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OUTLINES 
 
 OF 
 
 LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS 
 
OUTLINES 
 
 1 ' ' l./,liY- 
 
 OF 
 
 LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS 
 
 BY 
 
 JOHANN EDUARD ERDMANN 
 
 Zafe Professor of Philosophy in the University of Halle 
 
 TRANSLATED FROM THE 4th (REVISED) EDITION, WITH 
 PREFA TOR Y ESS A Y 
 
 B. C. BURT, Ph.D. 
 
 LONDON 
 SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO. Limited 
 
 NEW YORK : MACMILLAN & CO. 
 1896. 
 
 6c b 
 
Printed by Cowan &= Co., Limited, Perth. 
 
PREFATORY ESSAY. 
 
 In all discourse, or verbal expression of thought, 
 there regularly occur, besides terms representing 
 mere objects or groups or classes of objects, terms 
 which, instead, stand for general notions, originating 
 within rather than from without, predicates and 
 relations under which, for the mind, objects stand or 
 by which they are determined — that is to say, the 
 so-called categories of thought. Such terms are, for 
 example, being, quantity, essence, cause, actuality, 
 end, truth, with their primitives or derivatives. The 
 general notions for which such terms stand are of 
 very great significance and interest, not only as form- 
 ing the ground of definite connection, in consciousness, 
 among objects, but also as together constituting a 
 world of realities of themselves. 
 
 That these notions have a necessary reality and 
 meaning in experience, and so are a possible matter 
 for a real science, is practically evident from the fact 
 that they are indispensable to thinking and discourse 
 as such, to objective or fixed coherence among ideas, 
 to knowledge or science : the very forms of language 
 necessarily imply them, and for this reason, if for no 
 other, they are, since language is but the embodiment 
 and instrument of thought in general, indispensable 
 to thought itself; and the sciences, as the embodi- 
 ment of ideas of definite and necessary connections 
 
vi PREFA TOR V ESS A V. 
 
 among objects, continually involve them, so that it 
 may with entire truth be said that any science is 
 really and truly a science in proportion to the (in- 
 direct) recognition which the categories receive in it. 
 And for the matter of that — it is worthy of being 
 observed in passing — the products of mere fancy 
 could not exist without a certain basis in the cate- 
 gories. 
 
 The theoretical proof of the necessity, reality and 
 great significance of the categories has to be given by 
 a special science which takes precisely them for its 
 subject-matter. The recognition which the sciences 
 in general give to the categories, is, for the greater 
 part, merely practical and indirect, not theoretical 
 and direct. Even the sciences of discourse — grammar, 
 philology, rhetoric, formal logic — though containing 
 very distinct implications of the categories as some- 
 thing distinguishable from a given material in which, 
 speaking roughly, they are, so to say, immersed, and 
 bringing to clear consciousness the necessity of study- 
 ing the categories in and for themselves, do not 
 undertake so to study them, to investigate their 
 (logical) origin, necessity, validity, organic relations, 
 and groupings — in short, to " criticise " the categories 
 as such. Still less is this study undertaken by the 
 sciences whose subject-matter is the external world 
 rather than discourse or thought itself. Such study, 
 investigation, criticism, is, let it be repeated, the task 
 of a distinct science, the science, in fact, of science 
 as such, namely, Philosophy, and, in particular, the 
 fundamental part of it, Logic. 
 
 Now a complete understanding of the nature of 
 Logic is, of course, not possible at the threshold of the 
 science, but must be gained by the study of it in its 
 entirety. But a certain preliminary notion of it is 
 necessary and may here be laid down. Let, then, 
 Logic be provisionally defined as, par eocceUence, the 
 
PREFA TOR Y ESSA Y. vii 
 
 criticism of the categories. Criticism may be of two 
 sorts : it may be merely or mostly analytical, restric- 
 tive, negative, formal ; or it may be synthetical, 
 developmental, positive, real. Criticism of the first- 
 named sort is content to assume its object as given, 
 isolate, scrutinize closely enough merely to detect its 
 limitations without always positively and directly 
 supplying the proper complement for the overcoming 
 of the limitations ; and instead of allowing its object 
 to be determined for thought by its natural relations, 
 is apt to judge it according to a standard lying too 
 much outside itself, and hence to be formal rather 
 than real. Of this nature is, to cite an example, in a 
 measure the Kantian criticism of the categories, in 
 spite of the search for synthetic truth by which that 
 criticism was motived. That criticism was in great 
 part an effort to prevent the (mis)application of the 
 categories beyond a restricted sphere, to keep 
 "human" thought within certain secure bounds. 
 It assumed the categories as logical facts, analysed 
 them, treating as distinct and opposed certain of them 
 which had real meaning and truth only in organic 
 reference to one another, and in consequence reached 
 the essentially negative result that " human thought " 
 is fatally self-contradictory as regards ultimate 
 reality, that there is or may be a realm beyond the 
 reach of thought, an unknowable " thing-in-itself," and 
 that the laws of thought are in relation to it merely 
 regulative. But criticism, to be adequate to its 
 object, must be more than the Kantian criticism or 
 anything else of its kind. The categories must be 
 viewed as in organic relation to one another and to 
 all possible or conceivable matter of thought. The 
 discovery of the limitations of the categories taken 
 either individually or as groups must also be the 
 discovery of what is complementary to them ; each 
 category, instead of being assumed as given, must be 
 
viii PREFA TOR Y ESSA Y. 
 
 known in its origin in a logically preceding one, and 
 its transition into a logically succeeding one, and the 
 categories collectively must be seen as a system of 
 predicates in organic relation to a subject to which 
 they apply and give determination and meaning. 
 The true criticism of the categories is their self- 
 criticism, their spontaneous self-limitation and self- 
 sublation into higher truth, their evolution in a series 
 or system. It is thus the affirmation as well as the 
 negation of the categories ; a criticism, indeed, which 
 contains as a factor a certain measure of dogmatism. 
 Such is the general nature of the logical criticism of 
 the categories. From this it is necessary to distin- 
 guish strictly the "psychological" criticism which 
 occupies itself with the determination of the temporal 
 order in which, and the circumstances under which, 
 they make their entrance into the individual 
 consciousness as such in its relations with environ- 
 ment. The meaning of a category in itself and in re- 
 lation to other categories as such is not identical with 
 its meaning in and for the merely individual mind. 
 Logic, then, is the solution of the problem of the 
 evolution of the categories — is itself this evolution. 
 This solution, as having to do solely with activities 
 or objects of pure thought, is itself a work of pure 
 thought, and, naturally, proceeds according to the 
 method of that which is determined from within 
 rather than from without, or is self-determined. 
 Beginning with the lowest, simplest, most abstract 
 form of thought, it proceeds by a gradual develop- 
 ment to the highest, most complex, most concrete, 
 thereby discovering or rather evolving the series or 
 system of pure forms of thought or the categories 
 (See below § 20.) 
 
 For the sake of as full as possible a preliminary 
 notion of the nature and importance of the Science of 
 Logic, we may here consider, very briefly, its relation 
 
PRE FA TOR Y ESS A Y. ix 
 
 to the sciences in the more common acceptation of 
 the term. These sciences, whether consciously or not, 
 assume as a fact the general rationality of the world 
 of existing things, and their task is the working out 
 or verification of this assumption. Now it is almost 
 a mere truism to say that to the complete realisation 
 of this assumption made by science the conscious 
 understanding of what the rational, as such is, is in- 
 dispensable. But the knowledge of the rational as 
 such is precisely what Logic is ; therefore the cultiva- 
 tion of the sciences, to be sound and truly successful, 
 must be coupled with that of Logic. It has sometimes 
 been supposed, not unnaturally, perhaps, that the 
 science of thought as such is empty and barren, and 
 should be — in fact, really has been — superseded, for 
 really active intelligence, by a new form of thought, 
 viz., natural science — possessing a rich and valuable 
 content. But the judicious will guard against being 
 too sanguine in belief as to the value of the content of 
 the new form of thought taken merely by itself, or in 
 entire abstraction from that which it is supposed to 
 have superseded. There is more than one sort of 
 emptiness and barrenness ; pure sense-knowledge, or 
 mere experience, is quite as barren and empty as pure 
 thought, or mere speculation, can be. And science as 
 the work of observation, experiment, and formal in- 
 ference must, to maintain its interest for, and have a 
 real claim upon, the mind of man in its full integrity, 
 become distinctly congruent with and expressive of 
 the essence of pure, self-active thought. The final 
 interpretation and valuation of the results reached in 
 the sciences is not possible within the limits of the 
 natural sciences as such, but must depend upon the 
 co-operation of the science of thought as such. No 
 thoroughly intelligent devotee of science, commonly so- 
 called, thinks of the science of thought as empty and 
 lifeless ; he knows better, and, as his limited oppor- 
 
x PRE FA TOR Y ESS A V. 
 
 tunities permit, he borrows and applies its ideal and 
 idealising truths to give the results of his works depth 
 and stability for inner consciousness. To illustrate 
 the truth of the foregoing statements by means of a 
 concrete case, let us take the most interesting and 
 fruitful of the concepts advanced and applied by 
 '' science " in the present age, i.e., of " evolution." 
 The very clearest exhibition possible of the nature of 
 evolution is, it would seem, to be found in the pro- 
 cess by which (as shown in the present work) thought 
 by an inherent, natural tendenc} 7 unfolds from a germ 
 which is simplicity itself to the highest degree of 
 complexity or concreteness. Indeed, the concept of an 
 evolving activity, an activity continually repeating 
 itself in successively higher powers, each of which 
 preserves in itself the essential virtue of the one pre- 
 ceding, is an ideal, not an empirical, notion, an object 
 of pure, speculative thought rather than anything that 
 can actually be found (except as " put there ") in the 
 external world as such. It would seem, therefore, 
 that natural science, to complete its own work, to 
 secure its own complete evolution, in fact, must take 
 into itself, or, rather, be sublated into, the science of 
 thought; the result being, not indeed the pure science 
 of thought or logic, but rather philosophy in a con- 
 creter form. Again — to take another concrete case — 
 natural science, at least as cultivated at the present 
 day, assumes, or tends to assume, that it is true to its 
 ideal, and to the ideal generally, in proportion as it is 
 able to explain the world of external existences in 
 mathematical terms ; it, therefore, tries to reduce 
 dynamical or chemical, and even biological truth to 
 mechanical, and thereby to mathematical truth. Now, 
 whatever the convenience there may be in being able 
 to apply mathematical calculation to chemical and 
 biological phenomena, it is, to the student of the 
 categories as such, certain that there is a kind of un- 
 
PREFA TOR Y ESSA Y. xi 
 
 truth in such application, if it be regarded as ultimate 
 explanation. In pure thought, or in pure science, for 
 such is Logic, the mechanical categories just as cer- 
 tainly are incomplete and relative, and as certainly 
 sublate themselves into chemical and organic cate- 
 gories as their higher truth, as the stone, say, falls to 
 the earth because its absolute centre of gravity is in 
 the earth and not itself. In short, natural science 
 merely as such lacks in comprehension of the relative 
 value in themselves of the categories it finds it con- 
 venient to use, and must depend upon the science of 
 the categories as such, or Logic, for the remedy for its 
 defect in this case. 
 
 But there is one other consideration that may be 
 here adduced to show the nature and necessity of the 
 logical standpoint, a subjective and formal, because 
 psychological, consideration. It is this : the mind, in 
 the activities of sensible perception, sensuous imag- 
 ination and conception, feels impelled by a necessity, 
 which, while in these stages of its working, it does 
 not yet understand, to move onward to the stage of 
 thought as such in which, as at home with its essen- 
 tial self, it comfortably rests. In fact, the recognised 
 lower stages are in themselves self-contradictory and 
 incomplete. The world of perception is too much a 
 sphere of mere multiplicity, mere otherness ; that of 
 abstract understanding, or understanding which ig- 
 nores the individual for the sake of a fancied uni- 
 versal, has a unity that is constrained and repulsive 
 to the mind. What is demanded is that sense and 
 abstract understanding be harmonised in a certain 
 concrete unity, that the real and the (so-called) ideal, 
 phenomena and law, object and subject, be seen, or at 
 least distinctly felt, as at bottom one and the same 
 fact. The systematic development of the considera- 
 tion here briefly set forth forms the necessary psi/c/io- 
 logical propaedeutic to the study of Logic (see below), 
 
xii PREFATORY ESSAY. 
 
 § 25). From this it is not to be inferred that Logic 
 is not the ultimate form of thought as such, but 
 merely that a certain preparation is necessary for 
 minds inexperienced in logical reflection, a certain 
 elimination, as it were, of psychological functions 
 that would naturally exercise a perturbing influence 
 upon the function of pure thinking. 
 
 The work on Logic (in the sense above explained), 
 of which the present is offered as an English transla- 
 tion, is, of the number of existing works of its class, 
 by its conciseness, its relative simplicity of exposition, 
 and the systematic character of its form, peculiarly 
 well adapted for use as an introductory treatise on 
 the subject which it undertakes to cover : and for this 
 reason has been translated. Its author has for up- 
 wards of half a century been eminent as a philoso- 
 phical author and editor as well as university teacher. 
 The present translation has been made from the 
 fourth edition of the original work. For comparison's 
 sake we insert here a few notes of resemblances and 
 differences between this version of the Hegelian Logic 
 and others. In his division of the First Part of Logic 
 Erdmann agrees with Hegel, who is uniform with 
 himself in this respect, in the larger, the lesser, and 
 the propaedeutical treatises ; but differs from Michelet, 
 whose division is a little peculiar. Michelet divides 
 as follows : Being as such (or indeterminate being), 
 there-being (or determinate being), and being-for-self 
 (the synthesis of the two). For him quantity and mode 
 (or, as he prefers, measure), together with ideality, 
 fall under being-for-self, as its chief moments, while 
 quality is a subordinate moment of there-being. The 
 general development, however, which Michelet gives of 
 being, from the beginning to the transition to essence, 
 is substantially the same as that given by Erdmann ; 
 it is merely the nodes or crises in the development 
 that are different. The distinctions laid clown by 
 
PREFA TOR Y ESS/1 Y. xiii 
 
 Erdmann as regards quantitative relation, while agree- 
 ing with those laid down in Hegel's Larger Logic, are 
 more specific than those given in the Lesser Logic or in 
 Michelet's work. Attention may be directed to 
 Erdmann's use of mode as the third category of being, 
 the synthesis of quality and quantity. Hegel, 
 Michelet, and others here use measure instead. For 
 Erdmann, the reader observes, measure is a variety of 
 mode. Erdmann uses the term mode in the popular 
 rather than the philosophical sense ; for, by the very 
 powerful example and influence of Spinoza, mode has 
 generally had in philosophical discussion a significa- 
 tion which would make it denote a category of con- 
 siderably higher order than that it denotes in 
 Erdmann's treatment, namely, a category of essence 
 rather than of being. Michelet so uses it, making it 
 a sub-category to the absolute. Erdmann's treatment 
 of actuality, while essentially the same as Hegel's, as 
 given in the Lesser Logic, diverges from that given in 
 the Larger Logic and that given by Michelet, and, in 
 fact, seems unfinished. In interaction as such the 
 moment of plurality outweighs still that of unity ; in 
 order to bring actuality to its true conclusion it seems 
 necessary to posit it as totality, which is multiplicity 
 returned into unity. This is done in the concept of 
 the absolute. In pursuance of this idea Michelet 
 (Logilc, § § 82, 83, 84, 85) gives as the division of 
 actuality the following: (1) Actuality as such (em- 
 bracing possibility, contingency, and necessity), (2) 
 actuality as necessary relation (embracing substanti- 
 ality, causality, reciprocity, or interaction), (3) actu- 
 ality as the absolute (embracing exposition of the 
 absolute, relativity, mode). In the absolute the sphere 
 of mediation rounds itself completely out, and at the 
 same time becomes tangent to that of subjectivity. 
 The absolute is the reverse side of subjectivity. 
 Erdmann's symmetrical division of judgment and of 
 
xiv PREFA TOR Y ESS A Y. 
 
 syllogism, in accordance with the three-foldness of the 
 dialectic method, diverges from these given hy Hegel 
 and Michelet, which are as follows : (1) Judgments of 
 quality, 'of essence, of reflection, of necessity ; (2) 
 syllogisms of there-being, [and of quantity, Michelet] 
 of reflection (EL), or essence (M.), of necessity. Rosen- 
 kranz also gives a four-fold division of judgments. 
 Instead of the development of objectivity which 
 Erdmann gives, we find in Hegel and Michelet: 
 mechanism, chemism or dynamism, teleology. Rosen- 
 kranz and others relegate the categories of objectivity 
 to the philosophy of nature entirely. (See below § 191, 
 obs. 4, § 192, obs. 2, § 197, obs. 1. etc.) {Of. Hegel, 
 Encyldopadie, § 195, obs. ; Michelet, Logilc, § 124.) 
 Instead of the grand divisions of Logic given in the 
 present work, and in Hegel and Michelet, we find in 
 Rosenkranz the doctrine of being (including essence 
 as well as being proper), the doctrine of the concept, 
 the doctrine of ideas. (See Rosenkranz's Logik, or 
 his Meine Reform der Hegelschen Philosophic.) 
 
 An explanation seems called for as to the use 
 throughout of the term concept as a translation of Be- 
 griff, instead of the term notion so long in vogue in the 
 same use. Concept has been chosen for three reasons. 
 First, it is the etymological equivalent of Be-griff. 
 Secondly, its use is necessary to consistency in logical 
 terminology ; if judgment and syllogism are neces- 
 sarily employed in the doctrine of subjectivity, con- 
 cept must be preferred to notion. Since the three 
 terms, concept, judgment and syllogism, regularly are 
 found together in psychological as well as logical dis- 
 cussion, as denoting the three successive stages of 
 (abstract) thought and its products, there seems no 
 better reason for discarding concept and using notion 
 in its stead, than there would be for discarding judg- 
 ment and syllogism, one or both, and putting others 
 in their places. Thirdly, the use of concept, in an 
 
PREFATORY ESSAY. xv 
 
 objective as well as a subjective sense, gives a whole- 
 some shock and challenge to thought, too much in- 
 clined to be merely subjective and one-sided, and 
 helps to elevate it to the truly philosophic plane. To 
 the foregoing considerations may be added this, that 
 notion is in its ordinary sense rather too subjective — 
 more subjective than even concept, since it may signify 
 what is merely arbitrarily fancied, or surmised, or in- 
 tended, instead of being definitely represented in any 
 form of thought proper, whether concrete or abstract. 
 Some additions have been made to the original of 
 the present work, in the form of references, included 
 in [ ]. They occur in the Notes; it is hoped that 
 they contribute to the usefulness of the volume. 
 
 B. C. B. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 INTRODUCTION (§ 1-27) 1 
 
 FIRST PART— Categories of Immediacy (§ 28-87) - 22 
 
 I.— First Chapter— quality (§ 29-55) 2 4 
 
 A. ENDLESSNESS (iNDETERMINATENESS) (§ 29-34) - 24 
 
 B. FINITUDE (DETERMINATENESS) (§ 35-46) 31 
 
 C. INFINITUDE (§ 47-55) 41 
 
 II. — Second Chapter— Quantity (§ 56-76) 53 
 
 A. MAGNITUDE (§ 57-62) 54 
 
 B. QUANTUM (§ 63-70) 60 
 
 C. QUANTITATIVE RELATION (§71-76) 71 
 
 III.— Third Chapter— Mode (§ 77-&7) 78 
 
 A. quantitative mode (measure) (§ 78-82) 79 
 
 B. quantitative mode (manner) (§ 83) 84 
 
 C. mode proper (§ 84-87) 85 
 SECOND PART— Categories of Mediation (§ 88- 
 
 139)- - 92 
 
 I. — First Chapter— Essence as such (§ 92-107) 98 
 
 A. identity (§ 93-94) - 98 
 
 B. difference (§ 95-101) 101 
 
 C. ground and consequent (§ 102-107) 107 
 II.— Second Chapter— Phenomenon (§ 108-123) 112 
 
 A. EXISTENCE (THINGS) (§ I09-1 12)- - 113 
 
 B. ESSENCE AND PHENOMENON OF THE THING 
 
 (§113-116) - 119 
 
 C. ESSENTIAL RELATION (§ 1 1 7- 1 23) - - 122 
 
 xvii 
 
xvill CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 III.— Third Chapter— Actuality (§ 124-139) 13° 
 
 A. SUBSTANTIALITY (§ 132-133) I3 8 
 
 B. CAUSALITY (§ 134-137) I40 
 
 C. INTERACTION (§ I38-139) 143 
 
 THIRD PART— Categories of Freedom (§ 140- 
 
 233) - H7 
 
 I. — First Chapter — Subjectivity (§ 140-189) 147 
 
 A. the concept (§ 142-154) 151 
 
 B. the Judgment (§ 155-170) - - 167 
 
 C. the syllogism (§ 171-189) - 182 
 II.— Second Chapter— Objectivity (§ 190-210) 207 
 
 A. relation of objects (§ 192-201) 210 
 
 B. subjectivity and objectivity (§ 202-206) 219 
 
 C. finality [or purposiveness] (§ 207-210) 225 
 III.— Third Chapter— Idea (§ 211-233) 230 
 
 A. the immediacy of the idea (§ 213-218) 232 
 
 B. THE IDEA AS ESSENTIAL RELATION (§ 219-226) - 238 
 
 C. THE IDEA AS ABSOLUTE (§ 227-233) - 243 
 
OUTLINES 
 
 OF 
 
 LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 § 1. The union of Logic and Metaphysics must, if 
 one consider the long period iD which they were 
 treated separately one from the other, be called some- 
 thing new ; while recent works represent it as some- 
 thing antiquated. Our introductory remarks, accord- 
 ingly, have to examine not merely the objections that 
 are usually made to each of these two disciplines, but 
 also those which are brought against their union. 
 
 § 2. The old (or school) logic, which was mostly 
 regarded as description^ of correct thinking or also 
 as a guide® thereto, lo3t the respect which for two 
 thousand years it had enjoyed, when the discovery 
 was believed to have been made that it was not only 
 
2 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 useless, because teaching only what everyone already 
 knew without it, but even harmful, because, if its 
 rules (which, of course, are valid only for finite 
 thought) < 3 > were followed in the highest spheres of 
 knowledge, the result must be an abstractly intel- 
 lectual treatments of philosophy. The universally 
 felt need of a reform of philosophy could not be satis- 
 fied by the employment of foreign elements/ 5 ) but 
 only by the presentation of logic as a science, which 
 has not so much to reject as to understand the rules 
 of the old logic, and, while that took account only of 
 finite thought, to consider also free or absolute 
 thought/ 6 ) 
 
 W The father of logic, Aristotle, proceeded as a 
 " describer of Nature." W Hence in the Middle 
 Ages the question whether logic is an art or a science. 
 This question also underlies the Kantian distinction 
 between canon and organon. [See Kant's " Critique 
 of Pure Reason, Method of Transcendentalism," ch. ii.] 
 < 3) Finite thought is thought of a given objective ; 
 such thought is expressed in propositions, and from 
 the analysis of the proposition Aristotle deduced 
 the primary logical distinctions. W The age in 
 which the intellect was so depreciated was therefore 
 inimically disposed also towards logic. < 5 > Such 
 foreign element is, for example, introduced into logic 
 by its union with psychology. W This is the task 
 which Hegel set himsef in his reform of logic. 
 
 § 3. Metaphysics — merely per accidens so called, in- 
 stead of by the earlier designation, wpoin/ <f>i.X.o<ro<f>ia 
 
 styled sometimes the theory of the being, or also of 
 
INTRODUCTION. 3 
 
 the essence, of things (hence also ontology), sometimes 
 the science of that which transcends the sensible, could 
 be accepted as the proper centre of philosophy — 
 indeed, could in general exist — only so long as the 
 knowability of the essence of things or of the super- 
 sensible was admitted. The Kantian reform of 
 philosophy had therefore as a consequence the fact 
 that the earlier metaphysics appeared as something im- 
 possible. Upon what foundations the objections to it 
 rest, and what is the strength of the objections, logic 
 itself has to investigate. (§40.) True, these objections 
 have, by the fact that they have become universally 
 prevalent opinions of the age, acquired a great influ- 
 ence, but before they are proved they are to be 
 treated as mere prejudices of the age ; and, in the first 
 instance, to the assertion that metaphysics is impos- 
 sible, may by way of neutralisation be opposed the 
 assertion that it is possible. 
 
 § 4. Finally, the combination of logic and meta- 
 physics, — since the former has thought, the latter being, 
 as its object, — appears inadmissible, on account of the 
 opposition of subjective and objective. This opposi- 
 tion will indeed show itself to be false, but only 
 within logic itself. It is, therefore, since, particularly 
 in modern times, it has taken possession of the 
 opinion of all the educated, provisionally to be made 
 harmless by showing how even this opinion does not 
 
4 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 treat it as so uncontested an axiom as this opinion 
 itself supposes. This showing is obviously no proof 
 for the contrary view, but merely claims to neutralise 
 one prejudice by another. 
 
 § 5. If, that is, one reflects upon what the thought 
 with which logic is supposed to be concerned is, one 
 understands thereby the activity of the mind which 
 has as its product the universal. Since, further, the 
 mind in thought acts as universal, the expression 
 " Thought is the activity of the universal," is in its 
 two-fold sense correct. Contemplation, or the think- 
 ing consideration of an object, therefore, universalises 
 it, i.e., alters it. Nevertheless, we believe that by 
 contemplation we gain a knowledge of the essence of 
 things — become conscious of fact itself. 
 
 Why such an alteration must be made in the object 
 in order to perceive its essence, will become yet clearer 
 later, when essence in general is treated. (§ 87, obs. 2.) 
 
 § 6. But, now, since what we gain a knowledge 
 of by thinking can be nothing other than thought, i.e., 
 something subjective, and, also, we suppose that by 
 thinking we gain a knowledge of fact — fact in its 
 truth, i.e., something objective — it is contained in our 
 ordinary consciousness that there are determinations 
 of thought which are at one and the same time pre- 
 cisely as well subjective as also objective relations of 
 actuality/ 1 ) These subjective and objective thoughts 
 
INTRODUCTION. 5 
 
 we call, to distinguish them from merely subjective 
 thoughts or notions, categories W> and understand 
 thereby, not, with Kant, merely so-called root-con- 
 cepts, but likewise also root-relations, approximating 
 thus the Aristotelian concept of categories. If, now, 
 it is shown that what ontology and metaphysics con- 
 tained consists, precisely as did the content of the old 
 logic, only in categories, it is thereby also shown that 
 a separation of the two is a violent abstraction which 
 may under certain circumstances be proper,® but is 
 not conditioned by the nature of the two disciplines- 
 In this manner, then, is the difficulty above stated 
 (§ 4) removed. 
 
 W Mere reflection upon ideas common to us all, 
 shows, therefore, that that opposition of subjective 
 and objective is not an absolute one. (2) Instead of 
 category one may also employ the word thought 
 merely as singular. < 3 > The propriety of a separa- 
 tion of the formally logical from the metaphysical is 
 a pedagogical one for the subject. Similarly, words 
 are presented to the child, separated into letters, in 
 order that the child may learn to read words as wholes. 
 
 § 7. Scientific method demands completeness of 
 content. The science of the categories will have, 
 therefore, to lay down all the categories. Their 
 totality may be termed reason;^ they themselves, 
 accordingly, relations of reason. (The word idea <® 
 designates only the system of rationality.) No 
 name' 3 ' is for this science more suitable than that of 
 
6 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 logic, since etymologically it has reference^ as much 
 
 to the objective as to the subjective nature of its 
 
 content, and since it contains nothing whatever 
 
 besides the laws and forms by which thought is 
 
 bound.® 
 
 (1) " In the world there is reason," signifies (objec- 
 tive) coherence. " We think by means of reason," 
 means by means of the categories/ 2 ' The word idea 
 is, precisely as reason, in the first instance merely a 
 name ; zvkat the idea is is shown in the entire logic, 
 hence first at the end of it. (8) For the combination 
 of logic and metaphysics which Schleiermacher at- 
 tempted, the name dialectic was in every respect the 
 most suitable. In Schleiermacher the Platonic, Aris- 
 totelian and Stoic senses of the word are combined. 
 (4) A.070S similarly as ratio. (6 > One may, therefore, 
 not say that Hegel has employed the word contrarily 
 to the ordinary usage of language. 
 
 § 8. The peculiar difficulty of logic lies in the fact 
 that, since the categories are continually employed, an 
 abstraction is necessary for making them themselves 
 the subject of consideration. In the unwontedness 
 of making an object of consideration that which 
 appears to one as the most familiar of things, and 
 directing attention upon the categories themselves 
 instead of upon what, otherwise, one thinks by 
 means of the categories, the greater part of what is 
 called the unintelligibility of logic has its ground. 
 This unwontedness creates always the wish that, in 
 using the categories one might, as one habitually does, 
 
INTRODUCTION. 7 
 
 think something else (namely, the object), whereas 
 the problem is, precisely, to think them only. 
 
 § 9. But precisely in what constitutes its difficulty 
 lies also the importance, or the so-called advantage, 
 of logical study. As the scientific criticism of the 
 categories employed in thought, logic teaches how to 
 distinguish W the true from the untrue categories, as 
 well as how to discern in what sphere of knowledge 
 certain categories have validity, in what not.< 2 > As 
 embracing all categories, it prevents the narrowness 
 of finding in one or some relations of reason, reason 
 itself as a whole. With this material importance is 
 also connected a formal importance. As habituation 
 to the dealing with mere categories, logical study is a 
 discipline for consciousness, and serves as exercise 
 and propaedeutic® for the subject entering upon 
 philosophy. In all these respects, logic is properly 
 the fundamental philosophy, or forms the first part 
 of the system of philosophy. 
 
 W A category may in itself be untrue, and in the 
 application of such a category the result of- thought 
 must be false. ( 2 >One may, for example, apply to 
 the spiritual, categories which are correct in the study 
 of nature ; and thus the result is inept. (3) If one 
 regards and employs logic as mere gymnastic of 
 thought, one must, of course, disregard the objective 
 (metaphysical) meaning of thought, and view it only 
 in so far as it is produced by the thinking of the sub- 
 ject. (See § 7, obs. 1.) Like all gymnastics, logic as 
 
8 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 mere exercise belongs to the school. The school or 
 gymnastical logic is a subject of learning and exercise, 
 not of scientific study. 
 
 § 10. The last expression states, so far as this may 
 be done prior to the treatment of logic, the relation 
 of logic to the other philosophical disciplines. {Cf. 
 § 233.) Logic has to do not only with tint forms of 
 truth, but also with truth itself, with the categories 
 as the " souls of actuality." But they are the mere 
 souls of actuality, and logic leads, therefore, into a 
 "realm of shadows." Logic is, therefore, not the 
 whole of science, but only its foundation. 
 
 Our exposition has two rocks to avoid. First, 
 there is that of taking logic in the merely formal 
 sense and making it lifeless abstraction. The fact, 
 on the contrary, is, that logic contains in germ the 
 entire truth. Second, is the rock of making it so 
 comfortable for the subject in this realm of shadows 
 that he will no longer have a desire for the life-giving 
 blood of the concrete! - parts of philosophy. Here the 
 case is that logic presents only the germ of truth. 
 
 §11. If logic is the science (§ 2) of the categories or 
 of thought, that will be true of it which is true of 
 science in general. Since of the latter, that, in the 
 first instance, only is well known which is contained 
 in cultivated opinion, it is necessary to reflect upon it. 
 Of science as a system of what is knownW and not 
 a mere aggregate, that must be valid which is true 
 of knowledge in general, viz., that it may not be 
 
INTRODUCTION. 9 
 
 satisfied with the perception that something is so or 
 otherwise, but has to do with the necessity of this 
 relation.® Our idea of necessity is, therefore, to be 
 analysed, and from it conclusions drawn. 
 
 W The word Wissenchaft is formed analogously 
 with Landschaft, Ritterschaft, etc., and means, as 
 they do, a body closed within itself. ( " 2) Aristotle's 
 distinction between 6Vt and Ston correctly brings out 
 the essential character of knowledge. [See A.'s " Pos- 
 terior Analytics," i. 13 ; ii. 1.] 
 
 § 12. Since in this analysis it appears that necessity 
 may be spoken of only where two things {i.e., a 
 ground and thing grounded) are inseparably united or 
 identical/ 1 ) and that herein alone necessity consists, 
 one, in order to know a thing in its necessity, must, 
 since the necessary nevertheless is, first seize it in 
 this its fixed determinateness and unity with itself. 
 Contemplation which emphasises this moment is con- 
 templation by the understanding ; (2) when it is carried 
 out one-sidedly, it results in the mode of view which 
 is termed dogmatism.® 
 
 ® Identity is inseparable combination, not same- 
 ness. (2) The element of the understanding is an 
 essential one in philosophical contemplation. Where 
 it is wanting everything floats in nebulous indefinite- 
 ness. This is by those forgotten who try to make the 
 understanding out to be something bad. < 3 ) Cor- 
 rectly is it given as the character of dogmatism that, 
 in the interest of definiteness it holds fast to aut aut. 
 [See Hegel's " Encyklopadie," § 119.] Since it resolves 
 
io INTRODUCTION. 
 
 everything into its fixed, simple determinations, dog- 
 matism has an abstract character. In the so-called 
 metaphysics of the understanding of the Wolfian 
 school, this moment stands out in its extreme one- 
 sidedness. 
 
 § 13. But, likewise, the necessary contains in it- 
 self, secondly, distinct determinations (that duality, 
 § 12), since only thereby does it contain the motion 
 which belongs to necessity. The contemplation 
 of the understanding, therefore, does not suffice; 
 for regard must be had to contradiction in the object 
 as well as to its resting determinateness. To do this 
 is the problem of reflection^ which, carried out 
 one-sidedly, gives the diametrical opposite of dogma- 
 tism, scepticism!® 
 
 W The moment, which reflection emphasises, is by 
 Hegel [" Encyklopadie," § § 79, 81] designated as the 
 dialectical or negatively rational. ( 2 >As dogmatism 
 holds fast to the fact that the object is and therefore 
 does not contradict itself, so scepticism maintains 
 that the object contradicts itself, and therefore cannot 
 be. 
 
 | 14. But, thirdly, the necessary is both at once : 
 it is, and contains in itself contradiction. Therein is 
 it something concreted The combining moment is, 
 therefore, precisely as essential in the account as are 
 the two others. But even this, which in practical 
 matters gives to the healthy human understanding 
 such superiority to all abstractions (i.e., one-sidedness), 
 
INTRODUCTION. n 
 
 may in science be one-sidedly emphasised at the ex- 
 pense of the others ; and this happens not merely 
 upon the standpoint of so-called common sense, but 
 also upon that of intellectual intuition, and, finally, 
 even in Jacobi's immediate knowledge, both of which 
 last oppose themselves to the thought of the under- 
 standing as well as to reflection/ 2 ) 
 
 W The abstract is that which contains in itself 
 only one determination ; the concrete that which con- 
 tains several. < 2 > The age has scarcely passed in 
 which the philosophy of reflection was the most 
 common term of reproach. 
 
 § 15. Fully conceived, the necessary is found only 
 where all these moments receive their rights, i.e., in 
 speculative thought (cf. my "Outlines of Psychology," § 
 122) or where there is comprehension. This occurs 
 when the object is taken first as it is, then as it con- 
 tradicts itself, finally as it is the concrete identity of 
 opposites. 
 
 If one term virtuosity in fixing, understanding, 
 in analysing, acumen, in combining, ingenuity, then 
 speculative penetration will have them all as pre- 
 supposed moments. 
 
 § 16. But if one takes the object so, it is at first 
 something other than what it is afterwards ox finally; 
 but what it is afterwards proves, on nearer examina- 
 tion, to be its proper being. Comprehension will, 
 therefore, only then occur when in the object to be 
 
12 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 comprehended a contradiction is discovered between 
 what it was first taken to be and what is its proper 
 signification. In this case it is perceived that the 
 object is rightly taken only when conceived after- 
 wards in a way different from that in which it was 
 conceived before. But in this it is said that it must 
 be afterwards other than it was before. This means 
 that the perception of that contradiction will show 
 that the object must so alter that it actually becomes 
 that which it properly is. When this occurs, the 
 contradiction is resolved. But since an object's 
 becoming that which it properly is, is development, 
 it follows from the reflections just made (§ § 12-16) 
 that a thing is comprehended, and hence (§ 15) per- 
 ceived as necessary, only when it is perceived in its 
 development. 
 
 § 17. Though a thing is perceived as necessary 
 only when seized in its development, the converse 
 does not follow. Even temporal genesis is a develop- 
 ment; it proceeds from a contradiction like that just 
 indicated ;W but since the contradiction which 
 mediates the temporal genesis of an object, at least, 
 may® be an accidental one, the proper necessity of an 
 object is not with its genesis perceived/ 8 ) That 
 necessity is perceived only when in the object itself 
 apart from external circumstances there is, perceived, 
 as inseparable from the essence of the object, that 
 
INTRODUCTION. 13 
 
 contradiction from which, because it is inseparable, 
 the development which is posited with the concept of 
 the object, i.e., the eternal development, follows. W 
 This eternal development is what comprehending per- 
 ception has to bring to light. 
 
 (1) The ripe fruit separates itself from the tree be- 
 cause there is contained a contradiction in the fact that 
 the ripe, i.e., the really independent, should be fruit, 
 i.e., selfless. < 2 > External circumstances may produce 
 a contradiction where it has in the object no ground : 
 e.g., woundirig a living organism. (3 > This is mis- 
 taken by those who would replace comprehension by 
 genetic thought. The origin of States has nothing 
 to do with their notion. Even Aristotle distinguished 
 the historic origin of the State from its true ground. 
 W The concept of eternity which Spinoza already 
 rightly conceived has no relationship with time. 
 [See Spinoza's " Ethics," part i., def. viii. ; also part ii., 
 prop. 44, cor. 2.] Similarly the mathematician 
 speaks of that which (not temporally understood) 
 follows from what has preceded, but means, in so 
 doing, eternal sequence. 
 
 § 18. The property of an object to enter into such 
 eternal motion conditioned upon inner contradiction 
 is its dialectical nature, and this eternal motion, 
 itself, demanded by its essence, is its dialectic. This 
 the dialectic art < x) r method has to imitate and to 
 produce, since, though immanent in the object itself, 
 it nevertheless appears only because self-active 
 thought reproduces ® it. Since the dialectic 
 method produces all that is contained in the fact 
 
14 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 itself, it is, as regards its evidence and necessity, 
 superior to the geometrical, with which it is rightly 
 classed. 
 
 W Notwithstanding the different judgments which 
 the dialectic method has experienced at the hands of 
 Plato and of Kant, the two are agreed that it is the 
 art of discovering contradictions in objects. (2) More 
 extended discussions on the nature of the dialectic 
 method are to be found in my work, " Body and 
 Soul," 2nd ed., pp. 18-33. 
 
 § 19. Since, in this development, each successive 
 stage of development contains, solved, in itself a 
 contradiction (§ 16) which did not exist in the 
 preceding stage, it contains more determinations than 
 that. As this unity of more determinations, it 
 stands related to the earlier stages as the richer or 
 more concrete to the poorer and more abstract. 
 (§ 14, obs. 1.) The more all determinations which are 
 contained in germ in that which is developing itself 
 are posited, the more the object corresponds to its 
 final nature. In this it first appears in its truth, for, 
 earlier, it was as it was in truth {really § 16) not. 
 The dialectical method has therefore to show how the 
 object, through the contradiction lying in itself, rises 
 from the more abstract to the more concrete until it 
 reaches its final nature, in which all contradictions 
 are resolved; or it has to follow the object in its 
 development from its untruth to its truth. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 IS 
 
 The statement, Each later stage is the truth of the 
 earlier, here finds its justification ; which, that is to 
 say, shows what the object is in truth. (Cf. also § 220.) 
 
 § 20. If, now, through the dialectic method, science 
 as system is made possible, then will also logic as the 
 science of the categories (§6) have to follow the dialec- 
 tical development of them, and to produce the system 
 of them, beginning with the most abstract and the 
 poorest of them, and discovering the forward-impel- 
 ling contradiction in them, and so, in methodical 
 fashion, passing to the concreter. In precisely this 
 consists the criticism of them. (§ 9.) 
 
 § 21. But since, in contemplation, the categories 
 which have first to be developed by logic, must 
 already be applied, it may neither be required that 
 one should employ only such categories as are 
 already deduced, nor be expected that each point 
 when treated will be at once perfectly clear. The 
 thoroughness which (often only) appears to underlie 
 such expectation is not to be approved, since, for the 
 reason named, many things can receive their proper 
 explanation only in the sequel. That thoroughness 
 which will not go forward until everything is com- 
 pletely understood, is the opposed error to that of 
 immediately drawing consequences instead of abiding 
 by the given fact, since what follows can be shown 
 only in the consequence. 
 
i6 INTRODUCTION, 
 
 The latter mistake, of anticipating, is fostered 
 where relations of higher spheres are drawn into 
 logic, and objects — Nature, Spirit, God — are discussed, 
 of which logic as such knows nothing. Apart from 
 the fact that thereby the pedagogical purpose (§ 9) of 
 logic is defeated, many misconceptions arise as to the 
 significance of logic itself, which by such anticipa- 
 tions easily acquires the appearance of claiming to be 
 the whole of philosophy. (Cf. § 10.) 
 
 § 22. The beginning of philosophy in general, and 
 hence also of logic as its first part (§ 9), encounters 
 the difficulty that if philosophy starts with & proved 
 proposition, this proposition must be deduced from 
 another, hence will not be a beginning; if, on the 
 contrary, with an unproved proposition, philosophical 
 character is destroyed since it can be maintained only 
 when no presuppositions are made. 
 
 The presuppositionlessness of philosophy, which 
 was sought already by Plato, Aristotle, and since 
 Descartes more or less by all philosophers, appears, 
 by the dilemma that the beginning of philosophy must 
 either rest upon, or must itself be, a hypothesis, to be 
 proved an impossibility. 
 
 | 23. The assertion that philosophy must make no 
 presupposition, can not have the meaning that for 
 it nothing is presupposed, but only that by it nothing 
 is presupposed/ 1 ) But in fact, if it supposes, i.e., 
 asserts® nothing, it also /^supposes nothing. It 
 will therefore avoid that difficulty (§ 22) by begin- 
 ning not with an assertion, which of course would be 
 
INTRODUCTION. 17 
 
 or would rest upon a mere assumption, but with a 
 demand or a postulate®) as regards which the ques- 
 tion of proof would be an absurdity/ 4 ) What it 
 necessarily has it does not derive elsewhere, but puts 
 forth. 
 
 (1) Upon the confusion of these two relations it 
 depends when one says, for example, that since philo- 
 sophy comes into being only in the development of 
 history, it presupposes history. Certainly history 
 forms its presupposition, since it is presupposed for 
 the origination of philosophy, but it as little pre- 
 supposes history as in geometry the first axiom is 
 that there is a geometer. <® Where philosophy 
 avoids every Oeo-vs, there also can there be no question 
 of a viroQeo-is. < 3 > When Fichte [" Introduction to 
 Science of Knowledge ; " translated in Jour. Spec. 
 Philos., vol. i.] describes the beginning of philosophy 
 as not a fact but a fact-act, he thereby, as Hegel 
 always recognises, discovers the real philosophical 
 method. His error was in postulating several such 
 fact-acts. (4 > Were the beginning of philosophy, 
 therefore, a theoretical proposition, that dilemma 
 (§ 22, obs.) would be valid, because the beginning 
 must then be an axiom or theorem, while now it is a 
 postulate or problem. 
 
 § 24 What logic will demand or wherein that 
 postulate will consist, is determined by its entire pro- 
 blem. If, that is to say, it is the science of thought 
 (§6, obs. 2), it requires no other matter than merely 
 this; it will, therefore, naturally be compelled to 
 begin with the proposal to produce only this matter. 
 This means that it proposes that there be merely 
 
18 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 thought, and begins with the postulate, Think! There 
 is, therefore, " at first present, merely the resolve to 
 engage in the activity of thinking." This resolve is 
 presupposed for logic without its having begun with 
 the definition of thought as its first deo-is. 
 
 § 25. The difficulty which arises on the one hand, 
 by the fact that this postulate appears as a purely 
 arbitrary act of will, because, instead of it, perhaps, 
 another or many others (e.g., that upon which the 
 Science of Knowledge itself rests) might be laid down, 
 and on the other hand by the fact that thereby it is 
 not known how one has to act in order to realise that 
 postulate, is to be removed in a systematic way by 
 philosophical propedeutic which makes possible for 
 the subject®) philosophising the beginning of logic. < 2 > 
 Where such propaedeutic has not preceded, it may 
 be suggested against the first-mentioned claim how 
 in our consciousness it is assumed that thought 
 is that function which makes man man, and hence 
 the demand to think will have an entirely other 
 justification than any other demand which, perhaps, 
 could be expressed.® The second difficulty may be 
 met by a practical illustration, as it were, of what 
 that postulate requires. By these two ways may the 
 mere resolve to engage in the activity of thought be 
 produced. 
 
 W The accusation made against Hegel that his 
 
INTRODUCTION. 19 
 
 system has a double beginning is by this means ob- 
 viated. <" 2 > The best propaedeutic appears to be a 
 dialectical development of consciousness which shows 
 that thought is the real goal to which consciousness 
 points. Rightly, therefore, has Gabler treated the 
 phenomenology of consciousness as propaedeutic. 
 (3) Herein is contained the reason why it is merely a 
 misconception on the part of Classendi when he ob- 
 jected against Descartes that ambulo ergo sum pos- 
 sesses the same validity as cogito ergo sum. 
 
 § 26. Thought was said (§ 5) to be the activity of 
 universalisation. One will therefore engage in the 
 activity of mere or pure thought when, in thinking, 
 one at the same time abstracts from everything 
 objective which makes thought applied thought and 
 does not leave it pure. But if one does this, the re- 
 sult will be thought as such, the category completely 
 pure, unmixed, and undetermined, hence the most 
 abstract possible. As this most abstract category 
 is the most untrue (§ 19), the beginning is as be- 
 ginning the untrue, and its untruth is corrected by, 
 not abiding by it, but going forward, i.e., abandoning, 
 negating the mere beginning. All beginning is 
 heuristic. 
 
 § 27. If anything definite, objective were thought, 
 there would be in thinking, besides mere thought, 
 also that to which thought would be applied, and 
 thjnking would therefore be differentiated within 
 itself ; but now, where there is the activity of mere 
 
20 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 thinking, thinking is in itself undifferentiated. This 
 undifferentiatedness we call immediacy, and im- 
 mediacy is the first of all things to be treated in 
 logic. Not only the absence of combination and 
 mediation in this thought is indicated by this name, 
 but also the fact that this category is not thought by 
 means of any other to be thought prior to it, (1 > 
 rather, however, that it, as the prius of all other 
 categories, is contained in and conditions them. If 
 the difference of thought consists merely in the use 
 of diverse categories, the category of immediacy will 
 be found if one answers the question : What is the 
 least that is contained in thought ? or what thought 
 is contained in every thought along with it ? 
 
 (1) When Aristotle [" Posterior Analytics," i. 2], in 
 speaking of derived and original propositions, desig- 
 nates as a/X£<ros that Trporrjcris ^s prf icriv a.X.Xr) irporepa, 
 
 he quite correctly places immediacy, in the fact that a 
 thing is a first (dpxn), for if it were a second, it would 
 be mediated by the first. Because of the double 
 meaning which 5t/>u>toi> has with him, notv the most 
 universal is termed immediate (for airiov, hence also 
 <*PXV> is to KaOoXov), now again the individual, sensible. 
 In fact, the simple and more abstract forms the 
 foundation for the more concrete and composite, or 
 precedes it as the lower, just as the sensible and 
 natural does as regards the super-sensible and spir- 
 itual. < 2 ) Mere immediacy, as will be shown here- 
 after, is an abstraction, the untrue with which it is 
 impossible to rest. But for this reason it is merely 
 the beginning. For the rest, immediacy and media- 
 
INTROD VCTION. 
 
 tion are only relative determinations, since one and 
 the same thing may appear in relation to one thing as 
 the more concrete, the mediated, in relation to another 
 as the immediate. Here is to be thought immediacy 
 in its purest form, i.e., simple differencelessness. 
 
jfirst part. 
 
 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 BEING. 
 
 § 28. In what the peculiarity of a group of categories 
 consists can be clear always only when it is fully set 
 forth and distinguished from others. If, further, the 
 development of the categories (§ 17) was to be set 
 forth, and only in such development the articulation 
 of what is developing itself originates, a preliminary 
 statement of how the categories will group themselves 
 would not only be unintelligible, but would even 
 create the appearance of one's having to do with what 
 is already formed, which may be divided, and not 
 with what is organic, which articulates itself. Instead 
 of making such a preliminary statement, therefore, 
 it is better to facilitate the survey of the ground 
 passed over by a recapitulation at the end of each 
 section. Even the general superscriptions are, before 
 such recapitulation, meaningless names. 
 
 In oral discussion the designations of the individual 
 
BEING. 23 
 
 chapters may be omitted, and may be expressed only 
 at the close, but in a printed outline they are not to 
 be dispensed with. In doing this, reference is gener- 
 ally made to the section in which the selection of 
 precisely this or that name is justified. In the matter 
 of nomenclature a threefold principle may be observed; 
 either one may designate each group according to the 
 first category which occurs in the group, since it con- 
 tains in itself the germ of all (so Hegel generally), or 
 when a development is set forth one may designate 
 the individual groups as periods whose terminal points 
 are given (so Schelling in the " Transcendental Ideal- 
 ism," and Fichte, the younger), or, finally, one may 
 seek a name which points out that which is charac- 
 teristic of the entire group. In the use of this 
 principle, which we shall follow, the name, of course, 
 in most instances appears meaningless before the end 
 of the group. 
 
L— FIKST CHAPTER. 
 
 QUALITY. (See § 54.) 
 
 A. Endlessness (Indeterminateness). (See § 54.) 
 
 § 29 (a). In the first instance, by the resolve to 
 engage in the activity of pure thought, thought (the 
 category) is produced as distinctionless reference to 
 self. For this pure immediacy, which is affected by 
 no distinction, we have no more suitable expression 
 than being. ^ Being is, as pure immediacy, the 
 first, i.e., the most abstract, category, and hence with 
 it the beginning is to be made. Because of this 
 abstract character, being is difficult, impossible we 
 may say, of conception or comprehension^ (see § 
 32) ; the question, What being is, as a question con- 
 cerning the nearer determinations of being, is, since 
 being is the most indefinite of all things, unanswer- 
 able,® and only by reflection upon higher categories 
 is the interest underlying it to be satisfied. Being is 
 in the first instance to be explained only by itself, 
 since what it is otherwise or besides (see § 30) can 
 
 first appear hereafter. Only in the infancy of meta- 
 
 24 
 
QUALITY. 25 
 
 physics (logic) can the mind abide by this category as 
 
 the highest. 
 
 *> This word will, therefore, be employed through- 
 out to designate what is not further deduced : hence 
 in feeling, in which what is to man is just so, etc. 
 ® Conceived or comprehended can be only that in 
 which what one must take together {con-cipere) is 
 contained. ( 3 ) A definition of being would represent it 
 as composite, made up of genus and differentia, which, 
 however, it should not be. (4 > Being is essentially 
 different from existence or even actuality. A chimera 
 which does not exist, to say nothing of its possessing 
 actuality, is — a chimera, that is. To be is merely the 
 infinitive of the copula is, is merely the etvai which 
 Aristotle describes as a-vyKeurdat. As there is no 
 thought in which thought would not be posited 
 (thought), so there is no expressed thought or pro- 
 position which does not contain the category being. 
 (i > When the consciousness of the meaning of a cate- 
 gory first dawns upon the mind, it expresses its sense 
 of triumph in this new conquest by making it the 
 predicate of every thing, even of the absolute, i.e., it 
 treats it as the absolute category. With being, this 
 happened in the case of the Eleatics, the greatest of 
 whom regarded not only 8v but precisely etVai as this 
 category. The Eleatic theory has, therefore, a 
 dogmatic character, because being is the favourite 
 category of dogmatism. (See § 12.) It is the logic of 
 dogmatism. 
 
 § 30 (b). Since being is not at all affected with 
 distinction, there is in it nothing whatever to be dis- 
 tinguished, and it is therefore complete contentless- 
 ness and emptiness, which is just as indefinite and as 
 purely to be conceived as being, above. More closely 
 
26 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 regarded, therefore, being proves to be pure negation. W 
 We call this nothing, not being, or perhaps better, 
 not.® The expression, Being is being and nothing 
 more, contains unwittingly the right relation. As all 
 thought is a positing, so is it, more closely regarded, 
 an ^position or ^position, i.e., a negation. 
 
 W This transition may in more suggestive form be 
 also expressed as follows : Since being originated 
 for us by our having abstracted from everything 
 objective (§ 26), it therefore consists merely in 
 this abstraction and emptiness or contentlessness. < 2 > 
 The expression nothing (nichts from ni-wiht [no whit, 
 naught^) carries with it the inconvenience that in the 
 use of it a negative reference to something is thought 
 of; just so the expression not-being, because here the 
 reference to being is anticipated, which will, of 
 course, immediately (§ 31) appear so soon as one sees 
 that not can not be thought without being ; at first, 
 the term not (ni) would seem to be the best for com- 
 pletely undetermined negation. This category, which 
 forms the real core of all views that are designated as 
 Nihilism, was, in opposition to the affirmation of 
 being by the Eleatics, employed by the disciples of 
 Heraclitus, even more than by Heraclitus himself. 
 Thereby they became, naturally, the logicians of 
 scepsis (see § 13), which Heraclitus was not. They 
 seize in the Heraclitic becoming only the side of not 
 being, and thus convert it into mere not-heing, an 
 abstraction, like being. (See § 32.) 
 
 § 31. Nothing itself, as wholly referenceless, is 
 
 mere reference to self, hence complete distinction- 
 
 lessness ; which means that when we think nothing 
 
 we really think being, and as this was really (or also) 
 
QUALITY. 27 
 
 nothing, the converse also obtains. The two are so 
 related that when one is thought, the other, rather, 
 is thought. But this means that we merely denote 
 a single idea by two words. The distinction between 
 being and not, which, for us, consists in the fact that 
 we came upon the former first and the latter after- 
 wards, is also a distinction in them themselves; 
 " not," that is to say, in order to be thought, must 
 become that whose not it is. It is, therefore, pure 
 opposition, while being was pure position. Hence, 
 being is posited as Being (or being) ; but not, posited 
 as not (or not being), is its contrary, namely being. 
 
 If to distinguish nothing from being, one wishes 
 to define it, and begin with the words, nothing is, 
 since being is not equal to existence but is merely 
 participle of the copula is (§ 29, obs.), being is pre- 
 dicated of nothing, and thus is completely expressed 
 what the section declares. Likewise, if one will avoid 
 the word is, and say, nothing equals nothing, there is 
 attributed to it mere unity with itself, i.e., being. 
 Finally, when one asserts that one feels a distinction 
 between being and nothing, this also merely means 
 that the distinction when reflected upon vanishes, 
 which is exactly our assertion. For the rest, that 
 proposition appears objectionable merely because one 
 does not abide by it, but draws consequences from it. 
 (§ 21.) 
 
 § 32 (c). The result is, therefore, that when we think 
 being, nothing, instead, is thought, and conversely. 
 (Now may we, therefore, call not or nothing also not- 
 
28 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 being) Neither, therefore, can be thought without 
 the other. Consequently, each can be truly thought 
 only in its unity with the other. Really, therefore, 
 we must think their unity, because really each is in- 
 separably combined with the other ; the truth (§ 19, 
 obs.) of being and of not is the unity of the two. We 
 call it (this interchange or this oscillation) becom- 
 ing^ This unity is so little incomprehensible that 
 rather in it only are being and nothing compre- 
 hended!® Becoming is the real truth of the 
 categories hitherto considered ;< 3) as compared with 
 becoming, they are untrue/ 4 ' The three categories 
 considered correspond essentially to the Kantian cate- 
 gories of quality. In their consideration the three 
 moments (§ § 12-14) of scientific method, like Fichte's 
 Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis, are to be recognised. 
 
 < n Becoming — the kh^o-is of Aristotle — must here 
 be taken as pure transition, with the exclusion of 
 all idea of time. Our language permits this, since it 
 employs the word becoming to denote as well the 
 future as the present (passive). It thus neutralises the 
 notion of time which creeps into this word. Since 
 alteration is equivalent to becoming other, it is already 
 something much more concrete than mere becoming, 
 which both underlies it, and is, further, change of 
 place and every other alteration. < 2 > Because of 
 their abstract character, being and nothing were not 
 to be conceived. (§ 24.) It is now apparent why : 
 because they are moments of a higher unity, which 
 are kept apart only by a violent abstraction. (In 
 like manner it has until now been impossible to fix 
 
QUALITY. 29 
 
 fluor by itself.) Becoming as concreter category is, 
 properly speaking, the first concept. With it philo- 
 sophy distinguishes itself from dogmatism, whose 
 principle Woiff enunciated when he said, " Inter nihil- 
 um et aliquid non datur medium." ("Onto!," § 60.) Be- 
 coming is precisely such a medium, i.e., the concrete 
 unity of the two. In like manner, philosophy by the 
 recognition of this concept distinguishes itself from 
 all scepticism. On account of this concreter character, 
 some have wished to begin logic with the unity of 
 being and not-being, hence with j«v?7o-is, or even with 
 beginning. But the beginning cannot be made with 
 that, precisely because the prius is always the most 
 abstract. (§ 19.) ®That becoming is the real truth 
 of being, is implied in ordinary consciousness. 
 Everything (a city, for example) becomes rather than 
 is. When Heraclitus, in opposition to Xenophanes, 
 made becoming the predicate of everything, he was 
 right. Heraclitus is in his speculative depth equally 
 far removed from dogmatism and scepticism. His prin- 
 ciple of absolute flux is concrete. (See § 14.) W This 
 untruth of being is the reason why thought cannot 
 abide by that but must go further ; the untruth of 
 being therein corrects itself. 
 
 § 33. Becoming, as the concrete unity of being and 
 not being, contains both in itself. But, of course, no 
 longer as they were before their union, but as de- 
 graded to mere moments, i.e., as sublatedP^ Hence 
 in it being is contained as passing into nothing, i.e., 
 as ceasing, and likewise nothing as passing into 
 being, as originating.^ The two as constituting 
 a becoming are inseparably joined.® 
 
 < x > Sublate taken in the threefold sense of tollere, 
 
30 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 conservare, elevare: hence sublate and degrade at 
 one and the same time. ® Similarly, in combina- 
 tions of oxygen radical and acid principles as such 
 no longer exist, because we have to do with some- 
 thing other than a mixture. < 3 > That what originates 
 also ceases to be, or that what has a beginning also 
 comes to an end, is no merely empirical observation, 
 but origination and cessation are one {one becoming), 
 and every origination is in itself a cessation. Signi- 
 ficance of o-Te/Mjo-is for all origination, with Aristotle. 
 
 § 34. " Origination and cessation are the same be- 
 coming, and at the same time, as these distinct ten- 
 dencies, reciprocally interpenetrate and are paralysed. 
 The one tendency is cessation : being passes over 
 into nothing, but nothing is just as much the con- 
 trary of itself, transition into being, origination. 
 This origination is the other tendency : nothing 
 passes over into being, but being just as much sub- 
 lates itself, and is instead the transition into nothing, 
 is cessation." (Hegel, " Werke," iii., p. 109.) Each of 
 these sublates itself and its other, and becoming, as 
 the unity of such self-sublating terms, sublates itself. 
 The result of such sublation cannot be equivalent to 
 nothing/ 1 ^ for this has itself been only a moment in 
 becoming, but the result of the self-sublating becom- 
 ing, as it were the precipitate of that process, is the 
 become.®* 
 
 (1) This is the claim of the sceptic. (§ 13, obs.) 
 But it is just as false as it would be to claim that 
 when the process between acid and oxide is completed 
 
QUALITY. 31 
 
 the result will be the radical or oxygen : rather the 
 result of it is the neutral, the crystal. < 2) The pre- 
 terite of becoming {werden) language rightly denotes 
 as that which has become {geworden). The become is 
 becoming that has come to a rest (it is or has become). 
 
 B. Finitude (Determinateness). (Cf. § § 42, 44.) 
 (a) Something. {Cf. § 24.) 
 
 § 35. If one analyses the concept of the become one 
 finds contained in it the fact that it is [has] become. 
 There is contained in it, therefore, the moment of being, 
 but, not of pure being, but being as identical with not- 
 being (§ 30) ; this unity, also, however, no longer as a 
 moment of unresting becoming, which was likewise 
 unresting cessation (§ 33), but this unity as having 
 come to rest, become fixedp) hence has a resting 
 being that is coloured with not-being, i.e., there- 
 being!® 
 
 W That until now fluid unity of being and not- 
 being here appears fixed like water in the crystal. 
 < 2 > There-being is being, but with a negation is {yonder- 
 being). Instead of it one might say jo-being or 
 m4#£-being. There-being, therefore, contains being 
 in itself as its moment ; hence one may speak of a 
 being in all there-being, but not conversely. There- 
 being is limited being ; hence " the there-being Dasein 
 of God " is an improper expression. God is not here 
 or there, because he is (to express the thought quite 
 as spacially) everywhere. 
 
32 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 § 36. (/3) Secondly, the become contains as a 
 moment in itself not; but no longer the abstract 
 referenceless not, but not as identical with being 
 (§ 31), also no longer this unity as unresting origina- 
 tion (§ 33), but as not that has come to rest, or 
 as being. This "not" which in there-being constitutes 
 the there, in jo-being the so we call quality, or per- 
 haps better by the scholastic name, quiddity,^ the 
 translation of the Aristotelian to ri «m which com- 
 pletely corresponds to this concept. This as the not 
 in there-being is of course negation, but as being 
 negation to be called with the same right reality.*® 
 
 W By quality or quiddity is not meant a separable 
 property which one merely has, but that determinate- 
 ness with the change of which the quid itself ceases 
 to be, that determinateness which says what an object 
 is. [" Epistolae," 50, 41 ; " Ethics," i., prop, viii., 
 Scholium]. (2) Spinoza is entirely right when he 
 says, " Omnis determinate est negatio." But he for- 
 gets, in so doing, the other side, which is almost as 
 one-sidely emphasised, when one, for example, calls 
 God, because He is the omnimode determinatum, the 
 sum of all realities. Reality in this sense is essenti- 
 ally different from existence, actuality, etc., which 
 have no plurals. Later, reality will be taken in 
 another sense. (See § 127.) 
 
 § 37 (y). But neither of these two moments con- 
 stitutes fully the become ; but this is rather the con- 
 crete unity of the two, i.e., there-being, which is a 
 quale or quid, or qualitative, quidditative there-being. 
 
QUALITY, 33 
 
 Such a thing we call something, and now for the first 
 time we fully perceive what really became in the re- 
 solution of becoming ; the become has now for the first 
 time won its true name, it is something. Something, 
 as having behind it the contradiction of becoming, is 
 complete and free from contradiction. 
 
 In our consciousness it is implied that when becom- 
 ing is complete, something has become. That some- 
 thing is really the best designation for the concrete 
 unity of those two moments is admitted by the fact 
 that we habitually designate as well that in which a 
 quality appears, as also the quality itself by the word 
 something. In general something is a favourite cate- 
 gory of the ordinary consciousness, because it is 
 neither so abstract as the earlier categories, nor so 
 concrete as the succeeding. 
 
 § 38. But if something is what is become, i.e., is 
 becoming sublated into being, the result of this subla- 
 tion is, properly speaking, not fully conceived. For 
 since the process from which it results was a unity of 
 being and nothing, in which the two appear as quite 
 equally justified, the result of the process cannot as 
 here be posited merely as being, but, to be fully con- 
 ceived, must be equally posited as not, and the real 
 result of becoming we get only by thinking along 
 with something the nothing of something, i.e., other. 
 Only so is something thought in its truth ; and what 
 was said in the previous section must now be more 
 
 c 
 
34 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 nearly defined to the effect that the result of becoming 
 
 is something and other. 
 
 That (the thought of) something involves other as 
 its complement is expressed in the Latin aliquid, as in 
 German it is expressed by the fact that by the word 
 something a little is denoted, i.e., merely a part of a 
 totality. 
 
 (b) Something and Other. 
 
 § 39 (a). Something cannot be thought without 
 other. This relativity of the two, therefore, does not, as 
 it were, fall only in us as the thinking and relating 
 subjects ; but in the very concept of something is in- 
 volved the being related to other and having towards 
 it an open side. By this, its being open towards 
 other, it is for other, or also in or by other. To be for 
 other is in something the side of its not-being. 
 
 By this abstract expression Hegel admirably de- 
 notes the selflessness of something. It is the in alio 
 esse of Spinoza, which coincided with the per aliud 
 concipi. What is merely a something is thereby for 
 other, as, for example, things out of which therefore 
 we make what we will. They have, accordingly, 
 an " adjectival being " (Weisse). Man, who is more 
 than a something, is for himself ; out of him not 
 everything is to be made. (See § 50.) 
 
 § 40 (13). But as something contains the moment 
 of not-being (§ 36), so does it also that of being. 
 
QUALITY. 35 
 
 (§ 35.) If it was for other because it displayed its 
 not-being towards other, it will in this relation to 
 other have also to be posited under the character of 
 being. The being of something, as opposed to its being 
 for other, is its being-in-self. Something is in itself 
 only, because it is (what it is) not for other, just as its 
 being-for-other is only the negative of its being-in- 
 self. 
 
 The Kantian philosophy in a great measure turns 
 upon this distinction of what something is in itself 
 and what it is for consciousness, i.e., for other. It is 
 the never-enough-to-be-esteemed merit of this philo- 
 sophy to have been in earnest with the application of 
 this category. If it is once applied, the result of 
 course is that things as they are in themselves or the 
 in-themselves of things is not known (i.e., is not for 
 us, not for other), a tautology and no new discovery. 
 The Kantian objections to the knowability of the in- 
 itself, it has been shown (§ 3), made the possibility of 
 metaphysics doubtful. They rest upon the holding 
 fast of these two categories, and receive their answer 
 so soon as one perceives that we can not abide by 
 these categories as ultimate categories. (§ 41.)- 
 
 § 41 (y). But if the being-in-self of something is 
 merely the negation of its being-for-other and con- 
 versely, neither of the two may really be thought 
 without the other, rather each presupposes (1 > the other. 
 Hence each taken by itself is only a violent abstrac- 
 tion ; in its truth it is taken as inseparable from the 
 other, i.e., is identical with it. To this unity of being- 
 
36 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 in-self and being-for other language points in many 
 ways/ 2 ) particularly in the expression, "to be at 
 something."® Since what something is in itself is 
 aSsofor other, this is in it, or it is posited as this. (4) 
 
 (1) Universally where two things are so related 
 that each is merely the not-being of the other, they 
 are not to be thought without one another, and point 
 to one another as their complements. < 2 >Such refer- 
 ence consists in the fact that the being-for-other of an 
 object, i.e., its external relationship, is denoted by 
 precisely the same word as its being-in-self ; as when 
 one says, the object has something in itself, or there 
 is something only in it. ® At the same time the 
 phrase, There is something in him, means the man has 
 an inner worth, signifies something in himself ' ; like- 
 wise the other expression, There is nothing in it, 
 means that a thing lacks the in itself, is only an 
 appearance, i.e., being-for-other. W The expression, 
 being posited, taken from the circumstance that an 
 object is not in a place accidentally merely, but is 
 expressly set (gesetzt— posited) there, contains the 
 confirmation, i.e., the fulfilment of the mere being-in- 
 self. The categories of being-in-self and posited being, 
 are applied, only under other names, already in § 16, 
 as real being and actual being. In posited beincr is 
 contained the perfection and the goal (finis) of being- 
 in-self. 
 
 § 42. In the union of those two thoughts coincides 
 what had been peculiar to each of the two. It is 
 clear, therefore, that it is necessary to go beyond the 
 two only possible relations in which something stands 
 opposed to other, and hence beyond this opposition. 
 Something, in so far as it is something, or has being 
 
QUALITY. 37 
 
 only through the being of another, i.e., of its own not 
 being, is definite something, and its definite being, or 
 that which makes it definite, is to be more precisely 
 considered. The individual moments which are con- 
 tained in this concept, which as the most important 
 of the entire group was selected to designate them 
 (see p. 33), have to be developed. They are pre- 
 scribed in a very intelligible way in language, since 
 this, just as in the case of the word something, de- 
 notes by one and the same word not only that unity 
 itself, but at the same time the moments contained in 
 it of a further development. 
 
 (c) Determined Being. (§ 44.) 
 
 § 43 (a). Determined being contains, first, being-in- 
 self {i.e., independently of other), but as involved 
 with its opposite, hence as restricted being. Some- 
 thing in which is restricted what it is in itself, be- 
 comes a determined being only through the tendency 
 which is called determination or what is to be. 
 
 W Something is determined (destinatum) to that 
 which is in it as a thing yet to be fulfilled or posited; 
 it therefore requires to be accomplished outwardly, a 
 fact that implies a defect, but at the same time the 
 tendency towards its removal. Determination is the 
 tendency to posit being-in-self. In determination 
 appears to us being-in-self, as it were in higher power ; 
 hence, according to Fichte, things in themselves are 
 
38 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 what (through our doing) they should be. ® Since 
 what-is-to-be is the proper inner determination of 
 something, something is adequate to its what-is-to-be ; 
 hence the correctness of the expression that man 
 can be (is) what he is to be. Of course, also the 
 opposite is correct, since what-is-to-be is restricted 
 being, and hence is determination yet to be realised. 
 
 § 44 (yS). Determined being as being-in-self, or be- 
 ing that is in itself determined, is what-is-to-be. But 
 since determined being contains likewise the moment 
 of being-for-other, something is not determined with- 
 out other. Hence its being determined depends upon 
 other, i.e., is or must m be determined by other. But 
 since the opposite moment also is contained in it, the 
 determining other becomes the limiting thing which 
 experiences resistance or compelling limitation.® 1 
 Through it the determined is a finite thing, since 
 where the limiting other begins, it itself is not, but 
 rather has its termination.^ Only by its finitude, 
 or as it is limited, is something a determined some- 
 thing and precisely thereby something.^ It be- 
 comes something, therefore, through the other. < 6) 
 
 W Something is determined (coactum, determina- 
 tion) when it receives its determinateness (to be 
 distinguished from determination) from other. The 
 same distinction underlies that between shall and 
 must. (9 All compulsion, as law, duty, etc., presup- 
 poses an opposing tendency, since that which compels 
 is as such a foreign power, i.e., another (not one's own) 
 will. (3 > Limit, barrier, termination are here em- 
 
QUALITY. 39 
 
 ployed as synonyms, and in their use all spatial 
 meaning is abstracted from. Something is finite in 
 that it is limited by another. Since here the other 
 which appears to present itself beside something 
 (| 38), and is so posited in something itself that this 
 owes its being to that, we have in the concept of fini- 
 tude the most important concept in this group ; and 
 hence it was employed as superscription. (See p. 33.) 
 W Hence the expression for one who has definite 
 duties of calling, that he (only then) is something. 
 The moment of iinitude {jvkpa.% was by Pythagoras and 
 Plato rightly emphasised as the higher compared with 
 mere indeterminateness {airupov). Limit is that 
 whereby something is this determinate thing (roSe n, 
 according to Aristotle) the haecceitas of Duns Scotus. 
 ® This was above given as concept of determined 
 being. (§ 42.) 
 
 § 45. (y) But since beginning and termination were 
 according to § 33, the unity of being and not-being, 
 that which makes something determined being (its 
 limit, its barrier, its termination) will be that in which 
 it both is and is notj^ and in which the other is not 
 and is. Definite something, therefore, displays in it- 
 self the contradiction that it coincides with its limit, 
 and yet does not. (2) But this leads still further. 
 Something is something through its limit or within it. 
 But the limit of something is precisely the beginning 
 of the other (§ 44), hence the being of something is 
 really the beginning of the other. It, therefore, be- 
 longs to its essence that it is only because in its being 
 the other begins. Its contradictory nature is, the 
 
4 o CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 necessity of being other or alterability. (3) Some- 
 thing is, as determined, alterable/ 4 ) and only as alter- 
 able is it something. 
 
 W Hence could " haecceitas," this quiddity of 
 higher power, be called the ultimate reality, and 
 Wolff's ens realissimum also omnimode determinatum, 
 as well as, by Spinoza, the former was conceived as 
 negation, and all determinateness was excluded from 
 God. (Cf. § 36 ; 2.) < 2 > Since something by its limit 
 excludes other from itself, it is one with its limit; 
 but since in the limit the other has its beginning, 
 something extends beyond its limit, i.e., is not 
 one with it. l3) This word is here (analogously 
 with mortality) not used for the mere possibility of 
 alteration. Something is alterable because in its 
 concept is involved the being other. {Aliud, aliud ; 
 alterum, alterum ; erepov 'irepov. The Middle Ages 
 predicated of the quid, alteritas.) The being other 
 has lure entered completely into something, and we 
 have in alterability the fulfilment of finitude. At 
 the same time, also, here is met completely the 
 demand of § 38, according to which the result of 
 becoming should be thought also as not. Here 
 something is really thought as identical with its not. 
 (4) As determined, something is alterable. Where 
 something is determined to something, and is deter- 
 mined by other, there is posited the necessity that 
 it now become that, i.e., alter. Where it shall and 
 must, or where its own tendency unites with external 
 compulsion, there it becomes. Alteration is also 
 becoming, but a determined becoming, a becoming 
 other. 
 
 § 46. But alterability, as it is the real fulfilment 
 of finitude, also forms the transition to a new group 
 
QUALITY. 41 
 
 of categories. Something, that is to say (because 
 it must become other, because its determination is to 
 become other), becomes other, i.e., its negative. (§ 33.) 
 But since this other has in the limit of something, 
 just as does something itself, its beginning as well 
 as its termination, it is, in fact, itself something 
 {something other or other something). Therefore we 
 have in this transition really a passage to other, in 
 which that which is in transition comes into co- 
 incidence with itself, becomes or remains identical 
 with itself. Such transition is what we call Infini- 
 tude. If, therefore, we think alteration completely, 
 we think infinitude. 
 
 The seeming sophism contained in this section dis- 
 appears so soon as one reflects that we bave here to 
 do with the thought-determination something, and 
 not with any definite object. As we cannot otherwise 
 express it, so also we cannot otherwise think it than 
 that something, when it alters (since alteration was 
 equal to becoming something), becomes something, i.e., 
 comes into coincidence with itself. 
 
 0. Infinitude. 
 
 § 47. Infinitude or Absoluteness is to be found 
 wherever something becomes in its negation identical 
 with itself, W i.e., wherever, by the negation of its 
 negation, it is the affirmative return to itself, or 
 absolute negativity. (2) In this, the first negation has 
 
42 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 not vanished, but is subletted (§ 33, obs.), or ideally 
 posited. ( 3 ) The infinite is, therefore, that which 
 does not exclude limit and finitude, but which, as the 
 ideality of these, rather includes and contains them 
 in itself as sublated moments, i.e., which is its own 
 termination, its own limit. (4) 
 
 W The word infinite is, therefore, not employed by 
 us in the highest spheres only. The circle is an 
 infinite line because it returns to itself, limits itself. 
 Hence, in every enjoyment, every satisfaction, be- 
 cause it is a return to self, there is contained also 
 infinitude. < 2 >The Ego is absolute negativity, be- 
 cause it distinguishes itself from itself (therefore 
 negates its unity with itself), but again sublates this 
 distinction (therefore restores its unity with self. 
 Negatio duplex ajfirmaf). Just so God. They are 
 infinite because the barrier in them is at the same 
 time no barrier. W Ideality = sublatedness. The 
 sublated is, but as the not-real. W The expression of 
 Schelling, " The infinite is the unity of the infinite 
 and the finite," finds here its justification. As the 
 Platonic awupov and 71-epas correspond to indetermin- 
 ateness and limit, so his \xiktov corresponds to the 
 infinite. 
 
 § 48. The concept of infinitude arose when we 
 thought alteration and observed what at tlie termina- 
 tion resulted therefrom. If now one does not allow 
 this thought to come to a termination, but constantly 
 repeats, something becomes other, other as itself some- 
 thing, becomes again other, etc., i.e., if one constantly 
 repeats what has really vanished, namely, the opposi- 
 
QUALITY. 43 
 
 tion of something and other, the matter reaches no 
 conclusion. This conclusion we (§ 46) have drawn and 
 indicated by the word therefore. If one does not 
 allow thought to arrive at this " therefore " and 
 " conclusion," there arises, in the constant alternation 
 of the two determinations something and other, a 
 progression, to which commonly the predicate infinite 
 is given, although only that of endlessness, or false 
 infinitude, properly belongs to it. 
 
 Endlessness is false infinitude, because it does not 
 correspond to the concept of infinitude. Since, that 
 is to say, it excludes termination and finitude, it has 
 in that which is excluded another opposed to itself, 
 which forms its limit, its termination. As the circle 
 is the image of infinitude, so is the straight line, 
 which is constantly lengthening, that of endlessness. 
 Hence, according to Aristotle (" Phys.," iii., 6, 6), the 
 (false) infinite is that which forever leaves some- 
 thing outside itself. What leaves nothing outside 
 itself is to him the perfect, i.e., truly infinite. Of 
 
 this he Says, riXiov ovblv fifj '^X ov Te\,os, rb Se TtXos irkpas. 
 
 The Grecian expression, eVreXes, like our perfect {voll- 
 endet), points to an inclusion in itself by the infinite 
 of the finite, and Spinoza's distinction between the 
 infinitum (rationis) and the indefinitum or infinitum 
 imaginations at least approximates the correct con- 
 cept of infinitude [Spinoza's " Ethics," part ii., prop. 
 44, cor. 1, 2.] 
 
 | 49. But if the endless progression arises by the 
 fact that one, in the case of the transition of one 
 thought- determination into its opposite, does not 
 
44 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 allow the return into self to complete itself, but, 
 precluding this result, always begins anew and al- 
 ternates the two determinations, there must, wherever 
 endless progression shows itself in our thought, be 
 perceived in it the demand to posit the two deter- 
 minations, through whose alternating appearance the 
 progression arises, as really identical, i.e., think true 
 infinitude, which, if one pleases, may be called also 
 superfinitude, superalterability. 
 
 When Avistotle terms every thought which runs 
 out into endless progression fallacious, he is in so far 
 correct as it is not possible to abide by that. The 
 application of the above-given rule which follows 
 from the very concept of endless progression is, 
 for methodical procedure, of extreme importance. 
 Wherever, that is to say, a concrete identity of 
 opposite determinations must be thought, endless 
 progression must result if one does not allow that 
 identity to be realised. In § § 31 and 32 this 
 might easily have been shown. Conversely, wherever 
 it appears to be unavoidable, there the demand 
 stated in the section is to be seen therein. However, 
 there may be spheres in which, because such a con- 
 crete identity cannot be realised, the endless pro- 
 gression occurs. But even then it is not ultimate, but 
 there is to be found in it the demand to get beyond 
 and leave behind in thought this entire sphere. 
 Thus, for example, nature does not rise above endless 
 progression in the generic process. The scientific 
 consideration of this process therefore impels thought 
 beyond the sphere of nature. {Cf. my work " Body 
 and Soul," 2nd ed., Halle, 1849, p. 61, ff.) 
 
 | 50 («). Something, therefore, since, while being 
 
QUALITY. 45 
 
 other, it became or remained identical with itself, 
 became (§ 46) restored unity with self or absolute 
 negativity, and thereby passed into infinitude. Such 
 a something, now, is no longer a mere something, i.e., 
 a there-being something, which required completion 
 through other (§ 35), for which and in which it was, 
 and by which it was limited (§ 44), but it will be a 
 self-sufficient, self-dependent, distinct thing, a refer- 
 ence to self, which at the same time, in a negative, 
 ideal way, contains the other in itself, so that this 
 merely appears <U in it. Something as this ideality 
 of the other, we call being ^ in, ox for, self ox one.^> 
 If there-being is limited being, being-for-self is in- 
 finite being. 
 
 W This more figurative expression may state the 
 being-contained of the other in the one as no longer 
 real. ® Something was only for other (§ 39, obs.), 
 not for itself. Being-for-self is here to be understood 
 only as that reference to self which is mediated by 
 negative relation to other. In fact, even in the ex- 
 pression there is contained this polemic withdrawal 
 of itself into itself. We have not yet here true sub- 
 jectivity, to say nothing of the idea of conscious 
 personality, although being-for-self forms the founda- 
 tion for those determinations, just as becoming does 
 for alteration (§ 32, obs. 1), and later for life. The 
 " substantive being " {cf § 39, obs.), that is, of what 
 is for itself is the foundation as well of substantivity 
 as of subjectivity. Spinozistically expressed : in se 
 est per se concipitur. ( 3 >Here one is not to think of 
 the numerical term one, but the word is to be under- 
 
46 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 stood as in such forms of expression as, If one has his 
 house, and the like. It is more indefinite than one 
 (= a person) (because it is merely incipient subjec- 
 tivity), and much more concrete than something (be- 
 cause it is incipient subjectivity). And the fact that 
 one and whole are often synonyms may justify this 
 linguistic usage. The category of the one which is 
 for itself is the ground-category of all atomistic 
 theories. The atomists of antiquity were entirely 
 right in thinking of their atoms as above all change. 
 Leibnitz's monad theory agrees with them in that. 
 It also emphasises the moment of ideality in the 
 monads. These were therefore conceived as repre- 
 sentative, i.e., in them all other monads appeared, or, 
 as Leibnitz expresses himself (" Opp. Phil. Ed. 
 Erdmann," p. 184), they are reflected in them as in 
 tniroirs artifs. This side of the ideal relation, which 
 is contained in the concept of the one which is for 
 itself, the atomists have entirely overlooked. They, 
 therefore, cannot say of every atom, as Leibnitz does 
 of every monad, that it contains (true) infinitude. 
 
 § 51 (d). One is, therefore, as infinite return to self, 
 for itself. Thus it is passive, negative relation. But 
 towards what ? Other does not stand opposed to it, 
 but is contained in it as a sublated moment. If, 
 therefore, it is negatively related, it can be so only 
 towards one or the entire totality of ones which now 
 stand opposed to it as the rest. Really, therefore, 
 one can only be thought as negatively related to the 
 remaining ones. (1) Being-for-self is to be thought 
 only as the juxtaposition of beings-for-self. It, there- 
 fore, presupposes these and excludes them from itself. < 2 > 
 
QUALITY. 47 
 
 In this exclusion not-being showed itself raised to in- 
 finitude ; it is the not (or un-) being of one. 
 
 (1) That one cannot be thought without this negative 
 relation to all other ones will readily be admitted as 
 a fact ; for us it is no longer an empirical observation. 
 Even the atomists are compelled to admit this dis- 
 tinction ; only they do not deduce it from the con- 
 cept of the atom, but the separating void (the pores) 
 exists along with it, just as, for the teachers of atom- 
 istic theories of the public law of the State, the 
 bellum contra omnes does. For Leibnitz, on the con- 
 trary, the monad is in a negative relation to the 
 others, not only because it has " no windows " through 
 which they may act upon it, but because the prin- 
 ciple of distinction dwells in every monad. ® Hegel 
 employs the term repulsion [see Hegel's "Ency- 
 klopadie," § 98 ; " Larger Logic," vol. iii., p. 178] ; but 
 apart from the fact that this term, because it denotes 
 a definite manner (the physical) of exclusion, is too 
 concrete, one in its use easily thinks of that which is 
 repelled as already existent. The excluded one, how- 
 ever, originates as an opposing term only through the 
 exclusion, hence the one presupposes the remaining 
 ones. 
 
 § 52 (c). One, therefore, is only in negative relation 
 to the opposing ones, and through this relation. But 
 since each of them is one, each consists merely in this 
 negative relation. Since, now, one negates the oppos- 
 ing ones, it really negates the negative relation to- 
 wards the ones. But since it negates the negative re- 
 lation towards the ones, their relation has, rather, be- 
 come an affirmative one, and the previous exclusion 
 proves to be a coinciding. We call it relation ; self- 
 
48 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 exclusion is therefore in fact its contrary, namely, re- 
 lation.^ Where relation is posited, i.e., where self- 
 excluding things (§ 51) form one (§ 50), there the two 
 determinations are united, and in the sphere of infini- 
 tude the analogue of becoming is presented. (2) Re- 
 lation is becoming-related. The three moments can 
 also, therefore, be designated thus : United Being, Dis- 
 united Being, Becoming of Unity. The last of these 
 may also be designated as becoming for one another 
 in which beings opposed to one another are for them- 
 selves. 
 
 W The fact that exclusion is not, and cannot be, 
 thought without relation, no one will dispute who 
 merely reflects that almost involuntarily the word 
 {i.e., the thought) excluding or negative relation gets 
 used. We have, therefore, to discover the necessity 
 of that fact. Hegel uses the term attraction, against 
 which, however, there obtains what was said in § 51, 
 obs. 2 ; and, further, it would perhaps have been 
 more correct to see in the Kantian attraction, which, 
 taken by itself, would contract all things to a mathe- 
 matical point, a concreter conception of what Hegel 
 had called being-for-self. The necessity of passing 
 forward to the becoming of unity justifies blending 
 attraction and repulsion into a single thought. 
 Hegel himself lays upon these terms no such stress as 
 that he deemed them entirely apposite. (" Werke," iii., 
 p. 202.) [? See p. 193.] Since relation is contained in 
 the concept of the one, the atomists cannot help em- 
 phasising this determination also ; but, of course, 
 they as little deduce it as they do the exclusive 
 relation above ; but beside the atoms there is to be 
 
QUALITY. 49 
 
 found chance or necessity, which brings them together. 
 Similarly the atomistic teachers of the public law of 
 the State represent individuals as brought together 
 by external need or force, or by an equally external 
 contract. The pre-established harmony which, ac- 
 cording to Leibnitz, places the monad in relation is, 
 since every monad is a mirror of the same universe, 
 at least, not so much brought in from without as 
 many suppose. Also in this regard Leibnitz deserves 
 preference before the atomists. < a >As being-for-self 
 forms the basis for subjectivity (see § 152), so does the 
 relation of beings-for-self for what later will be 
 recognised as realisation of subjectivity, i.e., as system. 
 (§ 189.) A system can be thought only where we 
 have process, i.e., becoming. 
 
 § 53. The concept of infinitude was absolute nega- 
 tivity. The one that was identical with itself was 
 this, it is true, but because it had not yet carried 
 itself into effect (against other), it was merely implicit 
 absolute negativity. (§ 40.) One must, therefore, be 
 for other also ; and since there is no longer any other, 
 it must be absolute negativity for the remaining ones ; 
 this it shows itself in exclusion. But as being-in-self 
 and being-for-other coincided in posited being (§ 41), 
 so also, where the self-excluding ones return again 
 into one (% 52), or exclusion shows itself as relation, 
 there is posited in relation or in becoming-for-other, 
 and thereby completed (§ 41, obs.), the concept of 
 infinitude; and the circle of categories embraced 
 under infinitude is fulfilled and closed. 
 
 Wherever a concept is posited^ i.e., wherever that is 
 
50 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 realised, which it is in itself (or wherever it actually 
 has become what it really was (cf. § § 16 and 41,) 
 there is also its development concluded. 
 
 § 54. At the same time, however, an entire group 
 of categories here concludes. How these are articu- 
 lated together is shown by a recapitulation of the 
 course passed over (cf. § 28), which also has to justify 
 the superscription chosen. Since in this group we 
 had to deal first with being, then with merely those 
 determinatenesses of being with whose alteration the 
 determined itself altered, and we have called such de- 
 terminateness Quality (§ 36), the superscription of 
 quality, or also categories of quality, is given it. Within 
 this group have arisen three divisions, which, according 
 to the different principles of designation (see § 28, obs.) 
 may either receive the superscription (Hegel's) being 
 there-being, being-for-self, or be designated as the 
 period from being to becoming, from there -being to 
 alterability, from being-for-self to relation, or finally 
 may be called Endlessness (Indeterminateness), Fini- 
 tude (Determinateness), Infinitude (Self-determination). 
 
 The parallelism which, when one enters more deeply 
 into the articulation, appears between the sub- 
 divisions and the larger groups is a necessary con- 
 sequence of methodical progression ; but, on the other 
 hand, the great pleasure which one has in this con- 
 stant repetition is often merely a pleasure in an 
 entirely abstract schematism, which causes that which 
 is in general of greatest concern, viz., the differences, 
 
QUALITY. 51 
 
 to be overlooked, and with reason has drawn upon 
 itself contempt and reproach. 
 
 § 55. The qualitative thought - determinations of 
 indeterminateness and determinateness came together, 
 in infinitude, into concrete unity. Since, therefore, in 
 this are contained all qualitative categories, but 
 among them relation, or becoming-for-one-another, was 
 the highest, we have in this category the truth of all 
 the preceding. But even in it, precisely as in become- 
 ing, there lies a contradiction. As in becoming, being 
 was contained as cessation, and not-being as origina- 
 tion (see § 33), so here united being, since it had 
 passed into disunited being, as disunion, and dis- 
 united being for the same reason into united being 
 as union. Since the two are opposed, but neither is 
 to be thought without the other, because union (pre) 
 supposes disunion and conversely, these two thoughts 
 sublate into the stable precipitate of a being-together- 
 and-along-with-one-another which is neither unitary 
 nor the opposite, in which the peculiarity which 
 above was (§ 54) ascribed to qualitative being has 
 vanished. This non-qualitative being we call quanti- 
 tative being, (1) and the inner contradiction of the 
 highest, hence of all, qualitative categories, necessi- 
 tates a passage to those of quality.® 
 
 WWhen it is said of the Kantian concept of 
 matter that it implies only quantitative distinctions, 
 
52 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 this is from § 52, 1, clear enough.® That the 
 quantitative determinations presuppose the qualitative ; 
 hence can be treated only after them, is easily shown 
 empirically. One must have the concept of a what 
 before one numerates like or similar whats. To the 
 contrary the j'ounger Fichte and Braniss. Of course 
 the application of the category many at the stage of 
 being-for-self is an anticipation of a quantitative 
 category. (Cf. § 58, obs. 1.) 
 
II— SECOND CHAPTER. 
 
 QUANTITY. 
 
 § 56. In what the peculiarity of quantity consists 
 appears from reflection upon what qualitative deter- 
 minateness, whose negation and truth 0) it proved 
 to be, had been. As this was one with the deter- 
 mined in such a manner that with its alteration the 
 determined itself altered (§ § 36, 54), so the term 
 quantity W will be employed where something has 
 a determinateness, which, without prejudice to the 
 nature of that whose attribute it is, may be altered, 
 which, therefore, "having become indifferent to being, 
 is a limit that is just as well no limit." (3) Such an 
 attribute alone have we first to think. This gives us 
 the concept of magnitude. 
 
 C^That quantity is the truth of (mere) quality 
 gives to all attempts to reduce all qualitative attri- 
 butes {e.g., specific gravity, fluidity) to merely 
 quantitative {e.g., number of atoms), an inner justi- 
 fication. < 2 > The word quantity, like the word 
 magnitude, has the inconvenience that by it one may 
 mean as well quantity in general (in the sense 
 of ttoo-otijs, the being a magnitude) as also a quantity 
 
 53 
 
54 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 (in the sense of ttoo-ov n, quantum, a magnitude), 
 which are, however, essentially distinct concepts. In 
 order here to avoid misconception the foreign word 
 quantity shall be used in the widest sense, so that by 
 it all determinations of magnitude shall be meant, 
 i.e., the quantitative in general, and hence this word 
 has been chosen for the superscription of the entire 
 chapter ; the word magnitude will be used to 
 denote ttoo-otj/s in the sense in which one speaks of 
 the magnitude (size) of a house ; finally, quantity in 
 the sense of a ttoo-ov, or a magnitude, will be denoted 
 by the word quantum. < 3 >The (quantitative) limit 
 of a forest may be widened, the forest extend beyond 
 it, and the forest remain a forest ; to alter its qualita- 
 tive limit, its haecceilas (1, § 44, obs. 3) means to 
 change it into something else. This is true only 
 within certain limits, because it is only a limited 
 sphere in which quantity is the supreme category". 
 {Cf. § 80.) 
 
 A. Magnitude. 
 
 § 57 (a). A thing has magnitude, or the being a 
 magnitude is predicated of it, when there belongs to 
 it an attribute which is also external, immaterial to 
 it.W Because of this difference from being-for- 
 self, being a magnitude has the character of beino 1 - 
 for-other, and is opposed as relative being to absolute. 
 (See § 47.) (2) One was determined in itself; that 
 which possesses magnitude, on the contrary, does so 
 only comparatively. To these negative deductions 
 the positive now are to be added, viz., What is con- 
 
QUANTITY. 55 
 
 tained in the concept of magnitude, and what, there- 
 fore, one really has in this category can be known by 
 reflection upon that from which this concept origin- 
 ated. The two sides of the contradiction, whose truth 
 quantity proved to be (§ 55) must be found in it, but 
 as sublated moments, and hence otherwise (3) than 
 where they formed the unresolved contradiction. 
 
 (1) Hence merely quantitative determinations have 
 meaning chiefly where external existence is dealt 
 with ; but even in the mental sphere we speak of the 
 greatness of a character or a deed, e.g., where the 
 mind enters into external existence. Magnitude is 
 taken as the supreme category when, as, for example, 
 is done by Islam, supreme stress is laid upon the 
 greatness of God. ® Hence distinctions of magni- 
 tude and relative distinctions are used as synonymous., 
 (3 As being and not were no longer as such con- 
 tained in becoming (§ 33), so in every later stage of 
 development the earlier are contained in an essenti- 
 ally altered form. 
 
 § 58 (o). In magnitude we shall first have the dis- 
 united (§ 55) or self-excluding (§ 51) ; but the 
 moment of self-exclusion is here no longer opposed to 
 the moment of union or the becoming one (§ 50), 
 since it has shown itself to coincide with it. (§ 52.) 
 Therefore, the self-excluding ones will have also the 
 character of sameness ; will, because they zx&one, not 
 be self-excluding. This means that in magnitude 
 are to be distinguished what are not distinguished. ^ 
 On account of this, therefore, magnitude appears 
 
56 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 as many, < 2 ) or discrete, <$> or there belongs to 
 magnitude the moment of discretion.*- 4 ^ As in ex- 
 clusion, so in discretion not-being is repeated. 
 
 M When one says tbat two things are only quanti- 
 tatively different, this refers merely to the fact that 
 this difference is an immaterial one, i.e., is equivalent 
 to no difference. ® Of Many one can speak only 
 where there is addibility, i.e., homogeneity, the 
 things which are distinguished being also not dis- 
 tinguished. Many is, therefore, a . purely quantita- 
 tive determination ; the many stand opposed to the 
 numerically one (see § 55, obs.) ; to one as we learned 
 to know it, without any numerical meaning (see 
 § 50, obs.) are opposed not many but the rest. (§ 51.) 
 (s) A sum, therefore, is not formed of disparates but 
 of discretes. (4) This moment of discretion we 
 emphasise when we think of magnitude {e.g., of a 
 kingdom) as originating for us by leaps, by the com- 
 ing together of something and something, and again 
 something or rather one, and again one ; or explain 
 the greater length of a line to ourselves by the 
 addition of points. (The somethings, the ones, the 
 points are each what the others are, they are not 
 really different, and yet no one of them is what 
 another is.) Since this is an essential side of magni- 
 tude, such a mode of viewing magnitude is not in- 
 correct. In many mathematical demonstrations one 
 cannot avoid using it. 
 
 § 59 (c). But that from which quantity originated 
 contained in itself, secondly (§ 55), the moment which 
 was there designated as Union, a term which then 
 denoted transition, while here it denotes something 
 completed. (Cf. § 35.) Magnitude, therefore, just 
 
QUANTITY. 57 
 
 as it contained that first moment, will have the 
 character of distinctionlessness, and be simple homo- 
 geneity/ 1 ) But that first moment will not thereby 
 be excluded, but will be contained as moment in 
 this homogeneity — as moment, hence as both being 
 and not being. This means that magnitude, which, 
 as in itself homogeneous, is one, or forms a unity, 
 will in an ideal manner (§ 47) contain the many 
 in itself/ 2 ) which as such or as real will appear 
 only where that simplicity ceases/ 3 ) Magnitude 
 is on this side constant or a continuum < 4 ) to 
 magnitude as such belongs continuity, since it is a 
 union. 
 
 WOur consciousness says that the magnitude of 
 a kingdom, the length of a line, is a simple determina- 
 tion, that the former has not several magnitudes, 
 the latter not several lengths. ®The many are 
 contained in magnitude in an ideal manner, hence 
 as mere possibility. Therefore the length of a line 
 may be considered as divided, by dividing the line 
 into lines, each of which has its length, or also 
 into points. @)As in the living organism simple 
 chemical substances are contained as sublated (com- 
 bined), and as such (free) first appear in decomposi- 
 tion, so points, because they are sublated in the 
 line, appear only at its extremities, where it is 
 interrupted. The line does not consist (festeht) of 
 points, for then it would contain them as real, but 
 wrists (entsteht, formed like entflieheii) from them, 
 contains them negatively. ( 4 )If one conceives of 
 magnitude as growing gradually, or without leaps, 
 one makes prominent the moment of continuity. 
 
58 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 That Leibnitz ranges the lex continui with the 
 theory of increments is easily explicable. When 
 one speaks of discrete and continuous magnitudes as 
 different, the plural alone shows that one takes 
 magnitude in the sense of quantum. But continuity 
 and discretion are here taken only as determinations 
 which belong to magnitude as such (in the sense 
 of being a magnitude not of a magnitude). 
 
 § 60. But what has thus far been developed com- 
 pels us to go further. Discretion and continuity are 
 determinations of magnitude. It is both many and 
 constant. It is taken as the former when we attri- 
 bute to an object the predicate much or little, as the 
 latter when the epithet great or small. In both 
 cases magnitude is attributed to it. But those deter- 
 minations are such that each of them has in the other 
 its limit, i.e., its termination and its negation ; for as 
 the moment of discretion appears only where con- 
 tinuity terminates (§ 59, obs. 3), so can continuity 
 appear only at the expense and by the negation of 
 discretion. M Each limits the other, and magnitude, 
 therefore, contains determinations, each of which is 
 the negation of the other. C 2 > 
 
 (D When Aristotle ("Phys.," Z 1) says, i( 8' ear*' . . . 
 crvvexfj /uev (ov to, etrxara ev . . . e^efqs 8 v 5i> fir/Bev peragv 
 (rvyyts, dSvvaTov e£ dSiatpcTwv elvai ti (Twe^es, he has 
 quite rightly perceived that we, for example, conceive 
 a line (a continuum) arising out of points only by 
 giving the points an extension, i.e., by conceiving 
 their mere discretion as sublated. Hence our division 
 
QUANTITY. 59 
 
 ceases when we arrive at the indivisible {continues, 
 aToafj,). < 2 > Among the logical puzzles of the ancients, 
 some {e.g., calvus, acervus, etc.), treating of the growth 
 of magnitude, now put forward the moment of dis- 
 cretion, by conceiving one grain brought, then an- 
 other, and so on, now pass suddenly from this 
 determination to their co-existence, or their union. 
 The heap as a co-existence is a continuum ; as a co- 
 existence of individual kernels, it contains many. 
 The very remarkable problem of how entirely 
 definite homogeneous quanta {e.g., side and diagonal 
 of a square) can be incommensurable, would be solved 
 if it were shown why, when the one is thought as 
 discrete, the other must be taken only as a con- 
 tinuum. 
 
 § 61. But it is also evident that each of these two 
 determinations is identical with the other ; discrete 
 things are different, but, at the same time, they are 
 determined as the same, their difference is really 
 none. Hence, magnitude in being discrete is really 
 distinctionless, i.e., continuous. (§ 59.) Hence, since 
 discretion can not be completely conceived except 
 when one thinks continuity, discretion is really the 
 unity of discretion and continuity. But in like manner 
 magnitude was continuous, only because the many 
 were sublated in it. Hence it presupposes these 
 many {one point has no magnitude, because no con- 
 tinuity); therefore continuity is not to be thought 
 without the many, i.e., without discretion ; it, there- 
 fore, itself is unity of continuity and discretion. 
 
 The Kantian Second Antinomy of pure reason rests 
 
60 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 upon the effort to hold fast one of these determina- 
 tions without the other, and is, therefore, really 
 already solved by Leibnitz's sans les simples, il n'y 
 aurait point de composi. 
 
 § 62. What we have at this point is this : each is 
 the concrete unity of both, each is, therefore, the 
 whole of magnitude, which indeed was both. (§ 60.) 
 But now, the two limit one another. (Ibid.) What 
 we really have then is, self-limiting magnitude. But 
 magnitude as limiting itself is definite magnitude {a 
 magnitude, a quantity) or what, as the second term 
 to magnitude, we call quantum. This we must think 
 if we are to think magnitude completely. 
 
 The transition from magnitude to a magnitude or 
 to quantum, which the section shows, has no other mean- 
 ing than that, if magnitude is thought out, a magni- 
 tude is thought. The empirical observation that, in 
 order to think magnitude, one must think something 
 having magnitude as the substrate of it, although it 
 makes this transition appear as one which we 
 ordinarily make, does not show the necessity of it. 
 
 B. Quantum. 
 
 § 63. As from the transition (§ 62) results as the 
 concept of quantum, that it is definite or limited 
 magnitude, (1) further, since it was magnitude that 
 limited itself, quantum is the same with its limit 
 coincides ® with it, and, finally, since magnitude was 
 indifferent limit which the limited also transcended 
 
QUANTITY. 6 1 
 
 (§ 56, obs.), quantum, as that which coincides with its 
 limit, will be indifferent to itself, and pass beyond 
 itself. Thereby it will be that which is indifferent to 
 its own alteration, or absolutely variable/ 3 ) 
 
 If in our idea of quantum all the developed deter- 
 minations should be contained, then the choice of the 
 term for this category would be justified. (1 > But 
 that quantum is a (i.e., determined) magnitude is sug- 
 gested even by language ; ® that a quantum is that 
 which coincides with its limit is continually asserted 
 when it is said that the nature of a magnitude con- 
 sists in magnitude, or that it becomes quantity by 
 quantity ; but that by which a thing becomes a thing 
 was its limit. (Cf. § 45.) Finally, ® the deter- 
 mination of being indifferent to itself is brought out 
 by the mathematical explanation of magnitude, which 
 says that a magnitude is that which may be increased 
 or diminished, i.e., altered without alteration of its 
 nature ; any quantum may be transcended, because it 
 is that which is indifferent to itself. Absolute varia- 
 bility is, therefore, what constitutes the nature of 
 quantum. 
 
 § 64 (a). Also here must be found, degraded to 
 moments, hence essentially modified, those determina- 
 tions in quantum from whose contradiction it re- 
 sulted. {Cf. § § § 23, 25, 26, and elsewhere.) First, 
 must be contained therein what there was discretion ; 
 that is, quantum will contain in itself the moment of 
 the many. But since it was shown that this moment 
 was identical with that opposed to it by which 
 magnitude was a continuous unity (§ 68), the many 
 
62 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 as moment of quantum will be many as forming a 
 unity, i.e., plurality. , (1) This moment of quantum we 
 call annumeration (anzahl) ; it is discretion as sub- 
 lated. But, secondly, there must be contained in 
 quantum what previously constituted the continuity 
 of magnitude (§ 59) ; on this side, quantum will be 
 unity, but, because now unity no longer stands opposed 
 to the many, but has become identical with it (cf § 
 64), this, like that, becomes plural, i.e., unities!® 
 The real identity of these two moments is quantum 
 as an annumeration of unities, i.e., number. 1 ® Pro- 
 perly, therefore, quantum is number. W 
 
 (1) Scarcely in the case of any category has lan- 
 guage so aptly anticipated thought as in that of 
 quantity. The many which are self-exclusive it 
 shows as becoming plurality by uniting themselves. 
 < 2 ' Similarly, it speaks of unities, whereas until now 
 unity was in its concept a mere singular. <& That 
 number has as its moments unities and annumeration 
 may also be sensibly represented by uniting numbers 
 as products or as fractions, the multiplicand in the 
 first case, the denominator in the second, representing 
 unity, while the multiplier in the first case, the 
 numerator in the second, represents annumeration. 
 Whenever one of these moments disappears, number 
 ceases, since o or oo takes its place. They form the 
 limits of mere number. When in the case of a con- 
 tinuously increasing magnitude we go beyond it, 
 there enters into its place something not merely quan- 
 titative, but essentially other — instead of a positive a 
 negative. <$ Number is a category ; in this lies the 
 justification of subjecting everything spiritual as well 
 
QUANTITY. 63 
 
 as natural to calculation. The Pythogoreans re- 
 garded it as the highest category. The correct percep- 
 tion that two moments (the airupov and the Trepaivovra) 
 constitute the essence of number, is not wanting 
 among them. Every quantum is number. Spatial 
 magnitudes form no exception : a spatial quantum is 
 the number of spatial unities. 
 
 § 65. Since numbers are thought-determinations, 
 operation upon them is thought; since they are 
 thought-determinations of externality (§ 57), such 
 operation is external thought or reckoning. Reckon- 
 ing is the production of numbers, or numbering.^ 
 Since, because of the externality of number, numbers 
 are outside one another, and also their moments can 
 separate, there is an opposition in numbers, in that 
 numbers may be produced by composition or by 
 being reckoned together, i.e., when separate numbers 
 or their separate moments are united, or by decom- 
 position, or being taken separately, as when, on the 
 contrary, one divides what is united. (2) The real 
 foundation of the entire system of number is formed 
 by number in its immediacy, which, as such, will be 
 first in that system. (§ 27, obs.). If number had as 
 its moments annumeration and unity, the most im- 
 mediate, i.e., the first mode of its unity, will be where 
 with unity (or annumeration), also unity with an- 
 numeration (or unity), is immediately posited. Num- 
 ber in its immediacy is, therefore, one (1x1 = 1). 
 
64 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 By the position of one, the series of numbers origin- 
 ates. (3) 
 
 W The act of numbering is not XoyiK-q, it is true, 
 but yet XoyurriK-q. < 2 ' Like variability, calculability, 
 i.e., the ability to be compounded and decompounded, 
 does not find in the nature of number its limit. 
 Hence here even the impossible (imaginary) is per- 
 mitted. Only the Platonic numbers, which are more 
 than mere numbers, concepts, are oo-u/ijSAijToi. ® One 
 is the real principle of numbers, hence even by 
 the Pythagoreans so taken. It is number as not 
 posited, in so far number in itself. (§41, obs.) Hence 
 it comes that every number (a) as not posited (a°) 
 equals 1. In their principle all numbers are the 
 same, namely, one. 
 
 § 66. All the various forms of reckoning are based 
 upon certain elementary operations which are the 
 fundamental modes (species) of it, but are themselves, 
 again, posited by the concept of number. The first 
 mode of reckoning consists in the operation in which 
 from number, i.e., immediate number, numbers are 
 compounded (summing), a process which has as its 
 negative correlate diminishing or differencing. The 
 second mode of reckoning occurs where unity and 
 annumeration, taken separately, are operated upon. 
 Numbers are produced^ when one number is posited 
 as unity, another as annumeration, one is separated 
 into its moments, the number being sought which 
 was the unity therein or that which was annumera- 
 tion (quotient), the latter process giving the correlate 
 
QUANTITY. 65 
 
 of production, so-called division. While, in the first 
 mode, one had to do with the immediate unity of 
 unity and annumeration, and, in the second, with the 
 separation of hoth, the third mode of reckoning 
 combines the other two, since one produces numbers 
 from one number by positing the same number as 
 unity and annumeration — -potentiation (i.e., producing 
 squares and higher powers ® or such numbers as are 
 posited as identical with one another, and therefore 
 are mediated by their self -external being) together 
 with its correlate, the determination of roots. Herewith 
 is concluded the circle of the elementary operations, 
 which had to be discussed on account of what is to 
 follow. 
 
 (1) Hence a product is a more intimate and there- 
 fore higher unity than a sum, and if arithmetical ex- 
 pressions may at all be employed to denote concrete 
 unities, one may, if necessary, call that into which 
 a chemical combination is decomposed its factors, 
 but not its components, i.e., summands. W The 
 concept, stated in this section, of power makes it 
 clear why many philosophers are fond of using this 
 category. In fact, the nature of the concept is con- 
 tained in it only in an external manner. (See § 141, 
 obs. 2.) 
 
 § 67 (b). Quantum (or number, see § 64) was mag- 
 nitude which was identical with its limit. Looking 
 to the limit of it, we shall thereby know how 
 quantum is in the first instance to be conceived. By 
 
66 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 the limit of quantum or number is to be understood 
 merely that by which this definite quantum is this 
 one number, hence that which completes this number. 
 But now the number, one hundred (for example), is 
 completed by no other number than the hundredth, 
 but, since no one of the hundred is not the hundredth, 
 all make a hundred complete. In one hundred, there- 
 fore, is contained the limit of the hundred. But now 
 in a hundred (1100), hundred is precisely the moment 
 of annumeration. (§ 64, obs. 3.) In the first instance, 
 therefore, we shall have to take quantum in the 
 aspect which it has through annumeration. Number, 
 quantum, posited as annumeration, is extensive quantum, 
 a body or number of somethings. 
 
 With reason does Hegel condemn the confounding 
 (which, for the rest, is explicable by the concept 
 given of discretion and annumeration) of discrete and 
 extensive magnitudes, since discretion is a determina- 
 tion of magnitude in itself, extension of quantitative 
 limit. ("Works," iii., p. 252 [242].) The question 
 whether a person has much money has reference 
 merely to the being large of his means, they may 
 be large even when diminished; the question how 
 large they are, how much he has, aims at know- 
 ing the extension of his possession, which extension 
 really becomes different with every change. Magni- 
 tude in general is conceivable even without number, 
 whereas an extensive quantum requires number. 
 But number itself is not yet extensive quantum ; 
 but in the latter, so-called denominate number, it 
 forms the co-efficient (for example, twenty apples.) 
 
QUANTITY. 67 
 
 Rightly does one here call twenty the annumera- 
 tion (Anzahl) of apples ; in fact, number (Zahl) is 
 here posited as annumeration, i.e., it is related to that 
 which gives the denomination precisely as the first of 
 its moments to the second. This determination of 
 quantum is the first ; hence in the common usage of 
 speech quantum is usually taken only so. Maimon's 
 definition is that extensive quantum is plurality as 
 unity. Kant defines similarly. By what is joined 
 to the number — the denomination — number forfeits a 
 part of its variability and calculability. Extensive 
 quantum is increased or diminished by leaps, because 
 in it the moment of discretion repeats itself. Of 
 course in higher potency ; hence was fault found 
 above when extensive quantum and discrete magni- 
 tude are interchanged. 
 
 § 68 (c). As quantum in general, so is also extensive 
 quantum something definite, distinct from all others. 
 But (§ 67) it is determined by annumeration, i.e., the 
 moment of plurality. (§64.) Without plurality, there- 
 fore, extensive quantum would not be this definite 
 thing, i.e., it presupposes plurality. This being 
 understood, really, when we think extensive quantum 
 there is consistently thought a quantum which is a 
 simple determination, which, however, presupposes 
 plurality, from which it is distinct, but which, never- 
 theless, it contains as a sublated moment. Even this 
 quantum, although distinct from mere number, will 
 require it as its co-efficient. (See § 67, obs.) But, like 
 the quantum itself, whose co-efficient it is, number 
 here gives not so much an annumeration as, rather, a 
 
68 CA TEGORIES OF IMMEDIA C Y. 
 
 simple determination which, of course, contains and 
 hence presupposes an annumeration as sublated 
 moment ; i.e., the co-efficient is here an ordinal 
 number which gives not the sum but the position. 
 Quantum so conceived is intensive quantum, or degree. 
 If in extensive quantum, quantum was as annumera- 
 tion, it is here posited as unity, so that in extensive 
 and intensive quantum the concept of quantum is 
 completely posited. 
 
 The word degree we use wherever one determina- 
 tion (the twentieth degree of heat is only one heat, 
 the twentieth degree of latitude is only one latitude) 
 is different from all others (the twentieth degree is 
 another heat than the nineteenth) ; although it is not 
 without it (the twentieth degree is not without the 
 nineteenth), nay, it contains them all, as sublated (in 
 the twentieth degree the nineteenth is contained as 
 having been, i.e., as sublated). Hence degree, accord- 
 ing to Kant and Maimon, is unity thought as plurality. 
 But plurality is taken as passed through, i.e., as sub- 
 lated. For the rest, the analogy between degree and 
 continuity is so apparent that one can not wonder if 
 some entirely confound them. 
 
 § 69. To be extensive and intensive belongs to 
 quantum by its concept. It is the former when 
 posited as annumeration, the latter when posited as 
 unity. Neither, therefore, is to be thought without 
 the other. That extensive quantum refers to inten- 
 sive as its truth, has been shown (§ 68) ; but in 
 similar manner the latter refers back to the former. 
 
QUANTITY. 69 
 
 Definite degree, that is to say, is one simple deter- 
 mination, distinct from all others ; but since all other 
 (lower) degrees are contained, sublated, in it, it has 
 in these its annumeration, i.e., its extension!?* Every 
 extensive quantum is, therefore, also intensive, and 
 vice versa!® To put forward only one of the two 
 determinations is to involve oneself in insoluble diffi- 
 culties.® 
 
 W Since the twentieth degree contains in itself 
 the nineteenth, eighteenth, etc., i.e., twenty degrees, 
 instead of saying (intensively) the twentieth degree 
 we often say (extensively) twenty degrees of heat. 
 < 2 > The greater the mass (extensive) the greater the 
 pressure (intensive) ; the greatness (intensive) of the 
 character shows itself as a series (extensive) of deeds ; 
 the higher degree of heat as also a greater quantum of 
 heat (matter) ; the higher tone as a larger number of 
 vibrations. Often in the ordinary reckonings having 
 to do with intensive magnitudes, one treats them as 
 extensive; as, for example, when one speaks of twenty 
 pounds of force, etc. Only in higher analysis is the 
 strength (i.e.,, the degree) of change taken into account 
 without such transformation. @> The dispute of 
 atomism and dynamism in the natural sciences which 
 mostly, that is, in the application of numbers, turns 
 upon the distinction between extensive and intensive 
 magnitude is, therefore, idle. 
 
 § 70. But as discretion and continuity, though not 
 to be thought without one another (§ 61), were the 
 negation each of the other, so also the two higher 
 powers of them, extensive and intensive quantum, 
 exhibit, besides their inseparability just pointed out, 
 
70 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY 
 
 also a negative relation to one another. The prac- 
 tical human understanding, which supposes that with 
 increasing extension intensity is endangered, &> is 
 not entirely mistaken ; extensive quantum and in- 
 tensive quantum limit one another, and hence displace 
 one another. But then, since quantum is completely 
 thought only as both, it follows that the more com- 
 pletely it is thought, the more it contradicts itself. 
 Therefore, it forever ceases to be quantum, < 2) and in 
 the end the result is that, as quantum has proved to be 
 the truth of the category of magnitude, so the former 
 yields place to the still higher category of quantum 
 which is not quantum. Whoever operates upon that 
 thinks in a manner which, though doubtful to the 
 elementary (§ 66) reckoner, who has operated upon 
 mere quanta, can not seem strange to the logician. 
 The formula just used states, though in the first 
 instance only negatively, the concept of quantitative 
 relation as also of the quantitative infinite. 
 
 W The distinction that is usually made between 
 multum and multa contrasts strangely with the fact 
 that we are nevertheless (see § 69, 2) in the habit of 
 making the latter the measure of the former. < 2 > With 
 this coheres the fact that already in extensive quan- 
 tum calculability (§ 65, 2) begins to lose itself. The 
 denomination is in calculation neglected, has meaning 
 only in the application. Denominate numbers cannot 
 be multiplied. In intensive quantum there occurred 
 when one would reckon with that, a reduction to 
 the extensive. 
 
QUANTITY. 71 
 
 C. Quantitative Relation. 
 
 § 71. Every quantitative relation is, first, some- 
 thing definite, invariable; as such it is represented 
 by the exponent.*?* At same time it appears, secondly, 
 as a variable in the sides which compose it. But both 
 are one quantum, and are therefore rightly joined by 
 the sign =, (J = e). Since thus the exponent (be- 
 cause not variable) is, according to § 62, 3, no longer 
 mere quantum, while the sides are mere quanta, but 
 both are the same, there is, in every quantitative 
 relation, contained the contradiction above developed. 
 (§ 70.) But since every unity of opposed determinations 
 can be represented as an endless progression (§ 49), 
 the concept given throws light upon the meaning of 
 the quantitative infinite® as upon its application in 
 reckoning/ 3 ^ 
 
 (1) By the exponent of the relation I shall mean 
 merely the unalterable unit, which shows what the 
 relation is. (2 > By infinitely great (or small) magni- 
 tudes are meant such as cannot be transcended, i.e., 
 according to the definition (§ 63, obs. 3) such as are 
 not quanta. < 3 > Every relation, that is to say, may 
 be represented as an infinite series (e.g., 1 + x + x 2 
 
 4- x 3 — — — ), and the series may be summed up 
 
 in the relation which they represent ; finally reckon- 
 ing may be made with relations of magnitudes in the 
 moment of their vanishing, or of the elements 
 (principles) of these magnitudes. Only where re- 
 
72 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 lations are concerned is there necessarily reckoning 
 with the infinite. 
 
 § 72 (a). The variable sides compose the relation, 
 and, since the exponent says what the relation is, 
 they compose it. But if the exponent is a number, 
 the two sides will have merely the mean- 
 ing of being moments of a number. Each side is 
 therefore an imperfect quantum, has its completion in 
 the other, and will therefore be also variable only 
 with the other. The relation, therefore, appears in 
 the first instance as the relation in which one side 
 changes just as the other does, i.e., as direct relation. 
 
 It is the first, hence the most superficial, mode of 
 relation, and in higher spheres gives way to higher 
 modes. 
 
 § 73 (o). But this relation contradicts itself if we 
 pay regard to the exponent. This was said to be the 
 unity of both as its moments, but it is so neither in the 
 direct arithmetical relation, since there, as difference, 
 it shows precisely wherein the two sides do not 
 coincide/ 1 ) nor in the direct geometrical relation, for 
 there it is a quotient, and hence, since a quotient was 
 only unity or annumeration, it is merely a moment of 
 number, and therefore equal to only one side!® But 
 since it was made up of doth sides the relation will 
 correspond to its concept only where the exponent 
 contains both sides, whether as summands or as factors. 
 
QUANTITY. 73 
 
 In both cases we have inverse relation, in the first, 
 arithmetical,^ in the second, geometrical. <*) But 
 not only here (when it is sum or product), rather than 
 in direct relation does the exponent correspond to its 
 concept, but so also does the relation of the sides, 
 since here is posited what there merely was to be. 
 In the alteration of one side the other should alter in 
 like manner. This does not really happen in direct 
 relation, since the second side always appears as the 
 dependent and non- variable.® In inverse relation, 
 on the contrary, the second side alters exactly as 
 does the first, since it makes its change in opposition 
 to that of the latter.® 
 
 W If in the relation y — x = e, y and x are rect- 
 angles of equal bases, which, for comparison's sake, 
 are made to coincide, e is not that which is common 
 to both. (2) If y : x is reduced to the simplest 
 form by putting x = l, then e=y, i.e., one side. 
 ® Two radii vectores from one point of an ellipse are 
 in inverse arithmetical relation, because here y+x = e. 
 < 4 > The length of the arm of the balance (y) and 
 the weight (x) are in inverse geometrical relation, 
 because yx = e. ® In fact, if the rectangle x in- 
 creases, y remains that which exceeds it by e, or 
 if in y : x = e, y was the double of x, and this in- 
 creases, y remains its double. W Hence is inverse 
 relation, as the truth of the direct, higher than it ; 
 and in higher spheres, force, etc. (for example), 
 increase by use (negation). 
 
 § 74 (c). If in the inverse arithmetical relation the 
 exponent is, as the sum of the sides, their unity, 
 
74 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 so in the geometrical is it, as their product, a 
 definite quantum in which their identity is posited 
 as that of unity and annumeration. But at the 
 same time the two sides whose unity forms the 
 exponent separate, and indeed, forever, for, since 
 neither of the two moments can disappear, so neither 
 can become the exponent ; and, since this was the 
 unity of both, neither can become unity with the 
 other/ 1 ) We have, therefore, the status on the 
 one hand, that the exponent is a definite complete 
 quantum, i.e., is identical with itself; on the other 
 hand, that, since its moments are forever separate, 
 the exponent does not come to be or is not. Since, 
 now, the unity of being and not being is becoming, 
 the exponent of the relation is really to be taken 
 as becoming, as coming to be. The relation with 
 such exponents is variable or living (2 > relation, 
 the truth and concrete unity of the direct and the 
 indirect relations. The three together form a series 
 which runs parallel to that of quantum/ 3 ) Accord- 
 ing to the concept given (§ 66) of power, it cannot 
 appear strange if the formulae for variable relations 
 contain powers. W In the living relation the con- 
 cept of relation is realised because here both de- 
 terminations of the relation, the being constant, 
 the being variable, are posited in the self- developing 
 exponent. (B) 
 
QUANTITY. 75 
 
 W An endless approximation is posited : m (say 
 the length of the arm of the balance) may increase, 
 but since n (the weight) can never entirely disappear, 
 it can never become the entirely static moment. 
 ( 2) Hence expressions are here employed which are 
 taken from life, as members (of a series), functions, 
 increments, etc. ^Numbers may stand in direct re- 
 lation ; multitudes belong to inverse relation, while 
 degrees, as intensities, are sides of the living relation 
 which the continual change of an intensity (curva- 
 tive, for example) displays. (4) Therefore, we meet 
 the relation of power in the so-called living forces. 
 < 6 > In development that which changes yet remains 
 identical with itself.- If in the equations of the 
 straight line and the parabola, we designate the 
 unchangeable by e, the formulae ex = y, and ex=y 2 , 
 or still better, 7 / x = e, and y / x = j afford examples in 
 which the distinction of the direct relation is im- 
 mediately evident, since it appears that in the ex- 
 ponent of the latter relation are contained deter- 
 minations which constitute the relation. 
 
 § 75. Viewing relation in its entirety, we find in it 
 a determination which prepares the transition to a 
 new group of categories. Relation is a quantitative 
 category ; but, at the same time, was relation declared 
 (§ 70) to be no longer mere quantum, and how far it 
 is not this has now been shown : absolute variability 
 has vanished, for relation is only as it is, this definite 
 relation ; if the attribute alters, the relation also 
 alters. But it was the essence of qualitative attri- 
 butes that with them that which is determined by 
 them also alters. Eeally, therefore, we have in rela- 
 
76 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 tion an attribute which, though of a quantitative 
 kind, has yet become qualitative also.W Such an 
 attribute we call mode,*® and to the categories of 
 quality and those of quantity the categories of 
 modality < s > or of mode form the third group. 
 
 W This gives the positive determination to the 
 merely negative in § 70. Relations are not merely 
 quantitative, but also at the same time qualitative 
 determinations. Rightly is it said that the exponent 
 states what sort of a relation two numbers form. In 
 so far may the exponent be called the qualitative in 
 the relation. Hence it was correctly said of infinite 
 magnitudes, quantitatively taken, that they are = 0, 
 but that they had a qualitative meaning. Since in 
 the variable relation as the highest relation the 
 qualitative chiefly is active, the calculation of the 
 infinite occurs principally where such relations are 
 concerned. Degree was the category in which above 
 all mere quantums was sublated : it has, therefore, 
 more qualitative meaning than has extensive quan- 
 tum. Just on that account is every distinction of 
 degree already qualitative. Hence, in nature every 
 quality exists in a definite degree, or to have a de- 
 finite intensity is the manner in which natural quali- 
 ties are quantitative. The definition of degree, that it 
 is the qiiantity (better quantum) of a quality is not 
 incorrect. Conversely, the category of degree is 
 always applied where not so much things as rather 
 their qualities are to be quantitatively determined. 
 
 ( 2 ) Since the various meanings of this word will 
 gradually appear as various determinations of one 
 concept, the choice of the name will be justified. 
 
 ( 3 ) The word modality is here not taken in the merely 
 subjective sense in which Kant used it ; rather in the 
 sense in which it is taken when one, say, terms 
 
QUANTITY. 77 
 
 the d7ro<j!>avcreis juera rpoirov of the Aristotelians modal 
 judgments. 
 
 § 76. Also here a recapitulation of the completed 
 course {cf. § § 28 and 54) lets us see how under the 
 general superscription Quantity (§ 56, obs. 2), three 
 distinct groups arose as sub-divisions, which, in 
 parallelism with the qualitative categories, gave us 
 first indefinite magnitude, then definite magnitude, or 
 quantum, and, finally, discovered quantitative relation, 
 which last shows magnitude in its infinitude and also 
 in its transition beyond the merely quantitative 
 sphere. 
 
Ill— THIRD CHAPTER. 
 
 MODE. 
 
 §77. By " Mode" we mean that attribute which is 
 both quantitative and qualitative, in that by its quan- 
 titative being it is qualitative, by its qualitative 
 being it is quantitative. The development of this 
 important concept, which, as the unity of quantity 
 and quality, is their truth, consists in the positing of 
 the individual moments contained in it, whereby its 
 realisation comes to pass. This is accomplished when 
 all determinations contained in it are posited, and it 
 is determined as the unity of them. (§ 41, obs. 5.) 
 
 W On account of the ambiguity and the great 
 indefiniteness of this term, we take it, similarly as 
 in the preceding chapter we took the word Quantity, 
 as the superscription of the entire chapter, instead 
 of the term measure used by Hegel, which is proper 
 for one kind only of mode. (See § 78.) (2) If, there- 
 fore, the view was characterised (§ 56, obs. 1) as 
 justifiable which sought to reduce qualitative attri- 
 butes to quantitative, there now appears as still more 
 justifiable that view which will explain physical 
 qualities by the different mode of configuration of 
 the atoms, from which also the number of them shall 
 
 78 
 
MODE. 79 
 
 follow. Of course even this mode of view is not the 
 absolutely highest. < 3 > Also here shall we follow 
 the usage of language in justifying it. The various 
 meanings of the word mode are really different 
 determinations of thought. 
 
 § 78 (a). The mode as the unity of quantitative 
 and qualitative attributes appears first as the im- 
 mediate unity of them (§ 27 obs.) This cannot 
 be other than what we had in the transition from 
 quantity to mode. It had been shown that in a 
 quantitative attribute (viz., relation, in which, there- 
 fore, mode already lay dormant) the qualitative 
 came to light. The quantitative, therefore, forms 
 here the real basis, the qualitative appears as the 
 accidental ; the former is the principale, the latter the 
 accessorium. First, therefore, mode will be magnitude 
 upon which quality (quiddity) depends. The deter- 
 mining or modifying is here, therefore, the quantita- 
 tive. This gives us the notion of measure. 
 
 The jxkrpov apurrov is, therefore, something far higher 
 than the admiration of mere magnitude. Vetus 
 verbum est, Deum omnia pondere, mensura, numero 
 fecisse. — Leibnitz. 
 
 § 79. By measure is to be understood that quanti- 
 tative attribute which tells what the quantita- 
 tively determined object is. In all languages this 
 what is itself often a merely quantitative determina- 
 tion. (1) In this case measure is either the unity ^ 
 
80 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 whose annumeration the measured is, or it is an- 
 numeration^ which shows how many of a certain 
 unity the measured contains; in short, we are here 
 always concerned with only a quantitative relation, 
 the discovery of whose exponent is termed measuring. 
 That for which such an exponent cannot he found 
 is called the measureless or the unmeasured S^ it 
 coincides with undetermined magnitude. Like de- 
 gree, this form of measure is still quantitative re- 
 lation/ 6 ) But since everything whatever may be 
 put into relation, measure itself is indifferent, acci- 
 dental ; it is, accordingly as one understands by it 
 rather the unity whose number is to be found in the 
 measure, or the annumeration to which that which 
 is to be measured shall belong — a standard of 
 measure 1 ® or a rule^ in the concept of which, 
 j ust because of contingency, it is contained that the 
 exponent of that relation may be as well irrational 
 as rational. 
 
 (1) So, for example, in an elenchus above-named, 
 heap is just as well a merely quantitative determina- 
 tion as are the distinctions quantitative which are 
 assumed between dwarf and giant. Hence in regard 
 to that elenchus there is no question as to a change 
 of quality. How with quantity quality really alters 
 we shall speak of immediately. (§ 80.) < 2 > So, for 
 example, the ell, the foot, etc., is the measure for a 
 length. < 3 > So, six feet say, are the measure for the 
 height of a man. <*> Hence "measureless, limitless, 
 
MODE. 8i 
 
 numberless," are employed as synonyms. (6) Hence 
 in many phrases (" In a measure" etc.) measure, 
 degree, relation are used as synonyms. ^ A so- 
 called natural, i.e., necessary, standard, i.e., a neces- 
 sary unity for comparison is therefore a contradictio 
 in adjecto. External fitness may determine the 
 choice of the standard, which (choice) otherwise 
 is wholly a matter of indifference. W The rule 
 is merely the greater annumeration of cases ; 
 in its concept it lies, therefore, that it has ex- 
 ceptions. It is essentially distinct from law. That 
 the mode may be mere (contingent, external) rule, 
 appears to be suggested in the use of the word mode 
 in opposition to custom. 
 
 § 80. Because the what which the standard of 
 measure determines is not the real quiddity of the 
 object, the concept of measure is in the standard of 
 measure not yet, or not fully, posited. Measure was 
 to be immediate unity of quantitative and qualitative 
 attribute (§ 78) ; it is, therefore, to be taken rather 
 as a quantitative attribute with which the being- 
 so, or h&mg-this, of the definite object is really com- 
 bined, so that in another magnitude it would really 
 be different. In this case the magnitude will really 
 make the quality ; measure will be quali-fying quan- 
 tum. This quantum has for this reason no longer the 
 character of indifference. The qualifying quantum 
 will, therefore, no longer be a mere quantum, but 
 what makes the object this definite thing will be a 
 quantum of a qualitative being, i.e., a degree of some- 
 thing. (See § 75, 1.) 
 
82 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 As an apposite example of a qualifying quantum 
 that temperature is often cited at which alone water 
 is still water (and not vapour or ice). But it is, then, 
 not its amount {i.e., a definite quantum of water) 
 which makes water water, but a quantum of the heat 
 of the water ; i.e., a qualitative determinateness must 
 exist in a certain degree or a certain quantity, in 
 order that water may preserve the quiddity of water. 
 
 § 81. Qualifying quantum is more than external 
 standard of measure : it is real measure, for it is 
 already what measure was to be, unity of quantitative 
 and qualitative attribute. This unity is here first 
 immediate (§ 78), hence unity as being. (§ 29.) But 
 being was identical with not-being or passed into it 
 (§ 30) ; because of the immediacy of that coincidence 
 the quantitative and the qualitative attributes will 
 likewise separate, and since here the quantitative had 
 the meaning of the principale (§ 78), the qualitative, 
 that of the accessorium, the quantitative attribute 
 will, in this separation, show itself as preponderant in 
 the fact that it has a greater breadth. Quiddity will, 
 therefore, be completely joined to the qualifying 
 quantum, but not the latter to the former. There- 
 fore will the quantum retain the nature of mere 
 quantum in so far as it also may be altered without 
 the quiddity undergoing alteration. 
 
 In the example cited water remains water when it 
 rises from 40° to 50° of heat, though it has taken up 
 a greater quantum of heat. On the contrary, the 
 
MODE. 83 
 
 quiddity of the water can not change unless the 
 quantum of heat were altered. 
 
 § 82 (a). But if thus the unity of quantitative at- 
 tribute and qualitative attribute just as much is as 
 it is not, and being and not-being had their real truth 
 in cessation and origination (§ 33), this will appear 
 also here. Now will the qualifying quantum be mere 
 indifferent quantum, which may be altered, its unity 
 having ceased with a definite quiddity, and now 
 again, this unity come forth so that with the altera- 
 tion of this quantum there immediately, and therefore 
 suddenly, comes into being another quiddity. There- 
 fore the qualifying quantum, or the real measure, will 
 lie between limits ; and within these limits or within 
 this measure a certain quiddity will be found. If 
 the measure be exceeded, another quiddity comes into 
 being. 
 
 The phenomena, that in the gradual heating of water 
 there occurs a point where suddenly it is converted 
 into vapour, or that gases under continued pressure 
 suddenly become liquid, because the measure, of heat- 
 ing or pressure has been exceeded ; phenomena which 
 have their analoga in the mental sphere, are examples 
 of the passage of the merely quantitative into quali- 
 fying quantum. It is usual to call them incompre- 
 hensible. They are comprehended when we have seen 
 that such a passage is necessary. Of course they are 
 not thereby explained. Explanation has to do with 
 the nm, comprehension only with the Sloti. " The 
 greatest enemy of the concept," says Hegel, "is 
 
84 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 How.'' A phenomenon is understood or explained 
 when it is genetically developed (§ 17) ; comprehended 
 through its dialectical deduction. So soon as some- 
 thing is seen to be necessary it is comprehended, even 
 though unexplained, and indeed to remain inexplic- 
 able. If one cites the elenchi of the ancients as 
 examples of this passage, one forgets that heaps and 
 the like are merely quantitative determinations. (§ 
 79, obs. 1.) 
 
 § 83 {b\ If one reflects upon what is really con- 
 tained in the concept stated, the qualitative came 
 forward where the termination of quantum was 
 reached. But this obviously means nothing else than 
 that the quantitative is bounded, limited by the 
 qualitative. Therefore, precisely, is the qualitative 
 the determining. (§ 44.) If, therefore, we think 
 mode as measure logically through, we are compelled 
 to think not so much a qualifying quantum as ra- 
 ther quiddity W determining (quantifying) quantity. 
 Since it as such is coloured by quantity, quantifying 
 quality will have already in itself the quantitative 
 determination/ 2 ) Mode, as precisely quality which 
 is modifying, as consisting in a quality which is not 
 mere quality, but, even quantitatively determined, re- 
 acts against the quantitative determinateness and 
 modifies it, is way or manner. W If in measure 
 mode was posited in its quantitative moment, in way 
 it is posited in its qualitative.^ 
 
 W As an example of this category it may be cited 
 
MODE. 85 
 
 that water, because it is (by its quiddity) water, takes 
 up a definite quantum of heat as different degree of 
 heat from that of ice, say. The different capacities for 
 heat are in nature what in the spiritual sphere per- 
 haps so manifests itself that the same impression has 
 a different effect according to the different condition of 
 that which receives it, because it is its manner so to 
 receive it. (2) In the example cited, the heat capacity 
 of many substances is a definite one only in case of 
 definite temperature, i.e., a definite quantum of heat. 
 In the mental sphere the receptivity which 
 strengthens the impression received has its more or 
 less. Herein lies a difference between quiddity (§ 36) 
 and way or between what and how. Also here it 
 must be observed that with the development of this 
 category these phenomena are not explained, but 
 shown to be necessary, i.e., postulated by reason. 
 (3) Since mode means both way as well as measure, 
 it was chosen as the general superscription. Expres- 
 sions such as that, Everything depends upon manner 
 and way, The value of a gift is increased by the how 
 of the giving, etc., show the great importance which 
 is attributed to this category. W In this sense the 
 sophists take the term measure when in making man 
 the measure of things they make the objective value 
 of all things give way to his subjective condition. 
 The individuality of man is then the modifying 
 element. 
 
 § 84 (c). A further reflection upon the determina- 
 tions thus far considered leads further. The quanti- 
 tative mode limits the qualitative, and vice versa. 
 But if (§ 45, 2) the limited is one with its limit, those 
 two determinations must be thought as one, and, by 
 the combination of what on the one side and what on 
 
86 CA TEG0R1ES OF IMMEDIA C Y. 
 
 the other the mode had been, its concept realised or 
 completely thought. If, now, in measure the first 
 qualitative leading category, being, was joined with 
 first quantitative, magnitude, while in way, when 
 quantum must determine whether it belong to some- 
 thing or to other, and the second quantitative leading 
 category was conditioned by the second qualitative 
 determinateness (§ 35, if.), mode must, where it tran- 
 scends the opposition of those two, show itself as the 
 unity of that which quality and quantity had always 
 shown in their third position. This had been in 
 quality absoluteness, i.e., being-in-and-for-self, but in 
 quantity relation. The complete or real mode will, 
 therefore, be that which shows how one object is re- 
 lated to itself (not to another, but in general, i.e., 
 absolute, or how it is related, properly speaking, with 
 it). 
 
 § 85. That which expresses this relation may, in 
 default of a better term, be called Inner Relation, 
 Proper Being, Inner Nature, unless one will perhaps 
 say property. By it is to be understood that de- 
 pendence of the determinations of measure upon way, 
 and vice versa, which is postulated by reason, which, 
 therefore, wherever it is present, fills the thinker 
 not with admiration but with joy. When definite 
 ways combine only in definite measures, W or, 
 again, certain relations of measure betray themselves 
 
MODE. 87 
 
 in certain constantly appearing ways, this is with 
 reason referred to the property and inner nature 
 of such combinations, and thus is recognised that 
 they have their own mode. Since mode as here 
 conceived combines the two other modal categories, 
 and likewise also the qualitative which contained 
 all other qualitative categories with the quantitative 
 into which all quantitative categories bad entered, — 
 all the categories hitherto considered are in it con- 
 centrated, and a point is reached which is related to 
 the three chapters treated precisely as those (third) 
 categories had been, respectively, related to each 
 chapter. Here a principal division of the logic is 
 concluded. 
 
 W Chemical proportions, in which only definite 
 measures of combinations may enter and be repre- 
 sented by equivalents, find their analogues in the 
 spiritual world. (2 ' Likewise isomorphism. He 
 who does not perceive this to be a logical relation 
 may lapse into astonishment or dream of borrowings 
 when he hears of similarities in Buddhism and 
 Papacy, between Jews and Jesuits, etc. Like 
 relations give like forms, which is precisely their 
 mode. 
 
 § 86. A recapitulation of the course passed over 
 has here more than one purpose. First, it has to 
 show how in the chapter which has received 
 the superscription mode (§ § 77-85) the gradual 
 realisation of this concept has been accomplished, 
 
88 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 in that the mode is conceived first as quantitative 
 or as measure (§ § 78-82), then as qualitative or 
 as way (§ 83), finally, as unity of both, and so as 
 complete and real mode (§ § 84, 85). Secondly, it 
 must bring to consciousness the fact that here a 
 primary group of categories is concluded. This is 
 evident from the fact that just as in the individual 
 chapters closed circles had shown themselves, so 
 also here a relation of return into self appears, 
 whereby those circles become, as it were, points or 
 epicycles in the periphery of a greater circle. The 
 complex of inseparable or being attributes which 
 the first chapter had treated, quality, had given 
 place to the complex of the indifferent, which 
 (quantity) were treated in the second chapter. Since 
 neither could be thought without the other, the de- 
 velopment arrived at determinations in which the 
 indifference is sublated, and which, therefore, are 
 again in being, — in which " again " is suggested that 
 mode or the hozv, although distinct from quality or 
 the what, is, nevertheless, also it in such a manner 
 that it is higher quality, proper or second what. 
 With this second task is naturally combined a third : 
 to fix the superscription which belongs to the 
 finished part. Hegel, in accordance with the prin- 
 ciple mentioned in § 28, obs., uses the word being, 
 of course in a wider meaning than that which 
 
MODE. 89 
 
 it had there, where it denoted the first category. 
 Since being had been equal to immediacy, it is no 
 deviation from him when, instead of being, immediacy 
 was placed. Categories of immediacy are, however, 
 those thus far considered : first, because as the first, 
 presupposing no others, they are employed W by 
 the first thought which presupposes no preparation 
 for it, hence is immediate. Hence this first part of 
 the logic may be characterised as the logic of natural 
 thought (2) or of life, a fact in which the peculiar 
 difficulty precisely of this part is explained.® 
 Secondly, they were so called because they leave 
 the object to which they are applied, in its im- 
 mediacy ; do not, as do those hereafter to be treated, 
 take it as mediated in itself, so that with the aid of 
 the categories hitherto considered the object is taken 
 just as it is, while the later categories, where they 
 are applied, cause the being-just-so as well as being 
 to disappear. ^ 
 
 W Naming, numbering, measuring as answers to 
 the questions quid ? quantum? quomodo? are the first, 
 hence entirely natural forms of thought. < 2 > The later 
 categories are those which artistic and scholastic and 
 scientific thought applies. (3) To reflect upon reflec- 
 tive thought is easy for every one, whereas to study 
 undeveloped and unreflected thought is difficult, for 
 the same reason that the simplest occurrences in the 
 organism are investigated later than are the more 
 complex. Because it is not so easy to study exactly 
 
90 CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY. 
 
 naming and counting as judging and concluding ; the 
 former is more seldom done, and when one does it, he 
 must have it said of himself that he busies himself 
 with what does not belong to logic or the theory of 
 thought. As if counting were not a kind of think- 
 ing ! W Compare the answers which are received 
 to questions quid? and quantum? with those which 
 tit qua de causa ? and cui bono ? and it will be found 
 that there the answer states one thing which the 
 object is, while here a relation of two is always 
 stated, and the concern is about such a thing (cause, 
 end, etc.) as the object, not is, but has. To have is 
 the negation of to be : it therefore serves, in many 
 languages, to form the preterite of it. 
 
 § 87. The passage to a new group of categories is 
 mediated by the perception that in those last con- 
 sidered there begins to disappear the character which 
 all the categories of the First Part had had. That had 
 been the real how, the category which we apply 
 when we observe how it stands with the object, or how 
 the object is related to itself in itself. But since a re- 
 lation is conceivable only between two things, we have 
 in that question really no longer exercised a thought 
 which is a taking of objects just as they are, but is 
 a dualising thinking, i.e., what is usually termed re- 
 flection. (§ 13.) By this position of duplicity the 
 hitherto simple being separates in two, and it is no acci- 
 dent that for the designation of that category there 
 offer themselves only terms which require a comple- 
 ment. (Proper suggests an improper, inner an outer.) 
 
MODE. 91 
 
 For such duplication the name of immediacy is no 
 longer appropriate, and so the last modal category 
 formed the threshold to a group of categories, which, 
 just because immediacy has ceased to be we may 
 characterise as the categories of mediation. 
 
Seconfc part. 
 
 CATEGORIES OF MEDIATION. 
 
 ESSENCE. 
 
 § 88. As, wherever a hitherto whole suffers diremption, 
 
 instead of it, two things appear, each as the whole 
 
 but in opposite ways, thus negating W one another, so 
 
 we are compelled at the point reached, to think, 
 
 instead of being which is in itself one and whole, two 
 
 negations of it which are related to one another as 
 
 kernel and shell. To these thoughts correspond 
 
 completely the words essence and appearance, which 
 
 both negate® being, but not as not-being, for this 
 
 they do not both denote but as being proper < s ) and 
 
 improper. Essence and appearance are, therefore, 
 
 diametrically opposed to one another, since the former 
 
 is thought as that which cannot appear, the latter as 
 
 the essenceless, but so that the latter accompanies the 
 
 former, as it were, as a shadow, and appears in it. (4) 
 
 With essence and appearance the circle of mediations 
 
 is entered upon/ B) and if necessity proves to be the 
 
 92 
 
ESSENCE. 93 
 
 highest of all mediations (§ 130, if.), it is here al- 
 ready clear why the position of duplicity was neces- 
 sary to the perception of it. (§ 12.) 
 
 (1) Let one think of yolk or kernel and shell into 
 which that which has split in two has transformed 
 itself for the child who, hitherto, had seen only one 
 (egg or nut). < 2 >When our language designates 
 subletted being as that which has been, it takes an apt 
 turn. Ai'istotle calls essence to n fjv dvou ; the Middle 
 Age quod erat esse. <& Therefore is essence pre- 
 ferred (§ 86) to being proper, and in the essence of a 
 substance is sought the ground why it combines in 
 itself certain proportions, etc. ^{Cf. § 50, 1.) (6) If 
 God is conceived as essence over against the world as 
 appearance, this is a worthier, because deeper, 
 category than when he is conceived only as great. 
 
 | 89. Essence thought in opposition to appearance 
 gives the concept of the essential, that which in it 
 only appears being the unessential. But since the 
 essential is only as opposed to unessential, the latter is 
 essential to it ; it as much requires the unessential as 
 the unessential does it. Each, therefore, appears in 
 the other, or there exists between them a reciprocal 
 relation, which we call reflection,^ or relativity.^ 
 Like this first mediation, all others also are a 
 reciprocal union one with another. The distinction 
 of this sphere against that of immediacy may, there- 
 fore, be defined as follows : we here have to do with 
 pure determinations of reflection.^ This sphere is, 
 therefore, that of posited contradiction. (4 > As upon 
 
94 CATEGORIES OF MEDIATION. 
 
 this fact rests the difficulty of this sphere, so, on the 
 contrary, contradiction here is, as posited, easier to 
 discover than in the First Part. W 
 
 W This term, borrowed from Optics, is usually 
 taken only subjectively as denoting only our action 
 (see § § 13 and 87), later (§ 95, obs. 1) it will appear 
 in how far one is justified in so taking it. It is here 
 taken objectively as reciprocal reference of things to 
 one another. (2) The categories of relation, which 
 Kant treats beside these of quantity, quality, and 
 modality are, to say nothing of their subjective 
 meaning, only a part of the categories which are here 
 discussed. < s > In the sphere of being everything was 
 immediate, and hence reciprocal reflection did not 
 make its appearance ; one category did not refer 
 immediately to another, but went over into it ; some- 
 thing became other, etc. Here, on the contrary, a 
 reflection is posited. Positive, for example, is not to 
 be thought without negative, cause not with effect, 
 etc. Here always two are posited at once ; relativity 
 and, still, reference to self. (4) In the Introduction 
 (§ 13) it is said that to comprehension belongs re- 
 flection, which discovers contradiction in the object. 
 If later it is shown that the concept, the real object 
 of comprehension, is the unity of being and essence, 
 there will thereby be thrown a clearer light upon the 
 assertion there discussed, that comprehension has to 
 take the object first as it is, then as it contradicts 
 itself. < 6 > The transitions from one determination to 
 another are, therefore, that which is most difficult in 
 the First Part ; here, on the contrary, the difficulty 
 lies rather in abstracting from reflection upon other. 
 
 § 90. Since scientific procedure has to do with 
 necessity, all the mediations here to be considered are 
 
ESSENCE. 95 
 
 forms of scientific, hence also of artistic (by culture) 
 mediated thought, and precisely as the categories of 
 immediacy, those of mediation are so called for a 
 double reason/ 1 ) (Cf. § 86.) As the First Part, as 
 logic of life, criticises the categories of natural 
 thought, so the Second Part criticises the categories 
 of the sciences/ 2 ) The basis of them is constituted by 
 the two just named. They appear, therefore, as the 
 leading categories for the thought which makes the 
 transition from life to the sciences. If one denotes 
 the sphere which separates both by the word school, 
 it is intelligible why the school has elaborated pre- 
 cisely these categories into (exclusive) laws of thought, 
 in that scholastic dogmatism regarded only essence, 
 scholastic scepticism only appearance, as a justified cate- 
 gory. W Co nceiv ability, which alone interests scholastic 
 thought, is by it limited to the applicability only of 
 these two categories. In this the institution which 
 prepares for the scientific career, which (institution) 
 is also called school, follows it.W 
 
 W The first, yet unscientific, thinking is satisfied 
 with discovering quality, with counting, with measur- 
 ing. Quite otherwise does the mind function when it 
 compares (cf. § 95) or seeks grounds (cf. § 102) or will 
 discover efficient forces. (§ 119.) Then it has to do 
 with mediations. It does not stop at the immediate, 
 but, breaking through this, looks behind it, and by 
 means of it finds another. < 2 ) In this criticism they 
 are shown to be untrue ; such, however, they are 
 
96 CATEGORIES OF MEDIATION. 
 
 regarded only from the (philosophical) absolute stand- 
 point. The empiricist, for example, who as such has 
 not risen to this standpoint, but will remain upon the 
 standpoint of experience, i.e., of inceptive thought 
 (cf. my "Outlines of Psychology," § 112), cannot 
 avoid using these categories, any more than natural 
 thought can be satisfied with counting, etc. (3) Hence 
 with one that fear of all appearance which causes 
 him to demonstrate even that which is most 
 obvious, and with the other the tendency to see in 
 everything only appearance, at most, probability. 
 Scholastic dogmatism is related to the undeveloped 
 dogmatism of life as the categories which they 
 employ. The like is true of the two forms of 
 scepticism. Appearance is reflected not-being, essence 
 is reflected being. W It is, therefore, entirely proper 
 when in learned schools the pupils obtain conscious- 
 ness of the determinations of thought which form the 
 foundation for those by the application of which one 
 is scientifically occupied. This the pupil should not 
 yet be ; hence it is not proper to him to gain a judging 
 knowledge of them. If scholastic scepticism had 
 won the victory over dogmatism, there would have 
 been laid down in the gymnasial logic, instead of the 
 familiar three laws, three entirely opposite ones. 
 
 § 91. In the first instance, we have the concept of 
 essence as opposed to essenceless appearance. Now, 
 although (since essence is also what is reflected into 
 appearance) it must, in what is to follow, be shown 
 that mere essence is an abstraction, since it forces 
 itself into the sphere of the appearance standing 
 opposed to it {cf. § 10G), yet, because it has first 
 so presented itself, it is to be conceived as such, and 
 
ESSENCE. 97 
 
 mere essence, or essence in abstracto, is first to be 
 considered. All determinations which are present in 
 this consideration will be predicates of essence, 
 while their opposites may be assigned to appearance 
 or be made predicates of appearance. There is re- 
 quired, therefore, only a more precise consideration 
 of the one in order to know (by inversion) what is 
 true of the other. 
 
L— FIRST CHAPTER. 
 
 ESSENCE AS SUCH. 
 
 § 92. Essence is not being ; to discover it one must 
 not stop at being. (1) On the other hand, one must 
 not, in trying to discover the essence of a thing, 
 think of something entirely different/ 2 ) but only it 
 itself. Hence by essence is to be understood what is 
 not, yet is, being, i.e., reflected being, reference to self, 
 which, however, is mediated by reference to other, 
 which appears in it. This reflected reference we call 
 identity. 
 
 W Here is explained .why, when essence is sought 
 to be discovered, the object is altered (§ 5), i.e., its 
 being is treated as a shell that must be broken 
 through. < 2 ) One must go forward, it is true, but 
 keep by the fact in hand. 
 
 A. Identity. 
 
 § 93. Identity contains in itself the two determina- 
 tions of being and being-returned-into-self. If one 
 
 abstracts from the latter, one has mere indifference, 
 
 98 
 
ESSENCE AS SUCH. 99 
 
 abstract distinctionlessness/ 1 ) i.e., mere being. This 
 is often denoted by the word identity, although it is 
 merely the abstract form of identity, mere indiffer- 
 ence. This empty or abstract identity W is, however, 
 only a moment in identity. Identity is completely 
 conceived only when it is at the same time conceived 
 as actual reference, which as such has for its pre- 
 supposition exclusion (§ § 51, 52), so that the true or 
 concrete identity is the unity of abstract identity and 
 its opposite/ 3 ) i.e., inseparability '.W 
 
 W Hence the word identity is commonly taken 
 as similarity. (2 > Because it is the essence of the 
 thought of the understanding to isolate all deter- 
 minations, and thereby to fix them, this abstract 
 identity is also called identity of the understanding. 
 This abstract identity has been made the leading 
 category in the so-called first law of thought, in the 
 law of identity or of contradiction. It would there- 
 fore be stated, everything is identical, non-identity 
 (contradiction) is mere appearance. The law of 
 identity, A= A (as rule: If one thinks a thing, he 
 thinks only it), is empty, says nothing, because it pre- 
 dicates of A empty identity, pure being. In every 
 judgment one really contravenes this law, because 
 one therein places the subject in relation to a pre- 
 dicate, while this law allows A to be referred only to 
 itself. ( 3> So the proposition (Schelling and Hegel) 
 that identity is unity of identity, and non-identity is 
 entirely correct. (4) This word comes nearest to the 
 concept of identity. If hitherto {e.g., § § 12, 84, and 
 elsewhere) the category of identity was applied, this 
 word is always used in the now developed sense, 
 and this is one of many examples of how one is 
 
ioo CATEGORIES OF MEDIATION. 
 
 compelled to apply categories before they have been 
 critically examined. (Cf. § 21.) How it is with the 
 identity of being and not being, quality and quantity, 
 etc., will therefore properly be here for the first time 
 entirely clear. 
 
 § 94. If identity is to be rightly thought, we must 
 think it as unity or without sameness, i.e., unity of 
 (abstract) identity and non-identity. If we do this, 
 we really think what is called difference^ the 
 reflected form of what we have designated as other- 
 being. ® If, therefore, essence was to be thought 
 as identical with itself, difference is likewise an 
 essential category ; it is, beside identity as the first, 
 the second form of mediation.® Applied as a law 
 of thought, difference gives us the proposition, 
 Everything is different, which, of course, contradicts 
 the proposition of identity. (See § 93, obs. 2.) 
 
 W If one says of two objects that they differ in 
 this or in that, one says thereby that there is some- 
 thing in which they both coincide (are identical), but 
 that at the same time they both differ and are dis- 
 tinguished. (2) In what has just been said the 
 distinction is also given between being different and 
 being other. When two things are different (or each is 
 other) there may be assigned wherein they differ ; on 
 the contrary, this question has no meaning when we 
 have to do with something and other ; the other is not 
 in something but in general the absolutely other; 
 whether it is on that account other, remains un- 
 determined. (Or also thus, in difference the different 
 things are each related to its other.) W Since 
 
ESSENCE AS SUCH. 
 
 identity cannot be (completely) thought without 
 
 difference, one sees that the accusation brought 
 
 against philosophy that it is a system of identity 
 is not so terrible as it at first appears. 
 
 B. Difference. 
 
 § 95 (a). Each of the different is related to itself, 
 and at the same time reflected into its other. If they 
 are taken only in the first determination, they appear 
 as immediately being, and their being reflected into 
 one another then, falls outside of them.W This gives 
 us immediate or external*® difference, diversity. ,< 3) 
 Even in this are to be found, particularly determined, 
 the moments of difference : but identity is, as ex- 
 ternal, likeness; non-identity, as equally external 
 unlikenessS 4 ^ Both are therein contained, hence only 
 the like and unlike may be described (5) or be com- 
 pared as diverse. < 6) 
 
 (1 > In the subject comparing, who then reflects 
 upon them. Since reflection here falls within the one 
 comparing, it appears as the act of that one. {Cf. § 89, 
 obs. 1.) ® Although we regard them as diverse, it 
 appears not to touch things themselves, is external to 
 them. ^ This category is by Leibnitz converted 
 into a law of thought, although, particularly in the 
 grounding of it, the far higher category of end plays 
 a part. This law of thought runs : Everything is 
 diverse ; that the opposite is the case is merely an 
 appearance. A = not - B, or, stated as a rule, If you 
 think A, exclude B — whereby not merely A is thought. 
 
102 CATEGORIES OF MEDIATION. 
 
 WThe categories of externality, i.e., the quantitative, 
 play a very important part in comparison. (6) With- 
 out a tertium comparationis the search for diver- 
 sity is somewhat idle. < 8 > Not accidentally does 
 our language denote the termination of a dispute by 
 the word Vergleich [= comparison taken in the sense 
 of adjustment of a disagreement}. 
 
 § 96. In the concept of diversity there is contained 
 a contradiction which was indicated even in the name 
 when it was described as immediate difference (i.e., 
 relation which excludes relation) — a contradiction 
 which compels us to conceive the merely external 
 difference more inwardly, the immediate difference 
 more essentially. The moments of diversity are like- 
 ness and unlikeness. But likeness = identity of the 
 non-identical, while unlikeness is the non-identity of 
 things compared, i.e., of ones that have become: each 
 moment is therefore the other also ; i.e., each is 
 difference, and, since each side is reflected into the 
 other, we have, as the second form of difference, 
 difference that is reflected into itself, i.e., essential 
 difference. Essential difference is opposition, in which 
 the reflection no longer falls in the comparing subject, 
 but the things distinguished differ in themselves, each 
 of them having in the other its other. Essence is 
 opposition. Opposition is an essential category, and, 
 indeed, higher than mere diversity. 
 
 § 97 (b). As difference, opposition contains the 
 
ESSENCE AS SUCH. 103 
 
 moments of difference in itself. On the one hand, 
 therefore, will be found here identity ; but, since each 
 side is unity with the other, identity in spite of that 
 unity, hence confirmed, posited identity. So like- 
 wise non-identity. Hence opposition is formed ; first, 
 by the different posited as identical — the positive ; (1) 
 second, by the different posited as non-identical — 
 the negative. 1 ® 
 
 (1) The word positive is, . therefore, often used 
 merely to denote the being posited, e.g., positive re- 
 ligion. Here abstraction is made from the fact that 
 it is posited difference. (2) Because opposition is an 
 essential category, it has given content to a law of 
 thought. Everything is an opposite, or it must be 
 either + A or — A, tertium non datur (or is mere appear- 
 ance), is a proposition which completely contradicts 
 the proposition that it is mere A {i.e., neither + nor — ). 
 
 § 98. From the concept given of opposition result, 
 as regards the relation of positive and negative, the 
 following determinations : — Since all things are 
 posited as difference, they are therein alike ; W 
 but since everything is reflected into the other as 
 its other, so everything is inimical to every other, 
 and they cancel one another ;< 2) but, finally, since 
 the positive is the posited identical, 1 ® the negative 
 the posited non-identical, everything has its own 
 specific nature, which belongs not to any other, since 
 the positive appears as that which remains the same, 
 
104 CATEGORIES OF MEDIATION. 
 
 and is therefore determinable, while the negative 
 appears as the changing and determining.^ 
 
 In reckoning with opposite magnitudes all these 
 determinations receive their rights : — (1) As alike 
 they may be summed, and, for example + ae and— ae 
 together make 2ae as the excentricity of the hyper- 
 bola. ( 2 >As cancelling one another + 8 and — 8 
 together = 0. ^ A second power which were not 
 positive would be a contradictio in adjecto because in 
 the second power a number is posited as identical 
 with itself. {Cf. § 66.) <*> The positive multiplier, 
 therefore, does not alter the quality of the multipli- 
 cand, while the negative determines it. The positive 
 appears as the weaker, the negative as the active. 
 So in the difference of sex the woman is the positive, 
 the man the negative moment. {Cf. my " Outlines of 
 Psychology," § 26.) 
 
 § 99. But as diversity points beyond itself, so also 
 does opposition. If, that is to say, we consider its 
 moments, the positive is only by reflection into the 
 negative standing opposed to it, hence is positive 
 only because it is negative (the negative) ; the nega- 
 tive is opposed to it. The negative is only in so far 
 as it is not mere absence but a thing posited, i.e., in so 
 far as it is posiliv e. ( § 97, obs. l.)W Each, therefore, 
 is also identical with its contrary. But if each is 
 really also its contrary, each is really the entire 
 opposite, and since each is directed towards the other, 
 we think, when we think the opposite through, really 
 
ESSENCE AS SUCH. i°5 
 
 the opposite turned against itself, i.e., contradiction 
 as the third and highest form of difference.® 
 
 M Mere privation does not amount to opposition, 
 since opposition has as its conditio sine qud non 
 position. Thus, evil is not mere absence of the good 
 but its negation. < 2 > One needs only to consider the 
 proposition of opposition in the above formula, A = A, 
 more precisely to find contained in it A= not A, for 
 by A is to be understood A taken absolute, and the 
 predicate says that there is nothing of the kind. 
 
 § 100 [c). Contradiction occurs where something 
 is opposed to itself. As are diversity and opposition, 
 so also is contradiction an essential category and 
 deserves, like them, to be predicated of everything.^ 
 Nevertheless, the fear of contradiction is so great 
 that it is characterised as the inconceivable, whereas 
 a multitude of phenomena are real examples of 
 existing contradiction < 2 > without their being looked 
 upon as impossibilities. 
 
 W The commonly so-called proposition of contra- 
 diction does not do this : as the negative form of the 
 proposition of identity it the rather makes contra- 
 diction the predicate of nothing, or explains it as 
 appearance, and must therefore be called the prin- 
 cipium non-contradictionis. <® Motion and life are 
 such examples. Before all, belong here the various 
 phenomena of polarity. These are not exactly pheno- 
 mena of opposition, as Schweigger rightly observes; 
 but in that the unlike are posited as identical, that 
 each of the polar opposites is in tension, i.e., is defec- 
 
io5 CATEGORIES OF MEDIATION. 
 
 tive without its opposite, etc., contradiction appears to 
 us as reality. 
 
 § 101. But of course we cannot stop with con- 
 tradiction, and, in so far, the above-mentioned fear is 
 well grounded. For what is contained in contradic- 
 tion ? Each side of the opposition repels itself. But 
 since each side was the entire opposition (§ 99), 
 and the opposition itself was essence (§ 96), we have 
 the result that essence as contradiction repels itself 
 from itself. Thereby essence is as reflection into self, 
 and the duplicity which it was is posited, and hence, 
 as may be presumed, perfected. In this repulsion, 
 essence will be-, first, essence that is identical with 
 itself, but which repels itself, i.e., ground, and, 
 secondly, essence which is different from itself and 
 self-repelled — consequent. The former repulsion is 
 position ; (1) since essence contradicts itself, it, as 
 ground, posits a consequent, contradiction sublates 
 itself into the relation of ground and consequent.® 
 
 (1) The expression, posit (§ 41), obtains here a 
 closer determination. Posited is that which has a 
 mediated, conditioned being. In the example cited in 
 § 41, obs., there is aground for the object's being here. 
 The posited depends upon the positing, therefore, at 
 one time the being posited may be described as 
 superior (to being-in-self), at another a thing may be 
 described as merely posited, i.e. dependent. (2) When 
 language makes the contradictory fall to the ground, 
 it displays a shrewd perception. It has thus far been 
 
ESSENCE AS SUCH. 107 
 
 presupposed (see § 16), that where contradiction 
 occurs something must follow therefrom. Now that 
 presupposition is proved, since it has been shown that 
 contradiction has its truth in the relation of ground 
 and consequent. 
 
 0. Ground and Consequent. 
 
 § 102. The relation of ground and consequent, the 
 third form of mediation, besides identity and differ- 
 ence, forms, abstractly stated, the unity of both, since 
 wherein what is identical with itself contradiction 
 occurs, this relation also occurs. In it ground is the 
 movement of identity, hence the fixed, while what 
 follows moves, and hence contains contradiction. (§ 100, 
 obs. 2.)W This relation, like those two, is an essential 
 category, and therefore yields the content of a law of 
 thought.® In it the same thing (essence) is twice 
 posited < 3 > in different determinations, which reflect 
 into one another and are inseparable/ 4 ) so that it is 
 merely a violent abstraction, which will separate 
 them or maintain only one as essential. 1 ® Essence 
 is therefore perceived wherever the relation of ground 
 and consequent is perceived. Thereby it is expressed 
 that the two laws of thought thus far considered are 
 inadequate. (6) 
 
 W Empirical science uses these categories especially ; 
 in fact, to seek the ground is more than merely to 
 compare. They are treated as leading categories 
 
108 CATEGORIES OF MEDIATION. 
 
 when (say in a definition of philosophy) knowledge 
 of essence and knowledge of grounds are used promis- 
 cui. ® Particularly in Leibnitz is the proposition 
 of (sufficient) ground treated as sucb. Baumgarten 
 has rightly rounded out the Leibnitzian proposition 
 into his principium rationis et ratiocinati. Everything 
 has a ground means, everything is a consequent; 
 everything has a consequent means, everything is a 
 ground. This proposition says that groundlessness or 
 consequencelessness is mere appearance. (3) Ground 
 and consequent are the same essence ; hence Jacobi is 
 right in his polemic against the application of this 
 category to the relation of God and the world. (4) It 
 is, therefore, difficult to define the ground otherwise 
 than through the consequent, or vice versa. (6) Such 
 abstraction is it, for example, when one will justify 
 an action (quite in the masculine manner) only by 
 its grounds, or (quite femininely) only by its conse- 
 quences. (6) Hence the effort of Herbart, in order to 
 rescue the proposition of identity, to eliminate that of 
 ground. In fact, the latter has as its scheme, A = B, 
 that is, if you think something, think (at the same 
 time) other. (Cf. § 93, 2.) 
 
 § 103. If one considers this relation more closely, 
 it appears (a) that the consequent is the same with 
 the ground, only that it is it in the way of being 
 posited (§ 101) ; it is therefore so related to the 
 ground that the ground is, in itself, impliciti, what 
 explicite, or posited, is contained in the consequent. 
 The ground as in itself the consequent is the germ or 
 source from which the consequent issues. 
 
 This determination is correctly stated by the ex- 
 pression : Omne (animal) ex ovo. 
 
ESSENCE AS SUCH. 109 
 
 § 104 (b). But since the ground repels the conse- 
 quent, it stands opposed to it ; the repelled and ex- 
 pelled is therefore an other than it. The ground, as 
 referring itself to the consequent as its other, distinct 
 from it, is what is called condition or occasion under 
 which or through which the consequent issues. 
 
 The theory of generatio aequivoca, which, even if it 
 were not confirmed in experience, would therefore 
 not be irrational, will allow the consequent to occur 
 only under external conditions. The good reasons, 
 which a sophistical raisonnement has ready for every- 
 thing, are chiefly mere occasions. 
 
 § 105 (c). But even hereby the concept of ground 
 is not exhausted. If, that is to say, the consequent 
 is another than the ground, its being is the not-being 
 of the ground. The ground, therefore, in positing the 
 consequent, really posits its own not-being, i.e., sublates 
 itself. W The ground, as positing the consequent only 
 by its self-sublation (or negation of self), is foundation 
 or presupposition, compared with which the conse- 
 quent, because it is the ipresupposing, appears as the 
 higher/ 2 ) 
 
 W The concept of ground as foundation, i.e., as 
 that which grounds only as directed to the ground, 
 has been admirably discussed by Schelling (" Treatise 
 on Freedom," and particularly, " Memorial to Jacobi "). 
 Only as so understood is the concept of ground rightly 
 understood. (2) Hence, when one seeks consequents, 
 
■no CA TEGORIES OF MEDIA TION. 
 
 the grounds do not so readily offer themselves, be- 
 cause they are the subservient moment of the conse- 
 quents. For the rest, all the various determinations 
 of the ground coincide in living development : the 
 egg is equally germ, preserving condition, and finally 
 means of nourishment for the self-developing chick. 
 
 § 106. In its completed development it appears 
 that this relation contradicts itself/ 1 ) and hence 
 (§ 101) sublates itself to the end that something else 
 follow from it : the ground has been the positing 
 (§ 101, obs. 1), but it has rather been shown (§ 105) 
 that it is the (pre) supposed. Further, the ground had 
 been the same with the consequent (§ § 102, 103) ; 
 but, instead, it has been shown that it is not the 
 same (§ 104). Finally, the ground had been that 
 which was identical with itself ; but it has rather 
 been shown that it sublates itself. (§ 105.) As this 
 complete contradiction, the relation of ground and 
 consequent sublates itself; and since this relation had 
 been a determination of essence itself, so essence itself 
 sublates itself® posits itself as its own negative. 
 But now the negative of essence had been degraded 
 to appearance. Since, therefore, we are compelled by 
 the inner contradiction of essence to think it as its 
 own other (as estranged from itself), we are forced to 
 think it as entering into its other (appearance) filling 
 it. Filled with the essential, however, appearance is 
 phenomenon, and this we have, since it has been 
 
ESSENCE AS SUCH. in 
 
 shown that mere essence points beyond itself, and 
 hence is a mere abstraction (cf. § 91) in the second 
 place to consider. 
 
 W This contradiction occurs in the description of 
 the ground as that which is presupposed by the con- 
 sequent. It is its prius; hence the latter depends 
 upon it ; the ground is posited by the consequent, and 
 so, the rather, depends upon it. (2) Difference has so 
 entered into essence that essence is opposed to itself. 
 
 § 107. A recapitulation of this first chapter shows 
 that its articulation originated by the fact that 
 essence, or mediation, received various determina- 
 tions. The mediation was, first, identity ; it ap- 
 peared, secondly, as difference, and, namely, immediate 
 essential and complete difference ; and, thirdly, we 
 saw mediation appear as relation of ground and 
 consequent. The parallelism of this articulation 
 with that of the first chapter of the First Part is not 
 difficult to discover ; but much less important than to 
 hold fast the discovered essential categories in their 
 peculiarity. 
 
 Subjectively expressed, the propositions, Essence is 
 ideality, difference, ground, etc., may be brought 
 within easier reach of ordinary conception. They 
 would thus run : In order to know essence one must 
 distinguish, must discover grounds and consequents, 
 etc. 
 
II.— SECOND CHAPTER 
 
 PHENOMENON. 
 
 § 108. Phenomenon (erscheinung) is appearance 
 (schein) filled with essence (hence no longer mere 
 essenceless appearance) ; and essence clothed with 
 appearance, hence no longer mere essence/ 1 ) Essence 
 springs forth into phenomenon ; must enter into 
 phenomenon. ( 2) If, therefore, appearance stands 
 opposed to it as its other, it is now identical with 
 itself in its other-being. But if this was the concept 
 of being-for-self (§ 50), we have, when we think 
 phenomenon, essence as being for itself, i.e., we have an 
 essence. But since being-for-self was thought only 
 in the thought of passive negative relation of beings- 
 for-self towards one another. (§ 51.) So is pheno- 
 menon of essence to be thought only when a 
 plurality of essences that are for themselves < 3 > are 
 thought. Phenomenon, which in this sphere forms 
 the analogue to quantity, is, because of the analogy, 
 quantitatively determined, as multiplicity of essences, 
 or as many phenomena. ^ 
 
PHENOMENON. 113 
 
 (1) " What would appearance be where essence is 
 wanting?" < 2 > "Would essence be where it did not 
 appear ? " (Gothe). Phenomenon is an essential 
 category. To conceive everything as phenomenon, 
 means co conceive more deeply than when one merely 
 predicates being of it. The former is done by 
 empiricism, a scientific standpoint; the latter by 
 natural thought. The empiricist, therefore, looks 
 down upon dogmatism and scepticism as mere school- 
 wisdom. (Cf. § 90.) (3) Essence, as hitherto con- 
 sidered, was a singular, like-being, there-being, etc. ; 
 now the concept of an essence is given. There is 
 contained a deep meaning in the fact that in German 
 the word the essence (essentia) and an essence (ens) 
 are denoted by one word (wesen), only that word has 
 no plural. (4) Since nature is phenomenon (of ration- 
 ality, § 232) it appears as plurality of appearing 
 essences. Hence occur here categories which the 
 physicist, so soon as he will be empiricist, must of 
 necessity apply. In the first instance, his task is to 
 describe natural phenomena. For this purpose he 
 naturally applies the categories which offer them- 
 selves when one considers what the appearing essence 
 is. An essence and a phenomenon are, according to 
 ordinary usage of speech, the same thing. 
 
 A. Phenomena or Existence. 
 
 § 109. In the phenomenal essence, or in an essence, 
 must be contained the moments which were in that 
 from which this concept resulted (cf. § 33, and else- 
 where); hence, firstly, the positive moment, the ground 
 as having become the presupposed. This moment of 
 identity- with- self in the phenomenal essence we call 
 
IM C.4 TEGORIES OF MEDIA TION. 
 
 matter, stuff, or content.*® Secondly, the negative 
 moment which presupposed that first as its founda- 
 tion, and, as moment of difference, determines it — 
 formS*> The two are related as, in the sphere of 
 quantity, unities and annumeration. (The form is the 
 multiplier.) Here is the content rightly always 
 ranged with the essence, the form with the appear- 
 ance. Every essence will, therefore, be unity of con- 
 tent and form, i.e., will exist,® and from the analysis 
 of its concept it is clear that the phenomenal essence 
 is something existing or thingS^ That things are 
 phenomena is therefore a tautology.® 
 
 (1) The word matter is here taken only as the 
 Scholastics, and even Leibnitz still, having in mind 
 the vXt] of Aristotle, takes materia prima. The con- 
 cept materia secunda, matter as opposed to spirit, does 
 not belong to logic, but to the philosophy of nature. 
 The concept of logical matter coincides with that of 
 content. That the content is the underlying, the deter- 
 minable, and in so far the positive (cf. § 98), is implied 
 by ordinary consciousness. The Aristotelian deter- 
 minations that vXrj is the e£ o5, i.e., the ground whence 
 the consequent issues ; or also that it is the vTrodevvs, 
 i.e., the presupposition, are therefore absolutely 
 correct. < 2 > By form is in general to be understood 
 the principle of difference in an essence. Hence form 
 was by the Scholastics conceived as the mightier, the 
 determining. It is the executive and determining, 
 hence negative, principle. Form is the concreter as- 
 pect of limit. If, therefore, content was the moment 
 of ground, form is, Aristotle teaches, that which comes 
 forth, and hence is the presupposing, and therefore 
 
PHENOMENON. 1 1 5 
 
 rationally the earlier. Hence it is wrong to use the 
 word formal in a contemptuous sense. That which 
 has form is, alone, actual existence ; only the formal 
 contract is a contract. ® The concept of existence 
 has sprung from the relation of ground and con- 
 sequent ; by existence will therefore be understood 
 a being which has come forth from the ground 
 (existere — properly se exsistere or exsisti) i.e., grounded 
 being. (Cf § 29, obs. 4.) Since to existence unity 
 of content and form belong, it follows that although 
 each can be thought (i.e., represented) by itself, each 
 is, nevertheless, when separated from the other, a non- 
 existent abstraction. An absolutely formless content, 
 therefore, does not exist, and to give form is always 
 the same as to take form, just as to give a content a 
 form means at the same time to take its (other) con- 
 tent. A content, which, though not indifferent to 
 form in general, is yet so towards a definite form, is a 
 finite content, a mere substrate, which is external to 
 a definite content, is a merely finite form, a hollow 
 form, or mere condition, or shape. What is more 
 than mere substrate forms itself, i.e., has its form, 
 which is to it no longer external. This is true of the 
 crystal, still more of the living thing. (See § 215.) 
 The affirmation of Aristotle that every ova-la is 
 of vXrj and ISos <I>s o-wdirrj, and of the Scholastics that 
 every ens consists of materia and forma (sub- 
 stantialis) is, therefore, entirely correct, only the 
 unity of the two is to be conceived not so much as 
 sum as, rather, product. If they excepted God, that 
 is because the category of thing is not applicable 
 to God. (4) Thing is a category which, of course, 
 has a certain similarity with that of something (the 
 same similarity which appertains to there-being and 
 existence), but, as more definite, is limited to the 
 world of phenomena. Hence much is characterised 
 as something, which could not be called a thing. 
 
Ii6 CATEGORIES OF MEDIATION. 
 
 (6) But in how far one may say only phenomena, will 
 appear later. Here, where phenomenon is the 
 highest concept, only has no meaning. 
 
 § 110. But with the concept of thing we cannot 
 stop, because here the essence which is for itself is 
 not completely conceived. As being-for-self, that is, 
 an essence is referred to the rest of the essences (§ 54), 
 hence the remaining things appear in the thing, it 
 will have them in itself in an ideal manner. Besides 
 being for self, therefore, the reflection of the remain- 
 ing things will give itself effect in it. While on that 
 side it is identical with itself, thing/ 1 ) on this side is 
 something distinguished, related. These, its relations, 
 are manifold determinations, which, since they appear 
 in it, must, in the first instance, be conceived as borne 
 by it, as having only in it their subsistence, i.e., as its 
 properties/ 25 which it has*® as distinguished - from 
 it. They form the side of appearance in the thing, 
 while its being a thing constitutes the side of essence. 
 Or, otherwise, the properties show us the thing on its 
 formal side, while it is by its content thing. W 
 
 Compare upon this and the following sections, my 
 " Outlines of Psychology," § 74, ff. The totally different 
 standpoints which the exposition has to maintain here 
 and there, in that there it is shown how consciousness 
 upon various stages of development applies various 
 categories, here how these form a series, makes it 
 necessary that a symmetry should appear which, 
 
PHENOMENON. 117 
 
 superficially considered, may seem a repetition. That 
 the mere describer of nature makes use of the cate- 
 gories of the perceiving consciousness, is explicable, 
 since to describe means to exhibit perceptions {Ibid). 
 0-) Hence no thing can contradict itself. (2) Proper- 
 ties belong to the thing, only because as it stands 
 in relation with other things. A single thing would 
 only and alone (if such a thing were not in general 
 an impossibility, cf. § 108) have no properties. 
 ® The relation of having — this word is, therefore, 
 frequently used to denote the preterite — occurs 
 where immediate oneness does, as in something and 
 its quiddity, not exist. (Cf § 36, obs. 1.) (4) Hence 
 thing is so often characterised as substrate, the pro- 
 perties as conditions. 
 
 § 111. But the manifold attributes which constitute 
 the side of phenomenon of the thing and exist in it 
 only as its own, are yet, on the other hand, themselves 
 in turn manifold and determined, by the fact that 
 they are limited in relation to everything else, hence 
 also in relation to the thing (§ 44, obs. 3), i.e., are 
 distinct from it. They must, therefore, be thought 
 not merely as in other but as for themselves. If we 
 must, therefore, on the one hand, in the case of thing, 
 think the side of difference as that which only occurs 
 in it and has its subsistence in it, so, on the other side, 
 are these differences to be thought as independent, so 
 that rather the thing consists of these differences. 
 Viewed from this side, those manifold determinations 
 are not taken as properties, but as self-excluding 
 
1 18 CA TEGOKIES OF MEDIA TION. 
 
 independents, as stuffs and matters. Not only will 
 the physicist, when he has taken electricity, heat, etc., 
 as properties, meet phenomena which compel him to 
 take them as stuffs, but even in the highest sphere, 
 the description of the divine properties leads to the 
 assumption of an exclusive relation of them, a con- 
 flict of the properties, which is adjusted by fictions 
 similar to those employed by the physicists who 
 attempt to solve these contradictions by the fiction 
 of absolute impenetrability and contemporaneous 
 porosity. 
 
 § 112. But thereby has been shown in the concept 
 of the phenomenal essence a contradiction which as 
 such will be a ground to a consequent {cf. § 101, 
 obs. 2), i.e., will impel us forward. The phenomenal 
 essence is, on the one hand, thing, is reflected into 
 itself, and is this because it is essence ; on the other 
 hand, since it has issued from itself, there appertains 
 to it a manifoldness of relations, which make up the 
 side of its appearance. Each of the two sides has 
 proved to be essential in that (§ 110) the thing 
 underlay the manifold (properties) while (§ 111) the 
 manifold (stuffs) make up the thing. Further, both 
 sides are different, both, finally, are related to one 
 another. We have, therefore, as a comprehensive 
 result, not that the phenomenal essence really 
 separates into a relation again of non -appearing 
 
PHENOMENON. 1 1 9 
 
 essence and essenceless appearance, both of which 
 exist not, but, since the thought of the existent, or 
 of thing, remains, and, taken together with those, 
 becomes that juxtaposition of the two moments, the 
 essence of the thing stands over against the thing- 
 like or existing appearance, i.e., the phenomenon of 
 the thing. 
 
 To such a distinction of essence and phenomenon 
 the physicist passes when he no longer merely pre- 
 sents or describes his percepts, but when reflectingly 
 " Outlines of Psychology," § 79) he seeks something, 
 behind what is perceived, i.e., from a describer of 
 nature becomes an investigator, a point to which 
 he is brought even empirically only by the percep- 
 tion of manifold determinations of the one thing. An 
 essence without any manifoldness whatever does not 
 stimulate to the knowing of what is in or behind it. 
 Here it has a meaning only when one speaks of mere 
 phenomenon as of something unessential. 
 
 B. Essence and Phenomenon of the Thing. 
 
 § 113 (a). In the first instance this relation has 
 so presented itself to us that essence, not phenomenon, 
 this, not that, is. Each is, therefore, in the first 
 instance, to be taken as identical with itself, and 
 their first relation is that of indifferent diversity. 
 Essence is otlier than phenomenon. This category is 
 a justifiable one. Therein lies the justification of the 
 Kantian view of the world. It can here cause no 
 
120 CATEGORIES OF MEDIATION. 
 
 surprise that essence is described as being-in-self. Not 
 only that the relation between essence and pheno- 
 menon is analogous to that between being-in-self and 
 being-for-other, but phenomenon is actually being- 
 for-other, only in higher potency. 
 
 § 114. But as diversity in general was impelled 
 forward to opposition (§ 96), so also here : pheno- 
 menon is other than essence or distinguished from it : 
 but yet phenomenon is its phenomenon, just as 
 phenomenon has in essence its essence ; therefore, 
 essence is related to phenomenon, and logically 
 phenomenon is to be conceived as not only other 
 than essence but as its other, that is, its different. 
 Each is to be conceived as the negative of the 
 other, essence as the contrary of phenomenon. 
 
 Even the opposition of essence and phenomenon, 
 this-side and yon-side, rests upon a justifiable cate- 
 gory, which of course is not the highest. In the 
 Schellingian school this opposition often occurs, and 
 by Klein and others is made a principle. Things 
 appear as the contrary of that which they are in 
 themselves. This view, moreover, underlies the fact 
 that Fichte calls the world of phenomena the worst 
 possible. In the aesthetic sphere romanticism occu- 
 pies the standpoint of the " inverted world " (Hegel, 
 " Phanomenologie des Geistes," pp. 118 and fol.). 
 
 § 115 (b). But if essence is the opposite of pheno- 
 menon, and this the contrary of that, each contains 
 the other in itself, and is not to be thought without 
 
PHENOMENON. 121 
 
 it. Each contains the other in itself, and therefore 
 the relation here really is that one and the same con- 
 tent is taken as essence, and as phenomenon. This 
 means that it will now appear as that which is 
 identical with itself, hence singular, and again as the 
 manifold forming a plurality. W This relation we 
 designate as that of law and phenomena, of which the 
 former is represented as the unchanging prototype of 
 manifold phenomena, reflection into self,® the latter 
 as the manifold, reflection into other. 
 
 W Since it is one content, the law is apprehended 
 from the phenomena, the latter from the former. 
 < 2 > In the law, therefore, we have the true essence. 
 If one inquire still further after the essence of law, 
 one falls back, to an already out-grown lower 
 thought-determination. (§ 113.) The law as the 
 same content with the phenomena is more than mere 
 rule; with its concept, the exception, which was 
 involved in that of the rule (§ 79, obs. 6), is in con- 
 flict. 
 
 § 116. But if we look more closely into this rela- > 
 tion, we find, on the one hand, essence, but in its 
 phenomenon, for it is more than mere rule ; on the 
 other hand, phenomena, but as governed by law, i.e., 
 the phenomenon of essence, therefore ; each is accord- 
 ingly the unity of both, i.e., phenomenal essence. 
 Therefore, that relation brings us necessarily to a 
 relation in which each of the two sides is the same 
 
122 CATEGORIES OF MEDIATION. 
 
 phenomenal essence. With the phenomenon of 
 essence and the coming into mutual opposition of 
 essence and phenomenon is to be joined essential 
 relation as the third member of the triad. 
 
 If the empiricist, hence, for example, the empirical 
 physicist, must be content to describe and investigate 
 Nature, he must in the first case abide by things, in 
 the latter by the law, as the ultimate. His vocation, 
 however, is to explain Nature. This he will do when 
 he applies still higher categories, and indeed those 
 now to be developed. One first passes to explanation 
 when one has already discovered laws, and, on the 
 other hand, the knowledge of laws stimulates to 
 explanation, precisely as the perception of all marks 
 has stimulated to investigation. 
 
 C. Essential Relation. 
 
 § 117. By essential relatione e understand a relation in 
 which, exactly as in the quantitative, two sides con- 
 stitute the relation, only with the nearer determina- 
 tion that with each side the other to which it is 
 related is necessarily posited/ 1 ) and that each side 
 is at the same time the entire essence which forms 
 the relation. < 2 > The various forms of this relation 
 form a series in which the lowest is that which least 
 corresponds to its concept, the highest that which 
 corresponds most. 
 
 (1) In the quantitative relation I may at pleasure 
 
PHENOMENON. 123 
 
 place a in relation with b, c, etc. ; the whole, on the 
 contrary, is related necessarily to the parts, the 
 inner to the outer. ( 2 > This appears to be an absurd 
 determination. But it has been shown in the pre- 
 ceding section, and receives its verification in the 
 following. 
 
 § 118 (#). Naturally there are again here to be 
 found the moments which occurred in the last section, 
 only modified. Upon the one side will stand the 
 thing with the character which the law had, i.e., as 
 singular ; upon the other, the same thing W with the 
 character which these phenomena had as multifold. 
 In this form the relation meets us as that of the 
 whole and its parish Both are the same ; for the 
 parts make up the whole, and are equal to it ; the 
 whole contains the parts, and is equal to them. 3 
 
 (1) This relation is applicable only to phenomenal 
 essence, i.e., to things. If one takes God as a whole, 
 as all, for example, and creatures as his parts, this is 
 a crude mechanical pantheism, which makes of God 
 a thing. Even the living product of Nature has no 
 parts, since it is no mere thing ; in order to divide 
 it (e.g., to anatomise, to analyse it), one must convert 
 it into such, i.e., kill it. < 2 > When the physicist, in 
 order to explain the law (of chemical affinity), de- 
 mands (atomistically) that we think the smallest 
 parts of masses, he passes, just as we do,, from 
 law and phenomena to the whole and the parts. 
 < 3 > Here, it is evident, that in this relation there is a 
 real correspondence to the postulate above expressed. 
 (§ 117, obs. 2.) 
 
I2 4 CA TEGORIES OF MEDIA TION. 
 
 § 119. At the same time, also, the contrary ob- 
 tains. It was said that the whole is equal to the 
 parts. But it is equal to the sum or collective unity 
 of the parts, But this is not equal to the parts, but 
 is rather the negation of them as parts, i.e., equal to 
 the whole. Just so are the farts only equal to the 
 divided whole, i.e., not to the whole but to the parts. 
 We have, therefore, the contradiction — whole equals 
 the parts, rather whole equals whole ; so parts equal 
 the whole, rather parts equal the parts. If one alter- 
 nates these two determinations, one has the division 
 ad infinitum,®) or, more correctly, endless progres- 
 sion of division, which, like every such progression, 
 contains & problem (2) to be solved. 
 
 W This progression comes to an end only when 
 I regard, say a line A B, as a whole, hence take its 
 half A as part, then A as whole, A D as part, 
 which, again, is taken as whole, etc. < 2 ' When the 
 mathematician, in order to solve the difficulties which 
 are brought about by the endless division of the 
 path to be traversed in the familiar sophism 
 (Achilles), construes (geometrically) the totality of 
 the path, or (arithmetically) bids to sum the series 
 1 + £ + i • • ., he recognises this. To think this 
 totality, i.e., this divided thing, which is a whole, or 
 finite sum of infinitely many members, is indeed a 
 problem. 
 
 § 120 (b). This endless progression means, like 
 every other (§ 49), that we should hold fast both 
 
PHENOMENON. 1 25 
 
 determinations at the same time : the whole is 
 identical with the parts, and is different from them, 
 hence contradicts itself. Now the unity of those two 
 determinations, like contradiction, gave as their truth 
 the relation of ground and consequent. (§ 102.) By 
 that endless progression we are therefore compelled 
 to conceive essential relation so that the side which 
 had the character of singularity will be thought as 
 the ground of the other side, and that which had the 
 character of plurality as the consequent of the other. 
 If we do this, we think an essential relation which 
 corresponds more to the concept of it than does that 
 hitherto considered ; (1) it is the relation of force W 
 to its expressions, in which one and the same content O 
 is present twice in the manner described. 
 
 (1) In the relation of whole and parts, namely, 
 exactly these particular parts are not, as should have 
 been the case (§ 117, obs. 1), posited with the concept 
 of the whole, since I can divide at pleasure. On the 
 contrary, force has its definite expressions. ® Since 
 the category of force is really a higher category 
 than that of law, the physicist is justified when he 
 does not stop at law, but, in order to explain it, 
 speaks of the underlying forces. Of course it must 
 not be forgotten that, like all explanation, it moves 
 in tautologies. This dynamic mode of explanation 
 is, it is true, higher than the atomic, but is closely 
 akin to it, as is shown by the experience of the 
 psychologists who, with their faculties of the soul, 
 come very near to a soul that is divided. W Hence 
 
126 CATEGORIES OF MEDIATION. 
 
 force is usually explained only from its expression, 
 and vice versa. If we take God as force, the world 
 as expression, this, according to Schleiermacher, is 
 pantheism. One may maintain this in so far as force 
 and expression are one nature ; on the other side, 
 might such a view be characterised also as a contrast 
 to the previously-mentioned crude pantheism, since 
 here the difference between ground and consequent 
 comes forward. 
 
 § 121. But the conclusion is not above (§ 120) 
 fully drawn that every singular was identical with 
 the manifold opposed to it, and yet at the same time 
 different from it, and must therefore be taken as the 
 ground of it. Likewise is, however, the other side, to 
 which plurality appertains, identical with the singu- 
 lar, and at the same time different from it ; and it 
 appears to follow that, instead of the relation con- 
 sidered, one is to be thought in which also the plural 
 has the meaning of ground, the singular that of con- 
 sequent. The conclusion is correct ; in fact, the 
 demand which it contains is already satisfied in the 
 relation of force and its expression. For, since force 
 is force by means of the expression and in it, it 
 presupposes it ; and it is contained in the concept 
 of force to have itself a presupposition, i.e., to be 
 expression^ as, on the other hand, it is contained 
 in the concept of expression to beforceS® 
 
 < x) One says this when one says that force must 
 
PHENOMENON. 127 
 
 be solicited (set loose). <*> This one says when, in 
 something which one has designated as expression, 
 one recognises again the solicitation to something. 
 
 § 122 (c). Also here one may continually keep 
 apart the two determinations, and, by alternating 
 them, cause to occur an endless progression/ 1 ) The 
 truth is, that if force is expression, and the latter is 
 the former, the two coincide, and we are therefore 
 compelled so to conceive essential relation that, on 
 the one side, there is what was called force, so long 
 as it needed a solicitation, but which now solicits 
 itself to its expression, and is what we call the 
 inner;® on the other side is the expression which, 
 however, no longer has its ground in the inner, but 
 is this itself— the outer.*® That relation (§ § 120 
 and 121) refers us to a higher, the relation of inner 
 and outer. ,W 
 
 W In the endless progression which appears in 
 the fact that A is the expression of B, this again of 
 C, etc. ; B is first taken as force, then as expression, 
 but each time abstraction is made from the other 
 determination. ( 2 > The inner is essence as it mani- 
 fests itself of itself, in the outer. (3 > The outer is 
 more intimately joined with essence than is expres- 
 sion; the former is the constant, the latter the 
 transient, manifestation of it. A look, for example, is 
 an expression of a psychical event, while the physiog- 
 nomy is the expression of a constant psychical condi- 
 tion. (4) If, therefore, essence was known where 
 
1 28 CA TEG0R1ES OF MEDIA TION. 
 
 grounds were known, if it was known where the 
 properties of the thing were known (§ 110), still 
 more is it true that it is known where the inner is 
 known. Inner and outer are identical ; neither 
 is without the other : hence a mere inner is an 
 abstraction ; the man who is merely inwardly 
 good passes only for such. Of the abstract inner 
 it is of course correct to say that it is unknow- 
 able. This assertion is a pure tautology. [Cf. § 40, 
 obs.) 
 
 § 123. Recapitulating the course traversed by this 
 chapter, we had, first, essence as appearing in pheno- 
 menon, immediately one with it, and become pheno- 
 menal essence ; secondly, it appeared that both must 
 be thought as becoming distinguished, and as op- 
 posed to one another, a fact which gave the various 
 relations of essence to phenomenon ; finally, in 
 essential relation was shown concrete identity ever- 
 more realising itself, until at last appeared a relation 
 in which the inner had this determination in itself, 
 to be outer. But if, now, the former was the ex- 
 istent as essence, while the latter was the existent 
 as phenomenon, it follows that we must pass on to 
 the thought of an existence which is thought as 
 existence, hence as, as it were, potentiated, higher 
 existence. We call it actuality, and therefore under- 
 stand by the actual more than the existent. More, 
 because it is what exists also, though in a restored, 
 
PHENOMENON. 129 
 
 hence more lasting way, therefore with a plus. 
 Actuality as essence that has entirely entered into 
 phenomenon forms to essence as such and pheno- 
 menon the third member of the triad. 
 
Ill— THIRD CHAPTER. 
 
 ACTUALITY. 
 
 § 124. The actual is the concrete unity of essence 
 and phenomenon : more full of form than the first, 
 more full of content than the latter, it has a greater 
 intensity of being than something or thing ; it is, as 
 language beautifully suggests, the active ; its being 
 is essential, and exceeds mere existence/ 1 ) Com- 
 pared with actuality, essence and phenomenon are 
 equal one to the other/ 2 ) i.e., equal as mere moments. 
 As the concept of mode, because it was real unity of 
 quantity and quality, so realised itself that it was 
 posited, first in its quantitative, then in its qualita- 
 tive, moment, so here there appears a similar realisa- 
 tion, if we reflect upon the moments, which, though 
 they had been in the foregoing, must here occur 
 again in an essentially altered meaning. 
 
 f 1 ) Even the impossible may be called something, 
 even disorder may exist ; but the energy of actuality 
 does not appertain to it. < 2 > Here is explained how 
 that usage of speech could originate, which, in order 
 to express of a man that he is true-hearted only in an 
 
 130 
 
ACTUALITY. 131 
 
 external manner, says that he is not of such a nature 
 (" essence "), but only has it. 
 
 § 125 (a). What has in the foregoing shown itself 
 to he the highest, will necessarily be found as moment 
 in the actual. W The actual will, therefore, contain the 
 moment which, so long as it excluded phenomenon, 
 was called essence, but which here, as that which 
 tends to become phenomenon, gives (real) possibility. ® 
 Possibility, or capacity, is in the actual the side of 
 identity with self, which, however, has the tendency 
 to enter into difference, it is self-expressing inner, is 
 force ® pressing towards expression, is matter refer- 
 ring to form, ground W striving towards consequent, 
 etc. 
 
 W The connection of this concept with that of 
 essence is brought out by Spinoza and Leibnitz in 
 the use of the word essentia. ® Hence with Aris- 
 totle Suva/us, with the Scholastics potentia, means both. 
 The seed is the real possibility of the tree, is tree as 
 inner. (3) With Aristotle Swa/us = vXij ; with the 
 Scholastics potentia = materia. Even we say that in a 
 person there is stuff for a poet or painter, i.e., capa- 
 city for being either of these. (4) Finally, Aristotle 
 puts also v\r) and vwoKUfievov as equal to one another. 
 
 § 126. If, now, in the concept of possibility we 
 abstract from the fact that it is the inner, uttering 
 itself, there originates thereby the thought of abstract, 
 
132 CATEGORIES OF MEDIATION. 
 
 so-called logical, possibility. This category is then, 
 of course, not distinct from those earlier considered 
 and left behind, abstract identity, being, etc., and is, 
 therefore, denned like them/ 1 ' This possibility, or 
 so-called conceivability, since it is mere relation to 
 self, may be predicated of everything so soon as one 
 thinks it only out of all relation to other,® while 
 true (real) possibility belongs only to that which 
 realises itself.® Accordingly, as possibility is ab- 
 stractly or concretely conceived, it is an entirely 
 empty or a very important category.® 
 
 ® As distinctionless unity with self possible est 
 quod non implicat contradictionem. ® If one ab- 
 stracts from the fact that the air is specifically 
 lighter, it is possible that a leaden bird might fly, 
 etc. (3) The dispute between the Spinozists and 
 Leibnitzians is, therefore, to be settled by Leibnitz's 
 distinction of possibility and compossibiliti. ® Thus 
 it is absurd when the historian asks what conceivably 
 would have been possible, when, at the same time, his 
 highest task is to comprehend real possibility, the 
 germ, of what happens. 
 
 § 127 (b). Possibility is merely a moment. Its com- 
 pletion to full reality is formed by what was hitherto 
 called phenomenon, or existence.^ In concrete unity 
 with the other moment, it is expression of force, 
 actuality or energy!® It may be called (essential) 
 reality.®) It belongs to being-actual and becoming- 
 
ACTUALITY. 133 
 
 actual with the same logical necessity as does real 
 possibility.^ 
 
 W Existentia, which Descartes and Spinoza, like 
 later philosophers, opposed to essentia, is therefore 
 by Leibnitz and Wolff designated as complementum 
 possibilitatis. Since essentia was the moment of con- 
 tent (§ 125), Kant may rightly say that by existence 
 there is added to a concept no new determination of 
 content, a proposition which is absolutely correct only 
 as regards pure being. (2) Aristotle's kvipyaa, the 
 actus of the Scholastics, is not mere existence, but 
 manifestation of an inner existence grounded in itself, 
 etc. (3) From reality (§ 36, obs. 2) this would be dis- 
 tinguished as singulare tantum, or as the common 
 usage of speech distinguishes the solid (Reelle) from 
 the merely real (Realen). <*> The view that admir- 
 able intentions, even when they are not timely (i.e., 
 not really possible), may yet be executed, is precisely 
 as illogical as the philosophy of sloth and mediocrity, 
 which supposes that what is in time will execute 
 itself, in the absence of energy and of great indivi- 
 duals, i.e., those who are filled with an essential (solid) 
 content. 
 
 § 128. If reality is conceived just as, above (§ 126), 
 possibility was, its difference from mere existence 
 disappears, and we have mere positedness in the 
 being posited by other/ 1 ) This gives the category of 
 contingency. It does not exclude necessity, is rather 
 the same with external necessity^ in that the con- 
 tingent is what merely follows or is merely deter- 
 mined.® This concept of contingency answers the 
 
134 CATEGORIES OF MEDIATION. 
 
 question whether there is anything contingent/ 45 
 whether and where this category may be applied,® 
 etc. 
 
 W What posited itself would not be merely posited, 
 but, at the same time, positing. (2) Spinoza attri- 
 butes necessitas respectu causae, as Wolff did necessitas 
 hypothetica, with right to what he designates as 
 contingens, and says of it that it nunquam existere 
 potest necessitate essentiae. Hence also the determina- 
 tion cujus essentia non involvit existentiam. Leibnitz 
 rightly calls contingentia arbitrii a necessite brute. So 
 can the atomists identify necessity and contingency. 
 
 (3) If with Aristotle o-v//./?<u'veii' signifies necessary con- 
 sequence, o-v/i/Je/J^/cds the contingent (so in the Middle 
 Age contingit and accidit, and then again contingens 
 and accidens), there underlies the identification the 
 same perception which causes him to identify what is 
 fiiy., and what o-v^^^kos. So we also call the shape 
 of the tree, into which it was forced, contingent. 
 
 (4) The question whether the contingent is some- 
 thing actual must be answered in the negative ; that 
 whether anything contingent exists must be answered 
 in the affirmative. The merely existing is precisely 
 the contingent, and hence perishable. (6) One is 
 always justified in calling contingent what is posited 
 by external force, circumstances, etc. In a larger 
 survey of the total connection and inner determina- 
 tions, much that at first appeared contingent will 
 appear otherwise. To assert that there is (in Nature, 
 for example) nothing contingent, means to mistake 
 the fact that Nature shows us just such external 
 there-being, and hence the external violent encroach- 
 ment upon foreign spheres is here the order of the 
 day. To deny the contingent, as do those who will 
 have philosophy comprehend everything, as if there 
 
ACTUALITY. 135 
 
 were nothing unintelligible, is precisely as erroneous 
 as it is to posit it everywhere, as do those who see in 
 lawlessness freedom. 
 
 § 129. But that both logical possibility and con- 
 tingency are untrue, violent abstractions is shown 
 therein, that on closer consideration each is self- 
 contradictory. Possibility was merely ground, hence 
 not yet posited; but the ground has shown itself 
 to be foundation i.e., something presupposed. In the 
 first respect, therefore, possibility is the essential, (1) 
 in the latter the unessential.® The same has been 
 shown as regards contingency. This occurs where 
 something is posited only by other. But, then, since 
 it has the ground opposed to it, it has it outside 
 itself, or is ground/(?jj. (3) What, therefore, is merely 
 grounded, or posited, is to be thought as entirely 
 ungrounded, i.e., as not posited. Thereby, therefore, 
 the two contain the same contradiction, and their 
 difference disappears/ 4 ) But if we think of what 
 those contradictions point to, not only — negatively — 
 vanished difference, but — positively — the two as one, 
 these results complete actuality or necessity^ To 
 this, as to their truth, possibility and contingency (6) 
 are sublated. 
 
 (1) Hence it is said that the actual must above all 
 be possible. (2) And yet it is said, something is only 
 possible, and one regards the possible as so indifferent 
 
136 CATEGORIES OF MEDIATION. 
 
 that one defines it as that which may equally well 
 be and not be. ® What happens without ground is 
 called contingent, so that the word denotes the 
 contingens as well as the casus fortuities. W There- 
 fore, ordinary opinion defines the contingent precisely 
 as the possible is above defined, namely, as that which 
 may equally well be or not be. Even Spinoza, like 
 earlier logicians, takes possible and contingens as 
 interconvertible concepts. <® Hence the old de- 
 termination as regards the necessary cujus essentia 
 involvit existentian or the Leibnitzian " what by its 
 possibility has reality." ^ The necessary transition 
 from contingency to necessity underlies the argu- 
 mentum a contingentia mundi. 
 
 § 130 (c). Since the necessary is the truth of the 
 contingent, the latter is the powerless and subservi- 
 ent. The same is true of possibility, which yields to 
 the actuality of the necessary. From them both 
 issues the necessary, as that which we call fact,^ 
 which presupposes them, hence is not dependent upon 
 them but rather accomplishes itself at their cost. (2) 
 Its forthcoming is actual occurrence^ or becoming 
 of the truly actual, the necessary.^ Necessity is 
 the highest essential category : where the necessity 
 of something is perceived, its true nature is perceived. 
 As essence was the category of dogmatism, pheno- 
 menon that of empiricism, so necessity is that of 
 rational thought, or of rationalism.® 
 
 (1) The word fact is here taken as when one says, 
 The fact is true but does not concern the person, 
 
ACTUALITY. 137 
 
 What must happen is the (main) fact. < 2 > The fact, 
 say a historical occurrence, realises itself, and there- 
 fore makes for itself circumstances just as do con- 
 tingently (arbitrarily) acting persons. To attribute 
 everything to circumstances is just as one-sided as 
 to lay everything to the whim of the actors. In the 
 necessity of the fact is contained the pre-established 
 harmony of both. (3) This difference between mere 
 becoming and actual occurrence lies (unconsciously) 
 with many in the background, when they distinguish 
 the merely factual and the historical. (4) Only the 
 necessary is truly actual ; hence only the rational is 
 actual. The irrational has only the passing exist- 
 ence of a material to be used. So wrong, which 
 indeed exists, but only, by punishment, to be made 
 non-actual. W Kant's " Physica rationalis," or pure 
 natural science, will lay down propositions which 
 have as compelling evidence as the laws of thought 
 of the school, and are as full of content as the pro- 
 positions of the empiricists. Not what is only con- 
 ceivable nor what merely exists, but what must exist, 
 is to be formulated in that. 
 
 § 131. From this is evident what was presupposed 
 in the Introduction (§ 12) as contained in our think- 
 ing, namely, that the necessary contains in itself 
 opposed determinations. That is to say, since it 
 contains the moment of identity, it is simple im- 
 mediacy (§ 12) ; (1) but likewise there lies in it 
 contradiction (§ 13), since it is in itself mediation!® 
 It is both : it is, because it is. As this immediacy (3) 
 which is posited by the sublation of mediation, it is 
 relation, and indeed relation in itself, i.e., absolute 
 relation!® 
 
138 CATEGORIES OF MEDIATION. 
 
 (1 ) Hence, It is so, as expression of unalterable'neces- 
 sity. < 2 > Necessary is that for which a because can 
 be given. (3) Purposely is an expression chosen 
 which involves a contradiction. (4) As relation has 
 already in other groups proved to be the highest 
 category, so is it here also. Necessity, absolute 
 relation, is the highest form of mediation (cf § 90), 
 as mode was the highest form of being. These 
 highest forms of mediation have, instead of all others, 
 been by Kant treated as categories of relation. {Cf 
 § 89, obs. 2.) 
 
 A. Substantiality. 
 
 § 132. The necessary is because it is. There is, 
 therefore, contained in the absolute relation, first, 
 the fact W as its own ground negating all mere 
 groundedness.*® This it is as that which is identical 
 with itself and excludes from itself every determina- 
 tion.® If this is the moment of possibility in the 
 necessary, this side of essentiality gives us the con- 
 cept of substance^ Secondly, this is related to the 
 moment of mere consequent W in which falls differ- 
 ence,® mere positedness and contingency/ 7 ) This 
 moment of unessentiality in the absolute relation 
 gives us the concept of accidents, which do not 
 subsist for themselves, but as transient mere affec- 
 tions inhere (8) in substance, not so much produced by 
 it as rather going to the ground in it. The first form 
 of the absolute relation is the relation of substantial- 
 
ACTUALITY. 139 
 
 ity < 9 > or relation of subsistence and inherence (Kant). 
 (The relation of whole and parts appears here in a 
 higher potency.) ( 10 > Holding fast to the developed 
 concept of occurrence, one may say, no occurrence 
 without substance/ u) 
 
 In Spinoza, who in his system has taken the re- 
 lation of substantiality as the highest, all essential 
 determinations receive their dues: (1) substance is 
 to him something necessary, fact, cujus essentia 
 involvit existentiam. (2) It is causa sui, which is to 
 be taken only in the negative sense. (8) Substance 
 as absoluta affirmatio existentiae excludes every deter- 
 mination, is that which alone is because not related 
 to other. W The concepts essentia (see § 125, 
 obs. 1) and substantia, because of their kinship, 
 coincide in the Greek word ova-tat. ( 5 > In the double 
 sense which o-v^aiv^v has with Aristotle is to be 
 recognised the kinship of concepts otherwise so 
 different. W In the accidents, according to Spinoza, 
 plurality falls. (7 > Also here the languages are re- 
 presented, since they identify the concepts of the con- 
 tingent and the befalling (accidit, accidens etc.). 
 (8) With Spinoza the accident (mode) is quod in alio 
 est, and he says by way of pointing out its essenceless 
 nature, quamvis existant eos ut non existentes concipere 
 possumus. (9) If we take this relation as the highest, 
 and (say) God as substance and the world as ac- 
 cidents, the result is a pantheism which has been 
 correctly denominated acosmism. The essential in 
 such a view is the mere immanence of God in things. 
 (io) When Jacobi makes pantheism rest upon the 
 proposition of the ground which itself merely con- 
 tains an inference from whole to parts, he could 
 appeal to the fact that Spinoza frequently comes near 
 
140 CATEGORIES OF MEDIATION. 
 
 thinking of modes as parts of substance. _ (11) This 
 proposition occurs in Kant's rational physics as the 
 First Analogy of Experience. 
 
 § 133. In fact, however, in this, its first form, the 
 absolute relation does not correspond to the concept 
 stated in § 131, because not all the determinations of 
 it are posited. (See § 19.) In it, the necessary (the 
 fact) was said to be related to itself. In the relation 
 of substance only one side, viz., substance, is neces- 
 sary. The accidents, on the contrary, are merely 
 posited, hence are that cujus essentia non involvit 
 existentian ; they are nothing actual, but, like the 
 waves of the sea, merely changing, static, shapes. 
 
 B. Causality. 
 
 § 134. But, at the same time, because of this defect 
 the relation of substantiality points beyond itself in 
 that in it there is latent already a higher form of the 
 absolute relation. To substance the accidents, posited 
 by it, stand opposed ; at the same time, however, 
 they are nothing actual, but have their actuality only 
 in substance (in actuality the waves are merely in the 
 water of the sea) : what therefore actually stands op- 
 posed to substance, and what it is actually related 
 to, is only itself. When, therefore, we logically think 
 out the relation of substantiality we are compelled to 
 
ACTUALITY. 141 
 
 think a relation in which the fact occurs twice, once 
 as the positing, hence original (primary fact, German 
 ur-sache, English) causejW on the other hand, the act- 
 ual, which is posited from it (effected) — the effect. < 2 > 
 The truth (§ 19, obs. 1) of the relation of substance is 
 the relation of causality. Without causality there is 
 no occurrence.® 
 
 ^ Causa, cosa in both meanings. &> Even speech 
 suggests that the effect is something actual (effec- 
 tive), which mere accident was not. < 3 > (Cf. Kant's 
 " Second Analogy of Experience.") 
 
 § 135. The causal relation in which the same fact 
 appears once as cause and again as effect (1) is a 
 higher form of the absolute relation, just because here 
 in place of the accidents which in substance ceased to 
 be, stands the effect, which, as something actual, 
 issues from the cause (there appears in it, in higher 
 potency, the relation of force to expression). The 
 effect is here an essential into which the cause 
 passes ; < 2 > as into something actually standing over 
 against it. 
 
 W The cause of heat is heat, of moisture, moisture, 
 of motion, motion. (2) Hence Spinoza in maintaining 
 the relation of substantiality, speaks against the 
 causa transiens, while Jacobi, in order to establish an 
 extra (fraeter) mundane God, demands that God be 
 conceived as cause of the world. This gives what is 
 termed transcendence. 
 
142 CATEGORIES OF MEDIATION. 
 
 § 136. But the superiority which one side in the 
 causal relation has as compared with the relation of 
 substantiality, the other, more closely considered, 
 counterbalances. It is true that the effect in the 
 relation to the cause no longer, as there, returns to the 
 cause, but the cause disappears in its passage into the 
 effect. W In fact the relation of causality displays pre- 
 cisely the opposite defect from that of the relation of 
 substantiality ; the side of effect is here necessary/ 2 ) for 
 it is, and is at the same time, posited by the cause. 
 The cause therefore is only ; it has, therefore, merely 
 the character of contingency,® of mere existence. 
 If, therefore, the relation of substantiality did not 
 correspond to the concept of absolute relation, so does 
 the causal relation just as little correspond, only for 
 the opposite reason/ 4 ) 
 
 W Heat produces heat by becoming lost from the 
 communicating body. W Where a thing is known 
 as effect, one knows its necessity — that it must be 
 so. (3 ) If the cause is, the effect follows : wliether it 
 is, remains doubtful. <*> A view which conceives 
 the relation of God and the world only as causality, 
 would, consistently carried out, become the opposite 
 of acosmism, namely, atheism. No one has taken the 
 transcendence of the divine, i.e., the negation of all 
 immanence, so seriously as the Epicureans. 
 
 § 137. But at the same time in this relation is to 
 be perceived the necessity of going beyond it. The 
 
ACTUALITY. 143 
 
 cause is the positing, the effect the posited. But 
 since the cause is not cause without effect, the cause 
 is properly (as cause) effect of the effect, and pre- 
 supposes the effect as its own. But just so the effect 
 presupposes the cause, is, therefore, in fact, cause of 
 the cause. But if the cause presupposes the effect, 
 and the latter again the former, we think (if we will 
 not, through abstraction, be led astray into the end- 
 less progression) really a relation in which each side 
 is related as cause and effect to the other as effect 
 and cause, i.e., interaction. 
 
 The endless progression arises immediately so soon 
 as we apply to a definite thing the perceived truth 
 that the cause is in itself effect, and vice versd; and, 
 indeed, when we have first taken A as effect, then 
 abstracting therefrom take it as cause, where it has 
 an effect B, which then again is taken as cause, etc. 
 Since the nature of the endless progression is known 
 (§ -49), it can of course not terrify. Even Aristotle 
 is by the progression of causes and effects impelled 
 to the thought of interaction. (De Gen. et Corr. 
 II., 11.) 
 
 0. Interaction. 
 
 | 138. Interaction is the truth of mere causality. W 
 In it the absolute relation is actually realised. It 
 is related to the relation of substantiality and that of 
 causality as the relation of inner and outer (§ 722) 
 is to the two other forms of essential relation/ 2 ) 
 
M4 CATEGORIES OF MEDIATION. 
 
 There results, just as above, the proposition, Every 
 happening is interaction. But, at the same time, there 
 is, in this category, given the highest mode of media- 
 tion, because here is completely posited what above 
 (§ 89) was stated as its essence — reciprocal union with 
 one another. Just for that reason is it also the last. 
 We stand here at the limit of the sphere of media- 
 tions. As to every mediation (§ 89), so also to 
 necessity there belongs a duplicity ; need is only 
 where one thing experiences compulsion through 
 another. Only in duplicity is there a must be, which 
 of course involves a contradiction. (See § 44, obs. 2.) 
 But since in interaction each side is determined as 
 cause and effect, and they therefore coincide, there 
 had appeared, instead of duplicity, unity with self 
 again. We, therefore, have in fact that as actually 
 posited which (§ 131) was given as the concept of the 
 absolute relation, a being which coincides with 
 mediated being, the must be. In completed ("re- 
 vealed") necessity, therefore, we have the must be 
 identical with being. This inner necessity, which, 
 therefore, consists in that compulsion has disappeared 
 since the determined and the determining coincide, we 
 call freedom.® It is the subject of the Third Part 
 of the logic. 
 
 W Empirically this is expressed as follows : Action 
 and reaction are equal, a proposition which is fully 
 
ACTUALITY. M5 
 
 correct only where we have to do with mechanical 
 motion, which is better expressed thus : There is no 
 mere causality. (Kant's " Third Analogy of Experi- 
 ence.") Even in the highest sphere it is a deeper 
 view which causes the mystic to say, God is in me so 
 much as is laid to me in Him, as if here one would 
 assume a one-sided causality. For this mystic, 
 then, this opposition of immanence and transcend- 
 ence no longer exists. < 2 > If one returns to earlier 
 categories (§ 102, ff), substance is related to cause as 
 source to condition, and interaction exhibits in higher 
 potency negative grounding, or the being presup- 
 posed. ® The justification of this name appears in 
 the course of the discussion. 
 
 § 139. Also here (cf. § 86) recapitulation has a 
 double task. First, it has to fix the articulation of 
 the chapter here concluded, in which, in the analysis 
 of the actual, possibility and actuality or energy have 
 been shown to be its moments, the actual itself to be 
 the necessary, then the last-named has proved to be 
 absolute relation, which realised itself in subsistence 
 and inherence, in causality and in interaction. The 
 second object which is to be accomplished by the 
 recapitulation is that, by a retrospect of the entire 
 path traversed, the now treated main division of 
 logic is limited towards the others, its peculiar 
 character given, its articulation fixed. Because, at 
 the beginning of the logic, only the resolve was 
 present to think pure, i.e., distinctionless thought 
 (§ 27), the First Part had to do only with determina- 
 
 K 
 
146 CATEGORIES OF MEDIATION. 
 
 tions of distinctionlessness or immediacy. The result 
 was, that immediacy was sublated to relativity, and 
 this being, which was ruptured within, gave the 
 concept of essence and of the appearance standing 
 over against it, with which we entered upon the 
 Second Part of the logic. To this (from essence as 
 such to absolute relation) will, if it be designated after 
 the first of the categories appearing in it, necessarily 
 be given the superscription Essence (Hegel) ; if, after 
 the common character of all, the caption Mediation. 
 (Also here as above, § 86, the two determinations, 
 however, nearly coincide, see § 90). In this Part, 
 itself we had first (first chapter) considered essence in 
 general, then seen (in the second chapter) how it lost 
 itself in phenomenon ; finally (in the third chapter), 
 how, having become identical with itself, it gave 
 actuality. (The parallelism with the chapters of the 
 First Part is easy to be shown.) In ever- ascending 
 series we arrived finally at a point where the 
 mediation returned again to being, and with this 
 concept of inner necessity mediated in itself we enter 
 another sphere, that of freedom. 
 
Gbirb part. 
 
 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 CONCEPT. 
 
 I.— FIRST CHAPTER. 
 
 SUBJECTIVITY. (Cf. 152.) 
 
 § 140. Freedom exists where one thing is, not by 
 means of another, but by means of itself ; where, 
 therefore, instead of the highest form of necessity, of 
 being-through one another exists, being through self or 
 of self, to which the other conducts as to its necessary 
 consequence. (1) Freedom as a logical category is not 
 to be restricted to the sphere of spiritual pheno- 
 mena/ 2 ) therefore does not coincide with personality, 
 but with subjectivity, since it consists only in the carry- 
 ing out of a subject or a principled The transition 
 from the Second Part of the logic to the Third may 
 therefore be termed the transition from substan- 
 tiality to subjectivity, ^ or also from causality to 
 
 147 
 
148 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 creatorship. As immediate thought thought ever3 r - 
 thing as immediate, and mediated thought took its 
 objects as mediate, so to bring under the categories 
 of freedom means to consider freely. For the most 
 part this occurs in philosophical thinking, for which, 
 therefore, the first categories of freedom are inade- 
 quate, and only form the foundation/ 5 ) in that to it 
 not subjectivity but exerted and completed subjec- 
 tivity is the highest of things. Thought which has 
 not yet risen thus high, but yet so high that to it 
 happening-of-itself, i.e., what is termed evolution, is 
 the highest category, may be called deductive, deriv- 
 ing, developing, or even genetic. With the logic of it, 
 i.e., with a criticism of the categories which it applies, 
 has our first chapter to do. 
 
 a > From the premises, A is through B, and B is 
 through A, it necessarily follows that A is through A, 
 therefore is causa sui in the positive sense of this 
 term, while substance was so only in the negative 
 sense. (§ 132, 2.) < 2 > It is, therefore, not a figurative 
 but an entirely exact expression when free falling, 
 free growth are spoken of, because there is an inner 
 tendency in consequence of which the stone of itself, 
 falls, etc. (3) Originally were the three translations, 
 of the Grecian vTroKei/xevov and tm-dcrraa-ts, substrate, 
 substance, subject not at all distinct. (In the Middle 
 Ages subjective only, not predicative.) As everywhere 
 so here, the need of exact denotation causes synony- 
 mies to disappear. We use substrate (cf. § 109, 2) for 
 dead matter subject to changes, substance {cf § 132) 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 149 
 
 for that in which manifoldness goes to the ground 
 because it suffers them not, subjection that which puts 
 forth changes from itself, therefore is related to them 
 at once, positively and negatively. Man is the sub- 
 ject of his actions, but also the plant of its changes. 
 (A limitation will be discussed later, see § 153.) How 
 it could come that the word which here denotes only 
 creatorship in distinction from causality could also 
 acquire the entirely opposite meaning of opposition 
 to subjectivity can likewise become clear only later 
 (See | 202.) Therefore, Kant could characterise free- 
 dom as the possibility of absolute beginning. What 
 has initiative power is subject, hence free. (4 > Hegel 
 rightly prided himself upon this transition. When 
 his school saw therein a proof for the personality of 
 God, this was one of the mistakings of the meaning 
 of logic, and was therefore within the school punished 
 by the fact that D. Strauss, when he denied the 
 personality of God, yet called his God world-subject 
 because He put forth things from Himself, as trees do 
 blossoms. Certainly this view is higher than that 
 which sees in God merely the cause of the world, and 
 whoever will conceive God as personality must 
 conceive Him also as subject ; but the converse does 
 not follow. < 5) That the school has to prepare not 
 only for the sciences, but also for philosophy, is one 
 of the reasons why the logic to be treated in the 
 gymnasia has taken, besides the categories of the 
 first chapter of the Second Part, also those of the 
 opening chapter of the Third into its province. 
 
 § 141. First, we have to conceive subjectivity in its 
 first, i.e., lowest form, hence as it is at, the mere 
 beginning. This mere principle of development pre- 
 conceived to all realisation, we designate, since in 
 German there is only a single word which signifies 
 
1 50 CA TEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 at once inner necessity and beginning, by this word, 
 calling it concept (Begriff).^ By this word is, next, 
 also denoted the psychological reflex of this inner 
 necessity ; and accordingly conception and formation 
 of concepts can be spoken of only where inner neces- 
 sity is known. < 2 > The concept as inner necessity 
 does not, therefore, stand opposed to actuality ; ® it 
 is rather the true actuality, as it is the true essence 
 and being, since in it, as the true causa sui, being and 
 must-be W have become united and interlocked into 
 freedom/ 6 ) 
 
 W In the first meaning the word is taken when 
 one says, It follows from the concept of triangle that, 
 etc. ; this meaning the Greek word A.dyos also has, so 
 that Aristotle can say that a plant's Adyos impels it to 
 grow. The second meaning which occurs especially 
 in the phrase " to be in the notion " (Im Begriffe 
 stehen), may, at least, in an indirect fashion, be shown 
 in the Greek, since in the example cited, Adyos is the 
 a.pyj) of growing. < 2 > Hence a universal idea is far 
 from being a concept; to the latter belongs inner 
 ground and inner necessity. < 3 > A so-called actual 
 parabola is none ; while in the formula of the same, 
 we have alone a true and actual one. W He who 
 knows the concept of the plant, its type, knows its 
 nature, and comprehends what nature intended by it. 
 Hence the concept may serve as critical standard of 
 measure. < 6 > In relation to that which is compre- 
 hended (begriffenen) one stands free, to that which is 
 comprehensible unfree. Hence philosophy dispels 
 astonishment. 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 151 
 
 A. The Concept. 
 
 § 142. As the concept — and by the concept we shall 
 henceforth understand its thought-counterpart as well 
 as itself — contains the unity of being &a& must-be, the 
 question, What is the concept ? with which the ques- 
 tion, How do we comprehend ? coincides, contains in 
 itself opposite determinations.® Therefore could 
 those thoughts in which opposites were combined be 
 called concepts.® The concept is not, therefore, a 
 contradiction, but rather the resolution of it, and, 
 indeed, of all the contradictions hitherto considered, 
 which had amounted to the opposition of being and 
 must-be. Where, therefore, a freeing, i.e., resolution 
 of a contradiction, occurs, there is the concept, al- 
 though it is customary just there to speak of incom- 
 prehensibility.® Conversely, where the concept is, 
 hence also where it is in us, there must be present 
 resolved contradiction.® Therefore, the exposition 
 of the concept, i.e., of the categories of this Part of 
 the logic, is not so much an exposition of emerging 
 contradiction or of the transition from one thing to 
 another as in being, nor of posited contradiction or 
 appearance of things in one another, but is the de- 
 velopment into self, or the self-development of the 
 in-itself self-contained and self-satisfied concept.® 
 Compared, therefore, with the other Parts, the Third, 
 again, has its peculiar difficulties.® 
 
1 52 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 W The word concept (from concipere) suggests 
 this. Those who assume that there is no contradic- 
 tion in God deny that He can be comprehended, can 
 be an object of the concept. < 2 > Hence not being 
 and not-being, but becoming and all succeeding cate- 
 gories. In all these concepts was already the con- 
 cept as such, so that really we have been continually 
 considering it. (3) Love as free relation, enjoyment 
 as liberation, contain in themselves sublated defect, 
 hence resolved contradiction, and are, therefore, 
 phenomena of the concept, of rationality (see later, 
 § 212), although they may be an enigma to the under- 
 standing, which separates everything. W Hence the 
 joy and enjoyment when one has comprehended some- 
 thing, and the love towards what is comprehended. 
 W Hegel calls it clearness and transparency of the 
 concept — the fact that its development does not alter 
 it. [Hegel, " Werke," vol. v., p. 12.] The plant is 
 developed in becoming a plant. W Differences must 
 be fixed, which prove to be none because every 
 moment of the concept is also the others. 
 
 § 143. Since the development of the concept con- 
 sists in its becoming what it really is (see § 16), 
 we have to reflect upon what it has given itself 
 out to be. Since now it was resolved contradiction 
 it must contain those determinations whose opposition 
 is resolved in it. But, naturally, they will now, 
 when they no longer stand in opposition to one 
 another, but have become moments of the concept, 
 have acquired another meaning. Thereby also will 
 what outside of being has been essence now acquire 
 another name. Being, indifference, and distinction- 
 
SUBJECTIVITY, 153 
 
 lessness, as a moment of the concept, is universality, 
 and the concept is, in this moment, the universal 
 concept, or has extension. 
 
 Since the universal is being as distinguished 
 from essence, it is intelligible why Aristotle could 
 call it the immediate. {Cf. § 27, obs.) Likewise 
 is it explicable why the various determinations which 
 the universal will receive (see following sections) 
 must correspond to the three modes of being which 
 were treated in the three chapters of the First Part. 
 
 (a) The Universal Concept. 
 
 § 144 (1). The concept is the universal (1 > since 
 it is mere reference to itself, and excludes all refer- 
 ence to other. < 2 > In this absolute distinctionless- 
 ness the universal is the absolutely simple, which 
 excludes every difference and every distinction. If 
 it appears, therefore, on the one hand, as the fixed 
 and imperishable, it is, on the other hand, just thereby 
 without content, and empty.® The universal, as 
 it is when abstraction is made from every other 
 moment, is the abstract^ As this, it is merely 
 something fancied. < 8 > In the extension of the concept 
 falls all from which it can be abstracted, or whose 
 quality it gives. 
 
 (1) The analysis of the concept may also be so 
 conceived that the becoming of the concept in us, 
 
154 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 or the "psychological reflex of the concept" is re- 
 flected upon; then would first this appear, there is 
 comprehension where the universal is apprehended. 
 ® In this sense the word universal is taken when, 
 for example, one says that one asserts this or that 
 only universally without reference to the individuals. 
 That the universal concept is by Aristotle identified 
 with iSA.17, is explicable. It, like that, displays the 
 moment of identity. < 3) In this sense one takes the 
 word concept when one takes it as equivalent to 
 universal idea (see my " Outlines of Psychology," § 
 100), or when one, with Kant, speaks of concepts 
 without perception, which are empty. W Hence 
 universally and in abstracto as synonyms. When the 
 universal or the concept is viewed from this side, 
 the formation of the concept consists in abstracting 
 from specific differences. < 6) Of this universal is 
 therefore true what in antiquity, Epicurus, and in 
 the Middle Ages, the Nominalists claimed. 
 
 § 145 (2). But it appears here, upon closer in- 
 spection, that abstract universality must be conceived 
 otherwise when it supplies the defect of being merely 
 imagined. If it exists only so long as abstraction is 
 made from all difference, i.e., everything in particular, 
 it is, nevertheless, really related to the different, and 
 presupposes everything in particular. This univer- 
 sality is, therefore, more closely considered, one 
 which rests upon all these, W i,e., it is universality 
 of reflection, community ',(9 totality. <® The extension 
 of the concept is, therefore, formed by the sum of all 
 the things embraced in it. Totality is quantitative 
 universality. 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 155 
 
 (1) Similarly as above, this closer determination 
 may be expressed thus : Comprehension takes place 
 where the common is brought to light. (2) Since 
 this is the real truth of abstract universality, there- 
 fore by abstraction, precisely, is the common found, 
 and what is true of no one in particular (see § 144, 
 obs. 2) everyone just on that account rightly refers to 
 himself in particular. (3 > Totality is a universality 
 of reflection, because it is related to the particular 
 which is reflected into it. It is the universality 
 which chiefly hovers before the imagination when the 
 word universal is used, and which alone was allowed 
 validity by those in the Middle Ages who conceived 
 universals as collectiones, i.e., the Conceptualists. 
 
 § 146 (3). The concept of totality really contains a 
 contradiction/ 1 ) hence complete totality is always a 
 problem. This contradiction compels us to go beyond 
 totality. If, that is to say, the universal presupposes 
 the different, the latter are, nevertheless, /wzV^ by 
 it. (Cf. § 106.) Therefore, the universal is to be 
 conceived as that which is valid as against the differ- 
 ent, and rules them. It will not have the different 
 in opposition to itself, but, as the free, no longer com- 
 pulsory, might over them will express itself in them, 
 generate them.( 2 > The universal so taken is sub- 
 stantial {cf. § 140, obs. 2) universality, or conceptive 
 universality*® (genus); it is true totality. 1 ® There- 
 by the moment of universality is identical with the 
 other moments of the concept {cf. § 142, obs. 5), and 
 has become the entire concept.® It is not some- 
 
156 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 thing merely fancied, but rather real mode (§ 84) and 
 true actuality <«> and essentiality/ 7 ) The true exten- 
 sion of the concept is, therefore, the extension of 
 its impelling power.< 8 > 
 
 W It says, namely, that the individuals or par- 
 ticulars (i.e., the separate individuals) are taken 
 together (i.e., unseparated). Totality is, therefore, an 
 endless series, as sA 2 . (2) In nature this universality 
 may occur only as genus (cf. § 153, obs. 5), which is 
 not mere sum or unity, but real power, not only em- 
 bracing but producing the different examples under 
 it. In the sphere of the mind the category of genus 
 has no application. < 3 > In this sense is law custom, 
 universal will volonti gin&rale, and not volonti de tous. 
 w The genus is not merely a sum to be approxi- 
 mately discovered, but a really completed thing, 
 completeness. ® A thing corresponds to its concept 
 when its substantial universality has acquired reality 
 in it. W Herein is the justification of the Realists of 
 the Middle Ages, of whom the most significant were 
 those who conceded to the Nominalists and Conceptu- 
 alists (relative) justification. Where the universality 
 of the concept appears as genus, the examples have 
 their proper actuality (immortality ; see § 153, obs. 
 3) in this and only in this. (7 > So the Platonic ideas 
 represent the real essence of things, and, according to 
 Porphyry, the difference between -yevos and &ia<f>opd 
 (see § 148) is this, that the former kv t<$ tC km Karrjyo- 
 ptlrai. Analogously as above, it must be said that 
 one comprehends when one apprehends substantial 
 universality (the genus). < s > Hence Schleiermacher 
 is right when he identifies the universal with force ; 
 and Aristotle, when he took it as vXtj (see § 144, 2), 
 was compelled to identify it with Swa/iis. 
 
 § 147. Besides the moment, which, taken for itself, 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 157 
 
 had been being, but, as moment of the concept, uni- 
 versality/ 1 ) the concept contains in itself, secondly, 
 that which, taken for itself, had been essence, i.e., 
 difference and contradiction. (See § 89.) Difference 
 as held apart from the concept as identical with 
 itself (or as universal) is particularity, as essential a 
 moment of the concept as is universality. Particu- 
 larity is not relation of two entirely diverse things, 
 but, because the difference falls within the one con- 
 cept, the disparate (as, in magnitude, it became 
 the discrete) (see § 58, obs. 3), here has become 
 disjunction. The concept is particularity, disjunction, 
 or has content.® 
 
 (1) Particularity is not separation ; the latter is 
 hindered by the fact that the particulars are, in the 
 concept (A.o-y<j), one, which embraces or comprehends 
 them under itself (2) since the particular is the 
 negation of the universal, the rule that the exten- 
 sion and the content of the concept stand in inverse 
 ratio has a justification. The expression of that 
 which separates the extension of the concept into 
 particularity is commonly called division. 
 
 (b) The Particular Concept. 
 
 § 148 (1). Particularity appears, first, as the 
 moment of difference, opposed to the universal. It 
 is related to it as determining form to content/ 1 ) 
 As this it is not known, except as posited by the 
 
158 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 universal, or rather as put into it.< 2) Particularity 
 has, therefore, the character of something posited by- 
 external reflection it, therefore, does not constitute 
 substance, but forms only the accidental in it. 
 Particularity as brought into the universal concept 
 from without is logical difference, 1 ® mere markS** 
 The sum of marks forms the content of the concept. 
 
 (1) {Cf. § 144, 2). Logical determination is opposed 
 to abstraction. ^ When we speak of a division of a 
 universal sphere, or of grounds of division, these fall 
 into a reflection external to the one dividing, similarly 
 as diversity is brought to light by the comparison of 
 a third. (See § 95.) Such division is called artificial, 
 scholastic. In fact, this particularisation belongs to 
 the first chapter of the Second Part. It tells what 
 parts are conceivable. ® Porphyry not incorrectly 
 makes 8t.a.<f>opa and o-u/Aj8e^ijKo's pass into each other, 
 and says of the former that it 6vk lv rq ri em 
 KaTrjyopetTai dAA.' iv T(j> owoiov ri rariii. W By this term 
 many expositions of formal logic, in a very superficial 
 manner, denote the most various determinations, 
 already by Aristotle and Porpyhry very correctly dis- 
 tinguished. Analogously with what was said above, 
 it must be here said that one comprehends only as 
 one perceives differences and marks. 
 
 § 149 (2). But since particularity is opposed to 
 universality, it has in this its restriction and its 
 other. But thereby as well the universal also is 
 limited and restricted by the particular. The par- 
 ticular has thereby raised itself to equality with the 
 universal, or the universal has become degraded to 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 159 
 
 equality with the particular. Thereby we get the rela- 
 tion of two things which as particular are disjoined,^ 
 and hence stand under one universality, which, how- 
 ever, at the same time have the character of univer- 
 sality, and, therefore, embrace under them disjunc- 
 tion. {Cf. § 147.) Such are species.^ The species 
 expresses not, like mere difference, only the condition, 
 but the essence, the nature ; but yet it is opposed to 
 the universal as the positing, and has, therefore, 
 the character of the merely existing, phenomenal. 
 Specification is an essential moment of the con- 
 cept ; (3) as the concept was the universal, so it is 
 the species.^ The species which coDtain the con- 
 cept form its true content. 
 
 W Disjunction, as it was here explained, when it 
 was said that the particular opposes itself to the 
 universal, and that thereby the former is itself de- 
 graded to a particular, is the most immediate. 
 Rightly, therefore, is this mode of specification 
 pointed out in some so-called natural systems in 
 nature. In this particularisation, phenomenon, the 
 category of the Empiricists, repeats itself. (See 
 § 108, 1.) (2) The species is a difficult determination, 
 since here opposite moments must be held fast at the 
 same time. Hence the uncertainty in this concept to 
 which the Stoics, and, after them, Porphyry, in his 
 investigations upon the yeviKwraTov and elSiKWTaTov, 
 have well referred. ( 3) Hence the name etSos, species, 
 also kind (external mode), always signifies something 
 external. {Cf § 148, 1.) Analogously with the 
 above : Comprehended is only that whose species are 
 
160 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 known. W The concept is the species [plural], not a 
 species, since it is not a particular but is particularity 
 itself. 
 
 § 150 (3). But if particularity is the other of uni- 
 versality, it is in fact not to be thought without it, 
 hence is identical with it. The species, which the 
 concept was seen to be, do not, therefore, come forth 
 from the universal, but rather are to be thought as 
 filling it. If universality was totality (§ 146), the 
 species are rightly thought only when they make up 
 a totality. The concept is not merely the species, 
 but is completion of the species, since it contains the 
 ground of division, or has this as its content. (1) In the 
 completion of the species the moment of particularity 
 is actually realised. In truth, therefore, the particu- 
 larity of the concept consists not in a difference 
 brought in from without, nor even in that in univer- 
 sality the species are to be found, or that there are 
 such, but in the fact that the universal puts forth 
 from itself specific differences^ by means of which 
 it separates into the species < 3 > constituting the uni- 
 versal. 
 
 W Rightly, therefore, are the 8ia<j>opai x^purrai and 
 dX<o/)io-Tat distinguished, and among the latter again, 
 at ko.6' &vto irpocrowrcu, which Zv T<j! t»js ova-ias XoW 
 \ap,f}<ivovTai ko.1 woiovtriv aAAo and the Kara (ru/iySc/J^Ko's, 
 which irotova.lv aXkotov. ^ Of the 8ia<f>opate eiSojroJOis it 
 
 is therefore said that the yevos 8wa/»et p.tv wdo-as lx et - 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 161 
 
 < 3 > The real specific difference is not posited by the 
 one thinking ; it is contained in the concept of the 
 universal itself. The universal formula for all conic 
 sections (y 2 = px + p * 3 ) is its complete content because 
 the three possible cases, p * 2 = o, or + , or — give the 
 three species of it. It is contained in the concept of 
 the animal that it separates into certain disjunct 
 species. Aristotle saw that the true 8t,aipe<ris occurred by 
 
 the fact that to yevos Tats avTt,8Lr]p7]fjt,evais 8ia<j>opais Siaipel 
 Tat KO.66.irep to £<3ov t<£ irify, Kal ttttjvw ko.1 kvv8ptg. (Cf. 
 
 Schleiermacher, '' Dialectic," § 278.) Neither the 
 merely conceivable essential nor the phenomenal, 
 but only the actual and self -realising particularisation, 
 gives true disjunction. (Cf. part ii., ch. iii.) 
 
 § 151. If the hitherto considered moments of the 
 concept are merely being and essence sublated and de- 
 graded to moments, an analysis of the concept will 
 necessarily be able to reconvert its moments into 
 those determinations (similarly as by the analysis 
 [i.e., destruction] of water, the moments sublated in it 
 can be shown as independent substances). Then it 
 would be possible to begin the logic with the theory of 
 the concept. Such a course, however, would presup- 
 pose the concept as ready at hand, and hence not 
 correspond to the demand which must be made of the 
 science. Nevertheless, to go through the course for 
 one's self is, for one who will orientate himself as 
 to the point where he stands, not without advan- 
 tage.^ The real result, however, which has issued, 
 
162 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 is that the universal does not exclude the particular, 
 hut posits it ; particularity does not exclude univer- 
 sality but constitutes it ; only as this actual unity is 
 the concept actual, determined concept. < 2) (§41, obs. 5.) 
 
 W Hegel, who once so presented the logic, was 
 accordingly in the habit of recommending for self- 
 study this course besides the systematic. It would 
 be what the proof is in calculation. (2) The uni- 
 versal was first only the one, the particular the 
 other moment of the concept ; complete and realised 
 the concept appears only where it appears as the 
 unity of its moments. Then it is determined or has 
 determined itself as concept. (See § 41, obs. 5.) 
 
 (c) The Determined Concept. 
 
 § 152. The determined or concrete (complete) con- 
 cept, as the universality which is in particularity 
 identical with itself, is the unity of genus and specific 
 difference, is inner essence as it specificates itself in 
 external phenomenon, without becoming lost therein. 
 Only as this absolute negativity and return-into-self 
 is it the actual concept, i.e., concept displaying 
 activity, the actual subject, true principle. &> Since 
 the becoming of the concept in us, or the becoming 
 conscious of it, gives the definition,^ the Aristotelian 
 statements upon this are intelligible. If one leaves 
 one of them out of view,'< 3 > the other shrinks into 
 a wholly external formula. (4 > 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 163 
 
 (1) Not the concept of man, but that of Socrates, is 
 the principle of S.'s development. ® Hence in the 
 Middle Ages, and even later, the word definition is 
 used precisely as we use the word concept, to denote 
 the inner nature. (3) That it contains the ground of 
 existence. Spinoza lays down this principle : that 
 the correct definition of the right-angled triangle gives 
 us the (two) principal propositions regarding it, that 
 the formula of the ellipse helps us to discover an 
 apparatus for constructing it, shows how a definition 
 can he a creator (subject). (4) Genus was taken as 
 abstract universality, differentia specified as a mere 
 mark, then it occurred to set up definitions (of course, 
 arbitrary and numerous) by combining the two. As 
 there can be only one concept, from which everything 
 else follows, so there can be only one definition of an 
 object, from which ever} T thing else is deduced. 
 
 § 153. If this moment of the concept is fixed, and, 
 in the doing so, abstraction is made from the other 
 two, it appears as a third beside them/ 1 ) and gives 
 what we call the individual. 1 ® Individualisation is, 
 therefore, an abstract, i.e., untrue mode of manifesta- 
 tion of the, in itself, concrete concept. That the 
 individual is an abstraction is shown therein, that, 
 more closely considered, it precisely coincides with 
 the two others which were to be distinguished from 
 it. For if the individual is opposed to the particular, 
 so that it shall be the immediate, i.e., unmediated and 
 indifferent, one thinks mere relation to self, i.e., what 
 (§ 144) had been the abstract universal.® But the 
 individual, thought as that which excludes the uni- 
 
1 64 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 versal from itself and so stands over against it, is 
 the same with the particular. <*> If, therefore, in 
 any sphere the concept could not come forth as actual 
 subject, one would have in this sphere merely indivi- 
 dual beings, which would have their substance, as 
 their species producing them, outside themselves, and 
 have only the meaning of examples, which are repeat- 
 able, while true subjectivity is singularity.^ The 
 true relation is that each moment of the concept is 
 the unity of the other two. < 6 > 
 
 W If one counts the moments of the concept, one 
 applies to them an external, and hence improper, 
 category ; accordingly as one will count differently, 
 one may find triplicity, quadruplicity, fivefbldness, a 
 proof that we have here to do with apiOfwi da-v /a/JA.t;toi. 
 ( 2 > This would perhaps be what Hegel, who uses the 
 word individual in various senses, characterises as 
 immediate individual. < s > Hence, as the abstract 
 universal was a merely imagined universal, a mere 
 individual is only something supposed, has no true 
 substantial existence ; and an abstract universal (red, 
 for example) is merely an individual determination in 
 a thing. So it comes that Aristotle characterises now 
 the universal, and again the individual as immediate. 
 {Cf. § 144, 2.) < 4) A mere individual, stripped of its 
 universal determination, is, therefore, merely a sub- 
 stanceless fragment, a species, esphce. Thus, the slave, 
 as mere species, is called homo or puer; he is no sub- 
 ject, but only a thing, a mere predicate (singular). 
 Hence is the individual as such absolutely contingent. 
 It is accident in the genus, just as mere particularity 
 gave only the accidental. < 6 > Nature, whose aim is 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 165 
 
 to produce a true subject existing for itself, man, can- 
 not do this. Its productions are therefore repetitions 
 of one type. This, is the highest which it produces, 
 only an exemplar, i.e., example, which is not solely 
 and completely author of that which it does, but 
 helper, co-efficient of that whose example it is. Ex- 
 amples are mere individuals ; hence to them as sub- 
 stanceless stands opposed substantial universality as 
 the subjectless, non-self-developing, i.e., it is only as 
 genus. In this the examples as mere accidents go to 
 the ground, and only in this has the example its true 
 and unchangeable actuality (immortality, according 
 to Plato and Aristotle), while it itself is the sub- 
 stanceless and perishable. It is otherwise in the 
 sphere of spirit. Here there is neither an unalter- 
 able genus, nor replaceable, because indifferent (equi- 
 valent), examples. < 6 ; The genus embraces the species 
 and examples; the species make up the genus and con- 
 tain the examples ; in the examples, finally, genus 
 and species have their existence. In the sphere of 
 spirit, where the universal by its particularisation 
 closes with itself, man, since his universal nature 
 (reason) acts in him by means of his particular 
 species (nature), is a definite concrete character, and 
 therein precisely by himself. Therefore is he with 
 that which generates him, his substance, identical, is 
 not subject to it. As self-generating, he is his own 
 genus, as he specificates (distinguishes) himself. His 
 existence as subject is existence of the concept as 
 such. Therefore, it is his destiny to sublate his mere 
 individuality, and to fill himself with a universal con- 
 tent. The more he does this, the more he exists as 
 individual. Every true subject has its own defini- 
 tion. 
 
 § 154 Reflection upon this as what the concept 
 has proved to be (cf. § 143), has led to the fore- 
 
166 CATEGORIES Ofi FREEDOM. 
 
 going analysis of the concept (§ § 143-152), which 
 has not so much considered how it develops itself as, 
 rather, shown what that is in itself which has yet 
 to develop itself. But if the concept is considered 
 only as it is in itself (i.e., as related to itself), this 
 consideration can concern only the nature of the 
 concept in general. But hereby is said that this 
 consideration of the concept has not yet been ex- 
 haustive ; for if its development consists in that it 
 makes itself that which it is, and a thing is known in 
 its truth only when it is known in its development, 
 the concept must be posited also in the other moments 
 contained in it. But that it posits itself in the mo- 
 ment of particularity is really contained already in 
 the result arrived at. The determined concept is 
 subject, as such it is for itself ; but as being for itself 
 it is exclusive, posits difference. (§ 51.) (1) But, since 
 no other being stands opposed to the concept, the ex- 
 clusion, and the position of difference, can fall only 
 in the concept itself. In fact, therefore, there lies 
 concealed in the determinate concept a relation in 
 which the concept appears as dirempt. This diremp- 
 tion is therefore the further development, a fulfilment 
 which shows what the concept really is ; it is the 
 judgment.*® 
 
 W Hence the (determined) concept of the ellipse, 
 for example, is different from that of the parabola, 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 167 
 
 while there are no different necessities of both. If, 
 above, the transition from substantiality to subjec- 
 tivity was mentioned (see § 140), here it may be 
 remarked that while substance is by its concept sole, 
 distinctionless, subject, on the contrary, is differen- 
 tiated substantiality. In nature, where there are no 
 real subjects, examples are merely repetitions of one 
 type. Where they are not this, the case is regarded 
 as an irrationality, and we say the example is abor- 
 tive, while in the sphere of spirit originality is not 
 regarded as a mishap. (2) In so far as judgment 
 is a higher form of the concept, it is here clear how 
 we can speak of mere concept as distinguished from 
 the judgment, as later from the syllogism. The 
 determinate judgment met us in the definition just 
 as in the formula of the curve ; the fomer is, therefore, 
 always called a judgment, the latter an equation, i.e., 
 different things posited as one likewise. In general, 
 subjectivity is to be thought only as it posited as 
 active. If one does this, one has at once subject and 
 predicate, substantive and verb, i.e., judgment. 
 
 B. Judgment. 
 
 § 155. In the judgment the concept appears as 
 self - excluding duality. (1) In this diremption its 
 moments separate. True, since they are its moments 
 and in it identical, their unity has not disappeared, 
 but because it is not yet posited (as that to which 
 the realisation of the judgment has to conduct) 
 it has the character of immediacy, and appears as 
 copula (2) introduced from without. This is the 
 reason why the judgment, which, like the concept, 
 
168 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 is a category, is commonly regarded as a product only 
 of our reflection. Judgment is likewise an objective 
 relation, and our judging, if it is a true one, consists 
 merely in our following the self-diremption of the 
 concept as objective.® 
 
 (« Hence we may here, as already above (§ 155, 
 obs. 1), speak of several concepts, and of a combination 
 of two, which was until now not possible any more 
 than there are two or more actualities or necessities. 
 ® By copula we mean (subjectively and objectively) 
 the bond by which the terms related in the judgment 
 are joined to one another. < 8 > Hence we say of a 
 man who judges incorrectly that he has no judgment. 
 
 % 156. In the subject (§ 153) diremption made its 
 appearance. But since the other moments of the 
 concept stand over against it as exclusive, it has ac- 
 quired the meaning of the individual: as subject, it was 
 first to show itself in the realisation of the judgment, 
 in which realisation it fulfills its destiny as subject. 
 Until then it has only the position of subject, and 
 appears as the merely grammatical subject.^ Op- 
 posed to it stands the universal, or also the particular, 
 in either case that which comprehends it.® Because, 
 however, of their external relation to one another, 
 the latter appears not so much that to which the 
 individual must subsume itself, as, rather, that to 
 which it is, by the copula, subsumed. It has, there- 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 169 
 
 fore, even yet only the determination of its universal 
 nature, passes for that, and is predicate to that (gram- 
 matical) subject.^ Wherever, therefore, an in- 
 dividual is subsumed under a universal determina- 
 tion, a judgment occurs. W Since each moment is 
 really the unity of the two others, and hence is the 
 entire concept, the realisation of the judgment, 
 which gives the different forms of the judgment,®, 
 consists in that every moment shows itself to be 
 this unity i.e., that every concept of the judgment 
 becomes the concept. In the first instance the relation 
 exists that a mere individual is subsumed under an 
 abstract universal in an immediate way— -judgment 
 of immediacy. 
 
 W Also the so-called logical subject. It is, there- 
 fore, not accidental that Aristotle uses the same words 
 by which he denotes the real substrate and subject, 
 in order to denote the grammatical subject: mroKd^evov 
 is to him both. ® The universal formula for the 
 judgment is therefore : the individual is (or is not) 
 universal (I — U) since even the particular has, as 
 opposed to the universal, the value of the universal. 
 < 3 > If, according to Aristotle, to (Zov KaTq-yopeirai Kara 
 rov avdpmirov (is k<x6' vwoKeip.evov, this predication ap- 
 pears to be merely the work of the one judging ; but 
 the copula is shows that the predicate is no longer 
 attributed to the subject by us but is its. W Every 
 product of nature expresses or exhibits a judgment, 
 since it is subject to its universal standing over against 
 it. Therein consists its judgment and doom (Gericht). 
 W Most expositions of the old, i.e., abstract logic, 
 
170 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 start from the unreal abstraction of a contentless 
 form, and therefore place the difference of the 
 various judgments in the mere form. Since we have 
 seen that a mere form does not exist, the various 
 forms of the judgment will be to us also in content 
 different judgments. According to the old way, no 
 difference whatever is to be made between the positive 
 and the assertoric judgment, and the categorical judg- 
 ment is different from them only when one has regard 
 to the content. In Aristotle such empty distinctions 
 do not occur. Since here form and content are not 
 considered apart, it is an inadmissible demand if it be 
 required to show the passage of one form of judgment 
 into the others in one and the same content, and to 
 show (say) how the judgment, "The rose is red," 
 passes through the forms of the positive, negative, 
 indefinite, singular judgments, etc. In the case of 
 every other form there must, if the example shall be 
 fit, be chosen another example. Upon the nomencla- 
 ture a remark : If, to designate the various forms of 
 judgment, the same names should be employed that 
 are employed by formal logic, this will occur only 
 because that name appears as the most suitable. The 
 main thing is not the name but what is perceived as 
 the peculiarity of each form of judgment. 
 
 (a) The Judgment of Immediacy. 
 
 § 157 (1). The immediate judgment is positive 
 judgment, since the individual as subject is subsumed/ 1 ) 
 or subsumes itself,® under a predicate, without 
 there being a necessity for the subsumption, posited 
 by the nature of the subject or the predicate. This 
 judgment has as contingent no truth,®* although it 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 171 
 
 may be correct where a contingent content is con- 
 cerned. W> The universal formula of the judgment 
 (I - U) is also its. Only, since the union of subject 
 with predicate is here an external one, and the abstract 
 universal, is merely an individual determination 
 (§ 153, obs. 3), the predicate can receive the mean- 
 ing of a merely external attribute or mere mark 
 (§ 148), which inheres in the subject along with other 
 marks.® 
 
 W The propositions: "The sky is blue," "This 
 house is yellow, etc.," and the act whereby I occupy 
 a thing, are positive judgments. C 2) If I give my- 
 self up to a determination, let it pass for right, 
 yield to everyone without being obliged by my duty, 
 my pleasure is the copula in this judgment. (3) The 
 positive acquires here the meaning of the accidental, 
 hence the usage of speech opposes it to the rational 
 and necessary. The sky may also acquire another 
 predicate, I may be unaccommodating to others, 
 the subsumption is merely positive, i.e., contingent. 
 WEven if it have its correctness tha,t I have by occupa- 
 tion become the possessor, there is yet no (eternal) 
 truth (of reason) therein. < 5 > The relation of inher- 
 ence may, therefore, just as well be expressed by the 
 formula U— I : in this case the subjectivity of that of 
 which the mark is predicated is mere thinghood (cf. 
 § 110, obs. 4), i.e., the grammatical subject is the 
 substrate, and the predicate expresses a certain condi- 
 tion of it. 
 
 § 158 (2). But it appears in the case of the contin- 
 gent judgment as well as in contingency itself (§ 129, 
 
i 7 2 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 obs. 1), that in it lies its opposite, since the subsump- 
 tion which it expresses may just as well not occur. 
 If, namely, I predicate the universal of the individual, 
 there nevertheless belongs to the individual only a 
 part of the sphere which the universal includes ; 
 there can, therefore, be predicated of the indi- 
 vidual W only a particular species of the universal, 
 or the (entire) universal can not be predicated of it 
 The truth of the positive judgment is, therefore, the 
 judgment in which an individual is withdrawn 
 (I not — U), or withdraws itself from subsumption 
 under a universal in that it is subsumed under a 
 particular determination (I — P), i.e., the negative 
 judgment. (2) 
 
 W Of the sky only sky-blue, of this house not all 
 yellow but only a particular yellow. Both expres- 
 sions mean the same : hence the formula for the 
 negative judgment, I -P, i.e., This is an exception. 
 < 2 > In civil wrong I negate merely the subsumption of 
 my affair under a universal rule, and will represent 
 my conduct as an exception (as a particular). It is 
 therefore a negative judgment. Just so, it is a nega- 
 tive judgment when I renounce a right. Such a 
 judgment would the proposition, Cajus is not learned, 
 be. 
 
 § 159 (3). And in the negative judgment precisely 
 the same relation is repeated. Since, namely, the 
 predicate (the particular) embraces more than the 
 individual, this again contains more than merely 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. , 173 
 
 that particular determination, the relation between 
 subject and predicate is so to be conceived that every 
 reference of the individual to the universal becomes 
 by the complete negation of the latter impossible 
 (I — non U), W or the individual is related only to itself 
 (I— I). ® The result is, therefore, the indefinite 
 (infinite) or identical judgment, in which the pre- 
 dicate, which in the two other forms of judgment 
 had had the meaning of universal and particular, 
 appears as their unity. Hence it is in a higher 
 sense than is usually said, unity of the positive and 
 the negative judgment.® In this judgment the 
 judgment sublates itself. That is to say, since it is 
 a judgment which is no longer a judgment/ 4 ' it 
 contradicts itself and is in so far a meaningless 
 judgment. (B > 
 
 W The proposition : The mind is not-square, This 
 line is not-sweet; crime in which I do not negate 
 the subsumption of my act under the right, but the 
 right itself by my will. (2) The proposition : The 
 mind is the mind ; the obstinacy which says that my 
 will is my will. ( 3) In general the real difference 
 between the negative and the so-called infinite 
 judgment, to which Salomon Maimon has directed 
 attention, is too much neglected. (4) The proposition : 
 The mind is not square, or, The mind is the mind, 
 says (judges) nothing, is entirely empty. W Just as 
 absurd is, say, crime, i.e., a deed which is no deed, 
 obstinacy, i.e., a will which wills nothing. In spite 
 of their absurdity these judgments have (un- 
 fortunately !) reality. 
 
174 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 § 160. But what is contained in the fact that the 
 highest form of the immediate judgment contradicts 
 itself, is that we have to go beyond it. In fact, 
 this really occurs, for when the predicate in the 
 various forms of this judgment has passed through 
 the different moments of the concept, it has thereby 
 become true universality of the concept, and the 
 truth of the immediate judgment will be a judgment 
 in which the subject is subsumed (or subsumes itself) 
 to a predicate which constitutes the true substance 
 and real essence of the subject, i.e., its true concept, 
 (§ 152), even though this, as opposed to the mere 
 individual, get the meaning only of the genus. (§ 153, 
 obs. 5.) We call this judgment the essential 
 judgment. 
 
 (b) The Essential Judgment. 
 
 § 161. The essential judgment occurs where an 
 individual subsumes itself or is subsumed under an 
 essential (substantial) universal determination. As 
 the truth of the immediate judgment, it is higher 
 than that. (1) If in the immediate judgment the 
 series of its forms was produced by the alteration of the 
 predicate, here it is otherwise : the predicate is the 
 totality of the concept, needs therefore no further 
 development, while the subject is merely an indi- 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 175 
 
 vidual, and has consequently to develop itself and 
 become equal to that.® The various stages by 
 which this judgment has to realise itself give the 
 various forms of the essential judgment, in which 
 the foundation is formed by the fact that the subject 
 has an essential universality as its predicate. 
 
 W Hence more judgment is attributed to the man 
 who says, Tin is a conductor of electricity, Man is 
 free, than to one who says, Tin is white, or, The man 
 is blonde. < 2 > That is, to fill itself out to the 
 complete concept. {Cf. § 156.) If, therefore, one 
 will designate the various forms by the earlier 
 analogous formulae, the predicate will have to be 
 designated as unalterable (p). 
 
 § 162 (1). The essential judgment has itself still 
 the character of immediacy where a mere individual 
 in an immediate way is subsumed, or subsumes itself, 
 under an essential determination. 11 ) There then 
 appears an essential relation as a mere individual 
 case.® We call this relation singular (essential) 
 judgment.^ It is as contingent as the positive. 
 Its formula would be I — p. 
 
 W These propositions : This (tin) is an electrical 
 conductor, Cajus acts justly, is mortal ; despotism in 
 the Orient, in which an individual is free, not because 
 of his merit, but immediately by natural character 
 alone. (2) It is a contradiction that what is in itself 
 true should have merely the meaning of something 
 whereby it accidentally has its correctness. (3) Ac- 
 
176 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 cording to the formal logic, a judgment of immediacy 
 may be a singular judgment. Because of the other 
 meaning here, the word essentialis added. The death 
 of an animal shows it to be subject to its genus, etc. 
 
 § 163 (2). But the contradiction which is contained 
 in this judgment carries us beyond it. If, that is to 
 say, the individual shall be a universal, it is at the 
 same time determined as both, i.e., as unity of the 
 (subjected) individual and the essential universal 
 (predicated of it). If such a unity gives the concept 
 of a particular essential nature, i.e., the concept of the 
 species (see § 149, 2), the truth of the singular essen- 
 tial judgment will be a judgment in which the sub- 
 ject is a particular species of a genus, of which the 
 rational nature of the latter is predicated/ 1 Since 
 therein is impliciti contained that other species are 
 excluded by this suhsumiptiori, this particular (essential) 
 judgment (or the judgment of plurality) is equally 
 affirmative and negative/ 2 ) Its formula would be 
 P-p. 
 
 W The propositions : Some men are rational, 
 Some metals show capacity to conduct electricity ; 
 ancient freedom, which consisted in the fact that 
 some (the Greeks) were free. W The freedom of the 
 Greeks only, involved the non-freedom of the Bar- 
 barians. The negative judgment and the particular 
 judgments show relationship with the category of 
 possibility. (Cf. § 162. 1.) 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. ifr 
 
 § 164 (3). This defect is remedied in a higher form 
 of the essential judgment : this form, when we reflect 
 upon the two foregoing, emerges as their unity. If, 
 that is to say, in the singular judgment the subject 
 was conceived as the individual, in the particular as 
 the particular, it will, since both judgments should 
 be equally true, have to be taken as the unity of the 
 two determinations, i.e., as the universal embracing 
 the individuals and particulars. The universal 
 (essential) judgment, or the judgment of totality, is 
 found where the the totality of all individuals and 
 particulars are subsumed to an essential universality. 
 Its schema would be U— p. 
 
 The proposition : All wolves are vertebrates : the 
 complete equality of all classes of men before the 
 law. 
 
 § 165. But we cannot stop even with judgment of 
 totality. Totality comprehends together the indivi- 
 duals and particulars ; but as individuals and par- 
 ticulars, they exclude togetherness ; the concept of 
 totality, therefore, involves a contradiction, and 
 totality is, since it can never completely be, an end 
 still to be realised. A universal judgment, therefore, 
 is true only for the nonce, and has the value merely 
 of judgment which obtains of the greatest number, 
 i.e., the value of a particular judgment;^) hence, 
 
 M 
 
i?S CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 like that, points beyond itself, so that we can as little 
 rest with it as with the indefinite judgment to which 
 it corresponds. To what we have to pass from it, has 
 been shown in the various forms of the essential 
 judgment. In this, namely, as did the predicate 
 in the immediate judgment, the subject has passed 
 through the various moments of the concept, and 
 thereby has become the entire concepts (Cf. § 
 165.) Both subject and predicate, therefore, since 
 their determination is accomplished, have not to alter 
 further ; but it is merely required that the copula also 
 be fulfilled to the concept. This successive develop- 
 ment of the judgment into the syllogism (§ 170) 
 gives the various forms of the conceptual judgment. 
 
 (1) That all wolves are vertebrates is true in the 
 first instance only of all those which are known. 
 (2) Tacitly there is assumed as the basis of those 
 universal judgments the judgment that it is involved 
 in the concept of the wolf to be a vertebrate, of man 
 to be respected by the law. 
 
 (c) The Conceptual Judgment. 
 
 § 166 (1). The judgment of the concept occurs 
 where the subject has a determination that con- 
 stitutes its innermost essence, by which is determined 
 its relation to the predicate attributed to it. Sub- 
 sumption under this predicate appears first as a mere 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 179 
 
 immediate copula: it is not yet shown that this 
 predicate belongs to it from inner necessity, or must 
 be subsumed under it. This gives the immediate 
 judgment of the concept. (1) It corresponds to the 
 positive and the singular judgment, because the sub- 
 sumption is only a fact.® 
 
 (1 > Only of one who names beauty as the purpose 
 of the work of art, or faithfulness to duty as that of 
 man, is it said that he has real judgment. (2 > Such a 
 judgment is expressed in the proposition : man (no 
 longer a man) is a rational essence; it is contained 
 in innocence, in which in an immediate way man 
 corresponds to custom, i.e., destination. The im- 
 mediate judgment of the concept corresponds to what 
 Hegel calls the categorical and assertorical judgments. 
 If we employ once more the earlier analogous 
 formulas, an unalterable letter will here have to be 
 taken for the subject also, and we should have s — p. 
 
 § 167 (2). In the immediate judgment of the con- 
 cept there is contained a contradiction, which even 
 the name suggests. It consists in that, although the 
 subsumption under the predicate is posited and con- 
 ditioned by the essence of it, it has here only the 
 character of being and immediacy. The contradiction 
 is resolved, since the copula loses the character of 
 immediacy and becomes true necessity, i.e., a relation. 
 (See § 131.) If in place of mere is an essential 
 relatedness enters, we have the essential judgment of 
 the concepts It occurs where the subsumption of 
 
180 CA TEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 the subject under the predicate has acquired the 
 character of necessity, and may be called the judg- 
 ment of necessity or compulsion^ 
 
 (1 > With Hegel, the hypothetical judgment. < 2) In 
 the proposition, the criminal must be punished (or, 
 if a man is a criminal he is punished) ; further, in 
 the external legality of man we meet this judgment 
 in its subjective and objective meaning. 
 
 § 168. Since, however, the subsumption has lost 
 the character of immediacy, the opposite defect is 
 present. That is to say, being is wanting to it, it has 
 got the meaning of a mere must be, i.e., of a problem 
 (irp6j8Xr//ia), and this judgment istheref ore problematic.® 
 Just on that account there is repeated here, in 
 higher potency, the negative judgment as well as the 
 particular. What is problematic obtains always only 
 of some. Since the subsumption is compulsion, i.e., 
 external necessity, it is mere contingency (§ 126). 
 As mere problem this judgment contains an un- 
 resolved contradiction.® This, however, is resolved by 
 the copula's being posited again as immediacy, i.e., 
 as immediacy produced by the sublation of mere 
 mediation. (Cf.% 131.) This gives us the grounded or 
 completed judgment of the concept. 
 
 W Rightly, therefore, did Hegel, earlier, identify 
 the hypothetical judgment with the problematic. 
 Although it is necessary that the criminal be pun- 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 181 
 
 ished, it is yet problematical whether it always 
 happens ; and when it happens, it remains, since that 
 necessity is an external one, an accident. ® This 
 contradiction is contained in the concept of every 
 problem, every should-be, which as such cannot be 
 realised. (Cf. § 44, 2.) The law, therefore, can only 
 condemn, its judgment compels and punishes. 
 
 § 169 (3). The complete judgment of the concept, 
 or judgment of freedom, is to be found where the 
 subject, by means of its possible independence, is by 
 its essential W predicate nevertheless subsumed 
 under it. (§ 166.) It contains, therefore, the two 
 forms of the conceptional judgment W which have, 
 hitherto, been considered, and is their truth. The sub- 
 sumption, that is to say, is neither a new being, 
 nor even a mere must-be, but is both, hence free and, 
 therefore, conceptual subsumption.< 3) The judgment 
 of freedom has a universal character, for what should 
 be forms no exception. 
 
 < J > In so far as in such a judgment as : The wolf is 
 either a mollusc, or articulate, or vertebrate, it is at least 
 represented as possible that the subject is subsumed 
 under another as its appropriate predicate, we may 
 with Hegel call this judgment the disjunctive. (2 > It 
 has, therefore, the character of inner necessity, and 
 is, therefore, apodictic. < 8 > As an example of this 
 judgment in so far as it has real meaning, may be 
 cited even willed rationality, in which man, though 
 he can be irrational, is rational. This relation may 
 easily be reduced to a disjunctive judgment, 
 
182 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 % 170. The various forms of the conceptual judg- 
 ment have shown how the copula realises freedom, i.e., 
 the concept, just as the series of immediate judgments 
 had exhibited this realisation of the predicate, the 
 essential judgment that of the subject. Thereby, how- 
 ever, the goal of the judgment is reached (§ 157) and 
 hence also the termination of its development. For 
 since, as was postulated, the concepts have become 
 concept, we are compelled to think the concept which, 
 through the concept, is identical with itself, i.e., the 
 syllogism.®* This, as the return of the self -particular- 
 ising concept (§ 154) is the truth of the judgment, 
 whose highest form is, therefore, really the syllo- 
 gism/ 2 ) (Cf. § 16, § 41, obs. 4.) In this, self- 
 exclusion yields to self-inclusion. 
 
 (1) In the example last cited the subsumption of 
 man under rationality is itself rationality, i.e., con- 
 cept. ® The difficulty of distinguishing the highest 
 form of the j udgment from the syllogism has in this 
 relation its ground. The student involuntarily passes 
 from one to the other because what is thought of is 
 itself this passage. Only in a higher sense must it be 
 said of the judgment of freedom, as of identical and 
 universal judgment, that it is no (longer) judgment. 
 
 C. The Syllogism. 
 
 § 171. Also the syllogism is generally regarded as 
 merely a product of our thought ; but as category it is 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 18.; 
 
 just as well a real relation, and the syllogism which 
 we make is merely a psychological reflex, or an inner 
 repetition, of the syllogism which is contained in the 
 fact itself/ 1 ) As the return of the concept from the 
 judgment to itself, the syllogism is the unity of the 
 concept and the judgment (hence is latent in the 
 judgment of the concept), and its truth. < 2 > The 
 syllogism is the concept which is mediated with itself ; 
 its development can, therefore, consist only in that it 
 posits itself as this self- mediation. The various 
 stages of realisation of it are shown, each again, by 
 various forms, the figures of the syllogism ; (3) these 
 form a series of stages in that they successively 
 approach more nearly the final determination of the 
 syllogism. Since the syllogism has shown itself to be 
 the truth and foundation of the judgment, a paral- 
 lelism between the various syllogisms and judgments 
 cannot cause surprise. 
 
 W Where this is not the case, one says rightly 
 that there is no syllogism. (2) Such propositions as 
 everything, God, etc., is a syllogism, have therefore a 
 justification in these. (Cf. § 29, obs. 5.) W Pre- 
 cisely the same is true here as what was said (§ 156, 
 obs. 5) regarding the various forms of the judgment. 
 But the more the theory of syllogisms has kept, in 
 the formal logic, the form which the most careful 
 observer of the reflex of the syllogism in us, Aristotle, 
 has given it, the more we shall know ourselves in 
 agreement with it, the more its terms may also be 
 
184 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 employed here. Since the abstract logic abstracts 
 from the content, so it ignores the difference between 
 the stages, and rests in the most abstract. Hence in 
 the ordinary usage of speech the figures of the 
 syllogism denote only the forms of the immediate 
 syllogism, and the syllogism of analogy, for example, 
 is not commonly called a particular figure. 
 
 § 172. The syllogism will therefore appear first as 
 not yet realised. The concept has, therefore, not yet 
 become identical with itself ; therefore, the syllogism 
 appears as a plurality of concepts, like the judgment 
 (Cf. § 155.yw But mere judgment it can not be, for the 
 mere copula has become mediating concept. (§ 170.) 
 Therefore, the syllogism will first appear as a media- 
 tion of two concepts by means of a concept, in which 
 mediation the two extremes as much as the terminus 
 medins have the meaning of mere moments of the 
 concept, (1) each of which is by itself taken as concept. 
 As this not yet mediated syllogism the syllogism is 
 immediate syllogism. < 2 > 
 
 W As in the quantitative relation, because one 
 quantum was made of two, these had the meaning 
 only of moments of the quantum (§ 72), so here the 
 concepts which make up the syllogism, which is, how- 
 ever, only the self-mediating concept. <"-> This ex- 
 pression contains the contradiction which lies in the 
 fact itself; the syllogism is not yet (completed) 
 syllogism, but only begins to be it. Otherwise ex- 
 pressed : syllogism is conceptual mediation. The first 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 185 
 
 syllogisms to be considered exhibit only superficial, 
 forced, and hence, not conceptual mediations. 
 
 (a) The Immediate Syllogism. 
 
 § 173 (1). In the immediate syllogism the various 
 concepts are, by a concept distinct from them, 
 so mediated that each gets the meaning of a mere 
 moment of the concept. If these, now, were taken 
 by themselves, the universal, the particular, and in- 
 dividual, the immediate syllogism, the fulfilment of 
 the immediate judgment, will have in the first place 
 to be so conceived that in it an individual is by a 
 particular subsumed under a universal/ 1 ) This first 
 figure of the immediate syllogism (the foundation of 
 the positive judgment) may therefore be denoted by 
 the formula I — P — U. Since the three concepts are 
 valid each by itself, the mediation will have the 
 character of externality. Therefore both the sub- 
 sumption of the particular under the universal, 
 and that of the individual under the particular, 
 appear as an immediate and external subsumption, 
 i.e., as judgment. The premisses of the syllogism (the 
 immediate in it) are therefore (or may be represented 
 as) judgments/ 2 In this case, in the first figure the 
 particular will be combined with the individual as its 
 predicate and with the universal as its subject. < 3 > 
 
186 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 (1) Aristotle, who in his exposition always seizes 
 the real relation of the concepts combined, therefore 
 defines the first figure as that in which the terminus 
 minor is contained in the medius, and this in the 
 major. [See Prior, " Analytics," L, 4.] The proposi- 
 tion, This house is yellow because painted with ochre ; 
 the purchase in which I get possession by means of a 
 particular stipulation, or every contract, in which, for 
 the sake of a particular interest, I subject myself to a 
 particular determination as to a rule, may serve as 
 examples of this syllogistic figure. {Cf. § 157, obs. 1, 
 2.) < 2 > The modern expositions of formal logic 
 always put forward this form as the assented form. 
 < 3 > The regular form of this syllogism is then P — U, 
 I-P, .-. I-U. 
 
 § 174. This syllogism is as regards its content just 
 as contingent as the judgment which it proves. (See 
 § 157.) There could equally well be subsumed under 
 the universal another particular, and the individual 
 combined by the same particularity with another 
 universal. W From this defect of content there fol- 
 lows also its defective form. Only one part of the 
 syllogism, namely, is here, which the syllogism should 
 be, mediated, the conclusion, or the reference of the 
 two extremes.® On the contrary, the reference of 
 each extreme to the mean is an immediate presupposi- 
 tion or an assumption, in short a contingent judg- 
 ment. W 
 
 (1 > In that example another interest might lead me 
 to this same contract, or the same interest to another 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. i87 
 
 contract < 2 > The contract is concluded, my obliga- 
 tion compulsory ; or in every syllogism the conclusion 
 is by its ergo no longer a mere judgment. ® It is 
 accidental that I have this particular interest, etc. 
 
 § 175 (2). This defect demands a remedy, namely, 
 that from the syllogism everything shall be removed 
 which contradicts its nature. This now would not 
 occur if its premisses were by this same figure made 
 conclusions ; the regressus in infinitum which would 
 thereby arise would not take away this defective 
 form, but rather repeat it. This figure points to its 
 own sublation, and to another figure of the syllogism. 
 That is to say, if in the first premiss the universal 
 is identical with the particular, in the conclusion with 
 the individual, then really that which joins the par- 
 ticular with the individual, or in which the two 
 coincide, is the universal. But if this be posited as 
 that which it really is, there results a syllogistic 
 figure in which precisely the universal forms the 
 mean concept. This second figure of the syllogism,^ 
 the demonstration of the negative judgment, 
 whose formula will be I— U — P,< 2 > must, if one takes 
 the premisses as judgments, in both (as already done 
 in the first) assign to the universal the place of 
 predicate. It occurs when any individual what- 
 ever obtains through the universal a particular pre- 
 dicate.® 
 
1 88 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 W Also Aristotle ["Prior Analytics," i., 5] calls 
 this figure of the syllogism in which the concept of 
 greatest comprehension forms the terminus medius, 
 the second, but without giving a reason why it is so 
 declared. This reason lies in the fact that it has the 
 second form of the judgment for its conclusion. 
 < 2 > The regular form is then: P-U, I-U :. I -P. 
 ® Examples of this figure are so to be chosen that 
 the connection with the judgment is always clearly 
 apparent. Therefore {cf. § 158) the proposition, Cajus 
 is not learned because he was not industrious ; The 
 relation in which from universal respects I renounce 
 a particular right, or in which, supported upon 
 universal use, I represent my affair as an exception, 
 etc. 
 
 § 176 (3). This figure of the syllogism stands 
 higher than the first, because it presupposes it. W 
 But even it, since it still contains an immediated 
 premiss, points to another as its truth, one which is 
 contained in it as it is in the first. Since, that is to 
 say, in the second premiss, the identity of the uni- 
 versal with the individual, but, likewise, in the con- 
 clusion, that of the individual with the particular, is 
 expressed, it is really involved in this second figure 
 that the universal and the particular coincide in the 
 individual, and that, therefore, the individual medi- 
 ates them both. This being posited, there results a 
 figure in which a particular is by means of an 
 individual placed in relation with universality. 
 (P— I — U). (2) This third figure of the syllogism in 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 189 
 
 which the terminus medius appears as joined with 
 both extremes as its subject/ 3 ) has no unmediated 
 premiss. It is, therefore, the truth of the two former, 
 which it presupposes. W As, however, the indefinite 
 judgment, although the truth of the two other 
 forms, was, nevertheless, empty (see § 159, 3), so this 
 figure, in spite of the above-mentioned superiority, is 
 entirely nugatory, < 5 > and can gain a content only by 
 a subreption. W 
 
 W Precisely this is the reason why formal logic 
 gives the preference to the first figure ; but the 
 foundation or presupposition occupies a lower posi- 
 tion than the presupposition. (See § 105.) (2) In 
 the proposition, There are finite beings who are learned, 
 because Cajus is both, we have an example of this 
 syllogism ; also where (in transgression) a particular 
 interest, because it is my pleasure, is made law. 
 < 3 > The regular form here would be I— IT, I— P .". 
 P— U. (4) The first forms the presupposition of its 
 major premiss, the second of its minor premiss. 
 W From the fact that Cajus is learned, and that he 
 is a finite being, follows, exactly taken, only that a 
 finite being (i.e., Cajus) is learned, and rightfully one 
 infers from the major premiss only the major premiss 
 itself, i.e., one repeats, but one concludes or infers 
 nothing. (e) This subreption makes us say : Some 
 finite being is learned. It is a gratuity when one 
 allows validity to this further step, which really con- 
 tains the anticipation of a higher syllogism. (§ 182.) 
 
 § 177. Not only, however, does the syllogism of 
 immediacy show itself defective in the fact that its 
 
igo CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 highest form is really no syllogism, but a repetition 
 (a bis idem, as is the identical judgment) ; a like 
 result emerges when the three figures are more 
 exactly considered. Between all the three figures of 
 the syllogism there exists the relation that what in 
 one has (in the premisses) the character of immediacy, 
 appears in the others as something mediated (as con- 
 clusion). They, therefore, form a circle, and all three 
 figures conduct to the negation of true inference, to 
 the circulus in ratiocinando. But this is merely the 
 negative result. The positive is that what they each 
 have shown must be combined, and that, therefore, 
 the syllogism in whose various figures each moment 
 has taken the position of the mean will now have for 
 its terminus medius a determination which is not a 
 mere moment of the concept, which (moment) joins 
 in an external and accidental way the two extremes, 
 but forms an essential mediation of them. The 
 syllogism has become essential syllogism. 
 
 (o) The Essential Syllogism. 
 
 § 178. Since the terminus medius in the essential 
 syllogism is a determination which is essential to the 
 terminus minor, and not a mere accidental predicate of 
 it, the terminus major also, to which the same is to be 
 subordinated, cannot, as in the immediate syllogism, 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 191 
 
 stand to it in an external relation, but will likewise 
 be an essential universality. The essential syllogism, 
 the fulfilment of the essential judgment (cf. § 173), 
 occurs where something is by means of a determina- 
 tion essential to it subsumed, or subsumes itself, 
 under its universal nature. 
 
 § 179 (1). The mean, since it stands over against 
 the individual, will have the significance of the uni- 
 versal (§ 153, obs. 5) ; but since the individual can be 
 subject to the universal only by being subsumed under 
 it, it stands over against the universal, and has the 
 value of a particular. Both facts taken together, there 
 results a syllogism in which the mean is formed by 
 the species (§ 149, obs. 2), embracing all individuals, by 
 which (the species) the individual is subsumed under 
 its essential universality. We call this syllogism, 
 whose mean is formed by particularity widened into 
 universality, so that the individual, as being its 
 species, is subsumed under the universal, the syllogism 
 of totality.^ It corresponds to the first figure 
 among the immediate syllogisms® and proves the 
 singular essential judgment.® 
 
 W If one calls this (tin) an electrical conductor 
 because all metals are so, or if Cajus acts rightly 
 because it is universal custom, we have this figure as 
 proposition or as real relation. In the first example 
 the species is all metals ; in the second, all who act 
 form the middle term. (2) Here the species is the 
 
192 CA TEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 mediating, which means that the terminus medius 
 is the particular. The syllogisms, which are com- 
 monly cited as examples of the first figure, are, as a 
 rule, examples of this syllogism. ® Its schema 
 would be : I - P - p. (See § 162.) 
 
 § 180 (2). In the syllogism of totality a universal 
 is predicated of the individual because it pertains 
 to all individuals of this species. In spite of the 
 superiority which this syllogism has in comparison 
 with the immediate syllogism of the first figure, it 
 at last proves, nevertheless, to be a delusion. For 
 since a thing can be predicated of all individuals 
 only when it is true of this individual also, the major 
 premiss really /^supposes the conclusion, and the 
 circle which the three figures of the immediate 
 syllogism present has made its appearance also in 
 this syllogism. But if the conclusion of this syl- 
 logism really forms the premisses, the major premiss 
 really the conclusion, there lies concealed in the 
 syllogism of totality a syllogism in which precisely 
 the individual forms the middle term, which, there- 
 fore, if one compares it with the immediate syllogism, 
 follows the schema of the third figure. But by the 
 concept of the essential syllogism (§ 178), the middle 
 term can not be a mere individual, therefore only 
 individuals as forming a totality, i.e., all individuals 
 posited as individuals, are the mean. (In so far, 
 again, may one say of this syllogism, it follows the 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 193 
 
 second figure of the immediate syllogism.) This 
 syllogism of posited totality which the one above con- 
 sidered really presupposes, in which, therefore, the 
 middle term is formed by universality individualised 
 in a series, may be termed the syllogism of complete- 
 ness. It occurs where, by means of all the individuals 
 of a species, the species is subsumed under an essen- 
 tial universality. Its formula will be P — i, i, i, i 
 
 -p(2). 
 
 That all metals are electrical conductors is true 
 only on the presupposition that tin also is. That a 
 mode of action is the custom of all, presupposes that 
 it is of Cajus also. The psychological reflex of this 
 syllogism is what is familiarly known by the name 
 Syllogism of Induction : in this the mean is formed 
 by all individuals of a species (gold, silver, iron, etc.) 
 whereby this itself (metal) is joined to a determina- 
 tion essential to it (capacity of conduction.) Hegel, 
 therefore, uses for this syllogism the name Syllogism 
 of Induction : it is the syllogism of experience. As 
 real relation, this syllogism occurs when a corpora- 
 tion, through the condition of right and activity of 
 all its members, realises the universal end of the 
 State. 
 
 § 181 (3). This syllogism has a double defect. 
 First, the terminus medius, because the totality of the 
 individuals never is realised, is a never-concluded 
 series, an endless progression which merely says that 
 the individuals should form a totality. The validity 
 of this syllogism is therefore problematic (cf § 168), 
 
194 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 and since totality merely says that for the nonce the 
 series is to be regarded as complete, this syllogism 
 really proves only the particular essential judgment 
 (§ 133). Secondly, the subsumption of the minor 
 premiss under the major (the assumption) is per- 
 missible only under the presupposition of the correct- 
 ness of the conclusion which, therefore, forms for that 
 the presupposition. W As the syllogism just con- 
 sidered, so also this, by the circle which it contains, 
 points beyond itself. This reference is carried out 
 when the problem contained in the syllogism last 
 considered, i.e., when as middle term is taken in- 
 dividuality which not only should form a uni- 
 versality (i, i, i, i,) but is universality, i.e., individu- 
 ality, which at the same time is universality, and 
 when, further, what there was immediated assumption, 
 here becomes conclusion. Because the middle term 
 has this concrete character, this syllogism (cf. § 180) 
 may be referred to the second as well as the third 
 figure. Though Hegel calls this syllogism, in which 
 the individual as universal forms the middle term, 
 the Syllogism of Analogy,® this name is really proper 
 only for the psychological reflex of this syllogism, 
 which just as well appears as real relation,® and 
 hence may be better called the Syllogism of Com- 
 binations 4 ^ That is to say, it occurs wherever the 
 middle term is formed by an individual which, 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 195 
 
 however, is valued according to its universal nature, 
 or by a universal, but only as it immediately exists 
 as an individual. Since here there belong to the 
 middle term two determinations, this syllogism is 
 invalid when the middle term in the one premiss is 
 taken only in one determination, in the other, in the 
 other determination. Then would occur a quaternio 
 terminorumS 
 
 (1) In that example there is the tacit presupposition 
 that to be electrical conductors is essential to gold, 
 silver, etc., in so far as they are metals, and not in so 
 far (say) as they are coloured, i.e., that to the metal 
 this predicate is essential. ® A syllogism of ana- 
 logy would be, if one said, Gold combines metalleity 
 and capacity for electrical conduction ; now tin, lead, 
 zinc, etc., are (like) gold; therefore, etc. Here gold is 
 taken only in its universal nature ; hence, instead of 
 saying " like gold," one says " a species of gold." < 3) 
 We meet this syllogism where, for example, an in- 
 dividual claim becomes legal through the will of the 
 monarch. The monarch gives here the privilege be- 
 cause he is more than individual ego, because he is 
 a universal, a we. (4) With reason are we in the 
 habit of calling inference by analogy a combining. 
 ( 5 ) Analogy would be superficial and invalid if one 
 said that, since metals are like gold, they are nine- 
 teen times as heavy as water, or that the moon is 
 inhabited, as is the earth, since the earth is not 
 inhabited as a mere independent heavenly body ; 
 but merely in this latter respect is it taken when 
 one subsumes the moon under the concept earth. 
 Likewise would it be a quaternio terminorum if, in 
 the example cited, tel est notre plaisir and tel est mon 
 plaisir were confounded. 
 
196 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 § 182. But even in this syllogism there has not 
 disappeared the circle by which the two other forms 
 ' of the essential syllogism were fatally vitiated. (1) This 
 syllogism, that is, precisely as did the others, pre- 
 supposes its conclusion, since without this presup- 
 position the minor premiss would be incorrect. If, 
 therefore, all forms of the essential syllogism are 
 superior to those of the immediate syllogism in that 
 the former admit of an advance, while in tlie case 
 of the latter nothing results, since they move in a 
 constant circle, (2) the former on the contrary labour 
 under the defect which, instead of petitio principii, 
 should rather be called petitio conclusi.^ But the 
 consideration of these forms shows still another re- 
 sult. Since successively the major premiss (§ 180), 
 the assumption (§ 181), and the minor premiss (§ 1S2) 
 have been shown to be mediated (by the conclusion), 
 it is involved therein that everything unmediated 
 must be removed from the syllogism. Unmediated 
 were, however, even in the highest form of this 
 syllogism, the two determinations which were joined 
 only by also or at the same time. The true mediation 
 will consist in that, instead of such mere combina- 
 tion, which gives the syllogisms considered the char- 
 acter of contingency, w the middle term is formed 
 by the self-producing genus, i.e., by the true uni- 
 versality of the concept. The result is that the 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 197 
 
 essential syllogism realises its concept (see § 178), 
 and thereby has completed itself, and has passed into 
 the conceptual syllogism. 
 
 (1) The metals are like gold, only in so far as 
 they are electrical conductors, not in so far as they 
 are nineteen times as heavy as water. " This is 
 the will of the monarch," can I say only on the 
 presupposition that we have to do with something 
 which he can justify, ie., what is lawful, not with 
 (say) a matter of taste. (2) Hence Bacon of Verulam 
 (Introduction to " Instauratio Magna ") finds fault 
 with the syllogism on the ground that it gives no 
 new knowledge, and praises, instead of it, induction 
 and analogy. (8) The correctness of induction and 
 analogy depend upon whether the presaging of the 
 conclusion is correct. Hence it is contingent, depends 
 upon the genius of the investigator, whether his 
 inductions and analogies bring him to what is 
 correct or not. w This contingency has its chief 
 ground in that the individual (see § 153, obs. 4) 
 as such was the contingent. It is a matter of good 
 fortune when the individual will of this monarch 
 coincides with the will of the monarch (who does 
 not die). The quaternio terminorum is possible, 
 because here two things are combined ; one is not 
 mediated through the other. 
 
 (c) The Conceptual Syllogism. 
 
 § 183. In the conceptual syllogism the defect of 
 the immediate syllogism, in which the terminus medius, 
 as well as the subsumption of one extreme under 
 
198 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 the other, had the character of contingency, has 
 disappeared ; since now its own nature, the genus 
 (§ 146), forms the middle term, the syllogism has 
 acquired the character of necessity. Just so was 
 the essential syllogism defective ; namely, in that 
 the r .iddle term was to develop itself to true uni- 
 vers lity, it displayed a never-realised postulate, 
 which had as consequence either the endless pro- 
 gression (§ 181), or the circle in the syllogism (§ § 
 180 and 182), in which what could not be arrived 
 at* 1 ) was presupposed. This defect the conceptual 
 syllogism will not have, since in it true universality 
 forms the middle term, i.e., the concept which syn- 
 thetically combines in itself being and must be into 
 inner necessity. (§ 138.) The conceptual syllogism 
 is, therefore, the explication and proof of the con- 
 ceptual judgment.® 
 
 (1) Since what that postulate demanded is not 
 realised {efficere), therefore those syllogisms are not 
 completely demonstrative (efficere). (2) (Cf. § 178.) 
 Its formula will be s — m — p. 
 
 § 184 (1). How the conceptual syllogism is in the first 
 instance to be conceived appears from the foregoing. 
 There it was shown that the subject by its nature 
 subsumed itself to an essential determination. The 
 subsumption will therefore be conceptual (rational), 
 hence not the absolutely contingent one of an in- 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 199 
 
 dividual. But here the conceptual syllogism itself, 
 like everything in its beginning, will have in the 
 beginning the character of immediacy. This im- 
 mediate conceptual syllogism is, by Hegel, called the 
 categorical. W The immediate conceptual syllogism 
 is the fulfilment of the immediate conceptual judg- 
 ment (§ 160), and therefore has this for its premisses. 
 But herein consists its defect. Although the terminus 
 minor has in the medius its essential predicate, never- 
 theless the subsumption is, because it only is, only 
 conceivable or possible. 1 ® (See § 126.) But therein it 
 is contained that the contrary, as well, may be. 
 (§ 129, 4.) The same is true of the relation of the 
 medius to the major,® and both premisses have, 
 therefore, the character of mere possibility. 
 
 W Such a syllogism is expressed in the proposi- 
 tion : The (not d) wolf is, as mammal, a vertebrate. 
 It occurs as real relation in marriage, in which man, 
 by means of the sexual relation, is mediated with 
 custom. ® It is possible that man may lend ear 
 to the voice of the sexual impulse ; where he does 
 so, he follows his nature ; but it is equally possible 
 that he should not do so. That terminus medius is 
 not the only one by which a man subsumes himself 
 under ethicality ; in another this terminus medius is 
 something else. Marriage has not an absolute, but 
 only a conditioned, subjective (see § 191, obs. 1) 
 necessity. (3) It is just as possible that the sexual 
 impulse conduct to ethicality, but the contrary is 
 just as conceivable. 
 
200 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 § 185 (2). The defect in the syllogism just char- 
 acterised is, like every defect, a contradiction, and 
 must as such he resolved. This takes place precisely 
 as in the case of the judgment. What is essential 
 predicate is posited as such when it enters into, not 
 a merely being, but an essential, combination with the 
 subject, i.e., where the minor must be subsumed under 
 the medius, and the latter to the major. There will, 
 therefore, result, as the truth of the syllogism just 
 considered, one which demonstrates the judgment of 
 compulsion, in that it has judgments of compulsion for 
 its premisses. Like that, it also will have the 
 character of necessity, and may therefore be called 
 the Syllogism of Necessity or of Compulsion. 
 
 An example of this syllogism would be, The crimi- 
 nal must confess, but the one confessing must be 
 punished. Since this proposition may equally well 
 be expressed, If the criminal confesses, he must be 
 punished now, etc., it is justifiable when Hegel, who 
 called the preceding syllogism the categorical syllo- 
 gism, designates this as the hypothetical. As real 
 relation we meet it where the Hindu, since he must 
 belong to a caste, is compelled to carry out the end of 
 the State. It is easy to express this relation in a 
 proposition analogous to the above. 
 
 § 186 (3). But, more exactly considered, the syllo- 
 gism of compulsion, as diametrical opposite of the 
 immediate conceptual (categorical) syllogism, displays 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 201 
 
 an opposite defect. The subsumption here is a must- 
 be. But to the must-be is wanting being, and the 
 necessity of this syllogism is merely external neces- 
 sity, i.e., contingency '.W What the syllogism con- 
 tains remains, therefore, always a problem, and it is 
 problematical, as is the judgment founded upon it. 
 As possibility and contingency were only abstrac- 
 tions, which postulated their unity (§ 129), so here 
 an analogous thing occurs. If it lay in the concept 
 of the conceptual syllogism that the subsumption be 
 (§ 184), and, likewise, that it must be (§ 183), it is in 
 truth to be conceived as a syllogism in which sub- 
 sumption has the character of freedom. (Cf. § 142.) 
 This occurs in a higher form of the syllogism ; in this 
 the last remnant of immediacy . and contingency 
 (analogously as above in the judgment, § 169) will 
 disappear, since the terminus minor subsumes itself 
 under the medius, and the major by means of its in- 
 dependence of them. This syllogism of freedom*® will 
 have removed the conditionedness, which yet clings 
 to the syllogism of necessity, and will be unconditioned 
 and absolute.® As its premisses it will have the 
 judgment whose fulfilment it is, the judgment of 
 freedom. 
 
 W Because the criminal must confess (the de- 
 fenders of torture urge), therefore his confession is 
 contingent (as the adherents of the English jury 
 
202 CA TEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 assert). W The proposition, The criminal will con- 
 fess, and be punished, may also be expressed thus : 
 He may deny, lie, exculpate himself or confess, but 
 he does neither of those three, therefore, etc. Hegel 
 therefore calls this syllogism the disjunctive. (Cf. 
 § 185, obs.) As real relation we meet this syllogism 
 when a man, excluded from the labouring class, or the 
 military profession, connects himself with the State 
 through the learned class in his calling. < 3 > Freedom 
 (cf. § 142) is absoluteness, unconditionedness. 
 
 § 187. In this syllogism of freedom, or the absolute 
 syllogism, all immediacy has disappeared. The seat 
 of immediacy was always the premisses, but these 
 are now grounded (completed) judgments of the con- 
 cept (§ § 168, 169), hence mediated ; the conclusion is 
 already so. It is thereby the concept which had 
 dirempted in the judgment (§ 154), and was posited in 
 the moment of particularity (ibid.), actually returned 
 to itself ; and if the concept was as return into self 
 subject (§ 152), so is now the subjectivity of the con- 
 cept, which was continually realising itself, completed. 
 The development of the concept which had begun by 
 the diremption into the judgment, has now, since the 
 concept is posited in all its moments, reached its 
 conclusion. 
 
 The entire investigation into the various syllogisms 
 has merely the meaning of answering the question, 
 What is mediation of the concept ? i.e., what mediation 
 is conceptual and what development is, according to 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 203 
 
 that, complete? Since, now, it appears that that 
 development is not yet so in which there occurs a 
 relation such as that in the immediate syllogism, etc., 
 but only that which occurs in the syllogism of 
 freedom, which really is what the syllogism should be, 
 unity of concept and judgment, i.e., concept again 
 restored. 
 
 § 188. A recapitulation of this chapter, to which 
 the superscription Subjectivity^ (see § 99) was 
 given because therein the concept has realised its 
 nature to be subjective, shows that the concept was 
 first considered only in itself, as abstract, mere con- 
 cept (§ § 142-154), and then as dirempted in the judg- 
 ment, or relation of concept (§ § 157-170), in which 
 the individual moments of the concept fell asunder 
 and their unity only should be posited, and finally, 
 was shown how the concept issued from the sphere of 
 contradiction and in the syllogism or mediation of the 
 concept (§ § 171-187) has rounded itself out to that 
 which was its proper destination, to concrete sub- 
 jectivity.® Since the subjectivity of quality in the 
 First Part corresponded to essence in the Second, so 
 concept, judgment, and syllogism correspond to in- 
 determinateness, determinateness, and self-determina- 
 tion, just as, on the other hand, they run parallel 
 with identity, difference, and the issuing from a 
 ground. (3) Deductive thought which consisted in 
 the application of these categories (see above, § 140) 
 
204 CATEGORIES Of FREEDOM. 
 
 occupies itself, therefore, in defining, subsuming, and 
 combining. 
 
 <*> According to the various principles of designa- 
 tion (see § 28, obs.), this chapter may be also headed : 
 The Concept, or also, From the Concept to the 
 Syllogism. (2) Where really concrete subjectivity is, 
 there is on that account syllogism. Ego is a syllo- 
 gism, since the ego closes with itself; likewise God. 
 But even where subjectivity appears only confusedly, 
 it displays the same thing. The plant shows itself 
 subject only in that it develops itself, has made 
 itself subject only where its development has readied 
 a conclusion, i.e., the seed ; only, here the seed from 
 which and that to which the development proceeds 
 are distinct. (3) Herein lies the reason why Aris- 
 totle ["Posterior Analytics," ii. 2] identifies the 
 terminus medius with the ground, and why with us 
 concluding and inferring consequences are synonyms. 
 
 § 189. But the attained completion of subjectivity is, 
 as cannot be otherwise, also its termination. Reflec- 
 tion, that is to say, upon what has come to light in 
 the theory of the syllogism, shows that first (in the 
 figures of the immediate syllogism) every moment 
 of the concept gets the meaning of the terminus 
 medius, hence is the mediating; secondly (in the 
 various species of the immediate syllogism), the 
 terminus medius has developed into complete uni- 
 versality of the concept ; finally, in the third place (as 
 the conceptual syllogism), since immediacy always 
 disappeared, everything has now the character of the 
 
SUBJECTIVITY. 205 
 
 mediated. The result is, therefore, that the syllo- 
 gism has proved to be a circle, returning into itself, of 
 mediations or a syllogism of syllogisms. (1) Since 
 here it has ceased to be the case that mediation is 
 external to the things mediated, the mediation im- 
 manent in them is constant, and such a syllogism of 
 syllogisms is necessarily a process. The concept 
 has realised itself, i.e., the determinations lying in it 
 have unfolded themselves into a system which, in 
 relation to the concept and the judgment regarded as 
 the thesis and the antithesis, forms the synthesis.*® 
 System is realised concept or content. But if we 
 consider this attained reality of the concept, it is, 
 because returned to itself, unity with itself, hence 
 being, i.e., immediacy ; but, at the same time, as having 
 issued from mediation, and hence as containing this 
 moment in itself. (3) The concept in this its medi- 
 ated reality is true fact, or has objectivity. Objectivity, 
 therefore, is the truth of the merely subjective con- 
 cept <*> and its fulfilment.® 
 
 W Such a syllogism of syllogisms is everything in 
 which concrete subjectivity displays itself. In the 
 family, for example, there is a trinity of syllogisms, 
 since father, mother, child, are each the terminus 
 medius. < 2) System and synthesis are kindred con- 
 cepts. The question as to the possibility of syntheses 
 (Kant, Fichte) is the cardinal question of logic. A 
 true system which were not a process is not conceiv- 
 able. In it there occurs a mediation with self. 
 
206 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 < 3 > Hence the expression of Hegel: immediacy through 
 the sublation of mediation, or again acquired im- 
 mediacy. Hence we have here true, necessity. {Cf. 
 § 131.) W We called the inner nature of the plant 
 the subject of its development. (§ 152, obs. 5.) As 
 this subject it exists already in the seed. But, so, it is 
 still in its untruth. The true is, that the development 
 became objective also. Later it will appear how in a 
 certain way the contrary is just as correct. Similarly 
 had relation shaped itself in the treatment of quality 
 and of quantity and elsewhere. It may even here, 
 still more later, be pointed out in how far one may 
 speak of mere subjectivity, since until now subjec- 
 tivity was the highest. As opposed to objectivity, 
 the subject appears as the immediate, i.e., lower. 
 (5) The knowledge that objectivity forms the neces- 
 sary completion, and fulfilment of the mere concept 
 forms the logical basis for the ontological proof for 
 the being of God, the real value of which, however, 
 depends upon still another. It is clear even here, and 
 will hereafter be still clearer (§ 207), that the distinc- 
 tion of subjective and objective (cf. § 4) is not insur- 
 mountable and absolute. Against the claim that 
 there is no passage from the subjective to the objective, 
 it is rather to be remarked that only that is a sub- 
 jective (and not mere substrate) which shows itself to 
 be such a passage. He in whom the idea of God is 
 subjectively, i.e., vitally, and not as a dead possession, 
 will experience that God is active in him, and there- 
 fore has actuality, objectivity. 
 
II.— SECOND CHAPTER. 
 
 OBJECTIVITY. 
 
 | 190. By objectivity is to be understood neither 
 mere being nor there-being, nor existence, nor, finally, 
 mere actuality: all these determinations are poorer 
 than it. (1) Objectivity is conceptual reality, or 
 reality only of the concept. Objectivity exhibits in 
 higher potency the nature of quantity and of pheno- 
 menon. The question, therefore, whether to the con- 
 cept objectivity appertains, is peculiar, since only the 
 concept can have objectivity.® Philosophical linguistic 
 usage since Kant justifies the taking of this word in 
 this sense.® Another sense in which it is usual to 
 take this word will later show itself likewise to be 
 justified. In the first instance, we have nothing to do 
 with the opposition to the subjective upon which the 
 latter usage of speech rests, but only to take objec- 
 tivity as the explication and realisation of sub- 
 jectivity/ 4 ) 
 
 ® By uneducated thought these words are gener- 
 ally used as synonyms : being was entirely undeter- 
 
 207 
 
208 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 mined unity with self (§ 29), there-being was being 
 modified by not-being (§ 35), existence a grounded 
 being (§ 109), actuality phenomenon of the essential 
 (§ 124); objectivity, finally, reality of the in-and-for- 
 itself rational. < 2 > Of course, existence that may be 
 grasped with the hands does not appertain to the 
 concept, because it is to it too unworthy. Even the 
 empiricist does not keep to this existence, but seeks 
 the supersensible law as the really true ; philosophy 
 does this still more ; it, like religion, demands eleva- 
 tion beyond the sensible. It was therefore barbarous 
 when Kant, in his polemic against the ontological 
 proof (of God's existence) cited the hundred dollars, 
 which are not even to any rich man an object, much 
 less to philosophy. Just as barbarous was it to 
 demand that the true content, right, truth, etc., 
 should exist outside thought (i.e., be without thought). 
 W Kant opposes to one another maxims and laws: 
 the latter are (according to him) objective principles. 
 They are so .because in them reason is realised. 
 W Laws are objective, although they exist only in the 
 will of subjects. In the entire Middle Ages, and 
 then afterwards up to Kant, the word object was so 
 little opposed to being in thought that rather only 
 that whicli is thought, taken, of course, as the merely 
 conceived, should have objective reality. 
 
 § 191. Objectivity is, therefore, merely the concept 
 itself, as again immediate. W Now, in the realisa- 
 tion of the concept it has been shown that it is 
 system, syllogism of syllogisms. (§ 189.) Objec- 
 tivity is, therefore, only as totality, as system. But 
 a totality with the character of immediacy is a world,®* 
 objectivity therefore a world of objects, and the 
 
OBJECTIVITY. 209 
 
 nearer determinations of objectivity which will come 
 to light, or the objective categories, &> which are now 
 to be developed, will give the various relations to 
 which that world is subject. W We have, therefore, 
 first to consider the relations in which things stand as 
 objects of a world. That these relations can display 
 only processes, lies in the nature of the case. (§ 189.) 
 An inactive world were no world. 
 
 W Before it had returned to this immediacy, it 
 was merely subjective ; hence even the highest 
 syllogisms had a merely subjective necessity. (Cf. § 
 184, obs. 2.) < 2) A world is more than a mere aggre- 
 gate, it is a system, hence koo-^os ; world is a category 
 which can as well be applied to the spiritual as to the 
 natural ; one speaks of a world of thought, etc. 
 Kant often employs the expression realm, e.g., " realm 
 of ends," etc. The manifestation of essence appeared 
 in a plurality of things (§ § 108, 109), the objectivity 
 of the concept (Begriff) in a world of objects, or in a 
 totality (Inbegriff) of them. @) The categories of 
 phenomenon (or existence) are especially applied 
 where one will describe or explain nature {cf § § 108, 
 and 115, obs.) ; the objective categories have to do 
 with it in so far as it is a totality. By their applica- 
 tion we show the systematic connection of them, for 
 whether a phenomenon is to be explained mechanically 
 or chemically concerns the systematics of science. 
 (4) That they find their application alone or even 
 only especially in the sphere of nature is an illusion, 
 which is, it is true, explicable by the concept of 
 nature, but is, nevertheless, an illusion. 
 
210 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 A. Relation of Objects. 
 
 § 192. Since objectivity has the character of im- 
 mediacy, all its moments are immediate, hence not 
 posited (cf. § 41), but if so, then independent. (§ 101, 
 obs. 1.) But, on the contrary, they form a totality, 
 only because they are one. They will therefore form 
 a relation where, though independent, they nevertheless 
 are related to one another, and are precisely therein not 
 independent, or are objects to one another.* 1 ) These con- 
 tradictory determinations give us, as the first, and 
 hence lowest, relation of objectivity, interconnection or 
 mechanical relation. Mechanism® is an objective 
 category, and every world is ruled by it, or is in so 
 far a machine. 
 
 W Herein lies the reason why the word object has, 
 now a disparaging, now a respectful meaning. Things 
 become objects only when they come together into a 
 totality. That on which nothing depends is no 
 object. ® Since mechanism is a logical category, 
 one correctly speaks of it even in the sphere of the 
 mind. There is a mechanical memory ; there are 
 mechanical arrangements in the State, just as much as, 
 where various sensible objects form an aggregate, 
 there are mechanical combinations of them. 
 
 (a) Mechanism,. 
 
 § 193 (1). Since the related objects are indepen- 
 dent, their relation appears external to them and 
 
0BTECTIV1TY. 211 
 
 forced, and, in spite of their relation, they are 
 externally conditioned towards one another, and can- 
 not be thought as one, but only as composite.^ 
 Their relation to one another is, therefore, merely a 
 superficial operation or so-called impression.^ That 
 which receives the operation is therein not free but 
 mechanically determined.^ This determination is 
 possible, because it lies in the concept of the 
 object, although independent, nevertheless, to be re- 
 lated, and hence, both to operate force wise and to be 
 susceptible of such operation, i.e., to suffer. Since it 
 lies so in the concept of the object to determine and 
 to be determined/ 4 ) determinism, i.e., the view 
 which allows validity only to mechanical operation as 
 an objective relation, leads to endless progression.® 
 
 W If one assume that, for example, body and soul are 
 related to one another as objects, their unity can con- 
 sist only in that an external force (God's will or a 
 pre-established harmony) has brought them together. 
 Combination is a favourite category of the under- 
 standing, which has not risen to higher categories ; 
 combination or composition arises by mere addi- 
 tion. (2) In the sensible world this is pressure, im- 
 pact ; in the spiritual, that which is done from threats 
 or fear is mechanically done. (3 > Because here the 
 object is determined by another, compulsion is here 
 posited, and the determinist denies freedom, i.e., self- 
 determination. This would give what is not given 
 here, a perpetuum mobile. (4) That the two deter- 
 minations are inseparable, is expressed by the proposi- 
 tion, Every action calls forth a reaction, and the two 
 
2iz CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 are exactly {i.e., quantitatively and qualitatively) equal, 
 like impact and resistance. < 5 > The mechanical de- 
 terminism of Descartes seeks to avoid this endless 
 progression by supposing motion to act in a circle and 
 to remain constantly the same. 
 
 § 194 (2). In endless progression the contradiction 
 contained in mechanical determination is only fixed, 
 not overcome. It consists in that the object at one 
 and the same time shall both be for itself, and be 
 passive, i.e., be for other. If the two determinations 
 are, as is postulated by that progression (§ 49), actu- 
 ally posited as identical, this gives as the truth of it 
 that the being of the object is to be dependent. 
 The object, therefore, postulates something in relation 
 to which it is dependent ; (1) but this will, therefore, 
 be over against it, i.e., outside it, and it will posit 
 itself, on the contrary, as dependent, and will there- 
 fore fall outside itself.* 2 ) This eccentricity of the 
 object makes it subject to a relation which we 
 describe as mechanical tendency!® 
 
 <*> In Nature the object in relation to which 
 another posits itself as dependent is called its centre 
 of gravity, or its centre; even in the spiritual sphere 
 one having a desire appears dependent as regards 
 another thing, the object of his desire, wherein he has 
 his centre of gravity. < 2 > Since it lies in the concept 
 of the object to be outside itself, therefore every 
 object gravitates toward every thing external to it. 
 (3) A sensible manifestation of this tendency is 
 falling; in the spiritual the conditions of passion 
 
OBJECTIVITY. 213 
 
 and the like are rightly described as a being-beside- 
 one's-self, a losing of one's self, and the like. 
 
 § 195 (3). But even in mechanical tendency the 
 contradiction is not resolved, for, strictly taken, not 
 both, but rather only one of the two determinations 
 comes to its rights, namely, the one opposed to that 
 which had shown itself in mechanical determinedness. 
 That is to say, the object was essentially indepen- 
 dent, there where it posited itself ; its suffering came 
 to it from without, and it was therefore contingent, 
 or, what means the same, it exerted force. (1) Here, 
 on the contrary, where it itself tends to become de- 
 pendent, its separation from its object (centre) is 
 the rather brought about only by force, hence (§ 126) 
 contingently.® But in this separation consists the 
 independence. The true union, and hence the per- 
 fection, of the mechanical process or of mechanism 
 will be given in a relation in which the two, 
 centrality and eccentricity, are actually united. 
 Where the object just as much is centre as it at the 
 same time seeks a centre, then we have free or ab- 
 solute mechanism,^ a relation which, since it repre- 
 sents actually a system and not a mere series, 
 corresponds more to the concept of objectivity {ef. § 
 191) than do the mechanical determination and the 
 mechanical tendency, which two it synthetically 
 combines. ^ 
 
214 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM, 
 
 (1) That positing of self only as independent 
 appears in Nature as inertia, in the spiritual world as 
 indolence. < 2 > The stone tends towards the centre of 
 the earth, i.e., not to remain a hody but to become a 
 mathematical point. If it went to the centre, it 
 would be a point ; there are other bodies in the way 
 which prevent its doing so. It, therefore, suffers 
 violence from them. (3 > In nature we find such a 
 mechanism in the solar system, in the circulation of 
 the blood, etc. ; the State has a side by virtue of 
 which it has rightly been characterised as a machine 
 in the management of taxation where the individuals, 
 their needs, and the government form a system ; each 
 of these moments both is itself a centre, and has its 
 centre in the other. <*) Herein is contained a reason 
 why the view recommends itself, which will explain 
 the absolute mechanism from the concurrence oifall 
 and (§ 194) impact. (§ 193, obs. 2.) 
 
 § 196. In the free mechanism are contained the 
 two determinations, that the object both maintains 
 its independence towards other, and also, on the con- 
 trary, posits itself as dependent. But now, however, 
 that other is itself object ; the same will, therefore, be 
 true of it, and there results as the truth of free 
 mechanism (hence also of mechanism in general, since 
 in free mechanism all other forms of it were con- 
 tained) a relation of two objects directed towards one 
 another, each of which posits the other first as de- 
 pendent, or will be posited by it as dependent, secondly, 
 maintains itself, however, as independent, and, there- 
 fore, will posit the other as dependent. This being 
 
OBJECTIVITY. 2iS 
 
 directed towards one another, is no longer external, 
 mechanical, but dynamic or chemical relation. The 
 (every) world is, therefore, a system of chemical 
 relations. 
 
 When it is demanded that it be empirically shown 
 how out of a mechanical relation a dynamical arises, 
 there is a confusion of temporal becoming with con- 
 ceptual succession of stages. For that matter, it 
 might here be answered to that demand, that even 
 empirically it appears that the, in the first instance, 
 mechanical relation of the central body to the planets 
 manifests itself also dynamically, as light, by which, 
 finally, chemical processes are brought about. 
 
 (b) Chemism (Dynamism). 
 
 § 197. The chemical relation makes its appearance 
 when each of the mutually related objects is the 
 contradiction, which is described as the tension of the 
 sides towards one another. W Each by itself con- 
 tradicts itself because it is incomplete, and integrates 
 itself only by the absorption of the other. Therefore 
 it is a violent abstraction to isolate *® them while in 
 mechanism precisely force brought them together. 
 The tension is not a tension towards object in general, 
 but towards objects antagonistically in tension : their 
 relation is, therefore, called affinity, and also elective 
 affinity in so far as this tension is an inner nisus, and 
 in so far similar to arbitrary choice. Because here 
 
216 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 the reciprocal tendency is an inclination, chemism is 
 negation of mechanism.® 
 
 W This relation appears both in Nature (in the 
 relation of acids and bases) and in the spiritual 
 sphere, in the relation of the sexes, in the relation of 
 nations in tension towards one another, etc. The 
 word chemical is, therefore, here taken in a wider 
 sense than usual. ® The more objects are in chemi- 
 cal tension, the more are artificial means necessary to 
 keep them asunder. < 3 > The attempt to reduce all 
 chemical phenomena to mechanical relations mistakes 
 this. (C/., however, § 200.) 
 
 § 198. The postulated concurrence of two objects 
 is therefore a process, in which they equilibrate them- 
 selves, and their difference and tension cease. (1) Since 
 therein each of them is as much absorbed by the 
 other as it absorbs it, the product is one produced 
 by actual interpenetration — a neutral, in which each 
 of the two is degraded to a moment. But since the 
 chemical relation exists only so long as that one- 
 sidedness, it is lost in the result of the chemical 
 process. The product of it is no longer an object 
 in tension, but one at rest in itself, which no longer 
 must be integrated, but exist independently for 
 itself/ 2 ) 
 
 W If one puts, instead of chemical interpenetra- 
 tion, mechanical juxtaposition, one will fix the differ- 
 ence precisely in the extinction of which the chemical 
 
OBJECTIVITY. 217 
 
 process consists. Chemical combination is actual 
 intussusception, and originates, therefore, not by- 
 addition, but is rather to be described as a union 
 of factors, in which an actual multiplication, increase, 
 is effected. Concordia res parvce crescunt. ® If the 
 sexual relation be taken only on its chemical side, 
 the child is the neutral. In conversation, in war, 
 etc., chemically one-sided things are neutralised in 
 that they enter into one another. Action and re- 
 action are here no more, as in mechanical operation, 
 the same, although proportional to one another. 
 Oxygen is hydrogenised, hydrogen, oxygenised. In 
 nature the crystal is the caput mortuum of the 
 chemical process. 
 
 § 199. If, however, the result of the chemical pro- 
 cess is an object which is not chemically conditioned, 
 but has the character of independence, so that it 
 no more requires another for its completion, it is 
 related to other, all other objects, indifferently as 
 to things indifferent, i.e., its relation is external, 
 mechanical. (§ 192.) In the end, therefore, chemism 
 leads to mechanism, with the same necessity with 
 which the latter led to it. If, however, at the 
 end of chemism, mechanism appears, just as, at the 
 end of mechanism, chemism appears, this merely 
 means that they mutually limit one the other, and 
 there issues as the third relation among objects the 
 reciprocal determination of mechanism and chem- 
 ism. 
 
218 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 (c) Reciprocal Determination of Mechanism and 
 Chemism. 
 
 § 200. In this reciprocal determination the me- 
 chanical will show itself in so far the more powerful 
 as the dynamical and chemical properties of the 
 object are modified thereby, (1) and vice versd the 
 modification in a chemical regard has as consequence 
 a modification in a mechanical regard/ 2 ) Neither 
 is more inexplicable, neither is more natural, as 
 it is termed, than the other. This reciprocal de- 
 termination of two relations makes intelligible the 
 attempts to reduce each of them to the other.® 
 
 W In the natural sphere the chemical property 
 changes with the (mechanically) finely divided con- 
 dition ; in the spiritual, inclination or disinclination 
 changes with the pressure of circumstances or of 
 force. (2 > Thus the metal becomes friable by oxyda- 
 tion, etc. (3 > To the attempts to reduce chemical 
 affinity to mechanical attraction stands as correlate 
 the attempt to explain the phenomena of gravitation 
 by the assumption of chemical affinity between solar 
 and terrestrial bodies. In the spiritual sphere some 
 expect everything of force, others everything from 
 impelling inner inclinations. 
 
 § 201. But what is really contained in this reciprocal 
 reference is this, that each of those relations refers to 
 the other as to its truth ; both, therefore, to a relation 
 as their truth in which they are both sublated and 
 
dSjECTlVlTY. 219 
 
 degraded to moments. How is this relation to be 
 conceived ? Mechanism was posited contradiction 
 (§ 192) ; in chemism (§ 197) each of the related sides 
 was a contradiction, since its being consisted in its 
 allowing itself to be absorbed, hence not to be. Now 
 objectivity should be a relation in which both these 
 conditions are fulfilled at the same time. Objectivity 
 will, therefore, so enter into difference with itself that 
 at the same time each of the sides appearing in this 
 differentiation is reflected in the other, and outside 
 its unity with the other contradicts itself. But if, 
 since objectivity is only the realised concept (§ § 189, 
 190), and the only moments in it which can enter 
 into difference are the concept and its reality, there 
 will, therefore, result as the truth of the relations 
 hitherto considered between subject and object, a 
 relation between the concept and its reality, i.e., be- 
 tween subjectivity and objectivity. 
 
 From this it is clear (cf. the following section) in 
 how far one is justified in opposing subjectivity to 
 objectivity. Of course it will hereafter appear how 
 this opposition is overcome. (§ 211.) In both rela- 
 tions there is here repeated what had shown itself, in 
 a lower potency, in connection with essence and 
 phenomenon. 
 
 B. The Subjective as Opposed to the Objective. 
 § 202. All the developed determinations receive 
 
220 CA TEGORlES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 their dues in the relation of end. First, in this there 
 lies a dualism/ 15 since what is merely subjective,® 
 or mere concept, stands opposed to a mere objective, 
 and operates {in so far mechanically) upon it as upon 
 its other. Secondly, the end is not a concept which 
 could remain in its mere subjectivity, but refers to 
 objectivity as its necessary compliment, as, on the 
 other hand, objectivity, because it is properly its 
 reality (§ 190),® must receive it into itself as its 
 necessary fulfilment. Objectivity can, on account of 
 this {as it were chemical) relation, not withstand the 
 end entering into it, but shows itself to be the 
 matter to be determined by it.® The relation of 
 end is, finally, the truth of mechanism and chemism, 
 and shows itself as this in that it degrades them to 
 subservient moments, and they, powerless against 
 the end, must serve it; (6) against the end, for this 
 relation is the truth of those hitherto considered only 
 in that it is at the same time their negation. (6) If one 
 combines the mechanical and the chemical mode of 
 view under the term physical, the teleological stands 
 above that. 
 
 ® Anaxagoras, whose chief merit is rightly said to 
 be that he introduced into philosophy the concept of 
 end, is therefore necessarily a dualist. Before him 
 there is only a mechanical or chemical view of the 
 world ; the former among the Atomists, the latter in 
 Empedocles. ® The end is subject of the change 
 
OBJECTIVITY. 221 
 
 which occurs in its realisation. This subjectivity of it 
 acquires here the character of being mere subjectivity, 
 because objectivity is still wanting to it. (Cf. § 189, obs. 
 3). As this merely subjective, the end is found where 
 it is a lack {e.g., instinct of a plant or of an animal) or 
 even a merely willed end, i.e., an end existing in an 
 understanding. Here is explained how the words 
 subjective, subjectivity, etc., could have the sense which 
 Baumgarten first, and, since Kant, every one has 
 joined with them. (Cf. § 152, obs. 5). < 3 > Just for this 
 reason, on the other hand, objectivity here gets the 
 meaning of mere objectivity, i.e., the quality of stand- 
 ing over against the end to be realised, or the concept. 
 (See § 190.) W The difficulty contained in the 
 question how a subjective end can make its way into 
 objectivity, has caused many to take refuge in the 
 assumption of a divine assistance or a prede- 
 termined harmony, and the like. It is to be obviated 
 only by the perception that objectivity is the sub- 
 servient moment of the concept, that which is (pre) 
 supposed by it. (5 > If one places the causa jinalis on 
 a par with the causa efficiens, and does not regard that 
 as the truth of this, it must of course appear as some- 
 thing conceptless, i.e., as a miracle, that the end con- 
 travenes the (mechanically and chemically) working 
 causes. The end realises itself in that it over-rides 
 the laws of mere mechanism, i.e., uses them. Kant's 
 identification of end and contingency emphasises as 
 tertium comparationis the fact that both are non- 
 necessity (the one of course not yet necessity, 
 the other no longer so). Since the end is a higher 
 concept than that of ground or of cause, it is a 
 higher view which regards God as end of the world 
 than that which merely conceives him as cause of the 
 world. W In those two the determining lies before, in 
 this it lies behind, the determined, or there the ground 
 is the determining, here on the contrary the consequent. 
 
222 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 If the tacit presupposition is made that there can be 
 only those two, then the impossibility is that of easily 
 proving {i.e., claiming), that what only follows can 
 determine. 
 
 § 203 (a). In the first instance, therefore, the end 
 as merely subjective stands opposed to objectivity. 
 In this dualism each moment has in the other its limit. 
 Since the end has in objectivity its limit, it is 
 finite ; since it has not yet realised itself in objectivity 
 it is only inner ; since it is something entirely other 
 than objectivity, it is for this only external end. (1) 
 Over against it stands objectivity, which, since it ex- 
 cludes from itself or has over against itself the con- 
 cept, gets the meaning of conceptless mass.® The 
 complement to the fact that the end is merely subjec- 
 tive, mere impulse is formed by the fact that to mass 
 all subjectivity is wanting. As logical, this relation 
 occurs everywhere, hence even in Nature. (3) 
 
 (1) These various designations are, according as 
 one places himself upon the side of the end or upon 
 that of objectivity, equally correct. ® In the dualism 
 of Anaxagoras, therefore, there stands opposed to 
 the voCs as the possessor of all ends, things in their 
 mindless, massy finely-divided condition. < s > If, for 
 example, from a mass which has not in itself this 
 instinct, a nest is built; or also in all parasitic 
 phenomena. 
 
 § 204 (b). The contradiction « which is contained 
 
OBJECTIVITY. 223 
 
 in the fact that the concept is not yet objectivity, 
 although objectivity pertains to it, and that objec- 
 tivity, although the concept's reality excludes it from 
 itself, is resolved by the fact that the end realises 
 itself. This occurs quite immediately ; because it is 
 more competent than the mass, it relates itself to it 
 as mere (crude) force, and mass is related to it as 
 unresisting stuff or as material, in or by which the 
 end is realised.® This realisation of itself in the 
 stuff is a ridding itself of its finitude and the accom- 
 plishment of itself as against the mass. 
 
 (1) There is scarcely a concept in which it would 
 be so easy to show contradictions as in the concept of 
 end, i.e., of the inactive active, of the following ground, 
 etc. ® Such immediate realisation of the end meets 
 us in phenomena, where there is found over against 
 the end an unresisting (soft) material which at once 
 yields to it. Clay yields to the artist, but not so 
 marble : the animal finds at band what it seeks. The 
 vovs of Anaxagoras find no difficulty where it carries 
 its end into the mass. 
 
 § 205 (c). In this form, however, the relation of end 
 does not correspond to its concept. According to this 
 latter, that which stands over against the end should 
 actually be its objectivity, and have the meaning of 
 its basis (see § 202) ; here, however, it appears as 
 something found, already at hand by it, and just on 
 that account can the end which is limited by that 
 
224 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 external never be master of it. It remains external to 
 the mass, as the mass to it, and, therefore, never loses 
 its finitude. < 2 > If the relation of end is to corre- 
 spond to its concept, the object will no longer merely 
 yield to the end, and thereby necessarily offer first a 
 (passive) resistance ; (s) but in order really to be pene- 
 trated by the end, it must actually be negatively 
 posited (i.e., degraded to mere basis.) (§ 105.) This 
 gives us the concept of means, i.e., of an object 
 determined by the end, operating (mechanically, 
 chemically) upon other objects, and in this operation 
 being negatively posited (used up). (4) This mediated 
 realisation of the end, which displays itself no longer 
 as crude force (see § 204) but as cunning, presupposes 
 the immediate, and therefore stands higher than 
 that.® 
 
 W The end, therefore, does not force its way into 
 the material but merely produces changes in it from 
 without. ® They are finite ends which are thus 
 realised in the mass. (3 > The more the mass yields 
 the more it gives way to the end, and the less the 
 end presses into it. The end therefore remains ex- 
 ternal to it, and is only an external form (a concept, 
 the relationship of which with the end Aristotle 
 rightly insists upon) brought to the substrate. Since 
 the vow of Anaxagoras brings its ends to the mass, it 
 is merely forming, shaping end, not animating nor 
 creative. <*> The end realised itself not merely in 
 the means, but through them, since it permeates 
 them. < B > In man the immediate realisation of ends, 
 just as in the animal the mediated, is reduced to a 
 
OBJECTIVITY. 225 
 
 minimum ; he must learn that which the animal can 
 do of itself, and by making tools always acts with 
 cunning. In this cunning he gets rid of his barbar- 
 ousness. 
 
 § 206. But if one considers more precisely what 
 lies in the concept of means, one finds in it an object, 
 which, however, is determined, perhaps willed, by 
 the end. The finitude, therefore, of subjectivity 
 and objectivity has here been removed, since that 
 which is an object is at the same time subjective 
 also. The means, which, therefore, stand higher than 
 the mass and higher than mere finite end, compel 
 us to conceive a relation, in which no longer does the 
 subjective end stand over against objectivity, but, 
 rather, objectivity has come into accord with the end. 
 This gives purposiveness or realised finite end. 
 
 The plow is something higher and more honour- 
 able than the desire of enjoyment which causes it to 
 plough. Just so also is it more than the land. 
 
 C. Finality (or Purposiveness). 
 
 § 207. Where something is made according to an 
 end, there it is practically denied that there is no 
 transition from the subjective to the objective. W 
 The hitherto merely inward end is here present in 
 externality, and hence realised. (§ 123.) In this 
 
225 CA TEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 realised end is, therefore, permanently combined what 
 in the means was only transiently® united; there- 
 fore it stands higher than the means,® and, there- 
 fore, also than the merely wished or sought end. 
 Therefore enlightened^ thought is an advance upon 
 teleological contemplation,® and may pride itself, as 
 opposed to that, upon its realism.® 
 
 W This may be shown even as to Kant's celebrated 
 " hundred dollars." ® So long as it serves. If it is 
 not used, it is a mere object, and sees in a tool which 
 it cannot use mere iron. (3) This is the truth in the 
 maxims, The end sanctifies the means, Whoever 
 wills the end wills the means also, etc. They make 
 the end the principale. ® Even in the practical, 
 enlightenment (industry) consists in that, in the place 
 of mere (raw) material, something purposively formed 
 is posited. ® This asked cui bono ? The former 
 shows what one gets by a thing, or what it is good 
 for : The transition from Anaxagoras to the Sophists 
 is, therefore, an advance. (6) By " real interests " is, 
 as a rule, to be understood only advantage. 
 
 § 208. But not accidentally does the word pur- 
 posive or useful signify that which (as means) serves 
 an end. Since, that is to say, the end according to 
 which the material was formed was one external to it, 
 i.e., finite, so also the union of the two can be only a 
 mechanical and forced one ; but then it is a con- 
 tingent one (§ 128), and as such transitory, as that 
 given in the means had been. But just therefore is 
 
OBJECTIVITY. 227 
 
 also every realised end, upon nearer consideration, a 
 means to a new end to be attained. W And finitude 
 is not really removed from the end, if the end is 
 brought to the material from without and combined 
 with it by a sort of juxtaposition, as it were ; and 
 one must not wonder if, in spite of their realisation, 
 ends of that sort are called merely subjective or even 
 finite.® 
 
 d) The realised house is means to comfortable 
 living, this to undisturbed labour, etc. (2 > On a 
 higher standpoint (see below § 211 tf.) the teleological 
 mode of view which places the end outside the real 
 and beyond it, appears immature and childish, and 
 the enlightened, according to which things have value 
 only as transformed (the cork-tree only as stoppers), 
 narrow and silly. 
 
 § 209. But not only is the (and hence every) 
 attained finite end really means, but also the (and 
 hence every) means is not distinct from the attained 
 end, and therefore itself an end. (1) For if, in order 
 to bring the subjective end into objectivity and to 
 combine the two, a means was necessary, so also for 
 the transient union was a means necessary. The 
 concepts of the means and the realised end are, there- 
 fore, not to be separated, must be thought as unity. 
 By alternating application of them to one and the 
 same object, is, therefore, of course produced a pro- 
 gressus and a regressus, in infinitum.® (See § 48.) 
 
228 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 If we sum up what has been shown, we think end 
 which is means and is not wanting in reality, just be- 
 cause it is self-realising end. This gives that which 
 we call self-end or ideal.*® To it as to actual unity 
 of subjectivity and objectivity finite purposiveness 
 refer as to its truth/ 4 * 
 
 W The means to the building of the house must 
 be procured by all kinds of means, for which still 
 again means must be employed, etc. *® Such a 
 series is given in the preceding. (§ sub. 1, and in 
 what is remarked sub. 1.) (3) As the Sophists point 
 beyond Anaxagoras, so Socrates goes beyond the 
 Sophists, in that, in place of the finite end, be puts 
 self-end, and therefore, in the place of the useful, the 
 good. (4) The teleological argument for the exist- 
 ence of God, whicli passes from the existence of the 
 merely purposive to the concept of a self-end, has its 
 logical truth in this transition. 
 
 § 210. A retrospect of the chapter closed (§ § 190, 
 209), which has considered the categories of objec- 
 tivity, which in this sphere corresponds to pheno- 
 menon, just as concept does to essence, shows how, first, 
 the relation among objects comes to be as objective 
 relation. In this relation among objects objectivity 
 appears in its immediacy ; the various forms which 
 the relation of objects could assume were mechanism, 
 chemism, and reciprocal determination of the two. 
 They correspond to what in the Second Part the com- 
 plex of things had exhibited. Then, secondly, objec- 
 
OBJECTIVITY. 229 
 
 tivity entered into difference and mediation, which 
 gave us the relation of the subjective and the objective, 
 in which the relation of essence and phenomenon is 
 repeated. Finally, in the realised end we saw sub- 
 jective end become objective (as there the inner ex- 
 pressed itself), which referred as to the self-end, or to 
 the idea as the final true relation. It does not need 
 to be emphasised how exactly the transition from this 
 chapter corresponds to that from the Second Chapter 
 in the Second Part of the logic to the Third. 
 
III.— THIRD CHAPTER. 
 
 IDEA. 
 
 § 211. By idea we mean self-end. As such, the idea is 
 at once accomplished being and end to be realised/ 1 ) 
 and must be thought as immanent process of self- 
 mediation/ 2 ) While in the realisation of the end 
 the subjective and the objective still stand over 
 against one another, the idea is, as their unity, sub- 
 ject-object.® Where, therefore, philosophy places 
 itself upon the standpoint of the idea, or is idealism, 
 the opposition of subject and object does not for it 
 exist. (4) The idea as this unity is reason® in the 
 sense of rationality, so that to self-conscious reason 
 there is here no reference. To the idea as this 
 unity the concept appears opposed as a subordinate 
 moment. (6) Since the idea contains in itself the 
 highest opposition, resolved, it is, on the one hand, easy 
 to point out contradictions in it,P> and, on the other, 
 the idea is exalted above all objects, so that it contains 
 in itself ground and consequent, cause and effect, etc., 
 
 as their unity. The various determinations which 
 
 230 
 
IDEA. 23 1 
 
 the consideration of self -end brings to light may be 
 called ideal categories.^ They correspond to what 
 in the First Part was treated under the superscription 
 mode ; in the Second, under actuality. 
 
 W Of these two determinations, the idea in Plato's 
 sense emphasises the first, the idea in the Kantian 
 sense the second. The former is, therefore, lifeless, 
 the latter merely regulative. The idea is neither. 
 ® The idea realises itself, is not completed, dead 
 being. Therefore it is system. (3) In the idea, 
 therefore, the concept which had got lost in objec- 
 tivity returns to itself. W Philosophy as idealism 
 furnishes the proof for the possibility of the union 
 of Logic and Metaphysics (see § 4). (5) Schelling 
 therefore defines reason (what he calls reason means 
 here idea) as the unity of the subjective and the 
 objective. When he places this definition at the 
 beginning, and then proceeds, as it were, analytically, 
 there applies to his procedure what was said in § 151. 
 (6 Hence one may speak of mere concept in so far 
 as one means thereby the concept as not yet by itself 
 posited as identical with objectivity. As distin- 
 guished from it, the idea is the truly actual. (r) In 
 that, that is to say, the idea is analysed, i.e., abstractly 
 considered. ® For the same reason for which the 
 categories of objectivity, although logical categories, 
 nevertheless appear to find their application chiefly 
 in the natural sphere, the ideal categories, particularly 
 the higher, have theirs principally in the sphere of 
 spirit. Spirit is the idea as knowing itself, reason as 
 self-conscious (cf. my " Outlines of Psychology, § 92). 
 
 § 212. The idea is unity of concept and objectivity. 
 This it must be even in the beginning, i.e., as it must 
 
232 CA TEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 first be conceived. If now that which is at the 
 beginning is in general the immediate, the idea is 
 first to be taken in the way of immediacy, and since 
 immediacy was being, the idea is first to be considered 
 as being or as immediate. 
 
 A. The Immediacy of the Idea. 
 
 § 213. The immediacy or being of the idea we call 
 ZifeP) Even as being, the idea cannot contradict its 
 destiny of being self-mediation, infinite returning to 
 self ; its being will, therefore, be an infinite being, i.e. 
 (§ 50), being-for-self. But if being- for-self shows itself 
 only in beings-for-self, so also will life appear in a 
 plurality, and, since this is a conceptual plurality, in 
 a totality of living things. ® In each of these is the 
 idea, i.e., self-end.® 
 
 W This word is here taken as logical category, and, 
 therefore, in as wide a sense as it is taken in when 
 one speaks of living community, etc. This category 
 forms the abstract basis both of vitality in nature 
 and of other spiritual relations. To apply it means 
 to consider everything organically. In the highest 
 sphere beauty is the immediate existence (life) of the 
 absolute spiritual content. ® Hence, in popular 
 usage life often denotes a complex of living beings. 
 < 3 > Only what is manifestation of self-end has life. 
 Self-end idea has been rightly recognised by Kant as 
 the real nature of life. His "Critique of Judgment " 
 contains more (true) idealism than all the rest of his 
 
IDEA. 233 
 
 works. It is particularly the immediate idea with 
 which he therein occupies himself, hence the reflec- 
 tions upon life and upon beauty. 
 
 § 214 In every living thing, therefore, there will 
 be a no longer external end (§ 203), but an immanent 
 end, which does not realise itself against a foreign 
 material to which it does violence (§ 204), or at the 
 cost of a means to be used up (§ 205) ; but this end 
 will realise itself in such means as have value in the 
 realisation of that itself as end. If we call that end 
 the vital principle, or soul,V> the means, organs or 
 members, and their totality body,W> the living will 
 be a unity of body and soul,® and life be merely 
 where there exists such a unity. Since the manifold 
 (the members) are not an aggregate which is held to- 
 gether by an external force, but the end as the 
 ideality^ of the many posits them as unity,® all 
 mechanical and chemical action are degraded to a 
 moment/ 6 ) anc" appear as such only where life is 
 imperilled or extinct.^ 
 
 (1 > This word is here taken as Aristotle takes it, 
 i.e., as immanent end. < 2 > Even in the spiritual and 
 the highest spheres this category finds its application. 
 The Church is the body of the Lord. Organs are not 
 parts, not even mere means ; an organic view of the 
 State does not regard it as an aggregate. The organ- 
 ism is more than a mere machine, i.e., than a mechan- 
 ism, therefore a system in the highest sense. If these 
 concepts are taken as the highest, God would be con- 
 
234 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 ceived as the soul of the world, which, again, is more 
 than to conceive Him as its end. (See § 202, obs. 5.) 
 © Since life equals idea, Hegel [" Werke " v., p. 243; 
 "Encyklopadie,"§ 216] may with right describe the idea 
 as unity of body and soul. W The soul continually 
 negates in the interchange of material the manifold- 
 ness of the organs, and leads one into the other the 
 more the stronger it is. Animals live their lives 
 more quickly than trees. (5) According to the con- 
 cept laid down, the separation of body and soul is a 
 non-sens. < 8 > How the merely chemical mode of view 
 is not applicable to living being appears in an em- 
 pirical way in the fact that organic matter, even 
 chemically regarded, is a composition different from 
 the inorganic. (7) In disease, in decomposition, these 
 are merely chemical processes : digestion is not, because 
 it is something still more than that. 
 
 § 215 (a). Since the living is manifestation of the 
 idea, it cannot be processless rest, but its nature is, to 
 result. This its activity as process appears, in the 
 first instance, as directed towards itself, so that the 
 living produces itself : as the productive product it 
 shows itself in that it realises itself (as end) in itself 
 (as material). This self-production and self-forma- 
 tion gives us the process of organisation. Without 
 organisation there is no life. To it belongs both its 
 activity as a manifold and (1 > the positing of this 
 activity by itself.® 
 
 (1) That in this process of organisation precisely the 
 soul, i.e., the principle or subject of life, is taken as the 
 formative, lies in the nature of this relation. In 
 
IDEA. 235 
 
 general it is a likeness of the relation which, apart 
 from the example of Aristotle, in the Middle Ages 
 caused the soul to be conceived as the form of the 
 body, and the body as its matter. The soul is not 
 finite, but immanent, hence absolute form. The body 
 is not mere substrate, but the only possible mode of 
 actuality. This relation Aristotle [" De Anima," i., 3, 
 § 23] always affirmed in his polemic against the 
 transmigration of souls. (Cf., however, § 109, obs. 3.) 
 ® The elements are, therefore, not living, because 
 there is in them no manifoldness ; crystals are 
 not, because there is no manifoldness coming from 
 within. 
 
 § 216 (b). But herewith is the activity of the 
 living not closed. That is to say, since it is the 
 concept as having objectivity, so it stands in objec- 
 tivity as a part of a world (§ 191) ; it will, therefore, 
 be subject to all the relations in which objects stand 
 to one another (§ 192), to all the ways in which they 
 act upon one another. But if every mere object could 
 be determined by the other, this is not possible here, 
 since the being objective (objectivity) is its own 
 moment, and therefore has no justification against 
 it. Therefore, operation of objects upon the living 
 as suchW will be for this only the occasion of degrad- 
 ing it to a moment : the object can only stimulate © 
 the living : the living, on the contrary, will, as it 
 were, infect the merely objective with vitality, by 
 assimilating W it. The process of assimilation is 
 neither mechanical composition nor chemical neutral- 
 
236 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 isation, though ifc has both as its presuppositions; 
 without assimilation there is no life/* 
 
 W When a living thing is pushed, lifted, etc., it 
 does not enter into the account as living. ® Only 
 the living can, and every living thing must, be 
 stimulated, i.e., in it reaction is not equal to the 
 (stimulating) action, but is specifically different there- 
 from. ® This infectional process (Oken, Hegel) of 
 the assimilating object Aristotle has in mind when 
 he shows that everything nourishes itself by what is 
 and is not like itself. Assimilation is, therefore, no 
 mere chemical process. In this a third thing is pro- 
 duced, the neutral. In the former, on the contrary, 
 the product is only one of the two, namely, the as- 
 similating — a difference that is absolute. W Not 
 even in the spiritual sphere. Learning is assimila- 
 tion : without it the mind ossifies and dies. 
 
 § 217 (c). But the closer consideration of the pro- 
 cess just explained compels us to think another : The 
 result, namely, is that, on the one hand, in such 
 process the living satisfies itself. This satisfaction 
 lies merely in the fact that it has produced itself 
 anew W has enhanced its self-feeling. On the other 
 hand, in the process of satisfaction the object is 
 infected by it, and becomes of its essence. Both sides 
 taken together give us the concept of a process in 
 which the living produces itself by assimilating an 
 object stimulating it, which represents to it only its 
 own essence, by which, therefore, it is equally 
 assimilated.^ This process in which both of the 
 
IDEA. 237 
 
 forms hitherto considered of the life-process are 
 synthetically combined, may be described as process 
 of re-creation or reproduction. Without it there is 
 no life. (3) 
 
 < The living thing re-creates itself in the process 
 of assimilation. (2) The feeling of the necessity of 
 this transition — which transition cannot, of course, 
 have the meaning that by assimilation, of nourish- 
 ment for example, the latter becomes a representative 
 of the species — all hitherto have had who have identi- 
 fied the nutritive and the reproductive function. 
 (3 > In the natural sphere it occurs as process of 
 the genus ; in the spiritual, the mind reproduces 
 itself only in community with its fellows. 
 Language is then the fructifying germ, without 
 which the mental life dies. If, by mechanical 
 juxtaposition an aggregate, by chemical intussuscep- 
 tion a product, is generated, assimilation and repro- 
 duction are equivalent to potentiating ; this is not 
 merely perservation, but enhancement of exist- 
 ence. 
 
 § 218. But the result of this process is, since 
 assimilation is also a becoming assimilated, that each 
 of the two things undergoing a process have as such 
 disappeared, only that remains which was not out- 
 wardly directed, the identical essence. The living, 
 therefore, does not in this process so much produce 
 itself &s rather only its (universal) essence, and that 
 at the cost, and with the sacrifice, of its individu- 
 ality/ 1 ) But if now the idea was the immediate in 
 
238 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 that it existed in these (living) individuals, and it 
 here appears, in the highest form of the life-process, 
 that individuals as such must cease to be, it is mani- 
 fest that the idea as immediate has disappeared, i.e., 
 has for us ceased to be. But if immediacy, which was 
 distinctionlessness, has ceased to be, the idea which 
 at first was to be conceived in immediacy will now 
 have to be thought rather as having entered into 
 difference, i.e., as reference and as essential relation!® 
 
 W In the generic process the individual does not 
 produce itself as individual, but produces its blood, 
 i.e, its substance. Just so, man in society gives up 
 his individuality. De duobus intellectibus fit unus, 
 well says Johannes Erigena of dialogue. (2) Also here 
 obtains, of course, what in the preceding §, obs. 2, and 
 elsewhere, has often been recalled as regards transi- 
 tion. {Cf, however, § 221, obs. 2.) 
 
 B. The Idea as Essential Relation. 
 
 § 219. The idea is essential relation where it relates 
 itself to itself, where, therefore {cf. § 117), the idea 
 forms both sides, though in each side the other 
 shines (§ 89) as its necessary complement. In this 
 relation the idea can enter only as it is posited in the 
 different sides, always according to the different 
 moments which are contained in it. Hence the 
 subjective idea will stand over against the objective, 
 
IDEA. 239 
 
 and each will necessarily be referred to the other. 
 This relation, like every other, will, accordingly as 
 the one or the other side is regarded as the starting- 
 point, be two-fold. Objective rationality (idea) posited 
 as subjective gives us the concept of truth. 
 
 Socrates got beyond the Sophists (see § 209, 1) 
 in that he gave the idea validity, but only in the 
 form of immediacy, hence in his ideal living : where 
 he brings it to his consciousness it is always beauty 
 which he praises. Plato made the advance that he 
 conceived the idea as theoretical and practical, i.e., as 
 relation. 
 
 (a) The True. 
 
 § 220. In the first instance it is clear from the 
 above development how truth is distinguished from 
 mere objectivity. It consists in, that concept and 
 objectivity have become adequate one to the other, 
 and is, therefore, ideal objectivity. Therefore, in 
 the entire investigation of the categories each has 
 been described as untrue which has not been adequate 
 to its concept, but those in which it was adequate to 
 its concept as its truth. {Cf. § 19.) Therefore the 
 truth does not appertain to the idea, but the idea, and 
 only the idea, is the truth., A thing contains truth 
 only in so far as it contains ictea^/ 
 
 A man exists ; man, i.e., humanity, or the world 
 
240 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 of men, has objectivity ; a true man is he who has 
 become adequate to his concept, his destiny ; in whom 
 the subject identifies itself with humanity, and hence 
 has won ideal existence. 
 
 § 221. But in what has hitherto been said is con- 
 tained only what belongs to the ideal relation gener- 
 ally, whether it be regarded from the one or the other 
 side, and what here was given as the concept of the 
 true obtains likewise of the good. (§ 224, ff.) 
 More closely, however, this relation was determined, 
 to the effect that in it the objectivity of the idea was 
 the starting-point, its subjectivity, its goal. The idea 
 will, therefore, have this theoretical character, or will 
 be truth, if its object is for the idea as subject. Since, 
 now, the idea as subjective is manifested in rational 
 subjects, which as such are conscious, that is true 
 which is known as it is, and truth is self-manifesting 
 or conscious rationality.® A truth which were not 
 for knowledge would be a conlradictio in adjecto.^ 
 Objective rationality of itself tends to be as subjective, 
 and subjective rationality, likewise, to take into itself 
 objectivity. And to the subject's impulse to know, 
 corresponds the impulse of revelation in objective 
 rationality, and only by this correspondence does the 
 truth come to be/ 4) 
 
 W Hence the expressions, true man and good man, 
 are used as synonyms. < 2 > The usual explanation of 
 
IDEA. 241 
 
 truth, which in the place of knowledge puts repre- 
 sentation, in the place of objective rationality, mere 
 existence, gives a definition at most of correctness, 
 not of (rational) truth. If here the transition is made 
 from the process of reproduction (§ 218) to truth and 
 conscious rationality, it is also empirically shown as 
 follows : In the first of the above-cited examples 
 (§ 217, obs. 3) there is produced in the generic process 
 that in which the single exemplar has its truth : in 
 the second the giving-up of individuality leads to 
 knowledge of the truth. Hence the dialectic of So- 
 crates and Plato consists only in conversation. @> This 
 reference to knowledge is suggested in the word 
 dXrjdem, also in the fact that in German the word 
 manifest (offenbar) frequently stands in the place of 
 true (wahr). The thought of some mystics that 
 because there are eternal truths there must be an 
 eternal understanding, contains, therefore, the truth. 
 (4) It is usual to call accident that which is merely 
 this correspondence. Whoever seeks will find. 
 
 § 222. The truth, therefore, comes to be only in 
 the act in which objective rationality becomes sub- 
 jective, i.e., the act of knowing. But if this is so, 
 knowing must be both the perceiving of truth and 
 the producing of it. In the former aspect the truth 
 is assumed or received ; in the latter, it is put forth 
 (outward). If these moments are one-sidedly held 
 fast, there results the opposite views of dogmatical 
 empiricism, which knows only anxioms and theorems, 
 and recognises only an analytic method; and of 
 constructive idealism, for which there are only postu- 
 lates and problems and synthetic method. 
 
242 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 The psychology which considers knowing not so 
 much to show how truth comes to be as how the 
 subject comes into possession of it, must, only with 
 a changed point of view, treat of much that ap- 
 pears here. (Cf. § 110, obs., and my "Outlines of 
 Psychology," § 111, and ff.) 
 
 § 223. If we consider what lay in the fact that 
 the truth comes to be by being produced, it is mani- 
 fest that unity of the subjective and the objective 
 idea is the product of an activity which has its 
 proper ground in the idea as subjective, hence pro- 
 ceeds from it. Therefore the relation which was 
 described as truth points to another (or another form 
 of the ideal relation), in which the subjectivity of 
 the idea is the starting-point ; and the goal, that 
 it be as objective. Rationality, as rationality which 
 is to be carried into objectivity, is rationality as end, 
 the good. Since the good has emerged as the neces- 
 sary consequence of the true, it is to be seen in 
 how far Kant can grant to the practical reason the 
 primacy in relation to the theoretical. 
 
 (b) The Good. 
 
 § 224. The good is, in the first instance, precisely 
 as the true, ideal relation, and has being only where 
 the subjectivity of the idea and its objectivity are 
 
IDEA. 243 
 
 adequate to one another. (Cf. § 221, 1.) But if this 
 relation gave the true in that the subjective idea 
 was made adequate to the objective idea, and hence 
 thought as it is, the good occurs where subjective 
 rationality is carried over into objectivity, so that 
 it now is as it was thought (willed). Thus there 
 results as a determination corresponding to that 
 discovered in § 221. The good is rationality that is 
 to be realised, or rationality as end. So little as mere 
 objectivity is truth, so little is mere subjectivity the 
 good, if it have not the determination also of 
 objectivity/ 15 Compared with it, the finite end is 
 merely subjective, it, on the contrary, objective^ 
 
 V The mere conception of duty, the so-called 
 ideal, does not of itself make man good. ® Kant 
 is, therefore, entirely right when he opposes to one 
 another maxims and laws of reason as subjective 
 and objective. A view which, as, say, Fichte's, 
 knows no higher category than the good, conceives 
 God only as the world's final purpose that is to be, 
 as a world-plan to be realised, moral world-order. 
 
 § 225. The good is the idea as end. But the end 
 had as its truth and its termination its realisation. 
 In the termination, therefore (or really), the good 
 appears as realised, i.e., as being.0) But the idea as it 
 is realised or has objectivity, is for knowledge, is 
 no longer a problem for the will ; the concept of the 
 
 R 
 
244 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 good, therefore, points with necessity to the idea 
 as truth, with same necessity as that with which 
 transition must be made from the truth to the good. 
 Each is in the termination the other, and has it, 
 therefore, as much for its limit as for its presupposi- 
 tion.^ If one will avoid this consequence, this is 
 possible only if one never brings the matter to a 
 conclusion, and, therefore, on the one hand, takes 
 knowing, and thereby (§ 222) the true, as incomplete, 
 and, on the other, willing as a continual problem, and 
 so brings them into the endless progression/ 35 
 
 W Therefore, Kant, in the consideration of the good, 
 is driven to the idea of a perfect essence, i.e., the theo- 
 retical assumption of the reality of the good. ® Hence, 
 on the other hand, Kant is compelled to concede to 
 the practical reason, the primacy, because it limits 
 knowledge. @> Therefore, the thing-in-itself remains 
 behind as a forever unknown residuum ; as its cor- 
 relate it has the never realised ideal of the good. 
 Fichte, also, takes the good as endless problem, and 
 is forever again brought back to the non-deducible 
 appulsion, which is the (theoretical) conditio sine qua 
 non for the practical being of the spirit. 
 
 § 226. If we bring the endless progression to a 
 conclusion by fulfilling what it demands (§ 49), there 
 results that the idea, since it is already is as it should 
 be carried out, must be conceived as neither the one 
 nor the other, because it is both the one and the 
 
IDEA. 245 
 
 other. Thus it is the idea in general, rationality 
 taken absolutely, which is both realised good, and 
 living, self-realising truth. The idea so taken is 
 actual return-into-itself has as such got rid of all 
 finitude, (l) and is absolute idea, 2 absolute rationality, 
 in short, the absolute!® 
 
 (1) The true and the good, because each had it, 
 end in the other, were still finite modes of the idea. 
 Therefore, it appeared still as a plurality (these two) 
 of ideas. Each of them still displays in itself 
 finitude. In the absolute sphere, religion occurs as 
 reality (law and gospels, morals and dogmatics). 
 Hence Plato (§ 219, obs.) has been styled Christianus 
 ante Christum. ® This means here the idea taken 
 absolute. This neither theoretical nor practical idea 
 has also been called speculative idea. ® The idea 
 is the absolute, since it realises its determinations, 
 and so has absolved its development. All categories 
 may, therefore, be called definitions (of course defec- 
 tive) of the absolute, by which is asserted merely that 
 the (logical) absolute is not to be confounded with the 
 (theological) concept of divinity. The absolute is far 
 from being the absolute spirit. Historically, the 
 transition from the theoretical and practical to the 
 absolute idea was made by Aristotle. 
 
 C. The Idea as Absolute. 
 
 § 227. Since the idea has got rid of and taken up 
 into itself the limitation which it had when the good 
 
246 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 and the true were opposed to each other, it is the 
 truly infinite (§ 47). It is no longer a rational end to 
 be realised like the good, but the self-realising final 
 end ; it is absolute reason, Logos, whose manifestation 
 all actuality is. As is the difference of the good 
 and the true, so is also the difference of all categories, 
 which had in a succession ascended to this difference 
 destroyed in the idea ; the idea is the totality of the 
 categories (§ 6), the category taken absolutely. 
 
 The problem of philosophy is to apprehend in 
 actuality the absolute, the absolute final end, the 
 Logos, i.e., reason absolutely, absolute idea. It is, 
 therefore, neither empirical nor practical, but absolute 
 idealism. The word reason is here taken as it is 
 when one says, There is reason in the world. How 
 reason, or the Logos, is related to God, logic, which 
 knows nothing of God, cannot, of course, say. (Cfi, 
 however, my " Nature or Creation," p. 82, ff.) 
 
 § 228. Since difference is destroyed in the idea, the 
 idea has returned to immediacy, and it is, therefore, 
 life. This it is, in that it is not resting being but 
 process. On the other hand, the difference in it is 
 sublated, hence not destroyed, and the life of the idea 
 is constant mediation with self. (1 > The process of 
 self -mediation is logic, objectively taken. To follow 
 this is the task of the science of logic, or logic subjec- 
 tively taken. Its procedure consists in method, i.e., in 
 
IDEA. 2tfl 
 
 its accompanying the movement of the idea through 
 the various categories onward. The method is dialec- 
 tical, since that movement itself is dialectic!® The 
 science of logic, therefore, has for its subject the idea, 
 and if in the Introduction it was called the science of 
 the categories, here its true definition ® is that it is 
 the science of the idea. This it is in a double sense; on 
 the one hand, since it has the idea as its object, and, 
 on the other hand, because, having originated through 
 the self-movement of the idea, it has this as its sub- 
 ject/ 4 ) {Cf § 152, obs. 5.) 
 
 W In this respect one may (figuratively) speak of 
 the blessed, reconciled life of the idea. < 2 > Here is 
 made clear in how far in the Introduction the pre- 
 supposition could be made, of the subject of logic, 
 that it could have in itself the necessity of self- 
 development. {Cf \ 18, ff.) ® This can be intel- 
 ligible only at the end, must, therefore, first be given 
 at the end. W Here the genitivus objecti and subjecti 
 coincide, as in amor dei. 
 
 § 229. As only here at the close of the logic can 
 be said what logic is, so only here can one become 
 conscious of what has been done in the exposition of 
 it. In the beginning of the exposition, namely, the 
 resolve to engage in the activity of pure thought, ap- 
 peared as a mere act of arbitrary will. (§ 25.) At 
 most it could only be pointed out that it was not 
 
248 CATEGORIES Of FREEDOM. 
 
 inconsistent with reason. But now we know that 
 this resolve has been nothing other than the impulse 
 of reason, of the idea to be thought. (§ 221.) What 
 we might regard as our doing appears now as that 
 of the idea which impelled us. Therefore, we have 
 not generated the logic, but it has generated itself ; 
 we have merely followed it. What there might 
 appear Strange, namely, that thought has to be con- 
 sidered as something living, appears here as necessary, 
 since nothing else has been thought than the idea 
 which has shown itself to be the process of self- 
 mediation (§ 226), which, therefore, had to be followed 
 up to the point where it has completed itself as 
 process. 
 
 § 230. As at the conclusion of each main part, so 
 here, recapitulation musk first recall the course of the 
 chapter concluded. In this chapter we have had to 
 do with the idea, which had shown ltstlf to be the 
 unity of subjectivity and objectivity. This unity 
 met us first as immediate in the phenomenon of life ; 
 there was shown that the idea opposed itself to itself 
 as subjective and objective, and, in the essential rela- 
 tion, presented to us the ideas of the true and the 
 good ; finally, when all moments had attained to their 
 rights, the idea was considered as it had absolved and 
 completed itself. The recapitulation will, secondly, 
 then have to show what the peculiarity of the 
 
IDEA. 249 
 
 categories is which were treated of in the Third Part 
 of the Logic. They receive according to the different 
 principles, of nomenclature the superscription, Concept, 
 or From the Abstract Concept to the Absolute Idea, or 
 Categories of Freedom. First has been shown the 
 concept as subject of (every) free development ; 
 further, it has been shown how this development 
 realises and explicates itself in objectivity ; and, finally, 
 it has come to light that the real truth is there 
 arrived at where both sides are adequate to one 
 another, so that the idea which contains in itself all 
 categories of freedom (all the earlier ones, which 
 entered into these), as sublated moments, thus becomes 
 full, or all, truth. If, finally, only at the close of 
 every science can be said what its peculiar signi- 
 ficance is, so only here also may be brought to con- 
 sciousness what logic really is and should be. But 
 this occurs when two things are done ; first, when it 
 has been shown how logic, when it has completed its 
 course, forms a closed totality ; second, when logic has 
 been defined in relation to the discipline contiguous 
 to it, in the entire system of science. To accomplish 
 the first of the two is the third task which the 
 recapitulation had. It is, to compare it with the re- 
 capitulations already given, placed only at the close oj 
 the whole. 
 
 § 231. The goal of logic has been to follow the 
 
250 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 mediation of the idea. Even though already at the 
 beginning the subject was only the idea striving to 
 know itself, the idea was so, however, only as it is 
 most remote from the goal of self and mediation, it 
 was immediacy, and was by us termed being. The 
 most remote possible from being the totality of all 
 categories, it was the poorest of all the categories 
 indeed, poverty itself, which yearned after a fulfil- 
 ment. It strove to rid itself of the contradiction that 
 it, the totality, was as emptiness. This contradiction 
 we corrected by executing the self -correction of the 
 idea, and passing on to those categories which lie 
 nearer to its truth. The contradiction which dis- 
 played itself in all the categories of immediacy, 
 impelled us onward to the categories of mediation. 
 As against the idea as mediation, immediacy appeared 
 to be the untrue ; as mediation the idea was called 
 essence. Since the idea appeared here, ruptured within 
 we had constantly to do with relations ; the more 
 concrete these became, the more we approached the 
 abandoned sphere. It appeared, namely, that the 
 idea as mediation likewise contradicted itself, and 
 that the highest form of mediation as unresolved 
 contradiction pointed to the sphere where all con- 
 tradictions were solved. In the sphere of freedom 
 we have observed the idea as self-mediation, where it 
 as completed is satisfied in itself, so that the entire 
 
IDEA. 251 
 
 logic has had to do with the gradual self-realisation of 
 the idea as such, hence with its becoming, whether we 
 regard this becoming as becoming in us or as becoming 
 in itself. (Cf § 228.) 
 
 § 232. But if the logic has considered this gradual 
 self-realisation of the idea, its becoming, what then is 
 the real result ? Manifestly the settled precipitate 
 of that process (cf. § 34), i.e., the idea as there-being, 
 for therebeing was the product of becoming as 
 complete since it has realised itself. But the idea or 
 reason as therebeing, as complete and perfected, we call 
 Nature, and transition must be made from logic to 
 the philosophy of Nature as the second main part of 
 the system of philosophy, since if one has thought 
 the idea in its becoming to the end, one is compelled 
 to think it as become, i.e., as there-being. This 
 transition to Nature is not a transition of the idea, 
 for the idea, as in itself completed, is satisfied in 
 itself, has not, as hitherto, to complete itself; it no 
 longer becomes other, because there is in it no lack, 
 no limitation ; but the science of logic passes over 
 into the science of Nature, or we from the idea to 
 Nature. This transition is still less a speculative 
 demonstration of creation ; here is no question either 
 of a creator or of a forth-putting of creative activity. 
 Nature as it has here presented itself is only there- 
 being rationality. 
 
252 CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM. 
 
 It is a task of the philosophy of Nature to justify 
 the calling of Nature, only therebeing rationality ; 
 just as much is its task to show that the contradic- 
 tion which lies in that Nature is idea (hence process, 
 life), and yet therebeing {i.e., processless) drives us be- 
 yond Nature. It is the task of the philosophy of 
 religion to investigate whether what we call Nature 
 may have also still another meaning (of creation). 
 Both lie outside logical investigation. 
 
 § 233. With this we pass out of the sphere of logic. 
 This had to do with the inner movement of the idea, 
 its continual completion of itself; now, on the con- 
 trary, reason is to be conceived as external therebeing, 
 as completed. Hence, the distinction between the 
 subject of Logic and that of the philosophy of Nature 
 is so fixed that the former has to do with the idea in 
 its subjectivity, the latter with idea in its objectivity. 
 In distinction from the philosophy of Nature, which will 
 explain reason as therebeing, externally existing, logic 
 may be defined as science of the idea in the abstract 
 element of thought. This definition, which can here 
 for the first time be intelligible, shows how far it 
 could be said with right that logic is fundamental 
 philosophy^ but also mere fundamental philosophy. 
 It forms the presupposition and basis of the concreter 
 parts of philosophy.® The logical categories are 
 the universal relations of reason, which are valid alike 
 in all spheres ;W one must know these before one can 
 
IDEA. 253 
 
 show how in each sphere reason displays itself in a 
 particular manner. 
 
 W Logic forms the foundation for the other parts 
 of philosophy, and its study is for that of the latter 
 indispensable, since, in order to apprehend reason in 
 Nature, the life of the mind, etc. (which alone phy- 
 siology, pneumatology, etc., aim at), one must know 
 what reason is, which precisely logic shows. (2) It 
 forms only the foundation, just because it makes 
 known only at the end that which they presuppose, 
 and with which they begin. With logical knowledge, 
 therefore, one stands as yet only in their fore-court. 
 ® It is therefore a mistaking of the nature of the 
 logical categories when one, for example, believes 
 that he has conceived the essence of space, time, 
 motion, when one says that they are being, not-being, 
 becoming. Not these categories, but how the totality 
 of the categories, i.e., reason, manifests itself in space, 
 is what the philosophy of nature should explain. 
 The philosophy of nature of Vanini, who saw in a 
 straw-halm (his) God, i.e., the (entire) absolute or 
 (entire) reason, is something far better than such a 
 repetition of the logic. The application of the cate- 
 gories in the concreter parts of philosophy is, there- 
 fore, not false, but it gives, when it keeps to the 
 universal, not that which one really wishes — the 
 specific. Rightly would the physicist be dissatisfied 
 if one should demand of him, in the case of any 
 phenomenon, to be satisfied with the fact that it was 
 a manifestation of causality. That is, of course, 
 correct ; but this logical category does not suffice, 
 he wishes to know what physical category (electricity, 
 heat, etc.) is here to be applied. 
 
 THE END. 
 
Printed iy Ccniiax & Co., Limited, Perth. 
 
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