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FAITH AND FACT 
 
 A STUDY OF 
 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited 
 
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FAITH AND FACT 
 
 A STUDY OF 
 
 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 BEING THE ESSAY FOR THE NORRISIAN PRIZE, igo8 
 
 BY 
 
 ERNEST A. EDGHILL, M.A. 
 
 SUIIWARDEN OF THE C0LI.E<;E OF ST. SAVIOUR IN SUUIHWAKK AND 
 WILBERFORCK WISSIONF.R 
 SOMETIME SCHOLAR OF KING's COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE 
 
 BELL SCHOLAR AND CROSSE SCHOLAR 
 AUTHOR OF 'the EVIDENTIAL VALUE OF PROl'HECv' 
 
 WITH PREFACE BY THE RT. REV. 
 
 THE LORD BISHOP OF SOUTHWARK 
 
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 BY ROBERT MACLFHOSE AND CO. LTD. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 When I was asked by the writer of this Essay for 
 some sort of preface, I feared that a preface to an 
 essay might be disproportionate and incongruous, 
 and only consented out of gratitude to the writer for 
 great services to my diocese, and from admiration of 
 the way in which one so brilHantly endowed devotes 
 time and labour without stint to the children of 
 the poor. But when I came to read his work, my 
 mind changed altogether. If this is an essay by 
 origin, it is hardly less a handbook by character: 
 and it may be useful to point out that we have in 
 it something which was really needed, and is, so far 
 as I can judge, exceedingly well done. For the 
 interest of the subject reaches entirely beyond the 
 limits of theological or philosophical speculation. 
 It concerns, and vitally concerns, all those who think 
 about the relation of Christian faith to modern 
 thought and knowledge. It concerns them in two 
 ways. Ritschlianism is both influential and typical. 
 As an influence it has reached far, and is present in 
 many places where it is not named or recognized. 
 One who does not know the influence at its source 
 will deal clumsily with its results. But it is also 
 typical. Many minds in the last few decades have 
 
vi PREFACE 
 
 been Ritschlian without knowing it If there had 
 been no Ritschl, there would have been some one 
 else very like him. His is a system which fastens 
 upon some of the most characteristic features of 
 modern thought, detects their illuminating meanings, 
 discerns in them the means of deliverance from old 
 mistakes, both in speculation and practice, and revels 
 in the discovery that what seemed an enemy is first 
 a liberator, and then a defender, of the essentials 
 of that great faith which has given to Europe all 
 that is best in her civilization, and carries the only 
 promise of a world-religion. To watch such an 
 attempt with appreciative and admiring attention, 
 to see how it works out, what it gives us, and 
 what after all it may take away, to observe in this 
 great and typical instance what is the characteristic 
 strength, and what are the equally characteristic 
 weaknesses, of one whole great way of thinking, is 
 evidently a duty, and a duty of keenest interest, to 
 all who are themselves trying to think upon these 
 great topics. I value and dare to recommend 
 Mr. Edghill's essay because it seems to me to be 
 quite an admirable attempt to help us in this useful 
 and delicate task. It is quick and lucid, without 
 shrinking from detail. It sets the subject skilfully 
 into its context with the previous developments of 
 thought. But its greatest merit is that it is entirel)- 
 respectful, and yet quite independent. It shows 
 that combination of real and eager docility, with a 
 secure standard of judgment, which belongs to the 
 best and most hopeful forms of Christian theology. 
 I am less diffident in so speaking when I remember 
 that other parts of Mr. Edghill's theological work 
 
PREFACE vii 
 
 have won him marked approval and trust from the 
 mature and critical judgment of Professor Swete. 
 
 Perhaps having said thus much I have done my 
 part, and should at once make way for the 
 Author. But the interest of the subject tempts me 
 to go a little further. Why is it that Ritschlianism 
 is so typical, and the study of it therefore so 
 instructive ? 
 
 I think first and chiefly because it was the most 
 important attempt to challenge for Christianity the 
 thought of an intensely empirical or inductive time. 
 ' To believe in nothing which you could not claw ' 
 was, we remember, in conversational caricature, the 
 tendency of the time. At last it seemed that the 
 overdue achievements of Bacon's prophecy were to 
 come true. The old things were to be left behind. 
 A new way and method was to open the closed 
 doors, and reset all the problems, and sweep onwards 
 to victory in every sphere. It Was the way of the 
 chemist's or biologist's analysis, and of the inductive 
 logic which was its counterpart. The method and 
 the logic brought over the associations of the 
 sciences of external nature to which they had been 
 first triumphantly applied. Metaphysics were old- 
 world lumber. Mysticism, if the word may be used 
 to gather up the action of any direct or intuitive 
 capacities of the human spirit, was tabooed as 
 perilous, or despised as sentimental. It was a 
 difficult time for the Religion which had old and 
 honourable alliances with metaphysics, which was at 
 home with deductive logic, and had always claimed 
 a commanding place in regard to truth and morals 
 for the intuitions of faith and conscience. Then 
 
vin 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 it was that to Ritschl, but not to Ritschl alone, 
 there came hooie the thought, simple, luminous 
 and far-reaching, that Christianity was after all an 
 inductive religion. Alone of the religions it had 
 come in along the way of fact. Fact, not theory 
 or ideal, was its theme and burden. Before men 
 talked of development and evolution, the evolution 
 of Christianity out of the old Covenant, and its 
 own reliance on development were anticipations of 
 what they would say. But above all, one fact 
 unique, supreme, but central, had been alike its 
 credential and its message, and its standard both 
 of what was true and what was good : the fact of 
 Jesus Christ, living, dying, risen. Further, that 
 fact was of such a kind that it interpreted and 
 heightened the values of all the lesser facts of like 
 sort, the voices of prophets, the examples and 
 testimonies of saints, the moral victories of the 
 defeated, and the truths won by the childlike, over 
 a range of echoing experience not less wide than 
 life. So 'back to Christ' was the common thought 
 of varying minds : and men read the Gospels more 
 and talked of ' the Gospel ' less : and some, 
 forgetting that fact demands analysis, spoke of all 
 ' doctrine ' as though it were an encroachment on 
 life ; while others delighted to shov^ that not by a 
 prion methods, but by the analysis, largel}^ intuitive 
 and Spirit-led, of what Christ had been and spoken 
 and done, the Christian doctrine had grown. But 
 every way it was a great change. The note of it 
 rang clear to us in Oxford when Scott Holland 
 preached his first sermons before the University, 
 and I well remember how a representative theologian 
 
PREFACE ix 
 
 of the elder school said to me, " I have always been 
 trained to think of Christian theology as derived by 
 deduction from fixed principles : but this seems an 
 assertion of its inductive character." The criticism 
 was significant and partially true. 
 
 Further, the temper of the time was not only 
 inductive, but agnostic ; blankly so in many who 
 held any spiritual truth to be unprovable and un- 
 certain, and who became for the time the most 
 formidable antagonists of Christian faith: but equally 
 so, though ' with all the difference,' in believers who 
 recognized what the best lessons of time had done 
 to rebuke hard dogmatism, and to emphasize the 
 consciousness of ignorance as a necessary part of all 
 true knowledge. It was to them one true link 
 between Christians and their opponents. 
 
 Christian agnosticism was the reverent temper 
 which made men draw the morals that were sug- 
 gested by the stupendous extension of knowledge, 
 by the resetting of truth in all departments, by the 
 historical survey of many phases of thought positive 
 in their day but transient. Such men felt that the 
 knowledge of Himself which God had surely given 
 was a truth ringed about and interpenetrated by the 
 ignorance of fallible and finite minds to whom it was 
 entrusted. This feeling, paral3^sing to faith in some 
 minds, but in others recognized as giving to faith 
 more depth and reality, prepared a ready response 
 for teachings which, like those of Ritschl, offered the 
 prospect of a sufficient certainty, while disowning 
 speculative ambition. 
 
 One other point less obvious, but not, I believe, 
 less real, in which Ritschlianism seemed to meet a 
 
X PREFACE 
 
 deeply felt instinct of Christian need. Men felt that 
 for Christian faith something more was needed than 
 the relative approval and compliments which were 
 the best testimony that the truth could receive from 
 the critical and comparative labours of contemporary 
 thought. Something was wanted that was unique, 
 supreme, and commanding. This could never be 
 given by observing that Christian speculation had 
 reached (if it were so) further than Plato's, or that 
 the Christian West had thought more clearly and 
 effectively than the non-Christian East or gave a 
 more lucid and practical treatment to the moral 
 problem. It could be found only in that which was 
 the very centre of the Gospel, namely, the way in 
 which it had come, distinct from all the philosophies 
 and from all the movements, reversing and yet 
 fulfilling all the common ways of thought and life. 
 Ritschl stood forth to meet this with the offer of 
 allegiance to the Christ who needed no proof but 
 Himself, and to a Christianity which boldly began 
 with Christ as Christ, without stopping (as it were) 
 to enquire for any better reason than that He was 
 what He was, and came as He came ; without look- 
 ing round to ask how this was philosophically 
 justifiable, or what theology it presupposed. No 
 wonder that the offer seemed to be a godsend : to 
 correspond with penetrating discernment to the exact 
 needs of the time. 
 
 How far Ritschlianism answered to and justified 
 these hopes will be seen by those who keep Mr. 
 Edghill's company through these pages. If previously 
 unacquainted with the matter, he will give them the 
 opportunity of forming some estimate. But I think 
 
PREFACE xi 
 
 that those who know more will be glad to review and 
 reconsider the topic with such skilful help as his. 
 
 It seems to me that the rise of such a system so 
 fresh, so strong and vital, enlisting the allegiance of 
 minds so various and powerful, at a time when older 
 ways had grown out of use and so many guns had 
 been put out of action, is a marvellous testimony 
 to the permanent and enduring value of the Gospel. 
 I believe that many of the characteristic features of 
 Ritschlianism represent, or at the least point to, ad- 
 vances in a real understanding of the Christian witness 
 which our time has been allowed to make. But this 
 is quite compatible with the conviction, that as a 
 system, and through some of its parts, Ritschlianism, 
 if accepted as the norm of Christian apologetics, 
 would be as one of those reeds upon which if a man 
 lean it pierces his hand. That can be shown in two 
 ways — a priori, and by observation of its results. 
 A priori, it is one more attempt to cut faith and 
 reason apart ; to secure the former by disparaging 
 the latter. It is quite true that Christianity cannot 
 construct a philosophy, nor base itself upon one ; 
 but one of its noblest results has been to shed illum- 
 ination upon the great things of God and man which 
 are the subject matter of speculative thought : and 
 one of the noblest witnesses to it has been that 
 of philosophy. Ritschlianism surely fails from 
 the old fault of treating as worthless what is not 
 complete or demonstrative. Christianity, confident 
 in the truth of the Living God, recognizes in the 
 highest work of the reason a real though imperfect 
 value, and lines of thought converging towards a 
 synthesis which the wisdom of God is alone qualified 
 
xii PREFACE 
 
 to make or understand, and which it were irrational 
 to suppose could be within grasp of the reason 
 of man. Mr. Edghill has pointed out several ways 
 in which Ritschl, the enemy of metaphysics, was 
 metaphysical in spite of himself. Possibly the best 
 instance of all is that he fell into the metaphysician's 
 mistake of contempt for relative or qualified know- 
 ledge. An imperfect but aspiring metaphysic, an 
 imperfect but aspiring ethic, an imperfect but advanc- 
 ing knowledge of things visible — Christian faith 
 recognizes them all, learns from all, despises none ; 
 gathers, as it believes, witness, confirmation, and 
 enlargement from all, and so is really in a degree, 
 and wholly in desire, a rational faith.^ " The earth 
 is the Lord's and the fulness thereof" 
 
 If, on the other hand, we turn to the results, there 
 is the unwelcome but necessary task of pointing out 
 that Ritschlianism issues in an express denial of some 
 of the things which in spiritual practice as well as in 
 theological expression are of the very essence of the 
 Christian faith. That the Gospel should have won 
 from such thinkers as Ritschl and his followers the 
 title of * the perfect religion' is indeed a splendid and 
 arresting fact of homage to Christ. But our glad and 
 grateful sense of it cannot cause us to entrust ourselves 
 into RitschFs hands for guidance, when we remem- 
 ber on the one side the havoc which he makes of all 
 the natural evidences of God in creation and the 
 
 ^ I might quote, as being to myself instances ofwhat has been said in 
 the text, the relations, independent but deeply indebted, of Christianity 
 to T. H. Green's idealism, to Darwin's revelation of the meaning of 
 process, and to the positive side of Mill's Utilitarianism^ with its 
 stimulus to social effort, and its practical insistence upon the principle 
 of love. 
 
PREFACE xiii 
 
 heart of man, and on the other side discern (by 
 the help of Mr. EdghiU's able summary in his 
 final paragraphs), what Ritschl has surrendered of 
 the things that are most essential to the truth of 
 the Gospel and to its power. 
 
 EDW. SOUTHWARK. 
 
AUTHOR'S PREFACE 
 
 The progress of thought in recent times has necessi- 
 tated a corresponding advance in theology, if the 
 kingdom is not to be taken from her and given to 
 another. Science has swept aside scholasticism, and 
 reason, it is claimed, has discredited religion. Yet 
 theology, the queen of the sciences, refuses to abdicate, 
 and hears unmoved the lamentations of those that 
 mourn. For, many a time, if the figure may be 
 allowed, has she attended her own obsequies ; and 
 many a time also witnessed her own resurrection. 
 
 In the beginning, religion grasped reason by the 
 hand, and they two went on together ; though young 
 reason had at times hard work to keep pace with her 
 swiftly striding sister (for in those days religion did 
 the pulling). In more modern times reason has 
 rushed ahead, but religion will not release her hold. 
 She has grown somewhat old with the passing of the 
 centuries ; and, the experience of ages suggesting 
 caution, she moves somewhat slowly ; yea, she halts 
 as she goes. Be not unequally yoked, is a sound 
 saying ; and many demanded that the partnership 
 should be dissolved. "Let go my hand," cries reason, 
 impetuous to explore undiscovered and even forbidden 
 realms. " Let her then go, to self-destruction, if she 
 will," suggest man}^ that would not see religion 
 
XVI 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 ruined. " Stop before it is too late ; for you know 
 not to what abyss you are being hurried along, to 
 perish evermore." Yet timorous counsels have not 
 prevailed ; and still religion grasps reason by the 
 hand, and refuses to disclaim relationship. This 
 situation, however, is well-nigh impossible; some modus 
 vivendi must be found, but who shall discover it ? 
 
 Then rose Ritschl and chode with her. " What ! 
 wilt thou always cling to another ? Hast thou not 
 power in thyself? Art thou not conscious of self- 
 sufficient life within, for thy sufficiency is of God ? 
 Why needest thou this constant comradeship ? Why 
 claim an unfounded, and harmful relationship ? Why 
 cling on, hindering and hindered ? Rise in thy God- 
 given strength : address thyself to thy task and 
 redeem the world. Let reason fly withersoever she 
 will (if independent, yet grateful for release), over the 
 shoreless sea of speculation. But thy call is clear." 
 
 Religion, however, is yet reluctant to leave reason : 
 and it is well. Notwithstanding, Ritschlianism is an 
 earnest endeavour to face and to solve the religious 
 difficulty of the present day. It will be the object of 
 this essay to examine how far it has succeeded in its 
 enterprise. 
 
 The materials for a study of this new theology are 
 abundant ; the author has consulted the following 
 works : 
 
 Albrecht Ritschl.— Die christlicheLehre vender Rechtfertig- 
 ung und Versohnung, 3 vols, ist edition 1870, 4th edition 
 1895. English translation by various scholars of the third 
 German edition (identical with the fourth). 
 Unterricht in der Christlichen Religion (a most useful 
 and compendious summary of Ritschlian teaching). 6th 
 edition 1903. 
 
PREFACE xvii 
 
 Theologie und Metaphysik, 2nd edition 1887. 
 Schleiermacher's Reden. 
 Drei Akademischen Reden. 
 W. Herrmann. — Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott. 2nd 
 edition 1892 ; 6th edition 1908. (English translations, 
 both of second and third editions.) 
 Die Metaphysik in der Theologie. 
 
 Die Religion in Verhaltniss zum Welterkennen und zur 
 Sitthchkeit. 
 Julius Kaftan. — Brauchen wir ein neues Dogma ? 
 Die Wahrheit der christlichen Religion. 
 Das Wesen der christlichen Religion. 
 
 Adolf Harnack. — What is Christianity? 
 
 History of Dogma. 
 Otto Ritschl. — Albrecht RitschPs Leben. 
 
 Ueber Werthurtheile. 
 
 Kahler. — Die Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre. 
 
 The above-mentioned works may be considered as 
 "sources"; the following are rather expository or 
 critical, and have also been consulted with profit : 
 
 ECKE. — Die Theoiogische Schule Albrecht Kitschl's und die 
 
 Evangelische Kirche der Gegenwart. 
 Stahlin. — Kant, Lotze und Ritschl (mainly philosophical). 
 Kattenbusch. — Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl (an admirable 
 
 introduction). 
 LiPSlus. — Die Ritschl'sche Theologie. 
 Pfleiderer. -Die Ritschl'sche Theologie kritisch beleucbtet 
 
 (excellent, but most unfavourable). 
 Development of Theology. 
 Frank.— Zur Theologie A. Kitschl's. 
 SCHEIBE. — Die Bedeutung der Werthurtheile. 
 Reischle. — Ein Wort zur Controverse, etc. 
 R. M. Wenley. — Contemporary Theology and Theism (much 
 
 too smart). 
 
XVlll 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 Garvie.— The Ritschlian Theology. 
 H. M. Scott. — Nicene Theology. 
 
 James Orr.— The Ritschlian Theology and the Evangelical 
 Faith. 
 
 Ritschlianism — Essays critical and expository. 
 
 The Christian View of God and the World. 
 
 A. Swing.— The Theology of Albert Ritschl. 
 
 A. Sabatier. — Religions of Authority and of the Spirit. 
 
 The importance of Ritschlianism can hardly be 
 over-estimated ; it is a serious and systematic attempt 
 to restate the entire Christian position. Its influence 
 is both wide and deep ; and in no sense whatever 
 confined to the land of its birth. By way of conflict 
 or defence it has set many minds a-thinking : and 
 such labours have contributed largely to the fresh 
 understanding of Christian experience and Christian 
 theology. Moreover, its principles, often unrecognized, 
 and perhaps more often unacknowledged, lie at the 
 root of many powerful tendencies in modern religious 
 thought. 
 
 It is perhaps characteristic of the difference between 
 the religious interests of Englishmen and Contin- 
 entals, that while all Germany was recently divided 
 into hostile camps concerning Ritschl, England was 
 simultaneously distracted with controversies about 
 ritual. The centre of interest has now shifted, and 
 we can spare time to attend to, and discuss, the 
 claims of the Ritschlian theology, which in one form 
 or another is making great headway in this country, 
 where anything that tends to the discredit of syste- 
 matic and speculative theology may be sure of a 
 ready welcome, 
 
PREFACE xix 
 
 Starting, then, with the cry of a theology without 
 metaphysics, Ritschlianism found a glad response in 
 many hearts. Driven from this untenable position 
 by arguments impossible to withstand, it took refuge 
 in the alluring promise of a religion without theology. 
 This was succeeded by much subtle discrimination 
 between facts of faith and facts for faith, but those 
 who will not be deceived by the voice of the charmer 
 will find the truest description of this new theology as 
 an elaborate and elusive system of faith without facts. 
 
 The almost overwhelming pressure of continual 
 and exacting engagements made me well nigh 
 despair of ever being able to compile a satisfactory 
 index to this book. Miss Baily, of Purley, Surrey, 
 most kindly came to my aid ; and it is a pleasant 
 obligation to acknowledge the sympathetic discrimi- 
 nation and careful industry with which she set 
 herself to compile an index which will contribute 
 very materially to the usefulness of this book. 
 
 The Bishop of Southwark, than whom no one 
 even among the busy bishops of the present day 
 could be busier, has most generously found time to 
 read the proofs and to contribute a preface, for which 
 I am sure all readers of this book will share my 
 gratitude. My own obligations to the Bishop for 
 counsel and encouragement in this as in other 
 matters are so constant and numerous that I despair 
 of ever repaying even the half thereof, but inadequate 
 as is this expression of my gratitude, I could not 
 take the risk of allowing a respectful silence to 
 convey the erroneous impression that I was not 
 deeply appreciative of his kindness. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Preface v 
 
 Author's Preface - xv 
 
 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 I. Kant, Lange, and Lotze i 
 II. Schleiermacher and the Romantic School 28 
 
 EXPOSITORY AND CRITICAL 
 
 III. RiTSCHL : His Age and his School 44 
 
 IV. Theory of Knowledge 67 
 V. The Judgments of Value. I. 87 
 
 VI. The Judgments of Value. II. 108 
 
 VII. The Christian Idea of God 120 
 
 VIII. The Kingdom of God 140 
 
 IX. The Doctrine of the Trinity 160 
 
 X. The Person and Work of Christ 174 
 
 XL Sin and Salvation 204 
 
 XII. Conclusion 239 
 
 Index 264 
 
RITSCHLIANISM 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 INTRODUCTORY: KANT, LANGE, AND LOTZE 
 
 RiTSCHLlANISM has effected a revolution in the 
 sphere of systematic theology. It is not long since 
 the Hegelian philosophy and historical criticism 
 attempted to reconstruct the doctrines of the 
 Christian faith in accordance with their own pre- 
 possessions. Now modern empiricism and Neo- 
 Kantism, the avowed antagonists of all speculative 
 philosophy, are striving to remodel Christian dog- 
 matics. The Ritschlian theology has proved by its 
 rapid progress that it is in no sense the arbitrary 
 product of a single mind, but that it represents the 
 prevailing tendencies of the age and is deeply rooted 
 in the theological and religious consciousness of the 
 present day. 
 
 Ritschl himself (as we shall have occasion to 
 remark on more than one occasion) lays the very 
 greatest stress upon his theory of cognition, which is 
 the psychological presupposition of all his theology. 
 "Every theologian," he says, "as a scientific man is 
 under the necessity or duty of proceeding in accord- 
 ance with a definite theory of knowledge, of which 
 he must himself be conscious and the legitimacy of 
 
2 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 which he must be prepared to defend," Accordingly 
 it is absolutely necessary for an understanding of the 
 Ritschlian theology to discuss at some length those 
 theories upon which it is avowedly based, that are 
 associated with the names of Kant and Lotze. 
 
 Kant tells us that he was awakened out of his 
 dogmatic slumber by Hume. The result of the 
 Humian philosophy was to discredit dogmatism 
 which laid down positions that it was unable to 
 establish, and to bring in a scepticism which seemed 
 to involve the entire extinction of all knowledge. 
 Kant's aim, therefore, was to vindicate the objectivity 
 of human knowledge in opposition to the Humian 
 scepticism and at the same time to insist upon its 
 limitations in opposition to the theories of the dog- 
 matic school. It was Kant's belief that that which 
 gave necessity and objective validity to knowledge 
 was not to be found in the things themselves but in 
 the human mind. Accordingly he undertook a 
 critical examination of the cognitive faculty, and it 
 was upon the theory of knowledge thus established 
 that he bases both his system of ethics and his 
 philosophy of religion. 
 
 To proceed, then, with Kant's theory of knowledge, 
 we must learn to distinguish that which our cognitive 
 faculty brings with it and that in the object which 
 exists independently of our knowledge.-^ Our cogni- 
 tive faculty is itself capable of a double division, into 
 (i) sense, which is the capacity to receive impressions, 
 
 ^ A brief resum^ of the main presuppositions and conclusions of the 
 Kantian philosophy is necessary to the argument : a fuller discussion of 
 some special points will be found in the additional note at the end of the 
 chapter. 
 
KANT, LANGE, AND LOTZE 3 
 
 and (2) understanding, the capacity to form concepts. 
 Sense supplies some a priori contributions to every 
 act of knowledge, that is, the forms of space and 
 time, while the understanding uses concepts to think 
 objects supplied through sense. These concepts are 
 the categories which do not belong to the things in 
 themselves, but to our own faculties of perception and 
 conception. Yet these same categories are universally 
 and necessarily valid, for without them nothing can 
 become an object of knowledge. What then, we ask, 
 remains in the thing? Nothing, but an unknown 
 quantity, which is the cause of our impressions. All 
 knowledge therefore is phenomenal and deals with 
 appearance and not reality ; the thing in itself 
 remains as it ever was, entirely outside our know- 
 ledge.^ 
 
 Kant intended to establish the objective reality of 
 human knowledge, but it is hardly too much to say, 
 that his theory ends in the overthrow of all objective 
 validity. For what we know, and what we can 
 know, according to this theory, is only phenomenal 
 appearance. 
 
 I n dealing with the phenomenal we must dis- 
 tinguish between matter and form; the matter is 
 
 ^ It is difficult to see, if this theory be logically applied, how anything 
 can ever become an object of knowledge, for though the thing itself 
 may be supposed to cause our impressions, yet causahty is itself one of 
 the categories. We are thus reduced to an obvious dilemma. The 
 unknown and unknowable thing in itself being a cause precedes the 
 categories, but in the fact of being so conceived it becomes subject to 
 the very category of causality which it is supposed to precede. The 
 Kantian theory aims at limiting all human knowledge to phenomena ; 
 yet Kant cannot gain the starting-point of his theory without affirming 
 something of the things in themselves which it is the object of this 
 theory to render wholly inaccessible to human reason. 
 
4 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 sensation, that is, the impression the thing in itself 
 makes upon our sensitive faculty. The form again 
 is nothing but sensuous intuition or perception as it 
 exists in the ideas of space and time. To quote the 
 words of Kant himself, "the form lies ready a priori 
 in the mind." The phenomenal, therefore, exists only 
 in the mind, both as to form and as to content; in 
 other words it is wholly subjective, and may be not a 
 manifestation of the thing in itself at all, but merely 
 a modification of our own consciousness. How then 
 are we to attribute objective reality to our knowledge? 
 It can only be given when the phenomena are brought 
 under the categories which are the necessary forms 
 of all thought. Thus they are combined according 
 to law and consequently acquire universal validity. 
 But the strange part of this theory lies in the fact 
 that when we consider what it is that confers this 
 objective validity we find that it is itself subjective 
 and we are thus reduced to^ believing that our know- 
 ledge can only be composed of " elements or 
 constituents which appertain solely to the subject." 
 The human mind lamenting its own subjectivity and 
 barely able to peep through the prison bars of 
 phenomenalism, must reluctantly abandon its attempt 
 to reach the promised land of objective reality — a 
 land of far distances whereof it is dimly conscious 
 but whose joys it may never taste. Thus speaks 
 Kant himself, "Even if we were to carry our empirical 
 intuition to the highest degree of clearness we should 
 not thereby approach any nearer to a knowledge of 
 the objects considered in themselves. . . . What 
 the objects may be considered in themselves, would 
 never become known to us, even though we should 
 
KANT, LANGE, AND LOTZE 5 
 
 attain to the clearest possible acquaintance with that 
 which is alone within our reach : viz. their appear- 
 ance." ^ 
 
 This seems to take away all possibility of objec- 
 tive truth in knowledge. The. fact that this subjec- 
 tivity is universal and " necessary " does not obviate 
 the fact of its delusive character, but makes it all the 
 more lamentable. 
 
 The Kantian theory of knowledge is in reality 
 a philosophy of agnosticism : and objective reality 
 can only be maintained by directly controverting 
 the principal position on which Kant's Critique is 
 based. 
 
 Having laid down his epistemological principles, 
 Kant proceeded in his Transcendental Dialectic to 
 consider the conceptions of Pure Reason. The 
 understanding concerns itself with finite things under 
 the form of conceptions, and therefore never passes 
 the bounds of empirical possibility. Reason concerns 
 itself with the unconditioned, and therefore arrives at 
 conceptions by way of inference, not of reflection, 
 and deals with ideas which must necessarily and 
 eternally remain beyond experience. Unity is essen- 
 tial for knowledge: so Kant proceeds to discuss the 
 three great ideas of unity — the soul, the world, and 
 God. It follows naturally from Kant's premises by 
 which all real knowledge is limited to experience, 
 that although Kant is prepared to allow them a regu- 
 lative value, such ideas cannot claim any constitutive 
 validity ; for the human mind is incapable of knowing 
 ultimate truth. At first sight this position seems to 
 tell in favour of the Christian idea of revelation: but 
 ^ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason^ p. 59. 
 
6 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 a moment's reflection will convince us that no revela- 
 tion would be possible at all unless the mind were 
 capable of receiving it. The knowledge that revela- 
 tion gives, must itself be subjected to the laws of 
 knowledge, if it is ever to be appropriated by the 
 human mind. The Kantian philosophy overthrows 
 the objectivity of knowledge by its theory of the fatal 
 deficiency of the human intellect, but thereby makes 
 both revelation and religion theoretically impossible. 
 It is needless to pursue the subject at length, through 
 all its psychological and cosmological ramifications, 
 ultimately leading up to the refutation of the tra- 
 ditional theological proofs of the existence of God. 
 Kant's difificulties largely arise from a dualistic con- 
 ception of consciousness, involving an abstract separ- 
 ation between subject and object. How complicated 
 if not self-contradictory the discussions on free-will 
 and determinism become, may well be imagined. 
 With reference to the theological position, it is only 
 just to say that Kant succeeded in completely over- 
 throwing the usual form in which the arguments of 
 rational theology were stated. But, after all, Kant 
 argued on his own presuppositions ; and till these had 
 been tested, the victory could not be pronounced 
 ultimately decisive. Yet for a moment everything 
 was swept away before this imperious onslaught — the 
 soul, human freedom, God Himself: and a blank 
 agnosticism was left to mock the efforts of speculative 
 reason. It was impossible, however, to imagine that 
 metaphysic at a moment of renewed youth should be 
 slain by a single sword; and it is now universally 
 acknowledged that Kantism is in no sense the last 
 word on the subject of metaphysical speculation. 
 
KANT, LANGE, AND LOTZE 7 
 
 Indeed the necessity for unity of knowledge (such as 
 is guaranteed by a belief in the absolute, whether 
 viewed from a theistic or pantheistic point of view), 
 is not merely a result of a practical impulse but a 
 necessity of the theoretic reason. Otherwise all 
 knowledge is dissolved into doubt, reason into con- 
 tradiction, and truth into seeming. 
 
 Kant's theory of knowledge sets a limit to know- 
 ledge which it shall not pass. Led by theoretical 
 reason we arrive at a point, like Israel of old, where 
 the impassable sea rolls in front, the illimitable desert 
 stretches on the further side, and the inexorable foe 
 presses on behind. Flying before the onset of 
 materialism, knowledge finds itself between the sands 
 of doubt and the waves of scepticism. The situa- 
 tion is desperate and nothing but a divine interposi- 
 tion can save. Such a deus ex machina Kant finds 
 in his theory of Practical Reason. Theoretical 
 knowledge hems us in on every side, but it is 
 impossible that man can thus live or live content : 
 there must be freedom, scope for development, wide 
 regions of religion and morality, through which the 
 soul may wandering wonder, and wondering worship, 
 and worshipping reign. Kant sees clearly how im- 
 possible it is to rest content with the barren 
 delusions of the theoretic reason. So by a tour 
 de force the practical reason regains what the theoretic 
 reason had lost, or rather thrown away : and we are 
 introduced to what must ultimately prove to be two 
 realms of reality. In the one, theoretic reason reigns 
 supreme, and thought languishes under its stern 
 despotism ; in the other, practical reason gives 
 freedom and erects a spacious edifice, wherein 
 
8 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 religion and morality may dwell securely and none 
 make them afraid. 
 
 The Critique of Practical Reason starts with the 
 idea of a moral law. This is regarded as a fact of 
 reason, which there is no gainsaying. The existence 
 of a moral law which is the determining principle of 
 the will necessitated the assumption of moral liberty. 
 Similarly a will determined by the moral law neces- 
 sarily seeks the realization of the highest good. The 
 highest good, however, can only be realized by the 
 perfect conformity of the will to the moral law. But 
 this never takes place in the world of sense : hence 
 we are driven to postulate the immortality of the soul. 
 The practical reason is not yet content. The highest 
 good is the combination of virtue and happiness, and 
 this demands that nature should be in harmony with 
 morality. But if this is so, there must be not only a 
 cause of nature outside nature, but a cause which is 
 necessarily a complete manifestation of the perfect 
 moral law. Hence as a necessary postulate of the 
 practical reason, we must assume the existence of 
 God. 
 
 So all things are restored that were lost — freedom, 
 immortality, God. And these great doctrines, freed 
 evermore from the fluctuating speculations of theo- 
 retical philosophy, are exalted to the unassailable 
 heights of moral certainty. But we are not per- 
 mitted to ascribe to these things any theoretic value. 
 As Kant himself says, more than once : " We can 
 only think the Supreme Being; we cannot know him 
 or ascribe anything theoretically to him." The proof 
 of God's existence rests in no sense whatever on 
 demonstration, but solely and entirely on the practical 
 
KANT, LANGE, AND LOTZE 9 
 
 postulates of the moral consciousness. Kant, indeed, 
 seeks to maintain the objective reality of the three 
 great conceptions to which we have alluded, but 
 emphatically denies the possibility of their ever 
 becoming objects of theoretic knowledge. Under 
 these circumstances, however, it is really impossible 
 to assert their objective truth. 
 
 Kant's anxiety to defend the aprfority and 
 originality of the moral law leads him to assert 
 " the autonomy of the will as the sole principle 
 of moral laws and their corresponding duties.'' 
 Stated otherwise, the obligatoriness of the moral 
 law is to be found in the moral constitution of 
 human nature, and in no sense in its correspondence 
 with, and manifestation of, a perfect will of absolute 
 good, wholly independent of man, and serving as the 
 standard to which all ideals of morality must con- 
 form. It may be granted, and Kant has proved it 
 well, that the moral law is a fact of our reason. But 
 this proves no more than it states ; and then we must 
 hold our peace. The postulates of the practical reason 
 are thus no more than hypotheses and assumptions 
 based upon our moral consciousness, and the neces- 
 sary presupposition of man's moral activity : they can 
 in no sense whatever be said to be characterized by 
 objective necessity or truth. Starting from the 
 necessity of the subject, rather than that of the 
 object, they may indeed maintain their position as 
 real constituents of human nature, but only to be 
 rapidly dissolved into complete relativity. 
 
 By far the greatest difficulty of the Kantian 
 theory of knowledge has yet to be examined — the 
 complete separation of the theoretic and practical 
 
lo RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 reason. Such a separation it would be hard to 
 justify, save as a theoretical distinction conveniently- 
 drawn for the purposes of the critical examination of 
 elements recognized to be essentially inseparable. 
 This, however, is in no sense the meaning of Kant. 
 For him the two realms of knowledge are not merely 
 distinct, but mutually exclusive ; and mutual exclu- 
 sion may at any time pass into avowed hostility. 
 The unity of knowledge is practically sacrificed ; for 
 there seems no possible method by which the a prioTi 
 moral law, a form of the practical intelligence, can 
 ever become subject to the categories of the under- 
 standing. How then can the moral law ever become 
 an object of knowledge, unless the former or the 
 latter abandon their peculiar characteristics ? It 
 almost seems as if the principles of theoretic know- 
 ledge compel us to deny the possibility of the practical 
 postulates ever becoming an object of knowledge or 
 thought, or, indeed, having any real existence. 
 
 It need hardly be said that this result in no way 
 corresponds with Kant's intention. His fundamental 
 antithesis between the two realms of knowledge 
 has a very different object, that of setting religious 
 truths free from all fear of philosophical assaults. 
 Theoretic knowledge being limited to phenomena 
 and never attaining to the things in themselves 
 which are the pattern of the true, the reason could 
 no longer claim absolute supremacy. A fair field 
 was left for faith : for where knowledge is, faith is 
 done away : but where knowledge is not, there faith 
 can be active ; for faith is the evidence of things not 
 seen, nor known, nor understood. Knowledge may 
 ■even be regarded as the fount of unbelief : and the 
 
KANT, LANGE, AND LOTZE ii 
 
 Kantian philosophy, by dennonstrating the subjec- 
 tivity and insecurity of knowledge, claimed to have 
 cut off the waters of that fountain for ever. Reason 
 was dethroned and faith declared triumphant. But 
 the victory was too dearly purchased ; for faith and 
 knowledge are so closely interwoven the one with 
 the other, that when one perishes the other pines. 
 By reducing all knowledge to phenomena, faith itself 
 became nothing but subjective presentation ; and in 
 this overthrow of reason religion is itself over- 
 thrown. 
 
 The theory of knowledge which Kant elaborated 
 is the pivot of the Ritschlian theology, and, speaking 
 generally, it is quite impossible to understand the 
 religious thought of the nineteenth century, without 
 a thorough appreciation of the principles and pre- 
 suppositions of the Kantian philosophy. Its theory 
 of knowledge dominated many minds and many 
 schools : but in other directions also it was not with- 
 out far-reaching influences, some of which we may 
 briefly indicate. 
 
 (i) The critical philosophy marks a real stage 
 in the advance of thought in its relation both to 
 empiricism and dogmatism. The scepticism of 
 Hume furnishes an historical illustration of the 
 ultimate resting place of philosophical empiricism. 
 Kant attacked this negative conclusion through the 
 premises; and established the transcendental spon- 
 taneity of the human mind. He vindicated the truth 
 and certainty of the categories, and the right of 
 reason to form its own laws. 
 
 (ii) Even more important was the overthrow of 
 dogmatism, >vhich airned at demonstrating the 
 
12 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 ultimate identity of truth and being. While not 
 quarrelling with the conclusion (which is inevitable 
 for any systematic unity of thought) Kant rightly 
 demonstrated the inadequacy of the methods by 
 which it was reached. By Kant's masterly explica- 
 tion of the idea of reason, the old metaphysic was 
 not only discredited but practically destroyed. 
 
 (iii) In vindicating the originality of a moral law, 
 Kant shook off the fetters of empiricism and 
 materialism. These latter made common cause in 
 attempting to reduce morality to the social and 
 physical causes of environment and heredity. Kant's 
 assertion of the " categorical imperative " as no 
 empirical growth in society nor any result of custom 
 or education, but as an essential factor in the inmost 
 constitution of the human mind, raised human feeling 
 above the mechanical and material theories which 
 sought to deny this fundamental attribute of 
 humanity. 
 
 (iv) Kant's real greatness lies in the fact that he 
 inaugurated a tremendous and lasting revolution in 
 the world of thought. Ritschl himself states with 
 force and directness the great problem of human 
 existence. " Man as a spiritual being on the one 
 hand, makes the claim to be of greater worth than 
 the whole natural system ; and, on the other, finds 
 himself limited, hemmed in, and subjected by the 
 latter." ^ This difficulty was felt most acutely 
 towards the close of the eighteenth century : the 
 problem was how to reconcile freedom and depend- 
 ence. Practically, the question had been settled ; for 
 freedom was denied. Doctrines and institutions, 
 
 ^ Drei akademische Reden, p. lo ; cf. R. V, iii» 199. 
 
KANT, LANGE, AND LOTZE 13 
 
 political and ecclesiastical, were decorous and dead ; 
 for the spirit which gives life had fled to seek a more 
 congenial home. Forces moved beneath the surface 
 — volcanic forces of terrific power : forces and fires 
 the more violent because the longer suppressed. 
 These fierce desires were awhile inarticulate : it was 
 Kant who first gave them conscious and reasoned 
 expression. The Kantian philosophy represents the 
 rebellion of the human spirit, against the lifeless 
 externalism which threatened to crush the soul out 
 of existence. Kant reiterated with emphasis the 
 necessary and original freedom of the human mind : 
 and so doing voiced the passionate protest of the 
 human spirit against those soulless forces by which 
 it seemed at times that it must be inevitably over- 
 whelmed. In this respect the critical philosophy 
 marks a turning point in the history of freedom, 
 progress, and religion. 
 
 (v) We may in conclusion glance at the manner 
 in which specifically Christian doctrines are treated 
 by Kant, especially as not a few have in this form 
 been taken over into the Ritschlian theology. 
 Kant's conception of the highest good led him 
 to conceive the world as a teleological system, and 
 to postulate its moral government by God. The 
 issue would result in the realization of a universal 
 fellowship of men bound together by the laws of 
 virtue ; or, in other words, a consummation of 
 humanity in the Kingdom of God. In his Religion 
 within the Limits of Reason^ Kant somewhat alters his 
 earlier point of view : for, while in the Critique of 
 Practical Reason Kant deduced the idea of the 
 Kingdom of God from the idea of God himself, as 
 
14 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 the supremely moral Being, in his later work he 
 bases his deduction on man's need of moral fellowship 
 by which ultimate victory is to be secured. Ritschl 
 himself exhibits many changes of opinion, but he 
 remains constant in asserting that here we have 
 " Kant's weightiest thought for theology." Thus, in 
 the first edition of his monumental work he claims 
 that " This teleological interpretation of the system 
 of the world, derived from the valuation of fellow- 
 ship in action, according to moral law as the final 
 aim of the world, stands in direct analogy to the 
 Christian view of the world " ; ^ while in the third 
 he again declares that " a judgment of the moral 
 destination of men which attaches itself to Kant's 
 fundamental position serves as the ground of know- 
 ledge for the validity of the Christian idea of God as 
 solution of the problem of the world." ^ 
 
 (vi) Kant's doctrine of human freedom was of the 
 utmost importance to any doctrinal system which 
 nucleated itself round the great ideas of justification 
 and atonement. As part of the phenomenal world, 
 man is under the laws of natural necessity : as part 
 of the noumenal world, of realities, reason prescribed 
 to itself its own laws, and man is thus free. These 
 ideas were appropriated by Ritschl, in whose hands 
 they received systematic enlargement and theological 
 interpretation, " The high importance of Kant's 
 contribution to the right understanding of the Christ- 
 ian idea of reconciliation lies less in any positive 
 contribution to the structure of the doctrine than in 
 the fact that he established critically — that is, with 
 scientific strictness — those general presuppositions of 
 
 ^ R.V. iii^. 13-15. 2^. F. iii3. 215. 
 
KANT, LANGE, AND LOTZE 15 
 
 the idea of reconciliation, which lie in the conscious- 
 ness of moral freedom and moral guilt." ^ And again, 
 in reference to the Kantian system, Ritschl declares, 
 " A sharply marked and continued consciousness of 
 guilt without which the whole Christian idea of re- 
 conciliation is unintelligible, becomes methodically 
 possible only when we judge ourselves after the idea 
 of transcendental freedom." ^ 
 
 (vii) One feature of Kant's theory of the objective 
 character of guilt brought him into sharp antagonism 
 with the Illuminist Theologians, The latter held a 
 view of Divine punishment, which cannot be more 
 finely or more tersely expressed than in the noble 
 words of Clement of Alexandria, Unto salvation and 
 reform and conversion are the punishments of God. 
 Kant, followed by Ritschl, on the other hand, 
 maintains strongly the retributive as opposed to 
 the reformatory character of Divine justice, and 
 sees in the former, rather than in the latter, 
 the essential meaning of punishment " From 
 the idea of our practical reason which sets the 
 transgression of the moral law in the light of 
 guilt, it follows also that transgression deserves 
 punishment." "^ It is difficult to bring Ritschl's later 
 views into harmony with his early and emphatic 
 approval of Kant's position in this respect, but at 
 first its anti-mystical tendencies strongly appealed 
 to him. " Herein Kant s opposition to the Illuminist 
 treatment of the idea of punishment holds firm 
 ground, and in itself the thought is one of undoubted 
 truth." * 
 
 We may now take leave of Kant : our all too brief 
 
 ^ op. cit. i. 408. '^ Ibid. 394. ^ Ibid. 417. * Ibid. 417. 
 
i6 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 examination, or rather indication, of his main posi- 
 tions will have made it clear how powerful a stimulus 
 they afforded to thought, and how profoundly the 
 philosophical conclusions of this great thinker modi- 
 fied all subsequent attempts at systematic religious 
 reflection. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that 
 the Kantian philosophy necessitated not merely a 
 restatement, but a reconstruction of traditional theo- 
 logy. 
 
 A few words must be added on the subsequent 
 development of the Kantian philosophy by those who 
 are generally described as Neo-Kantians. The pre- 
 vailing distaste for metaphysics, the disillusionment 
 consequent on the break-down of the speculative 
 movement of the first half of the nineteenth century, 
 the triumph of the experimental sciences, all combined 
 to produce a reaction of which " Back to Kant " was 
 the watchword and battle-cry. For Kant's theory of 
 knowledge secured two things — the existence and 
 the unknowableness of the thing in itself The 
 latter sets science free to pursue its own course, 
 unhampered by metaphysical or theological inter- 
 ference : while the assertion of the former left open 
 a wide region for religious feeling and imagination. 
 Thus Materialists and Idealists both united in the 
 demand for a return to Kant. 
 
 The chief representative of this tendency is Lange, 
 whose History of JMaterialism is recognized as the 
 fullest and ablest exposition of the principles of the 
 Neo-Kantian School. Lange practically abolishes 
 the thing in itself: he certainly denies its objective 
 reality. It can only be affirmed as an epistemo- 
 logical category. We cannot know whether the 
 
KANT, LANGE, AND LOTZE 17 
 
 thing in itself exists ; all we can say is that the 
 conception of any true nature of things is " nothing 
 more or less than the progeny of an antithesis 
 (between the thing in itself and the phenomenon) 
 posited by our organization, with regard to which we 
 are ignorant whether it has any significance whatever 
 relatively to that which is outside us." ^ From the 
 physiological experiments on the organs of sense, 
 Lange concludes that sense and understanding can 
 no longer be treated as separate. Accordingly for 
 Pure Reason he substitutes " physico-psychical organ- 
 ization." Here then we seem to have drifted into 
 thorough-going materialism ; but we are violently 
 plucked out of the vortex into which we are 
 sinking, and are landed in the syrtes of idealism. 
 For Lange's philosophy is no naive materialism, but 
 critical materialism. He does not attribute reality 
 to matter : on the contrary he insists on its pheno- 
 menal character. It is difficult to admit the success 
 of this curious synthesis of discordant elements : 
 Proteus-like Lange's philosophy now appears ideal- 
 istic, now changes rapidly and inexplicably into a 
 materialistic form. 
 
 If this is the result of Kant's theoretic philosophy, 
 we cannot be surprised at the overthrow of his prac- 
 tical system. " The entire practical philosophy," says 
 Lange, " is the mutable and transitory part of his 
 system . . . The whole significance of the great 
 reform inaugurated by Kant must rather be sought 
 in his Critique of the theoretical reason." Even with 
 regard to our knowledge of ourselves, the conclusion 
 is drawn with resistless logical force that " the corner- 
 
 ^ Lange, op. cit. ii. 57. 
 B 
 
i8 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 stone of the Critique of Reason is that we do not 
 know ourselves as we are, but merely as we appear 
 to ourselves," 
 
 Our knowledge, then, is wholly limited to the 
 phenomenal, and though the human mind longs to 
 reach transcendental truth, it is an endless journey, a 
 hopeless task. What, then, becomes of religion?^ 
 There is a choice between two alternatives. 
 
 (i) Its function should be transferred to science 
 and to art ; but this might involve spiritual im- 
 poverishment, and might even provoke fanatical 
 reaction. 
 
 (ii) By penetrating to the kernel of religion, we can 
 consciously rise above the actual, thereby vanquishing 
 fanaticism and superstition, and at the same time 
 abandoning for ever the attempt to falsify the actual 
 by means of the mythical. The kernel of religion 
 must not be sought in certain doctrines which are 
 incapable of withstanding the solvent powers of 
 criticism — the end whereof is complete negation ; 
 but in the elements of the soul above the actual 
 where it can have the promise of a spiritual home. 
 
 Religion is really a product of phantasy, a free 
 creation of the imagination ; and its value lies in its 
 ethical, not in its logical substance. 
 
 Kant set bounds to reason to make room for faith ; 
 Neo-Kantism would abolish faith to make room for 
 religion. But it is only on one condition. Religion 
 must freely own itself poetry, not reality ; relative, 
 not absolute ; subjective, not objective. She must 
 not adorn herself in truth's stolen feathers lest her 
 nakedness appear, and she become a laughing-stock 
 
 ^ Cf. Lange, ii. 546, 547. 
 
KANT, LANGE, AND LOTZE 19 
 
 for all mankind. But dwelling in the region of 
 phantasy, she is secure from the attacks of science 
 and the doubts of philosophy. Indeed, religious 
 ideas will thus be strengthened. Their theoretic truth 
 is destroyed, but their practical value is enhanced. 
 Even the self-created illusions of religious belief may 
 be both beautiful and beneficial. 
 
 But the scepticism and illusionism whither Neo- 
 Kantism leads is no haven where we would be ; nor 
 can we think that Truth is a seemly sacrifice for 
 Illusion's altar, even though by some unexplained 
 means a more suitable victim at the last moment 
 takes her place, and she is preserved, like Iphigeneia 
 of old, to continue her life in some far distant shrine, 
 removed from the haunts of men. Illusion, that is 
 conscious illusion, can neither claim to possess true 
 beauty nor to confer lasting benefits. 
 
 It must not be supposed that Neo-Kantism has 
 not fulfilled a valuable service in the development of 
 human thought Against empiricism it insisted on a 
 /;7*d?;7' constituents of human knowledge ; against neo- 
 dogmatism it insisted upon a scientific examination 
 of fundamental presuppositions. Neo-Kantism is, 
 therefore, a true starting-point for further advance, 
 but cannot claim to have reached the goal of all 
 philosophical reflection. 
 
 We must finally examine the outlines of Lotze's 
 philosophy — for though the most diverse critics are 
 agreed in regarding Ritschl as a Neo-Kantian, he 
 himself emphatically repudiates the Kantian epistem- 
 ology, and declares his adhesion to Lotze.^ 
 
 We may perhaps, in passing, mention that Lotze 
 
 ^ Theologie und Metapkysik^ passim. R. V. iii. 19. 
 
20 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 himself took a very different view as to the place of 
 epistemological considerations in constructive theology 
 than that which Ritschl advocates. The latter, it 
 will be remembered, definitely laid down that every 
 scientific theologian must proceed in accordance with 
 a clear theory of knowledge, the legitimacy of which 
 he must be prepared to defend. Lotze, however, 
 considered any such preliminary investigation into 
 the psychological conditions of the origin of know- 
 ledge as " wholly unwarranted " and " essentially 
 unsound, if the purpose is to build upon that most 
 obscure of all problems any metaphysical system ; on 
 the contrary, these problems themselves have neces- 
 sitated the discovery of fresh methods of solution." ^ 
 
 It is important, therefore, to realize the position 
 that Lotze's theory of cognition holds to the rest of 
 his philosophical system. It is not as with Kant 
 the fundamental presupposition, but the natural out- 
 come of his philosophy. 
 
 Lotze agreed with scientific empiricism in assuming 
 an infinite multiplicity of simple beings which con- 
 stitute the sensual world ; with Spinoza he believed 
 in the substantial unity of all being ; with Plato in 
 the idea of the infinitely good. Thus he maintains 
 that the multiplicity of ' reals ' is embraced in an 
 absolute substance, in one infinite being, of which 
 they are really nothing but the modifications. Never- 
 theless, their independence necessitates their being 
 thought of as soul-like beings in which the infinite 
 being is spiritually immanent. 
 
 Lotze therefore controverts Kant's theory of 
 knowledge, for though he held with Kant that the 
 
 ^ Lotze, Metaphysik^ 1 5. 
 
KANT, LANGE, AND LOTZE 21 
 
 world of science is phenomenal, he yet maintained 
 the possibiHty of the things in themselves being the 
 object of theoretic thought. 
 
 Having thus shown how far a rational view of the 
 world was susceptible of theoretic demonstration, he 
 proceeds to contrast and compare it with the inde- 
 pendent sphere of moral and religious truth. In 
 this realm the mind has its own ideals ; and as it is 
 impossible that these, which are the most valuable 
 products of the human mind, springing from its 
 innate capacity for the appreciation of real worth, 
 can be mere illusions, he postulates for them an 
 actual existence. Thus, ethical good conceived as 
 all-personal is exalted to the throne of the universe, 
 and is crowned both by the theoretic thought and 
 the religious consciousness. 
 
 This idea of good is finally identified with the 
 conception of the living love of the living God, 
 from which is deduced a grand spiritual and teleo- 
 logical view of the whole world as leading to eternal 
 blessedness. 
 
 It remains to indicate those two directions in 
 which the teaching of Lotze exercised the greatest 
 influence. 
 
 (i) Ritschl sums up Lotze's theory of knowledge 
 in the following words : " He holds that in the 
 phenomena, which in a limited space exhibit changes 
 to a limited extent and in a definite order, we 
 recognize the thing as the cause of its qualities 
 operating upon us, as the end which they serve as 
 means, as the law of their constant changes."^ 
 Plato and Kant, in Ritschl's estimate, are both in 
 
 ^ R. V. iii. 19, 20, 
 
22 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 error in separating the thing in itself from its attri- 
 butes and activities. Lotze's theory makes no such 
 separation, so that we can state that the thing may- 
 be known in its phenomena. 
 
 Thus while Kant would consider the knowledge 
 of the things in themselves, were it attainable, as a 
 higher form of knowledge than that which we have, 
 Lotze holds that the things are only the means 
 to produce those representations which we actually 
 possess, and that therefore the higher knowledge con- 
 sists " rather in tracing the meaning bond and laws of 
 the phenomena than in pursuing anxiously beyond the 
 power of thought the means by which the latter are 
 produced." 
 
 Notwithstanding, Ritschl's refusal to treat the 
 phenomena as anything other than subjective ap- 
 pearances, and his curious suggestion about the 
 origin of the thing in itself as a memory picture of 
 repeated intuitions, does not take us much further 
 than the Kantian doctrine of the unknowableness of 
 the things in themselves. But to this we must refer 
 later. 
 
 (ii) Lotze consistently maintained a sharp dis- 
 tinction (capable of ultimate reconciliation) between 
 the religious consciousness and theoretic philosophy. 
 Man has a faculty for judging according to worth. 
 With this capacity he is originally endowed, and 
 through it he becomes conscious of a world of 
 values, as well as of a world of forms. This world 
 of values, the true sphere of religious consciousness, 
 has needs and ideals, and even a language of its own 
 quite distinct from those of the merely intellectual 
 view of the world. There can be no question that 
 
KANT, LANGE, AND LOTZE 23 
 
 Lotze's theory of these two types of representation 
 directly paved the way for the doctrine of value- 
 Judgments which plays so conspicuous a part in the 
 Ritschlian theology. 
 
 Additional Note. 
 
 Another problem that suggests itself is the origin of 
 sensation. Kant would ascribe this to the thing in itself, 
 but it is plain that this cannot be empirically deduced, 
 for experience itself can only arise when phenomena are 
 brought under the categories of the understanding. Pure 
 experience will not help us to discover whether the thing 
 in itself can have any existence independently of our own 
 consciousness. In other words, we cannot tell whether the 
 things have transcendental or merely empirical reality. 
 " Properly speaking, I cannot perceive external things : I 
 can merely infer their existence from my inner perception 
 by treating this latter as an effect, of which something 
 external is the nearest cause." ^ But this inference is 
 problematical in the extreme, owing to the possibility of 
 the plurality of causes, and consequently our perceptions 
 of external things may be nothing but modes of repre- 
 sentation or modifications of our own consciousness. 
 There seems no doubt that a legitimate inference from 
 Kant's language in his first edition of the Critique would 
 be that he left the existence of the thing in itself as a 
 wholly open question ; but in his second edition was 
 added the much disputed Refiitation of Idealism. The 
 account Kant himself gives of this passage is that it was 
 intended to clear up the obscurities of his former state- 
 ments and to obviate consequent misunderstanding. Kuno 
 Fischer, perhaps the greatest scholar in matters Kantian, 
 
 ^ Critique oj Pure Reason, 1st edition, p. 367. 
 
24 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 prefers the original form of the doctrine, which he considers 
 to be a genuine representation of Kant's meaning. He 
 holds that the later editions blunt the force of the idealism 
 with which, as a matter of fact, the Critique of Piire Reaso7i 
 is bound up. *'The Critique, in its first form, was the 
 Critique from Kant's own point of view : in its subsequent 
 form it was the Critique from the point of view of the 
 Kantians." ^ The Kantian philosophy exercised a strong 
 power of attraction for many minds : yet the philosophy 
 which resolved all phenomena into mere mental repre- 
 sentations could never permanently secure the enthusiastic 
 advocacy of any large number of converts. The dogmatic 
 mind demanded as a condition of its acceptance of the 
 Kantian philosophy a single concession which however 
 seeming slight yet was a surrender of the crucial point. 
 The limits of the human understanding suggested an 
 adequate explanation of the unknowability of the ultimate 
 meaning of phenomena. Kant was prepared to accept 
 the inevitable. In the second edition we are confronted 
 with a realistic modification of his original view, the logical 
 consequence of which was plainly in irreconcilable conflict 
 with the main presuppositions both in regard to the thing 
 and to the thinking subject underlying his whole work. 
 The fact is that Kant, dreading lest he should be drawn 
 into the vortex of metaphysical idealism, threw over some 
 of his elementary principles to save his philosophy, which 
 yet had to cling to them for the support elsewhere 
 denied. 
 
 Thus Kant refutes idealism yet lands us in inevitable 
 scepticism as to the things in themselves. Have they 
 real existence or no? Kant leads us to uncertain inferences 
 and insoluble doubts. Berkeley, against whom the Refu- 
 tatio7i of Idealism was chiefly aimed, was more thorough- 
 
 ^ Kuno Fischer, Geschichte^ etc. iii. 444. 
 
KANT, LANGE, AND LOTZE 25 
 
 going : " What conclusion can determine us to assume the 
 existence of bodies outside the mind as the ground of 
 that which we perceive, seeing that not even do the 
 advocates of the doctrine of matter maintain that there 
 is any necessary connection between bodies and our ideas?" 
 Kant attempts to answer this question, but succeeds only 
 in repeating it. For the whole essence of Kant's famous 
 criticism of the ontological proof of Gods being is the 
 inadmissibility of passing from idea to reality. Kant 
 severed the thing in itself wholly and entirely from the 
 phenomenon : the two are in no wise related as two 
 aspects of the same object, nor is the thing in itself the 
 phenomenon stripped of sensuous representation. For the 
 phenomenon stripped of its sensuous character vanishes 
 into the empty air. Between the phenomenon and the 
 thing in itself a great gulf is fixed : nor is there any 
 possibility of passing from one to the other, even for 
 those who would fain do so. The thing in itself must 
 therefore remain theoretically incognoscible forever. But 
 if so, how can the existence of the thing be justifiably 
 maintained? For all existence must be determined, nor 
 can being be separated from the mode of being. 
 
 Kant indeed declares that the thing in itself is merely 
 a limitative conception of exclusively negative use ; it is 
 therefore "Noumenon" as opposed to that which is empiri- 
 cally given. But even here we are not free from a crowd 
 of inconsistencies. The thing can only be thought under 
 the form of the categories which control all thought ; and 
 yet the categories are inapplicable to anything that lies 
 beyond the phenomenon. The thing in itself cannot be 
 known : nor can it be thought. And we may well ask 
 how can the unthinkable exist ? 
 
 The trend of the Kantian philosophy inevitably involves 
 the abolition of the thing in itself. What then becomes 
 
26 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 of the distinction between the thing in itself and the 
 phenomenon, on the basis of which distinction the entire 
 edifice of Kant's theory of knowledge, as vcell as his 
 practical philosophy, has been erected? Historically Fichte 
 carried Kantism to the only logically legitimate conclusion, 
 when he represented the thing in itself as merely the 
 non-ego ; not in the sense of anything actually independent 
 of the ego, but as a self-posited limit of our own con- 
 sciousness It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the 
 principles of the Kantian system demand a suppression 
 of its presuppositions. 
 
 The Kantian theory of knowledge seems to terminate in 
 complete subjectivism, if not in solipsism, and tends to the 
 entire overthrow of all objective knowledge. It may be 
 answered that we can predicate actual existence of the many 
 finite consciousnesses which compose the human race. But 
 it is difificult to see on these philosophical principles what 
 relation the human race can bear to the individual con- 
 sciousness other than as a species of subjective repre- 
 sentation. Yet it was on the assumption that reason was 
 common to all the members of the human race that Kant 
 asserted the necessity and universal validity of human 
 knowledge. But if the human race may itself be a 
 subjective representation, how then can human knowledge 
 acquire objective validity? 
 
 Kant set out to vindicate the objectivity of human 
 knowledge : he sought a sure foundation ; but he has 
 built his house upon the sands. The quicksands of 
 subjectivity would have indeed swallowed him up quick, 
 but he was himself saved by the inconsistencies which 
 ■destroyed his system. For, in spite of much self-con- 
 tradiction, it was always a fundamental thought of the 
 Kantian philosophy that beyond the confines of experience 
 lay another region vague and dim, possible only to specu- 
 
KANT, LANGE, AND LOTZE 27 
 
 lation, but capable of independent justification as a matter 
 of faith. 
 
 Kant's theory made the thing in itself absolutely inde- 
 terminate and indeterminable, and wholly disconnected with 
 the phenomenon. The inconsistencies and self-contradic- 
 tions which beset this position, do not merely indicate its 
 weakness, but suggest a possible answer. 
 
 Kant's failure to establish his position shows the lines 
 along which a reconstruction must be attempted. The 
 distinction between the phenomenon and the thing in 
 itself is an impossible abstraction. Kant would fain drive 
 us to an unjustifiable alternative. If with Hume we 
 suppose that the categories are derived from experience, 
 we must deny their aprioristic and necessary character ; if 
 on the other hand with the Rationalists we regard them 
 as conditioning all possible experience, he would have us 
 assert that they are only determinations of the mind, and 
 therefore possess nothing more than subjective value. This 
 however is a false dilemma. If in the mind, not in the 
 things, says Kant ; and therewith destroys the possibility of 
 objective knowledge. The reply is easy. If in the mind 
 then also in the things. If the categories are only con- 
 ceivable in the understanding, then there must be some 
 necessary correspondence between the knowing mind and 
 the known things. In other words, the existence of the 
 categories in the understanding points to the existence of an 
 understanding independent of our minds in the things also. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 SCHLEIERMACHER AND THE ROMANTIC SCHOOL 
 
 The nineteenth century marks a well-defined period 
 in the history of religion. The extraordinary re- 
 vival of philosophy — whether rational or experiential 
 — had given rise to a series of questions of universal 
 import. The sciences were rapidly emerging from 
 the subordinate position they had hitherto been 
 content to hold, and threatened to sweep all meta- 
 physical speculation off the field. What should be 
 the attitude of the Church amid prevailing uncer- 
 tainty and intellectual unrest ? Would she adapt 
 herself to her new environment ? Would she abate 
 her exclusive claims ? Would she descend from the 
 clouds and mingle among men to raise them to 
 heaven ; or would she remain inaccessible to the 
 new demands of human reason ? The question was 
 one of pressing importance ; perhaps more so in 
 Protestant than in Catholic circles, for the former 
 possessed no such logical and self-enclosed theory of 
 infallible authority as the latter. It was seen that 
 the earlier method of Protestantism was doomed, 
 but what was there to put in its place ? The answer 
 to this question was given by Schleiermacher, who 
 set himself in his two great works — the Discourses 
 
THE ROMANTIC SCHOOL 29 
 
 on Religion and the Doctrine of Chinstian Faith — to 
 restate theology in the terms of the new learning. 
 Such restatement was sorely needed ; and just at the 
 psychical moment appeared Schleiermacher's monu- 
 mental work, in which all the tendencies of the 
 expiring century were woven into a kind of unity, 
 while the trend of thought thus set in motion is yet 
 operative in the present day. The abiding service 
 that Schleiermacher rendered to religion was his de- 
 liberate undertaking to systematize theology. His 
 masterly work — Die Glaubenslehre — grasped the idea 
 of a system and developed its significance : his 
 entire outlook is dominated by the conception of a 
 whole in dogmatics. He will have no peace with 
 the popular theology of the day which reposes upon 
 fragmentary " passages " of Scripture. Calvin, it is 
 true, had bequeathed to the orthodox theologians of 
 the reformed school distinctly systematic tendencies; 
 not only by the impress of his own masterful per- 
 sonality but also as the necessary outcome of his 
 conception of the elect community in whose redemp- 
 tion the whole of God's world-plan is accomplished. 
 Lutheranism, with no such stimulus to a systematic 
 theology, tended more and more to become pure 
 traditionalism. Orthodoxy proved a dour mistress. 
 The Scriptures, from which a connected view of 
 Christian theology was to be drawn, had at all 
 costs to be preserved entire. Orthodoxy appointed 
 and approved the material, and even if some parts 
 of the material should be flagrantly out of har- 
 mony with the rest of the building, they must not 
 be discarded as superfluous but retained as being 
 of quite special value. The authority of Scripture, 
 
so RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 supported by the dogma of plenary inspiration, was 
 employed to give ample shelter to the unintelligible 
 and even to the irrational — which by an extra- 
 ordinary perversion both of faith and reason was 
 supposed to contain a special manifestation of the 
 supernatural and to be the special object of venera- 
 tion among the mysteries of the faith. The tendency 
 of modern Lutheranism even among the theologians 
 of the confessional (or orthodox) school to shake off 
 the shackles of tradition and to elaborate a con- 
 structive and systematic theology is wholly due to 
 the influence of Schleiermacher, who was really the 
 first to apply the modern scientific spirit to the study 
 of dogmatic religion, 
 
 Schleiermacher, then, inaugurated a new era in 
 theology by his systematic restatement of Christian 
 dogmatics. It is in his conception and development 
 of a systematic whole in religion that his real 
 originality is revealed. But his conspicuous and 
 enduring services in this respect were only made 
 possible by a new view as to the origin of dogma. 
 " Vixere fortes ante Agamemnona " : and Herder, to 
 mention no other names, had anticipated Schleier- 
 macher in maintaining the distinction between faith 
 and doctrine, religion and theology. The latter, how- 
 ever, was the first to make this distinction a real and 
 determining factor in his treatment of theology. For 
 the new rationalism zn essence differed but little from 
 the old theology, in that both conceived religion as 
 the assent to certain dogmatic propositions. Ortho- 
 doxy naturally fastened on the scriptural dogmas 
 formulated in the creeds and ecclesiastical con- 
 fessions as the essential propositions of Christian 
 
THE ROMANTIC SCHOOL 31 
 
 faith. Rationalism while reducing these essentials 
 to far smaller proportions nevertheless demanded 
 assent to its own propositions. These might be 
 conceived as natural truths and might claim the 
 support of Scripture : but the fact remains that while 
 rationalism and orthodoxy differed profoundly as to 
 the real essentials of Christian faith, they both agreed 
 in assuming some such essentials, and in demanding 
 assent to their own propositions as the only valid 
 basis of religion. The whole and the only point in 
 dispute between the two may be narrowed down to 
 the amount of things necessary to be believed and the 
 exact position of reason in theology. Schleiermacher 
 broke with both schools : indeed, he showed little 
 patience with either. In their place he substituted 
 his well known theory — religion is neither knowledge 
 nor action, but feeling ; — and dogma is the expression 
 of the inner significance of this religious feeling. 
 Hereby dogma was deprived of all external and ad- 
 ventitious authority. Such authority as dogma con- 
 tinued to possess was derived solely from its character 
 as the necessary expression of the religious conscious- 
 ness. In this connection Schleiermacher joined issue 
 with the Rationalists : for their exaltation of reason 
 as man's highest power led them to seek the truth of 
 this thought in a kind of abstract independent self- 
 sufficiency which ultimately sacrificed man's really 
 highest power, the ability to initiate new departures 
 in life and history. Rationalism by a kind of false 
 isolation spoke of the qualities inherent in mankind, 
 as in the abstract. With this abstraction Schleier- 
 macher shows himself wholly unsympathetic. He 
 knows nothing of human beings qua human beings ; 
 
32 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 but of human beings definitely and historically char- 
 acterized. Similarly in his view there is no such 
 thing as abstract religion but only concrete religions ; 
 that is to say, religion is never actually realized save 
 in a variety of individual and independent religious 
 fellowships. Every religion has its strongly marked 
 individual characteristics, largely historically deter- 
 mined : and every religious faith must have reference 
 to its own religious fellowship. We may, in passing, 
 refer to Ritschl's appreciation of the importance of 
 this conception. He considers it one of the most 
 important truths taught by Schleiermacher " whereby 
 he has given a new aspect primarily to ethics, and 
 secondarily to theology ; and has risen above the field 
 of vision both of the Kantian and Wolfian schools." 
 Schleiermacher will have nothing to do with the 
 natural religion of rationalism, nor with its thesis 
 that all religions are ultimately the same and that 
 their historical peculiarities are of little or no 
 account. On the contrary he insists with vehemence 
 that it is only from within the religious community, 
 only in the faith and fellowship of a definite Church, 
 that it is possible to arrive at any distinction between 
 the essential and the accidental features of a religious 
 body : and that, in drawing such a distinction, the 
 definite historical characteristics must be taken as 
 absolutely determinative. 
 
 Schleiermacher's reduction of religion to feeling 
 needs further amplification. The particular form of 
 feeling is characterized as a sense of dependence. 
 The feeling may, of course, be undeveloped or even 
 misdirected, but where it exists in a pure and 
 healthy form, there exists also true religion. The 
 
THE ROMANTIC SCHOOL 33 
 
 feeling arises in this manner. Our conception of the 
 world does not give us the realization of the highest 
 values. There is not the immediate harmony which 
 we naturally desiderate between the explanation and 
 evaluation of existence. As a result of this discord 
 between the valuable and the actual, man sets him- 
 self in earnest to see to it, that whatever happens the 
 former shall be preserved. Were man omnipotent, 
 no difficulty would be felt nor would any religious 
 feeling necessarily arise. But the reverse is the case. 
 In his struggle for the preservation of value, man 
 finds himself perpetually opposed and constantly 
 thwarted. It is here that religion comes to the 
 rescue, for there arises that feeling of dependence 
 upon an ultimate reality in which value and existence 
 are harmoniously united. 
 
 Schleiermacher's scheme is certainly open to the 
 suspicion of pantheistic tendencies. Each man, nay 
 every being, is a microcosmos, enshrining and repeat- 
 ing in itself the powers and problems of the universe. 
 When this secret of existence has been apprehended, 
 when the relation between the individual and the 
 universe has been realized, then comes this feeling of 
 dependence, in other words the origin of true religion. 
 When we come to press the question on what exactly 
 man depends, the answer is, on God. But God is 
 not apparently conceived in His transcendental rela- 
 tion to and above the world, but merely as a 
 convenient symbol, a kind of " Whereon " to round 
 off the idea of dependence. Schleiermacher himself 
 protested against any such deductions from his 
 teaching : and it may be inferred from his writings 
 that while laying stress on the immanence of God as 
 
 c 
 
34 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 the principle of universal order, he is yet prepared in 
 the idea of a universe to separate though not to sever 
 the world from God. It may be asked (as indeed 
 it has been, not once nor twice) of what value this 
 doctrine of dependence can be to the human mind. 
 Would not the constant recollection of our bonds, the 
 continual remembrance of our limitations, fetter all 
 free development and progress ? Can religion do no 
 more for us, save to oppress us with a melancholy 
 insistence on our own powerlessness ? Schleier- 
 macher's answer must be found in his conception 
 of the world. To him, as to Goethe, the world in 
 nature and in history is one vast drama in which 
 each man, each thing, has an important and even 
 indispensable part to play. All is a manifestation 
 of perfect and supreme intelligence. From this 
 standpoint dependence is the only possible expres- 
 sion of man's individual relation to the whole. In 
 his recognition of this fact, in this feeling of depend- 
 ence, man learns to acquire for himself both freedom 
 and happiness. This is the task and test of all 
 religion which, if properly conceived, cannot fail to 
 issue in man's perpetual blessedness. 
 
 Briefly to summarize Schleiermacher's main posi- 
 tions with special reference to their subsequent 
 influence on systematic theology, we should draw 
 attention to the following points : 
 
 (i) Schleiermacher aimed at a synthetic and 
 systematic exposition of Christian dogma. His work 
 was marked by unity and continuity ; and laid the 
 foundation of the modern restatement and even 
 reconstruction of theology. Thus Ritschl himself 
 pays his tribute : " He is the only one since the 
 
THE ROMANTIC SCHOOL 35 
 
 Reformation who has employed the scientific method 
 of proof in theology.'' 
 
 (ii) By placing the essence of religion in feeling, 
 Schleiermacher opened the door to a completely 
 subjective interpretation of religious experience which 
 had the most far-reaching results. 
 
 (iii) Schleiermacher's conception of dogma as the 
 expression of ever-varying life, and the consequent 
 denial of any permanent authority in the statement 
 of religious belief, was of immense importance for the 
 subsequent development of theology. In this con- 
 nection we may note his remarkable anticipation of 
 the results which the comparatively modern science 
 of psychology has brought to light in the sphere of 
 religion. " Everything immediate in religion is true, 
 for otherwise how could it have come into existence? 
 But only that is immediate which has not gone 
 through the conceptual mill, but has grown up on 
 the soil of pure feeling." 
 
 (iv) The doctrine of dependence was violently 
 assailed and zealously defended. Its logical conse- 
 quences seem to lead to Pantheism: its "immediacy" 
 is not without traces of mysticism. It may perhaps 
 be admitted that Schleiermacher did not lay sufficient 
 stress on the activity which precedes and conditions 
 this acknowledgment of dependence. 
 
 (v) Most important of all, perhaps, was his over- 
 throw of rationalism and natural religion by insisting 
 on the definite historical character of all religions. 
 The far-reaching effects of the application of this 
 principle to the origin and development of Christi- 
 anity as a positive historical religion can hardly be 
 exaggerated. 
 
36 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 (vi) Finally, Schleiermacher laid down with em- 
 phasis the true relation of our Lord to the community 
 He founded. Moses may be taken from Judaism, 
 and the law remains : Mahomet may be taken from 
 Islam and the pious Moslem can still practise his 
 accustomed ceremonies. But to sever Christ from 
 Christianity even in thought is an impossibility. 
 The Redeemer and the redeemed are indissolubly 
 joined. For the Christian religion is a life ; and its 
 principle is : " Because I live, ye shall live also." 
 The idea of the relation subsisting between Christ 
 and the Church was rightly apprehended by Schleier- 
 macher and exercised the greatest influence on 
 Ritschl, who agreed with him that Christ is " the 
 Founder of a society only in virtue of the fact that 
 the members of that society become conscious 
 through Him of their redemption." 
 
 Schleiermacher was not immediately succeeded by 
 Ritschl. In the interval three great schools of 
 thought — the Liberal, the Conservative or Confes- 
 sional, and the Mediating schools — took their rise, 
 whose characteristics must be briefly examined, if we 
 wish to form a right conception of Ritschl's true 
 relation to contemporary theology and his real place 
 in nineteenth century thought. In most respects the 
 three schools are widely separated and even bitterly 
 opposed : but in one particular they are all united. 
 From Schleiermacher they learn to regard an empiri- 
 cally-acquired feeling or an immediately-given self- 
 consciousness as the true starting-point of theology. 
 Schleiermacher may himself rightly be regarded as 
 the pioneer and champion of romanticism in theology ; 
 and in this respect the three schools of thought which 
 
THE ROMANTIC SCHOOL n 
 
 followed him were his disciples. Herein we can trace 
 the fundamental agreement and historical point of 
 union between these tendencies so widely different, 
 yet so closely related. For, however deep their dis- 
 agreement in particulars, they are all united in the 
 importance and indeed pre-eminence to be attached 
 to subjective impressions and aesthetic considerations. 
 It is a proof of the vigorous vitality of romanticism 
 that it shewed itself capable of such manifold and 
 diverse development. 
 
 The two most important representatives of German 
 Liberal Theology are Pfleiderer and Lipsius; but it 
 is important to notice that they were influenced by 
 Hegel as well as by Schleiermacher. It is well known 
 that these latter two regarded each other as irrecon- 
 cilable adversaries: and it is true that both in termin- 
 ology and in their theory of knowledge they exhibit 
 a fundamental difference. On this subject it may be 
 enough to state that Schleiermacher was the true 
 successor of Kant, while Hegel sought to re-establish 
 by a new method the positions of the pre-critical 
 philosophy. But apart from the methods and phrase- 
 ology employed, it is very doubtful whether their 
 conception of religion was not really the same. Both 
 were the determined foes of rationalism, both looked 
 upon man as a microcosm in which the whole life of 
 the universe received compendious but complete ex- 
 pression. In both, religion is the realization of the 
 infinite in human consciousness. But what is accom- 
 plished for Schleiermacher by his formula of absolute 
 dependence, Hegel accomplishes through the process 
 of speculative thought. It is plain that the Hegelian 
 philosophy can come to terms with orthodoxy: for 
 
38 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 all its historical and dogmatic progress is viewed in 
 its relation to the development of the central idea of 
 truth through antithesis. Each dogma, then, each 
 period has a true and even necessary value in the 
 great unfolding of the world-idea towards the perfect 
 light of Christianity. It must be admitted that this 
 treatment of all ecclesiastical history as furnishing 
 countless and ceaseless illustrations of this single con- 
 ception is apt to become unspeakably monotonous. 
 And yet this conception of religion is perhaps superior 
 to Schleiermacher's in the value it attaches to the 
 religious idea. Hegel develops where Schleiermacher 
 describes : and though the Liberal theologians lay 
 great stress on the identification of religion with 
 feeling they are naturally attracted by the idea of 
 development, and thus exhibit great affinity to the 
 scheme of the Hegelian dialectic and dogmatic. 
 
 Schleiermacher's empirico-historical conception of 
 religion resulted in his drawing up a table of religions 
 which in an ascending scale should manifest most 
 clearly the central idea of complete dependence. At 
 the head of the series stands monotheism which may 
 be viewed from two standpoints as leading either to 
 action or to contemplation. The former he regards 
 as the highest possible religion and considers that in 
 Christianity *'teleological monotheism" finds its most 
 perfect embodiment. The peculiar characteristic of 
 Christianity which distinguishes it from all other re- 
 ligions of the same order is to be found in the perfect 
 redemption it offers through Christ. Thus Schleier- 
 macher and all his school lay the greatest possible 
 stress on the right interpretation of Christ's work and 
 Person, rightly regarding these as all important and 
 
THE ROMANTIC SCHOOL 39 
 
 really constitutive facts in Christian piety. Redemp- 
 tion implies alienation : and thus Schleiermacher's 
 conception of Christianity gave a great impetus to a 
 thorough re-examination of such leading theological 
 thoughts as sin, atonement, regeneration and justifi- 
 cation. This necessarily led to much difference of 
 view, but it also concentrated attention upon those 
 dogmas which were in the greatest need of restate- 
 ment, and we have already noticed the influence of 
 Schleiermacher in this respect on the presentation of 
 the Ritschlian theology. 
 
 The strongest opposition to Liberal tendencies 
 was offered by the Confessional school of modern 
 orthodoxy. The connection of this school with the 
 historical movement in German history known as the 
 Awakening is universally conceded. It was an at- 
 tempt to import into theology a stronger and fuller 
 tone than could be found in rationalism ; a tone which 
 should be more in keeping with the new-found theories 
 of national life and national freedom. A special form 
 of this theological awakening may be found in the 
 revival of pietism, which in its insistence upon indi- 
 vidualism and strictly Biblical theology, brought to 
 the front a series of new and pressing problems. It 
 was natural that the pietistic movement should inspire 
 those who viewed its individualistic tendencies with 
 misgiving, with a renewed interest in the mainten- 
 ance of orthodoxy in matters of religious belief and 
 practice. 
 
 The chief exponents of orthodoxy are to be found 
 in the Erlangen school of theology. This school 
 contains such well known names as Hoffman, Thom- 
 asius, and Frank. Their dependence upon Schleier- 
 
40 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 macher is obvious : yet it was his method rather than 
 his results that they adopted. Schleiermacher was 
 really the first to draw up a system of Lutheran 
 dogmatics. This, of course, was in itself no new 
 thing: the new thing was to call it Lutheran rather 
 than Christian. In Schleiermacher's view it had 
 become necessary to choose between two historical 
 types of religion — evangelical or catholic : where- 
 upon he consciously and deliberately accepted the 
 situation and added to the title of his work on the 
 *' Christian Faith" the definite limitation "according 
 to the principles of the evangelical church." Thus 
 in a manner Schleiermacher gave a clear call to 
 particularism and confessionalism. In this connec- 
 tion we must once more lay stress upon his conception 
 of Christianity as a positive historical religion; to him 
 Christian dogma was the true expression of the life 
 and experience of the Christian community. Chris- 
 tianity is the religion of those who are conscious of 
 their redemption through Christ: and the relation to 
 Christ is the absolutely determining factor in the 
 religious life of the individual or of the Church. It 
 is in these formulas of Schleiermacher which approxi- 
 mated so closely to and justified so clearly the results 
 of ecclesiastical dogma, that the theologians of Erlan- 
 gen chiefly show themselves his disciples. 
 
 Hoffman, like Schleiermacher, recognized the need 
 of a systematic theology. Starting with the personal 
 experience of the Christian he worked backwards to 
 the experience of the Christian Church, as expressed 
 in its creeds and confessions ; and thus further to the 
 documentary proofs in Scripture upon which all is 
 based. In his work on prophecy and fulfilment his 
 
THE ROMANTIC SCHOOL 41 
 
 system receives careful elaboration. It may suffice 
 to say that the view of prophecy here taken is 
 mechanical in the extreme. It would appear that 
 prophecy itself has little value and even little meaning 
 save as unfolding and foreshadowing reformation 
 theology. Notwithstanding, the book has its value 
 for its philosophy of religion ; it conceived religious 
 history as a system of real facts, and Hoffman may 
 even be said to have inaugurated a new method in 
 theology in which he found many followers. 
 
 Thomasius in his history of doctrine is clearly 
 influenced by the principle of Hegelian dialectic. He 
 attaches the very highest importance to ecclesiastical 
 dogma, not as marking a real stage in a perpetual 
 process of development, but as the final and complete 
 expression of reasoned theology. 
 
 Frank is perhaps the best known, as he is also the 
 most able, representative of this school. His theo- 
 logical system is based upon an elaborate self-analysis. 
 The personal experience of the Christian is the test 
 by which all dogma must ,be tried ; and it is not 
 found wanting, though at times it emerges in a form 
 in which it would hardly be recognized by its original 
 defenders. In this manner Biblical theology and 
 ecclesiastical dogma (at anyrate in its Lutheran form) 
 are found to be in complete harmony, and to afford 
 a sufficient ground for Christian certainty. 
 
 Finally we come to the Mediating school of 
 theology. The best known names are Dorner, Rothe, 
 and Kahler. The " Vermittlungs-theologie " had ample 
 scope for its powers of pacification. In two respects 
 especially did this school endeavour to effect a rap- 
 prochement between opposing tendencies. In the 
 
43 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 first place they insisted upon the many points of 
 resemblance and contact between the Lutheran and 
 Reformed Churches, in their common opposition to 
 the spirit of Catholicism. Moreover, believing that 
 dogma divided where ethics made one, they laid the 
 main stress on the ethical side of Christianity. In 
 both respects they followed closely in Schleiermacher's 
 footsteps, and professed also to be followers of 
 Melancthon among the reformers. 
 
 In the second place, they strove to mediate 
 between theology and philosophy. From Schleier- 
 macher they inherited the idea of Christianity as a 
 historically given, historically conditioned religion, 
 while from Hegel they derived the impulse to demon- 
 strate its essential reasonableness and intelligibility. 
 Dorner's great work on the system of Christian 
 doctrine is a typical example of the labours of this 
 school In it faith and doctrine, religion and science 
 are happily combined. This combination may seem 
 to destroy the character of unity which is to be 
 desiderated in a systematic exposition of theology ; 
 but none the less this lack of unity in no wise 
 hindered but rather increased the practical influence 
 of the work. Rothe's books are characterized by 
 much originality (though sometimes of a rather 
 fantastic nature), by a thorough-going aestheticism 
 and by a bold use of speculation. Kahler abjures 
 speculation, and aims at a Biblical theology. Dogma 
 is for him the conviction concerning the Saviour's 
 work experienced first by the apostles and evan- 
 gelists, then by the Church, ultimately recovered and 
 clarified by the Reformers. But Kahler never seems 
 equal to the task of satisfactorily adjusting the claims 
 
THE ROMANTIC SCHOOL 43 
 
 of religious conviction and those of history. Was 
 Christ really He whom the Apostles were convinced 
 He was ? We may admit that the convictions of 
 the disciples coloured their narrative, but not to so 
 great an extent that it is impossible to recover the 
 lineaments of the historical Christ The reliance 
 upon evangelical experience in the last resort suggests 
 that the fascination of Schleiermacher's subjectivism 
 is still unbroken. It was reserved for Ritschl to 
 break the spell ; and having indicated the character- 
 istics of contemporary religious thought, we are now 
 in a position to consider the significance of his own 
 contribution to theology. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 RITSCHL; HIS AGE AND HIS SCHOOL 
 
 Our survey of the main theological tendencies in 
 Germany during the nineteenth century will have 
 taught us to realize how clearly all schools recognized 
 the urgent need for a restatement of theology which 
 should bring the facts and ideas of religion into 
 harmony with the changed attitude of modern 
 thought, and how earnestly they applied them- 
 selves to the task. 
 
 The need was indeed very sore, for though religion 
 in a sense was more than ever reverenced as a motive 
 to practical conduct, or as affording scope for man's 
 spiritual powers, theology came to be regarded more 
 and more as an essentially impossible science, mas- 
 querading in the borrowed plumes of truth, while a 
 philosophy of religion was increasingly viewed as a 
 contradiction in terms. 
 
 Briefly to recapitulate, and to summarize some of 
 the causes which contributed to this result, we may 
 notice : 
 
 (i) The prevailing distaste for metaphysics which 
 was the logical outcome of the Kantian philosophy. 
 Kant had set the strictest limits to the bounds of 
 reason. He was the real founder of theoretical 
 
RITSCHL: HIS AGE AND HIS SCHOOL 45 
 
 agnosticism. In Germany the Neo-Kantians set out 
 like the Seven against Thebes to the overthrow of 
 all objective knowledge. In England, Herbert 
 Spencer, with reiterated and almost monotonous 
 insistence, proclaimed the entire unknowability of 
 that which lay beyond the world of sense ; that the 
 reconciliation of religion and science could only be 
 effected on the basis of a frank recognition " of this 
 deepest, widest and most certain of facts that the 
 Power which the Universe manifests to us is utterly 
 inscrutable.'' 
 
 (ii) But the age was characterized not merely by 
 a positive dislike for, but a still more profound 
 distrust of metaphysics. The critical reaction to- 
 wards the Kantian position relegated religion to a 
 sphere, unknown and unintelligible ; while for 
 theology, extinction was confidently predicted. But 
 at this stage, philosophy appeared no longer as a 
 foe but as a friend. The Hegelian dialectic was 
 zealous to take Christianity under the shelter of 
 its wing. But it is perilous indeed to identify 
 the Christian religion with any particular form of 
 metaphysical speculation. Whither is it leading 
 us : to what does it commit us ? It will be little 
 use demanding a separation when the union is 
 become well nigh indissoluble ; or at any rate when 
 the mischief is done. "Timeo Danaos et dona 
 ferentes." Even Hegelianism- — if it does not lead (as 
 it seems inevitably to do) to the rejection of the 
 miraculous and a pantheistic view of the worlds- 
 regards the ideas of the religious consciousness as 
 nothing but wholly inadequate images of the perfect 
 truths of speculative reason. 
 
46 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 Thus whether philosophy chooses to attack, or 
 offers to defend, makes little difference. The 
 modern mind is simply obsessed with the idea that 
 metaphysics offers far too insecure and precarious a 
 foundation upon which to rest our religious con- 
 victions and most cherished beliefs. 
 
 (iii) In striking contrast to this anti-metaphysical 
 tendency is the advance and success of the experi- 
 mental sciences. New knowledge, new experience 
 make fresh demands upon our faith, which at times 
 it seems powerless to meet. " And yet the very 
 vastness of those demands serves to obscure and 
 conceal their true character. . . . The worlds of 
 knowledge and of action have assumed such huge 
 proportions, have accumulated such immense and 
 complicated resources, have gained such supreme 
 confidence in their own stability, have pushed for- 
 ward their successes with such startling power and 
 rapidity, that we have lost count of their primal 
 assumption. In amazement at their stupendous 
 range we are overawed : we dare not challenge them 
 with their hypothetical origin."^ 
 
 We are indeed in perpetual danger of forgetting 
 that empirical science has imposed on itself definite 
 limitations in order to achieve its two practical 
 objects : to facilitate intercommunication, with a view 
 to social co-operation, and to economize intellectual 
 labour by the creation of generalized conceptions. 
 It seems obvious that the success of the empirical 
 sciences in describing and calculating the course of 
 events must lie in the rigid exclusion of all moral, 
 aesthetic, historical, and metaphysical considerations. 
 
 ^ Lux Ahmdi {i2th Edition), 17. 
 
RITSCHL: HIS AGE AND HIS SCHOOL 47 
 
 Thus the interest of physical science is in no sense 
 the logical one of consistent thought about ultimate 
 reality, but the practical one of successful inter- 
 ference with nature. The wonderful achievements 
 of science over an enormous field have blinded our 
 eyes to its real character, namely, as a series of 
 practical postulates whose truth has been demon- 
 strated only within the strictly limited sphere of 
 their practical applicability. For science starts with 
 special restrictions and arbitrary exclusions. Practi- 
 cally this method has justified itself by its success. 
 But it has no claim to be regarded as a philosophy 
 of absolute truth. For physical science, asking 
 special questions of nature, determines the character 
 of the answers it wishes to receive. Notwithstanding, 
 the progress of science has been so rapid and all- 
 embracing that the purely practical, descriptive, and 
 hypothetical character of its postulates has been 
 forgotten, and they themselves have been treated as 
 the indispensable conditions of all existence and all 
 knowledge. Hence the truths of mechanical science 
 are perverted into the falsehoods of mechanical 
 philosophy,^ and a materialism presses on, threaten- 
 ing to sweep away spiritual and idealistic interpre- 
 tations of life in a universal overthrow. 
 
 (iv) On what basis then must religion rest ? For 
 long the authority of the Bible seemed all sufficient. 
 But the Sacred Scriptures have themselves been 
 subject to the most searching criticism ; and, though 
 it may be admitted that they have emerged triumph- 
 antly from the test, yet in very many cases the 
 
 ^ For all this section see an admirable chapter in Taylor's Elements of 
 Metaphysics on " the descriptive character of science." 
 
4^S RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 traditional accounts of theii* origin and authorship 
 have necessarily been given up. In many minds the 
 authority of the sacred books was so closely bound up 
 with their authenticity, that the critical theories, even 
 when their reasonableness was completely established, 
 proved extremely distressing and disconcerting. But 
 the higher criticism did not lose itself in questions of 
 date and style : a far deeper question was involved. 
 For the overthrow of Biblical infallibility necessitated 
 an entirely new conception of the inspiration which 
 might be claimed for the records of revelation. The 
 character of revelation was itself treated as an open 
 question. The human side received such abundant 
 illustration, such unsparing criticism, such reiterated 
 emphasis that the divine side receded further and 
 further into the distance. Delighted to discover that 
 the Bible was intelligible because it was in the 
 language of men, a newer age appeared to forget that 
 it was authoritative because through it came the 
 voice of God. 
 
 (v) In no sense less modern or less powerful than 
 the scientific doctrine of the uniformity of nature is 
 the conception of the continuity of history. Historical 
 science is even yet in its youth : but it makes exact- 
 ing demands. The historian's task is not merely to 
 record but to explain events. To do so, he must 
 trace out cause and effect ; for to believe in causeless 
 events violates every principle of rational intelligi- 
 bility. But when once the belief that history is all 
 continuous, passes from a working hypothesis to a 
 speculative doctrine, what becomes of inspiration or 
 miracle, or of that crowning miracle of all, the Incar- 
 nation of the Son of God? This view of history has of 
 
RITSCHL: HIS AGE AND HIS SCHOOL 49 
 
 late years become increasingly attractive: but we must 
 insist that it is rather a philosophical conception than a 
 conception of the world either derived from, or proved 
 by, history itself. It has however done real service 
 in refusing to countenance any further the arbitrary 
 distinction between sacred and profane, which de- 
 stroyed that community of character between man's 
 religious aspirations and secular experience, from 
 which so much that is valuable may be learnt and 
 on which modern science has done well to dwell. 
 Yet in its extreme form the doctrine of the continuity 
 of history makes havoc of the catholic conception of 
 Christ. We quote from Pfleiderer's well known work 
 on the philosophy and development of religion : 
 * The appearance of a heavenly being for an episodic 
 stay upon our earth breaks the connection of events 
 in space and time upon which all our experience 
 rests and therefore it undoes the conception of history 
 from the bottom."^ 
 
 (vi) Perhaps however the most pressing problem is 
 the relation of Christianity to those social questions 
 which the advance of science and the expansion of in- 
 dustry has in recent times forced to the front. A con^ 
 victiorl has seized the Church that it is entrusted with 
 a social mission.^ Other-worldliness, once a praise, has 
 become a reproach : the social question is almost 
 universally recognized as ultimately a religious ques- 
 tion, and a gospel of social regeneration, as well as, if 
 not instead of, a gospel of individual salvation is 
 everywhere preached. It is plain that much social 
 
 ^ Pfleiderer, Development of Religion^ ii. 43. 
 
 ^Cf. Ys\^^'% Social Evolution \ Peile's Reproach of the Gospel \ and the- 
 speeches and papers at the Pan-Anglican Congress on Socialism. 
 
 D 
 
so RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 enthusiasm must immediately be won, if it is not 
 to be permanently lost, to the Church. Accordingly 
 we cannot be surprised if these tendencies have had 
 no little effect in the increased importance given to 
 representation of the Church as a body, as a kingdom 
 with practical and ethical ideals, by which Christ is 
 exalted as the ultimate authority and sovereign over 
 every department of human life and thought. 
 
 Such were the principal influences at work which 
 created the " Zeitgeist " into which Ritschl was born. 
 The Ritschlian theology is a serious attempt to 
 answer the intellectual and social demands of the 
 age, to rescue theology from its perilous plight, and 
 set it up upon a rock of stone. 
 
 It might seem superfluous to trace the history of 
 Ritschl's theological career ; but he learned so much 
 from many teachers, incorporating many elements of 
 their teaching, and rejecting others, that some 
 acquaintance with his earlier associations forms an 
 indispensable preliminary to the study of his matured 
 theology. For Ritschl's mind was extraordinarily 
 receptive, and yet at the same time remarkably inde- 
 pendent. 
 
 Born in 1822, he soon showed an aptitude for 
 theology " not merely from the child's natural desire 
 to be what his father was (his father being * bishop ' 
 and general superintendent of the Lutheran Church 
 in Pomerania) but from a resistless speculative im- 
 pulse to comprehend the highest truth." ^ In 1839 
 he began university life at Bonn, where Nitzsch 
 enjoyed a great reputation. His first purchase in 
 Bonn was a copy of Hegel's Logic, Two years later, 
 
 ^ Leben, i. p. 1 8. 
 
RITSCHL: HIS AGE AND HIS SCHOOL 51 
 
 dissatisfied with Nitzsch he moved to Halle, where 
 Tholuck, Muller and Gesenius were the most distin- 
 guished theologians. That was Ritschl's period of 
 stress. His religious views were undergoing profound 
 modification. Reluctant to part with his strong and 
 early belief in the supernatural, he nearly threw him- 
 self into the arms of Hengstenburg, the most famous 
 representative of extreme conservatism. At this time, 
 however, Erdmann was lecturing on the Hegelian 
 philosophy, and Ritschl embraced with enthusiastic 
 conviction the tenets of this, at that time, all-dominant 
 school ; but it is doubtful whether he ever entirely 
 sacrificed his independent and essentially ethical view 
 of the world to Hegelian intellectualism. However 
 that may be, his philosophical speculations brought 
 him into renewed contact with Baur's doctrine of re- 
 conciliation, and after a brief association with Rothe 
 in Heidelberg, he definitely attached himself to the 
 Tubingen School, the reputation whereof was then at 
 its height. Here he produced a work on the relation 
 of the third Gospel to Marcion's expurgated edition 
 in which (in accordance with much that was produced 
 at Tiibingen) the theory of an Ur-Lukas figured pro- 
 minently. But it was Ritschl's fate to be always 
 alternately attracted and repelled. In 1846 he left 
 Tubingen to begin lecturing as a " privat-docent " in 
 Bonn. In the subsequent year Ritschl showed his 
 independence by a vigorous review of Baur's work on 
 Pau/j the Apostle of Jesus Christ. Two years later 
 appeared Ritschl's first work of permanent value, on 
 the Rise of the Old Catholic Church. In the preface he 
 refused to allow historical criticism to be drawn into 
 the service of any dogmatic presuppositions, whether 
 
52 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 negative or conservative ; while in the book itself he 
 broke completely with the Tubingen theory of early 
 Christianity. Baur maintained that Gentile Chris- 
 tianity was the product of exclusively Pauline 
 influences : Ritschl shows that it was really due to 
 the failure to appreciate the significance of the 
 Pauline ideas. A second edition, almost wholly re- 
 written, appeared in 1857, in which he sought to 
 obliterate the personal element. The book showed 
 that its author accepted practically the entire New 
 Testament Canon, and in the sphere of Church 
 History insisted that external reconciliation would 
 have been impossible save on the basis of internal 
 agreement. Ritschl had waited six years before he 
 received official recognition ; but in 1852 he was 
 appointed "Professor Extraordinarius " and in 1859 
 "Professor Ordinarius." Meanwhile, though lecturing 
 on exegesis and ethics, he began to devote himself 
 more and more to the study of Dogmatics ; and 
 when in 1864 he accepted the position of Professor 
 Ordinarius at Gottingen, his attention was almost 
 exclusively concentrated upon a fresh presentation of 
 dogmatic theology. 
 
 In 1870 appeared the first volume of his magnum 
 opus on Justification and Reconciliation. Ritschl 
 approached this work as an avowed Kantian, accept- 
 ing Kant's limitations of the theoretic reason, and his 
 deduction both of God and of the Kingdom of God 
 as postulates of the moral consciousness. He had 
 also seriously studied Schleiermacher, whose methods 
 and conclusions we find him alternately emphasizing 
 and repudiating. Traces of mysticism discoverable 
 in the latter's theological system were wholly to be 
 
RITSCHL: HIS AGE AND HIS SCHOOL 53 
 
 abhorred. In some of the letters of this period, 
 Ritschl professes himself to be positively repelled by 
 Schleiermacher's theology. Four years later, when 
 studying the Discourses on Religion, his tone is no 
 longer depreciatory but almost enthusiastic ; indeed, 
 he does not hesitate to declare that " he is the only 
 one since the Reformation who has employed the 
 scientific method of proof in theology." ^ Schleier- 
 macher's opposition to natural reHgion, his insistence 
 on the historical origin and character of all religions 
 and on their embodiment in an organized fellowship ; 
 above all, the employment of a systematic and 
 scientific method in theology, were all ideas which 
 appealed powerfully to Ritschl, and he incorporates 
 them all into his own work. From a specifically 
 Christian standpoint, Ritschl also borrowed much 
 from Schleiermacher — the conception of Christianity 
 as a positive historical religion, the function of the 
 Church as the sphere and witness of Christ's 
 redeeming activity, the utter impossibility of a 
 Christian religion without Christ : yet Kattenbusch 
 seems to be in the right when he sees the real 
 significance of Ritschl in the fact that he broke 
 more completely than any of his predecessors with 
 Schleiermacher's method. For while the latter made 
 the pious consciousness his starting point, Ritschl 
 starts from the Gospel, thus exactly reversing the 
 leading principle of the three chief schools that 
 followed Schleiermacher. Dogmatics for Ritschl is 
 not the interpretation of anj/ actual state of piety 
 within the Christian community, but the unfolding of 
 the norm of all piety in the Christian Church.^ 
 
 ^ Reden^ p. l8. ^Kattenbusch, Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl^ p. 60. 
 
54 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 But there is a third influence which worked 
 strongly on Ritschl's mind. His removal to Gottin- 
 gen brought him into contact with Lotze, with whom 
 he formed a close friendship, and from whose philo- 
 sophical works he derived many suggestions. In 
 particular, he declared himself a follower of Lotze 
 rather than of Kant in his theory of cognition, 
 though both his biographer and his critics agree in 
 thinking that epistemologically he remained a 
 Kantian to the end. More important is his obvious 
 dependence on Lotze in the development of his 
 theory of value-judgments, for it was Lotze who 
 insisted with the utmost clearness on the inde- 
 pendent value and reality of the religious — as 
 opposed to the intellectualist — view of the world. 
 
 Ritschl had published the first volume of Justifi- 
 cation in 1870, containing a history of the doctrine. 
 The second volume appeared four years later and 
 contained the Biblical material: the third in 1875, ex- 
 pounding " the positive development of the doctrine." 
 The same year witnessed the publication of his 
 treatise on Schleiermacher's Discourse on Religion, 
 where he assigns a high and honoured place to one 
 towards whom he has at times assumed an almost 
 bitter and uncharitable attitude. We ought also to 
 mention the Instruction in the Christian Religion, 
 published in the same year, a little work originally 
 intended for the use of higher forms in schools, but 
 of great value as a compendious and careful exposi- 
 tion of the chief tenets of the Ritschlian system. 
 His next great work was the History of Pietism, in 
 three volumes, the first of which appeared in 1880, 
 and the third in 1886. In 1881 he wrote a defen- 
 
RITSCHL: HIS AGE AND HIS SCHOOL 55 
 
 sive pamphlet on Theology and Metaphysics, It cannot 
 be pronounced a very happy effort, nor is it charac- 
 terized by the same fine grasp or lucid exposition 
 of the subject which Ritschl's other works might lead 
 us to expect. 
 
 Meanwhile he busied himself in preparing new 
 editions of his great work. Some of the differences 
 between the first and later editions are most remark- 
 able, and we shall have occasion to allude to some of 
 the more noticeable alterations at a later stage. But 
 there is nothing here for surprise, as Ritschl's views 
 never reached finality. He himself states that he 
 had learned infinitely much in the preparation of his 
 dogmatic work, and was still learning.^ It was, as 
 we have intimated, mainly in the di rection of a 
 Lotzean epistemology, and of the definition of 
 religious knowledge as value-judgments that the 
 most striking modifications are to be found. 
 
 In 1889 Ritschl died, leaving behind him a band 
 of earnest disciples who set themselves with fervour 
 to propagate the principles of their new found faith. 
 It is important to notice wherein the followers of 
 Ritschl were united, and where they are in complete 
 disagreement, for the independence of the disciples is 
 so strongly marked that friend and foe have alike 
 raised the question as to whether it is possible to 
 speak of a Ritschlian school in any sense at all. 
 Thus Herrmann, the most illustrious representative 
 of Ritschlianism, states : " A Ritschlian school as it 
 exists in the warlike minds of its opponents, does not 
 exist as far as I know. Of the theologians whom it 
 is customary to regard as specially belonging to that 
 
 ^ Lebm, ii. 150. 
 
56 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 school, none is ready to uphold Ritschl's theology at 
 all points. But we have learned more from him than 
 from any other theologian since Schleiermacher." ^ 
 Similarly Kaftan, after Herrmann the most noted 
 of the older Ritschlians, writing twelve years ago, 
 maintains that " The Ritschlian school as a definite 
 unity which represents the same theology, exists only 
 in the imagination of its opponents. The differences 
 among us are very great. Nevertheless in some 
 essential points we all agree." ^ 
 
 What then are these points of agreement ? And 
 what is it that these eminent theologians have 
 learned from Ritschl ? They have imbibed a 
 principle rather than adopted a system. Thus 
 Kattenbusch in the exceedingly able pamphlet to 
 which we have referred declares that " RitschFs 
 theological principle is infinitely richer than Ritschl's 
 system. Any man who seriously seeks to make 
 Christ understood, can bring new thoughts to supple- 
 ment those of Ritschl. Yet no such man will be in 
 a position to think slightingly of dependence on 
 Ritschl, for he has done so much for our better 
 appreciation and understanding of Christ that there 
 is no man who would not feel himself bound to 
 admit having received thoughts from him of the 
 greatest weight"^ 
 
 It was the principle of Ritschl — the principle that 
 saw in the historical person of Christ a full revelation 
 of things divine — that drew together men of the most 
 diverse temperaments and views. And this diversity, 
 so far from being an essential weakness of the 
 
 ^ Herrmann, Verkehr^ 2nd edition, p. 4. 
 2 Zeitschrif/f '96, p. 378. ^Kattenbusch, of, cit. p. ()7,. 
 
RITSCHL: HIS AGE AND HIS SCHOOL 57 
 
 school, tends to establish the real greatness of Ritschl, 
 who could unite such heterogeneous elements and 
 stimulate them to a common activity. ^ 
 
 Thus in the very beginnings of a Ritschlian 
 school it becomes obvious that the peculiar charac- 
 teristic of the school is not to be found in any 
 unanimous agreement of its members in any identical 
 propositions, but in their common acceptance and 
 working out of definite principles. ^ 
 
 Pfleiderer (who asks the same question as Herr- 
 mann — whether there is such a thing as a Ritschlian 
 school after all — and gives the same affirmative 
 answer from a very different standpoint) sees the nerve 
 of their opposition to the ordinary theology in their 
 unconditional rejection of that which they persist in 
 calling " natural religion," but which is usually known 
 as the religious disposition of human nature, the 
 aprioristic foundation of all religious and moral 
 development, the Divine image or natural revelation 
 implanted in mankind.^ Here at any rate we have 
 a negative unanimity ; but it is possible to discover 
 a community of ideas and aims (derived generally 
 from this root principle) shared by all the members 
 of the school. Thus Herrmann speaks of the funda- 
 mental ideas which have drawn together a group 
 of theologians in such an agreement as is not to 
 be met with elsewhere with so great a number. ^ 
 These fundamental ideas are admirably described by 
 Professor Orr : " The strong contrast that the 
 
 ^ Herrmann, Verkehr^ 2nd edition, 3. 
 
 ^Ecke, Die theologische Schule Albrecht Ritschl s^ vol. i. p. 76. 
 
 ^ Pfleiderer, Die Ritschlische Theologies 77. 
 
 ■* Herrmann, Die.Gewissheit des Glaubens, 17. 
 
58 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 Ritschlians all draw between religious and theoretic 
 knowledge : the desire to free theology from all 
 association with and dependence on metaphysics : 
 the insisting on the positive revelation in Christ as 
 the one source of true religious knowledge : the 
 central position they all assign to the doctrine of the 
 Kingdom of God ; the rigorous exclusion from 
 theology of all that lies outside the earthly mani- 
 festation of Christ ; and finally the distrust of every- 
 thing of the nature of mysticism in religion." ^ 
 
 These ideas appealed most powerfully to a far 
 wider circle than a few professed theologians. They 
 struck a chord which found a ready response in the 
 heart of the people. It is claimed that it is Ritschl 
 who has given the most powerful encouragement to 
 the present generation of German theologians : no 
 less it is claimed that hearts are being won almost 
 exclusively through the influences set in motion by 
 Ritschl. The opposition his theology encountered, 
 the desire to do him justice and propagate his views, 
 set all Germany in an uproar : and even now though 
 the weaknesses of the Ritschlian theology have been 
 frequently exposed, though the arguments employed 
 in its internal controversies have almost neutralized 
 each other, and demolished the whole system in its 
 parts, yet its influence is still dominant, its adherents 
 still increasing, its vitality yet abounding, and its 
 popularity yet unshaken. The reason can only be 
 found in the fact that the Ritschlian theology does 
 indeed answer to some of man's deeper needs : and 
 this truly represents the case. It has often been 
 remarked that Ritschlianism is the creation of its 
 
 ^ Orr, RitschHanism^ p. 55. 
 
RITSCHL: HIS AGE AND HIS SCHOOL 59 
 
 age : and the remark is apparently intended to be 
 taken in a depreciatory sense, as discounting all 
 Ritschl's claims to originality. To this it may be 
 replied that there is a kind of originality which 
 yields no good fruit for theology or practical religion. 
 Ritschl's originality was not of this kind : rather it 
 consisted in his ability to carry out new combina- 
 tions. It was not the principles that he adopted but 
 the manner in which these were formulated and 
 combined that constitute Ritschl's own original contri- 
 bution to theology. ■■■ He expressed much that was 
 inarticulate : combined much that was sundered. He 
 was thus enabled to propound a theology which proved 
 itself peculiarly acceptable to contemporary thought. 
 
 In this connection we cannot forbear to quote 
 a remarkable passage from a French writer which 
 gives the true explanation of the extraordinary 
 influence of this new theology upon all sorts and 
 conditions of men. 
 
 " To those who are disheartened by the attacks of 
 criticism it affirms that faith and salvation are in- 
 dependent of the results of our historical researches. 
 To theologians weary of dogmatic controversies it 
 presents a Christianity freed from all foreign meta- 
 physics. To scholars trembling to see theology fall 
 before the attacks of the natural sciences, it shows a 
 way by which all collision with the natural sciences 
 becomes impossible. To students devoted to history, 
 it unfolds the development of the primitive church. 
 To timid Christians, it says, God has never been 
 angry with you : He declares to you that you may 
 return to Him. To worn-out pessimists, it cries : 
 
 ^Ecke, Die theologische Schule A.R. 13-41. 
 
6o RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 Work for the advancement of the Kingdom , . . 
 Doctrine without Christian Hfe is nothing. ... In an 
 age greedy for Hberty and equality it establishes a 
 social theology which makes the individual disappear 
 in the mass." ^ 
 
 Nor should we omit to notice the claim put for- 
 ward on behalf of the new theology to be the only 
 adequate representation of original Lutheranism, the 
 only true development of Reformation principles.^ 
 How far Ritschl's confident claim may be allowed 
 will depend upon the view we take of the Reforma- 
 tion itself Certain it is that the Reformers, struggling 
 to be free of scholasticism, ended by erecting a similar 
 edifice— as complete, as imposing, as fundamentally 
 impossible (Ritschl would say), and as diametrically 
 opposed to their own principles as that which it was 
 intended to replace. Ritschl seizes on the idea of 
 / freedom as the ultimately determining significance 
 of the Reformation, and strives to carry it to a logical 
 conclusion, and to give it shape and substance in a 
 systematic theology : with what justification and 
 success we shall have to enquire later. 
 
 It now remains briefly to indicate the leading 
 representatives of Ritschlianism to-day. 
 
 Herrmann, Professor in Marburg, is perhaps the 
 earliest of the school. In his Theology and Meta- 
 physics^ published in 1876, he deals incisively with 
 the relation of the two sciences, which he claims to 
 ,be one of complete independence. Three years later 
 followed another work on Religion in Relation to 
 Knowledge ( Welterkennen) and Moi^ality^ which intro- 
 
 ^ Schoen, Les Origines historiqttes de la TMologie de Ritschl^ 6, 7. 
 aKattenbusqh, op. cit. 64. 
 
RITSCHL: HIS AGE AND HIS SCHOOL 6i 
 
 duced the term value-judgments to theology, though 
 of course the idea had long been familiar. But Herr- 
 mann is best known for his book on The Communion 
 of the Christian with God, which has now reached a 
 sixth edition in Germany, and a second in an English 
 translation. In this powerful book Herrmann seeks 
 to free religion from all scholastic and mystical con- 
 ceptions, and to ground the certainty of faith in the 
 impression wrought upon the soul by the historical 
 Christ, as presented in the Gospel. 
 
 Julius Kaftan takes a very different line : to him 
 religion is the life hid with Christ in God : but he is 
 one with Herrmann in his energetic repudiation of 
 anything savouring of scholasticism. His two chief 
 works are on The Essence of the Christian Religion 
 (i 888) and the Truth of the Chnstian Religion (i 889). 
 In I 890 these were followed by a much smaller work 
 entitled Do we need a new Dogma ? Kaftan thinks 
 that the whole history of dogma is a sad illustration 
 of the perpetual perversion of genuine Christianity ; 
 but that the time has at last arrived for a synthetic 
 and constructive attempt to find adequate expression 
 for the chief Christian truths. 
 
 The adhesion of Harnack has proved a tremendous 
 gain to the Ritschlian theology. Not only have his 
 profound learning, his penetrating criticism, his con- 
 structive and imaginative faculties, his eloquent style, 
 gained him a world-wide reputation among scholars 
 of all nationalities, but he has deliberately set himself 
 to popularize his own conception of religious faith 
 and practice. " This I know," he declares in his pre- 
 face to the English edition on his lectures on What is 
 Christianity ? ** the theologians of every country only 
 
62 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 half discharge their duties if they think it enough to 
 treat of the Gospel in the recondite language of the 
 schools, and bury it in scholarly folios." Harnack's 
 views on the Hellenization of Christianity need not 
 detain us here : they must be examined later : it 
 must suffice to point out that the main purpose of 
 his History of DocUHne is to prove that "dogma in its 
 conception and development is a work of the Greek 
 spirit on the soil of the Gospel." ^ 
 
 It is not necessary to specify all the members of 
 the Ritschlian school ; but mention must be made of 
 Bender, whose extreme subjectivism led to his ulti- 
 mate exclusion from the party : and of Schultz and 
 Wendt who are associated respectively with very 
 valuable work in the theology of the Old Testament 
 and the New. The doctrine of value-judgments has 
 created a literature of its own. Its chief upholders 
 are Otto Ritschl (the son of the founder of the 
 school, who has also written a full and able biography 
 of his father), Max Scheibe, and Max Reischle. To 
 Kahler we have already alluded : he can perhaps 
 scarcely in strict justice be called a Ritschlian, though 
 he has learned much from Ritschl. His standpoint, 
 as we have seen, is " mediating." Ecke follows 
 Kahler in his irenical standpoint, and has produced 
 a book on the theological school of Albrecht 
 Ritschl and the evangelical Church of to-day, which 
 must rank as a very thorough and valuable contribu- 
 tion to the hterature of the subject (1897). 
 
 In France, Sabatier has written with fervour and 
 eloquence in defence of the principles of the Ritschlian 
 theology. It must not be supposed that there has 
 
 ^ Dogmagesckichte, i. i8. 
 
RITSCHL: HIS AGE AND HIS SCHOOL 63 
 
 been direct or conscious borrowing; but it is admitted 
 by Sabatier and others that there is a kindred spirit 
 " with the theological movement to which Ritschl has 
 given his name, the doctrines of which, while not to 
 be confounded with ours, yet approached them on 
 the chief points." ^ Sabatier's standpoint may best 
 be seen in his Esqicisse cTiate Philosophie de la 
 Religion. He thinks that the younger generation 
 have been driven into an impasse when they are 
 bound to choose between pious ignorance and brutal 
 knowledge : when they must continue to live by a 
 morality which contradicts science, or build up a 
 theory of the world which science condemns.- He 
 sees an escape in a philosophy of religion, based upon 
 a study of psychology and history.^ Moreover he 
 adopts the Kantian epistemology which denies the 
 possibility of knowing of God, save " symbolically '' : 
 and also Ritschl's distinction between judgments of 
 essence, and judgments of value. Thus he reaches 
 the conclusion that in the face of the subjectivity of 
 religious knowledge, symbols alone can adequately 
 express religious ideas.* We can thus see how nearly 
 the school of Sabatier approached to Ritschl, whose 
 theology had for them the supreme merit of giving 
 an answer to the needs of the present generation. 
 
 It is only in recent years that Ritschlianism has 
 begun to attract any attention in English speaking 
 countries : and here such attention as it has received, 
 has been almost invariably unfavourable. Excep- 
 tions, however, must be made in the case of Professor 
 Swing, who appears as an enthusiastic disciple in 
 
 ^Menegoz, Publications Diver ses^ 236. -Sabatier, op. cit. v. 
 
 ^ Op. cit, XV, ^ P. 303. 
 
64 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 America, and Dr. Garvie who also follows Ritschl — 
 yet sometimes afar off. The latter's " critical and 
 constructive exposition and estimate " of the Ritsch- 
 lian theology is perhaps the fullest as it certainly is 
 the most sympathetic account of the aims and 
 doctrines of the movement in the English language. 
 
 We ought perhaps also to mention Professor 
 M'Giffert, whose History of Christianity in the 
 Apostolic Age (1897) clearly exhibits the Ritsch- 
 lian " Tendenz," though the subject obviously does 
 not admit of any detailed exposition of theological 
 presuppositions. 
 
 Quite lately, however, a great change has taken 
 place. " Modernism " has been attempting to do for 
 Catholicism what Ritschl tried to achieve for Pro- 
 testantism, that is, to set religion free from all 
 precarious connection with historical criticism or 
 scientific speculation. The attempt to suppress the 
 movement by invoking authority had the inevitable 
 effect of concentrating attention upon its claims and 
 characteristics. Almost simultaneously the standard 
 of the New Theology was raised in one of the most 
 prominent Nonconformist pulpits. To those un- 
 acquainted with the liberal tendencies of modern 
 theology, the advent of the New Theology appeared 
 startlingly sudden : all were surprised ; most were 
 shocked. Yet, as a matter of fact, the theology as 
 then propounded was anything but new, and its 
 appearance anything but sudden. It was merely 
 the place and moment of its publication that were 
 in any way really sensational. For the New Theo- 
 logy is but one more attempt to mediate between 
 the relis:ious and scientific views of the world ; 
 
RITSCHL: HIS AGE AND HIS SCHOOL 65 
 
 between modern thought and ancient doctrines ; 
 between present needs and past ideas. It repre- 
 sents to a great extent the English phase of the 
 RitschHan movement. In some respects the EngHsh 
 version of the New Theology is sundered most widely 
 from the theology of Ritschl and his followers : it is 
 connected with a Hegelian philosophy which Ritschl 
 would have energetically repudiated ; notwithstand- 
 ing, it is not far removed from that vigorous modern 
 pragmatism which makes man the measurer of all 
 things, and would distinguish the Christ of history 
 from the Christ of experience, not with the view of 
 reconciling or rather combining two independent 
 presentations, but of forcing them apart as funda- 
 mentally opposed and incapable of reconciliation. 
 
 The Ritschlian theology is a challenge to our age. 
 The old theology has failed apparently in recent 
 years to arouse enthusiasm, to inspire social effort, 
 or to encourage independent thought. An almost 
 pessimistic despondency hovers around the seekers 
 after truth. ^ What is to be the end of these things ? 
 Cannot religion be saved apart from reason ? Can- 
 not faith persist without creeds ? Cannot theology 
 be systematized without dependence on metaphysics ? 
 Cannot the miraculous be eliminated without any real 
 loss to the Christian believer ? The Ritschlian school 
 has given its answer to these questions : an answer 
 clear and definite and systematic. It is incontro- 
 vertible that in many directions it has succeeded 
 
 ^ In this connection we may call special attention to two remarkable 
 books of recent years. Kidd's Social Evolution^ and Balfour's Founda- 
 tions of Belief. The latter has been warmly welcomed by Kaftan as 
 strongly supporting the Ritschlian position. 
 
 E 
 
66 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 where other attempts had failed. It should, there- 
 fore, in no sense be treated without sympathetic 
 respect, without a willingness to learn : nor should 
 it be rejected until, after a searching examination, it 
 should be found unfitted to take the place of that 
 theology which it was intended to supersede. To 
 such an examination we must now address ourselves. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
 The 'Ritschlian theory of knowledge is the basis 
 upon which the whole edifice of the Ritschlian theo- 
 logy has been erected. We have already alluded to 
 Ritschl's own words in this connection. He insists 
 that every theologian whose aim it is to treat his 
 subject in a scientific method, must proceed on a 
 definite theory of knowledge, of which he must be 
 deliberately conscious, and which he must be pre- 
 pared to justify and defend. ^ 
 
 It must be admitted that this seems a strange 
 beginning for a theology professing to abjure all 
 metaphysics. For to establish an epistemological 
 theory, some kind of metaphysical enquiry becomes 
 essential. But Ritschl will not leave us in doubt as 
 to his meaning — for he continues : " If I am scienti- 
 fically qualified in theology, then I shall follow a 
 theory of knowledge which in the determination of 
 the objects of knowledge will be regulated by a con- 
 ception of things, and thus will be metaphysical." 
 So the promise of a theology without metaphysics 
 was somewhat delusive after all : for the only way to 
 reach it is along a metaphysical road. Arrived at 
 our destination we need traverse that path no more : 
 
 ^ Theologie und Metaphysik^ 48. 
 
6S RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 yet if we put up " no thoroughfare,'' how will others 
 come thither? We climb up to the height of 
 theology without metaphysics, where we can dwell 
 securely, but it is only by a metaphysical ladder 
 that we have attained thereto. If from our point of 
 vantage we kick away the ladder as of no further 
 use, how shall others find their way to our dwelling- 
 place ? Yet, Ritschl, embarking on a metaphysical 
 venture to reach the place where metaphysics may 
 not intrude, on the one hand allures those who 
 entertain a deep-seated distrust of philosophy with a 
 promise of theology without metaphysics, and on the 
 other insists upon the necessity of metaphysical 
 appliances if men are ever to reach the haven where 
 they would be. He affirms with emphasis that it is 
 *' an inconceivable and incredible contention that we 
 should be charged with excluding all metaphysics 
 from theology," and asserts that the real point at 
 issue between him and his opponents, is not whether, 
 but what metaphysics are to be employed. 
 
 After this repeated insistence upon the necessity 
 of a theory of knowledge for any systematic handling 
 of theology, it is somewhat disconcerting to read 
 after an interval of only a few pages that " as Chris- 
 tianity is neutral in regard to the differences between 
 Jewish and Hellenic morals, so also as a religion it 
 is indifferent in regard to the different theories of 
 knowledge by means of which its intellectual contents 
 may be scientifically arranged." ^ 
 
 The only coherent meaning to be gleaned from 
 this glaring inconsistency is that while theology 
 depends upon a theory of knowledge, religion does 
 
 1 T.M. 46. 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 69 
 
 not. We must therefore assume that theology and 
 rehgion represent two wholly independent points of 
 view ; or, in other words, that theology without meta- 
 physics has passed into religion without theology. 
 Apparently Christianity is identified wholly with 
 religion, and dissociated from theology : for Chris- 
 tianity is indifferent to theories of knowledge, while 
 theology cannot possibly pretend to indifference as 
 to the character of its fundamental presupposition. 
 But could any proposition well be more questionable 
 than a theory which entirely divorces religion from 
 theology, and makes what is fundamental to the one a 
 matter of indifference to the other? However, with- 
 out dwelling unduly upon this initial difficulty, we 
 will proceed to consider Ritschl's own view as to the 
 different theories of knowledge which have held the 
 field, and the reasons which have led him to accept 
 the Lotzean epistemology. 
 
 Within the domain of European thought Ritschl 
 distinguishes three theories of knowledge. The first 
 is due to the influence of Plato, and has found a 
 home in the realm of scholasticism. This theory, 
 which exercises perhaps the widest influence and may 
 be almost identified with the conceptions of popular 
 epistemology, maintains (according to Ritschl) that 
 the thing itself can be distinguished from its effects 
 upon ourselves. Thus while the thing works upon 
 us by means of its mutable qualities, arousing 
 our sensitive and perceptive faculties, yet it really 
 rests behind its qualities as an unchanging self- 
 equivalent unity of attributes. In other words 
 this theory holds that we can know the thing 
 in itself apart from its effects, and that everything 
 
70 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 may be deduced from universal ideas; thereby over- 
 looking the fact that the thing in itself is merely the 
 permanent memory-picture due to repeated impres- 
 sions or intuitions of effects by which our sensation 
 and perception have been stimulated. 
 
 Ritschl next discusses the second theory of know- 
 ledge which he holds to have been promulgated by 
 Kant. This would confine our intellectual knowledge 
 to the world of phenomena, but declares the thing in 
 itself or the things in themselves, in whose reciprocal 
 changes the changes in the world of appearances 
 have their origin, to be unknowable. The latter 
 part of this doctrine Ritschl holds to be a well-justified 
 repudiation of scholastic philosophy : but in the 
 earlier part of the theory he maintains that Kant has 
 himself fallen into the chief error of scholasticism — 
 the separation of the thing from its appearances. 
 For a world of phenomena can be posited as the 
 object of knowledge only if we suppose that in them 
 something — that is, the thing itself — appears to us 
 or is the cause of our sensations and perceptions ; 
 otherwise the phenomenon can only be treated as an 
 illusion. Thus, by his use of the conception of 
 phenomenon, Kant contradicts his own principle that 
 real things are unknowable. 
 
 Before proceeding to mention the third theory of 
 knowledge which is due to Lotze and is adopted by 
 Ritschl,^ we must offer a few remarks on his 
 criticisms of the two forms of epistemology which he 
 rejects. In the first place it is hardly fair to credit 
 
 ^If we can take Ritschl's own word for it: but all are agreed, both 
 friend and foe, that despite slight modifications of phraseology, he 
 remained a Kantian to the end. 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 71 
 
 Plato with a theory of knowledge. Plato's object 
 was to discover not the necessary factors of human 
 knowledge but the ultimate nature of reality. His 
 intention therefore was not epistemological but meta- 
 physical; and his method was logical and deductive 
 rather than analytical and descriptive. He ought 
 therefore to have been contrasted rather than com- 
 pared with Kant ; and contrasted rather in method and 
 intention than in result. Moreover it is astonishing 
 to be told that the naive realism and empiricism of 
 ordinary thought should be identified with Platonic 
 idealism. But when we come to the criticism of the 
 Kantian theory our astonishment is increased. For 
 it passes understanding to conceive how the unknow- 
 ability of the things can be justified, if the limitation 
 of knowledge to phenomena, which this theory ob- 
 viously necessitates, is to be condemned. The diffi- 
 culties with which we are thus confronted at the very 
 outset of our examination of the Ritschlian position 
 (when moreover he is simply attempting to describe 
 the standpoint of others, and not elaborating a meta- 
 physical theory of his own) afford a sure indication 
 that Ritschl's strength does not lie in philosophical 
 enquiry but in systematic theology — a conclusion for 
 which our further investigations will be found to 
 afford the completest justification. 
 
 Having thus dismissed the Platonic and Kantian 
 theories, Ritschl declares his adhesion to that 
 propounded by Lotze. He holds that "in the pheno- 
 mena which in a limited space exhibit change to a 
 limited extent and in a determinate order we 
 cognize the thing as the cause of its qualities opera- 
 ting upon us, as the end which these serve as means, 
 
72 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 and as the law of their constant changes." This 
 theory Ritschl accepts as his own, referring the 
 reader for a further treatment of the subject to his 
 Httle book on Theology and Metaphysics^ where in 
 trenchant, controversial and, it must be admitted, 
 confused style he elaborates his theory of know- 
 ledge. 
 
 Having as it were appealed unto Caesar, to 
 Caesar shall he go, and we with him. But before 
 our departure, we must insist that Ritschl's theory — 
 we know the thing in its appearances — by which he 
 supposes the problem of knowledge to be solved, 
 seems hardly to be aware of the existence of such a 
 problem at all. It seems intensely simple and 
 illuminating to assert that we know the thing in its 
 appearances ; so simple, that, as Pfleiderer says with 
 justice, we naturally wonder why it should never 
 have occurred to such talented people as Plato and 
 Kant ! ^ The formula entirely ignores the real 
 difficulty, whence do the phenomena originate? 
 Wherein do appearances consist ? Are they ex- 
 ternal to ourselves, or merely subjective represen- 
 tations of our own consciousness ? The latter seems 
 the only conceivable alternative on this theory, but 
 what then is the relation of the appearance to the 
 thing ? How in the face of repeated contradiction 
 are we to reconcile knowing and being, reality and 
 appearance ? The theories - of Lotze, as we have 
 seen, carry us far beyond the non-intelligent formula 
 which Ritschl employs : but it is precisely such 
 metaphysical theories as those of Lotze that Ritschl 
 either abjures or ignores. We ought also in this 
 
 ^ Pfleiderer, Die Ritschhche Theologie^ 2. 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 71 
 
 connection to remember how very strongly Lotze 
 himself condemned all epistemological enquiries, as 
 affording any adequate basis for religious or theo- 
 logical construction. Wherefore Ritschl's claim in 
 reference to the Lotzean epistemology must be 
 accepted with many reservations. 
 
 We are now ready to accompany Ritschl, and to 
 undertake the examination of his Theology and 
 Metaphysics^ by the study of which our ideas as to 
 the real significance of his theory may receive 
 considerable enlightenment. Here we find a repe- 
 tition of the statement that the distinction commonly 
 drawn between the thing as it is for us, and the 
 thing as it is for itself, lacks real foundation, but 
 originates in a memory-picture which represents 
 something constant and invariable behind the im- 
 mediate appearance. This unchanging somewhat is 
 however no more than an imaginary or " shadowy " 
 representation of reality. But now we are face to 
 face with the old question, what is reality ? The 
 things in themselves, that is, the things independent 
 of our consciousness, are nought but a deceptive 
 shadow-picture : yet the identification of the real 
 things with the products (for Ritschl's theory forbids 
 us to say objects) of our representing conscious- 
 ness seems incredible. This however seems to be 
 Ritschl's intention. In proof of our assertion we 
 must quote a passage of great importance. " One 
 knows," he says, " a self-sufficient thing first in its 
 qualities. . . . The appearances, which are perceived 
 in a limited space in the same position or succession, 
 and their changes in a definite order and method 
 are combined by our faculty of representation in the 
 
74 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 unity of the thing after the analogy of the cognizing 
 soul, which in the change of its corresponding sen- 
 sations feels and remembers itself as a permanent 
 unity. Accordingly the thing which we represent 
 for ourselves is an existence in itself . , . Accord- 
 ingly the isolated thing will be thought as its own 
 cause and its own purpose. Thus considered the 
 thing loses all its peculiar qualities. It is a purely 
 formal conception without all content." ^ 
 
 Ritschl lays down that a doctrine of things is only 
 formally employed in theology ^ : in the same way 
 he says a few pages previously that the formally 
 correct statement of theological doctrines is dependent 
 on a conscious or unconscious theory of cognition. ^ 
 What Ritschl means (and indeed explicitly states in 
 another passage) is that the laws laid down have no 
 exclusive bearing on religious knowledge, but are 
 applicable to all knowledge as such. In the first 
 volume he speaks of the necessity for theologians 
 of ideas which have originated outside the fact of 
 Christianity, and which, even though they should be 
 only logical, will yet have a determining influence 
 upon the theological presentation of Christianity. ^ 
 
 Professor Swing, an ardent champion, would mini- 
 mize the significance of Ritschl's declarations con- 
 cerning the dependence of theology upon a correct 
 theory of knowledge : Ecke, followed to some extent 
 by Garvie, suggests that this theory of cognition 
 is a foreign element in the Ritschlian theology. 
 To this, however, it must be replied that the aban- 
 donment of the Ritschlian theory of knowledge would 
 
 ^ See additional note at end of chapter, 
 
 '^K.V. iii. i8. '^Ibid. i6. "^ R.V. i. 571. 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 75 
 
 mean an entire transformation of the whole theo- 
 logical system. It is indeed only too clear that it is 
 because of the theology that Ritschl concerns himself 
 with knowledge ; and that the theory of knowledge 
 is intended to prescribe for theology the bounds 
 which it shall not pass. 
 
 A further quotation from Ritschl's Theology and 
 Metaphysics will throw light both upon the theory and 
 upon his own curious lack of self-consistency. " The 
 idea of a thing originates from the different sensations 
 which in a regular order attach themselves to some- 
 thing which experience fixes in a limited space. An 
 apple we represent as a round, red, sweet thing . . . 
 what we mean is that we know the subject of this 
 proposition only in its predicates. The impression 
 that the thing is a unity in the changes of the 
 qualities springs from our own persistent sense of 
 unity amid the succession of our sensations produced 
 by the thingP ^ 
 
 The last sentence contains an obvious self- 
 contradiction. The whole passage has made it 
 perfectly plain that the idea of a thing is a purely 
 formal conception, a unity of phenomena, which is 
 due to the activity of our representing consciousness 
 through its experience of simultaneous sensations. 
 The unity of the thing corresponds to the continuity 
 of ourselves who, amid changing surroundings and 
 successive experiences, are conscious of our abiding 
 unity. This is not to be distinguished from subjec- 
 tive idealism — a philosophy in flagrant contradiction 
 with the certain facts of life, and moreover psycholo- 
 gically false. It fails, moreover, to give a satisfactory 
 ir.^. 37. 
 
76 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 answer to fundamental questions such as the 
 origin of sensation and the nature of unity- 
 ascribed to things. Stated in whatever form it 
 rarely fails to embody a contradiction.^ But the 
 contradiction is rarely expressed in such paradoxical 
 form as is done by Ritschl in the passage quoted 
 above : for in the last sentence, after carefully 
 explaining the subjective origin of the thing, he adds 
 a few words which can have no other meaning save 
 that the thing is itself the cause or origin of our 
 sensations. How these two conceptions are to be 
 reconciled must remain a mystery, for Ritschl is him- 
 self, to all appearances, sublimely unconscious of his 
 mutually exclusive representations. Yet it is plainly 
 impossible that the same thing should have been 
 conceived both as the product and the cause of our 
 sensation. Pfleiderer is a severe critic : but both 
 Garvie and Orr admit the justice of his criticism at 
 this point. " The whole secret of the Ritschlian 
 method is here exhibited in this perplexing and 
 capricious swaying and skipping between an idealistic 
 and realistic mode of consideration." ^ The claim to 
 represent the epistemological standpoint of Kant and 
 Lotze must be set aside in favour of an extraordinary 
 combination or rather confusion of naive realism and 
 subjective idealism which makes havoc of any 
 attempt to reach the objective realities with which 
 theology must surely be concerned. For as we have 
 already intimated, this theory of knowledge stands in 
 closest connection with Ritschl's presentation of 
 theology, since it enables him at one and the same 
 time to confine our attention to things as they are 
 
 ^Cf. Taylor, Ele7nents of Metaphysics^ 7S-79. ^pflej^erer, op. cit. 5. 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE ']^ 
 
 for us, and yet to claim for them some kind of 
 objective reality. In his Theology and Metaphysics 
 he lays down and elaborates the epistemological 
 principles by means of which he proposes to establish 
 his theological positions. 
 
 Let us briefly glance at the effects of this theory 
 on the three theological conceptions of God, Christ, 
 and the Soul. 
 
 (i) " If God is to be reckoned among objects of 
 knowledge for scientific theology, then every claim 
 that we can learn anything of God in Himself^ apart 
 from what may be known for us through the revela- 
 tion which was given indeed by Him (we know not 
 how) but made manifest in our sensations and our 
 perceptions, every such claim must be pronounced 
 unfounded. This claim is yet advanced by Frank 
 who would have us regard God as the Absolute, and 
 by Luthardt who distinguishes the nature and attri- 
 butes of God in Hiviself as prior to the attributes as 
 manifested in activities /i?;- ^/.y." ^ This Ritschl holds 
 to be the source of all the false metaphysic which is 
 generally characteristic of popular thought, and yet 
 has no claim to represent scientific truth in spite of 
 its constant appearance in Christian dogmatics. 
 
 Now Ritschl is pushing at an open door when 
 he contends that no knowledge or doctrine of God 
 is possible without our having felt and perceived a 
 revelation from Himself The real question is 
 whether on the basis of that revelation we are 
 entitled to draw further conclusions as to the nature 
 and character of that activity, that cause in which the 
 revelation itself originated : in other words, why 
 1 T.M. 34. 
 
7^ RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 should we not from the character of the revelation 
 proceed to certain inferences as to the character of 
 the Revealer ? When, further, it is taken into 
 account that the revelation is itself largely concerned 
 with the nature and character of God, it becomes 
 impossible to see why such enquiries should be 
 regarded either as unscientific or unchristian. 
 
 The rejection of all speculative effort to under- 
 stand what God is in Himself and for Himself, and 
 the limitation of all our knowledge of the Divine to 
 what God is for us, seem to lead straight to an 
 atheistic view of the world. This danger has been 
 vividly recognized even by disciples, and is all the 
 more pressing because Ritschl was inclined to apply 
 the Feuerbachian theory to all non-Christian re- 
 ligions. To make a solitary exception in the case 
 of Christianity, to which alone a supernaturalistic 
 theory of Revelation is held applicable, must be 
 pronounced an exceedingly hazardous experiment.^ 
 But the insistence that we can only know things 
 in their appearances, renders the conclusion inevit- 
 able that God can only be known in His historical 
 manifestations. The Being of God can logically 
 have no significance save as a general expression for 
 the moral government of the world : and God is lost 
 in His attributes. The Deity is merely a personifica- 
 tion of the Divine in which all human beings share. 
 
 This conclusion is energetically repudiated by 
 Ritschl, who holds strongly to the doctrine of the 
 Personality of God.^ Ritschl moreover speaks of a 
 self-end of God into which the world-end is merged. 
 But such conceptions are wholly incompatible with 
 
 1 Troeltsch, Zeitschrift, 95, p. 375. '^ R. V, ii. 215-227. 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 79 
 
 the language previously employed. There Ritschl 
 states that it is impossible to know God in any 
 other way, save in so far as He exists for us. But 
 Pfleiderer is surely right in his contention that 
 *' personality is a being for self which apprehends 
 itself as such, and distinguishes itself from others, 
 which is not lost in the manifoldness of its modes of 
 activity and expression, but abides as a constant 
 unity, with itself and in itself" ^ 
 
 In the same way the idea of a self-end of God 
 (which is prominent in Ritschlian theology) certainly 
 implies a being for self which is not exhausted in a 
 being for others. 
 
 Ritschl is not true to his own premises; his strong 
 insistence on the personality of God is not to be 
 reconciled with the philosophical principles on which 
 his theory of knowledge is based : it is preserved 
 because in some strange way what is denied to 
 philosophy, he allows to theology. 
 
 Such then is the theory of God that is given by 
 this theory of knowledge. We shall, of course, have 
 to deal with his doctrines at greater length at a later 
 stage : here we are merely illustrating how funda- 
 mental is this theory of knowledge to the correct 
 presentation of theology as conceived by Ritschl. 
 We must now touch upon this theory as it affects 
 the doctrine of Christ, and the doctrine of the Soul. 
 
 (ii) Ritschl, as we shall see later, professes to derive 
 all his theology from the historical Person of Jesus 
 Christ. That is an unexceptionable position for 
 Christian theology. But Ritschl uses it as a pretext 
 for refusing to take any account of those questions 
 
 ^ Pfleiderer, op. cit. 8. 
 
8o RITSCHLTANISM 
 
 as to the transcendental element in Christ's person, 
 which are forced upon us by an impartial examina- 
 tion of the history. " What think ye of Christ ? 
 Whose son is he ? " are questions which cannot be 
 evaded, if we are aiming at a historical interpretation 
 of the Redeemer's life and work. The Ritschlian 
 theory of knowledge, on the other hand, lays down 
 the impossibility of knowing any character or person- 
 ality save through such words and works as are 
 manifestations of spiritual activity.^ This again all 
 would admit : but the meaning which the author 
 gave to these words is very different from that of 
 orthodox Christianity. We, like him, would start 
 with the historical acts as manifesting character ; but 
 unlike him we would not remain in them, but start 
 from them. It would be hopeless to reconstruct for 
 ourselves a conception of a personality by merely 
 piecing together the fragmentary notices of his 
 historical activities : it would be monstrous to sup- 
 pose that in such occasional indications a character 
 was contained, rather than expressed. The Ritsch- 
 lian theory professes to follow a historical method 
 which would make all true history impossible ; for it 
 would be reduced to a barren enumeration of names 
 and dates. The theory is intended to exclude all 
 discussions as to the nature of Christ's Person ; but 
 logically applied it would exclude everything that 
 would make the outward words and works intel- 
 ligible. For by assuming that the entire personality 
 was confined to recorded actions, it would forbid all 
 consideration of possible motives, all tracing of pur- 
 poses, all thought of feeling — in fact everything most 
 1 T.M. 30. 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 8i 
 
 necessary for any true delineation of character. 
 That any history thus constructed, should be 
 accepted as other than provisional, we do not for 
 a moment contend ; but that any representation of a 
 personality, drawn from historical actions, without any 
 consideration of the motives underlying those actions, 
 should be considered adequate, is wholly inconceivable. 
 But the Ritschlian theology does not aim at logical 
 consistency, it aims rather at sweeping metaphysics 
 from theology. So in order to preclude the discus- 
 sion even of Christ's pre-existence, or the union of 
 Divine natures, we are told that " the Godhead of 
 Christ must be apprehended in the definite traits 
 of his historical life as an attribute of his temporal 
 existence." ^ Everything else would be rendered 
 meaningless by the theory of knowledge which sees 
 the reality of the thing only in its activities and 
 attributes. 
 
 (iii) What then of the Soul? RitschFs language is 
 unambiguous. " We know nothing of the soul exist- 
 ing in and for itself, nothing of a self-enclosed life of 
 the spirit above or behind those functions in which it 
 is active, living, and present to itself as a being of 
 special worth." ^ So the One is dethroned, and the 
 Many reign : the One becomes appearance, and the 
 Many reality. Yet Ritschl appeals constantly to the 
 consciousness of self-identity amid change : and it 
 is from the knowledge of our own permanent unity 
 according to his theory that we ascribe unity to 
 things around us. But how this consciousness of 
 self-identity, and this knowledge of permanent unity 
 can either originate or survive, in a hypothesis which 
 i^.K iii. 383. -'R.v. iii. 21. 
 
82 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 makes the manifold functions the only reaHty, and 
 explicitly denies the existence of an underlying, all- 
 comprehending unity, must remain a mystery. We 
 are invited to hold a theory of the soul without a 
 soul at all. As for the immortality of the soul, it is 
 impossible to imagine on this hypothesis how the 
 soul could survive the suspension of those functions 
 conditioned by its attachment to a bodily frame, 
 unless it has a permanent unity, a real existence in 
 and for itself. 
 
 Nothing would be a greater mistake than to ima- 
 gine that this extravagant theory of knowledge could 
 without loss be removed from the Ritschlian theo- 
 logy : for it is upon the foundation of this theory 
 of knowledge that the entire theological system 
 reposes. Ritschl is careful to tell us so himself. 
 " Theology," he declares, " has nothing to do with 
 the natural order, but only with the conditions and 
 activities of the spiritual life of man. Hence the use 
 of psychology is necessary. In this connection we 
 are confronted with a collision between two concep- 
 tions corresponding to the first and third theories of 
 knowledge. The first gives rise to the assumption 
 of scholastic psychology that behind its special activi- 
 ties of feeling, thinking, and willing, the soul itself 
 remains at rest in its self-equivalence as the unity of 
 the corresponding powers, the spiritual faculties." ^ 
 This theory he criticises and rejects, he then, in 
 harmony with that theory of knowledge which he has 
 adopted, propounds his own idea of the nature of the 
 soul. What it is, we have seen : whither it will lead 
 us, we see, also, too clearly. 
 
 ^ iV, V. ii. 20 (free and slightly compressed translation). 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 83 
 
 We thus arrive, by means of this conception of 
 knowledge, at a theology where, to quote the words 
 of Dr. Garvie ("sympathetic" as ever, if yet critical for 
 the nonce): " God is, so to speak, lost in His kingdom, 
 Christ in His vocation, the Soul in its activities." ^ 
 
 It really seems incredible that this result represents 
 Ritschl's intentions. Many indications including per- 
 petual inconsistencies seem to point in an opposite 
 direction, and perhaps we may conjecture with a 
 penetrating critic "that Ritschl did not make this 
 theory of knowledge the basis of his theology from 
 the first, but propounded it subsequently in its 
 defence." ^ 
 
 Additional Note. 
 
 We quote the passage in its full context : 
 
 "Accordingly the isolated thing loses all its peculiar 
 qualities. 7/ zs a purely formal conception without all content. 
 So in>.ignificant is the conception of the Absolute proclaimed 
 by Frank with so much stress as God ! " 
 
 No slight stir has been raised concerning the sentence 
 italicized. StahUn seized upon it as a convincing proof of 
 the subjective idealism which underlay the entire Ritschlian 
 theology. Favre follows suit, and declares that Ritschl 
 must be counted as one of the extreme subjectivists. 
 Pfleiderer is equally decisive, and Professor Orr describes 
 "the whole process as subjective, hypothetical, imaginative 
 and never leading beyond phenomena '' ; and interprets this 
 particular passage as a description of the thing only as " a 
 mental fiction." Wherefore it needed considerable courage 
 for Dr. Garvie to maintain that all these scholars were 
 labouring under an entire misapprehension: that the passage 
 
 ^Garvie, p. 62. ^Pfleiderer, Development of Theology, 183. 
 
84 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 was intended as Ritschl's repudiation of Frank's views, 
 rather than a declaration of his own. 
 
 Now it may be admitted that the argument seems intended 
 to prove the worthlessness of the conception of the Absolute 
 in theology, particularly as the term is employed by Frank. 
 In this argument is included the analysis of our formation 
 of the conception of the thing, showing that it is nothing 
 but a conception divested of all content ; and this con- 
 clusion naturally discredits still further the metaphysical 
 position adopted by Frank. From this "sympathetic 
 scrutiny of the passage " Dr. Garvie concludes that the 
 words do not refer to the view of the thing that Ritschl 
 holds as his- own, but to the perversion of that view of 
 which he thinks Frank is guilty. That certainly is an 
 extremely sympathetic interpretation : it is ingenious also. 
 But is it correct? It seems unlikely in the highest degree. 
 
 (i) Ritschl refers to this passage later : and there he 
 identifies himself with the present argument. "The 
 impression that the perceived thing in the changes of 
 its qualities is one, arises as has been remarked above 
 (p, 19) from the persistence of the feeling of self in the 
 succession of our sensations excited by the thing. Further, 
 the conception of the thing as cause and purpose of itself 
 arises from the certainty that I am cause and I am purpose 
 in the activities which I initiate."^ 
 
 Now it was directly in connection with the thing 
 conceived "as its own cause and as. its own purpose' 
 that Ritschl declared that this idea amounted to "a purely 
 formal conception without any content." As, moreover, 
 in the later passage he proceeds to appeal to Lotze in 
 favour of his view, there seems to be no reasonable doubt 
 that he is here stating his own conclusions. 
 
 (ii) Conclusions perhaps ; but not his own. This, how- 
 1 T,M. 38. 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE -85 
 
 ever, cannot be maintained : he gives an account of how 
 the conception of a thing is formed, and shows that from 
 his point of view, it must lead to an impossible abstraction. 
 •How then does the conclusion discredit Frank's rather than 
 his own views ? The answer is simple. Ritschl will not 
 suffer metaphysical questions to intrude into the domain of 
 theology : Frank, on the other hand, sets out with the 
 avowed intention of effecting a reconciliation between the 
 speculative reason and theological dogma. Ritschl pro- 
 ceeds to show the logical conclusion which must inevitably 
 (as he thinks) follow from such a proceeding. Psycho- 
 logically, Ritschl's statements are not to be justified : 
 logically, arguing from his own premises, they are 
 undoubtedly correct. He is unable to conceive of a 
 thing save as a formal conception without content, and 
 this is an idea which he thinks reduces all metaphysical 
 theology to absurdity. 
 
 (iii) Dr. Garvie, contending that Ritschl has been 
 grievously misunderstood and misjudged, quotes a passage 
 from another work which he thinks might have been 
 expressly written to guard against such misconceptions. 
 " For the doctrine of the thing it is assumed that our mind 
 is not of itself the cause of sensations, perceptions, etc., but 
 that these distinctive activities of the soul are excited in 
 coexistence with things to which even the human body 
 also belongs."^ The meaning is perhaps not so clear as 
 Dr. Garvie seems to think, but even if it were, the passage 
 would prove nothing save Ritschl's inconsistency in all such 
 matters, an inconsistency which even his stoutest defenders 
 (such as Traub and O. Ritschl) are constrained to admit. 
 The quotation, however, suggests another. Mention is made 
 
 ^ R, V. iii. 18. — A work in which the doctrine of things is plainly at 
 variance with the more subjective philosophy of Theology and Meta- 
 physics. 
 
86 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 of "the distinctive activities of the soul." We shall have 
 occasion to speak further of RitschFs doctrine of the soul, 
 but it will at present suffice to quote Dr. Garvie's own 
 estimate of Ritschl's teaching on this point. " In his 
 denial of the metaphysical existence of the soul, and his 
 restriction of personal life to spiritual activities, he im- 
 plicitly contradicts the unity and identity of the ' self,' the 
 possibility of character, the certainty of immortality." ^ This 
 will help us to gauge the value of the analogy Ritschl 
 draws from the identity of the soul to the unity and reality 
 of the thing. 
 
 ^ Garvie, op, cit. 225. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE JUDGMENTS OF VALUE 
 
 I 
 
 The suggestion that the Ritschlian theory of know- 
 ledge was in a manner a happy afterthought to cover 
 the deficiencies of the Ritschlian theology, derives a 
 considerable measure of probability from the fact that 
 the theory of value-judgments was only expounded 
 in the second edition of Ritschl's great work on Justi- 
 fication and Atonement, though it has since been 
 elaborated with remarkable modifications by different 
 members of the school. 
 
 It will have been clear that the epistemology we 
 have been considering cannot afford any certainty 
 for religious knowledge. Ritschl therefore boldly 
 declares religious knowledge to be exempt from the 
 inexorable laws governing all other knowledge, insist- 
 ing that between theoretical and religious knowledge 
 there is a difference profound and fundamental. 
 
 In his first edition Ritschl distinguished sharply 
 between religion on the one hand, and philosophy 
 and science on the other. The former, starting with 
 the conception of the unity of God, naturally viewed 
 the world also as a unity, as a whole in which the 
 
8S RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 Divine life was manifested, or the Divine will was 
 operative. This conception of the world as a whole 
 is plainly not a fact of experience : wherever it 
 appears, it is due to the religious representation. 
 Science and philosophy have indeed neither material 
 nor method for arriving at such a conception. They 
 deal with general laws of knowledge and existence : 
 their function can only be to observe and explain the 
 world in its parts : a unified view of the world can be 
 given by religion alone. The claim of philosophy to 
 find the highest law of being must inevitably bring 
 about a collision with religion. But in truth this is 
 no part of the task of theoretic knowledge. Where 
 philosophy aims at rising to a systematic unity, we 
 can immediately detect a religious impulse. Even 
 in materialism, with its strivings after unity, a blind 
 confused religious impulse is at work. Thus collision 
 between religious and theoretic knowledge becomes 
 an absolute impossibility, so rapidly and entirely are 
 the two spheres kept apart. 
 
 It is plain that this theory, whatever RitschFs 
 intention, can bring about no truce between religion 
 and philosophy. The latter may indeed in the 
 middle ages have surrendered its claim to look for a 
 whole in things: but the entire history of philosoph}- 
 is a history of its emancipation from ecclesiastical 
 control, and of its determination to solve for itself 
 the problems of ultimate reality. In other words, 
 philosophy does seek for unity, and does aim at 
 comprehending the universe under one supreme law. 
 We must also notice the obvious inapplicability of 
 this theory to polytheistic religions which cannot b}- 
 any stretch of imagination be said to come to a 
 
THE JUDGMENTS OF VALUE Sg 
 
 unified view of the world through the idea of the 
 unity of God. 
 
 In later editions Ritschl considerably modifies his 
 earlier view. We are indeed invited to adopt an en- 
 tirely new theory as to the relation between theoretic 
 and religious knowledge. It will no longer allow us 
 to rest content with the pleasing delusion that Chris- 
 tian knowledge comprehends the world as a whole, 
 while philosophy fixes the special and universal laws 
 of nature and spirit. For with this task every philo- 
 sophy likewise combines the ambition " to compre- 
 hend the universe under one supreme law. . . . 
 Even the thought of God, which belongs to religion, 
 is employed in some shape or other by every non- 
 materialistic philosophy." ^ The two spheres of 
 knowledge can, therefore, no longer be kept utterly 
 and entirely separate. Where, then, is the principle 
 of discrimination to be found? As the distinction is 
 not to be sought in the object of knowledge, we must 
 seek it in the subject. 
 
 Herrmann, to whom the actual introduction of 
 the term value-judgments is due, is a strong 
 supporter of the principle of discrimination which 
 Ritschl here adopts. The new theology, cham- 
 pioned by De Wette, had grasped the symbolical 
 character of theological representations, and was thus 
 led not merely to a historical re-examination and re- 
 construction of early Christian history, but also into 
 a psychological investigation into the functions of the 
 human spirit. The progress in this latter direction 
 has been so rapid that psychological science has 
 assumed far different proportions from those of its 
 1 i?. V. iii. 
 
90 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 initial stages; and the merely descriptive type of 
 theology has been discredited as insufficient. Reli- 
 gion was obliged to listen to the most gloomy 
 and confident predictions of her own overthrow, if 
 Christianity should prove unable to the task of 
 exhibiting the entire world-view in a systematic 
 connection. We can understand how anxiously the 
 theologians sought for allies among eminent scientists 
 and philosophers who, discontented with the dis- 
 connected results of empirical investigation, sought 
 in religion the idea of unity which science and 
 philosophy were alike powerless to bestow. But the 
 hopes to which such an alliance naturally gave rise 
 were more than counterbalanced by the extreme 
 reluctance to make the most cherished truths of 
 religion dependent on the successful issue of so pre- 
 carious and far-reaching a venture. At any rate 
 Herrmann feels justified in insisting upon a searching 
 investigation as to the real place of metaphysics in 
 theology. He begins with the obvious. By way of 
 enlisting the sympathy of his readers, he introduces 
 Melancthon as drawing a distinction between the 
 imperfect idea of God given by reason and that 
 mediated through the Church; and declares, though 
 he leaves it uncertain whether he expresses the views 
 of Melancthon or his own, that this latter idea of 
 God is a matter not for metaphysics, but for ecclesias- 
 tical doctrine. 
 
 He then proceeds to establish another obvious 
 conclusion — namely, that the idea of God, if given 
 at all in metaphysics, must have a totally different 
 significance to that which it bears in theology. 
 
 At last we come to the point. Religious ideas are 
 
THE JUDGMENTS OF VALUE 91 
 
 fitted to solve the riddle of the universe: but what 
 relation do these conceptions bear to theoretic know- 
 ledge? The methods of modern science, resolving 
 all qualities into mathematical relations, have given 
 to man a dominion over nature. The feeling of 
 exaltation thus inspired has inevitably led man to 
 forget that the real discovery of modern science is 
 the hypothesis of mechanical necessity, a theory which 
 yet teems with countless contradictions, when applied 
 to other spheres than that of natural science. Yet 
 this view of mechanical necessity seems to be the 
 practical postulate upon which all the experimental 
 sciences are obliged to proceed, if they are either to 
 progress or to succeed. No theory, however, could 
 be more utterly out of harmony with the religious 
 view of the world. 
 
 If, then, scientific and religious knowledge are 
 opposed, there is equal opposition between meta- 
 physics and theology: for in the former we seek after 
 universally valid forms in which all being and happen- 
 ing may be combined without contradiction. For 
 the correctness of these representations no account 
 whatever need be taken as to the relation in which 
 the things stand to our aims and wills, our weal or 
 woe. This, on the contrary, is exactly that on which, 
 in a religious view of the world, all depends, while the 
 metaphysical problems we have mentioned are in 
 such a connection a matter of entire indifference. 
 
 We have thus arrived at a stage where it becomes 
 necessary to admit that religious knowledge is 
 independent, on the one hand, of those mechanical 
 formulas with which the empirical sciences seek to 
 achieve their practical purpose of controlling natural 
 
92 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 forces, and, on the other, of these metaphysical 
 formulas by means of which philosophy seeks to 
 penetrate beneath appearance to ultimate reality, 
 and to resolve the contradictions of the world into a 
 unified and systematic view of the universe. To 
 such matters the Christian may be indifferent, as far 
 as his religion is concerned. For Christianity is 
 concerned with an ethical aim, and has a sufficient 
 assurance in the certainties of religious experience. 
 The Christian is content to know that God helps ; 
 he does not seek to enquire how the help is given. 
 There is an irreducible difference between the feel- 
 ing of the value of goodness, and the knowledge of 
 facts. Every religious view of the world is an 
 answer to the question, how must the world be 
 judged if the highest good is to become real ? 
 
 Any attempt to reconcile religious with theoretic 
 knowledge involves only a fxeTa^a<TL<; ek aXXo yevo? 
 which brings in its train nothing but confusion and 
 disaster. How else could it be if the Gospel which 
 is to overcome the world is made dependent for its 
 success on a worldly condition ? The Christian 
 must never forget that the character of his concep- 
 tion of God and of the highest good would be less 
 corrupted by insistence on Judaizing ceremonies than 
 by a desire in the interests of religion to combine 
 the earthly knowledge of the world with the super- 
 mundane idea of God. 
 
 We are thus reaching important conclusions as to 
 the relation between these two forms of knowledge. 
 " The consideration of the peculiarity of religious 
 knowledge forces us to acknowledge that what we 
 speak of as real in Christianity is quite different from 
 
THE JUDGMENTS OF VALUE 93 
 
 what is spoken of as real in metaphysics. It thus 
 makes no difference to a Christian whether philo- 
 sophically he is a materialist or an idealist." ^ 
 
 "Are then metaphysics and theology to be regarded 
 as hostile or as independent powers ? There need 
 be no hostility. In fact, metaphysics can serve 
 theology most usefully in two respects. It should 
 teach us in the first place to recognize the modifica- 
 tion of our conceptions involved in the change of 
 their reference to things and spirits, and, secondly, 
 to respect the frontier which separates the field of 
 independent knowledge from the dominion of the 
 concrete moral ideal. For the rest, whether philo- 
 sophy is deistic, pantheistic, or theistic, can make no 
 difference to us qua theologians." " 
 
 It would not be easy to state the case more 
 strongly. For the present we must defer our exam- 
 ination of Herrmann's systematic defence of this 
 theory, which he has attempted in Religion in 
 relation to our knowledge of the world and to 
 morality. His conclusion is, as we have seen, that 
 the values valid in the Christian community, so far 
 from being more fully recognized, lose their original 
 meaning when by means of metaphysics we aim at 
 transforming them into the objects of theoretic 
 knowledge. 
 
 We must now return to Ritschl, and see how he 
 himself developed this theory in the second and 
 third editions of his principal work. We have seen 
 that as in his later view the two spheres of theoretic 
 and religious knowledge could no longer be kept 
 entirely apart, it became necessary to find some 
 
 M/. in T. 17. 2^/. in T. 21. 
 
94 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 other principle of distinction. This means that the 
 distinction must be found not in the object but in 
 the subject of knowledge. 
 
 The mind, then, appropriates its sensations in a 
 twofold manner. 
 
 (i) They are determined, according to their value 
 for the Ego, by the feeling of pleasure and pain. 
 
 (ii) They are judged in respect of their cause, its 
 nature, and in its connection with other causes. 
 
 These two functions of the mind — feeling and 
 knowing — are never actually separated, but are dis- 
 tinguishable factors in an invariable synthesis ; yet 
 sometimes one, sometimes the other preponderates, 
 and thus gives its own colour to the complex neutral 
 act. Accordingly, from a psychological standpoint, 
 we must distinguish between things (i) according to 
 their worth for the subject, as susceptible of pleasure 
 and pain, and (2) as objectively given, when the mind 
 connects them as parts of a systematic unity of 
 nature through the causal bond. The latter give us 
 theoretic knowledge, the former find expression in 
 value-judgments. Theoretic knowledge is based upon 
 the knowing, value-judgments upon the feeling func- 
 tion of the mind. 
 
 It must not be forgotten that every kind of know- 
 ledge derived through our sensations is not only ac- 
 companied but guided by feeling ("nicht bios begleitet 
 sondern auch geleitet," 194). Value-judgments are 
 therefore determinative in every systematic and con- 
 nected construction of our ordinary knowledge, even 
 should it be carried out in the most objective manner 
 possible. For the wide and diversified field of scien- 
 tific observation cannot fail to produce a feeling of 
 
THE JUDGMENTS OF VALUE 95 
 
 pleasure in one who devotes himself with enthusiasm 
 to practical or technical pursuits. As a matter of 
 fact no form of theoretic knowledge can ever be 
 wholly disinterested : every such act is accompanied 
 by feeling of some kind, and we are therefore led to 
 make a further distinction in the value-judgments 
 themselves, accordingly as they are classed as conco- 
 mitant or independent. The former are active and 
 necessary in theoretic knowledge. The latter are 
 untouched by the theoretic element. For indepen- 
 dent value-judgments may be said to consist in : 
 
 (i) All perceptions of moral ends or hindrances, as 
 exciting moral pleasure or pain, more particularly as 
 setting the mind in motion to appropriate the good 
 and reject the evil. 
 
 (ii) Another class of such value-judgments is to be 
 found in religious knowledge, which must be distin- 
 guished from the perception of moral ends, for it is 
 only in the higher stages that religion is united with 
 a moral outlook upon life. 
 
 " Religious knowledge moves in the sphere of 
 independent judgments of value, which correspond to 
 man's position in the world, and evoke feelings of 
 pleasure or pain, as man either with God's help 
 succeeds in maintaining his supremacy over the 
 world, or is painfully conscious of the lack of Divine 
 assistance to that end." 
 
 Religious knowledge has modes of representation, 
 has a method as well as a material, wholly different 
 from those of theoretic knowledge, and at times the 
 contradiction is manifest. Ritschl here is inclined to 
 revert to his original position. Collision is avoided by 
 a separation of sphere. The confusion and collision 
 
96 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 between religion and philosophy has its invariable 
 origin in the attempt of the latter to arrive at a 
 complete and unified view of the whole reality : but 
 in this attempt a religious impulse betrays itself 
 which the philosophers ought to have known how to 
 distinguish from their theoretic knowledge.^ 
 
 Briefly to recapitulate ; there are judgments of 
 existence and judgments of value. The former deal 
 with the objective nature and relation of things : the 
 latter solely with their value for us, that is, their 
 capacity to satisfy some want of the feeling self. 
 This contrast between scientific and Christian know- 
 ledge consists in the fact that the former is accom- 
 panied and guided by a judgment affirming the value 
 of impartial knowledge gained by observation and 
 experiment : while in Christianity, religious know- 
 ledge consists in independent value-judgments, for it 
 deals with the relation between the blessedness which 
 God promises and after which man strives, and the 
 conception of a whole to be found in the idea of a 
 world created by God and ruled by Him. in harmony 
 with this final end. 
 
 It is in no sense RitschFs intention to maintain 
 that the mind is indifferent to the reality of religious 
 representations : what he does mean is that this con- 
 viction of reality is not theoretically gained, and 
 rests on other than theoretic grounds. 
 
 What then does the restriction of religious know- 
 ledge to value-judgments involve ? Plainly, it leads 
 to the entire exclusion of metaphysics from theology, 
 and in particular to the rejection of the theistic 
 proofs, which fail to yield the Christian idea of God. 
 1 R.V. iii. 197. 
 
THE JUDGMENTS OF VALUE 97 
 
 Also it imposes upon theology the very serious 
 limitation that we must not go beyond what God is 
 for us to what God is in Himself. 
 
 The theory of value-judgments determines the 
 character of the Ritschlian theology. As we shall 
 see later, all doctrines are moulded in accordance 
 with this central idea — the personality of God, the 
 Divinity of Christ, the conceptions of sin and redemp- 
 tion, of providence and prayer. Before, however, 
 proceeding to mention the objections to the accept- 
 ance of this all-determining doctrine, it will be neces- 
 sary to see how it was developed by later members 
 of the Ritschlian school, who certainly made great 
 advances by way of conciliation, and also strove, not 
 without success, to remove some of the more obvious 
 difficulties and inconsistencies of the theory. 
 
 Herrmann, as will have been gathered from the 
 sketch we gave of his position as laid down in 
 Alctaphysics in Theology^ is even more thoroughgoing 
 than Ritschl himself in his separation of the two 
 spheres of knowledge. Three years after the publi- 
 cation of the book to which we have referred, 
 appeared his work on Religion in relation to our 
 knoii'ledge of the world and to morality^ which seeks 
 to prove unequivocally that the objects of Christian 
 faith do not fall within the province of our ordinary 
 knowledge. What then is the principle by means of 
 which we can distinguish between religious know- 
 ledge on the one hand, and philosophical and scien- 
 tific on the other ? 
 
 The answer is given in a psychological analysis of 
 the human mind. Here we can distinguish between 
 that activity of the representing consciousness which 
 
 G 
 
98 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 is wholly uninfluenced by the feeling and willing 
 powers of the mind, and that attitude of the knowing 
 subject to the known object, when it ceases merely to 
 represent, but feels and in feeling experiences values, 
 and wills, and in willing seeks to realize these values. 
 In the feeling of pleasure and pain the mind has a 
 standard of values, belonging to an order wholly 
 different from that of the representations in the 
 consciousness. 
 
 It is a mistake to suppose that science and philo- 
 sophy are themselves disinterested or entirely un- 
 influenced by these value-judgments. In science 
 numerous conceptions, of which the unity and intel- 
 ligibility of nature may be taken as examples, are 
 formed and posited for the practical purposes of the 
 subject ; while metaphysics offers us an interpretation 
 of the world, the content of which has no other ground 
 of validity than its worth for us. If then in science 
 and philosophy the value-judgments find a resting 
 place, much more in religion do they come to their 
 true home. Religion is unconcerned with the attempt 
 to represent the world of experience as an intelligible 
 unity : its interest lies in regarding the world in all 
 its bewildering multiplicity as the means^orderly 
 and complete — by which the highest value of the 
 religious man (experienced in feeling) may be realized. 
 
 For man is conscious that he is the subject of an 
 unconditioned moral law, and thus acquires a con- 
 sciousness of absolute worth in himself Conscious 
 of his own worth, he has within himself a standard 
 by which he may assign a true value to objects 
 accordingly as they help or hinder his self-realization : 
 and thus acquires the assurance " that the inmost 
 
THE JUDGMENTS OF VALUE 99 
 
 essence of the world is in harmony with his own 
 demand for self-preservation.'' 
 
 This valuation cannot be regarded as an arbitrary 
 subjective process, for it is based upon solid ground, — 
 the existence of an unconditioned moral law to which 
 we know ourselves as subjected, and the existence 
 of an end recognized as one of absolute worth. 
 Herrmann claims to follow Kant, and finds ob- 
 jective validity for his value-judgments in rerum 
 natura. Religious knowledge gives a practical ex- 
 planation of the world, which claims to be true 
 though very different from the theoretical explana- 
 tion offered by metaphysics. We cannot do better 
 than quote the words in which Herrmann summarizes 
 and explains his views. " When I seek to compre- 
 hend a world-whole because I wish to comprehend 
 the multiplicity of things in a never failing content 
 of law, then I go the way of metaphysics. When I 
 seek to represent a world-whole because I do not 
 wish to lose myself (as a person conscious of my 
 highest good) in the multiplicity of things, then I 
 receive the impulse to religious faith." In science 
 and philosophy the real means the explicable : in 
 religion the real means the valuable. This no doubt 
 is true, but Herrmann will not allow that ultimately 
 the explicable and the valuable are one, but main- 
 tains a double kind of reality. Indeed he goes so 
 far as to assert that even the meaning of the word 
 reality is in both cases different. Herrmann's con- 
 clusion is to find in the value-judgments the peculiar 
 characteristic of Christian truth : for religious know- 
 ledge completes the moral personality, and elevates 
 it over the world as final purpose, while the religious 
 
100 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 judgments do not profess to be any more than the 
 exposition of the one and only certainty that the 
 significance of actuality is to be found in ultimate 
 blessedness. 
 
 We may now leave Herrmann and consider Kaftan's 
 contribution to the doctrine. In some respects the 
 two men are widely different ; for whereas Herrmann 
 is a Kantian, Kaftan is an empiricist. But in other 
 respects, they are at one ; as in the importance to be 
 attached to the value-judgments of religion, though 
 Kaftan introduces considerable modifications of the 
 language familiar to us in the works of Ritschl and 
 Herrmann. 
 
 Kaftan's views are unfolded in his book on the 
 Essence of Christianity} The first chapter deals with 
 religion as d^ practical n^^d of the human spirit. He 
 begins by recalling Schleiermacher's famous dictum 
 that true religion is neither knowledge nor action, 
 but a particular kind of feeling, and declares that this 
 definition is the true starting point for a discussion 
 on the essence of religion. In conscious dependence 
 on Schleicrmacher, he declares that the pious or 
 religious consciousness is only capable of being ex- 
 perienced in individual feelings, or particular emo- 
 tions, and that in them is to be found the kernel 
 and the key-stone of religion. While admitting the 
 impossibility of piety apart from all representations 
 or theoretic knowledge, he yet insists that these 
 representations and judgments only belong to piety 
 
 ^The references are throughout to Kaftan's first chapter, which deals 
 with the place of feeling in religion (28-37) ; representation and feeling, 
 theoretic judgments and value -judgments {37-46) ; and value-judgments 
 as the basis of religion, and religious beHef {46-51). 
 
THE JUDGMENTS OF VALUE loi 
 
 because of the practical feelings with which they are 
 united. 
 
 Psychology, which aims at reducing the compli- 
 cated function of the mind to its simplest elements, 
 shows us that the fundamentally diverse functions 
 within the consciousness may be described as repre- 
 sentation and feeling. The difference between the 
 two is this : representation is the picture of another, 
 while in feeling we become aware of ourselves as 
 living beings. The appropriateness of the language 
 used to express this difference may be called in 
 question : but of this double-sided character of our 
 inner experience there can be no question in point 
 of fact. Our relation to the world has thus a double 
 character, as we seek to know it, or as we are plea- 
 surably or painfully affected by it. Corresponding 
 to this double relation we find the further fact that 
 all our simple judgments are of two kinds. Either 
 they express a factual state which we represent, or 
 they express a relation which we, as living beings, 
 assume towards the former. There is, it is true, a 
 third class of purely logical judgments which may for 
 the present purpose be left out of consideration, as 
 not affecting the real question. The theoretical 
 judgments, then, deal with facts : the value-judg- 
 ments express our attitude towards these facts. 
 Psychology thus leads us to a two-fold conclusion. 
 There is a double-sided character in all human con- 
 scious life. We stand in a double-sided relation to 
 everything which exists for us, according as we view 
 it objectively through representation, or subjectively 
 through feeling. In our simple judgments this double 
 character is seen again in the fundamental distinction 
 
102 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 between the theoretic judgments and the judgments 
 of value. 
 
 Having established his preliminary presupposi- 
 tions, Kaftan proceeds to draw his conclusions as 
 to the character of religious knowledge. If we 
 analyse piety as inner experience, we find that 
 value-judgments are ultimately the absolutely deter- 
 minative factors in religion. For religion is a 
 practical postulate of the human spirit, and religious 
 knowledge differs from every other kind of know- 
 ledge because it lies on that side of our spiritual life 
 where values and not facts are in the last resort 
 decisive ; it never springs from any objective ob- 
 servation, or investigation of nature, but invariably 
 from the position which our practical interests lead 
 us to assume towards the world : the conviction of 
 its truth can never be forced upon the reluctant with 
 the inevitable certainty of mathematical demonstra- 
 tion (as is the case with the judgments of science), 
 but is a matter of complete spiritual freedom. This 
 is the first and universal characteristic of all re- 
 ligion. 
 
 Kaftan has not yet, however, done with the value- 
 judgments.^ He distinguishes three kinds : 
 
 (i) Natural — indicating weal or woe. 
 (ii) Moral — good or bad. 
 (iii) Aesthetic — beautiful or hideous. 
 
 The last class may be dismissed from our present 
 enquiry, for, though aesthetic considerations have 
 frequently^[^co-operated with religious motives, it 
 
 ^ The second chapter deals with the highest good, and the distinction 
 between the different value-judgments. 
 
THE JUDGMENTS OF VALUE 103 
 
 would be impossible to discover in history any actual 
 religion in which the aesthetic standpoint was ulti- 
 mately determinative. So Kaftan at any rate, but 
 it is questionable whether the aesthetic standpoint 
 did not exercise paramount influence in the final 
 shaping of Greek religion. A further question arises 
 as to whether the moral judgments may not be con- 
 sidered as a special department of the larger class of 
 natural judgments. For reasons which will have to 
 be examined later, Kaftan draws a sharp distinction 
 between religion and morality. Every religion, he 
 thinks, is concerned with life, not with perfect life : 
 with goods or the highest good, not primarily with 
 ethical ideals. The two ■ classes of value-judgments 
 are completely independent though not mutually 
 exclusive. 
 
 Religion deals with man's claim for life : and thus 
 it is that the natural value-judgments constitute the 
 true basis of religious knowledge and of theoretical 
 propositions concerning religion.^ For it is utterly 
 impossible to banish theoretic propositions from 
 religion altogether. Thus every religion deliber- 
 ately propounds a doctrine of God, which cannot 
 in justice be called anything but theoretical. The 
 point, however, to observe is that there is a wide 
 difference between these and the usual theoretic 
 judgments. The latter are the result of an objective 
 observation of the facts and forces of nature, or of an 
 intellectual interpretation of such judgments ; but 
 the former are entirely conditioned by the practical 
 motive underlying all religious belief, and are based 
 
 ^ Cf. p. 210. "Neither the aesthetic nor the moral but only the 
 natural valuation makes the fundamental character of life." 
 
I04 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 upon the natural value-judgments corresponding to 
 the religious need. 
 
 Kaftan modifies the language of Ritschl. This 
 is clearer in the first edition than in the second. 
 " Nowhere have I affirmed that the religious judg- 
 ments ai'-e value-judgments : indeed I hold this 
 expression itself open, at least, to misunderstand- 
 ing : on the contrary value-judgments are their 
 basis, but they themselves are theoretical proposi- 
 tions." ^ In a more recent utterance he states : " 1 
 have never regarded the difference between Ritschl 
 and myself on this subject as one of principle, or 
 generally of substance. I have never said more 
 than that his mode of expression was liable to be 
 misunderstood." ^ 
 
 We have now come to the most serious problem 
 of all in connection with the value-judgments. How, 
 and in what degree can they claim objective truth ? 
 
 The propositions of faith are intended to express 
 an actual, objectively given state of things. Man 
 seeks for help and comfort in his faith : but how 
 could he do so, if that faith were all the while 
 suspected of being an illusion. Where faith ends, 
 religion itself must have an end. But religion 
 answers to man's highest needs, and therefore must 
 be true ; yet it is plain that religion without some 
 such faith, as e.g. a belief in God, is a contradiction in 
 terms, and can never have any actual existence. It 
 is, however, important to note, that this claim to 
 objective truth extends only to the kernel of religion, 
 and not to the particular propositions in which it is 
 
 ^ Das Wesen der christlichen Religion {ist ed.), 38. 
 2 Theol, Lit. Zeit. 1895. 
 
THE JUDGMENTS OF VALUE 105 
 
 formulated. The concern of religion is with man's 
 goods, life that is, and not with aesthetic emotions 
 nor merely with the realization of ethical ideals. 
 Therefore its own practical nature necessitates and 
 guarantees the certainty of the religious man as to 
 the objective reality of his faith. 
 
 The objectivity of religious truth is thus grounded 
 in the subjective pious consciousness, which is, how- 
 ever, itself a universal and objective fact. In speaking 
 of religious knowledge, we must be careful to re- 
 member that we do not mean an objective knowledge 
 concerning religion, but the knowledge, which justifies 
 religion from our own personal standpoint, a know- 
 ledge which is rooted in faith Knowledge can only 
 mean the appropriation to oneself of particular 
 judgments, or their further combination with the 
 consciousness that they are true. Hence it would 
 be impossible for religion to arise at all, impossible 
 to become the subjective truth in man, without man 
 thereby receiving knowledge. 
 
 The peculiarity of religious knowledge is to be 
 found in three respects : 
 
 (i) It is penetrated through and through with 
 subjective conditions. It is subjectively conditioned 
 because religious knowledge can only exist, when the 
 feelings or the will are moved. Thus the personal 
 interests which as a rule disturb knowledge, are here 
 its very foundation. 
 
 (ii) The subjective side of knowledge is of such 
 a character that it includes the strongest possible 
 interest in its objective reality. For on the answer 
 to the question as to its truth depends man's highest 
 interest, namely life and blessedness. 
 
io6 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 (iii) The object of religious knowledge is of all 
 things the most objective. Religious knowledge is 
 the knowledge of God. 
 
 Religious knowledge is therefore differentiated 
 from all other forms of knowledge. It is some- 
 thing entirely sui ge7ieris. It rests on faith, and 
 becomes part of our inner conviction in a manner 
 wholly different from our ordinary knowledge. 
 
 Kaftan seems thus to have led us to a position 
 not very different from that of Herrmann. But in a 
 concluding summary he says with emphasis : " Truth 
 is truth. It never means anything else than that 
 our judgments correspond to the objective state of 
 affairs, which is entirely independent of us, and of 
 our opinion. Of a double truth there can be no 
 mention." 
 
 Yet there are different ways of reaching truth ; 
 one man is guided by facts, while the other follows 
 a definite judgment of value. The various attempts 
 at harmonizing science and religion prove that man 
 is himself one, and can never rest content with any 
 idea of a double truth. 
 
 How then can science and religion be brought 
 into harmony ? We can either assume that ulti- 
 mately science will lead to the same result as 
 religious faith ; or we can show that the interests 
 and impulses of science are only a single part of that 
 process of life out of the whole of which religion 
 springs. The former alternative cannot be main- 
 tained. There are indeed no limits to the extension 
 of our scientific knowledge : but the truths of religion 
 have never been and can never be reached along 
 this road. 
 
THE JUDGMENTS OF VALUE 107 
 
 Kaftan having assured us of the unity of know- 
 ledge, now proceeds to assert that the representation 
 that one can reach the same truth by different ways, 
 is false. As the ways are different, so also is the 
 truth to which they lead. Unity can only be 
 reached by asserting, that knowledge and science 
 must be subordinated to that highest purpose of 
 life to which we as Christians can give, in religion 
 and through religious belief, unity and coherence. 
 
 We have dwelt at some length on Kaftan's 
 contribution to the Ritschlian theology in this re- 
 spect : for he is aware of the difficulties inherent in 
 RitschFs and Herrmann's presentation of the doc- 
 trine, and seeks to remove them by an independent 
 restatement. We have also outlined his treatment 
 of the distinction between religious and scientific 
 knowledge in this place, because his theories spring 
 naturally out of his analysis of value-judgments ; 
 while Ritschl begins with an " Erkenntness-theorie," 
 and only subsequently discusses the judgments of 
 value. Kaftan's position is this ; conviction of re- 
 ligious truth cannot be forced by an appeal to 
 sound powers of perception or reasoning ; but must 
 simply be accepted in the recognition of its value: and 
 the test of religious truth is not its correspondence 
 with scientific facts, but whether it can really bestow 
 the good which it promises. 
 
 The highest truth can never be known by the 
 scientific method : for in highest knowledge, values 
 and not facts are ultimately decisive. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE JUDGMENTS OF VALUE 
 II 
 
 The theory of value-judgments plays so important 
 and extensive a part in that theory of the essential 
 difference between religious and theoretic knowledge 
 which is the pivot of the Ritschlian theology, that 
 we may be excused if, after indicating the position 
 of the older members of the school, we pay some 
 attention to the more recent developments of the 
 doctrine in the hands of the younger representatives 
 of the party. 
 
 Otto Ritschl, the son and the biographer of the 
 founder of the school, has devoted a book entirely 
 to the subject : Concerning Value-judgments. It 
 was published in 1895, and deals with the ques- 
 tion with commendable thoroughness. Otto Ritschl 
 begins with a historical retrospect. It is the boast 
 of the school to be the only true representative of 
 Lutheranism, the only adequate exponent of the 
 spirit of Protestantism. Accordingly, in all their 
 writings, the apologetic note is greatly in evidence. 
 Elaborate efforts are continually made in order to 
 prove that the sayings and writings of Luther are 
 
THE JUDGMENTS OF VALUE 109 
 
 manifest anticipations of the Ritschlian theology. So 
 in this historical retrospect we begin with Luther. 
 He certainly insisted with vehemence on the in- 
 comparable interest of the objects of faith for the 
 religious subject ; thereby drawing an implicit and 
 far-reaching distinction between the disinterested 
 character of scientific knowledge, and religious know- 
 ledge, which from its very nature constituted an 
 appeal to the very strongest interests of mankind. 
 Passing from Luther to Kant, we find the latter not 
 merely distinguishing between pure and practical 
 reason, but between relative and inner value. In 
 Herbart, the contrast is more clearly brought out. 
 On the one hand we have theoretical representations, 
 where the subject may be considered indifferent : on 
 the other there are the aesthetic judgments which 
 express a spontaneous though often involuntary pre- 
 ference or rejection. Herbart insists that religion, if 
 it is to be morally effective, must make an aesthetic 
 impression as well as a moral appeal. But it is in 
 De Wette that the process of valuation is first de- 
 finitely recognized as a motive to action. He traces 
 the different stages of such value-judgments from the 
 sensuous to the spiritual, and concludes by identi- 
 fying religious faith with the highest judgment of 
 worth. It is, however, when we come to Lotze that 
 we recognize the real source of the Ritschlian theory. 
 The value, he explains, does not lie in the thing 
 itself, but exists only in a feeling of pleasure or pain, 
 in which the thing plainly cannot participate. The 
 capacity of valuation by the feelings of the subject 
 possesses as authoritative a revelation of the world, 
 as the laws of reasoning afford an indispensable 
 
no RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 instrument of experience. There is a world of 
 forms which must be distinguished from a world of 
 values, which may in their turn be identified with a 
 world of ends. We have seen in an earlier chapter 
 how repeatedly Lotze emphasizes the difference be- 
 tween a religious and a merely intellectual view of 
 the world, and how frequently various representations 
 are put aside as having no significance for religious 
 feeling, or as failing to provide an answer to the re- 
 ligious need. 
 
 Otto Ritschl next proceeds to give a psychological 
 analysis of the value-judgment. The mind of man 
 includes within itself the three functions of thinking, 
 feeling, and willing; and as the mind is one, it follows 
 that no one function can be exercised entirely apart 
 from the others. In illustration of this it may be 
 pointed out how very few men are fitted for purely 
 intellectual pursuits, where reason should banish all 
 traces of emotion or volition. It is in the experience 
 of childhood passing into maturer years, that we can 
 best trace the development and significance of the 
 value-judgments. At first we experience the liveliest 
 sensations of pleasure or pain : that is to say, we 
 regard the object from the point of view of its value 
 for the feeling self Repeated similar impressions 
 harden into familiarity; and judgments of value are 
 swallowed up in judgments of custom. At this stage 
 the reason intervenes, and abstracting as far as 
 possible from aught that may be due to emotion or 
 volition, gives rise to theoretical judgments, where the 
 emotional loss is compensated for by the moral gain. 
 
 Applying this to religious knowledge, we should 
 say that just as in childhood our capacity for forming 
 
THE JUDGMENTS OF VALUE in 
 
 judgments of value is the greatest — a capacity 
 blunted by the weight of custom, no less than by the 
 advancing power of abstract thought, — so also we 
 have the best authority for stating that this childlike 
 spirit is characteristic of reHgion. For religion is most 
 closely related to the emotional and volitional sides 
 of our nature; and not only does not depend upon, but 
 is in the highest degree unfavourably affected by, the 
 exclusive use of our intellectual functions. We ex- 
 pect help from God, and therefore we exercise faith 
 in God : our faith gives us this confidence in His 
 power and will to help, and therefore we value our 
 faith. Upon the value to us of our faith, all further 
 developments of our religious life ultimately depend. 
 
 This naturally leads to the consideration of the 
 two objections which inevitably suggest themselves 
 as fatal to any such theory. 
 
 (i) What then becomes of the objective character 
 of religious knowledge? Does not this theory destroy 
 all possibility of objective validity in religious truth ? 
 
 The answer is on the lines familiar to us. A dis- 
 tinction must be drawn between religious and scien- 
 tific knowledge. Faith assumes reality : that the 
 assumption is not ill-grounded, may be seen in the 
 fact that it is perpetually verified and vitalized in 
 Christian experience. Both in theoretical and in 
 value-judgments we assume the reality of the things : 
 but while in the one case we express their relation to 
 ourselves as known in our feelings, in the other we 
 express their nature as discovered by observation. 
 
 There is another difference. Religious knowledge 
 can never be universally accepted to the same degree 
 as scientific propositions. Foi' the values of religion 
 
112 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 must be felt in the heart before they are accepted by the 
 head : while the truths of science offer mathematical 
 demonstration to all and any possessed of sound 
 powers of ordinary perception or inference. 
 
 (ii) The second objection insists that this dis- 
 tinction between theoretic and religious judgments 
 involves the idea of a double truth. This is denied : 
 for their sphere is so wide apart that no collision can 
 possibly ensue. Science and religion may indeed be 
 regarded as complementary, as allies : for religion 
 gives moral qualities and spiritual powers which 
 science would gladly avail herself of, but is powerless 
 to bestow ; while science is daily adding fresh 
 treasures to our stores of knowledge by means of 
 which man's vocation shall be fulfilled. 
 
 Otto Ritschl's work is of value in more ways than 
 one. In particular, he affirms without hesitation that 
 the judgments of value are judgments of existence 
 also: and that the distinction between the two kinds 
 of knowledge is not to be sought in a double reality, 
 but in the manner in which the thing is regarded, 
 objectively as it is in itself, and subjectively as it is 
 of value for us. 
 
 Admitting our desire to reach objectivity, he bids 
 us find the same in history, a study whereof shows not 
 only the high spiritual value to be attached to all 
 religions, but also proves that that religion is the 
 highest in which the objects of faith have proved and 
 must prove themselves as the most strong, the most 
 pure, the most real. This proof leads us to Christianity. 
 We know that the Christian religion must triumph, 
 not merely because in our own experience we have 
 proved the power and tested the truth of its promises ; 
 
THE JUDGMENTS OF VALUE 113 
 
 but because the hope of ultimate victory is essential 
 to the Christian religion, and to abandon the hope 
 would be equivalent to denying the religion. Both 
 must live or perish together. The best proof of 
 Christian truth is Christian life : and were this 
 practical proof more in evidence, the demand for 
 theoretical demonstration would cease. 
 
 A somewhat similar apology for value-judgments 
 has been put forward by Max Scheibe in a work 
 entitled, The Significance of Judgments of Value for 
 Religious Knowledge (1893). ^ value-judgment, 
 according to Scheibe, is one in which the object is 
 measured by a standard, and this standard is not in 
 the object but in ourselves ; for we can set up standards 
 of value, not merely as beings who know but who also 
 feel. Judgments of this nature may be divided into 
 three classes; hedonistic, aesthetic, and moral. The 
 latter are not determined by any individual wilfulness, 
 but are expressions of the universal spirit of God in 
 our hearts and consciences. Of course these moral 
 judgments being so closely related to the character 
 and personality of the subject may easily be obscured 
 by individual inclinations. But the point is that they 
 are in no sense the result of logical demonstration, 
 but the outcome of personal experience. They are 
 of the heart and not of the head : and therefore their 
 truth is not less but more certain than if their appeal 
 was made to the reason only. 
 
 Concerning religious judgments, Scheibe accepts 
 Schleiermacher's definition, and considers religion to 
 be found in the consciousness of humble dependence 
 upon God, and in living communion with Him. 
 There is in the human heart a need of God, without 
 
114 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 which it cannot be still; religious knowledge is de- 
 signed to show us the way in which this need may 
 be satisfied. 
 
 Scheibe follows Kaftan closely, and is dissatisfied 
 with Ritschl's language on the subject of religious 
 knowledge. The value-judgments of religion do not, 
 he says, merely affirm effects within us, but also the 
 causes of those effects without us. So the religious 
 judgments are not indifferent to the divine nature in 
 which alone can be found an explanation of the 
 divine operations. Thus they affirm transcendental 
 reality, and to this extent are judgments of existence 
 as well as judgments of value ; and the knowledge 
 they g\v^ is not merely practical but theoretical also. 
 Ritschl stated that religious knowledge consisted of 
 value-judgments, but Scheibe considers this expres- 
 sion to be misleading and inappropriate. The mode 
 of expression is at fault, not the doctrine itself; for 
 Scheibe is clear that Ritschl did not intend to deny 
 real existence to the objects of faith, but only to affirm 
 their permanent value. God cannot be known in 
 Himself apart from the manifestations of the divine 
 activities. Yet it is not these operations themselves 
 that are the object of faith, rather it is God in His 
 divine nature Who is Himself their cause and their 
 end. We are consequently obliged to assume the 
 divine nature to be assured of the reality of the 
 divine operations. For it would be impossible to 
 attribute religious value to anything whose existence 
 we could either doubt or deny. Religious judgments, 
 no less than theoretical, predicate existence and affirm 
 reality. Wherein then lie the grounds of their 
 distinction ? There are two points in which they 
 
THE JUDGMENTS OF VALUE 115 
 
 may be sharply distinguished — they differ in origin, 
 and they differ in certainty. 
 
 (i) They differ in origin — for while in scientific 
 research personal interest must as far as possible be 
 eliminated, in religious knowledge personal interest 
 must as far as possible be retained. Personal interest 
 is in fact necessary for religion, and for religious 
 knowledge, while in science its introduction only 
 darkens knowledge. It is a practical necessity that 
 drives man to religion : for it is only in the recogni- 
 tion of God's existence and His supra-mundane 
 kingdom that man's personality and ideals can be 
 preserved. The judgments of religion therefore are 
 not value-judgments but postulates based on value- 
 judgments : and these postulates are '' not individual 
 wishes, but universal necessities." 
 
 (ii) They differ in certainty. In science the 
 certainty arises from the nature of the object, in 
 religion from that of the subject For science bases 
 its appeal to be accepted as the truth on the necessity 
 of the case : religion on its ability to supply our 
 needs ; that is, on its value for our own personal 
 experience. 
 
 Religious and theoretic knowledge must thus be 
 carefully distinguished both in their origin and in 
 their certainty ; but here our author parts company 
 with the earlier Ritschlians, Herrmann's solution is 
 explicitly repudiated : for however different the two 
 kinds of knowledge, they both belong ultimately to 
 the same province. " Reality can never mean any- 
 thing else than actual existence irrespective of our 
 ideas, and truth than the correspondence of our know- 
 ledge with the reality. There are not two realities 
 
ii6 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 and two truths ; but only two ways to the knowledge 
 of the one reality and one truth." 
 
 A further question still remains. Are these two 
 ways, as Ritschl holds, n:iutually exclusive? or do they 
 admit of reconciliation ? Scheibe answers the latter 
 question in the affirmative. The contrast between 
 nature and spirit is only denied in a wholly material- 
 istic metaphysic, while the metaphysical conception of 
 the absolute is in no sense whatever incompatible with 
 the Christian idea of God. There are two standpoints 
 from which it is possible to deduce a view of the 
 world — the causal and the teleological : but these do 
 not contradict each other. The latter, which includes 
 the distinctively religious view of things, is compelled 
 to employ the categories of the former : while the 
 causal conception takes no account of aesthetic, 
 moral, and religious ideals, and is therefore incapable 
 of offering a complete view of the universe. 
 
 It will thus be seen that religious knowledge is not 
 wholly independent of metaphysical enquiry : for 
 metaphysic settles the meaning of the categories 
 which religion must employ, if it is to present its 
 credenda in an intelligible form. This 'however is a 
 very different thing from saying that religion is sus- 
 ceptible of scientific proof Such a proof there is not 
 nor can there be : for in religion the experiences of 
 worth must precede the apprehension of truth. 
 Science can show that there is no necessary conflict 
 between religion and itself, and *' that a particular 
 religion is best suited to fill up the gaps science leaves, 
 and to satisfy the demands of the understanding 
 which it cannot meet by its own means and powers." 
 
 We may finally refer to the irenical standpoint 
 
THE JUDGMENTS OF VALUE 117 
 
 occupied by Max Reischle. In his Few words on 
 the controversy concerning the place of mysticism in 
 religion^ the argument is indeed apt to lose itself in 
 a series of over-subtle distinctions and complicated 
 refinements, but he has given us a book which makes 
 a real contribution towards the elucidation of the 
 doctrine of value-judgments. We start with an im- 
 portant definition. " I assign value to an object of 
 which on reflection I am sure that its reality afibrds 
 or would afford satisfaction to my whole self, and 
 indeed a higher satisfaction than its non-existence. 
 The feeling of value becomes clearer and surer when 
 it rests on a fixed value-judgment, that is, a judgment 
 in which a predicate of value is assigned to any 
 object." 
 
 Reischle now proceeds to classify value-judgments 
 in an ascending scale as exhibiting greater or less 
 right to the claim of universal validity. First come 
 the hedonistic judgments, which may vary as they 
 are either individual, collective, or general : then come 
 the logical judgments, of which it is not necessary to 
 take account in this connection : finally we are intro- 
 duced to the ideal judgments. We pass through the 
 aesthetic, intellectual, and ethical stages, until we 
 arrive at the religious judgments, which may either 
 be legislative or applied. 
 
 This may seem a sufficiently exhaustive classifi- 
 cation : but there is more to follow. There are 
 different points of view from which value-judgments 
 may be determined. These may be divided into 
 three classes. Value-judgments may be 
 
 (i) Verbal — which give us the relation of value 
 assigned to an object as predicate. 
 
ii8 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 (ii) Psychological — which introduce the element of 
 
 personal valuation, 
 (iii) Epistemological — which arise not from any 
 necessary perception or reasoning, but simply 
 make the attitude of the knowing subject to 
 the thing known absolutely determinative. 
 These latter judgments, involving, as they do, that 
 which is essential to the maintenance of human 
 personality and freedom, can claim universal validity. 
 Propositions of faith are seldom merely verbal : 
 more often they affirm a fact whose worth they 
 assert. This, however, would not entitle them to be 
 called either judgments of existence, or theoretical 
 judgments on the basis of value-judgments. When, 
 however, the judgments are the expression of per- 
 sonal conviction, they must be classed as falling 
 under the psychological standpoint. But the value- 
 judgments should most rightly be epistemological. 
 For such Reischle has invented a word — " thymetic " 
 judgments he calls them. They include the ideal, 
 personal, religious, morally conditioned valuations. 
 These judgments cannot be called subjective : they 
 do not originate merely in the sense of value which 
 the religious subject attaches towards certain objects 
 whose existence he is driven to assume : but they 
 are rather judgments of trust directed to normative 
 *' divine revelation." 
 
 But have these value-judgments universal validity, 
 or are they not rather a device for evading the whole 
 problem presented by the conflict of theoretic and 
 religious knowledge ? Reischle has a clear answer. 
 " None of the more distinguished followers of Ritschl 
 has fallen into this delusion, but they have occupied 
 
THE JUDGMENTS OF VALUE 119 
 
 themselves in the most energetic style with the 
 problem whether and how the truth of the Christian 
 faith can be proved." Some such proof is absolutely- 
 necessary if the supremacy of the Christian religion 
 is to be maintained, and all Christian missions are 
 not to be abandoned as without significance or valid 
 purpose. But the truth of Christianity is incapable 
 of theoretic demonstration : it is practical considera- 
 tions that can alone prove whether a religion can be 
 accepted as ultimately true. Man seeks for help in 
 his moral conflict, and in Christianity alone he can 
 find the help he needs. 
 
 Reischle denies emphatically any dualism in know- 
 ledge ; for the theoretic and practical reason are 
 after all both combined in a single personality, and 
 therefore cannot contradict, but must complement, 
 each other. By the growing harmony between these 
 two faculties, the spiritual life gains unity ; and the 
 Christian feels convinced that what he has himself 
 found of supreme value, must have that value for all, 
 and that among all the activities religion is supreme. 
 With this conclusion Reischle brings his pacific 
 intention to a triumphant close. 
 
 In a later chapter we shall have to enquire how 
 far these theories are an adequate explanation of the 
 problem of religious truth and scientific knowledge. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD 
 
 " All religious knowledge is knowledge of God," and 
 the reverse is equally true — that all our knowledge 
 of God is religious knowledge. As natural science 
 controlled by theology is universally repudiated with 
 well-justified scorn, so the Ritschlians contend should 
 a *' natural " theology be wholly rejected. It is no 
 mark of progress to deride the one, and hail the 
 other as a prophetess. Science and theology must 
 be kept utterly apart : and religious knowledge 
 must maintain its entire independence of speculative 
 philosophy. This theory, it is plain, is likely to 
 effect a revolution in the Christian idea of God : for 
 it insists that our knowledge of God must be religious 
 knowledge : and thus the idea of God must be 
 purged from all the metaphysical speculations which 
 through the course of centuries have come to cluster 
 round this central doctrine. 
 
 Ritschl, anxious as ever to vindicate for himself 
 the true Lutheran character, appeals to the great 
 reformer in support of his position. " A knowledge 
 of the being of God, as such," said Luther, " as 
 undertaken by scholasticism is without power to 
 save, and destructive." This is a statement none 
 would dispute : but Ritschl's views carry us much 
 
THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD 121 
 
 further afield. A merely intellectual knowledge of 
 God has never claimed the power to save the soul ; 
 even divine revelation itself cannot profit unless " it 
 be mixed with faith m. them that hear it " : but it is 
 quite another thing to say that such intellectual 
 knowledge either cannot exist at all, or at any rate 
 can achieve nothing even in its own sphere. Religion 
 cannot be wholly indifferent to reason : and if reason 
 leads to God, it is preposterous that religion should 
 affect to ignore, rather than rejoice to welcome, her 
 conclusions. 
 
 Notwithstanding, Ritschl is determined, not to 
 prove the superiority of religious knowledge over 
 theoretic, but to deny the right of reason to say 
 anything whatever concerning those things which 
 constitute the objects of religious belief Ritschl 
 enumerates the fundamental presuppositions of justi- 
 fication and reconciliation under the three headings 
 of the doctrine of God, the doctrine of Christ, the 
 doctrine of sin. 
 
 He begins the discussion of those three great 
 doctrines by emphasizing the peculiar character of 
 religious knowledge and elaborating the theory of 
 value-judgments which places the distinction between 
 the two kinds of knowledge not in the object but 
 in the subject. He next proceeds to apply himself to 
 the exposition of the Doctrine of God as he conceives 
 it, opening with a discussion of the theoretic proofs 
 of the existence of God. 
 
 Since the Middle Ages, Ritschl explains, these 
 arguments have been intended to prove that the 
 idea of God given in Christianity is scientifically valid. 
 This attempt does not imply that the reality of God 
 
122 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 for faith is uncertain, or that as a religious idea it 
 excites doubts as to its own truth, which another kind 
 of knowledge was needed to allay. On the contrary, 
 the Schoolmen regarded the existence of God as 
 entirely beyond the possibility of doubt. All they 
 wished to show was that the Christian idea of God 
 is valid also in the realm of science. Ritschl insists 
 that these proofs are incapable of proving the objec- 
 tive existence of God, but only His existence for 
 thought, and that they cannot be constructed save 
 in dependence on the very presupposition which 
 distinguishes the Christian view of the world from 
 that of science. 
 
 With regard to the cosmological and teleological 
 arguments, they are themselves the products of re- 
 ligion. For the desire to comprehend the world as 
 a whole is something over and above disinterested 
 science, and betrays the interest of religious faith. 
 The two arguments are merely the expression of 
 the conviction that if we are to know the world as a 
 whole, we must of necessity think of God as first 
 cause and final end : but they give us absolutely no 
 security that anything real corresponds to our 
 thoughts. The thoughts themselves are only neces- 
 sary under the given conditions. 
 
 The ontological proof is supposed to fill up the 
 gap, but — whether in the form adopted by Anselm 
 that the idea of a perfect being compels us to predi- 
 cate its existence, or in Descartes' modification of 
 the argument that we could not have the idea of the 
 infinite unless it were called forth in us by the 
 Infinite itself-— it is valid only for our thoughts, not 
 for a reality transcending thought. 
 
THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD 123 
 
 Ritschl's criticism is neither convincing nor con- 
 sistent ; it is beyond the scope of this essay to 
 indicate the forms in which the three " proofs " may 
 still be considered valid for human thought : but 
 Ritschl's inconsistencies may be pointed out. 
 
 (i) It is of course agreed on all hands that these 
 theoretic proofs yielded a poorer conception than the 
 Christian idea of God : and Ritschl has already 
 accepted a fundamental distinction between the two 
 forms of knowledge. It would therefore have been 
 simple enough to have passed over the theoretic 
 proofs as valueless for theology. By attempting to 
 prove the absolute failure of philosophy to reach the 
 idea of God, he is doing just what he has forbidden 
 us to do, and controverting his own principles. For 
 if a theologian may demonstrate not merely the 
 relative inadequacy but the absolute incapacity of 
 metaphysics, it follows that a metaphysician may 
 find his truest vocation in discrediting theology. It 
 were folly, if the river is not to be crossed, to span it 
 with a bridge over which we are ourselves the first to 
 pass. 
 
 (ii) Ritschl himself employs an argument for God's 
 existence which is not far removed from the onto- 
 logical proof, the cogency of which he denies. " We 
 must conclude either that the estimate which spirit 
 (as a power superior to nature) forms of its own worth, 
 is a baseless fancy ; or that the view taken by spirit 
 is in accordance with truth, and with the supreme law 
 which is valid for nature as well. If that be so, then 
 its ground must lie in the Divine will." There does 
 not seem much difference between this and asserting 
 that any conclusion which the human mind is com- 
 
124 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 pelled to reach in order to give coherence and 
 intelligibility to its own thoughts, must be regarded 
 as corresponding to reality ; that things and think- 
 ing have a common ground ; that to abandon all 
 idea of correspondence between intelligence and 
 existence is to make shipwreck of knowledge. And 
 what is this but the ontological argument ? 
 
 (iii) Still more remarkable is Ritschl's deliberate 
 employment of the cosmological proof. He argues 
 with vigour against Strauss's " new-found substitute 
 for religion '' in the idea of an impersonal universe. 
 " Such a universe which is at once cause and effect, 
 inner and outer, is, ex hypothesis withdrawn from 
 the conditions of scientific knowledge. This way of 
 looking at things entirely ignores the fact that a law, 
 or that which is constituted by law, points us back 
 to a law-giving spirit and will." Nothing could be 
 in more complete contradiction with his previous re- 
 pudiation of all cosmological arguments. Dr. Garvie 
 admits the inconsistency, and thinks that he has 
 accounted for it by supposing that *' what Ritschl 
 forbids philosophy to do, that he will allow to theo- 
 logy." ^ This, however, is only an epigrammatic way 
 of stating, not of solving the difficulty. Besides, it 
 cannot be regarded as true ; for Ritschl will not allow 
 theology to reach the idea of God by any meta- 
 physical argument or- method. 
 
 The theoretic proofs, then, stand convicted in 
 Ritschl's eyes of absolute failure. Is the Kantian 
 moral proof more successful ? In his first edition 
 Ritschl recognized it as a proper and necessary 
 task for theology to establish the knowability 
 
 ^ Garvie, op, cit, 83. 
 
THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD 125 
 
 of the idea of God. He even goes the length of 
 ascribing to the " moral proof " of God's exist- 
 ence, a theoretic character which Kant denied to 
 it. He points out the consequences to be drawn 
 from the moral government of the world, and 
 insists that as this form of proof is not merely the 
 product of religious reflection, but looks for its support 
 to those incontrovertible and fundamental data of 
 human experience which lie outside the religious 
 view of the world, one can only conclude that " this 
 acceptance of the idea of God is no practical faith, 
 but an act of theoretic knowledge." In the third 
 edition we have identically the same point of view, 
 the same arguments, and — a diametrically opposite 
 conclusion. For at the end of the reasoning, we are 
 astounded to read, that " this acceptance of the idea 
 of God is, as Kant remarks, practical faith, and not 
 any act of theoretic knowledge." ^ 
 
 The explanation of this entire change of view may 
 be found in Ritschl's own words. Theology has no 
 longer for him anything to do with any scientific 
 treatment of the objects of faith. Her task is now 
 to guard the peculiar character of the religious idea 
 of God which may only be expressed in judgments 
 of value. All theoretic attempts to establish or con- 
 fine the idea of God are doomed to inevitable failure 
 because, even if they were right, they would differ 
 from the Christian idea of God in failing to express 
 the value of that idea for men, in particular, for 
 sinful men. 
 
 Here a fundamental weakness of the Ritschlian 
 theology discovers itself Because science or meta- 
 
 ^ I?. V. iii. 191 (first edition) ; iii. 214 {second edition). 
 
126 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 physics cannot yield the complete conceptions of 
 Christianity, they are impatiently set aside as having 
 no value for religion. Ritschl refuses to believe that 
 any light can be thrown upon the perfect revelation 
 of God in Christ from sources manifestly imperfect. 
 Yet admitting the partial and fragmentary character 
 of scientific knowledge and philosophical speculation, 
 they cannot be blamed for recognizing the limitations 
 imposed upon them from the very nature of the 
 subject. It would be ridiculous to subordinate the 
 Christian idea of God as the God and Father of our 
 Lord Jesus Christ to any scientific or metaphysical 
 conception. But truth is reached in many ways : 
 and wherever truth is sought, some light is shed upon 
 the truth itself To ignore, or reject that light 
 because it is not the full light, seems suicidal : yet it 
 is the constant attitude of Ritschl in his growing 
 philosophical scepticism. Neither science nor meta- 
 physic can give us all ; but that does not justify us 
 in scornfully rejecting what they have to offer. 
 
 But there is another form in which the moral 
 proof may still retain its validity. Conscience is 
 universally regarded as the inner witness to God, the 
 voice of God. Ritschl examines this claim. At 
 first he seems inclined to have accepted ex animo 
 Kant's theory of an a priori unconditioned moral 
 law, but at a later stage, as evidenced by his lec- 
 ture on the subject, he regards conscience rather as 
 an empirical growth in society and history than as 
 the immediate voice of God. The common and per- 
 plexing attribution to conscience of thoughts and acts 
 that do not appear to admit of mutual reconciliation, 
 its singular development in opposite directions, the 
 
THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD 127 
 
 influence of social habit, of early associations, of 
 childhood's memories, of inherited prejudices that 
 go towards the forming of national or individual 
 conscience are not, and cannot be, denied. But the 
 description of a process is not necessarily the 
 explanation of its origin : and here Ritschl still 
 leaves us in the dark, save to deny that conscience 
 may claim directly and immediately to be the voice 
 of God. It should, however, be stated that Herr- 
 mann's investigations have led him to a different 
 conclusion, for he holds that in conscience, in man's 
 self-subjection to an unconditioned moral law, we 
 have a fact " independent of all psychological 
 observation." It is in this fact, that mankind has 
 been content to see the strongest internal witness 
 to the existence and righteousness of God. 
 
 The idea of God corresponds to, and is completed 
 by, a conception of the world. Theology has made 
 two such attempts. The first theory sees in God 
 the absolute sovereign over all His creatures. Before 
 Him men as such have no rights, yet He out of His 
 own arbitrary will treats them with equity. This 
 Ritschl identifies with the Socinian theory of the 
 moral government of the world. The second theory, 
 which he calls the orthodox or reformed, posits a 
 quite different relation between God and man. There 
 are mutual rights to be observed, a kind of re- 
 ciprocal obligation between God and man, which 
 God has ordained by a law and life of righteous- 
 ness, that are binding and necessary for Himself 
 no less than for man, Ritschl criticises both 
 these views with severity, but without offering any 
 adequate theory to take their place. Ritschl is 
 
128 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 obliged to admit that they both may claim on their 
 side Scriptural representations ; but objects to them 
 because their Biblical phraseology scarce serves to 
 conceal their real origin in natural religion. The 
 fact that Scripture may at times serve to support 
 natural religion, tends not to establish the latter, but 
 to discredit the former. It may be admitted that 
 neither view offers a complete or adequate theory of 
 the moral government of the world : but Garvie 
 rightly rebukes the Ritschlian " tendency to regard 
 as meaningless and worthless for Christian thought 
 all that falls short of the full measure of the 
 faith." 
 
 One by one, the customary proofs of God's exist- 
 ence and character have been examined and found 
 wanting. There is, however, a fact of universal 
 significance, of which account has not been taken — 
 the religious aspirations of humanity, the universal 
 consciousness of God. Whence did, whence could 
 this arise save from God Himself, to whom it points ? 
 Ritschl replies with scorn : " If this alleged natural 
 consciousness of God is to find its truth first by 
 means of something else, then it has no truth of 
 itself It is in itself a false doctrine. Or is this 
 natural theology to be reckoned a half truth until by 
 the revelation of salvation it is completed to the full 
 truth ? Alas ! falsehood on that account still cleaves 
 to it : for what is truth cannot be added together 
 out of different halves." ^ But this is not the 
 language of the Apostle, " Howbeit, not first that 
 which is spiritual but that which is natural," nor 
 of the writer to the Hebrews who knew of the many 
 1 T.M. 
 
THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD 129 
 
 parts and many manners whereby God spoke to the 
 fathers in the prophets : nor is it the language of the 
 Lord who has told us " First the blade, then the ear, 
 then the full corn in the ear." It is the language of 
 controversy which has substituted a mechanical and 
 external combination of halves for a process of 
 organic development. But Ritschl (as we might 
 almost expect) is not consistent with himself: for he 
 recognizes the genetic connection between Old Testa- 
 ment and New ; but are we to regard the preparatory 
 dispensation as a falsehood because it was fulfilled 
 under the New ? The lower truth is not false as 
 long as it leads up to, is false only whenever it 
 opposes itself to, a higher revelation. Ritschl admits 
 an element of revelation in all religions, but this 
 is unattainable without a universal consciousness of 
 God. Ritschl also admits an ascending scale of 
 historical religions : but he insists that the claim that 
 in Christianity all of truth and worth in all religions 
 is fulfilled and transcended, is only possible from 
 within Christianity itself. From that height we can 
 look down, observing the gradual descent : but from 
 no other standpoint can such a claim be advanced or 
 allowed. Any such argument would be wholly with- 
 out effect in dealing with a Buddhist or a Moslem ; 
 for such an argument could only be used as a par- 
 ticular assumption inherent in a particular religion, 
 which the member of another faith neither shared, 
 nor could share, while he remained unconverted. 
 
 The followers of Ritschl however take a far 
 stronger line. Thus, as we have seen, Otto Ritschl 
 seeks and finds objectivity in religious knowledge 
 through the evidence of history that " that religion is 
 
I30 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 the highest in which the objects of faith necessarily 
 prove themselves as real and genuine ; " and declares 
 that Christians anticipate the triumph of their religion 
 not only because they themselves have had inner 
 experience of its power and truth, but because the 
 hope of victory is essential to Christianity itself. 
 Similarly Reischle realizes that Christian missions 
 must lose their significance unless we are prepared to 
 prove the objective truth and supreme excellence of 
 the Christian religion. 
 
 All metaphysics seem now to have been satis- 
 factorily excluded from theology : but in accordance 
 with Ritschl's own declaration and Herrmann's sug- 
 gestion it may be asked whether metaphysics may 
 not have a regulative, rather than a constitutive value 
 in theology, Avhether they may not determine the 
 intellectual form of religious knowledge. The ques- 
 tion arises out of the use of the term Absolute. 
 Against the introduction of this word into theology 
 Ritschl wages bitter and unceasing war. It is a 
 " foreign importation," a " vitiating element." It is 
 no product of religious reflection but a purely meta- 
 physical conception. It means nothing but the 
 existent — a term denoting the greatest extension 
 and the least intension possible. The word absolute 
 means set free ; and the idea absolute means some- 
 thing without relations, without determinations. In- 
 stead of the Christian conception of the Fatherhood 
 of God we are asked to accept a Neoplatonic abstrac- 
 tion, making the Deity inaccessible to His creation, 
 and contradicting those fundamental laws of the 
 personality and love of God on which Ritschl so 
 strenuously insists. Here again Scheibe and Kaftan 
 
THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD 131 
 
 decline to follow Ritschl, the latter declaring that 
 God can mean nothing else than the Absolute, the 
 Unconditioned, though of course this is not in itself a 
 specifically Christian doctrine. 
 
 Ritschl has criticised : let us now see what he con- 
 structs. The theory of knowledge which he adopts 
 — albeit he calls it Lotzean — is really derived from 
 Kant, for it forbids us to know that which lies behind 
 phenomena. The limitations of our cognitive faculty 
 render impossible the knowledge of any essential 
 nature in God : we have only to deal with the divine 
 activities and operations. A dogma attempting to 
 define the former, speaks that which it does not 
 know, in a language that none can understand. 
 When dealing with the latter, it may either degen- 
 erate into a mere narration of the mighty works of 
 God, or, if seeking to establish a systematic scheme 
 of salvation, must learn to interpret the divine opera- 
 tions by an analysis of the corresponding self-activities 
 by means of which man appropriates the gifts of God. ^ 
 
 What then can we learn of God ? First that He 
 is a spiritual person.^ This is a point on which all 
 Ritschlian theologians unite in insisting. Ritschl 
 will have nothing to do with materialistic or pan- 
 theistic tendencies, and argues at length against the 
 objection to the personality of God, that the pre- 
 dicates of the absolute and of personality are 
 mutually exclusive. It had been objected that 
 " Personality is that self-hood which shuts itself up 
 against everything else, which it thereby excludes 
 from itself; the Absolute, on the other hand, is the 
 
 1 J?. V. iii. 33, 34. 
 
 2 Unlerricht, 8 ; R. V. iii. 215-227 ; Kaftan, Das Wesen, 400. 
 
132 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 comprehensive, the unlimited, which excludes nothing 
 from itself but just that very exclusiveness which lies 
 in the conception of personality." ^ Ritschl's argu- 
 ments against this position are well stated and 
 soundly conceived. He shows the impossibility of 
 such an exclusive personality as the objection 
 imagines. Personality, it is true, is conditioned by 
 the natural endowments of the individual : but char- 
 acter is developed from this foundation ; and the 
 limits of personality (in the strict sense) are neces- 
 sarily overstepped whenever a man assimilates any 
 material for his spiritual development If it were 
 possible to live a wholly self-enclosed life completely 
 shut off from all other influences and characters, 
 development would be impossible, and personality 
 without possibility of spiritual progress does not 
 deserve the name. On the contrary the more open 
 a man may be to the increase of knowledge, the more 
 susceptible to emotions and influences, the more 
 strong in the will power to change the course of 
 things, the more truly may he be said to be possessed 
 of personality. The greater the faculty of appro- 
 priation, the more marked becomes the individuality 
 of character, and the more complete the idea of per- 
 sonality. From this it follows that perfect person- 
 ality so far from implying limitation, points to the 
 entire absence of all limitation. 
 
 The personality of God may be compared and 
 contrasted with the empirical fact of human person- 
 ality. It may be compared, in so far that experience 
 and observation prove that personality is not the 
 mere inevitable reaction to the stimulus of inexorable 
 
 ^ Strauss, Die ckristliche Glaubenslehre, i. 504. 
 
THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD 133 
 
 environment, but rather consists in the power to con- 
 trol that which we have appropriated, to make it 
 answer our own needs, or suit our own purposes. It 
 may be contrasted, because we are always in a state 
 of becoming ; while the personality of God is think- 
 able without contradiction, because in His case there 
 is an entire absence of all those restraints that limit 
 our own personality. " As the cause of all that 
 happens, God is affected only by such properties as 
 He has conferred upon H is own creatures, and 
 recognizes as the effects of His own will. Nothing 
 which affects the divine Spirit is originally alien to 
 Him : and there is nothing which in order to be 
 independent, he must first appropriate."^ 
 
 Ritschl has given us a powerful defence of the 
 divine personality ; but it would be idle to call his 
 arguments anything but metaphysical. He draws, 
 however, an extremely far-reaching conclusion. " It 
 follows as a settled result of the assumption of the 
 divine personality that God is real only in the form 
 of will." ^ Similarly, as we shall see later, God's pur- 
 pose of love may only be expressed in terms of will. 
 
 God then is spirit : and God is personal. He must 
 also be conceived as transcendent. The supra- 
 mundane character of the Kingdom of God, which in 
 Ritschlianism is the centre of theology, demands that 
 God Himself should be thought of as above the 
 world. This does not mean that He is the eternal 
 ground and final purpose of the world, but that His 
 own life and being can in no wise be confused with 
 that of the world which He has made.^ 
 
 This definition of God as the supramundane 
 
 1 R. V. iii. 224. "^ R. V. 237. 3 Kaftan, 400. 
 
134 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 personal spirit marks the limits which no conception 
 of God professing to be Christian may overstep. To 
 identify God with the world, or to deny His 
 personality, are conclusions absolutely contradicting, 
 the fundamental positions of Christian faith.-^ 
 
 Kaftan follows Ritschl closely but not blindly. 
 While agreeing with Ritschl, to whose discussion of 
 the subject he expressly refers, that the personality 
 of God does not imply limitations, or contradict His 
 supramundane character, he states emphatically that 
 reason and will are in themselves meaningless 
 abstractions : we know nothing corresponding to 
 them save the functions of the human personal 
 spirit from whose life we have abstracted these con- 
 ceptions. Personality is therefore in no sense equi- 
 valent to will ; the will is merely one expression of 
 spiritual personality. 
 
 We pass now to consider the attributes of God. 
 These, it must be remembered, are to be understood 
 not in a metaphysical, but in a religious sense. Faith 
 ascribes two attributes to God — omnipotence and a 
 special relation to mankind. This latter may be 
 comprehended under the designation of all-mighty 
 and eternal love. 
 
 Religion offers man the highest good: but it would 
 be impossible to rest content with a faith that 
 doubted its own power to fulfil its promises. It is 
 therefore necessary to our conception of Christianity, 
 as offering us the highest supramundane good, to 
 assume that God's power reaches over all things in 
 heaven and earth, and that all things work together 
 for good to those that love God. 
 
 ^ Kaftan, 402. 
 
THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD 135 
 
 We thus come to the second attribute which faith 
 must ascribe to God — a relation towards mankind. 
 In Christianity this relation is revealed as one of love; 
 and the religious good it offers is the highest possible, 
 namely participation in the divine life. Thus this 
 second attribute points beyond what God is to us, to 
 what God is in Himself God then is Love, almighty, 
 and eternal.^ 
 
 The religious thoughts of God's omnipotence and 
 omnipresence have nothing to do with metaphysical 
 conceptions such as those terms are often supposed 
 to denote. Omnipotence does not signify supreme 
 causality, nor does omnipresence imply presence 
 throughout infinite space. They simply mean that 
 the providence and gracious presence of God is 
 absolutely certain to the pious believer, because the 
 will of God that created and rules the world is 
 directed towards the highest interests of mankind.^ 
 
 The attribute of eternity seems to have had a 
 curious attraction for Ritschl, who devotes much 
 attention to the elaboration of his theory as to the 
 meaning of eternity in this respect. In his Instruc- 
 tion in the Christian Religion he is, as we should 
 expect, more concise. The eternity of God must not 
 be understood, he tells us, as though His existence 
 stretches out beyond the existence of the world with- 
 out beginning or without end, as though God had 
 another standard of time than that of mortals. The 
 eternity predicated of the divine being means rather 
 that in all the changes and chances of this mortal 
 life God changes not, and that He is working out 
 His unalterable designs to their foreordained con- 
 
 ^ Kahler, op. cit. 407. ^ Unterricht^ II. 
 
136 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 elusion. But in his great work Ritschl's discussions 
 on this subject are unusually abstract and unmistake- 
 ably metaphysical. " Eternity in general is the 
 power of the spirit over time," ^ and instances are 
 given where, by reflection or judgment, we are 
 enabled to transcend temporal limitations.^ Eternity 
 is thus taken to mean not only that God is certain of 
 His self-end and His world-plan at every point in its 
 realization, but that " through the congruence of His 
 knowledge, which penetrates the whole, with His will, 
 which moves the whole, He is continuously conscious 
 of the realization of the whole at every single point." ^ 
 
 With reference to this abstruse and complicated 
 discussion, we may notice the extremely pertinent 
 criticism of Professor Orr, who points out that in 
 reality " it is the non-metaphysical mind which thinks 
 of eternity crudely as time without beginning and 
 without end : only by a metaphysical effort do we 
 rise above this first view and try to * frame a juster 
 conception, be it that of Ritschl or another." * 
 
 It is, however, in the idea of Love, rather than in 
 any of the previously mentioned attributes, that we 
 must seek the true significance of the Christian con- 
 ception of God. " Theology, in delineating the moral 
 order of the world, must take as its starting-point 
 that conception of God in which the relation of God 
 to His Son, our Lord, is expressed ; a relation which 
 by Christ's mediation is extended to His Com- 
 munity." ^ The complete Christian name of God is 
 the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.^ The 
 
 ^j?. V. 223. 2^. V. 286. ^/e. r. 2S7, 288. 
 
 ■^Orr, The Ritschlian Theology, iii. ^ R.V, 259. 
 
 ^ Ibid. cf. Untirricht, 8. 
 
THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD 137 
 
 name of God in Scripture is always used as a com- 
 pendious description of His self-revelation — "quatenus 
 Deus in hominibus cognoscitur et celebratur." The 
 key to the relation between God the Father and the 
 Son of God is contained in the declaration that God 
 is love.^ There is no other conception of equal 
 worth beside this, which need be taken into account.^ 
 Ritschl here refers especially to the idea of divine 
 holiness which in its Old Testament sense has, he 
 thinks, no longer retained its validity for Christian 
 people, while its meaning in the New Testament is 
 altogether ambiguous. Even the idea of personality 
 must be subordinated to that of love : it is merely 
 the form under which God's will of love is best 
 conceived. 
 
 Ritschl explains love to be the steadfast will to 
 further another rational being, of like nature with 
 oneself, in the attainment of his purpose in such 
 manner that the one who loves follows in so doing 
 his own self-end.^ Love adopts the ends of others 
 as its own, and so doing realizes its own ideal. We 
 must then see first God's purpose towards His 
 Son : and then, through our union with the Son, 
 learn to see in that purpose the Love of God towards 
 ourselves. 
 
 Kaftan arrives at the same result by a different 
 route. Starting with the conception of the highest 
 good that God offers to all believers, we reflect that 
 the content and the value of any love is shown by 
 that which the lover offers or attaches to the object 
 of his love. God, manifested through Christ, offers 
 us the supramundane kingdom of heaven : and 
 
 ^ Unterricht, 9. '^ R. V. ^ Unterricht, 9. 
 
138 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 from the value of the gift offered we can learn the 
 value of the love that offers : and feel that this is the 
 only adequate determination of God in Christianity. 
 
 That God is holy, and that God is righteous are 
 conceptions which must be strictly subordinated to 
 the ruling thought that God is love. The attitude 
 of a righteous God towards human sin will engage 
 our attention in a subsequent chapter. Here it will 
 be enough to state that righteousness is defined as 
 God's consistency in carrying out His purposes of 
 love. It is the same as faithfulness : and is stripped 
 of its essentially ethical character. Kaftan also 
 warns us in no sense to separate the holiness of God 
 from His primary attribute of love ; but he does not 
 suffer himself to be led into Ritschl's extreme 
 position. The supramundane kingdom of God to 
 which His love has called us, has for its earthly 
 correlative the ethical kingdom in the world ; and 
 thus to the love of God corresponds the holiness of 
 God. This gives us the assurance that all our 
 ethical ideals are perfectly fulfilled in God, and that 
 He is the fount and cause of all morality. But we 
 must be intensely careful not to regard this single 
 idea of holy love as if it were two distinct con- 
 ceptions, as though we could contemplate the possi- 
 bility of a conflict between God's justice and God's 
 love. Kaftan notices the objection that this theory 
 makes religion indifferent to ethical considerations, 
 but claims to have shown that the holiness of God 
 is contained in His love, as is the moral ideal in the 
 highest good. 
 
 The Christian doctrine of God is thus consistently 
 developed along the lines of its practical value. A 
 
THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD 139 
 
 theoretical view of God, bound up as it is with 
 philosophical speculation and traditional theology, 
 may at times appear innocent enough, but it ulti- 
 mately makes a claim to a higher kind of religious 
 knowledge to which it demands that the distinctively 
 ' Christian conception of God's character should be 
 subordinated. It is in order to emphasize the value 
 of the distinctively Christian revelation in things 
 divine as fully answering to all the practical needs of 
 life that the Ritschlian theologians have demanded 
 the recognition of its truth and independence, apart 
 from any of those metaphysical constructions which 
 as they are not themselves the product of religious 
 reflection, so also fail to satisfy the essential con- 
 ditions of religious life, and tend at times only to 
 obscure, not to illuminate, the true propositions of 
 Christian faith, whose reality and sufficiency are 
 guaranteed and bound up in their own practical 
 necessity. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE KINGDOM OF GOD 
 
 The treatment of the idea of God shows that the 
 RitschHan school cannot be accused of unduly 
 favouring any form of undogmatic Christianity. In 
 this respect the whole school follows closely in the 
 steps of the master who was above all things a 
 systematic dogmatician. Kaftan in two interesting 
 and important little books has developed the position 
 of the New Theology in this respect. He insists 
 that the Catholic dogmas are worthy of respect, 
 as they had their origin in a sincere desire to solve 
 the same problem which besets us at the present 
 day, the reconciliation of faith and knowledge. 
 Dogma was inevitable : for the Christian faith neces- 
 sarily involves doctrine. Faith always gives some 
 knowledge. It is by a common faith that the 
 members of the Church are bound together : and 
 this must find expression in a doctrine whose validity 
 is generally recognized. Hence faith involves know- 
 ledge, and doctrine leads to dogma. The old dogma 
 is discredited, we need a new dogma. What exactly 
 this new dogma may be, is not evident. But the 
 time is not yet ripe for it. At present it is needful 
 to work at the foundations : but the need of dogma is 
 
THE KINGDOM OF GOD 141 
 
 kept in sight ; and ultimately the new dogma will 
 emerge victoriously to claim the homage of the Church, 
 
 Herrmann in his later work on the Communion 
 of the Christian with God seems prepared to accept 
 the idea of an individual theology varying in accord- 
 ance with individual idiosyncrasies, yet equally 
 true, in all its forms ; but in his earlier work he 
 ranges himself on the opposite side. Meanwhile 
 Harnack has with increasing clearness come to hold 
 that in the Christian faith there is a dogmatic kernel 
 which it is the task of theology to unfold. Arguing 
 against Sabatier, he expresses himself thus : " The 
 intellectual element within the Christian religion 
 belongs to the essence of the thing itself, inasmuch 
 as this not only awakens feeling, but has a quite 
 definite content which determines and should de- 
 termine the feeling. In this sense Christianity with- 
 out dogma, that is, without a clear expression of its 
 content, is inconceivable." ^ 
 
 There is, therefore, a general consensus of opinion 
 among the Ritschlian theologians that the Christian 
 religion needs dogmatic restatement : there is also a 
 unanimous recognition that the idea of the Kingdom 
 of God is the comprehensive, and indeed exhaustive 
 category under which the whole system of Christian 
 doctrine must be brought. It was Kant who first 
 revived the prominence of this conception in theology. 
 It will be remembered that Kant deduced the idea 
 of the kingdom in two ways. In the Critiques^ 
 practical reason had led to the recognition of a moral 
 end involved in the idea of God, and this involved 
 the deduction of a moral kingdom of God, an 
 
 ^ Harnack, History of Dogma ^ 2i. 
 
142 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 association of men bound together by laws of virtue. 
 In his Religion within the limits of Pure Reason the 
 same conclusion was deduced from the need of moral 
 fellowship in order to secure the ultimate victory of 
 humanity over the evil in the world. This teleo- 
 logical interpretation of the system of the world laid a 
 strong hold on Ritschl's imagination. 
 
 Dr. Garvie insists that the true question for theology 
 is what or how? not why? but many will understand 
 Ritschl's sympathy with "a way of looking at nature 
 and history, which fixes its gaze on, not the being, 
 but the becoming of things, not their truth but their 
 worth, not their explanation but their destination, not 
 their ultimate cause but their final purpose.'' 
 
 It was this teleological aspect of the kingdom of 
 God as Kant conceived it that attracted Ritschl most 
 powerfully. Schleiermacher had also adopted the 
 idea, but his method did not find much favour with 
 Ritschl. For while on the one hand he declared the 
 kingdom of God to be an all-important and all- 
 comprehensive conception, he yet defines Christianity 
 as that monotheistic form of faith suitable to the 
 teleological view of the world, in which everything is 
 referred to the redemption accomplished through 
 Jesus Christ. In other words he is prepared to 
 subordinate the idea of the kingdom to that of 
 redemption, while from the Ritschlian standpoint 
 it is clear that if the kingdom is in itself the 
 final end divine, redemption itself should be 
 subordinated to the kingdom, as means to an 
 end.^ Indeed it cannot be doubted that Christ 
 recognized and made His own the divine purpose 
 
 ^ Die Glaubenslehre^ % 9. 2. 
 
THE KINGDOM OF GOD 143 
 
 of a universal moral kingdom of God, and that the 
 recognition of this purpose definitely determined 
 His choice of the manner of the redemption that 
 He wrought.^ Ritschl complains, not without justice, 
 that attention has been too exclusively concentrated 
 upon the manner of redemption, to the neglect of the 
 ethical apprehension of Christianity, conceived as the 
 kingdom of God.^ Christianity should not be com- 
 pared to a circle with one centre, but to an ellipse 
 controlled by two foci.^ 
 
 It should perhaps be mentioned at this stage that 
 Ritschl sharply differentiates the moral and religious 
 ideals in Christianity. The former refers directly to 
 men and only indirectly to God ; the latter deals 
 definitely and solely with our relation to God and 
 to the world. Christianity combines both ends : the 
 moral end of human service ; and the religious end 
 of human freedom. The former is fulfilled in the 
 kingdom of God ; the latter in that sense of depend- 
 ence upon God which God answers and rewards by 
 justification. The kingdom of God, then, must be 
 regarded as having relation to human activity, justifi- 
 cation to divine grace. The kingdom is a purely 
 moral, justification a purely religious conception. It 
 is important for our present purpose to observe that 
 this distinction is not only dropped by Ritschl's 
 followers, but that Ritschl himself, in later editions of 
 his chief work, profoundly modifies his former views. 
 Thus in the third edition oi Justification and Recon- 
 ciliation we even read that " the kingdom of God is 
 a directly religious conception." ^ In another passage 
 occurring in a different work the definition of the 
 
 ^R.V.\\\^. 9. "^Ibid, 10. '^Ibid. \\\'\ ii. ^ Ibid. 30. 
 
144 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 kingdom seems to be intended to include both the 
 moral and religious interpretations. " The kingdom 
 of God is the highest good assured by God to the 
 community founded through His revelation in Christ: 
 but it is to be regarded as the highest good only in 
 so far as it is at the same time recognized as the 
 moral ideal, for the realization of which the members 
 of the community bind themselves one to another 
 by a definite rule of reciprocal action." ^ 
 
 Before proceeding to outline the remarkable manner 
 in which Ritschl deduces this idea of the kingdom, 
 it may be well to notice certain statements of Herr- 
 mann and Kaftan which show the extent to which the 
 kingdom of God is accepted by them as the regulative 
 and determining factor in Christian theology. 
 
 Thus Herrmann in his work on the Relation of 
 religion to morality^ and knowledge of the worlds 
 asserts : " The idea of the kingdom of God is an 
 invaluable moment of Christian faith — the kingdom 
 of God, the universal moral community, the aspect 
 under which humanity is comprehended in God's 
 own self-end. The reality of the kingdom of God 
 must have seized a man and have positively influ- 
 enced his teaching, if he is to be capable of trusting 
 God in the Christian sense.'' Again, he asks, "how 
 is it possible that sinful man can seek his blessed- 
 ness . . . expressed in the moral community of the 
 kingdom of God, and to be assured of the same ? 
 Dogmatics takes the answer from the historical re- 
 velation of God: if this had not such a content, then 
 neither our faith nor dogmatics would exist." ^ 
 
 So also Kaftan proclaims with eloquent emphasis 
 
 ^ Unterricht^ p. 2 ; cf. also notes a and d. ^Herrmann, op cit. 431. 
 
THE KINGDOM OF GOD 145 
 
 that the highest practical purpose for Christians 
 should be the coming of the kingdom in all and to 
 all/ and begins that part of his book which deals 
 with specifically Christian doctrines, not with the idea 
 of God — that comes fifth ! — but with the kingdom 
 of God, preached by Jesus, proclaimed by the 
 apostles : the idea in which religion and morality 
 are fundamentally united.^ 
 
 How then does Ritschl arrive at this conception of 
 the kingdom ? By nothing less than an astounding 
 deduction from the nature of God. His method here 
 is so entirely speculative, that we cannot wonder that 
 Ecke regards it as one of the foreign elements of the 
 Ritschlian theology, and points out that not one of 
 the school have followed the master in his daring 
 flight. 
 
 We saw in the last chapter the stand-point from 
 which Ritschl approached the consideration of the 
 Christian idea of God. In the formula God is love 
 he found a complete description and determination 
 of the divine nature and character. The implica- 
 tions of the term might have led him to an 
 appreciation of the doctrine of the Trinity, but as 
 a matter of fact it leads him to a very different 
 conclusion. Realizing that love implies an object 
 of love, Ritschl refuses to seek the fulfilment of love 
 within the essential nature of God or as directed to 
 the Second Person of the Trinity, the Eternal Son 
 of one substance with the Father, but is borne along 
 to seek the adequate correlative of divine love in a 
 kingdom of God. Through this attribute of love it 
 alone becomes possible to derive the world from God, 
 
 ^Kaftan, Das Wesen^ 224. ^Kaftan, op. cit. 225-270. 
 
 K 
 
146 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 and to recognize in Him the ground of all that is, 
 and the law that binds together nature and spirit in 
 one all-embracing unity.^ 
 
 God is love. We have seen that this leads to a 
 recognition of the spiritual personality of God. 
 What does it tell us of the objects of His love ? 
 Ritschl gives his answer under four heads — 
 
 (i) The objects of love are necessarily homogeneous 
 to the loving subject, that is, they must be spiritual 
 personalities. 
 
 (ii) Love is a will steadfast in its direction. 
 
 (iii) Love is directed to the furtherance of the 
 recognized or surmised purposes of another. 
 
 (iv) Love can only be a steadfast will, and the 
 appropriation and furtherance of another's purpose 
 can only avoid separation and exhibit unity, if the 
 will of love takes another's purpose as its own 
 purpose and end. 
 
 Applying these principles to the idea of God, we 
 cannot see the objects of the divine love in any in- 
 determinate conception of the world, or of nature, for 
 in no sense can they be considered as of the same 
 kind as God. The object of the love of God must 
 be found either in one or in many spiritual person- 
 alities who can thus be said to correspond with our 
 idea of God. So far, we have been arguing in the 
 boldest a piioii fashion : but suddenly, without warn- 
 ing, experience takes the place of speculation. We 
 could not tell whether the object of God's love would 
 be one or many : but the world is a fact of experience ; 
 the world as a multitude of spirits bound together as 
 
 ^ R. V. iii. 262, 263. 
 
THE KINGDOM OF GOD 147 
 
 members of a race. Reflection on the world, there- 
 fore, makes it clear that a multitude of spirits bound 
 together in a race is the true correlative of the love 
 of God.^ 
 
 This leads to a necessary judgment on the material 
 world. Believing as we do in an almighty Creator, 
 who is love, we must suppose that the whole 
 creation and constitution of the world were designed 
 by Him to further the purposes of the objects of His 
 love, purposes which He has adopted as His own. 
 Therefore the world wins its place in the great 
 scheme of man's redemption. For if the idea of God 
 is necessary to guarantee our individual morality and 
 our moral fellowship, the purpose of the whole world 
 must be recognized as in relation to the will and 
 love of God. In other words, the world is the neces- 
 sary condition of a moral kingdom of created spirits, 
 and is itself created by God for this very purpose. 
 
 But humanity cannot be considered as an adequate 
 correlative to the love of God. Its multiplicity binds 
 it to the world of nature. It needs a unity, deeper 
 than that of race or species. In the Christian com- 
 munity, which accepts the kingdom of God as its 
 task, all conditions are fulfilled. It is the essential 
 characteristic of the kingdom of God to transcend 
 all national and natural limitations ; as the ultimate 
 purpose for the world, as also the highest good for 
 all created spirits, it reaches out beyond the world, 
 and is above the world, as God Himself. The idea 
 of the kingdom gives a deeper unity than that of 
 race or species, which after all is only superficial, and 
 barely conceals the many underlying possibilities of 
 ^R.v. 264,265. 
 
148 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 disunion which mark humanity as no real correlative 
 to the love of God. The community whose vocation 
 it is to be united in and with the kingdom, and to be 
 active in the accomplishment of this task, owes its 
 existence to the fact that the Son of God is its Lord, 
 and to its willing obedience to Him. The love of 
 God towards His Son, complete, unique, is through 
 His mediation made effectual for those who believe 
 on Him. God is love, inasmuch as He reveals Him- 
 self in His Son to the community which He founded, 
 so that the glory of God or the fulfilment of the divine 
 self-purpose is wrought out in this supramundane 
 purposeful destination of mankind. 
 
 Thus the kingdom of God is the key to the 
 solution of the problem of the world.-^ 
 
 But what is this kingdom of God ? We will use 
 Ritschl's own words. " The Christian representation 
 of the kingdom of God, which has been shown to be 
 correlative to the conception of God as love, denotes 
 the widest possible union of mankind, — both inten- 
 sively and extensively — through the reciprocal action 
 of its members." ^ Professor Orr concludes from this 
 and other similar passages, that *' Ritschl viewed this 
 kingdom exclusively under its earthly aspect." ^ 
 This, however, seems to be an unduly severe 
 estimate. Ritschl is at pains to describe the king- 
 dom as supernatural, supramundane and invisible : 
 though it must be admitted that the explanations he 
 proceeds to give of these expressions go far to eviscer- 
 ate them of their obvious meaning. The kingdom is 
 supernatural because it transcends natural limitations; 
 
 ^ For this whole passage cf. jV. V. iii. 262-269. 
 
 ^ AW. iii. 270. ^Orr, Ritschlian Theology^ 207. 
 
THE KINGDOM OF GOD 149 
 
 it is supramundane because, acting from the motive 
 of love, it is otherwise conditioned than by the 
 ordinary natural causes. But yet in the sense that it 
 is a task still to be striven for, we may regard it as, in 
 some wise, future. For those who are united in it, 
 the Kingdom is not merely a moral association of 
 men voluntarily acting towards each other according 
 to laws of virtue, but is the highest religious good 
 also ; for it solves the question with which every 
 religion is confronted, how man, at once a part of the 
 world, and at the same time conscious of his own 
 spiritual personality, can give effect to that claim 
 of spiritual supremacy over the world which in his 
 former capacity he knows will be perpetually thwarted 
 and in the latter be amply justified.-^ 
 
 The kingdom is connected with the historical 
 Christ. It was His vocation to found the Kingdom. 
 This is repeated again and again. " The task of 
 Jesus Christ in His vocation, or the final purpose of 
 His life, namely, the kingdom of God, was recognized 
 by Him as the final purpose of God in the world." ^ 
 " The realization of the kingdom forms the vocation 
 of Christ." ^ Herrmann follows Ritschl. Quite in- 
 cidentally, while discussing the natural impression we 
 should receive from the claim of Jesus to be the 
 Messiah, and from the entire difference between the 
 Messianic expectations of the Lord, and those of His 
 compatriots, and contemporaries, he alludes to the 
 doctrine of the kingdom — " By it He understands 
 the genuine sovereignty of God over personal beings, 
 that is, before all else a sovereignty in their inner life, 
 and in their mutual relations. To the kingdom of 
 
 1 Unterricht, p. 6. ^ Ibid, 17. ^ R. V. iii. 426. 
 
ISO RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 God, as He understands the term, those alone can 
 belong who have fully placed themselves under His 
 rule, in boundless trust towards Him, and in un- 
 bounded love towards their neighbour." ^ 
 
 Kaftan, however, entirely dissents from this view. 
 He rejects explicitly the view of the kingdom which, 
 following the Kantian conception, identifies it with a 
 moral community upon earth.^ " The kingdom can 
 in no sense be identified with the universal moral 
 society which is being developed in the world, and 
 in which all men are united by the law of love. As 
 the chief good, it is supramundane and invisible, the 
 kingdom of perfection belonging to the future, 
 heavenly world." ^ Kaftan, who frankly bases his 
 conception of religion on a eudaemonistic estimate 
 of life, sees in the kingdom of God the highest good 
 that can be offered to mankind. And because the 
 satisfaction of man's claim for life is only possible on 
 the hypothesis of an eternal supramundane kingdom 
 of God, the latter must be considered " a postulate of 
 reason, and from this postulate there arises the other 
 postulate of an historical revelation of God, which has 
 the supramundane kingdom of God as its content." * 
 But it must not be forgotten that this good thus 
 offered is not upon the earth, nor of the earth. It is, 
 in principle heavenly, supramundane.^ Its perfection 
 belongs to the future, and therefore the kingdom 
 may itself be regarded as future, as belonging to the 
 world to come.^ Further it is not to be connected 
 with the historical but with the exalted Christ. 
 
 ^ Herrmann, Verkehr (6th edition), p. 69. 
 
 * Kaftan, Das Wesen^ 234. ^ Wahrheit^ etc., 547. ^ Ibid, 548. 
 
 ^ Das PVesen, 238, ^ /did. 233. 
 
THE KINGDOM OF GOD 151 
 
 Vour life is hid with Christ in God, that is Kaftan's 
 key text to which he refers over and over again. 
 It represents the mystical element in religion which 
 Kaftan refuses to abandon at Ritschl's bidding. 
 Certain difficulties remain to be noticed — 
 (i) No little confusion arises from Ritschl's con- 
 ception of the " self-end " of God, and the final end 
 of the world. We have seen that the divine love 
 is to be thought as a steadfast will directed to the 
 furtherance of the ends of those spiritual beings whom 
 He has created. " As will, God can only be thought 
 in conscious relation to the end which He Himself 
 is." ^ Here we are at once in a difficulty from which 
 Ritschl does nothing to rescue us. Ritschl accepts 
 the definition, God is love ; but will only allow it to 
 be interpreted in terms of will. God's will of love 
 involves the appropriation of another's purpose as 
 His own. But why should the world have this 
 particular purpose ? Simply because it was God's 
 purpose before it was the world's : and thus the self- 
 end of God appears to be not to appropriate the end 
 of another, but to prescribe an end to another.^ 
 
 Moreover, God is exhausted in His world-end : for 
 *' nothing can be conceived in God before He deter- 
 mined Himself as love. Either He is conceived thus, 
 or He is not conceived at all." ^ We are not allowed 
 to think of God as in any wise determining the 
 direction of His will or Himself preceding it. God 
 is practically identified with His purpose : and His 
 purpose is the purpose of the world. As even 
 Dr. Garvin admits, God is to all intents and purposes 
 identified with, or rather subordinated to, the king- 
 
 1 R. V. 262. 2 0rr, Ritschlian Theology, 255. ^ R. F. 268. 
 
152 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 dom of God. It is the latter which solves the problem 
 of the world, and God is Himself merely introduced 
 as a means to ensuring the logical success of the 
 deduction. 
 
 It becomes impossible to maintain a sympathetic 
 attitude towards a theology in which *' God is, so to 
 speak, swallowed up in His activities." ■'' 
 
 (ii) What then is the relation between the king- 
 dom and the church ? Ritschl strenuously maintains 
 that they are different — and the same. The king- 
 dom is the universal moral fellowship, the church 
 consists of members of the kingdom united in prayer 
 and acceptable worship.^ Ritschl rejects the dis- 
 tinction between the visible and invisible church, 
 but substitutes that between church and kingdom. 
 That it was the intention of the Lord to found a 
 visible society, or church, in which the members of 
 the kingdom should be manifestly united, cannot be 
 seriously questioned. That the kingdom is often 
 conceived as invisible, as future rather than present 
 may also be admitted. It seems clear that while 
 sometimes they are practically identified, on other 
 occasions a distinction must be maintained. But it 
 must be very uncertain whether the distinction is 
 properly formulated by Ritschl. The difficulty 
 arises in this way. It is natural to use the word 
 " community " of the visible church ; but it is some- 
 what straining its sense to apply it to the invisible 
 kingdom. Yet he uses the term so promiscuously 
 that frequently it is impossible to determine whether 
 he intends it to be applied to the church, or to the 
 kingdom. He insists for instance on the theologian 
 
 ^ Garvie, op. cit. 62. '^ R.V. 271 ; Unterricht, 6. 
 
THE KINGDOM OF GOD 153 
 
 reckoning himself within the community : he also 
 maintains that the community is the proper object 
 of justification. It may be said that according to 
 Ritschl the members of the church and of the king- 
 dom are the same, and that therefore there need be 
 no ambiguity. But Ritschl has introduced this dis- 
 tinction, in order to be able to distinguish between 
 church connection and membership in the kingdom, 
 ecclesiastical profession and true faith. Thus many 
 might belong to the kingdom who were yet attached 
 to no visible church : but what then becomes of the 
 earlier definition by which church and kingdom 
 were declared co-extensive ? The indiscriminate use 
 of the word '' community " may betray a somewhat 
 deplorable carelessness in the face of important and 
 necessary distinctions, but it is perhaps unduly severe 
 to demand absolute consistency in Ritschl, when the 
 truth is that the Biblical representations with which he 
 deals are themselves inconsistent. The objections to 
 Ritschl's phraseology might with equal propriety be 
 brought against that of our Lord ; for nothing is 
 plainer than that the kingdom is susceptible of very 
 different interpretations at different times. That 
 Ritschl was really trying to express a fairly obvious 
 and orthodox position may be seen by a study of 
 his essay on the visible and invisible church, where 
 he distinguishes between it in its historical existence, 
 and in its gradual development : showing that even 
 in its visible capacity, faith is needed if the church 
 is to be seen. The Kingdom of God is outwardly 
 represented by the Holy Catholic Church ; but their 
 identification without more ado is simply disastrous : 
 for the Kingdom both in fact and in idea is some- 
 
154 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 times far wider than the Church. Nevertheless, it is 
 to the latter only that the expression community is 
 at all applicable ; for in it alone can be recognized 
 visible association of believers in common life. 
 
 (iii) The next difficulty arises from the difference 
 of representation between the teaching of Jesus and 
 the preaching of the Apostles. In the Gospels the 
 kingdom of God is prominent ; in the Epistles it is 
 entirely in the background. Other conceptions have 
 taken its place, and when the kingdom appears, it is 
 in a predominantly though not exclusively eschato- 
 logical sense. This fact has been recognized by the 
 Ritschlian theologians. " It is not wonderful," says 
 Harnack, " that in the oldest Christian preaching, 
 ' Jesus Christ ' meets us as frequently as in the 
 preaching of Jesus the kingdom of God itself" ^ 
 Ritschl himself accounted for the difference by show- 
 ing that the practical interests of the apostles being 
 bound up with the foundation of the church, the 
 centre of gravity was shifted from the kingdom to 
 the church, the significance of the former being 
 transferred from the present to the future.^ 
 
 Kaftan deals with the problem in a comprehensive 
 and convincing manner.^ The Lord's death had in 
 this one respect been more successful than His life : 
 for with His dead body had been laid in the grave 
 all the false Messianic expectations which had clus- 
 tered round Him in His life-time. The apostles 
 were called to preach the gospel of the kingdom to 
 the world as witnesses of the resurrection. That 
 ^reat event had revealed the real character and 
 
 ^ Dog/nengeschichte, i. 70. 2 /j_ y^ {[ 295 ; iii. 270. 
 
 ^ Das IVesen^ 246-262. 
 
THE KINGDOM OF GOD 155 
 
 nature of the Lord. He had proclaimed that the 
 kingdom had appeared in and with Himself; so also 
 the disciples with and since the resurrection saw the 
 kingdom of God coming in power, to be fully con- 
 summated at the return of the Lord. The preaching 
 of the kingdom became in their mouth the procla- 
 mation of the revealed and risen Christ. The King 
 takes the place of the Kingdom : but underneath 
 the difference of language substantial harmony is 
 apparent. For Christ is to believers all and more 
 than all that the kingdom offered : and occasional 
 expressions show that this formed part of the 
 general Christian consciousness.-^ 
 
 Such then are some of the difficulties, and such the 
 way in which they are met, in the Ritschlian concep- 
 tion of the kingdom of God. It remains to offer a 
 few remarks as to the place of this idea in any 
 dogmatic system. 
 
 The idea of a divine kingdom is as old as the 
 oldest idea of a divine revelation. The kingdom of 
 God is one of the fundamental doctrines common 
 to both Old Testament and New. The whole history 
 of the Jewish people is the history of the develop- 
 ment, purification and extension of this idea. It was 
 along these lines more than any other that prophecy 
 prepared the way for the true apprehension of Christ's 
 work and person. And when the Lord came, He 
 came with the message The kingdom of God is 
 at hand, and His teaching is almost exclusively 
 occupied in illustrating the principles of the king- 
 dom, or in insisting upon the character required in its 
 citizens and ministers. 
 
 ^ Rom. xiv. 17 J Col. i. 13. 
 
156 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 What then does the phrase exactly mean ? Recent 
 research leaves us in little doubt. From a linguistic 
 point of view it may be considered proved that the 
 expression " always denotes the rule and never the 
 realm of the king." ^ Of course it must be plain 
 that the idea of personal rule can never be so com- 
 plete an abstraction as to exclude all reference to the 
 sphere of rule ; and thus that the notion of realm 
 does sometimes enter into the conception of the 
 kingdom. But it is only in a secondary and sub- 
 sidiary sense that it so enters in. The important 
 thing to observe is that the kingdom of God in the 
 first instance denotes the active exercise of the 
 divine sovereignty. 
 
 In ancient Israel the prophets laboured to set this 
 great idea free from the national and political limit- 
 ations with which it appeared to be inextricably 
 bound up. Their efforts resulted in the possibility of 
 its survival. Then came Jesus claiming to fulfil: be- 
 ginning His ministry with the tidings of the kingdom's 
 near approach, giving to the kingdom the central posi- 
 tion in His teaching, and bidding His disciples pray, 
 whenever they prayed, for its full and final coming. 
 
 It must now be clear in what sense we are to 
 understand the expression as it recurs with startling 
 frequency in the mouth of Christ. The kingdom of 
 God stood for those principles of God's government 
 among men, which it was the task of Christ to reveal, 
 and the Church to realize. " Thy kingdom come " is 
 an amplification under a slightly different aspect of 
 " Thy will be done," and both are coordinated by the 
 succeeding phrase "in earth as it is in heaven.'' These 
 
 ^ Dalman, Die Worte Jesii^ 77. 
 
THE KINGDOM OF GOD 157 
 
 principles must find outward embodiment in the 
 community of believers, whom Christ founded and 
 bound together in the common task of accomplishing 
 the kingdom. These principles of divine action 
 have already won partial recognition, and thus at 
 times the kingdom may be spoken of as present, 
 at another as yet future, for " nondum regnat hoc 
 regnum." 
 
 Viewed in this light, we see a fresh significance in 
 the old Messianic titles, claimed by our Lord. And 
 it is only natural that when He had been declared 
 Son of God with power by the resurrection^ when 
 having conquered death He could claim all authority 
 to be His in heaven and earth, the apostles should 
 concentrate their attention on proclaiming Him to be 
 Lord of all. The resurrection was to them before 
 all else a triumphant vindication of the principles of 
 God's government, and a crowning assurance of the 
 ultimate victory of the kingdom. Thus believing, 
 they proclaimed Christ as King, the fulfiller of the 
 Kingdom's ideals, the monarch of an empire wherein 
 was neither male nor female, Greek nor Jew, but a new 
 creation. Preaching Christ, they proclaimed the 
 Kingdom of God. 
 
 Under these circumstances we may indeed be 
 grateful to the Ritschlian theologians for forcibly 
 recalling our minds to this central and fundamental 
 conception of our religion. Whether the idea of a 
 kingdom is really an exhaustive category under which 
 everything pertaining to Christianity may be profit- 
 ably brought, is perhaps open to question. Notwith- 
 standing, the term sufficed our Lord the Revealer, and 
 it may well suffice the Church, the interpreter of that 
 
158 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 revelation. It is astonishing that Dr. Garvie, gener- 
 ally so sympathetic, should declare the kingdom to 
 be only " a provisional conception not universally 
 significant." ^ He quotes with approval a saying of 
 Professor Orr, " Either the doctrines are viewed only 
 in their relation to this conception, in which case 
 many aspects are overlooked which belong to a full 
 system of theology, or a mass of material is taken in, 
 which is only connected with the idea in the loosest 
 way." But Professor Orr as a rule shows himself 
 much more appreciative and sympathetic in this 
 respect than his Ritschlian opponent. One of the 
 principal merits he assigns to RitschI is the new pro- 
 minence he has given to this thought of the kingdom 
 of God as a central idea in theology ; '-^ and again, " it 
 is a merit of the Ritschlian theology that it has done 
 so much to rescue this great conception of the 
 primitive gospel from neglect, and to concentrate 
 study and attention upon it." ^ 
 
 It must be admitted that Ritschl's use of the idea 
 of the kingdom to determine the nature and attributes 
 of God is not very encouraging. We have seen the 
 extent to which these attributes were impoverished 
 in the process ; and as the discussion of these divine 
 perfections is deliberately undertaken to bring the 
 idea of God into harmony with the idea of the 
 kingdom, there is truth in the charge of the subordi- 
 nation of the former to the latter. But we cannot 
 allow that this is any necessary consequence of the 
 position assigned to the kingdom. 
 
 To our own age the Gospel of the Kingdom comes 
 
 ^ Garvie, op. cit. 246. ^ Ritschhaiiism^ 23. 
 
 ^ Ritschlian 1 heology^ 268. 
 
THE KINGDOM OF GOD iS9 
 
 with a message new and old. Old, because in very 
 truth it is from the beginning. New, because the 
 complexities of modern life call for a clearer recog- 
 nition of Christ's living kingship in all spheres of 
 activity and enterprise, and for a unity which will 
 transcend the differences of race and sex, church 
 and sect, in the fellowship which is more than ever 
 essential for the defence and confirmation of the 
 Gospel. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY 
 
 All religious knowledge is the knowledge of God. 
 We have seen, from the Ritschlian standpoint, what 
 knowledge of God is given in the Christian revela- 
 tion. Under the formula, God is love^ we find 
 comprehended all that is essential to a right and 
 Christian conception of God's character and will. 
 Here we see that God must be conceived as a 
 spiritual personality : we see also how a religious 
 rather than a metaphysical interpretation must be 
 applied to those attributes of God — His omnipotence, 
 His omnipresence. His eternity — which are necessary 
 postulates for any faith which would maintain itself 
 against the world. 
 
 But so far our conception is in no wise essentially 
 Christian, and the Ritschlian school, whose strongest 
 point is the completeness of the historical revelation 
 in Jesus Christ, could not possibly rest content with 
 such a conclusion. Religion must find some practi- 
 cally useful and comprehensive formula to express 
 its idea of God ; and in the Christian religion we are 
 spared the necessity of inventing such a formula, for 
 we possess it already in the traditional doctrine of 
 the Trinity. 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY i6i 
 
 It does not, however, follow that we need attach 
 the same sense to this doctrine as that which it bears 
 in ecclesiastical orthodoxy, for all will depend upon 
 our view as to the significance we attach to the 
 Divinity of our Lord : but historically and practically 
 the doctrine of the Trinity is a necessary consequence 
 of the Christian view of God. For the Christian 
 believes first in the Almighty Ruler of the universe ; 
 he believes in the divinity of the historical founder 
 of the Christian religion, in whom God has perfectly 
 revealed Himself: he believes in the working of the 
 Divine Spirit among men, which since the resurrec- 
 tion of Jesus has dwelt in plenitude of power and 
 blessing in the Christian Church. Believing this, he 
 believes in the Trinity. " The Christian has and 
 knows God through Christ in the Holy Spirit." ■"■ 
 
 This belief, however, is practical and historical. 
 It must not be conceived mystically or speculatively 
 - — a course which often enough leads to pantheistic 
 constructions essentially antagonistic to the Christian 
 idea of God. The dogma of the Trinity must be 
 based on Christian revelation, not on the analogy of 
 physical relations. Similarly all distinctions between 
 an immanent and a revealed Trinity must be set 
 aside as fanciful subtleties ; for knowledge of the 
 essential nature of God can never be the subject of 
 a formal conclusion which would require empirical 
 verification, but can only be due to a speculative 
 recasting of the Christian faith. The one thing to 
 be avoided is to subordinate the Christian revelation 
 to any other kind of principle which may be supposed 
 to yield a higher revelation of the Deity. 
 
 ^Kaftan, 412, cf. the whole section, on which the above sketch is based. 
 
 L 
 
i62 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 The ecclesiastical dogma of the Trinity was the 
 product of various heterogeneous elements. On the 
 one hand we may note the philosophical terms 
 necessary for speculative construction, and on the 
 other the Logos-conception which soon came to 
 dominate Christian thought The doctrine of the 
 Trinity properly conceived is nothing but a con- 
 venient expression of what every Christian must 
 believe. To exalt it to a metaphysical dogma of 
 absolute truth is utterly to misunderstand its signifi- 
 cance and to impose an intolerable burden upon 
 Christian thought. 
 
 The attitude of RitschI and his followers, therefore, 
 is simply to assume the doctrine. RitschI himself 
 never discusses it or lays the least stress upon it. 
 Kaftan dismisses it in a few pages. But the Ritsch- 
 lian school, whose claim it is to vindicate the true 
 divinity of Christ from metaphysical corruptions, and 
 to be the real representative of genuinely Biblical 
 theology, are committed by their claim to a general 
 acquiescence in Trinitarian doctrine. Only it must 
 be remembered that as a metaphysical idea the 
 doctrine is regarded as of no importance whatever. 
 It is merely assumed as an obvious and expressive 
 phrase in which the Christian idea of God is con- 
 veniently condensed. Thus RitschI accepts as the 
 true designation of God the title perpetually recurring 
 in the Epistles — " the God and Father of our Lord 
 Jesus Christ." This he takes as the starting point of 
 all theology, for it describes the relation of God to 
 His Son, our Lord : a relation extended through His 
 mediation to the whole Church. " Any attempt to 
 construct a scientific doctrine of God must be wroncf 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY 163 
 
 which fails to keep in sight all the aspects of this 
 name. Of the same significance is the name of God^ 
 as that of the Father^ and of the Son^ and of the Holy 
 Ghost'' The name of God denotes God so far as 
 He reveals Himself. This revelation was effected 
 through His Son, while the Holy Spirit is the power 
 of God which enables the Church to appropriate to 
 itself the Divine self-revelation. ■'■ 
 
 In the same way Ritschl speaks of the doctrine in 
 the introduction to his Instruction in the Christian 
 Religion. He claims for Christianity the proud title 
 of the perfect religion. It is the perfect religion 
 wherein a perfect knowledge of God is possible. 
 Such perfect knowledge the Christian Church asserts 
 that she possesses, for the Church traces its origin to 
 Jesus Christ who as the Son of God claims this 
 perfect knowledge of the Father, and she traces her 
 knowledge of God to that same spirit of God in 
 which He knows Himself. These indispensable 
 conditions of the Christian religion find suitable 
 expression in the baptismal formula.^ 
 
 It may be conceded that this unquestioning 
 attitude was that of the early Church, The explana- 
 tion that the Apostles gave of this doctrine was 
 devotional rather than doctrinal. We find the 
 doctrine naturally accepted by many diverse writers, 
 and, we may suppose, by the many diverse Churches 
 to which their writings were addressed. There is 
 not the least vestige of any surprise, such as must 
 have been felt and expressed at the enunciation of 
 any entirely novel and tremendously far-reaching 
 mode of expression. It is all so quiet, so natural, 
 
 1 i?. V. 260. 2 Unterricht. i. 
 
j64 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 that we are almost driven to assume that the earliest 
 converts must have been familiar both with the idea 
 and the terminology. But whence ? There is not 
 the least trace of any elaborate attempt in the 
 Church of those days to construct a Trinitarian 
 dogma or to impose the same upon reluctant 
 disciples. The belief in the Trinity is intensely 
 practical, not doctrinal nor theoretic : it is moreover 
 so widely, even universally diffused. It is implicit in 
 the very earliest writings of the New Testament : and 
 it occurs in every variety of thought and expression — 
 not as any authoritative doctrine, but as a devotional 
 commentary, as it were, on the gracious operations 
 of the Three Persons in One God for man's sal- 
 vation. It seems an inevitable conclusion from 
 these facts that the early Christians had been 
 familiar with the formula from the beginning, that 
 they had learned it at their baptism : that, conse- 
 quently, the expression in Matt, xxviii. is not, as 
 the Ritschlian school would have us believe, " kein 
 Herrenwort," and only the result of ecclesiastical 
 interpretation : rather that there must have been some 
 direction of the Lord, thus expressed, to account for 
 the wide diffusion, and the natural acceptance, of 
 Trinitarian ideas and language in the Apostolic 
 Church. 
 
 Now Ritschl and his school would have us accept 
 the doctrine in the same way as did those earliest 
 believers — but that is just what we cannot do: and 
 we cannot do it, not because we are not willing, but 
 because it is impossible. At an early stage it may 
 be possible to remain satisfied with the immediate 
 apprehension of a truth, but when once the intellect 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY 165 
 
 has set to work and by a process of reflective 
 analysis has broken up the seeming unity into its 
 different and discordant elements, it is impossible 
 without a surrender of truth to be content with the 
 lower immediacy which existed before the intellect 
 had done its work : rather we must press on to a 
 synthesis which will resolve the diversities into a 
 higher unity, and will restore, but in a higher form, 
 that immediacy which we thought we had lost. The 
 mind always wins its way to unity through these 
 three stages : and it is impossible at any period 
 when the process has once begun, to start all over 
 again, as if nothing had taken place. But that is 
 just what Ritschlianism invites us to do. 
 
 It was inconceivable that the doctrine of the 
 Trinity immediately apprehended as a practical truth 
 of revelation should escape the criticism of reason. 
 For directly reflection began, the process of analysis 
 had begun also. This necessitated reconstruction, 
 fresh combination, a new synthesis, the knowledge of 
 a deeper unity. When once this had been achieved, 
 then it was possible for the Church to grasp the 
 doctrine once more, but with a higher type of im- 
 mediacy than before. The past cannot be simply 
 undone with a wish : progress cannot be merely set 
 aside. It may be a pity that reflective analysis 
 should ever have touched the objects of the Christian 
 faith ; and that we cannot continue to remain content 
 with that immediacy of apprehension at the lower 
 stage which sufficed the earliest believers. It may 
 be a pity : but lamentations do not alter facts. 
 Reason has its rights, and critical analysis necessi- 
 tated an attempt at systematic reconstruction. We 
 
i66 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 can never in this matter be the same as before : for 
 the work of reason has been done ; and it is impos- 
 sible even for a blind man to walk across a ploughed 
 field and imagine it fallow. Ritschlianism demands 
 an impossibility when it bids us return to the same 
 position as the earliest believers. As a matter of 
 fact, Ritschl and his school hardly seem to realize 
 how soon the process had begun which makes such a 
 return impossible. The Apostles themselves were at 
 first content with the simple creed K.vptog 'I^^o-ou? 
 'XpicTTo^ ; but the words involved inevitable question- 
 ings which it was impossible to set wholly on one 
 side. Thus Paul and Peter, Jude and John, all go 
 beyond the simple statement, and see the need of 
 explanation, of amplification, of definition and con- 
 struction. The process was inevitable ; and the 
 Catholic Church only followed the example of the 
 Apostles when she, reluctantly enough as history 
 shows, was driven into definitions whose practical 
 need was as manifestly great and as imperatively 
 necessary as the truths they were intended to safe- 
 guard. To ignore what was then achieved is merely 
 to set back the hands of the clock and to show 
 oneself incapable of appreciating either scientific 
 method or historical development. 
 
 It was, of course, Christological problems that lay 
 at the root of all Trinitarian controversies. The 
 Ritschlian doctrine of the Trinity is the result of the 
 Ritschlian conception of Christ. But this introduces 
 so vast and complicated a question that a separate 
 chapter must be devoted to its discussion. The rest 
 of this chapter will be occupied by considering the 
 Ritschlian treatment of the Fatherhood of God, and 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY 167 
 
 the doctrine of the Holy Spirit as expounded by 
 these theologians. 
 
 The Divine Fatherhood, embracing all mankind, 
 extending even over all God's works, is perhaps the 
 characteristic idea of more recent theology, which 
 has made this conception paramount in all popular 
 religious thought. It is strange that this view is 
 strenuously combated by Ritschl. To him the true 
 designation of God is " the Father of our Lord Jesus 
 Christ." In the historical life of Christ we can see 
 the true meaning of Fatherhood and Sonship. We 
 see the filial relations perfectly realized in the loving 
 submission of the Son's will to the Father. The Son 
 makes the purpose of God His own, and in the 
 carrying out of that single purpose, He shows per- 
 fect trust, resignation and obedience. To such a life 
 God responds by declaring the full and perfect satis- 
 faction of His good pleasure. Thus is established a 
 relation of peculiar intimacy and love, in which we 
 learn to see God as "the Father of our Lord Jesus 
 Christ." 
 
 Ritschl's antagonism to anything of a mystical 
 nature in religion leads him to deny any natural 
 Fatherhood of God to humanity, such as might be 
 based upon a consideration of the divine nature of 
 the soul, or of the indwelling spirit of God. His 
 determination to take Christ, and Christ only, as the 
 principle of Divine revelation, leads him to limit the 
 Fatherhood of God to the relation revealed as exist- 
 ing between the historical Jesus and God whom He 
 called His Father. 
 
 But it was the work of Christ to make this relation 
 valid for all those who accepted Him as their Lord. 
 
i68 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 Thus it becomes possible for all men to find in the 
 communit}' of Christ their true vocation to become 
 the sons of God. On this point Ritschl is emphatic. 
 "Upon the Son of God the love of the Father directs 
 itself in the first instance, and only for His sake upon 
 the community of which He is the Lord." ■"■ We may 
 give one more quotation. "As Father, God is not in 
 the first instance the Creator of the world, but the 
 Father of Jesus Christ, and through His mediation 
 the Father of believers as the children won to Him 
 through Christ. All men assuredly are not the 
 children of God^ but only the members of the com- 
 munity who already through Christ are reconciled to 
 God." 2 
 
 It will be remembered that Ritschl in pressing us 
 to accept the definition of God as love, insisted on 
 our considering God not in His nature, but in the 
 form of will. Thus the Divine Fatherhood in the 
 Ritschlian theology becomes almost a synonym for 
 the will of God. "The name of God as Father which 
 Jesus also makes valid for the community of His 
 disciples . has in this general application no 
 
 other content than the creative will of love." ^ 
 
 The Ritschlian contention that to Christians God 
 is pre-eminently the Father, is to be welcomed. At 
 a time when the Fatherhood of God is thoughtlessly 
 accepted as a self-evident axiom, it is a cause for 
 thankfulness that we should be recalled to the fact 
 that it is only through Christianity that the revelation 
 of a universal moral fatherhood is possible. It is 
 " He that hath seen me " that " hath seen the father.'' 
 
 ^ R. V. iii. 441; cf. Unterriiht, 10. ^ Lebeii^ ii. 199. 
 
 3 R. V. ii. 97. 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY 169 
 
 It is also well to insist that our relation to Christ is 
 in no sense an assent to propositions however admir- 
 able, or conformity to law however excellent, but a 
 life in Him. In Him we become the sons of God. 
 In him we have access to the Father. 
 
 But Ritschlianism cannot accuse Catholic theology 
 of neglecting either of these two considerations. On 
 the other hand the Ritschlian interpretation intro- 
 duces fresh and needless difficulties. The three most 
 obvious may be instanced. 
 
 (i) "It is not easy to reconcile the restricted view 
 of the Divine Fatherhood with the doctrine of God's 
 universal will of love." ^ If the community alone is 
 the object of God's love, what of those who are yet 
 outside ? The Scriptures give a clear answer — 
 " While we were yet sinners, God loved us and gave 
 His Son to die for us." But the Ritschlian theory 
 gives no clue as to how the sinner or the ungodly, 
 the heathen or the publican, may address the God 
 and Father of us all. 
 
 (ii) The theory entirely fails to distinguish between 
 the possibility of Divine Sonship by nature — that 
 man, by his natural constitution, has kinship with the 
 Divine — and the sonship of adoption and grace, 
 corresponding to the new creation in Christ Jesus. 
 
 (iii) The distinction that Christ Himself draws 
 most frequently and clearly between ' the Father/ 
 'my Father,' on the one hand, and 'your Father' on 
 the other, is entirely ignored. The difference of 
 expression to an unprejudiced mind conveys irresis- 
 tibly the impression of a difference in origin. 
 
 It cannot therefore be said that the Ritschlian view 
 
 ■* Orr, The Ritschlian Theology^ 115. 
 
I70 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 of the Divine Fatherhood is in any sense an improve- 
 ment upon the form of that doctrine, as it is held by 
 both CathoHc and Protestant theologians. On the 
 contrary it involves us in fresh difficulties which can 
 only be overcome by ignoring their existence — a 
 proceeding which can hardly be considered a satis- 
 factory basis for any systematic attempt at theological 
 construction. 
 
 We now pass to consider the Ritschlian doctrine 
 of the Holy Spirit. This is of the scantiest descrip- 
 tion. Ritschl, it is true, recognized a supernatural 
 power, a mysterious side in human life. But he 
 ■concentrated on the active forms of its manifestations, 
 in the most general terms, with a view to leaving 
 individual development unencumbered. It is of no 
 use trying, he would tell us, to answer the insoluble 
 riddle how man is seized or filled with the Holy 
 Spirit. -^ But it is conceded even by his defenders ^ 
 that Ritschl lays himself open to serious misunder- 
 standing : for he neither followed his usual methodical 
 principles, nor did he essay the systematic interpre- 
 tation of the critical passages bearing on the 
 doctrine. 
 
 It was a great mistake of Ritschl's that he failed 
 to distinguish between the mystical elements common 
 to all religion and that false unethical view of the 
 world which he called mysticism. ^ Ritschl rejects 
 the Pauline text which Kaftan takes as the character- 
 istic formula of Christianity — " the life hid with 
 Christ in God" — and refuses to give clear theological 
 recognition to the activity of the Holy Spirit as a 
 real, immediately operative power in the soul of man. 
 
 ^ R, V. iii^. 22, 23. ~ Ecke, Swing, Garvie. ^ Cf. Kaftan passim. 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY 171 
 
 Two influences may be detected as contributing to 
 this result Ritschl adopted two views, both of which 
 he held, seemingly unaware of their ultimately 
 irreconcilable character. On the one hand, he clung 
 to the supernatural manifestations of the activities of 
 the Spirit, on the other hand, he took the rational 
 view, which resulted from his recognition of the 
 psychologically improved investigations into the 
 being and working of the human soul. 
 
 Ritschl himself protested vigorously against the 
 accusation that he had no doctrine of the Holy 
 Spirit. He himself complains how seriously this 
 doctrine has been neglected in the Christian Church, 
 and contrasts with this neglect the position assigned 
 to the Holy Spirit by St. Paul in his scheme of man's 
 new birth and justification. ^ 
 
 Ecke, in an interesting discussion of this point, 
 attributes Ritschl's silence to his marked reserve in 
 speaking about inner experiences. Thus we hear 
 little of the Spirit's power to quicken from sin; but 
 Ritschl's denial of original sin has been thought to 
 point to a different conclusion — that he was prepared 
 to deny the power and presence of the Spirit in the 
 human heart. Similarly by denying that the indi- 
 vidual is the proper object of sanctification, he seemed 
 to deny the sanctifying grace of the Spirit in the 
 individual life. It cannot be said with certainty what 
 Ritschl's own view of the Spirit really was : though 
 we may admit that his reserved nature forbade him 
 to speak freely of religious experiences in which the 
 Spirit's power would have been unambiguously re- 
 cognized. 
 
 1 R. V. iii. 569. 
 
172 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 It need hardly be said that Ritschl would reject 
 the doctrine of the Spirit which represented Him as 
 the third Person of the Holy Trinity. Ritschl sub- 
 stitutes a strange, and it must be added, less intellig- 
 ible definition. " The Spirit of God is the knowledge 
 which God has of Himself, as of His own self-end. 
 Holy Spirit denotes in the New Testament the Spirit 
 of God so far as He is the ground of the knowledge 
 of God, and of the specifically ethico-religious ideal 
 in the Christian community." ^ 
 
 The Ritschlian School, however, go much further. 
 Not only do they accept the doctrine of individual 
 sanctification, but they are at pains to distinguish the 
 objectivity of the Holy Spirit from the spiritual life 
 of man. Thus Herrmann la}^s down clearly that " a 
 Holy Spirit who was no more than the spiritual life 
 of the Church, would surel}^ not be the Holy Spirit 
 of the New Testament. Nor does the latter concep- 
 tion correspond to the Holy Spirit which the believer 
 has before his eyes, if he imagines merely an earthly 
 power. The Christian who burns with the Holy 
 Spirit, stands under the influence of a power high 
 exalted above earthly possibilities." ^ 
 
 Bornemann is even more emphatic. " The Spirit 
 in* its clearness and power is only given to Christians 
 through Christ : the whole true Christianity is a 
 wonder of God, a proof of the Divine Spirit, of the 
 Divine power working within." ^ Again he says, 
 *' The Spirit of God is that life in which God Him- 
 self and Christ are present to us." " He is the power 
 on which depends the coming of the Kingdom, the 
 
 ^ A', r. hi. 444. ^ RenTcisLun, Th. Lit. 1891, 263. 
 
 •* Unterricht in Christentum (2nd ed.), 87. 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY 173 
 
 assurance of Divine love, the activity of the word, 
 the courage of trust, the renewal of life, the impulse 
 of child-like prayer, the joy of service, the truth of 
 our faith, the power of forgiveness, the understanding 
 of love, the certainty of hope, the confidence of labour, 
 the centre of Christian assurance, the fulness of gifts, 
 the genuineness of Christian belief; the peace, joy, 
 freedom and glory of Christendom and of every 
 single Christan soul — on Him all depend." The 
 rhetoric of this passage will not blind us to the 
 fact that the author has transformed Ritschl's vague 
 and unsatisfactory definitions into the ordinary ex- 
 pressions of orthodox belief. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 THE PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST 
 
 It is by its doctrine of Christ that any theological 
 system claiming the name of Christian must be tested. 
 What t/mzk ye of the Christy whose Son is He ? 
 is the question to which every school of Christian 
 thought must seek to find an answer. Nor can it 
 be charged against Ritschlianism that it is indifferent 
 to this momentous question. The Ritschlian theo- 
 logians one and all insist upon the unique importance 
 of a true understanding of Christ, for in Him as the 
 sole revelation of God all true theology is centred. 
 
 Thus Ritschl begins his discussion on the person 
 and work of Christ by affirming that " Christianity as 
 an universal religion is so constituted that in view of 
 the world a definite place must be assigned to its 
 historical founder." ■"■ In this Christianity is to be 
 distinguished both from all ethnic religions, and also 
 from those other religions, Islam and Buddhism, 
 which also lay claim to universal supremacy. With 
 the utmost emphasis he repudiates the thought of a 
 Christianity without Christ. He condemns the view 
 that " Jesus taught a lofty morality, but in the exer- 
 cise of this vocation never transgressed the limits of 
 1 R, V. iii. 364. 
 
PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST 175 
 
 a purely human estimate of himself; — only through 
 wholly extraneous influences have His followers been 
 led to regard Him as the incarnation of the Deity. 
 This view is histoncally false. For beyond all 
 doubt Jesus was conscious of a n^y^ and hitherto 
 unknown relation to God, which He declared to His 
 disciples, whom it was His aim to bring into the 
 same attitude to the world as His own." ^ 
 
 It is therefore necessary for a right understanding 
 of the origin of the community, and for our proper 
 participation in the same, to recognize and to under- 
 stand the enduring relation between the community 
 of the Kingdom of God and its founder Jesus Christ.^ 
 
 There are two aspects from which Christians may 
 approach the figure of the historical Christ. 
 
 (i) In Christianity the aim of the Christian is con- 
 ceived as the attainment of eternal life. The religious 
 vocation of the members of the Christian community 
 is prefigured in the person of its founder, and rests 
 upon His power and presence as its abiding source 
 of strength.^ Thus the ideal of self-realization is 
 bound up in Christianity as the perfect religion. 
 
 (ii) But Christianity embodies also the perfect 
 revelation. Islam makes the same claim, but being 
 content to acknowledge Mahomet as only a prophet 
 under God it is content with a more or less superficial 
 and imperfect recognition of its founder. Christ 
 claims that He brings the perfect revelation of God, 
 so that beyond what He brings, no further revelation 
 is conceivable or to be expected.* 
 
 That Christ, then, on the one hand is the perfect 
 revealer of God, on the other, the type of spiritual 
 
 1 R. V, 365. 2 Unterricht, 15. ^ j^ y^ iji_ ^i^^^ * j^-^^ ^g^_ 
 
1/6 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 lordship over the world, is expressed by attributing 
 to Him the predicate of Godhead. 
 
 The Godhead of Christ must not however be con- 
 sidered as involving an essential dissimilarity between 
 the Lord and His disciples : on the contrary, it is the 
 guarantee of the possibility of mutual relation and 
 similarity. This relation between the Godhead of 
 Christ and the raising of the members of the com- 
 munity, and their true destiny over the world, is 
 expressed in the old Greek formula — avro? yap evr^v- 
 6pco7rt](T€v iva rjfxeU OeoiroujOwjixev^ — but the idea was 
 gradually lost sight of in the Latin Church, which 
 pushed to the fore the mediatorial activity of Christ 
 — a conception which served only to widen the gulf 
 between the Divine Christ and human kind.^ 
 
 The Latin mediaeval church accepted the old 
 CathoHc formula of the One Person in two Natures, 
 but after a multitude of ingenious but unsuccessful 
 attempts at explanations was constrained by the 
 failure of all such efforts to confess its inability to 
 reach any real knowledge of its object, while mediae- 
 val piety was fain to treat Christ as though the 
 Godhead did not belong to Him at all.^ 
 
 An elaborate discussion of Luther's position shows 
 that he accepted the doctrine of the two Natures but 
 may be claimed as introducing two new elements. 
 
 (a) The Godhead of Christ is not exhausted by 
 maintaining the existence of his Divine Nature : in 
 His life and exertions as man, the Godhead was 
 manifest and effective to salvation. 
 
 ^ Athanasius, De Incam. liv. For He was ??iade man that we viight 
 be made divine. 
 
 2A'. K. iii. z^^' "^^bid. 367. 
 
PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST 177 
 
 {b) Luther restores the religious valuation of 
 Christ's Person — for it is through trust in our 
 Redeemer that we find our Lord and our God.^ 
 
 Ritschl notices some objections only to brush them 
 impatiently aside. It is objected that such a theory 
 denies the true Godhead of Christ, or concedes it only 
 in name ; Christ is after all nothing but a " mere 
 man." Ritschl's argument at this point becomes 
 somewhat sophistical, but he finally draws us back to 
 the distinction between religious and scientific know- 
 ledge. It is by the former alone that we can know 
 Christ as our God. " If Christ is my Lord through 
 that which He has done and suffered for my soul, if 
 I honour Him as my God when I trust in His might 
 and love for my salvation, that is a judgment-value 
 of the direct kind. The judgment does not belong to 
 the realm of disinterested scientific knowledge like 
 the Chalcedonian formula. Consequently in so far as 
 my opponents demand a judgment of the latter kind 
 in this connexion, they simply proclaim themselves 
 incapable of distinguishing between religious and 
 scientific knowledge, and not much at home in the 
 true religious sphere. All acts of religious knowledge 
 are direct judgments of value. We can only know 
 the nature of God and the Divine through an appre- 
 ciation of its value for our own salvation." ^ The 
 same argument is applied later, where Ritschl scorn- 
 fully retaliates upon his objectors. " If they are really 
 the religious and well-informed persons they prcfess 
 to be, let them prove it by showing that they know 
 how to distinguish between religious and scientific 
 knowledge."^ It may also be mentioned at this stage 
 
 1 R. V. iij. 369-375. ^Ibid. 376. ^ Ibid. 439. 
 
 M 
 
178 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 that Herrmann in the latter part of his pamphlet 
 on " Metaphysik in Theologie " employs almost 
 precisely the same argument which Ritschl has up to 
 this point advanced.^ He insists over and over 
 again on the religious as distinguished from the 
 metaphysical proof of Christ's Divinity. 
 
 But to proceed with Ritschl. It may be naturally 
 asked how this theory harmonizes with the representa- 
 tions of the New Testament Ritschl accordingly 
 applies himself to the task of dealing with the 
 Biblical evidence as to the Godhead of Christ. He 
 begins by warning us that the supposition that a 
 uniform doctrine of Christ's Godhead can be exegeti- 
 cally constructed from the New Testament is a false 
 assumption. There are two types of presentation — 
 the Pauline, and the Johannine. 
 
 (i) Christ is called Lord — which among the Jews 
 was equivalent to God — in virtue of His supremacy 
 over the world, into which Christ has entered through 
 His exaltation at the right hand of God." The attri- 
 bute Lordy then, denotes the Lord exalted over the 
 world, and exalted over the Church. (It must not 
 be forgotten that according to Ritschl, the latter is 
 the primary relation.) Whatever goes beyond this 
 practical attribute Lo7^d belongs to the sphere of 
 special " knowledge," that is of intellectual knowledge 
 which raises far more problems than it solves.*^ That 
 
 ^ Herrmann, op. cit. 51-82. 
 
 "The LXX almost invariably employ KiJpios to translate niH^ ■ ^^^ 
 it was thus by the fearless application to Christ of O.T. passages 
 referring to the Lord that the Apostles first approached and sought to 
 solve the problem of our Lord's divinity. 
 
 '^ R. V. iii. 379. 
 
PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST 179 
 
 passages of this nature exist in the PauHne Epistles 
 suggesting the pre-existence of Christ, and His con- 
 nexion with the work of creation, is not to be denied. 
 Thus St. Paul speaks of " one Lord, Jesus Christ, 
 through whom are all things, and we through Him." ^ 
 Even more emphatic are the expressions in the 
 Epistle to Colossians. " He is before all things and 
 in Him all things consist : He is the first begotten 
 of all creation, for in Him were all things created."^ 
 By a violent exegesis Ritschl converted these ex- 
 pressions into references to the exalted Christ 
 Orthodox fathers, he says, had, in the attempt to 
 " cut up the Arian argument by the roots," referred 
 the passage to the Incarnate Christ — an interpreta- 
 tion which, as Lightfoot shows, disregards history, 
 shatters the context, and could only have arisen in 
 the pressure of theological controversy."^ How that 
 great scholar would have characterized the Ritschlian 
 interpretation, is manifest ; for even Dr. Garvie com- 
 plains of his " arbitrary and artificial " methods. 
 Ritschl, however, insists that irpooroTOKo? must be 
 taken metaphorically ; that " the temporal priority 
 of Christ before the world cannot be the point at 
 issue — that would be a barren thought.* The similar 
 expressions in Ephesians must be taken to refer 
 to the exalted Christ,^ for ultimum in executione est 
 priviuin in intentio7te. This will explain the reference 
 to the Son in the Epistle to the Hebrews, " through 
 whom God made the worlds." ^ This expression 
 also must be taken as referring to the exalted Son 
 
 ^ I Cor. viii. 6. '^Col. i. 15-20. 
 
 =^ Lightfoot, Ep. Col. pp. 146-148. ^R.V. iii. 380. 
 
 ^Eph. i. y6^ 10-30. ^Heb. i. 3. 
 
i8o RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 of God who has assumed His pre-destined Lordship 
 over the world, 
 
 (ii) We come now to the Johannine form of ex- 
 pression. Here we move in a different circle of 
 thought. The controlling ideas are the conception 
 of the Incarnate Word, and His manifestation to 
 men as the full embodiment of Divine grace and 
 truth. Ritschl describes the significance of the 
 Johannine formula as consisting in the thought that 
 " the Word, which is the general form of divine 
 revelation, has in Him become a human Person." ^ 
 Ritschl ignores the intimations of pre-existence which 
 occur in the writings of St. John no less than in the 
 Epistles of St. Paul." The Johannine type of pre- 
 sentation, he holds, reflects the experience of the 
 community of disciples. 
 
 Now in one respect both these forms of represen- 
 tation are similar — they are essentially religious. In 
 other words they aim at describing the significance of 
 Christ for the world-view which He first brought to 
 light, and for the corresponding self-estimate of the 
 individual. The two ideas are in no sense exclusive, 
 but mutually complementary. St. John insists that 
 the influence of Christ is not to be sought solely in 
 the past, but is yet present: yet the idea of the God- 
 head of the exalted Christ depends entirely upon 
 whether the signs of His Godhead are to be found in 
 His historical existence upon earth.^ 
 
 '* If the Godhead of Christ is a Christian postulate, it 
 
 ^ R. V. iii. 302. 
 
 '^In the first edition he simply set aside the Lord's saying in John 
 viii. 58, as unintelligible, iii^. 357. 
 
 ^R.r. iii. 382,383. 
 
PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST i8i 
 
 must be demonstrated to us in His influence upon our- 
 selves. But every form of influence exerted by Christ 
 must find its criterion in the historical form of His life. 
 Therefore the Godhead or universal lordship of Christ 
 must be apprehended in the definite features of His 
 Jiistorical life, as an attribute of His temporal existence!' ^ 
 
 Having thus established his own position Ritschl 
 discusses the various kenotic theories which have 
 been advanced by way of an explanation of the two 
 natures in Christ. His general criticism is that such 
 explanations begin with metaphysical theories of the 
 divine nature rather than with the historical person- 
 ality. Despite much speculative ingenuity, these 
 theories have failed to combine a true humanity with 
 the divine nature. The only way in which com- 
 bination is possible, is by divesting the divine nature 
 of the distinctive attributes. It is nothing else than 
 mythology which is taught under the name of the 
 Kenosis of the Divine Logos.^ 
 
 Ritschl finds a strong supporter in Dr. Garvie who 
 states with apparent seriousness that the ecclesiastical 
 dogma of Christ's Divinity seems to sacrifice on the 
 one hand the unity of the Godhead ; and on the 
 other the unity of Christ's Person.^ It might have 
 been considered obvious to any one who had studied 
 the historical origin of the Christological dogma, that 
 these were exactly the two truths which the formula 
 of the two natures in one person was expressly in- 
 tended to safeguard. Garvie continues, " The kenotic 
 theories are commendable as, attempts to do justice 
 to the historical personality of Jesus while assuming 
 the ecclesiastical dogma ; but are unsatisfactory in 
 
 '^ Ibid. iii. 385. '^ Ibid. 384-393. ^Garvie, Ritschlian Theology, 271. 
 
i82 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 putting an undue strain on the passages of the New 
 Testament which are supposed to teach the doctrine, 
 and in venturing on bold assertions about the constitu- 
 tion of deity which go far beyond the legitimate 
 compass of our intelligence in these high matters." 
 
 The discussions on this subject in Germany during 
 the Reformation leading to the opposing views of the 
 " Kryptiker " and the " Kenotiker " may furnish illus- 
 trations of the kind of language which Dr. Garvie 
 condemns, but on the other hand it is perfectly 
 impossible to deny the mysterious fact of the self- 
 limitation of the Son of God if we would be true to 
 Scriptural teaching. EavTov eKevwaei/^ and €irTu)-)(€vaev 
 irXoucrio^ wv^ express a truth to which reflection 
 could not have failed to lead us, that the humiliation 
 of Christ must be regarded *' as being a voluntary act 
 of love ; a state maintained by a continuous act of 
 unwearied will." ^ Of course there are difficulties in 
 the conception of a single personality in a double 
 sphere of consciousness : but we cannot demand the 
 solution of all the hidden things of God to suit our 
 intelligence. In the self-humiliation of Christ, we 
 believe that God was really acting and working 
 under human conditions. And to a Scriptural 
 Christian the conclusion that " the Kenosis consisted 
 in a deliberate abstention on the part of the Logos 
 from Divine powers that might at any moment have 
 been resumed," ^ will seem a more reasonable deduc- 
 tion from the facts as they are revealed to us than 
 Ritschl's sweeping assertions and denials. 
 
 ■^ Phil. ii. 7; Me emptied Himself. 
 
 2 2 Cor. viii. 9; Being rich ^ He became poor, 
 
 ^Ouley, Doctrine of Incarnation, 609. ■* Ibid. 612. 
 
PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST 183 
 
 If then we are not allowed to approach the Christo- 
 logical problem from the point of view of Christ's 
 nature, how shall we proceed ? By a consideration of 
 His work, His vocation. " The theological solution 
 of the problem of the Divinity of Christ must be 
 based on an analysis of the activity of Christ for the 
 salvation of mankind in the form of His community."^ 
 
 Ritschl avails himself of the old ecclesiastical 
 formula of the three offices of Christ. As anointed 
 with the Divine Spirit, He is not merely king, but 
 priest and prophet also.^ The historical connexion 
 of Christianity with the religion of the Old Testament 
 explains the fact that Jesus comes before us as a 
 divinely sent prophet, who knows the counsel of God 
 concerning the world, and all men therein. As 
 prophet He speaks what He has heard from God 
 and what He has seen.^ 
 
 As priest, Christ maintains His own nearness to 
 God, and brings His people near. Ritschl discusses 
 this subject under a separate heading ; * and his 
 interesting and original conception is of importance 
 in understanding the doctrine of forgiveness. 
 
 But He is above all the priests and prophets of 
 the Old Covenant, for as the Son of God and 
 promised King of David's seed. He comes not to 
 prepare but to possess the Kingdom of God. This 
 kingly office is His highest function, corresponding to 
 the great central conception of the Kingdom of God. 
 
 Such then is Christ's vocation ; what may be 
 learnt from it as to His person ? First, Ritschl 
 
 1 R. V. iii. 393. '"■ Ibid. 394. 
 
 ^ Unterricht, i6 ; cf. John vi. 46 ; viii. 26, 38, 40. 
 
 "* Die priesterliche Leistung Christi fur sick^ R.V. iii. 444-456. 
 
i84 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 would have us realize the possibility of seeing real 
 personal development in the fulfilment of Christ's 
 task : and secondly, in His work for others we must 
 yield to Him a unique position. For, even should 
 another hereafter rise to His height, it would be 
 through His example and work alone. " As He, as 
 the founder of the Kingdom of God, and as the 
 bearer of the moral dominion of God over mankind, 
 is the only one in comparison with others who have 
 received from Him the same final determination, so 
 He is that magnitude in the world in whose self-end 
 God makes His own self-end in an original manner 
 operative and manifest ; whose whole activity in His 
 vocation, accordingly, forms the matter of the com- 
 plete revelation of God present in Him, or in whom 
 the word of God is human person." ^ 
 
 This cumbrous sentence is a measure of the 
 difficulties encountered by an interpreter of Ritschl. 
 Its meaning however is clear. Christ realizes God's 
 purpose, and reveals God's nature. What, then, are 
 we to think of Christ ? That to us He has the 
 value of God. But what more ? Is He, then, 
 God ? Ritschl puts the question aside, for no 
 answer can be given. " How the Person of Christ 
 became that which it is for the moral and religious 
 consciousness, is no proper subject for theological 
 investigation, for the problem stretches out far 
 beyond the limits of any possible investigation of 
 whatever kind." ^ To a meaningless question we 
 can only return a meaningless answer. Where the 
 problem is insoluble, solutions are without value. 
 Christ exists for faith, and not for reason. 
 
 ^R.V. iii. 426. ^Ibid, 426. 
 
PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST 185 
 
 In the Unterricht Ritschl deals with the 
 whole question in a less diffuse and more easily 
 intelligible manner/ In the moral world, he declares, 
 the authority of every personality depends on the 
 correspondence to be noticed between the vocation 
 and its fulfilment. Applying this test to Christ, 
 we notice : 
 
 (i) The fidelity of Christ in the fulfilment of 
 His mission. His was the highest possible vocation 
 — to found the Kingdom of God : and to it He 
 consistently applied Himself in the highest possible 
 way. Despite the enmity of the Jewish hierarchy, 
 despite the misunderstandings of the populace, and 
 manifold temptations, He displayed a marvellous 
 consistency and steadfastness in the execution of 
 His purpose through words of truth and acts of love, 
 and through patience and submission. 
 
 (ii) The task of Christ, the final purpose of His 
 life, was also that which He recognized as the 
 final purpose of God Himself He thus exhibits 
 " a solidaric unity with God." In this complete 
 identification of His own will with that of God in 
 the bringing of the Kingdom, Jesus is unique, for, 
 starting from His own consciousness and with no 
 example to imitate. He is the type of humanity 
 bound to God in His Kingdom. As such He is 
 the original object of God's love ; and it is through 
 His mediation that the love of God rests upon the 
 members of the Kingdom. 
 
 (iii) Corresponding to the solidaric unity of Jesus 
 with the supra-mundane God in the realization 
 of the supra-mundane kingdom we find Christ's 
 ^ op. cit. 16-20. 
 
i86 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 supremacy over the whole world. This attribute of 
 kingship, as Ritschl rightly insists, is not to be seen 
 solely in statu exaltationis?- It was in patience and 
 suffering, in the voluntary submission to the death 
 of the Cross as the means of ultimate victory, that 
 Christ's kingship was most truly shown. Not by virtue 
 of His miraculous powers, but in absolute indepen- 
 dence of the world's standards, in entire disregard of 
 its pains and pleasures did Christ exercise perpetual 
 sovereignty. It is this freedom, this kingship that 
 He bequeathed to all believers ; it is this kingship 
 which He Himself the Head of the Kingdom first 
 manifested in His own Person.'^ 
 
 These are the three grounds upon which we may 
 predicate the Divinity of Christ. They may be 
 reduced to two — the complete revelation of God's 
 grace and truth, through Christ ; and the perfect 
 supremacy over the world. ^ The signs of Christ's 
 Godhead may also be expanded as follows : 
 
 (i) He is the revelation of grace and truth — the 
 specially divine attributes of Him concerning whom 
 we have learned to say that God is love. 
 
 (ii) He manifests an entire independence of His own 
 religious self-consciousness in opposition to the world. 
 
 (iii) He proved the truth of His claim by His 
 actual success in founding the supra-mundane King- 
 dom of God. 
 
 (iv) He alone is able to reproduce His own 
 .attributes in the members of His community, 
 
 1 R. V. iii. 407. 
 
 2 In addition to the passage in Unterricht already cited, cf. R. V. 
 423-438, esp. 430 ff. 
 
 ^ Unferricht, 19. 
 
PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST 187 
 
 (v) but never loses, nor can lose His original 
 uniqueness. 
 
 That this is an adequate explanation of the 
 doctrine of Christ's Godhead can hardly be main- 
 tained, though of course it would not be denied that 
 through these things the Godhead is manifested to 
 men. Ritschl maintains that the union of will is 
 something far more real and more important than 
 any union of nature. It is through the will that the 
 nature is known. But the vital defect of the 
 Ritschlian theology is that we never go back from 
 the will to the nature — from the manifestation of 
 Godhead to the mystery of the Incarnation which 
 underlies, explains, and combines all the outward 
 manifestations. 
 
 This seems the most suitable point to consider 
 the Ritschlian attitude to the fact of Christ's Resur- 
 rection and to those attributes of miraculous power, 
 and of sinlessness, which are generally urged in 
 favour of a belief in Christ's Divinity. 
 
 Ritschl admits the sinlessness of our Lord ; but, 
 as he denies original sin and regards actual sin only 
 as " an apparently unavoidable product of the human 
 will under the given conditions of its development " ^ 
 the admission does not commit us to anything more 
 than that Jesus was an exceptional man, who 
 reached a standard not hithero attained, yet humanly 
 attainable. 
 
 As to the Resurrection, Professor Swing, in his 
 ■entirely appreciative and undiscriminating eulogy of 
 the Theology of Albrecht Ritschl^ maintains that it is 
 really the pivot of the whole system. This is a. 
 
 ^ Unterricht. 26. 
 
i88 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 ludicrous exaggeration. Ritschl, it is true, speaks 
 continually of the exalted Christ ; but never once in 
 the course of the thousand and more pages of his 
 great work does he make an unambiguous reference 
 to the Resurrection : and in the index the subject is 
 entirely ignored. In the Unterricht he alludes in 
 quite a casual manner to " the reawakening of Christ 
 through the power of God," ^ as the natural ending 
 of such a life as His, the only ending corresponding 
 to the value of His Person. But it must be dubious 
 how far this must be understood as equivalent to 
 the orthodox belief that on the third day He rose 
 again according to the Scriptures. Many other 
 passages seem to show that the idea of the resurrec- 
 tion must be taken as equivalent to that of the 
 exaltation to the right hand of God, an expression 
 which denotes the confidence of the community that 
 her Lord's influence is still a present power in her 
 midst, and that the purpose of His life was not 
 frustrated but fulfilled in death.^ 
 
 With regard to miracles, Ritschl speaks as if 
 Christ was conscious of, and actually possessed, a 
 miraculous power ; ^ but miracles he elsewhere tells 
 us are to be considered from a religious, not from a 
 scientific point of view. They must on no account 
 be regarded as contraventions of the established 
 order of nature. Miracle does not create, but pre- 
 supposes faith. Every man in the religious life 
 experiences miracles, and it is wholly gratuitous to 
 cast doubt upon the miracles experienced by others."* 
 We have thus reached a definition of miracle which, 
 
 ^ Unterricht^ 1 8. '^ Ibid. 20. 
 
 ^ R. V. iii. 430. * Unterricht^ 12, 13. 
 
PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST 189 
 
 from its excessive vagueness, precludes attributing 
 to Christ the exercise of any truly supernatural 
 powers. 
 
 The attitude of Ritschl in this respect is practically 
 that of the entire Ritschlian school. Thus Harnack 
 says of the miraculous element in the Gospels : 
 " The question of miracles is of relative indifference 
 in comparison with everything else which is found 
 in the Gospels. It is not miracles that matter." ^ 
 In another work he lays down the position that 
 " the historian cannot regard a miracle as a sure 
 historical event ; every individual miracle remains 
 historically quite doubtful, and a summation of 
 things doubtful can never lead to certainty."" Thus 
 also Herrmann : " The discussion for or against the 
 trustworthiness of the narratives of miracles is a 
 matter of perfect indifference for the theology of the 
 present day," '^ and in his later book he insists 
 upon the impossibility of making religion depend 
 upon a historical judgment.^ The immediate im- 
 pression wrought by Christ upon our souls is wholly 
 independent of the results of modern criticism of the 
 Gospel narrative. It is impossible not to feel much 
 sympathy with this attitude. Herrmann appeals to 
 the teaching of Luther in support of his position. 
 " If the miracles of Christ had never taken place, 
 or if we knew nothing of them, we should still have 
 sufficient hold on the Word, without which we could 
 have no life." ^ 
 
 ^Harnack, JVkat is Christianity? 31. ^ Hisiory of Dogma^ i. 65. 
 
 ^ Herrmann, Die Religion^ etc. 383. 
 
 ■* Contmunion with God^ (6th edition), 56. 
 
 ^Herrmann, op. cit. 1S4. 
 
190 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 It is almost an obvious truism when Harnack, 
 after stating " it is not miracles that matter," 
 proceeds to explain that " the question on which 
 everything turns is whether we are helplessly yoked 
 to an inexorable necessity, or whether a God exists 
 who rules and governs, and whose power to compel 
 Nature we can move by prayer and make part of 
 our own experience." ^ That is true ; but it is the 
 miracles of the Lord Jesus that gives us the assur- 
 ance of our freedom, and tell us of a power of love 
 above the mechanical forces of natural causation. 
 Moreover, the miracles of the Lord were not so 
 wholly for unbelievers as Herrmann would lead us 
 to suppose by his citations from Luther." It was St. 
 John, whose spiritual instincts had been quickened 
 by long years of Christian reflection and experience, 
 that saw most clearly in those wondrous works the 
 " signs " by which Christ manifested forth His glory. 
 
 Coming to the Resurrection, we find great diversity 
 among the Ritschlian theologians, but a fundamental 
 unanimity also — for all are agreed that in some sense 
 the Lord is alive for evermore. Harnack for instance 
 declares that " every conception which represents the 
 resurrection of Christ as a simple resurrection of His 
 mortal body is far from the original conception." 
 Indeed he goes so far as to say that " history does 
 not give the slightest cause for the assumption that 
 Jesus did not remain in the grave." ^ Similarly in 
 his popular lectures on the essence of Christianity he 
 explains that " if the resurrection meant nothing but 
 that a deceased body of flesh and blood came to life 
 
 ^Harnack, IV hat is Chnstianiiy? "^l. ^Herrmann, op. cit. 1S5. 
 ■^Harnack, Dogmengeschichtc^ i. 87. 
 
PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST 191 
 
 again, we should make short work of this tradition. . . . 
 The New Testament itself distinguishes between the 
 Easter message (of the empty grave) and the Easter 
 faith (the conviction that the Crucified yet lives). . . 
 Either we must decide to rest our belief on a founda- 
 tion unstable and alwa}^s exposed to fresh doubts, or 
 else we must abandon this foundation altogether, and 
 with it the miraculous appeal to our senses." ^ 
 
 Herrmann in his earlier works seems disposed to 
 accept the literal resurrection ^ but in his more famous 
 book on the "Communion of the Christian with God" 
 makes it quite clear that he attaches no real import- 
 ance to the resurrection in this sense. In Christianity 
 nothing else is necessary than to proclaim Christ. 
 In no sense is it helpful to such a proclamation to 
 insist, supported by New Testament references and 
 doctrines, on narrating that Jesus was born as Son 
 of God, of a pure Virgin, that He taught this or that, 
 wrought many miracles, even raised the dead, nay 
 that He Himself rose again, and, since His ascension 
 to the Father, rules with almighty power. These 
 and similar stories do not constitute the Gospel. 
 Indeed at the present day so far from helping, they 
 positively hinder faith.^ Wendt believes that the 
 predictions of Christ " directly conveyed only the 
 thought that Jesus would after the briefest interval 
 be awakened from death to the heavenly life with 
 God." * Kaftan however takes a much more positive 
 view. He cannot understand how any Christian 
 theologian should accept the impossibility of miracles 
 
 1 What is Christianity? 163-165. 
 
 '^Herrmann, Die Religion, etc. 386. 
 
 ^Herrmann, op. cit. 63. ^ Wendt, Die Lehre/esu, ii. 243. 
 
192 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 as a fundamental axiom. ^ He speaks with emphasis 
 of the central place that the Resurrection takes in the 
 scheme of Christian revelation.^ The task of the 
 Apostles was to be witnesses of the Resurrection. 
 The latter is the determining factor of Christian 
 revelation. From a human stand-point the revela- 
 tion without the appearance of the Risen Christ 
 would have been without result. Knowledge of Jesus 
 means knowledge of Him Who is risen. The Re- 
 surrection is an essential element of the Apostolic 
 preaching, without which we should never have 
 received the Gospel.^ Haring and Kahler also un- 
 equivocally admit the fact of Christ's literal rising 
 again. 
 
 To resume, we may state that the Ritschlian 
 School do not seek in the virgin-birth, in the sinless- 
 ness, in the miraculous power, in the resurrection of 
 Jesus any substantial evidence for the Godhead of 
 our Lord. We may sum up the teaching of Ritschl 
 on the subject, by predicating Divinity of our Lord, 
 inasmuch as He was the perfect revealer of the 
 Father's grace and truth, and also manifested inward 
 supremacy over the world. The objection — brought 
 against Ritschl impartially by theologians of all 
 schools — that the attribute of Godhead is placed 
 only in the will and not in the nature of Christ, is 
 met by the assertion that the difference is epistemo- 
 logical, not theological. In every sphere, he argues, 
 the nature is known from the will. So also it is 
 in the good and world-ruling will of Christ that we 
 must recognize His nature. It is hopeless to regard 
 
 Kaftan, i??'^ Wahrheii^ 561. "^ Das IVesen, 333, 334. 
 
 ^ Das Wesen^ 348 ; cf. 250 ff. 
 
PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST 193 
 
 it as a kind of mechanical consequence of natural 
 combinations/ Are we then justified in saying that 
 Christ is God by nature ? Ritschl unreasonably bars 
 the way. The question how the Person of Christ is 
 to be derived from God or comes to possess its moral 
 or religious value, lies entirely outside the scope of 
 theological investigation.^ 
 
 Therefore Christ under the attribute of pre-exist- 
 ence is not revealed but hidden. The expression 
 " before Abraham was, I am," must not be supposed to 
 have any reference to the Divinity of Christ. It was 
 spoken to close a discussion, not to state a doctrine.^ 
 The Eternal Godhead of the Son of God is perfectly 
 intelligible only for God Himself But only for God, 
 " since for us as pre-existent Christ is hidden^ * 
 
 As at the right hand of God exalted, Christ rules 
 in present power over the community of the Divine 
 Kingdom : but any immediate relation of prayer 
 which may be supposed to exist between Him and 
 individual believers is excluded, for as exalted He is 
 hidden from our sight!" The formula of the exal- 
 tation of Christ to the right hand of God either is 
 for us without content because Christ " as exalted is 
 directly hidden from us or is the occasion of all 
 possible mystical fanaticism, unless one refers it to the 
 power of His historical acts and words as the endur- 
 ing influence in His community." ^ Towards the close 
 of the third volume Ritschl recurs to this subject, and 
 draws an important distinction. He carefully abstains 
 
 1 R, V. iii. 440. '"■ R. V. iii. 426. 
 
 ^ R. V. (first edition), 357. The remark is suppressed in later 
 editions. 
 
 ^Ibid. 443, 444. ^ R, V, iii^. 381. '•407 ; cf. 384. 
 
 N 
 
194 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 from speaking of any real presence of Christ in the 
 community, or in the beHever's heart. He speaks of 
 Christ conceived as present, but not as really present.^ 
 
 We cannot, says a most sympathetic reviewer, 
 repress the judgment that Ritschl has allowed him- 
 self to be misled by his views as to theoretic 
 knowledge, into impoverishing the original Christian 
 relation to Christ, the exalted and present Lord.^ 
 
 It becomes clearer now what Ritschl means by a 
 return to the historical Christ : for both as exalted 
 and as pre-existent, Christ is hidden from us. His 
 Godhead must only be sought in the definite traits 
 of His historical life — His temporal existence.^ 
 
 Ritschl rejects entirely Kaftan's key-text — the life 
 hid with Christ in God. The glorified state in which 
 Christ is assumed to dwell means nothing to us ; 
 and unless we are prepared to fall into the extrava- 
 gances of mysticism, the exaltation must be inter- 
 preted as " the perpetuation of Christ's image and 
 influence in the Scriptures and in the Church." * 
 We may close this section by citing the words 
 with which Ritschl himself closes that part of his 
 instruction which is concerned with the doctrine of 
 Christ : " The continuance of the Christian com- 
 munity is grounded in the fact that the memory of 
 the completed life-work of Christ remains present in 
 her, and that corresponding to this conception the 
 personal impulse of her Founder works on unceas- 
 ingly in all the like strivings of her members. 
 These ideas form the open side of the mystery of 
 the exaltation to the right hand of God." ^ 
 
 1 R. V. iii. 562. 2 Ecke, 62. ^ /^/^_ gj. 
 
 ^ I\. V. iii. 383 ; cf. Unterricht, ig. ^ Unfe7-richt^ 20 
 
PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST 195 
 
 It need hardly be said that the RitschHan 
 Christology evoked a storm of opposition, and also 
 revealed grave differences of opinion between indi- 
 vidual members of the school. The objections, 
 however, were not directed against his methodical 
 or historical treatment of the Christological problem, 
 nor merely against his denial of personal pre- 
 existence to the Son of God. It was the denial 
 of immediate personal access to Christ, the exalted 
 Lord, and the restriction of the predicate of God- 
 head to the earthly historical life and work of Christ 
 that roused the most energetic protest. For religious 
 interest is not exhausted in the conception of the 
 Lord of the Community ; it also centres round the 
 Saviour of individual believers — the Good Shepherd 
 who knows our needs and hears our prayers.^ 
 
 Ritschl condemns this type of piety as mystical, 
 but thereby shows himself incapable of distinguishing 
 a healthy type of sound biblical piety from later 
 conceptions and accretions. Kaftan refuses to be 
 frightened by a name, and boldly declares that there 
 is a mystical side to Christianity, and that a distinc- 
 tion must be made between those mystical elements 
 which are common to all true religions and that 
 mysticism which represents a false unchristian form 
 of piety. ^ 
 
 The real quarrel with Ritschl is not concerned 
 with pre-existence, but with the possibility of imme- 
 diate access to a personal Saviour. On Ritschl's 
 side we have Herrmann, Harnack, and Schultz ; on 
 the other, Haring, Kahler, Bornemann, Kaftan, Ecke. 
 A few illustrations may be given. 
 
 ^ Ecke, 64. '-^Kaftan, Das fVesen, 262, 263. 
 
196 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 Thus Schultz, following Ritschl's lead, urges the 
 uniqueness of the revelation brought by Christ, but 
 yet insists on His essential similarity to many 
 brethren ; in other words, that Christ was purely a 
 created being even as others. " The belief in the 
 Godhead of Christ has to prove, in accordance with 
 the Scripture intimations, that the motives and 
 purposes which are revealed by the personality of 
 Christ in the work of Christ are recognized as the 
 proper and complete motives and purposes of God 
 Himself, and that as such they bear in themselves 
 a world-controlling power and wisdom." This we 
 discover to be the case in Christ. But " such a 
 human life, realizing divine, not worldly ideals, is 
 not to be explained from worldly conditions. It is 
 a secret, a mystery ; not in any sense as if on 
 account of this secret, this mystery, the Person 
 of Christ should straightway be separated from 
 the other children of God ; for in the last resort 
 every personality and its development in relation 
 to the kingdom lies hid in the secret of the 
 eternal counsel of God and the power of His 
 Spirit" 1 
 
 Herrmann was, at an earlier stage, disposed to 
 accept the idea of pre-existence. " I certainly have 
 the conviction that faith in Christ was led by a 
 natural process to the representation of a pre- 
 existence of Christ, and indeed of a personal, not an 
 ideal, pre-existence."^ But "the communion of the 
 Christian with God " strikes a different note. This 
 remarkable work really deserves a more thorough 
 
 ^ Schultz, Die Lehre von der Gottheit Christie 467. 
 ^ Die Religion^ etc., 449. 
 
PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST 197 
 
 examination than we can givc.^ The theory which the 
 writer seeks to estabhsh, is that our communion with 
 God is only made possible through the immediate 
 impression the soul receives, when confronted with 
 the image of the historical Christ. The writer denies 
 any direct working of God either on or in the soul. 
 The Gospels present us with a picture to which the 
 soul must yield, and yielding knows that God Him- 
 self has drawn near. Communion then is the result 
 of the historical manifestation. What else does this 
 teach us of Christ ? It tells us of His Godhead and 
 His exaltation. Herrmann would have his readers 
 accept the Divinity of our Lord, though not in the 
 usual ecclesiastical sense. In that which Jesus does 
 for us we grasp the purpose of God directed to our 
 salvation, or God Himself as personal spirit working 
 upon us. This is the form in which a man recon- 
 ciled with God through Christ must necessarily 
 acknowledge the Godhead of Christ, even if he 
 repudiates the expression.^ The Divinity of Christ 
 must in no sense be represented as a partaking of 
 a Divine substance — a mode of thought neither 
 monotheistic nor religious, but as the revelation of 
 the Divine will to which all is subject, and the 
 Divine power that constrains and frees our souls. 
 " The Godhead of Jesus can only be understood in 
 the sense that the mind and will of the eternal God 
 meets us in the historically active will of this 
 
 ^ From an English standpoint the book, is made somewhat tedious 
 owing to the elaborate attempt to show that the author's positions are 
 in harmony with the teaching of Luther. 
 
 2 Verkehr^ Il6; cf. also 133. ^ Ibid. 14I. 
 
198 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 With reference to the exalted Christ, Herrmann 
 is eloquent with almost mystical fervour. " Now 
 Jesus lives and is perfected, freed from earthly 
 limitations. Now He is most perfectly that which 
 He would be. . . . We must be convinced that 
 the exalted Lord knows how near or how far we 
 stand in relation to Himself."^ In moments when 
 we are tempted to despair of a successful issue in 
 our ceaseless struggle we are cheered by the thought 
 that the Lord who has conquered is still at our side 
 with all His human sympathies.^ These things, 
 however, are " thoughts of faith," most useful and 
 even necessary ; but it does not follow that they 
 actually correspond to fact. That is of minor 
 importance compared with their practical value, 
 which is to lead us to hold communion with God, 
 through whom we receive power to overcome the 
 world. The means thereto is to hold fast the image 
 of the historic Christ, and to live in the confidence 
 that the Exalted One is by our side.^ But if that 
 is really so, why not hold communion with Him ? 
 This Herrmann forbids absolutely. Of a communion 
 with the Exalted Christ there can be no mention} 
 Through the historic life of Jesus, God is made 
 manifest, but the Exalted Christ is hidden from our 
 eyes. That He helps our infirmities with might and 
 sympathy is simply a thought of faith. There is no 
 fact by which it can be substantiated. The resurrec- 
 tion is based on doubtful historical testimony ; the 
 work of the Spirit in the world may be called in 
 question. The Christian must admit that the Exalted 
 
 1 Verkehr, 233. ^ Ibid. 
 
 ""Ibid, 233. ^IHd. 234. 
 
PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST 199 
 
 Christ is yet hidden from him ; ^ he can only have 
 communion with Christ in faith, not in experi- 
 ence.^ 
 
 Herrmann gives us the most fully reasoned de- 
 velopment of Ritschl's views in this respect, but 
 despite its six editions it is difficult to take this 
 work quite seriously. There is no adequate apprecia- 
 tion of the distinction that should be drawn between 
 a fact of faith and a fact for faith. Moreover, it is 
 self-contradictory to base all upon a historical revela- 
 tion, and then profess entire indifference towards 
 historical criticism. We may also ask how it is 
 possible to speak of an immediate impression of the 
 historical Christ when such a faith is really mediated 
 to us through the witness of the Gospels, the teach- 
 ing of the Church, early associations, and spiritual 
 environment. Finally as judged by a scriptural 
 standard, Herrmann's theory must be pronounced 
 wholly inadequate, for Jesus and the Resurrection 
 was the substance of the Apostolic preaching, and 
 the life of the earliest believers was hid with Christ 
 in God. 
 
 Kaftan recognizing these' facts — and they are 
 nothing less — takes far firmer ground. He admits 
 that Christian faith has always ascribed to the his- 
 torical person of its Lord a supernatural dignity 
 which found expression in the Divine worship paid 
 to Him since the earliest times. He recognizes also 
 that the Divinity of our Lord is the cardinal problem 
 for any Christian theology. Kaftan quite deliberately 
 refuses to discuss the Christological dogma of the old 
 Catholic church, and sets out to seek an interpretation 
 
 1 Verkehr^ 235. '^ Ibid. 236. 
 
200 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 of Christ's Godhead which will " correspond with the 
 Christian religion.'' 
 
 It is along two lines that Kaftan would establish 
 the doctrine of the Lord's Divinity. 
 
 (i) The exalted Christ is the highest good of 
 Christian belief. 
 
 (ii) The historical Jesus is the perfect revealer of 
 the Almighty Father. " Who knows Him, knows 
 God. He is God manifest in the flesh, that is, 
 among men. As the exalted and revealed Christ 
 is the highest good of humanity, so was J esus 
 dwelling on the earth the perfect revelation of God 
 in the world." ^ 
 
 The evangelical picture of the life of Christ cor- 
 responds entirely to this conception of His Godhead. 
 
 We see in Him the incarnation of the holy love of 
 God. " He is the man in whom God caused the 
 fulness of His eternal being to dwell, so that for us 
 He is the image of the invisible God." ^ 
 
 A certain ambiguity clings about these expressions 
 — but in the light of Kaftan's later utterances, we are 
 justified in taking them in their most favourable 
 sense. " We cannot call a man God — the word is 
 too great and weighty — unless we truly mean that 
 the Eternal God has come to us in Him. ... If we 
 believe in the Godhead of the Lord, then we believe 
 also in His origin from above, from God." ^ 
 
 Ecke, whose book upon the theological school of 
 Albert Ritschl must be regarded as the classical 
 exposition of Ritschlianism, writing from an ex- 
 tremely sympathetic but judiciously independent 
 
 ^Kaftan, Das PVesen, 335. ^ Ibid, 339. 
 
 ^ Brauchen wir em neues Dogina ? 58. 
 
PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST 201 
 
 standpoint, indicates the real defect of the Ritschhan 
 theology in this vital point of the Lord's Divinity. 
 " The question is never raised," he says, " if our 
 strong emphasizing of the power of the historical 
 work of Christ does not constrain us to assume a 
 supra-historical background." He complains, with 
 justice, *' that the witness of the earliest community 
 to the influence of the exalted Lord, supported by 
 many writers, and manifested by many signs follow- 
 ing, is too often ignored in discussions of this 
 question." ^ 
 
 Dr. Garvie, whom no one will accuse of undue 
 prejudice against Ritschl, repeats what is practically 
 the same criticism, " The Christ of faith," he 
 insists, must be conceived " as actor as well as 
 spectator in Christian history — a truth Ritschl fails 
 to state with the clearness which would save him 
 from being misunderstood." ^ But it is not merely 
 a truth which Ritschl fails to state : it is a truth 
 he fails to see. For him the exalted Christ, to use 
 his own words, is hidden. Yet the Acts of the 
 Apostles should have made it manifest how very 
 different a view prevailed in the earliest community 
 of believers. 
 
 Ritschl, and Herrmann after him, seek to establish 
 the Godhead of Christ as a judgment of value — a 
 thought of faith, while denying, or at any rate 
 refusing to affirm. His essential dignity. But it is 
 impossible to be content with equivocation. What 
 think ye of Chi'ist ? Whose son is He ? An answer 
 is imperatively demanded. Ritschlianism leaves the 
 sudden appearance of a man supernaturally endowed 
 
 ^ Ecke, op. cit. 70. ^Garvie, 277. 
 
202 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 to be the bearer of a perfect revelation, an inex- 
 plicable and isolated phenomenon in human history. 
 But this is utterly unscientific. The fact of Christ 
 must be co-ordinated with other facts, as the Chris- 
 tian revelation cannot adopt a self-enclosed attitude, 
 nor refuse to take cognizance of external knowledge. 
 
 It is in the interests of religion that Ritschlianism 
 presents us with a non-metaphysical, or, to use a 
 plainer term, a humanitarian view of Christ. But it 
 is just the religious interests which feel the most 
 outraged by the Ritschlian conception. We may 
 admit the real service done to theology by the fresh 
 insistence on the historical aspect of the Lord's 
 Person, on the completeness of His revelation, on 
 the fact that He is alive for evermore ; but religion 
 must have facts on which to found its faith. To 
 insist upon a historical view of Christ which is 
 constructed in defiance of historical principles seem 
 little less than an absurdity. But that is the position 
 of Ritschlianism ; for while informing us that its sole 
 revelation principle is the historic Christ, this theology 
 nevertheless feels itself at liberty to discard anything 
 in the sacred narrative which it chooses to consider 
 as of secondary importance. Faith founded on 
 history cannot claim to be impregnable to historical 
 ■criticism. 
 
 But purely from a religious point of view it 
 cannot be said that Ritschlianism offers ^ny advan- 
 tages over the traditional Catholic belief. For a 
 Christ with whom we cannot hold communion, a 
 Christ whose presence by our side it is not ours to 
 feel but to fancy, a Christ to whom we may not 
 pray, is not the Christ of Christian experience any 
 
PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST 203 
 
 more than He is the Christ of the evangelical record 
 and apostolic preaching. 
 
 In spite of Dr. Garvie's protests and strained 
 defence, we cannot but think that Dr. Denney is 
 justified when he says : " We must as rational beings 
 try to clear up to our minds what is necessarily 
 involved in the existence among men of a person 
 who has the religious value of God. Theologians 
 who refuse to go beyond this are invariably found to 
 cover, under the guise of a religious indifference 
 to metaphysics, a positive disbelief of everything 
 which gives Christ's Godhead an objective character. 
 They do not admit the supernatural birth ; they do 
 not admit the pre-existence taught by St. Paul ; they 
 do not admit the doctrine of the Incarnation of the 
 Logos, at least as taught by St. John." ^ 
 
 What think ye of Christ ? Whose son is He ? 
 We have the Ritschlian answer before us, but it 
 lacks both the simplicity and the depth of the 
 scriptural witness and the Church's creed. Not so 
 have we learned Christ, and not so did the Apostles 
 bring the world to the foot of the Cross. 
 
 ^Denney, Studies in Theology ^ \^. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 SIN AND SALVATION 
 
 It is impossible to have a right conception of 
 Christ's redeeming work without a right conception 
 of sin, and " it is impossible to have an adequate 
 conception of sin without an adequate conception of 
 God. The Hebrews in general, and St. Paul in 
 particular, had this ; and that is why sin is such an 
 intense reality to them. It is not a mere defect, the 
 coming short of an ideal, the mark of an imperfect 
 development. It is something more than a negation: 
 it is a positive quality, calling forth a positive re- 
 action. It is a personal offence against a personal 
 God. It is an injury or wound — if the re-action 
 which it involves may be described in such human 
 terms as injury or wound — directed against the Holy 
 One, whose love is incessantly going forth towards 
 man. It causes an estrangement, a deep gulf of 
 separation, between God and man." ^ 
 
 Such is the Scriptural doctrine concerning sin. 
 It is not a mere falling short of a human ideal, but 
 involves disobedience to the will of God. This view 
 necessitates a corresponding conception of God as 
 essentially righteous and holy. In virtue of His 
 ^ Sanday and Headlam, Romans (3rd edition), 144. 
 
SIN AND SALVATION 205 
 
 essential righteousness, there is a wrath of God against 
 sin. Sin, just because it is directed against an all-holy 
 God, must be visited with punishment. "The soul that 
 sinneth, it shall die." ^ It is of course needless to 
 press the statement of the third chapter of Genesis 
 as to details : it is sufficient to point out that, in the 
 simplest form, the early prophet who first incorporated 
 those popular traditions into the national history, has 
 given us an account of the nature and character of 
 sin, which have never been surpassed. The knowledge 
 of the Divine will, the deliberate transgression of the 
 Divine command, the consciousness of guilt, the 
 separation from God, the Divine punishment on sin, 
 and the perpetuation and transmission of this hateful 
 tendency are the essential truths of the narrative 
 beyond which centuries of experience and reflection 
 have not enabled us to make much advance. How 
 man came to know the Divine will is another matter : 
 the point is, that man possessed of such knowledge, 
 yet found himself free to act in deliberate defiance of 
 right and wrong, and that to all men there is a 
 tendency towards evil, self-condemned no less than 
 condemned of God. 
 
 How then were sinners to be reconciled to God ? 
 " God was in Christ, reconciling sinners to Himself." 
 But it was only through the Cross that reconciliation 
 was in any wise made possible. Nothing, indeed, is 
 more impressive than the entire unanimity of the 
 Apostolic writers in this respect. However varied 
 their exegetical methods, or their Christological con- 
 ceptions, in this they are all agreed, that the death 
 of Christ had a sacrificial value, that by the shedding 
 
 ^ Ezek. xviii. 4. 
 
2o6 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 of His blood He vanquished sin and restored man's 
 true relation to God by a perfect atonement : that 
 His death is our only plea, and that through His 
 blood we receive forgiveness of all our sins. Nor 
 ought we to ignore the fact that the Apostolic lan- 
 guage was suggested by our Lord Himself, who spoke 
 of the giving of His life as a ransom for many} and 
 expressly connected the shedding of His blood 
 with the idea of sacrifice by which the old Covenant 
 had been inaugurated, and through which the new 
 Covenant would be fulfilled (Mt xxvi. 28). 
 
 But there is a human side also. Man must repent, 
 and must believe. There must be a change of mind, 
 a determination to turn from sin to God, and also 
 faith in Christ, through whom redemption is wrought, 
 an enthusiastic acceptance of the Redeemer's claims, 
 and adhesion to His Person. Such faith on the 
 human side is met on the Divine side by justifica- 
 tion. The believer, in reality ungodly^ is accounted 
 righteous? God looks at the man's change of heart, 
 rather than on his past record ; and he accepts him as 
 just and righteous. In other words, justification is the 
 free and full forgiveness of sins. It is not the making 
 righteous, but the accounting righteous — such is the 
 inexorable verdict of philological and grammatical 
 considerations — or, in other words, the remission of 
 sins at the outset of a man's Christian career. In 
 the sacrament of baptism that promise is sealed and 
 ratified: indeed, as in the early Church a non-baptized 
 Christian could not even have been imagined, no 
 great care was exercised in discriminating between the 
 effects of justification and baptism. It may perhaps 
 
 ^Mk. A. 45: Mt. XX. 28. ^i^oni. iv. 5. 
 
SIN AND SALVATION 207 
 
 be said, that while justification looked towards the 
 past, regeneration pointed to the future. Justification 
 was the doing away of the old conversation, re- 
 generation was the birth into new life. Baptism, by- 
 its expressive symbolism, sealed the promise of 
 forgiveness of the past ; yet typified not only the 
 death of the old man, but also the resurrection to 
 newness of life in the power of God. 
 
 As baptism was always accompanied by the 
 solemn profession of faith, as it marked the believer's 
 entrance into the Christian community, as it typified 
 and fulfilled all the conditions of the new birth, it 
 was so closely connected with regeneration as to be 
 practically indistinguishable from it, though of course 
 the actual baptism always remained the outward side 
 of an act whose inward significance was summarized 
 in the word regeneration, " a death unto sin and a 
 new birth unto righteousness.'' 
 
 After baptism, the believer found himself welcomed 
 as a new member of God's family in Christ. He 
 then became aware that the electing love of God had 
 adopted him into the full privileges of sonship : he 
 became the son of God by adoption and grace. 
 
 By grace : for it plainly was not earned by man's 
 merits. " Not by works of righteousness that we 
 have done, but according to His mercy God saved 
 us, by the washing of regeneration and renewing of 
 the Holy Ghost, which He shed on us abundantly 
 through Jesus Christ our Saviour, that being justified 
 by His grace, we should be made heirs according to 
 the hope of eternal life." ^ 
 
 Justification then is but the first step in the 
 
 ^ Titus iii. 5-7. 
 
2o8 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 Christian life : it is God's answer to our act of faith in 
 Christ : it is sealed in baptism when we are received 
 into the congregation of Christ's Church, and, cleansed 
 from sin, receive new birth from God. Within the 
 Christian community, we are called to live answerably 
 to our Christian calling, wherein we are assisted by 
 the Holy Spirit, who helpeth our infirmities. Justi- 
 fication issues in the life of sanctification, and living 
 thus, we may, with God's help and for Christ's sake, 
 hope to attain to full and complete salvation. Thus, 
 in one sense, those that are justified are also those 
 that are being sanctified : and those that are being 
 sanctified are those that are being saved. It is im- 
 portant that justification, sanctification, and salvation 
 should all be distinguished in thought ; but it is only 
 a false isolation, an unreal abstraction, that would 
 view them in entire independence. They are all most 
 intimately connected : yet to confuse them either in 
 time or in thought leads to disaster, as the history 
 of the doctrine abundantly proves. The scriptural 
 doctrine is this : " by our life we shall be judged 
 . . . but we are saved by Christ's death ; and 
 the initial act of faith has been the hand which we 
 stretched out to receive the Divine mercy." ^ 
 
 Having sketched the orthodox doctrine of sin and 
 salvation, which, whatever its defects, may certainly 
 claim the merits of clearness and coherence, we turn 
 to see what Ritschlianism has to offer us in its place. 
 That the Ritschlian theory necessitated profound 
 modifications of the ordinary view is manifested from 
 the fact that Ritschl starts with a wholly inadequate 
 conception of the righteousness of God. The formula 
 
 ^ S. H., Ro7nans^ p. 153, 
 
SIN AND SALVATION 209 
 
 God is love is supposed to prove that God can 
 only be known in the form of will, and this in its turn 
 is supposed to exclude all those attributes of power 
 and holiness with which Scripture clothes its concep- 
 tion of Godhead. " Since it follows as a settled 
 result of the assumption of the personality of God, 
 that He is real only in the form of will, it is bad 
 metaphysics to ascribe to Him righteousness as a 
 quiescent attribute, which belongs to Him apart from 
 the form of will." ^ We note in passing the strange 
 appeal to metaphysics to demonstrate a view to 
 be untenable in a sphere from which ex hypothesi 
 metaphysics are excluded. 
 
 What interpretation then does RitschI give of the 
 Biblical phraseology which finds in the idea of the 
 Divine holiness the fitting expression of the very 
 essence of Deity ? The holiness of God in Himself 
 is but another way of expressing the righteousness of 
 God in active operation. This fundamental deter- 
 mination of the Divine character expressed in 
 the phrase, the righteousness of God^ is of course 
 capable of various interpretations ; for the idea itself 
 is differently understood by the different writers of 
 the Old Testament and New. At one time it refers 
 to God's truth in the fulfilment of His promises to 
 His people, at another to the destruction of those 
 who set themselves in perpetual opposition to the 
 chosen people. RitschI seizes on such passages, and 
 claims that they justify the identification of the 
 Divine righteousness with grace and truth.^ In this 
 connection he refers to Rom. iii. 25-26, but the 
 language of that passage carries us far beyond any 
 
 ^ R. V. iii. 237. ^ Unterrzckt, 12. 
 
2IO RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 Ritschlian interpretation of righteousness. " Whom 
 God set forth to be a propitiation through faith in 
 His blood for a display of His righteousness : be- 
 cause of the passing over of sins that are past in the 
 forbearance of God, with a view to the display of His 
 righteousness at the present time, so that He might 
 be at once righteous (just) and declaring righteous 
 (justifying) him which believeth in Jesus." Without 
 entering upon a full discussion of this passage (which 
 is of paramount importance for the understanding 
 of the apostle's thought concerning the Divine 
 righteousness) we may at any rate insist that no 
 interpretation does justice to the language if it fails 
 to lay stress on the following points : 
 
 (i) The death of Christ was with a view to the 
 demonstration of the righteousness of God. 
 (ii) The way in which the death of Christ demon- 
 strated the righteousness of God was that it 
 proved the impossibility of passing over sin. 
 (iii) The death of Christ was of the nature of 
 sacrifice by which the Divine righteousness 
 was set free, as it were, to embrace all 
 believers. 
 
 It is impossible on any sound exegesis to eliminate 
 the idea of justice from righteousness, or to treat the 
 latter solely as if it were equivalent to God's faithful- 
 ness in carrying out His purposes of love. 
 
 But Scripture speaks also of the wrath of God. The 
 natural interpretation of this expression is to regard 
 it as denoting the Divine righteousness in collision 
 with sin. In the Old Testament the Divine wrath 
 breaks forth upon Israel for violation of the Covenant, 
 
SIN AND SALVATION 211 
 
 and upon the enemies of Israel for their cruel treat- 
 ment of the chosen people. In the prophets the idea 
 becomes more prominent, and is associated with the 
 doctrine of the Day of Jehovah — dies irae^ dies ilia — 
 when the Lord will gather out of His Kingdom all 
 that offends, and will utterly destroy with the breath 
 of His fierce anger those that oppose themselves 
 to Messiah's rule. Ritschl is therefore correct in 
 regarding the expression as predominantly eschato- 
 logical. It must also be admitted that where the 
 phrase recurs in the New Testament, there, also, it 
 is mainly used in an eschatological sense, though 
 with some notable exceptions ; ^ but this admission 
 cannot justify the deduction that the doctrine of*' the 
 wrath of God has no religious value for Christians." "^ 
 Ritschl does, however, admit (at the sacrifice of con- 
 sistency) the possibility of the wrath of God being 
 manifested in the annihilation of the obdurate and 
 impenitent. But this is no more than an entirely 
 hypothetical contingency. " Whether there are such 
 persons, and who they are, lies within the scope 
 neither of our practical judgment nor of our theo- 
 retical knowledge." ^ 
 
 We next feel inclined to ask what is the meaning 
 of those Biblical representations as to a Divine judg- 
 ment which are as common in the New Testament 
 
 ^ For the eschatological use cf. Mt. iii. 7 ; i Thess. i. 10; Rev, vi. 
 16, 17 — for the other senses, cf. Rom. i. 18 ; I Thess. ii. 16 (in both of 
 which cases the reference is rather to an actual condition than to a 
 future judgment) and Rom. xii. 19, where r\ dpy-i) is plainly the Divine 
 wrath. 
 
 2^.F. ii. 154. 
 
 ^ iii. 363; Ritschl's discussion of the significance of the wrath of 
 Godis contained in his second volume, cf. ii. 140-142 ; 154, etc. 
 
212 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 as in the Old. The Ritschhan exegesis is not 
 unequal to the strain. The idea of a government of 
 the world by punishment and reward is repeatedly 
 and emphatically repudiated. It is a case of false 
 analogy, the Divine kingdom being regarded rather 
 as the dispensing of justice on the lines of an earthly 
 government, than as the discipline of a family. 
 
 Ritschl points out three main differences between 
 the Biblical idea of government by punishment and 
 reward, and the popular conceptions of Divine rule : 
 
 (i) There is absolutely no question as of any 
 
 rights between man and God. 
 (ii) There is no real equivalence between reward 
 and worth, punishment and unworthiness, 
 (iii) No immediate coincidence between evil and 
 guilt, goods and goodness, such as may 
 occasionally be experienced in individual 
 cases, gives the least right to expect from 
 God any such correspondence.^ 
 
 He proceeds to show how this idea of government 
 by punishment and reward borrowed from the pro- 
 cedure of an earthly state — at best a merely mechani- 
 cal relation — is superseded by the organic relation of 
 ground and consequence, and declares that the scheme 
 of retribution in the final judgment is superseded by 
 the analogy of seed and harvest.^ 
 
 The whole passage is somewhat unconvincing, as 
 it hardly seems to make any serious attempt to 
 grapple with the persistent recurrence of the opposite 
 representation in every type of Biblical writing. In 
 his chief work we find the subject treated quite 
 
 ^ Unierricht, 13. "^ Ibid. 14, 15. 
 
SIN AND SALVATION 213 
 
 differently. In the first edition he rejected the idea 
 of the reformatory theory of punishment, and sought 
 its whole significance in retributive character. In 
 support of his position, he quotes Kant to the effect 
 that " in every punishment as such, there must first 
 be justice, and this constitutes what is essential to 
 the notion." -^ In later editions we see that he has 
 persuaded himself that this idea of Divine retribu- 
 tion is a Hellenic notion, yet almost immediately he 
 goes on to show that it cannot be considered ex- 
 clusively Hellenic after all — for it is an idea " that 
 attached itself to the representation of a reciprocal 
 relation of rights between man and God which is 
 found among the Gi^eeks^ Romans^ and Israelites from 
 the fact that with these peoples the state is valued 
 even in a religious sense as the highest good." ^ 
 
 Such being the Ritschlian conception of the 
 righteousness of God, we cannot be surprised that 
 the modern theology is utterly deficient in its doc- 
 trine of sin. In this respect also, Ritschlianism is in 
 accord with the dominant tendency of the age, which 
 is nowhere more marked than in the attempt to 
 minimize the significance of sin. 
 
 In the doctrine of sin, as in all else in the 
 Ritschlian theology, the idea of the kingdom must 
 be i-egarded as absolutely determinative. Sin is an 
 impossible abstraction unless viewed in connection 
 with that will which it contravenes : evil has no reality 
 in itself save as the contradiction of that good to 
 which it is opposed. It therefore becomes impossible 
 to form any true conception of the nature or effects 
 of sin apart from the corresponding good which 
 1^. F. i. 417. '^\\\. 343. 
 
214 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 Christianity offers. The latter is to be found in the 
 idea of the kingdom consisting of men bound to each 
 other by laws of virtue, bound also to God who loves 
 them in His Son ; the kingdom in which are united 
 man's highest moral and religious ideals. Such is 
 the promise of the kingdom, but, as Augustine says, 
 " nondum regnat hoc regnum." The kingdom is not 
 actually realized, but only in process of development. 
 Whatever, therefore, stands in the way of this de- 
 velopment, whatever impedes the realization of its 
 moral and religious aims, whatever is opposed, even 
 unconsciously, to the extension of its sway among 
 men, is therefore to be classed as sin and evil. 
 At an earlier period Ritschl was prepared to allow 
 much weight to the moral law as determining the 
 character of sin : and this moral law found its 
 expression and sanction in the Will of God, its 
 source and its upholder ; but subsequently this view 
 was almost entirely retracted, and the teleological idea 
 of the kingdom of God is used as the supremely regu- 
 lative conception in this as in all other departments of 
 Christian theology. 
 
 Sin, then, is whatever opposes itself to the king- 
 dom. It shows itself in a loss of confidence towards 
 God. But if we have thus discovered its true nature, 
 what of its origin ? Ritschl dismisses the Augustinian 
 theory of original sin, although almost in the same 
 breath appealing to Augustine for the support of his 
 definition. " Post lapsum Adae omnes homines 
 secundum naturam propagati nascuntur cum peccato, 
 hoc est sine metu dei, sine fiducia erga deum et cum 
 concupiscentia." ^ Though he denies the fact of 
 
 ^ Conf. Aug. i. 2. 
 
SIN AND SALVATION 215 
 
 original sin, Ritschl is not prepared to admit, save 
 theoretically, the possibility of the sinlessness of any 
 member of the human race ; for universal sinfulness 
 is a fact empirically established, which cannot be 
 gainsaid. With regard to anyone born of Christian 
 parents, the knowledge of the kingdom of God 
 involves a knowledge of sin. Born into a kingdom, 
 straining, struggling, often set back, the Christian is 
 no more perfect than the kingdom into which he is 
 born. The child of God falls wherever the kingdom 
 fails ; and thus to be a Christian involves not merely 
 the knowledge of sin, but the practical certainty of 
 sinning. But it is possible to take wider ground. 
 The human will had not in the beginning acquired a 
 full understanding of the perfect good : the will, with 
 its desires for the good, was in a perpetual process 
 of development ; it is a growing quantity incapable 
 of appreciating, still less achieving, the highest good. 
 A universal necessity for sinning cannot be estab- 
 lished from a consideration either of the constitution 
 of human nature or of moral evolution, or of any 
 known purpose of God. This argument makes it 
 possible to admit the sinlessness of Jesus as not 
 being in any essential contradiction to His human 
 nature. Sin originates from the impulse to use -to 
 the fullest possible extent that freedom with which 
 man is born into the world, and the use of this 
 freedom continually coincides with all those manifold 
 temptations to selfishness which as a matter of fact 
 arise out of the sinfulness of society. "^ Thus we 
 reach the conclusion that " sin is an apparently 
 unavoidable product of the human will under the 
 
 ^ Unterricht, 22. 
 
2i6 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 given conditions of its development, and is yet in 
 the consciousness of our freedom and independence 
 imputed by us to ourselves as guilt." ^ 
 
 The solidarity of the human race, the tangles and 
 complexities of all human relationships, make sin a 
 social rather than an individual matter. Self-assertion 
 and selfishness in every form, rebelling against all 
 ordinances for the common weal, have spread ruin 
 and disease throughout the social order. Such sins 
 in various forms have not merely effected a com- 
 bination, but have actually become stereotyped in 
 commonly accepted but wholly false standards and 
 principles. Conventional hypocrisies are crystallized 
 into tolerated abuses, which in their turn find embodi- 
 ment in evil institutions. Thus there arises a kingdom 
 of sin^ in opposition to the kingdom of God. Both 
 in the formation of individual character, as in 
 the regeneration of society, this evil principle, this 
 kingdom of sin, exercises its baneful activity. Sur- 
 rounded by vicious example and perverted influences, 
 those whose characters are yet undeveloped, whose 
 innocent eyes are yet untrained to pierce the 
 fine-spun web of evil and see the eternal realities, 
 are confronted with the well-nigh resistless power and 
 persuasiveness of sin. Yielding, they commit the 
 sinful act. But the process is not arrested at this 
 point. Sinful acts harden into sinful habits, and 
 sinful habits into sinful character. Thus evil pro- 
 pensities and dispositions are perpetuated, if not 
 inherited, and children are born into a kingdom of 
 sin. This is why infants are baptised — not to do 
 away with original sin, but that they may be trans- 
 
 ^ R. V. iii. 360. 2 Unierricht, 23 ; R. V. iii. 320. 
 
SIN AND SALVATION 217 
 
 lated from the kingdom of sin, with whose guilt all 
 are in some wise infected, into the kingdom of the 
 Son of His love.-"- 
 
 The full meaning of sin can only be seen in the 
 light of the kingdom of God ; but its character, as 
 the negation of man's true destiny, of the freedom of 
 the will towards the good, of the ordinance of God, 
 is established in another manner. At all stages in 
 the process of moral development we can trace the 
 power of self-judgment gradually emerging into 
 consciousness. This judgment of self begins in the 
 act of the individual, but it attains to a universal 
 supremacy. For the consciousness of guilt is really 
 the seed of all individual or social judgment of evil. 
 It is the proof that moral freedom has not entirely 
 succumbed to the power of sin : it is in no sense 
 a power that undoes the sinful past, or snaps the 
 cord of sinful habit. This guilt-consciousness has 
 its seat in the conscience; but conscience, as has been 
 remarked in an earlier chapter, must be regarded as 
 having rather an empirical than an intuitive origin. 
 
 It is this feeling of guilt that transforms physical 
 evils into Divine punishments. Ritschl, as we have 
 seen, emphatically repudiates any relation between 
 sin and natural evils. That there is no necessary 
 relation between individual sin and individual suffer- 
 ing is the theme of the loftiest literature of the Old 
 Testament. Whether we recollect the suffering 
 servant of Jehovah, or the example of Job, the 
 teaching is the same, that special calamities do not 
 necessarily imply special guilt. And the same 
 warning to men ready to make rash inferences 
 
 ^ j¥. F. iii. 320, 321. 
 
2i8 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 concerning sorrow and sin is enforced by the Lord. 
 " Suppose ye, they were sinners above all men, 
 because they suffered such things ? I tell you, Nay ; 
 but except ye repent ye shall all likewise perish ; " ^ 
 and again, *' Neither this man sinned, nor his parents, 
 but that the works of God might be made manifest 
 in him." ^ The apostles, also bearing in mind the 
 example of their Incarnate Lord, looked upon suffer- 
 ing, not in the light of punishment for their sins, 
 but as the highest privilege to which they could be 
 called, for thus they could be nearest their Master 
 and their King, and, called to suffer with Him, they 
 knew that they would also reign with Him in glory. 
 
 And yet it is equally clear that not only the 
 Old Testament prophets, but also Christ and His 
 apostles, recognized that God would not let sin go 
 unpunished. The prophets were never tired of in- 
 sisting that national sin inevitably entailed national 
 punishment — that individual sin merited perpetual 
 chastisement. His blood be upon us and upon our 
 children, cried the frenzied multitude of Jerusalem ; 
 and it came to pass, even as He had foretold, that 
 not one stone was left upon another, because the 
 Holy City knew not the time of her visitation. The 
 early Church was quick to see in the sudden death 
 of Ananias and Sapphira, in the revolting disease 
 that sent Herod to his living grave, in the blinding 
 of the sorcerer that withstood the Gospel, signal 
 chastisements for sins of perjury, pride, and hardness 
 of heart. St. Paul knew also how to hand over the 
 obdurate to Satan, that they might be taught not to 
 blaspheme, that their souls might be saved in the 
 
 ^ Lk. xiii. 1-5. -Jn. ix. 1-3. 
 
SIN AND SALVATION 219 
 
 day of the Lord. It is surely needless to multiply 
 instances. The entire volume of Scripture speaks 
 from almost every page assuring us that wind and 
 storm fulfil His word. The Son of God Himself, 
 with all the plenitude of His Divine power, was not 
 able (ovK rj^vvaTo) to work His gracious miracles of 
 healing because of their unbelief. Yet over and over 
 again the reward of faith was the saving of both 
 body and soul. 
 
 Moreover, although it may be unjustifiable rashly 
 to conclude that individual suffering must be the 
 measure of individual sin, yet this does not do away 
 with the connection between moral and physical evil. 
 " The Son of Man goeth as it is determined," " the 
 Christ must suffer " ; in other words, in this world 
 disordered by man's sin, the path of the sinless son 
 of man must be through suffering to victory. It is 
 sin that causes the evil : though it is not always he 
 that doeth the sin that suffereth the full consequence 
 thereof. 
 
 Ritschl, on the other hand, appears to ignore the 
 whole trend of Biblical theology in this direction. 
 The theory of the connection between physical evils 
 and moral transgression, he declares, is contrary both 
 to experience and to the teaching of Christ. A man's 
 idea of evil depends upon his temperament, his associ- 
 ations, his manner of thought — in other words, is 
 subjectively conditioned. One man will regard as 
 the loving chastisement of a father's discipline that 
 which another will look upon as an evil well-nigh 
 intolerable. It is the consciousness of guilt which 
 seizes upon some natural disaster, and sees in it a 
 sign of Divine displeasure. 
 
220 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 We have seen how summarily Ritschl dismisses 
 the representation as to the Divine judgment at the 
 end of the world. Here, at any rate, there can be 
 no question as to the Scriptural doctrine ; but Ritschl 
 puts the idea of reward and punishment calmly on 
 one side, and seeks to substitute another notion, which 
 after all is not contradictory, but complementary, to 
 the more usual conception. 
 
 In much the same way is treated the Scriptural 
 doctrine concerning death as the penalty of sin. It 
 is impossible to deny the teaching of St. Paul on 
 the subject ; but if it is impossible to deny, it is 
 yet possible to discredit. St. Paul, it is argued, 
 only arrived at his conclusion through a scholastic 
 exegesis.^ The apostolic argument is "no necessary 
 element of the Christian view of the world." 
 
 But there is another aspect of sin and guilt on 
 which Ritschl rightly lays the utmost stress. The 
 consciousness of guilt is always accompanied by a 
 feeling of separation from God, by a loss of that 
 trust and confidence towards Him, which can only be 
 possessed by a clean conscience and unstained life. 
 Sin interrupts the communion between the soul and 
 God, and the consciousness of guilt issues in complete 
 separation. 
 
 This sense of separation becomes all the more 
 intolerable within the Christian community : for here 
 man recognizes his true vocation in the kingdom of 
 God : here also he recognizes how, in the fulfilment 
 of his vocation, he is perpetually thwarted by that 
 consciousness of guilt, which springs not only from 
 his own sin, but also from his implication in that 
 
 ^ Unterricht^ 22 ; R. V. iii. 341. 
 
SIN AND SALVATION 221 
 
 universal kingdom of sin, in whose common guilt all 
 are partakers. Thus Christianity seems to confront 
 us with a heartless paradox : for the good news of 
 the kingdom serves only to accentuate man's sinful 
 condition. At this stage, the Christian doctrine of 
 redemption comes to solve the riddle, assuring us of 
 divine forgiveness through Christ, and of justification 
 and atonement. 
 
 The Christian doctrine of redemption must be 
 conceived as having an entirely spiritual, yet universal 
 significance. It is freed from all those political 
 associations with which it became entangled in Old 
 Testament literature, not to mention those predictions 
 of material welfare which abound even in the loftiest 
 psalms and prophecies. On the other hand, though 
 it must be individually appropriated, it is mediated 
 through the chosen people of God. 
 
 This justification or remission of sins, which fits a 
 man for the exercise of his Christian vocation, is 
 partly an act of the Divine will of love. The sinner 
 is received back into communion with God, and 
 permitted to co-operate in the work and final purpose 
 of God Himself, without his guilt or his consciousness 
 of guilt forming any bar to such communion or co- 
 operation. It is important to notice that in Ritschl's 
 scheme, justification does not mean the actual removal 
 of guilt, but only the abolishing of that sense of 
 separation which the consciousness of guilt engenders. 
 " The removal of guilt, and of guilt-consciousness, 
 would be in contradiction to the validity of the rule 
 of truth for God, as also for the conscience of the 
 sinner. . . . The Gospel of Forgiveness of Sins 
 does not remove the feeling of guilt for past sins, but 
 
222 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 only the effect of this in separation from God, or the 
 distrust of God inherent in it." ^ The forgiveness of 
 sins " is to be defined as the removal of the separation 
 which, in consequence of sin, has entered between 
 God and man." ^ " When God forgives or pardons 
 sin, He gives effect to His Will that the contradiction 
 in which sinners stand to Him, expressed in guilt, 
 shall not hinder their communion with Himself" ^ 
 " Justification signifies the leading back of the sinner 
 into nearness with God : the removal of the separation 
 from God, resulting from the existing contradiction 
 to God, and the accompanying guilt-consciousness." ^ 
 Or once more, "Justification or reconciliation is the 
 will of God as Father to admit sinners, notwith- 
 standing their sins and their consciousness of guilt, to 
 that fellowship with Himself, which includes the right 
 of sonship and eternal life." ^ 
 
 The idea of justification or forgiveness of sins 
 includes the more special doctrines of reconciliation 
 with God, and the adoption to sonship. In fact, 
 Ritschl much prefers the idea of adoption to the 
 whole nomenclature of justification. " The attribute 
 of father (implied by our adoption as sons,) stands in 
 relation to the peculiar rights and duties of the 
 fellowship of the family. For this reason, all investi- 
 gations on the position of God with respect to the 
 forgiveness of sins, hitherto derived from the analogy 
 of the head of a state, of the legal and relatively 
 moral fellowship of the members of a nation, appear 
 incongruent with the Christian idea of God." ^ One 
 can understand why Ritschl's intense dislike of any- 
 
 ^R.V. iii. 513. 
 
 '^/bid. 52. 
 
 ^Ibid. 61. 
 
 ^Ibid, 96. 
 
 "^Ibid. 114. 
 
 ^ Ibid. 92. 
 
SIN AND SALVATION 223 
 
 thing that savoured of scholasticism should lead him 
 to abjure the forensic associations inseparable from 
 the idea of justification ; but his argument seems to 
 apply, with no less force, to the unsuitability of the 
 regulative use of the kingdom of God as the all- 
 controlling conception in his theological scheme. 
 
 Such then is the Ritschlian treatment of the 
 
 idea of justification, which he regards as practically 
 
 • synonymous with forgiveness, reconciliation, and 
 
 adoption. But there are still four points of great 
 
 importance which must not be overlooked : 
 
 (i) Are all sins capable of Divine forgiveness ? 
 (ii) In what sense may Christ's death be said to 
 be connected with the forgiveness of sins ? 
 (iii) Is the society or the individual the proper 
 
 object of justification ? 
 (iv) What is the relation on this theory between 
 justification and sanctilication ? 
 To these four questions a fifth may perhaps be 
 added. In what sense may we speak of the im- 
 putation of Christ's merits, by means of which 
 justification can be mediated to sinners ? 
 
 (i) Addressing ourselves to the Ritschlian answer 
 to these cardinal problems, we observe with regard to 
 the first, that Ritschl falls into an error which he 
 himself condemns. The true idea of sin can only be 
 attained, on his showing, in contradistinction with the 
 idea of supreme good embodied in the kingdom of 
 God. What then of the sin that exists where the 
 latter conception is neither known nor recognized ? 
 The question is discussed at some length. Such sins 
 are done in ignorance : and because they are done 
 in ignorance, they are capable of pardon. There is 
 
224 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 of course much truth in Ritschl's contention. We 
 have the warrant of St. Paul for asserting that God 
 overlooked the sins that were past, in view of that 
 crowning manifestation of Divine righteousness which 
 was yet to come. Again, the Saviour based His 
 prayer for His murderers — and surely for others than 
 the Jews that sought, the Romans that sanctioned, 
 the soldiers that carried out the sentence of death — 
 on the ground that they knew not what they did, 
 thereby implying, that sins done with a full knowledge 
 might be outside the reach even of the Saviour's 
 intercession, beyond the bounds of Divine forgiveness, 
 even as, under the old dispensation, for presumptuous 
 sins done with a high hand no sacrifice could be 
 offered. Ritschl has thus apprehended a truth : but, 
 as in many other instances in the Ritschlian theology, 
 the apprehension of a truth leads to its exaggeration. 
 For Ritschl himself objects to the doctrine of original 
 sin, because it abolishes all distinction between the 
 different grades of sin ; yet his theory does practically 
 the same, for we are left with only two classes of 
 sin, those done in ignorance, and those in defiance 
 of the known will of God. Moreover, while ignorance 
 will of course be taken into account — for, if St. Peter, 
 following the Master's example, could excuse his 
 countrymen, and now^ bi^ethren^ I know that in 
 ignorance ye did it^ and shall not the Heavenly Father 
 hearken to His Son's prevailing intercession, for they 
 know not what they do ? — yet it seems utterly 
 impossible to suppose that the fact of ignorance is 
 the exclusive standard of Divine judgment. " Sin," 
 says Ritschl, " is judged not as the definite design 
 of contradicting the known will of God, but as 
 
SIN AND SALVATION 225 
 
 ignorance." ^ Thus Ritschl, " in his theory of sin, 
 plants himself upon the ground of the Greek intellec- 
 tualism, which he elsewhere so sharply criticises." ^ 
 
 (ii) We now come to the next question, as to how 
 far the forgiveness of sins is to be connected with 
 " the sacrifice of the death of Christ.'' Ritschl does 
 not trouble to deny what is incapable of denial. 
 He admits that the Christian church has not come 
 by the assurance of redemption or forgiveness of 
 sins through any such promise that Christ might have 
 made as the revealer of God in the fulfilment of 
 His prophetic vocation. On the contrary, He Him- 
 self, and after Him the oldest witnesses connect that 
 promise of redemption with the fact of His death. 
 Moreover, the sacrificial aspect of Christ's death 
 brings it into natural comparison with the sacrifices 
 of the Old Testament, particularly with those that 
 accompanied and ratified the inauguration of the 
 Sinaitic covenant, and still more with those yearly 
 remembrances of that covenant on the day of 
 atonement, whereby the forgiveness of sins was 
 symbolically effected and the covenant bond renewed 
 and preserved in its integrity.^ 
 
 Christ fulfilled those ancient sacrifices both as 
 victim and as priest ; and this necessitates an exami- 
 nation into what the Jewish sacrifices really were 
 intended to effect. 
 
 Ritschl, whose knowledge of Old Testament no 
 less than New Testament exegesis strikes one as 
 amazingly deep and comprehensive (even though he 
 may be guilty of partial selection and intermittent 
 
 '^R. V. z^T,. 2pflei(jerer, Die RztsckPsche Theologie, 88. 
 
 ■* Unterricht^ 31. 
 
226 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 insight) claims that the sacrifices of the Israelites 
 were in no way connected with the removal of guilt, 
 but were the gifts of those already within the 
 covenant to assure them of their communion, with 
 Jehovah. The LXX translators made a mistake 
 when they chose to render 1B2 (to cover) by 
 IXaa-KeaOat (to propitiate). " The protective cover- 
 ing of the offerers from the face of God includes 
 in general no reference to the sins of the same, but 
 has respect only to the effect that they are perishable 
 men." ^ The essence of sacrifice, therefore, was to 
 remove that distrust which formed the obstacle to 
 free and perfect communion ; and it was just this 
 that the death of Christ most effectively accom- 
 plished. Christ's death was the culminating act in 
 a life of unswerving obedience, by which Christ 
 maintained His own nearness to the Father, and 
 displayed His superiority to the world. And this 
 kingly and priestly vocation is potentially realized 
 in all members of His community. In Him the 
 new position of humanity before God is vindicated 
 and assured. " Christ's death in the view of the 
 Apostles is the compendious expression for the fact 
 that Christ has inwardly maintained His religious 
 unity with God and this revelation principle in the 
 whole course of His life." ^ So also justification is 
 connected with the death of Christ " by the positive 
 determination of the worth of the sufferings of Christ 
 as occasion of His patience, and as proof of His 
 fidelity in His vocation and of the steadfastness of His 
 faith." ^ Christ, therefore, by the sacrifice of His life 
 re-establishes the sinner's confidence to Godward and 
 1 J^. V. 204. 2 ^. F. ii. 51 1. 3 7^;v/. 524. 
 
SIN AND SALVATION 227 
 
 dispels his distrust, and thus a true atonement is 
 effected and reconcihation made between man and God. 
 
 But Christ is not only our victim, but our priest ; 
 and in the ending of His life, no less than in His 
 lifelong fidelity to His vocation, He fulfilled perfectly 
 all priestly ideals. Ritschl develops this conception 
 of Christ's execution of the priestly office for Himself 
 at great length, and concludes that it was in nearness 
 to God that the priestly ideal found its realization. 
 Orr pronounces this theory of RitschFs " a lame and 
 inconsequential attempt at interpretation," ^ but an 
 impartial and entirely independent study of the Old 
 Testament passages bearing on the subject has con- 
 vinced the writer that it was not so much in the 
 circle of sacrificial ideas, as in the conceptions of 
 personal holiness, constant access to God, and effec- 
 tual intercession for his fellow-men that the priestly 
 ideal proved most fruitful, and that an office so lofty 
 and so beneficent might well be associated (as indeed 
 it was in later prophecy) with the royal dignity.^ 
 
 Christ, then, maintained His own nearness to God, 
 but it was that He might bring others near. The 
 key-text for this interpretation he finds in i Peter, 
 iii. 18:" Christ also hath once suffered for sins . . . 
 that He might bring us to God." ^ 
 
 ^ The Ritschlian Theology ^ 154. 
 
 ^ A reference may perhaps be permitted to the section on the Priest in 
 the author's '' Value of Prophecy," 337-354. 
 
 ^ UnterHcht, 34; R.V. 214. Ritschl also compares Eph. ii. 16-18; 
 Heb. vii. 19, a. 19-22; and in the same sense Jn. xvii. 19; Heb. a. 14. 
 He might have compared i Pet. ii. iS-25, where occurs the remarkable 
 phrase, "who His own self bare our sins in His body on the tree that 
 we having died unto sins might live unto righteousness." To quote 
 from the most recent commentary: "The turn which St. Peter has 
 
228 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 Though Ritschl does well to emphasize the priestly- 
 character of Christ's work, and to insist that through 
 His perfect execution of the priest's office He has 
 won for us also that nearness to God which He 
 maintained for Himself, having made us a kingdom 
 and priests to God and His Father, yet it can 
 scarcely be contended that he does full justice to 
 the Old Testament idea of sacrifice or to the 
 phraseology of the New Testament with reference 
 to the propitiatory character of Christ's death. We 
 may, by way of contrast, quote the restrained but 
 impressive language in which some modern writers 
 seek to interpret the language of St. Paul on this 
 very subject. They speak of the death of Christ as 
 " a great cosmical act, the nature of which we are 
 not able to understand, but which at least presents 
 analogies to the rite of sacrifice, and to that particular 
 form of the rite which has for its object propitiation. 
 The whole sacrificial system was symbolical, and its 
 wide diffusion showed that it was a mode of religious 
 expression specially appropriate to that particular 
 stage in the world's development. Was it to lapse 
 entirely with Christianity ? The writers of the New 
 Testament practically answer. No. The necessity 
 for it still existed ; the great fact of sin and guilt 
 remained. There was still the same bar to the 
 offering of acceptable worship. To meet this fact 
 and to remove this bar there had been enacted an 
 event which possessed the significance of sacrifice. 
 
 given to the words represents Christ not only as the sin-offering who 
 bore the consequences of the sins of His people on the Cross of shame 
 {i^veyK€v iwl ti^ ^v'Kip)^ but as the priest who took the sins, or the sin- 
 offering [i] a/xaprfa, ra irepl ttjs afxaprias), and laid the sacrifice on the 
 altar of the Cross { dvrjveyKei' eirl t6 ^^\ov)," 
 
SIN AND SALVATION 229 
 
 And to that event the New Testament writers 
 appealed as satisfying the conditions which the 
 righteousness of God required." ^ To this we may- 
 add that if it is impossible to ehminate the concep- 
 tion of sacrifice from the New Testament, the idea of 
 propitiation is not less firmly established, and to the 
 question, " Who is propitiated ? " only one answer can 
 be returned ; but that is an answer for any echo of 
 which we listen in vain from the Ritschlian theology. 
 
 (iii) The consideration of the third point brings 
 us to a question which has aroused much contro- 
 versy. In no particular has the Ritschlian theology 
 been more persistently or more bitterly attacked than 
 in its description of the society as the proper object 
 of justification. On the other hand, in no particular 
 can Ritschlianism claim with better reason to present 
 a true exposition of Biblical theology. " Justification 
 or reconciliation relates, in the first instance, to the 
 whole of the religious community founded by Christ 
 which maintains the Gospel of the grace of God as 
 the primary means of its continuance, and to indi- 
 viduals on the condition that they enrol themselves 
 in this community through faith in the Gospel." ^ 
 The Ritschlian position is based upon a double line 
 of argument : (a) the analogy of the Old Testament, 
 (d) the express statements of the New. 
 
 Under (a) we have the fact that all the sacrifices 
 were of avail only for those already within the cove- 
 nant. We have a detailed account of the manner 
 in which the covenant embracing the whole people 
 was inaugurated with sacrifice, which is strangely 
 typical of Christ's redeeming death. Still more does 
 
 ^S. H., J^omans, p. 89. ^j?. F. iii. 132; cf. 545, 546. 
 
230 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 the ritual of the day of atonement undoubtedly 
 concentrate attention upon a sacrifice for sins whereby 
 the whole community could obtain forgiveness. 
 
 {b) Coming to the New Testament, we are con- 
 fronted with a series of phrases no less remarkable, 
 e.g. Acts XX. 28 : the Church of God which He 
 purchased through His own blood ;'^ and Eph. v. 25: 
 Christ loved the Church and gave Himself for her 
 that He might sanctify her} 
 
 On the other hand, Orr, with an almost savage 
 scorn, points to such expressions as Rom. iii. 26^: 
 {the Fathe'T) justifieth Jiini that is of the faith of 
 fesus^ But such and similar individualistic language 
 would not justify our rejection, without more ado, 
 of words which point just as strongly to the opposite 
 conclusion. The two forms of expression need in 
 no sense be considered as being necessarily in con- 
 tradiction. For, as Ritschl himself points out, the 
 community consists in its members,^ or, to quote 
 Ecke, the community is not '' ein blosses Gedanken- 
 ding." The members receive all the benefits of the 
 body — His body, the fulness of Him that filleth all 
 in all. 
 
 It is indeed remarkable — almost inconceivable to 
 modern ideas — how deeply this idea of fellowship in 
 a body cut into the heart and soul of Jew and 
 Christian in the days that are gone. To the exiled 
 
 ^Tr\v iKKXrjaiav rod Seov ■fjv TrepieTroiriaaTO Sia rov a'ifxaros tov Idiov. 
 
 -6 Xptcr^s TjydTTTjffev t7]v eKKkqfyiav Kal iavrbv -rrap^SuiKev vir^p a^rrij^ 
 tva ai}Ty)v ayLaar] Kadaplaas k.t.\. 
 
 ^Orr quotes as ii. 26. The references in this otherwise excellent 
 handbook are not always reliable, largely no doubt owing to fresh 
 editions of the works cited. 
 
 ^ biKaiovvTa tbv iK iriffrews 'Ifjaov, ^/^.V. ii, 160, l6l. 
 
SIN AND SALVATION 231 
 
 Jew exclusion from the sanctuary was almost equiva- 
 lent to exclusion from God. Cut off from the 
 company and worship of the faithful, he felt himself 
 cut off from God, the object of their worship. He 
 had, however, unintentionally forsaken the Lord ; he 
 lived in a constant dread that the Lord might there- 
 fore have forsaken him. 
 
 \Ye find it hard to suppress a superior smile at 
 such misgivings, but the early Christians would have 
 experienced no such aloofness. For, however strongly 
 we may be justified in asserting that at all times and 
 in all places acceptable prayer may both be offered 
 and answered ; yet, if the promises of Scripture, if the 
 teaching of Christ, if the practice of the apostles are 
 to have any weight, distinctive and particular blessings 
 are attached to united prayer, to common worship. 
 The Lord refused to recognize His disciples as a 
 mere conglomeration of individual units. He pro- 
 claimed a kingdom, an organized society, an all- 
 embracing Church. Into z't all believers were to be 
 baptized ; to its gatherings for worship the Lord 
 promised His special presence; through zts ministerial 
 hands the first disciples received the bread from 
 Heaven. There was no such thing as a merely 
 individualistic Christianity ; there was no such 
 person as a Christian unattached. Of course, the 
 blessings given to the Church as a whole must be 
 individually realized, individually appropriated ; each 
 member must use and treasure the privileges of the 
 whole body ; yet it is as members of the body that 
 believers receive grace and strength from the Head. 
 A limb severed from the body could not claim to 
 receive nourishment from the Head. On this point 
 
232 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 the apostolic witness is unanimous and decisive. 
 The Church is His body ; we are one body, and 
 severally members one of another. All must be 
 done in order that there be no schism in the body. 
 Christians must not forsake the assembling of them- 
 selves together as the manner of some is. The 
 highest act of Christian worship implies a sense of 
 fellowship, for the word communion does not merely 
 mean participation of or in Christ, hut joint partici- 
 pation, joint partaking of the sacred body and blood. 
 The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, the love of God, 
 the fellowship of the Holy Ghost are the priceless 
 heirloom of each individual Christian ; yet they too 
 are only the inheritance of each one, because they 
 are the rightful possession of " you all." 
 
 If such were the spirit in apostolic days, we 
 certainly should not be surprised to find that the 
 society rather than the individual was regarded as 
 the direct object of justification. To St. Paul excom- 
 munication from the body involved separation from 
 Christ. To be cut off from the faithful involved the 
 fearful risk of losing faith and the object of faith. 
 To profess love for God and to manifest no love for 
 the brethren was to state a self-contradiction and to 
 attempt to live an impossible lie. 
 
 So also Christ came to redeem mankind, and our 
 redemption was made perfect by His death ; but 
 just as the good news of redemption and salvation 
 was preached through the ministers of His Church, 
 so through the same ministry appointed for the 
 salvation of mankind were the benefits of Christ's 
 redemption mediated to all believers, not as indi- 
 vidual Christians only, but as individuals joined 
 
SIN AND SALVATION 233 
 
 together, welded together in one body, and thus as 
 members of one another and of Christ Outside this 
 body, outside these covenanted means of grace, out- 
 side the ark of Christ's Church, there could be no 
 certainty, no security of salvation. Extra ecclesimn 
 nulla salus. Of course this must not be taken to 
 imply that everyone who is not a churchman in the 
 strictly limited sense, cannot therefore be saved. 
 After all, baptism by whomsoever administered, 
 constitutes the entrance into the church of Christ : 
 nor would any Christian think for one moment of 
 laying down the laws under which Christ must act 
 to save sinners. 
 
 When we reflect on all these things, when we re- 
 member also that the profession of faith and baptism 
 were in apostolic days and long afterwards regarded 
 as absolutely inseparable, and that the same act by 
 which he is mystically united to Christ also signalizes 
 his entrance into Christian society with all its privi- 
 leges and blessings, " it is natural to identify the area 
 within which grace and justification operate with the 
 Church." " It is thus neither in the spirit of exclusive- 
 ness nor yet in that of any hard and fast scholasticism 
 but only in accordance with the free and natural 
 tendencies of the Apostle's thought, that we speak of 
 justification as normally mediated through the Church. 
 
 . The Christian sacrifice with its effects, like the 
 sacrifices of the Day of Atonement by which it is 
 typified, reach the individual through the com- 
 munity." -^ 
 
 (iv) We have thus every reason to be grateful to 
 Ritschlianism for recalling us to the primitive con- 
 
 ^ S.H., RomanSj 123, 124. 
 
234 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 ception of the Church as the direct object of justifi- 
 cation. But it is the fate of Ritschl to provoke 
 disappointment no less than admiration : and hardly 
 have we accepted his arguments in one direction with 
 gratitude, than we are compelled to dissent with 
 vehemence from his conclusions in another. Thus, 
 while agreeing with Ritschlianism as to the justifica- 
 tion of individuals through the society, we are next 
 asked to accept a theory as to the relation between 
 justification and sanctification which would inevitably 
 land us in inextricable confusion. For though 
 Ritschl appears to hold that justification is purely 
 a " religious " as opposed to a *' moral " notion, that 
 its significance is exhausted in the idea of eternal 
 life, and has no reference to good works of any 
 kind,^ yet he is driven by the exigencies of his 
 original theory of knowledge to a very different 
 conclusion. " It is only possible to learn to know the 
 acts of God, justification, the new birth, the com- 
 munication of the Spirit ... by the analysis of the 
 corresponding self-activities in which the workings 
 of God are appropriated by men. . . . Outside the 
 self-activity in which we appropriate the workings of 
 God and realize them for our own salvation, we have 
 no understanding of the objective dogmas as i*eligious 
 truths." ^ The removal of guilt, i.e. justification, puts 
 an end to the enmity of the will against God, and 
 involves the appropriation of the Divine purpose as 
 our own highest self-end. Justification can in fact 
 only be known by the good works which are the 
 
 ^ R. V. iii. 465, 503 ; but this representation is practically contradicted, 
 iii. 75, 77, 167. 
 ' R. V. iii. 33, 34. 
 
SIN AND SALVATION 235 
 
 outcome of the sinner's reconciliation with God. 
 Thus justitia imputata passes insensibly into justitia 
 infusa ; and " regeneration . . . can as predicate 
 of the individual believer in point of fact not be 
 distinguished from justification or reconciliation or 
 adoption."^ Thus once more the objective fades 
 away : reality can only be known " as mirrored in 
 the subject " : and subjective representation, value- 
 judging perhaps, takes the place of objective reality. 
 
 (v) With reference to the theory of the imputation 
 of Christ's merits, Ritschlianism is supposed to be a 
 protest against the ordinary doctrine. As re-formulated 
 by Ritschl, the dogma runs thus : " The admission of 
 the members of the Christian community to fellow- 
 ship with God notwithstanding their sins and feeling 
 of guilt, which is expressed in the forgiveness of sins, 
 has its typical exemplification and historical ground 
 in the fellowship of Christ with God which he main- 
 tained unbroken in the whole course of His life, 
 especially in His willingness to suffer for the sake of 
 His vocation, and in His patience, exercised even 
 unto death." ^ This does not tell us much ; and in 
 what it does say, it does not err on the side of 
 lucidity. After a short interval we come across a 
 clearer statement. " God imputes to the community 
 belonging to Christ the position in relation to the 
 love of God in which He maintained Himself through 
 His obedience." ^ But earlier in the book he speaks 
 in a manner scarcely to be distinguished from that of 
 orthodox theology : " The worth which one has as 
 an object of love is imputed to those who themselves 
 lack this worth, but belong to him who is the primary 
 "^ R.V. iii. 566, 567. "-Ibid. 514. "Ibid. 516. 
 
236 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 object of love. The position of Christ to God is 
 imputed to His disciples, since God for Christ's sake 
 accepts them into His effective love. But the posi- 
 tion of Christ to God depends on His righteousness. 
 Indirectly, therefore, the righteousness of Christ is 
 imputed to His disciples, in order that they may be 
 taken up into the love of God, as Christ is rooted in 
 the same." 
 
 We need say but little concerning Ritschl's concep- 
 tion of the new life. Humility, prayer and patience are 
 to be its main characteristics : but petitionary prayer 
 should be excluded, and thanksgiving and resignation 
 take its place, for it is idle to suppose " that man can 
 exercise the least influence on the Divine counsels." ^ 
 It is enough for a man to rest content in the convic- 
 tion that all things work together for good to them 
 that love God. 
 
 As to the future, though Ritschl does not deny the 
 blessed hope of everlasting life, he says but little on 
 the subject. Professor Swing enthusiastically claims 
 that the resurrection of Christ is the foundation of the 
 whole Ritschlian theology. In which case it is 
 passing strange that there should only be three or 
 four ambiguous allusions to that stupendous fact in 
 the three great volumes on Christian doctrine. And 
 it is specially strange that one whose profession is to 
 set the Christian revelation over every type of natural 
 theology, should base the argument for immortality 
 on natural grounds, and make no allusion to the fact 
 which the apostles recognized as the only sure basis 
 of Christian hope.^ 
 
 The silence of Ritschl as to the future life is not 
 
 1 R. V. iii. 60S. - R. V. 576. 
 
SIN AND SALVATION 237 
 
 accidental, but an essential feature of the whole 
 system. "If eternal life is defined as supremacy 
 over the world . . . what would be its meaning for 
 a state in which this world had ceased to exist ? 
 If, again, the Divine self-end which man is to realize 
 is a Divine kingdom of human beings upon earth, 
 what end remains when the believer is transferred 
 to conditions beyond death ? . . . Who can tell ? 
 The whole Ritschlian nomenclature loses its signifi- 
 cance." ^ 
 
 We have felt bound to devote considerable attention 
 to the discussion of these doctrines as expounded by 
 Ritschl, not so much because of their intrinsic interest 
 or importance, as because it is round these twin 
 ideas of justification and reconciliation Ritschl has 
 himself sought to nucleate all his labours in doctrinal 
 theology. We cannot leave the subject without a 
 tribute to the vast learning, acute insight, wide 
 scholarship, and systematic powers of this great 
 theologian. Ponderous and cumbersome as is the 
 style, one is yet irresistibly brought to realize that 
 one is in the hands of a masterful personality ; and 
 that beneath the involved arguments and sentences, 
 regardless of style, there burn the deep fires of 
 profound original thought. Yet it is almost im- 
 possible not to experience that same alternation of 
 attraction and repulsion which was so noticeable a 
 feature in Ritschl's own sentiments towards those 
 from whom he learnt. At times there seems such an 
 obstinate refusal to understand another point of view, 
 so calm a tone of complete self-assurance, such un- 
 mistakable signs of a deliberate determination to go 
 
 ^Orr, Ritschlian Theology, i8i. 
 
238 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 one's own way, not because it is right, but because it 
 is of one's own choosing, that one cares not to take 
 this imperious master as a certain guide. One cannot 
 help feehng a tinge of sadness at the prospect of 
 much energy misspent : but yet, we doubt not, he 
 did the work whereunto he was called : if it were 
 only to put new life into those very doctrines which 
 he sought to destroy. But he has done more. His 
 vigorous intellect and wide learning combined to 
 throw much new light on many problems of theology. 
 We cannot, however, regard his arguments as ex- 
 haustive or convincing. On the other hand, we can 
 see how a low estimate of sin involves a low estimate 
 of redemption ; and how this again leads to a 
 humanitarian view of the Redeemer. Both in its 
 correspondence with the facts of life, and experience, 
 and in its natural method of Biblical exegesis, we think 
 catholic theology vastly superior to Ritschlianism, 
 even in that sphere of justification and reconciliation 
 which the founder of the school made specially his 
 own. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 Bv their fruits shall ye know than. Let us, 
 therefore, consider first not what the RitschHan 
 theology is, but what it has done. By this method, 
 we shall be judging Ritschlianism ivl harmony with 
 RitschHan principles, for we shall be applying a 
 species of value-judgment to the new theology. 
 
 Ritschl spoke what many thought, when he de- 
 nounced the alliance of theology with metaphysics. 
 A philosophy of religion may have great attractions 
 for minds predisposed to speculative efforts : for 
 theological problems, more than all others, go to the 
 root of those ultimate questions concerning reality, 
 with which every philosophy tries to deal. It is, 
 therefore, a real delight to many, an occupation most 
 absorbing, to deal with theology by way of meta- 
 physics. But what, then, becomes of practical religion? 
 History shows that interest in theoretical speculation 
 need have no bearing whatever on the ordinary 
 religious life or moral duties. Indeed the latter 
 have too often suffered from the former. The 
 value of pure religion needs no external recom- 
 mendation ; it is its own witness. But that witness 
 is perpetually obscured by the professedly religious 
 
240 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 interest taken in problems quite alien to the real 
 spirit of religion. Jesus saith, " Thou hast had five 
 husbands, and he whom thou now hast is not thy 
 husband. . , . The woman saith unto him, Sir, 
 I perceive that thou art a prophet. Our fathers 
 worshipped in this mountain ; and ye say that in 
 Jerusalem is the place where men ought to worship." 
 Similarly, religion has often decayed when theology 
 has flourished : for the introduction of wholly 
 irrelevant questions tends to draw away man's interest 
 and effort from the main business of life — to know 
 himself perfectly free in the service of God. 
 
 But it is not merely that theology has done no 
 good to religion ; it has brought positive discredit 
 upon it For the main stream of philosophical 
 thought in these latter days has been to insist upon 
 the subjectivity and relativity of human thought ; but 
 theology claims to be the bearer of an absolute 
 revelation, perfect and final, knowing nothing of those 
 limitations of the human mind which both philosophy 
 and psychology are bringing daily into clearer relief 
 On every side, voices were heard professing willing- 
 ness, like Herod of old, "to come and worship Him 
 also," if, worshipping, they might destroy. Abate 
 your excessive claims, eliminate the supernatural 
 element, and we are ready to own ourselves followers 
 of the Crucified. It was to an age profoundly dis- 
 trustful of metaphysical speculation, tremendously 
 awake to reason's limitations, yet sincerely desirous of 
 preserving religious sentiment, that Ritschl addressed 
 his appeal : and not in vain. In no sense whatever 
 did Ritschl seek to throw doubt or discredit on 
 religion ; he sought, and sought successfully, to give 
 
CONCLUSION 241 
 
 it new life and power. At first, as has already been 
 remarked, the cry was raised, " theology without 
 metaphysics," but the inherent impossibility of such 
 a watchword soon became manifest, and a more 
 satisfactory formula was found in the demand for 
 religion without theology. 
 
 The aim of the Ritschlians was therefore the 
 restoration of true religion ; and in this task, as they 
 conceived it, they were all united. That the attempt 
 to divorce religion from theology, faith from know- 
 ledge, is foredoomed to failure, we shall hope to show 
 when discussing the reasons why it is impossible to 
 accept Ritschlianism as any adequate substitute for 
 the traditional faith of Christendom. At present, we 
 will confine our attention to the positive achievements 
 of the Ritschlian theology ; and foremost among 
 these must be placed the sincerity and genuineness 
 of its whole-hearted efforts to commend religion to 
 an age of doubt and scepticism. Nor can it be denied 
 that these efforts were without some measure of 
 success. To many it came as little short of a reve- 
 lation, that a life ruled by religion did not necessarily 
 involve the immediate acceptance of the entire body 
 of traditional theology. Ritschlianism may be, in 
 our opinion it is, mistaken in asserting the ultimate 
 irreconcilableness of theology with religion, but, it 
 did real service in emphasizing the value of religion 
 at a time when theology was widely discredited. 
 
 If we ask how the separation between religion and 
 theology was to be effected, we come to the now 
 famous theory of value-judgments. Here again we 
 may be grateful to the Ritschlian school for their 
 insistence on the practical motive of all religious 
 
 Q 
 
243 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 belief. These practical value-judgments are as 
 different as possible from the cool, unimpassioned 
 judgments of the theoretic reason. The untrained 
 ear cannot appreciate a musical masterpiece nor can 
 the untrained eye recognize the beauty of the loveliest 
 art. In either case the music or the picture may be 
 explained, scientifically described, illustrated ; but 
 just that which constitutes the real value is perforce 
 ignored. There is no judgment of value, only a 
 judgment of existence. It is a capacity for music 
 that makes men appreciate its elevating power : it is 
 a taste for art that enables men to recognize its 
 beauty* Similarly it is the religious feeling in the 
 subject that gives to religion its real value and power. 
 A coarse and brutal nature could not appreciate the 
 matchless beauty and tenderness of the Gospel 
 portrait of our Redeemer King. Yet it is here in the 
 inner significance, not in the outward fact, that the 
 true value of religion lies : for it is concerned with a 
 practical matter, the saving of the soul, the rising to 
 freedom and communion with God ; not with the 
 theoretical speculations as to the distinction of persons 
 within the Deity, nor metaphysical investigations as to 
 the nature of the Christ. To know the doctrine, we 
 must do the will of God. To know the Christ, we must 
 first submit to Him, that our souls may be flooded 
 with His grace, and that, the eyes of our under- 
 standing being opened, we may be able to compre- 
 hend with all saints that which passeth knowledge 
 — His inestimable love. It is impossible for a non- 
 Christian to give a true interpretation of Christ. It 
 is those who have felt, that know ; it is those that 
 know, who love. And the love of Christ alters 
 
CONCLUSION 243 
 
 one's whole view of Christian truth, as the light that 
 streams through a rich window of painted glass. 
 Much that before was obscure, becomes clear : we 
 see the figures as the artist pictured them : we 
 recognize fresh beauty, new significance. For the 
 light makes all things manifest. 
 
 We thank Ritschl for that thought. It is not 
 that he in any way originated it. It is a patristic 
 commonplace. But he recalled it, he revived it. It 
 is the truth that the doctrine of value-judgments is 
 intended to safeguard. It is the truth that led 
 Ritschl to break with the Tubingen school, and to 
 declare in the forefront of his great dogmatic \'olume 
 that " religious faith does not run counter to a 
 historical view of Jesus, and the historical estimate 
 of Jesus does not first begin when a man has rid 
 himself of this faith, this religious valuation of his 
 person." ^ It is the truth which finds expression in 
 Ritschl's insistence that the theologian must reckon 
 himself as a member of the community. It is a 
 truth of exceptional value which needs to be per- 
 petually enforced in an age of undogmatic Christianity 
 and presuppositionless histories of Christ and His 
 Church. The Ritschlian school contends with 
 earnestness that in religion it is the practical motive 
 that is the real test of reality, it is the value- 
 judgments that yield the highest truth. Had the 
 Ritschlians only been content with a thorough and 
 consistent unfolding of this principle in its various 
 ramifications and applications, we should have had 
 no cause to withhold our sincerest gratitude. When, 
 however, the judgments of value are made the ground 
 iy?. r. iii. 2. 
 
244 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 for the depreciations of the judgments of existence ; 
 and the conclusions of practical religion are supposed 
 to be independent of and irreconcilable with the 
 results of the theoretic reason, we are obliged to 
 limit our praise with many qualifications. 
 
 The value-judgments play a determinative part in 
 Ritschlian theology. The old theistic arguments in 
 proof of God are abandoned as metaphysical specu- 
 lations, and valueless for religious purposes, and in 
 their place we are introduced to a practical idea of 
 God. God is love, that is the golden text which 
 unlocks the myriad riddles of the universe. So have 
 many others felt ; but Ritschl with almost monoto- 
 nous persistence drives the text home to the heart 
 of modern theology, and it is well. Once more, 
 however, we are compelled to temper praise with 
 strong dissent when we come to the conclusions that 
 Ritschl would have us draw from these premises. 
 
 But- perhaps the greatest service of Ritschlianism to 
 theology has been to restore the prominence attached 
 to the kingdom of God. It is not merely that we 
 thus arrive at a teleological interpretation of the 
 world, infinitely richer and deeper than the scientific 
 doctrine of mechanical causation : it is not merely 
 that we are back to the evangelical teaching of the 
 Lord, for which the prophets prepared, and which the 
 apostles interpreted, but we have a conception of 
 Christianity in which dogmatics and ethics may 
 become united, which answers to the social needs of 
 our day, and which is at the same time in com- 
 pletest accord with the teaching of Holy Scripture. 
 Whether the doctrine of the kingdom can be the 
 regulative idea of all other Christian conceptions, 
 
CONCLUSION 245 
 
 whether it can be an absolutely exhaustive category 
 for all Christian doctrine, may perhaps be doubted. 
 But it is a merit of the Ritschlian theology — not 
 to be denied or decried — that it has once more 
 concentrated attention on that magnificent concep- 
 tion of a universal moral kingdom of God, which 
 was on the one hand the central thought of our 
 Lord's proclamation, and which on the other He has 
 taught us to pray for as that far off divine event to 
 which the whole creation moves. 
 
 It is in their doctrine of the kingdom, as the norm 
 of all Christian theology, that the Ritschlians have 
 done the most valuable work. But they have also 
 something to tell us of the king, to which we shall 
 do well to be attentive. It may be impossible for 
 us to accept a non-miraculous history of the Son of 
 God — yet even here Ritschlianism has much to teach 
 us concerning the Christ. It is above all things 
 " important to remind mankind again and again that 
 a man of the name of Jesus Christ once stood in their 
 midst." ^ To this task Ritschlianism has boldly 
 applied itself. To it the historical Christ is the sole' 
 principle of revelation, to whom all things must be 
 referred. The frank recognition by all the theo- 
 logians of this school of His sinlessness, of His 
 marvellous power over the hearts and consciences of 
 men, of the attraction, of His personality, which 
 centuries have shewn themselves unable to efface, 
 of the full revelation of the Father in Him, of the 
 perfect grace and truth, manifested in His earthly 
 life, of His victory over death, of His exaltation 
 and perpetual sovereignty in heavenly places — the 
 
 ^ Harnack, What is Christianity 1 i. 
 
246 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 recognition of all these things entitles Ritschlianism 
 to a hearing from those who would learn things new 
 as well as old concerning Christ. We rise from the 
 Ritschlian portrait of Christ, constrained to say, 
 " Was Christ a man like us ? Ah ! let us try if we 
 then too can be such men as He." ^ 
 
 The Ritschlians, it is true, contend vigorously 
 for the Godhead of our Lord, while rejecting the 
 traditional account of His divine and human natures. 
 Here, too, we may learn, even if we do not agree. 
 For no one has ever yet been saved by the scholastic 
 doctrine of Christ's divinity. In this sphere, too, 
 religion demands a living faith, a practical motive. 
 Christ is God to us, because, seeing Him we have 
 seen the Father. Christ is God to us, because in 
 Him we become partakers of His heavenly kingdom. 
 Christ is God to us, because our life is hid with Him 
 in God. Ritschlianism knows how close, how tender, 
 how warm the relation of the believer is to his Lord, 
 and therefore bids us put away all cold speculations 
 and barren theories, and seeing in the Lord Jesus the 
 ^bearer of a perfect revelation, and the mediator of 
 a perfect religion, exclaim with Thomas, My Lord 
 and my God. 
 
 There is yet one further point in which Ritschl- 
 ianism has taught a lesson of abiding value to the 
 Church of these latter days. Is the society or the 
 individual the direct object of justification ? The 
 question has been discussed with unnecessary, and 
 even unseemly warmth. But no one can deny that 
 RitschFs exposition of the doctrine, and of the 
 Scriptural passages bearing on the subject, marks a 
 
 1 Matthew Arnold, Sonnets, The Better Part. 
 
CONCLUSION 247 
 
 real contribution to the literature of justification : or 
 that his insistence upon the society as the proper 
 object of redemption^surprising as it is in the mouth 
 of a Lutheran — is based upon an impartial and 
 illuminating exegesis, which is valuable not only as 
 an original interpretation of Scriptural doctrine, but, 
 like the correlative conception of the kingdom of 
 God, supplies a much needed corrective to the 
 individualistic tendencies of a selfish age. 
 
 There is therefore much in Ritschlianism for which 
 we may be grateful. The attempt to free the simple 
 message of the Gospel from scholastic subtleties and 
 philosophical intellectualism demands our heartiest 
 sympathy. The desire to win to a life in Christ 
 men, to whom the affirmations of the creed have 
 ceased to bear a living significance, is worthy of all 
 support. The acknowledgment that practical judg- 
 ments of value are at least equally important with 
 theoretic judgments of existence, no one would care 
 to dispute. The conception of theology as a whole, 
 and the claim for Christianity to develop, if it will, 
 its own system, its own philosophy, deserves all 
 respect. The all-embracing conception of the king- 
 dom of God, compels admiration, and commands 
 assent. The doctrine of Christ the Revealer is full 
 of power. The importance attached to the society 
 is not misplaced. Ought we not, therefore, to proffer 
 sympathy and withhold criticism ? That can only be 
 answered when we have discussed those other points 
 where the Ritschlian system differs from, and we 
 believe manifests its inferiority to, the traditional 
 theology of the Church. 
 
 Ritschl begins with affirming the necessity of an 
 
248 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 epistemological theory for any theologian. It is on 
 his theory of knowledge that his theology is really 
 based. For the Ritschlian system assumes as a 
 fundamental presupposition the ultimate unknow- 
 ability of the things underlying phenomena. Hence 
 the impossibility of ever arriving at religious truth 
 or reality by metaphysical or speculative methods. 
 Accordingly, some other method must be devised, for 
 an uncertain faith is a self-contradiction. Ritschl 
 finds the solution in a theory of cognition which 
 draws a line of absolute demarcation between re- 
 ligious and theoretic knowledge. This distinction 
 within knowledge itself is the keystone of the Ritschl- 
 ian system. The questions thus raised are not prim- 
 arily religious but metaphysical. Religion as such 
 has no interest in deciding between different theories 
 of knowledge, save to see that under the exigencies 
 of epistemological theory her more precious truths do 
 not vanish away e/V ymvov aipa. But Ritschlianism 
 not only bases with the utmost deliberation theolog}' 
 upon a theory of knowledge, but has chosen for 
 the latter a theory which is fundamentally false. 
 Knowledge cannot be divided into two independent 
 sections ; there must be unity. It is impossible to 
 hold with religious knowledge as true that which the 
 theoretic reason pronounces false. If there is con- 
 tradiction, we must seek a solution — because the 
 intellect instinctively demands consistency and co- 
 herency of thought. Either it must be shown that 
 the two views do not really oppose each other, or 
 that they are capable of being harmonized and 
 reconciled in a wider, more comprehensive truth. It 
 is impossible to divide knowledge in such a way that 
 
CONCLUSION 249 
 
 two mutually opposing, views are both ultimately true. 
 Otherwise we might as well give up once for all the 
 attempt to think consistently. Now there are certain 
 spheres in which religion must meet philosophy and 
 science. There is the doctrine of God, the belief in 
 miracles. It is quite impossible to escape, though 
 we may evade, the difficulty by insisting on the 
 differences between a religious and a scientific view of 
 the world. Of course there is such a difterence : of 
 course there are different ways of regarding truth : 
 but there are not two truths, two realities. Yet that 
 is the impossible position into which Ritschlianism 
 inevitably leads us. 
 
 Precisely similar is the attempt to insist upon the 
 historical character of the Christian religion and yet 
 to claim its entire indifference to historical criticism. 
 The historic Christ is the positive principle of Christian 
 revelation. But how are we to obtain a knowledge 
 of the historic Christ, save through the evangelical 
 records and the apostolic testimony ? The absurdity 
 of maintaining the historical character of Revelation, 
 and at the same time seeking to establish the reality 
 of that revelation on grounds wholly independent of 
 historical investigations is self evident. 
 
 W'e thus come to the theory of value-judgments. 
 Much in this respect upon which the Ritschlian 
 school lay emphasis is undoubtedly true ; and we 
 acknowledge its truth with gladness. But after a 
 display of much ingenuity we are still faced with 
 many problems that are left with the most unsatisfy- 
 ing answer. Do these judgments of value necessarily 
 lead to objective truth ? May they not express an 
 artificial or conventional value, with no real reference 
 
250 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 to intrinsic worth ? What is it that gives these judg- 
 ments of value an objective character ? What test 
 can we apply to their truth ? Do they also involve 
 judgments of existence, and if so, are they ultimately 
 dependent upon theoretic knowledge ? 
 
 To these questions Ritschlianism offers no clear 
 and consistent answer. Indeed one position after 
 another has become logically untenable, until we are 
 told that '* judgments of value stand not in opposition 
 to so-called judgments of existence but to the theor- 
 etic judgments of science, regarded as excluding every 
 -subjective interest," and the difference after all is 
 reduced to this, " that religious judgments of value 
 include the highest subjective interest in knowledge." 
 This, however, is a knocking at open doors. No one 
 would deny that *' experience will decide.'' Yet what 
 makes experience possible ? All would admit that 
 the certainty of faith is not the result of theoretic 
 knowledge, but of personal conviction. The only 
 question is, , whence does this personal conviction 
 originate ? The Ritschlian theory, or theories as we 
 should say bearing in mind the diversities of the 
 school, give us no help in this matter. We are left 
 wholly in the dark as to the real basis of value -judg- 
 ments : and we begin to feel that they are a convenient 
 device for discrediting older methods while not in 
 reality offering any sure ground for a constructive 
 restatement of theology. 
 
 The Ritschlian theory of knowledge, and the 
 accompanying doctrine of value-judgments, are no 
 mere incidental parts of his system, but are vital to 
 it. The result is seen in the unsparing denunciation 
 of mysticism, the rejection of the speculative proofs 
 
CONCLUSION 251 
 
 of the existence of God, and the condemnation of 
 all ecclesiastical dogma. 
 
 Ritschl repudiates mysticism utterly. On no 
 point does he declare himself more plainly ; and he 
 is followed by all the school. Kaftan indeed de- 
 clares that Ritschl failed to distinguish between the 
 mystical elements to be found in all religions, and 
 the mysticism which he characterizes as a false con- 
 ception of religion. There are three reasons why 
 Ritschlianism can have no truce with mysticism. 
 Ritschl's theory of cognition forbids him to assert 
 that God can in any way be known save in His 
 operations ; compels him also to deny the existence 
 of the soul save as a complex of psychical activities. 
 Mysticism speaks much of the soul indwelt by 
 God. This Ritschl roughly brushes aside as mere 
 fiction. We cannot know God save in His opera- 
 tions : we cannot know His actions save as reflected 
 in the corresponding self-activities in ourselves. The 
 soul existing only in its functions, God known only 
 in His operations — such a theory leaves no room for 
 any doctrine of a mystical union between the soul 
 and God. 
 
 Another reason which makes mysticism impossible 
 in the Ritschlian system is the fact that this theology 
 professes to derive all from God's self-revelation in 
 the historic Christ. " All men assuredly are not the 
 sons of God " ; there is no original bond between the 
 soul and God ; there is no such thing as natural 
 religion, nor any such thing as original sin. It is 
 simply as members of Christ's community that we 
 are able to call God our Father ; it is only and 
 solely through the impression that we receive from 
 
252 RITSCHLTANISM 
 
 the perusal of Christ's historic Hfe that we rise to the 
 assurance that our sins are forgiven and that we can 
 hold communion with God. The whole process is 
 historical, and, by a strange irony we may say, 
 objectively conceived, not mystical, nor subjectively 
 conceived. Ritschlianism insists that mysticism 
 necessitates a pantheistic view of the world, which 
 the historical revelation in Jesus stamps as false. 
 The Ritschlian theologians point with justice to the 
 fact that mysticism is, in no sense, of Christian 
 origin ; and therefore they condemn it equally with 
 all metaphysical speculation. For in the Christian 
 religion they will have nothing that did not originate 
 in the Christian revelation. Hence the tendency to 
 mysticism which has always been apparent in Chris- 
 tianity is relegated by Ritschl to the unabsorbed 
 ideas of paganism taken over by, and constantly 
 recrudescing in, the Catholic church. 
 
 The third argument for the rejection of mysticism 
 is a marvellous feat of reasoning. Ritschlianism 
 views the work of Christ as being operative for the 
 community, and that it is only as members of the 
 society that we become partakers of the benefits 
 of Christ's death and passion. We seem to be 
 approaching an ecclesiastical exclusiveness which is 
 often attributed to Catholicism ; but Ritschl accuses 
 Catholicism of individualism ! Mysticism is essen- 
 tially individual ; it can, therefore, find a home in the 
 Catholic church ! But Ritschlianism, which knows 
 nothing of an individual Christian, but only of mem- 
 bers of a redeemed community, can find no chamber, 
 howsoever small or hidden, where mysticism may dwell. 
 
 As illustrating the entirely uncompromising atti- 
 
CONCLUSION 253 
 
 tude of Ritschlianism towards the least trace of 
 mysticism, we may point to the language of these 
 theologians concerning the exalted Christ. No words 
 can be too lofty to describe His session at the right 
 hand of the Majesty on high ; but " both as pre- 
 existent and as exalted^ Christ is hidden from our eyes^^ 
 and " there can be no talk of coinmunion with Hinir 
 Kaftan's favourite formula to describe the Christian 
 life as hid with Chinst in God^ from which he 
 concludes that a mystical element must be admitted 
 into the religious life and thought of Christians, is 
 expressly rejected as warranting no such conclusion. 
 If, then, the Ritschlian view of religion compels us 
 to refuse admission to those high and holy thoughts 
 and experiences, which Christian saints in all ages 
 have recognized as manifested in the indwelling 
 power of the Father, Son, and Spirit in the believer's 
 soul, no less does it impoverish the intellectual side 
 of Christian faith. A few words will be said later 
 in conclusion as to the irreconcilable conflict that 
 Ritschlianism assumes to exist between reason and 
 religion. At present we can do no more than refer 
 to the unhesitating rejection of the so-called theistic 
 proofs. It may at once be admitted that the exist- 
 ence of God cannot be proved to us in the same 
 sense as a mathematical demonstration that would 
 compel belief. Faith is always free ; there is not, 
 and cannot be, any inevitable overpowering of the 
 human mind in matters of religious faith. Yet there 
 are ways along which we may approach God ; ways 
 which are not to be rejected because they do not 
 yield us the full, complete idea only to be found in 
 revelation. It is simply in the interests of his 
 
254 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 epistemological assumptions that Ritschl condemns 
 both natural theology and philosophical thought to 
 sheer incapacity in the things of God. Yet it is 
 utterly incredible to believe that God, the moral 
 ruler of the universe, ordering all things for the 
 bringing of the perfect kingdom, should have left 
 Himself without witness in the world, or that He 
 should have condemned humanity to eternal blind- 
 ness to the manifold indications of His power and 
 presence. 
 
 With regard to the condemnation of ecclesiastical 
 dogma, the greatest unanimity prevails among all 
 members of the school. The view of Church history 
 thus presented is intolerably depressing. We are 
 asked to believe that even befpre the close of the 
 apostolic age the period of deterioration had begun, 
 and has continued ever since with wearisome mono- 
 tony. It would be difficult to reconcile such a theory 
 with any belief in the spiritual presence, or even in 
 the abiding influence, of the Lord in the Church. 
 Harnack, the most renowned representative of the 
 school, has set himself to prove Ritschl's contention 
 that the religion of Christ succumbed to the tempta- 
 tion to achieve intellectual supremacy, and that from 
 the first " dogma in its conception and development 
 is a work of the Greek spirit on the soil of the 
 Gospel." The Hellenization of Christianity led to a 
 false intellectualism. " The centre of gravity, instead 
 of being placed in the historical Christ who founded 
 the kingdom of God, is placed in the Christ who, as 
 the Eternal Logos of God, was the mediator in the 
 creation of the world." It is a view of the develop- 
 ment of Christian doctrine that may be disproved 
 
CONCLUSION 2SS 
 
 from the pages of Harnack himself. If there was 
 one thing the Church was really unwilling to do, it 
 was to define. It was only under the pressure of 
 controversy that she was compelled to defend the 
 truth with which she knew herself to be entrusted, by 
 making it clear on which side lay error and mutila- 
 tion. Not once nor twice onl}- does Harnack show 
 that the heresies against which the Fathers fought 
 were at root anti-christian, and that the truth of the 
 Gospel was only saved by the efforts of the Church 
 theologians. Both in regard to Athanasius and 
 Augustine, Harnack admits their abiding service to 
 religion. Yet he takes essentially a pessimistic view 
 as to the " acute Hellenization " of Christianity. To 
 such a view we may reply with a twofold criticism. 
 
 (i) Pfleiderer, writing before the publication of 
 Harnack's lectures on W/zat is Christianity ? 
 rightly insists that '* where a definite conception, 
 based on history, of the nature of Christianity is so 
 wholly wanting, the question as to whether individual 
 phenomena are truly Christian, or a degeneration, 
 corruption, and secularization of true Christianity, 
 can onl}^ be answered according to personal taste." ^ 
 The above-mentioned lectures of Harnack, though 
 often illuminating in the highest degree, can hardly 
 be said to alter the force of the criticism, since it is 
 impossible to contend that history is on their side. 
 
 (ii) The Fathers fought with such weapons as they 
 found ready for use ; of these the Greek language 
 and philosophy were the most in evidence. But the 
 Fathers did not fight /cr any philosophical theory, but 
 for the truth of the Gospel and for a transcendental 
 
 ^ Pez'ehpment of Theology^ p. 299. 
 
256 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 view of Christ's Person, which was as clearly inti- 
 mated in the apostolic writings as in the traditional 
 creeds. It should also be made clear to how great 
 an extent the Church refused to commit herself to 
 any metaphysical speculation. The doctrines of the 
 essential Trinity, and of the two natures in Christ, 
 as stated in the creeds of the Church, display a lack 
 of metaphysical explanation which is almost startling. 
 It was enough to put the truths to be held side by 
 side without demanding any assent to a speculative 
 combination, because experience had shown that 
 where these truths were neglected or denied, sooner 
 or later the Christian faith would itself of necessity 
 perish. 
 
 We cannot therefore accept the Ritschlian view 
 that the development of doctrine is only a conven- 
 tional synonym for the progressive obscuration, if 
 not destruction, of genuine Christianity — a process 
 which the reformers were powerless to arrest, for 
 they merely developed a new scholasticism to take 
 the place of the old, but which was really ended 
 when Kant shattered the claims of the theoretic 
 reason, and when Ritschl first among theologians 
 swept aside the accumulated rubbish of centuries, 
 and restored to Christendom the Christian faith in 
 its undefiled purity. 
 
 Such a view does more credit to the imagination 
 than to the intellect. 
 
 It still remains to inquire what Ritschlianism pro- 
 poses to offer us in the place of the old doctrines 
 which it bids us discard ; and in this connection we 
 may consider the Ritschlian doctrine of God, of 
 Christ, of sin. 
 
CONCLUSION 257 
 
 Concerning God, we are told that He is a spiritual 
 personality. This is satisfactory as far as it goes, 
 but to reach this conclusion it is necessary to employ 
 a method of argument which to any ordinary being 
 must appear decidedly metaphysical. Elaborate dis- 
 cussions as to the relation of God to time show how 
 little reliance is to be placed in the promise, with 
 which Ritschlianism takes the field, of a theology 
 without metaphysics. 
 
 We are next told that God is love ; and from this 
 doctrine the solution of the world problem is deduced 
 with a boldness of speculation not excelled in the 
 Hegelian philosophy. All the attributes of God are 
 merged in love. It is not that Ritschl views love as 
 the centre and combination of the divine qualities ; 
 but in love they are all dissolved, omnipotence and 
 righteousness alike. Love is, moreover, defined as 
 a direction of the will ; and Ritschl refuses to let us 
 ever move out of the charmed circle. God is His 
 own self-end ; and apart from will God can neither 
 be known nor imagined. So the formula, God is 
 love, is narrowed and impoverished until it means 
 something very different from that which it signified 
 to the apostle who wrote it first. Nor does Ritschl 
 draw either of the two conclusions which the tradi- 
 tional theology felt itself justified in drawing from 
 this saying, and others. 
 
 (i) God is love, and God so loved the world. 
 
 (2) God is love, and He loved the Son before the 
 world began. 
 
 Ritschl rejects the first view entirely. He repudiates 
 the doctrine of the Universal Fatherhood of God, 
 which, prepared for under the old dispensation, was 
 
258 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 publicly proclaimed in the new, and has been driven 
 like a golden wedge into the heart of humanity. 
 With regard to the second deduction, Ritschl is 
 working on traditional lines when he asserts that 
 perfect love must needs find a corresponding object. 
 It is entirely extraordinary that he should be so 
 wholly unappreciative of the inner significance of 
 Trinitarian dogma as not even to mention the solution 
 thus offered, when finding the answer to the problem 
 in his own fashion in the conception of a community 
 of men bound together by laws of virtue and faith 
 in Christ. 
 
 The Ritschlian doctrine of Christ is wholly un- 
 satisfactory. It is true that stress is laid upon His 
 perfect revelation of the Father ; but the question 
 cannot be evaded, " Who then was this Son of Man 
 that also claimed to be the Son of God?" Is the 
 latter expression to be understood as nothing but the 
 rich mantle of inspired imagination with which the 
 prophets clothed the Messianic figure of their hopes ? 
 Is it to be understood as nothing but a well deserved 
 title, expressive of the value Jesus has for us, as the 
 man in whom we see God most clearly, most closeh'? 
 Does it merely denote solidarity of will, while denying 
 dignity of essence ? Here we are back in the old 
 Athanasian controversy. Ritschlianism condemns 
 the Arian view of the world, condemns also the 
 doctrine of the two natures, holds that Athanasius 
 saved a conviction of faith. But what is this con- 
 viction worth ? If the very God was incarnate 
 among men, we are in the realm, not merely of 
 subjective values, but of transcendental realities. It 
 is sheer cowardice to avoid the question which He 
 
CONCLUSION 259 
 
 himself asks — What think ye of Christ : whose Son 
 is He ? It is utterly useless to ignore the experience 
 and reflection of centuries of Christian thought. We 
 cannot at this stage put ourselves back into the 
 position of the first believers, who, for the gladness of 
 the revelation, had but little time for reflection. For 
 good, or for ill, the reason has intruded with its 
 questionings, and it is impossible to refuse to listen 
 to argument, or decline to seek and try to state the 
 reason of the hope that is in us. 
 
 It is not that Ritschlianism solves the problems 
 which are inevitably raised concerning Christ. It 
 simply evades difficulties which it refuses to face. 
 An affectation of ignorance is in no sense a solution. 
 Catholic theology, relying upon the words of Christ, 
 upon the age-long preparation of prophecy, upon 
 the apostolic testimony ; upon the revelation of 
 Christ, not only in His words, but in His works ; upon 
 the power of His resurrection ; has stated a view of 
 Jesus of Nazareth, which has withstood the attacks of 
 ages. It is formulated in the doctrine of the Trinity, 
 and of the Divinity of our Lord. Other explanations 
 have been tried, and found wanting. Little by little, 
 the Church was constrained to protect her children 
 from plausible falsehoods, by stating in simple lan- 
 guage the truths she had received and defended. 
 The doctrine of the Holy Trinity has at any rate a 
 clearness and consistency, compared with which the 
 Ritschlian theory, as to the Divinity of Christ, is 
 confused and fanciful. It neither solves a single 
 problem, nor does it face the facts. The Scriptures 
 are fancifully interpreted, Church history is misread, 
 and we are left with a Christ who is not the Christ 
 
26o RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 of history, and who, ex hypothesis cannot be the Christ 
 of experience — a fanciful creation of the Ritschhan 
 school, which can only be precariously supported by 
 a theory of value-judgments of which no two 
 members of the school give an identical explanation. 
 Passing from the doctrine of Christ to the doctrine 
 of sin, we feel that the Ritschlian theory of re- 
 demption is no whit to be preferred to its Christological 
 misinterpretations. That ignorance enters largely 
 into sin we may admit, though it is, to say the 
 least, remarkable that Ritschl should in this doctrine 
 shew himself decidedly in favour of an intellectualism 
 which he elsewhere denounces. RitschHanism destroys 
 the objectivity of sin, and substitutes a consciousness 
 of guilt for the objective condemnation of sin, the 
 reaction of God's essential righteousness against 
 evil. These things Ritschl has destroyed. So the 
 whole doctrine of redemption and reconciliation is 
 changed. Standing before the cross, we may admire 
 Christ's steadfastness to His vocation : we cannot 
 look with awe on the mystery of atonement for the 
 sins of the whole world. It is true that RitschHanism 
 does well to emphasize that sense of nearness to God, 
 which sin disannuls, and forgiveness restores. But 
 for all that, a doctrine of sin which does not recognize 
 real estrangement, nor the need of real redemption, 
 must be considered vitally defective. Moreover, a 
 low conception of sin invariably leads to a low 
 conception of Christ. For faith can see the 
 terrible greatness of sin, since He who suffered 
 was the Son of God. It is the person of the 
 crucified that gives unique value to the sufferings of 
 the cross. 
 
CONCLUSIOiN 261 
 
 There are two further points to be noticed in 
 conclusion. 
 
 Ritschhanism claims to be truly scriptural, and 
 truly Protestant. The claim to embody the only 
 true exposition of Scripture needs little disproof 
 Over and over again, Ritschl and his followers find 
 themselves in the plainest conflict with Scriptural 
 representations. On such occasions, the language of 
 the Apostles is lightly set aside — sometimes by 
 astounding feats of exegesis, sometimes by a plain 
 statement that this or that is not necessary to his 
 argument, or is clearly of no permanent value. It 
 must have seemed an almost hopeless task to have 
 brought Ritschhanism into harmony with the state- 
 ments of Scripture on the subjects, for instance, of 
 the direct communion of believers with the exalted 
 Christ, or of the character of sin and its terrible 
 consequences. It argues no little ingenuity, and 
 much persistence on the side of the Ritschlian in- 
 terpreters, to advance the claim to be true to Scripture: 
 but it is a claim which cannot be sustained. 
 
 Ritschhanism also claims to be the true evangelical 
 theology. This is a claim we are not prepared to 
 admit, or to deny, though it is energetically repudiated 
 by many leaders of Protestant thought. Ritschl and 
 his followers are often at excessive pains to make 
 clear that they are only developing Lutheran ideas ; 
 and it must be admitted that, on the whole, they do 
 not make out a bad case for themselves. However, 
 this is a question best left to those who are most 
 qualified to deal with it, or who feel themselves chiefly 
 concerned in the matter. The present writer is 
 unconscious of any such vital interest, nor does he 
 
262 RITSCHLIANISM 
 
 possess the necessary qualifications to decide whether 
 the " plerophorie" with which the Ritschlians vindi- 
 cate the Lutheran character for their theology is, or is 
 not, justified. It is idle to suppose that the whole 
 trend of Protestantism was revealed at the Reforma- 
 tion. To us, the question takes another form. Does 
 the Ritschlian view of religion offer us a faith which 
 is at once Christian and reasonable ? We cannot 
 acquiesce in the view perpetually put forward that 
 Christianity must be either ultra-rational or non- 
 rational. There are divers kinds of reason ; there is 
 the reason of merely intellectual capacity ; there is 
 the reason of moral consciousness ; there is the reason 
 of spiritual discernment. These are not to be con- 
 sidered mere modifications of, or additions to, the 
 reason. They are three distinct kinds of reason. 
 Therefore, when it is said that spiritual things are 
 spiritually discerned, there is no kind of suggestion 
 that they are essentially non-rational. All that is 
 implied is that the merely intellectual reason will not 
 suffice for the apprehension of these high matters. 
 It becomes necessary to employ the spiritual reason 
 to understand the things of God. 
 
 Ritschlianism, giving clear expression to much 
 popular thought, and itself the child of modern 
 philosophy, has failed to grasp this distinction. It 
 therefore confronts us with a dilemma ; if Christian, 
 then not rational. This is an alternative we must 
 refuse to accept. " If Christian, then also rational — 
 but rational in the highest degree." But Ritschlianism, 
 following Kant, banishes reason that faith may reign 
 secure. This procedure recalls the words of the 
 Latin historian, solitudinem facinnt, pacem appellaiit^ 
 
CONCLUSION 263 
 
 for, indeed, there can be no real peace while reason 
 is suppressed. 
 
 When in addition to this fundamental objection, 
 we see that the Christianity which this new theology 
 offers us is Christian only in name; that in many 
 points it openly contradicts the Gospel record, and 
 the substance of the apostolic preaching ; when we 
 find that the Divine fatherhood of all mankind is 
 explicitly repudiated ; that it is prepared to surrender 
 to criticism the miracles and resurrection of the Lord 
 without striking one blow in their defence ; that the 
 mystical union of the believer with Christ is in- 
 dignantly rejected; that the predicate of Divinity is 
 only to be attributed to traits in the character of 
 the historical Christ, and is expressly denied as a 
 proper description of His essential dignity; that the 
 great sacrifice and propitiation for the sins of the 
 world is explained away; that the Holy Spirit who 
 sanctifieth all the elect people of God is barely 
 mentioned ; when, moreover, we remember — though 
 we have been unwilling to press this consideration — 
 the inconsistencies and contradictions rife among 
 various members of the school, we might fancy that 
 to us was addressed the Apostle's warning, But not 
 thus have you learned the Chi''ist if indeed ye have 
 heai^d Him and been taught in Him^ even as is trutJi 
 in Jesus} 
 
 ^ Eph. iv. 22. u/ias 8k ot^x olJtws i/xadere rhv XptcfTov et ye aiirhv 
 7]K0vaaTe /cat ev avT<^ eSLodxOrjTe /ca^cis etrrtp dX^^eta ip ry *I?7iToi'. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Absolute, use of term, 130-132. 
 
 Aestheticism, 37 ; 102-103, ^^9* 
 
 Agnosticism, ix ; — of Kantian 
 philosophy, 5, 44-45. Chris- 
 tian agnosticism, responsive to 
 Ritschlianism, ix. 
 
 Anselm, 122. 
 
 Apostolic age. Trinitarian ideas 
 and language in, 164. 
 
 Arnold, M., 246. 
 
 Athanasius, St., 214, 255. 
 
 Atonement, the, 225-229, 230, 233. 
 
 Augustine, St., 214, 255. 
 
 Balfour, Foundations of Belief, 65. 
 
 Baptism, Trinitarian formula, 163- 
 164 ; Sacrament of, 206-208, 
 216, 213, 233. 
 
 Baur, F. C., Ritschl influenced by 
 his doctrine of reconciliation, 
 51 ; his Pauline teaching criti- 
 cised by Ritschl, 51-52. 
 
 Bender, 62. 
 
 Berkeley, 24, 25. 
 
 Bornemann, on the Holy Spirit, 
 172-173; 195. 
 
 Buddhism, 174. 
 
 Calvin, systematic theologian, 29. 
 
 Chalcedonian formula, 177. 
 
 Christ, (the Person <and work of, 
 174-203). Ritschlian theology 
 derived from the historical Per- 
 son of Jesus, 79, opposed to 
 transcendental element, 80 ; 
 doctrine of Christ, as the sole 
 revelation of God, the test of 
 a. theological system, 174; the 
 
 historical founder of an universal 
 religion, I74-I75> 245; predi- 
 cate of Godhead in relation to 
 the community, two aspects, 
 176, Catholic formuk, One 
 Person in two Natures, mediae- 
 val treatment, i ^6, Luther's 
 position, 176- 1 77, Ritschl's 
 argument, 177-17S, Pauline and 
 Johannine types of presentation, 
 178-181, Kenosis of the Divine 
 Logos, 181-1S2, 246; Christ 
 considered in His activities apart 
 from His nature. His vocation, 
 three offices of prophet, priest, 
 and king, 149, 183-184, 225- 
 229 ; correspondence between 
 the vocation and its fulfilment, 
 1S5-187, 235; vital defect of 
 Ritschlian theology — attribute 
 of Godhead placed in the will 
 and not in the nature of Christ, 
 187, 192; on His sinlessness, 
 187, 215, 246; Ritschlian atti- 
 tude towards the miraculous 
 element in the Gospels, 187- 
 192; Ritschlian controversy on, 
 the exaltation and pre-existence 
 of Christ, and denial of im- 
 mediate access to a personal 
 Saviour, 193-203 ; criticism of 
 Ritschlian doctrine, 258-260. 
 Christianity, an inductive religion, 
 based on fact, viii-ix ; its reliance 
 on development, viii, 247 ; its 
 relation to social questions, 49, 
 244 ; a positive historical 
 religion, 35 ; concerned with 
 
INDEX 
 
 26s 
 
 an ethical aim, 92 ; a universal 
 religion, 174 ; the perfect 
 religion, 163, 175; the perfect 
 revelation, 175. 
 
 Church, furnishes necessary stand- 
 point for revealing religious 
 truth, 32 ; her social mission, 
 49-50 ; in relation to the King- 
 dom of God, 152-153; develop- 
 ment of her doctrines, viii, 166, 
 254-256. 
 
 Clement of Alexandria, 15. 
 
 Communion, with God, as the 
 result of the historical manifes- 
 tation of Christ, 197-198; in 
 faith, not in experience, ig8- 
 199; a joint act of participation, 
 232. 
 
 Community, views of Calvin, 29, 
 of Schleiermacher, 32, 36, 40, 
 53 ; a moral kingdom, 141- 144; 
 unity of Christian community, 
 147-149 ; in the church, 152- 
 154 ; common task of com- 
 munity of believers, 156-157; 
 vocation of members, 168 ; 
 relation between community of 
 Kingdom of God and its founder, 
 175- 183, 188, 193, 194; baptism, 
 the means of entrance, 207-208 ; 
 sense of separation, 220 ; the 
 object of justification, 229-233 ; 
 admitted to fellowship with 
 God, 235. 
 
 Confessional or Conservative 
 school, orthodox, 30, 36 ; 
 opposed to Liberal tendencies ; 
 national ; revival of pietism ; 
 expression of orthodoxy in the 
 Erlangen school, 39-41. 
 
 Conscience, the voice of God — 
 theory discussed by Ritschl, 
 Kant, Herrmann, 126-127; ^ti 
 relation to guilt-consciousness, 
 217. 
 
 Creeds, definitive statements 
 forced on the Church, 166, 255- 
 256, 259. 
 
 Dalman, 156, 
 Darwin, xii. 
 
 Denney, Dr., 203. 
 
 Dependence, a sense of, 32-34, 
 
 35- 
 
 Descartes, 122. 
 
 De Wette, 89 ; theory of process 
 of valuation as motive to action, 
 109. 
 
 Dogma, 30 ; 34 ; expression of 
 ever-varying life, 35 ; its his- 
 torical value, 38. Christian 
 dogma, expression of life and 
 experience of Christian com- 
 munity, 40 ; 42 ; need of dog- 
 matic re-statement of Christian 
 religion, views of Ritschlian 
 theologians, 61, 62, 140-141 ; 
 ecclesiastical dogma condemned 
 by Ritschlian school, 251, 254- 
 256. 
 
 Dogmatism, attacked by Hume, 2 ; 
 overthrown by Kant, 11. 
 
 Dorner, 41, 42. 
 
 Ecke, 62, 74 ; his criticism of 
 Ritschl's conception of the 
 Kingdom of God, 145 ; of the 
 Christian relation to Christ, 
 194-195; of the Lord's Divinity, 
 200-201 ; of the object of justifi- 
 cation, 230. 
 
 Erdmann, 51. 
 
 Erlangen school of theology, its 
 dependence on Schleiermacher, 
 39-40. 
 
 Eternity, attribute of God, 135- 
 136. 
 
 Faith, its objectivity, 104-105, 
 111-112; God, the object of, 
 114; ascribes to God attributes 
 of omnipotence and love, 
 134; involves knowledge, 140; 
 "thoughts of faith," 198-199. 
 
 Favre, S^. 
 
 Feuerbachian theory, 78. 
 
 Fichte, logical outcomeof Kan tism, 
 26. 
 
 Frank, his system of self-analysis, 
 41 ; God, the Absolute, 77, 
 83-85. 
 
266 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Garvie, Dr., 64, 74, 76, 83-86, 
 124, 128, 142, 151-152, 158, 
 179, 181, 201. 
 
 Genesius, 51. 
 
 God, theoretically incognoscible, 
 8 ; necessary postulate of prac- 
 tical reason, 8; supremely 
 moral (Kant), 14; infinitely good 
 and all-personal (Lotze). Theo- 
 logical conception, 77-79. 
 
 God, the Christian idea of, 120; 
 Luther's view, 120-121 ; Ritschl's 
 discussion of theoretic proofs of 
 existence of God, mediaeval 
 acceptance of doctrine, 121-123; 
 inconsistencies ofargument, 123- 
 124 ; his philosophical scepti- 
 cism, 126 ; his criticism of the 
 fact of universal consciousness 
 of God, 128-129; 253-254; on 
 the use of the term Absolute, 
 130-132; on the Personality of 
 God, 77-79, 132-134; attributes 
 of omnipotence, omnipresence, 
 eternity, love, 134-139 : signifi- 
 cance of the Name of God, 136- 
 137, 244; criticism of Ritschlian 
 doctrine, 257-258. 
 
 God, the Kingdom of, Kantian 
 conception, 13-14; 141, 150; 
 central position assigned by 
 Ritschlian school, 58, 133, 141- 
 145. .157-158' 183* 223, 244-245 ; 
 religion and morality funda- 
 mentally united in, 145 ; adop- 
 tion of formula, God is love ; 
 Kingdom of God correlative to 
 conception of God as love, 145- 
 149; 137-138,244; connection 
 with the historical Christ ; the 
 realization of the Kingdom, the 
 vocation of Christ, 149; views 
 of Herrmann, 149 ; of Kaftan, 
 the supramundane nature of the 
 Kingdom connected with the 
 exalted Christ, 150; difficulties 
 in Ritschl's conception, 151-155, 
 consideration of place of con- 
 ception in dogmatic system, 
 doctrine fundamental to Old 
 and New Testament, denotes 
 
 rule not realm, 155-156, stands 
 for principles of God's govern- 
 ment, revealed by Christ, real- 
 ized by the church, 156-157, 
 183; a message new and old, 
 158-159; 175- 
 
 Grace, means of, 231-233. 
 
 Green, T. H., idealism of, xii. 
 
 Haring, 192, 195. 
 
 Harnack, adhesion to Ritschlian 
 theology, 61-62 ; on the relation 
 of Christianity to dogma, 141, 
 154; on miracles, 189-190; on 
 the Resurrection, 190-191 ; 195; 
 245 ; on the Hellenization of 
 Christianity, 62, 254-255. 
 
 Hegel, I ; influence on Liberal 
 theology, i,'j-^'& ; 42, 45 ; 5^ ; in 
 relationtoNewtheology,65; 257- 
 
 Hengstenburg, 51. 
 
 Llerbart, 109. 
 
 Herder, 30. 
 
 Herrmann, on Ritschlian school, 
 55) 57 ; writings, introduction 
 of term value-judgments to 
 theology, 60-61 ; on place of 
 metaphysics in theology, 89-93, 
 97-100, 107, 115, 130; on 
 conscience, 127 ; 141 ; on the 
 Kingdom of God, 144, 149-150; 
 on the Holy Spirit, 172; on 
 Christ's Divinity, 177-17S ; on 
 miracles, 189-190; on the Re- 
 surrection, 191 ; 195, on the 
 pre-existence of Christ, 196-197; 
 on the exalted Christ, com- 
 munion in faith, not in experi- 
 ence, 198-199 ; 201. 
 
 Higher criticism, 48. 
 
 History, doctrine of continuity of, 
 48. 
 
 Hoffmann, 39-41. 
 
 Hume, 2, 1 1, 27. 
 
 Idealism, in Neo-Kantism, 16-17; 
 Kant's refutation, 23-25 ; sub- 
 jective, 75-76, S3 ; Ritschl's 
 interpretation of moral and 
 religious ideals in Christianity, 
 143-144, 
 
INDEX 
 
 267 
 
 Immortality, 81-82 ; Ritschl's 
 
 silence on doctrine, 236. 
 Incarnation, 48, 187. 
 Islam, 174, 175. 
 
 Judging according to woith, 22. 
 
 Judgments, of essence, 6^ ; moral, 
 103; ofexisttnce, 112, 114-115 ; 
 242; thymetic, 118; theoretical, 
 loi, 103, 114-115. 
 
 Justification, Kant's contribution, 
 14; 143; scriptural doctrine of, 
 206-208 ; 221-223 ; object of, 
 223, 229-233, 246-247 ; rela- 
 tion between justification and 
 sanctification, 223, 233-235; 
 mediated to sinners, 235-236. 
 
 Kaftan, on Ritschlian school, 56; 
 61 ; 65 note ; on value-judg- 
 ments, 100-107 : essence of 
 Christianity, religion a practical 
 need, 100, 102-103; on character 
 of religious knowledge, 102-107 J 
 114; on use of term Absolute, 
 130-131; on the Personality and 
 attributes of God, 134-138; a 
 systematic dogmatician, 140 ; 
 on the Kingdom of God, 144- 
 145 ; dissents from Kantian 
 conception ; represents mystical 
 element in religion, 150-151, 
 194, 195, 251 ; assumes doctrine 
 of the Trinity, 162; his positive 
 attitude towards miracles, the 
 Resurrection, igr-192 ; on the 
 Divinity of Christ, 199-200. 
 
 Kahler, 41, 42-43, 62, 192, 195. 
 
 Kant, awakened by Hume, 2 ; 
 theory of knowledge, 3-5 ; Pure 
 Reason, 5-6, Practical Reason, 
 7-8 ; two values of knowledge, 
 10; place of faith, lo-ii ; over- 
 throw of old metaphysic, 11-12, 
 256 ; categorical imperative, 12; 
 freedom of human mind, 13 ; 
 attitude to Christian doctrines, 
 13-15 ; complete subjectivity, 
 26; false dilemma, 27; Schleier- 
 macher, the successor of Kant, 
 37; founder of theoretical agnos- 
 
 ticism, 44-45 ; influence on 
 Ritschl, 52, 54 ; Kantian theory 
 of knowledge, 70-71, 131 ; dis- 
 tinction between relative and 
 inner value, 109 ; on existence 
 of an unconditioned moral law, 
 99, 124-126; revives prominence 
 of conception of Kingdom of 
 God in theology, 141-142, 150; 
 idea adopted by Schleiermacher, 
 attractive to Ritschl, 142 ; on 
 retributive character of punish- 
 ment, 213 ; 262. 
 
 Kattenbusch, 53, 56. 
 
 Kidd, Social Evolution, 49, 65. 
 
 Knowledge, Theory of, 67-86. 
 Theory of knowledge, basis of 
 Ritschlian system, l, 67 : sub- 
 jectivity of Kantian theory, 
 2-5 ; Kantian theory, pivot of 
 Ritschlian theology, il, 131; 
 Lotze's correction of Kant, 20 ; 
 Platonic, Kantian, Lotzean 
 theories, 69-73 » Theology and 
 Metaphysics, 73-77 : effects of 
 Ritschlian theory on the three 
 theological conceptions of God, 
 77-79, of Christ, 79-Si, of the 
 soul, 81-83 ; religious know- 
 ledge, 93-107. Criticism of 
 Ritschlian theory of knowledge, 
 248-249, 250. 
 
 Lange, criticism of Kant, 17 ; 
 attitude to religion, 18. 
 
 Liberal Theology, German repre- 
 sentatives, 37. 
 
 Lightfoot, 179. 
 
 Lipsius, 37- 
 
 Logos, — conception, product of 
 ecclesiastical dogma of the 
 Trinity, 162 ; Kenosis of the 
 Divine logos, 179-182; 254. 
 
 Lotze, theory of knowledge, 19-23 ; 
 Ritschl's professed adhesion, 19; 
 judging according to worth, 22; 
 theory of value-judgments de- 
 veloped by Ritschl, 54-55, 109-- 
 no; Lotzean epistemology 
 adopted by Ritschl, 69, 71-73, 
 76, 84, 131. 
 
268 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Love, key to relation between God 
 the Father and God the Son, 
 137 ; cause of derivation of 
 the world from God, 145, 
 
 257. 
 
 Ludhardt, 77. 
 
 Luther, on the Being of God, 120; 
 doctrine of the two Natures, 
 176-177 ; on miracles, 1S9. 
 
 Lutheranism, debt to Schleier- 
 macher, 29-30, 40, 42 ; repre- 
 sented by Ritschlianism, 60, 
 108, 120, 261. 
 
 Lux Mundi, 46. 
 
 Mahomet, 175. 
 
 Marcion, 51. 
 
 Materialism, Lange's position, 17 ; 
 
 47 ; a religious impulse in 
 
 materialism, 88. 
 M'Giffert, Prof., 64. 
 Mediating school, opposed to 
 
 spirit of Catholicism, emphasis 
 
 of ethical side of Christianity, 
 
 41-43- 
 
 Melancthon, 42, 90. 
 
 Messiah, significance of titles, 157- 
 
 Metaphysics in theology, distaste 
 for, 44-46 ; Ritschl's view of, 
 67-69; offer interpretation of the 
 world, 98 ; views of Herrmann, 
 89-93; J 16. 
 
 Mill, J. S., Utilitarianism, xii. 
 
 Miracles, Ritschlian position, 188- 
 190. 
 
 Modernism, 64-65. 
 
 Monotheism, teleological, 38 ; 
 views of Schleiermacher, 38. 
 
 Morality, moral law, 8, 98-99, 
 126-127 ; moral consciousness, 
 9, 103 ; moral proof of God's 
 existence, 125; moral Kingdom 
 of God, 141-144. 
 
 MuUer, 51. 
 
 Mysticism, vii ; 35; Ritschlian 
 position, 52, 58, 117, 151, 167, 
 170, 194-195. 250-253. Max 
 Reischle's mediating position, 
 1 1 7- 1 19. Kaftan's distinction 
 between true mysticism and 
 false, 151, 170, 253. 
 
 Natures, one person in two, 
 Catholic formula, accepted by 
 Latin mediaeval church, 176 ; 
 Luther's position, 176-177 ; 
 Kenosis of the Divine Logos 
 discussed by Ritschl, 181-182; 
 246 ; 256. 
 
 Neo- Kantism, represented by 
 Lange, 16 ; kernel of religion, 
 18; its service to thought, 19; 
 Ritschl a Neo-ICantian, 19. 
 
 New Theology, represents largely 
 the English phase of Ritschlian 
 movement, its connection with 
 Hegelian philosophy, 64-65 ; its 
 use of psychological science, 89- 
 90. 
 
 Nitzsch, 50. 
 
 Objectivity, overthrown by Kant, 
 6 ; of religious knowledge, 
 104- J 05 : of sin, destroyed by 
 Ritschl, 260. 
 
 Orr, Prof., on fundamental ideas 
 of Ritschlian school, 57-58; 76, 
 S3, 136, 148, 158, 227, 230, 
 
 237. 
 
 Orthodoxy, Calvinistic, Lutheran 
 tendencies, 29-30 : relation of 
 orthodoxy and rationalism, 30- 
 31 ; Hegelian philosophy on 
 terms with orthodoxy, 37-38 ; 
 the Erlangen school, 39-41. 
 
 Ottley, Doctrine of the Incarna- 
 tion, 182, 
 
 Peile, Reproach of the Gospel, 49. 
 
 Personahty, definition of, 79- 132; 
 Ritschl's adhesion to the doc- 
 trine of the Personality of God, 
 78-79, 131-133; 257. 
 
 Pfleiderer, 37 ; on philosophy and 
 development of religion, 49 ; on 
 the Ritschlian school, 57 ; 72 ; 
 76 ; on personality, 79 ; S3 ; 
 
 255- 
 
 Phenomena, Lotzean theory, 71- 
 72. 
 
 Plato, x; 20; theory of know- 
 ledge, criticised by Ritschl, 21- 
 22, 69-71. 
 
INDEX 
 
 269 
 
 Psychology, its use, 82 ; in lelaLion 
 to New Theology, 89 ; 97 ; its 
 aim, loi. 
 
 Punishment, Kant and the lUumi- 
 nists, 15, 2i3;scnpturaldoctnne 
 of Divine punishment, 205 ; 
 217-219; — reformatory or re- 
 tributive, Ritschl's view, 211- 
 213. 
 
 Rationalism, 27 ; agreement with 
 traditionalism, 31 ; repudiated 
 by Schleiermacher, 32. 
 
 Real, meaning of term, 99. 
 
 Reason, opposed to faith, 11 ; dis- 
 credited by Lange, 17 ; 31 ; 
 121 ; theoretic reason, barren- 
 ness of, 7 ; practical reason, its 
 necessar}' postulate, 8 ; criticised 
 by Neo-Kantians, 17. 
 
 Redemption, characteristic of 
 Christianity, 38-39, 40 ; 142 ; 
 Christian doctrine of, 221 ; 
 Ritschlian treatment, 260. 
 
 Reformation, Ritschlianism, — a 
 development of principles of, 60. 
 
 Reischle, Max. 62 ; on value- 
 judgments, 117-119. 
 
 Religion, purely relative, 18 ; as 
 feeling, 31-32; a sense of de- 
 pendence, 32-33 ; realization of 
 the infinite, 37 ; its basis, 47-4S ; 
 Ritschlian rejection of natural 
 religion, 57 ; Kaftan's view of 
 religion as a practical need of the 
 human spirit, 100-107 ; aesthetic 
 standpoint, 103; Ritschlian aim, 
 restoration of true religion, 239- 
 
 243; 
 
 Religious knowledge, true source 
 of, 58 ; 96; views of Plerrmann, 
 99; of Kaftan, 105-106; of 
 Scheibe, 113-116. 
 
 Resurrection, views of Kaftan, 154- 
 I55> 157; 191-192; Ritschl's 
 attitude, 187-188, 236; attitude 
 of Ritschlian school, i go- 192; 
 259; 263. 
 
 Revelation, Christian idea, 5-6, 
 character of revelation asafifected 
 by higher criticism, 48 ; Ritschl's 
 
 attitude towards revelation, 56, 
 58) 77) 139) ^n element of 
 revelation in all religions, 129; 
 Christian revelation, its value, 
 139; doctrine of the Trinity 
 based on Christian revelation, 
 161, 165 ; Christ, the principle 
 of Divine revelation, 167, 168; 
 Christ, the sole revelation of 
 God, centre of true theology, 
 174; 200; the historic Christ, 
 the positive principle of revela- 
 tion, 58, 249, 251, 252. 
 Ritschl, A. Tendencies of his 
 age, 44-50 ; birth ; aptitude for 
 theology; at Bonn, 50; at 
 Halle; belief in the superna- 
 tural ; Hegelian philosophy ; 
 Baur's doctrine of reconciliation ; 
 at Heidelberg ; attachment to 
 Tubingen school ; lectures at 
 Bonn ; breaks with Baur con- 
 cerning rise of the Old Catholic 
 Church, 51 ; rejects Tubingen 
 theory of early Christianity ; 
 accepts New Testament canon; 
 at Gottingen, 52; Justification 
 and Reconciliation ; 52, 54 ; a 
 Kantian, 52, 54 ; debt to Schleier- 
 macher, 53 ; interpretation of 
 dogmatics, 53 ; contact with 
 Lotze, development of theory of 
 value-judgments ; treatise on 
 Schleiermacher's Discourse on 
 Religion ; Instruction in the 
 Christian Religion ; History of 
 Pietism, 54 ; Theology and 
 Metaphysics ; death, 55 : a syste- 
 matic theologian, 71 ; estimate 
 of Ritschl, 237-238. Obligations 
 to Kant, 13-15, 52-54> 142, to 
 Lotze, 21, 54, Schleiermacher, 
 
 34, 52-53- 
 
 Ritschl, Otto, 62 ; 85 ; Concern- 
 ing Value-judgments, 108-I13; 
 129-130. 
 
 Ritschlian school, characteristics ; 
 independence of disciples : fun- 
 damental ideas ; its popularity, 
 55-60 ; its theology a develop- 
 ment of Reformation principles, 
 
270 
 
 INDEX 
 
 60 ; leading representatives in 
 Germany, 60-62 ; in France, 62- 
 63 ; in America, 63-64 ; un- 
 favourably received in England, 
 
 Ritschlianism, a typical system, v, 
 xi, xviii : New Theology, the 
 English phase of, 64-65, a 
 challenge to our age, 65 ; de- 
 mands dogmatic restatement of 
 Christian religion, 141 ; ap- 
 preciation of, 239-247, xi ; 
 criticism of: its epistemologi- 
 cal theory, independence of 
 historical investigation, theory 
 of knowledge, theory of value- 
 judgments, rejection of mysti- 
 cism, doctrine of God, doctrine 
 of Christ, doctrine of sin, its 
 claim of true exposition of Scrip- 
 ture, of trueevangelical theology; 
 its doctrine of the Holy Spirit, 
 247-263. 
 
 Romanticism, its vitalit}^ 36-37- 
 
 Rothe, 41, 42, 51. 
 
 Sabatier, 62-63, 141. 
 
 Sanday and Headlam, Romans^ 
 notes, 204, 20S, 229, 233. 
 
 Scepticism, result of dogmatism, 
 II ; attacked by Kant, 11, 
 
 Scheibe, Max, 62: Thesignificance 
 of Judgments of value for 
 Religious Knowledge, 113-116; 
 130. 
 
 Schleiermacher, systematized 
 theology, 2S-30 ; definition of 
 religion as feeling, 31, 35 ; as 
 dependence, 32-33, 113; religion 
 historically conditioned, 32, 35, 
 40, 42, 53 ; debt of Modern 
 Lutheranism, 30, 40 ; Ritschl's 
 debt to, 34, 36, 52 ; his rejec- 
 tion of rationalism, 31-32 ; view 
 of dogma, 35, 40; apprehends 
 true relation of Christ and the 
 Church, 36, ^^ ; influence on 
 later schools of theology, 36-37, 
 39-43 ; conception of Chris- 
 tianity, 40 ; teleological aspect 
 of the Kingdom of God, con- 
 
 ceived by Kant, attractive to 
 Schleiermacher, 142. 
 
 Schoolmen, 122. 
 
 Schultz, 62, 195, 196. 
 
 Science, freed from theology, 16 ; 
 experimental science ; limita- 
 tions of science ; physical 
 science, 46-47. 
 
 Scripture, isolated passages, 29 ; 
 infallibility, 29-30 : effect of 
 higher criticism on, 48. 
 
 Sin, doctrine of original, denied 
 by Ritschl, 171, 187, 214-217, 
 251 ; Augustinian theory, 214. 
 
 Sin and Salvation, 204-23S. 
 Scriptural and orthodox doc- 
 trine, 204-208 ; conception of 
 sin dependent on conception of 
 God, 204, 260 ; original sin, 
 essential truths taught in the 
 account of the Fall, 205 ; 
 unanimity of Apostolic writers 
 in accepting sacrificial value of 
 Christ's death, 205-206 ; re- 
 pentance and justification — the 
 accounting righteous, 206 ; 
 sacrament of baptism, doctrine 
 of regeneration, 206-208 ; sanc- 
 tification as the issue of justifi- 
 cation, 208 ; salvation, 208 ; 
 Ritschlian conception of the 
 righteousness of God, 208-213, 
 of the wrath of God and 
 Divine punishment, 210-213 • 
 Ritschlianism deficient in doc- 
 trine of sin — the dominant ten- 
 dency of the age, 213-214, 260 ; 
 idea of the Kingdom, deter- 
 minative in doctrine of sin, 
 213-214; origin of sin, its 
 development, a kingdom of sin, 
 214-216 ; guilt-consciousness, 
 217; relation between sin and 
 suffering, 217-219; on death, 
 the penalty of sin, 220; sense 
 of separation, a result of guilt- 
 consciousness, 220-221 ; Chris- 
 tian doctrine of redemption, 
 221 ; Ritschlian treatment of 
 idea of justification, reconcilia- 
 tion with God, and adoption to 
 
INDEX 
 
 271 
 
 sonship, 221-223; fi^s points: 
 
 (1) sins of ignorance, 223-225 ; 
 
 (2) sacrifice of the death of 
 Christ connected with forgive- 
 ness of sins, 223, 225-229 ; (3) 
 society or the individual, the 
 proper object of justification, 
 223, 229-233, 246-247; (4) 
 relation between justification 
 and sanctification, 223, 233-235 ; 
 (5) imputation of Christ's merits, 
 223, 235 ; Ritschl's conception 
 of the new life, 236 : of immor- 
 tality, 236-237 ; estimate of his 
 work, 237-238. 
 
 Socinianism, 127. 
 
 Soul, doctrine of the, 8 ; Ritschl's 
 
 theory, 81-83, §5-86, 251. 
 Spencer, H., 45. 
 Spinoza, 20. 
 Spirit, Holy, doctrine of the, 
 
 Ritschlian attitude, 163, 170- 
 
 173, 196, 234, 263. 
 Stahlin, S^. 
 Strauss, 124. 
 Swing, Prof., 6^, 74, 187, 236. 
 
 Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, 
 47- 
 
 Teleological, view of world, Kant, 
 14, 116; monotheism, 38; idea 
 of the Kingdom of God, con- 
 ceived by Kant, 142 ; 214, 
 244. 
 
 Theology, Calvin, systematic 
 theologian, 29 ; Protestant, 
 based on Scripture, 29 ; syste- 
 matic, influence of Schleier- 
 macher, 30; distinguished from 
 rehgion, 30 ; traditional, assent 
 to dogma, 30 ; modern Lutheran, 
 30 ; compared and contrasted 
 with rationalism, 31 ; need for 
 restatement, 44 ; theology and 
 metaphysics, 239-241 ; Ritschl- 
 ian claim to Evangelical theo- 
 logy, 261. 
 
 Theology and Metaphysics, 55, 72. 
 
 Tholuck, 51. 
 
 Thomasius, value of ecclesiastical 
 dogma, 41. 
 
 Traub, 85. 
 
 Trinity, doctrine of the, 160-175, 
 145 ; the Christian formula, 
 160; a necessary consequence 
 of the Christian view of God, 
 161 ; based on Christian revela- 
 tion, 161 ; an ecclesiastical 
 dogma, 162 ; assumed by 
 Ritschl and Ritschlian school, 
 162-163, 258; unquestioning 
 attitude of the Early Church, 
 devotional rather than doctrinal, 
 163-164; baptismal formula, 
 natural expression of Trinitarian 
 ideas and language, 163-164, 
 256 ; making of creeds, a 
 practical necessity, 166, 259 ; 
 Ritschlian attitude, a result of 
 Ritschlian conception of Christ, 
 166 ; the Divine Fatherhood of 
 God, Ritschl's limited concep- 
 tion, a synonym for the will of 
 God, 167-170, 257; Ritschlian 
 doctrine of the Holy Spirit, 163, 
 170-173, 263; 259. 
 
 Tubingen school, 51, 52, 243. 
 
 Unity, three great ideas of, 5, 9 ; 
 unity in knowledge sacrificed 
 by Kant, 10 ; of God, of the 
 world, 87-S9, 96 ; idea of, in 
 religion, go ; of knowledge, 
 107 ; of the Kingdom of God, 
 147-148, 159, 244. 
 
 Value-judgments, 87-119, suggest- 
 ed by Lotze, 22 ; introduction 
 of term to theology by Herr- 
 mann, 61, 89-94; contributions 
 to literature on, 62 ; Ritschl's 
 theory of, 87-89, 93-97 ; based 
 upon feeling functions of the 
 mind, 94; concomitant or inde- 
 pendent, 95 : their function, 
 96 ; determinative effect on 
 Ritschlian theology, 97, 244 : 
 contribution of Herrmann to 
 theory, 97-100 ; of Kaftan, lOO- 
 107 : recent developments of 
 doctrine of, 108; Otto Ritschl, 
 concerning value-judgments, 
 
2/2 
 
 INDEX 
 
 108-I12; gradual development 
 of theory, views of Luther, 
 Kant, Herbart, De Wette, Lotze, 
 109 ; Max Scheibe, The signi- 
 ficance of judgments of value 
 for religious knowledge, 113- 
 116: Max Reischle's theory, 
 117-119: "thymetic'' judg- 
 ments, 118: -on the practical 
 use of, 241-244, 
 
 Wendt, 62, 191. 
 
 World, the unity of, 5, 87-88, 
 96 ; interpretation of, offered 
 by metaphysics, 98 ; a con- 
 ception corresponding to the 
 idea of God, 127 : Socinian 
 theory of moral government, 
 orthodox or reformed theory, 
 127-128 ; derived from God, 
 through attribute of love, 145- 
 147 ; Kingdom of God, the key 
 to solution of problem of the 
 world, 148-152, 257. 
 
 GLASGOW : PRINTED AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS BY KODERT WACLEHOSE AND CO. LTD. 
 
SOME OPINIONS— C^/?^/>2;/^^ 
 
 Church Times.— ^"^ We rise from the perusal of Mr. EdghiU's book with an enhanced 
 sense of the value which the Old Testament prophecy has for the Church of to-day as 
 important evidence for the truth of the Incarnation. We trust that many others may 
 derive the same benefit from this striking volume, and that its author may benefit the 
 Church by further essays." 
 
 Athenaeum. — " Highly to be praised." 
 
 Contemporary Review. — "A work of singular value both to professed theologians 
 and to general students of inspired literature." 
 
 Saturday Review, — " Mr. Edghill has done an excellent service by his statement 
 of the case. The frankness of his treatment and the courage, and even the occasional 
 rashness, of his conjectures save his book from the appearance of an apology : while 
 the spirit in which he has worked shows that the methods of his teachers have 
 strengthened his convictions. His book is not only a conscientious and well-reasoned 
 presentation of his own point of view : it will also assure his readers, whatever their 
 own prepossessions, of the adherence of the best instructed among the younger clergy 
 to the ancient lines of the faith." 
 
 Chnrchtnari. — " The entire subject ot the book is discussed with great fairness, 
 genuine ability, and praiseworthy clearness, and no one, whatever his view of the 
 Old Testament may be, can consult it without obtaining information, guidance, and 
 suggestion on one of the most important'topics of biblical study and theology." 
 
 Layman.—''^ We hope that the general value and interest of Mr. EdghiU's volume 
 will be manifest from what has been said. It is most certainly a remarkable produc- 
 tion . . . An immense amonnt of work has been put into it, and, as has been pointed 
 out, there is added to the work a devout and reverent spirit. It is undoubtedly a 
 noteworthy and admirable contribution to the literature of a subject, of which the 
 intense interest must always be felt by those who believe in the Old Testament as 
 the appointed preparation tor the New." 
 
 British Weekly. — " That a fresh statement of the evidential value of prophecy was 
 needed, no one will dispute. Readers of Mr. EdghiU's volume will also agree that 
 it goes far to supply the want. . . . Certainly every reader will feel himself indebted 
 to Mr. Edghill and will more than endorse Bishop Ryle's commendation." 
 
 Christian World. — "An important contribution to theology. . , . There must be 
 general satisfaction at the appearance of a book that reveals the critical discrimination 
 and the sense of historical proportion without which there can be no Biblical theology 
 worthy of the name." 
 
 Methodist Recorder. — " Will retain the interest of all readers to the ^ery end. In 
 a most suggestive way he shows what ' fulfilment ' of prophecy really means and how 
 it possesses very great evidential value even if this be not realized in the sense in 
 which the words are generally understood. . . Mr. EdghiU's pages are not burdened 
 with learned notes, but he shows minute acquaintance with the critical discussion of 
 individual passages, and his more general surveys and summaries prove a familiarity 
 with the whole range of prophetic writings such as only a very few previous writers 
 have manifested." 
 
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