unless constitu- tional rights are infringed. Thus an ordinance passed after a munic- ipal election, may create a tribunal and prescribe the mode of proced- ure for determining election con- tests growing out of it. State v. Johnson, 17 Ark., 407. Ordinance not retrospective. Wil- low Springs v. Withaupt, 61 Mo. App., 275. As to binding effect on street railway company not in existence when the ordinance was enacted, see Thompson v. Citizens' St. Ry., 152 Ind., 461; 53 N. E. Rep., 462. Retrospective ordinance is viewed with disfavor. Carson v. Bloomington, 6 111. App., 481; Hansen v. Meyer, 81 111., 321; In re Fuller, 79 111., 99. 3 Const, of U. S., art. I, sec. 10. United States — Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S., 1. Georgia — Haywood v. Savannah, 12 Ga., 404. Illinois — Illinois Conference Fe- male College V. Cooper, 25 111., 148. Indiana — Indianapolis v. Con- sumers' Gas Trust Co., 140 Ind., 107; 49 Am. St. Rep., 183; 39 N. B. Rep., 433. Iowa — Davenport, etc., Co. v. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 229. Missouri — State ex rel. v. La- clede Gaslight Co., 102 Mo., 472; 14 S. W. Rep., 974; 15 S. W. Rep., 383; 22 Am. St. Rep., 789; Neill V. Gates, 152 Mo., 585; 54 S. W. Rep., 460. New York — Coates v. New York, 7 Cow. (N. Y.), 585. Pennsylvania — Western Saving Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St., 175. Virginia — Davenport v. Rich- mond, 81 Va., 636; 59 Am. Rep., 694. Section 232, et seq., post. * "No state shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be abso- lutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net pro- duce of all duties and imposts laid by any state on imports or exports shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the re- vision and control of the Con- gress." U. S. Const., art. I, sec. 10, par. 2; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (U. S.), 419; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U. S.), 316. 5 Const, of U. S., art. I, sec. 10, par. 3. Section 269, post. 6 "The Congress shall have pow- er to regulate commerce with for- §219J OF CONSTlTtTlbNALlTY OF ORDINANCES. 353 Sixth, an ordinance abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or denying to any person within the municipality ' ' the equal protection of the laws, ' ' as discriminating against non-residents in occupation and license taxes, etc. ; or,'' Seventh, an ordinance depriving any person of his liberty, or authorizing the taking of private property, without due process of law ; or ,8 Eighth, an ordinance in derogation of other constitutional eign nations and among the sev- 139 U. S., 621, 624, affirming State V. Natal, 39 La. Ann., 439; 1 So. Section 249, et Rep., 923. Ordinance requiring that stages ' "The citizens of each state used for the transportation of pas- shall be entitled to the privileges sengers should be licensed, and and immunities of citizens in the providing that persons violating it might be fined |100, or imprisoned ninety days, does not deny to the eral states." U. S. Const., art. I sec. 8, clause 3. seg., post. U. S. Const., art. several states.' II, sec. 2. "No state shall make or enforce drivers of such stages the equal any law which shall abridge the protection of the laws, or subject privileges or immunities of citi- them to cruel and unusual punish- zens of the United States, nor shall ment. Belmar v. Barkalow, 67. N. any state deprive any "citizen of J. L., 504; 52 Atl. Rep., 157. life, liberty or property without * U. S. Const., 14th Amendment; due process of law; nor deny to Coates v. New York, 7 Cow. (N. any person within its jurisdiction Y.), 585. the equal protection of the laws." Removal of dead animals. River U. S. Const., 14th Amendment; Ah Rendering Co. v. Behr, 77 Mo., 91. Kow V. Nunan, 5 Sawyer (U. S.), 552. "Equal Pkotection of the Law." In re Sam Kee, 31 Fed. Rep., 680; License of non-resident vehicles. St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo., 122; 11 Am. Rep., 440. Improvement ordinances — fail- State V. Topeka, 36 Kan., 76 ; 12 ure to provide for notice and hear- Pac. Rep., 310; 59 Am. Rep., 529; State V. Bering, 84 Wis., 585; 36 Am. St. Rep., 948; 54 N. W. Rep., 1104. Ordinance requiring bicycles to carry light after dark is constitu- tional. Des Moines v. Keller, 116 Iowa, 648. Section 259, post. Ordinance forbidding keeping private markets within specified distance from public market, held constitutional. "The case is too plain for discussion," per Mr. Jus- tice Gray, in Natal v. Louisiana, ing. Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S., 345; Norwood v. Baker, 172 D. S., 269, affirming 74 Fed. Rep., 997; Baltimore v. Tllman, 79 Md., 469; 30 Atl. Rep., 43; Ulman v. Balti- more, 72 Md., 587; 20 Atl. Rep., 141; 21 Atl. Rep., 709. Ordinance requiring all printing to bear union label violates the 14th Amendment, as it deprives those not using the label from pursuing their avocation as far as printing is concerned. Marshall V. Nashville (Tenn., 1903), 71 S. W. Rep., 815. See ch. XVI, Of 23 354 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§219 and recognized common rights, relating to the liberty or prop- erty of the individual ; or,^ Ninth, an ordinance in conflict with a provision of the con- stitution of the state. Most of the state constitutions contain various specific restrictive provisions of the povs^ers of munici- pal corporations. Thus they are forbidden by ordinance or otherwise from loaning their credit, granting money in aid of, or to, individuals or corporations, or becoming stockholders in corporations or associations; conferring exclusive franchises upon individuals or corporations to lay down railroad tracks in streets, supply light, water or other necessities or conven- iences to the inhabitants; authorizing irrevocable grants of special privileges or immunities ; granting extra compensation, fee or allowance to a municipal officer, agent, servant or con- tractor after service has been rendered or the contract has been entered into and performed in whole or in part; authorizing the payment of any claim created against the city under con- tract made without express warrant of law; legalizing the unauthorized or invalid acts of municipal officers, agents, serv- ants or contractors ; changing the compensation of a municipal Public Improvement Ordinances, sec. 553, post. "Due process of law" and "equal protection of the laws." United States — Blake v. Mc- Clung, 172 U. S., 239; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. V. Ellis, 165 U. S., 150, 154; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S., 377, 382; O'Neil v. "Vermont, 144 U. S., 323, 361; Spies v. Illi- nois, 123 TJ. S., 131; Santa Clara County V. So. Pac. R. R. Co., 118 U. S., 394; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 356; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S., 370; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S., 303; Davidson V. New Orleans, 96 U. S., 97; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.), 36. California — Ex parte Lacey, 108 Cal., 326; 41 Pac. Rep., 411; 49 Am. St. Rep., 93. Georgia — Cosgrove v. Augusta, 103 Ga., 835; 31 S. B. Rep., 445; 68 Am. St. Rep., 149. Illinois — Chicago v. Netcher, 183 111., 104; 55 N. B. Rep., 707. Louisiana — Waters-Pierce Oil Co. V. New Iberia, 47 La. Ann., 863; 17 So. Rep., 343. Mississippi — Donovan v. Vicks- biirg, 29 Miss., 247; 64 Am. Dec, 143. Ohio — Branahan v. Hotel Co., 39 Ohio St., 333; 48 Am. Rep., 457. Forfeiture of animals running at large, sec. 172, supra. 9 Section 220, et seq., post. Right of trial by jury. See ch. X, Of Action to Enforce Ordi- nances. Sec. 330, et seq., post. Ordinance forbidding sale of specified newspaper, held unconsti- tutional. Ex parte Neill, 32 Tex. Crim. App., 275; 4(5 Am. St. Rep., 776. Changing rule of evidence in criminal charge. In re Wong Hane, § -^^OJ OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 355 officer during his term of office; extending the term of office, etc.io § 220. Ordinances in derogation of common rights. Many cases have declared the ordinance void because found to be in derogation of common rights. Generally speaking, such rights are understood to be rights which are common to all. In sustaining an ordinance which imposed a penalty upon retail grocers for keeping spirituous liquors on their premises for the purpose of retailing the same, without a license, in an early case, the Supreme Court of South Carolina observed: "That which is not prohibited may be lawfully done, but that which is prohibited by law, no one has a right to do. If there was no law interfering, the butcher might kill his beeves and hogs in the street. If the butcher could do it any man might, and it might therefore be said to be a common right; but when the law prohibited it, it was no longer a common right. Before the ordinance * ^- * ^ •^yas the common right of every citi- zen to keep spirituous liquors in his retail shop or anywhere else at his pleasure ; but when it was found by experience that this was an easy method of violating the law prohibiting shop- keepers from selling spirits to slaves and cab loafers about town, and an ordinance was passed to prohibit such shop- keepers from keej)ing it in their shops and in secret back rooms adjoining, it was no longer a common right, but a legal re- straint imposed on a few for the benefit of the many.''^^ The sovereign power in a community may, and ought to, prescribe the manner of exercising rights over property, since it is for the better protection and enjoyment of that absolute dominion which the individual claims. The power rests upon the implied right and duty of the supreme power to protect all by proper restrictions, to the end that, on the whole, the benefit of all is promoted. Every public regulation in a city may, 108 Cal., 680; 41 Pae. Rep., 693; tional. Roth v. State ex ret, 158 49 Am. St. Rep., 138. Ind., 242; 63 N. E. Rep., 460. 10 Loaning money on credit by Changing salary during term, providing payment of interest on Wadsworth v. Maysville, 24 Ky. warrants for public work. Moran Law Rep., 312; 68 S. W. Rep., 391; V. Thompson, 20 Wash., 525; 56 Grenada v. Wood (Miss., 1903), 33 Pac. Rep., 29. So. Rep., 173. Forbidding removal of police of- " Per Evans, J., in Charleston v. fleers except for cause is constitu- Ahrens, 4 Strob. (S. C), 241, 257. 356 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§2-21 and does, to a certain extent, limit and restrict the absolute right that existed previously, but this cannot be considered an injury. On the other hand, the individual is presumed to be benefited. If it should be determined that the corporate au- thorities have not the right to regulate the use of private property in the city, so as to prevent its proving pernicious to the health and comfort of the citizens generally, or injurious to certain classes of property and business within the city, it would strike at the very foundation of all police regulations. Every right, from an absolute ownership in property down to a mere easement, is purchased and holden, subject to the re- striction that it shall be exercised so as not to injure, incon- venience or discommode others.^^ § 221. Same— Use of private property. An ordinance, for- bidding washing and ironing in public laundries and wash houses, within defined limits, from 10 at night to 6 in the morn- ing, was held to be a pure police regulation within the compe- tency of a municipality possessed of the ordinary powers.^* But an ordinance passed by a corporation, possessing general powers incident to such corporations and without special char- ter authority, which required stores (except drug stores, for the sale of drugs and medicines) to be closed at 7:30 in the evening, except on Saturdays, was declared void in North Carolina, because oppressive and against common rights, as it deprived such storekeepers of their natural right, free use and 12 Baker v. Boton, 12 Pick, joyment of individual rights, are (Mass.), 184, 193; Vanderbilt v. not unconstitutional, though no Adams, 7 Cow. (N. Y.), 349; Stuy- provision is made for compensa- vesant v. New York, 7 Cow. (N. tion for such disturbances." The Y.), 1. c. 604, 605; Green v. Savan- principle was applied to an ordi- nah, 6 Ga., 1; Shelton v. Mobile, nance relating to use of water, 30 Ala., 540; 68 Am. Dec, 143; which in effect compelled the water Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. (N. Y.), taker to bear the expense of put- 237; 19 Am. Dec, 493; Warren v. ting in the meter. Hill v.' Thomp- Greer, 117 Pa. St., 207; 11 Atl. son, 16 Jones & Spencer (48 N. Y. Rep.", 415. Super. Ct. Rep.), 481, 489. "Laws and ordinances relating Ordinance cannot prohibit solic- to the comfort, health, conveni- iting patrons. Thomas v. Hot ence, good order and general wel- Springs, 34 Ark., 553 ; 36 Am. Rep., fare of the inhabitants, are com- 24. prehensively styled police laws, is Barbler v. Connolly, 113 U. and it is well settled that laws and S., 27, per Mr. Justice Field, af- regulations of this character, firmed in Soon Hing v. Crowley, though they may disturb the en- 113 U. S., 703. §223] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OP ORDINANCES. 357 enjoyment of property, used in such way as not to interfere with the rights of others.^* So in the same state, an ordinance passed by a corporation possessing only general powers, forbid- ding one who sells liquor from occupying his own premises between 10 P. M. and 4 A. M., was condemned for the same reason.i^ So under the general power "to regulate the wharves on the shore of the Ohio River adjoining said city," the city cannot by ordinance define the line of high-water mark and declare the erection of buildings below such line a nuisance and impose a fine on persons erecting such buildings on their own land.i^ In North Carolina an ordinance providing that no person should erect or alter any building without first obtain- ing permission of the board of aldermen was held void as being unreasonable.!'^ But it may be stated that ordinances of this nature are generally sustained as being proper subjects within municipal police regulations. This subject is fully treated in the chapter on Police PoM'^ers.^* § 222. Same— Use of public property— Streets. It was early held in Connecticut that a by-law, which restricted the privilege of fishing in a navigable river within the corporate limits to the inhabitants of the town, was void because in derogation of the common rights of the non-residents.i'* Ordinances which permit the obstruction of public streets, in whole or in part, rendering them impassable, or in a measure useless to the public, are generally condemned. The city is the trustee of all public ways whether the fee is in the city or in the abutting i* State v. Ray, 131 N. C, 814; liberty and private property 42 S. E. Rep., 960. See sec. 480, within the limits of the munici- . post. pality. No such latitudinarlan 15 "If the general power to pass construction was intended by the by-laws, intended for local govern- legislature to be given by the ment merely, carries with it, by statute and its attempted exercise implication, the authority to re- was therefore invalid." State v. strict the use of private property Thomas, 118 N. C, 1221, 1225, by prescribing the hours when a 1226; 24 S. B. Rep., 535. See sec. person shall be permitted to oc- 480, post. cupy his own house, then cities is EvansvlUe v. Martin, 41 Ind., and towns need nothing more than . 145. the enactment of a law creating it State v. Tenant, 110 N. C, them, with the incidental grant 609; 14 S. E. Rep., 387; 28 Am. St. embodied in sec. 3799 of The Code, Rep., 715. to give them equal authority with is Chapter XIV, sees. 470, 471, the legislature itself, to restrict post. and regulate the right of personal lo Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn., 358 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§234 property owners. The fact that the fee of the street is in the city does not authorize the municipal authorities to divert it from its legitimate purpose as a street. Hence, an ordinance authorizing a bridge approach in a public street which ob- structs it is void.20 So an ordinance authorizing the construc- tion of a stairway, occupying a portion of a public alley, to the detriment of the traveling public, is void.^i Ordinances relating to the use of streets and public ways are treated in the chapters on Police and Franchise Ordinances.^i^^ § 223. Taking or damaging private property. Notwith- standing the corporation has express power to protect the health, to declare and abate nuisances, etc., ordinances which, in effect, declare that all dead animals found in the city, not killed for human food, nuisances immediately after daath, and making it unlawful for any person other than the city con- tractor to remove and dispose of them, have been held unrea- sonable, because the owner was denied the right of removal and also the right to realize anj'^ value the animal might have.^^ An ordinance designating limits outside of which no woman of lewd character shall dwell, containing a proviso that nothing therein shall be so construed as to authorize such women to occupy a house in any portion of the city, and containing no restriction respecting the legal right to restrain a private nuisance, was held by the Supreme Court of the United States a valid exercise of police power which does not invade the rights of property owners in or adjacent to the prescribed limits in violation of the federal constitution, notwithstanding the pecuniary value of their property may be depreciated as a result .23 § 224. Oppressive regulations. Under general power to regulate the sale of liquor by druggists, a provision in an ordinance exacting reports quarterly of the kind and quantity sold, when and to whom sold, and on whose prescription or assurance, under penalty, was held unreasonable.^* So an or- 391; Willard v. KlUingworth, 8 dering Co. v. Behr, 77 Mo., 91. See Conn., 247. sec. 452, post. 20 Stack V. East St. Louis, 85 111., as L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U. 377: 28 Am. Rep., 619. S., 587; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 788. See 21 Pettis V. Johnson, 56 Ind., 139. sec. 475, post. 21V2 Chapters XIV and XVII. 24 "The private citizen, invested 22 state V. Morris, 47 La. Ann., with no public oflSce or employ- 1660; 18 So. Rep., 710; River Ren- ment, should not he subjected to §335] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 359 dinance regulating merchants, engaged in buying and repack- ing loose cotton, which required them to give bond and to keep in a book specially provided for the purpose a daily record of the sellers of loose cotton and the quantity of each purchase, which book was required to be kept at all times open to the inspecti&n of the police, was held unreasonable and void, in the absence of special legislation.^^ But an ordinance of Chi- cago requiring detailed daily reports to the police of all per- sonal property received on deposit by pawnbrokers was held not oppressive or tyrannical, but a reasonable police regula- tion.26 The question as to interfering with what are known as com- mon rights has been variously answered by the decisions. Thus in North Carolina an ordinance imposing a tax on all persons engaged in the particular business, whether residents or not, was held valid against the contention that it was an interfer- ence with common rights. ^^ But in Missouri a tax on wagons of non-residents, engaged in hauling into and out of the city, was held void.-^ This subject is more fully illustrated in other parts of this work.^" § 225. Eelating to individual liberty. An ordinance author- izing certain officers to arrest and detain until the extinguish- ment 'of a fire, any person refusing to obey their direction, is unconstitutional for the reason that it deprives those arrested of their liberty without due process of law or a trial by jury.^" An ordinance authorizing police officers to make arrests with- out a warrant for breach of ordinances, not committed in their presence, is void.^^ But if the ordinance is violated in the officer's presence and view he may arrest without warrant whether the ordinance so authorized or not.^^ such inquisition. * * * This 28 St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo., section is an invasion of the sane- 122; 11 Am. Rep., 440. tity of private business, and ought 20 Chapter VI, Reasonableness of not to be tolerated." Clinton v. Ordinances. Chapter XIII, License Phillips, 58 111., 102, 104. Tax. Chapter XIV, Police Regula- Regulating the sale of intoxicat- tions. ing liquor, sec. 477, post. so Judson v. Reardon, 16 Minn., 25 Long V. Shelby Co. Taxing 431. District, 7 Lea (Tenn.), 134. 3i Pesterfleld v. Vickers, 3 2« Launder v. Chicago, 111 111., Coldw. (Tenn.), 205. 291. See sec. 492, post. ^2 Scircle v. Neeves, 47 Ind., 289; 27Edenton v. Capeheart, 71 N. Nealis v. Hayward, 48 Ind., 19. C, 156. See 306, post. 360 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§225 The Supreme Court of Texas held an ordinance void as being unreasonable in that it interfered with common rights, which forbade the renting of private property to lewd women or to any person for their use. This was held to be a proscriptive denial of shelter to that class, and therefore null and void and in contravention of common rights.*^ So an ordinance requir- ing a license for the doing of scavenger work in the city, and providing that all persons proposing to do such work must submit bids, and that the board of health shall decide who are competent bidders, and fixing the times at which closets shall be cleaned, is void as in derogation of common right, where no necessity is shown therefor, and the effect would be to prohibit property owners themselves from removing the refuse from their own premises. Respecting the effect of the ordinance the court said : ' ' This is clearly an interference with a natural right, and while this may be allowable on the ground of public necessity, some such necessity must appear, and the ordinance must be reasonable in its provisions. ' '^* Ordinances making it penal to carry concealed weapons have been judicially sanc- tioned as proper police regulations. Clearly the citizen has no natural right to do the thing forbidden.^^ An ordinance of Boston providing that no person should, except by permission of the committee of the city council, deliver a sermon, lecture, address or discourse on the commons or other public grounds, was held constitutional.^® And in Michigan an ordinance for- bidding the delivery of public address within half a mile of the city hall, without a license from the mayor, was sustained as reasonable.^'' Tn the absence of express power, aii prdi- nance declaring that any person bearing the reputation of a prostitute shall be fined, if residing or found within the cor- porate limits, is void.^* But an ordinance which forbids any ssMilliken v. Weatherford, 54 Mass., 485; 4 N. B. Rep., 577; Tex., 388; 38 Am. Rep., 629. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U. S., 34 state V. Hill, 126 N. C, 1139; 43; Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 50 L. R. A., 473; 36 S. B. Rep., Mass., 510; 26 L. R. A., 712; 39 326. N. B. Rep., 113 ; Commonwealth v. 33 Van Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark., Brooks, 109 Mass., 355; Common- 368; 14 S. W. Rep., 38; In re wealth v. Abrahams, 156 Mass., 57; Cheney, 90 Cal., 617; 27 Pac. Rep., 30 N. E. Rep., 79; Wilson v. 436; Opelousas v. Giron, 46 La. Eureka, 173 U. S., 32. Ann., 1364; 16 So. Rep., 190; St. st Love v. Recorder's Court, 128 Louis V. Vert, 84 Mo., 204. See Mich., 545; 87 N. W. Rep., 785; sec. 488, post. 55 L. R. A., 618. 36 Commonwealth v. Davis, 140 as Buell v. State, 45 Ark., 336; §226] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OP ORDINANCES. 361 prostitute from being on the streets of a city between the hours of 7 P. M. and 4 A. M. without any reasonable necessity therefor was sustained as a valid exercise of the police power, under a statute giving authority to ' ' restrain and punish pros- titutes, "so § 226. Discriminating on account of class, race or religious sect, etc. Hostile and discriminating legislation by a state against persons of any class, sect, creed or nation, in whatever form it may be expressed, is forbidden by the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution 6f the United States. That amendment declares that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person the equal protection of the law. "This inhibi- tion upon the state applies to all the instrumentalities and agencies employed in the administration of its government ; to its executive, legislative and judicial departments, and to the subordinate legislative bodies of counties and cities."*" Mu- nicipal ordinances applying alike to all persons engaged in a given pursuit, without distinction as to nationality, creed, etc., are not in violation of the federal constitution, nor of any treaty or law of the United States.*^ But an ordinance to regu- late the carrying on of public laundries which confers upon the municipal officers arbitrary power to give or withhold consent as to persons or places, who and where they shall carry on the business, is void and violates the provisions of the federal constitution, especially if it makes arbitrary and unjust dis- crimination founded on difference of race.*^ An ordinance which required the arrest of any free negro found on the street after 10 o 'clock and lodge him in the calaboose, there to remain Paralee v. Camden, 49 Ark., 165 ; *i Ordinances regulating laun- 4 Am. St. Rep., 35; 4 S". W. Rep., dries wherein the question of dis- 654. Compare Shafer v. Mumma, crimination against Chinese is 17 Md., 331; 79 Am. Dec, 656, fully treated. Barbier v. Connolly, •where a like ordinance was sus- 113 U. S., 27; Soon Hing v. Crow- tained, passed under express ley, 113 U. S., 703 ; In re Yick Wo, power. 68 Cal., 294, 305; 9 Pac. Rep., 139; 39 Dunn V. Com., 20 Ky. Law Ex parte Mount, 66 Cal., 448, 475 ; Rep., 1649; 43 L. R. A., 701; 49 S. 6 Pac. Rep., 78; Ex parte Moynier, W. Rep., 813. Compare sec. 475, 65 Cal., 33; 2 Pac. Rep., 728; Ex post. ■ parte Welters, 65 Cal., 269; 3 Pac. 40 Per Mr. Justice Field in Ah Rep., 894. Kow y. Nunan, 5 Sawyer (U. S.), 42 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. 552, 562, S., 356. 363 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§ 327 until the next morning, and imposing a fine of ten dollars on such offender, was declared "high-handed and oppressive, and enacted by the corporation without any authority. It is an attempt to impair the liberty oi: a free person unnecessarily, to restrain him from the exercise of his lawful pursuits, and to m^ic an innocent act a crime, and to exact a penalty therefor both by fine and imprisonment, without trial before any tri- bunal. "*3 So ordinances conferring upon one class, as a religious sect, a privilege which is denied to another, are un- constitutional and void.** So an ordinance requiring saloons to close when "any denomination of Christian people" were holding divine services anywhere in the town, which was silent as to a.ny and all other religious worshipers, was declared discriminating and void.*^ However, it has been held in Massa- chusetts that a city may, by ordinance, adopt reasonable rules and regulations respecting the use of streets and public places, as by itinerant musicians, although they may belong to a cer- tain religious organization, and such persons will not be pro- tected after the violation of such ordinance because of the fact that the act was done as a matter of religious worship.*^ § 227. Same— The San Francisco queue ordinance. An or- dinance of San Francisco, although general in its terms, which was directed against the Chinese only, and imposed upon them a degrading and cruel punishment, was held to be in conflict with that clause of the fourteenth amendment of the constitu- tion which declares that, no state "shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law." The ordinance provided that each jail prisoner should have the hair of his head "cut or clipped to an uniform length of one inch 43 Per Turley, J., in Memphis v. ■** Shreveport v. Levy, 26 La. Winfield, 8 Humph. (Tenn.), 707, Ann., 671. 709. *5Gilham v. Wells, 64 Ga., 192. A case decided in 1844 in South But ordinances forbidding the Carolina sustained an ordinance of sale of liquor on Sunday, passed Charleston which required "free under ample power, are uniformly negroes and free persons of color" sustained. Such regulations do to take out a license frtr "carrying not affect personal or religious on any trade or art, or being a freedom. Minden v. Silverstein, mechanic," etc. The discriminat- 36 La. Ann., 912. See opinion of ing feature of the ordinance was Manning, J., pp. 916, 917. neither discussed nor suggested. ^o Commonwealth v. Plaisted, State ex rel. Willtinson v. Charles- 148 Mass., 375; 19 N. E. Rep., 224. ton, 2 Speers (S. C), 623. § 228] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 303 from the scalp thei-eof." The regulation was intended only for the Chinese of San Francisco. It was known as the "queue" ordinance, being so designated from its purpose to reach the queues of the Chinese, and was not enforced against any other persons. In delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Field said: "The reason advanced for its adop- tion, and now urged for its continuance, is, that only the dread of the loss of his queue will induce a Chinaman to pay his fine. That is to say, in order to enforce the payment of a fine imposed upon him, it is necessary that torture should be super- added to imprisonment. Then, it is said, the Chinaman will not accept the alternative, which the law allows, of working out his fine by his imprisonment, and the state and county will be saved the expense of keeping him during imprisonment. Probably the bastinado, or the knout, or the thumbscrew, or the rack, would accomplish the same end; and no doubt the Chinaman would prefer either of these modes of torture to that which entails upon him disgrace among his countrymen and carries with it the constant dread of misfortune and suf- fering after death. It is not creditable to the humanity and civilization of our people, much less to their Christianity, that an ordinance of this character was possible. "*'' § 228. Regulating personal association, employment, etc. An ordinance making it an offense for any person to knowingly associate with those who have the reputation of being thieves, burglars, pickpockets, pigeon droppers, bawds, gamblers, etc., has been held unconstitutional, as being an invasion of the rights of personal liberty, because the law takes no notice of, and has no concern with, mere guilty intention, unconnected with any overt act or outward manifestation.*^ So an ordi- nance making it a misdemeanor for any person to associate, escort, converse or loiter with any female known as a common prostitute, either by day or by night, upon any of the streets or alleys of a city, except her husband, father, brother or other male relative, has been held to be an unconstitutional inter- 47 Ah Kow V. Nunan, 5 Sawyer 36 S. W. Rep., 628; 33 L. R. A., (U. S.), 552, 559, 560. See notes 606; St, Louis v. Roche, 128 Mo., of Judge Cooley, at pp. 558, 559, 541; 31 S. W. Rep., 915; St. Louis 564-566, of the opinion. Also note v. Fltz, 53 Mo., 582. Compare St. to case by Judge Cooley, in 18 Louis v. Lee, 8 Mo. App., 599; St. Am. Law Reg., 684. Louis v. Sealy, 8 Mo. App., 599; « Ex parte Smith, 135 Mo., 223; St. Louis v. Close, 8 Mo. App., 599. 364 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§230 ference with personal freedom, since any person should be allowed to converse with hei- long enough to transact any necessary and legitimate business. It is also held that there is no reason for exempting any other male relative than the husband, father, or brother, or for failing to give her mother oi" sister the same privilege allowed to the father or brother.*^ So an ordinance forbidding any women from going into any building where liquor is sold, or to stand within fifty feet of such building, has been held void as an unnecessary interfer- ence with individual liberty.^" So an ordinance which inter- feres with lawful employment and discriminates between the sexes, as one forbidding employment of females in dance cel- lars, barrooms, or in any place where malt, vinous or spirituous liquors are sold, is unconstitutional.''^ § 229. Personal liberty— Drunkenness. Ordinances which prohibit drunkenness on the streets and in other public places of the city, or which are directed against public drunkenness, are constitutional for the reason that no one has the constitu- tional right to appear in a state of intoxication in the streets and public places, and thereby degrade the public morals, to the annoyance and inconvenience of citizens in the discharge of their daily duties, and to destroy the peace, comfort and good order and well being of society.^^ § 230. Mode of trial. Article 5 of the amendments of the United States constitution, which provides that, "no person 49 Hechinger v. Maysville, 22 Ky. Compare St. Joseph v. Harris, Law Rep., 486; 49 L. R. A., 114; 59 Mo. App., 122, where it is said: 57 S. W. Rep., 619 ; Cady v. Barnes- "The common council in under- ville, 4 Weekly Cin. Law Bui. taking to regulate the subject of (Ohio), 101, holds that ordinance drunkenness under its l)olice making it unlawful "for any male power by its ordinance in that person to walk or ride in company direction went to the uttermost with any lewd female or common limit. It would seem that in this prostitute, or to stand and con- state drunkenness is not per se the verse with her upon any street," subject of legislative prohibition. etc., unconstitutional and void. Drunkenness cannot be made the 50 Gastenau v. Com., 108 Ky., subject of municipal regulation, 473; 56 S. W. Rep., 705; 49 L. R. except where its existence in the A., 111. individual is at a place or under 51 In re Mary Maguire, 57 Cal., circumstances or conditions when 604. it annoys or disturbs others. And 52 Gallatin v. Tarwater, 143 Mo., so it would appear that any sweep- 40; 44 S. W. Rep., 750; Green City ing regulation interdicting, under V. Holsinger, 76 Mo. App., 567. penalty, drunkenness generally, or §231] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 365 shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment of indictment of a grand jury, ' ' is alone applicable to the exercise of the power of the federal government, and is not a restriction upon the legislative author- ity of the states.^* Hence it does not forbid municipal corpo- rations from punishing such offense as they may be authorized to do by their charters and the laws of the state.^* § 231. Officer has no vested right in office— Office may be changed or abolished. In England, offices are considered in- corporal hereditaments, grantable by the crown and a subject of vested or private interest. But in this country they are not held by grant or contract, nor under our system of government has any person a private property or vested right in them. Therefore, in the absence of limitations in the organic law, all offices — federal, state and municipal — are subject to such modi- fications and changes as the proper authorities may deem advisable, irrespective of the consent of the officer. No law reducing the salary of an officer, imposing additional duties without increasing the compensation, or abolishing the office, will be held unconstitutional as "impairing the obligation of contracts" or as depriving any person of property "without due process of law."^^ All offices are created for the public in cases other than those specified Ann., 101; State ex rel. v. Walsh, in the exception just stated, would 69 Mo., 408; State ex rel. v. Davis, be an invasion of the 'inalienable 44 Mo., 129; State ex rel. v. Valle', rights of the citizen.' (St. Louis v. 41 Mo., 29; State v. Hermann, 11 Fitz, 53 Mo., 582.") Here drunken- Mo. App., 43; Wilcox v. Rodman, ness was forbidden "on any street, 46 Mo., 322; Westberg v. Kansas avenue, alley or public place with- City, 64 Mo., 493; Augusta v. in the city or any private house Sweeney, 44 Ga., 463. to the annoyance of any citizen No impairment of obligation of or person." St. Joseph v. Harris, contbact. "An appointment to a 59 Mo. App., 122, in substance public office is not a contract with- overruled by Gallatin v. Tarwater, in that clause of the constitution 143 Mo., 40; 44 S. W. Rep., 750. which forbids the state legislature See sec. 478, post. to pass any law impairing the obli- 53 Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. gation of contracts. The design of (32 U. S.), 243, per Marshall, C. J., that clause was in the language of relating to the taking of private Chief Justice Marshall, to restrain property without just compensa- the legislature from violating the tion. But the 14th Amendment, in right of property, from impairing this respect, is a limitation on the the obligation of contracts respect- power of the states. ing property, under which some 54 State V. Wells, 46 Iowa, 662. individual could claim a right to 55 Barrett v. New Orleans, 32 La. something beneficial to himself. 366 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OP ORDINANCES. [§231 good, and unless restraint exists in the organic law are com- pletely subject to the power creating them.^^ Thus an office not fixed by the constitution, but established by statute, may be abolished by statute.^^ But without express authority a municipal office created by the legislature cannot be abolished by ordinance/'* Where a municipal corporation under its charter or legislative act applicable has power to create by ordinance an office, it also has power to abolish it/^ But where the office is created by ordinance it can only be abolished by the public. Such salary as may be attached to it is. not given be- cause of any duty on the part of And because an appointment to office is not such contract, it is not within the prohibition of the con- stitution." Hoboken v. Gear, 27 N. J. L., 265, 278. The right to compensation grows out of the rendition of the services and not out of any con- tract between the government and the officer that the services shall be rendered by him. Connor v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y., 1 Selden (5 N. Y.), 285, 296. A PUBLIC OFFICE IS NOT PKOPEBTY Within the meaning of the consti- tutional provision that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law and the judgment of his peers." It is a mere public agency, revocable according to the will and appointment of the people, as ex- pressed in the constitution and the laws enacted in conformity there- with. An officer may be removed without jury trial. Moore v. Strickling, 46 W. Va., 515; 50 L. R. A., 279; 33 S. E. Rep., 274; Atty. Gen. v. Jochim, 99 Mich., 358; 58 N. W. Rep., 611; People v. Kipley, 167 111., 638; 49 N. B. Rep., 229. "The incumbent of an office has not, under our system of govern- ment, any property in it. His right to exercise It Is not based upon any contract or grant. It is conferred on him as a public trust, to be exercised for the benefit of the public to do so; but to enable the incumbent the better to per- form the duties of his office by the more exclusive devotion of time thereto." State v. Hawkins, 44 Ohio St., 98, 109; 5 N. E. Rep., 228. It may be noted that some cases — although very few — oppose the above doctrine. They have adopted the theory that an office is prop- erty, under the mistaken view that the common law doctrine that an office is a hereditament applies to the offices of this country, which is undoubtedly fallacious and against the decided and over- whelming weight of authority. The following cases support this view: King v. Hunter, 65 N. C, 603; Brown v. Turner, 70 N. C, 93; Vann v. Pipkin, 77 N. C, 408; Plimpton v. Somerset, 33 Vt., 283; Board v. Pritchard, 36 N. J. L., 101; Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Men. (Ky.), 648, 672; Commonwealth v. Silfer, 25 Pa. St., 23. seFarwell v. Rockland, 62 Me., 296, 299. 57 Standeford v. Wingate, 2 Duvall's Ky. Rep., 440. 08 Marquis v. Santa Ana, 108 Cal., 661; 37 Pac. Rep., 650; Vason V. Augusta, 38 Ga., 542. 39 Frankfort v. Brawner, 100 Ky., 166; 37 S, W. Rep., 950; 38 §231 J OK' CONSTITOTIONALITY OP ORDINANCES. 36'^ ordinance and not by resolution."" A legal provisio'n that no officer shall be removed, except for cause, does not prevent the abolishment of an office in the absence of restrictions in this respeet.fii Likewise the fact that the officer is appointed or elected for a definite term is no limitation of the power to abolish.^2 An unconditional repeal of a municipal charter, or the sub- stitution of another with inconsistent provisions, without a saving clause respecting offices and officers as they existed under the former charter, will operate to abolish all offices thereunder.*** The term of a charter officer may be shortened by amendment to the charter.^* It is also established that an office may be abolished by an authorized repeal of the law, S. W. Rep., 497; Robinson v. Balti- Ala., 357; 14 So. Rep., 793; People more, 93 Md., 208; 49 Atl. Rep., 4; v. Brooklyn, 149 N. Y., 215; 43 N. Goodwin v. State, 142 Ind., 117; E. Rep., 554, reversing 36 N. Y. 41 N. E. Rep., 359; State v. Jen- Suppl., 172; Meisaner v. Boyle, 20 nings, 57 Ohio St., 415; 49 N. B. Utah, 316; 58 Pac. Rep., 1110; Peo- Rep., 404;, 63 Am. St. Rep., 723; pie v. York, 60 N. Y. Suppl., 208. Waldraven v. Memphis, 4 Coldw. »2 Boylan v. Newark, 58 N. J. L., (44 Tenn.), 431; Donaghy v. Macj, 133; 32 Atl. Rep., 78; Frankfort v. 167 Mass., 178; 45 N. E. Rep., 87"; Brawner, 100 Ky., 166; 37 S. W. Smith V. New York. 37 N. Y., 518. Rep., 950; 38 S. W. Rep., 497; See Wilcox v. Rodman, 46 Mo., Butcher v. Camden, 29 N. J. Eq., 322. 478, distinguishing Bradshaw v. 60 San Antonio v. Micklejohn, 89 Camden, 39 N. J. L., 416; Primm Tex., 79; 33 S. W. Rep., 735. v. Carondelet, 23 Mo., 22. See At- Boards and departments may be torney General v. Jochim, 99 Mich., abolished. Sheridan v. Colvin, 78 358; 58 N. W. Rep., 611; State v. 111., 237. Hawkins, 44 Ohio St., 98, 109; 5 Sergeant of police abolished by N. E. Rep., 228; State v. Douglas, ordinance, irrespective of action of 26 Wis., 428 ; Prince v. Skillin, 71 police commissioner, under par- Me., 361; State v. Bell, 116 Ind., ticular charter. Oldham v. Birm- 1; 18 N. E. Rep., 263; State ex rel. Ingham, 102 Ala., 357; 14 So. Rep., v. Bogard, 128 Ind., 480; 27 N. E. 793. Rep., 1113; Augusta v. Sweeney, Where laws authorize heads of 44 Ga., 463. departments to employ such labor- fis Crook v. People, 106 111., 237. ers as may be necessary for the Creating another office and con- efficient working of their depart- ferring the same duties as pertain ment or as may be necessary for to the old operates to abolish the the inspection of certain work, the old office. Commonwealth v. Moir, head of the department may abol- 199 Pa. St., 534; 49 Atl. Rep., 351; ish such positions after they have 53 L. R. A., 837 ; Commonwealth v. been filled by appointment. People Reese, 16 Ky. Law Rep., 493; 29 V. Scannell, 62 N. Y. Suppl., 930. S. W. Rep., 352. 61 Oldham v. Birmingham, 102 64 see People v. Davie, 114 Cal., 368 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OP ORDINANCES. [§ 232- whether it be a charter, statutory or ordinance provision creat- ing it.''^ In accordance with the principle that all oiifices are subject to change, the proper authorities may legally impose additional duties upon an oiificer without creating a new ofifice or entitling the incumbent to higher compensation.^^ 2. ORDINANCES IMPAIRING THE OBLIGATION OP CONTRACTS. § 232. Ordinances cannot impair the obligation of contracts. "No state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of con- tracts."''^ "There is no more important provision in the federal con.stitution than the one which prohibits states from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, and it is one of the highest duties of this court to take care the prohibition shall neither be evaded or frittered away. Complete effect must be given to it in all its spirit. The inviolability of con- tracts, and the duty of performing them as made, are founda- tions of all well ordered society, and to prevent the removal or disturbance of these foundations was one of the great ob- jects for which the constitution was framed. "^^ A municipal corporation is bound by all contracts which it may legally enter into in like manner as a private corporation or an individual.*® The rule as to immunity of government from liability on contracts has no application to municipal corporations. They are held liable even when acting as repre- sentatives of the government. The rule of liability has been 363; 46 Pac. Rep., 150; Frankfort st u. S. Const., art. I, sec. 10. V. Brawner. 100 Ky., 166; 37 S. W. ,3 p^^ ^^ j^^^j^^ g^j.^^g .^^ Rep., 950; 38 S. W. Rep., 497. ^^^^^^ ^. Charleston, 96 U. S., o'> State ex inf. v. Rackliffe, 164 .„, 448 449 Mo., 453; 64 S. W. Rep., 772; Chandler v. Lawrence, 128 Mass.. '' *^""^y ^- Kansas City, 47 213; State ex rel. v. Jennings, 57 ^°- ^PP" ^°^' ^teffin v. St. Louis, 135 Mo., 44; Chambers v. St. Joseph, 33 Mo. App., 536; Spring- field Railroad Co. v. Springfield, 85 Ohio St., 415; 49 N. E. Rep., 404; 63 Am. St. Rep., 723. A board of improvements may _ be abolished by repealing the ordl- f «•' f *' ^l^'' ^/f "'^ I; |y'^<="/«' nance creating it. Toledo v. Lake 158 N. J 274 53 n. e. Rep., 12; Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Z^-^.\ ' ^V.o^ """oV ^°"'- Co., 2 Ohio Cir. Ct. Dec, 450. ^^h Ed.), sec. 913, p. 2231; Potter 66 See Redwood City v. Grimmen- °^ ^°^^-' ^^'^- ^''^■ stein, 68 Cal., 512; 9 Pac. Rep., One may be employed to per- 560. 450. § 333] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 509 applied to govern the contracts and control the acts of states clothed with all the powers and prerogatives o± sovereignty^" An ordinance extending fire limits and forbidding the erec- tion of wooden buildings within a designated district will not be held as impairing the obligation of a contract made prior to the passage of such ordinance for the erection of a wooden structure within the prohibited district.''^ §233. Ordinance as "law." The obligation of a contract can only be impaired by a "law" passed after the making of the contracts ^ The word "law," as used in the federal con- stitution, may be a provision of the state constitution, a legis- lative act, a provision of a charter of a public or municipal corporation, or a municipal by-law or ordinance, having the force and effect of a law of the state.''^ ' ' Any enactment, from whatever source originating, to which a state gives the force of law, is a statute of the state within the meaning of the clause cited." It was therefore held that a statute of the so-called Confederate States, if enforced by one of the states as its law, form services under contract with the city without becoming a municipal officer and when such is the case the city cannot vary the terms of the contract nor repudi- ate. It. Hall V. Wisconsin, 103 U. S., 5. City cannot repudiate by resolu- tion or ordinance a deed which it was authorized to execute. Dausch V. Crane, 109 Mo., 323, 330; 19 S. W. Rep., 61. 70 Dartmouth College Trustees v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U: S.), 518; Western Saving Fund Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St., 175. f 1 Knoxville v. Bird, 12 Lea (Tenn.), 121, 123; 47 Am. Rep., 326. 72 "The state may erroneously determine questions arising under a contract which constitutes the basis of the suit before it; it may hold a contract void which in our opinion is valid; it may adjudge a contract to be valid which in our opinion is void; or its interpreta- tion of the contract may, in our opinion, be radically wrong; but in neither of these cases would the judgment be reviewable by this court under the clause of the con- stitution protecting the obligation of contracts against impairment by state legislation, and under the existing statute defining and regu- lating its jurisdiction, unless that judgment in terms or by its neces- sary operation gives effect to some provision of the state constitution, or some legislative enactment of the state, which is claimed by the unsuccessful party to impair the obligation of the particular con' tract in question." Lehigh Water Co. V. Easton, 121 U. S., 388, 392. 73 Goodale v. Fennell, 27 Ohio St., 426; 22 Am. Rep., 321. Ordinance imposing a tax is a law. Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S.', 432, 440. Resolution of council may be such law. Iron M. R. Co. v. Mem- phis, 96 Fed. Rep., 113. 24 ■ytO OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§333 was within the prohibition of the constitution.'^ "Wo a by-law or ordinance of a municipal corporation may be such an exer- cise of the legislative power delegated by the legislature to the corporation as a political subdivision of the state, having all the force of law within the limits of the municipality, that it may properly be considered as a law within the meaning of the article of the constitution. ' '^^ Thus the power of determining what persons and property shall be taxed belongs exclusively to the legislative branch of the government, and, whether ex- ercised by the legislature itself or delegated by it to a municipal corporation, is strictly a legislative power.^" Accordingly, where a city, having power conferred by legislative grant, passed ordinances assessing a tax upon bonds of the city, and thus diminishing the amount of interest which it had agreed to pay, the Supreme Court of the United States held such ordinances to be laws impairing the obligation of contracts, "for the reason that the city charter gave limited legislative power to the city council, and when the ordinances were passed, under the supposed authority of the legislative act, their provisions become the law of the state. "^^ But where an ordinance merely grants permission to a company to lay water pipes, this merely constitutes a license and involves no exercise of legislative power, though the grant is put in the form of an ordinance. Such ordinance does not constitute a by-law of the city, and still less a law of the state. The license in the form of an ordinance was granted by virtue of legislative power, which power defined the class of persons to whom, and the objects for which the permission might be granted. "All that was left to the city council was the duty of determining what persons came within the definition, and how and where they might be permitted to lay pipes, for the purpose of securing their several rights to draw water from the river, without un- reasonably interfering with the convenient use by the public of lands and highways of the city. The rule was established by the legislature, but administrative, and might equally well 74 Per Mr. Justice Field in Wil- 98 U. S., 381, 392; Meriwether v. liams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S., 176, 183. Garrett, 102 U. S., 472. 75 Per Mr. Justice Gray in New 77 Per Mr. Justice Gray, New Orleans Waterworks v. LouisiSna Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louis- Sugar Refining Co., 125 U. S., 18, lana Sugar Refining Co., 125 U. S., 31. 18, 31, citing Murray v. Charles- 70 United States v. New Orleans, ton, 96 U. S., 432, 440, and Home §334] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 371 have been vested by law in the mayor alone, or in any officer of the city."* * * * jf ^jj^t license was within the author- ity vested in the city council by the law of Louisiana, it was valid ; if it transcended that authority, it was illegal and void. But the question whether it was lawful or unlawful depended wholly on the law of the state, and not at all on any provision of the constitution or laws of the United States. ' '^" "A municipal ordinance, not passed under supposed legis- lative authority, cannot be regarded as a law of the state within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition against state laws impairing the obligation of contracts. ' '^^ § 234. Ordinances as contracts. The term ' ' contracts, ' ' as used in both the federal and state constitutions, comprehends all forms of legal obligations, however executed, whether be- tween individuals, copartnerships and corporations, or between the state or a municipal corporation or governmental body or legal entity, possessing power to contract, and individuals, co- partners or corporations.*' "The term 'contract' is used in the constitution in its ordinary sense, as signifying the agree- ment of two or more minds for considerations proceeding from one to the other, to do or not to do certain acts. Mutual assent to its terms is of its very essence. "^^ Ins. Co. V. Augusta, 93 U. S., 116. 5 Dill. (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 310; Meri- ts Railroad Co. v. EUerman, 105 wether v. Garrett, 102 U. S., 472. XJ. S., 166, 172; Day v. Green, 4 "The legislature cannot enact a Cush. (Mass.), 433, 438. law Impairing the obligation of a 79 Per Mr. Justice Gray in New contract by a municipal corpora- Orleans Waterworks v. Louisiana tion." William's Appeal, 72 Pa. Sugar Refining Co., 125 U. S., 18, St., 214, 217. 32. As to how far a license of a 80 Per Mr. Justice Harlan In municipal occupation tax is a con- Hamilton Gas Light Co. v. Hamil- tract within the protection of the ton, 146 U. S., 258, 266. state and federal constitutions, see When ordinance authorizing a sec. 170, supra. contract does not give the contract The corporation is not liable for the force of law, see State ex rel. the non-enforcement of an ordi- V. New Orleans & C. R. Co., 37 La. nance on the theory that it is a Ann., 589. contract. Kiley v. Kansas City, 87 Ordinance held to be a "law" as Mo., 103; 56 Am. Rep., 443. term used in policy of insurance. Ordinances as contracts. War- Jones V. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., sop v. Hastings, 22 Minn., 437; 2 Daly (N. Y.), 307. , Bassett v. El Paso, 88 Tex., 168; 81 WoodrufE V. Trapnall, 10 How. 30 S. W. Rep., 893. (U. S.), 190; U. S. v. Jefferson Co., 82 Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109 SI'S OF CONSTltlJTIONALlTY OF ORDINANCES. [§ 335 1 285. The "obligation" of the contract. Obligations are of two kinds, "perfect" and "imperfect" or "civil" and "natu- ral. ' ' The imperfect or natural is only binding in morals ; it cannot be enforced by legal action. The perfect or civil may be enforced in law. Constitutions protect from impairment the latter only,** which consists in the remedy or the means to compel its performance and to make compensation in event of failure.®* ' ' The obligation of a contract includes everything within its obligatory scope. Among these elements nothing is more important than the means of enforcement. This is the breath of its vital existence. Without it, the contract, as such, in the view of the law, ceases to be, and falls into the class of those ' imperfect obligations, ' as they are termed, which depend for their fulfilment upon the will and conscience of those upon whom they rest. The idea of right and remedy are inseparable. 'Want of right and want of remedy are the same thing.* "^^ ' ' The obligation of a contract, ' ' says Mr. Justice Field, ' ' in the constitutional sense, is the means provided by law by which it can be enforced— by which the parties can be obliged to per- form it. Whatever legislation lessens the efficacy of these means impairs the obligation. If it tends to postpone or retard the enforcement of the contract, the obligation of the latter is to that extent weakened. The Latin proverb, qui cito dat bis dat (he who gives quickly gives twice) has its counterpart in a maxim equally sound, qui serius solvit, minus solvit (he who pays too late pays less). Any authorization of the postpone- U. S., 285, 288, speaking of statu- ^* Louisiana v. Police Jury, etc., tory right to recover of a munlc- 111 U. S., 716; Seibert v. Lewis, Ipal corporation damages for de- 122 U. S., 284; Walker v. White- struction of property by a mob, head, 16 Wall (83 U. S.), 314; which, in effect, was taken away United States v. Conway, Hemp., by the adoption of a new state con- 313; 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14849; John- stitution, after judgment had been son v. Higgins, 3 Mete. (60 Ky.), obtained, which limited the city's 566 ; Sabatier v. Creditors, 6 Mart, power of taxation. N. S. (La.), 585; Jacobs v. Small- 88 Louisiana V. New Orleans, 102 wood, 63 N. C, 112; Cochran v. U. S., 203; Dartmouth College v. Darcy, 5 S. C, 125; Fitzgerald v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.), 518, Grand Trunk R. R., 63 Vt., 169; 529; Blair v. Williamson, 4 Litt. 22 Atl. Rep., 76; 13 L. R. A., 70. (14 Ky.), 34; Wood v. Wood, 14 ss per Mr. Justice Swayne in Rich. (S. C), 148, 154; Webster v. Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S., 595, Rose, 6 Heisk. (53 Tenn.), 93; 19 598, citing 1 Bac. Abr., tit. Actions Am. Rep., 583. in General, letter B. §23G] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 373 ment of payment or of means by which such postponement may be effected, is in conflict with the constitutional prohibi- tion. "«« § 236. Question is for decision of United States Supreme Court. While the general rule is, that the United States Su- preme Court will adopt the opinion as conclusive of the highest state court on matters relating to the construction of the state constitution and state laws, wherein no question under the laws or constitution of the United States is involved,^^ the specific rule applicable to the point under consideration is: The Su- preme Court will, in a proper case, decide for itself independent of the decisions of the state courts, whether there is a contract and whether its obligations are impaired.** The general statement of the doctrine has been formulated by Mr. Justice Bradley: "In ordinary eases the decision of the highest court of a state with regard to the validity of one of its statutes would be binding upon this court; but where the question raised is whether a contract has or has not been made, the obligation of which is alleged to have been impaired by legislative action, it is the prerogative of this court, under the constitution of the United States and the acts of Congress relating to writs of error to the judgments of state courts, to inquire, and judge for itself, with regard to the making of such contract, whatever may be the views or decisions of the state courts in relation thereto."*® Subsequently the court affirmed the rule, thus: "The question of the exist- ence or non-existence of a contract in cases like the present (state law subjecting property of railroad cor- poration to taxation) is one which this court will determine for itself, the established rule being that where the judgment of the highest court of a state, by its terms or neces- sary operation, gives effect to some provisions of the state law which is claimed by the unsuccessful party to impair the con- tract set out and relied on, this court has jurisdiction to 86 Per Mr. Justice Field in Louis- so McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. iana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S., at S., 662, 667. pp. 206, 207. Similar emphatic language has 87 Erie R. R. Co. v. Pennsyl- been used by the United States vania, 21 Wall. (U. S.), 492, 497. Supreme Court in subsequent 88 Shelby County v. Union and cases : "In determining whether. Planters' Bank, 161 U. S., 149, 151, in any given case, a contract ex- per Mr. Justice Peckham. ists, protected from impairment 374 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OP ORDINANCES. [§237 determine the question whether such a contract exists as claimed, and whether the state law complained of impairs its obligation, ""o § 237. Taxation by municipal corporation of its own bonds, etc. The right of a municipal corporation to tax its own bonds and other obligations held by non-residents, by withholding the amount of the tax from the interest due thereon, has been denied, because in violation of the constitutional provision under consideration. No municipality of a state can by its own ordinances, under the guise of taxation, relieve itself from performing to the letter all that it has expressly promised to its creditors. Thus where a city has issued certificates of stock, whereby it promised to pay to the owners thereof certain sums of money which had been borrowed, with six per cent interest, payable quarterly, it cannot subsequently impose a tax of two per cent on the value of all property within its limits and treat its stock as a part of such property, and direct that the tax upon it shall be retained by the treasurer of the city from the interest due thereon. The city sought to justify the tax upon the ground that it was not higher than the tax on all other property of its citizens, and that all property within the city was subject to taxation; but the court answered that, by the legislation of the city, its obligation to its creditors was im- paired, and, however great its power of taxation, it must be by the constitution of the United which can not be legally im- States, this court forms an inde- paired." Gulf & Ship Island R. R. pendent judgment." Citizens' Sav. Co. v. Hewes, 183 U. S., 66, 75. Bk. V. Owensboro, 173 U. S., 636, The rule is discussed in the fol- 647, 648. lowing cases: Board of Liquida- 00 Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. tion v. Louisiana, 179 U. S., 622, Tennessee, 153 U. S., 486, 492, 493, 636; Stone v. Bank of Commerce, per Mr. Justice Jackson. 174 U. S., 412; Citizens' Savings "Before we can be asked to de- Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S., 636, termine whether a statute has im- 647, et seq.; Shelby County v. paired the obligation of a contract. Union, etc.. Bank, 161 U. S., 149, it should appear that there was a 151; Bank of Commerce v. Ten- legal contract subject to impair- nessee, 161 U. S., 134, 144; L. & ment, and some ground to believe N. R. R. Co. v. Palmes, 109 U. S., that it has been impaired." New 244; Erie R. R. Co. v. Pennsyl- Orleans v. New Orleans Water- vania, 21 Wall. (U. S.), 492, 497; works Co., 142 U. S., 79, 88. New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. "Indeed the whole foundation of Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., 125 our jurisdiction in this class of U. S., 18, 31, 38 ; Hamilton Gas cases must rest upon a contract Light & Coke Co. v. Hamilton City, §238] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. SrS exercised (being a political agency of the state) in subordina- tion to the inhibition of the federal constitution against legis- lation impairing the obligation of contracts. Until the interest was paid, no act of state or political subdivision, exercising legislative power by its authority, could work an exoneration from what was promised to the creditor.^i The rule has been most frequently applied in taxation of state securities by state statutes. However, the principle is applied with like force when taxation by the municipality of its own bonds or other obligations is attempted by ordinance. The rule of the United States Supreme Court "is settled that any tax levied upon them (bonds) cannot be withheld from the interest payable thereon. Such was the decision of this court in Murray v. Charleston.""- This doctrine was applied to a judgment for coupons of consolidated bonds issued by the City of New Orleans. Under the municipal charter the bonds were in terms exempted from taxation, and it was held that a judg- ment rendered thereon in favor of non-resident holders was equally exempt. The opinion also declares that in the absence of. any contract in the bonds, conferring the right to impose the tax, such tax could" not be levied upon bonds or other obligations of a city which belong to non-residents, without impairing the force of the obligation itself."^ § 238. Ordinances granting franchises as contracts. Ee- speetioig railroad charters and franchises, Mr. Justice Miller states that, in far the largest number of cases brought to the United States Supreme Court under that clause of the constitu- tion, "the question has been as to the existence and nature of the contract, and not the construction of the law which is supposed to impair it; and the greatest trouble we have had 146 U. S., 258, 265; Willmlngton & the mortgagees in the county Weldon R. R. v. Alsbrook, 146 U. where land lies, does not, as ap- S., 279, 293; Huntington v. At- plied to non-resident held mort- trill, 146 U. S., 657, 684. gages contravene the 14th Amend- 91 Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. ment of the United States Consti- S., 432, 448, per Mr. Justice Strong, tution. Savings and Loan So- approving R. R. Co. V. Pennsyl- ciety v. Multnomah County, 169 U. vania (State Tax on Foreign-held S., 421, 426, per Mr. Justice Gray, Bonds), 15 Wall. (82 U. S.), 300. reviewing many cases. (Mr. Justice Miller and Mr. Justice 92 Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U. Hunt dissented.) Jenkins v. S., 672, 683, per Mr. Justice Field. Charleston, 96 U. S., 449. 93 De Vignier v. New Orleans, 1? TE^xing mortgages of lands to 376 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§ 238 on this point has been in regard to what may be called legis- lative contracts— contracts found in statute laws of the state if they existed at all. It has become the established law of this court that a legislative enactment, in the ordinary form of a statute, may contain provisions which, when accepted as the basis of action by individuals or corporations, become contracts between them and the state within the protection of the clause referred to of the federal constitution. ' ' He further observed that, "this has always been a very nice point" (in determining the question) ; "and when the supposed contract exists only in the form of a general statute, doubts still recur after all our decisions on that class of questions."*** The rules applicable to legislative franchises which constitute contracts are alike applicable to ordinances granting franchises which are ' ' laws, ' ' and which, upon acceptance by the grantee, constitute con- tracts. No subsequent ordinance which constitutes a law can impair their obligations.^^ Thus where a city enters into a valid contract by ordinance which allots to a private corpora- tion particular subway spaces in its streets for laying its tele- phone and telegraph wires, it cannot invalidate or impair that contract by a subsequent ordinance by repudiating it and allot- ting the same space to another company.^^ The Supreme Court Fed. Rep., 11, 12; Folsom Bros. v. made." New Jersey v. Yard, 95 New Orleans, 16 Fed. Rep., 11. U. S., 104, 113. 9* "Statutes fixing the taxes to It was held in an opinion de- be levied on corporations, partake, livered by Chief Justice Marshal in a striking manner, of this dual that the constitutional provision character, and require for their extends to legislative grants which construction a critical examination constitute a contract to which the of their terms, and* of the circum- state is a party, and while it was stances under which they are admitted that one legislature is created. competent to repeal any act which "The writer of this opinion has a former legislature had legally always believed, and now believes, passed yet where an act is done that one legislature of a state has under a law it is not competent no power to bargain away the for a subsequent legislature to un- rights of any succeeding legisla- do it. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch ture to levy taxes in as full a (U. S.), 87, 135. manner as the constitution will 95 People v. Chicago, etc., Ry. permit. But, so long as the ma- Co., 118 111., 113; 7 N. B. Rep., 116; jority of this court adhere to the Kansas City v. Corrigan, 86 Mo., contrary doctrine, he must, when 67; Michigan Tel. Co. v. St. Jos- the question arises, join with the eph, 121 Mich., 502 ; 80 N. W. Rep., other judges in considering 383. whether such a contract has been so State ex rel. Subway Co, v. §238J OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 377 of the United States has held that the grant of right to supply water or gas to a city and its inhabitants through pipes and mains laid in the streets, upon condition of the performance of the service of the grantee, is the grant of a franchise vested in the state in consideration of the performance of a public serv- ice, and after performance by the grantee is a contract pro- tected by the constitution of the United States against legisla- tion to impair it.**^ This question frequently arises in grants of franchises to lay down tracks and operate ears in streets and public ways. Whether this privilege is granted directly by the legislature, or through a municipal corporation, the ac- ceptance thereof and the construction of tracks thereunder constitute a contract which cannot be impaired by any act of the state or city.^^ Southwest Mo. Light Co. v. Jop- lin, 101 Fed. Rep., 23. Where city has power to supply water or contract with a company for a supply, a contract with such company is impaired if city sup- plies water itself or contracts with another company for a supply. In- junction will lie. White v. Mead- ville, 177 Pa. St., 643; 34 L. R. A., 567; 35 Atl. Rep., 695; Metzger v. Beaver Falls, 178 Pa. St., 1; 35 Atl. Rep., 1134; Welsh v. Beaver Falls, 186 Pa. St., 578; 40 Atl. Rep., 784. Where the grant is not exclusive injunction will not lie to restrain the city from constructing its own plant for supplying water and light for municipal purposes, where it does not appear that the operation of such plants will nec- essarily interfere with the con- tract rights of the company. Little Falls Electric & W. Co. v. Little Falls, 102 Fed. Rep., 663. 98 Belleville v. Citizens' Horse Ry., 152 111., 171; 3 N. E. Rep., 584; -Port of Mobile v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 84 Ala., 115; 4 So. Rep., 106; 5 Am. St. Rep., 342; East Louisiana R. R. v. New Orleans, 46 La. Ann., 526; 15 So. Rep., 157; St. Louis, 145 Mo., 551; 46 S. W. Rep., 981. The city in granting to a com- pany the right to lay its wires and construct its underground conduits acts in its proprietary capacity, and in pursuance of the powers conferred upon it by charter. A contract to put electric wires un- derground was held to be for the private advantage of the city as a legal personality, distinct from considerations connected with the government of the state at large, and that with reference to such contract the city must be regarded as a private corporation. Safety Insulated W. & C. Co. v. Baltimore, 25 U. S. App., 166; 13 C. C. A., 375; 66 Fed. Rep., 140. Power to contract for waterworks is pri- vate. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank V. Arkansas City, 40 U. S. App., 257; 22 C. C. A., 171; 76 Fed. Rep., 271. 87 Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S., 1; 19 U. S. Sup. Ct, Rep., 77. An ordinance granting right to erect and operate electric light works is impaired if city operates works and supplies private con- sumers. Injunction granted. 378 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§ 240 § 239. Same — Imposing additional burdens. It may be stated, as a general proposition, that when a city makes a contract for a municipal improvement, e. g., conferring the right to introduce, distribute and sell water within the city, it cannot, in derogation of its contract, by ordinance or otherwise, impose additional burde^ns upon the grantee or vary the condi- tions contained in the contract.®" So when, by ordinance, a municipal corporation has authorized a telephone company to erect poles and string its wires, upon certain conditions, which are complied with, the municipality cannot, by a subsequent ordinance, require the company to pay so much for each pole erected by it within a certain district in return for being allowed to keep and use such poles.^ So, where by ordinance, a street railroad company is granted the right to lay its tracks on the streets under conditions specified, a subsequent act im- posing an additional condition, without the company's consent, in requiring the company to pave six feet on either side of its tracks, constitutes an impairment of the obligation of the fran- chise contract.^ § 240. Same— Exclusive privileges. A statute authorizing a municipality to contract for the erection of a bridge across a river and giving to the company exclusive privileges, that is, that no other bridge should be built across the river within a specified time or within a certain distance from the one erected, is a contract the obligations of which are fully protected against impairment by subsequent state enactments.^ An exclusive franchise granted to supply water to the inhabitants of a Detroit v. Detroit City Ry., 56 Fed. 2 Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Savan- Rep., 867; 54 Fed. Rep., 1; 64 Fed. nah, 30 Fed. Rep., 646. Rep., 628; Omaha Horse Ry. Co. v. Such contract cannot be amend- Cable Tramway Co., 30 Fed. Rep., ed by subsequent decisions of the 324; 3 Cook on Corp. (4th Ed.), state court. Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 sec. 913, p. 2231. See sees. 197, Wall. (U. S.), 50. 201, 202, supra. XJrant to lay double track can- so Los Angeles v. Los Angeles not be limited to single track. City Water Co., 177 U. S., 558, af- Burlington v. Burlington Street firming 88 Fed. Rep., 720; Los Ry. Co., 49 Iowa, 144; 31 Am. Rep., Angeles v. Los Angeles Water Co., 145. 61 Cal., 65. Reducing rates of fare. Cleve- 1 New Orleans v. Great Southern land City Ry. Co. v. Cleveland, 94 Tel. Co., 40 La. Ann., 41; 3 So. Fed. Rep., 385. Rep., 533; 26 Cent. Law Journal, s The Binghamton Bridge, 3 233, and notes. Wall, (U. S.), 51; Bridge Pro- §241] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 379 municipality by means of pipes and mains laid through the public streets is violated by a grant to an individual in the municipality of the right to supply his premises with water by means of a pipe or pipes so laid.^ In one case where the city had granted the exclusive privilege to a gas company to furnish gas and subsequently granted a similar privilege to another company, the city upon complaint of the first company was restrained from proceeding to complete such grant.^ It has been held that a franchise contract, consisting of an exclusive privilege to furnish gas is not violated by granting the right to another company to furnish electricity." § 241. Franchise contracts authorized by state. The state may enter into contracts with the city in matters outside of its charter, which cannot be impaired or annulled, notwithstand- ing the unlimited and autocratic power of the legislature over cities." Thus where a municipal corporation, by authority of the state, contracts with a third person, whereby rights become vested in such person, they cannot be divested by the state. prietors v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. (U. S.), 116. - N. O. Water-work Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S., 674; Louisville Gas Co. V. Citizens' Gas Co., 115 U. S., 683, 694; New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louis- iana Light Co., 115 U. S., 650; Cit- izens' Water Co. v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 55 Conn., 1; 10 Atl. Rep., 170. 5 Newport v. Newport Light Co., 84 Ky., 166, declining to follow State V. Cincinnati Gas Co., 18 Ohio St., 262, 266; and Norwich Gas Light Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn., 19, saying "the rule of law recognized in those cases and the reasoning upon which they are based or in the cases following them, has not been sustained or approved in the recent decisions of the Supreme Court (U. S.) in cases involving like questions," citing New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S., 650, 665; Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co., 115 U. S., 683; New Or- leans Water Works v. Rivers, 115 U. S., 674. Injunction to protect exclusive privilege to lay gas pipes in streets and to furnish gas, granted. Jersey City Gas Co. v. Dwight, 29 N. J. Eci., 242. Injunction denied. Norwich Gas- light Co. V. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn., 19; Montgomery Gas Light Co. V. Montgomery, 87 Ala., 245; 6 So. Rep., 113; 4 L. R. A., 616; Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 44 Iowa, 505. Saginaw Gas Light Co. v. Sagi- naw, 28 Fed. Rep., 529. When exclusive privilege to fur- nish gas does not exist. Vincennes V. Citizens' Gas Light & Coke, 132 Ind., 114; 16 L. R. A., 485; 31 N. E. Rep., 573; Memphis Gayoso Gas Co. V. Williamson, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.), 314; Norwich Gas Light Co. V. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn., 19. See sees. 190 to 192, 197, 201, 202, supra. 7 Black on Const. Prohibition, sec, 49, 380 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§ :H2 Such a contract is pro haec vice the contract of the state and cannot be impaired by it. Hence where the common council of a city in the exercise of power conferred by the legislature, made an absolute grant to a horse railway company of the right to build its road on certain streets, and the company accepted the grant and built a part of the road at great ex- pense, it was held that the legislature could not, by a subse- quent amendment of the charter, make the right of the com- pany to build the rest of the road dependent on the consent of a majority of the property owners on the street.^ § 242. Reservation of right to alter, amend or repeal fran- chise contracts. "When privileges, franchises, etc., of the char- acter under consideration are granted, either by the state or municipal corporation, the practice generally prevails to re- serve the power to alter, amend or repeal whenever the public interest may require, and this question is solely within the discretion of the legislative authorities. Such reservation may be in the state constitution, legislative act, municipal charter or in the law or ordinance granting the franchise.^ "Where the power to regulate the franchise and impose conditions is re- served no question as to the impairment of the obligation of the contract can arise if the legislative authorities choose to impose additional burdens upon the enjoyment of the franchise.^" The reserved power authorizes the making of any alteration or amendment which will not defeat or substantially impair the object of the grant or any rights vested under it. ' ' The power of alteration and amendment is not without limitation, but must be in good faith and consistent with the specific object of the charter. "11 The reserved power to alter or amend will be construed favorably to the public. Thus, under a statute con- ferring power to regulate water rates which are required to be "fixed by ordinance," the power was construed as continu- ing and authorized charges in rates from time to time as might 8 Hovelman v. K. C. Horse Ry. emption. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 79 Mo., 632. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S., 556; Skaneateles W. W. Co. v. Louisville Water Co. v. Clark, 143 Skaneateles, 161 N. Y., 154; People U. S., 1; Hoge v. Railroad Co., 99 V. O'Brien, 111 N. Y., 1; Greenwood U. S., 348; Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. V. Freight Co., 105 U. S., 13; Hen- S., 319; R. R. Co. v. Maine, 96 U. derson v. Central, etc., Ry., 21 Fed. S., 499. Rep., 358; 3 Cook on Corp. (4th lo Sioux City Street Ry. Co. v. Ed.), sec. 913, p. 2236. Sioux City, 138 U. S., 98. Rule applied in case of tax ex- " Per Jackson, J., in Hill v. § 243] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 381 be deemed necessary and just, both to the company and pub- lic.i2 § 243. Contracts of contractors for public work. Charters and ordinances generally provide for public improvements, as streets, sevsrers, etc., to be paid for by special taxation or assess- ment at the expense of the property owners. Ordinarily, the city in such case, does not assume any liability, but v?hen the work is completed in accordance with the ordinance and con- tract providing therefor special tax bills are issued to, and in the name of, the contractor which become first liens on the property abutting upon the improvement, or, the property in the improvement, benefit, or special taxing, district. Some- times after the contract is let and the work begun the laws or charter or ordinances governing such matters are changed, and hence it is then important to determine when such changes con- stitute an impairment of the obligation of the contract, within the meaning of the federal constitution. Therefore, it was deemed proper to consider this subject as especially applicable to municipal ordinances. The contract takes its character and receives its obligation from the law in force at the time it is made and the rights acquired under it cannot be affected materially by a subsequent repeal or change of the law.^^ In other words, the laws which subsist at the time and place of making a contract enter into and form a part of it, as much so as if such laws were expressly referred to and incorporated in its terms. "This rule embraces alike those which affect its validity, constructio'n, discharge and enforcement."^* Thus a legislative act authorizing the levy of the requisite tax to pay municipal bonds and in force when the bonds are issued enter into and become a part of the Glasgow R. R., 41 Fed. Rep., 610; Aycock v. Martin, 37 Ga., 124; 92 San Joaquin & K. R. Co. v. Stanis- Am. Dec, 56; State v. Bermudez, laus County, 113 Fed. Rep., 930. 12 La., 352; Daquin v. Coiron, 3 See sees. 200, 201, supra. La., 387, 407; Arnaud v. Executor. 12 Freeport Water Co. v. Free- 3 La., 337 ; Penrose v. Erie Canal port, 180 U. S., 587; Danville Co., 56 Pa. St., 46, 49. Water Co. v. Danville, 180 U. S., i* Per Mr. Justice Swayne in 619; Rogers Park Water Co. v. Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S., 595, Fergus, 180 U. S., 624, affirming 601, citing Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 178 111., 571; 53 N. E. Rep., 363. 4 Wall. (U. S.), 535, and Mc- 13 Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. Cracken v. Hayward, 2 How. (U. (U. S.), 314; Von Hoffman v. S.), 608; Nat. Bk. v. Sebastian Co., Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.), 535, 550; 5 Dillon, 414; 17 Fed. Cas. No. 38;e OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§244 contract under which the bonds are delivered aad taken.' ^ As stated by the United States Supreme Court, "no attempt has been made to fix definitely the line between alterations of the remedy which are to be deemed legitimate and those which under the form of modifying the remedy impair substantial rights. Every case must be determined upon its own circum- stances. Whenever the result last mentioned is produced thw act is within the prohibition of the constitution, and to that extent void, "i*' § 244. Same— Rights vested in the contractor. What rights are vested in the contractor for public work by virtue of his contract ? Clearly the remedy or means of enforcing, the con-, tract constitutes substantial rights. But what do these means include 1 Thej^ plainly embrace the right to have the corporate authorities proceed to levy the special tax and deliver the tax bills. The vested right of the contractor is to have such tax bills aggregate in amount the contract price for the work, and further to have such tax bills operate as first liens on the re- spective lots benefited by reason of the improvement. The contractor must look to the property owners and their property for payment of his tax bills, for under most municipal charters, in no event, can the city be made liable for any part of the work if all the tax bills issued therefor should prove to be worthless for any reason. The change of law must neither deny nor prejudice the contractor in any of these rights. The new method must not be less secure than the old, for the contractor is not compelled to take additional hazard.^^ Merely changing 10,040; Columbia Co. v. King, 13 kosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosli Fla., 451; Helm v. Pridgen, 1 (U. S., 1903), 23 Sup. Ct. Rep., White & W. Civ. Cas., Tex. Ct. 234; McCullough v. Virginia, 172 App., sec. 644. U. S., 102; Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 i5McCless V. Meekins, 117 N. C, U. S., 118; McGahey v. Virginia, 34, 40; 23 S. E. Rep., 99, approv- 135 U. S., 685; Vance v. Vance, 108 ing Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 U. S., 514. Wall. (U. S.), 535, 555. i' In event of change the new 16 Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U. S., remedy must be as efficient and 284, 294. substantial as that which subsisted A MEEE CHANGE OF REMEDY Will when the Contract was made; this not impair the obligation provided for the reason that the remedy is a substantial or efficacious remedy necessarily inseparable from the remains, or is given by the law obligation. making the change by means of United States — Antoni v. Green- which a party can enforce his how, 107 U. S., 769; Louisiana v. rights under the contract. Osh- Jumel, 107 U. S., 711; UniteiJ i2U\ OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 383 the method of levying the special tax/* as by transferring such power from the city council to a court and jury, does not im- pair the means of enforcement. The contractor is held to have no vested right in the particular method existing at the time States V. Union Pac. R. Co., 98 U. g., 569. Alabama — Coosa River Steam- boat Co. V. Barclay, 30 Ala., 120. California — Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal., 293; Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal., 524. Connecticut — Appeal of Me- chanics' and Farmers' Bank, 31 Conn., 63. Georgia— Aycock v. Martin, 37 Ga., 124; 92 Am. Dec, 56; Lockett V. Usry, 28 Ga., 345. Kentucky — Griswold v. Hepburn, 63 Ky., 20. iMuisiana — Robert v. Coco, 25 La. Ann., 199; Rowlett v. Shep- herd, 4 La., 86. Maine — Lord v. Chadbourne, 42 Me., 429; 66 Am. Dec, 290. Massachusetts — Commonwealth V. Comrs., 6 Pick. (23 Mass.), 501. Mississippi — Musgrove v. Vicks- burg & N. R. Co., 50 Miss., 677; Lessley v. Phipps, 49 Miss., 790; Commercial Bank v. Chambers, 8 S. & M. (16 Miss.), 9. New Hampshire — Rich v. Fland- ers, 39 N. H., 304. North Carolina — Williams v. Weaver, 94 N. C, 134. Pennsylvania — Rhines v. Clark, 51 Pa. St., 96; Kenyon v. Stewart, 44 Pa. St., 179. Tennessee — Hope v. Johnson, 2 Yerg. (10 Tenn.), 123. Texas — Treasurer v. Wygall, 46 Tex., 447. "It is to be understood that the encroachment thus denounced must be material. If it is not ma- terial, it will be regarded as of no account." Per Mr. Justice Swayne in Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S., 595, 601. Additional remedy given to the people by mandamus subsequent to the granting of street railway franchises, held not to impair the obligation of a franchise contract. Per Mr. Justice Harlan in N. O. & L. R. Co. V. Louisiana, 157 U. S., 219. Changing the municipal charter as to method of serving process subsequent to the issue of munic- ipal bonds, held to be valid as the matter of proceedings was not a part of the contract. Perkins v. Watertown, 5 Biss. (U. S.), 320; 19 Fed. Cas., No. 10,991. 18 Curative act changing the method of special assessment. in a Massachusetts case, a law which conferred power upon the street commissioner of Boston to make sewer assessment in a particular manner had been held to be un- constitutional in Sears v. Street Commissioner, 173 Mass., 350, and the legislature thereafter substi- tuted therefor a section contain- ing the following provisions: "The board of street commissioners of said city at any time within two years after any new sewer or drain * * * js completed, shall assess upon the several estates es- pecially benefited by such sewer or drain, a proportional part of the cost thereof, not exceeding in amount the sum of four dollars per linear foot," and goes on to provide for a re-assessment of any such assessment which shall have been found to be invalid and is unpaid or which shall have been recovered back. The act contain- ing the original provision was ap- proved May 22, 1897; the substi- 384 OP CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§3M the contract is made.^* But if the method of ascertaiaing the special tax under the new law should result in a less sum in the aggregate than by following the old provisions, clearly the obligation of the contract would be impaired, for the contractor would be compelled to take less money than the amount stipu- lated in his contract.^" tuted section took effect June 1, 1899; held that a sewer built under order of August 5, 1897, be- gun July 23, 1897, and completed April 5, 1898, is a "new sewer" within the meaning of the pro- vision of the substituted section aboVe quoted and that the pro- vision is constitutional. In this case the proceeding was a petition by a tax payer for a writ of cer- tiorari, to quash proceedings for special assessments to pay for sewer construction. Hall v. Street Commissioners of Boston, 177 Mass., 434; 59 N. B. Rep., 68. 19 In Palmer v. Danville, 166 111., 42, 45, 46; 46 N. E. Rep., 629, the special tax levy, to pay for sewer and water connections was made prior to the change in the law. Upon proceedings taken after the amendment, the tax levy was held invalid as inequitable. In the pro- ceeding to re-assess the tax, the new law was applied, and the property owners were allowed to have a jury pass upon the question of benefits. Prior to the change the power to determine the amount of such benefits was vested in the city council, and its exercise was not ordinarily subject to review. "There was no saving clause in the amendatory act and the statute thereby repealed must be consid- ered except as to proceedings passed and closed as if it never had existed." Respecting the con- tention that the change disturbed the vested rights of the contract- ors, the court said (p. 45): "So far as the contractors were con- cerned the tax had not been deter- mined previous to the substitution of the amended section. The man- ner in which it had been attempted to fix the benefits had been set aside by this court as illegal and the first proceeding to determine such benefits in conformity with the law was after the adoption of the amendment. The right (p. 46) of the contractors that the city should proceed to levy according to law and some principle of equal- ity the special tax to pay for the improvement was not impaired." 20 Goodale v. Fennell, 27 Ohio St., 426; 22 Am. Rep., 321. In a geading contract with a city the contractor was to receive a certain portion of his pay as the work progressed on estimates to be made by the city engineer, the re- mainder due being payable on completion and acceptance of the work. Held, that it was not com- petent for the legislature to change the city charter so as to bind the contractor to a new estimate made without his consent, or to accept less money than he had really earned. "As no legislation can be valid which impairs the obliga- tion of a contract, there can be no ground for claiming that the esti- mate made under the law of 1869 (law changing charter) is of any legal force concluding the con- tractor. It is authority for the new estimate but could not cut off the right to further payment, if it before existed." Per Campbell, §2i5] OP CONSTttUTIONALlTY OF ORDINANCES. 38§ § 245. Same subject— Illustrative cases. In an Ohio ca^e, a street improvement contract was duly let under a law in exist- ence at the time the contract was made which limited the amount of the special tax to 50 per cent of the value of the property assessed, and provided that all excess should be paid by the city. Before the ordinance making the assessment to pay for the work was passed and took effect, the law was changed limiting the special tax to 25 per cent of the lot value, and providing, as the prior law, that all excess should be paid by the corporation. There was no saving clause in the latter act. Under the latter act the lot in question was only liable for $165 assessment, but under the law in force at the time the J., in State ex rel. Whitely v. Lansing, 27 Mich., 131, 132. Limiting the amount of recov- ery constitutes impairment. Walk- er V. Whitehead, 16 Wall. (U. S.), 314. Changing time and method of payment of municipal indebted- ness. Tribune Association v. New York, 48 Barb. (N. Y.), 240; Had- fleld V. New York, 2 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) (N. Y.), 95; Bidemiller v. Tacoma, 14 Wash., 376, 383; 44 Pac. Rep., 877. State indebtedness. Forstall v. Consolidated Association, 34 La. Ann., 770; Sharp v. Contra Costa Co., 34 Cal., 284; Hunsaker v. Bor- den, 5 Cal., 288; 63 Am. Dec, 130; Lamkln v. Sterling, 1 Idaho, 92; Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss., 268. Presenting and allowing claim; charter change respecting, held not to impair obligation. Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Osh- kosh (U. S. Sup. Ct, 1903), 23 Sup. Ct. Rep., 234. Act postponing the payment of municipal indebtedness and stop- ping the interest thereon, held to be an Impairment of the obligation of the contract. Williams's Ap- peal, 72 Pa. St., 214. Law denying execution on judg- ments against a city, held to be unconstitutional. New Orleans v. Morris, 3 Woods (U. S.), 115; 18 Fed. Cas. No. 10,183. Material change as to method of raising revenue necessary to meet the accruing interest on municipal bonds which impair the rights or remedies of the bond- holders is unauthorized. Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U. S., 284; In re Copen- haver, 54 Fed. Rep., 660; State ex rel. V. Young, 29 Minn., 474; 9 N. W. Rep., 737. Imposing additional burdens or varying the conditions of a con- tract to supply water to the city by ordinance or otherwise, is for- bidden. Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Water Co., 61 Cal., 65. Law imposing certain condi- tions precedent to payment of municipal indebtedness which are reasonable and which did not ren- der less effective pre-existing rem- edies are valid. Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S., 203; State v. New Orleans, 32 La. Ann., 493; Lincoln v. Grant, 38 Neb., 369; 56 N. W. Rep., 995; Parker v. Buck- ner, 67 Tex., 20; 2 S. W. Rep., 746. But unreasonable conditions con- tained in state laws or ordinances respecting the presentation or reg- 25 386 OP CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§246 contract was made the assessment of $386.59 was valid. The corporate authorities, following the provision of the repealed law, made the assessment $386.59. The contract provided that the city should not in any event ' ' be liable to pay for any part of said work or of the material used for the same, except such as may properly be chargeable upon city property bounding or abutting the said street. ' ' It thus appears that if the amended law governed the contracl;or would lose the difference between $386.59 and $165, or $221.59, for he surrendered all claim on the city for any excess of cost over the assessment by his contract. The improvement ordinance, passed before the contract was made, provided that "the costs and expenses was to be ascer- tained and assessed according to the provisions of the acts of the legislature and other ordinances of the city on the subject of special taxes." The court sustained the assessment under the old law. 21 In a Texas case the action was to recover the amount of two certificates of assessment for work done in con- structing a. pavement in front of defendant's property under a contract with the city, dated Oct. 3, 1888. The work had been regularly let and was completed Oct. 30, 1888. As the law required, the city engineer made out the roll, showing prop- istry of bonds, warrants, claims, difference. The city was not bound judgments, etc., against the city to make It good out of the general are void. McCracken v. Moody, 33 fund, and could not be compelled Ark., 81; Robinson v. Magee, 9 to do so, under the authority of Cal., 21; 70 Am. Dec, 638; Rose v. the cases cited from 18 Ohio St. Estudille, 39 Cal., 270; Priestly v. (Creighton v. Toledo, 18 Ohio St., Watkins, 62 Miss., 798; Royall v. 447; Welker v. Toledo, 18 Ohio St.. Virginia, 116 U. S., 572; Sands v. 452). Its obligation was to pay by Edmunds, 116 U. S., 585; Willis v. assessment and in no other way. Miller, 29 Fed. Rep., 239; Mc- It could be made liable In no other Cauley v. Brooks, 16 Cal., 11, 29-31, way without the assent of both per Field, C. J.; Brewer v. Otoe parties." In referring to the con- County, 1 Neb., 373, 381. stitutional power of the legisla- 21 "In the case before us, the tiire to restrict the power of law in force at the time the city municipal corporation in their obligated itself to make an assess- powers of taxation, assessments, ment equal to the contract price etc., the court remarked that such of the work, created the obligation power was subject to the limita- of this contract. The act of 1870 tion of the federal constitution impaired that obligation by depriv- that, "no state shall pass any law ing the city of the power to per- impairing the obligation of con- form without any provision to tracts." Concluding the court ob- make good to the contractors the served (p. 434): "When the legis- §2-lGJ OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OP ORDlkANCBS. 387' erty fronting on the improvement, the owners, etc., the total cost of work and sum assessed against each lot owner, etc. This was not approved by the city council, as the city charter di- rected, but the mayor and secretary issued certificates of assessment (tax bills). Afterwards it was discovered that these certificates were defective. The city council ordered that the city engineer make out a new and corrected roll and that upon a return of the unpaid certificates they be cancelled and new certificates be issued. This was done, but before their issue the section of the charter under which the contract was let and the work done had been repealed (March 15, 1889) and a new section substituted, providing a wholly different mode of making street improvements and a different method of issuing certificates. It was claimed that the certificates were void. The court held the certificates valid. "The provisions of the last amendment of the city charter are so variant from the section as it existed at the time of the contract that certificates in accordance with the new section for work done under the old could not be issued without materially altering the terms of the contract. The legislature could not repeal the law or any of its provisions so as to impair the contract. If it had provided as effective a remedy imder the new as existed under the old it might be held that the old law was repealed. But such is not the case. The certificates provided for in the new section are materially different from those provided for in the old. It is not to be presumed that the legislature intended to repeal the old section as to existing contracts. ' ' ^^ § 246. Interest an special tax bills as part of obligation. Re- duction in the rate of interest after the contract is let and the lature has invested the corporation by the constitutional provisions." with the power to improve streets, Goodale v. Fennell, 27 Ohio St., and raise money to pay the cost 426, 434; 22 Am. Rep., 321. of such improvements by an assess- 22 Piewellyn v. Proetzel, 80 Tex., ment, and persons have, on the 191, 197; 15 S. W. Rep., 1043. faith of this power and the stipu- As affecting the validity of laws lation of the corporation, per- providing for the payment of formed the contract, and the con- special tax bills in annual install- tractor has become entitled to the ments, passed subsequent to the consideration there is a (p. 435) letting of the contract for the contract obligation to pay, valid in work, see argument of Mr. Justice all respects, that may be enforced. Swayne in delivering the opinion Such a contract is as free from of the Supreme Court of the legislative control as one between United States in Edwards v. Kear- Individuals. It is wisely limited zey, 96 U. S., 595, 601, 602. 388 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§ 246 work begun is sometimes made and the question is then pre- sented whether the provisions relative to interest constitute a part of the contract obligation. Respecting this proposition there is apparent conflict in the decisions. In one case the Supreme Court of the United States,*^^ with a divided court, held that a city may reduce the rate of interest on judgments when interest is not provided for in the contract. Other eases have announced the same rule.^^^ The doctrine of these eases is that, if not stipulated in the contract, interest is to be regarded as in the nature of a penalty or liquidated damages, arising merely by virtue of the operation of law, which may be changed at the pleasure of the state. However, these cases deal solely with interest on jlidgments, which matter is usually regulated by general laws. In the opinions a judgment is not viewed as a contract at all.^^ Therefore, the conclusion is reached that a mere penalty imposed for not paying a judg- ment when rendered is not a part of the obligation of the con- tract from which the judgment sprung. Does the doctrine of these cases go further than to establish the rule that the provisions of the state statute respecting inter- est on judgments do not constitute a part of the contract for the improvement? These provisions may be excluded and also the general statutory provisions relating to interest on con- tracts in general, judgments, etc., and the question remains whether the repealed provisions of the charter or ordinances as to interest on special tax bills do not constitute a part of the contract, as much so as if written therein, or as much so as other provisions of the law— statute, charter or ordinance— which authorize the making of the contract, and which control 22%Morley V.Lake Shore and Mich- ment founded upon a contract is igan Southern Ry., 146 U. S., 162. no contract." McCoun v. N. Y. 22% Nevada Co. v. Hicks, 50 Ark., Cent. R. R., 50 N. Y., 176, 180. 416; 8 S. W. Rep., 180; Read v. "A Judgment is no contract nor Mississippi, 69 Ark., 365; 63 S. W. can it be considered in the light Rep., 807. of a contract; for judicium red- 23 "A judgment is, in no sense, a ditur in invitum." Per Lord Mans- contract or agreement between field In Bidleson v. Whytel, 3 Bur- parties." Wyman v. Mitchell, 1 row, 1545. Cowen (N. Y.), 316, 321. "The term 'contract' is used in "A statute liability wants all the the constitution in its ordinary elements of a contract, considera- sense, as signifying the agreement tion and mutuality, as well as the of two or more minds, for consid- assent of, the parties. Even a judg- eratlon proceeding from one to §241'] OF CONS'TrrUTIONAI^ITY OF ORDINANCES. 389 its operation, although not set out in the contract or even referred to therein.-* In one ease the charter rate of interest was treated as a part of the contract up to the date of judgment on the tax bills and then on the judgment the rate of interest prescribed by gen- eral statute was applied. The court declared that the 15 per cent interest provided by the charter was more in the nature of a penalty than a contract. The charter did not provide that the judgment should bear 15 per cent interest, therefore, the law in existence when the judgment was entered controlled. But the point of the case is that the contractor was given the benefit of the charter rate of interest up to the date of judg- ment.^^ In -a Pennsylvania case, a legislative act forbidding the com- putation of interest on prior municipal indebtedness after a specified date, was held to violate the "constitution clearly, plainly, palpably and in such manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation in our minds. " ^^ If a new provision reducing the rate of interest can be made to apply to contract for public work on the theory that charter interest is not a part of the obligation, then for like reason, a new section forbidding any interest whatever on special tax bills can be made to apply .^^ § 247. When new remedy controls. Where a remedy is legally changed, all rights of action are enforceable under the new procedure.28 It is not enough that the remedy is changed and rendered less speedy and convenient. If there is still a substantial remedy left to enable the party to enforce his rights that is sufficient.^^ If the new remedy is not unreasonable and will enable the party to enforce his rights without new and burdensome restrictions the party is bound to pursue the new remedy.^" the other, to do or not to do cer- N. J. L., 389 ; Verree v. Hughes, 11 tain acts. Mutual assent to its N. J. L., 91; North River Meadow terms is of its very essence." Lou- Co. v. Shrewsbury Church, 22 N. Islana v. New Orleans, 109 U. S., J. L., 424, 429; Wilson v. Marsh, 285, 288. 13 N. J. Eq., 289. 24 Buehan v. Broadwell, 86 Mo., 2* Winslow v. People, 117 111., 31, seems to give an affirmative an- 152 ; 7 N. E. Rep., 135, affirming swer. 17 111. App., 222. 25 St. Louis v. Allen, 53 Mo., 44 29 James v. StuU, 9 Barb. (N. 28 William's Appeal, 72 Pa. St., Y.), 482. 214. 30 Per Mr. Justice Clifford, in Ed- 27 Further as to changing rates wards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S., 595, of interest, see Cox v. Marlatt, 36 608. 390 6K CONSTiTUTtONALlTY OF ORDINANCE^. [§ 343 § 248. When old law to be followed. Where the change of remedy is substantial or material the old law remains in force for the purpose of completing the execution of all contracts made by virtue of it. In other words, a law, although repealed, is still in force for the purpose of giving the remedy provided by the jobligation of the contract.^i In an Illinois case the im- provement ordinance made the assessment payable in five in- stallments, as provided by law then in force. Subsequently the law was changed, providing for the division of an assessment into not more than ten installments, which had been held to operate as an amendment of the previous law.^^. It was held that as the prior law was in force when the ordinance was passed and the proceedings instituted, they were unaffected by the change in the law.^^ A contract with a municipal corporation was made and the work performed, in reliance upon the mode of taxation enabling the corporation to perform its part, which afterwards was de- clared to be unconstitutional by the state Supreme Court. Sub- sequently the state legislature supplied the place of the void law with another which gave the power to levy a tax to pay the debt. Judgment was then obtained and application made for mandamus to enforce its collection, when the latter law was repealed. Here the repeal was disregarded, and the same rule applied as though the latter law had existed at the date of the ■ contract. The case seems, to rest upon the proposition that "where a remedy has once been accorded, the right to employ it existed, and especially where, as in this case, its employment had actually been entered upon, there was no power in the legis- Rule applied to proceedings to New remedy to be followed If ascertain damages to lands by the adequate. Von Baumback v. Bade, construction of a canal. Common- 9 Wis., 559; McMillan v. Sprague, wealth V. Beatty, 1 Watts. (Pa.), 4 How. (U. S.), 647; 35 Am. Dec, 382. 412; Bronson y. Kinzie, 1 How. Statute of limitations. Oilman (U. S.), 311. v. Cutts, 23 N. H., 376. 3i Rule applied to levy and Assessments for construction of collection of taxes for payment of drains, where law repealed with- judgment against municipal corpo- out saving clause. Bate v. Sheets, ration. Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U. 64 Ind., 209 ; McKinsey v. Bowman, S., 284. 58 Ind., 88; Board of Commission- 32 English v. Danville, 150 111., ers, etc., v. Ruckman, 57 Ind., 96, 92; 36 N. E. Rep., 994. 102; Roush v. Morrison, 47 Ind., 33 Merriam v. People ex rel., 160 414, 416, 417. 111., 555; 43 N. B. Rep., 705. § 2id] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 391 lature to take away that remedy without the substitution of some reasonable mode of relief in its place. ' ' ** 3. Obdinaxces Intekfeeing with oe Attempting to Regu- late FoEEiGN OR Interstate Commerce. § 249. Ordinances cannot interfere with or regulate inter- state or foreign commerce. Under the constitution of the United States the Congress possesses exclusive jurisdiction, "to regu- late commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states."^'' Therefore, all state laws or municipal ordinances, which, in effect, interfere with, or constitute a regulation of such commerce, clearly violate this provision of the federal con- stitution, and will be declared void by the courts. While most of the cases relating to this subject involved state laws, the principles are obviously the same whether the regula- tion is attempted by statute or municipal ordinance. Respecting this doctrine, the following principles, established by the United States Supreme Court, were stated by Mr. Jus- tice Bradlev : ' ' The constitution of the United States, having given to Congress the power to regulate commerce, not only with foreign nations but among the several states, that power is necessarily exclusive whenever the subjects of it are national in their character, or admit only of one uniform system or plan of regulation ; that where the power of Congress to regulate is exclusive, the failure of Congress to make express regulations indicates its will that the subject shall be left free from any re- strictions or impositions, and any regulation of the subject by the states, except in matters of local concern only, is repugnant to such freedom ; that the only way in which commerce between the states can be legitimately affected by state laws is when, by virtue of its police power, and its jurisdiction over persons and property within its limits, a state provides for the security of the lives, health and comfort of persons and the protection of property and imposes taxes upon persons residing within the state or belonging to its population, and upon vocations and employments pursued therein, not directly connected with foreign or interstate commerce, or with some other employ- ment or business exercised under authority of the constitution 34 Brooks V. Memphis (U. S. Cir. 3' Constitution U. S., art. I., sec. Ct. W. D. Tenn.), 4 Federal Cas. 8, par. 3. No. 1,954; 3 Central Law Journ., 356. -392 OP CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§250 and laws of the United States; and imposes taxes upon all property within the state, mingled with and forming part of the great mass of property therein; but that, in making such in- ternal regulations, a state cannot impose taxes upon persons passing through the state or coming into it merely for a tem- porarj'' purpose, especially if connected with interstate or for- eign commerce ; nor can it impose such taxes upon property imported into the state from abroad, or from another state, and not become part of the common mass of property therein ; and no discrimination can be made, by such regulations, adversely to the persons or property of other states; and no regulations can be made directly affecting interstate commerce." ^^ A law cannot be deemed a regulation of commerce among states merely because it may incidentally or indirectly affect it." § 250. Meaning of term ' ' Commerce. ' ' The able and com- prehensive opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, delivered in Gib- bons V. Ogden,^^ declares the fundamental principle for the construction of the commerce clause of the federal constitution. The doctrine of that opinion has been consistently followed by the United States Supreme Court in all subsequent cases, in- volving many state laws and municipal ordinances relating to the subject. In that ease the great jurist declared : "In regu- lating commerce with foreign nations the power of Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several states. It would be a very useless power if it could not pass those lines. The commerce of the United States with foreign nations is that of the whole United States. Every district has a right to par- ticipate in it. The deep streams which penetrate our country in every direction, pass through the interior of almost every state in the union, and furnish the means of exercising this right. If Congress has the power to regulate it, that power must be exercised whenever the subject exists. If it exists within the states, if a foreign voyage may commence or ter- se Robblns V. Shelby Taxing Dls- 262 et seg.; Opinion of Chief Jus- trict, 120 U. S., 489, quoted with ap- tice Marshall, in Brown v. Mary- proval in Caldwell v. North Caro- land, 12 Wheat. (U. S.), 419; of lina, 187 U. S., 622, 625 (1903). Mr. Justice Miller, in Cook v. For history and necessity of fed- Pennsylvania, 97 U. S., 566. eral control of interstate and for- 37 Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. eign commerce, see article of Haber, 169 U. S., 613. James Madison, 42 Federalist, p. ss 9 wheat. (U. S.), 1. §252j OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 393 minate at a port within a state then the power of Congress may be exercised." ^^ ' ' Commerce is a term of the largest import. It comprehends intercourse for the purpose of trade, in any and all its forms, includiilg the transportation, purchase, sale and exchange of commodities between the citizens or subjects of foreign coun- tries and between the citizens of different states. ' ' *" § 251. No analogy between the power of taxation and the regulation of commerce. In Gibbons v. Ogden the Chief Justice declared that the power of taxation is indispensable to the ex- istence of the states, "and is a power which, in its own nature is capable of residing in, and being exercised by, different au- thorities at the same time. We are accustomed to see it placed, for different purposes, in different hands. Taxation is the sim- ple operation of taking small portions from a perpetually accumulating mass, susceptible of almost infinite division, and a power in one to take what is necessary for certain purposes, is not, in its nature, incompatible with a power in another to take what is necessary for other purposes. Congress is author- ized to lay and collect taxes, etc., to pay the debts and pro- vide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States. This does not interfere with the power of the states to tax for the support of their own governments ; nor is- the exercise of that power by the states an exercise of any portion of the power that is granted to the United States. In imposing taxes for state purposes they are not doing what Congress is empowered to do. Congress is not empowered to tax for those purposes which are within the exclusive province of the states. When, then, each government exercises the power of taxation, neither is exercising the power of the other. But, when a state proceeds to regulate commerce with foreign nations, or among the several states, it is exercising the very power that is granted to Congress, and is doing the very thing which Con- gress is authorized to do. There is no analogy, then, between the power of taxation and the power of regulating com- merce." *^ § 252. License tax on those engaged in exporting and im- porting. In the language of the Supreme Court of the United 30 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. Preston v. Finley, 72 Fed. Rep., (U. S.), 1, 195, 850, 859. "Welton V. Missouri, 91 U. S., "9 Wheat. (U. S.), 1, 199, 275, 280, quoted with approval in 394 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§353 States : "No .state can tax an import or export as such except undei' the limitations of the constitution. But before the article becomes an export or after it ceased to be an import, by being mingled with other property in the state, it is a subject of taxation by the state. A cotton broker may be required to pay a tax upon his business, or, by way of license, although he may buy and sell cotton for foreign exportation."*^ Thus a tax on money and exchange brokers is valid as applied to one deal- ing exclusively in foreign exchange. Here it was decided that the tax was for the privilege of carrying on the business aaid was not imposed upon the bills of exchange as such.** So a license tax on residents of the state engaged in packing or canning oysters for sale or transportation was declared valid. Here it was held that the tax was imposed for the prose- cution of the business within the jurisdiction of the state, and the fact that the oysters were prepared for transportation did not constitute a tax on interstate commerce.** § 253. License tax for privilege of selling goods, etc. In ac- cordance with the principles above outlined, state laws and municipal ordinances imposing a license tax for the privilege of carrying on trades, occupations, etc., are uniformly held in- valid, where they interfere with or regulate interstate or for- eign commerce. Thus a state law of Tennessee was declared void which imposed a license tax on ' ' all drummers and all per- sons not having a regular licensed house of business in the tax- ing district," who should offer for sale or sell goods, wares or merchandise therein by sample. "This kind of taxation," re- marked the court, "is usually imposed at the instance and solicitation of domestic dealers, as a means of protecting them from foreign competition. And in many cases there may be some reason in their desire for such protection. But this shows in a still stronger light the unconstitutionality of the tax. It shows that it not only operates as a restriction upon interstate commerce, but that it is intended to have that effect as one of its principal objects. And if a state can, in this way, impose restrictions on interstate commerce for the benefit and pro- *2 Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. lading is tax on exports, see Fair- (U. S.), 73, 81. bank v. U. S., 181 U. S., 283. *3 Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. ** State v. Applegarth, 81 Md., (U. S.), 73, 81. 293; 31 Atl. Rep., 961; 28 L. R. A., When tax on foreign bills of 812. §254] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 395 tection of its own citizens we are brought back to the condition of things which existed before the adoption of the constitution and which was one of the principal causes which led to it."*^ The doctrine of this case has been repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in holding void state laws and municipal ordinances, seeking to impose a license tax on non-resident (of state) drummers and commercial agents, sell- ing by sample.*'^ Therefore, the law is firmly established that no state has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form, whether by way of duties laid on the transporta- tion of the subjects of that commerce, or on the receipts derived from that transportation, or on the occupation or business of carrying it on, for the reason that such taxation is a burden on that commerce, and amounts to a regulation of it, which belongs solely to Congress.*'^ § 254. Same— Discrimination is not the test. The fact that the local law by its terms is made applicable to all of the class, as drummers or commercial travelers or those going from place to place selling goods by sample, does not save it from being invalid under the interstate commerce clause of the constitu- tion. Numerous decisions of state courts prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District,** held that if the law was free from discriminating features it was valid. Concerning this point the Federal Supreme Court observed: "It is strongly urged, as if it were a material point in the case, that no discrimination is made between domestic and foreign drummers— those of Tennessee and those of other states: that all are taxed alike. But that does not meet the difficulty. Interstate commerce can- not be taxed^ at all, even though the same amount of tax should be laid on domestic cominerce, or th'at which is carried on solely within the state. This was decided in the case of the State Freight case.*^ The negotiations of the sale of goods which are in another state, for the purpose of introducing them into the state in which the negotiation is made, is interstate eom- *5 Per Mr. Justice Bradley, in burgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S., 141; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S., 129. 120 U. S., 489. " Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S., " Caldwell v. North Carolina, 161. 187 U. S., 622; Brennan v. Titus- "120 U. S., 489. ville, 153 U. S., 289; Crutcher v. 4015 wall. (U. S.), 232. Kentucky, 141 U. S., 47; Stouten- 396 OP CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§ 255 merce. A New Orleans merchant cannot be taxed there for ordering goods in London or New York, because, in one case it is an act of foreign, and, in the other, of interstate commerce, both of which are subject to regulation by Congress alone."®" The fact that such ordinance was held by the state courts to be enacted in the exercise of the police power does not relieve the Supreme Court of the United States of the duty of declar- ing it void where it is in fact, or in effect, an interference or burden on the lawful commerce between the citizens of the states. Any tax on the occupation is a restriction on the right to sell and is forbidden by the federal constitution.®' § 255. Same— Where goods sold are in the state. A license tax imposed for the privilege of doing business by the state or a municipality on all peddlers, hawkers, drummers and itinerant vendors, which operates uniformly upon all persons engaged in the same kind of business, whether residents or non-residents of the state, is valid, where the goods sold are at the time of the sale within the state and have become a part of the prop- erty of the state.®^ As soon as the goods are in the state and become a part of its general mass of property they -wiirbecome liable to be taxed in the same manner as other property of sim- ilar character.®^ Thus an ordinance requiring persons who engage on their own account in a "commercial street broker- age business," in the course of which they take orders for goods to be filled by non-resident dealers and re-sell any goods re- jected after their arrival in the state is not void nor in con- flict with interstate commerce.®* But a tax on goods sold by an auctioneer, so far as it applies to goods from a foreign state, sold in the original package of the importer before they become 50 Robbins v. Shelby County Tax- state he can obtain them, Is not ing District, 120 U. S., 489, 497. invalid as a regulation of com- 5J Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. merce. Carrollton v. Bazzette, 159 S., 289; State v. Agee, 83 Ala., 110; 111., 284; 42 N. E. Rep., 837. 3 So. Rep., 856. 53 Robbins v. Shelby Co. Taxing 52 Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S., Dist., 120 U. S., 498 ; 7 Sup. Ct. 622; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep., 1091; South Rep., 592; Brown v. Houston, 114 Bend v. Martin, 142 Ind., 31; 41 U. S., 622; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep., 1091; N. B. Rep., 315; Emert v. Missouri, Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 97 Ga., 156 U. S., 296. 114. An ordinance Imposing a license 64 Walton v. Augusta, 104 Ga., upon itinerant merchants, as ap- 757; 30 S. E. Rep., 964; case of plied to one who purchases for re- Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S., sale bankrupt stocks in whatever 640, referred to and distinguished. §256] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 397 mingled with the property of the country, is an interference with interstate commerce and is invalid.^^ And where the goods manufactured by a non-resident are sold by the agent on the installment plan and are to be delivered afterwards by the agent, the agent cannot be subjected to a license tax.^^ § 256. Same— Same— Peddlers. Many cases have been pre- sented where peddlers and itinerant vendors of goods manu- factured in a state other than that in which they were being sold have opposed the payment of a license tax, imposed by statute or ordinance upon the ground that it was an interfer- ence with interstate commerce and therefore void as to goods manufactured in another state. But the courts have held such statutes and ordinances valid where it was found that at the time the sale was made the goods were in the state,**^ as where a peddler going from place to place within the state carries the goods along with him.^* "\STiere the manufactured goods are sent into another state, in car load lots, and agents take the same in small quantities from a central warehouse and carry tliem about the country, selling them and delivering them direct to purchasers, such agents are not engaged in selling goods by sample.^* Where goods are previously contracted by the im- porter or his agent and are shipped and received in a single package and that package is broken up and its contents dis- tributed among the several pur(?hasers, the goods are not en- titled to the protection of interstate commerce.®" 55 Cook V. Pennsylvania, 97 U. A statute which provided for the S., 566. levy and collection of an occu- 56 /w re Spain, 47 Fed., 208; pation tax from every person or Huntington v. Mahan, 142 Ind., firm who peddles out clocks or 695; 42 N. E. Rep., 463. cooking stoves was held valid, and 57 South Bend v. Martin, 142 Ind., not in conflict with the commerce 31; 41 N. E. Rep., 315; Hynes v. act. Ex parte Butin, 28 Tex. App., Briggs, 41 Fed.. 468. 304; 13 S. W. Rep., 10. 58 Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S., 59 American Harrow Co. v. Shaf- 296, following Machine Co. v. fer, 68 Fed. Rep., 750. Gage, 100 U. S., 676; Common- eo Kimmel v. State, 104 Tenn., wealth V. Harmel, 166 Pa. St., 89; 184; 56 S. W. Rep., 854; Austin v. 30 Atl. Rep., 1036. State, 101 Tenn., 563; 48 S. W. Where the goods are ordered in Rep., 305. the name of the agent and when Cigarettes put up in small boxes, received and delivered by him to bearing internal revenue stamps, the purchaser. Croy v. Obion which are shipped from one state County, 104 Tenn., 525; 58 S. W. to another, the boxes constitute Rep., 235. original packages; but when they 398 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OP ORDINANCES.- [§257 The state may not only tax the property if it be within its jurisdiction at the time of the sale, but also the occupation of selling it, or it may authorize a municipal corporation to do so. A tax or license levied upon the property itself or on the occu- pation of selling it when such property is actually present within the jurisdiction exercising such authority is not in any sense an -interference with interstate or foreign commerce.^^ § 257. Personal contracts— Occupation tax. The exemption of persons and property from a local license tax or control is strictly ponfined to such persons as are engaged, and to such property as is employed, in interstate or foreign commerce. Commerce, as stated by the United States Supreme Court, in its broad sense, includes intercourse and the means of inter- course, as applied to trade.®^ The term commerce does not in- clude personal contracts although made between those residing in different states, as contracts of street brokers,^^ and insur- ance contracts,^* of fire,®° marine,"® or mutual life.®'' The making of contracts of this character is held to be a mere incident of the business transacted, and not commerce in and of itself. The distinction is well illustrated in the following cases, sustaining tax and license laws: a tax imposed upon agents doing business in a state for laundries, located in another state f^ a law regulating the sale and redemption of transporta- reach their place of rest for final 524; State v. Hoffman, 50 Mo. App., disposal, and remain there until 585; State v. Downing, 22 Mo. sold to customers, they thereupon App., 504. become a part of the mass of the 62 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (U. property of the state, and become S.), 168, 183. subject to a license tax, such as ss Walton v. Augusta, 104 Ga., was placed on all goods of that 757; 30 S. E. Rep., 964. character. In re May, 82 Fed., 422. «* License law operating directly 61 For various definitions of ped- upon agents of foreign insurance dlers and drummers: companies held valid. People v. Brookfield v. Kitchen, 163 Mo., Thurber, 13 111., 554. 546; 63 S. W. Rep., 825; State v. 65 paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (U. Snoddy, 128 Mo., 523; 31 S. W. S.), 168, 183. Rep., 36; State v. Parsons, 124 Mo., ee Hooper v. California, 155 U. 436; 27 S. W. Rep., 1102; State v. S., 648. Smithson, 106 Mo., 149; 17 S. W. 67 New York Life Ins. v. Cra- Rep., 221; State v. Emert, 103 Mo., vens, 178 TJ. S., 389. 241; 15 S. W. Rep., 81; State v. 68 smith v. Jackson, 103 Tenn., Welton, 55 Mo., 288; State ex rel. 673; 54 S. W. Rep., 981; 47 L. R. Barricelli v. Noonan, 59 Mo. App., A., 416. § -^58] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OP' ORDINANCES. 39!) tion tickets:"" a license imposed upon locomotive engineers, operating or running trains of cars on any railroad in the state ;^'' an ordinance imposing a license fee upon a telegraph company upon business done exclusively in the City;''i and a license for the privilege of doing a general commission busi- nes within the state. The fact that much of the business was done on behalfl of principals residing Avithout the state and many of the transactions were sales of goods to be shipped into the state, was held not to be an interference with interstate commerceJ^ An ordinance of the city of Mobile, Ala., which, imposed a license tax on all telegraph companies with offices in the city, was held invalid, being an interference with interstate com- merce, since its business consisted in transmitting messages to all parts of the United States.^^ § 258. License tax on brokers, agents, etc., engaged in inter- state commerce. Where the business or occupation consists in the sale of goods, the license tax required for its pursuit is in effect a tax upon the goods themselves, and where such a tax S9 state V. Corbett, 57 Minn., Mobile. Thus in W. U. Tel. Co. v. State, 55 Tex., 314, the court fol- lowing Osborne v. Mobile, held an occupation tax on an express com- pany graduated according to the business done, regardless of wheth' er it was within or without the state, valid. And a license tax upon foreign telegraph companies having an agency in the city was upheld in W. U. Tel. Co. v. Richmond, 26 <}ratt. (Va.), 1. And a tax on the gross receipts of a telegraph company for the year next preceding the assessment return was held valid. W. U. Tel. Co. V. Mayer, 28 Ohio St., 521. And a license tax imposed on the business of an express com- pany engaged solely in commerce between the state was upheld. Memphis, etc., v. Nolan, 14 Fed., 532. A privilege tax on steamboat agents and agents of railroad com- panies, having no terminus in the 345; 24 L. R. A., 498; 59 N. W. Rep., 317. 70 Smith V. Alabama, 124 U. S., 465. 71 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Charleston, 153 U. S., 692; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep., 1094; 38 L. Ed., 871, af- firming 56 Fed. Rep., 419; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Fremont, 39 Neb., 692; 58 N. W. Rep., 415; Postal Tel. & Cable Co. v. Norfolk (Va., 1903), 43 S. B. Rep., 207. 72 Ficklen v. Shelby Co. Taxing Dist., 145 U. S., 1. 73 Leloup V. Mobile, 127 II. S., 640, reversing Mobile v. Leloupe, 76 Ala., 401, and overruling Os- borne V. Mobile, 16 Wall., 479, which held an ordinance of the city, requiring express and rail- road companies doing business in the city and extending beyond the state, to pay an annual license was valid. And in effect overruling a large number of state decisions which were based on Osborne v. 400 OF CONSTITQTlONALtTY OF OllDINANCBS. [§ 358 conflicts with the constitution of the United States it can not be any the less invalid because enforced through the form of a personal licensed* The particular form of the transaction does not always furnish the test in determining whether it con- stitutes foreign or interstate commerce. Clearly the sale of property of one state to the residents of another state is inter- state commerce. It can make no difference whether the sale was negotiated by the principal or an agent or a broker, who has a^n established place of business, or by a commercial traveler or drummer, who goes from place to place soliciting orders.''^ Thus an ordinance imposing a license tax upon every travel- ing merchant, hawker or peddler, who vends goods, wares or merchandise other than the manufactures or productions of the state was upheld. Llghtburne v. Taxing District, 4 Lea (Tenn.), 219. 74 Walton V. Missouri, 91 U. S., 215. So it was held that the exaction of a license tax from the importer of goods was a tax on the goods, and therefore in conflict with the constitution. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (U. S.), 419, 425, 444. 75 Laws and ordinances requir- . Ing a license for taking orders and making sales of goods, as drum- mers selling by sample for princi- pals residing beyond the state, are void. The tax is, in effect, a tax on the goods sold and a state can- not levy a tax on goods not within her jurisdiction. United States — Stockard v. Mor- gan, 185 U. S., 27; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S., 289, reversing 143 Pa. St., 642; 22 Atl. Rep., 893; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S., 141; Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S., 129; Robbing v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S., 489;- Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S., 622; Webber V. Virginia, 103 U. S., 344; Cook V. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S., 566; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S., 275; JEx parte Hough, 69 Fed. Rep., 330; In re Rozelle, 57 Fed. Rep., 155; In re Kimmel, 41 Fed. Rep., 775; Ex parte Stockton, 33 Fed. Rep., 95; Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. (U. S.), 123; In re Hennick, 5 Mackey (D. C), 489. Indiana — McLaughlin v. South Bend, 126 Ind., 471; 26 N. B. Rep., 185. Kansas — Ft. Scott v. Pelton, 39 Kan., 764; 18 Pac. Rep., 954. Louisiana — Pegues v. Ray, 50 La. Ann., 574; 23 So. Rep., 904; Simmons Hdw. Co. v. McGuire, 39 La. Ann., 848; 2 So. Rep., 592. Maine — State v. Furbush, 72 Me., 493. Nevada — Ex parte Rosenblatt, 19 Nev., 439; 14 Pac. Rep., 298. New York — Buffalo v. Reavey, 55 N. Y. Supp., 792. North Carolina — State v. Bracco, 103 N. C, 349; 9 S. B. Rep., 404. Pennsylvania — Port Clinton Bor- ough v. Shafer, 5 Pa. Dist. Ct., 583. South Dakota — State v. Rankin, 11 S. Dak., 144; 76 N. W. Rep., 299. Texas — Talbutt v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. App., 64; 44 S. W. Rep., 1091. Virginia — Adkins v. Richmond, 98 Va., 91; 34 S. B. Rep., 967; 47 L. R. A., 583. §259] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 461 states/^ or who solicits orders for non-resident principals is voidJ^ The delivery of the goods sold is plainly a part of the com- mercial transaction. Thiis the occupation of delivering goods, as books, sold by a resident or corporation of one state to those in another cannot be licensed by the state or municipal corpora- tion, since this is clearly an interference with an interstate commercial transaction.^^ § 259. Discriminating license tax void. State statutes and municipal ordinances which discriminate in the license tax im- Illusteative Cases. A license on "itinerant dealers in fruit trees, vines," etc., so far as it applies to a foreign drummer or traveling agent, selling goods by sample for his principal who is a non-resident, is void. State v. Agee, 83 Ala., 110; 3 So. Rep., 856. An ordinance requiring an agent of a corporation residing in anoth- er state to pay a license for sell- ing a picture frame, encasing a picture sold by a corporation on previous orders, is in violation of the interstate commerce provision of the Constitution. Laurens v. Elmore, 55 S. C, 477; 33 S. E. Rep., 560. License tax on persons, other than photographers of the state, who solicit pictures to be enlarged, is void. State v. Scott, 98 Tenn., 254; 39 S. W. Rep., 1; 36 L. R. A., 461. So an act which requires a per- son who solicits orders for spirit- uous liquors, to procure a license, is void as applied to a person so- liciting orders for the sale of goods to be shipped from points outside of the state. State v. Lichtenstein, 44 W. Va., 99; 28 S. B. Rep., 753. So a license tax imposed by the board of supervisors of San Fran- cisco, on an agent soliciting busi- ness in San Francisco for a rail- road running from Chicago to New York, but who sold no tickets. McCall V. California, 136 U. S., 104. An ordinance applicable to bro- kers who represent non-resident principals exclusively is void. Stratford v. Montgomery, 110 Ala., 619; 20 So. Rep., 127. But a tax imposed by a state upon all money and exchange bro- kers, although the business was limited to foreign bills of ex- change, was held not in conflict with interstate commerce. Nathan V. Louisiana, 8 How. (U. S.), 73. 76 Ex parte Thomas, 71 Cal., 204; 12 Pac. Rep., 53; Corson v. Mary- land, 120 U. S., 502. To license a person peddling tea the growth of foreign country is in conflict with Federal Constitu- tion. State V. Pratt, 59 Vt., 590; 9 Atl. Rep., 556. 77 Ex parte Murray, 93 Ala., 78 ; 8 So. Rep., 868; Wrought Iron Range Co. v. Johnson, 84 Ga., 754; 11 S. E. Rep., 233; Martin v. Ro- sendale, 130 Ind., 109; 29 N. E. Rep., 410; People v. Bunker, 128 Mich., 160; 87 N. W. Rep., 90; Overton v. Vicksburg, 70 Miss., 558; 13 So. Rep., 226. 78 Huntington v. Mahan, 142 Ind., 695; 42 N. E. Rep., 463; In re Tuerman, 48 Fed. Rep., 167; In re Nichols, 48 Fed. Rep., 164; In re io-> OF CONSTITUTIOISIALITY OF ORDINANCES. i§ 359 posed by them against persons or produce of other states are uniformly held void, not only because such laws constitute an interference with interstate commerce, but because they also are in violation of the privileges and immunities of citizens in other states, guaranteed by the federal constitution.''^ No state can, consistently with the Federal constitution, impose upon the products of other states, brought therein for sale or use, or upon citizens because engaged in the sale therein, or the transporta- tion thereof, more onerous public burdens or taxes than it imposes upon like products of its territory.*" Thus an ordi- nance requiring a hawker or peddler, who is not a resident of the city, and who proposes to sell goods, wares or merchandise which are not grown or manufactured in the county in which the city is situated, to procure a license, discriminates against the citizens and products of other communities, and is uncon- stitutional.*' So a law authorizing the withholding of a ped- dler's license from the citizens of other states, is an unconsti- White, 43 Fed. Rep., 913; Bloom- ington V. Bourland, 137 111., 534; 27 N. E. Rep., 692; Baxter v. Thomas, 4 Okla., 605 ; 46 Pac. Rep., 479. Goods sold on the installment plan are also exempted. In re Spain, 47 Fed. Rep., 208. Contra — Ordinance passed by virtue of legislative grant impos- ing tax on goods, etc., not the product of the state, sold on com- mission by any person residing in the city, held to be a legitimate exercise of the power of the state to regulate its Internal commerce, and not an "impost or duty on im- ports." Gumming v. Savannah, R. M. Chart. (Ga.), 26, 28. State statute imposing license to vend merchandise of non-residents held valid. Sears v. Warren Coun- ty Comrs., 36 Ind., 267. State statute imposing license tax upon all traveling merchants, agents, etc., who sell goods in state by sample and otherwise, to be de- livered at future time, held valid. In re Rudolph, 6 Sawyer (U. S.), 295. 79 Const, art. IV.,. sec. 2; Wal- ling V. Michigan, 116 U. S., 446; Ward V. Maryland, 12 Wall. (U. S.), 418, reversing 31 Md., 279. Compare Crandell v. Nevada, 6 Wall. (U. S.), 35; Minneapolis Brewing Co. v. McGillivray, 104 Fei. Rep., 258. Ordinances discriminating against non-resident's goods held void. Ex parte Thornton, 12 Fed. Rep,, 538; Fecheimer Bros. & Co. V. Louisville, 84 Ky., 306; 2 S. W. Rep., 65. soTiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S., 123; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S., 434; Vines v. State, 67 Ala., 73; Arkansas v. McGinnis, 37 Ark., . 362; Ex parte Thomas, 71 Cal., 204; 12 Pac. Rep., 53; State v. Zo- phy, 14 S. Dak., 119; 84 N. W. Rep., 391. 81 Graffty v. Rushville, 107 Ind., 502; 8 N. E. Rep., 609; Rodgers v. McCoy, 6 Dak., 238; 44 N. W. Rep., 990. § -^59] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OP ORDINANCES. 403 tutional discrimination, and therefore void."*- Thus an ordi- nance which prohibits non-residents from peddling or selling goods from house to house without a license and which fixes such license tax at such sum, as in effect, to make it prohibitory, and, which in terms, excepts residents of the municipality from its operation, is void.*^ So an ordinance regulating the sale of farm product, making exceptions in favor of residents of the state, was held discriminating and void.*'' So an ordinance which imposed a license tax upon all persons selling meat except of their own raising, is void.^" So a law which excepts peddlers residing in the county from its operation is void.*^ And an ordinance imposing a tax on every agency of non- resident breweries doing business in the state, being a discrimi- nation in favor of domestic breweries, is void.*' But an ordi- nance imposing a lice^nse tax upon all dealers in beer or ale by the cask, which was not manufactured in the city but brought there for sale, was held valid, there being no evidence in the case to show that the beer sold was manufactured out- side of the state, and therefore not subject to the regulation of commerce.** 82 Bliss's Petition, 63 N. H., 135. A statute prohibiting ttie sale of any intoxicating liquors, except for medicinal or chemical purposes, as applied to a sale by the importer, and in the original or unbroken packages manufactured in and brought from another state, was held void, being repugnant to the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S., 100. 83 Sayre Borough v. Phillips, 148 Pa. St., 482; 24 Atl. Rep., 76. Ordinance discriminating in amount of license tax against non- residents void. Pacific Junction v. Dyer, 64 Iowa, 38; 19 N. W. Rep., 862; CarroUton v. Bazzette, 159 111., 284; 42 N. E. Rep., 837; State (Morgan) v. Orange, 50 N. J. L., 389; 18 Atl. Rep., 240; State v. Wiggin, 64 N. H., 508; 15 Atl. Rep., 128. Discriminating against vendors of patented articles. In re Shef- field, 64 Fed. Rep., 833. 8* Buffalo V. Reavey, 55 N. Y. Supp., 792 ; State v. Stevenson, 109 N. C, 730; 14 S. E. Rep., 385. 85 Georgia Packing Co. v. Macon, 60 Fed., 774. A statute which discriminates in favor of purchases from wholesale dealers, resident in the state, and against purchases from non-resi- dents is void. Albertson v. Wal- lace, 81 N. C, 479; Sinclair v. State, 69 N. C, 47. 86 Commonwealth v. Snyder, 182 Pa. St., 630; 38 Atl. Rep., 356; Rodgers v. Kent Circuit Judge, 115 Mich., 441; 73 N. W. Rep., 381; Marshalltown v. Blum, 58 Iowa, 184; 12 N. W. Rep., 266. 87 Cullman v. Arndt, 125 Ala., 581; 28 So. Rep., 70; Indianapolis V. Bieler, 138 Ind., 30; 36 N. E. Rep., 857. 88 Downham v. Alexandria, 10 Wall. (U. S.), 173. 404 OP CONSTITUTIONALITY OP ORDINANCES. [§ 2iW § 260. License tax under police power. Where the object is not to derive revenue but to protect the public against impo- sition the tax will be sustained under the general police power, but in the exercise of such power no interference with inter- state or foreign commerce will be permitted.*'^ Thus an ordi- nance prohibiting the business of peddling within the munic- ipal limits, without a license from the proper municipal ofBeer," would seem to be as clearly justified by the police power as a statute prohibiting the same business throughout the common- wealth. But it is very clear that a police regulation must be directed against a business or practice that is harmful, and which may in some way injuriously affect the peace, good order, health, morality, or safety of society."" Statutes and ordinances imposing a license upon itinerant vendors of drugs and proprietary medicines have been held not in conflict with the power of Congress to regulate commerce, but a valid exercise of the police power, intended to restrain the sale of nostrums by itinerants who profess knowledge of the art of healing in order to make sales.^i Ordinances and statutes requiring peddlers and itinerant vendors of goods to take out a license, have in many instances been held valid where the goods sold were manufactured in another state, upon the ground that the imposing of a license 83 Commonwealth v. Crowell, 156 which imposed an occupation tax Mass., 215; 30 N. E. Rep., 1015; of $500.00 upon every person, Arm, Arnold v. Yanders, 56 Ohio St., or association engaged in selling 417; 47 N. E. Rep., 50; Common- the "Sunday Sun," the "Kansas wealth V. Harmel, 166 Pa. St., 89; City Sunday Sun," or other publi- 30 Atl. Rep., 1036; Thompson v. cations of like character, was held State, 17 Tex. App., 253. valid, as a police regulation, and An act to license and regulate not invalid as a regulation of in- the business of commission mer- terstate commerce. Preston v. chants, etc., held not to he in con- Pinley, 72 Fed. Rep., 850. flict with the power to regulate »i State v. Wheelock, 95 Iowa, commerce, and as an act designed 577; 64 N. W. Rep., 620; Common- to prevent false and fraudulent wealth v. Newhall, 164 Mass., 338; practices was a valid exercise of 41 N. E. Rep., 647. the police power. State ex rel. A statute of West Virginia, re- Beek v. Wagener, 77 Minn., 483; quiring every person practicing 80 N. W. Rep., 633, 778, 1134. medicine in the state to obtain a »» Sayre Borough v. Phillips, 148 certificate from the state board of Pa. St., 428; 24 Atl. Rep., 76; Pabst health was upheld upon the ground Brewing Co. v. Terre Haute, 98 that it was within the power of Fed. Rep., 330. the state to secure its citizens A statute of the state of Texas against the consequences of igno- § 261] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OP OEDINANCBS. 405 was a valid exercise of the police power of the state, to protect its citizens against fraud and imposition. However, in most cases of this kind where the constitutional question of inter- ference with interstate commerce was raised, because the goods were manufactured in another state, it was found that the goods were carried along with the peddler and delivered at the time the sale was made, and the goods being in the state and not sold in the original package, were, therefore, subject to the taxing power of the state.®^ But where the license tax imposed is, in effect, a tax on the goods of another state, and is, therefore, an interference with interstate commerce, as an ordinance imposing a license tax upon persons soliciting orders for books, the orders to be filled by a principal in another state ;^^ or, on each brewery depot of non-resident breweries;-'^ or, on any person desiring to deal in convict-made goods when imported from another state,^^ it is void and cannot be upheld as a valid police regulation. An act imposing a license for the purpose of discouraging the use of intoxicating liquors and for the preservation of the health and morals of the people, cannot be justified as a police regulation, where it discriminates against the citizens and products of other states.^® By an act of congress of August 8, 1890, intoxicating liquors were made subject to the police regulations of the state into which they are transported.*^ §261. Same— Telephone and telegraph poles in streets. A city may by ordinance impose a license tax upon poles and wires of a telegraph company erected and maintained in its streets within the city, to cover the expense of the enforcement of its police regulations and the necessary expense to which it is put by reason of the existence of such poles and wires, although the company is a corporation of another state and is ranee and incapacity, as well as of ss In re Nichols, 48 Fed. Rep., deception and fraud. Dent v. 164. West Virginia, 129 U. S., 114. 9* Pabst Brewing Co. v. Terre 92 State V. Smithson, 106 Mo., Haiite, 98 Fed. Rep., 330. 149; 17 S. W. Rep., 221; Singer as Arnold v. Yanders, 56 Ohio Manufacturing Co. v. Wright, 33 St., 417; 47 N. E. Rep., 50. Fed. Rep., 121; Wrought Iron as Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. Range Co. v. Carver, 118 N. C, S., 446. 328; 24 S. B. Rep., 352; Rash v. »' /n re Rahrer, 140 U. S., 545; Farley, 12 Ky. Law Rep., 913; 15 Commonwealth v. Calhane, 154 S. W. Rep., 862; State V. Richards, Mass., 115; 27 N. E. Rep., 881; 32 W. Va., 348; 9 S. E. Rep., 245. Indianapolis v. Bieler, 138 Ind., 40.6 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OP ORDINANCES. [§^61 engaged in interstate commerce.^'* In one case the Supreme Court of the United States held that a charge imposed by ordi- nance for the use and occupation of the streets at so much per pole was in the nature of a rental or compensation for the space in the streets thus exclusively appropriated. "Clearly, this is no privilege or license tax. The amount to be paid is not graduated by the amount of the business, nor is it a sum fixed for the privilege of doing business. It is more in the nature of a charge for the use of property belonging to the city— that which may properly be called rental. 'A tax is a demand of sovereignty ; a toll is a demand of proprietorship. '^^ * * * That by it the city receives something which it may use as revenue, does not determine the character of the charge or make it a tax. ' ' i "Whether the charge be called a license tax for the privilege of erecting its poles, or whether, as held in the above case, it is termed a rental for the use of the space occupied, it has been clearly decided that it is within the power of a municipality to impose such a tax, although telegraph and telephone com- panies are Federal agencies and engaged in interst^ate com- merce.2 30; 36 N. B. Rep., 857; Reymann Brewing Co. v. Brister, 179 U. S., 445. It was held in Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S., 412, that under the act of Congress the state legislature did not affect the goods until the uct of transportation had been completed and the goods . had ar- rived at the point of destination and had been delivered to the con- signee. There was, however a dissenting opinion written by Mr. Justice Gray, and concurred in by Justices Harlan and Brown, which held that the laws of the state at- tached immediately upon the en- try of the liquor into the state. 08 Atlantic & Pacific Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep., 817; Philadelphia v. W. U. Tel. Co., 89 Fed. Rep., 454; Philadel- phia V. W. U. Tel. Co., 46 Fed. Rep., 615; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Charleston, 153 U. S., 692; Ches- ter v. W. U. Tel. Co., 154 Pa. St., 464; 25 Atl. Rep., 1134; Philadel- phia v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 21 N. Y. Supp., 556; 66 Hun. (N. Y.), 633; 67 Hun. (N. Y.), 21. 90 State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. (U. S.), 232, 278. 1 Per Mr. Justice Brewer, J., in St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U. S., 92, reversing 39 Fed. Rep., 59, which held the charge to be a privilege or license tax. 2 Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. (U. S.), 5, 30; Philadelphia v. W. U. Tel. Co., 82 Fed. Rep., 797; Allentown v. Tel. Co., 148 Pa. St., 117; 23 Atl. Rep., 1070; Phil- adelphia V. American U. Tel. Co., 167 Pa. St., 406; 31 Atl. Rep., 628; Philadelphia v. Postal Tel. Cable Co;, 21 N. Y. Supp., 556; 67 Hun. (N. Y.), 21; 66 Hun. (N. Y.), 6SS. "It never could have been intend- gSG'^J' OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. -107 But the charge which the city is allowed to impose must be reasonable, that is, it must not be in excess of a reasonable compensation i'or the space in its streets thus exclusively appropriated, together with a sufficient sum to pay for the necessary inspection and care upon the jjart of the city to insure the public safety.-'' An ordinance imposing a tax of one dollar per pole and two dollars and fifty cents per mile on each mile of wire, was held, under the circumstances, a reason- able charge.* But an ordinance charging more than five times the sum required to pay the cost of supervision and inspection necessary for the protection of property and persons, was held unreasonable and void.'' The amount of the charge rests with the municipal council in the first instance and whether the amount imposed is reasonable is a question for judicial deter- mination." And where the discretion of the council in fixing the amount has been manifestly abused the courts are justified in interfering." § 262. Taxation of property employed in interstate or for- eign commerce. It has been repeatedly decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, that Avhen a law of a state or municipality imposes a tax, under such circumstances and with such effect as to constitute it a regulation of commerce, either ed by the Congress of the United Md., 502; 29 Atl. Rep., 819; 24 L. States in conferring upon a cor- R. A., 161. poration of one state the author- 4 Philadelphia v. Postal Tel. Ca- ity to enter the territory of anoth- bie Co., 21 N. Y. Suppl., 556; 66 er state and erect its poles and Hun. (N. Y.), 633; 67 Hun. (N. lines therein, to establish the prop- y.), 21. osition that such a company owed 5 Philadelphia v. W. U. Tel. Co.. no obedience to the laws of the .„ p , j, g^g state into which it thus entered, St. Louis' v. W. U. Tel. Co., 148 and was under no obligation to pay tj a 90 its fair proportion of the taxes necessary to its support." W. U. Tel. Co. V. Massachusetts, 125 U. S., 530, 548. Fifty cents per pole annually. Lancaster v. Edison E. I. Co., 8 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep., 178. 3 St. Louis V. W. U. Tel. Co. 148 '^^^ reasonableness of the charge U. S., 92; Philadelphia v. W. U. depends upon the facts in each Tel. Co., 40 Fed. Rep., 615; Phil- case and is a proper question to adelphia v. W. U. Tel. Co., 89 Fed. ^^ determined by a jury where it Rep 454 arises in actions at law. Philadel- One dollar annually per pole sus- P^ia v. W. U. Tel. Co., 89 Fed. tained. Chester v. W. U. Tel. Co., Rep., 454; Philadelphia v. Atl. & 154 Pa. St., 464; 25 Atl. Rep., 1134. P- Tel. Co., 42 C. C. A., 325. Two dollars per pole sustained. " Allentown v. Tel. Co., 148 Pa. Postal Tel. Co. v, Baltimore, 79 St., 117; 23 Atl. Rep., 1070; Phila- 408 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§262 foreign or interstate, it is void on that account.^ The fact that, the legislative purpose is to raise money for the support of the state or municipal government and not to regulate transporta- tion, will not render such law valid ; for it is not the purpose of the law but its effect which is to be considered.® The fundar mental propositioli involved has been thus comprehensively stated by Mr. Justice Miller: "The question of the taxing power of the states, as its exercise has affected the functions of the federal government, has been repeatedly considered by this court, and the right of the state in this mode to impede or embarrass the constitutional operations of that government, or the rights which its citizens hold under it, has been uni- formly denied."!" ^g g^^jj jjy jjp Justice Matthews: "Other- wise unrestrained by the authority of the federal constitution, the taxing power of the states extends to and embraces the persons, property and pursuits of their people; although it is not always easy in particular cases to draw the line which -separates the two jurisdictions, "^i Although the transporta- tion of the subjects of interstate or foreign commerce, or the receipts received therefrom, or the occupation or business of carrying it on, cannot be directly "subjected to state or munic- ipal taxation, yet property belonging to individuals, corpora- tions or companies engaged in such commerce may be; and whatever the" particular form of the exaction, if it is essentially only property taxation, it will not be construed as falling within the inhibition of the constitution. Thus property em- ployed in interstate or foreign commerce of express com- panies.i^ and of telegraph companies,!^ is subject to taxation delphia v. American U. Tel. Co., 12 Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 167 Pa. St., 406; 31 Atl. Rep., 628. U. S., 194; Adams Express Co. v. 8 Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105-U. Ohio, 166 U. S., 185; American S.> 460; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Union Express Co. v. St. Joseph, Wheat. (U. S.), 419. 66 Mo., 675. 'J State Freight Tax Cases, 15 »3 Tax on property of a telegraph Wall. (U. S.), 232-276. company held to be essentially an locrandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall, excise tax, and not forbidden by the (U. S.), 35, 45. commerce clause of the constitu- 11 Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. tion. Western Union Tel. Co. v. S., 69, 74. Compare State Freight Taggart, 163 U. S.. 1; Postal Tele- Tax Cases, 15 Wall. (U. S.), 232- graph Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S., 276; State Tax on Railway Gross 688; Massachusetts v. Western Receipts, 15 Wall. (U. S.), 284: Union, 141 U. S., 40; Western Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. (U. Union Telegraph Co. v. Massachu- S.), 479. setts, 125 U. S., 530. §263] OP CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 409 by the state, or municipal corporation under delegated author- ity. So where a corporation of one state brings into another state, to use and employ, a portion of its movable property, it is competent for the latter state to impose upon the property thus used and employed, its fair share of the burden of taxa- tion imposed upon similar property used in like manner by its own citizens. The fact that such property, as railroad cars, is employed as vehicles of transportation for the interchange of interstate commerce does not render their taxation invalid.^* It has often been judicially declared by the Supreme Court of the United States that vessels engaged in foreign or inter- state commerce, and duly enrolled and licensed under the Acts of Congress, may be taxed by state authority as property; provided; the tax be not a tonnage duty, is levied only at the port of registry, and is valued as other property in the state, without unfavorable discrimination on account of its employ- ment.is § 263. License, tax on foreign corporations. Corporations are not citizens within the meaning of the constitution of the United States declaring that, "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in 1* Union Refrigerator Transit tion, proportionately, etc., held val- Co. V. Lynch, 177 U. S., 149. id. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Such a tax may be properly as- Pennsylvania, 141 U. S., 18. sessed and collected when the spe- i5 Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. ciflc and individual items of prop- Louis, 107 U. S., 365; Transporta- erty so used, as railroad cars, were tion Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S., 273; not continuously the same, but Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. (U. were constantly changing accord- S.), 471; Hays v. Pac. Mail Steam- ing to the exigencies of the busi- ship Co., 17 How. (U. S.), 596. ness, and the tax may be fixed in A state law requiring vessels to proportion to the value of the av- file a statement in writing in the erage amount of the property thus office of the Probate judge of the habitually used and employed, county, setting forth the name of American Refrigerator Transit Co. the vessel, the name, place of res- V. Hall, 174 U. S., 70. idence and the Interest of each Method of ascertaining assessed owner in the vessel, under a pen- value of railroad company. Pitts- alty for non-compliance, held void burgh, etc., Ry. v. Backus, 154 U. as applied to vessels engaged in S., 421. interstate or foreign commerce, Imposing a tax on those engaged and which had taken out a license in the transportation of passengers and were duly enrolled under the and freight between states, levied act of congress for carrying on the on the capital stock of the corpora- coasting trade. Sinnot v. Daven- 410 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OP ORDINANCES. [§264 the several states.^^ Therefore, a state is not prohibited from imposing such conditions upon foreign corporations as it may choose, as a condition of their admission within its limits.^^ But a state cannot, under the guise of a license tax, exclude from its jurisdiction a foreign corporation engaged in inter- state commerce.!® § 264. Gannot regulate or tax operations or objects of inter- state or foreign commerce. Neither a state nor its municipal corporation can regulate or tax the operations or objects of in- terstate or foreign commerce. The following have been held to be attempts to regulate or interference with interstate com- merce: Attempt to regulate the delivery of telegraph mes- sages in another state ;i^ attempt to regulate the charge for the transportation of passengers and freight begun within the state but extending into other states;^" imposing a license tax upon telegrams, passing over wires extending through more than one state f^ laying a tax upon every person passing through or out of the state \^^ imposing a tax upon the gross receipts of a steamship company engaged in the transportation of persons and property by sea between different states ;2* imposing a port, 22 How. (U. S.), 227, 243; Foster v. Davenport, 22 How. (U. S.), 244. 16 Pembina Mining Co. v. Penn- sylvania, 125 U. S., 181; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall., 168; McCready V. Virginia, 94 U. S., 391; United States V. Cruikshank, 92 U. S., 542. 17 Pembina Mining Co. v. Penn- sylvania, 125 U. S., 181; Philadel- phia Fire Assn. v. New York, 119 U. S., 110. An annual tax on a railroad company for the privilege of exer- cising its franchise therein to be determined by the amount of its gross transportation receipts, is not in conflict with the Federal Constitutional provision relating to interstate commerce. Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S., 217. A license upon an express com- pany doing business in Florida, which applies solely to business of the company within the state, is not an interference with interstate commerce. Osborne v. Florida, 164 U. S., 650. IS Norfolk Ry. Co. v. Pennsylva- nia, 136 U. S., 114. The exacting of a license fee to enable a corporation to have an office in another state, is a proper subject for license and is not in violation of interstate commerce. Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylva- nia, 125 U. S., 181. 19 W. U. Telegraph Co. v. Pen^ dleton, 122 U. S., 347. 20 Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry.- Co. V. Illinois, 118 U. S., 557. 21 Leloup V. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S., 640; Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S., 460. 22 Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. (U. S.), 35. 23 Phila. Steamship Co. v. Penn- sylvania, 122 U. S., 326. §265] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 4ll tax on every alien passenger who shall come by vessel from a foreign country to the port of New York and seeking to hold the vessel liable for such tax ;2* and laying a stamp duty upon bills of lading for gold or silver transported from the state.^^ § 265. Same— Property in transit. Ordinances imposing a license or tax upon personal property while in transit from one state to another or to a foreign port, are void for the rea- son that such a tax would be, in effect, a tax upon interstate commerce, which as has been seen, cannot be burdened with a tax or license imposed by any state or municipality through which the goods must pass. Thus logs drawn from Vermont and delivered on the ice in the Connecticut River and stored temporarily awaiting transportation as soon as the ice should break in the spring— the purpose being to float the logs down the river to mills in another state— are in commercial transit, and are exempt from state taxation.^" And where property is brought into the state in the course of transportation and is detained there for a long time; yet if it remained no longer than was necessary under the circumstances, it is in transit and is not subject to be taxed; as where logs, while in the course of transportation on the river, were detained for one summer on account of low water, they were, while there, in transit and not subject to tax.^'^ Property in transit through the state, or which has been sent within the state simply for the purpose of sale, is not to be considered as having a situs within such state for purposes of taxation. Coal shipped from Pennsylvania and deposited on the wharf in New Jersey for the purpose of separation and assortment, then to be shipped to different places, was held to be in transit.^^ The commercial transit of the goods is not terminated until the goods reach 21 People V. Compagnie Generate ing shipment to England is not Transatlantique, 107 U. S., 59, cit- subject to taxation by the state, ing and approving Henderson v. Blount v. Munroe, 60 Ga., 61. New York, 92 U. S., 259, and Chy A cargo of corn purchased in Lung V. Freeman, 92 U. S., 275; Iowa and removed to the railroad Passenger Cases, 7 How. (U. S.), station and temporarily stored in 283, 408. cribs to await transportation to 25 Almy V. California, 24 How. Canada, was held to be in transit (U. S.), 169. and exempt from taxation, provid- 26 Lumber Co. v. Columbia, 62 ed the purchaser intended to ship N. H., 286. immediately. Ogilvie v. Crawford 27 Coe v. Errol, 62 N. H., 303. County, 7 Fed. Rep., 745. Lumber in the port and await- 2s state v. Engle, 34 N. J. L., 412 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§366 their destination and are delivered to the consignee.^" While the property is still in the state from which the transportation is to be made, and before the transportation from the state has actually begun it is subject to the taxing power of the state. Thus where the logs have been hauled and placed on the ice in a river to await the opening of the river, then to be floated doAvn to mills in another state, it was held that while awaiting the opening of the river they could not be considered in tran- sit.30 § 266. License for privilege of navigation. An ordinance of New Orleans, which assessed and directed to be collected from persons owning and running tow boats to and from the Gulf of Mexico and the City of New Orleans, was declared in- valid by the Supreme Court of the United States as a regula- tion of commerce among the states. Mr. Justice Matthews, who delivered the opinion of the court, said that the license fee exacted was not a tax upon the boats as property. It was contended that the fee exacted was merely a tax on an occupa- tion, and for that reason not a regulation of commerce. In reply the court observed: "If it were a tax upon the income derived from the business it might be justified by the principle of the decision in the case of the State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts,^'*''^ which shows the distinction between a tax on transportation and a tax upon its fruits, realized and reduced to possession, so as to have become part of the general capital and property of the taxpayer. But here it is not a tax on the profits and income after they have been realized from the busi- ness. It is a charge explicitly made as the price of the privilege of navigating the Mississippi River between New Orleans and the Gulf, in the coastwise trade; as the condition on which the State of Louisiana consents that the boats of the plaintiff in error may be employed by him according to the terms of the license granted under the authority of Congress. The sole 425 ; State v. Carrigan, 39 N. J. L., 3o Nelson Lumber Co. v. Lo- 35. raine, 22 Fed. Rep., 54. 29 Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S., 412. In Kelley v. Rhodes, 7 Wyo., 237 ; In Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S., 39 L. R. A., 594; 51 Pac. Rep., 593, 622, coal which had been shipped it was held that a herd of sheep from Pennsylvania to New Orleans while being driven from Utah was held to be subject to tax while through Wyoming to Nebraska, remaining on barges to be sold which were allowed to graze and in open market. feed upon the natural grasses, were § 266] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 413 occupation sought to be subjected to the tax is that of using and enjoying the license of the United States to employ these particular vessels in the coasting trade; and the state thus seeks to burden with an exaction, fixed at its own pleasure, the very right to which the plaintiff in error is entitled under, and which he derives from, the constitution and laws of the United States. The Louisiana statute declares expressly that if he refuses or neglects to paj' the license tax imposed upon him, for using his boats in this way, he shall not be permitted to act under, and avail himself of the license granted by the United States, but may be enjoined from so doing by judicial process. The conflict between the two authorities is direct and express. What the one declares may be done without the tax the other declares shall not be done except upon payment of the tax. In such an opposition the only question is, which is the superior authority; and reduced to that, it furnishes its own answer. "^1 The same court held void an ordinance of the City of Chicago which imposed a license tax for the privi- lege of navigating the Chicago River and its branches upon steam tugs licensed by the United States, under federal laws. The ordinance provided that, "no person or persons shall keep, use or let for hire any tug or barge or tow boat for towing ves- sels or craft in the Chicago River, its branches, or slips connect- ed therewith, without first obtaining a license therefor, in the manner and way hereinafter mentioned." Then followed other sections indicating the amount of the license fee, the manner of its issuance, etc., and denouncing a penalty of a fine against any one violating the ordinance. It was a part of the agreed statement of facts that the Chicago River had been deepened and improved for navigation by the city at its ex- pense, and the contention was that the license fee was but a reasonable charge for that service. But the court replied: "The license fee provided for in the ordinance of the city is treated as in the nature of a toll or compensation for the ex- pense of deepening the river. But the plain answer to this po- sition is that the license "fee is not exacted upon any such ground, nor is any suggestion made that any special benefit has arisen or can arise to the tugs in question by the alleged not in transit so as to exempt them 3i Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. from taxation in Wyoming. S., 69, 74, 75. 3om5 Wall (U. S.), 284. 414 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§ ^e? deepening of the river." All of the foi'mer cases on the sub- ject are examined and fully eonsidered.^^ , The Supreme Court of Missouri held void, an ordinance of the City of St. Louis which exacted a license from the owner of a boat (licensed under the laws of Congress for the coasting trade and engaged under that authority in transporting freight upon the Mississippi River from Illinois to Missouri) for the privilege "of towing boats or other water craft into and out of the harbor, or from one place to another within said har- bor." The court held that the ordinance did not exact the license fee on the ground of compensation for the use of the wharf and could not be construed to simply demand the pay- ment of such wharf charges, although it contained a qualified provision that the amount paid for the license "shall be in lieu of all Avharfage during the time said license remains in force. ' ' , The latter provision was construed to mean that the city would not exact wharfage from the owner of a vessel who had paid the license for the privilege of navigating that part of the river embraced within the city harbor.^® § 267. License and taxation of ferries, etc. The authority to establish and regulate ferries is not included in the power of the federal government to regulate commerce between the states, but the right is within the control of the states, al- though the ferries cross a river which divides two states.** The rule is thus declared by the Supreme Court of the United States ; ' ' The exaction of a license fee is an ordinary exercise of the police power by municipal corporations. When, there- fore, a state expressly grants to an incorporated city, * * * the power to license, tax and regulate ferries, the later may impose a license tax on the keepers of ferries, although their boats ply between landings lying in two different states, and 32 Per Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, So the state in granting a ferry- in Harman v. Chicago, 147 U. S., license may impose conditions. 396, distinguishing Huse v. Glo- State v. Sickmann, 65 Mo. App., ver' 119 U. S., 543, and Sands v. 499. Manistee Improvement Co., 123 U. As to ordinances providing for S., 288. license of ferries, see Reddick v. 33 St. Louis V. Consolidated Coal Amelin, 1 Mo., 5. Co., 158 Mo., 342; 59 S. W. Rep., To license ferry boats running 103. across the Detroit River from De- 34 St. Louis V. Waterloo-Caronde- troit to the shore of Canada, held let Turnpike Co., 14 Mo. App., 216; not to be a regulation of commerce, Conway V. Taylor, 66 U, S., 603, and that the penalty can be im- §368] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 415 the act by which the exaction is authorized will not be held to be a regulation of commerce."*" Steam ships registered in their home ports are not subject to tax at another port while temporarily there and engaged in lawful trade and commerce.*^ But steamboats plying be- tween different ports on a navigable river may, under a state statute, be taxed as personal property by the city in which the company owning them has its principal office, although en- rolled and licensed as coasting vessels under the law of the United States." § 268. Wharfage charges. Although related to commerce and navigation, as aids and conveniences, wharves are local in their nature. They require special regiilation at particular places. In the absence of federal legislation on the subject, the jurisdiction and control of wharves properly belongs to the state, or by delegated authority to the municipal corpora- tion, where situated. A license or a certain rate of wharfage is frequently imposed by ordinance on vessels using wharves.** The law appears to be established that a municipal corporation cannot, solely for the benefit of the general revenue, exact a charge on vessels for entering or leaving a port, or remaining therein, nor levy a tax on vessels and water craft entering its port and using the wharves and landing.*^ But a municipal corporation owning' improved wharves and other artificial posed although the boat had been corporation when licensed under enrolled and licensed for the coast- federal law. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 ing and foreign trade under the Wheat. (19 U. S.), 264. United States laws. Chilvers v. Tax for privilege of exercising People, 11 Mich., 43. franchise of operating railroad The United States has jurisdic- partly within and partly without tlon of the navigable rivers, but the state, is valid. Maine v. Grand until Congress acts the state has Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S., 217. plenary authority over bridges as Hays v. Pac. Mail Steamship across such rivers in its municipal Co., 17 How. (U. S.), 596; People corporations, jurisdiction over the v. Niles, 35 Cal., 282. construction, repairs and use of •''^ Transportation Co. v. Wheel- those bridges within the city. So ing, 99 U. S., 273. held respecting the jurisdiction of ss Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken, Chicago over the Chicago River. 121 U. S., 444; Transportation Co. Escanaba v. Chicago, 107 U. S., v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S., 691. 678. •'!» Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. 35 Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Bast St. S., 80 ; Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 4 Louis, 107 U. S., 365, 374. Dill. (C. C), 10; Leathers v. Ai- License of lotteries of municipal ken, 9 Fed. Rep., 679. 416 OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§ ^''^ means which it maintains, at its own cost for the benefit of those engaged in commerce, upon public navigable waters ot the United States, may charge and collect from owners of ves- sels using its wharves such reasonable fees as will fairly re- munerate it for the use of its property.*" An ordinance pro- viding for wharfage dues to be paid by all boats landing at the city wharves is void so far as it applies to boats landing on the natural bank of the river and not at the city's im- proved wharf. A landing place to become a wharf must be improved for that purpose. *' Accordingly, an ordinance of the City of St. Paul which imposed a wharfage tax upon every boat or vessel landing or anchoring at, or in front of, the land- ing or wharf of the city was held void, as the tax was not a charge for the use of a wharf but for the privilege of arriving at or departing from the port.*^ § 269. Wharfage distinguished from tonnage. Wharfage is a compensation which the owner of a wharf demands for the use thereof. To be valid, it must not be so exorbitant as to constitute a burden on commerce. The duty of tonnage is a charge, according to the tonnage of the vessel as an instrument of commerce, for the privilege of entering, or loading at, or running in, a port or harbor, and can be laid only by the United States.*^ The question as to which of these classes, if either, a charge against a vessel or its owner belongs, is one, not of intent, but of fact and law ; of fact, whether the charge is im- posed for the use of a wharf, or for the privilege of entering the port; of law, whether, upon the facts which are shown to exist, it is wharfage or a duty of tonnage.** A statute giving masters and wardens of a port authority to demand and re- ceive, in addition to other fees, the sum of $5, whether called upon to perform any service or not, for every vessel arriving *o Huse V. Glover, 119 U. S., 543; First Municipality of New Orleans Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall., v. Pease, 2 La. Ann., 538. 577 ; Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 41 c^pe Girardeau v. Campbell, U. S., 559; Vicksburg V. Tobin, 100 26 Mo App 12 U. S., 430; Packet Co. v. St. Louis, ^^ Northwestern Packet Co. v. St. 100 U. S., 423; Blerman v. Mc- p^^j_ 3 ^.^^_ ^_ ^_ ^^_ g_ ^^^_ 43 Huse V. Glover, 119 V. S., 543. Mains, 30 La. Ann., 190; St. Louis V. St. L. & N. 0. Trans. Co., 84 jyjo -^55 44 Per Justice Bradley, in Trans- The extent to which the right portation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 may be exercised is purely admin- U. S., 691, 696,, which was an action istrative, and hence the courts will instituted in a United State court, not limit the amount of the charge, to enjoin the prosecution of a suit §270] OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 417 in the port, is a regulation of commerce and is also a tonnage duty, and is, therefore, unconstitutional.**'-^ So an ordinance levying a tonnage tax upon all vessels coming virithin the har- bor of the city (but a small portion of v/liose water line wbls improved as a wharf) irrespective of whether they landed at an improved wharf or not, is not valid, as imposing compensa- tion for wharfage service, but is void as a duty of tonnage and is an interference with interstate and foreign commerce.*" But an ordinance which authorizes the collection of a wharfage rate, to be measured by the tonnage of the vessels which use the wharves, and estimated to be sufficient to light the wharves and to keep them in repair and to construct new wharves as required, is not in conflict with the constitution or any law of the United States.*" § 270. Local police regulations. Local police regulations which do not impose restraints upon interstate or foreign com- merce and which do not conflict with the power of the Con- gress under what is called the ' ' Commerce Clause ' ' of the con- stitution of the United States will be sustained. Thus, an ordinance of the City of Chicago forbidding the emission of dense smoke within the corporate limits and directed against steam boats and water craft, plying on the Chicago River, which is a navigable stream under the laws of Congress, al- though such boats were engaged in interstate commerce, was held valid. Here the ordinance only purported to regulate the use of tug boats in such manner as might not produce effects detrimental to property and business, nor become a per- sonal annoyance to the public at large, within the city.*'' An ordinance of Philadelphia, general in its nature, limiting the speed of all vehicles used upon the streets was held to in a state court to collect a charge or, what is the same thing, requir- against a vessel imposed by ordi- ing the owners or managers of nance. tug boats to so use their vessels as *■*% Steamship v. Portwardens, 6 not to create a dense smoke, which Wall. (U. S.), 31. it is conceded would be an annoy- *3 Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 ance to the public at large, is in Wall. (U. S.), 577. See St. Louis no sense imposing any restraint V. Schulenburg & Boeckler Lumber upon commerce, nor does it in any Co., 13 Mo. App., 56. manner conflict with the power of 46 Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken, Congress under what is called the 121 U. S., 444; Packet Co. v. Keo- 'commerce clause' of the Constitu- kuk, 95 U. S., 80. tion of the United States." Har- 4T "Regulating the use of fuel, men v. Chicago, 110 111., 400, 408. 27 418 OP CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [§ 271 apply to vehicles carrying the United States mail. The ordi- nance conferred power upon the municipal authorities to stop vehicles violating its provisions. The fact that the enforce- ment of such ordinance might result in a temporary stoppage of United States mails was held to be no objection to its va- lidity.** A state law requiring electric wires to be placed under the surface of the streets is a valid police regulation, as to tele- graph companies accepting the act of Congress and which thereby become as to government business, an agency of the general government and which is an instrument of interstate commerce.*'* Obviously the same principle applies to like regu- lations by municipal ordinances ; and such matters must be so regulated where the local corporation has full control of its streets, as in Missouri and other states.^" § 271. Same— Scope of police power. The extent to which the state may go in the exercise of its police powers and inter- fere with the power of Congress regulating commerce depends upon the facts of each case. "By the settled doctrine of this court," remarked the Supreme Court of the United States, "the police power extends at least to the protection of the lives, the health and the property of the community against the in- jurious exercise by any citizen of his own rights. State legis- lation, strictly and legitimately for police purposes, does not in the sense of the constitution, necessarily intrench upon any authority which has been confided expressly or by implication, to the national government. " ^^ In determining whether or not a police regulation interferes with interstate commerce the court will look into the operation and effect of the statute, to 48 United States v. Hart, Peters ceived within the state, but the C. C. (U. S.), 390. power may be exercised with re- *9 Western U. Tel. Co. v. New gard to its poles and wires so far York, 38 Fed. Rep., 552, per Wal- as is necssary for the comfort and lace, J., where it is said (p. 555), convenience of the community. W. "Such statutes * * * unques- U. Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. S., tionably belong to the category of 347. police regulations, the power to ^o state ex inf. v. Lindell Ry. Co., establish which has been left to 151 Mo., 162, 183; 52 S. W. Rep., the individual states." 248. The police power of a state does ""i Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. not extend to the regulation of S., 501, 504. This doctrine was the delivery at points without the approved in In re Rahrer, 140 U. state of telegraphic messages re- S., 545. See § 430 et seq., post. ^271] OP CONStltUTIONALtTY OP ORDINANCES. 410 discern its purpose, and if it is found to be a just exercise of the state power it will be sustained ; but if it is intended by a roundabout means to evade the domain of Congress over com- merce it will be held void.''^ When exercised for the protec- tion of the lives and health of the people, the police power of a state extends beyond the commercial pow^er of Congress and may be exercised to abate nuisances;** to prohibit the con- tinuance of manufactures deemed injurious to the public health ;** the sale and manufacture of intoxicating drinks;*'' and the maintenance of lotteries, gambling, horse racing or anything else that the legislature may deem opposed to the public welfare.*^ But the state when providing by legisla- tion for the protection of the public health, the public morals, or public safety, is subject to the paramount authority of the constitution of the United States and may not violate rights secured or guaranteed by that instrument, or interfere with the execution of the powers confided to the general govern- ment.*^ To what extent the state may exercise its police power in prohibiting the sale of goods within the state without inter- ference with the commercial power is illustrated by Justice Catron in the License Cases,** where in referring to certain articles, the sale of which had been prohibited by the state, he said : "If, from its nature, it does not belong to commerce, or if its condition, from putrescence, or other cause, is such when it is about to enter the state that it no longer belongs to com- merce, or, in other words, is not a commercial article, then the state power may exclude its introduction. And as an incident to this power, a state may use means to ascertain the fact. And 52 Morgan v. Louisiana, 118 U. neighborhood of cities and towns; S., 455, 462; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 1114. with regard to the precautions to 53 Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, be talcen in the approach of such 97 U. S., 659. trains to bridges, tunnels, deep 54 Powell V. Pennsylvania, 127 U. cuts and sharp curves, and gener- S., 678. ally with regard to all operations 55 Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 in which the lives and health of U. S., 25;. Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. people may be endangered, even S., 201; KIdd v. Pearson, 128 U. though such regulations affect to S., 1. some extent the operations of 56 Stone V. Mississippi, 101 U. interstate commerce." Crutcher v. S., 814. Kentucky, 141 U. S., 47, 61. "It is also within the undoubted s? Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S., province of the state legislature to 623, 663. make regulations with regard to =8 5 How., 504, 599. the speed of railroad trains in the 420 OP CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. [^^112 here is the limit between the sovereign power of the state and the federal power. That is to say, that which does not belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police power of the state ; and that which does belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the United States." A statute of Massachusetts, "to prevent deception in the manufacture and sale of imitation butter," in its application to the sale of oleomargarine artificially colored so as to cause it to look like yellow butter and brought into Massachusetts, was held not in conflict with the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several states. The court said: "We are of the opinion that it is within the power of a state to ex- clude from its markets any compound manufactured in another state, which has been artificially colored or adulterated so as to cause it to look like an article of food in general use, and the sales of which may, by reason of such coloration or adulteration, cheat the general public into purchasing that which they may not intend to buy. The constitution of the United States does not secure to any one the privilege of de- frauding the public." f'8 § 272. Same— Quarantine laws. It seems that a state in the exercise of its police power to prevent the spread of infectious or contagious diseases may empower a board of health to ex- clude healthy persons from a locality infested with a conta- gious disease, and to prevent well persons seeking to enter the infected place from entering, whether they come from within or without the state. The most recent authoritative utterance of the United States Supreme Court on this subject is: "The health and quarantine laws of the several states are not repug- nant to the constitution of the United States, although they affect foreign and domestic commerce, as in many cases they necessarily must do in order to be efficacious, because until Congress has acted under the authority conferred upon it by the constitution, such state health and quarantine laws pro- ducing such effect on legitimate interstate commerce are not in conflict with the constitution. True is it that, in some of the cases relied on in the argument, it was held that a state law absolutely prohibiting the introduction, under all circum- stances, of objects actually affected with disease, was valid 59 Plumey v. Massachusetts, 155 TJ. S., 461, 479; Powell v. Pennsyl- vania, 127 U. S., 678. §2?3] 6F CdNSTlTUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES. 421 because such objects were n&t legitimate commerce. But this implies no limitation on the power to regulate by health laM's the subjects of legitimate commerce. In other words, the power exists until Congress has acted, to incidentally regulate by health and quarantine laws, even although interstate and for- eign commerce is affected, and the power to absolutely pro- hibit additionally obtains where the thing prohibited is not commerce, and hence not embraced in either interstate or for- eign commerce. ' ' ^^ Prior to this decision in considering a quar- antine law of the State of Texas, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller ob- serves: "While it is true that the power vested in Congress to regulate commerce among the states is a power complete in itself, acknowledging no limitations other than those pre- scribed in the constitution, and that where the action of the states in the exercise of their reserve powers comes in collision with it, the latter must give way, yet it is also true that quar- antine laws belong to that class of state legislation which is valid until displaced by Congress, and that such legislation has been expressly recognized by the laws of the United States almost from the beginning of the government."®^ In holding that a statute which prohibited the driving or con- veying of Texas, Mexican or Indian cattle into a state, during a certain period of the year, was in conflict with interstate commerce, and was not a legitimate exercise of the police power, nor a quarantine regulation, Mr. Justice Strong said: "While we unhesitatingly admit that a state may pass sani- tary laws, and laws for the protection of life, liberty, health or property within its borders; while it may prevent persons and animals suffering under contagious or infectious diseases, or convicts, etc., from entering the state ; while for the purpose of self-protection it may establish quarantine and reasonable in- spection laws, it may not interfere with the transportation into or through the state, beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-protection. It may not under the cover of exerting its police powers substantially prohibit or burden either foreign or interstate commerce. ' ' ^^ § 273. Same subject. An ordinance of the City of St. Louis, soCompagnle Francaise, etc., y. opinion, pp. 397-401, concurred In Louisiana State Board of Health by Mr. Justice Harlan. (June, 1902), 186 U. S., 380, 391, oi Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S., per Mr. Justice White. Mr. Jus- 1, 21. tlce Brown delivered a dissenting es Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. 423 Of constitutionality Of ORDINANCES. [§- Chapter VI, Of Reasonableness of Ordinances, sec. 181, et seq. of Ordinances. Chapter VIII, Of 6 Section 161 and 162, supra. Constitutionality of Ordinances. 7 Chapter VIII, Of Constitution- lo Chapter X, Of Actions to En- ality of Ordinances. Chapter XV, force Police Ordinances, sec. 348, Of Municipal Control of Offenses et seq.. post. Against State. ii Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chi- § 280] OF CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. 427 of the ordinance.' 2 So the rule of estoppel applies with full force to the municipal corporation itself.' ^ Thus where the ordinance is published in pamphlet form by public authority with the other ordinances of the municipality a city cannot question its validity, on the ground that it was not validly adopted. Its publication estops the city from so doing.' •* § 279. Collateral attack denied. The validity of the ordi- nance cannot be attacked collaterally. The passage of an or- dinance is a legislative act, and public policy forbids that it should be impeached collaterally.''' Thus in an action by a gas company for gas furnished the corporation by virtue of an ordinance conferring upon the company the perpetual and ex- clusive right to furnish gas, the validity of the ordinance can- not be questioned.'® An ordinance passed which the corpora- tion has no power to enact, as one levying a tax for a purpose not authorized by the charter, is an act of usurpation and all proceedings under it are void ; yet where the corporation has power to pass the ordinance for a certain purpose, but exer- cises that power in an unauthorized manner the ordinance is valid and binding until set aside by legal proceedings insti- tuted for that purpose, and its validity cannot be brought in question collaterally, as a matter of defense to an action under it."' § 280. Enumeration of proceedings in which validity may be questioned. The particular circumstances and the local practice will determine the nature of the proceedings to test the validity of the ordinance. The following proceedings have received judicial sanction: (1) Any judicial proceeding, civil or criminal, legal or equitable, wherein the cause of acition is cago, 176 111., 253; 52 N. B. Rep., Co. v. Decatur, 120 111., 67; 11 N. 880; 68 Am. St. Rep., 188. E. Rep., 406, affirming 24 111. App., 12 Launder v. Chicago, 111 111., 544. 291; 53 Am. Rep., 625. i^ Camden v. Mulford, 26 N. J. 13 See sec. 352, post. L., 49, per Green, C. J. 14 People V. Maxon, 139 111., 306, In an action to recover claims 310; 38 III. App., 152; 28 N. E. arising under an ordinance a copy Rep., 1074. of such ordinance attached to and 15 Consumers' Gas, etc., Co. v. filed with the petition as an ex- Congress Spring Co., 61 Hun. (N. hlbit is no part of it and hence Y.), 133, 135; 15 N. Y. Suppl., 624. the validity of the ordinance can- is Decatur Gas Light and Coke not be determined on a general 428 OF CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. [§281 founded thereon or the ordinance is directly involved ;i* (2) injunction ;i» (3) prohibition ;2o (4) mandamus ;2i (5) certi- orari ;22 (6) quo warranto ;2* (7) habeas corpus ;** (8) pro- ceedings for review, in actions to enforce police ordinanees.^^ § 281. Who may queetion validity. As a rule those not affected, or, whose personal or property rights are in no way involved, cannot question thei validity of the ordinance.^® On the other hand, personal and property rights being jealously guarded by the law,i cannot be interfered with unreasonably or disturbed injuriously by ultra vires or void municipal legislation, and therefore, the law sanctions proper and ■season- able legal proceedings to test the validity of ordinances, at the instance of those about to be so affected by their enforce- ment.2^ As stated elsewhere, in all prosecutions for the viola- demurrer to such petition. Bowl- ing Green v. C, H. & D. R. Co., 10 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep., 63. 18 Com. V. Robertson, 5 Cush. (Mass.), 438; St. Charles v. Meyer, 58 Mo., 86; Moir v. Munday, Sayer, 181. 19 Sees. 285, 368, post. 20 Sec. 369, post. ^1 Rex V. Harrison, 3 Burr., 1322, sec. 284, post. 22 Sees. 287, 364, post. 23 Sec. 288, post. 2* See sec. 367, post. 25 Sees. 360 to 370, post. Plea of guilty, held not to be waiver of right to question valid- ity of ordinance on review. Gross- man V. Oakland, 30 Oregon, 478; 60 Am. St. Rep., 832; 41 Pac. Rep., 5. 26 Dram shop license. People ex rel. V. Cregier, 138 111., 401; 28 N. E. Rep., 812. Forbidding the keeping of liquor for sale — Certiorari. Iske v. New- ton, 54 Iowa, 586; 7 N. W. Rep., 13. Taxing insurance agents. Sim- rail V. Covington, 90 Ky., 444; 14 S. W. Rep,, 369; 29 Am. St. Rep., 398. Vacating street. Arnold v. Weiker, 55 Kan., 510; 40 Pac. Rep., 901. Vacating street. Where petition failed to show complainant was abutting owner. Knapp, Stout & Co. V. St. Louis, 156 Mo., 343; 56 S. W. Rep., 1102. Excavations in streets. State (Rah way Gas Light Co.) v. Rah- way, 58 N. J. L., 510; 34 Atl. Rep., 3. License to lay tracks in streets. State (Montgomery) v. Trenton, 36 N. J. L., 79; State (Kean) v. Bronson, 35 N. J. L., 468. Sale of municipal property — Action by taxpayer. Tifft v. Buf- falo, 65 Barb. (N. Y.), 460. Street franchise — Action by tax- payer. Linden Land Co. v. Mil- waukee Blec. R. R. Co., 107 Wis., 493; 83 N. W. Rep., 851. 27 Handy v. New Orleans, 39 La. Ann., 107; 1 So. Rep., 593; (Tax- payers — Wharf lease) Conery v. New Orleans Waterworks Co., 39 La. Ann., 770; 2 So. Rep., 555 ( Taxpayers — Water contract ) . Injunction will lie at suit of one injuriously affected. Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md., 217; 21 Alb. L. J., 117; 33 Am. Rep., 239; Page v. §281] OF CONSIDERATION OP VALIDITY. 429 tion of police ordinances the defendant may question their validity.^* Municipal officers, as trustees of the public interests, may question the legality of ordinances. This is not only a legal right, but it should be viewed as a sacred public duty. They should prevent, if possible, all violations of law on the part of those associated with them in the public service, particularly those of a legislative character which vitally affect the per- sonal 'and property rights of the entire local community. Such duty is especially incumbent upon the mayor or chief executive officer, who is usually enjoined in express terms by the organic law to see that all kgal provisions are duly observed. Ac- cordingly, it has been held in Pennsylvania that the chief bur- gess of a municipal borough may question the validity of an ordinance by proper legal proceedings, notwithstanding he vetoed it.^^ Baltimore, 34 Md., 558, 564; State (Gregory) v. Jersey City, 34 N. J. L., 390; State (N. J. R. R. & T. Co.) V. Jersey City, 29 N. J. L., 170; State (Danforth) v. Paterson, 34 N. J. L., 163; Camden v. Mul- ford, 26 N. J. L., 49; State v. Jer- sey City, 34 N. J. L., 31. Court will enjoin operation of street railway at instance of pri- vate party under a pretended license for franchise which the corporation had no power to grant. Allen V. Clausen, 114 Wis., 244; 90 N. W. Rep., 181. Abutting ownek. A railroad company as an abutting lot owner may enjoin the unauthorized con- struction of a railroad upon streets by another company where special injury will result to com- plainant from the construction and operation of the proposed road. The fact that the complainant road is occupying streets under a void franchise does not estop it as an abutting owner from enjoining the other company from constructing and operating tracks under a void grant. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mobile, etc., R. R., 124 Ala., 162; 26 S. W. Rep., 895. Rival telephone company qan- not maintain action where it fails to show unreasonable interference with its business. Louisville Home Tel. Co. V. Cumberland Tel. Co. (U. S. C. C. A.), Ill Fed. Rep., 663. Fkanchise ordinance which has been accepted and acted upon be- comes a contract, and ordinarily its validity cannot be attacked by third persons. Chicago Telephone Co. V. North Western Telephone Co., 199 111., 324; 65 N. B. Rep., 329, affirming 100 111. App., 57. 28 Sec. 348, post. 2» Respecting the right of the chief burgess to question the va- lidity of the ordinance, the court remarked, that "this is hardly de- batable. The statute confers on him the veto power. * * * He has a right to assert his preroga- tive, and he can do this only by denying the validity of the ordi- nance alleged to be binding not- withstanding his veto. The ap- propriate remedy for him is by hill in equity to restrain action under 430 OP CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. [§282 § 282. Citizens and taxpayers may question validity of or- dinances. The law has been declared that a suit by injunction may be instituted by any taxpayer for himself and all others similarly situated to enjoin the collection of an illegal tax or the enforcement of an illegal ordinance where the effect would be to impose upon him an unlawful tax or to increase his bur- den of taxation.^" So "where a public right is involved and the object of the suit is to enforce a public duty or keep public officials within the limits of their legal powers the people are regarded as the real party; and in such case the relator, in a suit for a writ of mandamus and by analogy, the plaintiff in a suit for injunction, need not show any legal or special inter- est in the result.*^ The doctrine thus broadly stated] is denied by some cases.^^ It has been held that a resident and tax- the ordinance alleged on one side to be legal and on the other to be without legal force. This brings his prerogative and the manner of its exercise before the court and determines the duty of the council towards him." Lehigh Coal and Navigation Co. v. Inter-County Street Railway, 167 Pa. St., 126, 136; 36 Wkly. Notes of Cases (Pa.), 160; 31 Atl. Rep., 477. 30 St. Louis V. VSTenneker, 145 Mo., 230; 47 S. W. Rep., 105; Arnold v. Hawkins, 95 Mo., 569; 8 S. W. Rep., 718; Dennison v. Kan- sas City, 95 Mo., 416; 8 S. W. Rep., 429; Valle v. Ziegler, 84 Mo., 214; Newmeyer v. Mo. & Miss. R. R. Co., 52 Mo., 81; Ranney v. Bader, 67 Mo., 476. Taxpatee may enjoin action under void ordinance. Sank v. Philadelphia, 4 Brews. (Pa.), 133. Fact complainant voted for the ordinance on its final passage does not estop him from asserting its invalidity. Stadler v. Fahey, 87 111. App., 411, 414. Contra — Where interest on tax- payer differs only in degree from that of other residents and whose property does not abut on the park, he cannot sue to enjoin its- condemnation for a railroad sta- tion. Manson v. South Bound R. Co., 64 S. C, 120; 41 S. B. Rep., 832. Injunction at instance of tax- payers denied, to restrain building city hall. Parker v. Concord, 71 N. H., 468; 52 Atl. Rep., 1095. Although act may be ultra viries injunction will not lie at instance of taxpayers where it does not ap- pear that the execution of the act will injuriously affect such com- plainants. Blanton v. Merry, 116 Ga., 288; 42 S. E. Rep., 211. Injunction by taxpayers to pre- vent bond issue denied. LeTour- neau v. Duluth, 85 Minn., 219; 88 N. W. Rep., 529. State statutes give remedy against Illegal oflScial and corpor- ate acts. Osterhoudt v. Rigney, 98 N. Y., 222; Weston v. Syracuse, 158 N. Y., 274; 53 N. B. Rep., 12. 31 State ex rel. v. School Board. 131 Mo., 505; 33 S. W. Rep., 3; Ranney v. Bader, 67 Mo., 476; Overall v. Ruenzi, 67 Mo., 203; Rubey v. Shain,*54 Mo., 207; New- meyer V. Mo. Pac. R. R., 52 Mo., 81; Knapp v. Kansas City, 48 Mo. App., 485. 32 See cases supra i» tfeis sec- tion. §283j Of consideration op Validity. i^l payer has such an interest as to entitle him to an injunction to prevent the incurring of indebtedness in excess of that allowed by law.^* So where a city is attempting to dispose of public property without warrant of law a non-resident of the city who has property liable to taxation may maintain an injunc- tion to enjoin such disposition."* So, injunction will lie at the suit of a taxpayer to enjoin the entering into,^^ or the consum- mation,^*' or the enforcement, of an illegal or unauthorized contract.3^ Thus where the contract is illegal in that it con- fers a monopoly, equity may be invoked if the carrying out of the contract would increase the burden of taxation.^* So, in- junction on behalf of the property owner on the street to be improved will lie to enjoin the doing of the work under a con- tract not let to the lowest bidder where the charter so re- quires.''^ And it is generally held that injunction will lie on behalf of the public brought by a taxpayer to restrain the performance of any invalid contract for public work, as where the bidding was restricted so as to exclude nonunion labor and thus increased the co.st of the work.*" § 283. Same— When courts will not interfere at instance of taxpayer or citizen. It should be borne in mind that the doc- trine just stated and illustrated is not based on the right of the 33 Wright V. Bishop, 88 111., 302; Schiffman v. St. Paul (Minn., Springfield v. Edwards, 84 111., 626. 1902), 92 N. W. Rep., 503. 34 Brockman v. Creston, 79 Iowa, Taxpayer may enjoin the city 587; 44 N. W. Rep., 822. from entering into an illegal con- tract involving the expenditure of Injunction granted to prevent municipal funds. Austin v. Mc- unauthorlzed appropriation of cor- pall, 95 Tex., 565; 68 S. W. Rep. porate funds. Stevens v. St. nai ' Mary's Training School, 144 111., se Yarnell v. Los Angeles, 87 336; 36 Am. St. Rep., 438; 32 N. cal., 603; 25 Pac. Rep., 767. E. Rep., 962. 3^ crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. 35 Reighard v. Flinn, 189 Pa. St., s., 601; Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 355; 42 Atl. Rep., 23, and authori- u. S., 487. ties cited in brief of appellees at 38 Davenport v. Kleinschmldt, 6 page 359 of state report. Execu- Mont., 502; 13 Pac. Rep., 249. tion of contract relating to water 3» Mazet v. Pittsburg, 137 Pa., supply, held to be a ministerial 548; 20 Atl. Rep., 693; 27 Weekly act. Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Notes Cas., 73. Ind., 1, 3; 49 Am. Rep., 416. 40 Atlanta v. Stein, 111 Ga., 789; Injunction by taxpayer to en- Holden v. Alton, 179 111., 318; 53 force contract to light street. N. E. Rep., 556; Adams v. Bren- 438 OF CONSIDERATION OP VALIDITY. [§284 property owner or taxpayer, resident or non-resident, or citi- zen, to dictate and control the administration of the municipal government and to nullify by proceedings in the courts the lawful acts of the public officialsi, legislative or excutive, done in the administration of the municipal affairs, because it may be assumed that the proposed acts of the corporate authorities sought to be restrained do not promote the best interests of the community and are, therefore, against public policy. As to the taxpayer, the doctrine rests upon the ground of direct inter- ference with his rights, for the reason that if the proposed un- authorized act were consummated his burden of taxation might or would probably be increased. As to the citizen, the ground of relief is found in the fact that the public have a right to be protected against unauthorized or illegal acts on the part of the municipal authorities where such contemplated acts do not involve merely discretionary matters or questions of mere ex- pediency or policy, but where they are in fact in contraven- tion of express or implied constitutional, statutory, charter or ordinance provisions. Thus, whether a city being only au- thorized to purchase such lands as might be necessary for the purpose of the corporation, could take lands outside of her limits not necessary for such purposes, "is a question that can only ai'ise in a proceeding instituted by the state against the city for abusing her right to purchase lands. " "'i In one case, the proper municipal authorities granted to a railway com- pany the right of way over certain streets, on condition that the road should be completed within twelve months from ac- ceptance of the grant by the company, and that in case of fail- ure so to complete it, the council might take away the fran- chise. Here> it was held that this provision was a condition subsequent, and that the right of way, when accepted by the company, vested at once, subject to be defeated at the election of the' city for breach of the condition, but that a private citi- zen could 'not take advantage of a breach.*- § 284. Same— Mandamus. It is settled law in Missouri that where the performance of a public duty obviously affects the nan, 177 111., 194; 52 N. E. Rep., In a case determined by the 314. See § 553, post. United States Circuit Court for *i Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo., the Northern District of Ohio, 543, 576. there existed a contract between a *2 Hovelman v. K. C. H. R. R. city and a water company, by Co., 79 Mo., 632, 639. which the latter agreed to furnish §284] OP CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. 433 rights of all citizens, any of them may move for a mandamus to compel the performance of that duty, and ' ' citizens, taxpayers and resident householders" have sufficient interest to maintain such action.^* Where a public right is involved and the object is to enforce a public duty, the people are regarded as the mov- ing party ; and in such case, the relator in mandamus need not show any special interest in. the result, if the performance of the general duty obviously aifects hisi rights as a citizen.** While in matters in which public officers exercise a discretion, mandamus will lie to compel them to act, yet it will not dictate the terms of said discretion.*^ Thus mandamus will lie to com- pel the board of police commissioners of the City of St. Louis to vacate an order made by it directing the chief of police of the city not to interfere with the sale of wine or beer on Sun- day.** So, mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel the restoration of a highway to its former condition, and in this respect, to require the corporation to perform its charter du- ties.*^ The question here is one of public right, and the better opinion is that it is sufficient for the relators in such eases to show that they are citizens, and thus interested in the per- formance of a public duty.** And a private citizen is a com- water and to maintain sufficient pressure in the mains for Are pur- poses. Here the • property owner hased his suit on the ground that if a proper pressure had been maintained his property would not have been destroyed and the fire could have been extinguished. The court held that he had no right to maintain the suit, as there was no privity of contract between the company and the plaintiff. Boston S. D. & T. Co. v. Salem Water Co., 94 Fed. Rep., 238. ■13 State ex rel. Rutledge v. St. Louis School Board, 131 Mo., 505; 33 S. W. Rep., 3; State ex rel. v. Public Schools, 134 Mo., 296; 35 S. W. Rep., 617; State ex rel. Mor- ris v. H. & St. J. Ry. Co., 86 Mo., 13; State ex rel. Wear v. Francis, 95 Mo., 44; 8 S. W. Rep., 1; State ex rel. v. Crete, 32 Neb., 568; 49 N. W. Rep., 272. " State ex rel. v. School Board, 131 Mo., 505; 33 S. W. Rep., 3. The extraordinary writ of man- damus may be invoked either for the purpose of enforcing or pro- tecting a private right, uncon- nected with the public interest, or for merely a public right, where the people at large are the real parties. When addressed to a ministerial officer it simply com- mands him to perform some spe- cific act, the performance of which is required of him by law. State ex rel. v. Tracy, 94 Mo., 217, 220; 6 S. W. Rep., 709. *= State ex rel. Wear v. Francis, 95 Mo., 44; 8 S. W. Rep., 1. 48 State ex rel. Wear v. Francis, 95 Mo., 44; 8 S. W. Rep., 1. " State ex rel. Morris v. H. & St. J. Ry. Co., 86 Mo., 13. 48 state ex rel. Morris v. H. & St. J. Ry. Co., 86 Mo., 13. 28 434 OP CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. [§ S8o petent party to a mandamus proceeding to compel public offi- cers to enforce a city ordinance.*^ So, mandamus may be in- voked to test the validity of an ordinance appropriating money out of the general revenue where such appropriation is con- tended to be a diversion of the money of the taxpayers in con- travention of charter provisions."" So, mandamus is properly brought in the name of the state, on the relation of taxpayers residing in a school district, wherein an election of a school director is to be held, to compel the board and its members constituting the election committee to rescind certain appoint- ments of judges and clerks, made by such committee, for the election of a member of the board.^i So, mandamus will lie at the suit of one having no special interest to compel the mayor to revoke an illegal permit.^^ ^,jj(j the writ may be invoked to compel the board of engineers of St. Louis to grant an engineer's license where the same is withheld because of caprice or whim.^^ § 285. Injunction to restrain enforcement. The remedy by writ of injunction or prohibition (as termed bj^ some stat- iites)^'' usually exists in all cases where an irreparable injury to real or personal property is threatened and to prevent the doing of any legal wrong whatever, whenever, in the opinion of the court, an adequate remedy cannot be afforded at law, and, according to some statutes, by an action for damages.-'''^ This remedy has often been applied to restrain . the enforce- rs' State ex rel. Wear v. Francis, remedy to test validity of ordi- 95 Mo., 44; 8 S. W. Rep., 1. nance. Com. v. Pitler, 136 Pa. St., 50 Hitchcock v. St. Louis, 49 Mo., 129; 20 Atl. Rep., 424. 484. 5* The term prohibition is used 51 State ex rel. v. Public Schools, in the general sense of restraint 134 Mo., 296; 35 S. W. Rep., 617. by injunction and not in the tech- Where officials arbitrarily refuse nical sense of a writ of prohibi- to audit claims, etc., mandamus tion. Casby v. Thompson, 42 Mo., will lie. People v. Board of Super- 133. visors, etc., 45 N. Y., 196, 199; 55 2 R. S. Mo., 1899, sec. 3649. People V. Board of Supervisors, 73 iNjusfCTioisr Defined. A writ of N. Y., 173. Injunction may be defined to be a 52 State ex ret. v. Noonan, 59 Mo. judicial process, operating in per- App., 524; see State ex rel. v. sonom, and requiring the person to Francis, 95 Mo., 44; 8 S. W. Rep., 1. whom it is directed to do or re- 53 St. Louis V. Meyrose Lamp frain from doing a particular Co., 139 Mo., 560; 41 S. W. Rep., thing. In its broadest sense the 244; 61 Am. St. Rep., 474. process is restorative as well as Mandamus denied as proper preventive, and may issue both .^ 285] OF CONStDERATION OF VALIDITY. 435 ment of void ordinances where it appeared that their enforce- ment was threatened and which would result in irreparable injury to the property of the complainant and there was no other adequate remedy open to him. The eases in the notes fully illustrate the doctrine. •''<' The general doctrine is that in the enforcement of rights and in the prevention of wrongs. High on Injunctions, sec. 1. Mr. Justice Story describes it as "a judicial process whereby a party is required to do a particular thing, or refrain from doing a par- ticular thing, according to the exigency of the writ." 2 Story Bq. Jur., sec. 861; 3 Daniel's Ch. Pr., 1809, et seg. 38 Georgia — Athens v. Georgia R. R. Co., 72 Ga., 800; Gould v. Atlanta, 55 Ga., 678. Indiana — Rushville v. Rushville Natural Gas Co., 132 Ind., 575; 15 L. R. A., 321; 28 N. B. Rep., 853; Spiegel v. Gansburg, 44 Ind., 418. Maryland — Deems v. Baltimore, 80 Md., 164; 26 L. R. A., 541; 30 Atl. Rep., 648; 45 Am. St. Rep., 339; Baltimore v. Scharf, 54 Md., 499; Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md., 217; 33 Am. Rep., 239. Missouri — Dennison v. Kansas City, 95 Mo., 416; 8 S. W. Rep., 429. Xem York — People v. New York, 32 Barb. (N. Y.), 35; 10 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 144; 19 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 155; Birdsall v. Clark, 73 N. Y., 73; 29 Am. Rep., 105; Wood v. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. (N. Y.), 425. Pennsylvania — ^Appeal of Har- per, 109 Pa. St., 9; 1 Atl. Rep., 791; Sank v. Philadelphia, 4 Brews. (Pa.), 133; 8 Phila. (Pa.), 117. United States — Barthet v. New Orleans, 24 Fed. Rep., 563. , To prevent invasion of right of property. Gulllotte's Heirs v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann., 479; Morris Canal & B. Co. v. Jersey City, 12 N. J. Bq., 252. To protect vested right. Cape May & S. L. R. Co. v. Cape May, 35 N. J. Bq., 419; Platte & D. Canal & M. Co. v. Lee, 2 Colo. App., 184; 29 Pac. Rep., 1036. Forbidding burial of dead in designated cemetery — Property rights. Austin v. Austin City Cem. Assn., 87 Tex., 330; 28 S. W. Rep., 528; 47 Am. St. Rep., 114. Fire limits — Destruction of buildings. Montgomery v. Louis- ville & N. R. Co., 84 Ala., 127; 4 So. Rep., 626; Hine v. New Haven, 40 Conn., 478. License fee ordinance, enforce- ment enjoined. Southern Express Co. v. Ensley, 116 Fed. Rep., 756. Injunction to restrain enforce- ment of ordinance to levy tax on bicycles will lie, where city has no power to pass such ordinance. Chicago V. Collins, 175 111., 445; 67 Am. St. Rep., 224; 51 N. B. Rep., 907; 29 Chicago Legal News,' 426. An illegal ordinance imposing a license tax will be enjoined on a showing that the license is illegal and that on enforcement com- plainant would be compelled to de- fend a multitude of criminal pros- ecutions and would suffer irrep- arable injury in his business. Hutchinson v. Beckman (U. S. C. C. A.), 118 Fed. Rep., 399. Ordinance interfering with street railroad franchise and prop- erty. Mobile V. Louisville and N. R. Co., 84 Ala., 115 ; 5 Am. St. Rep., 342; 4 So. Rep., 106. 436 OF CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. [§285 courts of equity never interfere to stay proceedings of a crim- inal character, as such courts deal only with civil and property rights. This rule has been applied to proceedings under ordi- nances enforceable by fine, with consequent liability to impris- onment, where there appeared to be no invasion of property rights. ^'^ But equity will restrain unauthorized invasions of property rights which threaten irreparable injury, even though the threatened acts are punishable as crimes. °* And it has been declared in Missouri that the doctrine that criminal statutes cannot be tested or tlieir enforcement restrained in civil courts has no application to municipal ordinances, which, while penal, are not criminal statutes.^^ Thus the enforcement of a city ordinance making it a misdemeanor to buy or sell certain arti- cles, unless in a manner therein provided, will be enjoined if suph ordinance is invalid, although its invalidity has not been determined in a prosecution thereunder or in an action of a legal character.60 Where the ordinance is void the remedy by Impairing obligation of con- tracts. Cleveland City Ry. Co. v. Cleveland, 94 Fed. Rep., 385. Void ordinance — Reducing water rates. Los Angeles City Water Co. v. Los Angeles, 88 Fed. Rep., 720. Ordinance fixing water rates at unreasonable amounts in violation of the state constitution. Spring Valley W. W. v. San Francisco, 82 Cal., 286; 16 Am. St. Rep., 116; 22 Pac. Rep., 910, 1046. Ordinance illegal; forbidding hauling on certain streets. Cicero Lumber Co.' v. Cicero, 176 111., 9; 51 N. E. Rep., 758; 68 Am. St. Rep., 155. In Kentucky the validity of ordi- nances of cities of the first class may be tested by writ of prohibi- tion. Bybee v. Smith, 22 Ky. L. Rep., 467, 1684; 57 S. W. Rep., 789. 57 Injunction denied to restrain the execution of an ordinance of a criminal nature, on the ground of the invalidity of the ordinance or that the complainant is exempted from its operation. Moultrie v. Patterson, 109 Ga., 370; 34 S. B. Rep., 600; Garrison v. Atlanta, 68 Ga., 64; Phillips v. Stone Moun- tain, 61 Ga., 386. Court will not enjoin if property rights are not invaded. Atlanta V. Gate City Gas Light Co., 71 Ga., 106. Rule applied to criminal statute. Gault V. Wallis, 53 Ga., 675, 677. 58 Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Saxey, 131 Mo., 212; 32 S. W. Rep., 1106. Injunction to test validity of statute. Business Men's League v. Waddill, 143 Mo., 495; 45 S. W. Rep., 262; State ex rel. v. Hughes, 104 Mo., 459; 16 S. W. Rep., 489. 59 Sylvester Coal Co. v. St. Louis, 130 Mo., 323; 32 S. W. Rep., 649; 51 Am. St. Rep., 566; Kansas City V. Clark, 68 Mo., 588. 6« Sylvester Coal Co. v. St. Louis, 130 Mo., 323; 32 S. W. Rep., 649; 51 Am. St. Rep., 566. Contra. Invalidity must be es- tablished in court of law. For- cheimer v. Mobile, 84 Ala., 126; 4 So. Rep., 112; Marvin Safe Co. v. New York, 38 Hun. (N. Y.), 146. i 285 1 OF CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. 437 injunction has frequently been sustained in order to prevent a multii)iicity of prosecutions under it."i The rule is uniformly sustained that if an adequate remedy at law exists (according to some statutes by an action for dam- ages), or where no irreparable injury to property rights are threatened, injimetion will be denied to restrain the enforce- ment of the ordinance.*^ Equity has no jurisdiction. Bur- nett V. Craig, 30 Ala., 135; 68 Am. Dec, 115. «i Chicago V. Collins, 175 111., 445; 67 Am.. St. Rep., 224; 51 N. E. Rep., 907; South Covington & C. St. Ry. Co. V. Berry, 93 Ky., 43; 18 S. W. Rep., 1026; 40 Am. St. Rep., 161; Brown v. Catletts- burg, 11 Bush (74 Ky.), 435; New- port V. Bridge Co., 90 Ky., 193; 13 S. W. Rep., 720; Holland v. Baltimore, 11 Md., 186; Contra. West V. New York, 10 Paige (N. Y.), 539. To Avoid a Multiplicity of Suits and have the controversy settled at one hearing, followers of a particular occupation, as mas- ter plumbers, whose rights and liabilities are identical, may join in a suit in equity to restrain the enforcement of an alleged illegal ordinance requiring a license to be obtained, where it appears that the corporate authorities are threaten- ing each of them with prosecution for non-compliance, and each pros- ecution would involve the same right claimed. Wilkie v. Chicago, 188 111., 444; 80 Am. St. Rep., 182; 58 N. E. Rep., 1004, reversing 88 111. App., 315. Federal Courts Have Jurisdic- tion where the loss alleged exceeds $2,000 and the sum involved for jurisdictional purposes is not alone the tax demanded (here an illegal license tax) but the value of complainant's right to conduct his business without being subject to the illegal tax. Hutchinson v. Beckman (U. S. C. C. A.), 118 Fed. Rep., 399. 62 Adequate Remedy at Law. Alabama — Forcheimer v. Mobile, 84 Ala., 126; 4 So. Rep., 112. Colorado — Denver v. Beede, 25 Colo., 172; 54 Pac. Rep., 624. Connecticut — Whitney v. New Haven, 58 Conn., 450; 20 Atl. Rep., 666; Dunham v. New Britain, 55 Conn., 378; 11 Atl, Rep., 354. Georgia — Moultrie v. Patterson, 109 Ga., 370; 34 S. E. Rep., 600; Pope V. Savannah, 74 Ga., 365. Illinois — Poyer v. Des Plaines, 123 111., Ill; 13 N. E. Rep., 819; 5 Am. St. Rep., 494; 20 111. App., 30; Yates v. Batavia, 79 111., 500; Skakel v. Roche, 27 111. App., 423; Klinesmith v. Harrison, 18 111. App., 467. North Carolina — Scott v. Smith, 121 N. C, 94; 28 S. B. Rep., 64; Warden of St. Peter's E. Ch. v. Washington, 109 N. C, 21; 13 S. E. Rep., 700; Cohen v. Goldsboro, 77 N. C, 2. Texas — Wade v. Nunnelly, 19 Tex. Civ. App., 256; 46 S. W. Rep., 668. United States — Torpedo Co. v. Clarendon, 19 Fed. Rep., 231. As where right of appeal exists. Levy V. Shreveport, 27 La. Ann., 620; Browne v. New Orleans, 38 La. Ann., 517. Abuse of discretion by municipal authorities is not suflScient 438 OF CONSIDERATION OP VALIDITY. t§386 § 286. Injunction to prevent violation of ordinances. Or- dinarily, injunction will not lie to prevent threatened violation of an ordinance.®''' The usual remedy is by action to recover ground, when. Rosenbaum v. Newbern, 118 N. C, 83; 32 L. R, A., 123; 24 S. E. Rep., 1. Where the authorities are acting within their powers, and no fraud is imputed or shown, no invasion of private rights, no manifest op- pression and no gross abuse, their actions are not subject to judicial control. Brennan v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans (La., 1902), 32 So. Rep., 563. Ordinance for local improve- ment. Injunction denied. Sought on ground that ordinance was un- reasonable, oppressive and unjust. It appeared that there was an ade- quate remedy at law by objection on application to confirm the spe- cial tax levied to pay for the im- provement. Field V. Western Springs, 181 111., 186; 54 N. E. Rep., 929. Injunction denied to prevent the letting of contract, there being no irreparable injury shown or threatened. Barto v. San Fran- cisco, 135 Gal., 494; 67 Pac. Rep., 758; McBride v. Newlin, 129 Gal., 36; 61 Pac. Rep., 577. Forbidding erection of wooden building in fire limits. Hine v. New Haven, 40 Conn., 478. Franchise ordinance. New Or- leans Water Works Go. v. New Orleans, 164 U. S., 471. To stop issue of bonds. Joliet V. Alexander, 194 111., 457; 62 N. B. Rep., 861; Ottumwa v. City Water Supply Co. (U. S. C. C. A.), 119 Fed. Rep., 315. Ordinance as to Whakpage. Ordinance prescribing certain rates of wharfage on vessels "that ma^ discharge or receive freight or land on, or anchor at, or in front of, any public landing or wharf be- longing to the city, for the purpose of discharging or receiving freight." Here it was contended by a transportation company en- gaged in interstate commerce that the wharfage was extortionate and was merely a pretext for levying a duty of tonnage. An injunction suit was brought in the federal court praying that the prosecution of a suit brought in the state court to collect the wharfage be en- joined and that the ordinance be declared void. Held that the char- acter of the charges must be de- termined by the ordinance itself and as it on its face imposed them for the use of the wharf only, and not for entering the port or lying at anchor in the river, the court will refuse injunction. Transpor- tation Co. V. Parkersburg, 107 U. S., 691. Dairy ordinance. Hettinger v. New Orleans, 42 La. Ann., 629; 8 So. Rep., 575, Defective title of ordinance no ground. Barton v. Pittsburg, 4 Brewst. (Pa.), 373. Fact ordinance is not enforced against other violators is no ground for injunction. Wagner v. Rock Island, 146 111., 139; 21 L. R. A., 519; 34 N. E. Rep., 545. Denied where ordinance is not wholly void. Davis v. Fasig, 128 Ind., 271; 27 N. B. Rep., 726. Laches. Parker v. Concord, 71 N. H., 468; 52 Atl. Rep., 1095. 153 Illinois — Flnegan v. Allen, 46 111. App., 553. Michigan — St. Johns v. McFar- lan, 33 Mich., 72; 20 Am. Rep., 671; § 287] OF CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. -i39 the penalties imposed.'*-' However, injunction proceedings have been sustained vv^here the violation would constitute a public nuisance and result in special and irreparable damage to the complainant, as, for example, by the erection or removal of a wooden building to a place within the fire limits where it is to be located dangerously near complainant's premises.""' § 287. Certiorari. In New Jersey, certiorari will lie to test the validity of the ordinance.**'' Where the local corporation has no power to enact the ordinance it will be annulled by certiorari instituted by a person who may be affected by the enforcement of such ordinance, notwithstanding no attempt has been made to enforce it."" Thus where an ordinance grant- ing a franchise to lay railroad tracks in the streets is passed without previous notice to persons interested and where one of the monbers of the board of public works who votes for it is interested as a stockholder in the road, the ordinance may be annulled by certiorari."** The owners of the fee simple of land in a street may prosecute a certiorari to test the validity of a municipal ordinance purporting to authorize a railway com- pany to place rails, poles and wires on their lands in the street.**" So an abutting owner can maintain certiorari to re- New Hampshire — Manchester v. jury to him and his property. Smyth, 64 N. H., 380; 10 Atl. Rep., First Nat. Bk. v. Sarlls, 129 Intl., 700. 201; 28 Am. St. Rep., 185. New York — New Rochelle v. Depreciation in value of land Lang, 75 Hun. (N. Y.), 608; 27 held not to be such special damage N. Y. Suppl., 600; Hudson v. as would sustain injunction. Mc- Thorne, 7 Paige (N. Y.), 261. Closkey v. Kreling, 76 Gal., 511; Wisconsin — Waupun v. Moore, 34 18 Pac. Rep., 433. Wis., 450; 17 Am. Rep., 446. o'e Camden v. Mulford, 26 N. J. 04 See sec. 303, posf. L., 49; State (Leland) v. Long 65 Sustained at instance of prop- Branch Comrs., 42 N. J. L., 375. erty owner to enjoin removal of a Delay in bringing — Effect. State wooden building to a place within (Doyle) v. Newark, 30 N. J. L., fire limits in violation of ordinance 303, 306. where it is to be located danger- Irregularly adopted, will not be ously near plaintiff's frame house, set aside, when. State (Vanatta) Kaufman v. Stein, 138 Ind., 49; 46 v. Morristown, 34 N. J. L., 445. Am. St. Rep., 368. s' New Jersey R. & Transp. Co. So injunction was sustained to v. Jersey City, 29 N. J. L., 170. prevent erection of wooden build- es state (West Jersey Traction ing in violation of ordinance with- Co.) v. Board of Public Works. 56 in fire limits by property owner on N. J. L., 431; 29 Atl. Rep., 163. a showing that the erection wouW so State (Kennelly) v. Jersey- work special and irreparable in- 440 OF CONSIDERATION OP VALIDITY. [§288 view an ordinance changing grade of street in front of his property J° So certiorari lies where the prosecutors are in- cluded in the descriptive words of the ordinance when its re- straints on their business have been enforced against them, causing pecuniary loss, and they have submitted to it without an action and convictionJi § 288. Quo warranto. Quo warranto may be invoked for the unwarranted assumption of public powers. Thus in an early South Carolina case, the writ was allowed against a municipal corporation by the attorney-general, in behalf of the state, in order to test the right of the corporation to tax by ordinance certain bonds, notes and other obligations.^^ But the writ is generally employed to try the right of persons to exercise the functions of a public office, and not to test the legality of their acts.^^ The remedy has sometimes been permitted to try the right of the local corporation to exercise civil government over City, 57 N. J. L., 293, 298; 30 Atl. Rep., 531; 26 L. R. A., 281. TO Read v. Camden, 54 N. J. L., 347; 24 Atl., 549. 71 State (Staates) v. Washing- ton, 44 N. J. L., 605, 607. Where the passage of an ordi- nance is a legislative act rather than judicial, it is not subject to review by certiorari in Iowa. Iske V. Newton, 54 Iowa, 586; 7 N. W. Rep., 13. Certiorari. Marion v. Chandler, 6 Ala., 899; Carroll v. Tuskaloosa, 12 Ala., 173. See sees. 364, 365, post. Certiorari by Taxpayer. /owe— Dodge V. Council Bluffs, 57 Iowa, 560; 10 N. W. Rep., 886. Nebraska — Grand Island Gas Co. V. West, 28 Neb., 852; 45 N. W. Rep., 242. New Jersey — Lewis v. Cumber- land, 56 N. J. L., 416; 28 Atl. Rep., 553; Stroud v. Consumers' Water Co., 56 N. J. L., 422; 28 Atl. Rep., 578; State v. Robbins, 54 N. J. L., 566; 25 Atl. Rep., 471, reversing Middleton v, Robins, 53 N. ,T. L., 555; 22 Atl. Rep., 481; Read v. Atlantic City, 49 N. J. L., 558; 9 Atl. Rep., 759. Pennsylvania — Frame v. Felix, 167 Pa. St., 47; 31 Atl. Rep., 375. Texas — Altgeld v. San Antonio, 81 Tex., 436; 13 L. R. A., 383; 17 S. W. Rep., 75. '2 State V. Charleston, 1 Mill's Const. Rep. (S. C), 36. "Such use of the remedy is very rare." 2 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.), § 897. 73 People V. Maynard, 15 Mich., 463; State ex rel. v. Lawrence, 38 Mo., 535; State ex rel. v. Perpetual Ins. Co., 8 Mo., 330; State ex rel. V. Stone, 25 Mo., 555. Denied at relation of a private citizen to vacate charter of a municipal corporation on account of the passage of an unauthorized ordinance fixing the price of the license for retailing liquors. "Whether quo warranto is the ap- propriate remedy for vacating an invalid ordinance we do not now determine." Stone, J., in State ex rel. V. Cahaba, 30 Ala., 66, 68. § 289] OF CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. 441 added territory .^^ But such jurisdiction has been denied, and it has been held that it cannot be invoked to question the au- thority of municipal officers to exercise public functions within added territory by virtue of a legislative act. It is asserted that the proper way to test the validity of such law is to pre- sent this as a defense to the enforcement of the ordinances within the extended territory, or in event of an attempt to levy and collect taxes for municipal purposes within such territory, to appeal to a court of equity to enjoin such pro- ceedings.'^^ So the writ has been denied for the purpose of testing the power to pass certain ordinances. The remedy in such case is to enjoin any steps that may be taken to enforce the ordinance or to proceed by quo warranto against any per- sons who may claim to hold an office under and by virtue of the provisions of the ordinances alleged to be void.^® So it has been asserted (dictum) that the writ will not lie for the pur- pose of annulling an ordinance passed in the irregular and improper exercise of a power conferred by law.'''' 5289. Rules of construction. The construction of an ordi- nance is a question of law for the court.''^ The rules for the Denied to enforce execution of Rep., 758; State ex rel. v. Mote, public obligation. Atty. Gen. v. 48 Neb., 683; 67 N. W. Rep., 810; Salem, 103 Mass., 138. State ex rel. v. Dimond, 44 Neb., Denied in People ex rel. v. Hills- 154, 162; 62 N. W. Rep., 498. dale & Chatham Turnpike Co., 2 75 state ex rel. v. Whitcomb, 55 Johns (N. Y.), 190. 111., 172, 177. Denied where purpose was to 76 state ex rel. v. Newark, 57 deprive a certain gas company of Ohio St., 430; 49 N. E. Rep., 407. the right to lay pipe and distribute 77 "Our attention has not been gas in the city, on the ground that directed to, nor have we been able it has forfeited the right by vio- to find, any case in the books lating certain conditions imposed where proceedings by quo war- by the city, in granting it. The ranto, or information in the na- court expressed the opinion that ture thereof, has been entertained the state was not concerned, and for the purpose of declaring void that the injury, if any, should be or annulling a legislative act, redressed by the "usual legal rem- whether passed by a state or an edies." Per Campbell, C. J., in inferior municipal legislature." Eeople ex rel. v. Mutual Gas Light Per Cole, J., in State ex rel. v. Co., 38 Mich., 154, 156. Lyons, 31 Iowa, 432, approved in '■* People V. Reclamation Dist., State ex rel. v. Newark, 57 Ohio 130 Cal., 607; 63 Pac. Rep., 27; St., 430; 49 N. E. Rep., 407. People V. Peoria, 166 111., 517, 522; Examine State v. Evans, 3 Ark., 46 N. E. Rep., 1075; State ex rel. 585. V. Fleming, 147 Mo.. 1; 44 S. W. '« Pennsylvania Co. v. Frana, 13 442 OF CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. [§289 construction of state statutes usually apply to the construction of ordinances.''" Where the ordinance is open to two construc- tions one legal, and the other illegal, if possible, the former will be adopted.^" "Although it is desirable that by-laws 111. App., 91; Denning v. Yount, 9 Kan. App., 708; 59 Pac. Rep., 1092; 61 Pac. Rep., 803. Whether an ordinance is reason- able is a question for the court. Long V. Jersey City, 37 N. J. L., 348; Austin v. Austin City Ceme- tery Assn., 87 Tex., 330; 47 Am. St. aep., 114; 28 S. W. Rep., 528. The construction of an ordi- nance should not be submitted to the jury. In this respect it stands as a state statute. Denver & R. G. Ry. Co. V. Olsen, 4 Colo., 239. Thus the construction of an ordinance requiring a railroad company to keep a flagman at a crossing is not for the jury but for the court alone. Wilson v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 18 R. I., 598; 29 Atl. Rep., 300. Reasonableness is a question of law for the court. Sec. 185, supra. To/n re Yick Wo, 68 Cal., 294 58 Am. Rep., 12; 9 Pac. Rep., 139 Zorger v. Greensburgh, 60 Ind., 1 Denning v. Yount, 9 Kan. App., 708; 59 Pac. Rep.. 1092, aflirmed 61 Pac. Rep., 803; State v. Kirkley, 29 Md., 85; Quinette v. St. Louis, 76 Mo., 402. so Bicycle ordinance. Swift v. Topeka, 43 Kan,, 671; 23 Pac. Rep., 1075. Salary ordinance. Lowry v. Lexington, 24 Ky. Law Rep., 516; 68 S. W. Rep., 1109. Street paving ordinance. Balti- more V. Hughes, 1 Gill & J. (Md.), 480. Dogs at large — Non-residents. Commonwealth v. Dow, 10 Met. (Mass.), 382. Architect license. St. Louis v. Herthpl, 88 Mo., 128. Tax on railroad cars. Johnson V. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St., 445. Rule applied to statutory con- struction. Bigelow V. West Wis- consin Railroad Co., 27 Wis., 478; Iowa Homestead Co. v. Webster County, 21 Iowa, 221, per Wright, J. England — Dearden v. Townsend, L. R. 1 Q. B., 10; Paulterers Co. v. Phillips, 6 Bingham's N. C. (C. P.), 314. Canada — Re Cameron and Tp. of East Nissouri, 13 Up. Can. Q. B. Rep., 190; Re Gibson & U. C. of H. & B., 20 Up. Can. Q. B. Rep., 11; Re Borthwick and City of Ottawa, 9 Ontario Rep., 401. Hucksters living within one mile of corporate limits. Suell v. Belle- ville, 30 Up. Can. Q. B., 81. "Every intendment is to be in- dulged in favor of its validity, and all doubts resolved in a way to uphold the law-making power, and a contrary conclusion will never be reached upon slight considera- tion. It is the province and the right of the municipality to regu- late its local affairs, within the law, of course; and it is the duty of the courts to uphold such regu- lations, except it manifestly ap- pears that the ordinance or by-law transcends the power of the munic- ipality, and contravenes rights se- cured to the citizen by the consti- tution, or laws made in pursuance thereof." Ex parte Haskell, 112 Cal., 416; 44 Pac. Rep., 725; 32 L. R. A., 527, approved in Los An- geles County V. Eikenberry (Cal., 1901), 63 Pac. Rep., 766. Interpretation will be adopted that will fully effectuate the In- i289] OF CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. 443 should be so free from doubt that 'he who mas may read,' yet as even in the case of higher legislative bodies this is not always possible; and the courts should strive so to construe a by-law as to give reasonable effect to the object aimed at."*i Scrutiny unreasonably rigid will not be resorted to, in con- sidering the meaning of by-laws.*^ A by-law will not be de- clared void because of "a want of clearness of expression or a difficulty in construing or adopting its provisions."*^ All doubts are resolved in favor of the validity of the ordinance.** The presumption is in favor of the validity and the burden is upon the one who asserts its invalidity, to demonstrate it.*" Ordinances are to be tested bv the charter, or local constitu- tion. ^^ An ordinance passed by virtue of a state statute fixing ■ the time and manner of holding certain elections has the same power and effect and is to be interpreted as part of the statute itself.''^ Ordinances are to be construed in harmony with the laws and general legislative policy of the state.** Ordinarily the ordinance will not be so construed as to affect a repeal of the general state law with which it conflicts.*'-' Ordinances tent of the municipal legislation. One which violates the charter or law will be avoided, if possible and consistent, etc. St. Louis v. Kaime, 2 Mo. App., 66, 68. "The by-laws of a corporation are to receive a reasonable con- struction, so as, if practicable, to make them consistent with the law of its incorporation, and likewise with the general and fundamental laws of the state." Gass v. Green- ville, 4 Sneed (Tenn.), 62, 64. "The language of a charter cre- ated for the public good will be construed liberally in order to sup- port a by-law that tends reason- ably to effect that purpose." Rule applied to ordinance forbidding Sunday sales of liquor. Gabel v. Houston, 29 Tex., 335, 343. Every fair intendment and pre- sumption will be indulged to sup- port an ordinance within the local jurisdiction. Baltimore v. Clunet, 23 Md., 449. 81 Kruse v. Johnson, 2 Q. B., 91, 93; 14 Times L. R., 416, 417, per Lord Russell of Klllowen. 83 Whitlock V. West, 26 Conn., 406; Re Arkell and Town of St. James, 38 Up. Can. Rep., 594, 598; Re Croome and City of Brantford, 6 Ontario Rep., 188, 192. S3 Per Draper, C. J., in Re Smith and City of Toronto, 10 Up. Can. Com. Pleas, 225, 228. Si Stafford v. Chippewa Valley Electric R. C, 110 Wis., 331; 85 N. W. Rep., 1036. Sec. 186, supra. 85 Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. Car- linville, 103 111. App., 251. Com- pare Schott v. People, 89 III., 195. 88 Gabel v. Houston, 29 Tex., 335. 87 San Luis Obispo v. Fitzgerald, 126 Cal., 279; 58 Pac. Rep., 699. 88 Rule applied to an ordinance taxing peddlers. Moberly v. Hoover, 93 Mo. App., 663. 80 Bailey v. Com., 23 Ky. Law Rep., 1223; 64 S. W. Rep., 995. See ch. XV, Of Municipal Con- 444 OF CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. [§290 and by-laws should be so construed as to give every part of them effect, if possible.*^'" The court cannot insert words, quali- fications or conditions and thus amend the ordinance. Its prov- ince is to construe only.^i If possible, every clause and word in the ordinance will be given full force and effect.®^ § 290. Same subject. When the ordinance is to be treated as a contract and its words are plain and explicit in the con- struction the court will confine itself to the words.^* A reason- able construction will be adopted.^"* The intent of the ordinance controls in its construction.'*^ Objections to the constitutionality should be specific.^® The constitutionality of an ordinance is to be tested not by what has been done under it but by what it authorized to be done by virtue of its provisions.^^ All ordi- . nances relating to the sajtne subject should be construed to- gether.98 Thus where two ordinances are passed on the same day, one to widen a street and the other granting a franchise to a railroad company to lay its tracks in such street, they are to be construed as a. single ordinance.^^ The construction should be favorable to the public.^ Thus where the law provides that in conferring upon a water company the privilege for a stated pe- trol of Offenses Against the State. 312; 3 Pac. Rep., 455; Davidson v. oowhitlock V. West, 26 Conn., New Orleans, 96 U. S., 97; San 406. Mateo County v. S. Pac. R. R. Co., 91 Pittsburg V. Keech Co., 21 Pa. 8 Sawyer (U. S.), 238; Thomas v. Super. Ct., 548. Gain, 35 Mich., 155; Stuart v. Pal- 92 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. mer, 74 N. Y., 183. Darenkamp, 23 Ky. Law Rep., os Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La. 2249; 66 S. W. Rep., 1125. Ann., 162. 93 People's Gaslight & Coke Co. 99 Ligare v. Chicago, 139 111., 46; V. Hale, 94 111. App., 406. " 32 Am. St.' Rep., 179; 28 N. B. 94 First Municipality v. Cutting, Rep., 934. 4 La. Ann., 335. Statutes relating to the same It is proper to apply liberal rules matter should be considered to- of construction to town by-laws, gether and that construction Whitlock V. West, 26 Conn., 406. adopted which will give effect to An ordinance is not void because all of them. Andrew Co. ex rel. v. its subdivisions are not numbered Schell, 135 Mo., 31; 36 S. W. Rep., in consecutive order. Los Angeles 206. County V. Eikenberry (Cal.,1901), And in determining the meaning 63 Pac. Rep., 766. of an existing statute, it is proper 95 Merriam v. New Orleans, 14 to consider the prior law and all La. Ann., 318. changes therein. State ex rel. v. 96 New Orleans v. Chappuis, 105 Hostetter, 137 Mo., 636; 39 S. W. La., 179; 29 So. Rep., 721. Rep., 270. 97 Brown v, Denver, 7 Colo., 305, i Favorable to city, when public §291] OF CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. 445 riod to furnish water the company should charge such rates as might be "fixed by ordinance," and two constructions may be adopted— the rate fixed by ordinance to be permanent and the rate so fixed to be altered from time to time as justice may re- quire—the latter construction being favorable to the public will be adopted.2 Doubts as to whether an ordinance is invalid, as conflicting with individual rights, should be resolved agairst the city.3 The rule ejusdem generis is often applied in the con- struction of ordinances.* § 291. Title in construction. The title of an ordinance or statute may be construed in its interpretation.^ So the pream- ble to an act "may be used to explain an equivocal expression used in the enacting clause, but never to control its obvious interest conflicts with private. Philadelphia v. Western Union Tel. Co., 11 Phila. (Pa.), 327. 2 Freeport Water Co. v. Free- port, 180 U. S., 587; Danville Water Co. v. Danville, 180 U. S., 619; Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus, 180 U. S., 624, affirming 178 111., 571; 53 N. B. Rep., 363. 3 Slaughter v. O'Berry, 126 N. C, 181; 35 S. B. Rep., 241; 48 L. R. A., 442. i St. Louis V. Laughlin, 49 Mo., 559; State v. Schuchmann, 133 Mo., 534; 2 S. W. Rep., 836; State W. Rep., 842; State v. Bryant, 90' Mo., 534; 2 S. W. Rep., 836; State V. Dinnisse, 109 Mo., 434; 19 S. W. Rep., 92; State v. South, 136 Mo., 673; 38 S. W. Rep., 716; St. Louis Agr. and Mech. Assn. v. Delano, 108 Mo., 217; 18 S. W. Rep., 1101, following same case, 37 Mo. App., 284, and overruling State v. Wil- liams, 35 Mo. App., 541. Ordinance held to include horse racing though not speciflcally named. Webber v. Chicago, 148 111., 313; 36 N. B. Rep., 70. See sections 48 to 52, supra. 5 Dart V. Bagley, 110 Mo., 42, 51; 19 S. W. Rep., 311; Martin- dale V. Palmer, 52 Ind., 411; Port- land V. Schmidt, 13 Oreg., 17, 23; 6 Pac. Rep., 221; Ex parte Gregory, 20 Tex. App., 210; 54 Am. Rep., 516. The Bnglish Rule was that "the title cannot be resorted to in construing the enactment." Hun- ter V. Nockolds, 1 McN. & Cord, 651. "But the better rule, as we think, is to presume that the true intent and meaning is to be found in the title, unless it is plainly contradicted by the express terms of the body of the act." Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Albert, 39 Mo., 181. - The Title Does Not Control. The provisions of the ordinance itself and not the title are to be construed in order to determine the class of persons to which it is intended to apply. Spring Valley V. Henning, 42 111. App., 159. Title: "To prevent the estab- lishment of tippling houses." The ordinance went farther and for- bade any sale of lager beer, ale or other malt liquor, without a license. The evidence was that defendant sold a small quantity of beer by the quart. The con- viction was sustained, the court 446 OF CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. [§292 meaning, nor to supply matter not embraced in its spirit and meaning. ' ' " § 292. Contemporaneous construction. The general rule is that the meaning of an ordinance must be gathered from the law itself and not from contemporaneous statements of the individuals who framed it or those who voted for it.' This rule is particularly enforced where the provisions of the ordi- nance are clear.* In such case, contemporaneous construction adopted by the municipal officers -charged with its enforcement will be held inadmissible, to aid its construction."' However, in doubtful cases where the language of the ordinance is ambigu- ous, a contemporaneous construction adopted by the parties interested in the enforcement of the ordinance, while not con- trolling, is entitled to great weight.^** Respecting a discriminating ordinance, drawn in general terms, Mr. Justice Field observed : "The class character of this legislation is none the less manifest because of the general terms in which it is expressed. The statements of the super- visors in debate on the passage of the ordinance cannot, it is true, be resorted to for the purpose of explaining the meaning of the terms used ; but they can be resorted to for the purpose saying, "The title is unnecessary sorted to, to explain it." Per and cannot control the tenor of Thompson, C. J., in Jackson v. the enactment." Per Dixon, in Gilchrist, 15 John (N. Y.), 89, 116. State (Hershoff) v. Beverly, 45 N. The preamble cannot be invoked J. L., 288, 291. to control or restrain the obvious li Dictum, Johnson, J., in Clark meaning of an ordinance. Bohle V. Bynum, 3 McCord (S. C), L. v. Stannard, 7 Mo. App., 51, 55. 298, 299. '' Barnes v. Mobile, 19 Ala., 707. "It is, in general, true that the s Martin v. Swift, 120 111., 488; preamble of a statute is a key to 12 N. E. Rep., 201; Beardstown v. open the mind of the makers, as Virginia, 76 111., 34; Frye v. C, to the mischiefs which are in- B. & Q. R. R. Co., 73 111., 399; tended to be remedied by the Stadler v. Fahey, 87 111. App., 411. statute. This rule must not, how- o Wesson v. Collins, 72 Miss., ever, be carried so far as to re- 844; 18 So. Rep., 360, 917. strain the general words of an A construction put upon the enacting clause by the particular ordinance itself for a long period words of the preamble. Although will preclude its officers from the preamble cannot control the adopting a different construction, enacting part of a statute, which Harrison v. People, 97 111. App., is expressed in clear and unam- 421. ' biguous terms, yet if any doubt lo State ex rel. v. Severance, 49 arises on the words of the enact- Mo., 401; Wright v. Chicago, • etc., ing part, the preamble may be re- R. R. Co., 7 111. App., 438. § 293] OF CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. 447 of ascertaining the general object of the legislation proposed, and the mischief sought to be remedied. Besides we cannot shut our eyes to matters of public notoriety and general cog- nizance. When we take our seats on the bench we are not struck with blindness and forbidden to know, as judges, what we see as men ; and where an ordinance, though general in its terms, only operates upon a special race, sect or class, it being universally understood that it is to be enforced only against that race, sect or class, we may justly conclude that it was the intention of the body adopting it that it should only have such operation, and treat it accordingly. We may take notice of the limitation given to the general terms of an ordinance by its practical construction as a fact in its history, as we do in some cases that a law has practically become obsolete. If this were not so, the most important provisions of the constitution, intended for the security of personal rights, would by the gen- eral terms of an enactment, often be evaded and practically annulled." 51 § 293. Construction of penal ordinances. Ordinances penal in their nature are usually subject to strict construction.^ - Every law in derogation of rights of property, or that takes away the estate of the citizen, ought to be construed strictly .^^ But ordinarily rigid rules by which the validity of penal statutes are to be tested are not applicable to the by-laws of municipal corporations. "The by-laws of very few of these corporations could stand such test. They should receive a 11 Per Field, J., in Ah Kow v. Mo., 466; 37 S. W. Rep., 1108; 41 Nunan, 5 Sawyer (U. S.), 552, 560, S. W. Rep., 1094; 46 S. W. Rep., 561 (San Francisco "queue Ordi- 976; State v. Gritzner, 134 Mo., nance"); Brown v. Piper, 91 U. 512; 36 S. W. Rep., 39; State v. S., 37, 42, per Mr. Justice Swayne; Bryant, 90 Mo., 534; 2 S. W. Rep., Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. De- 836; Pacific v. Seifert, 79 Mo., 210, bolt, 16 How. (57 U. S.), 416, 435, 215; State v. Jaeger, 63 Mo., 403; per Mr. Chief Justice Taney; Scott St. Louis v. Goebel, 32 Mo., 295. V. Sandford (Dred Scott case), 19 New Jersey— McConYille v. May- How. (60 U. S.), 393, 407, per Mr. or, 39 N. J. L., 38. 42, 43; People Chief Justice Taney. v. Rosenberg, 138 N. Y., 410, 415. ^2 Illinois — Chicago v. Rumpff, This Is the statutory rule. Ex 45 111.; 90, 99. parte Simms, 40 Fla., 432; 25 So. Kentucky — Krickle v. Common- Rep., 280. wealth, 1 B. Mon. (Ky.), 361. is Fowler v. St. Joseph, 37 Mo., Missouri — St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 228. 448 Of consideration of validity. [1 394 reasonable construction, and their terms should not be strictly scrutinized for the purpose of making them void." ^* § 294. Construction of words and terms. It is competent for the ordinance to define words and terms used therein, and such definitions will usually be controlling.^'' Where a resolu- tion imposes duties on citizens in regard to care of sidewalks, with a provision that ' ' a copy of the resolution may be served, ' ' on citizens, the word ' ' may ' ' will be read as ' ' must, ' ' the resolu- tion being in protection of public interests and imposing a duty.i" General words and phrases, which are preceded by specific enumeration, are usually limited by such particular de- scriptions. ^^ The ordinance will be construed according to its reason and spirit. A literal interpretation will be rejected if such would defeat its purpose.^® In construction words will sometimes be rejected.^^ Inaccurate use of prepositions will not defeat the law.^'' 14 Per Eustis, C. J., in First Municipality v. Cutting, 4 La. Ann., 335. Reasonable construction is usu- ally adopted. Merriam v. New Or- leans, 14 La. Ann., 318; Common- wealth V. Robertson, 5 Cush. (Mass.), 438; Rounds v. Mumford, 2 R. I., 154. 15 St. Louis V. Weitzel, 130 Mo., 600; 31 S. W. Rep., 1045. "His," as used in the organic and statutory law, applies to fe- males as well as males, unless a different intent is exhibited by the context. State ex rel. v. Hostetter, 137 Mo., 636; 39 S. W. Rep., 270. Plural Number construed in State V. Sweeney, 93 Mo., 38; 5 S. W. Rep., 614. 16 Doane v. Omaha, 58 Neb., 815; 80 N. W. Rep., 54. See sections 82 and 83, supra. 17 Keokuk, etc., Co. v. Quincy, 81 111., 422; Snyder v. North Law- rence, 8 Kan., 82; St. Louis v. Herthel, 88 Mo., 128; St. Louis v. Laughlin, 49 Mo., 559; Grumley v. Webb, 44 Mo., 444; Knox City v. Thompson, 19 Mo. App., 523; Shultz V. Cambridge, 38 Ohio St., 659. 18 Indianapolis v. Huegele, 115 Ind., 581, 588; 18 N. E. Rep., 172. 13 State V. Acuff, 6 Mo., 54. 20 Worrell v. State, 12 Ala., 732. An ordinance made it an offense to be found associating with cer- tain characters "in a public place, street, alley, common, or within said city limits," construed to read "in any public place, street, alley or common within said city," thus making the conjunction "or" to precede instead of to follow the word "common." Zorger v. Greens- burgh, 60 Ind., 1. "Policy," in a penal ordinance forbidding "policy playing," the court will take notice of the fact that the term was in current use, in the town, when the ordinance was passed. State v. Carpenter, 60 Conn., 97, 102; 22 Atl. Rep., 497. The charter required election of stated number of "aldermen who § 295J OF CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. 449 § 295. Construction where ordinance void in part. The fact that an ordinance may be void in part does not necessarily render the whole ordinance invalid. The rule established is. that, where the valid parts are not necessarily dependent upon the void provisions, as where the former are independent of and not necessarily connected with the latter, and it is prac- ticable to separate them the court will sustain those parts which are valid. In other words, the valid and void parts must be entire and distinct from each other, and the former must be capable of distinct enforcement. But if the ordinance is entire, each part being essential and connected with the rest, the invalidity of one part renders the whole invalid.^^ Ordi- shall be known as the city coun- 21 Alaliama — Ex parte Bizzell, cil." The ordinance regulating 112. Ala., 210; 21 So. Rep., 371; municipal elections used the word Birmingham v. Alabama G. S. R. "councilmen" instead of "alder- Co., 98 Ala., 134; 13 So. Rep., 141; men" ; held, not material, as mean- Ex parte Byrd, 84 Ala., 17 ; 4 So. ing of ordinance is the same. State Rep., 397; 5 Am. St. Rep., 328; Ex ex rel. v. Anderson, 26 Fla., 240, parte Florence, In re Jones, 78 257; 8 So. Rep., 1. Ala., 419, 425. The constitution authorized Arkansas — Ft. Smith v. Scruggs, election of "justice of the peace." 70 Ark., 549; 69 S. W. Rep., 679; The statute provided for election 91 Am. St. Rep., 100. of "police magistrates." The ordi- California — San Luis Obispo nance under which the election County v. Greensberg, 120 Cal., was held followed the statutory 300; 52 Pac. Rep., 797; Ex parte designation. Some votes were cast Haskell, 112 Cal., 412, 420; 44 Pac. for "police justice," some for Rep., 725. "magistrate," some for "police Florida — State v. Dillon, (Fla. magistrate of City of Chicago." 1900), 28 So. Rep., 781; Tampa Held, terms "police magistrate" v. Salomonson, 35 Fla., 446; 17 So. and "police justice" were equally Rep., 581. within the meaning of the consti- Illinois — Poyer v. Des Plaines, tution and the intention of the 123 111., Ill; 13 N. E. Rep., 819; statute. The election was held 5 Am. St. Rep., 494; Baker v. valid as the intention of the voter Normal, 81 111., 108; Harbaugh v. should govern. People ex rel. v. Monmouth, 74 111., 367; Alton v. Matteson, 17 111., 157, 169, per Foster, 74 111. App., 511; Kettering Caton, J. V. Jacksonville, 50 111., 39. ■ Punctuation. Must yield to Kentucky — Baker v. Lexington, manifest intention of council as 21 Ky. Law Rep., 809; 53 S. W. expressed in an ordinance. Rep., 16. Charleston v. Reed, 27 W. Va., 681, Louisiana — State v. Riley, 49 La. 696; 55 Am. Rep., 336. Ann., 1617; 22 So. Rep., 843; Villa- UsAGE AND Custom, when may vaso v. Barthet, 39 La. Ann., 247, be invoked in construing ordi- 258; 1 So. Rep., 599. nances, see sec. 73, supra. Michigan — Detroit v. Ft. Wayne, 29 450 OP CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. [§295 nances relating to the same subject are generally to be con- etc, R. Co., 95 Mich., 456; 54 N. W. Texas— Bassett v. El Paso (Tex. Rep., b58; People v. Armstrong, Civ. App., 1894), 28 S. W. Rep., 554. 73 Mich., 288; 16 Am. St. Rep., i7 toft— Eureka City v. Wilson, 578; 2 L. R. A., 721; 41 N. W. Rep., 15 Utah, 67; 62 Am. St. Rep., 904; 275. Minnesota — WykofE v. Healey, 57 Minn., 14; 58 N. W. Rep., 685; Duluth V. Krupp, 46 Minn., 435; 48 Pac. Rep., 150. Washington — Seattle v. Pearson, 15 Wash., 575; 46 Pac. Rep., 1053. Wisconsin — State ex rel. v. New- 49 N. W. Rep.,. 235; State v. Can- man, 96 Wis., 258; 71 N. W. Rep., 438; Wilcox v. Hemming, 58 Wis., 144; 46 Am. Rep., 625; 15 N. W. tieny, 34 Minn., 1; 24 N. W. Rep., 458. ilfissoMn— Neosho Water Co. v. ^®P-' *^^- Neosho, 136 Mo., 498; 38 S. W. England and Canada — Fazaker- Rep., 89; Verdin v. St. Louis, 131 ^^^ ^- Wiltshire, 1 Stra., 469; Gun Mo., 26; 33 S. W. Rep., 480; 36 S. W. Rep., 52; Carroll v. Camjfbell, 108 Mo., 550; 17 S. W. Rep., 884; State ex rel. v. Cramer, 96 Mo., 75; 8 S. W. Rep., 788; St. Louis v. St. makers' Co. v. Fell, Willes, 390 Reg. V. Lundie, 8 Jur. N. S., 640 31 L. J. M. C, 157; 10 W. R., 267 5 L. T. N. S., 830; per Lord Ken- yon in Rex v. Favershan, 8 Term Louis R. Co., 89 Mo.. 44; 58 Am. ^^p., 356, 357; Rex v. Bumstead, 2 Rep., 82; IS. W. Rep., 305; 14 ^arn. & Ad., 704; Blackpool L. B. Mo. App., 221; Rockville v. Mer- «^ ^^^'^h v. Bennett, 4 H. & N., chant, 60 Mo. App., 365; County ^^S; Lee v. Wallis, 1 Ken., 295; Ross V. United Counties of York and Peeland Town of Belleville, 30 Up. Can. Q. B., 81; Re Harris and City of Hamilton, 44 Up. Can. We&ra«fca-Bailey v. State, 30 ^ j.^ ^ Neb., 855; 47 N. W. Rep., 208; ^^.^^^^ Columbia Rep., 338. Court y. Griswold, 58 Mo., 175; State V. Clarke, 54 Mo., 17; 14 Am. Rep., 471. State V. Hardy, 7 Neh., 377. Uew Jersey — Haynes v. Cape Various Illustrations. Improvement ordinance. Bitzer May, 52 N. J. L., 180; 19 Atl. Rep., y Dinwiddie, 20 Ky. Law Rep., 176; State (Staats) v. Washing- 298; 45 S. W. Rep., 1049; Pehler ton, 45 N. J. L., 318; 46 N. J. L., y Gosnell, 99 Ky., 380; 35 S. W. 209; State (Trowbridge) v. New- Rep., 1125. ark, 46 N. J. L., 140; State (Cham- Discriminating in part. Indian- berlain) v. Hoboken, 38 N. J. L., apolis v. Bieler, 138 Ind., 30; 36 110- N. E. Rep., 857. THew York — Rogers v. Jones, 1 One section which is void will Wend. (N. Y.), 237; 19 Am. Dec, not invalidate other sections of the 493; Broadway & S. A. R. R. Co. ordinance. Belleville v. Citizens' v. New York, 49 Hun. (N. Y.), 126. Horse Ry. Co., 152 111., 171; 38 N. North Carolina — State v. Web- E. Rep., 584 ; In re Ah Toy, 45 Fed. ber, 107 N. C, 962; 12 S. E. Rep., Rep., 795. 598; 22 Am. St. Rep., 920. Retrospective in part, only in- Ohio — Piqua v. Zimmerlin, 35 operative and void to that extent. Ohio St., 507 ; Stever v. McConnell, Salary ordinance. Rau v. Little 10 Ohio Dec, 573; Weaver v. Mt. Rock, 34 Ark., 303. Vernon, 6 Ohio Dec, 436, Void in Penalty. §295 J OF CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. 451 strued together. Thus where two ordinances are passed on the Arkansas — Eureka Springs v. O'Neal, 56 Ark., 350; 19 S. W. Rep., 969. Iowa — Keokuk v. Dressell, 47 Iowa, 597. Massachusetts — Com. v. Dow, 10 Met. (Mass.), 382. Nebraska — Magneau v. Fremont, 30 Neb., 843; 27 Am. St. Rep., 436; 9 L. R. A., 786; 47 N. W. Rep., 280. New /ersej/— Sterling v. Camden, 65 N. J. L., 190; 46 Atl. Rep., 781; Doran v. Camden, 64 N. J. L., 666; 46 Atl. Rep., 724. United States — Cooper v. Dis- trict of Columbia, 11 Dlst. of Col. (MacArthur & M.), 250. Ordinance Too Comprehen.si\'e. An ordinance covering matters be- yond the jurisdiction of the local corporation, held entirely void. Guilford V. Clark, 2 Vent. (K. B.), 247; Dodwell v. Oxford, 2 Vent. (K. B.), 33. Compare Elwood v. Bullock, 6 Q. B. Bng. L. R., 383 ; Reg. v. Rob- inson, 17 Q. B. Eng. Law Rep., 46. Contra. In such case, the ordi- nance may be enforced in cases within the jurisdiction. Shelton v. Mobile, 30 Ala., 540; 68 Am. Dec, 143; Canova v. Williams, 41 Fla., 509; 27 So. Rep., 30; Schofield v. Tampico, 98 111. App., 324; Eldora V. Burlingame, 62 Iowa. 32; 17 N. W. Rep., 148. Compare (regulating sale of liquor) Eureka v. Jackson, 8 Kan. App., 49; 54 Pac. Rep., 5; Cantril V. Sainer, 59 Iowa, 26; 12 N. W. Rep., 753; New Hampton v. Con- roy, 56 Iowa, 498; 9 N. W. Rep., 417; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165; 63 Am. Dec, 487. Vaiid and Void Parts Insepar- able renders whole ordinance void. Hannibal v. M. & K. Tel. Co., 31 Mo. App., 23; Kirkwood v. Meramec Highlands Co., 94 Mo. App., 637; 68 S. W. Rep., 761. Where clause defining the of- fense is Inseparably connected with the penal clause, and the lat- ter being void, invalidates the whole ordinance. Landis v. Vine- land, 54 N. J. L., 75; 23 Atl. Rep., 357. Conflict with Chaktek or Gen- eral Law; valid and void provis- ions. Alabama — Shelton v. Mobile, 30 Ala., 540; 68 Am. Dec, 143. California— In re Mansfield, 106 Gal., 400; 39 Pac. Rep., 775; San Luis Obispo V. Pettlt, 87 Cal., 499; 25 Pac. Rep., 694; Ex parte Holm- quist (Cal., 1901), 27 Pac. Rep., 1099; Ex parte Christensen, 85 Cal., 208; 24 Pac Rep., 747. Connecticut — State v. Smith, 67 Com., 541; 35 Atl. Rep., 506; 52 Am. St. Rep., 301; State v. Welch, 36 Conn., 215, 217. Dakota — Elk Point v. Vaughn, 1 Dak., 113; 46 N. W. Rep., 577. Illinois — Walker v. People, 170 111., 410; 48 N. E. Rep., 1010; Illi- nois Central R. Co. v. People, 161 111., 244; 43 N. E. Rep., 1107. Louisiana — Second Municipality v. Morgan, 1 La. Ann., 111. New Jersey — Landis v. Vineland, 54 N. J. L., 75; 23 Atl. Rep., 357. North Carolina— State v. Earn- hardt, 107 N. C, 789; 12 S. E. Rep., 426. Conflict with State Constitu- tion — Rule applied. Arkansas — Rau v. Little Rock, 34 Ark., 303. Iowa — Keokuk v. Dressell, 47 Iowa, 597. Louisiana — Villavaso v. Barthet, 39 La. Ann., 247; 1 So. Rep., 599. Minnesota — State v. Kantler, 33 Minn., 69; 21 N. W. Rep., 856. 452 OP CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. [§39t3 same day and one is dependent upon the other, if one is void both must fall.-2 An ordinance regulating the rate of speed of trains may be void as applied to the sparsely settled portions of the corpora- tion where the road is fenced and the circumstances are such as not to require any restriction in the rate of speed, and valid as applied to other portions of the city.^^ §296. Construction of ordinances— Illustrative cases. An ordinance forbidding wagons to stand on certain named streets and sell products therefrom was held not to be violat-ed by the wagon casually stopping to sell ; that the ordinance was intended 'to prevent such wagons standing in the streets for the Missouri — St. Louis v. St. Louis E. Co., 14 Mo. App., 221. Uneeasonable in Past — Eureka Springs v. O'Neal, 56 Ark., 350; 19 S. W. Rep., 969 ; Lamar v. Weid- man, 57 Mo. App., 507; Pennsylva- nia R. Co. V. Jersey City, 47 N. J. L., 286; Rahway Gas Light Co. V. Rah way, 58 N. J. L., 510; 34 Atl. Rep7, 3. Miscellaneous — Ordinance im- posing an occupation tax and pro- viding only an illegal method for its enforcement, is rendered wholly void. Omaha v. Harmon, 58 Neb., 339; 78 N. W. Rep., 623; German American Fire Ins. Co. v. Minden, 51 Neb., 870; 71 N. W. Rep., 995. But an ordinance providing for licensing certain occupation and also taxing the same, the fact the latter is void does not invalidate former, which is valid, the two be- ing severable and independent. State ex rel. v. Schoenig, 72 Minn., 528; 75 N. W. Rep., 711. Franchise ordinance granting exclusive use of streets for thirty years for laying water pipes, etc., to supply the city with water, and fixing compensation city shall pay for use of the water. The ordi- nance may be void as to the grant of the exclusive use, and also as to the indebtedness, yet valid as to the right of the grantee to construct the water works and lay his mains and pipes in the street for the purpose of supplying water for private use. Quincy v. Bull, 106 111., 337. Statutobt Construction; same rule applies. Alabama — McCreary v. State, 73 Ala., 480; Powell v. State, 69 Ala., 10; Vines v. State, 67 Ala., 73; Ex parte Pollard, 40 Ala., 77. Massachibsetts — Fisher v. Mc- Girr, 1 Gray (Mass.), 1; 61 Am. Dec, 381; Warren v. Charleston, 2 Gray (Mass.), 84. New J'ersej/— State (McClosky) V. Chamberlin, 37 N. J. L., 388. ISlew York — Duryee v. New York, 96 N. Y., 477. Ohio — State v. Sinks, 42 Ohio St., 345, 365. Rule applied to by-law of insur- ance company. Amesbury v. Bow- ditch M. P. Ins. Co., 6 Gray (Mass.), 596. 22 Jacksonville v. Ledwith, 26 Fla., 163; 23 Am. St. Rep., 558; 9 L. R. A., 69; 7 So. Rep., 885; com- pare State V. Tenant, 110 N. C, 609; 14 S. B. Rep., 387; 28 Am. St. Rep., 715. 23 Meyers v. C, R. I. & P. R. Co., 296] OF CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. 453 purpose of selling and with no intention of moving until all the products therein were sold. The purpose of the ordinance was to prohibit incumbering or obstructing the streets with ve- hicles, animals, etc. 2* An ordinance may be too comprehensive in its provisions and cover cases which the city has no power to control, but that is no reason why courts should refuse to en- force it in cases over which the jurisdiction of the local corpora- tion is unquestioned.-^ An ordinance providing that "hay bought or brought within the corporation" to be used therein, ' ' shall be weighed on the hay-scales of the corporation erected for the mutual accommodation of seller and buyer," was con- strued to apply only to persons bringing hay within the limits of the corporation to be sold and used there. Thus where one purchased a stack of hay beyond the corporate limits and hauled it with his own wagons and teams within the city to be used therein at a livery stable of which he was proprietor he is not a violator of such ordinance.^® So an ordinance forbidding 57 Iowa, 555; 10 N. W. Rep., 896; 42 Am. Rep., 50. See §§ 29 and 30, supra. 2* People V. Keir, 78 Mich., 98; 43 N. W. Rep., 1039. Regulating sale of meat, etc., at market. Snell v. Belleville, 30 Up. Can. Q. B., 81. 25 Ordinance forbade sale of liq- uor and beer generally. City had no power as to sale of liquor by wholesale. Prosecution was for sale of beer by the glass, in what is called a "saloon" and therefore did not involve the question of the power of the city to forbid its sale as an article of commerce, to be carried beyond the limits of the city, or used for mechanical pur- poses. The violation of the ordi- nance as proved was held within the jurisdiction of city and a prop- er police regulation. Kettering v. Jacksonville, 50 111., 39, 41. Contra — Where the city ha,s only power to regulate the sale of liquor not prohibited by state statutes, an ordinance which includes all kinds of intoxicating liquor, held too comprehensive and therefore void. Cantril v. Sainer, 59 Iowa, 26; 12 N. W. Rep., 753; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165; 63 Am. Dec, 487; New Hampton v. Conroy, 56 Iowa, 498; 9 N. W. Rep., 417. Compare Eldo- rado V. Burlingame, 62 Iowa, 32; 17 N. W. Rep., 148. Municipal Limits. Ordinance was not limited in its scope and operation to territorial limits of corporation. But the prosecution was for a sale of in- toxicating liquor conceded to have been made within the corporate limits of the village. Held valid. Schofield V. Tampico, 98 111. App., 324, 326. Disturbing Peace — Charivari. St. Charles v. Meyer, 58 Mo., 86. A Permit to Open a Street for the purpose of laying a drain is not to be construed as a gra-nt of a right to lay and continue a drain, but simply as what purports to be a license to disturb the surface of the street. Glasby v. Morris, 18 N. J. Eq., 72. Several Clauses. First clause 454 OF CONSIDERATION OP VALIDITY. [§ 397 sale of hay within corporate limits, without its being first weighed by city weigher, was held not applicable to a sale made without the city to be delivered within it.^'^ § 297. Same subject. Where an ordinance relating to cattle going at large upon the streets, etc., recited that the practice of letting cattle lie in the streets at night had become a dan- gerous nuisance, and then provided, first, that the owner of cat- tle shall pen them every night, by or before dark, under pen- alty for each omission; and second, that "all cattle found in the street between dark and daybreak shall be taken up and penned by the town constable and turned out the next morning, ' ' it was held that the first part did not apply to cattle of non-residents; that the penalty was directed against the owner of the beast for not penning it, and was not given for of ordinance recited that it shall be unlawful for any person, per- sons or corporation, etc. The sec- ond clause was connected with the first by the copulative conjunction "and." Held, in absence of any- thing in the ordinance to show contrary intent, the second clause should be construed as applying to and binding upon the same class of persons mentioned in the first clause. Wright v. C. & N. W. R. R. Co., 7 111. App., 438, 447. Exceptions From Operation. Ordinance relating to storing gua- no or commercial fertilizer within corporate limits, held not to apply to one who at large expense erect- ed building for this purpose, with- out objection on the part of the city authorities. The doctrine of estoppel was applied. Athens v. Georgia R. R. Co., 72 Ga., 800. Map Includes Survey. An ordi- nance directing one t "have a map made" authorizes the payment of making a map and the neces- sary survey also. Corsicana v. Kerr, 75 Tex., 207; 12 S. W. Rep., 982. 20 Question how are words to be understood: "All hay bought and brought within the limits of the corporation," etc. "It is ob- vious that the ordinance in ques- tion operates upon the seller and not upon the buyer. No one would be heard to say that It was intended to prohibit a farmer of the county from selling a stack or load of hay, on his farm, to a mem- ber of the corporation without hav- ing the same weighed." "The by- law seems to admit of but one sensible construction, and that is, that persons bringing hay within the limits of the corporation to be sold, and used there, shall be re- quired to sell it by weight. And of this, no just complaint can be made; for, coming voluntarily within the jurisdiction of the cor- poration and offering the product of their farm in the market they subject themselves to the corporate regulations, ordained for the ben- efit and portection of the members of the corporation." Gass v. Green- ville, 4 Sneed (Tenn.), 62, 64. 27 Hemlnger v. Cleveland, 2 Ohio Dec, 428. §397] OF CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. 455 any cattle found in the streets, but for cattle not penned ; that it was not given for the nuisance but for an act tending to pro- duce it.-"' So a by-law concerning licensing, regulating and restraining dogs from going at large within the town, was con- strued to apply only to dogs owned or' kept in the town, al- though, in its terms, it applied to "any person permitting his dog to go at large within the town. ' ' -» An j ordinance authorizing the marshal to seize sheep found running at large in the streets, etc., was held not to apply to sheep herded by competent persons within the city limits and in perfect control. ^o An ordinance providing a penalty for one who should "pennit" horses, etc., to run at large within the corporate limits, was held applicable to a non-resident owner living near the city who turned his horse loose, which strayed into the city. He did "permit" his horse to run at large.^i An ordinance which provides that, "no person shall put, or cause to be put in any street, sidewalk or other public place within the city limits, any dust, dirt, filth, shavings or other rubbish or 28 "When an offense is made to consist of the omission to do an act in the town, he only is within the purview of the law, upon whom, by that or some other law, the act is imposed as a duty to be performed within the town. Gen- eral terms used in reference to such duty and penalty are re- strained by the subject matter, and cannot be extended to persons who have no rights to be exercised and no duties to be performed within the place, since that would be to render them liable, not for the omission within the town (which is the specific offense) but for the consequential evil resulting from the omission of a similar act at another place, at which It was no duty. There ought to be express or plain words to include such per- sons." Plymouth v. Pettijohn, 4 Dev. Law (N. C). 591, 594, 595, per Ruffln, C. J. 29 Com. V. Dow, 10 Mete. (51 Mass.), 382. A Dog Is "Going at Large" where he is following through the streets, his master, or the clerk of his master, loose, and at such a dis- tance as that such control could not be exercised as would prevent mischief. Com. v. Dow, 10 Mete. (51 Mass.), 382. Swine at Large, Etc. "No swine shall be kept in any town to be fed on swill, offal, or any other decaying substance brought from any town except in such places as shall be designated by the town council thereof." Held that the in- tent was not to forbid a person liv- ing in one town to feed his swine on swill from another town unless he kept the swine purposely to be fed in that way. The intent was to prohibit the business of keeping swine to be fed in places other than those designated for it. State V. McMahon, 14 R. I., 285, 287, per Durfee, C. J. 30 Spect V. Arnold, 52 Cal., 455. 31 Moore v. Crenshaw, 1 White & 456 OP CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. [§398 sbstruetion of any kind," was held broad enough to embrace the obstruction of a street by a railroad company with its cars.^^ Where one section of an ordinance provides what kind of vehicles shall be licensed, and the next what amounts shall be paid for such licenses, the use of a general term of descrip- tion in the latter does not enlarge the scope of the former sec- tion, but on the contrary, the general words in the latter are limited by the particular words in the former.^* § 298. Same— Who liable— Landlord and tenant. The law seeks to place responsibility upon the author of the wrong. In ease of nuisance the one who creates it or suffers it to continue is made liable. Where premises are leased or rented for a spec- ified terra and the landlord surrenders for the time being to the tenant complete control thereof, as a rule, ordinances relat- ing to keeping premises safe and free from nuisances operate directly upon the tenant and not on the landlord.^* Thus an W. Civ. Cas. Ct. App. Tex., sec. 264. 32 Hlinois Central R. R. Co. v. Galena, 40 III., 344, per Breese, J. 33 Snyder v. North Lawrence, 8 Kan., 82; Shultz v. Cambridge, 38 Ohio St., 659. See Sec. 294, supra. Retkoactive. Ordinance provid- ing a tribunal for municipal elec- tion contests and course of proced- ure may be made applicable to election contests growing out of election held before ordinance en- acted. State V. Johnson, 17 Ark., 407. 3* Rule applied in civil action for damages resulting from falling into a coal hole which was not properly covered. The tenant was to keep the premises in good re- pair. West Chicago Masonic Assn. V. Cohn, 192 111., 210; 61 N. E. Rep., 439, reversing 94 111. App., 333. . "If the premises are so con- structed, or in such a condition, that the continuance of their use by the tenant must result in a nui- sance to a third person, and a nuisance does so result, the land- lord is liable." Knauss v. Brua, 107 Pa. St., 85, 88, per Gordon, J. Landlord held liable to plaintiff for damages resulting from falling into a dangerous opening in a side- walk on premises in the possession of a tenant, where it appeared that the dangerous opening was in ex- istence before and at the time of the execution of the lease and con- tinued in the same condition to the time of the injury. Reading City V. Reiner, 167 Pa. St., 41; 31 Atl. Rep., 357. Landlord held liable to civil ac- tion for damages resulting from ice on the sidewalk in front of his premises, though the premises had been rented. Brown v. White, 202 Pa. St., 297; 51 Atl. Rep., 962. Owner liable for an existing nuisance at the time the premises are let. Rule applied to da-mages resulting from leakage from a cess-pool on the demised premises, which had been defectively con- § 298] OF CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. 457 ordinance which provides that, ' ' if any person or persons shall erect and build, ' ' etc., wooden buildings within certain limits, the tenant who erects a building in violation of such ordinance is liable and not the owner of the premises.*^ So under an ordinance requiring the owner, agent or occupant to abate a nuisance on the premises, a mere ag^nt of the owner of the fee simple cannot be held punishable for failure to enter upon the premises in lawful possession of a tenant, in order to abate a nuisance within the tenant's exclusive con- trol for the time being. "The simple statement of the ques- tion seems to furnish its answer. When an owner lets to a ten- ant he surrenders the entire possession and control for the term, having then no more right of entry than any stranger, unless for certain exceptional purposes affecting his future en- joyment of the freehold. Outside of such purposes, the tenant may resist his invasion of the premises as a violator of the law which protects the domicile against the world. * * * The person having the actual occupancy or control of any premises is alone responsible for a private nuisance maintained thereon. If there be a tenant or occupant, he is the party to whom the penalty will attach if he fail to obey the notice and direction provided for by the municipal regulation. If there be no occu- pant, then the actual control is in the owner or his agent, or both, and to him or them the ordinance will apply. ' '^^ In a Georgia case, the ordinance made it the duty of the structed. But if the construction Boston v. Gray, 144 Mass., 53; 10 is proper and the leakage is due N. E. Rep., 509. to subsequent neglect of the ten- Mississippi — Jones v. Millsaps, ant, the latter alone is liable. Wun- 71 Miss., 10; 14 So. Rep., 440; 23 der V. McLean, 134 Pa. St., 334; L. R. A., 155, note. 19 Atl. Rep., 749. New York — Canandaigua v. Fos- The question discussed and the ter, 156 N. Y., 354; 50 N. B. Rep., above rules applied in the follow- 971; 41 L. R. A., 554. ing comparatively recent cases : Pennsylvania — Fow v. Roberts, California — Morrison v. McAvoy 108 Pa. St., 489, 491, per Paxson, J. (Cal., Oct. 30, 1902), 70 Pac. Rep., Wisconsin — Selleck v. Tallman, 62*.;. Rider. v. Clark,. 132 Cal., 382; 93 Wis., 246; 67 N. W. Rep., 36. 6fcPac'. Rep., .564. Canada — Organ v. Toronto (C. /ZZinois— Peoria v. Simpson,- 110 P.), .24.0nt. Rep., 318. 111., 294; 51 Am. Rep., 683; GrJdley as Douglass v. Commonwealth,- 2 V. Bloorolagton, 68 111., 47; Chica- Rawle (Pa.), 262, 265. go V, O'Brennan, 65 111., 160. ^e per Lewis, J., St. Louis v. ■Massachusetts — Stevenson v.Jpy, Kaime, 2 Mo. App., 61, 68, 152 Mass., 45; 25 N. E. Rep., 78; 458 OP CONSIDERATION OF VALIDITY. [§ 298 owner of every "untenanted or unoccupied" store-house or building, Avithin the corporate limits, to cause the same to be opened and ventilated at least once a vpeek, from May to No- vember, in every year. It appeared that the premises in ques- tion had been leased and at the time of the prosecution the term had not expired. In denying the liability of the landlord, Lumpkin, J., remarked: "He (landlord) has no right to enter upon the premises for the purpose of opening and ventilating the buildings. To do so would be to subject him to an action of trespass at the instances of the leasee. A lot thus situated is not 'untenanted' in the language of the ordinance. The duty of ventilation devolved upon the tenant. He is the temporary owner. ' '^'^ Under an ordinance imposing a penalty on the "owner or oc- cupier ' ' of any house or room, the chimney of which shall take fire and blaze out at the top, the tenant is meant and not the landlord.^* Under an ordinance of Boston which requires the removal of snow from the adjoining sidewalk by the "tenant, occupant, and, in case there shall be no tenant, the owner, ' ' the landlord is not liable where he had let part of the premises to one tenant and part to another, although he occupies rooms in the building as a boarder with one of his tenants.** 37 Shields v. Savannah, 20 Ga., title in revision. The notion that 57, 59. both owner and occupier were in- 38 "Words so unequivocal as to tended to be liable, we think alto- be incapable of any other inter- gether untenable." Wardlaw, J., pretation would be required to in Charleston v. Blake, 12 Rich. show a matter so unreasonable, as Law (S. C), 66, 68. that a landlord who, by a lease for The ordinance recited that, "no years, had transferred to a tenant person shall cast or lay or suffer the exclusive enjoyment and care or run in or upon, or within three of a house for a term, should dur- feet of any wharf, or in any lane, ing the term be liable for the ten- alley, lot or vacant place, * * * ant's negligence in respect to the the contents of any sink, tub, privy house. * * * It appears to us or cestpool," etc., under penalty. that the city ordinance by the al- The premises had been leased for ternatlve, owner or occupier, in- a term of five years and actually tended to provide that the owner occupied by tenant. Held landlord should be liable, if he occupied not liable. New Ybrk v. Corlies, personally, or by agent, or serv- 2 Sandf. Sup. Ct. Rep. (N. Y.). ant, or guest; but that the occu- 301, 303. pant should be liable if there was "o Com. v. Watson, 97 Mass., 562. a person in possession under some Fire Escape — Schmalzried v. definite right, not subject to the White, 97 Tenn., 36 ; 36 S. W. Rep., will of the owner, him who has the 393 ; 32 L. R. A., 782. CHAPTER X. OF ACTIONS TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 1. The Court and Its Jurisdic- tion. 2. The Action — Its Form, Na- ture and Institution. 3. The Statement, Complaint or Information. 4. The Trial — Summary or Jury — Proceedings. 5. The Evidence for the Cor- poration. 6. Defenses. 7. The Judgment, Record and Execution. 8. Review. 1. THE COURT AND ITS JURISDICTION. § 299. Establishment and Continu- ance of Local Courts. 300. Jurisdiction of Local Courts 301. Territorial Limits of Juris- diction. § 302. Who Authorized to Act as Judges, Jurors and Wit- nesses. 2. THE ACTION— ITS FORM, NATURE AND INSTITUTION. i 303. How Ordinances Enforced— § 306. Arrest Without Warrant. Form of Action. 307. Sufficiency of Summons or 304. How Far the Proceedings Warrant. are Criminal or Quasi 308. Bail Bond. Criminal. 309. Name in Which Action 305. Institution of Proceedings — Should Be Brought. Notice — Appearance. 3. THE STATEMENT, COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION. I 310. Formal Parts of Complaint § 317. Negativing Exceptions. or Information. 311. Allegation of Notice of Or- dinance Unnecessary — Ju- risdiction. 312. Averment of Power to Pass Ordinance. 313. Requisites of Statement, Complaint or Information — Substance. 314. Form of Complaint— Verifi- cation — Conclusion. 315. Pleading Ordinance Violated — Judicial Notice. 316. Same — Reference to Ordi- nance Violated Required. 318. Several Offenses — Joinder. 319. Same — Joint Liability. 320. Statement or Information for Penalty for Second Offense. 321. Sufficient of Complaint or Statemen t — Illustrative Cases. 322. Sufficiency of Report of Police. 323. Amendment of Statement or Information. 324. How Defective Statement or Information Cured, m 460 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§399 4. THE TRIAL— SUMMARY OR JURY— PROCEEDINGS. 325. Arraignment and Plea. 326. Mode of Conducting Trial- Civil or Criminal. . , - 327. Pleading the Defense. Summary Trial — Origin. Summary Jurisdiction of Municipal Offenses— Enu- meration. Constitutional Right of Trial by Jury Does Not Apply to Municipal Offenses. When Jury Trial Allowed. Same — Crimes — Criminal Prosecution, 328. 329 330. 331. 332. § 333. Same — Crime, Misdemeanor and Municipal Offenses Distinguished. 334. Same — Misdemeanor. 335. Jury Trial On Appeal. 336. Application for Jury — Con ditions — Waiver. 337. Method of Conducting Jury Trial. 338. Technical Rules of Proced- ure Disregarded — Practice. 339. Costs. 5. THE EVIDENCE FOR THE CORPORATION. i 340. Proof of Ordinance. 341. Proof of Offense. 342. Same — Illustrative Cases. 343. Proving the Intent. 344. Liability of Participants, Keepers, Subordinates, Servants, etc. § 345. Liability of Principal for Acts of Employes, Ser- vants, etc. 346. Burden of Proof— Negative Averment. 347. Variance. 6. DEFENSES. i 348. Defenses Enumerated. 349. Corporate Existence Cannot Be Questioned as a De- fense. 350. No Defense Because Prose- cution Under Validated Ordinance. § 351. Former Acquittal or Punish- ment. 352. Estoppel as a Defense. 353. When Defendant Estopped from Pleading Unreason- ableness of Ordinance. 354. Defenses — Miscellaneous. 355. Defenses — Illustrative Cases. 7. THE JUDGMENT, RECORD AND EXECUTION, i 356. The Verdict. 357. The Judgment. § 358. Record of Conviction. 359. Execution. 8. REVIEW. ! 360. Right of Review. 361. Review by Appeal.; : 362. Same— Time and'Method of - Taking. " ' ' ' .. ' 363. Same — Trial De Hovo on Appeal. 364. Review by Oertlorari. § 365. Record ou Certiorari. 366. Same— Writ' of Error. 367. Habeas Corpus. "' ' ' 368. Injunction. 369. Prohibition. 370. Sufficiency of Record Review. for j399] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 461 1. THE COURT AND ITS JURISDICTION. § 299. Establishment and continuance of local courts. The establishment and continuance of local courts, variously styled police courts, city courts, municipal corporation courts, recor- der's courts, mayors' courts, hustings courts, etc., depend en- tirely upon the constitution and general laws of the particular state. Ordinarily, the power to establish such courts is vested in the legislature ;i but municipal charters frequently provide for their establishment and confer upon them the jurisdiction they will be permitted to exercise.^ Unless the power is given by the constitution a municipal corporation cannot establish a court without express legislative sanction.* The jurisdiction of such local courts is generally confined to violations of ordinances and local police regulations, but in the absence of constitutional restriction they may be invested with 1 Local Courts. Perkins v. Cor- bin, 45 Ala., 103; 6 Am. Rep., 698; Williamson v. Commonwealth, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.), 146; Atkins v. Fraker, 32 Wis., 510. Acts creating, as special laws. Chesney v. McClintock, 61 Kan., 94; 58 Pac. Rep., 993; In re Greer, 58 Kan., 268; 48 Pac. Rep., 950. ■ " City court. Schroder v. Charles- ton, 3 Brevard (S. C), 533; 2 Const. Rep. (S. C), 726; Gray v. State, 2 Harrington (Del.), 76. The legislature may create the oflBce of police judge for a city and the election of such officer may be vested in the electors of such city. But the mere creation of the offi- cer without defining his duties, etc., does not constitute a court. People ex rel v. Curley, 5 Colo., 412. Territorial legislature may pro- vide police courts for miiiiicipal corporations. Kansas v; Young," 3 K&,h./44-5; Uridias v. Morrill, 22 Cal., 473. . 2. In Florida charters authorize municipal corporations, to estab- lish municipal courts for the trial of all offenses against local ordi- nances. Atkins V. Phillips, 26 Fla., 281; 8 So. Rep.,, 429. The City of St. Louis, Mo., has power to establish police courts and to provide for clerks and de- fine their duties. Ex parte Ki- burg, 10 Mo. App., 442, 446. Police courts may be established by ordinance under proper dele- gation of power. State v. Charles- ton, 12 Rich. Law (S. C), 480; State V. Helfrld, 2 Mott & McCord (S. C), 233. 3 People V. Curley, 5 Colo., 412 ; Pittsburg V. Young, 3 Watts, Pa., 363; Gettysburg v. Zeigler, 2 Pa. Co., Ct. Rep., 326. City cannot without express au- thority confer judicial powers upon its officers. Weeks v. Forman, 16 N. J, L., 237. Where the constitution autho- rizes the establishment of such courts, according to population, a legislative act for this purpose is necessary. In re Cahill, 110 Pa. St., 167; 20 Atl. Rep.,,. 414. 462 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§399 civil jurisdiction, and, also, power to enforce penalties for vio- lations of state laws.* In Washington cities authorized to adopt tlieir own charters can- not create police or municipal courts. Such power is delegated by the constitution to the legisla- ture. In re Cloherty, 2 Wash., 137 ; 27 Pac. Rep., 1064. Before the recent amendment of the consti- tution of California the same con- clusion was reached in that state. People V. Toal, 85 Cal., 333; 24 Pac. Rep., 603; Ex parte Reilly, 85 Cal., 632; 24 Pac. Rep., 807. The constitution of California confers express power upon cities which are authorized to adopt their own charters to establish po- lice courts. Const., 1880, Art. XI., Sec. 8%. Creating by adopting freeholders' charter. Ex parte Sparks, 120 Cal., 395; 52 Pac. Rep., 715. Punishment of offenses against municipal ordinances has been held not to be a judicial function, but merely an exercise of a branch of the police power. Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md., 331 ; 79 Am. Dec, 656. Contra. In re Cloherty, 2 Wash., 137, 141; 27 Pac. Rep., 1064. The establishment of such courts is limited by the state constitution. Montrose v. State, 61 Miss., 429, 432. Corporation courts in Texas are not a part of the state's judicial system except by virtue of express constitutional provision. Subject fully discussed in Ex parte Coombs, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep., 648; 44 S. W. Rep., 854; Leach v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep., 248; 36 S. W. Rep., 471; Ex parte Knox (Tex. Crim. App., 1897) 39 S. W. Rep., 670. Act conferring judicial powers on the mayor in violation of state constitution is void. Lafon v. Du- frocq, 9 La. Ann., 350. Legislature may confer greater jurisdiction upon municipal or po- lice courts than upon trial justices if not restrained by state consti- tution. State V. Cram. 84 Me., 271; 24 Atl. Rep., 853. Under a constitution authoriz- ing the establishment of "such municipal and other inferior courts as may be deemed neces- sary," the legislature may estab- lish a city court with jurisdiction of causes arising under municipal ordinances, involving sum not ex- ceeding constitutional limit. City Council V. Ashley P. Co., 33 S. C, 25 ; 11 S. B. Rep., 386. 4 Municipal Courts in England. English municipal charters, "from the earliest times, contain grants of courts of various degrees of importance. The mayor and aldermen were, in some cases, made magistrates ex offlcio, and authorized to hold courts of Quarter Sessions ; and these grants were accompanied or not, as the case might be, by a clause called the 'non-intromittant clause,' which ousted the jurisdiction of the county magistrate. In some cases towns were made counties of themselves." 1 Stephen's His. of the Crim. Law of Eng., p. 116; Haddock's Case, Raymond, 435. Lord mayor's court — A court of civil jurisdiction held by the Lord Mayor of London and dealing with cases in which the whole cause of action arises within the city. Various kinds of local courts. Marine Court of New York City. Callahan v. New York,- 66 N. Y., 656. An act establishing a local court known as Hustings Court of 2991 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 463 Unless restricted by the state constitution the legislature may abolish local courts or change their jurisdiction at pleas- ure,^ but a court established by the constitution cannot be Richmond, Va., held valid. Cha- hoon V. Commonwealth, 21 Gratt. (Va.), 822; Richmond Mayoralty Case, 19 Gratt. (Va.), 673. "Police judge" ; Deltz v. Central, 1 Colo., 323. Municipal coukt, a court whose territorial jurisdiction is usually conterminous with the jurisdic- tion of the municipal corporation; such court may exercise either civil or criminal jurisdiction and sometimes both. Constitutions do not usually de- fine municipal courts. The words are used as having an established meaning. State ex rel Stark v. MacArthur, 13 Wis., 383, 385. Where the inferior state courts are divided into justice, municipal and city courts, a city court cannot be held to be a municipal court. "We think when an act contains a provision relating to a municipal court, referring to it in express terms by the name municipal, it means one distinctively of that name and nothing more." Peck V. Powell, 62 Vt., 296, 298; 19 Atl. Rep., 227. Police court with the same pow- er and jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, and exclusive jurisdic- tion of all cases arising under the city charter and ordinances, and with the same power in cases of contempt as a court of record, is a "Municipal court," within the meaning of the constitution of Wisconsin. Mathie v. Mcintosh, 40 Wis., 120; Atkins v. Fraker, 32 Wis., 510; Connors v. Gorey, 32 Wis., 518; Jenkins v. Morning, 38 Wis., 197; Zitske v. Goldberg, 38 Wis., 216. In California the term "Munici- pal court" has a legal meaning and signification, and clearly in- cludes mayor's and recorder's courts, as those were well known and universally recognized as be- ing of that character when the constitution was adopted. Uridias V. Morrill, 22 Cal., 473, 478. Inferior Courts — Nugent v. State, 18 Ala., 521; Ex parte Strat- man, 39 Cal., 517; Thomas v. State, 5 How. (Miss.), 20. Inferior City Court — State v. Helfrid, 2 Nott & McC. (S. C), 233; Tesh v. Commonwealth, 4 Dana (Ky.), 522. A city court in Alabama is an inferior court. Per- kins V. Corbin, 45 Ala., 103; 6 Am. Rep., 698. The mayor's court is an inferior court. Gray v. State, 2 Harrington (Del.), 76. The recorder is not a judicial of- ficer of the state. Egleston v. Charleston, 1 Mill's Const. Rep., (S. C), 45. When municipal criminal court is an inferior court within the meaning of that term as used in the constitution of California. In re Stratman, 39 Cal., 517; People V. Nyland, 41 Cal., 129;, People v. Henshaw, 76 Cal., 436; IS Pac. Rep., 413. Superior Court of San Francisco held to be an inferior court. Hickman v. O'Neal, 10 Cal., 292. Of inferior police courts by clas- sification of cities. People ex rel V. Henshaw, 76 Cal., 436; 18 Pac. Rep., 413. Inferior courts of chancery. Houston V. Royston, 7 How. (Miss.), 543. 5 Boyd V. Chambers, 78 Ky., 140; 464 to ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§300 abolished by the legislature.*^ And a local court established for the convenience of the local community cannot be abolished by the corporation through its council.^ A franchise to hold a municipal court cannot be lost by non-user, however long con- tinued.^ § 300. Jurisdiction of local courts. Jurisdiction of munici- pal corporation, police and other inferior courts, established for the enforcement of local police regulations, depends upon the constitution and laws of the state, and the particular char- ter or legislative act creating them.^ In the absence of con- stitutional restriction the legislature may define the jurisdic- tion of such courts.!" Ordinarily their jurisdiction is limited to prosecutions for the violation of municipal ordinances and local police regulations.^^ Local courts are limited to the jur- isdiction expressly conferred with such other incidental au- thority as may be necessary to give proper effect to the pow- ers conferred.12 As a rule, such local courts have no power to punish for contempt ;i* but it has been held where a State V. Henshaw, 76 Cal., 436; 18 Pac. Rep., 413; Mx parte Sparks, 120 Cal., 395; 52 Pac. Rep., 715; Perkins v. Corbin, 45 Ala., 103; 6 Am. Rep., 698; Tesh v. Com., 4 Dana (Ky.), 522. 6 Alexander v. Bennett, 60 N. Y., 204. ' Vason V. Augusta, 38 Ga., 542. Effect of repeal of charter. Boyd V. Chambers, 78 Ky., 140. 8 Disuse for two hundred years. Rex V. Wells, 4 Dowllng, 562. Fifty years. King v. Avering Atte Bower, 5 Barn & Aid., 691; King V. Hastings, 5 Barn & Aid., 692. n Rohland v. St. Louis, 89 Mo., 180; 1 S. W. Rep., 147; People v. Slaughter, 2 Doug. (Mich.), 334; Zylstra v. Charleston, 1 Bay (S. C.),382. 10 Uridias v. Morrill, 22 Cal., 473; Holmes v. .Fihlenburg, 54 111., 203 ; Connors v. Gorey, 32 Wis., 518. 11 Santa Barbara v. Stearns, 51 Cal., 499; St. Louis v. Pahl, 114 Mo., 32; 21 S. W. Rep., 448; State V. Charleston, 12 Rich. Law (S. 0,480. The jurisdiction of the mayor over violation of an ordinance will not be defeated by the fact that a provision in the ordinance attempts to make his jurisdiction exclusive, if the laws give him at least a co-ordinate jurisdiction. State V. Higgs, 126 N. C, 1014; 35 S. B. Rep., 473; 48 L. R. A., 446. 12 People ex rel. v. Board of Ex- cise of N. Y., 3 N. Y. St. Rep., 253 ; St. Peters v. Bauer, 19 Minn., 327, 333. 13 In re Rich, 10 Kan. App., 280 ; 62 Pac. Rep., 715. A recorder or magistrate having power to fine and imprison in a summary manner without express power to commit in execution can- not commit for contempt. Under the common law this power could I 300] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 465 municipal court is a court of record it has such power. i* Un- less the power is expressly conferred, police and local courts have no power to disbar an attorney,^' nor jurisdiction of pro- ceedings by quo warranto}^ The proceeding must show upon its face that the case is within the jurisdiction of the court.^^ Unless the power is expressly given municipal and local in- only be exercised by court of rec- ord. In re Kerrigan, 33 N. J. L., 344. 14 Morrison v. McDonald, 21 Me., 550. Contempt — Police court may punish for contempt in like man- ner as court of record. Mathie v. Mcintosh, 40 Wis., 120. Power to punish for contempt discussed. State v. Galloway, 5 Coldw. (Tenn.), 326; 98 Am. Dec. 404, and note, p. 413, et seg.; note to Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray (Mass.), 120; 61 Am. Dec, 442; note to Clark v. People, 12 Am. Dec. 178, 186; note to Ex parte Grace, 79 Am. Dec. 536. Judicial powers — Question of judicial power discussed. Court and judicial officer discussed in Waldo V. Wallace, 12 Ind., 569. When mayor is judicial officer. Howard v. Shoemaker, 35 Ind., Ill; Waldo v. Wallace, 12 Ind., 569; Gulick v. New, 14 Ind., 93. Act conferring judicial powers on mayor is constitutional. Baton Rouge V. Dearing, 15 La. Ann., 208. Recorder of a municipal court is not a judicial officer. Morrison v. McDonald, 21 Me., 550. 13 btate ex rel. Storts v. Peabody, 63 Mo. App., 378. 16 People ex rel. Hughes v. Gilles- pie, 1 Cal., 342. " Averment as to jurisdiction held not necessary. Truchelut v. City Council, 1 Nott & McCord (S. C), 227, 229. Jurisdiction should he shown on the record. Grand Rapids N. & L. S. R. R. Co. V. Gray, 38 Mich., 461. Agreement cannot give a police court jurisdiction of a cause with- in the exclusive jurisdiction of an- other court. Bailey v. Common- wealth, 22 Ky. Law Rep., 512; 64 S. W. Rep., 995. Jurisdiction of particular infe- rior courts. Wiggins v. Chicago, 68 111., 372; Hensoldt v. Peters- burg, 63 111., 157; Madison v. Hatcher, 8 Blackf. (Ind.), 341; Louisiana v. Hardin, 11 Mo., 551 ; Fayette v. Shafroth, 25 Mo., 445; Edina v. Brown, 19 Mo., App., 672; Borough V. Hoagland, 3 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep., 283; McNulty v. Wilson, 4 Strob. (S. C), 231; Landers v. Staten Island R. R. Co., 53 N. Y., 450. Of particular municipal court under special statute. State v. Lockwood, 43 Wis., 403. Municipal court of New York City is a new inferior court. In re Schultes, 33 N. Y. App. Div., 524, 534. Justice of the peace has no juris- diction of violation of municipal ordinances. State v. Carreau, 45 La. Ann., 1446; 14 So. Rep., 292; Goodrich v. Brown, 30 Iowa, 291. Contra, Metcalf v. People, 2 Colo. App., 262; 30 Pac. Rep., 39; Ja- quith V. Royce, 42 Iowa, 406 ; Jack- son V. Boyd, 53 Iowa, 536; 5 N. W. Rep., 734; State v. Wood, 94 N. E., 855. State district courts have no ju- 30 46(; TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§300 ferior courts have no jurisdiction relative to the violation of acts of the legislature.^^ How^ever, such jurisdiction may be conferred if the state constitution does not forbid.^" Where risdictlon. Lansing v. C, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 85 Iowa, 215; 52 N. W. Rep., 195. State circuit court has jurisdic- tion, when. Janesville v. Milwau- kee & M. R. R. Co., 7 Wis., 484. Circuit court has concurrent ju- risdiction with justices of the peace. Brookvllle v. Gagle, 73 Ind., 117; Redden v. Covington, 29 Ind., 118. County criminal court has no jurisdiction. Garland v. Denver, 11 Colo., 534; 19 Pac. .Rep., 460. Superior city court has no juris- diction. State V. White, 76 N. C, 15; State v. Threadgill, 76 N. C, 17. Mayor has jurisdiction. McNulty v. Conners, 50 Ind., 569, denying jurisdiction of city judge; Wills v. Boonville, 28 Mo., 543; Flack v. Fry, 32 W. Va., 364; 9 S. B. Rep., 240. Police courts have jurisdiction. Owensboro v. Simms, 99 Ky., 49; 34 S. W. Rep., 1085; Kansas City V. Neal, 49 Mo. App. 72; Wong v. Astoria, 13 Oregon, 538; 11 Pac. Rep., 295. Recorder has jurisdiction. Vason V. Augusta, 38 Ga., 542; Guillotte V. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann., 432; State V. Mack, 41 La. Ann., 1079; 6 So. Rep., 808; State v. Lochte, 45 La. Ann., 1405; 14 So. Rep., 215. A burgess with jurisdiction of a justice of the peace only has ju- risdiction to impose fines for viola- tions of ordinances. Com. v. Thompson, 110 Pa. St., 297; 1 Atl. Rep., 375. Town council given by statute powers of a trial justice in all cases of violation of the town ordinances. Lexington v. Wise, 24 S. C, 163. IS Failure to take out water li- cense, required by state statutes. St. Louis V. Tiefel, 42 Mo., 578. Keeping open a saloon on Sun- day in violation of state law. Reich V. State, 53 Ga., 73; 21 Am. Rep., 265; Spencer v. Cllne, 28 Ind., 51. Recorder's court of Augusta, Ga., has no jurisdiction to hear offenses for the violation of state statutes. Williams v. Augusta, 111 Ga., 849 ; 36 S. E. Rep., 607. The jurisdiction of inferior courts is necessarily confined to the act creating them. Gray v. Delaware, 2 Harrington (Del.), 76. Corporation courts in Texas have not jurisdiction of the gen- eral laws of the state, but such jurisdiction only as may pertain to them as incidents to municipal charters. Such courts are not a part of that state's judicial sys- tem, and a city or town of that state has no power to pass an or- dinance making that an offense against the city or town which has been declared by statute an of- fense against the state. Ex parte Coombs, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep., 648; 44 S. W. Rep., 854; Leach v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep., 248; 36 S. W. Rep., 471. " May be invested with jurisdic- tion of all offense below the grade of felony. Brown's Case, 152 Mass., 1;' 24 N. E. Rep., 857; Ex parte Slattery, 3 Ark., 484. Assault and battery is criminal and can only be punished by pre- sentment or indictment. Rector V. State, 6 Ark., 187; Durr v. Howard, 6 Ark., 461. Larceny, power to try for, where property is found within the city. Myers v. People, 26 111., 173. §300] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 467 the powers of a municipal court are restricted by the constitu- tion to "municipal purposes," which are such matters as re- late to the affairs of the local corporation where alone they are authorized to be established, the recorder of a city cannot ' ' possess the powers and exercise the duties of committing mag- istrates, " etc.^^ Frequently local courts possess civil jurisdic- tion to a limited extent. -^ Some such courts have the same jurisdiction as courts of general jurisdiction.-- McConologue v. McCaffrey, 29 Jurisdiction of misdemeanors. Barden v. State, 74 Ga., 842. Corporation courts may have jurisdiction of felony cases, em- panel grand juries, etc. Chahoon V. Commonwealtli, 21 Gratt. (Va.), 822. ^0 Meagher v. Storey County, 5 Nev., 244. 21 California — Vassault v. Austin, 36 Cal., 691; Hiclcman v. O'Neal, 10 Cal., 292, 294; Seale v. Mitchell, 5 Cal., 401, 403. Illinois — Wilson v. McKenna, 52 111., 43. Kentucky — Smither v. Blanton, 1 Met. (Ky.), 44. Louisiana — State ex rel. v. Judge, 37 La. Ann., 583. Massachusetts — Bossidy v. Bran- nifC, 135 Mass., 290; Walker v. Cooke, 163 Mass., 401; 40 N. E. Rep., 185. Minnesota — Crawford v. Hurd R. Co., 57 Minn., 187; 58 N. W. Rep., 985. Misc. (N. Y.), 139. Have equity jurisdiction, when. People V. Green, 58 N. Y., 295. City court of New York has no jurisdiction to issue writs of man- damus. People ex rel. v. Board of Excise of N. Y., 3 N. Y., St. Rep., 253. Municipal court of New York City cannot entertain an action of mechanic's lien. Smith v. Silsbe, 53 N. y. App. Div., 462; McCono- logue V. McCaffrey, 29 Misc. (N. Y.), 139. Jurisdiction of action on re- plevin bond. Walker v. Cooke, 163 Mass., 401; 40 N. E. Rep., 185. Unlawful detainer. Petsch v. Biggs, 31 Minn., 392; 18 N. W. Rep., 101; Norton v. Beckman, 53 Minn., 456; 55 N. W. Rep., 603. Forcible entry and detainer. Tilleny v. Knoblauch, 73 Minn., 108; 75 N. W. Rep., 1039. Action by receiver. Hause v. New Jersey— Hutchinss v. Scott, Newel, 60 Minn., 481 ; 62 N. W. 9 N. J. L., 218. Generally, local courts possess no equity jurisdiction. Gentle v. Atlas Savings & L. A., 105 Ga., 406; 31 S. E. Rep., 544; Butler v. M. A. L. & I. Co., 94 Ga., 562; 20 S. E. Rep., 101; Petsch v. Biggs, 31 Minn., 392; 18 N. W. Rep., 101; Norton v. Beckman, 53 Minn., 456 ; 55 N. W. Rep., 603 ; Hause v. New- el, 60 Minn., 481; 62 N. W. Rep., 817; Tilleny v. Knoblauch, 73 Minn., 108; 75 N. W. Rep., 1039; Rep., 817. Action for damages for false and fraudulent warranty. Carl- son V. Segog, 60 Minn., 498; 62 N. W. Rep., 1132. Jurisdiction under particular charters or legislative acts. Lewis V. State, 21 Ark., 209; People v. Wong Wang, 92 Cal., 277; 28 Pac. Rep., 270; Goodrich v. Brown, 30 Iowa, 291; Commonwealth v. Pin- dar, 11 Met. (Mass.), 539; Com- monwealth V. Roark, 8 Cush. 468 TO ENFORCE POLICR ORDINANCES. [§301 Unless restrained by the constitution, the legislature may confer upon police justices and judges of local inferior courts the jurisdiction of justices of the peace.^^ Sometimes the civil jurisdiction is limited to residents.^* § 301. Territorial limits of jurisdiction. Usually the terri- torial jvirisdiction of municipal courts is confined to the cor- (Mass.), 210; People v. Goose- mann, 80 Mich., 611; 45 N. W. Rep., 369; People v. Mangold, 71 Mich., 335; 39 N. W. Rep., 6; Av- erill V. Perrott, 74 Mich., 296; 41 N. W. Rep., 929; People v. Phalen, 49 Mich., 492, 494; 13 N. W. Rep., 830. -- Civil jurisdiction equal to court of general jurisdiction may be given to municipal courts. At- kins V. Praker, 32 Wis., 510, ex- plaining State ex rel. v. Judges, etc., 11 Wis., 50. May issue writs of attachment. Bledsoe v. Gary, 95 Ala., 70, 73; 10 So. Rep., 502. May hear and determine con- demnation proceedings. Hercules Iron Works v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 141 111., 491; 30 N. E. Rep., 1050. 23 California — Uridias v. Morrill, 22 Cal., 473. Kentucky — Smither v. Blanton, 1 Met. (Ky.), 44. Maine — Allen v. Somers, 68 Me., 247. Missouri — Lonergan v. Louisi- ana, 83 Mo. App., 101. Minnesota — Petsch v. Biggs, 31 Minn., 392; 18 N. W. Rep., 101. New Jersey —State v. Zeigler, 32 N. J. L., 262; Hutchings v. Scott, 9 N. J. L., 218. Ohio — Steamboat Northern Indi- ana v. Milliken, 7 Ohio St., 383. Wisconsin — Mathie v. Mcintosh, 40 Wis., 120. jrrisdiction of justice of the Peace. Under the constitution of New Jersey of 1776 it was held tha,t the legislature had power to declare the mayor, recorder and aldermen of cities justices of the peace for the trial of certain causes. Hutch- ings V. Scott, 9 N. J. L., 218. - Under the constitution of Colo- rado there may be different classes or grades of police courts. Mcln- erney v. Denver, 17 Colo., 302; 29 Pac. Rep., 516. Power to confer criminal juris- diction on chief magistrate of a town distinguished from power to confer civil jurisdiction. State v. Pender, 66 N. C, 313. Under certain state constitutions the legislature cannot confer on the mayor the judicial powers of a justice of the peace in civil ac- tion. Edenton v. Wool, 65 N. C, 379; Wilmington v. Davis, 63 N. C, 582. Cannot confer on recorder's court of a city jurisdiction of a jus- tice of peace. Ex parte Knox, (Tex. Crim. App., 1897), 39 S. W. Rep., 670. Right of mayor to act as justice of the peace. State ex rel. v. May- nard, 14 111., 419. Mayor has no judicial power. Beesman v. Peoria, 16 111., 484. Ordinances conferring power of a justice of the peace on the mayor are void, ciuo ad hac. Weeks v. For- man, 16 N. J. L., 237. Power of mayor to act as jus- tice of the peace, and police pow- ers as conservator of the peace. Hagerstown v. Dechert, 32 Md., 369. §301] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 469 porate limits.^'^ Under a constitutional provision "that in- ferior local courts" may be established in the "cities of the state," and that "such courts shall have an uniform organiza- tion and jurisdiction in such cities," the legislature cannot au- thorize such a court to issue its summons beyond the city lim- its.^^ But it has been held that the legislature may authorize a superior court of a city to send its process out of the city, and this for the reason that such power does not enlarge its jurisdiction, op- render it less an inferior court under the con- "All the powers and jurisdic- tion of a justice of the peace in civil and criminal cases," gives R. Co, 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.), 338. Of foreign corporations having power to issue an attachment, not an office within the city. Worthing- to exceed the limit of amount pro- ton v. London G. & A. Co., 164 N. vided by statute. Bain v. Mitchell, Y., 81, reversing 47 App. Div., 609; 82 Ala., 304; 2 So. Rep., 706. The rule applies to notaries pub- lic empowered to act as justices of Crofut V. Brooklyn Ferry Co., 36 Barb. (N. Y.), 201. 25 Arkansas — Ex parte Slattery, 3 the peace. Griffin v. Appleby, 69 Ark., 484. Ala., 409; Rice v. Watts, 71 Ala., 593. Under such authority mayor may take affidavits generally. Robinson v. Benton County, 49 Ark., 49, 51; 4 S. W. Rep., 195. Act conferring the powers of a justice of the peace on the mayor, does not empower him to admin- ister the official oath to members of the common council. State v. Perkins, 24 N. J. L., 409. ^■t "Where the constitution for- bids, such courts cannot have ju- California — Meyer v. Kalkmann, 6 Cal., 582. Illinois — Joslyn v. Dickerson, 71 111., 25; People ex rel. v. Murphy, 67 IlL, 333. Michigan— C R., N. & L. S. R. R. Co. V. Gray, 38 Mich., 461. New York — In re Schultes, 33 N. Y. App. Div., 524, 534. Ohio — State v. Peters, 67 Ohio St., 494; 66 N. E. Rep., 521. South Carolina — State v. Helfrid, 2 Nott & McCord (S. C), 233. 237. Wisconsin — Mathie v. Mcintosh, 40 Wis., 120; Atkins v. Fraker, 32 risdiction of an action against a Tjvjg 510, overruling Lane v. Bur- foreign corporation for the recov- ery of money. Rieser v. Parker, dick, 17 Wis., 92, and Brockway v. Carter, 25 Wis., 510; Connors v. 27 Misc. (N. Y.), 205; The Phillip (jorey, 32 Wis., 518. Semmer Glass Co. v. Nassau Show- case Co., 28 Misc. (N. Y.), 577. Such action may be against resi- dent in municipal court. Suffi- ciency of record. Tyroler v. Gum- mersbach, 28 Misc. (N. Y.), 151. Cannot sit outside of corporate limits, to try causes of violation of ordinances. State (Hershoff) v. Beverly, 43 N. J. L., 139. Referee appointed by a city court has no power to try a cause be- Jurisdiction irrespective of resi- yond city limits. Bonner v. Mc- dence. Allen v. Somers, 68 Me., Phail, 31 Barb. (N. Y.), 106. 247; Johnson v. Hilton Lumber 2e Holmes v. Fihlenburg, 54 111., Co., 103 Ga., 212; 29 S. E. Rep., 203; People ex rel. v, Evans, X8 818; Landers v. Staten Iiland R, III, 361, 470 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§302 stitution.2'' Sometimes the jurisdiction includes the limits of the county in which the municipal corporation is located. ^'^ .Thus a constitutional provision authorizing the legislature to "vest such jurisdiction as may be necessary in municipal com-ts," confers power to invest a municipal court ^^ath juris- diction over the entire county.-^ § 302. Who authorized to act as judges, jurors and. wit- nesses. At common law citizens of the corporation could not act as judges and jurors because of their interest.^" But this doctrine does not obtain in this country. It is no objection to the jurisdiction of a city or municipal court that the pre- siding judge, officers of the court, jurors and witnesses are 2i Hickman v. O'Neal, 10 Gal., 292, overruling Meyer v. Kalk- man, 6 Cal., 582; Chipman v. Bowman, 14 Cal., 157. is Darden v. State, 74 Ga., 842; Johnson v. Hilton & D. L. Co., 103 Ga., 212; 29 S. E. Rep., 819. -'» State ex rel. Stark v. McAr- thur, 13 Wis., 383. Distinction Between Judge of Local Court and Justice op THE Peace. One distinction between the con- stitutional office of justice of the peace and that of a judge of a lo- cal court established by the legis- lature, even when such judge is called a justice of the peace, is the territorial restriction which limits the jurisdiction ot the latter court. In re Schultes, 33 N. Y. App. Div., 524, 534; Brandon v. Avery, 22 N. Y., 469; Geraty v. Reid, 78 N. Y., 64; People ex rel. v. Terry, 108 N. Y., 1. so Common Law Rile. A pen- alty of a by-law on custom can- not be sued for in the municipal court, "for they would be both party and judge." "If the penalty be made recoverable by the cham- berlain, it seems that he cannot sue in the municipal court, for there is an interest in the judges, the sheriff and the jury, to sup- port the custom against the de- fendants. In which respect pro- ceedings or by-laws founded on exclusive customs, differ from those which relate to freemen alone." But a penalty for "violat- ing a custom to the injury of a particular company, and given to that company or its masters in trust for them, may be made re- coverable in the corporation courts; for the corporation is no party, and has no general inter- est in the question." Willcock, Mun. Corp., p. 157. If the penalty be given to the corporation the action cannot be brought in any municipal court, in which the mayor presides either personally or by deputy; "for he would appear in the character of judge and party, which is incon- sistent with all rules of law." Willcock, Mun. Corp., 165. What actions may be brought in the corporation courts, and when freemen may be jurors and wit- nesses, see Willcock, Mun. Corp., 165, et seq. A challenge to the array of jurors on the ground that the sher- iff who summoned them, and the mayor and jurors who were to try the case were citizens and free- men of the city, and therefore in- §302] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 471 all corporators or inhabitants and therefore interested in the penalty .^1 But resident tax payers are incompetent as jurors terested, held well founded. Hes- keth V. Braddock, 3 Burr, 1847, per Lord Mansfield. If the establishment and juris- diction of municipal courts depend upon the common law such ohjec- ti'on would be fatal. Charleston V. Pepper, 1 Rich. Law (S. C), 364, 366. ■j1 The establishment and juris- diction of the city court is a grant of power from all the people of the state, through their legisla- ture, "and Surely they have the power to dispense with the com- mon law objection that the cor- porations were interested ani ought not to be entrusted with the enforcement of their laws against others." Such authority "im- pliedly declares, that notwithstand- ing the common law objection, it was right and proper to give it the power to enforce the city laws against all offenders. That there was great reason in this cannot be doubted when it is remembered that the interest of the corporation is so minute as not to be even thought of, by sheriff, juror or judge. It is very much like the in- terest which similar officers would feel in enforcing a state law, the sanction of which was a penalty. The sum thus to be recovered goes in exoneration of some part of the burden of government to which ev- ery citizen is subjected; but such an interest has no effect upon the mind. It is too slight to excite prejudice against a defendant. The same is the case here. For the judge, sheriff and jurors are mem- bers of a corporation of many thousand members. What inter- est of value have they in a fine of ?20? It would put a most emi- nent calculator to great trouble to ascertain the very minute grain of interest which each of these gentlemen might have." (1845) Charleston v. Peper, 1 Rich Law (S. C), 364, 367, per O'Neall, J.; Deitz v. Central, 1 Colo., 323, 329; State v. Craig, 80 Me., 85; 13 Atl. Rep., 129; State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 54 Me., 564 ; Fletcher v. Somerset R. R. Co., 74 Me., 434; State v. Severance (Me.), 2 New Eng. Rep., 425; Common- wealth V. Reed, 1 Gray (Mass), 472; Lincoln v. Prince, 2 Mass., 544; Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick (Mass.), 461, 471; Com. v. Ryan, 5 Mass., 90; Hill v. Wells, 6 Pick (Mass.), 104; Lufkin v. Haskell, 3 Pick (Mass.), 355; Jonesboro v. McKee, 2 Yerg. (Tenn.). 167, 169. Mayor not disqualified to act as police justice, because he is an in- habitant of the town. Thomas v. Mount Vernon, 9 Ohio, 290. So the fact that a part of the penalty would go to the town is not sufficient reason to disqualify a justice from hearing a case. Cor- wein V. Hames, 11 John (N. Y.), 76; City Council v. King, 4 Mc- Cord. (S. C), 487. But a justice of the peace was held to be disqualified because -of his interest in the penality as an inhabitant of the town where other justices of the peace within the county, but not inhabitants of the town, could have been selected to try the case. Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Mass., 324, 340; Resident and taxpaying jurors are not disqualified. Common- wealth V. Ryan, 5 Mass., 90; State V. Wells. 46 Iowa, 662, 664; John- son V. Americus, 46 Ga., 80, 87. 472 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§302 in actions to recover damages against the local corporation."*^ This was the rule at common law and unless changed by statute or charter it is usually enforced.^^ Constitutional qualifications of judges of superior courts do not always apply to judges of inferior courts. The law estab- lishing such courts ordinarily prescribes the qualifications of the judges thereof.^* 32 Gibson v. Wyandotte, 20 Kan., 156; Boston v. Baldwin, 139 Mass., 315; 1 N. E. Rep., 417; State v. Williams, 30 Me., 484; Russell v. Hamilton, 3 111., 56. Cramer v. Burlington, 42 Iowa, 315, where a challenge to a juror was sustained in an action for damages against a city on the ground that the proposed juror was a citizen and taxpayer of the city. Dively v. Cedar Palls, 21 Iowa, 565, is a like case. Rose V. St. Charles, 49 Mo., 509; P'ulweiler v. St. Louis, 61 Mo., 479; Fine v. St. Louis Public Schools, 30 Mo., 166; Eberle v. St. Louis Public Schools, 11 Mo., 247; John- son V. Americus, 46 Ga., 80, 87 Columbus V. Goetchius, 7 Ga., 139 Bailey v. Trumbull, 31 Conn., 581 Jefferson County v. Lewis, 20 Fla., 980. Contra: Kemper v. Louisville, 14 Bush. (Ky.), 87; Omaha v. Olmstead, 5 Neb.. 446; Middleton v. Ames, 7 Vt., 166. 33 Diveny v. Elmira, 51 N. Y., 506. 3* People ex rel. v. Wilson, 15 111., 388; Respublica v. Dallas, 3 Yeates (Pa.), 300. In Massachusetts a special jus- tice of a police court is a judge of any court of that commonwealth (except the court of sessions) within the meaning of the consti- tution, and therefore cannot act as such judge and also as a member of the state legislature. Full dis- cussion by Gray, C. J., Com. v. Hawkes, 123 Mass., 525. Constitutional provisions of ten- ure, election, etc., held not applic- able to corporation judges. Schro- der V. Charleston, 3 Brev. (S. C), 533, 539. Civjx Liability of Local and Municipal Judges. It is univer- sally held that judges of courts of superior and general jurisdiction are exempt from liability to dam- ages for judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U. S.), 335; Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. (U. S.), 523; Cooley on Torts (2nd ed.), p. 489. A distinction is made between acts done by them in excess of their jurisdiction and acts done by them in the clear absence of all jurisdic- tion over the subject-matter. As to a court of general jurisdiction, to escape liability, it seems that the act must have been done by the judge in his judicial capacity, that is, it must have been a judi- cial act. The judges of courts of inferior or limited jurisdiction are generally held to be liable in a pri- vate action for judicial acts which are both in excess and outside of that jurisdiction. And such juris- diction is not presumed, but must be proved. 7 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law 668, 669. This distinction is stated and explained by Judge Cooley. Cooley on Torts (2d ed.), pp. 489-492. But this distinction has been denied. Thompson v. Jackson, 93 Iowa, 376; 61 N. W. Rep., 1004; 27 L. R. A., 92. 95, where it is held that a Justice of t303j TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 473 2. THE ACTION— ITS FORM, NATURE AND INSTITUTION. § 303. How ordinances enforced— form of action. The only method of compelling obedience to penal ordinances is by the imposition of authorized penalties for their violation. Thus under the power "to compel all persons or corporations land- ing passengers within the corporate limits to construct such suitable and safe platforms and accommodations as may be necessary for the safety of passengers," a railroad company cannot be required by ordinance, within a specified period, to reconstruct a platform and stairway for this purpose upon land the peace, like judges of the su- perior courts, is protected from .personal liability for judicial acts in excess of his jurisdiction, if he acted in good faith believing he had jurisdiction. See Bishop's Non-Contract Law, §783; Bell v. McKinney, 63 Miss., 187 ; Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa, 378; 7 N. W. Rep., 623; Brooks v. Mangan, 86 Mich., 576; 49 N. W. Rep., 633; Clark V. Holdridge, 58 Barb., 61. The supreme court of Georgia in denying the distinction, says that in all cases where Judges of courts of general jurisdiction are exempt from civil liability in damages for their judicial acts, presiding oflS- cers of courts of limited jurisdic- tion are likewise exempt. There- fore, In that case it was held that where the presiding officer of a municipal court judicially deter- mines that a given ordinance is valid, though in fact, it is void for want of authority in the municipal corporation to pass it, he will not be liable in damages to a person convicted in his court of offense against such ordinance, and pun- ished under such ordinance by im- prisonment, without having been given an opportunity to pay a fine, provided the court in which such person is convicted has jurisdic- tion of the subject-matter of the offense; but it is sai^ arguendo, where there is a clear absence of jurisdiction over the subject-mat- ter, the officer will be liable for exercising it, provided such want of jurisdiction is known to him. Calhoun v. Little, 106 Ga., 336; 32 S. E. Rep., 86; 43 L. R. A., 630. The English rule is that, "no ac- tion will lie against the judge for any acts done or words spoken in his judicial capacity in a court of justice." "But in order to estab- lish the exemption as regards pro- ceedings in an inferior court, the judge must show that at the time of the alleged wrong doing some matter was before him in which he had jurisdiction (whereas in the case of a superior court it is for the plaintiff to prove want of jurisdiction) ; and the act com- plained of must be of a kind which he had power to do as judge in that matter." Webb's Pollock, Torts, pp. 130, 139, 327-330. "It is a cardinal principle of our juris- prudence that If an action be brought against a judge of a court of record for an act done in his judicial capacity, if he plead that' he did it as judge of a court of record, this is a complete justifica- tion ; and where a ministerial officer does an act as a judge or does a judicial act which is within his power and jurisdiction he is not liable in a civil action by any 47 J: TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§ 303 not belonging to it, and mandamus will not lie to compel the Ijerfonnance of the duty enjoined by the ordinance.^^ In this country there are two modes recognized for enforc- ing penal ordinances : one is an action of debt to recover the penalty, and the other is the ancient and familiar summary proceeding on information or complaint.^" At common law the action was, in form, either debt or assumpsit. It was merely to recover the penalty imposed for the violation of the ordinance.^^ In the action of assumpsit, the theory was that there had been a breach of duty, and by fiction of law it was assumed that the defendant had promised the municipal cor- poration, which in most cases became the plaintiff, to perform the duty. The action of debt was allowable, as the penalty was for a sum certain and in the nature of what might be termed licjuidated damages. ^^ In this country municipal charters, or state laws which con- trol, usually provide particular proceedings. Not often, how- ever, do they present a complete code of procedure. The power of enforcement of ordinances is conferred in general terms, with a declaration of right of action on the part of the local cor- poration, or some designated officer thereof, in the local courts, to recover the penalty, but the rules of practice, in so far as they have become definite, are largely the result of judicial con- struction. In their development the common law method, as in person injured by his said act un- Information. State (Hershoff) less it be proved that the act was v. Beverly, 43 N. J. L., 139; 45 N. willful and malicious." Albers v. J. L., 288, 289. Merchants' Exchange of St. Louis, Penalty recoverable by com- 138 Mo., 140, 164;- 39 S. W. Rep. plaint in town police court. Com. 473; Pike v. Megoun, 44 Mo., 491; v. Dow, 10 Mete. (51 Mass.), 382. Reed v. Conway, 20 Mo., 22; st willcock, Mun. Corp., 154. Scoettgen v. Wilson, 48 Mo., 253; "» 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4th ed.), Wertheimer v. Howard, 30 Mo., § 409 ; Tiedeman, Mun. Corp., § 156, 420; Stone v. Graves, 8 Mo., 149; p. 278, Lenox v. Grant, 8 Mo,, 254; Ed- Ix Exglaxd the penalty of the wards v. Ferguson, 73 Mo., 686. by-law on custom "is in the nature -^ People ex rel. v. N. Y., N. H. of liquidated damages, and stands & H. R. R. Co., 11 Hun. (N. Y.), instead of such damages as would 297. be assessed by the jury in an ac- Injunction against violating, see tion of trespass founded on the § 286, ch. IX. custom." Willcock, Mun. Corp., "'• Recovery by warrant in debt. 154, Meaher v. Chattanooga, 1 Head Actio.m op .\ssumpsit permitted, (38 Tenn.), 74. to recover, among other things, § 303 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. -tTo all branches of our jurisprudence, generally has been a control- ling factor. The rules in some jurisdictions constitute mainly the local judicial view of the organic law as dealt with by the legislature and the courts through a series of years of intei-- pretation. The method prescribed by charter or legislative act applica- ble is exclusive and the local corporation is generally confined to the method provided.^'-' Thus the early English rule is stated to be that, when a corporation is empowered to enforce its by- la\vs by fine or amerciament, it is, by implication, precluded from adopting any other method of punishing disobedience to them.'*" And where, under charter power, the local corpora- tion imposes a license tax and declares a penalty for doing business without a license, but makes no provision for enforc- ing by action the payment of the license fee, the corporation cannot proceed by action to recover such fee from one who fails to pay it, but is restricted to an enforcement of the penal- lies prescribed against those Avho do business without a li- cense. ■'^ If the method for enforcement is not specified the common law remedy may be adopted,^- and where the common law forms have been abolished it is said that the statutory civil penalties for obstructing streets New York — Coonley v. Albany, in violation of an ordinance. 132 N. Y., 145. Columbia v. Harrison, 2 Mill's Pennsylvania — Barter v. Com., 3 Const. Rep. (S. C), 213. Pa. (Penrose & Watts), 253. Action of debt, where common Ohio — Earnhart v. Lebanon, 5 law form was adopted. Coates v. Ohio CIr. Ct., 578. New York, 7 Cow. (N. Y.), 585. Not necessary to impose a fine 39 Illinois — Bubanks v. Ashley, for breach of the ordinance and 36 111., 177; King v. Jacksonville, then institute suit for its recovery. 3 111., 305; Israel v. Jacksonville, King v. Jacksonville, 3 111., 305. 2 111., 290. ■><) Willcock, Mun. Corp., 180; Kentucky — Williamson v. Com., Kirk v. Nowill, 1 Term Rep., 125. 4 B. Mon. (Ky.), 146, 151. -ii Charleston v. Ashley Phos- Z,Ottisiaraa— Bolte v. New Or- phate Co., 34 S. C, 541, 552; 13 S. leans, 10 La. An., 321, denying E. Rep., 845; Santa Cruz v. Santa right to close grog-shops sum- Cruz R. R. Co., 56 Cal., 143. marily for failure to take out Whatever be the mode of en- license where there was power to forcing obedience to a by-law, pre- fine, action to recovery, tax or scribed by that by-law, that mode criminal prosecution. must be strictly pursued. 2 Kyd. New Jersey— State (Smith) v. Corp., p. 169. Clinton, 53 N. J. L., 329; 21 AtL ^a Eubanks v. Ashley, 36 111., Rep., 304; State v. Zeigler, 32 N. 177, 180. J. L., 262. Rule applied in permitting sev- 476 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§ 304 action will lie.*^ And it has been held, unless expressly prohib- ited, inherent power exists in the municipal corporation to pro- vide for an action of debt to recover a penalty for a breach of its ordinances in its own courts.*'* § 304. How far the proceedings are criminal or quasi crim- inal. The decisions present some apparent conflict respecting the. precise nature of the proceedings. Whether in character they are to be considered civil or quasi-eivil, criminal or quasi- criminal has been discilssed (1) in connection with the method of instituting the pro- ceedings, (2) the name in which the action should be brought, (3) the sufficiency of the pleadings, (4) the mode of trial, whether summary or by jury, (5) the arraignment and plea of the defendant (6) the admission of evidence, burden and degree of proof, (7) the verdict, judgment and sentence and mode of execu- tion, and (8) the method of review. Leaving the details of the judicial rules to be presented in the sections which follow, only a few general observations will be mentioned here. The weight of judicial authority declares that the prosecu- tion is in the nature of a civil action for the recovery of a debt.*8 Sometimes the action is regarded as criminal, espe- eral penalties to be included In one Indiana — Shea v. Muncie, 148 declaration. Brooklyn v. Cleves, Ind., 14, 33; 46 N. E. Rep., 138; Hill & Denio Supp. (N. Y.), 231, Brookville v. Gagle, 73 Ind., 117; 233, per Nelson, C. J. Greensburg v. Corwin, 58 Ind., 43 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4th ed.), 518; Hammond v. N. Y. C. & St. L. § 410, p. 478. Ry. Co., 5 Ind. App., 526; 31 N. E. 4* Per Lord Mansfield in Has- Rep., 817 ; Quigley v Aurora, 50 keth V. Braddock, 3 Burr, 1847, Ind., 28; Indianapolis v. Fairchild, 1858. Approved by Gibson, C. J., 1 Ind., 315; Tippecanoe County v. in Barter v. Com., 3 Pa. (Penrose Chissom, 7 Ind., 688. & Watts), at p. 260; and by Judge Missouri — Delaney v. Kansas Dillon, 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4th City Police Court, 167 Mo., 667, ed.), §410. 678; 67 S. W. Rep., 589; St. Louis i^ Colorado — Greeley v. Ham- v. Coffee, 76 Mo. App., 318; St. man, 12 Colo., 94; 20 Pac. Rep., Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo., 600; 31 1; "Walton V. Canon City, 13 Colo. S. W. Rep., 1045; St. Lovfis v. App., 77, 56 Pac. Rep., 671. Knox, 74 Mo., 79; St. Louis v. Illinois — Chicago v. Kenney, 35 Schoenbusch, 95 Mo., 618; 8 S. W. 111. App., 57; Israel v. Jackson- Rep., 791; St. Louis v. Vert, 84 vjlle, 2 111., 290. Mo., 204; Ex parte Hollwedell, 74 § 304] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 477 eially where the offense constitutes a misdemeanor under the Mo., 395; Kansas City v. Clark, 68 Mo., 588; Kansas City v. Muhl- back, 68 Mo., 638; Marshall v. Standard, 24 Mo. App., 192; Kan- sas City V. Neal, 49 Mo. App., 72; St. Louis V. Sternberg, 69 Mo., 289, 295; St. Louis v. Smith, 10 Mo., 439; St. Louis v. Life Assn. of Am., 53 Mo., 466; Memphis v. O'Connor, 53 Mo., 468; St. Joseph v. Levin, 128 Mo., 588; 31 S. W. Rep., 101; Klrkwood v. Cairns, 44 Mo. App., 88; Sylvester Coal Co. v. St. Louis, 130_ Mo., 323, 330; 32 S. W. Rep., 649; Cassvllle v. Jimerson, 75 Mo. App., 426; Golden City v. Hall, 68 Mo. App., 627; De Soto v. Brown, 44 Mo. App., 148. New Jersey — State (Greely) v. Passaic, 42 N. J. L., 429; State (Smith) V. Clinton, 53 N. J. L., 329; 21 Atl. Rep., 304. South Dakota — Lead v. Klatt, 13 S. D., 140; 82 N. W. Rep., 391; Lead v. Klatt, 11 S. D., 109; 75 N. W. Rep., 896; Sioux Falls v. Kirby, 6 S. D., 62; 60 N. W. Rep., 156; 25 L. R. A., 621. Illustrations. Georgia — Prosecutions for viola- tions of ordinances, not involving the elements of offenses known to the state penal law, are not "criminal," as used in the consti- tution and statutes. Rule applied to ordinance forbidding retailing liquor without license. Floyd v. Eatonton, 14 Ga., 354. So, to ordinance regulating the keeping and retailing of gunpow- der. Williams v. Augusta, 4 Ga., 509. Indiana — Fact that process shall be a warrant and that the one named therein may be arrested and retnined in custody or under reasonable recognizance until the next sitting of the city court and that in event of judgment against defendant and It is not paid, de- fendant may be committed for a period not exceeding 30 days does not make the case criminal. Quig- ley V. Aurora, 50 Ind., 28; White V. Neptune City, 56 N. J. L., 222; 28 Atl. Rep., 378. Missouri — Fact that original writ shall be a capias. Instead of a summons or notice, does not make proceedings criminal. In re Mil- ler, 44 Mo. App., 125. New York — The violation of an ordinance prohibiting the sale of liquor on Sunday "Is neither a breach of the peace, nor, as has been decided by the Supreme Court in similar cases, a crime or misdemeanor." Per Strong, J., In Wood v. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. (N. Y.), 425, 431. Oftio— Notwithstanding the vio- lation is quasi criminal, the pen- alty results from such violation. "It is a sum of money due by rea- son thereof, and the remedy is strictly civil." "Is debt the proper form of action? If not It is very clear there Is no remedy. Assump- sit cannot be supported for the want of a promise. Covenant will not lie, for there Is no obligation under seal. Neither trespass nor case are any more appropriate. Debt Is, In fact, the only form of action recognized by the principles of the common law f-or the recov- ery of fines, penalties or forfeit- ures." Markle v. Akron, 14 Ohio, 586, 591, citing 1 Chltty PL, 101; Cincinnati v. Gwynne, 10 Ohio, 192. South Dakota — Where the act is not essentially criminal a munic- ipal ordinance will not make It so. Huron v. Carter, 5 S. D., 4; 47 N. W. Rep., 947. 478 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. L§ 304 laws of the state.*^ Such proceeding- "is civil in form and (/«((A'i-criminal in character. It is governed by the rules of pleading applicable to civil cases, but if it were solely civil no fine or imprisonment could be inflicted. It is therefore a quasi- civil and criminal action. Partaking of some of the features of each, its similitude to either is not complete. In pleading it is more like a civil action, but in its effect and consequences it more nearly resembles a criminal proceeding. "-^^ Tennessee — Although act com- mitted is a misdemeanor the ac- tion is civil. Bristol v. Burrow, 5 Lea (73 Tenn.), 128. Wisconsin — Civil actions merely for the collection of forfeitures. Fact that action is in name of state, does not make it criminal. Chafln V. Waukesha County, 62 Wis., 463, 467; 22 N. W. Rep., 732; State V. Smith, 52 Wis., 134; 8 N. W. Rep., 870; Sutton v. McConnell, 46 Wis., 269; 50 N. W. Rep.! 414. Penal action for violations of or- dinances as are not also misde- meanors, are civil actions. Osh- kosh V. Schwartz, 55 Wis., 483; 13 N. W. Rep., 552; Platteville v. Bell, 43 Wis., 488. Wyoming — Code of procedure of Wyoming provides that ordinances shall be enforced by "civil action." Jenkins v. Cheyenne, 1 Wyo. Ter., 287. ^0 Connecticut — If the offense is a misdemeanor the penalty may be recovered by criminal action. State V. Keenan, 57 Conn., 286; 18 Atl. Rep., 104. Iowa — Violation of ordinance, held to be a public offense subject- ing the guilty party to criminal prosecution. Jaquith v. Royce, 42 Iowa, 406. 'New York — ^Where warrant and arrest permitted, proceedings held iriminal. People v. Van Houten, 35 N. Y. Supp., 186; 13 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.), 603. Where the charter makes the violation of any city ordinance a misdemeanor it has been held to authorize an indictment for its violation. Cronin v. People, 82 N. Y., 318. North Carolina — Violation of or- dinance, criminal offense, when. State V. Powell, 97 N. C, 417; 1 S. E. Rep., 482. ■17 Per Marshall, J., in Stevens v. Kansas City, 146 Mo., 460, 465; 48 S. W. Rep., 658, approved in Dou- glas V. Kansas City, 147 Mo., 428. 436, 437; 48 S. W. Rep., 851. See U. S. v. Chouteau, 102 U. S., 603; McDonald v. Hearst, 95 Fed. Rep., 656. "The form of the proceeding is an action of debt for the penalty, but, substantially, it is a crimina,! proceeding on the part of the city, for the violation of her laws." Charleston v. Pepper, 1 Rich. Law (S. C), 364, 366. The rule that the action is of a quasi criminal nature was applied in an Illinois case in determining the jurisdiction of a particular local criminal court (Chicago.) As used in the Constitution of Il- linois it is said in that case: "When the entire section is con- sidered, in the light of our juris- prudence, vie must conclude that it was intended to embrace all offenses not crimes or misdemervn- ors, but that are in the nature of crimes — a class of offenses against the public which have not been declared crimes, but wrongs §304 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 479 In referring to the nature of a prosecution under an ordi- nance regulating bowling alleys, to recover the penalty, where- in the question of the disposition of the cost of the proceedings was involved, Bell, J., observed: "The question whether a legal proceeding is to be deemed civil or criminal, or as par- taking of the nature of civil and criminal proceedings, is to be determined by the consideration whether the law is designed to suppress and punish a public wrong, an injury affecting the peace and welfare of the community and the general security, or whether it is designed mainly to afford a remedy to an in- dividual for an injury done to his person or property. Upon this question the appropriation of the fine or penalty has a bearing, since if it is applied to the public use, no idea can be entertained that the proceeding is designed as a remedy for a private loss or injury, though it may sometimes have a different tendency, where the amount is appropriated to the use of a suffering party. * * * The present case is one of a proso cution for an oft'ense made penal bj' a city ordinance, because of its supposed evil consequences to society. It has no relation to any individual wrong, and the remedy prescribed is such as indicates a criminal proceeding. It is prosecuted by a pub- lie officer, as part of his official duty, but might be prosecuted by any other person as well. The fine is payable to the city, but not to compensate any wrong to the corporation. The bur- den of administering justice is here imposed upon counties, cities and towns, and fines and forfeitures are payable to them, as the representatives of the public, to aid in defraying this against the general local public warranto, etc." Per Walker, J., in which it is proper should be re- Wiggins v. Chicago, 68 111., 372, pressed or punished by forfeitures 375. and penalties. This would em- Quasi criminal prosecution, brace all qui tarn actions and for- Naylor v. Galesburg, 56 111., 285, feitures imposed for the neglect or 287; People v. Van Houten, 69 N. violation of a public duty. A Y. St., 265. quasi crime would not embrace an Civil in form and only qiiasi- indictable offense, whatever might criminal in character. Rule ap- be its grade, but simply forfeiture plied respecting right of appeal. for a wrong done to the public, Baldwin v. Chicago, 68 111., 418; whether voluntary or Involuntary, Greenfield v. Mook, 12 111. App., where a penalty is given, whether 281. recoverable by criminal or civil Prosecution for unlawful sale of process; and It would embrace liquor under ordinance is quasi- prosecutlons for bastardy, and in- criminal. Boscobel v. Bugbee, 41 formations in the nature of quo Wis., 59 ; Platteville v. McKernan, 480 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. t§ 30- part of the expenses of civil government. The case then seems to us to lack all the indicia of a civil action, and to be, in fact, as it appears, a criminal prosecution."** § 305. Institution of proceedings — Notice — Appearance. The proceedings to recover the penalty for violation of an ordi- nance are governed by local laws. Ordinarily the action takes its inception upon complaint being made by some competent person, or, in some cases, upon the view of the magistrate, or knowledge on the part of the officer duly empowered to act. Usually this is followed by legal notice of the charge to the per- son accused, trial, sufficient evidence of guilt, conviction and judgment. These are the essentials of a summary conviction.*^ Unless the defendant enters his appearance voluntarily, he mu.st be duly notified of the proceedings.^" If one is notified 54 Wis., 487; 11 N. W. Rep., 798; State V. Grove, 77 Wis., 448; 46 N. W. Rep., 532. *s State V. Stearns, 31 N. H., 106, 110, 111. IS Keeler v. Milledge, 24 N. J. L., 142; State (Hershoft) v. Beverly, 45 N. J. L., 288; White v. Neptune City, 56 N. J. L., 222; 28 Atl. Rep., 378; Commonwealth v. Borden, 61 Pa. St., 272. 60 Notice Required. Alexandria v. Bethlehem, 29 N. J. L., 375, 377, where it is said that "the prin- ciple is too plain to require illus- tration that no penalty can be im- posed upon a person without pre- vious notice. Our law condemns no man unheard, or at least with- out his having an opportunity of being heard." "In this country no person can be injured, in his personal prop- erty, without an opportunity of defending himself. He has the right of being confronted with his accusers, and of being apprised of the accusation against him. 'Audi alteram partem,' is a maxim of natural justice dear to the hu- man heart and associated with every principle of our jurispru- dence. Conviction, founded upon ex parte accusation is the most terrible species of despotism that the human mind can conceive. It is not only a violation of the most obvious dictates of Common law, but it is destitute of every prin- ciple by which the social compact is supported. * * * No law is better established than that of coi- porations ; and it is settled, by that law that a corporation can inflict no punishment or proceed against any person for a supposed offense, unless particular notice is given to the person against whom they are about to proceed, in order that he may prepare his defense." Per Charlton, J., in State v. Savannah, 1 T. U. P. Charlton (Ga.), 235; 4 Am. Dec, 708, citing Rex v. Liver- pool, 2 Burr., 731, and quoting from Rex v. University of Cam- bridge, 1 Str., 567, per Justice For- tescue, as follows: "The objection for want of notice can never be got over. The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity of making his defense if he has any. I remember to have heard it said by a very learned man upon such an occasion, that even God §305J TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 481 to appear on a named charge, as violating one ordinance, he cannot he tried and convicted for a different offense, as one created by another ordinance.^! Voluntary appearance to be effectual must be with full knowl- edge on the part of the defendant that there is a charge pend- ing against him and the appearance must be with an intention on his part to waive process and voluntarily appear therein. "The mere presence of a defendant in a court room does not authorize a magistrate to proceed and render a judgment against him, without advising him a suit is pending against him, nor without a full understanding on the part of the de- fendant as to the nature of the proceedings. "^^ Where the action is regarded as civil jurisdiction of the person of the defendant can be obtained as in other civil suits, himself did not pass sentence upon Adam tefore he was called upon to make his defense. 'Adam,' says God, 'where art thou; hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I com- manded that thou shouldst not eat?' And the same question was put to Eve also." Notice — Joint Defendants. Service on one of two members of a firm is not notice to the other. So held in case of notice to abate a nuisance. St. Louis v. Flynn, 128 Mo., 413; 31 S. W. Rep., 17. Two defendants cannot be served by leaving only one copy for both with a member of their family at the usual place of abode — the method prescribed by law for copy service. St. Louis v. Flynn, 128 Mo., 413; 31 S. W. Rep., 17; Laney V. Garbee, 105 Mo., 355; 16 S. W. Rep., 831; Madison County Bank V. Suman, 79 Mo., 527; Brown v. Langlois, 70 Mo., 226; Stewart v. Stringer, 41 Mo., 400. If a warrant is issued against two overseers, and only one of them has been served with notice, the warrant will be set aside. Alexandria v. Bethlehem, 29 N. J. L., 375. 51 Columbus V. Arnold, 30 Ga., 517; Lester jelle v. Columbus, 30 Ga., 936; Gates v. Aurora, 44 111., 121. Or when charged with a mis- demeanor, he cannot be convicted under an ordinance charge. Peo- ple V. Miller, 38 Hun. (N. Y.), 82. 52 Merkee v. Rochester, 13 Hun. (N.Y.), 157, 160. Yoluntary appearance — If de- fendant appears and submits him- self to the court's jurisdiction, he waives all defects in the process and the service thereof. Baldwin V. Murphy, 82 111., 485. In one case the suit was brought before one justice of the peace and tried before another. The defend- ant appeared and went to trial. "It is a matter of no consequence how the case was transferred from Police Magistrate Scully to Police Magistrate Banyon, as appellant appeared before the latter, and went to trial, and appealed the case to the criminal court. The magistrate having jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit, there cannot be the slightest ques- tion that he also acquired jurisdic- tion of the person of appellant, when he entered his appearance to 81 48:.' TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§305 as by notice or summons.''*^ Sometimes he is brought in by war- rant.'^ The method of beginning the proceedings differ. Under some charters they can only be commenced upon the complaint of a police officer,'''"* or on information or statement filed by the city attorney.^" Where the law required the mayor to begin the proceeding on information and proof of the violation, it was held that it was not necessary to show that proof was furnished as authority to institute the proceedings.''^ So where the law permitted the recorder to issue a warrant for arrest, on com- the suit." Per Walker, J., in Wig- gins V. Chicago, 68 111., 372, 375. Rule applied where defendant appeared, on defective summons and defended an action before jus- tice of peace. Roberts v. Form- halls, 46 111., 66, per Breese, J. The principle is well supported. Ohio & M. R. R. R. Co. v. Mc- Cutchin, 27 III., 9, approving Swingley v. Haynes, 22 111., 214, 216; Vaughn v. Thompson, 15 111., 39; Ballard v. McCarty, 11 111., 501; Shook V. Thomas, 21 III., 87; Mayson v. Atlanta, 77 Ga., 662. S3 In re Ada Jones, 90 Mo. App., 318. Where civil, begun by writ of summons. Milton v. Hoagland, 3 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep., 283. Where law provides action of debt, suit instituted by warrant and arrest in error. Pottsville v. Marburger, 1 Leg. Chron. (Pa.), 60. Sufficiency of notice. Rothschild V. Darien, 69 Ga., 503. Civil, though commenced by warrant. Tippecanoe County Com'rs V. Chisson, 7 Ind., 688; Levy V. State, 6 Ind., 281; Bogart V. New Albany, 1 Ind., 38. Writ In form of cwpias, served by reading, without arrest, held good, though summons is proper process. Eubanks v. Ashley, 36 111., 177, 179. 5J People V. Van Houten, 35 N. Y. Supp., 186; 13 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.), 603; Newark v. Murphy, 40 N. J. L., 145; St. Peters v. Bauer, 19 Minn., 327, 329. Held in an early South Carolina case that process in the city court to recover the penalty, may bear test before the accrual of the cause of action. Charleston v. Schmidt, 11 Rich. (S. C), 343, 345. Arrest of violator not permitted unless expressly authorized. ' State V. Ruff, 30 La. Ann., 497. ■>■' State V. Robitshek, 60 Minn., 123 ; 33 L. R. A., 33; 61 N. W. Rej)., 1023. "The prosecution for the viola- tion cannot be instituted other- wise than by the corporate author- ities, and however grievous the wrong inflicted on an individual, it is not within his control." Montgomery v. Poster, 54 Ala., 62, 63, per Brickell, C. J. 56 Kansas City v. O'Connor, 36 Mo. App., 594; Kansas City v. Flanagan, 69 Mo., 22. Affidavit or formal complaint not required. Chicago v. Ken- nedy, 35 111. App., 57. Warrant and arrest. Schweitzer v. Beottcher, 84 111., 289. Affidavit and warrant. Camden V. Bloch, 65 Ala., 236. 5T Portland v. Rolfe, 37 Me., 400. i3061 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 483 plaint made under oath, it was held that the recorder could issue the warrant without complaint and oath, upon his own knowledge that the ordinance had been violated.^* § 306. Arrest without warrant. There are many loose gen- eral statements in the books as to the authority of officers to make arrests without warrants. At common law peace officers had power to arrest without warrant when the offense was committed in their view.^" If the power is conferred by char- ter, an ordinance may authorize the officer to arrest without a warrant where the offense is committed in his view.®*^ But unless the violation is committed within his view process or 58 Meaher v. Chattanooga, 1 Head. (38 Tenn.), 74, 77. Provision that proceedings shall be begun on complaint of any per- son, held to harmonize with the charter requirement that all prose- cution.^ for violations of ordi- nances shall be conducted by the city attorney. Spokane v. Robi- son, 6 Wash., 547; 33 Pac. Rep., 960. 59 Power discussed in Prell v. McDonald, 7 Kan., 426; State v. Lafferty, 5 Harr. (Del.), 491. Allowed for breach of the peace committed in officer's presence. Quinn v. Heisel, 40 Mich., 576; Knot V. Gay, 1 Root (Conn.), 66; State V. Brown, 5 Harr. (Del.), 505. Arrest cannot be made on infor- mation to the officer or suspicion without a warrant for past offenses not amounting to felony. Quinn v. Heisel, 40 Mich., 576, 578; Com. v. Carey, 12 Cush. (Mass.), 246, 252; Compare McCullough v. Com., 67 Pa. St., 30. Police officer may arrest, with- out warrant for felony, which in- cludes petit larceny. Carpenter v. Mills, 29 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 473, 477. 60 Chicago v. Kenney, 35 111. App., 57, 63; Bryan v. Bates, 15 111., 87; Scircle v. Neeves, 47 Ind., 289; Nealls v. Hayward, 48 Ind., 19. Keeping open tippling house on Sunday. Maine v. McCarty, 15 111., 441. Disorderly conduct. Johnson v. Americus, 46 Ga., 80, 87. Conducting auction in public place. White v. Kent, 11 Ohio St., 550, 554. Charter may confer power to arrest one while in the act of vio- lating a state law or borough or- dinance, without warrant. St. Peters v. Bauer, 19 Minn., 327, 329. A "policeman," held to be legal equivalent to "watchman" at com- mon law. State v. Evans, 161 Mo., 95; 61 S. W. Rep., 590. Questioned, whether an ordi- nance can justify arrests without process, where common law prin- ciples do not. Quinn v. Heisel, 40 Mich., 576. Where the charge was cruelty to animals,' It was held that the officer could not arrest without a warrant although committed in his presence. This was said to be a mere misdemeanor not amounting to a breach of the peace. The charter may confer such power. Butolph V. Blust, 5 Lans. (N. Y.), 84. For obstructing bridge in viola- tion of an ordinance it was held 484 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§307 warrant for arrest is required.*^ In an early Tennessee case, an ordinance authorizing police officers to make arrests without a warrant for breaches of ordinances not committed in their presence was held void.^^ On the other hand, it was early held in Maryland that one violating an ordinance in depositing night soil in view of the officer may be arrested without war- rant on the order of the board of health.®^ In Minnesota an or- dinance was declared void which authorized specified officers to arrest and detain, until the extinguishment of a fire, any person refusing to obey their directions. Its invalidity was based upon the constitutional ground that it deprived those arrested of their liberty without due process. of law or trial by jury.«* § 307. Sufficiency of summons or warrant. The requisites of the summons or warrant are controlled by the local laws. It should clearly notify the defendant of the offense with which he is charged. A reference to the ordinance or section upon which the complaint is founded is often required.^^ Ordi- narily if the substance of the offense is precisely stated this will be sufficient. In view of the quasi-criminal nature of such actions, some courts demand considerable technical accuracy.*^ that a police oflScer could not ar- false imprisonment. Mitchell v. rest, without a warrant, unless Lemon, 34 Md., 176, 181. power expressly conferred by char- «* Judson v. Reardon, 16 Minn., ter. Even if misdemeanor, no power 431. exists "unless such misdemeanor The question whether the officer was accompanied by a breach of who arrested defendant had a war- the peace at common law." Hen- rant does not affect the legality of nessy v. Connolly, 13 Hun. (N. his conviction, after he is once Y.), 173. within the jurisdiction of court. An arrest without process can- People v. Iverson, 14 N. Y. Cr. not be made on Sunday for a vio- Rep., 155; 61 N. Y. Supp., 220; 46 lation of an ordinance. Wood v. App. Div., 301, relying on People Brooklyn, 14 Barb. (N. Y.), 425, v. Eberspacher; 79 Hun. (N. Y.), 431. 410; 29 N. Y. Supp. 796, where the Obstructing sidewalk in view of general rule is declared "that it is officer; arrest without warrant au- no defense to a criminal prosecu- thorized by statute. People v. Van tlon that the defendant was ille- Houten, 69 N. Y. St., 265. gaily or forcibly brought within 01 Summary arrest not allowed the jurisdiction of the court." without process, when. Clark v. es Reference to wrong ordinance New Brunswick, 43 N. J. L., 175. held would vitiate proceedings. 02 pesterfleld V. Vickers, 3 Coldw. Keeler v. Milledge, 24 N. J. L., (Tenn.), 205. 142, 145. 63 Rule applied in action against ee Warrant must set forth the police officer for trespassing and offense substantially within the §307] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 485 The defeudant must be precisely designated in the warrant.- Omission therein oi; the Christian name of the one intended to be charged, without otherwise describing such person, vi- tiates the warrant.®^ The warrant or notice need not set out the ordinance violated,^^ nor authority to pass it."* Generally the [aw is liberal in permitting amendments, especially those re- lating to form."" purview ot the law. White v. Washington, 2 Cranch. C. C, 337. Offense to be described with rea- sonable certainty. Barney v. Washington, 1 Cranch. C. C, 248; 2 Fed. Cas. No. 1,033. Vague and uncertain. Washing- ton V. Lynch, 5 Cranch. C. C, 498; 29 Fed. Cas. No. 17,231; Delany v. Washington, 2 Cranch. C. C, 459; 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3,755. By-law to be specified and viola- tion should be stated. Boothe v. Georgetown, 2 Cranch. C. C, 356; 3 Fed. Cas. No. 1,651. A summons to answer "for a violation of an ordinance of said town relative to nuisances" is bad. Israel v. Jacksonville, 2 111., 290. It should state whether it is an action of debt, or an information. State (Hershoff) v. Beverly, 43 N. J. L., 139. Where law permits the warrant to issue "upon information of the city attorney," an information signed by a deputy city attorney is bad. Kansas City v. Flanagan, 69 Mo., 22. Chief clerk of police court may sign. O'Brien v. Cleveland, 4 Ohio Dec, 189; 1 Cleve. Law Rev., 100. Warrant on charge of fast and reckless driving. State v. Merritt, 83 N. C, 677. Rescuing impounded animals. Sheldon v. Hill, 33 Mich., 171. Forbidding negroes from loiter- ing in liquor stores. Process need not state names and sexes of ne- groes or names of their owners. Charleston v. Seeba, 4 Strob. (S. C), 319. Liquor selling. State (Hershoff) V. Beverly, 43 N. J. L., 139. s'Prell V. McDonald, 7 Kan., 426, 454; Levy v. State, 6 Ind., 281. 68 State V. Cainan, 94 N. C, 880. 69 State V. Merritt, 83 N. C, 677. Prior to change in law it was re- quired in North Carolina that the warrant should set forth the state law authorizing the ordinance. Washington v. Prank, 46 N. C, 436. Effect of discrepancies between reference to section number of or- dinance violated in complaint and summons, see White v. Neptune City, 56 N. J. L., 222 ; 28 Atl. Rep., 378. Endorsement of reference to or- dinance required to be on the copy of the summons. The state law requirement was applied. New York V. Eisler, 10 Daly (N. Y.), 396. The warrant need not allege that the offense was committed in the county in which the city is situ- ated. Beasley v. Beckley, 28 W. Va., 81. 70 Bristol V. Burrow, 5 Lea (73 Tenn.), 128; Childress v. Nash- ville, 3 Sneed (35 Tenn.), 347. Amendment of defective warrant authorized after verdict on pay- ment of costs. Washington v. Frank, 46 N. C, 436. Defective statement in warrant may be corrected after verdict or judgment. McGunnigle v. Wash- 486 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§ 309 § 308. Bail bond. Unless the authority is conferred by law, a local magistrate has no power to issue a warrant of arrest for the violation of an ordinance which does not constitute a public offense against the criminal laws of the state, and take a bail bond for the defendant's appearance. "If the power exists it xaust be found in the statute. Otherwise officers and courts cannot assume it, however, convenient it may appear. It does not exist at* common law as incident to municipal cor- porations. "'^^ § 309. Name in which action should be brought. The char- ter or local law applicable usually designates the name in which the action for the enforcement of ordinances should be brought. Prosecutions for the violation of ordinances have been sustained which were brought in the name of the state, people or commonwealth. ''^ Ordinarily the action is required to be brought in the corporate name of the municipal corpora- tion.''' If the charter expressly directs the proceedings to be C, 460; 16 Wisconsin — Chafln v. Waukesha County, 62 Wis., 463, 468; 22 N. W. ington, 2 Cranch. C Pert. Cas. No. 8,818. ^1 "The proceedings in our crim- inal procedure, regarding hail, are all directed to offenses against the state. It must appear that the party is charged with a public offense." Canthorn v. State, 43 Ark., 128, 131. Bail authorized. People v. Jus- tices, 74 N. Y., 406; 18 Alb. L. J., 254. ■?- California — Santa Barbara v. Sherman, 61 Cal., 57; Pillsbury v. Brown, 47 Cal., 477. Massachusetts — Commonwealth V. Worcester, 3 Pick. (20 Mass.), 462 ; In re Goddard, 16 Pick. (Mass.), 504. Michigan — Vicksburg v. Briggs, 85 Mich., 502; 48 N. W, Rep., 625. Nebraska — Brownville v. Cook, 4 Neb., 101. Pennsylvania — Van Swartow v. Com., 24 Pa. St., 131. South Carolina — In re Oliver, 21 S. C, 318; 53 Am. Rep., 681. Washington — State v. Fountain, 14 Wash., 236; 44 Pac. Rep., 270. Rep., 732. Being criminal, the state is the party plaintiff. But if justice erro- neously enters in his docket the name of the local corporation as plaintiff, it is irregular, but did not oust the jurisdiction of the jus- tice, nor did it in any manner prejudice the defendant. State v. Grafemuller, 26 Minn., 6; 46 N. W. Rep., 445. "" Arkansas — Graham v. State, 1 Ark., 79. Illinois — Chicago v. Kenney, 35 111. App., 57; Partridge v. Snyder, 78 111., 519; Havana v. Biggs, 58 111., 483; Lewiston v. Proctor, 27 111., 414; Webster v. People, 14 111., 365; Israel v. Jacksonville, 2 111., 290. Iowa — Centerville v. Miller, 51 Iowa, 712; 2 N. W. Rep., 527. Kansas — Emporia v. Volmer, 12 Kan., 622. Michigan — Cooper v. People, 41 Mich., 403; 2 N. W. Rep., 51; Smith V. Adrian, 1 Mich.. 495. i309] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 487 in the name of the city it is error to bring the action in the name of the eommonwealthJ* Constitutional and statutory provisions requiring all prosecutions to be in the name of the state or peoplij are generally construed as relating alone to criminal proceedings for violations of state laws, and not to the recovery of penalties under municipal ordinances/^ The pre- vailing judicial view is, that cases of violation of ordinances are not criminal prosecutions, but are merely penal actions on the part of .the local corporation and have for their object the vindication of their own domestic regulations, and, to adopt the language of the Supreme Court of Michigan, "it is a mis- take to suppose the people have any right to sue."^^ Some- New Jersey — State (Greely) v. Passaic, 42 N. J. L., 429. Pennsylvania — Philadelphia v. Nell, 3 Yeates (Pa.), 475. Texas — Bautsch v. Galveston, 27 Tex. App., 342; 11 S. W. Rep., 414. Washington — Spokane v. Robi- son, 6 Wash., 547; 33 Pac. Rep., 960. Code provides that local corpora- tion shall be plaintiff. Jenkins v. Cheyenne, 1 Wyo. Ter., 287. Name of president and trustees of village. King v. Jacksonville, 3 111., 305. ^i Williamson v. Com., 4 B. Mon. (Ky.), 146, 151. Where it is in the name of the state, instead of the corporation, the case will not be reversed on ap- peal, especially if the objection was not presented to the trial court. State v. King, 37 Iowa, 462. '5 Alexander v. Greenville, 54 Miss., 659; Davenport v. Bird, 34 Iowa, 524; Centerville v. Miller, 51 Iowa, 712; 2 N. W. Rep., 527; Chi- cago V. Kenney, 35 111. App., 57; Romero v. Chapman, 2 Mich., 179; Lemon v. Reidel, 1 Lane. Law Rev. (Pa.), 3; Abbeville v. Leopard, 61 S. C, 99; 39 S. E. Rep., 248; Smith V. Marston, 5 Tex., 426. Contra — Brownville v. Cook, 4 Neb., 101, 105. ' Hardenbrook v. Ligonier, 95 ss Indiana — -Huntington v. Chees Ind., 70. bro, 57 Ind., 74; Frankfort v. Au- Power to pass an ordinance is ghe, 114 Ind., 77; 15 N. E. Rep. a matter of law of which the court 802 ; Goshen v. Croxton, 34 Ind. will ex otficio take notice. Green 239; Huntington v. Pease, 56 Ind. V. Indianapolis, 22 Ind., 192; Green 305. V. Indianapolis, 25 Ind., 490. Kansas— "Eraporia, v. Volmer, 12 Allegation that ordinance was Kan.,' 622. duly adopted is sufficient. Wagner New Jersey — Kip v. Paterson, 26 V. Garrett, 118 Ind., 114; 20 N. E. N. J. L., 298; Nicoulin v. Lowery, Rep., 706; Linkenhelt v. Garrett, 49 N. J. L., 391; 8 Atl. Rep., 513. 118 Ind., 599; 20 N. E. Rep., 708. North C aroUnor— StaiB v. Edens, 80 Cronin v. People, 82 N. Y., 318, 85 N. C, 522; Hendersonville v. 323; Stuyvesant v. New York, 7 McMinn, 82 N. C, 532; Greens- boro v. Shields, 78 N. C, 417. §313] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 491 act complained of in the language of the ordinance,** especially where the ordinance so clearly individuates the offense that the defendant has proper notice from the mere adoption of the terms of the ordinance what the offense that he is to be tried for really is.®*' Even in those jurisdictions where the proceed- ing is regarded as criminal or quasi criminal and a formal infor- mation is provided, that particularity which is technically nec- essary to constitute a good indictment is not required.'" In South Dakota — Lead v. Klatt, 13 S. D., 140; 82 N. W. Rep., 391. Sufficiency of complaint under particular statutes. Durango v. Reinsberg, 16 Colo., 327; 26 Pac. Rep., 820; Commonwealth v. Nightingale, Thatcher Crim. Cas., 251; Miles City v. Kern, 12 Mont, 119; 29 Pac. Rep., 720.' A charge that defendant "com- mitted a certain offense contrary to an ordinance of the town," is insufficient. Memphis v. O'Connor, 53 Mo., 468. sn Connecticut — State v. Carpen- ter, 60 Conn., 97; 22 Atl. Rep., 497. Massachusetts — Com. v. Cutter, 156 Mass., 52, 57; 29 N. B. Rep., 1146. Minnesota — Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn., 62; 30 N. W. Rep., 305. Missouri — Gallatin v. Tarwater, 143 Mo., 40, 46; 44 S. W. Rep., 750; St. Louis V. Weitzel, 130 Mo., 600; 31 S. W. Rep., 1045; Kansas City V. Zahner, 73 Mo. App., 396; St. Louis V. Knox, 74 Mo., 79; 6 Mo. App., 247. Verinont — W.inooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt., 282, 286. i)o If it follows the language of the ordinance, ordinarily it will be sufficient. However, it must allege an illegal act which the ordinance designed to forbid. State v. Gould- ing, 44 N. H., 284. Rule applies to indictments. Com. V. Barrett, 108 Mass., 302; Wharton's Cr. Pr., sec. 220. In crimes against the state the doc- trine is that where all the facts which constitute the offense are set forth in the statute it is only necessary to follow the language of the statute. State v. Davis, 70 Mo., 467; State v. Adams, 108 Mo., 208, 211; 18 S. W. Rep., 1000. "1 State v. Dunbar, 43 La. Ann., 836; 9 So. Rep., 492; State v. Baker, 44 La. Ann., 79; 10 So. Rep., 405; Springfield v. Ford, 40 Mo. App., 586; Gallatin v. Tar- water, 143 Mo., 40, 46; 44 S. W. Rep., 750; St. Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo., 600; 31 S. W. Rep., 1045; St. Louis V. Knox, 74 Mo., 79; Trenton v. Devorss, 70 Mo. App., 8; St. Louis V. Smith, 10 Mo., 439; St. Joseph V. Levin, 128 Mo., 588, 592; 31 S. W. Rep., 101. In passing upon the sufficiency of an indictment, Mr. Justice Brewer said: "But the true rule is, not whether it might possibly have been made more certain, but wheth- er * * * it sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and, in case any other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense, whether the record shows with ac- curacy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or con- viction." Cochran v. United States, 157 U. S., 286; Evans v. United States, 153 U. S., 584, 587, 588; Batchelor v. United States, 156 U. S., 426. 41)2 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§ 3i± misdemeanors rigid nicety is ever exacted."^ Liberal rules of pleading and practice pertain to suits and prosecutions to en- force municipal ordinances.^^ In most jurisdictions the statement is not tested by the rules appertaining to criminal procedure, but by those applicable to civil actions.** The action is merely in the nature of an action for the recovery of a debt, and being such, it will be sufficient if it states a good cause of aetion.^^ § 314. Form of complaint— Verification— Conclusion. The complaint should be in writing.*^ Its form is generally directed by local laws. Where the action is brought in the name of an officer as chamberlain (in England), or treasurer, it is sufficient for him to aver generally that he is such officer without setting 92 State V. Kesslering, 12 Mo., 565, 566. 03 St. Louis V. Levin, 128 Mo., 588, 592; 31 S. W. Rep., 101; Hard- enbrook v. Ligonier, 95 Ind., 70; Brookville v. Gagle, 73 Ind., 117; Greensburgli v. Corwin, 58 Ind., 518; Goshen v. Croxton, 34 Ind., 239 ; Bogart v. New Albany, 1 Ind., 38; Smith v. Emporia, 27 Kan., 528. Same strictness is not required as an information by a common informer. Complaint for the vio- lation of an ordinance is not of this nature. Keeler v. Milledge, 24 N. J. L., 142, 145. 9* Greensburgh v. Corwin, 58 Ind., 518; Goshen v. Croxton, 34 Ind., 239; Springfield v. Ford, 40 Mo. App., 586; St. Louis v. Weit- zel, 130 Mo., 600; 31 S. W. Rep., 1045. 95 Lippman v. South Bend, 84 Ind., 276; Murphy v. Lambert, 59 Ind., 477; McMlllen v. Terrell, 23 Ind., 163. Good if it includes all facts nec- essary to constitute the offense. Com. V. Cutter, 156 Mass., 52, 57; 29 N. E. Rep., 1146; Com. v. Barrett, 108 Mass., 302. The complaint need not contain the requisites of a written decla- ration as required at common law. It will be suflScient if it declares generally on debt. Deitz v. Cen- tral, 1 Colo., 323. Demand. As to necessity of de- mand before suit. Willcox, Mun. Corp., 174, 175; Butchers v. Bul- lock, 3 Bos. & P., 434, 437. State of demand need not be filed. Johnson v. Barclay, 16 N. J. L., 1. Name. Charging defendant by surname, alleging his Christian name to be unknown, held suffi- cient identification. Levy v. State, 6 Ind., 281. Omission of Christian name fatal, when. Prell v. Mc- Donald, 7 Kan., 426, 454. 98 Allen v. Gray, 11 Conn., 95, 102; Tracy v. Williams, 4 Conn., 107; Prell v. McDonald, 7 Kan., 426, 450. Oeal Good. State v. Northern Bell M., etc., Co., 12 Nev., 89, 92. Officer may make orally. Hobbs V. Hill, 157 Mass., 556; 32 N. E. Rep., 862. None Required before justice of the peace. Ewbanks v. Ashley, 36 111., 177, 180. § 314] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 493 out his election or appointment.^^ The same rule applies to boards. Sometimes the law requires the complaint or information to he made under oath,88 unless it is filed by some oiificer in his public capacity."'' In Massachusetts it has been held that the complaint should not only conclude against the form of the by-law in such case made and provided, but also against the form of the statute by which alone a prosecution can be maintained.^ The same rule has been announced in New Hampshire, where the action was founded as well upon the statute, which authorized the town to make the by-law, as upon the by-law, and hence the court concluded that it was necessary to allege in the declara- tion that the offense was committed as well against the form of the statute as against the form of the by-law." But it does not seem necessary to aver that the offense was committed contrary to the form of the statute where the right of action acci-ues under and by virtue of the ordinance upon which the proceeding is based, since as stated in a Vermont case, "the act of the defendant was not contra forman statufi."^ The allega- When required. Alton v. Kirsch, State v. Perth Amboy, 51 N. J. L., 406; 17 Atl. Rep., 971. A police judge in signing his name to the jurat attached to com- plaint put immediately underneath the letters "J. P." meaning justice of the peace, instead of "P. J." meaning police judge, his appro- priate olBcial title. It was con- tended that this slight irregularity rendered the complaint void. But the court held otherwise and de- clared it "a weak point." Cherokee v. Fox, 34 Kan., 16, 19 ; 7 Pac. Rep., 625. 1 Commonwealth v. Gay, 5 Pick. (Mass.), 44; Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. (Mass.), 461, 475, where question was raised but not decided. 2 Stevens v. Dimond, 6 N. H., 330, 331, relying upon the Massa- chusetts cases cited in the last note. 3 Winooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt., 282, 286, per Royce, .1. 68 111., 261; Chicago v. Kenney, 35 111. App., 57, 64. »'Willcock, Mun. Corp., 164. 98 Prell V. McDonald, 7 Kan., 426. VeriiBcation implied in criminal prosecutions. Campbell v. Thomp- son, 16 Me., 117, 120. In absence of law so directing, complaint not made under oath, held good. Alton v. Kirsch, 68 111., 261. Distinction between complaint and affidavit. State v. Richardson, 34 Minn., 115; 24 N. W. Rep., 354; McMath V. Parsons. 26 Minn., 246; 2 N. W. Rep., 703. -09 St. Louis V. Melville, 3 Mo. App., 597; O'Brien v. Cleveland, 4 Ohio Dec, 189; 1 Cleveland Law Rep., 100. Verification on Information — Sufficiency. Clarence v. Patrick, 54 Mo. App., 462. Jurat may be signed by magis- trate on return day of summons. 49i TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§ 315 tion that the offense M^as in violation of the ordinance is equiva- lent to the words "contrary to the form," etc* § 315. Pleading ordinance violated— Judicial notice. At common law the by-law itself must be set out fully in an action of debt upon it and not by way of recital ; therefore, it is not sufficient to aver that the defendant incurred the penalty by virtue of a certain by-laAV, as, for example, having refused an office ; but this latter averment appears to be sufficient in an ac- tion of assumpsit founded upon the same by-law ; for in that form of action greater latitude is allowed, because after all it comes to a question of evidence, what legal consideration there is either to support or raise the assumpsit. ° In view of this common law rule, it has often been declared in this country that the by-law must be set forth in the pleading when sought to be enforced by action, or when set up as a protection on the record. The rule is enforced in those courts which, under the law, do not take judicial notice of by-laws and ordinances of municipal corporations, as state courts, justices of the peace, and other local state courts, created directly by state authority and which are not necessarily a part of the municipal govern- ment." Judicial notice being taken of ordinances by the courts of the municipal corporation, the complaint or statement in such case need not plead the ordinance violated with the same degree of particularity as required in proceedings founded on such ordinance in the state courts where judicial notice of them is not taken. The usual rule of procedure that, neither pre- sumptions of law, nor matters of which judicial notice is taken, need be set forth in an indictment or information is applied properly to a statement or complaint for violation of municipal ordinances.'' * Faribault v. Wilson, 34 Minn., whether the defendant be a proper 254; 25 N. W. Rep., 449. object of the action. 2 Kyd, Corp., 5 Willcock, Mun. Corp., 173. p. 167. Form adopted and ap- CoMMON Law Rule — Form. In proved in Coates v. New York, 7 an action of debt, for the penalty Cow. (N. Y.), 585. of a by-law, the time when it was « When a justice of the peace made, the parties by whom it was does not take judicial notice the made, their authority to make it, ordinance must be pleaded and the custom on which it is founded, proved. Harker v. New York, 17 if it be founded on a custom, the Wend. (N. Y.), 199, per Cowen, by-law itself, and the breach of it J.; Winona v. Burke, 23 Minn., by defendant, mupt be set forth; 254. See next sections. that the court may judge both " Smith v. Emporia, 27 Kan., 528, whether the by-law be good, and 530. §316] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 495 In a Kansas case the ordinance was not set forth in full, or even in part, in the complaint, but the wrongful acts of defend- ant were alleged with sufficient fullness and precision and the ordinance, of which those acts were charged to be a violation, was referred to by number. Respecting the sufficiency of this complaint. Brewer, J., said: "Whatever may be the rule where proceedings are had in courts other than those of the munici- pality itself, we think that a complaint in the police court of a city for a violation of one of the ordinances of the city is suf- ficient, although no part of the ordinance is copied into it, and no express reference is made thereto bj- date, number, or other- wise, providing the acts or conduct of the defendant in violation of the ordinance are fully and clearly charged. There is no more need of express reference to the ordinance in such a com- plaint, than there is in an information for a felonj' in the dis- trict court, to "the particular section of the statute under which the information is filed. The only question is. Do the acts eharged constitute a violation .' The police court takes judicial notice of the ordinances, as the district court the statute ; and the defendant in each case is bound to know the law. ' "^ § 316. Same— Reference to ordinance violated required. Following the common law rule applicable to the action of debt, as already indicated, some courts have held that the ordinance "What did not need to be proved petent manner, and it is imma- dld not need to be alleged." Solo- terial that the bound volume in man v. Hughes, 24 Kan., 211, 212, which the ordinance appears was per Valentine, J. not referred to in the indictment. s Per Brewer, J., in West v. Commonwealth v. Odenweler, 156 Columbus, 20 Kan., 633, 635, quot- Mass., 234; 30 N. E. Rep., 1022. Ing from 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp., sec. Comjiox L.\w Rule. When an 346, that "the liberal rules of action on a by-law founded on a pleading and practice which char- custom is brought in the court of acterize modern judicial proceed- the municipality, the custom ings should extend to, and doubt- should not be set forth in the dec- less would be held to embrace laration; for the court must take suits and prosecutions to enforce judicial notice of the custom, for the by-laws or ordinances of they are the lex loci. WlUcock, municipal corporations." Mun. Corp., 166. An allegation in an indictment But on a by-law founded on a for keeping a troublesome dog to special custom or one founded on the effect that the acts charged are a private act of parliament con- contrary to the form of the ordi- fined to the city or to any trade nance is suflScient to allow the in It, a bare recital is not sufficient, proof of the ordinance in any com- but the special custom and by-law 496 TO ENFOECE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§ 310 violated must be set forth in the complaint." Many charters and legislative acts provide that it shall not be necessary to set forth the ordinance at large in the complaint or information."* But in the absence of such provision the prevailing judicial view is that it is suiBcient to set out the substance of the ordi- nance or the section thereof alleged to have been violated. This rule is reasonable.' ^ Reference in the complaint or statement to the particular ordinance or part thereof infringed is often required. '- An in- or the act of parliament must be Goldthwaite v. Montgomery, 50 set out. Willcock, Mun. Corp., 169, Ala., 486, distinguishing Case v. 170. Mobile, 30 Ala., 538, where com- » State V. Edens, 85 N. C, 522; plaint did not show what ordi- Hendersonville v. MoMinn, 82 N. nance had been violated. C, 532; Greensboro v. Shields, 78 "The great weight of authority N. C, 417; Nodine v. Union, 13 holds that it is sufficient to refer Oreg., 587; 11 Pac. Rep., 298. to an ordinance by its date and Complaint is sufficient where purpose, or by its title and the copy of ordinance violated is set number of the section violated, or out therein. Bberlln v. Mobile, 30 by its substance, or, in a general Ala., 548. way, with a degree of precision By statute in Indiana it is suf- sufficiently direct to identify it." ficient to set out a copy of the Pairmount v. Meyer, 83 Minn., 456, ordinance and recite the number 458, 459; 86 N. W. Rep., 457. of the section and the date of its 12 Case v. Mobile, 30 Ala., 538; adoption. Huntington v. Pease, 56 Lewiston v. Paiirfield, 47 Me., 481; Ind., 305. Keeler v. Milledge, 24 N. J. L., 142. 10 Commonwealth v. Worcester, Method of reference to ordi- 3 Pick. (Mass.), 461. nance. Rochester v. Upman, 19 11 Faribault v. Wilson, 34 Minn., Minn., 108; State v. Reckards, 21 254; 25 N. W. Rep., 449; Green Minn., 47. V. Indianapolis, 25 Ind., 490; Kip Title and section of ordinance v. Paterson, 26 N. J. L., 298; violated set forth in complaint is Nicoulin v. Lowery, 49 N. J. L., sufficient. Fink v. Milwaukee, 17 391; 8 Atl. Rep., 513. Wis., 26. Section of ordinance violated Complaint, title and substance need not be set out. Meyer v. of ordinance sufficient. Janes- Bridgeton, 37 N. J. L., 160. ville v. Railroad Co., 7 Wis., 484. Ordinance need not be set out; Ordinance described by section it is sufficient to state Its date and and date of passage sufficient, purpose, so as to identify it, and Goshen v. Kern, 63 Ind.. 468; 30 allege a violation of it. "Both in Am. Rep., 234; Elkhart v. Calvert, forms and principles, our system 126 Jnd., 6; 25 N. E. Rep., 807; of pleading is very different from Whitson v. Franklin, 34 Ind., 392. those established at common law. Complaint sufficient where it re- For this reason, common law fers to the ordinance by title or authorities are of little force upon date of approval and the date and such subjects in our courts." paper of its publication and re- §317] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 497 formation charged the violation of an ordinance entitled "Re- vision of the ordinances of the city of Kansas, Mo., of May 12, 1888," is bad, since it refers to the whole book of the ordi- nances and not to the special ordinance violated.^* A reference to the section violated was held insufficient where the section mentioned defined several distinct offenses. A law providing that the complaint need only state the number and section num- ber of the ordinance violated was held not to apply, since such general reference was not sufficient to notify defendant of the particiUar charge against him.i* Where one section of the ordi- nance made it unlawful for any railroad company to run any locomotive or cars over any railroad track within the corporate limits at a faster rate of speed than four miles an hour and an- other section imposed a penalty upon any engineer or person having control of any engine, car, etc., who should violate any of the provisions of the ordinance, the complaint should refer to both sections, the one creating the offense, and the other im- posing the penalty.'^ § 317. Negativing exceptions. In an action to recovery the penalty of an ordinance forbidding the sale of liquor, without a license, "except such as shall be compounded and intended to be used as a medicine," the complaint must negative the ex- ception. "Every allegation in the complaint may be true, and >et the party charged may not have violated the law, for the facts stated do not necessarily constitute an offense against the ordinance."!® The rule of law is that when the exception is in the body of the law which enacts the offense and enters into it as a part of its description it becomes necessary to state all the facts which constitute the offense; and to do this the exception in such case must be negatived. So where there is an exception in the enacting clause the party pleading it must show that his adversary is not within the exception. But if the exception is cites the several specific sections is Kansas City v. Whitman, 70 alleged to have been violated. Em- Mo. App., 630. poria V. Volmer, 12 Kan., 622. i* Fink v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis., The averment that the act was 26. done contrary to and in violation lo Complaint held insufficient for of an ordinance, setting out the failure to refer to the section im- title thereof, is a sufficient aver- posing the penalty. Whitson v. ment of the existence of the ordi- Franklin, 34 Ind., 392. nance at the time of the violation isRoherson v. Lambertville, 38 complained of. Meyer v. Bridge- N. J. L., 69, 73. ton, 37 N. J. L., 160. 32 498 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§318 distinct from the enacting clause, as where it is in a subsequent clause or a subsequent law, it then becomes matter of defense and need not be negatived.*^ Thus a complaint for the viola- tion of an ordinance forbidding the keeping open of a saloon on Sunday, but which permitted the furnishing of meals, etc., and allowed saloons to do business between the hours of 2 P. M. and 10 P. il. under certain restrictions, it is not necessary to negative the exceptions.^ ^ In a New Jersey ease the, ordinance required that no person should be allowed to place any box or other obstruction in any street in front of his residence or place of business, or suf- fer the same to remain there. It contained a proviso that if public transit be not thereby interrupted, seven days shall be allowed for removing said obstruction. A declaration to re- cover the penalty for a violation of this ordinance which set out the offense or thing prohibited was held good.^^ § 318. Several ofifenses— Joinder. Each successive violation of the ordinance may be treated as a distinct cause of action, but the complaint need not consolidate the several causes so that the combined penalties will exceed the court's jurisdic- tion.-" Where the aggregate sum claimed does not exceed the court's jurisdiction several violations may be united in one com- I'Blkins V. State, 13 Ga., 435, If the by-law excepts certain 439; Com. v. Maxwell, 2 Pick, classes of persons from its opera- (Mass.), 138; Com. v. Hart, 11 tion, and the exception be ma- Cush. (Mass.), 130; per Cooley, J., terial, it is necessary to aver that in Lynch v. People, 16 Mich., 472, defendant is not within it. Will- 476; Myers v. Carr, 12 Mich., 63, cock, Mun. Corp., 174; Rex v. 71, per Manning, J.; Attorney- Abingdon, 1 Salk., 432; Rex v. General v. Oakland Bank, Walker Coopers of Newcastle, 7 Term Ch. (Mich.), 90, 93; Tell v. Fonda, Rep., 547. 4 Johns (N. Y.), 304; State v. Affidavit for complaint held de- Barker, 18 Vt., 195, 197; State v. fective for failure to allege that Butler, 17 Vt., 145, 149. defendant was not within excep- 18 Lynch v. People, 16 Mich., 472, tions of the ordinance. Martins- per Cooley, J. ville v. Frieze, 33 Ind., 507. 19 "In this case the placing or On charge of selling liquor it is leaving a box, etc., in the street, not necessary to aver that it was Is the offense or thing prohibited, not sold for medicinal, etc., pur- The subsequent clause contains poses. State v. Beneke, 9 Iowa, mere matter of excuse which the 203. defendant must avail himself of 2« Whitehall v. Meaux, 8 111. as a matter of defense." McGear App., 182; Lancaster v. R. R. Co., V. Woodruff, 33 N. J. L., 213, 215. 12 Lane. Bar. (Pa.), 99. §319] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 499 plaint.-i This is the common law rule and it prevails in the ab- sence of charter or statutory change. ^^ Where the law author- izing the ordinance provides that any number of violations may be included in one information any number of offenses may be charged and a fine imposed for eaeh.^^ An information charging that defendant "did unlawfully sell beer to persons unknown," was held to charge, in effect, one sale to several per- sons jointlj', and hence, not bad for -duplicity under an ordi- nance constituting each separate act of selling an off'ense.^* A complaint which charges more than one offense in the same count is bad.^'' In a charge of sAvearing the same profane oath several times, on the same day, each oath need not be complained of, separately. 2^ An information under an ordinance making it unlawful to let or try to let jacks, stallions, or bulls serve marcs or cows in public places, which alleges that defendant did "let or try to let a stallion serve a mare," was held good against the contention that it charged two distinct offenses."''' Separate suits must be brought for the enforcement of each ordinance which presents a distinct and substantive cause of action and which has been the subject of distinct legislation. Thus one suit cannot be brought for the violation of ordinances, though relating to the same general subject, which are entirely different in the specification of offenses to which they affixed penalties and where. the penalties differ in amounts.^^ § 319. Same— Joint liability. Where the ordinance has been violated by two or more individuals, as one forbidding the 21 Hensoldt v. Petersburg, 63 111., charged made after plea of de- 111. fendant denied. Lead v. Klatt, 13 22 Brooklyn v. Cleves, HIU and S. D., 140; 82 N. W. Rep., 391. Denio Supp. (N. Y.), 231, 233, per Where the complaint includes a Nelson, C. J. charge punishable only by state 23 Eldora v. Burlingame, 62 statutes, held not bad for duplicity Iowa, 32; 17 N. W. Rep., 148; as the statutory charge may be Jackson v. Boyd, 53 Iowa, 536; 5 eliminated as a surplusage. Bl- N. W. Rep., 734. dora v. Burlingame, 62 Iowa, 32; 2* State V. King. 37 Iowa, 462. 17 N. W. Rep., 148. Illustration of one offense 25 Tiedke v. Saginaw, 43 Mich., charged in an indictment. Stevens 64; 4 N. W. Rep., 627. V. Commonwealth, 6 Met. (Mass.), 26 Johnson v. Barclay, 16 N. J. 241, per Shaw, C. J. L., 1. Charge of violation on divers 27 Bayard v. Baker, 76 Iowa, 220; days. Motion to quash on the 40 N. W. Rep., 818. ground that several offenses were 28 Kensington v. Glenat, 1 Phila. (Pa.), 393. 500 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§321 sale of liquor, the action may be against one or more.^® But a joint action against three persons for offenses individually sep-' arate and distinct cannot be maintained.^" § 320. Statement or information for penalty for second of- fense. The rule of criminal pleading is that, where the offense is the first, or is prosecuted as such, the indictment need not charge it to be the first, for this is presumed. But if it be the second or third, and the sentence is to be heavier by reason of its being such, the fact thus relied on must be averred in the indictment ; because, by the rules of criminal pleading, the in- dictment must always contain an averment of every fact essen- tial to the punishment to be inflicted.^i This rule has been applied to informations charging the violations of ordinances. Thus, where a greater punishment may be inflicted on a convic- tion for a second or subsequent violation of an ordinance than for the first, the fa ct that the offense charged is a second offense must be averred in the information or statement, in order to jus- tify the increased punishment.^^ § 321. Sufficient of complaint or statement— Illustrative cases. Deuxkenness— Intoxioatiox. Complaint must state that the intoxication resulted in the disturbance of the good order and quiet of the corporation, where this is an ingredient of the offense. ^^ But where it is made an offense merely to appear in such condition on the streets and public places, the statement that defendant appeared in such condition, specifying the time and place, will be suf- ficient, since the gist of the action is being drunk in a public place.^* Disobeying Order. An averment that defendant did disobey an order "after the same was duly served on him" is bad, since it is not a charge that the order was duly served. 4 29 The liquor was owned by 96 ; Westgate v. Carr, 43 111., 450, three persons. An action against 455. only two was sustained. It was ai i Bishop, Crim. Law (6th considered in the nature of a tort Ed.), sec. 961. for which one or more may be 32 Larney v. Cleveland, 34 Ohio sued. Jacksonville v. Holland, 19 St., 599. 111., 271. 33 Jeffreys v. Defiance, 11 Ohio Action against one of two part- Dec, 144. ners. Smith v. Adrian, 1 Mich., 3* Gallatin v. Tarwater, 143 Mo., 495. 40; 44 S. W. Rep., 750, In effect 80 Handlin v. State, 16 N. J. L., overruling St. Joseph v. Harris, 59 §3-21] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 501 There must be an allegation of the fact of legal service.*^ So the charge that defendant ' ' did disobey the lawful order of the health ofRcer," etc., without alleging the act of neglect, or in what it consisted, is insufficient.^^ Disorderly Conduct forbidden "in any street, house or place within the city." The complaint must show that the act was committed in a street or house or other designated lo- cality within the city.^^ Selling Liquor Without License. Merely charging sale to named person is not sufficient, but the complaint must allege that the sale was made without a license, having first been procured, as required by ordinance.*® So in such case a complaint which fails to state to whom the liquor was sold, without alleging that it was sold to a person unknown, is fatally defective. Here the allegation was that liquor was sold to "each of various and divers person. "^^ Just Cause to Suspect. Ordinarily, a complaint which merely charges that the complainant has just cause to suspect, and does suspect that the defendant is guilty of violating a city ordinance, as selling liquor without a license, without avering that he is guilty, will be held bad. It is not made with such reasonable certainty as to be the ground of a judicial determi- nation, conviction and sentence. As stated by Van Syckel, J. : "This is not a proceeding to obtain a warrant for the purpose of arresting an offender, to answer to a mere formal complaint, by indictment or information in another court, but is the basis of a substantive criminal charge, upon which the alleged of- fender is to be tried in a court of competent jurisdiction, and his guilt or innocence determined."**' "The salutary rule of the common law that no one shall be compelled to answer a Mo. App., 122; Green City v. Hoi- sgRoberson v. Lambertville, 38 singer, 76 Mo. App., 567. N. J. L., 69, 72, per Van Syckel, J.; Public drunkenness. Fairmont State (Flanagan) v. Plainfleld, 44 V. Meyer, 83 Minn., 456; 86 N. W. N. J. L., 118; Greely v. Passaic, 42 Rep., 457. N. J. L., 87, 93; Com. v. Dean, 21 35 State V. Soragan, 40 Vt, 450. Pick. (Mass.), 334. 36 State V. Soragan, 40 Vt., 450. Contra. Information held gcod 37 Barton v. La Grande, 17 Oreg., which did not state to whom liquor 577; 22 Pac. Rep., 111. was sold. Hill v. Dalton, 72 Ga., Disorderly conduct. Chicago v. 314. Kenney, 35 111. App., 57. 40 Roberson v. Lambertville, 38 38 Cunningham v. Berry, 17 N. J. L., 69, 72. Greg., 622; 22 Pac. Rep., 115. ^>02 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§ 321 criminal charge unless it is expressed with reasonable precision, directness and fullness, so that he may be prepared to meet and repel it, extends to every mode in which a citizen of this state can be put upon his defense to a charge of violating the criminal law and must be recognized and enforced in this ease."''* Unsafe Building. Where the law requires inspection and notice to o-wner before liability to prosecution will lie, the complaint must allege personal inspection and notice, otherwise it will be insufficient.*^ Resisting Arrest. In charging resistance of a night watchman in making an arrest, the complaint will be held bad if it does not allege that the night watchman was authorized to make arrests.** In such case the complaint must set out facts showing what ordinance was violated. A mere allegation "contrary to the form of the ordinance of such city" is insuf- ficient.** So the statement must set forth the nature of the offense for which the arrest was being made when the resist- ance or interference occurred.*''' Refusing to Supply Water. Complaint to supply water by an agent of a water company must allege the legal obligation to supply and offer or tender to pay the amount re- quired for such water.**' Cutting Down and Making Use of Trees. Under an ordinance which makes it unlawful "to cut down and make use of cedar or other trees," growing at a designated place within the corporate limits, the charge must state not only that the trees were cut down, but that they were made use of, etc., the offense being the cutting and making use of the trees.*^ Taking Animals From Pound. Where the complaint al- leges that defendant did break open the inclosure established by the city as a pound and did take therefrom animals therein lawfully impounded contrary to an ordinance duly passed, etc., referring to the same, the complaint is sufficient.*^ *i Adapted from Shaw, C. J., in *'• Marshall v. Standard, 24 Mo. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 16 App., 192, 196. Pick. (Mass.), 211, 213. -"i Johnson v. Winfield, 48 Kan., 42 Schafer v. Atlantic City, 58 N. 129; 29 Pac. Rep., 559. J. L„ 131; 32 Atl. Rep., 133. ^7 state v. Moultrieville, 1 Rice 43 Lamar v. Hewitt, 60 Mo. App., (S. C), 158. 314. 48 Smith v. Emporia, 27 Kan., 44 Marshall v. Standard, 24 Mo. 528, 529. App., 192. § 321] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 503 BuKxiNG Tan to the Axxoyaxce of Persons, etc. In a complaint for violation of an ordinance which declares it shall be unlawful to burn tan to the annoyance and discomfort of any person or persons residing within the vicinity ; and that if one does, and shall not at once desist, upon the request of any citizen annoyed thereby, or shall be guilty of any subse- quent violation of such ordinance, he .shall be subject to fine, etc., it is necessary to aver a burning after a request to desist, and the names of the persons who were annoyed.*^ De.sckiptiox of Pl.\ce. In a complaint charging the sale of intoxicating liquor contrary to an ordinance, where the place is described as a "certain one story frame building, known as West's Drug Store, and being within the corporate limits of the city of C, " it is sufficient.-"'" Pawx Beokek Refusing Official Ixspection of Books. The complaint of the violation of the ordinance in not pei-mitting the inspection by a police officer of the book re- ((uired by the ordinances to be kept by defendant as pawn- broker, is good, although it only inferentially charged that de- fendant kept said book.'^i XuiSAXCE. Under an ordinance forbidding the mainte- nance of in.jurious trades which constitute annoyance to persons and propei-ty within the city, the complaint must state facts shoM'ing that a nuisance in fact has been maintained. It is not enough to allege that defendant violated a specified ordinance i'-> "Now the defendant had a annoyed, or some of them, were right to contest several matters given? A grand jury might as under this ordinance, which he well indict a man for murder with- could not do unless the persons out saying who was dead." Per annoyed were named. He had a Vredenburgh, J., in Tyler v. Law- right to show that the persons son, 30 N. J. L., 120, 121, 122. complaining were not annoyed; •''" "If the testimony showed that that no smell issued from his there was such building within the premises, or that if it did it did city, and thus known, the identifi- not reach complainants, or that it cation would be complete. A speci- was not annoying to them, or that fication of the lot and block upon the persons complaining were not which the building was situated, in his vicinity, or were without the would under those circumstances limits of the corporation, or that be unnecessary." West v. Colum- no request had been made to him bus, 20 Kan., 633, 634, per to desist. How was it possible for Brewer, J. him to prove any of these things, si St. Joseph v. Levin, 128 Mo., unless the names of the citizens 588; 31 S. W. Rep., 101. 504 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§321 "by maintaining a nuisance within the limits of said city." This is only stating a conclusion of law, So a specification of the act "that said defendant kept a large quantity of hides, tallow and other substances which emitted a disagreeable odor, ' ' is insufficient. The facts stated do not constitute a nui- sance, either public or private. It must be averred that the keeping, etc., was offensive or disagreeable to some person other than the defendant, or to some portion of the com- munity.^^ Animals Running at Lakge. Under an ordinance pro- viding that it shall not be lawful to suffer any swine to run at large, a charge that the hogs were at large contrary to the ordinance is not sufficient. This is not equivalent to an alle- gation that the owner suffered them to run at large. "This knowledge and sufferance is the gist of the offense. The pen- alty is not to be enforced because the hogs were running at large, but because the owner suffered them to run at large. "^^ Selling Beek. Where the ordinance does not make the offense depend upon the selling of any particular quantity of beer, the information need not charge as to the quantity sold.^* Selling Liquor on Sunday. Where the selling of whiskey on Sunday within the city limits constitutes the offense, the quantity sold, as well as the place where it was drunk, need not be averred.^^ Permitting Swine to Go Upon Sidewalk. Under an ordinance making it unlawful for any person to permit swine under his care, to go upon any sidewalk, or otherwise occupy, obstruct, injure or incumber any such sidewalk, so as to interfere with the convenient use of the same by pedes- trians, a complaint which alleges that the defendant, on a day named, "unlawfully did permit a large number of swine, to- wit, thirty swine, then and there under the care of him, the said defendant— to go upon and injure the sidewalks on certain public streets in the city of C , to-wit, the sidewalks in Har- vard Square and North Avenue," was held good. It contains a sufficient averment that the sidewalks mentioned are part of 52 Llppman v. South Bend, 84 So as to price at whicti liquors Ind., 276. were unlawfully sold. Clare v. 53 Case V. Hall, 21 111., 632, 636, State, 5 Iowa, 509. per Breese, J. '^^ Megowan v. Com., 2 Mete. "State V. King, 37 Iowa, 462. (Ky.), 3. §322] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 505 a highway It is not bad for duplicity on the ground that it charges more than one offense, or that the offense is alleged to have been committed on more than one street, if it appears that the streets named were one continuous street.^^ Peofane Swearing. Charge in the precise words spoken is sufficiently specifics'' Disturbing Peace. In a complaint for disturbing the peace it is sufficient to set out that the defendant did break the peace and quiet of said village contrary to the provisions of a specified ordinance entitled "An ordinance relative to disturb- ance and breaches of the peace," giving the date of its adop- tion.58 Keeping House of Ill-Fame. An averment that defend- ant did, on (a certain day and at a specified place), "keep a house of ill-fame and prostitution, within said city, ' ' etc., suffi- ciently describes the offense."^ Teespass. In a prosecution for trespass on private prem- ises where the complaint contains no description of the locus in quo J and the name of the owners are not given in it, it is not sufficient as there is not such statement of facts as will render .judgment in the action a bar to another.*"' Various Offenses and the insufficiency of the com- plaints therein are referred to in the note.'^i § 322. SuflBciency of report of police. In some jurisdictions trials for the violations of ordinances and local police regula- tions are allowable upon the report of certain officers, as police officers, city marshal or chief of police. Sometimes an infor- 50 Com. V. Curtis, 9 Allen Keeping open saloon. Lynch v. (Mass.), 266, 269, per Metcalf, J. People, 16 Mich., 472, 473; Jordan 6T Johnson v. Barclay, 16 N. J. v. Nicolin, 84 Minn., 367, 370; 87 L., 1. N. W. Rep., 915. 58 Vicksburg v. Briggs, 85 Mich., Keeping sale stable and stock 502; In re Bushey, 105 Mich., 64; yard, without a license. St. Louis 62 N. W. Rep., 1036. v. Knox, 74 Mo., 79, 80. 59 Greensburgh v. Corwin, 58 Carrying on fertilizing business Ind., 518, 520. without a license under special eo St. Louis v. Babcock, 156 Mo., provision. Charleston v. Ashley 148; 56 S. W. Rep., 732. Phosphate Co., 34 S. C, 541; 13 61 Various Offenses. S. E. Rep., 845. Suffering filth to remain on pas- Keeping assignation house. State sage way abutting land of defend- v. Baker, 44 La. Ann., 79; 10 So. ant. Com. v. Cutter, 156 Mass., Rep., 405. 52; 29 N. E. Rep., 1146. Erecting building with wall less 506 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§ 322 niation is filed founded on such report."^ Where the report is required to be made by the chief of police it has been held that he need not sign the report in person, but his name may be af- fixed by a subordinate in charge of the office where such reports are usually prepared.®^ Where the ordinance fixes the maxi- thick than required. Com. v. Cut- ler, Thacker Cr. Cas. (Mass.), 137. Relative to market stand. Com. V. Rice, 9 Mete. (50 Mass.), 253. Permitting animals to stop to feed on highway. Com. v. Bean, 14 Gray (80 Mass.), 52. Obstructing water way. State v. Wilson, 106 N. C, 718; 11 S, B. Rep., 254. Obstructing street. Kingman v. Berry, 40 Kan., 625; 20 Pac. Rep., 527. Stopping vehicles on street more than twenty minutes. Com. v. Rowe, 141 Mass., 79; 6 N. E. Rep., 545; Com. v. Penton, 139 Mass., 195; 29 N. E. Rep., 653. Maintaining slaughter house. Spokane v. Robison, 6 Wash., 547; 33 Pac. Rep., 960. Sale of meat without a license. St. Joseph V. Dye, 72 Mo. App., 214. Conducting show without a license. Brookville v. Gagle, 73 Ind., 117. Information for carrying con- cealed weapons. Columbia v. John- son, 72 Mo. App., 232. Associating with thieves, pick- pockets, etc. St. Louis v. Fitz, 53 Mo., 582. Vagrancy. State v. Preston (Idaho, 1894), 38 Pac. Rep., 694; Bx parte McCarthy, 72 Cal., 384; 14 Pac. Rep., 96. Where the offense can only be committed in a certain relation, as an "omnibus agent," the complaint must aver that, at the time of the commission of the offense the de- fendant was then acting in such capacity. Napman v. People, 19 Mich., 250. Keeping disorderly place. State V. Reckards, 21 iMinn., 47. Forbidding minors "to partici- pate in any game of any kind whatever" at place where liquor is sold. Complaint must allege that game played by the minor was one upon the result of which a wager was made. Game construed to mean gambling or game of chance. Williams v. Warsaw, 60 Ind., 457. Riding bicycle on sidewalk. Whiting V. Doob, 152 Ind., 157; 52 N. B. Rep., 759. Keeping place for carrying on the game of policy. State v. Flint, 63 Conn., 248; 28 Atl. Rep., 28. Selling Ice on street without per- mit. Com. V. Reid, 175 Mass., 325; 56 N. B. Rep., 617. Being inmate of bawdy house. Perry v. State, 37 Neb., 623; 56 N. W. Rep., 315. Keeping unlicensed dog more than eight weeks old. State v. Brown, 72 Vt, 410; 48 Atl. Rep., 652. Selling milk without a license. State V. Tyrrell, 73 Conn., 407; 47 Atl. Rep., 686; State v. Galla- gher, 72 Conn., 604; 45 Atl. Rep., 430. 02 Report held insufficient. St. Joseph V. Harris, 59 Mo. App., 122. «3 St. Louis V. Vert, 84 Mo., 204; Ex parte HoUwedell, 74 Mo., 395; Missouri City v. Hutchinson, 71 Mo., 46; Kansas City v. Flanagan, 69 Mo., 22; Ex parte George Wash- ington, 10 Mo. App., 495. Oral charge sufficient. Hobbs v. §324] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. oO: mum and minimum penalties the trial can be had on such re- port, although it does not ask for any sum.®* § 323. Amendment of statement or information. The law is liberal in permitting amendments of statements or informa- tions, especially where the defect relates to form and not to substance. Such amendments are allowable by the general law of the state or charter or ordinances of the local corpora- tioUj^s or the rules of practice which obtain in the particular court. "''- Usually the action will not be dismissed for any formal defect in the statement if it substantially sets forth the nature of the violation alleged."" The rule is generally enforced that an information charging an offeiise of a criminal nature, originating in an inferior court, cannot be amended in the appellate court."" § 324. How defective statement or information cured. Al- though the statement or information is defective and advan- tage of such defective is not taken by the defendant, and the trial proceeds and verdict and judgment rendered, it does not follow that such proceeding should be treated as nugatory. All defects pertaining to form are regarded as waived if advantage is not taken in the manner permitted. They are cured by the doctrine of waiver. Defective statements are also cured by the doctrine of aider, that is, certain defects of which advantage is not taken by the defendant are cured by subsequent proceed- ings, by verdict or judgment or by statute. Thus if a defend- ant goes to trial on the plea of not guilty he will be held to have waived a defective statement relating to form."* But the Hill, 157 Mass., 556; 32 N. B. Rep., The Repokt of the Chief of 862. Police may be amended. St. Louis "* St. Louis V. Vert, 84 Mo., 204. v. Vert, 84 Mo., 204. '■■"■ The Municipal Code of St. »« The Municipal Code of St. Louis, sec. 1202, p. 687. Louis, sec. 1201, p. 687. 6514 An amended information may "^ State v. Russell, 88 Mo., 648 ; be filed before the police justice of State v. Kemple, 27 Mo. App., 392. the City of St. Louis without be- The ordinances of Kansas City ing noted on the docket; and on provide that the procedure in cases appeal the minute entry by the for the infraction of its ordinances clerk on the back of the informa- shall be as in misdemeanors before tion together with his certificate justices of the peace; held an sent up with the other papers in amendment of the information the case sufficiently shows that the cannot be allowed on appeal in the amended information was filed criminal court. Kansas City v. and when. St. Louis v. Lee, 8 Mo. Whitman. 70 Mo. App., 630. App., 598. "" State v. Welrh. 21 Minn., 22. 508 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [g 336 doctrine of waiver and aider js clearly defined. It is confined to formal defects. It does not apply to those which are radical in their character, therefore, neither (1) the objection of the jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter of the action, nor (2) that the statement or information does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action are waived. They may be raised at any stage of the proceeding for they are de- fects of substance. Where the law expressly forbids jurisdic- tion a party canuot confer it by failure to present the objec- tion. So where the statement is wholly wanting in material averment, that is, where it fails to show on its face a cause of action it will be insufficient even after verdict and judgment. ^^ The doctrine of aider after verdict and judgment relates solely to formal defects, such as inartistic, bungling, indefinite, uncer- tain and imperfect statements. 4. THE TRIAI^SUMMARY OR JURY— PROCEEDINGS. § 325. Arraignment and plea. In proceedings by indict- ment arraignment of defendant and a formal entry of his plea are conditions precedent to other proceedings.'''' The record must show that such steps have been taken. This course is also adopted in proceedings by information in case of misdemeanors, under statutes, or, the rules of the common law. However, it is not usually extended or deemed necessary to a prosecution for the violation of a local police regulation, especially where the ofiiense is not regarded as a crime against the law of the state. In Missouri these steps are held unnecessary, notwith- standing the charge may be viewed as quasi criminal, as keep- ing a bawdy house.'^i § 326. Mode of conducting trial— Civil or criminal. The mode of conducting the trial prescribed by charter, of course, is to be pursued. '2 The procedure in case of misdemeanor is "o Lang V. Brookston, 79 Ind., 'i Lexington v. Curtin, 69 Mo., 183; Com. v. Bean, 14 Gray (80 626. Mass.), 52. The same rule applied to charge Formal defect apparent on the °* ^^^^P'^^S sale stable without a face of complaint cannot be taken "'^^"^^ '"^ violation of an ordi- for first time in the Superior Court ^^^'^^^ S*' ^^^i^ ^- ^^^o^' ^^ ^°- on appeal. Statutory rule applied. '^^' ^ ^°- ^^'^- ^*'^- Com. V. Lagorio, 141 Mass., 81; disturbing the peace and public 6 N. E. Rep., 546; Com. v. Reid, 175 drunkenness. Delaney v. Kansas Mass., 325; 56 N. B. Rep., 617. ^ity Police Court. 167 Mo., 667, 678; 67 S. W. Rep., 589. 70 Thomas v. State, 6 Mo., 457. ts state v. Zeigler, 32 N. J. L., §3S7] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 509 often made applicable by charter or statuteJ' Where the power to enforce ordinances is conferred upon justices of the peace, in the absence of legal direction, he is authorized to proceed as ia other cases tried before himJ* So when police justices or municipal judges are invested with the same juris- diction as justices of the peace or trial justices, the rules of procedure in ordinance cases is the same, unless provision is otherwise made by lawJ^ Where the proceeding is regarded as civil and the mode is not provided, the trial is to be conducted according to the rules applicable to civil cases,^" but, in such ease where the action is viewed as criminal or quasi criminal it is governed by stricter rules of investigation. In some jurisdic- tions the rules applicable to criminal procedure are adopted.''^ § 327. Pleading^ the defense. The method of raising or pleading the defense will depend upon local practice. Usually formal pleading upon the part of the defendant is not re- quired.''^ Ordinarily all questions as to the legal sufSeiency of 262; state (Hankinson) v. Tren- ton, 51 N. J. L., 495; 17 Atl. Rep., 1083. "3 Delaney y. Kansas City Police Court, 167 Mo., 667; 67 S. W. Rep., .589; Cassville v. Jimerson, 75 Mo. App., 426; Golden City v. Hall, 68 Mo. App.. 627. '* Ewbanks v. Ashley, 36 111., 177, 180. f s People ex rel. v. Cox, 76 N. Y., 47; Beaufort v. Ohlandt, 24 S. C, 158; Lexington v. Wise, 24 S. C, 163. 76 Chicago V. Kenney, 35 111. App., 57; Greensburgh v. Corwin, 58 Ind., 518; Green v. Indianapolis, 2b Ind., 490; Lemon v. Reidel, 1 Lane. Law Rev. (Pa.), 3; Huron v. Carter, 5 S. D., 4, 7; 57 N. W. Rep., 947. T! Brown v. Mobile, 2g Ala., 722. Criminal Procedure. Remark of presiding judge to Jury: That proceeding was a "civil suit, but if jury considered the evidence they would find it decidedly criminal," held obnoxious. Furhman v. HuntsvillP, rA Ala., 263, 265. When proceedings are instituted, "they imply the commission of a crime, and their end is the pun- ishment of that crime," and the trial should be conducted accord- ing to rules applicable to indict- ments for misdemeanors. Brown V. Mobile, 23 Ala., 722, 724. "A trial before the mayor for a breach of city ordinances, may often involve much more serious consequences to the accused than a prosecution by indictment in the circuit court." Withers v. State ex rel., 36 Ala., 252, 264. "Ordinances are punitive regu- lations; and the object of a pro- ceeding for the violation of them is not redress for a civil injury, , but the punishment of an offender against the peace and good order of society. Hence, they. are termed quasi criminal proceedings." With- er v. State ex rel. Posey, 36 Ala., 252, 262; Mobile v. Rouse, 8 Ala., 515. 78 Moundsville v. Velton, 35 W. Va., 217; 13 S. E. Rep., 373. It defendant claims that the 610 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§338. the statement or complaint, or objection to jurisdiction of the subject-matter can be raised by demurrer.''" Where the de- fense is that the ordinance, e. g., imposing a license tax for the sale of liquor, is oppressive and unequal the plea must set forth facts showing its oppressiveness and inequality, or the facts from which this may be determined.*** So the defense of un- reasonableness of the ordinance must be specific, as the legal presumption is in favor of the validity of the ordinance. Or- dinarily the defendant will be required to point out specifically wherein the ordinance is unreasonable as applied to the facts of the particular case and usually the burden is upon him, to demonstrate the invalidity of the ordinance. ^^ § 328. Summary trial— Origin. In England, notwithstand- in.g the provision of Magna Charta that no freeman shall be taken, imprisoned or condemned, but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land, it has been the constant course of legislation in that country, for centuries past, to con- fer summary jurisdiction upon local magistrates and justices of the peace for the trial and conviction of parties for minor po- lice offenses, such as petty assaults and batteries, roguery and vagabondism, public drunkenness, family abandonment, etc. Workhouses and houses of correction, principally occupied by ordinance is void he must present quest for trial by jury. Bedford v. such defense. Frankfort v. Aughe, Rice, 58 N. H., 227. 114 Ind., 77; 15 N. E. Rep., 802. Where the declaration alleges '0 Selma v. Stewart, 67 Ala., that the meeting at which the by- 338; Williams v. Hinton, 1 Ala., law was passed was "legally 297. warned and held," and defendant Objection to the joinder of sev- demurs, because declaration fails eral offenses under the Code of to set out the warning, held de- South Dakota can only be taken murrer admitted the meeting was advantage of by demurrer; it can- legally warned and hence defend- not be by motion to quash after ant could not question the legality plea of defendant or by motion in of the warning. Winooski v. arrest. Lead v. Klatt, 13 S. D., Gokey, 49 Vt., 282, 286. 140; 82 N. W. Rep., 391. so Columbia v. Beasly, 1 Humph. Where the defendant demurs (Tenn.), 232; 34 Am. Dec, 646. to the complaint, but before the si Lancaster v. Edison Electric court takes action thereon, pleads Illuminating Co., 8 Pa. Co. Ct. not guilty, the demurrer will be Rep., 178. held waived. Pitts v. District of A general assertion in brief that Opelika, 79 Ala., 527. the ordinance involved is in viola- A plea to the jurisdiction can- tion of the federal and state con- not be filed after the case is trans- stltutions, held not to raise the ferred to another court upon re- question. Standard Oil Co. v. § 3"^y I TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 511 those so convicted have been maintained, certainly from the days of Queen Elizabeth to the present time, as a part of the police system. Both the jurisdiction and the means of punish- ment have been deemed essential to the good government and well being of society:*^ In this country there has been no time since the earliest days of the colonies that like summary juris- diction has not been exercised; sometimes under British Stat- utes, but more generally by virtue of laws passed by the colo- nial and state legislatures. The justice of the peace has always been regarded as an important functionary, and a large por- tion of the police power of the state has been enforced through his instrumentality.^* It is thus apparent that infractions of such local police regulations have ever been looked upon as trivial offenses, not in their essence crimes or misdemeanors, as those terms are employed in our criminal jurisprudence. In all such eases, therefore, it is entirely competent, unless the constitution for- bids, to provide for summary trial without a jury, either in the municipal charter or by act of the legislature of the state. The necessity of summary trial of such offenses is obvious. To in- sure the prompt and efficient exercise of the police authority, with which municipal corporations are ordinarily clothed, the trial of offenders must be speedy and the punishment sum- mary, which are impossible of attainment under the slow and formal methods of prosecuting by indictment or information and trial by jury. In the large cities, especially because of the vast number of such hearings daily, jury trial would be utterly impracticable.®* § 329. Summary jurisdiction of municipal oflfenses— Enu- meration. Summary jurisdiction is constantly exercised in the Danville, 199 111., 50; 64 N. E. and the like offenses, may be sum- Rep., 1110. marlly arrested and fined, without 82 Summary proceedings in Eng- any infraction of that part of the land, 4 Bl. Com., 280, 281. constitution which apportions the 83 Per Alvey, J., in State v. administration of judicial powers, Glenn, 54 Md., 572, 602, et seq., strictly as such." Per Le Grand, from whose able and exhaustive C. J., in Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md., opinion the substance of the text 331, 336; Proffatt, Jury Trial, sec. is taken. 95. "It has always beeii understood »* Monroe v. Meuer, 35 La. Ann., that, under the police power, per- 1192; Hill v. Dalton, 72 Ga., 314; sons disturbing the public peace, Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md., 331, persons guilty of a nuisance, or 336; United States v. Green, 19 D. Obstructing the public highway, C, 230, 512 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. L§ 329 trial of violations of the usual municipal police regulations, enacted to preserve the peace, good order, health, safety, con- venience and comfort of the inhabitants of the local com- munity ;8'> and has been expressly held to include infractions of ordinances forbidding disorderly condtict,*^ disturbing the peace,^'^ molesting religious societies,** profane swearing,** pub- lic drunkenness,*" "riotous" conduct,** corner lounging,*- car- rying concealed weapons,*^ assault and battery,** petit lar- ceny,*B (if not a felony),*" selling lottery tickets,*'^ keeping gambling house,** nuisance,** obstructing sidewalk,* or har- 85 Kansas — In re Kinsel, 64 Kan., 1; 67 Pac. Rep., 634; 56 L. R. A., 475; State ex rel. v. Topeka, 36 Kan., 76; 59 Am. Rep., 529; 12 Pac. Rep., 310. Louisiana — Monroe v. Hardy, 46 La. Ann., 1232; 15 So. Rep., 696. Minnesota — State v. Grimes, 83 Minn., 460; 86 N. W. Rep., 449; Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn., 62; 30 N. W. Rep., 305. Missouri — Vaughn v. Scade, 30 Mo., 600. Nevada — State ex rel. v. Ruhe, 24 Nevada, 251, 262; 52 Pac. Rep., 274. New Jersey — State (Greely) v. Passaic, 42 N. J. L., 87. Ohio — Fletcher v. State, 7 Ohio Dec, 316. Virginia — Ex parte Marx, 86 Va., 40; 9 S. E. Rep., 475. Washington — State ex rel. v. Kennan, 25 Wash., 621; 66 Pac. Rep., 62. seJSa; parte Schmidt, 24 S. C, 363. 87 Hunt V. Jacksonville, 34 Fla., 504; 43 Am. St. Rep.. 214; 16 So. Rep., 398; Ex parte Holwedell, 74 Mo., 395. ssjnwood V. State, 42 Ohio St., 186. 89 Johnson v. Barclay, 16 N. J. L., 1. 90 Delaney v. Kansas City Police Court, 167 Mo., 667; 67 S. W. Rep., 589. 91 "Riotous," as used in ordi- nance, held to mean wanton and boisterous — its popular meaning — and not the technical crime of "riot." State ex rel. Kennan, 25 Wash., 621; 66 Pac. Rep., 62. 92 Commonwealth v. Lynch, G Pa. Co. Ct. Rep., 536. 9s Opelousas v. Giron, 46 La. Ann., 1364; 16 So. Rep., 190. 94 People ex rel. v. Justices, 74 N. y., 406; 18 Alb. L. J., 254; Contra State v. Moss, 2 Jones Law (N. C), 66. 95 People ex rel. v. Dutcher, 83 N. Y., 240; People v. Stein, 80 N. Y. Suppl., 847; Murphy v. People, 2 Cow. (N. Y.), 815. 18 If punishment may be con- finement in jail or penitentiary, jury trial cannot be denied by leg- islative act or otherwise, under the constitution of Maryland. Danner v. State, 89 Md., 220; 42 Atl. Rep., 965. 97 Ex parte Kiburg, 10 Mo. App., 442. "8 State V. Grimes, 83 Minn., 460 ; 86 N. W. Rep., 449, following Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn., 62; 30 N. W. Rep., 305. »9 Jury Is not necessary In ascer- taining the existence of a nui- § 329] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 513 bor,2 dogs rurming at large,^ violating Sunday regulations,* selling watered or adulterated milk,^ violating market regula- tions,^ resisting an oflScer,'' lewd women on street,* keeping bawdy house,^ vagrancy,io vagrancy and disorderly conduct, under habitual criminal act,i^ professional thieves, pickpockets, etc., in and about Central railroad station in Philadelphia,!^ selling intoxicating liquor,^* and selling liquor on Sunday,^* Many other illustrations of offenses triable summarily ap- sance. St. Louis v. Stern, 3 Mo. App., 48. 1 People V. "Van Houten, 69 N. Y. St., 265. 2 Hart V. Albany, 9 Wend. (N. Y.), 571. 3 State V. Topeka, 36 Kan., 76; 12 Pac. Rep., 310; 59 Am. Rep., 529. * Liberman v. State, 26 Neb., 464; 42 N. W. Rep., 419; Theisen V. McDavld, 34 Fla., 440; 26 L. R. A., 234; 16 So. Rep., 321. 5 State V. Fourcade, 45 La. Ann. (Pt. 2), 717; 40 Am. St. Rep., 249; 13 So. Rep., 187. 6 Natal V. Louisiana, 139 U. S., 621; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep., 636; 35 L. Ed., 288, affirming State v. Natal, 39 La. Ann., 439; 1 So. Rep., 923. ^ Marshall v. Standard, 24 Mo. App., 192. s Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md., 331. » Ogden V. Madison, 111 Wis., 413; 55 L. R. A., 506; 87 N. W. Rep., 568; Wong v. Astoria, 13 Greg., 538; 11 Pac. Rep., 295. Keeping a house "for the resort of prostitutes, drunkards, tipplers, gamesters, or other disorderly per- sons." People V. Iverson, 14 N. Y. Crim. Rep., 155; 61 N. Y. Suppl., 220; 46 App. DIv., 301. 10 State V. Noble, 20 La. Ann., 325. 11 People V. McCarthy, 45 How. Pr. N. Y., 97, 98, where it is said: "Both In England and In this state, long prior to the earliest of our state constitutions, vagrants and disorderly persons, as defined by statute, were made subject to summary trials without jury, and frequently from time to time in both countries, additions have been made by statute to the classes known as disorderly per- sons, with provisions subjecting them to arrest and trial in the same form," per Davis, J. 12 Byers v. Com., 42 Pa. St., 89. 13 Iowa — 2elle v. McHenry, 51 Iowa, 572; 2 N. W. Rep., 264'. Louisiana — Amite City v. Holly, 50 La. Ann., 627; 23 So. Rep., 746; State V. Gutierrez, 15 La. Ann., 190. Minnesota — Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn., 62; 30 N. W. Rep., 305. New Jersey — Howe v. Plainfleld, 37 N. J. L., 145. Ohio — Markle v. Akron, 14 Ohio, 586; Wightman v. State, 10 Ohio, 452. South Carolina — Anderson v. O'Donnell, 29 S. C, 355; 13 Am. St. Rep., 728; 1 L. R. A., 632; 7 S. E. Rep., 523. Vermont — State v.Conlin, 27 Vt., 318. West Virginia — Moundsville v. Fountain, 27 W. Va., 182. 14 State (Riley) v. Trenton, 51 N. J. L., 498; 5 L. R. A., 352; 18 Atl. Rep., 116; State v. Harris, 50 Minn., 128; 52 N. W. Rep., 387; Van Swartow v. Com., 24 Pa. St., 131. 33 514 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [S330 pear in subsequent sections, and also in the Chapter relating to Miinieipal Control of Offenses Against the State.^^' § 330. Constitutional right of trial by jury does not apply to municipal offenses. The right of trial by jury existed in Eng- land and was formally declared as a right by Magna Charta,^^ but, as we have seen, municipal corporations in. that country, prior and subsequent to that declaration, enforced their by- laws by pecuniary penalties in a summary manner; and like summary jurisdiction was constantly exercised in this coun- try ; therefore, it has become an established doctrine that, the right of trial by jury is understood to apply alone to those cases or class of cases wherein the right existed under the prevailing rules of the common law, usually embracing only offenses against public laws general in their nature— in England, made penal throughout the realm, and in this country, penal through- out the state — because of their intrinsically criminal character, or because made criminal by statute.^'' Under the prevailing 1-^ Chapter XV. "■Magna Chart a. While the Great Charter is usually regarded as the basis of English liberty, it in itself was no novelty, nor did it claim to establish any new consti- tutional principles or municipal privileges. The charter of Henry the First formed the basis for the whole, but the vague expressions of the older charter were now ex- changed for precise and elaborate provisions. As Justly remarked by Green: "The Great Charter marks the transition from the age of traditional rights, preserved in the nation's memory and officially de- clared by the primate, to the age of written legislation, of parlia- ment and statutes, which was soon to come." Green's Short Hist, of the English People, sec. 3, ch. 3. "Magna Charter remains to-day one of the main foundations of English liberty." 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.), sec. 8d. It "Is the keystone of English Liberty." Hallam's Middle Ages, vol. II. ch. 8. "The whole of the constitutional history of England is a little more than a commentary on Magna Charta." Stubb's Const. History, vol. I, ch. 12. "It is impossible to gaze without reverence on the earliest monu- ment of English freedom which we can see with our own eyes and touch with our own hands, the Great Charter to which from age to age patriots have looked as the basis of English liberty." Green's Short Hist, of Eng. People, ch. 2, sec. 3. 17 Williams v. Augusta, 4 Ga., 509, 516; Floyd v. Batonton, 14 Ga 354; 58 Am. Dec, 559; Hill v. Dal- ton, 72 Ga., 314; Vason v. Augusta, 38 Ga., 542. "The framers of all our consti- tutions were well acquainted with the history of legislation in regard to the exercise of summary juris- diction, both in England and in this state, and of the needs of society for summary protection against the vicious, idle, vagrant and disorderly portion of its mem- S330J TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 515 judicial view the usual constitutional provisions relating to this subject are not considered as designed to extend the right of trial by jury, but are regarded as confirming and securing it as it Avas understood at common law.^** Generally, such pro- visions have no reference whatever to the violation of local by-laws and ordinances made for the internal police and good government of the locality. The penalties permitted to be in- flicted are nearly always trivial in character ; ' ' and the reason advanced as to why the trials under ordinances can be con- ducted without a jury, and without violating the constitu- tional guaranty is, that the constitutional provision does not ex- tend the right, but merely secures it in the cases in which it was a matter of right before the adoption of the constitution. Such trials were conducted generally without juries prior to the adoption of our constitution, and, consequently, do not fall within the constitutional guaranty. " ^^ The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that, within the federal constitution "is to be interpreted in the light of the principles, which, at common law, determined whether the accused, in a given class of cases, was entitled to be tried by bers; and it is difficult to suppose that, by any provision incorpor- ated in those instruments, it was intended to nullify previous legis- lation, altogether interdict the use of a long and well-established sum- mary jurisdiction for the protec- tion of society, and thus radically change and seriously impair the whole police system of the state." Per Alvey, J., In State v. Glenn, 54 Md., 572, 604, 605. Right to jury trial applies only to crimes and misdemeanors cre- ated and defined by the state penal code. People v. Van Houten, 35 N. Y. Supp., 186; 13 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.), 603. IS State ex rel. v. Ruhe, 24 Nev., 251, 262; 52 Pac. Rep., 274. Jury trial elaborately discussed by Bennett, J., in Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt., 328, and Redfield, C. J., in State v. Prescott, 27 Vt., 194. 19 Florida — Hunt v. Jacksonville, 34 Pla., 504, 507; 43 Am. St. Rep., 214; 16 So. Rep., 398. Maryland — State v. Glenn, 54 Md., 572. New York — People ex rel. v. Justices, 74 N. Y., 406; 18 Alb. L. J, 254. Oftio— Inwood v. State, 42 Ohio St., 186; Work v. State, 2 Ohio St., 296. Pennsylvania— Byers v. Com., 42 Pa. St., 89. South Carolina — State v. Wil- liams, 40 S. C, 373; 19 S. E. Rep., 5. Refers to criminal cases, as they were known when constitution adopted. Greeley v. Hamman. 12 Colo., 94; 20 Pac. Rep., 1. "It was not intended to intro- duce trial by jury in cases where it did not exist before, but merely to preserve it inviolate In cases where it existed at the time of the adoption of the constitution." Mc- 516 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§330 jury. ' ' ^0 Some cases have held that the right does not apply to new offenses or to cases arising since the adoption of the consti- tution.2i However, the better opinion is that the right applies to that class of cases, which, under the principles of the common law, were triable by jury. 22 Therefore, notwithstanding the particular ofPense was unknown to the common law, if it natur- ally falls within a class of offenses wherein such right was secured by that law the right of trial by jury is thus guaran- teed.2-^ The usual constitutional provision that, trial by jury shall "extend to all eases in which it has been hitherto used," is broad enough to embrace statutory offenses thereafter cre- ated, if such offenses are of the class of cases in which such trial was in use at the time of the adoption of the constitution. Gear v. Woodruff, 38 N. J. L., 213, 216. "All prosecutions," used in the bill of rights of the constitution of Kansas, applies only to prosecu- tions for violations of laws of state. State ex rel. v. Topeka, 36 Kan., 76; 59 Am. Rep., 529; 12 Pac. Rep., 310. "The right of trial by jury pro- vided for in the constitution of the United States, and of the various states, is understood to mean the common law trial by jury." Wong V. Astoria, 13 Oreg., 538, 545; 11 Pac. Rep., 295. Constitution securing trial by jury does not apply if offense is of class, which prior to adoption of constitution, were usually re- garded as triable in a summary manner. Trigally v. Memphis, 6 Coldw. (46 Tenn.), 382. 2" Per Mr. Justice Harlan, in Oallan v. Wilson, 127 U. S., 540. 21 Van Swartow v. Com., 24 Pa. St., 131; Rhines v. Clark, 51 Pa. St., 96; Ewing v. Pilley, 43 Pa. St., 384; Tims v. State, 26 Ala., 165; Kimball v. Connor, 3 Kan., 414; State Board of Health v. Roy, 22 R. I., 538; 48 Atl. Rep., 802. "Trial by jury is a well known kind of trial. The right of trial by jury, as secured by the consti- tution, is in our opinion, simply the right to that kin^ of trial. And the right remains inviolate so long as the jury continues to be constituted as the jury was con- stituted when the constitution was adopted, and so long as all such cases as were then triable by jury continue to be so triable without any restrictions or conditions which materially hamper or bur- den the right." Per Durfee, C. J., in Mathews v. Tripp, 12 R. I., 256, 258. Constitution declaring trial by jury in all cases in which it has been heretofore used shall remain inviolate, does not apply to an offense thereafter created and tried in a court not then existing. People V. Van Houten, 35 N. Y, Supp., 186; 13 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.), 603. 22 Plimpton V. Somerset, 33 Vt., 283. 23 This appears to be the view of the Supreme Court of the United States as expressed in Cal- lan V. Wilson, 127 U. S., 540. Keeping open dram shop on Sunday. The case is triable by S331] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 51? In other words, the right extends to such new and like cases as thereafter arise.^* The exercise of summary jurisdiction does not contravene the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States.^'^ Jury trial is neither guaranteed nor involved in that provision.^* The term "due process of law," as therein em- ployed, simply means a day in court, according to the practice provided for such cases, involving, of course, notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment is pronounced.^' § 331. When jury trial allowed. Unless the case is triable by jury such trial cannot be granted without authority by charter or statute.^s The right cannot be conferred by ordi- nance.^** Sometimes the trial by jury for violations of or- jury according to its status. Mc- Inerney v. Denver, 17 Colo., 302; 29 Pac. Rep., 516. 24 Fire Department v. Harrison, 2 Hilt. (N. Y.), 455; Wynehamer V. People, 13 N. Y., 378. overseers of the poor, and com- mittal of one to the work-house, as a vagrant, violates the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Portland v. Bangor, 65 Me., 120; 20 Am. Rep., 681, over- 25 Summary trial held valid to ruling Nott's ease, 11 Me., 208, and recover the penalty of $25.00 or Portland v. Bangor, 42 Me., 403, imprisonment not more than 30 and approving Dunn v. Burleigh, days on conviction for violating an ordinance prohibiting the keep- 62 Me., 24, a case of summary pro- ceeding in trespass, which resulted ing of a private market within six in depriving of property "without squares of a public market. "A due process of law." breach of such ordinance is one of ::8 "This creature of the statute. those petty offenses against munic- the recorder can have no power or ipal regulations of police, which authority, except such as is there- in Louisiana, as elsewhere, may by expressly, or by necessary im- be punished by summary proceed- plication given," in denying right ings before a magistrate, without of recorder to summon a jury. Per trial by jury." Per Mr. Justice Gray in Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U. S., 621, 624; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep., Ripley, C. J., in St. Peters v. Bauer, 19 Minn., 327, 333. Where law provides that police 636; affirming State v. Natal, 39 justice shall proceed "forthwith" La. Ann., 439; 1 So. Rep., 923, to try and "determine," the viola- and citing State v. Gutierrez, 15 La. Ann., 190; Monroe v. tion of an ordinance by one brought before him by arrest with- Meuer, 35 La. Ann., 1192; Callan out a warrant, it implies that trial V. Wilson, 127 U. S., 540, 553, 555. is to be without a jury. People v. 26 Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S., Van Houten, 35 N. Y. Supp., 186; 90. 27 Delaney v. Kansas City Pol. Ct., 167 Mo., 667. 678; 67 S. W. Rep., 589. Ex parte determination by two 13 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.), 603; 69 N. Y. St., 265; 91 Hun. (N. Y.), 638; 36 N. Y. Supp., 1130. 29 Zelle V. McHenry, 51 Iowa, 572; 2 N. W. Rep., 264. 518 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§ 331 dinances is expressly provided.^" And sometimes in the absence of express provision in the charter as to the mode of trial a jury trial is permitted.^^ Where the constitution au- thorizes a trial by jury, of course, it cannot be denied by ordinance. Thus, under the constitiition of Texas, which pro- vided that, "in all cases where justices of the peace or other judicial officers of inferior tribunals shall have jurisdiction in the trial of causes, where the penalty for the violation of the law is fine or imprisonment (except in eases of contempt) the accused shall have the right of trial by jury," an ordinance authorizing a summary trial is unconstitutional.^^ So it has been held in South Dakota that a charter authorizing the trial of certain cases without a jury, and allowing an appeal in such cases only when imprisonment exceeds ten days or a fine exceeding twenty dollars is imposed, violates a constitu- tional provision declaring that, "the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate and shall extend to all cases at law, with- out regard to the amount in controversy."^^ In South Carolina it has been held that, under a charter pro- viding that "the intendant of said town is hereby vested with all the power and jurisdiction given to trial justices of this state and may punish by fine or imprisonment in his discre- tion, or both," one charged with the violation of a town ordi- nance is entitled to a trial by jury, in like manner as in a trial justice 's court.s* But in Missouri it has been held that, a char- ter provision that, "all cases triable before the police judge shall be proceeded with in the same manner as trials before justices of the peace for misdemeanors," does not entitle the 30 State (Greely) v. Passaic, 42 154; Webster v. Reid, 11 How. (52 N. J. L., 429. U. S.), 437, 460. Where fine may be more than si People v. James, 16 Hun. (N. twenty dollars. Mt. Sterling v. Y.), 426. Holly, 22 Ky. Law Rep., 358; 57 S. 32 Smith v. San Antonio, 17 W. Rep., 491. Tex., 643; Burns v. LaGrange, 17 Keeping bawdy house. People Tex., 415. V. Hanrahan, 75 Mich., 611; 42 N. as Belatti v. Pierce, 8 S. D., 456; W. Rep., 1124. 66 N. W. Rep., 1088. In a proper case the right of "i Lexington v. Wise, 24 S. C, trial by jury extends to the people 163; Beaufort v. Ohlandt, 24 S. C, of the District of Columbia and the 158, approving State ex ret v. territories of the United States. Williams, 11 S. C, 288; State v. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S., 540; Larkins, 44 S. C, 362; 22 S. E. Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S., 145, Rep., 409; State v. Williams, 40 S. C, 373; 19 S. E. Rep., 5. §33-3] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 519 accused violator of a municipal ordinance to a jury trial.'^^ The usual rule of construction is that, when a new power or jurisdiction is conferred upon a judicial officer, without speci- fication as to the manner in which "it is to be exercised, e. g., to hear and determine a class of cases not before permitted, tlie power must be exercised in the form and manner provided for all other cases. It must be exercised according to the practice of the court and law applicable to the same. Thus under a charter giving the police justice the jurisdiction, po-wers and authority of the justices of the peace of the town, with "juris- diction to hear and determine all cases arising under the char- ter, by-laws or ordinances," the jurisdiction in the class of cases specified is to be exercised in like manner as in cases be- fore justices of the peace. The rule, of course, applies to trials by jury.36 § 332. Same— Crimes— Criminal prosecution. A distinction is usually taken between offenses against mere municipal police regulaiiou.f. and those which, in their nature, are public crimes, or made so by the laws of the state ; in the former, as we havn seen, the trial may be summary, but in the latter the constitu- tional guaranty of trial by jury is generally held to apply .•''^ Although the act constituting a violation of the ordinance is also m.ade penal by state statutes, the prevailing rule is that summary jurisdiction may be exercised ; the reason advanced is that the offense is not against the state but against the peace 35 Delaney v. Kansas City Police by others, where imprisonment on Court, 167 Mo., 667; 67 S. W. Rep., conviction is 30 days, held sum- 589. mary conviction illegal. Thomas 36 Per Church, C. J., in People v. Ashland, 12 Ohio St., 124. But ex rel. v. Cox, 76 N. Y., 47, 49. if the penalty is a fine only and "Where the law makes no pro- imprisonment for non-payment, vision for jury trial an offense the trial may be summary. Inwood triable by jury under the constitu- v. State, 42 Ohio St., 186, 189. In tion cannot be tried summarily be- referring to Thomas v. Ashland, fore the mayor. Thomas v. Ash- 12 Ohio St., 124, it is said: "We land, 12 Ohio St., 124. think the discrimination between 37 In re Jahn, 55 Kan., 694 ; 41 imprisonment as part of the pen- Pac. Rep., 956. alty, and as a means of enforcing Assault and Battery is a breach the penalty, is well made." of the peace and is therefore crim- The Offense of Libel was al- inal. State v. Moss, 2 Jones Law ways triable and tried by jury. (N. C), 66. Per Mr. Justice Blatchford In re Keeping Billiard Tables for use Dana. 7 Ben., 1. 520 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§333 and quiet of the city and is to be regarded in the light of a minor or trivial offense.*^ B'at in California it is held that although the legislature may authorize summary trials without m jury of violations of municipal police regulations, not embraced in the general crim- inal legislation of the state, yet where the offense falls within the legal or common law notion of a crime or misdemeanor, and is included in the criminal code of the state, the constitu- tional right of trial by jury cannot be evaded, because in such case the state code expressly gives the right.^^ § 333. Same— Crime, misdemeanor and municipal offense distinguished. The word "crime" in its more extended sense comprehends evei'y violation of public law; in a limited sense, it embraces offenses of a serious or atrocious character. The term as used in our constitution and statutes is to be intei'- preted in the light of the principles, which at common law, determined whether the accused, in a given class of cases, Wds entitled to be tried by a jury. In the opinion of the Unite il States Supreme Court, the word "crime," as used in the fed- iis Colorado — Mclnerney v. Den- ver, 17 Colo., 302; 29 Pac. Rep., 516. Florida — Theisen v. McDavid, 34 Fla., 440; 26 L. R. A., 234; 16 So. Rep., 321; Hunt v. Jacksonville, 34 Fla., 504; 43 Am. St. Rep., 214; 16 So. Rep., 398. Louisiana — Selling liquor with- out license. Amite City v. Holly, 50 La. Ann., 627; 23 So. Rep., 746. Carrying concealed weapons. Opelousas v. Giron, 46 La. Ann. (Pt. 2), 1364; 16 So. Rep., 190. Gambling, playing "craps." Mon- roe v. Hardy, 46 La. Ann., 1232; 15 So. Rep., 696. Missouri — Selling lottery tickets. Ex parte Kiburg, 10 Mo. App., 442. New Jersey — Selling liquor on Sunday. State (Riley) v. Trenton, 51 N. J. L., 498; 5 L. R. A., 352; 18 Atl. Rep., 116. Orepon — Wong v. Astoria, 13 Oreg., 538; 11 Pac. Rep., 295. Wisconsin — Keeping house of ill- fame. Reviewing many caE.es. Ogden v. Madison, 111 Wis., 413; 55 L. R. A., 506; 87 N. W. Rpp., 568. Compare State ea; rel. v. Newman, 96 Wis., 258; 71 N. W. Rep., 438; State ex rel. v. Munic- ipal Court, 89 Wis., 358; 61 N. W. Rep., 1100. 30 The offender was convicted in a justice's court for obstructing a sidewalk. He appealed to the superior court of the county, and was denied a jury. It appears that the offense was, under the law of the state, a public nuisance, and made a misdemeanor under the Penal Code of California, and in such case the Code required a jury trial unless waived. Taylor v. Reynolds, 92 Cal., 573; 28 Pac. Rep., 688. When an ordinance defines an of- fense the same as aeflned in the state statute, and when under suf li state statute defendant is entitled to trial by jury, he is likewise en- §333] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 521 eral constitution, is not to be construed as relating only to felonies or offenses punishable by confinement in the peniten- tiary. It embraces as well some classes of misdemeanors the punishment of which involves, or may involve, the deprivation of the liberty of the citizen.*** It is only where the peace, Crown and dignity of the Sover- eign is atlected, as distinct from his pocket, that an act can, in English law, be described as criminal, and the procedure in such case is to vindicate and punish by retributive justice.*^ In that Kingdom, apart from legislation, crime and indictable offense are synonymous. But treason and felony have always stood apart (like "high crimes and offenses" in Scots Law) from misdemeanor, or (as it was also styled) trespass against the peace, because of the difference in the consequences of con- viction and in the procedure before and during the trial. When legislation began to add to the common law category of offenses every new offense, unless otherwise qualified by statute, was held to be a misdemeanor (transgressio) ^~ titled to sueh trial under the ordi- nance. Hoffner v. Oberlin, 8 Ohio Dec, 710; 9 Wlcly. Law Bui., 239. *» "It would te a narrow con- struction of the constitution to hold that no prosecution for a misdemeanor is a prosecution for a crime within the meaning of the third article, or a criminal prose- cution within the meaning of the sixth amendment. And we did not think that the amendment was in- tended to supplant that part of the third article which relates to trial by jury. There is no necessary conflict between them." Per Mr. Justice Harlan, in Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S., 540. In referring to the amendment of the constitution of the United States, Mr. Justice Story says, that the amendment "in declaring that the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the state or dis- trict wherein the crime shall have been committed (which district shall be previously ascertained by law), and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and to be confronted with the wit- nesses against him, does but fol- low out the established course of the common law in all trials for crimes." Story, Constitutional Law, sec. 1791. ^ 41 4 Encyc. of the Laws of Bng., tit. "Crime." 42 The public remedy for breach of a statute, in the absence of other provision, is by indictment for misdemeanor (Rex v. Hall, 1 Q. B., 713), and all breaches of statute or by-law from which a remedy by information before jus- tices is given, are still technically regarded as petty misdemeanors, though they in no sense fall with- in the popular notion of crime or even delict, and correspond rather to what in France are styled con- traventions. 4 Encyc. of the Laws of England, tit. "Criminal Law." TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§333 The term felony at common law was indefinite. ^^ An offense may be indictable and not a felony. At common law many misdemeanors yere prosecuted by indictment, as those rtiala in se.^* So under statutes specified misdemeanors are likewise prosecuted. But where an indictment will lie for a misde- meanor a jury trial is usually allowed,*^ and must be granted under most of the state constitutions. The word crime is often applied to both a felony and a misdemeanor.''^ It sometimes includes every offense known to the laws of the state.*^ It is an act prohibited by law and made punishable by fine, penalty, forfeiture or imprisonment.''^ Crime and offense are some- times synonymous, as where the terms are applied to convic- tion.s for violations of statutes of a public nature.*'* In our law the term felony is usually applied to offenses involving punishment in the penitentiary.''''* Violations of municipal 'police regulations are not usually re- garded as crimes as that term is used in our laWj^^ although •13 Klock V, People, 2 Park Cr. Rep. (N. Y.), 676. 41 1 Hawk. P. C. C. 5, sec. 1; 1 Russell on Crimes, 46. ■IS Jones V. Robblns, 8 Gray (Mass.), 329, per Shaw, C. J.; People V. Johnson, 2 Parker Cr. Rep. (N. Y.), 322; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y., 378. IS People V. Hanrahan, 75 Mich., 611; 42 N. W. Rep., 1124. 47 Com. V. Dennison, 24 How. (U. S.), 66, 102. Breach of a public law. 4 Bl. Com. 5; 1 Bishop Crim. Law sec. 43; In re Bergin, 31 Wis., 383. Crime means an indictable o'f- fense. Lehigh County v. Schock, 113 Pa. St., 373, 380; 7 Atl. Rep., 52; In re Voorhees, 32 N. J. L., 141, 144; In re Clark, 9 Wend. (N. Y.), 212. "Offense of intoxication" is a crime. People ex rel. v. French, 102 N. Y., 583, 586. Crime includes misdemeanor. Van Meter v. People, 60 111., 168, 170; In re Bergin, 31 Wis., 383, 386. "Crime" is not a synonym of felony. Lehigh County v. Schock. 113 Pa. St., 373, 379; 7 Atl. Rep., 52. The test whether or not a cer- tain act is a crime at common law is not whether precedents for so treating it can be found in the books, but whether it injuriously affects the public policy and econ- omy. Com. V. McHale, 97 Pa. St., 397; Com. v. Randolph, 146 Pa. St., 83; 23 Atl. Rep., 388. 48 People V. Hanrahan, 75 Mich., 611; 42 N. W. Rep., 1124. 40 People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich., 611; 42 N. W. Rep., 1124. 50 Johnston v. State, 7 Mo., 183; State V. Smith, 8 Blackf. (Ind.). 4S9. 51 Violation of ordinance is not a criminal offense in the sense as used in the bill of rights in Mis- souri constitution. Ex parte HoU- •wedell, 74 Mo., 395; Marshall v. Standard, 24 Mo. App., 192; Stev- ens v. Kansas City, 146 Mo., 460; 48 S. W. Rep., 658; State ex rel. v. Renick, 157 Mo., 292; 57 S. W, §334] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. b■^3 certain of such offenses are so regarded in some jurisdictions, i\s assault and battery,"^ keeping house of ill fame,^* unlawful srtle of intoxicating liquor,^* keeping gaming house,^-^ petit lurceny, where punishment may be by jail or penitentiary sen- tence i^" however, this offense though a felony at comlnon law, was punishable without a jury trial, and, hence, it has been held in New York that a summary trial may be authorized by statutes'^ The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the offense of conspiracy, defined by ordinance, does not belong to that class or grade of offenses triable summarily v'ithout a jury; that it is an offense of a grave character, affecting the public at large and was so regarded at common laAv.ss § 334. Same— Misdemeanor. The term misdemeanor is not Rep., 713; Delaney v. Kansas City Pol. Ct., 167 Mo., 667, 678; 67 S. W. Rep., 589. Keeping disorderly liouse is not a crime or criminal offense, within constitution of Louisiana. Monroe V. Meuer, 35 La. Ann., 1192. Complaint for breach of Sabbath to a justice of the peace, held not intended to be included in the terms indictment or information as used in constitution of Connec- ticut. Goddard v. State, 12 Conn., 448. Municipal offenses relating to acts not included in the criminal statute of state, are not "crimes" in Georgia. Floyd v. Eatonton, 14 Ga.. 354; 58 Am. Dec, 559. Crime or misdemeanor defined to be the wilful or criminally neg- ligent violation of a public law. Municipal ordinance is not such law. Greeley v. Hamman, 12 Colo., 94; 20 Pac. Rep., 1. 52 In Arkansas assault and bat- tery is a criminal offense and can- not be punished by summary trial; it must be by presentment or in- dictment. Rector v. State, 6 Ark., 187; Durr v. Howard, 6 Ark., 461. 53 Indictable at common law, must be tried by jury. Slaughter V. People, 2 Doug. (Mich.), 334; Warren v. People, 3 Parker Cr. Rep. (N. Y.), 544; Miller v. Com., 88 Va., 618; 14 S. B. Rep., 161, 342, 979. 54 /» re Jahn, 55 Kan., 694; 41 Pac. Rep., 956; Neitzel v. Con- cordia, 14 Kan., 446. '' Indictable offense exclusively within the jurisdiction of the state courts. State v. Savannah, 1 T. U. P. Charl. (Ga.), 235; 4 Am. Dec, 708." seDanner v. State, 89 Md., 220; 42 Atl. Rep., 965. 57 Murphy v. People, 2 Cow. (N. Y.), 815; People v. Stein, 80 N. Y. Suppl., 847; People ex rel. v. Dutcher, 83 N. Y., 240. Petit larceny is not an infamous crime. Carpenter v. Nixon, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 260. 58 Per Mr. Justice Harlan in Cal- lan V. Wilson, 127 U. S., 540. CoNSPiKACY Defined. A combi- nation of two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlaw- 524 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§335 always accurately defined. Its meaning will depend upon the law and particular relation in which it is used. Sometimes it is limited to petty offenses; sometimes it embraces indictable offenses; but generally speaking, it includes all offenses less than felony.^'' Violations of ordinances are often referred to as misdemeanors; but the term is sometimes confined to acts or omissions condemned by state statute.^'^ But whether the act is technically a misdemeanor or not, if it is of a trivial nature it is such petty offense as may be tried summarily.*^ In the English law, it seems that the term was not always iised in a definite sense ; sometimes it was applied to the graver offenses as perjury and other felonies, and sometimes it in- cluded all offenses of a public nature, whether of omission or commission, which did not amount to treason or felony. Violations of by-laws and other trivial offenses were generally classified as misdemeanors. Whether a prosecution for mis- demeanor was to be brought by presentment or indictment, and tried by jury or summarily, seemed to depend more on the statute and practice than its intrinsic character.^^ § 335. Jury trial on appeal. Although the defendant should be compelled to submit to summary trial before the magistrate ful means. Com. v. Hunt, 4 Met. other than death or imprisonment (Mass.), Ill, 121, per Shaw, C. J.; is denounced by statute; that is, a State V. Burnham, 15 N. H., 396, legislative act. Pillsbury v. 401; Pettibone v. U. S., 148 U. S., Brown, 47 Cal., 477, 480. 197, 203 ; Breitenberger v. Schmidt, ei Misdemeanors may be tried 38 111. App., 168; People v. Mather, without a jury. Allen v. State, 51 4 Wend. (N. Y.), 229; State v. Ga., 264. Rowley, 12 Conn., 101, 108; Alder- Misdemeanor has been described man v. People, 4 Mich., 414, 424; by Dr. Johnson to Boswell, as "a 3 Wharton Cr. Law, sec. 2322; kind of indefinite crime, not capi- Tomlln, Law Die, title "Conspir- tal but punishable at the discretion acy." Bouvier's Law Diet, of the court." Boswell's Life, Ed. (Rawles Rev.), tit. "Conspiracy." Hill, vol. Ill, p. 214, quoted in 8 The crime of conspiracy seems Bncyc. of the Laws of England, as such to be peculiar to English tit. "Misdemeanour." law. It is triable by indictment. «2 Misdemeanor in the English 3 Encyc. of the Laws of Eng., tit. Law. This term does not belong "Conspiracy," p. 299. Regina v. to the earliest stage of the crimi- Parnell, 14 Cox Cr. Cas., 508, 514. nal law, which dealt with tres- es 4 Bl. Com., 5; People v. passes (transgressiones) , ot ■wh.ich Fisher, 20 Barb. (N. Y.), 652. felonies were a sub-class. It does 60 "Misdemeanor" has been de- not appear at what date the term fined in California as an act or "misdemeanour" was first used; omission for which punishment but probably it was adopted as §335] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 535 or police justice, according to the prevailing judicial view, if he is thei-eafter allowed a jury trial on appeal where the appeal is granted as of course, or the right thereto is unqualified and unfettered, or without unreasonable restrictions, the constitu- tional right is sufficiently preserved.''* In Kansas a provision requiring the recognizance on appeal to be conditioned "for the payment of such fine and costs as shall be imposed" on defendant, if the ease shall be determined against him, was held to be an unreasonable restriction on the right of appeal more appropriate than trespass to The history of the Criminal Law a number of violations of law, of England up to the 17th century such as forgery, perjury, and pub- Is treated by Sir Matthew Hale in lie nuisance, which did not include his Pleas of the Crown, and in this the technical elements of trespass, century by Sir James Stephen in Its derivation and original mean- his History of Criminal Law, and ing are obscure, and it seems to his Digest of Criminal Law and have been a bastard equivalent for Procedure. "misbehavior." The term is a es Collins v. State, 88 Ala., 212; iiomen coUectivwm (Rex v. Powell, 7 So. Rep., 260; Emporia v. Vol- 2 Barn & Adol., 75), and comprises mer, 12 Kan., 622, 631; In re Rolfs, an enormous variety of offences 30 Kan., 758; 1 Pac. Rep., 523; In of very different degrees of grav- re Rich, 10 Kan. App., 280; 62 Pac. ity, from perjury, with intent to Rep., 715; Steuart v. Baltimore, 7 get a man convicted and executed Md., 500, 514; State v. Whitaker, (Rex v. Macdaniell, 19 St. Tri., 114 N. C, 818; 19 S. B. Rep., 376; 746), down to the pettiest contra- State v. Powell, 97 N. C, 417; 1 vention of a by-law about dust- S. E. Rep., 482. Compare State v. bins. The main classes are: 1. Moss, 2 Jones (47 N. C), 66, de- Offences which were indictable cided under former constitution, misdemeanors at common law, e. Conditions. State v. Beneke, 9 g., assault and contempts of court. Iowa, 203. 2. Offences explicitly declared to Law providing for jury of six in be indictable misdemeanors by first instance, with a right to jury statute. 3. Breaches of a public of twelve on appeal, held consti- statute, which are regarded as a tutional. Collier v. Territory, 2 criminal offence, or of order or Okla., 444; 37 Pac. Rep., 819. regulations validly made under Forfeiting recognizances is statute, where the statute makes waiver of right to jury trial on no explicit provision as to the appeal. Com. v. Whitney, 108 mode of punishment. (Rex v. Mass., 5. Walker, L. R. 10 Q. B., 355; Rex Defendant required to procure v. Hall, 1 Q. B., 767.) 4. Breaches copies of appeal at his own ex- of statutes which are directed to pense, held a reasonable regula- be tried by courts of summary tion. In re Marron, 60 Vt., 199; jurisdiction, sometimes called pet- 12 Atl. Rep., 523. ty misdemeanors. 8 Encyc. of the Assault and battery, being a Laws of England, tit. "Misde- breach of the peace, is criminal, meanour." There must be a jury trial in the 536 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§335 and in conflict with the constitutional guaranty that, "the right of trial by jury shall be inviolate. ' '*'* And in Colorado, in addition to the above, a requirement that defendant should pay all costs accrued in the police court before the appeal could be perfected was held to be an unreasonable provision respecting the right of appeal.**^ Where in a criminal offense triable by jury but which is tried summarily in the first in- stance, the condition of appeal being made to depend upon the first instance. The right to a jury on appeal does not protect the con- stitutional right. "The right is absolute and unconditional, un- trammeled by any restriction whatever." State v. Moss, 2 Jones Law (N. C), 66, 69, per Nash, C. J. In speaking of the right given by an act of Congress of appeal where the information must be tried by a jury on a charge of libel, Mr. Justice Blatchford re- marked: "But this does not re- move the objection. If Congress ~ has the power to deprive the de- fendant of his right to a trial by jury for one trial, and to put him, if convicted, to an appeal to an- other court, to secure a trial by jury it is diflBcult to see why it may hot also have the power to provide for several trials, by a court, without a jury, on several successive convictions, before al- lowing a trial by a jury. In my judgment, the accused is entitled, not to be first convicted by a court and then to be acquitted by a jury, but to be convicted or acquitted in the first instance by a jury." In re Dana, 7 Ben., 1. "Except in that class or grade of offenses calle'd petty offenses, which, according to the common law, may be proceeded against summarily in any tribunal legally constituted for that purpose, the guarantee of an impartial jury to the accused in a criminal prose- cution, conducted either in the name, or by or under the author- ity, of the United States, secures to him the right to enjoy that mode of trial from the first mo- ment, and in whatever court, he is put on trial for the offense charged. In such pases a judg- ment of conviction, not based upon a verdict of guilt by a jury, is void. To accord to the accused a right to be tried by a jury in an appellate court, after he has been once fully tried, otherwise than by a jury in the court of original jurisdiction, and sen- tenced to pay a fine or be impris- oned for not paying It, does not satisfy the requirements of the constitution.'' Per Mr. Justice Harlan in Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S., 540. In Louisiana District court tries appeals from justices of the peace, as an appellate court, without a jury. State ex ret. v. Read, 50 La. Ann., 445; 23 So. Rep., 715. Reduction of verdict by appel- late court does not violate right of trial by jury. Texas & N. O. R. R. V. Syfan, 91 Tex., 562; 44 S. W. Rep., 1064. 64 /n re Jahn, 55 Kan., 694; 41 Pac. Rep., 956. 65 Mclnerney v. Denver, 17 Colo., 302; 29 Pac. Rep., 516. Requiring bond to pay and sat- isfy whatever judgment may be rendered in the appeal court, held not to unreasonably obstruct rfght § 33(1] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 527 defendant giving bond with sufficient sureties has been held an unreasonable restrietion."^ But where the right is subject only to the common liability to give bail for his appearance in the appellate court and to abide the judgment of such court, or in default of such bail being committed to jail, this has been held not unconstitutional as impairing the right of trial by jury.^'' § 336. Application for jury— Conditions— Waiver. The method of applying for thp jury and its selection are controlled by the local laws. Usually the application for the jury is re- quired to be made before the trial is begun.^^ The general rule is that a jury may be waived in all civil cases.^® The rule is otherwise in criminal cases,^" particularly those involving the graver crimes. Jn misdemeanors the defendant may waive a jury.'i Hence whether the proceeding under the ordinance be considered criminal or civil a waiver of a jury trial on the of trial by jury. Civil case. Capi- tal Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S., 1, 11; 19 Sup. Ct. Rep., 580. 116 Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curtis (U. S. C. C), 311; Saco v. Wentworth, 37 Me., 165; 58 Am. Dec, 786; State v. Gurney, 37 Me., 156; 58 Am. Dec, 782. "It is manifest that, in many cases, the right would be a mere shadow without the substance, if conditions may be imposed upon its enjoyment with which the de- fendant may be powerless to com- ply. If a defendant, upon his con- viction by a judge acting without a jury, must suffer the punish- ment to which he is sentenced on such conviction, unless he can give a bond with two or more suf- ficient sureties in such penalty as the judge who tried him may pre- scribe, then his right to a trial by jury is wholly dependent upon his ability to obtain such sureties." Reeves v. State, 96 Ala., 33, 38; 11 So. Rep., 296; State v. Everett, 14 Minn., 439. «7 Jones V. Robbins, 8 - Gray (Mass.), 329, 341, per Shaw, C. J. l TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 5i9 ordinance for the doing of it as for an illegal act. In such case the maxim volenti non fit injuria applies.®'' Where an applicant for a license to keep a dram shop complies with all of the re- quirements of the ordinance respecting its issuance, but he is refused a license by the corporate authorities and who make discriminations and issue similar licenses to others, in a prose- cution for keeping a dram shop without a license this will be a good defense. The fact that the license was refused was no fault of the defendant.®* The grant of a license to retail liquor from a day past has been held to oper^ate as a release of the penalties for retailing without a license subsequent to that day, although prior to the taking out of the license. The court illustrated the point thus : If A has committed various tres- passes on the close of B and B afterwards conveys the close to A or gives him a license to enter at pleasure, to take effect as of a period antecedent to the first trespass, this can only mean a release of the several trespasses.^ But under an ordinance ex- pressly providing that after suit is commenced no license shall be granted without discharging the penalty, and should such license be granted ' ' the penalty shall not thereby be remitted, ' ' a license granted after the institution of suit for the penalty will not operate as a release of the penalty, although the license by its terms takes effect from a day previous to the com- mission of the offense and covers the date of the offense.^ In 91 Genoa v. Van Alstine, 108 111., what we understand to be the prae- 555, 559. tice under the ordinance." Per In one case the city granted de- Harper, J., in Charleston v. Cor- fendant a license and subsequently leis, 2 Bailey (S. C), 186, 189. passed an ordinance requiring all 2 Charleston v. Schmidt, 11 Rich, retailers including defendant to (S. C), 343, 346, distinguishing close their doors and forbear to Charleston v. Corlels, 2 Bailey (S. sell while any "denomination of C), 186. Christian people" was holding di- The same principle is applied vine service anywhere in the town, under slightly different state of While the ordinance was held void facts by O'Neall, J., in Charleston the view taken by the court was v. Feckman, 3 Rich. (S. C), 385. that it could not be enforced In It Is established law that a any event against defendant. Gil- municipal corporation may waive ham V. Wells, 64 Ga., 192. strict compliance with police reg- 98 Zanone v. Mound City, 11 111., ulations, unless restricted by char- App., 334, 339 ; Prather v. People, ter, but a waiver will not be pre- 85 111., 36. Compare Deitz v. Cen- sumed. Chicago City Ry. Co. v. tral, 1 Colo., 323. People ex rel., 73 111., 541; Urqu- 1 "This view is confirmed by hart v. Ogdensburgh, 97 N. Y., 238. 550 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§ 353 Georgia the doctrine of estoppel was invoked in resti'aining a municipal corporation from enforcing an ordinance forbidding the storing of guano, or commercial fertilizer, within the cor- porate limits against a railroad company, where it appeared that the company, without objections on the part of the munic- ipal authorities and at great expense, erected buildings for such purpose. 3 In a New York case— an action to recover a penalty for keep- ing gunpowder in violation of an ordinance— it appeared that the law allowed a pecuniary penalty to be recovered by action, and, in addition, permitted a seizure of the property, and if such property was not restored the owner had an action to try the question of forfeiture. The gunpowder had been seized. An order of the mayor and two aldermen directing the gun- powder to be restored to the owner was held not to be a judg- ment of acquittal in a proceeding in rem and as such was not conclusive or even proper evidence in defense. The court said: "If the question of the forfeiture of the property had been 'de- termined by due course of law' * * * the judgment would perhaps have been conclusive as an estoppel between the same parties, in this action for the pecuniary penalty."* In a proceeding to recover the penalty for erecting a build- ing contrary to ordinance, without first obtaining the consent of two-thirds of the members of the council, it appeared that after the construction of the building had begun the defendant, on petition, obtained unanimous consent of the council to pro- ceed. Such consent was held not to be a bar to the recovery of the penalty.^ § 353. When defendant estopped from pleading unreasona- bleness of ordinance. "Where the local corporation under un- doubted charter power grants a license and imposes terms and conditions respecting the conduct of the business thereunder,^ 3 Athens v. Georgia R. R. Co., 72 plaintiff, and that right the coun- Ga., 800. cil, conceding' their power to do so, •t Talmage v. Fire Department of did not in any wise attempt to New York, 24 Wend. (N. Y.), 235. impair." State (Clark) v. Fire per Bronson, J. Department of Elizabeth, 43 N. J. 5 "The defendant did not apply L., 172, 174. to have the penalty remitted, nor « Schwuchow v. Chicago, 68 111., did the council by their resolution 444; Wiggins v. Chicago, 68 111., relieve him from past •liability. 372. See sec. 419, post The right to sue had vested in the §354] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 561 as in the business of a pawnbroker, and one condition is that he is required to make daily reports of the personal property de- posited at his shop, together with a description of the persons leaving- the same to the police officers, in a prosecution for failure to observe the ordinance regulations in this respect he will be estopped from pleading that such provisions are op- pressive, tyrannical, etc., or that such disclosure would have a detrimental effect upon his business. He accepted the license under the conditions required and he is thereby bound by them.'' § 354. Defenses— Miscellaneous. Mere irregularities in bringing the action, as where it is instituted at the instance of the wrong officer, will not constitute a good defense.'* So the fact that others have violated the ordinance and have not been prosecuted is no defense.* As all persons upon whom ordi- nances are binding are charged with constructive notice of all valid ordinances,' o defendant cannot show that he did not know of the existence of the ordinance. '^ So, for like reason, it is no defense that one owner is a non-resident, where the ordinance is intended to apply to all within the corporate lim- its,i- as ordinances forbidding the running at large in the streets and public highways of animals. '^ The rule, being in '! Launder v. Chicago, 111 111., It is no defense that other nui- 291; 53 Am. Rep., 625. sances are in the same neighbor- s "The city is clothed with the hood. Burlington v. Stockwell, 5 right of action, and has, in fact, Kan. App., 569. brought this suit, and it is no con- lo Sec. 22, supra. cern of the defendant whether it n Central Georgia R. R. Co. v. was done at the instance of the Bond, 111 Ga., 13; 36 S. B. Rep., city solicitor or the building in- 299. spectors." It appeared the law 12 Homey v. Sloan, Smith (Ind.), contained no provision on the sub- 136. ject. Singer v. Philadelphia, 112 i^ Alabama — Folmar v. Curtis, Pa., 410, 413; 4 Atl. Rep., 28, per 86 Ala., 354; 5 So. Rep., 678. Green, J. Illinois — Roberts v. Ogle, 30 111., 9 Port Jervis v. Close, 6 N. Y. 459; 83 Am. Dec, 201. Supp., 211; Charleston v. Reed, 27 Iowa — Gosselink v. Campbell, 4 W. Va., 681, 696; 55 Am. Rep., 336. Iowa, 296. Prosecution for obstructing side- Kentucky — McKee v. McKee, 8 walk can not be justified by fact B. Mon. (47 Ky.), 433. that other persons placed obstruc- Massachusetts — Gilmore v. Holt, tions thereon in the same block. 4 Pick. (21 Mass.), 257. People V. Van Houten, 35 N. Y. North Carolina — Rose v. Hardie, Supp., 186; 13 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.), 98 N. C, 44; 4 S. E, Rep., 41; Whit- 603. 55a TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§ 355 some jurisdictions that, publication of an ordinance must be shown before a conviction under it can be sustained/* the de- fense of lack of publication must be established by defendant.!^ § 355. Defenses— Illustrative cases. On a charge of fast driv- ing, evidence of the general character of defendant as a careful driver is inadmissible.^" So on such charge evidence of per- mission from the mayor and aldermen to drive faster than thi' by-law permitted was held inadmissible.*" In one case on .i charge of riding faster than a walk in turning a corner of the street, the ordinance permitted defendant to show as a defense to the satisfaction of the court that urgent causes compelled him to so ride. But here the court decline to pei-mit the de- fendant to testify in his own behalf. The rule of the common law being applied and no mode of proof was pointed out."* On the trial of a charge that defendant stopped his vehicle on the street for a longer period than twenty minutes, evidence that defendant has a license as a hawker and peddler from the commonwealth is no defense.*^ On the trial of a charge for the -violation of an ordinance "for the protection of the beach or shore" in a Wisconsin case, it was held that defend- iint may show by expert evidence that the act charged would have no effect to injure the harbor or to render the city liable t(i inundation. 2" In a prosecution for the violation of an oi- field V. Longest, 6 Iredel (28 N. Contra. Charleston v. Chur, 2 C), 268. Bailey (S. C), 164. Missouri — Spitler v. Young, 63 is Van Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark., Mo., 42. 368; 14 S. W. Rep., 38; 22 Am. St. South Carolina — Kennedy v. Rep., 214; Downing v. Miltonvale, Sowden, 1 McMull, (S. C), 323. 36 Kan., 740; 14 Pac. Rep., 281. Tennessee — ^Knoxville v. King, 7 is Commonwealth v. Worcester, Lea (75 Tenn.), 441. 3 Pick. (Mass.), 461. Texas — Moore v. Crenshaw, 1 " Commonwealth v. Worcester, White & W. Civ. Gas. Ct. App. Tex., 3 Pick. (Mass.), 461. sec. 264. 18 City Council v. Dunn, 1 Mc- Contra. Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Cord (S. C), 333. Ohio, 427. Centra. Defendant permitted to Particular ordinance, held to testify in his own behalf, Grauhner apply only to cattle of residents, v. Jacksonville, 50 III., 87. Plymouth v. Pettljohn, 4 Dev. (15 lo Commonwealth v. Lagorio, 141 N. C), 591. Mass., 81; 6 N. B. Rep., 546; Com- 1* Schott V. People, 89 111., 195; monwealth v. Penton, 139 Mass., Elizabethtown v. Lefler, 23 111., 90; 195; 29 N. B. Rep., 653. Hutchison v. Mt. Vernon, 40 111. 20 Clason v. Milwaukee, 30 Wis., App., 19. 316. § 355j TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 553 dinance as to speed, the defense that the defendant railroad was carrying the United States mail and was required by con- tract to transport such mail within a prescribed time and the enforcement of such ordinance would prevent this, was held bad.21 An ordinance forbade the erection of wooden buildings within prescribed limits without a license granted by the coun- cil on petition to be approved by the mayor and chief of the fire department. In a prosecution to recover the penalty named the defense that there was no chief of the fire department was de- nied. Here it was shown that the wooden building was erected in entire disregard of the ordinance. ^^ A resolution of the council granting permission to construct a wooden building which is obtained by fraud is no defense in a prosecution for erecting a wooden building without legal permission.^^ Where the law provides for the examination of fire escapes and, if ap- proved, a certificate is to be issued which shall relieve the party from liabilities, fines, etc., in a prosecution for the violation of such regulations, the certificate issued by the proper authori- ties is a complete defense. 2* Notice — Violating Building Law. That commissioner failed to give notice to city solicitor of violation, and if building conforms to requirements of such notice, one-half of the iine shall be abated. Held bad. "But the right of the city to recover the penalty is not made to depend upon the perform- ance of this duty by the commis- sioners of highway. On the con- trary, the right of recovery is ex- pressly given upon the mere viola- tion of the law. While an allega- tion that the commissioners of highways had not performed their duty of giving notice might pos- sibly raise a question whether they would be liable to the defendant in damages therefor, it does not take away or impair the city's right of action for the penalty." Per Green, J., in Singer v. Phila- delphia, 112 Pa. St., 410, 413; 4 Atl. Rep., 28. Hogs Running at large without fault of defendant will not render him responsible. Spltler v. Young, 63 Mo., 42. "Willful Violation" ; inability to prevent a good defense, when. Indianapolis v. Consumers' Gas & Trust Co., 140 Ind., 246; 39 N. B. Rep., 943. Bkick Kiln. Authority to open is no defense where the brick kiln is a nuisance. State ex rel. v. St. Louis Board of Health, 16 Mo. App., 8. When brick kiln is a nuisance. Kirchgrober v. Lloyd, 59 Mo. App., 59. 21 Whitson V. Franklin, 34 Ind., 392. 22 Alexander v. Greenville, 54 Miss., 659, 663. Failure to show consent to erect a wooden building as required by law. Troy v. Winters, 4 Thomp. & C. (N. T.), 256. 23 Grayson v. Gas Co., 4 Lane. Law Rev. (Pa.), 41. 24 Commonwealth v. Emsley, 5 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep., 476. 554 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§ 365 In a proceeding to recover the penalty for violating an or- dinance requiring abutters on public highw^ays to remove filth, etc., it is no defense that defendant was required to remove matter which he had no agency in depositing on the way, or to do what he would not be obliged to do if he did not own land abutting thereon, or that the ordinance required the defendant to do in part the work which the city had formerly done, oi' that another ordinance forbade the defendant from removing filth or refuse matter through the streets without a permit from the board of health, or that the ordinance omitted to provide a time beyond which the filth should not be allowed to remain.^^ On the charge of selling liquor without a license defendant can- not show that the city clerk improperly refused to issue a license to him.^e In a prosecution under a by-law which made it unlawful to "permit" swine to go upon any sidewalk and obstruct or in- jure it, evidence that it was impossible to drive swine through the street so as to prevent them from going upon the sidewalks and that defendant did all that could be done to prevent it, is inadmissible. As the defendant voluntarily drove the swine through the streets under the law he was bound to prevent them at all hazards from going upon the sidewalks and doing the injury alleged. "Permit," as used in the by-law, means "to ill low by not prohibiting." In considering the by-law the word "permit" is not to be preceded with "carelessly" or "without using all preventative care. ' ' ^'^ Erected according to plans and cept by going upon the sidewalk, specifications approved, is good de- and that the particular street was fense. New York Fire D. v. Braen- the only one available for his busi- der, 14 Daly (N. Y.), 53. ness, held bad. State v. Brown, 25 Commonwealth v. Cutter, 156 109 N. C, 802. Mass., 52; 29 N. E. Rep., 1146. Obstructing Stkeet with rail- 2s Deitz V. Central, 1 Colo., 323. road cars, no defense that defend- But compare Zanone v. Mound ant was acting as agent of the City, 11 111. App., 334, and Prather railroad company. Duluth v. Mal- V. People, 85 111., 36. lett, 43 Minn., 204; 45 N. "W. Rep., 27 Per Metcalf, J., in Com. v. 154. Curtis, 9 Allen (Mass.), 266, 271. Hog-Pen Nuisance. Where the Driving Vehicle on Sidewalk, facts prove a public nuisance it is Defense that street on account of no defense to show that the pens mud was in such condition that are kept as clean as possible under he could not drive a loaded wagon, the circumstances. Burlington v. with safety to its load, over it, ex- Stockwell, 5 Kan. App., 569, §367] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 566 7. THE JUDGMENT, RECORD AND EXECUTION. § 356. The verdict. In proceedings for the violation of ordi- nances usually courts are not technical respecting the form of the verdict. Substance and not form is regarded. The verdict will be held sufficient if it is responsive to the issue. It has been held in Illinois that it may be given in open court and entered by the clerk. Thus, where after hearing, the court an- nounced that he found defendant guilty and ordered that de- fendant be fined, etc and awarded execution, etc.. this will be sufficient.-* In Colorado it has been held that on the charge of selling liquor without a license a verdict of guilty is substantially re- sponsive to the issue, although the proceedings is in form of an action of debt. The question in issue is whether the defendant has been guilty of a violation of the ordinance, and this issue is certainly settled by the verdict of guilty.^* § 357. The judgment. The judgment must be for the pre- cise offense. The defendant cannot be tried on one charge and convicted on another.^" Where the ordinance imposes a pen- alty for each of several distinct acts, some of which are within the corporate power to punish and some are not, a general charge of the violation of the ordinance, without specifying any act whatever, will not sustain a judgment or a plea of guilty .*! Where the complaint charges several violations of the 28 Wiggins V. Cliicago, 68 111., amount of the fine." Deitz v. Cen- 372, 376. tral, 1 Colo., 323, 333. 29 "The only other finding which, Vageancy. Verdict: "We, the upon any principle, could have jury, in the above entitled cause, been made, is the common law ver- find the defendant guilty of being diet, in the action of debt, that a vagrant at the time charged in 'the defendant doth owe the said the complaint." Held suflScient. plaintiff the said sum of, etc.. State v. Preston (Idaho, 1894), 38 above demanded,' but it cannot be Pac. Rep., 694. said that there is any specific debt so Columbus v. Arnold, 30 6a., or sum certain sought or demand- 517; Lesterjelle v. Columbus, 30 ed in such prosecution as this; the Ga., 936. fine to be imposed, which is the Must be tried on the charge that only thing recovered, might be he was summoned to answer. Re- greater or less within certain gina v. Mines, 25 Ont. Rep. (Can- limits, and in the absence of any ada), 577. regulation by ordinance it appears si Collins v. Hall, 92 Ga., 411; to us that the jury could have 17 S. E. Rep., 622, nothing to do with fixing the 556 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§357 same ordinance and the defendant is convicted, punishment for the different violations cannot be aggregated in order to make a single or entire punishment for ail, but the sentence for each violation is to be imposed separately and as for a separate offense.32 i^ one case the ordinance provided a fine for each day that a certain business was carried on without registration. The charge was expressly limited to one day's business. The trial court imposed a fine for three days' business. On ap- peal this was held erroneous, but the fine was reduced to one day 's bu-siness.*^ Where the charter authorizes the recovery of several fines in one action and the proof is clear showing four distinct violations, a verdict and judgment for the penalty of but one is improper, since it is a bar to future prosecutions for the other penalties. The judgment should be for all the pen- alties proved.^* On trial of charge for swearing the same pro- fane oath several times on the same day there need not be a separate conviction for swearing each oath.^^ As we have seen, where the ordinance provides no penalty none can be in- flicted.36 The nature and extent of the penalties that may be imposed are considered in the chapter on penalties.^^ The penalty of imprisonment cannot be imposed unless au- thorized. Thus where the ordinance allows the justice to im- prison for non-payments of a fine imposed in event an appeal , is not taken, in case an appeal is taken to the circuit court, the latter court cannot inflict the penalty of imprisonment for the non-payment of the fine.*^ Where the charter provides that if defendant has no property whereof the judgment can be col- lected he may be committed to jail, it is error to enter judg- ment that defendant stand committed until the fine and costs imposed are paid. In such case execution should be awarded 32 Bl Dorado v. Beardsley, 53 conviction of one. Philadelphia v. Kan., 363; 36 Pac. Rep., 746; In re Kitchen, 2 Phila. (Pa.), 44. Donnelly, 30 Kan., 424; 1 Pac. 3* st. Charles v. O'Mailey, 18 111., Rep., 648, 778. 407, 412. 33 "Thrice this unquiet case has ^s Johnson v. Barclay, 16 N. J. materialized at the sitting of this L., 1. tribunal. We hope its perturbed se Smith y. Gouldy, 58 N. J. L., spirit will now enter into un- 562; 34 Atl. Kep., 748. broken rest." Bleckley, C. J., s' Chapter V, sees. 168 to 180, Phillips V. Atlanta, 87 Ga., 62; 13 supra. S. E. Rep., 201. 88 Carson v. Bloomington, 6 111. Joint indictment against two; App., 481, 484. §357] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 557 and if no property of defendant can; be found the defendant may then be committed to jail.^* Sometimes it is sufficient to enter the judgment in the lan- guage of the charter, as where the charter provides that on conviction defendant may be fined and if the fine is not paid he may be imprisoned for a time specified.*" But a judgment in favor of the corporation upon a complaint consisting entirely of a copy of the section of the ordinance, unaided by any aver- ment tending to show a cause of action, is insufficient. ^^ The sentence must be definite and certain. A sentence "to commence after the expiration of previous sentences have ex- pired or otherwise disposed of according to law," is too un- certain and indefinite to be supported.''^ Likewise is a sen- tence "to commence after the expiration of the sentence afore- said," where the record does not show to what the word "aforesaid" related.*^ The term of imprisonment should bo so definite and certain on the face of_the record as to advise fully of the time of its commencement and termination.** The fact that the judgment does not possess the formal parts of a judgment in debt is not material. Where it orders and ad- judges and awards execution for its collection it is sufficient. .An erroneous form of entry of a judgment is no objection to its validity if it is clearly a finding and an adjudication.*" The court cannot set aside a judgment of conviction at a sub- 39 Deitz V. Central, 1 Colo., 323, *i Long v. Brookston, 79 Ind., »33. 183. Imprisonment — Form under par- *' Larney v. Cleveland, 34 Ohio ticular charter. Keokuk v. Dres- St., 599. sell, 47 Iowa, 597, 601; State v. « Williams v. State, 18 Ohio Jordan, 39 Iowa, 387. St., 46, 48. *o"This section of the charter . 23; 25 S. E. Rep., 612; Maxwell v. Tumlin, 79 Ga., 570; 4 S. B. Rep., 858; Hayden v. State, 69 Ga., 731. Michigan — Swift v. Wayne Cir- cuit Judges, 64 Mich., 479; 3i N. W. Rep., 434. Minnesota — In re Wilson, 32 Minn., 145; 19 N. W. Rep., 723; Tierney v. Dodge, 9 Minn., 166. Pennsylvania — West Pittston v. Dymond, 8 Kulp. (Com. PI. Pa.), 12. Held to lie from supreme court to justice court. Warner v. Porter, 2 Doug. (Mich.), 358. Certiorari will lie without mov- ing for a new trial in the city court. Archie v. State, 99 Ga., 23; 25 S. E. Rep., 612; Maxwell v. Tum- lin, 79 Ga., 570; 4 S. E. Rep., 858; Daniel v. State, 55 Ga., 222. In absence of legislative restric- tion certiorari will lie where no ap- peal is provided. Tierney v. Dodge, 9 Minn., 166. Certiorari is a writ from a su- perior directed to one of inferior jurisdiction commanding the latter to certify and return to the former the records in the specified case. It is used as a mode of appeal from the judgments of courts not of rec- ord. It is also the proper process for correcting any errors that may have occurred in the proceedings of an inferior court when such pro- ceedings are, in any stage of them, different from the course of the common law, unless some different process is given by statute. In Massachusetts it is defined by stat- ute as a writ issued by the Su- preme Judicial Court to an infe- rior tribunal, commanding it to certify and return to the former court its records in a particular case, in order that any errors or irregularities which appear in the proceedings may be corrected. Pub. St. of Mass., 1882, p. 1288. At Common Law the writ issued out of chancery or the King's Bench, directed, in the King's name, to the judges or oflicers of the inferior court, commanding them to return before him the rec- ord of a cause depending before them, that the party may have more speedy justice or such other justice as he shall assign to deter- 570 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§36i Where the party aggrieved has the right to review by appeal or writ of error he is not entitled to a writ of certiorari.^ And it will not issue for relief in eases where the party has allowed the time for appeal to expire, unless he show clearly that it was Avithout any negligence or fault upon his part.* Certiorari from the Circuit Court is the appropriate remedy, where the party would be remediless, to correct an improper judgment rendered by an officer of a municipal corporation, where a new jurisdiction has been created by statute, and the court exercising it, proceeds in a summary method, or in a course different from the common law.^ And where no remedy mine the cause. Anderson's Law Diet., tit. "Gertiorari." Certiorari derives its name from tlie empliatic word in the old Latin form of the writ, which ran as follows: quia certis de causis certiorari volumus, because we wish to be certified concerning cer- tain causes. It signifies to be in- foi-med of, to be made certain in regard to. Black's Law Diet., tit. Certiorari. ■> Alabama — Dean v. State, 63 Ala., 153. Illinois — Harvey v. Dean, 62 111. App., 41. New York — Birdsall v. Phillips, 17 Wend. (N. Y.), 464; Storm v. Odell, 2 Wend. CN. Y.), 287. New Jersey — Smith v. Clinton, 53 N. J. L., 329; 21 Atl. Rep., 304. North Carolina — Petty v. Jones, 1 Ired. (N. C). 408. West Virginia — Beasley v. Beck- ley, 28 W. Va., 81, 89; Poe v. Ma- chine Works, 24 W. Va., 517. The granting of the writ is not a matter of right, but vested in the legal discretion of the court. Hunt V. Jacksonville,. 34 Fla., 504; 43 Am. St. Rep., 214; 16 So. Rep., 398; Jacksonville, Tampa & K. W. Ry. Co. V. Boy, 34 Fla., 389; 16 So. Rep., 290. It lies to keep the inferior court within the scope of its powers, but not to correct errors of fact. Ex parte Schmidt, 24 S. C, 363. In Texas held, proceedings of a mayor's court are examinable oa certiorari from the district court, but the prosecution Is not triable de novo. Burns v. La Grange, 17 Tex., 415. Where no appeal is given by the statute in cases of proceedings by municipal authorities in relation to petitions for and against the issuance of a license to sell liquors, certiorari will lie to correct errors. Corbett v. Duncan, 63 Miss., 84; Loeb & Co. V. Duncan, 63 Miss., 89. •i Beasley v. Beckley, 28 W. Va., 81, 89; Poe v. Machine Works, 24 W. Va., 517; Duggen v. McGruder, Walker (Miss.), 112; 12 Am. Dec, 527; Dye v. Noel, 85 111., 290; Hag- ar V. Board of Supervisors, 47 Cal., 222. ^ Ex parte Tarlton, 2 Ala., 35; Marion v. Chandler, 6 Ala., 899; Camden v. Bloch, 65 Ala., 236; Ridgway v. Hinton, 25 W. Va., 554;' Tierney v. Dodge, 9 Minn., 166; Commonwealth v. Ellis, 11 Mass., 462; Collins v. Kinnare, 89 111. App., 236; Smith v. Hudson Tp. Commissioners, 150 111., 385; 36 N. E. Rep., 967. And in such case the court issu- § 364] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 571 by statute for reviewing the judgment of municipal courts is provided certiorari will lie, but if any special method of review is provided that method must be followed.^ In New Jersey it has been held that the writ of certiorari will lie at the instance of a party aggrieved to review the acts of a municipal corporation whether such acts are judicial or leg- islative.^ And the remedy extends to the power of setting aside an ordinance which the common council without power to pass enacted, where it was brought by certiorari before the court by a person who might be affected by it.^ In Georgia it has been held that certiorari will not lie in favor of a municipal corporation to reverse an acquittal.'' So certiorari will not lie where it does not appear that the plaintiff has some interest and will sufl'er injury unless the court acts.''* Nor will it lie where the plaintiff after being convicted for the violation of a city ordinance, paid the fine, since reversal could not benefit him.ii The office of the writ is to bring up the record for re- view and correct errors of law appearing on its face. Thus where it is shown that the mayor and city council had no juris- diction to try the defendant, because the act complained of was not committed within the corporate limits of the city, certiorari ing the writ may consider other ^ Camden v. Mulford, 26 N. J. than jurisdictional questions. Foe L., 49; Carron v. Martin, 26 N. J. V. Machine Works, 24 W. Va., 517. L., 594. So where there is nothing in the Contra — Certiorari will not lie summons to inform the defendant t6 review a mere legislative act of whether it is an action of deht in a municipal corporation. Thus it a justice court or an information, will not lie to review the ordinance certiorari will lie to review the and proceedings by which it was proceedings. State (Hershoff) v. attempted to establish districts Beverly, 43 N. J. L., 139. outside of which no license to sell "Taylor v. Americus, 39 Ga., 59; liquors should be granted, and un- Montgomery v. Belser, 53 Ala., der which the petitioner's applica- 379; Marion v. Chandler, 6 Ala., tion for a license was denied. In 899: John v. State, 1 Ala., 95; re Wilson, 32 Minn., 145; 19 N. State V. Bill, 13 Ired. (N. C), 373; W. Rep., 723; Harvey v. Dean, 62 Miller v. Trustees, 88 111., 26. 111. App., 41. Where after an appeal has been s state v. Jersey City, 29 N. J. taken from the mayor's court the L., 170. records are corrected in the may- » Cranston v. Augusta, 61 Ga., or's court, certiorari is the proper 572. method to bring the corrected rec- lo State v. Blauvelt, 34 N. J. L.. ord before the court. Camden v. 261; Davison v. Otis, 24 Mich., 23. Bloch, 65 Ala., 236. " People v. Leavitt 41 Mich., 572 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§366 will lie.12 It seems that by provision of the statute of New Jersey certiorari is the only method of review of judgments given by confession; judgments rendered without jurisdiction are reviewable on appeal or by certiorari}^ § 365. Record on certiorari. In proceedings by certioran the trial is not de novo, and conclusions of fact cannot be reviewed. The only questions to be considered are those relative to the jurisdiction of the court, which pronounced judgment and the regularity of the pro- ceedings—that is, errors of law apparent on the face of the record and which are jurisdictional in their nature. i* Plain- tiff in certiorari must allege error so distinctly that the review- ing court may understand the ground of error relied on.^^ The Ga., 236; 470; 2 N. W. Rep., 812; Powell v. People, 47 Mich., 108; 10 N. W. Rep., 129. '2 Taylor v. Americus, 39 59; Camden v. Bloch, 65 Ala., Jackson v. People, 9 Mich., Ill; Poe V. Machine Works, 24 W. Va., 517; Dean v. State, 63 Ala., 153; Ex parte Madison Turnpike Co. 62 Ala., 93 ; White v. Neptune City, 56 N. J. L., 222; 28 Atl. Rep., 378; Flanagan v. Plainfleld, 44 N. J; L., 118. A petition for certiorari which alleges that in the trial before the mayor there was no evidence that the offense for which the petitioner was found guilty was committed within the corporate limits of the city, makes out a prima facie case which would entitle the party to the issue of the writ to correct the error by the superior court. Tay- lor V. Americus, 39 Ga., 59. On review by certiorari the ques- tion as to whether the evidence was sufficient was for the recorder and his opinion is final and will not be disturbed by the reviewing court. Lynch v. People, 16 Mich., 472. 13 Watson V. Plainfleld, 60 N. J. L., 260; 37 Atl. Rep., 615; Rltter v. Kunkle, 39 N. J. L., 259; Drake v. Berry, 42 N. J. L., 60. Where a judgment for a viola- tion of an ordinance was based upon a confession made in the pri- vacy of the judge's office, the party convicted is entitled to have the proceedings reviewed on certio- rari. Watson V. Plainfleld, 60 N. J. L., 260; 37 Atl. Rep., 615. Review by certiorari allowed where the ordinance was claimed to be invalid. Muhlenbrinck v. Commissioners, 42 N. J. L., 364; 36 Am. Rep., 518. The remedy to review a judg- ment in the court of small causes, except where there is a district court,' is by appeal to the common pleas and on certiorari. Smith v. Clinton, 53 N. J. L., 329; 21 Atl,, Rep. 304. 11 Camden v. Bloch, 65 Ala., 236; State ex rel. v. Smith, 101 Mo., 174; 14 S. W. Rep., 108; Hannibal & St. Joseph Ry. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 64 Mo., 294; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Co. V. Young, 96 Mo., 39; 8 S. W. Rep., 776. Rehearing had on record. Peo- ple V. McCarthy, 45 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 97. 15 Hayden v. State, 69 Ga., 731. §366] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 57;i record should show that the defendant committed the offense which should be so described as to appear that it falls within the condemnation of the ordinance.^® If the record on certiorari fails to show that the offense was committed within the limits of the borough, the proceedings will be dismissed.!^ Failure of the record to show the affidavit or warrant by which the prosecution was commenced renders it defective and such de- fect cannot be cured by extrinsic proof. i^ The proceeding will be dismissed if the record fails to show that the act was com- mitted after the passage of the ordinance.*® Where the re- corder of the city rested his judgment in overruling a demurrer to the complaint, upon an ordinance of the city, the ordinance should be set out in the return made by the recorder.^o § 366. Same— Writ of error. Review of proceedings of an inferior court in actions for the violation of an ordinance are allowed upon writ of error in some states by statutory pro- vision. The application for review by writ of error should be The jurisdiction of the magis- trate and the liability of the de- fendant should affirmatively ap- pear. Reading v. O'Reilly, 1 Woodw. Dec. (Pa.), 408. Alleging act of defendant under which ordinance imposed penalty. Northern Liberties v. O'Neill, 1 Phila. (Pa.), 427. The statute in New Jersey gov- erning certiorari does not require the supreme court to consider any question of fact which might have lieen presented in the trial court, Init which no attempt was made to present. State (Smith) v. Eliza- beth, 46 N. J. L., 312. Where on review by certiorari objection was not raised at the trial that the ordinance was not properly proved, it cannot he con- sidered where the magistrate has certified in the record that the or- dinance was proved. Sparks v. Stokes, 40 N. J. L., 487. Where defendant raised the con- stitutionality of the statute author- izins; tlie proceedings, but made no mention of it in the argument or brief of counsel, the point was re- garded by the court as waived. White v. Neptune City, 56 N. J. L., 222; 28 Atl. Rep., 378. 16 Reld v. Wood, 102 Pa. St., 312. 17 Plymouth Borough v. Penkok, 7 Kulp. (Pa. Com. PI.), 101. 18 Camden v. Bloch, 65 Ala., 236. 19 Reading v. O'Reilly, 1 Woodw. Dec. (Pa.), 408. 20 Phillips V. Atlanta, 78 Ga., 773; 3 S. E. Rep., 431. The return to a writ of certio- rari should set out the evidence upon the conviction. Jackson v. People, 9 Mich., 119. On a petition for certiorari to re- view the proceedings of the city council in regard to its action re- lating to certain street improve- ments, the return should show that the application' for the improve- ments was signed by a majority of the resident owners; the burden of proof is on the defendant and such fact being a jurisdictional one must appear on the face of the pro- ceedings. State V. Council of Eliz- abeth, 30 N. J. L., 176. 574 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§ 36r upon a transcript of the complete recprd.^^ Where no right to review by appeal is given the defendant may bring up the case by writ of review, in the same manner as the common law writ of certiorari.^^ But a writ of error does not lie from the judg- ment of the mayor imposing a fine for the violation of an ordi- nance where the right of review by appeal is given.-^ A plea of guilty is not a waiver of a right of review by writ of review, where the defendant claims that the ordinance violated is void. 2* The city cannot prosecute a writ of error from a judg- ment of the superior court refusing to dismiss a writ of certi- urari to review the conviction in the municipal court. ^^ § 367. Habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus is regarded as a civil process and may be employed to release a prisonci' illegally confined or held in subjection. Such process is termed a habeas curpus. ad subjiciendum. It is a general rule that the writ does not perform the office or function of an appeal or writ of error.2® Thus it is not a proper remedy and cannot be used 21 Van Buskirk v. Newark, 26 Ohio St., 37. In Ohio the statute provides that proceedings for the violation of a city ordinance shall be reviewed by the court of common pleas by a petition in error. Miller v. Belle- fountaine, 2 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep., 139. - So by a proceeding in error a conviction in a police court may be reviewed on the ground that it is against the weight of the evi- dence. Slaughter v. Columbus, 61 Ohio St., 53; 55 N. B. Rep., 221. In Kentucky the supreme court was held to have jurisdiction to re- vise on writ of error a judgment of the city court of Lexington. Will- iamson v. Commonwealth, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.), 146. And in Georgia, of city court of Brunswick. John- son v. Hilton, etc., 103 Ga., 212; 29 S. E. Rep., 819; Roach v. Suiter, 54 Ga., 458. 22 Barton v. La Grande, 17 Or., 577; 22 Pac. Rep., Ill; Cunning- ham V. Berry, 17 Or., 622; 22 Pac. Rep., 115. 2 '• Ridgway v. Hinton, 25 W. Va., 554; Savage v. Gulliver, 4 Mass., 171, 178. 2^ Grossman v. Oakland, 30 Or., 478; 41 Pac. Rep., 5; 36 L. R. A., 593; 60 Am. St. Rep., 832. -5 Hawkinsville v. Ethridge, 96 Ga., 326; 22 S. E. Rep., 985. 2s State V. Glenn, 54 Md., 572; Ex parte Mitchell, 104 Mo., 121; 16 S. W. Rep., 118; Ex parte Snyder, 29 Mo. App., 256; Ex parte Clay, 98 Mo., 578; 11 S. W. Rep., 998; Ex parte Boennighausen, 91 Mo., 301; 21 Mo. App., 267; 1 S. W. Rep., 761; Ex parte Bowler, 16 Mo. App., 14; In re Harris, 47 Mo., 164; Perry v. State, 41 Tex., 488, 490; Ex parte Scwartz, 2 Tex. Ct. App., 74. Inability of the offender to give bail by reason of his poverty is no ground for discharge on habeas corpus. In re Jahn, 55 Kan., 694, 699; 41 Pac. Rep., 956. A discharge under a writ of lia-- beas corpus was denied where it was held that an appeal would lie 367] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 575 as a summary process to review errors or irregularities which occur upon the trial of a case in a court of competent jurisdic- tion.2^ The principle is applied to convictions and sentences for the violation of ordinances. ^s But where a court exceeds its jurisdiction and acts contrary to law a writ of habeas corpus may be invoked.-" Sometimes the court will release one on liabeas corims held in custody who has been convicted under a void ordinance ;^*' but unless it appears as a matter of law that the ordinance is void the court will remand the petitioner, leav- ing him to his remedy of review by appropriate proceedings.^^ from a conviction for the viola- tions of a city ordinance. In re Rolfs, 30 Kan., 758, 765; 1 Pac. Rep., 523. ^T Ex parte Mitchell, 104 Mo., 121; 16 S. W. Rep., 118; Ex parte Ruthven, 17 Mo., 541. 28 Madden v. Smeltz, 2 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep., 168; Morris Canal, etc., V. Jersey City, 12 N. J. Eq., 252. A circuit judge has no power to discharge a person onhabeas corpus who Is in custody under a sentence of Imprisonment, imposed by the mayor of a municipal corporation for the violation of a valid city ordinance. Ex parte Montgomery and Knox, 64 Ala., 463. Where a party has been improp- erly discharged on habeas corpus by the circuit court the proper remedy for review is on petition for certiorari to the supreme court. Ex parte Montgomery and Knox, 64 Ala., 463. Where the record does not con- tain the ordinance alleged to have been violated it will be presumed that the charge was in accordance with the ordinance. In the absence of any showing to the contrary in the record. Morgan v. Nolte, 37 Ohio St., 23. 29 Ex parte Page, 49 Mo., 291; Ex parte Snyder, 64 Mo., 58; State ex rel., v. Fox, 85 Mo., 61. 30 Ex parte Slaren, 3 Tex. Ct. App., 662, 668; Ex parte Gregory, 1 Tex. Ct. App., 753. 31 7n re Wright, 29 Hun. (N. Y.), 357, 362. Habeas corpus lies only when the sentence is void, not merely voidable. State ex rel. v. McMahon, 69 Minn., 265; 72 N. W. Rep., 79; nor when the term of imprison- ment has expired. State ex rel. Karr v. Shelby Co. Taxing Dlst., 16 Lea. (84 Tenn.), 240. Conviction under a valid ordi- nance, on a valid complaint, by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be disturbed on habeas cor- pus. In re Bushey, 105 Mich., 64; 62 N. W. Rep., 1036. If the judgment is regular on its face and entered by a court of com- petent jurisdiction defendant will not be discharged on habeas cor- pus. Ex parte Douglass, 1 Utah, 108. If the imprisonment is under a void ordinance the prisoner will be released on habeas corpus. Herrick v. Smith, 1 Gray (67 Mass.), 1; 61 Am. Dec, 381; Ex parte Clamp, 9 Ohio Dec, 672; Ex parte Fagg, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep., 573; 44 S. W. Rep., 294; 40 L. R. A., 212; Ex parte Grace, 9 Tex. App., 381; Ex parte Rollins, 80 Va., 314. Compare In re Underwood, 30 Mich., 502. Conviction without jury trial 576 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§3G8 § 368. Injunction. A bill in equity as a general rule will not lie to restrain a prosecution under a municipal ordinance, upon the mere ground of alleged illegality of such ordinance. If the defendant is convicted under a void ordinance his rem- edy is by appropriate proceedings in review.^^ Thus the col- lection of a fine assessed for the violation of an ordinance can- not be enjoined upon the ground that there was no offense charged in the complaint. The remedy is by appeal.^'' But where the act complained of would work irreparable damage a court of equity has jurisdiction to restrain proceedings under an ordinance.^* The remedy by injunction to test the validity of ordinances is fully treated in. another chapter.^^ entitled defendant to release on ho lieas corpus. Thomas v. Ashland, 12 Ohio St., 124. It appears now to be the estab- lished doctrine in Missouri that appellate courts will interfere by means of the writ of habeas corpus to look into ^nd inves- tigate the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance on which a judgment which results in the im- prisonment of a petitioner is found. Ex parte Smith, 135 Mo., 223; 58 Am. St. Rep., 576; 33 L. R. A., 606; 36 S. W. Rep., 628, over- ruling Ex parte Boenninghausen, 91 Mo., 301; 1 S. W. Rep., 761; 21 Mo. App., 267, and In re Harris, 47 Mo., 164. Compare also Ex parte Marma- duke, 91 Mo., 228; 4 S. W. Rep., 91; Ex parte Swann, 96 Mo., 44; ^9 S. W. Rep., 10; In re Thompson, 117 Mo., 83; 22 S. W. Rep., 863; Ex parte Bowler, 16 Mo. App., 14. Validity of ordinance cannot be raised by defendant by habeas cor- pus. Piatt V. Harrison, 6 Iowa, 79 ; 71 Am. Dec, 389. Where prosecutor is in custody, only validity of the process on its face and the jurisdiction of the court issuing It will be considered. This for the reason that the writ cannot be legally converted into a writ of error. Ex parte Poote, 70 Ark., 12; 65 S. W. Rep., 706; 91 Am. St. Rep., 63; State v. Neel, 48 Ark., 283, 289; 3 S. W. Rep., 631. When return reciting record to be taken as true. Ex parte HoU- wedell, 74 Mo., 395. On habeas corpus the court can- not review the facts of the case as upon appeal, but is confined to the case as presented to the legal suf- ficiency or insufficiency of the re- turn to the writ. Where it appears that the magistrate has jurisdiction and a conviction within that juris- diction in the warrant of commit- ment, on habeas corpus the convic- tion is presumed to be lawful until the contrary is shown. State v. Glenn, 54 Md., 572. •■!2 Taylor v. Pine Bluff, 34 Ark.. 603; Poyer v. Des Plaines, 20 111. App., 30; Yates v. Batavia, 79 111., 500; Gartside v. East St. Louis, 43 111., 47; West v. New York, 10 Paige (N. Y.), 539. 33 Schwab V. Madison, 49 Ind., 329; Wertheimer v. Boonville, 29 Mo., 254. 34 Morris Canal, etc., v. Jersey City, 12 N. J. Eq., 252; Oakley v. Williamsburgh, 6 Paige (N. Y.), 262. "Courts of equity will not, by in- junction, prevent the institution of prosecutions for criminal offenses, § 369J TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 5111 § 369. Prohibition. Prohibition may be invoked to prevent an inferior court from proceeding in a cause depending before it on the suggestion that the cognizance of such cause does not properly belong to it. It is an original remedial writ and was provided by the common law as a remedy for encroachment of jurisdiction. It is directed to the judge and parties to a suit in an inferior jurisdiction, upon the ground that they have assumed and transgressed the limitations of their authority. It is also granted in some cases where the inferior court pro- ceeds upon the misconstruction of the law. The writ may be issued for defect of jurisdiction or defect in the manner of trial — pro defecto jurisdictionis or pro de- fecto triationis.^^ Prohibition will not lie solely to correct errors of an inferior court. The purpose of the writ is to prevent the inferior tribunal from assuming a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested, or where, having jurisdiction, it has ex- ceeded its legitimate powers and especially in the latter class of cases where there is no remedy by appeal.-^^ The writ of prohi- bition is not like the writ of habeas corpus, a writ of right. It is a writ, the award of which is to be governed by the discretion of the court applied to the facts presented by the individual ease.®* "Where the allegations in the application if true show whether the same be the violations Prohibition to prevent trial jus- of State statutes or municipal ordi- tice from proceeding contrary to nances; nor will they, upon peti- law. Delaney v. Kansas City Po- tion for an injunction of this na- lice Court, 167 Mo., 667; 67 S. W. ture, inc[uire*into the constitution- Rep., 589, to prevent usurpation of ality of a legislative act, or the va- jurisdiction. If police justice has lidity or reasonableness of an ordi- jurisdiction, prohibition will not nance making penal the act or acts lie. Remedy is appeal if convicted, for the doing of which prosecutions Prohibition against justice of are threatened." Paulk v. Syca- peace granted by superior court more, 104 Ga., 24; 30 S. B. Rep., on ground that justice was pro- 417; 41 L. R. A., 772; Bainbridge ceeding without jurisdiction, and V. Reynolds, 111 Ga., 758; 36 S. E. his conclusion would be void, not Rep., 935. disturbed by supreme court where 35 Sections 282 to 285, supra. it appeared questionable whether 36 Thomas v. Mead, 36 Mo., 232. defendant would have an adequate 37 State ex rel. v. St. Louis Court remedy to appeal from judgment of Appeals, 99 Mo., 216, 221; 12 S. of justice. State ex rel. v. Ken- W. Rep., 661, per Black, J.; United nan, 25 Wash., 621; 66 Pac. Rep., States V. Shanks, 15 Minn., 369; 62 relying on Callan v. Wilson, Quimbo Appo v. People, 20 N. Y., 127 U. S., 540; 8 Sup. Ct. Rep., 531; Zylstra v. Charleston, 1 Bay 1301. (S. C), 382; Supervisors v. Gor- 38 state ex rel. v. Levens, 32 Mo. rell, 20 Gratt. (Va.), 484. App., 520. 578 TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. [§ 370 that the proceedings sought to be prohibited are absolutely void the writ will not issue.*^ The writ should issue only under such circumstances where the ordinary remedies are inadequate to the ends of justice ; hence it will not lie to arrest proceed- ings for errors which may be corrected on appeal or writ of error.*" Likewise the writ will be refused where the applicant has an adequate remedy by certiorari*^ § 370. Sufficiency of record for review. The record must show that sentence was passed before the supreme court will review a conviction in the recorder's court for the violation of an ordinance. *2 A statement of the facts in a case cannot be filed in the appeal court unless first filed in the trial court and sent up as a part of the record.*^ Usually the appeal will be dismissed where the transcript does not contain the ordinance, or the substance of it, for the alleged violation of which the appellant' was fined.** But where it is necessary for the pur- pose of justice the appeal court will in some cases take notice of the ordinance of a municipal corporation, although not con- tained in the record.*^ In determining whether an ordinance violates a city charter the court of appeal will not consider grounds of repugnancy under sections, of the charter not cited in the record.*" Where the record in an appeal from a justice of the peace in a proceeding for the violation of an ordinance fails to set out facts sufficient to show that the justice had juris- diction and the record is vague and uncertain, referring to no • -ti Barnes v. Gottschalk, 3 Mo. person and subject matter, al- App., 222. though the ordinance is void. The ■to Bowman's Case, 67 Mo., 146; grievance may- be redressed on ap- State ex rel. v. Heege, 39 Mo. App., peal or recordai or certiorari. 49; State ex rel. v. Ross, 136 Mo., State v. Whitaker, 114 N. C, 818; 259, 273; 41 S. W. Rep., 1041; State 19 S. E. Rep., 376. ex rel. v. Withrow, 108 Mo., 1, 8; *2 People v. Jackson, 8 Mich., 18 S. W. Rep., 41; State ex rel. v. 110. Southern Ry. Co., 100 Mo., 59; 13 is Curry v. State (Tex. Crim. S. W. Rep., 398; State ex rel. v. St. App., 1893), 24 S. W. Rep., 516. Louis Court of Appeals, 99 Mo., a Baton Rouge v. Cremonini, 35 216; 12 S. W. Rep., 661; Mastin v. La. Ann., 366; State v. Clesi, 44 Sloan, 98 Mo., 252; 11 S. W. Rep., La. Ann., 85; 10 So. Rep., 409; 558; Lloyd on Prohibition, p. 48; Furhman v. Huntsville, 54 Ala., Shortt on Mand. & Proh., p. 436. 263. ■ii State ex rel. v. Bowerman, 40 ■'■'' March v. Commonwealth, 12 Mo. App., 576. B. Mon. (Ky.), 25, 28, Prohibition will not lie where -le State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 169 the court has jurisdiction of the Mo., 31; 68 S. W. Rep., 900. § 370] TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES. 579 ordinance a motion to dismiss in the circuit court should be sustained.*'^ As a general rule where the record does not con- tain all the evidence bearing upon a point raised the point will not be considered by the appellate court.^^ A criminal prose- cution for the violation of an ordinance cannot on appeai be transformed into a civil suit.*** In one case the defendant was found guilty upon a verdict of a jury. The case was taken to the state district court and decided upon the questions of law appearing on the recorder's record and the judgment of the recorder was affirmed. On be- ing removed to the supreme court upon writ of error the lat- ter court found that under the law the recorder had no power to summon a jury and the sentence, being illegal, the defendant was discharged.'^'' <" Salisbury v. Patterson, 24 Mo. peal but will assume that the facts App., 169. before the circuit court justified *8 State V. Graffmuller, 26 Minn., such modification. Greenville v. 6; 46 N. W. Rep., 445. Eichelberger, 44 S. C, 351; 22 S. Where on appeal from the may- E. Rep., 345. or's court to the circuit court that *o Webster v. Lansing, 47 Mich., court reduces the sentence the su- 192; 10 N. W. Rep., 196. preme court will not interfere s" St. Peters v. Bauer, 19 Minn., where no facts are stated on ap- 327, CHAPTER XI. OF PLEADING ORDINANCES IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS. 371. Pleading ordinances when cause of action is founded thereon. 372. Same — Illustrative cases. 373. Judicial notice of ordi- nances. 374. Pleading substance of or- dinance. 375. Pleading ordinance by title and date of passage. 376. Pleading negligence in vio- lation of ordinances. § 377. Same — Proof of acceptance of ordinance by defendant. 378. Same — Relating to public safety. 379. Same — Relating to opera- tion of railroad trains and street cars. 380. Same — Relating to the re- moval of snow and ice. 381. Pleading in action of spe- cial tax bill for improve- ments. § 371. Pleading ordinances when cause of action is founded thereon. Where a cause of action is founded upon an ordi- nance the plaintiff must plead the ordinance, op so' much of it as relates to the action must be set out in the declaration. The same is true where the defendant relies upon an ordinance as the ground of his defense ; he must plead it in his answer.^ And where the action is brought to enforce the performance of a duty imposed by an ordinance, the ordinance must be pleaded.^ An averment that the passage of a municipal ordinance relied upon was procured by bribery, not specifying the names of the officers bribed, nor the sums paid or promised, is not sufficiently definite and certain on demurrer. ^ § 372. Same— Illustrative cases. In an action by mandamus to compel the issue of a building permit, an allegation that the petitioner has complied with all the requirements of the ordi- nances of the city relative to the erection of buildings therein, is not sufficient. The ordinance, or so much thereof as is relied 1 Idaho — People v. Buchanan , 1 Idaho, 681. Indiana — Clevenger v. Rushville, 90 Ind., 258. Oregon — Pomeroy v. Lappens, 9 Oregon, 363. 2 Charleston v. Ashley Phosphate Co., 34 S. C, 541; 13 S. E. Rep., Missouri — Mooney v. Kennett, 19 845 ; Rockford City Ry. Co. v. Mat- Mo., 551. New York — People v. New York, 7 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 81. thews, 50 111. App., 267. 3 Perry v. New Orleans, M. & C. Ry. Co., 55 Ala., 413. 580 § 372] OP PLEADING ORDINANCES. 681 upon, should be set forth.* So in an action by a city marshal to recover salary, fixed by an ordinance, the ordinance must be set out in, or filed with, the declaration.^ So a complaint upon a cause of action based upon the making and annulling of a con- tract by a city must contain a copy of the orders of the council in making and annulling the contract.® In an action to re- cover an office which has been created by ordinance it is not necessary to set out the entire ordinance creating the office, but it will be sufficient to state substantially only so much thereof as is necessary to show prima facie the plaintiff's title and right to recover.'^ In an action by a property owner against the city for damages caused by raising the grade of a street, an allega- tion that the city raised the grade was held equivalent to an allegation that the grade was raised in pursuance of an ordi- nance, since the city could only act in such matters by ordi- nances.* So in pleading tbat an ordinance was duly passed, it is necessarily implied that all essential antecedent acts, requis- ite to the legal enactment of the ordinance, were done.^ Thus in an action by the city for condemnation of land, an averment that an ordinance was duly "passed and adopted," is a sutti- cient statement that everything necessary to be done by the council to give it legal effect had been done.^o But under the charter of St. Louis it is held that the petition for the con- demnation of private property for a street must show that the ordinance providing for opening the street was passed as pro- A'ided by the charter — either on the unanimous recommenda- tion of the board of public improvements, or on the petition of the owners of a major portion of the ground, fronting on the proposed street.i^ In an action to recover a sum stipulated by ordinance to be paid for the privilege of operating passenger cars upon the streets the declaration must set out enough of Rule Applies to All Cotirts. ? Callopy v. Cloherty, 95 Ky., The rule applicable to pleading 330; 25 S. W. Rep., 497. ordinances is the same whether the " Werth v. Springfield, 78 Mo., cause of action originated in the 107; Stewart v. Clinton, 79 Mo., justice court or circuit court. Judd 603; Unionville v. Martin, 95 Mo. V. W., St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 23 Mo. App., 28; 68 S. W. Rep., 605. App., 56. ' Becker v. Washington, 94 Mo., *Burkley v. Eisendrath, 58 111. 375; 7 S. W. Rep., 291. App., 364. ^" Los Angeles v. Waldron, 65 5 Brazil v. McBride, 69 Ind., 244. Cal., 283; 3 Pac. Rep., 890. 6 Terre Haute v. Lake, 43 Ind., " St. Louis v. Gleason, 89 Mo., 480. 67; 14 S. W. Rep., 768. 582 OF PLEADING ORDINANCES. [§ m the ordinance so that it will appear upon its face that the de- fendant is within its provisions.^ ^ In an action for damages an allegation that the defendant "wantonly, carelessly, recklessly and negligently" omitted to do acts imposed on it by a mu- nicipal ordinance, is sufficient to allow the admission of the ordinance in evidence to show negligence.!^ § 373. Judicial notice of ordinances. Courts will judicially notice the charter or incorporating act of a municipal corpora- tion without being specially pleaded, not only when it is de- clared to be a public statute, but when it is public or general in its nature or purposes.^* But state courts will not take judi- cial notice of ordinances of municipal corporations ; hence they must be pleaded with as much certainty of description as to their subject matter as a contract or other private paper.^^ Courts of the state take judicial notice of public laws of the 12 Cape May v. Cape May Transp. Co., 64 N. J. L., 80; 44 Atl. Rep., 948. 13 Brasington v. South Bound Ry. Co., 62 S. C, 325; 40 S. E. Rep., 665. 34 Alabama — Albrittin v. Hunts- ville, 60 Ala., 486; Ferryman v. Greenville, 51 Ala., 507, 510. Illinois — Doyle v. Bradford, 90 111., 416; Potwin v. Johnson, 108 111., 70; Jones v. Lake View, 151 111., 663; 38 N. E. Rep., 688; Har- mon V. Chicago, 110 111., 400. Minnesota — State v. Tosney, 26 Minn., 262; 3 N. W. Rep., 345. Missouri — Kansas City v. Vine- yard, 128 Mo., 75; 30 S. W. Rep., 326; St. Louis v. Lang, 131 Mc, 412, 420; 33 S. W. Rep., 54. Virginia — Duncan v. Lynchburg (Va., 1900), 34 S. B. Rep., 964; 48 L. R. A., 331. Vermont — Winooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt., 282. Wisconsin — Smith v. Janesville, 52 Wis., 680; 9 N. W. Rep., 789; Rains v. Oshkosh, 14 Wis., 372; Swain v. Comstock, 18 Wis., 463. '■■Alabama — Case v. Mobile, 30 Ala., 538. Colorado — Garland v. Denver, 11 Colo., 534; 19 Pac. Rep., 460. Idaho — People v. Buchanan, 1 Idaho, 681. Illinois — -Bloomington v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 154 111., 539; 39 N. B. Rep., 478. Indiana — Green v. Indianapolis, 22 Ind., 192. Iowa — Wolf v. Keokuk, 48 Iowa, 129; Stier v. Oskaloosa, 41 Iowa, 353; Goodrich v. Brown, 30 Iowa, 291; Garvin v. Wells, 8 Iowa, 286. Kansas — McPherson v. Nichols, 48 Kan., 430; 29 Pac. Rep., 679; Watt V. Jones, 60 Kan., 201, 207; 56 Pac. Rep., 16. Kentucky — Lucker v. Common- wealth, 4 Bush. (Ky.), 440. Louisiana — New Orleans v. La- batt, 33 La. Ann., 107; Hassard v. Municipality, No. 2, 7 La. Ann., 495. Maine — Lewistown v. Fairfield, 47 Me., 481. Minnesota — Winona v. Burke, 23 Minn., 254. Missouri — St. Louis v. Roche, 128 Mo., 541; 31 S. W. Rep., 915; Butler V. Robinsons 75 Mo., 192; State V. Oddle, 42 Mo., 210; Keans §374] OF PLEADING ORDINANCES. jS3 state. Ordinances when legally enacted operate throughout the limits of the city in like manner as public laws operate Avithin the state limits. The city or municipal courts bear the same relation to ordinances of the city as the state courts do to the public laws of the state. Hence, on principle, the municipal courts may for like reason take judicial notice of all city ordi- nances of a general nature, or those having a general obliga- tory force throughout the city. Hence the rule that courts will not take judicial notice of munieipal ordinances does not apply to police courts and city courts, which have jurisdiction of com- plaints for the enforcement of ordinances. They will take ju- dicial notice of their ordinances, without allegation or proof of their existence.!^ § 374. Pleading substance of ordinance. Sometimes it is .sufficient in pleadiiig to set out the substance of the ordi- nance.^^ In pleading private statutes the common law practice was to recite so much of the act as was pertinent to the issue made. In pleading the substance of an ordinance all of the ordinance that is legally necessary must appear, and it is gen- erally sufficient if the descriptive words of the ordinance are V. Klausman, 21 Mo. App., 485 Cox V. St. Louis, 11 Mo., 431 Bowie V. Kansas City, 51 Mo., 454 St. Louis V. St. Louis Ry. Co., 12 Mo. App., 591; Mooney v. Kennett, 19 Mo., ^51. New York — Harker v. New York, 17 Wend. (N. Y.), 199. South Carolina — Charleston v. Ashley Phosphate Co., 34 S. C, 541; 13 S. E. Rep., 845. Texas — Austin v. Walton, 68 Tex., 507; 5 S. W. Rep., 70. "Courts do not take judicial no- tice of city ordinances. Such ordi- nances should be pleaded and proved." Suth. St. Const. (2nd Ed.), sec. 296. 18 California — Ex parte Davis, 115 Cal., 445; 47 Pac. Rep., 258. Iowa — Scranton v. Danenbaum, 109 Iowa, 95; 80 N. W. Rep., 221; Laporte City v. Goodfellow, 47 Iowa, 572; State v. Leiber, 11 Iowa, 407; Conboy v. Iowa City, 2 Iowa, 90. Kansas — Solomon v. Hughes, 24 Kan., 211; West v. Columbus, 20 Kan., 633. Maine — O'Malia v. Wentworth, 65 Me., 129. South Carolina — Anderson v. O'Donnell, 29 S. C, 355; 7 S. B. Rep., 523; Charleston v. Chur, 2 Bailey (S. C), 164. West Virginia — Moundsville v. Velton, 35 W. Va., 217; 13 S. E. Rep., 373; Wheeling v. Black, 25 W. Va., 266. "Apitz v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 17 Mo. App., 419; Kansas City v. Johnson, 78 Mo., 661; Hirst v. Ringen Real Estate Co., 169 Mo., 194, 200; 69 S. W. Rep., 368; Mob- erly v. Hogan, 131 Mo., 19, 25; 32 S. W. Rep., 1014; Decker v. Mc- Sorley, 111 Wis., 91; 86 N. W. Rep. 554. 584 OF PLBAiDING ORDINANCES. [§ 376 followed.!* The contents should be so stated that the court can judge from the provision of the ordinance itself.^^ Where the plaintiff depends upon an ordinance for his rights it is not suf- ficient to refer to "certain terms of an ordinance," but the terms upon which he relies must be set out in the declaration.-" lu an action by quo warranto to oust the occupant of an office the party asserting a right founded upon ordinances must set them forth in the pleading in whole or in substance. ^^ In a suit to recover a merchant tax, pleading that a tax was "duly levied" is equivalent to pleading the substance of the ordi- nance under which it was levied and is sufficient to authorize the. reception of the ordinance in evidence.^^ § 375. Pleading ordinance by title ajid date of passage. In some jurisdictions it is i^ermissible by statute to plead an ordi- nance by referring to its title, number and date of its passage ; but a statute which provides that in pleading a private statute or a right derived therefrom it is sufficient to refer to sueli statute by its title and the day of its passage is not complied with by pleading an ordinance, as "that a certain ordinance of said city of T., known as No. 66. "-^ Unless authorized by statute a municipal ordinance cannot be pleaded in a civil ac- tion by its title and date of its passage; it must be set out in full, or in substance and where it is pleaded in substance it is not necessary to set out its title, the date of its passage or a copy of it.^-* So in a return to a writ of habeas corpus where an- ordinance must be set forth in a pleading as any other fact of which the courts take no judicial notice, a mere reference to it by number, title and date of enactment, is not sufficient.^^ § 376. Pleading negligence in violation of ordinances. It IS Woods" V. PrinevJUe, 19 Or., 2u Kansas City v. Johnson, 7S 108; 23 Pac. Rep., 880. Mo., 661. IS) Austin V. Walton, 68 Tex., 507; 23 Tulare v. Hevren, 126 Cal., 5 S. W. Rep., 70. 226; 58 Pac. Rep., 530. 20 Cincinnati Water Co. v. Cin- a* Apitz v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 17 cinnati, 4 Ohio, 443. Mo. App., 419; State v. Oddle, 42 21 But if the material allegations Mo., 210; St. Louis v. Stoddard, 15 were founded upon a city charter. Mo. App., 173. and the act was pleaded by its 25 Pomeroy v. Lappeus, 9 Dr., title, the court could, under the 363; People v. New York, 7 How. provisions of the practice act, take Pr. (N. Y.), 81. .iudicial notice of its provisions. Mandamus. The same rvile was State V. Oddle, 42 Mo., 210. held to apply in an action by man- §3?}] OF PLEADING ORDINANCES. 585 seems that where the cause of action is based upon negligence in the violation of an ordinance, the ordinance may be intro- duced In evidence to shov^r such negligence, although not pleaded.-^ Thus is an action against a contractor for damages caused by the negligent manner in which he blasted rock near the plaintiff's house, an ordinance of the city providing that any one blasting within the city limits should cover the orifice in which the explosive was placed, so as to prevent fragments of rock from being thrown into the air, was held to be admis- sible in evidence, where the petition alleged that the blasts were set off in such a negligent manner as to cause "loose frag- ments of rock to be thrown upon plaintiff's home." -^ The gen- eral rule is that an ordinance tending to show negligence must be pleaded where it is relied upon as giving a right to recover. ^^ But where an ordinance is relied on as a cause of action, estab- lishing negligence, it is sufficient to plead it by statement of the substance, general terms, and legal effect of the ordi- nance.28 § 377. Same— Proof of acceptance of ordinance by defend- ant. Many cases hold that the violation of an ordinance, regu- lating the speed of trains is negligence per se,^" and where the plaintiff bases his cause of action upon an ordinance, regulat- ing the speed of trains, it is not necessary to the admission of the ordinance in evidence that he show and plead an agree- ment upon the part of the defendant to comply with the ordi- damus to compel approval and ac- South Carolina — Nohrden v. ceptance of officer's bond. Com- North Eastern Ry. Co., 54 S. C, monwealth v. Torrey, 13 Pa. Co. 492; 32 S. B. Rep., 524; Brasing- Ct., 362; Commonwealth v. Chit- ton v. South Bend Ry. Co., 62 S. tenden, 2 Pa. Dist, 804. C, 325; 40 S. E. Rep., 665. 26 Minnesota — Faber v. St. Paul, 2^ Mahoney v. Dankwart, 108 M. & M. Ry. Co., 29 Minn., 465; 13 Iowa, 321; 79 N. W. Rep., 134. N. W. Rep., 902; Kelly v. St. Paul, ss Rjchter v. Harper, 95 Mich., M. & M. Ry. Co., 29 Minn., 1; 11 221; 54 N. W. Rep., 768. N. W. Rep., 67; Klotz v. Winona 29 Hirst v. Ringen Real Estate & St. P. Ry. Co., 68 Minn., 341; 71 Co., 169 Mo., 194; 69 S. W. Rep., N. W. Rep., 257. 368. Missouri — Judd v. W. St. L. & so prewitt v. Railroad, 134 Mo., P. Ry. Co., 23 Mo. App., 56; Riley 615; 36 S. W. Rep., 667; Gratiot V. The W. St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 18 v. Railroad, 116 Mo., 450; 21 S. W. Mo. App., 385; Robertson v. W. St. Rep., 1094; Dickson v. Railroad, Louis & Pac. Ry. Co., 84 Mo., 119; 104 Mo., 491; 16 S. W. Rep., 381; Goodwin v. Chicago, Rock Island Hanlon v. Railroad, 104 Mo., 381; & Pac. Ry. Co., 75 Mo., 73. 16 S. W. Rep., 233; Murray v. Rail- 586 OF PLEADING ORDINANCES. [§ 379 nance, or that the defendant had accepted the ordinance.'^' Prior to the decision in the case of Jackson v. Railroad,*^ it had been held in Missouri that the plaintiff in order to recover where the violation of an ordinance is relied upon to establish negligence, must allege and prove an agreement upon the part of the defendant to accept the ordinance violated.^^ § 378. Same— Relating to public safety. The violation of ordinances which have for their purpose the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all persons within the city, such as ordinances regulating the speed of trains and street cars within the corporate limits, and the regulation and pro- tection of dangerous openings and hatchways upon the prem- ises of persons or firms, passed for the protection of persons rightfully upon the premises, is negligence per se, and the plaintiff, wdiere his cause of action is based upon negligence, may introduce the ordinance in evidence and prove its viola- tion, although the ordinance was not pleaded.^* § 379. Same— Relating to operation of railroad trains and street cars. But, on the other hand, it has been held that in an action for damages resulting from the negligence of a railroad company, an ordinance fixing the rate of speed of cars within the city limits is material and if relied upon by plaintiff it must be specially pleaded.-^-"' Hence where the declaration contained road, 101 Mo., 236; 13 S. "W. Rep., 855; Byington v. St. Louis Ry. Co., 817; Drain v. Railroad, 86 Mo., 147 Mo., 673; 49 S. W. Rep., 876; 574; Kellny v. Railroad, 101 Mo., Sheehan v. Citizens' Ry. Co., 72 67; 13 S. W. Rep., 806. See sec. Mo. App., 524. But these cases 397, post. have not been followed in the more 31 Jackson v. K. C. F. S. & M. recent decisions. Ry. Co., 157 Mo., 621; 58 S. W. 34 Jackson v. K. C. F. S. & M. Rep., 32, refusing to follow Fath Ry. Co., 157 Mo., 621; 58 S. W. V. Tower Grove & L. Ry. Co., 105 Rep., 32; Wendler v. People's Mo., 537; 16 S. W. Rep., 913. To House Furnishing Co., 165 Mo., the same effect, Weller v. Chicago, 527; 65 S. W. Rep., 737; Hirst v. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 164 Mo., 180; Ringen Real Estate Co., 169 Mo., 64 S. W. Rep., 141; Hutchinson v. 194; 69 S. W. Rep., 368. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 161 Mo., 246; 61 Ordinances relating to civil S. W. Rep., 635. rights and liabilities, sees. 40 to 32 157 Mo., 621; 58 S. W. Rep., 42, supra. 32. SB Chicago W. D. Ry. Co. v. 33 Fath v. Tower Grove & L. Ry. Klauber, 9 111. App., 613. Co., 105 Mo., 537 ; 16 S. W. Rep., In an action for damages against 913 ; Sanders v. Southern Elec. Ry. a street railway company an ordi- Co., 147 Mo., 411; 48 S. W. Rep., nance fixing the rate of speed in § 380] OF PLEADING ORDINANCES. 587 no allegation that there was a city ordinance regulating the speed of engines, the admission of the ordinance in evidence was held erroneous.^*' The rule has been declared in Michigan that where the plaintiff seeks to charge a street railway com- pany with violation of duty imposed by ordinance, giving to him a right to recover, the ordinance must be pleaded.^^ But where, in an action against a railroad company for injury re- sulting from negligence, in running its trains in violation of an ordinance, the cause of action is based upon negligence and not on the ordinance, the ordinance may be introduced in evi- dence, to support the charge of negligence, although the exist- ence of the ordinance has not been alleged in the pleading.^* Under an allegation of "want of due care" evidence that the defendant omitted to ring the bell of the engine or sound the whistle as required by law was held admissible.'*'-' § 380. Same— Relating to the removal of snow and ice. The violation of ordinances requiring the abutting ownere of prop- erty fronting on a street to remove ice and snow from the walks in front of their premises, is not such evidence of negligence when the ordinance and its violation is pleaded as will entitle the plaintiff to recover in a suit for damages against the owner of the property fop injuries received from a fall on the side- walk.**' It being the dvity of the city to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition, it cannot shift that duty by requir- ing the abutting owner to remove the ice and snow and upon failure to do so create a civil liability in favor of any one in- jured by the violation of the ordinance.*' the city has a direct bearing on the lo Kansas — Jansen v. Atchison, question ol negligence. Moore v. 16 Kan., 358. St. Louis Transit Co., 95 Mo. App., Maryland — Flynn v. Canton Co., 728; 75. S. W. Rep., 699; Shinner 40 Md., 312. V. Merchants Bank, 4 Allen Massachusetts — Kirby v. Boyl- (Mass.), 290. ston Market Assn., 14 Gray 36 Chicago W. D. Ry. Co. v. (Mass.), 249. Klauber, 9 111. App., 613. Missouri — Norton v. St. Louis, :JT Gardner v. Railway Co., 99 97 Mo., 537; 11 S. W. Rep., 242; Mich., 182 ; 58 N. W. Rep., 49. St. Louis v. Connecticut Mut. Life 38 Brasington V. South Bound R. Ins. Co., 107 Mo., 92; 17 S. W. Rep., Co., 62 S. C, 325; 40 S. E. Rep., 637. 665; Lynn v. C, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., Ohio — Vandyke v. Cincinnati, 1 75 Mo., 167. See cases in sec. 376, Disney (Ohio), 532. supra. Rhode Island — Heeney v. 39 Jones V. Andover, 10 Allen Sprague, 11 R. I., 456. (Mass.), 18. *i See sees. 40-42, supra. 588 OF PLEADING ORDINANCES. [§ 381 § 381. Pleadilig in action on special tax bill for improve- ments. The petition in a suit on a special tax bill, must allege that the work was done in accordance with the charter and ordinances.*^ The ordinance under which the work was done must be pleaded. The general averment that the ordinance, stating its general purport, was duly enacted, is usually suffi- cient.*3 It is not necessary to set out the ordinance in full, and the steps leading to its enactment, unless they constitute juris- dictional facts, in the proceedings, wherein the jurisdiction of the court is special and limited.** In one case an allegation which stated the substance and general tenor of the ordinance which formed the foundation of plaintiff's demand, was held sufficient.*^ But where the plaintiff pleaded an ordinance by its number and the date of its approval, a motion to make more definite and certain was sustained. The court said: "Mu- nicipal ordinances, not being subjects of judicial notice, must be pleaded with as much certainty of description, as to theij- subject matter and effect as a contract or other private paper. "*8 So a petition on a special tax bill, which pleaded, an ordinance by its number, title and date of passage, and failed to set out the substance of the ordinance, would be bad on de- murrer.*'^ A complaint which avers that an ordinance for the improvement was enacted "by a two-thirds vote of her common council," the vote required by charter, is sufficient as to the validity of its passage.** However, under particular charter provisions, it has been held that the suit is based on the tax bill and not on the ordinance, hence, the ordinance need not be pleaded, but, if pleaded, it is sufficient to refer to it by giving its title and date of passage.*'' 42 Irvin V. Devors, 65 Mo.,' 625. Moberly v. Hogan, 131 Mo., 19 ; 32 43 Byerman v. Payne, 28 Mo. S. W. Rep., 1014. App., 72. 4« Keane v. Klausraan, 21 Mo. Sufficiency. "Welch v. Mastin App., 485, 489; State v. Oddle, 42 (Mo. App., 1903), 71 S. "W. Rep., Mo., 210. 1090. "'Crone v. Mallinckrodt, 9 Mo. « Herman V. Payne, 27 Mo. App., App., 316; St. Louis v. Stoddard, 481. 15 Mo. App., 173. 45 Especially is this bo where 48 Connersville v. Merrill, 14 the defendant has taken no steps Ind. App., 303. by motion to have the petition 49 Kansas City v. Am. Surety Co., made more definite and certain. 71 Mo. App., 315; St. Louis v. Hardy, 35 Mo., 261. CHAPTER XII. OF EVIDENCE OF ORDINANCES. 5 382. Proof of authority to enact. 383. Proof of existence of ordi- nance, when required. 384. Burden of proof. 385. Judicial notice — Appeal from municipal courts. 386. Proof of formal steps in enactment, when required. 387. Proof of -record of ordi- nance. 388. Proof of publication of ordi- nance, when required. 389. How proof of publication made. 390. How ordinances proved. 391. Same — Ordinances published by authority. §392 Same — When original record required. 393. Same — Proof by copy. 394. Same — Sufficiency of authen- tication. 395. Same — Proof in actions for penalty. 396. Admissibility of parol tes- timony to prove. 397. Proof of violation of ordi- nances as evidence of neg- ligence. 398. Proof of violation by plain- tiff in actions for civil lia- bility. § 382. Proof of authority to enact. It seems that a conclu- sive presumption of the regularity of the passage of an ordi- nance does not exist.' Some courts have held that, in a prose- cution to recover a penalty under an ordinance, proof of the authority to enact it is necessary,^ as where the ordinance is objected to as incompetent evidence,^ or where the objection is made on the ground that it interferes with common rights.'* But wheie the violation of the ordinance is confessed by de- murrer it is unnecessary to show the authority to enact it.^ And where municipal police courts take judicial notice of ordi- nances it is not necessary to plead or prove the authority to enact.8 S 383. Proof of existence of ordinance when required. Where the adoption of the ordinance is denied, it must be proved, to render it admissible in evidence.'^ The enactment can be proved 1 Altoona City v. Bowman, 171 Pa. St., 307; 33 Atl. Rep., 187. 2 Alton V. Hartford Ins. Co., 72 * St. Paul V. Laidler, 2 Minn., 190; 72 Am. Dec, 89. 5 Frankfort v. Aughe, 114 Ind., 111., 328; State v. Threadgill, 76 77; 15 N. E. Rep., 802; 114 Ind., N. C, 17; Dunham v. Rochester, 5 600; 15 N. B. Rep., 804. Cow. (N. Y.), 462. 3 Schott v. State, 89 111., 195. « Sees. 312 and 373, supra. J Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ruzicka 589 590. OF EVIDENCE OF ORDINANCES. [§ 384 by the proceedings of the council and their promulgation duly attested.** But it is not competent to prove by extrinsic testi- mony that an ordinance was voted upon and passed, where the journal of the council only showed that it was reported.* The book of ordinances kept by the municipal corporation contain- ing the ordinance in question is prima facie evidence of its passage.!" A lapse of fourteen years after the passage of the ordinance was held to raise a sufficient presumption of the ex- istence of every fact necessary to the validity of the ordinance, including its approval by the mayor and publication." § 384. Burden of proof. The ordinance is presumed to be valid and reasonable where it has reference to a subject mat- tei- which is within the corporate jurisdiction, unless the con- trary appeared on the face of the law itself. ^^ Therefore, the general rule is that, when the validity of an ordinance is called in question, the burden is upon the party who denies the valid- ity to demonstrate it by proper proof, as where the question of the lack of power to enact it is raised.^* So the introduction of the ordinance book, containing a certain ordinance, and showing its passage by the board, with the vote thereon, and the proper authentication thereof, together with evidence, as to its due publication, is prima facie proof of its validity, and the burden is upon the defendant to overcome the presump- tion.i* And where the defendant raises the objection that the ordinance has been repealed the burden is upon him to prove it.i^ So the burden is upon the defendant to prove that the ordinance was not published, as required.^* (Neb., 1902), 91 N. W. Rep., 543. 368, 377;- 14 S. W. Rep., 38. Sec. 340, supra. ii Santa Rosa v. Central St. Ry. sBreaux's Bridge v. Dupuis, 30 Co. (Cal., 1895), 38 Pac. Rep., 986. La. Ann., 1105; People v. Murray, 12 Van Hook v. Selma, 70 Ala., 57 Mich., 396; 24 N. W. Rep., 118. 361; 45 Am. Rep., 85; Frankfort 9 Covington v. Ludlow, 1 Mete. v. Aughe, 114 Ind., 77; 15 N. E. (Ky.), 295. Rep., 802; Trenton Horse Ry. Co. 10 Barr v. Auburn, 89 111., 361. v. Trenton, 53 N. J. L., 132; 20 Atl. Book of printed ordinances held Rep., 1076; 11 L. R. A., 410. prima facie evidence of the exist- is Haywood y- N. Y. Cent. & H. ence and legality of ordinances. Ry. Co., 59 Hun. (N. Y.), 617; 13 State V. King, 37 Iowa, 462; Barr N. Y. Suppl., 177. V. Auburn, 89 111., 361; Prell v McDonald, 7 Kan., 426, 446; Arka delphia Lumber Co. v. Arkadel phia, 56 Ark., 370; 19 S. W. Rep. 1053; Van Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark. 1* Merced County v. Fleming, 111 Cal., 46; 43 Pac. Rep., 392. 15 Hanna v. Kankakee, 34 III. App., 186. 16 Van Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark., §386] OF EVIDENCE OF ORDINANCES. 591 § 385. Judicial notice — Appeal from municipal courts. While, as we have seen, municipal or city courts will take judi- cial notice of the ordinances and resolutions passed and in force within the jurisdiction of the court, without being pleaded and proved,!^ in many jurisdictions it is held, and the weight of authority seems to be that, on appeal from such courts to a state court the latter will not take judicial notice of ordinances unless they have been pleaded in the municipal or city court and set out in the record.^'* But the better view appears to be that where an action for the violation of an ordinance has been commenced in a municipal or police court and the case is appealed, the latter court, whether state or municipal, will take judicial notice of the incorporation of the city and of the existence or substance of its ordinances.^'' § 386. Proof of formal steps in enactment, when required. It has been said that the same presumption does not exist re- specting the regularity of the passage of an ordinance as in the case of an act of the legislature.-'' Where it appears that a 368; 14 S. W. Rep., 38; State v. Atlantic City, 34 N. J. L., 99, 106. 3 7 Sec. 373, supra. 18 Alabama — Furhman v. Hunts- ville, 54 Ala., 263. Colorado — Garland v. Denver, 11 Colo., 534; 19 Pac. Rep., 460. Georgia — McDonald v. Lane, 80 Ga., 497; 5 S. E. Rep., 628; May- son V. Atlanta, 77 Ga., 662. Idaho — People v. Buchanan, 1 Idaho, 681. Iowa — Garvin v. Wells, 8 Iowa, 286; Goodrich v. Brown, 30 Iowa, 291. Maine — Lewiston v. Fairfield, 47 Me., 481. Maryland — Shanfelter v. Balti- more, 80 Md., 483; 31 Atl. Rep., 439; Central Savings Bank v. Bal- timore, 71 Md., 515; 18 Atl. Rep., 809; 20 Atl. Rep., 283. Minnesota — Winona v. Burke, 23 Minn., 254. Missouri — Cox v. St. Louis, 11 Mo., 431. New York — Porter v. Waring, 69 N. Y., 250; Harker v. New York, 17 Wend. (N. Y.), 199. South Carolina — Charleston v. Ashley Phosphate Co., 34 S. C, 541; 13 S. E. Rep., 845. Vermont — State v. Soragan, 40 Vt., 450. Where the Parties Stipulate that a paper filed In the appellate court is a genuine ordinance, it will not be evidence, as the appel- late court only passes on cases as they appear in the trial court. O'Connor v. Shahhona, 49 111. App., 619. 19 Solomon v. Hughes, 24 Kan., 211; Downing v. Miltonvale, 36 Kan., 740; 14 Pac. Rep., 281; Moundsville v. Velton, 35 W. Va., 217; 13 S. E. Rep., 373. By provision of the Code of Iowa, in an appeal from a town or city court, the district court takes judicial notice of ordinances the same as public statutes. Scranton V. Danenbaum, 109 Iowa, 95; 80 N. W. Rep., 221. 2i> Altoona v. Bowman, 171 P^. 592 OF EVIDENCE OF ORDINANCES. [§ 387 i . city ordinance was enacted and the charter requires unanimity in its enactment this will be presumed until the contrary is shown.21 So where a two-thirds vote is necessary to enact an ordinance the presumption is that the ordinance received such vote, in the absence of proof to the contrary.-- In an Illinois case the introduction of the ordinance was objected to. The charter provided that before an ordinance should be in force it should be submitted to the voters of the town for their approval or rejection, and that it should be pub- lished in a particular manner. It was held that these must be proved before the ordiriance could be received in evi- dence.23 Ordinances published in book form will be presumed to have been signed by the mayor, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, where the city charter provides that such books shall be received in evidence without further proof.^^ There is no presumption that other proceedings than those men- tioned in the record were had in the passage of the ordi- nance.25 § 387. Proof of record of ordinance. The failure of the city to comply with a charter provision that all ordinances siiall be recorded does not render the ordinance void, the provision be- ing merely directory. ^^ So a city charter requiring ordinances to be recorded in a book kept for that purpose, is complied with by a publication of the ordinance in book form.^^ The fact that a printed ordinance was cut out and pasted in the record book instead of writing it in the , book, is no objection to the admission of it in evidence. ^^ After an ordinance was signed by the mayor certain changes, and interlineations were made on the record. It was held that as the charges were made to St., 307; 33 Atl. Rep., 187; 37 of council proceedings in the pas- Wkly. Notes Cases (Pa.), 102; sage of ordinances, see sec. 126. et Scliott V. People, 89 111., 195. seg. 51 Louisville v. Hyatt, 2 B. Mon. 26 Allen v. Davenport, 107 Iowa, (41 Ky.), 177; 36 Am. Dec, 594; 90, 97; 77 N. W. Rep., 532; Whalin Lexington v. Headley, 5 Bush v. Macomb, 76 111., 49; Upington v. (Ky.), 508. Oviatt, 24 Ohio St., 232, 241; Amey 22 Buffalo & N. F. R. Co. v. Buf- v. Allegheny City, 24 How. (U. S.), falo, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 209. 364; Stevenson v. Bay City, 26 2.-! Schott V. People, 89 111., 195. Mich., 44. See sec. 153, supra. -'+ Allen V. Davenport, 107 Iowa, 27 Allen v. Davenport, 107 Iowa, 90; 77 N. W. Rep., 532. 90; 77 N. W. Rep., 532. 23 Tracey v. People, 6 Colo., 151. 28 Eubanks v. Ashley, 36 111., As to sufficiency of record, etc., 177. § 388] OF EVIDENCE OF ORDINANCES. 593 show the true ordinance, as passed, that it was not an impeach- ment of the record, and the record of the ordinance as passed was admissible in evidence.^^ The defendant may introduce a certified copy of the record of the proceedings of the board held at the meeting in which the ordinance was adopted to show that the ordinance was not passed as required.*" § 388. Proof of publication of ordinance, when required. No general rule as to the presumption of the publication of ordinances can be deduced from the eases, as this is affected by the local regulations and the facts in each case. In the absence of evidence to the contrary it will be presumed that ordinances were duly published.^^ A copy of an ordinance duly certified by the recorder of a town is prima facie admissible in evidence without proof that it was properly recorded and published.*^ Proof of publication, in Indiana, is not required unless the pub- lication is denied under oath.*^ Where an ordinance has been recognized by the city for a long time as being in force the pub- lication will be presumed.^* Where the ordinances are pub- lished in book or pamphlet form by authority no other publi- (ration is necessary.*' It has been held that the publication of Iho ordinance must be shown by proper proof before a convic- tion under it can be sustained.*® So where the statute requires that all ordinances imposing a fine shall be published proof of the publication is a prerequisite to a recovery.*^ But where one sets up as a defense omission to publish the burden is on him to establish it.** ^" Yesler V. Seattle, 1 Wash., 308; Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Nobles- 25 Pac, 1014. vlUe, 16 Ind. App., 20; 44 N. E. ■ioTracey v. People, 6 Colo., 151. Rep., 652. •51 Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Chick., 6 «* Atchison v. King, 9 Kan., 550; Kan. App., 481; 50 Pac. Rep., 605; Quincy v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., Van Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark., 368; 92 111., 21; Santa Rosa v. Central 14 S. W. Rep., 38; Fonda v. Louis- ht. Ry. Co. (Cal., 1895), 38 Pac. ville, 20 Ky. Law Rep., 1652 ; 49 S. Rep., 986. W. Rep., 785. Compare Larkln v. s^ Raker v. Maquon, 9 111. App., Burlington, etc., R. R. Co., 85 Iowa, 155; State v. King, 37 Iowa, 462. 492; 52 N. W. Rep., 480. 38 Elizabethtown v. Lefler, 23 111., 32 Bayard v. Baker, 76 Iowa, 90; Schott v. People, 89 111., 195. 220; 40 N. W. Rep., 818. Contra Charleston v. Chur., 2 Bal- sa Rowland V. Greencastle, 157 ley (S. C), 164. Ind., 591; 62 N. E. Rep., 474; Har- s? Hutchison v. Mt. Vernon, 40 denbrook v. Ligonier, 95 Ind., 70; 111. App. 19. Green v. Indianapolis, 25 Ind., 490 ; 's Van Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark., 38 594 OF EVIDENCE OP ORDINANCES. L§ 38!) § 389. How proof of publication made. In the absence of a statute or charter provision to the contrary, oral evidence is competent to prove the publication of an ordinance.^^ Where the publication vt^as by posting, in order to give such posting effect, it must be shown that there was no newspaper published in the village in which such ordinance could have been pub- lished.'**' The publication by posting may be proved by the testimony of the clerk that he posted up copies of the ordi- nance.*! A memorandum upon the record of an ordinance re- citing that it has been duly published was held to be prima facie proof of such fact.*- The certificates of the village clerk attached to the ordinance is sufficient evidence of due publica- tion of the ordinance, by provision of the statute of Illinois.*^ Where proof of the publication is not shown, as required by the charter, the ordinance is not admissible in evidence.** The introduction of the printed copy of the ordinance, with the affidavit of the printer, his foreman, or clerk, or any compe- tent witness, stating the fact of its publication and the dates thereof, has been held sufficient.*'^ The certificate of the clerk 368; 14 S. W. Rep., 38; 22 Am. St. Rep., 214; Downing v. Miltonvale, 36 Kan., 740; 14 Pac. Rep., 281. See Sees. 155-157. 39 Eldora v. Burlingame, 62 Iowa, 32; 7 N. W. Rep., 148; Des moines v. Casady, 21 Iowa, 570; Bayard v. Baker, 76 Iowa, 220; 40 N. W. Rep., 818. Contra Napa v. Easterly, 61 Cal., 509. Compare Santa Rosa City R. Co. v. Central St. R. Co. (Cal., 1895), 38 Pac. Rep., 986. Where it was shown that the files of the paper in which the Ordi- nance was published could not be obtained, and that no proof -of pub- lication was on file, parol evidence was held admissible to prove pub- lication. Larkin v. Burlington, etc., Ry. Co., 91 Iowa, 654; 60 N. W., 195. In the absence of charter or other provisions requiring proof of publication in a particular way, any competent proof tending to establish the publication of the ordinance is admissible. Seattle V. Doran, 5 Wash., 482; 32 Pac, Rep., 105, 1002. Presumption of publication after lapse of time. Quincy v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 92 111., 21. *o Raker v. Maquon, 9 111. App., 155. *i Teft v. Size, 10 111., 432. ■*2 Downing v. Miltonvale, 36 Kan., 740; 14 Pac. Rep., 281. ^3 Moss V. Oakland, 88 111., 109. But it is incompetent as evi- dence unless made so by statute. Railroad v. Bngle, 76 111., 317. a Schott V. People, 89 111., 195. i-- Kettering v. Jacksonville, 50 111., 39; Rowland v. Greencastle, 157 Ind., 591; 62 N. E. Rep., 474; Schwartz v. Oshkosh, 55 Wis., 490 ; 13 N. W. Rep., 450. Charter provided for proof by the affidavit of the foreman or pub- lisher of the newspaper, and it was held that the statement in the affidavit that the person making it was the foreman was sufficient evi- dence of the fact. Faribault v. i390] OP EVIDENCE OF ORDINANCES. 595 attached to an ordinance was held to be sufficient proof of pub- lication where no objection was raised.*^ An error in the print- ing of a word in the publication of an ordinance, will not affect its validity where it is plain from the context what word was intended.*'^ So a mistake in the publication of the date of the passage will not affect it, the date of passage not being a part of the ordinance.** § 390. How ordinances proved. In many states the method of proving ordinances is prescribed by statute,*^ but the statu- Wilson, 34 Miiin., 254; 25 N. W. Rep., 449. The method of proving the pub- lication of ordinances is controlled largely by the charter provisions of the municipality, and in many instances by statutory provisions. Schott V. People, 89 111., 195; Terra Haute & I. Ry. Co. v. Voelker, 129 111., 540; 22 N. E. Rep., 20; 1 Starr and Curtis Anno. Stat., p. 718, and notes to par. 66. *6 Chamberlain v. Litchfield, 56 111. App., 652. Proof of publication held to be suflScient. Albia v. O'Harra, 64 Iowa, 297 ;~ 20 N. W. Rep., 444; DeLoge v. N. Y. Central & H. R. Ry. Co., 92 Hun. (N. Y,), 149; 36 N. Y. Suppl., 697. Not necessary that the certificate of the recorder show dates of pub- lication. Preston v. Cedar Rapids, 95 Iowa, 71; 63 N. W. Rep., 577. 47 Moss V. Oakland, 88 111., 109. *8 Vincent v. Pacific Grove, 102 Cal., 405; 36 Pac. Rep., 773. As to time and frequency and method of publication, see sees. 156 and 157. *9 Printed copies of the ordi- nances, resolutions, rules, orders and by-laws of any city or incor- porated town of the state of Mis- souri, purporting to be published by authority of such city or incor- porated town, and manuscript or printed copies of such ordinances, resolutions, rules, orders and by- laws, certified under the hand of the oflScer having the same in law- ful custody, with the seal of such town or city annexed, shall be received as evidence in all courts and places In Missouri, without further proof; and any printed pamphlet or volume, purporting to be published by authority of any such town or city, and to contain the ordinances, resolutions, rules, orders or by-laws of such town or city, shall be evidence in all courts and places within the state of Mis- souri, of such ordinances, resolu- tions, rules, orders or by-laws. R. S. Mo., 1899, sec. 3100; Eichenlaub V. St. Joseph, 113 Mo., 395; 21 S. W. Rep., 8; 18 L. R. A., 590; Ruth- erford V. Hamilton, 97 Mo., 543 ; 11 S. W. Rep., 249; Keating v. Skiles, 72 Mo,, 97. Where printed volume of ordi- nances may be put in evidence, by charter, the ordinances stand as statutes so far as relates to the method of proving their contents. Napman v. People, 19 Mich., 352, 355. Ordinances are not admissible in evidence unless certified under seal of the town. Civil Code of Georgia, sec. 5216; Central Ga. Ry. Co. v. Bond, 111 Ga., 13; 36 S. E. Rep., 299. 596 OF EVIDENCE OP ORDINANCES. [§ 390 tory method is not exclusive ; the common law method may be employed.^" "Where the state statute provides that, "all ordi- nances of the city may be proved by the seal of the corpora- tion," a document purporting to be a city ordinance approved by the mayor, attested by the register and under the seal of the city is admissible in evidence.'^i The book in which ordi- nances are recorded, properly authenticated and proved is competent to prove the ordinance therein contained.^^ So or- dinances may be proved by entries in city records, kept by proper authority.^* Where the city fails to provide a book for the record of ordinances, ordinances placed on file by the proper custodian may be used as evidence.^* And the min- utes kept by the council clerk were held, in a New York case, competent evidence to prove the adoption of the ordi- nance.^^ So ordinances may be proved by a book containing a compilation of them legally adopted, notwithstanding a dif- ferent method of proof is prescribed *in the charter .^^ So the record book of ordinances made by the clerk is competent evi- dence, although the ordinances were never signed by the pre- siding officer of the council, as the law required.^'^ A printed compilation of the ordinance when properly authenticated as correct is admissible where it is shown the original ordinance was destroyed.^* And where the record of the ordinance is shown to have been destroyed by fire, extrinsic evidence is competent to prove an ordinance.^^ Proof of the repeal of the Printed copies of by-laws or or-' ss Billings v. Dunnaway, 54 Mo. dinances of a corporation pub- App., 1; Clarence v. Patrick, 54 lisbed under authority are admis- Mo. App., 462; People v. Murray, sible in evidence. 1 Bates Anno. 57 Mich., 396; 24 N. W. Rep., 118. Ohio Stat., sec. 1699. 54 Troy v. Atchison & N. R. R. 50 Birmingham v. Tayloe, 105 Co., 11 Kan., 519. Ala., 170 ; 16 So. Rep., 576 ; Metro- ss Kennedy v. Newman, 3 N. Y. politan Street R. R. Co. V. Johnson, Super. Ct. (1 Sandf.), 187. 90 Ga., 500; 16 S. B. Rep., 49; so Birmingham v. Tayloe, 105 Green v. Indianapolis, 25 Ind., 490; Ala., 170; 16 So. Rep., 576. Johnson v. Finley, 54 Neb., 733; 57 Toledo Consolidating St. Ry. 74 N. W. Rep., 1080. Co. v. Toledo Elec. St. Ry. Co., 6 siEichenlaub v. St. Joseph, 113 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep., 362. Mo., 395; 21 S. W. Rep., 8; 18 L. ^^s Ex parte Canto, 21 Tex. App., R. A., 590. 61; 17 S. W. Rep., 155; 57 Am. 52 Rutherford v. Swink, 90 Tenn., Rep., 609. 152; 16 S. W. Rep., 76; Metropoli- 59 Gulf Sea & S. F. R. R. Co. v. tan St. R. Co. v. Johnson, 90 Ga., Calvert, 11 Tex. Civ. App., 297; 32 500; 16 S. E. Rep., 49; Wapella v. S. W. Rep., 246. Davis, 39 111. App., 592. § 391] OF EVIDENCE OF ORDINANCES. 597 ordinance may be made by the production of the repealing ordinance.^" An ordinance is to be proved by evidence ad- dressed to the court and not to the jury.^^ §391. Same— Ordinances published by authority. Under charter provisions reciting that ordinances published by au- thority of the corporation shall be received in evidence without further proof, a book of ordinances which appears to be so published is admissible in evidence without further proof. A case of prima facie publication is thus made out, but, of course, may be rebutted.^^ go a printed copy of an ordinance pub- lished by authority of the city is prima facie evidence of the le- gal existence of the ordinance and its contents. The burden is on the defendant to overcome this evidence.®* If it can be de- termined from any part of a printed book or pamphlet of ordi- nances that it purports to be published by proper authority it is admissible in evidence.^* But a book containing a series of ordinances, with no declaration in, or upon, or as a part of, it, that it was published by competent authority is not conclusive evidence of the adoption and publication of any particular ordinance contained therein.'^^ An ordinance contained in a printed book which is in charge of the proper custodian and purports to have been published by authority of the city and to contain its ordinances, is admissible in evidence without further proof.®® Authority to reprint and publish a charter is 60 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. 6* Wapella v. Davis, 39 111. App., Gilbert, 157 111., 354; 41 N. B. Rep., 592; McGregor v. Lovington, 48 724; 51 111. App., 404. 111. App., 202, 207. 61 Roulo V. Valcour, 58 N. H., 65 Quint v. Merrill, 105 Wis., 347. 406; 81 N. W. Rep., 664. Proof of ordinance in particular 66 starks v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. cases, in accordance with certain Rep., 233; 42 S. W. Rep., 379 provisions of charters. Pendergast Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Mo., 1 ; 25 S V. Peru, 20 111., 51; Lindsay v. W., 202; 41 Am. St. Rep., 678 Chicago, 115 111., 120; 3 N. E. Rep., Tipton v. Norman, 72 Mo., 380 443; Boyer v. Yates City, 47 111. Sheehan v. Owen, 82 Mo., 458 App., 115. Canton v. Ligon, 71 Mo. App., 407. 62 St. Louis v. Foster, 52 Mo., When the ordinances of the city 513; Lindsay v. Chicago, 115 111., of St. Louis are collated and pub- 120; 3 N. E. Rep., 443. lished by authority of the city 63 Arkadelphia Lumber Co. v. they are admissible in evidence Arkadelphia, 56 Ark., 370; 19 S. without any seal, or attestation. W. Rep., 1053; State v. King, 37 St. Louis v. Foster, 52 Mo., 513; Iowa, 462; Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Me., Rockville v. Merchant, 60 Mo. App., 1; 25 S. W. Rep., 202; 41 Am. St. 365; Schweitzer v. Liberty, 82 Mo., Rep., 678. 309; Tipton v. Norman, 72 Mo., 380. 598 OF EVIDENCE OF ORDINANCES. [§ 393. not authority to publish ordinances in a book therewith so as to make it conclusive of the regularity of the ordinances.^'' § 392. Same— When original record required. Where a city is required by statute or the provisions of its charter to keep a journal of its proceedings, and of all acts, resolutions and ordi- nances of the corporation, such journal or record is admissible in evidence to prove the ordinance.^* And where the book containing the ordinances of the city was produced and the mayor testified that it was the journal of the proceedings of the board of aldermen, including the ordinance adopted, ordi- nances contained therein were held admissible in evidence by reading from the book.^^ Where the charter of a town requires its officers to keep a record of the by-laws, and ordinances, and of the time, manner and place of publication, in a book to be provided for that purpose, which shall be received in all courts as evidence, other proof than such record is unnecessary.'^'' Where by statute it is essential to the validity of a village or- dinance that the vote upon the passage be taken and recorded, the record of the proceedings of a village board reciting that all the members were present and that the ordinance in ques- tion was passed unanimously, is sufficient to show that the ordinance was legally passed.''^ § 393. Same— Proof l)y copy. A properly authenticated copy of an ordinance is usually admissible in evidence, where it is at- tested by the seal of the corporation and the signature of the officers having charge of the original.'^^ go jt has been held that a sworn copy of an ordinance of an incorporated city of another state is competent evidence.''* State statutes and city charters usually authorize the admission in evidence of printed copies of by-laws and ordinances when certified under the hand of the But a pamphlet purporting to Ry. Co., 157 Mo., 621, 634; 58 S. W. contain an ordinance, which does Rep., 32. not purport to he puhlished hy ■"> St. Charles v. O'Mailey, 18 111., authority, is incompetent to prove 407. the ordinance. Baker v. Maquon, fi Schofield v. Tampico, 98 111. 9 111. App., 155. App., 324; Gilberts v. Rabe, 49 111. 07 Quint V. Merrill, 105 Wis., 406 ; App., 418. 81 N. W. Rep., 664. ''^ Pugh v. Little Rock, 35 Ark., 08 Stewart v. Clinton, 79 Mo., 75; Bayard v. Baker, 76 Iowa, 220; 603; Lebanon Light & Water Co. 40 N. W. Rep., 818; Metropolitan V. Lebanon, 163 Mo., 254; 63 S. W. Street R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 90 Rep., 811. Ga., 500; 16 S. E. Rep., 49; Green 69 Jackson v. K. C, Ft. S. & M. v. Indianapolis, 25 Ind., 490. § 396] OF EVIDENCE OF ORDINANCES. 599 officer having the same in lawful custody, with the seal of such town annexed.^* §394. Same— SuflSciency of authentication. Where objec- tion is raised to the introduction of an ordinance in evidence, its authenticity as a part of an ordinance of the city must be shown by proper proof .''^ The production of a newspaper, pub- lished in the town, containing what appears as an ordinance of the town, which is headed "Published by Authority," and the ordinance purports to be signed by the president of the board, and countersigned by the town clerk, proves a sufficient adop- tion and authentication of the ordinance, to render it admis- sible in evidence, under the charter of the city.'^^ The certificate of the city clerk, under his official seal, is prima facie evidence of the passage of an ordinance, and renders it admissible in evidenee.'^'^ The identification by a policeman of the ordinance book and the signature of the mayor to the ordinance was held sufficient to render it admissible in evidence.'^* § 395. Same— Proof in actions for penalty. In most states the manner of pleading ordinances and the method of proof in actions to recover a penalty, is prescribed by statute. In the main the rules of evidence and proof of ordinances in ac- tions for the recovery of a penalty are the same as in a civil action, with this difference, however, municipal courts have jurisdiction of actions to recover a penalty, and since these courts take judicial notice of the ordinances of the municipality, the same care in pleading and proving the ordinance is not re- quired as in a civil action in a state court.'^^ § 396. Admissibility of parol testimony to prove. Parol evi- dence is not admissible to prove an ordinance or resolution. The ordinance itself or a proper authenticated copy,*** or the 73 Louisville N. A. & C. Ry. Co. Chicago, 115 111., 120; 3 N. E. Rep., V. Shires, 108 111., 617. 443. 7+ R. S. Mo., 1899, sees. 3100, 's Ottumwa v. Sehaub, 52 Iowa, 5521, 5694; 1 Bates Ann. Ohio 515; 3 N. W. Rep., 529. Stat., sec. 1699; Eichenlaub v. St. The proof of authenticity of an Joseph, 113 Mo., 395; 21 S. W. ordinance, held suflScient in par- Rep., 8; 18 L. R. A., 590. ticular cases. Terre Haute & I. R. 75 Union Pac. Ry. Co. V. Ruzicka, Rf. Co. v. Voelker, 129 111., 540; (Neb., 1902), 91 N. W. Rep., 543. 22 N. E. Rep., 20, affirming 31 111. 76 Block V. Jacksonville, 36 111., App., 314; Knight v. Railroad Co., 301. 70 Mo., 231. 77 McChesney v. Chicago; 159 111., 7o See. 340, supra. 223; 42 N. E. Rep., 894; Lindsay v. so Pugh v. Little Rock, 35 Ark., 600 OF EVIDENCE OF ORDINANCES. [§ 397 council record ^^ must be produced. So parol evidence is not admissible to explain representations and understandings of an ordinance at the time of its passage,*^ nor to prove that an ordinance, valid upon its face, was not legally passed, or was passed and approved prior or subsequent to the date of its at- testation; and it seems that not even the record of the pro- ceedings of the city council would be admissible for the pur- pose.*3 As a rule, the records of municipal action by a city council cannot be contradicted or supplemented by parol evi- dence. Where the law requires such records to be kept they are the only lawful evidence of the action to which they refer.** So extrinsic proof of the consent of the mayor is not admis- sible.*^ But where an ordinance has been destroyed by fire parol proof is admissible to show that it had been signed by the mayor.*® And in one case the testimony of the mayor who presided at the time the ordinance was passed was admitted to prove the passage of the ordinance.*'' So in another, where the records of a city were imperfect, and did not show all the pro- ceedings, parol testimony to show that an ordinance did pass the council was admitted.** And in an Illinois case parol eyi- dence was admitted to show that interlining in an ordinance was done before the passage of it.*^ § 397. Proof of violation of ordinances as evidence of negli- gence. The passage of ordinances by a municipality regulating the speed of trains and the running of street cars within the city limits, is a valid police regulation for the protection of the lives of persons, and the evidence of such an ordinance and 75, 80. Contra Troy v. Atchinson 76; Hagerstown v. Startzman, 93 Ry. Co., 11 Kan., 519. Md., 606; 49 Atl. Rep., 838. But in one case parol evidence ss Ball v. Fagg, 67 Mo., 481. of resolutions was held competent 84 Stevenson v. Bay City, 26 where it appears that no record of Mich. 44. See sec. 124 et seq., therh has been made and the char- supra. ter did not, in express terms, re- ss Lexington v. Headley, 5 Bush, quire them to be recorded. Darl- (Ky.), 508. ington V. Commonwealth, 41 Pa. so Seattle v. Doran, 5 Wash., 482 ; St., 68. 32 Pac.Rep., 105, 1002. 81 Stewart v. Clinton, 79 Mc, 87 Heller v. Alvarado, 1 Tex. Civ. 603; Lebanon Light & Water Co. v. App., 409; 20 S. W. Rep., 1003. Lebanon, 163 Mo., 254; 63 S. W. ss Troy v. A. & N. Ry. Co., 11 Rep., 811. Kan., 519. 82 State v. Paris Ry. Co., 55 Tex., so Ronan v. People, 193 111., 631; 61 N. E. Rep., 1042. §397] OF EVIDENCE OF ORDINANCES. 601 proof of its violation in a civil action for damages is negligence per se.^° The effect of evidence of the violation of an ordinance regulating the speed of trains has been extensively discussed in a large number of cases in the Supreme Court of Missouri. The final conclusion of that court appears to be that evidence of the violation of an ordinance regulating the speed of trains is negligence per se and that it is not necessary for the plaintifl: to allege and prove acceptance of the ordinance upon the part of the railroad company .^^ Ordinances which have for their purpose the protection of persons from injury, may be introduced in evidence in actions 90 Correll v. B. C. R. & M. Ry. Co., 38 Iowa, 120; Wilson v. South- ern Ry. Co., 64 S. C, 162; 36 S. B. Rep., 701; 41 S. B. Rep., 971. Obstructing street, held negli- gence. Overhouser v. American Cereal Co. (Iowa, Oct. 3, 1902), 92 N. W. Rep., 74. It is negligence per se for a rail- way company to violate valid ordi- nances and the court may so in- struct the jury, as ordinances reg- ulating the speed o*f trains. Cen- tral of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Bond, 111 Ga., 13, 17; 36 S. E. Rep., 299 (doubting "W. & A. R. R. t. King, 70 Ga., 261); Atlanta & W. P. R. R. V. Wyly, 65 Ga., 120; Central R. R. V. Thompson, 76 Ga., 770; Tift V. Jones, 77 Ga., 181; 3 S. E. Rep., 399; Central R. R. v. Smith, 78 Ga., 694, 697; 3 S. E. Rep., 397; Western & A. R. R. Co. v. Young, 81 Ga., 397, 412; 7 S. E. Rep., 912; Columbus v. Ogletree, 96 Ga., 177, 179; 22 S. E. Rep., 709. 91 Jackson v. K. C. F. S. & M. Ry. Co., 157 Mo., 621; 58 S. W. Rep., 32, per Burgess, J., reviewing lead- ing Missouri cases. Upon the lat- ter point the court refused to fol- low Fath v. Tower Grover Ry. Co., 105 Mo., 537; 16 S. W. Rep., 913, and subsequent cases adopting the rule therein contained, which was that in order to recover for negli- gence in the violation of an ordi- nance regulating the speed of trains the plaintiff must prove ac- ceptance of the ordinance by de- fendant. The Fath case was fol- lowed in Sanders v. So. Electric Ry. Co., 147 Mo., 411; 48 S. W. Rep., 855. Compare also Bluedorn V. Mo. Pac. R. R., 108 Mo., 439; 18 S. W. Rep., 1103; 32 Am. St. Rep., 615; Dahlstorm v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. R. Co., 108 Mo., 525; 18 S. W. Rep., 919; Grube v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co., 98 Mo., 330; 11 S. W. Rep., 736; 14 Am. St. Rep., 645; Bergman v. St. L., I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 88 Mo., 678; Merz v. Mo. Pac. R. R., 14 Mo. App., 459; 88 Mo., 672; Becker v. Schutte, 85 Mo. App., 57; Brannock v. Elmore, 114 Mo.; 55; 21 S. W. Rep., 451; Butz V. Cavanaugh, 137 Mo., 503; 38 S. W. Rep., 1104; Harman v. St. Louis, 137 Mo., 494; 38 S. W. Rep.. 1102; Gratiot v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co., 116 Mo., 450; 21 S. W. Rep., 1094; Murphy v. Lindell Ry., 153 Mo., 252; 54 S. W. Rep., 442; Day v. Citizens' Ry. Co., 81 Mo. App., 471 ; McAndrew v. St. Louis & S. Ry. Co., 88 Mo. App., 97. Ordinance admissible to show negligence without being pleaded. Brasington v. South Bound R. R. Co., 62 S. C, 325; 40 S. E. Rep.. 665. Contra Chicago W. D. Ry. Co. 602 OF EVIDENCE OF ORDINANCES. [.§ 397 for damages resulting from the violation of such ordinance.*^ Thus an ordinance requiring "any owner or contractor who shall hereaiter build or cause to be built" any building abut- ting upon a public sidewalk after the completion of the first story to cause a roofed passageway to be built in front of the building upon the sidewalk is admissible in evidence in an ac- tion for an injury resulting by reason of the failure to roof such passageway, and is evidence of negligence.^^ So evidence of the failure to comply with an ordinance regulating the use of elevators,^* and an ordinance regulating the protection of hatchways was held to be negligence per se?^ So evidence that a street car was stopped in the middle of the crossing of a street in violation of an ordinance is admissible in an action for dam- ages resulting therefrom, and is sufficient proof of negligence.^® An ordinance designed to enforce the performance of a com- mon law duty, is properly admitted in evidence in an action for damages arising from common law negligence. Thus an ordinance requiring that openings in pavements should be prop- erly guarded is admissible in evidence in an action for damages for injuries resulting from falling into an unguarded opening in the sidewalk.^^ So ordinances prohibiting animals from run- ning at large upon the streets and highways without a keeper are admissible in evidence in actions to recover damages aris- ing from injuries received by allowing animals to be improperly at large in violation of the ordinance.^® So violating an ordi- nance forbidding horses to stand in the street unhitched and V. Klauber, 9 111. App., 613, 619. oe Mueller v. Milwaukee St. Ry. Compare Illinois Central R. R. v. Co., 86 Wis., 340; 56 N. W. Rep., Godfrey, 71 111., 500. 914. 92 Decker v. McSorley, 111 "Wis., »' Roberson v. "Wabash St. L. & 91; 86 N. W., 554; "Wright v. Mai- Pac. Ry. Co., 84 Mc, 119. den & M. Ry. Co., 4 Allen (Mass.), as Baldwin v. Ensign, 49 Conn., 283; Lane v. Atlantic "Works, 111 113; Decker v. Gammon, 44 Me., Mass., 136; Karle v. K. C, St. 322; Barnes v. Chapin, 4 Allen Joseph & C. B. Ry. Co., 55 Mo., 476. (Mass.), 444. 93 Smith v. Milwaukee B. & T. "Violation of an ordinance for- Exch., 91 "Wis,, 360, 367; 64 N. "W. bidding horses to run loose upon Rep., 1041; 51 Am. St. Rep., 912. the streets which results in injury 94 "Wendler v. People's House to a child, held to be negligence. Furnishing Co., 165 Mo., 527; 65 "The ordinance having been de- S. "W. Rep., 737. clared on, and in evidence, and the 95 Hirst V. Ringen Real Estate plaintiff having shown that appel- Co., 169 Mo., 194; 69 S. "W. Rep., lant's horses were loose upon the 368. streets, the accident, and due care § 397] OF EVIDENCE OP ORDINANCES. 603 unguarded where injury results, is evidence of negligence.®" Such ordinances are designed to protect life and limb. Persons upon the streets have a right to expect that such regulations will be obeyed, and hence will govern themselves accordingly .^ So ordinances forbidding wagons to stand crosswise of the streets and trucks and other obstructions to be placed on the streets or sidewalks, of course, are intended to render the streets more safe and convenient, and are, therefore, proper police regulations.^ It seems that where the duties enjoined by a city ordinance • are due to the municipality or to the public at large, and not as composed of individuals, the admission of the ordinance in evidence and proof of its viofetion is not evidence of negligence and cannot create a civil liability upon the part of the person violating the ordinance. This is well illustrated in cases where the city by ordinance undertakes to place upon the abutting owner of property on a public street the duty of removing the ice and snow therefrom. Evidence of such ordinance and its violation will not make the abutting owner liable to persons in- jured by the neglect to remove the snow and ice as required by the ordinance.^ In cases of negligence growing out of injuries resulting from the violation of Statutes the violation is generally held to be negligence per se.* upon her part, that proof made a Donnell, 43 Md., 534; Wright v. prima facie case of negligence." Maiden & M. R. R., 4 Allen Maxwell v. Durkin, 86 111. App., (Mass.), 283. 257, 261, affirmed 185 111., 546. 3 Klrby v. Boylston Market 99 Jones v. Belt, 8 Houston Assn., 14 Gray, 249; Flynn v. Can- (Del.), 562. ton Co., 40 Md., 312, 323. See sees. Failure, negligence per se. Siem- 40 to 42, and sec. 376, supra. ers V. Eisen, 54 Cal., 418, approving * Dodge v. B. C. R. & M. R. R. Jetter v. N. Y. & H. R. R. Co., 2 Co., 34 Iowa, 276; Reynolds v. Abb. (N. Y.), 458, 464. Hindman, 32 Iowa, 146; Johnson 1 Bott V. Pratt, 33 Minn., 323; 23 v. St. P. & D. R. Co., 31 Minn., 283; N. W. Rep., 237. 17 N. W. Rep., 622. 2 Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Statute required door opens in Mass., 136, 140. buildings to be protected, and fail- In an action for damages result- ure was held to be prima facie Ing from the violation of certain evidence of negligence. McRIckard ordinances it was held that the v. Flint, 114 N. Y., 222, 227; 21 N. ordinance might be considered by E. Rep., 153. the court with other evidence. The failure to perform a statu- Baltimore City Pass. Ry. v. Mc- tory duty, specifically Imposed 604 OF EVIDENCE OF ORDINANCES. [§ 398 § 398. Proof of violation by plaintiiT in actions for civil lia- bility. In an action for damages for negligence, evidence of the fact that at the time the injury for which damages is sought was received the plaintiff himself was violating an ordinance, will not prevent recovery unless it is shown that such violation upon the part of plaintiff contributed to the injury. "Because a plaintiff is himself negligent or is acting in violation of law, he is not therefore prevented from recovering damages for an injury which has resulted from the negligence of defendant where but for the want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant the misfortune would not have happened."^ In a Massachusetts case the ordinance required horses and wagons while loading to be placed lengttiwise of the street and as near as possible to the sidewalk. Plaintiff violated the ordi- nance by placing his horse and wagon transversely to the course of the street. It was held that his failure to comply with the ordinance in this respect did not prevent him from main- taining an action against one who injures his horse by negli- gently driving another wagon against it, when by exercising more care he might have avoided doing so. It was "found that, though plaintiff's team was standing there in violation of a city ordinance, yet there was room for defendant's team to pass by, using due care, and the only fault of the plaintiff con- sisted in the violation of the city ordinance. It was not found that this violation contributed to the injury. " ® In an early English case it was held that evidence of wrongfully allowing a fettered donkey to be on the highway, where the donkey was injured, did not bar action by the owner for damages.' So leaving a horse attached to a vehicle untied and unattended in a street in violation of an ordinance, will not bar recovery for damages by a street car.* In a New York case the statute for- bade standing on street car platforms. In an action for negli- under the police power for the pro- 33 Md., 542, 554; B. & 0. R. R. Co. tectlon of the public, is negligence v. State, 36 Md., 366. per se. Platte, etc., C. & M. Co. v. e Steele v. Burkhardt, 104 Mass., Dowell, 17 Colo., 376; 30 Pac. Rep., 59, 61. 68. TDavies v. Mann, 10 M. & W., oKlipper v. CofCey, 44 Md., 117, 545. 127. 8 Albert v. Bleecker Street Ry. Principle is well established, as Co., 2 Daly (N. Y.), 389; Wasmer in cases of trespass on railroad v. D., L. & W. R. R. Co., 80 N. Y., tracks. B. & O. R. R. Co. v. State, 212. i398] OF EVIDENCE OF ORDINANCES. 605 gence by one in such position it was held that mere violation of the statute in this respect did not bar the action.^ Evidence of the violation of an ordinance by plaintiff in an action for damages is admissible to show contributory negli- gence on his part.io Thus in an early Massachusetts ease plain- tiff was traveling in violation of the statutes for the observance of the Lord's day. In an action for damages by reason of a defective highway the violation of the statute was not pleaded as a defense, but it was held that the defendant town could prove the violation of the statute.^i So in the same state it was held that in an action for damages caused by a collision of two vehicles on a highway, evidence that plaintiff was traveling on the left side of the road in violation of a statute, when the collision occurred, was admissible in evidence to show negligence.12 9 Connolly v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 114 N. Y., 104, 108; 21 N. E. Rep., 101. 10 Steele v. Burkhardt, 104 Mass., 59. 11 "In such cases, evidence that a party is guilty of a violation of law supports the issue of a want of proper care; nor can it be doubted that in these and similar actions the averment in the decla- ration of the use of due care, and the denial of it in the answer, properly and distinctly puts in issue the legality of the conduct of the party as contributing to the accident or injury which forms the ground-work of the action. No specific averment of the particular unlawful act which caused or con- tributed to produce a result could, in such cases, be deemed necessary. * * * It is the disregard of the requirements of the statute by the plaintiff which constituted the fault or want of due care which is fatal to the action.'' Per Bige- low, C. J., in Jones v. Andover, 10 Allen (Mass.), 18, 20, 21, approving Bosworth v. Swansey, 10 Met. (Mass.), 363. 12 Jones v. Andover, 10 Allen (Mass.), 18. See Kearns v. Snow- den, 104 Mass., 63, note. CHAPTER XIII. OF ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION AND LICENSE TAX. i 399. General nature of taxes. 400. Taxation limited to munici- pal or corporate purposes. 401. Power to levy taxes. 402. Method of levying taxes. 403. Municipal power to license and regulate trades, occupa- tions, etc. 404. Mode of delegation — How power construed. 405. Same — Enumeration fol- lowed by general words. 406. Power "to regulate" as pow- er to license. 407. Power "to regulate" as pow- er to prohibit. 408. Distinction between license to regulate and tax to raise revenue. 409. License taxes distinguished from general taxes. 410. License tax as a contract. 411. License for municipal pur- pose. 412. Power to license non-resi- dents. 413. License tax to be levied by ordinance. § 414. Delegation of power to license forbidden. 415. Same — Consent of property- owner. 416. Same — Permit to parade streets. 417. License fee or tax must be uniform — Discrimination forbidden. 418. Reasonableness of amount of license. 419. Application for license — Granting. 420. Revocation of license or per- mit. 421. Method of enforcement of payment of license. 422. License on dogs. 423. License on lawyers. 424. License on vehicles — Double taxation. 425. License on saloons and liquor selling. 426. Same subject — Conditions. 427. License on street railways. 428. License on miscellaneous trades, occupations, avoca- tions, etc. § 399. General nature of taxes. Taxes are charges or bur- dens levied on persons or property for purposes public in their nature.i They may be imposed directly by the state through its legislature or indirectly by the municipal corporation under delegated powers. The state, having power to tax property for state purposes, may confer the power on municipal corpora- 1 California — People v. McCreery, 34 Cal., 432, 456; Perry v. Wash- urn, 20 Cal., 318, 350. Colorado — People v. Lathrop, 3 Colo., 428. Maine — Opinion of Justices, 58 Me., 590. Missouri — Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo., 479, 489. Pennsylvania — Philadelphia 606 §399] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 607 tions to tax the same property for local purposes.^ "A mu- nicipal corporation without the power of taxation would be a body without life, incapable of acting and serving no useful purpose. ' ' ^ The power possessed by local communities to assess and col- lect taxes for municipal or corporate purposes is in the nature of governmental authority, conferred by the state. Generally this power is exercised under constitutional authority and ex- pressly granted by the state legislature. Constitutions frequent- ly forbid- the legislature from imposing taxes upon municipal corporations for municipal purposes, but the state is authorized, by general law, to vest in the corporate authorities of municipal corporations the power to assess and collect taxes for such pur- poses.* The constitutional provision is usual that the valua- tion of property for taxation shall not exceed the valuation of Assn. V. Wood, 39 Pa. St., 73, 82; Hilbish V. Catherinan, 64 Pa. St., 154, 159. Wisconsin — Dalrymple v. Mil- waukee, 53 Wis., 178, 184; 10 N. W. Rep., 141. 2 St. Louis V. Bircher, 76 Mo., 431; Springfield v. Smith, 138 Mo., 645; 40 S. W. Rep., 757; Hender- son Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 173 U. S., 592; 19 Supreme Ct. Rep., 553. 3 United States v. New Orleans, 98 U. S., 381, 393. The power of the city to raise revenue is derived from the power of taxation. Lyon v. Elizabeth, 43 N. J. L., 158. 4 Const., art. 7, sec. 6, of Idaho, applies only to taxation proper, as distinguished from license tax. State v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. (Idaho, 1902), 67 Pac. Rep., 647; Const, of Mo., 1875, art. X, sec. 10. Acts of the legislature providing for police courts, election boards and other boards and state officers, although exercising their functions within the particular locality, and permitting the revenue of the city derived from taxation to be ap- plied to the maintenance of such boards and officers do not consti- tute the levy of municipal taxes by the state. State ex ret v. Board of Education, 141 Mo., 45; 41 S. W. Rep., 924; State ex rel. v. Owsley, 122 Mo., 68 ; 26 S. W. Rep., 659; State ex rel. v. St. Louis County, 34 Mo., 546; St. Louis v. Shields, 52 Mo., 351, 354; State ex rel. Hawes v. Mason, 153 Mo., 23; 54 S. W. Rep., 524; Lucas v. Tippe- canoe, 44 Ind., 524, where the question is fully discussed, leading cases are carefully considered and both views are presented. Under such constitutional pro- vision it is generally held that the legislature cannot delegate this power, e. g., to the police. Lov- ingston v. Wider, 53 111., 302; Wider v. East St. Louis, 55 111., 133; or to park commissioners. People ex rel. v. Detroit, 28 Mich., 228; People v. Mayor, etc., 21 111., 17. But see Contra, the Philadel- phia City Hall Case, Perkins v. Slack, 86 Pa. St., 270, 278. Com- pare Ex parte Pfirrman, 134 Cal., 143; 66 Pac. Rep., 205. 608 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§400 the same property in the city for state purposes.^ So constitu- tional provisions are usual that taxes "shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax," and that all property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value.^ Hence, a, charter or ordinance provision that, lands within the city which have not been laid off into lots or blocks shall not be assessed otherwise than by the acre as agricultural lands, conflicts with such provisions. ' ' The rate of taxation and the valuation for taxation are two distinct things. ' ' ^ The percentage of taxes or the rate of taxation, when not otherwise established, is gen- erally fixed by ordinance from time to time.* § 400. Tajcation limited to municipal or corporate purposes. The authority of the local corporation to raise revenue by tax- ation is limited to taxation for municipal or corporate pur- poses." What is a corporate or municipal purpose is to be de- termined by the local laws and the facts in each particular case. If the object is beneficial to the inhabitants and directly con- nected with the local government it will be considered a cor- porate purpose.!" The establishment and regulation of schools has been declared a municipal purpose.!^ So taxes imposed for 5 Const, of Mo., 1875, art. X, sec. County Supervisors v. Weider, 64 11. III., 427. 6 Const, of Mo., 1875, art. X, sees. n East Tennessee University v. 3, 4. Knoxville, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.), 166; ^ State ex rel. v. O'Brien, 89 Mo., Ballentine v. Pulaski, 83 Tenn. 631, 634; 1 S. W. Rep., 763; Ben- (15 Lea.), 633. oist V. St. Louis, 15 Mo., 668; Lee To provide a location or site for v. Thomas, 49 Mo., 112; Walden v. a state institution as a reform Dudley, 49 Mo., 419. school has been held not to be a 8 St. Louis Charter, art. V, sec. corporate purpose in Illinois. Liv- 27 ; Municipal Code of St. Louis, p. ingston County Supervisors v. Wei- 51. der, 64 111., 427. Bates v. Bassett, 60 Vt., 530, A donation for a university held 534; 15 Atl. Rep., 200. to be a corporate purpose within 10 East Tennessee University v. the meaning of the constitution of Knoxville, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.), 166. Illinois of 1848. Hensley Tp. v. Corporate purposes mean for People ea; rel., 84 111., 544. purposes and such only as are Under a statute forbidding tax- germane to the objects of the crea- ing a national bank for "munici- tion of the municipality, at least pal purposes," it was held that such as have a legitimate connec- such bank might be taxed for tion with those objects and mani- school purposes, or to aid in the test relation thereto. Livingston construction of a railroad, as such 1402] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 609 the purposes of defraying the expenses of conducting municipal elections are assessed and collected for corporate purposes.^^ § 401. Power to levy taxes. "Without authority conferred hy law a municipal corporation possesses no power to levy taxes for any purpose.^^ This power in this respect rests upon the same general principle of construction as other powers ; there- fore, although not given hy the legislature in express terms, the power may arise by necessary implication.^* But the power will not ordinarily be inferred from a general grant of power.^^ § 402. Method of levying taxes. The method of levying taxes is controlled by the municipal charter and local laws applicable. The levy of taxes is usually discretionary with the municipal authorities, and ordinarily the courts will not inter- fere if the provisions of the law have been, in substance, ob- served.i^ Usually the levy is provided for by ordinance,i^ but were not "municipal purposes." Root V. Erdelmeyer, 37 Ind., 225, 227; 1 Nat. Bank Cases, 432. 12 Wetherell v. Devine, 116 111., 631; 6 N. E. Rep., 24. See State ex rel. v. Owsley, 123 Mo., 68; 26 S. W. Rep., 659. Taxes for park purposes are municipal purposes. Knowlton v. Williams, 174 Mass., 476; 55 N. E. Rep., 77; 47 L. R. A., 314. Taxes for public purposes. Dag- gett v. Colgan, 92 Cal., 53; 28 Pac. Rep., 51; 14 L. R. A., 474; Pritch- ard V. Magoun, 109 Iowa, 364; 80 N. W. Rep., 512; 46 L. R. A., 381. 13 Bates V. Bassett, 60 Vt., 530; 15 Atl. Rep., 200. 14 United States v. New Orleans, 98 U. S., 381. In Wisconsin it is said that where a city h5,s power to contract a debt, by necessary implication, it has power to resort to the usual mode of raising money to pay it, which undoubtedly is taxation. State ex rel. v. Milwaukee, 25 Wis., 122, 133. 15 Drake v. Phillips, 40 111., 388, 394; Minnesota Linseed Oil Co. v. Palmer, 20 Minn., 468, 475; In re 39 Second Ave. Methodist Episcopal Church, 66 N. Y., 395; Jonas v. Cincinnati, 18 Ohio, 318. Power to tax for street lighting, held not to include street improve- ments. Webster v. People, 98 111., 343. 16 Hyde Park v. Ingalls, 87 111., 11; People v. East Saginaw, 33 Mich., 164; Hope v. Deaderick, 8 Humph. (Tenn.), 1. Immaterial irregularities disre- garded. Purrington v. People, 79 111., 11; Taylor v. McPadden, 84 Iowa, 262; 50 N. W. Rep., 1070; People V. Wright, 68 Hun. (N. Y.), 264; 22 N. Y. Suppl., 961. Failure to record votes, invali- dates tax, when. Pontiac v. Ax- ford, 49 Mich., 69; 12 N. W. Rep., 914. Certiorari will lie — Validity of law authorizing, will be considered. State V. Bell, 91 Wis., 271; 64 N. W. Rep., 845. 17 Sufficiency of Ordinance. San Luis Obispo v. Pettit, 87 Cal., 499 ; 25 Pac. Rep., 694 ; Spring Val- ley Coal Co. V. People, 157 111., 543; 41 N. E. Rep., 874; People ex rel. V. Peoria, etc., R. R., 116 111., 610 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§402 under some charters it may be by resolution.^* The time of making the levy, when fixed by law, should be observed.i^ But if no time is prescribed it may be designated by the municipal authorities.20 Charters usually require that the object of the levy of the tax must be specified.^! The power to levy and collect taxes is legislative in its nature, and involves the exercise of discretion and judgment ; and like all other municipal powers must be exercised by the corpora- 410; 6 N. B. Rep., 459; People v. Lee, 112 111., 113; Frantz v. Jacob, 88 Ky., 525; 11 S. W. Rep., 654. 18 Resolution levying taxes; legal adoption presumed, when. Taylor V. McPadden, 84 Iowa, 262; 50 N. W. Rep., 1070. 19 Williamspoft v. Kent, 14 Ind., 306. Levy subsequent to time named. Peed V. Millikan, 79 Ind., 86; New Orleans v. Mechanics & T. Bank, 15 La. Ann., 107. 20 San Luis Obispo v. Pettit, 87 Cal., 499; 25 Pac. Rep., 694; Har- per V. Elberton, 23 Ga., 566; Benoist v. St. Louis, 19 Mo., 179. Taxes to pay bonds may be levied in advance. Wright v. People, 87 111., 582. Ordinance passed before tax list completed, held suflScient. Clayton v. Chicago, 44 111., 280. 21 Specification, sufficiency. Au- rora V. Lamar, 59 Ind., 400; State V. Davenport, 12 Iowa, 335; Cov- ington Gas Light Co. v. Covington, 84 Ky., 94; Boyce v. Peterson, 84 Mich., 490; 47 N. W. Rep., 1095; In re Cloquet Lumber Co., 61 Minn., 233; 63 N. W. Rep., 628. Library tax. Spring Valley Coal Co. V. People, 157 111., 543; 41 N. E. Rep., 874. An ordinance imposing a tax of a named amount for "permanent improvements," held suflScient. Clayton v. Chicago, 44 111., 280. Water supply. Stiles v. Jones, 3 Yeates (Pa.), 491; Hixon v. Eagle River, 91 Wis., 649; 65 N. W. Rep., 366. To pay interest and principal of bonds. Davis v. Brace, 82 111., 542. What constitutes a levy. Snell V. Ft. Dodge, 45 Iowa, 564; Meser- vey V. Webster County, 46 Iowa, 702; Bartemeyer v. Rohlfs, 71 Iowa, 582; 32 N. W. Rep., 673. Amount of taxes. Fairfield v. People, 94 111., 244; People v. Lee, 112 111., 113. Special levy denied, after insuf- ficient levy for general purposes. State eoc rel. v. Van Every, 75 Mo., 530. Regularity. Mayor must ap- prove resolution, to validate, when law so requires. O'Neil v. Tyler, 3 N. D., 47; 53 N. W. Rep., 434; Walker v. Burlington, 56 Vt., 131. See sec. 149, suprq,. Ordinance need not be signed by presiding officer. Blanchard v. Bis- sell, 11 Ohio St., 96. Veto by mayor of action of coun- cil in fixing tax rate denied. Tru- man v. San Francisco, 110 Cal., 128; 42 Pac. Rep., 421. Assessment to conform to ordi- nance. Glass V. White, 5 Sneed (Tenn.), 475. Passage of ordinance levying a tax Is a legislative act. Merchants V. Memphis, 9 Baxter (Tenn.), 76. Apportionment of taxes among the several municipal subdivisions is sometimes required. But this has been held to be a mere minis- terial function. Shippy v. Mason, 1403] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 611 tion itself, through the legal body created for this purpose, and can in no manner be delegated.^^ §403. Municipal power to license and regulate trades, oc- cupations, etc. It is usual to confer upon municipal corpora- tions the power to levy and collect a license tax upon certain trades, occupations, etc., carried on within the corporate limits. Unless the state constitution forbids the state may, through its legislature, provide for imposing a charge upon any and all trades, occupations, avocations, professions, etc., and such power may be delegated to its municipal corporations,^^ to be exercised either as a police regulation or for the purpose of raising revenue.^* And while the state may so delegate such 90 Mich., 45; 57 N. W. Rep., 353; Fay V. Wood, 65 Mich., 390; 32 N. W. Rep., 614. 22 Bellinger v. Gray, 51 N. Y., 610; Robinson v. Dodge, 18 Johns. (N. Y.), 351; Trumbull v. White, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 46. Delegation of powers forbidden. Sec. 84, et seq., supra,; license, sec. 414, post; police power, sec. 438, post. 23 Alabama — ^Van Hook v. Selma, 70 Ala., 361; Montgomery v. Knox, 64 Ala., 463; Ex parte Montgom- ery, 64 Ala., 463; Montgomery v. Shoemaker, 51 Ala., 114; Gold- thwaite v. Montgomery, 50 Ala., 486; Carroll v. Tuskaloosa, 12 Ala., 173. California — San Jose v. S. J. & S. C. Ry. Co., 53 Cal., 475, 481; Ex parte Hurl, 49 Cal., 557; Sacra- mento V. Crocker, 16 Cal., 119; Sacramento v. California Stage Co., 12 Cal., 134; People v. Cole- man, 4 Cal., 46. Georgia — Johnston v. Macon, 62 Ga., 645; Rome v. McWilliams, 52 Ga., 251. Kansas — Newton v. Atchison, 31 Kan., 151; 1 Pac. Rep., 288; Tul- loss V. Sedan, 31 Kan., 165; 1 Pac. Rep., 285; Fretwell v. Troy, 18 Kan., 271. Missouri — St. Louis v. Bircher, 76 Mo., 431; Lamar v. Adams, 90 Mo. App., 35. Nebraska — Magneau & Brunner V. Fremont, 30 Neb., 843 ; 47 N. W. Rep., 280; 9 L. R. A., 786. North Carolina — State v. French, 109 N. C, 722; 14 S. E. Rep., 383; 26 Am. St. Rep., 590. OAio^Marmet v. State, 45 Ohio St., 63; 12 N. B. Rep., 463; State V. Gazlay, 5 Ohio, 14. Oregon — Lent v. Portland (Ore- gon, 1903), 71 Pac. Rep., 645. South Carolina — Charleston v. Oliver, 16 S. C, 47, 50; Informa- tion V. Oliver, 21 S. C, 318; State v. Hayne, 4 S. C, 403. Texas — State v. Stephens, 4 Tex., 137. Virginia — Woodall v. Lynchburg, 100 Va., 318; 40 S. E. Rep., 915. Impairing Obligation of Con- TEACT. Where the city has entered into a contract with a party to supply the city with water and transferred to him certain water works, upon named conditions, and reserved no right to tax or license the business, an ordinance which attempts to impose a license on his business impairs the grant to him and is void. Stein v. Mobile, 49 Ala., 362; 20 Am. Rep., 283. 24Gundling v. Chicago, 176 111., 340; 52 N. E. Rep., 44; 48 L. R. 612 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§405 authority the power may be withdrawn at any time unless the right to do so is prohibited by the constitution.^^ § 404. Mode of delegation— How power construed. As the power to tax and license as a means of raising revenue is not inherent in municipal corporations, it follows that such power must be expressly conferred in plain terms, or it must arise by necessary implication from powers expressly granted.^^ The exercise of the authority must be within the clear scope of the language of the law conferring the power. Grants of this na- ture are usually strictly construed against the exercise of the power and in favor of the public, especially where the sole pur- pose of the ordinance is to raise revenue.^^ § 405. Same— Enumeration followed by general words. The A., 230, affirmed 177 U. S., 183; Hogan V. Indianapolis (Ind., 1902), 65 N. E. Rep., 525; Springfield v. Smith, 138 Mo., 645 ; 40 S. W. Rep., 757; State v. Columbia, 6 S. C, 1. 2SWilkie v. Chicago, 188 111., 444; 58 N. E., 1004; 80 Am. St. Rep., 182. When state statute supersedes charter provision. Mulcahy v. Newark, 57 N. J. L., 513; 31 Atl. Rep., 226; Elizabeth v. Burning, 58 N. J. L., 554; 34 Atl. Rep., 752. Where the constitution forbids a local license imposed in a greater sum than that imposed by the state, and no license is required of traveling agents, none can be exacted by the city. New Orleans V. Graves, 34 La. Ann., 840. The fact that a statute requires a license for the same thing does not forbid an ordinance exacting. Ex parte Siebenbauer, 14 Nev., 365. 26 Welch V. Hotchkiss, 39 Conn., 140; Delcambre v. Clere, 34 La. Ann., 1050. Power to license physicians de- nied. Savannah v. Charlton, 36 Ga., 460. 27 Kniper v. Louisville, 7 Bush. (Ky.), 599; New Iberia v. Migues, 32 La. Ann., 923; St. Paul v. Briggs, 85 Minn., 290; 88 N. W. Rep., 984, where strict rule of con- struction applied to license of ped- dlers. "The authority to impose a -tax or to exact a license must clearly appear and must be strictly con- strued. If there is a doubt as to the right, it must be resolved ad- versely to it." Chicago v. Collins, 175 111., 445; 67 Am. St. Rep., 224; 51 N. E. Rep., 907. The power of a city to levy a tax depends upon the power conferred by its charter. PuUen v. Raleigh, 68 N. C, 451. Where the power to tax occupa- tions has not been conferred upon the city it cannot exercise it as a means of preventing huckstering. Mays V. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St., 268. When general power to tax is conferred the city can tax all sub- jects within its jurisdiction not withheld from taxation by the laws of the state, irrespective of the fact whether or not they are taxed by the state. Woodall v. Lynch- burg, 100 Va., 318; 40 S. E. Rep., 915. A charter, authorizing a munic- ipal corporation to tax real and personal estate, does not, neces- §405] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 613 rule frequently invoked is that where power is given to enact ordinances in certain cases and for certain purposes the power is limited to the case and ohjects specified, all others being ex- cluded by implication. 28 So, in construing the power to pass ordinances, the rule usually applied is that, where a specific enumeration is followed by general words the latter are re- stricted to the things specifically mentioned.^^ Thus power to license and regulate dram shops, public shows, theatrical and other amusements, will not be extended to include the power of licensing wagons run for hire, by virtue of a general clause at its close, gra,nting power to pass other ordinances for the sarily, confer tlie right to tax in- come. Savannah v. Hartridge, 8 Ga.', 23. License for revenue. In re Quong Woo, 13 Fed. Rep., 229. License on broker upheld, as a license on an occupation. Braun V. Chicago, 110 111., 186. A provision, giving power "to levy and collect a license on theatres, and on trades, profes- sions, and business," etc., was held to confer authority to impose a license on a stage coach company whose office and place of business was in the city but whose busi- ness was that of carrying pas- sengers from and to the city. Sacramento v. Stage Company, 12 Cal., 134. Under the constitution of Texas a municipality cannot levy an occupation tax on an occupation or pursuit that has not been pre- viously taxed as such by the state. So a city ordinance imposing an occupation tax upon the use of vehicles, where such pursuit has not been taxed by the state, is unconstitutional and void. Ex parte Terrell, 40 Tex. Cr. App., 28; 48 S. W, Rep., 504. Exclusive Privileges Foebidden. Power to license, tax and regulate does not authorize the granting of exclusive privileges, as for ex- ample, the exclusive right to run omnibuses within the corporate limits. Logan v. Pyne, 43 Iowa, 524. This subject is considered in other sections. Sec. 190 et seq., supra. National Banks cannot be licensed by ordinance. Carthage V. First Nat. Bank, 71 Mo., 508; 36 Am. Rep., 494; Macon v. First Nat. Bank, 59 Ga., 648; Second Nat. Bk. V. Caldwell, 13 Fed. Rep., 429; Nat. Bk. V. Mayor, etc., 8 Heisk. (Tenn.), 814. Exemptions. A municipal cor- poration has no inherent power to exempt from license. Such power is incident to sovereignty. Thomas V. Snead, 99 Va., 613; 39 S. E. Rep., 586. 28 New Orleans v. Philippi, 9 La. Ann., 44, 46. For construction of Illinois con- stitution, as to enumeration, see Price V. People, 193 111., 114; 55 L. R. A., 588; 61 N. E. Rep., 844. 29 Independence v. Cleveland, 167 Mo., 384; 67 S. W. Rep., 216; State V. Schuchmann, 133 Mo., Ill; 33 S. W. Rep., 35; 34 S. W. Rep., 842; St. Louis v. Bowler, 94 Mo., 630, 633; 7 S. W. Rep., 434; State ex rel. Bersch, 83 Mo. App., 657. 614 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§406 police regulations of the corporation.^" And under a general provision that the corporation may collect a tax on all subjects of taxation, which is followed by a specific enumeration of polls, real estate and personal property as subjects of taxation, and no enumeration is made of a tax on merchants, drummers of other occupations, it was held that the town had no power to levy a tax on trades or occupations.^^ So charter authority "to tax or entirely suppress all petty grocers," does not con- fer power to grant licenses for retailing.^^ § 406. Power "to regulate" as power to license. Ordinarily the power to tax for revenue will not be implied from a general grant of authority, as power "to regulate," or "to license and regulate. "3* Thus power "to regulate and tax taverns and 30 Knox City v. Thompson, 19 Mo. App., 523. Under power given to pass such ordinances as are necessary for the government and welfare of the city, a license tax on places main- tained for amusement is not au- thorized. Carbondale v. Vail, 2 Del. Co. Ct. R., 387. The power to exercise must be conferred. Joplin v. Leckie, 78 Mo. App., 8. Enumeration of occupations. St. Joseph v. Lung, 93 Mo. App., 626; 67 S. W. Rep., 697. A city cannot Impose a license tax on any business, avocations or calling, unless the same be espe- cially named as taxable in its char- ter, or in state statute applicable. R. S., 1889, sec. 1900; Kansas City V. Grush, 151 Mo., 128; 52 S. W. Rep., 286; Kansas City v. Lorber, 64 Mo. App., 604. But the maxim, "expressio unius est exclusio al- terius," is not to be so applied that the city cannot tax any calling not enumerated by its specific name. St. Louis V. Herthel, 88 Mo., 128, 130. The concluding words "all occupations, professions and trades not heretofore enumerated, of whatever name or character," are so very comprehensive^ that the rule of ejusdem generis need not be invoked. St. Louis v. Bowler, 94 Mo., 630, 633; 7 S. W. Rep., 434. siLatta V. Williams, 87 N. C, 126. 32 "The word 'license' is used in this section of the charter in re- gard to other, subjects, but is dropped when the subject is touched, and the word is again re- sumed in relation to other sub- jects; and hence we must conclude that the power to license was in- tended by the charter to be con- fined to the several subjects, and to those only, which are specifically named." Leonard v. Canton, 35 Miss., 189. Where one pays such license he may recover it as for money had and received. Leonard v. Canton, 35 Miss., 189. Rules of construction of munic- ipal powers. Sees. 48 to 52, supra. 33 St. Louis V. Western Union Tel. Co., 39 Fed. Rep., 59; Ottumwa V. Zekind, 95 Iowa, 622; 64 N. W. Rep., 646; 58 Am. St. Rep., 447; 29 L. R. A., 734; Burlington v. Putnam Ins. Co., 31 Iowa, 102; State V. Smith, 67 Conn., 541; 35 Atl. Rep., 506; 52 Am. St. Rep., i406] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 615 houses for the public entertainment" has been held to confer no authority to license taverns for revenue.^"' So power to regulate omnibuses, stage coaches, etc., gives no authority to license as a means of raising revenue.*^ So power to make regulations as to hucksters, etc., does not include the power to exact a license for revenue purposes.^® But many cases have invoked a more liberal construction and sustained license fees under the power to regulate which were levied in part for rev- enue.^'' The distinctions elsewhere pointed out between the exercise of power to tax and police regulations are to be ob- served. Where the license is intended to serve as a means of raising revenue it is usually construed as a tax on the business or occupation itself, but where it is intended to serve as a regu- lation merely it will be usually construed as a police regulation and if the amount required to be paid is reasonable and does not exceed the sum necessary to pay for the granting of the license it will be sustained. However, the cases present some lack of harmony in view of the fact that they constitute con- 301; North Hudson Ry. Co. v. Hoboken, 41 N. J. L., 71, 78; Ex parte Graza, 28 Tex. App., 381; 13 S. W. Rep., 779; 19 Am. St. Rep., 845. Construction of power "to regu- late." Sec. 51, supra. 34 Burlington v. Bumgardner, 42 Iowa, 673. Contra. Under power given by a village charter to regulate vic- tualing shops, it was held that the power to license was conferred. St. Johnsbury v. Thompson, 59 Vt., 300; 9 Atl. Rep., 571; 59 Am. Rep., 731. 35 Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 Cush. (Mass.), 562, 572; Boston v. Schaffer, 9 Pick. (Mass.), 415; Charleston v. Pepper, 1 Rich. Law (S. C), 364. 36 Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow- an (N. Y.), 462, 466. 37 Kinsley v. Chicago, 124 111., 359; 16 N. E. Rep., 260; Dennehy V. Chicago, 120 111., 627; 12 N. E. Rep., 227; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Bast St. Louis, 102 111., 560. When power to license and regu- late occupations may be exercised for revenue. San Jose v. S. J. & S. C. Ry. Co., 53 Cal., 475; Ex parte Frank, 52 Cal., 606; Charity Hos- pital V. Stickney, 2 La. Ann., 550; Boston V. Schaffer, 9 Pick. (Mass.), 415; Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15 Ohio, 625, 644. Under the power to regulate, the city may license and charge a rea- sonable fee, but not for revenue. Ft. Smith V. Ayers, 43 Ark., 82. The power to regulate the sale of an article includes the power to require a license to authorize the sale thereof. Gundling v. Chicago, 176 111, 340; 52 N. E. Rep., 44; 48 L. R. A., 230; Farwell v. Chicago, 71 111., 269; Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass., 375; 19 N. E. Rep., 224; 2 L. R. A., 142; 12 Am. St. Rep., 566. So the requiring of a license for the sale of an article is a legiti- mate means of regulating its sale. Chicago Packing & P. Co. v. Chi- cago, 88 111., 221. 616 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§407 structions of particular charter provisions, and are oftentimes the result of the legislative policy of the particular state.^* Illustrations appear from the cases in the note.*^ §407. Power "to regulate" as power to prohibit. The power "to regulate" is not usually construed as conferring power to prohibit, unless in exceptional cases where it is neces- sary to be exercised as a police power, in order to preserve the public health or morals. The power of prohibition cannot be 38 United States — ^The Laundry- License Case, 22 Fed. Rep., 701. Arkansas — Russellville v. White, 41 Ark., 485. Minnesota — St. Paul v. Traeger, 25 Minn., 248. Ohio — Marmet v. State, 45 Ohio St., 63; 12 N. B. Rep., 463; Cin- cinnati V. Bryson, 15 Ohio, 625; Cincinnati v. Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 257, 261. Wisconsin — Fire Department v. Helfenstein, 16 Wis., 136. Cost op License. Under the power to regulate the city may re- quire the payment of a fee from those who engage in the business regulated, such as will cover the labor and expense of issuing such license. St. Paul v. Dow, 37 Minn., 20; 32 N. W. Rep., 860; 5 Am. St. Rep., 811. 39 Inspection and Regulate. Under power given the city to pro- vide for the inspection and to reg- ulate the sale of meats, power to tax for revenue the occupation of selling them is not given, but such fees and charges as are necessary to cover the cost of inspection and police supervision may be imposed. Jacksonville v. Ledwith, 26 Fla., 163; 7 So. Rep., 885; 23 Am. St. Rep., 558; 9 L. R. A., 69. Amusements. Power to license, regulate and restrain amusements authorizes the requirement of the payment of a named sum for the privilege. Hodges v. Nashville, 2 Humph.. (Tenn.), 61; Boston v. SchafEer, 9 Pick. (Mass.), 415. Packing Houses. In the exer- cise of the power conferred upon cities to direct the location and regulate the management of pack- ing houses, the city may license such establishments, as one means of regulating them. Chicago Pack- ing and Provision Co. v. Chicago, 88 111., 221. BiLLiAKD Tables. In the exer- cise of the power granted "to sup- press and restrain billiard tables," the city has power to license the same, under proper conditions. Smith V. Madison, 7 Ind., 86; Bur- lington V. Lawrence, 42 Iowa, 681; In re Snell, 58 Vt., 207; 1 Atl. Rep., 566; Winooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt., 282. Peekies. Power "to regulate fer- ries" does not confer power to pro- hibit without license is obtained. Duckwall v. New Albany, 25 lad., 283. Markets. Power to regulate gives authority to impose a license fee as reasonable compensation for the expense of regulation. Atkins V. Phillips, 26 Fla., 281; 8 So. Rep., 429; 10 L. R. A., 158; Kinsley v. Chicago, 124 111., 359; 16 N. E. Rep., 260; Ash v. People, 11 Mich., 347. License to sell hay denied. Kip V. Paterson, 26 N. J. L., 298. Sale of milk cannot be licensed, when. State v. Smith, 67 Conn., 1 408] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 617 used to suppress useful occupations.*'' Thus an exorbitant li- cense cannot be required which amounts in effect to a prohibi- tion of the business.*^ In other words, the license cannot be so high as to destroy the business.*^ The license tax "must be reasonable, ' ' considering the nature of the business and not so high as to prohibit the carrying on of the business.** §408. Distinction between license to reflate and tax to raise revenue. The distinction between a license fee, or a li- cense ' ' to regulate, ' ' and a tax imposed for the purpose of rev- enue is not always clearly made in the statutes and ordinances providing therefor, and in judicial utterances.** The nature of 541; 35 Atl. Rep., 506; 52 Am. St. Rep., 301. In the exercise of the power given by the charter "to establish public markets and other public buildings, and make rules and reg- ulations for the government of the same," etc., it was held that an ordinance which prohibited every farmer, gardener or person produc- ing vegetables, from selling the same in and along the street, with- out first procuring an annual license and paying therefor the sum of $25.00, was void. St. Paul V. Traeger, 25 Minn., 248. Saloons. Power to restrain, prohibit and suppress, confers power to license. Mt. Carmel v. Wabash County, 50 111., 69; Em- poria V. Volmer, 12 Kan., 622, 630, per Brewer, J.; Keokuk v. Dressell, 47 Iowa, 597. Laundries. Power to "control and regulate" wash houses and public laundries confers authority to license. In re Wan Yin, 22 Fed. Rep., 701. Draymen, Hackmen, Etc. Power "to license, tax and regulate," etc., gives authority to license. Joyce V. East St. Louis, 77 111., 156; Far- well V. Chicago, 71 111., 269; Ex parte Gregory, 20 Tex. App., 210; 54 Am. Rep., 516. Hotel Dkummeks. General pow- er confers authority to license as a means of regulating. Fayette- ville V. Carter, 52 Ark., 301; 12 S. W. Rep., 73; 6 L. R. A., 509. Plumbers. Power to license de- nied. Wilkie V. Chicago, 188 111., 444; 58 N. E. Rep., 1004; 80 Am. St. Rep., 182. ioin, re Quong Woo, 13 Fed. Rep., 229. Municipal corporations have not the power under the usual pro- visions to levy and collect licenses and taxes on businesses and pro- fessions, to impose upon a useful and legitimate business (as lend- ing money on household and kitchen furniture and wearing ap- parel) a prohibitory tax. Morton V. Macon, 111 Ga., 162; 36 S. E. Rep., 627. *i Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala., 461. 42 Lyons v. Cooper, 39 Kan., 324; 18 Pac. Rep., 296. 43 Caldwell v. Lincoln, 19 Neb., 569; 27 N. W. Rep., 647. see sec. 418, post. 4* Quartlebaum v. State, 79 Ala., 1;" Paton v. People, 1 Colo., 77; Wiley V. Owens, 39 Ind., 429. All License Fees Regarded as a Tax. Santa Barbara v. Stearns, 51 Cal., 499; State v. Citizens' Bank, 52 La. Ann., 1086; 27 So. Rep., 709. License tax upon a lottery and 618 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§408 the grant of power to enact the ordinance and the purpose of the enactment will generally determine the precise character of the exaction.*^ The license fee or tax is imposed by virtue of delegated power, sometimes as an exercise of the police power alone, sometimes solely for revenue purposes and some- times for both objeets.*^ The license is the authority to con- duct the business or pursue the calling; the right conferred by the public agency which renders the pursuit lawful, and without which it would be unlawful. The law exacting the license, when observed, legalizes the conduct of the business or practice of the professiqn and constitutes a non-observance an illegal act. The various methods of delegating the power, as evidenced by municipal charters, and the somewhat diver- occupations, held to be a tax. The court said, "That a license is a tax, is too palpable for discussion, and comes within the terms of the law, unless there is something in the idea that it is a political or police regulation intended to pre- serve, maintain and regulate the lottery system." Lucas v. Lottery Comms., 11 Gill & Johns (Md.), 490, 506. When levied for revenue alone, license fees are taxes. Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. (U. S.), 418; St. Louis V. Spiegel, 75 Mo., 145; Wilmington v. Macks, 86 N. C, 88; Lightburne v. Taxing Dist., 4 Lea (Tenn.), 219; Ould v. Richmond, 23 Graft (Va.), 464. *5 Where the power to license ■ has been granted, in order to de- termine whether it is given for the purpose of revenue or for reg- ulation alone, the terms of the grant must be examined, and if there is nothing in the grant which indicates with certainty that it was given for the purpose of raising revenue, it will be con- strued to be given for the purpose of regulation. Kniper v. Louis- ville, 7 Bush. (Ky.), 599; St. Louis V. Boatmen's Ins. & Trust Co., 47 Mo., 150; Gettysburg v. Zeigler, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep., 326. ^6 Hogan V. Indianapolis (Ind., 1902), 65 N. E. Rep., 525; Roch- ester V. Upman, 19 Minn., 108. Revenue. Power to levy and col- lect a "license tax" on specified occupations "was designed for pur- poses of revenue rather than po- lice regulation." Fretwell v. Troy, 18 Kan., 271; Lamar v. Adams, 90 Mo. App., 35. An ordinance having no provis- ions of regulation, held to be a tax ordinance, designed to raise reve- nue. State ex rel. v. Boyd, 63 Neb., 829; 89 N. W. Rep., 417. A license when imposed for rev- enue is not a police regulation but a tax, and can only be upheld under the power of taxation. Kan- sas City V. Corrigan, 18 Mo. App., 206. Police Regulations. Under the charter provision giving a city power to pass ordinances for the good government of the city, and among other things "to grant license to and regulate auctions and auctioneers," the power is con- ferred to license only as a police regulation, not for purposes of revenue, and a license of $300 was held to be unreasonable as a police regulation. Mankato v. Fowler, 32 Minn., 364; 20 N. W. Rep., 361. § 408] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 619 gent judicial views respecting the necessity of police regulation of certain occupations, has resulted in some confusion in judi- cial expressions, as well as apparent or real conflict in the de- cisions. The cases on this subject are numerous, but a large majority of them are chiefly of local application. The general statement is often made that occupation taxes are imposed for revenue and license taxes or fees for police regulation. When imposed for the latter purpose the rule generally obtains that the amount demanded should be reason- able and not in excess of the sum required for issuing the li- cense providing necessary or desirable police regulations.*^ Express charter power confers authority to exact a license tax from those pursuing useful occupations, avocations or profes- sions within the corporate limits, which are in themselves bene- ficial to the community. Accurately speaking, it would seem that this should be regarded as a tax. However, it is often spoken of as a "license" or "privilege" for carrying on the business. Undoubtedly such fee is collected for the purpose of revenue, but where . a money payment is exacted for the privilege of pursuing occupations, looked upon as more or less injurious to society or which require careful police supervision (as the liquor traffic, theaters, dance houses, certain kinds of amusements, as circuses and the like) or trades which may become detrimental to health or become public nuisances (as slaughter houses, bone and rendering factories, garbage reduc- tion plants, stone quarries, dairies and cow stables, laundries, wash houses and dyeing establishments), this is usually desig- nated a license tax levied by virtue of the police power. In construing the power to levy such exactions courts are usually quite liberal. If charter power exists in such cases, the exac- tion may be made both for revenue and police protection, but if it is levied by virtue of general power, as power "to regu- late," or under the general welfare clause, the amount, as stated, must not exceed what is reasonably required for police protectionj** A city cannot in the exercise A license to sell liquor is not a of its police power levy a tax. tax nor is It governed by the rate Pitts V. Vicksburg, 72 Miss., 181; of uniformity required in levying 16 So. Rep., 418. taxes. Bast St. Louis v. Wehrung, A license to authorize the re- 46 111., 392. tailing of spirituous liquors held *7 gee. 418, post. to be a police regulation. Ea; parte *8 License foe Revenue, and Li- Marshall, 64 Ala., 266. cense for Police Regulation. 620 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§409 § 409. License taxes distinguished from general taxes. Gen- erally speaking, the power to license is a police power, but the exaction of license fees for revenue purposes is the exercise of the power of taxation.*^ A license tax is not a tax upon prop- erty, but is a burden imposed for the right to exercise a fran- chise or privilege, which could be withheld or forbidden alto- gether,5<* and the sum to be charged is merely used as a mode of computing the amount to be paid for the exercise of the privilege.^i Thus an ordinance which imposes a license fee of twenty-five cents per wagon, and an additional license tax of two dollars for each six months is, as a matter of law, an ordi- nance for revenue purposes.^^ < ' ^he imposition of a license tax is in the nature of a sale of a benefit, or privilege, to a party who would not otherwise be entitled to the same. The imposi- tion of an ordinary tax is in the nature of a requisition of a contribution from that which the party taxed already right- fully possesses in the state. "^^ "A tax is a rate or sum of money assessed on the person, property, etc., of the citizen, while a license confers a privilege, and makes the doing of something legal, which, if done without it, would be illegal. ' ' ^* "The distinction between the pow- To justify a license fee for po- er to license, as a police regulation, lice protection alone the regulation and the same power when con- ferred for revenue purpose, is of the utmost importance. If the power be granted with a view of revenue, the amount of the tax, if not limited by the charter, is left to the discretion and judgment of the municipal authorities, but if it be given as a police power for regulation merely, a much nar- rower construction is adopted; the power must then be exercised as a means of regulation, and cannot be used as a source of revenue." North Hudson County Ry. Co. v. Hoboken, 41 N. J. L., 71, 81. A reasonable license fee should be intended to cover the expense of issuing it, and services of officers and other expenses directly or in- directly imposed. Unless the amount is manifestly unreasonable the court will not adjudge it a tax. Mankato v. Fowler, 32 Minn., 364; 20 N. W. Rep., 361. must be directed against a business or practice which is of itself harm- ful or in some manner injuriously affects the peace, good order, health, morals or safety of society. Such will be sustained to regulate property or persons engaged in interstate and foreign commerce. Sec. 260, supra. *9 North Hudson County Ry. Co. V. Hoboken, 41 N. J. L., 71. 50 Savannah v. Charlton, 36 Ga., 460; Wilkie v. Chicago, 188 111., 444; 58 N. E. Rep., 1004; 80 Am. St. Rep., 182. 51 People V. Thurber, 13 111., 554, 557. 52 Knox City v. Thompson, 19 Mo. App., 523; St. Louis v. Green, 7 Mo. App., 468; St. Louis v. Boat- men's Ins. & Trust Co., 47 Mo., 151. 53 Leavenworth v. Booth, 15 Kan., 627. 5* Savannah v. Charlton, 36 Ga., 460. § 410] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 621 "Where a municipal corporation has power to prohibit the do- ing of a thing, and also the power to license the same thing to be done, the license fee demanded by ordinance for the do- ing of such thing is not a tax, but is a price paid for the priv- ilege of doing such thing. "^^ "The object of a license is to confer a right that does not exist without a license, and conse- quently a power to license involves, in the exercise of it, a power to prohibit under a pain or penalty without a license. ' '^® A license tax within the meaning of the constitution is not a burden on property, but on that which results from its enjoy- ment, or the conduct of the business or calling.^^ The imposi- tion of a tax upon a trade, occupation or profession cannot be made to operate as a tax upon the personal property used in, or as the instrumentality of such trade, occupation or profes- sion. If a license tax is imposed upon a business it must be in addition to, and not in lieu of, an ad valorem tax upon the property employed in the business.^* The constitutional pro- vision requiring that property shall be assessed at its true value, does not apply to license fees for the privilege of trans- acting business, although such power be exercised for revenue purposes.^* § 410. License tax as a contract. A municipal occupation license tax is not a contract within the protection of the fed- eral or state constitution. "A license tax, as such, does not 55 Craw V. Tolono, 96 111., 255, 59 Johnson v. Asbury Park, 58 N. 261. J. L., 604; 33 Atl., 850; Informa- 66 Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich., tion v. Oliver, 21 S. C, 318; 53 Am. 43 Rep., 681; Adams v. Somerville, 39 License Tax distinguished from ^enn. (2 Head), 363. general tax. A license is not a ^ P^"" <=e°t on receipts of pre- .. ..^ 4. , „„„„„ ^f miums or insurance policies re- tax m the constitutional sense of . , , , . , , . ., . . Tj, 4. £34. T ,•„ -^ -aTay. Quirod to bo paid by insurance that term. East St. Louis v. weh- ^ ^ ^ . in T,i ono agents of foreign companies, was rung, 46 111., 392. - i.,j4.4,,4.\,4. held not to be a tax, but a sum 57 Levi V. Louisville, 97 Ky., 394; p^.^ ^^^ ^ ^^^^^^^ ^^ ^^.^^^^^^ ^^^ 30 S. W. Rep., 973; 28 ^.. R. A., 480. business. Walker v. Springfield, 58 Levi V. Louisville, 97 Ky., 394; 94 m.^ 334; Ducat v. Chicago, 48 30 S. W. Rep., 973; 28 L. R. A., 480. m., 172; Illinois Mutual Fire In- An ordinance which requires surance Co. v. Peoria, 29 111., 180; that persons shall take out a sepa- People v. Thurber, 13 111., 554. rate license for each place where Occupation Tax. Under power business is carried on at different to impose an occupation license places in the city, held valid. Rohr tax, authority to use it as a mode V. Gray, 80 Md., 274; 30 Atl., 632. of taxation for revenue is not 632 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§412 create any contract right."*"* Under the police power certain occupations may be prohibited during the term for which they are licensed.^i Although a license is a privilege, yet it has been held that it is equivalent to a contract right to the extent that it cannot be abrogated at any time without sufficient cause.''^ § 411. License for municipal purpose. Laws relating to li- cense taxes on persons engaged in trades, businesses or profes- sions within the particular corporation are regulations of purely municipal character, but, as considered elsewhere, pro- visions requiring commercial agents in offering merchandise for sale by sample, to take out and pay such license, is a regu- lation of interstate commerce, so far as applicable to persons soliciting the sale of goods on behalf of individuals or firms doing business between the states,^^ and it is not within the constitutional power of Congress to delegate such authority, for example, to the District of Columbia, for it is not a munici- pal purpose.^* §412. Power to license non-residents. An occupation tax given. State v. Bean, 91 N. C, 554. Authority in the charter to li- cense particular employments does not confer power to tax such em- ployments for revenue purposes. St. Louis V. Boatmen's Ins. & Trust Co., 47 Mo., 150. Permit to Tap Sewers. A munic- ipal corporation may hy general rules, independent of its general taxing power, regulate the use of sewers and fix the price at which any private person may tap them. Fisher v. Harrisburg, 2 Grant's Cas. (Pa.), 291, 296. License Permit to Build Vault. Under the charter power to regu- late the building of vaults, etc., an ordinance requiring that appli- cants shall be assessed a certain amount for the privilege of build- ing vaults in front of their dwell- ings, was held to be without au- thority and void, and not within the usual police powers given the city. State (Benson) v. Hoboken, 33 N. J. L., 280. 60 Bishoff V. Tampa Waterworks Co. (Pla,, 1901), 30 So. Rep., 808. 61 But whether the city may not then be under a duty to return the license fee is left an open question. St. Charles v. Hackman, 133 Mo., 634; 34 S. W. Rep., 878. 62 State ex rel. Shaw v. Baker, 32 Mo. App., 98; Hannibal v. Guy- ott, 18 Mo., 515; McElhany v. Mc- Henry, 26 Mo., 174. Transfer or License. A license to erect and maintain a stationary engine was held to be transferable to another company to whom the business and property was trans- ferred. Quinn v. Middlesex Elec. Light Co., 140 Mass., 109; 3 N. E. Rep., 204. 63 Sec. 253, et seq., supra. 64 Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S., 141, 144. "Municipal" has been defined to be that which belongs to a corpor- ation or city, and to include the rules by which a particular dis- trict, community or nation, is gov- erned. It may also mean local. § 412] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 6^3- may h_e imposed on a noii-resident."^^ General power to make by-laws, rules and ordinances respecting streets, lanes, car- riages, wagons, carts, drays, etc., as deemed expedient and necessary, is wide enough to authorize an ordinance providing that a non-resident who employs a wagon for hire within the city shall take out a license.®® But under a charter confining the taxing power (1) to inhabitants of the corporation (2) to taxable property within the corporate limits of non-residents, and (3) to income of non-residents from professions carried on in the city, a license by ordinance on carriages, horses and drivers of non-residents, used in going to and from their places of business in the city is void.®'^ So under charter power "to levy and collect a license tax on * * * attorneys at law residing in such city, ' ' an ordinance cannot legally levy such tax upon attorneys having offices in the city, and doing business therein, but who do not reside there. "As to some persons, the locality of their business in the city determines whether they are to be taxed, or not ; as to wagons and other vehicles, their use for pay in the city, determines whether they are to be taxed or not, but as to attorneys at law and physicians, their resi- dence in or out of the city determines whether they are to be taxed or not. ' ' ®® Under a law giving a municipal corporation power to direct the location and regulate the management and particular, independent. Horton v. es Charleston v. Pepper, 1 Rich. Mobile School, 43 Ala., 598, 607. Law (S. C), 364, 367. So it has been described as "an yot use of streets with vehicles. agency for carrying out a part of Mason v. Cumberland, 92 Md., 451; the administrative duties of the 43 ^tl. Rep., 136. city," as commissioners to fill up ,j,^^ ^^ non-resident wagons certain slough ponds of city. St. jj^uUng in and out of city, held Louis v. Shields, 62 Mo., 247, 251. .^^^^j^ g^ Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo., 85 Gunn V. Macon, 84 Ga., 365 ; ^22 10 S. B. Rep., 972 Member of a commercial firm Ordinance license applied to non- ^ . . ., 04. 4.„ „ resident butcher, doing business in doing business in city. State v. ., „^ ^ , ,„.„ . „ , ^ „ , . noo city. State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Houghton, 6 La. Ann., 783. ' ,0 n ^ coo „.,'_.., ,. V • „r. Charleston,- 2 Speers (S. C.),623. Resident of city whose business is outside of limits is not subject License on wagon of non-resi- to license tax. Bates v. Mobile, dent butcher, sustained. Prommer 46 Ala 158 ^- I^ichmond, 31 Gratt (Va.), 646; Non-resident of state, "agent" 31 Am. Rep., 746. construed. Stewart v. Kehrer, 115 67 state ex rel. Adger v. Charles- Ga., 184; 41 S. B. Rep., 680. ton, 2 Speers (S. C), 719. License applies to all who pack es Garden City v. Abbott, 34 and ship fish. Bdenton v. Cape- Kan., 283, 284; 8 Pac. Rep., 473. heart, 71 N. C, 156. 624 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§ 413 construction of packing houses, etc., within its limits and to a specified distance beyond, and as one means of regulation, to license such establishments, it has been held, the fact that a packing house has been licensed by a town where it is located, but within the prescribed limits of the city, does not exempt the same from an ordinance of that city requiring it to pay a license to that municipality. Both the city and town may ex- ercise the license power over the establishment.^^ As a rule, all ordinances operate upon all property within the corporate limits,'^*' and the rule generally applies to license taxes ■^'^- how- ever, where such exactions interfere with or attempt to regu- late interstate or foreign commerce, the levy and collection of them will be condemned as unconstitutional.^^ § 413. License tax to be levied by ordinajice. The general rule is that the power of a municipal corporation to license can be exercised only by ordinance and not by resolution. The nature of the subject requires legislation of a permanent char- acter. Thus where the power to license is conferred in gen- eral terms the license and the amount thereof must be imposed by ordinanee.'^^ Failure to fix the amount in the ordinance cannot be remedied by resolution or motion, for the general rule is that an ordinance cannot be amended, repealed or sus- pended by mere resolution.^* It has been held to be a sufficient observance of the charter to provide by ordinance that there shall "be levied on every license granted" such sum as the council may, by resolution, declare from time to time.'^^ The 69 Chicago, P. & P. Co. v. Chi- 644 ; 30 S. W. Rep., 745. Sees. 2 cage, 88 111., 221; 30 Am. Rep., 545; to 5, suvra. Albia V. O'Harra, 64 Iowa, 297; 20 '* People ex rel. Conlon v. Mount, N. W. Rep., 444. 186 111., 560; 58 N. E. Rep., 360. Licensing heyond corporate liro- Sec. 210, supra; sec. 427, post. its. Van Hook v. Selma, 70 Ala., " Burlington v. Putnam Ins. Co., 361; 45 Am. Rep., 85; Emerich v. 31 Iowa, 102. Indianapolis, 118 Ind., 279; 20 N. License fee may be fixed by reso- B. Rep. 795. lution, under general ordinance im- To Sec. 24, supro. P°**''S ^^^ ^''=®''^^- ^rkadelphia Lumber Co. v. Arkadelphia, 56 71 Sec. 25, supra. ^^^ ^ 3^^. ^g g y^ ^^^^ ^^^g T2 Sec. 253, et seq., supra. one council cannot, by ordi- Peddlers and itinerant vendors, nance, bind its successors to a Sec. 256, supra. given line of policy, or prevent free 78 People ex rel. v. Mount, 186 legislation by them in matters of 111., 560; 58 N. E. Rep., 360; Mem- municipal government. So an or- phis V. Bing, 94 Tenn. (10 Pickle), finance that no license to retail- liquor should be granted for less §414] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 625 ordinance should specify who shall issue the licenses, the length of time they shall run, the sum to be paid by the applicant, the time and manner of payment. A resolution simply fixing the amount to be paid and the time of payment is not sufficient.''^ § 414. Delegation of power to license forbidden. The rule that powers vested in particular officers, boards or councils cannot be delegated,^^ applies with full force to the exercise of the power of granting license, etc.''* The exercise of this power involves the necessity of determining with reasonable certainty both the extent ajid duration of the license and the amount of money to be paid therefor. Under most charters, the power must be exercised exclusively by the legislative au- thority and cannot be delegated, in whole or in part, to any other person or authority whatever. The ordinance should pro- vide all of the terms under which the license is to be issued and prescribe a_ uniform rule applicable to all of the class to which it is intended to apply, without discrimination, or dele- gation of power to the officer or board empowered to receive and pass upon the application which will permit unreasonable discrimination. Thus an ordinance requiring a license for car- rying on the business of roller skating which provides that the license shall be issued upon the payment into the city treasury of a specified sum, "as the mayor or common council shall de- termine in each particular case," is void, as conferring upon the mayor or council discretion to fix the fee.''® So an ordi- nance permitting the licensee to determine the time that the license will be in force is void.^" So an ordinance, regulating peddling, and delegating to the mayor the power to fix the than $500 per annum until the out approval of mayor, held void, expiration of those for which that Eichenlaub v. St. Joseph, 113 Mo., sum was paid, was void. Williams 393; 21 S. W. Rep., 8; 18 L. R. A., V. "West Point, 68 Ga., 816. 590. Where the price of a license to Immaterial defect in title of or- sell liquor has been lowered before dinance does not invalidate it. the one held by a dealer has ex- Morgan v. State (Neb., 1902), 90 pired, he cannot repudiate the li- N. W. Rep., 108. cense and recover the amount paid 77 See sec. 84, et seq., supra. for it. Williams V. West Point, 68 Js state v. Fiske, 9 R. I., 94; Ga., 816. Hennepin County v. Robinson, 16 76 People V. Crotty, 93 111., 180; Minn., 381. Quincy v. Bull, 106 111., 337, affirm- 79 Bills v. Goshen, 117 Ind., 221; ing Bull V. Quincy, 9 111. App., 127. 20 N. E. Rep., 115; 3 L. R. A., 261. Permit to erect a wooden build- so Darling v. St. Paul, 19 Minn., ing, by resolution of council, with- 389, 392. 40 626 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§ 414 license at not less than one dollar nor more than one hundred dollars for six months, is an illegal delegation of power and is void.^i But an ordinance providing that the mayor shall issue the license, conferring upon him no discretion, is not an illegal delegation of power .^^ go it is not an unlawful delega- tion of power to grant the license where the council by ordi- nance grants license to a class of persons upon certain condi- tions and authorizes the mayor to issue the license when the conditions for its issue have been duly observed.*^ So an ordi- nance providing for licensing drivers of carts and wagons . which vested the power of license in the mayor and board of aldermen, after describing the persons to whom the license should be granted, added "to such persons as the mayor may deem proper, ' ' was held not invalid as a delegation of power.®* So an ordinance which requires the application for the license to be indorsed by five persons, where, under the law the mayor, president of the council and chief of police pass upon the ap- plicant 's moral character, is valid, since the provision only re- lates to the mode of applying for the license.^^ But similar ordinances have been condemned. Thus an ordinance permit- ting the board of aldermen to exercise discretion in granting or refusing the permit for the erection of a building within a fire district was held void.*^ And where permission to erect a slaughter house or dairy was required by the council the regu- lation was held void.®'^ 81 state Center v. Barenstein, 66 si Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 N. Y., Iowa, 249; 23 N. W. Rep., 652; 591. Trenton v. Clayton, 50 Mo. App., An ordinance passed under 535. power given by charter to make But see Decorak v. Dustan Bros., laws licensing and regulating 38 Iowa, 96, where an ordinance hackney carriages, carts and other authorizing the mayor to fix the vehicles, giving to the mayor and amount of license for auction sales board of aldermen power to grant within a specified sum was held license in their discretion, and giv- valid. In re Christensen, 43 Fed. ing to the mayor power to revoke Rep., 243. any license so granted was held to 82 Bradley v. Rochester, 54 Hun. be valid. Child v. Bemus, 17 R. I., (N. Y.), 140; 7 N. Y. Suppl., 237; 230; 21 Atl. Rep., 539; 12 L. R. A., Commonwealth v. Sotkley, 12 57. Contra held in State v. Fiske, Phila. (Pa.), 316; State v. Redmon, 9 R. I., 94. 43 Minn., 250; 45 N. W. Rep., 232. ss in re Bickerstaff, 70 Cal., 35; 83 Gundling v. Chicago, 176 111., 11 Pac. Rep., 393. 340,; 52 N. E. Rep., 44; 48 L. R. so Newton v. Belger, 143 Mass.; A., 230; Swarth v. People, 109 111., 598; 10 N. E. Rep., 464. 621. 87 Slaughter house. Barthet v. §416] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 627 § 415. Same— Consent of property owners. An ordinance of the City of St. Louis requiring any person desiring to erect a livery stable, before a building permit will be granted him, to obtain in writing the consent of owners of one-half the ground in the block, was declared invalid, since it makes the issue of the permit depend upon the consent of the property owners, and is a delegation of the power to issue the permit.*^ Similar ordinances in force in Chicago have been sustained in Illinois.*^ A law requiring the granting of a liquor license on a petition of a majority of the legal voters is void where the power to grant the license is vested in certain officials.^" But the Supreme Court of Illinois sustained an ordinance adopted in Chicago which required the consent of two-thirds of the freeholders of a block in which there was no saloon, before a license to keep such saloon in the block should be issued.®^ An ordinance which required recommendations of not less than ten citizens and taxpayers in the block in which a laundry is proposed to be established was condemned as a delegation of power, or as making the exercise of the power depend upon the consent of others.®^ § 416. Same— Permit to parade streets. In Illinois an ordi- New Orleans, 24 Fed. Rep., 563. 28; Klnmundy v. Mahan, 72 III., Dairy. State v. Mahner, 43 La. 462; In re Wilson, 32 Minn., 145; Ann., 496; 9 So. Rep., 480. 19 N. W. Rep., 723. Ordinance requiring mayor to ss gt. Louis v. Russell, 116 Mo., give permission to use steam boil- 248; 22 S. W. Rep., 470; 20 L. R. ers, held void. Baltimore v. A., 721. Hadecke, 49 Md., 217. This case in effect overrules Delegating to board of engineers State v. Beattie, 16 Mo. App., 131. power to examine as to qualifica- See also Chillicothe v. Brown, 38 tion to act as stationary engineer Mo. App., 609, and Kansas City v. and to grant licenses, held proper Cook, 38 Mo. App., 660, where police regulation. St. Louis v. State v. Beattie was cited and ap- Meyrose Lamp Mfg. Co., 139 Mo., proved. 560; 41 S. W. Rep., 244; 61 Am. so Sees. 86 and 87, supra; sec. St. Rep., 474. 450, post. License of plumbers to water so Jones v. Hilliard, 69 Ala., 300; company. Franke v. Paducah Groesch v. State, 42 Ind., 547; Water Supply Co., 88 Ky., 46T; 11 House v. State, 41 Miss., 737. S. W. Rep., 432, 718 ; 4 L. R. A., 9i Martens v. People ex rel., 186 265. 111., 314; 57 N. E. Rep., 871, rely- Permit to remove building. Day ing on Chicago v. Stratton, 162 V. Green, 4 Cush. (58 Mass.), 433. 111., 494; 44 N. B. Rep., 853; 35 L. Liquor license as delegation. R. A., 84. East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 50 111., 92 In re Quong Woo, 13 Fed., 229. G28 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§416 nance of Chicago which delegated to the police department the power to grant permits for parades and processions was de- clared void, as a delegation of the legislative power of granting or refusing the permit.®^ In Michigan an ordinance prohibit- ing any person or association or organization from marching, parading or driving, in or upon its streets, with musical instru- ments, etc., without having obtained the consent of the mayor or common council, was held void. The court said : ' ' This by- law is unreasonable because it suppresses what is in general perfectly lawful, and because it leaves the power of permitting or restraining processions and their course to an unregulated official discretion, when the whole matter, if regulated at all, must be by permanent legal provisions operating generally and impartially. " "* In Kansas a similar ordinance prohibiting pa- rades and processions without consent of the mayor or other designated officer was held void. The conditions of the ordi- nance were such that it did not operate upon all of the same class alike, and, moreover, it delegated the issuing of the permit to an unregulated official discretion.^s In Massachusetts, under sufficient legislative authority, it has been held that the city council of Boston had power to delegate to the board of police the authority to adopt rules for the regulation of itinerant mu- sicians in the streets and public places within the corporate limits and under such delegation the police board could re- quire the taking out of a license for which a small fee must be paid for the privilege of playing musical instruments upon the streets.^® An ordinance, making it unlawful for any person 83 Cliicago V. Trotter, 136 111., turbance, was held to be an itiner- 430; 26 N. E. Rep., 359 (affirming ant musician and not exempt un- 33 111. App., 206). der the rules requiring a license, 94 jn re Frazee, 63 Mich., 396; 30 because the act was a matter of N. W. Rep., 72. religious worship. Commonwealth 95 Anderson v. Wellington, 40 v. Plaisted, 148 Mass., 375; 19 N. E. Kan., 173; 19 Pac. Rep., 719; 2 L. Rep., 224; 2 L. R. A., 142. R. A., 110. Musicians. It is no defense to 96 Commonwealth v. Plaisted, the violation of an ordinance re- 148 Mass., 375; 19 N. E. Rep., 224; quiring a license to be procured by 2 L. R. A., 142. See Roderick v. every person who shall play upon Whitson, 51 Hun. (N. Y.), 620; 4 any musical instrument upon the N. Y. Suppl., 112. street, that the person was en- A member of a religious organi- gaged in religious worship and zation while playing on a cornet was not creating any disturbance without a license in a street of the peace. State v. White, 64 parade, and creating no actual dis- N. H., 48; 5 Atl. Rep., 828; Com- §417] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 629 or organization to parade, certain streets, shouting, singing, or beating drums or tambourines, or playing on any other instru- ment, without first having obtained written permission from the mayor, but excepting from its provisions funerals, fire companies, state militia and political parties having state or- ganizations, was held void in Wisconsin, because of the un- reasonable and unjust discrimination which it makes and which it gives the mayor arbitrary power to make in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution.^''' § 417. License fee or tax must be uniform— Discrimination forbidden. Constitutional provisions requiring that taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the state have no ap- plication to the taxation of trades, professions and occupations, but apply only to direct taxation on property as such.^* How- ever, the rule is that all persons engaged in the same occupa- tion, profession or class of business must be taxed equally and monwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass., 375; 19 N. E. Rep., 224; 2 L. R. A., 142. s^ State ex rel. v. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 19 L. R. A., 858; 54 N. W. Rep., 1104. See ch. VI, Of Rea- sonableness of Ordinances. Sec. 466, post. ss Arkansas — Ft. Smith v. Scruggs, 70 Ark., 549; 69 S. W. Rep., 679. California — Ex parte Hurl, 49 Cal., 557; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal., 46; 60 Am. Dec, 581; People V. Naglee, 1 Cal., 232 ; 52 Am. Dec, 312. Georgia — Stewart v. Kelirer, 115 Ga., 184; 41 S. E. Rep., 680; Rome V. McWilliams, 52 Ga., 251; Weaver v. State, 89 Ga., 639; 15 S. B. Rep., 840; Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta, 50 Ga., 530. Indiana — Bright v. McCuUough, 27 Ind., 223. Kansas — Leavenworth v. Booth, 15 Kan., 627. Louisiana — New Orleans v. Pont- chartrain R. Co., 41 La. Ann., 519 ; 7 So. Rep., 83; Walters v. Duke, 31 La. Ann., 668. Michigan — Ash v. People, 11 Mich., 347. Missouri — Kansas City v. Rich- ardson, 90 Mo. App., 450. Montana — State v. French, 17 Mont, 54; 41 Pac. Rep., 1078; 30 L. R. A., 415. Nevada — Bx parte Robinson, 12 Nev., 263; 28 Am. Rep., 794. New Jersey — Standard Under- ground Cable Co. v. Attorney Gen- eral, 46 N. J. Eq., 270; 19 Atl. Rep., 733; 19 Am. St. Rep., 394. North Carolina — Gatlin v. Tar- boro, 78 N. C, 119. Pennsylvania — Hadtner v. Will- iamsport, 15 Wkly. N. Cas., 138. Wisconsin — Morrill v. State, 38 Wis., 428; 20 Am. Rep., 12. Wyoming — State v. Willingham, 9 Wyo., 290; 62 Pac. Rep., 797; 52 L. R. A., 198. License Not a Tax. A license fee imposed by a city, in pursuance of power granted by charter, upon certain avocation, trades, business and occupations is not a tax, in the constitutional sense of that term. Distilling Co. v. Chicago, 112 111., 19; Braun v. Chicago, 110 111., 186. 630 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§417 uniformly.^^ Hence, an ordinance which imposes a license on non-residents of the city and exempts persons in the business within the city limits is void for discrimination.^ And the rule is uniformly enforced that any discrimination, as to persons of a class, in the ordinance imposing the license will invalidate the legislation and render the collection of the license fee void. The numerous cases in the notes illustrate fully the judicial Uniform on Same Class. Under the provision of the constitution requiring occupation taxes to be equal and uniform upon all in the same class, the enforcement of pay- ment by criminal proceedings against some persons and not against others is an evasion of the constitution. Hoefling v. San An- tonio, 85 Tex., 228; 20 S. W. Rep., 85; 16 L. R. A., 608. 99 United States — Singer Mfg. Co. V. Wright, 33 Fed., 121. Georgia — Cutliff v. Albany, 60 Ga., 597; McGhee v. State, 92 Ga., 21; 17 S. E. Rep., 276. Illinois — Braun v. Chicago, 110 JU., 186. Indiana — Terre Haute v. Kersey (Ind., 1902), 64 N. E. Rep., 469. Kentucky — Bullitt v. Paducah, 8 Ky. Law Rep., 870; 3 S. W. Rep., 802. Louisiana — Browne v. Selser, 106 La., 691; 31 So. Rep., 290; McClel- lan V. Pettigrew, 44 La. Ann., 356; 10 So. Rep., 853; Hodgson v. New Orleans, 21 La. Ann., 301; New Orleans v. Staiger, 11 La. Ann., 68; Municipality No. 2 v. Dubois, 10 La. Ann., 56; State v. Rebassa, 9 La. Ann., 305. Missouri — St. Louis v. Bowler, 94 Mo., 630; 7 S. W. Rep., 434; Am. Union Ex. Co. v. St. Joseph, 66 Mo., 675 ; 27 Am. Rep., 382 ; Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo., 479. Nehraslca — Rosienbloom v. State (Neb., 1902), 89 N. W. Rep., 1053; 57 L. R. A., 922; Magneau v. Fre- mont, 30 Neb., 843; 47 N. W. Rep., 280; 27 Am. St. Rep., 436; 9 L. R. A., 786. North Carolina — State v. Carter, 129 N. C, 560; 40 S. E. Rep., 11; Rosenbaum v. New Bern, 118 N. C, 83; 24 S. E. Rep., 1; 32 L. R. A., 123; State v. Powell, 100 N. C, 525; 6 S. E. Rep., 424. Pennsylvania — Mechanicsburg v. Koons, 18 Pa. Super. Ct., 131. South Carolina — Information v. Oliver, 21 S. C, 318; State v. Co- lumbia, 6 S. C, 1. Tennessee — Columbia v. Beasly, I Hump. (20 Tenn.), 232. Texas — Ex parte Williams, 31 Tex. Cr. App., 262; 20 S. W. Rep., 580; 21 L. R. A., 783. 1 Georgia — Gould v. Atlanta, 55 Ga., 678. Illinois — Lucas v. Macomb, 49 111. App., 60. Indiana — Indianapolis v. Bieler, 138 Ind., 30; 36 N. E. Rep., 857. Michigan — Saginaw v. Circuit Judge, 106 Mich., 32; 63 N. W. Rep., 985; Brooks v. Mangan, 86 Mich., 576; 49 N. W. Rep., 633; 24 Am. St. Rep., 137. Missouri — St. Louis v. Consoli- dated Coal Co., 113 Mo., 83; 20 S. W. Rep., 699. New Jersey — Thompson v. Camp Meeting Assn., 55 N. J. L., 507; 26 Atl. Rep., 798; Morgan v. Orange, 50 N. J. L., 389; 13 Atl. Rep., 240. Ohio — Radereaugh v. Plain City, II Ohio Dec, 612. Pennsylvania — Sayre v. Phillips, 148 Pa. St., 482; 24 Atl. Rep., 76; 33 Am. St. Rep., 842; 16 L. R. A., §417] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 631 view and the application of the doctrine.^ Where the license fee is fixed at a given sum the fact that under the power given by the charter a license may be withheld from one who might be deemed unsuitable to conduct the business, because of im- morality, want of qualifications, etc., is not discriminations be- 49; Shamokin v. Flannigan, 156 Pa. St., 43; 26 Atl. Rep., 780; Bur- gess V. Fennel, 3 Del. Co. R., 354; West Pittson v. Dymond, 8 Kulp. (Pa.), 12. Tennessee — Nashville v. Althrop, 5 Cold. (Tenn.), 554. Wyoming — Clements v. Casper, 4 Wyo., 494; 35 Pac. Rep., 472. Canada — Jones v. Gilbert, 5 S. C. (Canada), 356. Discriminating License Tax be- tween persons and products of dif- ferent states is void. Sec. 259, supra. Discriminating Against Non- residents. So where a license is - required of non-residents of the state it is void, being an interfer- ence with interstate commerce. Pacific Junction v. Dyer, 64 Iowa, 38; 19 N. W. Rep., 862; Baston City V. Easton Beef Co., 5 Pa. Co. Ct. R., 68; Pullman Palace-Car Co. V. State, 64 Tex., 274; 53 Am. Rep., 758; Simrall v. Covington, 90 Ky., 444; 14 S. W. Rep., 369; 29 Am. St. Rep., 398; 9 L. R. A., 556; Daniel V. Richmond, 78 Ky., 542. This subject is fully treated in Chapter VIII., Of the Constitution- ality of Ordinances, § 252 et seq. 2 Auctioneers, classification of, held valid. Stull v. De Mattos, 23 Wash., 71; 62 Pac. Rep., 451; 51 L. R. A., 892. Brokers. Designating two class- es, held valid. Pittsburg v. Coyle, 165 Pa. St., 61; 30 Atl. Rep., 452. An occupation tax of $250 on brokers in a town of 5,000 and a tax of $50 on the same occupation in towns of less population, held valid. Texas Banking and Ins. Co. V. State, 42 Tex., 636; Blessing v. Galveston, 42 Tex., 641. Deam Shops. Discriminating li- cense ordinance, held void. Zanone V. Mound City, 11 111. App., 334; 103 111., 552. Emigrant Agents, license on, held void for want of uniformity. State V. Moore, 113 N. C, 697; 18 S. E. Rep., 342; 22 L. R. A., 472. Farmers Selling Their Own Produce. Where an ordinance im- poses a license on all persons sell- ing meats within the city whether from stalls or by peddling on the streets, it is not a discrimination to exempt farmers selling their own produce. Davis & Co. v. Ma- con, 64 Ga., 128; 37 Am. Rep., 60. Hotel. Exempting hotels of less than ten rooms from payment of license, held valid. Fulgum v. Nashville, 76 Tenn. (8 Lea), 635. Intelligence Office. An ordi- nance which requires the payment of $150 for a license to conduct the business of an intelligence oflBce, "until the 1st day of January next following the date of the applica- tion" is void, the fee charged not being uniform nor equal. Moore V. St. Paul, 61 Minn., 427; 63 N. W. Rep., 1087; Moore v. St. Paul, 48 Minn., 331; 51 N. W. Rep., 219. Insurance. An ordinance which requires an insurance company to pay a license on the basis of the amount of premiums received is unequal and void. New Orleans v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 23 La. Ann., 632 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§417 449. Compare State v. Liverpool, etc., Ins. Co., 40 La. Ann., 463; 4 So. Rep., 504. Laundry license based on the number of persons engaged in the business held to be uniform. Such license is not a tax within the con- stitutional sense of uniformity. State V. French, 17 Mont, 54; 41 Pac. Rep., 1079; 30 L. R. A., 415. Lawyers. A uniform license on all lawyers without reference to the value of the practice of each lawyer held valid. St. Louis v. Sternberg, 69 Mo., 389. As to class- ification of lawyers, see Sec. 423, post. Merchants may be classified. Clark V. Titusville, 184 U. S., 329; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 382. A tax of $2 on merchants with a stock of less than $1,000 and of $3 on merchants with a greater stock is not violative of the constitution requiring taxes to be uniform. Au- rora V. McGannon, 138 Mo., 38; 39 S. W. Rep., 469. An ordinance imposing a license on merchants who use "trading stamps," held discriminating and void. The trading stamp device is not in the nature of a lottery. Ex parte McKenna, 126 Cal., 429; 58 Pac. Rep., 916; but compare contra, Humes v. Ft. Smith, 93 Fed. Rep., 857. Selling by Sample. An ordi- nance imposing a license which discriminates against merchants selling by sample and in favor of others is void. Nashville v. Al- throp, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.), 554. Tax on sample merchants held not a discrimination in favor of mer- chants. Ex parte Thornton, 12 Fed. Rep., 538; 4 Hughes, 220. Itinerant Merchant. An ordi- nance which requires itinerant merchants to procure a license and exempts persons coming into the city with produce, and commercial travelers, makes a discrimination between persons and is void. Peo- ria V. Gugenheim, 61 111. App., 374. Transient Merchants. An ordi- nance requiring transient mer- chants to pay license, was held not to be a discrimination in favor of residents, "Transient" having ref- erence to the nature of the busi- ness and not the residence. Ot- tumwa V. Zekind, 95 Iowa, 622; 64 N. W. Rep., 646; 58 Am. St. Rep., 447; 29 L. R. A., 734 (distinguish- ing Pacific Junction v. Dyer, 64 Iowa, 38; 19 N. W. Rep., 862). Milk Ordinance, classifying herds of animals, taking counties as the basis, held void. State v. Elofson, 86 Minn., 103; 90 N. W. Rep., 309. Peddlers. An ordinance which imposes a license of $75 on a ped- dler of meats from a vehicle, and $10 on other peddlers is valid, since they do not deal in the same commodities. Ex parte Heylman, 92 Cal., 492; 28 Pac. Rep., 675. An ordinance requiring a license from peddlers of milk, and not re- quiring any license from peddlers of bread, fish and oysters, is not within the provision of the consti- tution requiring uniform taxation and is valid. Danville v. Weaver, 17 Pa. Co. Ct. R., 17; 4 Pa. Dist. R., 768. An ordinance passed under au- thority given by charter, prohibit- ing the peddling of vegetables without a license, was held not to be a discrimination in favor of oth- er forms of peddling for which no license was required. Bradley v. Rochester, 54 Hun. (N. Y.), 140; 7 N. Y. Suppl., 237. Powder Magazines. An ordi- nance requiring persons who keep §-417J ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 633 tween persons.^ So an ordinance which merely discriminates between different localities of the corporation according to the advantage they may present for the business for which license is sought, leaving all persons at equal liberty to apply for li- cense in whatever locality they think proper and making no distinction between persons, but between places only, is open to no objection.* So a license imposed on the occupiers of pri- vate markets, although no license was charged for selling meats and vegetables in the public markets was held valid.^ But an ordinance requiring a license of one hundred dollars a powder magazine in quantities of 50 lbs. or over to procure a li- cense and requiring no license from persons keeping a less quan- tity is void. Parish of Orleans v. Cochran, 20 La. Ann., 373. Vehicles. Charter authorized the borough to require all vehicles "using the paved streets of the bor- ough to be registered, and a mod- erate license to be paid for them." The ordinance imposed a specific tax on all vehicles "passing through the street," etc., and ex- cepted travelers and also farmers "bringing their own produce to the market," and finally declared that the ordinance should apply to "all vehicles passing through the bor- ough on their way to Pittsburgh or elsewhere, on their ordinary busi- ness." Held void. The act only authorized a tax on vehicles of cit- izens, and vehicles of persons car- rying on some branch of business or occupation within the town by means of them. Bennett v. Bir- mingham, 31 Pa. St., 15. ii Tax on Draymen, fixed accord- ing to the capacity of the dray, that is, one rate for one horse and another for two horse drays, is uniform. Johnston v. Macon, 62 Ga., 645; Smith v. Louisville, 9 Ky. Law Rep., 779; 6 S. W. Rep., 911. Contra, State v. Bndom, 23 La. Ann., 663; Cullinan v. New Or- leans, 28 La. Ann., 102. Miscellaneous Instances. The following cases illustrate particu- lar methods, which have been sus- tained, of fixing the amount and graduating the license according to the amount of business done. Sacramento v. Crocker, 16 Cal., 119; Rankin v. Henderson, 9 Ky. Law Rep., 861; 7 S. W. Rep., 174; State V. Traders' Bank, 41 La. Ann., 329; 6 So. Rep., 582; State v. Applegarth, 81 Md., 293; 31 Atl. Rep., 961; 28 L. R. A, 812; Gatlin V. Tarboro, 78 N. C, 119; Allen- town V. Gross, 132 Pa. St., 319; 19 Atl. Rep., 269; Williamsport v. Wenner, 172 Pa. St., 173; 33 Atl. Rep., 544. Not Unifoem. A license tax graduated according to the amount of sales held not to be uniform in a particular instance. Johnston v. Macon, 62 Ga., 645. A tax on persons engaged in pur- chasing tobacco of fifteen cents on each one thousand pounds of to- bacco without regard to value is unequal and void. Danville v. Shelton, 76 Va., 325. 3 Mason v. Lancaster, 4 Bush. (Ky.), 406. * East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 46 111., 392. 5 New Orleans v. Dubarry, 33 La. Ann., 481; 39 Am. Rep., 273. 634 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. . [§ 418 to conduct a meat shop in one part of the city and twenty-five dollars in another was declared unfairly discriminating and void.^ So an ordinance providing for a liquor license which im- posed different rates on different streets was declared voidJ So an ordinance which exacts a license for selling goods and fixes one rate for selling goods which are within the corporate limits, or in transitu to the city and another much larger license for selling goods which are not in the city or in transitu to it, was held invalid as unjust, unequal, partial, oppressive and in restraint of trade. ^ § 418. Reasonableness of amount of license. Where the ex- action is imposed under the power to regulate or in the exercise of the police power, as distinguished from the power to tax for revenue, as heretofore explained,** the general rule obtains that the sum levied cannot be excessive or more than reasonably nec- essary to cover the costs of granting the license and proper police regulation. The nature of the business sought to be con- trolled and the necessity and character of police regulations are the dominating elements in determining the reasonableness of the sum to be paid.^** The sound judicial view is that much should be left to the discretion of the municipal authorities. The courts will presume the amount demanded to be reason- able.ii Where under undoubted charter power, the tax is im- 6 St. Louis V. Spiegel, 75 Mo., Iowa, 622; 64 N. W. Rep., 646; 58 145, reversing 8 Mo. App., 478; St. Am. St. Rep., 447; 29 L. R. A., Louis V. Spiegel, 90 Mo., 587; 2 S. 734. W. Rep., 839. Massachusetts — Commonwealtli ' Harrodsburg V. Renfro, 22 Ky. v. Stodder, 2 Cush. (Mass.), 562; Law Rep., 806; 58 S. W. Rep., 795. Boston v. Schaffer, 9 Pick. (Mass.), s Ex parte Frank, 52 Cal., 606; 415. 28 Am. Rep., 642. Michigan — Ash v. People, 11 9 Sec. 408, supra. Mich., 347; Chilvers v. People, 11 10 United States — Philadelphia Mich., 43. V. W. U. Tel. Co., 40 Fed. Rep., 615; New Jersey — State v. Hoboken, In re Laundry License Case, 22 33 N. J. L., 280; Kip v. Paterson, Fed., 701. 26 N. J. L., 298; Freeholders v. Alabama — Van Hook v. Selma, Barber, 7 N. J. L., 64. 70 Ala., 361; Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ohio — Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15 Ala., 137. Ohio, 625. Connecticut — State v. Glavin, 67 Texas — Ex parte Gregory, 20 Conn., 29; 34 Atl. Rep., 708; New Tex. App., 210, 222; 54 Am. Rep., Haven v. New Haven Water Co., 516. 44 Conn., 105. n Alabama — Van Hook v. Selma, Jo«ja— Ottumwa v. Zekind, 95 70 Ala., 361. §418] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 635 posed for revenue alone, or for police regulation and revenue, the amount thereof is usually a matter for determination by the legislative branch of the municipal government.^^ Ordi- narily the courts will decline to interfere on the ground that the amount is oppressive or unreasonably large.^^ Many in- stances of the reasonableness of the amount of the license will appear from the cases in the note.^* Arkansas — Fayetteville v. Car- ter, 52 Ark., 301; 12 S. W. Rep., 573; 6 L. R. A., 509. Iowa — ^Burlington v. Putnam Ins. Co., 31 Iowa, 102. Michigan — "Van Baalen v. People, 40 Mich., 258. The question of amount is one of law for the court. Iowa City v. Newell, 115 Iowa, 55; 87 N. W. Rep., 739. Reasonableness of an ordinance is a question of law for the court. Section 185, supra. Graduated Price. As a police regulation the price of a license may be graduated by the popu- lousness of the community in which the privilege is to be exer- cised, and the profitableness of the business. Ex parte Marshall, 64 Ala., 266. 12 St. Paul V. Colter, 12 Minn., 41; 90 Am. Dec, 278; State v. Har- rington, 68 Vt., 622; 35 Atl. Rep., 515. 13 United States — Cooper v. Dis- trict of Columbia, 11 D. C. (4 Mc- Arth. & M.), 250. Illinois — Kinsley v. Chicago, 124 111., 359; 16 N. E. Rep., 260; United States Distilling Co. v. Chicago, 112 111., 19; IN. E. Rep., 166. Iowa — Burlington v. Putnam Ins. Co., 31 Iowa, 102. Kansas — In re Martin, 62 Kan., 638; 64 Pac. Rep., 43. Kentucky — Mason v. Lancaster, 4 Bush. (Ky.), 406; Kniper v. Lou- isville, 7 Bush. (Ky.), 599. Maryland — Mason v. Cumber- land, 92 Md., 451; 48 Atl. Rep., 136. Michigan — Kitson v. Ann Arbor, 26 Mich., 325. Graduated According to Stock of merchants, held valid. In re Martin, 62 Kan., 638; 64 Pac. Rep., 43. 1* Auctioneers. An ordinance of the city of Chicago requiring auctioneers to pay a license of 1200 per annum, and to give bond in the sum of $1,000 was held rea- sonable and valid. Wiggins v. Chicago, 68 111., 372. Discretiona- ry. United States Distilling Co. v. Chicago, 112 111., 19; IN. E. Rep., 166. $5 per day held reasonable. Fretwell v. Troy, 18 Kan., 271. Banks. $50 annually on each bank held reasonable. Oil City v. Oil City Trust Co., 11 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep., 350. Butchers. An ordinance regu- lating and licensing butcher shops and vendors of fresh or butcher's meat and fixing the price of the li- cense at $200, was held to be valid, and its passage being authorized by the legislature, if oppressive the remedy is with the legislature or council. St. Paul v. Colter, 12 Minn., 41; 90 Am. Dec, 278. Druggists. $500 per year, in town of 1,600 held unreasonable. Lyons v. Cooper, 39 Kan., 334; 18 Pac. Rep., 296. Itinerant Vendors. An act re- quiring "itinerant vendors" to de- posit with the state treasurer $500 and to take out a state license and in addition to obtain a local li- 636 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§419 §419. Application for license— Granting. It is not essen- tial to the validity of a license that there should be a previous cense in each town or city, was held valid, and that whether the law was oppressive was not a ques- tion for the court to decide. State V. Harrington, 68 Vt., 622; 35 Atl., 515. A license fee of |200 per month on an itinerant merchant is un- reasonable and void. Peoria v. Gugenheim, 61 111. App., 374. An ordinance imposing a license fee of flO per day on itinerant merchants, making no discrimina- tion on account of the extent of the business or the length of time during which it is carried on, would seem to be unnecessarily burdensome in such a case, in gen- eral restraint of trade and prohib- itory of the business. CarroUton V. Bazette, 159 111., 284; 42 N. E. Rep., 837. Market. |10 per month for mar- ket license, held unreasonable un- der particular circumstances. Chad- dock V. Day, 75 Mich., 527; 42 N. W. Rep., 977; 13 Am. St. Rep., 468; 4 L. R. A., 809. Meat Market. Biloxi v. Bor- ries, 78 Miss., 657; 29 So. Rep., 466. Pawn Broker. Seattle v. Barto, (Wash., 1903), 71 Pac. Rep., 735. A license of $50 annually and a bond for $5,000 for a pawnbroker held not unreasonable. Grand Rapids V. Braudy, 105 Mich., 670; 64 N. W. Rep., 29; 55 Am. St. Rep., 472; 32 L. R. A., 116. Peddlers. Three dollars per day for hawker and peddler not ex- cessive. In re White, 43 Minn., 250; 45 N. W. Rep., 232. $10 per month on peddlers, held unreason- able. State V. Angelo, 71 N. H., 224; 51 Atl. Rep., 905. A license of $15 a year or $3 a day to peddle clothes wringers is not excessive. People v. Russell, 49 Mich., 617; 14 N. W. Rep., 568; 43 Am. Rep., 478. Permit to open street, fee re- quired, held unreasonable in par- ticular instance. New Haven v. New Haven Water Co., 44 Con., 105. Skiffs and Row Boats. A li- cense fee of $5 per annum on skiffs and row boats, kept for hire, held not unreasonable. Foyer v. Des Plaines, 22 111. App., 576. Telegraph Poles. $5 per pole for the first year and $1 per pole thereafter, was held to be reason- able. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia (Pa., 1888), 12 Atl. Rep., 144. See Sec. 261, supra. Vehicle. $2.50 per year for one- horse vehicle is not unreasonable. Mason v. Cumberland, 92 Md., 451; 48 Atl. Rep., 136. Wash Houses. $20 a year for conducting a wash house held to be in excess of the amount neces- sary for purpose of regulation and therefore void. In re Wan Yin, 22 Fed. Rep., 701. Exorbitant Pmoe required for license, held invalid. Walker v. New Orleans, 31 La. Ann., 828. Constitutional Limit exceeded by license tax, invalid. Ex parte Slaren, 3 Tex. App., 662. Particular Instances where the license fee imposed has been held not to be invalid nor excessive. Du- luth V. Krupp, 46 Minn., 435; 49 N. W. Rep., 235; Littlefield v. State, 42 Neb., 223; 60 N. W. Rep., 724; 47 Am. St. Rep., 697; 28 L. R. A., 588. Miscellaneous Instances, in which ordinances imposing a li- § 419] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 637 application in writing.i^ "^here the party applying for a li- cense to sell liquor has complied with all the requirements of the ordinance, by paying the license fee and giving bond, he will be protected in selling, although the clerk neglected to give him a license.^^ A license issued to a firm will hold good for the term, notwithstanding one of the members, thereof re- tires from the co-partnership before the expiration of the li- cense.i'' The granting of a municipal license is, in general, discretionary with the corporation. But, when the elements of discretionary action have been eliminated by acts of the par- ties the question resolves itself into one of legal duty, which may be enforced by mandamus}^ Thus where a board of en- gineers created by ordinance to examine and pass upon the qualifications of stationary engineers, withholds a license from caprice or whim, mandamus will lie to compel the board to perform its legal duty.i^ Ordinance provisions as to applica- tion for license, as a rule, are mere matters of detail.^" Thus an ordinance requiring that one hauling garbage shall first obtain a license from the proper officer, and prohibiting the latter from granting it unless the applicant furnishes a certifi- cate to the board of health to the effect that he has filed with the board the required statement, is not invalid as delegating cense have been held void for un- i^ St. Charles v. Hackman, 133 reasonableness in the amount of Mo., 634; 34 S. W. Rep., 878. the license fee Imposed. is state ex rel. Shaw v. Baker, 32 Iowa — Ottumwa v. Zekind, 95 Mo. App., 98; St. Louis v. Weitzel, .Iowa, 622; 64 N. W. Rep., 646; 58 130 Mo., 600; 31 S. W. Rep., 1045. Am. St. Rep., 447; 29 L. R. A., 734. 19 St. Louis v. Meyrose Lamp Maryland — Vansant v. Harlem Mfg. Co., 139 Mo., 560; 41 S. W. Stage Co., 59 Md., 330. Rep., 244. Michigan — Brooks v. Mangan, 86 Mandamus to compel mayor to Mich., 576; 49 N. W. Rep., 633; 24 sign license. Where the mayor is Am. St. Rep., 137. not satisfied that a person apply- Nebraska^-Camwell v. Lincoln, ^^S for a license as a common vict- 19 Neb., 569; 27 N. W. Rep., 647. nailer, has complied with all the Oftio— Sipe V. Murphy, 49 Ohio provisions, mandamus will not lie St., 536; 31 N. E. Rep., 884; 17 L. to compel him to sign the license R. A., 184; Glaser v. Cincinnati, which has been granted by the 31 Wkly. Law Bui. (Ohio), 243. tio^rd of aldermen. Deehan v. rea;as— Hirshfield v. Dallas, 29 Johnson, 141 Mass., 23; 6 N. E. Tex. App., 242; 15 S. W. Rep., 124. Rep., 240. 15 Swarth v. People, 109 111., 621. 20 St. Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo., 16 Prather v. People, 85 111., 36. 600; 31 S. W. Rep., 1045. 638 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§ 420 the taxing power to the board of health.^i So an ordinance which requires the application for the license to be indorsed by- five persons, where, under the law the mayor, president of the council and chief of police pass upon the applicant's moral character, is valid, since the provision only relates to the mode of applying for the license.^^ § 420. Revocation of license or permit. Usually the power to license, regulate, etc., confers authority to provide reason- able terms and conditions under which the business licensed shall be conducted.^^ The ordinance providing for the grant- ing of the license may also prescribe reasonable conditions under which the license may be revoked by the municipal au- thorities.2* A license accepted under an ordinance providing that it may be revoked at pleasure or within the discretion of a specified municipal officer or board is binding on the licensee. ^^ The power to revoke permits depends upon their nature, the terms under which they were issued, the public necessity and the effect of such action upon contract and property rights. Usually a permit, as one for the erection of a wooden building, may be revoked legally upon breach of condition by the con- tractor.26 But after a permit to erect a frame building has been duly granted, and the work of construction has begun and material therefor has been purchased, a revocation of such 21 St. Louis V. Weitzel, 130 Mo., Forfeiture denied. State v. Wash- 600; 31 S. W. Rep., 1045. ington, 44 N. J. L., 605. 22 7JI re BirkerstafE, 70 Cal., 35; Power to inflict penalty of for- 11 Pac. Rep., 393. feiture, § 170, suvra. Notice — appearance, held waiver. 2* Wiggins v. Chicago, 68 111., Quinn v. Middlesex Electric Light 372. Co., 140 Mass., 109; 3 N. E. Rep., 25 Schwuchow v. Chicago, 68 111., 204. 444; Wiggins v. Chicago, 68 111., Form for steam engine building. 372; Com. v. Kinsley, 133 Mass., Alter V. Dodge, 140 Mass., 594; 5 578; Child v. Bemus, 17 R. I., 230; N. E. Rep., 504. 12 L. R. A., 57; 21 Atl. Rep., 539. 23 Conditions allowing with- The taking out of a new license drawing may be imposed. Towns before the old one expires cannot V. Tallahassee, 11 Fla., 130; Child affect the validity of the new li- V. Bemus, 17 R. I. 230; 21 Atl. cense, and this is so where the li- Rep., 539; 12 L. R. A., 57. cense was taken out in anticipation Building permit. Harper v. of the passage of an ordinance in- Jonesboro, 94 Ga., 801; 22 S. E. creasing the rate of license. Swarth Rep., 139. V. People, 109 111., 621. To clean privies. Boehm v. Bal- 26 Harper v. Jonesboro, 94 Ga., timore, 61 Md., 259. 801; 22 S. E. Rep., 139. §422] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 639 permit, without notice and public necessity, will not be sus- tained.^'^ § 421. Method of enforcement of payment of license. The charter method of enforcement of the payment of the license must be observed.^^ Only such penalties as are authorized may be inflicted. Forfeiture of the license cannot be imposed as punishment unless expressly sanctioned by law.^^ The usual method of enforcing ordinances is by action to recover the penalties provided.*" If no method is prescribed by charter, debt is the appropriate form of action.^i § 422. License on dogs. The regulation of the keeping of dogs is within the police power.^^ Ordinances requiring dogs kept within the corporation to be registered, licensed, etc., are 27 Buffalo v. Chadeayne, 7 N. Y. Suppl., 501. 28 Sec. 169, supra. Blanchard v. Bristol, 100 Va., 469; 41 S. E. Rep., 948. An ordinance imposing an occu- pation tax which provides an ille- gal method of enforcing payment will be held void. German Amer- ican Fire Ins. Co. v. Minden, 51 Neb., 870, 877; 71 N. W. Rep., 995. But if it also provides a method of enforcing payment which is le- gal, the ordinance will not be de- clared void in toto, but so much of it as is unaffected by the void por- tion will be sustained. Templeton V. Tekamah, 32 Neb., 542; 49 N. W. Rep., 373; Magneau v. Fremont, 30 Neb., 843, 854; 47 N. W. Rep., 280. In Nebraska the courts have held that the payment of an occupation tax imposed by a city cannot be en- forced by requiring its payment as a condition precedent to doing business, or by the imposition of a criminal punishment for doing business without payment. Ger- man Amer. Fire Ins. Co. v. Men- den, 51 Neb., 870, 877; 71 N. W., 995; Templeton v. Tekamah, 32 Neb., 542; 49 N. W. Rep., 373; State V. Green, 27 Neb., 64; 42 N. W. Rep., 913. Payment cannot be made a con- dition precedent to the issuing of a license to sell liquor. State v. Bennett, 19 Neb., 191; 26 N. W. Rep., 714. 28 Sec. 170 et seq., supra. Where the charter authorizes a penalty of fine or imprisonment for breach of ordinances, a penalty of a fine and forfeiture of license is illegal. Staates v. Washington, 44 N. J. L., 605. 30 Chapter X., § 303, supra. 31 Philadelphia v. Atlantic & P. Tel. Co., 109 Fed. Rep., 55. City may enforce penalty for vio- lating ordinances, exacting licen- ses, etc. St. Louis V. Sternberg, 69 Mo., 289; St. Louis v. Green, 70 Mo., 562. Excess of amount paid may be recovered. Harrodsburg v. Renfro, 22 Ky. Law Rep., 806; 58 S. W. Rap., 795; 51 L. R. A., 897; Bruner V. Stanton, 102 Ky., 459; 43 S. W. Rep., 411. But if license money has been paid under a mistake of law it can- not be recovered. Taber v. New Bedford, 177 Mass., 197; 58 N. E. Rep., 640. 32 Section 469, post. 640 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§423 uniformly sustained.^* Thus charter power to "tax, regulate, restrain and prohibit the running at large of dogs" and to provide for the impounding or destruction of them "when found running at large contrary to ordinance," authorizes a per capita tax upon dogs by way of a license. Such tax is an exercise of the police power, and is not forbidden by the con- stitutional provision requiring all property to be taxed in pro- portion to its value. A reasonable penalty may be imposed upon the owner for failure to observe the ordinance.^* An or- dinance requiring a dog to wear a collar and tag and making it unlawful for any dog to run at large without them, with au- thority to any person to kill the same, does not authorize any one but an officer to kill a dog.^s The fact the dog was under the immediate care of its owner does not exempt it from the operation of the law.^® § 423. License on lawyers. Where the power is expressly granted by the charter a municipal corporation may impose a tax on lawyers for the privilege of practicing their profes- sion within the city.^'^ But authority to levy a license on at- torneys residing within the city, does not give power to tax -33 Faribault v. Wilson, 34 Minn., 254; 25 N. W. Rep., 449; Ex parte Cooper, 3 Tex. App., 489; State v. Brown, 72 Vt., 410; 48 Atl. Rep., 652; State v. Smith, 72 Vt., 140; 47 Atl. Rep., 390; Carter v. Dow, 16 Wis., 298; Tenney v. Lenz, 16 Wis., 566. 34 Carthage v. Rhodes, 101 Mo., 175; 14 S. W. Rep., 181; Van Horn V. People, 46 Mich., 183; 9 N. W. Rep., 246; Hoist v. Roe, 39 Ohio St., 340; Cole v. Hall, 103 111., 30. The license is not a tax for rev- enue. Com. V. Markham, 7 Bush. (70 Ky.), 486. The penalty Is not a special tax. Mitchell V. Williams, 27 Ind., 62. Dog held to be property. Har- rington V. Miles, 11 Kan., 480. An ordinance requiring a license to keep a dog, held illegal. A dog may be taxed like other property, but the owner cannot be subjected to criminal punishment for failure to pay the tax. Washington v. Meigs, 1 McArther (D. C), 53. 35 Lowell V. Gathright, 97 Ind., 313. The dog cannot be pursued into the dwelling of owner, even after refusal to surrender the dog. Kerr V. Seaver, 11 Allen (Mass.), 151. An officer may lawfully enter upon premises of owner. Blair v. Forehand, 100 Mass., 136; 97 Am. Dec, 82. 36 Tower v. Tower, 18 Pick. (Mass.), 262. 37 Alabama — Ex parte Montgom- ery, 64 Ala., 463; Goldthwaite v. Montgomery, 50 Ala., 486. Florida — Young v. Thomas, 17 Fla., 169; 35 Am. Rep., 93. Georgia — Wright v. Hill, 54 Ga., 645; Savannah v. Hines, 53 Ga., 616. Missouri — St. Louis v. Sternberg, 69 Mo., 289; 4 Mo. App., 453. 'North Carolina — Wilmington v. Macks, 86 N. C, 88; 41 Am. Rep., 443; Holland v. Isler, 77. N. C, 1. Texas — Languille v. State, 4 Tex. App., 312. §424] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 641 attorneys not residing in the city, who have offices and do busi- ness within the eity.^* A tax which is uniform upon all attor- neys is valid.^9 In Virginia it has been held that the city coun- cil of Kichmond had power to lay a tax upon lawyers and to provide that they should be divided into six classes and those in each class pay a certain sum.*" Bach member of a law firm may be taxed separately under power given to tax all persons exercising any profession.*^ But provision may be made in the ordinance imposing the license that a firm shall pay but one tax.*2 In Kentucky the constitutional provision empowered a municipal corporation to impose "license fees" on occupations and professions, authorized a license tax on lawyers for the purpose of raising revenue. Such ordinance is not void as im- pairing a contract between the state and lawyer.** § 424. Vehicle license— Double taxation. Charter power to Virginia — Blanchard v. Bristol, 100 Va., 469; 41 S. E. Rep., 948; Petersburg v. Cocke, 94 Va., 244; 26 S. B. Rep., 576; Ould v. Rich- mond, 23-Gratt. (Va.), 464. Power to regulate attorneys does not give power to license. Sonora V. Curtin, 137 Cal., 583; 70 Pac. Rep., 674. The Legislattjke may impose such tax. State v. Waples, 12 La. Ann., 343; State v. Fellows, 12 La. Ann., 344; State v. King, 21 La. Ann., 201; Simmons v. State 12 Mo., 268; 49 Am. Dec, 131; St. Louis V. Laughlin, 49 Mo., 559. Not Unconstitutional. Egan V. Court, 3 Har. & McH. (Md.), 169; State v. Gazlay, 5 Ohio, 14, 21; Ex parte Williams, 31 Tex. Cr. App., 262; 20 S. W. Rep. 580; 21 L. R. A., 783; Trez- vant V. State (Tex. Cr. App., 1892), 20 S. W. Rep., 582; Hart v. State, 21 Tex. App., 31'8; 17 S. W. Rep., 127. In Missouri municipal corpora- tions cannot impose a license tax on attorneys and others following professions. R. S. Mo., 1899, sec. 5262. Tax on attorneys held void CaseSj 55 34 In re Lawyer's Tax Tenn. (8 Heisk.), 565. 38 Garden City v. Abhott, Kan., 283; 8 Pac. Rep., 473. 39 State V. King, 21 La. Ann., 201 ; St. Louis v. Sternberg, 69 Mo., 289; 4 Mo.. App., 453. *» Ould & Carrington v. Rich- mond, 23 Gratt. (Va.), 464. *i Jones V. Page, 44 Ala., Blanchard v. State, 30 Fla., 11 So. Rep., 785; 18 L. R. A., Lanier v. Macon, 59 Ga., Wilder v. Savannah, 70 Ga., 48 Am. Rep., 598. *2 Savannah v. Hines, 53 616. *3 Baker v. Lexington, 21 Law Rep., 809; 53 S. W. Rep., 16; Ould V. Richmond, 23 Gratt. (Va.), 464, 468. The amount of tax authorized by the constitution and laws of the state has no reference to spe- cific taxes which may be imposed upon occupations and privileges and the power to tax occupations and privileges in accordance with the power to license them. Gold- smith V. Huntsville, 120 Ala., 182; McCaskell v. State, 53 Ala., 510. 657; 223; 409; 187; 760; Ga., Ky. 613 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§424 license vehicles is usually expressly conferred, but unless the power exists the tax cannot be imposed.** A license is au- thorized by most charters on the occupation or use to which the vehicle is put, as hacks, cabs, etc., carrying passengers for hire, and drays, etc., carrying goods, merchandise, etc., as a business.*^ But discriminations are not permitted in the Im- 44 New Iberia v. Migues, 32 La. Ann., 923; Plaquemine v. Roth, 29 La. Ann., 261. Where the power authorizing the city to impose licenses does not refer to vehicles, an ordinance im- posing a license on vehicles is in- valid. Millerstown v. Bell, 123 Pa. St., 151; 16 AU. Rep., 612; 23 Wkly. Notes Gas., 78. A license on hack drivers, held not authorized under the power given to tax callings, and not with- in the police power of the city. Jackson v. Newman, 59 Miss., 385 ; 42 Am. Rep., 367. License on milk wagon held in- valid. Reading v. Bitting, 167 Pa. St., 21; 31 Atl. Rep., 359. Under power "to license and regulate hackmen, draymen, ex- pressmen, and all other persons engaged in carrying passengers, baggages or freight," no power is conferred to license any one who does not come within that class, and it does not apply to one who hires out teams and vehicles to persons who have property to transport. State v. Robinson, 42 Minn., 107; 43 N. W. Rep., 833; 6 L. R. A., 339. 45 Indiana — Scudder v. Hinshaw, 134 Ind., 56; 33 N. E. Rep., 791. Massachusetts — Commonwealth V. Page, 155 Mass., 227; 29 N. B. Rep., 512. New Jersey — Belmar v. Barka- low, 67 N. J. L., 504; 52 Atl. Rep., 157. Pennsylvania — Gibson v. Cara- opolis, 22 Plttsb. Leg. J. (N. S.), 64. Texas — Ex parte Gregory, 20 Tex. App., 210; 54 Am. Rep., 516. United States — Washington v. Wheaton, 29 Fed. Cas. No. 17, 239; 1 Cranch C. C, 318. As the charter empowers the city to impose a tax on vehicles for street use and also a tax on occupations, it may require the payment of a license tax on ve- hicles used in particular occupa- tions, in addition to that imposed for street use. St. Louis v. Weit- zel, 130 Mo., 600; 31 S. W. Rep., 1045. Sprinkling Carts. One engaged in sprinkling streets for compen- sation, and using tanks mounted on wheels for that, purpose, is sub- ject to a license tax, as such cart is a public vehicle. St Louis v. Woodruff, 71 Mo., 92; 4 Mo. App., 169. Stage Coaches may be licensed. Belmar v. Barkalow, 67 N. J. L., 504; 52 Atl. Rep., 157. All Vehicles used for business purposes whether as common car- riers or by merchants for the pur- pose of delivering goods to their customers have been held subject to license. Johnson v. MacT)n, 114 Ga., 426; 40 S. E. Rep., 322. For Fee. An ordinance requir- ing a license on wagons which run for "fee or reward," does not apply to wagons used by a coal merchant in delivering coal to his customers. Henderson v. Marshall, 22 Ky. Law Rep., 671; 58 S. W. Rep., 518. Delivery Wagons. Kansas City V. Smith, 93 Mo. App., 217. Hackney Coaches and cabs not §424] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 643 position and collection of such license tax.*^ An ordinance di- viding vehicles and teams into different classes and imposing an occupation tax on the separate classes has been sustained. The exaction is not a personal tax on property, and, though im- posed for revenue, is in the nature of a license, being a privilege using public stands. New York v. Reesing, 79 N. Y. Suppl., 331. Automobile. An electric car- riage or automobile, held not to be included in enumeration of ve- hicles to be licensed. Washington Electric Vehicle Transp. Co. v. Dis- trict of Columbia, 19 App. D. C, 462. Pleasure — Private. Authority to license only vehicles used for pay does not include wagons used for pleasure. Mt. Olive v. Hozel- bart, 26 Pittsb. L. J. (Pa. N. S.), 400. Under the power to license "other vehicles" following a spe- cial enumeration of vehicles which may be licensed (such enumera- tion including vehicles used for pecuniary profit only) the city can- not impose a license tax on ve- hicles used exclusively for private purposes. St. Louis v. Grone, 46 Mo., 574; Hannibal v. Price, 29 Mo. App., 280. Miscellaneous Illustrations. Business within and without the city. Cairo v. Adams Express Co., 54 111. App., 87; Gartside v. East St. Louis, 43 111., 47. The legislature cannot give to a city power to impose a license tax upon wagons of outside residents engaged in hauling into and out of the city. St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo., 122. See Wells v. Weston, 22 Mo., 384; Cameron v. Stephen- son, 69 Mo., 372; Corn v. Cameron, 19 Mo. App., 573. Water carts held not to be in- cluded. Lafferranderie v. New Or- leans, 3 La., 246. Where the purpose of the ordi- nance is to impose a license upon the business or occupation, one who may occasionally haul goods for another, which is not in his calling, is not subject to license. Collinsville v. Cole, 78 111., 114. Under power to license vehicles engaged in certain business a ve- hicle temporarily and accidentally in the city, on business of that nature, is not subject to license. Gary v. North Plainfield, 49 N. J. L., 110; 7 Atl. Rep., 42; North Plainfield v. Gary, 50 N. J. L., 176; 17 Atl. Rep., 1103. A License Plate may be re- quired to be attached to a vehicle licensed for use in a particular occupation, notwithstanding such vehicle already has a license plate for street use attached, and the reasonable expense for furnishing such special license plate may be charged. St. Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo., 600; 31 S. W. Rep., 1045. Compare Walker v. New Orleans, 31 La. Ann., 828. Mandamus. Where the require- ments specified by law for procur- ing a license have been complied with and the oflScer in whom au- thority is lodged refuses to issue it, he may be compelled to do so, by mandamus. St. Louis v. Weit- zel, 130 Mo., 600; 31 S. W. Rep., 1045. Excessive License. If the tax exceeds the constitutional limit, it is void. Ex parte Slaren, 3 Tex. App., 662. *6 State V. Finch, 78 Minn., 118; 80 N. W. Rep., 856; 46 L. R. A., 437. 644 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§424 connected with property and is not in violation of the consti- tution providing that all property shall be taxed in proportion to its value.*'' Charters are construed ordinarily as conferring power to impose a tax for the use of streets by vehicles,*® even though not used thereon for hire.*^ But the Chicago "wheel tax ' ' ordinance exacting a license on all wheeled vehicles using the streets, was held void in the absence of express charter power authorizing such tax.^o And as the same vehicles were taxed for general purposes at their value, as personal property, the additional license tax for the use of the streets was de- clared to be double taxation and for this reason also void. However, it has been laid down that imposing a license tax upon the business or occupation, in addition to an ad valorem tax upon the property as such used in the business is not double taxation. 51 In Indiana a license tax may be imposed under 47 Kansas City v. Richardson, 90 Mo. App., 450. Classification sustained in Terre Haute V. Kersey (Ind., 1902), 64 N. E. Rep., 469. 48 Ft. Smith v. Scruggs, 70 Ark., 549; 69 S. W. Rep., 679; 91 Am. St. Rep., 100. Power "to license, tax and regu- late vehicles." Terre Haute v. Ker- sey (Ind., 1902), 64 N. E. Rep., 469; Mason V. Cumberland, 92 Md., 451; 48 Atl. Rep., 136, applied to non-residents. 49 St. Louis V. Green, 70 Mo., 562; 7 Mo. App., 468; 6 Mo. App., 591; Kansas City v. Richardson, 90 Mo. App., 450. 50 If a right exists to impose a license fee, hy way of tax, on every person using a wheeled vehicle on the streets, in like maner such license fee may be imposed for such use of the streets in every other manner of locomotion or travel, and reach the man on horseback or the pedestrian walk- ing along the same. Chicago v. Collins, 175 111., 445; 67 Am. St. Rep., 224; 51 N. E. Rep., 907. 51 Ex parte Mirande, 73 Cal., 365; 14 Pac. Rep., 888; Carson v. Forsythe, 94 Ga., 617; 20 S. B. Rep., 116; Covington v. Woods, 98 Ky., 344; 33 S. W. Rep., 84; St. Louis V. Green, 6 Mo. App., 591; 7 Mo. App., 468; 70 Mo., 562. Bank is not exempt from munic- ipal license, because of having paid a state license. State v. Columbia, 6 S. C, 1. An ordinance requiring those who have paid their license tax on vehicles to obtain at an exorbitant price certain plates for identifica- tion, is, in effect, another license,' and, therefore, void. Walker v. New Orleans, 31 La. Ann., 828. Compare St. Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo., 600; 31 S. W. Rep., 1045. A Private Wagon, not employed in hauling for hire, can not be taxed a second time for such busi- ness. Johnson v. Macon, 62 Ga., 645. So a license of $3 on family ve- hicles already subject to an ad valorem tax was held void, as a double tax. Livingston v. Paducah, 80 Ky., 656. Ordinance held not to impose a double tax. Bishoff v. State ex 1425] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 645 the police power on vehicles used for the transportation of passengers and freight, and a second license tax under the tax- ing power may be imposed on the same vehicle.^^ §425. License on saloons and liquor selling. The regula- tion and control of saloons, dram shops and liquor selling is clearly within the police power of the state. This power may be exercised directly by the state, or it may be committed, in whole or in part, to its municipal corporations.^^ The power and manner of its exercise by the local authorities is gov- erned by the local laws applicable. The license may be im- posed as an occupation tax, in addition to the amount paid to sell liquor ;S* or it may be imposed for revenue, or as a police regulation, or for both purpo^es.^s rel. Tampa Waterworks Co. (Fla., 1901), 30 So. Rep., 808. 52 Hogan V. Indianapolis (Ind., 1902), 65 N. E. Rep., 525. Bicycles. General power to con- trol and manage streets, and power to pass ordinances under the gen- eral welfare clause, held to give no authority to pass an ordinance im- posing a license on bicycles as a condition to use the streets. State V. Bruce, 23 Wash., 777; 63 Pac. Rep., 519; Collins v. Chicago, 175 111., 445; 67 Am. St. Rep., 224; 51 N. E. Rep., 907; 29 Chicago Leg. News, 426; 4 Detroit Leg. News, No. 20; Densmore v. Brie City, 7 Pa. Dist. Rep., 355. Bicycle held to be a carriage within the meaning of a law per- mitting the collection of tolls. Geiger v. Perkiomen & Reading Turnpike Road, 167 Pa. St., 582; 31 Atl. Rep., 918. Contra. Murfin v. Detroit & Erie Plank Road Co., 113 Mich., 675; 71 N. W. Rep., 1108; Williams v. El- lis, 5 Q. B. Div., 175. See sec. 465, post. 53 A power to license places for the sale of fermented liquors granted to a city where such places were unrestrained by gen- eral law, coupled with the general power to pass ordinances for pro- moting the peace and good order of the city, justifies an ordinance which forbids any sale of such liquors in unlicensed places. Her- shoff V. Beverly, 45 N. J. L., 288; Clintonville v. Keeting, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 341. License for selling liquor may be exacted by both city and county. Los Angeles County v. Eikenberry, 131 Cal., 461; 63 Pac. Rep., 766; Ex parte Mansfield, 106 Cal., 400; 39 Pac. Rep., 775; In re Lawrence, 69 Cal., 608; 11 Pac. Rep., 217. If there be a conflict between the city ordinance and the county reg- ulation respecting the exercise of the police power the ordinance has superior force within the corporate limits of the city. Ex parte Roach, 104 Cal., 272; 37 Pac. Rep., 1044; Ex parte Mansfield, 106 Cal., 400, 403; 39 Pac. Rep., 775. 54 State V. Bennett, 19 Neb., 191; 26 N. W. Rep., 714. 55 California — Ex parte Hurl, 49 Cal., 557. Illinois — East St. Louis v. Trus- tees of Schools, 102 111., 489; King V. Jacksonville, 2 Scam. (111.), 305; Goddard v. Jacksonville, 15 646 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§426 § 426. Same subject— Conditions. Ordinances regulating the granting of saloon licenses, often impose conditions to be complied with before the license will be issued, such as requir- ing the applicant to present a petition signed by a certain num- ber of citizens, property owners, etc., and, as a rule, the courts have held such conditions valid, and not a delegation of the power to grant the license, as, usually, these conditions relate only to the mode of applying for the license. The reasons for such conditions are found in the nature of the business, making 111., 588; Byers v. Olney, 16 111., 35; O'Leary v. Cook, 28 111., 534; Block V. Jacksonville, 36 111., 301; Kettering v. Jacksonville, 50 111., 39; Strauss v. Pontiac, 40 111., 301; AsMon V. Ellsworth, 48 111., 299; Gunnarssohn v. Sterling, 92 111., 569; Harvey v. Dean, 62 111. App., 41. Indiana — Moore v. Indianapolis, 120 Ind., 483; 22 N. E. Rep., 424; Wagner v. Garrett, 118 Ind., 114; 20 N. E. Rep., 706; Linkenhelt v. Garrett, 118 Ind., 599; 20 N. B. Kep., 708. Kansas — Franklin v. Westfall, 27 Kan., 614. Michigan — ^Kitson v. Ann Arbor, 26 Mich., 325; Wolf v. Lansing, 53 Mich., 367; 19 N. W. Rep., 38. Minnesota — State v. Priester, 43 Minn., 373; 45 N. W. Rep., 712. Missouri — State v. Willard, 39 Mo. App., 251; St. Louis v. Smith, 2 Mo., 113. New HampsMre — State v. Clark, 28 N. H., 176. Pennsylvania — In re Durach, 62 Pa. St., 491. South Carolina — Charleston v. Heisemhritte, 2 MacMuUen (S. C), 233. Power to License. Power to tax and restrain the sale of liquor in- cludes power to grant licenses. Schweitzer v. Liberty, 82 Mo., 309. The right to keep a dramshop is not a legal right, but is a munic- ipal privilege. State v. Hudson, 13 Mo. App., 61; Austin v. State, 10 Mo., 591; State ex rel. v. Holt Co. Ct., 39 Mo., 521; State ex rel v. Meyers, 80 Mo., 601; Bean v. Bar- ton County Court, 33 Mo. App., b35. Who is dramshop keeper, see State ex rel. v. Schweickardt, 109 Mo., 496; 19 S. W. Rep., 47. Where a city is authorized by its charter to collect a license tax for the sale of intoxicating liquor, the powei to punish for selling liquor with- out a license is implied. Warrens- burg V. McHugh, 122 Mo., 649; 27 S. W. Rep., 523. A single sale Is sufficient to support a conviction. Springfield v. Ford, 40 Mo. App., 586; State v. Andrews, 27 Mo., 267; State V. Small, 31 Mo., 197 ; Kansas City V. Muhlback, 68 Mo., 638. Cases relating to dramshops. State ex rel. v. Francis, 95 Mo., 44; 8 S. W. Rep., 1; State v. Binder, 38 Mo., 450; State v. Winkelmeier, 35 Mo., 103; State v. Jamison, 23 Mo., 330; Cameron v. Middough, 57 Mo. App., 312. Municipal corporations some- times have power to license whole- sale as well as retailers in liquors. Roberson v. Lambertville, 38 N. J. L., 69. Power conferred by charter "to license, regulate and restrain" the sale of liquor, denied, where place of business was two or three miles remote from settled portion of city — where there were np streets, lots 1426] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 647 it necessary that the applicant shall show himself to be a suit- able person to carry on the business in such a way that it shall not threaten or become dangerous to the social order of the community. Thus an ordinance providing that an applicant shall, before receiving a license, produce the written recom- mendation of four of his nearest neighbors, was held to be or blocks, in the neighborhood of the business. Salt Lake City v. "Wagner, 2 Utah, 400. Where the city by its charter has power to enact any ordinance or by-law not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the state, it has power by ordinance to pro- hibit persons not licensed tavern keepers and physicians from vend' ing and retailing any ardent spir- its or other intoxicating liquors, for such ordinance is not incon- sistent with the constitution and laws of the state and is therefore valid. Markle v. Akron, 14 Ohio, 586. Under the general welfare clause in a charter, providing that "the mayor and municipal assembly shall have power to pass all ordi- nances that they may consider necessary to the peace, good order, health, prosperity, comfort and security of the city and the citi- zens thereof," etc., a city may not pass an ordinance making it penal for one who has lawfully pur- chased liquors without the limits of the city to receive the same in the city without paying a tax for so doing, and, notwithstanding the sale of liquor is absolutely forbid- den in the city. Such ordinance is also invalid as a tax measure because it is neither ad valorem nor uniform. Henderson v. Hey- ward, 109 Ga., 373; 34 S. B. Rep., 590; 47 L. R. A., 366. Amount op License. Arkansas — Drew County v. Ben- nett, 43 Ark., 364. California — Merced County v. Fleming, 111 Cal., 46; 43 Pac. Rep., 392. Georgia — Williams v. West Point, 68 Ga., 816. Illinois — Swarth v. People, 109 111., 621; Dennehy v. Chicago, 120 111., 627; 12 N. E. Rep., 227. Indiana — Cheny v. Shelbyville, 19 Ind., 84; Wiley v. Owens, 39 Ind., 429; Sweet v. Wabash, 41 Ind., 7. Louisiana — Jones v. Grady, 25 La. Ann., 586; Goldsmith v. New Orleans, 31 La. Ann., 646. New York — People v. Medberry, 39 N. Y. Supp., 207; 17 Misc. Rep., 8. Wisconsin — McGuigan v. Bel- mont, 89 Wis., 637; 62 N. W. Rep., 421. Reasonableness of Amount of License. A license of $50 per month sustained. Ex parte Hurl, 49 Cal., 557; In re Guerrero, 69 Cal., 88; 10 Pac. Rep., 261. Thirteen dollars per month held reasonable. Los Angeles v. Eiken- berry, 131 Cal., 461; 63 Pac. Rep., 766. One hundred and fifty dollars per month sustained. Ex parte Felchlin, 96 Cal., 360; 31 Pac. Rep., 224; 31 Am. St. Rep., 223. Amount Not a Judiciai, Qui:s- TiON. The fee charged for a whole- sale liquor license is not a tax, but is the price of a privilege which may be denied altogether. The reasonableness of the amount of license is not a question for the court. Dennehy v. Chicago, 120 648 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§426 legal.^® So a statute requiring the applicant to file a petition signed by himself and a majority of the qualified resident voters of the ward, city or town, in which the applicant resides, was held to he constitutional and not a delegation of legislative power.^^ So an ordinance requiring the applicant to file with his application a certificate of five respectable citizens of the neighborhood in which the business is to be conducted, as to his character, was held not to be an unreasonable condition.^® Laws referring to the people of the locality in which the pro- posed saloon is to be located, the question whether license should be granted therein to sell intoxicating liquors have been sustained.^^ But an ordinance delegating to the mayor the power to designate the districts in the city in which liquor might be sold under license, was condemned as a delegation of the power to the mayor to regulate the business.^" So where a bond was required and its approval was left to the discretion of an approving board, who might reject the bond, if the prin- 111., 627; 12 N. E. Rep., 227; Dis- tilling Co. V. Chicago, 112 111., 19. Pkohibitoey. An ordinance fix- ing a saloon license at $1,000 is in its nature prohibitory and therefore void. Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala., 461; Craig v. Burnett, 32 Ala., 728. Sufficiency of Oedinance. State V. Andrus, 11 Neb., 523; 10 N. "W. Rep.; 410. Ordinance void in part. State v. Hardy, 7 Neb., 377. 66Whitten v. Covington, 43 Ga., 421. sTGroesch v. State, 42 Ind., 547; House V. State, 41 Miss., 737; Jones V. Hilliard, 69 Ala., 300; State v. Brown, 19 Fla., 563. Ordinance requiring written con- sent of property owners of block, held valid. . Kansas City v. Fland- ers, 71 Mo., 281. 58 In re Bickerstaff, 70 Cal., 35; 11 Pac. Rep., 393. Requiring that the petition shall be signed by a majority of the male citizens over twenty-one years, and a majority of the fe- male citizens over eighteen years of age, was sustained. Rohrbacher V. Jackson, 51 Miss., 735. Requiring the applicant to se- cure a permit from the board of police commissioners as a condi- tion to the issue of the license was held not to be a delegation of authority to issue the license. In, re Guerrero, 69 Cal., 88; 10 Pac. Rep., 261. 69 Connecticut — State v. Wilcox, 42 Conn., 364. Kentucky — Anderson v. Com- monwealth, 13 Bush. (Ky.), 485. Massachusetts — Commonwealth V. Bennett, 108 Mass., 27; Com- monwealth V. Dean, 110 Mass., 357. New Jersey— Paxil v. Gloucester County, 50 N. J. L., 585; 15 Atl. Rep., 272; State v. Court, 36 N. J. L., 72. Pennsylvania — Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. St., 491. 60 State V. Kantler, 33 Minn., 69 ; 21 N. W. Rep., 856; In re Wilson, 32 Minn., 145; 19 N. W. Rep., 723. § 427] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 649 cipal was known to be a person whose character and habits would render him an unfit person to conduct the business of selling liquor, this was held to be, in effect, a delegation of the power to reject or approve the bond, and for that reason in- valid.®^ Where the state authorizes municipalities to create excise boards, the creation of an excise board by the city, with power to regulate the traffic in intoxicating drinks is held not to be a delegation of the power by the city, but the board re- ceives its power from the state under the act providing for its creati9-n.^2 g^t one of the federal courts held that an ordinance requiring that no license be issued to sell liquor, unless the per- son desiring the same shall have obtained the written consent of a majority of the board of police commissioners of the city and county of San Francisco, was void and in violation of the constitution, in forbidding a license to be issued unless upon the arbitrary and uncontrolled written consent of a certain designated number of persons.®^ § 427. License on street railways and cars. The right of the municipal corporation to levy and collect a license tax on street railways and cars depends upon the local laws and the terms under which the franchise to maintain the tracks in the streets and to run cars thereon' were granted. It is competent for the state to levy an excise tax upon a railroad corporation for the privilege of exercising the corporation franchise within the ei Robison v. Miner & Houg, 68 pend upon obtaining the consent of Mich., 549; 37 N. W. Rep., 21. a certain number of persons, was 62 Riley V. Trenton, 51 N. J. L., void. 498; 18 Atl. Rep., 116. Where the ordinance requires The power to grant the license the applicant to obtain the consent cannot be delegated by the council of a majority of the board of police to the mayor. Winants v. Bay- commissioners, and being unable to onne, 44 N. J. L., 114. do so, a writ of mandamus to Recommendation of at least ten compel the collector of licenses to freeholders required to be fur- issue the license was refused, up- nished by the applicant. Winants on the ground that if the act is V. Bayonne, 44 N. J. L., 114. constitutional he must comply 63 In re Christensen, 43 Fed., with its requirements before he 243. can demand a license, and if un- The court followed the decision constitutional, the collector had in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 IT. no power to issue licenses at all. S., 356; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 1064, Purdy v. Sinton, 56.Cal., 133. where it was held that an ordi- Vesting the discretion of grant- nance making the granting of a ing or refusing a license to sell license to carry on a laundry de- liquors by the court in the com- 650 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§427 state."* And this power may be delegated by the state to mu- nicipalities, giving to them power to impose a license fee upon street railroads and other corporations for the privilege of using and enjoying the corporate franchise within its limits.®^ Where the franchise does not grant the privilege of using and exercising the right of way for a street railroad, free from any license, the exaction of one does not impair the obligation of the contract.^® Under most municipal charters as elsewhere stated, legislative action, usually by ordinance is required to impose license tax, fix the terms thereof and the manner of its payment."^ But where the charter provides for the payment of license fees to the local corporation and the amount is fixed such fees may be collected without an ordinance. "* An ordi- nance requiring street railway companies to pay an annual license fee of so much per car may be enforced against all companies whose charters provide that they shall be subject to the payment of license fees. In one case the charter, grant- ing the right to construct and operate the road, was made sub- ject "to the payment to the city of the same license fee an- mlssioners of roads .and revenue, held valid. Mayson v. Atlanta, 77 Ga., 662; Thorn v. Atlanta, 77 Ga., 661. 0* Main v. Grand Trunin Ry. Co., 142 U. S., 217; 35 L. Ed., 994. 65 Byrne v. Chicago General Ry. Co., 63 111. App., 438, affirming right of Chicago to exact a license tax. An ordinance fixing a tax of $50 upon every railroad running through the city was held to he valid and within the power of the city to pass under the authority given it by the state; being a tax imposed upon the business in the town and not a tax on the prop- erty of the railroad company. Richmond & Danville Ry. Co. v. Reidsville, 101 N. C, 404; 8 S. E. Rep., 124; 2 L. R. A., 284. A license on "each and every street railway company," in addi- tion to an ad valorem tax on the railroad property, sustained, as not unequal taxationi Newport News & 0. P. Ry. & E. Co. V. Newport News, 100 Va., 157; 4 Va. Sup. Ct. Rep., 31; 40 S. E. Rep., 645. 06 New Orleans v. Railroad Co., 40 La. Ann.,.587; 4 So. Rep., 512; State V. Herod, 29 Iowa, 123. Right to license denied under condition of grant. Philadelphia v. Empire Pass. Ry. Co., 177 Pa. St., 382; 35 Atl. Rep., 721. Aftee Expiration of Franchise. After the expiration of the term for which the franchise of a street railroad company was granted, if not renewed, it is not liable for the license lax during the time it occupies the streets after the expi- ration of the franchise, it being a mere trespasser on the streets. Cincinnati Incline PI. Ry. Co. v. Cincinnati, 52 Ohio St., 609; 44 N. E. Rep., 327. 6' Sec. 413, supra. 68 New York v. Broadway & Sev- enth Ave. Ry. Co., 97 N. Y., 275, 284. §427] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 651 nually for all cars run thereon as is now paid by other city railroads in said city." At the time two railroads paid a li- cense fee of $50 per car, one paid $20 per car, and three paid no license. Here it was held that a license fee of $50 per car could be legally levied and collected.®® Where the local corporation is given power to grant franchises to street railroad companies and to stipulate the conditions upon which they may exercise the privilege, it has authority to impose a license fee as a con- dition to the granting of the franchise.^^ Such license fee may be fixed by virtue of special provisions in the municipal cliarter or it may be stipulated in the franchise that the license fee thereafter to be fixed by the council shall be paid.'^i The license fee may be imposed for revenue or for police rgulation.''^ Thus an ordinance imposing an annual license of $50 per car 60 New York v. Broadway & Sev- enth Ave. Ry. Co., 97 N. Y., 275. 70 New York v. Eighth Avenue Ry. Co., 118 N. Y., 389; 23 N. B. Rep., 550; New York v. Broadway & Seventh Ave. Ry. Co., 97 N. Y., 275. 71 New York v. Eighth Avenue Ry. Co., 118 N. Y., 389, 398; 23 N. E. Rep., 550; New York v. Broad- way & Seventh Ave. Ry. Co., 97 N. Y., 275. Ordinance Imposing Penalty. The fact that the council has passed an ordinance imposing a penalty for failure of a street rail- way company to procure a certifi- cate for a license, does not prevent the city from maintaining an ac- tion to recover the license fee. New York v. Eighth Ave. Ry. Co., 118 N. Y., 389; 23 N. E. Rep., 550. Statutes sometimes authorize cities to exact a certain per cent of the gross earnings of the street railroad company as a condition of the granting the franchise. 3 Heydecker's Gen. Laws N. Y. (2d Ed.), 3314; Cincinnati St. Ry. Co. V. Cincinnati, 8 Ohio N. P., 80; New York v. Twenty-third Street Ry. Co., 79 N. Y. Suppl., 323. 72 Both an ad valorem tax and the tax upon the use of the com- pany's cars as street railroad cars can be exacted. Kansas City v. Corrigan, 18 Mo. App., 206; Aurora V. McGannon, 138 Mo., 38; 39 S. W. Rep., 469; Springfield v. Smith, 138 Mo., 645; 40 S. W..Rep., 757; St. Louis V. Green, 70 Mo., 562, and 7 Mo. App., 468; St. Louis v. Ernst, 95 Mo., 360; 8 S. W. Rep., 558. Such power may be exercised by the city as a police regulation or for the purpose of raising revenue within the constitutional limita- tions. Springfield v. Smith, 138 Mo., 646; 40 S. W. Rep., 757. A contract on the part of the city not to levy and collect a tax from a railroad company there- after, is ultra vires and void. Springfield v. Smith, 138 Mo., 645 ; 40 S. W. Rep., 757; State v. H. & St. J. Ry. Co., 75 Mo., 208. As to exemption from license fee, see State y. Herod, 29 Iowa, 123.' An ordinance taxing a street railway $10 for each car operated by it, and imposing a fine on the company for operating its cars 652 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION, [§427 operated by a street railroad company within the corporate limits was held to be a valid exercise of the police powerJ* And it has been held that authority to license hackmen, dray- omnibus drivers, etc., and all others pursuing like occu- men, pations and to prescribe their compensation, gives power to license street railways^* Unless restricted by law the license fee may be increased from time to timeJ^ ■without having paid such license tax, is yalid, and a conviction of the manager for violating such ordinance was proper. Springfield v. Smith, 138 Mo., 645; 40 S. W. Rep., 757. 73 Allerton v. Chicago, 6 Fed. Rep., 555. 7-» Allerton v. Chicago, 6 Fed. Rep., 555. The tax may be imposed under an ordinance relating to a license on omnibuses, carriages, hacks and other vehicles used in carry- ing passengers. North Braddoek V. Second Ave. Tract. Co., 28 Pittsb. L. J., 27. The operating of a street rail- road by horse and steam is a busi- ness, within the meaning of the law, giving the city power to levy a license tax. New Orleans v. Railroad Co., 40 La. Ann., 587; 4 So. Rep., 512. ' Police Regulation. Johnson v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St., 445; Frankford & Phila. Ry. Co. v. Philadelphia, 58 Pa. St., 119; Har- risburg v. Bast Harrisburg Pass. Ry. Co., 4 Pa. Dist. R. (Com. PI.), 683; Harrisburg v. Citizens' Pass. Ry. Co., 4^Pa. Dist. R. (Com. PI.), 687. License for Revenue Denied. A provision in the charter of the city granting power "to license and regulate," does not authorize the city to exact license fees for reve- nue purposes from a street rail- way company. North Hudson Ry. Co. V. Hoboken, 41 N. J. L., 71; New York v. Second Ave. Ry. Co., 32 N. Y., 261. The imposition of a license on the passenger cars of a street rail- way company to raise revenue would be an invasion of the char- tered right, but a charge for a license as a police regulation, al- though it may Incidentally add to the receipts of the city, Is valid. Johnson v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St., 445. A license on passenger railroad cars for revenue purposes only is not an ordinance for police and internal government. Hence, un- der general power, without special authority, an ordinance imposing annual tax on passenger railroad cars running into cities is valid. New York v. Second Avenue R. R. Co., 32 N. Y., 261; New York v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 33 N. Y., 42. These cases considered and lim- ited in New York v. Broadway & Seventh Ave. R. R. Co., 97 N. Y., 275. A license for revenue cannot be imposed where the franchise au- thorizes the company to operate its cars without any other condi- tions than the payment of a cer- tain percentage of its receipts. New York v. Twenty-third Street Ry. Co., 79 N. Y. Suppl., 323. 76 R. R. Co. V. Philadelphia, 101 U. S., 528; Johnson v. Philadel- phia, 60 Pa. St., 445; State ex rel. Cream City R. Co. v. Hilbert, 72 Wis., 184; 39 N. W. Rep., 326. Method of Calctjlating License i428] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 653 § 428. License on miscellaneous trades, occupations, avoca- tions, etc' A license under various charter provisions of the following trades, occupations, avocations, etc., has been sus- tained: Auctioneers,''® second-hand dealers,'''^ junk dealers,'^* pawn brokers,''" laundry and wash houses.*" hotels and board- Tax. Under an ordinance requir- ing a street railroad company to pay $4 per lineal foot for every car, and in addition 2% % of the gross earnings, it was held that in calculating the amount due at $4 per lineal foot the company was not entitled to any allowance for the time when the cars were not in use. Cincinnati St. Ry. Co. V. Cincinnati, 8 Ohio N. P., 80. Under an ordinance imposing a tax of 12.50 on each working horse in the city it was held that a street railway company was liable for this sum upon each horse in addi- tion to a stipulated license upon each car. Montreal Street Ry. Co. V. Montreal, 23 S. C. (Can.), 259, 76 Carroll v. Tuskaloosa, 12 Ala., 173; Port Jervis v. Close, 6 N. Y. Supp., 211; Iowa City v. Newell, 115 Iowa, 55; 87 N. W. Rep., 739; White V. Kent, 11 Ohio St., 550; StuU V. De Mattos, 23 Wash., 71; 62 Pac. Rep., 451; 51 L. R. A., 892. Power to license must exist. Fowle V. Alexandria, 3 Pet. (28 U. S.), 398; 7 L. Ed., 719. One licensed as auctioneer can- not delegate his authority to sell to another. Stone v. State, 12 Mo., 400. An auctioneer in the city of St. Louis was formally compelled to obtain a license from the state as well as from the city. Simpson v. Savage, 1 Mo., 359. A person may be guilty under the act to license auctioneers of exercising a trade or business of a public auctioneer without a li- cense, although he may receive no compensation for the act of sell- ing. State v. Rucker, 24 Mo., 557. '7 Atlantic City v. Goldstein, 67 N. J. L., 517; 51 Atl. Rep., 471. One who buys and sells as a mere incident to a general busi- ness is not a second-hand dealer. Eastman v. Chicago, 79 111., 178. 78 A Junk Shop is a place where old metals, ropes, rags, etc., are bought and sold. Duluth v. Bloom, 55 Minn., 97; 21 L. R. A., 689; 56 N. W. Rep., 580; Charleston v. Goldsmith, 12 Rich. Law (S. C), 470. One who buys, to sell again, from a certain number of carriage manufacturers, who are customers of his, the odds and ends of new iron which have been left from larger pieces used in the manu- facture of carriages and which are not available for further use in that line, is not a junk dealer. "The reasons for requiring junk dealers to take out licenses do not apply to such a business." Per Morton, J., in Com. v. Ringold, 182 Mass., 308; 65 N. E. Rep., 374. '9 Power to license must be con- ferred. Shuman v. Ft. Wayne, 127 Ind., 109; 28 N.- E. Rep., 560; 11 L. R. A., 378. The power to license is usually conferred by charter. Colorado — Soloman v. Denver, 12 Colo. App., 179; 55 Pac. Rep., 199. Georgia — Phillips v. Atlanta, 78 Ga., 773; 3 S. B. Rep., 431. Illinois — Launder v. Chicago, 111 111., 291; 53 Am. Rep., 625; 654 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§428 ing houses,*! cattle and horse dealers,®^ livery stables,** archi- tects,** printing,*^ stationary engineers,*® railroad engineers,*^ Kuhn V. Chicago, 30 111. App., 203. Michigan — Grand Rapids v. Braudy, 105 Mich., 670; 64 N. W. Rep., 29; 55 Am. St. Rep., 472: Van Baalen v. People, 40 Mich., 258. Minnesota — St. Paul v. Lytle, 69 Minn., 1; 71 N. W. Rep., 703. Missouri — St. Joseph v. Levin, 128 Mo., 588; 31 S. W. Rep., 101; 49 Am. St. Rep., 577. Under a grant of power "to li- cense, tax, regulate, suppress and prohibit hawkers, peddlers, pawn- brokers, and to revoke such license at pleasure," the court said, "It is a matter purely discretionary with the city authorities whether they will license and regulate the busi- ness of pawnbrokers, or wholly prohibit and suppress the business by them within the city. In such case, if the city grants a license, it may impose such conditions and burdens as it may see fit. This latitude of power grows out of the fact that it is discretionary to pro- hibit the business, or license it on such terms as the city may choose." Launder v. Chicago, 111 111., 291; 53 Am. Rep., 625; Schwuchow V. Chicago, 68 111., 444; Wiggins V. Chicago, 68 111., 372. 80 St. Joseph V. Lung, 93 Mo. App., 626; 67 S. W. Rep., 697; State V. Camp Sing, 18 Mont, 128; 56 Am. St. Rep., 551; 32 L. R. A., 635; 44 Pac. Rep., 516. 81 St. Louis V. Bircher, 76 Mo., 431, affirming 7 Mo. App., 169. 82 St. Louis V. Knox, 6 Mo. App., 247. 83 License is on the occupation. Municipality No. 2 v. Dubois, 10 Ca. Ann., 56; State v. Powell, 100 N. C, 525; 6 S. B. Rep., 424. License tax based on the num- ber of carriages kept for hire, sus- tained. Howland v. Chicago, 108 111., 496. 84 A license tax may be imposed upon architects under power in the city charter to license trades, avo- cations and professions. Cook v. Memphis, 94 Tenn., 692; 30 S. W. Rep., 742. Architects, as members of a lib- eral profession, are ejusdem gen- eris with lawyers, doctors and artists of like professions. St. Louis V. Herthel, 88 Mo., 128, af- firming 14 Mo. App., 467. 85 Peinting Office. An ordi- nance imposing a license fee of $25 on job printing office sus- tained. New Orleans v. Clark, 15 La. Ann., 614. Under the law imposing a li- cense tax on "manufacturing com- panies," a company publishing a newspaper was held not to be within the law. Evening Journal Assn. v. Board of Assessors, 47 N. J. L., 36; 54 Am. Rep., 114. But a company doing job print- ing, engraving, electrotyping, was held to be within the meaning of the law. lb. 86 St. Louis V. Meyrose Lamp Mfg. Co., 139 Mo., 560; 41 S. W. Rep., 244; 61 Am. St. Rep., 474; St. Louis V. Tamm Bros. Glue Co., 139 Mo., 572; 41 S. W. Rep., 1100, distinguishing Baltimore v. Rad- ecke, 49 Md.. 217. The city is not liable for negli- gence in the inspection of boilers, although a city ordinance under the charter Imposed a penalty on any person using such boiler be- fore inspection. Mead v. New Haven, 40 Conn., 72. 87 Statute requiring all railroad engineers engaged in running a §428] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 655 city weighers,*^ city scavengers,*^ express companies,^'* foreign corporations,^! brokers,*^ real estate agents and brokers,*^ train of cars or engine to be exam- ined and licensed, held to be valid as a police regulation. McDonald V. State, 81 Ala., 279; 2 So. Rep., 829; 60 Am. Rep., 158. 88 Hoffman v. Jersey City, 34 N. J. L., 172. A city has power to provide for the measuring or weighing of hay, wood, or any other article for sale within its limits.? But such charges must be reasonable and cannot be directed to the end of raising a revenue. Taylor, Cleveland & Co. v. Pine Bluff, 34 Ark., 603. 89 License to haul garbage and requiring a certificate of character from the board of health held valid. St. Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo., 600; 31 S. W. Rep., 1045. An ordinance providing for li- censing persons to clean privy vaults and remove dirt and filth from the city was held to be a lawful and proper exercise of the power "to preserve the health of the city and to prevent and re- move nuisances." Boehm & Loe- ber V. Baltimore, 61 Md., 259, dis- tinguishing Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md., 217; 33 Am. Rep., 239. So by-law prohibiting any per- son not duly licensed therefor, from removing house dirt and offal from the city was held not to be in restraint of trade and valid. In re Vandine, 6 Pick. (Mass.), 187. But an ordinance providing for city scavengers, prescribing the duties and regulations governing the same, providing a license therefor, being an attempt to au- thorize the creation of a monopoly of a lawful calling, is in restraint of trade and void. In re Lowe, 54 Kan., 757; 39 Pac. Rep., 710. 9» Adams Exp. Co. v. Owensboro, 85 Ky., 265; 3 S. W. Rep., 370. City may impose an acL valorem tax upon the gross annual re- ceipts of an express company from its business done in the city. Such tax does not violate the constitu- tion which requires uniformity and equality because different from that imposed upon merchants. The tax is valid where all persons en- gaged in the same business are taxed alike. American Exp. Co. v. St. Joseph, 66 Mo., 675; St. Louis V. Sternberg, 69 Mo., 289. See Kansas City v. Corrigan, 18 Mo. App., 206. Power to license denied. South- ern Express Co. v. Tuscaloosa (Ala., 1902), 31 So. Rep., 450. A license on express companies is unconstitutional if it consti- tutes an exaction, interference with, or attempt to regulate, inter- state or foreign commerce. South- ern Exp. Co. V. Ensley, 116 Fed'. Rep., 756. Sec. 262, supra. 91 Calculated on basis of busi- ness done in city. New Orleans v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 106 La. Ann., 31; 30 So. Rep., 254; Com. v. Milton, 12 B. Hon. (51 Ky.), 212; 54 Am. Dec, 522. 92 Street brokers may be li- censed. Walton V. Augusta, 104 Ga., 757; 30 S. E. Rep., 964. One who buys claims for him- self, held not to be a broker. Gast V. Buckley, 23 Ky. Law Rep., 992; 64 S. W. Rep., 632. Railway ticket broker. Hirsh- fleld V. Dallas, 29 Tex App., 242; 15 S. W. Rep., 124. Tax on the business of money and exchange brokers held not to be a tax on foreign exchange. Na- than V. Louisiana, 8 How. (U. 656 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§428 dealer in "futures,"** occupiers of market stands and stalls,*^ butchers and keepers of meat shops,*^ bakers,*^ me- chanical trades,** merchants,** manufacturers,* peddlers,^ S.), 73. Tax on foreign bill of lading is tax on exports. Fairbank V. U. S., 181 U. S., 283. Brokers representing foreign principals, license tax on as in- terference witb foreign and inter- state commerce, see section 258, supra. 93Wiltse V. State, 8 Heisk. (Tenn.), 544; Blackford v. State, 8 Heisk. (Tenn.), 538. Question discussed. Rounds v. Alee, 116 Iowa, 345; 89 N. W. Rep., 1098. Ordinance providing for the li- censing of real estate agents and brokers, held valid against con- tention that they violated the bill of rights of the state constitution. St. Louis V. McCann, 157 Mo., 301; 57 S. W. Rep., 1016. 9* Persons engaged in the busi- ness of buying or selling produce or other products for future deliv- ery may be required to pay a li- cense tax. Alexander v. State, 86 Ga., 246; 12 S. E. Rep., 408; 10 L. R. A., 859; Memphis Brokerage Ass'n V. Cullen, 79 Tenn. (11 Lea), 75. 95 Ash V. People, 11 Mich., 347. The power to establish and reg- ulate markets authorizes an ordi- nance requiring persons occupying stands in the market to pay the sum of twenty-five cents. Cincin- nati V. Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 257. Regulation of markets, § 481 et seq., post. 96 St. Louis T. Freivogal, 95 Mo., 533; 8 S. W. Rep., 715. Meat vendor. St. Paul v. Colter, 12 Minn., 41, 90; Am. Dec, 278. Butchers' wagons. Frommer v. Richmond, 31 Gratt. (Va.), 646. Cannot be imposed as a police regulation, when. Chaddock v. Day, 75 Mich., 527; 42 N. W. Rep., 977; 4 L. R, A., 809; 13 Am. St. Rep., 468. 97 Power "to license and regulate the weight and price of bread, and prohibit the baking for sale, ex- cept by those licensed," gives au- thority to license bakers and fix the weight of loayes, and the pow- er was held not to be unconstitu- tional. Mobile V. Yuille, 3 Ala., 137. 98 Under an ordinance imposing a license tax on every individual carrying on the business of mas- ter builder, a contractor who em- ploys workmen in executing his contracts is not exempt from the payment of a license tax. New Or- leans v. O'Neil, 43> La. Ann., 1182; 10 So. Rep., 245. But one who con- structs and shapes material with his own hands will be exempted from the license, although he em- ploys other mechanics who work with him. New Orleans v. Lag- man, 43 La. Ann., 1180; 10 So. Rep., 244. 99 Cape Girardeau v. Riley, 72 Mo., 220; St. Louis v. Knox, 6 Mo. App., 247. Charter power "to license, tax and regulate * * * transient merchants," etc., authorizes an or- dinance taxing such merchants. Mt. Pleasant v. Clutch, 6 Iowa, 546. Additional Tax. Tuscaloosa v. Halczstein, 134 Ala., 636; 32 So. Rep., 1007. A Merchant is one who traffics or carries on trade ; he is a traffick- er as well as a trader. To traffic is to pass goods from one person to another for an equivalent in goods §428] OHDINANCES RELATINa TO TAXATION. 657 or money. Kansas City v. Vind- quest, 36 Mo. App., 584. Sec. 1900, R. S. M., 1889, provides that, "No municipal corporation in this state shall have the power to impose a license tax upon any business avo- cation, pursuit or calling, unless such business, avocation, pursuit or calling be specially named as taxable in the charter of such mu- nicipal corporation, or unless such power be conferred by statute." It has been expressly held that the above provision applies to Kansas City, notwithstanding it waa framed under constitutional pro- visions. Kansas City v. Lorber, 64 Mo. App., 604; St. Joseph v. Port- er, 29 Mo. App., 605. Under the Kansas City charter the term merchant has been held to mean dealers of every kind in commercial commodities, includ- ing produce dealers. Kansas City v. Lorber, 64 Mo. App., 604. See Kansas City v. Johnson, 78 Mo., 661. So, an ice dealer falls within the term of merchant. Kansas City V Vindquest, 36 Mo. App., 584. The term merchant, as used in the charter of St. Joseph, was held sufficiently generic to include one who is "engaged in the business of selling fresh meats at wholesale from cars." St. Joseph v. Dye, 72 Mo. App., 214. Payment of taxes on a different stock of goods as a merchant dur- ing a given fiscal year is no de- fense to an action for. the tax of a merchant legally imposed upon a stock of wares and merchandise which he had been engaged in sell- ing as a merchant on the 1st day of January of that year and for three months preceding that day. Kansas City v. Johnson, 78 Mo., 661. See State ex rel. v. Tracy, 94 Mo., 217; 6 S. W. Rep., 709; Au- rora V. McGannon, 138 Mo., 38; 39 S. W. Rep., 469; St. Louis v. Stern- berg, 69 Mo., 289; State v. Whit- taker, 33 Mo., 457; State v." West, 34 Mo., 424; State v. Cox, 32 Mo., 566; State v. Willis, 37 Mo., 192; State V. Jacobs, 38 Mo., 379. A Produce Dealek who is clearly a merchant may be taxed as a mer- chant under the provision which authorizes the city to "license, tax or regulate merchants." Kansas City V. Crush, 151 Mo., 128; 52 S. W. Rep., 286. Uniformity, Aurora V. McGannon, 138 Mo., 38; 39 S. W. Rep., 469. As to difiEerence be- tween wholesale merchant and manufacturer under Kansas City charter, see Kansas City v. Butt, 88 Mo. App., 237. Mercantile Agent. Brookfield V. Kitchen, 163 Mo., 546; 63 IS. W. Rep., 8.25. 1 Manufacturer. One who con- ducts a business of slaughtering hogs and converts them into lard and cured meats is subject to a tax as a manufacturer. Engle v. Sohn, 41 Ohio St., 691; 52 Am. Rep., 103. Denied. Thomas vt Snead, 99 Va., 613; 39 S. B. Rep., 586. 2 For selling commodities. In re Nightingale, 11 Pick. (Mass.), 168. Hucksters. Dunham v. Roches- ter, 5 Cowen (N. Y.), 462. Hawkers and peddlers. State ex rel. V. Noonan, 59 Mo. App., 524. Under a charter authorizing the city to "restrain" hawking and peddling, an ordinance requiring a license to be procured by any one pursuing the occupation of peddler is valid. Huntington v. Cheesbro, 57 Ind., 74. License of two dollars and fifty cents on hawkers, sustained. Cher- okee V. Fox, 34 Kan., 16; 7 Pac. Rep., 625. Express power necessary. St. 42 658 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§428 house to house canvassers,^ sewing machine agents,* billiard halls and pool rooms,^ theaters, theatrical exhibitions,^ horse App., Paul V. Stultz, 33 Minn., 233; 22 N. ■W. Rep., 634. Peddler Defined. "A peddler, within the general accepted mean- ing of the word, is a small retail dealer, who carries his merchan- dise with him, traveling from place to place, and from house to house, exposing his goods for sale and selling them." There are five ele- ments which constitute a peddler: 1. He should have no fixed place of dealing, but should travel from place to place. 2. He should carry with him the wares he offers for sale, not merely samples thereof. 3. He should sell them at the time he offers them, not merely enter into an executory contract for future sale. 4. He should deliver the goods then and there, not merely con- tract to deliver them in the future. 5. The sales made by him should be to consumers and not confined exclusively to dealers in the arti- cles sold by him. "The fact that the sales are to dealers and not to consumers, is the distinguishing feature." Agent of wholesale shoemakers' supplies who sold and delivered such goods to dealers only, and not to consumers, held not, a ped- dler. Ordinance definition too broad. Per Bram, J., in St. Paul V. Briggs, 85 Minn., 290; 88 N. W. Rep., 984, quoting from and ap- proving article in 34 Am. Law Reg., 569, citing South Bend v. Martin, 142 Ind., 31; 29 L. R. A., 531; 41 Cent. L. J., 400; 41 N. B. Rep., 315. The word "peddler," as used in a particular ordinance, held to be employed as defined by statute. Moberly v. Hoover, 93 Mo. 663; 67 S. W. Rep., 721. "Peddlers or itinerant retailers of goods." West v. Mt. Sterling, 23 Ky. Law Rep., 1670; 65 S. W. Rep., 120. - Book Canvasser. Warren v. Greer, 117 Pa. St., 207; 11 Atl. Rep., 415. A license tax imposed upon per- sons going from house to house to sell goods is a tax upon the privi- lege of conducting the business and not a tax on the goods. Tem- ple V. Sumner, 51 Miss., 13. Selling on streets or soliciting orders from house to house. Brownback v. North Wales, 194 Pa. St., 609; 45 Atl. Rep., 660. * A license tax on sewing ma- chine companies and dealers in sewing machines is not void be- cause not a uniform mode of tax- ation. Weaver v. State, 89 Ga., 639; 15 S. E. Rep., 840. Tax on solicitors or canvassers of sewing machines sustained, against the objection that such tax conflicted with sec. 3 of art. X. of the state constitution (Mis- souri) and the 14th amendment of the federal constitution. St. Louis v. Bowler, 94 Mo., 630; 7 S. W. Rep., 434. 5 Morgan v. State (Neb., 1902), 90 N. W. Rep., 108. The license is on the occupation. Ex parte Bernert, 62 Cal., 524; Merriam v. New Orleans, 14 La. Ann., 318; New Orleans v. Tur- pin, 13 La. Ann., 56. 6 Charity Hospital v. Stickney, 2 La. Ann., 550; Charity Hospital v. De Bar, 11 La. Ann., 385. "The levying of an excise has been practiced in regard to other occupations, and the constitution- ality of it has never been doubted. §428] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. 650 i'aces/ row boats kept for hire,^ packing and canning oysters," dealers in pistols and cartridges,^** gift enterprises,!^ sale of cigarettes,!^ ferry boats, etc.,!^ telegraph and telephone com- panies,!* insurance companies, foreign or domestic, and their agents doing business within the corporation.^^ There can, therefore, be no objec- tion to it in the present case, ad- mitting theatrical entertainments to be as meritorious as other oc- cupations. But it seems to be pe- culiarly proper in employments of this kind. They require to be watched. Towns are put to ex- pense in preserving order, and it is proper they should be indemni- fied for inconveniences or injuries occasioned by employments of this nature." Boston v. Schaffer, 9 Pick. (Mass.), 415. ■ Horse Racks exhibited within inclosures, where admission fee is charged the public, are shows and amusements within the statute conferring power upon cities to li- cense, tax and regulate theatrical and other exhibitions. Webber v. Chicago, 148 111., 313; 36 N. E. Rep., 70. 8 Foyer v. Des Plaines, 22 111. App., 576. » Tax on occupation. State v. Ap- plegarth, 81 Md., 293; 28 L. R. A., 812; 31 Atl. Rep., 961. 10 Browne v. Selser, 106 La., 691; 31 So. Rep., 290. 11 Gift Enterprises, as premium stamps, periodical trading stamps and similar schemes and devices by means of which certain mer- chants, manufacturers and other persons engaged in lawful callings are advertised, etc. Humes v. Ft. Smith, 93 Fed. Rep., 857; Fleet- wood V. Read, 21 Wash., 547; 58 Pac. Rep., 665. Compare Ex parte McKenna, 126 CaL, 429; 58 Pac. Rep., 916. 12 Gundling v. Chicago, 176 111., 340; 52 N. E, Rep., 44; 48 L. R. A., 230, affirmed in 177 U. S., 183; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 633. Miscellaneous. "Raising, graz- ing and pasturing sheep" does not apply to "ne driving sheep through the county. Mono County v. Flan- igan, 130 Cal., 105; 62 Pac. Rep., 293. "Gross profits" construed. New Orleans v. Comptoir National d'Escompte de Paris, 104 La., 214; 28 So. Rep., 910. 13 Wiggins Perry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S., 365; 102 111., 560; Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich., 43; Reddick v. Amelin, 1 Mo., 5; St. Louis V. Waterloo-Carondelet T. Co., 14 Mo. App., 216. In granting the license charge for the round trip may be limited. State V. Sickmann, 65 Mo. App., 499. The imposition of such charge does not contravene the commerce clause o' the federal constitution. Section 266, 267, supra. 1* A reasonable license imposed upon telegraph companies for the privilege of transacting business within the corporation may be au- thorized. Western Union Tel. Co. V. Fremont, 39 Neb., 692; 58 N. W. Rep., 415; Western Union Tel. Co. V. Richmond, 26 Graft. (Va.), 1. Tax on property of telegraph company sustained. Sec. 262, su- pra. So a reasonable license tax may be levied and collected for the privilege of erecting poles and stringing wires in the streets, etc. Sec. 261, supra. An annual license on the poles 660 ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. [§428 of a telephone company which is already established under an ordi- nance granting permission to erect its lines, is not a valid exercise of police power. New Orleans v. Great So. Tel. & Tel. Co., 40 La. Ann., 41; 3 So. Rep., 533; 8 Am. St. Rep., 502; Philipsburg v. Cen- tral Penn. Tel. & Sup. Co., 22 Wkly. Notes Cas., 572. But license fees of this character cannot regulate or interfere with interstate or foreign commerce; this feature is treated elsewhere. Sees. 257, 264, supra. 15 Alabama — Clark v. Mobile, 67 Ala., 217. Georgia — Home Ins. Co. v. Au- gusta, 50 Ga., 530. Illinois — Illinois Mut. Fire Ins. Co. V. Peoria, 29 111., 180. Kansas — Leavenworth v. Booth, 15 Kan., 627. Missouri — St. Joseph v. Ernst, 95 Mo., 360; 8 S. W. Rep., 558; St. Louis V. Life Ass'n of Amer., 53 Mo., 466; St. Louis v. Independent Ins. Co., 47 Mo., 146. Pennsylvania — ^Aetna Fire Ins. Co. V. Reading, 119 Pa. St., 417; 13 Atl. Rep., 451. Virginia — Humphreys v. Nor- folk, 25 Gratt. (Va.), 97. Wisconsin — Milwaukee Fire De- partment V. Heifenstein, 16 Wis., 136. License tax as an interference with interstate commerce, see sec- tion 257, supra. The license tax may be imposed on the company and the agents employed by it. Farmington v. Rutherford, 94 Mo. App., 328; 68 S. W. Rep., 83. Power to tax "brokers" confers no power to license insurance agents. McKinney v. Alton, 41 111. App., 508. So power to tax and regulate auctioneers, etc., is not sufficient. State V. Smith, 31 Iowa, 493. Bach agent may be taxed sepa- rately. Simrall v. Covington, 90 Ky., 444; 29 Am. St. Rep., 398; 9 L. R. A., 556; 14 S. W. Rep., 369. Constitutional. An ordinance imposing an annual license tax on insurance companies having an of- fice or doing business within a city is not in violation of that clause of the United States constitution which declares that, "no state shall pass any law impairing the obli- gation of contracts." Home Ins. Co. V. City Council of Augusta, 93 U. S., 116. License to Regulate Only. The power given to the City of St. Louis to license insurance compa- nies does not authorize the impo- sition of a tax for revenue. St. Louis V. Boatmen's Ins. & Trust. Co., 47 Mo., 150. License fob Revenue Solely. Leavenworth v. Booth, 15 Kan., 627. Gross Receipts. A foreign in- surance company may be required to pay a certain percentage on the amount of its gross receipts for the privilege of doing business, and such payment is not a tax. Walker v. Springfield, 94 111., 364. License and Tax on Business. - Power to collect a revenue tax both by way of license for con- ducting the business and a tax on the income of foreign insurance companies is not duplicate taxa- tion. St. Joseph V. Ernst, 95 Mo., 360; 8 S. W. Rep., 558. In Illinois Cities incorporated under the general law have no power to require foreign insurance companies to take out a license for the privilege of doing business. Chicago v. Phoenix Ins. Co!, 126 111., 276; 18 N. E. Rep., 668 (affirm- ing 26 111. App., 650). In Nebraska occupation tax may be imposed where it is uniform. German Amer. Fire Ins. Co. v. j428] ORDINANCES RELATING TO TAXATION. €ni Minden, 51 Neb., 870; 71 N. W. Rep., 995; Templeton v. Tekamah, 32 Neb., 542; 49 N. W. Rep., 373; State V. Green, 27 Neb., 64; 42 N. W. Rep., 913. Insurance compa- nies are not exempt from payment of a license tax on their occupa- tion or business witliln the limits of the city. Columbus v. Hart- ford Ins. Co., 25 Neb., 83; 41 N. W. Rep., 140. A tax on the gross re- ceipts of fire insurance companies for corporate purposes was held void. State v. Wheeler, 33 Neb., 563; 50 N. W. Rep., 770. To Support Fire Department. The legislature of California hav- ing no power under the constitu- tion to levy or impose a tax for local or municipal purposes cannot require of the agents of foreign insurance companies the payment of a certain per cent of the premi- um, and provide that the money paid shall constitute a fireman's relief fund of the county or city in which the property insured is situated. San Francisco v. Insur- ance Co., 74 Cal., 113 ; 15 Pac. Rep., 380; 5 Am. St. Rep., 425. A license fee of 2 per cent of the gross receipts of foreign insurance companies levied for the support of a city fire department is a priv- ilege fee and may be levied in addi- tion to the amount levied for the purpose of general taxation. Walk- er V. Springfield, 94 111., 364. The power in the city to impose an occupation tax on fire insur- ance companies doing business within the city and to apply the proceeds of that tax to the main- tenance of volunteer fire depart- ments was sustained. German Amer. Fire Ins. Co. v. Minden, 51 Neb., 870; 71 N. W. Rep., 995. CHAPTER XIV. OF ORDINANCES RELATING TO MUNICIPAL POLICE POWERS, And Hebein Nuisances, Public Health, Safety and Convenience. 1. General nature, scope and ex- 4. Offenses against public mor- ercise of police power. als and decency. 2. Health and sanitary regula- 5. Markets — Weights and meas- tlons — Nuisances. ures, 3. Public safety — Streets — Build- 6. Miscellaneous regulations, ings. 1. GENERAL NATURE. SCOPE AND EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. 429. General nature and scope of the police power. 430. Same — Basis of police pow- er. 431. Same — Extends to destruc- tion of property. 432. Limitation of police power. 433. Exercise of police power by municipal corporations. 434. Same — Power under gener- al welfare clause. § 435. Exercise of police power within and without corpo- rate limits. 436. Municipal liability for fail- ure to enact and enforce police regulations. 437. Same subject — Exception — Nuisance. 438. General requisites of valid police regulations. 2. HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS— NUISANCES. 439. Health and sanitary regu- § lations — Power to make and enforce. 440. What constitutes a nuis- ance? 441. Municipal power to declare and define nuisances. 442. Same — Illustrative cases. 443. Same — Doubt as to nuis- ance. 444. Power to abate nuisances. 445. Contagious diseases, etc. — Quarantine. 446. Burial of the dead — Ceme- teries. 447. Nuisances arising from trades, manufactures, etc. 662 448. Slaughtering of animals — Slaughter houses. 449. Dairies and cow stables. 450. Livery stables. 451. Hogs and hog pens. 452. Dead animals, garbage, of- fal, etc. House dirt, rubbish, privy vaults, etc. Drains, sewers, ponds, stag- nant water, pollution of water supply, etc. Wells. Emission of dense smoke as a public nuisance. 457. Regulating S9,le of cigar- ettes. 453. 454. 465 456. UBNERAL NATURE OF POLICE POWER. 663 3. PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. 458. Regulatlag uses of streets, etc., and keeping same free from obstruction. 459. Obstructions in public streets and liighways as nuisance. 460. Power to remove obstruc- tions and nuisances. 461. Awnings, signs and projec- tions over streets. 462. Regulation of lamp posts, poles, electric wires, un- derground conduits, gas pipes, etc. 463. Billboards and structures for advertising. 464. Riding and driving on streets. 465. Regulation of bicycles and velocipedes. § 466. Regulating street parades. 467. Distribution of handbills, circulars, advertising mat- ter. 468. Animals at large — Regula- ting driving of, through streets. 469. Regulating dogs. 470. Fire limits — Wooden build- ings. 471. Same — Building regulations — Permits. 472. Gunpowder and explosives — Blasting. 473. Power to regulate operation of locomotives, trains and cars in streets. 474. Same — Enumeration of reg- ulations. 4. OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS AND DECENCY. 475. Lewd conduct — Bawdy houses — Prostitution, etc. 476. Gambling, gaming houses, lotteries, bowling alleys, billiard halls, etc. § 477. Regulating sale of intoxi- cating liquor. 478. Public drunkenness. 479. Observance of the Sabbath. 480. Regulating hours of busi- ness. 5. MARKETS— WEIGHTS AND MEASURES. 481. Markets — Establishment § 483. Regulation of hucksters, and regulation. hawkers, etc. 482. Confining sales and pur- 484. Milk inspection and adul- chases to public markets — teration. Forbidding private mar- 485. Weights and measures. kets. 6. MISCELLANEOUS REGULATIONS. 486. Offenses affecting the public order and peace. 487. Same — Disturbing the peace. 488. Same — Carrying concealed weapons. 489. Cruelty to animals. 490. Vagrancy. 491. Regulations of various occu- pations. 492. Pawnbrokers. 493. Regulation of private prop- erty — Trespassing. 494. Regulation of tenement houses, etc. 495. Limiting day's work — Eight hour laws. 496. MlscoUaneoue, 664 GENERAL NATURE OF POLICE POWER. [§ 429 1. GENERAL NATURE, SCOPE AND EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. § 429 General nature and scope of the police power. The police power has been described as "that power under which everything necessary to the protection of the property of the citizen and the health and comfort of the public may be done."i It is defined by Blackstone to be the power which concerns "the due regulation and domestic order of the king- dom, whereby the individuals of the state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general be- havior to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood and good manners, to be decent, industrious and inoffensive in their respective stations. "^ Chief Justice Shaw declares that, it is the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as the legislature shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth and of the subjects of the same. He points out the distinction between this power and the right of eminent domain, which is the right of the government to appropriate private property when the public emergency requires it on condition of making proper compensation therefor. He affirms that it is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and source of this power than to mark its boundaries or prescribe limits to its existence.^ Upon it depend the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of and existence in a thickly popu- lated community, the enjoyment of private and social life and the beneficial use of property.* The extent of this power has never been defined with precision. Indeed, it seems to be prac- tically impossible to do so because of the vast variety of condi- 1 Harmon v. Chicago, 110 IlL, and convenience of the communl- 400j 408. ty, wliich do not encroach upon the - i Bl. Com., 162. like power vested in congress by ■! Com. V. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.), the federal constitution. Of that 53, 85; Com. v. Bearse, 132 Mass., power, it may well be said that it 542, 546; 42 Am. Rep., 450. is known when and where it be- * Police Power Described. "It gins; but not when and where it may be said to be the right of the terminates. It is a power, in the state, or of a state functionary, to exercise of which a man's property prescribe regulations for the good may be taken from him, where his order, peace, protection, comfort liberty may be shackled, and his 1430] GENERAL NATURE OF POLICE POWER. eso tions, and circumstances governing its application.^ As stated by the Supreme Court o,f the United States : ' ' Many attempts have been made in this court and elsewhere to define the police power, but never with entire success. It is always easier to determine whether a particular case comes within the general scope of the power, than to give an abstract definition of the power itself which will be in all respects accurate. ' ' ^ The police power is sufficiently comprehensive to embrace new sub- jects as conditions demand.^ § 430. Same— Basis of police power. The proposition can- not be denied that organized government has the inherent right to protect health, life and limb, individual liberty of action, private property and legitimate use thereof, and provide gen- erally for the safety and welfare of its people. Not only does the right exist, but this obligation is imposed upon those clothed with the sovereign power. This duty is sacred and person exposed to destruction, in cases of great public exigencies." Per Bermudez, C. J., in New Or- leans Gas Light Co. v. Hart, 40 La. Ann., 474, 477; 4 So. Rep., 215; Bass V. State, 34 La. Ann., 494. s State V. Yopp, 97 N. C, 477, 479; 2 S. B. Rep., 458; 2 Am. St. Rep., 305. Lottery case. Stone v. Missis- sippi, 101 U. S., 814. The police power In its applica- tion to the sale of liquor. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1, following Mugler V. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623; Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S., 201; Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S., 25. Slaughter house regulations. Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City, etc., Co., Ill U. S., 746. Nuisance. Fertilizer Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S., 659. Gas regulations. New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana Gas Light Co., 115 U. S., 650. Warehouses; fixing charges for storage of grain therein. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S., 113. Real estate broker; regulations concerning. Little Rock v. Barton, 33 Ark., 436. Police power described. Steh- meyer v. Charleston, 53 S. C, 259; 31 S. B. Rep., 322; State v. Burgoyne, 7 Lea (75 Tenn.), 173; 40 Am.- Rep., 60. Statute requiring destruction of certain kinds of trees as nuisances. State V. Main, 69 Conn., 123; 37 Atl. Rep., 80; 61 Am. St. Rep., 30. Statute regulating horse racing, held valid. State v. Roby, 142 Ind„ 168; 41 N. E. Rep., 145; 51 Am. St. Rep., 174. ' Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co., 103 Tenn., 421; 53 S. W. Rep., 955, afllrmed 183 U. S., 13. Embraces all things in the state relating to internal affairs, as all laws establishing and enforcing duties of citizens to each other. Lacey v. Palmer, 93 Va., 159; 24 S. E. Rep., 930; 57 Am. St. Rep., 795. Interstate and foreign com- merce; local police power extends to subjects and objects of, sections 270, 271, supra. 666 GENERAL NATURE OF POLICE POWER. [§430 cannot be evaded, shifted or bartered away without violating a public trust.* Police regulations are based chiefly on the Latin maxims, salus popwii suprema est lex— the welfare of the people is the first law— ^ and sic utere tuo ut alienum non Icedas— so use your own property as not to injure the rights of another.^** "It has its foundation in that maxim of all well-ordered society which requires every one to use his own so as not to injure the equal Quarantine laws. Sees. 3.72, 273, supra. Harbor and wharf police regula- tion. Sec. 274, supra. 8 § 84, supra. 9 "Salus populi est suprema lex" — The health of the people is the first law. 13 Coke, 139. Salus populi suprema lex — ^That regard be had to the public wel- fare is the highest law. Bacon, Max., reg. 12; Deems v. Baltimore, 80 Md., 164, 173; 30 Atl. Rep., 648; 45 Am. St Rep., 339. "Whatever difference of opinion may exist as to the extent and boundaries of the police power, and however difficult it may be to render a satisfactory definition of it, there seems to be no doubt that it does extend to the protection of the lives, health and property of the citizens and to the preserva- tion of good order and the public morals. * * * They belong emphatically to that class of ob- jects which demand the applica- tion of the maxim, salus populi suprema lex; and they are to be attained and provided for by such appropriate means as the legisla- tive discretion may devise." Per Mr. Justice Bradley, in Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S., 25, 33. 10 "As we understand it, the po- lice power is the name given to that function of government by which is enforced the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non Iredas." In re Morgan, 26 Colo., 415, 423; 58 Pac. Rep^ 1071; 77 Am. St. Rep., 269. This maxim "is that which lies at the foundation of the power." Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th Ed.), 208; Tiedeman, Lim. of Po- lice Power, sec. 1. "According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non Icedas, which being of universal applica- tion, it must of course be within the range of the legislative ac- tion to define the mode and man- ner in which every one may so use his own as not to injure others." Per Redfield, C. J., in Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co., 27 Vt., 140, 153. "It (the police power) is found- ed very largely in the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non Icedas, and also to some extent in that other maxim of public policy, salus populi suprema (est) lex, and it is of almost universal application in regulating the interests of so- ciety within the jurisdiction of the state. It is too well settled to ad- mit of serious question that every person is subject to it in his per- son and property. And however absolute his right to and owner- ship of property may be, he holds it subject to the implied obliga- tion that he will use it in such way as not to prevent others from hav- ing their property and enjoying the just use and benefit of it, and as wiM not destroy, abridge or in- jure the rights of the public." State V. Yopp, 97 N. C, 477, 479; 2 S. E. § 431] GENERAL NATURE OF POLICE POWER. 667 enjoyment of others having equal rights of property." ^^ Un- wholesome trades, slaughter houses, operations offensive to the senses, the deposit of powder, the application of steam power to propel cars, the building with combustible materials and the burial of the dead may all be interdicted by law, in the midst of dense masses of population, on the general and rational: princi- ple that every person ought so to use his property as not to in- jure his neighbors; and that private interests must be subser- vient to the general interests of the community. ^^ §431. Same— Extends to destruction of property. "All rights of property are held subject to such reasonable control and regulation of the mode of keeping and use as the legisla- ture, under the police power vested in them by the constitu- tion of the commonwealth, may think necessary for the preven- tion of injuries to the rights of others and the security of the public health. In the exercise of this power the legislature may not only provide that certain kinds of property (either abso- lute, or when held in such manner or under such circumstances as to be injurious, dangerous or noxious) may be seized and confiscated upon legal process after notice and hearing; but may also, when necessary to insure the public safety, authorize them to be summarily destroyed by the municipal authorities without previous notice to the owner, as in the familiar cases of pulling down buildings to prevent the spreading of a con- flagration or the impending fall of the buildings themselves, throwing overboard decaying or infected food or abating other nuisances dangerous to health, "i^ Under the police power Rep., 458 ; 2 Am. St. Rep., 305, per Pennsylvania — Godcharles v. Merrlmon, J. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St., 431; 6 Atl. 11 Slaughter House Cases, 16 Rep., 354. Wall (U. S.), 36. West Virginia — State v. Good- 12 2 Kent's Com., 340. will, 33 W. Va., 179, 185; 25 Am. The maxim, sic utere tuo ut ali- St. Rep., 863; 10 S. B. Rep., 285; enum non Iwdas, applied in the State v. Gilman, 33 W. Va., 146; following cases: 10 S. E. Rep., 283; State v. F. C. /ZZimois— Millett v. People, 117 Coal & Coke Co., 33 W. Va., 188; 111., 294; 7 N. E. Rep., 631. 10 S. E. Rep., 288. Massachusetts— Austin v. Mur- is Per Gray, J., in Blair v. Fore- ray, 16 Pick. (Mass.), 121; Baker hand, 100 Mass., 136, 139, 140. V. Boston, 12 Pick., 184. Property may be destroyed to New York— In re Jacobs, 98 N. prevent the spread of flre. Keller Y., 98, 114; People v. Rosenberg, v. Corpus Christi, 50 Tex., 614; 67* Hun. (N. Y.), 52; 22 N. Y. Conwell v. Emrie, 2 Ind., 35; Hale buppl., 56. V. Lawrence, 21 N. J. L., 714; 47 668 GENERAL NATURE OF POLICE POWER. [§432 property which constitutes a auisance may be destroyed and diseased cattle ordered slaughtered.^* "The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property, which is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value became depreciated, is very different from taking property for public use, or from depriving a per- son of his property without due process of law." ^^ § 432. Limitations of the police power. The legislature may determine the exigency, that is, the occasion for the exercise of the police power, but under our constitutional system, the judi- ciary determines what are the subjects and objects upon which the power is to be exercised and the reasonableness of that exereised.i* Both the federal and state constitutions protect life, individual liberty and private property from undue gov- ernmental encroachment, although arising by virtue of what is claimed to be within the police power. Thus laws, whatever may be the intent of the framers, which authorize the confisca- tion of private property for the mere protection of private Am. Dec, 190; American Print Works V. Lawrence, 23 N. J. L., 9. An ordinance of the City of Riclimond, Va., directing the de- struction of all liquor within the city and pledging the city for its payment, held ultra vires. The ordinance was passed on the eve of the evacuation of Richmond hy the Confederate forces. Wallace v. Richmond, 94 Va., 204; 26 S. B. Rep., 586. Bawdy House; house used for, cannot be destroyed. Welch v. Stowell, 2 Doug. (Mich.), 332. i-i Lawton v. Stelle, 152 U. S., 133. Adulterated Milk offered for sale may be destroyed. Deems v. Baltimore, 80 Md., 164; 30 Atl. Rep., 648; 45 Am. St. Rep., 339; § 484, post. Destruction of Infected Cloth- r.Nu sanctioned. Boehm v. Balti- more, 61 Md., 259, 264; Train v. Boston Disinfecting Co., 144 Mass., 523; 11 N. E. Rep., 929; Newark & O. H. C. Ry. Co. v. Hunt, 50 N. J. L., 308; 12 Atl. Rep., 697. Nuisance. If use of property creates a nuisance the property may be destroyed. State v. Yopp, .97 N. C, 477; 2 S. E. Rep., 458; 2 Am. St. Rep., 305. The property must be a nuisance in fact and so declared. Pieri v. Shieldsboro, 42 Miss., 493; Fields V. Stokley, 99 Pa. St., 306; 44 Am. Rep., 109; Miller v. Burch, 32 Tex., 208; 5 Am. Rep., 242. Damaged Grain may be con- demned and destroyed by the mu- nicipal authorities. Dunbar v. Au- gusta, 90 Ga., 390; 17 S. E. Rep., 907. 15 Per Mr. Justice Harlan, Mug- ler V. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623. 18 Colorado — In re Morgan, 26 Colo., 415, 424; 58 Pac. Rep., 1071; 77 Am. St. Rep., 269. Illinois — Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co., 70 111., 191. Michigan — Spry Lumber Co. v. Sault Savings Bank, 77 Mich., 199 ; § 43'd] GENERAL NATURE OF POLICE POWER. 669 rights will be condemned as unconstitutional.^^ So the legiti- mate exercise of the police power will not sustain midue inter- ference with the conduct of a lawful business,^* or the depri- vation of life, liberty or property without due process of law. But it is universally admitted that however broadly these con- stitutional principles may be expressed "there exists, ex neces- sitate rei, in every government, the power to impose restrictions upon individual life, liberty and property, which it is not with- in the meaning or intent of such provisions to prohibit or re- strain. * * * So universal and long continued has been this construction of constitutional inhibitions against govern- mental deprivation of life, liberty and property of citizens that it may now be considered as written into every constitution. " i* § 433. Exercise of the police power by municipal corpora- tions. The police regulations of municipal corporations are usually enforced by ordinance. What police powers the local corporation may exercise and the manner in which they are to be enforced will depend upon its charter or legislative acts applicable, and the general policy of the state with respect thereto. Generally, cities may make and enforce within their 43 N. W. Rep., 778; People v. J. & M. P. R. Co., 9 Mich., 285, per Chrlstlancy, J. New York — People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y., 389; 17 N. E. Rep., 343. Ohio — Palmer v. Tingle, 55 Ohio St., 423; 45 N. B. Rep., 313. United States — Jones v. Great Southern, etc.. Hotel Co., 86 Fed. Rep., 370. Cooley Const. Lim. (6th Ed.), p. 208; Tiedeman Lim. Police Power see. 3. 17 Colon V. Lisk, 153 N. Y., 188; 47 N. E. Rep., 302; 60 Am. St. Rep., 609. 18 As manutacture of cigars in tenement houses. In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y., 98, per Earl, J., fully treating the police power; or man- ufacture of oleomargarine. People V. Marx, 99 N. Y., 377; 2 N. E. Rep., 29, reversing 35 Hun. (N. Y), 528. Contra. State v. Adding- ton, 77 Mo., 110; 12 Mo. App., 214; Powell V. Com., 114 Pa. St., 265; 7 Attl, Rep., 913, affirmed 127 U. S., 678. Insurance business held to he a proper subject of police regulation. Com. V. Vrooman, 164 Pa. St., 306 ; 30 Atl. Rep., 217; 44 Am. St. Rep., 603. 19 State ex rel. Walker v. Judge, 39 La. Ann., 132; 1 So. Rep., 437, approved in State v. Schlemmer, 42 La. Ann., 1166, 1168; 8 So. Rep., 307. "Every man holds his property subject to the maxim that he must so use it as not to injure his neighbor. Nothing in that amend- ment (14th U. S. Const.) has shorn the states of their police power to prohibit or regulate un- wholesome trades and occupations. Nothing in the constitution of the United States or of this state se- cures to any man the right to maintain a nuisance to the discom- fort and peril of the health of his ^70 GENERAL NATURE OF POLICE POWER. [§ 434 limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations de- signed to promote the health, safety, comfort, convenience and welfare of the local community which are not in conflict with constitution or the general laws.^" Crowded urban popu- lations require numerous police regulations which would be unreasonable in rural districts or sparsely populated territory. This dift'erence was quickly recognized, and from the first es- tablishment of local corporations, invested with civil govern- ment, the local community has been empowered to enact and enforce all sorts of such regulations which restrict more or less the liberty of the individual, his personal movements and the use of his property. These are absolutely essential to life in crowded centers. From the beginning their necessity has been sanctioned by the public authorities and they have been sustained generally by the courts.^^ The police power primar- ily inheres in the state but if the state constitution does not forbid the legislature may delegate a part of such power to the municipal corporations of the state, either in express terms or by implication.22 § 434. Same— Power under general welfare clause. Power ' ' to ordain and publish such acts, laws and regulations, not in- consistent with the constitution and laws of the state as shall be needful to the good order of the city," authorizes the city to establish all suitable ordinances for administering the gov- neighbor." Per Gantt, J., In St. 19 Colo., 325; 35 Pac. Rep., 535. Louis V. Fischer, 167 Mo., 654, 664; Georgia — Morris v. Columbus, 67 S. W. Rep., 872. in sustaining 102 Ga., 792; 66 Am. St. Rep., 243; dairy and cow stables ordinance 30 S. E. Rep., 850; Cranston v. regulations. Augusta, 61 Ga., 572. 20 Constitution, California, art. Illinois — McPherson v. Che- XI, sec. 11; Constitution, Washing- banse, 114 111., 46; 28 N. E. Rep., ton, art. XI, sec. 11. 454; 55 Am. Rep., 857; Harmon v. 21 Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N. Chicago, 110 111., 400; 51 Am. Rep., Y., 268; 25 N. E. Rep., 480; New 698; Roberts v. Ogle, 30 111., 459; York V. Dry Dock R. R. Co., 133 83 Am. Dec, 201. N. Y., 104; 28 Am. St. Rep., 609; 7owa— Des Moines Gas Co. v. 30 N. E. Rep., 563; Burckholter v. Des Moines, 44 Iowa, 505; 24 Am. McConnellsville, 20 Ohio St., 308, Rep., 756. 315; Trigally V. Memphis, 6 Coldw. Indiana — Walker v. Jameson, (Tenn.), 382, 388; Boehm v. Bal- 140 Ind., 591; 37 N. E. Rep., 402; timore, 61 Md., 259; State v. Hill, 39 N. B. Rep., 869; Crawfordsvllle 126 N. C, 1139, 1147; 36 S. B. Rep., v. Braden, 130 Ind., 149; 28 N. E. 326; 50 L. R. A., 473. Rep., 849; 30 Am, St. Rep., 214; 22 Colorado — Keilkopf v. Denver, Mt. Vernon First Nat. Bk, v. §435] GENERAL l^ATURE OF POLICE POWER. all ernment of the city, the maintenance of peace and order, the preservation of the health of the inhabitants, and the conven- ient transaction of business within its limits, and for the per- formance of the general duties required by law of municipal corporations.^^ Reasonable ordinances for these purposes are necessary, and they are generally sustained by the courts (as will clearly appear from the sections which follow), though passed by virtue of general charter power, or authority con- ferred by the general welfare clause. 2* §435. Exercise of police powers within and without cor- porate limits. The general rule is that the police powers of Sarlls, 129 Ind., 201; 28 N. E. Rep., 434; 28 Am. St. Rep., 185; Baum- gartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind., 575; 50 Am. Rep., 830; Beiling v. Evans- vllle, 144 Ind., 644; 42 N. E. Rep., 621; 35 L. R. A., 272. Kentucky — McKee v. McKee, 8 B. Mon. (47 Ky.), 433; Com. v. Milton, 12 B. Mon. (51 Ky.), 212; 54 Am. Dec, 522. Louisiana — Lamarque v. New Orleans, 1 McGloin (La.), 28. Massachusetts — Com. v. Plaisted, 148 Mass., 375; 19 N. E. Rep., 224; 12 Am. St. Rep., 566; Bancroft v. Cambridge, 126 Mass., 438. Michigan — People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich., 611; 42 N. W. Rep., 1124; 4 L. R. A., 751. Minnesota — St. Paul v. Colter, 12 Minn., 41; 90 Am. Dec, 278. Missouri — Sanders v. Southern Electric R. R. Co., 147 Mo., 411, 427; 48 S. W. Rep., 855; Jackson V. K. C, Ft. S. & M. R. R. Co., 157 Mo., 621; 58 S. W. Rep., 32; State V. Cowan, 29 Mo., 330; State v. Gordon, 60 Mo., 383. Nebraska — Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. V. State, 47 Neb., 549; 58 Am. St. Rep., 557; 66 N. W. Rep., 624. New Hampshire — State v. Noyes, 80 N. H., 279. North Carolina — Louisburg v. Harris, 52 N. C, 281. South Carolina — SummerviUe v. Pressley, 33 S. C, 56; 11 S. E. Rep., 545; 26 Am. St. Rep., 659; 8 L. R. A., 854. Tennessee — Nashville v. Linck, 12 Lea (80 Tenn.), 499. State may withdraw and rein- vest. Pickles v. McLellan Dry Dock, 38 La. Ann., 412; Harmon v. Chicago, 110 111., 400; 51 Am. Rep., 698. As to powers possessed by mu- nicipal corporations and the meth- od of their exercise, see chapter II. As to municipal control of of- fenses against the state, see chap- ter XV. 23 Per Howard, J., in State v. Merrill, 37 Me., 329. Oftentimes the power given by the general welfare clause is lim- ited by other provisions of the charter. Mt. Pleasant v. Breeze, 11 Iowa, 399; Montgomery City Council V. Montgomery & W. PI. R. Co., 31 Ala., 76. 2* POWEK UNDER GENERAL WTEL- PARE Clause — Illustrations. Cannot pass an ordinance in its nature prohibitive. Cosgrove v. Augusta, 103 Ga., 835; 31 S. E. Rep., 445; 68 Am. St. Rep., 149. Venders of meat may be re- quired to take out licenses under the general welfare clause. Kins- ley V. Chicago, 124 111., 359; 16 N. E. Rep., 260. Under the general welfare clause the city may by ordinance prevent 672 CJBNBRAL NATURE OF POLICE POWER. [§435 a municipal corporation can be exercised only -within its own territorial limits, and therefore, without special authorization, they can not be exercised outside of the municipal bound- aries.2'' The right to exercise police power beyond the cor- the feeding of cows on distillery slops and the vending of milk of cows so fed. Johnson v. Simon- ton, 43 Cal.,' 242. Auctioneers may be required to obtain licenses. Goshen v. Kern, 63 Ind., 468. Regulations under general wel- fare clause. Waters v. Leech, 3 Ark., 110; Buell v. State, 45 Ark., 336. Indigent sick may be relieved; so the poor unable to work. The power declared to be inherent in every municipal corporation. Vio- net V. First Municipality, 4 La. Ann., 42. Under the general welfare clause St. Louis has power by ordinance to prohibit cruelty to dumb ani- mals. St. Louis V. Schoenbusch, 95 Mo., 618; 8 S. W. Rep., 791. May regulate billiard halls. Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Mo., 1; 25 S. W. Rep., 202. May prohibit business on Sun- day. St. Louis v. CalTerata, 24 Mo., 94. May regulate laundries. Barbier V. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Soon Hing V. Crowley, 113 U. S., 703; Yick Wo V. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 356. Vagrants. St. Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo., 61. Dramshops in parks. State ex rel. V. Schwelckardt, 109 Mo., 496; 19 S. W. Rep., 47. Abolish wells in streets. Ferren- bach V. Turner, 86 Mo., 416. Ordinance imposing fine foi- car- rying concealed weapons Is valid. The "right" to carry, etc., Is not "protected by any constitutional guaranty." St. Louis v. Vert, 84 Mo., 204, 209. So, ordinance prescribing re- moval by the mayor of an ap- pointed officer as a penalty for misconduet in office is within the general welfare clause. State ex rel. Reid v. Walbridge, 119 Mo., 383, 393; 24 S. W. Rep., 457. Rights recognized by the general law cannot be restrained by ordi- nance, without legislative grant, express or implied. Carey v. Wash- ington, 5 Cranch. C. C, 13; 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,404. See chapters VII and XV. Unless authorized, ordinance cannot create offenses. Adams v. Albany, 29 Ga., 56; Owensboro v. Sparks, 99 Ky., 351; 36 S. W. Rep., 4. Ordinances cannot interfere with private property. Mitchell v. Rockland, 45 Me., 496; sec. 39, supra. Workhouse cannot be estab- lished by ordinance, without char- ter power. Ordinance of St. Paul establishing the House of Good Shepherd, held void. Farmer v. St. Paul, 65 Minn., 176; 67 N. W. Rep., 990; 33 L. R. A., 199. See sec. 57, supra. General and Implied Poweks of municipal corporations are fully treated in chapter II. 2» Strauss v. Pontiac, 40 IlL, 301; Ex parte Deana, 2 Cranch C. C, 125; 7 Fed. Cas., No. 3, 712. Territorial operation of ordi- nances. Sec. 26, supra. Land. City possesses no control ,436] GENERAL NATURE OF POLICE POWER. 67S porate limits must be derived by legislative grants which ex- pressly or impliedly permits it.^® It is not unusual to grant to cities the right to exercise police regulations beyond their limits.^'' Cities often are permitted to purchase, condemn and otherwise acquire, within and without their limits, all neces- sary lands for water works, gas works, electric lighting plants, hospitals, work houses, poor houses, asylums, pest houses, cemeteries, etc., and extend their police jurisdiction over such lands and property .^^ Cities are also often given the power to direct the location and regulate the management and construc- tion of packing houses, rendering establishments, soap and bone factories, and the like, within their limits and to specified distance beyond, generally ranging from one to three miles. As one means of regulation, the power to license such establish- ments is sometimes conferred.^® § 436. Municipal liability for failure to enact and enforce police regulations. The liability of municipal corporations ti) or rights over land outside city limits without special authoriza- tion. Duncan v. Lynchburg (Va., 1900), 34 S. E. Rep., 964; 48 L. R. A., 331; Coldwater v. Tucker, 36 Mich., 474, 477; 24 Am. Rep., 601; Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns Ch. (N. Y.), 320, 336. Held, under charter of Lynch- burg, relating to right to purchase and hold and sell real estate, the city was not authorized to operate a rock quarry outside the city limits. Duncan v. Lynchburg (Va., 1900), 34 S. E. Rep., 964; 48 L. R. A., 331. Cemeteries. City has no power to prohibit establishment of ceme- teries or burying grounds outside of the city limits, nor can it con- trol them when so established. Begein v. Anderson, 28 Ind., 79. Cak Fakes. Ordinance regulat- ing fares to be collected beyond city limits held void. South Pasa- dena V. Los Angeles, etc., R. Co., 109 CaL, 315; 41 Pac. Rep., 1093. 28 Coldwater v. Tucker, 36 Mich., 474; 24 Am. Rep., 601, per Camp- bell, J. 27 State ex rel. v. Franklin, 40 Kan., 410; 19 Pac. Rep., 801; R. S. of Mo., 1899, sec. 6169; Laws of Mo., 1901, p. 79. Power, as to traffic beyond boundaries. In re East River Bridge Co., 75 Hun. (N. Y.), 119; 25 N. Y. Suppl., 145. Improving highways outside limits, under legislative power. Hagood V. Hutton, 33 Mo., 244, 249. 28 state ex rel. v. Franklin, 40 Kan., 410; 19 Pac. Rep., 801. 29 Chicago, P. & P. Co. v. Chi- cago, 88 111., 221; 30 Am. Rep., 545. Police jurisdiction within onie mile. Falmouth v. Watson, 5 Bush. (Ky.), 660. Power to regulate hucksters and runners selling In market, living within one mile of corporate lim- its. Snell V. Belleville, 30 Up. Can. Q. B., 81. LiQUOB Selling. Legislature may confer jurisdiction upon a munici- 43 674 GENERAL NATURE OF POLICE POWER. [§436 actions ex delicto is recognized.*" There seems to be no time when such corporations were wholly free from responsibility for torts by the common law.^i In considering liability for civil wrongs, it should be borne in mind constantly that municipal corporations are of two-fold character: The one as regards the state at large in so far as they are its agents in government ; the other private in so far as they provide the local necessities and conveniences for their own citizens. In other words, a municipal corporation ' ' possesses two kinds of powers, one gov- ernmental and public, and to the extent they are held and exercised, is clothed with sovereignty— the other private, and to the extent they are held and exercised, is a legal individual. The former are given and used for public purposes ; the latter for private purposes. While in the exercise of the former the corporation is a municipal government, and while in the exer- cise of the latter it is a corporate legal individual. ' '^^ The rule is firmly established in our law that where the municipal cor- poration is performing a duty imposed upon it as the agent of the state in the exercise of strictly governmental functions, there is no liability to private action on account of injuries re- sulting from the wrongful acts or negligence of its officers or pal corporation to regulate, pro- hibit and license the sale of malt or vinous liquors within two miles of the corporate limits, and, upon the courts and officers thereof, to enforce such regulations. State v. Shroeder, 51 Iowa, 197; 1 N. W. Rep., 431; CentervlUe v. Miller, 51 Iowa, 712; 2 N. W. Rep., 527; Toledo V. Edens, 59 Iowa, 352; 13 N. W. Rep., 313. Jurisdiction Over Whabves, docks, and other artificial erec- tions. Udall V. Brooklyn, 19 Johns (N. Y.), 175. Sometimes the whole of a navigable river and harbor, adjaeent to the city, to actual low water mark on the opposite shores, as the same- may be formed, from time to time, by docks, wliarves and other perma- nent erections. Stryker v. New York, 19 Johns (N. Y.), 179. 30 Richmond v. Long; 17 Graft. (Va.), 375. 31 Jones, Negligence of Mun. Corp., sec. 18, and authorities cited; Municipal Code of St. Louis, p. 394, sec. 110, et seq. In Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass., 344, Gray, C. J., reviews the authorities and adopts the conclusion that at common law no private action would lie for injury inflicted on account of failure to repair a high- way or bridge unless the right to such action was given by statute. 32 Per Foot, J., in Lloyd v. May- or, etc., of N. Y., 5 N. Y., 369, 374; 55 Am. Dec, 347; Maxmilian v. New York, 62 N. Y., 160, 164; 20 Am. Rep., 468 ; Edgerly v. Concord, 62 N. H., 8; Springfield, etc., Ins. Co. v. Keeseville, 148 N. Y., 46; 30 L. R. A., 660; Caspary v. Port- land, 19 Oreg., 496; 24 Pac. Rep., 1036. §436] GENERAL NATURE OF POLICE POWER. 675 agents thereunder, unless made liable by statute.^^ A distinc- tion has been drawn between the performance or not of quasi judicial duties which are discretionary, and such as are minis- terial which are mandatory. '^^ As a general rule, a municipal corporation is not liable either for the non-exercise of, or for the manner in which, in good faith, it exercises discretionary pow- ers of a public or legislative character.^^ Thus, it is not liable for failure to enact ordinances or when enacted to enforce 33 Louisiana — Rudolph v. New Orleans, 11 La. Ann., 242. Maine — Mitchell v. Rockland, 41 Me., 363; 66 Am. Dec, 252. Massachusetts — Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass., 344; Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass., 87; Hafford v. New Bed- ford, 16 Gray (Mass.), 297. Michigan — Webb v. Board, 116 Mich., 516; 72 Am. St. Rep., 541; 74 N. W. Rep., 734; Gilboy v. De- troit, 115 Mich., 121; 73 N. W. Rep,, 128; Detroit v. Blackeby, 21 Mich., 84; 4 Am. Rep., 450; Larkii* v. Saginaw County, 11 Mich., 88; 82 Am. Dec, 63; Leoni Tp. v. Taylor, 20 Mich., 148 ; O'Leary v. Board, 79 Mich., 281; 19 Am. St. Rep., 169; I L. R. A., 170; 44 N. W. Rep., 608. Missouri — Donahoe v. Kansas City, 136 Mo., 657, 664, et seq.; 38 S. W. Rep., 571; Carrington v. St. Louis, 89 Mo., 208 ; 58 Am. Rep., 108; 1 S. W. Rep., 240; Kiley v. Kansas City, 87 Mo., 103; Arm- strong V. Brunswick, 79 Mo., 319, McKenna v. St. Louis, 6 Mo. App., 320. 2Vew Hampshire — Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H., 284, 298; 72 Am. Dec, 302. New York — Maxmilian v. New York, 62 N. Y., 160; 20 Am. Rep., 468. Texas — Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex., 118. West Virginia — Brown v. Guyan- dotte, 34 W. Va., 299; 12 S. E. Rep., 707; 11 L. R. A., 121; Mendel v. Wheeling, 28 W. Va., 233; 57 Am. Rep., 664. Negligent Management of Hos- pitals, etc., creates no liability. Ogg V. Lansing, 35 Iowa, 495; 14 Am. Rep., 499; Barbour v. Ells- worth, 67 Me., 294; Brown v. Vin- alhaven, 65 Me., 402 ; 20 Am. Rep., 709. No liability for failure to disin- fect a smallpox hospital. Nichol- son v. Detroit (Mich., 1902), 88 N. W. Rep., 695, reviewing authori- ties. Nor for unskilled treatment by physician. Sherbourne v. Yuba Co., 21 Cal., 113; 81 Am. Dec, 151. Removing negligently sick per- son, held to create a liability. Aaron v. Broiles, 64 Tex., 316; 53 Am. Rep., 764. No liability for negligence of servants and officers of hospital. Murtaugh v. St. Louis, 44 Mo., 479. 34Judd V. Hartford, 72 Conn., 350; 44 Atl. Rep., 510. Fob Distinction Between Man- datory AND DISCEETIONARY POW- ERS, see sections 82 and 83, supra. SB Moran v. Pullman, Palace Car Co., 134 Mo., 641; 56 Am. St. Rep., 543; 33 L. R. A., 755; 36 S. W. Rep., 659; Stewart v. Clinton, 79 Mo., 603, 611, 612; Imler v. Spring- field, 55 Mo., 119, 125; Schattner V. Kansas City, 53 Mo., 162; Steines V. Franklin County, 48 Mo., 167; St. Louis V. Gurno, 12 Mo., 414; Taylor v. St. Louis, 14 Mo., 20; ma GENERAL NATURE OP POLICE POWER. [§436 them, or, enforce state laws within its jurisdiction,^^ as, for ex- ample, an ordinance forbidding the unlawful use of the streets, as by coasting,^'' (unless such use amounts to the maintenance of a public nuisance),^* or, prohibiting swine or cattle from run- ning at large,^^ or, neglect to prevent the erection of wooden buildings within certain limits, in accordance with charter or ordinance provisions,*" or, failure to exercise power to supply water and apparatus for extinguishing fires,*i or, the power to enforce ordinances forbidding the use of fire works within the corporate limits,*^ or, an ordinance directing the city to remove obstructions in a navigable river.** So there is no liability for failure of firemen to use proper efforts in preventing the spread of fire,** or, according to some eases, for the negligent con- Woods V. Kansas City, 58 Mo. App., Iowa — Ball v. Woodbine, 61 272, 279.. Iowa, 83; 47 Am. Rep., 805; 15 N. 30 Fowle V. Alexandria, 3 Peters (U. S.), 398; Collins v. Savannah, 77 Ga., 745; Forsyth v. Atlanta, 45 Ga., 152; Odell v. Schroeder, 58 111., 353 ; Wheeler v. Plymouth, 116 Ind., 158; 9 Am. St. Rep., 837; 18 N. E. Rep., 532. Compare New Or- leans V. Peyroux, 6 Mart. (N. S. La.), 155; Arnold v. Stanford (Ky., 1902), 69 S. W. Rep., 726. Duty imposed by statute. Balti- more V. Marriott, 9 Md., 160; Pitts- burgh V. Grier, 22 Pa. St., 54. 37 Lafayette v. Timberlake, 88 Ind., 330; Faulkner v. Aurora, 85 Ind., 130; 44 Am. Rep., 1; Burford V. Grand Rapids, 53 Mich., 98; 18 N. W. Rep., 571; 51 Am. Rep., 105. 38 See next succeeding section. 39 Rivers v. Augusta, 65 Ga., 376; 38 Am. Rep., 787; Levy v. New York, 1 Sandf. (N. Y.), 465; Kelly v. Milwaukee, 18 Wis., 83. 40 Harman v. St. Louis, 137 Mo., 494; 38 S. W. Rep., 1102; Forsyth v. Atlanta, 45 Ga., 152; 12 Am. Rep., 576. 11 New York v. Workman, 35 U. S. App., 201. 42 Arimona — Fifield v. Phoenix (Ariz., 1894), 24 L. R. A., 430; 36 Pac. Rep., 916, W. Rep., 846. Massachusetts — Morrison v. Law- rence, 98 Mass., 219. North Carolina — Hill v. Char- lotte, 72 N. C, 55 ; Love v. Raleigh, 116 N. C, 296; 21 S. B. Rep., 503; 28 E. R. A., 192. Pennsylvania — McDade v. Ches- ter, 117 Pa. St., 414; 12 Atl. Rep., 421; 2 Am. St. Rep., 681; Norris- town V. Fitzpatrick, 94 Pa. St., 121. Ohio — Robinson v. Greenville, 42 Ohio St., 625, 630; 51 Am. Rep., 857. West Virginia — Bartlett v. Clarksburg, 45 W. Va., 393; 31 S. B. Rep., 918; 43 L. R. A., 295. Wisconsin — Aron v. Wausau, 98 Wis., 592; 74 N. W. Rep., 354; 40 L. R. A., 733. No liability for failure to en- force ordinance as to storing in- flammable oil. Roberts v. Cincin- nati, 5 Ohio Dec, 361. Courts will not control the ex- ercise of discretionary powers. Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. St., 324; 78 Am. Dec, 342. *s Coonley v. Albany, 57 Hun. (N. Y.), 327. 44 New York v. Workman, 35 U. S. App., 201; Mendel v. Wheeling, 28 W. Va., 223. § 437] GENERAL NATURE OF POLICE POWER. 61 7 struction, maintenance or use of appliances for the extinguish- ment of fire.*^ So, as a general rule, failure to enforce ordi- nance providing for the abatement of nuisances, creates no liability to private action.** § 437. Same subject— Exception— Nuisances. The rule that, a municipal corporation is not liable for the non-exercise of its legislative powers or for the failure to enforce its ordinances, should be applied reasonably. If the corporation permits something to exist in its streets and public ways, by license or otherwise, which constitutes a nuisance and which may seri- ously interfere with a reasonable use of such ways by travelers in the ordinary modes, no good reason can be advanced to ex- cuse municipal liability, in event of damage directly resulting from such nuisance. This would constitute a sound exception to the rule under consideration, which exception is recognized by the decisions. Thus in a New York case, it was held that a city is liable for injury to property by an explosion of fire works, constituting a dangerous public nuisance, when the dis- play was made under a permit given by the mayor, acting under authority of an ordinance.*'^ Prior to this decision the same court held that the granting of a license, even though author- ized by ordinance, to an individual, permitting him to keep wagons on the highway, and a person passing under one of them was damaged by its falling upon him because of the col- lision of the wagon in question with an ice wagon properly passing along the street, would render the city liable. The court found that the wagons in the street constituted a public nuisance maintained by the city, and that the city could not thus make use of its legislative powers to the damage of indi- viduals.*^ And where the municipal authorities suffer streets to 45 Massachusetts — Tainter v. 139 ; 23 Am. Rep., 545 ; Butz v. Worcester, 123 Mass., 311; 25 Am. Cavanaugh, 137 Mo., 503; 38 S. Rep., 90. W. Rep., 1104; Kiley v. Kansas Missouri — McKenna v. St. Louis, City, 87 Mo., 103; Armstrong v. 6 Mo. App., 320. Brunswick, 79 Mo., 319. New Hampshire — Bdgerly v. Con- Rule applied in location of pest cord, 62 N. H., 8. house. Arnold v. Stanford, 24 Ky. Neto York — Springfield F. & M. Law Rep., 626; 69 S. W. Rep., 726. Ins. Co. v. Keeseville, 148 N. Y., *^ Speir v. Brooklyn, 139 N. Y., 46; 30 L. R. A., 660. 6; 34 N. E. Rep., 727; 21 L. R. A., WiscoMSin— Hayes V. Oshkosh, 33 641; 36 Am. St. Rep., 664. Wis., 314; 14 Am. Rep., 760. 48 Cohen v. New York, 113 N. Y., 46 Davis V. Montgomery 51 Ala., 532; 21 N. E. Rep., 700; 10 Am. St. 678 GENERAL NATURE OF POLICE POWER. [§ 437 become unsafe by reason of failure to enforce police regula- tions designed to keep them free from obstructions and nuis- ances and damage results by reason thereof, responsibility can- not be evaded on the ground that the omitted duty is legislative or governmental in character. Thus where a city by license authorizes a use to be made of a street which rendered it dan- gerous or unsafe for travelers, e. g., the exhibit of wild animals thereon, resulting in damage by reason of the team of a person properly using the street, taking fright, the city was held liable.*® While a city possesses the right to use any proper implement run by steam for the purpose of constructing or re- pairing its streets, and, in the absence of carelessness or negli- gence in its management, it is not liable for damages occa- sioned by a horse becoming frightened thereat,^" "an object in a public street calculated to frighten horses ordinarily gentle, and which causes an accident resulting in injury," has been held to render municipal corporations liable, "if they have been guilty of negligence in allowing it to remain for an unreason- able time. * * * But objects, outside the traveled way, and not near enough to the line of public travel to interfere with or incommode travelers, are not defects in the highway." ^i This Rep., 506, approved in Speir v. ening of plaintiff's horse by a Brooklyn, supra. steam motor, used upon a street ■•9 2 Dillon, Mun. Corp., sec. 1021, railway by permission of the city citing Little v. Madison, 42 Wis., council, it was held that, in the 643; 24 Am. Rep., 435, where a absence of express statutory au- city licensed the exhibition of thority, a city has no power to au- bears in one of its principal thorize or permit the use of steam streets, thus authorizing a danger- motors upon its streets, either ous obstruction and nuisance. See upon ordinary railroads or street also the "Sacred Ox Case," Cole v. railways, and the grant of such au- Newburyport, 129 Mass., 594; 23 thority or permission constitutes Albany Law Journ., 3, where the negligence which will render the city granted the right to erect a city liable for damages caused booth in one of its public squares thereby. The fact that the action for the use and exhibition of an of the city council in granting such animal. The city was held not right was without authority would liable. not protect the city from liability, 50 Sparr v. St. Louis, 4 Mo. App., corporations being responsible for 572. the acts of their officers and agents But in Stanley v. Davenport, 54 done within the apparent scope of Iowa, 463; 2 N. W. Rep., 1064; 6 their authority, and the streets of N. W. Rep., 706, in an action the city, under the control of the against a city to recover for per- city council, sonal Injuries caused by the fright- 5i 2 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4th §437] GENERAL NATURE OF POLICE POWER. CIO rule is well illustrated and enforced in a Virginia case, where the charter of the particular city imposed the duty to keep the streets in good condition. Under ordinance, persons building or excavating on lots adjoining the street were allowed to de- posit materials in that part of the street opposite their prem- ises to the extent of one-half of the width of the street and under special license they might be authorized to occupy more than one-half of such street with such material. Where a per- son lawfully riding in the street at night was damaged by fall- ing over a pile of sand in the street, not occupying more than one-half of its width, the city was held liable on the ground that it might not abrogate, nor dispense by ordinance, with the du- ties and liabilities imposed by charter ;^2 that (to quote the language of the court), "reason and public policy supplement the law in holding the city responsible for neglect or omission of due diligence in the discharge of their charter duties. ' ' '^■'• As we have seen, the city may lawfully permit the use of its streets for coasting,"* but it cannot do so if such use amounts to the maintenance of a public nuisance, the determination of which question is controlled by the surrounding circumstances. In a Michigan case a city had set apart a particular street for coasting, and one making proper use of the street was injured by a coasting sled running into him. The court found that the use of the street for coasting was not necessarily a nuisance, therefore, the city was held not liable. The court further found that the action of the council in setting aside the street for this use was within its discretionary and legislative powers, and however unwise it may have been exercised in the particular instance, the court should not interfere.^^ The circumstances under which the municipal corporations will be held liable for nuisance generally will further appear from the cases in the note.^* Ed.), sec. 1011, where many illus- se Municipal Liability foe Nuis- trative cases are cited in the notes, ances Exists, When. 52 Public powers cannot be sur- Connecticut — Mootry v. Dan- rendered or delegated. Sec. 84, sm- bury, 45 Conn., 550; 29 Am. Rep., pra. 703. 33 Per Fauntleroy, J., in McCouU Illinois — Champaign v. Forre3t- V. Manchester, 85 Va., 579, 587; 8 er, 29 III. App., 117. S. E. Rep., 379. Maryland — Baltimore v. Marri- 54 Section next preceding. ott, 9 Md., 160; 66 Am. Dec, 326. 55 Burford v. Grand Rapids, 53 Michigan — Pennoyer v. Saginaw, Mich., 98; 18 N. W. Rep,, 571; 51 8 Mich., 534. Am. Rep., 105. l^ev^ Jersey — Hart v. Union 680 GENERAL NATURE OP POLICE POWER. [§438 § 438. General requisites of valid police regulations. The lequisites of a valid ordinance, enumerated elsewhere,^^ a^pply to police ordinances. Likewise the rules elsewhere given for- County, 57 N. J. L., 90; 29 Atl. Rep., 490. New York — Jackson v. Roches- ter, 43 Hun. (N. Y.), 635; Hill v. New York, 139 N. Y., 495; 34 N. B. Rep., 1090; Bolton v. New Ro- chelle, 84 Hun. (N. Y.), 281; 32 N. Y. Suppl., 442. North Carolina — Downs v. High Point, 115 N. C, 182; 20 S. E. Rep., 385. Pennsylvania — Vanderslice v. Philadelphia, 103 Pa. St., 102. Texas— Ft. Worth v. Crawford, 74 Tex., 404; 15 Am. St. Rep., 840; 12 S. W. Rep., 52; San Antonio v. Mackey, 14 Tex. Civ. App., 210; 36 S. W. Rep., 760; Hillsboro v. Ivey, 1 Tex. Civ. App., 653; 20 S. W. Rep,, 1012. Wisconsin — Harper v. Milwau- kee, 30 Wis., 365. Pest House; municipal liability for location of, when. Henderson V. O'Haloran, 24 Ky. Law Rep., 995; 70 S. W. Rep., 662; Paducah V. Allen, 20 Ky. Law Rep., 1342; 49 S. W. Rep., 343; Clayton V. Henderson, 20 Ky. Law Rep., 87; 44 S. W. Rep., 667; Neblett v. Nashville, 12 Heisk. (Tenn.), 684. No Municipal Liability for Nuisance, When. Georgia — Atkinson v. Atlanta, 81 Ga., 625; 7 S. E. Rep., 692. Indiana — Anderson v. East, 117 Ind., 126; 2 L. R. A., 712; 10 Am. St. Rep., 35; 19 N. E. Rep., 726. Louisiana — Howe v. New Or- leans, 12 La. Ann., 481. Maine — Seele v. Deering, 79 Me., 343; 1 Am. St. Rep., 314; 10 Atl. Rep., 45. Missouri — Armstrong v. Bruns- wick, 79 Mo., 319; Martinowsky v. Hannibal, 35 Mo. App., 70; Van de Vere v. Kansas City, 107 Mo., 83; 28 Am. St. Rep., 396; 17 S. W. Rep., 695; Whitfield v. CarroUton, 50 Mo. App., 98. Pennsylvania — McDade v. Ches- ter, 117 Pa. St., 414; 2 Am. St. Rep., 681; 12 Atl. Rep., 421. Tennessee — McCrowell v. Bristol, 5 Lea (73 Tenn.), 685. Texas — Ft. Worth v. Crawford, 64 Tex., 202; 53 Am. Rep., 753. Under legislative authority a mu- nicipal corporation may establish a smallpox hospital upon its own grounds, and if the hospital is properly located and conducted no action will lie for damages to the value of property in the neighbor- hood, for such act does not consti- tute a taking or damaging of pri- vate property for public use, with- in the meaning of the constitution. Frazer v. Chicago, 186 111., 480; 57 N. E. Rep., 1055. Compare L'Hote, etc., V. New Orleans, 177 U. S., 587; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 788. Contra. "Where a city or other municipality erects and maintains a public institution, which, by rea- son of its nature, endangers the lives or health of the occupants of adjacent premises, as by sub- jecting them to contagious or in- fectious diseases, it is not only a nuisance, but it is such an inva- sion of the property rights of such adjacent holders as amounts both - to an injury and a taking of prop- erty under the section of our con- stitution. For this the city must make compensation." Paducah v. Allen, 23 Ky. Law Rep.; 701; 63 S. W. Rep., 981. ■"'T Section 14, supra. §439] HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. 681 bidding the delegation of power, legislative or otherwise,''* dis- criminations as to persons or classes, ^^ and oppressive and un- reasonable regulations,'"' must be duly observed in the enact- ment and enforcement of police regulations. The police ordi- nance must prescribe a general and uniform rule and condi- tions for the regulations, to which all similarly situated may conform.®! But limitations are best determined by individual cases, and what courts have in fact sanctioned or condemned. General rules may serve as guides; but each case presents its own facts. Therefore, an effort has been made to present in text and note the rules as applied to the facts and circum- stances of the particular case, with the reasoning of the court, when practicable. 2. HEALTH AND. SANITARY REGULATIONS— NUISANCES. § 439. Health and sanitary regulations— Power to make and enforce. One of the chief purposes for the institution of mu- nicipal government is the conservation of the public health and safety. No more important obligation is confided to municipal corporations. The nature of the ordinances they shall adopt for this purpose is largely a matter within the discretion of the local authorities. Under the usual charter powers to pre- serve the public health, etc., ordinances designed to protect 58 Section 84, supra. Dairies — permission of council. 58 Sections 193 and 194, supra. State v. Mahner, 43 La. Ann., 496; Discrimination against residents 9 So. Rep. 480. in favor of non-residents of cer- Erection of buildings. Newton tain class as to width of tires on v. Belger,_ 143 Mass., 598 ; 10 N. E. vehicles, held bad. Regina v. Pipe, Rep., 464. 1 Ont. Rep., 43. Ordinances regulating the ster- eo Ch. VI, Of Reasonableness of ing of petroleum, naphtha, ben- Ordinances, zine, etc., condemned because it 61 No Uniform Rule — Delega- did not provide a uniform rule. TioN. Richmond v. Dudley, 129 Ind., Laundry. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 112; 28 N. E. Rep., 312; 28 Am. 118 U. S., 356; In re Quong Woo, St. Rep., 180; 13 L. R. A., 587. 7 Sawyer (U. S. C. C), 526; 13 Establishment of pounds and ap- FedT Rep., 229. point pound keepers. Dillard v. Use of steam-whistles-^Permis- Webb., 55 Ala., 468. Compare Bat- sion of mayor. Baltimore v. Rad- sel v. Blaine (Tex., 1901), 15 S. ecke, 49 Md., 217. W. Rep., 283. Slaughter house— permission of Tannery; granting of permit in council. Barthet v. New Orleans, uncontrolled discretion of board of 24 Fed. Rep., 563. health and council, held void. Ply- 683 HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. [§439 the local community from infectious, contagious and pestilen- tial diseases, frOm impure water, bad food, nuisances injurious to health and comfort, noxious odors and gases, unusual noises, etc., are usually liberally construed by the courts, and, unless clearly unreasonable and arbitrary, or demonstrably violative of some constitutional provision intended to protect the liberty of the individual or property rights, they will be sustained."- Within the power to preserve the public health is the -power to create boards of health with authority to appoint officers and subordinates for this purpose ;^^ establish hospitals or asylums for the care of the sick or afflcted;^* promulgate reasonable mouth V. Schultheis, 135 Ind., 339; 35 N. B. Rep., 12; 135 Ind., 701; 35 N. E. Rep., 14. Street obstruction; power to re- move may be delegated. New Or- leans Gas Co. V. Hart, 40 La. Ann., 474; 4 So. Rep., 215; 8 Am. St. Rep., 544. «2 Louisiana — Kennedy v. Phelps, 10 La. Ann., 227; Tissot v. Great Southern T. & T. Co., 39 La. Ann., 996; 3 So. Rep., 261; Monroe v. Gerspach, 33 La. Ann., 1011. Maryland — Baltimore v. Marri- ott, 9 Md., 160; 66 Am. Dec, 326; Harrison v. Baltimore,, 1 GUI (Md.), 264. Massachusetts — Baker v. Boston, 12 Pick (Mass.), 184, 193; 22 Am. Dec, 421. North Carolina — State v. HUI, 126 N. C, 1139, 1147; 36 S. E. Rep., 326; 50 L. R. A., 473, 475; State v. Summerfield, 107 N. C., 895; 12 S. E. Rep., 114; State v. Pendergrass, 106 N. C, 664; 10 S. E. Rep., 1002. New York— In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y., 98; 50 Am. Rep., 636; In re Ry- ers, 72 N. Y., 1; Kelley v. New York, 6 Misc. (N. Y.), 516. Ohio — State v. Capital City Dai- ry Co., 62 Ohio St., 350; 57 N. E. Rep., 62. South Dakota — State v. Scougal, 3 S. D., 55; 51 N. W. Rep., 858; 44 Am. St. Rep., 756, Virginia — Lacey v. Palmer, 93 Va., 159; 24 S. E. Rep., 930; 57 Am. St. Rep., 795. United States — Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S., 659, 667. Incidental Poweb to enact sani- tary ordinances exists. St. Paul V. Laldler, 2 Minn., 190; 72 Am. Dec, 89. Incidental powers broad- ly claimed in Crawfordsville v. Braden, 130 Ind., 149; 28 N. B. Rep., 849; 30 Am. St. Rep., 214, holding enumeration does not nec- essarily exclude other powers. Health and Safety Distin- guished. Distinction between or- dinances to protect the health, and those- designed to insure safety merely, as inspection of steam boilers, stated in State v. Robert- son, 45 La. Ann., 954; 40 Am. St. Rep., 272; 13 So. Rep., 164. 63 Boehm v. Baltimore, 61 Md., 259. PowEK OF Boards of Health. Grace v. Newton, 135 Mass., 490; State V. Neidt (N. J. Eq., 1890), 19 Atl. Rep., 318; Philadelphia v. Provident Life, etc., Co., 132 Pa St., 224; 18 Atl. Rep., 1114; Ken nedy v. Philadelphia, 2 Pa. St., 366 «i Hospitals. The city may reg- ulate the establishment of hospi tais and forbid the erection of pri- vate hospitals within the city, §440] HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. B83 regulations respecting the practice of medicine, surgery and midwiferyss (if charter power exists or the matter is not controlled by state statute, which is often the case) f'' forbid bringing within the limits insane persons and paupers f pro- hibit the use of poison and adulteration in drugs, medicines, chemicals, etc. :''* adulteration of milk, bread and other food products sold -within the city; and, generally, to prevent and abate all public nuisances which are or may become detrimental to the public health.®'' § 440. What constitutes a nuisance. Nuisance, nocumentum, or annoyance, signifies anything that works hurt, inconvenience or damage. A private nuisance is anything done to the hurt or annoyance of lands, tenements or hereditaments of another. A common or public nuisance affects the public. It is such an inconvenience or troublesome offense as annoys the whole com- munity, in general, and not merely some particular person. A Milne v. Davidson, 5 Martin (N. S. La.), 409; 16 Am. Dec, 189. Hospitals are not nuisances. City cannot license under general police powers. Bessonies v. Indianapolis, 71 Ind., 189. Hospitals, insane asylums, poor houses and dispensaries may be es- tablished. Municipal Code of St. Louis, p. 578. These are sometimes eleemosy- nary institutions of the state, but often they are private and belong to the city. State ex rel. St. Louis V. Seibert, 123 Mo., 424, 429; 24 S. W. Rep., 750; 27 S. W. Rep., 624. The business of maintaining pri- vate hospitals, asylums, etc., being lawful cannot be forbidden either directly or indirectly by restrict- ive and unreasonable regulations. Ex parte Whitwell, 98 Cal., 73 ; 32 Pac. Rep., 870; 35 Am. St. Rep., 152. 85 Municipal Code of St. Louis, p. 576, sec. 719 et seq. Vital statistics containing the births and deaths may be required to be made regularly by practicing physicians, etc. Mun. Code of St. Louis, 576, 715 et seq. Also mor- tuary records. Mun. Code of St. Louis, p. 593 et seq. 66 Practice of medicine is within the police power of the state. State V. Carey, 4 Wash., 424; 30 Pac. Rep., 729. State statutes often regulate. 2 R. S. of Mo., 1899, sec. 8507; Laws of Mo., 1901, pages 207, 210. 87 Municipal Code of St. Louis, p. 601, sec. 868 et seq. 88 State V. Pourcade, 45 La. Ann., 717; 13 So. Rep., 187; 40 Am. St. Rep., 249; Milne v. Davidson, 5 Mart. La. (N. S.), 409; 16 Am. Dec, 189. 69 Ferguson v. Selma, 43 Ala., 398; Salem v. Eastern R. R. Co., 98 Mass., 431; 96 Am. Dec, 650; Armstrong v. Brunswick, 79 Mo., 319, 321. Pesthouse, as nuisance. Haag V. Vanderburgh Co. Comrs., 60 Ind., 54; 28 Am. Rep., 654. Opium, regulating sale of. valid. Ex parte Hong Shen 98 Cal., 681; 33 Pac. Rep., 799; In re Ah Lung, 45 Fed, Rep., 684, 684: HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. [§440 private nuisance is a private wrong done to an individual and must be redressed by private action. Such wrongs fall under the head of torts. Common or public nuisances are denomi- nated public wrongs, and are classified as crimes and misde- meanors, since the damage resulting therefrom is common to the whole community, in general, no one being able to assign his particular portion of it.''" Generally speaking, anything which is detrimental to health or which threatens danger to persons or property within the city may be regarded and dealt with by the municipal authorities as a nuisance.''^ But what annoyance or combination of annoyances will constitute a nui- sance in a given instance will depend upon the circumstances '0 Nuisance means "annoyance," anything that works hurt, incon- venience or damage. Miller v. Burch, 32 Tex., 208; 5 Am. Rep., 242. Public and Private Nuisance distinguished. State v. Luce, 9 Houst. (Del.), 396; 32 Atl. Rep., 1076; Burlington v. Stockwell, 5 Kan. App., 569; 47 Pac. Rep., 988; Seifried v. Hays, 81 Ky., 377; 50 Am, Rep., 167; King v. Morris, 18 N. J. Eq., 397; Warren v. Hunter, 1 Phila. (Pa.), 414. Crime at common law to main- tain public. Indianapolis v. Blythe, 2 Ind., 75. 71 Nuisance Described. "If it af- fects the rights of the community in general, and not merely of a few persons; if it damages or men- aces all persons who come within the sphere of its operations, though it may vary in its effects on indi- viduals, it amounts to a common or public nuisance." Common- wealth V. Miller, 139 Pa. St., 77; 21 Atl. Rep., 138; Westcott v. Mid- dleton, 43 N. J. Eq., 478; 11 Atl. Rep., 490. Blackstone defines a nuisance as anything done to the hurt or an- noyance of the lands, tenements or hereditaments of another. 3 Bl. Com., 215. Mr. Justice Cooley describes an actionable nuisance to be anything wrongfully done or permitted which injures or annoys another in the enjoyment of his legal rights. Cooley on Torts (2nd Ed.), 670, 671. If the thing complained of does in fact operate injuriously upon the rights of the public, it is a common nuisance, irrespective of any motive or intent, wrongful or innocent, on the part of the per- son charged. Bonnell v. Smith, 53 Iowa, 281; 5 N. W. Rep., 128; South Royalton Bank v. Suffolk Bk., 27 Vt., 505; Seacord v. People, 121 111., 623; 13 N. E. Rep., 194. "The fact being established, that the act or thing endangers the life, health or property of the public, or any considerable part of it, the offense is proved and there can be no justification." Parker and Worthington on Public Health and Safety, sec. 178. Any use of property that cor- rupts the atmosphere with noxious and noisome smells,, producing in- jury to property or health, or im- pairing the comfortable enjoyment of it as a dwelling, etc., is a nuis- ance. But the damage "must be real, not fanciful ; not a mere nuis- ance to a person of fastidious §441] HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. 685 of each rase as it arisesJ^ No particular kinds of annoyance are requisite to constitute a nuisance. The definitions or de- scriptions found in the text books and judicial decisions are neither exhaiistive nor inclusiveJ^ Some structures when lo- cated in close proximity to a family residence or other places of habitation, or when the filth therefrom is carried onto the premises of another, are necessarily nuisaneosJ* But others which are not nuisances per se may, under certain conditions, become such, as brick kilnsJ^ The law recognizes two kinds of public nuisances: 1. Wrongs or injuries which affect morality and decency. They are maleum in se and constitute nuisances in fact, irrespective of location and results. 2. All kinds of acts relating to the exercise of trades, occupations, etc., and the use of property which become public nuisances because of the location and sur- roundings.'^® §441. Municipal power to declare and define nuisances. Under general grant of power respecting nuisances the mu- nicipal corporation may declare a thing a nuisance which is one in fact,^^ but, without express charter power, the general rule is maintained that the local corporation cannot declare by tastes and habits, but such sensi- or conceded the question of nuis- ble and real damages as a sensible ance is solely one of law for the person, if submitted to it, would court. Kirchgraber v. Lloyd, 59 find injurious to him." Wood on Mo. App., 59, 62. But where evi- Nuisances, sec. 599, 600, adopted by dence is conflicting, or the thing Philips, P. J., in Beckley v. Skroh, is not a nuisance per se, the ques- 19 Mo. App., 75. tion is to be determined by the 's Read observations of Pollock, jury or triers of the fact. Kearney J., in Bamford v. Turnley, 113 Bng. v. Farrell, 28 Conn., 317. C. L., 66, as to difficulty or impos- Ordinarily, the question of nuis- sibility of formulating a rule to ance is one of fact. Yates v. Mil- cover all cases, waukee, 10 Wall. (U. S.), 497; St. t:i See Galbraith v. Olivet, 3 Pitts. Louis v. Schnuckelberg, 7 Mo. (Pa.), 78; Huckenstlne's Appeal, App., 536. 70 Pa. St.,. 102; 10 Am. Rep., 669; 7« Ex parte Foote, 70 Ark., 12; Salvin v. North Brancepeth Coal 65 S. W. Rep., 706; 91 Am. St. Rep., Co., L. R., 9 Ch. App., 705; Camp- 63. bell V. Seaman, 63 N. Y., 568. ^^ Arkadelphia v. Clark, 52 Ark., 71 Kirchgraber v. Lloyd, 59 Mo. 23; 20 Am. St. Rep., 154; 11 S. W. App., 59, 62. Rep., 957; Green v. Lake, 60 Miss., 75 Huckenstlne's Appeal, 70 Pa. 451 ; Nazworthy v. Sullivan, 55 111. St., 102; 10 Am. Rep., 669. App., 48. When the facts are undisputed 686 HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. [§441 ordinance that a nuisance which is not so in fact J* Under this rule some decisions would appear to limit the inquiry as to. what is a nuisance to those things which have been regarded so at Nuisances in Fact. Wreck dangerous to health. Lew- is V. Dodge, 17 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 229. Milldam. State v. Close, 35 Iowa, 570. Power to declare what shall be a nuisance confers authority to de- clare by ordinance that the keep- ing of a stallion within one-half mile of the public square shall be a nuisance. Hoops v. Ipava, 55 111. App., 94. The keeping of a jackass within the corporate limits may be de- clared to be a nuisance by ordi- nance and the offense punished. Ex parte Foote, 70 Ark., 12; 65 S. W. Rep., 706; 91 Am. St. Rep., 63; Farrell v. Cook, 16 Neb., 483; 20 N. W. Rep., 720; 49 Am. Rep., 721. Under general power to prevent and remove nuisance, an ordinance is valid which forbids the exhibit- ing of a stud horse within the town limits. Nolin v. Mayor, etc., 4 Yerg. (12 Tenn.), 163, where it is said: "Was this a nuisance within the meaning of the act of Incorporation? Keeping hogs in a market town has been so holden (Salk, 460); as are ale houses, gaming houses, brothels, booths and stages for rope-dancers, moun- tebanks and the like. 1 Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown C, 75, sec. 6. The exhibition of these in the streets would be clearly a nuis- ance; and we think as certainly showing and keeping a stud horse in the town is. The corporation law was warranted by the char- ter." Compare Ex parte Robinson, 30 Tex. App., 493; 17 S. W. Rep., 1057. Under general power, ordinance cannot declare the running of locomotives at a certain rate of speed a nuisance. State (The N. J. R. R. & T. Co.) V. Jersey City, 29 N. J. L., 170. Ordinance cannot provide to pun- ish the crime of nuisance by virtue alone of general charter powers. Knovxille v. C, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 83 Iowa, 636; 50 N. W. Rep., 61; 3J, Am. St. Rep., 321, approving Nevada v. Hutchins, 59 Iowa, 506; 13 N. W. Rep. 634. Fire engine house erected under authority of charter is not a nuis- ance per se. Van de Vere v. Kan- sas City, 107 Mo., 83; 17 S. W. Rep., 695. Power to declare must be exer- cised by ordinance, affecting all property similarly clrcumBtanoed. American Fur. Co. v. Batesville, 139 Ind., 77; 38 N.'B. Rep., 408. Declaration under express char- ter power. Americus v. Mitchell, 79 Ga., 807; 5 S. E. Rep., 201. Ordinance forbidding boys from getting on and off trains, unless passengers, held valid. Bearden v. Madison, 73 Ga., 184. Private property ; regulating. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Hag- gerty, 67 111., 113. Throwing cotton bales from up- per floor, may be prohibited by penal ordinance. Charleston v. Elford, 1 McMull. (S. C), 234. f 8 United States — Yates v. Mil- waukee, 10 Wall. (77 U. S.), 497; 19 L. Ed., 984; Hennessy v. St. Paul, 37 Fed. Rep., 565. Arkansas — Ward v. Little Rock, 41 Ark., 526; 48 Am. Rep., 46. Colorado — Denver v. Mullen, 7 Colo., 345; 3 Pac. Rep., 693. Illinois — Harmison v. Lewis- §441] HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. f)8r common law or have been declared such by statute."'^ .Many decisions hold that where a city has power to determine what town, 153 111., 313; 46 Am. St. Rep., 893; 38 N. E. Rep., 628; Des Plaines v. Poyer, 123 111., 348; 14 N. E. Rep., 677; 5 Am. St. Rep., 524; North Chicago City R. Co. v. Lake View, 105 111., 207; 44 Am. Ret)., 788; Railroad v. Jackson- ville, 67 111., 37, 40; Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co., 70 111., 19i, 198; Chicago' V. Laflin, 49 III., 172. Indiana — Walker v. Jameson, 140 Ind., 591; 37 N. E. Rep., 402; 39 N. E. Rep., 869; 49 Am. St. Rep., 222; Evansville v. State, 118 Ind., 426, 447; 21 N. E. Rep., 267; Plymouth v. Schultheis, 135 Ind., 339; 35 N. E. Rep., 12; Evansville V. Miller, 146 Ind., 613; 45 N. E. Rep., 1054. lotoa — Everett v. Council Bluffs, 46 Iowa, 66; Patterson v. Vai), 43 Iowa, 142; Bills v. Belknap, 36 Iowa, 583. Mlchiiian — In re Frazee, 63 Mich., 396; 30 N. W. Rep., 72; 6 Am. St. Rep., 310; Wreford v. Peo- ple, 14 Mich., 41. Minnesota — St. Paul v. Gilfillan, 36 Minn., 298; 31 N. W. Rep., 49. Mississippi — Ex parte O'Leary, 65 Miss., 80; 3 So. Rep., 144; 7 Am. St. Rep., 640; Quintini v. Board, etc.. 64 Miss., 483, 489, 491; 1 So. Rep., 625. Missouri — St. Louis v. Heltzberg P. & P. Co., 141 Mo., 375; 42 S. W. Rep., 954; 64 Am. St. Rep., 516; 39 L. R. A., 551. New Jersey — Hutton v. Camden, 39 N. J. L., 122, 130; State (N. J. R. & T. Co.) v. Jersey City, 29 N. J. Law, 170. New York — In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y., 98; People v. Rosenberg, 138 N. Y., 410, 415, 416; 34 N. E. Rep., 285; Coe v. Schultz, 47 Barb. ( N. Y.), 64, 69. North Carolina — State v. Taft, 118 N. C, 1190; 23 S. E. Rep., 970; 5'4 Am. St. Rep., 768. Ohio — Cleveland v. Malm, 7 Ohio Dec, 124. Oregon — Wygant y. McLauchlan (Oreg., 1901), 64 Pac. Rep., 867. Ii.r.t;sTn.\Tiox,s. Rule applied to ordinance forbid- ding burial of dead in city. Ex parte Wygant, 39 Greg., 429; 64 Pac. Rep., 867. So power to pass by-laws and or- dinances to abate and remove nuis- ances does not give power to enact legislation to prevent. Rochester V. Collins, 12 Barb. (N. Y.), 559. An ordinance forbidding as a nuisance the fencing of a right of way of railroad, held void. Gross- man V. Oakland, 30 Oregon, 478; 60 Am. St. Rep., 832; 36 L. R. A., 593; 41 Pac. Rep., 5. Til St. Louis V. Heitzeberg P. & P. Co., 141 Mo., 375; 64 Am. St. Rep., 516; 39 L. R. A., 551; 42 S. W. Rep., 954; Everett v. Council Bluffs, 46 Iowa, 66; Bates v. Dis- trict of Columbia, 1 MacArthur (8 D. C), 433. An ordinance declaration that any specified thing is a nuisance does not make it so in fact. Board, etc., V. Norman, 51 La. Ann., 736; 25 So. Rep., 401; Walker v. Jame- son, 140 Ind., 591; 37 N. E. Rep., 402; 39 N. E. Rep., 869; 49 Am. St. Rep., 222; 28 L. R. A., 679; Evans- ville V. Miller, 146 Ind., 613; 45 N. E. Rep., 1054. A declaration on the part of the city that a particular thing is a nuisance is not conclusive unless the thing declared against is a nuisance, per se. at common law, 688 HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. [§442 constitutes a nuisance and it declares that a particular thing is a nuisance such determination is conclusive of the question.**" And it has been held, and it is doubtless the true rule, that where the particular thing declared against is a nuisance per se the action of the city authorities is conclusive.*^^ §442. Same— Illustrative cases. The general power to de- clare what constitutes a nuisance was held, in Louisiana, to be sufficient to support an ordinance of the City of New Orleans, forbidding smoking in street cars as a nuisance. ^^ Likewise under general power an ordinance forbidding the cultivation Hisey v. Mexico., 61 Mo. App., 248, or has been declared such hy stat- ute. Allison V. Richmond, 51 Mo. App., 133. Stationary steam engine. Balti- more V. Radecke, 49 Md., 217; 33 Am. Rep., 239; Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Pa. St., 274; 98 Am. Dec, 221. so Georgia — Green y. Mayor, etc., 6 Ga., 1. Illinois — Goddard v. Jackson- ville, 15 111., 588. Louisiana — ^State v. Heldenhaln, 42 La. Ann., 483; 7 So. Rep., 621. Missouri — St. Louis v. Stern, 3 Mo. App., 48; St. Louis v. Schnuck- elberg, 7 Mo. App., 536. New York — Van Wormer v. May- or, etc., 15 Wend. (N. Y.), 262. Pennsylvania — Kennedy v. Board of Health, 2 Pa. St., 366; see Wis- tar V. Addicks, 9 Phila. (Pa.), 145. South Carolina — Crosby v. War- ren, 1 Rich. (S. C), Law, 385; Ken- nedy V. Sowden, 1 McMuUen (S. C), 323. Where thing is condemned as a nuisance investigation of fact of whether or not it is a nuisance is not required. Waters Pierce Oil Co. V. New Iberia, 47 La. Ann., 863; 17 So. Rep., 343. 80% Harmison v. Lewistown, 153 111., 313; 38 N. E. Rep., 628; 46 Am. St. Rep., 893, affirming 46 111. App., 164; Kansas City v. Neal, 49 Mo. App., 72; Kansas City v. Mc- Aleer, 31 Mo. App., 433; St. Louis V. Steele, 12 Mo. App., 570; St. Louis V. Stern, 3 Mo. App., 48, 55; People V. Rosenberg, 138 N. Y., 410; 34 N. E. Rep., 285. Nuisance per se. Bleating of calves at slaughter house is. Bish- op V. Banks, 33 Conn., 118; 87 Am. Dec, 197. Boards of health; power to de- clare and abate nuisances. Bates V. District of Columbia, 1 MacAr- thur (8 D. C), 433; Baker v. Bo- hannan, 69 Iowa, 60; 28 N. W. Rep., 435; St. Louis v. Steele, 12 Mo. App., 570; Hamilton Tp. Board of Health v. Neidt (N. J. Ch., 1901), 19 Atl. Rep., 318; Rogers v. Barker, 31 Barb. (N. Y.), 447; Peo- ple V. New York Board of Health, 33 Barb. (N. Y.), 344; Gregory v. New York, 40 N. Y., 273. 81 "Smoking in itself is not to be condemned for any reason of pub- lic policy. It is agreeable and pleasant, almost indispensable to those who have acquired the habit, but it is distasteful and offensive, and sometimes hurtful to those who are compelled to breathe the atmosphere impregnated with to- bacco in close and confined places. Smoking may be classed among §442] HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. 689 of rice within the corporate limits was sustained, in Georgia, as a proper police regulation.*^ So power to declare what shall be a nuisance, is sufficient to support an ordinance declaring that swine running at large within the corporate limits is a nuisance.** Under like power, an ordinance declaring that the selling of spirituous liquor within the corporate limits is a nuisance was sustained.** The general rule of law is well established that the power of a municipality to declare what shall be deemed a nuisance is not so absolute as to be beyond the cognizance of the courts to de- termine whether it has been reasonably exercised in a given case or not.*^ Thus a partially burned building cannot be de- clared a public nuisance, irrespective of its actual condition as affecting private or public safety and health.*^ The enactment of an ordinance declaring a thing a nuisance under express these of legislation by the munic- ipal corporation." Per McBnery, J., in State v. Heidenhain, 42 La. Ann., 483, 486; 21 Am. St. Rep., 388; 7 So. Rep., 621. Smokijstg on Streets. An early statute of Massachusetts imposed a penalty on "any person who shall smoke or have in his possession any lighted pipe or cigar in any street, lane or passageway" in Bos- ton. It was construed to apply to all open ways, used as such, al- though not legally established as public ways. Com. v. Thompson, 12 Met. (53 Mass.), 231. s2 In a proceeding under such an ordinance it is not necessary to show that the cultivation of rice is injurious to health, since the power to declare what is a nuis- ance was conferred by the charter. Green v. Savannah, 6 Ga., 1, rely- ing on the principle of Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. (U. S.), 19. See Summerville v. Pressley, 33 S. C, 56; 26 Am. St. Rep., 659; 8 L. R. A., 854; 11 S. B. Rep., 545. 83 Roberts v. Ogle, 30 111., 459; Crosby v. Warren, 1 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 385; Kennedy v. Sowden, 1 McMuUen (S. C.),323. s*Goddard v. Jackson, 15 111., 588; Block v. Jacksonville, 36 111., 301. 85 Denver v. Mullen, 7 Colo., 345 ; 3 Pac. Rep., 693; Yates v. Milwau- kee, 10 Wall. (77 U. S.), 497; 19 L. Ed., 984; St. Louis v. Heitzeberg, P. & P. Co., 141 Mo., 375; 64 Am. St. Rep., 516; 39 L. R. A., 551; 42 S. W. Rep., 954; River Rendering Co. V. Behr, 77 Mo., 91, 98. 88 Bvansville v. Miller, 146 Ind., 613; 45 N. E. Rep., 1054; 38 L. R. A. 161. Building may be declared a nuisance, when. Nazworthy v. Sullivan, 55 111., App. 48. Public Picnics and open air dances cannot be declared by ordi- nance to be nuisances. The nui- sance must consist in the manner of conducting them which may be productive of annoyance and in- jury to the public and this is a question of fact and not of law. Des Plaines v. Poyer, 123 111., 348 ; 6 Am. St. Rep., 524; 14 N. B. Rep., 677, affirming 22 111. App., 574; 18 111. App., 225. 44 690 HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. [§443 power to declare, prevent and abate nuisances, is prima facie reasonable and valid.*^ "Before a by-law can be set aside on this ground its unreasonableness must be shown demonstrably. There should be no equipoise or vacillation in the beam, the scale containing the proofs should instantly descend and hold the counter-proofs in steady suspension. "^^ §443. Same— Doubt as to nuisance. "In doubtful cases," says the Supreme Court of Illinois, ' ' where a thing may or may not be a nuisance, depending upon a variety of circumstances, requiring judgment or discretion on the part of the town au- thorities in exercising their legislative functions, under a gen- eral delegation of power like the one we are considering, their action, under such circumstances, will be conclusive of the question. There are many innoxious useful things which the municipal authorities of a town or city could not lawfully, under a general grant of power, like the one in question, declare a nuisance— such, for instance, as the exercise of certain trades and callings, as that of a physician, druggist and the like. In all such eases as these, courts, acting upon their own experi- ence and knowledge of human affairs, would say, as matter of law, the exercise of these trades or callings, or things of like character, are not nuisances, and that any attempt to so declare them by the municipal authorities would be unwarranted abuse of their power. On the other hand, there are many things which courts, without proof, will, on the same principle, de- clare nuisances. Such, for instance, would be the digging of a pit, or the erection of a house, or other obstruction, in a public highway; and an ordinance passed by a town or city having, as <*^ Morse v. West Port, 110 Mo. A clear case should be made out 502 ; 19 S. W. Rep., 831. Hannibal to authorize judicial interference. V. M. & K. Tel. Co., 31 Mo. App., St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo., 547; 23; Commonwealth v. Robertson, St. Louis v. Griswold, 58 Mo., 175, 5 Cush. (Mass.), 438; Fisher v. 192; State v. Able, 65 Mo., 357; Harrisburg, 2 Grant (Pa.), 291. Plattsburg v. Riley, 42 Mo. App.. An ordinance declaring that the 18; St. Louis v. Spiegel, 8 Mo. running of a rock crushing ma- App., 478. chine on a block or square where The legal presumption is in fa- there are three or more residences vor of the ordinance and the bur- occupied is a nuisance is reason- den is upon the party who denies able and constitutes such act a its validity. State v. Trenton, 53 nuisance. Kansas City v. McAleer, N. J. L., 132; 20 Atl. Rep., 1076. 31 Mo. App., 433. 88 Paxson v. Sweet, 13 N. J. L., 196. § 444] HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. 69 r in the present case, a general power over the subject, declaring Siuch obstruction nuisances, would be valid on its face, and a conviction might properly be had under it, without any ex- trinsic proof to show the act complained of was in fact a nui- sance. In all such cases it is sufficient to show the existence of the fact constituting the nuisance." Accordingly, in this ease, it was held that the use of steam as motive power in operating trains along and over one of the public streets of the town, con- trary to an ordinance, was per se a public nuisance.*" § 444. Power to abate nuisances. The power to abate nui- sances is a portion of the police power necessarily vested in the corporate authorities.""' The right of summary abatement of public nuisances existed at common law, and this remedy has not been impaired by constitution, statute or decision."^ The public health, morals and safety are of paramount importance. Therefore, it cannot be contended that laws authorizing sum- mary abatement of public nuisances deprive one of liberty or property without due process of law or trial by jury. It is wisely held that formal legal proceedings and trial by jury are neither necessary nor appropriate in cases of this character.''^ Injunction has been recognized as a proper remedy to prevent s9 North Chicago City Ry. Co. v. to be nuisances, require abatement Lake View, 105 111., 207, 212. thereof, without hearing, etc. Har- These views indorsed in Harmi- rington v. Providence, 20 R. I., son V. Lewistown, 153 111., 313; 38 233; 38 L. R. A., 305; 38 Atl. Rep. 1. N. E. Rep., 628; 46 Am. St. Rep., Certainty of oedinance declar- 893 ; Walker v. Jameson, 140 Ind., ing a nuisance. Carthage v. Buck- 591; 37 N. E. Rep., 402; 39 N. E. ner, 4 111. App., 317; Ogdensburgv. Rep., 869; 49 Am. St. Rep., 222; 28 Lyon, 7 Lans. (N. Y.), 215. L. R. A., 679. »» Kennedy v. Phelps, 10 La., When legislature declares a Ann., 227. thing a nuisance, see Lawton v. oi Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N. Steele, 119 N. Y., 226; 23 N. E. Y., 268; 25 N. E. Rep., 480; Bum- Rep., 878 ; Train v. Boston D. Co., gartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind., 575. 144 Mass., 523; 11 N. E. Rep., 929; »= King v. Davenport, 98 111., 305; Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass., 540; Carleton y. Rugg, 149 Mass., 550; 26 N. E. Rep., 100; Philadelphia v. 22 N. E. Rep., 55; St. Louis v. Trust Co., 132 Pa. St., 224; 18 Atl. Stern, 3 Mo. App., 48; Lawton v. Rep., 1114; Hannibal v. Richards, Steele, 119 N. Y., 226; 23 N. E. 82 Mo., 330; Parker and Worthing- Rep., 878; Soon King v. Crowley, ton on Public Health and Safety, 113 U. S., 703; Mugler v. Kansas, sec. 249. 123 U. S., 623; Article 30 Am. Law The legislature may declare Reg., 157. privy vaults in crowded localities Where the nuisance is physical 69S HEALTH ANb SANITARY REJQULATlONS. [§ 44§ the erection or maintenance of a public nuisance.®* In declar- ing and abating public nuisances, especially where it results necessarily in the destruction of private property, the public authorities must observe all legal provisions applicable.®* § 445. Contagious diseases, etc.— Quarantine. The introduc- tion and spread of infectious and contagious diseases may be and tangible, the legislature may direct its summary abatement by executive oflScers, without the in- tervention of judicial proceedings, in cases analogous to those where the remedy by summary abate- ment existed at common law. Law- ton V. Steele, 119 N. Y., 226; 23 N. E. Rep., 878. Where a board of health declares a drain and sewer pipe to be a nuisance in an action for failure to abate the nuisance within a specified time, the adjudi- cation of the board of health is prima facie evidence of the exist- ence of the nuisance. Kirkwood v. Cairns, 44 Mo. App., 88; but not conclusive. St. Louis v. Schnuck- elburg, 7 Mo. App., 536. The same rule applies to a dairy. St. Louis v. Schnuckelburg, 7 Mo. App., 536. Also to a carpet beating establish- ment. St. Louis V. Steele, 12 Mo. App., 570. But where the thing declared against is a nuisance, per se, that is, a nuisance at common law, the declaration was declared conclusive as applied to a hog pen in the city. St. Louis v. Stern, 3 Mo. App., 48. In an action for the failure to abate a nuisance caused by a private drain and sewer pipe which had been condemned as a nuisance by the board of health, the fact that the city has not estab- lished a public sewer does not constitute a defense. Kirkwood v. Cairns, 44 Mo. App., 88. The fail- ure of a city is a mere non-exercise of a discretionary or legislative power, and it has been held that a person damaged by the failure of the city to exercise such a pow- er has no right of action against it. McCormack v. Patchin, 53 Mo., 33; Saxton V. St. Joseph, 60 Mo., 153; Carroll v. St. Louis, 4 Mo. App., 191; Foster v. St. Louis, 4 Mo. App., 564; Steinmeyer v. St. Louis, 3 Mo. App., 256; Armstrong v. Brunswick, 79 Mo., 319, 321; Kiley V. Kansas City, 87 Mo., 103. The city cannot exercise the power to abate nuisances where the owner fails and enforce a reim- bursement of the expenses by a lien on the lot where the nuisance was created by the city itself. The city cannot create a nuisance on defendant's lot and then require him to abate it at his own charge. Hannibal v. Richards, 35 Mo. App., 15; Hannibal v. Richards, 82 Mo., 330, 336. As to when owner will be compelled to abate nuisance at his own cost, see Watkins v. Mil- waukee, 55 Wis., 335; 13 N. W. Rep., 222. 93 Ottumwa V. Chinn, 75 Iowa, 405; 39 N. W. Rep., 670; Health Dept. V. Purdon, 99 N. Y., 237; 1 N. E. Rep., 687; Flint v. Russell, 5 Dillon, C. C, 151. Although equity will prevent the erection and maintenance of nuisances per se, the jurisdiction does not ex- tend to enjoining structures which are merely prohibited by munici- pal regulation. Thus the erection of a frame building within the fire limits win not be enjoined. Rice V. Jefferson, 50 Mo. App., 464. 8* Frank v. Atlanta, 72 Ga., 428. Council may confer power upon §445] HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. 693 prevented by reasonable police regulations.*^ For this purpose proper quarantine regulations may be established and en- foreed,^^ hospitals and pest houses maintained,*^ compulsory its board of health to abate nuis- ances dangerous to public health by the destruction of property. Waters v. Townsend, 65 Ark., 613; 47 S. W. Rep., 1054. Resolutions directing a named Woods, 1 McGloin (La.), 373; Leavey v. Preble, 64 Me., 120; State V. Speyer, 67 Vt., 502; 48 Am. St. Rep., 832; 32 Atl. Rep., 476. Legislative act may authorize officer to abate a specified nuisance the Icilling of horses to prevent the under a general ordinance is legal, spread of farcy or glanders. New- and cannot be assimilated to an ark & S. 0. Horse Car Co. v. Hunt, ordinance inflicting a penalty upon a particular individual. Kennedy V. Phelps, 10 La. Ann., 227. When existence of nuisance to be ascertained. Joyce v. Woods, 78 Ky., 386. Notice to property owner. Hut- ton V. Camden, 39 N. J. L., 122; 23 Am. Rep., 203; St. Louis v. Flynn, 128 Mo., 413, 422; 31 S. W. Rep., 17. Only in extreme cases should 50 N. J. L., 308; 12 Atl. Rep., 697; Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass., 540; 10 L. R. A., 116; 26 N. E. Rep., 100. 96 Qeorgia — Morris v. Columbus, 102 Ga., 792; 30 S. E. Rep., 850; 66 Am. St. Rep., 243. Louisiana — Rudolph v. New Or- leans, 11 La. Ann., 242. Maryland — Harrison v. Balti- more, 1 Gill (Md.), 264. Massachusetts — Train v. Boston Disinfecting Co., 144 Mass., 523 ; 59 one be deprived of the use of his Am. Rep., 113; 11 N. E. Rep., 929. property. Waggoner v. South Gorln, 88 Mo. App., 25. The corporation is liable for the wanton destruction of property. Allison V. Richmond, 51 Mo. App., 133. Decayed and dilapidated houses Mississippi — Kosciusko v. Slom- berg, 68 Miss., 469; 24 Am. St. Rep., 281; 12 L. R. A., 528; 9 So. Rep., 297. Misslouri — St. Louis v. Bofflnger, 19 Mo., 1. New York — In re Smith, 146 N. may be destroyed. Court will not Y., 68; 40 N. E. Rep., 497; 28 L. enjoin. Ferguson v. Selma, 43 Ala., 398. Compensation for destruction of property is sometimes required. Safford v. Detroit Board of Health, 110 Mich., 81; 67 N. W. Rep., 1094; 64 Am. St. Rep., 332; 33 L. R. A., 300. R. A., 820, reversing 84 Hun. (N. Y.), 465; 32 N. Y. Supp., 317; Peo- ple v. Roff, 3 Parker Cr. Rep. (N. Y.), 216; Young v. Flower, 3 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.), 34; 22 N. Y. Supp., 332. New Jersey — Newark & S. O. H. C. Ry. Co. V. Hunt, 50 N. J. L., 308; When a business officially de- 12 Atl. Rep., 697. clared to be a nuisance has been North Carolina — Salisbury v. discontinued, the owner of the Pbwis, 51 N. C, (6 Jones Law), property used in such business is 134. not entitled to compensation there- for as for property taken for pub- lic use. St. Louis v. Stern, 3 Mo. App., 48. 95 § 272 Supra. Lorenzen v. See elaborate note to Hurst V. Warner, 102 Mich., 238; 26 L. R. A., 484; 60 N. W. Rep., 440. Power of city in case of epi- demic. Thomas v. Mason, 39 W. Gy4 HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. [§4rf5 ■vaccination required,^* those afflicted with contagious diseases removed beyond the corporate liniits,i private buildings taken possession of and controlled temporarily by the public of- fieers,^ and practicing physicians within the city compelled, under penalty, to report immediately each case of smallpox, t\ phoid fever, cholera, etc.-' So clothing infected may be de- stroyed,* and second-hand clothing may be required to be de- livered to the proper officers for disinfection and a reasonable price for such service paid.^ But it has been held that general power to prevent the introduction of infectious or contagious diseases, and power to preserve the health, etc., does not con- fer authority to make, by ordinance, it unlawful "to import. Va., 526; 20 S. E. Rep., 580; 26 L. R. A., 727; Davock v. Moore, 105 Mich., 120; 63 N. W. Rep., 424; 28 L. R. A., 783. Particular quarantine regula- tions held valid. Metcalf v. St. Louis, 11 Mo., 103. An ordinance of the City of St. Louis prescribing that boats coming from below Memphis having had on board at any time during the voyage more than a specified number of passen- gers should remain in quarantine not less than 48 hours nor more than 20 days, held valid. St. Louis V. McCoy, 18 Mo., 238. In Alabama incorporated towns have no power to make and en- force quarantine regulations. New Decatur v. Berry, 90 Ala., 432; 7 So. Rep., 838. «T Frazer v. Chicago, 186 111., 480; 57 N. E. Rep., 1055; 78 Am. St. Rep., 296; Staples v. Plymouth County, 62 Iowa, 364; 17 N. W. Rep., 569; AuU v. Lexington, 18 Mo., 401; Richmond v. Henrico County, 83 Va., 204; 2 S. E. Rep., 26. Power "to remove or confine persons having Infectious dis- eases," gives Implied authority to hire buildings in which to confine sueh persons. Anderson v. O'Con- ner, 98 Ind., 168. s>8 Morris v. Columbus, 102 Ga., 792; 30 S. E. Rep., 850; 66 Am. St. Rep., 243; Pt. Wayne v. Rosenthal, 75 Ind.,, 156; 39 Am. Rep., 127; Hazen v. Strong, 2 Vt., 427. Children not vaccinated, exclud- ed from schools. In re Walter, 84 Hun. (N. Y.), 457; 32 N. Y. Suppl., 322. 1 Aaron v. Broiles, 64 Tex., 316; 53 Am. Rep., 764; Haverty v. Bass, 66 Me., 71; compare Boohi v. Utica, 2 Barb. (N. Y.), 104; Eddy V. Board of Health, 10 Phila. (Pa.), 94; 30 Leg. Int., 392. - Power of health officers to take possession and control private houses. Spring v. Hyde Park, 137 Mass., 554; 50 Am. Rep., 334; Brown v. Murdock, 140 Mass., 314; 3 N. E. Rep., 208. Power of health officers to take possession and control of ships. Mitchell V. Rockland, 41 Me., 363; 66 Am. Dec, 252. 3 State V. Wordin, 56 Conn., 216; 14 Atl. Rep., 801; Kansas City v. Balrd, 163 Mo., 196; 63 S. W. Rep., 495. * Rogers v. Barker, 31 Barb. (N. Y.), 447. 5 Rosenbaum v. Newbern, 118 N. C, 83; 24 S. E. Rep., 1; 32 L. R. A., 123. §446] HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. GU.) sell or otherwise deal in second-hand clothing or cast-oft' gar- ments, blankets, bedding or bed clothes," with a proviso ex- cepting the sale of such articles when' not imported or which have not been used by persons having infectious diseases." § 446. Burial of the dead— Cemeteries. Ordinances regulat- ing the burial of the dead and cemeteries fall strictly within the police power.^ But the exercise of this power must not be arbitrary. The necessity and reasonableness of such police con- trol must appear. A cemetery within the corporate limits is not a nuisance per se. The fact of nuisance is to be determined by the particular location and surroundings.^ Where the burial of the dead within the city, or certain parts thereof, would be « "The operation of the ordi- nance reaches beyond the scope of necessary protection and preven- tion into the domain of restraint of trade. * * * Municipal authorities * * * cannot absolutely prohibit a lawful business not necessarily a nuisance but may abate it when so carried on as to constitute a nuisance." Greensboro v. Bhren- reich, 80 Ala., 579, 583; 60 Am. Rep., 130; 18 Am. & Bng. Corp. Cas., 483; State v. Taft, 118 N. B., 1190; 54 Am. St. Rep., 768; 23 S. E. Rep., 970; 32 L. R, A., 122. Law- ful business cannot be suppressed. Weil V. Ricord, 24 N. J. Bq., 169. T Illinois — Concordia Cemetery Assn. V. Minnesota & N. W. R. Co., 121 111. 199; 12 N. E. Rep., 536. Louisiana — New Orleans v. St. Louis Church, 11 La. Ann., 244. Massachusetts — Woodlawn Cem- etery Assn. V. Everett, 118 Mass., 354; Com. v. Fahey, 5 Cush (Mass.), 408; Com. v. Goodrich, 13 Allen (Mass.), 546. New York — Brick Presbyterian Church V. New York, 5 Cow. (N. Y.), 538; New York v. Slack, 3 Wheeler Cr. Cas. (N. Y.), 237. New Hampshire — Page v. Sy- monds, 63 N. H., 17; 56 Am. Rep., 481. Pennsylvania — Craig v. Pitts- burgh First Presby. Ch., 88 Pa. St. 42; 32 Am. Rep., 417. Wisconsin — Pfleger v. Groth, 103 Wis., 104; 79 N. W. Rep., 19. Control sometimes limited to those belonging to city. Bogert v. Indianapolis, 13 Ind., 134. Cemeteries are owned by the municipal corporation in its pro- prietary capacity. Mount Hope Cemetery Assn. v. Boston, 158 Mass., 509; 33 N. E. Rep., 695. City cannot regulate by ordi- nance cemeteries or burying grounds outside of corporate lim- its. Authority "to prohibit inter- ments except in cemeteries here- tofore established by law," held to be restricted to interments within the city limits. Begein v. Ander- son, 28 Ind., 79. Crematoeies. Cities have power to establish. Right to establish and regulate by ordinance. Mun. Code of St. Louis, p. 600, sec, 863. Concerning the transportation and disinterment of dead bodies. State laws relating to embalming. Law of Mo. 1895, pp. 174, 176. 8 California — Los Angeles v. Hollywood Cemetery Assn., 124 Cal., 344; 71 Am. St. Rep., 75; 57 Pac. Rep., 153, 696 HEALTH AND SANITARY EEGULATIONS. [§446 detrimental to the public health, or would constitute a nuisance, municipal power to forbid it exists by virtue of general au- thority to protect the health and prevent and abate nuisances." And it is clearly within the police power to discontinue ceme- teries within the city,i"' and compel the removal of dead bodies interred therein. i* As a reasonable police regulation, ordi- Illinois — Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co., 70 111., 191; 22 Am. Rep., 71. Indiana — Begein v. Anderson, 28 Ind., 79. Louisiana — Musgrove v. Catholic Church, 10 La. Ann., 431. Maine — Monk v. Packard, 71 Me., 309; 36 Am. Rep., 315; Barnes V. Hathorn, 54 Me., 124. Xew York — Baptist Church v. Schenectady & T. Ry. Co., 5 Barb. (N. Y.), 79. North Carolina — Ellison v. Washington Comrs., 5 Jones Bq. (N. C), 57; 75 Am. Dec. 430. Oregon — Ex parte Wygant, 39 Oregon, 429; 64 Pac. Rep., 867. Texas — Dunn v. Austin, 77 Tex. 139; 11 S. W. Rep.,, 1125. 9 Forbidden within city limits. People V. Pratt, 129 N. Y., 68; 29 N. E. Rep., 7; 30 N. E. Rep., 64; 60 Hun. (N. Y.), 582; 14 N. Y. Suppl., 804. Confined to certain districts. Newark v. Watson, 56 N. J. L., 667; 29 Atl. Rep., 487. Prohibited in certain places. Scovill V. McMahon, 62 Conn., 378; 36 Am. St. Rep., 350; 26 Atl. Rep., 479. Ordinances preventing the estab- lishment of new burial grounds, sustained. Charleston v. Went- worth Street Baptist Ch., 4 Strobh. (S. C), 306. Ordinances restricting burials to three designated cemeteries in Austin, Tex. Court declined to declare it void on its face. Austin V. Austin City C/emet«ry Atssn., 87 Tex., 330; 47 Am. St. Rep., 114; 2& S. W. Rep., 528. Power to make by-laws for regu- lating the interment of the dead authorizes a by-law forbidding in- terment altogether in a particular cemetery, notwithstanding it de- stroys the private property of the owners of burial places therein. Slattery v. Naylor, 13 App. Cas., 446; 59 L. T. (N. S.), 41; 57 L. J. P. C, 73; 36 W. R., 897. General power, held insufficient to support an ordinance declaring generally that burials in any part of the city shall constitute a nuis- ance. Ex parte Wygant, 39 Oregon, 429; 64 Pac. Rep., 867, explaining Portland v. Terwilliger, 16 Oregon, 465; 19 Pac. Rep., 90, and approv- ing Grossman v. Oakland, 30 Ore- gon, 478; 60 Am. St. Rep., 832; 36 L. R. A., 593; 41 Pac. Rep., 5. Injunction to restrain enforce- ment of ordinance regulating cemetery, denied. St. Peters Epis- copal Ch. V. Washington, 109 N. C, 21; 13 S. E. Rep., 700. Injunction granted. Los Ange- les County V. Hollywood Cemetery Assn., 124 Cal., 344; 71 Am. St. Rep., 75; 57 Pac. Rep., 153; Austin V. Austin City Cemetery Assn., 87 Tex., 330; 47 Am. St. Rep., 114; 28 S. W. Rep., 528. Compare Lowe V. Prospect Hill Cemetery Assn., 58 Neb., 94; 46 L. R. A., 237; 78 N. W. Rep., 488. 10 Campbell v. Kansas City, 102 Mo., 326; 13 S. W. Rep., 897; 10 L. R. A., 593. 11 Humphrey v. Front Street M. §447]"- jiBALTH AND SAN,ITARY REGULATIONS. 697 nances may require permits for th.e buxial of the dead within the city. 12 § 447. Nuisances arising from trades, manufactures, etc. While residents of cities must submit to some annoyance and inconvenience arising from the various trades and manufac- tures carried on therein,^* municipal jurisdiction to regulate and prevent them from becoming public nuisances, and if they become such, to abate them, is everywhere enforced, as Mall appear from the cases in the notes and the sections which fol- low.i* Things oifensive to the sense of smell constitute nui- B. Church, 109 N. C, 132; 13- S. B. Rep., 793. In re Wong Yaug Quy, 6 Sawy. (U. S.), 442. The legislature has the right to authorize a municipality to re- move the remains of the dead from the cemeteries. Craig v. First Presb. Church, 88 Pa. St., 42; 32 Am. Rep., 417; Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Pa. St., 411. "The right of the legislature to authorize the removal of the dead from cemeteries is well settled. So it may delegate such power to municipalities. It is a police power necessary to the public health and comfort." Coats v. New York City, 7 Cow. (N. Y.), 585. See note to Raynor v. Nugent, 1 Am. & Bng. Corp. Cas., 271. If it can be clearly proven that a cemetery is so situated that the burial of the dead there will en- danger either life or health by cor- rupting the surrounding atmos- phere, or the waters or wells or springs, a court of equity will grant injunction to remove the same. Lake View v. Letz, 44 111., 81; New Orleans v. Church of St. Louis, 11 La. Ann., 244; Barnes v. Hawthorn, 54 Me., 124. 12 Graves v. Bloomington, 17 111. App., 476. In an early Massachusetts case it was held that power to appoint and locate places of burial, etc.. would not support an ordinance forbidding the bringing into or burial of any dead body within the town, without written consent of a majority of the selectmen, as the ordinance was not a regulation but a prohibition. Austin v. Murray, 16 Pick. (33 Mass.), 121. 13 Commonwealth v. Miller, 139 Pa. St., 77, 94; 21 Atl. Rep., 138 Hyatt V. Myers, 73 N. C, 237 Green v. Lake, 54 Miss., 540, 545 Powell V. Bentley & G. Furniture Co., 34 W. Va., 804, 810, 811; Van De Vere v. Kansas City, 107 Mo., 83; 17 S. W. Rep., 695; Gibson v. Donk, 7 Mo. App., 37. i-t California — Ex parte Whit- well, 98 Cal., 73; 32 Pac. Rep., 870; 19 L. R. A., 727. Connecticut — ^Raymond v. Fish, 51 Conn., 80; 50 Am. Rep., 3. Illinois — Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 111., 90; 92 Am. Dec. 196; Lake View v. Letz, 44 111., 81. Louisiana — New Orleans v. Lam- bert, 14 La. Ann., 247. Kentucky — Ashbrook v. Com., 1 Bush (Ky.), 139; 89 Am. Dec, 616. Massachusetts — Taunton v. Tay- lor, 116 Mass., 254; Com. v. Kid- der, 107 Mass., 188; Belcher v. Farrar, 8 Allen (Mass.), 325; Com. V. Rumford Chemical Works, 16 Gray (Mass.), 231. Michigan, — People v. Detroit White Lead Works, 82 Mich., 471; 698 HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. [§447 sances at common law,!^ and they may be forbidden, under 46 N. W. Rep., 735; 9 L. R. A., 722. If the ordinance operates in re- straint of trade power to pass it must be undoubted. St. Paul v. Traeger, 25 Minn., 248; 33 Am. Rep., 462; Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow. (N. Y.), 462. Regulations can only relate to public health, morals and order. Muhlenbrinck v. Long Branch Comrs., 42 N. J. L., 364; 36 Am. Rep., 518. Beick Kilns; establishment of, may be regulated by ordinance. State ex rel. v. St. Louis Board of Health, 16 Mo. App., 8. When a nuisaHce. Kirchgraber v. Lloyd, 59 Mo. App., 59; Huckenstine's Appeal, 70 Pa. St., 102, 106; 10 Am. Rep., 669. Ordinance forbidding erection and use, without a license. "Ward V. Washington, 4 Cranch C. C, 232; 29 Fed. Gas., No. 17,163. QuABRY. An ordinance forbid- ding the working of stone quarries within 300 feet of a residence, without the written consent of the occupant, js neither unreasonable nor unconstitutional. St. Louis v. Frein, 9 Mo. App., 590. Manufacture of Oils. Win- throp V. Farrar, 11 Allen (Mass.), 398. Distillery. Smith v. McCona- thy, 11 Mo., 517. Fertilizers, etc. State v. Luce, 9 Houst. (Del.), 396; Athens v. Geor- gia R. R. Co., 72 Ga., 800; Czar- niecki v. Ballman (Pa.), 10 Cent. Rep., 96; Garrett v. State, 49 N. J. L., 94, 103; 7 Atl. Rep., 29; 60 Am. Rep., 592; Manhattan Mfg. & F. Co. V. Van Keuren, 23 N. J. Eq., 251; Northwestern Fertilizing Co. V. Hyde Park, 97 U. S., 659. Lime Kilms, not being nuisances per se, cannot be declared such by ordinance. State v. Mott, 61 Md., 297; 48 Am. Rep., 105; Slight v. GutzlafC, 35 Wis., 675; 17 Am. Rep., 476. When a nuisance. Reynolds v. Schultz, 34 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 147. Steam Whistle. Whitcomb v. Springfield, 2 Ohio Cir. Dec, 138. Cultivation of Rice. An ordi- nance forbidding, and providing for the removal and destruction of growing crops of rice within the corporate limits, held valid. Green V. Savannah, 6 Ga., 1. Ordinance prohibiting the cultivation of rice, and of gardens of more than one- eighth of an acre by any one fam- ily, sustained. Summerville v. Pressley, 33 S. C, 56; 26 Am. St. Rep., 659; 8 L. R. A., 854; 11 S. E. Rep., 545. Tallow Chandler shop. Zylstra V. Charleston, 1 Bay (S. C), 382. FisH-FKYiRG. Bramtree Board of Health v. Boyton, 52 L. T. (N. S.), 99; 48 J. P., 582. Hide Cubing establishment. May V. People, 1 Colo. App., 157; 27 Pac. Rep., 1010; State (Marshall) V. Cadwalader, 36 N. J. L., 283; Baugh V. Sheriff, 7 Phila. (Pa.), 82; Weil v. Ricord, 24 N. J. Bq., 169; Kennedy v. Phelps, 10 La. Ann., 227; Llppman v. South Bend, 84 Ind., 276. Soap Factory. First Municipal- ity v. Blineau, 3 La. Ann., 688. RocK-CEUSHiNG machine. Kan- sas City v. McAleer, 31 Mo. App., 433. Bee Raising. Arkadelphia v. Clark, 52 Ark., 23; 20 Am. St. Rep., 154; 11 S. W. Rep., 957. Merry-go-bound. Davis v. Davis, 40 W. Va., 464; 21 S. E. Rep., 906. 15 Hackney v. State, 8 Ind., 494; State V. Boll, 59 Mo., 321. Gas. People v. New York Gas- light Co., 64 Barb (N. Y.), 55; §448] HEALTH J^ND SANITARY REGULATIONS. 699 penalty, by ordinance/® as unwholesome smells arising from the burning of garbage,!'^ odors and gas from fat-rendering es- tablishments/^ or from the manufacture of superphosphate of lime.19 §448. Slaughtering of animals— Slaughter houses. The regulation of the slaughtering of animals and slaughter houses within the corporate limits is within the jurisdiction of the municipal police power.^" Charter power "to regulate butchers and the place and manner of selling meat, " gives implied power Varnish. Rex v. Neil, 2 Car. & P., 483. 10 Com. V. Patch, 97 Mass., 221. " Kobbe V. New Brighton, 20 Misc. (N. Y.), 477. IS Weil V. Schultz, 33 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 7; People v. Rosenberg, 138 N. Y., 410; 34 N. E. Rep., 285; State V. Lederer, 52 N. J., Bq., 675; 29 Atl. Rep., 444; State v. Neidt (N. J. 1901); 19 Atl. Rep., 318; Grand Rapids v. Weiden, 97 Mich., 82; 56 N. W. Rep., 233; Seacord v. People, 121 111.. 623; 13 N. E. Rep., 194; Peck v. Elder, 3 Sandf. (N. \.), 126; Winslow v. Bloomington, 24 111. App., 647; Allen v. State, 34 Tex., 230. 19 Coe V. Schultz, 47 Barb. (N. Y.), 64. 20 California — Ex parte Shrader, 33 Cal., 279. Illinois — Tugman v. Chicago, 78 111., 405. Louisiana — Darcantel v. People's Slaughterhouse & R. Co., 44 La. Ann., 632; 11 So. Rep., 239. Massachusetts — Sawyer v. State Board of Health, 125 Mass., 182. Michigan — Wreford v. People, 14 Mich., 41. Wisconsin — Milwaukee v. Gross, 21 Wis., 241; 91 Am. Dec, 472. United States — Slaughter house cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.), 36; Butch- ers Union Slaughter house, etc. Co., V. Crescent City Live Stock, etc. Co., Ill U. S., 746; 4 Sup. Ct. Rep., 652; 28 L. Ed., 585. Monopoly. In regulating slaugh- ter houses, city cannot create a monopoly. Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 111., 90; 92 Am. Dec., 196. Establishment by City. Es- tablishment and maintenance of slaughter house by city, by appro- priation of public funds, denied un- der grant of power to regulate or prohibit slaughter house within the corporate limits. Huesing v. Rock Island, 128 111., 465; 15 Am. St. Rep., 129; 21 N. B. Rep., 558, reversing 25 111. App., 600. Under ample charter power city may es- tablish and maintain, and forbid slaughtering at other places with- in the city. Milwaukee v. Gross, 21 Wis., 241; 91 Am. Dec, 472. Approval of Health Board of Oemnance. Under charter provi- sion requiring that ordinances des- ignating places for the slaughter- ing of animals shall obtain the ap- proval of the board of health, the board has no power to amend, but must approve or disapprove. Dar- cantel V. People's Slaughterhouse & R. Co., 44 La. Ann., 632; 11 So. Rep., 239. One Animal. Ordinance, held not to apply to the case of the kill- ing and dressing of a single ani- mal. St. Paul V. Smith, 25 Minn., 372. Delegation of Power. An ordi- 700 HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. [§448 to regulate tkeJdllmg and bleeding of animal^. ^^ So power to protect the public kealth, to establish, control and regulate slaughter houses and to regulate the sale of fresh meat within the corporation, authorizes an ordinance forbidding the slaught- ering of animals to be used for food within the corporate limits unless slaughtered in a house or pen constructed in accordance with specifications provided in such ordinance. The fact that the operation of the ordinance is not, by its terms, suspended until such building as is therein described can be constructed is immaterial.22 Under the police power the city has the un- questioned right to restrict the slaughtering of animals to des- ignated districts or localities. These districts may be changed from time to time, as where the slaughter houses established become nuisances to the surrounding neighborhood. But, of course, such discretion must be cautiously exercised, for it is not an arbitrary power.^* Thus under power to regulate the erec- tion, use and continuance of slaughter houses, the city may, by ordinance, prohibit the slaughtering of animals within certain specified portions of the city.^* Power to provide for the ex- elusion of slaughter houses from the corporation, authorizes an ordinance forbidding the further use of such establishments nance forbidding operation of of restriction and restraint, and is slaughter house within 300 feet of applied in the charter not merely dwelling house, without the writ- to the 'use' of slaughter houses ten consent of the occupant, held which would relate to the manner invalid as attempting to substitute of conducting the business, but also for the sanction of a law the writ- to their 'erection' on the one hand ten consent of one or more indi- and their 'continuance' on the viduals. St. Louis v. Howard, 119 other; so that their 'erection' in Mo., 41; 24 S. W. Rep., 770; 41 the first instance, and then the Am. St. Rep., 630, following St. mode and manner of their 'use' af- Louis V. Russell, 116 Mo., 248; 22 ter they are built, and lastly their S. W. Rep., 470; 20 L. R. A., 721. 'continuance,' are placed under the "Opening a Slaughter House"; regulating power of the munici- what is. St. Louis v. Ki%ntz, 12 pal authority. It would be a very Mo., App., 591. narrow and technical construction 21 Brooklyn v. Cleves, Hill & to say that a power to regulate Denio Supp. (N. Y.), 231. the erection of a slaughter house 22 Maxim salus populi supreme is exhausted in prescribing the est lex applied. Boyd v. Montgom- form or material of its erection ery, 117 Ala., 677; 23 So. Rep., 663. and has no reference to its local- 23 Villavasco v. Barthel, 39 La. Ity." Cronin v. People, 82 N. Y., Ann., 247; 1 So. Rep., 599. 318, 321; 37 Am. Rep., 564, afflrm- 24 "To regulate implies a power ing 20 Hun. (N. Y.), 137. §449J HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. 701 already in operation. Such exercise of the police power invades no constitutional rights.^' General power to preserve the public health and declare and abate nuisance is ample to justify an ordinance declaring a slaughter house a nuisance.^* An ordinance passed under express charter power, forbidding the maintenance of slaughter houses within the corporate limits cannot be held void by the courts as unreasonable. In sfuch case, in Indiana, it has been held that no investigation into the character or condition of the slaughter houses is required.-^ § 449. Dairies and cow stables. The erection and mainte- nance of cow stables and dairies, within the corporation are subjects of reasonable local police regulation.^* Charter power 2^ "It is true that at the time it (slaughter house) was erected the law did not forbid the slaughter- ing of animals or the maintenance of a slaughter house within the city, but the law-making power did not thereby come under any obli- gation or give any assurance that the legislation upon the subject would remain unchanged. Indeed, the supervision of the public health and public morals is a gov- ernmental power which cannot be bartered away either directly or indirectly." Portland v. Meyer, 32 Oregon, 368, 371; 52 Pac. Rep., 21; 67 Am. St. Rep., 538. May be ex- cluded from city. Ex parte Heil- bron, 65 Cal., 609; 4 Pac. Rep., 648; Harmison v. Lewistown, 153 111., 313; 46 Am. St. Rep., 893; 38 N. E. Rep., 628, affirming 46 111. App., 164; St. Louis v. Howard, 119 Mo., 41; 41 Am. St. Rep., 630; 24 S. W. Rep., 770; Spokane v. Robinson, 6 Wash., 547; 33 Pac. Rep., 960. 26 Ordinance declaration, held conclusive. Harmison v. Lewis- ton, 153 111., 313; 38 N. E. Rep., 628; 46 Am. St. Rep., 893, affirm- ing 46 111. App., 164; Rund v. Fow- ler, 142 Ind., 214; 41 N. E. Rep., 4S6. 27 Belling v. Bvansville, 144 Ind., 644; 42 N. E. Rep., 621; 35 L. R. A., 272. No ordinance emanating by ex- press charter power, exercised in the manner prescribed, can be held unreasonable. Sec. 181 supra. A slaughter house forbidden by or- dinance becomes a public nuisance. Rund V. Fowler, 142 Ind., 214; 41 N. E. Rep., 456. When statutory provisions respecting the location and removal of slaughter houses will supersede charter sections on the same subject. St. Paul v. Byrnes, 38 Minn., 176; 36 N. W. Rep., 449. Estoppel. The fact that the lo- cation of the slaughter house was directed and consented to by the town trustees does not estop the corporation from claiming that the slaughter house violates an ordi- nance, in the absence of legal cor- porate action in the premises. Rund V. Fowler, 142 Ind., 214; 41 N. E. Rep., 456. The action of the council or trustees, to be binding, must be as an entity or board. Sec. 91, supra. 28 Ordinance forbidding the keep- ing of more than one cow within certain portion of the city, held valid, under usual power. In re 703 HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. [§449 to "prohibit the erection of cow stables and dairies * * * within prescribed limits, and to remove and regulate the same," and "to regulate and prevent the carrying on of Any business which may be dangerous or detrimental to the public health, ' ' 29 authorizes an ordinance prescribing that ' ' no dairy or cow stable shall hereafter be erected, built or established within the limits of the city, without first having obtained per- mission so to do from the municipal assembly, by proper ordi- nance, and no dairy or cow stable not in operation at the time of the approval of this ordinance shall be maintained on the premises unless permission so to do shall have been obtained from the municipal assembly, by proper ordinance. ' ' Respect- ing the contention that the law-making power should first des- ignate certain districts within the city by metes and bounds, within which no dairy or cow stable should be erected or main- tained, the court remarked: "But the charter does not so command. It nowhere limits the prohibited territory to less than the whole city, ' ' therefore, the conclusion was stated : "We have no doubt of the power under the charter to make the prescribed limits co-extensive with the city limits, and this we construe the ordinance to have done.^** Concerning the point that the ordinance was void because it provided for special privileges to one man by special ordinance, which might be denied to another man, his next-door neighbor, the court ob- served : ' ' We think this position is entirely untenable. The charter confers not only the power to prohibit, but to remove and regulate, and it was entirely competent for the assembly to decline to prohibit dairies altogether, but to impose on all per- sons desiring to erect or maintain a dairy or cow stable to first obtain permission from the mayor and assembly by a duly en- acted ordinance. Having absolute power to prohibit, it could make its own conditions. "^^ Linehan, 72 Cal., 114; 13 Pac. Rep., Where dairy is not a nuisance 170. By-law forbidding the keep- per se, see In re Linehan, 72 Cal., ing of cow stables at a less dis- 114; 13 Pac. Rep., 170; State v. tance than 40 feet from the near- Boll, 59 Mo. 321; Donough v. Rob- est dwelling, sustained. McKnight bens, 60 Mo. App., 156. V. Toronto, 3 Ont. Rep., 284. 29 St. Louis Charter, Art. III. § Ordinance regulating cow stables, 26, par. 6 ; The Municipal Code of etc., held void as not providing St. Louis, pp. 217, 218. uniform rule, etc. State v. Mahner, ao Distinguishing In re Linehan, 43 La, Ann,, 496; 9 So. Rep., 480; 72 Cal., 114; 13 Pac, Rep,, 170, State V, Dulaney, 43 La, Ann,, 500; 3i "We are asked to declare this 9 So, Rep,, 481. ordinance void in the face of the §451] HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. ;o3 § 450. Livery stables. While a livery stable in a populous community is not per se a public nuisance, it may become such, and hence it has been long recognized as a subject necessarily within reasonable police regulations.^^ Power to regulate livery stables and sales stables includes the power to limit them to certain localities and to provide for their cleanliness, so that they may not become injurious to health.^* §451. Hogs and hog pens. Charter power to define nui- sances and to regulate and control the keeping of animals will authorize an ordinance forbidding the keeping of hogs and hog pens within the corporate limits,^* especially where they are maintained in close proximity to residenees.^^ An ordinance unrestricted power in the charter, because forsooth the assembly may at some time discriminate against one man and favor another. We cannot and shall not indulge in any such presumption against the integrity of the municipal assem- bly, but shall, as was said in St. Louis V. Howard, 119 Mo., 41, 50; 24 S. W. Rep., 770; 41 Am. St. Rep., 630, assume that the municipal as- sembly, before granting permis- sion, will Inquire and determine whether the place and the neigh- borhood is a proper one iu which to allow a dairy to be maintained and will act impartially. Such fav- orable presumptions are constantly indulged in regard to legislative action." (State ex rel. v. Mead, 71 Mo., 266, 272) ; Per Gantt, J. in St. Louis v. Fischer, 167 Mo., 6-54, 657, 663; 67 S. W. Rep., 872, approved in St. Louis* v. Schefe, 167 Mo., 666; 67 S. W. Rep., HOG. 32 Phillips V. Denver, 19 Colo., 179; 41 Am. St. Rep., 230; 34 Pac. Rep., 902. Livery stable is not per se a nui- sance. Ex parte Lacey, 108 Cal., 326; 41 Pac. Rep., 411; 38 L. R. A., 640; St. Louis v. Russell, 116 Mo., 248, 259; 22 S. W. Rep., 470; 20 L. R. A., 721; Shiras v. dinger, 50 Iowa, 571; 32 Am. Rep., 138, 141; Burditt V. Swenson, 17 Tex., 489; 67 Am. Dec, 665. A livery stable within .lixty five feet of a hotel is prima facie a nuisance. Coker v. Birge, 10 Ga., 336. 33 St. Louis V. Russell, 116 Mo., 248; 22 S. W. Rep., 470; 20 L. R. A., 721, declaring void an ordi- nance authori'!lng lot owners to de- termine whether a person shall be permitted to erect a livery stable in a block in which their property is located, as permitting discrimi- nation, and delegating legislative authority. Contra. State ex rel v. Beattie, 16 Mo. App., 131. Similar Chicago ordinances were sustained. Chicago V. Stratton, 162 111., 494; 44 N. E. Rep., 853 ; 53 Am. St. Rep., 325; 35 L. R. A., 84, aiflrming 58 111. App., 539; Swift v. People, 1C2 111., 534; 44 N. B. Rep., 528, revers- ing 60 111. App., 395. License. A statute, forbidding the erection, occupation or use of any building in any city for a sta- ble for more than four horses, un- less licensed so to do by the board of health was held constitutional in Massachusetts. It Is an exercise of the police power and not of the right of eminent domain. Such an 704' HEALTH AND SANITARY RE3GULATI0NS. ,_§452 prohibiting hog pens except for the purposes of commerce in a city of fifteen thousand inhabitants was sustained.^® § 452. Dead animals, garbage, offal, etc. Dead animals, gar- bage, offal, etc., clearly are subjects within the municipal police l)()wer. Power to preserve the public health, etc., gives implied ])()\ver to pass and enforce reasonable ordinances to protect the community against offensive and unwholesome smells arising exercise of the power is valid, al- though no provision is made for compensation to the owner, and no right of appeal is given from the local authorities, to whom the leg- islature has seen fit to intrust the determination of the question. Newton v. Joyce, 166 Mass., 83; 44 N. E. Rep., 116; 55 Am. St. Rep., 385. Injunction to Restrain Beec- TiON allowed. Coker v. Birge, 9 Ga., 425; 54 Am. Dec, 347. Injunction Denied. Shiras v. Olinger, 50 Iowa, 571; 33 Am. Rep., 138; Kirkman v. Handy, 30 Tenn., (11 Humph), 406; 54 Am. Dec, 45. ■i* State V. Hord, 122 N. C, 1092; 29 S. E. Rep., 952; 65 Am. St. Rep., 743; Darlington v. Ward, 48 S. C, 570; 26 S. B. Rep., 906; 38 L. R. A., 326, compare dissenting opinions. 35 A hog pen or pig sty main- tained in close proximity to a dwel- ling house is a nuisance per se. Whipple V. Mclntyre, 69 Mo. App., 397, 402; Smith v. McConathy, 11 Mo., 517; St. Louis v. Stern, 3 Mo. App., 48, 54; Quincy v. Kennard, 151 Mass., 563; 24 N. E. Rep., 860; Com. V. Perry, 139 Mass., 198; 29 N. E. Rep., 656; Com. v. Kidder, 107 Mass., 188; Com. v. Patch, 97 Mass., 221. restate (Cedar Rapids) v. Hol- eomb, 68 Iowa, 107; 56 Am. Rep., 853; 26 N. W. Rep., 33. Contra, Ex parte O'Leary, 65 Miss-., 80; 7 Am. St. Rep., 640; S So. Rep., 144,' where It is said hogs may or may not be a nuisance. Compare Mc- Knight V. Toronto, 3 Ont. Rep., 284; Everett v. Grapes, 3 L. T. (N. S.), 669. The keeping of swine and cows may be regulated. In re Linehan, 72 Cal., 114; 13 Pac. Rep., 170. Under express legislative power forbidding the keeping of swine within a certain district, violation may be abated as nuisance. Com. V. Young, 135 Mass., 526; Com. v. Alden, 143 Mass., 113; 9 N. E. Rep., 15. Regulations are not in restraint of trade. Pierce v. Bartrum, 1 Cowp., 269. The keeping of hogs and hog pens as a nuisance. State v. Ras- ter, 35 Iowa, 221; In re Rolfs, 30 Kan., 758; 1 Pac. Rep., 523; State V. Payson, 37 Me., 361; Attorney- General V. Steward, 20 N. J. Bq., 415; Babcock v. New Jersey Stock Yards, 20 N. J. Bq., 296; Com. v. Van Sickle, Brightly (Pa.), 69; Com. V. Hutz, Brightley, (Pa.), 75. The stench from a hog pen to be a nuisance must be offensive to a person of ordinary • sensitiveness. Burlington v. Stock well, 5 Kan. App., 569; 47 Pac Rep., 988. DiscKiMiNATioN. An Ordinance is not void for discrimination which prohibits a citizen from keeping hog pens within one hundred feet of the residence of another, but does not forbid him from keeping them within a like distance from his own. A nuisance is to be pub- i 453] HEALTH AND SANITAilY REGULATIONS. 'mt from decaying vegetable and animal matter.^^ The power to remove dead animals, garbage, offal, etc., necessarily confers power to direct the manner thereof.^^ The collection and re- moval of dead animals not slain for food, garbage, offal, etc., may be forbidden by ordinance, without a license.^® And an ordinance is reasonable which requires garbage wagons or carts to be water tight and labeled ' ' garbage. ' ' *" Ordinances are common, particularly in the larger cities, pro- viding for garbage removal by contract. The nature of such ordinances and the manner of making the contract thereunder are controlled by the local charter. The property right of the owner in dead animals is recognized and protected.*^ Ordi- nances or contracts granting the exclusive privilege of remov;:! of dead animals, not slain for food, for a term of years to a single person or corporation have been sustained.*^ ' § 453. House dirt, rubbish, privy vaults, etc. The usual mu- llc, or to others than the one who creates It. An injury or annoyance which a person causes himself and family is not a public nuisance. State V. Hord, 122 N. C, 1092; 65 Am. St. Rep., 743; 29 S. B. Rep., 952. 37 State V. Payssan, 47 La. Am., 1029; 49 Am. St. Rep., 390; 17 So. Rep., 481; Newton v. Lyons, 11 App. Div. (N. Y.), 105. Decaying dead animals consti- tute a nuisance, per se. Rogers v. Barker, 31 Barb. (N. Y.), 447; Sea- cord V. People, 121 111., 623; 13 N. E. Rep., 194. Rendering of dead animals with- in the corporate limits may be pro- hibited. Gushing v. Buffalo, 13 N. Y. St. Rep., 783. 38 People V. Gordon, 81 Mich., 306; 21 Am. St. Rep., 524; 45 N. W. Rep., 658. 39 State V. Orr, 68 Conn., 101; 35 Atl. Rep., 770; 34 L. R. A., 279; In re Vandine, 6 Pick (Mass.), 187; 17 Am. Dec, 351; Morgan & Co. v. Cincinnati, 9 Ohio Dec, 280; 12 Wkly. Law Bull. (Ohio), 41. 40 People V. Gordon, 81 Mich., 306; 21 Am. St. Rep., 524; 45 N. W. Rep., 658. *i Schoen v. Atlanta, 97 Ga., 697 25 S. E. Rep., 380; 33 L. R. A., 804 State V. Morris, 47 La. Ann., 1660 18 So. Rep., 710; River Rendering Co. V. Behr, 77 Mo., 91; 46 Am. Rep., 6, reversing 7 Mo. App., 345; Underwood v. Green, 42 N. Y., 140. The carcass of a dead animal may be a nuisance. Ellis v. K. C. St. J. and C. B. -R. R. Co., 63 Mo., 131. *2 Smiley v. MacDonald, 42 Neb., 5; 47 Am. St. Rep., 684; 27 L. R. A., 541; 60 N. W. Rep., 355; Coombs V. MacDonald, 43 Neb., 632; 62 N. W. Rep., 41; Sanitary Reduction Works v. California Re- duction Co., 94 Fed. Rep., 693; Na- tional Fertilizer Co. v. Lambert, 48 Fed. Rep., 458. Compare In re Lowe, 54 Kan., 757; 39 Pac Rep., 710; 27 L. R. A., 545. Ordinance relating to the remov- al of dead animals and garbage, held valid. Alpers v. Brown, 60 Cal., 447; Walker v. Jameson, 140 Ind., 591; 49 Am. St. Rep., 222; 28 L. R. A., 679; 37 N. E. Rep., 402; 70G HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. [H53 nicipal powers respecting nuisances will support reasonable or- dinances and by-l-aws regulating the removal and deposit of house dirt, rubbish, filth, refuse matter, etc., the time and man- ner of cleaning and removal of the contents of sinks, cesspools, privy vaults, etc.,*-'* and when a public nuisance results from any of these, it may be abated by the proper municipal authori- ties.** Under general power "to preserve the health of the city and to ijrevent and remove nuisances, ' ' etc., the removal of the contents of privy vaults may be forbidden by ordinance, except under license.''^ And by virtue of like charter power, a by-law forbidding the removal of house dirt and offal from the city without a license, was sustained and declared not to be in re- straint of trade.*" So an ordinance was sustained which re- quired owners of land abutting on a private passageway to re- move filth, waste and stagnant water from such way.*'' So an ordinance prohibiting the throwing into or depositing upon the public ways, except at such places as might be properly desig- nated, any glass, broken ware, dirt, rubbish, garbage or filth, was held to be valid and within the municipal police power.*"* 39 N. E. Rep., 869; Louisville v. WiWe, 84 Ky., 290; 1 S. W. Rep., 605; Alpers v. San Francisco Co., 32 Fed Rep., 503. "Garbage," "offal," etc., defined. St. Louis V. Robinson, 135 Mo., 460, 469; 37 S. W. Rep., 110. Kitchen garbage, offal, refuse, etc. State v. Orr, 68 Conn., 101; 34 L. R. A., 279; 35 Atl. Rep., 770. ^s State (Nicoulin) v. Lowery, 49 N. J. L., 391; 8 Atl. Rep., 513. *i Pkivies as Nuisances. Vason V. Augusta, 38 Ga., 542; Wahle v. Reinbach, 76 111., 322. Ordinance requiring the filling up of sinks or vaults of privies sus- tained. "We think the right exists in the council * * * to deter- mine what, in its nature and use, it deems a nuisance, and to direct its removal or discontinuance." Monroe v. Gerspach, 33 La. Ann., 1011. Under charter power "to remove the cause of all nuisances," etc., the municipal authorities can not or4er privies to be replaced by water-closets, since the abatement of the nuisance may be accom- plished by the cleaning of the privy vaults. Philadelphia v. Provident Life and Trust Co., 132 Pa. St., 224; 18 Atl. Rep., 1114. Legislative Act declaring priv- ies unsanitary, etc. Theilan v. Por- ter, 14 Lea (Tenn.), 622; 52 Am. Rep., 173. The legislature may declare privies in crowded districts to be nuisances, and provide for the abatement thereof, without notice to and hearing of, the owners. Har- rington V. Providence, 20 R. I., 233; 38 L. R. A., 305; 38 Atl. Rep., 1. *5 Boehm V. Baltimore, 61 Md., 259; State ex rel v. McMahon, 69 Minn., 265; 72 N. W. Rep., 79. 46 In re Vandine, 6 Pick. (Mass.), 187; 17 Am. Dec, 351. 4' Commonwealth v. Cutter, 156 Mass., 52; 29 N. E. Rep., 1146. ■isBa; parte Casinello, 62 Cal., §454J HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. 107 Ordinances may regulate the burning of refuse matter and make it unlawful to burn rubbish in the streets and public places. Thus a village ordinance providing that no rubbish "shall be set on fire or burned in any street at any time, or in any lot of the village except between the rising and setting of the sun, ' ' was sustained, and construed as forbidding fires in the streets at all times, but permitting them in lots between sunrise and sunset.**'^ § 454. Drains, sewers, ponds, stagnant water, pollution of water supply, etc. In the interest of the public health, general municipal police powers authorize reasonable ordinances de- signed to protect the water supply from pollution,*^ to prevent the fouling of water in creeks, brooks, ponds, etc.,^'^ to regulate drains and sewers,^* and to abate nuisances arising from these sources.^2 In the exercise of this power under sufficient legis- 538 ; Rochester v. Collins, 12 Barb. Am. St. Rep., 357 ; Grace v. New- fN. Y.), 559. ton, 135 Mass., 490; Baker v. Bos- *8HNew Rochelle v. Clark, 65 ton, 12 Pick. (Mass.), 184; 22 Am. Hun. (N. Y.), 140; 19 N. Y. Supp., Dec, 421; State v. Newark, 34 N. 989. J. L., 264; Yonkers v. Copcutt, 140 *9 Martin v. Gleason, 139 Mass., N. Y., 12 ; 35 N. E. Rep., 443 ; 23 183; 29 N. E. Rep., 664; Helton v. L. R. A., 485; Bliss v. Kraus, 16 Baylor Female College (Tex. Civ. Ohio St., 54; Com. v. Webb, 6 Rand. App„ 1896) 33 S. W. Rep., 680; (Va.), 726; Bryant v. Robbing, 70 Belton V. Central Hotel Co. (Tex.- Wis., 258; 35 N. W. Rep., 545. Civ. App., 1895); 33 S. W. Rep., Discharge of Sewage may be 297; State v. Bergen County, 46 N. controlled. Bell v. Rochester, 58 J. Eq., 173; 18 Atl. Rep., 465; Kel- Hun. (N. Y.), 602; 11 N. Y. Supp., ley V. New York, 6 Misc. (N. Y.), 305. 516. Drain Emptying into a Public Ordinance may forbid boating Street is a public nuisance and and fishing on lake from which the may be abated. Kirkwood v. Cairns, water supply is taken. Dunham v. 44 Mo. App., 88; Board of Health New Britain, 55 Conn., 378; 11 Atl. v. Maginnis Cotton Mills, 46 La. Rep., 354. Ann., 806; 15 So. Rep., 164. '■" State V.Wheeler, 44 N. J. L., 88. Sewer Connection. Com. v. Rob- FotHLiNG OF Water is a public erts, 155 Mass., 281; 29 N. E. Rep., nuisance. State v. Taylor, 29 522. Ind., 517; Brookline v. Mackin- Private Sewers abated by judi- tosh, 133 Mass., 215; Morton v. cial action. State v. Hutchinson, Moore, 15 Gray (Mass.), 573; Com. 39 N. J. Eq., 218; State v. McCulla, V. Reed, 34 Pa. St., 275; 75 Am. 16 R. I., 196; 14 Atl. Rep., 81. Dec, 661 Injunction to restrain discharge 51 Police Power as to Drainage, of sewage, etc. Gould v. Roches- Americus v. Mitchell, 79 Ga., 807; ter, 105 N. Y., 46; 12 N. E. Rep., 5 S. B. Rep., 201; Zigler v. Menges, 275, reversing 39 Hun. (N. Y.), 79. 121 Ind., 99; 22 N. E. Rep., 782; 16 ^2 a Creek may be diverted from 108 HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. [§455 lative grant, grades may be established and lands may be made to conform thereto, to provide a proper drainage system, so as to abate and prevent nuisances.^* § 455. Wells. In Louisiana, an ordinance was sustained, as a valid exercise of the police power, which made it unlawful to excavate or sink a well on any premises used as a bakery or bake shop, within the corporate limits, and required all wells in such places to be filled up immediately, to the surface of the ground.^* Wells within the limits of the public streets and ways may be abolished by the public authorities, either as a sanitary measure or to accommodate the public travel, on the ground that such wells constitute an obstruction, without com- pensation to those who constructed them.^^ The enactment of an ordinance directing such wells to be filled up operates as a revocation of any license express or implied to construct the wells in the streets.^^ its channel. Murphy v. Wilming- ton, 5 Del. Ch., 281. RivEB. An ordinance declaring a particular branch of a river a public nuisance and providing for the abatement thereof by means of a new channel, held within the po- lice power. Hamilton v. Fond du Lac, 40 Wis., 47. Ponds. Ordinance may provide for filling up ponds, to prevent the collection of stagnant water. Roch- ester V. Simpson, 134 N. Y., 414; 31 N. E. Rep., 871, reversing 57 Hun. (N. Y.), 36; 10 N. Y. Supp., 499. 53 Lawrence v. Webster, 167 Mass., 513; 46 N. B. Rep., 123; Cavanagh v. Boston, 139 Mass., 426; 1 N. E. Rep., 834; 52 Am. Rep., 716; Bancroft v. Cambridge, 126 Mass., 438 ; Read v. Cambridge, 126 Mass., 427; Cambridge v. Monroe, 126 Mass., 496; Coble v. Boston, 109 Mass., 438; 112 Mass., 181; Dingley V. Boston, 100 Mass., 544; Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Mackenzie, 132 Mass., 71. Charters authorize work in abat- ing drain and pond nuisances at expense of owner. Hannibal v. Richards, 82 Mo., 330; Mun. Code of St. Louis, p. 298; St. Louis Charter Art. 12, §6. Resolution giving owner choice of means as to filling up, draining, etc., held valid. Bliss v. Kraus, 16 Ohio St., 54. The determination of the neces- sity of the required work to be done cannot be delegated to health oflBcers. Lufkin v. Galveston, 56 Tex., 522. 64 State V. Schlemmer, 42 La. Ann,. 1166; 8 So. Rep., 307. 56 Ferrenbach v. Turner, 86 Mo., 416. And this is true notwithstand- ing it is the law in this state that the lot owner has a property right in the street. Lackland v. N. Mo. Ry. Co., 31 Mo., 180; Hannibal Bridge Co. v. Schaubacher, 57 Mo. 582, 584. Even though the dedica- tion was by way of statutory plat. Rutherford v. Taylor, 38 Mo., 315; Price V. Thompson, 48 Mo., 361; Thurston v. St. Joseph, 51 Mo., 510, 512. 56 Ferrenbach v. Turner, 86 Mo. 416. The city cannot, in any event, permanently contract away the §456] HEALTH AND SANITARY HRGLLATIONS. 709 §456. Emission of dense smoke as a public nuisance. In Missouri it has been held that, as the emission of smoke within a populous city is not a nuisance per se at common law, an ordi- nance of the City of St. Louis, enacted under charter power "to declare, prevent and abate nuisances on public and private property and the causes thereof," declaring the emission "of dense black or thick gray smoke," within the corporate limits, to be a nuisance, without any limitation as to the time it is emitted, or as to whether it is in fact a nuisance, and without providing for any inquiry as to these matters, was invalid ; that such charter power does not include the power to declare that to be a nuisance which is not so in fact.^'' But in Illinois, under like charter power, an ordinance of the City of Chica go, which made it a misdemeanor to "permit or allow dense smoke to issue or be emitted from the smokestack of any boat or loco- motive or the chimney of any building within the corporate limits," was sustained.^* streets for private purposes. Bel- cher S. R. Co. V. St. L. G. E. Co., 82 Mo., 121. 67 St. Louis V. Heltzeberg P. & P. Co., 141 Mo., 375; 64 Am. St. Rep., 516; 39 L. R. A., 551; 42 S. W. Rep., 954; St. Louis v. Regina Flour Mill- ing Co., 141 Mo., 389; 42 S. W. Rep., 1148. The rule appears to be sustained by the dicta in Seiger v. Cleveland, 3 Ohio Nisi Prius, 119. 58 Harmon v. Chicago, 110 111., 400; 51 Am. Rep., 698. Emission or Dense Smoke — Proof Required. In Marshall Field & Co. V. Chicago, 44 111. App., 410, appellants complained of the re- fusal of the following Instructions : "The jury are Instructed that It is the duty of the city to prove that, among other things, the smoke that issued from the chimney of the de- fendants at the time complained of was not only dense, but was, at that particular time, of a nature detrimental to the property which was close enough in proximity to it to be affected by it injuriously, or was of a nature to be personally annoying to the public at large, and unless the jury believe from the evidence that the smoke com- plained of was, at the particular time In question, dense, and also proved to be detrimental to prop- erty within the City of Chicago, or was of 'a nature to be personally annoying to the public at large, then your verdict should be for defendants." Of the instruction the court said: "The last half of it, as to what the jury should be- lieve in order to convict, was, per- haps, proper, but the first half, re- quiring the city to prove what may be presumed without proof, was not. It is a matter of common knowledge that smoke becomes soot, which falls and blackens where it rests; that it is injurious to vegetation, to many kinds of goods, and annoying to people. This common knowledge is so generally diffused in Chicago, that no jury could be without it." Accordingly, a judgment of conviction was af- firmed which was obtained on the 1 10 HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. [§456 The power of the state legislature to declare the emission of dense smoke within the limits of a populous community a nui- sance is undoubted."'" The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, in a comparatively recent case, fully sustains legisla- tion against the smoke nuisance on the express ground that the emission of dense smoke in populous cities is per se a public nuisance, and that the legislative department of the govern- ment has plenary power to so declare, and when it does so de- evidence of two witnesses who tes- tified to dense smoke that could not be seen through coming from the chimney of the retail store of defendants, on a specified day, for several minutes. In Caskell v. Bayley, 30 L. T. (N. S.), 516; 38 J. P., 805, a prosecu- tion under the English smoke law, the inspectors testified to having seen "black smoke" and "medium smoke" emitted from defendant's stack for a considerable time, and the court, on appeal, in affirming the conviction, observed: "It is not necessary to show that the issuing of black smoke is injurious to health as well as a nuisance, and the issuing of black smoke in the quantities and manner described was undoubtedly a nuisance." Further as to nature of proof re- quired, see Art. 46 Central Law Journ. pp. 152, 153. Dense Smoke as a Nuisance. People V. Lewis, 86 Mich., 273; 49 N. W. Rep., 140; People v. Detroit White Lead Works, 82 Mich., 471; 46 N. W. Rep., 735; St. Paul v. Gil- fillan, 36 Minn., 298; 31 N. W, Rep., 49; State v. Sheriff, 48 Minn., 236; 51 N. W. Rep., 112; St. Paul v. Johnson, 69 Minn., 184; 72 N. W. Rep., 64; Whalen v. Keith, 35 Mo., 87; Prescott's Case, 2 N. Y. City Hall Record, 161; Cincinnati v. Miller, 29 Ohio L. J.,364; Higgins v. Northwich Union Guardians of the Poor, 22 L. T. (N. S.). 753; Queen V. Waterhouse, 26 L. T. (N. S.), 761; Barnes v. Ackroyd, 26 L. T. (N. S.), 692; Garrett on Nuisances pp. 274-278; Article in 46 Central Law Journ. p. 147, 153. "i> The Missouri Act. The emis- sion or discharge into the open air of dense smoke within the corpo- rate limits of cities of this state which now have or may have here- after a population of one hundred thousand inhabitants is hereby de- clared to be a public nuisance. The owners, lessees, occupants, mana- gers or agents of any building, es- tablishment or premises from which dense smoke is so emitted or discharged, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction, shall pay a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars, nor more than one hundred dollars. And each and every day whereon such smoke shall be emitted or discharged shall consti- tute a separate offense: Provided, however, that in any suit or pro- ceeding under this act, it shall be a good defense if the person charged with a violation thereof shall show to the satisfaction of the jury or court trying the facts, that there Is no known practicable device, appliance, means or meth- od by application of which to his building, establishment or prem- ises the emission or discharge of the dense smoke complained of in that proceeding could have been prevented. Section Two. All cities § 457j HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS. i'Jl clare the courts are not at liberty to put themselves in the place of the legislature and assume to say that such law is unreasonii- ble because smoke was not per se a nuisance at common law, or because there is no known practical device or appliance to abate smoke, or because the community where the law applies ex- clusively uses soft or bituminous coal, which is peculiarly lia- ble to make objectionable smoke.*" § 457. Regulating sale of cigarettes. It has been held that the power to pass and enforce all necessary police regulations which may be necessary or expedient for the preservation of to which the provisions of this act are applicable are hereby em- powered to enact all necessary or desirable ordinances, not inconsist- ent with the provisions herein, nor the constitution, nor any general law of this state, in order to carry out the provisions of this act. Ap- proved March 21, 1901; Laws of Missouri, 1901, pp. 71, 73; Mun. Code of St. Louis, appendix, pp. 969, 970. 'io The law involved was an act of congress applicable to the Dis- trict of Columbia only, and pro- vided that "the emission of dense or thick black or gray smoke or cinders from any smoke stack or chimney used in connection with any stationary engine, steam boiler or furnace of any description with- in the District of Columbia shall be deemed and is hereby declared to be a public nuisance; provided that nothing in this act shall be construed as applicable to chim- neys or buildings used exclusively for private residences. "That the owner, agent, lessee, or occupant of any building of any de- scription from the smoke stack or chimney of which there shall issue or be emitted thick or dense black or gray smoke or cinders within , the District of Columbia on or af- ter the day above named, shall be deemed and held guilty of creating a public nuisance and of violating the provisions of this act." The penalty was fixed at not less than ten dollars nor more than one hundred dollars, "and each and every day wherein the provisions of this act shall be violated shall constitute a separate offense." The decision sustains the law as valid and constitutional. The rules laid down in the case may be thus summarized: 1. It is a matter of common knowledge, not to be ignored by the courts, that the emission of a volume of dense black smoke from a single smoke stack or chimney of a large furnace may, under some circumstances, work physical dis- comfort to the general public com- ing within its circle of distribution upon- public thoroughfares, and may possibly also work injury to public interests in other respects. 2. A statute declaring the emis- sion of thick or dense black or gray smoke from chimneys a nuis- ance per se, and punishing the act as an offense, is within the police power, and therefore does not de- prive persons of property without due process of law. 3. Exempting chimneys of build- ings used exclusively for private residences from a statute declaring the emission of dense or thick black or gray smoke or cinders 713 PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. [§458 the health, oi- the suppression of diseases authorizes provisions regulating and licensing the sale of cigarettes.*' The Supreme Court of Tennessee has declared that cigarettes are not legiti- mate articles of commerce within the protection of the constitu- tion of the United States because they possess no virtue and are bad inherently .*- 3. PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. § 458. Regulating use of streets, etc., and keeping same free from obstruction. It is undoubtedly true that the police power extends to all reasonable regulations relating to keeping the sidewalks, streets and public ways free from obstructions and nuisances and to all proper restraining regulations rela- tive to the use thereof. The protection of life and limb is ;i matter of public concern and there is both a power and obligH- tion on the part of the public authorities to pass and enforce reasonable police provisions for this purpose.®^ Generally, the local corporation has discretionary power to establish and open from smoke stacks or chimaeys to be a public nuisance, and limiting the statute to any smoke stack or chimney used in connection with any st'ationary engine, steam boiler or furnace, does not make the sta- tute unconstitutional because of in- equality or unjust discrimination in violation of the provision as to equal protection of the laws, since it is not apparent that the classifi- cation made is without reasonable basis. 4. Evidence that no smoke-con- suming appliance known will pre- vent the emission of all black smoke from furnaces burning soft coal is immaterial upon a prosecu- tion for violation of a statute de- claring the permitting of such emission to be a nuisance. 5. Witnesses cannot testify that smoke from a certain chimney is not of such a character as to be dangerous to health, life, or prop- erly of persons living in the vicin- ity, or to the public at large, or that it does not constitute a public nuisance, since this would be to state not facts but opinions. 6. Evidence that certain neigh- bors may not have sustained in- jury to property or health from the smoke of a chimney Is not ad- missible in support of a defense to a prosecution for the violation of a statute which declares the smoke a public nuisance. 7. Smoke may constitute a pub- lic nuisance, although it is not con- stantly emitted, but only at inter- vals from day to day. Moses v. United States, 16 App. Cas. Dist. of Col., 428; 50 L. R. A., 532. 81 Gundling v. Chicago, 176 111., 340; 52 N. E. Rep., 44; 48 L. R. A., 230, affirmed in 177 U. S., 183; 44 L. Ed., 725; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 633. 62 Austin V. State, 101 Tenn., 563 ; 48 S. W. Rep., 305. es Alahama — Montgomery v. Par- ker, 114 Ala., 118; 21 So. Rep., 452; 62 Am. St. Rep., 95. §458] PUBLIC SAFETY— STREBTS^BUILDINGS. 713 streets and public ways, fix their width, determine how much of that width shall be devoted to a carriage way and how much to a foot way or sidewalk ; direct the planting of trees within the limits of the streets and public grounds ; decide where and how hitching posts shall be set, telegraph, telephone and elec- ti'ic wires and poles erected, and, finally, to make all necessary and desirable regulations which are reasonable and manifestly in the interest of public safety and convenience.®* With this end in view, regulations that are general and uniform, reason- able and certain, and that do not conflict with the charter, gen- eral laws or the constitution, may be prescribed by ordinance, forbidding the obstruction of streets with vehicles,''^ railroad Connecticut — Hawley v. Harrall, 19 Conn., 142. Kentucky — James v. Harrods- burg, 86 Ky., 191. Massachusetts — Alger v. Lowell, 3 Allen (Mass.), 402. Michigan — Everett v. Marquette, 53 Mich., 450; 19 N. W. Rep., 140. New York — Griffin v. New York, 9 N. Y., 456; 61 Am. Dec, 700; Lav- ery v. Hannigan, 20 Jones & S. (N. Y.), 463. North Carolina — State v. Sum- merfleld, 107 N. C, 895; 12 S. E. Rep., 114. Wisconsin — Janesville v. Milwau- kee & M. R. R., 7 Wis., 484. 6* Shade Trees ; planting of. The Municipal code of St. Louis, pg. 614, § 914. Charter power to direct and reg- ulate the planting, rearing, trim- ming and preserving of shade trees in the streets and public places, gives power to regulate the cut- ting of such trees, without legal permission. State ( Consolidated Traction Co.) v. East Orange Tp., 61 N. J. L., 202; 38 Atl. Rep., 803; affirmed 63 N. J. L., 669; 44 Atl. Rep., 1099. A penal ordinance punishing any one who may destroy trees planted in the streets, etc., within the cor- porate limits is valid. State v. Merrill, 37. Me.. 329. Hitching Rack, in public square contrary to ordinance is a public nuisance and may be destroyed by the municipal authorities. Samuels V. Nashville, 3 Sneed (Tenn.), 298. 85 Obstructing Streets With Ve- hicles. Ordinance prohibiting the stopping of vehicle on street for a longer time than twenty minutes, held valid. Commonwealth v. Fen- ton, 139 Mass., 195; 29 N. E. Rep,, 653; Commonwealth v. Rowe, 141 Mass., 79; 6 N. E. Rep., 545; Com- monwealth v. Lagorio, 141 Mass., 81; 6 N. E. Rep., 546. Under general power, city may forbid sale of produce or other merchandise on any sidewalk or the space in front of a building used as a sidewalk, in such man- ner as may incommode passengers, although the municipality may not have acquired an easement or title to the soil in the area within which the prohibition is intended to operate. State v. Summerfield, 107 N. C, 895; 12 S. E. Rep., 114. Charter power "to prohibit and prevent incumbering or obstructing streets," etc., "with vehicles, ani- mals," etc., authorizes an ordinance forbidding standing on designated streets and selling out loads of 714 PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. [§458 cars,8® Qj. otherwise; providing stands for cabs, hacks, car- riages, etc., and salutary rules for the proper regulation of the drivers thereof;"^ prohibiting excavations in streets and public ways or under sidewalks, without legal permit and under safe restrictions f^ regulating the extent to wjiich streets and sidewalks may be obstructed temporarily with building material, machinery, produce, goods, merchandise, etc. f^ the extent to which sidewalks may be obstructed by cellar doors. farm produce. However, such or- dinance is not to be so construed as to prevent casually stopping such wagons for sale, since the purpose of the regulation is to prevent street obstruction. People v. Keir, 78 Mich., 98; 43 N. W. Rep., 1039. An ordinance of Boston forbid- ding selling goods in streets, ex- cept in accordance with a permit from the superintendent of streets, held reasonable, constitutional and valid. "Anyone who has observed the obstruction to travel and the general inconvenience which are caused by a stationary object in our crowded and narrow streets, would be slow to declare unreason- able a prohibition intended to pre- vent that inconvenience. We are of opinion, both in principle and on authority, that for this purpose the city council lawfully may for- bid public selling in the streets. This being so, the ordinance is none the worse for the exception in case of a permit from the super- intendent of streets." Per Holmes, J. in Com. v. Ellis, 158 Mass., 555; 33 N. E. Rep., 651. 66 Duluth V. Mallett, 43 Minn., 204; 45 N. W. Rep., 154. 67 Montgomery v. Parker, 114 Ala., 118; 21 So. Rep., 452; 62 Am. St. Rep., 95; Chillicothe v. Brown, 38 Mo. App., 609. Places at depots and stations may be assigned to hacks or hack- men, and they may be forbidden, to go elsewhere. Colorado Springs v. Smith, 19 Colo., 554; 36 Pac. Rep., 540; Lindsay v. Anniston, 104 Ala., 257; 16 So. Rep., 545; 53 Am. St. Rep., 44; 27 L. R. A.," 436. Compare Napman v. People, 19 Mich., 352. Power to regulate cannot be del- egated. State V. Fiske, 9 R. I., 94. Ordinance authorizing depot mar- shal or police officer to designate stands, upheld. Veneman v. Jones, 118 Ind., 41; 20 N. E. Rep., 644; 10 Am. St. Rep., 100; St. Paul v. Smith, 27 Minn., 364; 7 N. W. Rep., 734; 38 Am. Rep., 296. Rate of hack fare. Com. v. Gage, 114 Mass., 328. 68 Dubuque v. Maloney, 9 Iowa, 450; Allen v. Boston, 159 Mass., 324; 34 N. B. Rep., 519; 38 Am. St. Rep., 423; Fisher v. Thirkell, 21 Mich., 1; 4 Am. Rep., 422; Westport V. Mulholland, 159 Mo., 86; 60 S. W. Rep., 77; Northern Liberties v. Northern Liberties Gas Co., 12 Pa. St., 318. 6s>Hexamer v. Webb, 101 N. Y., 377; 4 N. E. Rep., 755; 54 Am. Rep., 703.. Removal of Buildings and the temporary use of the streets for this purpose may be regulated by ordinance. The general police pow- er to regulate the use of streets will support it. Day v. Green, 4 Cush.. (Mass.), 433, 437. .§459] PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. 7V> doorsteps, coal holes/" bay windows, cornices and the like;'^ prohibiting the driving of vehicles and the riding of animals on the sidewalks,''- ball playing, stone throwing and any sport, amusement or exercise ' ' likely to scare horses or embarrass the passage of vehicles," or the flying of any kite in any part of the city devoted to business -J^ forbidding water from any flow- ing well or spring to flow upon any street, alley or sidewalk ;''* requiring the removal, by summary or other appropriate action, of obstructions and nuisances in the public ways, and, under the prevailing judicial view, compelling owners or occupiers of property abutting on sidewalks to remove snow and ice there- from, under penaltyJ^ § 459. Obstructions in public streets and highways as nui- sances. All unauthorized and illegal obstructions which pre- T> Gushing v. Boston, 128 Mass., 330; 35 Am. Rep., 383; Hoey v. Gllroy, 129 N. Y., 132; 29 N. E. Rep., 85; Clifford v. Dam., 81 N. Y., 52; 12 Jones & S. (N. Y.), 391. Co.vL Hole and- vault may be con- structed in sidewalk by abutting owner, where the sidewalk is left In a safe condition. Gordon v. Peltzer, 56 Mo. App., 599. ■1 Com. V. Goodnow, 117 Mass., 114; Livingston v. Wolf, 136 Pa. St., 519, 533; 20 Am. St. Rep., 936; 20 Atl. Rep., 551; Hess v. Lancas- ter, 4 Pa. Dist. Rep., 737. 72 State v. Brown, 109 N. C, 802 ; 13 S. B. Rep., 940. 73 Mashburn v. Bloomington, 32 111. App., 245; People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich., 288; 41 N. W. Rep., 275; 16 Am. St. Rep., 578, 584; 2 L. R. A., 721. 7* Power to enact the ordinance is implied from power to control streets and enforce sanitary regu- lations. Skaggs V. Martinsville, 140 Ind., 476; 39 N. E. Rep., 241; 49 Am. St. Rep., 209; 33 L. R. A., 781. Discharge of sewage on sidewalk is a public nuisance. Kirkwood v. Cairns, 44 Mo. App., 88. 75 Hartford v. Talcott, 48 Conn., 525; Plynn v. Canton Co., 40 Md., 312; 17 Am. Rep., 603; In re God- dard, 16 Pick. (Mass.), 504; 28 Am. Dec, 259; Kirby v. Boylston Mar- ket Assn., 14 Gray (Mass.), 249; 74 Am. Dec, 682; People v. Matti- more. 45 Hun. (N. Y.), 448; 19 Am. Law Review, 113; 33 Am. Law Re- view, 462; 8 Yale Law Journal, 344. Contra, Chicago v. O'Brien, 111 111., 532; 53 Am. Rep., 640; Gridley v. Bloomington, 88 111., 554; 30 Am. Rep., 566. May regulate the removal of snow and ice from railroad tracks by the company. Union Ry. Co. v. Cambridge, 11 Allen (Mass.), 287. Sweeping and Cleaning of Streets may be required of owners or occupiers of premises fronting thereon. Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N. Y., 268; 25 N. E. Rep., 480. Repaieing of Sidewalks. Ex- press charter power may compel the building, repairing, etc., of side- walks. James v. Pine Bluff, 49 Ark., 199; 4 S. W. Rep., 760; Macon V. Patty, 57 Miss., 378; 34 Am. Rep., 451. But it has been held that the owner or occupier of a lot cannot (IG PUBLIC SAFETY— STEBBTS— BUILDINGS. [§459 vent or interfere with the free use of the street or highway as such is within the legal notion of a nuisaneeJ^ But obstruc- tions to constitute a nuisance in the street or highway must be such an annoyance to the public as to render the use of the streets hazardous or prevent its free and unobstructed use as a public thoroughfareJ'^ The use of the street temporarily for the depositing of building material, merchandise and fuel is necessary, and such temporary use does not constitute a pub- lic nuisance. However, such use is subject to reasonable police regulations, and, ordinarily, restrictive ordinances exist regu- lating sucK matters.''^ Without legal sanction, the following be required to keep the sidewalk phanl v. Brown, 40 111., 428; Bond in repair by fine provided for by v. Smith, 44 Hun. (N. Y.), ,219; ordinance. Chicago v. Crosby, 111 Cain v. Syracuse, 95 N. Y., 83. 111., 538. Purposes of highway Stated. Co- ■>« Alabama — Webb v. Demopolis, hen v. New York, 113 N. Y., 532; 95 Ala., 116; 13 So. Rep.,' 289; 21 21 N. E. Rep., 700; 4 L. R. A., 406, L. R. A., 62. Georgia — Simon v. Atlanta, 67 Ga., 618; 44 Am. Rep., 739; Colum- bus V. Jaques, 30 Ga., 506. reversing 43 Hun. (N. Y.), 345. The obstruction or nuisance must be actual and interfere with the public easement. Jackson v. Illinois — People v. St. Louis, 10 People, 9 Mich., Ill; 77 Am. Dec, 111., 351; 48 Am. Dec, 339. Indiana — State v. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co., 86 Ind., 114. /owfl^^Patterson v. Vail, 43 Iowa, 142. 491. Partial obstruction. Laing v. Americus, 86 Ga., 756; 13 S. E. Rep., 107; State v. Berdetta, 73 Ind., 185; 38 Am. Rep., 117; Wil- Missouri — State v. Campbell, 80 bur v. Tobey, 16 Pick. (Mass.), Mo. App., 110. New York — Babbage v. Powers, 177. Nuisance in use of street. State 130 N. Y., 281; 14 L. R: A., 398; 29 v. Edens, 85 N. C, 522. N. B. Rep., 132; Callanan v. Gil- Location, width of street, and man, 107 N. Y., 360; 14 N. E. Rep., particular use as bearing on ques- 264; Davis v. New York, 14 N. Y., tion of nuisance. Graves v. Shat- 506; 67 Am. Dec, 186; Ely v. tuck, 35 N. H., 257; 69 Am. Dec, Campbell, 59 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 333. 536. Pennsylvania — Allegheny v. Zim- merman, 95 Pa. St., 287; 40 Am. Rep., 649. Wisconsin — State v. Carpenter, 68 Wis., 165; 31 N. W. Rep., 730; 60 Am. Rep., 848; State v. Leaver, " State V. Merrit, 35 Conn., 314; Burnham v. Hotchkiss, 14 Conn., 311; Griffith v. McCullum, 46 Barb. (N. Y.), 561; Howard v. Robbins, 1 Lans. (N. Y.), 63. '8 Illinois — McCarthy v. Chicago, 62 Wis., 387, 392; 22 N. W. Rep., 53 111., 38. 576. Indiana — Wood v. Mears, 12 Ind., Anything done to the street 515; 74 Am. Dec, 222. which renders its use in the ordi- nary way hazardous is a nuisance. Parker v. Macon, 39 Ga., 725; Ste- lowa — Sikes v. Manchester, 59 Iowa, 65; 12 N. B. Rep., 755. Nebraska — State ea; rel. v. Oma- §459] PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. 717 have been held to be illegal obstructions and nuisances within the view of the law : Objects calculated to frighten horses of or- dinary gentleness,^^ a tent within the limits of the highway,*" trees standing on a sidewalk and stone columns within the limits of the street, which impede public travel,**! a fence on part of the street,*^ deposit of earth, stone and gravel in the public way,83 hitching rack for horses in public square,*-^ un- authorized excavations on^^ or adjoining a highway,®^ weigh- ha, 14 Neb. 265; 45 Am. Rep., 108; 15 N. W. Rep., 210; Stuart v. Ha- vens, 17 Neb., 211; 22 N. W. Rep., 419. New York — People v. Cunning- ham, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 524; 43 Am. Dec, 709; Cohen v. New York, 113 N. Y., 532; 21 N. E. Rep., 700; 4 L. R. A., 406, reversing 43 Hun. (N. Y.), 345. Pennsylvania — ^Allegheny v. Zim- merman, 95 Pa. St., 287; 40 Am. Rep., 649; Com. v. Passmore, 1 Serg. &R. (Pa.), 217, 219. 79 Dimock v. Suffield, 30 Conn., 129; Clinton v. Howard, 42 Conn., 294. s" Ayer v. Norwich, 39 Conn., 376; 12 Am. Rep., 396. 81 Chase v. Oshkosh, 81 Wis., 313; 51 N. W. Rep., 560; 15 L. R. A., 553. 82 Langsdale v. Bonton, 12 Ind., 467. A Pence or other like obstruction in a street or highway is a nuis- ance. California — Bequette v. Patter- son, 104 Cal., 282; 37 Pac. Rep., 917. Connecticut — State v. Merrit, 35 Conn., 314; Hubbard v. Deming, 21 Conn., 356; Burlington v. Schwarz- man, 52 Conn., 181; 52 Am. Rep., 571. Illinois — Boyd v. Farm Ridge, 103 111., 408; Owens v. Crossett, 105 111., 354; Lake View v. LeBahn, 120 111., 92; 9 N. E. Rep., 269. Indiana — Langdale v. Bonton, 12 Ind., 467. i — Nixon V. Bolioxi (Miss., 1889), 5 So. Rep., 621. Michigan — Sheldon v. Kalama- zoo, 24 Mich., 383. New York — Wakeman v. Wilbur, 147 N. Y., 657; 42 N. B. Rep., 341. 0/iio— Little Miami R. R. Co. v. Green County Commissioners, 31 Ohio St., 338. Wisconsin — Chllds v. Nelson, 69 Wis., 125; 33 N. W. Rep., 587; Neff V. Paddock, 26 Wis., 546. Virginia — Yates v. Warrenton, 84 Va., 337; 4 S. E. Rep., 818. 83 Lowell V. Short, 4 Cush. (Mass.), 275; Indianapolis v. Mil- ler, 27 Ind., 394. 84 If placed in violation of an or- dinance the hitching rack may be removed by the public authority. Samuels v. Nashville, 3 Sneed (Tenn.), 298. 85 Portland v. Richardson, 54 Me., 46; 89 Am. Dec, 720. Ditch dug in a lane of the city without authority, held a nuisance. Runyon v. Bordine, 14 N. J. L., 472. Excavation made under legal permission, held not a nuisance per se. McNaughton v. Elkhart, 85 Ind., 384. 88 Excavations adjoining a high- way are nuisances per se, when. Norwich v. Breed, 30 Conn., 535; Birge v. Gardiner, 19 Conn., 507; 50 Am. Dec, 261; Beck v. Carter, 6 Hun. (N. Y.), 604; Irvine v. Wood, 51 N. Y., 224; 10 Am. Rep., 603; State v. Society, etc, 42 N. J. L., 504; Temperance Hall Assn. v. ;i8 PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. [§460 ing scales,**' open cellar way,^* unauthorized use of street or sidewalk for the display of goods, and merchandise, show cases, stands and booths for confectionery, etc., fish boxes, etc.®" Many other illustrations appear from the eases in the note.'*" §460. Power to remove obstructions and nuisances exists. The power to remove obstructions and nuisances in the public thoroughfares has thus been comprehensively stated in a Penn- sylvania ease: "It admits of no controversy that the city is armed with ample authority to remove from the streets and thoroughfares every obstruction or impediment to their free use as such by the public, unless legalized by the authority of Giles, 33 N. J. L., 260; Vanderbeck V. Hendry, 34 N. J. L., 467. 87 Emerson v. Babcock, 66 Iowa, 257; 23 N. W. Rep., 656. Weighing Scales are not an ob- struction or nuisance, when legal- ly authorized. Spencer v. Andrew, 82 Iowa, 14; 12 L. R. A., 115; 47 N. W. Rep., 1007. 88 Lowell V. Spaulding, 4 Gush. (Mass.), 277; 50 Am. Dec, 775. 80 Alabama — Costello y. State, 108 Ala., 45; 18 So. Rep., 820; 35 L. R. A., 303. Georgia — Laing v. Americus, 86 Ga., 756; 13 S. E. Rep., 107. New York — Lavery v. Hannigan, 20 Jones & S. (N. Y.), 463; Simis V. Brookfield, 13 Misc. (N. Y.), 569; People V. New York, 18 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.), 123; Ely v. Campbell, 59 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 333. Pennsylvania — Com. v. Went- worth, Brightly (Pa.), 318. Wisconsin — Barling v. West, 29 Wis., 307; 9 Am. Rep., 576. Ordinance Leasing Space in Street for produce dealers, held void as authorizing a nuisance. Schopp V. St. Louis, 117 Mc, 131; 22 S. W. Rep., 898. Obstructions in Alley. Bagley V. People, 43 Mich., 355; 38 Am. Rep., 192; 5 N. W. Rep., 415. 00 Obstruction in Highway as nuisance; when question of fact. Bybce v. State, 94 Ind., 443; 48 Am. Rep., 175; Logansport v. Dick, 70 Ind., 65; 36 Am. Rep., 166; Center- ville V. Woods, 57 Ind., 192; Grove V. Fort Wayne, 45 Ind., 429; 15 Am. Rep., 262. Building in a Street constitutes a nuisance and may be abated. Cheek v. Aurora, 92 Ind., 107; Hawley v Harrall, 19 Conn., 142; Barclay v. Commonwealth, 25 Pa. St., 503; 64 Am. Dec, 715; Cook v. Harris, 61 N. Y., 448. A barn in a street, held a nuis- ance. State V. Leaver, 62 Wis., 387; 22 N. W. Rep., 576. Compare Cook V. Covil, 18 Hun. (N. Y.), 288. City cannot license or give per- mission to maintain a nuisance in its streets and public highways, as by allowing the erection of buildings and other structures, without express legislative grant. Daly V. Georgia Southern & F. I. Co., 80 Ga., 793; 7 S. E. Rep., 146; or by leasing space in street to produce dealers. Schopp v. St. Louis, 117 Mo., 131; 22 S. W. Rep., 898. County jail standing in a public square held to be a nuisance. Llano V. Llano County, 5 Tex. Civ. App., 132; 23 S. W. Rep., 1008. Dwelling house in a public square held a nuisance; injunction §460] PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. 119 law. "^1 Manifestly, the power to remove includes the power to prevent by such reasonable regulations as do not conflict with any of the provisions of the federal or state constitution, charter or general laws.'-'^ Penal ordinances may be enacted and enforced forbidding obstructions and nuisances in public thoroughfares."^ The general power over highways is usually sufBeient to enable the municipal corporation to adopt adequate means and to take necessarj' and appropriate action, to re- move obstructions and nuisances therefrom which interfere with their free use for piiblic travel.-'* All obstructions in pub- to abate sustained. Com. v. Rush, 14 Pa. St., 186. Columns of a building projecting some two feet onto the sidewalk are nuisances. First National Bank V. Tyson, 133 Ala., 459; 32 So. Rep., 144; 91 Am. St. Rep., 46. SxKucTUREs O.N "WHEELS and ma- chinery in highway may be abated as a nuisance. Day v. Green, 4 Cush. (Mass.), 433. Mill Race in the street may be abated as nuisance. Waterloo v. Union Mill Co., 72 Iowa, 437; 34 N. W. Rep., 197. Stei'I'im; Stone on sidewalk,held not a nuisance. Dubois v. Kings- ton, 102 N. Y., 219; 6 N. E. Rep., 273; 55 Am. Rep., 804. Stone W.vi.iv in a public highway, held a nuisance. Smith v. McDow- ell, 148 111., 51; 35 N. E. Rep., 141; 22 L. R. A., 393. Booth in a public street for rope dancing is a public nuisance. Hall's Case, 1 Mod., 76; 2 Keble, 846; Vent, 169. Lamp Posts. New Orleans Gas Light Co. V. Hart, 40 La. Ann., 474; 4 So. Rep., 215. "1 Philadelphia v. P. $ R. R. R. Co., 58 Pa. St., 253, 263; San Fran- cisco V. Buckman, 111 Cal., 25; 43 Pac. Rep., 396; Terre Haute v. Tur- ner, 36 Ind., 522; Dudley v. Frank- fort. 12 B. Hon. iKy.), 610; Grand Rapids V. Hughes, 15 Mich.. 54; Compton V. Waco Bridge Co., 62 Tex., 715. Removing obstruction is an exer- cise of the police power. State (Dawes) v. Hightstown, 45 N. J. L., 501. »^ Philadelphia v. Brabender, 201 Pa. St., 574; 51 Atl. Rep., 374. s>« Eji pcirlc Taylor, 87 Cal., 91 ; 25 Pac. Rep., 258; White v. Kent, 11 Ohio St., 550; Norfolk City v. Chamberlain, 29 Gratt. (Va.), 534. D-* Massachusetts — Springfield v. Connecticut River R. Co., 4 Cush. (Mass.), 63. Minnesota — Stearns County v. St. Cloud, M. & A. R. Co., 36 Minn., 425; 32 N. W. Rep., 91; Hutchin- son Tp. v. Pilk, 44 Minn., 536; 47 N. W. Rep., 255. New Hampshire — Hooksett v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 44 N. H., 105; Troy V. Cheshire R. Co., 23 N. H., 83; 55 Am. Dec, 177. New Jersey — Easton & A. R. Co. v. Greenwich Tp., 25 N. J. Eq., 565. New York. — Hart v. Albany, 9 Wend. (N. Y.), 571; 24 Am. Dec, 165; Watertown v. Cowen,, 4 Paige (N. Y.), 510; 27 Am. Dec, 80. Pennsylvania — Philadelphia v. Thirteenth & Fifteenth Streets P. R. Co., 8 Phila. (Pa.), 648. Texas — Rio Grande R. Co., v. Brownsville, 45 Tex., 88. When a municipality has control of its Rlreets it may proceed in its 720 PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. [§461 lie highways which are nuisances per se may be abated sum- marily by the municipal authorities.*^ § 461. Awnings, signs, etc. Ordinances and by-laws intend- ed to accomplish the purpose of securing a free and uninter- rupted passage through streets situated in a populous neigh- borhood, by restraining and regulating erections over a por- tion of the traveled way, are clearly within the legitimate scope of the power confided, to cities and towns.^^'''' This is among the leading and obvious duties of municipal government. It wa.s early held in i\Iassachusetts that charter power to pass all salu- tary and needful by-laws was sufficient to authorize an ordi- corporate name to prevent or re- move obstructions therein by judi- cial proceedings. Yates v. Warren- ton, 84 Va., 337; 4 S. B. Rep., 818. The city has the same right to maintain an action to prevent the unlawful obstruction of a street as have the people of a state. People ex rel. v. Holladay, 93 Cal., 241; 29 Pac. Rep,, 54. Injunction to restrain the plac- ing of obstructions in streets, etc., may be invoked. Metropolitan City Ry. Co, V. Chicago, 96 111., 620; Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Ry. Co., 67 111., 540. OS Iowa — Kemper v. Burlington, 81 Iowa, 354 ; 47 N. W. Rep., 72. Masnachusetts — Com. v. Wilkin- son, 16 Pick, (Mass.), 175; 26 Am. Dec, 654. Pennsylvania — Easton, S. E. & W. B. P. R. Co. V. Easton, 133 Pa. St., 505; 19 Atl. Rep., 486; New Castle V. Raney, 130 Pa. St., 546; 18 Atl. Rep., 1066; 6 L. R. A., 737. Ohio — Van Dyke v. Cincinnati, 1 Disney (Ohio), 532. Wisconsin— Hubbell v. Goodrich, 37 Wis., 84; Neff v. Paddock, 26 Wis., 546. Obsthuctions. Charter power "to fix the squaring and to prevent any encroachment upon or the stopping and obstructing the streets," con- fers power to pass an ordinance directing the removal of obstruc- tions from the public streets. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. R. Co. v. Monroe, 48 La. Ann., 1102; 20 So. Rep., 664. StiMMAEy Removal of Raileoad Tracks. Cape May v. C. M., D. Bay & S. P. R. R., 60 N. J. L. 224; 37 Atl. Rep., 892; 39 L. R. A., 609; State (Kennelly) v. Jersey City, 57 N. J. L., 293; 30 Atl. Rep., 531; 26 L. R. A., 281; State (Del. & Atl. Tel. & Tel. Co.) v. Pensauken Tp., 67 N. J. L., 91, 531; 50 Atl. Rep., 452; 52 Atl. Rep., 482. Telkgkapii Poles; ordinance for removal. Hannibal v. M. & K. Tel. Co., 31 Mo. App., 23. Lamp Posts. New Orlean Gas Light Co. v. Hart, 40 La. Ann., 474; 4 So. Rep., 215; 8 Am. St. Rep., 544. When Shade Tukf:.s in streets constitute obstructions they may be cut down. Chase v, Oshkosh, 81 Wis., 313; 51 N. W. Rep., 560; 29 Am. St, Rep., 898; Mt. Carmel v. Shaw, 155 111., 37; 39 N. E. Rep. 584; 46 Am. St. Rep., 311. Judicial Proceedings necessary to abate, when. Teass v. St. Albans, 38 W. Va., 1; 19 L. R. A., 802; 17 S. E. Rep., 400. Notice Required. Pruden v. Love, 67 Ga., 190. fsyj/n re Goddard, 16 Pick. §461] PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. ni nance providing that no person shall maintain an awning be- fore his door without the consent of the mayor 'and aldermen and that one erected without such consent is an unlawful ob- struction and may be removed by the municipal authorities.^* General charter power to open public ways and keep streets and sidewalks free from obstruction and nuisance, was held, in North Carolina, to be insufficient to support an ordinance for- bidding the suspension or projection of signs over the side- walks, and requiring all signs so suspended or projected at the date of the passage of the ordinance to be removed, within a specified time. But it was conceded that where any sign consti- tutes an obstruction which tends to hinder, delay, incommode or in some way endanger the use of the sidewalk by pedestrians, its removal can be enforced under the police power .^^ In Con- necticut an ordianee was declared void for uncertainty which prohibited the maintenance of an awning over a sidewalk, ' ' ex- (Mass.), 504, 511; 28 Am. Dec, 259. 90 Pedrick v. Bailey, 12 Gray (Mass.), 161, per Blgelow, J. Especially is it within their prov- ince to regulate the construction of awnings, inasmuch as they are lia- ble for damages occasioned to pass- ers-by through any defect or insuf- ficiency in the construction. Drake V. Lowell, 13 Met. (Mass.), 292. Awning defined. State v. Clarke, 69 Conn., 371; 37 Atl. Rep.. 975; 39 L. R. A., 670. Awning as a Nuisance dis- cussed. Connecticut — Hewison v. New Haven, 37 Conn., 475; 9 Am. Rep., 342. Michigan — Hawkins v. Sanders, 45 Mich., 491; 8 N. W. Rep., 98. Minnesota — Bohen v. Waseca, 32 Minn., 176; 19 N. W. Rep., 730; 50 Am. Rep., 564. Missouri — Hisey v. Mexico, 61 Mo. App., 248. New York — Hume v. New York, 74 N. Y., 264 ; Farrell v. New York, 22 N. Y. St. R., 469; Brinkman v. Eisler, 40 N. Y. St. R., 865; Simls V. Brookfleld, 13 Misc. (N. Y.), 569. ''Encumbbance," when an awn- ing constitutes, within meaning of ordinance. Fox v. Winona, 23 Minn., 10. Ebection of awnings may be al- lowed. Hoey V. Gilroy, 129 N. Y., 132; 29 N. B. Rep., 85, reversing 37 N. Y. St. Rep., 754. Projections Over Sidewalk. Chambers v. Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co., 1 Disney (Ohio), 327. Law forbidding projection in front of any building "over or upon the pavement of any street," con- strued not to apply to projections from the front of a building which were too high up to interfere with the free passage along the foot- path. "The object * * * ap- pears to us to be to keep the pave- ment clear for the foot passengers, and to prevent obstructions to the passage of the street. * * * The words, as it seems to us, must be read as if they ran 'over or upon the pavement so as to obstruct the passage along it.' " Goldstraw v. Duckworth, 5 Q. B. Div., 275,' 277. 9' An abutting owner to a street and sidewalk has an easement in 46 722 PUBLIC SAFETY— STRE3ETS— BUILDINGS. L§46^ cept the same be upon a suitable frame, and attached entirely to the building, which awning shall not, when extended, be less than six feet from the sidewalk, ' ' and which ordinance did not specify what shouldbe deemed a "suitable frame. "^^ § 462. Regulation of lamp posts, poles, electric wire, under- ground conduits, gas pipes, etc. During the past few years the subject of municipal control over the erection and mainte- nance of poles and electric wires in the streets, alleys and public ways of cities, and the placing of wires underground has re- ceived special judicial consideration. All reasonable and gen- erally accepted improvements which tend to decrease the ob- struction of the streets, or increase the safety or convenience of the public in their use, may be compelled.^ The fact that the power to grant the franchise is vested in the legislature,^ or the company has the sole and exclusive privilege of lighting the streets in part of the city, clearly does not exempt it from reasonable municipal police regulations.-* But unreasonable his frontage which he may use in subordination to the superior Tights of the public. State v. Higgs, 126 N. C, 1014; 35 S. E. Rep., 473; 48 L. R. A., 446. Compare Augusta V. Burum, 93 Ga., 68; 19 S. E. Rep., 820; 26 L. R. A., 340. 98 The ordinance requires the awning to be "upon a suitable frame," but "furnishes no criterion by which the question of suitability can possibly be determined. It does not define the word 'suitable/ as here used, and the law does not define it. Indeed, when it is thus used. It Is Incapable of any general- legal definition. Batters v. Dun- ning, 49 Conn., 479; Smiths' ap- peal, 65 Conn., 135; 31 Atl. Rep., 529. Its use, of necessity, implies the judgment of some tribunal or person who is to determine the question of suitability, and yet neither the charter nor the ordi- nances of the city empower any person or tribunal to "exercise such judgment. The term 'suitable,' as here used, seems altogether too vague and indefinite to serve as the basis of an ordinance so highly pe- nal in its consequences as this one is. On the whole, we are of opin- ion that the ordinance In question is void for uncertainty." Per Tor- rance, J., in State v. Clarke, 69 Conn., 371; 39 L. R. A., 670; 37 Atl. Rep., 975. 1 United States Illuminating Co. v. Grant, 55 Hun. (N. Y.), 222; 5 N. Y. Suppl., 788; Mutual Union Tel. Co. V. Chicago, 11 Biss. C. C, 539; 16 Fed. Rep., 309; Allentown V. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 Pa. St., 117; 23 Atl. Rep., 1070; 33 Am. St. Rep., 820. 2 Barhite v. Home Telephone Co., 50 N. Y. App. Div., 25. 3 Missouri ex rel. Laclede Gas Light Co. V. Murphy, 170 U. S., 78, affirming 130 Mo., 10; 31 S. W. Rep., 594. May forbid suspension of wires on roofs of buildings. Electric Imp. Co. V. San Francisco, 45 Fed. Rep., 593; 13 L. R. A., 131. As to right to use terminal poles §463] PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. 723 burdens which impair eonlract obligations cannot he imposed.^ A franchise to use streets for the erection of poles and over- head lines under conditions respecting permits and directions as to where the same shall be placed, when accepted and acted upon, becomes a contract, which, without reservation, can neither be repealed or so amended as to impair rights acquired under it,'' yet all such franchises are subject to reasonable po- lice regulations in the interest of public safety and convenience and therefore when reason, convenience or the good govern- ment of the municipality requires, wire using companies may be compelled to place their wires in subsurface conduits." § 463. Billboards and structures for advertising. To pro- mote the public safety and convenience, the power to regulate in connection with underground conduits. Com. ex rel. v. Warwick, 185 Pa. St., 623; 40 Atl. Rep., 93. 1 § 239, supra. New Orleans v. The Great South- ern Tel. & Telephone Co., 40 La. Ann., 41; 3 So. Rep., 533. " Levis V. Newton, 75 Fed. Rep., 884; § 238, supra. As permitting by ordinance a sec- ond company to interfere with the rights of the first. Equity will en- join such interference. Rutland Electric Light Co. v. Marble City Electric Light Co., 65 Vt, 377; 26 Atl. Rep., 635. The city cannot revoke a desig- nation of the streets in which a telegraph company has been grant- ed the right to place its poles when the company has conformed to the conditions upon which the desig- nation was made, and has expend- ed money in so placing its poles. State (Hudson Telephone Co.) v. Jersey City, 49 N. J. L., 303; 8 Atl. Rep., 123. N. W. Telephone Bxch. Co. v. Minneapolis. 81 Minn., 140, 147 ; 83 N. W. Rep., 527; 86 N. W. Rep., 69; N. E. T. & T. Co. v. Boston Term. Co., 182 Mass., 397; 65 N. B. Rep., 835. Undergeound Conbuits. Tele- graph and telephone companies, under the Missouri statutes, have a right to occupy the streets of St. Louis in constructing their lines of wireT and, with the consent of the city, to lay such wires under- ground. And that city has the power to permit such companies to construct such underground condu- its, and to enter into contract with them specifying the conditions upon which its consent to such con- struction is given. State ex rel. National Subway Co. v. St. Louis, 145 Mo., 551; 46 S. W. Rep., 981. See note to State ex rel. Under- ground Service Co. v. Mtirphy, 34 L. R. A., 369. The city in granting to a company the right to lay its wires and construct its under- ground conduits, acts in a proprie- tary capacity, and in pursuance of the powers conferred upon it by its charter. State ex rel. National Subway Co. v. St. Louis, 145 Mo., 551; 46 S. W. Rep., 981. The stat- utes of Missouri authorize one such subway company to charge another rent for the use of any part of its way or facilities, nid,. The right to charge such companies tolls, or to make an agreement with other companies for the use of its sub- way, are franchise rights, derived 7-M PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. [§ 463 the use of streets and public ways, confers ample authority to enact and enforce, by ordinance, reasonable regulations, gen- eral and uniform in their nature, respecting the erection and maintenance of billboards and other structures used for adver- tising purposes and placed at or near the street lines. Such regulations are salutary and necessary, are not in restraint of trade, nor unlawful restrictions upon the legal and beneficial from the state alone, and with which the city has no concern. Ibid. A telegraph company is not a common carrier, and the fact that the city ordinance declares a tele- phone and telegraph company a common carrier does not make it such. It is the nature of the com- pany's business that determines its character. But the use of the streets of a city by such company is a public use, and while not a common carrier it is in some re- spects similar to one; the city may by ordinance require it to permit other companies engaged in a simi- lar business to lay their wires in its subway; on the other hand, such companies are public corpora- tions, having the right to condemn property for public use. (Over- ruling State ex rel. v. Murphy, 134 Mo., 548; 31 S. W. Rep., 784; 34 S. W. Rep., 51; 35 S. W. Rep., 1132.) Ihid. Where a telephone company has a clear legal right to the relief sought at the hands of the city, and no specific legal remedy there- for, a peremptory writ of manda- mus will issue. Ihid. Such compa- ny, when such right exists, may proceed by mandamus to compel the city of St. Louis and its board of public improvements to take ac- tion upon plans and specifications submitted by the company for serv- ice and supply pipes connecting manholes in the subway, construct- ed by virtue of the terms of cer- tain ordinances, with the area-way under the 'buildings and sidewalks, and for its permit to do such work. Ihid. Regulating Poles, Wire, etc. A grant by the legislature to a cor- poration of the right to use the streets of a city for illumination by electricity is subject to reason- able regulations as to its use, and, the power to regulate the use of its streets and general police power having been subsequently conferred on the city, such right must be ex- ercised subject to the ordinances ot the city relating to electric wires in its streets. State ex. rel Laclede Gas Light Co. v. Murphy, 130 Mo., 10; 31 S. W. Rep., 594; 31 L. R. A., 798. Such city, under its power to regulate the use of its streets, and under its general police power, has the right to require a compliance with its regulations which either wholly' prohibit the illuminating corporation from placing its wires under the streets, or which regu- late the manner of doing so. State ex rel. Laclede Gas Light Co. v. Murphy, 130 Mo., 10; 31 S. W. Rep., 594. Where the lighting of cities by electricity was unknown when the authority delegated to a city to regulate the use of its streets was conferred by the legislature, the latter will not be held to have in- tended to grant rights and powers inconsistent with the ordinary use of such streets. State ex rel. La- clede Gas Light Co. v. Murphy, 130 Mo., 10; 31 S. W. Rep., 594. It is within the municipal police power to designate on what parts of §464] PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. 725 use of property." Thus an ordinance of Buffalo, N. Y., which prohibited the erection of billboards exceeding seven feet in height, without permission of the council, and authorized the abatement of any billboard erected in violation of the ordi- nance as a nuisance, was sustained, but the ordinance was con- strued to be prospective in its operation only, and hence it did not authorize the destruction of billboards erected prior to its passage.* So it has been held by the Court of Appeals of New York that the charter of Rochester, N. Y., which confers power "to license and regulate bill posters * * * and to pre- scribe the terms and conditions upon which any such license shall be granted, ' ' authorizes an ordinance forbidding the erec- tion of billboards exceeding six feet in height, except with the permission of the council, after notice, in writing of the application for the permit, to the owners, occupants or agents of all houses and lots within a distance of 200 feet from where such billboard is to be erected.^ § 464. Riding and driving on streets. Under general char- ter power to regulate the use of streets, municipal corporations may enact and enforce ordinances, by penal provisions, reguliit- ing the use of streets by omnibuses, stage coaches and other vehicles; forbid fast driving and riding thereon, and may im- streets lines shall be constructed, for the removal. Hannibal v. M. The law will presume that the pow- & K. Tel. Co., 31 Mo. App., 23. er was exercised reasonably, and Wire company is liable for the the courts will not interfere unless death of a fireman caused by step- the exercise has been manifestly ping on a live grounded wire in a arbitrary and unreasonable'. Louis- public alley. Gannon v. Laclede ville Home Tel. Co. v. Cumberland Gas Light Co., 145 Mo., 502; 43 L. Tel. Co. (U. S. C. C. A.), Ill Fed. R. A., 505; 46 S. W. Rep., 968; 47 Rep., 663. S. W. Rep., 907. A telegraph company is not a ' Gunning System v. Buffalo, 62 common carrier. State ex rel. Na- App. Div. (N. Y.), 497; 71 N. Y. tional Subway Co. V. St. Louis, 145 Supp., 155; 75 App. Div., 31; 77 Mo., 551, 575, 576; 46 S. W. Rep., N. Y. Supp., 987. 981. HWhitmler v. Buffalo, 118 Fed. A municipal ordinance which per- Rep., 773. emptorily directs a change in the ^ "To Regulate is to govern by, location of telephone poles, as pre- or subject to, certain rules or re- viously permitted and occupied, strictlons. It implies a power of re- can not be upheld when it is nel- striction and restraint, not only as ther averred nor shown that the ex- to the manner of conducting a spec- isting location incommodes the pub- ifled business, but also as to the lie, or that any good reason exists erection in or upon which, the busi- ;'26 PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDlNOe, r§465 pose other restrictions as to the use thereof, designed to pre- serve the public safety and convenience.!" § 465. Regulation of bicycles and velocipedes. Reasonable regulations for the public safety may be made, concerning the use of streets by bicycles, velocipedes, etc." General charter ness is to be conducted." Roches- ter V. West, 164 N. Y., 510, 513; 79 Am. St. Rep., 659; 58 N. E. Rep., 673, affirming 29 N. Y. App. Div., 125. Unreasonable Ordinance. An ordinance of Topeka, Kan., provid- ing that, "no person shall erect any billboard or other structure for ad- vertising purposes unless the same is placed at such distance from the line of any street or sidewalk as shall exceed at least five feet the height of such billboard or struc- ture," was held void as unreason- able. Crawford v. Topeka, 51 Kan., 756; 37 Am. St. Rep., 323; 20 L. R. A., 692; 33 Pac. Rep., 476. 10 Persons driving in the streets of a city (in the absence of munici- pal regulations, as to fast driving) are not limited to any particular rate of speed. They may drive slowly or rapidly, but they must use proper care and prudence, so as not to cause injury to other persons lawfully upon the streets. Crocker v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 92 N. Y., 652. Regulations as to use of omni- huses and stage coaches, while passing over public streets, held reasonable. Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 Cush. (Mass.), 562. May prevent driving horses on a trot or gallop in public ways. Such restriction is reasonable and not in restraint of trade. Com. v. Wor- cester, 3 Pick. (Mass.), 461, 473. Riding or driving faster than a walk in "turning the corner of a street" may be forbidden. City Council V. Dunn, 1 McCord (S. C), 333. May forbid fast driving or rid- ing on streets "faster than an ordi- nary trot"; held not void for vague- ness or uncertainty. Nealis v. Hayward, 48 Ind., 19. May forbid "at a rate of speed which is deemed inconsistent with the public safety or convenience." Commonwealth v. Roy, 140 Mass., 432; 4 N.B.Rep.,814. Ordinance forbidding riding or driving at an "immoderate" rate of speed, held void for vagueness in a Massachusetts case. Law of the Road. It is the right of every person to travel on any part of the public way that may suit his taste or convenience, not occupied by another, provided no one is meeting him with teams and carriages having occasion or desire to pass. Dunham v. RacklifC, 71 Me., 345. And when persons are meeting and passing each other upon the highway, it Is their duty to drive to the right of the middle of the traveled part of the road or bridge when practicable. Kennard V. Burton, 25 Me., 39; Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Mich., 32; Cooley on Torts (2d Ed.), p. 434. Though the statute requires a traveler to keep to the right, yet it does not justify him in stubbornly keeping on that side, and thus causing a collision which a slight change on his part might have avoided. O'Maley v. Dorn, 7 Wis., 236. u Fuller v. Redding, 13 App. Div. (N, Y.), 61; 43 N. Y. Suppl., 96, i465] PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. 727 power to provide for the public safety, convenience, etc., gives authority to forbid by ordinance the riding of bicycles on the sidewalks,! 2 and it has been held that they may be excluded Bicycle Defined. Bicycle held not to be a carriage, within the meaning of a statute requiring highways to be kept in repair for safe and convenient travel. "A bi- cycle is more properly a machine than a carriage; and so it is de- fined in Murray's dictionary." It was held to be a machine within the meaning of the statute. Rich- ardson V. Danvers, 176 Mass., 413; 79 Am. St. Rep., 320; 50 L. R. A., 127; 57 N. B. Rep., 688. The "consensus of authority es- tablishes that the locomotive ma- chine known as a bicycle belongs to the genus vehicle or carriage." State ex rel v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 71 Mo. App., 385, 391. Bicyclist recklessly running into a pedestrian properly on the side- walTj is guilty of assault and bat- tery. Mercer v. Corbin, 117 Ind., 450; 10 Am. St. Rep., 76; 3 L. R. A., 221; 20 N. E. Rep., 132. Recklessly riding a bicycle pro- ducing damages to one. constitutes an offense under the English sta- tute. Reg. v. Parker, 59 J. P., 793. A person riding on a bicycle was held in Scotland not to be "travel- ing as an ordinary passenger" in a vehicle, within the meaning of the term as used in a policy of insur- ance. McMillan v. Sun Life As- surance Co., 4 Scots. L. T., 98. 12 Moore v. District of Columbia, 12 App. Dist. of Columbia, 537; 41 L. R. A., 208. A bicycle is an animal within the meaning of the statute forbidding the riding or driving of any animal upon sidewalk. Commonwealth v. Forest, 170 Pa. St., 40; 29 L. R. A., 365; 32 Atl. Rep., 652. Bicycle held a vehicle, as to use of sidewalks. Mercer v. Corbin, 117 Ind., 450; 20 N. B. Rep., 132; 10 Am St. Rep., 76; 3 L. R. A., 221; Reg. v. Justin, 24 Ont. Rep., 327. When bicycle will be held to be a vehicle. Taylor v. Goodwin, 42 Q. B. Div., 228; Whiting v. Doob, 152 Ind., 157; 52 N. E. Rep., 759; Holland v Bartch, 120 Ind., 46; 22 N. E. Rep., 83; Swift v. Topeka, 43 Kan., 671; 23 Pac. Rep., 1075; Myers v. Hinds, 110 Mich., 300; 68 N. W. Rep., 156; Thompson v. Dodge, 58 Minn., 555; 60 N. W. Rep., 545; Geiger v. Perkiomen & Reading Turnpike Road, 167 Pa. St., 582; 31 Atl. Rep., 918; Taylor V. Union Traction Co., 184 Pa. St., 465; 40 Atl. Rep., 159; 47 L. R. A., 289; State v. Collins, 16 R. I., 371; 17 Atl. Rep., 131; Reg. v. Plumber, 30 Up. Can. Q. B., 41. A tricycle in which a person un- able to walk is traveling on a side- walk is not within the scope of an ordinance against leading, riding, or placing "any beast of burden or vehicle on any sidewalk," or an or- dinance which prohibits riding or driving except between the curb lines of streets. Wheeler v. Boone, 108 Iowa, 235; 44 L. R. A., 821; 78 N. W. Rep., 909. Defense. It is no defense for a bicyclist to show that it was custo- mary to violate the law providing against riding on the sidewalk. Commonwealth v. Forest, 170 Pa. St., 40; 29 L. R. A., 365; 32 Atl. Rep., 652. Right of Way. Bicycles are not within the meaning of an ordinance giving vehicles a right of way upon street railway tracks in the direc- tion in which the cars usually run, over vehicles moving in the oppo- 7sja PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. [§466 from bridges,!^ and public parks under ample charter power ;i^ and general charter power will authorize other reasonable regulations, as requiring the use of bells when on the public streets and the carrying of lights at night.^^ § 466. Regulating street parades. Ordinances may provide reasonable regulations respecting the use of streets and public ways for processions, parades, etc. But such regulations must not be so framed as to allow their enforcement to rest alone upon official discretion. A uniform rule must be prescribed. i" An ordinance which prohibits the congregation of persons upon streets or sidewalks and the marching in processions, "at such site direction, so that a bicyclist riding between the rails can com- pel an approaching vehicle to give way to him. Taylor v. Union Trac. Co., 184 Pa. St., 465; 10 Atl. Rep., 159; 47 L. R. A., 289. The rule requiring drivers of ve- hicles drawn by horses, and riders of bicycles, to regard the ordinary rules of the road for each others safety, does not require the driver of a cart to drive to one side in order that the bicyclist may not have to deviate from a straight line. Taylor v. Union Trac. Co., 184 Pa. St., 465; 40 Atl. Rep., 159; 47 L. R. A., 289. 13 If riding bicycle or tricycle over a public bridge is likely to frighten horses, etc., rule forbid- ding, is reasonable. Twilley v. Per- kins, 77 Md., 252; 19 L. R. A., 632; 26 Atl. Rep., 286. Law conferring official discretion as to use of bicycles, etc., on cer- tain highways, sustained. State v. Yopp, 97 N. C, 477; 2 Am. St. Rep., 305; 2 S. B. Rep., 458. Contra. But in Kansas it has been held that an ordinance which attempts to prevent bicyclists from using the part of a street which is devoted to the use of vehicles is void as against common right. Swift V. Topeka, 43 Kan., 671; 8 L. R. A., 772; 23 Pac. Rep., 1075; Em- poria V. Wagoner, 6 Kan. App., 659; 49 Pac. Rep., 701. i* Where park commissioners have full and exclusive power to govern, manage and direct the sev- eral public parks, squares and places in the city, a resolution or ordinance passed by them, in pur- suance of the power so conferred, providing that no bicycle or tri- cycle should be allowed in cer- tain parks, is valid. In re Wright, 29 Hun. (N. Y.), 357. 15 Des Moines -v. Kellar, 116 loi^a, 648; 88 N. W. Rep., 827. !« See § 416 supra. Unreasonable Ordinances. In re Prazee, 63 Mich., 396, 407; 30 N. W. Rep., 72, Campbell, C. J. said: "This by-law is unreasonable, because • it sup- presses what is generally perfectly lawful, and because it leaves the power of permitting or restraining processions, and their courses, to an unregulated official discretion when the whole matter, if regu- lated at all, must be by permanent, legal provisions, operating general- ly and impartially." Followed in Chicago V. Trotter, 136 111., 430; 26 N. B. Rep., 359; Anderson v, Well- ington, 40 Kan., 173; 19 Pac. Rep., 719; 10 Am. St. Rep., 175; 2 L. R. §467] PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. 739 time and place and in such number and manner as to obstruct or impede public travel," or to interfere with the business of any person on the street, and which forbids the making of any noise upon the streets or sidewalks "by means of musical in- struments or otherwise, of such character and extent, and at such times and places as would be likely to cause horses and teams to become frightened and ungovernable or of such char- acter, extent and duration as to annoy and disturb others," and which makes it a misdemeanor to refuse to desist from such forbidden acts upon command of the mayor or city marshal, was held valid in Iowa. It is not an unwarranted restraint upon person liberty. The gravamen of the offense is the doing of the prohibited act and not disobedience to the order of the officer, hence the offense does not depend upon the whim or caprice of the officer. 1^ § 467 Distribution of hand bills, circulars, advertising mat- ter, etc. Power to enact and enforce reasonable ordinances for the protection of the public in their right to the free and safe use of the highways of the city, authorizes ordinances forbid- ding the casting of any paper, advertisement, hand bill, cir- cular or waste paper upon the streets, sidewalks and public places or prohibiting the carrying and placing in such places any show board, placard or sign, for the purpose of there dis- playing the same. Thus the general welfare clause and power to prevent "practices having a tendency to frighten teams or horses," was held sufficient to sustain the Denver ordinance, which made it unlawful to distribute hand bills, etc., in public places.!* So power to make all such salutary and needful by- laws, not repugnant to the laws of the state, for directing and managing the prudential affairs, preserving the peace and good order and maintaining the internal police thereof, as they may judge most conducive to the welfare of the town, was hffld A., 110; Rich v. Naperville, 42 IlL 828; Bloomington v. Richardson, App., 222. 38 III. App., 60. Right to parade and assemble in i'' Chariton v. Simmons, 87 Iowa, public places. State v. Hughes, 72 226; 54 N. W. Rep., 146. N. C, 25. 18 "The evident object of the or- Ordinance forbidding going dinance * * * is to prevent the about beating drums, etc., valid, littering of the streets and the Salvation army. Roderick v. Whit- frightening of horses. It certainly son, 51 Hun. (N. Y.), 620; State v. tends to the accomplishment of one White, 64 N. H., 48; 5 Atl. Rep., of the' purposes for which the city 730 PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. [§467 ample to support an ordinaiace providing that, "no person shall place or carry or cause to be placed or carried on any sidewalk any show board, placard or sign for the purpose of there dis- playing the same."!^ But general power and power to pre- vent obstructions, etc., on the streets and sidewalks was held insufficient to authorize the Detroit Ordinance which forbade the circulation, distribution or giving away of ' ' circulars, hand- bills or advertising cards of any description in or upon any of the public streets and alleys of said city. ' ' ^o An ordinance of Philadelphia was sustained which forbade the casting of such articles into the vestibules of dwelling houses and which ex- empted from its operation newspapers and addressed envel- opes.21 was incorporated, viz., the protec- tion of its inhabitants from danger as they pass along its streets, en- gaged in their business. Such an object is certainly legitimate, and the means employed are reasonable and surrounded by sufficient safe- guards." Wettengel v. Denver, 20 Colo., 552, 557; 39 Pac. Rep., 343. 10 "The purpose of the ordinance In question is to prevent the plac- ing of show-boards and signs upon the sidewalks so as to obstruct them, and also to prevent the car- rying of placards and signs for the purpose of displaying them, of which the tendency and effect might be to collect crowds, and thus to interfere with the use of the sidewalks by the public, and lead to disorder. We cannot say that such a provision applicable to the crowded streets of a populous city is unreasonable." Per Morton, C. J. in Com. v. McCafferty, 145 Mass., 384; 14 N. E. Rep., 451. 20 The special facts of this case probably had an influence on the decision. The cards given out were small, and read: "The invitation committee cordially invites you to spend this, or any Monday night from 7 ; 45 to 9 o'clock at the Y. M. C. A. Building. Ice water and fans." No persons were interfered with, nor were teams or horses frightened. There was no indis- criminate scattering of the papers. "The card itself was not only harm- less, but the words printed thereon were an invitation to a moral and Christian assembly of people, gath- ered together for the public good. If this act can be classed as an of- fense punishable by fine and im- prisonment, then the selling or dis- tribution of newspapers upon the streets of the city would be pun- ishable in the same way. * * * What direction or restraint is re- quired for the public good in the mere act of giving away an adver- tising card or handbill? This part of the ordinance is not aimed at the littering up of the streets, or to the frightening of horses, hut the offense is made complete in it- self hy, the mere act of distributing Or giving away these enumerated articles." The penalty was also held unreasonable. Per Long, J. in People V. Armstrong, 73 Mich., 288, 295; 41 N. W. Rep., 275; 16 Am. St. Rep., 578, 584; 2 L. R. A., 721. 21 Philadelphia v. Brabender, 201 Pa. St., 574; 51 Atl. Rep., 374. §468] PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. §468. Animals at large— Regulating driving of, through streets. Usually municipal corporations have power to restrain animals, such as cattle, horses, mules, goats, sheep, swine, etc., from running at large upon the highways, streets, etc., and to regulate the driving of the same over the public ways. General charter power is sufficient for this purpose.22 The local cor- poration generally has power to provide for the taking, im- 22 California — Amyx v. Taber, 23 Cal., 370. Colorado — Brophy v. Hyatt, 10 Colo., 223; 15 Pac. Rep., 399. Illinois — Quincy v. O'Brien, 24 111. App., 591; Kinder v. Gillespie, 63 111., 88; Roberts v. Ogle, 30 111., 459; 83 Am. Dec, 201; Chamber- lain V. Litchfield, 56 111. App., 652. KentucJcy — McKee v. McKee, 8 B. Mon. (47 Ky.), 433. Louisiana — Third Municipality of New Orleans v. Blanc, 1 La. Ann., 385. Maryland — Cochrane v. Prost- burg, 81 Md., 54; 48 Am. St. Rep., 479; 27 L. R. A., 728; 31 Atl. Rep., 703. Massachusetts — Com. v. Bean, 14 Gray (Mass.), 52. Missouri — Spitler v. Young, 63 Mo., 42; Frazier v. Draper, 51 Mo. App., 163; Sherrell v. Murray, 49 Mo. App., 233; Vail v. K. C. C. & S. Ry., 28 Mo. App., 372. North Carolina — Jones v. Dun- can, 127 N. C, 118; 37 S. E. Rep., 135; Rose v. Hardie, 98 N. C, 44; 4 S. E. Rep., 41; State v. Tweedy, 115 N. C, 704; 20 S. E. Rep., 183. Tennessee — Knoxville v. King, 7 Lea (Tenn.), 441; Chattanooga v. Norman, 92 Tenn., 73; 20 S. W. Rep., 417. Texas — Heath v. Hall (Tex. Civ. App., 1894) 27 S. W. Rep., 160; Waco V. Powell, 32 Tex., 258. Virginia — Bolton v. Vellines, 94 Va., 393; 26 S. E. Rep., 847; 64 Am. St. Rep., 737. Wisconsin — Miles v. Chamber- lain, 17 Wis., 446. Contra. Wilson v. Beyers, 5 Wash., 303; 34 Am. St. Rep., 858; 32 Pac. Rep., 90. Swine may be included, though not specially enumerated in the charter. Heath v. Hall (Tex. Civ. App. 1894) 27 S. W. Rep., 160. Limits. An ordinance forbid- ding the running at large in such limits as may be designated by the council from time to time, is not effective until such limits are so designated. Lenz v. Sherrott, 26 Mich., 139. Feeding Cattle on highways may be made unlawful. Com. v. Bean, 14 Gray (80 Mass.), 52. Conflict With State Law. Pow- er to enact such ordinances as shall be deemed necessary for "the well regulation, interest, health, clean- liness convenience, and advan- tage," of the corporation, and -"to require and compel the abatement of nuisances," does not authorize an ordinance forbidding swine, cattle, horses, etc., from running at large, where the general law of the state permits such animals to run at large. Collins v. Hatch, 18 Ohio, 523; 51 Am. Dec, 465. Ordi- nance cannot conflict with state laws. § 16 supra, unless § 17 supra. See Ch. XV for municipal control of state offenses. Trespass. Charter authorized ordinance to restrain animals from running at large. Held such power does not authorize ordinance pro- 733 PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. [§469 pounding and selling of animals found r mining at large, ia vio- lation of ordinance provisions.^s § 469. Regulating dogs. Ordinances regulating dogs and re- quiring them to be registered and licensed, and at times muz- zled and prevented from going at large, are within the police powers usually conferred upon the local corporation. Such ordinances are authorized by virtue of general powers and the viding penalty for trespass com- mitted by herdsmen or stock own- ers in herding their cattle upon the lands of private owners, within the corporate limits. State v. Johnson, 41 Minn., Ill; 42 N. W. Rep., 786. By law applied to swine on pub- lic highways, and not to going at large in private places. Shepherd V. Hees, 12 Johns. (N. Y.), 433. Leaving Animals Unfastened. At common law one who leaves a horse loose and unattended In a street is responsible for damage done by it in running away. Shear- man & Redf. on Neg., Sec. 35; Wharton on Neg. Sees. 113, 915; Phillips V. Dewald, 79 Ga., 732; 7 S. B. Rep., 151. An ordinance in this respect merely declares and enforces a common law duty. Beck- er V. Schutte, 85 Mo. App., 57. Hence, the rule declared in San- ders V. Southern E. Ry. Co., 147 Mo., 411; 48 S. W. Rep., 855; and other like cases is not applicable. Bicycle is an animal, in law for- bidding use of sidewalk. Common- wealth V. Forest, 170 Pa. St., 40; 32 Atl. Rep., 652, reversing 3 Pa. Dist. Rep., 797. Driving swine through street. Under power to make all salutary and needful by-laws, a by-law pro- viding that no person shall permit any swine under his care to go upon any sidewalk, etc., held val- id. Com. V. Curtis, 9 Allen (91 Mass.), 266. May regulate driving horned cat- tle through streets. St. Louis v. Rothschild, 3 Mo. App., 563; Mun. Code of St. Louis, Sees. 1489, 1490. Forbidding "drove" of cattle to be driven through streets, held void for vagueness. McConville v. Jersey City, 39 N. J. L., 38. See § 20 supra. Power to regulate driving cattle through street does not give power to prohibit altogether. McConville v. Jersey City, 39 N. J. L., 38. 23 Impounding or Stock. Alabama — Folmar v. Curtis, 86 Ala., 354; 5 So. Rep., 678. Connecticut — Whitlock v. West, 26 Conn., 406. Indiana— Slessman v. Crozier, 80 Ind., 487. Iowa — Gosselink v. Campbell, 4 Iowa, 296. Kansas — Smith v. Emporia, 27 Kan., 528. Kentucky — South Covington, etc. St. R. Co. v. Berry, 93 Ky., 43; 18 S. W. Rep., 1026; 40 Am. St. Rep., 161; Armstrong v. Brown, 106 Ky. 81); 50 S. W. Rep., 17; Varden v. Mount, 78 Ky., 86; 39 Am. Rep., 208. Michigan — Grover v. Huckins, 26 Mich., 476. Missouri — McVey v. Barker, 92 Mo. App., 498. North Carolina — Whitfield v. Longest, 6 Ired. (N. C), 268; Hel- len V. Noe, 3 Ired. (25 N. C), 493. South Carolina — Crosby v. War- ren, 1 Rich. Law (S. C), 385. Tennessee — Moore v. State, 11 Lea. (79 Tenn.), 35. West Virginia — Burdett v. Allen, ;469] PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. 733 usual general welfare clause.^* Thus power to pi'otect life, health and property authorizes an ordinance requiring owners of dogs, under penalty, to muzzle them, or keep them on their own premises, and directing the marshal to kill all dogs found running at large.^^ An ordinance authorizing the mayor, when- ever hS may apprehend danger of the existence or spread of hydrophobia, to issue a proclamation requiring all owners of 35 W. Va., 347; 13 S. E. Rep., 1012. Wisconsin — Wilcox v. Hemming, 58 Wis., 144; 15 N. W. Rep., 435; 46 Am. Rep., 625. See ch. V. 2i Georgia — Griggs v. Macon, 103 Ga., 602; 30 S. E. Rep., 561; 68 Am. St. Rep., 134. Indiana — Mitchell v. Williams, 27 Ind., 62. Kansas — State ex rel v. Topeka, 36 Kan., 76; 12 Pac. Rep., 310; 59 Am. Rep., 529. Maryland— Hagersto-wn. v. Wit- mer, 86 Md., 293; 37 Atl. Rep., 965. Massachusetts — Com. v. Dow, 10 Met. (Mass.), 382; Com. v. Chase, 6 Cush. (60 Mass.), 248. Missouri — Carthage v. Rhodes, 101 Mo., 175; 9 L. R. A., 352; 14 S. W. Rep., 181. Tennessee — Memphis v. Cornell, 3 Shan. Cas. (Tenn.), 477. Vermont — Brown v. Carpenter, 26 Vt., 638; 62 Am. Dec, 603. Wisconsin — Carter v. Dow, 16 Wis., 299; Tenny v. Lenz, 16 Wis., 566. United States — Washington v. Lynch 5 Cranch C. C, 498; 29 Fed. Cas. No. 17231. Imposing license is exercise of police power. Ex parte Cooper, 3 Tex. App., 489. Registering and license, valid, s'tate V. Topeka, 36 Kan., 76; 59 Am. Rep., 529; 12 Pac. Rep., 310; Faribault v. Wilson, 34 Minn., 254; 25 N. W. Rep., 449. From time immemorial dogs have been considered as holding their lives at the will of the legis- lature, and properly fall within the police power of the several states. Sentell v. N. 0. & C. R. R. Co., 166 U. S., 698. "It has been customary always to make dogs the subject of special and peculiar regulations," per Graves, J. in Van Horn v. People, 46 Mich., 183, 185; 9, N. W. Rep., 246. As a police regulation, the owner may be required to muzzle his dog for the public safety. Washington V. Meigs, 8 District of Columbia (1 McArthur) 53; 29 Am. Rep., 578; Julienne v. Jackson, 69 Miss., 34; 10 So. Rep., 43; 30 Am. St. Rep., 526. Owner has only a qualified property in dogs. Hagerstown v. Witmer, 86 Md., 293; 37 Atl. Rep., 965. Ordinance making owner of dog liable to penalty if dog bite any one on street, held valid. Com. v. Steffee, 7 Bush. (Ky.), 161. Ferocious Dog, is a nuisance. Com. V. McClung, 3 Clark (Pa.), 413. A Dog is at Large when follow- ing its owner on the highway, if he is so far away that the owner cannot control it. Com. v. Dow, 10 Met. (Mass.), 382. 25 Walker v. Towle, 156 Ind., 639; 59 N. E. Rep., 20; Haller v. Sheridan, 27 Ind., 494. Destuoyi.no Dogs. Authority to regulate the keeping of dogs under the penalty of having them sum- marily destroyed without previous adjudication is within the. police 734 PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. [§470 dogs to sonfine or muzzle them is not invalid as a delegation of legislative power to an executive officer.^s § 470. Fire limits— Wooden buildings. Under the powers usually conferred, municipal corporations may prescribe fire limits and forbid the erection therein of wooden structures. The power of the state through its legislature to enact such po- lice regulations for the protection of property against fire is undoubted. Such building restrictions are sometimes con- tained in legislative acts, but more frequently the regulation of these matters is committed, either in express or general terms, to the local corporation in deference to the idea that it is more competent to deal with such questions than the legislature. Many cases hold that the power to make such regulations is in- herent in the municipal corporation and is implied from its mere creation. ^^ A few cases have denied that the power arises by implication.^^ But such power will be sustained under a general grant of authority or power contained in the general welfare clause, and additional power to protect the in- habitants and their property from fire, etc.^" Building regula- power. Per Gray, J. in Blair v. Forehand, 100 Mass., 136; 1 Am. Rep., 94, Massachusetts legislation examined. Morey v. Brown, 42 N. H., 373; Nehr v. State, 35 Neb., 638; 53 N. W. Rep., 589; Hubbard V. Preston, 90 Mich., 221; 51 N. W. Rep., 209; 15 L. R. A., 249; Jenkins V. Ballantyne, 8 Utah, 245; 30 Pac. Rep., 760. Dogs may be impounded, and if not redeemed, etc., may be de- stroyed. Hagerstown v. Witmer, 86 Md., 293; 37 Atl. Rep., 965. M Walker v. Towle, 156 Ind., 639; 59 N. E. Rep., 20. Licensing dogs, § 422 supra. 27 Kaufman v. Stein, 138 Ind., 49; 46 Am. St. Rep., 368; 37 N. E. Rep., 333; First Nat. Bk. v. Sarlls, 129 Ind., 201; 28 N. E. Rep., 434; Clark V. South Bend, 85 Ind., 276; 44 Am. Rep., 13. The cases which sustain this view rest upon "solid principle, for the rule has always been that a municipal corporation has the in- herent power to enact ordinances for the protection of the property of its citizens against fire." Per Elliott, J., in Bumgartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind., 575, 580; 50 Am. Rep., 830; 8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 353; Monroe v. Hoffman, 29 La. Ann., 651; 29 Am. Rep., 345. Compare State V. Schuchardt, 42 La. Ann., 49; 7 So. Rep., 67; Wadleigh v. Oilman, 12 Me., 403; 28 Am. Dec, 188; Brady v. Northwestern Insur- ance Co., 11 Mich., 425. 28 State V. Schuchardt, 42 La. Ann., 49; 7 So. Rep., 67; Hudson v. Thome, 7 Paige (N. Y.), 261; Pye V. Peterson, 45 Tex., 312, 315; 23 Am. Rep., 608. Compare Keokuk V. Scroggs, 39 Iowa, 447; Troy v. Winters, 2 Hun. (N. Y.), 63; 4 Thomp, & C, 256 ; Kneedler v. Nor- ristown, 100 Pa. St., 368, 371; 45 Am. Rep., 383. 20 Alabama — Canepa v. Birming- ham, 92 Ala., 358; 9 So. Rep., 180. § 470.1 PdDLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINaS. 735 tions must be established by ordinance, unless self-enforcing charter and statutory provisions exist.^^^ The ordinances upon this subject vary. Frequently questions arise respecting Georgia — Ford v. ThralkiU, 84 Ga., 169; 10 S. E. Rep., 600. Illinois — King v. Davenport, 98 111., 305; 38 Am. Rep., 89. Indiana — Bumgartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind., 575; 50 Am. Rep., 830. Maine — Wadleigh v. Oilman, 12 Me., 403; 28 Am. Dec, 188. Massachusetts — Salem v. Maynes, 123 Mass., 372. Minnesota — State v. Starkey, 49 Minn., 503; 52 N. W. Rep., 24. Mississippi — Alexander v. Green- ville, 54 Miss., 659. Oregon — Hubbard v. Medford, 20 Oregon, 315; 25 Pac. Rep., 640. Washington — Olympla v. Mann, 1 Wash. St., 389; .25 Pac. Rep., 337; Baxter v. Seattle,. 3 Wash. St., 352; 28 Pac. Rep., 537. Generally cities may prevent wooden buildings within certain limits. Troy v. Winters, 4 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.), 256; 2 Hun. (N. Y.), 63. Ordinarily city must have char- ter power. Hudson v. Thorne, 7 Paige (N. Y.), 261. Charter power "to make regula- tions for guarding against damage or damages from fires," authorizes ordinance establishing fire limits, etc. Charleston v. Reed, 27 W. Va., 681; 55 Am. Rep., 336. Pennsylvania boroughs, as a rule, have no power to pass ordi- nances forbidding erection of frame buildings. Hence, where no special circumstances are disclosed, show- ing the advantage or necessity of such an ordinance, it would be held void. Kneedler v. Norristown, 100 Pa. St., 368; 45 Am. Rep., 383. Charter power limited. Keokuk V. Scroggs, 39 Iowa, 447. Act of legislature expressly au- thorized, hence ordinance valid. Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates (Pa.), 493. (Subject fully dis- cussed.) Frame building is not a nuisance per se. Wadleigh v. Gilman, 12 Me., 403, 406; 28 Am. Dec, 188; Klingler v. Bickel, 117 Pa. St., 326, 339, 10 Cent. Rep., 381; 11 Atl. Rep., 555. The legislature may forbid erec- tion of wooden buildings in limits and may confer power to prevent on municipal corporations. Kling- ler V. Bickel, 117 Pa. St., 326; 10 Cent. Rep., 381; 11 Atl. Rep., 555; Com. V. Tewksbury, 11 Met. (Mass.), 55; Douglass v. Com., 2 Rawle (Pa.), 262. Held, charter did not authorize borough to establish. Pratt v. Litchfield, 62 Conn., 112; 25 Atl. Rep., 461. ' Held suflScient charter power. McCloskey V. Kreling, 76 Cal., 511 18 Pac. Rep., 433. Ex parte Fiske, 72 Cal., 125; 13 Pac. Rep., 310 Hine v. New Haven, 40 Conn., 478 State V. O'Neil, 49 La. Ann., 1171 22 So. Rep., 352; Easton v. Covey 74 Md., 262; 22 Atl. Rep., 266 Knoxville v. Bird, 12 Lea (Tenn.), 121; 47 Am. Rep., 326. 2»H Chicago V. Ferris Wheel Co., 58 111. Apr., 625. Where the ordinance fixing fire limits Is to be passed on petition of certain property owners, such peti- tion is a necessary prerequisite, to validate the ordinance. Des Moines 736 PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. [§47l the extent of the power, what constitute wooden buildings and structures, repairs, additions, new buildings, material altera- tions, suiSeient fire escapes, etc., and their solution will depend upon the proper construction of the charter power and the lan- guage of the particular regulations, as will appear from the nu- merous cases set out in the notes.^'' § 471. Same— Building regulations— Permits. Where the charter power is ample, the local corporation may require a certificate or permit, issued by the proper official as a condition precedent to the erection of new buildings or the material alter- V. Gilchrist, 67 Iowa, 210; 25 N. W. Rep., 136; 56 Am. Rep., 341. 30 Fire limits may be established. McCloskey v. Kreling, 76 Cal., 511; 18 Pao. Rep., 433. "Fire district," and "Are limits." Des Moines v. Gilchrist, 67 Iowa, 210; 56 Am. Rep., 341; 25 N. W. Rep., 136. Ordinance held operative on building begun. Salem v. Maynes, 123 Mass,, 372, and building partly burned. State v. Johnson, 114 N. C, 846; 19 S. B. Rep., 599. Conditions on construction may be imposed. Campion v. Buffalo, 8 N. Y. St. Rep., 329. Ordinance held too broad under power granted. Marion v. Robert- son, 84 111. App., 113; Newton v. Belger, 143 Mass., 598; 10 N. B. Rep., 464. Fire Escapes. Schmalzried v. White, 97 Tenn., 36; 36 S. W. Rep., 393; 32 L. R. A., 782; De Ginther v. New Jersey Home, etc., 58 N. J. L,, 354; 33 Atl. Rep., 968; New York Fire Dept. v. Chapman, 10 Daly (N. Y.), 377. Entrance on street. Armstrong V. Building Inspectors, 4 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep., 477. Building Districts, discrimina- tion. Singer v. Philadelphia, 112 Pa. St., 410; 4 Atl. Rep., 28. Wooden building — one partly of brick and wood held not to be. Sewart v. Com., 10 Watts (Pa.), 306. Compare N. Y. Fire Dept. v. Buftum, 2 B. D. Smith (N. Y.), 511. "Wooden" and "F^ame" building, meaning of words held to be same. Ward V. Murphysboro, 77 111. App., 549, 552. Width. , Philadelphia v. Miche- ner. 10 Phila. (Pa.), 30. Walls, thickness. Hubbard v. Paterson, 45 N. J. L., 310; 46 Am. Rep., 772. Iron Building. Charleston v. Reed, 27 W. Va., 681; 55 Am. Rep., 336. Fire Walls; Langdon v. New York Fire Dept., 17 Wend. (N. Y.), 234. Roof supported by posts held not to be a building. Zimmerman v. Saam, 6 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep., 318. Rebuilding without consent. Wa- tertown v. Sawyer, 109 Mass., 320. Height. People v. D'Oench, 111 N. Y., 359; 18 N. E. Rep., 862; Cleveland v. Lenze, 27 Ohio St., 383. Distinct buildings. Townsend v. Hoadley, 12Conn., 541; Langdon v. New York Fire Dept., 17 Wend. (N. Y.), 234. Metallic Leaders on roof for conducting water. New York Fire Dept. V. Wendell, 13 Daly (N. Y.), 427. §471] PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. 737 ations or additions to buildings already erected; but whether such authority exists and the manner of its exercise depend upon the provisions of the charter and legislative acts applic- able. "Where the charter power is sufficient, an ordinance re- Vlolation of terms of construc- tion. Campion v. Buffalo, 8 N. Y. St. Rep., 329. Dwelling House. New Yorh: Fire Dept. V. Buhler, 1 Daly (N. Y.), 391. Hotel held not to be dwelling house as used in ordinance as to height of buildings. People v. D'Oench, 111 N. Y., 359; 18 N. E. Rep., 862. Repairs. State v. Schuehardt, 42 La. Ann., 49; 7 So. Rep., 67; Reg. V. Howard, 4 Ont. Rep., 377 ; 4 Am. & Bng. Corp. Cas., 377. Erection. Ordinance construed as relating to new erections. Buf- falo V. Chadeayne, 134 N. Y., 163; 31 N. E. Rep., 443; Reg. v. Howard, 4 Ont. Rep., 377; 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 377. When repairs and alterations do not constitute erection. Booth v. State, 4 Conn., 65; Daggett v. State, 4 Conn., 60; 10 Am. Dec, 100; Stamford v. Studwell, 60 Conn., 85; 21 Atl. Rep., 101. Additions as erections — New buildings. Montgomery v. Louis- ville & N. R. Co., 84 Ala., 127; 4 So. Rep., 626; Tuttle v. State, 4 Conn., 68; Delione v. Long Branch, 55 N. J. L., 108; 25 Atl. Rep., 274; Combs v. Lippincott, 35 N. J. L., 481, 483; Hancock's Appeal, 115 Pa. St., 1; 7 Atl. Rep, 773; Appeal of Brlce, 89 Pa, St.. 85; Harmon v. Cummings, 43 Pa. St., 322; Light- foot V. Krug, 35 Pa. St., 348; Pretz's Appeal, 35 Pa. St., 349; Nelson v. Campbell, 28 Pa. St.. 156; Arm- strong V. Ware, 20 Pa. St., 519; Carroll v. Lynchburg, 84 Va., 803; 6 S. B. Rep., 133. Erection. Removal of a wooden building within the forbidden dis- trict, held to constitute an erec- tion. Wadleigh v. Gilman, 12 Me., 403; 28 Am. Dec, 188. Removal, not an erection. Brown V. Hunn, 27 Conn., 332; 71 Am. Dec, 71. "Rebuilding," what is. First Nat. Bk. V. Sarlls, 129 Ind., 201; 13 l. R. A., 481; 28 Am. St. Rep., 185; 28 N. E. Rep., 434. "Trussed roof." Diamond State Iron Co. V. Giles, 7 Houst. (Del.), 453; 8 Atl. Rep., 368; 7 Houst. (Del), 557; 11 Atl. Rep., 189. Application to buildings already erected. Glenn v. Baltimore, 5 Gili & J. (Md.), 424. Building Line — ornamental structure. Garrett v. Janes, 65 Md., 260; 3 Atl. Rep., 597. Material Alterations. People V. Marley, 2 Wheeler Cr. Cas. (N. Y.), 74; Douglass v. Com., 2 Rawlc (Pa.), 262. Hi-jfAiK.s as affect insurance. Cor- des V. Miller, 39 Mich., 681; 33 Am, Rep., 430; Brady v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 11 Mich., 425. Removal of Wooden Buildings. City may prevent removal of wood- en buildings into fire limits. Kauf- man V. Stein, 138 Ind., 49; 37 N. E. Rep., 333; 46 Am. St. Rep., 368. Buildings erected in violation of fire ordinances may be removed by city without resort to judicial pro- ceedings, since such power is mere' , ly a police regulation. Arkansas — McKibbin v. Ft. Smith, 35 Ark., 352. Connecticut — Hine v. New Ha ven, 40 Conn., 478. 47 738 PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. [§471 (luiring a pei'mit in order to alter or repair wooden buildings within the fire limits will be held constitutional.''^ Under the St. Louis charter and ordinances the eommmissioner of public buildings has not the power to restrict the use of a building for which a permit to erect has been issued ; the construction of Illinois — King v. Chicago, etc., Removal of building partly de- R. R. Co., 98 111., 376, 385; King v. stroyed by fire. When notice to Davenport, 98 111., 305; 38 Am. owner required. Louisville v. Web- Rep., 89. ster, 108 111., 414; 5 Am. & Eng. Indiana — Baumgartner v. Hasty, Corp. Gas., 367. 10 Ind., 575; 50 Am. Rep., 830; 8 Revs^akd foe Incendiary. In ab- Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 353. sence of express authority city Iowa — Lemmon v. Guthrie Cen- cannot offer reward for detection ter, 113 Iowa, 36; 84 N. W. Rep., of incendiaries. Crofut v. Dan- 986. bury, 65 Conn., 294; 32 Atl. Rep., Missotiri — Eichenlaub v. St. Jo- 365; see sec. 74, sapro. seph, 113 Mo., 395; 21 S. W. Rep., ^^ Ex parte Piske, 72 Cal., 125; 8. Compare Allison v. Richmond, 13 Pac. Rep., 310; Hine v. New Ha- 51 Mo. App., 133. ven, 40 Conn., 478; Welch v. Hotch- Pennsylvania — Klinger v. Bick- kiss, 39 Conn., 140; 12 Am. Rep.,' el, 117 Pa. St., 326; 11 Atl. Rep., 383; Easton v. Covey, 74 Md., 262; 555; Aronheimer v. Stokley, 11 22 Atl. Rep., 266, mowdomus denied Phila. (Pa.), 283. to compel issuance of permit, as Utah — Eureka City v. Wilson, 15 commissioners had discretion. Utah, 67; 48 Pac. Rep., 150. Olympia v. Mann, 1 Wash., 389; 25 Washington — Baxter v. Seattle, Pac. Rep., 337; 32 Am. & Eng. Corp. 3 Wash., 352; 28 Pac. Rep., 537. Cas., 418; Hasty v. Huntington, 105 The agents of the corporation, Ind., 540; 5 N. E. Rep., 559. removingwithout judicial investiga- Certificate to be issued by city tion wooden buildings under an or- engineer, after approval of plans dinance, must, to exonerate them- and specifications. Ordinance held selves from liability, show first, void, under charter of New Orleans, that the building was erected or which made it a misdemeanor to permitted to remain in violation erect building without such certifi- of law, and, second, that in tear- cate. State v. Zurich, 49 La. Ann., ing down the same reasonable care 447; 21 So. Rep., 977. was taken to preserve the materi- The ordinance requiring permit als. Eichenlaub v. St. Joseph, 113 must provide a uniform rule. State Mo., 395; 21 S. W. Rep., 8. v. Tennant, 110 N. C, 609; 28 Am. Injunction to restrain the corpo- St. Rep., 715; 15 L. R. A., 423; 14 ration from removing will lie, S. E. Rep., 387. when. Lemmon v. Guthrie Center, Ordinance requiring permit to 113 Iowa, 36; 84 N. W. Rep., 986. repair, held void. Newton v. Bel- Order to remove and notice to ger, 143 Mass., 598; 3 New Eng. owner under particular provisions Rep., 722; 10 N. E. Rep., 464. construed. Thompson v. Evans, 49 Permit to remove wooden build- 111. App., 289; Ward v. Murphys- ing. State v. Kearney, 25 Neb., boro, 77 111. App., 549. 262; 41 N. W. Rep., 175; 13 Am. St. 14713 PUBLIC SAPETY-STREETS—BUILDINGS. m a building is one thing and its use after construction is an en- tirely different matter.*^ Charter power to regulate the grant- ing of permits does not authorize the delegation to an officer or committee of power to make restrictions and regulations."" The necessity of reasonable regulations respecting the con- struction of buildings in crowded centers has been long recog- nized. Restrictions as to height,** use of sidewalks and streets for building material and reasonable precautions to prevent injury to those properly on the public ways, have been sus- tained. Thus charter power "to control and regulate the con- struction of buildings, " " toi regulate the manner of using the streets and pavements," etc., confers authority to enact an or- dinance providing that "any owner or contractor who shall hereafter build or cause to be built" any building abutting on a public sidewalk shall, after the completion of the first story, cause a roofed passageway to be built in front of the building upon the sidewalk, under penalty of fine or imprisonment. Such ordinance is reasonable.*^ Ordinances regulating steam boilers, Rep., 493; Willow Springs v. Wit- haupt, 61 Mo. App., 275. Ordinance conferring arbitrary and despotic power in this respect, held void. State v. Tenant, 110 N. C, 609; 14 S. E. Rep., 387; 28 Am. St. Rep., 715; 15 L. R. A., 423. 32 St. Louis V. Dorr, 136 Mo., 370, 375; 37 S. W. Rep., 1108; 145 Mo., 466; 41 S. W. Rep., 1094; 46 S. W. Rep., 976. If permit is illegal, no rights are acquired thereunder. Brooklyn v. Purey, 9 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.), 193; 30 N. Y. Suppl., 349. After a permit to erect has been issued and the erection of the build- ing begun thereunder, power to re- scind, denied. Buffalo v. Chad- eayne, 134 N. Y., 163; 31 N. E. Rep., 443. 33 Eureka City v. Wilson, 15 Utah, 67; 62 Am. St. Rep., 904; 48 Pac. Rep., 150; Troy v. Winters, 4 Thomp. &C. (N. Y.),256. Reasonable conditions in permit are valid. Harper v. Jonesboro, 94 Ga., 801; 22 S. B. Rep., 139. 3* The New York Legislative act operative in New York city, requir- ing that the height of all dwelling houses and of all other houses, used or intended to be used as dwellings for more than one family r * * shall not exceed * * * 80 feet upon all streets or avenues exceed- ing sixty feet in width, held not to apply to hotels, but related mainly to tenements and apartment houses. People v. D'Oench, 111 N. Y., 359; 18 N. B. Rep., 862. 35 Damages resulting to pedestri- an properly upon the sidewalk be- cause of failure to observe the reg- ulation creates a cause of action. Smith V. Milwaukee Builders' & Traders' Exch., 91 Wis., 360, 367; 64 N. W. Rep., 1041; 51 Am. St. Rep., 912. As to ordinance creating civil rights and liabilities, see sections 40 to 42, supr (40 PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. [§472 elevators, hoistways, hatchways, etc., in buildings are clearly within the police power.^^ § 472. Gunpowder and explosives— Blasting. The storage of oil, combustibles and explosives, such as gunpowder, giant powder, nitroglycerin, dynamite, blasting powder, etc., within the corporate limits, being dangerous, its regulation falls prop- erly within the police power.sT The removal of powder maga- zines beyond the municipal boundaries may be required. In a 36 Elevators, hatchways, etc. New York V. Williams, 15 N. Y., 502; 4 D. B. Smith (N. Y.), 516; Hirst v. Ringen Real Estate Co., 169 Mo., 194; 69 S. W. Rep., 368; Wendler V. People's House Pur. Co., 165 Mo., 527; 65 S. W. Rep., 737. Steam Boii^ers — requiring engi- neers to be licensed, etc., valid. St. Louis V. Meyrose Lamp Co., 139 Mo,. 560; 41 S. W. Rep., 244; 61 Am. St. Rep., 474. Compare State v. Robertson, 45 La. Ann., 954; 40 Am. St. Rep., 272; 13 So. Rep., 164, which holds that the general welfare clause does not authorize an ordinance providing for the inspection of steam boilers, tanks, pipes, apparatus, etc., creat- ing a board of examiners and in- spectors of engineers in charge of the same, etc. The case alludes to the distinction between regulations of this character and the exercise of the police power, to preserve the public health. Use of steam boilers in a popu- lous community is not a nuisance per se. Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md., 217; 33 Am. Rep., 239; Rhodes V. Dunbar, 57 Pa. St., 274; 98 Am. Dec, 221. Steam Boat. Spark catcher and screens, etc., attached to smoke stack — Regulation held unreasona- ble. Atkinson v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 60 Wis., 141; 50 Am. Rep., 352; 18 N. W. Rep., 764. 37 Richmond v. Dudly, 129 Ind., 112; 28 N. E. Rep., 312; Standard Oil Co. v. Danville, 199 111., 50; 64 N. B. Rep., 1110; Laflin & Rand Powder Co. v. Tearney, 131 111., 322; 19 Am. St. Rep., 34; 7 L. R. A., 262; 23 N. E. Rep., 389; Wright v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 7 111. App., 438; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. New Iberia, 47 La. Ann., 863; 17 So. Rep., 343; Reg. v. Listers, 3 Jur. (N. S.), 572; 26 L. J. M. C. (N. S.), 196. Under general power, city may regulate the manner of keeping. "The ordinance regulating the keeping of gun powder in the city is, in our judgment, necessary for the security and welfare of the in- habitants in the city. It is a san- itary police regulation for the ben- efit and safety of the persons and property within the limits thereof, and is fully authorized by the act of incorporation." Williams v. Ati- gusta, 4 Ga., 509, 512. Powder magazine in a populous city held to be a nuisance per se. Cheatham v. Shearon, 1 Swan (Tenn.), 213; 55 Am. Dec, 734. Powder magazine not nuisance per se. Dumesnil v. Dupont, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.), 800; 68 Am. Dec, 750. Question fully considered in Kin- ney V. Koopman, 116 Ala., 310; 22 So. Rep., 593; 37 L. R. A., 497. Whether nuisance is one of fact. Heeg V. Licht, 80 N. Y., 579; 36 Am. Rep., 654. Transportation of giant powder §472] PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. 741 Virginia case it was held that the judgment of the municipal authorities as expressed in an ordinance requiring such removal was conclusive upon the courts.^* Power to maintain the inter- nal police and to ' ' make all such salutary and needful by-laws as towns by the laws of this commonwealth have power to make," was held in Massachusetts to confer authority to pass an ordinance forbidding, under penalty, the blasting of rock as a nuisance. Walker v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Co., 71 Iowa, 658; 33 N. W. Rep., 224. Negligent keeping is a nuisance per se. Myers v. Malcolm, 6 Hill (N. Y.),- 292; 41 Am. Dec, 744; People V. Sands, 1 Johns (N. Y.), ■ 78; 3 Am. Dec, 296; Bradley v. People, 56 Barb. (N. Y.), 72. Nuisance per se to keep in large quantities near dwelling houses. McAndrews v. Collerd, 42 N. J. L., 189; 36 Am. Rep., 508. Powder magazines declared pub- lic nuisance by statute in Illinois. Chicago, W. & V. Coal Co. v. Glass, 34 111. App., 364. Mill for manufacturing gunpow- der and other explosives, held a nuisance. Wilson v. Phoenix Pow- der Mfg. Co., 40 W. Va., 413; 21 S. E. Rep., 1035. Statute regulating the keeping is constitutional. Foote v. New York Fire Dept., 5 Hill (N. Y.), 99. Municipal control as against state, considered. Harley v. Heyle, 2 Cal., 477. Powder magazine maintained in violation of an ordinance is a nuis- ance. Hazard Powder Co. v. Vol- ger, 58 Fed. Rep., 152; 12 U. S. App., 665. Ordinance declaring forfeiture of gunpowder kept in violation there- of, without hearing, void. Cotter V. Doty, 5 Ohio, 393. Express power to declare for- feiture required. § 170 et seq., su- pra. When storing may be abated as a nuisance. Wier's Appeal, 74 Pa. St., 230. Keeping in large quantities in crowded population is nuisance per se. Rex v. Taylor, 2 Strange, 1167. An indictable offense in England. Crowder v. Tinkler, 19 Ves. Jr., 617; 1 Russell on Crimes, 321. Straw. Ordinance may forbid the keeping of more than five tons of straw on one block, unless pro- tected by fireproof enclosure. Clark V. South Bend, 85 Ind., 276; 44 Am. Rep., 13. PETROLEUM — Regulations of board of health. Metropolitan Board of Health v. Schmades, 3 Daly (N. Y.), 282. Explosion op Giant Powder kept by a corporation within the city limits renders corporation lia- ble for damages caused thereby. Cameron v. Kenyon-Connell C. Co., 22 Mont, 312; 44 L. R. A., 508; 56 Pac. Rep., 358. =8 An ordinance requiring the re- moval of powder magazines in a city, the sites whereof were sold by the city council to vendees for the purpose of erecting theron such magazines does not impair the obli- gation of a previous valid contract with that council and does not take private property without compensa- tion. It is constitutional and a valid exercise of the police power. Davenport v. Richmond, 81 Va., 636; 59 Am. Rep., 694. iu PUBLIC S4P1TY--STREETS— BUILDINGS, imt with gunpowder within the town limits without written consent from the board of aldermen.^'* § 473. Power to regulate operation of locomotives, trains and cars in streets. Reasonable police regulations concerning the operation of locomotives, trains and cars in the public ways, in the interest of public safety, comfort and convenience, are sanctioned on the ground of necessity. Corporations and indi- viduals maintaining tracks and running cars in the public thor- oughfares may be compelled to do whatever is, within reason, required, to promote these objects. ""^ The power to enact and enforce salutary lavps for these purposes is vested in the sover- eign, and the people, through their legally constituted au- thorities, may exercise it at any time for the public good. The power is continuing and no grant that can be made legally will or can destroy it.*i Therefore, the municipal corporation in granting franchises for the use of streets may not divest itself of the authority of control and regulation.*^ It is true, under 39 Com. V. Parks, 155 Mass., 531; 30 N. E, Rep., 174, per Holmes, J. - ■40 San Jose v. San Jose & S. C. R. Co., 53 Cal., 475; Louisville City R. Co. V. Louisville, 8 Bush. (Ky.), 415, 417; St. Louis v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 89 Mo., 44; IS. W. Rep., 305; 58 Am. Rep., 82; 14 Mo. App., 221; Hudson River Tel. Co. V. Watervliet Turnpike, etc., Co., 135 N. Y., 393; 31 Am. St. Rep., 838; 32 N. E. Rep., 148; Brooklyn Steam Transit Co. v. Brooklyn, 78 N. Y., 524; Frankford, etc., P. R. Co. V. Philadelphia, 58 Pa. St., 119; 98 Am. Dec, 242. *i St. Louis & S. P. Ry. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S., 649, 657. ■12 Glasgow V. St. Louis, 87 Mo., 678; 15 Mo. App., 112; Lockwood v. Wabash R. R., 122 Mo., 86; 26 S. W. Rep., 698; Sherlock v. K. C. Belt Ry. Co., 142 Mo., 172; 43 S. W. Rep., 629 ; State ex rel. v. Mur- phy, 134 Mo., 548; 31 S. W. Rep., 784; 34 S. W. Rep., 51; 35 S. W. Rep., 1132; Belcher Sugar Refining Co, v. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co., 101 Mo., 192; 13 S. "W. Rep., 822; 82 Mo., 121, 126; Matthews v. Alex- andria, 68 Mo., 115; Western Sav- ings Fund Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St., 175, 182; Presbyterian Church V. New York, 5 Cow. (N. Y.), 538, 540, 542; In re Opening of First Street, 66 Mich.,, 42; 33 N. W. Rep., 15; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. V. Riblet, 66 Pa. St., 164, 168; Boyd V. Alabama, 94 U. S., 645. The city has power to make the regulations apply to all street rail- ways, regardless of the motive pow- er, subject to the limitation that such power must be reasonably ex- ercised. Fath. V. Tower Grove & Lafayette R. R. Co., 105 Mo., 537; 16 S. W. Rep., 913; Lamb v. S. L. C. & W. Ry. Co., 33 Mo. App., 489. The ordinance of the City of St. Louis regulating the running of street cars within the limits of the city imposes certain duties on the companies, and the violation of these duties is negligence. Liddy V. St. Louis Ry. Co., 40 Mo., 506. The city may subject railroad §474] PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. 743 our constitutional system, that, neither vested rights can be destroyed, nor the obligation of contracts impaired.*^ But pub- lic necessity may, legally, limit or control these fundamental rights, only, however, in the reasonable exercise of the sover- eign police power.** The police power to regulate comprehends all necessary and convenient regulations designed to protect life or limb, or to promote the comfort of the public in the use of the streets and thoroughfares. Not only does such power exist, but the duty to exercise it is imposed as a solemn obliga- tion upon the municipal authorities.*^ § 474. Same— Enumeration of regulations. Within the po- companies to reasonable regula- tions as to running oars. Spring- field Ry. Co., V. Springfield, 85 Mo., 674. Where a street railway adopts and publishes reasonable regula- tions as to where its cars shall stop for leaving and taking on passen- gers, the latter are bound to take notice of such regulations. Jack- son V. Grand Ave. Ry. Co., 118 Mo., 199; 24 S. W. Rep., 192. See Sira v. Wabash Ry. Co., 115 Mo., 127.; 21 S. W. Rep., 905; Alcorn v. C. & A. Ry. Co., 108 Mo., 81; 18 S. W. Rep., 188. A city ordinance entitled "public carriers" may properly provide for the regulation of street railway cars. Senn v. Southern Electric Ry. Co., 124 Mo., 621; 28 S. W. Rep., 66. Where power to regulate is vest- ed In the state, without express grant, ordinances regulating are unauthorized. Brooklyn Crosstown R. R. V. Brooklyn, 37 Hun. (N. Y.), 413; Ravenna v. Pennsylvania Co., 45 Ohio St., 118; 12 N. E. Rep., 445. 43 § 232 et seq., supra. ** § 430 et seq., supra. *3 The power to regulate the use of streets falls under the head of the police power, and they belong emphatically to that class of ob- jects which demand the application of the maxim, salus populi supre- ma est lex and they are to be at- tained and provided for by such ap- propriate means as the discretion of those who officially represent and act for the municipal corpora- tion may devise from time to time. - In the language of the Supreme Court of the United States that dis- cretion may no more be bargained away than the power itself. Beer Co. V. Massachusetts, 97 U. S., 25, 33. "If one portion of the legislative power may be sold, another may be disposed of in the same way. If the power to raise revenue may be sold to-day, the power to punish for crimes may be sold to-morrow, and the power to pass laws for the re- dress of civil rights may be sold the next day. If the legislative power may be sold, the executive and judicial powers may be put in the market with equal propriety. The result to which the principle must inevitably lead proves that the sale of any portion of govern- mental powers is utterly inconsist- ent with the nature of our free in- stitutions, and totally at variance with the object and general pro- visions of the constitution of the state. * * * It is a question of constitutional authority, and not a case of confidence in the fidelity 744 PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. [§474 lice power, reasonable ordinances may be passed and enforced regulating the rate of speed at which cars propelled by steam,*^ of the legislature." Mott v. Penn. Bluedorn v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 108 R. R. Co., 30 Pa. St., 9, 27, 28. Mo., 439; 18 S. W. Rep., 1103; 32 *n Speed of Trains. Am. St. Rep., 615. Georgia — ^Western & A, R. Co. v. The authority of a city, under Young, 81 Ga., 397; 7 S. E. Rep., its police power, to regulate the 912; 12 Am. St. Rep., 320. speed of railroad trains within its Illinois — Lake View v. Tate, 130 limits, is not restricted to its 111., 247; 22 N. B. Rep., 791; Chica- streets and crossings. Prewitt v. go, B. & Q. R. Co. V. Haggerty, 67 M., K. & T. Ry. Co., 134 Mo., 615; 111., 113; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. 31 S. W. Rep., 667; Bluedorn v. Mo. Probeek, 33 111. App., 145. Pac. Ry. Co., 108 Mo., 439; 18 S. ZntZiawa— Cleveland, C, C. & I. W. Rep., 1103; 32 Am. St. Rep., Ry. Co. V. Harrington, 131 Ind., 615. 426; 30 N. E. Rep., 37; Whitson v. The ordinance will apply to the Franklin, 34 Ind., 392. private switch yards of a railroad Iowa — Meyers v. Chicago, etc., R. company within the city limits. Co., 57 Iowa, 555; 42 Am. Rep., 50; Grube v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 98 Mo., 10 N. W. Rep., 896. 330; 11 S. W. Rep., 736; 14 Am. St. Louisiana — Denied. State v. Mil- Rep., 645. Or to the uninclosed ler, 41 La. Ann., 53; 5 So. Rep., private property of the company. 258; 7 So. Rep., 672. Merz v. Mo: Pac. Ry. Co., 88 Mc, Massachusetts — Com. v. Worces- 672; 14 Mo. App., 459. ler, 3 Pick. (Mass.), 462. That a railroad company is au- Michigan — People v. Little, 86 thorized by the legislature to lay Mich., 125; 48 N. W. Rep., 693. its tracks along the streets of a city Missouri — Kempinger v. St. Louis does not prevent such city from & Iron Mountain Ry. Co., 3 Mo. limiting the rate of speed of the App., 581; Merz v. Mo. Pa.Ry. Co., trains run thereon. Neier v. Mo. 88 Mo., 672: 14 Mo. App., 459; Pre- Pac. Ry. Co., 12 Mo. App., 25. Witt v. M., K. & T. Ry. Co., 134 Mo., The reasonableness of an ordi- 615; 36 S. W. Rep., 667; Jackson v. nance regulating the speed of K. C, F. S. & M. R. R., 157 Mo., 621 ; trains is a question for the court 58 S. W. Rep., 32; Moore v. St. upon all the facts, and not for the Louis Transit Co., 95 Mo. App., jury. Zumault v. K. C. & I. Air 728; 75 S. W. Rep., 699. Line, 71 Mo. App., 670. See Glen- New York — Buffalo v. New York, ville v. St. Louis Ry. Co., 51 Mo. etc., R. Co., 6 Misc. (N. Y.), 630. App., 629; Liddy v. St. Louis Ry. South Carolina — Boggero v. Co., 40 Mo., 506; Hickman v. U. D. Southern Ry. Co., 64 S. C, 104, Ry. Co., 47 Mo. App., 65. 114; 41 S. E. Rep., 819. The regulation of the speed of The delegation to a city of the trains is subject to judicial review power to regulate the speed of as to the oppressiveness or unrea- trains need not be in express terms, sonableness of the ordinance. Zu- but may be implied from the power mault v. K. C. & I. Air Line, 71 Mo. of the city to abate nuisances and App., 670. provide for the general welfare. The running of a train in excess §474] PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. 745 and street cars, whose motive power may be horse, mule, elec- of the speed prescribed by ordi- nance is negligence per se. Thomp- son on Negligence, 588; Dahlstrom V. St. L., I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 108 Mo., 525; 18 S. W. Rep., 919; Schlereth V. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 115 Mo., 87; 21 S. W. Rep., 1110; Keim v. Union Ry. & Transit Co., 90 Mo., 314; 2 S. W. Rep., 427; Kellny v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 101 Mo., 67; 13 S. W. Rep., 806. That, under a franchise, the rail- road company has laid its tracks with so short a curve and at such a grade that it cannot conveniently move trains at a speed fixed by or- dinance, is no defense to an action for damages to an individual, occa- sioned by a greater rate of speed. Neier v. Mo. Pac. Ry Co., 12 Mo. App., 25. Running trains at a speed in vio- lation of law is competent evidence to support a charge of negligence. Robertson v. W., St. L. & P. R. R., 84 Mo., 119; Lynn v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. R. Co., 75 Mo., 167; Good- win V. C, R. I. & P. R. R. Co., 75 Mo., 73. Other regulations, Fath V. T. G. & L. Ry. Co., 105 Mo., 537; 16 S. W. Rep., 913. It does not require an expert to testify as to how fast a car is run- ning. Any one who sees a car run- ning may testify as to its speed. Walsh V. Mo. Pac. Ry Co., 102 Mo., 582; 14 S. W. Rep., 873; 15 S. W. Rep., 757; Covell v. Wabash Ry. Co., 82 Mo. App., 180, 187. Street car companies must have skillful servants in charge of their cars. Olsen v. Citizens' Ry. Co., 152 Mo., 426; 54 S. W. Rep., 470. An ordinance of Kansas City limit- ing the speed at which trains may run to six miles per hour through agricultural lands where there are no streets and little travel, is un- reasonable, in restraint of suburb- an travel, and cannot be upheld. Zumault v. K. C. & I. A. L. Ry. Co., 71 Mo. App., 670. An ordinance of St. Louis limit- ing the rate of speed at which trains may run to six miles per hour is not void as being in conflict with the franchise of the Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. Neier v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 12 Mo. App., 25. Such ordinance is not unconstitutional. Merz v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 88 Mo., 672. An ordinance limiting the speed of trains to six miles per hour is both reasonable and humane. Gra- tiot V. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 116 Mo., 450; 21 S. W. Rep., 1094. An ordinance of Kansas City lim- iting the speed of trains from Grand Central Depot to the eastern city limits to six miles per hour was held unreasonable and oppress- ive. Zumault V. K. C. & 1. Air Line, 71 Mo. App., 670. The restriction of the speed at which trains may run to four miles per hour is unreasonable and void. White V. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co., 44 Mo. App., 540. Unreasonableness must be clear before the court will declare the ordinance void. Four miles per hour within limits of St. Paul held reasonable. Knoblach v. C, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 31 Minn., 402; 18 N. W. Rep., 106. Where the right of way is fenced on both sides, and the locality is sparsely settled, and no platted streets were opened across the track, an ordinance limiting the rate of speed to six miles per hour was held unreasonable as applied to that part of the road. Burg v. C, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 90 Iowa, 106; 57 74:6 PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. [§474 tricity or cable, -may be run within the corporate limits ;*' pro- hibiting trains and cars from obstructing streets ;*8 forbidding til such prior ordinance or the con- flicting parts thereof are repealed by express terms." The court says that a special ordinance in such case is a part of the charter or franchise of the company and is to be regarded as an exception to the city charter and general ordi- nances. Ruschenberg v. Southern Electric Ry. Co., 161 Mo., 70; 61 S. W. Rep., 626. 48 Obstructing Street. The city has the right to limit the time that railway trains may block a street. Burger v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 112 Mo., 238; 20 S. W. Rep., 439. For ordi- nance regulations as to obstructing streets, etc., see Municipal Code ot St. Louis, sec. 1753. Ordinance forbidding trains to stand at street crossing more than one minute, except in case of acci- dent, held valid. McCoy v. Phila- delphia, W. & B. R. Co., 5 HouBt. (Del.). 599. Ordinance providing a two-min- ute limit, sustained. "The necessity for some such reg- ulation in a city, within whose lim- its numerous railroad tracks are laid, running at grade through and across its streets, is too obvious to be questioned. If not kept within reasonable limits by some compe- tent controlling authority, these street obstructions by railroad trains would be sure to multiply and to become, in the end, an intol- erable annoyance to the inhabit- ants.'' State (Long) v. Jersey City, 37 N. J. L., 348, 352. Total prohibition sustained. "It does not follow that the prohibition of the ordinance was unreasonable merely because it may have inter- fered with a use of the street-cross- ing, which was a matter of conven- N. W. Rep., 680, approving Meyer v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 57 Iowa, 555; 42 Am. Rep., 50; 10 N. W. Rep., 896. Where a general state law limits the rate of speed in all incorpora- ted places to six miles an hour, an ordinance fixing the limit at five miles per hour in certain parts of the city is void. Horn v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 38 Wis., 463. 47 Municipal Code of St. Louis, sec. 1760. Authority given to run cars at a certain rate of speed does not give the company a license to run at such rate of speed under any and all circumstances if the ordinance also imposes the duty of exercis- ing a "vigilant watch" and to stop the car in case of danger to pedes- trians. Schmidt v. St. Louis R. R. Co., 149 Mo., 269; 50 S. W. Rep., 921. If a crowd of children come on tlie street the gripman must regu- late the speed of the car and handle the appliance for its control, as one capable of handling with skill such a machine and mindful of his responsibility would do. Schmidt v. St. Louis R. R. Co., 149 Mo., 269; 50 S. W. Rep., 921. It has been held by division No. 2 of the supreme court of Missouri that the general provision limiting the speed of street cars to eight miles per hour is not applicable where a special ordinance provides for a greater rate of speed, not- withstanding the city charter (sec. 28, art. Ill) definitely provides that "no special or general ordinance which is in conflict or inconsistent with general ordinances of prior date shall be valid or effectual un- §474] PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. 7-ir the use of steam in propelling trains in parts of the city ;*" re- quiring a driver and conductor on each ear,'^'' and servants of ience to the railroad company, nor merely because the switching could not be practicably done in this place in any other manner than that adopted on this occasion." Du- iuth V. Mallett, 43 Minn., 204; 45 N. W. Rep., 154. Railroads, Obstructions, Etc. — The construction and operation of a railroad over a street so narrow that such use would necessarily de- stroy it as a public way may be either a public or private nuisance. It is a universal rule that the city cannot create a nuisance in its streets or devote them or any part of them to a purpose inconsistent with the rights of the public or abutting property owners. Lock- wood V. Wabash R. R. Co., 122 Mo., 86; 26 S. W. Rep., 698; Dubach v. H. & St. J. R. R. Co,, 89 Mo., 483; 1 S. W. Rep., 86; Schopp v. St. Louis, 117 Mo., 131; 22 S. W. Rep., 898; Gates v. K. C. B. & Ter. R'y Co., Ill Mo., 28; 19 S. W. Rep., 957. Where a railroad track Is built on a public street, the escape ot soot and smells from the locomo- tives, the obstruction of the streets with cars and the jarring of the earth and neighboring buildings by passing trains to the inconvenience and discomfort and danger of ad- joining proprietors, do not, in law, necessarily constitute a nuisance unless the road is negligently or unskillfully built or operated. Ran- dle v. Pacific R'y Co., 65 Mo., 325. Railroad tracks constructed by a private corporation and cars run thereon for the transaction of pri- vate business constitutes a pub- lic nuisance, and in such case a pri- vate individual suffering special damages may maintain an action for damages or have an injunction. Glaessner v. Anheuser-Busch B. Ass'n, 100 Mo., 508; 13 S. W. Rep., 707. TuBNOUTS constructed in pursu- ance of authority to lay tracks in the streets are not such obstruc- tions as justify their summary re- moval without notice and hearing; but a resolution of the council de- claring them unlawful and direct- ing legal proceedings to removal is valid. Cape May v. Cape May, etc., R. R. Co., 60 N. J. L., 224; 37 Atl. Rep., 892; 39 L. R. A., 609. *» May regulate mode of running, whether by steam or horse power. Donnaher v. State, 8 Smedes & M. (Miss.), 649. Use of Steam may be- forbidden. Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 96 U. S., 521. General power is sufficient to support such ordinance. North Chicago City R. R. Co. v. Lake View, 105 111., 207; 44 Am. Rep., 788; Buffalo & N. Y. R. R. Co. v. Buffalo, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 209. Whether the use of steam on streets is a nuisance is one of fact. Macomber v. Nichols, 34 Mich., 212; 22 Am. Rep., 522; Vason v. South Carolina R. R. Co., 42 Ga., 631. 50 Ordinance sustained under general power which required a conductor and driver on each car, and provided that in event of fail- ure, that police should cause all cars to be returned to the stables. South Covington & C. Ry. Co. v. Berry, 93 Ky., 43; 18 S. W. Rep., 1026; 40 Am. St. Rep., 161. Requiring an agent in addition to the driver on each car, held rea- sonable. State (Trenton Horse R. Co.) V. Trenton, 53 N. J. L., 132; 20 Atl. Rep., 1076, US PUBLIC SAFETY— STEEBTS— BUILDINGS. [HU each train to give danger signals,^^ as ringing of the bell while the locomotive is in motion ;S2 exacting of those -who operate street cars to keep a vigilant watch for all vehicles and persons on foot, either on the track or moving towards it, and on the first appearance of danger to stop the car within the shortest 51 The provision requiring rail- road companies to have a man sta- tioned on their trains to give dan- ger signals when backing through the city is valid. Bergman v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 88 Mo., 678; Merz v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 14 Mo. App., 459; Rafferty v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 91 Mo., 33; 3 S. W. Rep., 393. But such ordinance does not apply where the employes are simply engaged in setting cars in a car yard. RafEer- ty v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 91 Mo., 33; 3 S. W. Rep., 393. Such ordinance is not unreasonable. Merz v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 14 Mo. App., 459. And it is negligence for a railroad com- pany to send its detached cars without a brakeman, over its own grounds, which are open to the pub- lic, in the City of St Louis. Merz v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 14 Mo. App., 459. 52 The fact that a statute re- quired such signals to be given just before and while crossing high- ways, does not invalidate such or- dinance. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. V. Calvert, 11 Tex. Civ. App., 297; 32 S. W. Rep., 246. Whistle. Power to regulate the use of streets by street cars "so as to prevent injury and inconven- ience to the public," will not au- thorize an ordinance forbidding the blowing of a steam whistle within the city, where the state sta- tute provides that when any ob- struction appears upon a railroad the alarm whistle shall be sounded, etc. The ordinance is no defense for failure to observe the statute. Katzenberger v. Larvo, 6 Pickle (90 Tenn.), 235; 16 S. W. Rep., 611; 25 Am. St. Rep., 681; 13 L. R. A., 185. S3 The validity of such ordinance rests on the fact that under the state constitution and city charter street railways are allowed to lay their tracks upon the streets of the city upon the condition of yielding obedience to the city ordinances. Fath V. Tower Grove & Lafayette Ry. Co.. 105 Mo., 537; 16 S. W.Rep., 913; 39 Mo. App., 447. See Sanders V. R. R. Co., 147 Mo., 411; 48 S. W. Rep., 855; Senn v. Southern Ry. Co.. 108 Mo., 142; 18 S. W. Rep., 1007; Day-^v. Citizens Ry. Co., 81 Mo. App., 471. A violation of these ordinance regulations is negligence per se. Hutchinson v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 161 Mo., 246; 61 S. W. Rep., 635 ; Weller v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. Co., 164 Mo., 180; 64 S. W. Rep., 141; Prewitt v. M. K. & T. Ry. Co., 134 Mo., 615; 31 S. W. Rep., 667; Gratiot v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 116 Mo., 450; 21 S. W. Rep., 1094; Bluedorn v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 121 Mo., 258; 25 S. W. Rep., 943; Sullivan v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 117 Mo., 214; 23 S. W. Rep., 149; Fied- ler V. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 107 Mo., 645; 18 S. W. Rep., 847; Dahlstrom v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 108 Mo., 525; 18 S. W. Rep., 919; Kellny v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 101 Mo., 67; 13 S. W. Rep., 806; Murray v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 101 Mo., 236; 13 S. W. Rep., 817; Schlereth v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 96 Mo., 509; 10 S. W. Rep., 66; Han- Ion V. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 104 Mo., 381; 16 S. W. Rep., 233; Dickson v. s i->i] PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. 7i9 space and time possible ;5^ compelling the use of fenders,^^ Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 104 Mo., 491; 16 S. W. Rep., 381; Grube v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 98 Mo., 330; 11 S. W. Rep., 736; Eswin v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 96 Mo., 290; 9 S. W. Rep., 577; Donohue v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 91 Mo., 357; 2 S. W. Rep., 424; 3 S. W. Rep., 848; Keim v. Union Railway & Transit Co., 90 Mo., 814; 2 S. W. Rep., 427; Maher v. Atlantic & Pacific R. R. Co., 64 Mo., 267; Neier v. Mo. Pac, Ry. Co., 12 Mo. App., 25. No rate of speed is negligence per se except where the law of the state, or a municipal corporation authorized to do so, prescribes a limit. Maher V. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 64 Mo., 267; Wasson V. McCook, 80 Mo. App., 483; Kreis v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 148 Mo., 321; 49 S. W. Rep., 877. It is the duty of the motorman to stop the car in the shortest time and space possible upon the first ap- pearance of danger to persons or vehicles on the track or moving to- wards the track. Burnstein v. Cass Avenue & F. G. Ry. Co., 56 Mo. App., 45, 50; Bunyan v. Citizens' Ry. Co., 127 Mo., 12; 29 S. W. Rep., 842; Cooney v. Southern Elec. Ry. Co., 80 Mo. App., 226, 233; Klocken- brink v. St. Louis & M. Riv. Ry. Co., 81 Mo. App., 351; Sweeney v. K. C. Cable Ry. Co., 150 Mo., 385; 51 S. W. Rep., 682. This duty may exist notwithstanding the ordi- nance. Schmidt v. St. Louis R. R. Co., 163 Mo., 645; 63 S. W. Rep., 834. Persons have a right to pre- sume that cars will observe ordi- nance regulations. Weller v. Chi- cago, M. & St. Paul Ry. Co., 164 Mo., 180; 64 S. W. Rep., 141, and cases cited. In damage suits, whether the ordinance has been complied with is a question for the jury. Weller v. Chicago, M. & St. Paul Ry. Co., 164 Mo., 180; 64 S. W. Rep., 141. These provisions do not create a civil liability enforce- able at common law. Sanders v. Southern Elec. Ry. Co., 147 Mo., 411; 48 S. W. Rep., 855; Byington V. St. Louis R. R. Co., 147 Mo., 673; 49 S. W. Rep., 876. Compare Fath V. Tower G. & L. Ry. Co., 105 Mo., 537; 16 S. W. Rep., 913, and Senn v. Southern Elec. Ry. Co., 108 Mo., 142, 152; 18 S. W. Rep., 1007. In actions for damages, where a viola- tion of ordinance regulations is re- lied upon to establish negligence, the introduction of the ordinance as evidence establishes the fact that the ordinance has been adopt- ed by the city, but not its binding effect on the defendant. It has been held that it must be alleged and proved that defendant accepted the ordinance and agreed to be bound by it. Sanders v. Southern Elec. Ry. Co., 147 Mo., 411; 48 S. W. Rep., 855; Byington v. St. Louis R. R. Co., 147 Mo., 673; 49 S. W. Rep., 876; Sheehan v. Citizens' Ry. Co., 72 Mo. App., 524. But in the more recent cases the contrary, it seems, has been declared. Thus, Jackson V. K. C, F. S. & M. Ry. Co., 157 Mo., 621; 58 S. W. Rep., 32, held that it was not necessary to a re- covery that there be a contract be- tween the defendant and the city to comply with the ordinances or that the defendant had accepted the ordinance, before a civil liability is shown to a third person ; reviewing former cases and refusing to fol- low Fath V. Tower Grove & L. Ry. Co., 105 Mo., 537; 16 S. W. Rep., 913. To same effect, Weller V. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 164 Mo., 180; 64 S. W. Rep., 141, and 75(1 PUBLIC SAFETY— STREETS— BUILDINGS. [§474 lights on cars,-''^ and lights on railroad tracks ;^® requiring the fencing or inclosing of tracks at certain points ;^^ providing reasonable regulations at crossings,"* as safety railway gates,-^® and flagmen or watchmen ;®<* compelling street car companies to adopt and use a particular kind of rail ;"* to keep that part of the street between the rails clean f^ to remove snow, etc., Hutchinson v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 161 Mo., 246; 61 S. W. Rep., 635. It Is not necessary to allege and prove the acceptance of a special ordinance. Chouquette v. South- ern Blec. Ry. Co., 152 Mo., 257; 53 S. W. Rep., 897, distinguishing Sanders v. Southern Elec. Ry. Co., 147 Mo., 411; 48 S. W. Rep., 855. '"« Fenders. Failure of a street car company to equip its cars with a fender which would have pre- vented an injury complained of is not in the absence of ordinance or statute requiring it, negligence. Hogan V. Citizens' Ry. Co., 150 Mo., 36; 51 S. W. Rep.. 473. 55 Light on Cabs. It is negli- gence in a railroad company to run its trains in a city in violation of an ordinance requiring a light upon the cars. Basley v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co., 113 Mo., 236; 20 S. W. Rep., 1073. 56 Lighting of Tracks. Cincin- nati, H. & D. Ry. Co. V. Bowling Green, 57 Ohio St., 336; 49 N. E. Rep., 121; 41 L. R. A., 422. 57 Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mower, 16 Kan., 573. 58 Atlantic, S. R. & G. Ry. Co. v. State (Fla. 1900), 29 So. Rep., 319. 59 Whatever precautions are rea- sonably incident to the danger from the passing to and fro of trains in a crowded community may be lawfully adopted. Textor V. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 59 Md., 63. 60 Western & A. R. Co. v. Young, 81 Ga., 397; 7 S. E. Rep., 912; 12 Am. St. Rep., 320; Pennsylvania Co. V. Stegemeier, 118 Ind., 305; 20 N. E. Rep., 843; 10 Am. St. Rep., 136; State (Delaware, L. & W. R. Co.) V. Bast Orange, 41 N. J. L., 127. Red Wing v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 72 Minn., 240; 75 N. W. Rep., 223; 71 Am. St. Rep., 482. where it was held that general grant followed by specific enumera- tion was limited, relying on St. Paul V. Traeger, 25 Minn., 248, and distinguishing Green v. Eastern Ry. Co., 52 Minn., 79; 53 N. W. Rep., 808. Distinction and reasons therefor between regulating the rate of speed at crossings and requiring a flagman to be stationed there are stated in Ravenna v. Pennsylvania Co., 45 Ohio St., 118; 12 N. E. Rep., 445, approved in Red Wing v. Chi- cago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 72 Minn., 240, 245; 75 N. W. Rep., 223; 71 Am. St. Rep., 482. The object of a city ordinance, in requiring railroads to station a watchman at street crossings used by them, is to prevent travelers from going on the crossing when trains are approaching, and not to give warning of danger when it is too late to avoid it. Dickson v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 104 Mo., 491; 16 S. W. Rep,, 381. 61 Washington etc., R. Co. v. Alexandria, 98 Va., 344; 36 S. E. Rep., 385. 62 Chicago V. Chicago Union Traction Co., 199 111., 259 ; 65 N. B. Rep., 243. ' m PUBLIC MORALS AND DSQINOY. ni from tracks;®^ and to water tracks so as to lay the dust.^"* Ordinance may also require cars to be run at specified times,®^ regulate street railway transfers,®" and compel street railway companies to report to city officers at stated times."^ 4. OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS AND DECENCY. § 475. Lewd conduct — Bawdy houses— Prostitution, etc. In the interest of public morals and decency, under sufficient char- ter power, ordinances may be enacted and enforced to restrain, suppress and punish lewd and indecent conduct and practices, bawdy, assignation and disorderly houses, and prostitution."'* Regulations of this character are sometimes regarded as within "3 Broadway & S. A. R. R. Co. v. New York, 49 Hun. (N. Y.), 126; 1 N. Y. Suppl., 646. «4 Ordinance requiring sustained under general power. The ordi- nance "embraces all who exercise the same right and work the same inconvenience to occupants of houses on the street," per Jackson, C. J., in City & Suburban Ry. Co. V. Savannah, 77 Ga., 731, 734; 4 Am. St. Rep., 106. "•"' New York v. Dry Dock, E. B. & B. R. R. Co., 133 N. Y., 104; 28 Am. St. Rep., 609; 30 N. E. Rep., 563. Statute requiring erection of pas- senger waiting rooms at railroad crossings is a proper exercise of the police power. State ex rel. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 83 Mo., 144. (le Ex parte Lorenzen, 128 Cal., 431; 61 Pac. Rep., 68; 50 L. R. A., 55; Heffron v. Detroit City R. Co., 92 Mich., 406; 16 L. R. A., 345; 52 N. W. Rep., 802; Pine v. St. Paul City R. Co., 50 Minn., 144; 52 N. W. Rep., 392; 16 L. R. A., 347; Ma- honey v. Detroit Street R. Co. 93 Mich., 612; 18 L. R. A., 335; 53 N. W. Rep., 793 ; O'Rourke v. Citizens Street R. Co., 103 Tenn., 124; 52 S. W. Rep., 872; 46 L. R. A., 614. See § 590 post. «7 Section 1778 of the Municipal Code of St. Louis, requiring street railroad companies to make reports under oath to the city register is not void as being unreasonable or in restraint of trade, and does not violate the constitution. Such regu- lation is within the grant of power conferred by sec. 37, act of Jan. 16, 1860. St. Louis V. St. Louis R. R. Co., 89 Mo., 44; IS. W. Rep., 305; 14 Mo. App., 221. 05 New Orleans v. Costello, 14 La. Ann., 37; Municipal No. 1 v. Wil- son, 5 La. Ann., 747. A B.^WDY House is a Public NuLSAKCE pel- SB at common law, and to conduct such places or rent property for such purpose is a pub- lic wrong. Givens v. Van Studi- ford, 86 Mo., 149, 156; Ashbrook v. Dale, 27 Mo. App., 649. The offense of keeping a brothel is indictable at common law, and is made so by statute. St. Louis v. Mellville, 3 Mo. App., 597. "House of ill fame" is synony- mous with "bawdy house." McAlis- ter y. Clark, 33 Conn., 91. A house of ill fame is a constant menace to the public peace and good order of the community in which it exists, and is a nuisance, and its keeping a misdemeanor at 752 PUBLIC MORALS AND DECENCY. [H75 the exclusive control of the state, but it is undoubtedly true that the State may commit, in whole or in part, such police common law, and therefore its sup- pression and punisliment are prop- er subjects of police regulation. Rodgers v. People, 9 Colo., 450; 12 Pac. Rep., 843; 59 Am. Rep., 146. It would be contrary to the act to assert that houses of ill fame in the midst of a city are not danger- ous and revolting nuisances which may be suppressed by the local au- thorities. People V. Hanrahan, 75 Mich., 611, 621; 42 N. W. Rep., 1124; 4 L. R. A.. 751. Owners and Lessors; when lia- ble. Givens v. Van Studiford, 86 Mo., 149, 156; Ashbrook v. Dale, 27 Mo. App., 649; Childress v. Nashville, 3 Sneed (35 Tenn.), 347. General power to suppress bawdy houses, will support an ordinance forbidding owners to rent houses for the purpose of being used as bawdy houses, or with a knowl- edge that they will be so used by the lessee; but the local corpora- tion, under such power cannot de- fine what is such house, or declare a given house a bawdy house. State V. Webber, 107 N. C, 962; 22 Am. St. Rep., 920; 12 S. B. Rep., 598. A by-law subjecting the owner to a penalty of $50, where the house was used with his knowledge as a bawdy house, or to his knowledge reputed to be such, and also mak- ing him liable, in addition, for maintaining a nuisance, was con- strued to apply only to such owner as has both knowledge of such im- proper use and the power to pre- vent its use as such which he failed to exercise. The by-law was sus- tained under general power over nuisances. McAlister v. Clark, 33 Conn., 91. Inmates of bawdy houses who are there for lewd purposes may be punished by ordinance authority. Perry v. State, 37 Neb., 623; 56 N. W. Rep., 315; Ogden v. McLaugh- lin, 5 Utah, 387; 16 Pac. Rep., 721. Frequenters, for immoral pur- poses may be made subject to ordi- nance penalty. State v. Botkin, 71 Iowa, 87; 60 Am. Rep., 780; 32 N. W. Rep., 185. Certainty of Ordinance. An or- dinance forbidding any one to "con- duct a house of ill-fame in an inde- cent manner," is not void for un- certainty. Shreveport v. Roos, 35 La. Ann., 1010. See sec. 20, supra. Evidence to Estahltrii the Character of a bawdy house must in most cases be inferential, and hence, must be permitted to take a wide range. State v. Dudley, 56 Mo. App., 450, citing 2 Bishop's Criminal Practice, sees. 11.5- 116. The fact that the inmates of the house were prostitutes strongly conduces to establish the fact that the house was a bawdy house. State v. Bernard, 64 Mo., 260; State V. Bean, 21 Mo., 267; Clementine v. State, 14 Mo., 112. See State v. Lewis, 5 Mo. App., 465. Ordinances forbidding bawdy houses, sustained. Robb v. Indian- apolis, 38 Ind., 49; Welch v. Btow- ell, 2 Dougl, (Mich.), 332; Chari- ton V. Barber, 54 Iowa, 360; 6 N. W. Rep., 528; 37 Am. Rep., 209; Wong V. Astoria, 13 Oregon, 538; 11 Pac. Rep., 295; note to State v, Karstendiek (La.), 39 L. R. A., 520. Prostitutes. Mere presence of, within corporate limits .cannot be punished by ordinance. Paralee v. Camden, 49 Ark., 165; 4 S. W. Rep., 654; 4 Am. St. Rep., 35, following Buell v. State, 45 Ark., 336. Com- pare Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md., 331. 1 475] TUBLIC MORALS AND DECENCY. 753 power to local control,^^ and the question of the legislative in- tent in this respect is often presented to the courts for deter- mination. The general subject of municipal control of offenses against the State is treated in the chapter which follows.''^ Power to suppress and restrain disorderly houses and houses of ill-fame is ample, to sustain an ordinance forbidding under penalty, the keeping -of such houses.''^ And it has been held that charter power "to define and prevent disorderly conduct, ' ' and to punish disorderly persons as defined by law is sufficient to authorize an ordinance punishing keepers and residents of houses of ill-f ame.'^^ Charter power to pass ' ' by-laws, rules and regulations for preserving the peace, order and good gov- Ordinance prescribing limits for prostitutes, held valid. L' Hote v. New Orleans, 177 W. S., 587; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 788. Steeet Walking. An ordinance forbidding disreputable females from standing or loitering about the streets or stores at night, un- less on unavoidable business, was sustained. Braddy v. Milledgeville, 74 Ga., 516; 58 Am. Rep., 443. An ordinance prohibiting any prostitute from being on the streets or alleys of the city between the hours of 7 p. m. and 4 a. m. with- out any reasonable necessity there- for is a valid exercise of the police power under a statute giving au- thority to "restrain and punish prostitutes." Dunn v. Com., 20 Ky. Law, Rep., 1649; 43 L. R. A., 701; 49 S. W. Rep., 813. Conversing With Lewd Woman, cannot be condemned as an offense by ordinance. Cady v. Barnesvllle, 2 Cleveland Law Rep., 100; 4 Ohio Dec, 396; 4 Wkly. Law Bull. (Ohio), 101. See § 228 supra. Indecent Exposure of the Per- son. Ordinance may forbid irre- spective of intent. Grand Rapids V. Bateman, 93 Mich., 135; 53 N. W. Rep., 6. Act of Lewdness or Indecency; ordinance condemning, held void. State V. Hammond, 40 Minn., 43; 41 N. W. Rep., 243. Publication op Obscene Matter, may be forbidden by ordinance. O'Brien v. Cleveland, 1 Cleveland Law Rep., 100; 4 Ohio Dec, 189. Variety Show. Defined by ordi- nance as "any place or institution known or recognized as a variety show," held too indefinite. Ex parte Bell, 32 Tex. Cr. Rep., 308; 22 S. W. Rep., 1040; 40 Am. St. Rep., 778. See § 20, supra. 69 People V. Hanrahan, 75 Mich., 611; 4 L. R. A., 751; 42 N. W. Rep., 1124. Local control not exclusive. State V. Wister, 62 Mo., 592; Davis v. State, 2 Tex. App., 425 70 Chapter XV. '1 Ogden V. Madison, 111 Wis., 413; 55 L. R. A., 506; 87 N. W. Rep., 568. Compare Dabbs v. State, 39 Ark., 353; 43 Am. Rep., 275; McAlister v. Clark, 33 Conn., 91; L'Hote V. New Orleans, 51 La. Ann., 93; 24 So. Rep,, 608; 44 L. R. A., 90; Shreveport v. Roos, 35 La. Ann., 1010; Owensboro v. Simms, 17 Ky. Law Rep., 1393; 34 S. W. Rep., 1085; St. Louis v. Mellville, 3 Mo. App., 597. 72 People V. Miller, 38 Hun. (N. Y.),82. 48 7S4 PUBLIC MORALS AND DECENCY. [§476 ernment," was held in South Carolina, to justify an ordinance, making it unlawful to keep a bawdy house.'^ But general power (general welfare clause) "to improve the morals and order," and special power "to suppress and restrain disorderly houses and houses of ill-fame," was held insufficient in Iowa to support an ordinance punishing, as a misdemeanor, one who keeps a house of ill-fame or assignation. However, it was con- ceded that the power was ample to authorize municipal legis- lation for the direct suppression of such houses.^* § 476. Gambling, gaming houses, lotteries, bowling alleys, billiard halls, etc. Ordinances designed to restrain, suppress or control gambling, gaming houses, the sale of lottery tickets, and bowling alleys, billiard halls, etc., conducted for gain, are common.'^^ As gambling is usually an offense against the state, '3 state ex rel. v. Williams, 11 S. C, 288. General power held sufficient to sustain an ordinance restraining bawdy houses. Childress v. Nash- ville, 3 Sneed (35 Tenn.), 347. 7* Chariton v. Barker, 54 Iowa, 360; 37 Am. Rep., 209; 6 N. W. Rep., 528, following Mt. Pleasant V. Breeze, 11 Iowa, 399, saying, "the decision is not without grave objections as to the reasons upon which it is based. But it has been accepted without question or chal- lenge for more than nineteen years. We ought not, at this late day, disturb it." An ordinance directed against physical nuisances will not em- brace the nuisance of keeping a house of ill-fame. Krickle v. Com., 1 B. Mon. (40 Ky.), 361. 76 Gambling. State ex rel v. New- man, 96 Wis., 258; 71 N. W. Rep., 438. Keeping open gambling house. State V. Grimes, 83 Minn., 460; 86 N. W. Rep., 449. "Blind tiger." Bagwell v. Lawrenceville, 94 Ga., 654; 21 S. E. Rep., 903. "Policy." State v. Flint, 63 Conn., 248; 28 Atl. Rep., 28; State V. Carpenter, 60 Conn., 97; 22 Atl. Rep., 497. Keeping Common Gaming House. Where a defendant was found keeping the cashier's chair in a room where a game of keno was in progress, and, when the police en- tered, sprung up and took the mon- ey and chips from the stand, this will warrant an inference that he was in charge of and sat up the game, though no money was seen to pass from any player to him. St. Louis V. Wiley, 8 Mo. App., 597. Occasional games of poker private- ly played with acquaintances for money in his room does not make him a keeper of a common gaming house. State v. Mosby, 53 Mo. App., 571. A boat with a cabin equipped with tables, chairs, and such articles and devices as are necessary to carry on a gambling business is included in the term "house" used in the statute against gaming houses. State v. Metcalf, 65 Mo. App., 681. A common gam- ing house may consist of a single room rented in a house of many rooms, and it need not necessarily be open to the whole public in com- § 47(i] PUBLIC MORALS AND DECENCY. 755 legislative grant is generally necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with the subject.'''*' Municipal control of offenses of this nature is considered elsewhere.'''^ In the ab- sence of express grant of power to enact, ordinance provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with state laws are void.'^* The power to pass by-laws relating to nuisances has been held mon, nor the gaming be visible from the exterior, nor need gaming be the only business for which it is used, nor need it be constantly kept for that purpose; and it may be kept without charge or as a business, and may also be used as a sleeping room. State v. Mosby, 53 Mo. App., 571; State v. Mohr, 55 Mo. App., 329. Under an indict- ment for keeping a common gamb- ling house the general reputation of the defendant as a gambler is admissible as well as general repu- tation of the frequenters of the house. State v. Mosby, 53 Mo. App., 571. A conviction for gambling is no bar to a conviction for keeping a common gaming house. State v. Mosby, 53 Mo. App., 571. Setting Up Gambling Device. "Crack Loo'" is a gambling device for money within the meaning of an ordinance prohibiting any per- son from setting up "any gambling device" or playing "at any game whatever for money," etc. Canton V. Dawson, 71 Mo. App., 235; State V. Flack, 24 Mo., 378; R. S. 1889, Mo. sec. 3825. Where it is shown that the game is made by purchas- ing cards and putting money in a pool and that the defendant was sitting at the table with others, with the gambling devices before him and that the game was in progress, this makes out a prima facie case which warrants the inference that the de- fendant was gambling, though it does not appear by direct evidence that he had paid for the card be- fore him. St. Louis v. Sullivan, 8 Mo. App., 455. Betting money or property upon the game called "pool," is within the prohibition of the statute against gaming. State V. Jackson, 39 Mo., 420. Indictment under state statutes, see State v. Mohr, 55 Mo. App., 329; State v. Nelson, 19 Mo., 393; State v. Herry- ford, 19 Mo., 377; State v. Dyson, 39 Mo. App., 297; State v. Gilmore, 98 Mo., 206; 11 S. W. Rep., 620; State v. Scaggs, 33 Mo., 92; State v. Mosby, 53 Mo. App., 571. The repeal of an ordinance to suppress gaming, except as to offenses com- mitted and forfeitures incurred previous thereto, held valid. Kan- sas City V. White, 69 Mo., 26; Kan- sas City V. Clark, 68 Mo., 588. Betting on Horse Races may be made unlawful. Odell v. Atlanta, 97 Ga., 670; 25 S. B. Rep., 173. fi5 Gambling. Power to suppress held not to give power to declare by ordinance gambling a misde- meanor and provide punishment. Mt. Pleasant v. Breeze, 11 Iowa, 399. Charter of Minneapolis held suf- ficient to sustain an ordinance sup- pressing gambling. State v. Grimes, 49 Minn., 443; 52 N. W. Rep., 42. Compare Gwensboro v. Sparks, 99 Ky., 351; 36 S. W. Rep., 4. " Chapter XV. 78 Ex parte Solomon, 91 Cal., 440; 27 Pac. Rep., 757, following In re Ah You, 88 Cal., 99; 22 Am. St. Rep., 280; 11 L. R. A., 408; 25 Pac. Rep., 974. 75G PUBLIC MORALS AND DECENCY.- [§ 477 to authorize a by-law forbidding under penalty, the keeping of bowling alleys for hire. It seems that at common law such keeping is a public nuisance, notwithstanding gambling is ex- pressly prohibited.'''' Under sufficient charter powers ordi- nances may make it unlawful to sell lottery tickets within the corporate limits.®" § 477. Regulating sale of intoxicating liquor. The authority to regulate and license the sale of intoxicating liquor and places Charter provision may repeal general state law. In re Snell, 58 Vt., 207; 1 Atl. Rep., 566; § 214 supra. In re Lee Tong, 9 Sawyer (U. S.), 333; 18 Fed. Rep., 253. Pool selling. Ex parte Tuttle, 91 Gal., 589; 27 Pac. Rep., 933; Chi- cago V. Brownell, 41 111. App., 70. 70 "So far as I have been able to discover, erections of every kind adapted to sports or amusements, having no useful end, and notor- iously fitted up and continued with a view to make a profit for the owner, are considered in the books as nuisances. Not that the law discountenances innocent relaxa- tion; but because it has become matter of general observation that, when gainful establishments are al- lowed for their promotion, such es- tablishments are usually perverted into nurseries of vice and crime." Per Cowen, J., In Tanner v. Albion, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 121, 124; 40 Am. Dec, 337. •■ Bowling Alleys; ordinance may regulate. Smith v. Madison, 7 Ind., 86 ; State v. Hay, 29 Me., 457 ; State V. Noyes, 30 N. H., 279. Tenpin Alley. City cannot li- cense without express authority. Goetler v. State, 45 Ark., 454. Billiard Halls; Municipal con- trol of, sustained. Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Mo., 1; 25 S. W. Rep., 202; Plattsburgv. Trimble, 46 Mo. App., 459. Compare Breninger v. Belvi- dere, 44 N. J. L., 350. 80 State V. Riley, 49 La. Ann., 1617; 22 So. Rep., 843; Ex parte Kiburg, 10 Mo. App., 442; Seattle V. Let., 19 Wash., 38; 52 Pac. Rep., 324. The fact that an ordinance prohibiting the lottery business provides a more definite fine or penalty than the state statute, does not render such ordinance invalid. Kansas City v. Hallett, 59 Mo. App., 160; Kansas City v. Zahner, 73 Mo. App., 396. Lottery Tickets. Where the - constitution empowers municipal corporations to make and enforce within their limits all such local, police, sanitary and other regula- tions as are not in conflict with the general law, a city may, by ordi- nance, forbid persons having pos- session of lottery tickets. Such or- dinance is a proper exercise of the police power. Ex parte McClain, 134 Cal., 110; 66 Pac. Rep., 69. Evidence. State v. Rothschild. 19 Mo. App., 137; State v. Hind- man, 4 Mo. App., 582; State v. Rus- sell, 17 Mo. App., 16; State v. Sell- ner, 17 Mo. App., 39; State v. Ochs- , ner, 9 Mo. App., 216; State v. Nor- man, 44 Mo. App., 306; State v. Williams, 44 Mo. App., 302; State v. Bruner, 17 Mo. App., 274; State v. Harmon, 60 Mo. App., 48. Lottery. The proprietors of a newspaper, in pursuance of a pre- arranged and advertised scheme, ■ issued to each subscriber for their paper, in addition to the paper it- §478] PDBLIC MORALS AND DECENCY. 75r where sold must be derived frorii the legislature.^^ Frequently this power is expressly conferred upon municipal corpoia- tions*2 The nature and extent of municipal control of the liquor traffic, depend upon the local charter, the legislation and public policy of the state appertaining thereto. Court rulings respecting ordinance regulations of the sub.iect appear in the notes.*'' self, and without extra charge, a ticket which entitled the holder to participate in a distribution of prizes offered by the proprietors to all persons who should become sub- scribers. Held, that the scheme was a lottery, and that it made no difference that the tickets were not sold. State v. Mumford, 73 Mo., 647. 81 §§ 425, 426, supra. 82 Shea V. Muncie, 148 Ind., 14; 46 N. E. Rep., 138; Bennett v. Pu- laski, (Tenn. 1899) 47 L. R. A., 278; State v. Pamperin, 42 Minn., 320; 44 N. W. Rep., 251. Ordinance declaring all liquor kept within the town a nuisance and authorizing removal beyond limits, held void. Darst v. People, ',1 111., 286; 2 Am. Rep., 301. Retailing liquor. Ex parte Chris- tensen, 85 Cal., 208; 24 Pac. Rep., 747; State v. Deering, 84 Wis., 585, 54 N. W. Rep., 1104. Ordinance regulating sale of hop tea tonic, ginger ale, etc., valid. In re Jahn, 55 Kan., 694; 41 Pac. Rep., 956. Where towns have power to pro- hibit the sale of such intoxicating liquors only as are not prohibited by statute, an ordinance which forbids the sale of all kinds is invalid as to those kinds forbidden by statute. Cantril v. Sainer, 59 Iowa, 26; 12 N. W. Rep., 753; New Hampton v. Conroy, 56 Iowa, 498; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165. Amount for license must not be in excess of the necessities of the city; it must not be exorbitant. Columbia v. Beasly, 1 Humph. (Tenn.), 232; 34 Am. Dec, 646. An ordinance prohibiting keep- ing intoxicating liquors "in any re- freshment saloon or restaurant, within the city for any purpose whatever," held valid. It does not profess to forbid either the use or the sale of liquors altogether. Keeping liquor in a cellar, under a refreshment saloon or restaurant, is a violation of such ordinance. State V. Clark, 28 N. H., 176, ap- proved in State v. Freeman, 38 N. H., 426. Power to license, regulate, tax or suppress tippling houses and dram shops does not confer power to prohibit the sale of ardent or vinous spirits in any quantities, without a license. The general power contained in the general welfare clause was held not to en- large the special power given. Tuck V. Waldron, 31 Ark., 462, 465. Under general power an ordi- nance forbidding retail grocers, not having a license from keeping at their stores, etc., any wine, malt or spirituous liquors, held valid. Heisembrittle v. Charleston, 2 Mac- Mullan (S. C), 233. 83 Designation of Districts, within the corporate limits, where- in liquor may be sold, and exclud- ing sales elsewhere. Rowland v. Greencastle, 157 Ind., 591, 707; 62 N. B. Rep., 474, 1103. Screens, blinds, obstructions of public view, etc. Steffy v. Monroe 758 PUBLIC MORALS AND DECENCY. [§479 § 478. Public drunkenness. Drunkenness or intoxication in public places is unquestionably a matter of police regulation, and laws condemning such conduct have been sustained as con- stitutional.^* General charter power to preserve the peace, good order, etc., is sufficient to support ordinances, forbidding, under penalty, public drunkenness.*'' §479. Observance of the Sabbath. Penal ordina;nces re- quiring the cessation of certain secular business on the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday, do not violate con- stitutional principles, and will be sustained where they rest on proper charter power.*^ j^ Illinois, power to regulate the po- City, 135 Ind., 466; 41 Am. St. Rep., 436; 35 N. B. Rep., 121; Champer V. Greencastle, 138 Ind., 339; 35 N. E. Rep., 14; Shultz v. Cambridge, 38 Ohio St., 659; Bennett v. Pulas- ki (Tenn. 1899) 47 L. R. A., 278. Other Business forbidden where liquor is sold. State v. Gerhart, 145 Ind., 439; 44 N. E. Rep., 469; 33 L. R. A., 313. Minors forbidden from entering saloons; ordinance sustained un- der general charter power. State V. Austin, 114 N. C, 855; 41 Am. St. Rep., 817; 19 S. E. Rep., 919. Holidays, etc., prohibiting sale of liquor on. Merchants National Bank v. Jaffray, 36 Neb., 218; 54 N. W. Rep., 258; 19 L. R. A., 317 note. Music — Females. An ordinance was sustained which forbid noisy amusements, etc., and which pro- hibited in the night time after 12 o'clock, midnight, any person to play or make a noise upon any mu- sical instrument in any drinking saloon, or beer cellar, or to permit or allow the same by the proprie- tor, agent or manager thereof, and which also prohibited females to be in such places at such time. Ex parte Smith & Keating, 38 Cal., 702. Cider. Under general charter power, it has been held in Kansas that an ordinance regulating the sale of cider which is not intoxicat- ing by prohibiting its sale in less quantities than a gallon, and for- bidding the drinking of the same at the place of sale, violates no pri- vate rights and does not unreason- ably restrain trade. Monroe v. Lawrence, 44 Kan., 607; 24 Pac. Rep., 1113; 10 L. R. A., 520. s-i Sec. 229 supra. State v. Sevier, 117 Ind., 338; 20 N. E. Rep., 245; People ex rel. v. French, 102 N. Y., 583, 587; 7 N. E. Rep., 913; Tipton V. State, 2 Yerg (Tenn.), 542; State V. Smith, 3 Heisk (Tenn.), 465, State v. Cantieny, 34 Minn., 1; 24 N. W. Rep., 458. The legislature may forbid. Com. v. Morrisey, 157 Mass., 471; 32 N. B. Rep., 664. 85 Gallatin v. Tarwater, 143 Mo., 40; 44 S. W. Rep., 750, in effect overruling St. Joseph v. Harris, 59 Mo. App., 122; Green City v. Hol- singer, 76 Mo. App., 567; Fairmont V. Meyer, 83 Minn., 456; 86 N. W. Rep., 457; Bloomfield v. Trimble, 54 Iowa, 399; 37 Am. Rep., 212; 6 N. W. Rep., 586. One may be (Jrunk in a private place in violation of an ordinance. State V. McNinch, 87 N. C, 567. 86 Karwisch v. Atlanta, 44 Ga., § 479] PUBLIC MORALS AND DECENCY. 759 lice and pass and enforce all necessary police ordinances, has been held sufficient to authorize an ordinance prescribing pen- alties for non-observance of the Sabbath.*'' So, in Florida, a like ordinance was declared valid, enacted under charter power "to pass all ordinances and laws as may be expedient and nec- essary for the preservation of the public peace and morals."*^ The same rule has been announced in Missouri.*® But in Oregon, general charter power to make ordinances to "secure the health, peace and improvement of the city," was held not to confer power to pass such ordinance. The case affirms that the keeping open of a shop or store on Sunday, and selling ware and merchandise are not acts of a disorderly character, or in any sense within the purview of such acts as tend to disturb the public peace. The court expressed the opinion that the offense was "against public policy, punishable under the laws of the state.""** In other jurisdictions, like ordinances have been pronounced void, where the offense which they condemned was made punishable by state statute.''^ Under the general welfare clause, a penal ordinance cannot forbid the conducting of a lawful business, as mercantile, on Christmas day; for only when such business is calculated to 204; Charleston v. Benjamin. 2 ter provision superseded a general Strobh. L. (S. C), 508; Nashville statute on the same subject. V. Linck, 12 Lea. (80 Tenn.), 499. "o "There can be no breach of the Ex ■parte Abram, 34 Tex. Cr. Rep., peace without a disturbance, acts 10; 28 S. W. Rep., 818. Sunday or- disorderly or violent in their na- dinance, making certain excep- ture, and the day on which such lions, construed. Libermg,n v. State, acts are committed will not alter 26 Neb., 464; 42 N. W. Rep., 419. the nature or quality of such acts Sunday closing ordinances, held in the eye of the law. The keeping void. Cincinnati v. Rice, 15 Ohio, open of a store or shop on Sunday, 225; Canton v. Nist, 9 Ohio St., for the purpose of labor or traf- 439. fie, is not an offense against the "7 McPherson v. Chebanse, 114 public peace, but an offense against 111., 46; 55 Am. Rep., 857; 28 N. E. public policy, punishable under the Rep., 454, affirming 15 111. App., 311. laws of the state." Per Lord, C. J. 88 Theisen v. McDavid, 34 Fla., in Corvallis v. Carlisle, 10 Oregon, 440; 26 L. R. A., 234; 16 So. Rep., 139, 143, distinguishing St. Louis 321; ordinance need not necessar- v. Cafterata, 24 Mo., 94; State v. ily follow state statute, as to excep- Freeman, 38 N. H„ 426 and Jones tions. V. Richmond, 18 Gratt (Va), Sl7, 89 St. Louis V. Cafterata, 24 Mo., 523. 94, where it was held that a char- si Rothschild v. Darien, 69 Ga., 760 PUBLIC MORALS AND DECENCY. [§ 480 interfere with the peace, good order and safety of the com- munity can it be prohibited.^^ General power, and special exclusive control of licenses of sale of liquor was held to give power (implied, as a necessary incident thereto) to pass an ordinance forbidding the sale of liquor on .Sunday.'*^ And it is entirely competent, by ordi- nance, to permit the keeping open of saloons on Sunday for one purpose— furnishing meals and lodgings to travelers and boarders— and forbid their being kept open for other pur- poses.9* §480. Regulating hours of business. Charter power to make and establish by-laws on certain enumerated subjects, and "make other by-laws, regulations and ordinances which may seem for the welfare of said city, provided they be not repug- nant to the constitution and laws of the state, ' ' was held, suffi- cient in New Hampshire to authorize an ordinance making it unlawful to keep open restaurants after ten o'clock at night.^* But in North Carolina, general power incident to municipal corporations, and authority conferred by the general welfare clause, was declared insufficient to sustain a penal ordinance requiring business houses to close at 7 :30 p. m."" 503. See Chapter XV. of Municipal would thereby be opened for all Control of Offenses Against State. kinds of business. "This claim is »- Watson V. Thomson, 116 Ga., gravely made, but scarcely admits 546; 42 S. E. Rep., 747. of a grave answer. Every livery "The right to follow any of the stable, every drug store and even common avocations of life is an in- any private dwelling house in the alienable right." Per Mr. Justice city, might lawfully- be turned into Bradley in Butchers' Union, etc. tippling shops on Sunday if this Co. V. Crescent City, etc., Co., Ill position has any substance. It is U. S., 746, 762. certainly lawful to keep them open 93 Minden v. Silverstein, 36 La. for some purposes, as has been Ann., 912. done by this ordinance. To 'keep Ordinance forbidding sustained, open' within the meaning of the or- under general power. Megowan v. dinance implies a readiness to car- Com., 2 Mete. (Ky.), 3. ry on the usual business therein. Ordinance held valid under gen- and if this business is not within eral power, and particular power to the exception of the ordinance, the regulate "grog shops, and other offense is committed." Per Cooley, persons keeping public houses." J. in Lynch v. People, 16 Mich., Gabel v. Houston, 29 Tex., 335. 472, 477. !i4 The claim was made that if the os Per Bell, J. in State v. Free- ordinance allows a store or saloon man, 38 N. H., 426, 428, approving to be kept open on Sunday for one State v. Clark, 28 N. H., 176. kind of business, it necessarily fol- os State v. Ray, 131 N. C, 814; 42 lows that said store or saloon S. E. Rep., 960. §481] MARKETS— WEIGHTS AND MEASURES. 7G1 Charter power to regulate saloons and dram shops is usually construed as ample, to justify penal ordinances, prescribing the hours when such places shall open and close.®'^ 5. MARKETS— "WEIGHTS AND MEASURES. § 481. Markets— Establishment ajid regulation. To pro- mote the health and good government of the inhabitants, mu- nicipal corporations are usually endowed with ample charter power, to establish markets and market-places ;''^ to forbid within the corporation the sale and purchase of specified Auctioneers. Charter power to regulate, authorizes an ordinance forbidding the sale of watches at auction after 6 o'clock in the even- ing. Buffalo V. Marion, 13 Misc. Rep., 639; 34 N. Y. Supp., 945. 9' Ordinance forbidding the sale of liquor after 9 p. m., or after dark, held valid. Smith v. Knox- ville, 3 Head. (Tenn.), 245; Max- well V. Jonesboro, 11 Heisk (Tenn.), 257. Compare Grills v. Jonesboro, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.), 247; Ward V. Greenville, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.), 228. Ordinance requiring dram shop to be closed between hours named sustained. Tarklo v. Cook, 120 Mo., 1; 25 S. W. Rep., 202; State (Staats) v. Washing- ton, 45 N. J. L., 318; Ex parte Wolf, 14 Neb., 24, 31, 32; 14 N. W. Rep., 660; Bennett v. Pulaski (Tenn. 1899), 47 L. R. A., 278. Under power to license, and gen- eral power (welfare clause) bor- ough may, by ordinance, prohibit the sale of liquor in licensed houses after the hour of ten o'clock p. m. State (Staats) v. Washington, 44 N. J. L., 605, 608, 610. Such ordir nance does not take away any vest- ed or constitutional right. "It is merely the reservation of a police power, which the common council may exercise as they deem expe- dient for the good order and gov- ernment of the borough, of which they cannot divest themselves by granting licenses to inn-keepers." Page 608. Reasonableness of such regulations discussed. Page 609. "s Makket Defined. Cincinnati v. Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 257, per Lane, C. J.; Caldwell v. Alton, 33 111., 416, per Breese, J. Establishment or Markets. Georgia — Atlanta v. White, 33 Ga., 229. Michigan — Gale v. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich., 344. Minnesota — Paul v. Coulter, 12 Minn., 41. New York — People v. Lawber, 7 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 158; 28 Barb. (N. Y.), 65; Ketchum v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y., 356. North Carolina — Smith v. New- bern, 70 N. C, 14; 16 Am. Rep., 766; Wade v. Newbern, 77 N. C, 460. Ohio— White v. Kent, 11 Ohio St., 550. Texas — Palestine v. Barnes, 50 Tex., 538. United States — New Orleans v. Morris, 3 Woods (U. S. C. C), 103, 107. Establishment of markets by pri- vate individuals. Twelfth Street Market v. Philadelphia, etc. Ry. Co., 142 Pa. St., 580; 21 Atl. Rep., 902, 989. Power to Establish Continu- ing; hence markets may be 763 MARKETS— WEIGHTS AND MEASURES. [§481 products at places other than those established ;^9 to provide reasonable inspection regulations; to prevent the sale of bad, impure or adulterated articles of food/ and, cheats and frauds changed from time to time, within the discretion of the municipal au- thorities. Jacksonville v. Ledwith, 26 Fla., 163; 7 So. Rep., 885; Coop- er V. Detroit, 42 Mich., 584; 4 N. E. Rep., 262; Gall v. Cincinnati, 18 Ohio St., 563; Wartman v. Phila- delphia, 33 Pa. St., 202. Market Place in Public Street OR Square, as a nuisance. Alabama — State v. Mobile, 5 Port. (Ala.), 279; 30 Am. Dec, 564. Florida — Lutterloch v. Cedar Keys, 15 Fla., 306. Georgia — Columbus v. Jaques, 30 Ga., 506. Michigan — Henkel y. Detroit, 49 Mich., 249; 13 N. W. Rep., 611. New York — St. Johns v. New York, 3 Bosw. (N. Y.), 483. ■New Jersey — McDonald v. New- ark, 42 N. J. Eq., 136; 7 Atl. Rep., 855 ; State v. Laverack, 34 N. J. L., 201. Pennsylvania — Wartman v. Phil- adelphia, 33 Pa. St., 202. Delegation of Power to Estab- lish private markets, is void. State V. Dubarry, 44 La. Ann., 1117; 11 So. Rep., 718; State v. DefEes, 45 La. Ann., 658; 12 So. Rep., 841. Ordinance requiring consent of a majority of property owners in block, to open market, held void. State V. Garibaldi, 44 La. Ann., 809; 11 So. Rep., 36. Makket-house. It was early held in Massachusetts that cities and towns had power to establish, with- out express grant. Spaulding v. Lowell, 23 Pick. (Mass.), 71, per Shaw, C. J. "Cadillac Square," Detroit, Michigan; Establishment and his- tory, per Campbell, J., in Attorney- General V. Detroit, 71 Mich., 92; 38 N. W. Rep., 714; People v. Keir, 78 Mich., 98; 43 N. W. Rep., 1039. Ordinances Regulating Mar- kets are strictly an exercise of the police power. Lamar v. Weidman, 57 Mo. App., 507; Municipality v. Cutting, 4 La. Ann., 335. Charter power to regulate markets, gives power to provide by ordinance for collection of twenty-five cents for persons occupying stands in mar- kets. Cincinnati v. Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 257. ss See next succeeding section 482. 1 Adulterated Food. State v. Fourcade, 45 La. Ann., 717; 13 So. Rep., 187; 40 Am. St. Rep., 249; Shillito V. Thompson, L. R. 1 Q. B. Div., 12; 33 L. T. (N. S.), 506; 24 Week. Rep., 57. Such food may be seized and destroyed, etc. White Redfern, L. R. 5 Q. B. Div., 15; 41 L. T. (N. S.), 524; 28 Week. Rep., 168; Daly v. Webb. Ir. Rep., 4 C. L., 309; 18 Week. Rep., 631. Inspection of Animals intended for food. State v. People's Slaugh- terhouse & R. Co., 46 La. Ann., 1031; 15 So. Rep., 408. An ordinance requiring ante- mortem inspection of animals in- tended to be slaughtered for use as human food, and providing for a post mortem inspection of the meat of such animals before the same is placed upon the markets for sale is reasonable and valid. New Orleans V. Lozes, 51 La. Ann., 1172; 25 So. Rep., 979. Offering tainted meat at public sale was a nuisance at common law. Shillito v. Thompson, L. R. 1 Q. B. Div. 12, and indictable. Reg V. Stevenson, 3 F. & P., 106, and each separate exposure or offer for !482] MARKETS— WEIGHTS AND MEASURES. 763 in weights and measures ;2 and, finally, to make and enforce such other necessary and desirable regulations, consistent with the State laws and local charter, as will best promote the public interest.* § 482. Confining sales and purchases to public markets- Forbidding private markets. Charter power ' ' to regulate and manage markets," has been held sufficient to authorize an or- dinaince forbidding the sale of market commodities at stores, stalls and places in the city outside of the established market sale was a distinct offense. Emmer- ton V. Mathews, 7 N. & N., 586; Queen v. Jarvis, 3 F. & F., 108. Provisions. Power to regulate the vending of meat, held not to give power to make it penal to sell putrid provisions. Rochester v. Rood, Hill & D. Supp. (N. Y.), 146. Cotton Mekohants, dealing in loose cotton cannot be compelled, by ordinance, to keep a daily record to be open to the inspection of the police. Long v. Shelby County Taxing Dist, 7 Lea. (75 Tenn.), 134; 40 Am. Rep., 55. Delegation. An ordinance can- not delegate to the inspector the power to determine what articles if sold would be injurious to public health or a fraud on the public. Cairo v. Coleman, 53 111. App., 680. Buttee-Qleomargakine. Statute forbidding the sale of oleomarga- rine or any other article in imita- tion of butter or cheese, held con- stitutional. State V. Addington, 77 Mo., 110; Powell v. Com. 114 Pa. St., 265; 7 Atl. Rep., 913; affirmed 127 U. S., 678. Contra. People v. Marx, 99 N. Y., 377; 2 N. E. Rep., 29, reversing 35 Hun. (N. Y.), 528. 2 See § 485 post. 3 Davenport v. Kelley, 7 Iowa, 102, overruled in Le Claire v. Dav- enport, 13 Iowa, 210; State V. Du- barry, 46 La. Ann., 33; 14 So. Rep., 298; Lamarque v. New Orleans, 1 McGloin (La.), 28; State v. Sar- radal, 46 La., 700; 15 So. Rep., 87; 24 L. R. A., 584; Ash v. People, 11 Mich., 347; Hatch v. Pendergast, 15 Md., 251. Regulations must conform to state law. State v. St. Paul, 32 Minn., 329; 20 N. W. Rep., 243. Mercantile houses and markets. Vosse V. Memphis, 9 Lea. (Tenn.), 294. Permitting one to remain in mar- ket only twenty minutes, unless, etc. Regulation held valid. Com. V. Brooks, 109 Mass., 355. Hours of opening and closing. Jacksonville v. Ledwith, 26 Pla., 163; 7 So. Rep., 885; 23 Am. St. Rep., 558. Ice, sale of, on street may be reg- ulated. Com. V. Reid, 175 Mass., 325; 56 N. E. Rep., 617. Permission required, to occupy place on street to sell produce, which place is a part of the mar- ket. In re Nightingale, 11 Pick (Mass.), 168. Oysters, regulating sale of. Mu- nicipality No. 1 V. Harnett, 13 La., 344 ; Morano v. New Orleans, 2 La., 217. Meat Shops, etc. St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo., 547; St. Louis v. Jackson, 25 Mo., 37; St. Louis v. Freivogel, 95 Mo., 533; 8 S. W. Rep., 715; Rockville v. Merchant, 60 Mo. App., 365. A Butcher is one who slaughters 764 MARKETS— WEIGHTS AND MEASURES. [§482 houses.* "The right to establish a public market necessarily covers or embraces the right to prevent the establishment of private markets, and the right to prevent the sale of market commodities within the police regulations of a city for sanitary purposes and convenience. The object, primarily, is to enforce the inspection laws more strictly, and to prevent the sale of ai'ticles or provisions that are not sound. "^ Under power to make such prudential laws as may be deemed proper respect- ing markets, a by-law may deny the privilege of selling meats within the city, except at the public markets and within cer- tain districts thereof.* But similar ordinances passed under animals or dresses their flesh for market, hut an ordinance may use the word as the keeper of a meat market. Rockville v. Merchant, 6.0 Mo. App., 365. Licensing and regulating butch- ers, butcher stalls, etc. St. Paul v. Colter, 12 Minn., 41; 90 Am. Dec, 278. Oppressive Regulations Held Voiii. Ordinance forbidding sales on the principal city markets, ex- cept from stands leased by sellers, and confines farmers and others, with their vehicles, to other mar- kets, where the accommodations are inadequate and virtually shuts out the latter class of vendors from said markets, without giving them any substitute for it and requires their articles to be sold by the lessees of the stalls, held void. Hughes V. Recorders Court, 75 Mich., 574; 42 N. W. Rep., 984. Compare People v. Keir, 78 Mich., 98; 43 N. W. Rep., 1039, and dis- senting opinion of Campbell, J., p. 108. Necessity of Maeket Regula- tions, per Richardson, J. in State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Charleston, 2 Speers (S. C), 623, 626; Black, C. J. in Wartman v. Philadelphia, 33 Pa, St., 202, 209. ■t "While the power 'to regulate' does not authorize prohibition in a general sense, for the very essence of the regulation is the existence of something to be regulated, yet the weight of authority is to the effect, that this power confers the authority to confine the business referred to to certain hours of the day, to certain localities or build- ings in the city, and to the manner of its prosecution within those hours, localities and buildings." Per Stone, C. J. in ex parte Byrd, 84 Ala. 17, 20; 4 So. Rep., 397; 5 Am. St. Rep., 328. To same effect — Natal v. Louis- iana, 139 U. S., 621; Jackson- ville V. Ledwith, 26 Fla., 163; 7 So. Rep., 885; 23 Am. St. Rep., 558; State v. Barthe, 41 La. Ann., 46; 6 So. Rep., 531; State v. Schmidt, 41 La. Ann., 27; 6 So. Rep., 530; New Orleans v. Stafford, 27 La. Ann., 417; 21 Am. Rep., 563; Newson v. Galveston, 76 Tex., 559; 13 S. W. Rep., 368. 5 New Orleans v. Graffina, 52 La. Ann., 1082; 27 So. Rep., 590; 78 Am. St. Rep., 387 ; State v. Namais, 49 La. Ann., 618; 21 So. Rep., 852; State V. Gisch, 31 La. Ann., 544. 6 Buffalo V. Webster, 10 Wend. (N. Y.), 99; Bush v. Seabury, 8 Johns. (N. Y.), 418. An ordinance prohibiting butch- ers, not licensees of butchers' stalls, from selling meat in quantities § 483] MARKETS— WEIGHTS AND MEASURES. 1&5 the general power to e'stablish and regulate markets have been held unauthorized. Thus an ordinance was held void and in restraint of trade which declared it unlawful to keep a private market.'^ So under like power, an ordinance forbidding the sale of meat, except in market stalls, the rents of which were fixed and regulated by the city, was vacated.* So under power "to establish amd keep up markets," in the opinion of Lump- kin, J., in an early Georgia case, an ordinance cannot pro- hibit the sale of marketable articles, within market hours, else- where than in the markets.^ And in an early Illinois case, per Breese, J., general power was held to be insufficient to support an ordinance restraining merchants and dealers in family gro- ceries from selling vegetables at their places of business, out- side of the market limits.io But charter power "to regulate the vending of meats brought into the city for sale," and "to license, tax and regulate butchers," confers power to prevent,, by ordinance, the retailing of fresh meat from four o'clock, p. m. to nine o'clock, a. m., except by persons duly licensed.^i § 483. Regulation of hucksters, hawkers, etc. Reasonable or- dinances are valid which are intended to restrain and regulate hucksters, hawkers and peddlers. ^^ Under sufficient charter power, the peddling of garden and farm products, meat, poul- less than one quarter, held valid. s St. Paul v. Laidler, 2 Minn. Bowling Green v. Carson, 10 Bush 190; 72 Am. Dec, 89. (Ky.), 64; St. Louis v. Jackson, 25 9 Bethune v. Hughes, 28 Ga., 560. Mo., 37. This case has been much criticised. An ordinance forbidding sales of Compare Badkins v. Robinson, 53 meat, except at public markets, sus- Ga., 613. tained. Winnsboro v. Smart, 11 i» Caldwell v. Alton, 33 111., 416. Rich. Law (S. C), 551. u Porter v. Water Valley, 70 An ordinance may forbid the sale Miss., 560; 12 So. Rep., 828. of perishable food commodities in An ordinance may prohibit the the railway stations, depots and sale of milk from vehicles by those landings of the city, except such not duly licensed. People v. Mul- sale of articles in the unbroken holland, 82 N. Y., 324; 37 Am. Rep., packages in which they are im- 568. ported into the state. State v. 12 Tomlin v. Cape May, 63 N. J. Davidson, 50 La. Ann., 1297; 69 L., 429; 44 Atl. Rep., 209; Bush v. Am. St. Rep., 478; 24 So. Rep., 324. Seabury, 8 Johns. (N. Y.), 418; Of course, ordinance. regulations Sayre Borough v. Phillips, 148 Pa. cannot interfere with foreign or St. Rep., 482; 24 Atl. Rep., 76; 33 interstate commerce. Sec 249 et seq. Am. St. Rep,, 482; Milton v. Hoag- T Bloomington v. Wahl, 46 111., land, 3 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep., 283. 489. Must not discriminate. Danville 766 MARKETS— WEIGHTS AND MEASURES. [§ 484 try, game, etc., about the streets may be forbidden. ^^ So an ordinance may make it unlawful, during certain months of the year, to hawk about or sell by retail any kind of fish, beef, pork, or mutton, except at the public markets, or within desig- nated limits around the same.^* Charter power to license and regulate hawkers, peddlers, etc., and the sale of meat, fish and vegetables, has been held to confer power, to forbid, by ordi- nance, the peddling of fruit and garden and farm products in the public streets between five o'clock in the morning and one o'clock in the afternoon. i^ To prevent obstructing or encum- bering the public streets, the time that wagons shall be allowed to stand in the streets, to make sales may be limited.^® § 484. Milk inspection and adulteration. Ordinance regu- lations providing for the inspection of milk sold within the corporate limits and forbidding its sale when below a standard prescribed, and authorizing its destruetioo if found to be im- pure, in accordance with such standard, have been sustained.^ ^ The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in a well considered opinion, held valid an ordinance of the City of New Orleans which re- quired (under penalty in case of refusal) vendors of milk to the public to furnish gratuitously on application of sanitary in- spectors samples of milk, not exceeding one-half pint, for in- spection and analysis. The ordinance was declared not uncon- V. Peters, 8 Luz. L. Reg. (Pa.), Graff ty v. Rushville, 107 Ind., 502; 272; Hughes v. Recorder's Court, 8 N. E. Rep., 609; Duluth v. Krupp, 75 Mich., 574; 42 N. W. Rep., 984. 46 Minn., 435; 49 N. W. Rep., 235. Unreasonable regulations. Dun- is Buffalo, N. Y. Charter. Buf- ham V. Rochester, 5 Cow. (N. Y.), falo v. Schleifer (Buffalo Sup. Ct. 462. General Term), 2 Misc. Rep. (N. By law forbidding hawkers, etc., Y.), 216; 21 N. Y. Supp., 913. on certain streets, held void. Virgo is Com. v. Brooks, 109 Mass., V. Toronto, 22 Canada Sup. Ct. 355; People v. Keir, 78 Mich., 98; (Duval), 447. 43 N. W. Rep., 1039. HucTcster defined. Mays v. Cin- i' Deems v. Baltimore, 80 Md. cinnati, 1 Ohio St., 268. 164; 45 Am. St. Rep., 339; 26 L. laShelton v. Mobile, 30 Ala., R. A., 541; 30 Atl. Rep., 648. 540; 68 Am. Dec, 143. Regulating inspection of milk. Particular case. Sharon v. Haw- Littlefield v. State 42 Neb., 223 ; 60 thorne, 123 Pa. St., 106; 16 Atl. N. W. Rep., 724; 47 Am. St. Rep., Rep., 835. ' 697. 1* Buffalo V. Webster, 10 Wend. An ordinance may adopt a stand- (N. Y.), 99, per Savage, C. J. ard to test quality. State v. Four- What constitutes "peddling." cade, 45 La. Ann., 717; 13 So. Rep., Chicago V. Bartee, 100 III., 57; 187. The burden is upon defend- 485] MARKETS— WEIGHTS AND MEASURES. ~iC>] stitutional as forcing dairymen to furnish evidence against themselves, as taking private property for public use without compensation and without due process of law, as depriving them and their property of the equal protection of the law, and denying them protection in person and property from unrea- sonable searches and seizures and authorizing invasion of the same, without warrant founded on oath or affirmation. Nor is such ordinance unreasonable, vexatious or oppressive; it is a legitimate exercise of the police power in the interest of public health.18 § 485. Weights and measures. Ordinances regulating the character of weights and measures to be used for coal, hay, lumber, cord wood and other bulky articles, and meat, bread, ant to show that the standard is unreasonable. Implied power will sustain such ordinance (Arguen- do). State V. Stone, 46 La. Ann., 147, 151; 15 So. Rep., 11. An ordinance requiring in inspec- tion the application of the "tuber- culine test," is not unreasonable. State V. Nelson, 66 Minn., 166; 61 Am. St. Rep., 399; 68 N. W. Rep., 1066; 34 L. R. A., 318. Ordinance forbidding feeding still slops to cows and the vending of milk of cows so fed, is within the police power. Johnson v. Si- monton, 43 Cal., 242. Statutes prohibiting sale of adul- terated milk, held constitutional. Iowa — State v. Schlenker, 112 Iowa, 642; 84 N. W. Rep., 698. Massachusetts. — ^Com. v. Wether- bee, 153 Mass., 159; 26 N. E. Rep., 414. New Hampshire — State v. Camp- bell, 64 N. H., 402; 13 Atl. Rep., 585. New York — People v. West, 106 N. Y., 293; 12 N. B. Rep., 610. Rhode Island — State v. Groves, 15 R. I., 208; 2 Atl. Rep., 384. Knowledge of adulteration on the part of defendant need not be shown. Com. v. Evans, 132 Mass., 11; Com. V. Farren, 9 AJlen (Mass.), 489; Com. v. Weiss, 139 Pa. St., 247; 21 Atl. Rep., 10. § 343 supra relates to proving the intent. The legislature may forbid the sale of impure or adulterated milk, and provide a standard to test the quality. Com. v. Waite, 11 Allen (Mass.), 264; 87 Am. Dec, 711; Com. V. Farren, 9 Allen (Mass.), 489; People v. Cipperly, 101 N. Y., 634; 4 N. E. Rep., 107; Polinsky v. People, 73 N. Y., 65; People v. Ed- dy, 59 Hun. (N. Y.), 615; 12 N. Y. Suppl., 628; State v. Smythe, 14 R. I., 100. An ordinance making it unlaw- ful to sell skimmed milk, is a valid exercise of the police power. Kan- sas City V. Cook, 38 Mo. App., 660. Statutes forbidding sale of skim- med milk are constitutional. Com. V. Wetherbee, 153 Mass., 159; 26 N. E. Rep., 414. 18 Per Nichols, C. J. in State v. Dupaquier, 46 La. Ann., 577; 15 So. Rep., 502; 26 L. R. A., 162. In Massachusetts a statute was held constitutional which author- ized inspectors of milk "to enter any place where milk is stored or kept for sale, and all carriages used 768 MARKETS— WEIGHTS AND MEASURES. H85 and other specified market and food products sold and deliv- ered within the corporate limits are strictly an exercise of the police power, and are common in all cities and towns.^^ Gen- eral charter powers will support an ordinance requiring coal to for the conveyance of milk; and whenever they have reason to be- lieve any milk found therein is adulterated, they shall take speci- mens thereof and cause the same to be analyzed, or otherwise satis- factorily tested, the result of which they shall record and preserve as evidence." Com. v. Carter, 132 Mass., 12. To the same effect. Shivers v. Newton, 45 N. J. La., 469; Blazier V. Miller, 10 Hun. (N. Y.), 435. The fact that the thing seized may be used as evidence against the person from whom taken is not a violation of the bill of rights. Com. V. Dava, 2 Met. (Mass.), 329. Statute (relating to sale of li- quor) requiring druggists to pro- duce in court, or before any grand jury, all prescriptions compounded "whenever thereto lawfully re- quired," etc., held constitutional. State V. Davis, 117 Mo., 614; 23 S. W. Rep., 759. The constitutional provision, "that no one shall be compelled to testify against himself in a crimi- nal case," forbids the seizure of one's private books and papers in order to obtain evidence against him. State v. Davis, 108 Mo., 666; 18 S. W. Rep., 894. 13 Arkansas — Taylor v. Pine Bluff, 34 Ark., 603. Kentucky — Collins v. Louisville, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.), 134. Massachusetts — Baton v. Kegan, 114 Mass., 433; Ritchie v. Boyn- ton, 114 Mass., 431. Minnesota — Lehigh Coal & Iron Co. V. Capehart, 49 Minn., 539; 52 N. W. Rep., 142. Missouri — Sylvester Coal Co. v. St. Louis, 130 Mo., 323; 32 S. W. Rep., 649; 51 Am. St. Rep., 566; St. Louis V. Priesmeyer, 12 Mo. App., 592. New Jersey — Hoffman v. Jersey City, 34 N. J. L., 172. New York — People v. Rochester, 45 Hun. (N. Y.), 102. North Carolina — State v. Tyson, 111 N. C, 687; 16 S. E. Rep., 238; Raleigh v. Sorrell, 1 Jones (46 N. C), 49. Oftio— Huddleson v. Ruffln, 6 Ohio St., 604. Pennsylvania — Phillips v. Allen, 41 Pa. St., 481; 82 Am. Dec, 486. South Carolina — Charleston v. Rodgers, 2 McCord L. (S. C), 495; 13 Am. Dec, 751. West Virginia — State v. Peel Splint Coal Co., 36 W. Va., 802; 15 S. E. Rep., 1000. Wisconsin — Yates v. Milwaukee, 12 Wis., 673. United States — Turner v. Mary- land, 107 U. S., 38. By-law which requires hay to be weighed on public scales, con- strued to apply to hay only bought within city. Gass v. Greenville, 4 Sneed (Tenn.), 62. Sales outside of city limits. La- mar V. Weidman, 57 Mo. App., 507. Ordinance forbidding the sale of any timber brought into the cor- poration for sale, without a survey, held not to apply to timber deliv- ered there to be used for a specific purpose under , a special contract made elsewhere. Briggs v. A Light Boat, 7 Allen (Mass.), 287, 298, per Bigelow, C. J. Statute forbidding purchase of §4861 MISCELLANE30US POLICE REGULA'J'IONS. 769 be sold by weights and measures.^" A reasonable charge for the service of weighing or measuring is not in the nature of a tax.21 Charter power to make provision for weighing coal, confers implied power to provide the means of weighing it, in- cluding the authority to maintain public scales.22 6. MISCELLANEOUS REGULATIONS. § 486. Oflfenses affecting the public order and peace. Under the usual charter powers, ordinances are authorized directed against offenses affecting the public order and peace, as those forbidding riotous assemblies, disturbing the peace,^^ molesting religious and other lawful meetings, blowing whistles of fac- tories, shops, etc., parading in public thoroughfares with music, etc., without legal permits,^* ringing bells for auction sales, lumber not surveyed as required is constitutional though it applies to only part of the state. Pierce v. Kimball, 9 Me., 54. Ordinances relating to cording wood held to be superseded by State Statute. Com. v. Gillam, 8 Serg. & R. (Pa.), 50. Weight of Bread; regulating. Mobile V. YulUe, 3 Ala., 137; Peo- ple v. Wagner, 86 Mich., 594; 49 N. W. Rep., 609; 13 L. R. A., 286. Phillips V. Allen, 41 Pa. St., 481; 82 Am. Dec, 486; Paige v. Fazack- erly, 36 Barb. (N. Y.), 302. A city may establish the assize and regulate weight and inspection of bread, under power "to regulate everything which relates to bak- ers." If unstamped, as ordinance requires or deficient in weight, of- ficers given power to seize such bread and bring offender before court, who in event of conviction, could order forfeiture of bread for use of city work house. Guillotte V. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann., 432. 20 Under general power an ordi- nance may require coal sold in the city to be weighed by city weigh- ers. Stokes V. New York, 14 Wend. (N. Y.), 87. 21 "We cannot understand how any one can take exceptions either to the reasonableness, lawfulness or constitutionality of a regulation requiring people to buy and sell by lawful weights and measures rath- er than by guess. A proposition such as this is too plain for dis- cussion; it is determined at once by the application of the ordinary principles of fair dealing and com- mon sense," per Gordon. J in O'Mat- ly V. Preeport, 96 Pa. St., 24, 30; 42 Am. Rep., 527 ; Fisher v. Harris- burg, 2 Grant (Pa.), 291. 22 St. Charles v. Eisner, 155 Mo., 671; 56 S. W. Rep., 291. One public scale established in a town of six hundred inhabitants, held valid. Davis v. Anite, 73 Iowa, 325; 35 N. W. Rep., 244. Power to regulate the inspection and weighing of "brick, lumber, firewood, coal, hay and any article of merchandise," does not Include articles of merchandise of a sta- tionery store. Cairo v. Coleman, 53 111. App., 680. 23 § 487 post. 21 §g 416 and 466 supra. 49 (70 MISCELLANEOUS POLICE REGULATIONS. 1487 etc., playiEg on hand organs and other musical instruments, giving false alarms of fire, etc. § 487. Same— Disturbing the peace. Usual charter powers are sufScient, to authorize ordinances directed against the dis- turbance of the peace by unusual noises and other boisterous and improper conduct calculated to disturb the tranquillity of citizens. -° Thus the charter of Detroit, which confers power to prevent any disorderly noise or disturbance in the streets or elsewhere within the corporation, was held to be sufficient to support an ordinance punishing "any persons who shall make any disturbance by which the peace and good order of the neighborhood are disturbed," etc.^'^ So, under the usual char- ter power, an ordinance is authorized forbidding, under pen- alty, loud and boisterous cursing and swearing in any street, house, or elsewhere, within the city.^'' Obviously, the purpose of such ordinance is to promote good morals, the decencies and -■• CiiAEivAEi. An ordinance pro- viding that "every person who shall willfully disturb the peace by loud or unusual noise, by blowing horns, trumpets, or other instru- ments, or by any other device or means whatsoever, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor," is not violated by parties engaged in a "charivari" unless the effect is to disturb the peace and quiet of the citizens or some of them. St. Charles v. Meyer, 58 Mo., 86. Firing off Pistol, etc. Washing- ton V. Eaton, 4 Cranch C. C, 352; 29 Fed. Cas. No. 17, 228; Cotton- wood Falls V. Smith, 36 Kan. 401; 13 Pac. Rep., 576. Salvation Army. People ex rel. V. Rochester, 44 Hun, (N. Y,), 166. Beating Deum or tambourine on street or sidewalk. Vance v. Had- fleld, 22 N. Y. St., 858. Beating drum or tambourine or making any noise with any Instrument for any purpose whatever without a written permit; valid. Roderick v. Whitson, 51 Hun (N. Y.), 620; 4 N. Y. Suppl., 112 ; Wilkes Barre v. Garebed, 9 Kulp. (Pa.), 273. Peo- ple V. Van Houten, 13 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.), 603; People v. Garabed, 20 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.), 127. Public Meeting or gatherings on the streets may be forbidden, without a permit. Bloomington V. Richardson, 38 111. App., 60. Addresses in public parks, etc., without permission. Com. v. Abra- hams, 156 Mass., 57; 30 N. E. Rep., 79; Com. v. Davis, 140 Mass., 485; 4 N. B. Rep., 577. "Noise" construed to mean an unreasonable noise, of a nature to disturb the community. State v. Cantieny, 34 Minn., 1; 24 N. W. Rep., 458. 26 /n re Bushey, 105 Mich., 64; 62 N. W. Rep., 1036. 2T State V. Cainan, 94 N. C. 880. State V. Earnhardt, 107 N. C, 789 ; 12 S. E. Rep., 426. Boisterous and Disorderly Con- duct — ordinance forbidding, valid. Mt. Sterling (Newport) v. Holly, 108 Ky., 621; 57 S. W. Rep., 491. Magistrate may fine for. Louis- burg V. Harris, 7 Jones L. (52 N. §489J MISCELLANEOUS POLICE REGULATIONS. 771 proprieties of society, prevent nuisances and other criminal offenses that might result from the acts and conduct forbid- den.2* § 488. Same— CanTing concealed weapons. Ordinances forbidding the carrying of concealed weapons have been sus- tained.2'' Such ordinance is not invalid because it fails to in- clude certain exceptions embraced in the state law provided as a defense against the charge.*" And it has been held in Missouri that such ordinance is not void because it provides for a fine less than that fixed by a state statute.^i § 489. Cnielty to animals. Under the general welfare clause ordinances may be enacted forbidding cruelty to dumb animals ; and this notwithstanding such cruelty is made a mis- demeanor by the general laws of the state.^^ C), 281. Boisterous assemblages may be forbidden at "any" place witliin the corporate limits. Vicks- burg V. Briggs, 102 Mich., 551; 61 N. W. Rep., 1. 28 Obscene or Indecent Lan- guage used in public, may be for- bidden. Ex parte Slattery 3 Ark. . (3 Pike), 484. Disorderly House. Centerville V. Miller, 57 Iowa, 56, 225; 10 N. W. Rep., 293, 639. Conflict with the State Law must be avoided. State v. Sher- rard, 117 N. C. 716; 23 S. E. Rep., 157. Breach or Peace; ordinance fix- ing penalty for, held void, as of- fense controlled by State Statute. Raleigh v. Dougherty, 3 Humph. (22 Tenn.), 11; 39 Am. Dec, 149. Assault, ordinances forbidding have been sustained. Amboy v. Sleeper, 21 111., 499 ; State v. Bruck- hauser, 26 Minn., 301; 3 N. W. Rep., 695. Also, held void. Walsh V. Union, 13 Oregon, 589; 11 Pac. Rep., 312; People v. Brown, 2 Utah, 462. The points involved related to charter power and consistency with State laws and are fully treated in chapter XV. 29 Cottonwood Falls v. Smith, 36 Kan., 401; 13 Pac. Rep., 576; St. Louis V. Vert, 84 Mo. 204; Abbe- ville v. Leopard, 61 S. C, 99; 39 S. E. Rep., 248. By any person other than police officers and travelers, wltfiout a permit from police commissioners. Penalty not less than $250, nor more than $500, or imprisonment not less than three months, nor more than six months, or both, is valid. Penalty not excessive. Ex parte Cheney, 90 Cal., 617; 27 Pac. Rep., 436. 30 Linneus v. Dusky, 19 Mo. App., 20. Where the offense is covered by State Statute, it cannot be con- demned by ordinance. Collins v. Hall, 92 Ga, 411; 17 S. E. Rep., 622. See Chapter XV. of Municipal Control of Offense Against the State. 31 Sa; parte Caldwell, 138 Mo., 233; 39 S. W. Rep., 761. See § 178 supra. Delegation ; ordinance forbid- ding, without permission from the village president held void. Mc- Gregor V. Lovington, 48 111. App., 211. 32 St. Louis V. Schoenbusch, 95 772 MISCELLANEOUS POLICE REGULATIONS. [§491 § 490. Vagrancy. Charters often confer power in express terms to restrain and punish vagrancy.^* A charter giving power "to regulate the police" of a city authorizes an ordi- nance to punish vagrants.®* Under a statute declaring that habitual drunkards, who shall abandon, neglect or refuse to aid in the support of their families, and who may be com- plained of by their families, shall be deemed vagrants, an ordi- nance which omits habitual drunkenness, as a constituent ele- ment of the offense, is void.®^ § 491. Regulations of various occupations. Reasonable reg- ulations may be imposed on auetioneers,^^ as forbidding the sale of watches at auction after six o'clock in the evening;®''' junk shops ;®^^ second hand dealers ;®* rag pickers, as by for- Mo. 618; 8 S. W. Rep., 791. See Chapter XV of Municipal Control of Offenses Against the State. An ordinance fixing the maxi- mum load of a two-horse team and wagon and prescribing a penalty against the contractor employing such team for exceeding such maxi- mum is not void on the ground of partiality. Kansas City v. Sutton, 52 Mo. App., 398. Intent. Under section 3896, R. S. Mo., 1889, the intent with which cruelty is inflicted on an animal is immaterial, provided the act it- self was willful and not accidental. State V. Hackfath, 20 Mo. App., 614. But evidence that the horse was overdriven does not warrant a conviction under this section, in the absence of proof that the over- driving was willful and not acci- dental. State V. Roche, 37 Mo. App., 480. See § 343 supra. 33 Kansas City v. Neal, 49 Mo. App., 72; Withers v. Coyles, 36 Ala., 320. 34 St. Louis V. Bentz, 11 Mo., 61. One cannot be fined as a vagrant because found trespassing on the private premises of another if able to give an account of himself. St. Louis V. Babcock, 156 Mo., 148; 56 S. W. Rep., 732. A law authorizing a vagrant not accused or convicted for any crime to be hired for six months to the highest bidder after the determin- ation of the fact of such vagrancy by a jury, is violative of both state and federal constitution prohibit- ing slavery or involuntary servi- tude except in punishment of crime where the party shall be duly con- victed. In re Thompson, 117 Mo., 83; 22 S. W. Rep., 863. 35 State V. Burns, 46 La. Ann., 34; 11 So. Rep., 878. See § 16 supra and Chapter XV. 38 License of auctioneers, § 428 supra. 87 Buffalo V. Marion (Buffalo Sup. Ct. Gen. Term), 13 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.), 639; 34 N. Y. Supp., 945. History of licensing and regulat- ing auctioneers in New York is given by Ruger, C. J., in People ex rel. v. Grant, 126 N. Y., 473; 27 N. E. Rep., 964. 37% Louisiana — New Orleans v. Kaufman, 29 La. Ann., 283; 29 Am. Rep., 328. Massachusetts — Com. v. Leonard, 140 Mass., 473.; 4 N. E. Rep., 96; 54 Am. Rep., 485. §491] MISCELLANEOUS POLICE REGULATIONS. 773 bidding in certain districts the collection, storing or dealing in old rags, old papers, or such other refuse material ;*8 carpet beating machines, as by forbidding the use of, within one hun- dred feet of any church, schoolhouse or residence;*** rock crushing machine ;*i intelligence ofSces (under sufficient char- ter power) ;*2 laundries and wash houses, as by specifying dis- tricts in which such business shall be conducted,*^ prescribing hours,** the character of buildings,*^ and requiring the due ob- servance of proper sanitary conditions, and providing for in- pi — Pitts V. Vicksburg, 72 Miss., 181; 16 So. Rep., 418. Minnesota — Duluth v. Bloom, 55 Minn., 97; 56 N. W. Rep., 580; 21 L. R. A., 689. Michigan — Grand Rapids v. Brandy, 105 Mich., 670; 64 N. W. Rep., 29; 32 L. R. A., 116; 55 Am. St. Rep., 472. Ohio — Marmet v. State, 450 Ohio St., 63; 12 N. E. Rep., 463. South Carolina — Charleston v. Goldsmith, 12 Rich. Law (S. C), 470. License of Junk dealers, § 428. 38 Marmet v. State, 45 Ohio St., 63; 12 N. E. Rep., 463; State v. Segel, 60 Minn., 507; 62 N. W. Rep., 1134. Disinfection. Dealers in second hand clothing may, by ordinance, be required to turn over to the city, for disinfection, second hand cloth- ing, at specified prices. Rosenbaum V. Newbern, 118 N. C, 83; 32 L. R. A., 123; 24 S. E. Rep., 1. FuENiTUKE Dealer. Duluth v. Bloom, 55 Minn., 97; 56 N. W. Rep., 580; 21 L. R. A., 689. Peohibitory Ordinance, held void. Greensboro y. Bnrenreich, 80 Ala., 579; 60 Am. Rep., 130. Book Seller, held not a second hand dealer. Eastman v. Chicago, 79 111., 178. 39 Ordinance of Worcester, Mass., sustained. Com. v. Hubley, 172 Mass., 58; 70 Am. St. Rep., 242; 51 N. E. Rep., 448. *oEx parte Lacey, 108 Cal., 326; 41 Pac. Rep., 411; 49 Am. St. Rep., 93; where it is said that the ques- tion of the necessity or propriety of such ordinance is alone for the mu- nicipal authorities. *i Kansas City v. McAleer, 31 Mo. App., 433. ■12 Intelligence Office, to obtain employment for domestic servants and laborers cannot be regulated, if not enumerated in the charter. Keim v. Chicago, 46 111. App., 445. Labor Agent; ordinance requir- ing bond of, held void, in absence of charter power. State v. Von Sachs, 45 La. Ann., 1416; 14 So. Rep., 249. 43 /ji re Hang Kie, 69 Cal., 149; iO Pac. Rep., 327. Delegating power to tax-payers as to location is void. In re Quong Woo, 7 Sawyer (U. S.), 526; 13 Fed. Rep., 229. 44 Forbidding in certain block without consent of city authorities, held void. Ex parte Sing Lee, 96 Cal., 354; 31 Pac. Rep., 245; 31 Am. St. Rep., 218; Soon Hing v. Crawley, 113 U. S., 703; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep., 730; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S.. 27. 45 Construction of, in designated manner. Ex parte White, 67 Cal., 102; 7 Pac. Rep., 186. Stone or brick buildings. In re Yick Wo, 68 Cal., 294; 58 Am. Rep., 12; 9 Pac. Rep., 139. 774 MISCELLANEOUS POLICE REGULATIONS. l:§492 spection thereof ;**" hotel porters and runners ■*'' and the busi- ness of cutting ice;*^ but an ordinance regulating department stores, by forbidding the sale of certain articles therein, was held void, without special legislative grant.*^ § 492. Pawnbrokers. Reasonable police regulations may be made with_ respect to the conduct of the business of pawn- broking ;5<' but there must be no unreasonable interference with the right of property .^^ And it has been held that the right to regulate such occupation must be conferred by the leg- islature. ^^ An ordinance requiring pawnbrokers to keep a book in which shall be entered a description of all property left with them in pawn, together with the name and description of the person leaving it and to submit such book to the police or other public officers on "demand is reasonable, it being a mere police regulation to aid in the detection and prevention of lar- ceny. ^^ Such regulation does not contravene the constitutional 40 Reasonable fee to cover city inspection, sustained. "It is neither a tax nor the imposition of a li- cense for revenue purposes * * * This is not the case of the city at- tempting to use its police power to enforce the collection of revenue." Per Blanchard, J., New Orleans v. Hop Lee, 104 La., 601, 603; 29 So. Rep., 214, approving dissenting opinion of Bermudez, C. J. in State V. Blaser, 36 La. Ann., 363, 366. 47 Chillicothe v. Brown, 38 Mo. App., 609. 48 The Municipal Code of St. Louis, p. 615, § 914. 4" Chicago V. Netcher, 183 111., 104; 55 N. E. Rep., 707; 48 L. R. A., 261. f^o Georgia — Phillips v. Atlanta, 78 Ga., 773; 3 S. E. Rep., 431. Illinois — Kuhn v. Chicago, 30 111. App., 203. Michigan — Grand Rapids v. Braudy, 105 Mich., 670; 55 Am. St. Rep., 472; 64 N. W. Rep., 29; Van Baalen v. People, 40 Mich., 258. North Carolina — Schaul v. Char- lotte, 118 N. C, 733; 24 S. B. Rep., 526. Texas — Heitzelman v. State (Tex. Crim. App., 1894) 26 S. W. Rep., 729. Pawkbroker Defined. Lobban v. Garnett, 9 Dana (Ky.), 389, 390; St. Paul V. Lytle, 69 Minn., 1; 71 N. W. Rep., 703; Owens v. Kinsey, 7 Jones Law (52 N. C), 245, 246; Schaul V. Charlotte, 118 N. C, 733; 24 S. E. Rep., 526; Johnson v. Smith, 11 Humph. (Tenn.), 396, 398; National Bank v. Winston, 5 Baxt. (Tenn.), 685, 688; Hurst v. Jones, 10 Lea. (Tenn.), 8, 14; Rus- sell V. Filmore, 15 Vt, 130, 136; Surber v. McClintic, 10 W. Va., 236, 242. 51 Fulton V. District of Columbia, 2 App. Cas. (D. C), 431. f^2 State V. Itzcovitch, 49 La. Ann., 366; 21 So. Rep., 544; 62 Am. St. Rep., 648. S3 Illinois — Launder v. Chicago, 111 111., 291; 53 Am. Rep., 625. Indiana — Shuman v. Ft. Wayne, 127 Ind., 109; 26 N. B. Rep., 560; 11 L. R. A., 378. Kansas — Kansas City v. Garnier, 57 Kan., 412; 46 Pac. Rep., 707. Michigan — Grand Rapids v. § 493] MISCELLANEOUS POLICE REGULATIONS. V(i) provision declaring the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects from unreasonable Searches and seizures."** § 493. Protection of private property— Trespassing. Regu- lations for the protection of private property,"''' as by forbid- ding trespasses thereon, without the consent of the owner, have been held authorized under general charter power.^" Ill Maine an ordinance imposing a reasonable fine for mutilating or de- Braudy, 105 Mich., 670; 64 N. W. Rep., 29; 55 Am. St. Rep., 472; 32 L. R. A., 116. Minnesota — St. Paul v. Lytle, 69 Minn., 1; 71 N. W. Rep., 703. Missouri — St. Joseph v. Levin, 128 Mo., 588; 49 Am. St. Rep., 577; 31 S. W. Rep., 101. s-» St. Joseph V. Levin, 128 Mo., 588; 31 S. W. Rep., 101; 49 Am. St. Rep., 577. Interest, Usuky, etc., usually regulated by lavt^. Hallenbeck v. Getz, 63 Conn., 385; 28 Atl. Rep., 519; Jackson v. Shawl, 29 Cal., 267. Where a pawnbroker has re- leased his lien upon his security by reason of his usury, the owner of the property is not required to ten- der the amount of the debt before he brings an action to recover the pledged property; and in an ac- tion for conversation, such failure to tender the debt must be availed of, if at all, by the defendant in his answer. Hilgert v. Levin, 72 Mo. App., 48. Where the pledgee clothed with the appearance of ownership sells to an innocent purchaser, and the pledgor purchases the chattel from such vendee, he is not estopped to maintain an action against the pledgee for illegal conversation of the chattel. Hilgert v. Levin, 72 Mo. App., 48. The laws of 1891 (Mo.), page 170, apply to and govern pawn- brokers, notwithstanding the gen- eral subject, is emphasized in Re- vised Statutes, chapter 124, which prescribes punishment for the vio- lation of its provisions. Hilgert y. Levin, 72 Mo. App., 48. License of pawnbrokers, § 428 supra. '"'■"■ Crawfordsville v. Braden, 130 Ind., 149; 30 Am. St. Rep., 214; 28 N. E. Rep., 849. An ordinance to preserve private propercy, as a wharf, from en- croachment, held ultra viries. This is not a public purpose. Such pro- tection must come from the state. Horn V. People, 26 Mich., 221. See § 39 supra. s« Saxton V. Peoria, 75 111. App., 397, following the rule of McPher- son V. Chebanse, 114 111., 46; 28 N. B., Rep., 454. Maxicious Tkesi'ass upon real or personal property; ordinance pro- hibiting, sustained although there was a state statute on the subject. It was held competent for the ordi- nance to make farther regulations. Brownville v. Cook, 4 Neb., 101. See Ch. XV., post. Ordinance Jor- bidding deposits or removal of ma- terial, substance, earth, dirt, ashes, refuse, turf, or other article from improved real estate does not ap- ply to trespass committed within a building. St. Louis v. Babcock, 156 Mo., 154; 56 S. W. Rep., 731, 776 MISCELLANEOUS POLICE REGULATIONS. [§ 495 stroying ornamental shade trees was declared to be a valid exercise of the police power.^'^ But, according to a New Jersey- case, power to declare and define nuisances in the lots and lands, within the corporate limits, will not sustain an ordinance making a mere private trespass on the lands of another penal.'''* Regulations forbidding the obstruction of windows, shutting out light, etc., by fence and other erections, have been sus- tained.s" §494. Regulation of tenement houses, etc. In New York a law was sustained which required tenement houses to be furnished by the owners with water "when they (the owners) shall be directed to do so by the board of health, in sufficient quantities at one or more places on each floor occupied or in- tended to be occupied by one or more families." This was re- garded as a proper exercise of the police power both as a guard to the public health and as a protection against fire."" Ordinances are common, especially in the larger cities, provid- ing that lodging and tenement houses shall be sufficiently lighted or ventilated, supplied with water and properly con- structed privies or water-closets, and kept in a cleanly and sanitary condition, and unless they are so kept they may be declared public nuisances.^^ § 495. Limiting day's work— Eight hour laws. Laws pre- scribing the number of hours that shall constitute a day s work, and forbidding, under penalty, contracts of employment in violation thereof, in recent years, have received special judi- cial consideration.*^ In determining the validity of such laws, the fundamental question involved is : Do they unwarrantably interfere with the freedom of contract? The right to labor or employ labor and make contracts in respect thereto, upon such =' State V. Merrill, 37 Me., 329. "2 Under the recent charter of "8 Bregguglia v. Vineland, 53 N. San Francisco, the board of super- J. L., 168; 20 Atl. Rep., 1082. visors Is given power "to fix the ■'''» Kansas City v. Young, 85 Mo. hours of labor or service required App., 381. of all laborers in the service of the 60 Per Peckham, J. in New York city and county, and to fix their Health Department v. Trinity compensation; provided, that eight Church Rectors, etc., 145 N. Y., 32 ; hours shall be the maximum hours 45 Am. St. Rep., 579; 39 N. E. Rep., of labor in any calendar day, and 833. that the minimum wages of labor- si The Municipal Code of St. ers shall be two dollars a day." Louis, pp. 550, 551, §§ 601, 602 Charter of San Francisco, art, 11, 1495] MISCELLANEOUS POLICE REGULATIONS. terms as may be agreed to, is both a liberty and a property right, and is embraced within the constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.®* The right to contract, like all rights, is subject to such reasonable police regulations as spring from the obligation which each individual owes to society. The preservation of the ptiblic health and the promotion of the pub- lic interests are the primary ideas of organized government. But to secure these, the restrictions imposed by virtue of the sovereign police power must rest upon some reasonable basis; they must be necessary or desirable in advancing the public good, not ai'bitrary; and they must be impartial and uniform in their operation. In the practical application of these rules the courts are not entirely harmonious, as the decisions in the notes disclose."* An act of the congress declaring ' ' that eight hours shall con- stitute a day's work for all laborers, workmen and mechanics ch. 2, sec. 1, par. 24; Codes & Amendments to Stat, of Cal. (1899) p. 250. 63 Per Magruder, J., in Ritchie v. People, 155 111., 98, 104; 40 N. B. Rep., 454; 46 Am. St. Rep., 315. Laborers have the constitutional right to make their own contracts which cannot be impaired by legis- lative enactment. In re House Bill No. 203, 21 Colo., 27; 39 Pac. Rep., 431. Resteaints on Legislature. "Un- der our form of government the legislature is not supreme. It is only one of the organs of that abso- lute sovereignty which resides in the whole body of the people. Like other departments of the govern- ment, it can only exercise such powers as have been delegated to it;- and when it steps beyond that boundary, its acts, like those of the most humble magistrate in the state who transcends his jurisdic- tion, are utterly void. * * * The security of life, liberty and property lies at the foundation of the social compact; and to say that this grant of legislative power in- cludes the right to attack private property, is equivalent to saying that the people have delegated to their servants the power of defeat- ing one of the great ends for which the government was established." Per Bronson, J., in Taylor v. Por- ter, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 140, 144, 145. "The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred." Per Mr. Justice Story in Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Peters (U. S.), 627, 657. 6* A Statute op Nebraska which, in effect, provided that for all classes of mechanics, servants and laborers, excepting those engaged in farm and domestic labor, a day's work should not exceed eight hours, was held unconstitutional, because, in the opinion of the court, (1) it unjustly discriminated, and (2) it impaired the right or free- dom .of contract. Low v. Rees Ptg. Co., 41 Neb., 127; 43 Am. St. Rep., 670; 59 N. W. Rep., 362. This case 778 MISCELLANEOUS POLICE REGULATIONS. [§495 now employed, or who may hereafter be employed, by or on be- half of the government of the United States, ' ' was held, by the Supreme Court of the United States, to be valid and in the na- ture of a direction by the government to its agents and ser- vants. The act did not specify any sum which should be paid for the labor of eight hours, nor that the price should be more when the hours were greater or less when the hours were is approved In re House Bill No. 203, 21 Colo., 27; 39 Pac. Rep., 431. The Ohio Statute provided that the services of all day laborers, workmen and mechanics employed upon any public work of, or work for the State of Ohio, or for any po- litical sjibdivision thereof, whether such work is done by contract or otherwise, shall be, and is hereby limited, and restricted to eight hours in any one calendar day. The act made it unlawful to refuse or permit them (laborers, etc.), to lal)or more than eight hours in any one calendar day, except in cases of extraordinary emergency, caused by fire, flood or danger to life or property, and except to work upon public, military or naval works or defenses in time of war, and ex- cept in cases of employment of la- bor in agricultural pursuits. Held unconstitutional because it inter- fered with the freedom of contract. Cleveland v. Clements Bros. Const. Co., 67 Ohio St., 197; 65 N. E. Rep., 885. Under the New York Statute which provides that "eight hours shall constitute a day's work for all classes of mechanical working- men and laborers, excepting those engaged in farm and domestic la- bor, hut overwork for extra com- pensation hy agreement between e^nployer and employe is hereby ad- viitted," one who works ten hours or more per day, and receives his wages regularly and gives receipts therefor, without any expectation or understanding, express or im- plied, that extra compensation was to be paid for the extra time, can- not recover extra pay. McCarthy V. New York, 96 N. Y., 1; 48 Am. Rep., 601. See also People ex rel. V. Coler, 166 N. Y., 1; 59 N. E. Rep., 716. The Massachusetts Statute which provided that no employer shall impose a fine upon an em- ployee engaged at weaving, or withhold his wages, in whole or in part, "for imperfections that may arise during the process of weav- ing," was held to be in conflict with the constitution. Com. v. Perry, 155 Mass., 117; 28 N. E. Rep., 1127, Holmes, J. dissenting, p. 123. Partial and Discriminating Laws. Act forbidding the employment of females in any factory or work- shop for more than eight hours a day, held unconstitutional. Per Magruder, J., in Ritchie v. People, 155 111., 98; 40 N. B. Rep., 454; 46 Am. St. Rep., 315. Cases fully treated. Union labor employees. State v. Julow, 129 Mo., 163; 31 S. W. Rep., 781. Statutes relating to method and times of payment of employees. Law partial as to payment of week- ly wages, held unconstitutional. Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 111., 66; 35 N. E. Rep., 62; 37 Am, St. Rep., 206. "Truck Store" law held unconstitutional. Frorer v. People, 141 111., 171 ; 31 N. E. Rep., 395. "Scrip laws." State v. Loomis, §495] MISCELLANEOUS POLICE REGULATIONS. i79 fewer."" The same construction was given to the Kansas statute which embraced all persons employed by, or in behalf of, the state, a county, township or municipality.'"' The Supreme Court of the United States sustained the Utah statute which forbid the employment of workingmen for more than eight hours per day in mines and in smelting, reduction, or refining ores or metals, as within the police power of the state. In the opinion of the court, the law was not unconsti- tutional as an undue interference with the right of private eon- tract, or as a denial of due process of law, or, the equal pro- tection of the laws.®''' An ordinance making it a misdemeanor for any contractor to employ any person to work more than eight hours a day, or to - employ Chinese labor, where the work is to be performed under any contract with the city, was held void, in California, as an attempt to prevent persons from employing others in a lawful business, and as improperly interfering with the liberty of 115 Mo., 307; 22 S. W. Rep., 350, (principal and dissenting opin- ions) ; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va., 179; 10 S. E. Rep., 285; 25 Am. St. Rep., 863, 881. ss "Principals, so far as the law can give the power, are entitled to employ as many workmen, and of whatever degree of skill, and at whatever price, they think fit, and except in some special cases as of children or orphans, the hours of labor and the price to be paid are left to the determination of the parties interested. The statute of the United States does not inter- fere with this principle.'' Per Mr. Justice Hunt, in United States v. Martin, 94 U. S., 400, 403. Extra pay to government letter carrier for more than eight hours' work considered in United States V. Gates, 148 U. S.. 134. 66 7n re Dalton, 61 Kan., 257; 59 Pac. Rep., 336; State ex rel. v. Mar- tindale, 47 Kan.,147; 27 Pac. Rep., . 852, holding that the law did not apply to certain persons. Particular statute providing for ten hours as a day's work, con- strued. Brooks V. Cotton, 48 N. H., 50; 2 Am. Rep., 172. A statute providing that "eight hours of labor performed in any one day by any one person shall be deemed a lawful day's work, un- less otherwise agreed by the par- ties," does not apply to a "week's work," fixed wages by virtue of contract. Luske v. Hotchkiss, 37 Conn., 219; 9 Am. Rep., 314. 6' Per Mr. Justice Brown in Hol- den V. Hardy, 169 U. S., 366; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 383, affirming 14 Utah, 71, 96; 46 Pac. Rep., 756, 1105, Mr. Justice Brewer and Mr. Justice Peckham dissented. Exam- ine In re Morgan, 26 Colo., 415; 58 Pac. Rep., 1071; 77 Am. St. Rep., 269; Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 Mass., 383; State v. Peel Splint Coal Co., 36 W. Va„ 802; 15 S. E. Rep., 1000; Leep v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 58 Ark., 407; 25 S. W. Rep., 75. 780 MISCELLANEOUS POLICE REGULATIONS. [§ 496 oontract. The court declined to sustain the ordinance as a sanitary or police regfulation.®^ The City of New Orleans may designate the number of hours in which laborers and mechanics shall work upon public work in the city, but cannot make the violation of an ordinance regu- lating such hours a misdemeanor, for, in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, this is an indictable offense, one which the general assembly of the state alone can create. ^^ § 496. Miscellaneous. General charter power will not au- thorize an ordinance prescribing, under penalty, that it shall be unlawful to insult any officer "while in the discharge of his duty."^* In Kansas an ordinance was held valid which re- quired keepers of boarding houses, restaurants and hotels to furnish the names of persons liable to poll tax boarding or lodging at their houses.'^ 08 ^a; parte Kuback, 85 Cal., 274; 69 state v. McNally, 48 La. Ann., 24 Pac. Rep., 737; 20 Am. St. Rep., 1450; 21 So. Rep., 27. 226; 9 L. R. A., 482. Examine recent case of McChes- A law whicli fortid contractors ney v. People ex rel. 200 111., 146; for city work in the City of Buffalo 65 N. E. Rep., 626; and note to case to accept more than eight hours in 9 Mun. Corp. Cases, 227. for a day's work, except in case of '» State v. Clay, 118 N. C, 1234; necessity, held constitutional by 24 S. E. Rep., 492. the Superior Court of Buffalo. Peo- 'i Topeka v. Boutwell, 53 Kan., pie ex rel. v. Beck, 30 N. Y. Supp., 20; 35 Pac. Rep., 819. 473, White, J. dissenting. CHAPTER XV. OF MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF OFFENSES AGAINST STATE. § 497. State laws and municipal § 502. Same — Georgia, ordinances distinguished. 503. Same — Illinois. 498. Municipal and state of- 504. Same — Kentucky. tenses. 505. Same — Missouri. 499. Source of municipal power 506. Same — North Carolina. to legislate on offenses 507. Same — Rhode Island — Indi- against the state. ana. 500. The same act may be made 508. Same — Texas. an offense against the 509. Offenses that may be made state and the municipal both state and municipal corporation. enumerated. 501. Same — California — Con- 510. Can there be two punish- necticut. ments? § 497. State laws and municipal ordinances distinguished. While state laws are designed to furnish a rule of conduct, operating alike on all persons to whom they are intended to apply throughout the limits of the state, such laws are some- times local or special in their character and apply only to desig- nated portions of its territory.^ The limitation in this respect is controlled entirely by the organic law. Ordinances and by- laws, as we have seen, as concern the limits of the local cor- poration, may possess the same restrictive characteristics; and by express legislative grant they may be made to operate be- yond the corporate boundaries. It is obvious, therefore, that the distinction between such local and state laws is not to be found alone in their territorial operation. The source of power to promulgate is one fundamental distinction, as fully ex- plained in appropriate places throughout this work, particu- larly in the chapter on the Power to Enact Ordinances. An- other fundamental difference is that state laws are designed to meet demands, exigencies and conditions which concern all of the people of the state, while ordinances are enacted and en- 1 It is not necessary that a pub- sons within the territorial limits lie act should extend to all parts of described by the statute. Levy v. the state. It is public in charac- State, 6 Ind., 281. ter if it extends equally to all per- 781 782 MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF STATE OFFENSES. [S498 forced for the benefit of the inhabitants of the local community. The purpose of the former is to control state affairs and of the latter to deal with municipal matters. §498. Municipal and state ofifenSes. Not infrequently do we find matters of essential public concern confided to the mu- nicipal corporation, as the enforcement of state tax and elec- tion laws, local control of state officers, the preservation of the public peace, the administration of justice, etc. On the other hand, we often find state control of local officers, municipal taxation, license and local improvements, the collection and dis- tribution of revenue in the local community for purely munici- pal purposes, the control of strictly municipal departments, local parks, waterworks, sewers, the construction of municipal buildings, etc. No general rule can be laid down respecting what matters are state and what are municipal that will apply in all jurisdictions. This is usually made to depend not alone upon the fundamental principles of decentralization in our system of government, and home rule for the local community, but, as well, upon the constitution and course of legislation and judicial decision in the particular state. ^ In no state is the line very accurately drawn where municipal power ends and state authority begins. This is especially true respecting offenses.^ ]\Iost municipal charters authorize the local corporation to levy taxes, prohibit, suppress and license saloons, tippling houses, billiard tables, ten pin alleys, etc., restrain and prohibit houses of prostitution and other disorderly houses and practices, dis- orderly conduct, breaches of the peace, gaming and gambling houses, desecrations of the Sabbath day, various kinds of pub- lic indecencies and many other things treated in part or in 2 The constitution does not "de- That difficulty is not a new one." fine what are state purposes and Per Barclay, J., in St. Louis v.. what are local purposes, but leaves Dorr, 145 Mo., 466, 479, 480; 41 S. us to find the boundary line be- W. Rep., 1094; 46 S. W. Rep., 976. tween them in right reason, the " The municipality "has ample legislation of the state, and the ad- space to legislate without trench- judications of the courts, as de- ing upon the jurisdiction of the veloped in the history of the state state. In all doubtful cases it at the time of its adoption." Per would be better for the corporate Black, J., in State ex ret. v. Ow- authorities to arrest and commit sley, 122 Mo., 68, 76; 26 S. "W. Rep., the offender for trial before the 659. "It may not always be easy to proper state tribunal." Per Lump- determine what subjects are local kin, C. J., in Jenkins v. Thomas- and municipal and what are not. ville, 35 Ga., 145, 147. ;? 499] MUNICIPAL CONTROL OP STATE OFFENSES. 783 whole by general state statutes.* Sometimes the jurisdiction of the state and local corporation is concurrent ; sometimes the latter has exclusive control, properly granted by the state, of specified offenses; and sometimes local jurisdiction is denied where the particular offense is fully covered by state statute, or where it is in its essence regarded as a public crime as dis- tinguished from an offense peculiarly municipal. Thus public drunkenness although made a public offense by statute affects especially the morals of the local comnmnity; and hence, ordi- nances denouncing it have been sustained under a general grant of power, ■"■ l)y courts that have declined to uphold ordi- nances originating by the same authority relating in like man- ner to subjects covered l)y state laAvs, e. g., sale of intoxicating liquor.'' The decisions on this subject are numerous and con- flicting. Perhaps on no single topic of municipal corporation law have there been so ma«y discordant utterances even by the same courts and the same individual judges. But the best con- sidered cases, especially the more recent ones, have properly cx- 1 ended the sphere of activity of the municipal corporation in dealing with police oli'enses. The necessity of thus enlarging mnnieipnl jurisdiction is obvious to the careful student of the •'•(Miditions and needs of the crowded modern urban centers of population. The earlier conceptions of our courts on this sub- ject are less definite and satisfactory. § 499. Source of municipal powder to legislate on offenses against the state. Under the usual grant of municipal powers, which, in general terms, includes the authorit.y to enact all necessary ordinances to preserve the peace and advance the < Rice V. State, 3 Kan., 141, 164; deal only with the central ele- Gardner v. People, 20 111., 430, 433. ments of a transaction which is " Bloomfield v. Trimble, 54 Iowa, fringed all round with adjuncts 399; 6 N. W. Rep., 586. "Municipal that ought to be prohibited by or- government stands between the dinance as highly mischievous to lamily and the state. It is an aid the quiet of municipal society." to both, and partakes of the nature Per Bleckley, J., in McRea v. of both. Police ordinances are at Amerlcus, 59 Ga., 168, 170. Keep- once family rules on a large scale, ing house of ill-fame character- and state laws on a small scale, ized as an offense peculiarly jnu- * * * Many transactions that nlcipal. Greenwood v. State, 6 are made penal by the general Baxter (65 Tenn.), 567. laws of the state may, at the same o Foster v. Brown, 55 Iowa, 686; time, afford material for a proper 8 N. W. Rep., 654. police ordinance. The state may ^4 MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF STATE OFFENSES. ^■i99 local government of the community, the local corporation can- not provide by ordinance for the punishment of an act consti- tuting a misdemeanor or crime by state statute. The cases in the note fully illustrate the rule.'^ It may only exercise such powers as legitimately belong to the local and internal affairs of the municipality. In the performance of such functions ' Offenses Covered by State Statutes; ordinances relating to, void. Kassell v. Savannah, 109 Ga., 491; 110 Ga., 289; 35 S. E. Rep., 147; Moran v. Atlanta, 102 Ga., 840; 30 S. E. Rep., 298; Keck V. Gainsville, 98 Ga., 423, 425; 25 S. E. Rep., 559; Strauss v. Way- cross, 97 Ga., 475; 25 S. E. Rep., 329; Kahn v. Macon, 95 Ga., 419; 22 S. E. Rep., 641; Reich v. State, 53 Ga., 73, 75; Vason v. Augusta, 38 Ga., 542; Adams v. Albany, 29 Ga., 56. Gambling. New Orleans v. Mil- ler, 7 La.- Ann., 651. Prohibiting and exhibiting gaming table. Ex parte Fagg, 38 Tex. Grim. App., 573; 44 S. W. Rep., 294; 40 L. R. A., 212. Sale of intoxicating liquor. Com- monwealth V. Turner, 1 Cush. (Mass.), 493. Selling lottery tickets. Ex parte Solomon, 91 Cal., 440; 27 Pac. Rep., 757. Visiting house of ill-fame. In re Ah You, 88 Cal., 99; 25 Pac. Rep., 974. Opium smoking, etc. In re Sic, 73 Cal., 142, 148; 14 Pac. Rep., 405. Power to pass ordinances to se- cure the peace does not authorize an ordinance forbidding the keep- ing open of stores and shops on Sunday. Corvallis v. Carlile, 10 Oreg., 139. Ordinances relating to selling goods on Sunday held void when subject was covered by state ; there was no express power to pass the ordinance. Flood v. State, 19 Tex. Crim. App., 584, overruling Craddock v. State, 18 Tex. Crim. App., 567. Charter power to "close up dram-shops, etc., whenever nec- essary or expedient," and to "make all needful and proper regulations concerning grog shops," etc., not sufficient to regulate by ordinance Sunday closing, when subject cov- ered by state statute. Angerhoffer V. State, 15 Tex. Crim. App., 613. Regulating the number of hours in which mechanics and laborers shall be employed each day on pub- lic work of the city. Ordinance held void as offense was made in- dictable by statute. State v. Mc- Nally, 48 La. Ann., 1450; 21 So. Rep., 27. Assault and Battery. Under general power to "regulate the po- lice," etc., an ordinance creating the offense of assault and battery — a state offense — and providing for its punishment is unauthorized. The court observed that where "personal rights and liberty are involved," the charter powers are to be strictly construed; that if under simply a general welfare clause, a city can pass ordinances against assaults and batteries, it is difficult to conceive to what extent a city government might not go under such a clause. People ex rel. v. Brown, 2 Utah, 462. Compare Mayor v. Allaire, 14 Ala., 400. As- sault on public officer. State v. Keith, 94 N. C, 933. Power "to prevent and restrain disturbances," does not authorize an ordinance permitting punishment for the crime of assault with a dangerous §499] MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF STATE OFFENSES. ^85 much latitude is often permitted. But it is entirely competent for the legislature to confer in express terms such powers as will enable the local corporation to declare by ordinance any given act an offense against its authority, notwithstanding such act has been made by statute a public offense and a crime against the state. And where the regulation of a specific mat- ter has been thus expressly and exclusively given to the local corporation, whether it be intrinsically state or local, the cor- poration may exercise the power so conferred, unfettered, until such time as it is legitimately withdrawn by the state. The cir- cumstances under which charter or ordinance provisions will supersede state laws on any given subject are fully explained in a former chapter. ^ The enforcement of the fundamental rule that the ordinance must be in harmony, or at least not incon- sistent, with the state law, has been the source of much con- fusion on this subject. The true doctrine appears to be that, stances of aggravation, such as an affray, for instances, the corporate authorities with a view to suppress the special mischief, might prob- ably provide against it by ordi- nance; because that ingredient or concomitant of the crime might not be supposed to be included in the state law. And this is going quite far enough." Savannah v. Hussey, 21 Ga., 80, 86. See dissenting opin- ion pp. 90-97. State Affairs. "I am aware of the necessity of giving extensive powers to these city corporations. There are many regulations of a local nature, in a large populous town, which are not of sufficient importance to the state, to attract the attention of the legislature, but which are, nevertheless, very important to the inhabitants of the town. All these fall within the pe- culiar province of the city council, but they must not set about regu- lating the affairs of the state. It is an usurpation of the powers of the legislature, in which they are not to be indulged." Per Nott, J. in Schroder v. Charleston 3 Brev. (S. C), 533, 541. 8 Sections 214 and 215 supra. weapon. Walsh v. Union, 13 Oreg., 589; 11 Pac. Rep., 312. Ordinance as to breach of peace which is an offense against the state is void un- der general power. Raleigh v. Dougherty, 3 Hump. (Tenn.), 11. An Affray being a petty offense the ordinance forbidding it is valid. Ex parte Freeland, 38 Tex. Crim. App., 321; 42 S. W. Rep., 295, distinguishing Leach v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. App., 248; 36 S. W. Rep., 471. Injuring Public Propekty. Washington v. Hammond, 76 N. C, 33. Harboring and Enticing Sea- men. Lumpkin, J., who gave the opinion observed that under the general grant of power delegated, "the city authorities may cover all cases not provided for by the para- mount authorities of .the state. * * * Nay, I might go further, and concede, that where the state law defines an offense generally, and prescribes a punishment without reference to the place where it Is committed, in town or county, and the act when committed in the pub- lic streets and places of the city, would be attended with circum- 50 '^86 MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF STATE OFFENSES. [§ 500 whether the city may exercise control of state offenses must be determined by the legislative intent. And such intent must also decide the manner in which the power is to be exercised, and whether such control is to be exclusive or whether it is to be exercised concurrently with that of the state. § 500. The same act may be made an offense against the state and the municipal corporation. The general doctrine is supported by the weight of judicial authority that, an act may be made a penal offense under the statutes of the state, and that farther penalties may be imposed for its commission or omission by municipal ordinance. But to authorize such ordi- nance the local corporation must possess sufficient charter power and such power must be exercised in the manner con- ferred and consistent with the constitution and laws of the state. The cases present some discord respecting the nature of the grant of power necessary to sustain such additional regulations. The question of power seems to be the chief source of conflict. Double regulations have been sustained in Alabama," Arkansas,^" Colorado," Dakota,!^ Plorida,!^ Idaho,'* Illinois,!^ Indiana, (by statute at present the contrary rule prevails),'" Iowa,''' Kansas,'^ Kentucky,'", Louisiana,-** ^Alabama — Mobile v. Rouse, 8 phy, 82 111., 485; Selbold v. People, Ala., 515; Mobile v. Allaire, 14 86 111., 33; Skidmore v. Bricker, Ala., 400. 77 111., 164; Severin v. People, 37 ^"Arkansas — Van Buren v. 111., 414; Freeland v. People, 16 111., Wells, 53 Ark., 368; 14 S. W. Rep., 380; Chicago v. Brownell, 41 111. 38; 22 Am. St. Rep., 214. App., 70; Spring Valley v. Spring 11 Colorado — Mclnerney v. Den- Valley Coal Co., 71 111. App., 432. ver, 17 Colo., 302; 29 Pac. Rep., lo /wtZiana — Williams v. Warsaw, 516; Hughes v. People, 8 Colo., 60 Ind., 457; Waldo v. Wallace, 12 536; 9 Pac. Rep., 50. Ind., 569, disapproving Madison v. i 2 Dakota — Elk Point v. Vaughn, Hatcher, 8 Blackf. (Ind.), 341 and 1 Dak., 113; 46 N. W. Rep., 577. Indianapolis v. Blythe, 2 Ind., 75. i 3 Florida — Theisen v. McDavid, ^t Iowa — Bloomfleld v. Trimble, 3,4 Fla., 440; 26 L. R. A., 234; 16 54 Iowa, 399; 6 N. W. Rep., 586; 37 So. Rep., 321; Hunt v. Jackson- Am. Rep., 212. vlUe, 34 Fla., 504; 43 Am. St. Rep., ^^ Kansas — In re Jahn, 55 Kan., 214; 16 So. Rep., 398. 694; 41 Pac. Rep., 956; In re ^* Idaho — State v. Preston (Ida- Thomas, 53 Kan., 659; 37 Pac. Rep., ho) 38 Pac. Rep., 694, where au- 171; Kansas City v. Grubel, 57 thorities are reviewed. Kan., 436; 46 Pac. Rep., 714. ^^ Illinois — Hankins v. People, ^"Kentucky — Taylor v. Owens- 106 111., 628; McPherson v. Che- boro, 98 Ky., 271; 56 Am. St. Rep., banse 114 111., 46; 28 N. E. Rep., 361; 32 S. W. Rep., 948; March v. 454; Wragg v. Penn Tp., 94 111., Commonwealth, 12 B. Mon. (Ky,), 11; 34 Am. Rep., 199; Westgate v. 25. Carr, 43 lU., 450; Baldwin v. Mur- 20 Louisiana — Monroe v. Hardy, § 500] MUNICIPAL CONTROL 01? STATE OFFENSES. 787 Massachusetts,^! Maryland,^^ Michigan,^^ Mmnesota,^* Missis- sippi,25 Missouri,2e Nebraska,2T New Jersey,28 New Tork,29 Ohio,3o Oregon,3i South Carolina,^^ South Dakota,33 Ten- 46 La. Ann., 1232; 15 So. Rep., 696; 59 Mo. App., 160; St. Joseph v. Ves- State V. Fourcade, 45 La. Ann., per, 59 Mo. App., 459; St. Louis v. 717; 40 Am. St. Rep., 249; 13 So. Schoenbusch, 95 Mo., 618; 8 S. W. Rep., 187; State v. ClifEord, 45 La. Rep., 791; Ex parte HoUwedell, 74 Ann., 980; 13 So. Rep., 281; State Mo., 395; Independence v. Moore, V. Chase, 33 La. Ann., 287; Board 32 Mo., 392; St. Louis v. Cafferata, of Police V. Giron, 46 La. Ann., 24 Mo., 94; Linneus v. Dusky, 19 1364; 16 So. Rep., 190; New Or- Mo. App., 20; Kansas City v. Neal, leans v. Collins, 52 La. Ann., 973; 49 Mo. App., 72; Piper v. Boonville, 27 So. Rep., 532. 32 Mo. App., 138; St. Louis v. Lee, !ii Massachusetts — Common- 8 Mo. App., 598; St. Louis v. Weit- wealth V. Goodnow, 117 Mass., 114. zel, 130 Mo., 600; 31 S. W. Rep., 22 Maryland — Shafer v. Mumma, 1045 ; Marshall v. Standard, 24 Mo. 17 Md., 331; 79 Am. Dec, 656. App., 192; Ex parte Kiburg, 10 Mo. ^^ Michigan — Wayne Co. v. De- App., 442; Kansas City v. Zahner, troit, 17 Mich., 390; Fennell v. Bay 73 Mo. App., 396; Ex parte Cald- City 36 Mich., 186; People v. De- well, 138 Mo., 233; 39 S. W. Rep., troit White Lead Works, 82 Mich., 761; St. Charles v. Hackman, 133 471; 46 N. W. Rep., 735; People v. Mo., 634; 34 S. W. Rep., 878. Hanrahan, 75 Mich., 611; 42 N. W. ^t Nebraska — Brownville v. Cook, Rep., 1124. 4 Neb., 101. ^i Minnesota — State v. Lee, 29 28 2^ew Jersey — State (Riley) v. Minn., 445; 13 N. W. Rep., 913; Trenton, 51 N. J. L., 498; 5 L. R. State V. Oleson, 26 Minn., 507 ; 5 N. A., 352; 18 Atl. Rep., 116; State W. Rep., 959; State v. Ludwig, 21 (Paul) v. Gloucester, 50 N. J. L., Minn., 202; State v. Charles, 16 585; 15 Atl. Rep., 272; State v. Minn., 474; State v. Bruckhauser, Plunckett, 18 N. J. L., 5. 26 Minn., 301; 3 N. W. Rep., 695. ^^New Tor fc— Brooklyn v. Toyn- Ordinances relating to gaming bee, 31 Barb. (N. Y.), 282; Rogers does not abrogate or suspend the v. Jones, 1 Wend. (N. Y.), 237; common law on the subject in the New York v. Hyatt, 3 E. D. Smith city. State v. Crummey, 17 Minn., (N. Y.), 156. 72. 30 Oftio— Wightman v. State, 10 25 Mississippi — Johnson v. State, Ohio, 452; State v. Ulm, 7 Ohio, N. 59 Miss., 543; Ex parte Bourgeois, P. 659. 60 Miss., 663; 45 Am. Rep., 420. si Orefirora— Wong v. Astoria, 13 26 Missouri — Glasgow v. Bazan, Oregon, 538 ; 11 Pac. Rep., 295 ; 96 Mo. App., 412; 70 S. W. Rep., State v. Sly, 4 Oreg., 277; State v. 257; St. Louis v. Vert, 84 Mo., 204; Bergman, 6 Oregon, 341. State V. Cowan, 29 Mo., 330; St. ^^ South Carolina — State ex rel. Louis V. Bentz, 11 Mo., 61; State v. v. Williams, 11 S. C, 288; State ex Walbridge, 119 Mo., 383; 24 S. W. rel. Heise v. Columbia, 6 Rich. Law Rep., 457; 41 Am. St. Rep., 663; (S. C), 404, 406, per O'Neall, J., De Soto V. Brown, 44 Mo. App., dissenting from Schroder v. 148; Plattsburg V. Trimble, 46 Mo. Charleston, 3 Brev. (S. C), 533, App., 459; Kansas City v. Hallett, on this point; Greenville v. Kern- 788 MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF STATE OFFENSES. [§503 nessee,3* Utah.^s Washington,36 ■Wisconsin,^^ and by the United States courts.** § 501. Same— California— Connecticut. It appears that in California no power exists in the municipal corporation to pass an ordinance punishing precisely the same offense as made pun- ishable by the penal laws of the state.*^ So in Connecticut it appears the rule obtains that matters regulated by general statutes cannot be covered by municipal ordinance.*" §50^ Same— Georgia. In Georgia where the subject is covered by state statute the municipal corporation cannot deal with it by ordinance, unless expressly authorized,*^ but where the statute does not cover the subject a municipal ordinance is valid.*2 ' The fact that the offense is against the common law, as street and night walking by females, does not deprive the city of jurisdiction.*^ So where the statute prohibits the keeping of tippling houses or retailing liquor without a license an ordinance may prohibit sales of liquor, since in the opinion mis, 58 S. C, 427; 36 S. B. Rep., 727; 50 L. R. A., 725; McCormick V. Calhoun, 30 S. C, 93; 8 S. E. Rep., 539. 33 South Dakota — Yankton v. Douglass, 8 S. Dak,, 440; 66 N. W. Rep., 923. 3* Tennessee — State ex rel. Karr V. Shelby Co. Taxing Dist., 16 Lea. (84 Tenn.), 240; State v. Mason, 3 Lea. (71 Tenn.), 649; Greenwood V. State, 6 Baxter (Tenn.), 567; 32 Am. Rep., 539. 35 Utah — Ex parte Douglass, 1 Utah, 108. se Washington — Seattle v. Chin Let, 19 Wash., 38; 52 Pac. Rep., 324. 37 Wisconsin — State v. Newman, 96 Wis., 258; 71 N. W. Rep., 438; Platteville v. McKernan, 54 Wis., 487; 11 N. W. Rep., 798. 38 United States — Moore v. Peo- ple, 14 How. (U. S.), 13; United States V. Holly, 3 Cranch C. C, 656; McLaughlin v. Stephens, 2 Cranch C. C, 148; United States v. Wells, 2 Cranch. C. C, 45. s»Ex parte Solomon, 91 Cal., 440; 27 Pac Rep., 757; In re Ah You, 88 Cal., 99; 25 Pac. Rep., 974; In re Sic, 73 Cal., 142, 148; 14 Pac. Rep., 405. *o Examine State v. Welch, 36 Conn., 215; State v. Flint, 63 Conn., 248; 28 Atl. Rep., 28. Ordi- nances enacted under charter power held abrogated by subse- quent legislative act covering the same subject. Taking oysters with- in the borough. South Port v. Ogden, 23 Conn., 128. An ordinance of Waterbury for- bidding the sale of impure milk within the corporate limits, held ultra vires, because the subject- matter was regulated by general statute. In such case the munici- pal charter contained an express prohibition. State v. Tyrrell, 73 Conn., 407; 47 Atl. Rep., 686. *i See Georgia cases in Sec. 499, supra. *2 Rothschild V. Darien, 69 Ga., 503. 48Braddy v. Milledgeville, 74 Ga., 516, 519. § 504] MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF STATE OFFENSES. 780 of the court, the two offenses are not identical.** So municipal corporations in that state may regulate the selling of intoxicat- ing liquor if this subject is not covered by state law.*^ While the city cannot punish as an offense against it anything which by statute is an offense against the state, where the statute makes the unlawful sale of liquor an offense but does not make the keeping of liquors for unlawful sale an offense^ an ordi- nance legally may provide for the punishment of the latter of- fense. The ordinance "hovers on the margin of the statute, but nowhere overlaps the text^ If there is keeping for unlaw- ful sale, the ordinance is violated, whether any sale is made or not. In case a sale ensues, the statute is also violated ; but this does not cancel the violation of the ordinance. An offense committed against one jurisdiction cannot be wiped out by committing another against another jurisdiction."*^ § 503. Same — Illinois. General power to enact ordinances does not authorize ordinances covering state offenses. Con- ferring upon the local corporation power to act concerning the sale of liquor, for example, does not repeal the general law of the state on the same subject.*'^ Unless the city has exclusive power on the subject, as for example, the power to regulate gaming and gambling houses, the general state law prevails. A mere general grant of power on the subject does not repeal the state law relating thereto. The jurisdiction may be concur- rent and mere failure of the city to act under the ■ power granted does not prevent the state from exercising jurisdic- tion.** In Illinois where the power is expressly conferred the municipal ordinance may cover a state offense, and double pun- ishment may be inflicted for the unlawful act. § 504. Same — Kentucky. Under the Kentucky constitution, "No municipal ordinance shall fix a penalty for violation thereof at less than that imposed by statute for the same of- fense. A conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. "*8 4« Hill V. Dalton, 72 Ga., 314. *^ Menken v. Atlanta, 78 Ga., 668, 45Paulk V. Sycamore, 104 Ga., 672; 2 S. E. Rep., 559; Mayson v. 728; 31 S. E. Rep., 200; Brown v. Atlanta, 77 Ga., 662, 666. Social Circle, 105 Ga., 834; 32 S. E. 47 Gardner v. People, 20 111., 430. Rep., 141; Cunningham v. Griffin, 48 Berry v. People, 36 111., 423; 107 Ga., 690; 33 S. B. Rep., 664. Fant v. People, 45 111., 259. Compare Hood v. Von Glahn, 88 49 Taylor v. Owensboro, 98 Ky., Ga., 405; 14 S. B. Rep., 564. 271; 56 Am. St. Rep., 361; 32 S. W. Rep., 948. 790 MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF STATE OFFENSES. ! S 508 § 505. Same— Missouri. The Missouri statute provides that "Any municipal corporation in this state, whether under general or special charter, and having authority to pass ordi- nances regulating subjects, matters and things upon whicli there is a general law of the state, unless otlierivise prescribed or authorized by some special provision of its charter, shall confine and restrict its jurisdiction and the passage of its ordinances to and in conformity with the State law upon the same sub- ject, "so § 506. Same— North Carolina. Ordinances making acts punishable that are already made penal and punishable under the general law of the state are not favored in North Caro- lina. ''^ The power to pass ordinances is held to be in subordi- nation to the public laws regulating the same matter for the entire state.^^ "It may be that the legislature has power to authorize a town to make an offense against the state a sepa- rate offense against the town, but this could be done only by an express grant of power. "^^ § 507. Same— Rhode Island— Indiana. In Rhode Island by statute "no ordinance or regulation whatsoever, made by a town council, shall impose, or at any time be construed to continue to impose, any penalty for the commission or omis- sion of any act punishable as a crime, misdemeanor, or offense, by the statute law of the state. ' 's* In like manner the Indiana statute provides that, "when- ever any act is made a public offense against the state by any statute and the punishment prescribed therefor, such act shall not be made punishable by any ordinance of any incorporated city or town; and any ordinance to such effect shall be null and void, and all prosecutions for any such public offense as may be within the jurisdiction of the authorities of such incorporated cities or towns, by and before such authorities, shall be had under the state law only."55 § 508. Same— Texas. It has been held in Texas that it is ■ 50 statute construed to hold that 52 Selling liquor on Sunday, an ordinance concerning breach of State v. Langston, 88 N. C, 692. the peace did not conflict with the =3 state v. Brittain, 89 N. C, 574. state statute on the same subject. 54 Baxter, Petitioner, 12 R. I., 13 ; Glasgow V. Bazan, 96 Mo. App., 412, State v. McCulla, 16 R. I., 196; 14 415; 70 S. W. Rep., 257. Atl. Rep., 81; State v. Pollard, 6 51 Assault on public officer. State R. I., 290. V. Keith, 94 N. C, 933. s"' Whiting v. Doob, 152 Ind., Injuring public property. "Wash- 157; 52 N. E. Rep., 759; Indianap- Ington V. Hammond, 76 N. C, 3?. olis v. Higgins, J41 Ind,, 1; 40 N. § 509] MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF STATE OFFENSES. 791 not competent for the municipal council to create by ordi- nance and make it an offense against the city, that which is by general law already an offense against the state punishable by fine and imprisonment, as the offense of keeping and exhibit- ing a gaming table.^** But it has also been held in that state that state laws and municipal ordinances may concurrently operate upon the same subject, if not inconsistent, as the offense of assault.^'' So it has been held that an affray being a petty offense may be made a municipal offense by ordinance although it is by statute an offense against the state.^^ In that state the legislature cannot confer upon municipal court juris- diction concurrent with the state courts over violation of state laws within the state. ^^ § 509. Offenses that may be made both state and municipal enumerated. Under ample charter power, ordinances carrying appropriate penalties forbidding acts also made penal by state statutes relating to the following subjects, have been sus- tained : bawdy houses and houses of ill fame ;*''♦ lewd women E. Rep., 671; Zeller v. Crawfords- jurisdiction of the state court. Ex ville, 90 Ind., 262; Clevenger v. Rushville, 90 Ind., 258. Act held constitutional. Jett v. Richmond, 78 Ind., 316. Statute applied in case of inter- ference with policeman. Indianap- olis V. Huegele, 115 Ind., 581; 18 N. E. Rep., 172. Statute does not apply to an or- dinance making it an offense to sell intoxicating liquors within the city limits without first obtaining a city license. The case"^ proceeds upon the theory that such act was not an offense against the state law. Frankfort v. Aughe, 114 Ind., 77; 15 N. E. Rep., 802. 30 "Under the authorities, we are inclined to the view that, in the face of the constitutional provision * * * where an offense has been made such by state law, notwith- standing it -is a petty offense, it must be prosecuted by authority of the state, and against its peace and dignity." But it was unnecessary to decide the question in that case, since the offense, under the law of Texas, was exclusively within the parte Fagg, 38 Tex. Crim. App., 573, 589; 44 S. W. Rep., 294; 40 L. R. A., 212. s? Hamilton v. State, 3 Tex. Crim. App., 643; Ex parte Wilson, 14 Tex. Crim. App., 592. 58 Ex parte Freeland, 38 Tex. Crim. App., 321; 42 S. W. Rep., 295, distinguishing Leach v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. App., 248; 36 S. W. Rep., 471. The Texas Penal Code Defines A Petty Offense as one which a justice of the peace or the mayor or other officer of a city or town may try and punish. Penal Code, Tex., 1895, art. 57. Ordinance relating to selling goods on Sunday passed without express power held void where it conflicted with the state statute on the same subject. Flood v. State, 19 Tex. Crim. App., 584, overruling Craddock v. State, 18 Tex. Crim. App., 567. 59 Leach v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. App., 248; 36 S. W. Rep., 471. 0" Louisiana — Amite City v. Holly, 50 La. Ann., 627; 23 So. Rep., 746, 792 MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF STATE OFFENSES. [§ 509 on streets ;^i public drunkenness j*^ liquor selling ;^8 liquor selling on Sunday;®* keeping open saloons on Sunday;®^ Sun- day regulation ;8® gaming and gambling;*^ keeping gambling house f^ billiard tables f^ sale of lottery tickets ■,'"^ nuisances ;^i disturbing peace ;^2 assault ;''3 assault and battery;''* carrying concealed weapons ■,''^ cruelty to animals ■,'^^ animals running at Michigan — People v. Hanralian, 75 Mich., 611; 42 N. W. Rep., 1124; 4 L. R. A., 751. Minnesota — State v. Lee, 29 Minn., 445; 13 N. W. Rep., 913. Missouri — State v. Wister, 62 Mo. 592; State v. DeBar, 58 Mo., 395; State V. Clarke, 54 Mo., 17; State V. Thornton, 37 Mo., 360. Oregon — Wong v. Astoria, 13 Oreg., 538; 11 Pac. Rep., 295. Wisconsin — Ogden v. Madison, 111 Wis., 413; 55 L. R. A., 506; 87 N. W. Rep., 568. 81 Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md., 331; 79 Am. Dec, 656. 02 Bloomfield v. Trimble, 54 Iowa, 399; 6 N. W. Rep., 586. »3 Connecticut — State v. Welch, 36 Conn., 215. Missouri — State v. Harper, 58 Mo., 530. New Jersey — Howe v. Plainfield, 37 N. J. L., 145. New York — Blatchley v. Moser, 15 Wend. (N. Y.), 215, per Savage, C. J.; People v. Stevens, 13 Wend. (N. Y.), 341. Ohio — Wightman v. State, 10 Ohio, 452. South Carolina — State ex rel. Heise v. Columbia, 6 Rich. (S. C), 404. o*Elk Point v. Vaughn, 1 Dak., 113; 46 N. W. Rep., 577; State (Riley) v. Trenton, 51 N. J. L., 498; 5 L. R. A., 352; 18 Atl. Rep., 116; State (Paul) v. Gloucester County, 50 N. J. L., 585; 15 Atl. Rep., 272. 05 Van Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark., 368; 14 S. W. Rep., 38; 22 Am. St. Rep., 214; Seibold v. People, 86 111., 33. 66 State V. Ludwig, 21 Minn., 202 ; St. Louis V. Cafeerata. 24 Mo., 94. Sales on Sunday. McPherson v. Chebanse, 114 111., 46; 28 N. E. Rep., 454. 6T State V. Crummey, 17 Minn., 72. Gaming. Greenville v. Kemmis, 58 S. C, 427; 36 S. E. Rep., 727; 50- L. R. A., 725. Playing "craps." Monroe v. Hardy, 46 La. Ann., 1232; 15 So. Rep., 696. 6s Greenwood v. State, 6 Baxt. (65 Tenn.), 567; 32 Am. Rep., 539; Robbins v. People, 95 111., 175; Ex parte Douglass, 1 Utah, 108. Keeping gaming table. McLaugh- lin V. Stephens, 2 Cranch C. C, 148; United States v. Holly, 3 ' Cranch C. C, 656. 69 Plattsburg v. Trimble, 46 Mo. App., 459, 461. TO Ex parte Kiburg, 10 Mo. App., 442. '1 People V. Detroit White Lead Works, 82 Mich., 41; 46 N. W-. Rep., 735; 9 L. R. A., 722. 72 St. Charles v. Meyer, 58 Mo., 86 ; Glasgow v. Bazan, 96 Mo. App., 412; 70 S. W. Rep., 257. T3 Hamilton v. State, 3 Tex. Crim, App., 643. Ti State V. Ledford, 3 Mo., 102. 70 Van Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark., 368; 14 S. W. Rep., 38; 22 Am. St. Rep., 214; Opelousas v. Giron, 46 La. Ann. (Pt. 2), 1364; 16 So. Rep., 190. 76 St. Louis V. Schoenbusch, 95 Mo., 618; 8 S. W. Rep., 791. §510] MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF STATE OFFENSES. 793 large ;^^ obstructing highways;^® regulating bay windows j^^ fast and careless driving;®" vagrancy ;*i attempting to rescue prisoner from custody of officer ;*2 aiding, counseling and ad- vising prisoner to make escape;*^ regulating porters at sta- tions;** selling impure and unwholesome milk;®^ unlawful trespass on property.**' § 510. Can there be two punishments? A few cases have declared the rule that, when an ordinance and state law pre- scribe a penalty for the same act, a conviction or acquittal under one is a complete bar to a prosecution under the other.®^ But the decided weight of judicial authority sustains the con- trary doctrine. The same act may constitute several crimes or misdemeanors and the trial and punishment of one will be no bar to a prosecution of another, growing out of the same act.** Thus it is no bar to a prosecution for riot that one of the accused had been convicted of assault and battery, aris- ing out of the same transaction or offense.*^ So an assault T'Westgate v. Carr, 43 111., 450. 78 Wragg V. Penn Tp., 94 111., 11; 34 Am. Rep., 199. 79 Commonwealth v. Goodnow, 117 Mass., 114. so State V. Cowan, 29 Mo., 330. »i St. Louis V. Bentz, 11 Mo., 61; Kansas City v. Neal, 49 Mo. App., 72, 78. 82 Independence v. Moore, 32 Mo., 392. 83 De Soto V. Brown, 44 Mo. App., 148, 152. 84 Chillicothe v. Brown, 38 Mo. App., 609. 85 Polinsky v. People, 11 Hun. (N. Y.), 390. 80 Brownsville v. Cook, 4 Neb., 101. All crimes less than felony at common law may be given to cor- poration courts. Ex parte Slattery, 3 Ark., 484. 87 Rule suggested in State v. Welch, 36 Conn., 215, 217. Bar by state constitution. Tay- lor V. Owensboro, 98 Ky., 271; 56 Am. St. Rep., 361; 32 S.W.Rep.,948. State V. Cowan, 29 Mo., 330; State v. Thornton, 37 Mo., 360. These cases overruled by later Mis- souri cases. See Sec. 500. Conviction under the ordinance bars prosecution under the statute for the same act. Ex parte Free- land, 38 Tex. Crim. App., 321; 42 S. W. Rep., 295. Contra. Hamilton V. State, 3 Tex. Crim. App., 643. Question Undetermined whether one convicted before a justice of the peace for an assault and bat- tery could be tried and punished by the mayor under an ordinance. Burns v. La Grange, 17 Tex., 415. "It is not necessary in this case to decide whether both can punish for the same act; but we have no doubt but that the one which shall first obtain jurisdiction of the per- son accused may punish to the ex- tent of its power." Rice v. State, 3 Kan., 141, 164. State v. Plunkett, 18 N. J. L., 5, question raised but not determined whether there could be two punish- ments. 88 Preeland v. People, 16 111., 380; Gardner v. People, 20 111., 430, 434. 89 Freeland v. People, 16 111., 380. 794 MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF STATE OFFENSES. [§510 committed in the presence of the court may be punished in two ways— first, for contempt of court, and second, as a crimi- nal prosecution for the assault.^" The doctrine generally supported may be thus stated : That the single act being made punishable both by the state law and by the municipal ordinance of the place where in it was com- mitted constitutes two distinct and several offenses ; an offense against the state and an offense against the municipality. The purpose of the ordinance is to provide a mere police regulation for the enforcement of good order and quiet within the limits of the corporation: the state law has a more enlarged object in view, namely, the maintenance of the peace and dignity of the state. The offenses, although growing out of the same act, are distinguishable and wholly disconnected, and the prosecution at the suit of each proceeds upon a different hypothesis. This rule finds support in Alabama,®^ Arkansas,*^ Colorado,^^ Georgia,®* Illinois,®^ Indiana,®^ Louisiana,®^ Mary- land,®* Missouri,®® Minnesota,^ New York,^ Oregon,^ Ten- nessee,* and in other jurisdictions.^ 90 {Arguendo) Wragg v. Penn Township, 94 111., 11. 91 Per Collier, C. J. in Mayor, etc., V. Allaire, 14-Ala., 400, 403. 92 Van Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark., 368; 14 S. W. Rep., 38; 22 Am. St. Rep., 214. 93 Hughes V. People, 8 Colo., 536. 9* An acquittal in a state court for assault and battery was held in Georgia to be no defense to an action under an ordinance in the city court for disorderly conduct in fighting, notwithstanding the facts were the same in both trials. McRea v. Americus, 59 Ga., 168; 27 Am. Rep., 390. 95 Hankins v. People, 106 111., 628, 638; Robbins v. People, 95 111., 175. Contra. Berry v. People, 36 111., 423; Bennett v. People, 30 111., 389, 394. But these cases are overruled. 96 Offenses are different — One is an action of debt; the other a fine for violation of a criminal law. Indianapolis v. Fairchild, 1 Ind., 315; Levy v. State, 6 Ind., 281; Ambrose v. State, 6 Ind., 351; Waldo V. Wallace, 12 Ind., 569. But at present by statute an ordinance cannot cover the same act covered by state law, § 507. 97 Monroe v. Hardy, 46 La. Ann., 1232; 15 So. Rep., 696. 9s Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md., 331; 79 Am. Dec, 656. 99 State V. Muir, 164 Mo., 610; 65 S. W. Rep., 285, affirming S. C, 86 Mo. App., 642, disapproving State V. Simonds, 3 Mo., 414 and follow- ing Kansas City v. Clark, 68 Mo., 588; St. Louis v. Knox, 74 Mo., 79; Ex parte HoUwedell, 74 Mo., 395; Ex parte Boenninghausen, 91 Mo., 301; 1 S. W. Rep., 761; St. Louis y. Weitzel, 130 Mo., 600; 31 S. W. Rep., 1045. 1 State V. Lee, 29 Minn., 445 ; 13 N. W. Rep., 913; Mankato v. Arn- old, 36 Minn., 62; 30 N. W. Rep., 305; State v. Robitshek, 60 Minn., 123; 61 N. W. Rep., 1023. 2Blatchley v. Moser, 15 Wend., § 510] MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF STATE OFFENSES. 795 (N. y.), 215, per Savage, C. J.; People V. Stephens, 13 Wend. (N. Y.), 341. 3 State V. Sly, 4 Oreg., 277 ; Wong V. Astoria, 13 Oreg., 538; 11 Pac. Rep., 295. * State ex rel v. Shelby County Taxing District 16 Lea (84 Tenn.), 240; State v. Mason, 3 Lea (71 Tenn.), 649; Greenwood v. State, 6 Baxter (65 Tenn.), 567; 32 Am. Rep., 539. 5 Texas — A conviction under the one is no bar to a prosecution un- der the other. Hamilton v. State, 3 Tex. Crlm. App., 643. Contra — Ex parte Freeland, 38 Tex. Crim. App., 321; 42 S. W. Rep., 295. Where the conviction is void un- der the municipal ordinance it is no bar to a prosecution under the state law. Leach v. State, 36 Tex. Crlm. App^, 248; 36 S. W. Rep., 471. See Sec. 508, supra. United States — ^Act punishable under .federal law may also be pun- ishable under state law. Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. (U. S), 410; Moore V. Illinois, 14 How. (U. S.), 13; Cooley's Const. Llm. (6th Ed.), 329 ; Biggars, Mun. Manual of Can- ada, pp. 629, 630; Bishop, Crim. Law., sec. 897 A; Bishop, Statu- tory Crimes, sees. 23, 25. CHAPTER XVI. OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. i 511. Nature and purpose of pub- § lie improvements. 512. Municipal power to make public improvements. 513. Public Improvements out- side of corporate limits. 514. Nature of power — where vested — state control. 515. Same subject. 516. Only officers duly autho- rized can provide for im- provements. 517. Same — delegation of power forbidden. 518. Improvement by property owner. 519. Discretion of municipal au- thorities as to improve- ments. 520. Boulevards. 521. Improvements interfering with franchise rights. 522. Special assessment or taxa- tion for local improve- ments. 523. Uniformity and equality of special assessments. 524. Purpose of special assess- ments. 525. Preliminary proceedings. 526. Petition or consent of prop- erty owners affected. 527. Opening and establishing streets. 528. Establishment of street grade. 529. Recommendation of ordi- nance by board. 530. Water and gas pipes in ad- vance of improvements. 531. Estimate of cost of im- provement. 532. Submission to, and approv- al of, electors. 796 533. Preliminary resolution or ordinance. 534. Declaration of necessity of improvement. 535. Providing for improvement — ordinance, resolution or order. 536. Sufficiency of order for im- provement. 537. Ordinance for each distinct Improvement. 538. Procedure in passage of or- dinance. 539. Recital of authority to pass. 540. Description of the improve- ment. 541. Sufficiency of description in street improvement ordi- nances. 542. Sufficiency of description in sewer construction ordi- nances. 543. Same — Joint district sewer. 544. Specification of material. 545. Description by reference. 546. Matters of detail need not be specified in the im- provement ordinance. 547. Ordinance must provide method of payment. 548. Sufficiency of ordinance re- lating to payment in in- stallments. 549. Sufficiency respecting basis of apportionment of tax. 550. Improvement ordinance must be reasonable. 551. Certainty — Validity. 552. Agreements of citizens and property owners. 553. Ordinances restricting com- petition—Union labor. § 511] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 797 § 554. Ordinances authorizing pa-- § 557. Same — Curative power of tented and monopolized the legislature, articles. 558. Construction of improve- 555. Ordinances providing for ment ordinances. maintenance of street for 559. Parol evidence of terms a term of years. used in improvement or- 556. Validating void improve- dinances. ment ordinances. § 511. Nature and purposes of public improvements. Gen- erally speaking, the term "public improvements," as applied to municipal corporations, is limited to improvements which are the proper subject of police and local government regula- tion, and do not include private affairs or commercial enter- prises.i What the particular local corporation is authorized to do depends upon the proper construction of its charter, the statutes applicable thereto and the legislative policy of the state respecting municipal government. This subject is fully treated elsewhere.^ Adequate municipal administration necessarily includes the power to provide suitable public buildings for the convenient transaction of business, as a city or town hall,^ fire engine house,* market houses, market places,^ hospitals," dispensEiries, and sometimes penal, charitable and eleemosynary institu- tions, as jail, workhouse, poor houses, houses of refuge, etc. But the public improvements most fruitful of litigation, those in which the property owners, inhabitants and the local ad- ministration are most deeply concerned, and those which most municipal corporations have express or implied power to make, relate to the establishment, vacation, sprinkling and cleaning of public ways; paving, repairing aaad otherwise improving streets and sidewalks; the construction of drains, sewers and watercourses; the lighting of public thoroughfares, squares, parks, places and (sometimes) public buildings and private 1 Low V. Marysville, 5 Cal., 214; a People v. Harris, 4 Cal., 9; Fos- Markley v. Mineral City, 58 Ohio ter v. Worcester, 164 Mass., 419; St., 430; 51 N. E. Rep., 28; 65 Am. 41 N. E. Rep., 654; Bates v. Bas- St. Rep., 776. sett, 60 Vt., 530; 15 Atl. Rep., 200; Local Impkovements. Chicago v. 1 L. R. A., 166. Law, 144 111., 569 ; 33 N. E. Rep., * Torrent v. Muskegon, 47 Mich., 855; State v. Reis 38 Minn., 371; 115; 10 N. W. Rep., 132; 41 Am. 38 N. W. Rep., 97; Rogers v. St. Rep., 715. Paul, 22 Minn., 494. = See Section 481 supra. 2 Chapter II. ° "Private" hospital cannot be 798 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§511 residences;'' providing an adequate and wholesome water sup- ply ;* opening and maintaining public parks and other pleasure resorts; constructing or authorizing the constructing of safe established. Bessonles v. Indian- » Water Supply, § 64 supra. Liv- apolls, 71 Ind., 189. See § 445, ingston v. Pippin, 31 Ala., 542; IHi- supra. nois Trust & Savings Bank v. Ar- ' Lighting, implied power. See kansas City Water Co., 67 Fed. § 66, supra. Nelson v. La Porte, Rep., 196. 33 Ind., 258; State v. Hiawatha, 53 When council may determine Kan., 477 ; 36 Pac. Rep., 1119 ; necessity of a new system. Austin Newport v. Newport Light Co., 84 v. Nalle, 85 Tex., 520; 22 S. W. Ky., 166; Opinion of Justices, 150 Rep., 668, 960; Nalle v. Austin Mass., 592; 24 N. E. Rep., 1084; 8 (Tex. Civ. App., 1893), 21 S. W. L. R. A., 487; Detroit v. Wayne Rep., 375. Co. Cir. Judges, 79 Mich., 384; 44 Waterworks, general power to N. W. Rep., 622; Wade v. Oakmont, contract held to confer power to 165 Pa. St., 479; 30 Atl. Rep., 959. contract for in Rome v. Cabot, 28 Inherent power to furnished Ga., 50. Contra. Greenville Wa- light declared. Crawfordsville v. terworks Co. v. Greenville (Miss. Braden, 130 Ind., 149; 28 N. E. 1890), 7 So. Rep., 409; National Rep., 849; 30 Am. St. Rep., 214; Foundry & P. Works v. Oconto 14 L. R. A., 268; Bllinwood v. Water Co., 52 Fed. Rep., 29. Reedsburg, 91 Wis., 131; 64 N. W. Legislative power to establish; Rep., 885. construction of. Murphy v. Way- Gas works may be erected by cross, 90 Ga., 36; 15 S. E. Rep., city. Hamilton Gaslight & Coke 817; Dutton v. Aurora, 114 111., Co. V. Hamilton, 146 U. S., 258; 13 138; 28 N. E. Rep., 461; Ysleta v. Sup. Ct. Rep., 90, affirming 37 Fed. Babbitt, 8 Tex. Civ. App., 432; 28 Rep., 832; State v. Hamilton, 47 S. W. Rep., 702; Springville v. Ohio St., 52; 23 N. E. Rep., 935; Fullmer, 7 Utah, 450; 27 Pac. Rep., Mauldin v. Greenville, 33 S. C, 1; 577; Attorney General v. Eau 11 S. E. Rep., 434; 8 L. R. A., 291. Claire, 37 Wis., 400. Private places may be supplied. Inherent municipal power to Thompson-Houston Electric Co. v. build, asserted in Elllnwood v. Newton, 42 Fed. Rep., 723. Reedsburg, 91 Wis., 131; 64 N. W. Contra. Ladd v. Jones, 61 111. Rep., 885. See § 64 supra. App., 584; Spauldlng v. Peabody, Legislative power to contract for 153 Mass., 129; 26 N. E. Rep., 421; supply. Burlington Water Works 10 L. R. A., 397; Christensen v. Co. v. Burlington, 43 Kan., 725; 23 Fremont, 45 Neb., 160; 63 N. W. Pac. Rep., 1068; Hackensack Water Rep., 364; Mauldin v. Greenville, Co. v. Hoboken, 51 N. J. L., 220; 33 S. C, 1; 11 S. W. Rep., 434; 8 L. 17 Atl. Rep., 307; Andrews v. Na- R. A., 291. tlonal Foundry & Pipe Works, 61 Supplying light to residence. Fed. Rep., 782; 10 C. C. A., 60; Fer- held a municipal purpose. Jack- gus Falls Water Co. v. Fergus sonville Electric Light Co. v. Jack- Falls, 65 Fed. Rep., 586. sonvllle, 36 Fla., 229; 18 So. Rep., Delegation. Council cannot au- 677; 51 Am. St. Rep., 24; 30 L. R. thorize committee to contract for A., 540. hydramt. Talnter v. Worcester, 123 512] OP PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. ri)9 harbors, landings, piers, wharves and docks;® the regulation of the placing of poles, wires and electrical appliances, and of the construction and management of conduits, subways, etc.i" § 512. Municipal power to make public improvements. Ample power to make public improvements, as already indi- cated, is possessed by municipal corporations. The power is usually exercised under legislative discretion, but when the work has been determined upon, the construction thereof is merely ministerial.^^ Authority to provide for public improve- Mass., 311; 25 Am. Rep., 90. See §§ 84 to 89 supra. CiiARTEi: Power to furnish, held revoked by law conferring exclu- sive right upon a private corpora- tion. Gas & Water Co. v. Down- Ingtown, 175 Pa. St., 341; 34 Atl. Rep., 799. " Piers. Marshall v. Guion, 11 N. Y., 461. Breakwater may be constructed by city, under general power, to protect public streets. Miller v. Milwaukee, 14 Wis., 642. Levees; power to construct de- nied in Newport v. Batesville & B. Ry. Co., 58 Ark., 270; 24 S. W. Rep., 427. Public Landing place, held not a way, conferring power to discon- tinue it. Com. v. Tucker, 2 Pick. (19 Mass.), 44. Harbor; power to establish de- nied in Spengler v. Trowbridge, 62 Miss., 46. WHAE^'ES, Landing, etc. Alabama — ^Webb v. Demopolis, 95 Ala., 116; 13 So. Rep., 289; 21 L. R. A., 62. California — San Pedro v. South- ern Pac. R. Co., 101 Cal., 333; 35 Pac. Rep., 993. Illinois — Ligare v. Chicago, 139 111., 46; 28 N. B. Rep., 934; 32 Am. St. Rep., 179. Indiana — Snyder v. Rockport, 6 Ind., 237. Loi.iisiana — Shepherd v. Munici- pality No. 3, 6 Rob. (La.), 349; 41 Am. Dec, 269; St. Martinsville v. The Mary Lewis, 32 La. Ann., 1293. Michigan — Backus v. Detroit, 49 Mich., 110; 13 N. W. Rep., 380; 43 Am. Rep., 447. Missouri — Hannibal v. Winchel, 54 Mo., 172. Texas — Galveston v. Menard, 23 Tex., 349. 10 See Section 462 supra. River Tunnel, Chicago author- ized to construct. Chicago v. Rum- sey, 87 111., 348. 11 Georgia — Fuller v. Atlanta, 66 Ga., 80. Indiana — Leeds v. Richmond, 102 Ind., 372; 1 N. E. Rep., 711; Kokomo V. Mahan, 100 Ind., 272. Massachusetts — Collins v. Wal- tham, 151 Mass., 196; 24 N. B. Rep., 326. Michigan — Davis v. Jackson, 61 Mich., 530; 28 N. W. Rep., 526; Lansing v. Toolan, 37 Mich., 152; 38 Mich., 315 ; Detroit v. Beckman, 34 Mich., 125; 22 Am. Rep., 507. Minnesota — Pye v. Mankato, 36 Minn., 373; 31 N. W. Rep., 863. Missouri — Donahoe v. Kansas City, 136 Mo., 657, 666; 38 S. W. Rep., 571; Thurston v. St. Joseph, 51 Mo., 510, 519. New Jersey — Soule v. Passaic, 47 N. J. Eq., 28; 20 Atl. Rep., 346. New York — Seifert v. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y., 136; 4 N. B. Rep., 321. United States — Johnston v. Dis- 800 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§ 513 ments is generally granted in express terms or by necessary implication. It has been held in Pennsylvania that a municipal corporation has authority to pass ordinances for the grading and paving of streets without express grant from the legisla- ture.i2 Municipal corporations generally have power to condemn private property for public use. In the opening and widening of streets and alleys, the construction of drains, sewers and water courses, and the laying of water pipes, condenmation proceedings are frequently required. They can only be sanc- tioned legally by express grant from the state,^* and in the exercise of the sovereign right of eminent domain in condemn- ing property for such use, the constitutional rights of the property owners cannot be invaded. Just compensation must be paid for all property taken or "damaged" (according to some state constitution) for public use. The local corporation in such proceedings acts as the agent of the state under dele- gated authority, and the exercise of the power is subject to the inflexible rule that the power must be strictly pursued, and, ordinarily, must appear to be so on the face of the proceed- ings.i* The right to provide for local improvements by the exercise of the extraordinary power of special assessment or taxation, like the right of eminent domain, is a power primarily vested in the state, and can only be invoked by the municipal cor- poration, under express grant, either delegated by the legisla- ture of the state or conferred by the constitution. Constitu- tions frequently provide, in substance, that the legislature may vest the corporate authority of cities, towns and villages with power to make local improvements by special assessments or by special taxation of the property benefited.i^ § 513. Public improvements outside of corporate limits. The general rule is that, without legislative grant, ordinances enacted by a municipal corporation have no force beyond its trict of Columbia, 118 U. S., 19; instate (Durant) v. Jersey City, Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 25 N. J. L., 309. U. S., 540. Lands for opening and widening 12 Willlamsport v. Com., 84 Pa. street. Dorgan v. Boston, 12 Al- St, 487; 24 Am. Rep., 208. len (94 Mass.), 223. 13 Associates of Jersey Co. v. Jer- is Darst v. GriflSn, 31 Neb., 668; sey City, 8 N. J. Eq. (4 Halst.), 48 N. W. Rep., 819; State v. Dodge 715. County Court, 8 Neb., 124 ; 30 Am. Rep., 819. Sees. 522 to 524, post. § 513] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 801 corporate limits.i^ Thus, in the absence of such authority, it cannot open a street,^'' repair a highway ,i* grade an avenue,^® or aid in the construction of a plank road or bridge,^^ without its boundaries. Under a legislative act authorizing Boston 'and Cambridge to construct a bridge and avenue across the Charles River, between certain points in each municipality, and prescribing that the location shall be determined by the respective cotm- cils of the corporations, "acting separately," and that they shall jointly construct the bridge, in accordance with plans concurrently approved by both councils, and that each city may condemn within its own limits lands for the avenue, and shall respectively defray the expenses of construction on each side of the river, it was held that neither corporation has any voice in the location or construction of that portion of the avenue lying within the limits of the other.^i In Michigan, it has been decided that authority to act beyond the corporate boundaries may be implied on the grounds of necessity, as in preserving a stream which bounds the city from deposits of filth, and in conducting drains and sewers without the limits.^^ And in Illinois, a law which authorized cities and villages "to make local improvements," was con- strued to empower a village to levy a special assessment for the construction of a sewer which was partly outside of the corporate limits, where it appeared that it was necessary to so extend the sewer, in order to obtain an outlet.^^ So, in that state it has been decided that an ordinance authorizing the construction of a sewer may provide for the purchase by the corporation of lands outside its limits for the purpose of 16 Sees. 26 and 435, supra. be constructed by city, when. Dive- 17 Municipality No. 1 v. Young, 5 ly v. Cedar Falls, 27 Iowa, 227. La. Ann., 362. 21 Cambridge v. Railroad Comrs., 18 Georgetown v. United States, 153 Mass., 161; 26 N. E. Rep., 241. 2 Hayw. & H. (U. S.), 302; 30 Fed. See In re Butler Street, 6 Kulp. Cas. No. 18,281. When highway (Pa.), 488. beyond limits may be improved, 22 Coldwater v. Tucker, 36 Mich., see In re East Syracuse, 20 Abb. 474; 24 Am. Rep., 601. N. C. (N. Y.), 131. 23 Cochran v. Park Ridge, 138 "One side of avenue in the 111., 295; 27 N. E. Rep., 939, follow- county. Baltimore v. Porter, 18 ing Shreve v. Cicero, 129 111., 226; Md., 284. 21 N. B. Rep., 815; Maywood Co. 20 Montgomery v. Montgomery & v. Maywood, 140 111., 216 ; 29 N. E. W. Plank Rbad Co., 31 Ala., 76. Rep., 704. Free Bridge across a river may 802 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§S14 extending the sewer to its outlet.^* It is usual for charters to provide for the construction of sewers which extend, or drain territory, without the limits.^^ It has been judicially declared that where the boundary lines of the municipal corporation are uncertain and indefinite at certain points, local improvements may be made legally with reference to any recognized corporate limits.^^ § 514. Nature of power— Where vested— State control. The powers to provide public improvements, like all municipal powers, are held in trust for the public. They cannot be abdicated or surrendered.^'^ The power is in its nature legis- lative, not judicial. Thus, unless expressly authorized by law, an action will not lie to change the location of a street which has been established.^* Courts possess only such jurisdiction respecting municipal improvements as may be conferred by the legislature. Powers relative to the subject may be, and frequently are, conferred upon the courts.^* But for the most vague and indefinite, the court will adopt the lines fixed by the inhab- itants in exercising their munici- pal privileges. Miln v. New Or- leans, 13 La., 69. Boundaries may be defined by long usage, confirmed by legisla- tive recognition. People v. Farn- ham, 35 111., 562. In ascertaining boundaries due weight should be given to the con- temporaneous interpretation of the courts and other lawful authori- ties, and by the population at large residing therein. Maps published by authority of law may be re- ferred to as evidence. Hamilton V. McNeil, 13 Gratt. (Va.), 389, 393, 394. Where a road is the boundary line between two towns the sepa- rating point is the middle of the road. State v. Thomaston & Rock- land, 74 Me., 198. 2' Section 84 et seq. supra. Wa- bash R. R. Co. V. Defiance, 52 Ohio St., 262; 40 N. E. Rep., 89. 28 De Witt V. Duncan, 46 Cal., 342. 29 Surveyor of highway appoint- 2* Callon V. Jacksonville, 147 111., 113; 35 N. E. Rep., 223. 2^ Charter of St. Louis, art. VI, sec. 22 (amendment of October 22, 1901). 26 Bloomington Cemetery Assn. V. People, 139 111., 16; 28 N. E. Rep., 1076. Corporate Boundaries. "Corpo- rations have boundaries or they have no existence. To determine whether they have or not, or what they are, is within the power of the courts," Little Rock v. Parish, 36 Ark., 166. The organization of a municipal government without defined metes would be a nullity. Enterprise v. State ex rel., 29 Fla., 128, 142; 10 So. Rep., 740. Where the boundaries are un- certain, recognition by the inhabi- tants in certain limits may be con- sidered by the court. Pidgeon v. McCarthy, 82 Ind., 32; Albia v. O'Harra, 64 Iowa, 297; 20 N. W. Rep., 444; Belknap v. Louisville, 93 Ky., 444; 20 S. W. Rep., 309; State v. Columbia, 27 S. C, 137; 3 S. E. Rep., 55. Although boundaries may be §514] OP PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 803 part these appertain to the condemnation of private property for public use, which is essentially a judicial proceeding. The prevailing practice is to invest the municipal government with all the requisite powers, to provide all necessary and desirable public improvements.^*^ However, laws exist which confer power respecting public highways, although within the limits of a municipal corporation, upon officers other thail municipal, variously styled county commissioners, supervisors, highway surveyors, road boards, etc. These generally apply to small cities, towns and villages.*^ Occasionally, legislative acts pro- vide for the creation of special commissioners or boards, to administer certain functions belonging to the municipality, e. g., to devise a system of parks and boulevards,^^ a plan of sewerage, or to provide an adequate and wholesome water ed by court. Pancoast v. Troth, 34 N. J. L., 377. Power of county court over high- ways and bridges under legislative act. Norwich v. Story, 25 Conn., 44. Powers of court of quarter ses- sion in Pennsylvania. In re Osage Street, 90 Pa. St., 114; In re Road, 14 Serg. & R. (Pa.), 447; In re Callowhill St., 32 Pa. St., 361; In re Twenty-eighth St., 102 Pa. St., 140; In re Road Sterrett Tp., 123 Pa. St., 231; 16 Atl. Rep., 777; In re Vacation of Henry St., 123 Pa. St., 346; 16 Atl. Rep., 785; In re Vacation of Union St., 140 Pa. St., 525; 21 Atl. Rep., 406. Examine Knowles v. Muscatine, 20 Iowa, 248; Brandt v. Milwaukee, 69 Wis., 386; 34 N. W. Rep., 246. 30 Illinois — People v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 118 111., 520; 8 N. E. Rep., 824; Shields v. Ross, 158 111., 214; 41 N. E. Rep., 985. Indiana — Sparling v. Dwenger, 60 Ind., 72; State v. Mainey, 65 Ind., 404; Anderson v. Endicutt, 101 Ind., 539. Iowa — Gallaher v. Head, 72 Iowa, 173; 33 N. W. Rep., 620. Kansas — Ottawa v. Rohrbough, 42 Kan., 253; 21 Pac. Rep., 1061. Michigan — Comrs. of Highways V. Willard, 41 Mich., 627; 3 N. W. Rep., 164. Mississippi — Bloclcer v. State, 72 Miss., 720; 18 So. Rep., 388. New Jersey — Campbell v. Hale, 25 N. J. L., 324; Cross v. Morris- town, 18 N. J. Eq., 305; Keyport v. Cherry, 51 N. J. L., 417; 18 Atl. Rep., 299 ;.. Cherry v. Keyport, 52 N. J. L., 544; 20 Atl. Rep., 970; In re Public Road, 54 N. J. L., 539; 24 Atl. Rep., 759. Pennsylvania — In re Road in Borough of Baston, 3 Rawle (Pa.), 195; In re Jackson Street, 83 Pa. St., 328. Texas — State v. Jones, 18 Tex., 874; Norwood v. Gonzales County, 79 Tex., 218; 14 S. W. Rep., 1057. Vermont — Bennington v. Smith, 29 Vt., 254. 31 In re Hanson, 51 Me., 193 ; Washington v. Fisher, 43 N. J. L., 377; Carroll v. Irvington, 50 N. J. L., 361; 12 Atl. Rep., 712; People V. Queens County Supervisors, 62 Hun. (N. Y.), 619; 16 N. Y. Supp., 705 ; Wells v. McLaughlin, 17 Ohio, 99; Butman v. Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101. 32 West Chicago Park Comrs. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 103 111., 804: OP PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§ 515 supply.33 Unless the state constitution forbids, laws of this character are often sustained. § 515. Same subject. As yet purely municipal questions have not been clearly differentiated in all cases. As these questions arise_ the courts announce certain principles, sug- gesting particular limits on both the legislature and the local corporation, but for the most part these rules are applicable only in the jurisdiction in which they are declared. As relates to legislative control, the tendency ot the courts seems to be to regard everything within the administrative competence of cities as municipal in character. However, this does not and should not go to the extent of the entire destruction of uni- formity, or what has been termed state unity in government, and the establishment of imperia in imperio.^* The theoreti- cally omnipotent parliament which opposes the idea of local autonomy has long been a principle of the English law; and, to a considerable degree, notwithstanding our constitutional system of precise division of governmental powers, the prin- ciple has been incorporated, as a heritage, into our juris- prudence. From this theory the careful enumeration of munic- ipal powers and the rule of strict construction naturally fol- lowed, which of necessity has resulted in frequent appeals to the legislature on the part of local authorities to exercise doubtful, desirable or indispensable powers through officers selected by the city or appointed by the state. When these occasions arose, the city's proper sphere of activity as distin- guished from that of the state, was not, as a rule, considered; hence the confusion existing on this subject. But, many courts, notably in recent years, have rigidly enforced the right of the local community to exercise local self-government, unrestrained by improper legislative interference. It has been held that the following matters are of exclusive local control: street improvements,^^ condemnation proceed- ings to acquire lands for streets, parks, water works, sewers, etc.,^® establishment and maintenance of boulevards,^^ assess- 33; In re Central Park Comrs., 51 479; 27 S. W. Rep., 711; State ex Barb. (N. Y.), 277; 35 How. Pr. rel. v. Field, 99 Mo., 352, 356; 12 S. (N. Y.), 255. W. Rep., 802. 33 7m re Zborowski, 68 N. Y., 88; ae Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., Clark V. Lyon, 68 N. Y., 609. 140 Mo., 458, 472; 41 S. W. Rep., 3* Goodnow, Municipal Problems, 943 ; Harward v. St. Clair, etc. Co., ch. IV. 51 111., 130. 35 Murnane v. St. Louis, 123 Mo. 37 St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo., §515] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 805 ing damages and benefits for grading and regrading streets,^* the establishment and control of parks,^* fire department,*" water works,*' gas works,*^ and the assessment and collection of costs for street improvements.*^ The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, although regarding the system of water Avorks, the markets, hospitals, cemeteries, library and the system of parks of Boston as estab- lished and maintained essentially "for the benefit of the pub- lic," yet declares that they are "held more like property of a private corporation," and therefore protected from legislative interference.** Other illustrations appear from the cases in the note.*5 ".» 466, 480; 41 S. W. Rep., 1094; 46 S. W. Rep., 976. 38 State ex ret v. Field, 99 Mo., 352, 356; 12 S. W. Rep., 802. 39 State ex rel. v. Schwelckardt, 109 Mo., 496; 19 S. W. Rep., 47; Kansas City ex rel. v. Scarritt, 127 Mo., 642; 29 S. W. Rep., 845; 30 S. W. Rep., Ill; People v. Chicago, 51 111., 17; People ex rel. v. Detroit, 28 Mich., 228; 15 Am. Rep., 202; Oren v. Bolger, 128 Mich., 355; 87 N. W. Rep., 366; 8 Det. Leg. News., 675. Contra. State v. Smith, 44 Ohio St., 348; 7 N. E. Rep., 447; 12 N. E. Rep., 829. Legislature may provide for construction of park system to be paid for by local as- sessments. In re Adams, 165 Mass. 497; 43 N. E. Rep., 682. Legisla- tive mandatory act is valid which requires city to purchase lots or condemn land for a park. Balti- more V. Reitz, 50 -Md., 574. 40 State ex rel. v. Denny, 118 Ind., 382; 21 N. E. Rep., 252; 24 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 165; State v. Fox, 158 Ind., 126; 63 N. E. Rep., 19; Lexington v. Thompson, 24 Ky. Law. Rep., 384; 68 S. W. Rep., 477; State v. Moores, 55 Neb., 480; 76 N. W. Rep., 175, overruling State V. Seavey, 22 Neb., 454; 35 N. W. Rep., 228. Compare Redell V. Moores, 63 Neb., 219; 55 L. R. A., 740; 88 N. W. Rep., 243. 4^1 State ex rel. v. Barker, 116 Iowa, 96; 89 N. W. Rep., 204. 42 Western Sav. Fund Sac. v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St., 175, 183. 43 Murnane v. St. Louis, 123 Mo., 479; 27 S. W. Rep., 711. Con- tra. Legislature may authorize as- sessments for local improvements. Lent V. Tillson, 72 Cal., 404; 14 Pac. Rep., 71; Thomason v. Rug- gles, 69 Cal., 465; 11 Pac. Rep., 20; People V. Bartlett, 67 Cal., 156; 7 Pac. Rep., 417; Oakland Pay. Co. V. Rier, 52 Cal., 270. In re House Bill No. 165, 15 Colo., 593; 26 Pac. Rep., 141; In re Van Antwerp, 56 N. Y., 261; Seanor v. Whatcom County Comrs., 13 Wash., 48; 42 Pac. Rep., 552. Power to assess city property for local improvements may be dele- gated by the legislature to a board of assessors, acting independently of city council. Little Rock v. Board of Improvement, 42 Ark., 152. The legislature may relieve prop- erty improperly assessed for a lo- cal improvement and compel the city to pay the sum. State v. Hoff- man, 35 Ohio St., 435. 44 "In establishing all of these the city has not acted strictly as an agent of the state government for the accomplishment of the pub- lic or political purposes but with 806 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§516 § 516. Only officers duly authorized can provide for im- provements. Public improvements can be legally provided for only by the officers, boards or departments, duly empowered.*" Municipal charters differ widely in the manner of vesting the several municipal functions ; changes in this respect are fre- quent; and oftentimes laws are so drawn, amended and re- pealed, that judicial construction is necessary to inform those special reference to the benefit of its own inliabltants." Mt. Hope Cemetery v. Boston, 158 Mass., 509, 519; 33 N. E. Rep., 695. *i> Bridges and Ferries. May provide for establishment of bridge and ferry, and compel city to pay without its consent. Simon v. Northrup, 27 Oreg., 487; 40 Pac. Rep., 560; 30 L. R. A., 171; Phil- adelphia V. Field, 58 Pa. St., 320. Legislature may compel levy of taxes for bridges. Talbot Co., v. Queen Anne Co., 50 Md., 245, 259. Court House. The legislature cannot compel a city at its sole ex- pense to erect a court house in the county in which the city is situate, but may authorize the city to do so. Callam v. Saginaw, 50 Mich., 7; 14 N. W. Rep., 677. Sewers. Legislature may regu- late the manner in which city sew- ers shall be constructed. In re N. Y. P. E. Public Schools, 46 N. Y., 178. Legislature may compel city to pay damages in making im- provements. In re Reynolds, 21 N. Y. Supp., 592; Tocci v. New York, 25 N. Y. Supp., 1089. Public Health. May make pro- vision for disposition of sewage from a number of towns and cities, and compel cities and towns to pay expenses therefor — matter relates to public health — area con- tained 1-6 of state population. In re Kingman, 153 Mass., 566; 27 N. E. Rep., 778; 12 L. R. A., 417; S. P. King V. Reed, 43 N. J. L., 186. Commissioners, to perform mu- nicipal functions forbidden by con- stitutions of many states, as'in Cal- ifornia, Pennsylvania and Wash- ington. Transferring duties of construction, maintenance and regulation of highways to commis- sioners is prohibited in Pennsylva- nia. Porter v. Shields, 200 Pa. St., 241; 49 Atl. Rep., 785. But a legislative act creating a commission to investigate and re- port as to certain improvements, was decided in California not to violate the constitution forbidding the delegation of power to a spe- cial commission. Under the act the report was only effective and binding when approved by the council. Davis v. Los Angeles, 86 Cal., 37; 24 Pac. Rep., 771. As to what constitutes delegation of power see §§ 84 to 89 supra. Claims. May exercise power to tax to pay claims. Guthrie Na- tional Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U. S., 528; Guthrie v. Territory ex rel. Losey, 1 Okla., 188; 31 Pac. Rep., 190; Coast Co. v. Spring Lake Borough, 56 N. J. Eq., 615; 36 Atl. Rep., 21. Funds and Revenue. Act re- quiring council to levy special tax to create a fund for pensioning crippled and disabled firemen and the families of deceased members, held void. McDonald v. Louis- ville, 24 Ky. Law. Rep., 271; 68 S. W., 413. 48 Brooklyn v. Meserole, 26 Wend. (N. Y.), 132, reversing Meserole v. Brooklyn, 8 Paige (N. § 517] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 807 interested of their true meaning.''^ A slight departure or an immaterial irregularity will not invalidate the proceedings.""^ As an ordinance cannot change legally a provision of the charter,*^ power conferred upon officers by this instrument cannot be limited or restricted by ordinance or resolution. Thus where the charter authorizes the board of street commis- sioners to provide for the lighting of the city, an ordinance directing that the board shall make provisional contracts, sub- ject to the approval of the council, for the erection or lighting of street lamps, should be construed either as directory merely, or as an unauthorized limitation of the board's powers, and therefore void.°" So, where under the charter, the mayor and council have power to widen and extend the streets and open new ones, and authority to grade, repair and otherwise improve them, ordinances forbidding the removal of earth in the city during the summer months, without the permit of the board of health, which do not expressly name the mayor and council as subject thereto, are not operative upon them when acting as a municipal body in improving or repairing the streets.^^ § 517. Same— Delegation of power forbidden. The rule for- bidding the delegation of legislative power, stated and ex- Y.), 198; Van Doren v. New York, drains and sewers to the council, 9 Paige (N. Y.), 388; O'Rourke v. and a legislative act to the mayor Hart, 9 Bosw. (22 N. Y. Super. Ct), and alderman; held that an order 301; King v. Brooklyn, 42 Barb, of the latter was not rendered void (N. Y.), 627. because the council concurred. i'' Regulating grade of streets Woodbridge v. Cambridge, 114 transferred from department of Mass., 483. public works to council. In re Where the charter provides that Roberts, 89 N. Y., 618, affirming 25 the board of public works cannot Hun. (N. Y.), 371. change plats which have been ap- Power to contract for water proved by it, unless authorized by works vested in mayor and coun- the council, the board cannot va- cil, changed to water commis- cate plats. Cainpau v. Detroit sioner. Wells v. Atlanta, 43 Ga., 67. Board of Public Works, 86 Mich., Contract for water pumping ma- 372; 49 N. W. Rep., 39. chinery to be authorized by coun- *» Section 15, supra. cil. Chicago v. Fraser, 60 111. App., so Hartford v. Hartford Electric 404. Light Co., 65 Conn., 324; 32 Atl. *s Dorey v. Boston, 146 Mass., Rep., 925. Examine Minneapolis 336; 15 N. E. Rep., 897. Gaslight Co. v. Minneapolis, 36 Change of grade, held not alter- Minn., 159; 30 N. W. Rep., 450. ing street. Callender v. Marsh, 1 si Brunswick v. King, 91 Ga., Pick. (18 Mass.), 418. 522; 17 S. E. Rep., 940. The charter gave power as to 808 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§517 plained elsewhere,'^^ is well illustrated in improvement ordi- nances, as appears from the numerous cases in the notes deal- ing with various kinds of improvements.^^ Thus where the council or legislative body is required by charter to determine the nature, character, location, material to be used and the manner in which the improvement should be made, such authority cannot be delegated by ordi- nance or resolution, either by recital or omission in specifica- tion, or otherwise, to any officer of the city or committee^^ of 52 Sections 86 to 88, supra. sa Delegation of Powek as to Improvements, forbidden. California — Richardson v. Hey- denfeldt, 46 Cal., 68. Illinois — Foss v. Chicago, 56 III., 354; Jenlis v. Chicago, 56 111., 397; Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Chi- cago, 56 111., 454; Moore v. Chi- cago, 60 111., 243; Wright v. Chi- cago, 60 111., 312; Bryan v. Chi- cago, 60 111., 507; Page v. Chicago, 60 111., 441; Rich v. Chicago, 152 111., 18; 38 N. B. Rep., 255. Kentucky — Hydes v. Joyes, 67 Ky. (4 Bush), 464; 96 Am. Dec, 311; Murray v. Tucker, 73 Ky. (10 Bush), 240. Maryland, — Baltimore v. John Hopkins Hospital, 56 Md., 1; Moale V. Baltimore, 61 Md., 224. Massachusetts — Taber v. New Bedford, 135 Mass., 162. Michigan — Scofield v. Lansing, 17 Mich., 437. Missouri — Thomson v. Boonville, 61 Mo., 282; Sheehan v. Gleeson, 46 Mo., 100; St. Louis v. Clemens, 43 Mo., 395; St. Joseph v. Wllshire, 47 Mo. App., 125; Si. Louis v. Glea- son, 15 Mo. App., 25. New Jersey — Bodine v. Trenton, 36 N. J. L., 198; State v. Newark, 54 N. J. L., 62; 23 Atl. Rep., 129. Keii) York — Merritt v. Portches- ter, 29 Hun. (N. Y.), 619; Birdsall V. Clark, 73 N. Y., 73; 29 Am. Rep., 105, reversing 7 Hun. (N. Y.), 351; Phelps V. New York, 112 N. Y., 216; 19 N. E. Rep., 408; 2 L. R. A., 626; Van Nest v. New York, 113 N. Y., 652; 21 N. E. Rep., 414; Peo- ple V. Haverstraw, 137 N. Y., 88; 32 N. E. Rep., 1111, Rhode Island — Rounds v. Mum- ford, 2 R. I., 154. South Carolina — Charleston v. Pinokney, 3 Brev. (S.'C), 217. Tennessee — Whyte v. Nashville, 2 Swan (32 Tenn.), 364. 5i Delegation of certain author- ity to street committee sustained. Hitchcock V. Galveston, 96 U. S., 341; Brewster v. Davenport, 51 Iowa, 427; 1 N. W. Rep., 737; Dor- man V. Lewiston, 81 Me., 411; 17 Atl. Rep., 316; Renting v. Titus- ville, 175 Pa. St., 512; 34 Atl. Rep., 916. Compare Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss., 378; 34 Am. Rep., 451; Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 9 Barb. (N. Y.), 152, affirmed 6 N. Y. 92; 55 Am. Dec, 385; Gulf C. & S F. Ry. V. Riordan (Tex. Civ. App 1893), 22 S. W. Rep., 519; McCro- well V.Bristol, 89 Va., 652; 16 S E. Rep., 867; 20 L. R. A., 653. Sidewalk, construction of, may be given to an officer. Bowers v. Barrett, 85 Me., 382; 27 Atl. Rep., 260; Attorney General v. Boston, 142 Mass., 200; 7 N. E. Rep., 722. Agents may be employed to su- pervise the work. Collins v. Hol- yoke, 146 Mass., 298; 15 N. E. Rep., 908. §517] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 809 the council.^^ Hence an ordinance which omits to name the material for the receiving basins and manholes contravenes this rule, and as a result the tax bills issued to the contractor for the work will be held void as to such basins and manholes, but valid as to the rest.^s So, an ordinance which leaves the determination of the dimensions of a sewer to an officer or the contractor, in violation of the charter requiring the ordinance to fix such dimensions, is clearly void.^^ But where the charter merely provides that the size of the sewer to be constructed shall be prescribed by ordinance, and contains no such require- ment as to inlets, manholes, etc., nor of the material to be used in their construction, the latter are mere appendages and may be regarded as matters of detail not necessary to be speci- fied in the ordinance.''* In one case an ordinance provided that a sidewalk might, at the option of the contractor, be constructed of pine, white or burr oak, of certain dimensions. Here it was held that the ordinance did not constitute a dele- gation of the authority as to material with which the sidewalk was to be constructed. The court observed that by allowing the walks to be constructed of one or the other material a Ordinance as to construction of railroad may designate officers, to execute its provisions. Nortliern Central R. Co. v. Baltimore, 21 Md., 93. ssRuggles V. Collier, 43 Mo., 353; King-Hill Brick Mfg. Co. v. Hamilton, 51 Mo. App., 120, 125; Galbreatli v. Newton, 30 Mo. App., 380. See cases in last note. "The trust is an important and delicate one. * * * in effect, it is a power of taxation which is the exercise of sovereign author- ity; and nothing short of the most positive and explicit language can justify the court in holding that the legislature intended to confer such power on a city officer or committee. The statute not only contains no such language, but on the contrary, clearly, to my mind, expresses the intention of confin- ing the exercise of this power to the common council, the members of which are elected by and re' sponsible to those whose property they are thus allowed to tax." Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6 N. Y., 92, 96. Authority to let contracts can- not be delegated to a clerk. Meuser v. Risdon. 36 Cal., 239. Reletting contract; same course usually as in first letting. Z6. Time of completion of contract; the fixing of is generally a legisla- tive function, and, hence, cannot be delegated. Ayers v. Schmohl, 86 Mo. App., 349. 56 St. Joseph V. Wilshire, 47 Mo. Appr,, 125. =7 St. Louis- V. Clemens, 52 Mo., 133; St. Louis v. Clemens, 43 Mo., 395; Sheehan v. Gleeson, 46 Mo., 100. 58 St. Joseph to use, etc. v. Owen, 110 Mo., 445 ; 19 S. W. Rep., 713. 810 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§518 larger competition in bidding would likely be opened up, and the work therefore done at a lower price.^^ § 518. Improvements by property owners. Under ample charter power, penal ordinances have been sustained compell- ing abutting property owners on streets to construct and main- tain sidewalks and footways when necessary to the safety or convenience of pedestrians. This has been adjudged as a proper exercise of the police power,^'* and not unconstitu- tional as an unwarranted delegation of the taxing power.^^ On the other hand, such laws have been declared void.®^ In 59 Gallagher v. Smith, 55 Mo. App., 116, 121, 122, distinguishing Galbreath v. Newton, 30 Mo. App., 380; Ruggles v. Collier, 43 Mo., 353. Culvert, ordinance may confer power on city engineer to fix di- mensions. Young V. Kansas City, 27 Mo. App., 101. 60 Palmer v. Way, 6 Col., 106 ; Macon V. Patty, 57 Miss., 378; 34 Am. Rep., 451; Wilson v. Philippi, 39 W. Va., 75; 19 S. B. Rep., 553. SI Arkansas — James v. Pine Bluff, 49 Ark., 199; 4 S. W. Rep., 760. California — Hart v. Gaven, 12 Cal., 476. Kentucky — Paris v. Berry, 2 J. J. Marsh (25 Ky.), 483. Pennsylvania — Greenburg v. Young, 53 Pa. St., 280. Tennessee — Franklin v. Maberry, 6 Humph (25 Tenn.), 368; 44 Am. Dec, 315; Washington v. Nash- ville, 1 Swan (31 Tenn.), 177. Virginia — Sands v. Richmond, 31 Graft. (Va.), 571; 31 Am. Rep,, 742. Particular provisions construed. Arkansas — Little Rock v. Fitz- gerald, 59 Ark., 494; 28 S. W. Rep., 32; 28 L. R. A., 496. Connecticut — Norwich v, Hub- bard, 22 Conn., 587; Yale College V. New Haven, 57 Conn., 1; 17, Atl. Rep., 139; Hillhouse v. New Haven, 62 Conn., 344; 26 Atl. Rep., 393. Indiana— Wiles v. Hoss, 114 Ind., 371; 16 N. E. Rep., 800; Keith v. Wilson, 145 Ind., 149; 44 N. E. Rep., 13. Iowa — Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282. Kansas — Emporia v. Gilchrist, 37 Kan., 532; 15 Pac. Rep., 532. Massachusetts — Charlestown v. Stone, 15 Gray (81 Mass.), 40; Nute v. Boston, etc., Co., 149 Mass., 465; 21 N. E. Rep., 881. Missouri — McCormack v. Patch- in, 53 Mo., 33; Estes v. Owen, 90 Mo., 113; 2 S. W. Rep., 133, af- firming Farrar v. St. Louis^ 80 Mo., 379. New Jersey — Paxson v. Sweet, 13 N. J. L., 196; Bergen v. Van Home, 32 N. J. L., 490. Pennsylvania— FinAley v. Pitts- burg (Pa. 1887), 11 Atl. Rep., 678; Smith v. Kingston Borough, 120 Pa. St., 357; 14 Atl. Rep., 170. Rhode Island — Swan v. Colville, 19 R. 1., 161; 32 Atl. Rep., 854. Drains, RepaiSs. Compelling property owners to make. Bangor V. Lansil, 51 Me., 521. 62 Port Huron v. Jenkinson, 77 Mich., 414; 43 N. W. Rep., 923; 18 Am. St. Rep., 409; 6 L. R. A., 54. Sidewalk Repairs; city cannot compel abutting owner to make, Chicago v. Crosby, 111 111., 538; Woodward v. Boscobel, 84 Wis., § 518] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 811 Illinois, a regulation of a board of public works was sustained which required citizens desiring to use the water of the city flowing through the main pipes, to lay down, at their own expense, the necessary service pipes. The court expressed the opinion that the regulation was just and reasonable, and in harmony with the principle upon which special assessments are based.f^ It is usual for laws of this character to provide for due notice to the property owners that the construction or repair- ing is necessary, and thus give them an opportunity to do the work, within a time named, and in event of default the munic- ipal authorities may proceed to have the work done at the expense of the property. These conditions must be, in sub- stance, observed, as they are jurisdictional.''* In Missouri, an ordinance of St. Louis which provided that ' ' the board of public improvements may, upon the application ' ' of the abutting property owner, grant him permission ' ' to con- struct the sidewalk in front of such property, but without such permission no sidewalk shall be constructed by any person other than the contractor having the annual contract for con- structing new sidewalks, ' ' was construed as investing the board with discretion to permit the abutting owner the right to con- struct a sidewalk in front of his property or deny to him that 226; 54 N. W. Rep., 332. Contra. N. J. L., 361; 12 Atl. Rep., 712; Buell V. Ball, 20 Iowa,, 282; War- Rathbun v. Acker, 18 Barb. (N. ren v. Henly, 31 Iowa, 31. Y.), 393; Moore v. Falrport, 11 63 Prindiville v. Jackson, 79 111., Misc. Rep. (N. Y.), 146; 32 N. Y. 337. Supp., 633; Philadelphia v. Ed- PiEES — Marshall v. Guion, 4 wards, 78 Pa. St., 62; Philadelphia Denio (N. Y.), 581. v. Donath, 13 Phlla. (Pa.), 4; Phil- si Manning V. Gen., 90 Cal., 610; adelphia v. Meighan, 159 Pa. St., 27 Pac. Rep., 435; Newbery v. Fox, 495; 28 Atl. Rep., 304; Simmons v. 37 Minn., 141; 33 N. W. Rep., 333; Gardiner, 6 R. I. 255; Galveston v. 5 Am. St. Rep., 830; Covington v. Heard, 54 Tex., 420; Rogers v. Bishop, 10 Ky. Law. Rep., 939; Milwaukee, 13 Wis., 610; Myrick 11 S. W. Rep., 199; Cowen v. West v. La Crosse, 17 Wis., 442; Johns- Troy, 43 Barb. (N. Y.), 48; Gal- ton v. Oshkosh, 21 Wis., 184. veston V. Heard, 54 Tex., 420. Time within which the work is Notice generally necessary; suf- to be done by property owner, ficiency of service. Shrum v. Particular instances. Loughridge Salem, 13 Ind. App., 115; 39 N. E. v. Huntington, 56 Ind., 253; Nu- Rep., 1050; Tufts v. Charlestown, gent v. Jackson, 72 Miss., 1040; 18 98 Mass., 583 ; Leach v. Cargill, 60 Rep., 493 ; Fass v. Seehawer, 60 Mo., 316; Carroll v. Irvington, 50 Wis., 525; 19 N. W. Rep., 533. 812 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§519 permission, hence mandamus to compel the board to issue a permit was denied.^^ § 519. Discretion of municipal authorities as to improve- ments. It is a fundamental rule that discretionary powers vested in public oiScers are not subject to judicial control.*'' Ordinances providing for public improvements give frequent occasion for the application of the rule.*^ Unless legal limita- tions exist, power to open, improve, and pave streets is dis- cretionary with the municipal authorities and if the law has been observed substantially their action therein is not subject to judicial review.*^ In other words, where a power touching local improvements is expressly granted to municipal authori- ties, as a rule, they are, in the reasonable exercise of it, beyond the control of the courts.^" Ordinarily, courts will not inter- fere on the ground that a given improvement is unnecessary, and that the ordinance providing for it is therefore oppressive and unreasonable.'^" In the absence of constitutional or charter 65 state eoc rel. v. St. Louis. 158 Mo., 505; 59 S. W. Rep., 1101. Ordinance sustained which auth- orized property owners to con- struct their own sidewalks. Zal- esky V. Cedar Rapids (Iowa Dec. 17, 1902), 92 N. W. Rep., 657. Mandatory and Dieeotoey pro- visions, construction of "may", "shall", etc., see sections 82 and 83, supra. 66 Sees. 76 and 77, supra. Limi- tations of rule sec. 78, supra. Mandatory and Discbetionaey Powers distinguished. Sees. 82 and 83, supra. Mandatory law requiring the modification of grade of certain street. People v. San Francisco, 36 Cal., 595. 67 § 77 supra and notes. 68 Barber A. P. Co. v. French, 158 Mo., 534; 58 S. W. Rep., 934. Charter prevails over state law, when. Hill v. St. Louis, 159 Mo., 159; 60 S. W. Rep., 116. 68 California — Harney v. Benson, 113, Cal., 314; 45 Pac. Rep., 687. Illinois — Curry v. Mount Sterl- ing, 15 111., 320; English v. Dan- ville, 150 111., 92; 36 N. B. Rep., 994; Shannon V. Hinsdale, 180 111., 202; 54 'N. E. Rep., 181; Church v. People, 179 111., 205; 52 N. E. Rep., 554; Davis v. Litchfield, 145 111., 313; 33 N. E. Rep., 888. Kentucky — Worthington v. Cov- ington, 6 Ky. Law Rep., 237. Missouri — Skinker v. Heman, 64 Mo. App., 441; Estes v. Owen, 90 Mo., 113; 2 S. W. Rep., 133; Far- rar v. St. Louis. 80 Mo., 379; Mc- Cormack v. Patchin, 53 Mo., 33. J/eto Jersey — Taintor v. Morris- town, 33 N. J. L., 57. 70 Georgia — Bacon v. Savannah, 105 Ga., 62; 31 S. B. Rep., 127. /owa— Miller v. Wester City, 94 Iowa, 162; 62 N. W. Rep., 648; In re Cedar Rapids, 85 Iowa, 39; 51 N. W. Rep., 1142. Illinois — Chicago v. Nichols, 177 111., 97; 52 N. E. Rep., 359; Chi- cago & N. W. R. Co. V. Cicero, 154 111., 656; 39 N. E. Rep., 574. §519] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 81J restrictions, municipal discretion includes the extent and na- ture of the improvement/! the material for construction/^ and the vacation of streets and public waysJ^ Indiana — Elkhart v. Wickwire, 121 Ind., 331; 22 N. E. Rep., 342. Missouri — Saxton v. St. Joseph, 60 Mo., 153; Morse v. Westport, 110 Mo., 502; 19 S. W. Rep., 831; 136 Mo., 276; 33 S. W. Rep., 182; Marionville v. Hanson, 65 Mo. App., 397. New York — Kelsey v. King, 32 Barb. (N. Y.), 410; 11 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 180. Pennsylvania — Oil City v. Oil City Boiler Works, 152 Pa. St., 348; 25 Atl. Rep., 549. Opening Street, necessity. De- troit V. Beecher, 75 Mich., 454; 42 N. W. Rep., 986; 4 L. R. A., 813; In re Folts Street, 46 N. Y., Suppl. 43; 18 App. Div. (N. Y.), 568. Seweks and Drains, necessity. Carr v. Doley, 122 Mass., 255; Paulson V. Portland, 16 Oregon, 450; 19 Pac. Rep., 450; 1 L. R. A., 673. Condemnation — Public Use. In re Condemnation of Independence Ave. Boulevard, 128 Mo., 272; 30 S. W. Rep., 773. Municipal Officers, how far agents of the property owners in authorizing improvements. Schum V. Seymour, 24 N. J. Eq., 143, 147; Barber Asphalt P. Co. v. Hezel, 76 Mo. App., 135, 152. ■fi Nature and Extent, streets and public ways. Murphy v. Peoria, 119 111., 509; 9 N. E. Rep., 895; Lightner v. Peoria, 150 III., 80; 37 N. E. Rep., 69; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. East St. Louis, 134 111., 656; 25 N. E. Rep., 962; Brown v. Barstow, 87 Iowa, 344; 54 N. W. Rep., 241; Bos- ton & M. R. Co. V. Lawrence, 2 Al- len (84 Mass.), 107; Dunker v. Stlefel, 57 Mo. App., 379; State v. Portage, 12 Wis., 562. The improvement of a street need not extend to the sidewalk. Moran v. Lindell, 52 Mo., 229, 232, where only a carriage way on each side of the street was macadam- ized, and the material did not cov- er the whole street, and the side- walk, distinguishing Philadelphia V. Eastwick, 35 Pa St., 75. Sewers. Hoboken v. Chamber- lain, 37 N. J. L., 51. One sewer district may be plan- ned; whole city need not be laid out into sewerage districts. In re Protestant Episcopal Public School, 40 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 198; 47 N. Y., 556. Compare, 46 N. Y., 178; reversing 58 Barb. (N. Y.), 161; 40 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 139. 72 Material for Construction. Illinois — Cunningham v. Peoria, 157 111., 499; 41 N. E. Rep., 1014; Cram v. Chicago, 138 111., 506; 28 N. E. Rep., 757; Shannon v. Hins- dale, 180 111., 202; 54 N. E. Rep., 181; Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. East St. Louis, 134 111., 656; 25 N. E. Rep., 962; Illinois Central R. R. Co. V. Chicago, 141 111., 586; 30 N. E. Rep., 1044. Iowa — Burlington & M. R. R. Co. V. Spearman, 12 Iowa, 112. Louisiana — Gunning Gravel & P. Co. V. New Orleans, 45 La. Ann., 911; 13 So. Rep., 182. Michigan — Grand Rapids v. Board of Public Works, 87 Mich., 113; 49 N. W. Rep., 481; 99 Mich., 392; 58 N. W. Rep., 335; Shimmons v. Saginaw, 104 Mich., 511; 62 N. W. Rep., 725. Missouri — Gallagher v. Smith, 55 Mo. App., 116. 814 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§530 It has been held that the passage of the ordinance is usually conclusive as to the necessity of the workJ* § 520. Boulevards. Express power is often conferred upon the municipal authorities to establish and open boulevards, or change existing streets into boulevards, and fix the width thereof, and the manner of laying out and improving the same ; to regulate the traffic thereon by excluding heavy driving thereon or any kind of vehicle therefrom; to forbid the erec- New York— Berg v. Grace, 1 N. Co., 10 Colo.. 243; 15 Pac. Rep., Y. St. Rep., 418; Schenectady v. Union College, 66 Hun. (N. Y.), 179; 21 N. Y. Suppl., 147; reversed 144 N. Y., 241; 39 N. E. Rep., 67; 26 L. R. A., 614. Pennsylvania — Schenley v. Com., 36 Pa. St., 29; 78 Am. Dec, 359; Philadelphia v. Evans, 139 Pa. St., 483; 21 Atl. Rep., 200. Wisconsin — Benson- v. Waukesha, 74 Wis., 31; 41 N. W. Rep., 1017. Property owners may select — Waiver of right. Moale v. Balti- more, 61 Md., 224. 73 Vacation of Street for benefit of private individual or corpora- tion, held not illegal. Meyer v. Teutopolis, 131 111., 552; 23 N. E. Rep., 651; Marshalltown v. For- ney, 61 Iowa, 578; 16 N. W. Rep., 740. Street can only be vacated when no longer required for public use. Smith V. McDowell, 148 111., 51; 35 N. E. Rep., 141; 22 L. R. A., 393. No implied power exists to close a public alley for a money con- sideration against the will of those owning lots in the square through which the alley runs, and who have the right of passage over it. Louisville v. Bannon, 99 Ky., 74; 35 S. W. Rep., 120. The power to vacate streets can- not be exercised arbitrarily; it must be in the interest of the pub- lic. Whitsett V. Union Depot & R. 339. Contract with a railroad com- pany in vacating a street, prohibit- ing the city from condemning property for street in future, held ultra vires. Grand Rapids v. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co., 66 Mich., 42; 33 N. W. Rep., 15. Vacating an alley in considera- tion of a division with the city of the property after the erection of a building thereon by the owner of the fee, held void. Horton v. Wil- liams, 99 Mich., 423; 58 N. W. Rep., 369. Reducing the width of a street one half and giving an abutting owner permission to inclose the ex- cess, held illegal, as attempting to give for private purposes a por- tion of a public street. St. Vincent Female Orphan Asylum v. Troy, 76 N. \, 108; 32 Am. Rep., 286. Where power to vacate exists, the question whether or not it should be exercised is solely one of legis- lative discretion. Knapp-Stout & Co. V. St. Louis, 156 Mo., 343; 56 S. W. Rep., 1102. '4 Seibert v. Tiffany, 8 Mo. App., 33; Bohle v. Stannard, 7 Mo. App., 51. But in Corrigan v. Gage, 68 Mo., 541, it was held that an ordinance for a sidewalk in an uninhabited portion of a city, and disconnected with any other street or sidewalk, was unnecessary and oppressive; and such facts might be shown in an action on the special tax bill. § 5-20] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 8l5 tion, establishment or maintenance of any business house, or the carrying on of any business vocation on the property front- ing on such boulevard; to establish a building line to which all buildings, fences or other structures thereon shall conform ; and to provide for grading, improving, constructing, recon- structing, maintaining, cleaning, sprinkling, the planting of trees, shrubbery, and other things of that description and na- ture thereon. Usually, the entire cost connected with all such work is levied, assessed and collected, as a special tax or assess- ment on the property fronting or bordering on such boulevard, according to some just method of apportionment, specified in the charter or legislative act applicable. The restriction is common that no franchise for the occupancy or use of such lioulevard, or anj- part thereof, shall be granted, except with llie consent, in writing, of the owners of a certain proportion (generally two-thirds) in frontage of the property fronting or bordering thereon."'^ In view of the prevailing constitutional provision that pri- vate property shall not l)e taken (or damaged) for public use, without just compensation, to be ascertained in a manner speci- fied, it is essential that such laws should make adequate pro- vision for the ascertainment and allowance of just compensa- tion to the owners of property fronting or bordering thereon for damages occasioned by the establishment of a building line on such boulevard and by the use to which such property may be put by the owners thereof."" All laws relating to the iise of boulevards and streets set aside for pleasure drives must operate generally and impartially, and provide a permanent and uniform rule. Thus an ordinance forbidding the use of such ways for heavy hauling, or for any of the purposes above mentioned, except on the special permission of certain munici- pal officers, as for example, the board of trustees, is unreason- able, since it invests in such board an unregulated official dis- cretion."^ Charter provisions also exist for the discontinuance of boule- 7= Charter of St. Louis, Art. VI., 466, 485; 41 S. W. Rep., 1094; 46 Sec. 1 (amendments, Oct. 22, 1901). S. W. Rep., 976; Philadelphia v. Cicero Lumber Co. v. Cicero, 176 Linnard, 97 Pa. St., 242; In re III.. 9; 51 N. E. Rep., 758. Chestnut Street, 118 Pa. St., 593; Tfi St. Louis V. Hill, 116 Mo., 527; 12 Atl. Rep., 585. 22 S. W. Rep., 861; 21 L. R. A., 7^ Cicero Lumber Co. v. Cicero, 226; St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo., 176 111., 9; 51 N. E. Rep., 758. 816 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§ 521 vards legally established, under specified conditions, having in view the public interest and the constitutional rights of the property ownersJ® Where the boulevard is to become an ordi- nary street, to be treated in all respects as "this class of public thoroughfares, it would seem that special legal authority is necessary, to give the change due sanction. If the boulevard is to be vacated and cease to exist as a public way for any pur- pose, the paramount public control of highways, or the special provisions (if any) relative to the vacation of streets, would doubtless support such action. § 521. Improvements interfering with franchise rights. Ordinances granting to individuals and corporations the privi- lege of occupying the streets and public ways for lawful pur- poses, as for railroad tracks, poles, wires, gas and water pipes, when accepted and acted on by the grantees thereof become, as stated elsewhere, contracts, the obligations of which cannot be impaired constitutionally by act of the municipality.'^'' However, such rights are held in subordination to the superior rights of the public. As explained in a prior chapter, all neces- sary and desirable police ordinances, which are reasonable, may be enacted and enforced, to protect the public health, safety and convenience, notwithstanding the enforcement of such regulations may interfere with legal franchise rights.*" Thus a water company, placing its pipes in the streets under a fran- chise contract with the local corporation, does so in subordina- tion to the superior rights of the public, through its duly con- stituted municipal authorities, to construct sewers in the same streets, whenever and wherever the public interest demands; and if, in consequence of the exercise of this right, the water company is compelled to relay its pipes, in the absence of un- reasonable or malicious conduct, it has no cause of action against the corporation for reimbursement on account there- of.^i But the location of sewers must be reasonable, with '8 Charter of St. Louis, art. VI., to an averment that the corpora- sec. 1 (amendment Oct. 22, 1901). tion acted unreasonably or mali- 79 §§ 197, 200 and 201, 238 to ciously. National Waterworks Co. 242, supra. v. Kansas City, 28 Fed. Rep., 921. 80 Chapter XIV. Interference with operations of a 81 In such action, a mere allega- railroad by constructing and re- tion that the sewer might have pairing sewers is authorized. Dry been placed properly in another Dock, E. B. & B. R. Co. v. New part of the street, is not equivalent York, 55 Barb. (N. Y.), 298. § 521] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 817 respect to franchise rights. Thus where other parts of the street are equally suitable, the location of a sewer in a part of the street occupied with tracks by a railway company, under valid ordinance, which compels the company to suspend opera- tions, greatly to its damage, will be held unreasonable.*^ So, in the exercise of the undoubted right in constructing sewers, a municipal corporation cannot compel a street railway com- pany to tear up its tracks laid in the center of a street, pur- suant to ordinance authority, to permit the placing of a sewer under it, where it appears that the company has expended large sums in constructing its roadbed, and the contemplated action would impair the value of the property, and cause incon- venience to the public, and it would be just as suitable to lay the sewer on one side of the track.*^ The municipality cannot, by any franchise it may grant, relinquish any of its rightful authority over its streets,®* or, indeed, any municipal function whatever.*^ Every franchise conferred by it is subject to this limitation, whether expressed therein or not. Cases involving the grading, constructing, repairing and otherwise improving streets fully illustrate and explain the rule.*® Thus the legal right of a water company to lay its pipes 82 Clapp V. Spokane, 53 Fed. Co. v. Quincy, 136 III., 563 ; 27 N. Rep., 515. E. Rep., 192. 83 Des Moines City Ry. Co. v. Missouri — National Waterworks Des Moines, 90 Iowa, 770; 58 N. W. Co. v. Kansas City, 20 Mo. App.,237. Rep., 906; 26 L. R. A., 767. ^^^ Jersey— Townsend v. Jersey A sewer may be constructed in ' ^' • • - the center of the street, notwith- OT^to-Columbus Gaslight standing the presence of tracks by legal authority, though there was space on either side of the tracks, , , „ „ „ „ _„ „, . .. .4., „ 4. bash R. Co. v. Defiance, 52 Ohio to allow its construction without _, „„_, .„,,„„ Coke Co. V. Columbus, 50 Ohio St., 65; 33 N. E. Rep., 292; 40 Am. St. Rep., 648; 19 L. R. A., 510; Wa- St, 262; 40 N. E. Rep., 89. Pennsylvania — North Pennsylva- nia R. Co. V. Stone, 3 Phila. (Pa.), 421; 8 Am. Law Reg., 112; Mo- nongahela v. Monongahela Elec- tric Light Co., 3 Pa. Dist. Rep., 63. Virginia — Roanoke Gas Co. v. 84 §§ 458 et seq. 473 and 474 posf. Roanoke, 88 Va., 810; 14 N. B. C^- XVII. j^^p ^ 665. 85 Sec. 84 supra. The fact that a railroad com- 86 Illinois — Chicago, B. & Q. R. pany agreed to so improve the 52 disturbing the railway. Spokane Street Ry. Co. v. Spokane, 5 Wash., 634; 32 Pac. Rep., 456. The con- sequences of the removal of the tracks therefore are damnum ahse- que injuria. Kirby v. Citizens' Ry. Co., 48 Md., 168. 818 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§522 through the streets, "in such a manner as not to obstruct or impede travel thereon," does not impair the obligation of the municipal corporation to repair its streets. This may be done in the ordinary and proper manner, although in so doing the pipes of the water company become exposed, necessitating their being sunk deeper at considerable expense to the company, to protect them from frost and other dangers.*" But the power to improve streets, like that in locating and constructing sewers, must be reasonably exercised. It is not an arbitrary power. Vested rights must be protected.** § 522. Special assessments or taxation for local improve- ments. Special assessments for the payment of the cost of local improvements commonly prevail and are generally sus- tained under the exercise of the power of taxation.*^ Both the streets upon which its tracks are laid that it may be safely used for vehicles, does not destroy the right of the local corporation to improve the streets. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. V. Quincy, 139 111., 355; 28 N. E. Rep., 1069. s7 Rockland Water Co. v. Rock- land, 83 Me., 267; 22 Atl. Rep., 166. 88 Seattle v. Columbia & P. S. R. Co., 6 Wash., 379; 33 Pac. Rep., 1048. Possible injury to vested fran- chise rights will not invalidate a street improvement ordinance. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Quincy, 139 111., 355; 28 N. E. Rep., 1069. Outlet of sewer system may pass over private property. Burhans v. Norwood Park, 138 111., 147; 27 N. B. Rep., 1088. 80 Aster V. New York, 37 N. Y. Super. Ct. (5 Jones & S.), 539. Special assessments have no rela- tion to the right of eminent do- main. Hence constitutional pro- visions respecting this right have no application. Gibson v. Owens, 115 Mo., 258; 21 S. W. Rep., 1107; St. Joseph V. Parrell, 106 Mo., 437, 442; 17 S. W. Rep., 497; Keith v. Bingham, 100 Mo., 300, 306; Gar- rett V. St. Louis, 25 Mo., 505, 514; People ex rel. v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 419; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn., 189; 60 Am. Dec, 636. Special assessments differ from general taxes. Illinois Central R. R. Co. V. Decatur, 147 U. S., 190; Williams v. Corcoran, 46 Cal., 553; People V. Austin, 47 Cal., 353; Mc- Guire v. Brockman, 58 Mo. App., 307; Chester v. Chester & D. R. R. Co., 3 Del. Co. Rep. (Pa.), 389; Hale V. Kenosha, 29 Wis., 599. Local assessments prevailed in Engl ud several centuries ago, and the assessments made there by the commissioners of sewers on the 1 nds affected by their operations was taxation of this character (28 Hen. VIII., Ch. 5, § 5), and it pre- vailed from an early day in nearly all American States whose juris- prudence is rooted in the common law. The property is assessed in re- spect to the benefit derived from the improvement; it is a tax on the property, and is therefore not obnoxious to the constitutional re- quirement that all property sub- ject to taxation shall be taxed ac- cording to its value. * * * §52^] Of public improvement ordinances. 819 federal and state constitutions expressly forbid the taking of private property for public use by the municipal corporation, acting under authority conferred by its charter, or, the legis- lature of the state, without just compensation being made theref or.^'' ' ' The whole theory of local taxation or assessments is that the improvements for which they are levied afford a remuneration in the way of benefits. A law which would at- tempt to make one person, or a given number of persons, under the guise of local assessments, pay a general revenue for the public at large would not be an exercise of the taxing power, but an act of confiscation. In effect it would be transferring the property of one individual to another. These are legal truisms which have long been entertained and firmly estab- lished. "®i The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Norwood vs. Baker, determined in 1898,®^ thus declares the rule: "The principle underlying special assessments to meet the cost of public improvements is that the property upon ■ which they are imposed is peculiarly benefited, and therefore There Is a marked difference be- v. Newark, 37 N. J. L., 415; Wash- tween general taxation and special assessment for local objects. The word tax may be used in a contract or in a statute so as not to embrace within its meaning lo- cal or special taxes, although both kinds of taxation derive their au- thority from the general taxing power. Leonard, J., Newby v. Platte, 25 Mo., 258, 269, 272; Lock- wood V. St. Louis, 24 Mo., 20, 22; Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo., 505, 513; Neenan v. Smith, 50 Mo., 525, 529. The foundation of the power to lay a special tax, as for paving, is the benefit which the object of the tax confers on the owner of the property. Wistar v. Philadelphia, 80 Pa. St., 505; 21 Am. Rep., 112. Special assessments explained and judicial history given in Ma- con V. Patty, 57 Miss., 378, per George, C. J. Special assessments as an exer- cise of the police power. Palmer V. Way, 6 Colo., 106; State (Agens) ington V. Nashvile, 1 Swan (Tenn.), 177; McBean v. Chandler, 9 Heisk (Tenn.), 349; Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S., 30; Morrison V. Morey, 146 Mo., 543; 48 S. W. Rep., 629; Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt., 174. 90 Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Chi- cago, 166 U. S., 226, 241; Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brook- lyn, 166 U. S., 685, 695. 91 Per Wagner, J., in McCormack V. Patchin, 53 Mo., 33, 36. Mc- Grath v. Clemens, 49 Mo., 552, 554. "The tax is local and for local purposes, and is a tax upon bene- fits and not directly upon prop- gpj.y * * * -pjig cost of the public benefit is made a public bur- den, and the expense of the indi- vidual benefit is placed upon the shoulders of the person who re- ceives it." Per Napton, J., in Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo., 505, 513. 92 172 U. S., 269, affirming 74 Fed. Rep., 997. 820 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§522 the owners do not, in fact, pay anything in excess of what they receive by reason of such improvement. * * * The exac- tion from the owner of private property of the cost of a public improvement in substantial excess of the special benefits accru- ing to him is, to the extent of such excess, a taking under the guise of taxation, of private property for public use without compensation. We say 'substantial excess,' because exact equality of taxation is not always attainable, and for that rea- son the excess of cost over special benefits, unless it be of a material character, ought not to be regarded by a court of equity when its aid is invoked to restrain the enforcement of a special assessment. "^^ The principle of the Norwood-Baker case is that a special assessment levied under a rule which makes it possible that the assessment may exceed the benefit to the land in question and in fact does exceed it, is void. In this case the land for the street was taken without compensa- tion, and in addition the property owner was assessed some $218.58, to pay the cost of the condemnation proceedings.^* The rule that a method of assessment cannot be arbitrary, and niust have some relation to the benefits appears reasonable. It would seem that the legislature is competent to judge of benefits. This is assumed by the current of authority. A pub- lic improvement having been made, the question of determin- ing the area benefited by such improvement is generally held to be a legislative function, and such legislative determination, unless palpably unjust, is usually conclusive.^^ The prohibi- 93 Three of the justices dissented si See State (Agens) v. Newark, through Mr. Justice Brewer (Mr. 37 N. J. L., 415. Norwood-Baker Justice Shiras and Mr. Justice case followed in Hutcheson v. Stor- Gray), who held that the deter- rie, 92 Tex., 685; 51 S. W. Rep., mination of the property to he as- 848; 45 L. R. A., 289. sessed was solely a legislative Misconception and erroneous ap- function, that it was not at all a plication in Fay v. Springfield, 94 judicial question. See comments Fed. Rep., 409. on Norwood v. Baker, supra, in 95 Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U. Sears v. Boston, 173 Mass., 350; 53 S., 304, 311; 111. Cent. R. R. Co. v. N. E. Rep., 876; Cowley v. Spo- Decatur, 147 U. S., 190; Spencer kane, 99 Fed. Rep., 840; Lyon v. v. Merchant, 125 U. S., 345, 355; Tonawanda, 98 Fed. Rep., 361; 100 N. Y., 585; 3 N. E. Rep,, 682; Charles v. Marion, 98 Fed. Rep., Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 166; Loeb v. Trustees Columbia U. S., 701. Tp., 91 Fed. Rep., 37; Davidson v. Where the assessment Is against Wight, 16 Dist. of Columbia App., the abutting property, whether it 371; Wood v. Quimby, 20 R. I., "shall be upon all property found 482; 40 Atl. Rep., 161. to be benefited, or alone upon the § 522] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 821 tion is that assessments shall not be levied in excess of the benefits conferred, whether by the valuation, front foot, area, or any other method.®^ The series of decisions of the United States Supreme Court in April, 1901, fully sustain the principle that the question of determining the property or area benefited is one for the legislative department. These principles were declared : 1. The apportionment of the entire cost of a street improvement upon the abutting lots according to their front- age, without any judicial inquiry as to their value or the bene- fits they receive, may be authorized by the legislature; and this will not constitute a taking of property without due process of law.®^ 2. The legislative act need not provide for a hearing, allowing the property owner to show that his prop- erty was not benefited to the amount of the assessment.^* 3. It is within the power of the legislature to create special abutters, according to frontage or ben, 22 Ky. Law Rep., 1224; 60 S. according to the area of their lots W. Rep., 291. is, according to the present weight Massachusetts — Sears v. Boston, of authority, (1890) considered to 173 Mass., 71; 53 N. B. Rep., 138. be a question of legislative expedi- Michigan — Cass Farm Co. v. De- ency." 2 Dillon on Mun. Corp. troit, 124 Mich., 433; 83 N. W. Rep., (4th Ed.) sec. 752, approved in 108. Parsons v. District of Columbia, Minnesota — Ramsey County v. 170 U. S., 45; Astor v. New York, Robt. P. Lewis, Co., (Minn. 1901) 37 N. Y. Super. Ct. (5 Jones & S.), 86 N. W. Rep., 611; 53 L. R. A., 539. 421. 96 Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S., Missouri — Barber, A. P., Co. v. 269, 277, 282. On general subject French, 158 Mo., 534; 58 S. W. of special assessment see Bell's Rep., 934; Heman v. Gilliam, 171 etc. Co. R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 Mo., 258; 71 S. W. Rep., 163. U. S., 232, 237; Scott v. Toledo, 36 jv^ew Torfc— Conde v. Schnectady, Fed. Rep., 385; Kansas City v. Ba- i64 n. Y., 258; 58 N. E. Rep., 130. con. 147 Mo., 259; 48 S. W. Rep., Pennsylvania^Unrrisbnrgw.Mc- 860; Schroder v. Overman, 61 Ohio pj^grran. 200 Pa., 343; 49 Atl. Rep., St., 1; 47 L. R. A., 156; 55 N. E. ggg ®^" . . ■ J J . ».T Wisconsin — Gleason v. Wauke- Decisions rendered since Nor- ^^^ ^^^ ^^ ^ ^ wood-Baker case. „ „ .. California— Uadley v. Dague, 130 ^" Cal., 207; 62 Pac. Rep., 500. " Tonawanda v. Lyon, 181 U. S.. /Mmots-Farrell v. West Chicago 389; Cass Farm Co. v. Detroit, 181 Park Comrs., 182 111., 250, 254; 55 U. S., 396. N. E. Rep., 325. '« Detroit v. Parker, 181 U. S., /ndioMO— Adams v. ShelbyvlUe, 399; French v. Barber, A. P., Co. 154 Ind., 467; 57 N. E. Rep., 114. 181 U. S., 324; Shumate v. Heman, Kentuchy-Augvista, v. McKib- 181 U. S., 402. 822 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§5-23 taxing districts, and to charge the cost of a local improvement, in whole or in part, upon the property in said district, either according to valuation or to superficial area or frontage.*"* 4. The Congress has power to provide for assessments on abutting lands and lands benefited, of one-half or more of the damages for and in respect of land condemned for the opening of streets, in the District of Columbia.^ These cases fully ex- plain the Norwood-Baker case and declare that it is "to be limited to its special facts." In the opinion of the majority of the judges, the nature and effect of the proceedings in the case of Norwood-Baker was an attempt, under the guise of legal proceedings, to deprive a citizen of property without due process of law. In the decisions delivered in April, 1901, a dissenting opinion was filed by Mr. Justice Harlan, with whom Mr. Justice McKenna and Mr. Justice White concurred.^ § 523. Uniformity and equality of special assessments. The rule is generally laid down and enforced that, the usual con- s') Webster V. Fargo, 181 U. S„ 394. 1 Wight V. Davidson, 181 XJ. S., 371. 2 Decisions exist which sustain the theory that local assessments for public improvements need not be based on any special benefits to the property assessed. In re Bonds of Madera Irrigation Dist., 92 Cal., 296; 28 Pac. Rep., 272, 675; 14 L. R. A., 755; Rolph v. Fargo, 7 N. D., 640; 76 N. W. Rep., 242; 42 L. R. A., 646; Allen v. Davenport, 107 Iowa, 90; 77 N. W. Rep., 532; Dew- ey V. Des Moines, 101 Iowa, 416; 70 N. W. Rep., 605; and Iowa cases cited on page 423 of state re- port. But this theory is rejected by most of the decisions. Asberry v. Roanoke, 91 Va., 562; 22 S. E. Rep., 360; notes to 14 L. R. A., 755 and 42 L. R. A., 636. Power to levy special assessment for local improvement must exist. Caldwell v. Rupert, 10 Bush. (73 Ky.), 179, 182. Cannot be levied for street inter- section unless the law so provides. Button V. Kremer, 24 Ky. Law Rep., 1194; 71 S. W. Rep., 332. Repairing Sidewalks authorized. Skinker v. Heman, 148 Mo., 349; 49 S. W. Rep., 1026; Wilhelm v. Defiance, 58 Ohio St.. 56; 50 N. E. Rep., 18; 65 Am. St. Rep., 745; Warren v. Barber, A. P., Co.^ 115' Mo., 572, 580; 22 S. W. Rep., 490; Moberly, v. Hogan, 131 Mo. 19; 32 S. W. Rep., 1014; Ross v. Stack- house, 114 Ind., 200; 16 N. E. Rep., 501. Objection to reconstruction of sidewalk under valid ordinance must be made before the work is begun and cannot be set up for the first time in the special tax bill suit. Heman v. Ring, 85 Mo. App., 231. Frontage Rule. Franklin v. Hancock, 204 Pa. St., 101; 53 Atl. Rep., 644. I 533] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 823 stitutional mandate enjoining equality and uniformity in taxa- tion does not apply to special assessments or taxation for local improvements.* "Charges for the costs of a local improvement against the property benefited by the improvement, although an exercise of the taxing power, are not such taxes as are re- ferred to in the various clauses of the constitution * * * and they are neither embraced, nor intended to be embraced in Benefit; property owner can- not show that Improvement is not a benefit to the property. Smith v. Worcester, 182 Mass., 232; 65 N. E. Rep., 40; 59 L. R. A., 728; Keith V. Bingham, 100 Mo., 300; 13 S. W. Rep., 683. ■I California — Burnett v. Sacra- mento, 12 Cal., 76; 73 Am. Dec, 518; Emery V. San Francisco Gas Co., 28 Cal., 345. Colorado — Denver v. Knowles, 17 Colo., 204; 30 Pac. Rep., 1041; 17 L. R. A., 135, following Palmer v. Way, 6 Colo., l"06. Florida — Edgerton v. Green Cove Springs, 19 Fla., 140. Georgia — Speer v. Athens, 85 Ga., 49; 11 S. E. Rep., 802; 9 L. R. A., 402. Illinois — Murphy v. People, 120 111., 234; 11 N. E. Rep., 202; Hund- ley V. Lincoln Park Com'rs, 67 111., 559. Indiana — Rienken v. Fuehring, 130 Ind., 382; 30 N. E. Rep., 414; 30 Am. St. Rep., 247; 15 L. R. A., 524. Iowa — Warren v. Henly, 31 Iowa, 31. Kansas — Ottawa County Com'rs v. Nelson, 19 Kan., 234; Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Kan., 186. Kentucky — Holzhauer v. New- port, 94 Ky., 396; 22 S. W. Rep., 752. Louisiana — New Orleans v. El- liott, 10 La. Ann., 59; In re New Orleans, 20 La. Ann., 497. Minnesota — State v. St. Louis County Dist. Ct, 61 Minn., 542; 64 N. W. Rep., 190. Mississippi — Daily v. Swope, 47 Miss., 367. North Carolina — Hilliard v. Asheville, 118 N. C, 845; 24 S. E. Rep., 738 ; Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. C, 32; 14 S. E. Rep., 521; 17 L. R. A., 330; Cain v. Davie County Com'rs, 86 N. C, 8; Shuford v. Lincoln County Com'rs., 86 N. C, 552. Ohio — Gest v. Cincinnati, 26 Ohio St., 275; Bonsall v. Lebanon, 19 Ohio, 418; Ridenour v. SatBn, 1 Handy (Ohio), 464. Oregon — Cook v. Portland, 20 Oregon, 580; 27 Pac. Rep., 263; 13 L. R. A., 533; King v. Portland, 2 Oregon, 146. Pennsylvania — B eaumont v. Wilkes-Barre, 142 Pa. St., 198; 21 Atl. Rep., 888; Chester v. Black, 132 Pa. St., 568; 19 Atl. Rep., 276; 6 L. R. A., 802; Shoemaker v. Har- risburg, 122 Pa. St., 285; 16 Atl. Rep., 366; Huidekoper v. Mead- ville, 83 Pa. St., 156. Rhode Island — Bishop v. Tripp, 15 R. I., 466; 8 Atl. Rep., 692. Texos— Taylor v. Boyd, 63 Tex., 533; Roundtree v. Galveston, 42 Tex., 612. Virginia — Violett v. Alexandria, 92 Va., 561; 23 S. E. Rep., 909; 53 Am. St. Rep., 825; 31 L. R. A., 382; Richmond & A. R. R. Co. v. Lynchburg, 81 Va., 473; Sands v. Richmond, 31 Gratt. (Va.), 571; 31 Am. Rep., 742. 834 OP PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§ 533 them. " ^ It is a fundamental rule that an assessment or a tax for local benefits should be distributed among, and imposed upon, all equally standing in like relations. Hence, one street cannot be improved at the expense of the property owners of another.8 So, an ordinance authorizing the cost of grading a section of a street to be charged against, not oniy the property fronting on that section, but also against property fronting on another section which has been graded at the cost of that prop- erty exclusively is inequitable and unjust.'^ So, under a con- stitutional provision reciting that, "the legislature may vest the corporate aiithorities of cities, towns and villages with power to make local improvements by special assessments, or by special taxation of property benefited; for all other corporate pur- poses all municipal corporations may be vested with authority to assess and collect taxes, but such taxes shall be uniform in respect to. persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same"— a tax levied upon all the real estate of a city, and not upon personal property, for the purpose of making local improvements, is, in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Nebraska, unconstitutional and void, either considered as a special tax or as a general one.* The general rule is, that taxation, whether general or special, must be uniform, and must be distributed among those who are required to pay it by a just ratio of apportionment. It hardly need be observed that no system of taxation has ever been devised, and probably never will be, that will lay equal bur- WasMngton — Spokane Falls v. s Per Norton, J., in Farrar v. St. Browne, 3 Wash. St., 84; 27 Pac. Louis, 80 Mo., 379, 387; Kansas Rep., 1077; Austin v. Seattle, 2 City v. Bacon, 147 Mo., 259; 48 S. Wash. St., 667; 27 Pac. Rep., 557. W. Rep., 860; Lamar, W. & E. L., Wisconsin — Bond v. Kenosha, 17 Co. v. Lamar, 128 Mo., 188; 26 S. Wis., 284. W. Rep., 1025; 31 S. W. Rep., 756; Respecting rule of equality and St. Joseph v. Owen, 110 Mo., 445; uniformity examine. Jones v. De- 19 S. W. Rep., 713; Clinton v. Hen- troit Water Comr's., 34 Mich., 273; ry County, 115 Mo., 557; 22 S. W. In re Willis Ave., 56 Mich., 244; Rep., 494; Adams v. Lindell, 72 22 N. W. Rep., 871; Mauldin v. Mo., 198, affirming 5 Mo. App., 197. Greenville, 42 S. C, 293 ; 20 S. E. e Kansas City Grading Co. v. Hoi- Rep., 842; 46 Am. St. Rep., 723; den, 32 Mo. App., 490. 27 L. R. A., 284; Washington v. 7 Halpin v. Campbell, 71 Mo., Nashville, 1 Swan. (31 Tenn.), 493. 177; Norfolk v. Chamberlain, 89 « Kittle v. Shervln, 11 Neb., 65; Va., 196; 16 S. B. Rep., 730; Lums- 7 N. W. Rep., 861. den v. Cross, 10 Wis., 282. § 524] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 825 dens on all alike. The difBculty of approximating equality in apportioning special assessments or taxes has long been real- ized.^ "The question is not whether individual instances of injustice may occur. It is not whether the tax will produce perfect equality of burdens, nor whether the power * * * may not be abused. We know too well that under any system of taxation these things may and do happen. These are evils not within the power of the courts to remedy. It is for the leg- islature to guard against them."!** § 524, Purposes of special assessments. The purposes for which special assessments may be made axe controlled by the local laws. The object must be public.ii It has been said that a municipal corporation having power to make local im- provements by special assessment and taxation has implied power to declare what are local improvements, where such declaration is not made arbitrarily or unreasonably, or without reference to benefits.^^ But an ordinance declaring that a pro- posed improvement is a local improvement is not a conclusive determination of the question.!^ Special assessments are usually imposed for the making of streets and public ways, the construction of drains and sewers, sometimes for street clean- ing and sprinkling, 1 •* and other specified public purposes. Thus in Massachusetts, it has been held that assessments for » Independence v. Gates, 110 Mo., 12 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. 374, 381; 19 S. W. Rep., 728. Decatur, 154 111., 173; 38 N. E. 10 Per Napton, J., in Garrett v. Rep., 626. St. Louis, 25 Mo., 505, 513. is Morgan Park v. Wiswall, 155 "As in all applications of the 111., 262; 40 N. B. Rep., 611. taxing power, it is not always pos- Particular Local Improvements sible to establish a scheme of as- under various charters. Munici- sessment which shall bear with pality No. 2 v. McDonough, 16 La., absolute uniformity on all prop- 553; New Orleans v. McDonough, 9 erty subject to the tax. Much lati- Roh. (La.), 408; Briggs v. Whit- tude of discretion * * * be- ney, 159 Mass., 97; 34 N. E. Rep., longs to the legislative department, 179; People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb, and the courts will not interfere (N. Y.), 177; Krumberg v. Cin- with it unless there is some mani- cinnati, 29 Ohio St., 69; Wilson v. fest abuse." Keith v. Bingham, 100 Allegheny, 79 Pa. St., 272. Mo., 300, 307; 13 S. W. Rep., 683, Railroad Bridge; right to pro- quoted with approval in St. Joseph vide by special taxation denied. V. Farrell, 106 Mo., 437, at p. 442; Bloomington v. Chicago & A. R. 17 S. W. Rep., 497. Co., 134 111., 451; 26 N. E. Rep., ti In re Market Street, 49 Cal., 366. 546. 1* Street Sprinkling authorized 826 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§524 sprinkling streets within a specified territory may be made law- fully in Boston upon abutting property, although the sprin- kling of other parts of the city is done at the public expense ; and that the frontage rule may be applied.^'' So, in Minnesota it has been decided that street sprinkling is a "local improve- ment" for which special assessments may be made upon the property fronting on the street sprinkled, in proportion to its lineal feet frontage, without regard to its valuation. i® But in Illinois 1^ and in other jurisdictions a contrary conclusion has been reached.^* Special assessments upon abutting property for the expense of sweeping streets, including crossings, have been adjudged valid in Indiana, on the ground of special bene- fit, even where the abutting owners were taxed with the bal- ance of the public for cleaning other streets in which the public alone have an interest.!^ What part of the cost of street construction or reconstruction (whether the total cost or only a part thereof, and what part or parts, and whether for repairs or maintenance after the street is made, and whether after the street is once made it may be by charter. St. Louis Charter, Art. VI, § 29 (amendment Oct. 22, 1901) ; Charter Kansas City, Art. IX, § 21. 15 Sears v. Boston, 173 Mass., 71; 53 N. B. Rep., 138; 43 L. R. A., 834, wherein -Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S., 269, is considered and approved, as well as numerous special tax or assessment deci- sions. 16 State ex rel. v. Reis, 38 Minn., 371; 38 N. W. Rep., 97. "Chicago V. Blair, 149 111., 310; 36 N. B. Rep., 829; 24 L. R. A., 412. 18 N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Prest, 71 Fed. Rep., 815, where it is said (per Philips, D. J.) : "It (the im- provements) is as evanescent as the early and later dew, and, in my judgment, it is no more within the power of the municipality thus to create liens on citizens' prop- erty than to hire a rainmaker to vex the skies fqr refreshing show- ers, and to charge the lots adja- cent to the raindrops with the cost thereof. As the sprinkling of the public highways of a city, like the cleaning thereof, contributes much to the comfort and enjoyment of the public, its cost should be made a general and not a special bur- den." In Kansas City v. O'Connor, 82 Mo. App., 655, 660, Ellison, J., ex- pressed the opinion that, as a spe- cial tax against abutting property Is based and sustained on the idea that the work for which the tax Is laid is an improvement of the property, sprinkling to keep down the dust, while good for the com- fort of the inhabitants, "is too in- tangible to be denominated an im- provement of the property." To same effect Pettit v. Buke, 10 Utah, 311; 37 Pac. Rep., 568. 1!) Reinken v. Fuehring, 130 Ind., 382; 15 L. R. A., 624; 30 N. B. Rep., 414; 30 Am. St. Rep., 247. §525J OP PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 827 reconstructed), may be assessed as a special tax must be deter- mined by a proper construction of the local laws applicable.-" § 525. Preliminary proceedings. Prior to the formal order- ing of the improvements (which is usually a legislative act, executed by ordinance or resolution) what preliminary pro- ceedings, if any, are required, depends upon the local laws ap- plicable and the nature of the proposed improvement. If the improvement involves the condemnation of private property, or the levying of special assessments against the property assumed to be benefited, strict adherence to all mandatory and jurisdictional provisions are rigidly enforced by the courts, and properly so.^i It is a general rule that when measures are au- thorized by statute or charter "in derogation of the common law, which may result in divesting the title of one person to land, and transferring it to another, that every requisite hav- 20 Discretionary with local au- thorities. Watson V. Chicago, 115 111., 78; 3 N. E. Rep., 430. Special Assessments fok Im- provements Made. Calif ornia-^In re Market Street, 49 Cal., 546. Connecticut — Meriden v. Camp, 46 Conn., 284. Illinois — McChesney v. Chicago, 152 111., 543; 38 N. E. Rep., 767; Weld V. People, 149 111., 257; 36 N. E. Rep., 1006; Ricketts v. Hyde Park, 85 111., 110; Prindiville v. Jackson, 79 111., 337; Dorathy v. Chicago, 53 111., 79; Pease v. Chi- cago, 21 111., 500. Indiana — Elkhart v. Wickwire, 121 Ind., 331; 22 N. E. Rep., 342; Bennett v. Seibert, 10 Ind. App., 369; 35 N. E. Rep., 35; 37 N. B. Rep., 1071. Massachusetts — Slocum v. Brook- line, 163 Mass., 23; 39 N. E. Rep., 351. New Jersey — JellifE v. Newark, 48 N. J. L., 101; 2 Atl. Rep., 627; 49 N. J. L., 239; 12 Atl. Rep., 770. New York — In re CuUen, 119 N. Y., 628; 23 N.E. Rep., 1144; affirm- ing 53 Hun. (N. Y.), 534; 6 N. Y. Supp., 625 ; In re Sackett, 74 N. Y., 95, affirming 4 Hun. (N. Y.), 92; 6 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.), 347; Manice v. New York, 8 N. Y., 120; Wet- more V. Campbell, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.), 341. Pennsylvania — ^Appeal of Har- per, 109 Pa. St., 9; 1 Atl. Rep., 791. Texas — Alford v. Dallas (Tex. Civ. App., 1896), 35 S. W. Rep., 816. Reconstruction and Repairs. Baltimore v. Scharf, 54 Md., 499; O'Meara v. Green, 16 Mo. App., 118; Parrell v. Rammelkamp, 64 Mo. App., 425; Ritterskamp v. Sti- fel, 59 Mo. App., 510; State ex ret V. Corrigan Consolidated Street Ry. Co., 85 Mo., 263; In re Fulton Street, 29 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 429. Cross-walks, Intersections and Connections. Gibson v. Kayser, 16 Mo. App., 404. Curbing. Gibson v. Kayser, 16 Mo. App., 404. Grading. Gibson v. Kayser, 16 Mo. App., 404. Alley. St. Louis v. Juppier, 16 Mo. App., 557. ^1 Indiana — Case v. Johnson, 91 Ind., 477. 828 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§526 ing the semblance of benefit complied with. "22 Massachusetts — Northampton v. Abell, 127 Mass., 507. Missouri — Trenton v. Coyle, 107 Mo., 193; 17 S. W. Rep., 643; Sax- ton V. St. Joseph, 60 Mo., 153; Stewart v. Clinton, 79 Mo., 603; Werth V. Springfield, 78 _Mo., 107; State ex rel. v. Barlow, 48 Mo., 17; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 56 Mo., 277; Perkinson v. Partridge, 3 Mo; App., 60. New Jersey — State v. Jersey City, 54 N. J. L., 49; 22 Atl. Rep., 1052; State (Arnett) v. Lambert- ville (N. J. L. 1886) 6 Atl. Rep., 432. Oregon — Hawthorne v. East Portland, 13 Oregon, 271; 10 Pac. Rep., 342. Preliminary proceedings not re- quired. Kelsey v. King, 32 Barb. N. Y., 410; 11 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 180; Pooley v. Buffalo, 122 N. Y., 592; 26 N. E. Rep., 16. Directory provisions. McKune V. Weller, 11 Cal., 49, 54; Stein- lein V. Halstead, 52 Wis., 289, 293; 8 N. W. Rep., 881. A provision that the council "may, by ordinance," prescribe general rules "as to the material to be used and the mode of exe- cuting the work," held not manda- tory. The council may obtain jur- isdiction without observing the condition. Santa Cruz Rock Pave- ment Co. V. Heaton, 105 Cal., 162; 38 Pac. Rep., 693. Maps and Surveys of streets, etc., to be laid out, provisions as to, held directory in Coles v. Williams- burgh, 10 Wend. (N. Y.), 659. 22 Per Dixon, C. J., in Kneeland V. Milwaukee, 18 Wis., 411, 418; Atkins V. Klnnan, 20 Wend. (N. Y.), 241. Plans. Failure to make proper to the owner must be strictly plans, etc., and failure to let the contract to the lowest bidder are fatal. Wells v. Burnham, 20 Wis., 112. Making and filing of plans and specifications for street and sewer construction held to be con- ditions precedent to power to pro- ceed with the proposed improve- ment. Kn«eland v. Milwaukee, 18 Wis., 411, 417; Myrick v. La Crosse, 17 Wis., 442. Ieeegulabities. Minor irregu- larities will not invalidate the spe- cial tax. Warner v. Knox, 50 Wis., 429; 7 N. W. Rep., 372. Omissions which do not preju- dice the tax payer. Houghton v. Burnham, 22 Wis., 301, 306. Departure from ordinance in constructing sidewalk, held not material. Steffen v. Fox, 124 Mo., 630; 28 S. W. Rep., 70; 56 Mo. App., 9. Statute providing that errors in the proceedings in the council shall not exempt from payment af- ter the work has been done. Broad- way Baptist Church v. McAfee, 8 Bush. (Ky.), 508. "Informality, irregularity or de- fect," enabling it to recover for im- provement for sidewalk, means er- ror or omission to do something which in no manner affects the jur- isdiction of the city to build the walk. Where a resolution provid- ing therefore is repealed, city has no jurisdiction. Chariton v. Hol- liday, 60 Iowa, 391; 14 N. W. Rep., 775. Irregularities in council pro- ceedings in ordering improvement may be corrected by the court, so that no one's property may be im- proved at the general expense of the city when in equity he should himself pay foi' the same. Coving- ?625] OF PUBLIC IMPR0VEME3NT OEDINANCES. 839 The manner in which the proceedings shall be instituted and conducted is generally specifically provided by charter or statute. Some charters require certain preliminary steps, as notice to the property owners interestedj^s and hearing before certain municipal officers, committees or boards, as the board of public works or improvements.^* In justice to the property owners when they must bear the burden of the cost of the im- provements, they are frequently given by express provision of law an opportunity to protest or remonstrate against the pro- posed improvement at a hearing duly convened for this pur- pose before specified officers, committees or boards.^^ ton V. Dressman, 6 Bush. (Ky.), 210. Estoppel. Argenti v. San Fran- cisco, 16 Cal., 255. Too late to ob- ject to preliminary proceedings where the land owners with notice of such proceedings have failed to object until after the work is com- pleted and paid for by the city. State (Youngster) v. Paterson, 40 N. J. L., 244. 23 California — Charter San Fran- cisco, art. VI, ch. 2, §§ 3 and 4; statutes and amendments to Codes of Cal. (1898), pp. 293, 294; Ander- son V. De Urioste, 96 Cal., 404; 31 Pac. Rep., 266. Colorado — Brown v. Denver, 7 Colo., 305; 3 Pac. Rep., 455. Indiana — Barber A. P. Co. v. Bd- gerton, 125 Ind., 455; 25 N. E. Rep., 436; Swain v. Fulmer, 135 Ind., 8; 34 N. B. Rep., 639; Kiphart v. Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 7 Ind. App., 122; 34 N. E. Rep., 375. Michigan — Kundinger v. Sagi- naw, 59 Mich., 355; 26 N. W. Rep., 634; Osborne v. Detroit, 32 Mich., 282; Mills v. Detroit, 95 Mich., 422; 54 N. W. Rep., 897. New Jersey — State (Vanatta) v. Morristown, 34 N. J. L., 445, 452; Beam v. Paterson, 47 N. J. L., 15; State V. Jersey City, 27 N. J. L., 536; State v. Jersey City, 35 N. J. L., 404, 408; State v. Newark, 31 N. J. L., 360. New York — People ex rel. v. Rochester, 5 Lans. (N. Y.), 11; In re Central Park Comrs., 51 Barb. (N. Y.), 277; In re Anderson, 60 N. Y., 457. Notice is jurisdictional. Joyce V. Barron, 67 Ohio St., 264; 65 N. E. Rep., 1001. Notice need not be provided. Davis V. Lynchburg, 84 Va., 861; 6 S. E. Rep., 230; Hawley v. Har- rall, 19 Conn., 142. 24 Hearing; where the law re- quires. Courts are strict in en- forcing all legal provisions relating thereto. Gray v. Burr, ;i38 Cal., 109; 70 Pac. Rep., 1068. The power conferred upon the council to hear, cannot be dele- gated, for example, to the clerk, nor can the council limit objections made in writing, where the char- ter allows a hearing before the council itself. State (Durant) v. Jersey City, 25 N. J. L., 309. Necessity of hearing on subse- quent change of proposed plan. Washburn v. Chicago, 198 111., 506; 64 N. E. Rep., 1064. 25 Arkansas — Keel v. Board of Directors, etc., 59 Ark., 513; 27 S. W. Rep., 590. California — Smith v. Hazard, 110 Cal., 145; 42 Pac. Rep., 465; 830 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§536 § 526. Petition or consent of property owners affected. Un- der many charters, where the cost of the improvement is to be paid for by special assessments or taxation against private property, the consent of the property owners whose property must bear the burden is required as a condition precedent to proceed with the contemplated improvement. This is usually evidenced by petition, signed by the requisite number of land owners whose property fronts on the proposed improvement, or those whose property is in the assessment or taxing district. Whether such step is jurisdictional, of course, depends upon the proper construction of the local charter. Many cases con- struing various charter provisions relating to the several kinds of improvements are set out in the note.^^ Los Angeles Lighting Co. v. Los Angeles, 106 Cal., 156; 39 Pac. Rep., 535; Burnett v. Sacramento, 12 Cal., 76; 73 Am. Dec, 518. Indiana — Kirkland v. Indianap- olis, 142 Ind., 123; 41 N. E. Rep., 374; House v. Greensburg, 93 Ind., 533; Spiegel v. Gansberg, 44 Ind., 418. Kansas — Marshall v. Leaven- worth, 44 Kan., 459; 24 Pac. Rep., 975. Louisiana — Daniels v. New Or- leans, 26 La. Ann., 1. Mississippi — Nugent v. Jackson, 72 Miss., 1040; 18 So. Rep., 493. Missouri — Forbis v. Bradbury, 58 Mo. App., 506; Fruin-Bambrick Const. Co. V. Geist, 37 Mo. App., 509. New Jersey — Jersey City Brew- ery Co. V. Jersey City, 42 N. J. L., 575; Green v. Jersey City, 42 N. J. L., 565; State (Durant) v. Jersey City, 25 N. J. L., 309; Vanderbeck V. Jersey City, 44 N. J. L., 626. New York — In re Street Opening and Improvement Board, 133 N. Y., 436; 31 N. E. Rep., 316; In re Street Opening Board, 82 Hun. (N. Y.), 580; 31 N. Y. Supp., 732. Oregon — Clinton v. Portland, 26 Oregon, 410; 38 Pac. Rep., 407. Utah — Armstrong v. Ogden City, 12 Utah, 476; 43 Pac. Rep., 119. 26 Consent of Pbopbety Owneks OK Petition, required. California — Mulligan v. Smith, 59 Cal., 206; Dyer v. Miller, 58 Cal., 585; Gately v. Leviston, 63 Cal., 365. Indiana — Case v. Johnson, 91 Ind,. 477; Covington v. Nelson, 35 Ind., 532. Nebraska — Jones v. South Oma- ha (Neb. 1902), 94 N. W. Rep., 957. New York — People v. Rochester, 21 Barb. (N. Y.), 656; In re Banta, 60 N. Y., 165. United State's — Liebman v. San Francisco, 24 Fed. Rep., 705. Petition. State (Ogden) v. Hud- son, 29 N. J. L., 104 ; Corry v. Gay- nor, 22 Ohio St., 584; Anderson v. Hamilton County Comrs., 12 Ohio St., 635. Petition and notice. Dennison V. Kansas City, 95 Mo., 416; 8 S. W. Rep., 429; Verdin v. St. Louis, 131 Mo., 26; 33 S. W. Rep., 480; 36 S. W. Rep., 52. Publication of preliminary reso- lution declaring necessity for, etc. Uplngton V. Oviatt, 24 Ohio St., 232. §527] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 831 § 527. Opening and establishment of streets. Public high- ways may be created (1) by dedication, (2) by prescription, or (3) by condemnation proceedings. The street must be es- Sometimes the requirement does v. Judge of Recorder's Ct. of De- not apply to all improvements, trolt, 40 Mich., 64. Ganson v. Buffalo, 2 Abb. Dec. (N. Y.), 236; Philadelphia v. Tryon, 35 Pa. St., 401. Paving street. McGuinn v. Peri, 16 La. Ann., 326; Henderson v. Baltimore, 8 Md., 352; Bouldln v. Prescribed vote of council, as Baltimore, 15 Md., 18; Baltimore two-thirds, may pass, without pe- tition. Lafayette v. Fowler, 34 V. Eschback, 18 Md., 276. Re-paving. In re Smith, 99 N. Ind., 140; Jessing v. Columbus, 1 Y., 424; 2 N. E. Rep., 52; Jex v. Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep., 90. New York, 103 N. Y., 536; 9 N. B. Street Improvements, required. Rep., 39. Indiana— Shrnm v. Salem, 13 where property owners petition Ind. App., 115; 39 N. B. Rep., 1050; that street be "graded and grav- approving Allen v. Salem, 10 Ind. eled," at a cost of $750; the work App., 650; 38 N. E. Rep., 425. can not be changed to macadamiz- Jl/ijireesoia— Bradley v. West Du- jng and guttering, at a cost of over luth, 45 Minn.. 4; 47 N. W. Rep., $5,000 without a new petition. 166. Watkins v. Griffith, 59 Ark., 344; Nebraska — Von Steen v. Beat- 27 S. W. Rep., 234. rice, 36 Neb., 421; 54 N. W. Rep., 677; State v. Birkhauser, 37 Neb., 521; 56 N. W. Rep., 303. New York — In re Garvey, 77 N. Y., 523; In re Delaware & H. Canal Co., 60 Hun. (N. Y.), 204; 14 N. Y. Supp., 585; Miller v. Am- sterdam, 149 N. Y., 288; 43 N. E. Rep., 632, affirming Smith v. Am- sterdam, 78 Hun. (N. Y.), 609; 2S N. Y. Supp., 1021. Pennsylvania — Pittsburg v. Wal- ter, 69 Pa. St.. 365; Philadelphia V. Lea, 5 Phila. (Pa.), 77; In re Frederick Street, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep., 114. Wisconsin — Dean v. Madison, 9 Sewees. Keese v. Denver, 10 Colo., 112; 15 Pac. Rep., 825; Works V. Lockport, 28 Hun. (N. Y.), 9; Bacon v. Nanny, 55 Hun. (N. Y.), 606; 7 N. Y. Supp., 804; Van Brunt v. Platbush, 128 N. Y., 50; 27 N. B. Rep., 973, reversing 59 Hun. (N. Y.), 192; 13 N. Y. Supp., 545. Vacating Stkeets. Gargan v, Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co., 89 Ky., 212; 12 S. W. Rep., 259; 6 L. R. A., 340; Excelsior Brick Co. v. Haverstraw, 62 Hun. (N. Y.), 620; 16 N. Y. Supp., 681; Pettibone v. Hamilton, 40 Wis., 402; Warren v. Wausau, 66 Wis., 206; 28 N. W. Wis 402 ''.' ^ , . t Rep., 187; James v. Darlington, 71 Grading street at expense of . ... „. „ „„. property. Steinmuller v. Kansas City, 3 Kan. App., 45 ; 44 Pac. Rep., 600. Street opening included. Wood' Wis., 173; 36 N. W. Rep., 834. Widening Stbeet. Carron v. Martin, 26 N. J. L., 594; 69 Am. Dec, 584, reversing Martin v. Car- ruff V. Elizabeth, 30 N. J. L., 176; ron, 26 N. J. L., 228. Brooklyn v. Patchen. 8 Wend. (N. Slight Change or Street Grade, y ) 47 without consent sustained. Audi- Private alley; opening. People tor General v. Chase (Mich. 1903), 833 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§527 tablished before it can be improved.^^ The law respecting the 94 N. W. Rep., 178; 10 Detroit Leg. News, 34. Petition. A recital In the ordi- nance that a majority of the prop- erty owners had petitioned for the improvement is prima facie_, evi- dence that the petition exists. Far- rell V. West Chicago, 181 U. S., 404; 21 Sup. Ct. Rep., 609; 45 L. Ed., 924. Consent or Petition Not Re- quired. Spaulding v. Wesson^ 84 Cal., 141; 24 Pac. Rep., 377; De Puy V. Wabash, 133 Ind., 336; 32 N. E. Rep., 1016, approving Mc- Eneney v. Sullivan, 125 Ind., 407; 25 N. E. Rep., 540; St. Louis v. Clemens, 36 Mo., 467; State (Mann) v. Jersey City, 24 N. J. L., 662; State (Malone) v. Jersey City, 28 N. J. L., 500; JellifE v. Newark, 48 N. J. L., 101; 2 Atl. Rep., 627; 49 N. J. L.,239; 12 Atl. Rep., 770; State V. Camden, 53 N. J. L., 322; 21 Atl. Rep., 565; Spring Garden Comrs. V. Wlstar, 18 Pa., 195 ; Beau- mont V. Wllkesbarre, 142 Pa. St., 198; 21 Atl. Rep., 888. Grade of street. Burr v. New- castle, 49 Ind., 322; State v. Jersey City, 52 N. J. L., 490; 19 Atl. Rep., 1096. By general ordinance, Napa V. Easterby, 76 Cal., 222; 18 Pac. Rep., 253. Sidewalk. Wilkin v. Houston, 48 Kan., 584; 30 Pac. Rep., 23. Changing grade. In re Buhler, 32 Barb. (N. Y.), 79; 19 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 317; Mott v. Rush, 2 Hill. (N. Y.), 472; In re Walter, 83 N. Y., 538, affirming 21 Hun. (N. Y.), 533; O'Reilly v. Kingston, 114 N. Y., 439; 21 N. E. Rep., 1004, affirm- ing 39 Hun. (N. Y.), 285. Does not apply where cost Is not to be paid for by special assess- ments. Goodwillie v. Detroit, 103 Mich., 283; 61 N. W. Rep., 526. Relaying stone pavement with brick, held not to be an original Improvement, requiring petition. Reuting v. Tltusville, 175 Pa. St., 512; 34 Atl. Rep., 916. Opening and widening of street. Granger v. Syracuse, 38 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 308. Extension of street. People v. Port Jervis, 100 N. Y., 283; 3 N. E. Rep., 194. Dispensing with by charter amendment during pendency of proceedings sustained. Elwood v. Rochester, 4JHun. (N. Y.), 102. Vacating Streets. Excelsior Brick Co. v. Haverstraw, 142 N. Y., 146; 36 N. E. Rep., 819, reversing 66 Hun. (N. Y.), 631; 21 N. Y. Supp., 99. Sewers. Park Ecclesiastical Soc. v. Hartford, 47 Conn., 89; St. Louis V. Oeters, 36 Mo., 456; Brew- ster V. Syracuse, 19 N. Y., 116; Philadelphia v. Tryon, 35 Pa. St., 401; Wood V. McGrath, 150 Pa. St., 451; 24 Atl. Rep., 682; 16 L. R. A., 715. 27 McGinnis v. St. Louis, 157 Mo., 191; 57 S. W. Rep., 755. Opening Streets. Preliminary proceedings "are important, to en- able the council to properly to de- cide whether the improvement is proper to be made, as well as to inform the owners of the land to be assessed how it will affect their interests." Preliminary assess- ment made by the commissioners must be filed within the time pre- scribed by charter, or the street cannot be opened. State (Acker- man) V. Bergen, 33 N. J. L., 39, 41. Condemnation. When public property to be condemned for sewer. Kelsey v. King, 32 Barb. (N. Y.), 410; 11 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 180. An alley which is public need not 528] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 833 establishment or opening of streets must be strictly observed.^^ Many laws provide that it shall not be lawful to grade, pave or macadamize (to improve) streets, etc., not established and opened according to law and ordinance. ^^ § 528. Establishment of street grade. Charters frequently require the council or legislative body to establish by ordinance the location and gradation of streets within the corporate lim- its.*" This requirement does not always extend to alleys.*^ Some charters provide that a designated board, as the board of public improvements, shall recommend to the legislative de- partment all ordinances for the establishment or change of grade of streets, public ways, alleys, etc.^^ Under such pro- vision, until the grade of a street or alley is fixed by ordinance the street or alley is not fully established and cannot be ordered to be improved. Charters generally require the grade to be established before proceedings for the permanent improvement of streets at the expense of property owners shall be commenced.^* Where the be condemned when it is to form Contract for macadamizing may part of a street, as there is no one he let after the contract for the to complain. Scotten v. Detroit, 106 Mich., 564; 64 N. W. Rep., 579. 28 People ex rel. v. Whitney's Point, 32 Hun. (N. Y.), 508. 29 Particular case. Moran v. Lindell, 52 Mo., 229. Sewer may he constructed there- in before street is opened. In re Fowler, 53 N. Y., 60. 30 Power to open streets implies power to fix grade. Himmelmann V. Hoadley, 44 Cal., 213. 31 Weber v. Johnson, 37 Mo. App., 601. Compare Joyes v. Shad- burn, 11 Ky. Law Rep., 892; 13 S. W. Rep., 361. 32 Charter of St. Louis, art VI., sec. 17 (Amendments Oct. 22, 1901.) 33 Napa V. Easterly, 61 Cal., 509 ; State v. Judges of District Court, 51 Minn., 539; 53 N. W. Rep., 800; 55 N. W. Rep., 122; In re Delaware & H. Canal Co., 60 Hun. (N. Y.), 204; 14 N. Y. Supp., 585, reversing 8 N. Y. Supp., 352. 53 grading has been made and before the grading has been done. Dyer V. Hudson, 65 Cal., 374; 4 Pac. Rep., 231. If the grade and width of a street have been officially estab- lished, it may be ordered planked, though it has not been graded. Knowles v. Seale, 64 Cal., 377; 1 Pac. Rep., 159. Official grade of all streets may be established by one general or- dinance. Napa V. Basterby, 76 Cal., 222; 18 Pac. Rep., 253. Although the charter requires the grade to be established before the street is paved, the city may order paving and make a contract therefor before the grade is estab- lished, where the contract is made with reference to a proposed grade which is established before the work is done. Allen v. Danven- port, 107 Iowa, 90; 77 N. W. Rep., 532. So, a contract for grading may 834 OP PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§528 grade must be established hy ordinance, which is often re- quired,^* the act is legislativej^*^ and cannot be delegated to executive and administrative officers,^" or to private corpora- tions.^^ The doctrine that the legislative body must act as a legal entity, duly convened,^^ has been applied to the estab- lishment and change of grade of streets. Thus individual members of the council cannot consent to the placing of dirt on a street and thereby change its grade.^^ So the rule, elsewhere explained that, a municipal corporation may ratify the unau- thorized acts of its officers and agents which are within the corporate powers,** was applied in Pennsylvania to a change of a grade of a street made by officers without ordinance au- thority by ratification by the eouncil.*^ In improvement proceedings the question is sometimes pre- sented, What constitutes the establishment of a grade 1 It has been held in California that the fixing of a definite height of a street at two points does not establish the official grade be- tween such points on an arbitrary straight line drawn between them.*2 If an ordinance establishes the grade of a street or be let, although the gradient lines for the street prior to the passage of an order directing the street to be graded have hot been fixed. Keough V. St. Paul, 66 Minn., 114; 68 N. W. Rep., 843, reviewing and distinguishing Pitzhugh v. Duluth, 58 Minn., 427; 59 N. W. Rep., 1041; Sang V. Duluth, 38 Minn., 81; 59 N. W. Rep., 878; Sta'te v. District Court Judges, 51 Minn,, 539; 53 N. W. Rep., 800; 55 N. W. Rep., 122; and State v. District Court, 44 Minn. 244; 46 N. W. Rep., 349. Sidewalks, construction of, to conform to established grade. Burr v. Newcastle, 49 Ind., 322. Some charters permit sidewalks to be constructed before the street has been graded or macadamized. Challiss V. Parker, 11 Kan., 394. 34 Chicago & N. Pac. R. Co. v. Chicago, 174 111., 439; 51 N. B. Rep., 596. Change of grade to be by ordi- nance. Kraffe v. Springfield, 86 Mo. App., 530. Grade established by resolution. State (Meday) v. Rutherford, 52 N. J. L., 499; 19 Atl. Rep., 972. 35 Section 12, supra. 36 Sees. 86 to 89, supra. Chilson V. Wilson, 38 Mich., 267; Theman- son V. Kearney, 35 Neb.. 881; 53 N. W. Rep., 1009 ; Ware v. Ruther- ford, 55 N. J. L., 450; 26 Atl. Rep., 933. 3T Egbert v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 6 Ind. App., 350; 33 N. E. Rep., 659. 3s Section 91, supra. 39 Denison & Pac. Sub. Ry. Co. v. James, 20 Tex. Civ. App., 358; 49 S. W. Rep., 660. 40 Section 120, supra. •41 McCormick's Appeal, In re Shiloh Street, 165 Pa. St., 386; 30 Atl. Rep., 986. 42 Borland v. Bergson, 78 Cal., 637; 21 Pac. Rep., 537. Establishing Grade. Particular cases. Burr v. Newcastle, 49 Ind., 322; De Soto ex ret v. Showman, (1903, Mo. App.) 73 S. W. Rep., 1529] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 835 alley at certain elevations between designated points a level cross grade would seem to be intended. If one side of such street or alley should be constructed above the established ele- vation and the other side below it, then, in such case, the ques- tion is presented, whether legislative power has been exercised. In many cases natural conditions require that one side of a street be considerably higher than the opposite side, and the elevation of the side lines determines the relation of the street grades to adjacent property. This is in consequence of the fact that streets have width as well as length and their grade is that of a plane or surface and not of a line. The width of road- way is the distance between curb lines. Therefore, where the fixing of the grade is a legislative act, the elevation of the curb lines should be established by ordinance, either by estab- lishing their elevation at controlling points, or by the adoption, by ordinance, of a general uniform rule fixing the relation of curb grades to center line grades.*^ § 529. Becommendation of ordinance by board. Some char- 257 ; Kearney v. Andrews, 10 N. J. Bq., 70; Parker v. New Brunswick, 30 N. J. L., 395. Particular laws establishing grades, construed. Gafney v. San Francisco, 72 Cal., 146; l3 Pac. Rep., 467; Lake v. Decatur, 91 111., 596; State v. Ramsey County Dis- trict Court, 33 Minn., 295; 23 N. W. Rep., 222; Yanish v. St. Paul, 50 Minn., 518; 52 N. W. Rep., 925. An ordinance required that street grade should be estiniated from a certain datum line, and "calculated for the middle of the several streets for which they are established." Taking the outer line of the streets as the grade line is a violation of such ordinance. Given v. Des Moines, 70 Iowa, 637; 27 N. W. Rep., 803. Recital that the street shall be filled up to the "highest grade," in- sufficiently indicates the grade. Stretch v. Hoboken, 47 N. J. L., 268. A vote to place the grade as re- ported by a committee, held not sufficient to establish grade. Gard- nier v. Johnson, 16 R. I., 94; 12 Atl. Rep., 888. Change of grade. Niver v. Bath- on-the-Hudson, 27 Misc. Rep., (N. Y.), 605. Establishment of grade by ref- erence to an ordinance, monument, etc. Chicago & N. Pac. R. Co. v. Chicago, 172 111., 66; 49 N. E. Rep., 1006; Carlinville v. McClure, 156 111., 492; 41 N. E. Rep., 169; Wash- ington Ice Co. V. Chicago, 147 111., 327; 35 N. E. Rep., 378; Blooming- ton V. Pollock, 141 111., 346; 31 N. E. Rep., 146. As to description of improve- ment by reference, see Sec. 545, post. 43 Annotated Amended Charter of St. Louis by the author (1902), pp. 48, 49, contribution of Robert E. McMath, President St. Louis Board of Public Improvements, 1893 to 1901, and member of said board for sixteen years. 836 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§530 ters require that the ordinance for the improvement shall be recommended by a designated municipal board, as the board of public works or improvements, before the council or legislative body is authorized to pass such ordinance.** Provisions of this character are usually construed as mandatory.*^ So some- times all ordinances resulting in contracts for public work or improvements are required to originate in such board. The requirement of such recommendation is not regarded as a dele- gation of legislative authority.*® § 530. Water and gas pipes in advance of improvement. Charters sometimes prescribe that water and gas pipes shall be laid before the street shall be paved. The Detroit charter requiring water and gas pipes to be laid at least one year be- fore a street could be ordered paved was adjudged void be- cause inconsistent with the general power of the city to pave streets.*'' ** St. Louis Charter, art. VI., sec. 14; Municipal Code of St. Louis, p. 260; Amended Charter of St. Louis (Annotated) p. 322; Charter, San Francisco^ art. VI., eh. 2, sec. 2; Stat, and Codes of Cal., 1901, page 293j Charter Kansas City, Mo., art. IX., sec. 2; R. S. Mo., 1899, sec. 5390; Rawson v. Chicago, 185 III., 87; 57 N. E. Rep., 35; Bar- ber Asphalt P. Co. V. Gaar, 24 Ky. Law Rep., 2227; 73 S. W. Rep., 1106. The recommendation of the ordi- nance for passage in prima facie evidence that all the preliminary requirements, including the giving of notice of public hearings, have been performed. Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Chicago, 202 111., 576, 581; 67 N. E. Rep., 383. 45 Reynolds v. Schwelnefus, 27 Ohio St., 311, reversing 1 Cin. Rep., 215; Stephan v. Daniels, 27 Ohio St.! 527; Brophy v. Landman, 28 Ohio St., 542; Toledo v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 2 Ohio Cir. Dec, 450; Longworth v. Cincinnati, 23 Wkly. Law Bui. (Ohio), 100. Sewek; board of health need not recommend. St. Louis v. Oeters, 36 Mo., 456. Boulevard; board of park and boulevard commissioners need not recommend. In re Independence Avenue Boulevard, 128 Mo., 272; 30 S. W. Rep., 773. Amendment. An ordinance is not invalid, although board amend- ed it upon suggestion of assembly and then returned it and recom- mended its passage, without chang- ing endorsement of estimated cost made on original draft. Bambrick v. Campbell, 37 Mo. App., 460. 46 An ordinance providing for the erection of litter boxes in the streets, having originated in the municipal assembly and not by the board, was held void. State ex rel. V. Belt, 161 Mo., 371, 375 ; 61 S. W. Rep., 658. Proceedings for improvement. Welker v. Potter, 18 Ohio St., 85. *' It appeared that the laying of gas pipes was done by private cor- porations and the laying of water pipes was in control of the water YM] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 837 §531. Estimate of cost of improvement. Where the im- provement is to be paid for by special assessment or taxation, the provision is frequent that the total cost thereof shall be estimated by designated officers, and sometimes it is required to be indorsed on the improvement ordinance. This provision is generally regarded as mandatory.** § 532. Submission to, and approval of, electors. As a condi- tion precedent to the advancement of certain public improve- ments, many charters and laws provide that the proposition shall first be submitted to, and approved by, a majority of the electors of the municipality.*^ Such provisions are mandatory and must be observed. Many cases construing laws of this character are given in the note.^<* board. Goodwillie v. Detroit, 103 Mich., 283; 61 N. W. Rep., 526. Water Mains need not be laid prior to order to pave street. Eng- lish V. Danville, 150 111., 92; 36 N. E. Rep., 994. 18 Gilmore v. Hentig, 33 Kan., 156; 5 Pac. Rep., 781; Hentig v. Gilmore, 33 Kan., 234; 6 Pac. Rep., 304; Kinealy v. Gay, 7 Mo. App., 203; Barber- Asphalt Paving Co. V. Hezel, 76 Mo. App., 135; De Soto rx rel. v. Showman (1903, Mo. App.) 73 S. W. Rep., 257; Frosh v. Galveston, 73 Tex., 401; 11 S. W. Rep., 402; Dallas v. Ellison, 10 Tex. Civ. App., 28; 30 S. W. Rep., 1128; -Dallas v. Atkins (Tex. Civ. App. 1895), 32 S. W. Rep., 780; Pound V. Chippewa Co. Supervis- ors, 43 Wis., 63. Sufficiency of estimate. Cuming V. Grand Rapids, 46 Mich., 150; 9 N. W. Rep., 141; Balsch v. Grand Rapids, 84 Mich., 666; 48 N. W. Rep., 176; Goodwillie v. Detroit, 103 Mich., 283; 61 N. W. Rep., 526; Wewell V. Cincinnati, 45 Ohio St., 407; 15 N. E. Rep., 196; Erie v. Brady, 150 Pa. St., 462; 24 Atl. Rep., 641. Variance between ordinance and estimate. Chicago v. Singer, 202 111., 75; 66 N. E. Rep., 874. *o Section 152, supra. 50 Lighting. Citizens Gas Light Co. v. Wakefield, 161 Mass., 432; 37 N. E. Rep., 444; 31 L. R. A., 457; Hudson Electric Light Co. y. Hudson, 163 Mass., 346; 40 N. E. Rep., 109; Carthage v. Carthage Light Co., 97 Mo. App., 20; Thomp- son Houston Electric Co. v. New- ton, 42 Fed. Rep., 723, holding that submission of the entire proposi- tion may be made prior to the adoption of the ordinance provid- ing for the lighting plant. Where the electors have voted in favor of a municipal lighting plant, a contract made thereafter with a private corporation, to furnish light is void. George v. Wyan- dotte Electric Light Co., 105 Mich., 1; 62 N. W. Rep., 985; Campbell v. Wyandotte, Id. Only the matters expressly di- rected need be submitted to the voters. Hence, where the law does not so require, the rate of interest of the bonds, their sale at par and the place of payment need not be approved by the electors. Yesler V. Seattle, 1 Wash. St., 308; 25 Pac. Rep., 1014. Entire proposition may be sub- mitted. Seymour v. Tacoma, 6 Wash., 138; 32 Pac. Rep., 1077. Watee Supply. Hornby v. Bev- 838 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§533 § 533. Preliminary resolution or ordinance. Certain im- provements are sometimes begun by a preliminary resolution or ordinanee.^i This constitutes the preliminary expression of opinion that the improvement is necessary or desirable. Usual- ly the resolution is required to be published, in order to advise the property owners, and thus enable them to protest or re- monstrate if they think fit.-''^ Under a charter providing that, before ordering any improvement, the council shall pass a reso- lution of intention so to do, describing the work, a resolution for the improvement of a street, "to consist of the construction therein of granite or artificial stone curbing, ' ' confers no juris- diction to order the work.^-'* So where the charter requires the' resolution authorizing condemnation proceedings to describe the property "with particularity sufficient for an ordinary conveyance thereof," a resolution which does not contain sepa- rate descriptions of the property proposed to be condemned, nor the names of the owners, is insufficient.^* Whether the erly, 48 N. J. L., 110; 2 Atl. Rep., 637; Thompson v. Sumner, 9 Wash., 310; 37 Pac. Rep., 450. Or- dinance providing for the erection of waterworks may be passed be- fore the approval of the proposi- tion by the voters, and made to take effect on such approval. Tay- lor V. McPadden, 84 Iowa, 262; 50 N. W. Rep., 1070. Held under particular law that contract for supply valid, without submission to voters. East Jor- dan Lumber Co. v. East Jordan, 100 Mich., 201; 58 N. W. Rep., 1012. "General" or "special" election. Yesler v. Seattle, 1 Wash. St., 308; 25 Pac. Rep., 1014. Public Wobk. Assessment of benefits for sewer, held valid, though cost exceeded charter limit, etc. Park Ecclesiastical Soo. v. Hartford, 47 Conn., 89. Establishing park. People v. Salomon, 46 111., 415. Street improvement; approval pf voters not necessary. Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. Gogreve, 41 La. Ann., 251; 5 So. Rep., 848. Levee; election held irregular. Byrne v. Parish of East Carroll, 45 La. Ann., 392; 12 So. Rep., 521. Subway for railroad tracks. Prince v. Crocker, 166 Mass., 347; 44 N. E. Rep., 446; 32 L. R. A., 610. City hall and fire engine house; vote of people not required. Tor- rent V. Muskegon, 47 Mich., 115; 10 N. W. Rep., 132; 41 Am. Rep., 715; Public School. Decatur V. Wil- son, 96 Ga., 251; 23 S. E. Rep., 240. Vacating street; proposition to be submitted to voters under char- ter of Mankato, Minn. Lamm v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 45 Minn., 71; 47 N. W. Rep., 455; 10 L. R. A., 268. 01 Not required. Elma v. Carney, 9 Wash., 466; 37 Pac. Rep., 707. 52 Nevada v. Eddy, 123 Mo., 546, 558; 27 S. W. Rep., 471. 53 San Jose Imp. Co. v. Auzerais, 106 Cal., 498; 39 Pac. Rep., 859. As to description of improve- ment, see §§ 540 to 545, post. =* Owosso V. Richfield, 80 Mich., 328; 45 N. W. Rep., 129. §535] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 839 mayor should sign the preliminary resolutiou or ordinance depends upon the particular charter. Sometimes this is not necessary.^'' This subject is fully considered elsewhere.'"''' § 534. Declaration of necessity of improvement. As else- where stated, ^^ the general rule is that, unless required in ex- press terms, the ordinance need not recite the necessity of its enactment. Under some charters the necessity of certain kinds of improvements must be declared. This may be done in the preliminary resolution or ordinance."^ Such declaration has been held jurisdictional.^^ Sometimes it does not apply to con- demnation proceedings.®" Municipal charters diifer as to this requirement, but in construing them most of the decisions are to the effect that neither the ordinance nor resolution providing for the improvement, or any part of the proceedings therefor, need contain a formal declaration of necessity.''^ 55 Howeth V. Jersey City, 30 N. J. L., 93. 50 Sec. 100, 149, supra. ■>'' Section 140, supra. 5s Michigan XlJentral R. Co. v. Huehn, 59 Fed. Rep., 335. 59 McLauren v. Grand Forks, 6 Dais:., 397; 43 N. W. Rep., 710; Hoyt V. East Saginaw, 19 Mich., 39; 2 Am. Rep., 76; White v. Sag- inaw, 67 Mich., 33; 34 N. W. Rep., 255; In re Schreiber, 3 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.), 68; Stephan v. Daniels, 27 Ohio St.. 527. 60 Caldwell v. Carthage, 49 Ohio St., 334; 31 N. E. Rep., 602; Krum- berg V. Cincinnati, 29 Ohio St., 69; Longworth v. Cincinnati, 23 Wkly. Law Bui. (Ohio), 100. ei Indiana — Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. V. Edgerton, 125 Ind., 455; 25 N. B. Rep., 436; Pittsburg C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. V. Hays, 17 Ind. App., 261; 44 N. E. Rep., 375. Maryland — Baltimore v. John Hopkins Hospital, 56 Md., 1. Maine — Dorman v. Lewistoh, 81 Me., 411; 17 Atl. Rep., 316; Cas- sidy V. Bangor, 61 Me., 434. Massachusetts — Com. v. Abbott, 160 Mass., 282; 35 N. E. Rep., 782; Wright Y. Boston, 9 Cush. (63 Mass.), 233. Michigan — Beecher v. Detroit, 92 Mich., 268; 52 N. W. Rep., 731; Davies v. Saginaw, 87 Mich., 439; 49 N. W. Rep., 667; Naegely v. Saginaw, 101 Mich., 532; 60 N. W. Rep., 46. Minnesota — Cook v. Slocum, 27 Minn., 509; 8 N. W. Rep., 755. Missouri — Taylor v. St. Louis, 14 Mo., 20; 55 Am. Dec, 89; Miller V. Anheuser, 2 Mo. App., 168. Tsfew York — Elwood v. Rochester, 43 Hun. (N. Y.), 102; Trinity Church V. Higglns, 4 Rob. (27 N. Y. Super. Ct), 1. North Carolina — Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. C, 32; 14 S. E. Rep., 521; 17 L. R. A., 330. Ohio — Cincinnati v. Mathers, 6 Ohio Dec, 755; 4 Wkly. Law Bui. (Ohio) 273; Strauss v. Cincinnati, 24 Wkly. Law Bui. (Ohio), 422. Oregon — Clinton v. Portland, 26 Oregon, 410; 38 Pac Rep., 407; Strowbridge v. Portland, 8 Oregon, 67. Texas — Kerr v. Corsicana (Tex. Civ. App., 1895), 35 S. W. Rep., 840 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§ 535 § 535. Providing for improvement— Ordinance, resolution or order. Under most charters improvements cannot be ordered, nor the contract entered into therefor without formal action, either by ordinance or resolution, adopted by the legislative body. Without such action no liability is created to pay for such work, although done under the direction of the municipal officers. ^2 Thus- entries by the secretary upon the minutes that the work had been duly ordered by the council and a contract therefor legally made, are insufficient.^^ Where an ordinance or resolution is made a condition precedent to the exercise of the power, this, of course, is essential to the validity of the pro- ceedings."* In proceedings of special assessment or taxation for improvements if the ordinance or resolution should prove to be invalid for any reason the special assessment made there- under is also void."^ In many jurisdictions, as in Illinois, the first step, when the improvement is to be paid for by special assessment or taxation, is the enactment of an ordinance speci- fying the nature, character, locality and description of the im- provement and the mode in which its cost shall be collected ; and no work can be done or expenses incurred which can be- come a charge on the property of the land owner before such ordinance is passed.*" But the sufficiency of the action in pro- viding for a given improvement is to be determined by the local laws. Certain improvements directed by order,"" or resolution 694; Connor v. Paris, 87 Tex., 32; and East St. Louis v. Albrecht, 150 27 S. W. Rep., 88. 111., 506; 37 N. E. Rep., 934. Wisconsin — Boyd v. Milwaukee, s? Order Sufi'Icient. 92 Wis., 456; 66 N. W. Rep., 603. To pave street. Alexandria v. 02 Street grading. Kolkmeyer v. Mandeville, 2 Cranch C. C, 224; Jefferson City, 75 Mo. App., 678. 1 Fed. Cas.. No. 184. 63 Waco v. Prather, 90 Tex., 80, Construction of sidewalk. State 81; 37 S W Rep. 312 ""■ Armstrong, 54 Minn., 457; 56 N. "4 Zalesky v. Cedar Rapids (Iowa, 1902), 92 N. W. Rep., 657; Nevada v. Eddy, 123 Mo., 546, 588, 589; 27 S. W. Rep., 471. W. Rep., 97. To improve street. Corry v. Campbell, 25 Ohio St., 134. Specified work on street. Napa V. Basterby, 76 Cal., 222; 18 Pac. 65 Brown v. Denver, 7 Colo., 305; Rep., 253. 3 Pac. Rep., 455; Jacksonville Ry. Ordinary street improvement. Co. V. Jacksonville, 114 111., 562; Board of Comrs. of Allen County v. 2 N. E. Rep., 478. Silvers, 22 Ind., 491, 502. |5» Davis V. Litchfield, 155 111., Improvement may be ordered by 384; 40 N. E. Rep., 354, distin- resolution or order and need not guisliing Carlyle v. Clinton County, be entered of record. Indianapolis 140 111., .^12; 30 N. B. Rep., 782, v. Imberry, 17 Ind., 175. §535] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 841 have been sustained under particular charters.^^ However, if the act is to be regarded as essentially legislative an ordinance is necessary or a resolution passed v^ith all the formalities of an ordinance, which, then, in effect, becomes an ordinance.*^ 08 Resolution Sufficient. Bar- ber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. Bdgerton, 125 Ind., 455; 25 N. E. Rep., 436. To grade and improve street. Wright V. Forrestal, 65 Wis., 341; 27 N. W. Rep., 52; Hall v. Racine, 81 Wis., 72; 50 N. W. Rep., 1094. Widening and extending street. In re Knaust, 101 N. Y., 188; 4 N. E. Rep., 338. Opening street. Sower v. Phil- adelphia, 35 Pa. St., 231. Street improvement. Indianap- olis V. Imberry, 17 Ind., 175; Buck- ley V. Tacoma, 9 Wash., 253; 37 Pac. Rep., 441. Change in street grade. State v. Rutherford, 52 N. J. L., 499; 19 Atl. Rep., 972. Sewer. Grimmell v. Des Moines, 57 Iowa, 144; 10 N. W. Rep., 330; State (Van Vorst) v. Jersey City, 27 N. J. L., 493. Sewer, without previous formal order. Leominster v. Conant, 139 Mass., 384; 2 N. E. Rep., 690. Not required to fix bounds of sewer district. Strowbridge v. Port- land, 8 Oregon, 67. Contract for lighting streets, re- quiring no plant, but post and lamps. Lincoln v. San Vapor Stre«t Light Co., 59 Fed. Rep., 756; 8 C. C. A., 253. Plans and specifications may be adopted by resolution. Santa Cruz Rock Pav. Co. v. Heaton, 105 Cal., 162; 38 Pac. Rep., 693. Ordinance is not required, to au- thorize under permit the removal of deposits from the channel of a natural water course. Weber v. Gill, 98 Cal., 462; 33 Pac. Rep., 330. Waterworks. Where charter dofes not require the power to establish a system of waterworks may be exercised prior to the passage of the ordinance. National Tube Works V. Chamberlain, 5 Dak., 54; 37 N. W. Rep., 761. 69 DiFFEKENCB BETWEEN ORDI- NANCE AND Resolution and illus- trative cases. Sections 2 to 6, supra. Ordinance Required. Carlyle v. Clinton County, 140 111., 512; 30 N. E. Rep., 782; East St. Louis v. Al- brecht, 150 111., 506; 37 N. E. Rep., 934; Sloan v. Beebe, 24 Kan., 343; Indianapolis v. Miller, 27 Ind., 394; Nevada v. Eddy, 123 Mo., 546; 27 S. W. Rep., 471; Scranton v. Mc- Donough, 1 Lack. Leg. N. (Pa.), 177; Alford v. Dallas (Tex. Civ. App. 1896), 35 S. W. Rep., 816; Waco V. Prather (Tex. Civ. App. 1896), 35 S. W. Rep., 958. Ordinance or resolution. Hell- man V. Shoulters, 114 Cal., 136; 44 Pac. Rep., 915 ; Los Angeles v. Wal- dron, 65 Cal., 283; 3 Pac. Rep., 890. Open and condemn street. Balti- more V. Porter, 18 Md., 284; 79 Am. Dec, 686. Street improvement, involving deferred payments. Noel v. San Antonio, 11 Tex. Civ. App., 580; 33 S. W. Rep., 263. Widening Street. In re Powel- ton Avenue, 11 Phila. (Pa.), 447. Sidewalk construction. Barron V. Krebs, 41 Kan., 338; 21 Pac. Rep., 235. Repair of sidewalk. Louisiana V. Miller, 66 Mo., 467. Altering carriage way of side- walk. Cross V. Morristown, 18 N. J. Eq., 305. U2 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§537 § 536. Sufficiency of order for improvement. If the charter requires a resolutian "ordering" the work to be done, a resolu- tion declaring it to be the "intention" to improve the street is insufficient.''^'' An order of the council directing the removal of fences or other encroachments on certain streets is not an order for laying out or widening a street.''^ So a vote of the council to place the grade of a certain street as reported by a committee does not establish such grade.''^ So a viva voce vote directing officers to proceed, notwithstanding a remonstrance, is insufficient. The order should be given by resolution.^^ § 537. Ordinance for each distinct improvement. Generally speaking, each separate and distinct improvement requires a separate proceeding and ordinance.'''* Thus under authority to lay out "any one street" between certain termini, etc., only one street may be included in one proceeding.''^ So where an ordi- Sewer along a public street to be paid for by private persons. State (Hunt) V. Lambertville, 45 N. J. L., 279, 282. Street improvement — directing removal of obstructions. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co. v. Hoboken, 35 N. J. L., 205; Story v. Bayonne, 35 N. J. L., 335. Drawbridge construction-. Pack- ard v. Bergen Neck Ry. Co., 48 N. J. Bq., 281; 22 Atl. Rep., 227. Reconstruction must be author- ized by ordinance but repairs of streets may be made by order of street commissioner. Ritterskamp V. Stifel, 59 Mo. App., 510; Farrell V. Rammelkamp, 64 Mo. App., 425. Grading street. Clay v. Mexico, 92 Mo. App., 611; Fulton v. Lin- coln, 9 Neb., 358; 2 N. W. Rep., 724; State v. Brigantine Borough, 54 N. J. L., 476; 24 Atl. Rep., 481; State V. Bayonne, 54 N. J. L., 474; 24 Atl. Rep., 448. Changing street grade. Kroffe v. Springfield, 86 Mo. App., 530. To establish system of street lighting. Taylor v. Lambertville, 43 N. J. Bq., 107; 10 Atl. Rep., 809. To make contract for gas. lb. "An ordinance * * * direct- ing the construction of a work * * * is a Judicial act * * * but the prosecution of the work is ministerial in its character." Lo- gansport v. Wright, 25 Ind., 512. Resolution, held to be ordinance. Springfield v. Knott, 49 Mo. App., 612. Commissioners to estimate cost of improvement need not be ap- pointed by ordinance. Scovill v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio St.. 126. 70 Kline v. Tacoma, 12 Wash., 657; 40 Pac. Rep., 418. fi Somerville v. Middlesex Coun- ty Com'rs, 122 Mass., 292. Order laying out a way authoriz- ing assessments for betterments. Masonic Bldg. Assn. v. Brownell, 164 Mass., 306; 41 N. B. Rep., 306. Vacating street. Hinchman v. Detroit, 9 Mich., 103. 72 Gardiner v. Johnston, 16 R. I., 94; 12 Atl. Rep., 888. 73 Buckley v. Tacoma, 9 Wash., 269; 37 Pac. Rep., 446. 71 As opening and widening a street. In re Powelton Ave., 11 Phila. (Pa.), 447. 7'^ Boorman v. Santa Barbara, 65 Cal., 313; 4 Pac. Rep., 31. § 537] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 843 nance provides for the widening of an alley running north and south through a block, and the opening of a new alley running east and west through the same block, and also the condemna- tion of two triangular pieces of land at the intersection of these alleys for the purpose of improving the ingress and egress to and from the alleys, two distinct improvements are contem- plated and they cannot be united in one proceedingJ^ But under the usual charter power, a single ordinance may provide for the improvement of a single street, or a part thereof, oi for several streets/ '^ So, under some charters, a resolution to im- prove a street, may include a declaration of intention to both grade and macadamized^ So an ordinance providing for the lay- ing of water pipes which requires the laying to begin on one street, and, after being laid in that for some distance, to turn by right angle into another street, is not void in that it authorizes in one proceeding two separate and distinct improvements^'' One ordinance may authorize an improvement consisting of sev- eral parts. Thus it has been decided ^n Illinois that, inasmuch as grading, draining and sodding of a street combine to produce the improved street, all this work may be projected in one ordinance. 8" And in the same state it has been held that where streets and parts of streets are similarly situated, and are to be paved in the same manner and with the same material, they may be treated as a single improvement, and hence, such im- provement may be authorized by one ordinance.*^ So an ordi- 76 Weckler v. Chicago, 61 "ill., In Iowa the resolution ordering 142. the Improvement embraced parts ^'^ Savannah v. Weed, 96 Ga., of several streets, one more ex- 670; 23 S. B. Rep., 900; Adams pensive than another. It was sus- County v. Quincy, 130 111., 566; 22 tained under the code which pro- ' N. E. Rep., 624; 6 L. R. A., 155; vided that if the special tax is Wilbur v. Springeld, 123 111., 395; such as the city is authorized to 14 N. E. Rep., 871 ; State v. District make, any irregularity in the pro- Court, 33 Minn., 295; 23 N. W. ceeding by any officer of the city Rep,. 222; State v. District Court, will not defeat a recovery of the 29 Minn., 62; 11 N. W. Rep., 133; abutter's proportion. Burlington v. In re Walter, 75 N. Y,. 354. Quick, 47 Iowa, 222. 78 Emery v. San Francisco Gas A street in one subdivision, Co., 28 Cal., 345. practically a continuance of a 79 Ricketts v. Hyde Park, 85 111., street in another subdivision may 110. be authorized to be improved by so Murphy v. Peoria, 119 111., 509; one ordinance. Cincinnati v. Cor- 9 N. E. Rep., 895. ry, 7 Ohio Dec, 415; 2 Wkly. Law «i Springfield v. Green, 120 111., Bui. (Ohio), 337. 269; 11 N. E. Rep., 261. 844 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§ 538 nance providing for the construction of a sidewalk on both sides of the same street is not invalid as embracing two sepa- rate and distinct improvements. In such case, the construction of the sidewalk on one side of the street is of more or less bene- fit to the property on both sides of the street.®^ In Indiana, a statute conferring authority in one section to order the widen- ing of a street and in another grading and graveling, was con- strued as contemplating distinct improvements, and therefore one ordinance providing for widening and grading was held unauthorized.*^ A single ordinance may provide for the laying of sewers in several streets, where the streets are so situated that the several sewers constitute one system.** So an ordi- nance authorizing the construction of a main sewer, with branches, does not call for more than one improvement.*^ In an early New York case, it is said that, usually the combina- tion in one proceeding of improvements and assessments so dissimilar in their nature as the grading of a street, the build- ing of a bridge as a part thereof, and the construction of a sewer, would be vicious in principle ; but where the sewer is a part of the bridge, serviceable only from relieving it from the effect of water collecting upon the street, there is no objection to such union. *8 § 538. Procedure in passage of ordinance. The procedure in the passage of ordinances is treated elsewhere.*'' These rules are applicable to the enactment of improvement ordinances. To be valid, the improvement ordinance must be in form suffi- cient, passed at the time** and in the manner prescribed,*^ 82 Watson V. Chicago, 115 111., ss Payne v. South Springfield, 78, 83; 3 N. E. Kep., 430, where it 161 111., 285; 44 N. B. Rep., 105. was said: "To constitute one im- ss people v. Yonkers, 39 Barb, provement, it is not necessary that (N. Y.), 266. there should be physical connec- S7 Chapters III and IV. tion between different portions of ss Fehler v. Gosnell, 99 Ky., 380 ; it. The impiwvement here was 35 S. W. Rep., 1125; Wright v. upon one and the same street, and Forrestal, 65 Wis., 341 ; 27 N. W. being upon its two sides only, by Rep., 52. the building of a sidewalk, and not Time. A general ordinance pro- an improvement of the street in its vided that the council may "at any entire width, did not constitute time hereafter," direct, by reso- two improvements." lution, street guttering. It took ef- ssMendenhall v. Clugish, 84 feet August 17th. On August 9th Ind., 94. and 14th, resolutions were adopted 84 Beach v. People, 157 111., 659 ; authorising a street to be guttered. 41 N. E. Rep., 1117. The resolutions were sustained, the §538] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 84-5 receive the vote designated®*' (sometimes to be taken by word "hereafter" being construed to refer to the time of the passage of the general ordinance, and not to the date it took effect. Kendig V. Knight, 60 Iowa, 29; 14 N. W. Rep., 78. Time allowed for filing claims. Where no claims are presented, an ordinance passed prior to the ex- piration of the time, is not ren- dered void. Toledo v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 2 Ohio Cir. Dec, 450. Time of introduction and pass- age. Sec. 146 supra. Where steps are taken as re- quired by charter, the council may advertise for bids and contract for paving a street before the formal passage of an ordinance ordering the work to be done. Springfield V. Weaver, 137 Mo., 650; 37 S. W. Rep., 509; 39 S. W. Rep., 276, over- ruling Keane v. Gushing, 15 Mo. App., 96. Contract made before the enact- ment of the necessary ordinance, held void. Paxton v. Bogardus, 201 111., 628; 66 N. E. Rep., 853. Passed at special meeting. See section 110 supra. Smith v. To- bener, 32 Mo. App., 601; Dollar Sav. Bank v. Ridge, 62 Mo. App., 324; Aurora Water Co. v. Aurora, 129 Mo., 540; 31 S. W. Rep., 946. 89 Trenton v. Coyle, 107 Mo., 193; 17 S. W. Rep., 643; Saxton v. St. Joseph, 60 Mo., 153; Stewart v. Clinton, 79 Mo., 603; Werth v. Springfield, 78 Mo., 107; State ex rel. v.. Barlow, 48 Mo., 17; State ex rel. V. St. Louis, 56 Mo., 277; Perk- inson v. Partridge, 3 Mo. App., 60. Reference to and report by com- mittee. § 148 supra. Failure to refer to committee of council and report, invalidates street improvement proceedings. Worthington v. Covington, 6 Ky. Law Rep., 237; Oilman v. Milwau- kee, 61 Wis., 588; 21 N. W. Rep., 640. All steps to be observed. Mur- phy V. Louisville, 9 Bush. (Ky.), 189. Reading on different days. Sec. 119 supra. Improvement ordinance held to be of a permanent nature, within the meaning of a charter requiring reading on three different days. Campbell v. Cincinnati, 49 Ohio St., 463; 31 N. E. Rep., 606; Tyler V. Columbus, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep., 224. Reconsideeation, held valid in Hough V. Bridgeport, 57 Conn., 290; 18 Atl. Rep., 102. See Sections 121 and 122 supra. Vote on several at one time. Cin- cinnati V. Anderson, 52 Ohio St., 600; 43 N. W. Rep., 1040; Bode v. Cincinnati, 9 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep., 382; 6 Ohio Cir. Dec, 131; Wright V. Forrestal, 65 Wis., 341; 27 N. W. Rep., 52. Two propositions; separate vote. State V. Armstrong, 54 Minn., 457; 56 N. W. Rep., 97. Minor Irregularities. Parker v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 146 111., 158; 34 N. B. Rep., 473; Pick- ford V. Lynn, 98 Mass., 491; Cor- nell V. New Bedford, 138 Mass., 588; Simpson v. McGonegal, 52 Mo. App., 540; Astor v. New York, 62 N. Y., 567. 90 § 106 supra. California — Charter San Fran- cisco, Art. VI, ch. 2, § 2; Statutes and Amend, to Codes of Cal. (1899), p. 293. Indiana — McEneney v. Sullivan, 125 Ind., 407; 25 N. E. Rep., 540; Logansport v. Legg, 20 Ind., 315. Kentucky — Covington v. Casey, 3 846 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§539 yeas and nays^^ and so recorded), ^^ signed by the presiding officer,^^'''-' mayor^s and other ofScer,"'* when required, and pub- lished, if so prescribed.'''' The record of the proceedings should be kept properly and show that all mandatory and jurisdic- tional steps have been taken.^* § 539. Recital of authority to pass. The provisions of the charter authorizing- the ordinance need not be recited there- Bush. (66 Ky.), 698; Kaye v. Hall, 13 B. Mon. (52 Ky.), 455. Michigan — Tennant v. Crocker, 85 Mich., 328; 48 N. W. Rep., 577. Pennsylvania — Bradford v. Fox, 171 Pa. St., 343; 33 Atl. Rep., 85. Washington — Buckley v. Taco- ma, 9 Wash., 269; 37 Pac. Rep., 446. Wisconsin — Dieckmann v. She- boygan County, 89 Wis., 571; 62 N. W. Rep., 410. Definite vote required, sec. 106 supra. »i Yeas and Nays. Sections 117 and 118 supra. Directory. Wiggin v. New York, 9 Paige (N. Y.), 16; Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 9. 02 Sec. 127 supra. 92% Sec. 99 supra. Creighton v. Manson, 27 Cal., 613; Thompson v. Hoge, 30 Cal.. 179. 93 Sections 100, 101, 149 supra. Ordinance, to be signed by may- or. Doty V. Lyman, 166 Mass., 318; 44 N. E. Rep., 337; Saxton v. Beach, 50 Mo., 488; Irvin v. De- vors, 65 Mo., 625, 627. Resolution to be signed by may- or. Kinsella v. Auburn, 54 Hun. (N. Y.), 634; 7 N. Y. Supp., 317. Ordinance need not be signed by mayor. Martindale v. Palmer, 52 Ind., 411. Resolution need not be approved by mayor. Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal., 241; Hendrick v. Crowley, 31 Cal., 471 ; Beaudry v. Valdez, 32 Cal., 269; McDonald v. Dodge, 97 Cal., 112; 31 Pac. Rep., 909; Clark V. Jennings (Cal. 1893), 32 Pac. Rep., 1049 ; Hall v. Racine, 81 Wis., 72; 50 N. W. Rep., 1094. Order for street improvement need not be signed by mayor. State V. Armstrong, 54 Minn., 457; 56 N. W. Rep., 97. 94 Clerk to Sign resolutions for improvement; held printed signa- ture sufficient. Williams v. Mc- Donald, 58 Cal., 527. 95 Section 155 et seq., supra. 96REC0KDS; manner of keeping; sufficiency ; evidence amendment, etc. Section 124 et seq., supra. Indiana — New Albany v. Endres, 143 Ind., 192; 42 N. E. Rep., 683. Kentucky — Lexington v. Head- ley, 5 Bush. (8 Ky.), 508; Nevin v. Roach, 86 Ky., 492; 5 S. W. Rep., 546. Massachusetts — Leominster v. Conant, 139 Mass., 384; 2 N. E. Rep., 690 ; Chase v. Springfield, 119 Mass., 556. New Jersey — Hand v. Elizabeth, 30 N. J. L., 365. New York— In re BufiEalo, 78 N. Y., 362; People v. Whitney's Point, 32 Hun. (N. Y.), 508; In re Schreiber, 53 How Pr. (N. Y.), 359. Pennsylvania — Darlington v. Com., 41 Pa. St., 68. Contingency in Taking Effect. Sec. 36. Supra. Ordinance for construction of water works, to take effect when proposition accepted by popular § 540] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. S47 iii.8' In one ease the ordinance for a special assessment recited for its authority certain statutes which had been repealed. This part was rejected as surplusage, and the ordinance sustained as having been passed in pursuance of any enabling statute in force.^* § 540. Description of the improvement. The cases differ materially respecting the construction of laws relative to the description of the proposed improvement. But this difference is due mainly to the fact that the laws are different. Where it is to be paid for by special assessment or taxation closer ad- herence to charter provisions is usually enforced. The proceed- ings should clearly indicate the nature, extent, cost and method of apportionment that the property owners may know what they will be called upon to pay and the probable benefits to them. Simple justice demands this. Where notice and hearing are provided all these matters may be considered. But not- withstanding, under most charters as they are construed by the courts in view of the constitutional provision of due process of law, etc., the order, resolution or ordinance directing the improvement should contain specific information.'^'-* Thus by statute in Illinois, where the expense of the improvement is collected, in whole or in part, by special assessments upon abut- ting property, the ordinance "must specify the nature, char- acter, locality and description" of the proposed improvement; and, according to the decisions of that state, this must be done with reasonable certaintj^ This provision is mandatory. It is clear, therefore, that an ordinance which does not substan- tially conform to the requirement of the statute in this respect will confer no power on the corporate authorities to make the assessment. 1 Some charters require the ordinance to "specify vote, held void. Thompson v. Sum- Rep., 33; Joyes v. Shadurn, 11 Ky. ner, 9 Wash., 310; 37 Pac, Rep., Law Rep., 892; 13 S. W. Rep., 361. 450. 1 Cass V. People, 166 111., 126; 46 17 Sec. 139 supra. Cape Glrar- N. B. Rep., 729; Otis v. Chicago, deau V. Houck, 129 Mo., 607; 31 S. 161 111., 199; 43 N. E. Rep., 715; W. Rep., 933. Delamater v. Chicago, 158 111., 575; Omission to specify the law un- 42 N. B. Rep., 444; Stanton v. Chi- der which made is not material, cago, 154 111., 23; 39 N. E. Rep., Jones V. Boston, 104 Mass., 461. 987; Gage v. Chicago, 143 111., 157; OS Delamater V. Chicago, 158 111., 32 N. B. Rep., 264; Kimble v. 575; 42 N. E. Rep., 444. Peoria, 140 111., 157; 29 N. E. Rep., 90 Bolton V. Gilleran, 105 Cal., 723 ; Woods v. Chicago, 135 111., 244; 38 Pac. Rep., 881; 45 Am. St. 582; 26 N. E. Rep., 608; Adams 848 OP PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. |J 5-10 the character of the work, its extent, the material to be used, the manner and general regulations under which it shall be executed, the fund out of which it shall be paid * * * and shall be indorsed with the estimate of the cost thereof. " - To comply substantially with such provision, an ordinance provid- ing for the improvement of streets, and as a part thereof for the construction of sidewalks, must prescribe the width of the sidewalks and the material of which they are to be constructed, unless a general ordinance, sufficiently covers these matters, for they cannot be left to the discretion of an officer, as the street commissioner.^ In other words, the extent of the work must be specified in the ordinance, for it is clear that this can- not be delegated to an executive and administrative officer. But where under a particular charter a railroad company is liable for the cost of reconstructing so much of the street as is included between the rails of the company's tracks,* the ordi- nance to improve the street need not specify such liability, since it is fixed by the charter and it will be presumed that the city authorities will observe all legal requirements.^ As the presumption is that the municipal authorities kept within their powers, the ordinance need not recite in express terms that the County V. Quincy, 130 111., 566; 22 111., 18; 43 N. B. Rep., 335; Chi- N. E. Rep., 624; 6 L. R. A., 155; cago v. Habar, 62 III., 283. Pearce v. Hyde Park, 126 111., 287; Insufficient Descriptions. 18 N. E. Rep., 824 ; Jacksonville Ry. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Co. V. Jacksonville, 114 111., 562, Chicago, 144 111., 391; 33 N. E. 564; 2 N. B. Rep., 478; Sterling v. Rep., 602; Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. Gait, 117 111., 11; 7 N. B. Rep., 471; v. Chicago, 144 111., 392; 33 N. E. Lake v. Decatur, 91 111., 596, 600; Rep., 602; Andrews v. Chicago, 57 Andrews v. Chicago, 57 111., 239; III., 239. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Chi- 2 Charter St. Louis, Art. VI., Sec. cago, 56 111., 454; Foss v. Chicago, 15 (Amendment Oct. 22, 1901). 56 111., 354. These must be described with such definiteness and certainty as to furnish data for the intelligent Estimate, map and plan to be at- estimate of the cost of the work. Cached. Reading v. O'Reilly, 169 Kankakee v. Potter, 119 111., 324; ^^- ^^- ^^^- ^2 Atl. Rep., 420. 10 N. B. Rep., 212; Sterling v. Gait, * St. Louis v. St. Louis R. R. Co., 117 111., 11; 7 N. E. Rep., 471; 50 Mo. 94. Levy V. Chicago, 113 111., 650. : Farrar v. St. Louis, 80 Mo., A description of the same exact- 379, 393; Stifel v. McManus, 74 ness as the law will be sufficient. Mo. App., 558; Neenan v. Smith, 60 Harney v. Heller, 47 Cal., 15. Mo., 292; Springfield v. Weaver, Illustrations of sufficient descrip- 137 Mo., 650; 37 S. W. Rep., 509; tions. Chytraus v. Chicago, 160 39 S. W. Rep., 276. 3 Heman Const. Co. v. Loevy, 64 Mo. App., 430, 434. § 641] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 8iii contemplated improvement is within the corporate boundaries.^ § 541. Sufficiency of description in street improvement ordi- nances. The eases respecting the sufficiency of street improve- ment ordinances and resolutions are numerous, but for the most part they are constructions of particular legal provisions; therefore, many general rules are not readily dedueible from them. The judicial view can be best understood by diligent study of the individual cases, especially of those in the home jurisdiction. However, the illustrative cases referred to here- in, in text and notes, may serve as guides to such investigation. The fact that an ordinance for the laying of a brick pavement provides that the brick shall be firmly settled by a roller of a certain weight, or a paving ram, at the engineer's discretion, does not render uncertain the description of the nature of the improvement. "The specification is that the brick shall be firmly settled, and the means by which it is to be done are pointed out, either by a roller or a pavement ram. There is no uncertainty as to the character of the work, but simply as to the manner in which it shall be accomplished. It might be, and doubtless is, true, that particular parts of the pavement could not be rolled, and yet the same purpose — namely, to bring the surface of the pavement to a proper level and firmly settle the brick— be accomplished by the use of the ram."^ An ordinance establishing grades of streets is not void for uncertainty if the grades so established can be ascertained without difficulty.* Thus a paving ordinance which provides that the excavation of the street at the center be a certain number of inches "below eChytraus v. Chicago, 160 111., 180; 40 N. E. Rep., 574; Meadow- 18; 43 N. E. Rep., 335; Andrews v. croft v. People, 154 111., 416; 40 N. People, 158 111., 477; 41 N. E. Rep., E. Rep., 442; Stanton v. Chicago, 1021; Delamater v. Chicago, 158 154 111., 23; 39 N. E. Rep., 987; 111., 575; 42 N. B. Rep., 444; Beach Wheeler v. People, 153 111., 480; 39 V. People, 157 111., 659; 41 N. E. N. E. Rep., 123. Rep., 1117; Chicago v. Silverman, ' Trimble v. Chicago, 168 111., 156 111., 601; 41 N. B. Rep., 162; 567, 569; 48 N. E. Rep., 416. Bliss V. Chicago, 156 111., 584; 41 s Burr v. Newcastle, 49 Ind., 322. N. E. Rep., 160; Ziegler v. People, Establishing grade. Chicago 156 111., 133; 40 N. E. Rep., 607; Terminal R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 184 Young V. People, 155 III., 247; 40 111., 154; 56 N. E. Rep., 410. §528 N. E. Rep., 604; Browning v. Chi- supra. cago, 155 111., 314; 40 N. E. Rep., Grade lines; sufficient indica- 565; West Chicago St. R. R. Co. v. tion of. Carlinville v. McClure, People, 155 111., 299; 40 N. E. Rep., 156 111., 492; 41 N. E. Rep., 169. 599; Wisner v. People, 156 III., 54 850 OP PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§ 541 the established grade," the excavation at the side lines being similarly described but of greater depth, is sufScient in its specification of the grade.^ So an ordinance adopting the grade lines by reference to a map on file (the map when produced not being marked filed) is not void for uncertainty, where the map had been adopted by ordinance and was sufficiently identi- fied by proof.i" In Illinois, a street improvement ordinance which failed to specifiy the height of the curb provided for was held insufficient in description.i^ Words "not less than" used in a paving ordinance in describing measurements and dimensions, as "not less than seven inches of sand," "a finish- ing coat not less than one-half inch thick, ' ' will not render the ordinance void for uncertainty of description.^^ So a street improvement ordinance is not rendered void for vagueness be- cause of the fact that it is necessary to take together the title and the body of the ordinance referring to its title, to ascertain with certainty what street or parts thereof is to be improved. ^^ In one case the paving ordinance did not provide for manholes and catch-basins, to convey from the pavement the surfaice water, dirt, etc. But it was held sufficient, since it appeared that a sewer had already been constructed in the street of ample capacity for this purpose.^* The ordinance may want precision and be not as full and complete as it should be, yet it will not be declared void for uncertainty, if it can be ascer- tained with reasonable accuracy the character and extent of the improvement intended.^ ^ Other illustrations of the sufficiency of street, alley and side- walk improvement ordinances under various laws appear in the note.i® 9 Cramer v. Charleston, 176 111., same efEect Shannon v. Hinsdale, 507, 509; 52 N. B. Rep., 73. 180 111., 202; 54 N. E. Rep., 181; 10 State (Vanatta) v. Morris- distinguishing Mansfield v. People, town, 34 N. J. L., 445. 164 111., 611; 45 N. E. Rep., 976. Ordinance may be aided by maps. i3 Martindale v. Palmer, 52 Ind., State (Boice) v. Plainfield, 38 N. 411, 414. J. L., 95. Title in construction. § 291 11 Cruickshank V. Chicago, 181 supra. 111., 415; 54 N. E. Rep., 997; Hoi- " Vane v. Evanston, 150 111., 616; den V. Chicago, 172 111., 263; 50 N. 37 N. E. Rep., 901. E. Rep., 181. 1= Sheehan v. Gleason, 46 Mo., Examine Mead v. Chicago, 186 100. 111., 54; 57 N. E. Rep., 824. ic Street improvement. State v. 12 Latham v. Wilmette, 168 111., Painfield, 38 N. .1. L., 95. 153, 157; 48 N. E. Rep., 311. To Grading. State v. New Bruns- §542] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 851 § 542. Sufficiency of description in sewer construction ordi- nance. In an Illinois case an ordinance for a sewer which wick, 30 N. J. L., 395; Kearney V. Andrews, 2 Stock (10 N. J. Eq.), 70. Filling street. Mann v. Jersey City, 24 N. J. L., 662. Opening street. Danville v. Mc- Adams, 153 III., 216; 38 N. B. Rep., 632; Newman v. Chicago, 153 111., 469; 38 N. B. Rep., 1053. Opening street through a pond and across a river. Washington Ice Co. V. Chicago, 147 111., 327; 35 N. B. Rep., 378. Extension of street. Pearson v. Chicago, 162 111., 383; 44 N. E. Rep., 739. Widening street. Hays v. Vin- cennes, 82 Ind., 178. Location of street. State (Wood- ruff) V. Orange, 32 N. J. L., 49. Locating improvement. Sargent V. Bvanston, 154 111., 268; 40 N. B. Rep., 440. Description of street to be paved. Rawson v. Chicago, 185 111., 87; 57 N. B. Rep., 35; C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. V. Quincy, 136 111., 563; 29 Am. St. Rep., 334; 27 N. E. Rep., 192. Width of pavement. Harrison Bros. V. Chicago, 163 111., 129; 44 N. B. Rep., 395 ; Woods v. Chicago, 135 111., 582; 26 N. B. Rep., 608; Adams County v. Quincy, 130 111., 566; 22 N. B. Rep., 624; Topliff v. Chicago, 196 111., 215; 63 N. E. Rep., 692. New assessment ordinance to complete improvement need not give detailed description. Hull v. West Chicago Park Com'rs., 185 111., 150; 57 N. E. Rep., 1. The following ordinances relat- ing to street and alley improve- ments held valid under the St. Louis charter, prior to amend- ments of 1901: Adams v. Lindell, 72 Mo., 198; 5 Mo. App., 197, 213; Crone v. Mallinckrodt, 9 Mo. App., 316; Steffen v. Fox, 124 Mo., 630; 28 S. W. Rep., 70; 56 Mo. App., 9; Farrar v. St. Louis, 80 Mo., 379, 382, 383; Skinker v. Heman, 148 Mo., 349; 49 S. W. Rep., 1026; He- man V. Ring, 85 Mo. App., 231; Seaboard Nat. Bank v. Woesten, 147 Mo., 467; 48 S. W. Rep., 939; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Ha- zel, 155 Mo., 391; 56 S. W. Rep., 449, affirming 76 Mo. App., 135; Stifel V. McManus, 74 Mo. App., 558. Sufficient Descbiption. That street will be graded and macadamized from one named- point to another. Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co., 28 Cal., 345. That the crossing of designated streets be planked and that the angular corners thereof be recon- structed. Deady v. Townsend, 57 Cal., 298. Ordering a change of grade by lowering it a few inches, leaving courses, distances and width un- changed, and that property owners interested "curb and pave gutters, and concrete the sidewalks * * " to the established grade." Dur- and V. Ansonia, 57 Conn., 70; 17 Atl. Rep., 283. Width of improvement on inter- secting streets. Shannon v. Hins- dale, 180 111., 202; 54 N. E. Rep., 181. Insufficient Description. Hull V. Chicago, 156 111., 381; 40 N. E. Rep., 937; Merrill v. Abbott, 62 Ind., 549; Smith v. Duncan, 77 Ind., 92; Copcutt v. Yonkers, 83 Hun. (N. Y.), 178; 31 N. Y. Suppl., 659. 853 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§ 5-12 failed to specify the nature, character and location of the man- holes, etc., was held bad.i'' But in another case in the same state, where the ordinance referred to "necessary man-holes" in such manner as to be intelligible to a civil engineer, it was declared good.^^ So an ordinance was held sufficient in de- scription which specified the number of man-holes and catch- basins, their dimensions and constituent material, and pro- vided that they should be located at necessary points on the improvement, without farther specification of location or of the manner of connecting them with the sewer.i^ An ordi- nance for a sewer which gives the internal diameter, etc., need not specify the thickness of vitrified tile pipe, the material for construction, as the description of the material will be under- stood to call for the ordinary and usual vitrified tile pipe of a standard thickness recognized by manufacturers as necessary for a pipe of the internal diameter of the sewer-^** In one case the ordinance provided that a sewer through an alley in a given block be reconstructed and deepened to as great a depth as its connection with another sewer named would admit, the grade of bottom to be as thereafter established by the city sur- veyor, and after fixing its locality, provided that the character of the work should be the same as the then present sewer, and that the material in the old sewer should be used in the new Rule "falsa demonstratio non than 25 feet, where it appears that nocet," applied. State fWoodruff) the property is assessed by its V. Orange, 32 N. J. L., 49. correct description. Walker v. Chi- SiDBWALKS. Chariton v. Halli- cage, 202 111., 531; 67 N. E. Rep., day, ^0 Iowa, 391; 14 N. W. Rep., 639. 775; Frankfort v. Murray, 99 Ky., Manholes, location. Cochran v. 422; 36 S. W. Rep., 180; Browne v. Park Ridge, 138 111., 295; 27 N. E. Boston, 166 Mass., 229; 44 N. E. Rep., 939; Barber v. Chicago, 152 Rep., 127. 111., 37; 38 N. E. Rep., 253; St. 17 Ogden v. Lake View, 121 111., Joseph v. Owen, 110 Mo., 445; 19 422; 13 N. E. Rep., 159. S. W. Rep., 713. 18 Springfield v. Mathus, 124 111., Catch basins, location. Rich v. 88; 16 N. E. Rep., 92. Location of Chicago, 152 111., 18; 38 N. E. Rep., need not be specified. Springfield 255; Hinsdale v. Shannon, 182 111., V. Sale, 127 111., 359; 20 N. E. Rep., 312; 55 N. E. Rep., 327. 86. Connection. Pearce v. Hyde 19 Walker v. Chicago, 202 111., Park, 126 111., 287; 18 N. E. Rep., 531; 67 N. E. Rep., 369. 824. A provision for house connection 20 Hynes v. Chicago, 175 111., 56; slants every 25 feet, held valid, 51 N. E. Rep., 705. even though the lots are wider §543] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 8S as far as possible. It was held void.^^ Other illustrations wi appear from the cases in the notes.^^ § 543. Same— Joint district sewer. A sewer created by o: dinance uniting more than one district and providing a mai outlet or intercepting sewer for the joint benefit of such dii tricts, to be paid for by special taxes assessed upon all pro] erty in a joint sewer district, was held in Missouri, to be a joir district sewer, within the meaning of the amended charter c St. Louis, which defines a joint district sewer to be a sewf constructed or acquired under the authority of ordinance uniting one or more districts or unorganized territory, for ti purpose of providing main outlet or intercepting sewers for th joint benefit of such districts or territory, to be paid for b 21 Kankakee v. Potter, 119 111., 324; 10 N. E. Rep., 212; Hyde Park V. Spencer, 118 111., 446; 8 N. E. Rep., 846. 22 Duane v. CMcago, 198 111., 471; 64 N. E. Rep., 1033 ; Brickerdike v. Chicago, 185 111., 280; 56 N. E. Rep., 1096. Material. St. Joseph v. Landis, 54 Mo. App., 315. Size of sewer; failure to epecify, held not to destroy jurisdiction, under Indiana law. Rickcords v. Hammond, 67 Fed. Rep., 380. Sewer, depth to be specified. Alton V. Middleton's Heirs, 158 111., 442; 41 N. B. Rep., 926; St. Louis V. Oeters, 36 Mo., 456. Description of curves. Hyde Park V. Borden, 94 111., 26. Sewer, location. Stanton v. Chi- cago, 154 111., 23; 39 N. B. Rep., 987; Bennett v. New Bedford, 110 Mass., 433. Location and length. Pearce v. Hyde Park, 126 111., 287; 18 N. E. Rep., 824. Extending sewer. Com. v. Ab- bott, 160 Mass., 282; 35 N. E. Rep., 782. Provision that sewage be dis- charged into a river does not ren- der assessment void. Walker v. Aurora, 140 111., 402; 29 N. B. Rei 741. Sewer district. State ex rel. St. Louis, 56 Mo., 277. Description of fire hydrant crosses, tees and supply-pipes i "City of Chicago standard," hel insufficient, in absence of proo Washburn v. Chicago, 202 111., 21C 66 N. B. Rep., 1033. Ordinance need not provide fc obtaining outlet on private pro] erty. Payne v. Springfield, 161 111 285; 44 N. B. Rep., 105. Outlet for sewer indispensabli South Highland Land & Imp. C( V. Kansas City, 172 Mo., 523; 72 J W. Rep., 944. Single ring of sewer brick lai edgewise, held sufficient. Peters ^ Chicago, 192 111., 437; 61 N. I Rep., 438. Providing for connection of se-w er not constructed, held did not ii validate. Ryder Estate v. Altoi 175 111., 94; 51 N. B. Rep., 821. Culvert, dimensions of need no be prescribed. Young v. Kansa City, 27 Mo. App., 101. Drain; location. Steele v. Rive Forest, 141 111., 302; 30 N. E. Rep 1034. Box drain. Hyde Park v. Cai 854 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§544 special taxes assessed against all property in said joint sewer district. And such sewer is none the less a joint district sewer because the purpose of its construction is to supplement an inadequate sewer, which, under the charter prior to its amend- ment, was a public ^ewer constructed out of public revenues.^^ § 544. Specification of material. Under a charter requiring the ordinance to specify the "material to be used" in the im- provement, a recital to be "paved with Trinidad sheet asphal- tum, according to specifications in office of city engineer," in a street paving ordinance, was held sufficient.^* An ordinance requiring the pavement to be what is known as the "Bloom- ington brick pavement, ' ' and the foundation thereof to be laid of cinders, sand, gravel or "other material equally suitable," at least six inches deep, etc., was sustained against the con- tention that it was uncertain in description of the material to be used for the brick to rest upon. The words "or other material" were treated as surplusage.^^ ton, 132 III., 100; 23 N. B. Rep.. 590. 23 Prior V. Buehler & Cooney Construction Co., 170 Mo., 439, 448; 71 S. W. Rep., 205, per Marshall, J. Joint district sewer under Kan- sas City charter; authorized the grouping of 105 sewer districts, embracing one-fourth the area of the city into a joint district sewer to he paid for hy special taxation. The terms "public," "joint dis- trict" and "private" sewer as em- ployed in charter defined and ex- plained. South Highland Land & Imp. Co. V. Kansas City, 172 Mo., 523; 72 S. W. Rep., 944. 24 Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. Ullman, 137 Mo., 543, 571; 38 S. W. Rep., 458, citing Sheehan v. Glee- son, 46 Mo., 100 ; Moran v. Lindell, 52 Mo., 229; Carlin v. Cavender, 56 Mo., 286. Description of material for pave- ment. Becker v. Washington, 94 Mo., 375; 7 S. W. Rep., 291; Morley T. Weakley, 86 Mo., 451; Verdin v. St. Louis, 131 Mo., 26; 27 .S. W. Rep., 447. Brick to be used. Chicago v. Singer, 202 111., 75; 66 N. E. Rep., 874. "Wooden block." Rogers v. St, Paul, 22 Minn., 494. "Stone." Shannon v. Hiiisdale, 180 111., 202; 54 N. E.,Rep., 181. "Asphalt." Redersheimer ' v. Flower, 52 La. Ann.,, 2089; 28 So. Rep.; 299. 25 Jacksonville Ry. Co. v. Jack- sonville, 114 111., 562, 566; 2 N. E. Rep., 478. Change of material, held not fa- tal. Barber Asphalt P. Co. v. Gaar, 24 Ky. Law Rep., 2227; 73 S. W. Rep., 1106. Under an ordinance requiring the order published to "specify briefly but plainly, the kind of Im- provement ordered," the material need not be described. Main v. Ft. Smith, 49 Ark., 480; 5 S. W. Rep., 801. Ordinance need not name ma- terial. Bacon v. Savannah, 86 Ga., 301; 12 S. E. Rep., 580. 546] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 855 § 545. Description by reference to documents, maps, plans, specifications, etc., on file, or in official custody, has received judicial indorsement. Such reference, however, should be con- fined to mere details. The ordinance or resolution itself should contain a substantial description of everything relating to the proposed improvement required by charter.^^ In Illinois it has been decided that the nature, character and locality of the im- provement may be stated by reference to a former ordinance which fully states these matters.^'' § 546. Matters of detail need not be specified in the improve- ment ordinance,^* especially where these are provided for by general ordinance. ^^ "It is not to be expected that an ordi- nance of this kind," remarked the Supreme Court of Illinois, Co. V. Ullman, 137 Mo., 543, 571; 38 S. W. Rep., 458; Becker v. Wash- Sidewalk, material to be pre- scribed. Lowell V. Wheelock, 11 Cush. (65 Mass.), 391. 28 California — Stockton v. Skin- ner, 53 Cal., 85. Illinois — Brewster v. Peru, 180 111., 124; 54 N. B. Rep., 233; Alton V. Middleton's Heirs, 158 111., 442; 41 N. E. Rep., 926; Cunningham v. Peoria, 157 111., 499; 41 N. B. Rep., 1014; Carlinville v. McClure, 156 111., 492; 41 N. E. Rep., 169; Gallon V. Jacksonville, 147 111., 113; 35 N. E. Rep., 223; Steele v. River For- est, 141 111., 302; 30 N. E. Rep., 1034; Pearce v. Hyde Park, 126 111., 287; 18 N. B. Rep., 824; Sterl- ing V. Gait, 117 111., 11; 7 N. B. Rep,. 471; Jacksonville R. Co. v. Jacksonville, 114 111., 560; 2 N. E. Rep., 478; Lake v. Decatur, 91 111., 596; Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 56 111., 454; Foss v. Chi- cago, 56 111., 354. Kentucky — Barber Asphalt P. Co. V. Gaar, 24 Ky. Law Rep., 2227; 73 S. W. Rep., 1106. Maryland — Burk v. Baltimore, 77 Md., 469; 26 Atl. Rep., 868. Massachusetts — Stone v. Cam- bridge, 6 Cush. (60 Mass.), 270. Michigan — Boehme v. Monroe, 106 Mich.> 401; 64 N. W. Rep., 204. Missouri — Barber Asphalt Pav. ington, 94 Mo., 375; 7 S. W. Rep., 29L 27 MoManus v. People ex rel, 183 111., 391, 393; 55 N. E. Rep., 886; West Chicago Park Com'rs v. Far- ber, 171 111., 146; 49 N. E. Rep., 429; Ogden v. Lake View, 121 111., 422; 13 N. B. Rep., 159; Shannon V. Hinsdale, 180 111., 202; 54 N. E. Rep., 181. Material for sidewalk may be described by reference to certain section of a general ordinance. Gallagher v. Smith, 55 Mo. App., 116. By reference to other sewers, etc., as to material and manner of construction. Pearce v. Hyde Park, 126 111., 287; 18 N. B. Rep., 824. Reference to public building, to locate improvement. Ewart v. Western Springs, 180 111., 318; 54 N. B. Rep., 478. 28 Haughawout v. Hubbard, 131 Cal., 675; 63 Pac, Rep., 1078; St. Joseph to use Gibson v. Owen, 11() Mo., 445; 19 S. W. Rep., 713; Beck- er V. Washington, 94 Mo., 375; 7 S, W. Rep., 291. 29 St. Joseph to use, etc., v. Lan- dis, 54 Mo. App., 315. 856 OP PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§ 548 "should set forth the details and all the particulars of the work. Indeed, this is not contemplated and the statute re- quires nothing of the kind. A substantial compliance with its provisions is all that is required. ' ' *" § 547. Ordinance must provide method of payment. As the ordinance is the foundation upon which all subsequent pro- ceedings are based, it has been determined in Illinois that the method of paying for the improvement must be provided there- in; whether by special assessment, special taxation or general taxation, or out of the municipal revenue. The mode so pre- scribed is exclusive.^^ § 548. Sufficiency of ordinance relating to payments in in- stallments. Many charters provide for the payment of the cost of certain improvements by special assessment or taxation in installments. The usual requirement is that the ordinance di- recting the improvement shall prescribe the number of pay- ments, within the restrictions of the charter.32 The Illinois statute provides that special assessments may be divided into not more than seven installments, the first to include all frac- tional amounts, leaving the others equal in amount and mul- tiples of $100. In that state an ordinance which divided the assessments into seven installments, the first including 20 per cent of the assessment, together with all fractional amounts, 30 Kankakee v. Potter, 119 111., the ciy officers under it. It is not 324; 10 N. E. Rep., 212, approved every irregularity or omission that and quoted in Delamater v. Chica- goes to the substance of a pro- go, 158 111., 575, 578; 42 N. E. Rep., ceeding," per Bliss, J., in Sheehan 444. V. Gleeson, 46 Mo., 100, 104. "It would be difficult for ordi- General direction as to plan of nances to specify every particular work, held sufficient. Taber v. of a work; but they must be more Graf miller, 109 Ind., 206; 9 N. E. or less general, and must take Rep., 721; Connersville v. Merrill, many things for granted in the his- 14 Ind. App., 303; 42 N. E. Rep., tory, geography and topography of 1112. the place, and in the arts called si Dolese v. McDougall, 78 111. into requisition by the iniprove- App., 629, 643; Hyde Park v. ments ordered. * * * An ordinance Thatcher, 13 111. App., 613, 616. may lack desirable precision, and 32 st. Louis Charter, Art. VI., still may so provide for the manner Sec. 25 (Amendment, October, in which an improvement shall be 1901) ; Annotated Amended Char- made, and be such a compliance ter of St. Louis, p. 359. with the law, although a loose one. Drainage assessments. Gray v. that the courts would not be au- Cicero, 177 111., 459; 53 "N. E. Rep., thorlzed to invalidate the action of 91. § 550] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 857 leaving the others equal in amount and multiples of $100, was sustained; the court ruling that the statute did not limit the first installment to one-seventh of the whole assessment plus the fractional amount.^* So the failure of the ordinance to make the first installment include all fractional amounts does not render it void.^* So the fact that the ordinance provides that the first installment of 20 per centum shall be paid upon the confirmation of the assessment and 20 per centum of the total each year thereafter does not render it void for uncertainty as to the time of payment of the deferred installments.*^ An or- dinance which provided that "the assessments shall be divided into and collected by installments," in accordance with the statute (specifying it), "and that the amount of the first of said installments shall be 20 per cent of the total of said assess- ment," was pronounced sufficient. The statute provided for the number and time of payment of each installment. "The ordinance, taken with the statute, is certain and specific. ' ' *^ § 549. Sufficiency respecting basis of apportionment of tax. An ordinance providing that a certain street shall be paved a designated distance on each side of the center between specified points constituting the termini, and that the improvement be paid for by special taxation upon contiguous property, except at street crossings and opposite property owned by the city, was held in Illinois to sufficiently show that the tax is to be apportioned on the basis of frontage. *''' § 550. Improvement ordinance must be reasonable. The rule elsewhere announced and explained that all ordinances must be reasonable,^* is often applied in testing the validity of im- 33 Latham v. Wilmettej 168 111., Farther respecting the ordi- 153; 48 N. E. Rep., 311. nance providing for payment by 3-4 Delamater v. Chicago, 158 111., installments under the Illinois 575; 42 N. E. Rep., 444. statute, see Hinsdale v. Shannon, 3s Davis V. Litchfield, 155 111., 182 111., 312; 55 N. B. Rep., 327 384; 40 N. E. Rep., 354. Danforth v. Hinsdale, 177 111., 579 se Andrews v. People ex rel, 164 52 N. E. Rep., 877. 111., 581, 584; 45 N. B. Rep., 965. 3? Cramer v. Charleston, 176 111., Division of assessment into in- 507; 52 N. E. Rep., 73. stallments not in accordance with Method of apportionment of the requirements of the law, held special tax. Gleason v. Barnett, no ground for refusing judgment 20 Ky. Law Rep., 1694; 50 S. W. of sale if the objector is not Rep., 67. thereby prejudiced. Walker v. Chi- Examine Ryder Estate v. Alton, cago, 202 111., 531; 67 N. E. Rep., 175 111., 94; 51 N. B. Rep., 821. 369. 3s Chapter VI. 858 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§ 550 provement ordinances.^* Considering all the circumstances, courts having the authority to determine whether a particular power has been reasonably exercised, may declare improvement ordinances void for unreasonableness, notwithstanding the broad discretion usually conceded to be vested in the municipal authorities. This judicial power is most frequently invoked in proceedings for improvements by special assessment or taxa- tion in eases where, in the opinion of the court, unjust discrim- ination has been exercised ; or positive legal provisions have been violated, as where the method of laying the tax as prescribed is not observed ; or where improvements are ordered without necessity or reason whatever, as in a sparsely settled and unin- habited section, or directing the tearing up of a good sidewalk or pavement and replacing it with an expensive one, according to the caprice or whim of municipal oiHcers or to favor some contractor; or exercising the power in such arbitrary and un- reasonable manner as to constitute extortion, confiscation or the taking of private property without just compensation or due process of law.*" "A local assessment may so transcend the limits of equality and reason that its exaction would cease to be a tax, or contribution to a common burden, and become extortion and confiscation. In that case it would be the duty of the court to^protect the citizen from robbery under color of a better name. ' ' *i The reasonableness of an ordinance providing for a system of sewerage is to be determined on a consideration of the situation and condition of the entire territory to be reached by the sys- tem, and not merely that part of the property of persons ob- jecting.*2 An ordinance intending to change the grade of a street so as to carry the way over an intesecting railroad by means of a bridge and approaches, contained a clause vacating a part of the street on which the approach is to rest, and, there- fore, it thereby defeats its main object and is unreasonable. Vacating the part of the street upon which the approach to the 39 Morse v. Westport, 136 Mo., 4 Atl. Rep., 511; Wistar v. Phila- 276; 37 S. W. Rep., 932; Field v. delphia, 80 Pa. St., 505; Norwood Barber Asphalt Pav. Co., 117 Fed. v. Baker, 172 U. S., 269; 74 Fed. Rep., 925. Rep., 997. *o Hawes y. Chicago, 158 111., *i Per Redfleld, J., in Allen v. 653, 657; 42 N. E. Rep., 373; Cor- Drew, 44 Vt., 174, 188. rigan v. Gage, 68 Mo., 541; Wistar *2 Washburn v. Chicago, 198 III., V. Philadelphia, HI Pa. St., 604; 506; 64 N. E. Rep., 1064. § 551] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 859 bridge is to rest surrenders all the public rights therein and deprives the public of the right to use this approach, and thus destroys the public utility of the entire structure.*^ A provision in a paving ordinance requiring bidders to submit specimen brick which must withstand specified ' ' absorption ' ' and ' ' abra- sion" tests by the board of local improvements, and providing for rejection of all specimens not sustaining the test, does not render the ordinance void. The requirement is not an unrea- sonable restraint upon competitive bidding.** §551. Certainty — Validity. The improvement ordinance must be precise, definite and certain.*^ It must be full and complete.*® Uncertainty in essential parts will render such parts void.*'^ But a recital in the ordinance that the proceed- ings are to be as provided in a particular la^v, so far as appli- cable, has been held in Maryland not to render the ordinance uncertain or inconsistent.** It is within the province of the court to determine the va- lidity of the improvement ordinance.** The legal presumption will be indulged that the ordinance is valid,^** but this may be rebutted.^^ Void parts will not affect valid parts, provided the latter are not dependent upon and are separable from the lat- ter. This general rule, defined and illustrated in a former chap- ter,s2 iia^ often been applied in the construction of improve- ment ordinances.^^ In contesting the validity of the ordinance fraud may be shown, but where power to enact the ordinance is undoubted, the single fact that many improvement ordi- *3 Read v. Camden, 54 N. J. L., ignating. Burghard v. Fitch, 24 347, 374; 24 Atl. Rep., 549, re- Ky. Law R,ep., 1983 ; 72 S. W. Rep., versing 53 N. J. L., 322; 21 Atl. 778. Rep., 565. *9 Sec. 275 et seq., supra. "Chicago v. Singer, 202 111., 75; so Rutherford v. Hamilton, 97 66 N. E. Rep., 874. Mo., 543; 11 S. W. Rep., 2^9; St. 45 General rule, Sec. 20, supra. Louis v. Gleason, 15 Mo. App., 25. *6 Title Guarantee, etc. Co. v. si Fruin-Bamhrick Const. Co. v. Chicago, 162 111., 505; 44 N. B. Geist, 37 Mo. App., 509, 514. Rep., 832. " Improvement ordinances not IT Davidson v. Chicago, 178 111., passed in public interest, held 582; 53 N. E. Rep., 367; Lusk v. void. § 39 supro and cases. Chicago, 176 111., 207; 52 N. B. • 52 Sections 295 and 296. swpra. Rep., 54; Hull v. Chicago, 156 111., 53 shannon v. Hinsdale, 180 111., 381; 40 N. E. Rep., 937. 202; 54 N. B. Rep., 181; Chytraus 48Alherger v. Baltimore, 64 Md., v. Chicago, 160 111., 18; 43 N. B. 1; 20 Atl. Rep., 988. Rep., 335; Johnson v. People, 202 Carriageway and sidewalk, des- 111., 306; 66 N. B. Rep., 1081. 860 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§552 nances are enacted about the same time, in view of an impend- ing change in the charter, does not tend to prove fraud.^* While the rule is rigidly enforced that, corporate authorities cannot surrender or barter away public powers,^^ the fact that an ordinance for an outfall sewer provides that the use and benefit of such sewer shall be available to all property owners, obtaining permission to make connection therewith, is not a surrender of the corporation's police powers, for the power remains to regulate the manner of making such connections and to abate any nuisance that might be created thereby.^® § 552. Agreements of citizens and property owners to pay the expense or a part thereof, of improvements, when they were 54 Morse v. Westport, 136 Mo., 276; 37 S. W. Rep., 932. Legislative motives; how far courts will inquire into, see sees. 161 and 162, supra. Statement of members of coun- cil will not afCect validity. Ches- ter V. Eyre, 181 Pa. St., 642; 37 Atl. Rep., 837. See sec. 292, supra. The ordinance must be enacted in good faith, § 19, supra. 55 Sec. 84, supra. 56 Gray v. Cicero, 177 111., 459; 53 N. E. Rep., 91. Validity — Illustrations. Ordinance consisting of separate papers. Keating v. Skiles, 72 Mo., 97. Under the St. Louis charter, the ordinance need not contain a pro- vision for advertisement for bids for the work, as this is sufficiently prescribed in the charter. Bam- brick V. Campbell, 37 Mo. App., 460, 465. Proceedings under an ordinance between date of passage and date it takes effect are void. Heman Const. Co. V. Loevy, 64 Mo. App., 430, 437; Keane v. Cushing, 15 Mo. App., 96 ; but the last case is over- ruled in Springfield v. Weaver, 137 Mo., 650, 668; 37 S. W. Rep., 509; 39 S. W. Rep., 276, which holds that advertising for bids may be made and the contract let for the work, prior to the formal passage of the ordinance. The work may be subdivided and sublet in parts to different persons, but whenever the construction of a street is provided for by ordi- nance, the entire work must be completed before adjoining prop- erty can be taxed for any of its cost. Heman Const. Co. v. Loevy, 64 Mo. App., 430, 437. "The rea- son is that the property owners might be willing to bear the ex- pense of a completed street, and unwilling to pay for its partial im- provement. In the one case the benefits conferred on the proper- ty might justify the outlay, where- as in the other the improvement might be a decided detriment." He- man Const. Co. V. Loevy, 64 Mo. App., 430, 437. The decisions were made prior to charter amendments of 1901. An ordinance which provides that a city shall do the work and furnish -the materials for making a sewer connection up to within three feet of the building to be connected is yoid as an unreasonable in- vasion of the rights of property, although such work is done under the supervision of the city. Slaughter v. O'Berry, 126 N. C, 181; 35 S. E. Rep., 241; 48 L. R. A., 442. I 553] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 861 under no legal obligation to do so, have been sanctioned by the courts, and held not to be opposed to public policy.^^ Thus a promise made by citizens to pay a part of the expense of open- ing a street, which, under the law, was to be imposed upon the property owners in proportion to benefits, etc., was judicially declared, in New Jersey, not against good public policy, and hence, an ordinance passed to open the street in pursuance of such promise was decided not to be void on this ground.^* § 553. Ordinances restricting competition — Union labor. Charters generally require contracts for public work, particu- larly in the construction and reconstruction of streets, sewers and drains, which is to be paid for by the property owners, to be let to the lowest responsible bidder.^^ Public lettings of public work are exacted on the ground of public policy, to avoid favoritism, extravagance, improvidence and corruption. As aptly declared in a New York case, provisions of this char- acter "should be so administered and construed as fairly and reasonably to accomplish this purpose. ' ' ^^ All competitors are entitled to an equal basis.^^ Laws of this nature are usually held to be mandatory.^^ 57 Ford V. North Des Moines, 80 Iowa, 626; 45 N. W. Rep., 1031; Parks V. Boston, 8 Pick. (25 Mass.), 218; 19 Am. Dec, 322; Crockett v. Boston, 5 Cush. (59 Mass.), 182. 58 State V. Orange, 54 N. J. L., Ill; 22 Ati: Rep., 1004; 14 L. R. A., 62. See cases in opinion pro and con fully discussing question, and note to 14 L. R. A., 62, 63, 64 and cases. 59 Electric Light, etc. Co. v. San Bernardino, 100 Cal., 348; 34 Pac. Rep., 819; Dement v. Rokker, 126 111., 174; 19 N. E. Rep., 33; Sea- board Nat. Bank v.- Woesten, 147 Mo., 467; 48 S. W. Rep., 939; Springfield v. Weaver, 137 Mo., 650; 37 S. W. Rep., 509; 39 S. W. Rep., 276; Gibson v. Owens, 115 Mo., 258; 21 S. W. Rep., 1107; Frame v. Felix, 167 Pa. St., 47; 31 Atl. Rep., 375. •9 Per Earl, J., in People v. Glea- son, 121 N. Y., 631, 634; 25 N. E. Rep., 4, reversing 4 N. Y., Suppl., 383; Dickinson v. Poughkeepsie, 75 N. Y., 65; McDonald v. New York, 68 N. Y., 23; Brady v. New York, 20 N. Y., 312; Lyddy v. Long Island City, 104 N. Y., 218; 10 N. E. Rep., 155; Board of Richmond County V. Ellis, 59 N. Y., 620; Nel- son v. New York, 5 N. Y. Suppl., 688. 61 McQuiddy v. Brannock, 70 Mo. App., 535; Clapton v. Talylor, 49 Mo. App., 117; Keane v. Klaus- man, 21 Mo. App., 485; Brambrick V. Campbell, 37 Mo. App., 460. 62 City Imp Co. v. Broderick, 125 Cal., 139; 57 Pac. Rep., 776; Balti- more V. Keyser, 72 Md., 106; 19 Atl. Rep., 706; Whitney v. Hud- son, 69 Mich., 189; 37 N, W. Rep., 184; Worthington v. Boston, 152 U. S., 695. Discretion in letting contracts. Illinois — Dement v. Rokker, 126 863 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§ 553 In. a recent Tennessee case an ordinance providing that all city printing should bear a union label was held void, because (1) it deprives those not using the label from, pursuing their avocation so far as such public printing is concerned, and hence contravenes the fourteenth amendment of the United' States constitution; (2) it is against public policy; and (3) it restricts competition in violation of the charter.®^ A late Georgia case seems to announce the broad doctrine that all such contracts are void when not executed. In that case it was decided that a municipal corporation, though not required by its charter to let contracts for work to the lowest bidder, and though clothed as to such matters with the broadest discretionary powers, has no authority to adopt an ordinance prescribing that all work of a designated kind shall be given exclusively to persons of a specified class (those authorized to use the union label) ; that such an ordinance is ultra vires and illegal, because it tends to encourage monopoly and defeat competition, and all contracts made in pursuance thereof are void.®* In Illinois, where a board of education restricted the bidding for work on public build- ings so as to exclude nonunion labor, and the cost of the work was thereby much increased it was held that such restriction was invalid.®^ In the same state printing contracts let under an ordinance which excluded the bidding of nonunion labor, were declared void, but it affirmatively appeared that because 111., 174, 189; 19 N. E. Rep., 33; man, 174 U. S., 639; 19 Supr. Ct. Kelly V. Chicago, 62 111., 279, 281. Rep., 839; 45 L. R. A., 410; Jen- Massachusetts — Mayo v. Com'rs nings County v. Verbarg, 63 Ind., of Hampden Co., 141 Mass., 74; 6 107; People v. Stephens, 71 N. Y.,. N. B., Rep., 757. 527, 557. Missouri — Barber A. P. Co. v. «3 Marshall v. Nashville (Tenn. Hezel, 76 Mo. App., 135; Verdin v. 1903), 71 S. W. Rep., 815; 65 Alb. St. Louis, 131 Mo., 26, 162; 33 S. L. J., 102, fully reviewing the W. Rep., 480; 36 S. W. Rep., 52; cases. State ex rel. v. McGrath, 91 Mo., ei Atlanta v. Stein, 111 Ga., 789; 386, 394; 3 S. W. Rep., 846. 36 S. B. Rep., 932; 51 L. R. A., New Jersey — Wilson v. Trenton, 335. 61 N. J. L., 599; 44 L. R. A., 540; «5 Adams v. ' Brenan, 177 111., 40 AtL Rep., 575. 194; 52 N. E. Rep., 314; 42 L. R. Pennsylvania-^-Com. v. Mitchell, A., 718 ; 69 Am. St. Rep., 222. 82 Pa. St., 343; Douglass v. Com., Under a Pennsylvania statute re- 108 Pa. St-., 559; Erie v. Bier, 10 quiring the contract to be awarded Pa. Supr. Ct., 381. "to the lowest responsible bidder," Combination among bidders vit- a like ruling was made. Elliott v. iates contract. McMuUen v. HofC- Pittsburg, 6 Pa. Dist. Rep., 455. § 553] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 863 of the restriction the cost of the work had been increased.®^ The St. Louis Court of Appeals declined to sanction an ordi- nance of the City of St. Louis which required all dressed rock, stone 0?" granite used in connection with public work to be dressed within the limits o£ the State of Missouri.^^ Ordi- nances exist which, in substance, provide that, no contract re- quiring the employment of skilled labor on public work in any of the municipal departments shall be made with any person, firm or corporation unless it is expressly agreed in such con- tract that only union labor shall be employed on such work. In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois all such ordi- nances are void.^® On principle it would seem that, as the primary duty of the public officers is to secure the most advantageous con- tract possible for accomplishing the work under their direc- tion, any regulation which prevents the attainment of this end is invalid. A law demanding competition in the letting of public work is intended unquestionably to secure unre- stricted competition among bidders, and hence, where the effect of an ordinance is to prevent or restrict competition and thus increase the cost of the work it violates manifestly such law and is void, as are all proceedings had thereunder.®^ It may be farther observed that, according to the judicial view so 66 Holden v. Alton, 179 111., 318, dinance requiring contractor to re- 324; 53 N. E. Rep., 556. strict the hours of labor of its em- 67 St. Louis Quarry & C. Co. v. ployees to eight hours per day, Von Versen, 81 Mo. App.; 519. See held not to be unreasonable. "On comments on this case In St. Louis the contrary, it is in accord with Quarry & Const. Co. v. Frost, 90 the law of the state (R. S., Mo., Mo. App., 677, 689. 1899 §8136), with enlightened 68 Fiske V. People, 188 111., 206 ; sentiment, and the trend of mod- 58 N. E. Rep., 985; 52 L. R. A., ern legislation everywhere. That 291. it had no influence whatever on the Contracts in which the public cost of the work is shown by the are interested which tend to pre- fact that in this character of work vent competition are void. Fish- laborers are paid by the hour, and burn V. Chicago, 171 111., 338; 49 stone cutters and pavers by the N. B. Rep., 532; 39 L. R. A., 482; SQuare." St. Louis Quarry & 63 Am. St. Rep., 236; People v. Const. Co. v. Frost, 90 Mo. App., Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 111., 677, 690. As to eight-hour feature, 268; 22 N. B. Rep., 798; 8 L. R. A., see § 495 supra. 497; 17 Am. St. Rep., 319; Foss v. Pbice of Common Labor. Re- Cummings, 149 111., 353; 36 N. K. cently, in Indiana, a legislative act Rep., 553. which required municipal corpora- 69 Mazet v. Pittsburg, 137 P. St., tions to pay for common labor em- 548; 20 Atl. Rep., 693. ployed on public work more than EiGHT-HoTJE Ordinance. An or- its market value, was declared un- 864 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§554= far declared, all such ordinances are void on, the constitu- tional ground of discriminationJ° r § 554. . Ordinances authoming patented and monopolized articles. Under a charter provision requiring contracts for pub- lic work to be let to the lowest responsible bidder, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the city could not contract to lay Nicholson pavement where the right to lay it is patented and owned by a single firm. The court remarked that the conten- tion that there could be no competition in the letting of the contract "seems unanswerable. * * * j^ seems to me, therefore, a conclusion derivable from the very nature of the case, that competition could not be, and was not preserved in the letting of this contract ; and that it was, therefore, beyond the scope and in violation of the spirit of the charter, "''i While this- view has received judicial support,''^^ the tendency of the courts appears to be to adopt the opposite view.^^ constitutional, because (1) It de- prives tax-payers of their privil- eges anc* immunities, (2) of tteir property witlioi:jt due process of law, (3) interferes unreasonably with the right of contract, and (4) is class legislation. Street v. Var- ney Electrical Supply Co. (Ind., 1903), 61 L. R. A., 154; 66 N. E. Rep., 895, approving People ex rel. V. Coler, 166 N. Y., 1; 52 L. R. A., 814; 59 N. B. Rep., 716; Cleve- land V. Clements Const. Co., 67 Ohio St., 197; 59 L. R. A., 775; 65 N. E. Rep., 885, and other like cases, cited in sec. 495, supra, relat- ing to the eight-hour law. ^o Discriminations forbidden, sees. 193, 194, 226, 259, 417, supra. Yick Wo V. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 356; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 1064; 30 L. Ed., 220; Gillespie v. People, 188 111., 176; 58 N. E. Rep., 1007; 80 Am. St. Rep., 176; 52 L. R. A., 283; Cairo v. Feuchter, 159 111., 155; 42 N. E. Rep., 308; Eden v. People, 161 111., 296; 43 N. E. Rep., 1108; 32 L. R. A., 659; 52 Am. St. Rep., 365; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo., 387; 22 S. W. Rep., 350; 21 L. R. A., 789; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y., 389; 17 N. E. Rep., 343; 4 Am. St. Rep., 465; In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y., 98; 50 Am. Rep., 636; Appeal of Durach, 62 P. St., 491, 495. 71 Dean v. Charlton, 23 Wis., 590; 99 Am. Dec, 205. In McCor- mack V. Patchin, 53 Mo., 33, under a like charter provision, a special tax bill for Nicholson pavement was sustained without question. Kilvington v. Superior, 83 Wis., 222; 53 N. W. Rep., 487 restricts somewhat the rule of Dean v. Charlton, supra. Examine Dean v. Borchsenius, 30 Wis., 236, and Mills V. Charlton, 29 Wis., 400; 9 Am. Rep., 578, being construction of statute relating to specified kind of pavement. 72Mulrein v. Kalloch, 61 Cal., 522; Nicolson Pav. Co. v. Painter 35 Cal., 699; Barber A. P. Co. v. Gogreve, 41 La. A^n., 251; 5 So. Rep., 848; Burgess v. Jefferson, 21 La. Ann., 143. "The question is close; but there seems, so far, to be a tendency in the courts to adopt the Wisconsin view." Per Judge Dillon, writing in 1890, 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.), sec. 467. 73 Hobart v. Detroit, 17 Mich., 246; 97 Am. Dec, 185; Harlem Gas §555] OP PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 865 § 555. Ordinances providing for maintenance of street for a term of years. The cost of construction or reconstruction is usually charged to the abutting owners or those owning prop- erty in the benefit or taxing district, and the expense of keep- ing the street in repair to the general municipal revenue. Or- dinances which impose the cost of repairs upon the property, therefore, are void.''* The validity of an ordinance authorizing the letting in one contract the work of construction or recon- struction and maintenance of the street for a definite period oi years will depend upon the provisions of the particular char- Light Co. V. New York, 33 N. Y., 309; People ex rel. Trundy v. Van Nort, 65 Barb. (N. Y.), 331; New- ark V. Bonnell, 57 N. J. L., 424; 51 Am. St. Rep., 609; 31 Atl., Rep., 408; SUsby Mfg. Co. v. Allentown, 153 Pa. St., 319; 26 Atl. Rep., 646. Species of street work covered by letters patent may be required. Barber A. P. Co. v. Hunt, 100 Mo., 22, 28; 13 S. W. Rep., 98; 18 Am. St. Rep., 530. In Verdin v. St. Louis, 131 Mo., 26; 33 S. W. Rep., 480; 36 S. W. Rep., 52, the question is elaborate- ly discussed by Burgess, Barclay and Sherwood, J. J., as to whether the charter of St. Louis prevents from letting a contract for paving with asphalt from the Island of Trinidad, when it appears t-hat one corporation has, by " virtue of a contract with the government of the island, a monopoly of furnish- ing such material. Burgess, J., concludes that. Inasmuch as the charter says that all contracts for street improvements shall be let to the lowest responsible bidder, "it means that no such contract can be let for a patented or monopo- lized article for which there can be no competition or bidding," p. 97 of the opinion. Barclay, J. (p. 102, 103), announces a contrary view, adheres to the ruling in the Hunt case, supra, on the rule of stare decisis. This view is sup- ported by Sherwood, J., and fully discussed at pages 138, 139, 167 et seq., and is the opinion of the court. See Kansas City Transfer Co. v. Hulling, 22 Mo. App., 654, where it is held that the provision of the Kansas City charter as to letting contracts to the "lowest and best bidder," only applies to work done at the expense of the city, and has no relation to work done at the expense of the. adjacent property owners. The court declined "to express an opinion upon the ques- tion as to whether the contract * * * would have been lawful had the requirement of the char- ter applied to such work." 7* Kansas City v. Hanson, 8 Kan. App., 290; 55 Pac. Rep., 513: Feh- ler V. Gosnell, 99 Ky., 380; 35 S. W. Rep., 1125; St. Louis Quarry & Const. Co. V. Frost, 90 Mo. App., 677; Robertson v. Omaha, 55 Neb., 718; 76 N. W. Rep., 442; 44 L. R., 534; People v. Maher, 56 Hun. (N. Y.), 81; 9 N. Y. Suppl., 94; Schen- ectady V. Union College, 66 Hun. (N. Y.), 179; 21 N. Y. Suppl., 147; Boyd V. Milwaukee, 92 Wis., 456; 66 N. W. Rep., 603. 55 866 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§557 terjs Such ordinances have been sustained.'^'' On the other hand, they have been declared void.'^'^ § 556. Validating void improvement ordinances. The gen- eral authority to ratify irregular and void acts ^^ and to vali- date void ordinances by municipal action and the method of doing so are treated elsewhere.''^ It has been decided in Illi- nois that, where the_original ordinance directing a special assessment proves defective and insufficient to support the as- sessment (as a defective description of the work to be done), if not absolutely void, it may be amended or the defect cured by a supplemental ordinance and a re-assessment.®" § 557. Same— Curative power of the legislature. The gen- eral curative power of the legislature over void municipal ordinances, considered in prior sections,*^ has been extended to void improvement ordinances.^^ Irregularities and defects Bush. (Ky.), 515; Gosnell v. Louis- ville, 14 Ky. Law Rep., 719; Latham v. Wilmette, 168 111., 153; 48 N. E. Rep., 311; Allen v. Daven- port, 107 Iowa, 90; 77 N. W. Rep., 532; Osburn v. Lyons, 104 Iowa, 160; 73 N. W. Rep., 650; State (Wilson) V. Trenton, 60 N. J. L., 394; 38 Atl. Rep., 635. T 7 Excelsior Paving Co. v. Leach (Cal. 1893), 34 Pac. Rep., 116; Mc- Allister v. Tacoma, 9 Wash., 272; 37 Pac. Rep., 447, 658. 78 Ratifying Void Acts, sec. 120 supra. 79 Validating Void Oedinancbs, sec. 164, supra. 80 Alton V. Foster, 74 111. App., 511. Amendment of improvement or- dinances, sec. 198, supra. Rbpeal of improvement ordi- nances, sec. 202, supra. Effect of such repeal, sec. 207, supra. 81 Curative Poweb of the Legis- LATUKE, sees 165 to 167, supra. 82 San Francisco v. Certain Real Estate, 42 Cal., 513; State (Boice) v. Plainfleld, 38 N. J. L., 95; State v. Newark, 34 N. J. L., 236; State V. Union, 33 N. J. L;, 350; Bergen 75 Brown v. Jenks, 98 Cal., 10; 32 Pac. Rep., 701; Bullitt v. Selvage, 20 Ky. Law Rep., 599; 47 S. W. Rep., 255; Barber A. P. Co. v. Ull- man, 137 Mo., 543; 38 S. W. Rep., 458; Verdin v. St. Louis, 131 Mo., 26; 33 S..W. Rep., 480; 36 S. W. Rep., 52; Gibson v. Owens, 115.. Mo., 258, 270; 21 S. W. Rep., 1107; Warren v. Barber A. P. Co., 115 Mo., 572; 22 S. W. Rep., 490;' Morse V. Westport, 110 Mo., 502, 509; 19 S. W. Rep., 831; Gilmore v. Utica," 131 N. Y., 26; 29 N. E. Rep., 841; Portland v. Portland Bituminous P. & I. Co., 33 Oregon, 307; 44 L, R. A., 527; 52 Pac. Rep., 28. 78 Seaboard Nat. Bank v. Woes- ten, 147 Mo., 467; 48 S. W. Rep., 939; Barber A. P. Co. v. Hezel, 76 Mo. App., 135, affirmed 155 Mo., 391; 56 S. W. Rep., 449; Barber Asphalt P. Co. V. Gaar, 24 Ky. Law Rep., 2227; 73 S. W. Rep., 1106; Williamsport v. Hughes, 21 Pa. Super. Ct. Rep., 443; State (Wil- son) v. Trenton, 61 N. J. L., 599; 44 L. R. A., 540; 40 Atl. Rep., 575. Guaranty for good work. Coving- ton V. Dressman, 6 Bush. (Ky.), 210; Louisville v. Henderson 5 i557] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 867 in ordinances and the proceedings for public improvements made by a municipality, which render the assessments for the payment of the work void, may be cured and legalized by a subsequent act of the legislature, where the defect, omission or want of compliance with the law is such as the legislature might have dispensed with by a prior statute.^^ If in conse- quence of a defect which consists in some irregularity in the proceedings, or in some oversight in the law itself, a just and equitable claim has failed to be legally imposed, there is no reason why the legislature should not retrospectively supply the oversight or cure the irregularity.^* Thus where property owners have received the benefits of a street improvement, made under a void ordinance, the legislature has power to legalize what it might previously have ordered.*^ And the legislature may under its original power to have authorized the act, ratify an act of a municipal corporation which is ultra vires. Thus in a case where authority conferred upon the com- mission of public works was limited to contracts for regulating and grading an avenue, and did not include the power to con- tract for setting curb and gutter stones, and flagging the V. State, 32 N. J. L., 490; Tift v. Bufealo, 82 N. Y., 204; May v. Holdridge, 23 Wis., 93. S3 Clinton v. Walliker, 98 Iowa, 655; 68 N. W. Rep., 431; Lockhart V. Troy, 48 Ala., 579; Mason v. Spencer, 35 Kan., 512; 11 Pac. Rep., 402; Emporia t. Norton, 13 Kan., 569; O'Hara v. State, 112 N. Y., 146; 19 N. E. Rep., 659. A special assessment invalid for insufficiency of the petition may be cured by act of the legislature. People V. Wilson, 50 Hun., 606; 3 N. Y. Suppl., 326; Nottage v. Port- land, 35 Oregon, 539; 58 Pac. Rep., 883. Where Improvements were made by a board of public works, created by an act of congress, congress had authority and power after the work was completed to pass a cura- tive act and ratify the work that had been done. "It may," the court said, "therefore, cure irreg- ularities and confirm proceedings. which, without the confirmation, would be void, because unauthor- ized, provided such confirmation does not interfere with interven- ing rights." Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U. S., 687. Where the initiatory steps taken by commissioners for the construc- tion of gravel road were invalid, an act of the legislature passed to legalize the action of the commis- sioners and declaring valid the as- sessments and charges for the work was held valid. Johnson v. Board of Comrs. of Wells County, 107 Ind., 15; 8 N. B. Rep., 1. 84 Brevoort v. Detroit, 24 Mich., 322. 85 Donly V. Pittsburg, 147 Pa. St., 348; 30 Am. St. Rep., 738; 23 Atl. Rep., 394; Whitney v. Pittsburgh, 147 Pa. St., 351; 23 Atl. Rep., 395; Mills V. Charleton, 29 Wis., 400 ; Baltimore v. Ulman, 79 Md., 469; 30 Atl. Rep., 43. 868 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§ 557 sidewalks, in holding a curative act of the Jegislatiare valid the court said : ' ' The power of the legislature to ratify a contract entered into by a municipal corporation for a public purpose, which is ultra vires, results from its power to have originally authorized the very contract which was made. Municipal corporations are agencies of the state, through which the sov- ereign power acts in matters of local concern."^® But where the legislature, as in California, cannot exercise the power of assessment for the purpose of improving a street within the limits of an incorporated city, andj therefore, could not originally have levied the assessnient,- it is powerless to validate it by a subsequent act.^'' So the legislature cannot by a curative act validate a defective assessment unless the tax is for a purpose for which the legislature had power in the first instance to authorize the municipality to impose.®® In one case, a town, believing that its charter conferred the power, entered into a contract for street improvements, the cost to be paid by the abutting ovraer. The work was done, and upon the refusal of some of the abutting owners to pay the assess- ments, the court held that the charter did not confer the power to improve its streets at the cost of the abutting owner. The legislature then attempted by a healing act to validate the con- tract and give the town a lien upon the property of the abutting owner, but the act was held void because there was no pre- existing right to require the abutting owner to pay for the improvement, and therefore none could be created by a curative act.®8 So where the legislature under constitutional inhibition against class legislation, is without power to pass a law refer- ring to a special class, a curative act intended to validate all assessments for improvements made in cities of certain classes, within five years preceding the approval of the act, was held void.90 A curative act of the legislature takes effect only from the time of. the passage of the act. Thus an assessment originally 8s Brown v. New York, 63 N. Y., lature providing for paying for 239. work done without proper author- s' People V. Lynch, 51 Cal., 15; ity, held valid. In re Cullen, 53 Schumaker v. Toherman, 56 Cal., Hun. (N. Y.), 534; 6 N. Y. Suppl., 508; Fanning v. Sehammel, 68 625. Cal., 428; 9 Pac. Rep., 427. 89 Bellevue v. Peacock, 89 Ky., 88 Dill V. Roberts, 30 Wis., 178; 495; 12 S. W. Rep., 1042; 25 Am! Shattuck V. Smith, 6 N. D., 56; 69 St. Rep., 552. N. W. Rep., 5. An act of the legis- s") Reading v. Savage, 120 Pa. St., §558] OP PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 86S void for want of publication of the resolution or ordinance authorizing the work, was held to be validated by a sUbsequenI act of the legislature, but that it became valid only from the time of the passage of the act, and that a sale before the act oi the legislature passed, made when no valid assessment existed, was void and was not rendered valid by the act.^^ § 558. Construction of improvement ordinances. Ordi- nances relating to public improvements to be paid for by special assessment or taxation are to be construed in favor oi the property owner.®^ An ordinance reciting that the im- provement is to be made in accordance with a named law will be construed to mean the law as amended.®^ An ordinance providing that the culvert is to be constructed of "sewer brick," with a block of masonry at each end, means masonry composed of sewer brick and not other material.^* A paving 198; 13 Atl. Rep., 919; Meadville V. Dickson, 129 Pa. St., 1; 18 Atl. Rep., 513; Kimball v. Rosendale, 42 Wis., 407. It has been held that where an assessment has been de- clared void by the supreme court of the state, the legislature cannot legalize it by a subsequent act. As where an assessment against the abutting property owners was held void, for failure to observe a pro- vision of an act which requires that the mayor and city council should first deteripine that the im- provement was "consistent with the public good." Baltimore v. Porter, 18 Md., 284, 300. It was held that an act of the legislature passed after the decision to author- ize the city authorities to proceed and collect the assessments was void, it being an assumption of ju- dicial power by the legislature. Baltimore v. Horn, 26 Md., 194, 206. An assessment of water rates upon lots without giving to the owners or occupants an opportun- ity for a hearing, is repugnant to the constitution and a curative act of the legislature cannot make valid an act that is void because unconstitutional. In re Trustees oi Union College, 129 N. Y., 308; 29 N. E. Rep., 460, reversing 55 Hun, 605; 7 N. Y. Suppl., 866. Where an act provided that no assessmeni "for any local improvement oi other public work shall be vacated for any irregularity save In case of fraud," it was held that the opening or enlarging a street was within the meaning of the pro- vision, and that it applied as well to an assessment for that purpose as to an assessment after a street is actually opened. Astor v. New York, 62 N. Y., 580, to same effect In re Delaware & Hud. Canal Co., 60 Hun. (N. Y.), 204; 14 N. Y, Suppl., 585. 91 Lennon v. N. Y. City, 55 N. Y., 361. 92 Slaughter v. O'Berry, 126 N, C, 181; 35 S. E. Rep., 241; 48 L, R. A., 442; Edgerton v. Goldsboro Water Co., 126 N. C, 93; 35 S. E, Rep., 243. 93 Steele v. River Forest, 141 111., 302; 30 N. E. Rep., 1034. 9* Shannon v. Hinsdale, 180 111., 202; 54 N. E. Rep., 181. 870 OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. [§ 558 ordinance providing that the surface of the concrete base upon which the pavement is to rest shall be parallel with the surface of the finished pavement, means that such base shall be on a level with such surface.^^ Mere clerical errors will not invali- date the ordinance. Thus the word ' ' fall, ' ' used in a drainage ordinance, will be construed to read "rise," where a clerical mistake is manifest.^® In one case the specifications called for granite blocks, ranging from seven to eight inches deep; they were written out in full in the contract for the improvement. The ordinance provided for eight inch blocks. In view of the fact that for two years, under similar ordinances, the plans and specifications had always called for blocks ranging from seven to eight inches deep, the ordinance was sustained, the variance not being regarded fatal.^'^ It has been decided that improve- ment ordinances may be construed in the light of a custom or usage prevailing at the time of their adoption.^* Settled mean- ing of words used among engineers and contractors will be adopted.8^ Where a literal construction renders the execution of an ordinance impracticable, or leads to manifest contradic- tion of its apparent purpose, such interpretation will be re- jected and a construction given which modifies the literal meaning of the words.^ Ordinarily strict compliance with im- provement ordinances is not required.^ Where the ordinance under which public street improvements are made is general in its application, it would be unreasonable to require literal compliance therewith under every exceptional circumstance, as instances might arise where such a rule would work great hardship or injustice upon a contractor or property owner, or 95 Cunningham v. Peoria, 157 111., »8 Cole v. Skrainka, 105 Mc, 303 ; 499; 41 N. E. Rep., 1014. 16 S. W. Rep., 491; 37 Mo. App., 96 Steele v. River Forest, 141 111., 427; Kimball v. Brawner, 47 Mo., 302; 30 N. E. Rep., 1034. 398. CONSTETJCTION OF WOKDS AND USAGE AND CUSTOM, SeC. 72, SU- Teems in ordinances, sec. 294, su- pra. pra. Rules of construction, sec. 289 False Recital in Preamble -will et seq. supra. not render ordinance void. Bohle 99 Levy v. Chicago, 113 111., 650. V. Stannard, 7 Mo. App., 51. i Cole v. Skrainka, 105 Mo., 303; Title in construction, sec. 291, 16 S. W. Rep., 491; 37 Mo. App., supra. 427; Connor v. C. R. I. & P. R. R., 97 Cole V. Skrainka, 105 Mo., 303; 59 Mo., 285, 295. 16 S. W. Rep., 491; 37 Mo. App., 2 Steffen v. Fox, 124 Mc, 630; 28 427. S. W. Rep., 70; 56 Mo. App., 9. § 559] OF PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES. 87 both.* A special ordinance directing the construction of i sidewalk ordered it to be constructed in the manner and of th material named in a certain section of a general ordinanc relating to sidewalks. Here it was held that such section o the general ordinance was thereby made a part of a specia ordinance.* §559. Parol evidence of terms employed in improvemen ordinances has been held admissible. It may be shown that th words and terms used have a well known and settled meaninj in the city among engineers and street contractors.^ Thus th word "filled," employed in a street improvement ordinance may be proved to mean to raise the surface of the street b using clay, earth, sand or other suitable material, free froi animal or vegetable substances, etc.^ The circumstances unde which a custom or usage may be received to. explain the mear ing of words and terms used in improvement ordinances an( contracts are treated elsewhere.'^ asteffen V. Fox, 124 Mo., 630; 28 Hinsdale, 180 111., 202; 54 N. E S. W. Rep., 70; 56 Mo. App., 9. Rep., 181; Hinsdale v. Shannoi 4 Gallagher v. Smith, 55 Mo. 182 111., 312; 55 N. B. Rep., 327 App., 116. See St. Joseph to use Latham v. Wilmette, 168 111., 153 V. Landis, 54 Mo. App., 315; He- 48 N. E. Rep., 311; Danville v. M( man Const. Co. v. Loevy, 64 Mo. Adams, 153 111., 216 ; 38 N. E. Rep App., 430, 434. 632. 5 Kuester v. Chicago, 187 111., 21 ; e Levy v. Chicago, 113 111., 65( 58 N. E. Rep., 307; Shannon v. ' §§ 72 and 73 supra. CHAPTER XVII. OF FRANCHISE ORDINAJSPCES. I 560. Highway defined. 561. Street defined. 562. Sidewalk defined. 563. Alley defined. 564. Distinction Between Rural and Urban Ways — Uses of Streets. 565. "Franchise" as Applied to Grants and Privileges of Municipal Corporations. 566. Same Subject — Franchise Defined. 567. Same Subject. 568. Legislative Control of High- ways and Streets. 569. Municipal Control of Streets. 570. Street Railroad Tracks, Gas and Water Pipes, Poles and Wires as Nuisances. 571. Use of Street Must be Pub- lic. 572. Same — Rights of Abutters. 573. Ordinance Necessary to Grant Right to Use Streets. 574. All Mandatory Require- ments Imposed by Law Must Be Duly Observed. 575. The Grantee— Existence of Corporation. 576. Conditions Imposed on Grantee. § 577. Paving, Repairing, etc., of Streets, by Railway Com- panies. 578. Exclusive ' Privileges and Monopolies. 579. Acceptance of Franchise Or^ dinance. 580. Right to Occupy Streets, etc., as Contract. 581. Change in Location of Water Mains — Injunction to Pre- vent. 582. Police Regulations — Grade Crossings. 583. Power to Regulate Rates or Charges. 584. Same — Under General Power — Estoppel. 585. Reasonableness of Water Rates. 586. Regulating Price of Gas and Light. 587. Regulating Street Car Fares. 588. Reasonableness of Street Car Fares. 589. Discrimination in Street Car Rates Forbidden. 590. Place of Sale of Street Cai' Tickets — Transfers. 591. Duration of Privileges or Franchises to Use Streets, Etc. 592. Forfeiture of Franchise. § 560. Highway defined. As licenses, privileges or fran- chises to use the public ways for purposes other than uses open to all, relate only to such ways and places wherein the public have an easement which is protected by the state or municipal corporation in a trust capacity, some general definitions and descriptions of highways, streets, alleys and sidewalks will be appropriate. All highways are either public or private. A way open to 872 561] OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. 873 all the people is public, and, in law, is termed a highway whether called a road, street, avenue or public square.^ The term highway is the generic name for all kinds of public ways, whether they be carriage ways, bridle ways, foot ways, bridges, turnpike roads, railroads (street or steam), canals, ferries or navigable rivers.^ It therefore follows that a public thorough- fare is a highway. And at common law it is not essential to a highway that it be a thoroughfare ; it may be a cul-de-sac.^ § 561. Street defined. A way over land set apart for public travel in a city, town, \illage or borough is usually designated as a street, whether it be a thoroughfare or not, for a mere cul-de-sac (open at one end only, with no outlet) is a street.* ' ' Street " is a generic term, and includes all urban ways which can be, and are, generally used for the ordinary purposes of travel.^ Street, in a legal sense, usually includes all parts of the way— the roadway, the gutters and the sidewalk.^ But a law which uses the words "bridges, culverts and cross-walks" will be construed to exclude sidewalks, because of the special limitation.'' And the word may be used in such restricted sense so as to include only the roadway.* 1 Blliottr Roads and Streets ( 2nd Ed.), sees. 1, 5, 7; "Woolrych on Ways, p. 3, (4 Law Library); Davis V. Smith, 130 Mass., 113; State V. Proctor, 90 Mo., 334; 2 S. W. Rep., 472. 2 Elliott, Roads and Streets ( 2nd Ed.), sec. 1; Angel on Highways, ch. 1; Sherman and Redfield on Negligence (4th Ed.), 333; 3 Kent's Com., 432; Westfield Borough v. Tioga County, 150 Pa. St., 152; 24 Atl. Rep., 700. 3 Fields V. Colby, 102 Mich., 449 ; 60 N. W. Rep., 1048; Bartlett v. Bangor, 67 Me., 460; People v. Kingman, 24 N. Y., 559. See El- liott, Roads and Streets (2nd Ed.), sec. 2 and cases. Wharves whether terminating highways or not, are not highways, but are private property. The title thereto, whether owned by city or not is proprietary, and not a pub- lic easement. Horn v. People, 26 Mich., 221. * Sheaf e v. People, 87 111., 189; 29 Am. Rep., 49. 5 Elliott on Roads and Streets (2nd Ed.), 23. e Knapp, Stout & Co. v. St. Louis Transfer Co., 126 Mo., 26, 35; 28 S. W. Rep., 627; Denver Board of Public Works v. Hayden, 13 Colo. App., 36; 56 Pac. Rep., 201; Dillon Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.), sec. 280 and note; Elliott, Roads and Streets (2nd Ed.), sees. 17, 20. Street means the whole surface and so much of the depth as is or can be used, not unfairly, for ordinary purposes of a street. 2 Bouv. Law Diet. (Rawle's Ed.), p. 1049. T Detroit v. Putnam, 45 Mich., 263; 7 N. W. Rep., 815. 8 Knapp, Stout & Co. v. St. Louis Transfer Co., 126 Mo., 26, 35; 28 S. W. Rep., 627. Water way, held not a street re- specting right to assess property for improvement. Reed v. Erie, 79 Pa. St., 346. 8T4 OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§563 § 562. Sidewalk deJBmed. That part of the way intended for horsemen and vehicles is commonly designated the street; and that part intended for the use of pedestrians is termed the sidewalk.^ An ordinance granting permission to construct a railway switch track along a particular "street" was held not to restrict the construction of such switch to the street, as distinguished from the sidewalk.^" § 563. Alley defined. A narrow way, less in size than a street, is generally called an alley, but it is obvious that whether the way is or is not to be called an alley depends upon the relation it bears to other ways in the same city, or in the particular part of the city. If the alley is a public one, it is a highway, and, generally, is governed by the rules applicable to streets. The distinction between streets and alleys is some- times important in the construction of statutory, charter and ordinance provisions relating to their improvement, and the liability of the city growing out of their use.^^ "An alley is not a highway, in the proper sense of the term, but is no more than a way subject to a modified supervision, and liable to be used for drainage and other urban services, under municipal regulations, but intended for the convenience of adjacent prop- erty, and not for general travel or passage, like streets."!^ The proper uses of alleys are quite as familiar as those of streets, so that the word alley may be said to have acquired a definite meaning. "Assuming that alleys may, under some circumstances, involve public easements in the nature of ways, 9 Elliott, Roads and Streets (2nd sense denotes that portion of the Ed.), sec. 20; Challiss v. Parker, public highway which is set apart 11 Kan., 384 ; James v. Portage, 48 by dedication, ordinance, or other- Wis., 677, 681. wise for the use of pedestrians. A sidewalk is a part of the Ord v. Nash, 50 Neb., 335, 338; 69 street, and a street is a highway. N. W. Rep., 964. Frankfort v. Coleman, 19 Ind. A sidewalk, held to be included App., 368; 49 N. B. Rep., 474; 65 within the clause "streets and pub- Am. St. Rep., 412. lie grounds," as employed in a 10 Knapp, Stout & Co. v. St. Louis municipal charter, rendering the Transfer Co., 126 Mo., 26; 28 S. W. city liable for damages resulting Rep., 627. from defective condition. GrifEen A sidewalk is a part of the v. Lewiston (Idaho 1898), 55 Pac. street. State v. Mathis, 21 Ind., Rep., 545. 277; State v. Berdetta, 73 Ind., ii- Elliott, Roads and Streets 185, 188. (2nd Ed.), sec. 23. The term "sidewalk" is a com- 12 Paul v. Detroit, 32 Mich., 108, prehensive one, and in its broadest 111. § 564] OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. 875 yet the primary purpose, even then, is not to be substituted for streets, but to serve as means of accommodation to a limited neighborhood for chiefly local convenience."^* The use of the ■word alley, vrhen not qualified by the term private, as, for example, in a lease, is conventionally understood in its relation to cities and towns, to mean a narrow street in common use.^' § 564. Distinction between rural and urban ways— Uses of streets. All streets are highways, although all highways are not streets. It is a well recognized legal principle that many uses may be made of streets which cannot be made of suburban roads. In streets the rights of the public are much greater than in roads of rural districts; therefore the method of regu- lating their construction, improvement, maintenance, repair and use are materially different.!^ A street, aside from its use as a highway for travel in the usual manner, may be used for the accommodation of drains, sewers,^® aqueducts, water and gas pipes,^'^ poles and lines of wires for conveying electricity, rail- road tracks,!* subways,!'* tunnels, and for all other purposes which are reasonably conducive to the general police, sanitary and business interests of the municipal corporation and its in- habitants. ^^ A street may. be used by individuals for the temporary deposit of goods, merchandise and other movables,^! 13 Per Campbell, C. J., in Beech- People ex rel. Elgin, 91 111., 251 ; er V. People, 38 Mich., 289, 291. See Mui'phy v. Chicago, 29 111., 279 ; Bagley v. People, 43 Mich., 355; 5 Moses v. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. N. W. Rep., 415; Campau v. Board R. R. Co., 21 111., 516, 522. of Public Works, 86 Mich., 372; 49 i9 See § 462, supra. N. W. Rep., 39. -2» Cisterns may be dug in "When alley not included in term streets. West v. Bancroft, 32 Vt., "Street," see Face v. Ionia, 90 367; Barter v. Com., 3 Pen. & W. Mich., 104; 51 N. W. Rep., 184. (Pa.), 253, 259; Branson v. Phila., 1* Bailey v. Culver, 12 Mo. App., 47 Pa. St., 329 ; Cincinnati v. Pen- 175, 183. ny, 21 Ohio St. 499. 15 Elliott, Roads & Streets (2Bd The city may take possession of Ed.), § 16; lb. ch. XVIII; Good- an abandoned well originally dug now, Man. Home Rule, 146, 147. in the street by the abutting land 10 Traphagen v. Jersey City, 29 owner, and may maintain a public N. J. Eq., 206; Cincinnati v. Pen- pump therein. No compensation ny, 21 Ohio St., 499. need be paid the original owner. 17 Quincy v. Bull, 106 111., 337, The maintenance of the pump is 349; 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., 554. not a public nuisance. Lostutter State V. Cincinnati Gas L. Co., 18 v. Aurora, 126 Ind„ 436; 26 N. E. Ohio St., 262; Des Moines Gas Co. Rep., 184. v. Des Moines, 44 Iowa, 505. 21 Gerdes v. Iron Foundry Co., 18 Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. 124 Mo., 347; 25 S. W. Rep., 557; 876 OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§565 or for material and scaffolding for building or repair, and other like purposes, but generally only under permit duly granted, and provided such uses do not unreasonably abridge or incom- mode its primary use for public travel.^^ "All parts of the street, from side to side and end to end, are for public use in appropriate and proper methods, and are not for permanent private use."^* A sidewalk may be excavated for a basement or cellar, or vault or coal hole,^* or pierced by an aperture for the admission of light, or overhung by a projection, as a sign^^ or an awning.^^ Another distinction between streets and country highways may be mentioned here incidentally. Generally municipal cor- porations are held liable in damages growing out of injuries resulting from defective highways, whereas no liability attaches to the state, county or township for injuries on suburban high- ways or bridges, unless an action is expressly given by stat- ute.27 §565. "Franchise" as applied to grants and privileges of municipal corporations. The grant of the right or privilege to use the streets and public ways by the municipal corporation for railroad tracks, poles, wires, gas and water pipes, etc., or a use not open to the public generally, is usually a franchise.^* The word "franchise" has various significations, both in Watson V. Robberson Ave. Ry. Co., Chicago, 145 111., 451; 34 N. E. Rep., 69 Mo. App., 548. 426; 36 Am. St. Rep., 496. 22 Gardes v. Iron & Foundry Co., 25 See § 461, supra. 124 Mo., 347; 25 S. W. Rep., 557. 26 Hlsey v. Mexico, 61 Mo. App., 23 Elliott, Roads & Streets ( 2nd 248. See sec. 461 supra. Ed.), § 20; Schopp v. St. Louis, ' 27 Reardon v. St. Louis County, 117 Mo., 131; 22 S. W. Rep., 898; 36 Mo., 555; Swineford v. Franklin Lockwood V. Wabash Ry. Co., 122 County, 73 Mo., 279; Hannon v. Mo., 86; 26 S. W. Rep., 689; Eels St. Louis County, 62 Mo., 313; V. American T. & T. Co., 143 N. Y., Pundman v. St. Charles County, 133; 38 N. E. Rep., 202. 110 Mo., 594; 19 S. W. Rep., 733. 24 An abutting pwner has a right 28 "The rule must be considered to construct a vault and coal hole settled, that no person can acquire in the sidewalk in front of his a right to make a special or excep- premises, provided the sidewalk is tional use of a public highway not left in such a condition as to be common to all of the citizens of reasonably safe for ordinary travel the state except by grant from the and the rights of the public left sovereign power." Reg. v. Long- undisturbed. Gordon v. Peltzer, 56 ton Gas Co., 2 El. & EL, 651; Reg. Mo. App., 599. V. Charlesworth, 16 Q. B., 1012. Vault under alley. Gregsten v. §565] OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. 877 legal and popular sense. The relation in which the term is employed controls its meaning. Speaking generally, a fran- chise is a special privilege of a public nature conferred by governmental authority upon individuals as such, or artificial personalities usually called corporations, and which privilege did not belong to individuals generally as a matter of common right.2® It is a generic term embracing all rights granted to corporations by the legislature of the state, or such right as can only be granted by the state in the first instance, which by delegated authority are conferred by the municipal corpo- ration, or other designated public body, acting in such relation as an agency of the state. The right to conduct a business of public utility and use the streets and public ways for this purpose, as, for example, to supply the public with water, light, transportation and other comforts and conveniences in crowded urban centers, is ordinarily required to be conferred by public authority, and this constitutes the giving of a fran- chise.^" But the privilege of so providing for the municipal corporation and its inhabitants is not, in the strict sense of the term, a "corporate franchise;" that is (as often pointed out), it is not a privilege derived from or obtained by the act of incorporation. Charter rights and privileges of a corporation are such only as are derived by virtue of its organization under legislative enactment. They do not include the right to con- duct the business above mentioned.*^ 29 It is a privilege of a public "The franchise of being a corpo- nature which cannot be exercised ration belongs to the corporators, ■without legislative grant. State while the powers and privileges ex rel. v. Weatherby, 45 Mo., 17, vested in and to be exercised by 20. the corporate body as such, are the 30 Feebt. The right to maintain franchises of the corporation." Per and operate a ferry and collect Mr. Justice Matthews in Memphis tolls is a franchise which can be & Little Rock R. R. Co. v. R. R. granted only by the state directly Comrs., 11'2 U. S., 609, 619. or indirectly. Evans v. Hughes "Corporate franchises in the County, 3 S. Dak., 580; 54 N. W. American states emanate from the Hep., 603. government, or the sovereign pow- 31 Cedar Rapids Water Co. v. er, owe their existence to a grant, Cedar Rapids 117 Iowa, 250; 91 N. or, as at common law, to prescrip- W. Rep., 1081. tion, which presupposes a grant. The franchise of taking tolls is and are vested in individuals or a distinct from the "corporate fran- body politic." Per Scott, J. in Chi- chise." Per Cooley, C. J., in Grand cago City Ry. Co. v. People ex rel. Rapids Bridge Co. v. Prange, 35 73 111., 541, 547. Mich., 400, 405; 24 Am. Rep., 585. 878 OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§566 § 566. Same subject— Franchise defined. Under the early English law, Blackstone defines a franchise as "a royal privi- lege, or branch of the king's prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a subject. "^^ Speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, after quoting this definition, Mr. Justice Bradley observed: "Generalized, and divested of the special form which it assumes under a monarchical government based on feudal traditions, a franchise is a right, privilege or power of public concern, which ought not to be exercised by private individuals at their mere will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and administration, either by the government directly, or by public agents, acting under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose in the public interest, and for the public security. Such rights and powers must exist under every form of society. They are always educed by the laws and customs of the community. Under our system their existence and disposal are under the control of the legislative department of the government, and they cannot be assumed or exercised without legislative author- ity. No private person can establish a public highway, or a public ferry, or railroad, or charge tolls for the use of the same, without authority from the legislature, direct or derived. These are franchises. No private person can take another's property, even for a public use, without such authority ; which is the same as to say, that the right of eminent domain can only be exercised by virtue of a legislative grant. This is a. franchise. No persons can make themselves a body corporate and politic without legislative authority. Corporate capacity is a franchise."^* 32 2 Bl. Com. 37. Earle, 13. Pet. (38 U. S.), 519, 595. In American Law, "francliises As applied to American law, are special privileges conferred by Blackstone's definition "is not government upon individuals, and strictly correct; since our fran- ■which do not belong to the citi- chises spring from contracts be- zens of the country, generally, of tween the sovereign power and pri- common right. It is essential to vate citizens, made upon a valuable the character Of a franchise that it consideration, for purposes of pub- should be a grant from the sever- lie benefit as well as of individual eign authority, and in this country advantage." 4 Thomp. Corp. sec. no franchise can be held which is 5335. not derived from a law of the ss California v. Central Pac. R. state." Per Mr. Chief Justice R. Co., 127 U. S., 1, 40, 41. Taney in Bank of Augusta v. I 567] OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. 879 § 567. Same subject. It has been decided in Illinois that, where a railway company is incorporated by the state, with power to construct, maintain and operate a railway in a city, upon the consent of the city, in such manner and upon such conditions as the city may impose, and the city, by ordinance, grants the privilege of constructing and operating the same upon a specified street, the grant by the city is a mere license, and not a franchise. ' ' The license granted by the ordinaiice is no more a franchise than would be a grant of the right of way by a private citizen to the company to construct its road over his land. "3* But when the right to lay and maintain tracks and operate cars thereon is gran-ted and accepted and all condi- tions imposed incident to the right performed, it ceases to be a mere license and becomes a valid contract.*^ Grants of this nature are often spoken of as licenses on the theory that a Franchise Defined. Arkansas — State v. Real Estate Bank, 5 Ark., 595; 41 Am. Dec, 109. Connecticut — Bridgeport v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., 36 Conn., 255, 266. Illinois — Fietsam v. Hay, 122 III., 293; 13 N. E. Rep., 501; 3 Am. St. Rep., 492; Chicago & Western Ind. R. R. Co. V. Dunbar, 95 111., 571; Chicago Board of Trade v. People ex rel. 91 111., 80. Kansas — State ex rel. v. Western irrigating Co., 40 Kan., 96, 99; 19 Pac. Rep., 349. Massachusetts — Fay, petitioner, 15 Pick. (Mass.), 243. Minnesota — State ex rel. v. Min- nesota Thresher Mfg. Co., 40 Minn., 213, 225; 41 N. W. Rep., 1020. Nebraska — Abbott v. Omaha Smelting, etc. Co., 4 Neb., 416, 420. New Hampshire — Pierce v. Em- ery, 32 N. H., 484, 507. New York — People ex rel. v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. (N. Y.), 358, 387. United States — Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S./359, 365. 4 Thomp. Corp., § 5337; 3 Kent. Com., 458. Si Chicago City Ry. Co. v. People ex rel. 73 111., 541, 548. Grant as a license discussed. People ex rel. v. Suburban R. R. Co., 178 III., 594; 53 N. E. Rep., 349; Quincy v. Bull, 106 111., 337. Compare New Orleans Waterworks Co. V. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., 125 U. S., 18, set out in sec. 233, supra. "The word franchise is frequent- ly applied (or misapplied) so as to designate a mere license given, for example, by a municipal corpora- tion to a street railway company, or a water supply company, to oc- cupy its public streets for their corporate purpose. * * * g^^ it is essential to the legal idea of a franchise that it should be a spe- cial privilege emanating from sov- ereign authority." 7 Thomp. Corp. sec. 8294. 35 Harvey v. Aurora & Geneva Ry. Co., 186 111., 283, 293; 57 N. E. Rep., 857; Belleville v. Citizens Ry. Co., 152 111., 171; 38 N. E. Rep., 584; Chicago Municipal Gas Light Co. V. Lake, 130 111., 42; 22 N. E. Rep., 616. 880 OP FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§568 municipal corporation cannot grant a franchise, but can only grant a license, "yet they are franchises in every essential par- ticular as much as though they had been granted directly by the legislature. ' '^^ The municipal corporation in granting such privileges acts as the agent of the state. In this relation it represents the state's sovereign power.*'' The privilege of laying railroad tracks and maintaining and operating cars thereon for hire is undoubtedly a franchise.** So the right to use the public streets for the purpose of laying gas pipes therein to supply gas for hire is a franchise.*^ In Wisconsin, an or- dinance granting the right to use streets for railway purposes was held to have the force of a statute of the state, and hence, for a violation of the provisions of such ordinance, an action can be maintained to vacate the charter or annul the existence of such corporation.*" § 568. Legislative control of highways and streets. The use of streets is designed for the public at large, as distinguished 36 Thomp. Corp., sec. 5335. 37 United States — Hayes v. Mich. Cent. R. Co., Ill U. S., 228; Trans- portation Co. V. Chicago, 99 U. S., 635, 641; Sioux City St. Ry. v. Sioux City, 138 U. S., 98, 107. Alabama — Mobile v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 84 Ala., 115, 119; 4 So. Rep., 106. Iowa — Des Moines G. Co. v. Des Moines, 44 Iowa, 505; 24 Am. Rep., 756. Missouri — State ex ret v. Bast 5th St. Ry. Co., 140 Mo., 539, 550; 41 S. W. Rep., 955. New York — Kittinger v. Buffalo T. Co., 160 N. Y., 377; 54 N. E. Rep., 1081. Wisconsin — State ex rel. v. Mil- waukee Co. Sup. Ct., 105 Wis., 651, 674; 81 N. W. Rep., 1046. 38 People ex rel. v. Sutter Street R. Co., 117 Cal., 604; 49 Pac. Rep., 736; Denver, etc. R. Co. v. Denver City R. Co., 2 Colo., 673, 682; Mil- hau V. Sharp, 27 N. Y., 611, 618; People V. Kerr, 37 Barb. (N. Y.), 357, 393; Davis v. New York, 14 N. Y., 506. A proceeding to determine the right of a railroad company to use public streets for its tracks does not present a question of fran- chise. Parlin v. Mills, 11 111. App., 396. 39 United States — New Orleans Gas Co. V. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S., 650. Connecticut — Norwich Gas L. Co. V. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn., 19. Kentucky — Newport v. Newport etc. Co., 84 Ky., 166, 176. Massachusetts — Boston v. Rich- ardson, 13 Allen (Mass.), 146, 160. New Jersey — State ( Montgom- ery) V. Trenton, 36 N. J. L., 79; Jersey City Gas Co. v. Dwight, 29 N. J. Eq., 242, 248. Oftio— State v. Cincinnati Gas Co., 18 Ohio St., 262, 291. Right to lay gas pipes in the public streets, was termed a "lO' cal easement," resting only on contract or license. Maybury v. Mutual Gas Light Co., 38 Mich., 154, 156, per Campbell, C. J. *« State ex rel. v. Madison Street Ry. Co., 72 Wis., 612; 40 N. W. Rep., 487. §568] OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. 881 from the legal entity known as the city or municipal corpora- tion. The management of highways may be characterized as municipal duties, relating to government affairs. During the early periods of English history the highways were laid out and constructed directly by the government. The government assumed the immediate and sole management of them, and this was recognized as an essential governmental function.***^ In this country the control of highways is primarily a state duty.*^ They are everywhere maintained for the use of the public at large. "To the commonwealth here, as to the King in Eng- land, belongs the franchise of every highway, as a trustee for the public ; and streets regulated and repaired by the authority of a municipal corporation are as much highways as are rivers, railroads, canals or public roads laid out by authority of the Quarter Sessions. In England a public road is called a King's highway, and although it is not usually called the common- wealth's highway here, it is so in contemplation of law, for it exists only by force of the commonwealth's authority. "*2 In view of state control, municipal corporations cannot, without being expressly authorized, confer the authority to use the public streets and ways for the purpose of transporting gas, electricity, water, etc., or for railroad purposes, or indeed for any purpose other than the ordinary use appertaining to such ways and which are open to all individuals.** General power to regulate and control streets is ordinarily held to be insuffi- cient.** Unless restricted by the state constitution, the legis- *o% Beach, Monopolies & Indus- law, or which is not under public trial Trusts, § 133, p. 412. custody; and unless coming within *i Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S., some constitutional protection, 324; People ex rel. v. Supervisors, there is none that can exist where 112 N. Y., 585; 20 N. B. Rep., 549; the law has provided it shall not Davies v. Saginaw Co., 89 Mich., exist." Per Campbell, J. in Horn 295; 50 N. W. Rep., 862. v. People, 26 Mich., 221, 223; Peo- 42 Per Gibson, C. J. in O'Connor pie v. Ingham, 20 Mich., 95; Peo- v. Pittsburg, 18 Pa. St., 187, 189. pie v. Jones, 6 Mich., 176. "All land highways are such ^s Louisville & Nashville R. Co. solely by municipal law, which v. Mobile, etc. R. R. Co., 124 Ala., may establish, regulate and de- 162; 26 So. Rep., 895; Potter v. stroy them at all times. All pub- Collis, 156 N. Y., 16 ; 50 N. B. Rep., lie easements are subject to extin- 413 ; Beekman v. Third Ave. R. Co. guishment, or control, by legisla- 153 N. Y., 144; 47 N. B. Rep., 277; tive authority. * * * There Detroit Citizens' St. Ry. Co. v. De- can be no highway which is not troit Ry. Co., 171 U. S., 48. made so by common or statute ** Colorado — Denver & S. Ry. Co. 56 883 OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§568 lature may grant the use of the streets and public ways for the purposes above mentioned, whether they have been dedicated by the owner of the fee, established by prescription or acquired in the exercise of the right of eminent domain.*^ V. Denver City Ry. Co., 2 Colo., 673. FZorido— Florida, C. & P. R. Co. V. Ocala St. & S. R. Co., 39 Fla., 306; 22 So. Rep., 692. Illinois — Chicago v. Evans, 24 111., 52. Kentucky — Covington, etc. Ry. V. Covington, 9 Bush. (Ky.), 127. New Yorfc— Potter v. CoUis, 156 N. Y., 16; 50 N. E. Rep., 413. Oregon — Parkhurst v. Capital City R. Co., 23 Oreg., 471; 32 Pac. Rep., 304; 3 Cook, Corp. (4th Ed.), sec. 913. General grant of power to regu- late streets, does not give power to grant to an individual license, by ordinance, to lay a railroad track across the public streets for his own use. State (Montgomery) v. Trenton, 36 N. J. L.r 79; Davis v. New York, 14 N. Y., 506. S. P. Wilson V. Cunningham, 3 Cal., 241. General power, etc., over streets, held broad enough to permit the city to consent to the use of its streets for street railway purposes by any company having the neces- sary franchise. Detroit Citizens' Street Ry. Co. v. Detroit, 64 Fed. Rep., 628; 12 C. C. A., 365; 22 U. S. App., 570. But where lands required for streets have not been acquired in fee, but an easement only has been condemned, the mu- nicipal corporation has no power to appropriate them to the uses of a street railroad company. To au- thorize such use a legislative act is indispensable. Perry v. New Or- leans, etc. R. R. Co., 55 Ala., 413; 28 Am. Rep., 740. Poles and Wikes. City has no implied power to permit erection of poles in streets. Brush Elec. L. Co. V. Jones, etc. Co., 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep., 340. 15 Alabama — Perry v. New Or- leans, etc. R. R. Co., 55 Ala., 413, 418 to 425; 28 Am. Rep., 740. Georgia — Savannah, etc. R. R. v. Savannah, 45 Ga.^ 602. Florida — State v. Jacksonville St. R. R., 29 Fla., 590; 10 So. Rep., 590. Louisiana — N. O. M. & C. R. Co. V. New Orleans, 26 La. Ann., 577. New Jersey — ^AUen v. Jersey City, 53 N. J. L., 522; 22 Atl. Rep., 257. Pennsylvania — Danville H. & W. R. Co. V. Com., 73 Pa. St., 29; Phil- adelphia & T. R. Co.'s Case, 6 Whart. (Pa.), 25; 36 Am. Dec, 202; Green v. Reading, 9 Watts. (Pa.), 382; Henry v. Pittsburgh & A. Bridge Co., 8 Watts & S. (Pa.), 85. In the absence of constitutional restriction the legislative control is paramount, subject to the prop- erty rights and easements of the abutting land owners. Buchan v. Broadwell, 88 Mo., 31, 36; Atl. & Pac. R. R. Co. V. St. Louis, 66 Mo., 228; Perry v. N. O. & C. R. R. Co., 55 Ala., 413, 418-425; 28 Am. Rep., 740; Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U. S., 304; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 617; Backus V. Depot Co., 169 U. S., 557; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 445. Legislature may provide for con- struction of subway for railroad tracks in a city, without city's con- sent, although the act imposes a heavy debt on the city and to an extent deprives it of control of the i569] OP FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. 883 § 569. Municipal control of streets. But paramount legis- lative authority respecting streets and public ways has been, by virtue of constitutions and statutes, delegated to a large extent to municipal corporations. The powers granted to the local corporation to control the streets and their uses, within its limits, are generally very extensive, but the extent must be determined by the state constitution, the charter of the par- ticular public corporation and legislative acts applicable, which operate as a limitation of state control.*® Under the constitu- streets. Prince v. Crocker, 166 Mass., 347; 44 N. E. Rep., 446; 32 L,. R. A., 610. Authority to tunnel streets may be granted by the legislature by implication. Baltimore & P. R. Co. V. Reaney, 42 Md., 117. State may exercise the power di- rectly or devolve it upon city. Har- rison V. N. 0. Pac. Ry. Co., 34 La. Ann., 462; 4^ Am. Rep., 438; Mer- cer V. P. Ft. W. & C. R. Co., 36 Pa. St., 99. Thus the legislature may vacate streets, etc., or authorize the mu- nicipal corporation to do so. Ap- peal of McGee, 114 Pa. St., 470; 8 Atl. Rep., 237. Where streets cannot be closed, etc. Ashby v. Hall, 119 U. S., 526, affirming Parchen v. Ashby, 5 Mont, 68; 1 Pac. Rep., 204. Highways are not private prop- erty of city and hence legislature may transfer their supervision to another governmental agency pro- vided there is no diversion of the use intended. Simon v. Northrup, 27 Oregon, 487; 40 Pac. Rep., 560; 30 L. R. A., 171. The legislature may make grants of franchises to use streets. Peo- ple V. N. Y. & H. R. Co., 45 Barb. (N. Y.), 73; 26 How. Prac, 44. Legislature may transfer control of streets, highways, etc., to park commissioners. People v. Walsh, 96 111., 232; 36 Am. Rep., 135. The legislature may compel a city to reduce the grade of a street and may prescribe the details for letting out the contract, etc. Peo- ple ex rel. v. San Francisco, 36 Cal., 595, 601. *6 Sometimes the right to use streets is conferred by legislative grant, coupled with municipal au- thority. Murphy v. Chicago, 29 111., 279 ; Lexington & Ohio R. R. v. Applegate, 8 Dana (Ky.), 289; Chapman v. Albany & S. R. R., 10 Barb. (N. Y.), 360; Adams v. Sara- toga R. R., 11 Barb. (N. Y.), 414; Williams v. N. Y. Central R. R., 18 Barb. (N. Y.), 222. Vacating Streets, power in city. Glasgow V. St. Louis, 87 Mo., 678. Damages may be recovered from city in vacating street, when, Hein- rich V. St. Louis, 125 Mo., 424; 28 S. W. Rep., 626; 46 Am. St. Rep., 490. Likewise, where city abol- ishes sidewalk or unreasonably narrows it, directly affecting rights of property owner. Naschold v. Westport, 71 Mo. App., 508. The vacating of a street under Charter powers is wholly a question of ex- pediency for the municipal author- ities acting fairly and without fraud. Glasgow v. St. Louis, 107 Mo., 198, 202; 17 S. W. Rep., 743; State V. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17; Spring- field R. Co. V. Springfield, 85 Mo., 674; Atkinson v. Wykoff, 58 Mo. App., 86; Knapp-Stout & Co. v. St. Louis, 156 Mo., 343; 55 S. W. Rep., 104, reviews Missouri cases. 884 OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§569 tions of some states the power which the state primarily had over all highways, including urban ways, within its bounda- ries, has been transferred to its municipal corporations,*'' and in such case the legislature has no power to authorize the con- struction, operation or transfer of any street railway wholly within any city of the state, without the consent of such city.** The necessity of obtaining local consent to acquire privileges and franchises to use the streets, is quite general. Ordinarily, the power to grant privileges or franchises to use the streets for any purpose other than for travel in the usual manner, and such uses as belong to public ways, is vested in the municipal corporation, or in the duly qualified electors thereof.** *7 Grhee v. Northern Union Gas Co., 158 N. Y., 510; 53 N. B. Rep., 692. *8 State ex inf. v. Lindell Ry. Co., 151 Mo.. 162, 183; 52 S. W. Rep., 248; A. & P. R. R. Co. v. St. Louis, 3 Mo. App., 315; Dubach v. H. & St. J. R. R. Co., 89 Mo., 483; 1 S. W. Rep., 86; Knapp, Stout & Co. V. Transfer Co., 126 Mo., 26; 28 S. W. Rep., 627. Sometimes full and complete jur- isdiction and control over streets and highways is conferred upon the municipal corporation. When such is' the case the local authori- ties may give or withhold fran- chises, as for a railroad, which nec- essarily involves ^the right to pre- scribe the terms and conditions upon which their assent is given. Northern Central Ry. Co. v. Bal- timore, 21 Md., 93. The right to use the streets may be made subject to reasonable local regulations. State ex rel. Laclede Gas Light Co. v. Murphy, 130 Mo., 10; 31 S. W. Rep., 594; 31 L. R. A., 798; Jersey City v. Jersey City & B. R. Co.. 20 N. J. Eq., 360. Assent to be given without re- strictions, where legislative act does not authorize. Pittsburgh's Appeal, 115 Pa. St., 4; 7 Atl. Rep., 778. *9 Laws of Mo. of 1899, pp. 105, 106, require consent of property owners. See The Municipal Code of St. Louis, pp. 351, 352, sees. 58 and 59. Right to construct horse railways in streets, etc., may be granted, also railways operated by steam. State ex rel'. v. Corrigan C. Street Ry. Co., 85 Mo., 263; Sherlock v. K. C. B. Ry. Co., 142 Mo., 172; 43 S. W. Rep., 629, or electricity. Granting the right to construct and operate railroad tracks through the streets is con- ferred by the charter exclusively on the mayor and municipal assem- bly to be exercised by ordinance. Such right conferred by permit from the mayor is utterly void. Lockwood V. Wabash Ry. Co., 122 Mo., 86; 26 S. W. Rep., 698. Control and supervision of streets may be delegated to the mu- nicipal corporation. Montgomery V. Parker, 114 Ala., 118; 21 So. Rep., 452; 62 Am. St. Rep., 95; Mc- Cain V. State, 62 Ala., 138; Brook V. Horton, 68 Cal., 554;- 10 Pac. Rep., 204; Polack v. Trustees, etc., 48 Cal., 490. Gas Pipes; consent of local cor- poration. Allegheney's Appeal (Pa. 1887), 11 Atl. Rep., 658; Phil- adelphia Co. V. Freeport, 167 Pa. St., 279; 31 Atl. Rep., 571; Read- I 569] OP FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. 885 But whatever rights the city ing V. Consumer's Gas Co., 41 Leg. Int. (Pa.), 428; Philadelphia Steam Supply Co. v. Philadelphia, 41 Leg. Int. (Pa.), 252; Kalamazoo V. Kalamazoo, etc. Co., 124 Mich., 74; 82 N. W. Rep., 811. Poles and Wires. Pereria v. Wallace, 129 Cal., 397; 62 Pac' Rep., 61; Wyandotte Electric Light Co. V. Wyandotte, 124 Mich., 43; 82 N. W. Rep., 821. City may authorize use of streets for poles, wires, etc., if they do not materially obstruct the ordinary use of the street for travel. Abutting owner cannot enjoin such use. McWethy v. Aurora Electric L. & P. Co., 202 111., 218; 67 N. E. Rep., 9, affirming 104 111. App., 479. A telegraph or telephone company may, in con- formity with law and ordinance, plant and maintain its poles on the sidewalk of a street. Julia Build- ing Assn. V. Bell Telephone Co., 13 Mo. App., 477; Schopp v. St. Louis, 117 Mo., 131; 22 S. W. Rep., 898; St. Louis v. Bell Telephone Co., 96 Mo., 623; 10 S. W. Rep., 197. See article on "Rights of Tele- graph Companies in Streets and Highways," 21 Alb. L. J., 44-46. The power granted by the charter "to regulate the use" of streets within its limits, extends to the right to regulate the erection of poles and stringing thereon of wires for the supply of electric light by private corporations to consumers. W. U. Tel. Co. y. Guern- sey & Scudder Light Co., 46 Mo. App., 120. Under the statutes of the state and the charter and or- dinances of the city, the erection of telegraph and telephone poles must be in such a manner as not to incommode the public in the use of such roads and streets. Gay may have over its streets, its V. Mutual Union Telegraph Co., 12 Mo. App., 485. But, inconvenience to the public from the erection of telephone and telegraph poles can- not be reasonably avoided, and fur- nishes no ground for an injunc- tion. Gay v. Mutual Union Tele- graph Co., 12 Mo. App., 485. The right to erect telegraph and tele- phone poles in the streets of a city does not carry with it the right to erect broken and unsight- ly poles. Forsythe v. Baltimore & Ohio Tel. Co., 12 Mo. App., 494. The erection of a telegraph pole so as to incommode the public gives an individual no right of action to abate the nuisance unless he has sustained special damage. Gay v. Mutual Union Tel. Co., 12 Mo. App., 485. Telephone companies may set their poles along public streets of cities, subject to regulation by or- dinance as to the location and kind of posts, piers, and abutments, and the height of the wires. State ex rel. Bell Telephone Co. v. Flad,.23 Mo. App., 185. And where such companies have complied with all the lawful requirements, the board will be compelled by mandamus to issue a permit for the erection of poles on the streets. State ex rel. Bell Telephone Co. v.^Flad, 23 Mo. App., 185. See Hannibal v. M. & K. Tel. Co., 31 Mo. App., 23. Power to grant for the institu- tion of a telephone system in the city of Rochester, N. Y., is vested in the legislature. The power of the council in the premises is lim- ited to the regulation under the po- lice power of the manner in which the franchise shall be exercised. Barhite v. Home Telephone Co., 50 N. Y. App. Div., 25. Railkoad Tracks. Mobile v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 84 Ala,, 886 OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§570 powers are those of a trustee for the benefit of the cestui que trust (the public), liberally construed for its benefit, strictly construed to its detrime-nt. Whatever may be the quality or quantity of the estate of the city in its streets, that estate is essentially public and not private property, and the city in holding it is considered the agent and trustee of the public and not a private owner for profit or emolument. The interest is exclusively publici juris and is in any respect wholly unlike property of- the private corporation which is held for its own benefit and used for its private gain and advantage.^i § 570. Street railroad tracks, gas and water pipes, poles and wires as nuisances. The general doctrine relating to obstruc- tions in public streets and ways as nuisances, and municipal power to abate or remove the same, is stated and illustrated elsewhere.52 Railroad tracks laid down in the streets, without legal authority, constitute a public nuisancers So railroad 115; 4 So. Rep., 106; Perry v. New Orleans etc. R. Co., 55 Ala., 413; 28 Am. Rep., 740; New Orleans v. Steinhardt, 52 La. Ann., 1043; 27 So. Rep., 586. Location of tracks. Power of Chicago as to Chicago Dock & Ca- nal Co. V. Garrity, 115 111., 155; 3 N. E. Rep., 448; Bullen v. Higgins, 115 111., 155; 3 N. E. Rep., 456. The city cannot grant right of way over private property, nor over a proposed street, not yet opened or extended. Wichita & W. R. Co. V. Fechheimer, 36 Kan., 45; 12 Pac. Rep., 362. Where a rail- road has by its charter a general power to huild its road in streets of a city, it is not estopped from asserting the power to build on a particular street by the fact that it has once solicited and obtained from the city permission to lay and use a track on that street for a limited time, and has actually laid and used it, and then tore up the track and surrendered posses- sion of the street to the city. A. & P. R. R. V. St. Louis, 66 Mo., 228. Undergkound Conduits. Nation- al Subway Co. v. St. Louis, 169 Mo., 319; 69 S. W. Rep., 290; State ex rel. v. Murphy, 134 Mo., 548; 31 S. W. Rep., 784; 34 S. W. Rep., 51; 56 Am. St. Rep., 515; 34 L. R. A., 369. 51 People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y., 188, 192, 197-200. The exercise by a city of its gen- eral power given it by the legisla- ture of controlling the streets and of making and enforcing contracts with reference to their occupancy by individuals or corporations, is action by the state within the meaning of the provision of the first section of the 14th constitu- tional amendment. Iron M. R. Co. v. Memphis (C. C. A.), 96 Fed. Rep., 113. The power of the city to grant franchises for use of streets is lim- ited to such power as it possesses in its sovereign capacity. It has no proprietary interest in its streets. San Francisco v. Spring Valley Waterworks, 48 Cal., 493. 52 Sec. 459 et seq., supra. 03 Denver & S. Co. v. Denver City R. Co., 2 Colo., 673; Garnett v. §571] OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. 887 tracks in a public highway not constructed as authorized and which obstruct it, in the view of the law, are public nuisances.®* The rule has also been applied to gas pipes, etc.,®® and poles and wires.®* The general rule is equally well established that railroad tracks in public streets laid by authority of law, pursuant to grant lawfully made, are not public nuisances.®'' § 571. Use of street must be public. The streets and public ways of a municipal corporation are held by it in trust for the public, to be used for the ordinary purposes of travel and such other uses as usually pertain thereto.®* Therefore, exclusive private uses, whether by license, permit, contract or grant by ordinance, are forbidden.®^ In referring to the authority to grant an individual the right" to lay railroad tracks in the Jacksonville, etc. R. Co., 20 Fla., 889; St. Louis & Meramec R. R. v. Kirkwood, 159 Mo., 239; 60 S. S. Rep., 110. A railroad track con- structed under an unlawful ordi- nance constitutes a public nuis- ance. Glaessner v. Anheuser-Busch Brew. Assn., 100 Mo., 508 ; 13 S. W. Rep., 707. Such nuisance may be reached by injunction at the suit of a private individual who shows special damages to himself. Glaess- ner V. A. B. B. Assn., 100 Mo., 508 ; 13 S. W. Rep., 707. City may in- voke equity to abate a nuisance created by street railway company, arising from failure to comply with conditions of grant of right of way. Springeld v. Robberson Ave. R. R. 69 Mo. App., 514. 5* Com. V. Vermont & Mass. R. Corp., 4 Gray (Mass.), 22; Com. v. N. & L. R. Corp., 2 Gray (Mass.), 54. 55 Reg. V. Longton Gas. Co., 29 L. J. Mag. Cas., 118. 56 Carthage v. Carthage Light Co,. 97 Mo. App., 20. 67 Florida — Geiger v. Filer, 8 Fla., 325. Illinois — Murphy v. Chicago, 29 111., 279; 81 Am. Dec, 307. Indiana — New Albany & S. R. Co. V. O'Daily, 12 Ind., 551; State v. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co., 86 Ind., 114. Michigan — Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v. Heisel, 38 Mich., 62; 31 Am. Rep., 306. New York — Davis v. New York, 14 N. Y., 506; 67 Am. Dec, 186. Pennsylvania — Easton S. E. & W. E. Pass. R. Co. V. Easton, 133 Pa. St., 505; 19 Atl. Rep., 486. North Carolina — Ridley v. Sea- board & R. R. Co., 118 N. C, 996; 24 S. E. Rep., 730; 32 L. R. A., 708. 58 Glasgow V. St. Louis, 87 Mo., 678; 15 Mo. App., 112. 59 Chicago Dock Co. v. Garrity, 115 111., 155; 3 N. E. Rep., 448. Private Uses — Illustrations. Streets and alleys cannot be dedi- cated to private uses. Bailey v. Culver, 12 Mo. App., 175. Act of Missouri of Mch. 18, 1891, author- izes St. Louis to consent by ordi- nance to the construction of a un- ion depot upon portions of its streets. Union Depot Co. v. St. Louis, 8 Mo. App,, 412. A city can- not create a nuisance in its streets or devote them or any part thereof to a purpose inconsistent with the rights of the public or abutting property owners. Lockwood v. Wa- bash Ry. Co., 122 Mo., 86; 26 S. W. Rep., 698. An ordinance granting 888 OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§571 streets and operate ears thereon, it has been well observed in a New Jersey case that everything which is fairly within the idea to a steam railway the right to construct its railroad tracks in a public alley twenty feet wide, which puts no limitation upon the continuous and continual use of the alley by the railroad's train or cars is void. And so, also, is an ordinance that states the track must not be used for loading and unloading cars more than twelve hours consecutively. Corby v. C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 150 Mo., 457, 465-470; 52 S. W. Rep., 282. Power to regulate use of streets extends to public use only, and does not authorize an ordinance permitting a private corporation to build a railroad track and run trains on the streets for private business. Glaessner v. Anheuser-Busch B. Assn., 100 Mo., 508; 13 S. W. Rep., 707; Brown v. C. G. W. Ry., 137 Mo., 529; 38 S. W. Rep., 1099; Cummings v. St. Louis, 90 Mo.,, 259; 2 S. W. Rep., 130; State ex rel. v. East 5th St. Ry., 140 Mo., 539; 41 S. W. Rep., 955; State v. Trenton, 36 N. J. L., 79; State v. Jersey City, 52 N. J. L., 65; 18 Atl. Rep., 586, 696. Power to grant right to railroad to lay its tracks in the streets is not abso- lute. The right cannot be confer- red if the operation of the road will destroy the use of the street or a part thereof, as a public thor- oughfare. Brown v. C. G. W. Ry, Co., 137 Mo., 529; 38 S. W. Rep., 1099; Lockwood v. Wabash R. R., 122 Mo., 86; 26 S. W. Rep., 698; Dubach v. H. & St. J. R. R., 89 Mo., 483; 1 S. W. Rep., 86; Schulen- burg & B. Lumber Co. v. St. L. K. & N. W. R. R. Co., 129 Mo., 455; 31 S. W. Rep., 796; St. Louis T. Ry. C. V. St. L. M. B. Ry. Co., Ill Mo., 666; 20 S. W. Rep., 319; K. C. St. J. & C. B. Ry. C, V. St. J. T. Ry. Co., 97 Mo., 457; 10 S. W. Rep., 826; Grand Ave. Ry. C, v. People's Ry. Co., 132 Mo., 34; 33 S. W. Rep., 472; Belcher S. R. Co. V. St. L. Grain Elevator Co., 82 Mo., 121; Sherlock v. K. C. B. Ry. C, 142 Mo., 172; 43 S. W. Rep., 629. Or will destroy, or unreason- ably interfere with, the right of an abutting owner to access to and from his property. Knapp, Stout & Co. V. St. L. T. Ry. Co., 126 Mo., 26; 28 S. W. Rep., 627; Lockwood V. Wabash Ry. Co., 122 Mo., 86; 26 S. W. Rep., 698; Stephenson v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 68 Mo. App., 642. Where right is given to construct a road in private alley, and the privilege has been accepted, a pre- sumption arises that the power was properly exercised. Brown v. C. G. W. Ry. Co., 137 Mo., 529; 38 S. W. Rep., 1099. St. Louis cannot lease for twenty years to the own- ers of property abutting thereon the use of a street dedicated and opened to public use under the act of 1845. Glasgow v. St. Louis, 15 Mo. App., 112, 87 Mo., 678; Lackland v. N. Mo. R. R. Co., 31 Mo., 180, 187. Private individuals cannot be granted right to con- struct a wharf over a public street and thus defeat the public right of way. Wood v. San Francisco, 4 Cal., 190. If the charter forbids the grant- ing of streets for any purpose, ex- cept by act of the legislature the municipal authorities cannot au- thorize the erection of a market to use even temporarily, where the effect is to impair in any way the free use of the street for public travel. Savannah v. Wilson, 49 Ga., 476. So the right "to regu- §571] OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. 889 of regulating streets, with a view to their use as streets, may be done by municipal legislation. In measuring the extent of the power, the object and purpose for which it was given must always be regarded as the test. "Streets and highways are intended for the common and equal use of all citizens, to which end they must be regulated. An appropriation of them to private individual uses, from which the public derive no con- venience, benefit or accommodation, is not a regulation, but a perversion of them from their lawful purposes, and cannot be regarded as an execution of the trust imposed in the city authorities. ' '^^ late," does not authorize the leas- ing of spaces on street In front of business houses for produce deal- ers. Schopp V. St. Louis, 117 Mo., 131; 22 S. W. Rep., 898. Or the es- tablishment of private scales. Ber- ry-Horn Coal Co. V. Scruggs-Mc- Clure Coal Co., 62 Mo. App., 93, 96. Ptjblic Use — Illusteations. A railway switch on a public street for the use of a stock yard com- pany, created for "the convenience of drovers, dealers and the public at large," is a public and not a pri- vate use. Knapp, Stout & Co. v. St. L. T. Ry. Co., 126 Mo., 26; 28 S. W. Rep., 627; Belcher Sugar R. Co. V. St. L. Grain Elevator Co., 101 Mo., 192; 13 S. W. Rep., 822. So, a switch in a public alley, connected with the main line and operated therewith, is for public use, although it be provided that the cars run on such switch are to be used exclusively for the bene- fit of the adjoining property own- ers. Brown v. C. G. W. Ry., 137 Mo., 529; 38 S. W. Rep., 1099. Nor is the use to be held private although the switch is confined to the car- riage of property. Brown v. C. G. W. Ry., 137 Mo., 529; 38 S. W. Rep., 1099. The constitution of 1875, art. 12, sec. 14, declares all rail- roads public highways, and all railroad companies common car- riers. 60 "Is one of those objects or purposes subserved by permitting one individual to enjoy a use of the highways which is denied to all others? I think not. If such power is conceded, its exercise is limited only by the discretion of the common council who must be the sole judges of the extent to which obstructions may be placed in the streets. If they can license one to build a railroad across the highway for his own exclusive benefit, of which the public can have no use or advantage or con- venience, it is diflicult to perceive why they can not empower another to place therein a structure which will more effectually impede the public passage, and maintain it there during their pleasure. How considerable must be obstruction to the way become before the judg- ment of the common council can be controverted, and the judicial arm interposed? A grant to every one on- the street of a like nature with that now resisted, would ren- der the highway well nigh impas- sable. The right to license one necessarily implies authority to li- cense all, and thus municipal cor- porations under the general power to regulate streets become the source from which franchises to favored individuals, in the public ways derive their existence." 890 OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§572 § 572. Same— Rigfhts of abutters. Streets in which private rights and public interest have vested cannot be diverted to a permanent private use. Every part of a street is for public use. The abutting owner acquires his property and makes improvements or pays for improvements made by the public by special assessment or taxation on the faith that the way will be maintained as a street. ' The power of the legislature or the municipal corporation as to such ways is limited to authority over them as streets. In no case can they be deprived of this character to the special injury of abutters without just com- pensation. In some states'the fee of the street is vested in the municipal corporation in trust for the public, and in such case, in the absence of constitutional restrictions, it has been held that the legislature may grant franchises to street railways without the city's consent and without allowing compensa- tion.81 In other states it is the settled doctrine that the owner of premises abutting on a public street is presumably the owner of the fee to the center thereof, subject to the easement to which the land is devoted.''^ "Where the fee is vested in the abutters and where the public have only an easement in the State (Montgomery) v. Trenton, 36 N. J. L., 79, 83, 84, per Van Syckel, J. Street railway companies can- not turn over part of its line to be used by private individual for his exclusive business. Fanning v. Osborne, 102 N. Y., 441; 7 N. E. Rep., 307; Barker v. Hartman Steel Co., 129 Pa. St., 551; 18 Atl. Rep., 553. Use of private railroad in street, constructed by ordinance authority may be enjoined by abutting prop- erty owner. Gustafson v. Hamm, 56 Minn., 334; 57 N. W. Rep., 1054. 61 Hine v. Keokuk & D. R. R., 42 Iowa, 636; Clinton v. Cedar Rapids Ry. Co., 24 la., 455; Mercer V. Pittsburg, etc., Ry. Co., 36 Pa. St., 99; People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y., 188; Savannah, etc., Co. v. Savan- nah, 45 Ga., 602. See Dubach v. H. & St. J. R. Co., 89 Mo., 438; 1 S. W. Rep., 86; 2 Dillon on Mun. Corp. sees. 702, 704, 726. 82 Thomas v. Hunt, 134 Mo., 392; 35 S. W. Rep., 581; Pemberton v. Doley, 43 Mo. App., 176; Grant v. Moone, 128 Mo., 43; 30 S. W. Rep., 3128; Snoddy v. Bolen, 122 Mo., 479; 25 S. W. Rep., 935; Union Elevator Co. V. K. C. S. B. Ry. Co., 135 Mo., 353; 36 S. W. Rep., 1071; Baker v. St. Louis, 7 Mo. App., 429; 75 Mo., 671; Lackland v. N. M. R. R. Co., 31 Mo., 180; Hannibal Bridge Co. V. Schaubacher, 57 Mo., 582; Glas- by V. Morris, 18 N. J. Eq., 72 ; State V. Taylor, 107 Tenn., 455, 463; 64 S. W. Rep., 766; Hamilton Co. v. Rape, 101 Tenn., 222, 225; 47 S. W. Rep., 416 ; Iron Mountain R. R. V. Bingham, 87 Tenn., 522, 530; 11 S. W. Rep., 705 ; Smith v. East End St. R. R., 87 Tenn., 626, 630; 11 S. W. Rep., 709. And such owner- ship attaches although the dedica- tion was by way of statutory plat. Rutherford v. Taylor, 38 Mo., 315; Price V. Thompson, 48 Mo., 361; Thurston v. St. Joseph, 51 Mo., 510; i572J OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. 891 street as against such abutters, some decisions hold that the use of the street for the purposes of a steam railroad is an additional burden or new servitude, and under the state con- stitution compensation must be paid to the proprietors of the Lot owner's right to the use of a street is a property right and he may recover damages if his use of the street Is unreasonably prevent- ed by a railroad, where his dam- ages are peculiar and different In kind from the public generally. Stephenson v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 68 Mo. App., 642; Tate v. M. K. & T. Ry. Co., 64 Mo., 149. Where a railroad track is illegally con- structed and property owner Is in- jured thereby. Injunction will lie. Knapp, Stout & Co. v. St. L. T. Ry. Co., 126 Mo., 26; 28 S. W. Rep., 627; Lockwood v. Wabash Ry. Co., 122 Mo., 86; 26 S. W. Rep., 698; Schopp V. St. Louis, 117 Mo., 131; 22 S. W. Rep., 898. See Hovelman V. K. C. H. R. R. Co., 79 Mo., 632. The fact that such complainant has used the track will not destroy this right. Knapp, Stout & Co. v. St. L. T. Ry. Co., 126 Mo., 26; 28 S. W. Rep., 627. Franchise to lay railroad track in streets is right to lay on the grade of the streets. If* not so laid company Is liable to property owners in damages. Cross V. St. L. K. & N. W. Ry., 77 Mo., 318; Swenson v. Lexington, 69 Mo., 157; Stephenson v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 68 Mo. App., 642; Tate v. M. K. & T. Ry. Co., 64 Mo., 149; Placke V. U. D. Ry. Co., 140 Mo., 634; 41 S. W. Rep., 915. And the owner has a right to the use of the land for all purposes not In- consistent with the grant. Thom- as V. Hunt, 134 Mo., 392; 35 S. W. Rep., 581; Gamble v. Pettljohn, 116 Mo., .375; 22 S. W. Rep., 783. An abutting owner has a property right in an alley in the rear of his lot. Christian v. St. Louis, 127 Mo., 109; 29 S. W. Rep., 996. And he also has a right to the free admission of light and pure air, and to ingress and egress, which form a part of the estate, and are deemed as much property as the lot Itself. Gaus & Sons Mfg. Co. T. St. L., K. & N. Ry. Co., 113 Mo., 308; 20 S. W. Rep., 658. The own- er of property abutting on the street has rights to the highway peculiar to himself, and which are not possessed by the public gen- erally, and for a violation of which he may maintain an action, notwithstanding the wrong done also affects the public. Thomas v. Hunt, 134 Mo., 392; 35 S. W. Rep., 581; Schopp v. St. Louis, 117 Mo., 131; 22 S. W. Rep., 898. But in order to recover damages for an obstruction to the highway he must show that the damages suffered are peculiar to him, being such as are different In kind, and not merely in degree, from those sustained by other members of the community. Rude v. St. Louis, 93 Mo., 408; 6 S. W. Rep., 257; Gates V. Kansas City B. & T. Ry. Co., Ill Mo., 28; 19 S. W. Rep., 957. Or, he must show that the property itself, or some right or easement connected therewith, is directly affected, and that It is specially affected. Gates v. K. C. B. & T. Ry. Co., Ill Mo., 28; 19 S. W. Rep., 957. Damages may be awarded to a property owner for an obstruction in the street, where, while the property does not abut on the street, it communicates with it by a private way. Rude v. St. Louis, 93 Mo., 408; 6 S. W. Rep., 257. Property owners can main- tain ejectment for the permanent obstruction of the surface of the street adjoining their property. Thomas v. Hunt, 134 Mo., 392; 35 892 OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§572 soil for such use.®* But in some states it seems to be settled law that an electric street railway, laid to grade, is not an additional servitude and does not infringe upon the property rights of those whose lots abut on the street and over which the electric road is operated.®* S. "W. Rep., 581. Damages for erection of bridge, see Welters v. St. Louis, 132 Mo., 1; 33 S. W. Rep., 441; Slattery v. St. Louis, 120 Mo., 183; 25 S. W. Rep., 521. Where an obstruction in a street or highway is both a public and private nuisance, the pri- vate person who suffers a spe- cial injury may have relief by in- junction. Knapp, Stout & Co., v. Transfer Ry. Co., 15f6 Mo., 26; 28 S. W. Rep., 627; Schulenburg & B. Lumber Co. v. St. L., K. & N. W. Ry. Co., 129 Mo., 455; 31 S. W. Rep., 796; Watson V. Robberson Ave. Ry., 69 Mo. App., 548. The city is responsible in damages to an abutting owner for decrease in value of his property caused by the enactment of an or- dinance vacating a public street. Heinrich v. St. Louis, 125 Mo., 424; 28 S. W. Rep., 626. Nor is it any defense to such action that the owner has access to his own prop- erty by another street. Heinrich V. St. Louis, 125 Mo., 424; 28 S. W. Rep., 626. But see Werth v. Springfield, 78 Mo., 107; Moore v. Cape Girardeau, 103 Mo., 470; 15 S. W. Rep., 755. 63 2 Dill, on Corp., 703, 704 cases; also sec. 725; Williams v. Plank Road Co., 21 Mo., 580. Where streets have been dedi- cated to the public, as highways, the ultimate fee remaining in the original owner of the soil, the municipal corporation cannot, in the absence of express legislative authority, allow them to be used by a railroad company to lay its tracks on them to the injury of the proprietors of the adjacent land. Perry v. N. O. & C. R. R. Co., 55 Ala., 413, 418-42S. 6* Placke V. Union Depot Ry. Co., 140 Mo., 634, 638; 41 S. W. Rep., 915. See Ashland & C. St. R. Co. V. Falkner, 106 Ky., 332; 43 L. R. A., 554; 45 S. W. Rep., 235. New Uses or Streets. Charter power "to regulate the use of streets" is very comprehensive.. The word "regulate" is one of broad import. It may be likened to the comprehensive power con- ferred upon the congress by the federal constitution relating to foreign and interstate commerce. The federal courts have always held this power to be broad and comprehensive. Mr. Justice Brew- er in St. Louis v. W. U. Tel. Co., 149 U. S., 465, 469. The right to regulate the use of the streets is not limited to a mere right of way, but it extends to all beneficial uses which the public good and con- venience may from time to time require. New uses, as they arise, may be made of the streets, with- out the consent of the abutting lot owners. All such uses are regard- ed as included in the original ap- propriation. Ferrenbach v. Tur- ner, 86 Mo., 416. "As civilization advances new uses may be found expedient." Julia Building Assn. Y. Bell Tel. Co., 88 Mo., 258; 13 Mo. App., 477. It extends to the erection of poles and stringing wires for the supply of electric light by private persons or corpor- ations to consumers. W. U. Tel. Co. V. G. & S. E. L. Co., 46 Mo. App., 120. See Palmer v. Larch- mont Electric Co., 158 N. Y., 231; 52 N. E. Rep., 1092; 43 L. R. A., 574] OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. 893 § 573. Ordinance necessary to grant right to use streets. As a rule, the right to use streets and public ways for railroad tracks (steam or street), gas and water pipes, subways and underground conduits, poles, wires, etc., or to obstruct public places for any purpose, except temporarily, can only be con- ferred by the municipal corporation by legislative act.^^ § 574. All mandatory requirements imposed by law must be duly observed, otherwise the ordinance granting the privilege or franchise will be void ; as, for example, failure to give the prescribed public notice of the time and place of presenting the petition for the privilege of laying railroad tracks in the 672; Carpenter v. Capital Electric Co., 178 111., 29; 52 N. E. Rep., 973; 43 L. R. A., 645. Such power may tie exercised both as to an adjoin- ing owner and as to a licensee having prior rights of user. W. U. Tel. Co. V. G. & S. E. L. Co., 46 Mo. App., 120. Adjoining own- ers cannot claim compensation for damages resulting to their proper- ty from such use. It is only when the street is subjected to a new servitude inconsistent with and subversive of its proper use as a street that the abutting property owner can complain. Julia Build- ing Co. V. Bell Telephone Co., 88 Mo., 258. When the public ac- quires a street in a city, either by condemnation, grant or dedication, it may be applied to all purposes consistent with the proper use of a street. Julia Building Assn. v. Bell Tel. Co., 88 Mo., 258. The piling of paving material upon the sidewalk, prior to reconstructing a street, is a use of the street by the city of which an abutting land owner cannot complain. Westliche Post Assn. V. Allen, 26 Mo. App., 181. 65 The privilege or franchise of constructing and operating a street railway in the public street can only be given by ordinance. State V. Newark, 54 N. J. L., 102; 23 Atl. Rep., 284; West Jersey Traction Co. V. Shivers, 58 N. J. L., 124; 33 Atl. Rep., 55. So the right to lay gas pipes in public streets. People's Gas Light Co. v. Jersey City, 46 N. J. L., 297. The authority to permit the ob- struction of streets and alleys is an exercise of legislative power; hence an ordinance is necessary. Indianapolis v. Miller, 27 Ind., 394. The right to dig in a public street can only be conferred by ordinance. Hunt v. Lambertville, 45 N. J. L., 279. No one can without proper per- mission of city open or disturb the surface of the street in front of the land of another. Glasby v. Morris, 18 N. J. Eq., 72. Under a law which conferred upon the municipal corporation authority to authorize or forbid the construc- tion by a railroad company of tracks on its streets which did not prescribe the manner of exer- cising such authority whether by ordinance, resolution or vote duly recorded, it was held in an Iowa case that such authority might be exercised by resolution duly passed or by vote legally taken which appeared in the proper records. Merchants' Union Barb-wire Co. v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 70 Iowa, 105; 28 N. W. Rep., 494; 29 N. W. Rep., 822. 894 OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§574 streets,^^ or omission to publish the ordinance granting the franchise.®^ So any delegation of power to municipal boards or administrative officers at any step in conferring the privi- lege or franchise will invalidate the grant.''* So a violation of any restriction contained in the state constitution or the organic law of the municipal corporation will render the fran- chise void. Thus an ordinance granting permission to lay railroad tracks in the streets which ignores the limitation that no street shall be occupied with two railroad tracks, whether they belong to corporations or private persons, for a distance of more than five blocks, is worthless.^® Where the law pro- vides for competitive bidding and requires the franchise to be awarded to the lowest bidder, based on the percentage of gross receipts,'^'' or agreement to perform designated service at the lowest rates, such restrictions must be obsetved.'^i So provi- de Harvey v. Aurora & Geneva Ry. Co., 186 111., 283; 57 N. B. Rep., 857; Metropolitan City Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 96 111., 620. «7 State ex rel. v. Omaha & C. B. Ry. & Bridge Co., 113 Iowa, 30, 34; 84 N. W. Rep., 983. Notice of application. Benwood V. Wheeling Ry. Co. (W. Va. 1903), 44 S. E. Rep., 271. 68 Illinois — St. Louis, etc. R. R. v. Belleville, 122 111., 376; 12 N. E. Rep., 680, affirming 20 111. App., 580; Chicago & W. I. R. Co. v. Dun- bar, 100 111., 110; Hickey v. Chi- cago & W. I. R. Co., 6 111 App.., 172. Louisiana — Board of Liquidation of City Deht v. New Orleans, 32 La. Ann., 915. Maine — Veazie v. Mayo, 45 Me., 560. Missouri — Lockwood v. Wabash R. Co., 122 Mo., 86; 26 S. W. Rep., 698; 43 Am. St. Rep., 547; 24 L. R. A., 516; Union Depot Co. v. St. Louis, 76 Mo., 393. New Jersey — Trustees Presby. Ch. V. State Board, etc., 55 N. J. L., 436; 27 Atl. Rep., 809. New Yorh — Central Crosstown R. Co. V. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co., 16 App. Div. (N. Y.), 229. OAio— State ex rel. v. Bell, 34 Ohio St., 194. United States — Citizens' Street Ry. V. Jones, 34 Fed. Rep., 579. Permits to use street for build- ing material to be regulated by ordinance. McCarthy v. Chicago, 53 111., 38. Permit to dig in street, etc. Boyle v. Hazleton, 171 Pa. St., 167; 33 Atl. Rep., 142. Delegation of Powek Forbidden, sees. 84 to 89, supra. 69 People v. Rich, 54 Cal., 74. 70 Charter San Francisco, art. II., ch. 2, sees. 6 and 7. Statutes and Amendments of Codes of Cal. (1899) pp. 253, 254. Missouri Act of April 9, 1895, as to sale of franchise or right of way for street railroads, was held to be void for uncertainty in State ex inf. v. West Side Street Ry. Co., 146 Mo., 155; 47 S. W. Rep., 959. 71 Covington St. Ry. Co. v. Cov- ington, 72 Ky. (9 Bush), 127; New Orleans, etc. R. Co. v. Watkins, 48 La. Ann., 1550; 21 So. Rep., 199; Beekman v. Third Ave. R. Co., 153 N. Y. 144; 47 N. E. Rep., 277; State ex rel. v. Bell, 34 Ohio St., 194. A franchise must be sold for §575] OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. 895 sions requiring a petition of interested property owners, or the consent of abutters, must be observed, as they are mandatoryj^ So, where as a condition to granting, the consent of the local authorities,^* or a particular department or board of the municipality,'^* or the duly qualified electors thereof, by vote, at an election legally called,''^ is required, omission is fatal to the validity of the ordinanceJ^ § 575. The grantee— Existence of corporation. Under some laws the grant of the right to use the streets for the purposes under consideration may be to individuals or corporations. By cash under a provision that fran- chises "must be awarded to the highest bidder." Thompson v. Al- ameda County Sup'rs, 111 Cal., 553; 44 Pac. Rep., 230. Consideration for privilege or franchise to use streets. Daly v. Georgia, etc. R. Co., 80 Ga., 793; 7 S. B. Rep., 146; 12 Am. St. Rep., 286; Board of Liquidation, etc. v. New Orleans, 32 La. Ann., 915; Barr v. New Brunswick, 58 N. J. L., 255; 33 Atl. Rep., 477; Stuyve- sant V. Pearsall, 15 Barb. (N. Y.), 244. Contract for private benefit to individuals is against public policy and void. New Haven v. New Ha- ven, etc. R. Co., 62 Conn., 252; 25 Atl. Rep., 316; 18 L. R. A., 256. 72 North Chicago Street Ry. Co. V. Cheetham, 58 111. App., 318; Beeson v. Chicago, 75 Fed. Rep., 880. Sufficiency of Petition, with some signatures of agents. Tibbetts V. West & S. T. Street R. Co., 153 111., 147; 38 N. E. Rep., 664, affirm- ing 54 111. App., 180. Not Applicable, when. A legis- lative act forbidding any ordinance authorizing the erection of electric light appliances in the streets, ex- cept upon petition of property own- ers and authorizing property own- ers to enjoin such use of streets if not so petitioned for, held not to apply to previously granted pri- vileges. McWethy v. Aurora Elec- tric L. & P. Co., 202 111., 218; 67 N. E. Rep., 9, affirming 104 111. App., 479. 73 Not properly given in a par- ticular case. Kavanaugh v. Mobile & G. R. Co., 78 Ga., 271; 2 S. E. Rep., 636. 7*Veazie v. Mayo, 45 Me., 560; Lowell V. Simpson, 10 Allen (92 Mass.), 88; Union Depot Co. v. St. Louis, 76 Mo., 393. Consent of board of public works, to be given as entity. West Jersey Traction Co. v. Shivers, 58 N. J. L., 124; 33 Atl. Rep., 55; Tamaqua, etc. Co. V. Inter-County Street Ry. Co., 167 Pa. St., 91; 31 Atl. Rep., 473. See sec. 91, supra, and notes. 75 Consent of Electors gas and electric light franchise. Keokuk V. Fort Wayne Electric Co., 90 Iowa, 67; 57 N. W. Rep., 689, fol- lowing Hanson v. Hunter, 86 Iowa, 722; 48 N. W. Rep., 1005; 53 N. W. Rep., 84. Nebraska constitution of 1875 requires the consent of a majority of the electors of the municipality, to construct a street railway. Sternberg v. State, 36 Neb., 307; 54 N. W. Rep., 553. Or- dinances passed and approved by electors. Sec. 152, supra, and notes. 76 Conditions complied with — particular case. Appeal of McGee, 114 Pa. St., 470; 8 Atl. Rep., 237. 896 • OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§ 576 statute, in New York, a grant to individuals to lay down tracks is forbiddenJ'^ In California, a grant to construct tracks was made to individuals who afterwards organized a corporation which assumed the franchise, but no formal transfer thereof was executed. The franchise was sustained.''* In West Vir- ginia, a grant by a municipal corporation to an intended com- pany, though at the time the corporation is not chartered, but is chartered subsequently and accepts the grant, was sus- tained.'^^ But such grant cannot take effect until the corpo- ration is organized.*'* And in Illinois, it has been decided that the ordinance granting the franchise may be presented before the corporation grantee is fully organized, where the organiza- tion is completed before the passage and acceptance.*^ But in New Jersey, where the first and second reading of the ordinance occurred before the organization of the gas company which was to obtain the grant, the franchise was declared void.*2 § 576. Conditions imposed on grantee. In granting the right to use the streets and public ways for transporting pas- sengers, gas, electricity, etc., reasonable conditions may be im- posed upon the grantee in the exercise of such right,*^ espe- " Case V. Cayuga County, 88 The fact the corporation is not Hun. (N. Y.), 59; 34 N. Y. Suppl., organized when the ordinance 595. granting the franchise is passed is '8 Santa Rosa, etc. R. R. Co. v. an irregularity which may he Central Street Ry. Co. (Cal. 1895), waived by the parties. Property 38 Pac. Rep., 986. Compare Home- owners cannot enjoin on this stead Street Ry. v. Pittsburg, etc. ground. McWethy v. Aurora Elec- Street Ry., 166 Pa. St., 162; 30 Atl. trie L. & P. Co., 202 111., 218; 67 ^Rep., 950; 27 L. R. A., 383; At- N. E. Rep., 9, affirming 104 111. kinson v. Asheville Street Ry., 113 App., 479. N. C, 581; 18 S. E. Rep., 254. Application may be made before 79 Clarksburg Electric Light Co. incorporation if the grant is made V. Clarksburg, 47 W. Va., 739; 35 after incorporation. Sloane v. S. E.-Rep., 994. Deed conveying People's El. Ry. Co., 7 Ohio Cir. land prior to formal incorporation, Ct. Rep., 84. held good. Spring Garden Bank 82 Stevens v. Merchantville, 62 V. Hurlings Lumber Co., 32 W. Va., N. J. L., 167; 40 Atl. Rep., 688. 357; 9 S. E. Rep., 243; 3 L. R. A., Contract to furnish light may be 583. 5 Thomp., Corp. § 5802. with individuals. Citizens Electric 80 Aspen Water & L. Co. v. Aspen, Light & Power Co. v. Sands, 95 5 Colo. App., 12; 37 Pac. Rep., 728. Mich., 551; 55 N. W. Rep., 452. 81 Chicago Tel. Co. v. Northwest- 83 Western Paving & Supply Co. em Tel. Co., 199 111., 324; 65 N. E. v. Citizen's Street R. Co., 128 Ind., Rep., 329, affirming 100 111. App., 525; 10 L. R. A., 770; 26 N. B. Rep., 57; 188; 28 N. E. Rep., 88. Indian- §576] OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. 897 cially where the discretion of conferring the right is vested exclusively in the municipality or the local authorities.** Thus a street railvray franchise may forbid the carrying of freight ;8s an ordinance giving a gas franchise may require compulsory service to all consumers along its line,*^ and the supplying of gas on reasonable terms ;*'' and, if authorized by the charter, an ordinance granting a street railroad franchise may provide for arbitration of controversies between the railway company and its employees.s^ It is usual to require bonds for the apolis v. Consumer's Gas Trust Cor, 140 Ind., 107;' 27 L. R. A., 514; 39 N. E. Rep., 433; Cambria Iron Co. V. Union Trust Co., 154 Ind., 291; 55 N. E. Rep., 745; 56 N. E. Rep., 665; Union Trust Co. v. Richmond City R. Co., 154 Ind., 291; 48 L. R. A., 41; 55 N. E., 745; 56 N. E. Rep., 665; NoWes- ville V. Noblesville Gas & Imp. Co., 157 Ind., 162; 60 N. E. Rep., 1032; Citizens' Gas & M. Co. v. Elwood, 114 Ind., 332; 16 N. E. Rep., 624; Detroit v. Ft. Wayne & Belle Isle Ry. Co., 95 Mich., 456; 54 N. W. Rep., 958. 84 Where the right to give or re- fuse consent to the occupations of streets by municipal corporation is unqualified, the power in grant- ing the right to impose reasonable conditions is necessarily implied. Allegheny City v. Millville, etc.. Street Ry. Co., 159 Pa. St., 411; 28 Atl. Rep., 202; Plymouth Tp. V. Chestnut Hill, etc., Ry. Co., 168 Pa. St., 181; 32 Atl. Rep., 19; Min- ersville Borough v. Schuylkill Elec- tric Ry. Co.. (Pa. 1903), 54 Atl. Rep., 1050. When consent of city required, conditions may be imposed, other- wise not. Philadelphia v. Empire Pass. R. Co., 177 Pa. St., 382; 35 Atl. Rep., 721. Conditions may be attached to grant, to protect city from pecun- iary liability and to secure the health and welfare of its citizens. 57 If the city should fail in this it will be primarily liable for all in- juries resulting from the misuse of its street. Blake v. St. Louis, 40 Mo., 569; Norton v. St. Louis, 97 Mo., 537; 11 S. W. Rep., 242; Wal- ker V. Kansas City, 99 Mo., 647; 12 S. W. Rep., 894. Right to impose conditions de- nied. McCune v. Norwich City Gas Co., 30 Conn., 521; 79 Am. Dec, 278; Patterson Gas Light Co. v. Brady, 27 N. J. L., 245; 72 Am. Dec, 360. See article by Salon D. Wilson, Esq., in relation of gas and water companies with their consumers. 27 Am. L. Reg. (U. S.), 277-288. 85 St. Louis & Meramec R. R. Co. V. Kirkwood, 159 Mo., 239; 60 S. W. Rep., 110. 86 Rushville V. Rushville Natural Gas Co., 132 Ind., 575; 15 L. R. A., 321; 28 N. E. Rep., 853. sTNew Orleans Gas Light & B. Co. V. Paulding, 12 Rob. (La.), 378; Baltimore Gas Light Co. v. Colliday, 25 Md., 1; Williams y. Mutual Gas Co., 52 Mich., 499; 18 N. W. Rep., 236; 50 Am. Rep.. 266; People v. Manhattan Gas Light Co., 45 Barb. (N. Y.), 136; Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 6 Wis., 539. 88 Wood v. Seattle, 23 Wash., 1; 62 Pac. Rep., 135; holding also that a provision permitting con- solidation with existing lines was valid. 898 OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§577 faithful performance of the obligations imposed upon the grantee ; but in one case, this provision was held not to apply to a gas company already doing business by virtue of a fran- chise not requiring a bond.*® § 577. Paving', repairing, etc., of streets by railway com- panies. The requirement is general that, as a condition to the grant of the franchise to maintain tracks and operate cars in the public streets, the grantee or its successor shall pave the streets between the rails of its tracks and for a certain distance outside of its tracks and also between its tracks, where double tracks are laid.®" Sometimes the whole street from curb to curb is required to be paved and kept in repair by the railroad company.81 But the extent of this obligation will depend upon the proper construction of the law applicable and the language of the charter of the company and the law or ordinance granting the franchise or privilege.*^ In a case determined by 89 Rushville v. Rushville Natural Gas Co., 132 Ind., 575; 28 N. E. Rep., 853; 15 L. R. A., 321. 90 State V. Jacksonville St. R. R., 29 Fla., 590; 10 So. Rep., 590; Conway v. Rochester, 157 N. Y., 33; 51 N. E. Rep., 395. 91 Philadelphia v. Thirteenth, etc., Ry. Co., 169 Pa. St., 269; 33 All. Rep., 126; Philadelphia v. Spring Garden, etc., R. Co., 161 Pa. St., 522; 29 Atl. Rep., 286; Leake V. Philadelphia, 150 Pa. St., 643; Philadelphia v. Ridge Ave. Pass. Ry. Co., 143 Pa. St., 444; 22 Atl. Rep., 695. Every ordinance granting the right to lay tracks and operate cars In the streets shall be on the express condition that the com- pany shall pave and keep in repair the streets from curb to curb, and that the company shall allow any other railroad company to use in common with it the same track or tracks, each paying an equal por- tion for the construction and re- pairs of the tracks and appurte- nances used by such railways joint- ly. Charter, San Francisco, art. II., Ch. 2, sec. 1, par. 28; Amend- ments to Statutes and Codes of Cal. (1899), pp. 250, 251. 92 The ordinance granting the right to lay tracks and operate cars may exempt the company from paving, where the law does not forbid. Lacey v. Marshalltown, 99 Iowa 367; 68 N. W. Rep., 726. The requirement as to paving may be modified by the munici- pality and company. An abutting property owner cannot complain. Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co., 49 La, Ann., 1608; 22 So. Rep., 955. The company cannot.be charged with the cost of paving made prior to its occupancy of the street. Gulf City St. Ry. v. Galveston, 69 Tex., 660; 7 S. W. Rep., 520; District of Columbia v. Washing- ton, etc., R. R., 4 Mackey (15 D. C.) 214; Philadelphia v. Empire Pass. Ry., 3 Brewst. (Pa.), 547. A street railroad company was authorized to lay its tracks In cer- tain streets, one condition being that it should pave the streets in and about the rails. Subsequently, 1577] OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. 899 the Supreme Court of the United States, the ordinance granted the street railway company the right to operate a street rail- way; one condition being that it should pave the streets be- tween its rails. Subsequently an ordinance was passed requir- ing the company to also pave the street for one foot outside of the rails. This ordinance was declared valid by virtue of the reserved power to amend, etc. The court remarked: "The company took its franchise subject to such legislation as the state might enact. * * * The general assembly deemed it necessary for the public good to require street railways to pay for the paving of one foot outside of the tracks, probably upon the view that it was right that they should be required to pave that part of the street which they used almost exclusively. It was not in the power of the city, by any contract with the company, to deprive the legislature of the power of taxing the company."®^ A new corporation formed by the merger of old ones is subject to the condition as to paving imposed on the latter.^* The requirement is general that the paving by the company shall be of the same material as used on other parts it was duly authorized to extend its Mandamus to compel paving as tracks, but the law did not express- required by ordinance denied, ly impose the condition that it should pave the street; held that as provision in former grant re- specting paving did not apply to the extension, the company need not pave streets on extension. New York v. N. Y. & H. R. Co., 19 N. Y. Supp., 67. A reasonable time must be al- lowed the company in which to do the paving. Ten days was held too short. People ex rel. v. Coftey, 66 Hun. (73 N. Y. Sup. Ct.), 160; 21 N. Y. Suppl., 34. If the company fails, the mu- nicipality may do the work and collect from the company. Colum- bus V. Columbus St. R. R. Co., 45 Ohio St., 98; 12 N. B. Rep., 651; Philadelphia v. Thirteenth St. Ry. Co., 3 Pa. Dis. Ct. Rep., 468. Mandamus will lie to compel the company to pay. State v. Jackson- ville St. R. R. Co., 29 Fla., 590; 10 So. Rep., 5^0. where it appeared the company was out of funds and could not raise them. Benton Harbor v. St. Joseph, etc., St. Ry. Co., 102 Mich., 386; 60 N. W. Rep., 758. Court will not compel road to operate where it is out of funds. State ex rel. v. Dodge City, etc. Ry. Co., 53 Kan., 329; 36 Pac. Rep., 755; 24 L. R. A., 564 and note. Failure on the part of the com- pany to pave, as required, was held no ground of forfeiture of its char- ter in State ex rel. v. Omaha & C. B. Ry. & B. Co., 91 Iowa, 517; 60 N. W.-Rep., 121. Acts involving special facts. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Ansonia, 61 Conn., 76; 23 Atl. Rep., 705. 93 Sioux City Street Ry. Co. v. Sioux City, 138 U. S., 98, 107, af- firming 78 Iowa, 367; 43 N. W. Rep., 224. »* Philadelphia v. Ridge Ave. 900 -OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§578 of the street, and if the street should be repaved with different material the company must adopt the new material.^^ The obligation to repair has been held to require repaving.^® But the weight of authority appears to support the contrary rule.9'' § 578. Exclusive privilegfes and monopolies. As pointed out elsewhere, without express power, exclusive franchises or privi- Pass. Ry. Co., 143 Pa. St., 444; 22 Atl. Rep., 695. 95 Mandamus will lie to compel the company to comply. Lansing V. Lansing City Elec. Ry. Co., 109 Mich., 123; 66 N. W. Rep., 949. Paving Matebial, kind of. Phil- adelphia V. Hestonville R. R., 177 Pa. St., 371; 35 Atl. Rep., 718; Philadelphia v. Philadelphia, etc. Ry. Co., 177 Pa. St., 379; 35 Atl. Rep., 720; Philadelphia v. Empire Pass. Ry. Co., 177 Pa. St., 382; 35 Atl. Rep., 721; McKeesport v. Mc- Keesport Pass. Ry., 158 Pa. St., 447; 27 Atl. Rep., 1006; Norristown V. Norristown Pass. Ry., 148 Pa. St., 87; 23 Atl. Rep., 1060; Phil- adelphia V. Empire, etc._ Ry., 3 Brewst. (Pa.), 570. 96 Liability to keep "in good or- der and repair," includes paving. This was assumed. People ex rel. Detroit v. Fort Street & E. Ry. Co., 41 Mich., 413; 2 N. W. Rep., 188. S. P. Ridge Ave. Ry. Co. v. Phil- adelphia, 124 Pa. St., 219; 16 Atl. Rep., 741, per Paxson, C. J.; Hug- gans V. Riley, 125 N. Y., 88; 25 N. E. Rep., 993. No sound distinction can be made between needful repairs and such improvements as are required for the public good. Middlesex R. R. Co. V. Wakefield, 103 Mass., 261, 266. 9' Repair Does Not Include Re- paving. The obligation imposed upon a railroad company to repair a street is not an obligation to con- struct thereon a new pavement. State ex rel. v. Corrigan Consoli- dated Ry. Co., 85 Mo., 263; Balti- more V. Scharf, 54 Md., 499, 525; Western Paving & Supply Co. v. Citizens Street Ry. Co., 128 Ind., 525; 26 N. E. Rep., 188; 28 N. E. Rep., 88; In re Repaying Fulton Street, 29 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 429. In one case, the condition of the franchise was that the company should "keep the surface of said streets and' highways within the rails, and for one foot outside thereof, and to the extent of the ties, in good and proper order and repair." The street in issue had never been paved. The council or- dered the street to be paved with asphalt, having a concrete founda- tion. As the company refused to pave, the city did the work and as- sessed the expense . against the company and brought action to re- cover. No evidence was offered to show that the street was not in good repair or that the pavement was necessary to keep the street in such condition. In denying the right to recover, it was held. 1. That the franchise obligation to keep the surface in good repair did not include repaying. 2. That the council resolution di- recting an asphalt pavement to be laid was not presumptive evidence that such pavement was necessary and proper. (Distinguishing Tingue v. Port Chester, 101 N. Y., 294; 4 N. E. Rep., 625; and New York v. Second Ave. R. R. Co., 102 N. Y., 572; 7 N. E. Rep., 905. Com- pare section 534, supra.), 3. That the city could not con- §578] OP FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. 901 leges in the nature of monopolies cannot be granted by a municipal corporation.''* Some municipal charters, in express terms, forbid the granting of monopolies and exclusive privi- leges.^^ Such restrictions also exist in constitutions and statutes.^ strue the legislative act granting the franchise to its own advantage. Gilmore v. Utica, 121 N. Y., 561; 24 N. E. Rep., 1009. 4. That as the rights of the com- pany had been fixed by the state act, the city could not impose addi- tional burdens. Binghamton v. Binghamton & Port Dickinson Ry. Co., 61 Hun. 479; 16 N. Y. Supp., 225. Paving Defined. Burnham v. Chicago, 24 111., 496; Warren v. Henly, 31 Iowa, 31. Macadamizing, held not paving. State V. Ramsey Co. Dist. Ct., 33 Minn., 164; 22 N. W. Rep., 295. Condition to pave with macadam does not include asphalt. Shamo- kin V. Shamokin St. Ry. Co., 178 Pa. St., 128; 35 Atl. Rep., 862. Repairing. Grading is not. Gal- veston V. Galveston City Ry. Co., 46 Tex., 435. Duty to repair includes the re- moval of deposits from the street caused by extraordinary rains, etc. Pittsburgh & B. Pass. Ry. Co. v. Pittsburgh, 80 Pa. St., 72. 88 Sees. 191 to 192 supra. Clarks- burg Electric Light Co. v. Clarks- burg, 47 W. Va., 739; 35 S. E. Rep., 994. Grant to build tracks, etc., in streets without power of revoca- tion reserved to city, denied. Mil- hau V. Sharp, 17 Barb. (N. Y.), 435; Davis v. New York, 14 N. Y., 506, per Denio, C. J. The grant of the exclusive right to lay and maintain water pipes in the public highways without ex- press power to do so will not estop the municipal corporation from taking advantage of the invalidity of such contract, although the wa- ter company had, in good faith, performed its part of the contract. The well established rule was in- voked that the company was bound to know the extent of the author- ity of the local corporation. Smith V. Westerly, 19 R. I., 437; 35 Atl. Rep., 526. As the streets are held in trust for the public, the right to grant the exclusive privilege to one tele- phone company alone to occupy streets with its poles, wires, etc., was denied in Chicago Tele. Co. v. N. W. Tel. Co., 199 111., 324; 65 N. E. Rep., 329 affirming 100 111. App., 57. If the constitution does not for- bid, it has been held that, the leg- islature may grant an exclusive franchise to an electric light com- pany. Grand Rapids, etc. Co. v. Grand Rapids, etc. Co., 33 Fed. Rep., 659; Scranton, etc., Co.'s Ap- peal, 122 Pa. St., 154; 15 Atl. Rep., 446. 99 "No exclusive franchise or privilege shall be granted for lay- ing pipes, wires, or conduits." Charter, San Francisco, art. II, ch. 2, sec. 5; Stat, and Amend, to Codes of Cal., 1899, p. 252. Under the San Francisco charter steam railroads are allowed to en- ter the city on such terms as may be fixed by the board of supervis- ors, but no exclusive right shall be granted and the use of all such rights shall at all times be subject to regulation by the board. Char- ter, San Francisco, art. II, ch. 2, sec. 11, par. 28; Stat, and Amend, to Codes of Cal. (1899), 250. 1 Section 219, p. 354, supra. 903 OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§579 Within the powers duly conferred by the state, the municipal corporation oftentimes grant franchises and make contracts which, in effect, confer upon individuals and corporations ex- clusive privileges in connection with the performance of some public or quasi public service. However, the rule of construc- tion is that such grants are construed against the grantee and in favor of the public ; and any ambiguity in the terms of the grant operates in favor of the public. ^ § 579. Acceptance of franchise ordinance. Acceptance of the franchise ordinance by the grantee is usually evidenced in a formal manner by entry upon the municipal records. How- ever, "no formal resolution of acceptance is necessary in any case, if the facts show an actual, practical acceptance by the company." So, "it is universally held that a previous request for an ordinance obviates the necessity of a subsequent accept- ance. "^ "We are also of the opinion that an acceptance may be presumed from the fact that the amendment (to the ordi- nance) was beneficial to the corporation," and from the further fact that it issued bonds, as was contemplated when the ordi- nance was applied for, and made them fall due at the expira- tion of the enlarged franchise.* Thrift V. Board of Comrs. etc., 122 3 Rule applied to the charter of N. C, 31; 30 S. B. Rep., 349; Atchi- a corporation. Atlanta v. The Gate son St. Ry. Co. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., City Gas Light Co., 71 Ga., 106, 117. 31 Kan., 661; 3 Pac. Rep., 284. * Per Mr. Justice Brown in City The constitutional restriction as Ry. Co. v. Citizens' Street Ry. Co., to the grant of any special or ex- 166 U. S., 557, 568; 17 Sup. Ct. elusive privilege, immunity or Rep., 653. franchise was held, in Illinois, to It is an old principle of law, as be a limitation of the power of the stated by Mr. Cook, that accept- state legisature and not a restric- ance of the charter is necessary to tion of the power of a municipal the actual existence of the private corporation to designate certain corporation. But there is no rigid streets and fix the conditions upon rule of law requiring an indication which a railroad company organ- of such acceptance in a formal ized under a special charter, pre- manner. "Any act which proves viously granted, may build and an intent on the part of the corpo- operate its road. Chicago City R. rators to proceed under the char- R. Co. V. People, 73 111., 541. ter is a sufficient acceptance of it 2 See 1 Eddy on Combinations, It has been held frequently that an sec. 19 et seq. and cases acceptance may be shown by proof Exclusive water franchise. At- that corporate meetings and elec- lantic City Waterworks Co. v. At- tions have been held and other cor- lantlc City, 39 N. J. Bq., 367. porate acts entered Into. Mere user §583] OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. 903 § 580. Right to occupy streets, etc., as contract. The right conferred by ordinance by municipal corporations upon public or quasi public service companies, to occupy the public streets and ways for legitimate purposes, when accepted by the grantee under the terms prescribed, and after compliance there- with on the part of the grantee, becomes a valid contract be- tween the municipality and the grantee which cannot be repudiated by either party, nor can the obligations thereof be impaired by any act on the part of the public authorities.^ This subject is fully treated in prior sections.^ § 581. Change in location of water mains— Injunction to prevent. A contract by ordinance between a city and water company, that the latter will lay water mains and supply the inhabitants with water on certain streets, may, after such mains are laid, be so modified and changed by the city and water company as to require the water company to remove its mains from certain streets, where, in the opinion of the council, public necessity no longer requires their continuance, to other portions of the city where public necessity requires that mains should be laid. The fact that such change may greatly de- crease the value of private property will not support injunction at the instance of a property owner to prevent it.'' § 582. Police regulations— Grade crossings. The power of the municipal corporation to make and enforce reasonable of the right to act as a corporation city cannot object. "When a mu- is sufficient." 1 Cook Corp. sec. nicipal corporation enters into a 2a, and cases in extensive note. contract which it has authority to 5 Grant of right to lay gas pipes, malte, the doctrine of estoppel ap- etc, is property and will be pro- plies to it with the same force as tected. People v. Deehan, 153 N. against individuals." Union Depot Y., 528; 47 N. E. Rep., 787. Co. v. St. Louis, 76 Mo., 393, 396. City cannot repudiate. Lima s Ordinances granting franchise Gas Co. V. Lima, 4 Ohio Cir. Ct. as contracts. Impairment of obli- Rep., 22. gation. Sections 238 to 241, supra. The municipal corporation may Amendment and repeal of fran- require the gas company to per- chise and contract ordinances, form its part. Pensacola Gas Co. Sections 197, 200 and 201 supra. V. Provisional Municipality, 33 Reservation of right to alter, Fla., 322; 14 So. Rep., 826. amend or repeal franchise con- Where a city has granted a fran- tracts. Section 242 supra. chise to a union depot company to i Asher y. Hutchinson Water L. use and occupy streets and the & P. Co. (Kan. 1903) 61 L. R. A., company has erected permanent 52; 71 Pac. Rep., 813. and costly buildings thereon, the 904 OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§583 police regulations respecting the uses of streets and public ways and keeping the same free from obstruction and nuisance, in the interest of public safety and convenience, is fully treated elsewhere.* Regulations of this character applicable to the operation of locomotives, trains and streets railways within the corporate limits are fully discussed in prior sections.^ Charter power to define and abate nuisances, general author- ity to adopt necessary police regulations to secure the safety of the inhabitants in the running of trains, and special power to require change of location, grade of roads and crossings, to compel the raising or lowering of tracks to conform to any grade that might be established, and to construct bridges, via- ducts or tunnels across the right of way at street crossings, was held in Indiana insufficient to authorize a general ordinance declaring grade crossings a nuisance and directing all railroad companies to elevate their tracks within the city for the pur- pose of abolishing grade crossings, where it appeared that the condition of some of the crossings did not require such remedy. The court viewed the question as solely one of charter power, and whether the ordinance was within the general police power. The opinion was expressed that, although " crossings were authorized by law, if they are so maintained as to become public nuisances the question of fact may be judicially de- termined in a ease properly presented, but that general charter power to define nuisances does not empower the municipal corporation to declare anything a nuisance per se which in fact was not recognized as such by common law.^" 8 Section 458 et seq, supra. lo The fact that relator's com- PoLKS AND WiEES. Reasonable mon council under the ordinance rules and regulations for the erec- in controversy has by its own flat tion and maintenance of the poles declared all of the appellee's rail- and wires of electric light com- road crossings to be nuisanoes does panics may be adopted and en- not justify the demand that, by forced. The removal of those that reason of such declaration, appel- are dangerous may be compelled, lee must move its surface tracks Wyandotte Electric Light Co. v. and construct, instead thereof, a Wyandotte, 124 Mich., 43; 82 N. W. series of elevated ones." State ex Rep., 821; Michigan Telephone Co. rel. Indianapolis v. Indianapolis V. St. Joseph, 121 Mich., 502; 80 Union Ry. Co. (Ind. 1903), 66 N. N. W. Rep., 383; 47 L. R. A., 87; E. Rep., 163; 60 L. R. A., 831. Michigan Telephone Co. v. Benton Duty of railroad company to Harbor, 121 Mich., 512; 80 N. W. maintain safe use of highway Rep., 386; 47 L. R. A., 104. crossed by railroads. Chicago, In- Sections 472 and 474 supra. dianapolis & L. Ry. Co. v. Zimmer- §583] OF fra;^chise ordinances. 905 § 583. Power to regulate rates or charges. In the leading case of Munn v. Illinois,^^ the Supreme Court of the United States announced the doctrine that, by virtue of the power in- herent in every sovereignty, a government may regulate the conduct of its citizens towards each other, and, when necessary for the public good, the manner in which each shall use his own property. Ferries, common carriers, hackmen, inn keep- ers, wharfingers, bakers, millers, markets, etc., have been the subject of regulation in England from the earliest period and in this country from the date of the establishment of the colo- nies. The purpose has been not only to insure efficient public service, but to prevent extortion and monopoly, the monopoly so odious to the common law.^^ Supplying transportation, water, light, etc., to the municipality and its inhabitants by virtue of franchise grants involving the use of public ways impresses the business with a public character and justifies public regulation, especially if the right to supply is exclusive and in the nature of a monopoly.^* The power of regulation appertaining to the state as a sover- eignty may be delegated by the state to its municipal corpora- tions, and such agencies may fix the maximum rates or charges of public or quasi public service companies, engaged in the business of supplying water,i* gas or electric light, heat and power, or transportation, to the inhabitants of the local corn- man, 158 Ind., 189, 193; 63 N. E. 862; Danville Water Co. v. Dan- Rep., 224, quoting with approval ville, 180 U. S., 619; 21 Sup. Ct. § 1107, Elliott on R. R., as follows: Rep., 505, affirming 186 111., 326; "Each particular crossing presents 57 N. E. Rep., 1129; 178 111., 299; different conditions, hut the gener- 53 N. E. Rep., 118; Rogers Park al rule * * * is that the com- Water Co. v. Fergus, 180 U. S., pany must erect whatever stric- 624; 21 Sup. Ct. Rep., 490, affirni- tures are reasonably necessary to ing 178 111., 571; 53 N. E. Rep., the safety and convenience of the 363; Agua Pura Co. v. Las Vegas traveler using the crossing." (N. Mex. 1900), 60 Pac. Rep., 208; General police power. State v. 50 L. R. A.. 224; Kennebec Water Gerhardt, 145 Ind., 439; 33 L. R. Dist. v. Waterville, 97 Me., 185; 54 A., 313; 44 N. E. Rep., 469. Atl. Rep., 6; American Water- 1194 U. S., 113. works Co. v. State, 46 Neb., 194; 12 See Beach, Monopolies and In- 64 N. W. Rep., 711; 30 L. R. A., dustrial Trusts, sec. 133, p. 413. 447. 13 Spring Valley Waterworks v. i* Danville v. Danville Water Schottler, 110 U. S., 347; Freeport Co., 178 111., 299; 53 N. E. Rep., Water Co. v. Freeport, 180 U. S., 118; Cedar Rapids Water Co. v. 587; 21 Sup. Ct. Rep., 493, affirm- Cedar Rapids, 117 Iowa, 250; 91 N. ing 186 111., 179; 57 N. E. Rep., W. Rep., 1081. 906 OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§ 585 munity. And such power may be conferred to be exercised from time to time as public necessity may require.!^ While the obligations of contracts cannot be impaired or vested rights disturbed by action on the part of the municipal cor- poration,!^ the reserved power to repeal or alter the ordinance granting the privilege or franchise will justify reasonable change or reduction in rates or charges. In such case there is no impairment of the obligation of contracts, since there can be no vested right to the rates or charges.^'' § 584. Same— Under general power— Estoppel. General control over streets and power "to license, tax and regulate" various businesses and occupations, was held in Missouri in- sufficient to authorize an ordinance regulating telephone charges.!* Charter power "to provide for supplying the city with water" gives authority to contract with a water company in respect to rates to be charged to consumers. In such case the municipal corporation may, by contract in granting the franchise, limit its powers as to fixing rates. And the rates so fixed cannot be reduced. And where the municipality, by ordinances passed each year, assumes to regulate the sums to be charged by a water company, acquiescence by the company in the reduction made by one of such ordinances, was held not to be acquiescence in the ordinances of the succeeding years. i^ A water company will not be estopped from contesting the con- stitutionality of an ordinance fixing rates where it collects rates under protests, although for a period of fifteen years.^'' § 585. Reasonableness of water rates. The rates or charges must be reasonable and made in good faith.^i Usually the 15 Danville v. Danville Water v. Schottler, 110 U. S., 347; 4 Sup. Co., 180 111., 235; 54 N. E. Rep., Ct. Rep., 48. 224; Rogers Park Water Co. v. is St. Louis v. Bell Tel. Co., 96 Fergus, 178 111., 571; 53 N. E. Rep., Mo., 623; 10 S. W. Rep., 197; 2 L. 363; Knoxville v. Knoxville Wp,ter R. A., 278; 9 Am. St. Rep., 370. Co., 107 Tenn., 647 ; 64 S. W. Rep., is Injunction against enforce- 1075; Carlyle v. Carlyle Water, L. ment of ordinance reducing water & P. Co., 52 111. App., 577. rates granted. Los Angeles City 16 Sections 197, 200, 201, 238 to Water Co. v. Los Angeles, 88 Fed. 242. Rep., 720. . Contracts or vested rights can- 20 Los Angeles v. Los Angeles not be impaired. Santa Ana Wa- City Water Co., 177 U. S., 558; 20 ter Co. v. San Buenaventura, 56 Sup. Ct. Rep., 736. Fed. Rep., 339. 21 San Diego Water Co. v. San 17 Spring Valley Waterworks Diego, 118 Cal., 556; 50 Pac. Rep., §585] OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. 907 ordinance fixing the rates or charges will be held to be prima facie reasonable.22 xhe ordinance fixing the rates or charges must be definite and certain.^^ Thus in an Iowa case, an ordi- nance was held void for indefiniteness which stipulated that the water should be furnished at the average rate paid in other cities of the union, having efficient water works operated by private corporations, amd which provided for arbitration of such rates if they could not be fixed by agreement.^* The reasonableness of the ordinance is a judicial question.^^ 633; 38 L. R. A., 460; Des Moines V. Des Moines Waterworks Co., 95 Iowa, 348; 64 N. W. Rep., 269; Goebel v. Grosse Pointe Water- Works, 126 Mich., 307; 85 N. W. Rep., 744. 22 Rule applied to ordinance reg- ulating street car fares, § 588 post. 23 § 20, supra. 2i Des Moines v. Des Moines Wa- ter Works Co., 95 Iowa, 348; 64 N. W. Rep., 269. 25 Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 189 U. S., 434; 23 Sup. Ct. Rep., 531, affirming 107 Tenn., 647; 64 S. W. Rep., 1075. Validity or ordinance restricting power as to future regulation. Creston Waterworks Co. v. Cres- ton, 101- Iowa, 687, 698; 70 N. W. Rep., 739. Terms used in ordinances. St. Louis Brewing Assn. v. St. Louis, 140 Mo., 419; 37 S. W. Rep., 525; 41 S. W. Rep., 911. "Bath," "water-closets," "water basins." Allen v. Duluth Gas & W. Co., 46 Minn., 290; 48 N. W. Rep., 1128. "Room," "domestic purposes." Crosby v. Montgomery, 108 Ala., 498; 18 So. Rep., 723. "Dwelling." Smith v. Birming- ham Waterworks Co., 104 Ala., 315; 16 So. Rep., 123; United States V. American Waterworks Co., 37 Fed. Rep., 747. Method of determining reason- ableness of water rates. San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, 174 U. S., 739; 19 Sup. Ct. Rep., 804, affirming 74 Fed. Rep., 79; Redlands, L. & C. Domestic Water Co. V. Redlands, 121 Cal., 312; 53 Pac. Rep., 791. Watee Works Owned and Ope- KATED BY CiTY. When the power to fix rates is conferred on the board of public works the council cannot fix such rates under the general power to pass such ordinances as may be necessary to protect the water works and enforce the rules and regulations of the board. The board has power to recommend the ordinance fixing the rates and the council the power to adopt or re- ject. State ex rel. v. Gosnell (Wis. 1903), 93 N. W. Rep., 542; 61 L. R. A., 33. Water Meters. An ordinance may require consumers of water to provide at their own expense meters for measuring water. Such ordinance may prescribe that con- sumers using service pipes of a cer- tain diameter shall furnish such meters, leaving the matter of us- ing a meter by others optional. State ex rel. v. Gosnell (Wis. 1903), 93 N. W. Rep., 542; 61 L. R. A., 33, distinguishing Red Star S. S. Co. V. Jersey City, 45 N. J. L., 246, and Spring Valley Water- works V. San Francisco, 82 Cal., 286; 22 Pac. Rep., 910, 1046; 6 L. 908 OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§ 586 § 586. Regulating price of gas and light. General power to provide reasonable regulations for the safe supply, distribution and consumption of natural gas, was held in Indiana insuffi- cient to authorize the regulation of the price by ordinance.^^ But in the same state it has been decided that a statute giving the local corporation exclusive power over the streets, high- ways and alleys, confers authority in granting a, franchise to lay gas pipes in the streets, to prescribe the maximum rates to be charged by the company for gas.^'^ In Washington, it was ruled that power to regulate and control the use of light was insufficient to authorize a reduction in the price of light.^® Where the charter of a gas company, granted by the state, authorized it to fix the price of gas manufactured by it, it was held in Missouri that such price could not be diminished by subsequent legislative action, state or municipal, for the reason that the charter constituted a contract between the company and the city and the obligations of which could not be impaired. And where an ordinance grants to a gas company the privilege of furnishing gas to the municipality and private consumers for a named period, and provides the maximum price of gas, which ordinance is ac- cepted by the company, the city cannot thereafter reduce such price. The case declares the law to be that the regulation of the price of gas by the state or by municipalities created by it is not the exercise of a police power which cannot be abridged by a contract.2^ R. A., 756; 16 Am. St. Rep., 116, permit a natural gas company to and approving SheflSeld Water- use the streets without any con- works Co. V. Bingham, 25 Ch. Div., ditions annexed except such as the 443. See article 27 Am. Law Reg. law attaches, it is not perceived (N. S.), 277-288 by Salon D. Wil- why, as in this case, in making pro- son, Esq., on relation of gas and vision for supplying natural gas water companies with consumers, to all of the inhabitants of the 26 Louisville Natural Gas Co. v. city, it may not protect such in- State ex rel. Reynolds, 135 Ind., habitants against extortion by pro- 49 ; 34 N. E. Rep., 702 ; 21 L. R. A., viding that the company shall not 734, overruling Rushville v. Rush- charge in excess of certain prices ville Natural Gas Co., 132 Ind., for its service." Per Gillett, J., in 575; 28 N. E. Rep., 853; 15 L. R. A., Muncie Natural Gas Co. v. Muncie 321. (Ind. 1903), 66 N. E. Rep., 436; Power to regulate price of gas 60 L. R. A., 822. denied. In re Pryor, 55 Kan., 724 ; 2s Tacoma, etc., Co. v. Tacoma, 14 29 L. R. A., 398; 41 Pac. Rep., 958. Wash., 700; 44 Pac. Rep., 106. 27 "If the common council may 29 state ex rel. St. Louis v. La- §587] OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. 909 § 587. Regulating street car fares. As stated, it cannot be questioned that the legislature has power to regulate the charges of common carriers,*"^ and this power may be delegated to the municipal authorities.^^ If the power has been properly delegated by the state to the municipal corporation, its exercise is a matter of municipal discretion. Whether there exists a public demand or need for the enactment, or even whether it is just and reasonable in all its provisions, are not questions for judicial determination, except for the sole purpose of ascer- taining whether constitutional rights have been violated.*^ After a full review of the cases, the law is thus concisely stated by Mr. Justice Harlan: "In view of the adjudications, these principles must be regarded as settled : 1. A railroad corporation is a person within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, declaring that no state shall deprive any person of property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro- tection of the laws. 2. A state enactment, or regulation made under the author- ity of a state enactment, establishing rates for the transporta- tion of persons or property by railroad, that will not admit of the carrier earning such compensation as under all the circum- stances is just to it and the public, would deprive such carrier of its property without due process of law and deny to it the equal protection of the laws, and would therefore be repugnant to the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States. elede Gaslight Co., 102 Mo., 472; Ry. Co., 64 III. App., 165; Chicago 14 S. W. Rep., 974; 15 S. W. Rep., Packing Co. v. Chicago, 88 111., 221, 38a; 22 Am. St. Rep.. 789. 225. Implied power to regulate the 32 Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light price of light, § 67, supra. Co. v. Milwaukee, 87 Fed. Rep., 30 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S., 113; 577. Chicago, etc., R. R. v. Iowa, 94 U. Rates apply to non-residents of S., 155; Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U. the local corporation. Coy v. De- S., 526; Ruggles v. People, 91 111., troit Y. & A. A. Ry., 125 Mich., 616; 256. 85 N. W. Rep., 6. 31 Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Right to change — Particular Chicago, 199 111., 484, 523 ; 65 N. E. Case — Consolidation — Reserved Rep., 451. S. P. Rogers Park Water right, etc. Cleveland City Ry. Co. Co. V. Fergus, 178 111., 571; 53 N. v. Cleveland, 94 Fed. Rep., 385. E. Rep., 563; Danville v. Danville When fare cannot be reduced. Water Co., 180 111., 235; 54 N. E. Old Colony T. Co. v. Atlanta, 83 Rep., 224; Dean v. Chicago General Fed. Rep., 39. 910 OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§588 3. While rates for the transportation of persons or property within the limits of the state are primarily for its determina- tion, the question whether they are so unreasonably low as to deprive the carrier of its property without such compensa- tion as the constitution secures, and therefore without due process of law, cannot be so conclusively determined by the legislature of the state or by regulation adopted under its authority, that the matter may not become the subject of judicial inquiry."*^ § 588. Reasonableness of street car fares. Street ear rates must be reasonable. If they are fixed unreasonably low, this will amount to confiscation of property without due process of law within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution.^* The law will presume street- car fares fixed by ordinance to be reasonable until the contrary is shown, and the burden is on the party contending them to be unreason- able.*5 A street railroad company desiring to present this- question must show the profits and earnings of its entire sys- tem and the effect which the enforcement of the ordinance will Cannot fix fare for cars run out- 116 U. S., 307; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., side of city. South Pasadena v. 334; Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S., Los Angeles Term. Ry. Co., 109 680; 8 Sup. Ct. Rep., 1028; 34 Am. Cal., 315; 41 Pac. Rep., 1093. & Eng. R. Cas., 322; Georgia Ry. & Regulating rates on electric Banking Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S., roads running through several 174; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 47; 35 Am. & cities, villages and townships in Eng. R. Cas., 511; C, M. & St. P. Michigan. Coy v. Detroit, Y. & A. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S., A. Ry., 125 Mich., 616; 85 N. W. 418; 10 Sup. Ct. Rep., 462; 42 Am. Rep., 6. & Eng. R. Cas., 285; Budd v. New 33 Smyth V. Ames, 169 U. S., York, 143 U. S., 517; 12 Sup. Ct. 466, 526; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 418, Rep., 468; 36 Am. & Eng. Corp. 426. Cas., 31; Reagan v. Farmer's L. & 34 Corporations are persons Trust Co.. 154 XJ. S., 362 ; 14 Sup. within meaning of amendment. Ct. Rep., 1047; 58 Am. & Eng. R. R. Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pac. Cas., 699; Chicago & G. T. Ry. Co: R., 118 U. S., 394; 24 Am. & Eng, v. Wellman, 143 U. S., 339; 12 Sup. R. Cas., 523; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 1132; Ct. Rep., 400; 49 Am. & Eng. R. R. Charlotte, C. & A. R. R. v. Gihbes, Cas., 1; St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. 142 U. S., 386; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep., v. Gill, 156 V. S., 649; 15 Sup. Ct. 255; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. R. v. Ellis, Rep., 484; Covington & Lexington 165, U. S., 150; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., Turnpike Road Co. v. Sanford, 255. 164 U. S., 578; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., Reasonableness of Rates dis- 198. cussed as relates to 14th amend- ss g. p. Cotting v. K. C. Stock ment. Railroad Commission Cases, Yards, 183 U. S., 79, 97. §590] OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. 911 have upon such system. The basis of calculation is the fair value of the property ; the apparent value of the property and franchises as represented by stocks, bonds and obligations is not alone to be considered. A showing that other companies of a similar character charged the same rate for transportation for the same or longer distances is one way of ascertaining the reasonableness of rates of fare.^^ § 589. Discrimination in street car rates forbidden. The rule elsewhere stated and illustrated which forbids discrimi- nations in municipal legislation,^^ has been applied to ordi- nances regulating the rates of street car fare. Thus an ordi- nance permitting a street railroad company e^ngaged in interstate commerce under franchise granted by the local cor- poration to make discrimination in rates in favor of residents of the city against residents of another state conflicts with the interstate commerce clause of the federal constitution and is therefore void.^® Ordinances of this character must have an uniform operation. If they give residents of the city the special privilege of obtaining transportation at a less rate than other residents of the state they will be declared unconstitu- tional.^' § 590. Place of sale of street car tickets— Transfers. Power "to fix and determine the fare charged," necessarily carries with it all incidents necessary to carry the power into effect, including power to require by ordinance tickets to be kept for sale by each conductor of a street car. "A street railway has no depots. Its stations are the street corners, and its business with the public is conducted on its cars. * * * The ques- tion is one of power, and the power of the city over the street railway is full and ample, and the requirement is reasonable, and the company must perform on its part."*<> 36 Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Junction v. Dyer, 64 Iowa, 38; 19 Chicago, 199 111., 579; 65 N. E. N. W. Rep., 862. Rep., 451. See San Diego Land & so Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Town Co. V. National City, 174 U. Smith, 173 U. S., 684; 19 Sup. Ct. S., 739, 755 ; St. Louis & San Fran- Rep., 565 ; Gloucester Ferry Co. v, oiscQ Ry. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S., Pennsylvania, 114 U. S., 196; 5 649, 665. Sup. Ct. Rep., 826; Guy v. Balti- ST Sections 184, 193, 226; 417, more, 100 U. S., 434. 438. *» Per Maxwell, C. J., in Stern- 38 State ex rel. v. Omaha & C. B. berg v. State, 36 Neb., 307; 54 N. Ry. & Bridge Co., 113 Iowa, 30; W. Rep., 553, sustaining Lincoln 84 N. W. Rep., 983. S. P. Pacific ordinance. 913 OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§ 591 A reservation in the ordinance granting the franchise of the right "to make such further rules, orders or regulations as may from time to time be deemed necessary to protect the interest, safety, welfare or accommodation of the public," in- cludes the right to pass an ordinance requiring the company, for the accommodation of the public, to keep tickets for sale upon its cars to be good for transportation over its entire route or any portion thereof, "traveling continuously either way," between certain hours, at a rate prescribed. Such ordinance may make each day's neglect to comply therewith an offense punishable by fine and may provide for the collection of such fine in an action at law.*^ § 591. Duration of privileges or franchises to use streets, etc. Municipal charters or general laws usually limit the time for which franchises or privileges for using the streets by public or quasi public service companies may be granted.*^ It has been held that where a limit is contained in the charter or general law a grant of a franchise without limit is void.*^ Where a municipal corporation grants to an electric light com- pany an easement in its streets for the maintenance of poles and wires, without specifying the time of user, the grant is good for the corporate lifetime of the grantee,** provided, however, that such privilege or franchise is not otherwise limited by law. And it has been decided that a street railway company is not incapable of taking a grant of a right to use streets for its railways for a period extending beyond the life of its own corporate franchise, the interest granted being assignable.*^ This doctrine has been applied to a grant to a 41 Detroit v. Ft. Wayne & Belle York, 1897, ch. 378, sec. 73. Isle Ry. Co., 95 Mich., 456; 54 N. *3 Blaschko v. Wurster, 156 N. W. Rep., 958. Y., 437; 51 N. E. Rep., 303; Norris Requiring sale of tickets on cars. v. Wurster, 23 App. Div. (N. Y.), Rice V. Detroit, Y. & A. A. Ry., 122 124. Mich., 677; 81 N. W. Rep., 927; 48 «* Wyandotte Electric Light Co. L. R. A., 84, V. Wyandotte, 124 Mich., 43, 47; Chicago ordinance of 1897 sus- 82 N. W. Rep., 821. S. P. St. Clair tained which fixed the rate of fare County Turnpike Co. v. Illinois, at five cents for one continuous 96 U. S., 63, 68. passage on any line within the cor- *5 Detroit Citizens' St. Ry. Co. v. porate limits. Chicago Union Detroit, 64 Fed. Rep., 628; 12 C. C. Traction Co. v. Chicago, 199 111., A., 365; 22 TJ. S., 570, reversing 484, 579 ; 65 N. B. Rep., 451. Detroit v. Detroit City Ry., 56 Fed. 12 Twenty-five years. Charter Rep., 867; 60 Fed. Rep., 161; Peo- Greater New York; Laws of New pie v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y., 1; 18 N. §592] OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. 913 gas company to occupy the streets, etc., with, its gas pipes, etc.46 § 592. Forfeiture of franchise. A franchise to run a street railway may be forfeited by non-user.*'' If the right conferred by the franchise is not acted upon within the time specified, where this is an essential condition, the franchise may be forfeited.** So if the franchise or the rights conferred thereby are abandoned after the construction of the road is begun, the franchise may be forfeited.*^ Non-user of a street railway franchise is established by proof that there was a sham pre- tense of user by running but one car a day without intending E. Rep., 692, reversing 45 Hun. perpetual is discussed in Levis v. (N. Y.), 519. "The right to construct and op- erate tracks on a street may be granted for a longer period than the charter duration of the corpo- ration which talies the grant; and, where there is no express limita- tion of time specified in the char- ter or ordinance giving this right, it is granted in perpetuity and ex- ists forever." 4 Cook. Corp. § 913, p. 2237. *6 A city ordinance, granting to a gas company, its successors and assigns the privilege of furnishing gas to the city and to private consumers for a named period, is not void because the time extends beyond the termination of the conipany's chartered existence, the ordinance providing that it might transfer all of its rights and priv- ileges, property and franchises, given by the ordinance, to any or- ganized gas company of the state which would, within twenty days after the transfer, file its written acceptance of the ordinance and give bond to perform all the agree- ments required of the original company. State ex rel. St. Louis V. Laclede Gas Light Co., 102 Mo., 472; 14 S. W. Rep., 974; 15 S. W. Rep., 383; 22 Am. St. Rep., 789. Whether a grant to maintain gas pipes, etc., in streets, etc., is 58 Newton, 75 Fed. Rep., 884. Street railway franchise in per- petuity cannot be granted by mu- nicipality under general powers. Birmingham & P. M. St. Ry. Co. v. Birmingham St. Ry. Co., 79 Ala., 465; 58 Am. Rep., 615. Perpetual right to maintain stairway in part of alley— Stair- way may be abated as nuisance. Pettis V. Johnson, 56 Ind., 139. Duration of franchise discussed. Milhau V. Sharp, 17 Barb. (N. Y.), 435; State v. New York, 10 N. Y. Super. Ct. (3 Duer), 119; Houston V. Houston City Ry. Co., 83 Tex., 548; 19 S. W. Rep., 127; Seattle v. Columbia & P. S. R. Co., 6 Wash., 379; 33 Pac. Rep., 1048. An irrepealable contract for use of street may be made. Baltimore Trust & Guarantee Co. v. Balti- more, 64 Fed. Rep., 153. " State ex rel. Kansas City v. East 5th St. Ry. Co., 140 Mo., 539; 41 S. W. Rep., 955; 38 L. R. A., 218. ■48 Atchison St. R. Co. v. Nave, 38 Kan., 744; 17 Pac. Rep., 587; 36 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas., 29. *9 Great Central R. Co. v. Gulf, etc., R. Co., 63 Tex., 529; 26 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas., 114. Failure to comply with terms, will work revocation. Plymouth 914 OP FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§593 to accommodate the public and which could not have accom- plished this purpose.50 Where the right conferred by ordi- nance to use the streets for railway purposes is granted on the express condition that such rights shall be forfeited if the company does not within a year build a named extension (which condition is reasonable), the municipal corporation en- acting the ordinance may remove the tracks of the company from the streets on failure on the part of the company to comply with the condition.^i The municipal corporation may waive strict performance of the conditions under which such privileges or franchises are gra-nted.^^ But mere delay on its part in bringing proceedings will not constitute a waiver, espe- cially where it does not lead to any material change in the situation.^8 Although the municipal corporation may by delegated authority grant a franchise to construct, maintain and operate a street railway, it cannot maintain an action to forfeit such franchise for misuse or abuse. Such jurisdiction belongs ex- clusively to the state unless delegated to the city. The mere right to grant the franchise does not constitute a delegation of such authority.^* Tp. V. Chestnut Hill & N. R. Co., 168 Pa. St., 181; 32 Atl. Rep., 19. 50 People ex rel. v. Sutter Street Ry. Co., 117 Cal., 604, 613; 49 Pac. Rep., 736. 51 Minersville Borough v. Schuyl- kill Blec, Ry. Co. (Pa., 1903), 54 Atl. Rep., 1050. 52 Chicago City R. R. Co. v. Peo- ple, 73 111., 541. Right of city to waive a for- feiture of a street railway fran- chise or to be estopped in respect thereto was discussed but not de- cided in People ex rel. v. Sutter St. Ry. Co., 117 Cal., 604, 612; 49 Pac. Rep., 736. 53 Minersville Borough v. Schuyl- kill Ry. Co. (Pa., 1903), 54 Atl. Rep., 1050. An ordinance provided that a proceeding for a forfeiture should be begun in six months after the forfeiture accrued. The suit was not begun for 18 months. Held, that the city did not thereby waive its right to forfeiture be- cause it has no right to contract with defendant that non-user by the corporation of its tracks for any length of time should not act as a forfeiture. State ex rel. Kan- sas City V. East 5th St. Ry. Co., 140 Mo., 539; 41 S. W. Rep., 955; 38 L. R. A., 218. A Fine may be imposed in de- claring a forfeiture of a street railway franchise and such fine will not be disturbed on appeal if not unreasonable. People ex rel. V. Sutter St. Ry. Co., 117 Cal., 604, 613; 49 Pac. Rep., 736. 5* Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co. V. Milwaukee, 95 Wis., 39; 69 N. W. Rep., 794. Action by City to Enforce For- feiture Sustained. Failure to comply with the condition to fur- 592] OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. 915 Where the condition is that, if the road is not built within a specified time the franchise shall be forfeited, a judgment de- claring a forfeiture. is required.^'' But where the condition is that the franchise shall "be terminated" or shall cease within nish water of a certain quantity and quality is ground of forfeiture and an action to annul the grant will lie on behalf of the municipal corporation. The right of forfeit- ure is not limited to quo warranto on the part of the state. St. Cloud V. Water, Light & P. Co. (Minn., 1903), 92 N.W. Rep., 1112. Private Citizen Cannot Main- tain Action. Right of way to build tracks in certain streets granted, provided that road should be completed within twelve months from date of company's acceptance of grant, and that in event of fail- ure the franchise might be taken away. Held, that this provision was a condition subsequent and that acceptance vested right of way at once subject to be defeated at election of city for breach of conditions, but not at instance of private citizens. Hovelman v. K. C. H. R. R. Co., 79 Mo., 632. See A. & P. R. R. Co. V. St. Louis, 66 Mo., 228. So a like ruling was made where the condition was that the franchise should become null and void if the company should ever remove its machine shops from the city. Knight v. K. C, St. J. & C. B. R. R., 70 Mo., 231. Quo Warranto is proper to for- feit franchise of street railway. The franchise given by city ordi- nance to construct and operate a street railway comes from the state, which, in granting it, acts through the city as its agent, and such agent cannot abridge the sovereign power of the state to proceed by quo warranto to have such franchises forfeited. State ex rel. v. Bast Fifth St. Ry. Co., 140 Mo., 539; 41 S. W. Rep., 955; 38 L. R. A., 218. Municipal corporation cannot enforce part and repudiate part of a franchise. New Orleans, S. F. & L. R. Co. V. New Orleans (La., 1902), 33 So. Rep., 192. Surrender of Franchise by the owners thereof may be accepted by the city, if the charter does not forbid. Wood v. Seattle, 23 Wash., 1; 62 Pac. Rep.. 135. Any street railroad company unable or indis- posed to carry forward its business may notify the mayor of such in- disposition and surrender thereby all their chartered rights or fran- chise in such manner and under such terms and conditions "as may be provided by ordinance. Char- ter, St. Louis, art. X, sec. 3; The Municipal Code of St. Louis, p. 294. State May Question validity of corporate existence. Detroit St. Ry. Co. V. Mills, 85 Mich., 634, 637; 48 N. W. Rep., 1007. Rule applied to national banks. National Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S., 621; National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U. S., 99. Vested Rights. Right granted by city to build a private sewer in streets and alleys with the right of the builder to charge abutting owners for connections therewith was held to be a vested right and not a license revocable at the will of the city. Stevens v. Muskegon, 111 Mich., 72, 77; 69 N. W. Rep., 227. Compare dissenting opinion and cases cited therein. 55 In re Brooklyn Elevated R. R. Co., 125 N. Y., 434; 26 N. E. Rep., 474. 916 OF FRANCHISE ORDINANCES. [§593 the time named, no judicial declaration is necessary, to con- stitute a forfeitures^ 56 7w re Brooklyn, Winfleld & Newtown Ry. Co., 72 N. Y., 245; Oakland R. R. Co. v. Oakland, B. & F. V. R. R. Co., 45 Cal., 365; Atchi- son Street Ry. Co. v. Nave, 38 Kan., 744; 17 Pac. Rep., 587; Street Ry. Co. of Grand Rapids v. West Side Street Ry. Co., 48 Mich., 433; 12 N. W. Rep., 643; Ft. Worth Street Ry. Co. V. Rosedale St. Ry. Co., 68 Tex., 169; 4 S. W. Rep., 534. When company is prevented by the mayor, through police officers, no rights are lost, though the road is not constructed within the time named. Chicago v. Chicago West- ern & Ind. R. R. Co., 105 111., 73. INDEX. The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated. Reference numbers preceded by p. and followed by n. refer to page and note matter. ABATEMENT OP ACTION prosecution for violation of ordfnance abates on death of de- fendant 338 ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE (See Nuisance.) ABDICATION of public powers forbidden 84 "ABSENT" when presiding officer of councils is p. 159n ABUTTERS (See" Injunction; Property Owners; Public Improvements; Public Improvement Ordinances.) failure to remove filth; defenses 355 duty to remove snow and ice from sidewalk, when 42, 458 consent to grant to use streets by public service companies. . . 574 rights of, as to granting right to use streets by public service companies 572 when damages in favor of, may be recovered 572 when may question validity of grant to railroad p. 429n injunction by, to prevent use of streets for railroad tracks. . . . 572 cannot enjoin use of streets by public service companies, when 569 injunction by, to restrain erection of poles, wires, etc p. 885n ACCEPTANCE of franchise ordinance 579 ACTION municipal corporation may institute, defend, etc 45 civil, ordinances regulating 40 to 42 ACTIONS TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDIl^ANCES. (See Defenses; Evidence for the Corporation; Trial.) is method of compelling obedience 303 form of action 303 method prescribed by law is exclusive 303 if mode not provided, common law rule applies 303 when statutory civil action applies 303 how far proceedings are criminal or quasi criminal 304 proceedings held civil by weight of authority 304 how proceedings instituted 305 917 918 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) ACTIONS TO ENFORCE POLICE ORDINANCES— Continued. notice to defendant 305 appearance oil defendant — voluntary 305 arrest without warrant 306 sufficiency of summons or warrant 307 bail bond 308 name in which action should be brought 309 penal; effect of repeal on prosecution 206 ADDRESS in public parks, street, etc., as disturbance of the peace. . . .p. 770n delivery of, in public places, may be regulated 225 ADJOUR]^ less than quorum may 105 power to adjourn corporate meetings exists Ill method of exercising power Ill ADJOURNED MEETING (See Meetings.) corporate business that may be transacted at 112 members to take notice of Ill ADMINISTRATIVE ORDINANCE defined 8 the two general classes 8 form of 138 ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS (See Executive Powers.) ADMISSION by defendant of violation of ordinance, admissible as evidence 341 ADVERTISING MATTER forbidden distribution of on streets, sidewalks, etc 188, 467 ADVERTISING STRUCTURES (See Billboards.) AFFRAY is petty offense; ordinance may forbid p. 785n both statute and ordinance may punish 508 AGENT method of employment, ordinance or resolution p. 9n, 5, 81 appointment of, without legal authority, void 4 p. 9n to sell bonds 4 p. 9n may be authorized by resolution to make contract, when 5 may employ legal services in behalf of town in Vermont p. 142n may be employed to supervise public work p. 808n real estate, may be licensed 428 of sewing machines, may be licensed 428 engaged in interstate commerce, license tax on 258 for laundry, tax on, held valid '. 257 for insurance company, license tax on, valid 257; 428 INDEX. 919 (The references are to the aeotions, except as otherwise indicated.) AIDER doctrine of, applied to defective statement, complaint or in- formation 324 ALABAMA corporate authority of towns in, where vested p. 141n appeals in prosecutions for violation of ordinances p. 562n municipal corporation in, not liable for costs in ordinance cases 339 same act may be made a state and municipal offense 500 double punishment authorized 510 ALDERMEN (See Offices and Officers.) construed as councilmen p. 448n ALLEY (See Public Improvements; Public Improvement Ordinances; Streets.) defined 563 grade of, fixing prior to improvement 528 AMENDMENT of municipal record 132 method of making 133 court may order — mandamus 134 after lapse of time 135 to return of service of, notice of New England town meeting.. p. 150n of warrants or summonses for violations of ordinances 307 of information, complaint or statement 323 of report of police on violation of ordinances p. 507n of information,, disallowed on appeal 323 AMENDMENT OF CHARTER ordinances superseded by, when 211 AMENDMENT OF ORDINANCES method of making 195 void ordinance cannot be amended 196 by striking out void parts 196 constitutional provisions as to state laws do not apply 195 cannot be by resolution 3, 195 setting out amendment; method 195 of ordinance on passage 158 publication of 159 requirements in making 158 of franchise and contract ordinances 197 reservation of right to change 197, 242 doctrine in New Jersey .> 197 rule under Ohio constitution 197 reasonableness of amendment 197 of improvement ordinances 198 city may relieve street railway of duty to pave by 197 of improvement ordinance by board, without change of esti- mate of cost p. 836n 920 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) AMOTION power of, may be exercised by municipal corporations 56 AMUSEMENTS as ball playing, etc., on streets, may be forbidden 458 ANIMALS (See Cruelty to Animals; Dead Animals; Dogs; Driving and Riding; Slaughter Houses; Slaughtering Animals.) intended for food, inspection of, authorized p. 762n killing of, may be limited to certain places 3!; ordinance declaring all dead, not slain ^or food nuisances, void 223 driving of, through streets may be regulated 468 driving of, on certain streets forbidden 32 cruelty to, may be forbidden 74, 489 teams attached to vehicles, to be hitched 41 violation of ordinance as evidence of negligence 41 trespass committed by p. 731n leaving, unfastened, negligence p. 732n bicycle held to be, in law forbidding on sidewalk p. 732n taking, from pound; allegation on charge of 321 feeding of, on highway, may be forbidden p. 731n permitting to feed on highway; complaint p. 506n ANIMALS AT LARGE may be forbidden 24, 468 in designated limits 32 ordinance may prohibit, though subject covered by state statute 509 dogs may be kept from going 469 power to kill dogs at large 469 when is a dog at large p. 733n ordinance forbidding dogs at large, applied to dogs of resi- dents only 297 "to permit" horses, etc., to go at large, applied to horses of non-residents ,. 297 sheep herded are not at large 297 dog; summary jurisdiction on charge of 329 sufficiency of complaint on charge of violating ordinance for- bidding 321 permitting swine to go on sidewalk; complaint in charge of . . . . 321 swine on sidewalk ; proof of 342 construction of ordinance requiring cattle to be penned at night 297 may be impounded 468 power to restrain running at large, does not give power to im- pound and sell , 169 running at large; forfeiting; proceedings 172 ANNIVERSARY appropriations to celebrate, generally forbidden 69 APARTMENT HOUSES erection of, regulations 32 INDEX. 921 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) APPEAL (See Review.) right to, in prosecutions for violations of ordinances 360 law must authorize 361 time and method of taking 362 trial de novo on 363 judicial notice of ordinance on 363, 385 raising objections, condition of record 363 suiHciency of record for review by 370 jury trial on, unreasonable restrictions 335 in ordinance cases, security for costs not required in Illinois. . 339 costs on, in New Hampshire 339 judgment may be reduced on 357 APPEAL BOND Governor cannot relieve surety on in ordinance case 359 APPEARANCE voluntary, on charge of violation of ordinance 305 APPROPRIATIONS as pure donations, forbidden 68 for celebrations, entertainments, etc., void 69 bounties to soldiers, when authorized; validity 70 to obtain or oppose legislation 71 by virtue of usage or custom 72, 73 APPROVAL of ordinance by mayor 149 of resolution by mayor 149 time and manner of 149 official, of fire escape, is good defense 355 ARBITRATION disputed controversies may be submitted to 74 between street railway company and employes, may be required as condition to grant right to use streets 576 ARCHITECTS license of, valid 428 ARKANSAS statute and ordinance may denounce the same offense 500 double punishment authorized 510 ARRAIGNMENT of defendant on charge of violating ordinance, not required 325 ARREST without warrant, when authorized 225, 306 for refusal to obey police officer at fire, void 225 resisting; sufficiency of allegation of 321 ASSAULT validity of ordinance, forbidding p. 771n both statute and ordinance may punish 508 922 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) ASSAULT AND BATTERY ordinance may punish, tliougli subject covered by statute 509 under general power, an ordinance is unauthorized where sub- ject is regulated by statute p. 784n summary jurisdiction of 329 ASSESSMENT (See Special Assessments or Taxation.) ASSESSMENT DISTRICTS (See Special Taxing District.) ASSIGNATION (See Bawdy House.) ASSOCIATION (See Constitutionality of Ordinances.) forbidden with thieves, pickpockets, etc., complaint p. 506n ASSUMPSIT action of, to enforce penal ordinances 303 ATTACHMENT local court may issue writ of p. 468n ATTORNEY, CITY. (See Trial.) ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW legal authority to employ must exist 4 p. 9n power to employ to be exercised by ordinance 81 cannot be disbarred by police court 300 license on, not applicable to non-resident 25 license on, irrespective of amount of practice p. 632n AUCTION lease of property to be made by public, when 75 ringing bells for, may be forbidden 486 AUCTIONEERS reasonable regulations may be imposed on 491 history of licensing and regulating in New York p. 772n ordinance may forbid sales by, after 6 p. m p. 761n may be licensed 428 classification of, to license, sustained p. 631n amount of license tax on p. 635n AUCTION SALES ordinance forbidding in public places p. 303n AUTHORITY to enact ordinances, recital of, not necessary 139 recital of authority to pass improvement ordinance not re- quired 539 AUTOMOBILE not a vehicle, as to license tax p. 643n INDEX. d-io (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) AWNING defined " p. 72ln extending over sidewalks, may be regulated 461 when nuisance 461 ordinance directing removal, validity 461 ordinances regulating must be certain 461 "suitable frame" 461 ordinance requiring consent of officers to maintain, valid 184 AYES AND NOBS (See Yeas and Nays.) BAIL BOND when may be taken 308 BAKERS (See Bread; Markets.) may be licensed 428 BALL AND BANQUET appropriation for, void 69 BALL PLAYING on streets, etc., may be forbidden. '. 458 BALTIMORE milk ordinance of, sustained 484 BANK license tax on, reasonableness of amount p. 635n BATH meaning of, in ordinance as to water rates p. 907n BATTERY (See Assault and Battery.) BAWDY HOUSES may be suppressed 475 are public nuisances per se p. 751n evidence to establish character of p. 752n inmates of, may be punished p. 752n power of municipal corporation to make it unlawful to visit. p. 784n power to suppress is authority to impose fine 168 may be forbidden by ordinance, though condemned by statute. 509 conducting in an "indecent manner," may be punished. .20, p. 752n may be confined to certain districts 32 may be prohibited in certain sections 223 keeping; summary juris^ction on charge of 329 being inmate of; complaint p. 506n keeping assignation house; complaint p. 505n complaint In charge of keeping 321 keeping; proof of 342 proof of ownership p. 537n keeping; participants liable for 344, p. 540n married woman, jointly liable with husband 344, p. 540n owner or tenant, who liable for p. 752n 924 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicateij.) BAY WINDOWS extending over sidewalk, regulation of 458 may be regulated by ordinance, though covered by statute 509 BELL on railroad engine, may be required to be rung 474 ringing of, for auction sales, may be forbidden 486 BENEFIT (See Special Assessment or Taxation.) BENEFIT DISTRICT (See Special Taxing District.) BEER SELLING (See License; Liquor Selling; Saloons.) proof of 342 BICYCLES defined .p. 727n right of way '. . . .p. 727n riding of, on streets, etc., may be regulated , 465 may forbid riding of, on sidewalks 465 may require bell and light on 194, 465 held to be an aniiflal, in law forbidding on sidewalk p. 732n riding, on bridge p. 538n may be punished 465 riding of, in public parks, may be forbidden 465 Chicago wheel tax license ordinance, imposing tax for use of streets, held void 424 riding on sidewalk; complaint p. 506n BIDS (See Competition; Public Improvements; Public Improvement Ordinances; Public Work.) BILL ordinance to be by, when 137 reading of, on different days, before council 119 BILL BOARDS erection and maintenance of, may be regulated 463 Buffalo and Rochester ordinances, sustained 463 Topeka, Kan., ordinance regulating, held unreasonable p. 726n BILLIARD HALL for hire, keeping of, may be regulated 476 may be licensed 428 BILLIARD TABLES ordinance may regulate, though subject covered by statute. . . . 509 BLACKSTONE definition of "franchise" 566 comments of Judge Thompson on p. 878h BLASTING may be regulated 472 violation of ordinance regulating as evidence of negligence... 40 INDEX. ~ 925 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise Indicated.) BLASTING POWDER keeping of, may be regulated 472 BOARDING HOUSES license of, valid 428 BOARD OF HEALTH (See Health and Sanitary; Nuisances.) power to enact sanitary ordinance 90, p. 143n BOARD OP PUBLIC WORKS (See Public Improvements; Public Improvement Ordinances; Public Work.) improvement ordinances to be recommended by 529 ordinances fixing grade of streets 528 may pass franchise ordinances, when 90, p. 143n required to keep records 124, p. 198n BOARD OP POLICE may regulate use of streets p. I43n BOATS- (See Row Boats; Ferries.) BOILERS (See Steam Boilers.) BOISTEROUS CONDUCT (See Disturbing the Peace.) BONA FIDES (See Good Faith.) BOND (See Appeal Bond.) contract of mayor as to, may be ratified by coutlcil 89 as bail, when may be taken 308 ordinance requiring of labor agent, held void for lack of charter power p. 773n municipal, to be issued as prescribed. . , 75 when to be exercised by ordinance 3, 75 when by resolution 75 for electric light plant, submission to electors 76 BOOK MAKING may be limited to certain localities 32 BOOK SELLER is not a second-hand dealer p. 773n BOOKS by-law forbidding directors from inspecting, void p. 301n BOOTHS on sidewalks for goods, etc., as nuisance 459 BOROUGH (See Municipal Corporation.) is a public corporation 38 9S}6 INDEX. (The references are to the sectious, except as otherwise indicated.) BORROW MONEY implied powers respecting 74 BOSTON , special assessment for street sprinkling, sustained 524 ordinance regulating delivery of discourse, etc., on the com- mons, valid 225 ordinance t)f, giving police board power to regulate itinerant musicians in streets, sustained. 416 ordinance of, requiring removal of snow from sidewalk, applies to tenant 298 BOULEVARDS power to establish 520 property rights must be observed 520 discontinuance of 520 subject of local control 515 heavy hauling and driving on 32 BOUNDARIES (See Corporate Limits; of Wards, see Ward Lines.) BOUNTIES to soldiers, power to provide for 70 BOWLING ALLEY for hire, keeping of, may be restrained and regulated 476 for hire, power to suppress nuisances is sufficient to sustain ordinance forbidding 476 cannot be licensed without express authority p. 756n BREACH OF THE PEACE (See Disturbing the Peace.) ordinance fixing penalty for, void if conflicts with state law. p. 771n ordinance as to, held not to conflict with statute on subject. p. 790n ordinance denouncing invalid, if subject regulated by statute p. 785n BREAD may be required to be sold by weight 485 short weight; power to seize and forfeit p. 275n BREAKWATER general power to protect streets, sufllcient to authorize con- struction of : p. 799n BRICK KILNS as nuisances; regulation of p. 698n erecting near dwelling; proof of p. 537n residence deflned p. 537n burning brick in p. 537n BRIDGES bicycles may be excluded from 465 legislature may compel tax levy for p. 806n BROKEN WARE deposit of may be regulated 453 INDEX. 927 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) BROKER (See Pawnbroker.) may be licensed 428 classification of, to license, sustained p. 631n engaged in interstate commerce, license tax on 258 personal contracts of, not commerce 257 BROOKS fouling of waters of, may be prevented 454 BROTHEL (See Bawdy House.) BUFFALO ordinance of, regulating billboards, sustained 463 eight-hour law, applicable to p. 780n BUILMNGS power to establish fire limits 470 regulations for, to be established by ordinance 470 various regulations as to additions, repairs, fire escapes, etc. pp. 736, 737n wooden, frame, iron p. 736n what is erection p. 737n wooden, power to remove pp. 737, 738n injunction to restrain p. 738n notice, when required p. 738n permits to erect 471 regulations as to erection 471 regulations as to use of sidewalks and streets , 471 in streets, etc., when nuisance p. 718n for laundries and wash houses character of, may be prescribed . 491 public, constitute public improvements 511 unlawfully erecting wooden, without license; defense 355 unsafe; charge of, allegation of inspection 321 wall of, failure to tear down dangerous after notice, proof of. . 342 erecting unlawfully; subsequent consent; estoppel 352 walls less thick than required; complaint p. 505n BUILDING LINE power to establish 32 BULKY ARTICLES may be required to be sold by weight or measure 485 BURDEN OF PROOF in ordinance violations 346 BURIAL OF DEAD (See Cemeteries.) BURNING TAN to the annoyance of persons; allegation in charge of 3^1 928 INDEX. (The references are to tlie sections, except as otherwise indicated.) BUSINESS (See Liquor Selling; Saloons; Sunday.) ordinances forbidding on Sunday 479 on Christmas day, void 479 ordinances regulating hours of 480 on Sunday; general power insufficient to forbid, where subject is covered by state statute p. 784n BUTCHER may mean keeper of meat shop p. 763n license of .' p. 764n may be licensed 428 reasonableness of amount of license tax on p. 635n BUTTER laws forbidding sale of oleomargarine as Imitation of p. 763n BY-LAW (See Ordinances.) defined 1, 6 distinguished from ordinance 1, 6 of New England towns 1, p. 2n CABMEN police control of, sustained 184 CABS violating stand regulations for, ijroof of 342 license on p. 642n CALIFORNIA municipal corporations in, where corporate authority vested. p. 141n doctrine in, as to repeals of ordinances and revival 205 ordinance forbidding employment of Chinese labor, void 495 limiting day's work to eight hours, void 495 rule as to effect of general laws on municipal ordinances 214 ordinance can not punish offense,. condemned by state statute. . 501 appeals from municipal court of San Francisco, allowed. . . .p. 562n CALLED MEETING (See Special Meetings.) CANAL COMPANY is a quasi-public corporation 38 CANVASSER house to house, may be licensed 428 CARDS distribution of, on sidewalks, streets, etc 467 CARPET BEATING MACHINES use of, may be forbidden near church, school house or residence 491 CARRIER (See Common Carrier.) without license; proof of p. 538n CARS (See Street Railways.) INDEX. 029 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) CASTING VOTE by presiding officer in case of tie 102 CATCH BASINS location and description of, in sewer construction ordinances. . 542 CATTLE (See Animals; Animals at Large.) CATTLE DEALERS may be licensed 428 CAUSE OF ACTION ordinances creating 40 to 42 CAUSE TO SUSPECT allegation as to ground for 321 CELLAR DOOR in sidewalk, may be authorized and regulated 458 CEMETERIES regulation of, fall within the police power 446 as nuisances 446 may regulate places for burials 446 may discontinue 446 may require permits for burial of the dead 446 CERTAINTY (See Public Improvement Ordinances.) ordinance must be definite and certain 20 CERTIORARI will lie to test validity of ordinances 287 by tax payer p. 440n denied in Iowa p. 440n right to review by, in prosecutions for violations of ordi- nances 360, 364 trial de novo denied; review on record 363 early North Carolina ruling, contra 363 proceedings by, defined 364 record 365 to try title to office 97 CESSPOOLS removal of contents of, may be compelled and regulated 453 if result in nuisance, may be abated 453 CHANCERY (See Equity; Injunction.) CHANGE OF CORPORATE LIMITS (See Corporate Limits.) CHANGE OF VENUE allowed 338 CHARGE (See Price.) 930 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) CHARGES (See Rates of Public Service Companies.) CHARTER, MUNICIPAL. (See Construction.) its nature and purpose 43, 44 is not a contract 43 how granted 44 legislative and constitutional 44 limits corporate powers 44 usual powers conferred by 45 Is organic law of corporation and ordinance must conform to . . 15 how ordinance differ as to force and effect from 13 method prescribed by, for enforcement of penal ordinances, is exclusive 303 controls in imposing penalties 169 general rules for construction of 48 to 52 self-enforcing provisions of 81 provisions of constitutional, in Missouri, supersedes general laws, when , 214 rule in California 214 rule in Minnesota 214 rules as to repeal of, by general laws 212 question of intent 213 when provisions of, superseded by general laws 214 effect on ordinances by surrender of 216 CHARTER AMENDMENTS ordinances superseded by, when 211 CHARIVARI as disturbing peace p. 453n, p. 770n CHICAGO (See Illinois.) form of enacting clause of ordinance p. 231n ordinance of, regulating department stores, held void 491 ordinance of, regulating street parades, held void 416 ordinance of, requiring consent of certain property owners, to erect livery stable, sustained 415 ordinance of, regulating pawnbrokers, valid 225 ordinance of, prohibiting discharge of dense smoke within city, sustained 456 ordinance of, forbidding discharge of dense smoke from boats on Chicago River, constitutional 270 ordinance of, imposing a license to navigate Chicago River, void 266 wheel tax ordinance of, imposing license tax for use of streets, held void 424 ordinance of, fixing street car fares, sustained p. 912n authorized to construct river tunnel p. 799n CHIEF BURGESS of borough in Pennsylvania may question validity of ordinance vetoed by him 281 INDEX. 9a 1 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) CHINESE ordinance forbidding employment of Chinese labor, void 495 ordinances discriminating against, void ^. 194 San Francisco queue ordinance relating to, void 227 CHRISTMAS DAY ordinance cannot forbid business on 479 CIDER regulating sale of, is not in restraint of trade p. 304 ordinance regulating, sustained in Kansas p. 758n CIGARETTES sale of, may be regulated and licensed 428, 457 CINCINNATI omposition of council of p. 142n CIRCULARS distributing on streets; regulating 188, 467 CITY (See Municipal Corporation.) is a public corporation S8 CITY ATTORNEY (See Trial.) CITY COURTS (See Municipal Corporation Courts.) CITY HALL place of corporate meetings 92 CITIZEN actions by, to restrain illegal acts; reason for doctrine 283 actions by, to enjoin enforcement of void ordinances and con- tracts 282, 283 mandamus by 284 of other states, ordinances discriminating against, void.... p. 353n ordinances cannot abridge the privileges and immunities of . . . 219 agreements by, to pay for public improvements 552 CIVIL ACTION how far proceedings to enforce penal ordinances are 304 ordinances regulating '. 40 to 42 CIVIL LIABILITIES ordinances regulating 40 to 42 CIVIL RIGHTS ordinances regulating 40 to 42 CLAIMS paid, only as law warrants 219 CLASS discrimination on account of, void 226 change of municipal corporation in, effect on ordinances 216 932 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) CLASSIFICATION reasonableness of, in ordinances . _. 193 discrimination in, void 193 illustrative cases 194 CLAUSES (See Construction; Maxims; Words and Phrases.) CLEANING (See Street Cleaning.) street railways may be required to clean between tracks 474 CLERICAL ERROR will not invalidate improvement ordinance 558 CLERKS additional, to be appointed by ordinance, when 4, p. 8n of local court, usually issue execution , 359 when not officers 4 CLOSING (See Business; Saloons.) places of business; ordinances regulating hours of 480 CLOTHING (See Second-Hand Clothing.) COAL (See Weights and Measures.) may be required to be sold by weight or measure 485 COAL OIL (See Oil.) COAL HOLES in sidewalks, regulation of 458 COASTING (See Nuisance.) COKE, SIR EDWARD definition of monopoly by p. 306n COLONY ORDINANCE of Massachusetts 1, p. 4n COLORADO representation in towns and cities of p. 142n action to enforce police ordinances, held civil in 304 statute and ordinance may denounce the same act as an offense in 500 double punishment authorized 510 as to forfeiture of license as penalty 170 COMBINATIONS (See Monopolies and Exclusive Privileges.) among bidders for public work, vitiates contract p. 862n COMBUSTIBLES keeping of, may be regulated 472 tNDEX. 933 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) COMMERCE: FOREIGN AND INTERSTATE meaning of term "commerce" 250 ordinances must not interfere with or attempt to regulate. 219, 249 regulation of, distinguished from power of taxation 251 personal contracts ; occupation tax 257 license tax on brokers, agents, etc., engaged in 258 discriminating license tax, void 259 license tax under police power 260 telephone and telegraph poles in streets 261 license tax on those engaged in exporting and importing 252 license tax for privilege of selling goods, etc 253 discrimination is not the test 254 where goods sold are in the state 255 peddlers 256 quarantine laws 272, 273 harbor and local police regulations 274 license and taxation of ferries, etc 267 wharfage charges, valid 268 distinguished from tonnage 269 local police regulations 270 scope of 271 taxation of property employed in ; 262 taxation of operations or objects of 264 license tax on foreign corporations 263 tax on property in transit 265 license for privilege of navigating, void 266 COMMISSIONER appointment of, to assess damages to be by ordinance 3 COMMISSIONS to perform municipal function; power of state to provide, .p. 806n COMMITTEES of council or legislative body, powers 123 power to make contracts 123 under control of council 123 quorum of 123 may act separately, when p. 145n reference of bills or ordinances to, and report by 148 COMMON CARRIER how far telegraph company is pp. 724n, 725n nature of business must determine p. 724n effect of ordinance declaration p. 724n COMMON GAMING HOUSE evidence to establish keeping p. 754n COMMON LAW definition of monopoly. p. 306n powers recognized by, possessed by municipal corporations .... 45 of state, ordinances must harmonize with 18 corporate meetings under 92, p. 146n 934 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) COMMON LAW— Continued. quorum of indefinite corporate bodies under 94, p. 149n head oflicer to preside at corporate meetings under 98, p. 156n mayor to preside at meetings of corporate bodies under. 98, p. 156n quorum of corporate meeting under 104 of definite body 105 of joint assemblies 109 is not abrogated in city by ordinance relating to gaming. . .p. 787n if mode' of enforcement of penal ordinances it not prescribed, method of, applies 303 rule as to competency of corporators to serve as judges, jurors and witnesses p. 470n penal ordinances enforced at, by action of debt or assumpsit. . 303 influence of, in actions to enforce penal ordinances 303 costs were unknown to 174, 339 COMMON RIGHTS (See Constitutionality of Ordinances; Liberty of Individual.) ordinances in derogation of, void 220 what are? 220 use of private property 221 use of public property; streets 222 C0MPE3NSATI0N (See Salary.) COMPETITION ordinances restricting — union labor 553 in granting use of streets to public service companies 574 COMPLAINT (See Index under titles of various offenses.) proceedings by, to enforce penal ordinances 303 COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION to enforce police ordinances; formal parts 310 allegation of notice of ordinance unnecessary 311 must show jurisdiction 311 averment as to power to pass 312 requisites of, as to substantial averments 313 how tested 313 form of, directed by local laws 314 must be in writing 314 verification of, when required 314 conclusion of 314 pleading ordinance violated 315 judicial notice 315 reference to ordinance violated 316 negativing exceptions In ordinance 317 several offenses — joinder 318 joint liability 319 sufficiency for penalty for second offense 320 various illustrations as to sufficiency 321 INDEX. 935 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise inflicated.) COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION— Continued. for offense committed in certain relation p. 506n on report of police 322 amendment of 323 usually disallowed on appeal 323 how defects in, cured 324 waiver of defects of form 324 doctrine of aider 324 defects of substance, not waived.-. 324 COMPROMISE city may compromise disputed claims 74 CONCEALED WEAPONS carrying of, may be punished by ordinance, though condemned by statute 5D9 carrying, ordinance forbidding, valid ■ 225, 488 carrying, summary jurisdiction 329 carrying, information p. 506n CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS (See Eminent Domain.) jurisdiction of local court in p. 468n CONDUITS (See Underground Conduits.) CONFIRMATION prior corporate. acts may be confirmed by resolution, when. ... 5 CONGRESS act of, forbidding discharge of dense smoke within the District of Columbia, sustained 456 CONJUNCTION transposition of, in construction p. 448n CONNECTICUT matters regulated by statutes cannot be covered by ordinance. 501 ordinance penalty may be recovered by criminal action in. . .p. 478n CONNECTIONS descriptions as to, in sewer construction ordinances 542 CONSENT (See Abutters; Franchise Ordinances; Property Owners; Pub- lic Improvements.) CONSPIRACY defined p. 523n charge of, trial to be by jury 333 CONSOLIDATION of municipal corporations; effect of, on ordinances 218 of suits to recover ordinance penalties 338 CONTAGIOUS DISEASES health and sanitary regulations 445 936 INDEX. (The references are to tlie sections, except as otherwise Indicated.) CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION effect of, in construing ordinances 292 CONTEMPT power of local courts to punish for 300 CONTINUOUS OFFENSE illustrations 179 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (See Forfeiture; Special Assessment or Taxation; Trial.) CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES ordinances must be constitutional; enumeration 219 ordinances in derogation of common riglits 219, 220 use of private property 221 use of public property; streets 222 taking or damaging private property 223 oppressive regulations 224 affecting individual liberty 225 discriminating on account of class, race, religion, sect, etc.... 227 San Francisco queue ordinance 227 regulating personal associations, employment, etc 228 public drunkenness 229 respecting mode of trial 230 offices may be changed or abolished 231 limiting day's work, eight hour laws 495 pawnbrokers to keep records and submit to police inspection, valid 492 ordinances forbidding carrying concealed weapons, valid. ..... 488 milk inspection ordinances sustained 4S4 respecting observance of the Sabbath 479 regulating hours of business 480 forbidding business on Christmas day, void 479 law permitting vagrants to be hired out, is void p. 772n must conform to federal and state constitutions 219 ordinances cannot impair the obligation of contracts. See Contracts; Franchise Ordinances, ordinances cannot interfere with or regulate foreign or inter- state commerce. See Commerce, Foreign and Interstate. contract and franchise ordinances, cannot be impaired 197 reservation of right to alter, etc 197 New Jersey doctrine 197 rule under Ohio constitution 197 penalty of imprisonment, valid 173 ordinance will not be declared unconstitutional unless clearly so 219, p. 351n ordinances requiring printing to bear union label, void 553 CONSTRUCTION (See Maxims; Words and Phrases.) of municipal charter 43_ 44 general rule as to municipal powers stated 46 INDEX. 937 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) CONSTRUCTION— Continued. of powers New England towns 47 of corporate powers illustrated 48 to 52 of specific enumeration as to penalties 169 the rule of ejusdem generis 50, 52 and n of laws as to whether duty discretionary or mandatory 82, 83 to be in favor of public, rule applied to continuing power to fix water rates 242 of municipal power to impose license 404, 405 of grants of exclusive privileges and monopolies 578 CONSTRUCTION OP ORDINANCE (See Reasonableness of Ordinances.) rules for, stated 289, 290 title in construction 291 title may be resorted to, in ascertaining what streets or parts thereof are to be improved 541 preamble in construction 291 contemporaneous ; effect of 292 penal ordinances 293 illustrative cases '. 296, 297 liability of landlord or tenant 298 of improvement ordinances 558 parol evidence of terms used in 559 construction of words and terms 294 gender and number p. 448n transposition of conjunction p. 448n punctuation p. 449n where ordinance void in part 295 limiting operation of ordinances as to sale of liquor 30 limiting ordinance as to rate of speed of train to certain ter- ritory 29 ordinances construed as apply to cases in future p. 352n effect of form of ordinance 138 CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE of corporate meetings, when suflScient 92 CONTINGENCY the taking effect of an ordinance may be made to depend upon 36 CONTRACTS (See Public Work.) contract ordinances. See Franchise Ordinances. of contractors for public work, cannot be impaired 243 nature of contract 243 rights vested in contractor 244 mere change of remedy authorized 244 may change method of payment 244 reducing sum to be paid, void 244 illustrative cases 245 interest on special tax bills as part of obligation 246 938 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) CONTRACTS— Continued, when new remedy applies 247 when old law controls 248 for public work, authority to let cannot be delegated p. 809n right to occupy streets by public service companies as 580 for public work, cannot restrain competition 189 void, action by citizens and taxpayers, to prevent enforce- ment of 282, 283 no impairment of obligation of, to change or abolish office or reduce salary of 231 municipal corporation is bound by 232 impairment of obligation of, forbidden 219, 232 ordinance extending fire limits and forbidding erection of wooden building, does not impair obligation of contract of construction made prior thereto 232 ordinance granting franchise as 238 franchises authorized by state 241 reservation of right to alter, amend or repeal 242 impairment of obligation of, to be determined by United States Supreme Court 236 taxation by municipal corporation of its own bonds 237 ' ordinances granting franchises , 238 imposing additional burdens 239 exclusive privileges 240 ordinance as "law" relating to impairment 233 ordinance granting license under legislative act is not a "law" 233 ordinance as contract 234 the obligation of 235 judgment as 246 personal, not commerce 257 municipal occupation tax as 40, p. 274n municipal charter is not 43 when ordinance conferring privilege is 197 impairing obligations of, by amendment 197 impairing obligations of franchise ordinances by repeals. .200, 201 price of, cannot be increased, when 219 for removal of garbage, dead animals, etc 452 limiting day's work; eight-hour laws 495 ordinance providing for, may include police regulations 11 agent may be authorized by resolution to make 5 implied power to make as to water supply 64 for employment, ordinance necessary 3 waiver of time of performance by resolution, when 5 for building sidewalk may be ratified by council 89 power of council committee 123 of mayor as to municipal bonds may be ratified by council ... 89 made without authority cannot be ratified 73 INDEX. 9 3 'J (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise Indicatea.) COOLEY, JUDGE views of, relating to exclusive market privileges 192 CORNER LOUNGING summary jurisdiction of 329 CORPORATE AFFAIRS distinguished from private 39 "CORPORATE AUTHORITIES" ^ , who are p. i28n CORPORATE AUTHORITY where vested 90 CORPORATE LIMITS fixed by charter 44 change of; effect on ordinances 218 public improvements outside of 513 how ascertained p. 802n operation of ordinances restricted to 26 ordinances apply to changes and additions 26 ordinance operating in public or particular places only 31 ordinance applying to part of, valid 32 improvement ordinance 33 CORPORATE FRANCHISE distinguished from grants to use streets 563 CORPORATE MEETINGS (See Meetings.) CORPORATE PURPOSE (See Municipal Purpose.) power of taxation limited to, what is 400 powers to be confined to 50 implied powers, must relate to 54, 55 CORPORATE SEAL authority to adopt and alter conferred by charter 45 .CORPORATIONS (See Foreign Corporations; Municipal Corporations; Private Corporations.) defined and classified 38 COSTS statutes as to security for, do not apply to ordinances in Illinois 339 what they include, when authorized 339 costs on appeal in New Hampshire 339 unknown to the common law 174, 339 created by statutes 339 municipal corporation not liable for in Alabama 339 cannot be allowed defendant on acquittal in Massachusetts. . . . 339 as penalty for violating ordinance ; 174 estimate of, for public improvements 531 CONVEYANCE of property, may be directed by resolution, when 5 9-iO INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as othervrise indicated.) CONVICTION i (See Judgment; Record of Conviction.) ' CORNICES extending over sidewalk, regulation of 458 COUNCIL (See Meetings; Proceedings of Council; Quorum.) must be legally constituted 96 de facto members of 96 conflicting councils — injunction 97 mayor as member of 98 presiding officer of 98 at common law ; 98, p. 156n power to elect its own presiding officer 98 signing bills by presiding officer of 99 when mayor to approve proceedings of 100 approval to be in writing 101 casting vote by presiding officer of 102 majority of members of, may organize 97 expiring, cannot organize and hold valid meeting 97, p. 154n when presiding officer is "absent" 159n as continuous body 113 may elect or appoint officers, when 4 and n may validate void ordinances 164 may prescribe time of meetings of, when 92 functions of 91 COUNCILMBN construed as aldermen p. 448n cannot be personally interested in matters in which they act. . 108 COUNTY is public corporation 38 COUNTY COMMISSIONERS may only act as board p. I45n COURTS (See Municipal Corporation Courts.) may order amendment of municipal record 134 mandamus will lie 134 will not control exercise of discretionary powers 76, 77 limitation of rule of non-judicial interference. 78 cannot question reasonableness of ordinances passed under express power Igl but may under implied powers 182 position of, in construing ordinances; views of Mr. Justice Field 292 defer to judgment of municipal authorities 186 reasonableness of ordinance is question of law for '. . . 185 method of determining 186 will not interfere with municipal discretion 186 INDEX. 941 (The retereiioes are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) COURT HOUSE for county, legislature cannot compel city to erect at its sole expense p. 806n implied power to purchase lands for 57 COW STABLES may be regulated 449 CRAPS playing, may be punished by ordinance p. 792n CREDIT municipal corporation cannot loan 219 CREEKS fouling of waters of, may be prevented 454 CRIME defined 333 by the United States Supreme Court 333 in the English law 333 distinguished from municipal police regulations 332 jury trial 332 distinguished from misdemeanor 333 distinguished -from municipal offenses 333 CRIME AGAINST STATE (See State Offenses.) CRIMINAL how far proceedings to enforce penal ordinances are 304 CRIMINAL PROSECUTION defined, as relates to jury trial 332 distinguished from municipal police offenses 332 CROSSINGS (See Grade Crossings.) of street and steam railroads; regulations 474 safety gates, flagmen and watchmen 474 CRUELTY TO ANIMALS ordinance may punish, though condemned by statute 509 intent, immaterial p. 772n general welfare clause will sustain ordinance forbidding 489 CULVERT (See Sewers.) ordinance may confer power on city engineer to fix dimensions of p. 810n CURSING (See Swearing; Oath.) CUSTODY of ordinances , 154 CUSTOM AND USAGE as establishing corporate boundaries p. g02n English, as precedent to determine reasonableness of ordinance 187 exercise of power by virtue of 72, 73 943 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) DAIRIES AND COW STABLES may be regulated 449 DAKOTA same act may be denounced as offense by statute and ordinance 500 DAMAGES violation of ordinance, as ground of action for 40 to 42 DANGER SIGNALS train servants may be required to give 474 DAY'S LABOR (See Bight-Hour Laws.) ordinance cannot prescribe hours of, if regulated by statute. p. 784n DAY LABORER is not an officer 4 DEAD ANIMALS subject to police regulation 452 power to remove, gives authority to direct the manner thereof. 452 ordinances for removal of, by contract 452 DECENCY (See Public Morals and Decency.) DECLARATION (See Complaint or Information.) DEBT action of, to enforce penal ordinances ; 303 payment of private, as condition to connect with sewer 183 for water, as condition to obtain 183 imprisonment for non-payment of fine, valid 173 DEDICATION of property, may be accepted by resolution 5 streets and highways may be established by 527 DEFENDANT admissions of, of violation, admissible 341 competency of, as witness 341 DEFENSES enumeration of, in ordinance violations 348 existence of municipal corporation cannot be raised 349 prosecution under validated ordinance allowed 350 former acquittal or punishment 351 estoppel 352 when defendant estopped from contesting reasonableness of ordinance 353 miscellaneous defenses 354 various illustrative cases 355 method of pleading 327 bicyclist cannot show that it was customary to violate the law in riding on sidewalks p. 727n DEFINITIONS (See Words and Phrases; and various words in this index.) INDEX. 9^3 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) DEFINITE BODY (See Council; Quorum.) DELEGATION OF POWER state may delegate power to its municipal corporations 43 of public powers, forbidden 39, 84 officers cannot delegate their powers 85 legislative authority cannot be delegated 86 to 88 ministerial duties may be delegated 89 of power as to offices and officers, forbidden 4 and n of power in granting right to use streets by public service companies, fatal 574 of power to provide for public improvements, forbidden 517 of power to inspector, void p. 763n of power to establish markets, void p. 762n of power as to permits for street parades, etc 416 of power to levy taxes, forbidden 402 of power to levy license tax, forbidden 414 consent of property owners 415 permit to parade streets 416 requiring consent of citizens, property owners, and compliance with conditions in granting saloon licenses 426 requiring consent of certain property owners to maintain livery stables, laundries, etc 415 DEMURRER insufficiency of complaint raised by 327 objection to jurisdiction of subject-matter, raised by 327 DENSE SMOKE (See Smoke.) DENVER ordinance of, forbidding distribution of handbills, etc., on side- walks, streets, etc., sustained 467 DEPARTMENT STORES cannot be regulated by ordinance, without express legislative grant 491 DEPOSIT of ordinances 154 DEPOSITS of earth, stone and gravel in public way, is a nuisance 459 DEPOT of railroads, etc., regulation of hackmen in and about 184 DESCRIPTION (See Public Improvements; Public Improvement Ordinances.) of place, on charge of selling liquor 321 DETAIL matters of, need not be specified in improvement ordinances. . . 546 944 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) DETROIT form of enacting clause of ordinance p. 232 charter of, requiring water and gas pipes laid in advance of street improvements, held void 530 establishment and history of "Cadillac Square" p. 762n ordinance forbidding disturbances of the peace, sustained 487 ordinance of, forbidding distribution of circulars, cards, etc., on sidewalks, streets, etc., held void 467 DIMENSIONS of sewer, determination of, cannot be delegated 87 DIRECTORY PROVISIONS distinguished from mandatory, respecting council procedure.. 116 DIRT (See Filth; House Dirt; Rubbish.) deposit of, may be regulated 453 DISCOURSE delivery of, in public places, may be regulated 225 DISCRETION of officers in letting public work p. 86I11 DISCRETIONARY POWER courts will not control exercise of 76, 77 limitation of rule 78 distinguished from mandatory 82, 83 distinguished from ministerial 85, 86, 89 DISCRIMINATIONS in ordinance, forbidden 19, 193 illustrative cases 194 in ordinances because of class, race, religion, etc 226 against non-residents, void 222 respecting keeping hog pens p. 704n in street car fares, forbidden 589 in laws as to day's labor and wages 495, p. 778n in ordinances in favor of union and against non-union labor, void 553 in license tax, void 259, 417 in laws relating to employment of labor p. 778n in special assessment or taxation, forbidden 523 DISINFECT-ION of second-hand clothing, may be required p. 773n DISOBEYING ORDER sufficiency of complaint, to recover penalty for 321 DISORDERLY CONDUCT summary jurisdiction of 329 under habitual criminal act, summary jurisdiction on charge of 329 sufficiency of complaint for 321 proof of p. 537n INDEX. 945 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise Indicated.) DISORDERLY PLACE (See Bawdy House.) keeping; complaint In charge of p. 506n DISSOLUTION of municipal corporation; effect on ordinances 217 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA act of Congress forbidding discharge of dense smoke in, sus- tained 456 DISTURBING THE PEACE ordinance forbidding, sustained under general power 487 charivari is no violation p. 453n, p. 770n Salvation Army p. 770n beating drum or tambourine p. 770n public meeting on street p. 770n addresses in public places p. 770n "noise," construed p. 770n boisterous and disorderly conduct p. 770n riotous assemblies may be forbidden 486 molesting religious and other meeting 486 blowing whistles 486 parading street with music, etc 486 ringing bells, playing hand organs 486 ordinance may punish, though subject covered by statute 509 summary jurisdiction of 329 molesting religious societies 329 "riotous" conduct 329 complaint in charge of.- 321 DOCKS as public improvements 511 DOGS ordinances regulating, are valid 422, 469 may require them to be registered and licensed 469 may be kept from going at large 469 power to kill dogs at large 469 may be impounded p. 734n when is a dog at large p. 733n ordinance licensing and restraining from going at large, limited to residents 297 wlien "going at large" p. 455n owner may be made liable if one is bitten by, on street 188 DOMESTIC PURPOSES meaning of, in ordinance as to water rates p. 907n DONATIONS by municipal corporations, forbidden 68 for celebrations, entertainments, etc., void 69 bounties to soldiers 70 • 60 946 "INDEX., (The references are' to -the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) DOORSTEPS - may be regulated, with reference to sidewalk. . . . : 458 DOUBLE OFFENSE (See State Offenses.) DRAINAGE DISTRrCT is public corporation 38 DRAINS - .(See Public Improvements; Sewers.) emptying into a public street is a nuisance p. 707n may be regulated, to avoid nuisance . . .' 454 DRAM SHOP (See Liquor Selling; Saloons.) DRAY (See Vehicles.) DRAYMEN- • ' ■ • llcfenseon, -fixed according to capacity of dray, valid. .... .p. 633n DRIVERS ' of cabs, hacks, etc., subject to police control 184 DRIVING of animals through streets, may be regulated 468 "drove or droves" as apply to cattle, bad 20 DRIVING AND RIDING may be regulated '. 464 fast and careless, may be punished by ordinance, though cov- ered by statute 509 "faster than an ordinary trot," gbbd'.'. 20 "immoderate gait," bad 20 fast, on streets, etc.. may. be. forbidden. 189, 464 proof of 342 character of driver, inadmissible ; 355 perrriit, iriadiriissible. 355 law of the road p. 726n right of way. .' p. 727n riding of bicycles and velocipedes on streets, etc., may be regu- lated 465 DRUGGISTS reports of sale of liquor by 224 license tax on; reasonableness of amount p. 635n DRUMMERS (See Commerce, Foreign and 'Interstate.) DRUNKENNESS (See Public Drunkenness.) DUTIES of "tonnage" cannot be levied by ordinance 219 on imports and exports; ordinances cannot impose 219 INDEX. 947 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) DUE PROCESS OF LAW cannot be denied by ordinance 219 DYNAMITE keeping of, may be regulated 472 DWELLING may be exempted from operation of law forbidding discharge of dense smoke 194 meaning of, in ordinance as to water rates p. 907n forbidding erection of brick kiln near p. 537n EIGHT-HOUR LAWS do they interfere with freedom of contract 495 constitutional test applied to 495 restraints on legislation 495, p. 777n act of Congress, relating to laborers of United States 495 Kansas statute construed 495 Utah statute relating to mine workers 495 ordinance regulating held void in California 495 ordinance of New Orleans construed 495 Nebraska statute 495, p. 777n Ohio statute 495, p. 778n New York statute ; 495, p. 778n Massachusetts statute as to weavers' wages 495, p. 778n must not be partial or discriminating 495, p. 778n ELECTION of officer by council, method of 116 providing for time of, to be reasonable 183 of officers, casting vote p. 163n ELECTORS ordinances passed and approved by 152 certain propositions for public improvements to be submitted to, and approved by 552 consent of, to use streets by public service companies 574 ELECTRIC COMPANY is a quasi-public corporation 38 ELEVATORS in buildings, may he regulated 471 violation of ordinance as to guarding opening of, as evidence of negligence 41 EMINENT DOMAIN power of, can only be exercised under express grant 512 must be strictly pursued 512 municipal corporation acts as agent of state 512 highways and streets, established by 527 exercise of power of, for streets, sewers, etc., is local 515 special assessments or taxation differ from right of p. 818u 948 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) EMPLOYES liability of, in ordinance violations 344 of principal for acts of 345 EMPLOYMENT of individuals, ordinances cannot regulate 228 ENACTING CLAUSE formal part of ordinance 138 of ordinance, sufficiency 145 forms of various cities pp. 231, 232n ENFORCEMENT OF ORDINANCES (See Actions to Enforce Police Ordinances.) ENGINEERS stationary and railroad, license of, valid 428 ENGLAND summary jurisdiction exercised in 329 municipal corporation courts in p. 462n highways in early 568 ENGLISH LANGUAGE (See Publication.) to be used in ordinance 137 ENGLISH LAW (See Common Law.) corporate meetings under early 92, p. 146n mayor as presiding officer under 98, p. 155n forbids enforcement of ordinances by forfeiture 170 crime in 333 misdemeanor in 334, p. 524n early, monopoly p. 306n not guide in determining reasonableness of ordinances 187 ENUMERATION (Specific, Effect of/ See Construction.) EQUALITY of special assessment on taxation 523 EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS (See Constitutionality of Ordinances.) cannot be denied citizens by ordinance 219 EQUITY (See Injunction.) jurisdiction in, usually not possessed by municipal and police courts p. 467n is not proper remedy to try title to office 97 ERROR clerical, will not invalidate improvement ordinance 558 ERROR, WRIT OF (See Writ of Error.) INDEX. 949 (The references arc to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) ESTOPPEL as applied to amendments of municipal records 135 doctrine of, in questioning validity of the ordinance 278 applied to grant of right to erect depot buildings ^. 903n applies to municipal corporation in regulating rates and charges 584 of railroad company to lay tracks p. 886n applies to proceedings for public improvements p. 829n as a defense on charge of violation of ordinance 352 when defendant cannot contest reasonableness of ordinance. . . . 353 EVIDENCE municipal records as 128 presumptions 126, 127 parol to prove 129 to show omissions , 130 rights of creditors 131 ordinance changing rule of, void p. 354n proof of acceptance of police ordinance by defendant 377 when to be set out in record of conviction 358 objections to, made when offered 338 ordinance as, in action of negligence 40 to 42 parol, of terms used in improvement ordinances 559 to ascertain corporate boundaries p. 802n EVIDENCE FOR THE CORPORATION IN ACTIONS TO EN- FORCE POLICE ORDINANCES proof of ordinance 340 judicial notice of ordinance 340 proof of offense 341 beyond a reasonable doubt 341 preponderance of evidence 341 admissions of defendant admissible 341 proof of a number of offenses, when 341 various offenses; illustrations ^ 342 essential elements of, to be proved 342 proof of intent 343 liability of participants, keepers, subordinates, servants, etc.. 344 liability of principal for acts of employes, servants, etc 345 burden of proof; negative averment 346 variance 347 proof of ordinance 395 EVIDENCE OF ORDINANCES proof of authority to enact 382 proof of existence of ordinance, when required 383 burden of proof ; presumption 384 presumption of existence 383 judicial notice; appeal from municipal courts 385 proof of steps in passage, when required 386 proof of record of ordinance 387 presumptions as to steps in enactment ..,, 386 950 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) EVIDENCE OF ORDINANCES— Continued. proof of publication of ordinance, when required 388 presumptions : 388 how proof of publication made 389 how ordinance proved 390 ordinances published by authority 391 when original record required 392 proof by copy 393 sufficiency of authentication 394 proof in actions for penalty 395 admissibility of parol testimony 396 proof of violation of ordinance as evidence of negligence 397 proof of violation by plaintiff in actions for civil liabilities. . . . 398 EXCAVATIONS unauthorized in or near streets, etc., as nuisance 459 in streets and public ways, may be regulated and permits may be required 458 EXCEPTIONS in ordinance, negativing in complaint to enforce 317 EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGES AND MONOPOLIES (See Monopolies and Exclusive Privileges.) EXCISE DEPARTMENT may exercise certain local police powers 88, p. 144n EXECUTIVE POWER distinguished from legislative 79, 80 vested in mayor and officers 90 EXECUTION must be judicial finding, to authorize 359 controlled by local laws 359 pardon, without authority, will not prevent issuance of 359 to be issued forthwith 359 police judge may stay and grant reprieves 359 mayor may remit fine; sufficiency r. 359 governor cannot pardon one convicted of violating municipal ordinance 359 failure to issue within time, is a mere irregularity 359 EXEMPTIONS city has no inherent power to grant, in license tax p. 613n from license of farmers selling their own products p. 631n EXPENDITURES (See Appropriafions.) EXPIRATION of ordinances 37 EXPLOSIVES keeping of, may be regulated 472 EXPORTS duties on, cannot be imposed by ordinance 219 INDEX. 951 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) EX POST FACTO ordinance, void 219 rule respecting amendment of council proceedings 135 EXPRESS POWER mode of exercise of, must be reasonable 183 ordinance passed by virtue of, cannot be held unreasonable. . . 181 EXTRA COMPENSATION (See Salary.) "PALL" used in drainage ordinance, construed to mean "rise" 558 FALSE ALARMS of fire, may be punished 486 FAST DRIVING AND RIDING (See Driving and Riding.) FEDERAL COURTS (See United States Courts.) FELONY at common law 333 in English law 333 FEMALES forbidding in saloons at certain hours p. 758n discrimination as to employment of, void p. 778n FENCE on part of street, as nuisance '. . 459 FENDERS use of, on street cars, may be compelled 474 FERTILIZING conducting business of, without license; complaint p. 505n FERRIES franchise for, exclusive 191, p. 309n license and taxation of, valid 267, 428 state may authorize establishment of, and compel city to pay therefor p. 806n FIELD, MR. JUSTICE views of, as to position of courts, in construing ordinances. . . . 292 views of, as to classification in ordinances 193 "FILLED" construction of, as used in street improvement, ordinance . 559 FILTH deposit of, may be regulated 453 abutter may be required to remove from private passageway. . . 453 suffering to remain on passage way; complaint p. 505n FINE tfSee Forfeiture Penalties.) power to enforce ordinances by penalty of 168 to be paid into city treasury p. 270n 952 INDEX. (Tbe references are to ttie sections, except as otherwise indicated.) FINE-^Continued. may be provided for, within reasonable limits 175 New Jersey doctrine 176 North Carolina doctrine 177 must be reasonable 178 limit, continuous or separate offense 179 heavier for second offense, authorized 180 may be imposed in declaring forfeiture to use streets by rail- way company p. 914n unreasonable in amount, void 173 may be remitted by mayor 359 offense to be accurately described in 359 FIRE giving false alarms of, may be punished 486 power to suppress, confers authority to secure means therefor 65 FIRE DEPARTMENT subject to local control 515 apparatus of, purchased by resolution, valid 5 FIRE ESCAPES certificate of official approval of, is defense 355 FIRE ENGINES imi)lied power to purchase 65 FIRE LIMITS (See Buildings; Wooden Building.) power to establish 470 FIREWORKS forbidding, does not apply to exhibition by city p. 538n FISHING limiting right of, to town residents, void 222 FLAGMEN at railroad crossing may be required 474 FLATS erection of 32 FLORIDA penal ordinance against non-observance of Sabbath sustained.. 479 statute and ordinance may punish same act in 500 FOOD PRODUCTS may be required to be sold by weight and measure 485 FOOTWAYS (See Sidewalks.) FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER action of, jurisdiction of local court p. 467n FOREIGN COMMERCE (See Commerce, Foreign or Interstate.) FOREIGN CORPORATIONS license on, as Interference with foreign or interstate commerce 263 INDEX. 953 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise inaicated.) FOREST ordinance of, an English statute 1, p. 3n FORFEITURE (See Fine; Penalties.) penalty of, power to inflict 170 right to declare, vested in state 592 when action may be taken by city p. 914n private citizen cannot maintain action p. 915n quo warranto will lie p. 915n failure to pave street as ground of p. 899n fine may be imposed, in declaring p. 914n proceedings of 171 animals running at large 172 of privilege or franchise to use streets for public service com- panies 592 FORM of ordinance 137 FORMER ACQUITTAL as a defense 351 FORMER PUNISHMENT as a defense 351 FORTHWITH term as applied to issue of execution 359 FOURTH OF JULY appropriation to celebrate, forbidden 69 FRANCHISE (See Franchise Ordinances; Forfeiture.) power to acquire lands beyond corporate limits for a park, held to be 58 of municipal corporation, belongs to inhabitants 39 as applied to grants and privileges to use streets by municipal corporations 563 distinguished from "corporate franchise" 563 meaning illustrated 563 Blackstone's definition 566 Judge Thompson's comments on p. iJ78n Mr. Justice Bradley's definition 566 Mr. Chief Justice Taney's definition p. 878n various descriptions and definitions 566, 567 distinguished from license or privilege 567 definition of Judge Thompson p. 879n right to charge tolls and make agreement for use of subway space is p. 723n ordinance granting as contract 238 imposing additional burdens 239 exclusive privileges 240 authorized by state 241 954 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) FRANCHISE— Continued. exclusive, cannot be conferred by municipal corporation. .190, 219 irrevocable, forbidden 219 water ; gas ; ferries 191 markets • 192 to build and operate street railroad requires ordinance 87 license to lay water pipes, under legislative act, ordinance granting, not a law 233 police regulations authorized 582 to use streets, may be regulated under police power 473 grants of, cannot surrender police power over streets 521 public improvements, interfering with 521 reservation of right to alter, amend or repeal 242 surrender of, by owners p. 915n duration of, to use streets by public service companies 591 forfeiture of 592 FRANCHISE ORDINANCES (Treated in Chapter XVII.) (See Franchise; Street.) necessary to grant right to use streets by public service com- panies 573 mandatory legal requirement must be observed 574 notice for right to lay tracks in streets 574 omission to publish, fatal 574 delegation of power in granting,- invalidates 574 violation of legal restrictions, invalidates 574 letting to highest bidder 574 consent of abutting property owners 574 consent of municipal authorities 574 consent of electors 574 who may be the grantee 575 existence of the corporation 575 conditions imposed upon grantee 576 paving, repairing, etc., of streets by railway companies 577 may combine contractual and police regulations 11 grant of special privilege is 8 form of 138 grants of exclusive privileges and monopolies 578 construction of 578 acceptance of 579 right to occupy street, etc., as contract 580 amendment of 197 repeal of, general powers as to 199, 200 reservation of right 200, 201 ' illustrative cases 201 when constitutes contract 197 cannot be impaired 197 validity, as a rule, cannot be questioned by third persons, .p. 429n INDEX. 955 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) FRAUD as ground for setting aside municipal acts 78 consent to erect a wooden building obtained by, is no defense. . 355 FRONT-FOOT RULE in special assessment or taxation, sustained 522 applied to special assessment for street sprinkling in Boston . . . 524 FURNITURE DEALER regulation of p. 773n FUTURES dealers in, may be licensed 428 GAMBLING (See various kinds of gambling games in Index.) power of municipal corporation to legislate against p. 784n ordinance may forbid 476 is usually an offense against the state 476 municipal control of 476 ordinances as to, inconsistent with state laws are void 476 power to suppress, does not authorize punishment p. 271n instruments of, cannot be seized, without express authority... 170 GAMBLING DEVICE setting up, may be forbidden p. 75Bn GAMBLING HOUSE keeping; summary jurisdiction on charge of 329 GAME (See Index under titles of various games.) means gambling or game of chance 342 forbidding minors to play at, proof of 342 complaint p. 506n GAMING ordinance may punish, though forbidden by statute 509 ordinance relating to, does not abrogate or suspend the com- mon law on the subject p. 787n GAMING HOUSE ordinance may forbid keeping 476 evidence to "^establish keeping common p. 754n GARBAGE, OFFAL, ETC. subject to police regulation 452 power to remove, gives power to direct the manner thereof 452 ordinances for removal of, by contract 452 removal of house dirt, rubbish, refuse matter, etc 453 license to remove house dirt, offal, etc., may be required 453 GAS price of, must be fixed at reasonable rate 19 power to regulate price of 583, 584, 586 exclusive franchise to supply 191 956 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) GAS COMPANY is a quasi-public corporation 38 ordinance granting right to use street may require compulsory service lo all consumers 576 reasonable charges may be required 576 GAS PIPES in streets, as nuisances 570 placing of, in streets, etc., may be regulated 462 in advance of public improvements 530 regulating time of laying 188 GAS WORKS of city, subject to local control 515 GENDER "his" applied to females p. 448n GENERAL LAWS when charter and ordinances repealed by 212 question of intent 213 when charter provisions superseded by 214 when ordinances superseded by 215 GENERAL ORDINANCES deniied 9, 10 distinguished from special ordinance 9, 10 repeal of 204 GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE exercise of police power under 434 illustrations pp. 671, 672n sufficient to sustain ordinance forbidding cruelty to animals . . 489 GEORGIA doctrine in, as to stray animals 172 nature^ of action, to enforce police ordinance 304 ordinance requiring printing to bear union label, held void . . . 553 power to deal by ordinance with state offenses 502 acquittal by state court, no bar to prosecution under ordinance 510 GIANT POWDER keeping of, may be regulated 472 GIFT ENTERPRISES may be licensed 428 GINGER ALE ordinance regulating sale of, valid p. 757n "GOING AT LARGE" when dog is p. 455n GOOD FAITH ordinance must be enacted in 14 GOODS display of, on sidewalk is nuisance 459 INDEX. 957 (The references are to tlie sections, except as otherwise indicated.) GOVERNING LEGISLATIVE BODY (See Council; Legislative Body; Meeting; Quorum.) GOVERNOR cannot pardon one convicted o£ violating municipal ordinance 359 cannot relieve surety on appeal bond 359 GRADE CROSSING power to abolish and declare nuisance 582 GRADE OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION effect on change in, on ordinances '. 216 GRADE OF STREET establishment of, required before improvement 528 ordinance for, to be recommended by board 528 when to be fixed by ordinance 528 what constitutes fixing 528 established by resolution, when p. 834n suflScient specification of, in Improvement ordinance 541 grade lines by reference, may be adopted 541 vote of council to place the grade as reported by committee does not establish 536 official, may be established by one general ordinance p. 833n if grade can be ascertained without difficulty, ordinance is not uncertain 541 changing pp. 831, 832n change of, to be by ordinance. 3, pp. 834n, 842n by resolution, when p. 841n change, without consent of abutters p. 831n change of, held not altering street p. 807n power to open street, gives implied power to fix p. 833n contract to improve before grade fixed p. 833u legislature may compel city to reduce, when p. 883n mandatory law requiring modification of p. 812n GRAIN (See Weights and Measures.) GRAMMAR in construction 294 and notes GRANTS (See Franchises; Franchise Ordinance; License Tax.) GREAT CHARTER (See Magna Charta.) GUILD HALL place of corporate meetings in ancient England 92 GUILDS by-laws of, in restraint of trade, void p. 304n GUNPOWDER keeping of, may be regulated , 472 when nuisance pp. 740, 741n 958 INDEX. (The references are to ttie sections, except as otherwise indicated.) GUTTERS (See Sewers.) HABEAS CORPUS to review prosecutions for violation of ordinances 367 HACKMEN police control of, affirmed 184 ordinance my regulate, in and about landings, depots and sta- tions 28 HACKNEY COACHES license on p. 642n HANDBILLS distributing on streets; regulating 188, 467 HAND ORGAN playing may be forbidden 486 HARBOR as public improvement 511 and local police regulations as inteference with foreign or in- terstate commerce 274 HATCHWAYS in buildings may be regulated 471 HAWKERS (See Commerce, Foreign and Interstate; Peddlers.) may be regulated 483 HAY may be required to be sold by weight 485 construction of ordinance as to weighing for sale 296 HEALTH public, state may provide for p. 806n HEALTH, BOARD OF (See Board of Health.) HEALTH AND SANITARY REGULATIONS (See Nuisances; Police Powers.) power to make 439 contagious diseases, etc. — quarantine 445 general scope of, stated and illustrated 445 require report of contagious diseases 445 HEARING (See Public Improvements.) required in public improvements, when.. 219, p. 353n in proceedings for Improvements, to be before council p. 829n HEREAFTER as to time of street guttering p. 844n HIGHWAYS (See Obstructions; Public Improvements; Streets.) defined 560 wharf is not p. 873n INDEX. 959 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) HIGHWAYS— Continued. power to establish beyond corporate boundaries, denied 58 opening and establishment of . . . -. 527 "HIS"' apiJlied to females p. 448n HITCHING POSTS corporate authorities may control 458 in public square as nuisance 459 HOGS (See Animals; Swine.) HOGS AND HOG PENS may be regulated 450 keeping of, may be confined to certain districts 32 HOISTWAYS in buildings, may be regulated 471 HOLIDAYS prohibiting the sale of liquor on 758n appropriations to celebrate, generally forbidden 69 HOME RULE of municipal corporations 43 and notes as relates to public improvements 514, 515 HOP TEA TONIC ordinance regulating sale of, valid p. 757n HORSES (See Animals; Animals at Large.) objects in streets, etc., calculated to frighten, are nuisances. . . . 459 HORSE DEALERS license of, valid 428 HORSE RACES may be licensed 428 HOSPITALS may be established and maintained 445 private, permission to erect 194 HOTELS license on, valid 428 HOTEL PORTERS may be regulated 491 HOTEL RUNNERS may be regulated 491 HOURS (See Saloon.) of business, ordinances regulating 221, 480 of business; cannot be regulated under general power, where subject is covered by state statute p. 784n of laundries, may be regulated 491 for opening and closing markets p. 763n 960 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise Indicated.) HOUSE DIRT removal of, may be required and controlled 453 license to remove, may be required 453 HpUSE OF ILL FAME (See Bawdy House.) HUCKSTERS (See Peddlers.) may be regulated 483 HUSTINGS, COURTS (See Municipal Corporation Courts.) ICE (See Snow.) on sidewalk, abutters may be required to remove 32, 298, 458 failure to remove from sidewalk, does not give right of action 42 business of cutting, may be regulated 491 sale of, on street, may be regulated p. 763n selling on street, without license; complaint p. 506n IDAHO ordinance and statute may punish same act in 500 ILLEGAL ORDINANCES (See Void Ordinances.) ILL FAME, HOUSE OF (See Bawdy House.) ILLINOIS council may prescribe time and place of corporate meet- ings 92, p. 146n mayor presiding officer of council in 98 p. 156n general power, sufficient to sustain penal ordinance for non- observance of the Sabbath 479 ordinances restricting competition, void 553 nature of action to enforce police ordinances 304 statute as to security for costs, does not apply to ordinance cases 339 improvement ordinance must specify method of payment 547 payment in installments 548 sufficiency of description of improvement paid for by special assessment 540 street improvements 541 sewer construction 542 description by reference 545 street sprinkling held not to be a local improvement 524 special assessment for sewer outside of corporate limits au- thorized 513 sewers may be constructed beyond corporate liriiits. 513 users of water may be required to provide at their own expense water pipes 518 . INDEX. 9C1 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) same act may be made penal by statute and ordinance in 500 but mere general grant of power is insufficient to authorize an ordinance 503 double punishment authorized 503 IMPERATIVE DUTIES (See Mandatory Powers.) IMPLIED POWERS of municipal corporations recognized 46, 50 to enact ordinances recognized 53 general doctrine of 54 must relate to municipal affairs 55 respecting offices and officers 56 to acquire and hold property 57 beyond corporate limits 58 to dispose of property 59 held for particular purposes 60 to transfer, donate or dedicate for particular uses 61 as to police and sanitary regulations 63 to supply water 64, p. 798n to purchase engines to prevent and suppress fires 65 respecting lighting 66, p. 798n to regulate price of light ., 67 appropriations as donations forbidden 68 for celebrations, entertainments, etc., void 69 bounties to soldiers 70 expenditures to obtain or oppose legislation 71 by virtue of usage or custom 72, 73 to borrow money 74 to purchase on credit 75 to purchase market grounds 57, 74 to forbid beating animals 74 to provide for election, to vote to establish waterworks 74 to establish smallpox hospitals 74 to compromise or settle disputed claims 74 to submit disputed controversies to arbitration 74 to offer rewards for arrest, etc., of offenders against local reg- ulations authorized , 74 but not against state statutes 74 to establish fire limits. 470 to enforce ordinances by penalties. 168 power to restrain, gives power to punish 168 to construct drains and sewers beyond corporate limits, recog- nized 513 ordinances passed by virtue of, must be reasonable 182 no, to grant exclusive franchises or privileges 190 IMPLIED REPEALS . of ordinances, general doctrine 203 general and special ordinances 204 61 9C2 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) IMPLIED REPEALS— Continued. effect of ; revival 205 of penal ordinances 206 of public improvement ordinances 207 IMPORTS duties on, cannot be imposed by ordinance 219 IMPRISONMENT (See Penalties.) power to impose as punishment 173 for non-payment of fine; constitutional 173 cannot be imposed unless authorized 357 judgment of, must be definite and certain 357 may be provided for, within reasonable limits 175 must be reasonable 178 as penalty, duration of •,. 173 IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCE (See Public Improvement Ordinance.) INCIDENTAL POWERS (See Implied Powers.) INDECENT EXPOSURE of person may be forbidden, irrespective of intent ip. 753n in public, proof of p. 539n INDECENT MANNER ordinance forbidding conducting bawdy house in, suffi- cient 20, p. 752n INDEBTEDNESS municipal corporation may incur 74 INDEMNITY right to indemnify municipal ofllcers for loss 74 INDIANA nature of action, to enforce police ordinances 304 license tax on vehicles in 424 appeals in prosecutions for violations of municipal ordi- nances p. 562n statute of, forbids ordinance from punishing state offense. 500, 507 street sweeping, special assessment for, sustained in 524 INDICTMENT for violation of ordinance, if offense is a misdemeanor p. 478n INFECTIOUS DISEASES (See Health and Sanitary Regulations.) INFERIOR COURTS (See Municipal Corporation Courts.) INFORMATION (See Index under titles of various offenses.) proceedings by, to enforce" penal ordinances 303 INDEX. 9G3 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) INFORMATION— Continued. (For violation of _ police ordinance. See Complaint or Infor- mation.) INITIATIVE (See Electors.) INJUNCTION to restrain passage of ordinance 163 to restrain illegal council from organizing 97 is not the remedy to try title to office 97 to test validity of ordinance 281 and notes doctrine stated and illustrated 285 and notes by citizens and taxpayers, to test validity of ordinances . . 282, 283 to prevent violation of ordinance 286 to restrain enforcement of ordinances, to avoid multiplicity of suits p. 437n to review prosecutions for violations of ordinances 368 by abutters, to prevent use of streets for railroad tracks 572 by property owners to prevent change of location of water mains, denied 581 to prevent operation of street railway p. 429n to restrain removal of wooden building p. 738n to restrain erection of livery stable p. 704n to restrain discharge of sewage, etc p. 707n to restrain placing obstructions in streets p. 720n ■ to prevent erection of poles, wires, etc p. 885n INSPECTION regulations relating to market products may be established . . . 481 illustrations of regulations pp. 762, 763n delegation of power to inspector, void p. 763n of milk 484 of laundries and wash houses, may be prescribed 491 refusal to permit; complaint in charge of 321 allegation of, on charge of unsafe building 321 INSTALLMENTS sufficiency of ordinance providing for payments in 548 INSURANCE COMPANIES may be licensed, and their agents 428 license on basis of amount of premiums, held unequal .... p. 631n INSURANCE CONTRACTS are personal, not commerce 257 INTELLIGENCE OFFICE may be regulated 491 license of, to be uniform and equal p. 631n INTENT proof of, in ordinance cases 342 on charge of cruelty to animals ". p. 772n knowledge of adulteration of milk need not be shown p. 767n ordinance may forbid indecent exposure, irrespective of p. 753n 964 INDEX. (The refefenoes are to the sections, except as otherwise Indicated.) INTEREST of members, how quorum affected by 108 INTERPRETATION (See Construction; Construction of Ordinances.) INTERSTATE COMMERCE (See Commerce, Foreign and Interstate.) INTOXICATING LIQUORS (See Liquor Selling; Saloons.) INTOXICATION (See Public Drunkenness.) INTRODUCTION of ordinance, time of 146 double board 147 ITINERANT VENDORS (See Commerce, Foreign and Interstate; Peddlers.) amount of license tax on p. 635n IOWA violation of ordinance, a public offense p. 478n certiorari, to test validity of ordinance, denied in p. 440n ordinance and statute may denounce same offense 500 JAIL implied power to purchase lands for 57 JOINDER of several offenses, in action to enforce penal ordinance 318 joint liability 319 JOINT ASSEMBLIES of definite bodies, quorum 109 JOINT DISTRICT SEWER under St. Louis charter 543 JUDGES (See Municipal Corporation Courts.) JUDGMENT (See Penalties; Record of Conviction.) must be for precise offense 357 where ordinance imposes several penalties ■ 357 charge of several violations, separate sentences 357 reduction of, on appeal 357 should cover all penalties 357 imprisonment, only when authorized 357 jail sentence where defendant has no property 357 in language of charter, when sufficient 357 must be definite and certain; illustrations 357 error in form of entry does not invalidate 357 cannot be set aside at subsequent term 357 if two penalties are prescribed, judgment must show for which given 358 record of conviction should show 358 Index. 96S (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) Judicial notice of ordinance 340 municipal court will talte, of ordinances 373 state court will not take, of ordinances 373 of ordinances; pleading ordinance violated 315 of ordinance on appeal 363, 385 of meaning of "policy," in penal ordinance p. 448n JUDICIARY (See Courts.) JURISDICTION (Of Offenses, See Municipal Offenses; State Offenses.) must appear on face of record 358 of municipal corporation and local courts 299, 300 territorial limits of 301 of subject-matter, objection to raised by demurrer 327 of subject-matter, cannot be waived or given by consent 324 complaint must show, in action to enforce police ordinance 311 of same act as offense against state and municipal corporation 500 ■of offenses, state or municipal 498 of federal courts, to restrain enforcement of ordinances. . . .p. 437n of superior courts over inferior 360 method of exercising 360 JURORS who may act as in municipal corporation courts 302 JUNK SHOPS may be regulated 491 may be licensed 428 "junk shop" defined p. 653n JUSTICES OF THE PEACE jurisdiction of, for violation of ordinances p. 468n distinction between, and judges of local courts p. 470n exercise of summary jurisdiction by 329 as "police justice" or "police magistrate" p. 449n JURY may determine reasonableness of ordinances 185 JURY TRIAL (See Trial.) KANSAS statute and ordinance may denounce as offense the same act in 500 statute of, limiting day's work to eight hours, construed 495 ordinance regulating street parades, held void 416 ordinance regulating sale of cider sustained in p. 758n appeals in prosecutions for violation of ordinances 361, p. 563n KANSAS CITY (MO.) council of, composed of two branches p. 142 violations of ordinances of, triable summarily 331 merchant defined under charter of p. 657n ordinance of, forbidding sale of skimmed milk, sustained, .p. 767n 966 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) KEEPERS liability of, in ordinance violations 344 KENTUCKY constitution of, authorizes license tax on lawyers 423 statute and ordinance may condemn same act as offense 500 ordinance penalty must not be less than statute 504 there can be but one punishment 504 prohibition authorized in, to test validity of ordinances of cities of first class P- 436n KILN (See Brick Kiln.) KITE PLYING within business portion, may be forbidden 458 KNOWLEDGE (See Intent.) LABOR (See Eight-Hour Laws; Union Labor.) regulating price of common p. 863n as penalty for violating ordinance 174 time and method of payment p. 778n partial and discriminating laws as to employment of p. 778n LABOR AGENT ordinance requiring bond of, void where charter did not au- thorize >p. 773n LAMP POSTS in streets, etc., as nuisances p. 719n placing and maintenance of, may be regulated 462 . LANDINGS as public improvements 511 LANDLORD AND TENANT who liable for nuisance, etc., on premises 298 which liable, for bawdy house, on premises p. 752n LANGUAGE English, to be used in ordinance ". 137 ordinance in French, sustained in early Louisiana case 137, p. 219n "wanton or obscene"; proof of p. 537 LARCENY (See Petit Larceny.) LAUNDRIES ordinances regulating; discrimination p. 361n regulations of, to be uniform 194 location and hours of, may be regulated 194 may be regulated, as to location, character of building, sanitary conditions and hours 491 inspection of, may be prescribed 491 ordinance may regulate hours of 220 INDEX. 967 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) LAUNDRIES— Continued. may be confined to certain sections 32 license of, valid 428 license based on number in business, held uniform p. 632n reasonableness of license tax on p. 636n ordinance requiring consent of certain property owners, to erect, held void 415 LAW ordinance as, as to impairment of obligation of contract 233 LAW, QUESTION OF unreasonableness of ordinance is 185 LAWYER (See Attorneys-at-Law.) LEASE of property, to be executed as prescribed 75 of real estate, council may fix rent 76 LECTURE delivery of, in public places, may be regulated 225 LEGISLATION expenditures of municipal corporation to obtain or oppose, gen- erally void 71 LEGISLATIVE BODY (See Council; Meeting; Quorum.) when legally constituted 96 (Le facto officers of 96 conflicting bodies 97 LEGISLATIVE MOTIVE courts will not inquire into. 161 rule limited to ministerial acts 162 LEGISLATIVE POWER (See Ordinances.) where vested i 90 when mayor part of 90 cannot be delegated; illustrations 86 to 88 distinguished from ministerial 85, 86, 89 passage of ordinance is exercise of 79 distinguished from executive 80 power of taxation is 402 LEGISLATURE (See Public Improvements.) curative power of, over void ordinances 165 proceedings to subscribe to railroad stock 166 to collect taxes 167 to validate void improvement ordinances 557 LETTINGS ( See Competition ; Contracts; Public Work.) 968 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) LEVEE DISTRICT as a public corporation 38 LEWD CONDUCT (See Public Morals and Decency.) may be forbidden 475 LEWD WOMEN (See Bawdy Houses; Prostitution; Street Walking.) ordinance forbidding renting property to, void 225 LIABILITIES, CIVIL ordinances regulating ." 40 to 42 LIBERTY OF INDIVIDUAL oppressive regulations 224 ordinances relating to 225 discriminating ordinances 226 personal association, employment, etc 228 ordinance may punish public drunkenness 229 LICENSE (See Franchise; Franchise Ordinance; Permit.) LICENSE TAX (See Commerce, Foreign and Interstate.) municipal power' to license and regulate trades, occupations, etc. 403 mode of delegation of power by state 401 ^ how power construed 404 enumeration followed by general words 405 power "to regulate," as power to license 400 as power to prohibit 407 distinction between license to regulate and tax to raise revenue 408 license taxes distinguished from general taxes 409 as a contract 410, p. 274n limited to municipal purpose 411 power to impose on non-residents 25, 224, 412 to be levied by ordinance 381, 413 resolution may prescribe fee under general ordinance .... 5 delegation of power to impose, forbidden 88, 414 consent of property owners 415 permits to parade streets 416 reasonableness of amount 418 illustrative cases p. 635n application for license 419 license to firm, good for term 419 how far granting of, discretionary 419 mandamus 419, p. 643n conditions respecting granting 419, 420, 426 revocation of license or permit 420 method of enforcement of payment of 421 on dogs 422, 469 on lawyer 423 on vehicles — double taxation 424 INDEX. 969 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) LICENSE TAX— Continued. on saloons and liquor selling 30, 425, 426, 477 on street railways and cars 427 on street railway under power to amend franchise 197 on miscellaneous trades, occupations, avocations, etc 428 discriminating, void 259 different rates for, discriminating and void 194 uniform rule for, required p. 294n to maintain well in public street, may be revoked 455 doctrine of estoppel applies 352 forfeiture of, as penalty 170 as denying due process of law 219, p. 353n as restraint of trade 189 of vehicles; construction of general and particular words 297 of auctioneers, history of, in New York p. 77 2n ten pin alleys: power must be expressly given p. 756n to remove contents of privies, etc., may be required 453 also to remove house dirt, offal, etc 453 under police power as interference with foreign or interstate commerce 260 on foreign corporations as interference with foreign or inter- state commerce 263 of ferries, constitutional 267 on brokers, agents, etc., engaged in interstate commerce 258 on non-residents, on occupation, held constitutional 257 keeping dog without; complaint p. 506n selling milk without; complaint p. 506n selling ineat without; complaint p. 506n conducting show without; complaint p. 506n conducting business without; complaint p. 505n refusal to produce on request; proof of p. 538n carrier without; proof of p. 538n for vehicle; proof of failure to obtain p. 537n selling second-hand goods without; proof of p. 537n LIGHT (See Gas.) obstructing, may be forbidden 493 power to regulate price of 583, 584, 586 on cars running in street, may be required 474 on railroad tracks, may be compelled 474 LIGHTING as public improvement; power to provide 511 council power to provide for, cannot be delegated 87 ordinance delegating power to make contract for, void 516 plant to supply, submission to voters 76, p. 837n Implied powers respecting 66, p. 798n to regulate price 67 supplying to residents, is a municipal purpose p. 798n 970 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) LINCOLN (NEB.) ordinance of, regulating sale of street car tickets and trans- fers sustained 590 LIQUOR ordinance declaring keeping of, void p. 757n LIQUOR SELLING (See Saloon.) municipal power to regulate and prohibit. . •. 477 may be forbidden on Sunday 479 may be punished by ordinance, though condemned by statute. . 509 same on Sunday 509 license tax for 425 conditions 426 by druggists ; compelling reports by, void 224 without license, sufficiency of conlplaint in charge of 321 summary jurisdiction on charge of 329 on Sunday, proof of 342 sufficiency of complaint 321 unlawful ; proof of 342 charge against two partners; proof of 342 LIVERY STABLES power to regulate 450 not nuisance per se 450 regulating location of p. 303n ordinances requiring consent of certain property owners 415 location of, power of property owners to determine 87 may be forbidden in resident districts 32 injunction to restrain erection of p. 704n license of, valid 428, p. 703n LOADS for teams, regulating p. 303n LOANS municipal corporation may negotiate 74 LOBBYING expenditures of municipal corporation for, generally void 71 LOBSTERS unlawfully taking, proof of 343, p. 53711 LOCAL COURTS (See Municipal Corporation Courts.) LOCAL ASSESSMENT (See Special Assessment or Taxation.) LOCAL IMPROVEMENTS (See Public Improvements; Public Improvement Ordinances; Special Assessment or Taxation.) LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT of municipal corporations 43 and notes as relates to local public improvements 514, 515 INDEX. 971 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise inflicated.) LOCOMOTIVES may be exempt from operation of law forbidding discharge of dense smol^e 194 LOTTERIES ordinance may forbid conducting 476 newspaper advertising scheme as p. 756n LOTTERY TICKETS ordinance may prohibit sale of, when 476, p. 784n selling; summary jurisdiction on charge of 329 ordinance may forbid sale of tickets for, though subject cov- ered by statute 509 LOUISIANA statute and ordinance may condemn same act as offense 500 double punishment authorized 510 appeals in proceedings for violations of ordinances 361 MAGNA CHARTA guarantees legal procedure 328 right to jury trial, declared by 330 purpose of p. 514n forbids penalty of forfeiture, unless expressly granted 170 MAJORITY (See Quorum.) MAINTENANCE of street, ordinances providing for, for a term of years 555 distinguished from repairs 555 MANDAMUS to try title to office 97 proper to require amendment of municipal records 134 to compel granting of license will lie. , 419, p. 643n to require calling of special borough meeting, denied p. 150n if granting permission to build sidewalk is discretionary, will not lie 518 to require a board to issue permit, to erect poles, wires, etc. p. 885n to compel street railway to pave street p. 899n by citizens and taxpayers, to test validity of ordinances. . . .282, 284 city court of New York, has no jurisdiction p. 467n MANDATORY POWERS distinguished from discretionary 82, 83 MANDATORY PROVISIONS distinguished from directory, respecting council procedure .... 116 as to subject and title of ordinance 141 MANHOLES for sewers, description of, in ordinances for construction 542 MANUFACTURERS may be licensed 428 nuisances arising from 447 972 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) MAPS may be used as evidence in ascertaining corporate boundaries p. 802n direction to make includes survey p.. 454n MARKETS establishment of ***1 may be regulated 481 sale of certain products except at, may be forbidden '. . 481 private may be forbidden, and certain sales confined to public. 482 private, within specified distance from public, may be for- bidden p. 353n inspection regulations may be established 481 cheats and frauds in weights and measures may be forbidden. 481 hours for opening and closing p. 7*J3n regulation of hucksters, hawkers, etc 483 milk inspection and adulteration 484 weights and measures may be required and regulated 485 implied power to purchase grounds for, on credit 57, 74 to employ architect to prepare plans for 74 privileges for, exclusive forbidden 192 occupiers of stands and stalls of, may be licensed 428 license tax on, reasonableness of amount p. 636n delegation of power to establish, void p. 762n in public streets, constitute nuisance p. 762n ordinance giving space for, on streets, etc., void p. 718n violating regulations; summary jurisdiction on charge of 329 private forbidden; summary Jurisdiction on charge of p. 517n selling on street; proof of p. 538n sale of unwholesome food ; proof of knowledge 343 violating regulations as to stands; complaint p. 506n MARRIED WOMAN jointly liable with husband for keeping bawdy house p. 540n MARSHALL, CHIEF JUSTICE construction of commerce clause of federal constitution 250 MARYLAND statute and ordinance may condemn as offense same act 500 double punishment , 510 MASSACHUSETTS where corporate authority of cities of, vested p. 142n statute of, relating to withholding wages of weavers, uncon- stitutional p. 778n on acquittal on charge of violation of ordinance, defendant is not entitled to costs in 339 conclusion of complaint for violation of ordinance 314 statute and ordinance may condemn as offense same act 500 MASSACHUSETTS COLONY ORDINANCE relating to right of property on waters 1, p. 4n INDEX. 973 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) MATERIAL for streets, sewers, etc., how far selection of discretionary with municipal authorities 519 specification of, in improvement ordinances 544 for streets, sewers, sidewalks, etc., delegation of power to name 517 "MAY" when construed as "must" or "shall" 83 read as "must," relating to service of resolution 294 MAYOR chief executive officer of municipal corporation 90 when part of legislative power 90 as member of council 98 as presiding officer of council 98 as presiding officer at common law 98, p. 156n right of mayor to vote at council meetings 98 signing hills by, as presiding officer 99 when his approval of proceedings necessary 100 approval must be in writing 101 casting vote by, in event of tie 102 presiding officer of council in Illinois 98, p. 156n presiding officer of board of supervisors in San Francisco 98, p. 156n when to sign and approve ordinance and resolutions 149 time and marrner of approval 149 veto of bill, ordinance or resolution by 150 return of bill or ordinance by 151 power to approve or veto ordinance cannot be delegated by. . . . 85 consideration of veto of, by legislative body 160 power to call corporate meetings 92 may grant reprieves and remit fines 359 offense must be described 359 may question validity of ordinance, when 281 MAYORS' COURTS (See Municipal Corporation Courts.) MAXIMS delegatus non potest delegare 89 ejusdem generis p. 81n, p. 82n expresio unius est exclusio alterius p. 79n, p. 271n, p. 614n falsa demonstratio non nocet p. 852n noscitur d socus p. 82n qui cito dat his dat 235 qui serius solvit, minus solvit 235 quorum aliquem vestrum * * * unum esse volumus. p. 164n salus populi suprema est lex 84, 430 sic utere tuo ut alienum non Iwdas 430 volenti non ft injuria 352 MEASURES (See Weights and Measures.) 974 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) MEAT (See Markets.) sold for food, inspection of, authorized P- 762n selling without license; complaint P- 506n may he required to be sold by weight 485 oilering for sale tainted, indictable at common law p. 762n MEAT SHOPS may be licensed 428 MECHANICAL TRADES may he licensed 428 MECHANIC'S LIEN action of, cannot be entertained by municipal court of New York p. 4B7n MEETING (See Public Meeting.) of municipal corporation, required 91 existence of governing body is as an entity 91 formal action at, required 91 kinds of 92 regular meeting of municipal corporation 92 stated meeting of municipal corporation 92 special meeting of municipal corporation 92 adjourned meeting of municipal corporation 92 notice of 92 corporate meetings at common law 92, p. 146n place of 92 of New England towns 93 notice or warning 93 sufficiency of 94 specification of 95 when council may prescribe time of 92 MERCHANDISE display of, on sidewalk, is a nuisance 459 MERCHANTS may be licensed 428 classification of, to license, valid p. 632n discrimination against those selling by sample, void p. 632n itinerant p. 632n transient p. 632n definitions of, in license laws .pp. 656, 657n to keep hook of sales, open for police inspection, void 224 METER user of water, may be required to provide p. 356n MICHIGAN common law origin of municipal corporations declared in 45 implied power to construct drains and sewers beyond corporate limits, recognized 513 ordinance regulating street parades, held void 416 statute and ordinance may condemn as offense same act 500 INDEX. 975 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) MILK ordinance forbidding sale of impure, Is void where subject Is regulated by statute p.' 788n ordinance may punish sale of impure, though covered by statute 509 statutes forbidding sale of adulterated, held constitutional, .p. 767n knowledge of adulteration need not be shown p. 767n ordinance forbidding sale of skimmed, valid p. 767n inspection and adulteration of 484 selling adulterated; summary jurisdiction on charge of 329 selling adulterated; criminal intent need not be proved. . . .p. 539n selling adulterated by servant, when principal not liable 345 selling without license; complaint p. 506n MILL RACE in street, is nuisance p. 719n MILWAUKEE charter of, recognizes common law powers 45n MINISTERIAL ACT court will not inquire into motive in performing 162 MINISTERIAL POWERS may be delegated 85, 89 ■MINNESOTA statute of, gives common law powers to municipal corporations 45 rule as to effect of general laws on municipal ordinances 214 statute and ordinance may condemn as offense same act 500 double punishment authorized 510 street sprinkling, held "local improvement" 524 MINOR forbidden from participating in certain games, where liquor is sold ; complaint p. 506n proof of 342 forbidding, from entering saloons p. 758n MINUTES OF COUNCIL (See Records.) MISDEMEANOR defined 334 in the English law 334, p. 524n distinguished from crime and municipal offense 333 liability of participants, keepers, subordinates, servants, etc... 344 liability of principal for acts of employes, servants, etc 345 MISDEMEANOR AGAINST STATE (See State Offenses.) MISSISSIPPI statute and ordinance may condemn as offense same act 500 MISSOURI doctrine in, as to mandamus, to prevent illegal public acts 284 nature of action to enforce ordinances 304 &r6 tNDBX, (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise Indicated,) MISSOURI— Continued. ordinances directed against non-observance of Sabbath, sus- tained in 479 doctrine in, as to repeal of ordinances and revival 205 summary trial for police offenses, authorized 331 appeals in prosecutions for violation of ordinances p. 563n tax on non-resident wagons, void 224 statute and ordinance may condemn as offense same act 500 ordinance must conform to statute 505 double punishment authorized 510 rule as to effect of general laws on municipal ordinances 214 MISTAKE as ground for setting aside municipal acts 78 MOBILE (ALA.) ordinance of, imposing license tax on telegraph companies, held void 257 MONOPOLIES AND EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGES essence of p. 307n diflBculty in defining 189 common law definition p. 306n exclusive market privileges 192 described ; power to grant 190, 219 to supply water; gas; ferries 191 Judge Cooley's views as relates to markets 192 in slaughtering animals 189 in removing dead animals 189 exclusive privileges; impairment of 240 ordinances authorizing monopolized and patented articles 554 exclusive privileges in licensing, forbidden p. 613n contracts for removal of dead animals, garbage, etc., as 452 municipal corporations cannot grant 190, 219, 578 construction of such grants 578 MORALS (See Bawdy House; Public Morals and Decency.) MORTGAGE of property, implied power of municipal corporation 62 MOTIVE (See Legislative Motive.) MUNICIPAL defined p. 622n MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS ordinances are designed to regulate 497 distinguished from state matters 497 as applied to offenses 498 distinguished from private 39 implied powers must relate to 55 as relates to public improvements 515 tNDBX. 9?? (The references sire to the sections, except as otherwise Indicated.) MUNICIPAL BONDS (See Bonds.) MUNICIPAL CHARTfeR (See Charter, MUNICIPAL.) MUNICIPAL CORPORATION defined and classified — ^kinds 38, 90 distinguished from other public corporations 38 objects are public, not private 39 distinguished from private corporations 39 created, to conduct local civil government 38 purpose of, is to supply needs, conveniences and comforts 39 is organ of government 79 powers of, vested in council unless otherwise prescribed 79 corporate authority of, where vested 90 state may delegate power to 43 - may pass ordinances 38 acts of, must be as law prescribes 91 existence of, cannot be questioned, in trial of charge of violai- ing ordinance 349 doctrine of estoppel applies to 352 two-fold character of, as relates to liability for torts 436 cannot establish court, without express grant 299 is bound by its contracts 232 cannot grant exclusive franchises or privileges 190, 219, 578 cannot loan credit or grant aid 219 cannot make irrevocable grants 219 extra compensation to officers of, forbidden 219 cannot increase price of contract, when 219 law must warrant payment of claims 219 cannot legalize invalid acts, when 219 cannot increase officers' compensation during term 219 cannot extend term of office 219 change of class or grade, effect on ordinances 216 effect on ordinances of, by surrender of charter. 216 by dissolution and reorganization 217 by consolidation and change of corporate limits 218 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION COURTS establishment and continuance of 299 jurisdiction 299, 300 territorial limits of 301 who may act as judges, jurors and witnesses 302 distinction between judges of, and justices of the peace p. 470n MUNICIPAL OFFENSE^ (See State Offense; Trial.) MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE (See Ordinances.) 62 978 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION kinds of 90 examples of various forms of 90 and notes form of, contained in charter 44 MUNICIPAL POLICE POWERS (See Police Powers.) MUNICIPAL POWERS (See Charter; Implied Powers; Powers.) MUNICIPAL PURPOSE municipal defined p. 622n powers' to be limited to 50 power of taxation limited to; what is? 400 supplying light to residence, held to be p. 798n license tax, limited to 411 relating to jurisdiction of local court 300 MUSIC parading with in streets, may be forbidden 48B playing hand organ, may be prohibited 486 forbidding in saloons at certain hours p. 758n "MUST" construction of 83 when "may" construed as 83 "may" read as, relating to service of resolution 294 NAME of municipal corporation, given by charters 45 in which action for violation of ordinance should be brought. . 309 in warrant for violation of ordinance 307 NAPHTHA violation of ordinance, as to keeping, as evidence of negligence 41 NATIONAL BANKS license tax cannot be imposed on, by city p. 613n NAVIGATION license for privilege of, ordinances imposing, void 266 regulating, uniform rule required p. 294n NAYS (See Yeas and Nays.)" NEBRASKA statute and ordinance may condemn same act as offense 500 statute of, limiting day's work to eight hours, unconstitutional 495, p. 777n NECESSITY for the enactment of ordinances, need not be recited 140 declaration of necessity in improvement ordinance. 534 NEGATIVE AVERMENT proof of 346 INDEX. 979 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) NEGLIGENCE municipal liability for failure to enact and enforce police regu- lations 436 nuisances 437 relating to streets, etc 437 violation of ordinance, as ground of action for 40 to 42 in creating or permitting nuisances and obstructions on streets and highways 40 to 42 in violation of ordinance, pleading 376 proof of acceptance 377 relating to public safety 378 railroads and street cars 379 removal of snow and ice 380 proof of violation of ordinance as evidence of 397 by plaintiff in action for civil liability 398 leaving animal unfastened is p. 732n NEGRO ordinance directing arrest of, when on street after 10 o'clock, p. m., void 226 NEW CHARTER when will supersede ordinances 211 NEW ENGLAND CITIES legislative body of, composed of aldermen p. 142n NEW ENGLAND TOWNS powers of, vested in inhabitants 90 acts of, to be at legal town meeting 91, 93 notice or warning necessary 93 quorum 93, 104 sufficiency of notice or warning 94 specification of notice or warning 95 legislative body of, composed of selectmen p. 142n powers of 47 and notes NEW HAMPSHIRE where corporate authority of municipal corporations vested. p. 142n costs on appeal, in ordinance cases 338 conclusion of complaint for violation of ordinance 314 general power held sufiBcient to require restaurants to close at 10 p. m 480 NEW JERSEY nature of action, to enforce police ordinances 304 doctrine of, as to certainty of penalties 176 doctrine in, as to certiorari, to test validity of ordinances 287 certiorari in, to review prosecutions for violation of ordinances 364 statute and ordinance may condemn same act as offense 500 rule in, as to change of contract and franchise ordinances. . . . 197 NEW ORLEANS (LA.) form of enacting clause of ordinance p. 232n ordinance limiting day's work to eight hours, construed 495 980 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) NEW ORLEANS (LA.)— Continued. ordinance of, imposing license for running boats to and from the Gulf of Mexico, void 266 milk inspection ordinance of, sustained 484 NEWSPAPER ordinance forbidding sale of specified, unconstitutional. .. .p. 354n NEW YORK nature of action, to enforce police ordinances 304 history of licensing and regulating auctioneers in p. 772n statute and ordinance may condemn same act as offense 500 double punishment authorized 510 statute of, relating to eight hours as day's work p. 778n laws of, regulating tenement houses, sustained 494 grants to individuals to lay down railroad tracks in streets, forbidden 575 NEW YORK .CITY form of enacting clause of ordinance p. 231n city court of, has no jurisdiction in mandamus p. 467n nor action of mechanic's lien p. 467n NITROGLYCERIN keeping of, may be regulated 472 NOES (See Yeas and Nays.) NOISE as disturbance of the peace p. 770 NON-PENAL ORDINANCE defined 10 distinguished from penal ordinance 10 NON-RESIDENTS when bound by ordinance 23 rule as applied to license 25 discriminations against, in license taxes, void p. 631n power to impose license tax on 412 denying right to fish in navigable river, void 222 ordinance requiring penning at night of cattle, not applicable to 297 same, forbidding dogs on streets 297 contra, permitting horses to go at large 297 NON-USER (See Forfeiture.) NORTH CAROLINA license tax on residents and non-residents, valid 224 early case of, asserts right of trial de novo on certiorari 363 doctrine of, as to certainty of penalties 177 violation of ordinance, criminal, when p. 478n statute and ordinance cannot condemn same offense 506 ordinance requiring business houses to close at 7:30 p. m., held void 480 INDEX. 981 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicatea.) NORWOOD V. BAKER rule of, relating to special assessment or taxation, stated 522 NOTICE (See Judicial Notice.) of corporate meetings, when required 92 sufficiency of 92 of New England town meetings 93 sufficiency of : 94 specification of 95 of corporate meetings personal, when required 92 of regular meetings, members charged with notice of 92 of special meeting 110 members to take notice of adjourned meeting Ill of petition for right to lay tracks in streets 574 to property owners, of proceeding for public improvements. . . . 525 to property owners, to make improvements, repairs of side- walks, etc 518 of public improvements, when required 219, p. 353n In proceedings to forfeit property 170 animals running at large 171 record of conviction should show, when required 358 to remove wooden building p. 738n of ordinance; allegation of, unnecessary in action to enforce. . . 311 to recover penalties for violation of ordinance, required 305 not required If defendant appears 305 to joint defendants p. 481n of pendency of ordinance, when required 155 to be taken of ordinances 22 NORTH-WEST ORDINANCE law for territorial government of northwest territory .... 1, p. 3n NUISANCES (See Obstructions.) general municipal powers as to 439 what constitutes 440 public and private distinguished 440 two kinds of public nuisances 440 municipal power to declare and define 441 illustrative cases 442 doubt as to nuisance 443 municipal power to abate 444 cemeteries as 446 arising from trade, manufactures, etc 447 illustrations 447 power to abate 447 power to abate to be exercised by ordinance 81 method of abating to be reasonable 78 markets in public streets as p. 762n obstructions, etc., in streets, corporate authorities may remove 460 982 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) NUISANCES— Continued. awnings, signs, projections over sidewalk, streets, etc 461 summary jurisdiction on charge of 329 summary removal of railroad tracks p. 720n essential elements of, to be proved 342 pond, owner of abandoned quary, liable p. 537n complaint, suffering filth to remain on passageway p. 505n municipal liability for authorizing or permitting 437 relating to highways 437 on premises; liability of landlord or tenant 298 declaring dead animals, not slain for food, void 223 burning tan to annoyance of persons, etc., complaint in charge of 321 maintaining; sufficiency of complaint in charge of 321 gunpowder, explosives, powder magazines, as 472 created by sinks, cesspools, privy vaults, etc., may be abated. . . 453 arising from creeks, brooks, ponds, etc., may be abated 454 arising from drains and sewers may be abated 454 fouling of water is public p. 707n drain emptying into public street is p. 707n abatement by establishment of grades and drainage system. . . 454 wells, when constitute, may be abated 455 dense smoke as 456 in streets, etc., may be removed by corporate authorities 458 obstructions in streets, etc., as; illustrations 459 bawdy house is public, per se p 751n in public ways, as ground of action 42 ordinance declaring keeping of liquor a nuisance, void p. 757n ordinances may condemn, though covered by statute 509 street railroad tracks, gas and water pipes, poles, wires, etc., as 570 power to declare grade crossings a 582 power to abate as authority to inflict penalty p. 271n NULLIFICATION ordinance of 1, p. 3n NUMBER plural, construction of p. 448n OATH (See Profane Oath.) OBSCENE LANGUAGE in public, may be forbidden p. 77111 what is, as employed in ordinance p. 537n OBSCENE PUBLICATION may be forbidden p. 753n OBLIGATIONS (See Contracts.) of contract, defined 235 INDEX. 983 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.), OBSTRUCTIONS railroad tracks, gas and water pipes, poles, wires, etc., in streets as. 570 ordinance prohibiting, applied to railroad cars 297 by wagons from which products are sold 296 of public ways, ordinances authorizing, void 222 of streets, with steam and street cars 474 by railroads , p. 747n of sidewalk; summary jurisdiction on charge of 329 of harbor ' 329 of sidewalk; proof of 342 In public way; action for damages 42 on highway, ordinance may condemn, though forbidden by statute 509 in street or water way; complaints p. 506n stopping vehicle for more than specified time p. 506n of street by vehicles; state license as a peddler is no defense. 355 of streets by "public meetings"; salvation army p. 537n in streets, etc., corporate authorities may remove 460 in streets, etc., as nuisances; illustrations 459 of streets, etc., with vehicles; ordinances may regulate 458 on streets, may be removed by corporate authorities 458 streets, etc., may be kept free from 458 OCCUPATION TAX (See License Tax.) ordinance imposing, on non-residents, constitutional 257 OFFAL (See Garbage, Offal, Etc.) OFFENSES (See State Offenses; Penalties; and various offenses in this Index.) double regulations, state and municipal 500 OFFICE public, is not property '. 231 may exist without an incumbent 4 OFFICES AND OFFICERS implied powers as to 56 do not constitute municipal corporation 90 are to be trustees 39, 90 of municipal corporation, belong to inhabitants 39 has no vested right in office 231 ofllce may be changed or abolished * 231 municipal, how far agents of property owners in authorizing improvements p. 813n to be created by ordinance, when 4 power to create is legislative act 4 difference between oflice and clerical positions 4 when officer may appoint additional help 4 984 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) OFFICES AND OFFICERS— Continued. legislative power to provide for, cannot be delegated 87 who to appoint 4 and n aldermen and councilmen are civil, in Rhode Island p. 143n cannot he deprived of power to select subordinates, when 15 election of, method by council 116 defects in election or appointment defeats salary 4, p. 9n cannot recover compensation for services under void statute 4, p. 9n providing for time of election of, to be reasonable 183 election of, casting vote p. 163n additional duties may be imposed on 231 right of corporation to indemnify for losses 74 de facto 96 powers of, fixed by charter 44 of municipality, may question validity of ordinance 281 extra compensation to, forbidden 219 increase of during term, prohibited 219 city cannot extend term of 219 ordinance making it unlawful to insult, while in the discharge of duty, not authorized under general charter power 496 resisting; summary jurisdiction on charge of 329 OHIO house of legislation exists in principal cities of p. 142n statute and ordinance may condemn same act as offense 500 nature of action, to enforce police ordinances 304 appeals in prosecutions for violation of ordinances 361 right to amend franchise ordinance under constitution of 197 statute of, limiting day's labor to eight hours, unconstitutional p. 778n OIL violation of ordinance as to keeping, as evidence of negligence 41 storage and keeping of, may be regulated 472 manufacture of, regulation p. 698n keeping crude petroleum; proof of p. 538n OLEOMARGARINE regulating sale of, constitutional 271 laws forbidding sale of, as imitation of butter p. 763n OMISSIONS in municipal record, parol to prove 130 creditors' rights to show when municipal record imperfect... 131 OPENING (See Saloons; Streets.) places of business; ordinances regulating hours of 480 OPIUM SMOKING power of municipal corporation to forbid p. 784n "OR" transposition of conjunction in construction p. 448n INDEX. 985 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) ORDAINING CLAUSE (See Enacting Clause.) ORDER (See Disturbing the Peace; Public Order and Peace.) defined 6 distinguished from ordinance 6 I'or public improvements, when authorized and sufficiency. .535, 536 ORDINANCE (See Actions to Enforce Police Ordinances; Reasonableness of Ordinances; Validity of Ordinances.) defined 1, 6 distinguished from by-law 1 distinguished from public laws 1 various use of term ordinance 1, p. 3n distinguished from resolution 2 all legislative acts must be by 2 illustrations as to when ordinance necessary 3 when ordinance necessary to create offices and situations 4 distinguished from regulations, orders, resolutions, etc 6 distinguished from rules of procedure 7 classification of 8 general and special 9, 10 penal and non-penal 10 may combine contractual and police regulations 11 force and effect of 12 how they differ from charter or statute 13 requisites of valid ordinance stated 14 must conform to charter 15 must be consistent with general laws of the state 16 exception 17 must harmonize with public policy and common law of state 18 must be enacted in good faith 19 must be definite and certain 20 ordinances of cities of same class may vary 21 notice to be taken of 22 who bound by 23 operate upon property within corporate limits 24 rule as applied to license 25 territorial operation of 26 place within municipal jurisdiction 27 wharves — private property 28 regulating speed of trains 29 judicial limitation of operation of 29, 30 public or particular places only 31 applying to part of city, valid 32 improvement ordinances 33 time of taking effect of 34 illustrations 35 986 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) ORDINANCE— Continued. contingency in taking effect 36 expiration and suspension of 37 recital of authority to enact, not required 139 need not recite necessity of enactment 140 subject and title 141, 142 title in revision of ordinance , 143 preamble not necessary 144 ordaining or enacting clause, sufficiency 145 time of introduction and passage 146 double board 147 reference to and report on by committee 148 signing and approval of, by mayor, when required 2, 149 veto of, by mayor 150 consideration by legislative body 160 return of bill or ordinance by mayor 151 ordinance passed and approved by electors 152 recording 153 deposit and custody of 154 publication of and notice of pendency 155 time and frequency of 156 method of 157 amendment of, on passage 158 publication of, amendments on passage 159 legislative motive in passage not inquired into by courts 161 rule limited to ministerial acts 162 injunction to restrain passage of 163 validating void ordinance by municipality 164 public improvement ordinances 556 curative power of legislature 165 proceeding to subscribe for railroad stock 166 to collect taxes 167 public improvement ordinances 557 when necessary to exercise power 79 legislative or executive power 80 self-enforcing charter provisions 81 necessary to grant right to use streets by public service com- panies 573 can be repealed by ordinance only 210 necessary to authorize bond issue, when 75 usually necessary to exercise power of taxation 402 necessary to establish building regulations 470 necessary to change grade of street, when pp. 834, 842n necessary to levy license tax 413 fixing from time to time by resolution 413 purpose is to regulate municipal affairs 497 cannot deal with state offense p. 271n relating to civil rights and liabilities 40 to 42 to subserve private interest is bad 39 INDEX. 987 (The relerences are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) ORDINANCE— Continued. primary object of, is public, not private 39 charter method of enactment of, exclusive 136 form of 137 to be in writing 137 to be in English language 137 to be by bill, when 137 in form of resolution 137 when to be read on different days before council prior to passage 119 may refer to books, maps, etc 137 may refer to prior ordinance and carry forward 137 formal parts of, penal , 138 of franchise, administrative and improvement 138 public corporations empowered to pass 38 cannot discriminate; classification of 193 illustrative cases 194 proof of, in action for violation 340 courts will determine validity of 275 presumed to be valid 275 as contract, relating to impairment 234 as "law," respecting impairment of obligation of contract 233 power to enforce by penalties 1B8 charter method of enforcing exclusive 169 reasonableness of, under express powers 181 under implied powers 182 valid if fairly within implied powers 182 when supersede general state laws 215 effect on, by surrender of special charter 216 change of class or grade 216 by dissolution and reorganization 217 by consolidation and change of corporate limits 218 ORAL ORDER committal by virtue of, illegal p. 560n OREGON general power insufficient to sustain penal ordinance against non-observance of the Sabbath 479 statute and ordinance may condemn same act as offense 500 double punishment authorized 510 "OWNER OR OCCUPIER" denouncing blazing chimneys, means tenant and not landlord. 298 OYSTERS sale of, may be regulated p. 763n business of packing and canning, may be licensed 428 PAPER forbidding casting on streets and private hallways, excepting newspapers and addressed envelopes p. 313n 988 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) PARADES on streets, may be regulated 466 such ordinances must be reasonable and uniform 416, 466, p. 294n discretionary power to regulate cannot be conferred on officers 88 PARDON governor can not pardon one convicted of violating municipal ordinance 359 but mayor may, and remit fines 359 unauthorized by governor, will not prevent issuance of execu- tion 359 PARISH Is public corporation 38 PARKS (See Public Parks.) PARLIAMENT ordinance of, a temporary act 1, p. 3n PARLIAMENTARY LAW failure to conform to, does not invalidate action 115 PAROL ( See Evidence ; Evidence of Ordinances; Records.) PARTICIPANTS liability of, in ordinance cases 344 PARTNERS charge of selling liquor; evidence against one is evidence against all 342 PATENTED ARTICLES ordinances authorizing, to be used in public work 554 PAVING (See Public Improvements; Public Improvement Ordinances.) of streets by railway companies 577 of street or part by street railway company 577 duty "to repair" as obligation to "repave" 577 street railway may be relieved of duty of 197 cannot be imposed by amendment p. 318n PAWNBROKER defined p. 774n reasonable regulations may be imposed on 492 power to regulate, to be conferred by state 492 may be required to keep records and submit to police in- spection 492 license of, valid 428 reasonableness of license tax on p. 636n daily reports open for police inspection 224 refufeal to permit police inspection; complaint in charge of.. 321 when estopped from questioning reasonableness of ordinance. 278 INDEX. 989 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) PAYMENT of public improvement, ordinance must provide method of . . . . 547 installments 548 basis of apportionment 549 PEACE (See Disturbing the Peace; Public Order and Peace.) PEDDLERS (See Commerce, Foreign and Interstate.) ordinances regulating, not in restraint of trade p. 304n of food products, may be regulated 483 may be licensed 428 reasonableness of license tax on p. 636n without license; sufficiency of record of conviction 358 license on; discrimination, void p. 632n PENAL ORDINANCES (See Actions to Enforce Police Ordinances; Ordinances; Police Ordinance.) defined 10 distinguished from non-penal ordinance 10 form of 138 formal parts of 138 when to take effect 35 construction of 293 effect of repeal of, on actions under 206 injunction to restrain enforcement of 285 PENALTIES (See Fine; Forfeiture; Imprisonment; Judgment.) of ordinances, power to enforce by 168, 303 implied 168 charter method exclusive 160 forfeiture 170 proceedings 171 animals running at large 172 by imprisonment 173 various penalties 1,74 of costs 174 must be certain 175 New Jersey doctrine 176 North Carolina doctrine 177 must be reasonable — limit 178 limit of fine 179 continuous or separate offense 179 heavier for second offense authorized 180 duration of imprisonment 173 ordinance without, is nugatory 168 may be provided for within reasonable limits 175 terms of grant, limits power to impose p. 271n construction of specific enumeration 169 clause for, part of ordinance 138 990 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) PENNSYLVANIA chief burgess of borough In, may question validity of ordinance vetoed by him 281 PERMIT may be required, to obstruct streets temporarily with goods, building material, etc 458 to make excavations in streets, etc 458 to erect buildings 471 to tap sewer, may be required p. 622n to build vault, charge for, held void p. 622n to open streets, reasonableness of fee for p. 636n for street parades 466 to parade streets, ordinance authorizing granting must be uni- form 416 consent of property owners as to granting 415 revocation of 420 term construed, in ordinance directed against swine on side- walks 355 to connect with sewer, payment of special tax bill 183 to open street; how construed p. 453n construed in ordinance forbidding horses, etc., from going at large 297 selling ice on street without; complaint p. 506n PERSONAL ASSOCIATION ordinance cannot regulate. 228 PEST HOUSE may be established and maintained 445 PETITION (See Complaint or Information; Public Improvements.) PETIT LARCENY summary jurisdiction on charge of 329 PETROLEUM (Ses Oil.) regulating storage of, valid p. 304n PETTY OFFENSE defined by Texas penal code p. 791n affray is 508 PHILADELPHIA form of enacting clause of ordinance p. 231n ordinance of, forbidding thieves, pickpockets, about central station, valid , 329 ordinance of, forbidding casting of circulars, etc., on streets, vestibules of dwellings, excepting newspapers and addressed envelopes, sustained 467 ordinance of, limiting speed applied to vehicle carrying U. S. mail 270 INDEX. 991 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise iudicated.) PHRASES (See Maxims; Words and Phrases.) PICKPOCKETS summary jurisdiction of 329 associated with, forbidden; complaint p. 506n PIERS as public improvements 511 PISTOLS AND CARTRIDGES dealers in, may be licensed 428 PLACARDS forbidding displaying of, on sidewalks, streets, etc 467 carrying on street, forbidding 188 PLACE of corporate meetings 92 PLEA of defendant, on charge of violation of ordinance, not required 325 PLEADING (See Complaint or Information.) PLEADING ORDINANCES IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS when cause of action founded thereon 371, 372 state courts will not take judicial notice of ordinances 373 pleading substance of ordinance 374 by title and date of passage 375 negligence in violation of ordinance 376 proof of acceptance of, by defendant 377 relating to public safety 378 railroads and street cars 379 removal of snow and ice 380 in action on special tax bills 381 PLEDGE of property, implied power of municipal corporation 62 POLES, WIRES, ETC. in streets, as nuisances 570 placing of, may be regulated 458, 462, 511, p. 904n validity of ordinance directing removal p. 720n reasonableness of charge for maintaining p. 636n discriminations as to location and use of, void 194 POLICE delegating power to regulate itinerant musicians in streets, sus- tained as to Boston 416 sufficiency of report of, of violation of ordinance 322, p. 506n oral charge, held sufficient p. 506n need not ask for specific sum 322 amendment of, permitted P- 507n report of, signing of 322 992 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) POLICE BOARD (See Board of Police.) power to regulate uses of streets 88 POLICE COURTS (See Municipal Corporation Courts.) POLICE JURY in Louisiana may pass ordinance p. 144n POLICE JUSTICE same as "police magistrate" or "justice of peace" p. 449n POLICE LAWS described p. 356n POLICE MAGISTRATE same as "police justice" or "justice of the peace" p. 449n POLICE ORDINANCES (See Actions to Enforce Police Ordinances; Ordinances; Penal Ordinances.) defined ; 8 distinct class 8 general requisites of, valid 438 may include contract regulations 11 violation of, as ground of action for negligence 40 to 42 POLICE POWER (See Penal Ordinances; Police Ordinances.) defined 429 general nature and scope of 429 basis of 430 extends to destruction of property 431 limitations of 432 exercise of, by municipal corporations 433 under general welfare clause 434 within and without corporate limits 435 municipal liability for failure to exercise 436 for negligent exercise of 436 nuisances relating to streets, etc 437 surrender or delegation of, forbidden 84, 473 scope of, as affects foreign and interstate commerce 271 license tax under, as interference with foreign or interstate commerce 260 what it comprehends as to use of streets 473 to regulate public service companies , 582 to abolish railroad grade crossings 582 as a rule, to be exercised by ordinance 81 how exercise of, may be questioned 277 POLICE REGULATIONS (See Penal Ordinances; Police Ordinances, and various titles in this Index.) INDEX. 993 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) POLICE REGULATIONS— Continued. local, as interference with foreign or interstate commerce 270 scope of 271 quarantine laws 27a, 273 harbor regulations 274 implied powers respecting 63 delegation of power to provide and enforce 88 "POLICY" game of, sufficiency of ordinance denouncing 20 in penal ordinance, forbidding "policy playing"; current use of term judicially noticed p. 448n keeping place to carry on game of; complaint p. 506n POLL TAX names of persons liable to, may be required to be furnished by keepers of hotels, etc. 496 PONDS ordinance may order filling up, when constitute nuisances, .p. 708n fouling of waters of, may be prevented 454 POOL ROOMS may be licensed 428 POOL SELLING may be limited to certain localities 32 PORTERS at stations, ordinance may regulate, though covered by statute 509 POSTS (See Hitching Posts; Lamp Posts; Poles, Wires, etc.) POWDER MAGAZINES may be regulated 472 as nuisances p. 740, 741n license to keep; discrimination p. 632n POWERS (See Discretionary Powers; Express Powers; Implied Powers; Mandatory !^owers; Police Powers.) method prescribed for exercise of, to be followed : 75 court will not control exercise of discretionary 76 illustrations 76, 77 limitation of rule of non-judicial interference 78 when ordinance necessary to exercise 79 legislative or executive powers 80 self-enforcing charter provisions 81 mandatory and discretionary powers distinguished 82, 83 surrender or delegation of, forbidden 84 officer or department cannot delegate 85 legislative authority cannot be delegated 86 to 88 ministerial duties may be delegated 89 general rule as to municipal powers stated 45 those granted cannot be exceeded 45 and notes «3 994 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) POWERS— Continued. diflSculty in determining 45 of New England towns 47 and notes rules of construction of 48, 49, 52 effect of specific enumeration 50 construction of power "to regulate" 51 source of the enactment of ordinances need net be recited 139 exercise of, is in nature of public trust 78 reasonable exercise of, always required 78 conferred by charter 43, 44 usual powers conferred on municipal corporations 45 common law powers of municipal corporations 45 to be exercised as prescribed 183 must be reasonable, exercised 183 designation of manner of execution, excludes other methods. . . 169 PRACTICE (See Defenses; Trial.) PREAMBLE formal part of ordinance 138 in construction of ordinance 291 mistake in recital of, immaterial 139, p. 222n of ordinance, rarely used 144 forbidding smoking in street cars 144, p. 231n PRELIMINARY STEPS (See Public Improvements; Public Improvement Ordinances.) PRESCRIPTION as warrant for exercise of municipal powers 72 relating to corporate meetings in early England 92, p. 146n rule applied to powers of New England towns 47 highways and streets, may be established by 527 PRESIDING OFFICER of council, power to call corporate meetings 92 PRESUMPTIONS (See Evidence.) of authority to enact ordinance, exists 139 indulged in favor of exercise of power 78 in favor of validity of ordinance 275 PREVENT (See Injunction; Prohibition.) authority, implies power to inflict penalty p. 271n PRICE of light. Implied power to regulate 67 PRINCIPAL liability of, for acts of employes, servants, etc 345 PRINTING license of business of, valid 428 ordinances requiring printing to bear union label, void 219, p. 353n, 553 INDEX. 995 TmrarWi^T^^^^'^^^''^^ ^'"^ ^° *''* sections, extiept as otherwise indicated.) aiding to escape, ordinance may punish, though covered by statute 509 ordinance may punish attempting to rescue from oflficer, though covered hy statute 509 PRIVATE AFFAIRS distinguished from corporate or municipal 39 ordinances cannot interfere with 39 PRIVATE CORPORATIONS deiined 3g by-laws of, in restraint of trade, void p. 304n PRIVATE INTERESTS ordinance designed to promote, bad 19 PRIVATE MARKETS (See Markets.) PRIVATE NUISANCE (See Nuisance.) PRIVATE PROPERTY may be regulated under the police power 220," 221 taking and damaging 223 when ordinances operate on 28 ordinance may regulate hackmen, etc., in and about landings, depots, stations, etc 28 ordinance does not apply to inner fence between farms 28 ordinance making it unlawful to rent to lewd women, uncon- stitutional 225 ordinances forbidding trespasses on 493 ordinance to protect, is bad 39 nuisances on, who liable, landlord or tenant 298 regulating hours for occupancy of, unlawful 221 may be destroyed by virtue of police power 431 PRIVILEGES (See Franchise; Franchise Ordinance; License Tax; Monopo- lies and Exclusive Privileges Permit.) PRIVY VAULTS removal of contents of, may be compelled and regulated 453 if nuisance results from, it may be abated 453 license to remove contents of, may be required 453 PROCESSIONS (See Parades.) PROCEDURE rules of, defined 7 distinguished from ordinance 7 PROCEEDINGS OF COUNCIL when presiding officer to sign bills of 99 when mayor to approve 100 approval to be in writing 101 vote of presiding officer in case of tie 102 996 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) PROCEEDINGS OF COUNCIL^Continued. special meetings — notice 110 method of calling 110 and notes presumptions as to regularity p. 177n power to adjourn meetings Ill business that may be transacted at an adjourned meeting 112 council as continuous body 113 action of legislative body consisting of two branches 114 rules for conduct of business— parliamentary law 115 mandatory and directory provisions 116 taking yeas and nays 117 reasons for requiring 118 record of 127 reading bills on different days 119 ratification of void ' acts 120 power as to reconsideration 121 power to rescind prior act 122 committees, appointment and reports of 123 record of 124 who to keep 125 sufficiency of — presumptions 126 as evidence 128 parol evidence to prove 129 parol to show omissions 130 imperfect record — rights of creditors .' 131 amendment of 132 method of making 133 court may order, mandamus 134 after lapse of time 135 charter method of enacting ordinances, exclusive 136 in passing public improvement ordinance 538 PROFANE OATH swearing same, on same day, separate convictions for each, not required 357 PROFANE SWEARING -sufficiency of complaint on charge of 321 PROHIBITION to try title to office 97 authorized in Kentucky to test validity of ordinances of cities of first class p. 436n to review prosecutions for violations of ordinances 369 when writ may issue 369 the writ of, described 369 power of, implies power to punish 168 PROOF (See Evidence.) INDEX. 997 (Ths references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) PROPERTY (See Forfeiture; Private Property; Public Property; Trespass.) power to acquire, manage and dispose of, conferred by charter 45 implied power to acquire and hold 57 beyond corporate limits 58 implied power to dispose of 59 held for particular purposes 60 to transfer, donate or dedicate, for particular uses 61 implied power to mortgage or pledge 62 within corporate limits, ordinances operate on 24 public office is not 231 lease of, to be executed as prescribed 75 power to hold may only be questioned by state 58 of municipal corporation, belongs to inhabitants 39 PROPERTY OWNERS (See Abutters; Public Improvements; Public Improvement Ordinances. ) consent of, as to permits and licenses 415 cannot enjoin change of location of water mains 581 agreements by, to pay for public improvements 552 improvements, penal ordinances requiring 518 may be required to provide water pipes 518 permission to construct sidewalks 518 PROSECUTIONS (See Actions to Enforce Police Ordinances.) PROSTITUTION (See Bawdy Houses.) municipal power to suppress 475 street walking may be forbidden 475, p. 753n. lewd women on street; summary jurisdiction on charge of 329 bawdy houses may be confined to designated sections 32 one bearing reputation of, if found to be, fined, etc., void 225 may forbid on streets, at certain times 225 ordinance forbidding conversing with prostitutes on street, void 228 PROVISIONS (See Bread; Inspection; Markets; Meat; Milk; Weights and Measures.) PUBLICATION of ordinances, notice of pendency, when required 155 time and frequency of 156 method of 157 of amendmcHts of ordinance on passage 159 of ordinance, failure as a defense 354 of ordinance, when proof of, required 388 presumptions 388 how made ,. 389 failure to publish franchise ordinance, fatal 574 998 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) PUBLICATION— Continued. of preliminary resolution or order for improvement 533 of ordinance, when city estopped from denying 278 of obscene matter, may be forbidden p. 753n PUBLIC AFFAIRS (See State Affairs.) PUBLIC AUCTION (See Auction.) PUBLIC BUILDINGS (See Implied Powers.) constitute public improvements 511 PUBLIC CORPORATION (See Municipal Corporation.) defined and classified 38 PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS ordinance may forbid and punish 31, 229 may be punished by ordinance, though condemned by statute. . 509 general power, sufficient to sustain ordinance forbidding 478 sufficiency of complaint for 321 PUBLIC HEALTH (See Health and Sanitary Regulations; Nuisances; Police Powers.) state may provide for p. 806n PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS nature and purpose of 511, 514 usual, enumerated 511 public building constitute 511 of streets, sewers, drains, lighting, water supply 511 providing parks and pleasure resorts 511 harbors, wharves, docks, landings, etc 511 regulation of poles, wires, conduits, subways, etc 511 municipal power to make and provide for 512 to condemn property for 512 by special assessment or taxation 512, 522 to 524 power to make or provide for outside of corporate limits 513 power to provide cannot be surrendered 514 power of courts over 514 state control over 514, 515 only officers duly authorized may provide for 516 where power to provide for vested 514, 516 power to provide for cannot be delegated 516, 517 cases illustrating rule , . 517 by property owners, penal ordinances requiring 518 notice 5IS may be compelled to furnish water pipes 518 permission to construct sidewallt 518 INDEX. 999 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise Indicated.) PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS— Continued. discretion of municipal autliorities as to 77, 519 how far subject to judicial control 519 discretion includes extent and nature of 519 material for construction 519 vacation of streets and public ways 519 Interfering with franchise rights 521 preliminary steps, regulated by local laws 524 strict adherence to laws required 524 irregularities p. 82iin notice to, and hearing of, property owners 525 when hearing must be before council p. 829n objections and remonstrances of property owners 525 petition or consent of property owners affected 526 street to be established before improved 527 opening and establishment of 527 law respecting to be strictly followed 527 establishment of street grade 528 recommendation of ordinance for 529 water and gas pipes in advance 530 estimate of cost of 531 submission to, and approval of, electors 532 when property owner is estopped from objecting p. 829n when ordinance necessary to provide for 3,81, 535 ordinances for, to be passed as charter directs 136 when not necessary, tax bill void 181 reasonableness of power exercised 181 where concurrence of two boards required approval of one in- sufficient 85 power to determine material for streets or sewers cannot be delegated 85 council cannot delegate the manner of making 87 of streets ordered by resolution, when 5, 535 contract for making may be ratified by council 89 may apply to part of city only 33 PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES (Considered in Chapter XVI.) defined 8 the three general classes 8 when to be recommended by board 529 fixing grade of street 528 endorsement of estimate of cost on 531 approval of, by electors 532 preliminary resolution or order 533 declaration of necessity of improvement 53 J when ordinance necessary 3, 81, 535 when resolution or order will answer 5, 535 sufficiency of order 536 ordinance for each distinct improvement 537 lOOO INDEX. (The reterences are to the sections, except as otherwise Indicated.) PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT ORDINANCES— Continued. recital of authority to pass 539 description of the improvement 540 sufficiency of description in street improvement ordinances. . . . 541 sewer construction ordinances 542 joint district sewers 543 specification of material 544 description by reference to documents, etc 545 matters of detail need not be specified in 546 must provide method of payment 547 sufficiency of, as to payment in installments 548 sufficiency as to basis of apportionment of tax 549 must be reasonable, how tested 550 certainty as to validity 551 agreements of citizens and taxpayers to pay for improvements 552 ordinances restricting competition — union labor 553 authorizing patented and monopolized articles 554 providing for maintenance for term of years 555 validating void 556 curative power of legislature 557 construction of 558 parol evidence of terms used in 559 need not recite Improvement is within corporate boundaries. . . 540 when courts will not interfere with p. 424n failure to provide for notice and hearing 219, p. 353n amendment of 198 repeal of 202 effect of 207 procedure in passage 538 PUBLIC LANDINGS (See Wharf; Wharfage.) as public Improvements 511 PUBLIC LAW ordinance distinguished from 1 PUBLIC MARKETS (See Markets.) PUBLIC MEETINGS as used in ordinance, forbidding street obstructions p. 537n on street, as disturbance of peace p. 770n PUBLIC MORALS AND DECENCY (See Bawdy Houses; Gambling; Liquor Selling; Prostitution; Public Drunkenness; Saloons.) lewd and indecent conduct may be forbidden 475 prostitution, bawdy and assignation houses may be suppressed 475 street walking may be punished 475, p. 753n conversing with lewd women p. 753n municipal power to suppress, punish lewd conduct, etc. — state control 475 publication of obscene matter p. 753n INDEX. lOOi (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) PUBLIC NUISANCE (See Nuisance.) PUBLIC ORDER AND PEACE (See Disturbing Peace; State Offense.) acts affecting, may be forbidden 486 PUBLIC PARKS as public improvements; power to provide 511 bicycles may be excluded from 465 power to acquire lands beyond corporate limit? must be con- ferred 58 municipal corporation may establish and control 515 when board to recommend establishment of 88 PUBLIC PLACES operation of ordinances confined to, when 28^ 31 public drunkenness 31 PUBLIC PROPERTY use of; streets 222 PUBLIC POLICY ordinances must harmonize with 18 PUBLIC SAFETY in the interests of, streets may be regulated and kept free from obstructions, etc 458 PUBLIC SCALES (See Weights and Measures.) PUBLIC SCHOOLS rule denying admission to, because of deficient knowledge of grammar, unreasonable p. 301n PUBLIC TRUST exercise of municipal powers in nature of 78 PUBLIC WAYS (See Alleys; Highways; Obstructions; Sidewalks; Streets.) PUBLIC WORK (See Board of Public Works; Labor.) contracts for, nature of 243 cannot be impaired 243 rights vested by 244 changing method of payment, valid 244 changing method of levying tax authorized 244 reducing sum, void 244 illustrative cases 245 interest on special tax bills as part of obligation 246 when new remedy controls 247 when old law to be followed 248 illegal contracts for, may be enjoined 282 ordinances limiting competition in bids for, void 189, 553 ordinances requiring union labor on 553 discretion in letting contracts for p. 861n 3003 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise Indicated.) PUNCTUATION in ordinances, must yield to manifest intention p. 449n PUNISHMENT (See Pine; Forfeiture; Imprisonment; Penalties.) for ninety days, not cruel and unusual p. 350n double authorized for violating statute and ordinance con- demning same offense 503, 510 but denied 504, 510 ordinance authorizing clipping hair of Chinese, held cruel .... 227 QUARRY regulation of, authorized p. 698n QUARANTINE regulations may be established 445 regulations of as interference with foreign or interstate com- merce 272, 273 QUASI-CIVIL how far proceedings to enforce penal ordinances are 303 QUASI-CRIMINAL how far action to enforce penal ordinance Is 304 QUASI-PUBLIC CORPORATION defined " 38 QUESTION OP LAW reasonableness of ordinance is 185 QUEUE ORDINANCE of San Francisco, directed against Chinese, void 227 QUORUM presence of will not constitute corporate meeting, when 92 defined 103 origin of term 103, p. Hi4n at common law 104" in New England town meetings 93, 104 of definite body 105 when definite vote required 106 vote necessary in suspending rules 107 how quorum affected by interest of members 108 of joint assemblies of definite body 109 rule in England 109 method of counting 105 in the national House of Representatives 105, p. 167n of council committee 123 majority of members of council may organize 97, p. 154n of indefinite corporate bodies at common law 94, p. 140 QUO WARRANTO to try title to office 97 as remedy, to test validity of ordinances 288 to forfeit street railway franchise, will lie p. 9i5n police courts have no jurisdiction in proceedings by 300 INDEX. 1003 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise Indicated.) RACE discriminations on account of, void 226 San Francisco queue ordinance 227 RAG PICKERS may be regulated and forbidden in certain districts 491 RAIL particular kind may be required to be used by street railways. . 474 RAILROAD (See Steam Railroads; Street Railways.) grade crossings of; power to abolish 582 to declare nuisance 582 RAILROAD COMPANY is a gwosi-public corporation 38 RAILROAD ENGINEERS license of, valid 428 RAILROAD STOCK irregularities in subscribing for, may be cured by legislature. . 166 RAILROAD TRACKS in streets, as nuisances 570 in streets; summary removal of p. 720n RATE OF SPEED regulating p. 303n may be prescribed for steam and street cars 474 reasonableness of ordinance limiting pp. 744 to 747n violating; that railroad was carrying the United States mail is no defense 355 regulation as applied to whole corporate limits 29 court may limit ordinance to certain municipal territory 29 RATES OF PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANIES power to regulate 583 under general grant of power 584 estoppel 584 reasonableness of water rates 585 regulating price of gas and light 586 street car fares 587 doctrine of U. S. Supreme Court 587 reasonableness of street car fares 588 discrimination in, forbidden 589 place of sale of tickets; transfers 590 RATIFICATION (See Public Improvement Ordinances.) of irregular and void acts 120 of unwarranted allowance of salary, denied 72 of unwarranted expenditure for legal services, denied 72 of contract of mayor relating to municipal bonds 89 of council of contract for building sidewalk 89 1004 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) READING BILLS before council on different days, when 119 REAL ESTATE BROKERS may be licensed 428 REASONABLE DOUBT as applied to proof of violation of ordinance 341 REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCES (See Monopolies and Exclusive Privileges; Rates of Public Service Companies; Validity of Ordinances.) under express power to pass 181 mode of exercise must be reasonable 183 under implied or incidental power 182 grounds of unreasonableness 182 under express power — illustrations 183 ordinance must provide a uniform rule , . . 184 illustrations p. 294n question of law for court 185 when jury may determine 185 rules as to, under implied powers 186 ordinance is prima facie valid 186 English cases — custom and usage 187 restraint of trade 189 monopolies and exclusive privileges 190 water and gas franchises 191 ferries 191 exclusive market privileges 192 discriminations — classification 193 various illustrations 194 penalties must be reasonable 178 ■ of amendments of franchise and contract ordinances 197 of amount of license tax 418 illustrative cases p. 635n regulating street parades 466 as to rate of speed of steam and street cars. . . .29, pp. 744 to 747n various illustrations 188 defense of, to be specific 327 when defendant estopped from contesting 353 when pawnbroker estopped from questioning 278 of public improvement ordinances 550 RECEIVER action by, jurisdiction of local court p. 467n RECLAMATION DISTRICT is a public corporation 38 RECOMMENDATION of certain improvement ordinances by board of public works required 529 INDEX. 1005 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicatea.) RECONSIDERATION general power respecting 121 power to rescind prior acts 122 RECORDS of council or governing body 124 when municipal records to be kept 124 who to keep 125 sufficiency of, presumptions 126 of taking yeas and nays 127 as evidence 128 parol evidence to prove 129 parol evidence to show omissions 180 imperfect record — rights of creditors 131 amendment of ! 132 method of making 133 court may order, mandamus 135 after lapse of time 135 of ordinance, proof of 387 RECORD OP CONVICTION what it should show; enumeration 358 when evidence and names of witnesses to be set out 358 jurisdiction must appear on face of 358 must show specific charge 358 must show precise penalty for which judgment is given 358 RECORD ON REVIEW (See Appeal; Review.) RECORDING ORDINANCE when required and method of 153 RECORDER'S COURT (See Muncipal Corporation Courts.) RE-ENACTMENT OP ORDINANCES effect of 208 REGULAR MEETING (See Meetings.) REGULATION defined 6 distinguished from ordinance 6 REFERENCE description by, in public improvement ordinances 545 REFERENDUM (See Electors.) REFUSE (See Dirt; Filth; House Dirt; Rubbish.) RELIGION discriminations on account of, void 226, p. 303n 1006 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) RENT reasonable, iu lease of real estate to be fixed by council 76 REORGANIZATION of municipal corporation; effect of, on ordinances !il7 REPAIRS (See Buildings; Street Railways.) compelling property owners to make 518, p. 810n duty of street railway, as obligation to repave 577 of streets, distinguished from maintenance for a term of years 555 REPEAL OF ORDINANCES general powers respecting 199 francbise and contract ordinances 200 Illustrative cases 201 reservation of right to repeal 200, 201, 242 of public improvement 202 effect of 207 by implication; general doctrine 203 general and special ordinances 204 effect of; revival 205 effect of repeal and re-enactment 208 effect of repeal of penal ordinance 206 of improvement ordinance 207 effect of revision of ordinances 209 ' by ordinance only 3, 210 by charter amendments 211 by general laws 212 question of intent 213 when charter superseded by 214 when ordinances superseded by 215 by surrender of special charter 216 by change in class or grade 216 by dissolution and reorganization 217 by change of corporate limits 218 by consolidation 218 REPLEVIN action on bond; jurisdiction of local court p. 467n REPORTS of street railways, may be required 474 REPRIEVE (See Pardon.) RESCIND (See Reconsideration.) RESERVATION (See Amendment of Ordinances; Franchise Ordinances; Repeal of Ordinances.) RESIDENCES (See Dwelling Houses.) INDEX. 1007 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) RESISTING ARREST sufficiency of allegation in charge of 321 RESOLUTION (See Ordinances; Public Improvements; Public Improvement Ordinances.) distinguished from ordinance a, 6 constitutes an ordinance, when 2 when action may be taken by, illustrations 5 and n when and when not to be signed by mayor 149 change of grade of street by p. 841n fixing grade of street by p. 834n ordinance cannot be repealed by 210 ordinance cannot be amended by 195 taxes may be levied by, when 402 when sufficient to fix license tax from time to time 413 sufficient to authorize bond issue, when 75 ■when public improvements may be provided for by 535 RESTRAINT power of, implies power to punish 168 RESTRAINT OF TRADE ordinances in restraint of trade, void 189 monopolies and exclusive privileges 190 water and gas franchises ; ferries 191 exclusive market privileges 192 RESTRICTING COMPETITION ordinances having such effect 553 confining bidding to union labor 553 RETROSPECTIVE ORDINANCE judicial view of 219 RETURN of bill or ordinance by mayor 151 REVENUE (See License -Tax; Taxation.) municipal, discretionary power as to control of 77 municipal, state control of p. 806 REVIEW right of, in prosecutions for violations of ordinances 360 methods of 360 by appeal 361 to 363 by certiorari 364, 365 by writ of error 366 by habeas corpus 367 by injunction 368 by prohibition 369 sufficiency of record for 370 1008 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise Indicated.) REVISION OF ORDINANCES provisions tor 143 title, sufficiency of 143 effect of, as to repeals 209 REVIVAL of ordinance by repeal 20.5 of penal ordinance 206 REVOCATION (See Forfeiture.) of license to maintain well in public street, may be revoked. . . . 455 of license or permit 420 REWARDS for apprehension and conviction of offenders 74 RHODE ISLAND aldermen and councilmen are civil officers in p. 143n ordinance and statute cannot condemn same offense 507 RICE cultivation of, may be regulated p. 698n . RICHMOND (VA.) ordinance of, licensing lawyers, sustained 423 RIDING (See Driving and Riding.) RIGHTS, CIVIL ordinances regulating , 40 to 42 RIOTOUS ASSEMBLIES forbidding of, valid 486 RIOTOUS CONDUCT summary jurisdiction of , 329 meaning of, as used in ordinance p. 512n "RISE" "fall" construed to mean, in drainage ordinance 558 ROAD DISTRICT is public corporation 38 ROCHESTER (N. Y.) ordinances of, regulating bill boards, sustained 463 ROCK-CRUSHING MACHINE use of, may be regulated 491 ROOM meaning of, in ordinance as to water rates p. 907n ROWBOATS kept for hire, may be licensed 428 reasonableness of license fee on p. 636n RUBBISH deposit of, may be regulated 453 removal of, may be directed and controlled 453 may forbid, and regulate the burning of, in streets, etc 453 INDEX. 1009 (The refereuces are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) RULES OF PROCEDURE suspension of, vote necessary 107 power of municipal body to adopt 115 RURAL WAYS distinguished from urban 564 SABBATH (See Sunday.) ST. JOSEPH (MO.) merchant defined under charter of p. 657n ST. LOUIS form of enacting clause of ordinance under charter of.... p. 231n legislative powers of, vested in two houses p. 142n ordinances of, to be by bill 137 sufficiency of improvement ordinances under charter of . . . .p. 851n charter of, requirement as to description of improvement paid for by special taxation 540 charter of, requires grade of street to be fixed by ordinance prior to improvement 528 joint district sewer under charter of 543 ordinances of, imposing a license on boats running from Mis- souri to Illinois, void 266 ordinance of, forbidding discharge of dense smoke, held void. . 450 Missouri legislative act, applies to p. 710n ordinance of, regulating dairies and cow stables, sustained .... 449 ordinance requiring consent of certain property owners to erect livery stable, held void 415 ordinance of, relating to permission to property owners to construct sidewalks, construed 518 ordinance of, requiring all dressed rock, stone, etc., to be dressed within the state, declared void 553 powers of commissioner of public buildings of 471 appeals in prosecutions for violation of ordinances of p. 563n SALADIN TITHE ordinance of, early English personal tax law 1, p. 3n SALARY must be provided by law 4 permanent, to be fixed by ordinance 3 change of, to be by ordinance 3 need not be fixed by ordinance, when 4, p. 8n may be prescribed by resolution, when 5 extra, to public officers, forbidden 4,72, 2iy increase of, during term prohibited 219 unwarranted allowance of, cannot be ratified 72 cannot be recovered for services rendered under void statute 4, p. 9n cannot be implied promise to pay officer -. . . . 4, p. 9n aldermen cannot provide, for themselves 56 64 1010 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) SALES STABLE keeping without license; complaint p. 505n SALOONS (See Liquor Selling.) license tax on 425 conditions 426 license of, to be uniform p. 631n may be forbidden in certain sections 32 designation of districts for p. 757n screens, blinds, etc , p. 757n forbidding other business p. 758n to "keep open," implies a readiness to carry on the usual busi- ness therein ^ . . .p. 760n keeping open on Sunday ; proof of 342 ordinance may regulate the time of opening and closing of . . . . 480 forbidding sale of liquor on holidays p. 758n forbidding music in p. 758n forbidding females in, at certain hours p. 758n keeping open; sufficiency of complaint p. 505n SALVATION ARMY public meetings of, in streets, etc p. 537n violation of ordinance forbidding disturbance of peace.... p. 770n SAN FRANCISCO board of supervisors is legislative body of p. 141n form of enacting clause of ordinance p. 231n ordinances of, to be in form of bill 137 mayor presiding officer of board of supervisors in.... 98 p. 156n hours of day's work and wages may be fixed by ordinance, .p. 776n queue ordinance of, directed against Chinese, void 227 appeals from municipal court of, allowed p. 562n SANITARY DISTRICT is a public corporation 38 SANITARY REGULATIONS (See Health and Sanitary Regulations; Nuisances.) implied powers respecting 63 SCALES (See Weighing Scales; Weights and Measures.) SCAVENGERS city, may be licensed 428 regulation and license of, held void because unreasonable 225 SCHOOL DISTRICT is public corporation 38 SCREENS in bar rooms p. 757n SEAL (See Corporate Seal.) INDEX. 1011 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) SEAMEN harboring and enticing, ordinance cannot forbid p. 785n SECESSION ordinances of, passed by Confederate States 1, p. 3n SECOND-HAND CLOTHING ordinance may require disinfection of p. 773n SECOND-HAND DEALERS may be regulated 491 license tax on, sustained 428 book seller, is not p. 773n SECOND-HAND GOODS selling, without license; proof of p. 537n SECOND OFFENSE heavier penalty for. authorized 180 action to recover, suflSciency of complaint or information 320 SECURITY FOR COSTS not required in ordinance cases, in Illinois 339 SELECT ASSBMBLTS at common law the presence of mayor was not necessary 98, p. 156n SELF-DENYING ORDINANCE early English ordinance 1, p. 3n SELF-GOVERNMENT of municipal corporations 43 and notes SELLING BEER (See Saloons.) sufficiency of complaint on charge of 321 SELLING LIQUOR (See Liquor Selling; Saloons.) SEPARATE OFFENSES illustrations 179 SERMON delivery of, in public places, may be regulated 225 SERVANTS liability of, in ordinance violations 344 liability of principal for acts of 345 SEWER (See Public Improvements.) may be regulated, to prevent nuisance 454 legislature may regulate manner of construction p. 806n power to make or provide for beyond corporate limits 513 construction of, as interference with franchise rights 521 determination of material for, cannot be delegated 85 determination of dimensions of, cannot be delegated 87 materials, dimensions, etc.. delegation of power to name 517 construction of, ordered by ordinance 3 resolution to ■construct, sufficient, when 5 1012 INDEX. (The references are to tlie sections, except as otherwise indicated.) SEWER— Continued. payment of cost of construction as condition to connect 183 connecting with private, costs to be equally apportioned, .p. 294n SEWER CONSTRUCTION (See Public Improvements; Public Improvement Ordinances.) SEWING MACHINE AGENT may be licensed ^'^^ SEX ordinance discriminating on account of, void 228 discriminations in employment of labor, on account of, void. p. 778n SHADE TREES (See Trees.) "SHALL" construction of 83 when "may," construed as 83 SHEEP (See Animals at Large.) SHOW conducting without license; complaint p. 506n SHOW BOARDS carrying on streets; prohibiting 188, 467 SIDEWALK (See Nuisances; Obstruction; Public Work; Public Improve- ment Ordinances.) defined 562 compelling property owners to make 518 construction and repair of, by abutters 518 contract for building of, may be ratified by council 89 snow and ice on, removal of may be required of abutters .... 32, 298, 458 ordinance providing for improvement of must prescribe width 540 altering width of, to be by ordinance 3 may be kept free from obstruction, etc 458 temporary deposit of goods, merchandise, etc., on may be au- thorized and regulated 458 material for, delegation of power 517 forbidding display of signs on 188, 467 construction of, may be given to officer, when '. .p. 808n cellar doors, coal holes, etc., in, may be authorized and regu- lated 458 SIGNALS of danger, servants of trains may be required to give 474 SIGNS ordinances may regulate 461 as nuisances 461 ordinances directing removal, validity 461 violating ordinance regulating, as evidence of negligence 40 forbidding displaying of, on sidewalks, streets, etc 188, 467 INDEX. , 1013 (The refereuces are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) SIGNING of ordinance by mayor 149 of resolution by mayor 149 time and manner of 149 SINKS removal of contents of, may be compelled and regulated 453 if nuisance results from, it may be abated 453 SITUATIONS (See Offices.) SKIFFS reasonableness of license fee on p. 636n SLAUGHTER HOUSES power to regulate 448 may exclude from corporate limits 448 may declare to be a nuisance 448 ordinances regulating, not in restraint of trade p. 304n location of, power of property owners to determine 87 violating ordinance in maintaining; complaint p. 506n unlawful erection of; proof of 342 SLAUGHTERING ANIMALS killing and dressing one, insufficient proof p. 638n SMOKE dense, emission of, in populous community as a public nuisance 456 Chicago ordinance forbidding, sustained 456 St. Louis ordinance forbidding, held void 456 power of legislature to declare discharge a public nuisance is undoubted 456 emitting dense, uniform rule required p. 294n act of Congress forbidding discharge of, within the District of Columbia, sustained 456 dense, law forbidding discharge of, may contain exemptions.. 194 ordinance forbidding emission of dense, may exempt resident districts 32 discharging dense; proof of offense 342, p. 709n SMOKING in street car forbidden, uniform rule required p. 294n SNOW on sidewalk, abutters may be required to remove 32, 458 violation of ordinances requiring removal of, does not give cause of action 42 requiring removal of, from sidewalk; Boston ordinance ap- plied to tenant 298 street railways may be required to remove from tracks 474 SOCIETIES by-laws of, in restraint of trade, void .p. 304n SOLDIERS bounties to, power to provide for 70 1014 ^ INDEX. (The reterences are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) SOLICITING of patrons, cannot be forbidden by ordinance p. 356n patronage for hotel unlawfully; proof of p. 537n SOURCE OF POWER for the enactment of ordinances need not be recited 139 SOUTH CAROLINA statute and ordinance may condemn same act as offense 500 early rule of, as to forfeiture of license ITO jury trial allowed in misdemeanors 331 quo ivarranto to test validity of ordinance in 288 appeals in prosecution for violation of ordinances p. 563n SOUTH DAKOTA nature of action, to enforce police ordinances 304 statute and ordinance may condemn same act as offense 500 charter denying jury trial in certain cases, held unconstitu- tional 331 SOVEREIGNTY municipal corporations do not possess elements of 46 resides in state 46 and notes not possessed by New England towns 47 SPECIAL ASSESSMENT OR TAXATION for local improvements, generally prevail 522 sustained under taxing power 522 have no relation to right of eminent domain p. 818n differ from general taxes p. 818n theory and principles. of 522 sustained on ground of benefit 522 rule of Norwood v. Baker 522 decisions of U. S. Supreme Court in April, 1901 522 benefits as a legislative question 522 front foot rule, without judicial inq\nry, valid ' 522 hearing of property owners as to benefits, need not be provided 522 special taxing districts may be created 522 levies according to value, superficial area or frontage, sus- tained 522 uniformity and equality of 523 may be levied for what purposes 524 object must be public 524 power to declare what are local improvements 524 for street sprinkling and cleaning 524 ordinance must provide method of payment 547 payment in installments 548 basis of apportionment 549 can only be exercised by express grant 512 legislature may authorize, for local improvements p. 805n for local improvements; state control of p. 805n for street improvements, subject to local control 515 for sewer beyond corporate limits, authorized in Illinois 513 INDEX. 1015 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise iudicated.) SPECIAL ASSESSMENT OR TAXATION— Continued. for sidewalk in uninhabited part, void - lijl payment of, for sewer, as condition to connect therewitli. . . ,. . 183 SPECIAL MEETING defined 92, p. 146n in Illinois council may call 92 notice of 110 method of calling 110 and note when purpose of, to be stated 110 power to adjourn Ill SPECIAL ORDINANCE defined . , 9, 10 distinguished from general ordinance 9, 10 repeal of 204 SPECIAL TAX BILLS duty to sign cannot be delegated 85 pleading ordinance in action on 381 interest on, as part of contract obligation 246 for unnecessary public improvements 181 payment of, as condition to connect with sewer 183 SPECIAL TAXING DISTRICT may be created, for local improvements paid by special as- sessment or taxation - 522 SPECIFIC ENUMERATION (Effect of, See Construction.) of municipal powers, effect of 50 SPEED (See Rate of Speed.) SPRINKLING (See Street Sprinkling.) SPRINKLING CART may be licensed as vehicles p. 642n STABLE (See Livery Stable; Sales Stable.) STAGES may be licensed; amount ,. p. 353n, p. 642 STAGNANT WATER abutter may be compelled to remove from private passageway 453 STANDS for goods, confectionery, etc., on sidewalk as nuisance 459 STATE AFFAIRS ordinance cannot regulate p. 785n ordinances relating to, void 55 state laws designed to regulate 497 distinguished from municipal matters., 497 lOlG INDEX. (The retereuces are to the sections, exiept as otherwise indicated.) STATE CONTROL (See Franchises; Public Improvements; State Offenses.) over local public improvements 514, 516 STATE LAWS (See Statutes.) distinguished from municipal ordinances 497 purpose is to regulate state affairs 497 local affairs controlled by 498 STATEMENT (See Index under titles of various offenses.) (For violation of police ordinance, see Complaint or Informa- tion.) STATE OFFENSES (See Trial.) distinguished from municipal 49S source of municipal power to legislate as to 499 general power, insufficient 499 express power may be conferred 499 when covered by statute, ordinances regulating are unau- thorized under general power 499, pp. 784, 785n ordinance cannot deal with p. 271n sale of liquor; ordinance regulating, void p. 757n general power will not sustain ordinance dealing with, in Il- linois 503 whether ordinance may regulate is a question of legislative intent ^ 499 ordinances may impose farther penalties for, in most states . . 500 but denied in some states 501, 502, 506, 507 rule in Texas 508 ordinances dealing with to conform to statute 504, 505 what may be condemned by ordinance enumerated 509 double punishment authorize for violating statute and ordi- nance covering same act 503, 510 but denied 504, 510 ordinance relating to gaming does not abrogate or suspend the common law on subject • p. 787u ordinance forbidding sale of impure milk is void where sub- ject is regulated by statute p. 788n ordinance forbidding sale of goods on Sunday is void if it conflicts with statute p. 79in STATED MEETING defined 92, p. 146n STATION drivers of cabs, etc., in and about, may be regulated 184 STATIONARY ENGINEERS license of, valid 428 INDEX. 1017 (The relerences are to the aectious, except as otherwise iudicated.) STATUTE (See State Laws.) how ordinance differs as to force and effect from 13 creating civil liability, distinguished from ordinance 40 to 42 of state, ordinance must conform to 16 exception 16 STEAM use of, to propel trains in streets, may be forbidden 32, 474 STEAMBOATS spark catcher 188, p. 740n may be exempt from operation of law forbidding discharge of dense smoke 194 STEAM BOILERS may be regulated 471 ordinance regulating, to be uniform 184 STEAM RAILROADS trains and cars on, may be regulated 473 enumeration of regulations 474 use of steam on certain streets may be forbidden 32, 474 STONE COLUMNS within limits of street, as nuisance 459 STONE STEPS on sidewalk, is nuisance , p. 719n STONE THROWING may be forbidden 458 STORES department, cannot be regulated by ordinance without special legislative grant 491 STRANGERS when bound by ordinances 23 STREET BROKERS contract of, not commerce 257 STREET CAR FARES power to regulate 583, 584, 587 rules of United States Supreme Court 587 reasonableness of 588 discrimination in, forbidden 589 place of sale of tickets 59U transfers 590 STREET CLEANING special assessments for, sustained in Indiana 524 STREET IMPROVEMENTS (See Public Improvements; Public Improvement Ordinances.) STREET PARADE (See Parade.) 1018 INDEX. (The relerences are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) STREET RAILWAYS (See Franchises; Franchise Ordinance; Rate of Speed.) power to grant franchise for, cannot he delegated 87 repeal of ordiriance granting franchise 200, 201 trains and cars on, may he regulated 473 enumeration of regulations 474 reasonable conditions may he imposed on, when ordinance grants right to use streets 576 ordinance granting right to use streets may forbid carrying of freight 576 arbitration of controversies between company and employes.. 576 paving and repairing of streets by 577 may be required to run cars at stated times 474 time of running of cars, public necessity 186 may regulate transfers of 474 may be required to report at stated times 474 requiring sale of tickets on cars P- 313n may be required to use specified rail 474 to keep street between rails clean 474 to remove snow and ice 474 to water tracks, to lay dust 194, 474 reports of, may be required P- 304n requirement as to paving streets or parts 577 new corporation formed by merger '■ 577 kind of material 577 "repair" as obligation to "repave" 577 city may relieve of duty to pave 197 operation will be enjoined, if license to run is void p. 429n right to lay double track cannot be limited to single 201 not in existence when ordinance passed, binding effect p. 352n license on property of, cars, etc 427 imposing license fee, under power to amend franchise ordinance 197 STREET RAILWAY COMPANY is a gMasi-public corporation 38 STREET SPRINKLING as local improvement 524 special assessment for, sustained 524 but denied in Illinois, Missouri and Utah 524 street railway may be required to water tracks, to lay dust. . . . 474 STREET WALKING may be forbidden and punished p. 753n may be punished by ordinance, though condemned by statute. . 509 summary jurisdiction on charge of 329 STREETS (See Franchise; Franchise Ordinance; Grade of Street; Nuisances; Obstructions; Public Improvements; Public Improvement Ordinances; Vacating Streets.) defined 561 INDEX. 1019 (The I'efereuces are to the sections, except us otherwise indicated.) STREETS— Continued. distinguished from rural ways ,^. 56 1 uses of, stated and illustrated 501 management of, relate to governmental affairs 568 municipal control of 569 right to use by public service companies, usually granted by local authorities 56i) municipal corporation is trustee of, for public 569 railroad tra,cks, gas and water pipes, poles, wires, etc., in, as nuisances 570 use of, must be public 571 exclusive private use, forbidden 571 illustrations of public use p. 889n public and private uses illustrated 572, p. 887n, p. 889n rights of abutters 572 legislative control of 568 legislature may grant use of, to public service companies, when 568 opening and establishment of 527 municipal corporation may determine width of, and assign carriage and foot ways 458 new uses of; illustrations p. 892u determination of material for construction of, cannot be dele- gated 85 repairs of, as interfering with franchise rights 521 exclusive franchises or privileges to use, forbidden 190 regulating opening of, to lay gas pipes 188 regulating use of, generally 222 may be kept free from obstructions, etc 458 obstructions of, with vehicles, may be regulated 458 may forbid water, etc., from flowing onto 458 obstructions of, with steam and street cars 474 obstructions of, with railroad cars, may be regulated 458 may regulate stands for cabs, hacks, etc 458 may regulate temporary obstructions of 458 may require permits for excavations 458 obstructions in, as nuisances; illustrations 459 corporate authorities may remove 460 distributing hand bills, etc., on, regulating. . : 188, 467 STRUCTURES FOR ADVERTISING (See Billboards.) SUBJECT when ordinance to contain but one and when not 141, 142 SUBORDINATES liability of, in ordinance violations 344 liability of principal for acts of 345 SUBWAYS (See Underground Conduits.) may be regulated 511 1020 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) SUMMARY TRIAL (See Trial.) SUMMONS for violation of ordinance 305 sufficiency of 307 SUNDAY validity of ordinances requiring observance of 479 general power is insufficient to support ordinance forbidding business on, where subject is covered by state statute. . . .p. 784n but regulations as to, may be made by ordinance, though covered by statute 509 liquor selling on, may be punished by ordinance, though con- demned by statute 509 ordinance forbidding sale of goods on, held void because of conflict with statute p. 791n selling liquor on; sufficiency of complaint on charge of 321 selling liquor on; summary jurisdiction on charge of 329 violating regulations concerning; summary jurisdiction on charge of 329 selling liquor on ; proof of - 342 keeping open tippling house on; proof of 342 "keeping open" on; proof of p. 537n SURETY (See Appeal Bond.) SURRENDER of public powers, forbidden 84 SURVEY included, in direction to prepare map p. 454n SUSPECT just cause to, allegation of, sufficiency 321 SUSPENSION of ordinances 37 of rules, vote necessary 107 SWINE (See Animals; Animals at Large.) keeping of, may be regulated 450 keeping of, may be confined to certain districts 32 SWEARING loud and boisterous, may be made penal 4S7 same profane oath several times on same day, separate con- viction for each oath, not required 357 profane; complaint in charge of 321 TAMPA (FLA.) form of enacting clause of ordinance p. 232 INDEX. 1021 (The reterences are to the sectious, except as otherwise indicated.) TAXATION (Special, see Special Assessment or Taxation.) general nature of taxes 399 necessity of power of 399 limited to municipal or corporate purposes 399 existence of power to levy 401 power of, limited to municipal or corporate purposes 400 method of levying taxes., 402 how far power is discretionary 402 by ordinance or resolution 402 time of levy 402 objects of, to be specified 402 power of, Is legislative in nature 402 power of, cannot be delegated 402 distinsiiished from license tax 409 must be uniform; discrimination forbidden 417 powers of, differ from regulation of commerce 251 impairing power to levy, by ordinance, void 201 by municipal corporation of its own bonds, is impairment of contract obligation - 237 of ferries, consti tutional 267 of property employed in foreign or interstate commerce 262 right to exercise power of, tested by quo warranto 288 TAX BILLS (See Special Tax Bills.) TAXES (See License Tax; Taxation; Special Assessment or Taxation.) special assessment or taxation differ from general p. 818n irregularities in collecting, may be cured by the legislature.. 167 assessment and rating of, cannot be made by council clerk. ... 87 TAXING DISTRICT (See Special Taxing District.) as a public corporation 38 TAX PAYER action by, io prevent illegal acts; reason for rule 283 actions by, to enjoin enforcement of void ordinances and con- tracts 282,283 mandamus by 284 agreements by, to pay for public improvements 552 TEAMS attached to vehicles, to be hitched, violation of ordinance as negligence 41 TENANT (See Landlord and Tenant.) TELEGRAPH COMPANY is a quasi-pwhlic corporation 38 1022 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANIES may be licensed 428 TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE POLES (See Poles, Wires, Etc.) charge for maintaining in streets, etc., may be imposed 261 must be reasonable 261 TELEPHONE COMPANY must obtain consent of local authorities in Virginia 201 right of repeal may be reserved 201 is a gttosi-public corporation 38 TENEMENT HOUSES sanitary regulations of, are authorized 494 TENNESSEE action to enforce police ordinances is civil 304 statute and ordinance may condemn same act as offense 500 double punishment authorized 510 union label ordinance declared void in 553 TEN-PIN ALLEYS cannot be licensed without express authority 476, p. 756n TERM OP OFFICE cannot be extended by municipal corporation 219 TERMS (See Construction; Construction of Ordinances; Maxims; Words and Phrases.) TENT within limits of highway is a nuisance 459 TEXAS ordinance authorizing summary trial, held unconstitutional... 331 power to pass ordinances condemning state offenses 508 double punishment 510 THEATERS may be licensed 428 compelling proprietor, to pay for attendance of officer at, void. 188 THEATRICAL EXHIBITIONS may be licensed 428 THIEVES summary jurisdiction of 329 associating with, denounced; complaint p. 506n TICKETS transfer, of sireet cars; regulation of 590 TIE VOTE when and who to cast 102 TIME (See Meetings; Notice.) naming, when ordinance to take effect 138 INDEX. 1023 (The references are to the seclious, except as otherwise Indicated.) TITLE formal part of ordinance 138 when subject of ordinance to be expressed in 141 sufficiency of 141 illustrative cases 142 in revision of ordinance 143 amendment of, on passage of ordinance 158 of ordinance, in construction 291, 541 TONNAGE distinguished from wharfage 269 TOPEKA (KAN.) ordinance of, regulating billboards, held unreasonable p. 726n scavenger ordinance of, void 190 "TO REGULATE" (See Construction.) construction of power 51 power of, as power to impose license tax 406 as power to prohibit 407 power, as applied to markets p. 764n TORTS (See Negligence; Nuisances.) TOWN (See Municipal Corporation; New England Towns.) Is a public corporation 38 TOWN HALL place of corporate meetings 92 providing, is a public improvement 511 TOWNSHIP is public corporation -58 corporate authority of, where vested p. 142n Illinois system p. 143n form of enacting clause of ordinance of p. 232n TRACKS (See Railroad Tracks.) TRADE (See Nuisances; Restraint of Trade.) -nuisances arising from 447 TRAINS running of, in streets, may be regulated 473 enumeration of regulations 474 TRANSFERS of street railways, may be regulated 474, 590 TRANSIENT (See Peddlers.) as applied to license on merchants p. 632n TREASON in the English law 333 1024 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) TREES planting of, may be controlled, within limits of streets and public grounds 458 on sidewalk, as nuisance 459 In streets, when nuisance, they may be cut down p. 720n mutilation or destruction of, may be prohibited 493 cutting down and making use of; allegations of complaint. . . . 321 TRESPASS on private property, ordinances forbidding 493 complaint for, liiupt contain description of the locus in quo .... 321 on property, ordinance may punish, though covered by statute. 509 TRIAL summary, authorized ; origin 328 essentials of summary trial 305 necessity for 328 municipal offenses enumerated 329 jury trial, not applicable, when 330 construction of constitutional provisions as to 330 when jury trial allowed 331 crimes and criminal prosecutions. . ." 332 crimes, misdemeanors and municipal offenses distin- guished 333 misdemeanor defined as relates to jury trial 334 jury trial on appeal, unreasonable restrictions 335 application for jury; conditions; waiver 336 manner of conducting jury trial 337 practice; technical rules, disregarded 338 costs 339 formal arraignment and plea of defendant, not required 325 mode of conducting — civil or criminal 326 pleading defense; method 327 mode of; regulation of, does not violate federal constitution. . . 230 power and duties of city attorney 338 service of copy of information or complaint on defendant 338 consolidation of suits, to recover ordinance penalties 338 prosecution abates on death of defendant 338 for violation of ordinance, in absence of defendant 338 mode of, whether summary or jury, should be shown in record of convirtion 358 record of conviction to show defendant's presence at, when. . . . 358 TUNNEL river, Chicago authorized to construct p. 799n TURNPIKE COMPANY is a QMosi-public corporation 38 UNDERGROUND CONDUITS for wires, tubes, cables, etc., may be required and regulated. 462, 511 UNIFORM RULE ordinance must provide 184 INDEX. 1025 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) UNIFORMITY of special assessment or taxation 523 UNION LABEL ordinance requiring printing to bear, void 219, p. 353n, 553 UNION LABOR ordinance restricting bidding to 553 employes p. 778n UNLAWFUL DETAINER action of, jurisdiction of local court p. 467n UNITED STATES COURTS jurisdiction of, to restrain enforcement of ordinance p. 437n same act may be an offense against a state and the federal government 500 double punishment authorized 510 URBAN WAYS distinguished from rural 564 USAGE (See Custom and Usage.) UTAH statute of, limiting day's work to eight hours in mines, sus- tained 495 statute and ordinance may condemn same act as offense 500 VACATING STREET p. 831n, p. 832n proposition to be submitted to voters under charter of Man- kato, Minn p. 838n rights of abutters ..p. 883n action for damages by abutting owner p. 892n for benefit of individual or corporation p. 814n validity of p. 814n how far discretionary with municipal authorities 519 VACCINATION may be required 445 VAGRANCY ordinance may forbid and punish 490 to conform to state law 490 ordinance may punish, though condemned by statute 509 complaint in charge of p. 506n sufficiency of verdict on charge of p. 555n summary jurisdiction on charge of 329 VAGRANTS law permitting vagrants to be hired out, unconstitutional. . .p. 772n VALIDITY OF ORDINANCES (See Reasonableness of Ordinances; Rules of Construction; see Construction of Ordinances.) of public improvement ordinances, see Public Improvement Ordinances. 1026 INDEX. (The relerences are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) VALIDITY OP ORDINANCE— Continued. courts will determine 275 methods of considering 276 police power, how exercise of, may be questioned 277 doctrine of estoppel 278 presumed 275 franchise, as a rule third persons cannot question p. 429n when rival companies may question p. 429n municipal officers may question 281 those not affected in person or property cannot question 281 those affected or about to be affected by enforcement may question 281 defendant prosecuted under may question 281 injunction to restrain enforcement and to test validity; general doctrine stated and illustrated 285 and notes injunction to prevent violation 286 certiorari, to test; New Jersey doctrine 287 quo warranto, to test 288 prohibition authorized in Kentucky to test. .• p. 436n citizens and taxpayers may question 282 when courts will not interfere at instance of 283 VALUATION special assessment or taxation levied according to, valid 522 VARIANCE in name of corporation in enacting clause 145 between complaint and proof 347 in improvement ordinances 558 VEHICLES (See Obstructions; Streets.) license tax, for use of streets 424 Chicago wheel tax ordinance, held void 424 license tax on, when authorized 424 double taxation 424 license on; reasonableness of amount p. 636n license on; discriminations, void p. 633n license for; proof of failure to obtain p. 537n licensing, construction of general and particular words 297 license of non-resident p. 353H width of tires of, ordinances cannot discriminate 194 ordinances to prevent obstructions of streets, etc., by, valid... 458 VELOCIPEDES riding of, on streets, etc., may be regulated 465 VENUE changes of, allowed 338 VERBAL ORDER committal by virtue of, illegal p. 560n INDEX. 1027 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) VERDICT sufficient. If responsive to tlie issue 356 given in open court and entered by clerk, valid 356 of guilty in action of deM, sufficient 356 on charge of vagrancy p. 555n when given, record of conviction should show 358 VERMONT conclusion of complaint for violation of ordinance 314 VESTED RIGHTS (See Franchise Ordinances.) are protected 521 cannot be destroyed by amendment of ordinances p. 317n nor by repeals 199 of contractor for public work 244, 245 interest on special tax bills 246 political powers of municipal corporation are not 43 grant of right to build private sewer, held to be p. 915n VETO of bill, ordinance or resolution 150 consideration of. by legislative body 160 VIGILANT WATCH ordinances requiring, of servants of steam and street cars, are valid 474 VILLAGE (See Municipal Corporation.) is a public corporation 38 chief officer is designated village president p. 143n form of enacting clause of ordinance of p. 23 2n VIOLATION OF ORDINANCE (See Actions to Enforce Police Ordinances.) injunction, to prevent 286 VIRGINIA telephone company to obtain local consent in 201 may reserve right to repeal 201 VOID ACTS when municipal corporation cannot legalize 219 VOID ORDINANCES may be validated by municipality 164 curative power of legislature over 165 proceedings to subscribe to railroad stock 166 to collect taxes 167 validating improvement 556 curative power of legislature 557 cannot be amended 196 amendment of, by striking out void parts 196 is no offense to violate p. 270n in part only; valid parts sustained 295 1038 INDEX. (The references are to the seetious, except as otherwise indicatea.) VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE of defendant, on charge of violation of ordinance 305 VOTE (See Quorum.) casting, in event of tie 102 metliod of giving and council procedure H6 VOTERS (See Electors.) WAIVER of right to -jury trial 336 of defects in statement, information or complaint 324 of right to forfeit privilege or franchise to use streets 592 WALL (See Buildings.) "WANTON" what is, as applied to use of language, in ordinance p. 537 WANTONLY doing a given thing; proof of 342 WARD LINES usually fixed by charter 44 changing, to be by ordinance 3 WARRANT for violation of ordinance, when required 305 necessary to authorize arrest, when 306 sufficiency of 307 for violation of ordinance, criminal in New York p. 478n WARRANTY action for false, jurisdiction p. 467n WARNING (See New England Town; Notice.) WASH HOUSES (See Laundries.) WASHINGTON statute and ordinance may condemn same act as offense 500 WASTE abutter may be compelled to remove, from private passageway. 453 WATCHMEN at railroad crossings, may be required ; 474 WATERBURY (CONN.) ordinance of, forbidding sale of impure milk, held void as subject was regulated by statute p. 788n WATER exclusive franchise to supply 191 refusing to supply, allegation in charge of 321 right to supply, cannot be impaired 201 when not a mere license 201 user of, may be required to provide meter p. 356n INDEX. 1039 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) WATER BASINS meaning of, in ordinance as to water rates p. 9C7n WATER-CLOSETS. See PRIVY VAULTS. meaning of, in ordinance as to water rates p. 907n WATER COMPANY is a gwasi-public corporation 38 WATER METERS consumers may be required to provide p. 907n WATER PIPES in streets, as nuisances ; 570 in advance of public improvements 530 change of location of, authorized 581 property owner cannot enjoin 581 users of water, may be required to provide, at their own expense 518 WATER RATES power to regulate 583 under general grant of power 584 estoppel applied to municipal corporation 584 reasonableness of 585 power to fix by ordinance, held continuing 242 construction of terms regulating p. 907n illegal reduction; injunction p. 436n WATER SUPPLY • implied power to provide p. 798n implied power to furnish by contract 64 as public improvement; power to provide 511 proposition, submission to, and approval of, electors p. 837n pollution of, may be forbidden 454 WATER WAY (See Obstructions.) WATERWORKS power to establish p. 798n implied power to hold election to establish 74 establishing, submission to voters 76 sufficiency of ordinance 76 implied power to purchase lands for, denied 57 power to establish, to be exercised by ordinance 81 subject to local control 515 WAYS (See Alleys; Highways; Nuisances; Obstructions; Streets.) rural distinguished from urban 564 WEIGHERS city, may be licensed 428 WEIGHING SCALES public, may be established 485 on streets, etc., as nuisance 459 1030 INDEX. (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) WEIGHTS AND MEASURES ordinances may regulate and require articles to be sold by. 18a, 485 weighing privately is no violation P- 537n construction of ordinance as to weighing hay ^9ti public scales may be established 485 reasonable charge for weighing, valid 485 WELLS may be ordered filled up, when nuisances 455 in public streets, may be abolished 455 license to maintain may be revoked 455 WHARF is not a highway 561, p. 873n as public improvements 511 when ordinance does not apply to private 28 WHARFAGE how right to collect arises 28, p. 38n charge for, valid 268 distinguished from tonnage 269 WHISTLE of locomotive, to be sounded 474 blowing of, may be forbidden 486 WHORE HOUSE (See Bawdy House.) WINDOWS obstruction of, may be forbidden 493 WISCONSIN nature of action, to enforce police ordinances 304 jury in, may determine reasonableness of ordinance 185 ordinances as to street parades, etc., held void for discrimina- tion 416 WITNESSES who may act as, in municipal corporation courts 302 competency of defendant on charge of violation of ordinance. . 341 objections to competency of, to be made when offered 338 when names of, to be set out in record of conviction 358 WOOD may be required'to be sold by cord or measure 485 WOODEN BUILDINGS (See Buildings.) "frame," held to be p. 736n may be forbidden within certain limits 32 WORCESTER (MASS.) ordinance of, relating to rag pickers, sustained p. 773n WORDS AND PHRASES (See Maxims, and various words in this Index.) "absent," when presiding officer is p. I59ri "fall" construed as "rise" in drainage ordinance 558 INDEX. 1031 (The references are to the sections, except as otherwise indicated.) WORDS AND PHRASES— Continued. "filled," as used in improvement ordinance 559 "hereafter," as to time of street guttering p. 844n to "conduct a house of ill-fame in an indecent manner" 20 "policy," forbidding game of 20 "residence portion" and "business portion," relating to sale of liquor i 20 small ware, regulating sale of 20 "faster than an ordinary trot," applying to driving 20 "immoderate gait" 20 "drove or droves," relating to driving cattle through streets . . 20 -when dog is "going at large" p. 455n "may," "must," "shall," etc., construction of 83 "it shall be lawful," construction of 83 "not less than," used in improvement ordinance 5'41 the "obligation" of the contract 235 "owner or occupier," forbidding blazing chimneys, applied to tenant only 298 "permit," in ordinance forbidding horses, etc., from going at large 297 "to keep open" implies a readiness to carry on the usual busi- ness p. 760n in municipal charter, how construed 52 terms in ordinances regulating water rates p. 907n in ordinances, construction of 294 construction of, as used in improvement ordinances 558, 559 WRIT OF ERROR to try title to office 97 to review prosecutions for violation of ordinances 366 WYOMING action to enforce police ordinance is civil 304 YEAS AND NAYS in council proceedings, when required to be taken 117 reasons for requiring taking of 118 sufficiency of record of taking 127 KF ^^13 M17 Author Vol. . McQijlllin, Eugene ■'■''■« A treatise on the law of &pt municipal ordinances.