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Cornell University Library HD41 .M15 Policy of free exchange. Essays by vario Clin 1924 032 409 371 The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924032409371 A POLICY OF FREE EXCHANGE HORACE HART, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY A POLICY / FREE EXCHANGE ESSAYS BY VARIOUS WRITERS ON THE ECONOMICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF FREE EXCHANGE AND KINDRED SUBJECTS EDITED By THOMAS MACKAY EDITOR OF 'a plea FOK UBERTY ' NEW YOEK D. APPLETON AND CO. 1, 3 AND 5 BOND STEEET 1894 P A. t Now, let us see how far Mill is consistent with himself. After giving this wide and general definition he shortly afterwards attempts a second, and identifies the 'production of wealth, the extraction of the instruments of human sub- sistence and enjoyment from the materials of the globe.' Mill admits that industrial qualities are wealth. Now, how are industrial qualities extracted from the materials of the globe ? Mill admits that personal credit is wealth. How is a merchant's or banker's credit extracted from the materials of the globe % Mill admits that a credit given by a solvent banker or merchant is of the same value as gold, and therefore wealth. How is a credit — a mere abstract right of action — extracted from the materials of the globe ? Elsewhere Mill speaks of wealth as being the product of land, labour and capital ; but how are personal qualities and abstract rights the product of land, labour and capital ? We might point out several other self-contradictions of Mill on the nature of wealth ; but that would be too wearisome for our readers. Mill says that every one has a sufficiently correct knowledge of the meaning of wealth ; and now it is seen that he has no consistent ideas on the subject himself. I.} The Science of Economics. 2 5 The fact is that Say and Mill have brought the science to a complete ivupasse. The expression 'production, distri- bution and consumption of wealth ' was expressly restricted to the commerce, or exchanges, of material products only; and when we introduce personal qualities and abstract rights into the science, as Adam Smith, Say and Mill have rightly done, it throws the whole subject into irremediable confusion. There is no possibility of erecting the ' production, distribu- tion and consumption of wealth ' into any sort of scientific system ; if we are to attain that end we must revert to the concept of Economics as the science of exchanges, or of com- merce, as the most advanced Economists are now doing: and then we have a body of phenomena as capable of being erected into an exact and definite science as astronomy, optics, or any other. We shall now see the bearings of the doctrines of the Economists and Adam Smith on free trade. The Economists established it as one of the fundamental rights of mankind that they should be allowed to exchange their products and services freely with one another. Now, it is evident that when men agree to exchange their products and services, the arrangement of the price, or value, of the reciprocal products and services exchanged should be left entirely to the mutual agreement of the parties, the buyer and the seller. Who can tell so well as they what is the real value of the product or service to them ? Now, when the price of the product or service is agreed upon and settled between the sole parties who are interested in it, suppose that some artificial force is suddenly directed against one of them, beyond what arises from their natural position, to oblige him to yield up more of his property to the other than he would do if the arrangement were left perfectly free — such a force suddenly put at the disposal of either party, whatever its nature be, whether moral or material, would clearly be unjust in its very nature, and would be nothing more than a license enabling one party to rob the other. It may be asserted in the broadest possible terms that 26 A Policy of Free Exchange. [i. it is the natural right of every man to employ his industry and the talents which Providence has given him in the manner which he considers to be most for his own advantage, so long as it is not to the injury of his neighbour. He has the natural right to exchange the products of his industry with those of any other person who will agree to such exchangej to buy from whom he will, and to sell to whom he can. A law which seeks to check the course of this free exchange is inherently wrong, and, because inherently wrong, inhe- rently mischievous. And, though it may be permitted to take something from him for the necessities of the State, which is the guardian of the interests of all, a law which deprives one class of the community of a part of their pro- perty in order to bestow it upon another class is an intolerable violation of natural justice. If a person forcibly takes away a part of his property from another person without any equivalent it is simply robbery. In the same way if a man wishes to sell any article and can by any means force the buyer to pay a higher price for it than he otherwise would, it is simply despoiling him of part of his property, and appropriating it to himself. Let us put this in a familiar way. Suppose that Richard Stubble lives in the country and grows corn, and that his friend John Smith carries on his business in town. Having some corn to sell, Richard proposes to have a transaction with his friend John. The free marketable value of the corn is 40s. per quarter. But suppose that Richard has about a hundred times more influence over the legislature than John has, and he gets them to pass a law by which he can compel John to pay him 50s. for what he could buy elsewhere for 408. In that case he deprives John of los., representing so much of his industry, for which he gives him no equivalent, and takes it to himself. In the mediaeval ages great lords and barons used to keep armed retainers whom they employed to plunder any unfortunate travellers who came within their power. In the nineteenth century the governing classes passed laws by which they forced traders to surrender to them a considerable portion of their property against their I.] The Science of Economics. 2 7 will. Where is the moral diflFerence between the two cases ? When one man forcibly and unjustly deprives another man of his property, the precise method he may adopt for his purpose does not materially affect the moral aspect of the thing. It is no argument to say that till comparatively recent times the protective system was established in this country, that it is still in force in foreign countries, and that it was supported and adopted by men of unblemished character and integrity. It is absolutely necessary that we should not suffer our estimation of the moral character of men to influence our view as to the soundness of their opinions. There never prevailed a pernicious error in the world which was not supported by the authority of men of eminent personal virtue. It is, unfortunately, through the very excellence of the men who adopted them, that most of the erroneous principles which have done so much mischief in the world derived their fatal influence. The real question is, not whether the men who hold certain opinions are estimable, but whether the opinions themselves are right or wrong. The fact is that questions are examined with greater care and more searching criticism nowadays than ever they were before ; and by this more comprehensive investigation new considerations and relations are discovered. Arguments drawn from equity; sometimes well founded, sometimes the reverse, are every day obtaining greater influence in legislation ; and many of the most beneficial reforms of the present day have been to abolish and set aside the partial and unjust laws which encumbered the statute-book. It is not so very long ago that public opinion in this country tolerated the slave trade, and men of eminent piety saw no harm in stealing men from their homes and transporting them to foreign countries to labour for the benefit of their masters. But public opinion became convinced of its abomination, and not only put it down but declared it to be a great crime. What was considered to be legitimate traffic at the beginning of the century is now declared by law to be piracy, and Englishmen who engage in it are liable to be dealt with as pirates. Little more than one hundred years ago, if 28 A Policy of Free Exchange. [i. a gale came on, it used to be the custom to pitch the negroes overboard like cattle, and this was related in a court of law without eliciting the slightest comment. Now, at bottom there is not much difference in the idea involved in protection and the slave trade. They both seek to effect the same object by somewhat different methods. They are both for the purpose of enabling one set of men to appropriate to them- selves the fruits of their neighbours' industry — the one by the coarse method of force, the other by the somewhat more refined method of fraudulent taxation. Lord Macaulay remarks that the two greatest and most, salutary social revolutions which have taken place in England were those which, in the thirteenth century, put an end to the tyranny of nation over nation ; and which, a few generations later, put an end to the property of man in man. To these we may venture to add a tJdrd, not less great and not less salutary than the other two — that great revolution in the ideas of the age which, in the nineteenth century, abolished for ever the property of one set of men in the industry of another. The protective system is, therefore, nothing more than a method by which producers endeavour to force consumers to pay a higher price than they otherwise would do for their commodities. Now, let us consider a different case. Suppose that the legislature, being entirely composed of consumers, should pass a law forbidding the farmers to sell their produce above a certain price, or to export it to foreign countries, where they might find a better market for it : or suppose that laws were made to prevent workmen demand- ing above a certain rate of wages : or compelling producers to bring their products to market and accept a price for them much below what they would fetch if there were no such law. This would be a case on the part of consumers precisely analogous to what protection is on the part of producers. This form of injustice did formerly prevail to a certain extent in this country ; but it never acquired a distinctive name in our language as it did in France. During the height of the horrors of the French Kevolution in 1793, when the I.] • The Science of Economics. 29 insecurity of property had scared away almost all sorts of produce from the market, the French Convention passed the severest laws to limit the price of commodities, forbidding persons to sell their produce above a certain fixed price, whence they were called the laws of the maximum. As might have been foreseen, these laws only aggravated the evil; and their disastrous effects are set forth with great minuteness in the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth volumes of Alison's History of Europe (seventh edition); though the author overlooks the fact that the very same objections apply against the system of protection, of which he is so strong an advocate. Each of these systems, then, is erroneous, but in opposite directions ; that of protection, by which the producer obliges the consumer to buy from him his produce at a price above its natural value ; that of the maximum, by which the consumer obliges the producer to sell to him his produce at a price below its natural market value. Now, every law which interferes with the natural course of trade, which attempts to regulate the wages of labour, or the price of commodities, which attempts to meddle with the free ex- change of industry or products between man and man, must necessarily fall under one of these forms of error. Every such law sins against natural justice, more or less, in one direction or the other, either as it assumes the form of protection or the maximum ; and it is just as clear as the sun at noonday, that the only true, just and proper course is to establish and maintain absolute freedom of exchange. The fact is, that both of these erroneous systems — pro- tection and the maximum — are forms of socialism ; they are both especially designed for the very purpose of interfering with the natural value of commodities. Consequently, which- ever of the parties is enabled to compel the other to part with his property at a different rate than what he would, if unconstrained, is able to appropriate to himself a portion of the other's property. And this is the very essence of socialism. Protection is the socialism of producers ; the maximum is the socialism of consumers. And nothing is more natural to find 30 A Policy of Free Exchange, [i. than that where the one doctrine is popular with one party the other doctrine is popular with the other party. Of this we may see examples in foreign countries where protection is the creed of the State, and socialism is the alarmingly increasing creed of the people. Now, the idea which was at the root 'of all this legislation was that cost of production should regulate value, and that those who had produced articles had the right to have re- munerative prices secured to them by law. This idea was a very natural one to occur to producers ; and when we think of the condition of Parliament when this species of legislation was in fashion it is not surprising that it prevailed. In the last century, it is true, there were at various times laws enacted for disturbing the natural course of commerce ; but the corn laws, which lasted, with various alterations, until Sir Robert Peel abolished them, were made in 1815. Now, what was the state of Parliament at that time ? One branch was entirely composed, as it still is, of agriculturists; the other principally of agriculturists, and the nominees of agriculturists, as well as great manufacturers, great merchants, great shipowners, and great producers of all sorts. It was entirely a Parliament of sellers, a vast close and corrupt combination. The great body of the people, i. e. the consumers, had very little influence in the House of Commons. The sellers had a complete monopoly of law-making; and theii- legislation is exactly what might have been expected. All the producers in turn were permitted to plunder the public for their own benefit. It was nothing more than a gigantic conspiracy of all the sellers against all the buyers. These laws were a striking proof that no single interest can be entrusted to frame laws for the whole community in a spirit of justice ; but, to insure that, all interests must have a voice. These considerations are, we think, sufficient to place the doctrine of free exchange on an impregnable moral basis: and we have now to consider the eflTect of Adam Smith's demonstration that in commerce hoth sides gain. This, of all the services he has done to Economics, may be considered bis chief achievement, one which alone, from its stupendous I.] The Science of Economics. 3 1 effects on national policy, would entitle him to immortal glory. The essence of Adam Smith's doctrine is that the wider and more extensive commercial intercourse is among nations, the more prosperous and wealthy they all become. Every one, in seeking his own advantage benefits others as well, because if a man wants to acquire any object, he must have to oifer in exchange for it something which other people want. Different countries have different advantages for pro- ducing commodities for the enjoyment and satisfaction of mankind. It is the interest of the whole world that all com- modities should be produced in those places where they can be obtained best and cheapest, and exported to those places where they can only be produced of inferior quality and at a greater cost. Thus the whole world will obtain the greatest amount of enjoyments and satisfactions at the least labour and cost. Thus absolute freedom of commerce and exchange throughout the whole world is the true nature of things. But when hostile tariff's are interposed they act at once as a barrier, and diminish the commercial intercourse of nations to their mutual loss and impoverishment. Pro- tective tariffs are expressly made for the purpose of forcing commerce out of its natural course and development, and that alone is sufficient to condemn them. This is so obvious that we need not dwell on it further. It is, however, necessary to correct an assertion which is by no means uncommon. It is well known that Cobden in his wonderful campaigns many times declared that if England would lead the way other nations would quickly adopt free trade. At that time there seemed every prospect that this hope would be realized. The success of free trade legislation in England gave an immense stimulus to free trade doctrines in France, the birthplace and cradle of Economics and free trade. In 1846 and 1847 numerous Economists, among whom Michel Chevalier and Frederic Bastiat were the most conspicuous leaders, got up an association and agitation in France on the model of the Anti-Corn Law League in England, and excited immense enthusiasm. The movement 32 A Policy of Free Exchange. [f- had the best prospect of success, when the French Eevolution of 1848 broke out and quickly spread all over Europe. That of course extinguished all hopes of free trade. When thrones ■were rocking to their foundations, and crowns were tumbling in the dust, statesmen could give no attention to Economics. Inter arma Economics silet. And instead of Economics the wildest socialism got the upper hand. The socialists knew instinctively that true Economics was their deadly enemy, so they abolished all the chairs of Economics in France. Under the fatal advice of Louis Blanc they established the Ateliers Nationaux (of which I have given an account in my Dictionary of Political Economy), where every workman was to be provided with work out of the resources of the State. But though the State could pay workmen to produce articles, it could not provide purchasers to buy them : so that, to prevent bankruptcy, the Ateliers Nationaux had to be suppressed at the cost of the most terrible civil war ever waged in any city. Napoleon III, with the advice and assistance of Rouher, Chevalier, Cobden and Mallet, negotiated a commercial treaty with England in i860 which considerably relaxed the pro- tective system then established. But this treaty was carried by the autocratic power of the Emperor, and was utterly distasteful to the great mass of the French people, who were now mainly protectionist and socialist, which are one and the same thing. And alas ! France, which in the last century was the beacon to spread the light of free trade thi-oughout the world, is now enveloped in the deepest darkness of pro- tection and socialism: nor does there seem any immediate prospect of her emerging from it. Now, a considerable number of persons, seeing that other nations not only have not followed the example of England, but on the contrary have retrogressed, and are now even more protectionist than they were in 1 847, and that, up to this time, Cobden's hopes have been falsified, have maintained that what Cobden regarded only as a hopeful prospect, was in his view the necessary corollary of England's adoption of free trade : and that as other nations have plunged deeper and I.J The Science of Economics. %l deeper into protection and socialism, England should do so likewise. They clamour against what they are pleased to designate as one-sided free trade. And under the specious names of reciprocity and fair trade, they are calling for England to retaliate by enacting protective tariffs against those nations which have enacted protective tariffs against her, and so to do unto them as they do unto her. If this were carried out, England would have to revert to the darkest days of protection. It has been frequently said that if Cobden were alive now, and saw the falsification of his hopes, he would advocate reciprocity and fair trade, as they are pleased to term it. But those who say so never studied Cobden's doctrines. Constantly and uniformly he inculcated that England ought to adopt free trade whether other nations did so or not, and even if all the world were against her, as is pretty much the case at present. Having a perfect recollection of the great free trade discussions, I have no hesitation in saying that Cobden would have done nothing of the sort which the reciproci- tarians and fair traders would attribute to him. His con- stant maxim was that fhe true way to fight hostile tariffs is by free trade. No doubt all these hostile tarifis are extremely exasperating : they inflict incalculable injury, not only upon the wealth and prosperity of England, but upon the nations which enact them, and on the rest of the world. But if, as some hot- headed and inconsiderate persons urge, England were to resort to reciprocity and retaliation, she would merely double the mischief. If the present hostile tariffs destroy an incalculable amount of commercial intercourse, a resort to reciprocity and retaliation would destroy it infinitely more. As Sir Louis Mallet pithily said, ' If one tariff is bad, two are worse.' If foreign nations smite us on one cheek by their hostile tariffs, if we followed the advice of the reciprocitarians and retaliated, we should simply smite ourselves very hard on the other cheek. Retaliation is not to be thought of. England may justly D 34 A Policy of Free Exchange. [i- fume and fret, but she must keep her temper and possess her soul in patience. There is no remedy but time and patience. When protectionist policy once gets the upper hand the natural tendency of its advocates is to strain it till it cracks. When protectionists do not reap the benefits they expect from protection, their constant cry is for more protection. We see this in Russia, Germany, France, Italy, and most conspicuously in the United States. In this last-named country there are evident signs that the people see that they have bent the bow too far, and the present Government is strenuously bent on relaxing it to a considerable extent ; but how far it will succeed time only can show. But, whatever other nations may do, England must endure to the end and steadily keep the light of free trade burning amid despondency, gloom and darkness, in the hope that time, experience and reflection will bring other nations to a better frame of mind. One example alone is sufficient to prove the wisdom of this policy. Even in former times, when all nations were protectionist, there were always a certain number of free cities, and their wealth and prosperity, while all nations were weighed down with pro- tection, completely establish the truth of Cobden's doctrine. If so be, England must continue to the end as the free port and market of the world. Thus we see how true Economics throws a clear and steady light on the path of national policy. We have now to consider the influence of economic specula- tion, true or false, on that new form of protection which, under the name of socialism, has in these last few years become so increasingly prevalent, and which is assuming more alarming and portentous influence every day. Adam Smith, as we have shown even in this brief and cursory sketch, did immense services to Economics ; but, alas ! he also did infinite mischief by his self-contradictions and confusion on the nature and causes of value. Aristotle said — ' Value is the relation which anything bears to other things.' The Economists were perfectly clear and consistent in their I.] The Science of Economics. 35 doctrine of value. Le Trosne says — ' Products acquire, then, in the social state which arises i'rom the community of men among each other, a new quality. This new quality is value, which makes products become wealth. ' Value consists in the ratio of exchange which takes place between such and such a product, between such a quan- tity of one product and such a quantity of another product.' And in this the Economists were unanimous. Now, it is evident that if value is a ratio, there can be no such thing as intrinsic value ; and also that a standard of value is impossible by the very nature of things. Value, like distance, necessarily requires two objects or quantities. Aristotle also showed that the cause of aU value is demand — yj>da. The word yjyf\\i.a, which is one of the most usual words in Greek for wealth, comes from xpao/xai, to want or demand : and the ancients showed a thing is XPW" — wealth — only where and when it is yj>i]y\\i.a — wealth. In the ancient dialogue we have referred to above, Socrates shows that money is wealth only in those places where it will purchase other things, and he instanced several examples of local moneys which were valuable and were wealth in certain places, but which had no value and were not wealth in others, where they had no power of purchasing. All the Economists of France and Italy showed that value proceeds entirely from the wants and desires of men. The Economists were quite unanipaous that all value proceeds from consomniation, or demand ; and that where things are not consommes — demanded — they are no better than so much rubbish. Now, as all commerce or exchange proceeds from the mutual wants and desires of men, it is quite evident that value requires the concurrence of two miuds, and that it proceeds from reciprocal demand. Our great philosopher Locke was, unfortunately, the origi- nator of all the confusion which has done so much to blight the progress of English Economics. Locke maintained that all differences of value arise from differences of labour. Locke's D a 36 A Policy of Free Exchange. [r, abstruse works are very little known, and if this fatal dogma had lain perdu in them there would have been very little harm done. But, unfortunately, this idea was taken up in the early part of his work by Adam Smith, though quite discarded in the latter part of it, and his fifth chapter has been the ruin of English Economics. Of this chapter that distinguished Economist and statesman Francis Horner says — ' We have been under the necessity of suspending our progress in the perusal of the Wealth of Nations on account of the insurmountable difficulties, obscurity and embarrassment in which the reasonings of the fifth chapter are involved .... the discovery that I did not understand Smith speedily led me to doubt whether Smith understood himself.' We shall now lay before our readers the cause of all this confusion. In this unfortunate chapter Smith begins by saying that the, value of any commodity is equal to the quantity of labour which it entitles him to purchase. Hence if we denote labour by I, we have A=l,2l,^l,4l... He then says that this is the same thing as saying that it is equal to the produce of labour which it enables him to purchase. On denoting produce by p, we have A=p, 2p, ^p, 4p . . . Then he" says that the value of anything is more frequently estimated in money than either in labour or commodities. On denoting money by m, we have A = m, a m, 3 m, 4 171 . . . Now, although it has been pointed out that these modes of estimating the value of a quantity are by no means identical, we observe that in this passage Smith defines the value of a thing to be something external to itself. Hence the value of A must vary directly as I, p or m. The more of Z, ^ or m that A can purchase, the greater is the value of A : the less I.J The Science of Economics. ?>7 of l,p or m that A can purchase, the less is the value of A, It is also perfectly clear that if any change takes place in the relation between A and these quantities, the value of A has changed. Hence Smith admits that value, like distance, requires two objects. If any change takes place in the position of these two objects, the distance between them has changed, no matter in which the change has taken place. So if any change takes place in the relation of two quantities, their value has changed, no matter in which the change takes place. Hence it is clear that there can be no such thing as invariable value. Nothing whatever can have invariable value unless its exchangeable relation with everything else is fixed. Hence we can at once see that, by the very nature of things, there can be no such thing as an invariable standard of value by which to measure the value of other things, because by the very nature of things, the very condition of any- thing being invariable in value is that nothing else shall vary in value, and that there shall be no variations to measure. Nevertheless a very large body of Economists have set out upon this wild-goose chase, this search for an invariable standard of value, which it is utterly contrary to the nature of things should exist at all. Directly after the passage we have referred to. Smith commences the search for that single thing which is the invariable standard of value. He says that gold and silver will not do because they vary in their value ; sometimes they can purchase more and sometimes less of labour and commodities. Then he says — ' But as a measure of quantity, such as the natural foot, fathom or handful, which is always varying its own quantity, can never be an accurate measure of the quantity of other things, so a commodity which is itself continually varying in its own value can never be an accurate measure of the value of other commodities. Equal quantities of labour at all times and places may be said to be of equal value to the labourer. In his ordinary state of health, strength and spirits, in the ordinary degree of his skill and dexterity he must always lay down the same portion of his ease, his 38 A Policy of Free Exchange. [i. liberty, and his happiness. Tlie 'price which he pays must always he the same whatever the qtutntity of goods which he receives in return for it. Of these, indeed, it may somietiines purchase a greater, and sometimes a smaller quantity, but it is their value which varies, not that of the labour which purchases them. At all times and places that is dear which it is difficult to come at, or which it costs much labour to acquire, and that cheap which is to be had easily, or with very little labour. Labour alone, therefore, never varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate and real standard by xvhich the value of all commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared. It is their real price; money is their nominal price only. ' But though equal quantities of labour are always of equal value to the labourer, yet to the person who employs him they appear sometimes to be greater and sometimes of smaller value. . . . ' Labour, therefore, it appears evidently is the only universcd, as well as the only accurate measure of value, or the only standard by which we can compare the value of different commodities at all times and 2)laces.' The utter confusion of ideas in these passages is manifest. A foot, or a fathom, is an absolute quantity, and of course may increase or decrease by itself: but value, by Smith's own definition, is a ratio, which requires two quantities : and therefore we might jiist as well say that because a foot which is constantly varying its own length 'cannot be an accurate measure of the length of other things, therefore a quantity which is always varying its own ratio cannot be an accurate measure of the ratio of other things. This is utter confusion of idea. We may measure a tree with a yard, because they are each of them single quantities ; but it is impossible that a single quantity can be the measure of a ratio. It is manifestly impossible to say that a : b : : X. It is manifestly absurd to say that 4 is to 5 as 8, without saying as 8 is to— what ? just as it is absurd to say that a horse I.] The Science of Economics. 39 gallops at the rate of twenty miles, without saying in what time. But Smith says that ' equal quantities of labour are always of equal value.' What? If a man is paid five shillings for a certain amount of labour, is his labour of the same value to him as if he were paid .5^1,000'? This certainly is a very comfortable doctrine for the employer, because, if he pays his workmen one shilling a week, according to Smith their labour is of just as much value to them as if he paid them twenty shillings a week. We doubt whether the workmen would acquiesce in this view. Smith himself says that gold and silver vary in their value because they sometimes can purchase more and sometimes less of other things. But when labour sometimes earns more wages and sometimes less wages, does it not also vary in its value ? How, then, can its value be invariable % How is its value to be determiued on principles different from those which govern the value of gold and silver % The fact is that Smith's dogma that labour is an invariable standard of value is a pure mare's nest. Neither labour nor any other single quantity can be a standard of value ; and to suppose that it could, is on]y to betray utter ignorance of the mathematics of ratios. The term value has been so confused by Economists that it will aid much in showing the confusion of Smith's ideas to translate them into mechanical language, substituting the word didance, which has not been so befogged in popular language, for value, thus — ' As a measure of quantity, such as a foot, which is always varying its own length, can never be an accurate measure of the length of other things, so an object which is always vary- ing its own distance can never be an accurate measure of the distance of other objects. But the sun is always at the same distance. And though the earth is sometimes nearer to the sun and sometimes further ofi" from it, the sun is always at the same distance. And though the earth is at different distances from the sun, the sun is always at the same distance from the earth : it is the distance of the earth which has varied, and 40 A Policy of Free Exchange. [i. not that of the sun : and the sun alone never varying its own distance is the ultimate and real standard by which the distances of all things can at all times and places be estimated and compared.' Such is a fair translation into mechanical language of Smith's ideas on value, merely substituting distance for value. Smith practically contends that if a railway station is fixed, and a train approaches, or recedes from it, the distance of the train from the station varies ; but that the station is always at the same distance from the train ! Can we wonder at the language of Horner ? The cause of the confusion is obvious. Smith begins by holding the value of a product to be the quantity of other things it will purchase : and then he suddenly changes his concept of value to the quantity of labour em- bodied in obtaining the product itself: and he has not the slightest idea that these are utterly inconsistent ideas. Exactly the same confusion runs through the whole of Ricardo. His conception of value is vitiated by the same utter want of unity. Ricardo's work is avowedly a treatise on value. Now, Bacon and common sense show that before a person begins to theorize on a subject he must first make an exhaustive collection of the facts relating to itj even the most minute ; because a single fact which is irreconcileable with a theory is fatal to it. Ricardo excludes immaterial and incorporeal quantities from his investigations, which Adam Smith in conformity with the unanimous agreement of ancient writers included : he confines his inquiiy solely to material things: and of these he excludes all but those which are the product of human labour. Now, material commodities which are the product of human labour, are one subdivision, and that by no means the largest, of material commodities, which are wealth by unanimous consent. Ricardo then attempts to found a general theory on a single subdivision of one class of commodities which have value : by this method he omits about eighty per cent, of the facts of the case. The veriest tyro can perceive that such a method of philoso- phizing is absolutely inadmissible. I.] The Science of Economics. 41 He also falls into exactly the same confusion on value that Adam Smith does. He begins by saying — 'The value of a commodity, or the quantity of any other commodity for which it will exchange.' Also — ' The exchangeable value of these commodities, or the rule which determines hoiu much of one shall he given in exchange for another' : and several other passages to the same effect. But he very soon slides into the same pitfall as Smith does ; and he calls the ' quantity of labour bestowed on a commodity under many circumstances an invariable standard indicating correctly the variations of other things.' He then maintains that, ' if a commodity could always be produced by an invariable quantity of labour, its value would be invariable, and it would be eminently well calculated to measure the varying value of all other things'; and in a subsequent part of his work he says : 'The labour of a million of men in manufactures will always produce the same value. That commodity is alone invariable which at all times requires the same quantity of toil and trouble to produce it.' Now, Eicardo's doctrine is that when manufactures have been produced they are of exactly the same value, whether they sell for a large sum of money or cannot be sold at all. We doubt whether the manufacturers of Manchester would acquiesce in this doctrine. He then says : ' I cannot agree with M. Say in estimating the value of a commodity by the abundance of other com- modities for which it wiU exchange.' Thus Eieardo, in this last sentence, not only disagrees with the whole world, but he flatly contradicts himself. Kicardo, then, having excluded all commodities from his inquiry which are not the produce of human labour, roundly declares that labour is the foundation of all value. Kicardo gives an instance, which is indeed the logical consequence of his doctrine, which will enable plain persons to judge of the value of his system. As he contends that labour is the sole cause of value, he alleges that as fine weather, the warmth of the sun, and copious showers, are the free gift of nature, they add nothing to the value of the crops. 42 A. Policy of Free Exchange. [i. If this be 80, it is obvious that bad weather, storms of rain and wind, can in no way damage their value. If Ricardo's dogma be true, the value of the crop reaped cannot be greater than the value of the seed sown ; because with the ploughing of the land, the sowing of the seed, and manuring the ground, human labour ceases, all the rest is the agency of nature. Surely the naked statement of Ricardo's doctrine is sufficient to show that his whole system is fallacious. M^CuUoch is the bondslave of Ricardo ; he also asserts that labour is the sole cause of value. , Carey, the American Economist, says : ' Labour is the sole cause of value,' and he adds, it is so in nine hundred and ninety-nine cases out of a thousand; and if there be one case in a thousand where there is value without labour it is just the exception which proves the rule. Carey had queer notions of natural philo- sophy, for it is an axiom of natural philosophy that if there be a single case which is irreconcileable with a theory it is fatal to it. Now the superlative importance of this doctrine is that it is the foundation of socialism and all its consequences. Socialists avowedly base their doctrines on Adam Smith and Ricardo, and just as the astounding consequences which the Economists drew from their doctrine, that in an exchange neither side gains or loses, caused Condillac and Smith to inquire into its truth ; so the portentous consequences which the socialists draw from the Smith-Ricardo doctrine, that labour is the cause of all value, demand the strictest inquiry into its truth, because it has become a very prevalent dogma among working men, and a good many others besides, that working men are the creators of all value and of all wealth. In the brief space at our command it would be impossible to give a full examination of the dogma commensurate with its superlative importance and its consequences. We can only touch upon a few leading points ; but if any of our readers care to examine it more minutely, we may refer them to our Theory of Credit, in which it is investigated exhaustively. i-J The Science of Economics. 43 Let us now test the dogma that working men are the creators of all value and of all wealth. We may premise that by the term wealth, in accordance with the argument contained in an earlier portion of this paper, we mean anything whatever whose value can be measured in money ; anything which can be bought and sold ; anything which has purchasing power. Now let us take a few examples of wealth : ( 1 ) The simple space of ground upon which a great city stands has enormous value and is wealth. Did working: men create the ground upon which a city stands and give it value ? (2) Herds of cattle, sheep, pigs, fowls, and other animals fit for food have value and are wealth. Did working men create aU these kinds of animals and give them value ? (3) Timber trees standing on the ground, which no human being ever touched, often have very great value, and are bought and sold. Did working men create these timber trees and give them value % (4) A whale was stranded on the shore of the Frith of Forth. As it lay on the beach it was sold for £70. Did working men create the whale and give it value ? (5) An aerolite fell in Sweden. The curator of the national museum bought it for £84. Did working men create the aerolite and give it value ? (6) Mr. Buckland says that at the Zoological Gardens the dejecta of the snakes sold for nine shillings the pound. Did working men create the excreta of the snakes and give them value % (7) The manager of a great commercial company, such as a bank or a railway, often earns by his business capacity an income of several thousand pounds a year. His business qualities, therefore, have great value, and are wealth to him. Did working men create his business qualities and give them value ? (8) To professional men, advocates, physicians, surgeons, engineers, and many others, their capacity often brings them an income of many thousands of pounds a year. Their 44 A Policy of Free Exchange. [i- capacity has therefore great value and is wealth to them. Did working men create their professional ability and give it value ? (9) Mill says justly that everything is wealth which has purchasing power. Merchants and traders purchase com- modities almost exclusively with their credit, i. e. by giving a promise to pay at a future time ; and these promises to pay have value, because they will be paid at maturity. Merchants and traders make a profit by trading with their credit : their credit has great value to them and is wealth. Did working men create the credit of our merchants and traders and give it value % (10) The express purpose of a bank is to create credit, i. e. to issue promises to pay several times the amount of cash they hold in reserve. The floating rights of action issued by all the banks in Great Britain, and at present in circulation, are about £1,000,000,000. These thousand millions of cir- culating credits have all the etfects of an equal amount of gold. They have value and are wealth. Did working men create the credit of our great banks and give it value? We must now say something about credit, because the dogma that labour is the cause of all value has made the subject absolutely unintelligible. We shall first explain what credit is. When one person has the legal right to compel another person to pay or do something for him he is termed a creditor ; the person who is legally bound to pay or do that something is termed a debtor; and the right of action which the creditor has against the debtor is termed indifferently a credit or a debt. It is to be carefully observed that this credit or debt is not the right to any specific material chattel ; the creditor has no right to any part of his debtor's property; that is absolutely intact; it is simply the right against the person of the debtor to compel him to part with some part of his property in exchange for this right of action, credit or debt, at a fixed time. It is, therefore, a pure abstract right. But the creditor can seU his rigVit of action to any one else for money; and it may be bought and sold any number of times like any material I-] The Science of Economics. 45 chattel. And because the right of action may be bought and sold, the Roman jurists termed it pecunia, res, bona, 7)ierx ; the Greek jurists, \pfjij.a, Trpayixa, dyadov, otKoy, ovo-m, ovcrCa ddd adopt the doctrine of tho nationalization of tho sourocs of production. ' God hatos tho poor, and justly punislios tlioui for their wickodiioss,' is not a dootrino that has ovm" boon sorioualy hold, though it is, I am aware, often roprosontod as the Anti-Socialist's gospol. Tho question is, Would tho realiza- tion of Socialism moud matters, or would it not ralber make them worse? That is tho problem whioh I propose (o cou- sidor in the light of the oxporienoo of the national workshops of 1848. 11. Perhaps it will bo stud that the Parisian I'xporimont of forl^y- five years ago is no guide, because tho m(^n who set up Ww Atelicru Nil tioiiittox did not really a(h)pfc tho Colloctivist thiMiry, or because, oven if they did, they did not apply it projiei'ly, i.e. give the scheme a fair trial. Tliorefoin, it will lie urg(\d, the doings of 1 848 throw no light on tlu* sidijeet. 1 accept the challenge. If tho precedent is to aj)ply, the int.cMition unist have biHiu geiiiiin(dy Socialistie, and the (^xperim(^nt. must have boi^n made consciously and deliberately, and not merely haphazard. Heforo, thon, boginniiig to read a lesson IVom tlu* nal-ioiuil worksh()i)M, it is necessary to show (i) the Sooialistio intent of the foundecs of the Aldicvx NalioiMVX; (2) the fa.(',t that th((y did Iheir best to make tho workshops a Hueeoss. Tho readiest way of oHtalilishing the truth of th(* lirsl, of those propositions is to quote verbatim the Dooreo of tho I'rovisional Oovornment, in which tlioy laid down tho principles that guided HI.] N(i/ioital ]Fori\\'//(>/>s. 89 tlunii ill (lioir iloaliiij^a with tho Hocial pvoMoin. llorc is tlio l)oiT(\o : - Paws, FcbriiiDij a8, 1848, In run Namu of tiik Kiiknoh Tkoi'LH. SiK'iiiK Umt Ui<\ n'voliiliciii minlii by tho pnuplo Hlumld Iw also for tho 1'<'"I'1" i Thnt i( is liiMii 111 jmt lui oml to ihi' long and iniquitous sulToringa of tho woi'lvors ; 'I'li.'il t.ho iiuosliou of woili is of sniu'oiuo iuiiiorljinoo ; Th.'it tlu'ro is U(> (jui'siiou gvojUoi- or nioro worthy of ilio t'onsidorjitioii of n ivimblii'.'iii govornnionl ; 'I'lint il, spociiiUy boliovos Kiiinoo lo c:u-ofiilly atuiiy and to solvo a problom nt this momont boforo I'vory inu\n\itfi'o, lo iuy i';Uliui Oovirnmi'rtl Conmiitht^ for tl'iwAvrs, ^b^^ll bo nou)iuati>il, with t.Iu^ (>xpri>ss aud spi'oiiil obJtH't of watohiug ovor tbo woi'lioi-s. To slu>w wli.'it iniiioi'liiniw tho l*roviNiou:il Oovoiuuunit of tbo b'opiiblii' jiltiirbos to tbo solution of this ditlloult problom M. l Ooivi'uwcnt C()mnvttr<^ for tl';«7.vis, ;\nil anotbor of its nionibors will bo obosi>n iis Vico-rrosiilout^ M. Alliorl, workniau. Worknu'n will b<> oiillod on to sit upon tho Oommittoo. 'V]u\ uio(*liugs of tbo <.\>niu»ittoo will {.alio i>l:voo in tbo Palais d\i l,uxon\bourg. TiiK Mkmukhs ok riiK Vhovisional Government. III. No doubt soiiio of tlio HUM! who signoil t.lua ilooiinient only half lii'lii'vod that tho oxpi'iiinoiit would bo suoo.ossful, and ftftor its fiviluvo doclarod that thoy know all ixlong that it was liopoloss. No 0110, lunvovor, who roails tho roeovds of tho IvovoliU.ion of 1 848, and notos bow groatly obargod tbo air was with Socialism, onn doubt thai tbo tHovovnioont as a wholo woro gonuinoly dotormiiu'd to givo tbo Sooinlistio principle a fair trit\l, and that many of thorn, and ospocially tliose obargod witli tho conduct of tho workshops, at whoso head was Louis Rlajio, a oonvinood Sooia.list, ontortainod (bo highest hopos of siioooss. Kvon Lamoi'tino, who in 1 844 Mroto tliat the host govornmonts woro tboso that did not intorforo with liberty of ao(,ioii in industrial aflnirs, signed tho Dee.roo, and for the time pliingod deep inUi Collectivism. That tbo oxporimont was 90 A Policy of Free Exchange. [in. fairly made, and that there was no determination, conscious or unconscious, to show that the national workshops were a piece of Utopia, is clear from the account of the undertaking written by M. ifimile Thomas, their director and president, and published only a month or two after the collapse. M. Emile Thomas was a practical man of business, who was entrusted with the superintendence of the work by the Government. Though not a Socialist by conviction, it is clear that he did everything in his power to " run ' the workshops successfully, and that if any one could have organized them into efficiency it was he. That, at any rate, is the impression which I believe will be produced upon any one who reads the Histoire des Ateliers Nationaux consid^rds sous le double point de vue politique et social ; des causes de leur formation et de leur existence; et de I'infiuence qu'ils ont exercee sur les evdne- ments des quatres premiers mois de la Republique suivi des pieces justificatives. Par J^niile Thor)ias. Paris: Michel Levy Frlres, 1848. The proof that Thomas did his best for the workshops is to be found in the fact that Louis Blanc, armed with virtually absolute powers, superintended the under- taking, and could, if he had thought the work was being mismanaged, have dismissed Thomas. Perhaps, however, the best way of showing the bona fide character of the experiment is to describe the actual organization of the workshops and to note what they accomplished. In doing so I shall adopt, with some slight alterations, dictated by the desire to economize space, the account given by Mr. Nassau Senior in an essay in the Edinburgh Revieiu, since republished by his daughter, Mrs. Simpson (' Journals kept in France and Italy : ' H. S. King and Co., 1871). It must be remembered that Senior visited Paris directly after the Eevolution, that he was on terms of intimacy with many of the men who were responsible for the Ateliers Nationaux, and that he had talked with those who had seen the workshops in full swing. In a word, he is a firsthand authority on a subject in which he took a profound interest. The actual details of his account are drawn du'ectly from Thomas's book, which is primarily a reprint of the official documents. III.] National Workshops. 91 IV. Before, however, summarizing Senior's account of the work- shops I wiR give the Decrees formulating the droit avb travail and establishing the Ateliers Nationaux. Here is the Decree which stated the right to work, or more scientifically — the right to wages {le droit au salaire) : — Paris, February 25, 1848. The French Republic. The Provisional Government of the French Eepublic binds itself to guarantee the existence of the workman by means of work ; It binds itself to guarantee work to every citizen ; It recognizes the right of the workmen to unite, to enjoy the fruits of their toil. The Provisional Government gives back the million which will fall in from the civil list to the workmen to whom it belongs. The Members of the Provisional Goverhment. Here is the Decree under which the Ateliers Nationaux were actually established : — Paris, February 26, 1848. Iif THE Name op the French People. The Provisional Government of the Republic decrees the immediate establishment of national workshops. The minister of public works is charged with the execution of the present Decree. The Members or the Provisional Government. V. The effect of this Decree was the immediate opening of national workshops. Their organization was as follows. I adopt Senior's abstract of Thomas's account. A person who wished to take advantage of the offers of the Government took from the person with whom he lodged a certificate that he was an inhabitant of the Ddpartement de la Seine. This certificate he carried to the mairie of his arrondissement, and obtained an order of admission to an atelier. If he was received and employed there, he obtained an order on his onairie for forty sous. If he was not received, after having applied at all of them, and found them all full, he received an order for thirty sous. Thirty sous is not high 92 A Policy of Free Exchange. [iii. pay ; but it was to be had for doing nothing, and hopes of advancement were held out. Every body of eleven persons formed an escouade ; and their head, the escouadier, elected by his companions, got half a franc a day extra. Five escouades formed a brigade ; and the brigadier^ also elected by his subordinates, received three francs a day. Above these again were the lieutenants, the chefs de compagnie, the chefs de service, and the chefs d' arrondissement, appointed by the Government, and receiving progressively higher salaries. Besides this, bread was distributed to their families in proportion to the number of children. 'The hours supposed to be employed in labour were,' adds Senior, ' nine and a half. We say supposed to be employed, because all eleemosynary employment, all relief work, all parish work, to use expres- sions which have become classical in Ireland and England, is in fact nominal.' M. ifimile Thomas tells us that in one mairie, that containing the Faubourg St. Antoine, a mere supple- mental bureau enrolled, from March i a to March 30, more than 1,000 new applicants every day. On May 19, 87,943 had altogether been enrolled, and a month later, 135,000 — repre- senting, at four to a family, 600,000 persons — more than one half of the population of Paris. VI. Such are the facts of the organization. I have no desire to moralize as to the abstract futility of these arrangements. I merely desire to call attention to the actual results of M. Louis Blanc's experiment, under the nineteenth and thirtieth Decrees. The first witness I will call is the Cor- respondent of the Economist newspaper, who was in Paris in 1 848, and saw with his own eyes what he describes : — The greatest experiment made by Louis Blanc was the organization of tailors in the Hotel Cliehy, which, for the purpose, was converted from a debtors' gaol into a great national tailors' shop. This experiment began with peculiar advantages. The Government made the buildings suitable for the purpose without rent or charge ; furnished the capital, without interest, necessary to put it into immediate and full operation ; and gave an order, to commence with, for tmntyfive thousand suits for the National Guard, to be III.] National Workshops. 93 followed by more for the Garde Mobile, and then for the regular troops. The first step taken was to ascertain at what cost for workmanship the large tailors of Paris, who ordinarily employed the bulk of the workmen, and performed Government contracts, would undertake the orders. Eleven francs for each dress was the contract price, including the profit of the master tailor, the remuneration for his workshop and tools, and for the interest of his capital. The Government agi'eed to give the organized tailors at the H6tel Clichy the same price. Fifteen hundred men were quickly got together, with an establishment of foremen, clerks, and cutters-out. It was agreed that inasmuch as the establishment possessed no capital to pay the workmen while the order was in course of completion, the Government should advance every day, in anticipation of the ultimate payment, a sum equal to two francs (is. 'jd. ) for each man in the establishment, as ' subsistence money ' ; that when the contract was completed, the balance should be paid, and equally divided amongst the men. Such fair promises soon attracted a full shop ; and when we visited the H6tel Clichy, upwards of fifteen hundred men were at work, and apparently were not only steady, but industrious. The character of the work they were upon at the time, the urgency of the ragged Garde Mobile for their uniforms, formed an unusual incentive to exertion ; the foreman told us that notwithstanding the law limiting the hours of labour to ten, the ' glory, love, and fraternity ' principle was so strong that the tailors voluntarily worked twelve or thirteen hours a day, and the same even on Sundays : they seemed to forget the stimulus of the expected balance which each was to receive at the conclusion of the contract. What was the result ? For some time many contradictory state- ments were put forward by the friends and opponents of the system. Louis Blanc looked upon it as the beginning of a new day for France. He had already arranged that as the tailors were the first to begin, the cabinet- makers should next be organized, and one by one all the trades of France. He forgot that he would not have an order for the cabinet-makers to furnish half the houses in Paris to begin with : this, in his estimation, was no difficulty. He had in view public warehouses for the sale of furniture ; and although not a chair or table had been sold in the existing over-stocked shops for two months, he had no doubt about customers. But the result of the experiment in the Hatel Clichy has been fatal. The first order was completed : each man looked for his share of the gain. The riches of Communism, and the participation in the profits, dazzled the views of the fifteen hundred tailors, who had been content to receive is. ^d. per day as subsistence money for many weeks : no doubt every one in his own mind appropriated his share of the ' balance '; for once he felt in his own person the combined pleasure of 'master and man.' The accounts were squared. Eleven francs per dress for so many dresses came to so much. The sub- sistence money at is. ']d. a day had to be deducted. The balance was to be divided as profit. Alas ! it was a balance of loss, not of gain ; subsistence money had been paid equal to rather more, when it came to be calculated, than sixteen francs for each dress, in place of eleven, at which the master tailor would have made a profit, paid his rent, the interest of his capital, and good wages to his men, in place of a daily pittance for bare subsistence. The disappointment was great when no balance was to be divided. The consternation and disturbance was greater when a large loss was to be 94 A Policy of Free Exchange. [in. discussed, for which no provision in the plans had been made. The customers— that is, the new National Guard and the Garde Mobile— were in a rage at the detention of their uniforms, and the whole attempt seems to have resulted in confusion and disappointment. Louis Blanc is not a match for the master tailors of Paris. — From The Economist, May 20, 1848. The next witness is Mr. Senior — for, as I have said, he was cognizant of the facts at first hand. He entirely corroborates the testimony of the Correspondent of the Economist, and tells us, as above, that the work done in the Ateliers Nationaux was purely nominal — an exact counterpart of ' all Parish work' — i.e. the parish farms and parish houses of industry which Senior had seen at work, or rather at idleness and waste, during his inquiry into the English poor law. In addi- tion, however, to noting Senior's evidence in regard to the complete failure of the national workshops, I should like to quote the following very able reflections : — When the relations of the labourer and the capitalist are in the state which in a, highly civilized society may be called natural, since it is the form which in such a society they naturally tend to assume when undis- torted by mischievous legislation, the diligence of the labourer is their necessary result. As he is paid only in proportion to his services, he strives to make those services as valuable as he can. His exertions perhaps ought more frequently to be moderated than to be stimulated. A large proportion of our best artisans wear themselves out prematurely. In another state of society, which is also natural in a lower civilization — that of slavery — a smaller but still a considerable amount of industry is enforced by punish- ment. But in eleemosynary employment there is absolutely no motive for the labourer to make any exertion, or for the employer, a mere public ofScer, to enforce it. The labourer is, at all events, to have subsistence for himself and his family. To give him more would immediately attract to the public paymaster all the labourers of the country ; to give him less, and yet require his services, would be both cruelty and fraud. He cannot be discharged — he cannot be flogged — he cannot be put to task work — since to apportion the tasks to the various powers of individuals would require a degree of zealous and minute superintendence which no public officer ever gave. When the attempt was made in Paris, men accustomed to the work earned fifteen francs a day, those unaccustomed to it not one. Another witness is Victor Hugo, who boldly asserted in the National Assembly that the experiment was a failure. ' The national workshops,' he declared, ' have proved a fatal experi- ment. The wealthy idler we already know well ; you have created a person a hundred times more dangerous both to himself and others, the pauper idler. ... At this very moment III.] National Workshops. 95 England sits smiling by the side of the abyss into which France is falling.' The pauper idler is a happy phrase and well describes the condition of the unemployable — the men who pass their lives looking for work and praying God they won't find it. Hardly less emphatic was the grave report of the Commission appointed by the French Government to inquire into the subject. While compelled to recommend the expenditure of further enormous sums of money, it felt bound to admit that 'the Revolution, which found the workmen of Paris contracted in their proper sphere, has been, by treating them like spoilt children, the cause of that change in their character which makes every one now dread the excesses of which they may be guilty.' The next witness to whom I would refer is M. Emile Thomas, the Director of the Ateliers Nationaux, whose work I have named above. He shows how exceedingly difficult it is to do the thing which the Socialist assumes to be so easy, i.e. make people work, and how in spite of the most tremen- dous exertions to render the workshops a success, they broke down. His work, however, should be read, not merely quoted. He was a plain man of business, not a forger of epigrams, and he does not attempt to sum up the results of the experi- ment in any single passage. He tells the plain tale of what he saw and did quite plainly — a fact which makes the general drift of his history all the more impressive. His account of the workshops is the most convincing testimony possible that in 1848 Collectivist production had a fair trial and utterly broke down. A word in conclusion as to what was the end of the national workshops. When the National Assembly found that the Ateliers Nationaux were rapidly bringing the State to a condition of bankruptcy they determined to close them. This they did, with the result that the workmen rose in insurrection, and that for four days and nights there was such street fighting as the world had never seen before. In putting down the insurrection caused by the dissolution of the great Socialist experiment, 12,000 men were sacrificed — the number of killed at Waterloo was hardly greater. 96 A Policy of Free Exchange. [ni. VII. Before leaving the subject of the Socialistic experiments tried in Paris, I will put on record for purposes of reference the following extract from Thiers's Rights of PropeHy, which describes another experiment in Collectivism : — The owner of a great engine factory lent for a time his works to his workmen, so that there was no capital sunk in the formation of an establish- ment, and he agreed to buy at a stated price the machines or parts of machines they might construct. This price has been augmented 17 per cent, on the average. The associated workmen were to govern themselves, to pay themselves, and to share the profits among them. The master had nothing to do with them. He paid for the machines, or portions of machines, and naturally he was not to pay until the work was done. The associated workmen remained divided, as they were before, in different departments (a great facility of organization, since they had only to continue the habits they had acquired) ; they placed at the head of each department or workshop a president, and a general president over the whole. They preserved the former classification of wages (another facility arising from acquired habits), except that they gave three francs instead of two-and-a-half francs to the lower class, that of common labourers, and they discontinued paying the skilful workmen (the ma/rchandewrs, or middle-men) the high wages resulting from piece-work. These did not, like the rest, work all day; yet as they must be satisfied in a certain degree, they were accorded supple- mentary wages of ten, fifteen, and sometimes twenty sous, which, added to the four francs of average wages, gave five francs, at the most, to those workmen who had previously earned six, seven, or eight francs a day. These supplementary wages were given by the presidents of the workshops. After having thus raised the wages of the mere labourer, and lowered those of the clever workman, the following was the result of the three months' trial. There was a daily tumult in the workshop. 'Tis true, tumult was pretty general then, and was not less at the Luxembourg, or the Hotel de Ville, than in the manufactories. The men made holiday whenever it pleased them to take part in this or that demonstration, which, however, only injured the workmen themselves, for the proprietor paid only for the work when done. But they did not work much when they were present, and the presidents charged with the maintenance of order and the super- vision of the labour were changed two or three times a fortnight. The general president, having no local supervision in the workshops, was subject to fewer variations of favour, being changed once only during the period of the association. Had they worked as before, they would have received a sum of 367,000 francs in these three months ; but their returns were only 197,000 francs, although their prices were raised 17 per cent. The principal cause of this smaller production was not owing solely to the fewer number of days and hours they attended the workshops than before, but because, when present, they did not work with such activity. The piece-hands, who only received at the utmost a trifling supplement of a franc, were not very zealous in labouring for the association. The men whom they generally took in.] National Workshops. 97 ■with them when they were on piece, to whom they gave a small additional sum, and whom they superintended in person, were left to the almost negative supervision of the presidents of the workshops, and a thousand workmen out of fifteen hundred manifested that ardour with which men are animated when they do not work for themselves. In a word, loo labourers received half-a-franc a day more ; 300 or 400 workmen received their ordinary 300 or 400 francs, but during fewer days, for they took more holidays ; and the 1,000 clever mechanics, who formerly worked by the piece, were deprived of the advantage due to their exertions, which had raised their daily wages to seven, eight, and ten francs. Accordingly, the good hands were all determined to leave the establishment, and when the three months assigned to the association had expired, it came to an end without a single protest. It was a kind of insolvency, for it owed many hours which had not been made up, and had swallowed up the little capital of a benefit fund instituted by the owner of the establishment previously to this philanthropic administration. Ten sous more a day, to a hundred labourers out of 1,500 ; the wages of 300 or 400 more kept at the same point ; those of 1,000 clever hands dimin- ished ; the whole body much poorer in consequence of absences, represent- ing 32 per cent, of time lost; 197,000 francs of work, instead of 367,000 in the same period ; all the good workmen disheartened ; and finally, the association itself insolvent after three months' existence, although there was an establishment already prepared by the owner — this was the result. Compare in this context the Eeport of the Surveyor who in 1893 superintended Mr. Shaw Lefevre's attempt to pull down a part of Millbank Prison by means of the unemployed. When these men worked with the knowledge that their pay would vary according to the work done, they did twice as much as when they knew that whether they worked or idled their pay would be t\d. an hour. While the cost of cleaning and stacking bricks by the unemployed, acting as the pensioners of the State, averaged from 12s. to 13s. a thousand, the same men when employed by piece managed to earn higher wages than before, although the rate agreed on was only 7s. a thousand. VIII. Perhaps it will be said that the national workshops failed because they were set up in France, and that Collectivism would do much better in England. That is a strange argu- ment considering the natural aptitude for being ordered about officially possessed by our neighbours. Still I will try to meet it. We possessed till the Eeform of the Poor Law a good many experiments in Socialism in the shape of Parish H 98 A Policy of Free Exchange. [in. Farms and Houses of Industry, where the poor were, in accordance with the Statute of Elizabeth, 'set on work.' These experiments have lately been examined in a very able and moderate article by Professor James Mavor {Nineteenth Century, October, 1893). The conclusions he arrives at are that all the attempts were failures : — The conclusions from this survey of attempts ' to set the poor on work ' cannot be said to afford much substantial ground for optimism regarding the probability of success of modern attempts in the same direction. It is quite evident that the parish farm hitherto has not afforded a means of relief to the respectable artisan out of employment, but that it has been occupied solely by the vagrant and the beggar. It would seem to be a well-established fact that these two very distinct classes will not mix together in parish farms or anywhere else. The history of the parish farm shows that while it is costly and highly susceptible to the evils of bad management, it may be adapted to the needs of the beggar ; but there is no evidence to show that the respectable artisan would be likely ever to enter it so long as the beggar is there. IX. Before I leave the subject of Collectivism tested by experiment, I desii'e to say a word on the general question, and for that purpose will resume some portion of what I have written elsewhere on the subject (i. e. in The Liberal Unionist in 1891). I admit as fully as any Socialist can that the ideal is to get a better, fairer and more equal distribution of the world's goods. Two solutions are offered of this problem — one by the Socialists, the other by those who follow in the footsteps of Mr. Cobden and Mr. Bright. The Socialists in effect say, 'Make the State the universal proprietor and the universal employer of labour, and you will have solved the problem and produced a community where misery shall have ceased to exist.' On the other hand, the advocates of Free Exchange, not less zealous nor less religious in their own faith, say, 'Free trade and labour from all shackles, put an end to the ruin and waste of war, and of the armaments maintained for the purpose of war, stop all unnecessary absorption by the State of wealth which should belong to the individual, and you will make human labour so valuable that every man willing and able to work wiU be able to command material comfort.' I have no hesitation in saying III.] National Workshops, 99 that I believe the solution offered by the advocates of Free Exchange is the ti'ue solution. Socialism, which has existed as an aspiration since the world began, has in bygone times been carried into practice, but always with one result — the enslavement and misery of people. When the Spaniards tore down the veil behind which the Peruvian State had developed secluded from all intercourse with the outside world, they found a community arranged on the most approved Socialistic model. The State owned the land, the flocks and herds, the houses, and finally, the bodies of the inhabitants. What was the result ? The Peruvians were a nation of slaves, living a life which was little better than that of well-kept, well-fed animals. Again in Pai-aguay the Jesuits produced a Socialistic state. The iufanteg barbati, or beai'ded childi-en of their Reductions — the name given to the communities in which the Indians were collected — were ideal Socialist citizens. They possessed no property. No family was richer or more esteemed than another, and all individual effort was suppressed. Yet who will venture to assert that Paraguay under the Jesuits is a model which ought to be copied in the regulation of human society 1 The case against Socialism is, indeed, conclusive in ever}- par- ticular. Socialism c&a be proved unsound both economically and historically ; and, further, it can be shown to be in conflict with the strongest impulses and instincts of human nature. It may be said, perhaps, that if Socialism can be shown to have failed it cannot be shown that any system based on Free Exchange has ever succeeded. No doubt no State has yet been civilized enough to adopt the principle of Free Exchange in its eutii-ety. It can, however, be proved that those States which have approached most nearly to that ideal ai-e the most prosperous, and their inhabitants least miserable. England has gone further than any other country in the du-ection of Free Exchange, and unquestionably the people of England aie better off than those of any country whose conditions as to debt and geographical position make the comparison a fair one. Wages ai-e better, prices lower, and the standai'd of comfoi-t higher in England than in any H 3 loo A Policy of Free Exchange. [iii. country of the Continent. That this is due to the partial adoption of the principle of Free Exchange, I do not doubt for a moment. X. I will end by giving what I believe to be the plain reasons why plain men should not be Socialists. It is not because Socialists are innovators or agitators or preach things contrary to the Book of Daniel, or are this, that, or the other, but simply and solely because Socialism is nonsense. Let me try then to put my reasons for not being a Socialist in the simplest possible form — the form which is patron- izingly called suitable for children and uneducated persons, but which in reality is the form in which everyone reasons out a subject in his own mind. Should those who desire, above all things, an improvement in the condition of the labourer become Socialists ? No. Why not ? Because Socialism, if carried out, would injure, instead of benefiting, the labourer. Why would Socialism injure the labourer? For the following reason : If the condition of the working men is to be improved, that is, if they are to have more food, more room in their houses, more clothes, more firing, more of everything they desire, it is evident that there must be more of all these things in the world. That is, there must be more wealth, for these things make up wealth. But in order that there shall be more wealth, i.e. more of the things men need and desire, more must be produced. If ten men have only five loaves between them, and need one each, the only way they can be made comfortable is by getting five more. It follows, therefore, that nothing which decreases the total wealth of the world, which diminishes, that is, the corn grown, the wool clipped, the houses built, the cotton spun, or the coal dug, can improve the condition of the poor. If, then, Socialism would diminish the production of the things needed by mankind it would be injurious. Ill,] National Workshops. loi But would it diminish the wealth of the world, and so make less to go round % Yes. How? In this way. The great stimulus to the production of wealth of all kinds is self-interest. American farmers who increase the wheat supply of the world, by working hard throughout the year, do not do so out of love for their fellows, but because they want to get rich, and be able to spend money in the manner most pleasing to themselves. In the same way the man who throws up a life of comfort, and works from morn to night till he has made a discovery which will enable the manufacturer to turn out double the amount of woollen cloth without increased expenditure, does so because he has the incentive of self-interest before his eyes — the incentive of knowing that success will be rewarded by the fulfilment of his desires. Throughout the world the motive force of the machinery which produces wealth is self-interest — not self-interest in a bad sense, but the natural and legitimate desire for reward and enjoyment. Destroy this motive force, give men no rewards to strive for, and each individual, unless compelled, will do no more than is necessary to keep himself and his family from starvation. But this is exactly what the Socialist intends to do. He proposes to take away the incentive, under the influence of which more and more wealth is added to the world's store, and to deprive men of the rewards in order to obtain which they now labour. The Socialist would confiscate all private property, and dole out to each individual a subsistence portion. But in order that there shall be something to dole out the inhabitants of the Socialistic state will be compelled to work. Compulsion in a word will become the ultimate motive force of the machinery of production under Socialism, just as under our present system it is self-interest. Which is likely to be the most successful ? Who works best, the slave or the labourer, at weekly wages who, if he finds his work irksome, can at least gratify his own tastes in his own way ? All experience shows that compulsion produces less than pay. I02 A Policy of Free Exchange. [iii. Convict labour is a synonym for waste and inefficiency. Socialism, then, based as it must be on compulsion, would diminish the wealth of the world. But if the total wealth of the world is diminished there will be less to go round, and, therefore, the share of each person will be less. That is, Socialism would injure instead of benefiting the poor. St. Loe Steachey. IV. STATE SOCIALISM AND THE COLLAPSE IN AUSTRALIA. HON. J. W. rORTESCUB. IV. STATE SOCIALISM AND THE COLLAPSE IN AUSTRALIA. The literature of State Socialism is ever increasing, though it is but rarely emlched by the addition of such a volume as that wi-itten by Dr. Pearson under the title of National Character. Possibly it might seem a depreciation of the value of this book to rank it in so narrow a category as that of State Socialistic literature. The scholarship, the wide culture, the encyclopaedic study and research which show themselves on every page, have been duly recognized by critics far more competent to appreciate, though not less ready to admire, than the present writer ; and praise from such quarters might reasonably be held to claim for it a higher place. None the less, however, is it certain that Dr. Pearson's book is an inquiry into the working of State Socialism — a forecast of its probable effects on human character — to which the writer, by his own admission, has felt himself impelled by 'twenty years' residence under the Southern Cross.' In other words, we owe this book to the inspiration of Australia ; and this is a highly significant fact. ' The history of the English Colonies in Australia and New Zealand is particularly instructive because it shows what the English race naturally attempts when it is freed from the influence of English tradition. The settlers of Victoria and, to a great extent, of the other Colonies, have been men who carried with them the English theory of government ; to circumscribe the action of the State as much as possible ; to free commerce and production from legal restrictions ; and to io6 A Policy of Free Exchange. [iv. leave every man to shift for himself with the faintest possible regard for those who fell by the way. Often against their own will the colonists have ended by a system of State Socialism that rivals whatever is attempted in the most bureaucratic nations of the Continent. The State employes are an important element in the population ; the State builds railways, founds and maintains schools, tries to regulate the hours and wages of labour, protects native industry, settles the population on the land, and is beginning to organize systems of State insurance. . . . Planted in Australia the Englishman ... is rapidly creating a State Socialism, which succeeds because it is all embracing and able to compel obedience, and which surpasses its continental State models because it has been developed by the community for their own needs, and not by State departments for administrative purposes.' Of course it does not follow that they are right ; but ' it is surely safe to say that political experiments which half a dozen self-governing British communities are instinc- tively adopting deserve attention as an indication of what we may expect in the future.' This quotation gives the key to Dr. Pearson's design. State Socialism ' succeeds ' in Australia : Dr. Pearson will work out for us the probable results of its success in the civilized world at large. The argument is developed briefly as follows. It seems absolutely certain that the higher races — i. e. those that are held to have attained the highest form of civilization — are confined within certain unchangeable limits by the influence of climate. Australia is a country in point, half of it being, so to speak, ' a white man's country,' half of it dis- tinctly not so. Having established his position as to the ' unchangeable limits of the higher races ' (a most valuable and interesting chapter, by the way, on a sadly neglected subject). Dr. Pearson passes on to consider how confinement within those limits is liiccly to afl'ect those races— how, in fact, they arc to survive, or rather think they ai-e to survive, rostrictidn witliin their own climatic borders, the increasing competition of the inferior races, the consequent closing of the outlets for trade iind energy. He answers— and he gives IV.] State Socialism. 107 good ground for his answer — By resort to State Socialism ! Englishmen, for instance, losing faith in themselves, will fall back on the State and State Socialism, and resign themselves to a stationary order in society — wealth and population ceasing to increase. From such stationary order is likely ■ to result increase of standing armies, of great cities, and of national debts — the first by no means an unmixed evil, which is more than can be said of the other two. The nation is bound to remain the unit of political society, because the interests and feelings of different races and countries are too discordant to be harmonized under a central government. The future of society will, then, depend very much on the perpetuity of national feeling. Given that perpetuity of national feeling, and with it the exaltation of the State to the highest place in the minds of men, we may expect — what 1 The millennium % No ; ' the decline of the family and the decay of character.' Such is the conclusion to which Dr. Pearson is irresistibly led by his review of the prospects of State Socialism as a success; and we cannot sufficiently admire the practical courage and candour wherewith he has given it utterance. He holds no brief for or against State Socialism ; he accepts it as inevitable ; examines it in an impartial spirit and pronounces judgement without flinching. Not unnaturally, therefore, his work has been branded by many as pessimistic — after the usual fashion of those who strike unpleasant argu- ments with a label and therewith declare them slain. Per- sonally I cannot see that it is more pessimistic than optimistic ; for surely it is an optimistic assumption that State Socialism will successfully fulfil the functions that are generally pre- scribed for it. Moreover this assumption, as it seems to me, is rather more than the mere acceptance of an hypothesis for the sake of argument. ' In Australia State Socialism succeeds,' are Dr. Pearson's own words. Does it succeed? That is a question to be examined rather than begged. In a chapter— the most optimistic chapter in his book — on the advantages of an enhanced national feeling. Dr. Pearson has much to say of the hold that a State, which confers in- io8 A Policy of Free Exchange. [iv. numerable benefits on its citizens, should thereby acquire over them. Such enlargement on the topic is pertinent, because it is on the perpetuity of national feeling (according to Dr. Pearson) that society depends in the future. . A few quota- tions will make the matter clearer. ' Whatever may have been the case in old days, a child's obligations to the State are now infinite. The State watches over the infant from birth ; provides that the growing child shall not be stunted by excessive toil, is properly clothed and fed, and so educated as to have a fair start in life ; it assures the adult against starvation, protects him against tyrannical employers and from the criminal classes that prey upon property ; it secures him liberty of thought and faith ; and it offers him the means of safe and easy insurance against illness or death.' Again : ' The love of any man speaking the English tongue for his country is now for a land that can give him ampler protection than his fathers ever dreamed of, that invests him with the privilege of a dominant race, that adjusts his public burdens so as to be least onerous, that gives him the right to assist in the making of laws, that protects him against his own weakness, and ofters him the means to start on equal terms in the race for honour or wealth.' And yet again : ' It is now the State which is fascinating every family by profiFering the h&ton de maHchal to its children as it forces upon them an education that will fit them to rise to wealth or dignity . . . The broad fact remains that human co-operation for political ends is yeai-ly becoming more fruitful of good purpose, and more successful in its attempts to relieve want . . . Neither is it only material benefits with which a great country endows its citizens . . . the citizens of every historic State are richer by great deeds that have formed the national character, by winged words that have passed into current speech, by the examples of lives and labours conseci-ated to the service of the common- wealth. Tho religion of the State is surely as worthy of ri^vrrcnci' as any crood of the churches, and ought to grow in IntonHity year by year.' IV.] State Socialism. 109 '/i is, however, the note of every true religion that if it promises great good it demands proportional sacrifices' It is in this last sentence that the difficulties of State Socialism really confront us. I am not concerned to dispute that in the religion of the State, as outlined by Dr. Pearson, there is much that may elevate and ennoble ; nor that the State, as apparently the less unintelligible abstraction, may command readier and more willing worship than Humanity. But abstractions are abstractions, and no profusion of capital letters will make them concrete. We are forced to ask. What is the State ? With Dr. Pearson we must set it down at something higher than merely ' the casual aggregation of persons who find it to their advantage to live in a certain part of the earth'; and if we desire to appraise it at its highest — as worthy of its capital letter — we must treat it as an abstraction, and a remarkably vague abstraction. But human creatures who, like the Australians and, indeed, the majority of English-speaking peoples, have a decided bias, temporary or permanent, towards materialism, are somewhat impatient of vague abstractions. Even three hundred years ago the framers of the Anglican Articles of Belief thought it expedient to define the visible Church. There is no such formula, so far as I know, for the visible State. Such phrases as ' a congregation of faithful men in which the pure gospel of State Socialism is preached and salaries are received according to Act of Parliament,' are insufficient and out of date. Men seek for something terse and tangible, and accordingly objectif}'' the State in the Government for the time being ; and in that Government seek for the outward manifestation of those hidden qualities, which, by their hypo- thesis, are comprehended in the abstract idea of the State. There is one divine attribute, and one only, that is assigned by its devotees to the State— namely, omnipotence. It is thought that the State, in virtue of some mysterious and unexplained qualities, can do for men what they cannot do for themselves — enjoys, in fact, powers that are practically superhuman. Even Dr. Pearson, soberest of writers, seems to lend countenance to this astonishing doctrine when he no A Policy of Free Exchange. [iv. employs such loose expressions as that ' the State offers a man the means to start on equal terms in the race for honour and wealth.' That the State may profess to make the offer is likely enough ; but herein it arrogates superiority to Fate, which, in my judgement, is not a tenable position. This omnipotence of the State is, however, assumed, as I have said, and in common with other attributes finds objectification in the reigning Government. It is, moreover, by no means sur- prising that the faith therein is never stronger than in a democracy. For democracy (to employ Dr. Pearson's excellent definition) seems really to mean the vesting of power in the people in such a way that their changes of purpose may have instantaneous effect given to them. It is the peculiarity of a democracy that it never believes that a Government cannot do a thing : it believes only that it will not do it. So if one Government declines to give instantaneous effect to one change or another of its purpose, it seeks another that undertakes the duty ; and some party can always be found to make the undertaking. Hence the eternal cry of the disappointed agitator — ' We can expect nothing from ihis Government. But wait a little ; a time will come.' Nor can it be denied that to a superficial observer the State seems to possess some attributes that are generally accounted divine. To the mass of mankind material considerations are paramount — it is not sweetness and light, but fullness and warmth, that signify happiness. If the prayers of the world for a single day could be summarised it would be found, I cannot doubt, that the commonest and most constant petition is for the grant of material benefits. The Lord's Prayer itself contains the material clause, ' Give us day by day our daily bread.' Those, however, who utter it in other than a merely formal spirit rarely hope to see a raven fly in with provisions through the window, or to find an angel at the door with a bread-basket. They trust that the prayer may be answered according to the inscrutable wisdom of a Power that has allowed men to starve before now ; and they are stimulated by their trust to individual endeavour. Not so with the State. The State undertakes immediate and direct IV.] State Socialism. 1 1 1 supply of material benefits. Men go to the State and ask, if not for bread, at all events for work — and they get it. They ask higher wage for that work — and they get it. They ask for reduction of hours of work without corresponding reduction of pay rate — and they get it. They ask for relief from the burden of educating the children which they have begotten into the world — and they get it. They ask for protection against the consequences of their own folly — and the State undertakes to grant it. They ask for an equal start in the race for power and wealth — and the State promises it. They ask for the moon — and the Government, or objectified State, binds itself to give the demand its most serious consideration. For it is the peculiar attraction of the deity of the State that it is never absolutely inexorable. In fact it is a deity that can be coerced. Jehovah may be adored or blasphemed ; the idol of the savage may be feasted or whipped by the helpless and the starving ; and the food supply is not thereby visibly afiected. The State, on the contrary, in its objectifi- cation as the reigning Government, can always be squeezed. Nor does it object to such pressure. Ministers of the State whei"ein State Socialism prevails are as vain, as ambitious and as arrogant as the high priests of any church ; and they rejoice in every new appeal to their authority as fresh evidence of the faith that is reposed in them. They borrow prestige fi-om the mysterious abstraction, of whose bounty they are held to be the dispensers ; and they know that every addition to the prestige of the State is an addition to theii" own. To this source may, perhaps, be traced the ever increasing intensity and passion of the struggle for the government of men. All great rulers, from Moses onward, have testified to the thanklessness of this task of government. Cromwell would sooner have kept a flock of sheep ; Danton would rather have been a poor fisherman ; but still men press and hustle each other in the race for authority to rule. The State is omnipotent; with such omnipotence at their back they can seize the reins with a light heart. Now if the faith, alike of ministers and citizens, in the 112 A Policy of Free Exchange. [iv. omnipotence of the State be taken as the test of success, then assuredly Dr. Pearson has some reason to claim success for State Socialism in Australia. Everything that the devotee of the State chose to demand from his idol has practically been granted or promised. The State has provided, in one or other or in all the Colonies, all the cherished privileges that were enumerated a few pages back. Moreover, it has made the provision of work doubly attractive, in the eyes alike of worker and onlooker, by declaring the work to be repro- ductive — in fact, to pay for itself. Thus, a railway not only furnishes emplojrment and wage during its construction ; but, when constructed, assumes the guise of a national benefit, and, more curious still, of a national asset. Moreover, in Australia the State gi-ants all these privileges unconditionally, without demanding any service from its citizens in return. The logical complement of State Socialism is compulsory military service ; a subject on which Dr. Pearson's remarks are well worth reading. But, from the point of view of national defence, Australia has no occasion to compel military service. Her defence is undertaken by England, and depends on the British fleet, which was specially increased for the purpose at British expense, and is maintained at no greater cost to the six Australasian Colonies than an annual payment of jf 125,000, divided between them. Thus, in all its doings, the State in Australia omits to train its citizens to the idea of sacrifice. Noting, no doubt, how thoroughly the citizens appreciated the duty of the State towards themselves, it counted on them for as thorough an appreciation of their duty toward the State ; in fact, it calculated (if it thought about the matter at all) that multiplicity of benefit would breed infinity of obligation. Finally, therefore, as the crowning attraction and supreme revelation of its omnipotence, the Australian State bestowed all these benefits upon its citizens, apparently free of charge, by the simple expedient of borrowing scores of millions of pounds from the British capitalist. It is true that taxes were levied; but very largely in the form of protective customs duties, which are always popular among those who seek au IV.] State Socialism. 1 1 3 easy life; and, indeed, it is pretty evident from the latest developments that the State virtually provided the citizens with money to pay taxes withal. Of course the amount of the debt always appeared as an offset against the national prosperity ; and here the fiction of the ' reproductive ' works came usefully into play. If the British capitalist happened to observe that he had lent the State ten, twenty or forty millions, the high priests waved their hands towards railways and irrigation schemes, and said, loftily, 'There are your millions ; not idle, but breeding new millions.' So the prestige of the State grew and waxed great ; and therewith, that of the ministers also ; for they needed but to wave their handsj and the land was filled with plenteousness. And they looked upon the work of their hands, and saw that it was good. And Mr. Froude journeyed to Australia to see the wonderful things that were there ; for the fame thereof had reached his ears in his own country. And he saw the ministers of the State, and communed with them; he saw their work also, and blessed it. And his blessing is a curse unto Australia unto this day. And passing over to New Zealand he saw there George Grey, the seer (which had formerly been of the ministers, but was cast out), and he communed with him, and cursed New Zealand. Notwith- standing, his curse was changed into a blessing. And other men also came from England to see Australia, which blessed it, and gave glory to the' State, not knowing what they did. Nay, there were that blessed it, not having seen it with their own eyes ; and of all these the blessing is changed into a curse. Undoubtedly, in the piping times of the ' eighties/ the Australian Colonies, judged by certain standards, were quite ideal States — paradises of the working man, and so forth. Their success was frequently quoted as conclusive evidence of the value of State Socialism and of the infinite power of the State for good ; and they were consequently flattered and belauded to an extravagant degree. Nor were they backward to accept such homage. The Australian Colonies began to look upon themselves as decidedly superior communities; 114 A Policy of Free Exchange. [iv. and the men that directed them began to imagine themselves statesmen. To nourish the prevailing sentiment of national self-satisfaction, the Governments instituted that peculiar form of national advertisement which is known by the name of ' statistics ' — statistics of ' realized wealth,' ' national resources,' ' national assets,' and the like — all designed to assure the world in general, and the people of England in paiticular, that the Australians were, for all their State comforts, the most energetic, industrious and enterprising folk in the world. Now, no one likes to be called energetic and industrious so much as the man who never does more work than he can help ; and accordingly the Australian working man heard and was delighted. Nor was he alto- gether without justification. All ofiicial documents declared Australian prosperity to be phenomenal ; and that prosperity was certainly due to some one's exertions— why not, there- fore, to his own (as every one assured him), with the help and guidance of an enlightened abstraction called the State? Deity and devotee alike live on faith, and thrive with its increase. So the game went merrily on during the eighties, becoming fast and furious towards their close, till at last it culminated in the year 1888. That year was marked in Sydney by a great festival to celebrate the centenary of the arrival of the first two convict ships at Botany Bay ; and in Melbourne by a great Exhibition to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of Victoria. Shortly after, the tide began to turn. The first blow dealt at the omnisufiicience of the State was struck by an Australian newspaper, the Melbourne Argus, which discovered and gave publicity to the fact that the surplus shown by the Victorian Treasurer for the financial year just expired (1889) had no existence except in imagination. Further inquiry showed that the surpluses of some previous years had been obtained by a manipulation of the public accounts, which in a private firm would not have been considered straightforward. Though known and remarked in the Colonies, this incident of the sham surplus of 1889 was unheard of in England until Mr. Charles Fairfield made it public in the pages of A Plea for IV.] State Socialism. 115 Liberty. Other attacks followed Mr. Fairfield's, as the mysteries of Australian State Socialism were gradually un- veiled; and at last the ministers took fright and began to admit, in Australia at least, that matters might not be in quite so satisfactory a state as could be desired. In England they continued, through their instruments, to pufif the per- fection of their system and to denounce the attacks of critics as persistently as ever. Still, the steadiness of the downward tendency was too strongly marked to make denials and denunciations of any avail. The Colony of Victoria, wherein Dr. Pearson made his principal study of the success of State Socialism, presents, perhaps, the most instructive picture of financial collapse — Victoria was the enfant gdt4 of the British State Socialist, the darling example of such critics as Sir Charles Dilke. Her decline and fall may be traced in the following brief statement. July, 1889. The Treasurer announced a surplus of £1,600,000. Nov. 1889. The Treasurer announced that the surplus of £1,600,000 had sunk to £142,000; and that there were liabilities of £5,600,000 to be met. Liabilities accordingly met by means of loans, and finance declared (by Mr. H. Willoughby, Nineteenth Century, Sept. 1891) to have been ' put straight without the slighest confusion.' 1890. Treasurer announces a surplus of £600,000 on the past financial year. 1891. Treasurer announces a deficit of £797,000 on the past financial year, reckoning to June 30; and of £1,418,000, reckoning to July i ; also that £1,700,000 had been borrowed from trust funds (Government Savings Bank deposits) in anticipation of loans. £3,000,000 were borrowed in London during the year, of which £900,000 were for conversion of a matured loan. 189a. Treasurer announced a deficit of close on £1,600,000 for the past financial year. £3,000,000 raised by loans during the year 1892. 1893. Estimated deficit of £2,500,000. Collapse. There is no necessity to dilate further on the present finan- I a 1 16 A Policy of Free Exchange. [iv. cial condition of Australia — it has been all too soiTowfully brought home to hundreds of ruined Englishmen. ' When a State undertakes enterprises beyond its strength, it always does it at the risk of bankruptcy,' writes Dr. Pearson, very sagely ; and . bankruptcy is the fate that has overtaken Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland. Now it is agreed by common consent that finance is the principal test whereby the success or failure of a system of administration should be tried. Applying this test to Australia we are surely forced to the conclusion that State Socialism, so far from succeeding there, is a hopeless and disastrous failure. Now, the practical certainty of bankruptcy in these three provinces, and particularly in Victoria, has been patent to any man who chose to use his eyes, since the year 1890, if not from still earlier times. Dr. Pearson's book bears date 1893 ; and we must, therefore, assume that, at all events to the close of 1 891, he still considered State Socialism to be a success in Australia. Consequently we can only conclude that he would not regard such a test as final, and would require further evidence to convince him that he was mis- taken. I can hardly believe, I confess, that if his book were still unprinted he would leave the passage about the success of State Socialism in Australia unaltered. But his subject is a wide one ; and he expressly disclaims the consideration of such possible contingencies as the trial of impracticable experiments, and the resort to such old failures of the past as unlimited issues of paper money by 'ignorant tribunes of the people.' We are, therefore, driven to apply some other test. It may, of course, be said, and indeed it has been said, that the financial collapse in Australia is due merely to a fortuitous concurrence of unfortunate circumstances ; that it is merely transitory and superficial, and that it will be followed by speedy and solid revival. It has also been said that the collapse was due to the malicious attacks of English critics, who sought notoriety by uttering dismal prophecies of Australia's failure, and secured fulfilment of those prophecies by decrying her credit. But it would be as reasonable to attribute the outbreak of an epidemic of typhoid fever to IV.] State Socialism. 117 the predictions of a doctor who condemns the sanitary con- dition of a town. The fact that it could be predicted is sufficient evidence that the collapse was due, not to unlucky mischance, but to simple and ascertainable causes. If, in spite of national bankruptcy, success can still be claimed for State Socialism in Australia, it can be upon one ground only — viz. that, though the State may have failed (let us say through excessive zeal) in its duty to the citizens, yet the citizens have redeemed such failure through their infinite devotion to the service of the State. Now, I have already described, in Dr. Pearson's own words, the consummation which he hopes may be reached in the growth in each individual citizen of a proper sentiment of gratitude, loyalty and piety toward the State — ^I have sketched what the State has undertaken to do, and what it actually has done (no matter at whose expense), for its citizens in Australia ; and it now remains to examine what return the citizen seems likely to offer to the State. ' It is the note of every true religion that, if it promises great good, it demands proportionate sacrifice.' ' What reward shall I give unto the Lord for all the benefits that He hath done unto me ? ' The peculiar tendency to accumulate large debts, which present experience has shown to be characteristic of State Socialism, has not escaped so keen an observer as Dr. Pearson. His residence in Victoria cannot but have forced this danger upon his notice, and presented it to him as real and pressing. It is evident, indeed, that this peculiarity has puzzled and disturbed him not a little. ' The day may come,' he hopes, ' when a man who leaves an old and indebted State will be like the partner who peremptorily withdraws from an embaiTassed firm ' ; but he admits that if thousands of citizens who have supported a policy of lavish expenditure leave the country when the burden of taxation becomes unpleasant, the very existence of the State may be imperilled. I have little doubt but that this latter sentiment was sug- gested to Dr. Pearson by (among other examples) what happened in New Zealand in the year 1888-9. New Zealand, it should be mentioned, at that time led the race 1 1 8 A Policy of Free Exchange. [iv. of extravagant administration among the Australian Colonies ; and, indeed, is still rather ahead of her sisters in the matter of certain State institutions — e. g. State insurance. Her career ■was, however, cut short in the nick of time by Mr. Froude's strictures in that delightful but inaccurate book Oceana. New Zealand gained a bad reputation in the English money- market; the supply of loans was cut off; and she found herself on the brink of bankruptcy. Now, there can be no doubt whatever that the adventurous politician who initiated and encouraged the policy of extravagant borrow- ing in New Zealand was cordially supported by the mass of the people. To this day, I venture to affirm, there are many in the Colony who still swear by him. Nor is it altogether surprising considering that, as if by the waving of a magic wand, he flooded the country with money, and began an era of apparently unexampled prosperity. Let it be noted mean- while that in New Zealand there was no concealment of the financial position by mishandling of the accounts. The annual balance sheets showed faithfully enough a deficit just about equivalent to the amount of the annual interest due on the loans ; so that it was sufficiently patent to any intelligent man that the interest on old loans was discharged, not by the labour of the citizens, but by the complaisance of the British capitalist. No sane man could believe that such a system would last for ever ; yet it was stopped, not by the unwillingness of the citizens to continue it, but by the refusal of the British capitalist any longer to support it. Now, innocent people might suppose that citizens under such obligations to the State as in New Zealand would have stood by her in the hour of her trial. Nothing of the kind. No sooner was the borrowing stopped than the 'working men,' the adult males, who are generally reckoned to be the cream of the population, streamed away in thousands to Australia. So far from making a saci'ifice for the State, which had nursed them so tenderly, they not only forsook her, but in many cases left their wives and children behind to be a burden to her. Those who remained sought by every means in their power to shift the weight of their obligations to the State IV.] State Socialism. 119 on. to others' shoulders. Sir George Grey openly proposed that, under the form of an income tax, a fraction of the interest due to the English bondholders should be confiscated for the benefit of the State, which meant, in plain words, repudiation. The Government, without going so far as this, imposed this income tax upon the foreign holder of debentures in New Zealand companies ; and has got into some trouble in consequence, though not with its own citizens. So much for New Zealand. Sensible colonists who watched the exodus of the working man from that country on the cessation of the borrowing policy, predicted (not without bitter satisfaction) that he would soon return, a wiser creature than when he left. And so in fact it has turned out. Com- pared with the crashing collapse of Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland, the fall of New Zealand appears like a gentle subsidence. The ' working man ' of Australia, sworn supporter of reckless extravagance, ' cleared out ' directly there was a question as to the payment of the bill ; and fled to New Zealand, South America or any country where he could hope to receive benefits without repaying them. Nay, a few hundred extremists, so we read in the papers, have started off to construct a Utopia which shall satisfy all their ideals ; schismatics from the established State religion which once commanded their reverence in Australia, embarked on some parody of the Mayflower, bound on the welcome and simple mission of forming a fool's paradise. But the bulk of the emigrants, so far as I can gather, has made its way to New Zealand ; deserters, some of single, some of double, some of triple dye, but all alike without shame. Within six months of their arrival they are entitled to a vote ; and, with unconscious irony, will probably press for the imposition of heavy burdens on absentee proprietors and absentee lenders. Absentee debtors, of course, are not to be classed with such vermin. The devotee of the State has but two clauses to his prayer — ' Give us day by day our daily bread, and forgive us our debts.' It may be said that such citizens as these are no citizens. Possibly ; but why, then, does the State so readily grant them I20 A Policy of Free Exchange. [iV. the privileges of citizenship, asking at very most no more from them than an occasional service on a jury — a service, by the way, which, being properly within the domain of the State, not infrequently finds its way into private hands, to the great discomfort of justice ? There is, I think, but one answer — the religion of the State encourages hirelings rather than shepherds. Now let us consider the case of the citizens who remain faithful to the country of their birth or their adoption. Some, beyond all question, remain true to her from really high motives of sentiment and honour — the men who would never desert a companion in misfortune or disgrace, much less a country. But are such motives bred by the lavishment of material benefits % Surely not. Were the sharers of the sportula the men who stuck to their Roman patrons in their fall as well as their prosperity ? I do not think so. But there is a much larger body that stays from sheer inability to go away. These are mainly of two classes — salaried official employes of the State, too old, too strongly committed to her service, or too much narrowed in the discharge of the duties thereof to begin life over again ; and the country people, who are attached, partly by sentimental, more often by commercial, ties to the soil — the working moiety of the population, which produces whatever wealth is produced in the country. The first is that over which the State has most immediate and complete control. They are simple dependents — the one class from which the State can extort sacrifices. As the easiest, they are always the first victims of retrenchment ; and the first cry in a country where State Socialism has brought about financial embarrassment is ' Cut down the salaries of the Civil Service.' The ministers lend a willing ear : salaries are cut down, old servants are dis- charged, with or without an inadequate composition for the pension to which they were entitled by the terms of their contract ; and the whole service is disheartened and demo- ralized. These men are among the few that have faithfully served the State ; and this is their reward. Is it conceivable that such involuntary Abdiels should keep their loyalty, love and zeal towards so faithless and oppressive a taskmistress 1 IV.] State Socialism. 121 The people who work on the land are in rather a different position. Although from the mere fact of dispersion they cannot organize themselves to put pressure on the State like the townsmen, yet they have compelled the State in some measure to justify their faith in its omnipotence. Of course they have ever been the last to receive protection for their industries ; but they would not consent eternally to pay through the nose for every tool, utensil and garment in order that the townsman might prosper and amuse himself; and accordingly, together with the privileges extended to every citizen, they have occasionally exacted special favours, such as bounties and the like. Now, these men have always felt a conviction (and quite justifiably) that they are the true Australian citizens — ready, it is true, to take anything that they could get from the State, but proud to think that they were not dependent on it, nor bound to it by a daily increasing sum of uncancelled obligation. To them the collapse must have been a more than ordinarily painful surprise. They know that they have worked on as usual, and yet they learn of failure after failure of banks and business fii-ms — probably enough of the disappearance of their own earnings in such failure. They hear of public liabilities whereof the total seems ever to increase, of a public revenue that never ceases to fallj of business at a standstill, of a Government at its wit's end. They hear of imperative necessity for immense retrench- ment and new taxation ; reduction of the benefits granted by the State, increase of the burdens to be borne for her. Lastly, they hear that thousands of taxpayers have fled from the coming wrath, and that thousands more are preparing to follow them ; and that they who have always worked must stay and work on, in difliculty and discouragement, to pay the piper to whose music the fugitives have danced. Then they ask. Why this collapse ? Who is responsible for it? And the answer is. The State. It was the State that promised to create universal prosperity and universal content- ment; and to carry out its promise utilized, not its own resources, but money borrowed from other countries. The State had ideas of ready-made prosperity as of a ready-made 122 A Policy of Free Exchange. [iv. suit of clothes. It seems so simple to take a man of fine physique, clap him in a borrowed suit of fine clothes, call him a millionaire, and bid him go play. But, the true workers rejoin, Why so sudden a collapse 1 Surely there should have been unmistakable warnings. We had no such warnings. The balance sheets and official information furnished by the State through its ministers were, at any rate till quite recently, most satisfactory and reassuring. The answer is, The State your god is a jealous god, and does not like its devotees to think that they can do without her, still less that she is wholly dependent upon them. It was a part of her policy to conceal from you that you were the only true workers in the country, and that without you she was nothing. It was equally part of her policy to conceal from the Biitish capitalist the fact that he has hitherto paid the interest on the money that he has lent her out of his own pocket. Whether from unwilling- ness to lose faith in the omnipotence of the State or from fear of publishing the discovery which they had themselves made, that such faith was groundless, successive batches of ministers so garbled the financial accounts and returns of the State as to convey a wholly false impression. Hence a general feeling of distrust and uncertainty towards AustraUan State balance sheets at the present moment. In Victoria these balance sheets were presented with various suppressions and omissions according to the interest of the reigning Government in showing a deficit or a surplus, i.e. a deficit as the creation of then- predecessors in office, a surplus as the production of their own talent. In New South Wales the dispensers of the riches of the State have recently made some very candid admissions. ' The Colonial Treasurer is practically powerless to control the finances ; he is liable at any moment to have accounts to meet of the very existence of which he was unaware ' — such is the confession of the present Treasurer. You ask, How about the ' reproductive public works ? ' wherein the borrowed money was invested ; and you point triumphantly to the Victorian railways, which, according to official returns, paid not only the interest on the capital borrowed for their construction, but a small percentage of profit also. Well, by this time you must TV.] State Socialism. 123 know that these official returns were misleading. Those rail- ways never did pay that interest, and at the present moment are less likely to pay it than ever. In 1891 the earnings were avowedly £332,000 short of the interest on the capital outlay, and in 1893 £445,000. If you ask about another class of ' reproductive ' public works, those constructed for purposes of irrigation for the benefit, at any rate ostensibly, of you in the country, I must point out to you that the aggregate arrears of interest due from local bodies on this account rose from jEaoOjOOo to £300,000 between 1891 and 1892, and that you may as well write off these sums and more as bad debts. It is of no use for you to say that much of the money spent on these reproductive works was wasted ; that some of the rail- ways, for instance, ought never to have been made at all ; that many ought to have been delayed for ten, twenty or thirty years ; that nearly all should have been constructed at much smaller cost ; and that if you had had any idea of the haphazard fashion in which the affairs of the State were conducted you would have risen to put a stop to the system. All that is no doubt very true, indeed, has been admitted to some extent by ministers. You supposed, at any rate hoped, that all was right, and never dreamed that the ministers of the State were deceiving you. But you must remember that the ministers are but men, like you believers in the State, con- cerned to uphold its divinity, and therefore unwilling to profane its mysteries. All this, though interesting, is but a digression from the most important point, namely, that the State looks to you and to your exertions to discharge liabilities incurred partly for your good, but chiefly for the good of others. You must not complain of this. You must not say that the State has done you more harm than good by attracting all labour away from you to its own works, and encouraging the population to do artificial work in the towns, instead of natural work in the country, and that its eternal interference has been the ruin of Australia. The interest on the debt must be paid, and you have got to pay it. Can we believe that these citizens will feel gratitude and 1 24 A Policy of Free Exchange. [iv. devotion towards the State which has so deceived them ? Will they not rather curse her for the injustice that she has wrought ? For has not each man the perfect right to say that if the State had but openly shown him the true nature of her doings he would have renounced his allegiance and left the country while he could, without loss of independence, character or honour ? Meanwhile, the State has made a last effort to retrieve its damaged character. In the general distress the people, demoralized by long dependence on its bounty, call louder than ever on the State for help ; and the State has responded. In Victoria it tried, besides other experiments, to avert the failure of banks, by declaring them closed for five days; which is as though a doctor should stop a man's breath to save him from breathing his last. Needless to say, the few banks that were confident as to their soundness refused to avail themselves of this enforced holiday ; while those that knew their own unsoundness closed for five days, reopened — and failed — as it was inevitable that they should fail. In New South Wales and Queensland, the Governments, still filled with the omnipotence of the State, have undertaken, with no mightier engine to hand than an ordinary paper mill, to create money, under the name of ' Treasury Notes,' ' Treasury Bonds,' and so forth. This, of course, is no new thing. The State has set itself the same task at various periods in various countries; but it is significant that such 'money,' whether designated ' Treasury notes,' 'Cedulas,' or ' Assignats,' has never failed to fall into early disrepute. These ' State promises to pay ' are in reality nothing more nor less than drafts on the credulity of those who believe in the omnipotence of the State ; and human credulity finds its limits very swiftly, when pounds, shillings and pence are in question. Thus in two at least of the Australian provinces the State has fired its last shot. What may be the ultimate outcome of these issues of forced paper it is difficult to say. The issue, of course, is declared to be limited, and all reissue to be for- bidden ; so that at present the scheme does not come under Dr. Pearson's category of ' old failures ' ; but it is a disquieting n'.] State Socialism. 125 reflection that issues of forced paper have a tendency to outlive the term originally assigned for their existence. In any case there is but one source from which these promissory notes can be redeemed, viz. the labour and production of the workers in the country districts, who are already sadly overburdened. The truth is that the State in the last resort can find neither help nor salvation except in the private enterprise, which in Australia it has done its best to extinguish ; but this truth being unpalatable, both to itself and to its worshippers, the State leaves no means untried to 'disguise it. By the people these paper issues have been hailed with acclamation as a stroke of magical beneficence ; in other words, neither Government nor people are alive to the fact that a State's promise to pay is a people's promise to work. Looking, then, at the situation from both sides — from the side of the State in respect of the benefits which it has conferred upon the citizens and from the side of the citizens in respect of the obligations which they recognize towards the State — I find it impossible to justify Dr. Pearson's assumption that State Socialism succeeds in Australia. The experiment may have been interesting, but the result is failure ; and the immediate products are a bankrupt treasury and a demoralized people. The reign of State Socialism in Australia has been a reign of gambling, pure and simple ; and the tendency to gambling is of all tendencies that which an Australian Government should have been most careful to discourage. For the English have a natural passion for gambling only less intense than have the Chinese ; and Australia is from the nature of the case a gambling country. So treacherous is the climate, with its alternation of heavy destructive drought and heavy destructive flood, that even the soberest work on the land partakes heavily of the nature of gambling. If the new settler begins with a good season, he makes money very rapidly ; if with a bad, he is, for all his efforts, not less rapidly ruined. On this point all men with experience of Australia seem to agree — there is, as a rule, no medium between these two extremes. Then, as if this were not 126 A Policy of Free Exchange. [iv. enough, the State aggravates the uncertainty of work on the land by continual tinkering at the land laws — now withhold- ing the public land from sale, alleging scruples about ' alienat- ing the national patrimony,' now disturbing the holders of land already alienated, now proposing to repurchase the ' national patrimony ' ; so that men can hardly tell what their rights in the land may be ; while rabbits, by a strange irony, enjoy undisputed possession of thousands of square miles. Another natural stimulus to the gambling spirit was the discovery of gold; which, though commonly accounted a blessing, is in reality the greatest curse that can oppress a country — offering royal roads to wealth, and discouraging steady industry. As if this were not enough, the State floods the country with borrowed millions, thus obtaining and pro- moting, directly and indirectly, an unprecedented extension of credit for its citizens. Hence, as was to be expected, more and more gambling, culminating in the frantic speculation known as the Melbourne Land Boom of 1888; when the price of real property in Melbourne actually rose above that in the City of London; while the State, to keep the ball rolling, carelessly squandered a quarter of a million^ of borrowed money on a great exhibition. The prevalence of the gambling spirit, and the direct encouragement thereof through precept and example by the State, has, of course, left its mark on commercial moraUty. I must guard myself against misconception and the accusation of Pharisaism by saying at once that I do not think English commercial morality is much to boast of; and am rather inclining to the opinion that the old and extinct aristocratic prejudice against trade had its root in something greater and stronger than the mere pride and folly of caste. I am not concerned to deny, meanwhile, that the morality of the tradesman or merchant or banker has as good a right to distinct existence and special recognition, as such, as the morality of the advocate or the politician; for every pro- fession and calling has its own ethical code — known to the ' The net loss on this exhibition exceeded £200,000. IV.] State Socialism. 127 outside world as etiquette, and to the initiated as business. But, making all these allowances, I do not think it can be disputed that the standard of commercial morality in Austra- lasia is low, and lower than in England. The position can be illustrated by the different treatment of bankruptcy in the Colonies and the old country. Gambling and bankruptcy are intimately connected together — gambling being carelessness, indifference, contempt, but always at bottom defiance towards obligation ; bankruptcy the admitted inability, from whatever cause, to fulfil obligation. The attitude of law and still more of society towards bankruptcy is a sure index to the standard of respect that is paid to the sanctity of obligation in any commu- nity. If any one will compare the bankruptcy laws of England with those, say, of New Zealand, I do not think he will find any difficulty in deciding which are the most stringent, or, in other words, make most for honesty. But the social attitude towards bankruptcy in the Colonies is even more significant. Bankruptcy is attended by comparatively few difficulties ; and is accompanied by no stigma. Perhaps this may be more excusable in a new country than an old, but it is not less dangerous. Dr. Pearson justly says that ' in a new society a man goes on experimenting till he finds the career in which he works best ; and that this facility has a great effect in promoting individualism.' I think that it has a great effect in promoting bankruptcy also ; for, through the too lax acceptance of the principle, the liberty to experiment ad libitum is construed as the right to fail ad infinitum. Hence to have ' passed through the court,' as the phrase runs, is in the Colonies held to be rather an evidence of enterprise than a certificate of failure. It cannot astonish us, therefore, to find bankruptcy in high places in the Colonies. I take no such unfair test as a mere enumeration of the Australian premiers, past and present, who have been obliged to confess insolvency ; for misfortune spares no man. I take the recent and significant case of a politician who quite lately held the office of premier. This gentleman, while yet in the first blush of bankruptcy and of intimate connexion with a business whose failure had justly or unjustly provoked severe criticism 128 A Policy of Free Exchange. [iv. in the Colony, was actually selected for the appointment of Agent-General in England ; and this at a time when his prime duty would have been to reassure British capitalists as to the safety of their investments in his Colony. The press, to its honour, opposed the appointment and forced the Government to cancel it. But conceive the selection of a bankrupt for such a mission ; and consider the standard of commercial morality in a country where such a selection could not merely be thought of, but was only most reluctantly withdrawn, as much from policy as shame, in deference to the press. It is the standard reproach against two great rival English statesmen, that the one lived a gambler and the other died a bankrupt. If his marvellous talents and amaz- ing personal charm cannot save the fame of Eox; if his lofty character and transcendent services cannot wholly efface the one stain on the memory of Pitt, surely it is a mistaken and unwholesome leniency to leave similar fail- ings in Australian politicians wholly out of account. Let us take another aspect of Australian commercial morality. It is constantly claimed on behalf of Australian ministers, that they have never diverted the riches of the State to their own personal gain. Let us freely grant that in some important English-speaking communities such virtue is all too rare; and let us give all honour to Australasian ministers for that they still hold it dear. But what are we to say to the publication of misleading accounts, false balance sheets and fictitious returns by authority of the State? It cannot be urged that ministers were unaware of the irregu- larity of their proceedings, for it was constantly brought to their notice by the auditors. It cannot be advanced that political exigency is sufficient excuse; for the ministers and their apologists expressly debarred themselves from any such plea. They asserted again and again that the money borrowed by the State was expended on commei'cial undertakings in accordance with business principles ; and they must, thei-efore, be judged by the code, not of political, but commercial ethics. What, again, are we to say of the ministers who, after admitting, under the legitimate torture of press criticism, IV.] State Socialism. 129 that a certain balance sheet was misleading, not to say falsej none the less advised the Governor to countersign that same false balance sheet, and suffered it to pass into the English ofEcial returns as correct % What, further, shall we say of the people which, after the exposure of such a scandal by the press, allows the guilty ministry to remain quietly in office^ and retire on its laurels % Lastly, what shall we say of New South Wales and of its present Premier? In the summer of 1892 that Premier, Sir George Dibbs, came to England to support the tottering credit of his Colony. He wrote a long letter to the Tmies in defence of Australian financial adminis- tration in general, and of New South Wales finance in particular ; he succeeded in reassuring English investors to some extent (for he was received with honour in high places, and even knighted), and is said to have actually raised the New South Wales Government Stock one per cent. He then pressed the Chancellor of the Exchequer hard to open Colonial Government Stock to English trustees ; most fortunately with- out success. Shortly after he returned to his Colony. Within six months he saw it sunk in hopeless financial collapse ; within nine he had, by the establishment of a forced paper currency, virtually admitted its bankruptcy. Now, one would have thought that a Premier so ignorant of the fijiancial con- dition of his Colony as to cry up its soundness and stability (and make a journey to England for the purpose) but half a year before a confession of insolvency — one would have thought, I say, that a minister so ignorant, would have been forthwith driven from oflSce. On the contrary, he not only remains in office, but has received a public testimonial (£700 was, I thiuk, the amount subscribed) for his eminent services to his country. Such sympathy with ignorance seems, at first sight, a Little difficult to account for, in view of the free education so liberally supplied by the State to every citizen in New South Wales, though, to directors of shaky companies, and indeed, to debtors at large, it must be very full of encouragement and comfort. But surely it must be conceded that a community in which executive power and public feeling conspire to set at naught the sanctity of K 1 30 A Policy of Free Exchange. [iv. obligation, is, to say the least of it, in a very unsound condition. The whole fabric of State Socialism depends for stability and coherence on the due maintenance of mutual obligation between citizen and State. Yet the State, as we have seen, neglects to uphold it, even as between citizen and citizen ; and if man keeps not faith with his brother, whom he has seen, how shall he keep it with the State, which he has not seen? Why, lastly, should men hesitate to abuse the trust of their fellow men, when the State itself, which is the pattern for all, does the like to a feUow State ? It may be replied that education is the means whereby such evil may be corrected. Now, we hear a great deal about education in Australia and of the consequent intelligence of its citizens ; but the same fundamental mistake runs through the whole scheme of Australian State Socialism — namely, the grant of benefit without the exaction of sacrifice — and in the case of education shows itself as the imparting of knowledge without the enforcement of discipline. Mr. Gladstone recently said that the English are an undisciplined race; and the assertion contains so much truth that it is much to be regretted that it should have been spoiled by its context; for the English are at any rate patient of discipline, which is precisely the point at which the Irishman fails. The English, as compared with the Germans, are decidedly undisciplined; and the Australians, as compared with the native English, are even more decidedly undisciplined. The cause is not far to seek. A settlement in a strange land is not formed by the steady, the soberminded and the commonplace ; these can do weU enough at home ; but by the discontented, the restless, the adventurous and the enterprising, who are attracted by the relief from discipline and restraint — by the liberty to fight the battle of life in their own way. Even after the settlement has become a colony the population is fed mainly by the infiux of men of similar temperament; for the man who leaves his native land — whether as an emigrant to seek his fortune or as a colonist to make a new home — is plainly a man who is not satisfied with it and hopes to do better. Thus in all new countries there is, so to speak, a kind of hereditary IV.] State Socialism, 131 predisposition to indiscipline, which shows itself mainly in the relaxation of parental authority. All the more reasons, it wiU be urged, why the State should take the rising genera- tion in hand. The State has taken the rising generation in hand accordingly, and has absolved parents from all responsibility in respect of the making of citizens. The decline of the family, which is the fate that Dr. Pearson predicts for the civilized world, is rapidly accomplishing itself in Australia ; but the rise of the State in its place is invisible, except to those who pretend to see it in columns of reckless expenditure. The ministers of the State have so little con- ception of the responsibility that the State has assumed that they ignore the necessity for inculcating obedience as the first of all lessons. In one Antipodean Colony which I know, it was proverbial that if a schoolmaster attempted to enforce discipline by proper punishment, the parents promptly com- plained to the member for the district, the member complained to the Minister of Education, and the schoolmaster ran great risk of dismissal. What wonder that the children kick up their heels at all authority, and grow up to become larrikins ? Parents wash their hands of them as soon as they are old enough to be put in charge of the State ; the State washes its hands of them as soon as school hours are over ; and yet the children are expected to grow up good citizens. As to higher education, Dr. Pearson, who is a most competent witness, shall himself tell us how and why it is valued in Australia : ' In the English Colonies I have known the tendency is to tolerate University training as a necessity for professional men ; but to regard primary school education, or something only a little above it, as suiEcient for all the needs of practical men and men of the world. Indeed, high schools in Australia seem to be maintained chiefly because some people like their children to have the distinction of a rather costly training; because a few others intend to send their sons and daughters into pro- fessions; and because a good many find it convenient to keep their children of a certain age away from home during the day.' Such is the spirit in which the citizens receive such gifts of the State as they consider to pass the needs of every day. K 2 1.^,2 A Policy of Free Exchange. [iv. How, then, to recall Dr. Pearson's words already quoted, are they to gain knowledge of the immaterial benefits with which every historic State endows its citizens — the great deeds which have formed the national character, the winged words that have passed into current speech, the example of lives and labours consecrated to the Commonwealth % It is to historic England that the Australian owes whatever significance he may possess. What does he know of it ? and in what light is that historic England displayed to him by the State % Fii-st, as a credulous and convenient loan agency, and latterly as a grasping and suspicious creditor. Whether it wished it or not, this is what the State in Australia has done ; and for noble deeds, winged words and lofty examples the Australian must fall back on such men as Sir George Dibbs. This is on the whole the blackest blot on the administration of State Socialism in Australia — it has corrupted the national character. If the situation were merely that of communities wherein a few rogues at the head of affairs had embezzled public money, borrowed on the public credit, and absconded therewith, then we might contemplate it with comparative equanimity and look with confidence for ultimate revival. But in Australia such a scandal in high places has been escaped only at the price of far greater mischief. The borrowed millions have been lavished on the people at large — every soul has had his share of the plunder — and the absconders are numbered by thousands. The colonists have played at work for so long that they have forgotten how to work in earnest; and industry and honesty have gone to the wall. And yet, if we forget (as we can afford to forget) the early days of penal settlement in Australia, and think only of more recent times, I think we must admit that there was plenty of good human material to the State's hand for the making of a solid and prosperous community. The deeds of the pioneers and explorers and early settlers are rightly enshrined as monuments of energy and enterprise ; and it is not too much to say that the eai'ly traditions of Australia are of hard work, perseverance and self-help. Whatever of good there is in Australian life (and there is much) is due to these IV.] State Socialism, 133 traditions and to the habits that grew up along with them. Colonial hospitality is proverbial — indeed, hospitality (as we understand it in England) is too weak a word to express this side of the colonial character. Colonial neighbourliness is another virtue which equally deserves to pass into a proverb. Indeed, I know nothing more beautiful to see than the spontaneous and unreflecting self-abnegation wherewith colonists come forward to share the burden of a neighbour's sickness or distress. Young clerks, for instance, who are busy at their desks all day and, it may be, have to prepare for an examination all the evening, relieve each other and keep each other company over a neighbour's sick bed — sacrifi^cing pleasure, health, rest, and even prospects, without the slightest consciousness of performing more than the simplest neighbourly duty. Such virtues as these the State could not destroy if it would ; but the old energy and self-reliance it has done its best to destroy, with a lamentably full measure of success. 'The Lord will provide' is a text with a dangerous double-edge; 'the State will provide' is an excuse for idleness and shiftlessness ; ' the State will provide at another State's expense ' is an irresistible exhortation, not only to idleness, but dishonesty. It has first corrupted the commendable and sturdy pride of the colonists in their young motherland into noisy, blatant conceit, and finally smothered it in shame. Seeing, then, things as they are, I think we have at least as much right to take State Socialism in Australia for a failure as Dr. Pearson has to treat it as a success ; and that we are justified in reasoning from this failure to other failures, just as he reasoned from this assumed success to other successes. Of course it may be urged, not without plausibility, that the experiment of State Socialism has not been fairly tried in Australia ; that it is incomplete ; that the system has broken down for the moment only ; that the recuperative power of young communities is great ; that one should not be in too great a hurry to rush to sweeping conclusions. That there may be some force in such objections I will not dispute. But I am obliged to ask, What is a fair trial of State Socialism ? Are we to declare all trials unfair, until at last one be found. 1 34 A Policy of Free Exchange. [iv. or claimed, to be successful'? And when are we to declare the experiment complete, if not at the stage where the explosion of bankruptcy brings the whole laboratory about the experi- menters' ears ? As to the recuperative powers of young com- munities ^ these depend not upon mere natural resources, but principally upon the citizens, or, as we may now say, with thanks to Dr. Pearson for teaching us the word, upon national character. The national character in Australia has, I think, been sufficiently proved to have suffered very seriously from State Socialism. Where, then, is ground for hope of swift recovery ? Let us now, therefore, pass to the consideration of the question whether State Socialism is as likely to break down in other countries as in Australia. The Australian Colonies are under the rule of a democracy ; and, as Sir Henry Maine pointed out many years ago, democracy is a terribly expensive system of government. Are we to look for a similar collapse of State Socialism in Germany, where administration is from long habit and tradition conducted on the most economical principles, and the people, from long centuries of suffering and misfortune, are drilled, disciplined and patriotic? And if not in Germany, are we to look for it in England, which represents the mean between these two extremes % I do not question for a moment but that in all cases the effect of State Socialism will in the long run be the same. For, whether under the guidance of an enlightened despot, of a hare-brained Kaiser or an ordinary demagogue, State Socialism seems to proceed on a false principle towards the fulfilment of an impossible task. At the core of the system is to be found the oft-exploded ' I am aware that two of the lap.se ; and am strengthened in my Australian provinces have recently opinion by two recent enactments succeeded in floating loans in Lon- of the Parliament of New Zealand, don, and that it is now assumed that which could only have been passed tliuir priucipal difficulties are over. in the feai- of a serious financial crisis, N'liHitholcMN I soo uo occasion to alter and ai-o not justified even by that. a word that 1 havd written ; for with- If Now Zealand's recovery be so slow out K"ing into detail I may say that and uncertain, how much slower and I do not uluijn tlici general confidonce move uncertain must Australia's be 1 in suc'li HudcU'ii roaunoetionfrom col- IV.] State Socialism. 135 fallacy that all men are equal; presenting itself in tlie still more preposterous notion that all men are equalizable. On what other possible hypothesis could Dr. Pearson have worked out his conclusion as to the decay of individual character? State Socialism is, in fact, the creation of the ever-increasing multitude of civilized men who are oppressed with the sense of the finality of this life. They have seen, froin the teaching of history, that hitherto it has always been the fate of a large fraction of mankind to serve the remainder; that in fact history is simply the record of the struggles of individuals to pass from the class that serves to the class that is served, and of the efibrts of communities to adjust the relations between the two to the current ideas of justice. Speaking generally, it can hardly, I think, be denied that the fraction of mankind that is served is superior to the class that serves it. It is not necessarily a question of merit in them ; it is simply an exemplification of the unpleasant but incontestable truth that, broadly speaking, a lucky man for the purposes of this life' is better than an unlucky man. The Church, while unable to resist the temptation to try and do something towards relieving the distress of the unlucky, always kept the promise of redress in a future life in reserve as a final resource, when all others should fail. The State is far bolder. It undertakes to make this life potentially endurable and pleasant to all — to say that henceforth there shall be no such division of men into servers and served ; but that all men shall serve the State, and the State serve all. And this it hopes to accomplish by taking the human organism in hand almost from the cradle^ passing it (to take an extreme case) through the State crfeche into the State school, and from the State school into the State workshop, from the State workshop to the State asylum for the old, and from the State asylum to the State grave. But this is a process which costs money ; and who is to provide the money ? In Australia it was claimed for a time that this problem had been solved ; but in truth it was only evaded. State Socialism there worked on the old lines — that there was a class to serve and another class to serve it. The class to be served was the colonist, and the class to serve was the British 136 A Policy of Free Exchange. [iv. capitalist. But the British capitalist kicked ; and the system broke down, with disastrous results both to capitalist and colonist ; and now the situation is recognized in its true light as reversed, i.e. that the capitalist claims the service of the colonist. In other countries the methods of State Socialism can be only superficiallj' different. The savings of successful natives instead of those of foreigners will be appropriated for the supposed happiness of the unsuccessful, and the certain demoralization of all. This has been done even in Australia itself, where the Government Savings Bank deposits have in some cases been taken by the State to meet current expenses, and virtually form a portion of the national debt : indeed, in Victoria the Mdhovbrne Argus openly says that they may as well be reckoned as such. Now, if a schoolmaster were to fix an arbitrary standard of marks, far below the 'highest possible,' for his pupils, and, deducting the excess gained over that number by the first boy, should add the difference to the marks gained by the last boy, we should call him an idiot, ignorant of the rudiments of his profession. Yet this is the process which under State Socialism the State proposes to pursue towards its citizens. The pace of a cavalry charge is (or rather was) supposed in theory to be regulated by that of the slowest horse in the regiment. Military men, by reputa- tion the most precise and hidebound of pedants, have freed themselves without difficulty in practice from so absurd a restriction ; for they recognized the value of the counter- proposition — that if every bridle could be cut at the supreme moment, a cavalry charge could not fail to sweep everything before it. Yet the pace of the slowest horse is the ideal which, consciously or unconsciously. State Socialism has perpetually before its eyes. The carthorse cannot gallop like the thoroughbred, so the thoroughbred must be hobbled to bring him back to the carthorse. It is claimed, of course, that State Socialism can, so to speak, raise the general average speed of the carthorse ; and so conceivably it may, but, by Dr. Pearson's own confession, not by very much. But the point is that the ideal of the State, particularly of the IV.] State Socialism. 137 democratic State, is the lowering of standards. The same influence is at work everywhere and is traceable with equal clearness in trades unions and would-be-intellectual society cliques, viz. the reduction of the standard of excellence to the shallowness of the meanest member's capacity ; the claim that the best shall fare no better than the worst ; the ostensible exaltation of all geese to be swans ; the veritable attempted degradation of all swans to be geese. Now, is it conceivable that such a system can endure? That the State wiU attempt to make it permanent I cannot doubt, for I have seen in Australasia with what desperate jealousy it will endeavour to throttle all private undertakings which it chooses to consider encroachments on its province ; nor do I think it the least unreasonable to believe that, in its efforts to enforce it, the State may be as intolerant of the right of private judgement, and as ruthless in its endeavour to suppress it, as any church. But that the system will break down in bankruptcy long before it can be pushed to the limits now assigned to it seems to me to be inevitable. For from whence are to come the funds to support it? It is useless (as has been very frequently pointed out) to indicate the millionaire with one hand and the pauper with the other, and ask whether it is right that the one should have been permitted to make his million and the other to sink to starvation. If a country wants millions it must allow those that can to make them, or it will never get them at all ; in a word, it must give the lucky men liberty to follow out their luck. If, while a man is trying to make his million, the State perpetually interferes to prevent him from making it, the million will never be made, by the State or the beggar or any one else. But this is exactly what State Socialism proposes to do, forgetting that though the State can make, and does make, beggars by the thousand, it cannot make a millionaire. Nor does it weigh in the slightest degree with the officials of State Socialism that a millionaire, when once he has made his million, as often as not hands back a large portion of it, of his own free will, to the service of the public. The making of a million is one way whereby a man can show 1 38 A Policy of Free Exchange. [iv. his superiority to other men, if in no more than the art of thriving according to the material standard of this world ; and demonstrated individual superiority is what State Socialism cannot endure. For State Socialism in practice is the embodiment of the jealousy that the unsuccessful feel towards the successful. Meanwhile, when the cloud of bankruptcy comes up over the horizon, the State (as may be observed in Australia) suddenly relaxes its hold of individuals and begs them to go to work as they will, so they do but consent to save it ; in a word. State Socialism falls back on personal liberty and private enterprise as its only hope of salva- tion. It is noticeable too that in this way, as in others, the State, so far from holding the highest place in men's minds, grows to connote something of inferiority, to become, in fact, somewhat a term of opprobrium. In the public offices of the whole world the delay which the State alone can affisrd to permit in the transaction of business is so well recognized as to enjoy its own name of ' red-tape.' But this is a small thing com- pared to certain others. In London, for instance, some of the working class prefer to pay for the education of their children in private establishments rather than suffisr them to associate with those that they meet in the State schools. So also in a New Zealand town I saw a private school, which undertook no more, nominally, than the elementary State schools, filled up immediately with children of parents for whom the State standards were not high enough. These parents, almost all of the working class, preferred to educate their children at their own expense rather than make them over to the State to be educated gratis ; and this, not from mere vulgar love of ostentation, but from honest preference for what was good though dear over what was cheap and nasty. In plain English, the State standard represented with them the lowest, and was accordingly contemptible to them. So likewise with the Civil Service. While the State lived on borrowed money the Civil Service was overgrown and overmanned. When the State came to live upon its own resources all this was changed and the service became, very naturally and justly, a byword. Thus, not only did the State earn an evil name as IV.] State Socialism. 139 an employer, but, worse still, it was badly served. Finally, we come to the crucial instance of State credit. Dr. Pearson's remarks on the superstitious trust reposed in a State guarantee are so admirable that they must not be weakened by paraphrase in these pages. It is sufficient to say that he shows with unerring force that a guarantee by the State, to merit confidence, requires as good testimonial to character as that of any other corporate guarantor. We use the phrase ' as safe as the Bank of England.' There is no corresponding Bank of Australia ; but the Government Savings Bank takes its place as the neai-est equivalent. Yet the State Savings Banks in Australia, as we have seen, are used by the Aus- tralian Governments as milch kine ; and the deposits in one case have been swept into the national debt. As to State railways and State works, enough has already been said. State balance sheets seem to be at least as dubious in some European countries, where State Socialism is in the ascendant, as in Australia itself. Latterly, State prosecutions have also fallen into disrepute, as they well might, after the Panama scandals in France, and the minor, but equally unpleasant, 'Davies' scandals in Austraha. All these things tend to bring the State into contempt, and, more, into well-deserved contempt — a dangerous and lamentable thing, even in a free community ; a fatal calamity in a country governed according to the standards of State Socialism. But, in spite of the acknowledged and unacknowledged drawbacks of State Socialism, it is likely, so Dr. Pearson warns us, to be forced upon us by circumstances, e. g. by the limits imposed on the higher races by climate, the consequent closing of present outlets for trade and energy, and the turning of every nation inward upon itself. But, admitting as we freely may, the reality and pressure of these dangers — what deliverance is to be expected from the State ? Com- pulsory military service — a people in arms. I am not one of those who lightly dismiss the advantages of compulsory military service, and condemn it as anathema; but surely efficient military service is as much dependent on national character as any other national service. Surely a people I40 A Policy of Free Exchange. [iv. which throws itself in despair into the arms of an helpless abstraction; which fears the bare idea of the worst going to the wall ; which shrinks from the laws of nature and tries to evade, instead of obeying and so subduing them — surely such a people will never win battles. Destruction of family ties (a consummation which is rapidly accomplishing itself) and decay of individual character — are these the stuff of which Conquering armies are made? It must be remembered too that highly civilized communities have generally ended by hiring mercenaries to do their fighting for them ; and the same may happen now — nay, is more than likely to happen, if the natural outlets to individual energy are closed — with the usual results. State Socialism, in seeking to lessen compe- tition, is destroying the fighting spirit. Then once more the question of money crops up — money, the sinews of war. Also there is another consideration to which we are led by Dr. Pearson's vision (amply justified by existing conditions all round us) of future increase of great cities, standing armies and national debts, viz. How are these communities, cramped within their own limits, to be fed % If the town population is for ever to increase at the expense of the country, where is the food to come from? From the inferior races outside those limits ? But they may have none to spare, or refuse to spare what they have. State Socialism delights in large towns, for it is in them that the power of the State may be most strikingly exhibited, while the sense of oppression born of confinement within streets helps to render men more docile to its teaching. In the country the State can never obtain the ascendency which it may gain in the towns ; and it is in the country accordingly that the men who love liberty and independence ai'e most likely to be found. In Australia, as we have seen, State Socialism, which for a time kept town and country alike in subjection, by pampering both at the expense of the British capitalist, has been compelled to transfer all burdens to the country. Whether the country will stand it remains to be seen; but that it will do so without a struggle to assert its political supremacy I do not believe. Thus there is every indication IV.] State Socialism. 141 that State Socialism, so far from promoting peace and con- tentment within a community, simply tends to embitter the country against the town ; and it is in the combat between the two that we may expect to see it fall, both in Australia and elsewhere. For though we have few clues as to the issue of such strife, we have at least one, and that of no ordinary significance, viz. that life in large towns means physical degeneration. In England the country has now lain for some years under the heel of the towns ; but the towns must decline with the decline of foreign trade, which townsmen in their wisdom are doing their best to accelerate. When the ' boom ' on which the English towns grew and throve for half a century has been finally broken down (the process of destruction is still going on) — ^then, perhaps, we may expect the English State to remember that' there are country districts and country interests even in England. Whether the country districts will feel as kindly towards the State, and help her in her hour of need, is another question. Altogether, we are forced to accept Dr. Pearson's conclusion, which is (if I understand it aright) that State Socialism is the death-cry of our civilization. It is only reasonable to assume that our civilization will perish just as other civilizations have perished before it — for it seems to be incontestable that the lower races tend to outbreed the higher, just as curs outbreed pure foxhounds. The tendency of the moment (and it may be of more than the moment) is to abandon all efi'ort and to yield place to the inferior races, provided they will but let us alone to enjoy our State Socialistic dreams. Ireland, it is said, stops the way — is the bar to all English legislation. In that case — long may she stop the way, and keep us from the most ignoble form of national suicide ! J. W. FORTESCUE. V. THE INFLUENCE OF STATE BOMB OWING ON COMMEBCIAL CBISES. WYNNARD HOOPER. THE INFLUENCE OF STATE BORROWING ON COMMERCIAL CRISES. Commercial crises are primarily the consequence of the imprudence of bankers, merchants, financiers and other members of the business classes, and also of the credulity of the general public. Crises vary very much in the details of the phenomena composing them, but they all possess certain well-marked characteristics which it is necessary to describe with some miauteness, as otherwise it would not be possible to indicate the important part which the action of governments in regard to finance and commerce have had on the crises of recent years. A commercial crisis is a state of things resulting from a period of inflation and over-speculation; its characteristics are usually a breakdown, for a short time, of the ordinary machinery of credit, followed by a period of inactivity. The violence and extent of the collapse is proportionate to the strain that has been put upon credit by the previous inflation. For inflation of prices is the concrete expression of over- production and over-speculation, and over-speculation is only possible when a great many people have trusted others too much and have been trusted too much themselves. Sooner or later the more cautious lenders begin to get anxious about the money they have lent and restrict the accommodation they aflbrd to borrowers, who are then obliged to try and obtain what they need from less careful, or worse informed people. The latter, in their turn, eventually become uneasy, and as they are a large class, the bulk, indeed, of the business L 146 A Policy of Free Exchange. [v. community, their newly acquired fear of continuing loans soon produces a considerable effect on the money market, necessitates sales of stock and commodities, and causes failures. When once the process we have briefly described has com- menced its effects are felt even by manufacturers and traders who have not operated beyond the extent which in ordinary times their means justify. The paralysis of credit eventually becomes acute, and even the most careful and wealthiest people have to be content to abstain from all but the most necessary transactions in which no risk is involved, until by sales of securities and commodities the embarrassed portion of the business world has either paid what it owes or made a com- position with its creditors. After a certain lapse of time an approximately ' clean slate ' is shown, creditors having taken what they can get and written off the balance of what is due to them from their books as a ' bad debt.' Of course the condition of affairs is never in practice so simple as this. There are no men who are creditors, or debtors, pure and simple ; but there are always men who are, on balance, creditors, that is, have more owing to them than they owe. That is, or ought to be, the position of the bulk of the community, with one important exception, the bankers, A banker is a person who is at all times a debtor, on balance. He owes a great deal more than he could pay if all the people whose money is left with him asked for it at once. But he is in no danger whatever on that account provided he has ob- served what are known as the rules of sound banking. The normal condition of a careful trader is to be a creditor, on balance, but he can only be in this position if some one else is always a debtor, on balance ; and this latter function is fulfilled by the banker. The safety of a banker depends partly on the character of the liabilities he has assumed, but even more on due proportion being kept between the various classes of those liabilities, and above all on his preserving a proper amount of actual cash constantly in hand, or, under the London system, in the Bank of England. What the ' proper ' amount may be each banker must judge for himself, but it is necessary to v.] Influence of State Borrowing. 147 observe that even a proportion of cash which would rightly be considered large in ordinary times may be insufficient in times of general discredit, when the banker, the universal debtor, is called upon to pay an unusual amount on demand. What he can keep in cash is a small portion, at the best, of what he owes, for cash kept as a reserve, ex Jiypothesi, earns no interest, and as bankers have to pay interest on most of the money left with them, they have to use the bulk of it profitably or become bankrupt. The universal debtor, therefore, must be very careful to whom he lends and even more careful how he lends it. If a banker lends more than a small portion of his resources to even the most wealthy of his customers for a long period, he is courting danger. In technical language he has allowed his money to be ' locked up.' It avails him nought to be able to say, ' So and So is a good man, the interest is fair, and the loan is secure of repayment when it is due.' The banker can be made to pay large sums on demand under pain of commercial death, and his demand creditors will not be put off by being informed of the promise of Messrs. So and So to repay him, for they want cash at once, and must have it, under pain, perhaps, of commercial death them- selves. Bankers, therefore, cannot hold a large proportion of long dated securities, no matter how good they may be, unless these securities are what is called marketable, that is, are freely dealt in at all times on the Stock Exchange. Now, the number of such securities is not great, for though under normal conditions readily marketable securities of good quality are fairly numerous, they become few during periods of commercial distrust. In the extreme case of a panic they are, to aU intents and purposes, reduced to one, namely. Consols. The rest of the ' readily marketable ' class can, indeed, sometimes be sold at such times, but only at a ruinous fall in their price. Consols on the other hand can be sold at a moderate decline, or bor- rowed on, even in a panic, and this is why bankers always keep a considerable quantity of Consols in spite of the low rate of interest they yield. If all merchants were careful to remain, on balance, creditors and took care to give credit only to people who could eventually L 3 148 A Policy of Free Exchange. [v, pay, and if all bankers invariably kept tbe money lent them in proper proportions of cash, short loans, bills and marketable securities, there would never be a commercial crisis, though owing to failures of crops, wars and revolutions, and unavoid- able accidents which can only be partly covered by policies of insurance, there would still be occasional times of compara- tively dear money. But merchants, bankers, and the general public, are human beings, and are consequently liable to be led from the path of safety, from time to time, by the delusive hope of abnormally large gains. The desires of even the humblest man or woman may be said to be infinite relatively to his or her resources for gratifying them, and though most people learn at an early age that their desires can only be fulfilled to a strictly limited extent, and only by constant hard work, and though, as a rule, they also learn to act on the knowledge they have acquired, the desires never wholly become extinct, and occasionally play strange pranks with the mental eqmlibrium of usually staid and grave persons. This is the secret of the never-failing attraction of lotteries, and of the periodic out- bursts of insane speculation in Stock Exchange securities. The class of people who live by promoting and dealing in loans and public companies have an enormous mass of latent cupidity to work upon, and from time to time this cupidity becomes ungovernable and leads large masses of people to do things which they would not, in their normal state, have dreamed of doing, and which they bitterly regret having done for the rest of their lives. It must not be assumed that the people who promote and deal in loans and other securities of a speculative character are intentional cheats. If they were they would not be as dangerous as they are. In nineteen cases out of twenty they too are misled by their desires into greatly exaggerating the profits which can be derived from theu* undertakings. It is true they are usually better informed as to the risks run than they allow the public to be, but they underrate the risks, even to themselves, when under the influence of Desire the mother of Hope. That this is so is plain from history, for there have been occasions when the public even v.] Influence of State Borrowing. 149 when ' on the feed,' to use an expressive phrase sometimes heard on the Stock Exchange, have shrunk back in fear from some palpably dangerous undertaking which its promoters have nevei-theless persisted in going on with, having rashly- committed themselves to it. A striking example of this infatuation was afforded by the issue of the Buenos Ayres Drainage and Waterworks in 1888, which was conducted by Messrs. Baring Brothers, and was one of the principal causes of the destruction of that famous firm two years later. Messrs. Baring, who like most other great finance houses were ' regis- tered as bankers,' had allowed themselves, under the guidance of their senior partner, to drift into the position of bankers in fact as well as in name, without at the same time taking the precautions which a banking business demands. Instead of being, on balance, creditors they gradually allowed their necessarily very large liabilities to assume enormous dimensions, by entering into engagements, chiefl}^ in Argentina, which they could only fulfil if everything, political as well as financial, went smoothly in that country. They had undertaken to find five millions of money within a short time and another five millions subsequently for the Buenos Ayres Drainage and Waterworks, thinking that the public would gladly relieve them of a large part of the shares bj' which this liability was represented. But the public was scared at the magnitude of the scheme, which fairly staggered the wiser heads among them, who began to feel uneasy about other investments which they had acquired from a firm which showed so strange a want of prudence on such a huge scale. There is nothing to show that Messrs. Baring felt any misgiving at that time as to their own safety, to say nothing of other people's, for when, after the col- lapse of the Comptoir d'Escompte of Paris in the spring of 1889, the Russian Government asked Messrs. Baring to take over a deposit account they had kept with that institution, Messrs. Baling did so with alacrity, thus placing themselves under a fresh liability of a very dangerous kind. It also lent the Argentine Government money, on security, of course ; but though faii-ly good as an investment, the security was not of a kind that could be readily converted into cash in time of 1 50 A Policy of Free Exchange. [v. financial pressure, and was, as a matter of fact, quite unsale- able for some time after Messrs. Baring's collapse, though it was at length disposed of. The mistakes of Messrs. Baring have been dwelt on because they afforded the biggest example that was ever seen of the peculiar kind of madness which comes over the public gene- rally at times. The breakdown of Overends in 1866 was equally striking, but it did not occur in the same way. Overends were broken because, being from the nature of their business, debtors, on balance, at any given moment, they lent the money under their control foolishly, so that they could not get enough of it back immediately when they required cash to meet payments due on demand. Barings, who ought never to have been debtors, on balance, at all, slipped into the position of being so without intending it. Now, small capital- ists and manufacturers, who also ought not to be in debt, are from time to time seized with a species of madness, and commit themselves to liabilities which they cannot meet, thinking that they will never have to meet them, that ' it is a mere form,' or that their speculations, whether in stocks or commodities, wiU have turned out well by the time they have to pay calls or take up securities they have 'underwritten,' or to pay for materials consumed. They do this under the influence of various delusions, such as belief in the infallibility of great finance houses, in the indefinitely great riches and prosperity of foreign countries, and in the ability of foreign governments to construct an unending series of ' productive public works,' or works which, though not directly productive, are supposed to add to the ' efficiency of production.' The general public, which does not underwrite new loans or intentionally specu- late, buys with its savings securities which it fondly believes to be good investments, and thus frequently becomes com- mitted to speculations of a more or less uncertain character. The end of all this is weeping and gnashing of teeth, furious denunciation of the great finance houses, for it is on them that the ' investing public ' relies, and equally furious denunciation of foreign governments, ending with rueful acceptance of the fact that a good deal of capital has been lost and a solemn v.] Influence of State Borrowing. 151 determination to gather up the wreckage and be content with ' a safe Three Per Cent.' in future. The manufacturer who has risked his capital in a struggle for a new market, and has lost it owing to the general breakdown of credit, suffers in the same way. Many have gone through this experience during the last three years, owing to events in South America, Australia, Portugal, and elsewhere, and until sounder ideas are held as to what a government can wisely do in the direction of ' developing the resources ' of a country, similar experiences win probably be the lot of many more unwary persons. Mistaken speculation there will always be. Railways, steamships, waterworks, gasworks, breweries, mines, and indus- trial undertakings generally, do not always yield the profits expected of them, and sometimes give no profit at all. These unsuccessful companies, however, are a small minority, as an inspection of that marvellous embodiment of the financial and industrial energy of this country, the Official List of the London Stock Exchange, shows. But during the last ten years there has been a steady increase in the number of loans to govern- ments and public bodies, which depend for their revenue in the main upon taxation, frequently excessive taxation relatively to the normal income of the people, which is a more precarious security for the payment of interest than the receipts of a well- planned railway carried out entirely by private enterprise. But governments not only raise loans, the proceeds of which may or may not be used for constructing public works ; they also frequently give what are called ' guarantees ' to railways, and sometimes to industrial undertakings, by which they undertake to pay an annual subsidy to the companies concerned. When carefully thought out and properly limited, arrangements of this kind may be beneficial. The Government aid given to the early Indian railways was wisely given, but in other countries the principle of granting guarantees has been much abused. In Argentina it was abused to such an extent that payment of the sums promised became impossible, even supposing the revenue of the State had not been unduly pledged in other ways. The world is at present sufiering almost everywhere from 152 A Policy of Free Exchange. [v. excessive government interference with industry and com- merce. It has always suffered in this way, sometimes to a formidable extent, and probably always will in some degree, owing to the exigencies of political parties. As this is not an essay on politics, the ways in which the working of the party system tends in all countries to the establishment of bad financial and economic arrangements intended to place patronage in the hands of party managers can only be touched on incidentally. Politicians will always find suitable excuses for any line of action they may wish to take, and their line of action in regard to finance and commerce is almost always the same, namely, an extension of the sphere of State Action, on pleas which vary much at different times and places. The course of events in the United Kingdom after the great war must be considered as an episode. Owing to a series of for- tunate accidents this country got rid, during the fifty years ending with 1870, of an enormous mass of mischievous laws tending to restrict trade and enable the State to control it. We are still enjoying some of the benefit of the supremacy of the philosophic theories which dominated politics during those years, but for some time past legislation has shown a tendency to resume its normal direction, the sphere of State control being extended in several directions. Laisser /aire is no longer the economic maxim of either of the great parties of the United Kingdom. On the contrary, both of them have of late made tentative advances towards socialism, and seem likely to move still further in the same direction. So far, however, these advances have not taken the form of open encroachment by the State on the sphere of private enter- prise ; but if the outcry for the management of railways and other public works by the State becomes sufficiently powerful to make it worth attending to, the politicians will not be long in finding pretexts for accepting that policy. Ah-eady some progress has been made in this direction in the sphere of Local Government, gasworks, waterworks, and tramways having in many cases become the property of municipalities. Local bodies, however, provided they are controlled by the ratepayers of the area they administer, are less unfitted than v.] Influence of State Borrowing. 153 the national government to manage undertakings of this kind, though even in their case abuses of patronage and other forms of corruption are sure to become prevalent sooner or later. We must look abroad, to our own colonies and to foreign countries, for full-blown examples of administrative control of public works, and of interference with trade gene- rally. In Australia practically all the railways are owned by the State, with very unsatisfactory results from a financial view alone, and almost equally bad consequences politically. In all the Australasian colonies there are strong parties in favour of extending the principle of State ownership still further, but recent events have checked their influence for the time. We are not now concerned, however, with the mode in which the extension of State ownership of public works and the general spread of socialistic theories affect the finances and political stability of countries, but with the effect of these tendencies on the markets for money, securities and com- modities, throughout the world, more particularly in London, the centre through which a large proportion of the world's transactions are 'cleared,' and where considerable quantities of money are lent to states, municipal and other semi-public corporations, and joint-stock companies. The means whereby these various bodies obtain money to carry out their objects are the issues of loans, bonds and shares, or stock. The issues of governments or municipalities are made through finance houses, but the larger public companies sometimes do the work themselves, or employ a bank merely to receive subscriptions. An issue backed by a house of good repute is sure of success in ordinary times, for * good repute ' means that the firm in question is believed to look carefully into any issue they allow their name to be connected with. Sometimes this belief turns out to have been mistaken, and the repute of the firm becomes less ' good ' in consequence. We will suppose that a foreign or colonial government raises a loan in London to provide for some ' productive public work.' Either it has already begun the process of construction, borrow- ing the money from a bank or finance house in order to pay the 154 -^ Policy of Free Exchange. [v. contractor such portion of the contract money as becomes due to him from time to time, or it commences operations after raising the loan. In the former case orders for materials have already been placed by the contractor, or whoever is in charge of the work. In the latter they are still to be placed. Either way, the effect of the government's use of its credit is to create a demand for certain commodities. If the government has entered on an extensive scheme of railway-making, which will require many thousands of tons of rails, chairs, fishing plates, &c., as well as girders and other ' heavy structural ironwork ' for bridges and stations, there is a considerable addition to the pre- viously existing demand for all these commodities. If several governments are committed to large operations of this kind at the same time, which is not unlikely to be the case, a perceptible rise in the prices of such commodities is probable, the makers of the articles wanted will extend their works, and new men will put capital into the iron and steel trade, probably raising wages by doing so. So long as the works undertaken by the various governments go on uninterruptedly, the iron and steel trade is prosperous ; but eventually one of two things happens — either the works contemplated are all completed and the governments cease for a while from stimulating the iron market or, which is only too likely in the case of the govern- ments of the rash and impulsive peoples of young countries, they find they have undertaken too much, and that they cannot meet the interest on what they have borrowed. Some- times their creditors come to the same conclusion before the actual breakdown arrives, and refuse to lend them any more. In either case there are no more orders for rails, gix'ders, &c., from this source, and the makers of these articles suffer severely in consequence. When a trade has been stimulated by two or three years of extra demand, which looks as if it would last for as many years more, it is a serious thing when the demand suddenly stops. And the demand artificially created by the government of a young country whose people are full of extravagant ideas of what it needs, and still more extravagant notions of what is necessary to its future develop- ment, is liable to stop with great suddenness. The Argentine v.] Influence of State Borrowing. 155 RepubKe was kept well supplied with money up to 1 890 by the issue of national and provincial loans for all sorts of purposes, in addition to the considerable sums raised by com- panies. In that year, although the country's credit was distinctly on the wane, it imported 274,000 tons of iron and steel rails. In the following year, after the complete collapse of Argentine credit, these imports only amounted to 88,000 tons, and in 1893 they were barely 13,000 tons. This enor- mous falling off in the purchases of rails was only typical of what took place in regard to all our exports to Argentina after the great collapse of 1890, the total of these exports falling from £8,416,000 in that year to £4,241,000 in 1891, and a similar reduction took place in the exports to most countries which depend for the capital required to develop them on the issue of loans here. Now, it is quite natural that new countries should be indebted to this country for the means of developing their natural resources. Simply stated, and ignoring for the moment the financial and commercial machinery by which the end is accomplished. Great Britain hands over to her Colonies and to foreign countries a certain amount of plant, machinery and materials every year, and takes in return a percentage of the profits they yield. That is the transaction in its essence, though it is obscured somewhat by the form it takes in practice. The question that arises is, Are there not seiious drawbacks to the carrying out of this useful and, indeed, necessary transfer through the medium of extensive loans contracted by governments ? There unquestionably are. First, public works carried out by governments are some- times badly done, and are always extravagantly done. Secondly, the power of raising money for productive public works is sure to be employed sooner or later for non-pro- ductive works whose usefulness can be plausibly maintained. Thirdly, the public never troubles its head, when it is ' in a buying mood,' about works of any kind, but insists on regarding the loans as the obligations of a ' rich and progressive young country,' New Gerolstein, let us say, vouched for by that ' eminent house ' X, Y, Z & Co. There is not much, therefore, 156 A Policy of Free Exchange. [v. to prevent the Government of New Gerolstein, with the aid of Messrs. X, Y, Z & Co., raising loans for any purpose it may think fit, including the reimbursement of Messrs. X for advances previously made, perhaps to provide interest on loans for ' productive public works ' which have, quite unac- countably of course, failed to yield profits. To sum up, the process of equipping a new country with the appliances of a modern commercial and industrial community by lending largely to its government, involves waste of money and bad work from the commencement, and bad and, very possibly, corrupt finance eventually. It is almost an infallible way of producing a breakdown of the credit of the country con- cerned, unless it is conducted with more prudence on all sides than can reasonably be expected of human nature. And, as has been shown, the consequences of the breakdown in the credit of a country which has been a large customer for commodities is a sudden stoppage of demand for them, and a violent fall in their price, followed, of course, by forced restriction of production, loss of capital, eventual reduction of wages, and all that results therefrom. It may be said that in a new country the only way in which development is possible is through the credit of the government ; or, if the absurdity of this contention is demon- strated, it will certainly be alleged that the development will be ' too slow for the modem spirit ' unless government loans are raised. As we have shown, however, more haste may be worse speed in this matter. Rapid development attained in this manner is often over-development, involving either a heavy burden to be borne by the taxpayer (or by one set of tax- payers for the benefit of another) or an injury to the State's credit, and possibly actual default. Moreover, talk of this kind about the requirements of ' the modern spirit ' is not sincere, being merely part of the stock-in-trade of corrupt politicians and officials leagued with contractors and financiers in want of a job, in both senses of the word. There is not the slightest fear of a country which is really worth developing not being developed quite as fast as is good for it by private enterprise, provided it affords reasonable security for life and property. v.] Influence of State Borrowing. 157 Of course private enterprise, conducted by independent com- panies, is not likely to make railways merely to help the election of supporters of the government — a motive for railway construction not wholly unknown either in our Colonies or in foreign countries. But all really useful lines or other works are sure of support in London, except in times when a series of commercial and financial collapses has temporarily de- stroyed confidence, as has been the case for the last three years. There is one argument, however, against leaving the making of public works, such as railways, to private enterprise which is advanced frequently in perfect good faith and deserves consideration from the economist. It is the well-known socialistic plea that governments ought, as a matter of prin- ciple, to possess control of all instruments of production, and consequently of the means of communication which subserve production. To combat this notion, however, which is based on a profoundly mistaken view of the functions of government, would open up a discussion of greater extent than is con- templated in this essay, in which it is merely intended to show that the construction of pubhc works by means of State loans necessarily aggravates commercial crises. If young countries insist upon disregarding the experience of past ages, and imagine that because they are new they require new principles for their guidance, they will probably involve themselves in considerable trouble, but they will be useful to the rest of the world as ' object lessons,' to use the slang of the New Journalism. The United States, a young and vigorous, but overweening community, has lately performed a series of most interesting experiments on itself — first, by deliberately adopting Protection in its most extreme form; and, second, by converting its Treasury into a Pig Silver Warrant Store, in the mistaken hope of keeping silver at the old American ratio to gold of sixteen to one. Although it is easy to extract amusement from the spectacle thus afforded, the results of this latter freak on the part of our lively cousins are by no means wholly comical, or entirely confined to their afiairs ; and everybody is heartily glad that this attempt to perform the impossible has been abandoned, for it had caused 158 A Policy of Free Exchange. [v. temporary paralysis in most of the great markets of the world by disturbing confidence in American securities. The commercial and financial relations between countries are now so close that no country can arouse distrust in its own ability to fulfil its obligations without causing general uneasiness. The principal creditors of the world are capital- ists in Great Britain, and if one of the debtor countries gets into difficulties of any kind the capitalists become not only less able to lend money elsewhere, but, for the time, less willing to do so. This is why the breakdown in Argentina produced such serious efliects, even in quarters quite uncon- nected with that country. After the great collapse of November, 1890, there was hardly a country which depends on the London Money Market for aid in developing its re- sources which did not find its supplies of capital curtailed. All second-rate investments are liable to risks, which are, more or less, recognized by those who engage in them ; but, as a rule, the perception of these risks is dormant. Where, however, some one of this class of investments, to which the securities of most new countries belong, ceases to yield interest the whole class becomes temporarily discredited, because it is impossible for even the dullest not to perceive that what has happened in one case may happen in others. All the weak points of securities of this class are suddenly brought home to those who have been in the habit of holding them, and, for a time at any rate, are probably as much exaggerated as they had previously been underrated. As we have shown, government borrowings are much more likely to lead a country into financial trouble than the borrowings of companies conducted by private enterprise — first, because the governments are pretty sure to obtain more money than they can productively employ (which is not so much the case with companies) ; and, secondly, because even what they employ productively would have gone further in the same direction if managed by companies controlled by private individuals. Moreover, if a private enterprise is found to be hopelessly unremunerative, the company carrying it on wiU, indeed must, go into liquidation, while a government which can draw V.J Influence of State Borrowing. 159 on the revenue of its subjects by taxation, is very likely to go on throwing good money after bad, long after an undertaking it has committed itself to is proved a failure. The facilities for borrowing enjoyed by governments have been too great for many years past. There is something dangerously seductive both to lender and borrower in the power possessed by governments of mortgaging the future revenue of the countries they administer. The government of a new country is especially prone to take a sanguine view of its prospects ; the people are at least equally certain of their capacity to provide the interest required ; the finance houses, which stand as sponsors for the loans, may be credited with a belief that at any rate their particular issues are safe, and the public here too often blindly follow the finance houses. In the majority of cases all the parties concerned are actuated by perfect good faith, and the evils which follow from excessive issues are the results of being oversanguine, and sometimes, as regards the finance houses, of neglect to look sufficiently carefully into all matters connected with such issues, especially the amounts of those already in existence. Now, this too ready belief on the part of the borrower in his future ability to pay, and the tendency on the part of issuing houses to shirk examining carefully the troublesome details of a loan operation, are examples of ordinary failings of human nature, which must be reckoned with at all times. They are constant elements in the situation, and their efiects are certain to make their appearance sooner or later in cases where governments habitually raise loans outside their own country. Of course it is true that any country may without danger have a small foreign debt; but the interpretation of the word small must be strict — that is, the debt incurred must be compared with the right quantities, and not with quanti- ties whose relative dimensions have no real bearing on the question at issue. Occasionally, it is to be regretted, figures are introduced into prospectuses of loans which suggest quite irrelevant comparisons, of course tending to show that the proposed issue is 'small' and the resources available for 1 60 A Policy of Free Exchange. [v. meeting it 'greatj whereas comparison with the proper quan- tities would have brought out a very different result. These are matters in which finance houses allow themselves to be ' caught napping ' more often than is good for their reputations or for the pockets of those who place confidence in their judgement. But it is necessary to emphasize the fact that the investing public, in demanding infallibility from finance houses, as they practically do, are asking for too much. Every investor will admit this obvious truth individually, and yet readily forms one of a drove of similar persons who coUec- tively act as if Messrs. X, Y, Z & Co. were both omniscient and exempt from all human failings, whether moral or mental. Is it surprising under these conditions that the said public sometimes finds that its money is lost, in whole or in part ? If all finance houses had taken as much trouble as they ought, the number of foreign government loans would be about half what it is ; but the same result would have been attained if the public had not foolishly accepted the belief that the promise of a government is always a good guarantee for payment The economic objections to the principle of allowing govern- ments to raise big loans abroad for public works are equally strong as regards similar loans made at home. It is inter- esting to observe, however, that, except in the case of naval and military expenditure, where it can be defended on other than economic grounds, few countries ever attempt to raise money for public works except abroad. In most countries there is none to be got ; and in those where it has been tried the plan has by no means proved to be a success economically. Even in France it broke down. The gigantic railway scheme elaborated by M. de Freycinet in 1879 could not be carried out, the State having, some years later, to beg the great railway companies to take over the lines it had partly constructed and was unable to complete, and to transfer to them most of the remainder of the mileage originally intended to be built as part of the addition to the r^seau d'Mat. Whether the possession of the Prussian railway system by the State will eventually turn out well remains to be seen ; but v.] Influence of State Borrowing. i6i it can be plausibly justified by considerations connected with the military safety of the country. It is doubtful if the Belgian railways are as efficient as they would have been if made by private enterprise. The acquisition of the telegraph system of the United Kingdom by the State is defended, even by those who are no friends to State Socialism, as a necessary corollary of the administration of the Post Office by a Govern- ment department. It can also be justified, with some plausi- bility, on political-military grounds. But, although it has long been an accomplished fact, and must be tolerated, it is economically bad — first, because the actual service rendered is less good than would have been furnished by private enterprise; and, secondly, because the ordinary defects of a bureaucracy, namely, morbid hostility to change and dislike of criticism, are formidable obstacles to the adoption of im- proved methods in a business which depends largely on adequate recognition of the progress of science. The delay in the extension of the telephone system in this country was entirely due to the fact that the Telegraphs are managed by one of the Eevenue departments of the United Kingdom, and that the Treasury is an octopus, which insists that there shall be surplus revenues for it to throw its tentacles around — in the interest of economy, no doubt, but in disregard of efficiency. In conclusion, the opinion of the present writer is that, to employ a well-known formula, the sphere of action of governments in matters affecting trade and commerce 'has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished.' The more strongly the current of general opinion, which necessarily means ill-instructed opinion, runs in favour of more govern- ment interference, the stronger should be the efforts of those who see the evils it prodiices to make them plain. And if we cannot easily begin ' at home ' in this case, it is comparatively easy to begin abroad. For the evil results of entrusting large amounts of money to foreign governments, ostensibly for the construction of productive works, can be made patent to every one. Wynnaed Hoopek. M VI. THE STATE IN RELATION TO RAILWAYS. W. M. ACWORTH. M 2 VI. THE STATE IN RELATION TO RAILWAYS. The writers of this volume I understand to be in agreement on this main principle — that individual initiative, or where that is from the nature of the case impossible, the initiative of bodies spontaneously organized on a voluntary basis to meet each new necessity of civilization as it arises, is, unless in exceptional circumstances, and then for due cause shown, to be preferred to State management. It falls to me to apply this general principle to the particular case of railways. The relation of the State to the railways in any given country may take one of five forms. (i) The State may both own and work. (2) It may own and not work, but lease. (3) It may work without owning. (4) It may neither own nor work, but merelj^ control, (5) It may let the railways alone altogether. Of these various forms No. 3, working without ownership, practically only arises in countries where the State, already owning and working some lines, agrees for convenience' sake to work certain other lines which it does not care to purchase. No. 5, which may be described as laisser faire pure and simple, has practically never existed except in the United States ; even there it is now obsolete. In fact, a state of things in which a stockbroker and two of his clerks could register themselves as a company desiring to build a line from New York to Buffalo, and thereupon ipso facto obtain powers to take compulsory possession of any house that might happen to be in the way in the course of a 400 miles 1 66 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vi. progress across country, with further powers, if and when they opened the line, to run what trains they pleased, over bridges as shaky as they might see fit to build, charging such rates and fares as they thought proper — such a state of affairs could evidently only exist in a new and unsettled country where the great object was to get railroads — proper railroads, and in a proper manner if possible, but by all means to get railroads. The second alternative, that the State should own the railways and lease them to operating companies, is out of fashion at the present time in this country, not being a sufficiently root and branch reform for our modern State Socialists. But it enjoyed at one time considerable popularity, and was, indeed, recommended by no less a person than Sir Eowland Hill in his minority report as a member of the Eoyal Commission of 1865. Moreover, it was the principle adopted after the most exhaustive inquiry by the Italian Government as recently as the year 1885. Still more recently the same policy has been systematized in Holland. Indeed, it might be said to be the French policy also, for French law regards the soil on which the French lines are laid as part of the public domain, and the railway companies as only the occupants on a terminable lease. And France is a type of not a few other continental countries. But we need not concern ourselves with the political problems of our neigh- bours ; we have quite enough to do to solve our own ; and may therefore pass by the question of the State owning and leasing. There remain therefore for consideration but two possible methods; and for us the alternative is between Government railways pure and simple, such as those of Prussia or Victoria, and railways as we have them now, owned and worked by private companies and subject to a State control of more or less stringency. We have, therefore, in the first place to consider the arguments for and against Government railways ; and if these lead us, as I think they will, to conclude against them, to go on further and discuss the principles on which State control of private lines should be based, the end at which it should aim, and, in broad outline VI.] The State in relation to Railways. 167 of course and not in detail, the methods which it should adopt. It is impossible within the strict limits of an essay such as this to do more than touch the fringe of the subject of State ownership. A very recent writer has indeed published a tolerably bulky book on the subject, and yet found no space in it to come to the actual point at all ^. An adequate treatment of the question would evidently imply, in the first place, an exhaustive consideration of the proper functions of the Executive Government as a general principle, and of such modifications of that principle as the varied forms of the Government (despotic, aristocratic or democratic, as the case might be), and the diiFerent genius and quality of the nation concerned might seem naturally to suggest. Secondly, it would imply an equally exhaustive consideration of the nature of railways and railway transportation. Such questions as, for instance, whether railways should compete with or only supplement water carriage ; whether the cost of the railroad itself, as distinguished from the expenses of carriage along it, should be charged against the individual users as on the old turnpikes, or paid for out of general taxation, as being public necessities like any other highways ; whether rates and fares ought to be fixed on what may be called the postal principle, ignoring distance altogether, or on the opposite principle of charging so much for each mile travelled, or again, on the merely commercial principle of ' charging what the traffic will bear ' — in other words, endeavouring to lay on the consumer of each kind of railway service the least possible burden consistent with the raising from the traffic as a whole the revenue necessary to pay working expenses and interest on capital — questions such as these must evidently be faced and solved at the outset, for on the solution arrived at will largely depend whether we finally decide for State or private owner- ship of railways. Nor could any treatise on this subject be complete which failed to supplement these two heads of more or less abstract inquiry by a history tracing the experience of the civilized ' Haiiimal Bailioays, by James Hole. London : Cassell & Co., 1893. 1 68 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vi. world in the last half-century, showing the progress of railway development in the different countries, and indi- cating which of the failures of the one or of the successes of the other might fairly be ascribed to the management of that system by the State or private enterprise, as the case might be. To write such a book would be the work of a lifetime, and when written its author would probably be the only person to feel bound by its conclusions. For the facts under each of the suggested heads of inquiry are so multifarious and so obscure that no writer, however capable and con- scientious, could ever count on getting them all in front of him, still less on appraising each of them at its precise value. We must be satisfied here with presenting the outline of the abstract arguments upon the question, and sketching in as few words as possible the history of State-owned lines in other countries. It is equally impossible to deal here with the general question of State Socialism. The delegates, for instance, who at the Trade Union Congress of 1893 voted, after five minutes' dis- cussion, for the nationalization of all the means of production at one gulp, will evidently not be deterred by a mere mouthful such as the thousand millions of capital represented by our English railway system. We must confine ourselves here to arguments that apply to railways more particularly. Now there is no reason to praise the existing system too highly. It gives us unquestionably in some instances what it is common to describe as the waste of competition. That waste, how- ever, is by no means so large as is believed by the public unfamiliar with practical railway accounts. To take the stock instance of the London and Dover expresses. Whenever either of the competing trains is canying as many as four first class passengers — and it is difficult to believe that they often run with less — it is earning a not profit. Further, we cannot ignore the question whether two simultaneous trains, both run under the stimulus of competition, may not carry twice as many passengers as one train run without this stimulus. If X be the gross revenue and Fthe cost of earning it, 3Z — 3 Fis greater than X—Y, whatever values be assigned VI.] The State in relation to Railways. 169 to X and Y, Still we must acknowledge after all that the waste of competition has a real existence. Another argument is to the effect that commercial companies may, in spite of extravagance of management, earn bloated dividends by what is practically a tax upon trade. This too no doubt is theoretically true. I can, however, recall but one instance— that of the Taff Vale Company — in modern English railway history ; and here commercial competition has already done its work, and the BaiTy Company has taught its elder rival to modernize both the rates and the methods of working. Then, again, it may fairly be said that the natural tendency of a company bound to return to its shareholders twice a yeai* a dividend at least not less than that for the preceding half- year, is to fight shy of bold and radical concessions. For instance, it is quite arguable that third class fares at a half- penny a mile might in the long run pay the company ; undoubtedly they would be an enormous benefit to the community ; but no railway company dare try such an experi- ment. Again, the objection is not without weight. Once more, however, it is more theoretical than practical ; for, in fact, experience shows that State railways do not venture the reductions which theoretically they might be expected to make. Far and away the most sweeping reduc- tions the world has seen have been those made by the highly competitive railways of the United States. The latest exploit of the commissioners of the State railways in Victoria is a proposal for the universal increase of the rate of charge. Similarly, the tendency of a State railway system ought to be in the direction of regarding the general good, and giving the blessings of adequate communication to all the parts of the country alike. Commercially-minded companies, on the other hand, must surely hesitate to extend their systems into poor and profitless districts ; content with the splendid profits of the main trunk lines, they will naturally — so one would reason a priori — decline to water their dividends by investing capital in new lines which can never pay more than a very moderate rate of interest. Again, the facts are the other way. That England led the world in railway extension sixty years 1 70 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vi. back is notorious ; that the Cape and Australia lag behind even Argentina, much more behind the Western States of America at this moment, is equally obvious now. Once again. Commercial companies will act from commer- cial considerations, and every merchant knows that the bigger the buyer the larger discount he will demand as his right. Translated into railway language this means the concession of cheap special rates for wholesale traffic between great centres, and the maintenance of a high standard of charge for the transaction of the general retail business of the country. Of course, the natural tendency of this is to make the great greater, and thereby the small smaller. And it is a common and, I think, a reasonable belief, that this tendency, if not indeed wholly mischievous, is at least of questionable advan- tage to the community. But once more it may, I think, be answered that the tendency is too strong to be resisted by any Government department. The Prussian State makes special rates just as freely as the North- Western Eailway ; the English War Office and Admiralty do not venture to place on their list of contractors the names of any except the leading and most powerful firms in their respective branches of industry. Moreover, whether the preference of one trade or trader, of one town or district over another, be justifiable or unjustifiable — be or be not, to adopt the legal phraseology, an undue and unreasonable preference — is a matter involving careful and detailed consideration of all the circumstances of the indi- vidual case. As such it is eminently suitable for judicial decision. Now a court of justice can much more easily curb the action of a private corporation, however powerful, than it can that of a department of the Executive Government with a majority of the House of Commons behind it. One more objection, and perhaps the most serious, has been kept to the last. Where a body of shareholders are so blind to their own interests as to leave the management of their railway in the hands of an incompetent and effete body of directors and officials, the public lacks definite and posi- tively legal right of interference to prevent the service of the line becoming quite disgracefully bad. It is, I think, VI.] The State in relation to Railways. 1 7 1 undeniable that such cases have occurred and do still occur in England ; and, further, that a Government department would not dare to treat any large section of the electorate with neglect as gross as that from which some parts of the country suffer at the present moment. But, after all, we must regard the interest of the country as a whole rather than any indi- vidual section of it. It would need a great deal of levelling up in services which only concern, perhaps, 5 per cent, of the community to counterbalance even a small amount of levelling down in the services given to the remaining 95 per cent. And experience goes, I believe, to show that the tendency of State management is towards uniformity indeed, but towards uni- formity on a lower level than the average of private manage- ment. There is another point : ' The price of liberty is eternal vigilance ! ' and if the inhabitants of A, B and C — there is no need to mention names, they will rise instinctively before the mind of every reader — are suffering — and some of them do suffer grievously — from the badness of their railway service in this free country, where, after all, public opinion is in the long run supreme and irresistible, they have mainly their own supineness to thank for it. I have endeavoured to sketch the objections commonly made to private railway management, and to outline the answer which can be given to each. Let us now see, in the same general fashion, what are the main arguments advanced as justifying State ownership. It may be noticed in passing that, pro tanto, according to the extent and minuteness of the system adopted, some of these arguments apply to State con- trol also. It is said in the first place that railways are a monopoly, and a monopoly of an article of public necessity ; but this is a point I should wish to reserve for consideration at a later stage. Again, it is claimed that, if the credit of the State were behind the railways, the portion of the rates and fares which represents interest on capital could be largely reduced. The facts, however, do not bear out the statement. It is true that railway capital at this moment receives on an average within a fraction of 4 per cent., and that the State 172 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vii can borrow money at something like 2| per cent. But the great railway companies can borrow practically as much as they please at almost the same rate ^. It is not a question of the price at which the company could raise the money to-day, but of the price which they had to pay when their lines were built originally. And when we remember that, even as lately as the Crimean War, the State issued consols at about 85, we can hardly admit that through lack of credit the companies have on the whole paid very dear for their money. At a| per cent, the Exchequer must make up any possible deficiency of railway earnings ; purchasers of ordinary railway stock can at present prices get in normal times about 3^ per cent, for their money ; but then they take the risk of a coal strike at any moment annihilating a half-year's dividend altogether. Economy of interest would then, I think, be something quite trifling. There is the question also of economy in working expenses. I have already said that the economy secured by the abolition of competitive services would be very much smaller than the public seems commonly to suppose. I may add that the economies resulting from unity of management would also, I believe, be comparatively insignificant. In Ireland, with its fifty or sixty separate companies, each with its own board of directors, they would no doubt be proportionally great ; but the whole working expenses of all the Irish railways put together are a mere bagatelle. In Great Britain the under- takings are already big enough to give every man as much as he can do, and for my own part I fail to see how the re- organization of the service would enable a single official to be reduced. On the other hand, everybody who has had experi- ence of methods of business of public departments and private undertakings knows well that the former are more com- plicated and therefore more expensive. Nor is it generally believed that the State gets more work out of its servants than the private employer. Similarly, I think one might go through all the branches of railway expenditure and show that ' London and South-Western 3 per cent, debentures have, I believe, been dealt in at 107. VI.] The State in relation to Railways. 173 in none of them, except possibly in that much magnified mole- hill, Parliamentary and legal expenses, could any reduction worth speaking of be effected. Again, it is said that at present our railways are worked in the interests of the shareholders ; the State would adopt a different principle, and work them for the benefit of the community at large. This sounds, of course, very nice and pretty. When we ask for particulars, however, of the improvement, we are generally informed that the Government department would improve the revenues by a series of judicious reductions in rates. Stated thus broadly, the claim would appear to be that, because certain reductions in rates, made deliberately by the skilled managers of existing lineSj have proved to be profitable, all other reductions of rates, which those same skilled managers have ex hypothesi rejected as likely to be unprofitable, would in the future increase the net revenue of the State railways. The fallacy is obvious, and comes back really to the theory of the Irish apple woman who could afford to sell her apples at a loss because she sold so many of them. And it will not be for- gotten that, while at the present time the railways shareholder pays the piper for unprofitable experiments, under a State regime the cost would fall on the taxpayer at large. There is another point worth notice. If we can persuade our would-be reformers to descend from the general to the particular, we do not always find them agreed as to the principles on which the reform should be based. Liverpool, for instance, is the nearest port for the manufacturing towns of Lancashire. Accordingly, we find the mayor of Manchester telling a House of Commons' Committee that railways ought not to be permitted to ' deprive a town of the advantage of its geographical situation.' In other words, the distance carried is to be the governing factor in the rate. Other places — say, for example, Southampton and Plymouth — have behind them only thinly-populated agricultural districts. Their repre- sentatives, therefore, are equally persuaded that the true principle on which judicious reductions will be based is to be found in an approximation to the postal principle of one 1 74 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vi. uniform rate— that the great duty of a railway is to annihilate distance. Evidently, till all the inhabitants of Liverpool and Plymouth respectively are agreed to the principle on which the judicious reductions which they both equally desiderate are to be based, it will not be very easy for the State officials of the future to set about making them. But, after all, the question of State purchase of the railways in this country will never be decided on a •priori considerations. In so complicated a subject practical men will be guided by the sum of practical experience. For railway experience of course we must go outside England itself. But we may fairly call in our own experience of the Government undertakings most nearly comparable —the Post Office and the Telegraphs — to supplement it. A lengthened experience of State railway management, even as railways count length, is only to be found in Belgium and in the smaller states of Germany. As for Wiirtemberg, Bavaria and Saxony, it may safely be said that, as far as speed goes, their railway services are among the very worst in the world. Those of Baden are distinctly better ; but Baden has from the beginning had the benefit of being on an international route, and taking part in keen competition for international traffic. It is true that rates and fares are low in these small German states, but it is difficult to call them low considering the quality of service that is given in return. Moreover, they are not low according to the general money standard of the country. The difference be- tween a Bavarian and an English railway fare is nothing at all so great as the difference between a Bavarian and an English hotel bill, or between the wages of an English and a Bavarian artisan or day labourer. Belgium undoubtedly affords a more favourable instance of the result of State con- trol. Taking into consideration both the rates charged and the service given, the Belgian railways can fairly hold their own with any continental country. But then we must re- member that the Belgian State railway system is a small affair ; the whole of it not as important as our own Midland Railway. It is very much as though the State here were to VI.] The State in relation to Railways. 1 75 buy up the Midland Eailway, remaining exposed not only to the competition by water on all sides, but to that of the North- Western on the one side and of the Great Northern on the other. Further, it cannot be said that Belgium has developed any special principles broadly differentiating State railways from those of private commercial companies. ' In Belgium,' says Professor Hadley, ' State raih'oads were simply roads owned by the State, but managed on the same principles and with the same abuses as competing private roads.' ' At one time,' the quotation is again from the same authority, ' the Government railroads themselves granted special rates to prevent people from using the Government's own canals . . . they abandoned schedule rates, and had recourse to personal discriminations and to special contracts of every kind. It is probable that in these respects the State was a worse offender than the private companies themselves. . . . Charges have been made in official form by one of the best authorities in Belgium, Le Hardy de Beaulieu, that the connexion between railroads and politics has produced distinctly bad results ; that there has been a multiplication of forms and offices of no use in actual busi- ness, and that there has been serious manipulation of accounts to make an unduly favourable showing for the Government.' Still, on the whole, it would I think be fair to admit that there is no evidence that a private company would have managed the Belgian railways better than the State has done. Those who are satisfied to put forward the example of Hudders- field, where the Corporation works the tramways so far at but small cost to the rates, as the main argument to prove that the County Council should work the tramways of London, which carry a number of passengers equal to the entire popu- lation of Huddersfield once every two hours, will doubtless be likewise ready to generalize for the railways of England from the experience of Belgium. If from Belgium they pass to Prussia they will certainly not find much to strengthen their case. Even had the State management of railways in Prussia been proved a triumphant success, it would be inadmissible to argue that England was 1 76 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vi. capable of doing likewise. No one doubts, for instance, that Prussia can organize and administer an army : it would be rash to found on this fact a belief that England can do the same. Says Mr. Charles Francis Adams, with the statesman- like wisdom hereditary in his family : ' In applying results drawn from the experience of one country to problems which present themselves in another, the difference of social and political habit and education should ever be borne in mind. Because in the countries of Continental Europe the State can and does hold close relations, amounting even to ownership, with the railroads, it does not follow that the same course could be successfully pursued in England or in America. The former nations are by political habit administrative, the latter are parliamentary ; in other words, France and Germany are essentially executive in their governmental systems, while England and America are legislative. Now the executive may design, construct, or operate a railroad ; the legislative never can. A country, therefore, with a weak or unstable executive, or a crude and imperfect civil service, should accept with caution results achieved under a government of bureaus.' But in fact there is no need to enter any such caveat. The Prussian Government did indeed, when it was urging the pur- chase of the railways upon the Prussian Parliament, point out that private companies were actuated only by greed of gain and care for their dividend, and steadily opposed to any reduc- tion in rates ; that the State alone was in a position to work the railways in the public interest; that the Government ownership would secure more judicious and equitable employ- ment of the railway capital, as well as more rational and economical methods of working; further, that the State, freed from the obligation to consider particular interests, would regard the railways as the instrument of the general prosperity, and would devote itself constantly, as far as finan- cial prudence permitted, to the development of the entire railway system, to improvements of service and reduction of rates. But the facts have belied these high-flown assertions. The railways have been worked mainly as instruments of VI.] The State in relation to Railways. 177 taxation. They have been managed on precisely the same commercial principles that were denounced when put in prac- tice by the companies. The development of the system, the improvements of service are not yet visible ; when traders cry out for trucks to keep their works going, they are calmly told that they ought to have laid in a supply of coal or raw material during the slack months of the summer ; when pas- sengers petition, not of course for English and American speeds, but for expresses at say 35 to 40 miles an hour, they are assured by the official apologists that the physical condi- tion of the lines would render such speeds unsafe. As for reduction of rates, they have been made, of course, here and there, but there has been no general reduction, no simplifica- tion in tariffs, nothing but partial concessions, made from time to time to particular interests and particular localities, con- cessions absolutely insignificant in amount by the side of those granted in the same period by the competitive systems of the United States. There is, no doubt, in Prussia an elaborate machinery of district and national councils, whereby the public can express opinions as to changes of tariff which they consider desirable. But such expressions of opinion remain opinion only, for the State has carefully retained all actual authority on the subject in the hands of its own employes. It is true that in the years of good trade the State railways have paid over large surpluses in reduction of general taxation ; but, now that the good years have come to an end and the lean years have followed, the railway revenues have fallen off in an alarming manner and, spite of new taxation, there is a threatened deficit of four millions in the Prussian Budget. Of course it is easy to produce witnesses on either side to testify for or against the existing system. Professor Cohn, whose authority I should be the last to question, has recently placed it on record that no one outside of the Radical opposition wishes to go back to the former state of things. But certainly the said Radical opposition have recently uttered very caustic criticisms in the Prussian Parliament. I shall, not, I think, go beyond the fact if I say that, even without any discount for the undeniably 178 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vi: superior efficiency of the executive organization of the Prus- sian Government, the success of the Prussian State system has not been so striking as to constrain us to imitate it. The country whose experience of State management should really be of direct example to us is Australia. With the Australian evidence I have recently dealt at some length elsewhere ^, and I need only mention it here in the merest outline. Australia may fairly be compared with the Western States of America. These latter States have of course now a population many-fold that of Australia, but they had none till the railways went there. They would have had but little now, had the railways charged the rates which are apparently found necessary on the Government lines in Australia. This, however, is not the only, hardly even the chief, difficulty. The railways of the different colonies have all passed through a stage of direct management by a minister immediately responsible to Parliament. That such method of management meant jobbery, extravagance, and inefficiency, is admitted on all hands. One after another the colonies found themselves compelled to interpose a buffer, in the shape of a non-political and largely irresponsible Commissioner, between the railways and the political minister. The system is as yet on its trial. Sir Robert Hamilton, ex -Governor of Tasmania, whose com- petence as an observer can as little be questioned as his democratic sj'mpathies, has publicly expressed the opinion that the experiment cannot permanently succeed ^. 'I believe,' he writes, ' that any guard upon our parliamentary representa- tives, in the shape of permanent commissions appointed by them to exercise their powers, must, as experience appears to be already showing, break down.' The Victorian experiment has indeed already broken down. How far, during its short life, it availed to protect the public from jobbery, may be judged from the one fact that the Melbourne Age recentlj' published a list, occupying ii^ closely-printed columns, of free passes over the State railways granted to the wives and ' Government Railways in a * Lending money to Australia. Democratic State. Economic Journal, Nineteenth Century, August, 189a. December, 1892. VI.] The State in relation to Railways. 179 families and dependants of members of Parliament. In New Zealand, too, the non-political Commissioners will probably by the time these pages are published have been reduced to a condition of subserviency to the Ministry of the day. In New South Wales, thanks to the exceptional personality of the Chief Commissioner, they have so far held their own, but after a life and death struggle. In Queensland and South Australia their position has not, as far as I know, been chal- lenged. But in face of the fact that direct State manasement in Australia has confessedly meant in the past, and would again mean, extravagance and inefficiency, and that no sub- stitute for that system has yet been found which can offer any reasonable pledge of permanency, he would, I think, be a bold man who should claim the experience of Australia as in favour of direct Government management. Such then is in outline the case against the State manage- ment of railways. It cannot be better summarized than it was by the famous Italian Commission of Inquiry, which sat for three years, from 1878 to t88i, collected six quarto volumes of evidence both oral and written, and finally embodied the experience of the civilized world in these conclusions ^ : — ' I. Most of the pleas for State management are based upon the idea that the State would perform many services much cheaper than they are performed by private companies. This is a mistake. The tendency is decidedly the other way. Private companies can do for their patrons many things which the State cannot ; but it is doubtful whether the State would be justified in doing anything of the sort which private com- panies cannot. The State is much more likely to attempt to tax industry than to foster it. And when it attempts to tax industry, it is more omnipotent and less responsible than a private corporation. ' 0,. State management is more costly than private manage- ment. Such at least was the conclusion of the commission, on comparing the results of the two systems. The difierences which they bring out are quite marked, though it is fairly ' The summary of the text I borrow verbatim from Professor Hadley's invaluable BaUroad Transportation. N 3 i8o A Policy of Free Exchange. [vi. open to question just how much they prove. Comparing State and private railroads in different countries, they find that the ratio of operating expenses to gross earnings is always greater on State railroads— averaging eleven per cent, more in all the countries compared. In their more detailed comparisons, the commission take carefully into account the various elements which involve cost of handling ; but unfor- tunately they do not take up the question whether the rates charged on the State railroads considered may not be lower than on the private railroads — a thing which would make the percentage look unfavourable, and yet be rather a credit to the management than otherwise. We cannot, therefore, accept this point without reserve. ' 3. The political dangers would be very great. Politics would corrupt the railroad management, and the railroad manage- ment would corrupt politics. These effects have already been seen in actual working. Changes of rates are made for the sake of influencing elections. A questionable experiment was recently made in Belgium in the matter of railroad tariffs ; it had been adopted by the Government as a means of currying popular favour — a kind of bribery to which there is great temptation. It would not be hard to find similar instances in other countries on both sides of the Atlantic' So much for the foreign experience. It is worth while to supplement it with a few words as to our English experience of the nearest analogous business in the hands of our Govern- ment — ^tbe Post Ofiice. For a century and a half, from the time when ' an enterprizing citizen of London, William Dock- wra, set up at great expense a penny post which deKvered letters and parcels six or eight times a day, in the busy and crowded streets near the Exchange, and ... as soon as it became clear that the speculation would be lucrative, the Duke of York complained of it as infraction of his mono- poly, and the Courts of Law decided in his favour^,' the Post Office has been constantly worked as primarily an engine of taxation. 'The State has shown itself much ' Maoaulay, Hisifmj of Englani, Chapter III. VI.] The State in relation to Railways. i«i more inclined to tax industry than to foster it^.' The modern history of the Post Office might be given in a sentence. Half a century back an outsider of energy and genius, Rowland HiU, converted the nation to a belief in the possibility of ' The following summary of Post Office history from the time when the idea of using the Post Office monopoly as an engine of taxation first took root, down to the time when an out- raged public opinion thrust Rowland Hill into the office to prevent State officials doing after their kind, is not mine. It is extracted from Mr. Joyce's excellent History of the Post Office (Lon- don, Bentley, 1893). As Mr. Joyce is a trusted and high-placed officer of the Department, we may fairly assume that his indictment is at least not over- drawn. 'Let us compare for a moment the beginning of the nineteenth with the end of the seventeenth century. In 1695 the postage from London to Liverpool, or to York, or to Plymouth, was, for a single letter, ^d. ; in 1813 it was lid. In 1695, wherever letters were being carried clandestinely, the policy was to supplant ; in 1813 the policy was to repress. In 1695 the King would not consent to a single prosecution, even for the sake of example ; in 18 13, when the Post Office revenue had passed from the King to the people, prosecutions were being conducted wholesale. In 1695 a circuitous post would be converted into a direct one, even though the shorter distance carried less postage ; in 1813 a direct post, in place of a circuitous one, was being constantly refused on the plea that a loss of postage would result. In 1695 Lon- don enjoyed the advantage of a penny post, and this post carried up to one pound in weight ; in 18 13 the penny post had been replaced by a two- penny and three-penny one, and, except in the case of a packet passing through the general post, the weight was limited to four ounces. In 1813, moreover, the complications were be- wildering. In some places there were fifth-clause posts, and in others penny posts ; and the charge by these posts was in addition to the charge by the general post. Some towns, over and above all other charges, paid an addi- tional id. on each letter for the privi- lege of the mail-coach passing through them. Of two adjoining houses one might receive its letters free of any charge for delivery and not the other. This difference was to be found in towns where building was going on — as, for instance, at Brighton — old houses being considered within, and new houses without, what was called the usage of delivery. In London itself, the complications, if possible, were more bewildering still. The three-penny post began where the two-penny post ended. Thus far the practice was simple enough. But the general post limits did not coin- cide with the limits of the two-penny post ; and the limits of both the two- penny post and the general post dif- fered from those of the foreign post. Indeed, it is probably not too much to say that in 18 13 there was not a single town in the kingdom at the Post Office of which absolutely certain information could have been obtained as to the charge to which a letter addressed to any other town would be subject. More than ten years later. Post Office experts, examined before a Committee of the House of Com- mons, were unable to state what, even on letters delivered in London, would in certain cases be the proper postage.' 1 82 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vi. penny postage. The State organization fought tooth and nail against the innovation. Public opinion, however, was strong enough to thrust Rowland Hill inside the office ; there he carried out his reform ; and the Post Office has lived on his reputation ever since. The claims put forward in the annual report of the Postmaster- General, that the Post Office is a pro- gressive and business-like department, are not a little amusing in their stolid self-complacency. For indeed letter-distribution is one of the simplest businesses to manage in the world. It is fenced round by a statutory monopoly; it is transacted exclusively on a cash basis ; and no complicated commercial questions are involved. The standing difficulty which con- fronts a railway company is the question of differential rates. The inexorable laws of supply and demand compel a railway company to sell its services for what they will fetch. But it is only human nature that J. should object to a fifty per cent, profit being made out of him while 5's business is done on a margin of five per cent. The Post Office is spared the whole of this difficulty by the relative insignificance of the amount of its charge. If the sum were worth fussing about, depend upon it we should soon have a league in existence to protest agaipst the iniquity of charging one man a penny for a sheet of paper from Lombard Street to the Temple and another a halfpenny for two ounces of paper from London to San Francisco. One might admit therefore to the full that the Post Office does its present work well — and compared with the average English Government Department no doubt this admission ought to be made — and yet be very far indeed from admitting that this proves its capacity for managing the infinitely more difficult business of a railway. But let us examine the Post Office record a little more closely. Let us see fii'st how it has used its statutory monopoly. Take, for example, the tele- phones. Tens of thousands of pounds were spent in litigation to prove that the wording of an Act of Parliament, passed before telephones were born or thought of, might be strained to include a monopoly of all forms of electric communication. In the result London is ten years behind Stockholm or Rotter- VI. J The State in relation to Railways. 183 dam in telephone communication. Take again the more recent instance of the Boy Messengers Companies. There was no need, thought the Post OfBce, of an ex])ress messenger service, but no sooner does a private company make the attempt at its own risk to aiFord the public a new convenience, than the Post Office starts a rival service of its own, judiciously handicapping its more nimble rivals with the weight of a heavy royalty for the infringement of a statutory monopoly. Of course, the plea for these royalties is to be found in the alleged interests of the public revenue. It is, however, difficult to understand why a tax on communications becomes economically justifiable because its effect is to spare State officials the exertion of using their brains to cope with the competition of private enterprise. Not that one would wish to deny for an instant the wisdom of the Post Office from its own point of view in insisting on this taxation. For, where it has no monopoly behind it, it is usually beaten out of the field. Take for example the annuity business, in which the Post Office, with the credit of the Government at its back, does about as much business in a decade as a single private company gets through in a week. How long, one wonders, would the inconceivably clumsy money orders and the scarcely less inconvenient postal orders hold their own, if it were not for the stamp duty of one penny on cheques even of the smallest amount. Or take again the carriage of newspapers. Sixty years back the Post Office had a monopoly, not legal this time but only practical, of the carriage of all the newspapers out of London. To-day the Post Office has retained the unprofitable pait only ; the single paper earned in a separate parcel to remote country districts. Out of the wholesale business one firm alone of newsagents has built up a fortune of over two millions for its head. The State, we are told, will operate the railways, not actuated by greed of gain but in the interest of the public as a whole. As a salient example of this spirit, we may point to the Post Office, which runs a wire with alacrity into the betting ring of every gate-money race meeting, while it turns a deaf ear to aU demands for the extension of its lines to 184 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vL lighthouses, to fishing harbours, or to agricultural villages. Or again, who can fail to appreciate statesmanlike economy which refuses to recognize the unity of the British Empire by the establishment of a uniform rate of postage when a revenue of no less than £70,000 a year might be jeopardized by the innovation. Take another instance : For forty years past express legislation has made it impossible for private railway companies to contract themselves out of liability for the negligence or misconduct of their own servants. For this interference with freedom of contract public interest was undoubtedly the motive. Yet the Postmaster- General can and does repudiate all legal liability for the deliberate theft or injury by his own servants of property entrusted to him, even in cases where extra fees have been paid as an insurance premium. A union of continental railways led by the com- mercial companies of Switzerland has recently procured the enactment of international regulations, facilitating the re- covery of claims against railway companies. A man whose property is lost on a railway in Holland can settle the matter after his arrival at destination with the railway company in Italy. The State Postal Union, on the other hand, devotes its energy to barring out the claims of individuals altogether. Here is, for example, one regulation. 'Under no circum- stances is the charge for an unrepeated telegram which has been inaccurately transmitted refunded.' In other words, if the sender, after having paid five shillings for the despatch of a certain message, declines to pay x shillings ^ additional to discover whether the message which the Post Office has sent is really the message which he handed in, not only will he have no claim for any damage which may result to liim from Post Office carelessness, but actually he may find himself compelled to pay for a service which has never been rendered him at all. Conceive a railway company which loses a man's portmanteau and delivers him instead a sack of damaged potatoes. Not only does it refuse to pay compensation for the loss of the ' I have written x shillings Post Office Guide, I am quite unable because, after exhausting perambu- to understand what the additional lations through the mazes of the charge actually is. VI.] The State in relation to Railways. 185 portmanteau, but it insists on being paid for the carriage of the valueless potatoes. But indeed the comparison between railway and Post Office methods is fruitful of results. Imagine a railway com- pany placarding its station with a notice ' The booking clerk is not required to give change or authorized to demand it,' or with another notice requiring passengers personally to paste the labels on their portmanteaus. Or again, what would the public say, if the railway companies issued notices at Christ- mas and at Easter calling upon them to travel in the early days of the week, in order to make the work as easy as possible for the companies' servants % And yet an extra passenger needs more accommodation than an extra letter. One instance more. When a railway company puts on a new train or opens a new station it makes up its mind to face an almost certain initial loss. The Post Office refuses to open a new telegraph office, however great its indirect advantages to the locality may be, unless the actual cost is guaranteed from the outset. Heads the department wins, tails the guarantors lose. And yet, for all its penny wisdom, the Post Office can be at times extravagant enough. The rate, for example, for press telegrams — 100 words for one shilling — is, we are officially told, a rate which not only does not pay, but never could pay. But the rate continues, for the Press is powerful, and the profits of a handful of miUionnaire newspaper proprietors must not be lightly interfered with. On the whole, it is not too much to say that, before anyone can call the management of the Post Office successful, consciously or unconsciously he must have determined that a private enterprise is to be judged by one standard and a Government department by another and a much lower one. If then we admit State management of railways to be undesirable, we have next to consider what are to be the objects, the extent, and the methods of State control. Now the control of railways falls under two main heads. There is first what may be called the police control of working in the 1 86 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vi. interest of the public safety, and secondly control from the commercial side of the tariffs and services. The division is for practical purposes a fairly accurate one, though some subjects, as, for instance, new construction and train punctu- ality, are on the border line. In the early days of railvrays the police control was much the most important. In those days every town was a centre of demand and supply, and enjoj'ed, not of right but of necessity, 'the advantage of its geographical situation.' People bought the food grown within a few miles of them. If it did not grow they starved, or, always supposing the roads to be passable, they migrated to another district. The idea, I will not say of New Zealand and Texas, but of Devon and Aberdeen competing in the London Meat Market, had not yet dawned. It was a question not of relative but of absolute tariffs, and railways were — always considering the accommodation they gave — so im- measurably cheaper than any other mode of conveyance that no one grumbled. Nowadays the absolute quantum of a rate is unimportant. It is all a question of relation and propor- tion. The farmers of Devonshire may find themselves com- peting at a disadvantage in the London Market, in spite of a reduction of five shillings a ton in the railway rate, because a reduction of ten shillings has been made in the rate from Aberdeen. Naturally, therefore, with an ever-widening area of supply, tariff questions have constantly increased in in- tricacy and importance. As far as police control is concerned there would seem to be no special principles afi'ecting railroads, nor is it necessary to discuss the theoretic justification for such conti-oL No one, practically speaking, argues against marine inspection, boiler inspection, building act regulations, notification of infectious diseases, and so forth. The practical justification of any or all of these is of course a matter for discussion on the facts of the individual case ; but in theory they all seem comprised within the four comers of the old legal maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienuvi non laedas. In more modern phrase the community coerces certain individuals so far as may be necessary to secure that the freedom of all VI. J The State in relation to Railways. 187 other members of the community shall be at the maximum. So far as our present subject is concerned, it would seem to be absolutely a matter of detail whether certain injuries, to which railway passengers are liable, and from which they are not strong enough individually to protect themselves, shall be dealt with by the co-operative machinery of the State, or by the machinery of a voluntary co-operative Eailway Passengers' Protection Association. As for the kind of inter- ference which has been shown by experience to produce the best results, there wiU be a word or two to be said later on. Meanwhile let us notice some individual points in which State interference is obviously justifiable. First and foremost comes the construction of new Hnes. A railway cannot be made unless it has the power compulsorily to take the land required for the purpose. The only justification for the con- cession of this power is the public interest, and in this the existence of a tribunal to decide whether the public interest is really involved is at once implied. Carrying this a stage further, we may say that a railway can only be useful to those whom it accommodates. A line, for example, made without intermediate stations to serve the express traffic between London and Brighton, is evidently no convenience to the districts it passes through. Control therefore of the construction of the line implies control of the arrangements for dealing with traffic along it. On this point it may well be thought that the State — represented in this case by Parlia- mentary committees — has with us hitherto interfered too little. Kunning one's mind, for instance, down the line of a single company, the Great Western, it is evident that the public interest would have been better served had public authority prevented the construction of a second indepen- dent station, and insisted on the new company's admission to the old station at Reading, Oxford, and Swindon re- spectively. These, of course, are only given as examples. Any one who takes an interest in such questions could no doubt supply from his own local knowledge scores of instances in which slight modifications of promoters' plans would have resulted in greatly increased convenience to the 1 88 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vr. public. Of course there is a per contra in all such matters. One man may lead a horse to the water, but nine men may not be able to make him drink ; and so a public department may lay obligations on a body of promoters, with the result possibly of stopping the construction of the line altogether, or at least, in less extreme instances, of discouraging the promotion of similar schemes. No doubt there is need for a large allowance of common sense and elasticity at the back of such interference ; still, given the possibility of finding such qualities in a government department, I am constrained to think that State interference with the construction of new lines might with advantage be carried somewhat further than it has been hitherto. Again, the State may naturally be expected, before per- mitting owners and occupiers to be compulsorily dispossessed of their lands, to satisfy itself that the new company will really carry out the undertaking which it projects. Obviously, half-finished embankments and semi-pierced tunnels can afford no convenience to the public at large ; they may, however, as was found in practice after the mania of 1847, remain as a standing nuisance to landowners, and an eyesore to every passer-by for many years to come. It is, therefore, only right and proper that security should be taken that the promoters are persons who may be expected really to complete and open the line for which powers are given ; and further to be able to work it when opened in a reasonably efficient manner. Parliamentary committees and the authorities of the two Houses have in practice striven for half a century past to attain this end, but the scant measure of success to which they have attained is one more proof of the inherent difficulties of railway control. For in fact the Parliamentary control has protected neither the landowner on the one hand, nor the promoter on the other. Hundreds upon hundreds of Bills have been passed whose powers have subsequently lapsed, either wholly or partially unexercised, for want of funds, while a hundred millions sterling is a moderate estimate of the money that has gone in railway construction without yielding any dividend whatever. Indeed it may be questioned VI.] The State in relation to Railways. 189 whether on the whole railways, though incorporated under special Acts of Parliament, have been one whit safer invest- ments than banks and insurance and steamship companies incorporated in the ordinary fashion under the Companies Acts. After all, the best security the public can have for the success of a new scheme is the character of the persons associated with it as promoters and directors. And as long as Parliament satisfies itself that the promotion of a new scheme is bona fide and responsible, I am not clear that it can do better than accept this fact as sufficient. But there is another closely analogous function which can, I think, be exercised by the Government with every prospect of more useful result, namely, the supervision of the accounts and statistics not merely of new but of established companies. So long as companies are considered entitled to obtain, if they can, a dividend at the current rate on the money they have invested, the public has a right to know whether the nominal amount of the capital does or does not correspond to the sum spent on the construction and equipment of the lines. Where payments aggregating nearly a hundred millions per annum, more than five per cent, of the gross national income, are concerned, the public is entitled to have access to figures showing what services the companies render and at what price, and what is to them the out-of-pocket cost of doing the business. But no information on these points is attainable at present. The railway returns published year by year under the authority of our Board of Trade have been for years past a byword among railway economists in every other civilized country. The State would, in my judgement, not only be acting within its undoubted right, but be taking a step of the utmost practical importance, if it called on the companies to submit their accounts to State inspection, and to furnish statistics showing in an adequate manner their general course of business. In the next place, a public authority will naturally exercise control over the arrangements which involve the safety of the public, level crossings, height of platforms, methods of signalling and interlocking, methods of train- working, and so I go A Policy of Free Exchange. [vi. forth. It seems to me impossible to deny the justification for such control, but equally impossible to doubt that its practical working in England is far from satisfactory. A State department is almost bound to establish rigid codes of rules ; it dare not lay itself open to charges of partiality and favour- itism by varying its regulations to suit the infinitely various circumstances of practical everyday life. Regulations, there- fore, have to be laid down more or less by a method of average ; but an average can only be drawn too low for the top and too high for the bottom. We find accordingly, on the one hand, important stations left without safety appliances that in their case might fairly be called necessary, and directors and managers sheltering themselves under the plea that the Board of Trade does not prescribe their use as obli- gatory; while, on the other hand, petty railways in poor districts may be crushed by the burden laid upon them of providing even the average standard of safety appliances. Further, the Government ofiicials are not responsible for commercial results, and cannot be expected to regard the shareholders' dividends, while they do incur a serious personal responsibility if they permit poor railways to forego the use of safety appliances merely on the ground of cost. Naturally, therefore, the average of demand will be fixed too high rather than too low. Theoretically, the result may be merely to reduce dividends, and what is money, says the common opinion, compared to human life. Practically, however, the result is to prevent the making and working of railways in poor districts altogether; in other words, to deprive the public of the almost perfect safety of even the most primitive railway, and to leave them face to face with the comparatively appalling risk of transit in stage coaches and cai'riers' carts ^. ' I believe I am correct in saying impotence of statistics to touch the that since the beginning of this year imagination can hardly be better more passengers have been killed and illustrated than by the fact that, seriously injured in stage coach than while we constantly hear of the in train accidents. This would make dangers of railway travelling, the the percentage of risk run in these man who dares to climb the box seat two means of conveyance roughly of a coach is seldom acclaimed as a something like 10,000 to i. The hero. VI. J The State in relation to Railways. 191 We come, lastly, to the crucial point in railway adminis- tration, the control of tariffs, meaning thereby, be it observed, not only the rates and fares charged, but the services rendered in return therefor. That the State must interfere here may, I think, be taken for granted. Our own Government from the very earliest days of canal legislation has always fixed schedules of maximum tolls. In the United States too the States which began to interfere earliest have been precisely those which have found the question of the measure and methods of interference least insoluble. At the same time, we must recognize also that the problem is one of the most difficult in the whole range of economic legislation. To quote from a report adopted by a Convention of the State Railroad Commissioners held at Washington in April, t 893 : ' To fix a standard for reasonable rates is a duty that demands the gravest and most serious consideration and the most thorough independence . . . The law of the carrier requires him to perform the service for a reasonable rate. The railway freight agent, the shipper (trader), the granger, the politician, and the legislator, all agree that rates should be reasonable. This is all they seek and all they ask. When they attempt to arrive at what is reasonable their views are widely different. Who then shall determine ? Usually the party who feels aggrieved calls upon the State that has chartered these corporations to fix a standard. What the standard shall be, or how prescribe some rule, some law, or some formula by which rates may be measured, has been a problem that has puzzled the wisest and most thoughtful minds. Our belief is that this invariable standard cannot be found.' It is usually admitted that the State can only successfully perform services which are of a routine and non-speculative character. All experience shows that the railways which have had the most flexible and most commercial — one might almost say, most speculative-tariffs, have been those which have done most for the development of the country^. ' The fascination of the tlieory of subject the ordinary retail traffic of an ideal uniformity has indeed in- the country to equal mileage rates, duced the Prussian Government to the same for a ton of gray shirtings 192 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vi. Government interference must naturally make for inflexibility and routine; yet Government interference we cannot away with. All we can do is to see that the interference shall go on right lines and approach the subject from the proper point of view. What that point of view should be, it therefore becomes necessary for us to inquire. Control of railway charges is commonly justified on the ground that railways have a monopoly, or at least a practical monopoly. The argument will not hold water when we come to examine it. For what is a monopoly ? It is defined in the dictionaries as ' an exclusive right of selling.' This no English railway ever has had. Not only has competition by water and by road always remained open, but Parliament has never hesitated — at least for a generation past — to sanction competition by a rival railway. To take the most recent instance — the North Western and the Midland and the Great Northern asserted, and with perfect truth, that they were ready and anxious to carry every ton of traffic that presented itself between London on the one hand and Manchester, Sheffield, Nottingham, and Rugby, on the other. Yet, after full consideration. Parliament deliberately sanctioned a new competing route. Where then is the exclusive right of the existing railways? But the monopoly, though not legal, is, we are told, ' practical,' ' virtual.' In this sense there are few undertakings that are not monopolies. ' An apple stand,' says an American writer, 'is a monopoly up to the point when it begins to pay.' The existing railways have undoubtedly secured the best location ; they have also the advantage of a long-established connexion. But is this practical monopoly? Have Bo ad Street shopkeepers a monopoly because the number of Bond Street shops is limited % Have as for a ton of silk velvet. But when German ports of Hamburg and it comes to serious matters, to en- Bremen, theory and ideals go to abling German agriculturists and the winds, and the German Govern- millers to hold their own against the ment frankly puts out special tariffs competition of Russia and Hungary based wholly on what the traffic will and the United States, or to divert- bear ; in other words, on the very ing the traffic of Westphalia from unideal consideration of commercial Antwerp and Amsterdam to the competition. vi.J The State in relation to Railways. 193 London bankers a monopoly because there is no room for newcomers in the Bankers' Clearing House? Or, again, is a newspaper a virtual monopoly? A newly established journal which should fill twenty columns per diem with the proceedings of the House of Commons would bankrupt its proprietor, were he a Rothschild or an Astor, in a twelvemonth. The Times can do it because it is the Times. Is the Tivies, therefore, a practical monopoly ? Again, it is said that the fact that the Company has been suffered to take land compulsorily is a justification not only for State interference, but for exceptional taxation. This argument will hold water even less than the last. The power to take land by compulsion was not a present made to the railway. It is a function inherent in the State itself, exercised indeed through the agency of the Company, but exercised by the direct action of the State itself, as a consequence of the deliberate decision of the legislature that such compulsory expropriation in the particular case is for the benefit of the public at large. So fully indeed is the fact recognized, that public interest is the only justification for compulsory powers of purchase, that the Standing Orders of the House of Lords in terms provide for striking out compulsory powers from any Bill whose ' direct object is to serve private interests in any lands, mines, manufactories, or other properties.' The privilege conferred on the railway proprietors, so far at least as pecuniary benefit is concerned, may be said to be permission to pay every landowner along the route a sum of at least ten per cent, more than the maximum value of his property. There might be some justification for regarding this as a reason for laying exceptional taxation on the dispossessed landowner, but on the expropriating railway hardly. Once more, it is said, the special Act of Parliament au- thorizing the construction of a line should be regarded as a bargain made by Parliament, acting on behalf of the public at large, with the Eailway Company. Be it so, but unfortu- nately the bargain secures for the public nothing worth having. We have had schedules of maximum rates imposed with this object for two generations past. Except in a very o 1 94 A Policy of Free Exchange, [vi. few instances and under quite special circumstances they were of no use to anybody. The Companies habitually charged far below them. And, though useless, it cannot be said that they were innocuous, for it is, I think, unquestionable that the tendency of holding up before the railway managers the schedule of rates fixed by Parliament as reasonable for them to charge has been to keep rates higher than they would naturally have been, had each Company been left free to experiment for itself. It is impossible to doubt that in some instances managers, had they been free to charge what they liked, would have established ridiculously prohibitive tariffs. That no doubt, from one point of view, would have been hard on the district, but at least the district would have been no worse off than it was before the railway was made, and the reduction of rates which self-interest must shortly have com- pelled would not only have afforded a valuable object lesson to neighbouring lines, but would very possibly have gone much further than if, owing to Parliamentary compulsion, a less unreasonable scale of rates had prevailed at the outset. It will, of course, be understood that I am not arguing against the abstract justice of statutory maximum rates. Theoretically there is nothing to say against them ; prac- tically, however, the policy has proved a failure. 'Every careful student of the question,' writes Professor Hadley, ' from Morrison in 1836 down to the Committees of 1872 and 1882 has come to the conclusion that fixed maxima are of n^xt to no use in preventing extortion.' Unfortunately, the British public and the British House of Commons has a sovereign contempt for careful students, and prefers to trust to the rule-of-thunib guidance of the practical man. Its recent experiments in the revision of maxima have, however, now, I hope, finally convinced even that most impractical of mortals, the practical man, that a schedule of maximum rates is a double-edged weapon. The fixing of maximum rates is not likely, perhaps, to come back into fashion as a panacea for railway grievances till a new generation has arisen both of politicians and traders. 'Maximum rates,' said Sir Albert Rollit, in his address as president of the VI.] The State in relation to Railways. 195 Associated Chambers of Commerce at Plymouth last Septem- ber, — 'maximum rates are dangerous delusions, and they afford little, if any, practical protection to the trader.' The same may be said of various other forms of control that have from time to time been suggested or attempted. Limitation of dividend, sliding scales, periodic revision of rates, — all may be excellent in theory ; only, unfortunately, they are quite unworkable in practice. But State interference may be based on a different principle altogether. Without regarding railway companies as grantees of a monopoly, and as such subjecting them to exceptional burdens, the State is surely entitled to say that their position is such that real free contract between a railway company and an ordinary private citizen, in reference to each individual passenger journey or consignment of goods, is out of the ques- tion. Neither cabmen nor pilots have, in any ordinary sense, a monopoly, nor have they ever been regarded as fit subjects for exceptional taxation^ ; yet the civilized world agrees that cabmen and pilots must be licensed and their charges regulated by outside authority. So too I believe that the State should interfere in order to secure that the charges of railway companies shall be equal and fair to all their customers alike. In other words, the State must abandon the attempt to deal with railway charges as excessive and concern itself, not with their total amount, but only with their relative pro- portion. The principle is simple enough ; the application of it is, it must be confessed, of extraordinary difficulty. To take a well-known instance of Mr. Grierson's, the Great Western rate for coke from South Wales to Wiltshire may give the Westbury Iron Company an undue preference over ■ The hackney carriage license this. But, of course, tliese duties duties in London are historically a might quite well be justified on the survival from the days when loco- ground of the excessive user by motion, like everything else, was hackney carriages of the iondon taxed. And it is mainly owing to streets, and in that case would be the fact that the Chief Commissioner only another form of the very equit- of Police is a subordinate of the Home able principle involved in the High- Office and not a London local official ways (Locomotives) Amendment Act, at all that they have not been swept 1878. away, or at least largely modified, ere O % 1 96 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vi. its competitors at Coalbrookdale in Shropshire ; or, going yet further afield, the rate for American meat from Liverpool to London may be unfair to the cattle dealers in Yorkshire or Norfolk. We have admitted it to be the duty of the State to prevent undue preference. Before, therefore, going further, it is desirable to see clearly what undue preference is. The phrase is often used to cover two widely different things. A and B are, let us say, rival tradesmen in London sending goods to Cambridge. If each of them sends a hundredweight of sugar of the same kind, packed in the same way, and the one is charged is. and the other is. 3c?., that is one kind of undue preference. But suppose that they are both charged by the North-Western Company is. to Cambridge and is. %d. to Oxford, though the distance carried in the former case is fourteen miles more than in the latter, this may be called undue preference of Cambridge over Oxford ^. But it is undue preference, if it be undue, of a very different kind. The first case is practically non-existent in England. It happened largely in the early days of railways, and it has been continued, more or less, down to the present time in the United States. It is in conformity with the ordinary principles of business life. A is perhaps a large customer whom it is desirable to conciliate ; 5's custom may not be worth consideration. Or, again, A may be a keen man of business who always drives the best bargain he can ; B a happy-go-lucky individual who pays what is demanded and asks no question. In ordinary commercial life A would undoubtedly get better terms than B. No merchant sees anything disgraceful in allowing a friend to purchase from him retail quantities at the wholesale rate ; no merchant would deny that he shades off his prices sooner than allow his customer to go away without doing business at all. ' In this case the explanation is, of Western, with a distance of 63 miles, course, obvious on the face of the For its 78 miles to Ojcford the North- map. The North-Western ia not the Western can charge, therefore, as for direct line to either town. To Cam- 63 miles ; while for its 92 miles to liridge the rate is fixed by the Great Cambridge it can only charge as for Eahtern, with a route only 55-J miles 55J. in length ; to Oxford by the Groat VI.] The State in relation to Railways. 197 Priima facie, there is nothing immoral in such transactions. But from very early times it was seen that when one party to the bargain was a railway company, doing business on such a scale that it could afford to forego a profit, or even to incur a loss, on individual transactions, or sets of transactions, for an indefinite time without feeling the consequences, such liberty must lead to serious abuses. A company would be able to wreck the business of any merchant or manufacturer against whom it had a grudge, or even, it might be, out of mere caprice, or in order to favour a rival firm. Such a state of things was obviously intolerable. As long ago, therefore,as 1 845, public legislation — Private Acts of a much earlier date con- tained the same provision — required that all charges should at all times be equal under like circumstances, and that no reduc- tion or advance should be made, either directly or indirectly, in favour of or against any particular company or person using the railway. The Traffic Act of 1854 carried the matter a stage further ; and subsequent Acts have laid it down that all rates shall be public, so that every one can see for himself what the company professes to be charging for the carriage of each article. The upshot of this legislation, coupled with the very determined action of the courts of justice under it, has been that for a generation past undue preferences in the first sense — they call them ' personal discriminations ' across the Atlantic — have been a thing unheard of. ' It is remarkable,' says the Report of the House of Commons' Committee of 1883, after an exhaustive investigation, ' that no witnesses have appeared to complain of preferences given to individuals by railway companies as acts of private favour or partiality, such as were more or less frequent during the years immedi- ately preceding the Act of 1 854.' The other class of preferences exist by the million, and are given by every government railway in the world ; whether they be due or undue is a question of extreme difficulty — a question on which, when the cases get near the dividing line, two equally competent and equally impartial judges may hold diametrically opposed opinions. Preferences of this kind may be roughly classified iato preference of one 1 98 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vi. locality, whether of origin or destination, over another, and of one method of consignment (including therein volume, method of packing, responsibility for loss or damage, and so on) over another. Undue preferences, then, in the fii-st sense, 'acts of private favour or partiality,' are, like St. John's famous fox, to be knocked on the head, wherever they are found, with every weapon the State may have at its disposal. It remains for us to consider by what machinery the State shall exercise its control to prevent preferences of the second class, which must of necessity exist, from becoming undue. In the first place, of course, it can act by legislation ; but, practically speaking, such legislation must simply confine itself to generaUties. Some American State legislatures have indeed attempted to embody detailed railway rates and regulations in statutes, but their success has not been such as to encourage others to emulate their example. Other States have entrusted a power of fixing rates to the almost unfettered discretion of one or more commissioners appointed for this purpose. This experiment too has practically been abandoned as a conspicuous failure. In some States, however, it lasted long enough to prove that the equitable adjustment of the conflicting claims of rival localities was not made easier by the fact that the person entrusted with the task happened to be a State ofiicial. Even where the legislature has confined itself to generalities its incompetence to deal with questions of this character is only too apparent. Take, for example, the twenty-seventh section of our most recent general Act — the Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1888 : 'The Court may take into consideration whether such difference in treatment is necessary for the purpose of securing in the interests of the public the traffic' What public ? And who is to represent the interests of this indefinite public before the court? a lawyer asks, in respectful bewilderment. Or, again : ' No railway company shall make, nor shall the court or the commissioners sanction, any difierence in the tolls, rates or charges made for or any difierence in the treatment of home and foreign merchandise in respect of the same or similar services.' No doubt the noble lord who was responsible VI.] The State in relation to Railways. 199 for the insertion of this proviso, and the two Houses of Parlia- ment who passed it into law, did so with the best intentions. The railway companies were so determined to 'favour the foreigner' — from whom at best they could only get a mere fraction of their traffic — even at the risk of bleeding to death his English rival, on whom they were bound to rely for ninety-five per cent, of their livelihood, that it was no doubt necessary to stop them at all hazards. But really this proviso does not help much. What are ' similar services ' ? Is the service of carrying a ton of Texas beef, part of a con- signment of a hundred tons, the one-twenty-fifth part of its journey which lies on Enghsh soil, the same as the service of carrying the four quarters of an English bullock the whole way from the pastures in Cheshire to the Smithfield Meat Market ? Or is it totally dissimilar ? The Act of Parliament sounds very patriotic, even though its patriotism seem not wholly in conformity with the teachings of the Cobden Club, but it fails to guide us as to the principles to be kept in view in the solution of the practical question. If, then, legislative regulation be impossible, the task must be left in the hands either of the Executive or of the courts of justice. The leading example of Executive control is furnished by France. In France no railway rate can be altered either up or down ; none of the conditions of carriage can be modified in the slightest degree, without the formal assent and consent of a minister of State. The initiative rests with the companies ; but before any alteration suggested by them comes into practical operation it is submitted to a whole hierarchy of State officials for report, and finally to the exhaustive consideration of a council of over fifty persons, one-half of them highly placed Civil servants, and the other half representatives of mercantile, agricultural and manufacturing interests. Having regard to the constant financial support given by the Government to the French railway companies, such a system may be possible in France, and yet not be capable of transplantation here, where the companies have buUt their lines at their own sole cost and risk. But even in France its disadvantages are tolerably obvious. 200 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vi. For one thing the cost is enormous. To say that the com- pany must first of all propose a change, and that, secondly, the Government must investigate and decide whether to approve or no, means in plain English that the whole work of management must be done twice over. The French control staff numbers over i,ooo persons. It costs about £160,000 per annum, and the complaints are constant that both staff and salaries are insufficient. Further, a duplicate system, especially when one-half is in Government hands, naturally implies very considerable delay; and such delay, though none too acceptable in France, in the main a self- contained country, would be quite intolerable here, where we have to face the competition of the world at large. Tenders, for instance, are invited for the construction of a bridge over the Danube at Pesth. At Derby there is a famous firm of bridge-builders who would like to put in. Before doing so, however, they must know whether for a consignment of 10,000 tons of steel, the Midland is prepared to give them a special rate to Hull or to Liverpool or to the London Docks. The matter can be settled at present by a call at the goods manager's office, followed by an interchange of telegrams with the North-Western and the Great Northern. An answer is given next morning at the furthest. But it takes an English Government department as a rule ten days to acknowledge the receipt of a letter, and certainly two months to investigate the simplest cases. But there is yet another objection of principle. It is a fatal blot on any system that it divorces power from responsibility. In France the Government guarantees the railway dividends ; having, therefore, the power, it has also the responsibility. But with us ? A new special rate might develop trade, and so add, not only to the dividend of the company, but to the wealth of the country at large. But it is certain to rouse the jealousy of a host of neighbours to whom it is not extended. Why should any Government department sanction such a rate and risk the asking of a dozen inconvenient questions in the House of Commons? It is always so easy to utter platitudes about the obligation of preferring the general welfare to the interest vi.] The State in relation to Railways. 201 of one particular applicant. On the other hand, the general manager of the railway cannot fairly be held responsible if he is not permitted to manage it ; and, further, it takes the heart out of a man's work if you keep him in leading strings at every step ^. The following generalization is not, I believe, too wide. The whole tendency of modern commerce is to concentrate business into great aggregations, and the con- cession of special railway rates is only one exemplification of this tendency. In its working it undoubtedly inflicts some hardship on individuals, but this is more than counterbalanced by the benefit to society at large. Any interference by an out- side authority with the free play of commercial forces may be expected to be in the interest of the tangible individual who complains rather than in that of the public at large, which has no opportunity of making its voice heard, even if, indeed, it were conscious of its interest in the matter. Such inter- ference, therefore, is, in the public interest, to be deprecated and to be kept down to the irreducible minimum. For that there is such a minimum has been admitted from the outset. The free play of commercial forces is all very well in its way ; but when the scales are pulled by the North-Western Eailway on the one side and by the local shopkeeper on the other, the interests of the latter are likely to kick the beam. Still, as it seems to me, the shopkeeper should be sufficiently protected by an appeal being given him to a properly constituted court of justice. Such a court, of course, can interfere only after the event ; and prevention is usually regarded as better than cure. Still, if prevention is only possible at the price of a bodyguard of physicians in constant attendance, one may buy one's immunity from ' It is five years since we had any methods of working (signals, brakes, conspicuous improvement in English block system, mixed trains, &c.), railway service. Even in passenger railway servants' hours of labour, service, in which we led the world, employers' liability, &c., &c. The without equal or second, a few years railway chiefs have been occupied, back, the Americans are going ahead mistakenly perhaps, in endeavouring of us in all directions. This is no to minimise that regulation. They accident. The Board of Trade and have had neither time nor heart to Parliament and the public have been think of improvements, regulating railway rates, railway 202 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vi, disease too dear. Moreover, a court of justice, by a series of decisions, gradually builds up a code of law on the subject ; and in this way the cure of one case really constitutes the prevention of fresh outbreaks of the same complaint. Obviously such a court is no patent remedy for all railway diseases ; but experience shows it to be the best attainable in this imperfect world. The difficulty is, however, to get it. Such a court must consist of several members, for the bearings of these railway cases are so wide that no one mind can be expected to grasp the whole of them. Then the questions involved are not merely legal. The ideal judge should be not simply a lawyer, but a trained economist, with a practical knowledge of railway management and business methods as well. So far from a judge being thrown away on such matters, as more than one Member of Parliament has stated of late, what we want is something more than an ordinary judge. And we shall only get such men when the public realize that this question of railway control has come to stay, and is not to be settled oiF-hand by haphazard resolutions of chambers of commerce, or even by the passage of unworkable statutes. There is another point. Having got your court, you must make it possible for a complainant who is not a millionaire to go there. The railway companies have akeady expressed their readiness to accept the idea that as a general rule each side, whatever be the results, should pay its own costs. I believe that substantial justice would be done by going even further and providing that, while the railway company was left, if successful, to pay, except in extreme instances, its own costs, the commission should be empowered to give, under ordinary circumstances, to a suc- cessful applicant costs against the company. But, even when we have got an ideal court for the decision of these questions, there will still remain important functions to be discharged by the Executive Government. It is as true in the moral as in the material world, that corrupt matter is rapidly oxygenated and rendered harmless by the action of light and air. It should be the business of the Executive to investigate alleged abuses, and, where they are proved to VI.] The State in relation to Railways. 203 exist, to publish the fact. Abuses brought to light will mainly right themselves. There is nothing more remarkable than the sensitiveness of great corporations to public opinion. Not but that such sensitiveness is natural enough. A great corporation offers so big a mark to shoot at that it is bound to be hit if once it provokes the public to take to their weapons. And the men who manage our great companies are well aware of this. Or, if any one amongst them should be for a moment foolish enough to forget it, his colleagues may be trusted to remind him by the exercise of some such corporate discipline as is exercised, almost as a matter of course, in the old-established professions. Of this sensitive- ness to public opinion this very year has furnished a most striking instance. Parliament, after an exhaustive investi- gation of the subject lasting for over eleven years, solemnly enacted that from the first of January the railway com- panies should be entitled to make certain charges. Un- advisedly, as their own official representatives have since admitted, and without explanation or apology, the railway companies proceeded to exercise in full the rights which Parliament had most deliberately given them. Public opinion strongly disapproved of their action. An unopposed resolution of the House of Commons condemned it, and within three months the companies had been constrained to abandon the attempt to exercise their unquestionable legal right. In the face of this experience it would seem evident that pubhc opinion does not, at any rate, lack force. The object of the interference of the Executive Government should be to supply it with the facts and, where necessary, with the commentary required for its correct guidance. It may seem almost an insult to the Executive to propose to confine it to the humble function of purveying information. And yet we cannot be too often reminded that the action of the State — however large be the capitals in which we write the word — means only the action of the handful of fallible, perhaps arbitrary, possibly not wholly disinterested indi- viduals, who on any particular occasion are its instruments. Now we may fairly expect that these individuals will inves- 204 -^ Policy of Free\ Exchange. [vi. tigate more carefully and weigh their decisions more deliber- ately when they have to make them prevail by their own inherent rightfulness than when they are empowered to give a peremptory order and let their will avouch the deed. And in matters such as these, where, to borrow from a recent judgement of Mr. Justice Wills, a wrong decision would ' check competition, hamper enterprise, and enhance the price of many articles of primary necessity, . . . ruin many indi- viduals, and amount to an economic revolution in much of the business of the country,' we must be satisfied to move but slowly, so only that we move in the right direction. Experience of our own railway history, still more of the railway history of the United States, is available to confirm these a prion reasonings. For twenty years the inspecting ofiicers of our Board of Trade had practically no powers except to investigate and report. But by the constant employment of these powers, and with the force of public opinion behind them, they made English railway traveUing incomparably the safest in the world. In an evil hour Parliament passed the Eailway Regulation Act, 1889. The Board of Trade could order where before it could only advise, and rejoicing, one must suppose, in its new-won authority, it proceeded forthwith to strike a general average for the railways of the United Kingdom, and to prescribe for the railways of Caithness and Cardigan requirements well enough adapted for the latitude of London. Last session we heard more than once of public bodies in remote localities imploring in vain that the Board of Trade would sufier passengers to run the risk of travelling in company with goods waggons rather than be deprived of a train service altogether. But the Board was inexorable. It had formed its ideal of what a passenger service ought to be, and the railway companies must be compelled to give that or nothing. So in fact they will give nothing, and the Board of Trade will no doubt be satisfied. To take another instance, fortunately of a more satisfactory character. In America the control of railways was down to 1887 exclusively, and is still mainly, in the hands of the VI.] The State in relation to Railways. 205 separate State governments, and the experience of these forty- different bodies is a perfect mine of instruction for those who wish to appreciate at once the difficulties and the possibilities of government control '^. Broadly speaking, the States of the American Union have divided themselves on this question into two opposite camps. Those of the East and North, led by Massachusetts, have acted on one principle ; those of the South and West, led by Illinois, have adopted quite another. Both groups of States have appointed commissions to control the railways ; but while the Illinois Commission possesses large powers, the powers entrusted to the Massachusetts Com- mission — so says Mr. C. F. Adams, who for ten years was its chairman — ' hardly deserved the name . . . The only appeal provided was to publicity . . . The Commissioners had to listen, and they might investigate and report — they could do little more.' To quote Mr. Adams again, the Massachusetts type of commission means only publicity, the Illinois type means the constable. And now to summarize, equally broadly, the results. The commissions of the Illinois type have been in perpetual hot water from the day of their birth. Their powers have been increased and then again diminished, or even withdrawn entirely at a stroke. They have reduced railway companies by the score to banki-uptcy. But the more they have oppressed the companies the less the public at large have appeared to be satisfied. Finally, in despair, they have thrown the reins on the neck of the steed, and left the companies to take their own course almost unchecked. At the present time there is hardly one of the State Commissions of the compulsory type which attempts to exercise the powers which are nominally vested in it. Meanwhile, the Massachusetts Commission has constantly increased both its authority over ' There is no one work with which I have myself attempted, in evidence I am acquainted adequately dealing before the House of Commons Com- vrith this chapter of railway history. mittee of last session on Railway Its general tenour may be learnt Eates, to make the outlines of the from Hadley's Railroad Transportation, story accessible— if anything in a C. T. Adams' Railway Problem, and Blue Book ever is accessible— to Clark's State Railroad Commissions. English readers. 2o6 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vi. the railways and its hold over public opinion. Whenever a question arises, the Massachusetts Commission investigates and publishes its conclusions. If it concludes against the view taken by the railways, the company concerned finds itself constrained to submit ; if, on the other hand, its report endorses the action of the company, the public acquiesces and the agitation dies down. In a word, the corner-stone on which the Massachusetts railway legislation rests — and it is the true foundation for the legislation of a free people — is, to quote Mr. Adams yet again, ' the one great social feature which distinguishes modern civiHzation from any other of which we have a record, the eventual supremacy of an enlightened public opinion.' It might be argued that Massachusetts is not England. ' The men of Massachusetts,' says Lord Macaulay, ' could work any constitution.' Be it so, but we are not without preciselj' similar experience in this country. The Eailway and Canal Traffic Act of 1888, by a clause avowedly based on the Massachusetts precedent, gave to the Board of Trade in the matter of goods rates alleged to be oppressive these very powers of investigation and publication. The clause has only been in operation four years, and during almost the whole of that time the goods rates of the different companies were in the melting pot, and till they finally emerged, in their new shape, it was scarcely worth any one's while to raise fresh issues. Even so the Board of Trade has thrice reported that the effect of the Conciliation Clause, as it is termed, has been markedly beneficial. The railway companies have almost without exception adopted the recommendations of the Board of Trade, and as a rule their differences with their customers have been amicably settled. But four years have not been long enough to eradicate all trace of original sin even from the three hundred and fifty thousand railway officials and servants, still less has a method been found to make any concession satisfactory to claimants who urge simultaneously claims diametrically opposed the one to the other. So we are now told that publicity has failed ; that the constable's truncheon must be thrust into the reluctant VI.] The State in relation to Railways. 207 hand of the Board of Trade. It is not safe to prophesy unless one knows. But no one who has studied these matters can have the smallest doubt that if any government passes an Act giving, either to a Court of Law — the Eailway Commission — or to a government department — the Board of Trade — or even to the tertium quid suggested by some leading authorities — a ' cheap and expeditious tribunal ' composed of gentlemen neither lawyers nor railways experts and with no experience of administration — a power to arbitrate between railway companies and their customers and to force both sides to accept as final its decision whether a rate is reasonable or unreasonable — if any government does pass such an Act as this — and strong pressure in this direction is being brought to bear by traders' associations at the present tirap — that government will, before many months are out, have bitter reason to regret its action, and may quite possibly find itself in the humiliating position of being forced publicly to avow its mistake and retrace its steps. But enough. No attempt has been here made, nor is indeed possible within the limits of this paper, to discuss questions of detail. How far railway companies should be free to amalgamate, or to enter into agreements to abandon competition and divide traffic with each other ; whether they shall be confined strictly to railway business, or allowed to embark in subsidiary undertakings as dock and steamship owners, or warehousemen, as hotel keepers, or cartage agents — these and a score more questions of a like nature need the most careful and deliberate consideration, but they cannot be touched on here. Again, it is a question of principle of most vital moment, how the railways of a country can best be made subservient to its general prosperity. On the answer to that question, which at any given time commends itself to the minds of the controlling agents, miist depend the opinions they express and the judgements they pronounce on the facts of the concrete cases as they are brought before them^. But ^ The United States Interstate that 'the practice of the Commission Commerce Commission, in its sixth is so to administer the law as to pro- and latest annual report, declares tect each locality in the enjoyment 2o8 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vi. this question, though its importance cannot be overrated, is also foreign to our present scope. We must confine ourselves here strictly to the question of the measure and method of State interference. And on this question we may now formulate our conclusions as follows : — State ownership is undesirable, but State control is unavoid- able. So far as that control has to do with matters of police, with the security of the public, the proper treatment of employes, and so forth, it is on all fours with inspection in numerous other departments of daily life, and will naturally be carried out by officials appointed by the Executive Govern- ment. To the control of railways as commercial undertakings, on the other hand, a different set of considerations apply. Here the broad principle seems to be that the private investor, paying the piper, must be allowed to call the tune, subject only to this proviso — that no one customer of the railway shall be allowed to obtain an unfair advantage over the rest. Whether any particular advantage be in a given case fair or unfair is a matter best left to the judicial decision of a technically as well as legally qualified court. Where there is no general agreement even as to the most elementary principles of tarification — I make no apology for importing across the Channel an absolutely necessary word — we are less likely to go wrong if we confine ourselves to ex post facto judgements on concrete facts which have arisen in actual practice, and refuse to construct in advance symmetrical of its natural advantages. . . . Each them. Further, had the theory that community is entitled to the benefits a locality has a right to be protected arising from its location and natural in the enjoyment of its natural ad- conditions.' With all possible re- vantages been suffered to control spect for the Commission I venture the railway policy of the past, the to assert that its practice is nothing problem which the Commission now of the kind. The only practice that has to solve of an equitable adjust- even approaches conformity to this ment of competitive rates over the theory would be the enjoinment on continent of North America would the companies of equal mileage rates never have come into existence, for for like commodities in like quan- the buffalo must have still shared titles. And from such a course the with the Red Indian the undisturbed strong common sense of the Com- occupation of the larger part of the missioners may be trusted to preserve area of the United States. VI.] The State in relation to Railways. 209 edifices of theory. But there is also scope for useful action on the part of the Executive Government, whose officers can in- vestigate and report, both generally and when their attention is specifically directed to alleged abuses. In this manner the public will gradually be educated to form an intelligent judgement, and the railway companies will be kept on their good behaviour. Such is the railway creed which I would put forward as suitable for adoption, not semper, ubique, ah omnibus, but by Englishmen in England at the present day. If it be objected that it is mainly negative, that it amounts to little more than dotting the 'i's and crossing the 't's of the existing system, I venture to reply that therein lies its greatest recommenda- tion. In the dark it behoves us to feel our way cautiously ; and our legislatoi-s, with all respect be it said, are really very much in the dark as to the economics of transportation. To begin to run, as some distinguished persons are urging at this moment, when we are not certain that we have started in the right direction, and have no idea what obstacles there may be across the road, may be human nature, but is certainly not philosophic. Besides, simple publicity is an instrument whose value cannot be exaggerated, and it is a weapon which has hitherto been used, where used at all, only in the most hesitating and half-hearted manner. Given the right men as Government inspectors, with full access to facts and documents, and the power to publish the conclusions which they draw from them, powers of compulsion will be not merely super- fluous but actually a hindrance. For, in England as in Massachusetts, ' the eventual supremacy of an enlightened public opinion' is matter of certainty. In our present temper, however, ' eventual supremacy ' is not enough for us ; we are all for reaching immediate supremacy by the short cut of compulsion. In the words of a distinguished railway authority, Professor H. G. Adams, of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 'there is danger lest the quietness with which the principle of publicity works should deprive it of the confidence which it deserves.' The more reason, therefore, to press home the point that the nearest approach to success in p aio A Policy of Free Exchange. [vi. the very difficult task of controlling without fettering the commercial management of railways has been attained by a system which, refusing altogether the assistance of the constable, relies on the support of public opinion for its sole sanction. W. M. ACWOBTH. VII. THE INTEREST OF THE WOBKINa CLASS IN FREE EXCHANGE. T. MACKAY. P 2 VII. THE INTEREST OF THE WOBKING CLASS IN FREE EXCHANGE. ' The property which every man has in his own labour^ as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable.' Such is the axiom in which Adam Smith proclaims the charter of human freedom. It is a pregnant phrase, and the corollaries which follow from it are far-reaching and important. A man's property in himself gives him a right of exclusive use in his own labour, and, as under the present subdivision of labour its principal use will consist in being exchanged for wages, it gives him also a right of Free Exchange. To argue that exchange should be other than free is to countenance slaver}'^. This monopoly, or exclusive power of sale over his own labour, is sacred and inviolable. It can only be exercised by the free will of the seller, that is to say, in Free Exchange. This universal right vested in every seller of labour does not confer on any one man a right to coinpel others to purchase his labour, for such a forced exchange would be a violation of our axiom, in that it compelled other men to part with their labour, or the results of their labour, against their will. The axiom gives, there- fore, no guarantee of employment, no droit au travail; it merely affirms each man's exclusive right to take his own labour and services to market. Further, if the greater may be held to include the less, each man has the same right of property over all that he obtains in exchange for his labour. In other words, within the limits set by an enlightened juris- prudence, a man is entitled to dispose of his wages as he thinks fit. In the infinite series of exchanges here fore- shadowed, labour is 'the original foundation of all other 214 ^ Policy of Free Exchange. [vii. property.' To complete our view of the organizing influence of exchange, another deduction must be drawn, which seems to follow naturally from the axiom above stated. It is, that if a man has a right of sale he has also a right of gift. Hence the jurisprudence of the civilized world, recognizing that economically as well as physiologically the life of the child is a continuation of the life of the parent, has sanctioned, what it is probably powerless to forbid, the right of inheritance and bequest, as being on the whole the simplest and most equitable method of passing property from one generation to another. Every man, then, has property in his own labour, his own mental efforts, and in the values which neighbours freely give him in exchange for these. Liberty and Property, or, as rela- tively to an industrial society it may more suggestively be stated, Free Exchange and Property are two inseparable ideas. It is hardly necessary to depart from the precedent of our axiom, and to complicate the question by considering the case of property held in virtue of alleged acts of illegal appro- priation in a prehistoric past. Practically speaking, at the present day all property rests on a title of labour bestowed, or on some legal act of exchange or bequest. The current controversy as to the ' unearned increment,' that is, as to the right of private ownership in an undertaking like the New River Company, or in ground-rents in the city of London, has nothing to do with the validity of the original title. The point raised is whether the State should not retain to itself any increment of value which may arise from a future concentration of demand on a particular water supply or a particular bit of land. Our answer to this will depend on our judgement as to the ability of the State to forecast the course of demand, and as to the wisdom of leaving speculation in land to private persons. If we admit that the State should be a speculator in land values, there is no reason why now or at any other time it should not, with a view of lightening future taxation, purchase at the market rate land which, its advisers think, is likely to rise in value. It is well, however, to remember that if by chance it finds itself in possession VII.] The Interest of the Working Class. 215 of a site of enhanced value, it can only do what the private owner does, namely, let it at a rack rent. To let it under its market value, as fixed by the intensity of the demand for it, is at once jobbery and favouritism, and has further the mis- chievous consequence of concentrating population where the high price of land, if left to itself, would tend to disperse it. This intense concentration of demand on particular articles is an unavoidable incident so long as men naturally or by fashion continue to desire the same thing. It has, however, this convenience, that the values which it creates are a kind of natural consols. This is appreciated by the poorer classes, as is evidenced by the fact that their own provident insti- tutions invest a large amount of their funds in ground-rents. All this, however, has nothing to do with the question of title, and for the purpose of this discussion it is proposed to accept the proposition that the property which every man has in his own labour is the original foundation of all other property. One assumption has been made, that a man has a monopoly in his own labour and in the values for which he exchanges his labour. If this be conceded, we have a justification of the principle on which, though there are many lets and hindrances to its full influence, the present basis of society mainly rests ; we have also an acknowledgement that these lets and hindrances are contrary to justice ; it remains to be shown that we have found a principle, which, if these lets and hindrances could be removed, is capable of ' moralizing ' the whole organization of social life. All things in process of evolution are of necessity imperfect, and if we are analyzing society with a view of discovering the principle of association most conducive to its welfare, we waste our time if we search for one which has attained a parar mount ascendency. If there is any principle which at this moment has a complete and undisputed authority, the present imperfect condition of society wUl be its conclusive condemna- tion. If we are looking for a principle to which we can without misgiving entrust the progress of the race, it ought to have some of the following characteristics. It ought, in the first place, to be a force already at work. It ought to be a rule 2i6 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vii. of conduct which has already established some authority for good over human nature. It were hopeless to try to reorganize society by a force which in the past mankind has consistently ignored. Further, if we wish to recognize the influence which makes for social progress, we should look for one which has power to transform the lower and purely selfish motive into the higher and social motive. To adopt the epigrammatic phrase of Mr. Huxley's Eomanes lecture, we must look for some principle which, in itself, is a ' pedagogue to virtue.' All these conditions seem to be present in the principle of Free Exchange. Without doubt it has played, and is playing, a great part in the social economy of the civilized world. It has not permeated, it is true, to every corner of society. It has been restricted by the nature of things, and by human artifice. Still, to those who permit themselves to indulge in ideals, it is a principle capable of exorcising from human character the instincts of the ' tiger and the ape,' by making mutual interchange of service the all-pervading motive of our associated life. Even under our present subdivision of efibrt, no activity of the economic man is entirely self-regarding. Men labour and exchange their labour, or the products of their labour, for the labour or products of other men. The man, therefore, who wishes to receive much in exchange, must strive to perfect his capacity for the service of his fellows. This influence afiects not only manual labour, but every act of capitalization, for the application of capital to production can only bring reward to its author, so long as it ministers to the requirements of the public. Capitalization, as we shall presently see, is essentially a process of exchange. In this blending of the private with the public motive, we may perceive the birth of a new senti- ment and a new rule of conduct awakened, as it were, by this elementary lesson of the ' cosmic pedagogue.' On the other hand, it is acknowledged that this process of evolution is incomplete, that the lower nature of the 'tiger and the ape ' is by no means eradicated. Is it not conceivable, however, that the slowness of our progress is due to the inherent difficulty of the subject, to the dullness and obstinacy VII.] The Interest of the Working Class. 2 1 7 of the pupil, rather than to any defect in the teaching of the pedagogue ? It is the purpose of the following pages to trace the develop- ment of the principle of Free Exchange, more especially as it has affected the property and savings of the working class. How far has it already been the foundation of social welfare ? To what further heights of prosperity does it seem to beckon us? To what extent is it a 'pedagogy' creating competent social habits and character in the beings that live within its organizing influence ? To the poor man, his most important, as well as his most sacred, possession must ever be his own labour. His savings are in all probability of small amount, and their rise upon the original foundation of his labour has been of recent date. The labour market, therefore, is to him of the highest importance. To the man who has anything to sell, more especially to the man who deals in a commodity, which, like labour, will not keep, it is an advantage to be brought into contact with the largest possible number of buyers. This is the function of a market or exchange. In a great organized market, prices are fixed in an automatic fashion, into which no personal element can enter. In the general extension of the open market which has been going on for many years under the influence of free trade^ some things tend to rise in value, others to fall in value. To which of these classes does labour belong 1 A sovereign will exchange for a greater quantity of wheat or for a greater quantity of clothing than fifty years ago. On the other hand, it will purchase a less quantity of labour. The rule would seem to be, that those things which can be produced practically at will, tend to depreciate in value ; while those things of which the supply is more or less in- capable of being immediately increased, tend to appreciate in value. There would seem to be reason for thinking that in the past, at all events, the value of labour has been enhanced. We are hearing a good deal nowadays of the alleged appreciation of gold. It is argued that the value of gold has 2 1 8 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vii. risen because the number of exchanges in which it has to serve as a measure has increased far more rapidly than the production of gold. This, of course, is denied by some who are of opinion that the annual production, and the economies in the use of bullion effected by various expedients of credit, have kept pace with the public requirement for this precious metal. No opinion is here offered on the question, it is cited only to bring out the general admission, that if an article of universal demand is supplied in limited quantities, its value relatively to other exchangeable commodities, which iucrease less rapidly, must be enhanced. The universal demand for gold consists largely in the right of mintage afforded by the governments of the gold-using countries of the world. By means of the mint, gold bullion is assured of its market, and passed into the currency of the country. It is the object of civilization to organize a similar market for labour. Let us pursue the comparison a little further. Labour even more than gold is a necessary element in most operations of industry and exchange. Credit can serve as a substitute for gold, but no substitute can be found for labour. Lnproved machinery does not dispense with labour, on the contrary, it makes *a higher demand for skill and trustworthiness and for the higher forms of labour. Labour, moreover, unlike gold, can be applied to an infinite variety of purposes. Every increase of the labour population ought, and to a certain extent does, create a demand for its own employment. Given a number of employable but unemployed labourers, a well-organized market ought to afford them an opportunity for a profitable exchange of services. A glut of gold in the bullion market, owing to fresh discoveries, is a conceivable thing, and indeed has happened before now, bringing with it a depreciation in the value of gold. No operation of the mint could prevent this. On the other hand, with a really effective labour ex- change, and a real mintage for labour, an excessive supply of labour is impossible. I argue that this certain market for labour can be organized, not by a recognition of any droit au travail, but by the operation of the principle of Free Exchange, and by that only. VII.] The Interest of the Working Class. 2 1 9 The foregoing comparison between the gold and the labour market establishes a presumption in favour of the view that, in an absolutely free market, the price of labour must tend to rise. The trade unionist, however, will not trust himself to the open market, and seeks to raise the price of his labour by combination and by various restrictions on the right of Free Exchange. Let us consider this opinion somewhat more in detail. The attitude of the trade unionist would seem to rest on a certain phase of the Malthusian terror. As a general proposition, the doctrine attributed to Malthus has lost its force. If a really effective labour exchange were established, all labour would be passed into currency. Malthus' theory can only be true in markets which are artificially limited. There is un- fortunately congestion of population in certain industries, and when relief is sought, as it too often is, by action which results merely in limiting production, it may occasionally be true that population increases more rapidly than subsistence. Still, if there is no absolute mobility of labour, there is certainly no absolute immobility, and Mr. Henry George is, I think, right in arguing, not perhaps that subsistence actually does increase more rapidly than population, but that with a better organiza- tion of the labour market it certainly would so increase. The idea of the trade unionist that there is a limited amount of work to be done, is parallel to the Malthusian fallacy that there is a limit to the increase of subsistence. There is no truth in either proposition so long as no artificial impediment is put on those Free Exchanges which at once employ labour and increase subsistence. To what extent under existing circumstances are labour, and the capital necessary to its employment, distributed in the industries most proper to them by the operation of Free Exchange 1 Dr. G. B. Longstaff, in an elaborate paper on Rural Depopu- lation, read before the Statistical Society on June ao, 1893, sums up the matter as follows. ' Reduced to a sentence, what does this mean 1 It means that the dream of the free-trader is being fast realized. That we are more and more learning 220 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vii. to do in each place that for which each place is' most advantageously circumstanced.' As between the town and the country we have already reached a point where it is a somewhat nice calculation to determine whether the higher wages of the town are really preferable to the lower wages, lower rents and allotments of the country. The migration to the town has to some extent levelled up the rate of wages all over the country. An expression of this opinion does not debar one from thinking that a greater freedom of exchange in the matter of land values might turn the tide of migration back again to the country. The phenomenon of labour and capital migrating in search of greater freedom of enterprise is nothing new. It is the motive of the colonization of America and Australia. Hitherto these countries have for the most part taken our unskilled population only. We have preserved our market for skilled labour, because of our international free trade. It is suggested, however, by Mr. Maitland, that in the event of the United States adopting a policy of Free Trade, the greater internal freedom of American industry would attract both skilled labour and capital to a country where a career is open to talent, just as in mediaeval times industry deserted the chartered towns, where it was protected and regulated, for the open villages which grew to be the great manufacturing centres of to-day. Nor in this connexion should it be forgotten that the worst incidents of our feudal laws of settlement lasted down to the end of the last century, and that up to 1795 no poor man could come into a parish in search of work without being liable to removal to the place of his settlement, not because he was chargeable to the poor rate, but lest he should become so. Considering the many impediments to its mobility, the wonder rather is that labour has acquired even its present measure of fluidity. When we speak of the mobility of labour as between the town and the country, we do not, of course, mean that each labourer is able to transfer his labour from one market to another. A curious demographer might find in a Dorsetshire village a labourer who had never heard of VII.] The Interest of the Working Class. 221 Yorkshire, but there is probably not a village in England from which there has not been some migration, some dispersion of the young labour that comes each year to the market, and this is all that is needed to relieve an overstocked market. Again, it is sometimes argued that the great specialization of employment in modern industry is inimical to the mobility of labour. This, however, seems by no means to be the case. Some interesting information on the subject has been collected by Mr. Llewellyn Smith, in a pamphlet on ' Modern Changes in the Mobility of Labour.' From this it would appear that ability to manage machinery increases rather than diminishes a labourer's power to change his employment. A remarkable instance of this is mentioned, in which, at the close of the American war, a gun factory was turned without change of staff into a sewing machine factory. Although we are still very far from the time when there is one market and one price for all competent and employable labour, those who see no other solution of our social difficulties than that which involves a natural organization of society on a basis of Free Exchange may find some comfort in the progress already made. Before leaving this aspect of the question, it is worth noticing that there is an alternative to the mobility of labour, it is the mobility of capital. We shall have occasion later on to discuss the question of popular banks. I may, however, so far anticipate, as to suggest that the Dorsetshire labourer who never heard of Yorkshire may be a competent and trustworthy agriculturalist, that if by means of a co-operative bank he could obtain the use of capital, his ignorance of geography would not interfere with the profitable cultivation of his allotment any more than the Lord Chief Justice's indifference to the fame of music hall singers stands in the way of the due discharge of his judicial functions. The Dorsetshire labourer may refuse to move, but the capital may come to him. The thing required is not mere mobility, but a certain character of economic competence. The career opened to the humblest agricultural talent by the system of popular co-operative banks in Germany and Italy is an element in the problem worthy of careful attention. 222 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vii. The following practical instance will illustrate my contention that Free Exchange is the best available distributor of labour, and that it is to the interest of the labourer more than any one else to allow his labour to be directed by its influence. The wages of domestic service are a familiar but often neglected instance of the rapid rise in the value of labour in an open market. Within the experience of many people still living the wages of domestic servants have at least doubled. This result has come about in a market in which transactions have all been made in detail. No person willing to accept wages has been prevented from so doing by any labour organization. Undoubtedly here and there persons have served for very low wages, but the general result has been a great advance in the average price paid for the various qualities of domestic labour. No harm has come to the interest of labour, because some transactions, rather than not take place at all, have taken place at a very low rate of exchange. The tendency of the market has been upward, and continues to be upward. The balance of advantage is cer- tainly with the servant rather than the housekeeper. This, I contend, is largely due to the fact that domestic servants have done their bargaining in detail, and in a free market. The free bargain in detail, far from being a cause of low wages, is the only method by which an impersonal market can be organized without at the same time depriving it of its sensitiveness and power of expansion. The wages of a good cook or housemaid are just as well understood, and just as impersonal, as if they had been settled by the arbitration of a chamber of commerce or a long series of strikes. Servants' agencies, the advertisement columns of the papers, the good offices of friends, are sufficient to constitute an open labour exchange in which domestic servants have more than held their own. Any other organization of the market would have deprived it of its sensitiveness, for wages rise not because the whole bulk of the labour in a particular trade can at once command a higher price, but because in virtue of the bargain in detail the better class of labour gets a rise first, and establishes a precedent which others follow. Any other VII.] The Interest of the Working Class. 223 arrangement would have prevented the expansion of the market, and this perhaps is the most important point of all. If, by means of a trade union combination, attempt had been made to force the market in order to give to the servant something over the free market rate, it would .of course have prevented many people from employing servants. This actually has occurred in America, where the high wages of labour, and the greater equality of condition, have justly enough enabled domestic servants to set up higher pre- tensions. As a consequence, hotel life has been adopted by many American households which otherwise would have employed servants. In America this .is a natural and legitimate adjustment, for the free market enables those who would otherwise be servants to make a better use of their labour. In this country the conditions are different. To have kept persons willing to enter domestic service out of the market, without providing them with some equally good occupation, would have been most mischievous. The modern trade unionist is inclined to overlook these advantages of the free market, and to ignore the objections to the organization of the market by forced combination. Looked at from another point of view, it may be said that the favourable conditions of the domestic service market are due to the fact that the demand has always been in excess of the supply. This, again, is due to the continuous increase of wealth, and to the ever-growing number of persons who can afford to keep servants. This same increase of wealth gives rise to greater demand for all articles of consumption. Under a proper organization, therefore, there should be no break in the continuity of demand, for then the man who ' demands,' makes his demand effective by ' supplying ' some- thing in exchange. Only a free self-adjusting employment of labour and capital can discover what that ' something ' is, and what quantity of it is required. If by coercion of the market a higher price is kept up, say in miners' wages, than employers can for long afford to give, we lose the valuable warning of the free market which says, ' there is too much labour here already, let it be diverted elsewhere.' If, as must, I think, be 224 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vii. conceded, wealth, and consequently demand for something, is increasing, what is required is that new population shall be diverted to the making of this something, and not to producing more coal, which in the case considered is not wanted. Even under present restrictions demand does grow, but how much more rapidly would it grow if we really gave ourselves up to the free market, and allowed it to direct both labour and capital to the supplying of the thing that is really required. It is much to be feared that our present policy is rather in another direction. I may be wrong in thinking that labour will find its most profitable market in the entire absence of all combination, but if so, such combination as there is should surely not ignore the fact that all increase of wages must come from increase of supply, and that to restrict the supply of a thing that is not wanted is not as advan- tageous as to discover the thing that is wanted, and to set to work to create a supply of it. The strong belief which exists in most quarters as to the efiicacy of combination to increase the wages of labour, is based on the indubitable fact that when an industry is unprofitable, single sales of labour at a reduced price will come more rapidly than when labour is combined in one great association which stands and falls together. This is precisely the point on which I am insisting, namely, that the market is more sensitive if left uncombined. It should, however, be observed that what is true of a fall is true also of a rise of wages ; both will come more rapidly in a sensitive and free market. I have already given my reasons for think- ing that labour will of necessity have an enhanced value in proportion as the productive transactions, in which it forms a part, increase in number and in efficiency. If, then, the tendency of the price of labour in a free market is to rise, it might be argued that it is more important to keep the market sensitive for the sake of the rise that is inevitable, than to restrict the market for fear of the fall which is very unlikely. Further, though the values of gold and ground-rents are subject to fluctuations, it is clear that under a free organiza- tion of labour there can be no fluctuation, but only a growing VII.] The Interest of the Working Class. 225 intensity of demand for the proper things produced in their proper quantities and places. It is only through the organi- zation of an ever-increasing freedom of exchange that we can discover what these things are, and how and where they are to be produced. India is a country where the enterprise of Free Exchange is not very highly developed, yet during normal times, the staple foods of the country are circulated with unerring precision to the places where they are required. In times of famine it becomes the duty of the executive to provide maintenance for a starving population. The Indian Civil Service consists of a body of the most disinterested, most able, and most highly trained officials that the world has ever seen. Yet how inferior to the free principle of exchange have been their attempts to distribute the food of the people. In some famines they have failed utterly to gauge the requirements of the people, and wholesale starvation has been the result. At another time they have fallen into the opposite extreme, and there are instances on record where the grain has either rotted away, or where dealers have gone up into the famine districts in order to purchase the superfluous supply which the govern- ment had carried up at vast expense. So it is with the labour supply ; no human ingenuity can devise a system so likely to distribute it to advantage as that of an absolutely Free Exchange. While, therefore, I argue that a fall in wages is an event under a free system not likely to occur, there is something to be said for allowing the labour barometer to be extremely sensitive of the causes that tend to a fall of wages. Far from being matter of regret, it is on every account most desirable that labourers should have timely warning that too much enterprise of capital and labour is being applied to some particular industry. This indication they receive when wages show a tendency to fall, and the sooner this tendency makes itself felt the better. In each instance in which by a warning of this kind labour is diverted from one industry to another, a step is taken towards the perfecting of the market. Nothing but congestion of industry can follow from Q 226 A Policy of Free Exchange. [vii. a neglect of these signs ; in one market a glut of supply •which no one will purchase ; and elsewhere capital lying idle, and labour starving, because we have broken the machinery which would have attracted them to a point where they could have co-operated with profit. To those to whom the matter presents itself in this light, the wisdom of putting down coercively exchanges of labour which do not conform to Trade Union pattern will appear very doubtful. It will, for instance, appear to them manifestly unjust and by no means conducive to the object in view, to prevent an old man taking service at the best wages he can command, because those wages do not happen to be trade union wages. I have been informed that, as a consequence of obtaining a contract with the London County Council, which has faUen in with the views of trade unionists in this matter, a certain firm had to choose between dismissing a number of old workmen whose ability was failing, and employing them at a rate of wages which they were unable to earn. This crusade against the aged has without doubt thrown many very worthy persons out of employment, and in some places has increased the rate of pauperism. A similar policy is pursued with regard to the young and the less competent. Young men just out of their apprenticeship, and those who have not established a reputation for competence, are occa- sionally dismissed or rejected because the employer does not see his way to employ them at the wages of a fully competent man. This denial of a right of market prevents them from ever becoming competent, and they are left to deteriorate in the ranks of the unemployable. Society is then left face to face with the insoluble problem of how to employ an aggregation of the least competent labourers collected from all points of our industrial system. This difficulty of the un- employed is of our own creation. Collectively, the unemployed are the unemployable. Eemove these restrictions, and in small numbers, here a few, and there a few, this residuum will be distributed throughout our national industries by the ordinary action of Free Exchange. All will not exchange vil] The Interest of the Working Class. 227 at the same price, for there are different cualiries of labour, bm all will exchange at a price which at the moment i? an adxantage to all concerned, and that price must alwavs I*? an upward tending price. The trade unicns have a difficult and responsible task to perform, and for their main ■: r;ec:5 thev have the svTiir'&iLv of all feir-minded men. The qiestion at issue,, of Cviirse. is vheUier this restrictive policv is reallv wndueiTe 10 the end desired. Even if tiie wages-regulatinir policy of the unions conla be prove. 9.00I , 10,000 35 9.500 332,500 lA 5.649 „ 10,001 , 12,000 19 11,000 209,000 lA 3.762 „ 12,001 . 15.000 IS 13.500 202,500 lA 3,847 .. 15.001 , 20,000 10 17.500 175.000 2 3,500 „ 20,001 , 30,000 14 25,000 350,000 2A 7.350 „ 30,001 , 40,000 2 35.000 70,000 2 A 1.540 ,, 40,001 „ 50,000 I 45,000 45,000 2A 1.035 „ 50,001 a nd above 2 50,000 100,000 2A 2,400 43,661 31,020,700 334.266 Zurich, Vaud, Geneva, XJri and the Grisons, in which complete systems of these taxes exist, and many others in which a partial use of the principle is made ; and these systems are remarkable for the care with which they have been adapted to the circumstances of the people. The insuffi- ciency, however, of this fiscal method in the Swiss Confede- ration generally is shown by the marked tendency towards increased indirect taxation, which already, in 1881, amounted to 57-9 per 100^. ' A fairly full account of these taxes, whether on income or capital, real or personal estate, is given in a report by Mr. Buchanan (Foreign OfSoe, 1892; Miscellaneous Series, No. 267), 270 A Policy of Free Exchange. [viir. The returns of the new Prussian income tax for 1893-3, the first financial year since its introduction, do not prove much as to the efficacy of progression. There is an. increase of £3,364,201, in spite of the amount levied from smaller incomes having been decreased by £350,000; but 440,318 new taxpayers have been laid under requisition, including, for the first time, joint stock companies and trading associations. The moderate graduation adopted appears to meet the sense of justice in the community, and has not had the effect of causing any withdrawal of capital from the country. An agitation, of course, exists for increasing the tax on the higher incomes. It is interesting to observe that of incomes of £4,800 and over there are 1,780, while 'i,^ are over £45,000, 4 over £150,000, 3 over £350,000, and i of £350,000. The large figures are accounted for by the fact that the income of the mediatized princes have now, for the first time, been rendered amenable to taxation ^. The example of the Australian Colonies is so often quoted by democratic reformers that it is well worth while to see what, in regard to graduated taxation, that example really amounts to. The total revenue of the colony of Victoria^ in 1887 was £7,607,598, of which nearly 60 per cent, was raised from sources other than taxation, viz. : Crown Lands . . . £656,627 Eailways .... 2,741,488 Post and Telegraphs 485,533 Other Sources . . . 653,307 ^4,536,955 Whatever advantages such sources of revenue- may possess, they cannot be defended from the point of view of taxation as being charges on wealth. The railway revenue, for instance (36 per cent, of the whole revenue), is a tax on locomotion and on transport, not on ' realized riches.' ' Foreign Office, 1892 ; Misc. Series, year has been chosen before the recent No. 268. check to the Colony's prosperity; since ^ These figures are taken from which panegyrics of Victorian State Hayter's Victorian Year Boole ; and a Socialism have notably diminished. VIII.] The Principle of Progression in Taxation. 271 There remains 40 per cent, of the revenue which is drawn from taxation (as compared with 39-99 per cent, in Switzer- land and 84-25 in the United Kingdom in the same j'ear) of this revenue 75 per cent, (or 30 per cent, of the whole) was drawn from Customs and Excise, and therefore pressed unduly on the poor. The reinaining taxation, out of which alone can come any application of the principle of graduation, amounted to under 9 per cent, of the whole, and includes excise licences, stamps, succession and probate duties, property and income taxes, amounting to under £700,000. Under this head would fall the new forms of taxation directed against great estates, (i) the land tax and (2) the succession duty. The first of these is not graduated but is ' a tax with considerable exemptions, the classes of exemptions being so constructed that the tax is clearly intended to bring land into the market^.' The whole tax fell upon under 900 persons and brought in about £124,000 a year. The succession duty which brought in a slightly larger amount was graduated on a scale varying from 2 per cent, on small estates up to 10 per cent, on estates of over £100,000. We have said enough to show that, although the principle may be recognized and applied in most countries, the practice is certainly not to tax property in any undue proportion, if indeed sufficiently. It is not too much to say that in no stable civilized state has progressive taxation ever amounted to anything like confiscation of the larger incomes, such as is demanded by theoretic Socialism. Further, it does not appear by any means certain, from the experience of coun- tries where it has been tried, that much is to be gained from a revenue point of view by a progressive income tax. Taken by itself as a fiscal instrument, it has even been said that it must either amount to confiscation or it will be useless, that it must either aim at the destruction of private capital, in which case, to quote Proudhon's picturesque phrase, 'II aurait pour effet de refouler la richesse et de faire que le travailj comme un homme attach^ k un cadavre, embrasserait ' Sir C. Dilke, Problems of Greater Britain, vol. i. p. 192. 272 A Policy of Free Exchange. [viii. la misfere dans un accouplement sans fin; ' or that it will be moderate, and in this case will be little more productive than uniform or proportional taxation. The dilemma, how- ever, is probably less conclusive than it looks. It is rash to imagine that in a matter in which the habits of a people, the distribution of their wealth and the character of their government are all important factors, the example of one country can be of very great assistance to an- other. The same taxes, or similar methods of levying them, will not be suitable alike to tax-dodging America, frugal Switzerland and bureaucratic Prussia. But the question whether the circumstances of any particular country make it possible or desirable to adopt or develop a progressive system of taxation is one of practical finance upon which it has been no part of my design to touch, having had chiefly in view the greater question, namely, What ideal of justice should taxation endeavour to attain 1 Even if the comparative inutility of all existing systems of progressive taxation were established, this question would remain for solution; and, since a system of taxation will never be in its highest degree productive which does not conform to some standard of rightfulness in the heart of the taxpayer, it cannot well be neglected. The argument from Jevons' theory, if it is economically sound, has also the advantage of harmonizing with what we may take to be the rough-and-ready sense of justice of the ordinary man. It cannot, of course, be pushed too far ; and if it may be held to demonstrate in a general way that, in order to equalize the burden of taxation upon individuals and classes, a higher pro- portion should fall upon the larger than upon the smaller incomes, it does not help us to a practical scheme of pro- gressive rates, which has sometimes been deduced from it, and which can only be arrived at as the result of carefully guarded experiment. Taxation indeed belongs essentially to the domain of practical administration, and a conclusion based on considera- tions of theory, such as those discussed in this paper, must therefore of necessity be incomplete. The judgement of the Economists appears to deprive the principle, in its practical VIII.] The Principle of Progression in Taxation. 273 application, of much of the importance which has been claimed for it, but it entitles us at any rate to assume that progressive taxation, in its theoretical aspect, need neither be considered in the light of a socialistic bugbear, nor ridiculed as a mere 'joujou d^mocratique,' and that, if it be confined within bounds, some of which have been pointed out as essential to its safe and advantageous use, and if the object of equalizing taxation be clearly kept in view and the object of equalizing incomes be as clearly repudiated, it may be found a useful adjunct to a well-balanced fiscal system. Beenaed Mallet. IX. THE LA W OF TRADE COMBINATIONS. HON. ALFRED LTTTELTON. T 3 IX. THE LAW OF TRADE COMBINATIONS. The proximity into which men are now brought, and the almost bewildering ease with which they can communicate with one another, have given a strong impulse in business to the principle of combination. Combination is the motto of modern commerce. More and more is it apparent that iadustry will in the future be mainly in the hands of associated bodies. On the one side vast companies and amalgamations of companies quarter out the field in which capital circulates; on the other Trade Unions numbering members in thousands and tens of thousands organize and regulate labour. Already companies have practically absorbed the great operations of Land Transport and Fire and Life Insurance; soon Banking wiU pass also under their sway. The Salt Union, the United Alkali Company, and the pro- posed Coal Trust mark the advance in this country alone of ideas of even vaster enterprise. Yet outside the serried ranks of these great associations there yet exist a large though perhaps a diminishing number of individual capitalists and a still larger and probably not diminishing number of individual workmen. Combined capital, guided by salaried managers, measures its long purse and its long arms against the individual proprietor operating in a narrower area, but with more concentrated energy. Combined labour, strong in the discipline of the trade union, confronts the single craftsman, and brings irresistible pressure to bear on him, if he ventures to resist its authority. The interests of labour and capital, to those most nearly concerned, appear only too often to be divergent and furnish ample material 28o A Policy of Free Exchange. [ix- committed by one person would not be punishable as a crime. 'Nothing in this section shall exempt from punishment any persons guilty of a conspiracy for which a punishment is awarded by any Act of Parliament. ' Nothing in this section shall affect the law relating to riot, unlawful assembly, breach of the peace, or sedition, or any offence against the State or the Sovereign. ' A crime for the purposes of this section means an offence punishable on indictment, or an offence which is punishable on summary conviction, and for the commission of which the offender is liable under the statute making the offence punishable to be imprisoned either absolutely or at the discretion of the court as an alternative for some other punishment.' ' 7. Every person who, with a view to compel any other person to abstain from doing or to do any act which such other person has a legal right to do or abstain from doing, wrongfully and without legal authority, — '(i) Uses violence to or intimidates such other person or his wife or children, or injures his property ; or, '(a) Persistently follows such other person about from place to place ; or, ' (3) Hides any tools, clothes, or other property owned or used by such other person, or deprives him of or hinders him in the use thereof ; or, ' (4) Watches or besets the house or other place where such other person resides, or works, or carries on business, or happens to be, or the approach to such house or place ; or, ' (5) Follows such other person with two or more other persons in a disorderly manner in or thi'ough any street or road, shall, on conviction thereof by a court of summary juris- diction, or on indictment as hereinafter mentioned, be liable either to pay a penalty not exceeding twenty pounds, or to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding three months, with or without hard labour. 'Attending at or near the house or place where a person IX.] The Law of Trade Combinations. 281 resides, or works, or carries on business, or happens to be, or the approach to such house or place, in order merely to obtain or communicate information, shall not be deemed a watching or besetting within the meaning of this section.' Section 7, it will be seen, enumerates the various methods of coercion which from time to time have been employed by trade organizations, and may perhaps be said to comprehend the totality of such methods by the word ' intimidate.' It has been objected to this word that it is too vague, and if it be true, as many wise men think, that the criminal law should in all cases be rigidly precise in its definitions, it is a charge which we think is made out ; but there is more perhaps to be said in favour of a criminal statute that leaves something to the intelligence of the tribunal which administers its decrees than would at first be supposed. When for instance the word ' intimidate ' was limited as in a previous statute to actions which would justify a magistrate in binding over the intimidator to keep the peace, it was only human nature for men to ascertain precisely those actions which would cause the maximum of fear, without giving a magistrate such a jurisdiction. One of the most effectual penal statutes of modern times is the Corrupt Practices Act, 1883, which imposes fine and imprisonment on persons doing certain acts 'in and about the conduct and management of the election.' Now there is no definition in the statute of the time when an election commences, and during ten years no judge has laid down with precision this fatal hour. The result is that numerous offences subject to severe penalty are left vague. But the objectors to this vagueness are not purists in legal codification but old election hacks, who if the election period had been rigidly ascertained would only have ceased corrupt expenditure at midnight of the day before. A long stride in the clear definition of the word ' intimida- tion ' has now been made, so that the vice of vagueness, if it be a vice, is largely mitigated. As early as 1880 Mr. Justice Cave ruled that to constitute intimidation within the meaning of the section under consideration personal violence must be 282 A Policy of Free Exchange. [ix. threatened ; and in 189 1 the scope of the section, and in par- ticular the meaning of the word ' intimidation,' were considered and determined by five judges in two cases the importance of which justify a somewhat detailed reference. Gibson v. Lawson. In this case, in Dec. 1890, a workman named Gibson, a member of a trade union called the National Society of Engineers, was employed as a fitter by Messrs. Palmer & Co. shipbuilders in Northumberland. Another workman, by name Lawson, a shop delegate and a member of another trade union, the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, was employed in a like capacity at Messrs. Palmers. On Dec. 3 the Amal- gamated Society of Engineers met and resolved not to work at Messrs. Palmer's after Dec. 6 unless Gibson joined their union. Lawson communicated this resolution to Messrs. Palmer's foreman, who repeated it to Gibson. Gibson there- upon refused to leave his trade union or to join the other, and in consequence, and in order to avoid the threatened strike, Messrs. Palmer's foreman dismissed Gibson from his employ- ment. No violence or threats of violence either to person or to property were used to Gibson, but he swore that he was afraid, in consequence of what Lawson said, that he would lose his work and get no more at any place where the Amalgamated Society predominated numerically over his own society. Lawson was afterwards prosecuted for having wrongfully and without legal authority intimidated Gibson, under section 7, sub-section (i) of the Statute of 1875. On these facts it was held by a court consisting of five judges that the action of Lawson implied no threat whatever of personal violence, and was not ' intimidation.' It was also observed that the Statute of 1875 expressly legalized strikes, and that a conspiracy, by means of a strike thus legalized, to coerce another's will, notwithstanding certain decisions of Lord BramweU and Lord Esher, could not be indictable. Regarding this decision from a purely legal point of view, IX.] The Law of Trade Combinations. 283 it is to be observed that in the repealed Act of 1871, which dealt -with the same subject as the Statute of 1875, the word ' intimidation ' was limited to such intimidation as would justify a magistrate in binding over the intimidator to keep the peace towards the person intimidated. In the Statute of 1875 Parliament enacted the seventh section containing the word ' intimidation ' without any such limitation. It has been a matter of surprise to many lawyers that the word ' intimidation ' was construed in face of this contrast as if the limitation of the Act of 187 1 were still in force. Two reasons only are given in the report for this decision : (i) The changing temper of the times on the subject ; (a) That the Statute of 1875 was preceded by a Royal Commission which recom- mended a relaxation of the law in favour of trade unions. As to (i), it is submitted that though it is quite sound to permit 'the changing opinion of the times' to modify a common law rule, for such a rule is founded on custom, it is quite unsound to extend such reasoning to a statute. For a statute is to be construed according to the intention of those who passed it, and to construe it, not according to that intention as gathered from its tenor, but according to the fluctuating opinions of its readers, seems obviously to introduce confusion and uncertainty. As to (2), it is not legally permissible to read or even refer in argument to the debates preceding the passage of an Act, still less to the report of a Royal Commission on which it is supposed to be based. It is moreover inaccurate to say that the Royal Commissioners recommended a relaxation of the law as regards intimidation, on the contrary, they advised that no relaxation should here be made. CUKRAN V. TBELEAVEN. In this case the Secretaries of certain trade unions had been convicted before the Recorder of Plymouth of wrongful intimidation under the section above referred to. The Recorder stated the following case for the consideration of the Court of Queen's Bench before giving efifect to the conviction. 284 A Policy of Free Exchange. [ix. The appellant and two other secretaries of trade unions, in order to prevent the respondent employing non-union men, informed him that if he did not cease to do so, they would call off from their employment by him all the members of their respective unions. After a meeting of the unions, at which it was resolved that this course should be adopted, the appellant and the other secretaries, in the presence of the respondent, whom they asked to attend, made the following statement to the respondent's workmen and others who were assembled: — 'Inasmuch as Mr. T. (i.e. the respondent) still insists on employing non-union men, we, your officials, call upon all union men to leave their work. Use no violence, use no immoderate language, but quietly cease to work, and go home.' The union men in consequence ceased to work. Held, that there was no evidence of intimidation by the appellant within the meaning of the section, and that the conviction must be quashed. The reasons for this decision may be presumed to be the same as those given in the first case, as no others germane to the subject are given in the report. Whatever legal criticism may be suggested on the reasons given for these decisions, the law, as laid down in them, has at least the merit of being clear, and I venture to predict the result that no prosecutions will be undertaken under section 7, sub-section (i) of the Statute of 1875 unless proof can be given that physical force has been used or threatened. The other ofiences aimed at by the second, third, fourth, and fifth sub-sections are defined with great clearness, and require no comment here. It seems then that if in such cases as the above, the only resort to the criminal law against trade combinations left open to employers and workmen be the Statute of 1875, the conclusion follows that subjects of the Queen, owing allegiance only to the law of the land, can, against their will, be brought under the dominion of a power which they detest, and to which in a free country they owe no obedience, and that too, in matters so vital to them, as on the one hand the employment of their capital, and the hiiing of their workmen, IX.] The Law of Trade Combinations. 285 and on the other the expenditure of their income, the hours, methods, nay even the disposal of their labour. For it is idle to say that a power is not absolute which, though bound to abstain from physical violence, is yet at liberty to bring upon a fellow-subject industrial ruin. Such a conclusion is startling, for every one knows that the remedies of the civil law, for workmen at any rate, against trade unions are practically beyond their means or opportunities. (&) The common law crime of conspiracy. It has been too readily assumed, probably owing to some dicta in the cases above mentioned which were unnecessary for their decision, that outside the provisions of the Statute of 1875. the criminal law is powerless against combinations of capitalists and workmen. I propose to consider two doctrines of the common law relating to conspiracy which appear to be available against such combinations. There is authority that the following agreements are criminal. I. Agreements between more persons than one to do acts which are injurious to the public, or as Sir James Stephen puts it, ' Agreements between more persons than one to carry out purposes which the judges regarded as injurious to the public' 3. Agreements where, with malicious design to do an injury, the purpose is to effect a wrong though not such a wrong as when perpetrated by a single individual would amount to an offence under the criminal law. I. The statement of this rule appears and is extraordinarily vague. Convictions have in the past been obtained against persons conspiring to impoverish the farmers of excise, so as to make them incapable of rendering the king his revenue, against combinations of officers to throw up their commissions in times of danger, and against persons combining to disturb the price of the funds by false rumours. But the principle has never been applied, in England at any rate, against rings of capitalists or unions of workmen, and though it is possible to conceive cases in which the national importance of the industries affected might justify its use, no judge would venture to enforce it in cases such as those we have considered. 286 A Policy of Free Exchange. [ix. 3. The second prlnc!ij)](i lias the authority of the l<'iim1 Report of the Royal (.'(jiruniHHion on the Labour Laws in 1 87.(5 (a CommisBion which containod, lunong others, Jjord (Jliiof Justice (Jockbum,, Sir M. Smith, Mr. Russell Ournoy, Mr. Roebuck, and Mr. Tlioinas lliifflKiH), Ikih biien sup- ported by dicta of the (Jourt ol' Appeal, and its rcaHon- ing adopted in cases of high authority in Americu. If tlio principio be applied to tlio facts of the caso of (jibson v. Lawson I do not think it can l)o doulitod that in tlio ubHontio of the exempting section of the Statute of 1 87,'^, Lawson and those who acted with him would have boon found K"''*y legally of a criminal conspiracy. Their imincdiati; intention was to induce Gibson's omployorH to briiiik tlioir contract with him. Such an intention is malicious inlaw, oven though there be no personal ill-will. Their remoio object was to force Gibson to leave his trade union and join another, i.e. to infringe his legal right to belong to any union he thought fit. Then does the third section of the Stiiiute of 187,1; ex(!inf)t such a eornbination from the law of criminal conHjiiraey ■? That section, it will be rememliered, enacts that 'An agreement or combination by two or more jjersfiriH to do w procure to be done any act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute between employers and workmen shall not bo indiet- able as a conspiracy if such act committed by one pf^rHon would not be indictable as a crime.' TMs section has beisn judicially declared to have expressly legalized strikes. I'lit if it is closely scrutinized it will be fouml to exempt strikes from tlie operation of the Criminal liaw of Consfjiraey only when the agreements at their root are ' in furtherane.e or con- templation of a trade dispute between ernjiloyerH and work- men.' 'i'he whole history of this legislation shows that the object of Parliament in granting this exemjition was to remove all fetters from Laboui' which might seem to cramp it unfairly in the struggle with (.ajjita]. The caiiitalist, it was argued, is a combination in himself. The labourer should then lie free also to com?jino. The intention of I'ai'liarnent was not to give a dominance which might easily become a tyranny cithiir to rings of capitalists or unions of workmen, but to place IX.] The Law of Trade Combinations. 287 workmen so far as possible on terms of equality in competition with capitalists. The exemption of section 3 accordingly- only operates to make agreements otherwise criminal not criminal when they are made in the course or genuine con- templation of a trade dispute between employers and workmen. The belligerents must not be employers and employers or workmen and workmen, but employers and workmen, and there is no sanction in the statute for the notion, now widely prevalent, that a ring of capitalists can combine to ruin rival capitalists, or that a trade union can combine to ruin non- unionists, by wrongfully injuring them. The mere cover of a strike is not of itself to render not criminal all agreements attendant on its inception. It will be seen, therefore, that had Lawson and his friends, for example, been indicted for a common law conspiracy, and had their action been brought within the terms of the definition under consideration, they would not (it is submitted) have been entitled to an acquittal by virtue of section 3 of the Statute of 1875, unless the jury found as a fact that the agreement to procure the dismissal of Gibson had been in bona fide contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute between the defendants and their em- ployers. II. As already indicated, it is not intended to discuss the civil remedies of those aggrieved by the actions of trade com- binations, beyond adverting in detail to two recent decisions of the Courts in which these remedies have been elaborately discussed, and which illustrate in a very salient manner the bearing of the modern law in this connexion. The first of these cases is called The Mogul S. S. Company v. McGregor, Gow & Co. (1889), and will be hereafter referred to as 'the Mogul case.' In that case the defendants were a number of ship- owners who formed themselves into a league or conference for the purpose of ultimately keeping in their own hands the control of the tea-carriage from certain Chinese ports, and for the purpose of driving the plaintiffs and other competitors from the field. In order to succeed in this object, and to discourage the plaintiffs' vessels from resorting to those ports, 288 A Policy of Free Exchange. \}^- the defendants during the 'tea harvest' of 1885 combined to offer to the local shippers very low freights, with a view of generally reducing or ' smashing ' rates, and thus rendering it unprofitable for the plaintiffs to send their ships thither. They offered, moreover, a rebate of five per cent, to all local shippers and agents who would deal exclusively with vessels belonging to the conference, and any agent who broke the condition was to forfeit the entire rebate on all shipments made on behalf of any and every one of his principals during the whole year — a forfeiture of rebate or allowance which was de- nominated as ' penal ' by the plaintiffs' counsel. It must, however, be taken as established that the rebate was one which the defendants need never have allowed at aU to their customers. It must also be taken that the defendants had no personal ill-will to the plaintiffs, nor any desire to harm them except such as was involved in the wish and intention to discourage by such measures the plaintiffs from sending rival vessels to such ports. In a judgement, which is a monument of legal learning and literary form, Lord Justice Bowen, supported by Lord Justice Fry and afterwards by the House of Lords, Lord Esher dissenting, held that this transaction was only the ' lawful pursuit to the bitter end of a war of competition waged by the defendants in the interest of their own trade,' and that, although a damage to the plaintiffs, intentional in the sense of being necessarily consequential on the defendants' action, had been proved, the defendants had just cause or excuse for inflicting such damage in the instinct of self-advancement and self-protection which is the incentive of all trade. 'To say that a man is to trade freely but that he is to stop short at any act which is calculated to harm other tradesmen and which is designed to attract business to himself, would be a strange and impossible counsel of perfection.' The funda- mental ground for this decision is that it is good for the community that competition should be unfettered and that the exercise of a trader's right to trade freely necessarily implies the right intentionally to injure other traders. To ruin a man's trade because you want to ruin him is unlawful, ix.J The Law of Trade Combinations. 289 but to do so because you want it for yourself is in obedience to a natural and legitimate instinct. Since the decision in the Mogul case was given, the action of certain trade unions combining to ruin a person who refused to fall into a scheme for imposing generally, throughout a trade, trade-union regulations, has been discussed in the Court of Appeal. In the case of Temperton v. Russell and others (1893), 'the defendants were members of a joint committee of three trade unions connected with the building trade in HuU. A firm of builders there having refused to obey certain rules laid down by the unions with regard to building operations, the unions sought to compel them to do so, by preventing the supply of building materials to them. In pursuance of this object, they requested the plaintiff, a master mason and builder in Hull, who supplied building materials to the firm, to cease to supply them with such materials, but the plaintiff refused to do so. Thereupon, with the object of injuring the plaintiff in his business, in order to compel him to comply with their request, the defendants induced persons who, to the knowledge of the defendants, had entered into contracts with the plaintiff for the supply of materials, to break their contracts, and not to enter into further contracts with the plaintiff, by threatening that workmen would be withdrawn from their employ. The plaintiff sustained damage in consequence of such breaches of contract and of the refusal of such persons to enter into contracts with him : — Held, That an action was maintainable by the plaintiff against the defendants for maliciously procuring such breaches of contract, and also for maliciously conspiring together to injure him by preventing persons from entering into con- tracts with him.' So far as this decision relates to the maliciously procuring persons to break contracts actually entered into, it merely declares well-settled law and is altogether beyond criticism. On the other hand, so far as it relates to a conspiracy to induce persons not to enter into contracts with others in the future, the decision has no precedent, and appears to be at least questionable. For, if it be sound, it would appear that 290 A Policy of Free Exchange. [ix. in all cases the most effective weapon, and in most cases the only weapon, of a trade union, one which has been used for many years — viz., the power to refuse the service of their members to employers, except upon stated terms — would be struck from their hands. In the Mogul case, for the purpose of establishing a mono- poly, the conference of shippwners undoubtedly used means which involved the intentional and injurious coercion of a dissentient fellow-trader. In Temperton v. Russell, for the purpose 'of improving the condition of labour' and in furtherance of a labour dispute, the trade unionists un-' doubtedly took certain active measures highly oppressive to the person against whom they were directed. It would be presumptuous to suggest that there are not weighty reasons to be given in support of a judgement of the Court of Appeal, but it is obvious that these two decisions do not make the state of the law clear. On one side, it will be argued that the cases are dis- tinguishable ; that in the Mogul case the defendants only did what any trader is entitled to do, viz., offer exceptional terms for continuous and exclusive custom, and use the power of combination, peacefully and without personal iU-will, to drive all competitors from the field. In the second case, the defendants, it might be argued, went beyond the legitimate furtherance of a trade dispute when they brought injurious pressure to bear on the affairs of one who was no party to that dispute. On the other side it will be maintained that the two cases ought to be governed by the same rule. The trade unionist will naturally insist that the object in both cases, viz., the improvement of their own market, was identical, and that the steps taken to secure this legitimate end were in both cases the same. If coercion by combination is legitimate in one case it ought to be legitimate in the other. A combination to prevent persons entering into future contracts was held legal in one case and it ought to be held legal in the other. Why is the capitalist's combination merely an incident in a war of competition, waged in the interest of their own IX.] The Law of Trade Combinations. 29 f trade, and the trade-union combination a malicious and illegal conspiracy? It is impossible to deny the force of this reasoning, but it would require another paper to discuss the possible develop- ments of legal decisions or statute law whereby the uncertainty of the situation can be removed. If these two cases are distinguishable, the exact ground of distinction will, no doubt, be made clearer in future decisions of the Courts ; if, on the other hand (and to this opinion I am disposed to incline) they are not distinguishable, there can be no doubt that the balance will be righted by the strict and unquestioned impartiality of the judicial bench. The object of this paper has been to consider the law affecting trade combinations as determined by recent decisions, and we are now in a position to sum up the result of our inquiry. So far as the law of crimes is concerned, we have seen that Parliament, assisted by the judges, has laboured in the main since 1875 to secure absolute equality of conditions to combatants in the war between labour and capital. The opinion has been hazarded that, so long as every form of physical force is avoided, trade disputants in combination have no interference to fear and trade dissentients no protection to expect from the law of conspiracy ; but that if, on the other hand, coercion is used, which, without the excuse of a war between labour and capital, would be otherwise unlawful, the power of the law may successfully be called in. So far as the civil law is concerned it has been submitted that the principle of acknowledging every man's right to trade freely has been applied by the Courts in a sense which has accorded to combined capitalists a privilege not granted to the trade union. Further, it has been suggested that, while more use might have been made of the criminal law for the protection of dissentients against trade unions which may act oppressively, on the other hand the power of the civil law has been unduly strained against labour combinations. Whatever may be the justice of these conclusions, the 292 A Policy of Free Exchange. [ix. discussion has revealed the great complexity of the subject. The law is being called on to deal with a new and very difficult set of circumstances. The power of combinations, such as we have been considering, is always very great and sometimes very oppVessive. It is not too much to say that individuals are at times made subject not only to the law of the Queen, but also to the law of the Combination. The possibility of oppression and the difficulty of dealing with it are equally obvious, and it seems a dismal view of the future to say that the law can do no more than keep the ring on equal terms for the combatants in these disastrous and often ferocious contests. But we are here considering only the legal aspects of the question ; whether in the future it may be thought desirable to legislate for the protection of private citizens against the tyranny of combinations, the future only can decide. In conclusion, some hope may be gleaned from the advance of conciliatory principles. In the controversies of nations, for instance, although the law of force is still predominant, the greatest and most civilized races are beginning, timidly and fitfully, it is true, to look to arbitration. In industrial disputes, such as those which have been considered, the element of race animosity is absent, and the interests of the opponents are often not really conflicting. Is it Utopian to hope that the great waste and suffering of war between Labour and Capital may gradually give place to more civilized and more rational methods 1 Alfred Lyttelton.