CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY <•». :■•*■ i FROM W. P. Willcox B1191 .W95 1880 Advancement of Jea™'"& „,? an( j tne ther inkrpreiaiio nalura: the former being but a degree and rudiment of the latter. But I will not dwell too long, nor speak too great upon a promise. XIII. 6.] THE SECOND BOOK. 1 55 6. The invention of speech or argument is not properly an invention : for to invent is to discover that we know not, and not to recover or resummon that which we already know : and the use of this invention is no other but, out of the knowledge whereof our mind is already possessed, to draw forth or call before us that which may be pertinent to the purpose which we take into our con- sideration. So as to speak truly, it is no invention, but a remembrance or suggestion, with an application ; which is the cause why the schools do place it after judgement, as subsequent and not precedent. Nevertheless, because we do account it a chase as well of deer in an inclosed park as in a forest at large, and that it hath already obtained the name, let it be called invention: so as it be perceived and discerned, that the scope and end of this invention is readiness and present use of our know- ledge, and not addition or amplification thereof. 7. To procure this ready use of knowledge there are two courses, preparation and suggestion. The former of these seemeth scarcely a part of knowledge, consisting rather of diligence than of any artificial erudition. And herein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the Sophists near his time, saying, They did as if one that professed the art of shoe-making should not teach how to make up a shoe, but only exhibit in a readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and sizes. But yet a man might reply, that if a shoemaker should have no shoes in his shop, but only work as he is bespoken, he should be weakly customed. But our Saviour, speaking of divine know- ledge, saith, That the kingdom of heaven is like a good house- holder, that bringeth forth both new and old store : and we see the ancient writers of rhetoric do give it in precept, that pleaders should have the places, whereof they have 1$6 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XIII. 7. most continual use, ready handled in all the variety that may be; as that, to speak for the literal interpretation of the law against equity, and contrary ; and to speak for presumptions and inferences against testimony, and con- trary. And Cicero himself, being broken unto it by great experience, delivereth it plainly, that whatsoever a man shall have occasion to speak of (if he will take the pains), he may have it in effect premeditate and handled in Ihesi. So that when he cometh to a particular he shall have nothing to do, but to put to names, and times, and places, and such other circumstances of individuals. We see likewise the exact diligence of Demosthenes; who, in regard of the great force that the entrance and access into causes hath to make a good impression, had ready framed a number of prefaces for orations and speeches. All which authorities and precedents may overweigh Aristotle's opinion, that would have us change a rich wardrobe for a pair of shears. 8. But the nature of the collection of this provision or preparatory store, though it be common both to logic and rhetoric, yet having made an entry of it here, where it came first to be spoken of, I think fit to refer over the further handling of it to rhetoric. 9. The other part of invention, which I term sugges- tion, doth assign and direct us to certain marks, or places, which may excite our mind to return and produce such knowledge as it hath formerly collected, to the end we may make use thereof. Neither is this use (truly taken) only to furnish argument to dispute probably with others, but likewise to minister unto our judgement to conclude aright within ourselves. Neither may these places serve only to apprompt our invention, but also to direct our inquiry. For a faculty of wise interrogating is half a XIII. 9] THE SECOND BOOK. 157 knowledge. For as Plato saith, Whosoever seeheth, knowcth that which he seekelhfor in a general notion : else how shall he know it when he hath found it? And therefore the larger your anticipation is, the more direct and compendious is your search. But the same places which will help us what to produce of that which we know already, will also help us, if a man of experience were before us, what ques- tions to ask ; or, if we have books and authors to instruct us, what points to search and revolve; so as I cannot report that this part of invention, which is that which the schools call topics, is deficient. 10. Nevertheless, topics are of two sorts, general and special. The general we have spoken to; but the par- ticular hath been touched by some, but rejected generally as inartificial and variable. But leaving the humour which hath reigned too much in the schools (which is, to be vainly subtile in a few things which are within their com- mand, and to reject the rest), I do receive particular topics, that is, places or directions of invention and inquiry in every particular knowledge, as things of great use, being mixtures of logic with the matter of sciences. For in these it holdeth, ars invcnuiidi adolescit cum ijcaetitis; for as in going of a way, we do not only gain that part of the way which is passed, but we gain the better sight of that part of the way which remaineth : so every degree of proceeding in a. science giveth a light to that which fol- loweth ; which light if we strengthen by drawing it forth into questions or places of inquiry, we do gready advance our pursuit XTV. 1. Now we pass unto the arts of judgement, which handle the natures of proofs and demonstrations ; which as to induction hath a coincidence with invention. For in all inductions, whether in good or vicious form, the 158 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XIV. 1. same action of the mind which inventeth, judgeth; all one as in the sense. But otherwise it is in proof by syl- logism ; for the proof being not immediate, but by mean, the invention of the mean is one thing, and the judge- ment of the consequence is another; the one exciting only, the other examining. Therefore, for the real and exact form of judgement, we refer ourselves to that which we have spoken of interpretation of nature. 2. For the other judgement by syllogism, as it is a thing most agreeable to the mind of man, so it hath been vehemently and excellently laboured. For the nature of man doth extremely covet to have somewhat in his under- standing fixed and unmoveable, and as a rest and support of the mind. And therefore as Aristotle endeavoureth to prove, that in all motion there is some point quiescent ; and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable of Atlas (that stood fixed, and bare up the heaven from falling) to be meant of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the conversion is accomplished : so assuredly men have a desire to have an Atlas or axle-tree within to keep them from fluctuation, which is like to a perpetual peril of falling. Therefore men did hasten to set down some principles about which the variety of their disputations might turn. 3. So then this art of judgement is but the reduction of propositions to principles in a middle term. The prin- ciples to be agreed by all and exempted from argument ; the middle term to be elected at the liberty of every man's invention ; the reduction to be of two kinds, direct and inverted; the one when the proposition is reduced to the principle, which they term a probation ostensive ; the other, when the contradictory of the proposition is re- duced to the contradictory of the principle, which is XIV. 3.J THE SECOND BOOK. 159 that which they call per incommodum, or pressing an ab- surdity; the number of middle terms to be as the pro- position standeth degrees more or less removed from die principle. 4. But this art hath two several methods of doctrine, the one by way of direction, the other by way of caution ; the former frameth and setteth down a true form of con- sequence, by the variations and deflections from which errors and inconsequences may be exactly judged. To- ward the composition and structure of which form, it is incident to handle the parts thereof, which are propos- itions, and the parts of propositions, which are simple words. And this is that part of logic which is compre- hended in the Analytics. 5. The second method of doctrine was introduced for expedite use and assurance sake; discovering the more subtile forms of sophisms and illaqueations with their redargutions, which is that which is termed clinches. For although in the more gross sorts of fallacies it happeneth (as Seneca maketh the comparison well) as in juggling feats, which, though we know not how they are done, yet we know well it is not as it seemeth to be ; yet the more subtile sort of them doth not only put a man besides his answer, but doth many times abuse his judgement. 6. This part concerning tUncJus is excellently handled by Aristotle in precept, but more excellendy by Plato in example; not only in the persons of the Sophists, but even in Socrates himself, who, professing to affirm nothing, but to infirm that which was affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed all the forms of objection, fallace, and redargution. And although we have said that the use of this doctrine is for redargution, yet it is manifest the de- generate and corrupt use is for caption and contradiction, 162 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XIV.9. such thing is ; as they have feigned an element of fire, to keep square with earth, water, and air, and the like. Nay, it is not credible, till it be opened, what a number of fictions and fantasies the similitude of human actions and arts, together with the making of man communis mensura, have brought into natural philosophy ; not much better than the heresy of the Anthropomorphites, bred in the cells of gross and solitary monks, and the opinion of Epk curus, answerable to the same in heathenism, who sup- posed the gods to be of human shape. And therefore Velleius the Epicurean needed not to have asked, why God should have adorned the heavens with stars, as if he ' had been an adilis, one that should have set forth some magnificent shows or plays. For if that great work- master had been of an human disposition, he would have cast the stars into some pleasant and beautiful works and orders, like the frets in the roofs of houses ; whereas one can scarce find a posture in square, or triangle, or straight line, amongst such an infinite number; so differing an harmony there is between the spirit of man and the spirit of nature. 10. Let us consider again the false appearances im- posed upon us by every man's own individual nature and custom, in that feigned supposition that Plato maketh of the cave : for certainly if a child were continued in a grot or cave under the earth until maturity of age, and came suddenly abroad, he would have strange and absurd imaginations. So in like manner, although our persons live in the view of heaven, yet our spirits are included in the caves of our own complexions and customs, which minister unto us infinite errors and vain opinions, if they be not recalled to examination. But hereof we have given many examples in one of the errors, or XIV. io.] THE SECOND BOOK. 163 peccant humours, which we ran briefly over in our first book. 11. And lastly, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by words, which are framed and applied according to the conceit and capacities of the vulgar sort: and although we think we govern our words, and prescribe it well loquendum ut vulgus senti- endum ut sapientes ; yet certain it is that words, as a Tartar's bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert the judge- ment. So as it is almost necessary, in all controversies and disputations, to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians, in setting down in the very beginning the definitions of our words and terms, that others may know how we accept and understand them, and whether they con- cur with us or no. For it cometh to pass, for want of this, that we are sure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is, in questions and differences about words. To conclude therefore, it must be confessed that it is not possible to divorce ourselves from these fallacies and false appearances, because they are inseparable from our nature and condition of life ; so yet nevertheless the caution of them (for all elenches, as was said, _, , . are but cautions) doth extremely import the ma gni, she true conduct of human judgement. The de idolis ani- particular elenches or cautions against these "" bumani three false appearances, I find altogether naUvts el , n . " adventitiis. deficient. 12. There remaineth one part of judgement of great excellency, which to mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I may report that also deficient ; which is the application of the differing kinds of proofs to the differing kinds of subjects. For there being but four kinds of M 2 164 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XIV. 12, demonstrations, that is, by the immediate consent of the mind or sense, by induction, by syllogism, and by con- gruity, which .is that which Aristotle calleth demonstration in orb or circle, and not a notioribus, every of these hath certain subjects in the matter of sciences, in which re- spectively they have chiefest use; and certain others, from which respectively they ought to be excluded ; and the rigour and curiosity in requiring the more severe proofs in some things, and chiefly the facility in con- tenting ourselves with the more remiss proofs in others, hath been amongst the greatest causes of e ana ogia (jetj-jment and hindrance to knowledge. The demonstra- tionum distributions and assignations of demonstra- tions, according to the analogy of sciences, I note as deficient. XV. 1. The custody or retaining of knowledge is either in writing or memory; whereof writing hath two parts, the nature of the character, and the order of the entry. For the art of characters, or other visible notes of words or things, it hath nearest conjugation with grammar ; and therefore I refer it to the due place. For the disposition and collocation of that knowledge which we preserve in writing, it consisteth in a good digest of common-places ; wherein I am not ignorant of the prejudice imputed to the use of common-place books, as causing a retardation of reading, and some sloth or relaxation of memory. But because it is but a counterfeit thing in knowledges to be forward and pregnant, except a man be deep and full, I hold the entry of common-places to be a matter of great use and essence in studying, as that which assur- eth copie of invention, and contracteth judgement to a strength. But this is true, that of the methods of common- places that I have seen, there is none of any sufficient XV. I.] THE SECOND BOOK. 165 •worth : all of them carrying merely the face of a school, and not of a world ; and referring to vulgar matters and pedantical divisions, without all life or respect to action. 2. For the other principal part of the custody of know- ledge, which is memory, I find that faculty in my judge- ment weakly inquired of. An art there is extant of it ; but it seemeth to me that there are better precepts than that art, and better practices of that art than those re- ceived. It is certain the art (as it is) may be raised to points of ostentation prodigious : but in use (as it is now managed) it is barren, not burdensome, nor dangerous to natural memory, as is imagined, but barren, that is, not dexterous to be applied to the serious use of business and occasions. And therefore I make no more estima- tion of repeating a great number of names or words upon once hearing, or the pouring forth of a number of verses or rhymes ex tempore, or the making of a satirical simile of everything, or the turning of everything to a jest, or the falsifying or contradicting of everything by cavil, or the like (whereof in the faculties of the mind there is great copie, and such as by device and practice may be exalted to an extreme degree of wonder), than I do of the tricks of tumblers, funambuloes, baladines ; the one being the same in the mind that the other is in the body, matters of strangeness without worthiness. 3. This art of memory is but built upon two intentions ; the one prenotion, the other emblem. Prenotion dis- chargeth the indefinite seeking of that we would re- member, and directeth us to seek in a narrow compass, that is, somewhat that hath congruity with our place of memory. Emblem reduceth conceits intellectual to images sensible, which strike the memory more ; out of which axioms may be drawn much better practique than that 1 66 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XV. 3. in use ; and besides which- axioms, there are divers moe touching help of memory, not inferior to them. But I did in the beginning distinguish, not to report those things deficient, which are but only ill managed. XVI. 1. There remaineth the fourth kind of rational knowledge, which is transitive, concerning the expressing or transferring our knowledge to others; which I will term by the general name of tradition or delivery. Tra- dition hath three parts ; the first concerning the organ of tradition ; the second concerning the method of tradition ; and the third concerning the illustration of tradition. 2. For the organ of tradition, it is either speech or writing : for Aristotle saith well, Words are the images of cogitations, and letters are the images of words. But yet it is not of necessity that cogitations be expressed by the medium of words. For whatsoever is capable of sufficient differences, and those perceptible by the sense, is in nature competent to express cogitations. And there- fore we see in the commerce of barbarous people, that understand not one another's language, and in the prac- tice' of divers that are dumb and deaf, that men's minds are expressed in gestures, though not exactly, yet to serve the turn. And we understand further, that it is the use of China, and the kingdoms of the High Levant, to write in characters real, which express neither letters nor 'words in gross, but things or notions; insomuch as countries and provinces, which understand not one an- other's language, can nevertheless read one another's writings, because the characters are accepted more gener- ally than the languages do extend \ and therefore they have a vast multitude of characters, as many (I suppose) as radical words. 3. These notes of cogitations ar.e of two sorts ; the one XVI. 3.] THE SECOND BOOK. 1 67 when the note hath some similitude or congruity with the notion : the other ad placitum, having force only by con- tract or acceptation. Of the former sort are hieroglyphics and gestures. For as to hieroglyphics (things of ancient use, and embraced chiefly by the Egyptians, one of the most ancient nations), they are but as continued impreses and emblems. And as for gestures, they are as transitory hieroglyphics, and are to hieroglyphics Us words_sp_oken are to words written, in that Jhey_abide__notj but they,v have evermore, as well as the other, an affmityjwithjhe_i things signified. As Periander, being consulted with how / to preserve a tyranny newly usurped, bid the messenger attend and report what he saw him do ; and went into his garden and topped all the highest flowers : signifying, that it consisted in the cutting off and keeping low of the nobility and grandees. Ad placitum, are the characters real before mentioned, and words : although some have been willing by curious inquiry, or rather by apt feigning, to have derived imposition of names from reason and intendment; a speculation elegant, and, by reason it searcheth into antiquity, reverent; but sparingly mixed with truth, and of small fruit. This por- De nods tion of knowledge, touching the notes of things, and cogitations in general, I find not inquired, but deficient. And although it may seem of no great use, considering that words and writings by letters do far excel all the other ways ; yet because this part con- cerned as it were the mint of knowledge (for words are the tokens current and accepted for conceits, as moneys are for values, and that it is fit men be not ignorant that moneys may be of another kind than gold and silver), I thought good to propound it to better inquiry. 4. Concerning speech and words, the consideration of 1 68 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XVI.+ them hath produced the science of grammar. For man still striveth to reintegrate himself in those benedictions, from which by his fault he hath been deprived ; and as he hath striven against the first general curse by the in- verition of all other arts, so hath he sought to come forth of the second general curse (which was the confusion of tongues) by the art of grammar ; whereof the use in a mother tongue is small, in a foreign tongue more ; but most in such foreign tongues as have ceased to be vulgar tongues, and are turned only to learned tongues. The duty of it is of two natures : the one popular, which is for the speedy and perfect attaining languages, as well for intercourse of speech as for understanding of authors; the other philosophical, examining the power and nature of words, as they are the footsteps and prints of reason : which kind of analogy between words and reason is handled sparsim, brokenly though not entirely; and there- fore I cannot report it deficient, though I think it very worthy to be reduced into a science by itself. 5. Unto grammar also belongeth, as an appendix, the consideration of the accidents of words ; which are mea- sure, sound, and elevation or accent, and the sweetness and harshness of them ; whence hath issued some curious observations in rhetoric, but chiefly poesy, as we consider it, in respect of the verse and not of the argument. Wherein though men in learned tongues do tie themselves to the ancient measures, yet in modern languages it seemeth to me as free to make new measures of verses as of dances : for a dance is a measured pace, as a verse is a measured speech. In these things the sense is better judge than the art ; Coense fercula nostras Mallem convivis quam placuisse cocis. XVI. S.J THE SECOND BOOK. 1 69 And of the servile expressing antiquity in an unlike and an unfit subject, it is well said, Quod tempore antiquum videlur, id incongruitate est maxime novum. 6. For ciphers, they are commonly in letters, or alpha- bets, but may be in words. The kinds of ciphers (besides the simple ciphers, with changes, and intermixtures of nulls and non-significants) are many, according to the nature or rule of the infolding, wheel-ciphers, key-ciphers, doubles, &c. But the virtues of them, whereby they are to be preferred, are three ; that they be not laborious to write and read; that they be impossible to decipher; and, in some cases, that they be without suspicion. The highest degree whereof is to write omnia per omnia ; which is undoubtedly possible, with a proportion quintuple at most of the writing infolding to the writing infolded, and no other restraint whatsoever. This art of ciphering hath for relative an art of deciphering, by supposition unpro- fitable, but, as things are, of great use. For suppose that ciphers were well managed, there be multitudes of them which exclude the decipherer. But in regard of the raw- ness and unskilfulness of the hands through which they pass, the greatest matters are many times carried in the weakest ciphers. 7. In the enumeration of these private and retired arts, it may be thought I seek to make a great muster-roll of sciences, naming them, for show and ostentation, and to little other purpose. But let those which are skilful in them judge whether I bring them in only for appearance, or whether in that which I speak of them (though in few words) there be not some seed of proficience. And this must be remembered, that as there be many of great account in their countries and provinces, which, when they come up to the seat of the estate, are but of mean rank 170 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XVI. 7. and scarcely regarded ; so these arts, being here placed with the principal and supreme sciences, seem petty things ; yet to such as have chosen them to spend their labours and studies in them, they seem great matters. XVII. 1. For the method of tradition, I see it hath moved a controversy in our time. But as in civil busi- ness, if there be a meeting, and men fall at words, there is commonly an end of the matter for that time, and no proceeding at all ; so in learning, where there is much controversy, there is many times little inquiry. For this part of knowledge of method seemeth to me so weakly inquired as I shall report it deficient. 2. Method hath been placed and that not amiss, in logic, as a part of judgement. For as the doctrine of syllogisms comprehendeth the rules of judgement upon that which is invented, so the doctrine of method con- taineth the rules of judgement upon that which is to be delivered ; for judgement precedefh delivery, as it follow- eth invention. Neither is the method or the nature of the tradition material only to the use of knowledge, but likewise to the progression of knowledge : for since the labour and life of one man cannot attain to perfection of knowledge, the wisdom of the tradition is that which in- spireth the felicity of continuance and proceeding. And therefore the most real diversity of method is of method referred to use, and method referred to progression : whereof the one may be termed magistral, and the other of probation. 3. The latter whereof seemeth to be via deserta ei inter- clusa. For as knowledges are now delivered, there is a kind of contract of error between the deliverer and the receiver. For he that delivereth knowledge, desireth to deliver it in such form as may be best believed, and not XVII. 3-] THE SECOND BOOK. ljl as may be best examined ; and he that receiveth know- ledge, desireth rather present satisfaction, than expectant inquiry ; and so rather not to doubt, than not to err : glory making the author not to lay open his weakness, and sloth making the disciple not to know his strength. 4. But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun on, ought to be delivered and intimated, if it were possible, in the same method wherein it was invented : and so is it possible of knowledge induced. But in this same anticipated and prevented knowledge, no man knoweth how he came to the knowledge which he hath obtained. But yet nevertheless, secundum majus el minus, a man may revisit and descend unto the foundations of his know- ledge and consent ; and so transplant it into another, as it grew in his own mind. For it is in knowledges as it is in plants : if you mean to use the plant, it is no matter for the roots ; but if you mean .to remove it to grow, then it is more assured to rest upon roots than slips : so the delivery of knowledges (as it is now used) is as of fair bodies of trees without the roots ; good for the carpenter, but not for the planter. But if you will have sciences grow, it is less matter for the shaft or body qf the tree, so you look well to the taking up of the roots. jj e met hodo Of which kind of delivery the method of the sincera, she mathematics, in that subject, hath some adfilios shadow: but generally I see it neither put sclen larum - in ure nor put in inquisition, and therefore note it for deficient. ' 5. Another diversity of method there is, which hath some affinity with the former, used in some cases by the discretion of the ancients, but disgraced since by the impostures of many vain persons, who have made it as a false light for their counterfeit merchandises; and 173 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING [XVII. 5. that is, enigmatical and disclosed. The pretence whereof is, to remove the vulgar capacities from being admitted to the secrets of knowledges, and to reserve them to selected auditors, or wits of such sharpness as can pierce the veil. 6. Another diversity of method, whereof the conse- quence is great, is the delivery of knowledge in aphor- isms, or in methods ; wherein we may observe that it hath been too much taken into custom, out of a few axioms or observations upon any subject, to make a solemn and formal art, filling it with some discourses, and illustrating it with examples, and digesting it into a sensible, method. But the writing in aphorisms hath many excellent virtues, whereto the writing in method doth not approach. 7. For first, it trieth the writer, whether he be superficial or solid : for aphorisms, except they should be ridiculous, cannot be made but of the pith and heart of sciences; for discourse of illustration is cut off; recitals of exam- ples are cut off; discourse of connexion and order is cut off; descriptions of practice are cut off. So there remaineth nothing to fill the aphorisms but some good quantity of observation : and therefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt, to write aphorisms, but he that is sound and grounded. But in methods, Tantum series juncturaque pollet, Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris, as a man shall make a great show of an art, which, if it were disjointed, would come to little. Secondly, methods are more fit to win consent or belief, but less fit to point to action ; for they carry a kind of demonstration in orb or circle, one part illuminating another, and there- fore satisfy. But particulars being dispersed do best XVII. 7-] THE SECOND BOOK. 173 agree with dispersed directions. And lastly, aphorisms, representing a knowledge broken, do invite men to in- quire further; whereas methods, carrying the show of a total, do secure men, as if they were at furthest. 8. Another diversity of method, which is likewise of great weight, is the handling of knowledge by assertions and their proofs, or by questions and their deter- minations. The latter kind whereof, if it be immoderately followed, is as prejudicial to the proceeding of learning, as it is to the proceeding of an army to go about to besiege every little fort or hold. For if the field be kept, and the sum of the enterprise pursued, those smaller things will come in of themselves : indeed a man would not leave some important piece enemy at his back. In like manner, the use of confutation in the delivery of sciences ought to be very sparing; and to serve to re- move strong preoccupations and prejudgements, and not to minister and excite disputations and doubts. 9. Another diversity of methods is, according to the subject or matter which is handled. For there is a great difference in delivery of the mathematics, which are the most abstracted of knowledges, and policy, which is the most immersed. And howsoever contention hath been moved, touching an uniformity of method in multiformity of matter, yet we see how that opinion, besides the weak- ness of it, hath been of ill desert towards learning, as that, which taketh the way to reduce learning to cer- tain empty and barren generalities; being but the very husks and shells of sciences, all the kernel being forced out and expulsed with the torture and press of the method. And therefore as 1 did allow well of particular topics for invention, so I do allow likewise of particular methods of tradition. 1 74 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XVII. 10. 10. Another diversity of judgement in the delivery and teaching of knowledge is, according unto the light and presuppositions of that which is delivered. For that know- ledge which is new, and foreign from opinions received, is to be delivered in another form than that that is agree- able and familiar ; and therefore Aristotle, when he thinks to tax Democritus, doth in truth commend him, where he saith, If we shall indeed dispute, and not follow after simili- tudes, &c. For those whose conceits are seated in popular - opinions, need onl y b ut to prove or dispute ; but those whose conceits are beyond popular opinions, have a, double labour ; the one to make themselves conceived, and the other to prove and demonstrate. So that it is of necessity with them to have recourse to similitudes and translations to express themselves. And therefore in the infancy of learning, and in rude times, when those con- ceits which are now trivial were then new, the world was full of parables and similitudes ; for else would men either have passed over without mark, or else rejected for para- doxes that which was offered, before they had understood or judged. So in divine learning, we see how frequent parables and tropes are : for it is a rule, that whatsoever science is not consonant to presuppositions, must pray in aid of similitudes. ii. There be also other diversities of methods vulgar and received : as that of resolution or analysis, of con- stitution or systasis, of concealment or cryptic &c, which I do allow well of, though I have stood upon those which Depruden- are least handled and observed. All which tia iradi- I have remembered to this purpose, because tioms. J would erect and constitute one general in- quiry (which seems to me deficient) touching the wisdom of tradition. XVII.I2.] THE SECOND BOOK. 1 75 1 2. But unto this part of knowledge, concerning method, doth further belong not only the architecture of the whole frame of a work, but also the several beams and columns thereof: not as to their stuff, but as to their quantity and figure. And therefore method considereth not only the disposition of the argument or subject, but likewise the propositions : not as to their truth or matter, but as to their limitation and manner. For herein Ramus merited better a great deal in reviving the good rules of proposi- tions, KaBoXov irpaiToii, Kara navros &c, than he did in intro- ducing the canker of epitomes; and yet (as it is the condition of human things that, according to the ancient fables, the most precious things have the most pernicious keepers) it was so, that the attempt of the one made him fall upon the other. For he had need be well conducted that should design to make axioms convertible, if he make them not withal circular, and non-promovent, or incurring into themselves; but yet the intention was excellent. 13. The other considerations of method, concerning propositions, are chiefly touching the utmost proposi- tions, which limit the dimensions of sciences : for every knowledge may be fitly said, besides the profundity (which is the truth and substance of it, that makes it solid), to have a longitude and a latitude; accounting the latitude towards other sciences, and the longitude towards action ; that is, from the greatest generality to the most particular precept. The one giveth rule how far one knowledge ought to intermeddle within the pro- vince of another, which is the rule they call KaOavro ; the other giveth rule unto what degree of particularity a knowledge should descend : which latter I find passed over in silence, being in my judgement the more material. 176 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XVII. 13. For certainly there must be somewhat left to practice ; but how much is worthy the inquiry. We see remote and superficial generalities do but offer knowledge to scorn of practical men; and are no more aiding to practice, than an Ortelius' universal map is to direct the way between London and York. The better sort of rules have been not unfitly compared to glasses of steel unpolished, where you may see the images of things, but first they must be filed : so the rules will help, if they De prodm- be laboured and polished by practice. But tione axio- how crystalline they may be made at the malum. fa^ an( j j 10w f ar forth they may be polished aforehand is the question; the inquiry whereof seemeth to me deficient. 14. There hath been also laboured and put in prac- tice a method; which is not a lawful method, but a method of imposture ; which is, to deliver knowledges in such hianner, as men may speedily come to make a show of learning who have it not. Such was the travail of Raymundus Lullius, in making that art which bears his name : not unlike to some books of typocosmy, which have been made since; being nothing but a mass of words of all arts, to give men countenance, that those which use the terms might be thought to understand the art ; which collections are much like a fripper's or broker's shop, that hath ends of everything, but nothing of worth. XVIII. 1. Now we descend to that part which con- cerned! the illustration of tradition, comprehended in that science which we call rhetoric, or art of eloquence ; a science excellent, and excellently well laboured. For although in true value it is inferior to wisdom, as it is said by God to Moses, when he disabled himself for want of this faculty, Aaron shall be thy speaker, and thou XVIII. I.] THE SECOND BOOK. 1 77 shall be to him as God; yet with people it is the more mighty : for so Salomon saith, Sapiens corde appellabitur prudens, sed dulcis eloquio major a reperiet ; signifying that profoundness of wisdom will help a man to a name or admiration, but that it is eloquence that prevaileth in an active life. And as to the labouring of it, the emulation of Aristotle with the rhetoricians of his time, and the experience of Cicero, hath made them in their works of rhetorics exceed themselves. Again, the excellency of examples of eloquence in the orations of Demosthenes and Cicero, added to the perfection of the precepts of eloquence, hath doubled the progression in this art ; and therefore the deficiences which I shall note will rather be in some collections, which may as handmaids attend the art, than in the rules or use of the art itself. 2. Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about the roots of this science, as we have done of the rest; the duty and office of rhetoric is to apply reason to imagina- tion for the better moving of the will,, For we see reason is disturbed in the administration thereof by three means ; by illaqueation or sophism, which pertains to logic ; by imagination or impression, which pertains to rhetoric; and by passion or affection, which pertains to morality. And as in negotiation with others, men are wrought by cun- ning, by importunity, and by vehemency; so in this negotiation within ourselves, men are undermined by in- consequences, solicited and importuned by impressions or observations, and transported by passions. Neither is the nature of man so unfortunately built, as that those powers and arts should have force to disturb reason, and not to establish and advance it. For the end of logic is to teach a form of argument to secure reason, and not to en- trap it. The end of morality is to procure the affections to N I78 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XVIII.2. obey reason, and not to invade it. The end of rhetoric is to fill the imagination to second reason, and not to oppress it: for these abuses of arts come in but ex obliquo, for caution. 3. And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, though springing out of a just hatred to the rhetoricians of his time, to esteem of rhetoric but as a voluptuary art, re- sembling it to cookery, that did mar wholesome meats, and help unwholesome by variety of sauces to the plea- sure of the taste. For we see that speech is much more conversant in adorning that which is good, than in colouring that which is evil; for there is no man but speaketh more honestly than he can do or think : and it was excellently noted by Thucydides in Cleon, that because he used to hold on the bad side in causes of estate, therefore he was ever inveighing against elo- quence and good speech ; knowing that no man can speak fair of courses sordid and base. And therefore as Plato said elegantly, That virtue, if she could be seen, would move great love and affection; so seeing that she cannot be showed to the sense by corporal shape, the next degree is to show her to the imagination in lively representation : for to show her to reason only in sub- tility of argument was a thing ever derided in Chrysip- pus and many of the Stoics, who thought to thrust virtue upon men by sharp disputations and conclusions, which have no sympathy with the will of man. 4. Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient to reason, it were true there should be no great use of persuasions and insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and proofs; but in regard of the continual mutinies and seditions of the affections, Video meliora, proboque, Dcteriora sequol, XVIII. 4-] THE SECOND BOOK. 1 79 reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of persuasions did not practise and win the imagination from the affections' part, and contract a confederacy be- tween the reason and imagination against the affections ; for the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to good, as reason doth. The difference is, that the affection beholdeth merely the present ; reason beholdeth the future and sum of time. And therefore the present filling the imagination more, reason is commonly vanquished; but after that force of eloquence and persuasion hath made things future and remote appear as present, then upon the revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth. 5. We conclude therefore that rhetoric can be no more charged with the colouring of the worse part, than logic with sophistry, or morality with vice. For we know the doctrines of contraries are the same, though the use be opposite. It appeareth also that logic differeth from rhetoric, not only as the fist from the palm, the one close, the other at large; but much more in this, that logic handleth reason exact and in truth, and rhetoric handleth it as it is planted in popular opinions and manners. And therefore Aristotle doth wisely place rhetoric as between logic on the one side, and moral or civil knowledge on the other, as participating of both : for the proofs and demonstrations of logic are toward all men indifferent and the same ; but the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric ought to differ according to the auditors : Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion. Which application, in perfection of idea, ought to extend so far, that if a man should speak of the same thing to several persons, he should speak to them all respectively and several ways : though this politic part of eloquence' N 2 l8o OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XVIII. 5. in private speech it is easy for the greatest orators to want: whilst, by the observing their weil- eprudentta g racec [ f orms f speech, they leese the volu- sermonis .. _ .. . . . bility 01 application : and therefore it . shall not be amiss to recommend this to better inquiry, not being curious whether we place it here, or in that part which concerneth policy. 6. Now therefore will I descend to the deficiences, Colons boni which (as I said) are but attendances : and et mali, first, I do not find the wisdom and diligence simplwis et of Aristotle well pursued, who began' to make comparati. a collection of the popular signs and colours of good and evil, both simple and comparative, which are as the sophisms of rhetoric (as I touched before). For example : Sophisma. Quod laudator, bonum : quod vituperate, malum. Redargutio. Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces. Malum est, malum est (inquit emptor) ; sed cum recesserit, turn gloriabitur ! The defects in the labour of Aristotle are three : one, that there be but a few of many ; another, that their elenches are not annexed ; and the third, that he conceived but a part of the use of them : for their use is not only in probation, but much more in impression. For many forms are equal in signification which are dif- fering in impression ; as the difference is great in the piercing of that which is sharp and that which is flat, though the strength of the percussion be the same. For there is no man but will be a little more raised by hearing it said, Your enemies will be glad of this, Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridaj, than by hearing it said only, This is evil for you. XVIII. 7.] THE SECOND BOOK. 181 "j. Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned before, touching provision or preparatory store for the furniture of speech and readiness of invention, which ap- peareth to be of two sorts ; the one in resemblance to a shop of pieces unmade up, the other to a shop of things ready made up ; both to be applied to that which is fre- quent and most in request. The former of these I will call antitheta, and the latter formula. 8. Aniitheia are theses argued pro et contra ; wherein men may be more large and laborious : but (in such as are able to do it) to avoid prolixity * ' r J rerum. of entry, I wish the seeds of the several argu- ments to be cast up into some brief and acute sentences, not to be cited, but to be as skeins or bottoms of thread, to be unwinded at large when they come to be used; supplying authorities and examples by reference. Pro verbis legis. Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, quae recedit a litera : Cum receditur a litera, judex transit in legislatorem. Pro sententia legis. Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus qui interpretatur singula. 9. Formula are but decent and apt passages or con- veyances of speech, which may serve indifferently for differing subjects; as of preface, conclusion, digression, transition, excusation, &c. For as in buildings there is great pleasure and use in the well casting of the stair- cases, entries, doors, windows, and the like ; so in speech, the conveyances and passages are of special ornament and effect. A conclusion in a deliberative. So may we redeem the faults passed, and prevent the inconveniences future. XIX. 1. There remain two appendices touching the 182 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XIX. I. tradition of knowledge, the one critical, the other pedant- ical. For all knowledge is either delivered by teachers, or attained by men's proper endeavours: and therefore as the principal part of tradition of knowledge concerneth chiefly writing of books, so the relative part thereof con- cerneth reading of books ; whereunto appertain incidently these considerations. The first is concerning the true correction and edition of authors ; wherein nevertheless rash diligence hath done great prejudice. For these critics have often presumed that that which they under- stand not is false set down: as the priest that, where he found it written of S. Paul Demissus est per sportam, mended his book, and made it Demissus est per portam ; because sporta was an hard word, and out of his reading : and surely their errors, though they be not so palpable and ridiculous, yet are of the same kind. And therefore, as it hath been wisely noted, the most corrected copies are commonly the least correct. The second is concerning the exposition and explic- ation of authors, which resteth in annotations and com- -mentaries : wherein it is over usual to blanch the obscure places and discourse upon the plain. The third is concerning the times, which in many cases give great light to true interpretations. The fourth is concerning some brief censure and judge- ment of the authors ; that men thereby may make some election unto themselves what books to read. And the fifth is concerning the syntax and disposition of studies ; that men may know in what order or pursuit to read. 2. For pedantical knowledge, it containeth that differ- ence of tradition which is proper for youth ; whereunto appertain divers considerations of great fruit. XIX. 2.J THE SECOND BOOK. 1 83 As first, the timing and seasoning of knowledges ; as with what to initiate them, and from what for a time to refrain them. Secondly, the consideration where to begin with the easiest, and so proceed to the more difficult ; and in what courses to press the more difficult, and then to turn them to the more easy : for it is one method to practise swim- ming with bladders, and another to practise dancing with heavy shoes. A third is the application of learning according unto- the propriety of the wits ; for there is no defect in the faculties intellectual, but seemeth to have a proper cure contained in some studies : as, for example, if a child be bir d-wi tted, that is, hath not the faculty of attention, the mathematics giveth a remedy thereunto ; for in them, if the wit be caught away but a moment, one is new to begin. And as sciences have a propriety towards faculties for cure and help, so faculties or powers have a sympathy towards sciences for excellency or speedy profiting : and therefore it is an inquiry of great wisdom, what kinds of wits and natures are most apt and proper for what sciences. Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of great consequence to hurt or help : for, as is well observed by Cicero, men in exercising their faculties, if they be not well advised, do exercise their faults and get ill habits as well as good ; so as there is a great judgement to be had in the continuance and intermission of exercises. It were too long to particularise a number of other considerations of this nature, things but of mean appearance, but of singular efficacy. For as the wronging or cherishing of seeds or young plants is that that is most important to their thriving, and as it was noted that the first six kings being in truth as tutors of the state of Rome in the l8_4 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XIX. *. infancy thereof was the principal cause of the immense greatness of that state which followed, so the culture and manurance of minds in youth hath such a forcible (though unseen) operation, as hardly any length of time or contention of labour can countervail it afterwards. And it is not amiss to observe also how small and mean faculties gotten by education, yet when they fall into great men or great matters, do work great and important effects : whereof we see a notable example in Tacitus of two stage players, Percennius and Vibulenus, who by their faculty of playing put the Pannonian armies into an extreme tumult and combustion. For there arising a mutiny amongst them upon the death of Augustus Caesar, Blsesus the lieutenant had committed some of the mutin- ers, which were suddenly rescued; whereupon Vibulenus got to be heard speak, which he did in this manner : These poor innocent wretches appointed to cruel death, you have restored to behold the light; but who shall restore my brother to me, or life unto my brother, that was sent hither in message from the legions of Germany, to treat of the common cause ? and he hath murdered him this last night by some of his fencers and ruffians, that he hath about him for his executioners upon soldiers. Answer, Blasus, what is done with his body ? The morlalesl enemies do not deny burial. When I have performed my last duties to the corpse with kisses, with tears, command me to be slain besides him ; so that these my fellows, for our good meaning and our true hearts to the legions, may have leave to bury us. With which speech he put the army into an infinite fury and uproar : whereas truth was he had no brother, neither was there any such matter; but he played it merely as if he had been upon the stage. 3. But to return : we are now come to a period of XIX. 3-] THE SECOND BOOK. 1 85 rational knowledges ; wherein if I have made the divi- sions other than those that are received, yet would I not be thought to disallow all those divisions which I do not use. For there is a double necessity imposed upon me of altering the divisions. The one, because it differeth in end and purpose, to sort together those things which are next in nature, and those things which are next in use. For if a secretary of estate should sort his papers, it is like in his study or general cabinet he would sort together things of a nature, as treaties, instructions, &c. But in his boxes or particular cabinet he would sort together those that he were like to use together, though of several natures. So in this general cabinet of know- ledge it was necessary for me to follow the divisions of the nature of things ; whereas if myself had been to handle any particular knowledge, I would have respected the divisions fittest for use. The other, because the bringing in of the deficiences did by consequence alter the partitions of the rest. For let the knowledge extant (for demonstration sake) be fifteen. Let the knowledge with the deficiences be twenty; the parts of fifteen are not the parts of twenty ; for the parts of fifteen are three and five ; the parts of twenty are two, four, five, and ten. So as these things are without contradiction, and could not otherwise be. XX. 1. ~\\ 7E proceed now to that knowledge which considereth of the appetite and will of man : whereof Salomon saith, Ante omnia, fill, custodi cor tuum ; nam inde procedunt actiones vita. In the handling of this science, those which have written seem to me to have done as if a man, that professed to teach to write, did only exhibit fair copies of alphabets and letters 1 86 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XX. I. joined, without giving any precepts or directions for the carriage of the hand and framing of the letters. So have they made good and fair exemplars and copies, carrying the draughts and portraitures of good, virtue, duty, felicity; propounding them well described as the true objects and scopes of man's will and desires. But how to attain these excellent marks, and how to frame and subdue the will of man to become true and conformable to these pursuits, they pass it over altogether, or slightly and un- profitably. For it is not the disputing, that moral virtues are in the mind of man by habit and not by nature ; or the distinguishing, that generous spirits are won by doc- trines and persuasions, and the vulgar sort by reward and punishment ; and the like scattered glances and touches, that can excuse the absence of this part. 2. The reason of this omission I suppose to be that hidden rock whereupon both this and many other barks of knowledge have been cast away ; which is, that men have despised to be conversant in ordinary and common matters, the judicious direction whereof nevertheless is the wisest doctrine (for life consisteth not in novelties nor subtilities), but contrariwise they have compounded sciences chiefly of a certain resplendent or lustrous mass of matter, chosen to give glory either to the subtility of disputations, or to the eloquence of discourses. But Seneca giveth an excellent check to eloquence, Nocet Mis eloqueniia, quiius non rerum cupiditaiem facit, sed sui. Doctrine should be such as should make men in love with the lesson, and not with the teacher ; being directed to the auditor's benefit, and not to the author's com- mendation. And therefore those are of the right kind which may be concluded as Demosthenes concludes his counsel, Qua si fecerilis, non o atorem duntaxat in prce- XX. 2.] THE SECOND BOOK. 187 senlia laudabitis, sed vosmetipsos eiiam non tla multo post statu rerum vesiraram meliore. 3. Neither needed men of so excellent parts to have despaired of a fortune, which the poet Virgil promised himself, and indeed obtained, who got as much glory of eloquence, wit, and learning in the expressing of the observations of husbandry, as of the heroical acts of iEneas : Nee sum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere magnum Quam sit, et angustis his addere rebus honorem. And surely, if the purpose be in good earnest, not to write at leisure that which men may read at leisure, but really to instruct and suborn action and active life, these Georgics of the mind, concerning the husbandry and tillage thereof, are no less worthy than the heroical de- scriptions of virtue, duty, and felicity. Wherefore the main and primitive division of moral knowledge seemelh to be into the exemplar or platform of good, and the regiment or culture of the mind : the one describing the nature of good, the other prescribing rules how to subdue, apply, and accommodate the will of man thereunto. 4. The doctrine touching the platform or nature of good considereth it either simple or compared; either the kinds of good, or the degrees of good ; in the latter whereof those infinite disputations which were touching the supreme degree thereof, which they term felicity, beatitude, or the highest good, the doctrines concerning which were as the heathen divinity, are by the Christian faith discharged. And as Aristotle saith, That young men may be happy, but not otherwise but by hope ; so we must all acknowledge our minority, and embrace the felicity which is by hope of the future world. Freed therefore and delivered from this doctrine of l88 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XX. 5. the philosopher's heaven, whereby they feigned an higher elevation of man's nature than was (for we see in what height of style Seneca writeth, Vere magnum, habere fra- gilitatem hominis, securitaiem Dei), we may with more sobriety and truth receive the rest of their inquiries and labours. Wherein for the nature of good positive or simple, they have set it down excellently in describing the forms of virtue and duty, with their situations and postures ; in distributing them into their kinds, parts, provinces, actions, and administrations, and the like : nay further, they have commended them to man's nature and spirit with great quickness of argument and beauty of persuasions ; yea, and fortified and entrenched them (as much as discourse can do) against corrupt and popular opinions. Again, for the degrees and comparative nature of good, they have also excellently handled it in their triplicity of good, in the comparisons between a contem- plative and an active life, in the distinction between virtue with reluctation and virtue secured, in their encounters between honesty and profit, in their balancing of virtue with virtue, and the like ; so as this part deserveth to be reported for excellently laboured. 6. Notwithstanding, if before they had comen to the popular and received notions of virtue and vice, pleasure and pain, and the rest, they had stayed a little longer upon the inquiry concerning the roots of good and evil, and the strings of those roots, they had given, in my opinion, a great light to that which followed ; and spe- cially if they had consulted with nature, they had made their doctrines less prolix and more profound: which being by them in part omitted and in part handled with much confusion, we will endeavour to resume and open in a more clear manner. £X. 7.J THE SECOND BOOK. 1 89 7. There is formed in every thing a double nature of good : the one, as every thing is a total or substantive in itself; the other, as it is a part or member of a greater body : whereof the latter is in degree the greater and the worthier, because it tendeth to the conservation of a more general form. Therefore we see the iron in par- ticular sympathy moveth to the loadstone; but yet if it exceed a certain quantity, it forsaketh the affection to the loadstone, and like a good patriot moveth to the earth, which is the region and country of massy bodies : so may we go forward, and see that water and massy bodies move to the centre of the earth ; but rather than to suffer a divulsion in the continuance of nature, they will move upwards from the centre of the earth, forsaking their duty to the earth in regard of their duty to the world. This double nature of good, and the comparative thereof, is much more engraven upon man, if he degenerate not : unto whom the conservation of duty to the public ought to be much more precious than the conservation of life and being : according to that memorable speech of Pom- peius Magnus, when being in commission of purveyance for a famine at Rome, and being dissuaded with great vehemency and instance by his friends about him, that he should not hazard himself to sea in an extremity of weather, he said only to them, Necesse est ut earn, non ut vivam. But it may be truly affirmed that there was never any philosophy, religion, or other discipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt the good which is commun- icative, and depress the good which is private and par- ticular, as the Holy Faith ; well declaring that it was the same God that gave the Christian law to men, who gave those laws of nature to inanimate creatures that we spake of before ; for we read that the elected saints of God have I90 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XX. 7. wished themselves anathematized and razed out of the book of life, in an ecstasy of charity and infinite feeling of communion. 8. This being- set down and strongly planted, doth judge and determine most of the controversies wherein moral philosophy is conversant. For first, it decideth the question touching the preferment of the contemplative or active life, and decideth it against Aristotle. For all the reasons which he bringeth for the contemplative are pri- vate, and respecting the pleasure and dignity of a man's self (in which respects no question the contemplative life hath the pre-eminence), not much unlike to that com- parison, which Pythagoras made for the gracing and magnifying of philosophy and contemplation : who being asked what he was, answered, That if Hiero zvere ever at the Olympian games, he knew the manner, that some came to try their fortune for the prizes, and some came as mer- chants to utter their commodiles, and some came to make good cheer and meet their friends, and some came to look on; and that he was one of them that came to look on. But men must know, that in this theatre of man's life it is reserved only for God and angels to be lookers on. Neither could the like question ever have been received in the church, notwithstanding their Pretipsa in oculis Domini mors sanctorum ejus, by which place they would exalt their civil death and regular professions, but upon this defence, that the monastical life is not simple contem- plative, but performeth the duty either of incessant prayers and supplications, which hath been truly esteemed as an office in the church, or else of writing or taking instruc- tions for writing concerning the law of God, as Moses did when he abode so long in the mount. And so we see Henoch the seventh from Adam, who was the first XX. 8.] THE SECOND BOOK. 19T contemplative and walked with God, yet did also endow the church with prophecy, which Saint Jude citeth. But for contemplation which should be finished in itself, with- out casting beams upon society, assuredly divinity knoweth it not. 9. It decideth also the controversies between Zeno and Socrates, and their schools and successions, on the one side, who placed felicity in virtue simply or attended, the actions and exercises whereof do chiefly embrace and concern society ; and on the other side, the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, who placed it in pleasure, and made virtue (as it is used in some comedies of errors, wherein the mistress and the maid change habits) to be but as a servant, without which pleasure cannot be served and attended; and the reformed school of the Epicureans, which placed it in serenity of mind and freedom from perturbation; as if they would have deposed Jupiter again, and restored Saturn and the first age, when there was no summer nor winter, spring nor autumn, but all after one air and season ; and Herillus, which placed felicity in extinguishment of the disputes of the mind, making no fixed nature of good and evil, esteeming things according to the clearness of the desires, or the reluct- ation; which opinion was revived in the heresy of the Anabaptists, measuring things according to the motions of the spirit, and the constancy or wavering of belief : all which are manifest to tend to private repose and con- tentment, and not to point of society. 10. It censureth also the philosophy of Epictetus, which presupposeth that felicity must be placed in those things which are in our power, lest we be liable to fortune and disturbance : as if it were not a thing much more happy to fail in good and virtuous ends for the public, than to lyi OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XX. 10. obtain all that we can wish to ourselves in our proper fortune ; as Consalvo said to his soldiers, showing them Naples, and protesting he had rather die one foot for- wards, than to have his life secured for long by one foot of retreat. Whereunto the wisdom of that heavenly leader hath signed, who hath affirmed that a good conscience is a continual feast ; showing plainly that the conscience of good intentions, howsoever succeeding, is a more con- tinual joy to nature, than all the provision which can be made for security and repose. ii. It censureth likewise that abuse of philosophy, which grew general about the time of Epictetus, in con- verting it into an occupation or profession; as if the purpose had been, not to resist and extinguish perturb- ations, but to fly and avoid the causes of them, and to shape a particular kind and course of life . to that end ; introducing such an health of mind, as was that health pf body of which Aristotle speaketh pf Herodicus, who did nothing all his life long but intend his health : whereas if men refer themselves to duties of society, as that health of body is best, which is ablest to endure all alterations and extremities ; so likewise that health of mind is most proper, which can go through the greatest temptations and perturbations. So as Diogenes' opinion is to be accepted, who commended not them which abstained, but them which sustained, and could refrain their mind in prcBcipitio, and could give unto the mind (as is used in horsemanship) the shortest stop or turn. 12. Lastly, it censureth the tenderness and want of application in some of the most ancient and reverend philosophers and philosophical men, that did retire too easily from civil business, for avoiding of indignities and perturbations : whereas the resolution of men truly moral £X. 12.J THE SECOND BOOK. 1 93 ought to be such as the same Consalvo said the honour of a soldier should be, e teld crassiore, and not so fine as that every thing should catch in it and endanger it. XXI. 1. To resume private or particular good, it falleth into the division of good active and passive : for this difference of good (not unlike to that which amongst the Romans was expressed in the familiar or household terms of promus and condus) is formed also in all things, and is best disclosed in the two several appetites in crea- tures; the one to preserve or continue themselves, and the other to dilate or multiply themselves; whereof the latter seemeth to be the worthier: for in nature the heavens, which are the more worthy, are the agent ; and the earth, which is the less worthy, is the patient. In the pleasures of living creatures, that of generation is greater than that of food. In divine doctrine, beatius est dare quam accipere. And in life, there is no man's spirit so soft, but esteemeth the effecting of somewhat that he hath fixed in his desire, more than sensuality; which priority of the active good, is much upheld by the consideration of our estate to be mortal and exposed to fortune. For if we mought have a perpetuity and certainty in our plea- sures, the state of them would advance their price. But when we see it is but magni asstimamus mori tardius, and ne glorieris de crastino, nescis parium diei, it maketh us to- desire to have somewhat secured and exempted from time, which are only our deeds and works : as it is said, Opera eorum sequuntur eos. The preeminence likewise of this active good is upheld by the affection which is natural in man towards variety and proceeding ; which in the pleasures of the sense, which is the principal part of passive good, can have no great latitude. Cogila quam- diu eadem feceris ; cibus, somnus, ludus; per hwic circulum 194 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXI. i. curritur; morivelle non tantumfortis, aut miser, autprudens, sed etiam fastidiosus potest. But in enterprises, pursuits, and purposes of life, there is much variety; whereof men are sensible with pleasure in their inceptions, progres- sions, recoils, reintegrations, approaches and attainings to their ends. So as it was well said, Vita sine proposito languida et vaga est. Neither hath this active good any identity with the good of society, though in some case it hath an incidence into it. For although it do many times bring forth acts of beneficence, yet it is with a respect private to a man's own power, glory, amplification, con- tinuance ; as appeareth plainly, when it findeth a contrary subject. For that gigantine state of mind which pos- sessed the troublers of the world, such as was Lucius Sylla and infinite other in smaller model, who would have all men happy or unhappy as they were their friends or enemies, and would give form to the world, according to their own humours (which is the true theomachy), pretendeth and aspireth to active good, though it recedeth furthest from good of society, which we have determined to be the greater. 2. To resume passive good, it receiveth a subdivision of conservative and perfective. For let us take a brief review of that which we have said : we have spoken first of the good of society, the intention whereof embraceth the form of human nature, whereof we are members and portions,~and not our own proper and individual form : we have spoken of active good, and supposed it as a part of private and particular good. And rightly, for there is impressed upon all things a triple desire or appetite proceeding from love to themselves ; one of preserving and continuing their form; another of advancing and perfecting their form ; and a third of multiplying and XXI. 2.] THE SECOND BOOK. I95 extending their form upon other things: whereof the multiplying,. or signature of it upon other things, is that which we handled by the name of active good. So as there remaineth the conserving of it, and perfecting or raising of it; which latter is the highest degree of passive good. For to preserve in state is the less, to preserve with advancement is the greater. So in man, Ignens est ollis vigor, et cslestis origo. His approach or assumption to divine or angelical na- ture is the perfection of his form; the error or false imitation of which good is that which is the tempest of human life ; while man, upon the instinct of an advance- ment formal and essential, is carried to seek an ad- vancement local. For as those which are sick, and find no remedy, do tumble up and down and change place, as if by a remove local they could obtain a remove in- ternal; so is it with men in ambition, when failing of the mean to exalt their nature, they are in a. perpetual estuation to exalt their place. So then passive good is, as was said r either conservative or perfective. 3. To resume the good of conservation or comfort, which consisteth in the fruition of that which is agree- able to our natures; it seemeth to be the most pure and natural of pleasures, but yet the softest and the lowest. And this also receiveth a difference, which hath neither been well judged of, nor well inquired: for the good of fruition or contentment is placed either in the sincereness of the fruition, or in the quickness and vigour of it; the one superinduced by equality, the other by vicissitude ; the one having less mixture of evil, the other more impression of good. Whether of these is the greater good is a question controverted ; but whether 2 ig6 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXI. 3. man's nature v may not be capable of both, is a question not inquired. 4. The former question being debated between Socrates and a sophist, Socrates placing felicity in an equal and constant peace of mind, and the sophist in much de- siring and much enjoying, they fell from argument to ill words : the sophist saying that Socrates' felicity was the felicity of a block or stone; and Socrates saying that the sophist's felicity was the felicity of one that had the itch, who did nothing but itch and scratch. And both these opinions do not want their supports. For the opinion of Socrates is much upheld by the general con- sent even of the Epicures themselves, that virtue bear- eth a great part in felicity; and if so, certain it is, that virtue hath more use in clearing perturbations than in compassing desires. The sophist's opinion is much favoured by the assertion we last spake of, that good of advancement is greater than good of simple preservation ; because every obtaining a desire hath a show of advance- ment, as motion though in a circle hath a show of pro- gression. 5. But the second question, decided the true way, maketh the former superfluous. For can it be doubted, but that there are some who take more pleasure in en- joying pleasures than some other, and yet, nevertheless, are less troubled with the loss or leaving of them ? So. as this same, Non uli ut non appetas, non appelere ut non metuas, sunt animi pusilli et diffidentis. And it seemeth to me, that most of the doctrines of the philosophers are more fearful and cautionary than the nature of things requireth. So have they increased the fear of death in offering to cure it. For when they would have a man's, whole life to be but a discipline or preparation to die, XXI. J.] THE SECOND BOOK. 1 97 they must needs make men think that it is a terrible enemy, against whom there is no end of preparing. Better saith the poet : Qui Hnem vitse extremum inter munera ponat Nature. So have they sought to make men's minds too uniform and harmonical, by not breaking them sufficiently to con- trary motions : the reason whereof I suppose to be, be- cause they themselves were men dedicated to a private, free, and unapplied course of life. For as we see, upon the lute or like instrument, a ground, though it be sweet and have show of many changes, yet breaketh not the • hand to such strange and hard stops and passages, as a set song or voluntary; much after the same manner was the diversity between a philosophical and a civil life. And therefore men are to imitate the wisdom of jewellers ; who, if there be a grain, or a cloud, or an ice which may be ground forth without taking too much of the stone, they help it ; but if it should lessen and abate the stone too much, they will not meddle with it : so ought men so to procure serenity as they destroy not magnanimity. 6. Having therefore deduced the good of man which is private and particular, as far as seemeth fit, we will now return to that good of man which rfespecteth and beholdeth society, which we may term duty; because the term of duty is more proper to a mind well framed and disposed towards others, as the term of virtue is applied to a mind well formed and composed in itself: though neither can a man understand virtue without some re- lation to society, nor duty without an inward disposition. This part may seem at first to pertain to science civil and politic: but not if it be well observed. For it I98 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXI. 6. concerneth the regiment and government of every man over himself, and not over others. And as in architecture the direction of framing the posts, beams, and other parts of building, is not the same with the manner of joining them and erecting the building; and in mechanicals, the direction how to frame an instrument or engine, is not the same with the manner of setting it on work and employing it ; and yet nevertheless in expressing of the one you incidently express the aptness towards the other ; so the doctrine of conjugation of men in society differeth from that of their conformity thereunto. 7. This part of duty is subdivided into two parts: the common duty of every man, as a man or member of a state ; the other, the respective or special duty of every man, in his profession, vocation, and place. The first of these is extant and well laboured, as hath been said. The second likewise I may report rather dispersed than deficient ; which manner of dispersed writing in this kind of argument I acknowledge to be best. For who can take upon him to write of the proper duty, virtue, challenge, and right of every several vocation, pro- fession, and place ? For although sometimes a looker on may see more than a gamester, and there be a proverb more arrogant than sound, That the vale best discovereth the hill; yet there is small doubt but that men can write best and most really and materially in their own profes- sions ; and that the writing of speculative men of active matter for the most part doth seem to men of experience, as Phormio's argument of the wars seemed to Hannibal, to be but dreams and dotage. Only there is one vice which accompanieth them that write in their own pro- fessions, that they magnify them in excess. But gener- ally it were to be wished (as that which would make XXI. 7.] THE SECOND BOOK." 199 learning indeed solid and fruitful) that active men would or could become writers. 8. In which kind I cannot but mention, honoris causa, your Majesty's excellent book touching the duty of a king: a work richly compounded of divinity, morality, and policy, with great aspersion of all other arts ; and being in mine , opinion one of the most sound and healthful writings that I have read; not distempered in the heat of invention, nor in the coldness of negligence; not sick of dizzi- ness, as those are who leese themselves in their order, nor of convulsions, as those which cramp in matters impertinent; not savouring of perfumes and paintings, as those do who seek to please the reader more than nature beareth; and chiefly well disposed in the spirits thereof, being agreeable to truth and apt for action; and far removed from that natural infirmity, whereunto I noted those that write in their own professions to be subject, which is, that they exalt it above measure. For your Majesty hath truly described, not a king of Assyria or Persia in their extern glory, but a Moses or a David, pastors of their people. Neither can I ever leese .out of my remembrance what I heard your Majesty in the same sacred spirit of government deliver in a great cause of judicature, which was, That kings ruled by their laws, as God did by the laws of nature ; and ought as rarely to put in use their supreme prerogative, as God doth his power of working miracles. And yet notwithstanding, 1 in your book of a free monarchy, you do well give men to understand, that you know the plenitude of the power and right of a king, as well as the circle of his office and duty. Thus have I presumed to allege this excellent writing of your Majesty, as a prime or eminent example of tractates concerning special and respective duties: 200 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXI. 8. wherein I should have said as much, if it had been written a thousand years since. Neither am I moved with certain courtly decencies, which esteem it flattery to praise in presence. No, it is flattery to praise in absence ; that is, when either the virtue is absent, or the occasion is ab- sent; and so the praise is not natural, but forced, either in truth or in time. But let Cicero be read in his oration * pro Marcello, which is nothing but an excellent table of Caesar's virtue, and made to his face ; besides the example of many other excellent persons, wiser a great deal than such observers ; and we will never doubt, upon a full occasion, to give just praises to present or absent. 9. But to return : there belongeth further to the hand- ling of this part, touching the duties of professions and vocations, a relative or opposite, touching the frauds, cautels, impostures, and vices of every profession, which hath been likewise handled : but how ? rather in a satire and cynically, than seriously and wisely: for men have rather sought by wit to deride and traduce much of that which is good in professions, than with judgement to ' discover and sever that which is corrupt. For, as Salomon saith, he that cometh to seek after knowledge with a mind to scorn and censure, shall be sure to find matter for his humour, but no matter for his instruction : Quce- De cautelis renti ^ ensort scienliam ipsa se abscondit; sed et malis sludioso fit obviam. But the managing of artibus. this argument with integrity and truth, which I note as deficient, seemeth to me to be one of the best fortifications for honesty and virtue that can be planted. For, as the fable goeth of the basilisk, that if he see you first, you die for it ; but if you see him first, he dieth : so is it with deceits and evil arts ; which, if they be first espied they leese their life ; but if they prevent, they endanger. So XXI. 9-] THE SECOND BOOK. 201 that we are much beholden to Machiavel and others, that write what men do, and not what they ought to do. For it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with the columbine innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the serpent; his baseness and going upon his belly, his volubility and lubricity, his envy and sting, and the rest ; that is, all forms and natures of evil. For without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced. Nay, an honest man can do no good upon those that are wicked, to reclaim them, without the help of the knowledge of evil. For men of corrupted minds presuppose that honesty groweth out of simplicity of manners, and be- lieving of preachers, schoolmasters, and men's exterior language. So as, except you can make them perceive that you know the utmost reaches of their own corrupt opinions, they despise all morality. Non recipit stulius verba prudenticE, nisi ea dixeris quce versantur in corde ejus. 10. Unto this part, touching respective duty, doth also appertain the duties between husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant. So likewise the laws of friendship and gratitude, the civil bond of companies, colleges, and politic bodies, of neighbourhood, and all other proportionate duties ; not as they are parts of government and society, but as to the framing of the mind of particular persons. 1 1. The knowledge concerning good respecting society doth handle it also, not simply alone, but comparatively; whereunto belongeth the weighing of duties between per- son and person, case and case, particular and public. As we see in the proceeding of Lucius Brutus against his own sons, which was so much extolled; yet what was said? Infelix, utcunque feient ea fata rainores. 202 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXI. n. So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both sides. Again, we see when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper certain whose opinions they meant to feel, whether they were fit to be made their associates, and cast forth the question touching the killing of a tyrant being an usurper, they were divided in opinion; some holding that servitude was the extreme of evils, and others that tyranny was better than a civil war : and a number of the like cases there are of comparative duty. Amongst which that of all others is the most frequent, where the question is of a great deal of good to ensue of a small injustice. Which Jason of Thessalia determined against the truth: AHqua sunt injuste facienda, ut multa juste fieri tossint. But the reply is good, Auctorem prasentis jus- iiticB habes, sponsor etn futures non habes. Men must pursue things which are just in present, and leave the future to the divine Providence. So then we pass pn from this general part touching the exemplar and description of good. XXII. i. Now therefore that we have spoken of this fruit of life, it remaineth to speak of the hus- Decultura Dan( j r y that belongeth thereunto; without which part the former seemeth to be no better than a fair image, or statua, which is beautiful to contem- plate, but is without life and motion ; whereunto Aristotle himself subscribeth in these words : Necesse est scilicet de virtute dicere, et quid sit, el ex quibus gignaiur. Inutile enim fere fuerit virtuiem quidem nosse, acquirendcE autem ejus modos et vias ignorare. Non enim de virtute tantum, qua specie sit, queer endum est, sed el quomodo sui copiam facial : ulrumque enim volumus, et rem ipsam nosse, et ejus compotes fieri: hoc autem ex voto non succedet, nisi sciamus et ex qui- bus et quomodo. In such full words and with such iteration XXII. I.] THE SECOND BOOK. 203 doth he inculcate this part. So saith Cicero in great com- mendation of Cato the second, that he had applied himself to philosophy, Non ila disputandi causa, sed iia Vivendi. And although the neglect of our times, wherein few men do hold any consultations touching the reformation of their life (as Seneca excellently saith, Be partibus vita quisque deliberat, de summa nemo), may make this part seem superfluous ; yet I must conclude with that aphor- ism of Hippocrates, Qui gravi morbo correpti do/ores non senliunt, iis mens cegrolat. They need medicine, not only to assuage the disease, but to awake the sense. And if it be said, that the cure of men's minds belongeth to sacred divinity, it is most true : but yet moral philosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble handmaid. For as the Psalm saith, That the eyes of the handmaid look perpetually towards the mistress, and yet no doubt many things are left to the discretion of the hand- maid, to discern of the mistress' will; so ought moral philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines of divinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself (within due limits) many sound and profitable directions. 2. This part therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I cannot but find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to written inquiry: the rather, because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech and action is often conversant ; and such wherein the common talk of men (which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass) is wiser than their books. It is reasonable therefore that we propound it in the more particularity, both for the worthiness, and because we may acquit ourselves for reporting it deficient; which seemeth almost incredible, and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those them- selves that have written. We will therefore enumerate 204 0F THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXII. a. some heads or points thereof, that it may appear the better what it is, and whether it be extant. 3. First therefore in this, as in all things which are practical, we ought to cast up our account, what is" in our power, and what not ; for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by way of application only. The husbandman cannot command, neither the nature of the earth, nor the seasons of the weather ; no more can the physician the constitution of the patient, nor the variety of accidents. So in the culture and cure of the mind of man, two things are without our command ; points of nature, and points of fortune. For to the basis of the one, and the conditions of the other, our work is limited and tied. In these things therefore it is left unto us to proceed by application : Vincenda est omnis fortuna ferendo: and so likewise, Vincenda est omnis Natura ferendo. But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull and neglected suffering, but of a wise and indus- trious suffering, which draweth and contriveth use and ad- vantage out of that which seemeth adverse and contrary; which is that properly which we call accommodating or applying. Now the wisdom of application resteth principally in the exact and distinct knowledge of the precedent state or disposition, unto which we do apply : for we cannot fit a garment, except we first take mea- sure of the body. 4. So then the first article of this knowledge is, to set down sound and true distributions and descriptions of the several characters and tempers of men's natures and dis- positions ; specially having regard to those differences which are most radical in being the fountains and causes XXII. 4-J THE SECOND BOOK. 205 of the rest, or most frequent in concurrence or com- mixture ; wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in passage, the better to describe the mediocrities of virtues, that can satisfy this intention. For if it deserve to be considered, that there are minds which are proportioned to great matters, and others to small (which Aristotle handleth or ought to have handled by the name of magnanimity), doth it not deserve as well to be con- sidered, that there are minds proportioned to intend many matters, and others to few? So that some can divide themselves : others can perchance do exactly well, but it must be but in few things at once : and so there cometh to be a narrowness of mind, as well as a pusillanimity. And again, that some minds are proportioned to that which may be dispatched at once, or within a short return of time ; others to that which begins afar off, and is to be won with length of pursuit : Jam turn tenditque fovetque. So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is commonly also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So further deserved it to be considered by Aristotle, That there is a disposition in conversation {supposing it in things which do in no sort touch or concern a man's self) to soothe and please; and a disposition contrary to contradict and cross: and deserveth it not much better to be considered, Thai there is a disposition, not in conversation or talk, but in matter of more serious nature {and supposing it still in things merely indifferent), to take pleasure in the good of another: and a disposition contrariwise, to take distaste at the good of another ? which is that properly which we call good nature or ill nature, benignity or malignity: and therefore I cannot sufficiently marvel that this part of knowledge, touching the several characters of natures 2o6 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXII. 4. and dispositions, should be omitted, both in morality and policy; considering it is of so great ministry and sup- peditation to them both. A man shall find in the trad- itions of astrology some pretty and apt divisions of men's natures, according to the predominances of the planets; lovers of quiet, lovers of action, lovers of victory, lovers of honour, lovers of pleasure, lovers of arts, lovers of change, and so forth. A man shall find in the wisest sort of these relations which the Italians make touching con- claves, the natures of the several cardinals handsomely and lively painted forth. A man shall meet with in every day's conference the denominations of sensitive, dry, formal, real, humorous, certain, huomo di prima im- pressione, huomo di ultima impressione, and the like: and yet nevertheless this kind of observations wandereth in words, but is not fixed in inquiry. For the distinctions are found (many of them), but we conclude no precepts upon them : wherein our fault is the greater ; because both history, poesy, and daily experience are as goodly fields where these observations grow ; whereof we make a few posies to hold in our hands, but no man bringeth them to the confectionary, that receipts mought be made of them for use of life. 5. Of much like kind are those impressions of nature, which are imposed upon the mind by the sex, by the age, by the region, by health and sickness, by beauty and deformity, and the like, which are inherent and not extern; and again, those which are caused by extern fortune; as sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy, privateness, prosperity, adversity, con- stant fortune, variable fortune, rising per saltum, per gradus, and the like. And therefore we see that Plautus maketh it a wonder to see an old man beneficent. XXII. 5-] THE SECOND BOOK. 207 benignitas hujus ui adolescentuli est. Saint Paul concludeth that severity of discipline was to be used to the Cretans, increpa eos dure, upon the disposition of their country, Creienses semper mendaces, males beslice, venires pigri. Sallust noteth that it is usual with kings to desire con- tradictories : Sed plerumque regies voluntaies, ut vehementes sunt, sic mobiles, sapeque ipsa sibi adversce. Tacitus ob- serveth how rarely raising of the fortune mendeth the disposition : solus Vespasianus mutatus in melius. Pin- darus maketh an observation, that great and sudden fortune for the most part defeateth men qui magnamfeli- citatem concoquere non possunt. So the Psalm showeth it is more easy to keep a measure in the enjoying of for- tune, than in the increase of fortune : Divitice si affluant, nolile cor apponere. These observations and the like I deny not but are touched a little by Aristotle as in passage in his Rhetorics, and are handled in some scattered discourses : but they were never incorporate into moral philosophy, to which they do essentially apper- tain ; as the knowledge of the diversity of grounds and moulds doth to agriculture, and the knowledge of the diversity of complexions and constitutions doth to the physician ; except we mean to follow the indiscretion of empirics, which minister the same medicines to all patients. 6. Another article of this knowledge is the inquiry touching the affections ; for as in medicining of the body, it is in order first to know the divers complexions and constitutions; secondly, the diseases; and lastly, the cures : so in medicining of the mind, after knowledge of the divers characters of men's natures, it followeth in order to know the diseases and infirmities of the mind, which are no other than the perturbations, and distempers 208 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXII. 6. of the affections. For as the ancient politiques in popular estates were wont to compare the people to the sea, and the orators to the winds ; because as the sea would of itself be calm and quiet, if the winds did not move and trouble it ; so the people would be peaceable and tractable, if the seditious orators did not set them in working and agitation : so it may be fitly said, that the mind in the nature thereof would be temperate and stayed, if the affections, as winds, did not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here again I find strange, as. before, that Aristotle should have written divers volumes of Ethics, and never handled the affections, which is the principal subject thereof; and yet in his Rhetorics, where they are considered but collaterally and in a second degree (as they may be moved by speech), he findeth place for them, and handleth them well for the quantity; but where their true place is, he preterm-itteth them. For it is not his disputations about pleasure and pain that can satisfy this inquiry, no more than he that should generally handle the nature of light can be said to handle the nature of colours; for pleasure and pain are to the particular affections, as light is to particular colours. Better tra- vails, I suppose, had the Stoics taken in this argument, as far as I can gather by that which we have at second hand. But yet it is like it was after their manner, rather in subtilty of definitions (which in a subject of this nature are but curiosities), than in active and ample descriptions and observations. So likewise I find some particular writings of an elegant nature, touching some of the af- fections ; as of anger, of comfort upon adverse accidents, of tenderness of countenance, and other. But the poets and writers of histories are the best doctors of this know- ledge ; where we may find painted forth with great life, XXII. 6.] THE SECOND BOOK. 200, how affections are kindled and incited ; and how pacified and refrained ; and how again contained from act and further degree ; how they disclose themselves ; how they work ; how they vary ; how they gather and fortify ; how they are enwrapped one within another; and how they do fight and encounter one with another ; and other the like particularities. Amongst the which this last is of special use in moral and civil matters; how, I say, to set affection against affection, and to master one by another ; even as we use to hunt beast with beast, and fly bird with bird, which otherwise percase we could not so easily recover : upon which foundation is erected that excellent use of pramium and pcena, whereby civil states consist : employing the predominant affections of fear and hope, for the suppressing and bridling the rest. For as in the government of states it is sometimes necessary to bridle one faction with another, so it is in the government within. 7. Now come we to those points which are within our own command, and have force and operation upon the mind, to affect the will and appetite, and to alter man- ners : wherein they ought to have handled custom, exercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation, company, friends, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies : these as they have determinate use in moralities, from these the mind suffereth; and of these are such receipts and regiments compounded and de- scribed, as may serve to recover or preserve the health and good estate of, the mind, as far as pertaineth to human medicine : of which number we will insist upon some one or two, as an example of the rest, because it were too long to prosecute all; and therefore we do resume custom and habit to speak of. p 2IO OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXII. 8. 8. The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent opinion, that of those things which consist by nature, nothing can be changed by custom ; using for example, that if a stone be thrown ten thousand times up, it will not learn to ascend ; and that by often seeing or hearing, we do not learn to see or hear the better. For though this principle be true in things wherein nature is per- emptory (the reason whereof we cannot now stand to discuss), yet it is otherwise in things wherein nature admitteth a latitude. For he mought see that a strait glove will come more easily on with use; and that a wand will by use bend otherwise than it grew ; and that by use of the voice we speak louder and stronger; and that by use of enduring heat or cold, we endure it the better, and the like : which latter sort have a nearer re- semblance unto that subject of manners he handleth, than those instances which he allegeth. But allowing his conclusion, that virtues and vices consist in habit, he ought so much the more to have taught the manner of superinducing that habit: for there be many precepts of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind, as there is of ordering the exercises of the body ; whereof we will recite a few. 9. The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the first, either too high a strain, or too weak: for if too high, in a diffident nature you discourage, in a con- fident nature you breed an opinion of facility, and so a sloth ; and in all natures you breed a further expectation than can hold out, and so an insatisfaction in the end : if too weak, of the other side, you may not look to perform and overcome any great task. 10. Another precept is, to practise all things chiefly at two several times, the one when the mind is best dis- XXII. io.] THE SECOND BOOK. 211 posed, the other when it is worst disposed ; that by the one you may gain a great step, by the other you may work out the knots and stonds of the mind, and make the middle times the more easy and pleasant. ii. Another precept is, that which Aristotle men- tioneth by the way, which is to bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto we are by nature inclined; like unto the rowing against the stream, or making a wand straight by bending him contrary to his natural crookedness. 12. Another precept is, that the mind is brought to anything better, and with more sweetness and happiness, if that whereunto you pretend be not first in the intention, but tanquam alitid agendo, because of the natural hatred of the mind against necessity and constraint. Many other axioms there are touching the managing of exercise and custom; which being so conducted, doth prove indeed another nature; but being governed by chance, doth commonly prove but an ape of nature, and bringeth forth that which is lame and counterfeit. 13. So if we should handle books and studies, and what influence and operation they have upon manners, are there not divers precepts of great caution and direc- tion appertaining thereunto ? Did not one of the fathers in great indignation call poesy vinum das.rn.onum, because it increaseth temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions? Is not the opinion of Aristotle worthy to be regarded, wherein he saith, That young men are no fit auditors of moral philosophy, because they are not settled from the boiling heat of their affections, nor attempered with time and experience ? And doth it not hereof come, that those excellent books and discourses of the ancient writers (whereby they have persuaded unto virtue most effectually, F 2 213 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXTI. 13. by representing her in state and majesty, and popular opinions against virtue in their parasites' coats fit to be scorned and derided), are of so little effect towards honesty of life, because they are not read and revolved by men in their mature and settled years, but confined almost to boys and beginners ? But is it not true also, that much less young men are fit auditors of matters of policy, till they have been throughly seasoned in religion and morality; lest their judgements be corrupted, and made apt to think that there are no true differences of things, but according to utility and fortune, as the verse de- scribes it, Prosperum et felix scelus virtus vocatur ; and again, Ille crucem pretium scehris lulit, hie diadema : which the poets do speak satirically, and in indignation on virtue's behalf; but books of policy do speak it seriously and positively; for so it pleaseth Machiavel to say, That if Cmsar had been overthrown, he would have been more odious than ever was Catiline; as if there had been no difference, but in fortune, between a very fury of lust and blood, and the most excellent spirit (his ambition reserved) of the world ? Again, is there not a caution likewise to be given of the doctrines of moralities themselves (some kinds 'Of them), lest they make men too precise, arrogant, incompatible ; as Cicero saith of Cato, In Marco Catone hac bona qum videmus divina et egregia, ipsius scilote*esse propria; qua nonnunquam requirimus, ea sunt omnia non a natura, sed a magistro? Many other axioms and advices there are touching those proprieties and effects, which studies do infuse and instil into manners. And so like- wise is there touching the use of all those other points, of company, fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited in the beginning in the doctrine of morality. 14. But there is a kind of culture of the mind that XXII. I4-] THE SECOND BOOK. 213 seemeth yet more accurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built upon this ground ; that the minds of all men are at some times in a state more perfect, and at other limes in a state more depraved. The purpose therefore of this practice is to fix and cherish the good hours of the mind, and to obliterate and take forth the evil. The fixing of the good hath been practised by two means, vows or constant resolutions, and observances or ex- ercises ; which are not to be regarded so much in themselves, as because they keep the mind in continual obedience. The obliteration of the evil hath been prac- tised by two means, some kind of redemption or expiation of that which is past, and an inception or account de novo for the time to come. But this part seemeth sacred and religious, and justly; for all good moral philosophy (as was said) is but an handmaid to religion. 15. Wherefore we will conclude with that last point, which is of all other means the most compendious arid summary, and again, the most noble and effectual to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate ; which is, the electing and propounding unto a man's self good and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reason- able sort within his compass to attain. For if these two things be supposed, that a man set before him honest and good ends, and again, that he be resolute, constant, and true unto them; it will follow that he shall mould himself into all virtue at once. And this is indeed like the work of nature ; whereas the other course is like the work of the hand. For as when a carver makes an image, he shapes only that part whereupon he worketh ; as if he be upon the face, that part which shall be the body is but a rude stone still, till such times as he comes to it. But contrariwise when nature makes a flower or 214 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXII. 15. living creature, she formeth rudiments of all the parts at one time. So in obtaining virtue by habit, while a man practiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to forti- tude, nor the like : but when he dedicateth and applieth himself to good ends, look, what virtue soever the pur- suit and passage towards those ends doth commend unto him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to conform himself thereunto. Which state of mind Aristotle doth excellently express himself, that it ought not to be called virtuous, but divine : his words are these : ■ Immanitati autem consent aneum est opponere earn, quaz supra humanita- tem est, heroicam sive divinam viriulem : and a little after, Nam ut ferce neque vitium neque virtus est, sic neque Dei: sed hie quidem status altius quiddam virtute est, ille aliud quiddam a vitio. And therefore we may see what celsi- tude of honour Plinius Secundus attributeth to Trajan in his funeral oration; where he said, That men needed to make no other prayers to the gods, but that they would con- tinue as good lords to them as Trajan had been; as if he had not been only an imitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it. But these, be heathen and profane passages, having but a shadow of that divine state of mind, which religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto, by imprinting upon their souls charity, which is excellently called the bond of perfection, because it comprehendeth and fasteneth all virtues together. And as it is elegantly said by Menander of vain love, which is but a false imitation of divine love, Amor melior Sophista Icevo ad humanam vitam, that love teacheth a man to carry himself better than the sophist or preceptor, which he calleth left-handed, because, with all his rules and preceptions, he cannot form a man so dexteriously, nor with that facility to prize himself and govern himself, as love can XXII. is-j THE SECOND BOOK. 21^ do : so certainly, if a man's mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work him suddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrine of morality can do, which is but a sophist in comparison of the other. Nay further, as Xenophon observed truly, that all other affections, though they raise the mind, yet they do it by distorting and uncomeliness of ecstasies or excesses ; but only love doth exalt the mind, and nevertheless at the same instant doth settle and compose it : so in all other excellencies, though they advance nature, yet they are subject to excess. Only charity admitteth no excess. For so we see, aspiring to- be like God in power, the angels transgressed and fell ; Ascendam, et ero similis allissimo : by aspiring to be like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell ; Erilis sicut Dii, scienks bonum et malum : but by aspiring to a similitude of God in goodness or love, neither man nor angel ever transgressed, or shall transgress. For unto that imitation we are called: Diligite inimicos vestros, benefacite eis qui oderunt vos, el orate pro persequentibus et calumnianlibus vos, ut silis filii Patris veslri qui in ccelis est, qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos, et pluit super justos et injustos. So in the first platform of the divine nature itself, the heathen religion speaketh thus, Optimus Maximus: and the sacred scriptures thus, Miseri- cordia ejus super omnia opera ejus. 1 6. Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral know- ledge, concerning the culture and regiment of the mind ; wherein if any man, considering the parts thereof which I have enumerated, do judge that my labour is but to collect into an art or science- that which hath been pretermitted by others, as matter of common sense and experience, he judgeth well. But as Philocrates sported with Demosthenes, You may not marvel {Athenians) that 2l6 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXII. 16. Demosthenes and I do differ; for he drinketh water, and I drink wine; and like as we read of an ancient parable of the two gates of sleep, Sunt gemmae somni portae : quarum altera fertur Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris : Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto, Sed falsa ad ccelum mittunt insomnia manes : so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a sure maxim in knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor -{of wine) is the more vaporous, and the braver gate (of ivory) sendeth forth the falser dreams. 17. But we have now concluded that general part of human philosophy, which contemplateth man segregate, and as he consisteth of body and spirit. Wherein we may further note, that there, seemeth to be a relation or con- formity between the good of the mind and the good of the body. For as we divided the good of the body into health, beauty, strength, and pleasure; so the good of the mind, inquired in rational and moral knowledges, tendeth to this, to make the mind sound, and without perturbation; beautiful, and graced with decency; and strong and agile for all duties of life. These three, as in the body, so in the mind, seldom meet, and commonly sever. For it is easy to observe, that many have strength of wit and courage, but have neither health from per- turbations, nor any beauty or decency in their doings : some again have an elegancy and fineness of carriage, which have neither soundness of honesty, nor substance of sufficiency : and some again have honest and reformed -minds, that can neither become themselves nor manage business : and sometimes two of them meet, and rarely all three. As for pleasure, we have likewise determined that the mind ought not to be reduced to stupid, but to XXII. iy.] THE SECOND BOOK. 217 retain pleasure ; confined rather in the subject of it, than in the strength and vigour of it. XXIII. i. /TVTL knowledge is conversant about a subject which of all others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to axiom. Nevertheless, as Cato the Censor said, That the Romans were like sheep, for that a man were letter drive a flock of them, than one of them; for in a flock, if you could get hut some few go right, the rest would follow : so in that Fespect moral philosophy is more difficile than policy. Again, moral philosophy propoundeth to itself the framing of internal goodness ; but civil knowledge requireth only an external goodness ; for that as to society sufficeth. And therefore it cometh oft to pass that there be evil times in good governments : for so we find in the holy story, when the kings were good, yet it is added, Sed adhuc populus non direxerat cor suum ad Dominum Deum patrum suorum. Again, states, as great engines, move slowly, and are not so soon put out of frame : for as in Egypt the seven good years sustained the seven bad, so govern- ments for a time well grounded, do bear out errors fol- lowing ; but the resolution of particular persons is more suddenly subverted. These respects do somewhat qualify the extreme difficulty of civil knowledge. 2. This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three summary actions of society; which are con- versation, negotiation, and government. For man seeketh in society comfort, use, and protection : and they be three wisdoms of divers natures, which do often sever : wisdom of the behaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom of state. 3. The wisdom of conversation ought not to be over 21 8 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXIII. 3. much affected, but much less despised; for it hath not only an honour in itself, but an influence also into busi- ness and government. The poet saith, Nee vultu deslrue verba tuo : a man may destroy the force of his words with his countenance : so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero, recommending to his brother affability and easy access; Nil interest habere ostium apertum, vulium clausum; it is nothing won to admit men with an open door, and to receive them with a shut and reserved countenance. So we see Atticus, before the first interview between Csesar and Cicero, the war depending, did seriously advise Cicero touching the composing and ordering of his countenance and gesture. And if the government of the countenance be of such effect, much more is that of the speech, and other carriage appertaining to con- versation ; the true model whereof seemeth to me well ex- pressed by Livy, thought not meant for this purpose : Ne aut arrogans videar, aut obnoxius; quorum alterum est alienee liber talis oblili, alterum sum : the sum of behaviour is to retain a man's own dignity, without intruding upon the liberty of others. On the other side, if behaviour and outward carriage be intended too much, first it may pass into affectation, and then Quid deformius quam scenam in vitam transferre, to act a man's life? But although it proceed not to that extreme, yet it consumeth time, and employeth the mind too much. And therefore as we use to advise young students from company keeping, by saying, A micifures temper is: so certainly the intending of the discretion of behaviour is a great thief of meditation. Again, such as are accomplished in that form of urbanity please themselves in it, and seldom aspire to higher virtue ; whereas those that have defect in it do seek comeliness by reputation ; for where reputation XXIII. 3.] THE SECOND BOOK. 31 9 is, almost everything becometh ; but where that is not, it must be supplied by punlos and compliments. Again, there is no greater impediment of action than an over-curious observance of decency, and the guide of decency, which is time and season. For as Salomon saith, Qui respicit ad vcnlos, non seminal; et qui respicit ad nuies, non meiet; a man must make his opportunity, as oft as find it. To conclude, behaviour seemeth to me as a garment of the mind, and to have the conditions of a garment. For it ought to be made in fashion; it ought not to be too curious ; it ought to be shaped so as to set forth any good making of the mind and hide any deformity; and above all, it ought not to be too strait or restrained for exercise or motion. But this part of civil knowledge hath been elegantly handled, and therefore I cannot report it for deficient. 4. The wisdom touching negotiation or business hath not been hitherto collected into writing, to De negotiis the great derogation of learning, and the gerendis. professors of learning. For from this root springeth chiefly that note or opinion, which by us is expressed in adage to this effect, that there is no great concurrence between learning and wisdom. For of the three wisdoms which we have set down to pertain to civil life, for wisdom of behaviour, it is by learned men for the most part de- spised, as an inferior to virtue and an enemy to meditation; for wisdom of government, they acquit themselves well when they are called to it, but that happeneth to few; but for the wisdom of business, wherein man's life is most conversant, there be no books of it, except some tew scattered advertisements, that have no proportion to the magnitude of this subject. For if books were written o£ this as the other, I doubt not but learned men with mean 220 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXIII. 4. experience, would far excel men of long experience with- out learning, and outshoot them in their own bow. 5. Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this knowledge should be so variable as it falleth not under precept; for it is much less infinite than science of govern- ment, which we see is laboured and in some part re- duced. Of this wisdom it seemeth some of the ancient Romans in the saddest and wisest times were professors ; for Cicero reporteth, that it was then in use for senators that had name and opinion for general wise men, as Coruncanius, Curius, Laelius, and many others, to walk at certain hours in the Place, and to give audience to those that would use their advice ; and that the particular citizens would resort unto them, and consult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the employing of a son, or of a purchase or bargain, or of an accusation, and every other occasion incident to man's life. So as there is a wisdom of counsel and advice even in private causes, arising out of an universal insight into the affairs. of the world ; which is used indeed upon particular cases pro- pounded, but is gathered by general observation of cases of like nature. For so we see in the book which Q. Cicero writeth to his brother, De pelitione consulatus (being the only book of business that I know written by the ancients), although it concerned a particular action then on foot, yet the substance thereof consisteth of many wise and politic axioms, which contain not a temporary, but a perpetual direction in the case of popular elections. But chiefly we may see in those aphorisms which have place amongst divine writings, composed by Salomon the king, of whom the scriptures testify that his heart was as the sands of the sea, encompassing the world and all worldly matters, we see, I say, not a few profound and excellent XXIII. 5-] THE SECOND BOOK. 221 cautions, precepts, positions, extending to much variety of occasions ; whereupon we will stay a while, offering to consideration some number of examples. 6. Sed et cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne accommodes aurem tuam, ne forte audias servum tuum malediceniem libi- Here is commended the provident stay of inquiry of that which we would be loth to find : as it was judged great wisdom in Pompeius Magnus that he burned Sertorius' papers unperused. Vir sapiens, si cum stullo conlenderit, sive irascatur, she rideat, non inveniet requiem. Here is described the great disadvantage which a wise man hath in undertaking a lighter person than himself; which is such an engage- ment as, whether a man turn the matter to jest, or turn it to heat, or howsoever he change copy, he can no ways quit himself well of it. Qui delicate a pueritia nutrit servum. suum, poslea seniiet eum contumacem. Here is signified, that if a man begin too high a pitch in his favours, it doth commonly end in unkindness and unthankfulness. Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo ? coram regibus stabil, nee eril inter ignobiles. Here is observed, that of all virtues for rising to honour, quickness of despatch is the best; for superiors many times love not to have those they employ too deep or too sufficient, but ready and diligent. Vidi cuncios viventes qui ambulant sub sole, cum adoles- cente secundo qui consurgit pro eo. Here is expressed that which was noted by Sylla first, and after him by Tiberius; Plures adorant solem orientem quam occidentem vel meri- dianum. Si spiritus poteslatem habentis ascenderit super le, locum tuum ne dimiseris ; quia cur alio faciet cessare peccata maxima. Here caution is given, that upon displeasure, 222 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXIII. 6. retiring is of all courses the unfittest ; for a man leaveth things at worst, and depriveth himself of means to make them better. Erat civilas parva, el pauci in ea viri: venit contra earn rex magnus, el vallavit earn, instruxitque munitiones per gyrum, el perfecla est obsidio; inventusque est in ea vir pauper el sapiens, et liber avit earn per sapienliam suam; et nullus deinceps recordalus est hominis illius pauperis. Here the corruption of states is set forth, that esteem not virtue or merit longer than they have use of it. Mollis responsio frangit iram. Here is noted that silence or rough answer exasperateth ; but an answer present and temperate pacifieth. Iter pigrorum quasi sepes spinarum. Here is lively represented how laborious sloth proveth in the end : for when things are deferred till the last instant, and nothing prepared beforehand, every step findeth a brier or im- pediment, which catcheth or stoppeth. Melior est finis oralionis quam principium. Here is taxed the vanity of formal speakers, that study more about prefaces and inducements, than upon the conclusions and issues of speech. Qui cognoscit in judicio faciem, non benefacit; isle el pro buccella panis deseret verilatem. Here is noted, that a -judge were better be a briber than a respecter of per- sons ; for a corrupt judge offendeth not so lightly as a facile. Vir pauper calumnians pauperes similis est imbri vehem- enli, in quo paratur fames. Here is expressed the ex- tremity of necessitous extortions, figured in the ancient fable of the full and the hungry horseleech. Fons turbatus pede, et vena corrupta, est Justus cadens coram impio. Here is noted, that one judicial and XXIII. 6.] THE SECOND BOOK. 223 exemplar iniquity in the face of the world doth trouble the fountains of justice more than many particular injuries passed over by connivance. Qui subtrahit aliquid a pair e el a maire, el dicit hoc non esse peccaium, pariiceps est homicidii. Here is noted, that whereas men in wronging their best friends use to ex- tenuate their fault, as if they mought presume or be bold upon them, it doth contrariwise indeed aggravate their fault, and turneth it from injury to impiety. Noli esse amicus homini iracundo, nee ambulato cum homine furioso. Here caution is given, that in the election of our friends we do principally avoid those which are impatient, as those that will espouse us to many factions and quarrels. Qui conlurbat domum suam, possidebit ventum. Here is noted, that in domestical separations and breaches men do promise to themselves quieting of their mind and con- tentment ; but still they are deceived of their expectation, and it turneth to wind. Filius sapiens Icetificat patrem: filius vero siultus mcestitia est mairi sua. Here is distinguished, that fathers have most comfort of the good proof of their sons; but mothers have most discomfort of their ill proof, because women have little discerning of virtue, but of fortune. Qui celat delictum, qucerit amiciiiam; sed qui alter o ser- mone repetit, separat fcederatos. Here caution is given, that reconcilement is better managed by an amnesty, and passing over that which is past, than by apologies and excusations. In omni opere bono erit abundantia ; ubi autem verba sunt plurima, ibi frequenter egeslas. Here is noted, that words and discourse aboundeth most where there is idleness and want. 224 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXIII. 6. Primus in sua causa Justus ; sed venit altera pars, et inquiret in euni. Here is observed, that in all causes the first tale possesseth much; in sort, that the pre- judice thereby wrought will be hardly removed, except some abuse or falsity in the information be detected. Verba bilinguis quasi simplicia, et ipsa perveniunt ad interiora ventris. Here is distinguished, that flattery and insinuation, which seemeth set and artificial, sink- eth not far ; but that entereth deep which hath show of nature, liberty, and simplicity. Qui erudit deriserem, ipse sibi injuriam facii ; et qui arguit impium, sibi maculam generat. Here caution is given how we tender reprehension to arrogant and scorn- ful natures, whose manner is to esteem it for contumely, and accordingly to return it. Da sapienti occasionem, et addetur ei sapientia. Here is distinguished the wisdom brought into habit, and that which is but verbal and swimming only in conceit ; for the one upon the occasion presented is quickened and redoubled, the other is amazed and confused. Quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium, sic cor da hominum manifesta sunt prudentibus. Here the mind of a wise man is compared to a glass, wherein the images of all diversity of natures and customs are represented ; from which representation proceedeth that application, Qui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus erit. 7. Thus have I stayed somewhat longer upon these sentences politic of Salomon than is agreeable to the proportion of an example; led with a desire to give authority to this part of knowledge, which I noted as deficient, by so excellent a precedent; and have also attended them with brief observations, such as to my understanding offer no violence to the sense, though I XXIII. 7.J THE SECOND BOOK. 225 know they may be applied to a more divine use: but it is allowed, even in divinity, that some interpretations, yea, and some writings, have more of the eagle than others; but taking them as instructions for life, they mought have received large discourse, if I would have broken them and illustrated them by deducements and examples. 8. Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews, but it is generally to be found in the wisdom of the more ancient times ; that as men found out any observation that they thought was good for life, they would gather it and express it in parable or aphorism or fable. But for fables, they were vicegerents and supplies where examples failed: now that the times abound with his- tory, the aim is better when the mark is alive. And therefore the form of writing which of all others is fittest for this variable argument of negotiation and occasions is that which Machiavel chose wisely and aptly for govern- ment ; namely, discourse upon histories or examples. For knowledge drawn freshly and in our view out of particu- lars, knoweth the way best to particulars again. And it hath much greater life for practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example, than when the example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no point of order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance. For when the example is the ground, being set down in an history at large, it is set down with all circumstances, which may sometimes control the discourse thereupon made, and sometimes supply it, as a very pattern for action; whereas the examples alleged for the discourse's sake are cited succinctly, and without particularity, and carry a servile aspect towards the discourse which they are brought in to make good. Q 226 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXIII. 9. 9. But this difference is not amiss to be remembered, that as history of times is the best ground for discourse of government, such as Machiavel handleth, so histories of lives is the most proper for discourse of business, because it is more conversant in private actions. Nay, there is a ground of discourse for this purpose fitter than them both, which is discourse upon letters, such as are wise and weighty, as many are of Cicero ad Atticum, and others. For letters have a great and more particular representation of business than either chronicles or lives. Thus have we spoken both of the matter and form of this part of civil knowledge, touching negotiation, which we note to be deficient. 10. But yet there is another part of this part, which differeth as much from that whereof we have spoken as sapere and sibi sapere, the one moving as it were to the circumference, the other to the centre. For there is a wisdom of counsel, and again there is a wisdom of pressing a man's own fortune; and they do some- times meet, and often sever. For many are wise in their own ways that are weak for government or coun- sels; like ants, which is a wise creature for itself, but very hurtful for the garden. This wisdom the Romans did take much knowledge of: Nam pol sapiens (saith the comical poet) fingit fortunam sibi; and it grew to an adage, Faber quisque fortunes propria; and Livy attri- buted it to Cato the first, In hoc viro tanta vis animi et ingenii inerat, til quocunque loco natus essei sibi ipse fortunam facturus videretur, 11. This conceit or position, if it be too much declared and professed, hath been thought a thing impolitic and unlucky, as was observed in Timotheus the Athenian, who, having done many great services to the estate in XXIII. ii.] THE SECOND BOOK. 22"J his government, and giving an account thereof to the people as the manner was, did conclude every particu- lar with this clause, And in this fortune had no part. And it came so to pass, that he never prospered in any thing he took in hand afterward. For this is too high and too arrogant, savouring of that which Ezekiel saith of Pharaoh, Diets, Fluvius est metis el ego feci memet ipsum : or of that which another prophet speaketh, that men offer sacrifices to their nets and snares; and that which the poet expresseth, Dextra mihi Deus, et telum quod missile libro, Nunc adsintl For these confidences were ever unhallowed, and un- blessed: and therefore those that were great politiques indeed ever ascribed their successes to their felicity, and not to their skill or virtue. For so Sylla surnamed him- self Felix, not Magnus. So Csesar said to the master of the ship, CcBsarem portas et fortunam ejus. 12. But yet nevertheless these positions, Faber quis~ que for tuna sua : Sapiens dominabitur astris : Invia virtuli nulla est via, and the like, being taken and used as spurs to industry, and not as stirrups to insolency, rather for resolution than for the presumption or outward de- claration, have been ever thought sound and good; and are no question imprinted in the greatest minds, who are so sensible of this opinion, as they can scarce con- tain it within. As we see in Augustus Csesar (who was rather diverse from his uncle than inferior in virtue), how when he died he desired his friends about him to give him a plaudite, as if he were conscient to himself that he had played his part well upon the stage. This part of knowledge we do report also as deficient : not but that it is practised too much, but it hath not been reduced to Q 2 238 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXIII. 12. writing. And therefore lest it should seem to any that Faberfor- it is not comprehensible by axiom, it is re- tun Audader calumniare, semper aliquid harel : so, except it 'be in a ridiculous degree of deformity, Audader te vendita, semper aliquid hard. For it will stick with the more ignorant and inferior sort of men, though men of wisdom and rank do smile at it and despise it; and yet the authority won with many doth countervail the disdain of a few. But if it be carried with decency and govern- ment, as with a natural, pleasant, and ingenious fashion ; or at times when it is mixed with some peril and unsafety (as in military persons) ; or at times when others are most envied ; or with easy and careless passage to it and from it, without dwelling too long, or being too serious; or with an equal freedom of taxing a man's self, as well as gracing himself; or by occasion of repelling or put- ting down others' injury or insolency; it doth greatly add to reputation: and surely not a few solid natures that want this ventosity and cannot sail in the height XXIII. 3o.] THE SECOND BOOK. 237 of the winds, are not without some prejudice and disad- vantage by their moderation. 31. But for these flourishes and enhancements of virtue, as they are not perchance unnecessary, so it is at least necessary that virtue be not disvalued and imbased under the just price ; which is done in three manners : by of- fering and obtruding a man's self; wherein men think he is rewarded, when he is accepted; by doing too much, which will not give that which is well done leave to settle, and in the end induceth satiety ; and by finding too soon the fruit of a man's virtue, in commendation, applause, honour, favour ; wherein if a man be pleased with a little, let him hear what is truly said; Cave ne insuelus rebus majoribus videaris, si hac ie res parva sicuti magna delectat. 32. But the covering of defects is of no less importance than the valuing of good parts ; which may be done like- wise in three manners, by caution, by colour, and by con- fidence. Caution is when men do ingeniously and dis- creetly avoid to be put into those things for which they are not proper : whereas contrariwise bold and unquiet spirits will thrust themselves into matters without differ- ence, and so publish and proclaim all their wants. Colour is when men make a way for themselves to have' a con- struction made of their faults or wants, as proceeding from a better cause or intended for some other purpose. For of the one it is well said, Saepe latet vitium proximitate boni, and therefore whatsoever want a man hath, he must see that he pretend the virtue that shadoweth it; as if he be dull, he must affect gravity; if a coward, mildness; and so the rest. For the second, a man must frame some probable cause why he should not do his best, and why he should dissemble his abilities; and for that purpose 338 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXIII. 32, must use to dissemble those abilities which are notorious in him, to give colour that his true wants are but in- dustries and dissimulations. For confidence, it is the last but the surest remedy ; namely, to depress and seem to despise whatsoever a man cannot attain; observing the good principle of the merchants, who endeavour to raise the price of their own commodities, and to beat down the price of others. But there is a confidence that passeth this other; which is to face out a man's own defects, in seeming to conceive that he is best in those things wherein he is failing ; and, to help that again, to seem on the other side that he hath least opinion of himself in those things wherein he is best : like as we shall see it commonly in poets, that if they show their verses, and you except to any, they will say That that line cost them more labour than any of the rest; and presently will seem to disable and suspect rather some other line, which they know well enough to be the best in the number. But above all, in this righting and helping of a man's self in his own carriage, he must take heed he show not himself dis- mantled and exposed to scorn and injury, by too much dulceness, goodness, and facility of nature; but show some sparkles of liberty, spirit, and edge. Which kind of fortified carriage, with a ready rescussing of a man's self from scorns, is sometimes of necessity imposed upon men by somewhat in their person or fortune ; but it ever succeedeth with good felicity. 33. Another precept of this knowledge is by all possible endeavour to frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to occasion; for nothing hindereth men's fortunes so much as this : Idem manebat, neque idem decebat, men are where they were, when occasions turn : and therefore to Cato, whom Livy maketh such an architect of fortune, XXIII. 33-] THE SECOND BOOK. 239 he addeth that he had versatile ingenium. And thereof it cometh that these grave solemn wits, which must be like themselves and cannot make departures, have more dignity than felicity. But in some it is nature to be somewhat viscous and inwrapped, and not easy to turn. In some it is a conceit that is almost a nature, which is, that men can hardly make themselves believe that they ought to change their course, when they have found good by it in former experience. For Machiavel noted wisely, how Fabius Maximus would have been temporizing still, according to his old bias, when the nature of the war was altered and required hot pursuit In some other it is want of point and penetration in their judgement, that they do not discern when things have a period, but come in too late after the occasion; as Demosthenes compareth the people of Athens to country fellows, when they play in a fence school, that if they have a blow, then they remove their weapon to that ward, and not before. In some other it is a lothness to leese labours passed, and a conceit that they can bring about occasions to their ply ; and yet in the end, when they see no other remedy, then they come to it with disadvantage; as Tarquinius, that gave for the third part of Sibylla's books the treble price, when he mought at first have had all three for the simple. But from whatsoever root or cause this restiveness of mind proceedeth, it is a thing most prejudicial; and nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of our mind concentric and voluble with the wheels of fortune. 34. Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity with that we last spake of, but with differ- ence, is that which is well expressed, Fads accede deisque, that men do not only turn with the occasions, but also run with the occasions, and not strain their credit or 240 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXIII. 34. strength to over-hard or extreme points; but choose in their actions that which is most passable : for this will preserve men from foil, not occupy them too much about one matter, win opinion of moderation, please the most, and make a show of a perpetual felicity in all they under- take ; which cannot but mightily increase reputation. 35. Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some repugnancy with the former two, but not as I understand it ; and it is that which Demosthenes uttereth in high terms ; Et quemadmodum receplum est, ut exercitum ducat imperator, sic et a cordatis viris res ipsce ducenda ; ut qua ipsis videntur, ea gerantur, et non ipsi eventus per- sequi coganlur. For if we observe we shall find two differing kinds of sufficiency in managing of business: some can make use of occasions aptly and dexterously, but plot little ; some can urge and pursue their own plots well, but cannot accommodate nor take in; either of which is very unperfect without the other. 36. Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good mediocrity in the declaring, or not declaring a man's self: for although depth of secrecy, and making way (qualis est via navis in mari, which the French calleth sourdes mentis, when men set things in work without opening themselves at all), be sometimes both prosperous and admirable ; yet many times dissimulatio error es parit, qui dissimulatorem ipsum illaqueant. And therefore we see the greatest politiques have in a natural and free manner professed their desires, rather than been reserved and disguised in them. For so we see that Lucius Sylla made a kind of profession, that he wished all men happy or unhappy, as they stood his friends or enemies. So Caesar, when he went first into Gaul, made no scruple to profess That he had rather he first in a village than second at Rome. XXIII. 36.] THE SECOND BOOK. ' 341 So again, as soon as he had begun the war, we see what Cicero saith of him, Alter (meaning of Caesar) turn recusat, sed quodammodo posiulat, ut («/ est) sic appelletur tyrannus. So we may see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus Csesar, in his very entrance into affairs, when he was a darling of the senate, yet in his harangues to the people would swear, Ila pareniis honor es consequi liceat (which was no less than the tyranny), save that, to help it, he would stretch forth his hand towards a statua of Caesar's that was erected in the place : and men laughed, and wondered, and said, Is it possible ? or, Did you ever hear the like ? and yet thought he meant no hurt ; he did it so handsomely and ingenuously. And all these were prosperous: whereas Pompey, who tended to the same ends, but in a more dark and dissembling manner, as Tacitus saith of him, Occultior non melior, wherein Sal- lust concurreth, Ore probo, animo inverecundo, made it his design, by infinite secret engines, to cast the state into an absolute anarchy and confusion, that the state mought cast itself into his arms for necessity and protection, and so the sovereign power be put upon him, and he never seen in it : and when he had brought it (as he thought) to that point, when he was chosen consul alone, as never any was, yet he could make no great matter of it, because men understood him not ; but was fain in the end to go the beaten track of getting arms into his hands, by colour of the doubt of Caesar's designs : so tedious, casual, and . unfortunate are these deep dissimulations : whereof it seemeth Tacitus made this judgement, that they were a cunning of an inferior form in regard of true policy; attributing the one to Augustus, the other to Tiberius ; where, speaking of Livia, he saith, El cum artibus marili simulatione filii bene composila : for surely the continual R 243 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXIII. 36. habit of dissimulation is but a weak and sluggish cunning, and not greatly politic. 37. Another precept of this architecture of fortune is to accustom our minds to judge of the proportion or value of things, as they conduce and are material to our particular ends : and that to do substantially, and not superficially. For we shall find the logical part (as I may term it) of some men's minds good, but the mathematical part erroneous; that is, they can well judge of conse- quences, but not of proportions and comparison, pre- ferring things of show and sense before things of sub- stance and effect. So some fall in love with access to princes, others with popular fame and applause, sup- posing they are things of great purchase, when in many cases they are but matters of envy, peril, and impediment. So some measure things according to the labour and difficulty or assiduity which are spent about them; and think, if they be ever moving, that they must needs advance and proceed; as Csesar saith in a despising manner of Cato the second, when he describeth how laborious and indefatigable he was to no great purpose, Hcbc omnia magna studio agebal. So in most things men are ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest means to be best, when it should be the fittest. 38. As for the true marshalling of men's pursuits towards their fortune, as they are more or less material, I hold them to stand thus. First the amendment of their own minds. For the remove of the impediments of the mind will sooner clear the passages of fortune, than the obtaining fortune will remove the impediments of the mind. In the second place I set down wealth and means ; which I know most men would have placed first, because of the general use which it beareth towards all XXIII. 38.] THE SECOND BOOK. 343 variety of occasions. But that opinion I may condemn with like reason as Machiavel doth that other, that moneys were the sinews of the wars ; whereas (saith he) the true sinews of the wars are the sinews of men's arms, that is, a valiant, populous, and military nation : and he voucheth aptly the authority of Solon, who, when Croesus showed him his treasury of gold, said to him, that if another came that had better iron, he would be master of his gold. In like manner it may be truly affirmed, that it is not moneys that are the sinews of fortune, but it is the sinews and steel of men's minds, wit, courage, audacity, resolution, temper, industry, and the like. In the third place I set down reputation, because of the peremptory tides and currents it hath ; which, if they be not taken in their due time, are seldom recovered, it being extreme hard to play an after game of reputation. And lastly I place honour, which is more easily won by any of the other three, much more by all, than any of them can be purchased by honour. To conclude this pre- cept, as there is order and priority in matter, so is there in time, the preposterous placing whereof is one of the commonest errors : while men fly to their ends when they should intend their beginnings, and do not take things in order of time as they come on, but marshal them accord- ing to greatness and not according to instance; not observing the good precept, Quod nunc inslat agamus. 39. Another precept of this knowledge is not to em- brace any matters which do occupy too great a quantity of time, but to have that sounding in a man's ears, Sed fugit interea fugit irrepardbile iempus : and that is the cause why those which take their course of rising by pro- fessions of burden, as lawyers, orators, painful divines, and the like, are not commonly so politic for their own R 2 344 0F THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXIII.39. fortune, otherwise than in their ordinary way, because they want time to learn particulars, to wait occasions, and to devise plots. 40. Another precept of this knowledge is to imitate nature which doth nothing in vain ; which surely a man may do if he do well interlace his business, and bend not his mind too much upon that which he principally in- tendeth. For a man ought in every particular action so to carry the motions of his mind, and so to have one thing under another, as if he cannot have that he seeketh in the best degree, yet to have it in a second, or so in a third ; and if he can have no part of that which he purposed, yet to turn the use of it to somewhat else ; and if he cannot make anything of it for the present, yet to make it as a seed of somewhat in time to come ; and if he can contrive no effect or substance from it, yet to win some good opinion by it, or the like. So that he should exact an account of himself of every action, to reap somewhat, and not to stand amazed and confused if he fail of that he chiefly meant : for nothing is more impolitic than to mind actions wholly one by one. For he that doth so leeseth infinite occasions which intervene, and are many times more proper and propitious for some- what that he shall need afterwards, than for that which he urgeth for the present; and therefore men must be per- fect in that rule, Hcec oportet facere, et ilia non omittere. 41. Another precept of this knowledge is, not to engage a man's self peremptorily in any thing, though it seem not liable to accident ; but ever to have a window to fly out at, or a way to retire : following the wisdom in the ancient fable of the two frogs, which consulted when their plash was dry whither they should go ; and the one moved to go down into a pit, because it was not likely the water XXIII. 41.] THE SECOND BOOK. would dry there ; but the other answered, True, but if it N do, how shall we get out again ? 42. Another precept of this knowledge is that ancient precept of Bias, construed not to any point of perfidious- ness, but only to caution and moderation, Et ama tan- quam inimicus futurus et odi tanquam amaturus. For it utterly betrayeth all utility for men to embark themselves too far into unfortunate friendships, troublesome spleens, and childish and humorous envies or emulations. 43. But I continue this beyond the measure of an example; led, because I would not have such know- ledges, which I note as deficient, to be thought things imaginative or in the air, or an observation or two much made of, but things of bulk and mass, whereof an end is hardlier made than a beginning. It must be likewise con- ceived, that in these points which I mention and set down, they are far from complete tractates of them, but only as small pieces for patterns. And lastly, no man I suppose will think that I mean fortunes are not obtained without all this ado ; for I know they come tumbling into some men's laps ; and a number obtain good fortunes by dili- gence in a plain way, little intermeddling, and keeping themselves from gross errors. 44. But as Cicero, when he setteth down an idea of a perfect orator, doth not mean that every pleader should be such; and so likewise, when a prince or a courtier hath been described by such as have handled those sub- jects, the mould hath used to be made according to the perfection of the art, and not according to common prac- tice : so I understand it, that it ought to be done in the description of a politic man, I mean politic for his own Fortune. 45. But it must be remembered all this while, that the 2,4-6 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXIII. 45. precepts which we have set down are of that kind which may be counted and called Bonce Aries. As for evil arts, if a man would set down for himself that principle of Machiavel, Thai a man seek not to attain virtue itself, but the appearance only thereof ; because the credit of virtue is a help, but the use of it is cumber : or that other of his principles, That he presuppose, that men are not fitly to be wrought otherwise but by fear ; and therefore that he seek to have every man obnoxious, low, and in strait, which the Italians call seminar spine, to sow thorns: or that other principle, contained in the verse which Cicero citeth, Cadant amici, dummodo inimici intercidant, as the triumvirs, which sold every one to other the lives of their friends for the deaths of their enemies : or that other protestation of L. Catilina, to set on fire and trouble states, to the end to fish in droumy waters, and to unwrap their fortunes, Ego si quid in forlunis meis excitatum sit incendium, id non aqua sed ruina reslinguam : or that other principle of Lysander, That children are to be deceived with comfits, and men with oaths : and the like evil and corrupt posi- tions, whereof (as in all things) there are more in number than of the good : certainly with these dispensations from the laws of charity and integrity, the pressing of a man's fortune may be more hasty and compendious. But it is in life as it is in ways, the shortest way is commonly the foulest, and surely the fairer way is not much about. 46. But men, if they be in their own power, and do bear and sustain themselves, and be not carried away with a whirlwind or tempest of ambition, ought in the pursuit of their own fortune to set before their eyes not only that general map of the world, That all things are vanity and vexation of spirit, but many other more par- ticular cards and directions: chiefly that, that being XXIII. 46.] THE SECOND BOOK. without well-being is a curse, and the greater being the greater curse; and that all virtue is most rewarded, and all wickedness most punished in itself: according as the poet saith excellently: Quae vobis, quse digna, viri, pro laudibus istis PrsBmia posse rear solvi 1 pulcherrima primum Dii moresque dabunt vestri. And so of the contrary. And secondly they ought to look up to the eternal providence and divine judgement, which often subverteth the wisdom of evil plots and imaginations, according to that scripture, He hath con- ceived mischief, and shall bring forth a vain thing. And although men should refrain themselves from injury and evif arts, yet this incessant and Sabbathless pursuit of a man's fortune leaveth not tribute which we owe to God of our time; who (we see) demandeth a tenth of our substance, and a seventh, which is more strict, of our time : and it is to small purpose to have an erected face towards heaven, and a perpetual groveling spirit upon earth, eating dust as doth the serpent, Alque affigil humo divinm particulam aura. And if any man flatter himself that he will employ his fortune well, though he should obtain it ill, as was said concerning Augustus Caesar, and after of Septimius Severus, That either they should never have been born, or else they should never have died, they did so much mischief in the pursuit and ascent of their greatness, and so much good when they were established; yet these compensations and satisfactions are good to be used, but never good to be purposed. And lastly, it is not amiss for men in their race toward their fortune, to cool themselves a little with that conceit which is elegantly expressed by the Emperor Charles the ' Fifth, in his instructions to the king his son, That fortune 248 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXIII. 46. hath somewhat of the nature of a woman, that if she be too much wooed she is the farther off. But this last is but a remedy for those whose tastes are corrupted : let men rather build upon that foundation which is as a comer- stone of divinity and philosophy, wherein they join close, namely that same Primum qucerite. For divinity saith, Primum queer He regnum Dei, etista omnia adjicienlur vobis: and philosophy saith, Primum qucerite bona animi; ccetera aut aderunt, aut non oberunt. And although the human foundation hath somewhat of the sands, as we see in M. Brutus, when he brake forth into that speech, Te colui (Virtus) ut rem ; ast tu nomen inane es ; yet the divine foundation is upon the rock. But this may serve for a taste of that knowledge which I noted as deficient. 47. Concerning government, it is a part of knowledge secret and retired in both these respects in which things are deemed secret; for some things are secret because they are hard to know, and some because they are not fit to utter. We see all governments are obscure and invisible : Totamque infusa per artus Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet. Such is the description of governments. We see the government of God over the world is hidden, insomuch as it seemeth to participate of much irregularity and con- fusion. The government of the soul in moving the body is inward and profound, and the passages thereof hardly to be reduced to demonstration. Again, the wisdom of antiquity (the shadows whereof are in the poets) in the description of torments and pains, next unto the crime of rebellion, which was the giants' offence, doth detest the offence of futility, as in Sisyphus and Tantalus. But this XXIII. 47-J THE SECOND BOOK. 249 was meant of particulars: nevertheless even unto the general rules and discourses of policy and government there is due a reverent and reserved handling:. 48. But contrariwise in the governors towards the governed, all things ought as far as the frailty of man permitteth to be manifest and revealed. For so it is expressed in the scriptures touching the government of God, that this globe, which seemeth to us a dark and shady body, is in the view of God as crystal : Et in con- spectu sedis tanquam mare vitreum simile crystallo. So unto princes and states, and specially towards wise senates and councils, the natures and dispositions of the people, their conditions and necessities, their factions and com- binations, their animosities and discontents, ought to be, in regard of the variety of their intelligences, the wisdom of their observations, and the height of their station where they keep sentinel, in great part clear and transparent. Wherefore, considering that I write to a king that is a master of this science, and is so well assisted, I think it decent to pass over this part in silence, as willing to obtain the certificate which one of the ancient philo- sophers aspired unto; who being silent, when others contended to make demonstration of their abilities by speech, desired it mought be certified for his part, Thai there was one that knew how to hold his peace. 49. Notwithstanding, for the more public part of government, which is laws, I think good to note only one deficience ; which is, that all those which have written of laws, have written either as philosophers or as lawyers, and none as statesmen. As for the philosophers, they make imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths, and their discourses are as the stars, which give little light because they are so high. For the lawyers, they write 350 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXIII. 49. according to the states where they live what is received law, and not what ought to be law: for the wisdom of a lawmaker is one, and of a lawyer is another. For there are in nature certain fountains of justice, whence all civil laws are derived but as streams: and like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from the soils through which they run, so do civil laws vary according to the regions and governments where they are planted, though they proceed from the same fountains. Again, the wisdom of a lawmaker consisteth not only in a platform of justice, but in the application thereof; taking into consideration by what means laws may be made certain, and what are the causes and remedies of the doubtfulness and incer- tainty of law; by what means laws may be made apt and easy to be executed, and what are the impediments and remedies in the execution of laws; what influence laws touching private right of meum and fuum have into the public state, and how they may be made apt and agree- able ; how laws are to be penned and delivered, whether in texts or in acts, brief or large, with preambles, or with- out ; how they are to be pruned and reformed from time to time, and what is the best means to keep them from being too vast in volumes, or too full of multiplicity and crossness; how they are to be expounded, when upon causes emergent and judicially discussed, and when upon responses and conferences touching general points or questions; how they are to be pressed, rigorously or tenderly; how they, are to be mitigated by equity and good conscience, and whether discretion and strict law are to be mingled in the same courts, or kept apart in several courts; again, how the practice, profession, and erudition of law is to be censured and governed; and many other points touching the administration, and (as I XXIII. 49.] THE SECOND BOOK. 25 1 may term it) animation of laws. Upon which I insist the less, because I purpose (if God give me De p-uden- leave), having begun a work of this nature in tia legidat- aphorisms, to propound it hereafter, noting ° ria < «»«. de it in the mean time for deficient. fontibm juris. 50. And for your Majesty's laws of England, I could say much of their dignity, and somewhat of their defect ; but they cannot but excel the civil laws in fitness for the government : for the civil law was non hos quasiium munus in usus ; it was not made for the countries which it gpverneth. Hereof I cease to speak, because I will not intermingle matter of action with matter of general learning. XXIV. '"THUS have I concluded this portion of learning touching civil knowledge ; and with civil knowledge have concluded human philosophy; and with human philosophy, philosophy in general. And being now at some pause, looking back into that I have passed through, this writing seemeth to me (si nunquam fallit imago), as far as a man can judge of his own work, not much better than that noise or sound which musicians make while they are in tuning their instruments: which is nothing pleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why the music is sweeter afterwards. So have I been content to tune the instruments of the Muses, that they may play that have better hands. And surely, when I set before me the condition of these times, in which learning hath made her third visitation or circuit in all the qualities thereof; as the excellency and vivacity of the wits of this age; the noble helps and lights which we have by the travails of ancient writers ; the art of printing, which com- municateth books to men of all fortunes; the openness %$% OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXIV. of the world by navigation, which hath disclosed multi- tudes of experiments, and a mass of natural history ; the leisure wherewith these times abound, not employing men so generally in civil business, as the states of Grecia did. in respect of their popularity, and the state of Rome, in respect of the greatness of their monarchy; the present disposition of these times at this instant to peace; the consumption of all that ever can be said in controversies of religion, which have so much diverted men from other sciences ; the perfection of your Majesty's learning, which as a phoenix may call whole vollies of wits to follow you ; and the inseparable propriety of time, which is ever more and more to disclose truth ; I cannot but be raised to this persuasion that this third period of time will far surpass that of the Grecian and Roman learning : only if men will know their own strength, and their own weakness both ; and take, one from the other, light of invention, and not fire of contradiction ; and esteem of the inquisition of truth as of an enterprise, and not as of a quality or orna- ment; and employ wit and magnificence to things of worth and excellency, and not to things vulgar and of popular estimation. As for my labours, if any man shall please himself or others in the reprehension of them, thej shall make that ancient and patient request, Verbera, set audi; let men reprehend them, so they observe anc weigh them. For the appeal is lawful (though it may be it shall not be needful) from the first cogitations of men to their second, and from the nearer times to the times further off. Now let us come to that learning, which both the former times were not so blessed as to know, sacred and inspired divinity, the Sabbath and port of all men's labours and peregrinations. XXV. i.] THE SECOND BOOK. 2 XXV. i. ""THE prerogative of God extendeth as well to the reason as to the will of man ; so that as we are to obey his law, though we find a re- luctation in our will, so we are to believe his word, though we find a reluctation in our reason. For if we believe only that which is agreeable to our sense, we give consent to the matter, and not to the author ; which is no more than we would do towards a suspected and discredited witness ; but that faith which was accounted to Abraham for righteousness was of such a point as whereat Sarah laughed, who therein was an image of natural reason. 2. Howbeit (if we will truly consider of it) more worthy it is to believe than to know as we now know. For in knowledge man's mind suffereth from sense ; but in belief it suffereth from spirit, such one as it holdeth for more authorised than itself, and so suffereth from the worthier agent. Otherwise it is of the state of man glorified ; for then faith shall cease, and we shall know as we are known. 3. Wherefore we conclude that sacred theology (which in our idiom we call divinity) is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God, and not upon the light of nature: for it is written, Cceli enarrant gloriam Dei; but it is not written, Cceli enarrant voluntalem Dei: but of that it is said, Ad legem et testimonium : si non fecerint secundum verbum istud &c. This holdeth not only in those points of faith which concern the great mysteries of the Deity, of the creation, of the redemption, but likewise those which concern the law moral truly interpreted: Love your enemies : do good to them that hate you : Be like to your heavenly Father, that suffereth his rain to fall upon the just and unjust. To this it ought to be applauded, Nee vox hominem sonat: it is a voice beyond the light of nature. 354 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXV. 3. So we see the heathen poets, when they fall upon a libertine passion, do still expostulate with laws and moral- ities, as if they were opposite and malignant to nature ; Et quod natura remittit, invida jura negant. So said Dendamis the Indian unto Alexander's messengers, that he had heard somewhat of Pythagoras, and some other of the wise men of Grecia, and that he held them for excellent men : but that they had a fault, which was that they had in too great reverence and veneration a thing they called law and manners. So it must be confessed, that a great part of the law moral is of that perfec- tion, whereunto the light of nature cannot aspire : how then is it that man is said to have, by the light and law of nature, some notions and conceits of virtue and vice, justice and wrong, good and evil? Thus, because the light of nature is used in two several senses ; the one, that which springeth from reason, sense, induction, argu- ment, according to the laws of heaven and earth; the other, that which is imprinted upon the spirit of man by an inward instinct, according to the law of conscience, which is a sparkle of the purity of his first estate; in which latter sense only he is participant of some light and discerning touching the perfection of the moral law : but how ? sufficient to check the vice, but not to inform the duty. So then the doctrine of religion, as well moral as mystical, is not to be attained but by inspiration and revelation from God. 4. The use notwithstanding of reason in spiritual things, and the latitude thereof, is very great and general : for it is not for nothing that the apostle calleth religion our reasonable service of God ; insomuch as the very cere- monies and figures of the old law were full of reason and signification, much more than the ceremonies of idolatry XXV. 4-] THE SECOND BOOK. 255 and magic, that are full of non-significants and surd cha- racters. But most specially the Christian faith, as in all things so in this, deserveth to be highly magnified ; hold- ing and preserving the golden mediocrity in this point between the law of the heathen and the law of Mahumet, which have embraced the two extremes. For the religion of the heathen had no constant belief or confession, but left all to the liberty of argument ; and the religion of Mahumet on the other side interdicteth argument alto- gether: the one having the very face of error, and the other of imposture : whereas the Faith doth both admit and reject disputation with difference. 5. The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts : the former, in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed; the other, in the in- ferring and deriving of doctrine and direction thereupon. The former extendeth to the mysteries themselves; but how ? by way of illustration, and not by way of argument. The latter consisteth indeed of probation and argument. In the former we see God vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity, in the expressing of his mysteries in sort as may be sensible unto us; and doth grift his revelations and holy doctrine upon the notions of our reason, and applieth his inspirations to open our understanding, as the form of the key to the ward of the lock. For the latter, there is allowed us an use of reason and argument, secondary and respective, although not original and absolute. For after the articles and principles of religion are placed and ex- empted from examination of reason, it is then permitted unto us to make derivations and inferences from and according to the analogy of them, for our better direction. In nature this holdeth not; for both the principles are examinable by induction, though not by a medium or 256 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXV. 5. syllogism ; and besides, those principles or first positions have no discordance with that reason which draweth down and deduceth the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth not in religion alone, but in many knowledges, both of greater and smaller nature, namely, wherein there are not only posila but placita; for in such there can be no use of absolute reason. We see it familiarly in games of wit, as chess, or the like. The draughts and first laws of the game are positive, but how ? merely ad placiium, and not examinable by reason; but then how to direct our play thereupon with best advantage to win the game, is arti- ficial and rational. So in human laws there be many grounds and maxims which are placita juris, positive upon authority, and not upon reason, and therefore not to be disputed : but what is most just, not absolutely but rela- tively, and according to those maxims, that affordeth a long field of disputation. Such therefore is that second- ary reason, which hath place in divinity, which is grounded upon the placets of God. 6. Here therefore I note this deficience, that there hath De usu lent- not been, to my understanding, sufficiently imo rationU inquired and handled the true limits and use humana in of reason in spiritual things, as a kind of divtms. divine dialectic : which for that it is not done, it seemeth to me a thing usual, by pretext of true con- ceiving that which is revealed, to search and mine into that which is not revealed ; and by pretext of enucleating inferences and contradictories, to examine that which is positive. The one sort falling into the error of Nicodemus, demanding to have things made more sensible than it pleaseth God to reveal them, Quomodo possit homo nasci cum sit senex r 1 The other sort into the error of the dis- ciples, which were scandalized at a show of contradiction, XXV. 6.] THE SECOND BOOK. 257 Quid est hoc quod dicit nobis? Modicum, etnon videbitis me; et iterum, modicum, et videbitis vie, &c. 7. Upon this I have insisted the more, in regard of the great and blessed use thereof; for this point well laboured and denned of would in my judgement be an opiate to stay and bridle not only the vanity of curious speculations, wherewith the schools labour, but the fury of controversies, wherewith the church laboureth. For it cannot but open men's eyes, to see that many contro- versies do merely pertain to that which is either not re- vealed or positive; and that many others do grow upon weak and obscure inferences or derivations : which latter sort, if men would revive the blessed style of that great doctor of the Gentiles, would be carried thus, ego, non dominus; and again, secundum consilium meum, in opinions and counsels, and not in positions and oppositions. But men are now over-ready to usurp the style, non ego, sed dominus ; and not so only, but to bind it with the thunder and denunciation of curses and anathemas, to the terror of those which have not sufficiently learned out of Salomon, that The causeless curse shall not come. 8. Divinity hath two principal parts; the matter in- formed or revealed, and the nature of the information or revelation : and with the latter we will begin, because it hath most coherence with that which we have now last handled. The nature of the information consisteth of three branches ; the limits of the information, the suffici- ency of the information, and the acquiring or obtaining the information. Unto the limits of the information be- long these considerations ; how far forth particular per- sons continue to be inspired ; how far forth the Church is inspired; and how far forth reason may be used: the last point whereof I have noted as deficient. Unto the s 2^8 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXV. 8. sufficiency of the information belong two considerations; what points of religion are fundamental, and what perfec- tive, being matter of further building and perfection upon one and the same foundation ; and again, how the grada- tions of light according to the dispensation of times are material to the sufficiency of belief. 9. Here again I may rather give it in advice than note Degradibus it as deficient, that the points fundamental; unitatis in and the points of further perfection only, amtateDei. 0U ght to be with piety and wisdom distin- guished: a subject tending to much like end as that I noted before ; for as that other were likely to abate the number of controversies, so this is like to abate the heat of many of them. We see Moses when he saw the Israelite and the Egyptian fight, he did not say, Why strive you? but drew his sword and slew the Egyptian: but when he saw the two Israelites fight, he said, You are brethren, why strive you? If the point of doctrine be an Egyptian, it must be slain by the sword of the spirit, and not reconciled ; but if it be an Israelite, though in the wrong, then, Why strive you ? We see of the fundamental points, our Saviour penneth the league thus, He that is not with us is against us ; but of points not fundamental, thus, He that is not against us is with us. So we see the coat of our Saviour was entire without seam, and so is the doctrine of the scriptures in itself; but the garment of the church was of divers colours and yet not divided. We see the chaff may and ought to be severed from the corn in the ear, but the tares may not be pulled up from the corn in the field. So as it is a thing of great use well to define what, and of what latitude those points are, which do make men merely aliens and disincorporate from the Church of God. XXV. io.] THE SECOND BOOK. 259 10. For the obtaining of the information, it resteth upon the true and sound interpretation of the scriptures, which are the fountains of the water of life. The interpretations of the scriptures are of two sorts ; methodical, and solute or at large. For this divine water, which excelleth so much that of Jacob's well, is drawn forth much in the same kind as natural water useth to be out of wells and fountains; either it is first forced up into a cistern, and from thence fetched and derived for use; or else it is drawn and received in buckets and vessels immediately where it springeth. The former sort whereof, though it seem to be the more ready, yet in my judgement is more subject to corrupt. This is that method which hath exhibited unto us the scholastical divinity; where- by divinity hath been reduced into an art, as into a cistern, and the streams of doctrine or positions fetched and derived from thence. 11. In this men have sought three things, a summary brevity, a compacted strength, and a complete perfection ; whereof the two first they fail to find, and the last they ought not to seek. For as to brevity, we see in all sum- mary methods, while men purpose to abridge, they give cause to dilate. For the sum or abridgement by con- traction becometh obscure; the obscurity requireth- ex- position, and the exposition is deduced into large com- mentaries, or into common places and titles, which grow to be more vast than the original writings, whence the sum was at first extracted. So we see the volumes of the schoolmen are greater much than the first writings of the fathers, whence the Master of the Sentences made his sum or collection. So in like manner the volumes of the modern doctors of the civil law exceed those of the an- cient jurisconsults, of which Tribonian compiled the digest. s 2 260 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXV. if. So as this course of sums and commentaries is that which doth infallibly make the body of sciences more immense in quantity, and more base in substance. 12. And for strength, it is true that knowledges reduced into exact methods have a show of strength, in that each part seemeth to support and sustain the other; but this is more satisfactory than substantial : like unto buildings which stand by architecture and compaction, which are more subject to ruin than those that are built more strong in their several parts, though less compacted. But it is plain that the more you recede from your grounds, the weaker do you conclude : and as in nature, the more you remove yourself from particulars, the greater peril of error you do incur : so much more in divinity, the more you recede from the scriptures by inferences and conse- quences, the more weak and dilute are your positions. 13. And as for perfection or completeness in divinity, it is not to be sought ; which makes this course of arti- ficial divinity the more suspect. For he that will reduce a knowledge into an art, will make it round and uniform : but in divinity many things must be left abrupt, and con- cluded with this : O altitudo sapientia et scientics Dei! quam incomprehemibilia sunt udicia ejus, et non investiga- biles vice ejus. So again the apostle saith, Ex parte sci- mus : and to have the form of a total, where there is but matter for a part, cannot be without supplies by sup- position and presumption. And therefore I conclude, that the true use of these sums and methods hath place in institutions or introductions preparatory unto knowledge : but in them, or by deducement from them, to handle the main body and substance of a knowledge, is in all sciences prejudicial, and in divinity dangerous. 14. As to the interpretation of the scriptures solute XXV. I4-] THE SECOND BOOK. 20V and at large, there have been divers kinds introduced and devised; some of them rather curious and unsafe than sober and warranted. Notwithstanding, thus much must be confessed, that the scriptures, being given by inspiration and not by human reason, do differ from all other books in the author : which by consequence doth draw on some difference to be used by the expositor. For the inditer of them did know four things which no man attains to know; which are, the mysteries of the kingdom of glory, the perfection of the laws of nature, the secrets of the heart of man, and the future succession of all ages. For as to the first it is said, He that presseth into the light, shall be oppressed of the glory. And again, No man shall see my face and live. To the second, When he prepared the heavens I was present, when by law and compass he inclosed the deep. To the third, Neither was it needful that any should bear witness to him of man, for he knew well what was in man. And to the last, From the beginning are known to the Lord all his works. 15. From the former two of these have been drawn certain senses and expositions of scriptures, which had need be contained within the bounds of sobriety; the one anagogical, and the other philosophical. But as to the former, man is not to prevent his time: Videmus nunc per speculum in cenigmaie, tunc autem facie adfaciem; wherein nevertheless there seemeth to be a liberty granted, as far forth as the polishing of this glass, or some moder- ate explication of this aenigma. But to press too far into it, cannot but cause a dissolution and overthrow of the spirit of man. For in the body there are three degrees of that we receive into it, aliment, medicine, and poison : whereof aliment is that which the nature of man can perfectly alter and overcome ; medicine is that 36a OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXV. 15. which is partly converted by nature, and partly converteth nature ; and poison is that which worketh wholly upon nature, without that, that nature can in any part work upon it. So in the mind, whatsoever knowledge reason cannot at all work upon and convert is a mere intoxica- tion, and endangereth a dissolution of the mind and understanding. 16. But for the latter, it hath been extremely set on foot of late time by the school of Paracelsus, and some others, that have pretended to find the truth of all natural philosophy in the scriptures ; scandalizing and traducing all other philosophy as heathenish and profane. But there is no such enmity between God's word and his works; neither do they give honour to the scriptures, as they suppose, but much imbase them. For to ,seek heaven and earth in the word of God, whereof it is said, Heaven and ear Ih shall pass, but my word shall not pass, is to seek temporary things amongst eternal : and as to seek divi- nity in philosophy is to seek the living amongst the dead, so to seek philosophy in divinity is to seek the dead amongst the living : neither are the pots or lavers, whose , place was in the outward part of the temple, to be sought in the holiest place of all, where the ark of the testimony was seated. And again, the scope or purpose of the spirit of God is not to express matters of nature in the scrip- tures, otherwise than in passage, and for application to man's capacity and to matters moral or divine. And it is a true rule, Auctoris aliud agentis parva audoriias. For it were a strange conclusion, if a man should use a simili- tude for ornament or illustration sake, borrowed from nature or history according to vulgar conceit, as of a basilisk, an unicorn, a centaur, a Briareus, an hydra, or the like, that therefore he must needs be thought to affirm / XXV. i6.] THE SECOND BOOK. a6l the matter thereof positively to be true. To conclude therefore these two interpretations, the one by reduction or aenigmatical, the other philosophical or physical, which have been received and pursued in imitation of the rab- bins and cabalists, are to be confined with a noli altum sapere, sed time. 17. But the two latter points, known to God and un- known to man, touching the secrets of the heart and the successions of time, doth make a just and sound difference between the manner of the exposition of the scriptures and all other books. For it is an excellent observation which hath been made upon the answers of our Saviour Christ to many of the questions which were propounded to him, how that they are impertinent to the state of the question demanded; the reason whereof is, because not being like man, which knows man's thoughts by his words, but knowing man's thoughts immediately, he never an- swered their words, but their thoughts. Much in the like manner it is with the scriptures, which being written to the thoughts of men, and to the succession of all ages, with a foresight of all heresies, contradictions, differing estates of the church, yea and particularly of the elect, are not to be interpreted only according to the latitude of the proper sense of the place, and respectively towards that present occasion whereupon the words were uttered, or in precise congruity or contexture with the words before or after, or in contemplation of the principal scope of the place ; but have in themselves, not only totally or collectively, but distributively in clauses and words, in- finite springs and streams of doctrine to water the church in every part. And therefore as the literal sense is, as it were, the main stream or river ; so the moral sense chiefly, and sometimes the allegorical or typical, are they whereof 254 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXV. if. the church hath most use: not that I wish men to be bold in allegories, or indulgent or light in allusions; but that I do much condemn that interpretation of the scripture which is only after the manner as men use to interpret a profane book. 1 8. In this part touching the exposition of the scriptures, I can report no deficience ; but by way of remembrance this I will add. In perusing books of divinity, I find many books of controversies, and many of commonplaces and treatises, a mass of positive divinity, as it is made an art : a number of sermons and lectures, and many prolix commentaries upon the scriptures, with har- monies and concordances. But that form of writing in divinity which in my judgement is of all others most rich and precious, is positive divinity, collected upon particular texts of scriptures in brief observations ; not dilated into commonplaces, not chasing after controversies, not re- duced into method of art ; a thing abounding in sermons, which will vanish, but defective in books which will re- main, and a thing wherein this age excelleth. For I am persuaded, and I may speak it with an dbsii invidia verho, and no ways in derogation of antiquity, but as in a good emulation between the vine and the olive, that if the choice and best of those observations upon texts of scriptures, which have been made dispersedly in sermons within this your Majesty's island of Brittany by the space Emanations ° f theSe { ° Tt y y eafS and m0re ( leavin g out the scripture- largeness of exhortations and applications rum in doc- thereupon) had been set down in a con- trinas posit- tinuance, it had been the best work in di- ' vinity which had been written since the Apostles' times. 19. The matter informed by divinity is of two kinds; XXV. 19-] THE SECOND BOOK. 25V matter of belief and truth of opinion, and matter of ser- vice and adoration ; which is also judged and directed by the former : the one being as the internal soul of religion, and the other as the external body thereof. And there- fore the heathen religion was not only a worship of idols, but the whole religion was an idol in itself; for it had no soul, that is, no certainty of belief or confession : as a man may well think, considering the chief doctors of their church were the poets : and the reason was, because the heathen gods were no jealous gods, but were glad to be admitted into part, as they had reason. Neither did they respect the pureness of heart, so they mought have external honour and rites. 20. But out of these two do result and issue four main branches of divinity; faith, manners, liturgy, and govern- ment. Faith containeth the doctrine of the nature of God, of the attributes of God, and of the works of God. The nature of God consisteth of three persons in unity of Godhead. The attributes of God are either common to the Deity, or respective to the persons. The works of God summary are two, that of the creation and that of the redemption; and both these works, as -in total they appertain to the unity of the Godhead, so in their parts they refer to the three persons : that of the creation, in the mass of the matter, to the Father; in the disposition of the form, to the Son; and in the continuance and conservation of the being, to the Holy Spirit. So that of the redemption, in the election and counsel, to the Father ; in the whole act and consummation, to the Son ; and in the application, to the Holy Spirit; for by the Holy Ghost was Christ conceived in flesh, and by the Holy Ghost are the elect regenerate in spirit. This work likewise we consider either effectually, in the elect; or 266 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXV. 20. privately, in the reprobate ; or according to appearance, in the visible church. 21. For manners, the doctrine thereof is contained in the law, which discloseth sin. The law itself is divided, according to the edition thereof, into the law of nature, the law moral, and the law positive; and according to the style, into negative and affirmative, prohibitions and com- mandments. Sin, in the matter and subject thereof, is divided according to the commandments; in the form thereof, it referreth to the three persons in Deity : sins of infirmity against the Father, whose more special attribute is power ; sins of ignorance against the Son, whose attri- bute is wisdom; and sins of malice against the. Holy Ghost, whose attribute is grace or love. In the motions of it, it either moveth to the right hand or to the left; either to blind devotion, or to profane and libertine trans- gression ; either in imposing restraint where God granteth liberty, or in taking liberty where God imposeth restraint. In the degrees and progress of it, it divideth itself into thought, word, or act. And in this part I commend much the deducing of the law of God to cases of conscience; for that I take indeed to be a breaking, and not exhibiting whole of the bread of life. But that which quickeneth both these doctrines of faith and manners, is the elevation and consent of the heart ; whereunto appertain books of exhortation, holy meditation, Christian resolution, and the like. 22. For the liturgy or service, it consisteth of the re- ciprocal acts between God and man ; which, on the part of God, are the preaching of the word, and the sacra- ments, which are seals to the covenant, or as the visible word ; and on the part of man, invocation of the name of God; and under the law, sacrifices; which were as XXV. 22.] THE SECOND BOOK. 267 visible prayers or confessions: but now the adoration being in spiritu el veriiale, -there remaineth only viluli labiorum,; although the use of holy vows of thankful- ness and retribution may be accounted also as sealed petitions. 23. And for the government of the church, it con- sisteth of the patrimony of the church, the franchises of the church, and the offices and jurisdictions of the church, and the laws of the church directing the whole ; all which have two considerations, the one in themselves, the other , how they stand compatible and agreeable to the civil estate. 24. This matter of divinity is handled either in form of instruction of truth, or in form of confutation of false- hood. The declinations from religion, besides the priva- tive, which is atheism and the branches thereof, are three ; heresies, idolatry, and witchcraft : heresies, when we serve the true God with a false worship ; idolatry, when we wor- ship false gods, supposing them to be true ; and witch- craft, when we adore false gods, knowing them to be wicked and false. For so your. Majesty doth excellently well observe, that witchcraft is the height of idolatry. And yet we see though these be true degrees, Samuel teacheth us that they are all of a nature, when there is once a receding from the word of God; for so he saith, Quasi peccatum ariolandi est repugnare, el quasi scelus idolo- latritz nolle acquiescere. 25. These things I have passed over so briefly because I can report no deficience concerning them : for I can find no space or ground that lieth vacant and unsown in the matter of divinity : so diligent have men been, either in sowing of good seed, or in sowing of tares. 268 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. '"THUS have I made as it were a small globe of the "*- intellectual world, as truly and faithfully as I could discover; with a note and description of those parts which seem to me not constantly occupate, or not well converted by the labour of man. In which, if I have in any point receded from that which is commonly received, it hath been with a purpose of proceeding in melius, and not in aliud; a mind of amendment and proficience, and not of change and difference. For I could not be true and constant to the argument I handle, if I were not willing to go beyond others; but yet not more willing than to have others go beyond me again: which may the better appear by this, that I have propounded my opinions naked and unarmed, not seeking to preoccupate the liberty of men's judgements by confutations. For in anything which is well set down, I am in good hope, that if the first reading move an objection, the second reading will make an answer. And in those things wherein I have erred, I am sure I have not prejudiced the right by litigious arguments ; which certainly have this contrary effect and operation, that they add authority to error, and destroy the authority of that which is well invented. For question is an honour and preferment to falsehood, as on the other side it is a repulse to truth. But the errors I claim and challenge to myself as mine own. The good, if any be, is due tanquam adeps sacrificii, to be incensed to the honour, first of the Divine Majesty, and next of your - Majesty, to whom on earth I am most bounden. NOTES. BOOK I. P. I. [i] See Lev. xxii. 18; Num. xxviii. 2, 3. [3] upon ordinary observance : ex rituali adiu. [7, 8] according . . . employments : Omitted in Lat. [14-17] and ... admiration : Omitted in Lat. [15] Prov. xxv. 3. P. 2. [8] Plato, Phaedo, i. 72; Meno, ii. 81 ; Comp. Theset. i. 166, 191; Arist. de Memor. 2; Anal. Pr. ii. 21 ; Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 24. 57. [10] notions: motions in ed. 1605, but corrected in the Errata to that edition. [17] 1 Kings iv. 29. [17, 18] For the construction see note on p. 20, 1. 26. [23] 'should' used for 'would.' [26] Tac. Ann. xiii. 3. Augusto prompta ac profiuens quceque deceret principem eloquentiq. fuit. [32,33] all this ... subject : Lat. nescio quid servile olet, nee sui juris est. P- 3- ['5] perfection : profection in ed. 1605 ; corrected in Errata. [20-27] Lat. PercurreU qui voluerit imperatorum- et regum seriem, et juxta mecum sentiet, omitting the particular dynasties. P. 4. [6] Hermes : Hermes Trismegistus, fabled to be an Egyptian priest, philosopher, and king. The author of the works ascribed to him was probably a Neoplatonist of the second or third century. Ficinus (Argum. in Merc. Tris. Pimandr.) says, Trismegistum vera termaximum nuncuparunt, quoniam et pkilosopkus maximus, et sacerdos •maximus, et rex maximus exiitit. [19] the former : the Lat. adds quae levior est, neque tamen ullo modo preetermittenda. In his letter to Toby Matthew, Bacon speaks of the first part of the Advancement ' but as a page to the latter.' [22] the latter: Lat. posterior vero pars (quod caput rei est). ■P- 5- [7] ignorance severally disguised : Lat. ignorantia non sub uno schemate. [17] 1 Cor. viii. 1. [18] Eccl. xii. 12. i[2o] Eccl. i. 18. [22] Col. ii. 8. [25] Among the causes of atheism Bacon enumerates, ' lastly, learned times, specially with peace, and prosperity : for troubles and adversities doe more bow mens mindes to religion.' Ess. xvi. p. 66. [32] Mr. Ellis gives the following note on the corresponding passage in the De Augmentis: 'This reference to the imposition of names in Paradise in illustration of natural knowledge, is common in the writings of the schoolmen. Thus S. Thomas Aquinas in discussing 270 NOTES. the question "utnim primus homo habuerit scientiam omnem," after stating objections alleged against the affirmative opinion, thus com- mences his refutation of them. "Sed contra est quod ipse imposuit •nomina animalibus, ut dicitur Gen. 2. Nomina autem debent naturis rerum congruere ; Ergo Adam scivit naturas omnium animalium, et pari ratione habuit omnium aliorum scientiam."' Comp. also the treatise Of the Interpretation of Nature (Works, iii. 219, ed. Spedding and Ellis) : ' For behold it was not that pure light of natural knowledge, whereby man in paradise was able to give unto every living creature a name according to his propriety, which gave occasion to the fall; but it was an aspiring desire to attain to that part of moral knowledge which defineth of good and evil, whereby to dispute God's command- ments and not to depend upon the revelation of his will, which was the original temptation.' [33] Gen. ii. 19, 20. P. 6. [11] Eccl. i. 8. [13 &c.j Comp. Of the Interpretation of Nature, p. 220. [18, 31] Eccl. iii. n. P. 7. [6] he doth in another place rule over: Lat. satis dare alibi dacel. [7] Prov. xx. 27. [12 4c] Comp. Of the Interpretation of Nature (Works, vol. iii. p. 222). [19] 1 Cor. viii. 1. [2 1] 1 Cor. xiii. 1. [31] Col. ii. 8. P. 8. [12] Eccl. ii. 13, 14. [15] roundeth about: Lat. oberrat. [20] Comp. Plato, Theeet. i. p. 155 d; Arist. Metaph. i. 2. Hesiod (Theog. 780) makes Iris the daughter of Thaumas. [26] Heraclitus the pro- ' found : Lat. Heraclitus tile obscurus. [2 7] avy^ £)jp^ ^ V X^ oovxi) aoiponarq was a corruption of 0617 ipvxi) aapaTarrj : gijp-fj having been in the first instance a gloss upon ait] and afterwards adopted into the text ; a change which necessitated the further alteration of airj to 011717 to make sense. Stobseus, ed. Gaisford, v. 120. The proverb is again quoted by Bacon, Ess. xxvi. p. 112:' Heraclitus saith well, in one of his Eenigmaes ; Dry light is ever the best. And certaine it is, that the light, that a, man receiveth, by counsell from another, is drier, and purer, then that which com- meth from his owne understanding, and ' iudgement ; which is ever infused and drenched in his affections and customes.' Comp. Apoph. 268; Adv. of Learning, p. 149, 1. 3. [31] — p. 9. [11] Compare the corresponding passage Of the Interpretation of Nature, p. 218. P. 9. [5, 6] broken knowledge : ' contemplation broken off, or losing itself.' Of the Interpretation of Nature, p. 218. [61 one of Plato's school: Philo Judseus, De Somniis, p. 577 E. (ed. Turnebus, Franc. 1691). [7] Comp. Apoph. 120. [14] A reference to the fable of Icarus. [15 &c] Comp. Of the Interpretation of Nature, p. 219- [20] Job xiii. 7, 9. [26 &c] Comp. Ess. xvi. p. 64 : ' It is true, that a little philosophy inclineth mans minde to Atheisme; but depth in BOOK I. 27 1* philosophy, bringeth mens mindes about to Religion: for while the minde of man, looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them, and goe no further: but when it beholdeth, the chaine of them, confederate and linked together, it must needs flie to providence, and deilie.' P. 10. [5] Horn. II. viii. 19. Comp. also p. 109, 1. 24. Plato, Theset. i. 153 c, [25]. too incompatible and differing: Lat. nimis extravagantia. [31] Plutarch, Cato, 22 ; Pliny, N. H. vii. 31. P. 11. [15] Virgil, JEn. vi. 852. [16] Plato, Apol. Socr. i. 19, 24 &c. Xenpphon, Mem. i. 1. 1. [28] Comp. Ess. lviii. pp. 237, 238: 'In the youth of a state, armes doe flourish: in the middle age of a state, learning ; and then both of them together for a time : in the declining age of a state, mechanicall arts and merchandize.' P. 12. [9] a greater: So ed. 1640; 'a' is omitted in edd. 1605, 1629, 1633. [14-20] Comp. Ess. lviii. pp. 237, 238, quoted above. [16] about an age : i. e. about the same age. According to Aristotle (Rhet. ii. 14. § 4) the body is strongest from thirty to thirty-five, the mind at forty-nine. [25] a few pleasing receipts : Lat. pauca quadam medica- tnenta qu 6] Comp. Macrob. in Somn. Scip. i. 12. [7-14] Comp. Of the Interpretation of Nature, p. 222: ' And knowledge that tendeth to profit or profession or glory is but as the golden ball thrown before Ata- lanta, which while she goeth aside and stoopeth to take up she hindereth ) the race.' [14] Ovid, Metam x. 667. [16] Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 4. 10. ' [23-26] Comp. Of the Interpretation of Nature, p. 222. [29] have: hath in edd. 1605, 1629, 1633. [32] Prov. xxvii. 6. BOOK I. 2'g P. 44. [12] arch-type: Arch-tipe in ed. 1605; Arch-type edd. 1629, 1633. [lb.] first platform: exemplari. Comp. Ess. xlix. p. 194: 'So I have made a platforme of a princely garden, partly by precept, partly by drawing, not a modell, but some generall lines of it.' [1 8] Comp. Prov. viii. 22-31. [33] Gen. i. 1. P. 45. [4]. Hooker, Eccl. Pol. i. 4. § 1, 2. [5] Dionysius, De Cselesti Hierarchia, 6, 7, 8, 9. A work erroneously ascribed to Dionysius the Areopagite. The epithet ' supposed' shows that Bacon believed it to be spurious. The Latin has merely qua Dionysii Areopagita nomine evul- galur. Thomas Heywood, in his Hierarchie of the Blessed Angels (1635), divides them into Seraphim, Cherubim, Thrones, Dominations, Vertues, Powers, and Principals. See also Milton, Par. Lost, v. 601, 772,840. [15] Gen. i. 3. [22] Gen. ii. 3. [32] Gen. ii. 19. P. 46. [1] Comp. pp. 5, 6. [7] In a note on the corresponding pas- sage of the De Augmentis Mr. Ellis quotes from S. Thomas Aquinas, Summ. Theol. Sec. Secund. q. 163. a. 2: Primus homo peccavit princip- aliter appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad scietitiam boni et mali, sicut serpens ei suggessit, Tit scilicet per virtutem propria natures determinaret sibi quid esset bonum et quid malum ad agendum. [13] Gen. iv. 2. [23] Gen. iv. 2r, 22. [25] Gen. xi. [30] Acts vii. 22. Comp. Of the Interpreta- tion of Nature, p. 219. [32] Plato, Tim. iii. 22. Comp. Nov. Org. i. 71; Apoph. 223. P. 47. [11] Lev. xiii. 12, 13. [14-18] Among the Regales Aphorismi or maxims of King James I. edited by W. Stratton, 1650, is the follow- ing, evidently borrowed from this passage: *As it is a principle of nature, that putrifaction is more contagious before maturity than after; so it is a position of Moral Philosophie, that men abandoned to vice, do not so much corrupt manners, as those that are half good and half evill ' (p. 165). In De Augm. iii. i, Bacon gives as a rule in physics, Putredo serpens magis contagiosa est quam matura. [24] Job xxvi. 7. [28] Job xxvi. 13, [30] Job xxxviii. 31. P. 48. [1] Job ix. 9. [5] Job x. 10. [7] Job xxviii. 1,2. [1 2] 1 Kings iii. 5, &c. [17] verdure: verdor edd. 1605, 1629, 1633, which Mr. Spedding retains as another form of the word. It probably only repre- sents the current pronunciation. The corresponding passage of the treatise Of the Interpretation of Nature, p. 220, has ' all that is green.' [18] the moss upon the wall : The English version of 1 Kings iv. 33 has hyssop. Bacon followed the rendering of Junius and Tremellius. [19] Nov. Org. ii. 30. [20-24] Nay, the same Salomon the king, although he excelled . . . yet he maketh &c. : The same loose construction ;as before, pp. 20. 1. 27; 39. 11. n, 33, 33. [26] Prov. xxv. 2. Comp. the corresponding passage Of the Interpretation of Nature, p. 220. P. 49. [4] Luke ii. 46. [8] Acts ii. 1. [18] who was only learned: i. e. the only learned man among the Apostles. Lat. qui inter Apostolos 280 NOTES. solus literalus fuit. [22] fathers: Father in ed. 1605. [24] Amm. Marc, xxii. 10. 7; xxv. 4. 19. Comp. Gibbon, ch. 23 ; Juliani Epist. xlii. The Lat. adds c- [3] Aurelius Victor, Epit. xli. 13. Quoted again in a Letter rom Bacon to King James, Of a Digest to be made of the Laws of England (Cabala, p. 75). [11] policing: the regulating and governing if a town. Edd. 1605, 1629 have pollicing, ed. 1633 pollishing. ' He ;ave also multitudes of charters and liberties for the comfort of corpora- ions and companies in decay.' Bacon, Offer of a Digest of the Laws of England. [16] Antoninus : the three old editions have Antonius. [19] Dio Cassius, lxx. 3. Comp. Juliani Caesares. ' If his wit be not apt to listinguish or find differences, let him study the schoole-men ; for they re cymini sectores.' Bacon, Ess. 1. p. 206. [31] Acts xxvi. 28. V. 57. [2] Lucius Ceionius Commodus, son of iElius Caesar, and fercus Annius Verus, were adopted by Antoninus Pius, and on his leath in 161 succeeded him with the titles of L. Aurelius Verus and A. Aurelius Antoninus. [4] Spartianus, Vit. jElii Veri, c. 5 : idem Warlialem epigrammaticum poetam Virgilvum suum dixisse. [6] Lucius ferns died of apoplexy a.d. 169: Marcus Aurelius survived till a.d. 180. 10] Juliani Csesares, xviii. [22] Lampridius, Vita Severi, 5-10. [31] lie world : ' the ' omitted in ed. 1605. P. 58. [1-5] Compare Bacon's Letter to the Lord Chancellor, touching he history of Britain, where he speaks of Queen Elizabeth in nearly the 28a NOTES. same words. [3] lives: lynes in ed. 1605. [6] rare: grace in some copies of 1605 ; others read great. In the Errata it is corrected to rare, and this is the reading of edd. 1629 and 1633. [12] her: So in some copies of ed. 1605; others read the. [30] to the purpose: that is, as regards the purpose &c. P. 59. [12] Plutarch, Alex. 8. § I. [19] Achilles: Plut. Alex. 15. § 3. , [22] Pliny, H. N. vii. 30 ; Plutarch, Alex. 26. § 1. [25] Plutarch, Alex. 7- § 4- P. 60. [1-10] And herein . . . praises : Omitted in the Latin. [14], Plutarch, Alex. 14. § 2., [17] Seneca.De Benef. v. 4. § 4. [23] Plutarch, De Adulatore et Amico, 25 ; Alex. 22. § 2. [27] The Latin adds, cum tarn indigentia quam redundantia natures, per ilia duo designata, mortis sint tanquam arrhabones. [31] Seneca, Ep. Mor. vi. 7. § 12. Plutarch, Alex. 28. § 1. [32] Horn. II. v. 340; Ix&P °'° s '"h Tc M a /""tfyeam BiOLffl. P. 61. [2] Plutarch, Alex. 74. § 2. [6, 7] that was the matter: We should say, that was the point. Lat. hoc ipsum animos eis dedit. [15] Plutarch, Alex. 53. § 2. Quoted again by Bacon in his Letter to the^ King on a Digest of the Laws of England (Cabala, p. 76). [24, 25] Lat. Callisthenes negotium in se recepit, idque tarn acerbe tamque aculeate pmstitit &"c. [29] translation : Bacon uses this word as the rendering of metaphor, borrowing it from the Lat. translatio as employed by Cicero. [30] Plutarch, Apoph. Reg. et Imp. Alex. 17. Mr. Ellis has pointed out that Bacon, following Erasmus, misunderstood the story. Holland translates it : ' When some there were who much praised unto him the plainenesse and homelie simplicitie of Antipater, saying that he lived an austere and hard life, without all superfluities and delicious pleasures whatsoever: Well (quoth he) Antipater weares in outward shew his apparell with a plaine white welt or guard, but he is within all purple (I warrant you) and as red as scarlet (' AvriiraTpos XevKoirapvtpos tan, tcL 5' Ivbov 6\on6p(pvpos)' P. 62. [3-9] Plutarch, Alex. 31. § 5. Quoted again in Ess. xxix. p. 120. [13] Plutarch, Alex. 47. § 3. [19] according to the model of their own mind : Comp. Hor. Epist. i. 7. 98, Metiri se quemque sua modulo ac pede verum est. [21] Plutarch, Alex. 29. § 3. [25] Perdiccas, according to Plutarch, was the only one of Alexander's friends who asked the question. Plutarch, Alex. 15. § 2. [30] Plutarch, Cffls. 11. § 1. Crassus became surety to Csesar's creditors for 880 talents, before he was allowed to take the praetorship in Spain. [32] This story of the Duke of Guise had been heard by Bacon when he was in France in 1576. In his Apology concerning the Earl of Essex, he says, in reference to Essex's offer of a piece of land, ' My answer, I remember, was, that for my fortune it was no great matter ; but that his lordship's offer made ■me to call to mind what was wont to be said, when I was in France, of BOOK I. 283 the duke of Guise, that he was the greatest usurer in France, because lie had turned all his estate into obligations; meaning that he had left him- self nothing, but only had bound numbers of persons to him.' P. 63. [4-8] To conclude. .. prince : Omitted in the Latin. [14] his company : that is, his companions, the company he kept. The Latin has ex familiaribus. [20] the real passages: This expression, which is omitted in the translation, either means the actual occurrences or the truthful descriptions of them. [21] lively images : We should say 'vivid pictures.' [25] Suetonius, Jul. Cses. 56; Quintil. i. 7. § 34. This work, De Analogia, in two books, is again referred to by Bacon, De Augm. vi. 1, in which passage he is doubtful whether it treated of what we should call philosophical Grammar, and not rather of elegance and purity of language. It is quoted by Cicero (Brutus, 72) under the title of ' De ratione Latine loquendi,' and in the first book Csesar is said to have laid down as a maxim verborum delectum originem esse eloquentia. Aulus Gellius (i. 10) quotes another precept from the same book that an unusual word is to be avoided like a rock (ut tanquam scopulum sic fvgias insolens verbum). Again (ix. 14) be appeals to the Second Book of the De Analogia as an authority for the forms hujus die and hujus specie, and to the work generally (xix. 8), without mentioning the book, for the opinion that harena, ccelum, trititum could only be used in the singular, and that quadriga could only occur in the plural. Compare also iv. 16. [28-30] This passage is slightly modified in the Latin translation, which is thus rendered into English by Wats : ' that words, which are the images of things, might accord with the things them- selves, and not stand to the arbitrement of the vulgar.' [32] Suet. Jul. Cses. 40. P. 64. [3] Anti-Cato: According to Suetonius (Jul. Cass. 56) this was in two books. It was written in answer to Cicero's panegyric on Cato, and is quoted by Aulus Gellius (iv. 16). Compare Cicero ad Att. xii. 40, 41, xiii. 50; Plutarch, Jul. Cjes. 54. § 3. [4] victory of wit: Archbishop Trench in his Select Glossary has given an excellent quota- tion from Bp. Reynolds, which illustrates the difference between the present and past usages of the word ' wit.' ' For I take not wit in that common acceptation, whereby men understand some sudden flashes of conceipt, whether in stile or -conference, which like rotten wood in the darke, have more shine then substance ; whose use an'd ornament are like themselves, swift and vanishing ; at once both admired and for- gotten ; but I understand a setled, constant, and habituall sufficiency of the understanding, whereby it is inabled in any kind of learning, theory, or practice, both to sharpnesse in search, subtilty in expression, and dis- patch in execution.' Reynolds, The Passions and Faculties of the Soul, c. xxxix. p. 514. [8] These Apophthegms (Cic. ad Fam. ix. 16), or Dicta collectanea as they are called by Suetonius (Jul. Css. 56), were 284 NOTES. among the works -which Augustus suppressed. [16] Eccl. xii. 11, from the Vulgate, though not quite literally. [21] Suetonius, Jul. Cses. 70. [25] cashiered: cassiered in ed. 1605, a form of spelling which points to the derivation of the word from Fr. cesser. In Wats's trans, of De Augm. the Latin is rendered, ' and seditiously prayed to be cassed.' [26] by expostulation thereof: Lat. hoc postulate. P. 65. [6] Suetonius, Jul. Cses. 79. [15] Rex was a surname with the Romans: comp. Hor. Sat. i. 7. 1 ; Bacon, Apoph. 186. [17] Plutarch, Jul. Cses. 35. § 4. P. 66. [1] Suet. Jul. Cses. 77. [15] Xen. Anab. ii. 5. 37. [16] the great king: of Persia. [25] The saying here ascribed to Xenophon is in Schneider's edition of the Anabasis (ii. 1. § 12) given to Theopompus. Xenophon, who is described as serving merely as a volunteer, and hold- ing no command in the army, could hardly have taken part in the parley with Phalinus. Diodorus (xiv. p. 409) attributes the speech to Proxenus. In Stephens's edition of 1561, which Bacon may have used, the reading is Rcvocpu/v. ■P- 67. [7] Jason the Thessalian (assassinated b. c. 370) was later than Agesilaus, though Bacon mentions him first. See Smith's Hist, of Greece, p. 473. [8] Agesilaus: See Plut. Ages. 15; Smith's Hist, of Greece, p. 439, &c. The date of the attempted invasion of Persia by Agesilaus was b. c. 396-394. Compare Bacon's treatise, Of the True Greatness of Britain (Works, vii. 50) : ' And those that are conversant attentively in the histories of those times, shall find that this purchase which Alexander made and compassed was offered by fortune twice before to others, though by accident they went not through with it; namely, to Agesilaus, and Jason of Thessaly. For Agesilaus, after he had made himself master of most of the low provinces of Asia, and had both design and commission to invade the higher countries, was diverted and called home upon a war excited against his country by the states of Athens and Thebes, being incensed by their orators and counsellors, which were bribed and corrupted from Persia, as Agesilaus himself avouched pleasantly, when he said That an hundred thousand archers of the kings of Persia had driven him home : understanding it, because an archer was the stamp upon the Persian coin of gold. And Jason of Thessaly, being a man born to no greatness, but one that made a fortune of himself, and had obtained by his own vivacity of spirit, joined with the opportunities of time, a great army compounded of voluntaries and adventurers, to the terror of all Grsecia, that continually expected where that cloud would fall, disclosed himself in the end, that his design was for an expedition into Persia, (the same which Alexander not many years after achieved,) wherein he was interrupted by a private conspiracy against his life, which took effect.' [14, 15] Ovid, Ep. Pont. ii. 9. 47. Ovid has Adde quod for scilicet. Mr. Ellis has pointed out that the BOOK I. 285 origin of this saying is to be found in a fragment of Theophrastus : SoKf? ya\p f/ iraiSeia, «al touto irivres o/ioKoyovai. fjiifpovv ras if>vx&s, mpaipowa rb flijpiSSes gal ayvoiiiov (Stobeei Florilegium, ed. Gaisford, iv. App. p. 55, ed. 1822). [23] examined and tried: observe the Latinized construction of the participles. [29] Eccl. i. 9 ('There is no new- thing under the sun'), quoted from memory. [30, 31] The Latin has, qui pone aulcea caput inserens organa quibus moventur et filamenta cernit. P. 68. [3] for a passage: that is, a pass or ford. The Latin has propter pontem aliquem. [4] Plutarch (Ages. 15. § 6) relates that Alex- ander called the battle between Antipater and Agis a battle of mice. The news was brought to him soon after the battle of Arbela. [9] Compare Seneca, Nat. Quaest. i. prol. § 10 : Formicarum iste discursvs est in angusto laborantium. [20] See Epictetus, Enchir. 33, and Simplicii in Epict. Comm. c. 33. The dramatic form of the story is apparently Bacon's own. [24] Virg. Georg. ii. 490. [33] rationem totius: appa- rently referring to Eccl. xii. 13. P. 69. [5] Plato, Alcib. Prim. ii. 133. [6] "Mr. Spedding quotes another form of this sentence as Bacon had entered it in the Promus, ' Suavissima vita indies meliorem fieri.' It appears to be derived from Xenophon, Memor. i. 6. § 8. The same sentiment occurs in Dante, Parad. xviii. 58, quoted by Mr. Ellis. Comp. also Adv. to the E. of Rutland (Works, ix. p. 7). P. 70. [6] Virg. Georg. iv. 561. [9] over the will: The Latin adds licet liberam el non astrictam. [23] Rev. ii. 24. [24] force: face in ed. 1605, corrected in Errata. [31] A saying of Hiero's, recorded by Plu- tarch (Reg. et Imp. Apoph.), is perhaps what Bacon was thinking of. Xenophanes complained that his poverty did not allow him to keep two servants. ' How is that?' said Hiero : ' Homer, whom you worry with abuse, dead as he is, supports more than ten thousand.' P. 71. [10] exceed the pleasure of the sense : So in the Errata to ed. 1605. The original editions have 'exceed the senses.' The Lat. is oHectamenta sensuum excedent. The true reading is probably 'exceed the pleasures of the senses.' [15] satiety : saaetie, ed. 1605. [16] ver- dure: In edd. 1605, 1629, 1633, it is verdour, which perhaps shows what the old pronunciation was. In Cotgrave's French Diet, and Florio's Ital. Diet, of 1 61 1, the spelling of the word is as we have it. See note on p. 48, 1. 17. [17] deceits of pleasure: that is, deceptive, unreal pleasures. The Lat. has umbras tautum et fallacias volupiatum. [20] ambitious princes : Bacon was perhaps thinking of the Emperor Charles V., who resigned the crown of Spain in favour of his son in 1556, and retired to the monastery of San Yuste. See Ess. xix. p. 76. [22] 'it,' that is, 'knowledge,' is omitted as the subject of 'appeareth.' The whole sentence stands thus in the Lat. : ut necesse sit hujus delectationis 286 NOTES. bonum simplex esse, non ex accidents, ut cumfraude. [27] Lucr. u, I-IO, quoted again in Ess. i. p. 3. P. 72. [11] to this tend: tend is omitted in ed. 1605, but added in the Errata. [19] infinite : used loosely for ' innumerable.' The Lat. has innumera. It occurs once In the same sense in Shakespeare, Tim. of Ath. v. J. 37: 'a satire against the softness of prosperity, with a dis- covery of the infinite flatteries that follow youth and opulency.' [lb.] have been decayed: that is, have been brought to decay, fallen into decay. [21] statuaes: so in ed. 1605. 'Statua' was the old form of the word while still unnaturalized which Bacon adopted. See Glossary to his Essays. [23, 24] cannot but leese of the life and truth : that is, cannot but lose some of the life and truth. P. 73. [4] Bacon here refers to Aristotle and his followers. [11] affection: The true reading is probably affections, as in 1. 14. [25] Phaedr. iii. 12. Quoted again in Ess. xiii. p. 48. It was a favourite fable with Bacon. Comp. Of the True Greatness of Britain (Works, vii. 5 7) : 'In which people (i. e. the Swiss) it well appeared what an authority iron hath over gold at the battle of Granson, at what time one of the principal jewels of Burgundy was sold for twelve pence by a poor Swiss, that knew no more a precious stone than did .ffisop's cock.' See Commines, B. v. c. 2. [26] Midas : Ovid, Metam. xi. 153, &c [29] Paris : Eurip. Troad. 924, &c. [30] Tac. Ann. xiv. 9, Occidat dum imperet. [31] any : Omitted in ed. 1605, but added in the Errata. [32] Horn. Od. v. 218 ; Plutarch, Gryll. 1 ; Cic. de Orat. i. 44. Quoted again in Ess. viji. p. 27. P. 74. [2] must: Omitted in ed. 1605, but added in the Errata. [4] Matt. xi. 19, quoted from the Vulgate. BOOK II. P. 75. [1-7] Comp. Ess. viii. p. 26 : ' Yet it were great reason, that those that have children, should have greatest care of future times; unto which, they know, they must transmit their dearest pledges.' [9-12) and yet so . . . survive her: Omitted in the Lat., apparently for the reason mentioned in note on p. 21, 11. 16-2 1. [19] affection: Lat. studium meuni erga literas. T- 76. [3] Hercules' columns : The two rocks Calpe (Gibraltar) and Abyla (Ximiera, or Jebel el Mind) on either side of the Straits of Gibraltar were so called by the ancients, as being supposed to mark the end of the western wanderings of Hercules, and so the limits of early geogra- phical knowledge in that direction (comp. Pindar, Nem. iii. 35 ; Herod, iv. 42, 181, 185). Pliny says of the Straits of Gibraltar (Hist. Nat. iii. proem, trans. Holland, ed. 1601): 'Of both sides of this gullet, neere unto it, are two mountaines set as frontiers and rampiers to keepe all in: namely, Abila for Africke, Calpe for Europe, the utmost end of Hercules' BOOK II. 287 Labours. For which cause, the inhabitants of those parts call them, The two pillars of that God ; and doe verily beleeve, that by certaine draines and ditches digged within the Continent, the maine Ocean, before excluded, made way and was let in, to make the Mediteranean seas, where before was firme land : and so by that meanes the very face of the whole earth is cleane altered.' The origin of the legend is probably to be sought in the fact that the Phoenicians were the great navigators of the ancient world, and that Melkarth, the Greek Hercules, was their tutelary deity. In any case ' the pillars of Hercules,' which, like the ultima Thule of a later period, once denoted the extreme limit of geo- graphical discovery in one direction, are used metaphorically by Bacon to denote the limit of any investigation whatever. [10] Lat. sermone quodam aclivo et masculo. [12] ground : the foundation or basis of an argument. [16] supplieth: Lat. succwrrit. [1 7] direction : Perhaps we should read ' soundness of direction,' as before. Lat. consilii prudentia et sanitas. [lb.] S. Augustine, Serm. clxix. (vol. v. p. 569, ed. Ant. 1700): Melior it claudus in via, quam cursor prater viam. See Nov. Org. i. 61. In the Promus (vii. p. 200) it stands, Melior claudus in via quam cursor extra viam. Ben Jonson, in his Sylva, quotes it in a different form, 'Aegidius cursu superat — A cripple in the way out-travels a footman, or a post out of the way:' St. Giles being the patron saint of cripples. [19] Eccl. x. 10. Quoted again in a modified form in the treatise Of the Interpretation of Nature (iii. p. 223) : ' for as Salomon sairh excel- lently, The fool putteth to more strength, but the whe man considereth wLi-h ■way, signifying the election of the mean to be more material than the multiplication of endeavour.' P- 77- [7] accomplishments: Lat. ornamentis. [20] discharge of cares: Lat. vacaiionem a curis. [23] Virg. Georg. iv. 8. [27] and that without delusion or imposture : Omitted in the translation. See note to p. 21, 1. 16. P. 78. [9] Cic. Orat. post reditum in Senatu, xii. 30 : Nam difficile est non aliquem, nefas quemquam prceterire. [11] Phil. iii. 13. [14] I find strange: Lat. demiror. [18] the ancient fable: The fable of the belly and the members told by Menenius Agrippa, Livy, ii. 32. See Shake- speare, Cor. i. 1. 99, Sec. [24] universality: the study of general princi- ples. Lat. contemplationibus universalibus. P. 79. [1] professory learning: the teaching which has for its object one special branch of study. [2] malign aspect and influence: This metaphor is derived from the old astrology, in which the planets were supposed to exercise control over human destinies. See Trench, English Past and Present, Lect. iv. p. 180, ed. 4. [15] The Lat. adds prcesertim afud nos. [17] Readers: i.e. lecturers. [22, 23] to appropriate his whole labour, and to continue his whole age in that function and at- tendance : i. e. to devote his whole energy and to spend his whole life in 288 NOTES. discharging ( and attending to the duties of his office. [23-26] and therefore . . . profession : Omitted in the Lat. [28] I Sam. xxx. 22. P. 80. [3] Virg. Georg. iii. 128. [4, 5] some alchemist. .. who call: For another example of this loose construction see p. 19, 11. 8, 9, ' some friar ... to whom,' &c. [10] Physic: Lat. medicina. [17] Lat. nee usu mortuorum corporum ad observaiiones anatomicas destitui. [28] Pliny, Hist. Nat. viii. 17. [31] travail: In edd. 1605, 1629, 1633, travailes. [3:, 32] much better . .. nature : Lat. certe majus quiddam debetur iis, qui non in saltibus natures pererrant, sed in labyrinthis artium viam sibi aperiunt. Mr. Spedding explains ' arts of nature ' as ' working upon and altering nature by art.' In p. 86 'history of arts' is equivalent to 'history of nature altered or wrought.' But from the expressions in the Latin translation it would rather seem that 'by arts of nature' Bacon intended those recondite and intricate operations which are the subjects of inves- tigation by the experimental philosopher, as the chemist for example, and which are contrasted with the more external manifestations with which the naturalist deals, as the windings of a labyrinth with the open glades of a forest. See Nov. Org. prsef. P. 81. [27] Cic. De Orator, iii. 26. [28] Cic. Orator. 24. P. 82. [22] Cic. Ep. ad Att. ix. 7. P. 83. [2] Lat. adeo ut habeant prafectos (alios Provinciales, alios Gene- rales) quibtis omnes parent. [9] James i. 17. [23] Aaron, not Moses. See Exod. vii. 12. [26] opera basilica, works for a king: Perhaps Bacon was thinking of the basilica facinora of Plautus (Trin. iv. 3. 23). [29] the inducing part: the introductory part. Lat. speculativa ilia pars. P. 84. [16] Amare et sapere vix Deo conceditur. Publ. Syr. Sent. 15. Quoted again in Ess. x. p. 37. Comp. Ovid, Met. ii. 846: Non bent conveniunt nee in una sede morantur Majestas et amor. [20] Quoted from Ennius by Cicero, De Off. i. 16. P- 85. [3] Prov. xxii. 13. [4] Virg. Mn. v. 231. [9-21] This,- paragraph is much enlarged in the De Augmentis, ii. 1. [22] De Aug. ii. 4. In the De Augmentis Bacon makes only two divisions of History, natural and civil; including in the latter history ecclesi- astical and literary. P. 86. [5] a just story of learning; i.e. an accurate history. [21] In De Augm. ii. 2 the same division is made but at greater length. [32] the strange events of time and chance: Lat. casuttm (ut ait ille) ingenia. P. 87. [11] it is never called down: Lat. mmquam postea exter- minantur aut retractantur. [13] The treatise De miris auscultationibus attributed to Aristotle is now believed not to be by him. Bacon again refers to it in p. 35, 1. 24. [lb.] is nothing less than : i. e. is by no means intended. [16] axioms: Mr. Kitchin, in his edition of BOOK II. 289 the Novum Organum, App. A., has shown that Bacon uses 'axiom' to denote any general principle of the lowest degree of generality. And in this he is followed by Sir Isaac Newton, who gives the title of ' Axiom' to all ' general experimental truths,' to the ' laws of motion,' which are purely inductive and not at all ' self-evident ' truths, to the principles of optics, &c. P. 88. [4] In the treatise ' Dsemonologie, in forme of a Dialogue,' in three books, printed among the works of James I., p. 93, ed. 1616. [5] Comp. Nov. Org. i. X I 20, sol enim ceque palatia et cloacas ingreditur, neque tamen polluilur. And Chaucer's Parson's Tale, quoted by Mr. Kitchin: 'Certes holy writ may not be defouled, no more than the sonne that schyneth on a dongehuT (vol. iii. p. 168, Percy Soc. ed.). [7-9] I hold fit, that these narrations . . . be sorted by themselves, and not to be mingled &c. : For other instances of this mixed con- struction, see Ps. lxxviii. 4, 8 (Pr. Bk.) : ' That we should not hide . . . but to shew &c.' ' That they might put their trust in God, and not to/orget &c.' [23] Plato, Hippias Major, iii. 291. P. 89. [3] the philosopher: Thales. See Plato, Thext. i. 174; Diog. Laert. i. 34. [9] Arist. Polit. i. 3. § I ; Phys. i. P. 90. [1] Proteus : Virg. Georg. iv. 386, &c. [5] De Augm. ii. 6. [22] of the world: i.e. in the world. [27] as was said: See above, 1. 13. In this paragraph Bacon perhaps had in his mind Camden's Remaines concerning Britaine (1605). P. 91. [2] In the discourse on the Union of the Kingdoms (Life and Letters, iii. p. 94) Bacon gives instances in nature of those bodias which were imperfecte mista, and concludes, 'So as such imperfect minglings continue no longer than they are forced, and still in the end the worthiest gets above.' He probably had this in his mind when he called such histories the salvage of the deluge of time. [5] epitomes: Bacon elsewhere (p. 175) condemns Ramus for ' introducing the canker of epitomes? Here he refers probably to the Epitomes of Floras, Aurelius Victor, and others. [10] De Augm. ii. 7. [26] the true and inward resorts : Lat. veros fomites et textwas subtiliores. Perhaps We should read/on/es. [27] The Latin adds neque enim de elogiis ec hujusmodi commemorationibus jejunis loquimur. [32] Referring to Thucydides, Xenophon, and Sallust. P. 92. [4, 5] specially of any length : This refers to the length of the period contemplated by the history, not to the history itself. The Latin has a different idea, prcesertim qua atate scripioris multo antiquior sit; where the true reading would be quod . . . antiquius. [5] — p. 93. [4] Omitted in the Latin. [22] Virg. Ma. iv. 177. [29] Justinianus: Eom a.d. 483; reigned from 527 to 565. [lb.] Ultimus Romanorum: Used of Cassius by Tacitus (Ann. iv. 34) and of Brutus and Cassius by Suetonius (Tib. 61). [33] to be kept: 'are' is omitted in the U 29O NOTES. construction. Comp. p. 94, 1. 8, ' and yet her government so mascu- line,' where the copula is omitted. P. 93. [8] Cicero, De Off. i. 34. Comp. Tac. Hist. i. 1. [10] in the main continuance thereof: Lat. quatenus ad corpus ejus integrum. [12] George Buchanan, who wrote Rerum Scoticarum Historia. To this James I. evidently refers in the second book of his Basilicon Doron, where he reckons among unpardonable crimes ' the false and vnreverent writing or speaking of malicious men against your parents and pre- decessors' (Works, p. 158). [2[] Bacon himself endeavoured to carry out the plan which he here suggested ; but the only part of the work which was completed was the History of Henry VII., published in 1622, during his retirement. Besides this he left a fragment of the history of the reign of Henry VIII. In his letter to the Lord Chancellor touching the history of Britain, to which reference has been made before (p. 58, note), he speaks in nearly the same words of the defects of previous histories. [24] hath been : Observe the construction, and see p. 52, 1. 9. [27] By Henry VII. Compare Bacon, Henry VII. p. 3: 'There were fallen to his lot, and concurrent in his Person, three seuerall Titles to the Imperiall Crowne. The first, the Title of the Lady Elizabeth, with whom; by precedent Pact with the Partie that brought him in, he was to marry. The second, the ancient and long disputed Title (both by Plea, and Armes) of the House of Lancaster, to which he was Inheritour in his owne Person. The third, the Title of the Sword or Conquest, for that he came in by victorie of Battaile, and that the King in possession was slaine in the Field.' [33] Henry VIII. P- 94- [5] Edward VI. and the attempt of the Duke of Northumber- land to place Lady Jane Grey on the throne. [6] Comp. Ess. xxix. p. 1 2 7 : 'A civill warre, indeed, is like the heat of a feaver.' [7] Mary, married to Philip of Spain. [lb.] Elizabeth. [8] and yet her govern- ment so masculine: The copula is omitted as in p. 92, 1. 33. [8-1 1] and yet ... thence : Omitted in the Latin. [12] divided from all the world: Comp. Virg. Eel. i. 67, Et penitus toto divisos orbe Britannos. [14] Virg. JEn. iii. 96. [18] Comp. p. 134, 1. 25, and Ess. xi. p. 43, 'And as in nature, things move violently to their place, and calmely in their place.' [23] it : redundant. [32] Ariosto, Orlando Furioso, at the end of the 34th book and the beginning of the 35th. Mr. Singer, in Notes and Queries, v. 232, was the first to point out the source of this reference. [33] the ancient fiction : The fable of the three fates, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos. The allusion is more distinctly given in the Latin translation. P. 95. [14] Virg. JEn. v. 751. [15] Plin. Ep. iii. 21 : Nam postquam desiimus facere laudanda, laudari quoque ineptum putamus. [17] Prov, x. 7- [ 2 4] Cicero, Phil. ix. 5. § 10: Vita enim mortuorum in memoria vivorum est posita. The sentiment appears to have been borrowed from the BOOK II, 291 law of Solon quoted by Demosthenes adv. Lept. p. 4S8, pi) \lyuv neuritis ruv Tcdvea/ra. P. 96. [7] De Aug. ii. 9. [lb.] partition : portion in ed. 1605, cor- rected in Errata. [12] giving but a touch of certain magnificent build- ings: that is, but slightly alluding to them. [13] Tac. Ann. xiii. 31. [15] a kind of contemplative heraldry: that is, as is explained in the Latin, a heraldry by which the rank of books as well as of persons may be distinguished. [22] time: Mr. Spedding reads times. [24] what passed day by day : For the construction compare Hamlet, i. I. 33: 'What we two nights rttive seen.' [25] Esth. vi. 1. [28] Plut. Symp. i. 6. 1 ; Alex. 23. § 2, 76, &c. P. 97. [1] De Aug. ii. 10. [4] Mr. Ellis, in his note on the corres- ponding passage of the De Augmentis, remarks that 'the most cele- brated work of this kind is one with which Eacon was familiar, — the Discorsi of Macchiavelli, of which the narrative part is derived from Livy.' See what Bacon himself says, p. 225. [22] Comp. Of the Interpretation of Nature (Works, iii. 225) : 'For at that time the world was altogether home-bred, every nation looked little beyond their own confines or territories, and the world had no through lights then, as it hath had since by commerce and navigation, whereby there could neither be that contribution of wits one to help another, nor that variety of particulars for the correcting of customary conceits.' See also Nov. Org. i. 84. [27] Virg. Georg. i. 250. P. 98. [1] in their word : Lat. in symbolo suo. [2] phis ultra : Charles the Fifth's motto. [3] imitabile fitlmen : referring to the invention of gunpowder. [5] Virg. JEa. vi. 590. [7] Fernando de Magalhaens (or Magellan) was the first navigator who sailed round the world, 15 19- 1522. Drake's voyage was in 1577-1579. [14] Dan. xii, 4. The quotation in the text, which is from the Vulgate, is altered in the Latin to augebitur scienlia. [21] De Aug. ii. 11. [22] in the propriety thereof: Lat. proprio vero nomine. P. 99. [n] Ps. xc. 4; 2 Pet. iii. 8. [23] 1 Cor. ii. 14. [26] Eph. ii. 12. [28] Hab. ii. 2. This very common form of misquotation of this passage appears to have had its origin in Coverdale's Version ; 'that who so commeth by, may rede it.' The correct rendering is that given in the English Bible ; ' that he may run that readeth it.' P. 100. [4] De Aug. ii. 12. [26] it is a great loss of that book of Cesar's : A loose construction equivalent to ' it is a great loss, viz. the loss of that book of Csesar's.' P. 10 1. [4-6] one of the cells . . .which is that of the memory: Comp. Burton, Anat. of Mel. Parti. Sec. 1. Mem. 2. Subs. 4. 'The fourth creek, behind the head, is common to the cerebel or little brain, and marrow of the back-bone, the least and most solid of all the rest, which receives the animal spirits from the other ventricles, and conveys U 2 29a NOTES. them to the marrow in the back, and is the place where they say the memory is seated.' Vigo defines the brain as 'a substance full of marrowe diuided into three ventricles, of which there is one in the .fore part which is greater then the other three. The second is in the middest. The third hath his residence in the hinder part. And therefore after Galens iudgement, it is the foundation of imagination, and of deuising, and of remembrance ' (Works, fol. 6 b, Lond. 1586). Compare Chaucer, Knight's Tale, 1378: ' Engendrud of humour malencolyk, Byforne in his selle faniastyk.' [7] Differently arranged in De Augm. ii. 13, where much new matter is introduced. [13J Hor. De Art. Poet. 9. [19] maybe styled: that is, may have this title of ' feigned history,' whether written in prose or verse. P. 102. [16] After this paragraph there is added in the De Aug- mentis one on Dramatic Poetry. [32] The seven wise men were Solon, Thales, Pittacus, Bias, Chilon, Cleobulus, and Periander of Corinth. Instead of the last, Plato (Protag. i. 343) enumerates Myso. Their maxims have been collected in Orelli's Opuscula Gracorum veterum sententiosa et moralia. As other instances of parabolical wisdom the Latin mentions tessera Pythagorte, and anigmata sphingis. The former of these are associated with Egyptian hieroglyphics by Plutarch (De Isid. et Osir. 10) in a passage which Bacon probably had in his mind. P. 103. [15] Both these fables are quoted by Bacon in his fifteenth Essay, ' Of Seditions and Troubles,' with substantially the same com- ments. In the De Augm. is substituted a lengthened discussion of the fables of Pan, Perseus, and Dionysus. See also Wisdom ot the Ancients, c. 9. [21] Virg. JEa. iv. 178. [30] Thetis, not Pallas. See Horn. II. i. 398, &c. P. 104. [2] Achilles: Horn. II. xi. 832 ; Plutarch (De Musica, xl. 4). [4] Machiavel: The Prince, c. 18. Mr. Ellis, in his note on this passage, suggested that ' As two of the animals are the same it is possible that Macchiavelli was thinking of what was said of Boniface VIII. by the predecessor whom he forced to abdicate, — that he came in like a fox, would reign like a lion, and die like a dog.' [1 1] Chry* sippus : a Stoic philosopher, born b.c. 280. Bacon here refers to what Cicero says of him, De Nat. Deor. i. 15, §§ 38-41. [13] the fictions: 'the' is omitted in some copies of ed. 1605. [16-20] Surely . . . meaning : The construction of this sentence is imperfect, though the sense is clear. [16] Homer : The same remark is made by Rabelais (Gar- gantua, prol.) of the allegorical interpretations of Homer by Plutarch, Eustathius, Heraclides Ponticus and Cornutus. [17] 'To the Greeks BOOK II, 393 Homer was in fact a Bible, and' guarded with all the care and all the piety that belong to such a book.' Prof. Blackie, Art. on Homer, Encyc. Brit, eighth ed. This is true generally, and not only of ' the later schools of the Grecians.' ' But what really conveys a more vivid impression of the influence of Homer in Greek education, than any anecdotes about schools and schoolmasters, is the very apt and easy way in which all Greek men are everywhere found quoting Homer from memory, and applying it for the need of the moment, by a sort of habitual " accommodation," just as we see many a devout father of the Christian Church, and the ancient Jews, constantly quoting the Old Testament, without any curious inquiry as to the exact critical propriety of the text so applied.' Blackie, Homer and the Iliad, i. 308. ■ [24] this third part of learning : It should be ' this second.' [27-32] But . . . harangues : Omitted in De Augm. P. 105. [3] The third book of the De Augm. begins here. [29] philo- sophia prima : See p. 40, 1. 8. P. 106. [1] a certain rhapsody: Lat. farraginem quondam et massam inconditam. [27] The instances of Ihese ' participles in nature' given by Bacon in the De Augm. are, moss, which is intermediate between putre- faction and a plant ; fish that adhere and do not change their place and are between a plant and an animal ; mice and other animals which are between those propagated by putrefaction and those propagated by impregnation; bats, which are between birds and quadrupeds; flying fish, between birds and fish ; seals, between fish and quadrupeds, and so on. See Nov. Org. ii. 30. P. 107. [8] Euclid, Elem. Book i. Axiom 4. [9, 10] an axiom . . mathematics : In some copies of ed. 1605, and in the edd. of 1629 and '633, this clause is inserted by mistake after the following sentence. The error is noted in the Errata at the end of a copy of ed. 1605 in the Bodleian Library, and the true reading is given, preceded by the follow- ing remark : ' In some few Bookes, in Ff : fol. 21, and the beginning of the second page thereof, there is somewhat misplaced, and to be read thus.' The catchword of the previous page is 'And.' [10] This ana- logy between commutative (or corrective) and distributive justice is derived from Aristotle (Eth. v. 3, 4). Of distributive justice Sir Alex- ander Grant in his notes on the passage gives the following summary : 'Justice implies equality, and not only that two things are equal, but also two persons between whom there may be justice. Thus it is a geometrical proportion in four terms ; if A and B be persons, C and D lots to be divided, then as A is to B, so must C be to D. And a just distribution will produce the result that A + C will be to B + D in the same ratio as A was to B originally. In other words, distributive justice consists in the distribution of property, honours, &c, in the state, according to the merits of each citizen.' And of corrective, or as Bacon 294 NOTES. calls it commutative, justice, he says: ' Corrective justice goes on a prin- ciple, not of geometrical, but of arithmetical proportion ; in other .words, it takes no account of persons, but treats the cases with which it is con- cerned as cases of unjust loss and gain, which have to be reduced to the middle point of equality between the parties.' (Grant's Aristotle, ed. 2, ii. pp. 108, 112.) [13] Eucl. Elem. Bk. i. Axiom 1. Whately, Logic, ii. 3. § 2; Nov. Org. ii. 27. [16] Ovid, Met. xv. 165. [18] Comp. Bacon, Sylva Sylvarum, cent. i. § 100 (Works, ii. 383, ed. Spedding) : ' There is nothing more certain in nature than that it is impossible for any body to be utterly annihilated ; but that as it was the work of the omnipotency of God to make somewhat of nothing, so it requireth the like omnipotency to turn somewhat into nothing.' [21] Eccl. iii. 14, quoted from the Vulgate. [23] Machiavelli, Disc, sopra Livio, iii. 1. [27] the Persian magic: 'Plato commends this Magia, and calls it Machagistia, and BiGiv Oepcnrela the worship of the Gods ; and saith, that the Kings of Persia learned it, as a knowledge of diuine mysteries, wherein by the worlds Common-wealth they were instructed to gouerne their owne.' Purchas his Pilgrimage, p. 366, ed. 1614. The passage of Plato referred to is Alcib. Prim. ii. 121, but the remark of Purchas is apparently derived from the Apologia of Johannes Picus Mirandula (p. 121, ed. 1557). That Plato called Magia by the mystic name of Machagistia is stated by Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiii. 6. § 32). [30] Comp. Bacon, Sylva Sylvarum, cent. ii. 113 : ' There be in music certain figures or tropes ; almost agreeing with the figures of rhetoric, and with the affections of the mind, and other senses. First, the division and quavering, which please so much in music, have an agreement with the glittering of light ; as the moon-beams playing upon a wave. Again, the falling from a discord to a concord, which maketh great sweetness in music, hath an agreement with the affections, which are reintegrated to the better after some dislikes ; it agreeth also with the taste, which is soon glutted with that which is sweet alone. The sliding from the close or cadence, hath an agreement with the figure in rhetoric which they call prater expectatum ; for there is a. pleasure even in being deceived' (Works, ed. Spedding, ii. 388, 389). Comp. also Nov. Org. ii. 27, and Of the Interp. of Nat. (vol. iii. p. 230). P. 108. [1] See Quint. Inst. Or. vi. 3 ; Cic. de Orat. ii. 63. § 255. [2] with: Some copies of the ed. 1605, according to Mr. Spedding, read 'which.' [4] Virg. -ffin. vii. 9. [5] Comp. Nov. Org. ii. 27, where the same illustrations are given of what Bacon calls 'conformable instances' or 'physical similitudes.' From these he deduces the principle, organs sensuum et corpora, qua pariunt rejlexiones ad sensus, esse similis natural. [6] the eye with a glass : i. e. a looking-glass. Lat. oculus enim similis speculo. [20] De Augm. iii. 2. [22] Virg. Mn. vi. 788. [28] Lat. scientia, seu potius sciential scintilla. [32] Comp. Ess. xvi. p. 64: 'And BOOK II. 295 therefore, God never wrought miracle, to convince Atheisme, because his ordinary works convince it.' P. 109. [10] Comp. Macrobius, in Somn. Scip. ii. 12: Idea physici mundum magnum hominem, et hominem brevem mundum esse dixerunl. [13] Gen. i; Ps. viii. 3, 6. Comp. Bereshith Rabba, § 8: 'Rabbi Tiphrai, in the name of R. Acha (says), the superior beings were created in the image and likeness (of God), and do not increase and multiply ; the inferior increase and multiply, but were not created in the image and likeness (of God).' [24] See p. 10, 1. 5. [33] hath: Observe the con- struction as in p. 34, 1. 25, ' so great an affinity hath fiction and belief.' P. no. [4] Otherwise .. spirits : i.e. with respect to the nature of angels and spirits the case is different. Comp. p. 158, 1. 2. Lat. Secus est quod ad angelorum et spirituum naturam attinet. [7] Col. ii. 4, 18. [15-17] Lat. c] tne second general curse : Gen. xi. 6-8. [7, 8] in a mother tongue : ' in another tongue ' ed. 1605, corrected to ' in mother tongue' in the Errata and in edd. 1629, 1633. The Latin has Unguis quibusque vernaculis. [32] Mart. ix. 83. BOOK II. 3'1 P. 169. [11] decipher: 'discypher' in ed. 1605. [13] Of this, kind oi cipher Bacon gives an example in the De Augm., which he says was invented by him at Paris. [30] words : some copies of ed. 1 605 read 'markes.' P. 170. [4] labours and studies : some copies of ed. 1605 read 'labours studies,' and Mr. Spedding, considering that one of these words is a correction of the other, reads ' studies ' alone. [5] De Augm. vi. 2. ' Besides Ramus himself and Carpentier, one of the principal persons in this controversy was the Cardinal D'Ossat, of whom some account will be found in De Thou's memoirs.' (Ellis.) [14] The first book of the Dialectica of Ramus is De Inventione, the second De Judicio, and of the latter the last four chapters are on Method. [19] invention: 'inventions ' in ed. 1 605, corrected in Errata. [29] Cicero, Pro Caelio xviii. 42 : Ergo htzc deserta via et inculta atque interclusa jam frondibus et virgultis relinquatur. P. 171. [1] be: Omitted in ed. 1605. [7] to be spun on: i. e. to be spun continuously, without break. [lb.] intimated : Mr. Spedding conjectures ' insinuated.' The Latin has insinuanda. But in distinguish- ing in the De Augmentis the two kinds of Methods, Magistrate and Initiativa, Bacon says 'Magistralis siquidem docet; Initiativa imimat,' and therefore, as in this passage he is speaking of the latter of these, ' intimated ' is probably the true reading. [9] knowledge induced : that is, derived by induction. Lat. scientia per inductionem acquisita. [12] secundum majus et minus : to a greater or less extent. See p. 30, 1. 8. P. 172. [1] enigmatical and disclosed: In the De Augm. he dis- tinguishes them as Acroamatica and Exoterica. In this passage Bacon's remarks apply to the enigmatical method. [16] except they should be ridiculous : We should now say ' unless they would be ridiculous.' [263 Hor. Ars Poet. 242. [31] demonstration in orb or circle : See p. 164. P. 173. [8] The scholastical method which is condemned previously. See pp. 32, 33. [13] indeed : Mr. Spedding interprets this as equivalent to ' although indeed.' Rather, perhaps, ' would ' is used for ' should.' The difficulty is evaded in the Latin translation, which is as follows : Illud tamen inficias non ierim urbem aliquam magnam el munitam a tergo relinquere haudquaquam semper tutum esse. The use of the words ' piece enemy ' seems to shew that Bacon was thinking of chess. He gives this as an example of what he means by keeping the field and pursuing ' the sum of the enterprise.' A general will not waste his strength in attack- ing some small fort when an important position is held by the 'enemy in his rear, and the teacher of a science will only employ confutation ' to remove strong preoccupations and prejudgements' from the minds of his pupils, and not to refute their minor cavils and doubts. Modern editions read 'some important piece with an enemy.' [29] shells: ' shales ' in ed. 1605. [31] particular topics for invention : See pp. 156, 157- 313 NOTES. P. 174. [1] judgement : The Latin has here Sequitur aliud Method! dis- crimen, in tradendis scientiis cum judicio adhibendum. Method has been described (p. 170) as a part of judgement, and here the one word seems to have been substituted for the other. [5] agreeable : i. e. to received opinions. Lat. opinionibus jampridem imbibitis et receptis affinis. [7] Arist. Eth. Nic. vi. 3. The opinion alluded to in this passage is generally supposed to be that of Plato (Theset. p. 197) and not Democritus. Mr. Ellis conjectured that Bacon might inadvertently have substituted one name for the other.' [10] need only but: One of these words is redundant. We should say 'need only' or 'need but.' [22] Mr. Ellis quotes Plato, Politic, ii. 277: x a *- e '"° v > P&I fapaotiyiuxai xpi- /j-ivov, l/cavuis evbuicvvc9ai ri tu>v p.uQ6vwv. [27] The Latin adds to these diversities of methods Di&reticam and Homericam. P. 175. [8] Ramus (Dialect, lib. ii. c. 3) divides the axioms or first principles of sciences (axiomata artium) as follows : Axioms are either true or false. Of true axioms, some are true contingently, others necessarily. A necessary axiom must be true in all cases, and the predication is then said to be Kara iravros. It must be homogeneous; that is, its parts must be essentially connected together, as form with the thing formed, the subject with its proper adjunct, genus with species : in this case it is said to be xa9' clvto. Thirdly, it must be catholic or universal, that is, the converse of the proposition must be true as well as the proposition itself, when it is Ka86\ov upaiTov. To" these three rules Ramus gives the fanciful names of the law of truth (xard. ttuvtSs), the law of justice {ko.6' o.vt6), and the law of wisdom (xa96\ov vpiaTov). It is the last law which is referred to in the concluding sentence of this paragraph. [ii] the canker of epitomes: In p. 91 Bacon calls epitomes 'the corruptions and moths of history.' [13] Referring probably to the dragons which kept the garden of the Hesperides and the golden fleece. Compare also Shakespeare, As You Like It, ii. I. 12-14 : 'Sweet are the uses of adversity, Which like the toad, ugly and venomous, Wears yet a precious jewel in his head.' [26-28] and the longitude . . . precept: Lat. longiludo vero sumitur a summa proposilione ad imam in eadem scientia. [30] which is the rule they call ita.9a.vTh : Omitted in the Latin. See note on p. 175, 1. 8. P. 176. [5] Ortelius: Abraham Ortel, or Ortelius, born June 9, 1527, at Antwerp, and called the Ptolemy of his time. He was appointed geographer to the King of Spain, and died June 26, 1598. Prefixed to his Theatrum Orbis Terrarum is a map of the world called Typus Orbis Terrarum, to which Bacon probably alludes. [20] Raymundus Lullius: born at Palma in Majorca in 1235. He was at first steward to King James of Majorca and High Chamberlain ; or, as others say, a merchant BOOK II. 313 like his ancestors. His early life was licentious, but he afterwards con- ceived a disgust for the world, and when forty years of age studied Latin and Arabic at Paris. While preaching Christianity in Africa he was stoned by the natives, and carried off by a Genoese vessel, on board of which he died off the coast of Majorca, March 26, 1315. For an account of his art, which he said was revealed to him on a mountain, see Maurice's Medieval Philosophy, pp. 244 &c. Cornelius Agrippa says of it, ' herein I wil admonishe you, that this Arte auaileth more to the outwarde shewe of the witte, and to the ostentation of Learning, than to gette knowledge: and hath much more presumptuousnesse, than efh- cacie.' Of the Vanitie and Uncertaintie of Artes and Sciences, cap. 9 (Engl, trans, ed. 1575). [27] De Augm. vi. 3. [lb.] which concerneth the illustration of tradition : Lat. de illustratione sermonis. [33] Adapted from Ex. iv. 16. See Ex. vii. 1. P. 177. [2] Prov. xvi. 21, quoted from the Vulgate from memory. [8] hath made : Observe the loose construction, the singular being used for the plural. [18] The Latin adds, Rhetorica certe Phantasiae quemad- modum Dial ec tea Intelleclui subservit: Rhetoric is to the imagination what logic is to the understanding. [23] morality: Lat. Ethicam, ethics or moral philosophy. [26] Lat. aut argumentorum fallcciis obruimur. P. 178. [2] to fill the imagination: Lat. phantasiam implere observa- tionibus et simulachris. [4] Plato, Gorg. i. p. 462, &c. [13] Thuc. iii. 42. [iS] Plato, Phsedr. iii. 250; see also Cic. De Off. i. 5. 14 ; de Fini- bus, ii, 16. 52 ; Rabelais, Pantag. ii. 18. For the opposite sentiment compare Pope, Essay on Man, Ep. ii. 217 : ' Vice is a monster of so frightful mien, As, to be hated, needs but to be seen.' [23] The Latin adds, a Cicerone. See Cicero, De Fin. iv. 18, 19 ; Tusc. Disp. ii. 18. 42. [26] with the will: Lat. cum phantasia el voluntate. [32] Ovid, Metam. vii. 20. P. 179. [16] See Aristotle, Rhet. i. I. 14. [18] The comparison is attributed to Zeno; Cicero, Orat. xxxii. 113; De Finibus, ii. 6. 17; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Mathem. ii. 7. Bacon uses it again, though in a different context, in his letter to Toby Matthew, upon sending him part of Instauratio Magna (Life and Letters, iv. 137): 'And to speak truth, it is to the other but as paltna to pugnus, part of the same thing more large.' [19] palm : ' pawme ' in ed. 1605. [23] Arist. Rhet. i. 2. 7. [29] Virg. Eel. viii. 56. [32] respectively; i.e. in terms adapted to the persons addressed. P. 180. [9] attendances: See p. 177, 'and therefore the deficiences which I shall note will rather be in some collections, which may as handmaids attend the art, than in the rules or use of the art itself.' The Latin has quce (ut ante diximus) ejus sunt generis, ut pro appendicibus potius 314 NOTES. censeri debeant, quam pro poriionibus artis ipsius, et pertinent omnia ad Promptuariam. [1 1] Aristotle, Rhet. i. 6, 7 ; Top. i. 1 2, &c. [14] Bacon refers to the Colours of Good and Evil which he published with the first edition of his Essays in 1597. In the Latin twelve examples fire given of these sophisms. [19] Hor. Ep. ii. 2. 11. [20] Prov. xx. 14. [31] Arist. Rhet. i. 6. [32] Virg. JEn. ii. 104. P. 181. [2] See pp. 155, 156. [9] Of these Antitheta forty-seven examples are given in the De Augmentis, of which the instance on this page is the last but one. [22] For examples of these formula, see the ' Promus of Formularies and Elegancies ' printed by Mr. Spedding in the seventh volume of his edition of Bacon. Three others are given from Cicero in the De Augmentis. [33] De Augm. vi. 4. P. 182. [1] the other pedantical : Lat. altera pcedagogica. [4, 5] con- cerned chiefly writing of books : The editions of 1605, 1629, and 1633 read 'concemeth chiefly in writing of books.' The true reading is pro- bably ' consisteth chiefly in writing &c.' In the Latin it is in scriptione librorum consistit. [11] In the De Augm. the story of the priest is omitted and another substituted of a proposed emendation of a passage in Tacitus, Hist. i. 66. [lb.] As the priest : I am afraid that this tale must share the fate of many other good stories, when their genuineness is put to the test. The Vulgate rendering of the passage in question is in sporta and not per sportam, a reading which leaves no room for the point of the story as Bacon tells it. Nor, so far as I can ascertain, is per sportam to be found in any Latin version. [12] Acts ix. 25. [17] as it hath been wisely noted : Lat. quod nonnemo prudenter notavit. [31] Lat. Ad Pcedagogicam quod attinet, brevissimum foret dictu, consule scholas Jesuilarum : nihil enim, quod in usum venit, his melius. Bacon has already (p. 21) expressed his appreciation of the services rendered by the Jesuits to education. P. 183. [6] courses: Mr. Spedding conjectures 'cases.' [7] See Essay xxxviii. p. 159 : ' Hee that seeketh victory over his nature, let him not set himselfe too great, nor too small tasks : for the first will make him deiected by often faylings ; and the second will make him a small pro- ceeder, though by often prevailings. And at the first, let him practise with helps, as swimmers doe with bladders, or rushes : but after a time, let him practise with disadvantages, as dancers doe with thick shooes. For it breeds great perfection, if the practise -.be harder then the use.' [1 3] See Essay 1. p. 205 : ' So if a mans wit be wandring, let him study the mathematicks ; for in demonstrations, if his wit be called away never so little, he must begin again.' [25] Cicero, de Orat. i. 33. Comp. Essay xxxviii. p. 160 : ' Let not a man force a habit upon himselfe, with a perpetuall continuance, but with some intermission. For both the pause reinforceth the new onset; and if a man, that is not perfect, be ever in practise, he shall as well practise his errours, as his abilities ; BOOK II. 315 and induce one habite of both : and there is no meanes to helpe this, but by seasonable intermissions." [33] and as it was noted: by Machiavelli, Disc, sopra Livio, i. 19. P. 184. [2] was : Observe the construction, the whole of the previous clause being the nominative. Or else we have here another instance of a common error, by which the verb is made to agree in number with the last substantive which precedes. [10] Tac. Ann. i. 16-22, quoted from memory. In the Latin Bacon strongly recommends acting as a branch of education, for though of ill repute as a profession yet as a part of training it is one of the best. In this he fortifies himself by the practice of the Jesuit schools. [1 5] mutiners, i. e. mutineers, the old form of spelling in Bacon's time. Compare planners for pioneers (p. 111) in ed. 1605. In Shakespeare's Temp. iii. 2. 41 the word is spelt m-uti- neere in the first folio, but in Coriol. i. 1. 254 it is mutiners as here. P. 185. [13] that he were like to use : i. e. that he might be likely to use. [16] had been to handle : We should now use the verb ' to have ' instead of the verb ' to be' in this idiom. But the latter was formerly common. See Shakespeare, Mer. of Ven. i. I. 5 : ' But how I caught it, found it, or came by it, What stuff 'tis made of, whereof it is born, I am to learn.' [27] De Augm. vii. 1. [29] Prov. iv. 23. P. 186. [10] they pass it over altogether: Another instance of the redundance of the pronoun, as in p. 20, 1. 27. [12] by habit and not by nature: See Aristotle, Eth. Nic. ii. 1. [13] Arist. Eth. Nic. x. to. [27] Seneca, Ep. ad Lucil. 52. § 14. [33] Demosthenes, Olyn. ii. 8. P. 187. [10] Virg. Georg. iii. 289. [29] were as the heathen divinity: Lat. quce ethnieis instar theologies erant. [30] Aristotle, Eth. Nic. i. 10 ; Rhet. ii. 12. P. 188. [3] than was : Lat. quam cujus ilia esset capax. [4] Seneca, Ep. ad Lucil. 53. § 12, quoted again in Essay v. p. 16: 'It is true greatnesse, to have in one, the frailty of a man, and the security of a god.' [18] their triplicity of good: the threefold division of good as it relates to mind, body, and estate. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. i. 8. 2. The comparison between a contemplative and an active life : See Arist. Eth. Nic. x. 6-8. [21] honesty and profit : Arist. Rhet. i. 6. [lb.] balanc- ing of virtue with virtue : Arist. Eth. Nic. iii. iv. P. 189. [12] rather than to suffer : We should say ' rather than suffer.' [21] being in commission of purveyance for a famine; i.e. being com- missioned to make provision for a famine. [25] Plutarch, Pomp. c. 50. [33] St. Paul in Rom. ix. 3, and Moses in Exod. xxxii. 32. Comp. Ess. xiii. p. 50 : ' But above all, if he have St. Pauls perfection, that he would wish to be an anathema from Christ, for the salvation of his brethren, 316 NOTES/ it shewes much of a divine nature, and a kinde of conformity with Christ himselfe.' P. 190. [1] anathematized: ' anathemized ' in ed. 1605, corrected in Errata. [15] The story is told by Cicero (Tusc. Disp. v. 3) from Hera- clides Ponticus of Leo tyrant of Phlius, not of Hiero. See Iamblichus, Vita Pythag. xii. 58. [21] this theatre of man's life, &c. : the reference is to Gen. i. where after each of the six days' work ' God saw that it was good.' Compare Essay xi. p. 40: ' For if a man, can be partaker of Gods theater, he shall likewise be partaker of Gods rest.' [24] Ps. cxvi. 15. [27] simple: So ed. 1605; the editions of 1629, 1633 read ' simply.' [30] or taking : Some copies of ed. 1 605 have ' or in taking,' others 'and in taking:' in the Errata to ed. 1605 the reading is 'or taking,' and this is adopted in edd. 1629, 1633. [31] Ex. xxiii. P. 191. [1] Gen. v. 24. [2] Jude 14. The apocryphal Book of Enoch was brought from Abyssinia by Bruce, and translated into English by Abp. Laurence. [4] knoweth it not: Some copies of ed. 1605 read 'knoweth it, decideth it not.' The Latin has nescit earn cer'e Theologia. The compositor's eye had been caught by the following line. [6] Zeno, the Stoic, who diedB.c. 263. [10] the Cyrenaics: founded by Aristip- pus of Cyrene, who flourished B.C. 366. Their doctrines terminated in Epicureanism. [15] Lat. nee minus illam alteram Epicuri scholam, quasi reformalam. [19] Comp. Ovid, Met. i. 107: ' Ver erat seternum, placidique tepentibus auris Mulcebant zephyri natos sine semine flores.' [20] and Herillus : Lat. denique et illam explosam Pyrrhonis et Herilli scholam. Herillus of Carthage flourished about b. c. 264, Cic. de Fin. iv. 14. [24] revived: Some copies of ed. 1605 read 'receued.' [29] Epictetus, Enchir. 1-7. P. 192. [2] Consalvo: Fernandez Consalvo, or Gonsalvo, of Cordova, the Great Captain. This story is told by Guicciardini, Hist. vi. 2. [3, 4] he had rather die . . than to have : Observe the looseness of the construction. See p. 189, 1. 12. [5] leader: So edd. 1629 and 1633, and some copies of ed. 1605; others have 'reader,' Lat. dux etimpera- tor. [6] hath signed : ' to sign to ' a document is to attest it by affixing one's signature, and hence to attest generally. [lb.] Prov. xv. 15. [18] Aristotle, Rhet. i. 5. § 10. [24] Mr. Ellis has shown that this was the opinion of Aristippus and not of Diogenes. Diog. Laert. Aristip. ii. 75 to Kpantv teal /j.)j 7}TTaa9aL rjbovuiv apiarbv, ov to fir} xpqoQai. [25] dv«- yov ual airix°v was the maxim of Epictetus. [26] refrain : to bridle, rein in, as it were ; a figure from horsemanship. [29] want of applica- tion : Lat. ineptitudinem ad morigerandum. Mr. Spedding rightly explains it as ' want of compliance or accommodation.' P. 193. [1] This saying of Consalvo is quoted again in Essay lvii. BOOK II. 317 p. 229; in Apoph. 180; and in the Speech against Duels (pp. 28, 29. ed. 1614). See note on the Essay. [4] De Augm. vii. 2. [8] Plautus, Pseud, ii. 2. 14, Condus promus sum procurator peni. Baret (Alvearie) gives : ' He that hath the keeping of a storehouse, or drie larder : also a buttler. Promus.' And "A Steward, or he that keepeth the store of houshold. Condus.' Bacon in this passage evidently regards condus as the officer who collected the stores, and promus the one who dispensed them, so called quia promit quod conditum est. [11, 12] whereof the latter seemeth to be the worthier : In the Latin this is expanded ; Atque hie posterior, qui Activus est et veluti Promus, potentior videtur et dignior; ille autem prior, qui Passivus est et veluti Condus, inferior censeri potest. [16] Acts xx. 35. [17] but esteemeth, i. e. but he esteemeth. [23] the state: Lat. securitas et mora. [24] Seneca, Nat. Quaest. ii. 59. § 7. [15] Prov. xxvii. 1. [28] Rev. xiv. 13. [32] Sen. Ep. x. 1. § 6, quoted also in Essay ii. with slight variations from the original, 'eadem feceris,' for jamdiu idem facias,' and ' fortis aut miser aut prudens ' for ' prudens et fortis aut miser.' P. 194. [6] By Seneca, Ep. 95. § 46: Vita sine proposito vaga est. [7] any: 'and' ed. 1605; 'any' is the reading of J629, 1633. [8] though in some case it hath an incidence into it : Lat. quamquam nonnunquam ambo coincidant. [13] gigantine : i.e. seditious, rebel- lious, like the giants who warred against the gods. See p. 103, and Ess. xv. [16] Sylla's epitaph, written by himself, was this, — ' That no man did euer passe him, neither in doing good to his friends, nor in doing mischiefe to his enemies.' North's Plutarch, p. 488 (ed. 1631). Compare p. 240, 1. 30. [19] active good: Lat. bonum activum indivi- duale saltern apparens. [20] See p. 189. [23] For let us take ..and rightly : Omitted in the Latin. [33] multiplying and extending their form upon other things: The ed. of 1605 has 'multiplying their fourm and extending upon other things.' P. 195. [6] in state : Lat. in suo statu. [9] Virg. JEn. vi. 730. [30] by equality : ' by the equality,' ed. 1605, corrected in the Errata. [31] evil: 'Euils' in some copies of ed. 1605. P. 196. [4] See Plato, Gorgias, i. 462, 494. [19-20] Compare what Bacon says in Essay xix. p. 76 : ' That the minde of man is more cheared, and refreshed, by profiting in small things, then by standing at a stay in great.' [27] Plutarch, Solon. 7. Again quoted by Bacon in Cogit. de Sc. Hum. frag. 3 (Works iii. 197). [31] Comp. Essay ii. p. 6: 'Certainly, the Stoikes bestowed too much cost upon death, and by their great pre- parations made it appeare more fearefull.' P. 197. [4] Juv. Sat. x. 358 ; quoted again in Ess. ii. p. 7. The true reading is spatium iaxfinem. [10-16] For as . . . life: Omitted in the Latin. P. 198. [22] Comp. Ess. xlviii. p. 200: 'For lookers on, many times, 318 NOTES, see more then gamesters : and the vale best discovereth the hill-' [27] of active matter : i. e. concerning subjects of active life. [29] The story is told by Cicero, De Orat. ii. 18. 75. P. 199. [4] The Basilicon Doron, written by King James for the in- struction of his eldest son, Prince Henry, and published in 1603. It is in three books: the first, 'Of a kings Christian dutie towards God;' the second, ' Of a kings dutie in his office ; ' and the third, ' Of a kings behaviour in indifferent things.' [9] not sick of dizziness: Lat. non vertigine aliquando corripitur. The edition of 1605 has 'Dusinesse,' which is corrupted to 'Businesse' in the editions of 1629 and 1633. [11] nor of convulsions . . impertinent : Lat. non digressionibus distrahitur, ut ilia quae nihil ad rhombum sunt expatiatione aliqua fiexuosa complectatur. [23] a great cause of judicature : Mr. Spedding says, ' Probably in the case of Sir Francis Goodwin, in 1604, when the question was whether it belonged to the House of Commons or the Court of Chancery to judge of the validity of an election.' [28] The title of this work of king James is ' The True Lawe of Free Monarchies, or the reciprock and mutuall dutie betwixt a free king, and his natural! subiects.' It was first published anonymously in 1603, and was afterwards included in the collected edition of the king's works published in 1616. P. 200. [10] In the De Augm. Bacon quotes the example of Pliny the younger in his panegyric on Trajan. [14] part: 'partie' in ed. 1605, corrected in Errata. [25] Prov. xiv. 6. [30] Comp, Shakespeare, Cym- beline, ii. 4. 107 : 'It is a basilisk unto mine eye, Kills me to look on't.' [32] which., they leese: Another example of the redundance of the pronoun. See note on p. 21, 1. 26. P. 201. [2-17] Comp. Bacon, Meditationes Sacrae, 3. [16] Prov. xviii. 2, quoted from the Vulgate. [18] for construction, see p. 52, 1. 9. [30] Lucius Brutus: See Livy, bk. ii. 5. [33] Virg. iEn. vi. 823; facta for fata is the true reading, but the latter is also found in the De Aug- mentis. P. 202. [2] This discussion is related by Plutarch, Brutus, xii. 2. [11] Comp. Shakespeare, Mer. of Ven. iv. I. 216: ' To do a great right, do a little wrong." [t2] Plutarch, De Sanitate Praecepta, 24; Praecepta Gerund. Reip. 24; Bacon, Apoph. 138. [20] De Augm. vii. 3. [26] Aristotle, Magn. Mor. i. 1. P- 203. [3] Cicero, Pro Muraana, 30. § 62. [6] Seneca, Ep. 71. § 2. [9] Hippocrates, Aphorism, ii. 6. [13, 14] Lat. attamen philosophiam moralem in famiditium theologian recipi inslar ancillee prudentis el pedissequa BOOK II. 3 l 9 fidelis, qua ad omnes ejus nutus prcesto sit et ministret, quid prohibeatf [15] Ps. cxxiii. 2. [20] as it may yield of herself: Observe that the neuter reflexive pronoun ' itself had not come generally into use. [24] — 204, [2] the rather . . extant : Instead of this the Latin has only, Earn igitur, ex more nostra, cum inter desiderata collocemus, aliqua ex parte adum- brahimus. P. 204. [7] the husbandman cannot command, neither, &c. : Observe the double negative, as in Shakespeare, Mer. of Ven. iii. 4. 11 : ■ I never did repent for doing good, Nor shall not now.' [11] without our command: i.e. beyond our control. [12-26] For to the basis .. apply : Altered in the Latin. [16] Virg. iEn. v. 710, 'Superanda omnis fortuna ferendo est.' [23] properly: 'property 'in ed. 1605, corrected to ' properly' in the Errata and in ed. 1629. P. 205. [2-31] wherein .. malignity: Omitted in the Latin. [6] Aris- totle, Eth. Nic. iv. 7. [10] to few : Mr. Spedding conjectures that we should read 'to intend few.' [18] Virg. JEn. i. 22. [20] See Ex. xxxiv. 5. [21] Aristotle, Eth. Nic. iv. 6. [30] properly: This is the reading of edd. 1605, 1629, 1633, but Mr. Spedding alters it to 'property,' as in p. 204, 1. 23. P. 206. [2] Lat. cum utrique scientice clarissimum luminis jubar ajfundere fossil. [6] These different dispositions are arranged according to the planets which are supposed to predominate over them : Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury, and the Moon. Comp. p. 43: 'Saturn, the planet of rest and contemplation, and Jupiter, the planet of civil society and action.' [6] Compare Bacon's Letter to Lord Burghley (Life and Letters, i. 108) : ' not as a man born under Sol, that loveth honour ; nor under Jupiter, that loveth business (for the contemplative planet carrieth me away wholly).' [8-23] A man shall find., use of life : This is entirely omitted in the Latin, and another paragraph sub- stituted which is partly made up of a sentence previously omitted (p. 203, 11. 24-28), and of a passage of some length in which Bacon points to the wiser historians as the source from which to gather materials for this treatise on the several characters of nafures and dispositions. [9] For some of these ' relations ' see Ranke's History of the Popes, App. §§ 5, 6 (trans. Foster). [16] is: 'as' in edd. 1605, 1629, 1633. [21] posies : ' poesies ' is the spelling of ed. 1605. [26] by the region : Lat. patria. [32] Plautus, Miles Gloriosus, iii. I. 40. P. 207. [4] Tit. i. 12, 13, quoting from Epimenides. [6] Sallust, Bell. Jug. 113. This is quoted again in Essay xix. p. 77, and there attributed to Tacitus : ' For it is common with princes, (saith Tacitus) to will contradictories. Sunt plerumque regum voluntates vehementes, cf inter se contraria. For it is the soljecisme of power, to thinke to 320 NOTES. command the end, and yet not to endure the meane.' [9] Tacitus ( Hist. i. 50; quoted again in Essay xi. p. 42. [11] Pindar, Olym. i. 55. of Tantalus : tcaraTT&pai fieyav oX(iov oitfc kdvvaaOrj. [14] Ps. lxii. 10. [17] Arist. Rhet. ii. 12-17. [ 2 ^1 it is m order: i. e. the order is. P. 208. [1] politiques: 'in politiques,' ed. 1605, corrected in Errata and in edd. 1629, 1633. [2] Solon, Fr. i. 8 (ed. Gaisford), referring to Pisistratus. See Bacon's Apoph. 232, and Cicero, Pro Cluentio, 49. Solon's lines are : 'E£ aviiiaw Z\ BaXaaaa. rapafffferai, r\v 54 Tts avTrjv Mr] Kivrj TiavToiv £ '■ 7- Acquaint, v. t. To accustom, familiarize: p. 67, 1. 21. Compare Shake- speare, Tempest, ii. ■&. 41 : ' Misery acquaints a man with strange bed- fellows.' Addition, sb. Title :. p. 95, 1. 20. According to Cowel (Law Diet. s. v.) it signifies * a title given to a man besides his Christian and surname, shewing his estate, degree, mystery, trade, place of dwelling, &c.' Com- pare Shakespeare, Coriolanus, i. 9. 66 : - ' Caius Marcius Coriolanus ! Bear The addition nobly ever 1 ' And Macbeth, i. 3. 106 : ' He bade me, from him, call thee thane of Cawdor : In which addition, hail, most worthy thane V See also Lear, ii. 2. 26. Adoption, sb. An obtaining, acquisition: p. 93, 1. 27. Adjacence, sb. Contiguity : p. 120, 1. 15. Adoptive, adj. Adopted: p. 57, 1. 2. 'Adoptive brethren ' = brothers by adoption. Advance, v.t. To promote: p. 231, 1. 5. Adventive, adj. Coming from without, adventitious : p. 113, 1. 29 ; p. 144, 1. 6. Advertised, p. p. Informed : p. 68, 1. 4 ; p. 80, 1. 27. Advertisement, sb. Information: p. 100, 1. 16. Notice: p. 219, 1. 31. Advise, v.i. To consider: p. 67, 1. 31 ; p. 161, 1. 21. Advised, p.p. Deliberate, well considered : p. 100, 1. 22. Compare Shake- speare, Merchant of Venice, i. 1. 142 : ' I shot his fellow of the selfsame flight The selfsame way with more advised watch.' Affect, sb. Affection, disposition: p. 131, 1. 24. Compare Shakespeare, Love's Labour 's Lost, i. I. 152 : ' For every man with his affects is born.' Affectionate, adj. Zealous, devoted, attached : p. 29, 1. 14. Eagerly desirous, studious: p. 112, 1. 10. Compare Bacon, Hist, of Hen. VII., p. 17 (ed. 1622) : ' So he being truly informed, that the Northerne parts were not onely affectionate to the House of Yorke, but particularly had been deuoted to King Richard the third.' After, adv. Afterwards : p. 18, 1. 9 ; p. 67, 1. 7. Afterward, adv. Afterwards : p. 27, 1. 2 ; p. 127, 1. 33. Agreed, p. p. Agreed to, admitted: p. 158, 1. 27. All, used where now we should use 'any': p. 17, 11. 2, 7: p. 56, 1. 27. Comp. ' without all contradiction ' (Heb. vii. 7). Allege, v.t. To quote: p. 88, 1. 30; p. 199, 1. 31. All one. The same: p. 30, 1. 17; p. 158, 1. I. Allow, v.t. To approve: p. 20, 1. 18; p. ill. 1. II. Compare Luke xi. 48 : ( Truly ye bear witness that ye allow the deeds of your fathers.* Allowance, sb. Approval : p. 24, 1. 6. So Shakespeare, Hen. VIII. iii. 2. 322 : ' Without the King's will or the state's allowance.' GLOS SARF. 335 Allusive, adj. Figurative: p. 102, 1. 22, 28. Todd quotes from South (Serin, ii. 276), ' The foundation of all parables, is some analogy or simili- tude between the tropical or allusive part of the parable, and the thing couched under it and intended by it.' Almost, adv. Apparently in the sense of 'most of all/ or 'generally': p. 163, 1. II. Bacon uses it in the same way in Essay xliii. p. 176; ' Neither is it almost seene, that very beautifull persons, are otherwise of great vertue.' Aloft, adv. Upwards : p. 89, 1. 6. Ambages, sb. Circuitous ways or methods: p. m, 1. 6; p. 124, 1. 18. Compare Bale, Image of both Churches (p. 260, Parker Soc.) ; • Evident will these secret mysteries be unto him, which are privily hid unto other under dark ambages and parables.' Amplification, sb. Exaggeration : p. 3, 1. 17. Shakespeare uses ' ampli- fied ' in the sense of * exaggerated' in Coriolanus, v. 2. 16 : ' His fame unparallel'd, haply, amplified* Anatomy, sb. A body used lor dissection : p. 80, 1. 18 ; p. 138, U. 16, 28 ; p. 139, 1. 17. Animosity, sb. Courage: p. 133, 1. 12. Cotgrave (Fr. Diet.) gives, ' Animosity : f. Animositie, stoutnesse, courage, metall, boldnesse, resolution, hardinesse.' Anointment, sb. Anointing : p. 83, 1. 5. Answerable, adj. Corresponding: p. 93, 1. 19; p. 162,1.9. Compare Shakespeare, Taming of the Shrew, ii. 1. 361 : ' Six score fat oxen standing in my stalls, And all things answerable to this portion.' Ant (p. 151, 1. 28), a feminine noun, as in Prov. vi. 6. Antistrophe, sb. Literally, that part of a song sung by a chorus of dancers when they retraced their steps in the dance. It corresponds to a previous 'strophe.' Bacon uses it of 'correspondence' generally: p. 131, 1. 22. Antiques, sb. Grotesque figures : p. 25, 1. 24. Compare Shakespeare, Much Ado, iii. 1.63: ' If black, why, Nature, drawing of an antique, Made a foul blot.' Apace, adv. Swiftly: p. 15, 1. 8. Apparently, adv. Openly, manifestly: p. 127, 1. 7. Compare Shake- speare, Comedy of Errors, iv. I. 78 : ' I would not spare my brother in this case, If he should scorn me so apparentiy.' Application, sb. Appliance: p. 21, I.3. Accommodation, adaptation: p. 192, 1. 30; p. 204, II. 6, 15, 24. Comp. p. 204,1. 23, 'which is that properly which we call accommodating or applying.' See also p. 26, 1. 25. Apply, v.i. To accommodate, adapt oneself: p. 204, 1. 26. Used re- flexively, p. 24, 1. 10. ' To apply ones selfe to others, is good : so it be with demonstrations that a man doth it upon regard, and not upon facilitie.' Essay lii. p. 211. Used transitively in the sense of, to devote oneself to: p. 41, 1. 1. Apprompt, v. t. To prompt : p.. 156, 1. 32. 33^ GLOSSARr. Apt, adj. Fit, suitable: p. 181, 1. 22. Compare Shakespeare, Jul. Cass. ii. 2. 97: 'A mock . Bounden, p.p. Bound, indebted: p. 268, 1. 28. Braver, adj. Finer, more beautiful: p. 216, 1. 10. ' The Duke of Milan And his more braver daughter could control thee.' Shakespeare, Tempest, i. 2. 439. Break, v. t. To train : p. 197, L 1 2. Still used of horses. 'Why, then thou canst not break her to the lute?' Shakespeare, Taming of the Shrew, ii. I. 148. Briber, sb. A taker of bribes : p. 222, 1. 25. Brittany, sb. Britain : p. 93, 1. 14 ; p. 94. "• I2 , l 7 • P- 26 4. '• 26. In the first and last of these passages the word is spelt ' Brittanie ' in ed. 1605. On the other hand, what we cajl ' Brittany ' is uniformly, I believe, called ' Britaine ' in Bacon's Hist, of Hen. VII. Broken, p.p. Trained : p. 156, 1. 5. Buckle, v. t. To bend : p. 102, 1. 10. Buffon, sb. The old spelling of 'buffoon': p. 136, 1. 20. Florio (Ital. Diet. 1 61 1) has 'Buffonare, to ie2St or play the buffon.' But only. This expression is found where we should now use one or other of the words: p. 234, 1. I. So 'only but' is used for 'but' or 'only': p. 174, 1. 10. Compare Shakespeare, Meas. for Meas. iii. I. 3 : ' The miserable have no other medicine Bui only hope.' By how much. In the same proportion as : p.. 12, 1. 8 ; p. 129, 1. 13. Z 33« GLOSSARY Called down, p. p. Cried down, decried; p. 87, I. II. Capable, adj. In the construction ' capable to lodge ' instead of * capable of lodging": p. 125,1. 31. Capable of. Able or apt to receive: p. 6, 1. 23. In a passive sense. ' Abhorred slave, Which any print of goodness will not take, Being capable of all ill/ Shakespeare, Tempest, i. 2. 353. Caption, sb. Deception, fallacy, in argument: p. 159,1.33. From the Lat. captio as used by Cicero, De Fato, xiii. 30, &c. Card, si. A chart : p. 246, 1. 33. Comp. Essay xviii. p. 72 : 'Let him carry with him also some card or booke describing the country, where he travelleth.' Carefulness, sb. Anxiety : p. 8, 1. 24. Comp. Ezek. xii. 18, 19. Carnoslty, sb. A fleshy excrescence : p. 139, 1. 14. Carriage, sb. Baggage : p. 79, 1. 29. See Judg. xviii. 21. Case, sb. ' In some case' = in some cases, sometimes : p. 194, 1. 8. Cast, v. t. To consider, plan : p. 181, 1. 26. Comp. Luke i. 29, and Bacon, Essay xlv. p. 183 : ' Cast it also, that you may have roomes, both for summer, and winter.' Casual, adj. Uncertain, subject to accident : p. 24I, 1. 27. Comp. Colours of Good and Evil, p. 248 : ' Sometimes because some things are in kinde very cas-uall, which if they escape, prove excellent.' Having reference to special cases : b p. 138, 1. 17. Casualty, sb. Uncertainty, instability: p. 23, 1. 13. See Bacon's Colours of Good and Evil, p. 256 (ed. W. A. Wright), 'this colour will bee reprehended or incountred by imputing to all excellencies in compositions a kind of povertie or at least a casualty or ieopardy.' Cautel, sb. Deceit : p. 200, 1. 16. ' And now no soil nor cautel doth besmirch The virtue of his will.' Shakespeare, Hamlet, i. 3. 15. ' Cautelle : f. A wile, cautell, sleight ; a craftie reach, or fetch, guilefull deuise or endeuor; also, craft, subtiltie, trumperie, deceit, cousenage.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Cautionary, adj. Full of cautions : p. 196, 1. 30. Caveat, si. A caution, warning : p. 22, 11. 9, 17 ; p. 55, 1. 7. Cavillation, si. A cavil, objection: p. 33, 1. 3 ; p. 154, 1. 12. ' Cavit- ation. A cauill ; a wrangling proposition, ouerthwart reason ; also, a cauilling.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Cease, v. t. To cause to cease : p. 40, 1. 8; p. 56, 1. 32. Celsitude, si. Lbftiness, height : p. 214, 1. 15. ' Celsitude : I. Celsitude, highnesse, excellencie ; (tearmes conferred on Princes).' Cotgrave, Fr, Diet. . Censure, v. i. To judge, give an opinion : p. 84, 1. 23 ; p. 250, 1. 32, 4 That I, unworthy body as I am, Should censure thus on lovely gentlemen.' Shakespeare, Two Gent, of Ver. i. 2. 10. GLOSSARY. oog Censure, sb. An opinion, judgement: p. 5, 1. 18 ; p. 7, 1. 28; p. 49, 1. 32. ' The speech of Theniislocles the Athenian, which was haughtie aud arrogant, in taking so much to himselfe, had been a grave and wise observation and censure, applied at large to others.' Essay xxix. p. 118. Ceremonies, sb. Superstitious rites: p. 146, 1. 23. 1 For he is superstitious grown of late, Quite from the main opinion he held once Of fantasy, of dreams and ceremonies! Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, ii. I. 197. Certify, v. t. To give information of: p. 154, 1. 13. Challenge, v. t. To claim : p. 11, 1. 13. Comp. Ex. xxii. 9. Challenge, sb. Claim: p. 198, 1. 21. ' And not of any challenge of desert.' Shakespeare, 1 Hen. VI, v. 4. 153. Champain, adj. Level, like a plain : p. 121, 1. 21. Charity, sb. Used in the same sense as in 1 Cor. xiii. 1, Sec, for the Greek ayairrj. p. 214, 1. 24. Ciphering, sb. Writing in cipher: p. 169, 1. 16. Circuit of speech. Circumlocution : p. 29, 1. 2. Compare Cotgrave (Fr. Diet.) : ' Circuition de paroles. A circumlocution, paraphrase, great circumstance of words ; a going about the bush.' Cireumferred, p. p. Carried round: p. 105, 1. 15. Civil, adj. Public, popular: p. 146, 1. 16. The Latin has quasi populares. Civility, sb. Civilization, refinement: p. 19, 1. 17. 'And a man shall ever see, that when ages grow to civility and elegancie, men come to build stately, sooner then to garden finely.' Essay xlvi. p. 186. Clear, v. t. To make clear or manifest: p. 17, 1. II. This is the sense in which it is understood in the Latin of the He Augmentis, but it appears to be used in the present passage in the legal sense ' to justify.' Cleave, v. i. To adhere : p. 18, 1. 26. Climate, sb. Region : p. 48, 1. 4. ' Climat : m. A clyme, or Clymate ; a diuision in the Skie, or Portion of the world, betweene South and North.' Cotgrave,, Fr. Diet. The ancient geographers ' divided the space comprehended between the equator and the pole into thirty parts, which they denominated Climates or Inclinations, viz. twenty-four between the equator and polar circle, and six between the polar circle and the pole.' Diet, of Science and Art, ed. Brande and Cox. Close, sb. A cadence in music : p. 107, 1. 33. ' The setting sun, and music at the close, As the last taste of sweets, is sweetest last.' Shakespeare, Richard II, ii. I. 12. Close, adj. Secret: p. 230, 1. 7. 'The close contriver of all harms." Shakespeare, Macbeth, iii. 5, 7. Close, adv. Closely, secretly: p. 234, 1. 22. ' Stand you thus close, to steal the bishop's deer ? ' Shakespeare, 3 Hen. VI, iv. 5. 17. Coarctation, sb. Restriction : p. 8, 1. 3. Z 2 34° GLOSSARY. Cockboat, sb. A small boat: p. 23, 1. 28. Called a 'cock' by Shake- speare, Lear iv. 6. 19 : 'Yond tall anchoring bark Diminished to her cock.' Cogitations, sb. Thoughts : p. 4, 1. 28 ; p. 70, 1. 14, &c. Comp. Dan. vii. 28. Colliquation, sb. Melting, liquefaction : p. 114,1. 30. ' Colliquation : f. A colliquation; a consumtion of the radicall humor, or substance of the bodie ; also, a melting, resoluing, dissoluing.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Colour, sb. Pretext: p. 24, 1. 26. 'To give colour,' p. 238, 1. 2. Columbine, adj. Dove-like: p. 201, 1. 4. 'Colombain: m. ine: f. Doue- like; of the nature of Doues; of, or belonging to, Doues.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Combustion, sb. Heat, feverish excitement : p. 184, 1. 13. Comen, p.p. Come: p. 37, 1. 3 ; p. 60, 1. 25 ; p. 188, 1. 24. So 'be- comen ' for ' become.' ' Sir Robert Clifford (who was now becomen the state informer).' Hist, of Hen. VII. (Works, vi. p. 152). See also Overcommen. Comfort, v. t. To strengthen : p. 77, 1. 4. 'Not contented thus to have comforted and assisted Her Majesty's rebels in England, he procured a rebellion in Ireland.' Bacon, Observ. on a Libel (Works, viii. 194). Comfortable, adj. Strengthening: p. 148, 1. 32. Comforting, sb. Strengthening, a verbal noun : p. 77, 1. 14. Comical, adj. Comic: p. 226, 1. 25. Commanded, p.p. Controlled: p. 141, 1. 33. See p. 140, II. 39, 30: p. 230, 1. 20. Commandment, sb. Command : p. 48, 1. 32 ; p. 69, 11, 20, 23, 24, &c. Commenter, sb. Commentator: p. 42, 1. 12. Commixed, p. p. Mixed: p. no, 1. 1. ' The smile mocking the sigh, that it would fly From so divine a temple, to commix With winds that sailors rail at.' Shakespeare, Cymb. iv. 2. 55. Commodity, sb. Convenience, advantage: p. 80, 1. 16. ' Commodity, the bias of the world.' Shakespeare, K. John, ii. I. 574. Commonalty, sb. A corporation: p. 56,1. 11. Spelt also commimalty, P> 83, 1. 5. ' Communaut6 : f. The comminaltie 3 or common people; .... also, a societie, brotherhood, corporation, or companie incorporate.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Common place, sb. The subject of a thesis or discussion: p. 19, 1. 8. ' Some have certaine common places, and theames, wherein they are good, and want variety.' Essay xxxii. p. 136. Commutative, adj. Relating to exchange: p. 107, 1. IT. See note. Johnson defines ' commutative justice ' as 'that honesty which is exercised in traffick ; and which is contrary to fraud in bargains.' Compacted, p.p. Compact, consolidated: p. 259, 1. 19; p. 260, 1. 10. See Eph. iv. 16. Compaction, sb. The being fastened together or consolidated : p. 260 1. 8. Compass, sb. A pair of compasses: p. 154, 1. 25. 'Compas: m. A GLOSSARY 341 compasse; a circle, a round; also, a paire of compasses.' Coterave Fr. Diet. 6 Compass, adj. Circuitous: p. 232, 1. 17. Compatible, adj. Sympathetic: p. 132, 1. 19. 'Compatible: com. Com- patible, concurrable; which can abide or agree together; or indure, or beare with, one another/ Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Complexion, sb. The constitution both of mind and body; p. 12, 1. 27; p. 162, 1. 30. Hence it denotes a natural tendency or inclination. Comp. Shakespeare, Meas. for Meas. iii. 1. 24: ' Thou art not certain ; For thy complexion shifts to strange effects, After the moon.' Compounded, />. />. Compound: p. 134, 1. ig. Conceit, sb. Conception: p. 20, 1. 17 ; p. 102,1*29; p. 174,1.9. ' Hear me without thine ears, and make reply Without a tongue, using conceit alone.' Shakespeare, K. John, iii. 3. 50. Conclude, v. t. To lay down as a conclusion : p. 206, 1. 17. Concordance, sb. Agreement, harmony: p. 89, 1. 16; p. 130, 1. 16. Concupiscence, sb. Eager desire, lust: p. 133, 1. 14. See Rom. vii. 8. Concurrent, sb. A rival: p. 235, I.4. 'Concurrent: m. A concurrent, corriuall, competitor.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Confectionary, sb. One who makes confections or conserves: p. 206, 1. 22. \See 1 Sam. viii. 13. ' But myself, Who had the world as my confectionary.' Shakespeare, Timon of Athens, iv. 3. 260. Confer, v.i. To consult: p. 66, 1, 24. See Gal. i. 16. To contribute : p. 102, 1. 6. Confidences, sb. Unusual in the plural: p. 227, 1. 13. See Jer. ii. 37. Congregate, adj. Collected : p. 1 30, 1. 3. Conjugate, adj. United : p. 1 30, 1. 4. Conjugates, sb. Things related to, and so resembling each other : p. 161, !• 33* Johnson defines a conjugate as ' Agreeing in derivation with another word, and therefore generally resembling in signification.' Bacon uses it in a wider sense. Conjugation, sb. Relation, connexion, combination : p. 89, 1. 12 ; p. 164, 1. 19; p. 198, 1. 10. Conscient, adj. Conscious: p. 227, 1. 30. Consecrate, p.p. Consecrated: p. 95, 1. 10. ' The imperial seat, to virtue consecrate.* Shakespeare, Tit. And. i. I. 14. Compare accommodate, accumulate, alienate, copulate, corroborate, dedic- ate, excommunicate, degenerate, demonstrate, devote, dilute, enumerate, illuminate, illustrate, incorporate, palliate, premeditate, &c. Consequent, sb. ' By consequent ' — in consequence, consequently : p. 134, 1- 33- Conserve, v. t. To preserve : p. 195, 1. 4. 'Thou art too noble to conserve a life In base appliances.' Shakespeare, Meas. for Meas. iii. I. 83. 343 GLOSSARY. Considerative, adj. Requiring consideration or reflection : p. 126, 1. 4. Compare Demonstrative. Consist, v. i. To stand firm, subsist, remain settled: p. 145, 1. 27; p. 209, 1. 13; p. 210, 1. 2. Comp. Col. i. 17. 'Consister. To consist, be ; rest, reside, abide ; to settle, stand still, or at a stay.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Consooiate, v. t. To associate, unite : p. 72, 1. 32. Consort, sb. Fellowship : p. 102, 1. 14. Constitute, v.i. To establish: p. 130, 1. 9. Construe, v. i. To interpret : p. 50, 1. 33 ; p. 245, 1. 4. ' Construe the times to their necessities.' Shakespeare, 2 Hen. IV, iv. 1. 104. Contain, v. I. To hold in, as the breath : p. 143, 1. 10. Contained, p. p. Restrained : p. 209, 1. 2 ; p. z6r, 1. 22. Contemplative, sb. One devoted to contemplation: p. 191, 1. I. Contend, v.i. To strive, endeavour: p. 22, 1. 6. Content, sb. The thing contained: p. 6, 1. 13. Contentation, sb. Contentment: p. 13,1. 18. Contention, sb. Effort, exertion: p. 104, 1. 12 ; p. 184, 1. 6. Contestation, si. Strife, debate : p. 22,1. 16. 'Contestation: f. A con- testation ; a protestation, taking, or calling to witnesse ; also, a contesting, striving, debating, reasoning, brabling about a matter.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. 'Your wife and brother Made wars upon me ; and their contestation Was theme for you.' Shakespeare, Ant. and CI. ii, 2. 43. Continent, adj. Containing ; ' the cause continent ' = the containing cause: p. 138, 1. 21. Continent, sb. The thing containing: p. 6, 1. 13. * Heart, once be stronger than thy continent, Crack thy frail easel' Shakespeare, Ant. and CI. iv. 14. 40. Continue, v. t. ' To continue his whole age ' = to devote his whole life continuously: p. 79, 1. 2 2. Continued, p.p. Kept, caused to remain: p. 162, 1. 25. Contract, sb. Convention, agreement: p. 167, 1. 2. Contrariwise, adv. On the contrary: p. 13, 1. 3; p. 15, 1. 19. See 2 Cor. ii. 7. Contristation, sb. Sadness: p. 5, 1. 21. Convenient, adj. Suitable: p. 58, 1. 21. Conversant, adj. 'Are conversant about ' = have to do with, are con- cerned with : p. 76, 1. 32. Converse, v.i. To dwell or abide; and so, to associate: p. 43, 1. 16. ' I have, since I was three year old, conversed with a magician, most profound in his art.' Shakespeare, As You Like It, v. 2. 66. Conversion, sb. A turning round, revolving: p. 158, 1. 19. Convince, v.t. To convict, refute: p. 10S, 1. 31. See John viii. 46. Copie, sb. Copiousness: p. 29, 1. 14; p. 30, 1. 4; p. 154, 1. 5. Copy. ' To change copy 1 = to change, shift about : p. 221,1.15. 'Then Callisthenes changing copy, spake boldly many things against the Mace- donians.' North's Plutarch, Alex. p. 701 (ed. 163 1). GLOSSARy. 343 Corroborate, v. t. To strengthen: p. 131, 1. 33. Corroborate, p.p. Confirmed in strength, grown strong: p. 21, 1. I. ' There is no trusting to the force of nature, nor to the bravery of words ; except it be corroborate by custonie.' Essay xxxix. p. 162. Corrupt, v.i. To become corrupt: p. 2^9, 1. 13. 'Likewise glorious gifts and foundations, are like sacrifices without salt ; and but the painted sepulchres of almes, which soone will putrifie, and corrupt inwardly.' Essay xxxiv. p. 148. Cosmetic, sb. The art of decoration : p. 133, I. 24. Countenance, sb. Appearance, semblance: p. 11, I. 26. 'A counte- nance of gravity ' = an appearance of importance. Countervail, v.t. To counterbalance, outweigh: p. 14,1. 15; p. 161 I.17. * But come what sorrow can, It cannot countervail the exchange of joy.' Shakespeare, Rom. and Jul. ii. 6. 4. Course, ' In course ' = in its due order: p. 86, 1. 2 3. Cramp in, v. t. To force, press in: p. 199, 1. 11. The modern cram. Creature, sb. Anything created: p. no, 1. 13. See Rom. i. 25; viii. 19. ' The first creature of God, in the workes of the dayes, was the light of the sense.' Essay, i. p. 2. Crossness, sb. Intricacy : p. 250, 1. 24. Cryptic, sb. Concealment: p. 174, 1. 27. Cumber, 56. Encumbrance : p. 246, 1. 6. Curiosity, sb. Nicety : p. 32,- 1. 10. ' Wherefore should I Stand in the plague of custom, and permit The curiosity of nations to deprive me.' Shakespeare, Lear, i. 2. 4. Curious, adj. Careful to excess, scrupulous, careful, nice : p. 10, 1. 2 1 ; p. 20, 1. 32; p. 180, 1. 6. Wrought with care: p. 134, 1. 30. * His body couched in a curious bed.' Shakespeare, 3 Hen. VI, ii. 5. 53. Customed, p. p. Frequented by customers : p. 155, 1. 29. D. Deearded, p.p. Discarded: p. 126,1.33. Decayed, p. p. Brought to decay: p. 72, 1. 19. 'Decay 'is used transi- tively in Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, i. 5. 82 : ' Infirmity, that decays the wise.' Decency, sb. Comeliness, propriety: p. 216, 11. 21, 2S ; p. 219, 11. 4, 5. • Decence : f. Decencie, seemelinesse, comelinesse, handsomenesse.' Cot- grave, Fr. Diet. Decent, adj. Becoming, appropriate : p. 6,1. 19; p. 181, 1. 22. ' In beauty, that of favour, is more then that of colour, and that of decent and gracious motion more then that of favour.' - Essay xliii. p. 1 76. 344 glossary:- Declination, sb. Decline: p. 143, 1. 25. ' And the one of them said, That to be a secretary, in the declination of a monarchy, was a ticklish thing, and that he did not affect it.' Essay xxii. p. 94. Deducement, sb. Deduction : p. 225, 1. 6 ; p. 260, 1. 30. Defeat, v.t. To ruin, undo: p. 207, 1. 11. ' Desfaire. To vndoe ; breake, defeat, discomfit, ouercome; ruine, destroy, ouerthrow.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Defieienoe, sb. Deficiency: p. 84, 11. 6, 22 ; p. 118, 1. 33. Define of. To define: p. 116, 1. 28; p. 257, 1. 5. Defunct, sb. A dead man: p. 149, I. 26. Degenerate,^./'. Degenerated: p. 81, 1. 32. 'Reduce things, to the first institution, and observe, wherein, and how, they have degenerate.' Essay xi. p. 41. Degrees, sb. Ranks in society : p. 9.6, 1. 17. Delectable, adj. Delightful: p. 64, 1. 17; p. 89, 1. 24. * Making the hard way sweet and delectable.' Shakespeare, Rich. II. ii. 3. 7. Delectation, sb. Delight: p. 102, 1. 7. 'Delectation: f. Delectation, deHght, pleasure, oblectation.* Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Delicacy, sb. Effeminacy: p. 19, 1. 14. ' Delicatesse : f. Delicacie, dainti- nesse, tendemesse, nicenesse, wantonnesse, effeminacie; sensualite.* Cot- grave, Fr. Diet. Delicate, adj. Affected, effeminate : p. 28, 1. 10. Deliver, v.t. To pronounce, communicate, as a message: p. 7» 1- 21. ' The former delivers the precepts of the art ; and the latter the perfection.* Essay xlv. p. 181. Demand, v. t. To ask, simply ; not as now, to ask with authority or as a right : p. 85, I. 7. See 2 Sam. xi. 7. Demonstrate, p. p. Demonstrated: p. 39, 11. 10, II. Demonstrative, -adj. Capable of demonstration, demonstrable : p. 14, 1. 29. 4 He sends you this most memorable line. In every branch truly demonstrative.' Shakespeare, Hen. V, ii. 4. 89. Dependences, 56. Dependents: p. 239, 1. 7; p. 231, 1. 9; p. 235, 1. 14. Depending, p. p. Impending: p. 218, 1. 11. Deplored, p.p. Despaired of: p. 140, 1. 20. ' Your love, sir, like strong water To a deplor'd sick man, quicks your feeble limbs For a poor moment.* Albumazar, i. 2. (Dodsley's Old Plays, vii. 115, ed. 1825.) Depravation, sb. Depreciation, defamation, slander: p. 17, 1. 2. 'Apt, without a theme, For depravation.' Shakespeare, Tr. and Cr. v. 2. 132. Deprave, v. t. To defame, depreciate, disparage : p. 27, 1. 25 ; p. 37, 1. 15. ' If affection lead a man, to favour the lesse worthy in desert, let him doe it without depraving or disabling the better deserver.* Essay xlix. p. 202. Depredation, sb. A robbing, plundering : p. 106, 1. 6. GLOSSARy. 345 Derivation, sb. Originally, the turning of a stream into another channel : p. 36, I. 12. See note. Derived, p. p. Drawn off, as in channels: p. 259, 11. 9, 17. Descry, v. t. To observe, discern : p. 71, 1. 33 ; p. 115, 1. 29. * Moreover, to descry The strength o' the enemy." Shakespeare, Lear, iv. 5. 13. Designation, sb. Appointment : p. 78, 11. ±, 3 ; p. 83, 1. 12 ; p. 84, 1. 4. Designment, sb. Design: p. 16, 1. 1. * Served his designments In mine own person.' Shakespeare, Coriolanus, v. 6. 35. Desolate, v. t. To render desolate : p. 2 3 I , 1. 8. ' Desoler. To desolate ; make lonelie, solitary, deavelie, or desart ; to deuast, waste extreamely, mine vtterly.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Despite, sb. Spite: p. 61, 1. 27. ' Full of despite, bloody as the hunter.' Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, iii. 4. 243. Destituted, p. p. Left destitute, abandoned: p. 129, 1. 31. Bacon uses ' destitute ' as a verb in Essay xxxiii. p. 143 : ' It is the sinfullest thing in the world, to forsake or destitute a plantation, once in forwardnesse.' Determinate, adj. Definite : p. 209, 1. 25. Determination, sb. The solution or decision of a question : p. 173, 1. 7. It is now used rather in the sense of ' resolution ' which itself once was equivalent to ' solution.' Devote, adj. Devoted : p. 42, 1. 8. Dexteriously, adv. Dexterously: p. 214, 1. 32. This is the form of the word in the editions of 1605, 1629, 1633, and in Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, i. 5. 66: ' Dexteriously, good madonna.' In p. 240,1. 15, the word is spelt as usual. Diascordium, sb. P. 140, 1. 32. See note. Dictature, sb. Office of dictator, dictatorship : p. 65, 1. 33. Difference, sb. A distinguishing mark, a badge : p. 4, 1. 14 ; p. 47, 1. 4. In heraldry a difference is * a figure added to a coat of arms to distinguish the persons or families who bear the same arms, and to indicate their nearness to the original bearer.' (Webster, Diet.) Hence, in Shakespeare, Haml. iv. 5. 183; 'O you must wear your rue with a difference' ; and. Much Ado, i. I, 69 ; ' Let him bear it for a difference between himself and his horse. Differing, adj. Different : p. 10, 1. 25 ; p. 28, 1. 33, &c. Difficile, adj. Difficult: p. 217, 1. 10. 'Difficile: com. Difficile, difficult; hard, vneasie, troublesome, intricate, painefull, almost impossible.' Cot- grave, Fr. Diet. Digested, p.p. Arranged: p. 154, 1. 28. 'We have cause to be glad that matters are so well digested.' Shakespeare, Ant. and CI. ii. 2. 1 79. Digladiation, sb. Literally, a combat with swords ; hence, a quarrel or controversy: p. 33, 1. 20. Dilatation, sb. Dilation, expanded description : p. 117, 1. 32. Dilute, adj. Diluted; and so, feeble: p. 260, 1. 16. Disable, v. t. Literally, to disqualify ; then, to pronounce disqualified, to disparage: p. 13, 1. 7 ; p. 153, 1. 32; p. 176, 1. 32. Comp. Shakespeare, As You Like It, v. 4. 80 ; ' He disabled my judgement.' 34<5 GLOSSARy. Disallowed, p. p. Disapproved: p. 27,1.13; p. 41, I. 31. See I Pet. ii. 4. 7- Discern, w. t. To distinguish between, recognize: p. 136, 1. 20. 'To discern of •-, p. 203, I. 18. Comp. * accept of,* * define of.' Discharge, sb. The phrase ' discharge of cares ' signifies delivery from the charge or burden of cares: p. 77, 1. 20. Discharged, p.p. Dismissed, got rid of: p. 187, I, 30. Disclaim in. To disclaim all share in, renounce: p. 73» 1- 15- 'You cowardly rascal, nature disclaims in thee : a tailor made thee.' Shake- speare, Lear, ii, 2. 59. Discontents, sb. Causes of disaffection : p. 58, 1. 23. * His discontents are unremoveably Coupled to nature.' Shakespeare, Tim. of Ath. v. 2. 227. Discontinuation, sb. A solution of continuity : p. 139, 1. 11. Discourse of reason. The power of inferring one thing from another; the reasoning faculty, as distinguished from reason: p. 28, 1. 13. Com- pare Shakespeare, Haml. i. 2. 150: 'A beast, that wants discourse of reason, Would have mourn'd longer.* And Troilus and Cressida, ii. 2. 116 : 'Or is your blood So madly hot that no discourse of reason Nor fear of bad success in a bad cause, Can qualify the same?' Shakespeare uses ' discourse* alone in the same sense, Haml. iv. 4. 36: ' Sure, he that made us with such large discourse, Looking before and after, gave us not That capability and godlike reason To fust in us unused.' Discoursing, adj. Discursive, shifting: p. 119, 1. 9. The figure is evidently taken from a sandbank. See p. 120, 11. 1-5. Discover, v.t. To uncover, lay bare: p. 9, 1. 10. Comp. Ps. xxix. 9. Disesteem, v. t. To depreciate, undervalue : p. 20, 1. 28. *Disestimer. To disesteeme, neglect, contemne, set naught by, make no reckoning of.* Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Disguisement, sbi A disguising, disguise: p. 123, 1. 19. Disincorporate, adj. Disincorporated, dissevered: p. 258, 1. 32. Dismantled, p. p. Unmasked, stripped of disguise : p. 238, 1. 19. Com- pare Shakespeare, Lear, i. I. 220 : 'That she . . . . should in this trice of time Commit a thing so monstrous, to dismantle So many folds of favour.* Dispose, v.t. To arrange: p. 44, 1. 23; p. 81, 1. 25. Disposition, sb. Arrangement: p. 44, 1. 27. Of studies, says Bacon, their chief use ' for ability, is in the iudgement and disposition of busi- nesse.' Essay ]. p. 204. Distaste, sb. Disgust: p. 8, 1. 8. 'Prosperity is not without many feares and distastes. 1 Essay v. p. 17. Distemper, v.t. To derange, disorder : p. 134. 1. 28. * The malignancy GLOSSARF. 34; of my fate might perhaps distemper yours.' Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, ii. I. 5. Distinguish, v. i. To assert distinctly, decide : p. 166, 1. 3. Disvalued, p.p. Depreciated: p. 237, 1. 3. ' But in chief For that her reputation was disvalued In levity.* Shakespeare, Meas. for Meas. v. I. 221. Divers, adj. Different; and so, several: p. 25, 1. 32; p. 85, 1. 31. 'For indeed, every sect of them, hath a divers posture, or cringe by themselves.' Essay iii. p. 9. Diverse, adj. Different: p. 39, 1. 27 ; p. 85, 1. 15. Divination, sb. Foretelling of future events : p. 87, 1. 25. ' Diuination, or Southsaying, & telling things by coniecture. Mantice.' Baret, Alvearie. Divulsion, sb. A tearing asunder : p. 189, 1. 13. 'Divulsion: f.Adivul- sion, or pulling vp ; also, a cutting, section, or division.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Dogmatical, sb. Dogmatical statement, dogma: p. 152, 1. 30. Dolor, sb. Grief, suffering : p. 140, I. 5. 'A minde fixt, and bent upon somewhat, that is good, doth avert the dolors of death.' Essay ii. p. 7. Domestical, adj. Domestic : p. 223, 1. 16. 'Domestique: com. Domes- tically housall, of our household.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Donative, sb. A gift, largess: p. 48, 1. 14; p. 71, 1. I. ' For their men of warre ; it is a dangerous state, where they live and remaine in a body, and are used to donatives' Essay xix. p. 81. Dotation, sb. Endowment: p. 79, 1. 1. Doubt, v.i. To hesitate through fear, and then, to fear: p. 16, 1. 28; p. 26, 1. 8. 'I doubt some danger does approach you nearly.' Shakespeare, Macb. iv. 2. 67. Droumy, adj. Turbid : p. 246, 1. 16. Halliwell (Arch, and Prov. Diet.) gives the word as a Devonshire provincialism. Chaucer uses ' drovy.' Drown, u. i. To be drowned : p. 92, 1. 27. Drowtn, sb. Drought: p. 151, 1. 23. Compare Pericles, iii. Gower, 8. Duleeness, 56. Sweetness, p. 238, 1. 21. E. Basiliest, adv. Most easily : p. 41, I. 29. Ecstasy, sb. A trance : p. 145, I. 24. A state in which the functions of the senses are temporarily suspended. Such was the ' trance ' {e/coraois) ' into which the Apostle Peter fell (Acts x. 10). See Shakespeare, Oth. iv. 1. 80 : ' I shifted him away, And laid good 'scuse upon your ecstasy.' Eccentrics, sb. According to the Ptolemaic system of astronomy, the supposed circular orbits described by the planets about the earth, which was not in the centre: p. 161, 1. 30. 348 GLOSSARY. Edition, sb. Promulgation, publication: p. 266, 1. 5. Effectual, adj. Energetic, effective, practical: p. 235, I. 17. 'Neither can they (i. e. vain persons) be secret, and therefore not effectuall.' Essay liv. p. 216. Elected, p.p. Chosen : p. 158, 1. 28. ' Why hast thou gone so far, To be unbent when thou hast ta'en thy stand, The elected deer before thee?' Shakespeare, Cymb. iii. 4. 112. Election, sb. Choice : p. 46, 1. 18 ; p. 49, 1. 9. ' But contrariwise in favour, to use men with much difference and election, is good.' Essay xlviii. p. 199. See also Haml. iii. 2. 69. Elegancy, sb. Elegance: p. 47, 1. 33; p. 64, 1. 18. ' But yet, since princes will have such things (i. e. masques), it is better, they should be graced with elegancy, then daubed with cost. Essay xxxvii. p. 156. Elenche, sb. From the Greek e\eyx os . a term in logic, which is defined as ' a syllogism by which the adversary is forced to contradict himself': p. 159, 11. 18, 25 ; p. 160, 1. 14. Elogy, sb. A panegyric, eulogy: p. 94, 1. 31. Emancipate,^./". Emancipated, set free: p. 130, 1. II. Embased, p.p. Debased, deteriorated : p. 127,1.9. 'And that mixture of falshood, is like allay in coyne of gold and silver ; which they make the metall worke the better, but it embaseth it.' Essay i. p. 3. Embassage, sb. An embassy. ' To come in embassage ' = to come on an embassy: p. n, 1. I. ' I will . . . do you any embassage to the Pigmies.' Shakespeare, Much Ado, ii. 1. 277. Emulate •with. To emulate, vie with: p. 112, 1. 32.' The construction is an imitation of the Latin * semulari cum aliquo.' Emulation, sb. Envy, rivalry in a bad sense : p. 49, 1. 29. ' Whilst emulation in the army crept.* Shakespeare, Tr. and Cr. ii. 2. 212. It is now used exclusively in a good sense, as in p. 50, 1. 18. Enable, v.t. To make able, to qualify: p. 12, 1. 22; p. 42, 1. 23. Comp. 1 Tim. i. 12. Enablement, sb. A qualifying or making able, qualification : p. 59, 1. 3; p. 79,1.9. End. 'To the end'=in order: p. 17, 1. 19; p. 46, 1. 6 ; p. 48, 1. 29. ' Nay, some undertake sutes, with a full purpose, to let them fall ; to the end, to gratifie the adverse partie, or competitour.' Essay xlix. p. 201. Endeavour, v. t. To strive after, aim at, attempt : p. 10, 1. 10. Obsolete construction. ' But I'll endeavour deeds to match these words.' Shakespeare, Tr. and Cr. iv. 5. 259. • Engaged, p. p. Literally, bound by a gage or pledge ; and so, pledged or committed to a certain course of conduct : p. 234, 1. 29. Engine, sb. A contrivance, device, requiring ingenium or skill: p. 241, 1. 18. Enginery, sb. Engineering: p. 122, 1. 8. Enterprised, p.p. Attempted, undertaken : p. 97, 1. 33. 'And therefore is not by any to be enterprised, nor taken in hand, unadvisedly.' Marriage Service. GLossARr. 349 Entitle, v. t. To give a title to, designate : p. 26, 1. 19. Enucleate, v. t. To extract as a kernel : p. 256, 1. 27. Enumerate, p.p. Enumerated : p. 83, 1. 24. Envious, adj. Malicious ; used in a much stronger sense than at present : p. i8, 1. 3. 'But none can drive him from the envious plea Of forfeiture, of justice, and his bond.' Shakespeare, Mer. of Ven. iii. 2. 285. Envy, si. Ill-will : p. 55, 1. 3. Envy, v. «. To bear ill-will, to grudg-e : p. 38, 1. 8. Epicure, 56. An Epicurean: p. 196, 1. 13. Essence, sb. Essential importance : p. 164, 1. 30. Estate, sb. State: p. 13, 11. 28, 30 ; p. 23, 1. 27 ; p. 70, 1. 13. Condition : p. 43, 1. 1. Esteem of. To esteem, reckon, estimate: p. 178, 1. 6; p. 228, 1. 24. ' Whosoever esteemetb too much of amorous affection, quitteth both riches, and wisedome.' Essay x. p. 37. Comp. ' define of,' ' discern of.' Estuation, sb. Fermentation, agitation of mind: p. 195, 1. 20. Every, pron. Each: p. 14, 1. 21 ; p. 136, 1. 1. 'Every of them is carried swiftly, by the highest motion, and softly in their owne motion.' Essay xv. p. 56. Examinable, adj. Capable of being examined : p. 255, 1. 33 ; p. 256, 1. 10. Exceed, v. i. To be excessive : p. 132, 1. 4. ' Marg. I saw the Duchess of Milan's gown that they praise so. Hero. O, that exceeds, they say.' Shakespeare, Much Ado, iii. 4. 17. Excellency, sb. Excellence : p. 55, 1. 3. ' As if nature, were rather busie, not to erre, then in labour, to produce excellency. 1 Essay xliii. p. 1 76. Except, p.p. Excepted : p. 68, 1. 8 ; p. 116, 1. 6. ' Christ in the truth of our nature was made like unto us in all things, sin only except* Art. XV. Excusation, sb. Excuse: p. 24, 1. 6; p. 181, 1. 25. 'Prefaces, and passages, and excusations, and other speeches of reference to the person, are great wasts of time.' Essay xxv. p. 102. Exemplar, adj. Pattern, used as an adjective; conspicuous : p. 92, 11. 10, 24; p. 222, 1. 33. Exhibit, v.t. To administer as a remedy; a medical term: p. 131, I.32. Expect, v. t. To await : p. 16, 1. 18. 'Let's in, and there expect their coming.' Shakespeare, Mer. of Ven. v. I. 49. Expedite, adj. Unencumbered, expeditious, speedy: p. 159, 1. 16. Expostulation, sb. Demand : p. 64, 1. 26. Expulse, v.t. To drive out, expel : p. 16, 1. 29 ; p. 173, 1. 30. 'For ever should they be expulsed from France.' Shakespeare, I Hen. VT. iii. 3. 25. Exquisite, adj. Elaborate, minute: p. 24, 1. 14; p. 28, 1. 23; p. 35, 1. 20. Extemporal, adj. Extemporary: p. 82, 1. 8. 'Sir Nathaniel, will you hear an extemporal epitaph on the death of the deer?' Shakespeare, Love's Labour 's Lost, iv. 2. 50. 350 GLOSSART. Extensive, adj. Capable of being extended: p. 31, 1. 13. Compare demonstrative. Extenuate, v. I. To lessen, depreciate: p. 13, 1. 6. 'Extenuating and blasting of your merit.' Bacon, Letter of Advice to Essex (Works, ix. 41). ' Speak of me as I am ; nothing extenuate. Nor set aught down in malice.' Shakespeare, Oth. v. 2. 342. Extern, adj. External : p. 106, 1. 16; p. 199, 1. 20. 'When my outward action doth demonstrate The native act and figure of my heart In compliment extern.' Shakespeare, Oth. i. I. 63. Extinguish, v. i. To be extinguished: p. 92, 1. 27. Extinguishment, sb. Extinction; p. 191, 1. 21. Extirper, sb. An extirpator: p. 52, 1. 2. Extreme, adv. Extremely: p. 243, 1. 16. 'Acting in song, especially in dialogues, hath an extreme good grace.' Essay xxxvii. p. 156, 1. 10. Extremely, adv. ' Most extremely compounded ' = compounded in the most extreme degree: p. 134, 1. 8. Exulceration, sb. An ulcer : p. 68, 1. 32. F. Face out, v. t. To confront boldly, brazen out : p. 238, 1. 8. Facile, adj. Easily swayed, fickle, pliant: p. 222, 1. 27. 'If they (i. c. judges) be facile, and corrupt, you shall have a servant, five times worse than a wife.' Essay viii. p. 27. Facility, sb. Pliancy : p. 238, 1. 21. See quotation under Apply. Eaeture, sb. Shape, form: p. 131, 1. 4; p. 138, 1. 19. 'Facture: f. The facture, workemanship, framing, making of a thing.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Faculty, sb. Power, influence: p. 136, 1. 12. ' Besides, this Duncan Hath borne his faculties so meek.' Shakespeare, Macb. i. 7. 1 7. Fair, adj.. Handsome: p. 32, 1. 30. 'It is a reverend thing, to see an ancient castle, or building not in decay ; or to see a faire timber tree, sound and perfect.' Essay xiv. p. 52. Faith, sb. The Christian faith or religion: p. 49, 1. 10 ; p. 132, 1. 7; P- 255, 1. II. False, adv. Falsely: p. 182, 1. 11. Fallace, sb. Fallacy: p. 159, 1. 30. Fallacy, sb. Deception: p. 71, 1. 22. 'Fallace: f. Afallacie; guile, deceit, wile, tromperie, a craftie tricke, cheating, sleight, cousening deuice.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Fall out, v. i. To happen : p. 28, 1. 7 J p. 103, 1. 16. Fame, sb. Report, rumour: p. 34, 1. 21. See Gen. xlv. 16. 'Seditious tumults, and seditious fames, differ no more, but as brother and sister, masculine and feminine. 1 Essay xv. p. 55. GLOSSARV. 351 Fastest, adv. Most closely: p. 18, 1. 26. Felicity, 56. Luck, good fortune: p. 227, 1. 15. 'The pencill of the holy Ghost, hath laboured more, in describing the afflictions of lob, then the felicities of Salomon.' Essay v. p. 17. Find strange. To wonder: p. 78, ?. 14; p. 94, I. 25; p. 141, 1. 21. 'It cannot be found strange' it cannot be wondered at: p. 149, 1. 33. Lat. non est cur miretur quispiam. Fitteth, is befitting: p. 82, 1. 3. Fixing, sb. Fixed position: p. 47, 1. 32. Compare 'fixure' in Troilus and Cressida, i. 3. 101. Flexuous, adj. Winding, intricate: p. 118, 1. 15. Fluctuant, adj. Floating : p. 98, 1. 26. Fly, v. t. To chase flying, as with a hawk : p. 209, 1. 10. ' But now, if a man can tame this monster, and bring her to feed at the hand, and govern her, and with her fly other ravening fowle, and kill them, it is somewhat worth.' Essay of Fame, p. 240. For = as for: p. 71, 1. 8. Force. ' Of force ' = of necessity , necessarily: p. 106, 1. 17. Forth, redundant in the phrases ' how far forth,' ' as far forth ' : p. 176,1. 12; p. 257, 1. 30. 'Forth of'=ont of: p. 231, 1. 14. See Gen. viii. 16. Fortify, v. i. To become strong : p. 209, 1. 4. Forwards. In the phrase 'so forwards ' = so forth, so on: p. 48, 1. 9. Frame. 'Out of frame' = ont of order: p. 217, 1. 19. 'And therfore, when great ones, in their owne particular motion, move violently. . . . it is a signe, the orbs are out of frame? Essay xv. p. 56. Fret, v. /. To eat away : p. 91, 1. 7. See Lev. xiii. 55. Frets, sb. p. 162, 1. 17. Figures in architecture, used in ornamenting the roofs of houses, 'formed by small fillets intersecting each other at right angles.' Parker's Glossary of Architecture. The Egyptian key pattern is a familiar example. ' Fringotteries : f. Frets ; cranklings, wrigled flourishing, in earnings, &c.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. A. S.fratu, an ornament. Fripper, sb. A dealer in old clothes: p. 176, 1. 25. 'Fripier: m. A Fripier; or broker; a mender, or trimmer vp of old garments, and a seller of them so mended.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Shakespeare (Temp. iv. I. 225) uses ' a frippery' for an old-clothes shop. Fro, prep. From : p. 68, 1. 10. Fume, sb. Vapour, smoke ; used metaphorically : p. 89, 1. 25. Funambalo, sb. A rope-dancer: p. 165, 1. 23.- 'We see the industry and practice of tumblers and funambulos, what effects of great wonder it bringeth the body of man unto.' Bacon, Disc, touching Helps for the Intell. Powers (Works, vii. p. 99). Futility, sb. Idle talkativeness, blabbing of secrets : p. 248, 1. 33. Bacon (Essay vi. p. 20) uses the adjective ' futile.' ' As for talkers and futile persons, they are commonly vaine, and credulous withall' And again in Essay xx. p. 84. 353 GLOSSARr. G. Gamester, sb. A player at any game ; not necessarily a gambler : p. 198, 1. 23. Generosity, sb. Nobility : p. 69, 1. 30. Gigantine, adj. Giantlike : p. 194, 1. 13. Referring to the war of the giants against Jupiter. Glance, sb. An allusion, hint: p. 57, 1. 17. Glass, sb. A mirror : p. 108, 1. 6 ; p. 161, 1. 6 ; p. 1 76, 1. 7. In the New Atlantis Bacon uses 'glass' for 'lens' (Works, iii. 162). Glory, sb. Ostentation: p. 7, 1. 27; p. 11 2, 1. 19; p. 171, 1. 4. See Essay Ivi. p. 224, 1. 31 : 'Whatsoever is above these, is too much; and proceedeth either of glory and willingnesse to speake ; or of impatience to hear, &c. Go, v. I. Used in a transitive sense : p. 83, I. 29. Go about. To endeavour: p. 173, 1. 10. See Rom. x. 3. Grace, v. t. To compliment, praise : p. 236, 1. 29. Comp. Essay lvi. p. 225 : 'There is due from the iudge, to the advocate, some commend- ation and gracing, where causes are well handled, and faire pleaded.' Gravelled, p.p. Puzzled. To be gravelled = to hesitate: p. 57, 1. 15. ' Nay, you were better speak first, and when you were gravelled for lack of matter, you might take occasion to kiss.' Shakespeare, As You Like It, iv. I. 74. Grecia, sb. Greece : p. 3, 1. 25 ; p. 12, 1. 10. See Dan. viii. 21. Grecians, sb. Greeks: p. 11, 1. 15. Comp. Joel iii. 6. Grift, v.t. To graft: p. 255, 1. 22. The ed. of 1605 has grifte, which in ed. 1629 became grift, and in ed. 1633 graft. Baret (Alvearie, s. v.) gives ' To griffe. Inserere arbori.' Grossly, adv. Clumsily, unskilfully : p. 37, 1. 7; p. 153, 1. 23. Grot, sb. A grotto or cave : p. 162, I. 26. Ground, sb. The plain-song of a tune, on which the variations or descants are made: p. 197. 1. n. Ground, sb. Foundation : p. 76, 1. 12. Ground, v.t. To lay the foundation of: p. 113, 1. 9. Grounded, p.p. Well founded: p. no, 1. 15. 'Well grounded ' = with good foundations : p. 217, 1. 21. Grounds, sb. Soils : p. 207, 1. 20. Among the disadvantages in the site of a house, Bacon enumerates ' want of fruitfulnesse, and mixture of grounds of severall natures.' Essay xlv. p. 180. H. Hand. To be in hand with = to have in hand, to treat of: p. 18, 1. 30; p. 9 8 > '■ 32. Hap, v.i. To happen: p. 61, 1. 4. 'The remnant of people, which hap to be reserved, are commonly ignorant and mounfanous people.* Essay lviii. p. 232. glossark 353 Hardlier, adv. With more difficulty : p. 245, 1. 15. Hardliest, adv. With most difficulty: p. 217, 1. 5. Hardness, sb. Hardiness: p. 143,1.4. Harmonical, adj. Harmonious : p. 197, 1. 7. Heat, sb. Anger: p. 221, 1. 15. Henoch, sb. Enoch: p. 190, 1. 33. This form is adopted in the older English versions of the Old Testament, and in the Authorized Version of I Chr. i. 3, while in the New Testament the Greek form Enoch is followed. Herdman, sb. A herdsman : p. 69, 1. 25. See Gen. xiii. 7. Heretical, adj. Heroic: p. 18, 1. 6; p. 51, 1. 32, &c: * But 'gainst your privacy The reasons are more potent and heroical.' Shakespeare, Tr. and Cr. iii. 3. 192. Heteroelite, sb. A word irregularly declined : p. 87, 1. 4. His. Its: p. 89, 1. 10; p. 120, 1. 31 ; p. 148, 1. 15. His, used as the sign of the genitive. ' Socrates his ironical doubting : ' p. 42, 1. ■£. Historiographer, sb. Historian : p. 1 7, 1. 30. Hold, v. t. To keep to : p. 141, 1. 7. To restrain, withhold : p. 15, 1. II. Hold of. To pertain to, have to do with : p. 2, L 32 ; p. 1 24, 1. 1 ; p. 228, 1. 16. Holden, p.p. Held: p. 69, 1. 31. Holpen, p.p. Helped: p. 92, 1. 22. See Ps. lxxxiii. 8: Dan. xi. 34. Honesty, sb. Used to denote high and honourable character, and hence transferred to moral beauty and grace : p. 22, 1. 8. Humanist, sb. A student of the humanities (litem Jiumaniores) : p. 135, 1. 33. The term is still used in the Scotch universities. Humanity, sb. The knowledge of man ; human philosophy, as distin- guished from natural theology and natural philosophy: p. 105, 1. 19; p. 130, 1. I. It is contradistinguished from divinity in p. 28, 1. 20; p. 58. 1-8. Humorous, adj. Fanciful, capricious: p. 18, 1. 12; p. 245, 1. 9. 'As humorous as winter.'- Shakespeare, 2 Hen. IV, iv. 4. 34. Humour, sb. Caprice: p. 49, I. 32. ' In humours like the people of this world.' Shakespeare, Rich. II, v. 5. 10. I. Ice, sb. A flaw in a jewel: p. 197, 1. 17. Compare the Fr. glafons, which Cotgrave explains ' Isicles, or flakes of yce ; also, flawes in stones resembling flakes of yce.' Ill, adj. Bad : p. 69, 1. 1 1. ' Neither is it ill aire onely, that maketh an ill seat, but ill wayes, ill markets.' Essay xlv. p. 180. niaqueation, sb. An entangling in argument, a sophism: p. 159, 1. 17; p. 177, 1. 21. Illuminate, p.p. Illuminated, enlightened: p. 53, 1. 16. Illustrate, v.t. To render illustrious : p. 37, 1. 16. Illustrate, p. p. Illustrated: p. 40, 1. 2. A a 354 GLOSSARY. Imaginant, sb. One who imagines: p. 132, 1. 29; p. 146, 1. 4. Imbarred, p.p. Interrupted, checked: p. 46, 1. 27. Imbase, v. t. To debase, degrade : p. 37, 1. 1 1 ; p. 96, 1. 18. ' Nuptiall love maketh mankinde ; friendly love perfecteth it ; but wanton love corrupteth, and imbaseth it.* Essay x. p. 38. Immediate, adj. Closely connected, proximate : p. 14, 1. 14. 'Immediate times' are those which are not separated by any interval from the present. Immediately, a dv. Directly, without the intervention of anything else: p. 154, 1. 14. Now generally used of time only. Import, v.t. To have a bearing upon, affect: p. 163, 1. 24. Impostumation, sb. An abscess : p. 139, 1. II. Imprese, sb. A device with a motto : p. 167, 1. 6. • An Imprese (as the Italians call it) is a devise in picture with his Motte, or Word, borne by noble and learned personages, to notifie some particular conceit of their owne.' Camden, Remaines, p. 158 (ed. 1605). Impression, sb. Stamp, lasting character ; used in a moral sense : p. 47, 1. 5. Comp. p. 214, 1. 24; 'by imprinting upon their souls charity:' and p. 69, 1. 17; 'for truth prints goodness.' Improficienee, sb. Want of progress or proficiency: p. 119, 1. 1. Impulsion, sb. Impulse, impelling cause: p. 137, 1. 19- In, prep. Into: p. 72, 1. 28. 'Conversant in ' = conversant with: p. 75, 1. J 6. With present participles in is used like the Latin gerund: 'while they are in tuning their instruments,' p. 251, 1. 22. Comp. 'in depart- ing,' Gen. xxxv. 18; 'in seething,' 1 Sam. ii. 13; '.in building,* I Kings vi. 7. Incensed, p. p. Burnt: p. 268, 1. 26. Incensing, adj. Exasperating: p. 231, 1. 14. Inception, sb. Beginning: p. 194, 1. 4; p. 213, 1. 13. Incertainty, sb. Uncertainty : p. 250, 1. 13. Incidence, sb. Coincidence: p. 122, 1. 30. 'It hath an incidence into it ' = it coincides with it: p. 194, 1. 9. Ineidently, adv. Incidentally: p. 182, 1. 6; p. 198, 1. 9. Included, p.p. Shut up, inclosed: p. 162, 1. 29. Incompatible, adj. Incongruous : p. 10, 1. 25. Used here in an obsolete construction. See also p. 212, 1. 24. Incomprehension, sb. Want of comprehension: p. 136, 1. 26. A trans- lation of the Greek acatalepsia, p. 1 54, 1. 4. Inconvenient, adj. Unsuitable: p. 81, 1. 8. Incorporal, adj. Incorporeal: p. 45, 1. 17: ' Alas, how is't with you, That you do bend your eye on vacancy, And with the incorporal air do hold discourse?' Shakespeare, Haml. iii. 4. 118. Incorporate,/!, p. Incorporated : p. 36, 1. 11 ; p. 97, 1. 5. ' No, it is Casca ; one incorporate To our attempts.' Shakespeare, Jul. Cses. i. 3. 135. Incurring, pr. p. Running: p. 175,1. 18. Indifferent, adj. Impartial: p. 21, 1. 31. See Ecclus. xlii. 5. Belonging to all alike, common : p. 113, 1. 27. GLOSSARV. 355 Indifferently, adv. Impartially: p. 84, 1. 19. Comp. Prayer for the Church Militant : ' That they may truly and indifferently minister justice.' Inditer, 56. A composer: p. 261, 1. 8. Induced, p.p. Derived by induction: p. 171, 1. g. Inducement, sb. An introduction: p. 83, 1. 16; p. 144, 1. 32; p. 222, 1. 21. Inducing, adj. Introductory, preliminary : p. 83, 1. 29. Indulgent, adj. Apt to indulge: as 'indulgent in allusions,' p. 264, 1. 2. Induration, sb. Hardening: p. 114, 1. 29. Infinite, adj. Innumerable: p. 72, 1. 19; p. 194, 1. 15. See note on p. 72. Infirm, v.t. To weaken, invalidate: p. 159, 1. 29. Influxion, sb. Inflowing, influence, intromission: p. 145, 11. 20, 27, 32. Infolded, p. p. Involved: p. 54,1. 10. Inform, v.t. To instruct, teach: p. 108, 1. 31; p. 254, 1. 24. 'To in- form ourselves «n' = to inform or instruct ourselves with regard to: p. 232, 1. 30. Informed, p. p. Taught: p. 257, 1. 22 ; p. 264, 1. 33. Animated : p. 105, 1. 5. Comp. Shakespeare, Coriol. v. 3. 71 : * Inform Thy thoughts with nobleness.' Ingenious, adj. Ingenuous : p. 236, 1. 23. Ingurgitation, sb. Ac immoderate draught: p. 140, 1. 14. Inherent to. Inherent in: p. 21, 1. 33. Injury, sb. Insolence, contumely: p. 236, 1. 30; p. 238, 1. 20. Inquire, v./. To investigate: p. 89, 1. 11; p. no, 11. 14, 25, &c. Inquisition, sb. Inquiry, investigation : p. 6, 1. 10 ; p. 48, 1. 25 ; p. 88, 1. I, &c. See Deut. xix. 18 ; Ps. ix. 12. Inquisitor, sb. Searcher : p. 88, 1. 24. Insatisfaction, sb. Dissatisfaction: p. 210, 1. 29. Insinuate, v.t. To introduce indirectly, by winding courses: p. 14, 1. 19. Insinuation, sb. Intertwining, intimate connexion: p. 102, 1. 12. Indi- rect argument: p. 1 78, 1. 29. Insinuative, adj. Winding itself in, insinuating: p. 148, 1. 19. Insolency, 56. Insolence: p. 67, 1. 20; p. 227, 1. 22. ' To give moderate liberty, for griefes, and discontentments to evaporate, (so it be without too great insolency or bravery) is a safe way.' Essay xv. p. 61. Instance, sb. Urgency: p. 189, 1. 23; p. 243, 1. 25. Instrumental, sb. An instrument: p. 80, 1. II. Intelligence, sb. 'To have intelligence' = to have an understanding, to correspond: p. 36, 1. I. 'The arch-flatterer, with whom all the petty flatterers have intelligence, is a mans selfe.' Essay x. p. 37. See Dan. xi. 30. Information : p. 80, 1. 25. Intelligenced, p.p. Informed: p. 233, 1. 13. Intelligencer, sb. An informer : p. 80, 1. 26. ' Richard yet lives, hell's black intelligencer, 1 Only reserved their factor, to buy souls And send them thither.' Shakespeare, Rich. Ill, iv. 4. 71. Intend, v.t. To aim at, direct the attention to: p. 135, 1. 31; p. 138, 1. 6; p. 192, 1. 19; p. 205, 1. 9; p. 218, 1. 22. 'The intending of A a 2 35<5 GLOSSARY. the discretion of behaviour' = attention to, Sec. : p. 218, 1. 29. 'Romulus, after his death (as they report, or faigne) sent a present to the Romans ; that, above all, they should intendaxms.' Essay xxix. p.125. Ibid. p. 126. Intendment, sb. Intention: p. 167,1. 19. Intensive, ad/'. ' Intensive upon ' = directed to : p. 146,1.4. Intent, sb. Intention, purpose : p. 6, 1. 3. See John xiii. 28. Interlace, v. t. To mix : p. 244, 1. 6. ' Interlace not businesse, but of necessitie.' Essay xi. p. 41. Intervenient, adj. Incidental: p. 122, 1. '18. 'When there is matter of law, intervenient in businesse of state.' Essay lvi. p. 227. Into, prep. ' Hath an influence mfo' = hath an influence upon : p. 218, 1. 2. Comp. p. 250, 11. 16, 17. 'Immersed into ' = ' immersed in,' p. 121, 1. 18. Intrinsic, adj. Internal; and so, hidden: p. 37, 1. 33. Compare the use of ' inward.' Invent, v.t. To find out, discover: p. [49, 1. 15. Invention, sb. Finding, discovery: p. [II, 1. 30: p. 149, I. 22. Inveterate, adj. Long established: p. 115, 1. 20. Invocate, v.t. To invoke: p. 40, 1. 27; p- 161, 1. 21. Inward, adj. Hidden, secret: p. 248, 1. 28. Inwardness, sb. Hidden sense: p. 104, 1. 20. Intimacy: p. 233, 11. 8, 18. Irony, sb. An ironical speech : p. 88, 1. 33. Issay. The old form of spelling ' Jesse ' : p. 152, 1. 25. Iteration, sb. Repetition: p. 137, 1. 18; p. 202, 1. 33. 'Truth tired with iteration.' Shakespeare, Tr. and Cr. iii. 2. 183. Joculary, adj. Belonging to jest or juggling : p. 143, 1. 28. Joy, v.t. To rejoice: p. 6, 1. 25. 'There is no man, that imparteth his ioyes to his trend, but he ioyeth the more.' Essay xxvii. p. no. Judge, v. L To give judgement, decide : p. 73, !• 28. Judged, p.p. Decided: p. 137, 1. 29. Jurisconsult, sb. A lawyer: p. 85, 1. 32; p. 259, 1. 33. Just, adj. Exact : p. 85, 1. 4. ' If thou cut'st more Or less than a just pound.' Shakespeare, Mer. of yen. iv. 1. 327. K. Kindly, adj. Natural: p. 140, 1. 12. So in the Litany, ' the iindly fruits of the earth.* Knit, v.i. To become compact: p. 39, 1. 31. Knowledge^ sb. A branch of knowledge, a science : p. 32, 1. 15 ; p. 50, 1. 16. 'To take knowledge of' = *to recognize': p. 48, I. 2; p. 226, 1. 24. Laboured, p.p. Elaborated : p. 78, 1. 4; p. 220, 1. 6. Large, adj. Diffuse: p. 181, 1. 10. GLOSSARY, 357 Latitude, sb. Extent: p. 52, 1. 14; p. 258, 1. 31. Laudative, sb. A eulogy: p. 44, 1. 4; p. 100, 1. 13. 'The funerall laudalives and monuments for those that died in the wars.' Essay xxix. p. 129. Learnings, sb. Branches of knowledge: p. 49, 1. 1,7. ' Puts to him all the learnings that his time Could make him the receiver of.' Shakespeare, Cymb. i. I. 43. Least wise. ' At least wise ' = at least : p. 147, 1. 23. Leese, v.t. To lose: p. 37, 1. 5; p. 72, 1. 23; p. 77, 1. 2; p. 239, 1. 18. ' For that that he winnes in the hundred, he leeseth in the shire.' Essay xix. p. 80. Legend, adj. Legendary: p. 55, 1. 1. Levant, High. The far East: p. 166, 1. 24. The Latin has ,x qu°d in Chinas et provinciis ultimi orientis in usu hodie sunt &c.' Levant, sb. The East: p. 24, 1. 32. Levity, sb. Lightness, in its literal sense: p. 116, 1. 23. Lidger, sb. A resident ambassador: p. 232, 1. II. Spelt also leiger. 'Lord Angelo, having affairs to heaven, Intends you for his swift ambassador, Where you shall be an everlasting leiger* Shakespeare, Meas. for Meas. iii. I. 59. Lieth, as much as: p. 113, 1. 9. See Rom. xii. 18. Like, adj. Likely: p. 39, 1. 18 ; p. 185, 1. 10. Liker, adj. More likely : p. 60, 1. 25. Lighter, adj. More foolish, or less grave: p. 221, 1. 13. Lightly, adv. Easily: p. 222, 1. 26. ' The traitor in faction lightly goeth away with it.' Essay, li. p. 208. Limned, p.p. Drawn, illustrated with drawings, illuminated : p. 30, 1. 12. Lively, adv. Vividly: p. 15, 1. 5 ; p. 52, 1. 23; p. 55, 1. I. 'Lively describing Christian resolution.' Essay v. p. 17. Long, v.i. To belong: p. 124, 1. 10. Longanimity, sb. Patience, longsuffering : p. 205, 1. 19. Longtime. Long: p. 28, 1. 21. Lothness, sb. Unwillingness, dislike: p. 239, 1. 18. Lubricity, sb. Slipperiness : p. 201, 1. 6. ' Lubricity : f. Lubricilie, siipperinesse, vncertaintie.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Lucre, sb. Gain : p. 19, 1. 7 ; p. 42, 1. 24. ' The stratagems of prelates for their owne ambition and lucre.' Essay xvii. p. 69. M. Magistracy, sb. The holding the office of magistrate : p. 206, 1. 30. Magistral, adj. Dogmatic : p. 41, 1. 27 ; p. 141, 1. 14; p. 170, 1. 27. Magistrality, sb. Dogmatism: p. 127, 1. 19 ; p. 140, 1. 27. Magnify, v.t. To make much of, to extol: p. 13, 1. 15; p. 73, 1. I. Comp. Ps. xxxiv. 3. Main, adj. Important: p., 80, I. 19. Malice, sb. Evil disposition : p. 38, 1. 6. 358 GLOSSARY. Malign, adj. Malignant, injurious : p. 79, 1. 2. Maniable, adj. Manageable, tractable: p. 17, 1.8. 'Maniable: com. Tractable, wieldable, handleable,' &c. Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Mansion, sb. A dwelling-place: p. 119, 1. 18; p. 134,1. 17. See John xiv. 2. Manurance, sb. Manuring, fertilizing : p. 184, 1. 4. Manured, p. p. Cultivated : p. 84, 1. 10. Mar, v. t. To injure : p. 10, 1. 20. Marvel, v. i. To wonder : p. 112, 1. 13. Materially, adv. Solidly, soundly: p. 198, 1. 26. Mathematie, sb. Mathematics: p. 121, 1. 2. Comp. athletic, cosmetic, metaphysic, physic. Matter, sb. The point or essential part of a subject : p. 61, 1. 7. Comp. Albumazar, ii. 4 : ' Then vouch a statute, and a Latin sentence, Wide from the matter.' May=can: p. 141, 1. 31. Comp. Shakespeare, Mer. of Ven. i. 3. J: 'May you stead me.' And Ps. exxv. I, Pr. Bk. ' Mount Zion, which may not be removed.' Mean, sb. Means, medium: p. 76, 1. 21 ; p. 195, 1. 19. 'For it is the soloecisme of power, to thinke to command the end, and yet not to endure the meane.' Essay xix. p. 77. Mean, adj. Moderate: p. 219, 1. 33. Mean3, sb. Wealth : p. 20, 11. 8, 9. Used as a singular noun : p. 242, 1. 24. Mechanicals, sb. Mechanics : p. 198, 1. 5. The word occurs in a different sense in Shakespeare, Mid. N's. Dr. iii. 2. 9. ' A crew of patches, rude mechanicals.' Mechanicfiie, sb. Mechanism : p. 124, 1. 10; p. 138, 1. 24. Medicinable, adj. Medicinal: p. 141, 1. 26. In Shakespeare, Oth. v. 2. 351, where the Quartos read, ' Drop tears as fast as the Arabian trees Their medicinal gum,' the Folios have medicinable. See also Much Ado, ii. 2. 5 ; Troilus and Cressida, iii. 3. 45. Medicine, u. t. To administer medicine to: p. 207, 1. 27. Mercurius, apparently not yet Anglicised: p. 52, 1. 10. Comp. Acts xiv. 12. Mere, adj. Absolute: p. 106, 1. 29. ' I have engaged myself to a dear friend, Engaged my friend to his mere enemy.' Shakespeare, Mer. of Ven. iii. 3. 265. Merely, adv. Absolutely, simply: p. 88, 1. 10; p. 121, 1. 30; p. 258, 1. 32. ' We are merely cheated of our lives by drunkards.' Shakespeare, Temp. i. 1. 59. Meriting, adj. Meritorious : p. 7, 1. 27. Message, 'Came in message' = came as a messenger: p. 66, 1. 16. Metaphysic, sb. Metaphysics: p. 112, 11. 1, 2 ; p. 113, 1. 18. Bacon's definition is given on p. 114. M'nion, sb. A darling: p. 30, 1. 33. In ed. 1605 it is printed migmon GLOSSARY. 359 in mistake for mignan. ' Mignon : m. A minion, fauorite, wanton, dilling, darling.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Minister, v.t. To supply, furnish: p. 14, 1. 21 ; p. 51, 1. 2. Ministry, sb. Service : p. 206, 1. 1. Mirabilaries, sb. Collections of marvels: p. 87, 1. 15. MITHRIDATUM, sb. See note on p. 140, 1. 3r. ' Methridat : m. Methridate; a strong Treacle, or Preseruatiue deuiscd at first by the Pontian King, Mithridates.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. 'The first he (i.e. Mithridates) was also who devised sundrie kinds of antidots or countre- poisons, whereof one reteineth his name to this day.' Holland's Pliny, XXV. 2. Model, sb. A small plan ; and so, a compendium : p. 54, 1. t. The Lat. has 'totius orbis tunc epitome' Measure, scale: p. 62, I. 19 ; p. 194, 1. 15. Moe, adj. More : p. 22, 1. 3; p. 166, 1. 1. Monastical, adj. Monastic: p. 190, 1. 27. Moneys, sb. Coins, pieces of money: p. 167: 11. 29, 31, Morality, sb. Moral philosophy: p. 177, 1. 23. Mopigeration, sb. Obsequiousness : p. 26, 1. 24. Mortalest, adj. Most deadly: p. 184, 1. 25. Most, adv. Mostly : p. 94, 1. 29. Motions, sb. Exercises: p. 124, 1. 19. Mought. Might: p. 79, 1. 7 ; p. 80, I. 30. 'The part of Epimetheus, mought well become Prometheus, in the case of discontentments. ' Essay xv. p. 61. Mountebank, sb. A quack doctor : p. 135, 1. 16. Cotgrave (Fr. Diet.) gives : ' Charlatan : m. A Mountebanke, a cousening drug-seller, a pratling quack-saluer.' See Essay xii. p. 45 : ' As there are moun- tebanques for the naturall body : so are there mountebanques for the politique body.' Move, v.t. To excite: p. 125, 1. 21. To propose: p. 244, 1. 32. Moyses. The old spelling of ' Moses,' from the Vulgate Moyses : p. 46, 1. 28, &c. Bacon is not uniform in adopting this spelling. See p. 83, I.23. Mutiner, sb. A mutineer: p. 184, 1. 15. See note. Mystery, sb. A craft or trade: p. 89, 1. 29. ' Mestier : m. A Trade, Occupation, Misterie, Handicraft.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Comp. Chancer, Cant. Tales, Prol. 615 : 'In youthe he lerned hadde a good mester; He was a wel good wright, a carpenter.' N. Nature, sb. Used in the phrase ' it is nature ' for ' it is natural ;' as ' it is reason' for ' it is reasonable:' p. 239, 1. 3. Nature, sb. Kind: p. 7, 1. 15 ; p. 168, 1. 11. ' Flower-de-lices, and lillies of all natures' Essay xlvi. p. 187. Navigation, sb. A sea voyage : p. 96, 1. 31. Near hand, adv. Near : p. 53, 1. 25. 360 GLOSSARY. Negotiation, sb. Transaction of business : p. 219, 1. 17; P- 225, 1. 17 s p. 226, 1. 12. Neighbour, adj. Neighbouring: p. 58, 1. 25. See Jer. xlix. 18, 1. 40. Nestling, sb. A place for building a nest; hence applied to the place where humours may breed: p. 138,1. 13. 'That the birds may have more scope, and naturall neastling.' Essay xlvi. p. 194. Nether, adj. Lower: p. 57, 1. 13. See Ex. xix. 17. New. In the phrase 'one is new to begin ' = ' one, has to begin anew': p. 183, 1. 16. Non-promovent, adj. Literally, not advancing: p. 175, 1- 17* The epithet is applied to axioms as equivalent to ' circular ' and * incurring into themselves.' Nor . . . not. Double negative : p. 120, 11. II, 13. Nor never. Double negative : p. 23, 1. 23. * This England never did, nor never shall, Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror.' Shakespeare, K. John, v. 7- 1 1 2. Not . . . nor: p. 4, 11. 10, II ; p. 127, 1. 9; p. 186, 11. 22, 23 ; p. 240, 1. 17. 'Is it not hard, Nerissa, that I canwoi choose one nor refuse none? 1 Shakespeare, Mer. of Ven. i. 2. 28. Notably, adv. Remarkably, conspicuously: p. 59, 1. 17. Note, sb. Mark, sign : p. 44, 1. 28 ; p. 166, 1. 33. Note, ■». t. To denote : p. 146, 1. i. Nothing, adv. In no respect : p. 251, 1. 23. Nothing less than = anything but : p. 87, I. 13. ' The use of this work ... is nothing less than to give contentment &c,' that is, it is so little intended to give contentment to the appetite of curious and vain wits that nothing is less so. Comp. Stubbs, Anatomie of Abuses, fol. 5 (ed. 1585) 1 ' Pride of the hatre is perpetrate, when as a man liftyng hymself on high, thinketh of hymself, aboue that whiche he is : dreamyng a perfection of himself, when he is nothyng lesse? Null, sb. A non-significant cipher: p. 169, 1. 7. O. Oblation, sb. An offering: p. 1, 1. 10; p. 4, 1. 17. Obnoxious, adj. Exposed, p. 229, 1. 7. In dread of punishment : p. 246, 1. 9. Obseureness, sb. Obscurity : p. 20, I. 10. Obtain, v. i. To attain: p. 51, 1. 22. Comp. Essay vi. p. 19 : 'But if a man cannot obtaine to that iudgment, then it is left to him, generally, to be close, and a dissembler.* Oecupate, v. t. To occupy: p. 133, 1. 8. Ocoupate, p.p. Occupied : p. 268, 1. 4. Of, redundant in the phrases ' accept of,' p. 63, 1. 23 : ' esteem of' p. 1 78, 1. 6 ; p. 228, 1. 24 : ' define of' p. 257, 1. 5 ; ' discern of p. 203, 1. 18 : 'meaning of,' p. 241,1. 2. 'The reverence 0/ laws and government:' p. 1 7, 1. I. We should now use for. Comp. ' a zeal of God,' Rom. x. 2. ' Of used partitively for ' some of: p. 72, 1. 24, 'cannot but leese of the life and truth.' See p. 135, 1. 33. ' To participate of = to participate in: GLOSSARV. 361 P- 73> 1- 3 i P- 87, 1. 28. ' To grow p/' = to grow from : p. 16, 1. 10. ' Invested of' = invested with: p. 4, 1. 5 ; p. 214, 1. 7. ' In comparison of: p. 20, 1. 13. 'O/the one side' = on the one side : p. 58, 1. 16. ' Of herself = by herself, alone: p. 58, 1. 26. 'Of consequence ' = in conse- quence, consequently: p. 71, 1. 12. Offer, sb. An attempt: p. 94, 1. 5. ' Many inceptions are but as Epicurus termeth them, tentamenta, that is, imperfect offers^ and essayes.' Colours of Good and Evil, p. 266. Oft, adv. Often: p. 25, 1. 12. Omnipotency, sb. Omnipotence: p. 51, 1. 13; p. 107, 1. 19. Is. xl. cont. On, p. 171, 1. 7. See note. One. The same; in the phrases 'much one,' p. 146, 1. 8; 'all one,' p. 158, 1.2. Only, adv. Alone ; * Saint Paul, who was only learned amongst the Apostles,' signifies that he alone of the Apostles was a learned man: p. 49, 1. 18 ; p. 80, 1. 10. Comp. Collect for Thirteenth Sunday after Trinity, ' of whose only gift it cometh.' Only but. Used for 'but' or 'only': p. 174, 1. 10. See But only. Open, v.t. To explain, or make plain; p. 43,1. 27. Comp. Acts xvii. 3. To disclose or reveal : p. 240, 1. 24. Opened,/./*. Explained: p. 162, 1. 3. ' And in regard of causes now in hand, Which I have open'd to his grace at large, As touching France.' Shakespeare, Hen. V, i. I. *jS. Operation, sb. Influence, effect: p. 94, I. 9; p. 211, 1. 22. 'A good sherris-sack hath * two-fold operation in it.' Shakespeare, 2 Hen. IV, iv. 3. 104. Operative, adj. Effective, productive : p. 80, 1. 9. ' Our foster-nurse of nature is repose, The which he lacks ; that to provide in him, Are many simples operative, whose power Will close the eye of anguish.* Shakespeare, Lear, iv. 4. 14. Opinion, sb. Reputation: p. 49, 1. 31 ; p. 87, 1. 10; p. 220, 1. 10. ' But fish not, with this melancholy bait, For this fool gudgeon, this opinion.' Shakespeare, Mer. of Ven. i. I. 102. Opposing, adj. Repugnant : p. 146, 1. 32. Opposite, sb. An opponent: p. 229, 1. 8. 'Betake you to your guard; for your opposite hath in him what youth, strength, skill, and wrath can furnish man withal.' Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, iii. 4. 253 ; and again, 1. 293. Ordainment, sb. Ordination: p. 23, 1. 17. Order. 'To be in order' = to be the true order of proceeding: p. 207, 1. 28. Ordinary, adj. Customary : p. 1 3, 1. 6. Ostensive, adj. p. 158, 1. 31. See note. Other, pron. Others : p. 14, 1. 6 ; p. 62, 1. 16 ; p. 160, 1. 10. Outwardest, adj. Outermost: p. 120, 1. 15. 3&Z GLOSS A RV. Over, redundant in ' command over,' p. I40, 11. 29, 30. Overcommen, p.p. Overcome, achieved, accomplished: p. 76, 1. *3> Compare Essay xxxiv, p. 146. See Comen. Over usual. Too customary: p. 182, 1. 21. P. Painful, adj. Laborious: p. 343, I. 32. 'I think we have some as painful magistrates as ever was in England.' Latimer, Sermons, p. 142 (Parker Soc). Painted forth, p.p. Depicted : p. 57, I. 31 ; p. 206, 1. 11 ; p. 208, 1. 33. Painted out, p.p. Depicted: p. 15, 1. 7. Palliate, />./>. Palliated: p. 138,1. 25. Pantomimus, sb. A mimic: p. 136, 1. 21. 'Pantomime: m. An Actor of many parts in one Play ; one that can represent the gesture, and counterfeit the speech, of any man.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Parcel, sb. A part. * Nothing parcel ' = no part : p. 7, 1. 5* * Many a thousand, Which now mistrust no parcel of my fear.' Shakespeare, 3 Hen. VI. v. 6. 38. Participant, adj. Partaking: p. 254, 1. 22. Particular, adj. Private: p. 185, 1. 12. ' But value dwells not in particular will.' Shakespeare, Tr. and Cr. ii. 1. 53. Particular, sb. .A private affair; used of an individual case : p. 8, 1. 22 ; p. 156, 1. 9- * Though no man lesser fears the Greeks than I, As far as toucheth my particular. 1 Shakespeare, Tr. and Cr. ii. 2. 9. Pasquil, sb. A satire: p. 57, I. 10. 'Sometimes contrived into pleasant pasquils and satires, to move sport.' Bacon, Obs. on a Libel (Works, viii. I48). 'Pasquille: f. A Pasquill ; a Libell clapt on a Poste, or Image.' 'Pasquin : m. The name of an Image, or Poste in Rome, whereon Libels and defamatorie Rimes are fastened, and fathered; also, as Pasquille.' Cotgrave, Fr, Diet. The statue still stands at the corner of the Palazzo Braschi, near the Piazza Navona. Passage, sb. A ford, or pass ; p. 56, 1. 11 ; p. 68, 1. 3. Comp. Judges xii. 6 ; I Sam, xiii. 23. Metaphorically, a proceeding, process, transaction, course: p. 35, 1. 19; p. 91, 1, 21; p. 100, 1. 18; p. 146, 1. 11. 'To give passage ' = to give way : p, 39, 1. 2 1 . 'In passage ' = in passing, cur- sorily: p. 78, 1. 28; p. 205, 1. 3; p. 207, 1. 17 ; p. 262, 1. 26. Passed, ad]. Past : p. 93, 1, 16 ; p. 139, 1. 26 ; p. 239, 1. 18. See note on p. 139, and compare Drayton, Polyolbion, i. 383 : ' And by his present losse, his passed error found/ Pastor, sb. A shepherd: p. 199, 1. 21. See Jer. xxiii. 1, 2. Patience, sb. In its literal sense of endurance of suffering: p. 143, H, 3,4. Peccant, adj. Morbid, unhealthy: p. 37. 1- 32; p. 43, 1. 28. 'L'humeur peccante. The corrupt, or corrupting humor in the bodie.' Cotgrave Fr. Diet. GLOSSARV. 363 Pedanti, sb. A pedant: p. 13, 11. 16, 19. Plur. pedantes : p. 13, 11. 7, 14; p. 21, 1. 8. From the It. pedante, which appears not to have been quite naturalised in 1605. ' Pedante ' occurs in Florio's Worlde of Wordes, 1598 ; and in Shakespeare's Love's Labour's Lost, iii. I. 179, ' A domi- neering pedant o'er the boy,' it must have been pronounced as a dis- syllable. The first ed. of this play was published in 1598. Pedantieal, adj. Pedantic: p. 13, 1. 26; p. 165, 1. 3. Pensileness, sb. Suspended condition : p. 47, 1. 26. Perease, adv. Perhaps : p. 209, 1. 11. Peremptory, adj. Destructive : p. 53, 1. 18. Perfective, adj. Capable of being perfected or improved: p. 258, 1. ■*, Compare Demonstrative. Peruse, v.t. To review : p. 3,1. 21. See Shakespeare, Rich. II, iii. 3. 53. ' That from this castle's tatter'd battlements Our fair appointments may be well perused* Phainomena, p. 129, 1. 30. This mode of spelling shows that the word in Bacon's time had not become fully naturalised, though in p. 127, 1. 23 it appears in its usual form. Later still in the Reliquiae Wottonianae (p. ioi, ed. 1655) I &tl& phainomenon. Physic, sb. Physics, or physical science: p. Ill, 1. 33 ; p. 114, 1. 21. Pilosity, sb. Hairiness : p. 120, 1. 10. Place, sb. A passage of an author or book : p. 7, 1. 32 ; p. 8, 1. 12 ; p. 190, 1. 25. A topic or subject of discourse : p. 155, 1. 33. A piazza, or public square ; here, the Forum: p. 220, 1. J 2 ; p. 249, 1. 10. ' To give place' = to yield: p. 98, 1. 19. Plash., sb. A shallow pool, a puddle : p. 244, 1. 32. Platform, sb. Plan : p. 44, 1. J2 ; p. 114, 1. 12. Pattern : p. 187, 1. 19. See note on p. 44. Ply, sb. Bend, bias: p. 239, 1. 19.. 'For it is true, that late learners, cannot so well take the pile,' Essay xxxix. p. 164. Poesy, sb. A poem : p. 35, 1. 6. Poetry : p. 60, 1. 28 ; p. 211, 1. 25. Point, sb. In the phrase ' was of such a point as whereat Sarah laughed ' : p. 2J3, 1. 10 ; where the Latin has de hujtismodi re extitit quam irrisui habebat Sarah. Police, v.t. To regulate: p. 56, 1. II. 'Spain,' says Bacon, in his Observa- tions on a Libel (Works, viii. 169) 'is not in brief an enemy to be feared by a nation seated, manned, furnished, and poinded as in England ; ' where two MSS. read polliced. Politique, sb. A politician : p. 5, 1. 9 ; p. IO, I. 17 ; p. 18, 1. 12, &c. In p. r3, 1. 6, it is used as an adjective; 'politique men ' = politicians. Popular estate. A democracy ; p. 53, 1. 8; p. 208, 1. 1. ' Therefore, we see it (i. e. boldness) hath done wonders, in popular states.' Essay xii. p. 45. Popularity, sb. Democratic character: p. 252, 1. 5. Populous, adj. Numerous : p. 243, 1. 5. See Deut. xxvi. 5. Portugal, adj. Portuguese: p. 29, 1. 23. Position, sb. The laying down of a law : p. 147, 1. II. A maxim, senti- ment: p. 221, 1. 1; p. 227,1. 19; p. 246,1. 20. Possess, v.i. To prepossess: p. 224, 1. 3. Practique, sb. Practice : p. 165, 1. 33. 364 GLOSSARY. Practise, v. i. To plot : p. 1 79, 1. 2. ' He will practise against thee by poison.' Shakespeare, As You Like It, i. 1. 156. Pray in aid. To call in to one's assistance : p. t 74> '■ 23. ' A conqueror that will pray in aid for kindness, Where he for grace is kneel'd to.' Shakespeare, Ant. and CI. v. 2. 2J. Sir T. Hanmer in his note on this passage says : ' Praying in aid is a term used for a petition made in a court of justice for the calling in of help from another that hath an interest in the cause in question.' Precedent, adj. Preceding, previous: p. 82, 1. 26; p. 214, 1. 7. * Our own precedent passions do instruct us What levity's in youth.' Shakespeare, Tim. of Ath. i. 1. 133. Preeeption, si. Precept : p. 214, 1. 31. Prefer, v.t. To promote: p. 3, 1. 31. See Esth. ii. 9; Dan. vi. 3. Preferred, p. p. Recommended: p. 203,1. 14. * Large gifts have I bestow'd on learned clerks, Because my gift preferred me to the king.* Shakespeare, 2 Hen. VI, iv. 7. 77. Preferred before. Preferred to : p. 48, 1. 13. See John i. 15. Prelusive, adj. Preliminary, introductory : p. 94, 1. 23. Premeditate, p.p. Premeditated: p. 82, 1. 6 ; p. 156, 1. 8. Prenotion, sb. Foreknowledge : p. 130, 1. 25 ; p. 145, 1. 23. Preoceupate, v.t. To preoccupy: p. 268, 1. 14. Preposterous, adj. Inverted in order; literally, having the last first: p. 243, I.21. Prescript, sb. A prescription: p. 22, 1. 25 ; p. 132, 1. 11 ; p. 142, 1. 5. Present, v.t. To represent: p. 100, 1. 2. * Ay, my commander : when I presented Ceres, I thought to have told thee of it.' Shakespeare, Temp. iv. I. 167, Present, adj. Immediate: p. 222, 1. 13. 'Present speeches ' = speeches made on the spur of the moment, impromptu speeches : p. 100, 1. 22. 'In present ' = Lat. in prcesenti, at present: p. 202, 1. 16. Presention, sb. Presentiment: p. 144, 1. 31. Press,*.*. To pursue eagerly: p. 226,1. 19. 'Pressing the fact ' seems to mean ' urgently pursuing the business in hand ' •- p. 235, 1. 27. Pretence, sb. The thing pretended or aimed at : p. 124, 1. 5. Pretend, v.i. To aim at, propose as an end or object: p. 36, 11. 5, 7, 10; p. 211, 1. 13. Pretermit, v. I. To pass by: p. 208, 1. 17; p. 215, 1. 30. Prevent, v.i. To anticipate: p. 200, 1. 33; p. 261, 1. 24. Comp. Ps. cxix. 148. Prevented, p. p. Anticipated: p. 171,1. 10. Price, sb. Value : p. 26, 1. 13 ; p. 29, 1. 8, &c. See Matt. xiii. 46. ' To be in price 1 = to be valued : p. 29, 1. 24. Prime, adj. Chief, excellent: p. 199, 1. 32. Prince, used of Queen Elizabeth : p. 58, 1. 2. Print, sb. Impression, of a seal : p. 69, 1. 16. Privateness, sb. Privacy : p. 10, 1. 29 ; p. 15, 1. 16, &c. Comp. Essay GLOSSARY. 363 xi. p. 39 : ' Nay, retire men cannot, when they would ; neither will they, when it were reason : but are impatient of privatenesse, even in age, and sicknesse, which require the shadow.' Probably, adv. With probability, in a probable manner: p. 156, 1. 29. Probation, sb. Trial ; and hence, proof from experience : p. 14I, 1. 10' P- 158. '• 31. Proceed, v.i. ' It proceedeth ' = the result is: p. 79, 1. 3. Proceeding, sb. Progress: p. 170, 1. 9; p. 173, 11. 9, 10; p. 193, 1. 30. Proceeding upon. Resulting from : p. 1, 1. 2. Profession, sb. Means of living, livelihood : p. 42, 1. 25 ; p. 43, 1. 9. Professory, adj. Professional : p. 79, 1. 1. See p. 43, 1. 7* & c > Proficience, sb. Progress, advancement: p. 43, 1. 30; p. 76, 1. 27. Profiting, sb. Profit, advantage: p. 183, 1. 19. Progression, sb. Progress: p. 76, 1. 27 ; p. 78, 1. 27. Promiscuous, adj. Mixed indiscriminately : p. 113, 1. 27. Proof, sb. Experiment: p. 119, 1. 27. ' Good or ill proof is the proving or turning out good or ill : p. 223, 1L 22, 23. Proper, adj. One's own: p. 182, 1. 3. Propriety, sb. Peculiarity : p. 1, 1. 10 ; p. 4, 1. 9 ; p. 6, 1. I. Property : p. 113, 1. 18; p. 212, 1. 28; p. 252, I. 12. 'Receipts of propriety' = specific receipts, proper or peculiar to certain diseases : p. 140, 1. 24. ' Not for propriety ' = not appropriate to particular diseases, as Bacon explains afterwards : p. 141,1. 2. Prosecution, sb. Investigation : p. 84, 1. 7- Provocation, sb. Incitement: p. 50, 1. 18. Punctual, adj. Minute : p. 25, 1. 21. Puntos, sb. Minute observances, punctilios : p. 219, 1. 2. Purchase, sb. Acquisition, that which is acquired: p. 16, 1. 4, Value: p. 242, 1. 14. Pureness, sb. Purity : p. 29, 1. 3, Purgament, sb. An excretion : p. 139, 1. 6. Pursuance, 56. A prosecuting or following out, sequence : p. 142, 1. 19. Pursued, p.p. Followed out: p. 106, 1. 14. Pursuit, sb. Consecutiveness, sequence : p. 142, 1. 13 ; p. 182, 1. 29. Pusillanimity, sb. Littleness of mind : p. 49, 1. 33 ; p. 205, 1. 13. Put forth, v.refi. To endeavour: p. 70, 1. 2. Put to, v. t. To apply : p. 156, 1. 10. Pyramides, sb. p. 117, 1. 18. The old form of the word before it was naturalised. Compare Shakespeare, Antony and Cleopatra, v. 2. 01 : ' Rather make My country's high pyramides my gibbet.' In Minsheu's Spanish Dictionary (1599), s. v. Piramide, the singular is given as 'pyramis.' But Cotgrave (Fr. Diet.) and Flono (Hal. Diet.) both use ' piramides ' as singular. Q. Question, v.t. To call in question: p. 132, 1. 16. Quintuple, adj. Fivefold : p. 169, 1. 14. Quit, v.refl. To get quit of, relieve oneself: p. 321, I. ID. 366 GLOSSARY. Baven, used as a feminine noun, p. 151, 1. 23. In the Authorized Version it is masculine. Beach, sb. A contrivance: p. 232, 1. 17. Beader, sb. A lecturer: p. 78, 1. I ; p. 79, 1. 17. Still retained in the Universities and the Inns of Court. Beason. 'By reason ' = because : p. 19, 1. 6; p. 167, 1. 20. 'It was reason' = it was reasonable : p. 27, 1. 10. ' It is reason ': p. 64, 1. 19. Beceipt, sb. Power of receiving, capacity : p. 7, 1. 9. Reception: p. 77, 1. 14 ; p. 100, 1. 10. Beceive, v.t. To admit: p. 157, 1. 18. Becess, sb. A withdrawal, retirement : p. 117, 1. 10. Becompense, v.t. To compensate for: p. 14, 1. 3. Beooncilement, sb. Reconciliation: p. 223, 1. 27 ; p. 231, 1. 4. Bedargution, sb. Reply, refutation: p. 18, 1. 14; p. 84, 1. 6 ; p. 159, 1. 18. 'Redargution : f. A redargution, checking, reprouing, reprehend- , ing, controwling.' Cotgrave, Fr. Diet. Beduced. ' Reduced to stupid ' = rendered stupid : p. 2 1 6, 1. 33. Ee-edify, v. t. To rebuild : p. 56, 1. 9. Befleot, v.t. To be reflected : p. 161, 1. 7. Befrain, v.t. To restrain, hold in check as with a bridle: p. 53, 1. 17; p. 183, 1. 3 ; p. 192, 1. 26. Begiment, sb. Regimen, training : p. 3, 1. 6 ; p. 97, 1. 19. Rule, govern- ment: p. 58, 1. 15. Begion, sb. Climate, atmosphere : p. 206, 1. 26. See note on Hamlet, ii. 2.472. Begular, adj. Rigid in adhering to rule, methodical : p. 14, 1. 28. Bacon had previously (p. 10, 1. 22) spoken of one of the charges brought against learned men that they were ' too peremptory or positive by strictness of rules and axioms.' For the word see Essay xxx. p. 133. Eeintegrate, v.t. To restore : p. ill, 1. 19. Belatiou, sb. p. 39, 1. 12. ' Relation is, where, in consideration of law two times, or other things are considered so as if they were all one ; and by this the thing subsequent is said to take his effect by relation at the time preceding.' Cowel's Law Dictionary, ed. 1727- Narrative, story : p. 52, 1. 24; p. 86, 1. 3. Beluctation, sb. Struggle, violent effort, reluctance : p. 45, 1. 27 ; p. 188, 1. 20; p. 253,1. 3. Bemembered, p.p. Mentioned : p. 102, 1. 23 ; p. 174, 1. 30. Bemora, sb. A fabulous fish, which was supposed to delay the progress of a vessel by adhering to its bottom ; and so generally, a hindrance : p. 119, 1. 20. * Many holde opinion, that in that last and famous sea-fight, which Antonie lost against Augustus, his Admirall-gallie was in her course staied by that little fish, the Latines call Remora, and the English a Sucke-stone, whose propertie is, to stay any ship he can fasten himselfe vnto.' Mon- taigne's Essaies, transl. Florio, p. 270, ed. 1603. Bemove, sb. Removal: p. 98, 1. 29; p. 242, 1. 28. Beposed, p. p. Laid up as in store : p. 77, 1. 28. GLOSSARV. 367 Reprehensions, sb. Reproofs : p. 100, 1. 14. Reprove, v.t. To refute : p. 112, 1. 19. Repugnancy, 56. Repugnance : p. 1 20, 1. 7 ; p. 240, 1. 8. Reseussing, 56. Rescuing : p. 238, 1. 23. Rescous and Rescusser are the old law terms for rescue and rescuer, and although I have not been able to find any other instance of the occurrence of reseussing, I have not hesi- tated to retain it, as it is found in the editions of 1605 and 1629. Chaucer (Cant. Tales, 2645) uses rescous : ' And in the rescous of this Palamon The stronge kyng Ligurgius is born adoun.' Resemble, v. t. To compare : p. 1 78, 1. 6. Resort, sb. Spring, source: p. 91, 1. 26. Comp. Essay xxii. p. 95 : 'the resorts and falls of businesse.' Respective, adj. Having respect or reference to: p. 31, 1. 12. Appro- priate : p. i, 1. 9. Special, relative: p. 114, U. 25, 29, 30; p. 198, 1. 14. Peculiar : p. 265, 1. 20. Respectively, adv. Appropriately: p. 179, 1. 32. Relatively: p. 263, I.24. Respect, sb. Consideration: p. 53, 1. 33 ; p. 194, 1. 10; p. 217, 1. 23 ; p. 228, 1. 28. ' For bribes come but now and then ; but if importunitie, or idle respects lead a man, he shall never be without/ Essay xi. p. 42. See Hamlet, iii. 1. 68. Rest, v. i. To remain : p. 1 29, 1. 8. ' Since therefore they must be used, in such cases, there restelk to speake, how they are to be brideled.' Essay xxxvi. p. 154. Retire, v.t. To withdraw : p. 103, 1. 12. Reverent, adj. Reverend, venerable: p. 19, 1. 18. Reverted, ^>./>. Turned back: p. 105, 1. 16. Revolve, v.t. To reflect upon : p. 3, 1. 21 ; p. 157, 1- 9. Revolved, p. p. Considered, reflected upon : p. 28, 1. 22 ; p. 212, 1. 4. Rhapsody, sb. A patchwork, confused mixture: p. 106, 1. 1. 'This concerneth not those mingle-mangles of many kindes of stuffe, or as the Grecians call them Rapsodies.' Florio's Montaigne, p. 68, ed. 1603. Rhetorics, sb. Rhetoric: p. 177, ', 9- Round about, v. i. To roam about : p. 8, 1. 15. ' For a man may wander in the way, by rounding up and down.' Bacon, Of the Interp. of Nature (Works, iii. 232). Rudiment, sb. An elementary form : p. 48, 1. 19. Rule over, v. t. To decide, as a judge decides a point of law : p. 7, 1. 6. Sabbathless, adj. Restless : p. 247, 1. 14. Sacramental, adj. Bound by an oath or solemn obligation : p. 146, 1. 24. Saddest, adj. Most serious, most important : p. 220, 1. 8. Sake. For .... sake : As in the phrases ' for entertainment sake ' : p. 61, 1. 16; 'for demonstration sake': p. 185, 1. 21; 'for example sake,' p. 81, 1. 16; 'assurance sake,' p. 159, 1. 16. Compare Hooker, Eccl. Pol. i. p. 156 (ed. Keble) : ' for that work sake which we covet to perform*' 3 68 GLOSSARr. Sale, sb. 'Confections of sale' = confections which are offered for sale: p. 141, 1. 1. Salomon, sb. Solomon: p. 20, 1. 5. The old form of the name in the Geneva Bible. Sapience, sb. Wisdom : p. 44, 1. 18 ; p. 118, 1. 16. Satisfactory, adj. Bacon uses this, word on three occasions in a sense which, so far as I am aware, has not been noticed in the dictionaries. 'These satisfactory and specious causes' (p. 119, 1. 5); 'by way of argument or satisfactory reason' (p. 153, 1. 16); 'more satisfactory than substantial ' (p. 260, 1. 7). See also p. 30, 1. 26. From these instances it appears that an explanation is satisfactory which merely stops the mouth of the inquirer, and, as Bacon says of Mirabilaries, gives ' contentment to the appetite of curious and vain wits' (p. 87). Again, in the same spirit he speaks of the methods of tradition of knowledge in his time ; ' he that receiveth knowledge desireth rather present satisfaction, than expectant inquiry: and so rather not to doubt, than not to err' (p. 171). Compare the use of 'satisfy,' p. 172, 1. 33. Scale. ' By scale '=by degrees, step by step : p. 1 18, 1. 4, Scape, v. 1. To escape : p. 161, 1. 20. Science, sb. Knowledge, erudition: p. 59, 1. 32. Scope, sb. Mark to aim at; and so, aim, object ; p. 42, 1. 6. Seducement, sb. Seduction: p. 14, 1. 17; p. 153, 1. 3. Seeing, used as an adjective, p. 76, 1. 6. Seek, to. 'To be to seei' = to be at a loss: p. 13,1.31; p. 25, 1. 20. ' For if you reduce usury, to one low rate, it will ease the common bor- rower, but the merchant will be to seeke for money.' Essay xli. p. 171. Seen, p.p. Versed, skilled: p. 25, 1. 19; p. 46, 1. 30; p. 136, 1. I. Seem much, to. To appear a great thing : p. 3, 1. 28. So ' to think much ' is to reckon highly as an act of importance. Segregate, adj. Separate: p. 130, 1. 2; p. 216, 1. 13. Septuagenary, adj. Seventy years old : p. 38, 1. 28. Service, sb. Used especially of military service ; a campaign or engage- ment : p. 68, 1. 2. We speak of a soldier having ' seen service.' Set forward, v. t. To further, promote: p. 83, 1. 30. See 1 Chr. xxiii. 4. Set into, v.t. To set to, apply oneself to: p. 82, 1. 18. Seven. The seven wise men of Greece : p. 102, 1. 32. See note. Sever, v.i. To be separated : p. 216, 1. 24; p."2i7,l. 29; p. 226,1. 20. , Several, adj. Separate: p. 185, 1. 14. See Matt. xxv. 15. Severally, adv. In several ways : p. 5, 1. J. Severe, adj. Rigidly accurate : p. 87, 1. 4. Severedly, adv. Separately: p. 128, 1. 12. Shall, used for ' will ' : p. 80, 1. 27. Shape, v. i. To acquire shape or form : p. 39, I. 31. Shoot, sb. A shot : p. 149, 1. 1 1. Shoot over, v. i. To overshoot the mark : p. 232, 1. 16. Should, used for 'would': p. i, 1. 23 ; p. 66, 1. 5 ; p. 126, 1. 17 ; p. 155, 1. 28. Show, sb. Semblance, appearance : p. 3, 1. 30 ; p. 102, 1. 9. See Is. iii. 9. Side. ' On the other side' = oa the other hand : p. 35, 1. 22. So also 'of the other side': p, 210, 1. 30. GLOSSARV. 369 Sign unto, v. t. To attest : p. 192, 1. 6. Signify, v. t. To indicate : p. 65, 1. 9. Similitude, sb. Likeness: p. 70, 1. 26; p. 215, 1. 16. Comparison: p. 87, 1. 10 ; p. 147, 1. 32. Simples, sb. Herbs : p. 80, 1. 1 7. Sineereness, sb. Sincerity : p. 195,.!. 29. Skill, v.i. To understand, know: p. 66, 1. I. Convp. 1 Kings v. 6; 2 Chr. ii. 7, 8, xxxiv. 1 2. Slug,.j/.r. To delay, hinder: p. 119, 1. 21. Sobriety, sb. Temperance in its widest sense, sobermindedness : p. 10, 1. 7; p. 44, 1. 14; p. 216, 1. 8. Softest, adj. Most effeminate : p. 195, 1. 25. Softness, sb. Effeminacy : p. 16, 1. 9. Solemn, adj. Grave, decorous : p. 235, U. iS, 27. Solidness, s6. Solidity: p. 119, 1. 17. So long time. So long : p. 38, 1. 23. Solute, adj. Free, unfettered : p. 259, 1. 4 ; p. 260, 1. 33. Some, used with a singular, p. 194, 1. 8. Sometime,_a collective noun for the people : p. 55, 1. 33, as in Hamlet, i. 1. 72. Suborn, v.t. Like the Lat. subornare, to furnish, equip: p. 187, 1. 14. Subsistence, 56. Substance : p. 44, 1. 22. Substantive, adj. Substantial : p. 106, 1. 8. Subtility, sb. Subtilty; the old form of spelling, which Bacon most frequently adopts; from Lat. subtilitas: p. 32, 1. 10; &c. Success, sb. The result or issue of an action, good or bad : p. 101, 1. 31 : P* I 35> !• 4* It was formerly used with some qualifying adjective. See josh. i. 8. Such. one. Such, such a one : p. 253, 1. 15. Succours. Plural for singular : p. 28, 1. 18. Suddenly, adv. Quickly, hastily : p. 184, 1. 16; p. 234, 1. 8. * Muse not that I thus suddenly proceed.' Shakespeare, Two Gent, of Ver. i. 3. 64. 'And suddenly resolve me in my suit.' Id. Love's Lab. Lost, ii. 2. no. Suffice, v.i. To be competent: p. 172, 1. 23. Sufficient, adj. Competent, able: p. 79, 1. 18; p. 93, 1. 32; p. 221, 1. 25. ' Sufficient men' = men of capacity, ability. Sufficiency, sb. Ability, capacity : p. 216, 1. 29. See 2 Cor. iii. 5. Summary, adj. Chief, most important : p. 6, 1. 30 ; p. 19, 1. 30 ; p. 45, 1-3I. Suppeditation, sb. Assistance : p. 206, 1. 2. Supply, v.t. To assist: p. 76, 1. 16. Suppose, v.t. To imagine : p. 267, 1. 19. Supposed, adj. Fictitious, imaginary: p. 45, 1. 5. 'Upon supposed fairness.' Shakespeare, Mer. of Ven. iii. 2. 94. 'Wounding supposed peace.' Id. 2 Hen. IV. iv. 5. 196. Surcharge, sb. Surfeit : p. 83, 1. 20. Surd, adj. Literally, without sound, unmeaning : p. 255, 1. I. Suspect, adj. Suspected, suspicious: p. 81, 1. 12; p. 260, 1. 19. 'Cer- tainly in Italy, they hold it a little suspect in popes, when they have often in their mouth, padre commune.' Essay li. p. 208. Swelling, sb. Inflation of mind by pride: p. 10, 1. 13. Compare 2 Cor. xii. 20. Syntax, sb. Arrangement : p. 182, 1. 28. Sy stasis, sb. See p. 174, 1. 27. T. Table, sb. A tablet, picture : p. 57, 1. 31. 'A pair of tables,' p. 64, 1. 10. « Who art the table wherein all my thoughts Are visibly character'd and engraved.' Shakespeare, Two Gent, of Ver. ii. 7. 3. B b 2 372 GLOSSARY. Taint, v.t. To sully, tarnish : p. 27, 1. 28. With the use of 'blemish and taint ' in this passage, compare Macbeth, iv. 3. 124: ' The taints and blames I laid upon myself." Take up, v.refl. To check oneself: p. 65, 1. 23. Take upon. To arrogate, assume to oneself: p. 65, 1. 31. Tax, v.t. To censure : p. 24, 1. 4 ; p. 135, 1. 14. In the former passage the Latin translation takes the word in the modern sense. See note. * They tax our policy and call it cowardice.' Shakespeare, Tr. and Cr. i. 3. 197. Taxation, sb. Censure, reprehension: p. 62, 1. 17; p. 103, 1. 27. 'You'll be whipped for taxation one of these days.' Shakespeare, As You Like It, i. i. 91. Temperature, sb. Temperament : p. 21, 1. 26 ; p. 59, 1. 2. * The best composition, and temperature is, to have opennesse in fame and opinion; secrecy in habit ; dissimulation in seasonable use ; and a power to faigne, if there be no remedj'.' Essay vi. p. 22. Tenderness, sb. Sensitiveness: p. 192, 1. 29. 'Tenderness of coun- tenance * = bashfulness : p. 208, 1. 31. ' Lest I give cause To be suspected of more tenderness Than doth become a man.' Shakespeare, Cymb. i. I. 94. Term, sb. Limit, termination: p. 129, 1. 14. Terrene, adj. Earthly: p. 48, 1. 13. ' Alack, our terrene moon Is now eclipsed.' Shakespeare, Ant. and CI. iii. 13. 153. That, pron. That which: p. 66, 1. 30; p. no, 1. S ; p. 112, 1. 9; p. 155, 1. 2. The, used for the possessive pronoun 'its': p. 27, 1. 26. Compare the version in the Bishops' Bible of Lev. xxv. 5 : * That which groweth of the owne accord of thy haruest, thou shalt not reape.' And also Holland's Plutarch, p. 812 (ed. 1603) : ' Anstotle and Plato doe holde, that matter is corporall, without forme, shape, figure and qualitie, in the owne nature and propertied The, redundant. 'At the first: 1 p. 37, 11. 7, 11. ' The which:' p. 37,1. 31; p. 234, 1. 10. 'Other the heathen gods': p. 38, 1. 25. Theomachy, sb. A battle with the gods : p. 194, 1. 18. Theory, sb. Speculation : p. Ill, 1. 33. Think much. To take ill, grudge : p. 88, 1. 30. Through-lights, sb. Lights or windows on both sides of a room : p. 97, 1. 25. Comp. Essay xlv. p. 183. Throughly, adv. Thoroughly ; p. 67, 1. 28 ; p. 86, 1. Ig. See Matt. iii. 12. Through-passage, sb. Transit, traversing : p. 98, 1. 15. Thwart, adj. Perverse : p. 1 7, 1. 10. ' Create her child of spleen ; that it may live, And be a thwart disnatured torment to her.' Shakespeare, K. Lear, i. 4. 305. To, prep. 'Designed . 198, 1. 7. So ' to set in work' = to put in motion : p. 240, 1. 23. Worthy, sb. A hero: p. 52, 1. 4. Comp. 'the nine worthies' and Nah. ii. 5- Wrought, p.p. Influenced, worked upon: p. 177, 1. 24. Additional Note. P. 228 [20]. Dr. Thompson, the Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, has pointed out to me that the origin "of Bacon's ' globe of matter ' and ■ 'globe of crystal or form* is probably the