CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY FROM BD632 .H69 •" """"""'' "-""^ Time and s >ace: a metaphysical essay. By oiln 3 1924 028 937 831 Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/cletails/cu31924028937831 TIME AND SPACE. LONDON : BOBSON AKD SON, GREAT NOKTHERN PKINTING WORKS, PANCRAS BOAD, N.W. TIME AND SPACE J{tet(ipi)i)mcal tss^ SHADWORTH H. HODGSON. TON AMO0EN TE 0EA ©TrATEP AIDS EIOE KAI HMIN. LONDON: LONGMAN, GREEN, LONGMAN, ROBEETS, AND GREEN. 1861:. CONTENTS. PART I. INTRODUCTION. § 1. Appeals to consciousness . PAGE 3 CHAPTER I. THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. 2. Subject and Object . 3. Necessity and Universality 4. The term a priori 5. Metaphysic is philosophy . 6. Metaphysic and rehgion . 7. Cogito ergo sum 8. Metaphysic and psychology 9. Metaphysic and ontology . 9 •11 13 16 19 30 30 CHAPTER II. THE NATUEE OF THE COGNITIONS OP TIME AND SPACE. 10. First and second intentions 11. Elements and aspects of phenomena 12. The formal element in consciousness 13. The unity of phenomena in space 14. The unity of phenomena in time 15. Time and space as pure objects . 16. The exhaustive divisibility of time and space 17. The infinity of time and space . 33 45 61 87 103 115 125 132 VI CONTENTS. CHAPTER III. Psychological. THE ORIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS OF TIME AND SPACE. § 18. The object of Psycliology .... PAKE . 144 19. Three classes of theories .... . 149 20. Theory of a Soul . 153 21. Theory of an Ego . 164 The phenomenon of Reflection . 173 22. The physiological theory .... . 192 23. Origin of the formal element . 210 CHAPTER IV. PEESBNTATION AND EEPEESENTATION. 24. The empirical ego ..... 25. Representation .... 26. The immediate and remote object 27. Remote objects in coimection 219 227 237 251 CHAPTER V. SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION 28. Redintegration 29. Analysis of redintegration 30. Results of the analysis 31. Volition 32. Division of functions in consciousness 256 264 273 283 286 CHAPTER VI. VOLUNTARY REDINTEGRATION 33. Abstract and general notions 34. Their nature .... 35. The law of Parcimony 36. Critical and acquisitive reasoning 37. The principle of acquisitive reasoning 38. Induction and Deduction . 39. Relation of critical and acquisitive reasoning 40. The three orders, Essendi, Existendi, Cognoscendi 295 301 305 311 316 318 332 333 CONTEKTS. Vll PART II. CHAPTEE VII. Metalogical. Division 1. THE POSTULATES AND THE CONCEPT-FORM. 41. Existence and Non-existence 42. Consciousness and thought 43. Origin of the laws of thought . 44. The Concept-form .... 45. Some remarks on Hegel's Logic ^ PAGE 345 350 355 360 364 Division 2. THE CONCEPT. 46. The nature of concepts 47. Some cases examined 48. The logical object and the logical unit 49. Categories or forms of thought . 50. The combination of concepts 51. The import of propositions 52. Categorical propositions 53. Hypothetical propositions . 54. Disjunctive propositions 55. Hypothetico-disjunctive propositions 56. Syllogisms .... 1st. Categorical. 2d. Hypothetical. 3d. Disjunc tive. 4th. Hypothetico-disjunctive. 57. Empirical and formal reasoning 58. Review of the analysis of the laws of Logic 403 413 419 425 428 432 436 448 451 453 455 469 477 Division 3. RATIO SUFFICIENS. 59. Cause and Reason . 60. The formal cause 61. Intuition and thought 62. Nihil Absoluti . 487 493 494 503 VIU CONTENTS. CHAPTER VIII. EBASON. § PAGE 63. Intuitive reflection 509 64. Eeasoning reflection . . . . . . .513 65. Eetrospect of metaphysical pLilosophy . . . 520 Plato. Aristotle. Post -Aristotelian philosophy. Giordano Bruno. Descartes and his successors. 66. Other domains of the reason 539 Eelation between ethic and physic. Ethic. Con- nection of ethic and law. Poetry. 67. Progress of science generally ... . 552 CHAPTER IX. IDEAS. 68. Classification of ideas ...... 563 69. Three instances examined 568 70. Faith 573 71. The logical idea of God 576 EPILOGUE 588 TIME AND SPACE. PAET I. B INTRODUCTION. § 1. The writer of the following pages submits them, § i. not without a sense of their imperfection, to the judg- consciousness. ment of his contemporaries. The questions treated of labour under one kind of difficulty pecuharly their own. It is not every reader who wiU be pre- pared to admit, that, in one part of metaphysical enquiries, the proof to be required differs in its nature from the proof to be required in the purely objective sciences. But that it is so follows from the nature of the matter, at once subjective and objective. In the purely objective sciences a writer need have no doubt about his facts ; he can protect himself by de- finitions and by distinctions, and can always make clear what the precise object is, about which he rea- sons. For instance, in Political Economy, he can obviate ambiguities in his object-matter by defining Wealth to mean " every commodity which has an exchangeable value ;" and, consequent on this defini- tion, he can define Productive Labour to mean labour which produces such commodities; for every one is agreed that there are such commodities and such labour. But where this has not been done, but is still in process of doing, there every man must be judge for himself, whether his own internal experi- ence bears out the assertions of the writer. For the facts of metaphysic, like those of every purely objec- 4 INTEODUCTION. § 1. tive science, are facts of consciousness, and their ob- cotrdousness. scunty and the difficulty of observing them make their interpretation, or their analysis, doubtful. The very questions at issue are. What are the facts ? What is their analysis? — and Is there any phenomenon answering to a given definition ? — of which there is no judge but consciousness itself. Such questions, for instance, are the analysis of the cognitions of time and space, the analysis of consciousness in its simplest concrete shape, the question whether we are immediately conscious of the Will, and so on. If the meaning of the term red was not sufficiently agreed upon, we should have to appeal to the consciousness of individuals to decide what colour should be dis- tinguished by this name ; and those who were colour- blind would be heard before the decision was arrived at, but not afterwards. A great part of metaphysic, not by any means the whole of it, and a continually though slowly de- creasing part, is in this unfixed and undetermined state; and it is natural that this should be the case with this the most comphcated and dependent of all branches of knowledge, though it is one which, from the universal and obvious presence of some of its elements, was cultivated among the earliest. In this unfixed part of metaphysic the appeal to conscious- . ness must stiU be permitted; there the proofs must not only be exammed but performed by every one for himself, with a view to the establishment of a sufficient consensus of judgments; and the aim of the metaphysical writer in this part of his task must be, not to give convincing inferential proofs of his posi- tions, but to state and describe the phenomena so as to lead and assist the reader in finding the proofs INTRODUCTION. 5 for himself, or in other words, to aid him in going g i. through the trains of reasoning in such an original consciousness. and independent way, as can alone procure, I do not say the conclusions here reached, but any real con- clusion at all. By the term consciousness, in this Essay, is al- ways meant consciousness as existing in an individual conscious being; and proofs dra;wn from such a con- sciousness can have no validity for other conscious individuals, unless they themselves recognise their truth as descriptions applicable to the procedure and phenomena of their own consciousness. Doctrines, if true, will ultimately be recognised as such by all individuals whose consciousness is formed on the same type, that is, by all human beings. Object. CHAPTER I. THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. 'AvaX/'KaiOTEpai fiev ovv waaai avTrji, afiewuiv Se ovSe/ica. Aristotle. PAiiTi. § 2. The true opposite of the term metaphysic is -^' empiric, whether empiric is employed in. dealing with Subject and states of consciousness or with external phenomena. States of consciousness and external phenomena, whe- ther abstract or concrete, whether considered as parti- cular and unclassified or as general and classified, are known to us by experience either direct or indirect, by perception or by inference ; that is to say, they are the data of empirical knowledge or science ; while metaphysic is employed in tracing the conditions of such data. Thus Kant says in the Prolegomena, § i, that metaphysical cognition is a cognition which lies on the far side of, or beyond, experience, — jenseit der Erfahrung liegende Erkenntniss. Metaphysic takes its stand at the point of junction between the mind which knows and the world which is known, and deals with the relations which obtain between them, so far as these relations are necessary and universal. Metaphysic may therefore be ap- proached both from the side of psychology, or the laws of consciousness and the organ of consciousness, and from that of physical science, or the laws of ex- ternal phenomena. In saying this I am not forget- ting that external phenomena are presented to us THE SCOPE OP METAPHYSIC. only in consciousness, nor on the other hand that parti, Ch. I. states of consciousness, when reflected on, are as objective as external phenomena. It is enough that subject and this difference of aspect, this distinction xara ftsp;?, ^^''' has given rise to a division of existences scmra, [liKri, a division of them into mind and matter, and their appropriated sciences, psychology and the physical sciences. Following the route of either of these groups of sciences, we come to ground which is com- mon to it with the other group, the common ground of phenomena with a double aspect, subjective and objective. This common ground of psychology and physic, phenomena in their most abstract shape, is the proper field of metaphysic. It considers pheno- mena as they possess an objective and a subjective aspect, and not as they are dependent on a series of events in the kingdom of mind, or on a series of events in the kingdom of matter. It is an analysis of phenomena, as such. Standing thus at the meeting point of the two groups of cognitions, psychological and physical, metaphysic contains, as its proper object- matter, those cognitions only which are common to all objects of knowledge and to all modes or states of consciousness. In other words, it is only certain universal modes or forms of consciousness and of objects external to consciousness which are the ob- ject-matter of metaphysic. The reason of this is, - that all the others fall properly into their places in the other sciences to which they belong, while those which are universal, both in consciousness and in its objects, are distinguished broadly by this charac- teristic from the rest, and, besides the place which they hold in any of the other sciences, have an- other place in that science, or mode of contempla- 8 THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. parti. tion, Avhich brings into one view both object and — subject as the two only constituents of the whole Subject and imaginable or conceivable universe. The import- ■"*"' ance and also, considering the constitution of our minds, the necessity of this latter science, called metaphysic, rests on the fact that this distinction of subject and object is the most general and ultimate distinction at which we can arrive in aU knowledge. If the human muad is compelled to push its enquiries to the furthest point attainable by it, it is to this distinction that it wiU come the last, from what- ever point of view it may start, and whatever road or science it may take. It is the ultimate distinction in the analysis of the universe from the human point of view, and therefore it is the starting point of meta- physic, which is the applied logic of the universe, the method of stating the problem in its lowest terms. Some may suppose that there is a point of view from which this distinction of subject and object, or, what is the same thing, of consciousness and the ob- jects- of consciousness, is not the ultimate and highest distinction possible, but some other distinction be- tween existences, as for instance that of Inner and Outer, or that of Form and Matter. From such a point of view, states of consciousness themselves would stiU be classed as, what in fact they are, special modes of existence, and perhaps, under the first distinction, as outward manifestations" of an in- ward spirit, or, imder the second distinction, as forms into which the matter of the external world is cast and moulded. Now what is there to show that a method of regarding the luiiverse founded upon such distinctions as these is not more complete and legiti- mate than a method founded on the distinction of THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. 9 subject and object? This only consideration, so far pabti. as can be at present evident, namely, that it adopts _ ' a single term or category, that of existence, into subiectand which to introduce its distinctions, a category un- ^^^ ' explained, unconnected, meaningless; that it leaves vague and undetermined, because out of relation to any thing else, the totality of the phenomena which it proposes to classify, and thus in fact starts with assuming an Absolute. Of such a single, non-relative, existence it must be admitted, that it has no meaning and no predicates, that it is in short pure nonentity and merum mhU. If however it should be replied,', that by existence is meant relative existence, such existence as is relative to us and our capacities, this is only to admit in other words the greater validity of the distinction between subject and object. For by a relative existence is meant an objective exist- ence, an existence the correlate of consciousness, the only existence which in fact we can conceive or ima- gine. Let this objective existence be divided or dis- tinguished as it may, it wiU still be one aspect only of the ultimate distinction into subject and object, or rather it will itself involve its opposite, the sub- jective aspect; and the further distinctions intro- duced into it will be distinctions of the object of consciousness only, and not of an absolute existence apart from consciousness. § 3. Xow with reference to the doctrine that the § s. , . , IT- r 1 ■ Necessity and cognitions, which are the object-matter oi metaphysic, Universality. are necessary as well as universal, it must be remarked that the term necessary is but the correlate of the term universal; what the latter is in the world of objects that the former is in the world of conscious- ness. Whatever is necessary in thought exists also 10 THE SCOPE OE METAPHYSIC. Part I. always Without exception in the object of thought; — ■ and whatever exists always without exception in the Neoelsity and object of thought is necessarj m thought. It is not Universality. ^^.^^ ^^^^ whatever exists always in " things-in-them- selves" is necessary in thought, for of things-in-them- selves we have no experience ; but, so far as any thing is an object for us, whatever is universal in the object is necessary in the subject. Necessity is a term which has meaning only in reference to our cognition; it is subjective in its reference; while the term univer- sality is objective, not referring however to existence ^per se, but to objective existence for us. "We shall have to consider in the course of these pages whether any causal relation obtains between these two corre- lates, necessity and universality. For the present it is enough to explain, that no necessity can be ad- mitted to exist ia the objective world; that what we call a necessary sequence is necessary solely in refer- ence to our understanding, because we refer the con- sequent to a special antecedent, and bring it thus under some law which we think of as fixed, at least so far as the particular case under consideration is concerned ; and that the only thing which corresponds to our notion of necessity in nature is the phenomenon of universality. Universality means, that the thing in question, whatever it is, never is otherwise ; neces- sity means, that we cannot conceive it otherwise. In the former case there is no impossibility introduced ; in the latter case there is an impossibility, but it is one of thought not of fact, subjective not objective. Like the terms subject and object themselves, the terms necessity and universahty are but two as- pects, inseparable from each other, of the same phe- nomenon. prion. THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. 11 S 4. It remains to be noticed in what sense the pabt i. Ch. I. cognitions of time and space, and any others which — ' may prove entitled to rank with them, can be said to The te™ a lie beyond experience and -to be a priori. All abstract cognitions, such as those of time and space, can be arrived at by generalising from experience ; and this property is common to all abstractions, of whatever kind they are. No one can be surprised that this property is possessed by those most general and ab- stract of aU cognitions which are the object-matter of metaphysic, Bvit it is equally clear that it is not this property which entitles them to be placed beyond experience, jenseit der Erfahrung, or to be called non- empirical, or a priori. What so entitles them is the addition of this character to their other character of universality or necessity, so that they are previously existing elements of every possible cognition or object of cognition. Now there are two distinct senses of the term a priori, which I do not remember ever to have seen clearly distinguished. Sometimes, since every condition is previous in i order of time to its consequent, the knowledge of the consequent derived from a knowledge of its conditions is said to be a knowledge a priori; and again, those existing con- ditions which are causes of a given effect, those con- ditions without which the effect could not be what it is, are said to be a priori conditions, since, when we know what the effect is, we conclude that such and such conditions must have j)receded it in order of time. These two modes rest upon priority in order of time, and constitute one sense of the term a priori. The other sense of this term has nothing to do with priority in order of time, but solely with priority in order of logic. For instance, the figure of a triangle 12 THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. paeti. drawn on paper exists only when three lines meet ^' each other at three angles; the three lines and the The teiin a three angles are the a priori elements of the triangle ; ^"""^ but they are not previous to it in point of time, but exactfy simultaneous, for the length and position of each hne, and the size of each angle, are determined respectively by the length and position of the other lines and the size of the other angles, that is, by the other elements of the triangle. Before the triangle was formed, there were neither the lines of such and such a length and position, nor the angles of such and such a size. The triangle is the brief synthetical expression for these lines and these angles, and the lines and the angles are the analysis of the triangle. Now any of these elements of the triangle, which bekig given the rest are deducible, or all these ele- ments taken together, may be called the a priori elements of the triangle ; but in neither case are they prior to the triangle in order of time, but only in order of logic. And if the term a priori is applied to any of the metaphysical elements of objects, it must be in this second sense of the term, and not in a sense implying priority in order of time. Applying these remarks to time and space, the results of any analysis may be considered prior ui logic to the whole analysed, and therefore a priori to that particular object; but time and space are a priori xocr e^o%^i', inasmuch as they are a priori to aU ob- jects of cognition, to cognition and existence itself. Themselves cognitions generalised from experience, and in that point of view later than experience in order of time, they are discovered to have been also elements of those very cognitions of experience from which they are generalised, present in them as con- THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. 13 stituent elements undistinguished before analysis. As paet i. to their becoming known to us as separate cognitions, — ' they are later than many other cognitions ; but as to The term their own existence in knowledge unseparated, they * ?"<>"• are simultaneous with all and every other cognition. The question of the origin of these cognitions will be discussed in Chapter III. ; but with reference to the mind of man as he now exists, and to all his other cognitions, these two cognitions of time and space at least are a priori, in the sense just explained; that is, are elements of any and every particular experi- ence, entering into every one of them as its necessary form. S 5. So far as to the leadinsr features and distinc- ,, §5. . . •> . -r Metapnysic is tions of metaphysic, as a separate phenomenon. It pMosophy. remains to regard it as a whole, and in relation and contrast with other branches of knowledge. Meta- physic is, properly speaking, not a science but a phi- losophy; that is, it is a science whose end is in itself, in the gratification and education of the minds which carry it on, not in any external purpose^ such as the founding of any art conducive to the welfare of life. This is the distinction between science and philo- sophy, that science does not include its own end, but is pure knowledge whose end is something external to itself, while philosophy is carried on for the sake of the learning and knomng alone which it involves. Nor is this the popular distinction between intel- lectual pursuits which lead to something, and those which only, as it is called, sharpen the mind. Intel- lectual pursuits which are employed to sharpen the mind are already pursued for an end external to themselves, and cannot deserve the name of philo- sophy. Philosophy is pleasurable and noble emotion 14 THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. Part 1. no less than knowledge ; the two elements are in- Ch I. o ' -^- separable, are logically and not empirically discerned. Metaphysiois In Other words, its end is in itself. The need to ^ °^^ ^' philosophise is rooted in* our nature, as deeply as any other of our needs. " Tutti gli uomini naturalmente desiderano di sapere," says Dante, a true philosopher, in the opening passage of his Convito, translating Aristotle's words at the beginning of his Metaphysic, TLcivTsg aii0gai'^oi rov 2;'5sva< ogeyovrai (pOffei. And Plato says in the Sophistes, 'AXXa jju^v -^vxriv ys 'h(/jsv axou- (Tccv "Trmav Toiv kyvoovtrccv. And the attempt to satisfy this need has at all times produced philosophies, which have been founded on the special sciences as they from time to time existed, and which have taken from the growth and development of these latter their own form and colour. For the great problems which in all ages have proposed themselves to man, such as these. Whence he and the world came; Whither they go ; What is the meaning of the whole scene of ex- istence, as it unfolds itself before him, and of which he himself is a part ; Is it truer to explain it by the analogy of this, or of that, familiar phenomenon, as of a dream, a tragic or a comic drama, of a battle or a war, or a lawsuit, or a journey; — ^these questions and such as these must for ever, whether answerable or unanswerable, whether conceived as questions or only as meditations, possess for him the profoundest interest; and to attempt their solution must be one of his most attractive labours. Now the very con- dition of prosecuting the enquiry is metaphysic, that is, the analysis of the phenomena whose history and import is to be studied. Before the laws of the suc- cession of phenomena, and therefore also before the laws or law of their tendency and final end, the THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. 15 nature of the phenomena must be analysed. This paeti. Ch. I. analysis or statical study of the nature of phenomena is metaphysic. Modern philosophy has attained at Metaphysio is least to this, that it can not only state the problem to ^ "^"'^ '^' be solved, but also lay down the conditions of its solution with certainty and precision. This we owe chiefly, perhaps, to Descartes and Kant. But each age, as it advances to a greater distance from these fathers of modern philosophy, must perforce alter something in the systems which they moulded, and re-state the old questions in terms allied to the ad- vancing discoveries of the sciences on which meta- physical philosophy is founded. It is idle to object against metaphysical philosophy that it is not a special science ; and yet it is into such an objection that most of the complaints commonly made against it are resolvable. For in fact all men who reflect are metaphysicians, and all sciences have a metaphysical side ; a system of metaphysic is merely a gathering up into one connected whole the scattered notions which each reflecting man entertains respect- ing the ultimate nature and scope of his own pursuit. The difficulty is to carry the metaphysical method far enough. Men soon become tired of distinguishing logically; they demand that the objects of reasoning should be exhibited empirically or as concrete wholes, and ask what the external end or good is in such enquiries. As men are most familiar with the special sciences, which are all empirical or employed with whole objects, abstract like the figures of geometry, or concrete like those of the sun and stars, they are apt to demand that all science shall be reduced to the same shape, that is, that metaphysic shall cease to be metaphysic by giving up its distinguishing charac- 16 THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. Pabt 1. Ch. I. §5. Metaphysic is philosophy. teristic. This demand, when it is naade without pre- vious examination of the nature and claims of meta- physic itself, appeafs to me to be one of Bacon's Idols of the Theatre. Even Auguste Comte thought that in establishing his PhUosophie Premiere, in the Poli- tique Positive, vol. iv. page 173, which corresponds to the Prima PhilosQphia of Bacon, and is a system of the few most general laws of all the sciences philo- sophically arranged, an analysis not of phenomena as such but of the universe of phenomena as a whole, he was carrying the metaphysical method far enough. He went somewhat farther, indeed, in his latest work, the Synthese Subjective, but even there he did not go beyond the notion of a system of general laws of empirical phenomena, and of thought occupied with empirical phenomena, as such. In my view, however, this is but a small part of true metaphysic. It goes beyond this, and refers even such general laws as these to their conditions and elements, without rest- ing satisfied with having it shown that they are the result of a complete induction. If we are to have a philosophy, or a science which is its own end or re- ward, it must advance to the ultimate possible Hmit, and not stop short at the point of arranging inductive principles in a philosophical manner; for this may aim only at the external reward of aiding the special §6. Metaphysic and BeligioiL sciences. §•6. Lord Bolingbroke, in his first Letter to Pope, "Works, vol. V. page 83-4, edit. 1809, distinguishes his First Philosophy from what he calls metaphysical pneumatics and from ontology, on the one hand, and on the other from the Prima Philosophia of Bacon. Proceeding to describe what his First Philosophy is, he defines it by its objects, "natural theology or THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. 17 theism, and natural religion or ethics." I have al- pabti. ready distinguished met'aphysic from such philosophy ^— as the Prima Philosophia of Bacon, and shall later Metlpiiyaic on distinguish it also from ontology; but I cannot *"^^«'^s'°"- admit that ethic or religion or theology are the ob- jects of metaphysic. Metaphysic has to take accoimt indeed of every class of phenomena, but its special business is with the elements universal and necessary of all phenomena alike, as such. It must explain all without exception, and deny none on pain of being untrue. But it approaches phenomena from the cognitive side, and treats them as cognitions, not as feelings or emotions. Since the implication of matter with form in phenomena is universal, and the impli- cation of dififerent kinds of matter with each other is almost universal, the distinction expressed by the Aristotelic ^, or the Spinozistic qu^tenus, is of almost universal application ; and is, besides, the only method of obviating the illogical vagueness of such expres- sions as "this rather than that," "this more than that," expressions which have their ground in the same almost universal implication just spoken of. Feelings and emotions are the object-matter of ethic, religion,' and theology, rather than of metaphysic. What is the reason and extent of this " rather than" ? It is this, that, since feelings and emotions are also at the same time cognitions, metaphysic treats them so far as they are cognitions, and ethic so far as they are feelings and emotions. Cognitions are the object- matter of ethic; not however in their character of cognitions, but only so far as they are feelings or emotions. This is the first step in the limitation of ethic ; the next step is, that not all feelings and emo- tions, as such, are the object-matter of ethic, but only c 18 THE SCOPE OP METAPHYSIC. Ch. I. 'SIC and Beligion, pabti. those feelings and emotions which contain, or with which is combined, a feeling or emotion of a pleasure- able or painful kind. Ethic thus becomes the general science of practice, as distinguished from pure specu- lation. Ethic is a systematic cognition of feelings, metaphysic of cognitions. Religion is a term for a particular and important class of ethical emotions, namely, those which are of a spiritual kind, or which satisfy the sense of delight- ing in what is right as distinguished from what is wrong, that is, which satisfy the conscience. Re- ligion consists of emotions. " Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind ; and thy neighbour as thyself; — on these two commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets." Matth. xxii. 37. But now, looking away from the particular emotions which constitute any particular religion, the Christian for instance, religion itself in the abstract has never been investigated, or its nature analysed, with sufficient accuracy. It will however be found, I apprehend, that it consists in the imion of two characteristics, 1st, that it is an emotion of some particular kind, as love, or hope; 2d, that the moral goodness of this emotion is self-evident, that is, the emotion is felt as an ultimate end in itself, as being its own warrant, needing and admitting no proof of its moral goodness beyond its actual presence in consciousness. All those emotions, and only those, which contain this second characteristic are religious emotions. Reli- gion is spiritual emotion. Theology is the embodiment of religion in doc- trines, that is, in cognitions, which give it a shape cognisable by the intellect, and relate either to the THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. 1 9 great object of religion, God, or to the conditions of pam i. its existence in man, or to the duties and actions -^' which are its consequences. Theology therefore is of Metapiiysic the same nature, and is to be broadly distiaguished ™ ^ ^™" from metaphysic on the same ground, as ethic. While metaphysic can overlook no phenomenon and no truth, of whatever kind it may be, or in whatever part of the mind it may come forward, theology and ethic, which are cognitive systems or sciences also, and as such have the investigation of truth for their idtimate purpose, may be carried on in harmony with metaphysic, and may even derive advantage from the results therein obtained. No truth, wherever found, whether in theology, ethic, or metaphysic, can pos- sibly be antagonistic to religion; the only danger is, that error should be mistaken for, and maintained in place of, truth; and against this danger, sober and searching enquiry, neglecting no facts and denying none, is the surest preservative. Further light wiU probably be thrown on these preliminary remarks in the course of the Essay. § 7. It was the above-mentioned dualism of sub- § 7. ject and object which was in Descartes' mind when "sum. he said to himself, Cogito ergo sum ; which sentence is the fountain-head of all modem metaphysic. It was the result of reflection, and the shortest and simplest way in which the act of reflection could be expressed. It contains the first distinction of reflec- tion on phenomena, the distinction into object and subject, into consciousness generally, abstracting from aU particular objects of consciousness, which is here established as being beyond the possibility of doubt, and the particular objects of consciousness which may be doubted. The reflective act and one of its objects, 20 THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. Pakt 1. Ch. I. sum. one of the two things distinguished by it, namely, consciousness, are together the fact which Descartes CogiU'ergo here asserts to be beyond the possibility of doubt. The first reflection is the first certainty, the first cer- tainty as distinguished from undoubting acquiescence. And thus reflection is the starting point of philoso- phy; the object asserted by it as certaia, conscious- ness, is the thing which is the object of philosophy, of which reflection is one mode. There are then two senses in which the Cogito or the Cogitatur of Des- cartes is to be taken, one in which it stands for the act of reflection, the other m which it stands for one of the two objects of reflection, consciousness gene- rally. He begins by seeing what things he is not certain of beyond the possibility of doubt. Nearly every thiag is in this category ; at last he puts the question about Sense ; Meditatio II. : " Sentire ? nempe etiam hoc non fit sine corpore, et permulta sentire visus sum in somniis qu£e deinde animadverti me non sensisse:" Here sense is not distinguished from the objects of sense; it therefore shares their uncertainty. He proceeds: "Cogitare? hie invenio, cogitatio est, hsec sola a me divelli nequit, ego sum, ego existo, certum est." Here at last he can dis- tinguish consciousness from its objects, the operation from the results. In the next page he follows up his enquiry: "Sed quid igitur sum? res cogitans; quid est hoc? nempe dubitans, intelligens, affirmans, negans, volens, nolens, imaginans quoque, et sen- tiens." Et sentiens, — here sense is distinguished from its objects, and is become part of the indubit- able operation of reflection itself, of the Cogito or the Cogitatiir. Here is the first answer to the question, What is it to exist, or What is existence? Existence THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. 21 is consciousness generally, in some or all of its modes ; Pakt i. or in other words, that exists which is revealed by — ^' •^ §7. consciousness. Coglto ergo Now the current theory, I believe, is this, that existence or Being far exceeds consciousness ; that many things exist of which we actually have not, and many other things of which we cannot have, the least knowledge ; that consciousness may and does make progress in penetrating into the former field, that of actually unknown existence, and in making many things actually known to us which before were ac- tually unknown, but existing beyond our knowledge ; while it is debarred from all progress whatever in the latter field, that of unknowable existence, which nevertheless is actually existing beyond our possi- bility of knowledge. If we so conceive, consciousness may be likened to a candle shining in a vast circle of darkness which it tends to illuminate more and more, while beyond this circle is a space of neither light nor darkness, which cannot, by its nature, be ever illu- minated by the candle's rays, however powerful they may become. There is thus formed a notion of an existence, real and actual, but out of aU relation to consciousness, not only unknown at present, but lui- knowable for ever; an objective existence which can never become subjective, an existence absolute, per se, a world of things-in-themselves. But to this existence I prefer to give th6 name non-objective existence, for I think it will become clear as we advance, that consciousness is limited only by existence, no less than existence is limited only by consciousness; that the two things are co- extensive ; that each is the opposite aspect of the other, the gold and silver side of the same shield. sum. 22 THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. sum. pabti. From whichever side we approach, that side seems — ■ to us the smaller of the two, appears as a Hmit im- co Jo^rgo posed on the other. If we approach from the sub- jective side, asking wfiat we can know, what can become an object of our consciousness, then we re- present to ourselves possible existence as far exceed- ing consciousness, and consciousness as conquering certain limits of existence, " won from the void and formless infinite." If on the other hand we approach from the objective side, and ask what exists or is capable of existing, then existence seems a small part of what we can imagine or conceive to exist, to be as it were an oasis of firm actual ground in the middle of the desert of the great Might-be, or Might-have- been. In the first case there appears to be a great field of non-objective existence, in the second case, of non-existing imagination or conception. The truth appears to be, that existence and consciousness are coextensive, one as wide as, and not wider than, the other. Non-objective existence, and non-real con- sciousness in conceiving or imagining, are terms with- out meaning. Whatever can be present in conscious- ness has some degree of reahty, the only question is, how much, or of what sort, how permanent, how arrived at. There may be names which are names only, whether the things supposed to be signified by them are supposed to lie in non-objective existence or in .non-real consciousness. And if we attempt to describe the subordinate position supposed to be occupied either by consciousness to non-objective ex- istence, or by existence to non-real consciousness, this very description is, and can only be, by means of expressions which in regard to this case are figura- tive, being drawn from cases of real consciousness sum. THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. 23 and real existence. The language borrowed from pami. experience within time and space is here made use of — ' to express our relation to things supposed for the cogitoergo moment to exist beyond time and space, beyond con- sciousness. How else can absolute impossibility of knowledge be characterised, except by figurative lan- guage? For whatever man can name, that he thinks he can in some way know, and that by naming the unknowable he brings it within the grasp of his know- ledge ; and, whether he in fact is so or not, he neces- sarily makes himself in the proceedings of his con- sciousness vavToiv fjb'sTgov. On the one hand, then, the attempt to characterise existence beyond the possi- bility of our knowledge requires the use of figurative expressions drawn from existence within our know- ledge ; and on the other hand, there is a natural and spontaneous assumption that every thing that exists stands in some nameable relation to our conscious- ness. All the meaning of the names appHed to ex- istence beyond consciousness is drawn from existence within consciousness ; and there is a spontaneous as- sumption that we are warranted in applying those names. In other words, the terms applied to non- objective existence, such as absolute, per se, beyond experience, transcendent, and so on, have a connota- tion, but no object denoted by them. Yet the very making use of them implies the assumption that there is something denoted by them. If, then, there is something denoted by them, this something has pre- dicates drawn from actual experience, and is of the same nature as objects of actual experience. Either the term non- objective existence is a name without meaning, or the object to which it is applied is an object within the range of our knowledge. In the sum. 24 THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. Part I. latter case it is synonymous with objective existence, — ^' or existence simply. Again, with regard to the term Cogito ergo existcncc. Either the term existence has a meaning, or it has none ; if it has none, it would be better to cease employing it; but if it has a meaning, then it must be, to the extent of that meaning, an intelligible object of consciousness. So that we can name no- thing, with a meaning in the name, but what has objective existence or existence for consciousness. To sum up all in a few words, it is impossible to know that any thing exists, without at the same time knowing somethmg of what it is, or of what we imagine it to be. It is the assumption of the subordinate position of consciousness to existence, of this primary relation of limiting and limited, of revealer and revealed, which is the ultimate ground of the distinction between phenomena and things -in -themselves, the Kantian Dinge-an-sich. If a limit, which would not other- wise have existed, is imposed by the Subject, that is, by the fact that aU existence has to be made known to us if at all, through consciousness, then we must assume the possibility of there existing, both in the things we are conscious of and also beyond them, that is, both as to quality and as to quantity, both as to intension and as to protension, something which we do not and cannot know; not only which we cannot know perfectly, but which we cannot know even imperfectly, that is, at all. The primary dualism of subject and object, when conceived as the sub- ordination of consciousness to existence, the limita- tion of existence by consciousness, the revelation of existence, within certain limits subjective in their nature, by consciousness, if unbalanced by the coim- THE SCOPE or METAPHYSIC. 25 ter conception of the subordination of existence to parti. Oh I consciousness, gives an intended meaning to the ex- — pression things-in-themselves, and at the same time cogito'ergo banishes them from our consideration ; admits the possibility of their existing, but condemns them to a non-objective existence ; and if the term existence has a meaning, this conception is self-contradictory. But the same primary dualism, when conceived as a dualism of two equal and coextensive factors or mem- bers, mutually limiting each other, is the ground of the expressions, All knowledge is relative, and All existence is relative existence. And one consequence of disregarding metaphysic, and busying the mind exclusively with objective existence, is, that objects themselves, the phenomena of experience, come to be considered as things-in-themselves ; and thus the popular view of them is practically, and as by a kind of forgetfuhiess, adopted by men of science, who would be the last willingly to accept it. Let us adopt for a moment this hypothesis of a thing-in-itself, a Ding-an-sich. Now what is this Ding- an-sich which we reject from knowledge and from .objective existence, or rather what is it' not? Con- sciousness, we will suppose for the moment, carves out from existence the objective world; the Ding- an-sich is that which cannot be reached or affected by consciousness; and thus, wherever we find an universal law or mode of consciousness, there we assume that we may be in contact with the Ding- an-sich. If things which exist in time and space are, to that extent, knowable by us, then the Ding- an-sich, which is by hypothesis unknowable, must be independent of those forms ; and if things which can impress or affect our sensibility are so far knowable, 26 THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. Pakt I, Ch. I. sum. then the Ding-an-sich cannot be capable of impressing our sensibility, for otherwise it would be knowable. cogitoergo Thus wc are guided in our notions of what it is not, and ipso facto unable to tonjeoture what it is. It wiU be seen in the course of the Essay whether there are any positive grounds for supposing that relative existence is infinite in any sense ; that is, for holding that there can be no existence beyond some at least of our capacities for knowledge. For it may well be that our consciousness may be limited in some respects and imlimited in others ; if now in any re- spect it is unlimited, in that respect it wiU include all existence; objective and relative existence itself will be unlimited in that respect; and the Ding-an- sich wiU in that respect vanish. If the necessary and universal forms of consciousness are themselves infi- nite, then the Ding-an-sich, if it exists at all, must be included in them, and in that respect, or to that ex- tent, cease to be a Ding-an-sich. On the non-existence of the Ding-an-sich, see ScheUing's Yom Ich, oder iiber das Unbedingte, Vol. i. of collected Works, p. 210. And on the complete mutuality of the subjective and objective kingdoms, see his masterly Einleitung, in the Ideen zu einer Philosophic der Natur, Vol. ii. of collected Works. It is the lasting service of the post-Kantian philosophers, Fichte, ScheHiug, and Hegel, each in his degree, to have established the doctrine of the perfect coextensiveness and mutuality of existence and con- sciousness. But it is not necessary, it is even for- bidden by the method in which alone this doctrine can be proved, to follow them in characterising this coextensiveness and mutuahty as identity, or as the Absolute. The union of the infinite and the finite. sum. THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. 27 and the supposed union of the absolute and the rela- paut i. tive, or of the Ding-an-sich and its phenomena, is to — ' be sought in the individual consciousness and within Cogitoergo its limits, by an analysis of its objects and its proce- dure; it is not to be placed in an absolute, or an infinite, or a Ding-an-sich, out of, prior to, or the source of, consciousness or its objects. What the absolute, the infinite, the Ding-an-sich are, that is, how they are conceived or imagined in the individual consciousness, how they come to be so conceived or imagined, and how far they are words without mean- ing, will have to be exhibited in the course of this Essay. They will be found to depend on the union of two functions of consciousness, volition and intui- tion. Schelling, in his Fernere Darstellungen, vol. iv. p. 356, quotes from Fichte the sentence, "dass nam- lich der endliche Geist nothwendig etwas Absolutes ausser sich setzen muss (ein Ding-an-sich), und den- noch von der andem Seite anerkennen muss, dass dasselbe nur fiir ihn da sey (ein nothwendiges Nou- men sey)." Schelling explains the contradiction by including the finite mind and its Ding-an-sich both together in the Absolute; but here it will be at- tempted to analyse the contradiction itself as a phe- nomenon, and to assign its causes and its elements. The absolute, the infinite, the Ding-an-sich, like all other objects, can exist only in consciousness; the only questions are, what is their nature and analysis, and what is their origin. Schelling says, in the Fer- nere Darstellungen, p. 378, "Sich vom Reflex, worin das an sich Erste immer als Drittes erscheint, mithin uberhaupt vom Bedingten und der Synthesis zum An-sich, zum Kategorischen und durch sich selbst Evidenten zu erheben, ist uberhaupt etwas, das sehr 28 THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. PABTi. vielen versagt scheint. Daher die Unfahigkeit, sich ^ die reine Subjekt-Objektivitat der absoluten Form als CogfJergo absolute Einheit zu denken." But I ask, by wha,t "u™- right can that "which constantly appears as third" be transformed into "that which is in itself first"? It can only be done by abstracting from the form of time in one moment, in order to exhibit the object in its essence or value, an essence simultaneous with the object itself, and then the next moment re-intro- ducing the form of time, in order to exhibit the object in its essence as prior to the object as a phenomenon. Taking, for instance, any series of phenomena in order of history, the last phenomenon, or the result, of the series is analysed into its elements m order of logic ; and then that element which is most important in order of logip, where abstraction is made of time, being necessary to the existence of the whole pheno- menon analysed, is considered to have been present as a cause from the first, in the earliest phenomenon of the series in order of history. It is true that what is first in order of history is often last in order of cognition ; but where the cognition is a logical cogni- tion, considering its object statically, and classing its elements in order of logical importance, there it does not follow that what is last in order of cognition, or first in order of logic, is first also in order of history. Thus, fovmded on the dualism of subject and ob- ject, conceived as two equal and coextensive members or factors, there arises before us the conception of the world distinguished, not divided, into two kingdoms, the kingdom of knowing, and the kingdom of being, a principium cognoscendi and a principium existendi. As in a court of justice guilt does not exist till it is proved, so here existence is nothing until known. sum. THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. 29 But we require, if possible, some more special know- part i. ledge of this dualism; we wish to see the modus — ^ operandi of consciousness, its method, and its nature; cogito'ergo to see whether, besides witnessing to the fact, and to some particular modes, of existence, it witnesses also to any necessary or universal modes of it. It was such questions as these which received an answer in the doctrines of Kant as to time and space, which doctrines wiU be reconsidered in these pages. The doctrines of Kant form a system which not only is more complete than any that preceded it, but also contains principles which are the firmest foundation for the labours of succeeding philosophers. The mar- vellous system of Hegel reposes on a Kantian basis ; but reasons will be given later on for the conclusion, that this was not the true edifice which should have arisen on that foundation. The fundamental prin- ciples still remain; and the following pages are an attempt, first, to analyse and interpret them, and then to raise on them the true superstructure of philo- sophy. Much wiU be foimd in this Essay which has been said, and in many instances far better said, by, other post-Kantian writers, Schelling, Hegel, Cole- ridge, Schopenhauer, Sir W. Hamilton, Mr. Mansel, Professor Ferrier, Mr. J. S. MUl, Mr. H. Spencer, for instance; resemblances to whose doctrines, and differences from them, and at the same time also some of my many obligations to their writings, will disclose themselves to the reader as he proceeds. What is distinctive and new in it wUl, I think, be found to arise chiefly from its keeping more exclu- sively to a purely metaphysical, as distinguished from either a psychological or an ontological, point of view. 30 THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. Part I. Ch. I. ii!" Metaphysic and Psychology. §9. Metaphysic and Ontology. § 8. What is the difference between psychology and metaphysic? A difiference in their object-matter. The object-matter of psychology is the mind, or con- sciousness in relation to the bodUy organs which are its seat ; that of metaphysic is consciousness in rela- tion to its objects. Psychology is thus a special part of physiology, that part which links physiology to metaphysic ; it is a special science or a portion of special science, and may be called the natural history of consciousness. To put the distinction between metaphysic and psychology in .another shape, it may be said that psychology regards the mind and its states of consciousness as members of the kingdom of Being alone; while for metaphysic they, in common with all other kinds of objects, are considered as mem- bers of both the kingdoms of Being and Knowing. Thus psychology is occupied not only with the organs of consciousness, its material conditions, and its con- ditions of existence, but also with its results con- sidered as objects, that is, with the laws of the asso- ciation of ideas, and filiation of opinions and systems of philosophy, as concrete phenomena of conscious- ness; while metaphysic is busied with these objects only so far as they are objects of consciousness; in order, first, to distinguish in them their subjective from their objective aspect, and secondly, to analyse them into their component parts, and classify the elements which compose them. § 9. Metaphysic has been characterised, in § i, as the applied logic of the universe. As such it is an entirely statical and not a dynamical theory. In other words, it is no theory of the causa3 existendi of the world or of consciousness ; it does not give the origin or the genesis of existence ; this, so far as it is THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. 31 possible, is the task of the special empirical sciences, whether physical or psychical. But it is the causa essendi, or nature, of the world of existence which metaphysic undertakes to examine; to analyse the structure of objects, as objects of consciousness, and to. resolve them into their elements. It does not pretend to determine whether the ultimate elements, which it reaches in its analysis, existed separately prior to the wholes or empirical objects which are their synthesis, nor to show how this is possible. Such a problem would be of a dynamical nature. There is no reason given in metaphysic for supposing that historically, in the order of nature, the simple existed before the compound, still less that the a priori elements existed separately before the empirical objects which yield them to our analysis. What is first in analysis is last in synthesis, and vice vers^; but both analysis and synthesis, whether employed upon particular objects of perception or upon general notions or uni- versals, are modes of statical enquiry, and warrant no conclusion as to what is first and what last in dynamical enquiry, or in the order of history. How consciousness is produced, how motion arises in ob- jects, how feelings come to be combined with cogni- tions, how the world itself came into existence,^ these are questions with which metaphysic has no- thing to do; metaphysic has but to accept the facts as they are, and to analyse them into their simplest elements. What and where are the elephant, the tortoise, and the stone, — these are dynamical not statical, empirical not metaphysical, questions; they relate to the history of empirical events, not to the analysis of facts. To mistake the ultimate elements in analysis for Part I. Ch. L Metaphysic and Ontology. 32 THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC. Past I. the first empirical existences in historical order of" — time, and from this to suppose that metaphysic can Metaphysic or ought to assign a cause or causes of existence to OntSogy. the universe, is to transform metaphysic into onto- logy. Not indeed by the route of the Ding-an-sich, or by that of an imagined substance or substratum of objects, but by a route not less certain. If in meta- physic we can go so far back in analysis, as to name elements of objects which are themselves a priori or logically previous to all experience and non-empi- rical, it is directly contrary to our own procedure and principles to make these into causae existendi of empirical objects; for to do so we must first trans- form them into empirical objects themselves. Ontology rests on the transformation of abstrac- tions into complete objects or complete existences. But all ontological systems do not adopt the same kind of abstractions to transform into complete exist- ences. One route to ontology has just been pointed out, that which adopts abstract elements of objects or of cognitions for this purpose. There is another which adopts abstract aspects of phenomena, that is, either their objective or their subjective aspect. An instance of the first is Spinoza's system, instances of the second are ScheUing's and Hegel's. Spinoza re- gards the Absolute as Substance, Schelling as Reason, Hegel as Mind. All such transformation is foreign to metaphysic, whose last word is — analysis. CHAPTER 11. THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS OF TIME AND SPACE. Infinitum illinc idemque per omnia finis, Atque heic finitum proprio sine fine videtur. , Giordano Bruno. § 10. Hume has the merit of being one of those phi- part i. losophers who have kept closest to phenomena them- — ' selves, without mixing up with the analysis of them First and considerations of their possible origia or causes ; phe- intentions. nomena are with him the beginning, middle, and end of his investigations. But in doing this he produced a picture of the universe as if it were unconnected, the work of chance, incoherent; especially was this the case with his theory of causation, which led Kant to undertake a stiU more searching investigation of phenomena, resulting in a discovery in phenomena themselves of the principle of their connection and consistence. He did this by directing his attention to an old distinction which had its origin with the philosophers of Greece and was always considered one of the cardinal distinctions of philosophy, — the distinction of Matter and Form. This distinction, taken together with that between analytic and syn- thetic judgments, is the comer-stone, the guiding thread, in Kant's work, the Kritik der Reinen Ver- nunft; and on that point philosophy is still standing. The application which Kant made of this distinction, the particular shape which his system buUt upon it 34 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS paeti. assumed, has been often, and in many points success- ch^ fully, attacked; yet the distinction remains an essen- Fifst and tial and an ultimate one, and especially so in that intentrons. matter to which he first applied it, the theory of per- ception; the distinction itself, apart from the theory which Kant built upon it, is sound. And this dis- tinction will be built upon throughout the course of this Essay, with what success remains to be proved by the event* But there is another distinction, only less import- ant and general than that between matter and form, which, owing its origin equally to Grecian antiquity, is also equally applicable and essential now to metia- physical questions ; and on this distinction, in ad- dition to that between matter and form, and in con- junction with it, I hope to establish the theory of this Essay. Aristotle drew the distinction between T^uTn and huTtgcc ovalcc, in the Categories ; the Schoolmen, or rather I believe the NominaUsts among the School- men, transformed this distinction into one between prima and secunda intentio animi. See William of Ockham, Summa totius Logicae, Pars i. cap. xii. xiv. Now without entering into the question as to the exact meaning attached by Aristotle or the School- men to these phrases, I will give what I think is the true modem shape of the distinction, as available for philosophical discussions at the present day, retaining the nomenclature of the Nominalists, and distinguish- ing first from second intentions. It is a current theory at the present day, that aU perception includes comparison; not only that a pro- cess takes place in the nerves or brain which is equi- valent to or results in comparison, but that when we perceive any object we perceive it as a distinct object OF TIME AND SPACE. 35 only by referring it quickly but consciously to a class pabt i. of objects to which it bears some relation or some -^' . S 10 resemblance ; that for instance when I see light I First and classify it at once as similar to light objects seen intentions. before; or if I have not seen light objects before, I classify it with other sensations, or with objects of existence as existing. If this were so, what would become of the first object, or could there ever be a first object perceived ? It seems that there could not, for the first object could not by hypothesis be perceived until another object was perceived to classify or compare it with. This leads us to the conclusion that, although aU subsequent perception includes comparison, the first and simplest object perceived contains in itself parts or elements which may be combined, but cannot properly be said to be compared, with each other when the object is per- ceived; that the first and simplest objects are the results of a synthesis or synthetic movement of con- sciousness, while all subsequent and more complex objects than these are the results of a comparison. It remains stUl to be seen whether the first and sunplest objects of perception are complex and syn- thetic in this sense ; but supposing them to be so, it follows in the next place, that not only these simplest and those more complex objects of perception are complex and synthetic, but also that the acts of per- ception must be complex and synthetic also ; that is, they must include a perception of two objects in the one case, and of two parts or elements of objects in the other case, and a perception of a relation between them, which perception of relation is in the one case a comparison, in the other is merely synthesis. Per- ception of the first and simplest objects is a synthetic 36 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS paet 1. act, perception of all other objects is an act of com- ^fli^ parison. The first and simplest objects of perception Fifst and are complex, all other objects of perception are com- second t /» . i intentions. pOUnds 01 tJieSe. But now are the first and simplest objects of per- ception complex? The reply can only be, Name any object that is not so, abstract or concrete, a thought or a thing. There will be found to be none ; and for this assertion to be proved true, I trust rather to the course of this Essay as a whole than to any remarks which I could make here at once. The object per- ceived and the act of perceiving it are then each of them complex, even in the case of the least possible object or moment of consciousness. But to call the act and the object complex is to call it distinguishable into parts or elements in itself; for otherwise it would be simple. Here then we reach the distinction mentioned in the preceding chapter between empirical and metaphysical objects; empirical objects are complex, complete, objects ; metaphysical objects are incomplete, elementary, ob- jects, only in combination forming complex, complete or empirical objects. See the distinction between metaphysical and physical analysis stated and applied to the distinction between matter and form, in Gior- dano Bruno's Dialogue De la Causa, Principio et Uno, III. vol. i. p. 252, Wagner's edit. The same holds of acts ; empirical acts are complex and complete ; metaphysical acts are the elements or moments of these. And both metaphysical acts and metaphysical objects differ from empirical acts and objects by having an existence only in logic, Xoyu ^'om mgysia, I' ov. Now the case of the metaphysical objects or ele- ments in perception I leave for the present, content OF TIME AND SPACE. 37 with having here shown their nature and position. pabti. But I follow up the case of the metaphysical acts, — " elements, or moments of the empirical act of percep- First and tion, since this will lead most readily to the distinc- intSns. tion between first and second intentions. The sim- plest empirical act of perception includes, it has been seen, three elementary acts: 1st the perception of element A, 2d the perception of element B, 3d the perception of their relation ; these three taken to- gether constitute the empirical perception of the object A, or of the element A as an object. But how is it known that these are the elementary acts and these the elementary objects included in the em- pirical perception, when by hypothesis the three ele- mentary acts and objects cannot be known separately? Solely by analogy from cases where an empirical ob- ject il compared with other empirical objects and perceived in consequence as what it is ; where for instance an object is perceived as a marble statue from being classed with former or other instances of marble statues. From the analysis of the doubly concrete case names are given to the elements in the analysis of the simply concrete case, where the mem- bers of the analysis are not concrete perceptions but elements of perception. We name the metaphysical elements of analysis as if they were empirical objects of perception; but this cannot alter their nature and give them independent existence. Let us now ex- amine the doubly concrete case farther. What is the character of the three acts of perception which con- stitute it? They are not all exactly alike. If I had never seen marble statues before, should I be unable to see this one if it were presented to me ? I should not be unable. If I had had no sight before, should 38 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Paej l I be unable to see this marble statue if it were pre- ^^ sented to me? I should still see it. K I had had Filt and no sensations at all before the statue was presented intent^s. to me, should I be unable to see it on its being pre- sented? I should still see it, I should have the sensation of whiteness and of a certain extension of whiteness, but I should not know what that sensation or that extension was. If now I had seen other ob- jects, I should know something more of this sensation by comparison with them; if I had seen other marble statues, I should know that this was of the same sort, though I should not know the meaning of its being of the same sort, or of the terin sameness. Here we have the three concrete acts contained in the doubly- concrete act of perception. The first is that which presents or in which is presented the object in ques- tion, as it would be presented to a man who hsid had no other perceptions. The second is that in which certain other objects, marble statues in this case, are presented or represented, as the case may be ; and the third is that in which the object of the first act is classed with or excluded from the objects of the second act. Here are three concrete acts of percep- tion so closely connected together and performed so quickly, that they can only be distinguished by close mental inspection; but yet each act a complete em- pirical act, not only existing logically or as a meta- physical act, and with a separate character of its own. The first of these three acts of perception I caU a perception of an object in its first iatention; when we perceive an object as a man would perceive it who saw in it an object for the first time, pr when we voluntarily abstract from a perceived object aU that is imported into it by our perceptions of other rela- OF TIME AND SPACE. 89 tions and objects, in both of these cases I call it '^^^''J- having before us an object in its first intention. The — first case arises in perception and without volition, First and the second arises in reasoning and in consequence of intentions, volition; the first case is intuitional, the second lo- gical; the first a percept, the second a concept. The second of the three acts composing the doubly con- crete perception may or may not give an object in its first intention ; if a man had seen but one marble statue before, the. representation of that would be a first intention ; but usually the class to which an object is referred in perception is perceived as an object or collection of objects in the second intention. The third of the three constitutive acts gives already an object in its second intention, for we cannot sup- pose that the relation, which is its object, is thought of or perceived in such an abstract way as would make it fall under the second or logical class of first intentions. Finally the whole doubly concrete per- ception itself, the perception of the object as a marble statue, is a perception of the object in its second in- tention ; and this is the perception which is properly opposed to the first of the three constitutive percep- tions, namely, that of the object in its first intention. First intentions may accordingly be defined as objects in relation to consciousness alone ; second intentions, as objects in relation to other objects in consciousness. The distinction between first and second inten- tions though arising in perception can only be em- ployed by logic ; it is discovered in perception by analytical reasoning; it is a fact in all domains of consciousness, but it is an instrument only in reason- ing. The neglect of this distinction I believe to vitiate more arguments than the neglect of any other 40 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Past l logical distinetion, perhaps with the sole exception of -^ " that between the causaj existendi, essendi, and cog- First and nosccndi. On this distinction between first and second iuteutbns. uitcntions hangs that between definition and descrip- tion ; for the doctrine that all perception includes comparison, taken without the limits here assigned to it, has naturally led to the confusion between the two kinds of acts. It was thought that aU perception not only included but could be analysed into acts of com- parison, and, as description was the result of compari- son, therefore, it was concluded, definition must be a result of comparison also, and therefore only a more accurate kind of description. The fact however is, that it is as necessary to keep description and defini- tion separate, as it is to keep separate first and second intentions. ' Definition is the expression of a first intention, description of a second intention; definition ought to give those qualities of an object which be- long to it by itself, without reference to other objects, or to whether these qualities belong to other objects also; description ought to give those qualities which show the fitness of an object for such and such a pur- pose, its similarity to, its rank and importance among, other objects; definition gives the analysis of an ob- ject, description characterises it. Definition and de- scription supply a corrective for the unavoidable ambiguity involved in the shortness of single names. The name of aii object may be meant to be taken, or may be actually taken, to mean either the first or second intention of the object it is applied to, or am- biguously to cover both. Expand the name however into a sentence or a phrase, and it is more easily seen whether it results in a definition or a description, whether the sentence presents an object intended to OF TIME AND SPACE. 41 be kept strictly and solely before the mind in the paeti. traits mentioned, or whether its equality or inequality, -^ " its similarity or dissimilarity, to other objects, its First and relative position and importance, is the thing present intentions. to the mind of the speaker. It may be asked. How can a definition express a first intention, since a defi- nition consists of two objects, at the very least, con- nected together, since it expresses the analysis of the object or name to be defined? The answer is, that any object, however complex, may be made a first intention by keeping it alone before the mind and separating it from other objects; it may include any number of relations within it, but must not be com- pared with objects without it. It is then an object in relation to consciousness alone, as distinguished from an object in relation to other objects in con- sciousness ; an object taken in relation to other objects in consciousness is a diflFerent object from itself out of that relation; the two sets of objects together be- come a new object in the first intention. The dis- tinction of objects of first and second intention is discovered to exist in very simple cases of empirical perception, but this distinction, found in nature and independent of our volition, is capable of being ap- plied voluntarily to other cases in reasomng ; the process of nature in perception can be repeated volun- tarily in reasoning. The discovery of it in perception shows that it is a natural and legitimate process, it does not restrict the process to the spontaneous pro- ceedings of consciousness. The names of simple feel- ings or the feelings themselves cannot be defined, for instance the sensation White. If a definition is at- tempted it must be by a reference to something else, for instance by its causes, as the meeting of a parti- 42 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS paeti. cular ray of light with the retina, or by' its effects, as ^^" the absorption of rays of heat, or by its relations, as the First and opposite of blact ; and in these cases there arises a de- intlntions. scription of WMte, and we have before us a new object composed of the original object. White, and some of its relations to other objects, and the description of White is a definition not of the original object but of this together with some of its relations to other objects; and of this object there is perhaps no single name, but the definition serves for one, and this object is an object of the first intention. The same phrase may be a definition of an object and. a description of part of it, a definition of it in. its first intention and a description of that part of it in its second intention. There may be names of complex objects as well as of simple objects, there may be descriptions of complex objects as weU as simple ; but there can be definitions only of complex objects. There may be names of simple objects of the first intention as well as of com- plex objects of the first intention; but there can be definitions only of complex objects of the first inten- tion; which is equivalent to saying that definitions belong to reasoning, a voluntary process of conscious- ness, while names belong both to spontaneous and to voluntary processes of consciousness, both to percep- tion and to reasoning. From this it also follows that definitions are not necessarily definitions of names, there may be definitions of objects of which there are not names, and there may be names of objects of which there are not definitions. Both names and definitions are marks for others, or expressions for ourselves, of objects of consciousness; marks which have their distinctive properties and uses. The fol- lowing is a distinction of objects which was current OF TIME AND SPACE. 43 among the Schoolmen, and derived from Aristotle; pakti. I take it from St. Augustine's Categoriae decem ex — ' Arist. decerptse, cap. 3. First and I. Res omnes quas natura peperit — sunt. intentions. II. Ea quorum imagines animo videndo forma- mus et recolimus — ^percipiuntur. m. Ilia quibus ea quae sunt animo impressa ef- feruntur — dicimtur. Names, definitions, and descriptions fall alike tmder the third head; aU aHke are expressions of the ob- jects contained under* the second head, or if not so, yet at any rate of those contained under the first head ; so that definitions are only so far expressions of names as they are both together expressions of objects belonging to the first or second head. What the relations- obtaining between the first and second heads themselves are, it is one main purpose of this Essay to investigate. A definition is a name of the first intention in an expanded form; a description is a name of the second intention in an expanded form. A definition is the expression of an object as it exists for consciousness alone, that is, of the object as it is, or ia its essence ; a description is an expression of an object in its relation to some one or more objects besides itself in consciousness, that is, of its compara- tive value to consciousness. In definition it is in- different what other objects may be; whether they are like or unlike the object defined, that is beyond the question for the present; in description it is essential that the circumstance or circumstances men- tioned should be known as common or not common to the object described with other objects. For in- stance when I say, Demosthenes is a patriot, I de- scribe hitn in comparison with other men, some of 44 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. ■whom are and some of whom are not patriots, and -^ I indicate his comparative value among men by the First aiid description. But if in saying these words I fix my second intentions, thoughts ou what Dcmosthencs is, irrespective of what other men are, and place him as an object before me, as a man who feels and acts from the feeling of love to his country, I have before me an entirely different object, an object composed of De- mosthenes and his country and his feelings and acts towards his country; and this is an object in the first intention, and the words which convey or ex- press this object' are a definition and not a descrip- tion; they may not be a perfect definition, the perfect definition of an object so complex as a human being would fiU a book, but they are part of a definition and not part of a description. The use of names and phrases in the first intention imphes neither praise nor blame, but states simply facts of analysis; but their use in the second intention, involving com- parison with others, nearly always impHes either praise or blame; and thus the confusion between the two intentions is not only the fi^uitful source of errors in reasoning but of quarrels in practice, when words spoken in the first intention, without arri^re pens^e, are understood ia the second intention as im- plying blame. Definitions and descriptions have no marks in grammatical form or structure by which they can be distinguished from each other ; if they had, the subject would have been cleared up long ago; but the objects which they express, the things signified by them, are essentially different. It is of the utmost importance in reasoning to distinguish which kind of object or significatum it is which is expressed, or concealed, by a word or set of words; OF TIME AND SPACE. .45 whether that object is a first or a second intention, Pabt i. and the set of words a definition or a description. -^' True as it is that the subtilty of nature far surpasses First and the subtUty of thought, it is no less true that the intentions, subtilty of thought far surpasses the subtilty of lan- guage. It may be hoped that, some day or other, language wiU develop forms corresponding to the above distinguished forms of consciousness. §11. I return now to the point passed over shortly §11. before, the consideration of the analysis of objects into aspects of their metaphysical elements, and make an application of the distinction now established between first and second intentions. An analysis of any object confined strictly to that object itself, without drawing its rela- tions to other objects into the analysis, is an analysis of the object in its first intention. Such an analysis will include neither the cause nor the mode of origin of the object analysed, nor its importance or meaning compared with other objects ; it will classify, not the object as a whole, but its parts as parts of the object; it win not classify its parts as similar or dissimilar to corresponding parts in other objects, but solely with respect to their functions in the object itself to which they belong. The result will be to give the elements of the object analysed, and not its aspects or any of its aspects. Take now any empirical phenomenon, from the simplest to the most complex, isolate it from others, treat it as an object of the first intention, and analyse it as such, without asking how it came to be what it is, or whence it derived its characteristics, or what other thmgs it. is like.. It wiU be found that aU its characteristics fall into two classes ; some are material, or particular feelings, others are formal, or particular forms in which these feelings appear. 46. THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS pabt l Every feeling must exist for a certain length of time, ^^^ • and some feelings must exist also in a certain position Eielnisa^d in spacc, and some also in a certain extent of space. pStenl. The time and the space in which feelings exist is called the formal element of the phenomenon; the feeling, whatever may be its kind, is called the ma- terial element of the phenomenon. Whether space is always included in every phenomenon, whether it is always a part of the formal element in phenomena, may be left for the present undecided; it is clear that time always is so, for if we had not a feeling in some duration, however short, we should have it not at all empirically. So that, leaving out of view the ques- tion whether the formal element always includes space as well as time, it is still quite certain that a formal and a material element is included in every empirical phenomenon. These two elements are entirely dif- ferent in kind from each other; and there is nothing in any phenomenon whatever which does not fall under one or other of these two heads. I do not know what it is or how to name it, if there is any such; but if there is, then, as Hume says, "I desire that it may be produced." Here then we have the two ultimate, heterogeneous, inseparable, elements of all phenomena in their first intention, namely Feeling and Time, or as it may turn out afterwards Time and Space; and these names, Feehng, Time, and Space, are names of the elements in their first intention; names of them in the second intention are Matter and Form, or material and formal elements of phenomena. Every phenomenon as such contains these two ele- ments, time, or time and space, on the one side, and feeling on the other. This is empirically and experi- mentally certain; on this as a verifiable fact I take OF TIME AND SPACE, 47 my stand, and shall appeal to the experience of every pabt i. one whether it is not so, whether he knows any phe- -^ ' nomenon which does not contain these two elements. Elements and and farther whether he knows any phenomenon which phenomena. contains more than these two elements; for I shall attempt to show that no phenomenon or variety of phenomena, as such, however rare or complex, con- tains any thing which cannot be reduced to or ana- lysed into these. This is the analysis of phenomena in their first intention. It is generally supposed that two other things are elements of phenomena, either besides or instead of those which have been mentioned. These two ele- ments, which are supposed to be elements of all and every phenomenon without exception, are the Sub- ject and the Object. "Along with whatever any intelligence knows," says Prof. Ferrier, " it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognisance of itself." Institutes of Metaphysic, Sect. I. Prop. I. Every phenomenon according to this, whatever other elements it may contain, must contain as elements an object and a subject ; one of its elements must be the object, another must be the subject. The meaning of this I apprehend to be, that feeling itself, the material element of perception, is capable of being considered by itself, as an object of the first intention, or at least by way of abstraction and without prejudg- ing the question whether it is or is not separable from the formal element; that feeling itself considered in its first intention is capable of further analysis, and that so analysed it consists of or at any rate contains as elements a Self and a Not-self. Feeling, according to this view, is not an ultimate object, or element made objective, but is capable of analysis. Pheno- 48 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS paet l mena, so far as they contain feeling and so far only, — ■ abstracting from their formal element, are not inde- S 11 Elements and composablc, but two inseparable elements are present pSTm^a. in them which combined constitute feeling, that is, constitute every determinate particular feehng, no matter which. These elements are Self and Not-self, It seems to me that to state this theory is to disprove it; to bring it clearly before the mind's eye is to show its incorrectness. For what are these elements? What is Self, what impression does it make, what is it in its first intention? What is Not-self, its impres- sion in the first intention? Is it not clear that we have no distinct notion of either of these elements, as we have of the feeling of light or soimd, of the time a sound lasts, or of the space a light occupies? Is it not clear also that we must ask these questions about them, and so must refer them to one or other of the before-mentioned elements of phenomena, the formal or the material; that if they were known to us, dis- tinguishable by us as elements of phenomena, it would be as modes, or a mode, or particular kind of feeling? Whatever then Self and Not-self may be, they are not elements of phenomena generally. If however they are not elements of phenomena generally, they must fall under the second mode of looking at phenomena, they must belong to pheno- mena considered not in their first intention, but in some of their second intentions ; they must arise in phenomena in consequence of a later-introduced dis- tinction, from a comparison of some phenomena with others, from the relations of a phenomenon to others and not from its elements within itself. This they do; and the distinction in question between Self and Not-self, being fundamentally the same as that be- OF TIME AND SPACE. 49 tween Subject and Object, is one which applies to all part i. * 1 Ch II phenomena without exception; it is the fundamental .^_' distinction m philosophy, although it is not a distinc- Elements and tion at all in direct analysis of phenomena; the reason ph^^omena. of which is evident, for all philosophy is reflection; and these notions. Subject and Object, arise first, and are the first to arise, in reflection, and are in fact that object which distinguishes reflection from direct consciousness. This distinction is the object which, as the object of a particular mode of consciousness, distinguishes that mode from others ; consciousness drawing this distinction, or having this distinction as its object, is called reflection. It would no doubt ' simplify matters very much, and would therefore be very desirable, if circumstances would permit, to sup- pose that consciousness is in its ultimate and simplest empirical perceptions reflective as well as perceptive. The richer the germ, the easier it is to imagine the growth of the entire tree from it. But on the other hand, the fewer the elements in the germ, the more complete is the explanation, if it succeeds, which deduces from it the tree. Usually this question is treated without distinction of first and second intentions. ■ Phenomena are no sooner mentioned than it is considered how they arise, or what they relate to, instead of what they are. Phenomena are divided into subjects and ob- jects, and then straightway are asserted to arise from the meeting of subjects and objects. Or if subject and object are held not to be phenomena, then phe- nomena are said to arise from a conjunction of an Unknown which underlies consciousness with an Unknown which underlies objects. But, known or unknown, subject and object are straightway assigned E 50 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. as the Condition of the existence of phenomena, and — ■ ' phenomena explained by a reference to their mode of Elements and Origin, OF by a distinction between them and what is phmonfenl. Called absolutc existence. The phenomenon becomes thus a tertium quid, arising from the meeting of two factors, known or unknown, called the subject and the object ; and each of the two factors is besides often supposed to contribute something from its own fund towards constituting the phenomenon ; either the subject contributes the matter, and the object the form; or vice vers^; or else the object contri- butes both and the subject contains the contribu- tions; or the subject contributes both and creates the object as their receptacle. But what is the fact? Do either of the two elements, material and formal, bear marks of a subjective or an objective origin, of being contributed by the subject or by the object? Is either of them subjective and not objective, or ob- jective and not subjective? I am entirely at a loss to determine which of the two elements should most properly have either character exclusively attributed to it. They both appear to me to be equally and alike subjective, equally and alike objective, and to bear both characters at once. I can indeed attend to the subjective character of either of them, and I can attend to the objective character of either of them; but this is by a yolimtary act, and an act of abstraction. I cannot avoid seeing them in both characters alternately. Both characters of each of the two elements are entirely independent of my will; when once I have made the distinction of subject and object, every thing appears to me as bearing both characters ; this only depends on my will, which character at any particular time I will attend to. OF TIME AND SPACE. 51 Besides, it is impossible that the elements, matter parti. and form, should bear originally the character of — " objectivity or subjectivity, if vrhat has been already Elements and said is true; for this would be to import subject and pSl'enl. object into phenomena as elements; Time, Space, and Feeling would have some other properties, as sub- jective or objective, besides those recalled or denoted by their names. The distinction between Subject and Object in phenomena arises first in reflection, and the pheno- menon of reflection will be analysed in the following chapter. So much however is already plain, that reflection will discover subject and object in pheno- mena not as elements but as aspects, not from the analysis of phenomena in their first intention, but from the comparison of them with each other or in some one of their second intentions. Every pheno- menon win then as a whole appear to have an objec- tive aspect and a subjective aspect, will be capable of being considered as an existence and also as an object of consciousness, or, what comes to the same thing, as an object among objects, and also as a mode or state of consciousness. And what is true of any phe- nomenon taken singly is true also of any number, or of the totality 'of phenomena, taken together ; one or all alike can be considered in two ways, first analysed into elements, secondly regarded as a whole or as wholes, the aspects of which from without are dif- ferent, but each of which aspects contains the same two elements, heterogeneous but inseparable, formal and material. The aspects of each and all pheno- mena are two, like their elements ; the aspects depend upon how we approach the phenomenon in reflection, whether as a mode of consciousness or as an object 52 Pabt I. Ch. II. §1L Elements and aspects of phenomena. THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS among- objects; but in either way, whether viewed from the objective or subjective point of view, each aspect contains the same two elements, formal and material. The annexed diagram may help to make my meaning clearer. Subjective point of view. B. Objective point of view. The two elements, matter and form, in the phe- nomenon, are distinguished by direct attention in perception; the twb aspects, subjective and objective, are distinguished by attention in reflection; but the analysis of the process of reflection, the origin and nature of the two aspects, subjective and objective, the introduction of the cognitions. Subject and Ob- ject, into phenomena, or the transformation of phe- nomena into modes of consciousness and modes of existence, is reserved for the next chapter, where it will be introduced in a different connection. Keeping however this further examination in reserve, it will be useful to dwell on the distinction between the two modes of examination a little more at length. Phe- nomena in their first intention are objects of con- sciousness consisting of two elements, form and mat- ter ; phenomena in their second intentions are ex- istences which, in addition to this character of being objects of consciousness, are related objectively to each other. These two characters are possessed by OF TIME AND SPACE. 53 all phenomena without exception, and must be pos- sessed also by those, if any such should disclose them- selves, which appear to be the conditions or contri- buting causes of the rest. Mind and matter, subjects and objects, if they assume a distinct place among phenomena as causes or conditions of other phe- nomena, must be themselves also phenomena, and present the characteristics of phenomena ; that is, must consist of elements in their first intention, and possess a subjective and objective aspect in their second intention. So that in accordance with this view we shall have nothing before us but phenomena, instead of having before us phenomena resulting from the concurrence of two unknown substances, mind on the one side, and existence or matter on the other, or composed of the contributions of two kinds of ex- istences, mental or absolute on the one side, and material or absolute on the other. What is called mind, and what are called existences, and that which Kant calls der transcendentale Gegenstand, will have melted into phenomena, out of which indeed they originally grew. We shall no longer be able to say mth the Nominalists ' such and such a conception is not a real existence, it is a mere fiction or intention of the mind;' nor with the Realists 'such and such an object has no true existence, it is merely em- pirical ;' for all phenomena are at once both objective and subjective, and if they are the one must of ne- cessity be the other. In the next place it will be seen that theories of perception are a part not of metaphysic but of psychology, of the science which examines the laws of the conditions and causes of consciousness as objects, not of that which analyses the phenomena of consciousness themselves ; of a Part I. Ch. II. Elements and aspects of phenomena. 54 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Past I. science in short which treats of objects in some of ^-" their second intentions. And it follows that what 8 n Element and are Called, on the theory of a representative percep- agpects of , . . . . T • 1 !• 1 • J. phenomena, tion, impressions, unages, and ideas oi objects, are the objects thenaselves, and not merely evidence of the objects ; that in fact there are no objects but these so called evidences of objects. From the sub- jective side, or in their subjective aspect, these so called evidences of objects are not merely evidences to the mind, but they are the mind itself. Thus, with whichever of the two we begin, the mind per- ceiving or the object perceived, we find one thing only before us, namely, the phenomenon, which was before thought to be only the intermediary between the mind and the object. And be it observed that this old division into three, mind, object, and inter- mediary, exists equally on a theory of immediate, presentative, as on a theory of mediate, representa- tive, perception. The difference between them is solely this, that on the former theory the interme- diary phenomena are the result of the contact of mind with the object, are that which springs from the concurrence or out of the contributions of two things or substances, more or less unknown and mys- terious, called mind and object; while on the latter theory the intermediary phenomena are the medium and condition of that concurrence. But in the view here brought forward, both mind and the object, whether conceived as entirely unknown or more or less known, are wrapped up in, and developed out of, the phenomena analysed; how much known, and how wrapped up in and developed out of phenomena, must remain undetermined till the process of reflec- tion is examined in the following chapter. Pheno- OF TIME AMD SPACE. 55 mena alone remain in the world, and mind and the pam i. Ch II object are no longer separate empirical things, or -^" separate unknown things, or separate absolute things. Elements and but two inseparable aspects of phenomena. From pEmena. one side the world is all mind, from the other all existence. It is impossible that any thing should exist unless possibly present to consciousness ; ' it is impossible that any thing should be present to con- sciousness unless possibly existing. And since con- sciousness and existence are completely correlative and coextensive, therefore it is impossible that any thing absolute should exist. Neither on the side of the unknown mind, nor on that of the unknown exist- ence, is it possible that an absolute can exist or be ; for every thing, whatever exists, call it what we will, is relative to consciousness, or has a subjective side. If it is argued that we may imagine or conceive an existence transcending our faculties and beyond the range of our knowledge, I reply that the very doing so brings it within them, for we are furnishing an instance of the very thing which is here observed, namely, conceiving or imagining an existence and supplying it with a subjective side; such existence would be, while imagined or conceived to exist, pre- sent as a possible existence in consciousness ; its essence, qnk existence, would exist, for it would be already present in consciousness as possible, as ana- logous in point of existence to all actual existences, in being so present. Analogous — there lies the point. Unknown existence, so far as it is existence, must be analogous to knoAvn existence ; either the word exist- ence has a meaning or it has not ; if it has, it is the same in both cases, and if it has not, then it has no meaning in the phrase ' known existence.' I find all 56 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS pabt I. philosophers with two exceptions, with exception of ^^- the metaphysical ontologists, such as ScheUing and Eieieitsand Hegcl, who dcducc cvery thing from mind, and of the pSmel empirical ontologists, who deduce every thing from matter (in their sense of the term) — ^with these two exceptions, I find aU philosophers conceiving the world as produced by two independent factors, vari- ously conceived both in their nature and m their connection with each other ; for instance, mind some- times as the coefficient, sometimes as the mirror of matter, but stUl two separate independent factors, mind and matter ; and this, whether they find these two factors both immediately present to conscious- ness in every instance of external perception, with Prof. Terrier, or only inferred to be present from those perceptions and their objects, which is the more usual way. I on the contrary Qonceive the world not as produced by two factors, these or any others, but as presenting two characters or aspects, in one of which it is entirely mind, in the other entirely mat- ter, (to adopt terms in their current meaning, though more suitable to the current theories than to mine). Mind and matter become transformed, in my theory, from factors into aspects of the world, each of which is an aspect of the other, and the world indififerently one or the other, acc9rding as it is regarded. My theory therefore is not a theory of causation, but of analysis of the world — an applied Logic of the world, as I have already said. If these conclusions, so far as they respect the complete correlation of existence and consciousness, are accepted by any one with difficulty, the cause will not be far to seek. The .cause will be the habit of regarding the existence or non-existence of parti- OF TIME AND SPACE. 57 cular objects as entirely independent of our minds, paet i. and of our imaginations concerning them. From — ^' this habit we reason to the world of existences in Elements and general, and conceive that this also is independent, phenomena, as to its existence or non-existence, of our minds and imaginations. When we speak of the existence of a particular object in a particular time and place, we mean that it could be seen, touched, or otherwise perceived, if we were present at that time and place ; so also of the world of existences in general, we mean by its existence now and here that it is present to consciousness now and here. The parallel is exact, and we argue thus : as the presence of the particular thing there and then was independent of our con- sciousness, so the presence of the world of existences here and now is independent of our consciousness, and so also the presence of other, absolute or un- known, existences is independent of our conscious- ness. True, the parallel is exact ; but both cases include the same fallacy. The absence of the parti- cular thing was not its absence from consciousness, but from presentative consciousness, it could not be seen or touched or perceived presentatively. If it were absent from consciousness altogether, we could not bring it before the mind and say of it that it was absent. To go back to the old phrase, — when we speak of the existence of a particular thing in a par- ticular place and time, we mean — ^what ? — that it could be seen, touched, or otherwise perceived if we were present at that place and time. Is this being independent of consciousness ? It is, on the con- trary, explaining existence to mean capability of being perceived ; it is making actual existence equivalent to being actually perceived, and actual existence at a 58 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. Ch. n. particular place and time equivalent to being actually ''^L^' perceived at that place and time. And so also in the Elements and casc of existeuces generally ; by the absence of the phaiOTuena. wholc world of existcnccs is meant its absence from presentative consciousness ; if it were absent from consciousness altogether, its absence could not be brought before the mind at aU. Such an absence would, be equivalent to the ceasing of consciousness. The fallacy in both cases is the same ; existence is not the equivalent of presentative consciousness, but is independent of presentative consciousness; and that whether we are thinking of the existence of an object of daily experience or of worlds unknown. From this it is argued that existence is independent of con- sciousness altogether, which is equally false both in the case of particular familiar objects and of imagined worlds. Such is the nature of the fallacy ; but what is its history, and how come we to be deceived by it? Through neglecting the distinction between objects in their relation to consciousness alone and objects in their relations to other objects in consciousness, be- tween objects in themselves and objects in their origin and causes, that is, the distinction between first and second intentions. When we say that particular objects existing in a particular place and time are independent of our consciousness, we mean that the causes of their existence there and then as objects are not to be found in us, but in other objects; we mean that we did not produce them, but that some- thing else independent of us was the condition of their existence. Independence in this sense, in which it is truly asserted of objects, is then fallaciously ap- plied to objects considered in themselves or in rela- tion to consciousness only; and the assertion, that OF TIME AND SPACE. 59 objects are independent of the mind, is understood as part i. if it meant that objects, or some objects, have no sub- ■^—' iective side, and are independent of consciousness not Element's and I • 1. .., .,. aspects of only m theu- origm but m their nature. phenomena. Accordingly, when in this Essay presence in and absence from consciousness generally is spoken of, it will not be meant to indicate presence in and absence from presentative consciousness only ; but the term consciousness, employed simply without limitation, will be used in its widest sense as including all its possible modes; in which sense it is the exact equi- valent of the term existence, including likewise all modes of possible existence, verified or unverified, actual or potential. It wUl be seen in proceeding, how a single moment of consciousness is or may be the equivalent of the whole universe as its object, namely, by its modes of time and space which are common to both. Existence, what is it? We are so familiar with it, that we think we understand it. But there is no understanding without explanation, defi- nition, analysis. The answer, given by philosophers to their own enquiries as to what existence is, has usually been in substance the same, namely, that it is a mode of the Absolute ; that is, of some real exist- ence which is the cause, or the essence, or both, of the apparent existence about which the question was originally put. Answers of this kind are ontological, and become the basis of systems of ontology. They labour under the fallacy of obscurum per obscurius. They do not explain the phenomenon of existence, but add to it another imagined phenomenon to be ex- plained; Ta^ocTKriffiof oi/TTeg av i't rig a§i6^risai ^ovKo^ivog iXarromv ^h ovruv o'ioiro |«/^ "bwristsdcctf •^Xsiu Is 'rot/jtrag apd^oiri, — which sentence is part of Aristotle's criti- 60 THE' NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS paet 1. cism on Plato's theory of the i'ih% Metaph. B. xii. cap. ^^- 4, § 5, and which, as I remember with pleasure, was Eieileitsand first pointed out to me by Prof. J. M. Wilson of pZ'omel C.C.C. Oxford. Existence is obscure enough as it is, without inventing a second existence beyond it. The true answer to the question, What is existence? is not ontological but metaphysical. It is impossible to refer existence, the most general class or name of aU, to a higher or more comprehensive class or genus. To use Aristotle's phraseology, it is impossible to make it a species by differentiating the genus to which it belongs, for it is itself the highest genus. But it may be possible to point out its characteristics, its propria, some quality or qualities which are coex- tensive with it, belong to it in all its instances, and belong to aU instances of it so far as they are exist- ences. There is one such characteristic, namely, that of being present in consciousness, taking conscious- ness in its widest sense and including therefore both possible and actual presence in consciousness. This is an analjiiical, and therefore a metaphysical not an ontological answer to the question, What is exist- ence ? Analytical, not indeed from the point of view of direct perception, but of reflection, as has been explained already. Whatever therefore can be per- ceived, conceived, or imagined, exists; exists either potentially or actually, in the past or present or future. It is necessary to classify existences, and not to con- found one kiad with another, or value all alike. For metaphysical purposes the classification should be in- stituted by asking how objects are present in con- sciousness. First, presentative must be distinguished from representative perceptions; in the former the object is, as a rule, more vivid than in the latter. consciousness. OF TIME AND SPACE. 61 Representative perceptions again are divisible into paeti. those which are capable and those which are incapa- -^ ' ble of verification by presentation, or by testimony Elements and founded on the presentations of others. And repre- phemmfena. sentative perceptions which are capable of verifica- tion may again be divided into those which are capa- ble of verification at present, and those which are conceived as capable of verification at some distant time. In short, some scale of truth must be intro- duced into the conception of existences, by which they may be distinguished from each other. § 12. I come now to the special subject of this §12. chapter, the consideration of the formal element of element in consciousness in its first intention. Of the two points of view already distinguished, the objective and the subjective, the subjective is the only one which is necessarily universal; in adopting the objective point of view, abstraction is made of the subjective, but in adopting the subjective it is impossible to abstract from the objective. The subjective contains both aspects at once, the objective only one. The subjec- tive point of view therefore is the one proper to this chapter, to the consideration of all objects in their first intention. Feeling is the material element in consciousness, the element which in some modification or other con- stitutes all consciousness. The question is. What is the formal element combined with feeling in all cases, whether it is time, or time and space, or time and motion, or motion alone, or space alone, or space and motion, or whether there are any other formal ele- ments, in addition to or in exclusion of these ; and again, What are the connections of these with feeling and with each other, whether one is derived from element in consciousness. 62 ' THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS pabti. another, and which are the origmal and which the — ' derived elements; such in general are the questions The formal to be auswered. Feelings may be roughly classified as follows: 1st, the feelings of the five special senses which have defined organs, sight, touch, hearing, taste, and smell; 2d, feelings which have as yet no specially defined organs, such as hunger, the sensus commums in all its branches, feelings of heat and cold, of muscular tension, and others, — these two classes are commonly called sensations; 3d, feelings which arise only in redintegration of the feelings of the two first classes, such as desire, aversion, love, hate, anger, fear, joy, grief, admiration, feeling of right and wrong, of hon- our and dishonour, of justice and injustice, of efibrt and resolution, and many others, aU of which are called emotions, and which are also sometimes dis- tinguished, either by differences in kind or by dif- ferences only in degree, into two classes, emotions and passions. These three classes comprehend all feelings. Now every feeling, whether sensation or emotion, must occupy some duration of time however short; it could not be a feeliag if it did not; and this I think is immediately and empirically certain to every one. But only two of these feelings must in and by themselves occupy extension in space as well as time ; these two feelings are the sensations of sight and touch ; and, of these, sensations of sight cannot be assumed to occupy by themselves more than two dimensions of space, namely, length and breadth, or superficial extension; sensations of touch also appear primarily, or in the first instance, that is, in one siagle touch uncompared with others, to oc- cupy only superficial extension or two dimensions of OF TIME AND SPACE. 63 space. The questions accordingly have been raised; part i. first, whether space in its three dimensions is not -^' capable of analysis into its two dimensions occupied The fomai by sensations of sight and by single sensations of consciousness. touch, and secondly, whether these two dimensions of space are not themselves capable of analysis into sensations occupying time successively. If the latter were the case, the entire range of our feelings would be capable of analysis into two elements only, time and feeling. Another series of questions has been opened up by the current distinction of feehngs into internal and external. Taking its origin from the apparent place of the object perceived, from the ■ distinction between the body of the observer and objects external to his body, the distinction between the internal and external sense was originally a distinction between feelings which arose within the body and those which arose from objects outside the body. But when this distinction between body and external objects gave place, in consequence of physiological and psycho- logical investigation, to a more subtil one between a mind or soul, dwelling somewhere and somehow in the body, and things external to the mind or soul, among which the body itself was included, then the distinction between the internal and external sense had to support itself on other considerations ; and the two senses were then distinguished from each other by their respective forms, the internal sense was that which had time, the external sense was that which had space, for its form. Time and Space became the distinguishing characteristics of the two senses, the internal and the external. Since however the mind was conceived as a single mind, as the unity of these element in consciousness. 64 . THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS pakt X. two senses, internal and external, and not as consist- — ■ ing of two isolated senses, the perceptions of the one The formal sensc wcrc necessarily conceived as passing over into perceptions of the other sense. Accordmgly, what the external sense was to outward objects, that the internal sense became to the external sense, and translated the space relations of the external sense into time relations of the internal sense ; the internal sense became, in fact, the mind, and the external sense became its organ for supplying it with intelli- gence of every thing outside itself, including the body which it inhabited. All feelings which existed only in relations of time, that is, in succession, and not also in relations , of space, and these feelings only, constituted the miad properly so called; and these feelings existed, as Hume observed, literally nowhere; " the greatest part of beings," he says, " do and must exist after this manner." Treatise of Human Nature, Part iv. Sect. 5. The distinction of internal and external objects thus became a distinction between the mind and objects ; in other words, the distinction between Subject and Object coincided with that be- tween objects in time and objects in space. Those things alone were objective which occupied space, those were subjective which occupied only time. What was internal was mental, what was external was material. Yet the mind itself was conceived as existing in the body, an external object, and conse- quently as having position in space ; and the mind was the object of psychology. Hence, from the ex- planation of the terms mental and internal to mean existing in time only, arose the insoluble contradic- tions of a mind existing only in time and yet having a position in space, and having a position in space OF TIME AND SPACE. 65 and yet not occupying space ; besides the difficulty part i. Oh. II. of seeing how a mind, conceived as an object not occupying space, could be brought into connection Thefoiinai with space-occupying objects. Kant, though adopt- oonsoiousness. ing the distinction of internal and external sense, does not fall into the error of leaking this distinction coincide with the mind, as the object of psychology, and the world of material objects ; for he replaces the mind by his Unity of Apperception, the Ich denke, a subjective act which binds together all states of con- sciousness and all phenomena, and of which the in- ternal and external senses are modes of operation ; the Ich denke can never be an object by itself. Yet since the distinction of the internal and external sense may be retained together with the notion of an ob- jective mind to which they belong, it will be useful to devote a few words to its consideration ; and, as it was shown before that the distinction of the material and formal elements in consciousness did not coincide with that between object and subject, so now I wUl attempt to show the same in the distinction between the formal element in the internal and external senses. I wiU attempt to show four things ; 1st, That phenomena which are perceived in two dimensions of space, phenomena of the senses of touch and sight, although also occupying time, do not owe their occu- pation of superficial extension to their occupation of time, but that their space-relations are not capable of analysis into relations of time; which is the answer to the second of the two questions proposed above ; 2d, That phenomena occupymg time do not owe their objectivity to their being referred to phenomena oc- cupying space ; 3d, That phenomena occupying space 66 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS pabti. do not owe their subjectivity to their being perceived. -^— ' in. time ; 4th, That phenomena of both kinds, in time Thefonnai and iQ space, owe both their objectivity and their consciousness, subjectivity to reflection, irrespective of their being represented in reflection as occupying space or time. 1st. If we had not the senses of sight and touch we should be without any cognition of space. Feel- ings which coexisted in our bodies would appear as a succession either of simple and definite, or complex and indefinite, feelings. Analysis of coexistent feel- ings would be nothing else than resolving the com- plex into a succession of simple feelings. Phenomena would be nothing but a series or succession of feel- ings, now simple, now complex. With sight however the case is different. The eye opened to the light sees a whole surface, one small portion of it distinctly, the rest indistinctly; it sees part bright, part dark,, part clear, the rest obscure; this is the phenomenon of seeing; and I cannot conceive how any one can suppose that the space-relations of this surface of Hght are reducible to relations of time. It is enough to contrast the two things, in their simplest forms, with each other, to see the difference in kind between the two; the form of sight is as different from the form of hearing, as the sensation of sight from the sensation of hearing. The mterpretation of the phe- nomenon of seeing is another thing ; the comparative magnitude of the parts of the surface, their compara- tive shape and distance, may need other -senses to bring them into notice, the sensation of muscular tension and of the degree of effort involved in it, in the machinery of the eye, for instance. But the ex- tended surface is seen at once, and is seen as some- thing different from feelings which are not extended. element in oonsoiousness. OF TIME AND SPACE. 67 Or if it is urged that we see points of light first and pabt i. then compose the surface out of these, stUl the point ^^' itself, be it the minimum visibile, is extended or it milfomai could not be seen. Similar is the case with touch. The whole surface of the body is endowed with the organs of touch. Here, if the body is touched in two or three different places at once, it is true that this will not produce the perception of its being a single extended surface ; different positions of the sensation win be all that is perceived, and perhaps not this at first ; for though each point touched is extended, yet there is no continuity of these points as in the surface seen by the eye. This kind of continuity is intro- duced into phenomena of touch either by a tolerably large surface of the body bemg touched at once, or by a comparison of the places touched with the order of succession of the touches in time. But in both cases the space-relation is not perceived, but only in- terpreted, by a reference to the time-relation. Some- thing is added, in these two senses, to the two ele- ments of time and feeling, something which, though always appearing in time and connected with time, is yet not capable of analysis into time, nor yet into time and feeling taken together. For it may be asked, K time and feeling- taken together constitute space-relations in the case of the two senses of sight and touch, why do they not constitute them also in other senses? It is again impossible to conceive the space-relations of superficial extension to be merely a mode of expressing to consciousness briefly the suc- cessive relations of feelings, or as a shorthand way of writing time-relations, since the question recurs, whence we get this very diiferent mode of expressing the time-relations ; and besides, the spac^-relations 68 THE NATURE OE THE COGNITIONS paeti. are, if more brief and compendious, yet more expKcit — and distinct than the time-relations which they are The formal supposcd to express, and what they lose in point of consciousness, time they acquire in another direction, in space. I conclude, then, that time-relations and space-relations of superficial extension are different in kind, and can- not be resolved one into the other. 2d. Suppose a man not to have the senses of sight and touch, but only those senses which present feel- ings in succession ; would those feelings which he has in succession be unreal, or less real than before? Every one will answer that they would be equally real. They wiU be phenomena, just as much as if they were accompanied with other feelings which occupy dimensions of space. Their connection with those other feelings can alter nothing in their reality, as first intentions, though it supplies them with new relations, and in this way with new significance. But this reality is the ground of their afterwards appear- ing, as wiU be seen in the answer to the 4th point, objective ; that is, their reality is the ground of their objectivity. 3d. Phenomena occupying space do indeed all of them also occupy time, but this is not the cause of their having reality. The reality of these phenomena, as of those which occupy only time, consists in the feeling which they contain, not in the form in which that feeling appears. In both cases the reality of the phenomenon is in its being felt, not in the mode of its being felt. And its reality is the ground of its subjectivity. 4th. Both kinds of phenomena are equally real, for both contain feeling; but as yet they are pheno- mena only, they are present in consciousness, but not OF TIME AND SPACE. 69 present as either subjective or objective. The reality pabti. of either kind does not depend upon the reality of -^ ' the other; one kind is more complex than the other, Thefomai but the additional character which that kind possesses consdoulnSs. is not a modification of the time-relations common to both kinds, but an addition of a new and different nature. The reality of each is independent of the other, and depends upon the feeling which each pos- sesses equally. The reality is the ground of the dis- tinction of subjective and objective, not the difference in the form of the two realities. It is within the reality of the phenomena, or within the phenomena so far as they are real or contain feeling, that the distinction into objective and subjective arises, and not within them so far as they contain a different kind of form. If the distinction of objective and sub- jective arose from the different kind of form in phe- nomena, then this distinction would be already there as soon as the two kinds of phenomena had arisen ; and would not be remaining stUl to arise in them. But it has not already arisen in them, but they are as yet mere phenomena, mere feelings possessing equal reality or unreality. It must be from some- t.hin g in the phenomena, still to be differentiated, that the distinction of objective and subjective arises, and not from what is already differentiated, namely, the formal element into time and space. Every de- velopment of a new character in phenomena, in the present case of the new character of subjectivity and objectivity, is a sinking back into the nature of the phenomenon in which it is developed; Hegel's word for it is Vertiefen; it is a bringmg out of something latent in the phenomena, and each new character or forward movement of development is also a back- element in consciousness. 70 THE NATUEE OF THE COGNITIONS Part 1. Ward movement, or the stirring up deeper and deeper ^±^' depths, and the bringing to light of some cause,-^a ThlfoLai cause of the kind known as potentiality or Suca^/?, — from below or behind the phenomenon which de- velops itself, and both effect and cause, energy and potentiality, begin to exist at the same moment. Now it is a commonplace of philosophical criticism, that we must not mistake the occasions of our coming to the knowledge of anything for the coming into exist- ence of the thttig itself; for instance, we must not mistake the increase in the returns of crime, owing to the more perfect means of statistical information, for an increase in the amount of crimes committed; and in apphcation of this rule it may be supposed that our coming to the knowledge of the newly de- veloped characters in phenomena, namely, their sub- jectivity and objectivity, is not coincident with the first existing of these characters in phenomena, but that they existed previously as subjectivity and ob- jectivity, and we afterwards find it out. But how is this possible? How is it possible that they should exist previously in phenomena as subjectivity and objectivity, without being perceived as such? It is impossible, for it is a contradiction in the terms. Their previous existence was a potential one, 'hvvu^u ■bsgysia V ov. And their potentiality is an inference, arising, as will be seen more clearly from the Chapter on the Ratio Sufficiens, from the form of time; an inference from their actuality, that is, from the actual development of the new character in consciousness. Nothing new can arise without bringing with it the inference of its potentiality previous to its arising. But this potentiality is not actuality, has not the character which is its bigynu. Subjectivity and ob- OF TIME AND SPACE. 71 jectivity exist first when they exist actually. They part i. do not exist actually in the phenomena of direct per- -^ ' ception. Time and space do exist actually in the Thefonnai 1 n T j_ ,. , n element in phenomena oi direct perception; we are actually con- consciousness. scious of them though we do not reflect that we are conscious of them, and though we have not distin- guished them from their content. But objectivity and subjectivity we are not conscious of at all until we reflect on direct perceptions. They then first exist actually, and their previous potentiality is then first inferred. > Time and space have no potentiality, for they are always, and in every thing, actual. I conclude therefore that, since the distinction of ob- jectivity and subjectivity has still to arise in pheno- mena, it does not arise from the distinction of the two kinds of form in phenomena, time and space. It is difficult to see what use there would be for the terms objective and subjective, supposing them to depend on the difference of form in phenomena, unless they were intended to express a different degree of reality in the phenomena differing as to form. And this is the meaning which is usually attached to those terms; the term objective signifies, as usually employed, something more real than sub- jective ; and the term subjective usually signifies something comparatively unreal. So that if the two kinds of phenomena are equally real, and yet the terms objective and subjective coincide respectively with these two kinds of phenomena, either the terms objective and subjective must cease to signify differ- ence in point of reality, or the characters which they signify must depend on something else besides the difference in form of the two kinds of phenomena, that is, they must depend on some distinction in the 72 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Part 1. feeling they contain. If however the terms objective -^ ' and subjective do not coincide respectively with these The foW two kinds of phenomena, then they may depend on consciousness, the feeling or material element in phenomena, in virtue of which phenomena are real, without signi- fying a difference in degree of reality between the classes of phenomena which they are employed to designate. The distinction into objective and sub- jective is one which arises within the reality of phe- nomena, and distingmshes that reality into two kinds, not different in point of degree of reality but in point of the character of that reality. When many pheno- mena have occurred in consciousness, that is, at a certain advanced point in the history of every indi- vidual man, a distinction is drawn between what is common to all phenomena and what is peculiar to single phenomena or sets of phenomena. They are recognised as being aU alike in being feelings, aijid different in being particular determinate feelings; as the first they are aU one, as the second they are aU different. The first perception that phenomena are all alike in being feelings is the first dawn of reflec- tion; it is the first generalisation in matter of con- sciousness ; phenomena have already been compared with one another in their differences of feeling and form, and already formed into groups which we csdl usually ' objects ;' nurse and mother, table and food, &c. &c. have been already distinguished; but that these groups have any connection of kind with each other has not yet been perceived; the first perception that they are all alike in being feelings is the first perception that they are subjective, and at the same instant also that they are objective, that is are still as different as before fi-om each other in their deter- element in consciousness. OF TIME AND SPACK. 73 minate particular qualities. They were before per- pami. ceiyed as different, they are now perceived as the —' same; which gives new meaning to the previously Thlfomai perceived difference. They were phenomena, they are now objective and subjective; each and all phe- nomena are both at once, and bear both characters at once. Connected as feelings, and in this common character, they altogether form a group, like the groups of ' objects' already formed; but it is a group of a different character and expressed by a different word ; ' Baby' has become ' I ;' not that any thing is proved by the word, but that my meaning is ren- dered clear by it. The perception of self, or self- consciousness, the perception that feelings are mine, is in fact the same thing as that which is expressed by saying that feelings are all alike feeling. What- ever things are alike in one point are one in that point; when these things are feelings they are sub- jectively one, for feeling is a word which we aU imderstand by experience as well as by any expla- nation; there is no understanding it, and we must content ourselves with familiarity ; it is already a subjective word, and if we would have an explana- tion we must explain the word subjective by feeling, and not feeling by subjective. This operation of reflection refers equally to phe- nomena in space and to phenomena in time ; for both are equally feelings, and both are equally real. Phenomena of both classes have acquired a double character, a reference to each other and a reference to consciousness, or as it has been previously ex- pressed a subjective and an objective aspect, each of which aspects contains both elements of the pheno- menon, the formal and the material. element in consciousness, 74 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS pabt I. The oonsideration of this fourth point has caused *^^liJ" me to make a spring in the regular development of The fonnai the subject, to pass over the formal element directly- present to consciousness, and take up the thread at the point of reflection; the reason being that the dis- tinction of objective and subjective is as yet usually considered to be involved in that of time- and space- relations, if not as a necessary element, yet at least as a condition of all phenomena. The purpose of meta- physic is to arrive at the lowest empirical phenomena of consciousness, then at their elements, whether one, two, or more; to trace as it were the stream of con- sciousness and of existence to its source or sources, and to decide the relation of these sources to each other. The sources of aU phenomena must be dis- covered ; whether there are any sources which belong to all phenomena without exception ; whether all the sources do so; and, if any do not, whether these are deducible from the others or have an independent existence. It must be remembered that in isolating any phenomenon whatever, even an element of con- sciousness, we treat it as if it were an empirical or complete object, and as if there might have been a time previous to its coming into existence. This method, which is common to all reasoning, does not however make the elements of consciousness into empirical objects, but leaves them at the conclusion of the process just what they were at the beginning, imless reasons should have been discovered in the course of it for considering them to be different. To reason about an element of consciousness is to assimie, for the jpurposes of reasoning, that it is a complete object; and, the reasoning ended, the as- sumption is dropped. OF TIME AND SPACE. 75 Time is involved in every moment and in every paeti. Ch II. obiect of consciousness; and this is a fact which is -^—' . . . § 12. incapable of proof by inference, because the inference The formal ,7, . 1 T • 1 • T 1 element in itseli supposes its truth, it is however immediately oonBciousness. certain to every one ; some time is occupied by every instant of consciousness however short. But it is not so with space, and this ' therefore requires ex- amination. If the senses of sight and touch were denied us, and we had only the other senses and the emotions, we should not have the cognition of space immediately; perhaps it would be going too far to say that we could never attain to it at aU. It is perhaps impossible to imagine the precise shape which our consciousness would assume under these conditions. But as it is, the space-senses sight and touch, and the sense of effort or muscular tension in- volved in both of them, are brought into play simul- taneously with the other senses, and in connection with them. The inner and outer senses are at work together, and both connected, as we know afterwards, by belonging to one organised body. One of the first groups of phenomena which forms itself in con- sciousness is the phenomenon called the body ; touch, sight, and sense of muscular tension together pro- duce this combination ; a space is marked out within which all our other feelings are found to fall, though they have n'ot aU definite places assigned them in it. It does not derogate from the necessity or vahdity of the space-relations that they are only given by two senses directly; it would be sufficient if they were only given by one seifse; if only that sense was always operative in connection with the others. The cognition of space-relations arising at all, in con- nection with phenomena of the other senses, binds element in consciousness. 76 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. together those relations with phenomena of the other — ■ senses, and gives these phenomena relations to the The^oLiai rest in space. A distinct portion of space is marked out by the senses of touch and sight combined with the sense of muscular tension, all three of which senses involve time-relations; this space is called the body, and within it sensations of hearing, taste, smell, hunger, heat, cold, and others, together with the emotions, are perceived as arising and existing, all perceived as in themselves occupying time, and from this connection perceived as also occupying, though not perhaps filling, a definite portion of space. That portion of space, in three dimensions, called the body, gives unity in point of space to all its feelings whether internal or external, that is, to all its world of phenomena. But inasmuch as it is a portion of space in three dimensions, the portions of space from which it is marked out must have three dimensions also, for they are perceived as enclosing it on all sides; and in fact the three space-dimensions occu- pied by other phenomena are perceived pari passu with the same three dimensions in the body itself; the body is perceived by being separated from other phenomena of sight and touch. We started however with only two perceived dimensions of space, and have ended with the per- ception of three, which are involved in the perception of our own bodies as solid objects surrounded on all sides by other objects at various distances. This perception has been produced by the combination of three senses, sight, touch, and muscular tension, none of which alone could give it. If any single sense alone could give the perception of the third dimen- sion of space, as Mr. Abbott in his Sight and Touch OF TIME AND SPACE. 77 argues that sight can, the work of the metaphysician pam i. in this point would be much simplified. But I can- — not admit that sight alone can give this perception. The fonnai . ° ° . ^ element in When, tor mstance, we see an object passmg, as we consciousness. know afterwards, behind another and concealed by it, what is really seen is the concealment or becoming invisible of one at the moment of its contact with the other; and it is referring this phenomenon to a supposed cause, and not analysing the phenomenon itself, to say that one of the objects must be behind the other. What is depth, or distance in depth, in its first intention? It has no explanation, no analysis, but itself, — ^the third dimension of space. But how does it dififer from the other two dimensions of space? In requiring the two former to be given in order to its being understood. A superficies must be taken, and then objects out of that superficies are in depth ; that is, a point of departure must be taken to con- trast it with, directions from which it is excluded. Now in empirical perception, this point of departure is given only by sensations of touch. Imagine a man fixing his eye on a point in the horizon, turning round and thus combining sensations of muscular tension with sight, and coming again to the same observed point in the horizon; this will not give him a perception of the circular figure of the horizon; he wiU. see the same superficies repeated, as often as he turns completely round, but he will not know that he is in the centre of it; he will have no fixed point wherewith to contrast the coloured superficies. Imagine him now to see his own body in addition, and this will be a fixed part of the same superficies ; but still a part of a superficies only, not the central part of a circular superficies, but only a fixed part of 78 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS element in consciousness. pabti. it while the other parts are changing. Suppose him ^^^ however now to be endowed with touch, and to touch Tie^foLai as Well as see his own body; then the fixed part of the visual landscape, or coloured superficies,, always seen when any other parts of the landscape are seen, becomes in addition the only object of touch, the only object which he perceives by both the senses of sight and touch. He gains, by the addition of the sense of touch, a point of departure from which to measure the superficies, which he saw previously as only superficially extended; and the third dimension of space means for him now distance from something actually tangible. The meaning of the third dimen- sion of space is originally, then, the distance from one tangible poiat to another in objects of sight. Whatever may be the proportions in which these two senses, or that of muscular tension, contribute after- wards to the interpretation or measurement of com- parative distances or magnitudes, of linear or super- ficial extension, or of depth, the sense of touch is indispensable as a constituent of the perceptions in which depth first becomes an object of consciousness. Equally inadequate is the sense of touch, either alone or combined with muscular tension, but without sight, to supply perceptions in which the third dimen- sion of space is perceived. Sensations of touch alone, or combined with those of muscular tension, can give a succession of feelings of superficial extension, but cannot bind these sensations into a solid whole with- out the combination of visual sensations. I can touch a surface, but I do not solely from that know in what direction the series of touches go, nor dis- tinguish a direction of a surface from a direction vertical to it. The only kind of cases where a com- element in consciousness. OF TIME AND SPACE. 79 bination of a whole series of touch-sensations into a pakt i. Ch II solid whole is apparently possible is in grasping a — ' small object, where the fingers meet each other as Thefonnai well as touch the surface all round. Here we have an entire series of touches on the outside of an ob- ject, just as in the above case of vision we had an entire series of visual images seen from the inside of the object, the horizon; we receive the impression of resistance at all points, but we get no perception of the solid space between those points. Nor, if we did receive this perception, could we extend the ex- perience to other cases where the series of touches could not be complete, that is, to space generally, for there is nothing to connect the two kinds of cases; without sight we cannot perceive our own bodies as sohd, and consequently not space generally in three dimensions. Sight therefore is an essential consti- tuent of the perception of depth. But again the same remark must be made here, namely, that this fact does not show in what relative proportion touch and sight are necessary to the measurement or inter- pretation of magnitudes. The sense of muscular tension alone is obviously less competent than touch to give the perception of depth or distance, for it does not even give that of superficial extension. If we could assume space in its three dimensions, and objects occupying it, as already existing in and by itself, and needing only to be perceived by us, then perhaps sight alone, or touch alone, would sufiice to this perception; for the question then would be one of mere interpretation. But to assume this is in fact to assume that we possess the perception of space, as a form of consciousness, previous to its becoming filled by sensible impressions. These two apparently element in consciousness, 80 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. opposite assuuiptions are fundamentally the same; in ^fli^ both of them space is conceived as lying before us, as Thifomai an absolute, to be perceived and interpreted. But if the very existence of space is its being perceived, and if consequently, in reasoning about it, it must be con- ceived as first coming into existence when it is first perceived, then we have to account not only for its interpretation but for its original perception ; and the senses have to produce its perception and its exist- ence. And for this purpose the senses have to be examined separately, in order to see what each sense by itself involves, and how much it can separately contribute to the complete perception of space in three dimensions. Sight contributes, at the least, perception of superficial extension; so also touch; the combination of the two produces, at the least, per- ceptions of the three dimensions, for part of the visual superficies is pushed to a distance from the fixed part, the body, when we touch the body and not the rest of the superficies, and yet the part of the superficies so pushed remains a superficies still. This is the origin, the creation, of the third dimension of space, when reasoned of as if it were an empirical object. Sight and touch however come into operation toge- ther, and consequently the perception of the third dimension of space begins simultaneously with that of its superficial extension. The object and the state of consciousness called perception of things in space of three dimensions is a highly complex state and object, but not necessarily later in time than any of the simpler states or objects of which it is composed; it is we who import the notion of growth in time into it, by our analysing it into its elements and then composing it afi-esh by their combination. In other element in consciousness. OF TIME AND SPACE. 81 words, the senses of sight and touch contain the pami. logical elements, but not the historical causes, of the ^— ' perception of objects in three dimensions. rhltomsi Logical language and the language of reflection, together with the modes of thought this language expresses, being that necessarily used by us in ana- lysing the phenomena of perception, we naturally, but not therefore correctly, imagine that perception ad- vanced by the same stages as those which we have discovered in the analysis of its objects, and that it not only reached that result which we analyse, but thg,t it reached it by the same route, and gained successively the same stages, as our two processes, analytical and synthetical, successively traversed and reached. For instance, we have analysed space into three dimensions, and therefore imagine that percep- tion saw first one of these and then the others ; or we distinguish the first and second from the third, and then imagine that perception saw the first and second together as distinguished from the third. But there is nothing to show that this was the case. Visual perception sees a superficies, but it does not see a superficies as distinguished from a solid ; if it did so, it must have previously seen the solid. It sees what we afterwards, in order to distinguish it from a solid, call a superficies. It has never conceived the ques- tion whether there is any thing behind the superficies or not; it sees colours which may be either super- ficies or solid, and which turn out to be solid. A superficies without a solid, and a line or a point without a superficies, are objects of abstraction, pro- visional images only ; and when it is said on one side and admitted on the other, that sight sees only a coloured superficies, it is meant that this is the least, G 82 THE NATURE. OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. TO amyttaHov, which' in our reflective and logical Ian* ^— ' guage can be expressed to be seen ; that sight sees The tomai this at the least, without asking how far it may go consdouBuSs. towards the next logical mark or division, trinal ex- tension, which would include too much, and without entering ia any way into the question what potenti- alities may be involved in this perception of super- ficies ; for the phenomenon of sight, the coloured surface, has not been yet analysed by the perceptive consciousness. The addition of touch to sight, com- bined in time, does not add a new distinct direction to an old distinct one, does not add depth as distin- guished from surface to surface as distinguished from depth ; but it changes the previously potential super- ficies into an actual solid; it makes us see into the superficies, and perceive it as, or transform it into, soHdity. Space in three dimensions, therefore, does not become .such by a composition of distinct, sepa- rate, parts or directions, but by a combination of sensations into one indivisible whole, a whole which, although complex, is not separable except logically and provisionally. Since space in three dimensions is an indivisible though complex whole, it does not arise in conse- quence of comparison or reasoning, which are pro- cesses concerned with complete empirical objects, or with abstractions treated as such objects. But in perceiving space : in three dimensions no such empi- rical or complete object has been arrived at, until space itself has been, perceived ; and the three dimen- sions of space are not capable of being treated as such empirical objects, until they have been abstracted from space itself as a whole. In the perception of space there is synthesis, but not comparison. OF TIME AND SPACE. 83 Such is the nature of the formal element of all pam i. external sensations, known as space, and such is the -^' combination of the sensations which gives rise to it, The foiinaa T • T r^ , , • • ,1 ^ element in or which nrst presents consciousness with phenomena consciousness. in three dimensions. It now becomes possible to answer the question proposed at first, whether motion is or is not a formal constituent in perception. What do we mean by motion? For different feelings exist- ing in order of time there is another name, Succession. For different feelings existing in space and time to- gether the most appropriate term is Motion. Ac- cording to this, sensations of muscular tension alone constitute no cognition of motion, but only of succes- sion; but changes in a coloured surface, changes in touch, or changes in sight and touch together, con- stitute the cognition of motion. Motion accordingly in its lowest and simplest terms is succession in the objects of sight or of touch. When such succession is perceived, motion is perceived ; that is to say, motion is the name of this particular combination, not the analysis and not the explanation of it. Not the analysis of it, because on the contrary succession of feelings of sight or of touch is the analysis of motion; not the explanation of it, because it cannot be perceived or conceived without itself involving the very succession it would explain ; unless indeed it is considered as an occult and absolute cause, and this is no explanation. Neither again is motion a constituent of objects in three dimensions of space ; for, though successions of feelings of touch and sight together constitute such objects, they do not require to be first gathered up into perceptions of motion, before they combine to constitute them ; it is because successions of feelings of touch and of sight combine element in oonsciouBness. 84 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. together, and not because each succession is a motion, -^ ' that objects in three dimensions arise. ThIfoLai It may now be objected that there is more than these elements, — there is their combination ; and that this combination is motion. The answer is, — this their combination is time. Feelings succeeding one another in time are combined already ; if those feelings are also in space, they are still combined as before in time; that is, their succession is their combination; and are besides combined in space by their space- relations. Their combination has already been ac- counted for, that is, referred to its proper element in the analysis. Accounted for in this sense it has been fuUy ; but accounted for in another sense it has not been, and the mixing up these two senses in which phenomena can be accounted for is a common source of error. Was it meant by asking after the com- bination of feelings in motion to ask how they came to be combined, or what was the cause of their being combined, instead of asking what was the analysis of the phenomenon of their being combined ? Was it meant to ask how feelings come to be combined with time and space relations, — the material with the formal element of cognition ; and how phenomena come to contain these two elements at all? These are questions which are not answered here, and which never have been answered ; they involve an attempt to spring beyond the last elements of con- sciousness, and they move only by employing the cognitions the cause of which they ask for ; they are intelligible only because they contain the cognitions which they seek to render intelligible. Motion is sometimes conceived as the combination of feelings in time with feelings in space, or of the Gonsciousness. OF TIME AND SPACE. 85 time-relations with the space-relations in feelings, or caii.' as a succession of feelings in space-relations, — in ^ which sense it has been already analysed ; and some- ^^eX^ times it is conceived as the cause or the fact, the objective fact as it is called, or the occult cause or fact as it is sometimes called, underlying that com- bination. Here comes out the result of dividing the world into two sets of objects, subjects or- minds on one side, and objects known or knowable by these subjects on the other. On this supposition there must be occult facts or occult causes, which are known only by their effects or manifestations, which are phenomena; there must be occult facts or occult causes on the side of the subjects, which are known only by their effects or manifestations, the cognitions or states of consciousness. Everywhere are Things- in-themselves, unknowable but imagined as existing ; imagined as the double of phenomenal existence in order to account for it; there must be a cause of every thing, it is said, even of the elements of phenomena ; multiply then these elements by 2, and call the result their cause. And that this is really the origin of the conception of Things-in-themselves or occult facts or causes, is shown in this instance by the exact similarity in nature and position between the real combination of feelings, namely time, and the imagined one, motion as an occult cause. Motion contains nothing but the formal element in cognition; it is simply that element made into an object by itself alone without a material element, and supposed to be the object perceived in its manifestations, in per- ceiving phenomena. One of the questions which was proposed at the beginning of this section has now been answered, 86 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. Ch. II. §12. The formal eleiaent in consciousness. namely, whether motion was one of the formal elements in consciousness. It has been shown that it is not, but is an empirical fact or phenomenon, capable of analysis into feeling, time, and superficial extension of space. And if motion is thus put aside, I do not know what other claimant there can be for such a rank. For force, about which so much is said in physical science, is but motion considered as determined to a particular direction or mode, and sometimes to a particular degree or measure of intensity. But the claim of space, in its three dimensions, to that rank, may yet be contested. In fact it has been shown that this cognition, space in three dimensions, does not spring up full formed with the first or simplest exercise of consciousness, but that its growth can be traced through com- bination of the data of the two senses of touch and sight; besides which, its being original only with two of the senses, and with those two only in combination, whUe the majority of the senses are originally without it, seems to show that it is not universal in phenomena or necessary in conscious- ness. JSTow, if its necessity in consciousness required the support of a theory of its being an innate or connate form of an objective mind, then these con- siderations would be fatal to its claim; for they would show that the connection between that psy- chological object and this its form of consciousness was not universal and without interruption, but that the mind might and originally did operate without operating under this form. But the necessity and consequent universality of space, in three dimen- sions, is not dependent on any objective psychologi- cal theory. Space is necessary, not because it is a OF TIME AND SPACE. 87 native form of the operation of the mind, but be- paeti. cause, being irreducible to any thing else, it is all- -— ' embracing and exhaustive in its nature, and occupies The formal the whole field of being. True, the particular consciousness. phenomena in which it arises may be pointed out, namely, the two senses of sight and touch in com- bination ; these are its sources, or the phenomena in which it is involved. But, in the first place, these cases never arise alone, but always in conjunction with some of the other phenomena of which the entire consciousness is composed ; and then, this being so, the nature of the cognition of space, so combined with the rest, determines its necessity, for its nature is such that no feeling can escape it ; it combines with the rest as their frame and dwelling- place, from which they can afterwards only be released provisionally and during a process of ab- straction. True, space is composite ; but it is com- posed only of itself ; true, it is not like time present in every moment of every feeling, but, except by an effort of volition, every moment of every feeling is present in it. Space is the necessary formal element of the senses of sight and touch taken together ; but it is the necessary formal element of the \ other feel- ings only on the supposition that these two senses are an inseparable part of the consciousness which is the complex of those other feelings ; in other words, it is only for an individual human consciousness, as we find it actually existing, that objects in space are mseparable from objects in time ; but this is enough for the purposes of analysis of an individual human consciousness. § 13. With the arising of phenomena in three The^™ltyof dimensions arises also the distinction of the pheno- itn",°'^ce"* 88 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS paet I. mena into those within and those without the body. Ch II -^—' For the perception of the third dimension of space The unity of takes placc oiilj in distinguishing the body as a solid in space, and tangible object from the space surrounding it, which must be therefore perceived as solid or in three dimensions. The phenomena are thus conceived as capable of beiag separated from each other in the third dimension of space. Another conception is con- nected with this, that of matter as impenetrable ; in which sense, so far from being taken to mean, as in this Essay, only the material element in conscious- ness, it means masses or molecules of some impene- trable stuff, which is in some way or Other the oppo- site of feeUng or consciousness. Putting these two conceptions together, there arises the conception of a world which is a congeries of material objects, sur- roimding the body on all sides, and endowed Y?ith qualities which operate upon each other, and upon the body, and produce changes in it which modify the states of the consciousness seated within it. It is easy to imagine how these two conceptions were combined, so as to produce the conception of a world of material objects. The quality of impene- trability is nothing else than the sensation of touch including or combined with the sense of muscular tension. I do not speak of the causes or antecedent conditions of this quality, but of what it is for con- sciousness alone; and if we are told of or imagine objects which are impenetrable, but in so slight' a degree that we cannot perceive them to be such actu- ally, but can only infer the quality by proof of its effects, as, for instance, in the case of the air on a still day, yet it is plain that the inferred resistance or impenetrability of the air is only understood or phenomena in space. OF TIME AND SPACE. 89 imagined by referring it to cases of actually perceived part l resistance. In the great majority of instances of actu- -^ ' ally experienced tangibility, this sensation is accom- The unity of panied by sensations of sight, and by sensations of sight in which a continuity or contact of surface with the body is seen. Break the visible continuity and the sensation of touch ceases, renew one and the other is renewed. Again, other sensations, such as odour and sound, become stronger in proportion as the tan- gible object is brought nearer to the body, and weaker as it is removed. When we actually have sensations of touch, we actually have also, in most cases, a variety of other sensations ; but this is the case with no other of the sensations, to any thing like the same degree. No other brings with it the other sensations ; we may hear, see, smeU, in some cases even taste, without touching or feeling any muscular tension ; but if we touch, we can also do some one or more of the rest. Touch then, with the sense of muscular tension, is a sense with which all or any of the rest can be combined ; at the same time it is impossible to be closer to any object than in touching it ; the object supposed to be touched is in visible continuity with the body; and the quality of impenetrability is not capable of being expressed or conceived ultimately in any other way than as a sensation of touch combined with muscular tension. Suppose now the very frequent case of objects, which have been touched, removed to a distance but still visible ; they will be represented as tangible, we shall remember that we touched them ; yet the sur- face still actually visible is no longer actually tangible. The two senses are no longer in combination, but we know by experience that a tangible surface must be 90 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS pakt 1. also visible, though a visible one need not be tangible ; -^' we remember that, the more distinctly visible any The unity of thing is, the easier it becomes to touch it, and that '"ii^'spMe""' the same holds good of the other senses. Tangibility is thus conceived as the condition of the other senses ; and since we represent the once touched and still \T.sible object as tangible, we now make it the seat of visibility, and consider the object as tangible to be the object proper, and the other sensations, visibility, odour, sound, and taste, as inherent in or dependent on it. The cognition of space in its three dimensions having "been already gained, this object is then re- ferred to some part of space distant from the body, and space thus becomes fiUed with tangible objects, that is, with dififerent masses of matter in which the other sensations inhere. The removal however of the seat of these sensa- tions to a distance, while they are felt all the time in the body, compels a change in our way of regarding them ; they must be regarded as caused in us by a property of the tangible object ; in other words, we cease to look at the sensations as objects for con- sciousness alone, and to ask what is their range as sensations, and we begin to enquire how they are produced in the tangible objects and transmitted from them to our bodies. Phenomena which are visible but not actually touched become thus removed by the imagination to a distance, because, conscious- ness argues with itself, if they were at the surface of the body they could be touched ; since they are not touched, they are not -at the surface of the body. Where are they then ? Somewhere in that third dimension of space which has been already discovered. They must exist in the two first dimensions of space, OF TIME AND SPACE. 91 for they are visible; yet they are not tangible, that ^^\]; is, not close to the body; but since they are repre- — sented as tangible, it follows that they are in such a ^he unity of a ' J , phenomena place where they could be touched if the body were "» space. near enough, that is, they are separated from the body by the third dimension of space. To examine now the validity of this conception. It may well be that tangible matter and motion, in masses or in. molecules, are the causes or conditions of our sensations of qualities of every kind ; but this does not alter the case as to the nature of those sen- sations, or those qualities, as objects for consciousness alone. The sensations themselves cannot be analysed into tangible matter and motion, though their causes may. Different modes of motion, mechanical, chemi- cal, or vital, may pervade all matter which is either capable of being actually perceived by touch or ima- gined as being so capable if our senses were more acute; and this tangible matter may pervade all space, and be the cause or condition of the different qualities which we perceive by the senses in space; but it cannot be the analysis of those qualities them- selves, as they are known immediately to conscious- ness. As immediate objects of consciousness, the qualities which are known by the other senses are in precisely the same case as those which are known by the sense of touch, including muscular tension; that is, are nothing else than the sensations of those senses themselves. And they resemble the sensation of touch also in another respect, namely, that they too are in immediate contact or continuity with the bodily organ which perceives them, and extend from it into space in three dimensions at least so far as the tangible ob- ject from which they appear to proceed; light occupies 92 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS ^^^IJ- the Space between us and the sun; a sound or an — odour occupies the space between us and the tangible Theimityof obiect perccived bv thesc seuscs. Suppose conscious- phenomena J r •! -^-^ •11 in space, ness tO' bc placcd at any mtermediate spot, with the requisite media, the atmosphere for instance, and it would have the same sensation. The sensation is there if its conditions are; and by 'being there' is meant, that if consciousness were there it would have the sensation, just as ia the case of other objects. This is the view which I wish to establish in place of the conception, above described, of what I may call the duplicity of phenomena, as cause there and ejBfect here, as quality in the tangible object and feehng, caused by the quality, in the body of the observer. Peelings and quaKties are convertible, or at least equivalent, terms, one the subjective aspect of the other; where one is, there is the other; and the same causes are the causes of both. The question is one concerning the distribution of the contents of spiace. The erroneous conception is, that the extension represented as tangible is the ex- tension actually seen; the true conception is, that the extension actually seen is continuous with, but not the same as, the extension represented as tangible; that the visibility of the extension is combined with its tangibility, but not confined to the limits to which its tangibility is confined. If I take the object to mean its tangibility combined with its visibility, then the object occupies all the space as far as it is visible, while its tangibility occupies a small portion, at the centre, of that space. , The sun, for instance, is not the object seen when we see light, but is the tangible centre of the object,, light; a tree or house or any other such object, in the same way, is the tangible OF TIME AND SPACE. 93 object at the centre of the coloured rays which are pami. Ch. H. the visible object. Perhaps the object is audible, — ' odorous, gustable, as well as tangible and visible; if The unity of , *iiipi '111 phenomena so, it occupies the whole oi the space occupied by the in space. widest of these properties. Suppose now the object to be presented to consciousness; part of it only as just described is presented, the rest is represented; the parts not actually touched, the rays of light or colour, of sound, of taste, not falling on the senses of the body, are represented. So that, whether we take the object in the widest sweep of its qualities, or limit it to the sweep of its tangible quality only, we must have a large portion of it an object of repre- sentation. The common opinion limits the object, not to the sweep of its presented tangible quality, but to that of its tangible quality presented and represented. It can derive no support from the coincidence of its Umit with the distinction between presentation and representation; for both views equally overstep this line. The rest of the qualities of the object in their wide sweep it calls effects of the object in those tan- gible limits, effects of the motion of its particles. Here are two opinions, both describing the same object, but in different ways ; one describes the phenomena as consisting of an object and its effects, the other as consisting of a combination of objects. The test to which I bring these two conceptions is the distinction between first and second intentions. Are not effects of an object themselves objects ? Have they not a nature, a kind, of their own, pre- vious to being known as the effects of another object? Is not the term effect applied to them in their second and not in their first intention ? They may be effects 94 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. of some Other object, or of some constitution or cause '^' in that other, object; but the present question is, Thel^ty of what they are for consciousness alone, arid not what ''^"proT* their relation is to other objects in consciousness, or what they are in that relation. Now for conscious- ness alone every quality is a sensation, and the single name, of colour, sound, and so on, expresses the two things, first the sensation, then the sensation as ex- tended in space, or as quality. All these qualities, except tangibility, may certainly be considered also as effects of the motion of tangible particles, if it is remembered at the same time that they are some- thing else for consciousness alone, namely, sensations of sight, sound, and so on. But if they are conceived as inherent in the tangible objects, and yet as direct objects for consciousness, they become reduced all to one quality, tangibility, as the sensation of motion in tangible particles ; and then we must consider tangi- bihty as the only sensation, which is absurd. The sensations other than touch cannot be analysed, in their first intention, into sensations of touch, though their antecedent conditions may perhaps be so ana- lysed, that is, though they may be found to depend upon different kinds of motion in tangible objects. Conceive them as qualities inherent in the tangible object only, and they become themselves modes of tangibility; but conceive them in their own shape as sensation^, and they occupy space in three dimensions, precisely as tangibility itself does. One of these theories has been called true, the other erroneous ; but are not both true, and each of them compatible with the other? They are incom- patible only if both are regarded as metaphysical conceptions, or conceptions of ultimate analysis ; but OF TIME AND SPACE. 95 true and compatible with each other, if one is re- pakti. garded as a conception of metaphysical or ultimate — ' analysis of phenomena, and the other as a conception The unity of of physic, or of psychology; of the account of the ^ta^pMe"* conditions and history of phenomena. This is their true relation to each other. The distinction of objects within and objects without the body is a distinction of physic, and at the same time a distinction of psychology; the objects in both parts of space are of the same nature, tangible, visible, audible, and so on, and different only in the place which they occupy in space; the distinction is a division. But the dis- tinction between the formal and material elements of these objects, and also that between their subjective and objective aspects, are distinctions which relate to the objects of both of these divisions alike ; with the objects of whichever division you begin, you find the same distinction of form and matter, of objective and subjective aspect, forced upon your notice ; and these are distinctions and not divisions. They are more general than the divisions of place alone, and must be examined first, in order that the examination of con- sciousness, considered as seated in the body, and of its objects, considered as seated outside the body, may be subordinated to their requirements. The metaphysical distinction of the subjective and objec- tive aspect of phenomena, which I may call the em- pirical ego and the world of qualities, will be found to harmonise completely with the physical and psycho- logical distinction between consciousness seated in the body and its objects in space outside the body; for the whole of space is occupied by qualities, and the whole of space is occupied by feelings, and the body itself is but that complex of qualities which is con- 96 THE NATXJEE OF THE COGNITIONS pabt I. stantly present, as a complex of feelings, in conscious- '^^- ness. When the action and reaction of feelings on The^i^ty of each other in space is in question, those feelings be- ^j^^pT™* come to us qualities, since we abstract from their relation to the mind ; when we ask what they are to ourselves, they remain feelings. And this is the case wherever we may imagine ourselves to be ; a feeling does not cease to be a feeling and begin to be a quality at a hairsbreadth distance from the body or nervous matter; light which is a feeling extends from the sun in all directions, and is felt by the sense of sight everywhere; in aU space it is a quality, and in all space it is a feeling. The world of qualities, as diiFerent from the world of feelings, arises only in consequence of an abstrac- tion supposed to be complete from the consciousness which perceives them ; and this supposed complete abstraction is thought to be possible and natural only in consequence of dividing consciousness in space from its feelings, and making both into objects. But this complete abstraction is a delusion and impossible, because, even while the separation is being made, both the things separated are objects and feelings of the same consciousness ; the qualities themselves are feelings when present to consciousness for the pur- pose of being divided from the mind, and the mind is in the same case. Psychological division in space of the mind from its feelings makes both members of the division into an absolute, into objects each of which is supposed to exist even if the other should not exist. But metaphysical distinction makes these qualities again into feelings, notwithstanding that they may occupy the whole of space. Feelings and qualities are the two aspects of the same world ; but OF TIME AND SPACE. 97 for metaphysic the world is a world of feelings, since paet i. the conception of feeling includes that of something ^ ' felt, that is, quality, but the conception of quality Thevmityof does not include that of feeling. ^u^^pmT* Very early the distinction was drawn between objects which touched one another and objects one of which had, besides this, the sensation of being touched by the other. All objects could be felt only by means of touch in the former sense ; if the object felt did not itself touch the body which felt it, it must put in motion something which did ; and the question was, what this medium, to fAsrali), was ; whether it belonged to the feeling body, as in the case of the senses of touch and taste, or was some- thing foreign to it, as in sight and hearing. Arist. De Anim^, iii. 6, et seqq. Touch in the first sense, which may be called contact, was evidently an interpretation of touch in the second sense, that is, of touch as a sensation ; the closeness between objects in contact was an inference from the sensation of closeness in the sensation of touching visible objects. Aristotle showed that even objects of touch were not strictly close to the part of the body which felt them, but were felt through a medium just as the objects of the other senses were, though this medium was part of the body itself. De Anim^, iii. ii. But the imagination had already firmly established the notion of objects being separate independent existences, led thereto by the sense of touch wrongly interpreted, and all enquiry had to be conducted on that basis. The consequence was the distinction between objects and their qualities, by which the objects were known as audible, visible, tangible, and so on. Take for instance a visible and tangible object as the object of H 98 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. enquiry, e. g. a table ; it has the tangible quality — ■ hardness, the visible quality brownness. Both these The unity of qualities are known, if either is, by an effect they ''ta^spTce"* produce in the medium between the object and the sensitive part in our bodies. As an object the table requires this medium as much in the sense of touch, in order to produce the sensation of hardness, as in the sense of sight to produce that of brownness. The object is not immediately touched ; there is the skin covering the nerve-extremities, and the nerve- substance itself, or as Aristotle called it the ff«f|, intervening. The original opinion was that the ob- ject touched was immediately present to the sensitive part in touch ; to show that there was a medium was virtually to show that the object so conceived was a fiction of the imagiaation, and that the object touched was the quality of tangibility, not a supposed object of which this was a quality inherent ; for in that case a quality in the medium would be what was im- mediately present to the sensitive part of the body. And thus we may read a profound meaning into Aristotle's words, De Anim^, iii. 12. KadoXov hi "^igi TuiTfig aladrjdiag "bii Xa^stv or/ ^ [Jjh a'iaSriaig lari to "hifcrixov rm ala6rtruy sihSv dvsv rijg {jKfjg. The liX)] was the object itself, the substance of which the qualities were properties or accidents, or, in modem German, the Ding-an-sich. Yet though Aristotle established clearly that in touch we perceive a quality and not the thing itself, he saw neither that after this there was no ground remaining to believe in the existence of the vX}], nor that the confusion between the vXri and tangibility was the cause of the distinction drawn between an object in itself and its qualities ; and he continued to argue on the same basis of an unknown OF TIME AND SPACE. 99 vX)j and known qualities of vK'^. But now instead pabti. of vK)] there remaias only the space occupied by — ' sensible qualities, with complete obliteration of the Theliityof divisions between sensitive body, medium, and object ^i'n^pao™"' with inherent qualities. But may it not be objected, that, in showing that the sensation of touch is not in immediate contact with the object supposed to be touched, but that there is a coveiing of skin between the nerve-ex- tremity and the object touched, we rather prove a duplicity in the sense of touch itself than remove duplicity from the other senses ? If this objection is made, I reply : the feeling is in the nerve-extremity, but where is the quality of tangibility ? In the nerve-extremity also. But how come we to transfer it or extend it to the skin, the glove, or the table ? In consequence of the simultaneous and inseparable accompaniment of a sensation of sight ; the sensation of tangibUity is always accompanied by the sight of a continuous surface, or continuity between my finger and the table. The tangibility of the table is in the nerve-extremity as we feel by touch, it is continuous with the table as we feel by the simultaneous sight of the finger and the table. The object then which is in truth touched is an object continuous with the nerve-extremity, and consisting of the medium and the visible object supposed to be touched. There is therefore no duplicity introduced into the object of touch, but this object is continuous and solid in ex- actly the same sense as the object of sight is. Now all the special senses depend on touch in the first of the two meanings distinguished above, namely, contact. The objects of all the senses are immediately present to the nerve-extremities, and the 100 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Pabti. feelings consequently are in the body in the same -^ ' way as those of the sense of touch are. All the The unity of seuses are in this way a kind of touch in the sense of ^in"pa(!e"* contact, but each with a peculiarity of its own which procures it its name. All feelings, of all the senses, are continuous, indivisible into an objective part and a subjective part, and solid; but one kind alone is the feeling of touch ; from the three dimensions of which latter kind of feeling, when combined -with sight, all the other feelings derive not tangibility but solidity. The formal element is transferred from touch and sight to other feelings; its own material element remains peculiar to touch. But it may be objected here, that, if we are not justified in trans- ferring the material element of tangibility to objects of sight and sound by association, neither are we jus- tified in transferring the formal element of solidity to the other senses besides touch and sight. Transfer, it may be said, both or neither. But solidity and tangibility, I reply, are quite different things and stand on quite different grounds. The sensation of touch is the last of a series of conditions on the com- pletion of which the perception of soHdity arises ; the perception of a body as solid arises from the combi- nation of feelings of sight and touch in superficial extension with their time-relations. The perception of our own body as solid arises in this Avay ;" and the perception of our own body as solid gives solidity to every thing about it; for if the space which it occu- pies is solid, the space which surrounds it must be solid also ; for the body is perceived as solid only by being distinguished from objects on all sides of it. The perception of solidity therefore is not due to association, as the transference of tangibility to ob- or TIME AND SPACE. 101 jects of sight is. Solidity is always perceived when part i. it has been perceived once, but tangibility may be -^" erroneously inferred. The unity of Phenomena, whether of one or more or all the ^i^f^^ senses, exist accordingly both in time and in three dimensions of space. No 'here' and 'there' in phe- nomena is possible ; there is only one continuous phe- nomenon, in which and of which are all its differences, parts, and kinds. There is one consciousness and one universe; each fact is the counterpart but not the cause or the effect of the other. Consciousness with aU its modes of feeling and its two modes of form is one and indivisible; the universe with all its quali- ties and its two modes of form, the same two modes as in consciousness, is one and indivisible also. Sight reveals continuity of superficial extension, touch and sight together reveal continuity of superficial and solid extension. Suppose now that in these modes of extension an empty place were found, that in the surface revealed by sight a portion was dark and in- visible, that in the surface revealed by touch a por- tion was intangible and did not affect the nerve of touch, cases which are frequent; then the dark por- tion and the intangible portion, being contrasted with the light and the tangible portions, become portions, of space, have position and figure. Space suffers no rupture, but its material co-element only. What is the cause of this phenomenon ? Has it not been shown that the material element is equally essential to consciousness with the formal? If then the mate- rial element vanishes anywhere, ought not there the formal element to vanish also? The solution is, that the place left empty of the material element is filled with the representation of that element; there is no 102 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. Ch. II. §13. The unity of phenomena in space. material element' in presentative perception at that place, but the gap is bridged over either by a mate- rial element supplied by representation, from what- ever source this may be drawn, or by a representation of the gap becoming filled without designating by what kind of material element. The dark portion of the visible surface is only itself present to conscious-, ness by being contrasted with the light portions ; the intangible portion of the tangible silrface is only pre- sent to consciousness by being contrasted with the tangible portions. In other words, the formal element is always actually and presentatively present in all consciousness, the material element may be present in representation only and provisionally. Hence the power which we have of forming an image of space and of time without any particular material element ; in this image the material element is only provision- ally present. But the material element can never be present in consciousness without the actual presence of the formal element. Some time, or some time and space together, every feeling must occupy. I do not say, some definite time, some definite figure; these may be provisionally present. But while we can banish matter from time and space, and keep.it only provisionally there, that is, without specifying what kind of matter it is to be, we cannot so banish time and space from matter. Sensations of sight and of touch niust always be in time and space; sensations of the other senses must always be in time. The cause of this is probably to be sought in the infinite number of modifications of the material element, while the formal element has but two modifications, time and space. Time and space may be presented as empty, -without any particular material content; in OF TIME AND SfACE. 103 Part I. Ch. II. §13. phenomena in space. that case their particular duration and figure is their matter, the lines which circumscribe the space and the points wliich limit the time, which they owe Theliity of to matter, become the material element in the pheno- mena. When time and space are so presented, they are said to be pure, by abstraction of their material element. Matter, which cannot be so abstracted from form, can never be a pure object ; it would cease to be an object at all at the moment that the abstraction was completed. This is the great distinction between the material and formal elements in consciousness, namely, that the formal element must be always actually present, while the material element may be only provisionally present in it. Matter changes, vanishes, leaves empty spaces and empty times in consciousness ; time and space alone never change, never vanish, never leave spaces which are not space, nor times which are not time ; are always continuous, always the same. They cease only when conscious- ness itself ceases. And this I think is a true descrip- tion of the facts of consciousness, however it may be sought to account for them. § 14. So far as to the unity of phenomena in space. But the same question arises also with refer- ence to phenomena in time; phenomena appear in time a,lso as involving a duplicity, a now and a then, an existence now in the mind, and then in the past course of history or in its anticipated future. It may for instance be objected : You say there are two forms of feeling ; some feelings present themselves in time alone, others in time and space together, and you speak as if the time-element in both classes of feelings was the same, only that in the one case it has a space-element in addition. But the fact is, — and §14. The unity of phenomena in time. 104 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. this shows that the old division iato an internal sub- -^ ' jective and an external objective sense is correct, — The unity of the fact is that there are two separate kinds and two in time. Separate portions of time contained in those feelings which occupy space as well as time; there is one time-element which is subjective and of the same kind as that occupied by feelings which occupy time alone, and there is another which is objective and is occupied by the feelings in exactly the same objective way in which they occupy space. Tangible and visi- ble objects are present in consciousness for a certain time subjectively, they occupy space objectively and for that time ; but not only for that time, but also for as long as they occupy space ; they have a place and a duration in time in the world of objects, as well as a place in space. When I see an oak, it exists for a minute in my mind, but it exists five hundred years objectively, and in the same objective sense as that in which it is said to exis.t as part of the visible and tan- gible landscape. There is, therefore, an objective and a subjective time, though you have only men- tioned one, the subjective. If I should not succeed in answering this objec- tion, I hope that the plainness with which I have exhibited it will shield me from the imputation of wishing to leave any difficulties dark. My answer to this objection is, that the oak considered as occupying this second portion of time, this objective portion of time, does not exist as part of the object or phenome- non of presentative perception, with the analysis of which we are more directly concerned. The oak ex- isting in that second, objective, portion of time; the five hundred years, is an object of representation only, believed on evidence interpreted by my experience of OF TIME AND- SPACE. 105 time in presentative perceptions. The universe in its pam l entire duration prior to this actually present moment, — ' nay even this actually present moment itself, if it be The unity of , ,1 , phenomena true that i„ time. Le moment ou je park est d6ja loin de moi, is in the same case. There remains therefore no other time in presentative phenomena than the time which I spoke of as the only one, the same in kiud with the time involved in feelings which exist in time only; and this time is both objective and subjective, equally the one, equally the other, as is discovered by reflection; that is, it is mine and the tree's both at once. Similarly with space ; the visible and tangible landscape of which the oak was a portion is the only' extended object present in presentative perception. Beyond an extent which Mr. Bain describes as " a range of about a third of a circle, right and left, up and down," all other visible and tangible objects are present to consciousness only in representation. The object which I have before me in presentation is this portion of space and the first portion of time, the minute, filled together by certain feelings. If I mix up with them, or add to them in the following minute, representative perceptions, I may in that next minute have before me the five hundred years of the oak's life, and ages before that also, and also the whole depth of sky above and beneath the earth, Europe, England, the field " of many one," with the oak there standing, the events that have passed around it and that may pass before it is gone, and in times when it shall have gone and been forgotten. The so-called objective portion of time, then, turns out to be time as the form of an object of representation not of pre- sentation. But nothing in representation is or can 106 THE NATUllE OF THE COGNITIONS pakti. be more real than things perceived in presentation. -^' So that if this portion of time is called objective to The unity of distinguish it from the minute in which it is per- phenomena .,. i-i i ii-i- in time. ceived, it Cannot be m the sense that what is subjec- tive is less real than what is objective. Will however any one maintain that the distinc- tion between subjective and objective coincides with that between representation and presentation, that every thing which is merely represented is merely subjective, every thing which is really presented is really objective? In that case, every thing not con- tained in the actual object of the present moment is merely subjective ; the course of the world up to the present moment, the space of sky seen at the Anti- podes, our own ancestors, are merely subjective; nor will it avail to reply, that they are now indeed sub- jective, but have been actually presented to conscious- ness once, that our ancestors have lived in a world of people to whom they were objects of presentation; for the people themselves, the consciousnesses to whom they were objects of presentation, are them- selves merely subjective too, all alike are objects of our representation. The addition of a further cha- racteristic to those objects cannot make them more real, if the added characteristic is itself also merely subjective. The objects, then, of representation not only are now subjective, but, where they do not belong to the actual experience of the person repre- senting them, i.e. where they are imagined as well as represented, they have never been any thing else ; while as objects of former presentation they are in- ■ ferences from objects of present or actual presenta- tion. This conclusion is inevitable on the supposition that the distinction between subjective and objective or TIME AND SPACE. 107 coincides with that between representation and pre- paktx. sentation, and that what is subjective is unreal. — ' It is in representation that the time and space The unity of occupied by the object come to be thought different ^to^tor" from the time and space occupied by it in presenta- tion. In representation the time and the space occu- pied by presented objects are taken up and included in a new or rather newly-recaUed object which oc- cupies, may be, an immense extent of space and duration of time; and this is the case, whether the originally presented object is still presented or itself also represented; which latter would happen if we suppose the eyes to be shut after seeing the oak, and the scene to be recalled in memory. Between presen- tation aiid representation there is a great difference, as important a difference as any in philosophy ; but the distinction between the time and the space, which are contained in the object of representation, and the time and the space (called by the objector subjective) contained in the moment of representation in the mind, does not arise solely from this difference. That dis- tinction arises in consequence of reflection upon the phenomenon of representation ; but yet not solely from this ; it arises from that reflection taking a par- ticular course, and distinguishing not subject from object, but the mind and its body taken together from other objects, according to the explanation offered in the foUowiag chapter. The mind, together with the body which it inhabits, is in this course of reflection made into an object similar to other objects, and an object of such a kind as to be a partial mirror, as it were, of the rest of the objective world. The world is divided into two classes of objects, this mind, " the wind-borne mirroring soul," on the one hand, and the 108 THE NATUEE OF THE COGNITIONS paeti. objects and events which it mirrors on the other. -^' These classes of objects have their separate and ap- The imity of propriate timcs and spaces in which they exist and in ^in"time"* wHch they are perceived to exist; but both are ob- jective and subjective in the same sense, that is, both are what are commonly called objects, and neither is a subject. The distuiction between the two kinds of time and space, occupied respectively by the object, as an object of this mind, and by this mind itself, as containing their image in its consciousness, is accord- ingly a distinction which arises in a particular kind of reflection on the phenomenon of representation, and not in this phenomenon of representation by itself, that is, as it first arises in consciousness, or as it is interpreted by reflection alone in its proper sepse. But in order here to decide the question of the unity of phenomena generally, whether presentative or representative, in time, the nature of representa- tive phenomena must be examined. What then is the phenomenon of representation as distinguished by reflection proper from the phenomenon of pre- sentation ? The object of representation is distin- guished from that of presentation solely by an in- ferior degree of viAidness, distinctness, and complete- ness in its material element. The events and objects of yesterday from noon to midnight were presented to me yesterday and occupied twelve hours. To-day they are represented to me and occupy five minutes. They are equally objects in both cases, and equally subjective. In both cases their presence in the mind and the time they occupy in that can be distin- guishedj in the kind of reflection above described, from the time the events themselves occupy as ob- jects. In both cases the tilnes occupied are equal, OF TIME AND SPACE. 109 are really the same. In the presentation the time is part i. twelve hours ; in the representation the time is five -^— ' minutes. "No, you object; the objective time in the Theanityof representation is twelve hours, the subjective is five ^in"tSr* minutes. Hence the difference." Times which con- tain the same events and objects are the same length of time ; but do the five minutes and the twelve hours in representation contain the same events ; that is, are they filled with the same material ele- ment? Certainly they are. Just as the small circle of the retina contains the same colours and forms which are spread out over the whole surface of the object seen, so the five miiiutes contain the same objects and events which are spread out over the twelve hours in the representation. As the object in the former case was one object in superficial ex- tension of space, so here in the representation of the events and objects of a day there is one object in one time, which may be called five minutes or twelve hours according as we consider it as part of the mind or as part of the other objects mirrored by the mind. Distinguished however into two objects by reflection proper, that is, distinguished into two objects of five minutes and twelve hours respective^, but without being placed in different portions of space, — that is, in the mind and without it ; distinguished therefore into two aspects of the same object, — what is the difference between them ? The difference between them in this case is solely the difference in the distribution of the material element. In the five minutes that element is gathered together, in the twelve hours it is separated by spaces of time pro- visionally not actually present. The twelve hours contain just so much material element as can be con- 110 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS pabt I. tained by five minutes ; and this difference in length — ' is rectified by the recollection that there are gaps The unity of Containing other matter which is omitted. In other ''iTtoe?* words, the five minutes or twelve hours, objects of representation, are a repetition of part only, and that a less vividly present part, of the same twelvfe hours as an object of presentation. This omission of the matter enables the twelve hours to be the equivalent of the five minutes ; since, if all the matter was con- tained in them which was contained in presentation, they would require an equal length of time in re- presentation ; it would require from noon to mid- night to-day to represent the events and objects con- tained in the time from noon to midnight which were presented yesterday. The same remarks ap- ply to the case of the five hundred years of the oak-tree ; only that in this case these years are not remembered but imagined. If events sufficient to fill every minute of five hundred years were im- agined one by one, not one ininute but five hundred years would be required for the purpose. In all cases of representation there is a decrease either in vividness, or in amount, or in distinctness of the order of occurrence of the material element, or in aU at once, in the object represented, compared to the object as it was presented. Something is omitted, either from the material element itself, or from its arrangement, or from both, in the object of presen- tation ; and the object with these omissions is the object of representation. In order to signa,lise that there are such omissions, and that the object of representation is a faithful transcript or repetition of the object of presentation only so far as allowance is made for such omissions, the object of representation OF TIME AND SPACE. Ill may properly be called a provisional image. For aU pakt i. kinds of knowledge are referred to presentative know- — ' ledge, as the most vivid and the most distinct and The unity of the most complete which is possible ; representative ''inTilSe!^ knowledge is but the substitute for, and means of • attaining, presentative knowledge, or as it is properly called actual experience. I do not maintain that five minutfes is the same length of time as twelve hours ; but that the differ- ence between them is due solely to a difference in their material content. No distinct portion of time is, strictly speaking, pure time; the material element gives both its divisions and its determined length to every portion of time ; so that, if you could abstract entirely from the material element, the portion of time called five minutes would in no respect differ from the portion of time called twelve hours, for aU division and limitation of time would in that case be taken away. Now this cannot be done ; conscious- ness requires both elements, formal and material. But the material element may be abstracted from so far as to leave only the divisions which it has im- pressed upon the formal element ; and then there remains what is called time as a pure object, or time of determined lengths, e. g. five minutes, or twelve hours, which are of course different in point of length. When twelve hours are represented in five minutes or in a second, they differ from the second or the five minutes only in respect of their divisions and lengths enclosed by the divisions, that is, in respect of what they derive from their material ele- ment. The divisions and lengths of the twelve hours are objects of representation, the time itself is com- mon both to the twelve hours represented and to the 112 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS pabtl second in which they are represented. The twelve ^-" hours and the second are one object in one time, just The unity of as the visible landscape and the impression on the phenomena . ■, . , in time. rctma are one object m one space. If representation differs from presentation only in the vividness, distinctness, and arrangement of its material element, then the formal element in presen- tation and in representation is the same ; there is no difference between presentation and representation in so far as their formal element is concerned. In an object presented and in the same object represented the time and the space occupied is the same ; the two objects differ only xaiga, i. e. in point of position in their times of being present to consciousness (which as will be seen farther on is the characteristic sig- nahsed by the term Sameness), and in certain changes in their material element. There is no correspond- ing change in their formal element. Just as it was shown above, that in presentative perception a space empty of feeling was still space, the matter of which was supplied by representation from other parts of space, so also in the objects of representation the omitted material element is what is supplied by re- presentation, the formal element remains the same as before. It makes no difference whether the object present in consciousness is one of presentation or re- presentation, the formal element in it is equally vivid in both cases. I do not say that it is equally distinct or the arrangement of its parts the same, because dis- tinctness and arrangement of parts depend upon the material element contained in the object as well as upon its formal element ; in other words, upon the division of the formal element by the material, as will be seen farther on. The presence, not of particular OF TIME AND SPACE. 113 lengths, figures, or arrangement of parts, in the pahti. Ch. II. formal element, but of the formal element itself in the object, is equally certain and equally vivid in The unity of representation and in presentation. The same might ^i^'tiSe"" be said of the material element itself, taken generally and in the abstract, that is, of feeling, if the word feeling could be understood as meaning not this or that particular feeling, but merely as signifying that representation involves feeling of some kind or other equally with presentation. Of feeling, however, the modes are innumerable, of the formal element the modes are only two, time and space ; so that we can speak of time and space in their first intention with a definite precision incompetible to the object, feeling, in its first intention, for feeling has innumerable modes, while time and space have only divisions. Or to put the case in another way, it may be said that feeling is one object divided by time and space and co-extensive with them ; but the feeling here and the feeling there, and there, and there, differ from each other in kind, as well as in position and quan- tity in time and space, and that innumerably and in- finitely, while the parts of time and space so divided, though equally innumerable and infinite, differ not from each other In kind. And this I believe is what is meant by those who maintain, that, while feeling is a general and abstract term, time and space are not general and abstract, but particular, terms indicating objects or forms of thought of a particular nature. There is a time and a space distinct from every par- ticular portion of either of them ; the relation be- tween those portions and time and space generally is that of parts to a whole. But there is no such thing as feeling distinct from every particular feeling ; the 114 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS pakt I. relation between these is that between a logical ab- Ch. II. -^' stract and general term and a logical concrete and The unity of particular term ; feeHng in the abstract can never be phenomena ,^ • t ..i. ■, • ^ in time. anjthmg but a provisional image, but time and space are always also an actual image ; feehng generally and time and space generally are wholes of very dif- ferent kinds, and in two very different senses. If then there is only one time and only one space, and if these are equally vivid in representation and in presentation, we may truly say that time and space are always presented, even in representation. The diflference between presentation and representation lies solely in the material element. When I look straight before me I see a surface, occupying " about a third of a circle, right and left, up and down ;" this is the object of presentation. When I recall the fact that I can turn round and see a s imil ar surface on aU sides of me, the material element contained in those represented surfaces is less vivid than in the pre- sented surface, and they are said to be represented on that ground; but the space contained in them is as vividly present as in the presented surface, and is presented to me in them, while the material element is represented only. When I interpret these surfaces by experiences drawn from the sense of touch, the surfaces become solid, and I find myself in a space of three dimensions presented to consciousness just as before. One and the same space in three dimensions is presented to me, disclosed indeed partially by one sense, partially by another, but completely by all together. There is one consciousness, and corres- pondingly there is one space, whatever may be the cause of there being but one of each. But what is meant by there, being but one consciousness? This; OF TIME AND SPACE. 115 Part I. Ch. II. §14. The unity of phenomena in time. that the feeling is continuous in point of time. Con- tinuity of time and continuity of space interpret each other, for both are continuity of feeling in time. So also when I imagine a series of events, and objects in and about which they take place in the past or the future, the time in which they occurred or are yet to occur is presented to me ; the past and the future are less vivid than the present only because the material element contained in them is less vivid. This leads to one of the fundamental differences between the formal and material elements. It is this, that the formal element, time and space, is not the object of sense, that is, of any particular sense whatever, but is the accompaniment of all and every of the senses in a more or less complete degree. By the term mate- rial element is meant the feeling contributed or per- ceived by some sense or some kind of sensibility. By the term formal element is meant something which accompanies the material element inseparably, but without being capable of being ascribed to, but which must be distinguished from, that sensibility and its proper object in every instance. If this is a true account of the difference between the formal, and material elements, it makes it easy to understand how the formal element is presented even in repre- sentation ; for it is involved in all consciousness, without depending on the degree of vividness of the sensations. § 15. The two elements of all consciousness and Timeand'space of all objects of consciousness are, according to what as pu^ objects. has been said, a priori and jenseit der Erfahrung, not as the occult causes of experience but as its meta- physically distinguishable elements. They are also necessary elements of consciousness and of all objects 116 THE NATURiE OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. of consciousness ; for by necessary I mean, as was — said in the preceding chapter, the subjective aspect of Timeand'spaoe Universality. It is impossible to be conscious and as pure objects. ■' . p <» t • ,• j rpi not be conscious oi a leelmg in time and space. Ine proof of their necessity is direct, practical, empirical, inevitable. Since however we never have feeling in the abstract but always some determinate feeling, and determinate feelings are innumerable, while time and space, modes of the formal element, are two only ; in other words, since feeling in its first intention is informal, unlimited, and we can only know about it that it is in consciousness, not what it is, while time and space we can know, in their first intention, not only that they are in consciousness, but also what they are (a distinction which has already been pointed out as one of the greatest importance between the equally necessary, formal and material, elements in consciousness), I shall cease noticing, except incident- ally, the necessity of the material element, and speak only of that of the formal element, time and space. It may be said that we can have feelings not in space. I admit that the majority of our feelings, all except those of the senses of sight and touch, can be repre- sented in consciousness with abstraction made of other feelings occupying space and of space-relations ; I admit that in representation the abstraction of time from space is possible, so as to represent feelings in time alone without space, though it is impossible to represent feelings in space without time. But I assert that feelings so abstractedly represented as occupying time alone are provisional objects only, and never are represented without the proviso tacitly made that they exist in space as well as in time. I do not admit Hume's postulate, that whatever we can imagine to OF TIMK AND Sl^ACE. 117 exist separately can possibly really exist separately. pakt i. Whatever we imagine to exist separately does actu- -^— ' ally exist separately in the way in which we imagine Timeand'space • , • • j_' i 1 • • It , as pure objects. it ; now we imagme tmie to be provisionally separate from space ; it is therefore provisionally separate from space ; I do not grant that because we can provision- ally separate them, they can exist actually separate. This postulate rests on the theory of two substances, of the object and its evidence in the mind, which I renounce. My imagining two things separate is taken for evidence of their being possibly separate in a world of absolute existences. No. My imagining two things separate is their being separate, so far as I can and do imagine them to be so. And this I admit to be the case with time and space, namely, that I can represent time to myself in a provisional image independent of space, space in a provisional image independent of time except the time occupied in representing it, and feeling in a provisional image independent of either or both, except the time occu- pied in representing it; consequently, that the pro- visional image of space includes, as its provisionally present elements, time and feeling ; but that time may be represented in a provisional image of which feeling is a provisional element, but space only a pro- visional accompaniment. Feelings in time are never presented or represented separate from the provisional accompaniment of space ; though this may be owing to their constant association by the simultaneous ex- ercise of the diflferent senses, or to some laws of nature which are the objective aspect of that association. Consciousness has two formal modes, time and space, different but inseparable and simultaneous ; the two senses which reveal space, sight and touch, exist 118 THE If ATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. simultaneously with those which reveal time by itself; -^' hence their inseparability in any way except provi- Timeand'spaoe sionally; and hence the difference in the modes of aspureojecs. g^jy^gg^^Q^ between them, ndmely, that in all time there is involved space as its accompaniment, in all space there is involved time as its element. Now as to the necessity of time and space, it is not said that they are necessary per se, or objectively, but that they are necessary to our consciousness, or subjectively. Universality, or presence in all objects without exception, is necessity subjectively, or in consciousness; they are two sides or aspects of the same phenomenon. Necessity, if used in an objective sense, can only be a conditioned necessity; for in- stance, if it rains, the earth wiU be wet; the earth wUl not necessarily be wet unless on the supposition that it rains. So in time and space objectively, if I say, all exis1;ence is necessarily existence in time and space, you directly ask me why ? that is, under what condition I assert that it is so. Now universality cannot have an objective condition, for then it would not be universality. There is then no objective con- dition of this universal fact ; and its necessity consists only in the knowledge of the fact, that is, it is its subjective aspect. It is sometimes held that time and space are merely generalisations from experience. AU abstract and general cognitions may be generalised from expe- rience, and as those of time and space are general and abstract in the highest degree, they also may be generalised in the same way. But this property, which they possess in common with other general and abstract cognitions, does not prove that they do not possess other properties which are peculiar to OJi' TIME AND SPACE. 119 themselves, and which distiii2:uish them from others. part i. Ch II And in point of fact they do possess such a property, -^— ' namely, that they alone of all abstract and general Timeand'spaoe cognitions cannot be annihilated in or banished from thought. It may be said that, after all, this is only apparently impossible because it never is so ; and that the fact of its never being so, however strict that never may be, however much we may try to banish them and fail, is after all only an empirical impossi- hihtj ; that it rests on a fact in the constitution of the universe which might be otherwise ; that in short in order to show necessity we must do more than' show empirical, contingent, universality ; we must show the cause of that universality. But this is to take necessity in an objective sense, whereas I am arguing for it in a subjective sense, that is, as con- sisting not in being the cause of universality, but in being the subjective aspect of universality itself. A cause of universality is a contradictory notion, for universality, ex vi termini, must include its cause, which is absurd. But universality may be perceived, or imagmed, or assumed, and in any of these ways it is subjective, and as such called necessity. That the ultimate standard of any truth is the in- conceivability of its negative has been conclusively shown, in my opinion, by Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his Principles of Psychology, Part i. § 6, 7. Objects are only given to us in consciousness, and what we can- not avoid being conscious of we call necessary. Whatever this world of existence may be or include besides, we have a starting-point for our knowledge of it, namely, the cognitions of time and space as the formal element in which all feeling exists ; we know it only as the object of our consciousness, and we are 120 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS paeti. unable to present or represent any object or any -^— ' feeling to our consciousness except under these forms. Timeand'space In Other words, time and space are necessary not be- cause we know the causes which produce them, not because they depend on an innate or supersensual constitution of the mind or soul, but solely because their negation is inconceivable. It is the moment of consciousness which is decisive for itself and while it lasts. The effort to escape from these forms of con- sciousness is convincing to any man of their necessity to him at that moment at any rate. Every such •effort only rivets them faster, for it supplies an in- stance of doing against your will the very thing which you labour not to do. You are trying to miss a mark which you are under an absolute com- pulsion to hit. So long as this is the case, so long- must the marksman regard his mark as necessary. The view here taken rests on no theory of the ob- jective constitution of the mind. Every theory which regards the mind and its forms of thought as objective existences, cannot attribute necessity, in the present sense, to either of them as such. The argument for the necessity of time and space can receive no support from any such theory ; and on the other hand it cannot be weakened by any such theory, by any explanation relating to their origin or condi- tions of existence, such as will be found in the fol- lowing chapter. What time and space as cognitions, or as forms of feeling, are, is a question to be kept entirely distinct from the question as to how we, or minds involved in bodies, come, by them. Their nature, value, and importance to consciousness alone, are distinct from their history. It is quite true that this subjective necessity is an GF TIME AND SPACE. 121 empirical fact, and it may appear to some that all parti. cognitions which come from experience, that is, all -^—' empirical facts, are matters of fact only, and never TimeandSpaoe contain in themselves necessity or a cognition that they must be as they are, as well as that they are so ; and that therefore this subjective necessity is one in appearance only. But the appearance is in this case the reality. It is not an inference from the pheno- menon, but an inseparable aspect of the phenome- non itself. It is to the empirical evidence of the necessity of time and space that appeal is made, to the fact in every one's experience that time and space are irremovable from consciousness, either in imagina- tion or actual inspection of objects. Let any one try to think at all, and all liis thoughts wiU presuppose them; or starting intentionally from within them he will find himself unable to transcend or go beyond them. The negation of every other object is con- ceivable, only not of these ; for what is negation itself but the removing an object in imagination out of time and space? Consciousness is feeling in the forms of time and space. Taking now time and space as separate objects, in which the material element is provisionally pre- sent, the following definitions of them, or analyses of them in their first intention, arise ; part of which de- finitions has been proved by what has already been said, and part remains still to be proved in what follows. Time and Space as such objects are called the pure object. Time. Time has one dimension — length. It is infinitely divisible in thought; it is infinitely exten- sible in thought. It admits of no minimum in divi- sion, and of no maximum in extension. For these 122 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. reasons it contains every thing ; nothing is short -^-" enough to slip through it, nothing long enough to TimeandSpace outruu it. It is ouB in nature, for all its parts are aspureojecs. ^^^^ i]j^Q_ Jt is incoHipressible, for no single part can be anmhilated.'. Space. Space has three dimensions, — length, breadth, and depth. It is infinitely divisible in thought; it is infinitely extensible in thought. It admits of no minimum in division, and of no maxi- mum in extension. For these reasons it contains every thing ; nothing is small enough to slip through it, nothing is great enough to outstand it. It is one in nature, for all its parts are still space. It is in- compressible, for no single part can be annihilated. We thus obtain such a datum as is required by Mr. Spencer in his Principles of Psychology, Part i. chap. I, 2. as the beginning of all philosophy; a datum within the limits of consciousness, a belief or a cognition. The characteristic, or second intention, of such a datum, namely, that it must be an itnme- diate ineradicable belief, does not give the datum itself in. its first intention, does not tell us what the datum is. Belief is no datum, but the characteristic of certain classes of data. Feeling, the material ele- ment in consciousness, though a necessary and uni- versal element, and ineradicably certain, offers no criterion for distinguishing one phenomenon from another, for it is the same in all phenomena alike ; it is impossible to say what it is in its first intention. Time and space alone unite the properties of being immediately and ineradicably certain, of being uni- versally present in all phenomena, of being knowable in their first intention and defined as what they are, and of being in nature the same, in all objects however OF TIJIE AND SPACE. 123 different. They thus become the common basis or pahti. Ch II bond of union between all other cognitions, and as such — ' the starting-point and corner-stone of philosophy. Timeand'spaoe The importance to philosophy of having some ''^p"''®" ^^''^• necessary truth as its corner-stone, — ^whether innate or connate is indifferent, so long as it is necessary, — consists in this, but without such a truth there would be no criterion of reasoning, phenomena of presenta- tive perception would alone be true, and no inference from them would be valid; all reasoning would be hypothetical and tentative, and entered on, as the Sceptics said, a5o|a(rr»j, that is, without entertaining an opinion as to its truth, but only as to its utility or its convenience. Scepticism would in that case be the only philosophy possible; and the only solution of problems the unphUosophical one of Solvitur am- bulando. If now there were no such necessary truth discoverable, the only philosophical course, however much against the grain, would clearly be to admit the fact, and to live and reason under protest, uho^uffTSg, as the Sceptics said. It would be impossible in that case to reject the argument of the Sceptics as to our ignorance of any criterion of truth ; for, according to that well-known argument, a criterion is requisite before we can prove anything, and proof is requisite before we can admit a criterion. Sextus Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. hb. II. cap. 3, 4. It is clear that reasoning goes on equally under both suppositions, the Sceptics rea- son equally with those who hold the doctrine of ne- cessaty truth ; but the nature and therefore the value of this process of reasoning is the point in question. Only if reasoning contains a necessary element can it be distinguished from other processes of which we are conscious, for only then can it contain truth. 124 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. Without such an element, the process of reasoning — r contains no more truth than the process of walking TimeandSpace or of eating. With such an element, it is the process as pure objects. . .. . ^^ .,, 01 acqun-mg true and systematic knowledge. All men reason; the question is, what is the nature of that process which aU alike perform, and of the re- sults which aU alike reach. It will be my endeavour to show, and to show by analysis, that this process and its results, whatever they may be, do as a fact contain a necessary element, and the same necessary element which is contained in the process of presen- tative perception and in the simplest instances of con- sciousness. No one, not even the Sceptic, doubts the reality of a phenomenon, while it is a phenome- non. The Sceptic doubts not its reality but its truth ; he doubts that its nature can be discovered, because he doubts that its nature is perceived. But its nature is perceived ; in every phenomenon is perceived its formal and its material element ; and the same formal element is perceived in every phenomenon, namely, its timie and its space. The criterion and its proof, instead of moving in a vicious circle, coincide ; instead of presupposing each other as a condition, they are given at once in one cognition; both characters are borne at once both by time and by space. Neither the formal nor the material element need any demon- stration, for they together constitute the phenomenon. But the formal element, as being the same in all phe- nomena, is the source of their truth, the starting- point of all demonstration. The criterion therefore, which the Sceptics require to be proved, is as certain as the phenomena to which it is to be applied, and about which the Sceptics do not doubt. See Sextus Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. lib. il. cap. 9. st lari n (plasi aKij^ig. OF TIME AND SPACE. 125 § 16. The most important feature in time and parti. space is their divisibility without residuum, or their ^— ' exhaustive divisibility. It will be seen in the second The exhaustive Part that on this property depends the whole of logic tinS andspace. and the postulates. Divisions are introduced into pure continuous time and space by the material ele- ment in cognition; where one sensation ends, another begins; where one colour for instance ends, or where one sound ends, another begins; and in emotions, when we cease to be affected by one feeling, we begin to be affected by another. There is nothing intermediate between the two sensations or feelings. " Wherever we are conscious of a difference in feeling, whether it is between colours on a surface, or between feeling resistance to touch and ceasing to feel it, or between the presence and absence of any feeling, there time and space are divided. Now between two such states of consciousness we are accustomed to speak as if a line of division existed, or as if a point of time intervened, which lines or points were them- selves portions of space or of time. By using this language we render ourselves liable to one of two opposite errors, and lay ourselves open to one of two opposite objections. Either this line in space and this point in time are conceived as occupying space and time, and then they become themselves subject to be divided again, in conformity to Aristotle's prin- ciple, Nat. Ausc. lib. vi. cap. i. § 3. wai' avvBxh ^ixigs- rov sig uil iiaigsToi, and then we have only added to the portions of time and space which need to be divided, and have not really divided them at all ; or the line is conceived as length without breadth, and the point is conceived as containing no quantity of time, and both thus become unreal, inasmuch as they are inconceiv- 126 THE NATUEE OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. able as separate objects of consciousness. If we choose — to adopt the terms point, line, surface, as divisions of Theexhaiistive space, and the term point, or present moment, as a time and space, division of time, WB must bear in mind, while we do so, that these terms are names not of objects but of operations, of events, the result of which they ex- press ; that they have no Separate existence, but are modes of representing the fact of a division in con- sciousness; the instantaneous change in the current of our consciousness, and of which we are conscious, is rendered plain to us under the figure of a visual line or point of demarcation, — a line or point which cannot be an object of consciousness, except the two* objects which it divides are present in consciousness, when it exists as a modification, part, or element, of that whole divided object. Space, metaphysically considered, has nothing to do with the geometrical abstractions of points, lines, and surfaces. As these terms are used in geometry they are abstractions, or qualities on which the at- tention is fixed to the exclusion of other qualities which are equally essential to the nature of the ob- ject common to both, ' A point has no parts and no magnitude,' that is, we attend to its position alone. 'A line is length without breadth,' that is, we at- tend to its length alone. ' A surface has length and breadth alone,' that is, we abstract from its depth. These are concepts, or, as I prefer to call them at present, provisional images, of objects of perception, formed by abstraction for certain scientific purposes. If now we speak of space beings divided by points, lines, and surfaces, meaning such abstractions as just described, we lay ourselves open to misunderstand- ing, either as if we asserted space to be divided by OF TIME AND SPACE. 127 objects which, as having no separate objective exist- Part i. ence, but being abstractions formed for the con- y— ' venience of geometers, are unreal ; or as if we took The exhaustive actual empirically known portions of space, which time and space, are themselves liable to division, such as actually visible points, lines, and surfaces with some depth, as the means of dividing space without a residuum. But metaphysical divisions are real objects ; never- theless not separable from the objects, or the two parts of the object, which they divide, but are as inseparable in consciousness from the divided object as the material and formal elements themselves are. Mathematically points, lines, and surfaces are treated by themselves as provisional images ; but metaphysi- cally no division exists, even in thought, apart from the objects or object divided by it. How then comes mathematic to be able to treat the divisions apart? It is because it starts, not from the metaphysical divisions, but from visual or tangible lines or divi- sions; or supposing it to start from the metaphysi- cal divisions, it begins by imagining these, the points, lines, and surfaces, to be separate empirical objects, and then abstracts from them respectively length, breadth, and depth, still treating them as separate but provisional objects ; for this is the special pur- pose which mathematic has in view, namely, to as- certain the possible modes of dividing pure space and time, and the relations and laws of relation of their parts or quanta. Not only in its method, which is abstraction from assumed empirical objects, but also in its purpose or scope, mathematic is a special and conditioned science, in the same sense, . though not in the same degree, as other special sciences are, as political economy for instance. Metaphysic points 128 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS pabtI. out what this condition is, namely, that the divi- -i_" sions, points, lines, and surfaces, are hypostasised by TheeWnstive mathcmatic, that is, made into or treated as if they timeand'spMe. werc empirical objects, from -which abstraction of length, breadth, and depth could be made. The di- visions in mathematic and metaphysic are the same ultimately ; that is, are inseparable from the objects which they divide ; but the difference is, that, while in metaphysic they bear this character all along, from beginning to end of its procedure (for the scope of metaphysic is to examine what they really are), in mathematic they reach it only by abstraction of pro- perties which have been attributed to them by mathe- matic itself for its own purposes ; mathematic first imagines that its divisions have a separate, empirical existence, and then abstracts from them portions or elements of this existence ; it first makes them con- crete, and then makes them abstract, in order to in- vestigate how space and time may be divided, and the relations which its divided parts bear to each other. Space metaphysically considered is not divided by points, lines, and surfaces at all, understand the terms as we wUl, either as geometrical abstractions, or as empirical visible or tangible objects. When two sen- sations limit each other in consciousness, when we are conscious ■ of a change in sensation, space is al- ready divided ; and if a line of demarcation is per- ceived, it is as the result of the process and not as the condition of it; that is, the objects on both sides of the demarcation are perceived before the demarca- tion, itself. The same is the case with sensations in time. The change from one sensation to another is instantaneous, and the moment in which it takes OF TIME AND SPACE. 129 place is empirically indivisible. Even when there is pakt i. a series of changes, each so slight that we cannot -^' name, can hardly even perceive it, even then the The exhaustive moment when we do perceive each change in the tii^ and space. series is indivisible. There is no time occupied in the passage, for we are conscious all the time, and are conscious of none. Hence the division is ex- haustive, without residuum. Time is bisected in a moment, no time elapsing between the two segments. The indivisibility of the moment of division, change, or transition, in consciousness, is the fact which con- stitutes or necessitates the indivisibility of the point or line of demarcation in objects, considered as such, both in time and space. We have nothing to do with the points, lines, and surfaces of geometry, and are clear of all such controversies as whether these are portions of space or not ; whether solids consist of, or are divisible into, or are formed by the motion of surfaces ; whether surfaces hold similar relations to lines, and lines to points ; and whether points, lines, and surfaces exist really as they are geometri- cally conceived to exist ; and clear also of the cor- responding questions about time, such as whether time is composed of present moments, ra vSi/, and how long such a present moment is to be conceived to last. It is enough for the metaphysician, that experience shows that, by means of the material ele- ment in consciousness, divisions are introduced into time and space, divisions which occupy no portion of time and space, except as belonging to the portions which they divide, and which therefore cannot be again divided. These divisions are not objects by themselves, either empirical or provisional ; they are not portions of time and space ; they cannot be pre- K 130 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS parti. sented to consciousness alone, apart from the sen- Ch. II ' r — ' sations of which they are divisions ; but they inhere § 16. . . ... ... Theexhaustive ui sensatious ; they are dividings not divisions, modes time and space, of sensation, acts of consciousness, which do not be- come independent objects because we afterwards ex- press them by empirical extended signs, as lines and points. Did these acts occupy an empirical moment of time, we should be conscious of them during the transition ; but this is not the case ; we are conscious only of the change when it has happened, and when the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quern are visible at once. Empirically speaking and with re- ference to the minima of consciousness in time and space, it is true to say ^s^oihxiv ov ^ochiZpv for as an empirical moment of time the moment of transit is indivisible. The moment that we fix our attention on the division itself, that moment we erect it into an object, and must conceive or imagine it as occupying time and space, and not merely as dividing them ; but this need not, and cannot, be as occupying time and space by itself, but together with the feelings on each side of it, between which it is the limit. This is a second step ; we have the division completed before we need to take this step, and we need to take the step at all only in the interest of the geometer or mathematician or logician, not in that of the metaphysician untU he becomes a logician. The consideration of divisions as instrumenta divisionis of time and space, as objects expressed by points, lines, and surfaces, belongs to the mathematician ; that of time and space themselves and their division in consciousness, apart from the mode in which that division is expressed, is the busi- ness of the metaphysician. or TIME AND SPACE. 131 When Aristotle says, Every continuous quantity, pam i. whether of .time, space, or motion, is divisible into -^— ' portions which are again divisible into other portions, The exhaustive and so on for ever, he assumes the fact of divisibility time and space, without a residuum in the sense in which it is here intended ; by the division of a continuous quantity he means its division into two or more portions which are exhaustive of the whole, without waste, so to speak, in the section. This divisibility arises from the changes in sensation, in the objects of perception, time and space being united with a material element in cognition ; and its being done without waste or residuum is due to no other cause than- this, that the change of which we are conscious from one sensation to another occupies not two moments of conscious- ness, but one, a moment, as we call it, empirically indi- visible, no moment intervening between the two sen- sations which is occupied by neither of them. It is true that there may appear to intervene a mixture of two sensations; but this is in cases where we see less instead of more clearly. And then the mixed sensa- tion is to be itself again distinguished from its two simple sensations, so that there will be two moments of change and transition instead of one, and three objects divided from each other instead of two. If blue and yellow run into each other on a coloured surface, the green which appears between them may occupy space, but there will be three portions of space to be distinguished instead of two ; we gain nothing by removing the question a step farther. The point to be observed is, that there is no intermediate space, which is neither blue nor yellow nor green. This fact in consciousness I name the divisibility of time and space exhaustively, or without a residuum. 132 THE NATXIRE OF THE COGNITIONS Paeti. S 17. It remains to consider the infinity of time Ch. II ^^- ' and space. Infinity no less than necessity when pre- The infinity of dickted of time and space is a relative term, that is, time and space. tit, . t , i • , • i applicable to consciousness only, or to objects m rela- tion to a Subject. Those two objects, in or under which we perceive all other objects, are themselves objects of consciousness and have no absolute cha- racter. As such objects they are infinite, that is, they cannot be transcended by consciousness, but must always be before the mind when it is conscious. Consequently they cannot be seen or thought of as complete wholes. It is this character of time and space which is marked by the word Infinite. Aristotle, who seems to have tried to eliminate the infinite, to aTsigoii, from philosophy as far as he could, is yet constrained to admit that it leads to con- tradictions to deny the infinite in all senses of the term. In the Nat. Ausc. book in. ch. 6, he says: "On S' s'i f/j'!] lariv cLtu^ov mTKSg TokXa, abvvuTu avf/j- (iocmi, S^Xov Tou re yug "x^ovov 'itrrcti rig ccg^^ xu) re- Ksvrrj, xmi ra fjusyidri ou haigira, sig fAsys^^j, xai u§i^[JiOg oiiK 'isrcct UTTSigog. "Oruv Ss tiupc^'ivm ovrug [JUfjbirsgag (pocivriTaf hViy^ia'^ai^ haiT)jTOv SsT, xal ^fjXoi) on -jrSig ^ih 'iart, -TTug I' ov. The umpire which he needs he finds in his ruling distinction of 'bvvu^ig and ivrsX£;^e;a. But this is vague to modem minds, and requires interpre- tation ; and moreover Aristotle does not follow it to the full extent of its guiding power, for he will not allow an uxugov xccra, Tgoff^eaiv in space to exist even IvmiJbii. But it is a weighty support to the view taken in this Essay, that the infinity of time and that of space, i^eyi'^}], in some sense, is placed by Aristotle among the facts to be explained by any true theory of these matters. OF TIME AND SPACE. 133 But even against the relative infinity which is parti. here maintained as appertaining to time and space -'— ' there are arguments brought forward, apparently con- The infinity of !• ii-11- 11, ,1 ■ time and space. elusive, arguments which brmg us back to the posi- tion of Aristotle in search of an umpire, for they seem to show that the conception of an infinite in any sense is an impossible one, that is, that it involves contra- dictions ; and consequently that we can think neither of time nor of space nor of any other nameable object whatever as infinite. The relative infinity here maintained has two modes in space and two in time ; that is, time is infi- nite in extension, Kara, 'ir^oa'hisiv^ and in division, Tcara hcitgtffiii, and space the same; in other words, time and space cannot be di"^dded so far that they are not divisible farther, nor extended so far that they are not extensible farther; and must be so represented in thought. Now it is these assertions which are on the other side alleged to contain, implicitly, contra- dictions; and since it is asserted at the same time that the opposite view to this, the view namely that time and space are finite, that is, that in division and extension a point can be reached beyond which we can neither divide nor extend farther, is also one which involves contradictions ; and that, since by the logical laws of contradiction and excluded middle one of these views must be false, and the other, its contradictory, must be true, while both as involving contradictions can be shown, as is alleged, to be false, the mind in its consciousness is thrown into contra- dictions with itself from which there is apparently no escape. But it is the business of philosophy to recon- cile apparent contradictions, not to acquiesce in them. Contradictions unsolved are the stronghold of scepti- 134 THE NATURE OE THE COGNITIONS paet I. cism, and that class of contradictions now under dis- -'- - ■ cussion was the stronghold of the philosophical sect The infinity of of Sceptics in Greece, contradictions which were not imean space, g^-^^g^ -^^^ Overridden by Neo-Platonism. Kant at- tempted their solution in the Antinomies of Pure Reason; and Hegel took them up and incorporated them in his logical system, which renders his system the most profound and complete system of Ontology which has ever been proposed; but it is unsatisfac- tory, not because it incorporates and therefore solves these contradictions, but because it does so only by recourse to Ontology. He maintains that Contradic- tion is the ultimate essence and the ultimate law of all things, of the universe and aU its parts from the greatest to the least, thus bringing aU things indeed to the same level, but not by bringing the contradic- tory up to the level of the non-contradictory, but by bringing the non-contradictory down to the level of the contradictory; and this is only possible by trans- forming logical and relative notions into absolute entities, that is, by making the assumption that me- taphysic is a science of the Absolute, that is, an Ontology. Ontology is like an attempt to leap off from one's own shadow; it attempts to predicate a second intention of the Sum of things as such; as if the Sum of things could, as such, be related to any- thing else in consciousness, and as if it must not always be related to consciousness itself; reflect on this relation, of the Sum of things to consciousness, ' and then that consciousness is included in the Sum of things, and the consciousness which reflects on both together takes the place of that consciousness now included in the Sum of things ; repeat the process for ever, and nothing further comes out of it; never is an OF TIME AND SPACE. 135 Absolute reached, or a Sum of things represented not part i. as an object of consciousness : a fortiori therefore the — — ' . S 17 Sum of things cannot have a second intention out of The infinity of -I ■ j^ J ■ 1 ■ 1 ■ ; 1 tiii>B and space. consciousness ; any second intention which it can have must be an aspect, or a differentiation, of itself in con- sciousness. I argue therefore that, if the universe is in its essence, or in one of its aspects, a contradiction, this is either to render it unintelligible, taken as a metaphysical explanation; or else it is to be taken as an ontological explanation, and then it rests on a mis- conception of what is possible. Consequently we can neither rest in contradictions remaining unsolved, nor acquiesce in Hegel's solution of them. The mode, in which I propose to solve the appa- rent contradictions involved in the infinity and the finity of time and space, is to show first, that their infinity does not involve contradictions, and secondly, that this infinity is not contradictory to their finity, though there is a sense in which their finity is true ; but that their finity and infinity are not predicated of them secundum idem, or from the same point of view. Now to instance in the extensibility of space, one of the four modes of infinity mentioned above, which I take as an example fairly representative of the other three, and as involving the rest in its fate. Mr. Mansel quotes from Werenfels such a proof as is men- tioned above of the non-infinity of space in the notes to his Bampton Lectures for 1858. Lect. 2. note 15. p. 301. 3d edit. Videtis banc lineam ^ «- ° . Constituamus earn esse infinitam, et ultra terminos b et c in infini- tum protendi. Dividatur hsec linea in puncto a. Manifestum est has partes inter se esse aequales ; quia utraque incipit in puncto a, et protenditur in infini- 136 THE NATURE OE THE COGNITIONS Part I. tum. Nunc te, Daedale, togo; hse duse partes sunt- ^^' ne finitas an infinitse? D. Finitse. Ph. Ita ex duobus TheMnityof finitis componeretur infinitum; quod repugnat. D. timea^dspa^e. j,^^^^^ errorem. Infinitse sunt. PH. Jam in Scyl- lamincidis: ita partes essent sequales toti; infimtum enim infinite sequale est. Praeterea vides utramque partem ia puncto a terminari; non igitur finibus et terminis caret. The argument proceeds farther, but rests always on the same principles which are here involved; and as I am not going to allege either the objection sup- posed by Werenfels, nor with Spinoza and Clarke that infinite quantity is not composed of parts, at least as an escape from this reasoning, I need not quote the rest of the passage. I agree with the re- mark quoted in the same note from Clarke, that infi- nites are not equals ; and for the answer to this rea- soning I look to the distinction between voluntary and involuntary modes of consciousness, which I hold to be the ground of the distinction between conceiv- ing and imagining, a concept being an imagination or a perception seized and limited by volition, as will be more fully drawn out in a following chapter. AioiiTi^Tov hJ. 1 find that umpire in the distinc- tion between voluntary and involuntary, logical and intuitive, processes, between perception, representa- tion, imagination, and these limited by volition. The strength of the argument quoted above lies in a covert passing over from one mode to the other, in substi- tuting a definition for an intuition and in substituting a wrong definition, or in including in the object de- fined what was not included in it as perceived. What is the meaning of Infinity as maintatned above in this Essay? It is, that space, in this case the line be. OF TIME AND SPACE. 137 cannot be so far extended in either direction as to be Part i. incapable of further extension. A fortiori, its limit ^-' cannot be assigned. But an assigned limit is requi- The infinity of site in order to compare it, as to its length, with ™'^'" ^^^^" another line, or to compare the two lines ab, ac, toge- ther, and to assert, Manifestum est has partes inter se esse asquales. They are not known as equals until a limit has been assigned to them, besides the common limit in the point a. This assumption of equaUty therefore violates the hypothesis. Ultra ter- minos b et c in infinitum protendi. But it may be said, Are not two infinites equal though we do not know their limits ? I answer that they are not, untU the objects to which the name is applied in each in- stance are compared. Thus there is substituted for the object of perception named infinite, that is, an object of which we can never see the whole, a defined object, of which, solely because it is defined, we are supposed to see the whole. The objects, the two lines extended from the point a, are not equal, but they have one property in common, that of being greater than we can present to ourselves in conscious- ness; they are equal not qu^tenus objects, but qu^- tenus infinite ; their infinity is equal, not their length ; but the question is not about the length of their in- finity, but about the infinity of their length ; and about this, whether it exists at aU. The definition of both from the same point of view, the logical cate- gory or genus under which they fall, that of infi- nites, is the same; but the objects are not the same, nor is their extent the same. If the matter of the comparison, instead of being the same, as two lines or two spaces, had been different, as for instance a line of time and a line of space, or a line and a surface, or 138 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Parti. a line and a solid, the fallacy would be seen in a -^~ moment. But the case is really the same, when two The infinity of objects of the Same kind, as when two objects of dif- time and space. „ .i-t tt.i to} lerent kmds are compared. It makes no diirerence at all whether the two objects compared together faU alike under one or two or more definitions of kind. It is as objects that they are compared together, dif- ferent in numero, and, in this case of the infinite hnes, in order to see whether they are equal, or with refer- ence to their equality in point of extent; and that they are both to be defined as infinite does not show that they are, but in fact precludes their being, de- fined as equal. And this appears to be Clarke's argument, or part of it. Let us fix our attention on the facts as perceived. It is perfectly true that in making infinite space, or infinite time, a distinct object of consciousness, we are compelled to introduce a limit into them. To become a distinct object is to become subject to limitation. The object space, limited by conscious- ness, is not infinite so far as it is included within those limits set by consciousness, but the conscious- ness of space is extensible ad infinitum, we can go on being conscious of further and further portions of limited space without ever reaching a limit not set by ourselves, by weariness in exertion of conscious- ness ; and all these further portions of space are still space in kind, each portion is limited only by another of the same nature. Here we have an infinite series of limited, finite, portions of space ; but now comes out another fact in the production of this series. Wherever we are compelled to draw our line and stop, we perceive time and space beyond, which we resolve not to present in detail or as a distinct object OF TIME ANU SPACE. 139 to consciousness. It was shown in the preceding sec- part i. 1 T • 1 • 1 1 f- CH. II. tion, that a limit cannot be set without the objects — on both sides of it being perceived. Thus before a The infinity of limit is set to space, the unlimited space beyond it is perceived as well as the limited space within it. The object, infinite space, is space hmited on one side of the last limit, and unlimited on the other side of it. If we stopped at the last limit, then it would be only the series of finite portions of space which was infinite, while the whole would be composed of finite portions ; then space would be infinite indeed potentially but finite actually ; there would be no contradiction, but space as finite would be the ob- ject of presentative perception, whUe space as in- finite would be a mere potentiality. But as it is, a Hmit is not a thing which it is possible to stop at ; a space beyond is perceived before the Hmit is perceived and while the limit is perceived ; the limit is introduced into space, and does not confine space but a part of space only.* Thus space as infinite is an object of presentative perception. This is what is meant by the infinite extensibility of space, and it is a fact of perception. And this fact is not impugned, though often supposed to be so, by the proof that none of the portions of space which have become distinct objects of consciousness, nor all of them taken together, are infinite. It may put the matter in. a clearer light, and ex- hibit the ground of the false appearance of contra- diction between the two impossibilities, of regarding space and time as finite on the one hand and infinite on the other, to state the case thus. We cannot im- agine time and space as finite. Why? Because our consciousness is limited in its nature, time and space 140 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. being its modes. We cannot make time and space, -^ ' as infinite, a distinct object. Why ? Because our § 17. . The infinity of cousciousness is limited in its degree of power. And time and space. ., . . . ,,... ■, ^ c. agam, keepmg m new the distmction, to be nereaiter more fully explained, between conceiving and im- agining, we must conceive time and space as finite. Why ? Because consciousness in one of its modes, namely conception, is voluntary limitation or impos- ing of a limit. We must imaigine them as infinite. Why ? Because so long as we are conscious we are conscious of time and space. Time and space are limited only by incapacity of exhausting them, that is, of continuing to be conscious of them ; and the limit imposed upon them is imposed by our vohtion. Conception is imagination limited by a voluntary ef- fort and for a certain purpose. But when an object is limited by volition, the object so limited is not the contradictory of an unlimited object, unless that ob- ject is voluntarily unlimited ; for the two objects are then not limited and unlimited secundum idem. The object time, or space, is limited and unlimited at once, and is one object, but is not limited and unlimited in the same sense, or from the same point of view. Time and space ~ as finite are concepts, that is, are limited by volition ; as such they are not contradic- tories of time and space as infinite; this would re- quire that their infinity should be imposed by voli- tion, which it is not. Time and space as finite are modes of voluntary consciousness, of consciousness adopting a purposed limitation ; as infinite they are modes of involuntary consciousness, which we can never transcend so long as we are conscious at aU. Aristotle tells us, Nat. Ausc. b. iii. cap. 6. § 7. that the Pythagoreans and others, against whom he OF TIME AND SPACE. 141 was arguing, defined the infinite, to aTsigov, as that paet i. ov ^rilh s^m 'iffTi. He himself, starting from the con- -— ' templation of the infinite xutu iiuigiam^ defines it as The infinity of that oS as/ ri 'i^u hrt. But though neither defini- ™ ™ ^^^°^' tion is adequate or correct taken alone, yet taken together they are applicable to both modes of the infinite in time, and to both in space. Thus the true definition of the infinite is Quod nihil ultra se habet praster se ipsum. Time is never limited except by time ; space never except by space ; but both are limited by themselves always. Thus Hegel says, Logik, Book i. Abschnitt i. p. 136, Werke, vol. 3. Darin selbst, dass etwas als Schranke bestimmt ist, dariiber bereits hinausgegangen ist. That is, all limi- tation involves an outside as well as an inside. This fact is nothing else but the fact of the infinity of intuition or imagination in time and space. The problem of the infinity of time and space has been thrown into a complete shape in our days by Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Mansel ; and it must be remembered that prudens qusestio dimidium scientise est. The question is not simply. Is there an infinite in time and space or is there not ? But it is : The infinite is impossible, therefore its contradictory only exists, namely the finite ; yet the finite is impossible, therefore its contradictory only exists, namely the infinite ; reconcile these reverberated contradictions. The way which has been taken here seems to off"er a satisfactory solution of this problem, for it has shown on the one hand, that there is not only negative but positive ground for affirming the infinite in one sense ; and not only negative but positive ground for affirm- ing the finite in another sense ; and on the other hand, that the infinite in the sense in which it is af- 142 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Pabt I. firmed is not open to the charge of involving contra- ^" dictions (for the infinite is not a concept but a per- The infinity of cept), and thus necessitating the substitution of the uneam space. £j^^g . ^^^ ^-j^^^ ^j^g finite also in the sense in which it is affirmed is equally secure from the same charge, and thus necessitating the substitution of the infinite. In other words, it has been shown that the finite and the infinite are not contradictories, but products of consciousness in two separate parts of its domain or in two separate functions. But now, if it is admitted that the apparent -con- tradiction, involved first in each view taken separately, and secondly and consequently in the two views taken together, has been dissolved, and that time and space are shown to be in one sense finite, and in another infinite, a further question arises, which is this : Of the two attributes finite and infinite, resting ea,ch on its own ground and predicated from its own point of view, which is the most • essential, the most funda- mental, expressing best the nature of time and space ; or, what comes to the same thing, which point of view is the most commanding, which is that to which the other is subordinate? There can be but one answer. It is that point of view which keeps equally in sight both object and subject. Time and space when they are treated as objects only, their subjec- tive character being lost sight of for the moment, when they are considered as having already become objects of consciousness, are then regarded as finite. The point of view from which they are called finite, is that from which they are regarded as objects of cognition only. That from which they are called infinite is one from which the moment of their passing into consciousness is seized and fixed on, in which OF TIME AND SPACE. 143 their relation to consciousness in the very act of our paet i. Ch II being conscious of them is weighed and described. -^~' This point of view therefore, which keeps their sub- The infinity of jective and objective character equally in sight, is that which is decisive of their ultimate or innermost cha- racter, and that to which the other point of view is subordinate. The finite character of time and space is subordinate to their infinite character. Subordinate not contradictory, since the two cha- racters are not predicated frOm the same point of view, as has been shown. The nature of our consciousness in presence of objects compels us to think of time and space as limited by nothing but themselves, and as always limited by themselves. Our incapacity to exhaust them is their infinity. But every step we make towards exhausting them is a limitation, all that we can distinctly include within our ken is finite. Nor is there any contradiction here to what has been said above, that the limitation of the degree of our power is the cause why we cannot present them to our conception as infinite. To conceive them as in- finite would involve a contradiction. But though this cannot be done, yet it will be seen in the last chapter of this Essay, that we can imagine or repre- sent it as done, represent it as an actual conception. There will then arise, not a conception of the infinite, but a conception of such a conception, a represented conception ; and such represented, or anticipated, con- ceptions of the infinite are called Ideas. CHAPTER III. PSYCHOLOGICAL. THE OEIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS OF TIME AND SPACE. ey /lev Tt feveaai ^dvrwv, ttjv Se ovalav erepov eu. Plato. ch^iii § 18- Here we leave that central point of view which 7^ embraces at once subject and object, and pass over psychology. The object of jjj-(;q ^q obiective kiQa;dom, that of obiects as such Dsvcholosrv. '> o ' j and their connections between themselves. We make abstraction of the principimn cognoscendi, and consider only the principium existendi. Cognitions themselves are existences, for they are objects; the evidence of their existence is our consciousness. If what has been said iii the preceding chapter of the nature and value of the two cognitions, time and space, as the starting-point of aU philosophical ana- lysis, and the ens unum in multis in aU cognitions, is admitted, it is of secondary importance what theory is held as to their origin in the mind. The objective kingdom is the kingdom of empiri- cal, that is, complete objects, as opposed to elements of objects, or members of analysis of objects, which have become objects only in conjunction with each other. Such elements of objects can never be re- garded as causes or the cause of the objects of which they are elements ; for in the first place all the ele- OF TIME AND SPACE. 145 ments of the object give and receive meaning and pami. existence from each other first in combination, and ■^— ' 8 18 in this same combination the object also which they The object of compose first exists; the object and its elements are ^^^ simultaneous in existence, and not one precedent, the other subsequent; and in the second place, were the elements regarded as existing first and separately, a further cause would have to be sought, a cause of their being brought into conjunction in the object. All causation, aU. history, must accordingly be dis- tinguished from metaphysical analysis, and. must be conceived as obtaining between empirical or complete objects, considered as former and latter in point of time. The result of the analysis in the preceding chapter was, that every instance of consciousness contained two elements, formal and material, that is, some par- ticular feeling in some particular time and some par- ticular space; which is equivalent to saying, that every object of consciousness contained two elements, formal and material, that is, some particular quality in some particular time and some particular space; for that which is feeling from the subjective point of view is quality from the objective. The elements in every cognition are time, space, and feeling, and in every object are time, space, and quality. Consci- ousness is feeling in time and space ; objects are qualities in time and space. But when it is said. Consciousness generally is feeling in time and space, attention must be called to an ambiguity in the term feeling, as in all general and abstract terms. It is the same ambiguity which kept up the NominaHst and Realist controversy, and is so natural and almost unavoidable that its influence has long outlived, as it 146 THE OEIGm OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. long preceded, that controversy. When an abstract - — and general term is used, for instance roundness, is it The object of imagined by speaker or hearer to be an object itself apart from all and every particular and determinate instance of roundness, from which it is generalised? Every one will say that it is not ; but not every one will be on his guard against so employing and imagin- ing it. In the case of feeling, this abstract and gene- ral term feeling may be taken as indicating the class of all the particular and determinate feelings, without specifying any of them, or it may be taken as indi- cating feeling by itself, as a real substratum, but with- out any particular determinate feeling; it may be imagined either as having no determination, but still really existing, or as having some determination, but one not specified or expressed.' In the latter sense it may be called a provisional image, but a provisional image doubly abstract, or doubly provisional ; for first all particular modes of the formal elements of time and space are abstracted from, secondly the deter- minate feelings are abstracted from, that is, are re- tained provisionally only in the general and abstract notion expressed by the term feeling. And this is the sense in which the term will be employed here. See Hume, who refers to Berkeley, on this subject. Treatise of Human Nature, Part i. § 7. Consciousness then being feeling in time and space, the three elements being in every instance and in every object inseparable, constituting one complete, empirical, object of consciousness, it foUows that to assign the cause or invariable condition of the origin of its one element, time and space, is impossible with- out assigning also the cause or invariable condition of the origin of its other element, feeling ; and thus the psychology. OF TIME AND SPACE. 147 question as to the origin of the cognitions of time pabti. and space is bound up with the question as to the • — ' origin of consciousness itself as a whole. The Ibfeot of But again consciousness as a whole, consisting of these elements, is one aspect of the entire universe, and, since time and space its inseparable elements are infinite, is infinite also, and no question as to its origin can possibly arise. It is not therefore con- cerning consciousness as the subjective aspect of the world of qualities that the question of origin is put, but concerning the mind, the conscious life of the individual consciousness, the object of psychology, distinguished from consciousness in the former sense, in § 13, as being those feelings which are localised and circumscribed by the body, which is a particular portion of the world of qualities. The mind, or con- sciousness as inhabiting the body, is the object of which the origin and the history is sought; not the whole, but a part of the world of feelings cut off from the rest by the fact of their having always the same set of qualities as their object, whatever other quali- ties they may have for objects besides, and limited to the space occupied by that set of qualities. This objective mind is sometimes taken as if it were the whole of the subjective aspect of the universe; the object of psychology, as if it were the object of meta- physic ; and the error of so doing will become appa- rent in the course of the present enquiry, which seeks to discover the origin of the mind. In the preceding chapter the distinction was drawn between elements and aspects of phenomena, and the distinction between the two aspects of phe- nomena, the subjective and the objective, was said to be a distinction perceived by reflection. The diagram 148 THE OEIGIN OP THE COGNITIONS pakt 1 there employed to make this clear was a circle, sup- ~ — " posed to be seen from two sides by a person changing The object of his pouit of vicw from One side to the other; and this syc oogy. pgj.gQj^ symboliscd reflection. But in fact reflection arises within those very phenomena, and is one of them. It neither divides the aspects from each other, nor itself from either of them ; but distinguishes them into feelings and qualities, every phenomenon being feeling and quality at once; and for reflection both feelings and qualities are objects, but only qualities are objects for direct consciousness; for feelings are perceived by reflection as direct consciousness itself. But in the mode of reflection which is entered on in this chapter, psychological not metaphysical reflection, the object of enquiry is the mind, an object consisting partly of feelings and partly of qualities ; which latter must be included in the object, since the circumscrip- tion of the feelings is given by them ; and since the former, the feelings of the mind, are circumscribed by the latter, the body, they are divided in space from other feelings. Psychological reflection therefore may be represented as standing between the two objects of which it examines the connection, between the mind on the one side and the world of qualities outside it on the other ; the mind occupying a distinct portion of space by being placed in the body. Now any par- ticular portion of the world of feelings may have an origin and a history, conditions of existence and of development^ a place in order of time in the whole world of feelings, as well as a place in -space ; and the question of this chapter is, what are the conditions of existence, what objects, feelings or qualities, must invariably precede the appearance, of that portion' of the world of feelings known as the mind. This is the OF TIME AND SPACE. 149 sense in which alone it is legitimate to speak of the pam i. Ch. III. origin or conditions of existence of consciousness. -^— ' But since I am about to examine some classes of The object of already existing theories, and this distinction as here drawn is not recognised in them, but consciousness is treated as capable of isolation, as an object by itself, without reference to the condition of this isola- tion, namely, its inhabiting a particular portion of the world of qualities, I shall not at first insist on this point, but take consciousness in the way in which it is presented in those theories. And it will after- wards be pointed out how the want of this distinction enables theories, which are at least legitimate whUe partial and subordinate, to pass into theories of the same class which are illegitimate because put forward as complete; for instance, it will be seen how the partial and subordinate psychological theories, which refer consciousness respectively to a soul and to a brain, become theories of absolute idealism and abso- lute materialism. S 19- AU theories, possible and actual, as to the ^ §i9- ■> 'J; _ ' _ 'Three classes origin of consciousness may be divided, first, into of theories. such as place its cause in an object outside of con- sciousness, inferred to be its cause from examination of the phenomena, and such as place its cause in an object within consciousness, revealed by an analysis of consciousness itself. Another division of such theories is the division into such as are idealistic, seeking the cause of consciousness in an immaterial object or essence, and such as are materialistic, seek- ing its cause in a material object and its properties. A third division is into such as place the cause of consciousness, in an object or essence considered stati- cally, and such as place it in a movement or an ac- 150 THE ORIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. tivity, which theories may be called dynamical. AU -^ ' theories must fall, since these divisions are each of Three eiksses them exhaustivc, imdcr one alternative at least of of theories. , „ , , each oi these three pan's. Taking the first of these divisions as a basis, the theories of the other two divisions may be referred to it. Then under those theories which infer an object to be the cause of consciousness will fall those idealistic theories which assert an immaterial soul, considered as an object existing statically, and those materialistic theories which assert a material object, as the brain or nervous matter, to be the cause of consciousness, considered also statically, or as existing previous to its operation. Under those theories which hold that the cause of con- sciousness lies within consciousness, and is revealed by an analysis of consciousness, will fall those ideal- istic theories which assert an Ego, considered dyna- mically as pure or absolute activity, whatever may be the laws regulating the development of this ac- tivity ; these theories are found in the works of Fichte, ScheUing, and Hegel, among Others. There will thus be three classes of theories: first, those which infer an external immaterial object, called a Soul, to be the invariable condition or cause of con- sciousness ; secondly, those which find by analysis an internal immaterial activity, called by Fichte the Ego, by ScheUing the Reason, by Hegel the Spirit, as the cause of consciousness, this activity being also the Absolute, the cause of all things as well as of consciousness, and the sum as well as the cause of all its effects ; and thirdly, those which infer an ex- ternal material object, such as the organised body, or the brain, or nervous matter, belonging to such a OF TIME AND SPACE. 151 body, to be the cause or invariable condition of con- pakt i. . r\f> T . . , . „ , . ch. hi. sciousness. Ut course a description so briei as this — . . . ' § 19. of the different theories respecting the origin of con- Three oiassea T , 1 11 ,-,,,, pof theories. sciousness is only to be regarded as an indication oi them, not as a sufficient description. It would be impossible to do justice to them without a much more elaborate description and statement of their several views, and the ground and connection of them, than is possible here. Besides which, each of these classes of theories has assumed a different shape in the hands of every independent writer who has supported it ; and arguments which may be valid against one writer would lose their force when con- fronted with distinctions and theories invented by another writer to escape from similar arguments. I offer the present division of possible theories about the origin of consciousness as a framework to guide discussion, as the lines of latitude and longitude on the map are a framework and guide to the relative size, outline, and position of the countries over which they are thrown, to any one beginning to learn geo- graphy. It is very difficult, for instance, to deter- mine under which of these three classes the Leib- nitzian theory of the Monads should be placed. It is clear, I think, that it belongs to those theories which infer a cause, and do not reach it by ana- lysis ; but whether it is to be placed under the idealistic or materialistic branch of this class is not so clear ; for first it appears to combine in the Monad both an immaterial and a material mode of existence, the Monad is said to be a simple substance without parts, Monadologie, (i); yet it has an interior, (7); and qualities, (8). If to be a simple substance with- out parts is to be immaterial, the Monad must belong 152 THE ORIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS pabtx. to both the materialistic and idealistic branches at Ch III -^— ' once, and my classification will be so far unsuited § 19. . Three classes for the explanation of the theory. The Monads again (3) are said to be the true atoms of nature, the ele- ments of thiugs ; and (9) those Monads which have ' perception more distinct and accompanied by memory are called Souls, Although therefore the above dis- tinctions' can be applied to all theories, yet thiey are not suitable to the explanation of all ; if any one wished to explain Leibnitz's theory, he must do so not by pointing out these distinctions, but by point- ing out other distinctions or principles which Leib- nitz employed, or along which he moved, in tra- versing and obHterating these. Again, it is diflScult to bring under any single head of the present division the theory of M. Cousin ; for although he maintains that the soul, le moi, is inferred as the supporter of consciousness, by a prin- ciple which is called the law of substance, loi des substances, yet he holds that it is inferred in every act of sensation, the first as well as subsequent acts. See, for instance, his Premiers Essais, Annee 1816, V. ix. Since it immediately accompanies every act of sensation, it should be discoverable by the analysis of that act, notwithstanding that it is an inference and not a perception. M. Cousin maintains that we do not perceive the substance, but infer that some- thing exists which we call by that name ; and argues accordingly that it would be no valid objection to ask. What this substance itself was? for its existence only is inferred and not its nature perceived. But the act of inference at least must be known to us, which accompanies or is involved in the act of per- ception. I think it will become apparent as we pro- Sovd. OF TIME AND SPACE. 153 ceed, that this substance supposed to be inferred is pahti. nothing but what I call the formal element in per- -^— ' Ception. Theory of a § 20. To speak now of the first class of theories, those which infer an immaterial substance to be the cause of consciousness. In the first place, it is im- possible to imagine a substance strictly immaterial according to the explanation of matter given in the preceding chapter, namely, as a particular feeling in a particular time and space ; for nothing can be pre- sent in consciousness without being present as some feeling ; the feeling in consciousness is the matter or quality of the object. I do not say that the feeling must be one of those of the five definite senses. The soul may be imagined as a substance which has quali- ties or a quality which have no objective names as quahties, but only subjective names as feelings. The soul may be imagined to be an object which, if we had presentative perception of it, would excite the feeling of joy, or pride, or love, or revererfce, or such- like. Nothing can possibly be more opposed to my theory than to deny the existence of objects of which we have not, or have never had, presentative percep- tion. Such feeling would be the matter of the soul. But this would be to make the soul material, if my phraseology were adopted ; it would be to make it immaterial, in the sense in which ideahsts have usu- ally employed the term. Such is the notion which I frame to myself of the meaning of those who speak of the soul as an immaterial substance ; and I think that this meaning is logically correct, that such an object is capable of being imagined or conceived with- out inconsistency. But from this it does not follow that such an Soul. 154 THE OBIGIN or THE COGNITIONS pakt 1. object is the cause of consciousness; it does not follow -^— ' that, because we can represent it as an object of pre- Theory'ofa scntative perception, it is actually at any tirhe an object of presentative perception. It exists, true, but how? As an object of representation, imagined ac- cording to the requirements of an object of possible presentation. It is an object of possible, not of actual, presentation. From this a further step is requisite to imagining it as the invariable condition of the origin of consciousness. Two steps must therefore be taken by the idealist of this school, first from the possible to the actual, secondly from actual existence to exist- ence in the relation of cause to a particular effect. I believe that it is the need of taking the latter step which has led idealists of this school to take also the first step ; that the need of accounting for certain phenomena in consciousness has led them to infer the actual existence of the object, which seemed to them alone capable of explaining the phenomena in ques- tion. I wifl. mfention and examine the principal of these phenomena, and attempt to show, that the ob- ject inferred to accoimt for them furnishes no better explanation of them than the material object does, the brain or nervous matter in an organised body, which is undoubtedly an object of presentative per- ception. These principal phenomena of consciousness are, so far as I know, the following : 1st, the total differ- ence in kind between consciousness and every other affection, or quality, or mode of existence, in objects ; 2d, the unity or oneness in every moment of con- sciousness, no matter how multiform the objects of that moment of consciousness may be, or whether they are a coiribination of presentations or of repre- Soul. OF TIME AND SPACE. 155 sentations, or of the two together ; 3d, the unity or part i. oneness of the individual consciousness throughout ■^— ' Hfe, whereas the body of the individual has com- Theory'ofi pletely changed, that is to say, the sense of individual personality; 4th, the sense of effort or volition known as the Will ; 5th, the sense of freedom or liberty of the will. Now as to the first point, the total difference in kind between consciousness and every other quality of objects, it is a difference which really exists, but which cannot be lessened by imagimng an object or a quality intermediate between other objects or quali- ties and consciousness; for, whatever object or quality we imagine as the condition of consciousness, that object or quality remains objective, and whether it is conceived as immaterial or material is equally objec- tive and unconscious. If however this object is con- ceived as itself a mode of consciousness, it then is discoverable by the analysis of consciousness in re- flection, and belongs to theories of the second class, it becomes an Ego and not a Soul. It is said, and truly, that all action supposes an agent, that con- sciousness therefore supposes a conscious object as its supporter, that thinking supposes a thinking sub- stance. But of what kind is this supporter, ' Trager,' of consciousness, considered by itself? Whether con- ceived as immaterial or material, the gap between it and the consciousness which it supports is equally wide. No middle object between consciousness and its supporter can be conceived, the difference in kind can not be annihilated or lessened. The same consi- derations apply also if we' conceive consciousness as the result or action, not of an immaterial substance simply, but of the action and reaction between such Soul. 156 THE ORIGIN OP THE COGNITIONS pabtI. an immaterial substance and the material substance ■^— ' of brain or nerve. In this case, the soul is conceived S 20. Theory "of a as a forcB, aualogous to the vital force and the nerve force, and this mind force is the supporter of con- sciousness ; there is an immaterial substance, the soul, but it has a force or mode of action of its own, and on this mind force in reaction with nerve force depends consciousness. "All our perceptions ori- ginate in the action and reaction which take place between the nervous system and the mind," says Mr. Morell, Introd. to Mental Philosophy, page io6. At page 36 he had said, " The view we have taken in the previous chapter of the vital and mental forces is opposed to the common notion that the body with its functions is one thing, the mind and its functions another. Physiology has rendered this notion wholly tmtenable. The alternative of the old dualistic theory, however, is by no means to force us into materialism. So far from that, we may hold that there is already a nascent spark of intelUgence in the primary cell, from which the individual man is developed, and that this is, in fact, the soul in its primary unconscious state, already commencing that series of acts which reach up, in one unbroken chain, to the highest efforts of reason and will." So that although it is a force on which consciousness depends, yet this force be- longs to an immaterial substance as its supporter, the "spark of intelligence in the primary cell;" and the force belonging to it, supported or exerted by it, is objective and unconscious, whether it is considered as belonging to, an immaterial or to a material sub- stance ; in short the same observations are applicable to this mode of conceiving it as to the former. There- fore, in whichever way the supporter of consciousness, Soul. OF TIME AND SPACE. 157 the conscious substance, is conceived, whether as im- pakt i. Ch 111 material or material, or as the force of an immaterial - — ' S 20 or of a material substance, the gap between conscious- Theory of i ness and objects is not bridged, the causation of one by the other is as inexplicable in one way as in the other. All that can be said of the causation of one phenomenon by another is, — after A, B. No two phenomena are perfectly similar. It may be that of two phenomena, equally invariable as antecedents of a third phenomenon, the one which is most similar to it is said to be its cause ; but it serves no purpose to invent a phenomenon similar to the one to be ac- counted for, when there is already a phenomenon discovered as its invariable antecedent, on the ground that this actually existing phenomenon is not suffi- ciently similar to the phenomenon to be accounted for. The second ground for maintaining the existence of an immaterial substance as the supporter of con- sciousness is the unity of consciousness, known by the name of the unity of apprehension. We are con- scious of objects as units, and however diverse these objects may be, and whether they are objects of pre- sentation or of representation, or contain both one and the other, they are still combined into one single object in a single moment of consciousness. The supporter of that consciousness therefore, it is argued, must be a single indivisible unit ; and since no mate- rial substance is indivisible, it must farther be imma- terial. Now if this indivisible and immaterial unit is itself an object of consciousness in the moment of consciousness, so as to be used as a standard for in- troducing unity into the objects perceived along with it, it must be discoverable by the analysis of consci- ousness in reflection, and becomes conceived therefore 158 THE ORIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. as an Mgo and not as a Soul, it is directly perceived in - — " consciousness and not inferred ; it becomes in fact the Theory 'of a Unity of apperception and not of apprehension. But if it is conceived as a soul, and not as an ego, if it is inferred, and not directly perceived, to exist as a single indivisible and immaterial unit, then there is no "way in which such an unit can be represented to consciousness except as a mathematical point ; and no mathematical point has a complete, empirical, exist- ence, but always involves an extended substance, of which it is a boundary or in which it lies. So far then from being capable of serving as the cause of consciousness, such an unit has no complete, empi- rical, existence of its own. Supposing it to be a point existing in an extended material substance, it becomes a mode of the existence of that substance, a differentiation or a property of it. So far from offering a better explanation of the unity- of appre- hension than is offered by a material substance, it cannot properly be said to oifer any explanation at all. Is there any insuperable difficulty in supposing unity of apprehension to arise in a compound mate- rial substance, such as the brain or nervous matter? I cannot see that there is ; there is indeed a great dissimilarity between consciousness and objects which are not conscious ; but the unity of apprehension offers no such difficulty; the unity of apprehension fully corresponds to the unity of objects apprehended. What is the unity of apprehension? That an object is perceived as one, and that objects differing only in point of their times of being perceived are perceived as the same. The perception of diflference precedes the perception of sameness both logically and histo- rically. We start from the perception of a single SouL OF TIME AND SPACE. 159 object, from the perception of oneness, suppose a feel- pabt i. ing of the colotir red, occupying the whole field of - — ' vision and lasting one minute; if the next minute Theory 'of a oiFers no change of feeling, we still say that we per- ceive one object; but if the next minute offers to us the colour green, then we have a perception of dif^ ference ; if this is followed by the colour red again, we perceive sameness, the sameness of this object with that of the first minute. There must be a per- ception of difference before a perception of sameness ; and logic^y the perception of sameness is more com- plex, and includes as part of itself the perception of difiference. Sameness of objects is nothiag more than oneness of feelings in difiference of times. Unity of apprehension arises both in perceiving oneness and in perceiving sameness. But the oneness of a perceived object, in what does it consist? In the oneness of the quality in oneness of the time, or in the oneness of the space occupied by diflferent qualities in oneness of the time, according as the object is perceived in time alone or in time and space together. The unity of apprehension is the subjective aspect of the unity of the object perceived; that is, unity of feelmg, or unity of a complex of feelings, in unity of time. This is the analysis of the phenomenon called Unity of Apprehension. The question is, whether a better explanation of this phenomenon can be ofifered, than is offered by the fact of the continuity of time and space, when undivided by any difiference in the feel- ings contained by them. Why should we iafer a single indivisible substance, a substance which is truly " one," to account for the oneness of consciousness, when the oneness of this inferred substance must be explained to consist simply in. unity of feeling in Soul. 160 THE OEIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS Parti. unity of time, that is to consist in the very thing ■^—' which it is introduced to account for? This is no- Theory of a thing but the old process of doubling the pheno- menon to be accounted for. The third argument is the sense of individual per- sonality, of personal identity throughout life. From this it is inferred, that there must be an immaterial soul, the supporter of this sense of identity. The body changes all its particles of matter during life, yet the conscious being feels that he is the same per- son from childhood to old age. If memory, it is argued, depended solely on the changing matter of the body, we should preserve no memory of what we were when our body consisted of a completely dif- ferent set of material particles from those which it consists of at any present time ; the particles would have vanished, and the memory attached to them and depending on them would have vanished also. To this it may be replied, that though the particles of matter in the body vanish and are Teplaced by others, yet the change is gradual enough to allow that qua- lity, in the vanishiiig particle, on which consciousness and memoiy depend, to be communicated to the par- ticle which takes its place ; and this is true in what- ever way we imagine to ourselves the connection between the material particles and consciousness, whether as wax and seal, or as some kind of move- ment mechanical or molecular or magnetic, accom- panied or unaccompanied by heat or light or sound. AU such figures are of course only aids to the imagi- nation in default of knowledge. But whatever the nature of the operation which goes on in the brain may be^ each particle, which takes the place of a vanishing one, has this quality, or this nature commu- Soul. OF TIME AND SPACE. 161 nicated to it, becomes a part of the old structure, and pam i. bears its part in supporting the consciousness which — " the old structure supported. The body then is in Thlo^'ofa one sense the same body from childhood to old age, notwithstanding the change in its particles ; and it is in a sense exactly parallel to this that the conscious- ness of the individual is said to be the same through- out life. Particular feelings and thoughts vanish and are replaced by others ; the body of the child does not more differ from the body of the man, than the thoughts of the child from the thoughts of the man. The vmity of organic growth and develop- ment of the body is exactly parallel to the unity in growth and development of the consciousness which is attached to it. In the brain are stored up impres- sions, qualities, or modes of operation, the causes of memory, which are communicated to and then pre- served by every fresh particle of matter which is taken up into the brain. The brain becomes richer in these impressions, qualities, or modes of operation, and they constitute one part of the life of the brain, and make with each other a connected whole. So also do the thoughts and images in consciousness, and this is what is meant by personal identity. If the supposition of an immaterial soul was adopted, we should stUl have to suppose that this immaterial soul was subject to changes, to the exchange of the thoughts of the child for those of the man; the bind- ing of these together is aU that the immaterial soul is adopted in order to explain. But this bond is found as readily in the organic unity of the development of the brain, as in the unity of an immaterial soul, and therefore it is superfluous to have recourse to the latter supposition. M 162 THE ORIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS pabt I. The fourth argument is the sense of effort or vo- -^— ' lition, the consciousness of Will. Properly indeed Theory 'of a tMs is an argument for the existence of an ego, not for the existence of an immaterial soul ; the object is thought to be directly envisaged in the moment of volition, not to be inferred in order to account for the phenomenon of volition ; but since this distinction is not always drawn, I will say a few words on it here. The sense of effort, I'effort voulu, as for instance ut. the phenomenon of attention, is among the simplest and earliest states of consciousness, perhaps as early historically as any; it is an immediate, not an in- ferred, fact of consciousness. Effort is a sensation which we perceive immediately, as we perceive anger, fear, hunger, warmth^ and so on. This sense of effort has been thought, notably by Maine de Biran, to reveal to us immediately the Moi, or substantial im- material Self; and it was thought that the self reveals itself to itself in its consciousness of its own volition. But the sense of effort, whether it is effort for a dis- tinct purpose, or volition proper, or only indetermi- nate effort, reveals the self neither more nor less nor in any other sense than other perceptions do. They aU contribute to self-consciousness, which is the first ; reflective act of consciousness, in which self and not- self are for the first time perceived. In other words, vo- lition is not reflection. All reflection is voHtion, that is, involves sense of effort for a purpose ; but all sense of effort for a purpose is not reflection. Attention involves sense of effort indeterminately, but it does not involve envisaging self as an object. Effort again is roused by an interest felt, but it does not require that we should be conscious that we are feeling an interest. This would suppose an analysis of the feel- Soul. OF TIME AND SPACE. 163 inff of interest which can come afterwards only. The paut i. Ch III consciousness of the ego as an object is a particular, - — " a reflective, mode of the consciousness of effort. An Theory'of a effort or a volition of which we are conscious is an object of perception, and an immediate object of per- ception, but it does not include the ego in itself as objective; we do not perceive the ego objectively in it, untU we have taken another step, untU we have reflected. The process of reflection will be examined shortly. The fifth argument, which is the last I shall men- tion, is the sense of freedom in volition. We are conscious of freedom, it is said, in choosing how to act, and this is an inomediate fact of consciousness ; but since we know that all material objects are sub- ject to fixed laws, that being which is conscious of fi-eedom, and which therefore is free, must be imma- terial. What the sense of freedom is, what we feel when we feel ourselves free, it must be left till the process of reflection is analysed to determine. But in whatever way freedom is conceived, whether, 1st, as fi'eedom to act when a wish is formed ; or 2d, freedom in forming that wish originally; or 3d, freedom of the judgment from the influence of desires; or 4th, freedom of the desires from the control of judgment; and also in whatever circumstance freedom of any kind may be supposed to consist; whether, 1st, in the absence of all controlling or causative influence, out of the agent which is free; or 2d, in the positive origination of an action, or feeling, or thought, in and by the free agent itself ; or 3d, in the total arbitrari- ness of the proceedings of the free agent, that is, in the impossibility of predicting any of them before- hand ; the moment freedom, in any way or in any 164 , THE OEIGIN OP THE COGNITIONS pabti. kind, is conceived as existing objectively, the expla- — nation of that freedom as a fact is quite as inade- §20. • ^ . . Theory of a quately Supplied by the supposition of an immaterial, as by the supposition of a material substance, as the ground and supporter of the attribute of freedom. It is as difficult to suppose an immaterial substance isolated from others, and originating actions by itself, as a material substance; it is as difficult to imagine an immaterial as a material substance producing ac- tions entirely arbitrary^ in the sense of following no law and being incapable of prediction; it is as diffi- cult to imagine an immaterial as it is to imagine a material substance, producing judgments unaflfected by desires, or entertaining desires uncontrolled by judgments, or originating actions which have no form and no content. I admit that to conceive these things in either way seems to me equally impossible; but what I contend for is, that it is as impossible in one way as in the other; and this being so, it remains only to attempt to throw some light on the pheno- menon of freedom, as a fact of consciousness, by the analysis of the phenomenon of reflection. §21. S 21. To come now to the second class of theories, Theory of an •> , . ' • Ego. those which place the cause of consciousness in an immaterial Ego, or an immaterial activity which is at once subject and object of every moment of con- sciousness,, and therefore to be discovered by analysis of the object or of the moment of perception ; foremost among the supporters of which Kant himself is to be reckoned. See his Transcendental deduction of the Categories, Kritik der Reinen . Vernunffc, Werke, vol. 2. ed. Rosenkranz und Schubert, page 90-116. He speaks of the transcendental apperception as being at once transcendental and a state of consciousness, — OF TIME AND SPACE. 165 "dieses reine urspriinffliche unwandelbare Bewusst- pabti. . . . Ch III seyn," page ^g ; and this I can conceive in no other - — ' ■way than as being what 1 call an aspect of a state of Theory of an consciousness, but an aspect perceived at once in the ®°" same act by which the object or state of conscious- ness is itself perceived. He seems to have con- sidered every state of consciousness to have had three such inseparable aspects, as containing or being at once a consciousness of the identity of self or the conscious Subject, of the identity of the function of being conscious, and of the identity of the empirical object perceived ; of these three aspects the con- sciousness of the identity of the action or function, Handlung, was the condition of the other two, the transcendental unity of apperception. See the pass- age at page lOO, Eben diese transcendentale Einheit — zuerst moglich macht. What Kant sought to ex- plain to himself was, how was the fact of unity or oneness, anywhere and everywhere, to be accounted for. He saw that there was this cognition in all con- sciousness and in aU objects of consciousness, uni- versally and without exception. It must therefore have or be some transcendental condition in nature, common to all its instances, every one of which sup- posed it, and in every one of which it also was mani- fested. The conception was like that of Plato's, to h, TO, s'ibfi, and ra ttMtjTa, only reappearing in the- kingdom of mind and consciousness instead of in the kingdom of e:jiistences. Like that too it was but a doubling of the phenomenon to be accounted for, a choosing of one aspect of the phenomenon and ele- vating it into the condition of the phenomenon. It makes no difference how that Unity is regarded which is conceived as the condition of phenomenal 166 THE ORIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. uiiity, for all unity which can be brought before our ^— ' consciousness at all consists of two elements at the • Theory of an Icast, time and feeling; and any condition of these ^°' elements becoming united, or being referred to each other, must itself consist of these two elements. Every existence can be analysed into elements which have no existence apart from each other. Kant's Ich denke is then the reappearance of Plato's TO h, but it is after passing it through the crucible of Descartes' Cogito ergo Sum. It is the Cogito ergo Sum analysed and made into an actual and universal element of all knowledge and aU exist- ence, an element which is at once their cause and their consequent. But it was not this with Des- cartes. With Descartes it arose in answer to the question. What is the ultimate certainty of which it is impossible to doubt, or. What is that fact which contains its own certainty combined with its exist- ence? The simplest fact containing at once these ' two elements, existence and certainty, is the fact or state of consciousness called reflection, and the sim- plest expression of this fact is Cogito- Sum, or Ich denke ; a fact which may be combined with, or form part of, any other state of consciousness, but which is not essential to all. It is composed of elements which are themselves complete states of conscious- ness. It is therefore the central point of philosophy but not of experience, the starting-point of examina- tion of consciousness and interrogation *of nature, but not of consciousness itself Yet in some way it is contained in aU consciousness, for it is developed out of it, and is the return of consciousness upon it- self The question is, how and in what manner con- tained in and developed out of consciousness. Just OF TIME AND SPACE. 167 as, in § 13, there arose a question about the mode partl in which the contents of space existed in space, -^— ' whether as feelings here, quaUties there, or as feel- The!r^''rfan ings and qualities everywhere, — so here the question ^°' is, not whether reflection is contained in conscious- ness, but as to the mode of its being contained in it, whether it is as a development of a new shape which did not previously exist, or as a previously existing ground or cause which can be discovered in the germ in all instances, and which may be conse- quently regarded as the necessary accompaniment and condition of all. Some writers have maintained the universal pre- sence of the consciousness of self in all instances of consciousness, by a direct appeal to the consciousness of themselves and others. Jacobi, for instance, de- scribes the discovery of the Ego in acts of direct per- ception, in his David Hume, ein Gesprach, Werke, vol. 2. page 175. edit. 1812-26. He says: Ich er- fahre dass Ich bin und dass etwas ausser mir ist in demselben untheUbaren Augenblick. Und in diesem Augenblick leidet meine Seele vom Gegenstande nicht mehr als sie von sich selbst leidet. And again at page 176 — dass auch bei der allerersten und einfachsten Wahmehmung, das Ich und das Du, inneres Bewusst- seyn und ausserlicher Gegenstand, sogleich in der Seele da seyn miissen; beides in demselben Nu, &c. But the question is, As objects both, or as object and subject ? I see an object ; there is a simple feeling. Neither "I" nor "object" as counter-dis- tinguished, each from other, is as yet contained in it to my consciousness. And attend to it as closely as I will, dwell upon it as long as I will, analyse it as accurately as I will, I can discover no "I" in it; 168 THE ORIGIN or THE COGNITIONS parti. but by attention, dwelling upon it, and analysing ■^— ' it, I can distinguish its feeling from its form, its Theoiyofan material and its formal element. Attention and its results must not be confounded with reflection and its results ; the first rough perception without the analysis of attention can be distinguished, it is true, from perception together with such attention ; but then this second analysing perception can be dis- tinguished also no less from perception reflecting as well as analysing. Those who find the ego in direct perception seem to me to distinguish only two things, the first rough perception on the one hand from perception analysing and reflecting at once on the other. But there are three things, not two, to be distinguished, perception, attention, and reflection. By reflection I distinguish the "I," the feeling, from the "object," the particular mode of the feeling, the colour, sound, taste, &c. There is neither substratum of the colour nor substratum of the feeling. If in reflection I fix my thoughts on the feeling, I may call it the subject; if on the mode of the feeling, I may call it the object. In seeing an external object I do not feel that I am and that the object is, but I have a feeling under the forms of time and space ; I am conscious, and am conscious of an object existing in time and space ; I am aware of the feeling, of the space it occupies, and of the time it occupies; but before I can distinguish the feeling from feeling generally, the incomplete from the com- plete moment of consciousness, the act of conscious- ness from its result, I must have represented or redin- tegrated the feeling in consciousness and compared it with others, that is, I must have reflected upon it. The question, how consciousness is related to, or Ego. OF TIME AND SPACE. 169 distinguished from, self-consciousness is one of the pakti. most difficult in philosophy. It is the most central -^— " and the most important question in philosophy, just Theory if an as the Ich denke is the most central and important point in the system of Kant. There are two chief ways of answering it. Either self-consciousness dif- fers from consciousness only as a developed, diflfer- entiated, whole differs from the same whole unde- veloped and undifferentiated, for example as a plant from its seed, in which case self-consciousness would be capable of discovery in consciousness by a suf- ficiently searching and properly directed analysis, and aU consciousness would be' rightly described as self-xionsciousness ; and this is the theory of Kant, Jacobi, and many others ; or self-consciousness dif- fers from consciousness as one phenomenon differs from another which it invariably, under certain con- ditions, supplants and succeeds, but which except for this relation can not be called the same with it, as for example one mode of physical force, such as fric- tion, passes into another, such as heat, or as elec- tricity passes into or is supplanted by light ; and this is the theory which I wish to establish here. In both cases consciousness is potential self- con- sciousness, the Ivvu^ig of which self-consciousness is the hi^yna, ; but this distinction of Aristotle's is very wide and embraces many modes or instances. The question is this : Is consciousness 'the lowest mode of self-consciousness, but self-consciousness still ; or is self-consciousness a differentiation of consciousness which cannot be traced at all in consciousness ? When we are fully self-conscious do we merely ana- lyse an object, and see clearly in it a circumstance which is already there, dimly present to conscious- Ego. 170 THE ORIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. ness, or does that circumstance first arise when we - — ■ are first clearly conscious of it? And if the latter Theory of an alternative in these two questions is true, and sup- posing it to be already established, is there not then, as a separate question, an easy explanation at hand, why the opposite alternatives should appear so pro- bable as they have done, in the fact of the extreme difficulty we have in throwing ourselves back in imagination into a position once occupied but long since abandoned, the readiness with which we im- agine ourselves always to have felt what we at pre- sent feel, the comparative inability, as it would be in this case, to separate' direct consciousness from self- consciousness when we have long accustomed our- selves to speak of feelings as 'ours,' that is, as al- ways combined with self-consciousness? Both sides admit that potentially self-consciousness is contained in consciousness ; but to me it appears that it can only be said to be actually present in consciousness when it is clearly perceived as an object, and when self and not-self are coimter-distinguished ; and that this is first done in reflection, preceded by many in- stances of perception. The question is by no means one about mere words and nomenclature, but about the analysis of simple elementary feeling, the material element in direct perception, which I maintain cannot be analysed into a self and a not-self, does not con- tain a self and a not-self, though it does contain a formal element, and which comes to contain a self and a not-self in a particular act, later than and de- pendent on perception, namely, the act of reflection. Perhaps the decisive solution of the question awaits the clearer because more practised insight of the future. OF TIME AND SPACE. 171 Pabt I. Ch. III. §21. No reflection, not even the transcendental apper- ception of Kant, if that is considered as a reflection containing an Ich denke, is required as a condition Themy'ofan or an element of a simple perception of an ob- ^°" ject. Simple perception of an object may indeed require attention, a felt effort; that is, it is possi- ble that the sense of effort may be involved in the feeling which is the material element of every ob- ject; but this has been already distinguished from reflection. I feel an effort as I feel any' other sensa- tion ; I do not necessarily reflect that "I" feel it, any more than in the case of any other feeling. Supposing therefore perception of an object to re- quire attention or effort either as a precedent con- dition or as an element of the object perceived, still it does not involve reflection, or an Ich denke, or an Ich bin. It may be said. How can I perceive an object as one and the same, unless I refer it to one and the same consciousness? The answer is, that consciousness is one and the same for the same reason that the object is so, namely, because it is a feeling in a continuous time. Different determinate feelings succeed each other without interval in different de- terminate times, the times are distinguished by the feelings which occupy them, and the series of deter- minate feelings is continuous. Call the series of feelings feeling simply, and the result is a single consciousness ; leave undetermined what the deter- minate feelings are, and we have a provisional image, feeling generally existing in a continuous time, just as we might describe a particoloured silk thread, of which one inch was blue, the next green, the next yellow, and the next red, as a single coloured thread, without determining what the particular colours were 172 THE ORIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS * . . . . Part I. into which it was divided; the thread which corre- - — ' spends 'to the time and the colour which corresponds Theory of an to the feeling are continuous, and the unity thus ^°' introduced into the series of determinate colours is the result of generalisation of the provisional image, colour, from the several determinate colours. When states of consciousness are the object-matter of the generalisation, the generalisation is called reflection, because it is the object itself which generalises from itself, because the same series of feelings prolongs itself in the act of generalising from its previous states, instead of having a series of objects before it different from itself. The unity of feeling generally, or in the abstract, in a continuous time is a fact in consciousness which is first discovered by reflection, cannot be given by a single perception, but must be collected from many perceptions before it is itself an object of perception. In other words, we do not per- ceive an object to be one and the same object by referring it to a continuous feeling, still less by re- ferring it to an Ich denke ; but we discover that there is a continuous feeling determined into many special feelings, after having many times experienced such special feehngs coimected in a continuous time. Feel- ing in a continuous time as a fact, and not the know- ledge of this fact, constitutes the simple perception of every single object. If it should be asked. Why and how it comes to pass that feeling is continuous, that is, combined with time, at all, that we ever have the feeling of oneness, it must be confessed that no answer can be given. No cause of the fact can be assigned, but only the analysis of the fact. Oneness is an ulti- mate fact in consciousness, as it is in every single object of consciousness* The same question might OF TIME AND SPACE. 173 be asked in the case of every thing, from the most pabt i. concrete to the most abstract objects of all. Oneness -^— " in a material object and oneness in consciousness, or Theory of an the feeling of oneness, are not different facts, one of which can be explained by the other as its cause, but they are the objective and subjective aspects of one and the same fact, beyond which, in the way of as- signing causes at least, we cannot reach. Did we go no farther than the stage of direct per- The ,. 1 ' • 1 1 n ' T 1 *j.i phenomenon, of ceptions, however richly our senses lumished us with Eeflection. them, we should have no knowledge but of pheno- mena and the relations between them, whether these were phenomena in time alone, or in' time and space together ; we should haVe no knowledge of their rela- tions to what we call ourselves, or of ourselves in relation to them. And in many animals, except man, and in man himself in his infancy, we- may suppose this to be the case. The notion of Self is introduced by reflection, which itself contains and in essence con- sists of the same simple unity of apprehension, but of apprehension applied to a particular kind of complex object, an object composed of previous cases of con- sciousness, of an apprehension in which their one common feature is contrasted with their many diverse features, the general indeterminate feeling with the particular determinate feelings. It remains now to describe the process of reflection, in order to see how the notion of self is introduced by it, or superinduced upon the simple perceptions. The unity of appre- hension in reflection is called Unity of Apperception. And here is reached the point so often referred to in the present and preceding chapters. Reflection is a generalisation, differing from other generalisations in having modes of consciousness as Ego. 174 THE ORIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS paeti. such for its object-matter; it is consciousness of per- -^— ' ceptions so far as they contaiu the common element 8 21 ' •/ Theory if an of feeling, abstracting from their other diiferences. In point of being feelings they are aU alike, however much one determinate feeling differs from another, a sound from a colour, a colour from a taste, or one colour from another, for instance. It is inevitable that familiarity with the perceptions should bring to light this ground-difference existing in all of them, namely, that what they all are in common should be distinguished from what some are and others are not. Eeflection first draws, then follows up this distinction, and investigates the element common to aU so far as it is common and not determinate. The method pur- sued by reflection in this is the following. The re- flecting consciousness considers those feelings which are nearest to it in point of time, it gets as close to its object as it can; that is, it turns its look back on the feehng of the moment immediately previous to itself, that is, represents or redintegrates it in con- sciousness. Reflection is a particular kind of redin- tegration, distinguished from other kinds by its parti- cular object, which object is the common element of feeling, the feeling common to all instances of feeling, a logical and provisional object. In following this course reflection perceives that it has produced the* same phenomenon, in point of kind, with that which it set out to examine. Instances have been produced in the course of reflecting of the same phenomenon, of feeling of determinate kinds and in separate but continuous moments of time; and these instances have been produced by the same reflecting conscious- ness. The chain of feeling or the series of feelings has prolonged itself, and, since it has been prolonged OF TIME AND SPACE. 175 in reflection, perceives that it has prolonged itself; parti. the process of perception of the common element in ■^— ' past states is a prolongation of that element in a pre- Theory k an sent state. One moment consciousness is a conscious- ^°" ness of having advanced or continued so far, the next moment of having advanced a further, and the next a further step. It has made out this fact concerning the indeterminate feeling which it set out to examine, namely, that it forms a continuously advancing line in point of time, continuing up to but not into or beyond that indivisible present moment which will the first become past. That it continues into the present, and will continue into future moments, is an inference from this reflection, not a part of this reflection itself. It is a further and a different re^ flection. It is clear that of this continuous feeling or consciousness, so far as it is provisional and not de- terminate, no complete empirical existence can be predicated ; that the fact discovered concerning it by reflection, namely, its continuity in point of time, does not warrant us in personifying the general term feeling, in assuming an ego or personality of which consciousness is the attribute. The ego or person- ahty which we are warranted in assuming, which we are compelled indeed to infer from the facts, is one which is the complex of all the determinate feelings of apprehension and apperception, the varying as well as the fixed, of all the apprehensions and appercep'^ tions which have been bound together as a continuous chain of feeling from the moment when it began to exist as feeling to the present moment of conscious- ness. The whole to which these apprehensions and apperceptions belong, which they constitute, is thus 176 THE OEIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS pakt I. definitely marked ; it includes, or may include if — memory is clear enough, all past states of conscious- Theory of an ness, but nothing which has not been consciousness. This whole is the Person, the identical man, the Em- pirical Ego, as he appears to himself as the object of consciousness, the object of that consciousness by which it has been produced as an object in its pro- gress. The phrase Empirical Ego wUl be familiar to readers of Schelling. See his Vom Ich, oder iiber das Umbedingte, Sammtl. Werke, vol. i. But a name must be found also for the gene'ral and provisional term Feeling, as existing indetermi- nate and in time, for its existence in time gives it continuity as a provisional image, and time is its substance when it is regarded as existing ; but it must be a name which does not express more than the analysis warrants us in assigning to it, a name which does not imply that it has empirical existence ; and for this purpose let the name of Subject be chosen, and, in order to distinguish it from the empirical ego, let it be. called the Pure Ego. The name Subject will distinguish it from its objects, whether determi- nate feelings or determinate qualities ; the name Pure Ego will distinguish it from the complex of those determinate feelings, the empirical ego. The name of Subject best marks the fact that the feeling in- tended by it is general and provisional, and never an object by itself. Whenever feeling exists empirically it exists determinately, and in a moment of time which is an empirical object and has empirical duration. If we divide in thought this least empirical moment of time, or feeling in time, the feeling vanishes, but the time remains; the time becomes an incomplete mo- ment, si'bviia.iJtiig, but it still remains as time present to OF TIME AND SPACE. ' 177 our consciousness. But what has become of the de- pabt i. terminate feeling? It does not exist as feehng any -^ ' more, our sensibUity is not acute enough to perceive Theory of an it below the point called by hypothesis the least em- ^°' pirical moment. It has not become feeling generally or in the abstract, for this is a generalisation from aU. the empirical determinate feelings, and cannot there- fore include a case which is not a determinate feeling. Sir W. Hamilton would perhaps say that the feeling had become latent ; but what is a feeling which is not felt? To say that it is latent, is only to say that it is not a feeling. There is only one adequate mode of conceiving the phenomenon of the vanishing of feel- ing in an incomplete moment of time. It remains potential or latent, not as feeling, but as organ, or as a mode of the material organ to which it is attached ; the sensibUity of the organ is not divisible so far as the form in which that sensibility operates. Starting then from the incomplete moment of time and letting it continue till it is complete, that is, tUl it is long enough for feeling to arise in it, we see that a deter- minate feeling is the result of a completed moment of time, and that consciousness arises at the end of the moment. At that instant we have an object of con- sciousness. Suppose that the next complete moment of time is a moment of reflection, and its object will be the previous complete moment. In this way we may be always conscious, but never conscious that we are conscious but only that we have been so ; except mdeed, as has been already said, by inference, in which sense we may be said also to be conscious that we shall be conscious hereafter. The present moment of consciousness is the darkest spot in the whole series of moments of reflection. The fact that con- N 178 ' THE ORIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS paet I. sciousness is fleeting in point of time, that it escapes ■^— ' observation in the moment of consciousness, so that S 21 Theoiy of am wc are ncver conscious that we are feeling but only that "we have felt, — the fact that we are never able to seize consciousness itself but only its product, war- rants us in distinguishing a Subject from an Object. Could consciousness be its own immediate object, could reflection and perception be one, could sensi- bility be as infinitely divisible as its form, then every thing would be indififerently subjective and objective, we should distinguish neither subject nor object in phenomena, the ultimate dualism of metaphysic would be done away with, and existence and consciousness would constitute a true Absolute. If we were to follow up this clue, it would pro- bably occur to us that the so-caUed substance of the soul is time, just as the so-called substance of exter- nal tangible and visible objects is space. Time has been called the form of the inner sense, space the form of the outer sense ; but both inner and outer sense belong to one conscious being, and this one conscious being as an existing object is now under investigation. The question before us is. Does the reflection of this conscious being on itself discover, in its object, itself, a constant and complete object, to which its changing states are attached, or with which they are bound up, so that this constant and com- plete object may be considered as the invariable con- dition of consciousness and its changing states ? The answer given by the analysis of reflection is, that the only constant element in the object of reflection is time, which is also the form of the inner sense. Time therefore is the condition of the subjective unity of the objects of the inner sense, of the series of states Ego. OF TIME AND SPACE. 179 of consciousness, and also of the obiective unity of pabt r. Ch III. consciousness considered as an existing obiect. But -^— . . § 21. time is no complete or empirical object, it is but the Theory of an formal element of objects ; it cannot therefore be re- garded as the cause or invariable condition of the existence of consciousness ; no more is space the cause of the existence of external objects. But the time and the space, contained as elements in objects of the inner and outer sense respectively, are that which causes them to appear as possessing a sub- stance or substratum, and which has thus given rise to the notion of a substance underlying external objects, and of a soul underlyiag states of conscious- ness. The foregoing view is not open to Prof. Ferrier's objection, Inst, of Metaph. Epistemology, i. § 8. There is no remembering that feelings were ours which we were not conscious of as ours when we felt them first. Feelings become ours first m. reflection. They belong originally to one continued series; this fact we indeed remember in reflection ; and in. conse- quence name the series ' our self,' and the several feelings composing it ' ours.' The perception of phenomena, as simple phenomena, precedes the per- ception of the Subject, of the empirical ego, and of phenomena as objects; apprehension precedes apper- ception, just in the same way as the perception of difference precedes the perception of sameness. The frequent conjunction of apperception and apprehen- sion, of reflection and direct perception, in later states of consciousness, as Kant says, Das : Ich denke, muss alle meine Vorstellunfgen begleiten konnen, need not make us conclude that apperception, or with Kant that transcendental apperception, is requisite as the go. 180 THE QEIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. condition of apprehension. That which is a pecu- ■^— liarity of some states of consciousness is not to be Theory of an erccted into a condition of existence of all states of consciousness. The same erroneous procedure is found in Schel- ling, the error of adopting, as the cause of a pheno- menon, the differentia or the definition of it. It is seen in the first sentence of the System des Trans- cend. Idealismus, Sammtl. Werke, vol. 3. AUes Wissen beruht auf der Uebereinstimmung eines Ob- jektiven mit einem Subjektiven. But knowledge does not rest upon the agreement of an objective with a subjective, but may be described as being such an agreement ; there is no causal connection between the two things, knowledge and the agreement of an objective with a subjective; each is another term for, or mode of regarding, the other. But let this be exhibited more particularly. In the same work at p. 367, vol. 3, ScheUing says : Man uberlasse sich ganz der unwiUkiirlichen Succession der YorsteUun- gen, so werden diese Vorstellungen, so mannigfaltig und verschieden sie seyn mbgen, doch als zu Einem identischen Subjekt gehorig erscheinen. Reflektire ich auf diese Identitat des Subjekts in den Vorstel- lungen, so entsteht mir der Satz : Ich denke. Dieses Ich denke ist es, was aUe Vorstellungen begleitet und die Continuitat des Bewusstseyns zwischen ihnen unterhalt. On this it is to be remarked, that in every series of perceptions, in all consciousness, there is a continyity of the consciousness, of the feeling or feelings. In reflection this continuity of feeling is fixed upon by the attention, observed, and called the Ich denke. The fact is the continuity of feeling, the expression or characterisation of it, when isolated OF TIME AND SPACE. 181 by the attention, is the Ich denke. The fact accom- pam i. panies inseparably all the Vorstellungen ; the expres- ^—^ sion for it arises afterwards, in reflection. But Schel- Thel^ht a ling here maintains not only that the Ich denke ac- ^^°' companies all the Vorstellmigen, which would be true m so far as this, that the fact now called Ich denke does so, but also that it is the cause of the phenomenon of their continuity, unterhalt die Conti- nuitat des Bewusstseyns zwischen ihnen. But it is clear that this is not the case, since the thought Ich denke itself involves continuity of consciousness, and is only possible in a continuous time. Continuity of consciousness and Ich denke are two terms for the same thing; the first is a name for it as an object of perception unseparated from the phenomena, the second as an object of reflection, isolated in a pro- visional image from the phenomena ; they are not two objects, but one object in two shapes. Con- tinuity of consciousness is common to all possible modes of consciousness; but the thought Ich denke belongs to one mode of consciousness only, namely to reflection. The Ich of the Ich denke becomes, according to ScheUing, its own object in intellectual intuition, inteUektuelle Anschauung. I admit that Intellectual intuition is a good name for reflection; but I deny that, under either name, it reveals any other Ego than the empirical ego on the one hand, and that general or provisional image, the Subject, on the other. There are two reasons why the Subject can- not be conceived as a complete or empirical object, — first, because it appears as abstract and general feel- ing, never given in perception except as an abstrac- tion; secondly, because, when we try to think of it as Ego. 182 THE ORIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. existing separately, we must think of it as existing -^ ' ia an incomplete moment of time; for if we think of Theory of an it as iQ a Completed moment of time, it is no longer general and abstract but a determinate objective feel- ing, the material element in a perception. The analysis of reflection is now complete. It will be observed that I have used the word objects in speaking of phenomena previous to reflection, both in this and the preceding chapter, although pheno- mena become objective and subjective, and feelings are distinguished from qualities, first in reflection. No other course was open to me, and for this reason, that language, the articulate language of men, is first formed when reflection has arisen, and thus describes objects and has names for objects only as they appear to a reflecting consciousness. Things as they appear to consciousness previous to reflection are not de- scribed in such language, but are, so far as the lan- guage is concerned, non-existent ; language itself is a late product of consciousness, and expresses things as they appear at the stage when it arises. If any animals besides man were found to have a language grounded on generalisation, this would I think be justly regarded as a proof that they had reflected and were possessed of reason. For they could hardly have generalised so much and so fixedly as to possess a language, without having also generalised the com- mon element of feeling. But though phenomena have been spoken of as if they were already distin- guished into their subjective and objective aspects,- into feelings and qualities, before reflection has arisen, this must not make us forget that this was only an imperfect way of speaking, and that the way in which this distinction arises in reflection had still to be OF TIME AND SPACE. 183 pointed out. The cognitions which we have of ob- part i. jects have been spoken of as if they were already ^— ' separate from their objects, and as such cognitions Theory of an became the objects of reflection. But they are in fact as yet only phenomena, not feelings as distinct from qualities, but both together and undistinguished ; they are states of consciousness and states of objects at once, if we describe them bywords applied to them by reflection. How do they first come to be thus distinguished? To answer this question, we must turn to the analysis of reflection and the distinction which it draws, namely, that between the Subject and the empirical ego. It does not distinguish the Subject from the empirical ego after having first dis- tinguished the empirical ego into qualities and feel- ings; but the distinction of the empirical ego into qualities and feelings is the consequence of the dis- tinction of the Subject from the empirical ego, which is at that time another name for the phenomena. When the Subject is on the point of being distin- guished from the empirical ego, this latter is nothing more than the complex of phenomena, in which feel- ings and qualities are yet undistinguished ; there is but one complex of phenomena in presence of reflec- tion. The distinction itself of the Subject from the empirical ego involves the distinction between the qualities and the feelings of the empirical ego, be- tween the complex of phenomena as feelings and the same complex of phenomena as qualities. Let these two distinctions be clearly seen to be two and not one ; and now turn to their identity in reflection, to the mode in which, or the reason why, reflection neces- sarily draws the second distinction in consequence of its having drawn the first. Reflection is the distin- 184 THE ORIGIN OP THE COGNITIONS ch"*!!! guishing of the course of feeling into pure and deter- — mitiate feelings, in time alone, abstracting provision- Theray of an ally from space ; no matter what space these feelings may occupy, reflection considers them only so far as they occupy time. Reflection abstracts provisionally from space, that is, from the particular space occupied by the feelings, the succession of which it examines. Though all these feelings occupy or are placed in some portion of space, yet this circumstance is ab- stracted from, and only their succession is considered. In this consideration arises the distinction between the Subject, the incomplete moment of time, and its objects, the whole series of determinate feelings. Phenomena have resolved themselves into this dis- tinction ; the objects of the Subject are a succession of feelings. But this abstraction was only provisional, for these feelings also occupy or are contained in space, — the comparatively constant feelings, which are the body, and the less constant feelings which surround it on all sides, and the feelings which ac- company these two classes, such as the emotions, the position of which is difficult to determine. These all occupy space and time together, are a succession of feelings and a succession of feelings in space-relations. When I take the feehngs, as a whole, in these two relations at once, as distinguished from the sanie feelings with provisional abstraction of space, I con- sider them as qualities; for they are considered as statical and fixed in space and in the whole of time ; they become the universe of qualities but without ceasing to be feelings. When any particular set of feelings is fixed on and considered in these two rela- tions at once, it becomes a complex of qualities, with a certain figure in space and duration of time, yet in Ego. OF TIME AND SPACE. 185 this case too without ceasiag to be a complex of pami. feelinffs. When I take a succession of ,these parti- - — " S 21 cular objects, some occupying a larger and some a Theory of an smaller space, some occupying an indefinite and some a definite position in space, I am said to have trains of thought or association of ideas; and this is the condition in which consciousness is normally found, and which is the groundwork of aU its elaborate and completed reasonings. Qualities in the metaphysical sense of the term are then to be distinguished from qualities in the psychological sense. In the former they are feelings considered as occupying space as weU as time ; in the latter they are feelings considered as occupying all or any space except that occupied by the mind; which is the place of their effects and of their evidence. Qualities in the metaphysical sense are the objective aspect of feelings, objective to reflection when, halving drawn the distinction between Subject and Object, it proceeds to distinguish its method in doing this from the facts or objects in which its method is involved. Its method is to abstract provisionally from space; but the objects in which that method is involved all occupy space. Its method then is the subjective aspect of its objects. And this method is the sub- jective aspect of the empirical ego; the objects of it are the objective aspect. Both together are the ob- ject of reflection, and therefore both together are the object of metaphysical enquiry. AU thoughts which arise in reflection are modifi- cations, differentiations of this thought, that the Object is different from the Subject; or, in Kant's phrase, they are accompanied by an Ich denke. The two aspects of phenomena, subjective and objective, are Ego. 186 THE OEIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS pakti. therefore in reflection as inseparable yet as distinct Ch. III. '■•'-,.. - — as the two elements, formal and material, are distmct Theory of an and inseparable in direct perception. It is impossible here, and I do not pretend, to ex- hibit even in outline the various idealistic theories of the Ego, or in any way to enter on their respective merits. Hegel's logical ideahsm will be in some mea- sure discussed in another part. Here I have offered only an analysis of reflection, which seems to me to take away the common ground on which all idealistic theories of the Ego must stand. For whether the individual Ego is deduced from thp Absolute, or the Absolute from the individual Ego, it is reflection in both cases which furnishes the content of the concep- tion formed. It makes no difference whether the universe is considered as one vast person, or the in- dividual person as the constructor of an ideal universe ; reflection is equally the source of the conceptions ap- plicable to both. If reflection is a mode of intuition, and if its analysis has been rightly given, an answer has been supplied not only to the incorrect conclusions of theories of intellectual intuition, but also to theories which do not recognise reflection as intuition at aU. But the question of the possibility of a purely logical idealism, such as Hegel's, requires a more direct and express treatment, and must be postponed for the present ; and for this reason, that Hegel is as careful to bring together the two domains of nature and his- tory, ovcria, and yscsff/j, as I am to keep them apart; and as the ymsig is with him inseparably bound up with the oyff/a, and this ovaia, is of a logical nature, his theory of the origin of consciousness and of its (forms cannot be understood untU the nature of his logic is considered, and this will find its proper place in the OF TIME AND SPACE. 187 second part. It would indeed be a triumph of philo- part i. sophy, if the distinction between nature and history -^— ' could be really traversed and obliterated; but this Theory of an cannot be done unless the distinction between com- ^°' plete objects and their incomplete elements and as- pects, that is, the distinction between empiric and metaphysic, is first done away. Nevertheless the attempt to obliterate this distinction between nature and history is one of the greatest charms of Hegel's system. That which, in Hegel's system, most nearly corresponds to the distinction between the nature and history of consciousness, is his distinction between the Logic and the two remaining parts of his Ency- clopadie, first the Naturphilosophie which contains the Idea, or completed Concept-form, in its Andersseyn or differentiation from logic, that is, as percept or VorsteUung or series of Vorstellungen, and secondly the Philosophic des Geistes, which contains the com- bination of the two former, or the transformation of percepts and concepts in the actually existing indi- vidual consciousness. These three parts of his system then form, or exhibit, one complete actually existing Spirit, Geist, which is identical with the logical form of it, the Idea. Space, time, and matter are the three first of the percepts, the three first steps taken in the second part of his system, the NaturphUosophie ; the Idea, which is the culminating point or completion of the Logic, passes over, in obedience to its moving principle, which is Negation, into its difference; and the simplest and most general form of difference is outness, Aussereinanderseyn, and this is called Space. Space then differentiates itself and culminates in Time ; and time and space together culminate in Matter. Consciousness in its simplest and most general form, 188 THE ORIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS pakti. Empfindung, or feeling, is in a similar manner the -^ ' completion of the first step in the return of the Idea Theory oi an to itself, out of its differential state, to its state of ^°' identity , with itself, as Geist; that is, it is the first step in the third part of the Encyclopadie, the Philo- sophic des Geistes, So far from considering feeling as an ultimate element of consciousness, the material element, incapable of analysis, Hegel derives it ulti- mately irom thought in some of its forms, and con- siders that the ultimate nature of feeling consists in the circumstance of what is general, allgemeines, becoming also particular or determinate, bestimmt, without losing its character of generality. Das Nicht- animalische, he says, empfindet eben desshalb nicht, weil in demselben das Allgemeine in die Bestimmt- heit versenkt bleibt, in dieser nicht fur sich wird. Das gefarbte Wasser, zum Beispiel, ist nur fiir uns unterschieden von seinem Gefarbtseyn und von seiner Ungefarbtheit. Ware ein und dasselbe Wasser zu- gleich allgemeines und gefarbtes Wasser, so wiirde diese unterscheidende Bestimmtheit fiir das Wasser selber seyn, dieses somit Empfindung haben; denn Empfindung hat Etwas dadurch, dass dasselbe in seiner Bestimmtheit sich als ein allgemeines erhalt. Philosophic des Geistes. Encycl. § 399. Werke, vol. 7, 2d div. p. 115. This is, first, to take feeling in one of its second intentions instead of in its first intention; and secondly, and consequently, it is to deduce feeling from what I should call the formal element of consciousness as it appears in thought. Such is a very brief sketch of Hegel's system, so far as is requisite to understand the position which the question of the origin, or the history, of time, space, and consciousness occupies with him ; and it is OF TIME AND SPACE. 189 clear that nothing said in this chapter, from the point - Pam i. of view adopted here of the relation of the history of -^- a part to the nature of the whole, can be an answer Theory of an to a theory founded on such a totally opposite view as Hegel's. The answer to Kegel's theory requires an examination into the nature of logic, and the con- troversy must be a logical one. Nothing decisive can be brought forward therefore in the first part of this Essay. What I think has been now shown is, that self-consciousness is on the one hand not an ele- ment in all cases of consciousness, and on the other not a simpler but a more complex phenomenon than consciousness ; and farther, that self- consciousness does not reveal to us any Ego or Subject-Object, but only the empirical ego on the one hand and the pure ego or Subject on the other; neither of which can be regarded as the 'cause either of consciousness or of self-consciousness, still less of their forms, time and space, either generally or in the mind; and that self- consciousness, as the more complex phenomenon of the two, must be explained by a reference to con- sciousness, and the object of self-consciousness by a reference to the object of consciousness, by stating it in terms of time, space, and feeling, and pointing out the additional element, namely reflection, which it contains. The Subject, such as it is, indeterminate feeling in incomplete moments of time, lies within consciousness, is discovered therein by reflection ; and on account of its incomplete nature is incapable of being the cause of consciousness. Psychology there- fore is debarred from all theories of the Ego as the cause of consciousness, for the whole ground where the Ego could be found is searched by reflection, and the Ego not found there. But whether physiological Ego. 190 THE ORIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS paeti. psychology will ever succeed in establishing by in- -^— ' ference the existence of an immaterial Soul, or, as I S 21 . . Theory of an should prefer to express it, an intangible and invisible Soul, as the cause of consciousness, and in inserting such a soul between th.e material organ, the brain or nervous matter, and consciousness, or in placing it before both consciousness and the material organ as the invariable condition of both the one and the other, — this is a question which cannot perhaps yet be decided in the negative,- and which it is not in place to discuss here. What science would gain by this being established is not clear; a more compli- cated cause would be substituted for a simpler one, but then this would be, by hypothesis, demanded by the facts. But until this has been done, it remains to the metaphysician to have recourse to that cause or invariable condition of consciousness which is an empirical object of presentative perception, to follow the physiological path as far as it leads him, secure that on that path he is at least on the safe road towards truth. .But before proceeding to consider the third class of theories of the origin of consciousness, let me be allowed to illustrate by a comparison the process of consciousness developing into reflection, a process which has already been described as accurately and unfiguratively as the language at my command per- mits. Consciousness in this process may be com- pared to a man walking backwards, who does not see each step as he takes it, but only immediately after it has been taken; who sees the ground beneath his feet only when he has passed over it, not while it is being passed over. He sees the past, but neither the present nor the future landscape. It spreads to his OF TIME AND SPACE. 191 right and left and before his face, and ever a new paeti. crescent rises, and an old one drops out of view. Of - — ' the future landscape behind him he argues from that Theory if an which is now past and before him, and he can guide ^°' his course by an anticipatory judgment. The step however which he is at any moment taking has no more certainty than any of his future steps, and it is only by an anticipatory judgment that he knows that it will not plunge him into an abyss. The past land- scape which is now in view has been not only an un- known future but an unknown present landscape, and has become past only by going through the stage of the present. So it is also with consciousness deve- loping into reflection, only that consciousness and reflection are compelled and do not choose to adopt a blind and backward course. First consciousness is conscious of the landscape right and left, including the path before its feet, then of the growth of the path before it (and it is in distinguishing its own path from the rest of the landscape that reflection is completed), then of the unknown portion of the path and of the landscape which will become known the next moment, and finally of the presence of the same unknown moment in every step of the past and future as well as of the present. The diflferent phases of the landscape, as seen from different successive places in the path, represent the empirical ego, the unknown moment in every present step represents the Subject. The fact of our never being, even in reflection, conscious of the moment of consciousness, but only of its result, the fact that there is this unknown moment in the very act of reflection, that the object of consciousness and of reflection is known only after and not in the moment of consciousness, in the com- 192 THE ORIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS Past I. pleted and not in the uncompleted moment of con- — ' sciousness, a fact first told to us bv reflection, this § 21. „ •' Theotyofan fact seems to me to be one ground, at least, of the ineradicable sense of freedom, which we call free- dom of the will. Das gebe ich dir, says Jacobi, ohne Widerrede zu: dass das Gebiet der Freiheit das Gebiet der Unwissenheit sey. Ich setze nur noch hinzu : Einer dem Menschen uniiberwindlichen. Werke, vol. 2, page 322. But I do not know tha* Jacobi would have given his words such an appli- cation. _ § 22. . S 22. I come now to the third class of theories, The physio- ■' ,■,,,, logical theory, that class usually but wrongly distmguished as ma- terialistic, and which ought properly to be distin- guished as physiological. For the first class of theo- ries is also materiaHstic according to the true meaning of the term. Some matter the Soul of those theories must possess, or it would not be an object at aU. " If matter, sure the most refined, High wrought and tempered into mind, Some darling daughter of the day, And bodied by her native ray ;" this it may be, — ^but it is matter luxmistakeably still. Both these classes of theories are materialistic in the same sense of the term, and both become equally ob- jectionable, if it is objectionable to be one-sided, only - if they are put forward as the whole account to be given of consciousness, if they profess to decide the nature of consciousness by an enquiry into its origin and history in the mind. On this point I must say a few more words before entering into the physiological theory. The analysis of the phenomenon of reflection has brought us back to the conception of subject and or TIME AND SPACE. 193 object, as two aspects of the same thing, co-extensive part i. and coeval with each other, the conception which ■^— ' was exhibited, though imperfectly, in the diagram in The physio- the preceding chapter. And since reflection is the "^"^ ^^' last effort of consciousness, the final analysis which is reached by reflection must be the ultimate analysis and nature of the thiug analysed; the conception ex- hibited by it cannot be overridden by, or made sub- ordinate to, any other mode of conceiving objects. Accordingly, every thing that follows in this chapter, the enquiry into the history and origin of conscious- ness, must be entirely subordinate to that conception of the nature of consciousness and its objects, as two aspects of one and the same thing. But how is this to be done; in what way can the origin of conscious- ness be conceived, when it has been shown that it is coeval and coextensive with its objects, with its forms, time and space, and with its material element or feeHngs, these being infinite both in time and space? To enquire into the origin of consciousness is to suppose that there was a time when, and a space where, it did not exist; yet reflection has forbidden us to suppose that there ever was such a time and such a space. Can consciousness have a beginning in time and space, and yet be coeval and coextensive with time and space ; or be coeval and coextensive with its objects, and yet be preceded by some of its objects as its causes? The individual consciousness seems to have an origin in time and space,- before which objects existed; and to await its end in time and space, after 'a short life, after which objects wiU exist as before. Yet these objects before and after Hfe are objects only of the individual consciousness, and when either of these two relatives are taken 194 THE NATUEE OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. away, the other, which is only its relative, must it - — " seems share its fate. Here is a manifest contradic- The physio- tion, or at any rate what seems to be such; and the ogi eory. ^^^^^ q£ ^^iq difficulty being reaUy felt is the fact of the many theories adopted in order to escape from it. Three ways have been struck into, corresponding to the three classes of theories exhibited in this chap- ter, and adopting the same principles respectively, in order to explain the origin and history of the world or of consciousness. Each of these ways is essentially a theory of an Absolute, and each trans- forms the theory of origin from a subordinate theory into a theory sometimes covertly and sometimes pro- fessedly complete and all-embracing. Corresponding to the first class of theories there is the theory of thorough-going Idealism. It escapes from the diffi- culty of supposing that the individual consciousness has an origin in time and space, and yet that time and space and objects exist only as objects of con- sciousness, by conceiving that the objective side of the equation or pair of relatives, that is, the objects of consciousness, are a mere appearance, a mirror, of the other side, consciousness itself; that consciousness is the only real existence, while its objects are a phantasm of consciousness, thrown off by it and last- ing only while consciousness exists, consciousness existing . absolutely and in itself, and out of reference to any object whatever. Corresponding to the third class of theories is the theory of thorough-going ma- terialism; as idealism annihilates objects, so mate- rialism consciousness. The origin of consciousness is here directly in question. Consciousness is con- ceived as a phantasm, or a mirror, of objects which exist really in time and space, of magnitudes which logical theory. OF TIME AND SPACE. 195 to US are " as good as infinite ;" certain combinations pakt i. of these objects, objects which are accepted as really — existing, without question as to their nature, that is, _ Thlphysio- as an Absolute, produce for a time a sort of phantasm which has the capacity of consciousness, but which is nevertheless a mod? of objects. These two theories, absolute idealism and absolute materialism, are the logical results reached, or to be reached, by following up the enquiry into the origin and history of the world, or of consciousness, as if it was the whole question ; instead of keeping that enquiry subordinate to the question of nature. The theories of the second class are already theories of an Absolute. They do not subordinate the enquiry into origin to that into nature, nor that into nature to that into origin, but they keep the two in balance and combine them at every step. This class of theories alone has been adequately worked out; it is represented by Hegel. Neither consciousness alone nor its object alone is the Absolute, the cause of the other, or the reality of which the other is the phantasm; both are united in- separably, and only together are they the Absolute. Thus the Absolute has a nature, it is to be subject and object, consciousness and its objects, at once. This nature of the Absolute is Der BegrifF. Its con- sciousness is Der Geist ; its object is Die Idee. In its infinite and eternal development every one of the forms which it throws up or assumes, however im- perfect, contains this same nature ; objects are never the cause of consciousness, nor consciousness of ob- jects. Such is its nature ; but what is its history, and what the origin of the forms of thought and of objects which it throws up or assumes in its develop- ment? Its nature, der Begriff, is to develop itself. 1% THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS pabt I. to unfold all that it has in it, in Hegel's phraseology, ^— ' to become an-und-fiir-sich aU that it is already an The physio- sich. How SO? Its nature is to be subject and ob- logioal theory. . , , -j. ^ i j.- j. i- ject, two opposites always, and sometimes contradic- tories, at once. It is all subject, but it is aU ob- ject; it is all object and subject? but it is neither alone; therefore it is Begriff, for a Begriff or Con- cept-form is that which is the Identity of contradic- tories. In other words, the nature of the Absolute, der Begriff, is to produce ever new forms because it contains in itself Negation. Negation is the es- sential point in the Begriff, and two negations com- plete every Begriff; and the Begriff itself is the to rt Yiv eimt of the Absolute ; negation therefore is the mainspring of its development or history. The his- tory and the nature are one and the same thing; it is only the special determinate forms of existence, the inadequate Concepts, Begriffe, which have an origin. Such briefly and inadequately expressed is one view of the grandest idea which the mind of man has ever conceived. Thus the theory of the second class has no par- tial theory of origin, of origin considered as sub- ordinate to nature, corresponding to it, because it contains both itself, and precludes the possibOity of a partial theory founded on the same principle. The two partial theories of origin are theories of the first and of the third class. Reasons have already been offered for rejecting theories' of the first class; the third class of theories has yet to be examined. But the question remains to be previously answered, how the apparent contradiction is to be solved be- tween the equal claims of nature and origin, the avoidance of which contradiction was the motive OF TIME AND SPACE. 197 ■which caused the substitution of the theories of ab- Paet i. solute idealism and absolute materialism in the place -- - " of subordinate and partial theories corresponding to Thejphysid- them. On what principle can the question of origin "^^ ^°^' be made subordinate to the question of nature? The true answer is the same in some respects with that of Hegel. It is, that the questions of nature and his- tory of consciousness and its objects are, though not identical, yet inseparably combined ; but that since both of them, nature and history, are infinite in time and space, no question of origin can arise about them ; while questions both of history and origin arise with respect to any and every particular object of con- sciousness. The history of consciousness is founded in its nature as much, though not in the same way, as in Hegel's theory. The history of consciousness is founded in its nature, not because its nature is the Concept-form and contains Negation, but because Time is one of its forms ; consciousness begins to have a history as soon as it begins to exist, and that is at any point you can reach the furthest, going back into infinite time. All particular objects of consci- ousness on the other hand have an origin as well as a history; and one of these particular objects of con- sciousness is the connection of the empirical ego with that small portion of the universe which is most fre- quently presented actually, and may be presented always to consciousness, that is, T^th the body inha- bited by it. In other words the conscious life of the empirical ego is the object of the investigations of psychology. Consciousness is a term of very wide meaning, and therefore may embrace very different particular meanings. Hence the apparent contradic- tion. If consciousness is taken to mean either the 198 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. Subject or the subjective aspect of phenomena, it has Ch. III. no oriffia : if it is taken to mean the conscious life of The physio- the empirical ego, as distinguished from the universe, ogio eoiy. ^^ -^^ ^^ origin, as a particular object of consci- ousness. The conscious life of an individual, or of the empirical ego, may be imaged as a ring sliding along a pole, from end to end, to which ring cords are attached going off from it in all directions, so as to make it the centre of a globe of which the cords are radii. During life, that is, from the time when the ring is put on the pole to that when it falls off at the other end, it is in connection with infinity by means of the cords. The cords represent the percep- tions and their objects in infinite time and space. The ring and the cords in the comparison are both tangible objects, and similarly the empirical ego in connection with its body is itself an object of con- sciousness in just the same sense as other objects are, namely, it is one of the objects which constitute the objective aspect of phenomena; it is as much an ob- ject as those objects are which are farthest removed from it in space and time ; before reflection entered there was no difference at all, both were phenomena; after reflection, both became objects, differing in space and time relations, the conscious life of the empirical egO occupying that portion of space which is always nearest to the centre, which the Subject always per- ceives, or may perceive, whenever it perceives any thing in space, and that portion of time which im- mediately precedes the moment of reflection. The connection of this portion of time and space with the more distant portions of both is the question of psychology. Any moment however short in the course of the OF TIME AND SPACE. 199 ring along the pole is sufficient to allow the Subject Pakti. in the empirical ego to perceive an infinity of time -— ' and an infinity of space. The Subject in the empi- The physio- rical ego is the correlate of all objects whensoever °^'"^ ^°'^' and wheresoever they may be, whether objects of psychology or objects of metaphysic. Existence is the sum of those objects ; existence is presence in consciousness. Consciousness however has, through its objects, a fixed position in time and space, in the living body. Time and space are the forms with which it operates, perceives, or is conscious. Feel- ings fillin g those forms and moulded into them are the objects which it perceives. Those objects in space which are the farthest off are often the last to be perceived, a wider and wider range of the heavens is taken in by means of astronomical instruments ; ob- jects which are farthest off in time are often the last to be perceived, witness the problems of geology. Now with reference to space there is not likely to be any difficulty; but with reference to time it may appear strange to some, that what is perceived first should not always be conceived as existing first. The reverse is the rule, giving rise to the expression, " last in order of knowledge and first in order of ex- istence." As we go on and on in investigation, we go back and back in order of nature. Instead of making the object last perceived the object last pro- duced, we conceive it as having preceded the object perceived before it. Yet it was said in the preceding chapter and repeated here, that to be perceived was to exist, that existence was presence in consciousness. If so, it may be said, ought not the order of existence to be me same as the order of perception? This is the case when future objects or events are in ques- 200 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS pakt I. tion ; when we imagine the future, that is, follow the — chain of effects instead of causes of existence, that The physio- which is last in order of perception is also, as a rule, logical theory. ■, , . -, c • -r>ii ni last m order oi existence. Both the past and the future, the past dating back from the time of- birth, and the future dating forward from the present mo- ment of consciousness, are objects of the imagina- tion, and are both constructed out of the same fund, namely, the fund of perceptions presentative and re- presentative, which have been present from the time of birth to the present moment of consciousness. The life-time, being a fixed moment in time, with time before it and after it, causes those objects which are imagined last to be placed at the furthest point of time from itself; that is, earliest in past time, latest in future time; and thus the apparent anomaly, of what is last in order of knowledge being first in order of time, is removed. There is thus a double order, of knowledge and of existence; a progress in two directions at once, for the order of knowledge is itself a prolongation of the order of existence in a forward direction, whUe the objects which it imagines as existing in past time are a prolongation of the order of knowledge in the reverse direction. This is what I understand to be in Hegel's mind when he speaks of the progress of the development of the Begriff being a progress at once in two directions, a Riickkehr and a Fortgang, a Vertiefen into and an Entwickelung out of its essence. Everywhere what Hegel says must be interpreted, as alone it can be expressed, by a reference to the forms of time and space. The forms of time and space lie at the root of all the con- ceptions he forms of the universe and of thought. I do not say only that the language he employs and OF TIME AND SPACE. 201 must employ involves, depends on, and expresses pabti. those forms, for this is by no means conclusive ; but — ' that the meaning of that language itself rests entirely The phyeio- on time and space, and the thoughts represent objects "^"^ *'"^' only in those forms. Every thing which is not contained in the incom- plete moment of consciousness, the Subject, is an ob- ject of consciousness, and every thing has existence in the same sense ; the objects of existence previous to birth are objects of imagination, that is, objects not simply represented, but constructed out of ob- jects represented, representations in a new shape. Past and future objects, each kind dating from the present moment, are present in consciousness as past and future, because time and space are forms of • every moment of consciousness. Past and future objects are revealed to us and exist in present con- sciousness as the long line of Banquo's descendants are revealed by the glass carried by the eighth of the royal phantoms in Macbeth. Their existence as past and future objects includes in it a reference to the present moment of consciousness. The empirical ego belongs to past, present, and future time. The connection of the empirical ego with the body belongs, as an object of representation and not of imagination, to the present and part of the past time only. All objects without distinction have the same title to existence, namely, presence in consciousness ; but all have not the same certainty, duration, or truth. That there has been a course of existence prior to the birth of the empirical ego into the body, or, what is the same thing, of the body into the em- pirical ego, no consciousness can doubt. Although this is an object of the imagination, it is not on 202 THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS pabt I. that account uncertain. It is the province of reason- Ch III -^ ' ing to decide on the certainty or the truth of objects The physio- and classcs of objects. Up to the present moment of ogioa eory. gQQg(J£Q^gJJggg^ then, there has been a series of objects and events, empirical, taking place in the order of ■ existence, and of which the connection of the body with the empirical ego is part. The invariable con- nections between the objects and events contained in this series, and in the future as well as in the past, since "Cujus rei ordo est, etiam prsedictio est," are the field of enquiry of the special sciences. Psych- ology investigates the invariable antecedents of the conscious life of the empirical ego ; not what con- sciousness is, but which objects of consciousness are they which invariably precede, in order of exist- ence, those feelings or objects of reflection which exist in the body during life, and the removal of which invariably precedes the cessation of those feel- ings. The physiological class of theories on this question remains to be examined. According to the physiological theories, the^ ex- istence of the conscious life of the empirical ego, or of the connection of the empirical ego with the body, depends on the existence of nervous mat- ter, and its degrees of development depend on the degrees of development of that nervous matter in quantity and complexity. Broussais in the 1st chap- ter of his work De I'lrritation et de la Folie, vol. i . page 4. ad edit., expresses himself thus : On voit que I'irritabilit^ est commune a tous les ^tres vi- vants, depuis le vdg^tal jusqu'a I'homme, et qu'elle est continue ; tandis que la sensibility est une faculte propre a certains atiimaux, qu'elle n'est pas con- tinue, et qu'elle ne se manifeste que sous des con- OF TIME AND SPACE. 203 ditions d^termin^es. Ces conditions sont I'exist- parti. ence d'un appareU nerveux, muni d'un centre, c'est- -^— ' a-dire d'un cerveau, — et un ^tat particulier de cet Thephysio- appareil^ car U n'est pas toujours apte k donner a "^^ ^'"^' I'animal la conscience des moUvements qui se pas- sent dans ses tissus. Nervous matter, organised, possessing a centre, that is, a brain existing in a particular state or condition, is here pointed out as the invariable condition of conscious life. Taking the word brain as a brief expression for un appareil nerveux muni d'un centre, the invariable condition of conscious life wiU be, briefly expressed, a brain in a particular state. What this particular state consists in has not been determined, but what it consists in and what it is caused by are the great secrets, yet undiscovered, of physiological psycho- logy. On these two questions increasing light may be expected to be thrown by physiological investi- gation, and to such an extent that they may be ultimately answered as fully as any other questions of physical science. Differences ia the solutions of- fered or attempted of these questions make the dif- ferences between the several physiological theories of psychology, which all start from the one common basis above indicated. Against this coinmon basis I thiok there are no valid objections ; I believe it to be established beyond doubt by scientific research. The brain is an object which may be perceived pre- sentatively ; and the only question is as to the in- variability of the connection between it and the feel- ings of the conscious life of the empirical ego. That it is the cause or contains the causes of those feelings is an inference, and in this respect the physiological theories agree with those of the first class ; they both 204c THE NATURE OF THE COGNITIONS paet r. seek tlie causes of the conscious life of the empirical Ch III -— " ego in something which is not included in that con- The physio- scious life itsclf J they both infer a cause, and do not eoiy. g^^ .^ ^^ analysis of the feelings caused. Conse- quently no physiological theory can logically confuse the brain with its feelings or thoughts ; the separa- tion of the two things in kind is provided for by the metaphysical distinction between feelings and quali- ties. Feelings can never be qualities unless they are considered as gathered up into fixed portions of space. • The brain itself is such a complex of feelings, but the feelings supported or caused by the brain are by the hypothesis, by the condition of the enquiry, exempted from such a transformation into qualities, for it is their connection as feelings with the brain as a complex of qualities which is being examined. The inference of a cause supposes it to be different from its effect, and not contained in it. Four things are to be distinguished, — ^the Subject ; the empirical ego, or the world of feelings ; the uni- verse of objects, or the world of qualities ; the brain, a particular object consisting of certain qualities, as the cause of the connection of the empirical ego with a small and distinct portion of the world of qualities. The Subject is no empirical or complete object, any more than time, space, and feeling are. The union of the three last constitutes empirical or complete phenomena; the union of phenomena with the Sub- ject constitutes empirical or complete objects. The Subject taken alone wotdd be necessarily conceived as out of aU time and space, in other words, the at- tempt to consider it as an object is directly self-con- tradictory ; the moment it is conceived as an object by union with phenomena, that moment it is con- OF TIME AND SPACE. 205 ceived as fixed in time and space, as belonging to the pam i. empirical ego. The natural tendency of every one is - — to conceive every thing as an empirical obiect, to Thephysio- 1 4.V 1 i J ^ i- 1 logical theory. make even the elements and aspects of phenomena empirical, and to deal with them as such. Pure metaphysic, which refuses to hypostasise ultimate elements and aspects of phenomena, has thus neces- sarily an unsatisfactory because incomplete appear- ance ; and there will always be a tendency to trans- cend it, and make some of its elements and aspects empirical, and therefore absolute. An idealist who should hypostasise the Subject might say, If the Sub- ject is a necessary aspect of phenomena, and pheno- mena are eternal and infinite a parte ante, must not the Subject be so also ? But this is to make the Subject into something which, besides being a mem- ber of a relation, has a separate and complete exist- ence of its own ; just as, for instance, master and ser- vant are members of a relation, and one cannot be a master without having a servant, nor a servant with- out having a master, yet a man who is a master can exist as a man without having a servant, and a man who is a servant the same. Here the existence sepa- rately as men is a prior condition of the subsequent relation of master and servant. But the Subject has no such prior separate existence, the only existence which it has is as an aspect of phenomena; and this does not require that it should, alone, exist in the time and space relations which the complete pheno- mena exist in. The often employed comparison of fight and darkness is much more to the point in this case. The first act of creation in the book of Genesis is " Let there be light : and there was light." The arising of light created an infinity and an eternity of 206 THE NATUEE OF THE COGNITIONS pabt I. darkness a parte ante ; at that moment, fixed by the ~^— ' arising of light, there began to be darkness which had The phyaio- existed from eternity. Light created darkness in the logical theory. i? • • -x • -i i ^ j i sense oi givmg it a meaning and a nature ; for dark- ness is one of those things which have meaning only in reference to something else, the first intention of which is a second intention. Darkness is the negation of all feeling of sight ; light on the contrary has a first intention, it is the feeling of sight ; in its second intention it is the negation of darkness. Hence light gives existence to darkness, which nevertheless occu- pies an eternity and an infinity previous to the exist- ence of light. So must the relation of the Subject and objects prior to it be conceived; the Subject gives existence to objects, which have existed previously, in the sdnse of giving them a meaning and a nature; for though contained in all phenomena it is not ob- served to be contained in them, and the moment of its being first observed is called the moment of its first coming into existence; and it is thus treated provisionally as a finite object which has a beginning, notwithstanding that its nature is to be no object at all, and consequently to escape from all notion of beginning and ending. What is true of the Subject is true also of the empirical ego and the world of qualities, the two members of the distinction between the subjective and objective aspect of phenomena, for the Subject is that moment of time on the completion of which this distinction, and consequently the two members of it, arise. These three, the Subject, the empirical ego, the world of qualities, are coexistent and coeval aspects of phenomena, and constitute the entire metaphysical analysis or logic of phenomena. When any one of them is taken and considered as an OF TIME AND SPACE. 207 object in relation to other objects, and as existing at part i, any point of time or of time and space together, which -— ' is done when they are considered as connected with The physio- a body or with a brain, — this is treating them pro- visionally as particular objects, for the purposes of reasoning, since we must reason in the forms of time and space, and assume time and space to be wider than any object which we limit by them in volition for the purpose of reasoning. But this assumption and this voluntary limitation cannot alter the nature of the objects, in this case the metaphysical members of analysis of phenomena, which are reasoned of; they must come out of the crucible of reasoning with the same nature with which they entered it, and the as- sumption which alone introduced them into it must be laid aside when they quit it. The very reasoning process itself, which limits them provisionally, is a part, and an extremely small part, of the thiags which it assumes to limit and to make into particular objects for itself. In such reasoning only can the Subject and the empirical ego be considered as arising or coming into existence at a particular moment in the existence of phenomena ; and when they are so con- sidered they become, ipso facto, the mind, the con- scious life of the empirical ego, the object of psycho- logy, instead of what they truly are, the empirical ego and the Subject. Difficult as it may be to become habituated to the distinction between the Subject and the conscious life of the empirical ego, or the mind, and to the consi- deration of the former as an aspect of all phenomena, and of the latter as an object among objects, it is yet not a self-contradictory theory; as those theories are which take mind for one thing and its objects for pfiVBl logical theory. 208 THE NATUEE OE THE COGNITIONS Part I. another, yet without resorting to an Absolute. In -^— ' those theories the question of nature and the question The physio- of historj hold an equkl rank. Empirical objects ^^' make mind what it is as its causes, and mind makes objects what they are in their nature. Both nund and its objects are empirical objects, and yet each is the cause of the other. Objects are the cause of the existence of mind, and yet mind is the cause of the existence of objects, since without mind objects would not be what they are, and therefore we could not tell that they were the cause of mind. And if it is said that objects cause mind first, and then appear to it in a new shape, as the objects we are acquainted with, this is to have recourse to an Absolute in the shape of the Ding-an-sich. Each claims to be the cause of the existence of the other, that is, the cause of the other in the same sense in which that other makes the same claim. These claims are not only incom- plete taken separately; that would be, by itself, no objection; but they are contradictory and incapable of combination, unless by making one or the other of the two objects, or both together, an Absolute. Transform however aU objects into modes of con- sciousness, that is, into the objective aspect of mind, and transform mind into the subjective aspect of objects, and the question of history and origin is at once subordinated to the question of nature. What is an object, a quality, time, space, , motion, causation, the series of objects in time, the series of objects in space? Take each separately and think of it, and the answer must be — a mode of consciousness. But in this the question of history is decided; the history or the sequence of causes of any object, however far back it may go, is a mode of consciousness ; that is to OF TIME AND SPACE. 209 say, is included in the question of nature. There is pabt i. nothing previous to consciousness, for those things -^ " which were supposed to be previous to it are modes The physio- of itself; the laws which govern the sequences and °^° ^'^' coexistences of these modes are all that can be en- quired into. There is nothing but time beyond time ; nothing but space beyond space ; the sum of things, existence, which is the objective aspect of conscious- ness, has no second intention, for it has nothing out- side itself or before itself, in relation to which it- stands. Consciousness and its objects are coeval and inseparable, two aspects of the same thing, which have no cause of existence out of themselves, but only a law of existence within themselves. Thus the question of origin and history, dealing with em- pirical objects, is subordinate to the question of na- ture dealing with metaphysical elements and aspects of objects. It is not only in this part of psychology that diffi- culties arise from the separation of mind from its objects, as two empirical objects different in nature. Here the difficulty is to see how objects can be the cause of consciousness as an object, when conscious- ness is the cause of them at the same time. Later on, a difficulty wiU be suggested by the course of the discussion as to the mode of the action and re- action of mind on objects of sight and touch, and these objects on mind ; how for instance a feeling of pain can cause the shutting of an eye, or the with- drawing of a hand, from a sunbeam or a candle. It is not only the physical action of the sensitive and motor nerves that is present and operative here ; the feelings of pain are not only present by the side of and along with these physical processes, but are links 210 THE ORIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. in the chaia of events, are caused by the action oit Ch III ■^~ ' the sensitive nerve, and produce the action on the The physio- motor ucrve. If not, why should exactly those ac- ogic eory. ^j^^^^g -^^ produced which withdraw the eye and the hand from the source of pain, the sunbeam or the candle? To escape from the pain, a final cause, is plainly the directing power, the motwe, m these actions ; feehngs are a causative link in the series of phenomena, not merely an accompaniment of a series of phenomena in the nerves and muscles. Here then mind must react on physical bodies. How is this to be conceived? It is clear that mind and physical bodies must be brought under some common cate- gory, or have some common nature. ?23. S 23. After the physiological theories of the ori- Origlnofthe . p , . ,.« » i . . formal eie- OTLn of the conscious liic of the empirical ego comes the consideration of the physiological theories of the origin of the formal element in the cognitions of the conscious individual mind, namely, of the cognitions of time and space. These theories may be reduced, so far as I know, to three, all of similar nature and distinguished only by their respective degrees of com- pleteness, according as they are founded on a single class of circumstances, or on the combination of this with a second, or with a second and a third class. They all seek the causa existendi of the cognitions of time and ^pace, during the conscious life, in objects; they all consider time' and space, existing in objects, as the cause of their existing also in the cognitions of the individual. The first of these three theories is, that time and space being universally present in ob- jects of presentative perception, in every state of the consciousness of an individual from birth to death, and being the only points in which all objects, how- OP TIME AST) SPACE. 211 ever dissimilar otherwise, invariably agree, become pabti. so habitual to the miad and assume such an excep- - — ' tional degree of persistency, that, although they differ ori^of the from other objects only in point of frequency of re- °™ent! ^ currence, which indeed is so great as to be universal presence in objects of presentation, they are soon re- garded by the individual who experiences them as essential parts of his mental structure, and in fact become such. The second theory agrees with the firgt so far as it goes, but adds a further circumstance in support of the conception common to both, namely, the circum- stance of the strength of inherited impressions. If aU the individuals of any generation are impressed as above described by time and space, those of succeed- ing generations will receive and transmit them with ever increasing accumulations of certainty, imtil they become inborn modes of consciousness, attached to and dependent on a particular inherited nervous or cerebral structure, which structure was produced originally by presentative perception of objects only in the first generation of men, as described in the first theory, and then being transmitted is fortified by the same constant perception in succeediag genera- tions. This second theory is insisted on and adopted by Mr. Spencer in his Principles of Psychology, Part IV. chap. 7. This theory, I may remark, is quite in accordance with that circumstance in which, as I have maintained, consists the true meaning of the term necessity, in the cognitions of time and space; but others I am aware have considered that this explanation of the origin of that necessity in cognition reduces it to an apparent necessity only, and in fact explains it away. In my view, the theory 212 THE ORIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. of origin in the conscious life of the empirical ego is ■^— ' but the complement of the theory of the nature of Origin of the these coguitions, so far as they are necessary ; whUe meait. in the view of many of those who hold, or reject, such a theory of their origin as the present, it is con- sidered to be antagonistic to and destructive of that theory of their nature in which they are exhibited as necessary ; and this in consequence of not keeping clear the distinction between the questions of history and nature. Similar has been the case with other doctrines in other subjects, for instance in anthro- pology with the doctrine of development of species by natural selection ; the dignity and nature of man has been thought to be endangered by any theory of his origin that did not consecrate a special creative act to the production of mankind ; but the question is here also, what man is, what his powers and endow- ments are, not how he or they came to be what they are, what the steps are by which his present actual position has been reached. It is of the greatest im- portance to keep these two questions, of history and nature, distinct; and the question of the history of any particular thing includes that of its origin, as the first link in its history. In psychology and meta- physic it is especially important, for the careful dis- tinction of these two questions can alone prevent us from falling into the onesidedness which is the re- proach of a materialism which has treated the ques- tion of origin as if it was the whole, question, over- riding, superseding, or supplying with a ready-made answer, the question of nature; which has thus given half truths for whole" truths, and in doing so prepared the way for a falling back into two opposite errors, the transformation of objects into a deceitful appear- OF TIME AND SPACE. 213 ance on the one hand, and into an absolute existence paht i. on the other. - — ' g 23 According to this second theory, the cognitions orfginofthe of time and space are, with the life of the empirical ment. ego of which they form a part, functions of the brain, and appear as a kind of intellectual instinct ; nor is there any thing absurd in regarding cognitions, as well as feelings and actions, as functional or in- stinctive. It is very probable that the phenomena which we call instinct, the actions which we class as instinctive, are due to transmitted habits, actions performed so invariably during countless generations, that, though at first performed with consciousness and discovered by a tentative process, they are at last performed miconsciously and spontaneously, for instance the action of the young of mammaha seek- ing the breast. Instinctive actions include both reflex and consensual nervous actions ; those are instinctive which appear to be performed for a purpose, in order to an end, but yet without apparent knowledge or perception of the end for which they are done, or in which the knowledge of the end is not the motive of the action. The terms instinct and instinctive are thus popular rather than scientific; they are the re- suits of a crude and not an exact theory of the phe- nomena to which they are applied; and it was this character of an end being sought blindly, and without apparent knowledge of it, which attracted attention, and caused the phenomena to be attributed to some divine or supernatural or unknown power; a power which inspired the action, as it were, in its own supe- rior wisdom and knowledge of what was fitting and requisite for the ends of nature. And what reason is there against supposing that a mode of cognition as 214 THE ORIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS Part I. well as a mode of action has in this way become Ch III . - — habitual and functional? Nothing or very little is 8 23, o •/ Origin of the indeed known of the process which takes place in the formal ele- - , , . . . , , ment. uervous matter of the bram m consciousness ; but it is impossible to suppose that consciousness takes place without action or movement of some sort in the nervous matter. It has been shown in the last chapter that movement is an all-pervading pheno- menon belonging to the kingdom of objects, though not an ultimate element of objects. The movements to which some cognitions are attached may, for aught that is known to the contrary, and in accordance with much which is known, have become habitual and functional, so that the cognitions attached to them may share in their habitual, that is, their func- tional nature ; or to put it in another light, that part of the movement essential to cognition, which is ap- propriated to the formal part of the cognition, may be the same in aU cases of cognition, and then the cognitions attached or resulting, namely, time and space, will derive their universal or functional pro- perty from this part of the movement. The third theory I will put in the form of a sug- gestion. The brain has been singled out as the cause of the conscious life of the empirical ego, yet not in isolation, without the concurrence of, and action and reaction with, other objects, but in such a sense that the entrance or addition of a brain to other objects completes the series of circumstances on the comple- tion of which the conscious life arises. Both the con- stitution of the brain and that of other objects are contributors to the existence of the conscious life with its properties such as have been described. Now it is well known that the nerves of the special senses OF TIME AND SPACE. 215 conduct only feelings each of its own special kind. parti. The optic nerve gives only feelings of light, the audi- — ' tory nerve only feelings of sound, and so on, whatever origLof the may be the means by which they are excited to ac- °™eiit! ^ tivity. Touch the optic nerve and a light is perceived, touch the auditory nerve and a sound is heard. Con- versely, no other nerves but those specially adapted for the purpose transmit special sensations; the optic nerve will not transmit sound, nor the auditory nerve hght. "Electricity may act simultaneously on all the organs of sense, — all are sensible to its action; but the nerve of each sense is affected in a different way, — becomes the seat of a dififerent sensation: in one the sensation of light is produced; in another, that of sound; in a third, taste; while in a fourth pain and the sensation of a shock are felt. Mechanical irritation excites in one nerve a luminous spectrum ; in another, a humming sound; in a third, pain. An increase of the stimulus of the blood causes in one organ spontaneous sensations of light; in another, sound; in a third, itching, pain, &c." Dr. J. Miiller's Elements of Physiology, Dr. Baly's transl., book iii. sect. 4. The sensations therefore of the special senses depend upon the particular constitution of the nerves of those senses. But on the other hand the sensations conducted by these nerves depend for their particular modifications upon the objects which excite them; what particular colour shall .be seen, what particular sounds shall be heard, depends upon the waves of Hght and of sound in the air, outside the organism. The properties of the nerve and those of the external object Umit and modify each other. Thus the matter of perceptions, the qualities of external objects, or the sensations in the perception of them, depend upon the 216 THE OEIGIN OF THE COGNITIONS pabt I. constitution of the nervous matter together with the Oh III . . -^— ' constitution of the obiect perceived : that a sound or S 23. . . Origin of the light shall be perceived depends upon the nerve, that ment. it shall be such and such a sound or light depends upon the object. May not the same hold good iu the case of the formal element in the same perceptions? Why should we attribute the appearance of sensations in the forms of time and space solely to the object, and not also to the constitution of the nerve? It is true that the time and the space occupied by percep- tions in the brain are not the same as the time and the space occupied by those same perceptions in the rest of the world of qualities ; in a short moment of cbnsciousness we can represent to ourselves a year, a century, or an age ; in a short moment of conscious- ness and in a small portion of nervous matter, the surface of the retina, we can present to ourselves a large portion of the expanse of heaven; in a short life- time and in a confined abode we can reproduce, and even produce in imagination, the perceptions of a great part of the worlds of history and astronomy. But may not the same conception hold good here which held good in the case of the matter of percep- tions ? May it not depend on the constitution of the nervous matter that we have time and space at all in our perceptions, and on the particular constitution of the objects perceived that we have this and'that size, length, figure, and order in the perceptions? It is true that, if we consider the perceptions as they exist in the brain, the relations of the time and the space which they occupy there to the time and the space occupied by them in the rest of the world of qualities have not been determined ; that, though the time they occupy in the brain is definite, yet the space is inde- or TIME AND SPACE. 217 finite except in the cases of the extremities of the paet i. Ch III nerves of sight and touch. But the same may be ^- ' said of the sensations or matter of perceptions ; in the Origin of the brain these are indefinite, and irrespective of the par- ment. ticular sensations of particular objects; the nerve- constitution supplies only a limit to the kind, that is, to the variations of the particular objective sensa- tions. So also the brain can be conceived as suppljnng a limit to the kind or to the variations of the parti- cular size, figure, length, and order, in time and space, of the perceptions of objects. The constitution of the brain, as possessing extension and duration, deter- mines that objects shall appear as possessing time and space relations, while the constitution of the objects, in the rest of the world of quahties outside the brain, determines what particular relations these shall be. . Thus the time and space and qualities or matter of objects come equally from within, equally from without, the brain; and owe their origin equally to the constitution of the brain, equally to the constitu- tion of other objects. This being supposed to be their first origin in the conscious life of the empirical ego, room is then left for the habit of the first theory and the inheritance of the second to operate, to continue the work, and to give the sense of necessity to these elements of perceptions. But the question of origin in the conscious Hfe, of conditions of existing of both elements, formal and material, siace both elements are equally necessary, should be decided by analogy. If the material element is due partly to the constitu- tion of the brain irrespective' of other objects, it is according to analogy to suppose that the formal ele- ment is so too ; and that objects appear in conscious- ness, in the conscious life of the empirical ego, as 218 ORIGIN OF THE COGOTTIOjNS OF TIME AND SPACE. Part 1. Ch. in. §23. Origin of the fonnal ele- ment. extended, not only because they have extension them- selves, but partly because the nervous matter has extension; that they appear as having duration partly because the nervous matter, as well as the objects, has duration. It is more according to analogy to suppose the cognitions of time and space coeval with the conscious life, because the nervous matter in which it arises occupies time and space, than to suppose the conscious Kfe, so far as relates to the form of its per- ceptions, existing first as a tabula rasa or sheet of white paper, which is first modified and written on from without; for the nervous matter in which it arises is not such a tabula rasa, but has both form and duration. Or if the figure of a tabula rasa is adhered to, it ought to be employed with the addition of a " per impossibile," for even a tabula rasa has ex- tension and duration. Indeed it appears to be impos- sible to suppose conscious life arisiag in an extended and enduring material substance, and yet arising not modified or conditioned by the properties or modes of that substance, as well as by the objects which excite that substance to reaction. CHAPTER IV. PRESENTATION AND EEPEESENTATION. Nun ist aber in der Anschauung nicht die blosse Wirkung eines Gegenstands, sondem der Gegenstand selbst unmittelbar gegen- wartig. Schelling. § 24. The analysis of consciousness and of pheno- paeti. mena is now complete; the elements and the aspects ^f;^- of all phenomena and of every phenomenon have been The fi^mcai pointed out. It remains to exhibit these elements ^^°' and aspects in conjunction, as constituting empirical objects and the complex of such objects in the uni- verse of feehngs ; that is, first, to analyse the compo- sition of the empirical ego statically; in other words, to examine the combination of the elements of con- sciousness in states of consciousness in which the time and the space are considered fixed and limited, ab- straction being made of the states of consciousness which precede and follow the one imder examination ; and secondly, to analyse the composition of the empi- rical ego dynamically; that is, to examine the laws of change from one state of consciousness to another. The empirical ego and the laws of its constitution and of its progress, of its nature and of its history, are the object of enquiry henceforward; not, as before, the nature of its constitution and the history of its ego. 220 PRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION. paet X. laws, but the laws of its nature as exhibited in the ■^— ' combination of its elements, and in the history or § 24. . The empirical progress of its development; the general and some- times the universal laws to which its combinations and its development anywhere and everywhere are found to conform. The empirical ego is the complex of all feelings or states of consciousness, as distinguished by reflec- tion from the qualities which are their objective aspect. These states of consciousness are either di- rect or reflective perceptions, or they may contain both direct perception and reflection. Reflections or reflective processes in consciousness are therefore themselves part of the empirical ego, and the objects of a further reflection ; they hold two positions, bear two characters, first as phenomena of the empirical ego, states of consciousness simply, or direct percep- tions, second as processes of reflection, inasmuch as their objects are other states of consciousness which have preceded them. In the present chapter abstrac- tion will be made of this their second character, or their character as reflective, and they will be con- sidered only in their first character as direct percep- tions or states of consciousness. The eighth chapter will be devoted to consider them in their character of reflective processes. It must be remembered that an investigation like the present is itself an exercise of reflection. The empirical ego must on the other hand, for the purposes of the present enquiry, be distinguished from objects as qualities which do not enter into it as feelings. The body, to which the consciousness of the empirical ego belongs, enters into it as a complex of feelings, and as such is combined with every one, or ego. PRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION. 221 nearly every one, of its states of consciousness ; but part i. the brain which is the cause of its conscious life does ^— ' not do so ; it may be represented in some unfrequent The empirical states of its consciousness, but it is not commonly pre- sent as a feeling in the empirical ego. It is univer- sally present as a contributing cause of the existence and continuance, and its changes are present as con- tributing causes of the changes, of the feelings in the empirical ego ; but this is a fact known by inference, and when we draw this inference or examine the con- nection between the brain and the empirical ego, that is, reason psychologically or as psychologists, then first the brain is present as a feeling and an object of representation. The brain therefore, as a complex of qualities, has no more to do with the analysis of the combination and development of the feelings of the empirical ego, than the air we breathe, or the food we eat, or the earth we stand on; all these are parti- cular objects of the empirical ego, necessary to its existence indeed, but forming an infinitesimal part. of the complex of its feelings. To make these into ob- jects of enquiry, in enquiring into the empirical ego, would involve giving a history of the objects of con- sciousness in all its branches, such as astronomy, geology, civU, political, and philosophical history, cheinistry, anatomy, physiology, and so on. But it is the laws of development of the empirical ego, not the history of that development, which is the pur- pose of the remainder of this Essay. Leaving then the brain and its connection with consciousness apart, I shall endeavour to exhibit an accurate picture of the complex of feelings presented or represented in the empirical ego. Of the four things disj;inguished from each other 222 PRESENTATION AND EEPEESENTATION. paet l in § 22, one, the empirical ego, has now been distin- ■^— ' guished more at length from two of the others, the The empirical Subject Or reflection as such, and the brain ; the ^^°' fourth is the world of quahties, which is in fact the objective aspect of the empirical ego. The world of qualities and the world of feelings are identical. There is no division between two objects, the feeling here, the quality there ; but both are the same. It is nevertheless with the subjective aspect only that we have to do here; though it might appear that, since both were the same, it would be indifferent which aspect should be chosen for examination. It is not indifferent, for this reason. In their subjective aspect objects can be presented in their first inten- tion, as they are to consciousness alone, without re- ference to their relations to any other objects; the same objects as quaUties are very often incapable of being presented in their first intention, and without a reference to their causes, or effects, or some other re- lation to other objects. The ultimate analysis of any object win always be found presented in the form of a feeling and not of a quality ; when any quality is named, there will always the further question arise. And what is that? The answer wiU be a feeling. Heat is a quality; it may be analysed into, motion, and a particular kind of motion or combination of motions is heat; that is, one kind of motion is pro- duced by another or composed of others, and the first kind of motion, heat, when described as so produced or composed, is described by a second intention. Heat in its first intention, however, when it is so pro- duced, what is it? The only answer possible is, that it is heat as a feeling. Beyond this we cannot go. The subjective aspect includes the objective in it. ego. PRESENTATION AND EEPEESENTATION. 223 which can be evolved out of it by reflection. The pabti. ■' Ch. IV. subjective aspect, feelings and not qualities, are the — ' kingdom of first intentions and of ultimate analysis The empirical at once, and therefore the object-matter of meta- physic. In investigating the laws of any special set of objects or portion of phenomena, that is, in any special science, the reverse is the method proper to be adopted; the objective aspect of things, or objects as qualities, are the most proper to be kept in view; for, first, the relations of objects and qualities to each other in time and space are the object-matter of in- vestigation, and not the ultimate analysis of each separately, nor the comparison of this ultimate ana- lysis with that of all other separate objects in other special sciences. Each special science works in a portion of the objective world, with only partial re- ference to other special sciences. What objects and qualities are towards each other, in what portions they will combine with each other, what they will produce when brought together, what changes they will produce in other objects ; these and the like are the questions of the special sciences, not what they are for consciousness alone. Consequently the special sciences make abstraction of this their subjective as- pect, and treat objects as collections of qualities, with- out reference to the feelings which they may at any moment be translated into. There is a well known dictum of Bacon's which seems at variance with the view here taken of the entire correlation of the subjective and objective as- pect ,of things. This dictum is to the effect, that the subtUty of nature far "exceeds the subtilty of the human intellect, and seems therefore to imply that 224 PRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION. pabt I. the latter is no perfect correlate of the former. The ■^—' dictum is undeniably true, but it does not for aU The empirical that destroy the correlation. The subtUty of nature is a fact of inference and representation ; wherever it has not been completely fathomed and perceived by, or translated into, the subtUty of the intellect, there - it is inferred and represented as existing, and as remaining to be some day perhaps perceived and fathomed. It exists no doubt ; and exists as an inference and a representation, not yet translated into subjectivity in its completeness. The existing subtUty of the intellect is far inferior to this repre- sented subtUty of nature ; but on the other hand, the subtUty of the inteUect, completely adequate to the subtUty of nature, exists also in representation and by inference, only that it is referred to the future, as that of nature to the past and the present. Some day or other aU the subtUties of nature wiU be per- ceived, and the subtUty of the inteUect brought up to a correlation with them. Both subtUties are in- ferences and representations, only one is represented as past and present, the other as future. The pre- sent degree of subtUty of the inteUect is certainly far inferior to the present, inferred and represented, subtUty of nature ; and man is regarded as the dis- coverer of a previously existing object ; and in this sense the dictum of Bacon is true, without doing any violence to the conception of the perfect correlation of the two aspects of phenomena. Since the world of qualities is the correlate of the world of feelings, and the general laws of both are under examination, if any general laws of one of the two correlates are discovered, they must also appear as general laws of the other. There cannot be ego. PEESENTATION AND REPRESENTATIOK. 225 general laws of consciousness which are not general Part i. laws of objects ; and this it will be found there are, - — " and that they bear both characters, objective and The empirical subjective. Since however these laws are discovered by reasoning, the proper place for their statement will be when the reasoning process is examined, that is, in the chapter on voluntary redintegration. Every universal law of consciousness is also an universal law of objects ; and every law of objects, universal in a particular field, such as chemistry or mechanics, is also an universal law of consciousness when occupied in that field. Presentative perceptions are the source from which aU others are derived, and from their vivid and inevitable nature they give the law to all others. Y,et they are not entirely constant and unchangeable; on the contrary, they are capable of modification by representative perceptions to which they have themselves given birth. Two kingdoms thus arise, one of objects, presented and represented, considered as constant and unmodified, whether pre- vious to or in consequence of modification ; the other of objects, presented and represented, considered as subject to, or in course of, modification ; the first is what is commonly meant by the term laws of nature, the second is what is commonly meant by the term man's empire over nature. It would be more correct to call the first the world as it is at any particular moment; and to call the second the world as it might be, or as capable of modification in certain ways. The second is entirely subordinate to the first, for the very circumstances and laws, which constitute and govern the modification of the world, are circumstances and laws which belong to, and are part of, the world as it actually is. Presentative and Q ego. 226 PEESENTATION ANB REPRESENTATION. pakti. representative perceptions, inseparably mingled to- — gether, constitute one universe of qualities and of The empirical feeliugs, ouc univcrsc governed by laws under which it functionates in one unchangeable course, but in the bosom of which, and among those very laws, there are found some which modify the operations performed under the guidance of others; and, since the proportion of the latter set of laws is small in comparison to the former set, the latter appear to be changers of the general order of the universe; the truth being, that the laws which govern the entire order of the universe embrace both sets of laws, both the modifying and the modified; and this order of the universe, this unchangeableness including change, it is, which alone deserves the title, or can be ex- pressed in the terms, of universal and necessary laws of the world of empirical objects. The change and modification here said to be in- troduced into the world as it actually is, at any par- ticular time, is not the change or modification of one set of objects in nature by another set, such as, for instance, the change introduced into the nature of plants or animals by transplantation into different soil, cHmate, or circumstances ; or such as the change introduced into inorganic matter by the implanting of organic matter, or vice vers& ; or the evolution of force or motion of one kind from force or motion of another kind, and the reaction of thei one on the other. All such cases of change, however striking, are instances of the regular and general course of nature, of the first of the two sets of laws mentioned above. The distinction here intended between those two sets of laws, the change apparently effected in the former by the latter, is a change and a distinction PRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION. 227 which arises from certain feelings of the empirical Paeti. f^zx TV ego which are localised within and not without the — ' body; it arises from the feehngs of pleasure, pain, The empirical effort, or volition; and the distinction is therefore ^^''" correctly drawn, though not correctly expressed, in saying that it is the distinction between the laws of nature on the one hand, and man's empire over nature on the other. The foregoing remaris will serve as an introduction to the remainder of the Essay. § 25. Presentative perception is never found by §25. itself unmixed with representative perception ; indeed sentation. the greater part of any state of consciousness, except the very earliest in Hfe, is composed of representa- tions. Representative perceptions are repetitions of presentative perceptions with a decrease in vividness. When an object has once been presented it has a ten- dency to be presented again, that is, represented, in other circumstances, and with decreasing vividness; and a store of representations is thus laid up, some of which are always present in consciousness. Since it is impossible to find states of consciousness which contain presentations only, it is necessary, in order to examine presentation, to consider cases of it in provisional images, abstraction being made of the representations involved in them ; and this was the course taken in §§ 13, 14, where presentations of objects were examined apart from representation. But hitherto the enquiry has been limited to objects which may themselves be directly presented to con- sciousness, without requiring other objects to be re- presented previously; that is, it has been limited to the examination of objects of sensation internal and external; and the world of objects, of qualities and sentation. 228 PEESENTATION AND REPRESENT ATION. Part I. of feelings, has "been described as a whole composed — of presentations and representations of sensations Repre- mingled together. But there are certain feelings which arise and are presented to consciousness first in the representation of objects of sensation external and internal. These are the emotions. On their first arising they are presented, but they arise first in the representation of objects of sensation. When we begin therefore with objects, or the world, of sen- sation, we soon come to a point, namely, the repre- sentation of its objects, where feelings of a new order enter into consciousness ; and these, though presented, yet belong to representation, if representation is taken to mean representation of the world of sensation. These new presentations, the emotions, give a new character to the world of objects. First the repre- sentations in which they arise are modified by them, and then indirectly future presentations of objects of sense are modified also; such presentations of objects of sense as are not in harmony with the emotions are destroyed or avoided, and such as are in harmony with them are produced or procured. It is necessary to take a view of the classes of the material element in cognition, in order to see the bearing of the fol- lowing enquiry. Feelings were divided, in § 12, into sensations and emotions, and the former into sensations of definite organs and sensations of indefinite organs. Of these three classes of feelings, emotions arise only in re- presentation of objects belonging to the other two classes; but this does not imply that they are com- posed of the feelings of those other classes. How- ever complex an emotion may be, whether it can be analysed into simpler emotions or not, it cannot be PRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION. 229 analysed into sensations ; nor can it be analysed into part i. sensations and imagination of them as past or future, ^— ' probable or improbable, although perhaps imagina- Repre- tions of this kind may be necessary as conditions of the arising of the emotion; for instance the emotion of hope is very different from the sensation of health, or any other pleasure of sensation, combined with the expectation of enjoying it; the feeling which we call hope is something different from this, though it may arise immediately and be inseparable from it. The same may be said of desire and aversion, of love, anger, fear, and I believe of all the feelings which we call emotions and passions. The same is true of moral approbation and disapprobation of others, and of a good and bad conscience in ourselves. There are two other feelings, or modifications of feeling, which accompany or can accompany all others, whether sensations or emotions, and arise indifferently in presentation and representation of sensible objects, I mean the feelings called pleasure and pain. If these arise in presentation and accompany sensations, they are commonly, but to the confusion of all ac- curate thought, called physical pleasure or pain; if in representation, accompanjdng emotions, they are commonly called, but with equal confusion as a conse- quence, mental or moral pleasure or pain. Every feel- ing if it has a certain considerable degree of intensity, or if it lasts for a certaia considerable length of time, is accompanied by the feeling of pleasure or of pain; and even a feeling accompanied by pleasure, if it attains a certain further degree of intensity, or lasts for a longer time, begins to be accompanied by pain; and the pleasure and pain, which accompany other feel- ings, are so mixed with them that they seem to make 230 ' PRESENTATION AND EEPEESENTATION. paeti. but one complex feeling; and this might lead us to ^— ' suppose that aU feelings were but modes of pleasure Eepre- and pain, were not this forbidden by the difference in kind which is always observable between them by analysis. Pleasure and pain never are observed pure, that is, separate from other elements of feeling, toge- ther with which they compose a complex feeling ; to separate them in thought from other feelings is to represent them in a provisional image, of which the other feelings are the parts abstracted from and pro- vided for. Pleasure and pain are the boundary line between cognition and emotion, for some sensations are with- out pleasure and pain, but no emotions are so. Emo- tion may be defined as feeling arising in representa- tion, involving pleasure or pain. Those feelings which are not accompanied by pleasure or pain belong to cognition and not to emotion. Cognition extends over aU feelings whatever; feeling extends over all cognitions whatever ; but the addition of pleasure or pain to feelings (and it must be remembered that aU feelings may be accompanied by pleasure and pain) makes of feelings two classes, one class to which in- terest attaches, the other to which interest does not attach. , These two classes of feelings and cognitions, distinguished from each other by the presence or absence of pleasure and pain in presentation, and of interest in representation (for interest is represented pleasure and pain), are the respective contents of speculation and practice ; and the distinction between these two classes is the ground of the distinction be- tween the two domains of speculative and practical knowledge. All action, operation, function, consi- dered as a series of circumstances or events, leads us PRESENTATION AND EEPRESENTATION. 231 to consider the motive power, that is, what circum- pabt i. stance or event in the series or without it is the in- ^ — ' variable antecedent of another circumstance or event Kepre- in the series. In all voluntary actions, or series of ^™***"'"- events produced voluntarily, when we look for such invariable condition, we find that it is always a pain or pleasure or an interest of some kind. No one can name a voluntary action of which pain or pleasure or interest, that is, pain or pleasure presented or repre- sented, is not the condition. Pain, pleasure, and in- terest are on this account called motives of actions, so far as they are voluntary; just as other circum- stances are called motives, or forces productive, of events so far as they are not voluntary. Pain and pleasure when represented and considered as the motives of voluntary actions are called final causes ; and as all causes productive of events or objects are called efficient, these causes are final and efficient at once ; that is, their being final is the mode of their efficiency. Does any one feel incliued to remark here, This is Utilitarianism? I reply: The term Utility, pro- perly applied, is a term which indicates only me- diate and subordinate ends. That which possesses utility, be it of ever so noble a kind, is by that very circumstance constituted subordinate to that for which it is useful; whatever possesses utility belongs not to practical knowledge generally, but to that wide sec- tion of it which is properly called prq,gmatic, or the knowledge of means for ends. Now I grant that things which are ultimate ends not only may be but always are also useful or productive of ends, which are less noble than themselves but still very desir- able ; for instance in the proverb,. Honesty is the 232 PRESENTATION AND EEPEESENTATION, Part 1. best policy, honesty which is an ultimate end is also - — ■ useful, that is, productive of certain tangible advan- Kepre- tages; but this is not its claim to our esteem. And it is in vain to apply the logic of utility here, and to say that the claim of honesty to our esteem is its util- ity in producing an approving conscience, for honesty does not produce but is such an approving consci- ence, the happy frame of mind called an approving conscience is included in the state of mind called honesty; that is, there is no more desirable state of mind produced by honesty than honesty itself; not what it produces or leads to, but what it is, is what the value of honesty and of all ultimate ends consists in. So again with Prayer. The logic of utility has been applied to prayer, and it has been argued that, if prayer does not produce rain or sunshine, it is of no value ; or again that, if it only produces an effect in the mind of the person praying, it is either useless or useless and hypocritical both. But the truth is, that prayer is a state of mind which is valuable for its own sake, or as an ultimate end; and instead of asking what it is useful to produce, the question ought to be, what it is in its analysis, and its worth determined accordingly. Utility implies that all ends are subordinate, whereas some are ultimate. In- terest is a term which includes both, and which is therefore coextensive with the term Practice in its widest sense. To judge of objects which are ulti- mate ends, like, honesty and prayer, by the properties they possess of producing other objects, to which as producing them they are subordinate, whether those other objects are more or less noble than themselves, is to judge them by an inadequate and therefore a misleading standard ; from which, I may add, the sentation. PRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION. 233 application of tlie distinction of first and second inten- pam i. tions would have saved us. Yet the term Utility ^^J^- would be legitimate instead of Interest, if we could R^pre- adopt a theory of consciousness being one thing and its objects another thing in kind; for then all objects of consciousness might be represented as existing for the sake of something else, namely, of consciousness itself. Here then, in Interest, is the great boundary Une between Ethic and Metaphysic, between practical and speculative knowledge. It is not coincident with the distinction between the formal and material elements of cognition; if it were, our systems would be much simpler, but as it is they are perhaps better morticed, their parts Ipng over one another as brick- layers lay their bricks; but the distinction between speculative and practical knowledge falls a little on the material side of the distinction between the for- mal and the material element. Pleasure and pain, or interest, almost universal modes of feeling, are the boundary line within which all practical knowledge consists; the little more which speculation possesses over and above practice, the feelings which do not contain pleasure or pain, is the circumstance which assures speculation its supremacy over practice, a supremacy the same in kind as that which the ju- dicial functions have over the administrative in a well-ordered state, a supremacy which we justify to our imagination by the epithets of calm, disinterested, unimpassioned reason. All emotion lies within, or on the practical side of, this boundary line ; and while all practical knowledge is also theoretical, there is a small part of theoretical knowledge which is not practical, namely, feelings which do not contain plea- 234 PRESENTATION AND EEPEESENTATION. pakti. sure or pain originally, or from which they have been ^— ' purged. Putting this small class of feelings aside, and Eepre- using it Only to remind us that there is such a thing as perfectly disinterested cognition, — ^though I am far from doing such a contradictory thing as holding that such perfectly disinterested cognition is an ideal to be admired or aimed at; — contradictory I hold it, because it would be adopting as an ideal an opinion which condemns adopting ideals at all, for what is an ideal but a conception to which the greatest degree • of interest is attached? — ^keeping then this small por- tion of feelings in mind only as a proof that specula- tive knowledge has a wider foundation than practical, and comparing together the two domains of specula- tive and practical knowledge, the two elements which each contains are found to be the same in kii^d, ma- terial and formal, but the material element in prac- tical knowledge is always considered so far only as it contains or consists of pleasure, pain, or interest. • Practical knowledge is speculative knowledge the material element of which contains, and so far as it contains, pleasure, pain, or interest. Specula- tive knowledge is practical knowledge abstracting from that part of its material element. That is to say, aU knowledge is both speculative and prac- tical, in two different respects ; all knowledge has a speculative aspect and a practical aspect, each al- ways at the least provisionally present in the other. In the proportion which the two elements hold to each other in any moment of consciousness, that is, in the proportion which the feelings of pleasure and pain hold to the feelings in which pleasure and pain are abstracted from, and vice vers^, in that propor- tion wUl the moment of consciousness be reckoned PRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION. 235 to be, predominantly or equally, practical or specula- pabt i. tive, a piece of conduct or a piece of reasoning. — There is one other feeling which must be men- Repre- 11. n 1 ^ sentation. tioned m order to complete the picture oi the ele- ments which come forward in representation as well as in presentation ; it is one which belongs to the same class as pleasure and pain, and is also like them an accompaniment and an almost universal accom- paniment of other feelings, — ^namely, the feeling of effort. It is not the feeling of muscular tension or exertion that is here meant, though that is a special kind of the feeling of effort, but it is the feeling of effort taken in a wider sense than as being confined to muscular action. It is difficult to imagine that any combination of two feelings in time, or in time and space together, can originally and in the first in- stance take place without being accompanied by a sense of effort, which afterwards vanishes when the combination of the feehngs into one object or succes- sion of objects has become habitual. All new objects are accompanied with a sense of effort, in compre- hending them, or conceiving them in the relations of their parts, for the first time. Whether the pheno- mena which are to be combined in consciousness are aU presented, or all represented, or partly one and partly the other, the object, that is, the phenomena in combination, involves a sense of effort until it has become familiar ; and this sense of effort is part of the object, which on that account is called strange, odd, or incomprehensible. We are perfectly* familiar with this circumstance in daily life, and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that all objects, which must once have been new, must also have been accom- panied originally by the sense of effort. This sense 236 PRESENTATION AND EEPEESENTATION, Part I. of effort in cognition is called Attention, and the ch rv" ■^—' quality which corresponds to it in the object is Repr'e- strangeness or incomprehensibility ; when we call any sentation. j.i • . ■ i -i i thing strange or mcomprehensible, we mean to assert that it would take a greater or less degree of atten- tion to make it harmonise with our previous know- ledge, or that it would take more attention than we could give to it, in order to make it do so. Gene- rally then it may be said, that all phenomena, what- ever other feelings they consist of, include or may include the feeling of effort, as well as those of pleasure and pain ; and that even the simplest states of consciousness are originally or may become, in their material elements, highly complex. The aris- ing of the sense of effort in any object is the arising of the phenomenon of attention. Previous to this the object was confused and obscure; it now begins to become distinct and clear. The difference between these two stages consists in the addition of a feeling, the sense of effort, a part of the material element of the object, which thus is differentiated and developed. Why such a process or such an addition takes place at all is not to be explained, but must be regarded as an ultimate fact in consciousness, like many others inexplicable, an ultimate element in analysis of the phenomena. It is probable besides that this sense of effort never arises but when accompanied, and never ceases but when it ceases to be accompanied, by pleasure, pain, or interest. Every object of percep- tion coi¥tains both or neither. To attend to any object or any sensation supposes either that I feel pleasure in it, or that I feel forced to attend to it by the pain it causes ; yet in both cases without having a distinct purpose in view, either the purpose of re- PRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION. 237 taining and increasma: the pleasure, or that of remov- part i. • . Ch I"V ing and lessening the pain. When there is such a ^— ' distinct purpose in view, it is a Jfuial cause of the at- Repre- tention, and such attention may be designated by the name voluntary, as distinguished from the original and spontaneous attention out of which it sprang. Besides the feelings already mentioned, there is the formal element to be taken into account; and then we shall have before us the entire object of re- flection, the empirical ego, the world of feelings, both presentations and representations, exhaustively de- scribed in its general outlines. This yet remains to be done, by showing the mode in which presentations and representations are combined, so as to form new and more complex objects. The same formal elements which presentations and representations separately contain, the same formal elements which hold them together before combination with each other, these same formal elements, time and space, perform the same office for them when they are combined. No categories of the understanding, except so far as time and space themselves are such; are required to com- bine presentations and representations into new ob- jects. § 26. It was said in § lo that all perception, and ^he ii^ediate consequently all representative perception, involved ^''^j,^^^"*® combination or synthesis, and that all the more com- plex perceptions involved comparison. As we have now before us all the elements of representation, we are in a position to enquire into this point. When I see before me a variously coloured surface and regard it with attention, fixing my view now on one part, now on another, T represent one part while another is being presented ; if I recall sensations of touch at the 238 PRESENTATION AND EEPEESENTATION. ch"iv s^™6 time and combine them with the sensations of — sight, the surface appears in three dimensions, and Theimm^ate breaks Up into obiects separate in space and at dif- aad remote . object. ferent distances from the- eye and from each other, and the entire surface becomes an object of represen- tation as well as presentation, it is presented to sight and represented to touch. Now in the process so described there are two stages ; first the visible sur- face is partly presented and partly represented, when I traverse it in different directions with the eye ; se- condly, it is represented to touch while presented to sight. In both stages comparison is involved. In the first stage, suppose, red in one part of the surface is separated from red in another part of the surface by a bright light; the red in two places is perceived as red in each of them, and the sensation of red is distinguished from the sensation of the bright light between the two places. Instead of three moments of sensation, red, light, red, there arise two, red and light ; that is, the red in one place and the red in the other are classed as the same sensation. It makes no difference whether I see the two places of red, or re- call one while I see the other, or recall them both; there is no difference in the sensation, there is differ- ence only in the place, or in the time and place toge- ther. No category or concept of unity or sameness is here applied; the surface is distinguished, difference is introduced iato it, by the difference in the material element, in the sensations of red and of light. The perception of the sensation red in two places is the first foundation of the notion of sameness. Where is the difference ? In the sensations of red and of light, Where is the sameness ? In the sensation of red in two places. There is no sameness in the sensation PRESENTATION Aim REPRESENTATION. 239 of light, for there is no difference in the formal ele- ,part i. . . .1 Oh. IV. ment, a difference first introduced by the material — • ■'. § 26. element. But why do I proceed in this way at all? The immediate IT. 1 1 ^'^^ remote why do 1 class the red m two places as the same sen- object, sation? The answer is found in the pain accompany- ing the sense of effort, the effort which accompanies the new phenomenon. The more the phenomenon is simplified, the less effort it involves. Tentatively, not at first with conscious purpose, I find that it is less effort to perceive red once than twice. But on what rests the power, the possibility, of perceiving red once instead of twice, as the same instead of dif- ferent? The answer of Kant, and I believe of most so-called Platonising philosophers, would be, On a category or concept of unity, or sameness, as a form of thought, of which no further account could be given. The true answer is. On the unity of space itself. Physiological psychology gives no answer to this question; it is indeed not properly a psycholo- gical but a metaphysical one; and therefore psycho- logy stops short with the answer to the previous question, namely, with saying that I do class certain sensations together, and that I do so because it is easier and simpler to classify than not to classify. It does not proceed to ask, What classification is in its ultimate analysis? The true answer to this question, which may also be expressed in a formula similar to Kant's, How is classification, or synthesis generally, possible? is. The Unity of space and time. Since space is one, and difference is only introduced into it by the different sensations, or by differences in the material element, it follows that, when there is no difiference in the material element, there is no dif- ference at all ; when there is difference only in the ' 240 PRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION. Part I. position of the material element, that is, in its relation - — ' to other sensations in space, there is iinity in kind and S 9fl The immediate difference in position, that is, there is sameness. Thus and remote ,•■ , o „ , . object. the concept oameness first arises, as a consequence, not a condition, of the process ; and the process which ends with classification is called diagnosis or compari- son, a putting asunder different sensations and putting together similar sensations. In the second stage of the process also a compa- rison takes place. Suppose the surface seen to be an open window with two red curtains on either side of it. The parts of the surface which I can touch, sup- pose one of the curtains, I have presented to two senses; two sensations characterise that portion of the surface, and distinguish it from the other por- tions ; I now move and touch the other curtain, that is, after certain other muscular sensations I find the other red portion of the surface become distinguished by sensations of touch, and sensations of touch of the same kind as those distinguishing the other curtain. And from the place where I now am I can repeat the same experience with regard to the first curtain. The two curtains then become by comparison the same in every thing except in position in space. But the light between them either caimot be touched, or if I put my hand out I find sensations either of warmth or cold, or wind, or rain, very different from the sen- sations of the curtains. Still the open space is part of the visible surface, and if it does not contain sen- sations of touch, it contains sensations of sight. Not- withstanding the difference of the sensations in dif- ferent parts of the visible surface, these parts are all alike in point of containing sensations ; there is same- ness between all the parts in this respect, and unity PRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION. 241 of the entire surface or object. Thus the second pakti. • • . ch rv" stage IS a repetition of the same process of compa- ^— ' rison as before, only with sensations of two senses The immediate instead of with sensations of one sense. And I think ™objeet.° ^ it will be admitted that, if this explanation is valid for the cases now examined, it is vahd also for cases iu which the material element is more various, for cases where the material element includes sensations of the definitely known organs, of the indefinitely known organs, and feelings which arise first in the representation of these sensations. All these form complete states of consciousness, portions of time and portions of space occupied by different feelings. Anger, for instance, is a state of consciousness in which a certain series of objects and events are repre- sented, which bear the character or quahty of being unjust, cruel, painful, or the like. The emotion is combined with the representation, and makes a part of it, corresponding in consciousness to some quality or circumstance represented as existing in the events or causes of them. If this circumstance, or this qua- lity, is separable from the events, and in proportion as it is separable from them, the emotion of anger, ceases or remits. The same remarks apply to phenomena which oc- cupy time alone ; the only difference being that here nearly all the sensations are represented, whereas in space a great number are presented at once. An instance of representation of objects both in time and space at once, and on a large scale, is Gibbon's treat- ment of the history of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. He there represents events not in the order of their actual occurrence, but of their afiinities for each other, relating separately several 242 PRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION. Part I. Series of events which occurred simultaneously, and — disintegrating the one complex cable of events into The immediate many strands. But this is a process which requires and remote . t- •• n -i • • i object. a prelimmary exanunation of the origmal complex series, in order to discover which are the events which belong to each separate strand ; and this is only pos- sible by observation of the similarities and dissimilari- ties in the material element of the events themselves. War, religion, wealth, law, race, and so on, become the heads under which the events are classified, ac- cording as they contain elements which predomi- nantly bear upon such and such feelings or emotions in mankind. Objects are phenomena combined in time and space, whether the material element is of one kind or more than one. One feeling in time, or in time and space, makes an object; and also any number of feelings combined in, that is, considered as occupy- ing, one portion of time or one portion of time and space together, is one object also ; but these two cases require distinction, for in the former case the object is simple and indecomposable empirically, in .the latter case it is empirically, but perhaps provi- sionally, decomposable into simpler objects of which it is the aggregate. The former may be called the im- mediate, the latter the remote object. In the former case, the material element limits the formal; in the latter case, the formal element, already limited by one of the material elements which it contains, is the limit to within which other material elements are referred. Take any feeling in a certain time and space, and then see what other feelings are contained in those boun- daries; in this way a remote object arises. Take the time and the space so limited and contrast it with PEESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION. 243 the material element of aU kinds which it contains, pakt i. ch. ly. that is, with the feelings which occupy it, and there - — arises a notion which is the truth, or true modern The immediate and philosophical representative, of the old Greek and object. Scholastic notion of Substance and Attribute, or Sub- stance and Quality. Time, space, and feeling are, taken objectively, time, space, and quahty, or xoiorijg, of that portion of time and space. Time and space are that in which alone the TowrfiTsg can be said to inhere ; and time and space are common both to feel- ings and to qualities. And not only sensations of the first class are quahties, but also sensations of the second class, such as the sense of effort, the sense of muscular tension, of heat, of cold, of hunger, and thirst, the last being qualities of our own bodies only, arising in certain circumstances. Lastly, emotions are qualities; for we always attribute to those objects of the senses, on the representation of which the emotions arise, some constitution or nature in conse- quence of which we desire, or fear, or hate, or love them ; just as we attribute to visible and tangible objects some constitution or other, in virtue of which we see them and touch them. And we do this not- Avithstanding that it has never been possible to point out, in any objects on the representation of which emotions arise, any qualities which could make any claim on the ground of similarity to be regarded as the direct cause of the emotions which they were supposed to excite. Qualities and sensations are the same, two aspects of the same thing, and not cause and effect one of the other ; so also with emotions ; they are the quahties on the perception of which they are supposed to arise. The quality of being injurious to our interest is not, on being perceived, the cause 244 PRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION/ ch^Iv °^ *^^ emotion of aversion, but this quality and the — aversion are one and the same thing, one arises and The immediate ceases and remits as the other does. This will pro- and remote i i i i object. bably be met by a denial, and instances brought, such as that of poison ; poison, it will be said, is injurious to my interest, yet it does not inspire me with aver- sion unless I perceive it to be poison, that is, unless I perceive that it has this quality of producing death. This quality remains whether I perceive it or not, whether I consequently feel aversion or not, whether I consequently drink the mixture or not. Well, let us examine this instance; and I hope to be excused if I dwell at some length on it, as such instances are well adapted to set the relation of presentation and representation, and of object to subject generally, in a clear light. By quality is meant here, as it has been through- out, perceived quality. The poisonous quality of a . potion when perceived is aversion in consciousness. The existence of the quality unperceived (that is, imagined or assumed only by us now and here for the sake of argument) is not the cause, or at least not the only cause, of its being perceived by the person who is about to drink the potion; whatever may be th« cause of the quality being perceived by him, when it is perceived by him he feels aversion, and feels less aversion the less certain he is that it is poisonous ; when he is certain that it is not poisonous, he feels no aversion at aU. The question is not as to the expediency of enquiring and feeling certain about the existence of the poison, but as to the nature of the phenomenon of the aversion when it arises. The question is, whether the perception of .the quality of being poisonous is the cause of the emotion of aver- PRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION. 245 ■sibn, or whether that perception is the ohjective pabti. aspect of the emotion. The quality of being poi- — " sonous is perceived in representation, an odour or The mimediate a colour presented is combined with a representation ''"objeot.° of an injurious or fatal effect on the body; of course it is highly important that I should so represent it (supposing it to be poisonous) ; it is highly important that I should feel aversion and not drink the potion; but the only question here is about the connection between the emotion of aversion and the represen- tation of the potion presented as poisonous. I main- tain that they are one and the same thing ; that it is impossible to have the representation and not to feel aversion, and impossible to feel aversion and not to have the representation of some injurious quality. If it is said that some people may have the representa- tion and not feel the aversion, the answer is that, if so, it will be in consequence of their having a representa- tion of some overbalancing benefit, as for instance of a release from suffering by death. The representation of the effect the potion will have on the body is the object, of which the emotion is the subjective side. There is no other object but this representation; ex- perience, or the result of drinking the potion, has to decide whether that representation was a true one, whether the object as presented wiU act in one way or another ; if it produces death, we then say that it be- fore contained the poisonous quality, and that the re- presentation was true. There is no other object but the representation. If there is, what is it ? The poi- sonous quality itself. But this is the object of the representation, or the object as represented. Let us examine this point. We say that it was poisonous after it has been proved to be so. But we speak 246 PRESENTATIOK AND REPEESENTATIOIir. pabtl proleptically, if we say it is poisonous before the — poison is represented as contained in it. Suppose The immediate the glass before US : is it or is it not poisonous ? and remote rpi , t i i • i , . . object. Inat we can doubt about it shows that it is not pre- sented as poison. It is, then, represented as such. When it shall have produced death, then we say that it was poisonous all along; a representation of what it has been, not of what it is, even now, presented as. The proleptical manner of speaking is very common and very convenient, but in the one case, it expresses an anticipation, even though there may be strongest evidence, in the other case a retrospection. In both cases the quality of being poisonous is an object of representation. When we say that it is poison, we mean that it will be followed in certain circumstances by death. The word "is" covers two meanings, it expresses either a fact of presentation or a fact of re- presentation, and gives no distinguishing token as to which of these it is used to express. The quality of being poisonous is a fact of representation, when in- ferred before the fact of producing death ; and, how- ever certain we may feel about it, we still are speak- ing by prolepsis if we say that the potion is poisonous, as if it were a fact of presentation. After the fact of death, the quality is again inferred to have been pre- sent, as a cause of the subsequent death, a represen- tation again, but one referred to the past time. The quality of being poisonous is never an object of pre- sentation, unless the potion should be seen in the operation of producing death; this operation is that on which the whole business hinges. Emotions being attached to representations ; — and this admits of no exception, for suppose that we saw a murder committed before our eyes, the horror felt PRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION. 247 by US would not arise from the facts of presentation, pakt i. but from the representation of their meaning and -^ ' importance, that is, from our knowing that it was a The immediate T , . 1 . .,11, and remote murder we saw; — emotions bemg attached to repre- object, sentations and not directly to presentations, they appear to have an arbitrary origin, to be, as the cur- rent phrase goes, subjective, and incapable to a great extent of prediction ; whereas the quaUties to which they are commonly referred, e. g. the quality of being poisonous in the above case, seems to be capable of actual proof, subject to strict physical laws, and, in the current phrase, objective. The fact is that the quality and the corresponding emotion are equally subject to strict law, equally capable of prediction. The opposite mistaken opinion arises from confusing our knowledge, the knowledge of observers who now discuss the question, with the knowledge of the em- pirical ego under discussion. To him, to that empi- rical ego, the knowledge of the poisonous quahty and the emotion of aversion are one and the same thing, equally subject to strict law, equally capable of pre- diction. To us, the observers, his emotion and his knowledge are two objects, and the fact of which he has or has not knowledge is a third object, which we may have means of discovering and being certain of, without his having any such knowledge. This third object, when known to us, is that which seems to possess such objective certainty when contrasted with the ignorance of another man, the empirical ego. But in this chapter, and in metaphysic generally, we are employed not in enquiring into the advantages ob- servers have over combatants, or into the difference between the general knowledge of an observer, that every thing is subject to law, and the particular per- 248 . PRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION. Part l plexities of a combatant as to what will be the parti- — cular events which will occur in obedience to general The immediate laws; but uito the naturc and proceedings of con- iuid remote . n • i • • i • object. sciousness generally, m the empirical ego, irrespective of what others may know about them. It is perfectly true that, to a third person, the opinions and feelings of another man are more uncertain and less capable of prediction than many facts in physical nature ; and generally speaking objective qualities are more easy of prediction than subjective feelings ; the history and prediction of things from the subjective side, as they will appear to another person (the empirical ego) is a more complicated affair than the history and prediction of them as they will appear or actually are appearing as objects to the observer himself. The observer has two sets of objects before him, the ob- jects or qualities of nature perceived by himself, and the objects or qualities of nature perceived by another man; no wonder the emotions and representations, which belong to this second set of objects, appear disconnected from the qualities of objects which be^ long to the first set. These two sets of objects ought never to have been compared together,, or brought into connection with ' each other ; nothing but con- fusion can result, or could possibly have resulted, as indeed has been the case, from such an illogical pro- cedure. The objects of nature and the feelings of the mind, as they are to one and the same individual, are the object-matter of metaphysic, that is, of the branch of knowledge or enquiry which aims at inves- tigating the connection and relations of consciousness to objects, of knowledge to things known, and of mind to the objective world. We are then right in judging of emotions by sensations, right in making PRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION. 249 both of them objective as well as subjective; but the paeti. - error lies in assuming occult causes, or occult quali- - — ' ties, as the ground of either. Not even in visible The immediate and tangible objects is it possible to point out any object. qualities which are not resolvable into sensations. Both emotions and sensations are the quaUties of which they are supposed to be only the evidence and image. So far as to the analysis of representations con- sidered as complete wholes, completed moments of consciousness, or complex objects. The following chapter wiU be devoted to the process by which they are produced, the course of their arising, or their genesis; yet not their psychological as distinguished from their metaphysical genesis, not their connection with the tangible organ, the brain, and the changes or processes which take place in it; nor yet their his- tory as an entire series, either in the race or in any individual, which would be the application of meta- physic to history ; but the principle of their genesis, the nature of the bond which is common to aU, that is, their metaphysical genesis, or analysis as states of consciousness dynamically, as members of a succes- sion of moments ; in other words, the connection and relation of moments of consciousness to each other, not, as in the present chapter, the analysis of them separately and for themselves. The moments of consciousness form a series, in which each moment is an object containing feelings, or qualities, occupying a portion either of time alone or of time and space together ; and this series of moments, in their connection and concatenation with each other, will be the subject of the folloHving chap- ter. It is true that the concatenation of the moments 250 PRESENTATION AOT) EEPBESENTATION, paet I. of consciousness depends on that of processes or mo- ch. rv. ... -^ ' difications which take place in the tangible organ of The immediate consciousncss, the brain, just as each moment of con- object, sciousness by itself, that is, presentations and repre- sentations separately, depends upon states or a state of the brain; but to investigate this dependance be- longs to psychology, which is in its earliest infancy in this branch, since nothing at all or very little is yet discovered of the condition of the brain either in perception or in redintegration of perceptions. The psychological causation of redintegration I shall leave entirely aside, and busy myself with attempting to discover the order in which moments of conscious- ness as such precede and follow each other, so far as these consist of representations and of presentations depending on them; for to investigate the order in which the original presentations occur, presentations independent of representation, would be to investi- gate the ultimate laws of nature themselves. These objects of redintegration at least we are acquainted with; and if any invariable order can be discovered in them, we shall be entitled to caU that phenomenon which invariably precedes another its cause in con- _ sciousness ; and those phenomena which invariably precede others, that is to say, that property or quality (whether belonging to the material or to the formal elements of the object) which detemunes what the succeeding object shall be, or from knowing which we can predict what the succeeding object wiU. be, that property in objects will be correctly designated as their motive power in consciousness, or the efficient cause of their redintegration. This whole subject is commonly known by the name of the Association of Ideas. PRESENTATION AND :BEPRESENTATI0N. 251 5 27. Man lives in a world of remote obiects, at pami. . . . . . . Ch IV least from the time of the arising of reflection in his -^ ' consciousness. These remote objects, as it has been Remote oibjeets 1 TO ... n .in connection. shown, are composed, oi presentative and representa- tive perceptions, presentations being vivid and ori- ginal perceptions, and representations being less vivid repetitions of presentations. But when the word re- petition is applied to them, it is implied that the same object is twice present in consciousness, once as pre- sented and once as represented. Sameness means unity of feeling in diversity of 'time or of space, or of both together. The representations therefore are also different from the presentations which they re- peat. The , same thing is true of the remote objects which constitute the world in which we live. For instance, I pass to-day for the first time through a certain street in London; the street is a remote ob- ject composed both of presentations and representa- tions; to-morrow I pass again through the same street, and on entering it I perceive that it is the same as that which I passed through the day before. What is it that takes place in consciousness, in this perception? First, a presentation of the street; se- condly, a representation of the street passed through yesterday; thirdly, a perception of the unity of these two objects, which would be perfect unity were it not that twenty-four hours intervene between the two. If the feeling differed, for instance, if some houses had been burned down in the night, I should doubt if it was the same street or not, for it would partly renew and partly not renew the first presentation. The object of my perception the second day con- sists therefore of an object composed of a presenta- tion and a representation, lasting twenty-four hours. 252 PRESENTATION AM) REPRESENTATION. pabti. counting back from the second presentation of the - — ' street. § 27. KemoteoiDjects There is another class of cases in which the pro- in connection, . ^ gress is not irom a presentation to a representation, but from one representation to another. Suppose that, instead of passing again through the street the second day, the street is suggested to me by some- thing else. Then the second day I have a less vivid perception of the street than I had in passing through it the day before, but I stUl have a representation of it in my mind now, and a representation of it as hav- ing formed part of the presentations of twenty-four hours ago; and these two representations melt into one, just as in the former case. I refer however the certainty of the existence of the street in both cases to the presentation. In the first case I say. The street certainly exists now, though I may have dreamed it yesterday; in the second case I say, The street certainly existed yesterday, though I only re- present it now. In the second case too, the places occupied by the presentation and the representation are difierent, as weU as the times ; for on the second day I am in another place, and the representation of the street does not fit in with the objects of the pre- sent landscape. This change of place requires ac- counting for; and this. is done only by the events which have happened in the course of the twenty- four hours during which the street is represented as existing in its own landscape, its landscape as an ob- ject of presentation. Presentations and representations dififer from each other only in .degree of vividness, which includes dis- tinctness in arrangement of their parts. But any particular object as a representation differs from the in connection. PRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION. 253 same object as a presentation, when the two are com- Paet x. pared together by a subsequent reflection, at least in — ' point of position in time. These two objects how- Remote objects ever make together but one object, occupying the whole of the time which separates them ; not indeed occupying the whole of it with equal certainty, but some parts with greater or less degrees of probability; as, for instance, I am certain of the existence of the street when I see it presented ; — ^when I recall it next day, I am certain only of its existence at the former time;" nor am I so certain of its having existed then, as I should be of its existing now, if I were again to have it presented; for the fact of its having been presented is now only a representation. Such is the account in general terms of the world in which we live, or in other words, of the empirical ego, con- sidered as distinguished into presentations and re- presentations. All our representations have been once presenta- tions, or have been formed out of their elements dif- ferently modified and combined ; a difference which is capable of an infinite variety. But here arise two questions, which it is well to state, but which are both unanswerable in metaphysic or as metaphysical questions; first, why there are presentations at all; second, why they have a tendency to become repre- sentations, or to be repeated less vividly in conscious- ness. The first question is equivalent to asking, why there is a world or an existence at aU ; as to which it has been shown that we can analyse its nature, but not assign its cause. The second question admits only of a psychological or partial solution. Given the fact of representations following presentations, or the tendency of presentations to be repeated as repre- 254 PEESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION, Part I. sentations, then the existence of the brain, its con- ch. rv. . . — nection with the rest of the world of qualities, and fiemoteo'bjects its consequent modifications, is to be regarded as in in connection. , - _.. „,. , some way or other the condition of this reproduction. The sequence of the reprfisentations depends ulti- mately upon the sequence of the presentations, so far as these latter are unmodified by volition; and the sequence of the representations, either modified or unmodified by voKtion, reacts again upon the pre- sentations, in a degree slight by itself but important in its accumulation, for it is this accumulation of men- tal wealth which transforms and improves the world. Two other questions arise however with reference to presentations and representations, which may be answered partially now, and perhaps completely in the far distant future. The first is, What is the law which determines whether such and such a particular presentation shall be repeated as a presentation or not; for instance, whether a man who has seen a particular street in London to-day shall ever have it again presented to him. The answer to such ques- tions as these depends upon the inductive examina- tion of the course of nature, and cannot be given by any knowledge of the laws of consciousness ; not be- cause the laws and the phenomena of nature are not equally phenomena and laws of consciousness, but because the phenomena require experimental obser- vation and comparison in their relations to each other, and their investigation has accordingly hitherto treated the phenomena as belonging to the world of qualities and not to the world of feelings. And in this inves- tigation the results hitherto reached have been very general, and men have not yet succeeded in reducing to knowledge the complicated contingencies of every- PRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION. 255 day life ; in other words, we know many of the laws, part r. but very few of the facts which would fall under - — ' . . . § 27. them, the greater part being hid from observation. Remote objects The second question relates to the sequences of representations, without intermixture of presentations ; and these have always been considered as phenomena of the world of feelings and not of the world of qua- lities; the examination of them has been hitherto psychological, and the results have been held to be- long to psychology. The question is. Why such and such a representation should be followed by such and such another representation ; or what is the elem.ent in any representation which is the invariable antece- dent of such and such another, or determines what the next shall be; for instance, why, when I am thiaking of St. Paul's, the name of Brunelleschi oc- curs to me. The enquiry is equally experimental and determinable by observation as in the case of presentations, and equally incapable of being deter- mined by any previous knowledge of the laws of mind. The suggestion which I offer in solution of this question wiU be found in the following chapter. CHAPTER V. SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION. 'A^' TjSovwu ri TrpoaietaOe iv Tij ^v^xpaaei ; Plato. ch^V' § ^^' ^^^ William Hamilton has shown, Lect. 31,32, r^ vol. 2, p. 233, referring besides to Aristotle and St. Redintegration Augustine, that the laws of association are aU of them cases of the single law of redintegration. Of any past state of consciousness, whether highly complex or comparatively simple, any part, member, or element, recurring again either separately or in connection with other objects, and whether it be in presentation or representation, has a tendency or power of calling back and redintegrating in consciousness a part larger and more complex than itself, or the whole, of the past state of mind in all its completeness. And since the whole of the past conscious life of an individual is one connected whole, any object or any moment of this connected series has the tendency or power of beginning a redintegration, which .might con- tinue itself until the whole conscious Hfe was lived over again in representation. Any object which has formed part of a complex state of consciousness may also have formed part of other complex states, and SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION. 257 have occurred in an infinite variety of combinations. pakt i. It will have a tendency to redintegrate all of these; — ' but it is obvious that it will not redintegrate nearly Bedintegration all, perhaps not even one completely ; for it will commence redintegrating one, and while this is going on another object may come into prominence, in the half-finished redintegration, which will change the course of thought and become the starting point of a new redintegration. It becomes necessary there- fore to enquire what are the particular laws of red- integration; what laws determine the preference of redintegrations, or the tendency of particular objects or states of consciousness to redintegrate other par- ticular states of consciousness. Turning for a moment to the psychological order of causes of redintegration, in order not to forget its position and the relation it holds to the metaphysical order, a homely comparison may perhaps be of ser- vice in connecting the two orders. Many people will remember seeing children "watch the congre- gation go out of church," or doing it themselves as children. A child burns a newspaper and throws it beneath the fire-grate; " The flame extinct, he views the roving fire, There goes my lady, and there goes the squire ; There goes the parson, oh illustrious spark, And there scarce less illustrious goes the clerk." But Cowper's lines do not give a full picture of the vagaries of the "illustrious sparks;" they often return on their steps (having forgotten perhaps a prayer- book), and shine where they had shone before ; they linger ^(having forgotten perhaps a prayer), and others join them to see what they are about; they s 258 SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION. pabti. illuminate the deserted benches, and different parts Ch V . -^' of the church are perhaps many times refilled with g no J. 1 ■/ Eedinteglratiou their former occupants ; they traverse the church again and again, and only after many partial reil- luminations the whole becomes finally dark. It is to these partial reilluminations of the newspaper tinder that I compare the process of redintegration. The brain is the tinder, the perceptions and aggrega- tions of perceptions are the sparks and masses of sparks, the redintegrations are the reilluminations, only not so short-lived. Of course this is not to be pushed too far, but only employed to assist the ima- gination in representing the process of redintegration as arising in its tangible organ, the brain. The law or laws of association are thought com- monly to have been already discovered ; causation, resemblance, contrast, contiguity in place and time. All of these Sir W. Hamilton reduces to one general law, that of affinity. It is true that aU moments of consciousness, all objects of consciousne^, have affi- nity with each other ; for all are feelings, all occupy time, or time and space together, and all are parts or portions of one series of moments of consciousness, and of one corresponding universe. If however, in order to come nearer to particulars, we distinguish this .general law of affinity into cases of contrast, resemblance, and contiguity in place and time, or go farther stiU and add causation to the list, this gives us no law of the preference of contrast to resem- blance, contiguity in place or time, cause or effect, or in short of the preference of any of these to any other of them; still less does it give us any law of preference within the selected category, or point out which among the causes, or effects, or objects resem- SPONTANEOUS EEDINTEGEATION. 259 bling or in contrast, is to succeed to the object with partl which we start. Any obiect whatever is connected -^' § 28 by affinity with all other objects whatever; and any Redintegration object whatever stands in relation of either contrast or resemblance, cause or effect, contiguity in place or in time, to any other object whatever; so that, if the two connected objects do not readily fall together under one category, they do under another; and con- sequently to point out that they stand in some one or more of these relations, when they occur in redin- tegration, is no explanation at all of the pr6cess of redintegration, is no discovery of the link between objects in redintegration, of that quality in any ob- ject which determines what the succeeding object shall be. Besides the foregoing objection, this explanation of the laws of association is open to another not less serious. It is, that they are calculated to form links only in voluntary and not in spontaneous redintegra- tion, nor yet in those cases of redintegration which having been originally voluntary have become spon- taneous, but solely in those which are still actually voluntary. For the explanation supposes that I pass from one object of consciousness to another through the representation of a relation of a certain kind, a relation either of cause or resemblance or so on. Suppose it is the relation of cause which is the link, why is this relation distinguished from others, unless it be that we already have a purpose in view, and know where to look for the object to be redinte- grated? And in this case the volition, the choice of the category of cause, is the real explanation, the de- termining element, in the object redintegrating, deter- mining first the redintegration of the notion of cause, 260 SPONTANEOUS EEDINTEGEATION. Part I. Secondly the particular objects which fall under that -^" notion. Neither in spontaneous nor in voluntary 8 28 ■ Redintegration redintegration are these categories of cause, resem- blance, contiguity, &c, a real explanation of the de- termining element in the objects redintegrating. Again, supposing that we did pass from one object to another through some one or other of these notions, as the connecting link, we should stUl require an ex- planation of the Hnk, which connects that link itself with the redintegrating object, or object beginning the redintegration, and to account for why this rela- tion and no other is fixed upon, retained, and em- ployed as a link with other objects. Why should the sight of a table redintegrate the notion of cause, or effect, or resemblance, or contrast, or contiguity in time, or contiguity in place? Why should we pass from any object to this class of six general notions? Why should we single out one of the six in prefer- ence to the rest? Why should these or any one of them be supposed to be the determining element in the object, table, by means of which it calls up or redintegrates in consciousness, say, a pen, a chair, a dinner, a Bench, or a Board? To take an instance ; . if my bookcase calls up the notion of the carpenter who made it because he is connected with it as its cause, this must be because I go through the notion of causation to reach that of the carpenter ; for if it calls up the notion of its car- penter before that of its cause, it is clear that car- penter rather than cause ^hould be the name of the link of association ; and the question still remains, What determines me to go in this particular instance from the notion of the bookcase to that of causation, in, preference to the other five notions or any others SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION. 261 besides them? All notions of obiects may be con- paeti. Ch V, nected together by or under some or aU of these cate- — -' 8 2ft gories; but this very fact disqualifies them for being Redintegration considered as the leading threads or motive power in producing or caUing up the notions of particular ob- jects out of, or in consequence of, the notions of other particular objects. There is no exciting, suggesting, or calling up of like notions by like, of cause by eifect, of neighbour by neighbour; this is no true account of the process of redintegration. There is no affinity between sepa- rate objects or their representations, in virtue of which one produces or reproduces the other. It is true indeed that something like this may appear to have taken place when we reflect on the redintegrating process, and first begin to ask after the laws of con- nection of objects supposed to be separate and inde- pendent. We have, however, not really been step- ping from object to object, contiguous, similar, or dissimilar, hke the Shadowless Man, in Chamisso's tale, from island to island. There is no power or quality in the representations, considered as images of objects, by which they can summon each other. The general notions which bind them together, such as causation, contrast, contiguity, and resemblance, though imdoubtedly they form a common element pervading them, yet have no generative power, and cannot impart any such to the perceptions which they bind together. Time and Space are indifferent to the particular empirical objects they may contain. The whole chain, network, or pile of network, to which our past states of consciousness may be com- • pared, and to which we may consider every new moment of consciousness, whether of presentation or 262 SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGEATION, paeti. representation, as adding a new mesh, : nected and closely netted whole, any part of which §28. • X • • n X r Eedintegration may come mto consciousness again, and some part oi which must come into consciousness agaia, in every new moment of consciousness. Not because notions have been together in the objects, or world of quali- ties, but because they have been together in con- sciousness, the feelings of the empirical ego, do they reproduce each other. How came it to pass that these categories were fixed upon, as the links connecting objects in redin- tegration? It appears to have been because objects were considered separately, one by one, and not as modifications of one world or one consciousness. Just as objects of perception were considered separate, a table, a chair, a Roman Emperor, a star, for instance, as so many distinct separate objects, the conjunction of which in one space made the world in which we live, so the representations of these objects were con- sidered not as moments in one and the same series, and one and the same consciousness, but as separate objects in the mind, each existing for itself, and con- nected, not in kind as parts of one whole, but by mere juxtaposition in time, in the empirical ego. The connection between the parts of the series of images in the mind was then sought in the images so far as they were representations of external ob- jects, that is, in the time and space relations of the images to each other, instead of in the images as mo- ments of consciousness, or as feelings of the empi- rical ego. Thus not only were the representations, or ideas as they were called, images of external ob- jects ; for instance, my idea of a Roman Emperor an image of that Roman Emperor as he once existed in SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION. 263 the external world; but the connections between the pabti. ideas were images of the connections between the ex- -^ ' ternal objects ; which circumstance lent great com- Redintegration pleteness and plausibility to the theory. As the external objects were subject to certain laws of sequence and coexistence, so also their images in the Blind; and the laws of sequence and coexistence of the imaD^es in the mind were the imao;es of the laws of sequence and coexistence in the external objects. The mind in producing her images in association thus was imitating and repeating, in her own domain, the operations of nature, making use of certain general laws which she derived originally from the obser- vation of the sequences and coexistences of external objects; not that the two, or the three, or the six, laws of association, however they might be counted, Avere supposed to be a representation of all the ge- neral laws of sequence and coexistence in external objects, but that they were a selection from them, or a general expression and image of them, adopted by the order of nature for the mind to conform to in her operations ; whether it was that the mind was de- termined so to operate by the physical laws or con- stitution of the brain, or whether the mind imposed the laws on herself in consequence of original obser- vation of, and abstraction from, the external objects. But when once the conception arose of conscious- ness being one cojinected series, lengthening itself each moment, and growing out of its former self and out of its previous content, as a plant out of its seed, so that the moments of consciousness are not separate objects, calling up each other in virtue of similarity or contrast, but organic parts of one living whole ; when once attention was called off from what repre- 264 SPONTANEOUS EEDINTEGRATION. paet 1. sentations are as images of objects in perception, and -^' fixed on what tliey are as members of a subjective Eedintegratiou series of moments of consciousness, as containing feel- ings and not as containing qualities ; which is virtually what Sir W. Hamilton has done in his reassertion of the general law of Redintegration; — then the enquiry was directed into its proper channel, and the process of lengthening of the chain of consciousness in red- integration was exhibited in a manner favourable to investigation. §29. § 29, Brown, in his Philosophy of the Human Analysis of , j^, , - ... . « redintegration. IVimd, icct. 35, m pomtmg to cmotions as a source 01 association, and James Mill, in his Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, chap. 3, in pointing to vividness and frequency as the causes of strength in association, and connecting vividness with pleasure and pain, came very near to what seems to me to be the truth. Referring to the analysis of representa- tions in § 25, there will be found only two which can be regarded as the elements or qualities determining redintegration. If the redintegrating object is a re- presentation, the factor in it which determines the redintegration of the next object is the predominant interest which it contains; if the redintegrating object is presented, then either the pleasure or pain, or some represented pleasure or pain, that is, some interest, is the determining factor. Sir W. Hamilton too, in note D*** to his edition of Reid, p. 913, states as a "Secondary or Concrete principle — what may be styled (under protest, for it is hardly deser\'ing of the title Law): — ix. The Law of Preference : — Thoughts are suggested, not merely by force of the general subjective relation subsisting between them- selves, they are also suggested in proportion to the SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION^ 265 relation of interest (from whatever source) in which paeti. ch. v. these stand to the individual mind." This however, — " 8 29 taken as it must be in connection with its context, Analysis of goes but a small part of the way which the principle ^^ ^^"' "'"' it states is capable of going. The method in which this principle operates must now be examined, toge- ther with the other operations which concur to the result. In every object there is a part which is either pleasing or painful, or may become so by the con- tinuance of the object in consciousness; if it is pleas- ing, that alone rivets the attention; if it is painful, the attention is drawn to it equally, but with an in- terest in its absence. Pleasure in presented objects, interest in represented objects, is that which occupies the attention, and causes that part of the object to which it is attached to linger in consciousness and to exclude the other parts of it from consciousness. It is true that in objects of presentation vividness fixes the attention, irrespective of the pleasure or pain at- tached to the part of the object which is vivid; but then this very vividness while it lasts prevents us from passing on to another object, the part which is vivid must lose its vividness before we can have a new object in its place; but the pleasure which be- longs to any part of an object is carried on into the redintegrated object. Vividness would sufiice to ac- count for the first step in redintegration, but not for the second, as will be seen when the second step is described. Vividness is the cause of an object re- maining in consciousness, not of its melting into an- other object; pleasure on the other hand we dwell upon, while the object to which it was attached is let go. Pleasure first fixes the attention on an object, 266 SPONTANEOUS EEDINTEGRATION. parti. then covers its departure, by remaining while the -^-' other parts of it vanish. Objects of presentation come Analysis of and go .entirely irrespective of our wishes, our likings and dislikings ; so long as an object of presentation or representation is vivid, it remains in consciousness and begins no series of representations. But when once it pleases us to dwell on it, we begin immedi- ately, in spontaneous, not in voluntary redintegration, to forget the object, and think only of the pleasure, and a series of representations is set on foot. The object originally presented, or represented, is then the first in the series of represented objects ; though we may be looking at it with our eyes, it is an object of representation. We exercise no volition, but spon- taneously redintegrate what we may. The motive power in this series, the secret spring which effects the changes in it, the invariable factor antecedent to every new object in it, is interest; the interest felt in the antecedent object determines what its form shall be, and consequently how the next moment shall dif- fer from it when it arises out of it. Two processes are constantly going on in redinte- gration, the one a process of corrosion, melting, de- cay, and the other a process of rene-ndng, arising, becoming. Unless by an effort of volition, which is here out of the question, no object of representation remains long before consciousness in the same state, but fades, decays, and becomes indistinct. Those parts of the object, however, which possess an in- terest, that is, those which are attended by a repre- sentation of pleasure or pain, resist this tendency to gradual decay of the whole object. I do not say those parts which are most vivid ; that would be a tautology ; but those parts are most vivid, or resist SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION. 267 decay, which are attended by the feeling of interest. part i. This inequality in the object, some parts, the unia- — ' teresting, submitting to decay, others, the interesting Analysis of parts, resisting it, when it has continued for a certain '■^^''*^^^*'°"- time, ends in becoming a new object. The old ob- ject by reason of its inequality, of the lasting nature of the interesting parts and decaying nature of the uninteresting parts, has changed into a new object, a new object consisting of the parts which had an in- terest for us in the old object, together with an en- vironment of some sort or other, but as yet quite indistinct and provisional. The question now is, how these new parts are fiUed up, that is, how the second object in the series of redintegration arises. I recur now, in order to take this next step in the redintegration, to the general law of redintegration, namely, that every object, which has occurred in a variety of combinations, has a tendency to redinte- grate, or call back into consciousness, all of them. The combination of the interesting parts with others, in the original object, kept their combination with other, that is, former, objects out of consciousness. But now that the uninteresting parts of the original object have vanished or decayed, the interesting parts of that object are free to combine again with any objects, or parts of objects, with which they have at any time been combined before. All the former combinations of these parts may come back into con- sciousness ; one must; but which wiU? There can be but one answer; That which has been most habit- ually combined with them before. This new object begins at once to form itself in consciousness, and to group its parts round the part still remaining from the former object; part after part comes out and ar- 268 SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGEATION; pabt I. ranges itself in its old position ; but scarcely has the -^ ' process begun, when the original law of interest be- Anaiysisof gius to Operate on this new formation, seizes on the interesting parts and impresses them on the attention to the exclusion of the rest, and the whole process is repeated again with endless variety. I venture to propose this as a complete and true account of the whole process of spontaneous redintegration. Several well known phenomena are accounted for by this analysis of the process of redintegration. First, the difference in kind of the objects repre- sented in redintegration according to the cheerful or melancholy mood we are in. For though it has aL ways been a well known fact, that cheerfulness and melancholy were accompanied by representations of very different kinds of objects, yet no one, so far as I know, has pointed out any other cause of this accom- paniment than the supposed suitability of objects like darkness, storm, confusion, slow music, to melan- choly, and objects such as sunshine, flowers, quick music, to cheerfulness ; a suitability of which no other ground could be discovered than the fact of the accompaniment, so far as it was a fact of pre- sentation ; which accompaniment, accordingly, as a fact of presentation. Mill, in the work already quoted, substitutes for the supposed suitability as an expla- nation of the phenomenon of the accompaniment in redintegration. The connection between the two circumstances, the mood of mind and the objects redintegrated, appears now to be a causal one, the interest felt being the common element in the two objects, the redintegrating add the redintegrated. When melancholy we do not redintegrate such ob- jects as storm, darkness, war, &c., because we know SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION. 269 beforehand that such objects will satisfy an interest, part i. and this must be the case if suitability is the cause of -^ ' 8 29 the redintegration ; — this would be to make the red- Analysis of ■ , .• I . . ^ 111 retotegration. mtegration voluntary ; nor yet because melancholy objects, such a storm, darkness, slow music, war, and so on, have in presentation occurred together, and so are reproduced together in redintegration ; the order of redintegration is too different from that of pre- sentation, and that of presentation too varied, to al- low of such an account being accepted as sufficient ; but the interest in such objects of representation is greater in moments when we are melancholy, and this is one of the signs of a melancholy mood ; and then the interest is the motive or efficient cause of their redintegration. The question is not, Why such and such objects have an interest for us when we are in a melancholy mood, and such and such other objects when we are in a cheerful mood ; this is an immediate and ultimate empirical fact of consciousness, which we can no more explain or account for than we can for the sweet or sour taste of some objects, or for the red or green colour of others. But the question is. Why certain classes of objects are redintegrated when we are in one mood, and certain other classes when we are in another mood ; and the answer is, not only that they are of a melancholy or cheerful nature, which may be called their suitability to our mood, but in addition to this, that the interest we feel in them, arising from this suitability, is the determining motive in spontaneous redintegrations, the element or factor which is common to both the objects in redintegration. Other sensible qualities of objects are fixed and constant in them, but the interest they possess for us is not fixed and constant in them, at 270 SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION, paet I. least is much less so than those sensible qualities are ; -^' and thus, when the interest becomes the fixed point Analysis of in any phenomenon or series of phenomena, the other ledjntegration. ti- /> ji i i qualities oi those phenomena become pan passu un- fixed and inconstant ; and, since this is the case in redintegration, the series of objects in redintegration loses that particular regularity and order which its objects possessed as presentations, and acquires an- other regularity and order determined by, or turning as it were on the pivot of, interest. Another thing accounted for by this analysis is the apparent melting of one object into another, a well- known phenomenon in dreams. Scenes and faces, and even objects not visible but inferred, change im- perceptibly into other forms and characters, in dream- ing. One moment you see one face which you know, the next you see that it is not that face but another; yet this excites no surprise, though you are conscious of the change. Objects imagined to be present but not seen in the dream change their character in the same way. The unity of the interest prevents sur- prise ; if the interest changes its character, if for in- stance, in the dream, a face, which excites interest of a pleasant kind strongly, is succeeded, in consequence of some external change of circumstances, by an- other, the interest of which is strong but painful, then surprise is felt. Thirdly, this analysis accounts for the balance between habit and interest; people who have few or weak interests are decided predominantly in their redintegrations by habit ; those who have many or powerful interests have redintegrations of more va- riety and piore apparent originality. Interest is the source of what is called character. What a man's SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION. 271 character is depends on Ms interests, that is, on what part i. he habitually takes pleasure in, on the habitual trains ^' S 29 of his spontaneous associations, and derivatively from Analysis of these of his voluntary associations. If I know what he habitually takes an interest in, I can predict what the character of his" associations wiU be, and know what his character is. But interests, if at once few and powerful, have a tendency to coincide with habit, for then they both run in the same groove; it be- comes a habit to feel certain interests ; and the same series of redintegrations revolves day after day, unless the objects of presentation are unusually new and various, as for instance in travelling. Old age brings with it a lessening of the number of interests, and of the intensity of many that remain; consequently it also brings an increasing domiaation of habit; and this the rather, if the interests that remain are few and powerful. To go back now to the instance of the bookcase ; if I go from the notion of the bookcase to the notion of the carpenter, the reason is because in the par- ticular instance of representing or presenting the bookcase I am interested by some circumstance in the material, or the measurement, or the construc- tion, with which the carpenter has been connected previously in consciousness. I do not call up the representation of the carpenter because I am inter- ested in him, but because one particular part or aspect of the bookcase, which interests me most and excludes or survives the rest, has been particularly connected with the carpenter in a previous presenta- tion. That part of the whole previous state of con- sciousness now again represented to me, to the exclu- sion of other parts of the bookcase, by a temporary 272 SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGEATION. Part r. feeling of interest in it, reillumines the whole state of Ch. V. P ' -— • consciousness, and recalls it as a whole, of which it Analysis of was a part in the original presentation. There are redintegration. ii- i-ii. -i. cases no doubt m which the interest felt is a purely intellectual one, and where any object at once leaves standing oiit, to the exclusion of its other parts, notions of relation or cause, and these again call up objects which have been most habitually presented or- represented as instances of such cases or such rela- tions; here the intellectual conception of a cause or other relation, such as contrast or resemblance, is the most interesting thing, and its interest is its title to prominence, and the circumstance which makes it the link between two objects in the redintegration. Dreams and reveries are the instances of the most purely spontaneous redintegration, without the ad- mixture of volition. When in dreaming we are con- scious of a purpose, of a preference for having or for not having such and such a representation, before it actually arises, then we must be in a state very near waking. Very often in redintegration we do not re- present the redintegrated objects as familiar remem- bered objects, but they come before us as quite new. This is called productive imagination, and the most perfect instances of it are dreams. No one doubts that the apparent novelty of the representations is due to the novelty of the combinations in which their parts are represented, and this apparent novelty is quite as intelligible on the theory now suggested as on any other. The more insignificant and un- essential the interesting part of any object is, the more different will the object which it redintegrates probably be from the former object, and the wider will be the range of possible objects habitually con- SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION. 273 nected with it ; again, the more habitual an object is, part i. the less likely is it to impress consciousness and dwell -- ' on the memory as one of the links in the redintegra- Aniysis of tion, and thus the points of interest alone wOl be ^^ '"^^e^**'""- those which wiU appear afterwards to have composed the series. There is another phenomenon, which occurs sometimes, of the very opposite character to this of apparent novelty. It is when we have a strong feeling of the sameness of objects, or states of consciousness in redintegration, with some object or state of consciousness which has preceded, but what or where we cannot remember. I allude to cases of dreams, and more rarely of waking perceptions, where we have a strong conviction of having been before in the same place or the same circumstances as those of the present presentation or representation, but never- theless can recall no other circumstances which con- firm the conviction. Sometimes we dream of a place which appears perfectly familiar; sometimes we see* a place, waking, which appears familiar, though we know we have not seen it before, and then, perplexed, say we must have seen it in a dream. Here are cases of an inexplicable sense of familiarity and recognition obtaining in dreams, in waking, or in cases which perhaps consist of both. It seems to me probable, that this sense of familiarity depends on the rousing of the same particular feeling of interest by two or more different perceptions; and that from the iden- tity of the interest we infer the identity of the objects of presentation or representation. S 30. The laws of spontaneous redintegration, ac- § so. T 111 • T 111 Results of tlie cording to what has been said, are three; 1st, the analysis. general law of redintegration, that consciousness is one connected whole, and that any object may call 274 SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGEATION. cpfV' "P' ^^*^^^ directly or indirectly through other objects, — any other object or the whole of past objects of con- Resnits of the sciousness : 2d, the first law of the method in which analysis. i • • -, this IS done, namely interest; 3d, the second law of the method, namely habit. The question now arises whether either of these latter laws can be reduced to, or subsumed under the other ; whether habit is a particular case of interest, or interest a particular case of habit, or whether both fall under a common category. The latter appears to me to be the truth. Habit so far as we are conscious of it, or conscious- ness of the series of objects so far as they are habitual, is a pleasure. What the physical cause or ground of this may be is a psychological question, as, for instance, whether it depends on physical changes in the brain which continue the same until some cause arises to turn them into another channel; this would be habit as a fact in tangible matter. But habit as a fact of uniform succession in states of con- sciousness is a pleasure; it is the pleasure of the sense of ease and facility, or the absence of the sense of effort. That is to say, habit, so far as we are conscious of it, is a kind of pleasure, and in this sense is a motive power in redintegration ; as a law of con- sciousness it is the law of minimising effort, of moving in the direction of least resistance, exactly parallel to the physical law expressed in these same terms. Re- sistance in consciousness is expressed by the term effort. Interest is the representation of pleasure or pain ; so that both habit and interest are referable to a common notion, pleasure, of which habit is one par- ticular kind, and of which interest is the represen- tation. That is to say, pleasure, either directly as SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGEATION. 275 habit or indirectly as represented, is the source and paet i. spring of all redintegration. For interest, as the re- -^ ' presentation of pain, is not a motive in spontaneous. Results of the but only in voluntary, redintegration ; pain iu repre- * ^°"'' sentation is not a motive but a resisting power, unless it is accompanied by volition and a purpose of avoid- ing it. The only way in which interest, as a repre- sentation of pain, is a motive power in spontaneous redintegration, is when the interest is of an intellec- tual character, and when the pleasure in represent- ing pain is the pleasure of wonder or curiosity; as, for instance, when we are said to be fascinated by painful images. So that, when interest is defined as the representation of pleasure or pain, and then be- sides called the motive in spontaneous redintegration, a further limitation is requisite, namely, the limita- tion of it to those cases where the representation of pleasure or of pain is itself a pleasure ; and this must be, if pain is the feeling represented, to cases where the pleasure is intellectual, arising from knowing rather than from feeling. ' The result is this, that pleasure contains in it aU the determinative power in spontaneous redintegra- tion; the link which connects one object with another in spontaneous redintegration is always some mode of pleasure. But pleasure is so wide a term that it requires limitation, and the particular modes assigned in which alone the determining power is exercised. These are, first, the mode called ease, absence of efibrt, or habit; second, the mode of representation called interest; but then, interest being a represen- tation both of pleasure and pain, it is easy to see how a representation of pleasure should be itself a plea- sure, but not so easy to see how a representation of 276 SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION. Pabt I. pain should be so ; accordingly, interest as a mode of -'— ' pleasure is of two kinds; first, where it rejjresents Results of the pleasure it is a pleasure arising from the matter, or ™ ^^^' feeling, contained in its object; secondly, where it represents pain it is a pleasure arising from the form or cognition of its object; in the former case it is a pleasure simply, in the latter it is a pleasure of intel- lect. It must be added that cases of the latter kind are rare, and that generally where interest as a re- presentation of pain is the motive of a redintegration, it is so only through voHtion or voluntary effort, and the redintegration is to that extent not a spontaneous but a voluntary one. Pleasure as limited above is the determining power of the movement of objects in spontaneous redintegration, a determination of the character of the series in every succeeding moment, or a motive if we consider the objects or moments separately. The law of redintegration is, that it is determined by pleasure limited as above ; this is the general fact in all redintegrations, that is, the efficient cause of their movement or determination, in other words, their determining law. It is hard, I grant, to banish from the mind the notion of physical impulsion or attraction, that is, of tangible bodies pushing or pulling each other, when motion, force, power, de- termination and so on are spoken of; and even harder perhaps to avoid thinking of force and power as some occult or unknowable Thtng-in-itself, behind or under the phenomena, that is, the feehngs in time and space. The common inability to do the former, that is, to banish the notion of actions of tangible bodies on each other, when the terms motion, force, and power are used, gives rise to the difficulty which has been analysis. SPONTANEOUS EEDINTEGEATIOX. 277 felt and which will probably be felt again, the diffi- part i. culty of representing to oneself how pleasure, a mode -^—' of consciousness, can be a cause, or motive, in trains Eesufts of the of spontaneous redintegration. The difficulty is not usually felt at all, though it ought to be more acutely felt, ih. the case of voluntary redintegration ; the will is a phenomenon so familiar, that we accept a voli- tion, as a cause of other phenomena, as readily as we accept a tangible body as the cause of motion in another tangible body. Accordingly, where the will cannot be regarded as the efficient or motive cause, ag^i] xivTiasus, as it cannot in spontaneous redintegra- tions, there recourse is usually had to a tangible, psychological, cause, namely, the changes in the brain, as the efficient cause of redintegrations, and to the so-called laws of association, contrast and re- semblance, cause and effect, contiguity in time and place, as a framework applied by ourselves afterwards to the phenomena, as a means of reducing them to some order and making them intelligible to our- selves, not as laws imposed on the brain by nature, but on the redintegrations, after they have arisen, by our logic. For, as it has been shown in § 28, if these categories are regarded as in any way effi- cient, or existing in consciousness previously to the production of the object redintegrated under them, they can only be causes of a voluntary and not of a spontaneous redintegration, they can only be causes employed by some one who has already a purpose, more or less definite, in redintegrating one class of objects and not another. If on the other hand they should be regarded by any one as effi- cient, but yet not existing in consciousness previ- ously to the production of the redintegrated object 278 SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION. pabt I. in consciousness, then they must be regarded as laws -— of the operation of the tangible organ of consci- Resuitsofthe ousness, namely the brain; but, if so, then only in the sense that they are expressions of the result, in redintegration, of certain laws of the operation of the tangible organ, which in their own shape as laws of that operation are unknown, or at least unexpressed by these laws of association ; that is, they do not de- scribe how the brain operates in producing redinte- gration, but only how the result is constituted which that operation has produced. Spontaneous redinte- gration is a process in consciousness which requires a further analysis than these laws of association furnish ; and this further analysis has been supplied by point- ing out the invariable factor in it, namely, pleasure limited as above. Thus the old theory of the laws of association, so far as it is a theory of spontaneous redintegration, is intelligible and complete only when supplemented with a psychological theory of the action of the brain in consciousness. To this action of the brain it refers for the motive or determining power of the course of association. The redintegrated states of conscious- ness are not produced by previous states of conscious- ness, but both are produced by the action of the brain; and, conversely, there is no ground for sa5dng that the redintegrated states of consciousness react upon the brain or modify its action, so as to cause that action to produce another state of consciousness. But the relation between the states of the brain and the states of consciousness must be conceived as si- milar to that between the ivory keys of a pianoforte and the striking of the strings by the hammers, when I run my finger along the key-board. The strings SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION. 279 are struck in a certain order, and this order indicates part i. the order of the striking of the keys on the key-board ; — ' but the striking of each hammer on its string depends Result's of the on the striking of its key on the key-board; and does ^"^'y''^- not cause either the striking of the next string by its hammer, or the striking of the next key by my finger. Such is the only explanation which the old theory has to offer of the phenomena of spontaneous redin- tegration ; and that there is such a distinct class of phenomena as those of spontaneous redintegration, the existence of dreams is sufficient to prove ; for no one can pretend that dreams are instances of redinte- grations which once and originally were voluntary, but which have become so habitual as to be performed without the sense of effort. The old theory therefore is imperfect; it not only requires the supplement of some psychological theory of the action of the brain, but also it offers no account either of the mode of production of states of consciousness by the brain, or of the reaction of the redintegrated states of con- sciousness on the brain itself; consciousness must be conceived- by it in some such way as the foam thrown up by and floating on a wave, and having no reaction on the motion of the wave; so consciousness must float, in its spontaneously redintegrated states, on the surface of the brain. It is therefore onlj?^ a part of a complete theory, and the connection with the other part is not worked out. Those who, in addition to holding this theory, hold also a total difference in kind between con- sciousness and its objects, would find such a connec- tion of the two parts of this theory of the laws of association very difficult. And this difficulty can not be avoided in the case of voluntary redintegration, 280 SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION. Part I. whatever may be done in that, of spontaneous. In — - ' them both, the production of states of consciousness Eesultsofthe by statcs of the brain has to be conceived; and in voluntary redintegration, certainly, the reaction of states of consciousness on the brain has to be con- ceived besides. It is impossible there to suppose consciousness to be a mere foam, aura, or melody, arising from the brain, but without reaction upon it. The states of consciousness are, in voluntary redin- 'tegration, links in the chain of physical events or cir- cumstances in the external world. When the sun in June shines in at the window, I lift my hand and puU down the green blind. The sensation of heat is pain- ful; representing this I feel an interest in obviating it ; this is a purpose, or final cause, which as efficient produces the sensation of effort in lifting my hand and pulling down the blind, and a more agreeable state of sensation is the result. The whole proceed-, ing is capable of analysis into states of consciousness which follow one another according to regular ob- servable laws. There is first the feeling of the sun, the blind, and the window, and of my own body near it; these objects are states or a state of feelings in time and space together ; in this state arises, or into it is introduced, a feeling of the heat being too great ; I feel an interest in representing the painful sensation and its removal ; I fix the representation of the re- moval of the painful sensation in consciousness ; here is voluntary effort; the representation so fixed com- pletes itself by the general law of aU redintegration, and becomes completed with the representation of the objects which must be presented to consciousness, if the painful sensation is to be removed; those objects, represented, become familiar and involve an effort SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION. 281 which is less" painful, as represented, than the sensa- pakt i. tion of heat, as represented; the least painful repre- -^' sentation remains alone in consciousness, that is, con- Results of the sciousness takes the direction of least resistance ; and the new object exists with greater vividness than when balanced by the opposite representation, that is, it becomes a presentation, namely, the presented fact of my hand moving and pulling down the blind ; on which the heat, as presented, ceases. External objects, tangible and visible, are modes of feeling, and the brain among them; the brain is not introduced into the series just described, solely because it is not included ia it as an object of consciousness ; its being of a visible and tangible nature would be no obstacle to its introduction, any more than it is in the case of the blind, the sun, and the window. The action of the brain may be inferred to exist and accompany and condition every step of the process ; but that will not alter the facts as they at present stand, nor intro- duce the brain into them as a presented object. But it is impossible to explain the phenomena of voluntary action, as for instance the case just described, by the mere production of consciousness by the brain ; for, unless a reaction of consciousness on the brain is in- troduced, the particular actions performed are mean- ingless, and no special cause for each or any of them can be assigned; for instance, what determines the brain to guide the muscles to pull down the blind? Can we conceive that just this phenomenon and no other would foUow, if every other circumstance re- mained the same, except that the feeling of pain from the heat and representation of the means to avoid it were absent? If spontaneous actions are explained as automatic, or as results of the action of a material analysis. 282 SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION. Part I. organ alone, still voluntary actions cannot be explained -^' so; and this explanation of spontaneous actions in- Eestdts of the volves the assumption of the action of external, ma- terial, tangible objects on consciousness; while the Corresponding explanation of voluntary actions in- volves, besides this, the further assumption of the reaction of consciousness on those objects; that is, involves twice the notion of influence or impulse ex- ercised by one heterogeneous object on another; the two objects being at the same time conceived as so heterogeneous, that the notion of their having an en- tirely different and independent origin was adopted solely to escape from the supposed difficulty of con- ceiving either of them as arising out of the other. I argue, therefore, that keeping consciousness and its so-called material and tangible -objects apart and treating them as separate and heterogeneous objects of existence is a course which leads to insoluble con- tradictions ; for though we may disguise their incon- gruity at starting, that is, in the theory of perception, if we start on a materialistic basis, yet we soon re- quire to employ not only the tangible objects as the cause of consciousness, but consciousness as the cause of the tangible objects, a result which might indeed have been perceived as inevitable from the first; and if we start from an idealistic basis, we have this latter difficulty at the very first setting out. If it is main- tained that neither can be produced out of or by the other, because they are heterogeneous, then also their mutual action and reaction, when they have been pro- duced, must be admitted to be inconceivable. Nor can they exist separately from the very first, for then we have the same inconceivability in the very first intercourse between them, an intercourse which SPONTANEOUS EEDINTEGEATION- 283 nevertheless is an admitted fact of experience. It paeti. follows that we must conceive them to be different -^-' aspects of the same phenomena, that is, that qualities EesultB of the are feelings and feelings qualities in their subjective *" ^^^^' and objective aspects respectively; that the series of states in the one are the same with the series of states in the other, only on its other side or aspect; and that each series is complete in itself, containing an interminable succession of causes and effects, belong- ing to itself, and not borrowed from the opposite aspect of the phenomena. § 31. The sense of effort may be included in all yomon cases of spontaneous redintegration ; but the sense of effort is not volition. Volition is the sense of effort fixed to a particular object with pleasure or pain; and these are the elements of liking or disliking, choosing to have or to avoid, any thing. In the in- stance given above of a voluntary redintegration, the action of pulling down the blind to avoid the heat, the moment of volition was that wherein the removal of the sensation of the heat was fixed upon, a moment in which effort was involved in representing the sen- sation of heat. The moment of external action, of the arising of the cognition, or the feeling, of my hand being extended and the blind drawn down, is not a moment of volition but of action consequent upon it. No volition exists at this latter moment, at the moment when the representation becomes a presentation; this happens in consequence of the ab- sence (in obedience to Jaws of spontaneous redinte- gration) of the opposing feeling, the representation of heat. Yet it is at this latter moment that volition is commonly supposed to be exerted, and not at the former moment; or rather the two moments are not 284 SPONTANEOUS EEDINTEGEATION. pabti. distinguished from each other, and the line between ^— ' feeling, or cognition, and action, or volition, is drawn Voution. at the moment of arising of the external event, at the moment when the representation becomes a pre- sentation. But in this account of the matter it is not made clear how a feeling, or cognition, becomes an action, how things so different as these are commonly supposed to be, a supposition which leads to the line being drawn where it is commonly drawn, can pass one into the other. For the interest in the former moment is the cause of the physical, presented, event in the latter moment, and this interest contains the volition. The true account must be, that the repre- sentation of the interest is an action in the same sense in which the subsequent presented event is. When an interest of this kind' is included in redintegration, the interest is still the determining factor of the red- integration ; but the knowledge of the particular object sought or avoided, anticipating the presenta- tion of it if obtained, and preventing the presentation of it if avoided, is the new element which distin- guishes voluntary from spontaneous redintegration. Volition is anticipation of a result, and all interest in redintegration which is anticipatory is a volition, and makes the redintegration voluntary from being spon- taneous. The interest is the efficient, the anticipa- tion the final, cause of the remainder of the redinte- gration. Anticipation in an interest makes the in- terest a final as well as an efficient cause ; interest in an anticipation makes the anticipation an efficient as well as a final cause. Volition, which is an interest in an anticipated object, for instance, either the in- creasing of an experienced pleasure, or the decreas- ing of an experienced pain, or the procuring of an SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION. 285 imagined pleasure, or the preventing of an imagined Part i. pain, — volition, which in some or other of these ways — -' is interest in an anticipated object, is a final cause volition, which has become efficient, according to the scholastic saying, Causa finalis movet (that is, becomes efficient, or an k^ xii/^ffsmg) non secundum suum esse, sed secundum suum esse cognitum. There are three degrees of complication in red- integrations : first, when there is pleasure or interest but no sense of eiFort; second, when there is both effiart and interest; third, when there is effort, and interest, and anticipation. Redintegrations are per- fect when there is interest and anticipation in a high degree, and effort in a low degree ; the minimising of efibrt is the perfection of redintegration ; when to will is to perform, to wish is to obtain. Redintegra- tions of the first degree of complication, where there is interest but no effiart or very little, are pure en- joyment; those of the second degree, where there is eSort and interest *but no final cause, are more or less painful and. bewildering, and of these there are very few and rare instances, since they at once and of themselves pass into redintegrations of the third degree, the pain being at once perceived as an object to be avoided. Redintegrations of the third degree, containing effort, anticipation, and interest, that is, voluntary redintegrations, are the highest and most important class ; and under this class fall all reason- ing processes, all action and conduct of reasoning beings, and all happiness of which such beings are capable, as such. In the history of the development of an individual from infancy, the sense of effort may have been involved in some of the earliest instances of consciousness, and volition the same. To trace 286 SPONTANKOUS REDINTEGRATION. Part I. the history of the development of an individual con- -^' sciousness is not the purpose of this Essay, but to Volition, analyse particular states and particular processes of consciousness into their component elements ; and for this purpose the logical order of increasing com- plexity is followed, since metaphysic is the applied logic of consciousness and of the universe. ^. l?2- , 5 32. The point which has now been reached is Division of ■' ^ fanotions in one at which the two elements of consciousness, for- ionsciousness. . mal and material, appear to have developed mto dis- tinct functions, or modes of operation, of the con- scious being ; and this is a consideration which deserves to be dwelt upon. Nearly aU enquirers into the nature of man agree in distinguishing in him three general or cardinal functions, and three only, to which either separately or in combination aU operations of consciousness may be referred. These are, to adopt Sir W. Hamilton's nomenclature, Feel- ing, Cognition, and Conation ; and man is accord- ingly considered in a threefold aspect, as a feeling, thinking, and acting being. Now the first thing that strikes the attention in this division of functions is, that it is threefold, while the elements of conscious- ness are never more than two, feeling and form. When the feeling or material element of conscious- ness is made the object of consideration, in a pro- visional image or series of images, then man is said to be a feeling being and to possess a function of feel- ing. When the formal element of consciousness is made the object of consideration, in similar pro- visional images, then the cognitive function of man is in question. But where has the function of cona- tion its source? And what is its claim to rank with the other two functions? It is founded on and in- SPONTANEOUS EEDINTEGEATION. 287 eludes feelings of a particular class. The sense of paeti. eiFort is conation ; the sense of effort attached to a —' g go definite object of desire or aversion is volition. The Division of material element of consciousness, the feelings, have consciousness. accordingly two great branches; the first iucluding feelings so far as they do not determine a series of red- integrations, actions, or reasonings ; and the second including feelings so far as they do determine such a series ; and this second branch is again divided into such feelings as are final causes as well as efficient, and such as are efficient only. Hence we distinguish among feelings, first conations, secondly volitions. But both the original branches of feeling, namely, feelings proper and conations and volitions, together constitute the material element of consciousness, and not one of the three taken alone is entitled to an equality of rank with the formal or cognitive element. Very different is the view usually taken of these three functions. The tendency to hypostasise is no- where more deeply rooted than in the case of cona- tion and volition. To hypostasise is to assume an unknown essence, substance, cause, or ground, be- hind or below phenomena ; and not only is this the case in phenomena so far as they exist in space, but also in phenomena so far as they exist in time. The terms motion, power, force, are used not to ex- press the phenomiena in particular arrangements of time and space ; for instance, the term motion is not used to express feelings in space changing in time, power and force not to express the rapidity of the change, or the quantity of the phenomena changed, but to indicate or imply some unknown and unknow- able cause, underlying and producing the change ; and while scientific writers warn us against understand- 288 SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION. Part I. ing them to employ the words with such a meaning, -^* and explain that they use them only to express Division of phenomena, and not such occult substances, essences, consciousness, causes, or grouuds (which is, if I rightly understand the phrase, the distinguishing mark of the "positive" method of philosophising), they stiU. assume or sus- pect that there may be such essences, only without the capability of being known to us, and of corre- sponding to our capability of knowing them. On this assumption or suspicion it is not the province of special and positive science to enter ; but it is the province of metaphysic ; and especially in cases where the hypostasising of phenomena interferes with and opposes positive results of actual analysis. Just as motion, power, and force cannot be hypo- stasised, so neither can conation or volition. That things move or change more or less rapidly, that they move and change at all, is an ultimate empirical fact in consciousness, which is resolvable by analysis into its elements, time, space, and a plurality of feelings. No cause or antecedent state to time, space, and feel- ing generally is conceivable ; time, space, and feelings together constitute change or succession in feelings. Consequently, not the cause of change, motion, power, or force generally, but the cause or invariably ante- cedent phenomenon of this or that particular change or object, arising in the place of or after another, is conceivable. But this is a cause not of change or motion, but of the determination of change or motion; it is a detennining cause, and if not final is efficient, the a^ri xiv/iamc of this or that object or feeling. But as motion, force, and power have been hyposta- sised in the external and tangible world, so conation and volition have been hypostasised in the empirical SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION. 289 ego ; and as the universe generally has been regarded paet l as nothing but an exhibition of Power, so aH human -^" actions and thoughts have been regarded as nothing Division of but exhibitions of a particular kind of power called oonsoiousuess. Will, subject however to restrictions and limitations arising from the universe, or exhibition of other power, in which the human being was placed. Hence the Win took its place by the side of Feeling and Cognition, as their equal at any rate, and sometimes as their source. The conception of the beginning of motion generally, as distinguished from that of the determination of motion, is a provisional image, or a conception, introduced by volition itself for the pur- poses of facility of reasoning, and supposes motion already both before and after the point where it chooses to assume the beginning. Motion generally is coeval with a plurality, of feelings in time and ' space ; the first difference of feelings in these forms together is motion ; there is no empirical fact pre- vious to motion. Vohtion is no beginning or source of motion, but a determination of it, and the begin- ning or source of a new and separately characterised portion of it. Volition impresses a character on motion and succession of feelings, it is no beguming of motion or succession. The normal state of consciousness is a spontane- ous state; it is that from which consciousness starts and to which it tends, passing through the interme- diate state of volition founded on conation. The vast importance of this intermediate state to us .practically, since it occupies in the ordinary business of life our whole attention, and is hourly increasing in the ex- tent and complexity of its objects, and absorbs our interest in the character of a search after practical 290 SPONTAOTIOUS EEDIKTTEGEATION. paet I. and theoretical truth, hides from our view the states — which are its source and its issue. Yet, as the § 32 , Diinsion oi mind progresses in its search after truth, it lays be- conBoiousness. hind it a seiies of spontaneous states, which though forgotten in themselves, forgotten in the form in which they appeared when new, are yet the lever, as it were, and the instrument of all future progress ; they have become part of the mind itself, which thenceforth is what it has become. The mind is always taking a fresh start, and considering itself as having always been, as necessarily being, that which it now finds itself to be. It forgets the origin of its opinions and principles, and considers them only as produced "from its own fund;" as a trustee, who mixes his own and his cestui-que-trust's moneys at his banker's, forgets how much is his own and how much his cestui-que-trust's. Voluntary redintegration is not more independent of the laws of spontaneous redintegration than walk- ing is independent of the laws of gravitation. As walking (I borrow the illustration from Coleridge, who applies it in a similar manner) is a constant interruption of, and a constant returning to, the law of gravitation, so the conscious guiding of the train of representations in voluntary redintegration, by re- ference to a purpose, is a constant interruption of, and a constant returning to, the laws of spontaneous redintegration. In the former we keep rejecting the representations which the latter keeps ofiering to our notice, if they do not appear conducive to the end we have in view, the question which we propose to our- selves to answer ; and the perceived non-conducive- ness of the rejected representations becomes our guide in fixing at last on representations which are SPONTANEOUS REDINTEGRATION. 291 conducive. But we work always through and with parti. Ch. v. the laws of spontaneous redintegration ; our most -^ ' artificial, most independent, and boldest steps are Dmsionof only leadings into other channels of the same trains consciousness. which took a course of their own previous to the interference of volition. Not only are the represen- tations the same in kind in both cases, but they are also the same in point of the possible number of them. No course can be taken under the guiding of volition, which could not have been taken without it; volition cannot increase our knowledge; it can only choose between different branches of it ; it can- not produce what is new, it can only select from the old. At any moment a certain number of courses are open to our thoughts; according to the degree or kind of the volition, the train of the redintegra- tions takes this course instead of that, plunges, sup- pose, into the fiftieth instead of into the first. At another time, returning to the same point, it might without volition take the very same or a diiferent direction. As many courses are open without as with volition. In other words, . the laws of spon- taneous redintegration embrace every possible case of trains of representation. The conscious volitional guiding of thought can create nothing, but can deal only with the representations or perceptions which are already, perhaps only in their elements, present in the web of the redintegrations waiting to be woven anew into this or that pattern. In psychology and in other special sciences the threefold distinction, of feeling, cognition, and cona- tion, is very serviceable, because, first, the distinction between the two branches of feeling, one of which is conation, is strongly marked and easily seized, and functions in consciousness. 292 SPONTANEOUS EEDINTEGEATION. pabt 1. secondly, the effect of men's volitions or conations -^' on other men is for other men most important. Division of It is Well therefore to mark off from others those states of consciousness, which at once involve a sense of effort and produce the effect of external actions or events towards other men or on otheir objects, and to consider these states of consciousness, that is, volitions and conations, together with the effects or events which they produce in external objects, as single but complex phenomena. But if this is done, and if volitions and conations together with the events produced by them are considered as single phenomena, under the name of actions, then the distinction must also be retained by which ac- tions are divided into immanent and transitive, that is, into those which do not produce a change without the mind, or in external objects, and those which do pass on to such production. In metaphysic, however, conations and volitions are nothing more than parti- cular kinds of states of consciousness, which Hke all other states of consciousness are resolvable into feel- ing, the material, and time and space, the formal, element. And as feelings are empirically inseparable from cognitions, so also are conations and volitions ; and though there may be feelings and cognitions which are neither conations nor volitions, there can- not be conations or volitions which are not both feelings and cognitions. When feelings, sensations, emotions, conations, volitions, and cognitions are spoken of as separate objects or separate states of consciousness, the terms must always be understood as provisional and abstract, and as implying a' qoA- tenus, or indicating the character and circumstance which is particularly intended to be made the object SPONTANEOUS KEDINTEGRATION. 293 of discussion ia the phenomena in question. As such paet i. provisional images, cognitions alone are the special -^~' objects of metaphysical, feelings and volitions of Divisiokof ethical, enquiries; and it is as belonging to feelings consciousness. and volitions, that is, to the domain of Ethic, that all knowledge and all cognitions have a final cause or serve an ultimate purpose, — a truth expressed so often by Aristotle in the famous words ou ymffig aXXa Tgu^is. Cognitions and feelings exist each with reference to the other and for the sake of the other, just as the material and formal elements in the least empirical moment of consciousness exist for each other and by each other alone. In volition first an end, a sake, a final cause and purpose, is discerned; in vohtion first it exists. As object and subject exist first in reflection, so final causes exist first in vohtion. Potentially both are contained in pheno- mena, before they exist actually for consciousness; we discover afterwards that they were provided for. We represent them as having been potentially pre- sent in the past ; and in the same way, in the future, higher and wider powers than we have yet any idea of may exist already in the states and modes of con- sciousness, and of existence, which have already been developed in man, and in the universe which is now actually his. Who shall limit the " endless resur- rections" of faculties yet dormant, whose very seeds may be yet uncreated? Who shall imagine hounds to the endless power of development, which has already, in the universe as it is already known to us, produced such phenomena as could not possibly have been anticipated until the fact itself declared them, yet all following one law, and consisting of the same elements ? Not those assuredly who contend for the 294 SPONTANEOUS EEDINTEGRATION. Part I. Ch. T. §32. Division of fuBcbions in consciousness. infinity of that, law and those elements; not those who see unity underlying all phenomena, and exist- ence and consciousness of a piece ; for this is the very condition of imderstanding the lowest as a prophecy of the highest, a grain of sand as the anticipation of the moral law, and the moral law itself as the promise of its own fulfilment. CHAPTER VI. VOLUNTART EEDINTEGEATION. Signifer, statue signum : hie manebimus optime. Livy. § 33. It has been sliown that the whole field of con- parti. sciousness is occupied by perception and spontaneous ^1— ' redintegration; that the latter may or may not in- Atstriict elude a new perception, but that, if it does so, the ^noK. new perception is a very small part of the entire pro- cess of consciousness; and that time and space are as necessary to spontaneous redintegration as to per- ception. Spontaneous redintegration is the subject- matter of aU more elaborate processes of conscious- ness; and these more elaborate processes, which are an included under the general term voluntary redin- tegration, are applications of a form to spontaneous redintegrations, are workings up of spontaneous redin- tegrations into shapes, and guidings of them into di- rections, under the influence of some end or purpose, more or less clearly seen by the person who performs them. It is the purpose of the present and the fol- lowing chapters to show, that all these shapes and directions depend ultimately upon, and are capable of being analysed into, the forms of time and space and nothing else ; in other words, that understanding and 296 VOLUNTAEY EEDINTEGRATION. pami. reason, in all their branches, are nothing more than Ch VI -1 ■^—' modes of time and space applied to perceptions and Abstract redintegrations, and that the laws of logic themselves ^'notfon^! are founded on, and. are an application of, the same forms. To explain this position more fully it should be recalled, that perception is the minimum of cognition, the subjective name for an object. But consciousness cannot rest with merely having formed objects, it is compelled to work them up into systems, and this it does in spontaneous redintegration ; but it cannot stop here; it is compelled also to dominate its own spontaneous systems, to remodel, organise, and com- plete them, which process is called the search after truth. All this organising and completing requires no further formal apparatus, no other a priori furni- ture or instruments, than those cognitions of time and space, which have already presided at the pro- duction of the subject-matter, the perceptions and spontaneous redintegrations which are to be com- pleted and organised. In the simplest cases of perception the procedure is entirely synthetic, a combining of separate sen- sations into a single object of perception ; but in spontaneous redintegration the foundation is laid for analysis, by the omissions which accompany repre- sentation. Thinking is nothing more than a volun- tary combination of synthesis and analysis ; we are employed both in dismembering the objects we have, and in forming others from their fragments. An abstraction may arise either by attention, by fixing the consciousness on an attractive part of the object presented to us, or spontaneously and without efibrt by the mere forgetting of some of the features of the VOLUNTARY REDINTEGRATION. 297 object. But by an abstract notion is usually meant pam i. a notion formed by voluntary attention to some parts ^ ' of an object, to the exclusion of the other parts ; and Abstract this sense of the word -will be retained here. Sup- ""noK! pose that we have a perception or a redintegration of some external object before us, for instance a house. We are attracted by some part of it which stands in relation to some feeling, perhaps intellectual, as curi- osity, perhaps sasthetic, as sense of beauty of outline, perhaps of a moral or sensuous nature, as if one room contains persons or things which interest us. In these cases we are first attracted and then deter- mined to abstract, or withdraw the attention, from all other parts of the object, and to fix it on that which interests us. The result of this process is an abstract notion. It is voluntary if we suppose that the abstraction has involved a choice between two attracting parts, that is, a conscious effort to fix the attention on one instead of on another. From this point we may again proceed -either spontaneously or voluntarily, by spontaneous or voluntary redintegra- tion. If by the former, no further effort or attention is required for the performance of the redintegration j if by the latter, we must have a purpose in view, an interest beyond, that of merely dwelling on the single abstract notion which has interested us. The redin- tegration itself must be instituted for a purpose, and with an end in view. This purpose involves the com- parison of two abstract notions, of the general same- ness of which we have had a perception in the course of spontaneous redintegration. The result of the comparison of abstract notions is a general notion, and this is formed out of the abstract notions by a voluntary redintegration of them. Say for instance 298 VOLUNTARY REDINTEGIlATIOI f t c , • ^ • t tp concepts, or a compicx 01 leelings oi a certam kind and oi a certain degree of intensity, bound together for a cer- tain time in a certain figure or in a certain place. A particular abstract notion is an actual image, a general notion is a provisional image. It is not the result of a single act of abstraction, but of several compared together, and therefore it is an image which was never given actually in presentation as it appears in representation, when the general term is applied to it. This circumstance, together with the fact that we use general terms apagogically more often than osten- sively, has made writers fancy that the general term, which they called a concept, was something different in its nature from an image, instead of being, and not merely being capable of translation into, or proof by means of, an image or object of perception. It is a provisional image, which is presented again to thought as an image of which there are many parts waiting to be filled up, and which therefore is still hable to mo- dification by the results of investigation. Fries, in his System der Logik, § 24, says. Das Denken der Begriffe ist immer vom Schematismus der EinbUd- ungskraft abhangig, denn jedes abgesonderte Be- wusstseyn allgemeiner Theilvorstellungen erhalten wir urspriinglich durch die Abstraction der Schemate in der Einbildungskraft. To his expression Theil- vorsteUung corresponds mine of provisional image. I think it will be admitted readily that the particular abstract notion, as described here, is an image, but not so readily that the general notion is so. At the same time, if my remarks establish the point with THE CONCEPT. 411 reference to the general notion, they will . a fortiori paet ii. have done so with reference to the particular. div. 2. ' Objects of consciousness, it has been here asserted, § 46. are all without exception capable of being analysed concepts. into two elements, the material or feeling, and the formal, time and space. It would follow that, if general notions are objects of consciousness, they also must be capable of analysis into these elements and no others. Here however appears to arise a case which is an exception from this law ; for general notions, ra kcc^' oXov, or universals, are certainly in some sense objects of consciousness, but never was one of them yet given in presentation. They seem to elude the laws of time and space. It would seem that they must have some other nature, or ratio es- sendi, apart from time and space, that they must con- stitute a region of consciousness apart, where they live under their own laws, a domus exUis Plutonia of shadowy forms without a body. That which appears, however, as an impossibility of being brought under the forms of time and space lies in reality not in the form of the general notion, but in its matter. The unreality of general notions consists in this, that they are objects which do not occur in presentation, that they contradict what is commonly called experience. They are combina- tions of objects, or skeletons of objects, which it goes against our habit to assign existence to, because we know that it is against universal experience of the senses that such abstractions should be presented to them; the object of the general notion is too absurd or too imperfect to exist. This however does not destroy in them either their form of time and space, which they had in the concrete, nor the material ele- 412 THE CONCEPT. paet II. ment or its modes, ■which they then also possessed. Div. 2.' The elements remain the same though combined S^. again, or though reduced to a minimum of power of coMepS ° being perceived. This I call a provisional image. If not this, then the concept-name or general term has no object of consciousness signified by it. But it is clear that it has an object signified by it, or it would be of no use in reasoniag. And when we voluntarily perform the process of abstraction, at what do we stop, what is the state of our mind when Ave have completed the process, and are looking about for a name to fix the result by? We have before us an abstract or a provisional image, in which the partS' of the object abstracted from are represented by a blank space, and the parts attended to remain in their own colours. This is the object of the abstract, and this in more complicated cases is the object of the general term, universal, or concept-name. The case is ex- actly the same as that of the division which separates two spaces or two times. It has no existence by itself, but only as involved in the two spaces, or times, which it limits. When we think of a division in the abstract or by itself, we represent the spaces or the times which it separates as existing provisionally and not definitely. What has usually been understood by the word Concept is a compound of the properties of this pro- visional image and the term which designates it, the concept-name. As the former, the concept was not an image, that is, a complete one, and as the latter it was capable of being employed in reasoning. Rea- soning appeared consequently to be a process inde-; pendent of the forms of time and space, which are the forms of all images ; though at the same time it was THE CONCEPT. 413 admitted that it was only valid when it could be applied to images; in other words, that the concept must always admit of being tested by objects of a possible intuition. But if it can be shown that all reasoning is employed with images, actual or provi- sional, the only valid distinction in this matter will be that between the concept and the concept-name, the general notion and the general term, and between the two kinds of reasoning employing them respec- tively, ostensive and apagogic, the latter being the representative of the former. Abstract and general notions therefore are images, though provisional ; and concepts differ from images solely in being held fast by a conscious effort in consciousness, and this cannot change their nature as images. § 47. There are however some instances of con- cepts which seem at first sight not to be capable of analysis into images modified . by volition. I will examine those given by Werenfels in the I)ialogue De Finibus Mundi, which has been already quoted. In that dialogue this point is argued at length. Werenfels says in effect, Infinita peene sunt quse non imaginamur, concipimus tamen, — Universalia, numerum millenarium, nulle-angulum, circulum per- fectum, icosa-hedrum, globum penitus rotundum, motum aut velocem nimis aut lentum, materise in infinitum sectionem. Now these all bear one cha- racter. In them the concept is an assumption that the task of imagination has been completed ; they are abbreviations, compendia, of imagination ; not be- cause imagination is unfit, but because it is too weak to perform the whole task of representation. The failing of the imagination is in degree, not in kind of efficiency. The number 1000, for instance, is a Part II. Ch. VII. Div. 2. i^ The nature of concepts. §47. Some cases examined. 414 THE CONCEPT. Paet U. Ch. VII. Div. 2. §47. Some cases examined. •whole consisting of 1000 units; the 1000 -angled figure is a figure containing 1000 angles. We begin by imagining the sjoithesis of a few units and a few angles, but being wearied have recourse to an " and so forth up to 1000." Without the beginning in imagination, we could not conclude by a concept. But how is the stopping-point reached, the number 1000 itself? This concept, 1000, which is assumed as the goal of the " and so forth," must be first at- tained. This, concept is the gathering up into unity of several syntheses of imagination. First units are added together, up to 10, then the sum 10 is added to itself 10 times, then to the sum 100 is added another sum of 100, which has been reached inde- pendently by another similar process, till it has been added to 9 other sums of 100. At each step there is a gathering up into a single unit, 10, 100, 200, &c., a synthesis of the units effected by the imagina- tion. Each of these gatherings up into unity is a concept, a brief expression of the result of imagina- tion, in order to keep hold of the ground which has been Won. The number 1000 is originally reached in this way ; and, when the meaning of the concept- name 1000 has been explained to any one, he appro- priates the result of the original imagination without himself going through the whole process, and deals thenceforth analytically with the amount 1000, which was attained originally by a synthetical process. The perfect circle and the perfect globe are also concept-names expressing the anticipated fulfilment of the task of imagination in analysis, in abstract- ing the material element from empirical circles and globes, so that what remains is a pure intuition of a figure in space. The so-called concept is a pure THE CONCEPT. 415 intuition of space. It says no more than this, Let pabtu. . . Ch. VII. it be granted that we can have pure intuitions of niv. 2.* figure. These cases differ from those previously §4r. -.■f. -i/>> -1 * -11*1 Some cases exammed m navmg no defimte goal assigned wmch examined. is assumed to have been reached, as was the case with the number 1000. They simply say the per- fect circle and the perfect globe; and perfection is a very indefinite notion. These cases exhibit the poverty of the concept ; for where the goal cannot be supplied, as in the case of the number 1000, by the imagination, there is nothing definite in the concept. Motion too swift or too slow to be seen, felt, or imagined, and the infinite division of matter, are con- cepts which differ somewhat from both of the former classes. They turn upon the old question of infinity in time and space. Motion and matter are objects of presentation ; and as such are always presented in certain quantities, ^certain minima of presentation. Beyond these minima of presentation we can go, in dividing them, by representation, and have represen- tations of motion much swifter and much slower, and of matter much smaller, than we ever have in presentation. But representations are images, not concepts; let vohtion fix on any image and it be- comes a concept. Now to conceive motion infinitely swift or slow, and matter as being infinitely divided, is to imagine our own power of representing motion and matter as too weak to go beyond a certain point, and to fix on that circumstance in the phenomenon of imagination or representation as the one we wish to consider. Either this fact in the phenomenon of representation is the content of the concept-names in question, or they have no content at aU. For if they are taken as meaning a motion and a division beyond 416 THE CONCEPT. Part IX. the point where consciousness becomes incapable, Div. 2.' from whatever cause, of penetrating, they manifestly § 47. contradict themselves by expressing an impossibility examined, performed, a finite-infinite, a divisible-indivisible. In the first case, the fact of weakness exhibited in cer- tain modes of imagination is seized on and expressed as a concept; in the second case, there is a concept* name without a concept. The contents of these con- cepts are images, and their infinity is another name for the weakness of the imagination. There is another concept mentioned by Weren- fels and quoted with approval from Descartes, that of ipsum nihil, pure nothing. We can conceive, he says, but not imagine, pure nothing. This must be con- nected with other concepts which he mentions, one of which is the lim it or end of any thing; "manet hoc fixum et immobile nos fines nullius rei imaginari posse." And again he says, Ita licet imaginari non possim nihil esse extra mundum, concipere tamen possum. These three instances show the true nature of a concept, its derivative nature, and its limited nature. The concept is a limitation of the process of imagination, the imagination stopped at a cer- tain point by vohtion. Imagination gives no last limit, because its form, time and space, has no limit. Imagination is never without an object, since it con- tains always time and space. The concept is an as- sumed limit, assumed for practical purposes by the wiU, — Signifer, statue signum, hie manebimus op- time. The relation between imagination and the concept is similar to that between a whole of exten- sion, a general notion, and a whole of intension, any particular object contained under it. The general notion or class, animal, has fewer qualities than any THE CONCEPT. 417 individual animal has; and in this sense the indivi- paetii. Ch. VII, dual animal contains more than the class ; but, on niv. 2.' the other hand, the class animal contains more than § 47. the individual, for it contains all the individuals. If examined, the class or general notion, animal, were a concrete phenomenon, any individual animal would be a modi- fication of it, adding some modification or other, and in this respect surpassing the thing modified; but the modification would itself belong to, and be a part of, the phenomenon modified. So it is with imagina- tion, which is a particular concrete process of con- sciousness, and the concept. The concept is a modi- fication of imagination, but it never exceeds the limits of imagination; all modifications of imagination are imagination. Now as to these three instances of concepts; if the concept is a form of consciousness, simply of consciousness, not of imagination, it cannot be without an object, it cannot have pure nothing for its object. If we suppose ourselves to conceive pure nothing, we are mistaken, and mistake the concept- name Nothing for an object. To suppose that we can conceive Nothing is to suppose that conscious- ness can exist without being consciousness. Because we can conceive limits within the field of objects, we suppose that we can conceive the limits of that field itself. As to the " fines nullius rei imaginari posse," — it is not the case, if by res is meant an object with a material as well as a formal element; such empiri- cal objects are limited in perception itself If, on the other hand, by "fines" are meant limits which have pure nothing beyond them, then conceiving them is nothing more than abstracting the attention from what is beyond or excluded from those limits; and the limits in this sense are as little conceivable as EE 418' THE CONCEPT. pabt iL ttey are imaginable. Tlie limits, in their true sense, Div. 2.' exist both in imagination and conception. As to the §47^ " nihil esse extra mundum," it will be clear from examined, what has been already said, that it is a mistake to apply the limitation of particular objects by others to the whole of the world, where the expression " whole of the world" assumes that no particular object is to be imagined outside it; whereas it is a law of imagination, wholly independent of our will, that no limit can be perceived, without there being perceived at the same time the existence of something beyond that limit, an existence involved in the fact of limitation itself. If this criticism is correct, it follows that the fun- damental doctrine of Werenfels must be rejected, "Imaginatio longe angustior est conceptu puro." In fact, reality is whatever can be given in imagination ; the field of the concept is limited by that of the im- agination, while the limits of particular objects in that field are given by the imagination and adopted by the conception. The statement of a limitation is a concept. But the limits of the whole can be neither imagined nor conceived ; it is not true to apply to the whole, as if it could be perceived, what is true of the parts, which are perceived. But the very func- tion of limiting, in which conception consists, pro- vides concept-names which have no objects ; and it is here only that imagination is really outstripped, namely, by the concept-names which are mere words. Nothing exists to which it is not easy, so far as words go, to prefix a "not." Again, the fact that all division increases the number of objects, since it makes two where only one existed before, shows in what sense only it can be said, that many things can be conceived which can not be imagined. If you THE CONCEPT. 419 break up a statue, you have a heap of fragments in- pabt ii. stead of a single image. The whole is of the same oiv. 2. extent in both cases ; the parts, membra dividentia., § 4r. though introduced by conception, are evolved from, examined. and remain parts of, the whole of imagination ; ima- gination is not transcended but modified. § 48. Intuition in its two shapes, presentative and § 48. . . .... The logical representative perception, supplies limitation of par- object, and the ^•1 1 . . I r, n . 1 1 logical »™*- ticular objects m the forms or time and space ; that is, the limitation of particular objects is given in and with the objects themselves, and in perception, of which imagination is one form, previous to and inde- pendent of conception. The function of conception is to hold these limitations fast, in order to compare the included object with others which are excluded. This is the first step in logic, and it is a step taken by the will. The wiU leads us to dwell on a par- ticular, limited, content of perception, as fixed for our purpose of arguing about it. In other words, when we treat a name or an object as a concept, we are exercising not merely cognition but volition, and are making a conscious efibrt. This view is not op- posed by the fact that afterwards we may become so familiar with the concept that we use it and under- stand it without effort. To fix on a particular ob- ject, in contradistinction to other objects, requires more than a spontaneous movement of consciousness ; it requires a conscious effort and a conscious purpose. In intuition no contradictories are found, but only contraries ; the sensibility is conscious of being af- fected in a particular way at one time, in another way at another time ; but these two objects are not yet contraries, but only differents ; they become con- traries when perceived to belong to one and the same 420 THE CONCEPT. paet II. consciousness ; these two objects, so given, are con- civ. 2. ' traries ; they are as yet only compared with each §48. other as different states of the same empirical ego. object, amdae When they are held fast, each by itself, and com- ogic uni. pg^j,g^ ^j^ji^ reference to the same time and space, that is, to the same moment of the empirical ego, then the same two contraries appear as contradic- tories. The assumption of the one is then contra- dictory to the assumption of the other, because we cannot at the same time and place cognise both one and the other ; and this involves their comparison also secundum idem, for to adopt two points of view, or two respects, is to place the objects in two mo- ments of time. If one is held fast, as it is in a concept, the other must be let go or assigned to an- other time and place. Approaching from the side of the concept, contradictories precede contraries and are their condition; we distinguish first an A and a Not- A, and secondly refer these to their common pa- rent, a third thing, the concept-form, which is at one time one of them, at another time the other. Ap- proaching from the side of perception, contraries precede contradictories ; consciousness is differently af- fected at different times, arid these affections or objects of perception are contraries, inasmuch as they are dif- ferent and yet united in a third thing, their common parent, consciousness, the common element in all its moments. ' They become contradictories when one object of perception, simple or complex as it may happen, is fixed on by volition and assigned to one moment of time in consciousness, long or short as it may happen ; then this object in this moment is the contradictory of all other objects referred to that moment. Assign those other objects to other mo- THE CONCEPT. 421 ments of the same consciousness, or to that same pabtii. moment considered from another point of view, niv. 2.' which is the same thin^, and the contradictories §48. become contraries again, and a new quality is added objeo1i,andae to the object perceived. Contradictories belong only "^^ ^^ ' to logic ; and since logic can only be applied to ob- jects in time and space, contradictories are valid only within and not without time and space, and can only be applied to particular objects of cognition, and not to a supposed whole or universe of those objects, for such a whole is not possible in time and space. The word Not is a word of logic, and not a word of intuition. It is the turning point of all concep- tion ; it expresses distinction, being borrowed from the greatest distinction known to reflection from cases of intuition alone, the distinction between being con- scious of particular objects and not being conscious of them. We are conscious of objects only in empirical ■ moments of time, and volition excludes from those moments the objects from which it abstracts. In vo- lition we are conscious only of one object, however complex or however simple that object may be. Logical contradiction depends upon the nature of our consciousness, which can cognise objects only in em- pirical moments of time, that is, on the incompres- sibUity of time in consciousness, in conjunction with the incompressibility of time and space in objects of consciousness. Thus the law of contradiction, to- gether with the two other forms of it, the laws of identity and of excluded middle, known as the pos- tulates of logic, is no law of intuition as such, but is a law, and indeed the first and fundamental law, of logic ; at the same time, it is founded on the laws of intuition, the forms of time and space in conscious- 422 THE CONCEPT. Past II. ness, and is the expression of these forms, as soon as BiT. 2. ' they are adopted and applied by volition. If an § 48. Hegelian should reply, that contradiction creates time obie^,anrtiie and space, by Constantly denying itself; contradiction gie imi . i^gj^g nothing else than the necessity of a constant division and casting off of a logical opposite ; and . that in this way, since the logical opposites cannot remain together, they are thrown apart, out of one another, and this outness is time and space; the an- swer is, that contradiction cannot throw objects out in time and space, unless the objects already exist in those forms; and all objects do this; the forms of time and space are in the contradictory objects, not in the contradiction, and are ia the objects as such, and before the contradiction is perceived. There is no- thing in contradiction which can make time and space intelligible to us ; but, given time and space, then the • addition of the feeling of volition is the explanation of contradiction. It may appear perhaps, at first sight, that only the form of time, and not that of space, is employed in logical thinking; this, however, is not so, but both forms are involved. The perception even of internal feelings, as was shown in § ij, is always connected with perceptions occupying space ; those internal feel- ings are always felt in connection with a body, and that body as a part of an external world. It is posr sible to fix the attention on the internal feelings only, and to abstract from the body and the external world ; but the moment we place those feelings in relation to others, which must be done in logic, they must have a position assigned them, the position they occupy in the body and the external world. Even if we con- sider the internal feelings as an isolated series, so that THE CONCEPT. 423 each feeling is compared with those' only which pre- paetii. cede and follow it in the same series, thus occupying niv. 2. time alone, yet the whole series is connected in ex- §48. perience with other feelmgs occupymg space, and has object, and the a position assigned to it with reference to them, so that the line of time, which the series occupies, be- comes a line of space ; and consequently each moment or feeling of the series occupies a part of that line of space, in other words, becomes a part of a series of modifications of objects existing in and occupying space. Therefore the form of space is necessary for the logical thinking not only of objects which are perceived as occupying space, objects of the senses of sight and touch, but also of the internal feelings them- selves. When we think of anger, for instance, we lidnk of it as an emotion belonging to a complex of feelings, among which are a body and objects outside, that body, in relation to some of which feelings the emotion of anger arises ; in other words, we think of it as a quality or modification of the empirical ego which exists in space. But not only does space enter into logical thinking in consequence of the constant coexistence of objects of space in perception with objects of time in percep- tion, but the line of time itself becomes treated as a line of space by having one portion of it fixed on by volition, as a concept, and contrasted with other por- tions of the same line. A line of time differs from a line of space in this circumstance only, that in the former nothing once presented is ever presented again, but only represented, while in the latter every part of the line may be presented again, and we may move backwards and forwards between the same presentar tions. Whenever a portion of a line, or series of feel- 424 THE CONCEPT. Part ii. ings, in time is fixed on as a concept, that portion is Diy. 2." taken to be examined as a whole, simultaneously; it §48. is indeed a representation, but we move backwards object, and the and forwards in it, and treat it statically, as a simul- ""' ' taneous or statical object, as if it were a part of a series of feelings in space. Every representation, whether of simple or complex content, when treated as a concept is treated statically, that is, as occupying a portion of a line on which we move backwards and forwards; is treated as if it were an object of pre- sentation in space ; and, since all feelings are part of an empirical ego which occupies space, every repre- sentation, when treated as a concept, is treated as occupying a portion of space as well as a portion of time. The concept expressed by the A of the pos- tulates occupies a certain portion of space existing for a certain portion of time. Every concept is the logical to ov and the logical TO IV. It is assumed to exist at the moment of thought, and every thing else to be non-existent at that momentJ Concepts as such have only an assumed existence; objects which do not exist may be assumed to exist for the purpose of being disproved. By giving a name, the existence of something named is assumed ; hence we can say without absurdity, Iron-gold is not ; for as a concept we choose to assume it for the pur- poses of argument, and then we deny that it exists for perception. To say, Iron-gold is not, is exactly equivalent to saying. Iron-gold is a concept-name and not a concept. Concepts as such, or concepts in their form alone, have no reality, and dififer not in point of existence from concept-names; — ^botk have an as- sumed existence only. The concept is thus the logical existence. It is also the logical unit. It is the ex- THE CONCEPT. 425 pression of a single empirical moment of time. No part n. matter how long a time may be occupied by the ex- nk 2.' istence or the consciousness of the particular objects § 48. comprehended under it as a general term, the under- object, and the standing them aU as comprehended in the concept makes them into a single empirical moment of time m. consciousness; they are gathered up into a pro- visional image, and assumed to be all one thing for the purposes of argument. § 49. The concept as an object is a provisional §49. image, and as such contains no other elements than forms of those found in images and objects of perception; and it owes its character of unity to the exercise of volition in the forms of time and space. Volition is a mode of consciousness, and sxibject as such to its forms ; in fixing on any object of consciousness by a voluntary efibrt, we fix on it as occupjdng a certain portion of time and a certain portion of space; and all the shapes which an object of consciousness can take are modes of these two ultimate forms of time and space. No other modes of unity but these would seem to be possible, and certainly no others are required. It is superfluous to look for any jDure or a priori forms of thought as thought, different from these two well- known forms of perception. For the will is not limited in its choice of objects, or parts, or shapes, or durations of objects, nor in its power of combining them, farther than in point of degree of energy. If, however, such other pure and a priori forms of thought as thought are assumed, as existing independently, and not as elements of the objects to be thought by means of them, then it may be shown, by a mode of argument known as the rgtrog av^gaxog, that these forms are similar to the objects which are thought by 426 THE CONCEPT. pabiu. means o£ them, and that some third concept or form Ch. TII. Div. 2. " is required to which they in their turn may be re- § 49. ferred, and by reference to which their relation to the forma of objects thought by means of them may be explained; thought. for without such a reference no explanation has been given, but the form of thought is a mere duplicate of the object thought; for instance, plurality as a form of thought is but a general expression for many objects of the same sort taken together, and the fact is as much an explanation of the form as the form of the fact. If, then, there are forms of intuition and forms of thought side by side, with distinct origin, then some third form of consciousness must be assumed in order to regulate the application of one set to the other; and this journey in infinitum Kant found him- self compelled to enter on, for, having established time and space as forms of intuition, and the cate- gories as forms of thought, he introduced as mediators between them, first, the Schemata, by which space relations of objects were transformed into time rela- tions, and so brought closer to the subjective process of thought, supposed to exist in time alone, and, secondly, the system of Principles of Synthetic Judg- ments a priori, by which schematised objects, or ob- jects reduced to the form of time, were subsumed under their proper category. On the other hand, if these forms of thought are taken as elements already existing in the objects of perception, which formal elements it is the office of logical conception to bring out distinctly and apply to the objects in which they are involved, then it may be shown that such formal elements are all capable of analysis into the forms of time and space, in union with the material element which is their content. And this may be shown of THE CONCEPT. all forms of thought, whatever their origin may be supposed to be ; and, for instance, it may be shown of the Kantian Categories, which are the following : I. Quantity. Unity. Plurality. II. Quality. Totality. Eeality. Negation. III. Eelation-. Limitation. Substance and Cause and Effect. Action and Accident. IV. Modality. Eeaction. Possibility and Existence and Non- Necessity and Impossibility. existence. Contingency. Under the first head, objects are compared with each other in respect to their extension alone in time and space, and their divisions in that extension. Under the second head, objects are compared with each other in respect to their material element, the feeHng which they excite or contain, and therefore under the form of time, abstracting from space. Under the third head are considered objects as, 1st, one within the other; 2d, one after the other; 3d, mutually affecting each other ; — all of these modes being modes of time and space. Under the fourth head, objects are compared as to their certainty or degree of evidence in consciousness. These notions are easily seen to contain' no more than is contained by the formal and material elements of consciousness. Possible and impossible is whatever is or is not ca- pable of being presented or represented in the forms of time and space. Existence and non-existence is whatever is or is not actually present in conscious- ness. Necessity and contingency exist in objects, 427 Past 11. Oh. vn. Div. 2. Categories or forms of thought. 428 THE CONCEPT. Paet II. Oa VII. Div. 2. Categories or forms of thought. §50. The combina- tion of concepts. according as we know or do not know of the exist- ence of the conditions of any given object. This latter notion, with that of cause and effect, depends on the canon of Ratio Sufficiens, which will be examined ia the following division of this chapter. Now if we grant that the will can fix on any object which has been presented to consciousness, and can abstract from the objects which accompany it, then it will appear Tiimecessary to look farther for the origiii of the no- tions of unity, or plurality, or totality, or any other of these categories. § 50. We next have to deal with the concept in reference to its exclusion, in its combination with other concepts, that is, with concepts as employed in propositions and in syllogisms. It is admitted that the formation of a concept, when it is a general no- tion, itself involves a judgment, and that the judg- ment expressed by a proposition is of the same nature as the judgment employed in forming the general notions which are its subject and its predicate; that to combine two objects ia a concept is a process the same in kind as that which combines two concepts in a proposition. When we form the concept man, we judge that certain properties in particular individuals are to be abstracted from the other qualities of the individuals, and combined into one object, the con- cept man. When we predicate of this concept man that it is included under the concept animal, we again combine into a whole, only in this case two sets of qualities instead of one, the qualities abstracted from individual men and those abstracted from individual animals besides men. The theory of predication, therefore, or of forming propositions, cannot be sepa- rated from the theory of the formation of concepts; THE CONCEPT. 429 it is a further development of the same process and part n. Ch VTI function, that of judgment. The process of judgment, oiv. 2/ an operation of consciousness, is what is expressed § so. _ in the proposition. Concepts are always formed by tionof judgments, but not always by judgments expressed """"^^ '" in propositions. When the terms of a judgment and the dealing of consciousness with the terms are suffi- ciently marked to be distinguished one from the other, when we can distinguish the process of judgment from the notions which it compares, then that process is capable of being expressed in a proposition. A judg- ment is a silent proposition, a proposition is an ex- pressed judgment. When the concepts have arisen, when images have been fixed and limited by volition, all further dealing with them must be distinct, and capable of expression in propositions. The limitation of an image as a concept involves the distinct exist- ence of the dealing of consciousness with it, compels us to attend to the operation of consciousness ia deal- ing with its concepts, as distinct from the concepts dealt with. Judgments and propositions come next after concepts in order of complexity, that is, in order of logic. Concepts, it has been shown, are provisional images considered as unities, and there are only two modes in which they can be connected or combined together in consciousness or in thought, namely, time and space. We should expect therefore, since logic in its verbal forms expresses the connections and com- binations of thought, that the forms of logical predi- cation should be founded on and express the relations of objects to each other in these two modes of time and space. And this is the case ; for there are two main kinds of logical propositions, and two only, 430 THE CONCEPT. paetii. founded on the modes in which the subject and Div. 2." predicate are connected in thought, and these are §50. categorical and hypothetical propositions, of which The eombina- , . , ... , , . , tionof categorical propositions express space relations, and hypothetical propositions time relations. Subordinate to these two classes of propositions stand two other classes, which are modifications of each of them re- spectively, disjunctive propositions, which are a mo- dification of categorical, and hypothetico- disjunctive, which are a modification of hypothetical propositions. Categorical and disjunctive propositions express space relations between their concepts, hypothetical and hypothetico-disjunctive propositions express time re- lations between them. This is an exhaustive division of propositions from the point of view of the mode in which their subjects and predicates are combined, of the course which consciousness takes in passing from one concept to the other. Propositions may be divided also from other points of view ; from that of their quantity, into universal and particular propositions; from that of their logical quality, into affirmative and negative propositions; from that of their certainty, into necessary and problematical propositions. But propositions of aU these kinds must fall also under one or other of the four kinds of categorical, hypo- thetical, disjunctive, and hypothetico-disjunctive pro- positions ; and this latter division appears a more elementary and fundamental division than the others, from being founded on nothing else than the modes in which consciousness passes from one of its objects to another, modes which are the possibility of propo- sitions existing at all, which constitute propositions not of this or that particular character, but affXa;?, so far as they are simply expressions of judgment. concepts. THE CONCEPT. 431 All logical objects exist at once in both these paetii. modes of time and space. When, therefore, I have nir. 2. fixed on one of these objects by vohtion and have it § 50. , ^ , r ii • p T,- The oombinar beiore me as a concept, a further exercise 01 volition tion of is required to decide in which of its two modes, time or space, it shall be chosen to connect it with other concepts. I choose one of these modes and abstract from the other; but I have only these two to choose from. If I adopt the mode of time, I connect the two concepts together as antecedent and consequent, and the proposition expresses the fact that, when I pass from one concept to the other, I find this con- nection between them, which makes an affirmative hypothetical proposition ; and there are no negative hypothetical propositions. If I choose the mode of space, the proposition is categorical, and expresses the fact that, while I pass from one image or concept to the other, I find them coalesce into one image, either as aspects of one image or as whole and part of one image. Categorical propositions express coales- cence of images, hypothetical propositions express sequence of images. The choice of the mode of time or space depends on volition, but whether or not an affirmative proposition will be possible depends on the facts or concepts in consciousness. Disjunctive propositions are founded on the exhaustive division of a whole image into its parts, and express the coales- cence, either of the whole and the sum of its parts, or of one of the parts with another to the exclusion of the rest. Hypothetico-disjunctive propositions are founded on the exhaustive division of the series of consequents of a given antecedent, or of antecedents of a given consequent, and express the connection be- tween the consequent, or the antecedent, and one 432 THE CONCEPT, pakt II. member of the series of antecedents, or consequents, Div. 2.' to the exclusion of the other members. Categorical § 50. and disjunctive propositions both express coalescence The oombina- „ . , . . i . xi t tionof 01 images or concepts m consciousness, but the dis- conoep s. jijjj^g^iye propositions more definitely than the catego- rical. Hj^othetical and hypothetico-disjunctive pro- positions both alike express the sequence of concepts in consciousness, and again the latter kind of proposi- tions more definitely than the former. _ §51. §51. Before examining however the classes of The import of ' . . . propositions, propositious, it may be well to say somethmg of their import generally. It has been already said that judg- ments are silent propositions, and propositions ex- pressed judgments. Judgments may be, 1st, percep- tions of the connection of presentations, as for instance when, standing on Westminster Bridge, I say, London is on the Thames; and in this case the proposition expressing the judgment expresses my consciousness of the connection of the two presentations. The two objects of consciousness are connected in conscious- ness; as the objects are objects of consciousness, so their connection takes place ia consciousness, and the objects and their connection are subjective as well as objective. If, 2dly, when I have gone down into the country, I relate to my friends, London is on the Thames, the proposition expresses a connection be- tween representations, the consciousness which makes me speak is a redintegration of London and the Thames and of their connection; the objects are re- presentations, no more and no less subjective than before, but in redintegration, not in presentation. The truth of the second judgment is derivative, derived from presentation. The test of the truth of the second judgment is to refer to the first, to repeat the THE CONCEPT. 433 presentation. But by repeating the presentation I pabtii. do not go from subject to object; objective truths are Div. 2.' not the test of subiective truths, but subjective truths § 5i. P . 1 „,..,» The import of 01 presentation are the test of subjective truths of re- propositions, presentation. Thirdly, judgments may be perceptions of the connection between objects of presentation and objects of representation; as, for instance, if I, stand- ing on Westminster Bridge, say, That London is on the Thames is what I remembered in the country, or. That London is on the Thames is true. Here again the propositions express a subjective process or con- nection between the two images, presentative and re- presentative. Since presentation and representation are all the states of consciousness, these three move- ments of consciousness in judgment are all that are possible ; aU judgments must fall under one or other of these three kinds. Now, in the two first cases, the proposition em- ployed to express both judgments is the same; one proposition expresses indiscriminately either judg- ment. And this circumstance perhaps may have concurred to lead Mr. Mill to say, in his System of Logic, Book I. ch. 5, that " propositions (except where the mind itself is the subject treated of) are not assertions respecting our idea of things, but asser- tions respecting the things themselves." The sharp distinction which Mr. Mill appears to take between things objective and things subjective leads him, since propositions clearly express objective things, to disre- gard the fact that they also, at the same time and in the same respect, express subjective things. "Effr; ftsf ovv ra, h rri (p&ivfi rSiv h rrj 4'0%i5 TDi^}JiJi>d'rei>i> ffi)[Jj(ioXcc, says Aristotle, De Interp. cap. i. Assume now that every thing is objective and subjective at once, and FF 434 THE CONCEPT. paht II. the difficulty, as to whether the import of propositions Div. 2.' is subjective or objective, disappears entirely, for the § 51. import is both at once ; and this distinction is replaced propM^dons! by another, namely, by that between presentative and representative judgments. Applied to this distinction, the words quoted from Mr. Mill would restrict proposi- tions to express only judgments of presentation. But the fact, that the form of the proposition does not indi- cate the kind of judgment which it expresses, does not warrant us in restricting it to one kind of judgment to the exclusion of another. It shows only that the precision of language falls short as yet of expressing ■ the distinctions of thought. Nor yet does it destroy the subjective character of propositions and their connection with judgments ; for judgments of presen- tations are subjective, and their presented objects are objects of consciousness,, and only as such can they be expressed in propositions. The same is the case with names. Names also, as well as propositions, show no inflections or forms indicating whether they are used as names of objects in presentation or objects in re- presentation. The name white expresses white ob- jects in presentation and in representation indiscrimi- nately; yet it is not in the one case a name of an idea (so-called) and not of an object, nor in the other case a name of an object and not of an idea. What is really shown by this indiscriminate application of names and propositions to express presentations and representations is, that we are as yet in no position to found a true classification of names and proposi- tions on the classification of judgments, as Judgments' of presentation and judgments of representation, since the names and propositions have not yet been divided at all; but must use them without such a classifica- THE CONCEPT. * 435 tion, except so far as the propositions expressing the pakt ii. third class of judgments are distinguished by their Diy. 2.' form from those expressing the judgments of the two § 51. first classes; — as, for instance, the proposition, That propositions. London is on the Thames is true, is distinguished by its form from the simple proposition, London is on the Thames ; and so far language provides an expression for the distinction in thought. Just as names are the expression of objects, not of things out of relation to consciousness, and as con- cept-names are the expression of concepts, so propo- sitions are the expression of judgments. In all these cases we act outwardly in consequence of having felt. They are aU, psychologically speaking, instances of afferent or sensitive nerves exciting efferent or motor nerves. If we want to know what is expi-essed by the act, we must ask what is impressed by the feeling. It is impossible to sever the connection between pro- positions and judgments; or to restrict propositions to express judgments of presentation only, or "things" in contradistinction to "ideas;" or to define proposi- tions by the class of objects, presentative or repre- sentative, which they connect. The import of pro- positions lies in the connection between the objects, which are the terms of the judgments expressed, ir- respective indeed of whether they are presentations or representations, but involving always their connec- tion in consciousness as well as in objective existence. I return now to the classification of propositions ac- cording to the modes in which their terms are con- nected, irrespective of the sphere of consciousness, presentation or representation, in which they may be connected; for these modes are common to both spheres of consciousness. 436 THE CONCEPT. pahtii. § 52. All categorical, including disjunctive, pro- Div. 2.' positions express the coalescence of images ^n con- §52. sciousness. Their copula, the word "is," means propositions, coalcscence; A is B means A coalesces with B. The copula does not express the existence or presence of the objects in consciousness; this is a condition of their being connected in a judgment, but is not expressed by the proposition expressing the judg- ment. Nor does the copula express the identity of the objects; this would be to make them convertible with each other. But partial identity, identity in some respect, is what is expressed by the copula, and this partial identity I call coalescence. All categori- cal propositions connect a concept with its exclusion in space, affirm or deny some part of its exclusion of its inclusion. But what is it that is said, in an affir- mative proposition, of that concept which is the sub- ject ? And again what is said of the predicate, which by being considered as belonging to the exclusion of the subject, is thereby considered as different from it? It is, — and this is what the proposition asserts, — that the subject is the predicate, a part of its own exclusion, and again that the predicate, a part of that exclusion, is the subject or the inclusion. Predicate and subject of the proposition are the same. The subject, the inclusion of the concept, is asserted to be its exclusion or a part of it, to be that which by its very nature, as the inclusion of the concept, it dis- tinguished from itself. In other words, the limits imposed by volition in creating the concept are over- leapt, and the concept is carried out beyond them, and made to coalesce with its contradictory or its exclu- sion. Are those limits destroyed by being overleapt? By no means ; they are essential to the overleaping. THE CONCEPT. 437 , to the proposition. They are valid for volition, but pabt ii. not for, intuition. The proposition, the continuation t>w. 2.' of consciousness, leaves them behind and asserts that, § 52. them notwithstanding, the objects within them and propoli^ons. the objects beyond them are one object. In regard to volition subject and predicate are two objects con- nected together; in regard to intuition they are one object. They are two objects connected together so long as we use the concept-names by which volition separates the inclusion from the exclusion of the con- cept. In order to say that A is the same as B, we must begin by assuming them to be different. We could not say that they were the same, unless we regarded them first as not the same. It follows that they are different in one respect, the same in another respect ; different in respect of volition, the same in respect of intuition. The image^ fixed by volition coalesces, while I keep it before the mind, with some- thing which was not included in it, but excluded from it, as so fixed by volition. Propositions express this coalescence of concepts, of the inclusion and exclu- sion of a concept, in intuition. Hence there is no contradiction involved in the proposition ; the propo- sition is not self-contradictory, for it is a movement of intuition, and the limits which intuition overleaps are not imposed by itself but by volition, are limits voluntarily adopted by consciousness to mark its own progress. Consciousness with one hand, as it were, intuition, draws an advancing line, with the other, volition, it marks progress. The two functions are not contradictory, but they are equally essential. If the marks were obliterated as soon as overleapt, there would be no progress, for the progress is one of con- sciousness, of knowledge, and consists in the accumu- 438 THE CONCEiPT. pabt it. lation of the marks, as well as in overleaping them, Ch. VII. , . . . Div. 2." Where volition makes a mark, there is the principle § 52. of contradiction ; all on one side of the mark is the proppsitions. Contradictory of all on the other side of the mark, one side is A, the other side is not- A. Intuition moves along the line of consciousness, and passes from the inclusion of the concept, which is the subject, over the limit of contradiction, to the exclusion of the concept, the predicate. If the object which it meets there is one which experience or association has shown to be connected in a certain way with the inclusion of the concept, the proposition expresses this connec- tion and is affirmative ; if not, it expresses the want of this connection and is negative. The two con- cepts coalesce or do not coalesce in intuition, presen- tative or representative. The copula, " is" or " is not," takes the place of the limit of contradiction. Categorical predication accordingly proceeds by adop- tion of the form of contradiction, of the postulates, and of the concept-form, as the means of distinguish- ing the movement of consciousness into distinct steps ; which adoption takes place in the establishment of concepts, the concept being a portion of intuition thrown into the concept-form. And as conscious- ness in predication does not adopt the form of contra- diction as an object in itself, but as a form applicable to all objects, as it does not identify the concepts, as content, with their form of contradiction, so it does not contradict itself in taking the concepts out of that form again, and asserting the coalescence of their in- clusion and exclusion in the proposition, or nullify the form of contradiction itself by changing its con- tent, and Substituting for its limit the copula of the proposition. THE CONCEPT. 439 There are two ways in which the coalescence of part n. concepts, expressed by affirmative categorical propo- dIv. 2/ sitions, can take place; either the concepts coincide, §52^ or one is a part of the other. And in the latter case propositions, it is not indifferent which of the two is part, and which whole; but logic chooses one mode only, and in logical propositions the predicate is always the whole, and the subject the part. To make this clear, reference must be made to the doctrine of the exten- sion and intension of concepts, which may be seen clearly explained by Sir W. Hamilton, Logic, Lect. vin. and Discussions, App> 2. B. Every concept, whether it is a general or a particular notion or image, is a quantum or a class, and that m two ways ; first, it contains a certain number of qualities, one or any number; secondly, it contains a certain number of individuals, one or any number, possessing each of them all those qualities. For instance, the general notion animal is a class or quantum of qualities, sup- pose sentience, possession of nerve, and cellular or- ganisation. It is also a quantum or class of indi- viduals, each possessing all these qualities, say the' classes, which are individuals to the genus animal. Vertebrate, Mollusc, Radiate, and Articulate. As a quantum of the first kind it has these qualities as its intension ; as a quantum of the second kind it has these classes, which are individuals to it, as its exten- sion. And it is manifest that the intension and ex- tension of any concept are exactly coincident ; those individuals only are included in the extension which have all the qualities 'included in the intension of the concept, whatever other qualities they may possess besides ; the intension measures the extension of the concept, and vice vers^. The extension is suspended 440 THE CONCEPT. paki II. on the intension ; all those obiects in which the qua- Ch. VII. . . ^ Div. 2.' lities of the intension are found united, no more and § 52. no fewer, are included in the extension. Farther it Categorical . , . „ . , j_ r iT_ propositions. IS plam, irom comparing several concepts oi tne same series together, that the proportion between their in- tension and extension, as quanta, varies inversely; Concepts whose extension is large have a small inten- sion, and those which have a large intension have a small extension. Animal for instance, compared with Vertebrate, has a smaller intension and a larger ex- tension ; as each new quantum of qualities is added to the intension, a new quantum of individuals is taken off from the extension, and the new name expresses the new dressing of the balance. The individual animals, such as this man, this horse, &c. have the largest iatension and the smallest extension, namely unity, of all the concepts in the series. The enlargement of the intension, the addition of specific qualities and peculiarities, lessens the number of in- stances in which all are found to coexist; so that, while extension and intension are always in inverse proportion, they always correspond to and balance or measure each other. The widest possible concept. Existence, has the smallest possible intension, but the greatest possible extension. This thought applied to the universe, as the object-matter of the different special sciences, is the ground of Comte's doctrine of the logical order of those sciences, of their arrange- ment in a scale or hierarchy according to the decrease in generality and increase in complexity of the laws of each of them, that is to say, 'their decrease in ex- tension and increase in intension. Thus the laws of Ethic as the most complex of all the sciences come last and highest, and the units to whom those laws THE CONCEPT. 441 apply are the ultimate individuals of the universe, opposed to the laws of the general concept, existence, at the other end of the logical scale. All concepts, whether general, particular, or indi- vidual, that is, images fixed on and limited as unities by volition, are alike included in this view of exten- sion and intension. And it is an useful suggestion made in the Essay, Language and Science (Three Essays, London, 1863, p. 86), that the connotation and denotation of words, in Mr. J. S. Mill's employ- ment of those terms, are to words what intension and extension are to concepts, or notions expressed by words ; so that by the connotation of a concept-name is understood the intension of the concept, and by its denotation the extension of the concept. Every con- cept is a quantum in two ways, a quantum of qualities and a quantum of individuals, each of which indi- viduals contains all the qualities of the other or in- tensive quantum; but the extreme members of a series, the individual concept at the one end, and the general concept at the other, contain respectively only one individual and only one quahty. But the con- ception of a quantum, whether of qualities or of ob- jects possessing qualities, whether one or many, is the conception of a space filled with what it contains ; so that, when one quality or one object is asserted to coalesce with another, it is either included in or coin- cides with the space occupied by that other, and we have before us the intuition of spaces including or coinciding with each other. If experience, in pre- sentation or representation, compels the two concepts to coalesce, it must be in one of these two ways. When the extension of a concept is predicated of its intension, or its intension of its extension, the two Pabt II. Ch. VII. Div. 2. §52. Categorical propositions. 442 . THE CONCEPT. pabt II. concepts coalesce as coinciding. For instance, Ani- Div. 2.' mals, meaning whatever possesses sentience, nerve, §52! and cellular organisation, are vertebrate, moUusc, ra- proposiMons. diate, and articulate. Here the intension and the extension of the same concept, animal, are balanced against each other, and animal as a class coincides with animal as a collection of qualities ; one is the definition of the other, its analysis and counterpart. But when the coalescence is not byway of coincidence but of inclusion, then subject and predicate must, in coalescing, become either whole or part one of the other. When I predicate in order of extension, the subject is included as a part in the predicate as a whole; for instance, Man is vertebrate, England is iasular; where the subject is contained in a larger class of individuals, man in that of things vertebrate, England in that of things insular. But these same propositions may be understood in order of intension, and in that case the subject is a whole of which the predicate is a part ; for instance, Man, as a quantum of qualities, contains among them the qiiality of being vertebrate ; England contains the quality of being insular. The same proposition, if its terms are un- derstood as units of intension, moves from subject as whole to predicate as part. It was said above that logic recognises, that is, at least, would do well to recognise (for I speak like a barrister who predicts that the Court will do what he knows to be the law), in propositions where the co- alescence is of whole and part, only those propositions as logical where the predicate is the whole and the subject the part, excluding those where the subject is the whole and the predicate the part. If this is admitted, it follows that propositions where the pre- THE CONCEPT. 443 dication is in order of intension should be excluded part ii. from logic. But to this objections wUl be raised. It niv. 2.' may be asked, Does predication iu order of intension § 52. necessarily make the subject whole, and the predicate propositions, part; and, Does predication in order of extension necessarily make the subject part, and the predicate whole ? And farther it may be asked, If, as is here maintained, the coalescence of the concepts is the sole thing asserted by propositions, is it not entirely indifferent which of the two, subject and predicate, is whole and which is part? Why should we not be equally correct and logical in saying, in order of ex- tension. Vertebrate is man, and in order of intension, Insular is England? Is it not indifferent whether subject be whole and predicate part, or predicate whole and subject part? And is it not consequently, indifferent whether we employ the order of extension or the order of intension in predication ; are not both equally legitimate ? First with regard to predication in order of inten- sion. Whatever may be the true rule as to the posi- tion of subject and predicate as whole and part, in •propositions in order of extension, yet, independently of that rule, propositions in order of intension are excluded from logic by the nature of the concept. Concepts are unities; when I predicate in order of intension, I do not treat concepts as unities. When I say Insularity is a property of England, 1 do not mean aU insularity, but a particular instance or kind of it ; when I say Man is vertebrate, in order of in- tension, I do not mean that he has the quality of being vertebrate in all its shapes, but only in one or some of them; the whole concept or unity of qualities, man, does not contain in it the whole concept or quality of 444 THE CONCEPT. Part II. being vertebrate. But if I take the two in order of Div. 2." extension, then man, as a whole or unity, is included §52! in the whole concept or unity, vertebrate; England propositions, is uicluded iu the whole class, insular objects. In fact, concepts are logical units only so far as they are wholes in order of extension; the qualities included in objects are concepts only so far as they are unified by volition ; it must be specified what quality is meant, whether by vertebration, for instance, is meant that common to aU vertebrate animals, or that common to man, or that to fishes, and so on. But this changes the quality into a whole or unit of extension, at the same time that it changes it into a concept. Suppose I have a provisional image of vertebration common to all vertebrate animals ; then, keeping this before me as a concept, an imit, I bring it into connection with the concept man, and say in order of intension Man is vertebrate, or contains in him vertebration, — the proposition is not true, he does not contain it in this sense; or suppose I say, still in order of intension, but changing the position of subject and predicate. Verte- brate is man, or the vertebration common to aU ani- mals contains in it the qualities of man, then the pro- position is absurd as well as untrue. If, therefore, concepts are logical unities, predication in order of intension is illogical. The only logical way of treating concepts is to use them in propositions in which they can be treated as unities, that is, ia propositions in order of extension. Propositions in which subject and predicate coin- cide are always legitimate ; for in these, though we pass from the intension to the extension of one and the same concept, and vice vers^,. yet the qualities which constitute the intension are unified and made THE CONCEPT. 445 concepts by volition; by the qualities are meant all the instances of the presence of the qualities ; they are in fact transformed into quanta of extension. The term animal, for instance, means all objects possessing sentience, nerve, and cellular organisation; the pro- visional image is an animal shape with these qualities, standing for all such shapes. The intension of the concept is a class of individuals as much as the ex- tension is ; one class of individuals is asserted in the proposition to coincide with another. Secondly with regard to the rule which makes the predicate whole and the subject part, in propositions in order of extension, where the terms do not coin- cide. It is true that coalescence in intuition may take place whether we begin with the whole or with the part, and, so far as this only is concerned, the expression of that coalescence in propositions might move from whole to part as well as from part to whole. But an almost universal custom has decided that the image which contains shall be placed last, and that which is contained first, in order of speech ; that the predicate shall express that to which the subject belongs, the subject be explained by assigning that to which it belongs, and not that which belongs to it. To this rule propositions in order of intension appeared to form an exception ; but they did so only apparently, since they reversed the position of subject and predicate, as part and whole, only by using ge- neral terms as equivalent, not to all the instances con- tained under them, but to single modes of qualities. It is only in categorical propositions that the order of intension comes forward ; no other kind of propo- sition lends itself to express the inherence of qualities in objects; and in categorical propositions this kind Pabt II. Ch. vil Div. 2. §52. Categoncal propositions. 446 THE CONCEPT. pakt II. of coalescence is not a logical one, since general terms Div. 2. should include and recall all the instances of objects § 52. or qualities to which the term applies, not one single Categorical , -in- t i -t propositions, instance Only of its applicability. A reference to the mental operations which give rise to the two orders of intension and extension wiU serve to verify the view now taken of them, as to their respective fitness for logical purposes. Every object has intension which exists as what has been called in § 26 a remote object, that is, as an empirical object composed of immediate empirical objects. Ob- jects have intension as objects of perception; their attributes or qualities are their intension. But ob- jects have extension only when fixed on by volition, and transformed from percepts into concepts. The term extension is derived originally, no doubt, from the case of those concepts only which are general as opposed to abstract notions, that is, which are general and not particular concepts; the extension of a ge- neral notion is composed of the several instances in which the abstract quality, expressed by its name, occurs ; for instance, the extension of the general notion pillared comprises the quality of being pil- lared in porticoes, Greek temples, Gothic cathedrals, and so on. But when only a single instance has been observed, and the quality is only an abstract notion or a particular concept, still the term exten- sion is applicable to the single object, but it is an unit of extension. In no case can there be extension without a concept formed by volition ; the intension of these concepts consists in the qualities which they have as objects of perception, the union of which qualities into complex parcels constituted them re- mote objects. To bring the intension of concepts THE CONCEPT. • 447 into loffic, in that character of intension, is to de- pabtii. Ch, VII. stroy the distinctive character of logic, the character niv. 2. which distinguishes it from modes of perception. §52. -r . . -in • • • Categorical Intension is a word of perception, extension is a propositions. word of logic. Concepts have intension as images or objects of perception, but only as concepts have they extension. Hence the only legitimate categorical propositions are those where the subject and predicate coalesce by coincidence, and those where they coalesce by including the subject m the predicate. In negative propositions no modes of coalescing can be distin- guished; if the terms coalesced ait all, they would not be negative propositions. But the two modes of categorical affirmative propositions are both ex- pressed by the same formula, A is B, and therefore require attention in practice to distinguish them, to distinguish whether the proposition is or is not simply convertible. Where subject and predicate coincide, each is the analysis of the other. Where subject is included in predicate, they are together the analy- sis of the proposition. Hence all propositions are analytical. But also, since aU propositions are for- ward movements of consciousness, are coalescences of images, they are in this respect synthetical. That is to say, the process is synthesis, the result is analysis ; or the process of predication is analysis as to its whole object-matter, synthesis as to its method of dealing with its object-matter as a collection of parts. The proposition is in aU cases an analysis of its whole content into its subject and predicate; in cases of coincidence, it is besides an analysis of subject by predicate and of predicate by subject. But it is syn- thesis of the parts of its whole content, subject and 448 THE CONCEPT. Pabt II. Ch. VU. Div. 2. §52. Categorical propositions. §53. Hypothetical propositions. predicate, a combination of one with the other in the forward movement of consciousness. If we hold that concepts enter into the proposi- tion as unities, we are enabled to dismiss the con- sideration of universal and particular propositions. Whether we say All animals, some animals, or this animal, are sentient, in any case the subject and the predicate are each a single concept. These, like modals, are forms of speech provided by grammar, which can, but need not, b6 adopted by logic for its own purposes. We need not think under these forms, but we may if we choose. But however we modify the concepts which are subject or predicate of our propositions, they stUl remain concepts, each a single concept, and must coalesce in consciousness in order to being combined in a proposition. §,53. The second great class of propositions con- tains those which express the connection of concepts in order of time, hypothetical propositions. But it is not enough that the concepts should be predicated of one another as succeeding, they must be connected together by some bond, ratified or valid in conscious- ness, expressing a fact of consciousness in order of time, the bond of causation ; just as in categorical propositions it is experience that makes the concepts coalesce into one object in one and the same por- tion of space. In categorical propositions subject and predicate coalesce into one object; in hypothetical propositions, where the relations of the concepts in order of time alone are considered, they cannot co- alesce into one object, and a bond of connection be- tween them as separate objects must be sought. This bond is the causal relation. The subject of categori- cal propositions becomes the antecedent, and the pre- THE CONCEPT. . 449 dicate becomes the consequent, of hypothetical pro- pakt ii. positions. The hypothetical proposition asserts that niv. 2.' given one object another will foUow, or be capable of §53! being asserted; If A is B, then C is D. The copula ^^oSnf in hjrpothetical propositions is not, as in categorical, a word signifying coalescence, but two words signi- fying the dependence of one object on another, — If, then. Since the word if is a conjunction, and gram- matically requires and introduces a sentence and not a single name, it foUows that the terms of hypothe- tical propositions are themselves propositions. But propositions which are the expression of judgments do not essentially differ from concept-names which are the expression of concepts, and it makes no es- sential difference between categorical and hypothe- tical propositions that the terms of the latter are propositions expressing analysed concepts, and not concepts simply. Hypothetical propositions do not assert that the complex of objects existing in one moment of time is or contains the cause of the com- plex of objects existing in the moment of time next succeeding, though it is true that it does so; nor do they directly assert that one object or event is a suflS.- cient cause of the existence of another, though such direct propositions might have been selected from grammatical speech by logicians as well as the form which -they have actually selected for the same pur- pose, namely, the purpose of expressing their reason- ings in the form of time; but hypothetical proposi- tions pick out some isolated object or event in one moment of time, and assert that it is such that an- other object or event in some succeeding moment of time will arise in consequence of it ; not however that the former object or event is the sole cause or condi- GG 450 THE CONCEPT. paet u. tion of the latter, but only that it is a sufficient cause. Div. 2.' This corresponds to the rule, in categorical proposi- §53! tions, that the subject is included as a part iu the pi^sitions. predicate ; for the consequent is larger than the ante- cedent, inasmuch as it may arise in consequence of some other antecedent, if the one named does not arise or exist. Different as hypothetical and cate- gorical propositions are in form, yet one is no more problematical than the other. Both alike express, not the existence of their terms or either of them, not the presence of their terms iu consciousness, though they both imply it ; but they express the connection between their terms, concepts expressed by names in the one, concepts or events expressed by propositions in the other; one in the order of space, the other in that of time. The If of the hypothetical copula does not render the proposition problematical ; but the hypothetical proposition. If A is B, then C is D, is exactly equivalent to this. The concept or event AB is a cause of the concept or event CD. Hypothetical propositions have a prerogative over categorical propositions, derived from their use of the form of time abstracted from space, and that is, that they can move either in order of history or in order of cognition; the antecedent can be either the causa existendi. or the causa cognoscendi of the consequent. Categorical propositions can make no distinction be- tween these two orders, they are bound to the third order, the order of logic alone ; they make abstrac- tion of the form of time, and of history and cognition in time. But the employer of hypothetical proposi- tions is bound to distinguish, in which of these two orders he places the connection of their terms, for the confusion of the two is one of the most fertile sources THE CONCEPT. 451 of fallacy. " If a man is merry, he is happy " is an instance of the antecedent being used as the causa cognoscendi of the consequent. " If a man has done his duty, he is happy" is an instance of its being used as the causa existendi of the consequent. In both cases the connection between the events as con- cepts or images in the mind of the speaker is what is expressed by the proposition. § 54. The next class is that of disjunctive proposi- tions. These flow from and are subordinate to cate- gorical propositions ; they are categorical propositions of a different kind ; but as categorical they assert co- alescence of concepts and unite their terms in order of space. Disjunctive propositions arise when a whole class of concepts in order of extension has been formed ; for instance, when the concept animal has been divided into its four sub-kingdoms, vertebrate, mollusc, radiate, and articulate animals ; or these again into orders and classes, ending with individual animals as the smallest class of extension. Then two kinds of disjunctive propositions arise, first when the whole concept animal is considered as coincident with the whole- of its dividing concepts, as. Animals are either vertebrate, mollusc, radiate, or articulate; secondly, when an individual animal, or a class con- sidered as an individual, as mammalia, is asserted to be referable to one of the classes above it, as, for instance, Man is either a mammal, a bird, a reptile, or a fish ; Mammals are either vertebrate, mollusc, radiate, or articulate. The first kind of disjunctive propositions, those in which the whole of a class is asserted to coincide with its parts, or to contain them each separately, is not exclusive but inclusive, the whole class is indifferent to its parts singly, is each of Pam II. Ch. VII. Div. 2. Hypothetical propositions. §54. Disjunctive propositions. 452 THE CONCEPT. pakt II. them at once. The second kind, in which the whole' Ch VII Div. 2." class is only given as divided into parts, and is pre- § 54. dicated as so divided, must contain any smaller portion propositions, of itsclf Only in one of these divisions and not in ano- ther, and therefore is exclusive; if the subject belongs to one part of the predicate, it is eo ipso excluded from the others. The disjunctive propositions of this latter kind are those which are properly disjunctive; the former kind are not distinguishable essentially from simple categorical propositions of coincidence. In disjunctive propositions, as in simple categori- cal, the copula expresses coalescence of the subject with the predicate in consciousness ; the difference between disjunctive and categorical propositions lies in the greater complexity of the predicates of the former. Less is asserted by the disjunctive than by the categorical in one sense, because the predicate is opened thereby to a further determination, an alter- native, and the subject not expressed in its comple- tion. More is asserted by them in another sense, because not only is a predicate asserted, but some of the relations of this predicate are included in the as- sertion. The categorical proposition, A whale is a mammal, is an assertion complete in itself, whatever further may have to be said on the subject. The disjunctive proposition, A whale is either a mammal, a reptile, a bird, or a fish, includes indeed the asser- tion, A whale is a mammal, but does not fix it as the thing asserted by the proposition; it gives the alter- natives of this assertion, and therefore the means of deciding on its truth, which were not contained in the categorical proposition. This character, of in- cluding the means of deciding or conditions of the truth of a proposition, seems to be the reason why THE CONCEPT. 453 Pabt II. Ch. VII. Div. 2. §55. Hypothetico- disjunctive propositions. disjunctive propositions are often treated in connec- tion with hypothetical. A negative disjunctive proposition expresses that J 54. the subject does not coalesce with any of the alterna- propositions, tives of the predicate, and therefore it is useless to enquire, in the case of negatives, whether they are of the inclusive or exclusive order. For instance. Whales are neither mollusc, articulate, nor radiate, is a negative disjunctive proposition, which expresses alike the non-coalescence of the concept whales with the whole indifferently and with the parts separately. § 55. The fourth and last class is that of hypo- thetico- disjunctive propositions. These flow from and are a modification of hypothetical, as disjunctive are of categorical propositions. Their form is time ; they express, in similar manner as the disjunctive, the completion of the series of effects of a given cause, or of causes of a given effect. The hypotheti- cal proposition asserts, for instance, If he is sad, he wants money (causa cognoscendi). The hypothetico- disjunctive asserts. If he is sad, he wants either money, or health, or employment ; that is, it com- pletes the series of consequents proved, one if not all of which must be proved by the antecedent or ground of inference, He is sad. Or again, the hypothetical proposition asserts. If he wants money, he wiU be sad (causa existendi). The hypothetico-disjunctive as- serts. If he wants either health, or money, or em- ployment, he will be sad ; completing the series of causes as before of effects. It is to be observed that the hypothetico-disjunc- tive, like the disjunctive, expresses its alternatives both exclusively and inclusively. Logical language provides no clear and simple formula by which the 454 THE CONCEPT. Part II. two modes are distinguished from each other ; it is Div. 2.' still left to the reasoner to state each time, in which § 55. sense, exclusively or inclusively, he is using the pro- disjimctive positious, or to his oppoucut to analyse his assertions and reduce them to one or other of these forms. This end might perhaps be attained by distinguishing the inclusive use of the disjunctive and hypothetico- disjunctive proposition by the addition of the word "indifferently," leaving them in their present form when they are intended exclusively. We might say, for instance, Verse is either rhymed or unrhymed, in- differently; but. The Faery Queen is either rhymed or unrhymed; and in the hypothetico-disjunctive. If we are prudent, we shall either command or deserve success, indifferently; but, If a religious creed is per- secuted, it will be either uprooted or strengthened. Neither hypothetical nor hypothetico-disjunctive propositions can be negative so long as they remaia in that form; for whether the terms are both of them negative, or one negative and the other affirmative, the connection between them, which is what is as- serted by. the proposition, must always be affirmed. There is no hypothetical form for a negative proposi- tion; grammatical language does not admit it. In order to deny both hypothetical and hypothetico- disjunctive propositions, they must be reduced to their categorical equivalents. For instance, the ne- gatives of the propositions. If a man is merry, he is happy; and. If a man is sad, he wants either money, or health, or employment ; are, A man's being merry 'is no proof of his being happy ; and, A man's being sad is no proof of his wanting either money, or health, or employment. The connection of the terms must be denied. THE CONCEPT. 455 § 56. It follows in the next place to treat briefly paktu. • Ch VII of syllogisms. A syllogism is a system of three pro- niv. 2.' positions which are of such a nature, and are so §56. arranged, that the third, the Conclusion or the Quaestio, ^ °^™^" is seen to result from the combination of the two first, or the Premises. As logic in its employment of lan- guage selects four kinds of propositions, as adequate to the expression of all the judgments of conscious- ness, and, in order to avoid confusion in the use of language for the expression of thought, restricts itself to the employment of these alone, so logic also selects four systems or arrangements of propositions as ade- quate to the expression of all generalisations of con- sciousness, whether critical or acquisitive, and rejects others as superfluous and leading to confusion. In both cases, both in propositions and in syllogisms, the language employed is selected for the accuracy with which it expresses the movement of consciousness, the judgments in the one case, the motived judgments, or judgments with the ground or reason, in the other ; so that we may be certain that whatever is obedient to the forms of the syllogism is obedient to the laws of thought, and that whatever can be expressed as the conclusion of a syllogism is true, so far as the laws of thought are concerned. The syllogistic forms are not the laws of thought, but expressions of them in language, in the arrangement of propositions. The laws of thought are time and space, the postulates, and the concept-form. Propositions and syllogisms, or systems of propositions, are arrangements of language, of words and sentences, so as to express accurately and yet adequately the movement of consciousness in accordance with those laws. The laws of thought are implanted in consciousness by nature ; language 456 THE CONCEPT. pabt II. also and all its forms, are expressions of consciousness, Ch. VII. 1 , . , ^ . , , ,1 Div. 2. belonging by nature to conscious bemgs ; but the selection of some of these forms of language, and their systematisation, so as to serve as expressions of judgments and generalisations in accordance with the laws of thought, this is an invention of reflecting man, an adaptation of natural circumstances to his OAvn purposes. Man was led to the conscious selec- tion of the forms by finding them or many of them in use before selection, he used them spontaneously before he selected them voluntarily, Then logical systems arose, each systematising language in dififerent "vyays. The last step is to find the principle of selec- tion, to find the laws of thought which the selection of forms of language is designed to express, or which they were unconsciously adapted to express; that is, to show the connection of logical propositions and syllogisms with their source, the laws of conscious- ness, and to harmonise them as a system from that point of view. The forms of time and space, with their material element, into which volition introduces the postulates and the concept-form, are the key of logic and of its verbal forms of propositions and syL logisms. Syllogisms are of four kinds, depending on the four kinds of propositions and called by the same names. ' The kind of the syllogism is determined by. the kind of the proposition which it has for its major premiss. See again Sir W. Hamilton, Logic, Lect. xv. Categorical syllogisms are those in which the three propositions are categorical ; and in which the coales- cence of the concepts in the quaestio, or conclusion, is made possible by the discovery of a middle term or third concept with which they both coalesce. In THE CONCEPT. 457 disjunctive syllogisms no new middle term is intro- duced, but the exhaustive analysis of the concept given in the major premiss is made the ground of the conclusion; for it was shown above that the disjunc- tive proposition does not assert a fact simply, but as involved in alternatives which contain the means of deciding on its truth. In hypothetical syllogisms also no new middle term is introduced, but, as in disjunc- tive, the ground of the conclusion is already contained in the major premiss. And the same may be said of the hypothetico-disjunctive syllogisms, which combine the peculiarities of the two preceding kinds. But the conclusion in three of the four kinds of syllogism, in all except the hypothetico-disjunctive, is a categorical proposition; that is, it is a proposition expressing the coalescence of two concepts into one. The result is the same in all these three kinds, and that result is an image, whether we reach it by reasoning in the form of space or in that of time, whether by the introduction of a new intermediate concept, as in categorical syllogisms, or by an exhaustive analysis, as in disjimctive syllogisms, or by the consideration of its consequents or of its antecedents, as in hypo- thetical syllogisms. The result in hypothetico-dis- junctive syllogisms is an hypothetical proposition. The middle term or concept of an affirmative categorical syllogism must either contain one of the extreme concepts and be contained in the other, or it must contain one and coincide with the other, or it must coincide with one and be contained in the other, or it must coincide with them both ; otherwise it does not compel their coalescence. This gives rise to four cases, or figures, of categorical affirmative proposi- tions, of each of which I wiU give an instance with Part 11. Ch. VU. Diy. 2. §56. Syllogisms, 1st. Categorical. 458 THE CONCEPT. Part U. Ch. VII. Div. 2. §56! Syllogisms, a diagram annexed to render the movement clearer. An instance of the first figure is, Man is (contained in) animal, Animal is (contained in) organic being, .-. Man is (contained in) organic being ; of the second figure^ Man is (contained in) animal. Animal is (coincident with) sentient being, .•. Man is (contained in) sentient being ; of the third figure, Animal is (coincident with) sentient being, Animal is (contained in) organic being, .•. Sentient being is (contained in) organic being; of the fourth figure. Animal is (coincident with) sentient being. Sentient being is (coincident with) posses- sion of nerve, .•. Animal is (coincident with) possession of nerve. These four figures are all that are possible, if con- cepts are treated as units. Negative syllogisms also fall under these same forms, since only one of the premises ia a negative syllogism can be a negative proposition, and the other premiss must express either coincidence or comprehension. Besides which, a ne- gative proposition is the counterpart of an affirma- tive proposition of coincidence ; the exclusion iu the one case, and the coalescence in the other, is total and without exception. When two concepts are coinci- dent, all predicates of the one are predicates of the other, to assert any thing of the one is to assert it also of the other; and, when two concepts are excluded 3 4, THE CONCEPT, 459 from each other, whatever is affirmed of the one must pam u. be denied of the other. The introduction of a nega- Dir. 2.' tive proposition, therefore, into a syllogism requires §56. no other form or forms of statement than those which suffice for affirmative syllogisms. Categoriqal syllogisms depend upon the form of space, since aU their propositions do so. A is in- cluded in B is the conclusion. Why? Because C is included in B, and A is included in C. — 'A is C, C is B, therefore A is B. It is not enough to say that concepts which coalesce with one and the same third concept coalesce with each other; we must add the requirement, that they coalesce with it, one as in- cluding or coincident, and the other as included or coincident. It is not enough, for instance, to say Man coalesces with animal, Horse coalesces with animal; for then we can only conclude, that Man coalesces with Horse so far as both are animals, that is, that they have one point or characteristic in com- mon; they are connected by belonging to a common notion, but they do not coalesce themselves; no fur- ther characteristics can be inferred from this connec- tion, and we are no nearer to the nature of man or of horse than we were in the premises. But we must be able to add the characteristics of the subject and those of the predicate of the conclusion together, in other words, the concepts of the conclusion must coalesce, or we have reached no further step in their determination. And, in order to be able to add the characteristics of the one to those of the other, the middle term or third concept, to which they are re- ferred, must contain or coincide with one of them, and be contained in or coincide with the other, must stand between them in point of comprehension, and Syllogisms. 460 THE CONCEPT. Part II. not outside both. When this is the case, a step for- Ch "VII DiT. 2.' ward is taken by the syllogism, which step forward is 56. the purpose of syllogising. If we consider those con- cepts which coincide with others, and those which contain others, as the predicates of those which they coincide with or contain, the syllogism wlU be in con- formity to the Dictum of Aristotle, Categ. iii. 15. "Oaa, icura rov Kurriyo^ov^ivov Kiysrai^ icavru. xui xura, Toi) vToxeii^biiiov '^^^fiffiTui. A predicate of a predicate is a predicate of its subject. Negative syllogisms are those in which the con- clusion is a negative proposition, one asserting that subject and predicate do not coalesce. This case arises when one of the premises is a negative, and the other an affirmative, proposition, and when, besides, the middle term excludes one of the extreme terms and either includes or coincides with the other. Ne- gative propositions assert exclusion, that the subject is excluded from the predicate, and the predicate from the subject; they make no distinction between modes of coalescence, by inclusion or coincidence, but they deny coalescence simply. There is in logic no such thing as a particular negative proposition ; con- cepts are unities, and if one excludes another, it ex- cludes it entirely. A proposition such as this. Some men are not negroes, excludes entirely the concept some men from the concept negroes ; and the same knowledge, which warranted the assertion of this pro- position, warrants also the affirmative proposition, Negroes are (contained in) men. Logic takes up or adopts no classes, genera, or species, ready made from other sciences, but forms its own concepts by volition; and every concept, every fact, stands on its own basis of knowledge. Logic cannot treat Man, for instance. THE CONCEPT. 461 as a genus or species or class, or as a collection of in- paetii. dividual men, but as a single concept with a definite di^z' meaning ; the logical concept man is not a multitude ^ of individuals, some of which are one thing, some an- Syllogisms. other, but it is one thing with a definite connotation and indivisible. To treat Man as a collection of indi- viduals, some of which are one thing and some an- other, is to treat it as a percept and not a concept; and whatever is predicated of " some men" is predi- cated of them as objects which happen also to be men, not of them qufi,tenus men, or as belonging to the concept man. The essence of a concept is to be a qu&tenus; its rights, to use a legal metaphor, are creatures of contract and not of status. If two con- cepts coalesce at all, it must be either as coincident or as containing and contained. If they are not coin- cident, they must either coalesce as containing and contained, or not coalesce at all. If you do not know that they coincide, then either you know that one contains the other, or you know nothing at aU about them ; in the former case, you can assert an affirma- tive proposition about them, in the latter case you cannot assert that one excludes the other. In order to assert a negative proposition, you must have know ledge of the two concepts ; and, if your knowledge of them falls short of enabling you to assert their mutual exclusion, you have enough to warrant some affirma- tive proposition respecting them. Wherever there is ground for a particular negative proposition, there is also ground for the affirmation of some fact or other respecting its terms. Particular negative propositions therefore, such as. Some men are negroes, and. Men are not contained in negroes, are of no use in logic and ought to be rejected from its forms; which, in 462 THE CONCEPT. pakth. volitional matter, is the same thing as saying, that Div. 2. they are rejected. §56. Whenever there is a negative premiss, the con- y ogisms. gj^g^Qjj jg simply negative, irrespective of the mode of coalescence expressed by the affirmative proposition. In the first and third figures of syllogisms given above, in order to exclude the subject of the conclusion from the predicate, the middle term must be excluded fi^om the predicate ; that is, the premiss in which the middle term is compared with the predicate of the conclu- sion must be negative ; otherwise, that is, if the.other premiss is negative, the subject of the conclusion is not excluded from the predicate, for it is only ex- cluded from a concept which is included in that pre- dicate, that is, from a part of it only and not from the whole. But in the second and fourth figures of syllogisms, it is indifferent which of the premises is negative and which affirmative. For the middle term is in the second and fourth figures coincident with the predicate of the conclusion, so that it is the same thing to exclude the subject of the conclu- sion from the middle term and to exclude it from the predicate of the middle term, that is, of the con- clusion ; no room is left between the limit of the middle term and the predicate of the conclusion, in which the subject of the conclusion might be found though excluded from the middle term. When there- fore we meet with a syllogism apparently informal, from having that premiss negative in which the middle term is denied of the subject of the conclusion, or vice vers^, for in either case the exclusion is mutual, we should consider whether it is not a syllogism of the second or fourth class, in which the middle term and the predicate of the conclusion are coincident or co- THE CONCEPT. 463 extensive, a syllogism disguised by the omission of paetii. the distinguishing words " coincident with" or " con- Div. 2." tained in" from the copula. For mstance, this syUo- §56. gism is faulty, '''"°^'"" Man is not vegetable, Vegetable is (contained in) organic being, . • . Man is not organic being. But the following syllogism is correct, Man is not vegetable. Vegetable is (coincident with) life without sentience, . • . Man is not life without sentience. For, although in both cases it is of the subject of the conclusion that the iniddle term is denied, yet in the latter case only, and not in the former, the middle term is the exact measure of the predicate of the con- clusion, so as to leave in it no room for the subject. The rule may be generally stated thus : In syllogisms of the second and fourth figures, either premiss being negative wiU warrant a negative conclusion; but in syllogisms of the first and third figures, that premiss must be negative in which the middle term is com- pared with the predicate of the conclusion. Since concepts, the terms of propositions and syl- logisms, are always treated as units, and at the same time it is not usual to employ the distinctions of " coincident with" and " contained in" as distinctions of the copula, or mode of coalescence, it becomes necessary, with every afiirmative proposition, to ask the question which of these two modes of coalescence is intended, if logicians would adopt this distinc- tion explicitly in their arguments, it would greatly simplify discussion, and save the recurrence of " all" and " some," which it is hopeless ever to see pass Syllogisms. 464 THE CONCEPT. Part II. ov€r iiito popular language. If however the plain and Div. 2.' easy distinction between coinciding with and contain- § 56. ing is always expressed in logical language, there is no reason why the language of popular discussion should not become exact and logical ; for the distinction is one which has not, like that of " all" and " some," an abstruse technical appearance, as if more was meant than met the ear. There would then at least be no obstacle presented by the phraseology of logic to its popular adoption ; the great difficulty would however remain the same, and must perhaps be first removed, the difficulty which is felt in using terms as concepts and not as percepts, as wholes of extension which can be defined and not as wholes of intension which may have an infinite number of qualities not yet perceived, and in substituting the definition and the qu&tenus in place of the loose and undefined name. The adoption of concepts as logical units removes the appearance of what has sometimes been called the petitio principii involved in categorical syllogisms. If I say, for instance, All men are responsible beings, Caius is a man, . • . Caius is a responsible being, it appears that Caius himself, being a man, is involved in the universal term "all men," and that I must have examined the case of Caius, and admitted the conclusion, before I can assert the major prenaiss. The term " all men" includes all men past, present, and to come ; it is not prim& facie restricted to my present knowledge of men, which it ought to be, since that is the sole ground of my proceeding to a further reasoning about them. But if I say Man is a responsible being. THE COJTCEPT. 465 then Man is a concept which has, or ought to have, a definite analysis or content ; suppose, for instance, that it means ' any being having emotions, voUtion, and powers of reflection ;' and by the term responsi- ble suppose is meant ' having the feeling of being bound to act according to some law.' Then the major premiss expresses no more than my present know- ledge, independent of the case of Caius, warrants; and when I compare the concept Caius with my con- cept man, and find that it is contained .in it, I then infer from the uniformity of the course of nature that it is contained also in the concept, a responsible being. The degree of certainty in the conclusion is no greater than the degree of certainty in the major premiss, but there is a greater quantity of knowledge ; the amount is increased by the combination of the minor ^ premiss with the major; a step forward has been taken, and taken in conformity with the laws of thought. But the term " all men" includes so much that there is no room for more, for it lays claim to have exhausted the concept, by anticipation of its future modifications. We are justified in speaking of our present conception of man, but not justified in asserting that it will not be modified by future in- stances ; and to adopt a logical formula, which is only suitable for cases where knowledge is perfectly certain and perfectly exhaustive, is to adopt what is unsuit- able to express the vast majority of judgments. Hypothetical syllogisms flow from hypothetical propositions; that is, the qusestio is established by being connected with its cause in order of time, not with a concept which contains it in order of space. The major premiss asserts that the qutestio will exist if some other event precedes it, and the minor pre- HH Part n. Ch. vn. Div. 2. §56. Syllogisms. 2d. Hypothetical. 466 THE CONCEI-T. Part U. Ch. VII. Div. 2. §56. Syllogisms. 3d. Disjimctive. miss asserts that this other event takes place, if the syllogism is an affirmative one, or in what is called the modus ponens. If it rains, the fish "will rise. But it does rain. Therefore the fish will rise. Since it is not asserted that rain is the only cause of the fish rising, we cannot conclude conversely, that if the fish rise it will rain ; for they may rise from other causes a,s well as rain. So that affirmative conclusions are only possible from an affirmation of the antecedent, not of the consequent. On the other hand, since this one cause, if it existed, would draw the consequent with it, if the consequent does not exist, we may con- clude that the antecedent does not exist ; and this is the ground of the negative conclusion, or modus tol- lens, in hypothetical syllogisms. If there is game, the dog points. But he does not point. Therefore there is no game. Disjunctive syllogisms have a major premiss which asserts the coalescence of a concept with one of a com- plete series of other concepts exclusively. The series must be exhaustive or complete, and the predication exclusive. If the series is not exhaustive, the propo- sition will be false, as admitting another alternative which may be the true one. If the predication is inclusive, as for instance. Animals are either verte- brate, mollusc, radiate, or articulate, indiiFerently, then the conclusion must be inclusive, and no step forward will be taken ; for instance. Animals are either v. m. r. or a., Sentient beings are animals, .•. Sentient beings are either v. m. r. or a., where we derive no benefit from the disjunctive form of the major premiss, but treat it as a mere catego- rical. But if we predicate exclusively, we can in the THE CONCEPT. 467 -minor deny some alternatives, and therefore in the partii. ... Ch. VII. conclusion affirm others, which is making use of the oiv. 2. disjunctive form. For instance, § 56. Syllogisms. Mammals are either t. m. r. or a., But they are not m. r. or a., . • . They are v. This is called the modus toUendo ponens. An ex- clusive disjunctive proposition contains in its form the ground of a possible conclusion, without reference to a third term beyond its own subject and predicate. A negative conclusion in disjunctive syllogisms arises when the minor premiss is affirmative, that is, affir- mative of one of the alternatives, for that involves the negation of the others ; as for instance if, in the above syllogism, the minor premiss were But mammals are vertebrate, the conclusion would be Therefore they are neither mollusc, radiate, nor articulate. This is called the modus ponendo toUens. The last class of syllogisms is that of hypothetico- disjunctive. These combine some of the character- istics of both of the two former classes. What they prove is not the existence of a consequent from that of an antecedent, nor the non-existence of an antece- dent from the non-existence of a consequent ; nor yet the connection of a consequent with one of a complete series of antecedents, by denying all but one ; but th^ connection of an antecedent with one of a complete series of consequents, on the assumption that it is the antecedent of one or other of them. It is requisite therefore that the series of consequents should be exhaustive, otherwise a new alternative may be the 4th. Hypothetico- disjunotive. Uogisms. 4G8 THE CONCEPT. Part II. true One ; but it is not requisite, indeed it is impos- Div. 2.' sible, that the predication should be exclusive. The 56. minor premiss takes care of the exclusion. The fol- lowing is an instance, If he wants money he will either work or fight, But he will not work, . • . If he wants money he will fight. It is not possible to prove the negative of one alter- native by affirming the other, as in the modus ponendo toUens of disjunctive syllogisms, for the conclusion would in that case contradict the major premiss. Again, since the proof moves by negation of alter- natives, and by denying the antecedent nothing is proved, the alternatives cannot be in the antecedent, in a hypothetico-disjunctive syllogism. Nothing is proved, for instance, by saying If he is either out of money, or health, or employment, he will be sad, But he is not out of health or employment, . • . If he is out of money he will be sad. We obtain less than we had in the major premiss. Consequently, hypothetico-disjunctive syllogisms use only the modus toUendo ponens, prove one of a series of consequents, not of antecedents, have an hypothe- tical proposition as theit conclusion, and their con- clusion is always affirmative. The syllogism commonly known as the Dilemma is not properly a hypothetico-disjunctive, but a hypo- thetical syllogism. It wears an appearance of dis- junction because the consequent is double, but it lacks the essence of disjunction because it does not proceed by affirming one alternative from the nega- tion of the other, or by denying one from the affir- THE CONCEPT. 469- mation of the other ; it denies both alternatives. It part ii. is in fact nothing but a hypothetical syllogism in the dIv. 2/ modus tollens. The whole consequent is denied in §56. the minor premiss, and therefore the antecedent is- ^ °^'""''' denied in. the conclusion. An instance is If A is B, then either C is D, or X is Z, But neither C is D, nor X is Z, . • . A is not B. ' But here I should remark that I attempt only to give simple instances of the four forms of syllogisms, in order to show the principles on which they rest, without professing to repeat or to formulate anew the inore complicated forms into which they may, perhaps with advantage, be thrown, or which may arise from their combination.' , 5 57. The hypothetico-disiunctive syllogism closes §67. ,.„,,. r. „ . Empirical and the series of syllogisms, or separate forms of reasoning formal by means of "words and sentences. If other forms of syllogism should be adopted, it is difficult to imagine that they should not be developments, modifications, or combinations of these. It will be observed that nothing has been said of the so-called inductive syl- logism. This is because, in the view here taken, inductions may be thrown into the form of any kind of syllogism, and because all induction is in its na- ture deductive, a deduction either from an anticipa- tion of redintegration, or from an assumption of the law that the course of nature is uniform. AU cases of acquisitive generalisation, it has been shown in § 38, as well those which move from particular facts as those which move from general facts, or laws, are deductions from such anticipation or such assump- tion. It is impossible to reason not ex prascognitis et praaconcessis ; induction itself is an instance of reasonmg. reasoning. 470 THE CONCEPT. pakt II. such reasoning. And, since induction is a mode of de- Ch. VII. ° Div. 2.' duction, the four forms of syllogisms, which suffice for . § 57. all cases of deduction, suffice also for this case of it. Empirical and ^ . . . . , . p fomai Induction, so far as it is reasonmg, that is, so tar as it is a voluntary putting together of two or any num- ber of facts or phenomena, is a deductive process. Induction, so far as it is a process, or connected pro- cedure, at all, is a deductive procedure. The line of demarcation falls, not between induction and de- duction, but between perception of phenomena or of facts, whether procured by observation or by ex- periment, and reasoning, analysing, or combining those phenomena or their elements. Perception of facts, whether by observation or experiment, is not induction ; reasoning acquisition of new and as yet unobserved facts is not perception, but deduction from former perceptions ; and induction answers to this description. It was because induction was con- sidered to be dififerent in nature from deduction, while syllogism was suited only for deductive pro- cesses, that a special form of syllogism was provided, or at least employed, to embody the results of induc- tion as a pre-syUogistic and extra-logical process. The process of induction, it was thought, was non-syllo- gistic, but its results might be expressed by the syllo- gism. An instance of the syllogism of induction is A, B, C, D are mortal, A, B, C, D are all mankind, . ■ . All manldnd are mortal. The premiss, "A, B, C, D are all mankmd," ex- presses the result of a complete induction, or one adopted by the logician as such. The task of show- ing that the induction was complete or correct, that is, the process of induction, was considered by the reaeoning. THE CONCEPT. 471 logician as extra-loajical, and made over by him to paetii. the inductive enquirer, a man supposed to be busied div. 2. with empirical matter only, as a task to be performed § 57. without the aid of logic ; the straw was denied, and formal the full tale of bricks was required. The logician de- manded a complete induction ; whether one reached' by simple enumeration of all the instances, or one reached by a .Baconian interpretation of nature, was to him indifferent ; all he demanded was a secure premiss for a syllogism ; since that premiss was pro- cured by induction, it was procured, he thought, by extra-logical means, means which depended on the matter, and not on the form, of reasoning. Those logicians, too, who were interested solely in their logical forms, and not in logic as an organon of in- vestigation, were indifferent whether this particular kind of premiss could be procured or not. The in- ductive enquirer, on the other hand, said : ' The logician considers my inductive .process extra-logical ; nevertheless it is reasoning ; it procures him not only certain means of syllogising, but also a wealth of knowledge which formal syllogising without it could never reach.' Thus philosophy was in a suicidal posi- tion. A valuable method of reasoning was excluded from syllogistic logic, and syllogistic logic was ex- cluded from the honours of scientific discovery. Now, if the old point of view is adhered to, if in- duction is not a deductive process, and if syllogism is entirely deductive, it is useless to attempt to recon- cile induction and syllogism by any invention of in- ductive syllogisms. Such inductive syllogisms will always be mere appropriations of the results of in- duction, and not forms of the inductive process. It is the inductive process itself which it is required , to 472 THE CONCEPT. pakt II. incorporate into syllogistic logic. Now it was shown Ch VII J n O Div. 2. ' in § 3 8, that the inductive process is a process of §5r. deduction, and that observation and experiment, as ™?OTmai*" modes of perception, are common to both. The con- reasomng. £^gJQjj q£ ^Yie notiou of inductiou with the notion of processes in which experiment and observation bear a large proportion to the reasoning founded on them, — this is probably the chief source of the divorce between induction and deduction. Wherever was seen a large accumulation of facts, experiments, and observations, there people said — Induction ; without stopping to ask whether induction was a simply per- ceptive or a redintegrative process. Wherever they saw long arguments from comparatively few facts or phenomena, there they exclaimed — Deduction. But the truth is, that, wherever there is a voluntary red- integrative process, there is deduction; the interest supplies the matter and directs the movement, logic supplies the form and moulds the movement in con- formity with the a priori requirements of truth. If we treat concepts as units, then there is nothing, short of infinity, too large, and nothing, short of in- finity, too small for the grasp of logic. Every new fact as it is observed, or brought to observation by experiment, is treated as a concept, compared with others, and made the subject or the. predicate of a proposition. Black, tawny, copper-coloured are said one by one, as the fact is observed, to be contained in the concept the human form. And again, the concept the human form is said to be either black, white, tawny, or copper-coloured, indififerently. Ac- quisitive generalisations, to which the term induc- tion is usually appUed, employ, when expressed syl- logistically, categorical syllogisms of which the major , reasoning. THE CONCEVT. 473 premiss is The course of nature is uniform. When pabt ii. Ch, VII. the hypothetical form is employed, the same premiss div. 2. may be added as a pendant to the antecedent; If ^57. A is B, and the course of nature is uniform, then formal C is D. The forms of syllogism above given are thus adequate measures or forms of thought, for both kinds of reasoning, critical and acquisitive, and not only for the results of reasoning but for the processes themselves. But of the four forms of syllogism, cate- gorical, hypothetical, disjunctive, and hypothetico-dis- junctive, the two former are most j&tted for acquisitive reasoning, and the two latter for critical ; or rather for that kind of critical reasoning which follows acquisi- tive, and reduces its results to a critical form; for these two latter forms of syllogism take up as their major premiss an elaborate result of reasoning, a whole class with its divisions ready formed, a concept already analysed exhaustively, either into its statical and mutually exclusive members of analysis, or into its complete series of effects. Logic offers us, in its four kinds of propositioris and in its four kinds of syl- logisms founded on them, forms corresponding and adequate to the two methods of empirical reasoning, critical and acquisitive, which were found to exhaust the whole domain of voluntary redintegration. Hypothetical propositions and hypothetical syllo- gisms depend on the postulates and the concept-form equally with categorical and disjunctive propositions and syllogisms. Only since they connect concepts in the order of time, keeping them apart without coa- lescence with each other, they avoid the appearance of contradicting the postulates and the concept-form which is the peculiarity of categorical propositions. They assert that one concept causes another, not that reasoning. 474 THE CONCEPT. pabtii. one concept is another. Time is involved in both Ch. VII. , . 1 p . . T n . T, 1 • , Div. 2. kinds 01 propositions and syllogisms alike, that is to §57. say, the movement of consciousness in judgment re- formai , quires time to exist. In another sense also they both require time, and they both require space ; the images, or concepts, which are their objects exist both in time and in space. Concepts, whether separate or in coalescence, must exist in time. But this historical existence in time is abstracted from in categorical and disjunctive propositions and syllogisms, and their extension in space is abstracted from in hypothetical and hypothetico-disjunctive propositions and syllo- gisms; no use is made of it in these forms of rea- soning. The form of time, abstracted from that of space, on which hypothetical and hypothetico-disjunc- tive propositions and syllogisms rest, is, as will be shown in the following Division, the formal element in the Law of Causality, and known by the name of Ratio Sufficiens. Hypothetical and hypothetico-dis- junctive syllogisms rest avowedly on the principle of Ratio Sufficiens ; categorical and disjunctive syllo- gisms rest also on the same principle, but do not make it their principle of movement, just as the other two kinds of syllogisms rest on the form of space without moving by means of it. The forms of time and space respectively determine the forms of these two main kinds of propositions and syllogisms in logic, the hypothetical and the categorical. The same distinction between the forms of time and space is the ground of another difference also in methods of reasoning, of the difference between the critical and acquisitive methods. Acquisitive reason- ing diiFers from critical in assummg as its principle that objects yet unknown will be subj,ect to the law reasoning. THE CONCEPT. 475 of the uniformity of the course of nature; and all partii. instances of acquisitive reasoning are deductions from oiv. 2. " this assumption. The purely formal element in this § 57. ■ law of the uniformity of the course of nature will be formal shown to be the form of time, under the name of the Ratio Sufficiens. The same form of time, therefore, which, when taken by itself, determines the form of hypothetical propositions and syllogisms, determines also, when combined with a material element and con- stituting the law of the uniformity-of the course of nature, the method of acquisitive reasoning. It is true that both kinds of reasoning, critical and acqui- sitive, can be expressed indifferently by all four kinds of syllogisms ; critical reasoning by hypothetical syl- logisms, no less than acquisitive by categorical. Logic being purely formal, and the distinctions' of her forms being grounded on distinctions of the form of thought, can apply any of her forms to any method of empi- rical reasoning, notwithstanding that the pure logical forms and the empirical methods of reasoning receive their distinctive shapes from the same source. For empirical reasoning is a voluntary process, and logic is the voluntary application of a form to that process ; logical reasoning is doubly volitional; two things are willed in it, namely, the questions to be solved, and their complete and satisfactory solution. Logi- cal forms are the universally applicable organon for the solution of all questions whatever. When the questions are solved, the conclusions reached, and the knowledge complete, the logical forms are thrown aside, or abstracted from; they related merely to the treatment of the question, being voluntary in the second degree; but the empirical or concrete course of reasoning, which 'ended in those conclusions, is a 476 THE CONCEPT. Part II. part of the entire knowledge reached, without which Ch. VU^ . Div. 2.' those conclusions would be unintelligible ; and this § 57. cannot be abstracted from, but is a valuable part of Empirical and , i , . f, ■• . -. formal the history oi the mind. reasoning. This doubly voluntary, logical, treatment may, in any kind of question and in either method of reason- ing, critical or acquisitive, proceed by the application of the forms either of time or of space. A period of history, for instance, may be treated as a statical con- cept, in which cause- and effect are qualities or modes of existence; The reign of Charles I., for example, may be treated as one concept, in which the event of the attempted Arrest of the Five Members and that of the beheading of the King are constituent parts, notwithstanding that the former event was one of the causes of the latter. If now we reason acquisitively, we may say that similar exercises of arbitrary power, in similar circumstances, will produce similar retribu- tion; A is productive ofB; or, A is (contained in) events productive of B. The word productive con- nects events in order of time, and makes cause and effect coalesce into one statical concept. Similarly, the same period of time may be treated as a network of causes and effects, and we may say If there is an exercise of arbitrary power, there yvill be retribution. And again, in wholes of simultaneous existence, where the parts exist simultaneously, for instance, the rising and falling of the opposite ends of a lever, the action and reaction of bodies in collision, the angles and sides of a triangle, each part may be considered as a cause of the rest, and as the effect of the rest; a single bone of a fos&U animal not only as proof of what the rest of the skeleton was, but also as having been with the other bones a condition of the whole, THE CONCEPT. ' 477 and as itself conditioned by the rest. In other words, part ii. Ch. VII. logic can treat wholes of succession statically, and oiv. 2. wholes of simultaneous existence d\Tiamically, for the § 57. „ . . . . "^ . Empirical and purposes 01 investigation; it can also treat new in- formal n • ... ,. . ■,. . reasoning. lerences, m acquisitive generalisation, as qualities or constituent parts of already acquired concepts, be- sides treating them in the character of future events, or events consequent on prior conditions. § 58. Logic has always been considered to be a Review of the purely formal science, making abstraction from all laws^of Logfo! content or matter of knowledge, and giving otily the laws which are afterwards applicable to all kinds of content or matter, but which do not contain any in themselves or of their own. If this were strictly true, it would follow that there was no community of nature between Metaphysic and' Logic, for metaphy- sic always has in its objects both form and matter, the latter being as essential as the former ; and conse- quently that metaphysical truths could not be de- duced from logical, nor logical from metaphysical. Two faculties or functions would then exist side by side in consciousness, which might be capaible of har- monious action, but which would not be necessitated to act harmoniously ; and thus a third principle or set of principles would be required, to establish the prac- tical rules which regulate, or ought to regulate, the concert of the two functions. But now, if any one, startled at the apparent incongruousness of such a system, should enquire whether, after all, it were the true one, and should experience the wish to reduce it to greater simplicity, the mode of doing this which would be likely first to suggest itself would be to ask whether one of the two kinds of principles, metaphy- sical and logical, could not be derived from the other. 478 THE CONCEPT. Part 11. And having put the question in this shape, it would ' ' Diy. 2." probably next occur to him, that the most concrete of § 58. the two kinds of principles must be deducible from analysis of the the most abstract. This attribute, of being the most ogio. g^|3g^.j,g^g^^ Yie would at first be led to think was pos- sessed by the principles of logic, since it has always been proclaimed that logic makes abstraction of aU content, and consequently is entirely and completely abstract. But when it had been proved that there is no object of thought or of consciousness which does not contain in itself both matter and form ; and that consequently even the postulates of logic can make no claim to be entirely and strictly formal, any more than the principles of metaphysic, or of intuition of existences as objects, namely, time and space ; but that both kinds of principles alike contain both matter and form, that is, are felt as well as known in consci- ousness ; he would then find the question of the re- duction of one kind to the other opened afresh, since in this respect they stand on the same level ; and it would remain only to ask, not which was abstract and which was concrete, but which was the most abstract, the most simple and elementary. The difficulty aris- ing from the apparent diflference in kind of the two sets of principles would be thus removed; it would remain to compare them together and see whether either contained the elements of the other, whether either contained more than was contained implicitly in the other. Now the postulates contain explicitly more than time and space contain explicitly, but not more than time and space contain iniplicitly. In other words, they are a development of time and space, and not an additional or new principle. Time and space contain THE CONCEPT. 479 all feeling ; the postulates are particular feelings. part ii. They arise only when matter, or objective feeling, div. 2.' has been perceived in the forms of time and space ; § 58. and they arise in the act of separating one object or analysis of the feeling from another, in and by those forms, which ™^° °^''' act is itself, a feeling. A feeling placed in a definite time and space is one object ; when experienced again, i.e. at a different time, occupying the same space and the same portion of historical time, it is the same object; when another feehng is experienced, if it is in the same space and the same portion of historical time, it is a different quality of the same object ; if it is in a different space and portion . of historical time, it is a different object. Objects which are the same ac- cording to this definition of sameness, for instance, cotton in England and cotton in India or America, justice in the law courts of Athens and justice in those of Paris, we class together and distinguish from aU others, whether different from them in point of feeling only, as cotton from wool, both bemg in one bale in England, hardness and whiteness in one piece of marble, or in point both of feeling and posi- tion in time and space, as a bale of wool in England and a bale of cotton in America. The constant re- currence of objects in these conditions, the recurrence of feelings held apart only by difference of times and spaces, is the simplest form of the fact which is ex- pressed by the postulates. A is A, the postukte of Identity, is the assertion of sameness; is the assertion that the feeling A, though experienced in different portions of space and historical time, is the same feeling, that is, that as far as feeling goes, and ab- stracting from the differences of its emdronment, it is one jfeeling, a logical unit. The postulate, No A is 480 THE CONCEPT. pam II. Not- A, is the assertion of difference of feeling. Every Div. 2.' thing is either A or Not- A is the assertion that same- §58. ness and diiference, as above defined, are the only Review of the . , . , . „ ■, . m. analysis of the wav m which wc Can conccive of two objects. Ine laws of Logic. . -i -t n • -i i 1 mcompressibihfcy oi time and space, and ■ the conse- quent security of the feelings or matter which they contain, is the ground of the certain assertion of the postulates. The postulates again are the assertion of general facts, facts as necessary and certain as any others; only less general and less certain than the forms of time and space, which they express, but ex- press with the addition of a matter or content con- tained in them and distinguished from them. They are the first and most general and most necessary laws of empirical phenomena as such. This unity of feeling in difi'erence of position in historical time and space is the first and simplest fact which the postulates can be employed to express, or which they express in the first instance. Afterwards, any feature in an object can be fixed on and made a concept, for instance, a particular figure, a particular duration, a, particular position with reference to other objects, as weU as a particular feeling, such as hard- ness or colour. Objects in which occurs this parti- cular figure, duration, position, or particular feature be it what it will, are then said to be the same in that particular respect, or qu^tenuS such. That is to say, the postulates are applicable to all and every feature in objects without exception. Still this refers only to objects existing in time and space historically. When we go farther, and reflect on objects, as ob- jects existing both historically and in consciousness, a further application of the postulates is made. The same feature is then perceived as twice present to ,THE CONCEPT. 481 consciousness when regarded as a single feature or paetu. ° ° Ch VII .feeling. I reflect that I have said of it A is A. The dIv. 2. ' only difference of the two A s is the difference in § 58. ... . . Eeview of the their times 01 recurrence m consciousness, not, as analysis of the ■I r A^^ T m • i • • • ^^^ °* Logic. beiore, the diirerence m their environment ; cotton in my mind now and cotton in my mind five minutes ago, the Roman Empire in my mind now and the Roman Empire in my mind five minutes ago, occupy historically the same space and time, at each moment of representation. The subjective space they occupy is also the same, they are environed by the same body and the same external world each time. The only difference between them is, that one is before and the other after an intervening series of feelings. The judgment, A is A, is now the outward expression of this reflective act of consciousness ; the reflective moving from one feeling to the other requires time, and this time from A to A is represented by the two A s of the judgment. Reflection ratifies the postu- lates by adopting them; and the postulates are ex- pressions of the ultimate judgments of reflection, as well as of the original judgments of perception and understanding. The simplest expression or formula of the postu- lates contains a material element in it, besides that contained in time and space as pure objects. It has been already said that even the pure cognitions of time and space are material as, well as formal, that they are felt as well as known, and involve a being conscious as well as a form of that consciousness. But the particular or determinate mode of this mate- rial element is, in the pure object, only provisionally present. In the postulates, on the contrary, the ma- terial element is present determinately ; it is some II laws of Logic, 482 THE CONCEPT. pabt il distinct limitation of time and space impressed upon Div. 2. ■ them by volition. Three things were distinguished §58. in § 1 6, Ist, Time and space themselves; 2d, the ma- . analysis of the tcHal element; 3d, the limitations and divisions of time and space impressed upon them by the material element. The postulates express those divisions which can exist only when form and matter are present with them. Volition fixes on the divisions and retains form and matter provisionally ; the divisions so fixed are the concept-form, and the expression of them is by the postulates. The simplest formula of the pos- tulates is representative of any determinate material element whatever ; it is not an expression of one object or one element existing alike" in all objects, or of all objects or all matter indiflferently, but it is one object, chosen for its insignificance by itself, in order to represent any determinate object whatever as de- terminate. A letter of the alphabet serves this pur^ pose well. There is no simpler or better formula for the postulates than this concrete, determinate, yet representative one, — A is A; No A is Not- A; Every thing is either A or Not- A. A and Not-A are not properly speaking abstractions, they are not ab- stracted as universal properties or qualities of objects, and considered logically as independent of the con- crete objects to which they belong ; but they are signs denoting any concrete, empirical, determinate object whatever. A means this-object ; Not-A means not -this -object; and the three postulates express truths concerning objects, but no other truths than are contained in the facts of perception, in the sub- jection of feelings to the forms of time and space. In other words, the cognitions of time and space are the condition and ground of the postulates. The A of THE CONCEPT. 483 the postulates is an object of perception fixed by pabtu. attention and distinguished from every thing else by nk 2/ volition ; and the expression A, being insignificant §5a ', Tf* . 1 .-11 . . 1 Review of the m itselt, represents any and every possible empirical analysis of the object. laws of Logic. It is certainly the case that a more evident truth has been attributed to the postulates, and even to more concrete and less general forms of them than the above, than has been attributed to the cognitions of time and space. There has never been a time when the postulates have not been appealed to as the test, or the conditio sine quk non, of truth. A thing cannot at once be and not be, is the most current coin of argument, which every one must admit or be excluded from arguing. It seems at first sight to be of a certainty far superior to the certainty here claimed fpr the cognitions of time and space, which appear to be not older, in their character of a priori necessary truths, than the days of Kant. And it is true that, for all purposes of argument about empi- rical phenomena, the postulates, represented by such current phrases as A thing cannot at once be and, not be, are quite sufficient and, being within the reach of every one, are best fitted for the purpose which they have, time out of mind, served and wiU serve. But this empirical character of theirs at once accounts for their greater currency, and shows that they are the development of more general and more recondite cognitions. They are the common ground where metaphysicians, logicians, men of science, and men in general can meet, and which all must admit to be firm. They are at once indemonstrable and empirical. As the former, it is absurd to attempt to prove them or show their certainty. As the latter, they must be 484 THE CONCEPT. Past II. capable of being resolved into non-empirical elements. Div. 2." This latter analysis, here attempted, is no attempt to I5s. prove the postulates, to add a certainty to them which analysis of the they had not before ; but it is an attempt to show ogic. ^^^ ^j^^^ came to be invested with that character of certainty. In other words, it is an attempt to assign their conditio essendi et existendi, as distinguished from their conditio cognoscendi, an attempt corre- sponding to that made in Chap. in. with respect to time and space ; the only difference being that, in the last-mentioned case, the causa existendi was sought in objects in their objective, in the first-mentioned case, in objects in their subjective character; in the last case, in objects as empirical existences, in the first, in the metaphysical analysis of such objects. A similar phenomenon has been observed in the relation of the cognitions of time and space to each other. Just as the postulates, being empirical, are more familiar than the forms of time and space, and have consequently usurped their place in men's minds, so space, being more complex, is also more familiar than time, and has become the mode in which we represent every thing to ourselves, time itself in- cluded. Space is more complex because of its three dimensions, which can be compared together ; it con- tains in itself the conditions of its intelligibility ; but we render time intelligible to ourselves by an image drawn from space, by a line, the image of the first dimension of space. Yel; no statical image is really contained in the cognition of time ; but time is en- tirely irreducible to any form of space. The cognitions of time and space, as lying deeper than the postulates, are discovered later ; they have however, been familiar from the first, and certainly THE CONCEPT. 485 before the postulates, if the present account of them pabt ii. is true. There should be no confusion on this point. dIv. 2/ The knowledge of time and space is coeval with con- § 58. ,, Till !•! Review of the sciousness ; the knowledge that they are coeval with analysis of the consciousness is of late growth. The knowledge of the postulates is later than the knowledge of time and space, and depends upon it ; but the knowledge that the postulates are necessary truths is prior to the knowledge of the corresponding fact in the case of time and space. But the knowledge that the postu- lates are necessary truths does not depend upon the knowledge that time and space are necessary truths ; in fact it is known long before it in point of time. The earliest recognition of a necessary truth as such, that is, of such and such a truth as necessary, is the recognition that the postulates are such. This was done satisfactorily first by Aristotle ; while the cor- responding recognition in the case of time and space is due to Kant. The knowledge, therefore, that time and space are necessary truths, is no causa cogno- scendi, no reason for our recognising the postulates as such ; that is, it affords no proof of the postulates. But on the other hand the knowledge of time and space is the causa essendi et existendi of the know- ledge of the postulates. The existence of the one cognition is the cause of the existence of the other. Unless we had the cognitions of time and space, we could never have arrived at the cognition of the pos- tulates. The existence of consciousness in one mode is the cause of the existence of consciousness ia the other mode. Neither the knowledge that the postu- lates are true, nor the knowledge that they are neces- sarily and universally true, depends upon the know- ledge that the cognitions of time and space are 486 THE CONCEPT. Part u. necessarilv true ; this would be to make the former Ch VII J ' Div. 2.' depend on the latter as their conditio cognoscendi, § 58. But they depend, both of them, upon the knowledge analysis of the that the coguitions of time and space are true; this ogic. .^ ^^ make them depend on these cognitions as their conditio essendi et existendi. They depend upon a knowledge of time and space, but not upon a reflec- tion on that knowledge. To make them depend upon a reflection on that knowledge, for instance, upon the reflection that time and space are always true, or necessarily true, would be to prove them by, or deduce them from, the knowledge of time and space, as their causa cognoscendi, instead of analysing them into those cognitions. CHAPTER VII. MBTALOGICAL. Division 3. Ratio Sufficibns. Aevffffe S* 0fit09 aireovra vow irapeovja ^e^aiiv^' oil i^ap airoT/iy^ei to iov tov e'o'wTOS e)(^ea0ai, — Farmenides. § 59. In Chapter vi. it was shown that the canon of paktii. acquisitive reasoning was common both to induction dw. 3." and deduction ; and this canon is known as the canon § 59. /I . 1 , . T ±1 J. 1:1 n 1 • Cause and 01 mduction, namely, tnat the course of nature is Reason. uniform. It is an empirical law, which contains both a material and a formal element, the former not ca- pable of being treated apart from the latter, but only as embodied in the empirical canon. The latter, or formal, element however can be abstracted and treated provisionally as a formal law; and as such it is known as the Ratio Sufficiens. It has now to be shown that this formal element, called, when treated as a provi- sional or abstract object, the Ratio Sufficiens, is the form of time itself. The canons employed in critical as well as acquisitive reasoning, known as the postu- lates of logic, have also in the preceding divisions of this chapter been shown to contain in like manner a material and a formal element ; and of these the 488 RATIO sinBTiciE]srs. pabt II. formal element has been shown to be resolvable into Ch. VII. , . . „ . ^ ^ . , Div. 3. ,the cogmtions oi time and space. It remams to show § 59. the parallel circumstance with regard to the formal Reason. element of the Ratio Sufficiens, the principle of ac- quisitive reasoning and hypothetical and hypothetico- disjunctive syllogisms ; — a task which, as I have said, has already been virtually performed by Sir W. Hamilton, Appendix i. A., Discussions, ad edit. pp. 618-21. Like the postulates, ' the law of ratio sufficiens cannot be expressed except in a shape includiag a material element, that is, empirically. It must always be expressed generally and representatively, whether it be as the ratio existendi, or the ratio cognoscendi. The first of these, for instance, may be thus expressed : Whatever exists must have a cause ; — ^nothing exists without a cause ; the second thus : Infer nothing with- out a reason. The words, Whatever, Nothing, and Cause, mean ariy object, no object, and some object as cause. Now both the cause, or ratio existendi, and the reason, or ratio cognoscendi, in every particular case must be given by actual experience, subject to the canon of induction. The course of nature is uni- form. It would be impossible to obey the law of ratio sufficiens, in either of its branches, existendi or cognoscendi,' unless the sequences and coexistences among material objects were uniform; we could never say that one particular object, A, was the cause or the reason of another particular object, B, unless they uniformly preceded and followed each other. We should indeed be still compelled to look for an ante- cedent, but we should be condemned never to be satisfied by finding the same consequent attached to the same antecedent. Hence the law of ratio suffi- EATIO SUFFICIKNS. 489 ciens has been sometimes expressed: Every thing pamii. must have a cause, or a reason, why it is as it is and niv. 3.' not otherwise; a formula which expresses the fact §59. that the law of ratio sufficiens is bound up with, and Reason, refers to, the empirical law of the uniformity of the course of nature. It expresses not only that every object is bound to some antecedent, in fact or in knowledge, but also that it is bound to some one or more particular and unvarying antecedents. With this form of the law of ratio sulficiens, therefore, in- asmuch as it is the expression of the union of the two elements, formal and material, we have nothing to do, the present purpose being to analyse the formal ele- ment in as abstract a shape as possible. Even the simplest formula expressing the law of ratio sufficiens, taken by itself and apart from the law of uniformity, includes, as has been seen, a ma- terial part or element, just as the postulates do. We have then to analyse it farther, just as in the case of the postulates, and to -see what the purely formal element in it is, apart from the matter or objects which are involved in every expression of it. It has two branches ; it is both the ratio sufficiens existendi, and the ratio sufficiens cognoscendi. The principle of both will be found to be the same ; but it will be requisite first to see what are the relations of these two branches to each other, one of which may be called the Cause, and the other the Reason. The cause must always precede its effect empiri- cally, in the order of history of objects as objects of consciousness, in time ; the reason must always pre- cede its consequent empirically, in the order of cog- nition, or of the history of states of consciousness, in time. I will distinguish these two orders by calling 490 RATIO SUFFICIENS. pabtii. the former historical, the latter psychological; both Div. 3." are equally objective to reflection. Any one of its §59. causes or eflfects, historically speaking, may be the Cause and « • f • ii • , t> i • j. "j. Eeason. rcasou lor jour mierrmg the existence oi an object; it is psychologically only that the knowledge of the reason must precede the knowledge of the conse- quent. For instance, when we see blackened ruins, we infer that a building has been burnt. The burn- ing of the building is historically earlier than the existence of the blackened ruins, but psychologi- cally it is later. If we are told that A is a great man, we infer that he will be honoured by pos- terity; the cause historically being also the reason psychologically, and prior in both respects to the fact inferred. The cause, or causa existendi, is entirely historical, and must always precede its effect historically ; when we say, Whatever exists must have a cause, we mean to say, that whatever exists must have some object existing previously to it, and that, unless some object had previously existed, it could not l^ave come into existence. When empirical observation has shown that two objects are invariably linked together in time, of which one invariably precedes and the other invariably follows; and that the taking away of the preceding object, without taking away any other of the accom- panying phenomena, involves the disappearance of • the following object; then we call the former the cause and the latter the effect, one of the other. The cause however, as exhibited in the ratio sufflciens alone, is not a special and invariable antecedent ob- ject, but some antecedent object, no matter what. That some object must precede objectively every object which can exist, this is the necessary truth EATIO SUFFICIENS. 491 expressed by the ratio sufficiens existendi, and the pabtii. only truth of a necessary character involved in it. dit. 3.' In the same way in the case of the reason; the §59. only necessary truth involved in the ratio sufficiens Eea«on. cognoscendi is There must be some antecedent in your knowledge before you can inier the existence of any object. The necessity in the ratio sufficiens cog- noscendi is solely this, the necessity of asking Why for every thing ; every assertion must have some reason for it. The formula given above, Infer no- thing without a reason, stands on the same level as the formula. Every thing must have a cause ; while the psychological formula corresponding to the for- mula. Every thing which exists must have a cause why it is as it is and not otherwise, which is com- pounded of the material canon of uniformity and the formal law of the causa existendi, would be some- thing of this kind. Infer no particular object without a particular reason connected with it by experience. But the terms cause and reason usually signify particular or special cause, and particular or war- ranting reason; so that it would be confusing to employ these terms in expressing the purely formal connections of the ratio sufficiens. It will be better to exhibit the two forms of the cause, and the two of the reason, in such phrases as the following : Cause, oe Eatio Sufficiens Existendi. 1st. Every thing which exists must have an antecedent. 2d. Every thing which exists must have a cause. Beason, or Ratio Sufficiens Existendi. 1st. Every thing known must have an antecedent in consciousness. 2d. Every thing known must have a warrant in consciousness. The first formula in each case is alone strictly neces- 492 RATIO SUFFICIENS. Part II. sarv, or the embodiment of a necessary truth. The Ch. VII. . . "^ niv. 3. ' second formula in each case is merely another ex- §59. pression of the law of the uniformity of the course Eeaso™ of nature, seen first from the objective side, th^n from the subjective. The two formulas, the first in each case, dififer from each other in nothing but in the point of view being in the former historical, in the latter psychological; the former declares how objects must exist, the latter how they must be known to exist; the former declares how they are connected with each other, the latter how the consciousness of one is connected with the consciousness of the other. Now in both cases, in both modes of connection, we have before us a provisional object; in the one, the objective aspect, in the other, the subjective aspect of phenomena. The connection in the first case is objective, with abstraction of the subjective side, for which reason it has been called historical; the con- nection in the second case is subjective, with abstrac- tion of the objective side, for which reason it has been called psychological and not subjective. Both cases, however, are connections of states of conscious- ness, both are subjective and objective at once. This connection, common to the two cases, which is at once objective and subjective, and at once universal and necessary, is the cognition of time; for, besides being universal and necessary, it is nothing more than the relation of succession, abstracted from any content or series of succeeding objects. It is the formal cognition of time which forces us back in every instance upon a previous condition of existence to that with which we begin, whether it is priority in order of thought or in order of nature, whether the previous condition is considered as adapted to cause RATIO SUFFICIENS. 493 a thought in us, or as adapted to cause an object independent of us. The same cognition of time in- volves also the necessity of an effect for every cause, as weU as of a cause for every effect; it extends for- wards into the future as well as backwards into the past, historically; and, psychologically, every thought has consequences which must lead to theories and systems capable of infinite development. This is the ground of prediction of the future from the past. Whatever object, whether of objective or subjective reference, we take as our starting point, we must go backwards a parte ante, in conceiving its causes or its reasons, and forwards a parte post, in conceiving its effects or its consequences; and in both cases in infinitum. The result therefore of the foregoing analysis is, that the cognition of time is the purely formal and necessary principle involved in all the shapes of the ratio, sufficiens. § 60. What has been called the causa essendi, or formal cause, is nothing else than the analysis of an object in its first intention. When any object is so analysed, then either of its two aspects, the thing defined and its definition, may be called metapho- rically the form, or causa essendi, of the other, or pari ratione the effect of the other; or its parts or elements of analysis may be metaphorically called causes or effects of the whole, or reciprocally causes and effects of each other within the whole. Meta- phorically, because both the aspects, and all the parts and elements, are simultaneous and coexistent, and can only be called causes and effects by an unwar- ranted extension of the relations subsisting between objects in their second intention, or between one ob- ject and another in consciousness, to cases where the Part II. Ch. VII. Uiv. 3. §59. Cause and Beason. §60. The formal cause. 494 RATIO SIIFFICIENS. Part ii. object is already assumed to be one single, though Div- 3.' perhaps complex, object, in which neither aspect, no § 60. part, no element, precedes another. The term causa- The formal ^. ' . , • -, ■, ■ -, cause. tion IS Dcst restricted to express relations between objects in time, as preceding and succeeding. Make any one of these aspects, or parts, or elements, an object by itself in a provisional image, and then you can consider what causes or effects it has ; but what- ever is coextensive with it in respect of time is not its cause or its effect, but a co-element or co-partner in the provisional object from which it is abstracted. The causa essendi, or formal cause, must be contained in the object of which it is considered as the cause; but for this relation terms have been already pro- vided, those of definition, aspect, element, and part in analysis. Kant made reciprocity of cause and effect one of his categories, which is the conception of two objects being reciprocally conditions of each other ; of which the equality of mechanical force im- , parted and lost, of action and reaction, the diagonal movement in the parallelogram of forces, positive and negative electricity would perhaps be among, the instances. Now if either of the two forces acting in any of these cases is prior in existence to the other, it may be considered as among the causas existendi of the other; but if they both begin to exist ex- actly at the same moment, then I contend that it is more reasonable to regard them as elements or component parts of one phenomenon, and not as causes of that phenomenon, or of each other. Only if an actual priority of existence is assumed or dis- covered can one of them be properly called cause, and the other effect. §6L I 61. Here is completed the analysis of the logical EATIO SUFriCIENS. 495 laws into laws of intuition. The intuitional principles, pam ii. Ch VII. the cognitions of time and space, are the forms- both niv. s.' of intuition, or perception in all its branches, and of § 6i. reasoning ; and there is no conflict between these two Thought. modes of consciousness. There is besides no place left for a faculty such as that which Kant calls the Reason, with its ultimate principle or Idea of the To- tality of the conditions of a given conditioned object, that is, of an Unconditioned. (Kritik d. R. V. Tr. Dial. B. I. Abs. 2. vol; 2, p. 260, Rosenk. ed.) For every totality is a concept, and concepts are products of volition within the limits of perception or percep- tive imagiuation ; and the logical function of such a concept in all its branches, as a regulative principle or law for the practical exercise of reasoning, is fully performed by the law of Parcimony, resting, equally with the concept as product of volition, upon the ma- terial element, or feeling, in consciousness. There is no such faculty of reason commanding us to assume an unconditioned, and consequently we need no cri- tical system to restrict its operation to a merely regulative function. We are under a total inability to do so if we would ; we may make a false, or what Kant calls a transcendental, use of the laws of reasoning, but we cannot conceive an Uncondi- tioned, or what Kant would call a transcendent object. > (Kritik d. R. Y. page 240, ed. Rosenk.) The prin- ciples of reasoning, whether distinguished or not into principles of a Kantian understanding and a Kantian reason, are not wider than those of intuition; but they are the same principles limited by volition and guided by the law of Parcimony. By exercising volition we can limit but not extend our consciousness or its objects, which are existence. Intuitional truth is not 496 RATIO SUFMCIENS. Part II. the Coordinate of logical truth, but at once its source Ch. VII. Div. 3." and its field. By imagining it to be its coordinate we §61. imagine the possibility that one may transcend the Thought, other. If logical laws are objects of cognition at all, and yet not derived from time and space, on what principle are we to justify their limitation in use to objects within time and space? We shall be inevit- ably carried on to the assertion of an Absolute, a logical truth independent, in some incomprehensible way, of aU objects known or knowable by us in time and space, and yet objectively existing, The view here taken on the other hand introduces unity into all the operations of the mind, and reduces our risk of error by one important item, the conflict of coordinate tribunals. The incongruousness of such a system, with its double source of truth, intuitional and logical, and its critical machinery for avoiding the consequences, seems to have struck the ontological successors of Kant. For just as, in the case of Aristotle, metaphy- sical and, ontological principles existed side by side, and contained the germs of future systems of meta- physic and ontology, and just as, in his case, the onto- logical principles were first seized on and carried out into systems by the philosophers of Alexandria, so iu j.the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft there lay thoughts, which might develop into ontologies, side by side with thoughts which were purely metaphysical; and in this case again the ontological side was first seized and developed. Looking now at Kant's system of philo- sophy as a whole, it will be seen that the central point of the whole is the transcendental unity of ap- perception, the Ich denke, which accompanies, and may be perceived to accompany, every moment of con- EATIO SUFFICIENS. 497 sciousness and makes it a single moment. Confused pa»t ii. impressions ot sense m time and space are the raw Div. 3. matter iato which this unity of apperception is intro- § 6i. , , , . , . ^ri- ■ 1 Intuition and aucea, or on which it operates, iune and. space are Thought, the forms of all sensible impressions, whether in con- fusion or in order. But how is order introduced into them, or how are they cast into order? The unity of apperception combines them, true ; but it may com- bine them without the least trace of regularity or uniformity. The transcendental unity of appercep- tion would, in this case, be an unity of apperception of the sensible impressions in time and space; but there would be no knowledge of any thing, for there would be no uniformity. The transcendental unity of apperception works necessarily in the forms of in- tuition, time and space; they are properly its own forms, forms of bringing sensible impressions into unity ; but they are not as yet knowledge. To pro- duce knowledge, to form a regular world or Cosmos of sensible impressions in time and space, the tran- scendental unity of apperception, according to Kant, possesses and applies, or rather operates in and by, certain forms of thought,' the Categories, which are modes of unity, modes of the transcendental unity of apperception itself; and therefore in every step of the operation there is an unity of apperception, but one employed upon the sensible impressions, and upon them in the other forms of the transcendental unity of apperception, the forms of intuition combined with the categories or category used. The transcendental unity of apperception has thus indeed , two kinds of forms in which it operates, those of intuition, time and space, and those of thought, the categories ; but neither the sensible impressions nor their forms of in- KK 498 RATIO SUFFICIENS. Pabtu. tuition, time and space, are objects by themselves, Div. »/ until combined, by the unity of apperception working §61. through some category, or mode and, as it were, brsXs- Thought. %g/a of unity ; then first arises objectivity or reality of objects. This same unity of apperception also ac- companies, the Idea, or Keason-concept, of an absolute totality of conditions. Now the transcendental unity of apperception is the principle of reality and objec- tivation of objects, as well as the principle of their truth, or their ultimate test; and, in both characters, is a principle of reasoning and not a principle of intui- tion. Alle Yerbtndung ist eine Verstandeshandlung, says Kant in the 2d edition of his Kritik. If now, it was argued by Kant's ontological suc- cessors,, any forms and modes of procedure can be found in this transcendental unity of apperception, any forms of thought, any concepts, — these must con- tain reality and truth itself, for they are the source of it in experience; and cannot be limited to matters contained within the intuitional forms of that apper- ception, which are at best only its partial and preli- minary modes, and rather offer resistance to the uni- fying principle, the apperception, than express it fuUy. The apperception is essentially unity, and unity is not a principle of intuition but of thought ; thought, there- fore, cannot be confined within time and space, or limited to work only on objects within those forms, on pain of losing its reality. Whatever can come forward in the unity of apperception is real, conse- quently the Kantian Idea of an absolute totality is real ; and this Idea it is which seems to have become, with Hegel, the absolute Begriff. Some such reasoning as this, I apprehend, must have convinced those who were dissatisfied with the RATIO SUFFICIElSrS. 499 double source of truth proposed by Kant, intuition paetii. and thought, and with the merely regulative truth ok 3.' possessed by the latter wherever it transcended in- §6i. . . , . ' . Intuition and teutional experience, that the Unity of Apperception, Thought, as an unity of thought and not of intuition, was the sole source of constitutive, that is, positive and theo- retical, as well as of practical or regulative truth. And they may have reflected besides, that the doc- trine which limited Ideas of the Reason to a merely regulative function was itself essentially only of a regulative nature, in other words, that the denying to purely formal concepts, whether of the under- standing or of the reason, an independent objective existence was a proceeding founded on no other ground than an anticipation of their futihty and emptiness, if they should be treated as objective and_ independent of a material content ; and was thus itself but a practical rule for arriving at some, real, or supposed, profitable result. The merely regular tive character of this doctrine or procedure was no sufficient ground for restricting the ideas of the rea- son to a regulative function ; some positive ground,, valid in theory as well as practice, must be given for such a doctrine. Thenceforward their endeavour was to discover the law of the operation, or the forms essential to the operation, of thought, or in other words, to discover the particular modes of unity of apperception in which the transcendental unity of apperception, the pure ego, was clothed, or into which it was by itself transformed, the brsKix^iat of its Sucafi/j, or the xccgccxri^gsg of its vTocrruffig. The gulf, left by Kant between intuition and thought, it was attempted to close by bringing over intuition to thought, and subsuming all the content of intuition 500 EATIO SUTFICIENS. Part II. Under the operations of the pure ego, a method which Div. 3.' has issued in the logical ontology of Hegel, as its § 61. most complete and satisfactory outcome. This Essay Thought." has taken the opposite mode of filling up the gulf, and has attempted to reduce the forms of thought to those of intuition; thus restoring the unity of con- sciousness as completely as the ontologists, though reversing their method ; and getting rid, equally with them, of a Thing-in-itself transcendent in its nature, and of concepts which, though they ought to be merely regulative of the practical exercise of Teason, are constantly mistaken for objects of a pos- fsible experience. Whatever can be presented or represented in the forms of time and space has a certain objective ex- -istence. To be able to present or represent any object to ourselves is to assert its existence, not its so-called subjective existence only, but its objective existence also ; for it is now sufficiently clear, that i;he popular use of the words, subjective and ob- jective, as if they signified respectively unreal and real, — subjective existence meaning apparent and possibly mistaken existence, — is unsound and must Tie given up. Hence its true meaning is given to the ■doctrine of Descartes, that whatever he clearly and iSistinctly conceived existed ; that existence is not a quality or attribute to be proved in addition to a con- ■cept or perception, but is involved in all clear con- ceptions alike. What Descartes, however, applied especially to clear conceptions, is true of all ; their conception includes existence, and the only question remaining is, whether that existence is permanent or transitory. Both fields of knowledge, intuition and thought, RATIO SUITICIENS, 501 being thus reduced to one, the remaining question is Pabtii. to distinguish apparent, not from real, but from true dIv. 3/ existence. Whatever danger there is of applying the §6ii laws of logic to pretended objects, the same danger ^"Thougir'' exists of applying the laws of intuition to them. This danger is real in both cases. Its character is to im- agine, in portions of time and space, a material con- tent which does not stand the test of experience; which, believed in once, is found to vanish on fur- ther investigation. Truth has been defined to be the agreement of our imaginations, perceptions, or thoughts, with actual objects ; but according to the distinction already drawn, § 42, it is properly de- fined as the agreement of our present with our future perceptions, when the most accurate and complete investigation shall have tested them. Erroneous and true perceptions are equally objects of consciousness; former and latter perceptions are so too ; the percep- tions which are to agree with objects and those ob- jects with which they are to agree are equally sub- jective. The former perceptions and the erroneous perceptions may be equally clear and equally distinct with the true and the latter perceptions, but they are not the less erroneous on that account. Clearness and distinctness in perceptions are not a test of their truth ; the most distinct and clear perceptions may be changed by future enquiry and by newly observed facts. The figures in a dream have often the greatest clearness and distinctness, and are accompanied by the strongest sense of reality. But why do we call them unreal and untrue? Solely because they will not bear repeated investigation, because, though we can remember them on waking with as great clear- ness and distinctness as other things, yet we cannot 502 RATIO SUFFICIENS. paetil mould them into a consistent whole alone: with the Div. 3. other particular circumstances which we JfcnoAV co- §61. existed with them, the room we slept in and the Intuition and . . -ii ix Thought. time of our bemg asleep, nor with the general tenor of experience, which is a consistent whole of which they are an incongruous portion. It will be said perhaps here, that whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is true so far as it goes and while it lasts; and that the error lies in drawing inferences from our clear and distinct per- ceptions, not in the perceptions themselves ; that we infer from the clearness and distinctness of the dream- perceptions, that they will last and are independent of our will, in fact that they are real ; and thus that the error is one of inference, not of perception. The first assertion I admit, namely, that the perceptions are true so far as they go and while they last; not so the second, namely, that the sense of independence and reality in the dream-figures is not a perception but an inference. Properly speaking we do not infer at aU in dreaming; we exercise no voluntary, but spontaneous, redintegration; we do not say to our- selves These figures are real and independent of our- selves, but we never doubt it and, therefore, cannot reason about it. But we see them move without our suggestion, hear them speak without our sug- gestion, feel them touch (not violently, for that would probably imply wakiag) without our sugges- tion; and this is to perceive the independent and real. The dream-figures, then, are objects of per- ception, clear, distract, and true, so far as they go and while they last. But is this what we mean by Truth? However certain we may feel of any thing for the present, there is no ground in this RATIO StOFFICIENS. 503 alone for saying that it is true; we mtist have, be- pabtii. sides this, a distinct belief in its permanent character, dIv. 3.' or the notion of its remaining as it is, if compared | ei. . , 1 , T . , . , , Intuition and ^vlta otner perceptions; otherwise we use the word Thought, true wrongly in application to it. It is true, if it has stood and will stand the test of investigation in all lights. There is no other truth but this, the agreement of our present perceptions with others which ,are or shall be the result of more accurate investigation. This is a fertile doctrine, especially in the province of Ethic, where as yet it has not been much applied. All perceptions of what is morally right or wrong depend, for their truth, on their agreement with . future states of the more enlightened conscience. The distinction between reality and truth must be applied also to Ethic. § 62. Hence it results that there is no test of truth, of present and immediate applicability. It depends upon the future. If a present perception agrees with many accurately tested past perceptions, it is a strong ground for anticipating that, it will agree with future and more accurately tested per- ceptions. Of such a present perception we predi- cate with confidence that it is true. But except as matter of confidence we can never say that it is true, but only that it will be proved to be true or found to be, true. This doctrine, that there is no test of truth, of present applicability, is one which it is perhaps hardest of all to admit serviceably and prac- tically. We all treat those opinions, which we are confident will be proved to be true, as if they had already been proved to be so, and consequently the opposite opinions as if they had already been proved to be false, instead of conceiving both alike as being §62. Nihil absoluti. §62. Nihil absoluti. 504 BATIO SUFFICIENS. paktii. on their probation. Every one seeks for a test of Ch VII , T Div. 3.' truth, whether in a principle, or in a system. It can be found however nowhere but in continued investi- gation; that is to say, it is not found in any com- pleted investigation. Yet here the rule of practice is to adopt a principle or a system as a limit of enquiry, a terminus a quo and ad quern, and to work from it and live by it as if it were true. It is the same process as that which formed the remote out of the immediate object, and the concept out of the remote object. The will says Here we take our stand. The result of metaphysical enquiry, just as that of practical experience, shows us that there is no absolute or ultimate empirical truth, but every where relative and approximate truth. It is an inflexible law of consciousness — Nihil abso- luti. Hence too arises the justification of the right, which every generation of men exercises, to pass judgment on the conceptions of all preceding gene- rations, and to reverse or confirm their decisions; while future generations, in their turn, will weigh with truer insight this verdict itself. For as indi- viduals increase in knowledge, so also does the race; and though some generations may be more ignorant than some that have preceded them, yet some there must arise which will be wiser. It is not the mere fact of being later in time that makes one judgment truer than another, but the fact of its being the result of a more complete investigation, of which posteriority in time is one condition. It has been said that man never possesses but always anticipates happiness ; and so it may be said of truth, that as truth it is never present. It is the thought of yes- Nihil absolutj. EATIO SUFFICIENS. 505 terday which we address as truth; the thought of Pabtii. to-day, which warrants that of yesterday, needs itself dIv. 3.' the warranty of to-morrow. § 62. It must not be concealed but freely confessed that, in giving up all notion of an Absolute and of an ontology, and in falling back on a metaphysic which is a mere analysis of the ultimate elements in empirical experience, aU hope is renounced of solving that problem which has been the aim, conceived more or less distinctly, and more or less exclusively, of all philosophers from the earliest times to Hegel; a problem which may be thus expressed, to find the ground, first, of there being an existence at all, and secondly, of this existence being such as we perceive it. Hegel's solution of these problems is probably the most complete that has ever been proposed. But not only are all complete ontologies here ab£|,n- doned, Hegel's among the rest, but also all ontologi- cal portions in systems which otherwise are purely metaphysical. Kant does not seem clearly to have drawn the distinction between metaphysic and onto- logy, and the Kritik contains both elements. He does not indeed, like Hegel, profess to account for the existence of impressions of sense generally ; but he does profess to account for the order of those impressions, that is, for there being stability of na- ture and uniformity in the course of nature ; and to that extent the Kritik is an ontology. The tran- scendental deduction of the categories is an account of the origin of what I call the stability and uniformity of nature, of the synthetic unity of all phenomena. " Es ist also der Verstand nicht bios ein Vermogen, durch Vergleichung der Erscheinungen sich Regeln zu machen: er ist selbst die Gesetzgebung fiir die Nihil abBoluti, 506 RATIO StJTFICIENS. paktii. Natur, d, i. ohne Verstand wiirde es iiberall nicht Div. 3.' Natur, d. i. synthetische Einheit des Mannigfaltigen §62. der Erscheinungen nach Eegeln geben." Werke, ed. Eos. u. Sch. vol. 2, p. 113. And again he says, page 114, "der Verstand ist selbst der Quell der Gesetze der Natur, und mithin der formalen Einheit der Natur." Now the expressions stability and uniformity of nature have two senses, one, in which they have been employed in Chapter vi. and elsewhere iu this Essay, namely, the sameness obtaining between im- mediate or remote objects of consciousness, and the sameness obtaining between the sequences of such immediate or remote objects ; and the other, in which they express the connection of feelings as elements of objects with certain portions of time and figures of space as their formal element, it being an universal and necessary circumstance that feelings can exist only in some such portions of time and space. There is no state of consciousness in which stability and uniformity, in this second sense, do not pervade the object of consciousness ; but such stability and uni- formity must be conceived as coexistent and coeval with consciousness itself. In the complex empirical fact of feelings being given to us in consciousness we have the fact of their orderly arrangement, each feel- ing as an unity in time and space by contrast with different feelings, given also; and it is impossible to conceive or imagine feelings existing otherwise. The stability and uniformity of nature in this sense is part of the ultimate phenomenon of experience to be ana- lysed ; and in this sense too it is the ground of the stability and uniformity in the first sense, namely, that between complete objects in nature; of- which no §62. Kihil absoIiitL EATio surriciENS. 507 other explanation or deduction but this is possible, pabt ii. except it be the empirical or historical explanation of dIt. 3.' showing the growth of the conception in the empirical ego. Kant however accounts for the existence of the stability and uniformity of nature in both its senses, accounts for the synthetische Einheit aller Erschein- ungen, by referring it in aU its forms to the unity of transcendental apperception. Now I argue that, if the synthetic unity of feel- ings, as elements of empirical objects, is an ultimate fact in the phenomenon to be analysed, if all empirical consciousness contains such a synthetic unity, it is superfluous to double this fact by seeking to refer it to a second unity, the unity of transcendental apper- ception; and farther, that, if this synthetic unity is an ultimate fact in aU consciousness, it suppHes of itself the best ground for explaining the sjTithetic unity obtaining between empirical or complete ob- jects, which would then arise in the empirical ego by a mere extension of the analytical process and by more accurate examination of the figures and dura- tions of those empirical objects themselves. The unity of transcendental apperception would thus become superfluous, even to explain this more empirical case of synthetic unity, but at the same time without making this case of it an ultimate and necessary fact of consciousness. Kant assumes that a circumstance which is coeval and coexistent with all empirical con- sciousness must be accounted for and its cause of existence pointed out, and not only referred by ana- lysis to its proper place in the phenomenon analysed ; and he seems to me to have done so in consequence of imagining that he could picture to himself the feelings in consciousness as given to us or felt by us. 508 RATIO SUFFICIENS. Past II. ^ time and spdce certainly, but all in confusion and ^DivTs!'" without any particular duration or figure whatever, i^ in Verwirrung, with a total absence of form. In the Nihu absoiuti. second edition of the Kritik, where he gave a new shape to the transcendental deduction of the Cate- gories (Supplement xiv. "Werke, vol. 2. Rosenk. u. Schub. edit.), he begins by stating this somewhat explicitly. "Das Mannigfaltige der Yorstellungen kann in einer Anschauung gegeben werden, die bios sirmlich, d. i. nichts als EmpfangHchkeit ist, — ." Separating the elements of phenomena from each other by reference to the supposed sources from which they flowed or were produced in conscious- ness, the senses and understanding, he imagined them as capable of existing separately from each other, inasmuch as their supposed sources or faculties of the mind were imagined separate. Now if a total absence of form could be imagined or conceived, then the arising of form would demand an explanation, an origin or cause of it to be pointed out. But if this can not be done, as it cannot, then all that remains for us is to analyse the phenomenon into its material and formal elements. This analysis has been shown to be the ultimate step which human knowledge can take, and consequently it has been shown that all ontology or kno\i^ledge of an absolute is beyond our reach. At the same time, since this also shows that existence and consciousness are coextensive, it is plain that an absolute does not exist. Our laiowledge is extended in the very fact of its being limited ; and this reflection must be our recompense for the limi- tation. CHAPTER VIII. REASON. Kai aiiTos Be ainov ToVe hvvwrai voeTv. Aristotle. 5 63. The foregoinff account of the functions of the Paetii. . T r 9 . . . . , Ch. VIII. mind so lar as it is a cognitive power is a complete — one; there is no function Avhich is not capable of intuitive being brought under its description, and there is no part of knowledge which can be reached by any track or means exclusive of those already described. The essential unity of the functions known as perception and understanding has been shown. But a further distinction is often made between understanding and Reason, on which it may be desirable to say a few words, especially as the distinction, as a difference in kind, comes recommended to Englishmen, by the honoured name of Coleridge. The real difference between them appears to me to be one of degree, expressed by or consisting in the fact that the object, on which they are employed, assumes a new aspect when the higher degree has been reached. Pheno- mena assume the character of objects in presence of a Subject, or, what is the same thing, the character of being objective and subjective; the former, if we regard the development of the phenomena themselves, the latter, if we regard them as the object of our own 510 , REASON. paet II. Teflection : the former, from the point of view of ex- CH. Tin. . ' ^ ■, n ■ rrl. — istence, the latter, from that of consciousness. Ine Intuitive presence of a new class of cognitions, not any differ- ence in the cognitive function itself, is the ground of making the distinction, certainly a very important and fundamental one, between the two functions of con- sciousness, understanding and reason. Keflection on itself is the distinguishing charac- teristic of a stage or mode of consciousness next above understanding in complexity, and this is the last stage of development of which consciousness has hitherto been capable. Consciousness first under- stands objects, that is, phenomena are first a collec- , tion of feelings or matter indifferently in time and space ; then it reflects on itself, or, what is the same thing, on the phenomena, and distinguishes feeling generally from particular feelings, and these from qualities; and since the distinction between objects and Subject thus drawn is exhaustive, so far as we can see, the decision of reflection on any question is final^ and irreversible except by a further exercise of reflection; so that reflection is the final arbiter of truth. In this way consciousness , shows us its own poverty and weakness, as well as its own strength and dignity ; it destroys illusions by creating them, for it gives us truths secured from doubt in exchange for notions which had not before been doubted. It de- stroys the appearance of certainty which* before at- tached to our cognitions; it exhibits the inevitable nature of error, in exhibiting the necessity of progress towards truth. A new light dawns with reflection, in which we see ourselves as we are ; from the nature there exhibited there is no escape, from the decision of reflection there is no appeal. Reason is our being; reflection. EH AS ON. 511 and above all other intellectual needs is the need of paei n., knowing objects in their true nature. - — Reflection, or reflective consciousness, has two intuitive modes or stages, the earlier and the later, diflPering from each other in degree of development, not in kind, which it may be proper to call the intuitive and the discursive stages of reflection, following the dis- tinction in Milton, The Soul Reason receiyes, and Reason is Ler being, Discursive or intuitive. The names of the two- stages are Self-consciousness and Reason, the former being the intuitive, the lat- ter the discursive, stage of reflection. These two modes of reflection correspond to the two modes of direct consciousness, intuition and comparison, per- ception and understanding. They are a repetition of perception and understanding in a new and more advanced sphere, or with a new object. When con- sciousness has itself, or phenomena have themselves, for object, it proceeds in exactly the same way as when it was direct or simple consciousness, undistin- guished from phenomena. All reflection is funda- mentally a process of comparison ; originally, it is an act which can be characterised ia no other way than as a distinction between object and Subject. Syn- thesis is involved in all, and comparison in all but the simplest, actions of consciousness, even in per- ception; but just as all those actions of consciousness which resulted in the production of a remote object, notwithstanding that comparison was largely involved in the process, were called perceptions, so also, iii re- flection, the act of distinction which has for its object the objective and subjective aspect of things, notwith- reflection, 512 EEASON. pahtii. standing that this involves comparison in a greater ■^ — degree, may, when compared with its second stage, Intuitive be Called intuition or self-consciousness. It is only by what they are predominantly, not by what they are solely, that actions or states of consciousness are called perception, intuition, understanding, reflection, and reason. Self-consciousness, which is the first or intuitive stage of reflection, distinguishes the pure ego or Sub- ject from its objects, distinguishes the binding thread of feeling, common to all the changing feelings which it binds together into the empirical ego. It is this pure thread of feeling which is the object of self-consci- ousness. Its peculiarity is, that it cannot be made an object by itself; it is always involved in objects as their unity, it is that which feels and perceives them, or that in which they are subjective. The act or mo- ment of perceiving that there is such a binding thread of feeling is called apperception, the Ich denke of Kant ; and this must be combined with other percep- tions or thoughts. The Subject is abstract feeling; and like other abstractions cannot be exhibited except in a provisional form. That this abstraction is abstract consciousness itself is what makes it appear more mys- terious than other abstract notions. Thus it is that the Subject cannot be an object by itself, but only as the subjective aspect of other objects. To have the Subject for an object is the same thing as to have the distinction between the subjective and objective as- pects of phenomena for an object, or to have as an object objects as the correlate of consciousness, or consciousness as the correlate of objects. This act or moment, whether separate, or in combination with others as apperception, is called self - consciousness. REASON, 513 Those acts or moments with which it is combined, or pakt ii. which contain it, are called Keason when they are ^^lII"' predominantly acts of comparison or understanding. § 64. As the Subject or pure ego, but always as ^1^^^ involved in the empirical ego, is the object of self- reflection. consciousness, so the empirical ego is the object of reason, or reflection in its discursive stage. It is the object which reflection creates; for reflection is the perception that all objects are subjective, in other words, that the empirical ego is the complex of all the states or actions or modes of consciousness bound together by the Subject. Ilaffa ip^Z^ "jrdvTo, \ar) ra irgdyi^aTu, says Proclus, Inst. Theol. § 195. In reality this is only a completion of the process which self-con- sciousness began ; self- consciousness took the first step towards making the phenomenal world objective and subjective, reason makes the whole of it in detaU so, and calls it the empirical ego ; (historically indeed the process has been gradual, since the empirical ego has been long regarded as an object among objects;) and it calls by the name of the empirical ego what- ever phenomena or classes of phenomena it has from time to time made subjective, and ultimately embraces under that name the whole objective world; for the world of any individual consciousness is the complex of the states of consciousness which it includes in present, past, and future time. The Subject is the object of self-consciousness, the empirical ego is the object of reason ; the former expresses the distinction between the objective and subjective aspects of phenomena in its abstraction, the latter expresses the same distinction in its complete, empirical, complex development. In examining and dealing with the empirical ego, reason is dealing with LL 514 KEASON. c^^vni phenomena in both aspects at once, objective and sub- ~ ' jective, and has the two correlates present in a single Eeasoning object. Reason distinguishes the two aspects of things, makes abstraction of the objective aspect, and consti- tutes the subjective aspect alone its own object ; where- as the understanding in dealing with the same pheno- mena, the moments of the empirical ego, treats them as objects external to itself, either from not having drawn the distinction, or, if it has been drawn by the reason, by abstracting from the subjective aspect. The understanding, for instance, does not reflect that, in voluntary redintegration, its own voHtion deter- mines what objects or parts of objects shall be ex- amined, but seems to be guided by the objects them- selves alone. It is reason which makes this discovery, in examining the connection between its states of con- sciousness as such. In voluntary redintegration,, as performed by the miderstanding, the shapes which the objects assume appear to be forms of the objects alone, to be discovered in the objects by the Tinder- standing;^ reason traces the subjective conditions of the arising of those forms, and sees that they are en.- tirely products of previous states of consciousness. Both the voluntary and spontaneous processes of con- sciousness are the objects of the reason, and reason herself works by means of, that is, is a mode of volun- tary redintegration. The ■ operations of reason are not limited to this single reflection, that all things are subjective, or modes of consciousness, though this reflection accom- panies all its operations, and distinguishes them from the operations of the understanding. All the opera- tions of the reason deal with the empirical ego as then- object ; they reason about it and introduce further EEASON. 515 Ch. VIU. §64. Beasoning reflection.. modifications into it. And all these operations fall pamii. into two main kinds, speculative and practical; for this is a distinction which applies to consciousness in all its branches, and consequently to reflection as well as* to understanding, to the reflective as well as to the direct modes of consciousness. Reason compares one state of consciousness with another, in order to see which of them is most true, or which of them is most good ; those which it perceives to be neither true nor good it endeavours to exclude from the empirical ego or from consciousness, and as it is impossible to do this completely, seeing that it is not in our power to forget beyond possibility of recurrence, reason draws as strong a line of demarcation between them as pos- sible, and rejects the false and the bad beyond that line, thus creating from time to time an empirical ego which it calls emphatically its own, and distinguishing it from those opinions, actions, and other modes of consciousness, which it would if possible cut off^ from itself by forgetting them, as false and bad. When states of consciousness are rejected as bad we are said to repent of them, to turn away from them, and cast them from us. This state of consciousness is called repentance, (jusravoia. Was't Hamlet wronged Laertes ? Never Hamlet. If Hamlet from himself be ta'en away And, when he's not himself, does wrong Laertes, Then Hamlet does it not, Hamlet denies it. Hamlet, Act 5, Sc. 2. See too De Quincey's remarks on the term furavoiu, in Selections Grave and Gay, vol. 2, p. 46. In the ethic of religion, the perfection or completion of repentance is the Kuiv^ arlaig of St. Paul. There is no special name for the state of reason which rejects the false ; 516 REASON. Part II. but in both cases reason is dealing with the empirical ' '- — ' ego and remodelling it, making so far as possible a Reasoning new man in place of the old. It is the will that is ;e ec ion. ^gj-j^^g here, rejecting the false and bad and remo- delling the empirical ego ; reason is a mode of volun- tary and not of spontaneous redintegration. Besides rejecting some states of the empirical ego, reason also brings other states into new prominence, those namely which are true and those which are good, and these reason seeks to impress upon con- sciousness, and to bind up with it by remembrance and repetition. In so doing it produces ideas, that is, images which contain an assumed or anticipated infinity or perfection, for an object is perfect when considered as developed in its nature in infinite time. The ideas which will be chiefly considered in the fol- lowing chapter are products of reason ; though it is clear that there may be ideas of concepts of the un- derstanding, as for instance the perfect circle, and the perfect globe, and time and space, considered as infinite, are ideas. The new self which is thus distinguished from and educed out of the empirical ego by reason has not as yet received any name ; but it may properly be called the True Ego, in distinction from the em- pirical and the pure. It is by this true ego that we pass moral judgments on the man, as distinguished from his conduct. According as this true ego ap- proaches our standard of truth and goodness, and also according to the degree of stedfastness and clear- ness with which a man cleaves to it and imprints it on his consciousness, that is, according to his en- lightenment and to his will to act up to his light, we judge the man to be good or bad. Reason is the EEASON. 517 mode of consciousness to which, ethic belongs ; there pam ii. is no ethical science apart from reason. Technic ^- — there may be, but not ethic, or practical science in Reasoning it§ highest branch. All ultimate ends must be given "^"^'''°' by reason, and not by understandmg. If we could discover what were the truths and what the objects which the reason of all men when most developed would include in the true ego, we should know what the perfect life consisted in ; and if we could appeal to any one or more objects or states of consciousness as irreversibly and ineradicably best and truest for every individual consciousness, as the • same objects are for our own, we should know what was the su- preme happiness and the supreme duty of all men, as we now know what is the supreme happiness and supreme duty for ourselves individually. And this would be the principle or system of principles of ethi- cal science, holding the same place in ethic, with re- gard to universal applicability and certainty, that time and space hold in speculative philosophy. There is however this difference, namely, that the cognitions of reason, both principles and details, both general and particular cognitions, are the fruit of the exercise of consciousness, while the cognitions of time and space are the elements of every exercise of it; the former are produced as a tree produces its fruits, as a consequence and result of its development. The true ego thus contains less than the empiri- cal, but what it contains is of greater value and dignity. What once was truth is now rejected as error, "««/ yag ^rj o^oiv hiu xgurrov 1^ ogup" and what once was good is now rejected as bad. Reason trans- forms what once was true and good into untrue and bad, and the will rejects them from the true into the 518 REASON. CH'rni ^^pij^ical ego. Eeason is the ultimate judge of truth — and goodness, and what it declares to be such is such, Eea«oning just as what the eye declares to be red is red. In reflection. i i . . j both cases presence m. consciousness is existence, and existence is presence in consciousness. There is no- thing absolute in this or in any mode of conscious- ness; when the reason is employed in judging of the good and bad, it is called conscience ; conscience is its name in this part of its function ; but there is no distinct name for its function of judging between truth and error; for this the common name Reason is employed. The view of reason here taken is opposed to all such views as would make it consist in the logical principle of unity, a principle compelling us to unify all our conceptions, leading, with Kant, up to the three Ideas of the Pure Reason, God, the World, and the Soul. This unification is sufficiently provided for by the principle of Parcimony, and the facts on which it rests. It is opposed also to such views as those which deduce it from the power of making abstract conceptions, or of drawing conclusions from them; these are functions of the understanding, and as such are possessed in a low degree by many ani- mals besides man. Nor again is it the mor-al or emotional importance of certain reflections, nor the perception of a moral value in certain truths, nor a reference of knowledge to action, or of action to moral ends, which constitutes reason; although it is true, as has been shown above, that reason is the source of morality and ethical science, and that there- fore there is a close connection between them; for reason is speculative as well as practical, and both of these at once ; and this character it shares with other reflection. EEASON. 519 modes of consciousness. It is not the moral value of paet ii. the truths perceived that constitutes the faculty per- ^—^ ' ceiving them reason ; but it is the nature of the EeL^g faculty or function of consciousness perceiving the truths, namely, its nature of discursive reflection, which constitutes the truths perceived ultimate truths, and, so far as they are emotional, moral truths. Reason has often been said to be the characteristic which distinguishes man from other animals ; and on the view which I have taken of reason this appears to be true. There are many other animals besides man, however, of whom it is difficult to imagine that they have not reached that stage of reflection which I may call psychological reflection, in which they dis- tinguish between their feelings as circumscribed by the body from objects outside the body, and reason about the effects of the latter on the former, though not under the notion of causes and effects. But there seems to be no evidence to show that they can distin- guish feeling generally and in the abstract from their particular determinate feehngs ; nor indeed that they can distinguish any general notion from particular in- stances of it, though this is a function of understanding as well as of reason. If they generalise, it is without knowing the nature of generalisation, that is, without fixing the general as different from the particular no- tions. Their language appears to have no distinctions corresponding to such a distinction of notions. Man however not only redintegrates voluntarily, but does so by fixed rules of abstraction and gene- ralisation ; he not only reflects psychologically, but he distinguishes himself from his feelings as well as his feelings from qualities in space. This is the con- dition of all human culture. 520 EEASON. paktii. In the exercise and not the bare possession of Ch. viii, ,.,,.. „ . , . c — reason nes the dignity of man, m the expansion oi Reasoning his faculties, in the operations performed by his reason, and not in the single reflection which ac- companies them and conditions them. The percep- tion that representations are, as such, objective, and that they can be recalled and banished by volition, is perhaps the first step in the exercise of the discursive stage of reflection. Other animals certainly have trains of redintegration, both voluntary and spontaneous; but there is no evidence to show that they have dis- tinguished representations from presentations, and found one subjective, the other objective ; or that they have found representations objective ; or lastly have found presentations subjective ; in other words, that they have reflected on their relation to the world about them ; though they may have drawn the primary distinction between extended matter and feeling, and represented the latter by a rudimentary language. §65. § 65. Since metaphysic itself is an operation, or metaphysical g, particular application, of the Reason, it may perhaps not be considered out of place here to take a brief retrospect of the course which the human mind has followed in reflecting on, or applying reason to, the phenomena of experienca in their most general aspect, that is, of the course of metaphysical philosophy, from an early epoch to the present day; sometimes ex- hibiting and always bearing in mind the distinction of metaphysical from ontological, speculative from practical, and direct from reflective theories. Those which are at once purely reflective, speculative, and metaphysical will be found to make but a very small portion of what is commonly included in the history of philosophy. Our present point of view, the position REASON. 521 occupied in this Essay, will of course be the clue pabtii. adopted to guide us in this retrospect; and I shall "^V— ' not attempt to do more than indicate the most salient Retrospect of and cardinal points, without attempting any thing like philosophy, an outline of the whole history of philosophy. The philosophical system of Plato was the care- i"!**"- fully and critically elaborated result of a study of the theories of previous philosophers, among whom per- haps Parmenides had, and deservedly, the greatest influence. He included in his survey all branches of human knowledge as they then existed, and conceived more perfectly than any of his predecessors a system more universal than any of theirs, and turning on distinction^ more subtU and more central. This sys- tem was the Dialectic, the Theory of the E'thri. It has been often described by historians of philosophy, and its chief features and their concatenation exhi- bited. I shall confine myself to showing what it was from the point of view of this Essay. It was a system at once of logic and of existence, both logical and ontological, in which both elements existed mutually involved and undistinguished from each other. Logic and metaphysic were both one with Plato, his forms of thought, the ei'S;;, were forms of objects ; they were the former, or logical, because they were the latter, or forms of things or existences, avra, ra ocra. He did not take general notions as logical forms, and then attribute to them a real and separate existence; but he had not gone so far as to distinguish logical notions from real. General notions were not with him the means of investigation, or rather they were so only because, and so far as, they were the objects of investigation. General notions, as we call them, were the only real existences, and there was a har- 522 REASON. pamii. monised or organic world of general notions in and Gh. VIII - — ' behind the particular notions or ala^tird. Instances Retrospect of of these are the following three pairs as they are metaphysical T,'i,v J • j.1. C? u- j. phUosophy. exhibited m the bophistes : TO oV TO AiJ ov Being and Not-being. TavTov Barepov Sameness and DiEference. o-Tcjo-ts KivrjaK Rest and Motion. Each of these six s'/hj] had a double sense, according as it was used in what may now be properly called its first or its second intention ; tSv ovrtuv rot, fjulv upra, xu^' avra, to, ti 'jr^og a'Kkri'kci act 'Kiysir'^ui. Sophistes, Steph. 255. In the first intention they were ra |tA^ si^skovTcc uXk^Kois ^symc'^a.i. In the second intention they were ra, I'^ikovTo, KXkfjXoig ^lyvva'^ai. id. 256. It would appear that all general terms or z'thri were to be con- sidered in the same way, and were of the same nature as these six. And these would constitute together TO ovTojg h, when used in their first intention or as categories. Objects of sense which fell under a general term in its first intention would be that general term in its second intention, and would be said to share in it, jM/sra%g/c, as their ihia. For instance, in the case of objects difiFerent from each other, Plato says h 'ixxarov ya§ STSgov shai rSi> oiKkuv, ov ^ta, rrjv ctvrov ihcci of a vTnj, and that this vKij was a Sua?, consisting of to [isya. and TO fAi^foV, words which plainly have a visual sig- nification. Plato's Dialectic therefore was a logic, but it was an intuitional logic ; it saw the general notion as ex- isting in and behind the particulars. It never occurred to Plato that the truths which he reached by reason- ing were less real than the objects which he started from to reach them, that by reasoning he could pos- sibly have objects presented in a less real or true shape than before he began to reason ; the new world discovered by reasoning was the real and the true ■ world, which he had attained so and so far to see. Plato left philosophy as a system of absolute neces- sary truth ; all error attached to the individual merely, and to him only so far as he did not reason ; the true essences were existing, it only needed to see them. If others did not see them as he did, it was because they did not reason at all, not because they reasoned wrongly; because they remained in the ah^Jira and did not see the ei'S;? ; for to see the s'lbri was to reason, and nothing else but seeing the i'/hi] was reasoning. "Whatever was merely subjective was fleeting and Aristotle. REASON. 525 false ; whatever was true was objectively existing and Part ii. eternal : it was found to be true only because it existed. - — There was no doubt a great and fundamental dif- Retrospect of ference of character between Aristotle and Plato, a philosophy. difference which is seen reappearing in numerous cases of philosophers, so that it has been said that every man is born either Platonist or Aristotelian. But this at least is certain to me on the other hand, that, had Plato lived when Aristotle did instead of in his own day, and had he then found philosophy ex- isting as he left it himself, had he, instead of Aris- totle,, been the pupil of a man who held his own phi- losophy in that stage which it had reached when Aristotle was his pupil, he would have taken the very step which Aristotle took, and introduced the very same development. That step consisted in transforming the to ovrcog ov into the to oc fi ov. In that little phrase lies hid the separation of ontology and metaphysic, taken together, from logic. Logic becomes volitional and, as a consequence, knowledge becomes relative to different individuals. Many men may reason, though they do not reason alike or to the same result. Every object, says Aristotle, has many aspects; some or all of the ten categories; seize on any one or more of these and hold it fast ; if you take the first category, that of obala, you then con- sider the object ft w, if the second, that of iroaov^ you then consider the object ^ maov ri. Noav it is true that all these aspects are really existent in the object ; but then each of them is not like Plato's truth the one thing to be seen, but one thing among many to be seen. A guide to truth is therefore needed, some criterion to tell us which of these aspects we are to see. A man seizing on one of them reasons just as 526 REASON. pabt II. much as a man seizing on another of them; the ques- '■ — ' tion is, whether he reasons equally to the purpose, Eetrospect of that is, to his OAVu purposc, the object which he has metaphysical , . __ ,• r j.1, philosophy, chosen to examme. Hence arose a separation oi the laws and method of reasoning which were common to all enquirers, whatever aspect of things or whatever purpose they had in view, from the laws and forms of each separate class of phenomena. There arose thus two classes of general notions, one abstracted from objects, the categories, which was a classiiication of objects on the principle of the elements or qualities found by analysis in all objects ; the other, — which was the result of a comparison of these categories with each other, and especially of the contrast be- tween the first of them, ovala^ mth the other nine, — the logical categories, as they may be called, o^oj, i'S;o)', ysvof, and ffy/a.)3s|3;j«oV, or, as Porphyry gives them, yhog, slSoj, S/aipogia, 'ihov^ and av^^z^riKog. On the re- lation between these two classes, the categories of existence and of logic, the categories and the predi- cables, see Topica, Book i. cap. 7. The predicables together with the postulates, which latter Plato also states and appeals to, make a kind of machinery out- side of objects, to be employed in sifting thenr, a bat- tery to be worked ab extra. The importance of this step taken by Aristotle was, that a class of objects,' these general logical notions, was found, which clearly owed its origin to volition, was an artificial creation of the mind, and yet was of equal certainty with the objects on which it was employed. The separation wrought by Aristotle was essen- tially a further separation of the subjective point of view from the objective; for it separated what was volitional in the search after truth from what was EEASON. 527 unavoidable and contained in the object only. In ^^."^i^ every investigation you had now to choose your point ^ , of -view, and determine as a preliminary what aspect ^eteXs^o^* you would have presented to you. Hence a number pi^»3ophy. of partial, relative, systems of truth, relative to the point of view chosen, instead of one sole system of truth, like the Dialectic ; and side by side with these partial systems, another distinct and developed system, partial also but formal and generally applicable, the Theory of Logic. But the separation of Subject and Object was not yet complete ; and this it must be before the complete correlation of the two could be seen. Although Aris- totle had separated the subjective from the objective aspect of phenomena, finding .truth in both aspects ; although he had established subjective theories of phenomena as separate from their objective counter- parts in nature, and had formed a system of pure thought by the laws of which subjective theories were formed, and formed in harmony with their objective counterparts ; yet he did not go so far as to separate ontology from metaphysic, and still retained the no- tion of an absolute existence ; his TO o» ^ oj' was still an existence by itself as well as a subjective abstraction. The ouijtoi of Aristotle was the foundation of all the other categories, necessary to them all and each, that which could not be abstracted from in thought, ra xu^' szdffrci were aU ovra, and their existence whether in connection with attributes or by itself, ^ w, no less than Plato's ro ovtu? ov, was an absolute existence. And the same may be said of Der transcendentale Oegenstand of Kant, only that it was unknowable. Hence Aristotle did what Kant refused to do, and added to his other partial and special systems of truths 528 REASON. Post- Aristotelian philosophy. pakt II. another, which investigated ro ov ^ ov, which we have , — ' in the treatise now known as the Mstcc to, tpvaiKo. ; a Retrospect of treatise which, thousrh it bears every mark of Aris- metaphysical ii-n i -i ^ philosophy, totle s intellect, yet cannot be supposed to have re- ceived its final shape from him ; the result of which was an oveia, in all respects like r« xaS-' IxairTa, com- plete or empirical objects really existing, except that it was eternal, infinite, and immaterial. Here the progress of speculative metaphysic was checked for many centuries. Until Descartes, no one arose capable of carrying on the development of me- taphysic from the point where Aristotle left it, of proceeding to the separation of ontology from meta- physic, _ and educing reflection out of direct under- standing. No one again occupied the same central and commanding position occupied by the " masters of those who know." The remaining schools of phi- losophy in Greece were all schools of practical philo- sophy. Stoic, Epicurean, Cynic, Cyrenaic, the Acade- mies, and the Sceptics; they were not exclusively indeed but primarily and predominantly practical; speculative knowledge was not their chief purpose, but only so far as it was requisite to give a philoso- phical and consistent basis to their practical theories. At Alexandria arose a school, which was iddeed purely speculative, the Neo-Platonists, of whom the greatest known to us are Plotinus and Proclus. But these were not distinctively metaphysicians but onto- logists; the One Supreme Existence, rwya^oj', was their object; to be reached either by intuition or dialectic. They abandoned the position occupied by Aristotle, from which an advance was still possible by further distinction of the processes of thought, and struck into one of the paths, the ontological, to which REASON. 529 they made metaphysic subordinate, instead of re- Paetii. nouncing the path of ontology or advancing in both *^°l!^"- with equal steps. They stood to Aristotle in a rery Eetrospeot of similar relation to that in wHch Fichte, Schelling, and TShy'!^ Hegel stand to Kant. Plato had not separated meta- physic from ontology; Aristotle, in separating logic, had begun but had not completed that separation, Plotinus and Proclus took their stand on Platonism, which they developed with the aid of the additional light derived from Aristotle, and thus bound up me- taphysic with ontology more closely than before. In many shapes they kept repeating indeed the concep- tion of Parmenides, TtiivTov 5' itTTi voe7u Te KUL ovveKev effTt voTjfia' but it remained with them a paradox equally as with him, for they did not make it clear in what way this unity of thought and fact was to be understood. The light which was ultimately to be thrown upon the paradox and exhibit it as a truth came from another source, and from facts of a different order from those with which philosophers were at that time engaged. These new facts, the importance of which to phi- losophy was in the end so great, were the religious emotions, facts or phenomena in the nature and his- tory of consciousness, the delight felt in worshipping, obeying, and loving God as a Father who knew and loved his children. Such feelings had long been fa- miliar to the Hebrew race, which may be regarded as the home of emotional, as Greece of intellectual, philosophy. The great writers of the Hebrew Scrip- tures alone had adequately expressed the deep religi- ' ous emotions of the heart of man ; and these, summed up as they were into one pure religion by Christ, were now commmiicated and took root in nations till MM 530 REASON. Part II. then familiar only with Grecian culture. The effect Ch, VIII. '- — of the introduction of these new facts into philosophy, Eetrospe'ctof the ^ffect of the rehgious emotions becoming the com- 'pMoBophy. mon property of all men, either as proved and felt realities or as facts admitted by common consent, was to raise, in the estimation of philosophers, the personal importance of the human soul, to turn their attention to what it was in its capacities, its history, and its destiny, to make it appear the great phenomenon, the great existence in the world, no longer an accident but the final cause of the whole created universe. God and the soul of man, as the seat of the religious emotions, became thus the two chief objects of philo- sophy; and the world, which in purely Grecian phi- losophy had played the chief part, became a scene in which the destiny of man was to run its course. _ It was religion, the pure religion preached by Christ, which, when made known to the Grecian world (and it was fitted to be made known by its purity), wrought this change. But the fruits were not yet to be reaped. Two processes had before that time of harvest to be gone through, and gone through simultaneously; first, the two trains of thought, Hebrew and Greek, had to be incorporated into one complete philosophical sys- tem, and secondly, the nations of modern Europe had to work out this philosophy and bring it to a point corresponding to that at which Aristotle had stood in Grecian philosophy; that is to say, the insight into the distinction of ontology from metaphysic had to be attained by the schools of modern Europe. These processes occupy the time from the esta- blishment of Christianity as a religion to the days of Descartes. Two periods may be distinguished as occupying this time, the first of which may be cha- REASON. '53l racterised as that of the Fathers of the Church, the pam ii. Ch. YJJI. second as that of Scholasticism, the philosophy of the - — Middle Ages. Throughout the Middle Ages, from Retrospect of ■Alcuin who died a.d. 804, to Jean Charlier de Ger- "hiiL^hy. son who died a.d. 1429, two streams of speculation iu philosophy are to be distinguished, that of onto- logy and that of metaphysic, running either sepa- rately or combined. As instances of philosophers who are predominantly of the former kind are to be mentioned John Scotus Erigena and St. Anselm, predominantly of the latter, Ab^lard and William of Occam. The Realists may be considered as combin- ing the two. The history of the philosophy of the Middle Ages is to be regarded as a struggle of philo- 'sophy to cast off the dominion, not of religion, but of ontology, which came disguised generally in a theological dress. It was not theology but onto- logy which was in process of separation from meta- physic. Theology, which is the philosophy of reli- gion, was purifying itself from ontology, just as metaphysic was doing. Religion indeed, as distin- guished from theology, that is, from the speculative doctrines in which from time to time it is presented to the understanding or the reason, was the instru- ment which supplied the perceptions out of which reflection arose, out of which Descartes remodelled metaphysic ; for it was religion in which the sense of personality, self-consciousness, was so strong as to be necessarily forced upon the attention of philosophers. Whether it would ever have been so forced upon their attention if the Hebrew race, or the Semitic races, had not existed, is another question, impossi- ble perhaps at present to decide. The metaphysical philosophy of the Middle Ages, with its dominating 532 REASON. partu. controversy between Realism and Nominalism, that '- — is, between metaphysic mixed with ontology and Retrospect of metaphysic pure, is a painful working back to the phUosdphy. pouit of view which Aristotle occupied, and a redis- covery of his meaning. But at the same time it was a reproduction of his meaning in a new and original mould, so' that the form was simpler and clearer, and the contradictions which Aristotle's system contained, in its combination of ontology with metaphysic, were brought to view. This was a great step in advance, although no one as yet arose capable of introducing a principle of solution for those contradictions. Jean CharHer de Gerson's work, De modis significandi and De concordi^ Metaphysics3 cum Logic^, a work dated Christmas Eve, 1426, may be taken as an exponent of the results obtained by Scholasticism; and it is surprising to see the close agreement between it and modem Kantian, and therefore also of much post- Kantian, philosophy. It is the result of previous philosophising, and the seed of modem philosophies. It is the bud which contains all the flower com- pressed and undeveloped, needing only the life- giving breath of genius to quicken it into flower and fruit. It still speaks of existence, of objects, of mind, as if they were things well known in them- selves and needing no explanation. Descartes' ques- tion, Am I? and his answer, I think, produces out of this philosophy the philosophies of Locke, of Leibnitz, of Berkeley, of Hume, of Kant and his successors* "When these appear, each in their turn, they are oc- cupied with the same phrases, the same distinctions which meet us in Gerson's work. What was new and important in Descartes' question was, that it expressed a resolution to approach philosophy from EEASON. 533 the subjective side, to examine, not what things pabtii. ■were, but how we could know what they were. ^'- — Henceforth, this resolution being followed up by Retrospect of other philosophers, metaphysic became subjective in a ™hUoso^hy. partial sense, that is, it became psychology, an enquiry into the conditions of knowledge. This however would not have been possible, had not the human mind been long familiarised with states of consciousness as objects, and accustomed to regard its thoughts and feelings, and the systems into which these were moulded, as objective and existing realities. And this was owing chiefly to the introspective character of the religious philosophy of Christianity. Between Gerson and Descartes came a period of preparation and transition, in which two other sources of instruction for metaphysic were disclosed and ap- plied, just as had been done previously by Christi- pnity. One of these sources was the great discove- ries in physical science, the other was the more com- plete acquaintance with the literary and scientific writings of the Greeks, known as the Renaissance ; in other words, a development of the human mind in two directions, first in the special sciences, secondly in the Literse Humaniores. Of religion, of the literse humaniores in all their branches, and of the empirical sciences in all their branches, physic, physiology, and psychology, metaphysic is the constant and insepar- able companion, whether we judge as in the present case from its history, or as before from the analysis of its nature. Of the great names of this transition period I will mention only one, Giordano Bruno, II '^^^^° Nolano, memorable here for his opposition to the doctrine of Aristotle about space. He proved that space was infinite xuroi Tgoff^sm, that the universe 534 KEASOX. PAETir. was one and unlimited. This was the metaphysical Ch. VIII. -1. •' - — application of the astronomical doctrines of Copemi- Eetrospeot of cus ; and is an instance of metaphysic owing its deve- phuosophy. lopmcnt, from time to time, to following in the track of the empirical sciences and adopting their discove- ries. His doctrines about space Giordano Bruno had derived from Copernicus ; but he also drew attention to time. On this subject he held a Platonic doctrine, namely, that time was non-essential to existence, that eternity was the negation of time, and that potential and actual existence were the same thing. Both doc- trines, that as to space and that as to time, were des^ tined to produce their eifects in future philosophies.. > Descartes and "When Dcscartcs explained existence by conscious- nis successors. ' -■■ ■' ness, — cogitatur, he gave the real and the true mean- ing to the term existence. This relative existence was what philosophers and all men had always meant and understood by existence without knowing it ; they had never had any other existence in their thoughts than thisj nor was it possible that they should have had any other. But now the point of view of philosophy was changed ; ever since that time philosophers enquired, not what objects were, but what they were known as; not what the condi- tions of objects were, but what were the conditions of our knowledge of them. Hence the mind and its nature was the object of research; henceforth philo- sophy approached from the subjective side of the shield, and psychology became closely, almost in-" distinguishably, united 'with metaphysic. Men began at the beginning, with the investigation of percep- tion. Locke led the brawls, with Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu. Leibnitz followed with the amplification, Nisi ipse intellectus. He added indeed ■EEAsoiir, 535 an ontology, the ontology offerees, in the Monadolo* pakth. gie. Spinoza gave also an ontology, founded on the ^^lI^' scholastic notion of substance. Great as the ontolo. netlfecrt oi gical works of the two latter writers are, and though "S^hyf Spinoza's certainly is the enduring work of genius, yet they are byways from the main road of metaphysics Berkeley, returning to the mam road, analysed the notion of Matter mto perceptions of mind; and Hume analysed the notion of Mind into perceptions of con- sciousness. Hume was no sceptic. Philosophical ana- lysis is not scepticism, though it is impossible for the human mind to rest in analysis unless a bond of union is discovered by the analysis itself; for such analysis destroys old doctrines without constructing new ones. Kant, called erroneously — and just as Mebuhr in Eoman History was thought to destroy, whereas iri reality he buUt up — der alles-zermalmende, taking an aU-comprehending view of the field of philoso- phy, laid the foundation, in his doctrine of time and space, and in his connection of the reasoning func- tions with these forms of intuition by his "Ich denke," for the completion of the subjective course of philosophy, on which it had entered with Des- cartes. There is one single chain of thought con- necting Locke with Kant ; and each linl?: is formed by some philosopher taking the thought of his pre- decessor and giving it a new shape by drawing some new conclusion from it. Locke, considering the mind as a tabula rasa written on by external objects of sense, made these external or material objects the realities of existence. Berkeley, discontent with this as materialism, showed that these material objects were modes of the mind's own consciousness, and as* sumed the mind or soul as their cause, and assumed 536 REASON, Part u. God as the cause of the mind. Hume, reflecting on Ch. VIII. . '- — ' this view of things, showed that the notion of causej Ketrospectof ftssumed by Berkeley, was drawn from the succes- phiiosophy, sions of material objects as known to the mind, and that therefore the objects assumed by Berkeley as causes were themselves part of that consciousness of which they were assumed as pre-existing causes. Kant, dwelling on this view of Hume's, took up the view of Leibnitz, Nisi ipse inteUectus, and showed that the forms of consciousness in intuition and thought accompanied all its objects and gave them consist- ency. Sense gave impressions, but the mind formed these first into objects by its own unity of apper- ception. But though the unity of apperception was every thing, was the source of the reality of objects, it had no use except in application to impressions of sense. It was wider than the field of sense to which it was applied. This was the point seized on by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. They argued. Can the Transcendental Object formed immediately by the unity of apperception, which is the source of all reality, itself have no reality, merely because no im- pressions of sense correspond to it ? Rather this tran- scendental object is the true reality. Their efibrt accordingly was to deduce, or construct, the world of impressions of sense out of the transcendental object or the operation of thought in its unity of appercep- tion. They saw luiity in consciousness, unity in the world, and unity in both connected ; their error, as it appears to me, was that they pitched upon a function of consciousness, as fundamental and ultimate, which was not so, but was on the contrary a mode of an- other simpler function, namely, intuition. The miity of apperception cannot account for intuition in thq • EEASON. 537 forms of time and space nor for the existence of im- pressions of sense ; but these can account for the unity of apperception, -which results from them, and contains them all. The choice of a derivative function of conscious- ness and the erection of it into the whole, causes Fichte, Schellmg, and Hegel, to become ontologists, and the particular function of consciousness which they choose, being the intellectual function of reason- ing, makes them ontologists of the same school as Plotinus and Proclus. Tuvrov to simi »a) to vobTv, says Plotinus, and Wt voS i^ti h a^ The metaphysical state consisted in explaining phenomena by the action of abstract entities or es- sences, such as an abstract will, fortune, necessity, or chance, which caused the phenomena to be what they were, and to act and react as they were observed to do. The positive state consists in observing the phe- REASON. 555". nomena and their regularities of sequence and coex- part ii. istence, that is, in discovering their laws ; and its '^^iZ."^' explanations become an analysis of the phenomena pJ^Lot instead of an assignation of the cause of their produc- geuSuy. tion; for the laws under which they exist and operate are not previously existing reasons or causes why they exist, but are answers to the question how they exist, that is, are modes of their existence and opera- tion. Xow in each of these three states, both the phenomena and their proposed explanation, or ana- lysis, are subjective as well as objective, and vice versa; the phenomena are phenomena in conscious- ness, and the explanation or the analysis is a subjec- tive way of looking at the phenomena as well as a mode of existence and operation in the phenomena themselves, or, as in the two former states, applied erroneously to the phenomena. And in the third or positive state, the empirical objects or phenomena, separately and in conjunction, and the conceptions or laws which are their positive explanation, and the still more general conceptions upon which these laws rest, or of which they are instances, such as the con- ceptions of motion and force, require analysis; and this analysis can only be effected by metaphysic, which is a particular mode of reflection. Every em- pirical object also, and every positive conception, has its subjective side or aspect as well as its objective, and the recognition of this fact is the work of reflec- tion ; and that point of view which keeps both aspects at once in sight is the subjective or metaphysical point of view. So that metaphysic is the key to the signi- ficance both of objects and their laws; and even the special empirical sciences converge to it as to a com- mon centre, which connects them as a whole, and also,. 556 REASON. Pakt U. Ch. VIII. §67. Progress of science generally. in pointing out their material and formal elements, completes them as special sciences. The cause of the rejection by Positivists of meta- physic, "the transient state of metaphysic," will have already become apparent from what has been now said. The metaphysic of their metaphysical state is not metaphysic proper, but ontology. The distinc- tion between the two was not drawn, and the neces- sity of metaphysic, as the subjective theory of the universe, was not seen by Comte when he wrote his Philosophie Positive. From M. Littre's book, Auguste Comte et Le Positivisme, it would seem that Comte was not directly acquainted with any of the writings of Kant except the Idee zu einer allge- meinen Geschichte in Weltbiirgerlicher Absicht. It cannot then surprise a metaphysician that a mind so great as Comte's, working independently and starting ■with the empirical sciences, should end with concep- tions of the same, that is, a metaphysical, order, as those with which Kant, an avowed metaphysician, from the first began ; that he should in his second great work, the Politique Positive, work avowedly from a subjective point of view, one which embraced the two aspects objective and subjective at once; and that in his last and unfortunately uncompleted work, the Synthese Subjective, he should attempt a sub- jective logic, and one in which the phenomena of pure space play the chief part. It was, as a meta- physician must believe, not his weakness but his in- tellectual greatness that led him to take this course. M. Littr^ himself too recognises, in the Conclusion of the above mentioned work, that the Positive Philo- sophy requires completing in three respects, one of which is the establishment of a th^orie subjective de REASON. 557 I'humanit^. But such a complement of positive philo- paet xi. sophy does not need to be taken in hand and supplied *^°llf"- & fi7 now for the first time ; its construction has been in Progress of progress, side by side with the other sciences, from generaUy. the time when reflection first accompanied thought. Its constructors are such men as Plato, Aristotle, Des- cartes, and Kant. Metaphysic also is a positive science, as well as the special and empirical sciences which it connects, and whose component parts it analyses. The position which the Philosophie Positive of Auguste Comte holds, and the service which it has rendered, to metaphysic seem to me to be parallel to the position held, and the service rendered, to meta- physic by the astronomical theory of Copernicus ; the Copemican theory laid hold of the vigorous meta- physical mind of Giordano Bruno, and produced in him the thought of the infinity of space ; and the cases of Copernicus and Comte are both instances of what I have abeady observed, namely, of the ein- pirical sciences supplying food and fuel to meta- physic, and of metaphysic progressing by reflecting on the results of the empirical sciences. Comte's Philosophie Positive established a result in empirical science, whether physical or sociological, of the very highest order, nothing less than a law of succession of the states and of the development of the human mind in all branches of empirical enquiry, a law com- mon to and valid in them all. Expressed iti general terms this law, the law of the three states, is, that in historical or empirical enquiry the How, and not the Why, of objects and events is the result, and the only possible result, of investigation; in other words, that Laws and not Causes can be discovered, and that Laws can not be employed as Causes. Great as was 558 REASON. Part II. Kant, the writer of the Kritilc der Reinen Vernunft, he Ch. yiix. ■^— ' did not draw this distinction, nor distinctly reiect the 8 67 JO Progress of search after causes as distinguished from laws. The generaUy. j&rst paragraph of the Introduction to the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, ist edit., shows this. Experience, he says, that is, empirical experience, "tells us in- deed what exists, but it does not tell us that it must necessarily be as it is and not otherwise." It tells us facts, but not why they exist. The answer to this Why? was the purpose of his work. He still sought the conditions of experience, not the mere analysis of it, — the conditions of synthetic judgments a priori, the conditions of existence of there being order and systematical arrangement in the world at all. He was too great to employ these conditions, the tran- scendental unity of apperception, and its categories of the understanding, and the forms of intuition, time and space, as entities with an absolute or independent existence ; but stUl they were, with him, not mere metaphysical elements of experience, but also pre- ceding conditions of experience. Necessity was not merely another name, the subjective aspect, of univer- sality, but something of another order from empirical universality. He had not drawn clearly out that dis- traction between analysis and construction, history and nature, elements of analysis and conditions- of existence, which metaphysic is now able to appro- priate and employ, yet without becoming an onto- logy, as with Hegel, chiefly if not solely in consequence of the Comtian distinction between laws and causes in the empirical sciences, and the impulse given to thought generally by the appearance of Comte's Philosophie Positive. Gn the one hand metaphysic is a positive science, EEASON. 559 •on the other hand all positive empirical sciences are paktII. metaphysical. Even the feeble germ of positive sci- ^°— "' ence existing in the theological state, and its stronger Progress of and wider growth in the transient ontological state, genSfy is metaphysical ia the same sense and for the same ■reason that its full development in the Philosophie Positive is so. Positive science, empirical and meta- physical, grows and spreads, takes in all the pheno- mena and classes of phenomena once explained by theological and metaphysical entities, and becomes coextensive with consciousness and with existence. The human mind passes through these three stages, and in each of them knowledge, the science as it ap- pears at the time being, wears a diiferent aspect. The thoughts of men in the theological state are to them their science ; so also in the ontological, and in the present positive state. We who are in the posi- tive state see and assert that what they thought sci- ence was not so, because it was not positive. If now by science is meant the conceptions and explanations of facts accepted at any particular period, then science itself may be said to have passed through three stages, and the law of the three states will then be called a law of the development of science itself; but this wiU not be any thing more than was before meant by say- ing that the law of the three states was a law of the development of the human min4- But if by science is meant science as we now conceive it, that is, posi- tive science, then the law of the three states is no longer a law of the development of science, but a law of the relations which science, the positive germ increasing from the beginning, has successively held, in its development, to the facts to be explained by it; and, farther, this law characterises the successive 560 REASON. paetii. relations of positive science to the facts to be ex- Ch VIII . . '- — ' plained, by contrasting them not with previous states Progress of of positive scicnce itself, but with relations held by generaUy. systems which are not positive science to the facts which they profess to explain, that is, with concep- tions not of positive science at an earlier or a later period, but with conceptions which do not belong to positive science at all. The law of the three states is a true law in the sense in which Comte meant it; but it is a law of the historical development of the human mind, in its speculation, that is, of the history of philosophy, and not a law of the development of positive science ; for it does not give the law of suc- cession of states of science, states of mind comprised within positive science, compared together as mem- bers of a series. It explains how the human mind came to explain to itself phenomena by theological entities, how it then used this conception as a stepping stone to that of ontological entities, and finally how it rose from this to the conception of positive laws. But it does not explain how the positive science which existed in the theological state passed into the s,uc- ceeding states of positive science, existing in the ontological state, and finally into the final states of positive science in which we are at the present day. It is not a law of the development of the positive element alone, and as distinguished from the non- positive elements combined with it in the theological and ontological states. I have no further suggestion to offer in solution of the question of the law of succession of the states comprised in positive science itself The logical order of the special empirical sciences has been considered by Comte as being also the historical order in which EEASON. 561 they successively became component parts of positive paet u. science generaUy, and this conception he exhibits as ^^— "' the hierarchy of the sciences m the Philosophie Posi- VroJIssoi tive. But whether the historical order of existence gIneX of the special sciences is or is not the same with their logical order, a question recently debated by Mr. H. Spencer, both these orders of arrangement of the special sciences are arrangements of the sciences as complete systems, and are neither of them an account of the way in which positive science itself advances in all and each of its domains, that is, in all and each of the special sciences. Positive science must have some method of advancing peculiar to itself, and common to all the branches, that is, aU the special sciences, or in its application to any particular collec- tion of phenomena. And some stages in this method or this application must be discernible, in the earlier of which the science is less, and in the later more, complete and self-dependent. Such a law of progress in positive science generaUy, and consequently in aU. the special sciences, metaphysic included, is oifered by Mr. J. S. MUl's distinction between the inductive or tentative and the deductive stage of any science. The deductive stage may be considered to arise in any science, when a sufficient body of truths pecuhar to the objects of that science has been discovered, truths sufficiently certain and sufficiently coherent to serve not only as starting points for future generalisa- tions, but also as at least negative tests of their cor- rectness, that is, truths which are so general and so certain, as not to be liable to be overthrown by any thing short of a reversal of the laws of the stability and uniformity of the course of nature. While this may be regarded as a general and direct law for all 00 562 REASOIT. Part II. sciences "whatever, there is another law to which some CH. Till. . , ,' _ - T , . T 1 — sciences are subject directly, and others mdirectly Progress of through the mediation of the former. This law is, generally, that there are two stages of the development of con- sciousness, the direct and the reflective, the latter being the completion, and furnishing the ultimate analysis, of the former. In the first stage, conscious- ness deals with objects alone, in the second with sub- ject and objects at once. And aU sciences become subjective, in this complete sense, as soon-as they are connected with metaphysic, which is the speculative employment of reflection. Metaphysic itself becomes deductive when a sufficient body of truths is estab- lished to reason from ; it might be said perhaps that it became deductive when Aristotle consciously estab- lished logic on the basis of the Postulates. There are thus two laws of the development of the sciences ; first, that they advance from the inductive to the deductive stage; secondly, that they advance from the objective, or solely empirical, stage, to the meta- physical, or that which is at once and equally sub- jective and objective. CHAPTER IX. IDEAS. Kai firjv irpo's 76 ^ov•Tov iravi't Xo'iyuj /jbaxeTeov, 8s av einaTqfirjv ^ (ppovijffiv 7] vovv a.(pavi^wv la'^ypi^ijiat irepi twos otttjovv. Plato. § 68. The true philosopher differs from the sophist paetil in the habitual feeKnff that his words are the feeble ^— expression of their objects, instead of being their classification adequate expression or the objects themselves; in never taking objects, as they appear to him, to be what they must appear to the most complete investi- gation possible; in using his words as coin, not as the wealth which coin represents. He sets no store by the way in which the thoughts have occurred to him, provided that his expression of them brings the thoughts themselves clearly before the minds of others. He does what he does in the name and for the service of truth. He does not consider his own system as the truth he has to serve, but prays with the Choephoroe Tijie reXevrav n TO diKaiov fieTaPaivec, Hence the profound significance of the words which Sir W. Hamilton delights to quote from St. Augus- tine, Noscendo ignoratur, ignorando cognoscitur. of ideas. 564 IDEAS. Past II. Not that there is any transcendental existence ■^— lurking either behind the Subject or behind the caasBification obiect, behind the empirical ego or behind the ob- of ideas J ' r o jects of consciousness, which is unknown to us from its very nature. Such transcendental existence has been shown to melt into the phenomena, by the ana- lysis already applied. But the unknown existence which remains unknown to aU men, even after the most accurate and Complete investigation, is an ex- istence transcending our knowledge in degree not in kind, transcending our conative not our intellectual powers, an existence of unknown and undiscovered feelings in infinite expansions of time and space ; of which possible and unknown existence we can pre- dicate this only, that it must be feeling and time and space in conjunction. It may have appeared to some that, in making time and space the formal limits of existence, we shall be taking away the possibility of thoughts which give its true dignity and value to human nature and human life; that we shall be curtailing and even denying the spiritual nature of man. But such sus- picions arise from not considering the import of the doctrine of the infinity of time and space. To com- plete the view already taken of existence and con- sciousness, it remains to say a few words of that unknown possible existence, transcendent in degree not in kind, towards which we cast longing glances, but which we can only anticipate and not know, the kingdom of Ideas and Ideals. It was the great ser- vice of Coleridge to dwell upon the nature, the reality, the supreme value of ideas. That is the ' doctrine for which we, his countrymen at least, owe him lasting honour and gratitude. His error was, if IDEAS, 565 of ideas. I may presume to say so, an error common to many paet ir. others equally great with himself, that of supposing ^-^ it essential to ideas to have a faculty of the mind ciaifittion appropriated to them, which was their organ of per- ception, as the eye of colours, a faculty named the reason. The existence of the reason as a separate faculty was an inference from the phenomena of ideas; and it was supposed that, if the faculty or special function was denied, the real existence of the objects of it, the ideas, must be denied also. But in this Essay it is always the phenomenon itself which is the point of departure and the object of analysis. It is the phenomenon which is first in analysis and cannot be denied or deemed unreal, whatever may be thought of its origin. So it was with the perceptions, so it was with the concepts, and so it is also with the ideas. What are they then in themselves? They belong to the kingdom of possible existence ; but not all possible existences are ideas. Those only are ideas which are possible as infinite; into the defini- tion of which it enters that they cannot be fully con- ceived ; which are assumed as existing in infinite time and space, and not in those portions of time and space which are within our ken. Truth, for instance, is it- self an idea, according to what has been said in § 62, Ideas are a particular kind of concepts, that kind which advances on the line of imagination and then, finding the road lead on to the infinite, takes a spring and reaches the goal per saltum, assuming that the infinite road has been traversed. See § 47. Every one of such anticipatory concepts is an idea. Time and Space themselves, as infinite, are ideas. Objects in time and space, feelings of all kinds, may be ideas also, when considered as carried out to infinity. In- 566 IDEAS. pakt 11. finite motion, infinite power, infinite knowledge, in- — finite happiness, infinite pam, mfinite virtue, the per- caassifioatioii fect globe, the perfect circle, and so on are ideas. These all depend on the two modes of the infinite, time and space. There are therefore ideas of the understanding as well as ideas of the reason. Those ideas which are names of modes or states of con- sciousness, as distinguished from objects of conscious- ness, are ideas of the reason ; for we must have re- flected on objects and distinguished their subjective from their objective aspect before we can consider them as modes of consciousness, and therefore before we can consider them as modes of consciousness car- ried out to infinity. The subjective side of objects is what arises first in reflection, and therefore all modes of consciousness, as distinguished from objects of con- sciousness, are the objects of reflection. Fear as dis- tinguished from the object of fear, or the terrible ; love as distinguished fi"omthe object of love, or good- ness; knowledge as distinguished from the object of knowledge, or truth, are modes of reason or reflecting consciousness, and when considered as infinite are ideas of reason. But let us farther classify ideas or infinite objects. They naturally faU into three great classes, according to the three great branches of human knowledge, which again depend on the three great functions of conscious- ness, which, it has been said in § 3 2, are logical and not empirical divisions of consciousness. The three func- tions are conation, cognition, and feeling. The three branches of knowledge founded on these are Technic, Theoretic, and Teleologic. Technic and Teleologic are the two branches of practical knowledge, founded respectively on conation and feeling, and are both to- of ideas. IDEAS. 567 gether, as Ethic, opposed to Theoretic, which is founded part ii. on cognition. Every one of these three branches in- '^— ^' eludes the other two, for the functions on which they aaJifloation are founded are not separate, but logically discerned. The objects of these branches considered as infinite, that is, their ideas, are naturally classified by the branch to which they predominantly belong, or in which they usually come to light. In teleologic, for instance, we shall have the ideas of infinite goodness, love, happiness, pleasure, and others ; in technic, those of infinite virtue, power, perfection, and others; in the- oretic, that of infinite knowledge or truth. Then there will arise ideas which it is more difficult to arrange under a single branch, as not containing one element more eminently than others ; and these may be called mixed ideas, or objects common to two or to all three of these branches, such as Wisdom, which is a com- pound of knowledge and goodness, or knowledge di- rected to good ends ; and such as Justice, which Leib- nitz defined as Charitas Sapientis. We shall also find ideas of the opposite objects to these, founded on the infinite divisibility of time and space, or their infinity «05r« huigsffip, as the former on their infinity xara 'Tgoff^iffiv. We shall have them classified in the same way, and among them will be the infinite minima of love, of goodness, of happiness; the infinite minima of virtue and of power ; the "infinite minimum of knowledge, or infinite ignorance, forgetfulness, and so on. Again there will be bad qualities, the opposites of these in their several branches, infinite xaroi Tg6a^sffii>, such as hate, craft, tyranny, belonging to the emo- tional, cognitive, and conative branches respectively; but to which adequate names have not been given, for mankind have not dwelt on them and never will 568 IDEAS. Paet II. Ch. IX. i68. djvell on them as they have dwelt on their opposites. They have however been embodied in an idea, the caassifioation cvil principle, and that again in an ideal, which has 1 eas. played a great part in human creeds. I understand by an ideal the embodiment, and, in cases where the ideas are modes of reflecting consciousness or reason, the personification of ideas one or more; the ideal being to the ideas which it embodies as the concrete to the abstract, the example to the rule; or, to com- pare a later with an earlier stage of consciousness, it may be said that ideals are to ideas what the remote object is to the immediate objects in perception. We must not expect to find names in common, or even in philosophical, language for all the ideas, either simple or mixed. The history of ideas and ideals, their psy- chology, is a part of the history of philosophy and opinion which has yet to be written. It is enough here to contribute something to their analysis. § 69. But now leaving the other ideas, whether named or unnamed, let us consider, as representative instances, the ideas belonging to the three great func- tions of consciousness, as objects infinite xara, Tg6] [Jt/dXiffTcc, xat ToXd fJboiKkov ri ttov rig, aig (paffiv, av^^uTog. Laws, A. 716, I do not then say with 680 IDEAS. PABTir. St. Augustine, In Johann. Evang. Tract, i. 13, that - — " sin and idols have no existence at all, and that man ;rhe logical is ipso facto and pro tanto annihilated when he sins ; but I say, that evil of all kinds, moral and physical, has no ideal truth. By infinite power, then, is meant power directed to a certain purpose, namely, love and knowledge, and overcoming power, improperly so called, directed to all antagonistic ends; for power conflicting with power is not power but weakness. And in this I do but repeat St. Anselm, Proslogium, cap. 7. And because power conflicting with power is weakness, therefore infinite power, which is not weakness but its opposite, must be power of a certain kind, distin- guished by its result or purpose ; must be not power generally, as commonly understood, but power di- rected to some single or harmonious purpose ; it must be power to produce the good and eliminate the bad. I would therefore employ always the word activity to signify power taken generally, and restrict the word power to mean activity of a certain kind, activity directed to purposes which are considered as good. Assuming then that love and knowledge are the brief summary of aU good, a point which it is the province of ethic to investigate, the power of loving and know- ing is the only power which is infinite, for it is the only power which can destroy all antagonists. The contradiction then lies only with those who maintain that infinite power is equivalent to power generally, or to the power of producing good and bad indif- ferently. The insight, that infinite power must be power of a particular kmd characterised by its purpose or result, may be obtained by reflecting on the exercise IDEAS. 581 of volitional, emotional, and cognitive functions of Paetii. Ch. IX. consciousness. When we exercise volition and reflect on that consciousness, we see that our volition has Thlio^cai always a purpose, " uycc^ov rivos lipkrui." If the pur- ''^"^ °* ^°^ pose is attained, the volition is complete and ceases. Suppose the purpose to be perfect good, the volition by which it is attained will be perfect also. If we have contrary purposes in view, the volition will be distracted and conflicting with itself. In such a case, although there would be greater intensity of volition, greater consciousness of efibrt, the result would be less, the sum total of the power would be reduced. The same thing may be shown also in another and more direct way. The function of conation and its completion in volition was shown in § 3 2 to be, not a function of equal rank with those of feeling and cognition, but a part of the general function of feel- ing. All activity or action is divisible into two ele- ments only, feeling and cognition. AU action is cognition, and all action is feeling. If the whole of the cognition is characterised by one term, know- ledge, and the whole of the feeling is characterised by one term, good, the whole action is characterised by the two terms in union ; and there is no room for the action itself, or any part of it, such as conation or volition, to be characterised as bad. To characterise an action, a conation, a volition as bad, is to charac- terise the feeling, which it contains, as such ; for there is no such thing as action, conation, or volition apart from feeling. But now arises a further question. Why should our idea of God be an idea of goodness ; why should it not be an idea of infinite activity directed to in- finite evil and infinite error, an activity for which 582 IDEAS. Pabt II. there is no special name ? It might seem superfluous — — to answer such a question. Practical interest indeed & 71 The logical it has not, but it has some speculative interest. The idea of God. • /> -i • n , • answer is lound m renectmg on our own conscious- ness, its objects, and its method. What is goodness? That which we desire. What is the summum bonum ? That which we permanently and increasingly desire, when more and more enlightened by knowledge; in other words, that state of consciousness which is the end at once of our volition, cognition, and emotion. We reason in order to attain the good, we desire to attain the good, we act to attain the good. The exercise of any one of these functions, and stiU more the exercise of them all in conjunction, as it is the nature of our consciousness to exercise them, involves logically the assumption that the exercise will issue in good, since we exercise them consciously. It would be a stultification of ourselves to assume that they could issue in what was undesirable and untrue. This consideration therefore is a bar to our pleading that evil will be ultimately predominant, wUl not be ultimately annihilated, in the universe. It- is decisive as an argumentum ad hominem. Such pleading would be parallel to the contradiction into which a sceptic would fall, who should think that it was possible to prove that no proof was possible. But secondly, and without arguing ad hominem, but looking to the historical or psychological side of the question, the course of this world has been and is being actually, though gradually, improved; con- sciousness does actually exhibit a progress towards good and towards the elimination of evil; and the grounds of this gradual progress may be pointed out in the metaphysical analysis of successive states of IDEAS. 583 consciousness. Take the process of spontaneous red- paet ii. integration, one of the most elementary processes of -^— ' consciousness. It was shown in Chap. v. that the The logical determining cause of the moments in spontaneous redintegration is the pleasure or interest felt in the objects dwelt upon. In that fact lies, in germ, the whole after progress of consciousness from bad to good. That fact contains the whole history of the development of consciousness, the history of the aris- ing of the idea of God, which is developed in the course of the development of consciousness. That which interests us determines our spontaneous red- integrations ; that which interests us determines our voluntary redintegrations ; that which permanently interests us determines our latest and most perfect redintegrations, and becomes the habit of our con- sciousness. But that which interests us permanently is the object of our cognitions, volitions, and emo- tions, in their greatest development, in other words, it is the Summum Bonum, or the idea of God. Our whole consciousness is transformed by its acquired habits, and becomes what it is conscious of; and this in no vague sense of the terms, but, as was pointed out in §§ 24, 31, representations react upon presenta- tions and gradually remodel them, and to this process there is I beheve no limit assignable as final, although we cannot see very far along its course. Generations transmit the acquired habits, with accumulations small or large, amd enjoy also the inheritance of the presentations remodelled by the representations of preceding ages. Thus the fundamental and simplest facts of psychology involve, as its causte existendi, or produce the fruit of, the idea of goodness being the idea of God. The foundations of the idea of God are 584 IDEAS. Part II. laid in one of the deepest and most elementary facts -^ of consciousness, a fact which appears at first sight to The logical have no connection with that idea; and thus this fact throws light at once on the idea assumed and on the necessity of its assumption. It win be evident that here also, as in the case of the postulates of logic, it is no proof that is intended, but an analysis ; an analysis of the idea of God, and of the mode of its arising, or rather an indication of its sources in human consciousness. But in both cases aUke the proof of the truth of the object ana- lysed is contained imphcitly in the analysis ; no one can admit the analysis, and doubt the truth of the object analysed ; ^at least on the admission of the doc- trine, that presence in consciousness is existence and vice vers^. Many have been the modes in which philosophers have analysed the idea of God. To reli- gion it matters little how the analysis is performed ; in religion the truth of the object is the important point, and this is founded in the nature of conscious- ness itself, and is secure beyond the reach of question. But the analysis of it is the important point for phi- losophy, and every system of philosophy will in turn propose its own analysis as the most satisfactory. Plato analysed the idea of God into life and reason ; Aristotle into the supreme good conscious of itself ; St. Anselm into the union of all reality and perfec- tion, existence being one of the perfections ; Spinoza into the hidden substance of two infinite attributes, thought and extension; Leibnitz into the monad of monads ; and all these conceived the idea as an object for the speculative reason. Kant, renouncing the attempt to conceive the idea of God as an object for the theoretic, which with him was the " constitutive," idea of Grod. IDEAS. 585 reason, maintained that it was true, but true only Partii. for the practical reason, or as an idea regulative of -^— thought and of life. In these cases, and I believe in The logical aU others that could be mentioned, the truth of the idea is felt to be necessary ; the attempt is to give some account of what the idea is, that is, to analyse it. Analysis is not irreligious because religious writers usually make no attempt to analyse ; such an attempt is not within their province as religious writers. But the repeated attempts on the part of philosophy to analyse the idea of God are an evidence of the truth, a recognition of the necessity, and therefore a homage to the power of the object of their contemplations. As it is impossible to be conscious and not conscious of some object, so it is impossible to be reUgious and not religious towards God. God is the object of the religious consciousness, and man is by his na- ture religious. And this is true, however imperfect or inadequate may be the analysis proposed j the truth of the idea of God is felt to be necessary, even though the analysis proposed of it should divide its constituent elements, or even characterise it by a different name. The union of the members of analysis into a single object transforms the idea into an ideal, a whole whose parts are ideas ; and when the ideas so united are subjective modes of consciousness, as for instance when they are love, power, and knowledge, instead of the good, power, and truth, then the ideal in which they are united is a person. Now the phenomena from which we start in this case are the religious emotions ; the nature of the object of the emotions can only be learnt by an examination of the emotions themselves. And there is one truth to which all 586 IDEAS. paetii. religious writers testify unanimously, whether they -^ have written as expressing their own emotions, or as The logical describing them ; and this truth is, that religion is a ideaofGod.^ 1 ,, - j.- r j_ J personal matter, an emotion of a person towards a person, ",ipoy^ [jijoiiov Tgog fjuovov" and not towards an object which is not conceived as containing a Subject. It follows therefore that the ideal of God consists in the union of the personal subjective attributes of love, power, and knowledge,, and not of the objective attributes of the good, power, and truth; in other words, that the ideal of God is an ideal of the reason and not of the understanding. Hence also the validity ' of the title, Father, the only name which expresses by itself alone the nature of God, a name in which the whole of religion finds its utterance, a name first uttered in its full significance by Christ. Christianity as Christ conceived it is the true religion. It is not within the province of this Essay to show that no other religion but the religion of Christianity, — not indeed the system or systems of philosophy or yvSaig which pass too commonly under that name, but the reHgion of Christianity as it was conceived by Christ, — corresponds fully to the needs, and is as expansive as the nature, of man. Nevertheless the analysis of the ideal of God here proposed is proposed as an analysis of the Christian ideal of God, that is, as an analysis of that ideal of God which is implicitly adopted by true Christians. And if the Christian ideal is capable of being so analysed, it follows that it shares ,the truth of that analysis. But it is not requi- site, for its capability of being so analysed, that it should have been explicitly recognised by any Chris- tian as so capable. Figurative expressions best con- vey, and have been always found the best to convey, IDEAS. 587 to the human consciousness the idea and the ideal of pabt ii. God, inasmuch as they best signify the unapproach- -^— ableness and the infinity involved in the idea. Light, .The lo^cai Love, Creator, Judge, Father are expressions of the kind most proper to embody the idea of God, so as best to satisfy the needs of the beings who use them. It is another thhig altogether to analyse the object meant by these expressions, the emotions which prompt them, and the ground and nature of those emotions. The emotions themselves are the phenomena from which we start, and the facts which have to be ex- plained. The foregoing analysis exhibits an Ideal constituted by the three modes of consciousness, love, power, and knowledge, in union. Christian writers appear to aim at expressing, by figurative terms, the very same Ideal. Both that analysis and those ex- pressions confessedly fall far short of conveying an adequate impression of the infinite object to which they are directed; but it is the same infinite object which both methods of expression are directed to indicate, although the fuU proof that it is so does not fall within the province of an Essay hke the present, but is the task rather of the ethical than of the meta- physical writer. EPILOGUE. " Turpe est difficiles habere nugas, Et stultus labor est ineptiarum." It is so. And I remark only that, if the endeavoui* to analyse the world is a trifle, it is because the world is such. The Sum of things can have no second intention, nor can it be characterised by any trait that is not included in itself. Some things are sweet, but what is our sense which perceives them; some things are good, but what is our conscience which judges them; some things are true, but what is our intellect which argues them; some things are deep, but what is our reason which fathoms them? Every one who thinks deeply must have reflected that, if the purposes and results of man's practice are vanity, so also must be those of his speculation, Goethe said, that there was no refuge from virtues that were not our own but in loving them; and Ecclesiastes, that there was none from the vanity of life but in fearing and obeying God. So also from the vanity of specu- lation there is no refuge but in acquiescing in its relative nature, and accepting truth for what it is.