CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF THE AFFECTIVE PROCESSES BY f TAIZO NAKASHIMA Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924073670444 CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARV 1924 073 670 444 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF THE AFFECTIVE PROCESSES^ By Taizo Nakashima PAOE Introduction i,» I. The Affective Judgment .' 158 (i) Experiments with Tones 159 (2) Experiments with Colors 175 II. The Method of Single Stimuli 178 III. Incidental Results ' . . 183 IV. The Method of Discriminative Reaction .... 187 The writer's interest in the psychology of the affective pro- cesses dates from the year 1896, when he read Wundt's Grund- riss der Psychologic, and in conjunction with Professor Motora began a translation of that work into the Japanese language. Hence, when opportunity arrived for the undertaking of ad- vanced work, in the laboratories of Harvard and Cornell Universities, he naturally chose the feelings as a subject of special research. The experimental results obtained in the Harvard laboratory, under the direction of Professor Mtinster- berg, will be published in another place. The present paper gives the results of three investigations pursued in the Cornell laboratory during the years 1907- 1909. It is to be said at the outset that these investigations have not been made upon any systematic plan. In the present state of affective psychology, no such plan is possible, save to those who adopt the attitude and theories of a particular school. The writer entered upon them with an open mind, and believes that he has impartially recorded their outcome. He has sim- ply sought to experiment at points where experimentation appeared feasible and desirable. So far as space allowed, he has given the observers' judgments and reports in their own words. Nevertheless it may quite well be the case that his interpretation and conclusions seem to the reader to lay undue 1 From the Psychological Laboratory of Cornell University. 158 NAKASHIMA J emphasis here and to show undue neglect there. The handling '"*> of a large body of introspective material, obtained in experi- ;^fr ments that continued for several months, is at best a difficult -. task ; and there is something misleading in the printed account, <-QO even if it is objectively correct, since all the sentences stand kl I. out at the same level, without the shading and subordination ** that appear in the spoken reports. Hence the writer desires (<^QOto say here, at the very beginning, that no interpretation or ' conclusion is offered in the following pages that is not accept- able to the observers themselves. Wherever there was doubt as to the meaning of a report, the observer was consulted, and ■i ... was asked to supplement or explain. '"^SSl^^T^ The paper falls into four parts : I. a study of the mechanism ^ ' <^ 6;f the affective judgment; II. a study of the Reizmetkode; ■^HI. an account of incidental results, bearing upon current Effective problems, which were obtained in the course of the •preceding studies; and IV. a study of affective process by the . 5^e^thod of the discriminative reaction. ^ I. Thb Apfbctivb Judgment When an observer, in work done by means of some one of the regular metric methods of psychophysics, makes a record of 'like' or 'different', 'present' or 'absent', we say that he has passed a sensory judgment. When the observer makes this record in work upon the affective processes, we say that he has passed an affective judgment. The phrases are parallel, and suggest an identity, or at any rate a similarity, of mental mechanism. Nevertheless, our knowledge of the two sorts of judgment is very different. Stumpf, for instance, bases his whole psychophysical theory upon the fact of the universality of the sensory judgment, and defines psychophysics itself as the concluding chapter of a "quantitative science of judg- ment".* Whether or not we accept this view, we cannot doubt that the position is tenable and arguable; enough is known of the sensory judgment to make its facts available for theory. On the other hand, our knowledge of the affective judgment is practically nil. Scattered hints towards its psy- chology may be found in the various investigations carried out by the method of impression. But no one appears to have askfed, or to have sought experimentally to answer, the ques- tion: What precisely goes on in consciousness when I judge 'pleasant', 'indifferent', 'unpleasant', or 'more (less) pleasant', 'more (less) unpleasant'? There are, of course, many cases in which this question is rendered nugatory by the writer's general conception of affec- tive process. If affective tone or algedonic tone is merely an > C. Stumpf: Tonpsychologie, i, 1883, §§ 1-7; Titchener, Exper. Psychol; II, ii, 1905, clxi ff. STUDY OP THE AFFBCTIVB PROCESSBS 1 59 attribute of sensation, co-ordinate with intensity and quality, then the afective judgment is a sensory judgment akin to that of 'louder' or 'fainter', 'blue' or 'red*. If affection is itself sensation, organic sensation or centrally excited concomitant sensation, then again the affective judgment is a sensory judg- ment, akin to judgments of kinsesthesis or of synsesthesis. The former hypothesis, however, may be summarily dismissed; it cannot be seriously maintained, in the present state of psy- chology, that feeling is an attribute of sensation. The latter hypothesis is now on trial, in various forms, and has been accepted by many psychologists of standing. But there are at least as many, of equal standing, who assert the independ- ence of affection as an elementary mental process. We cannot, therefore, assume without examination that a study of the affective judgment is superfluous, or identify that judgment outright with sensory judgment. Experiments with Tones Of the three principal forms of the method of impression, the serial method, the method of single stimulus, and the method of paired comparisons, the last was chosen in the present ex- periment as the method of procedure. As regards the selection and duration of stimuli, the interval between observations, and general experimental conditions, Titchener's method in his harmonical experiment was repeated as closely as possible, ex- cept in a few points where differences were necessitated by the divergent aim of the present investigation. The reasons for repeating these experimental conditions are as follow. Titch- ener's article in the Wundt Festschrift^ contains definite indica- tions as to the nature of the affective judgment, and Hayes' study" by the same method strongly confirms Titchener's con- clusions. But these indications were brought out by way of evidence for the dual theory, as against Wundt'ls tridimen- sional theory, of affective process. Hence, although the two papers in question contain many suggestions with regard to the nature of affective judgment, and although the conclusions are based upon careful introspective records, yet the results are in so far indirect as that they were obtained incidentally, in the course of work upon a wider problem, the problem of the num- ber of elementary affective qualities. On this account it is im- portant to repeat Titchener's and Hayes' experiments, and to confirm or to refute their conclusions. Another and, from the standpoint of systematic psychology, iTitchener: Ein Versuch, die Methode der paarweisen Vergleichung aufdie verschiedenen GefUhlsrichtungen amuwenden, Philos. Studien, XX, 1902, 382 ff. ^Hayes: A Study of the Affective Qualities, Amer. Journ. Psychol., X.V11, 1906, 358 ff. l6o NAKASHIMA a still more important reason for the repetition of these experi- ments lies in the fact that the nature of their 'subjective evi- dence' suggests the existence of simple, elementary affective processes, and tells against the view that makes feeling a resultant or mediated experience. Again, however, the intro- spective indications do not demonstrate the independent ex- istence of an affective element, nor did the authors directly approach this problem. There can, then, be no doubt that we have here a definite point of departure for a further experimental study of the affective problem. It remains to decide how, in detail, the method of paired comparisons shall be applied. Titchener applied his method to two of the three Wundtian dimensions; while Hayes, for sufiScient reasons, extended it, and attempted to take into account, for one and the same set of stimuli, all three of the affective dimensions. In the pres- ent study, the observers were required to pass judgment only in terms of pleasantness and unpleasantness (F-U), except when the affective reaction was 'doubtful'. This limitation is justified by the considerations: (i) that while no one denies the validity of P-Uas an affective dimension,^ all. other dimen- 1 In the Journal of Philos. Psychol, and Set. Meth., iv, 1907, 190, C. H. Johnston remarks that "it is not quite accurate to say that 'no one denies the validity of P-U as a feeling dimension'". He cites the work of C. Minnemann, Atmnng und Puis bei aktuellen Affekten (Martins' Beitrage, i, 4, 1905, 514 ff.), asserting that the author "is inclined to give up the P-U hypothesis as not serviceable, in that there are found for them {i.e., for P and U] no distinguishing charac- teristic physiological symptoms". The reader will not find this state- ment in Minnemann. This writer is discussing emotions, not simple feelings; and he is examining them in the light of their expression in pulse and breathing. What he says is that, if you set to work to classify emotions in the light of physiological Affektbilder, you will not get much beyond the old division into sthenic and asthenic states. Johnston is probably quoting a remark made, not by Minnemann, but by Martins {ibid., 512J, to the effect that "festznstehen scheint auch, dass Lust und TJnlust in keiner Weise bestimmte Symptomenkom- plexe besitzen, durch welche sie sich voneinander unterscheiden". But this fact, if fact it be, has nothing to do with the validity of P-U as an affective dimension. Johnston further says that "Royce . . . finds many affective states which do not exhibit the P-U dimension". So he does, and so does Wundt ; but neither denies the existence of the P-U feelings ; see Royce, Outlines of Psychol., 1903, 178. To main- tain that P-U is an affective dimension is not to maintain that all affections are necessarily comprised within that dimension; and, simi- larly, to maintain that some feelings are feelings neither of P nor of U is not to maintain that P and U are not feelings. "It will be re- called further," says Johnston, "that for Binet also the fundamental feeling opposition is not of the P-U type, but rather of the nature of an activity-repose dimension." If the reference is to the work of Binet and Courtier, in Annie psychol., iii, 1897, 65 ff., it is no more relevant than that to Minnemann. The Affektbilder are, again, de- pendent rather on the intensity than on the quality of the emotion ; but the writers speak, without hesitation, of emotions and ideas that STUDY OF THE APFBCTIVE PROCESSES l6l sions are matters of dispute, and (2) that our immediate prob- lem is not that of the number of the affective qualities, but that of the determination of the nature of the affective judg- ment. The method employed, therefore, is the same as that de- scribed by Titchener and Hayes, save for the limitation just stated, and for one important and a few minor differences, to be mentioned below. The same harmonical and noiseless pen- dulum, marking seconds, were used. The 24 tones in the three octaves C-c (64-128VS.), c*-«^ (256-512VS.), V'-c* (1,024- 2,048vs.) were combined in all possible ways, thus giving a series of 276 pairs of tones. The series was first formed by chance, and then so rearranged that the same tone should never occur in two successive pairs. Which tone of a pair should be given first was also determined by chance. In the earlier studies, this series was given 12 times to each observer; 6 times upward (lower tone first), and 6 times downward (upper tone first); so that there was a total of 3,312 experi- ments for each observer, exclusive of 'Make-up' experiments. In the present experiment, the series was not repeated, and only the total number of 276 pairs of tones was given to each observer. Number of experiments was here less important than full and accurate observation, since we were to make no appeal to the 'curves' which present in quantitative form the course of the affective judgment, but had introspective analysis as our primary object. The whole series of 276 pairs was given in precisely the same order to both observers. In most experiments, the two observed together sitting with their backs to the harmonical, about 2 meters from it, with a screen be- tween them. The experiments were made at weekly intervals during the months of November, December, 1907, and January, 1908;^ the hour, 2-3 p. m., was kept constant. The observers were instructed to judge of the relative pleasantness of the tones in the pairs sounded. They were told to listen to each tone separately, and to analyze their judgments introspectively, as fully and accurately as possible; especially they were to note the basis, motives, cues, in short, the means by which these judgments were or seemed to be effected. After ten pairs of tones had been presented, the observers began to write down their introspections; no limit of time was set, but in general a period often to fifteen minutes was found sufficient. The ex- perimenter had intended to allow five minutes for rest as near the middle of the hour as the work permitted, but the observers are 'gaies' and 'tristes'. Finally, Johnston refers to Mach; but see Analyse der Empfindungen, 1900, 14! iThe interval of a full week was chosen with a view to the avoid- ance of any possible habituation, of which, we may here say, there was not the slightest trace throughout the experiments. 1 62 NAEASBIMA. declared that this interruption was unnecessary, and for the most part continued throughout the hour without any relaxa- tion. The actual procedure of an experiment is as follows. The experimenter stands before the harmonical with one foot upon the raised pedal, the paper containing the series of the tones in his left hand, the pendulum bob in his right. At the signal "ready," he releases the bob and presses down the first note to be sounded. After two full swings of the bob (2 seconds), he treads once quickly and once slowly upon the pedal, and keeps a strong, even tone sounding for two swings of the bob. Then, after two seconds of silence, the second tone is sounded for two seconds in the same way. An interval of from 2 to 6 seconds is allowed, between the pairs of tones, for the record- ing of the judgment. After the J4ist pair, this interval was increased to 30 .sec, to allow of the writing of short notes upon important points of observation, and to prevent a possible lapse of memory during the remainder of the ten comparisons. This arrangement was continued until the 171st pair, when the observers decided that the interval was unnecessarily long, and the time was accordingly reduced to 15 seconds for the rest of the series. The occasional unevenness in the intensity of the tones, the noises from the mechanism of the organ, the occasional creaks of the pedal in certain kinds of weather, noises within and without the building, the peculiar character of a few tones (c was apt to sound suddenly and at high intensity; d^ and c* were rather faint; c* now and again developed a tremolo) — these dis- turbances and variations in the stimuli were of no material consequences for our problem. Moreover, the high degree of training of the observers showed itself in the rapid development of power of concentration, and in the complete ignoring of the disturbing factors. We were, therefore, not obliged to repeat in 'Make-up' series the occasional tests into which these dis- turbances and variations entered. The results of the experiment are embodied in the intro- spective records of the observers. G's records are presented below in their entirety, so that any possible arbitrariness of quotation and conclusion is out of the question. Insight and accuracy are individually different, and the same materials may admit of different conclusions. But the introspective records here quoted stand for the facts observed, and repre- sent the actual reaction of the observer. Observer G is Mr. I,. R. Geissler, assistant in the psychological laboratory. G had had 3 years experience in experimental work, and had already taken part in extended affective studies. He is musical. Introspective record I. ist to loth pair I (a'-e^) first Judgment usually very difficult. There was hardly STUDY OF THB AFFECTIva PROCESSBS 1 63 2 ic-c^) first any inherent afiective tone in the stimulus. Judg- 3 (a'-«i) second ment was arrived at by reasoning about the differ- 4 (d'-d^) second ent attributes of the two tones; for instance, the 5 (g^-D) second one tone was smoother, more evenly blown (in- 6 (B-e^) first tensively). The highest tones usually call forth 7 {^S ) second a frowning and twitching in the eye-lids. I am 8 i^'S^X ^''st afraid I am not yet in the right mood; I am some- 9 {P-S'') first what constrained in my bodily attitude. 10 («*-/*) second In the above record, the figures in the first vertical row indicate the number of the pair sounded for comparison, while the word 'first' or 'second' in the third row indicates the observer's judgment that the first or the second tone of the pair was the more pleasant. In the re- maining records, these data are omitted. Record II. nth to 20th pair This series was rather irregular because of disturbances. I never could get into a truly affective mood. My judgments were still made intellectually, by deciding on the different attributes of each tone. Record III. 21st to 30th pair Closed my eyes, took the most comfortable bodily position, and let myself go entirely. Kept all foreign ideas out of my mind, and tried to keep myself in a perfectly constant and unchanged mental and bodily attitude. Now whichever of the two tones was more confirm- ing in this, or whichever was less disturbing, was felt as the more pleasant. . Record IV. 31st to 40th pair Was more difficult than last time to get into an entirely restful, quiet attitude. Consciousness was several times disturbed by external noises and ideas associated with them. Otherwise, I tried to make judgments on the same basis as before. Of my body I seemed to be unconscious altogether. The tone which disturbed me the less by fewer parallel other sensations and associated ideas was called the more pleasant. The tone whose qualities could easily be analyzed or forced themselves singly into focus was unpleasant. Record V. 41st to 50th pair In these cases the pleasantness was usually decided on the basis of some quality in the two tones. I was not yet able to get into the right mood. Associations aroused by the tones also sometimes de- cided the affective judgment. There seems to have been an entire absence of organic sensations, as far as I remember; i. e., the judg- ment must have been based only on the external stimulus. Record VI. 51st to 6oth pair I am at a loss to say why I liked the one tone better than the other. I know I am somewhat biased in favor of the lower tones anyhow, but I try to neglect this. My judgments are the conclusions drawn from an intellectual comparison of the different qualities in the two tones, the tone which comes nearer to a pure tone being called more pleas- ant. But I am unable to discover a purely affective elementary pro- cess in my consciousness. Record VII. 6lst to 70th pair Tried to let tones make their impression without writing down the judgment, but found that I could not get much, because the tones did not have much affective quality in them, and associated ideas tried 164 NAKASHIMA to take the place of the affective judgment; only two or three pairs seemed to have something essentially different in the affective color- ing of their respective members. But this shows that compulsory affective'judgment is artificial. Record VIII. 71st to 8oth pair Was still trying to quiet down after a fast walk; the lower tones were more quieting and soothing than the higher, and therefore more pleasant. By more quieting I mean that they seem to have a slowing effect upon breathing (and perhaps on pulse as felt in temples). Record IX. 8ist to 90th pair Much more difficult to judge this time. Decided mainly by the quali- ties of roughness or smoothness in tones. I am not sure whether the lower tones are not more conducive to my general mood of quiet phlegmaticism. The lower tones do not disturb my organic equilib- rium, do not seem to call for any kind of conscious muscular read- justment, while the higher tones do, sometimes very distinctly so. Record X. 91st to looth pair I don't know whether there was anything peculiar in the different octaves. I know the tones made very little impression upon me one way or another; they hardly changed my general mood, and I simply judged them more pleasant by the presence of greater smoothness. Record XI. loist to iioth pair Most notes were hardly pleasant at all, only in so far as my general mood was not disturbed by them. Only the very high tones are less pleasant distinctly, and always cause an involuntary frown. Occa- sionally I noticed my breathing and thought it rather deeper and longer than commonly. Record XII. iiith to 120th pair I was somewhat distracted by various things, and my mood was not very constant. The judgment was made more or less on the basis of secondary qualities in the tones; i. e., they are logical constructions rather than indications of feelings. The whole situation as such was not very pleasant; there was much anxiety about the unsuccessful- ness. This anxiety seemed to be an irregular flow of ideas, sometimes smoother and easier than at other times. Record XIII. 121st to 130th pair This time the general mood was better, almost indifferent, and the tones that disturbed it less were judged more pleasant. For the first time I noticed a mass of organic sensations trying to claim my atten- tion, especially in the intervals between the pairs. I cannot say whether these organic sensations had anything to do with the general mood or the various feelings in particular; I simply noticed their presence. Record XIV. 131st to 140th pair The tones were more indifferent than ever before; even the highest ones no longer cause any great affective disturbance of the general mood. I had to guard myself against perfunctory judgments and asked myself again and again: Which tone do I actually like the better? Record XV. 141st to 150th pair My general mood of undisturbed indifference was very little or sometimes not at all changed by the various tones. The judgments were made on an inferential basis. Sometimes a few organic changes were noticed, but they did not seem to influence or be influenced by the general mood or even the tones. STUDY OF THB AFFBCTIVB PROCESSBS 1 65 Record XVI. 151st to i6oth pair The long intervals between the pairs (30 sec.) allowed me to fall into a kind of sleepy drowsy mood of a distinctly pleasant character. Now whichever of the two tones disturbed this mood more was judged more unpleasant. Some tones seemed to be surprisingly different either as to loudness or smoothness or both, and thus their affective tone was more easily determined by the greater surprise which they set up and which was unpleasant. Also the momentary awakening and writing down of the judgments was more or less unpleasant. Record XVII. i6ist to 170th pair The situation was very similar to the one before. I find my previous observations confirmed, and merely tried to rule out the element of surprise as far as possible. I noticed also that the more unpleasant tones sometimes evoke a tendency to some facial muscular reactions, but only once did I feel an actual frowning, perhaps because my attention was not especially concentrated on this element. Record XVIII. 171st to 180th pair The only way I seem to be able to judge real pleasantness and un- pleasantness is to let myself go entirely, to become passive, and to remain in a very constant, even half-sleepy mood and observe which of the two tones arouses me more or less to a normal state and which leaves me in the same mood as before. The tone which leaves me in the drowsy mood or disturbs me less in it, is the more pleasant. The tone which brings me back to a more normal mood of everyday life is more unpleasant. Record XIX. i8ist to 190th pair Somewhat similar to last series, although the mood was not so phlegmatic and drowsy. I cannot remember that any organic sensa- tions disturbed me or came into notice at all. The general feeling of indifference seems indescribable. The judgments arouse sometimes ideational associations, but these come rather after the figure [in- dicating judgment] is written down. Sometimes also, after the writing, I catch myself reflecting on other qualities of the tones compared. Record XX. 191st to aooth pair This time my attention seemed more labile; several times I found myself thinking of other topics. Hence the tonal judgments were made entirely on the affective basis. Only once I was doubtful, and began to reflect on the other qualities of the two tones compared. Toward the last the question occurred to me: Which of the two tones would disturb me less, or to which of them could I adapt myself more perfectly and more easily? The answer coincided with the more pleasant tone. Record XXI. 201st to 210th pair It seemed much easier to make the judgments, except in the doubt- ful cases. My attention was more concentrated than before, and idea- tional associations were easily kept out. My general mood was an easy let-go feeling; no organic or other sensations disturbed me. Record XXII. 211th to 220th pair Was less restful than before, also disturbed by wandering attention. But most of the judgments were easily made; perhaps because there was a great difference in pitch between the tones in the pairs. Record XXIII. 221st to 230th pair I have not yet got into a really comfortable mood of indifference, 1 66 NAKASHIMA and it was harder for me to make the judgments than before. Still I think I made them in the same fashion as before, letting myself go, giving myself up to the tonal pair and letting myself be affected by them, either the one way or the other. Once or twice I noticed with very high tones a strain in the right tympanic membrane. Record XXIV. 231st to 240th pair This time it was easier for me to make my judgments. Nor was I bothered by organic sensations. I just feel comfortable, and if a tone does not disturb me in this feeling I call the tone more pleasant._ I don't remember any associated ideas or trains of thought; I was sim- ply passively listening. Record XXV. 241st to 250th pair The situation was much as before. There is hardly anything to add. Twice, after the judgment was made, it occurred to me that I have heard the same tonal interval once before to-day, but this con- sideration did not influence my judgment. Record XXVI. 251st to 260th pair _ My general mood was not quite so stable this time. The noise out- side from the wind seemed to make me feel somewhat restless. Nev- ertheless, I tried to be as calm as possible, and to make my judgments purely on the tones themselves, abstracting from the noises. Record XXVII. 261st to 268th pair Was very much less disturbed this time. Do not remember having heard the wind. Hence judgments were made more easily. My mood was quite restful and calm, and neither organic sensations nor trains of ideas were noticed. Record XXVIII. 269th to 276th pair Much the same as before. Only toward the very end it occurred to me that these were the last judgments, and I felt somewhat anxious about whether I had completely analyzed the situation or not. But when I look back I cannot find anything I left out, and I know bow just as little as at the beginning why I like some tones better than others. It is just simply the way they affect me ; and I imagine under other circumstances they would affect me quite differently. We now proceed to an examination of the above introspective records. I. In the case of this observer, the following five factors in, or determinants of, affective judgment may be distinguished. (i) Reflection on the different attributes of the two tones. "Judg- ment was arrived at by reasoning about the different attributes of the two tones; for instance, the one tone was smoother, more evenly blown (intensively):" Record I. This factor is also mentioned in Records II, V, VI, IX, X, XV, XVI, XXII. (2) General condition or mood. "Now whichever of the two tones was more confirming in this, or whichever was less disturbing, was felt as the more pleasant." Record III. "Which of the two tones would disturb ice less, or to which of them could I adapt myself more perfectly and more easily? The answer coincided with the more pleasant tone." Record XX. This factor is referred to in all records, except VI and VII. In IV, VIII, XXII, XXIV, XXV, and XXVIII, the word 'mood' is not employed, but the operation of the factor is distinctly implied. (3) Associations. "Associations aroused by the tones also some- STUDY OF THS AFFECTIVS PROCESSES 1 67 times decided the affective judgment:" Record V. See also Record (4) Bias or prejudice. "I am somewhat biased in favor of the lower tones anyhow : " Record VI. See also Record XIV. (5) Breathing and pulse. "By more quieting I mean that they seem to have a slowing effect upon breathing (and perhaps on pulse as felt in temples)." Record VIII. Such facial expressions as frown- ing, twitching in the eyelids, etc., are also recorded, but are looked upon as concomitants only. And it should be noted that during the experiments of Record VIII, the observer was trying to quiet down after a fast walk. II. Critical changes in the course of introspection. In accordance with his understanding of the instruction given, and in accordance also with his personal interest in discovering the basis of the affective judgment, the observer entered npon the experiments in a distinctly analytical attitude. He had often spoken in conversation of the 'infer- ential' nature of pleasantness and unpleasantness; and he now set systematically to work to find a 'reason' for the affective judgment. Such a 'reason' was first found in the different attributes of the two tones. In the first 20 comparisons, judgment was for the most part passed on this basis. _ At the 2ist comparison, however, the observer abandons this reflec- tive attitude for an attitude that must be characterized as its direct opposite. The following quotations will show what is meant. "Closed my eyes, took the most comfortable bodily position, and let myself go entirely. Kept all foreign ideas out of my mind, and tried to keep myself in a perfectly constant and unchanged mental and bodily atti- tude" (Record III). "The only way I seem to be able to judge real pleasantness and unpleasantness is to let myself go entirely, to be- come passive, and to remain in a very constant, even half-sleepy mood" (Record XVIII). "My general mood was an easy let-go feel- ing; no organic or other sensations disturbed me" (Record XXI). The attitude is now that of passivity or receptivity; analysis and re- flection have disappeared. Under these conditions, the observer recognizes that the affective judgment is prompted directly by the external stimulus. "In these cases the pleasantness was usually decided on the basis of some qual- ity in the two tones; there seems to have been an entire absence of organic sensations, as far as I remember" (Record V). It should be especially noticed that the records nowhere (save in the one doubtful case of Record VIII)) suggest the mediation of the affective judgment by organic sensations; see, e.g., Records XIII, XV, XIX. The search for a 'reason' has not, however, been given up. The observer is perplexed that the judgments attach thus directly to the stimulus, and mistrusts his observation: "I am at a loss to say why I liked one tone better than the other" (Record VI). He accordingly introduces a change in his method of observation: thinking that the explicit formulation of his judgment on the tones might lend an ap- pearance of directness to the affective reaction, he now allows the tones to make their impression upon him without writing down a judgment at all. But the character of the judgment remains the same. Henceforth, therefore, the mood of passivity becomes the essential condition for the pure affective judgment, and the intellectual cues are relegated to a secondary place. Introspection furnishes the war- rant. "The judgments arouse sometimes ideational associations, but these come rather after the figure is written down. Sometimes also, after the writing, I catch myself reflecting on other qualities of the tones compared" (Record XIX). And, this warrant once acknowl- 1 68 NAEASHIMA ed^ed, the whole task becomes simpler and easier. "It seemed much easier to make the judgments, except in the doubtful cases" (Record XXI. There were 27 doubtful cases in the total number of 276 com- parisons). "This time it was easier for me to make my judgments" (Record XXIVJ. Finally, the observer declares that "I know now just as little as at the beginning why I like some tones better than other. It is just simply the way they affect me" (Record XXVIII) . III. Conclusion. — It seems clear, from this examination of G's observations, that he passes his P-U judgments directly and immedi- ately on the basis of the stimuli and of these only. The ideal condi- tions for the experiment are a mood of passivity or listlessness; an undisturbed bodily attitude and state; and freedom from intruding or distracting ideas when the series begins. There is apparently no mediation of the affective judgment by organic sensations. G himself, unwilling at first to believe that the affective judgment is prompted directly by the stimulus, and confirmed in his scepticism by the nature of the instruction, attempts to find — almost one might say to manufacture — an intellectual basis for the judgment. He thinks that there must be a 'reason' for it over and above the mere quality of the tones. So he has recourse to 'smoothness', or to the 'tone which is nearer a pure tone', etc., varying his report in all sorts of ways, but always seeking for some intellectual construction of the affective judgment. That this search for a 'reason' is a search for what does not exist is clearly shown by the later introspections. G gives up his endeavor to find the 'reason', even while he would still like to find it, and is finally satisfied to take the stimuli as they come. He has tried various logical constructions (associations, organic sensations, power to distract, general disturbance of mood, etc.), and his efforts having been unsuccessful, he renounces the mediation of the affective judgment, and at once the "work is easier". Here, then, is an observer who at the beginning distrusts the immediacy of the affective judgment, and tries to argue himself out of it by all possible means; but whose own introspections, given by the way, convict him of immediate judgment as it were against his own will. The second observer, Miss M. C. West, is graduate fellow in the department of psychology. lyike G, she had already taken part in extended affective studies. W is also musical. An examination of the introspective records of this observer seems to justify the distinction of two main classes of affective judgment: the associative and the direct. The direct judg- ments are again divisible as (i) judgments prompted by the tones themselves, with or without certain concomitant pro- cesses (especially organic sensations), and (2) judgments prompted by other motives than the tones. I. The associative judgments 1. The tones were judged on the basis of their 'fitting in with the mood': they seemed to be what the observer wanted; she wanted to sing them; while in the tones themselves, as qualitative processes, there was nothing unpleasant, and nothing strikingly pleasant. 2. Certain middle tones were pleasant, because the observer had the same sense of ease (or absence of strain) and rest, in hearing them, that she would if she were trying to sing them. 3. Tones were unpleasant because agressive, forcing themselves on the observer, seeming not to fit in with or belong to the disposition of consciousness. STUDY OF THE AFFBCTIVE PROCHSSBS 169 4. Tones were unpleasant because too loud or sudden, 'ruffling' the observer 'all up'. Or because harsh and rough, 'keeping her on edge'_. Or, again, because nasal and twanging. In all these cases associations wereset up,along with the obvious arousal of organic sensa- tions. "The ominous association with the sound in some of those lower notes seems to make them more distasteful than even very shrill, thin high notes that I usually dislike most" (Record III). "The first tone in the pair 75 had an arousing effect through the asso- ciation of a trumpet call that was solemn in nature and therefore un- pleasant" (Record XVIII). "I am pretty sure that the gruffness and roughness of some lower notes may be unpleasant partly through as- sociations with hoarseness and with people of rough low tones in speech, who are often cross and disagreeable people" (Record XXV). "Some of the deep rough tones were judged so not by strains but by a sort of mood they threw me in, of depression and fear" (Record IX). "Many of the notes are judged pleasant or unpleasant by , asso- ciations, I think, such as Christmas horns, whining animals and people, roaring lions, etc., according to the associated mood these objects set up" (Record XIII) . "None but sweet notes seem pleasant to me unless because of associated mood" (Record XVIII). II. The direct judgments prompted by tones The nature of these judgments will be clearly seen from the follow- ing quotations. "I don't know by what means I judged that I liked it. Maybe I thought 'clear, full, sweet,' maybe I thought of flute notes; but I don't think I did. Maybe I judged by the absence of things that made me shrink" (Record IX). "The high notes seem unpleasant in themselves, but it may be only that the unpleasant strains are more local, in the region of the ear. I can't make out whether the unpleasantness is the strains or not" (Record VI). "The unpleasant- ness seems to come in at once. There is a kind of jarring which is unpleasant, though I don't think I call it that; I could as easily call it jarring as unpleasant, but I don't think I call it anything. It is just a feeling that I can't sit still and listen to it" (Record VI). "They seem unpleasant from the first, and I can find no word or judg- ment in consciousness. I caught myself making a mental grunt" (Record VI). "Can't tell what made 71 [the first tone in the pair] pleasant or sweet" (Record XVIII). "I think some tones are pleasant and unpleasant to the ear itself, not counting strains around the ear or unpleasant vibrations, which are not always present even when the tone is unpleasant" (Record XX). " Some very high tones are un- pleasant just because they are high, without being shrill or causing any particular associations" (Record XX). "The organic sensations in the case of pleasant tones seem to follow the affective judgment and do not seem to be its basis. They seem to create a desire for more, and a restlessness; their pleasantness is not created by this re- laxation, etc." (Record XXV). "Caught myself saying 'don't like it,' but generally noticed a shrinking, wincing, turning of head away without any words or thought; but I can't tell whether those movements were the unpleasantness, or their sensations were the unpleasant- ness, or whether there was a distinct process of unpleasantness" (Record V) . "There were three tones there that I just liked in them- selves, and when I asked why, the words 'full, rich, sweet' came. It had something to do with the pitch being a medium one (not asso- ciated with the strain of high pitch), but it was more than that. They were accompanied by no perceptible organic sensations and no idea- tional associations. They seemed to satisfy, and a deep breath followed as a result. The ear lingered on them and tried to hold them and one 17° NAKASHIMA wished they would continue" (Record XXIII). "In the pair 262, there was not anything except the tone itself which was agreeable. I liked the tone. I am not even sure that it was full or resonant or had any of those associated attributes which might be a basis of judg- ment. I noticed that the nasal quality of both tones in the pair 264 [^1^^] set up no detectable vibrations and strains and had no observable associations, but when I asked why unpleasant, I merely answered 'nasal.' It seemed as if the inharmoniousness of the tone itself were directly unpleasant to the ear drum. Nor was the roughness in the first tone {P] in the pair 266 [JP'-e] unpleasant because of associated hoarseness; but it seemed to have thickness and roughness, unpleasant just as the nasal tone was to the drum itself" (Record XXIII). " I tried to think what made 33 so pleasant to me but I could not. I think it put me in a pleasant mood but why, or why the mood was pleasant, I do not know. I know that relaxed organic sensations had somet,hing to do with it" (Record XIV). "i in each case gave no disagreeable strain sensations and was in no distinguishable way other- wise unpleasant than by the gloomy mood it induced" (Record XVJ. "The very deep tone in 57 seemed to be judged disagreeable instantly from a general dislike of very deep tones, not because it was intrin- sically very disagreeable" (Record XVI). "The judgment is nearly always made on the basis of degrees of unpleasantness. No tone seemed really pleasant. It was a matter of release from unpleasant. [<:and^^] in 61 and 62 were rather sweet, possibly because of no strain" (Record XVII). III. The direct judgments prompted by other motives The principal motives to judgment in this class were organic sensa- tions of ear strain, nose tingling, tendency to shut ears, vibrations in head, nose, ear or chest, hitting or piercing of ear-drum or head, head- wincing, etc. "The shrill notes that I did not like were sometimes judged so by ear strains that seemed to go down to my toes" (Record IX). "In some cases I judged it was unpleasant by means of strains, as. in the pair 100, a high shrill tone that made my nose tingle and my eyes shut, and I did not like it because of the strain, I think. On the other hand there were twangy tones that were unpleasant because of something else, I don't think it was strain, but an unpleasant vibration set up somewhere in the head, nose or ears" (Record X). "One note seemed to pierce the ear drum and made me want to put my hands to my ears. My head distinctly winced. Other twangy tones set things vibrating around nose and ears, which was unpleas- ant. Other rough low tones caused a disagreeable vibration some- where (could not localize it); seemed perhaps in the chest; it was un- pleasant. In all these cases it seemed more the organic sensations that were unpleasant than the tones" (Record XI). "Very disagree- able to the ear, induced reflex of head, felt as if things were hitting the drum and piercing the head" (Record XV). "Sometimes the judgment is entirely based on organic sensations of strain and dis- agreeable vibrations in face and ear; sometimes apparently localized in drum, those seemed squeaky; sometimes across nose and face, those seemed twangy" (Record XVI). "Based largely on strains, contrac- tions of muscles and ear and nose vibrations; sometimes in body (chest particularly) also" (Record XXII). The last quotation that we shall make shows a mixture of motives. "In every instance the unpleasantness seems to be derived from something else, organic sensations or a foreboding mood. It is possible that the pleasant tones also were judged so by comparison with a standard of clarity of tone which I considered beautiful and which was gained from opera STUDY OF THB AFPECTIVB PROCBSSBS 171 singers and from musical instruments. I think the absence of jarring organic sensations is one thing in the pleasantness of a tone. I don't know whether the rest is an inference according to some standard or not" (Record XII). CoNCLtisroNS FROM W's Observations This observer is much more liable than G to organic sensations. And she has fallen into a rather natural mistake : she thinks that, if she can put her finger on some accompanying organic sensation, she has found a 'reason' or 'basis' for the affective judgment. But, of course, we have to ask how an organic sensation is judged pleasant or unpleasant, just exactly as we ask how a tone is thus judged. In fact, if we abstract from the cases of association, the affective judgment seems to be immediate (there were only five 'doubtful' cases out of the total number of 276 judgments). The immediacy is, however, of two kinds. The affection may attach (i) to the tone itself, without there being any assignable 'reason' for it to do so; it just belongs to tjie tone: or it may attach more prominently (2) to the organic re- verberation set up by the tone. It is clear, indeed, that this observer wished to find a basis for judgments in organic sensations, just as G wished to find a basis in intellectual factors. She succeeds better than G, in the sense that she often finds the P-TJ judgment attaching to organic sensations set up by the tone, while G had no success with his logical reflection. But she offers no 'reason' for this attachment of P-U to organic sensations; so that really the judgment is as imme- diate as it is in the many instances in which the tones themselves are pleasant or unpleasant. W's introspective records are not given here in full, since they are far more homogeneous than those of G, and offer no similar possibility of varying interpretation. We have now to compare the general result, gained from the study of these introspective records, with the conclusions drawn by Titchener and Hayes, so far as these are relevant to our problem. "Judgments of P-U," these authors report, "were easy, direct and natural. It was exceptional to find any rea- son, any basis for these judgments: the stimuli were intrinsi- cally pleasant and unpleasant, more pleasant or more unpleas- ant than their neighbors: and when a reason, or a basis was found, outside of intrinsic affective tone, it lay in the organic reaction set up by the stimulus employed." ' So far as direct- ness or immediacy of judgment is concerned, the outcome of the different investigations is strictly comparable. And even on the score of ease and naturalness there is some possibility of comparison. It is true that a judgment might be difficult, straining, and yet be immediate: that would be the case, e.g-., when the state or process to be judged lacked clearness, was faint or indefinite or fleeting. On the other hand, since it must be impossible to analyze, or to pass mediate judgment upon, a mental process which is in reality simple and ultimate, judg- iTitchener: Psychology of Feeling and Attention, 1908, 165. Hayes: A Study of the Affective Qualities, Amer. Journ. Psychol., 1906, 389. 172 NAKASHIMA ment under such circumstances will become unspeakably easier and more natural as soon as the attempt at analysis is given up. In this sense, ease and naturalness of judgment become a test of the simplicity of the process in question, and thus a test of the immediacy of judgment itself. The testis especially applicable to the situation in which the observer G found himself placed during the latter part of the experimental series reported above. As regards the primary issue, of immediacy of judgment, the evidence of the earlier studies was, of course, not conclusive, and was not stated as conclusive. The spirit of the instruction given, and the mode of treating the observers' judgments (the procedure of 'make-up' series), may even be said to have put a premium upon the immediate affective judgment. 'The stimuli judged directly affective under these conditions might prove to be only indirectly affective under another form of instruction. Hence it was plainlj' necessary to supplement the earlier work, in which judgment was called for on the ground of the stimuli, by experiments in which the observer was re- quired to introspect the affective judgment, with a view (if possible) to the discovery of its 'basis' or 'reason.' If the im- mediacy of the affective judgment is still attested, with this special direction of attention, then it may be regarded as estab- lished with some degree of certainty. But this is precisely the result to which we have been led. And it is a result, be it remembered, which is entirely opposed to the initial expec- tation of the two observers. But, it may be urged, these observers speak in fact of several bases or reasons for their judgments, over and above the mere quality of the tones, and beside the organic reverberation set up by the stimuli. They appeal to various secondary attri- butes of the tones, such as their smoothness, purity, etc. ; to general disturbances of mood; to associations; to a bias or prejudice of general like or dislike; to the sense of fitness; to the mood temporarily aroused by the stimulus; to some rela- tion, of contrast or what not, to other affective or sense quali- ties; to motor tendencies, and to actual movements. That is true. It is, however, equally true that these bases or reasons are for the most part directly attributable to the interpretation put upon the instructions given, an interpretation dictated by the observers' personal interest in the explication of the mech- anism of the affective judgment. The immediacy of that judg- ment is, nevertheless, plainly brought out, even against their inclination, and in spite of a reflective attitude that was un- favorable to any immediate experience. Had they passed their judgments, throughout the experiments, under the ideal con- STUDY OF THB AFFBCTIVB PROCBSSBS 1 73 ditions of passivity and receptivity, practically all of these judgments would probably have been immediate. We do not deny that there are cases in which an indifferent stimulus may be affectively judged by association, or in terms of some bias or prejudice. An indifferent impression may be judged affective through its relation to some other, vividly affective experience; a 'blunt meaningless tone', for instance, may become unpleasant by contrast (the term in its widest sense) with a 'full rich tone', the bluntness and meaningless- ness being simply the result of association. Or again, the impression may be more orless affectively colored, intrinsically, and yet may be distinctly modified in its affective intensity or quality through bias or contrast or any other form of associa- tion. There are many cases, among these associative judg- ments, in which the observer cannot be sure whether or not there was any affection attaching to the stimulus as such, but is aware only of the affection attaching to the associated ideas. All these facts we admit. But we assert that, in general, these mediated judgments tend more and more to disappear as the experiments progress and the observers gain in practice. Asso- ciated ideas, permanent likes and dislikes, the 'sense' of fitness or congruits' with the present contents of consciousness, — all these things are secondary criteria, which the observer at first, in his comparative helplessness, avails himself of, but which he learns to disregard as his familiarity with the problem in hand increases. The very same stimuli which are now judged by their associates are presently ranked in terms of their intrinsic pleasantness or unpleasantness. There can be no doubt of the immediacy of the affective judgment; there can, we think, be no doubt that the various experiences offered from time to time by our ob- servers as the 'basis' or 'reason' of the affective judgment are of the nature of disturbing factors, that should so far as pos- sible be eliminated from an experimental study of that judg- ment; precisely as, in psychophysical work, the influence of association and the admission of secondary criteria are ruled out by experimental arrangement and by the shaping of in- structions. The tones are judged pleasant or unpleasant with the same directness with which they might be judged loud or faint. Experiments with Colors In the earlier studies of the affective tone of colors, the prob- lem was the determination of preference, and its systematic expression in quantitative terms. Neither Cohn nor Major, for instance, gives us any definite information as regards the mediacy or immediacy of the affective judgment. Thus, Cohn says only: JOURNAI,— 2 174 NAKASHIMA "Der eine [Beobachter] -wird rascli zugreifend entscheiden, der andere lange bin und her schwanken, das einmal gegebene Urtheil wieder zuruckziehen und schliesslich zu keinem oder doch nur zu einem uasicheru Resultat gelangen. Haufig h3rt man gerade im Anfang, dass die Sache doch wohlbekanntlich subjectiv und unsicher sei, dass man sich der Verwendungs-Associationen gar nicht erwehren konne und dergleichen mehr. Wenn man dann ■wieder und wieder hervorhebt, dass es sich ja hier nicht um eine Geschmackspriifung handele, dass jedes Urtheil gleichwerthig sei, es moge nun ausfalleu wie es wolle, dass es nur darauf ankomme, den augenblicklichen, un- mittelbaren Gefuhlseindruck wiederzugeben, so gewohnt man seine Beobachter allmahlich an ein ruhigeres Verhalten. Und diese gleichmassigere Gemiithslage ist ein unabweisbares Brforderniss zum Gelingen der Versuche. Handelt es sich doch bei denselben um einen ziemlich complicirten psychischen Process. Der Beo- bachter soil die ihm gebotenen Sinneseindriicke moglichst ohne Reflexion auf sich wirken lasseu under soil dann diesen rein gefiihls- massigen Vorgang in die intellectuelle Form eines Geschmacks- urtheils kleiden. Es besteht also die Gefahr, dass jener intellec- tuelle Urtheilsvorgang -gewissermassen vorweg genommen werde, dass der Beobachter sich Theorien mache und unbewnsst nach diesen sein Urtheil Wide."* These sentences point out difficulties of method ; they do not help us greatly to an understanding of the nature of the affective judgment. Major's notes, under the heading The Affective Judgment, practically coincide with those of Cohn. He noticed the tendency to theorize, to put reflection in the place of direct experiencing; and the difficulty of obtaining a 'gleichmassige Gemuthslage' from his observers, due partly to the confusion of the aesthetic with the affective judgment, the conviction of the 'subjectivity' and uncertainty of the experiment, etc., and partly to the unaccustomedness of the required judgment. He also noticed the influence of mood. Major's observers sent all impressions alike up towards pleasantness when they were in 'good spirits', working on a pleasant day after much wet weather, etc.^ So Cohn's "vier verschiedene Beobachter erwahnten gelegentlich, dass sie dieses oder jenes Urtheil abgaben, wiel die betreffende Farbe oder Farbencombination ihrer augenblicklichen Stimmuug besser ent- sprache. So wurde auch einmal ein Gleichbeitsurtheil durch die Aeusserung motivirt: 'manwiirde jenach der Stimmung bald das eine bald das andere schoner finden; verschiedener Gefiihlscbaracter, da- rum sehr schwer zu entscheiden'. Ein Beobachter hob hervor, dass ihm bei guter Stimmung die Unterschiede viel deutlicher zum Be- wusstsein gekommen seien, als bei schlechter".' For this reason, Cohn finally decided not to appeal to introspection. Indeed, both he and Major found it necessary to work towards mechanization of the judgment process during the experimental hour. They both noticed that the number of distracting associations decreased as the experi- ments progressed. But we are not informed whether or how the asso- ciations influenced the nature of judgment. Some of Cohn's observers, again, seemed to be influenced by the serial order of experimentation; a color or color combination might be judged pleasant simply because it was strikingly different from the preceding, unpleasant "^Experimenielle Untersuchungen uber die Gefuhlsbetonung der Farben, Helligkeiten, und ihrer Combinationen, Philos. Studien, X, 1894, 596-597 ^On the Affective Tone 0/ Simple Sense-Impressions, Am. Jour. Psy., VII, 1895, 61-62. ''Op. cit., 598. STUDY OP THB APFBCTIVB PROCBSSES 175 n°atureo^"L'?udgment?' '"^"'°'' """^ fundamentally change the Our own experiments with colors, like those with tones, were planned solely with a view to the better understanding of the aflFective judgment. The experience gained in the harmonical experiments made it possible for us to put a series of definite questions to the observers,— who, however, were notified that they should by no means consider themselves bound by the order of the suggestions, nor feel obliged to state their observations on all points during every introspective in- terval, but that they should observe and report as opportunity arose, and supplement the questions set in any way that oc- curred to them. The method employed was again that of paired comparisons. The judgment was passed in terms of P and U; the observers reported which of the two stimuli was the more pleasant, or (if both were unpleasant) which was the more unpleasant. The 26 (Milton Bradley) colors employed were combined in all possible ways, thus giving a series of 325 pairs. The whole series of 325 pairs was given in precisely the same order to both observers, who in these experiments ob- served separately, sitting at a distance of 1.5 m. from the windows (3x3 cm. ) of the neutral gray exposure apparatus. The experiments were made during the months of January, February, and March, 1908. They were performed in ordinary diflFuse daylight in the same room of the laboratory; every care was taken to keep the light as constant as possible, by the ad- justment of white curtains at the windows of the room. The time of exposure of the colors was 5 sec. ; the interval between observations, during which the observers recorded their judg- ments and could make short introspective notes, was 10 sec. After every 5 comparisons, they were required to write out full introspective reports, without any definite time limit. Miss West and Mr. Geissler again served as observers. We begin with an examination of W's records. Of the total number of 325 judgments passed by W, 266 were imme- diate. W now terms these direct judgments 'affective' or 'purely affective.' They are all phrased in much the same way; the following may serve as illustrations. "I think the judgments were certainly purely affective; I could give no reasons why, and felt no organic sensations throughout these experiments, except consciousness of deep breathing when I liked the color and of movement away from the color I disliked." "Soth colors in the pair are horrid to me; one perhaps less than the other because 'less like purply' I said, but I really think it was a purely afiective judgment. 'Less purply' was no reason." " I hated the dark buff [in no. 40]. It is a color seldom or never seen and I had no prejudice against it or association with it; it was an affective judgment." There were 35 mixed reports of the following kind, in which, never- 176 NAEASHIMA theless, immediately affective judgments appear to be comprised. "There was a distinct prejudice against the color at the right hand side, but also there wasanimmediatedislike of it." "I think there was a distinct prejudice from preceding judgments that I shouldlike the pure yellow better than the orange; but perhaps I also liked it imme- diately." "In the third pair there were also intellectual judgments that the oranges were too bright, but I think an immediate judgment that the red was the more pleasant came first, and a feeling of irrita- tion with the orange." "After deciding that I liked the pure yellow there came the thought 'but see how bright they are,' which though I think it modified my liking did not make me find the yellow un- pleasant." "In no. 4 I immediately liked the greenish yellow and then I thought ' but is not that the ugly bilious green you do not like?' but it did not make me dislike it.." "I had an image of robin's eggs with the blue green, which was almost inseparable from the color itself, and made me like it better than I would otherwise." "In 56 the thought of yellow satin dresses and yellow ribbons, and the ^ood times I had had wearing them, made me like better the yellowwhich I think I liked anyway." "The yellow in 68 I did not like at first, but suddenly there came a vivid recollection of the sunshine on the wet grass in the picture of a French artist whom I like, which made me like this green and the greens in 69 and 70." "As the blue violet re- appeared in 74 I could hardly make myself look at the other color to see whether I liked it or not. I forced myself to ask, why do I like it? and I answered 'soap bubbles' and then 'Frenchman's pictures of the Seine and The Tower of I MV s u % MV t (U MV Pi s < MV 1 Hard 72-86 81 4.6 82 4.4 I 52-72 60 6.4 61 6.8 Soft 58-72 62 6.2 64 6.0 I 38-50 42 3-8 44 3-8 Rough 80-108 93 12.0 96 12.0 I 50-68 58 5-2 58 5-2 Smooth 60-86 73 6.7 73 6.7 48-68 53 4.8 55 5-7 Sharp 52-64 55 6.0 57 4-7 38-48 40 4.1 42 4.0 I Blunt 84-94 91 14.0 90 14.0 I 46-62 59 50 56 4.8 Wet 74-86 82 8.0 81 7.0 56-76 68 4-9 67 4-5 Dry 70-78 80 4-5 75 2-3 I 62-82 73 5-8 75 68 Warm 71-98 84 7.0 82 6-5 70-86 76 4-7 77 4-5 Cold 80-100 91 8-5 89 7-7 78-94 86 5-3 87 4-3 Inspection of these tables shows that the affective discrimina- tion times are uniformly longer than the sensible discrimination times. In general, also, as might have been anticipated, the MVoi the affective reactions is larger than the MV of the sensory; exceptions occur only for Gwith the stimulus smooth, JOURNAI,— 3 igo NAKASHIMA and for /'with the stimuli kard and dry. Nevertheless, the MVoi the affective reactions is by no means abnormally large. And it can hardly be doubted that the affective times represent the observers' discriminative reactions in precisely the same way as the sensory times. The individual ranges are of the same order ; and the total range of the sensory times, from 28 with sharp to 86 with warm for G, and from 38 with sharp to 94 with cold for P, are paralleled by the affective limits 32 (un- pleasant) and 99 (pleasant) for the former, and 52 (unpleasant) and 108 (unpleasant) for the latter observer. The Tables, therefore, seem to show conclusively that the affective processes are amenable to the reaction method. The observer P discriminated the warm stimulus sometimes as warm, and sometimes as hot. The average times are: Warm Hot Sensory: 20 reactions: 78±4.5 20 reactions: 98±7.i Affective: 15 reactions: 8o±6.o 15 reactions: loSiS.o It would, of course, have been exceedingly difficult, in an experi- ment like ours, to keep the temperature of the stimulus constant; and beside taking an initial test and carefully regulating the time-relations of the experiments, we made no effort to do so. In so far, then, as these figures depend upon objective differences in the temperature of the stimulus, they are in agreement with Thunberg's statement that the simple reaction-time of heat is longer than that of warmth {Zeiis. f. Psychol., xlvii, 1908, 166 ff.). There were a few cases, however, when the effect of the stimulus was not simply warmth or heat, but when the sensory experience began with a warmth, which quickly passed over into heat. In these cases the observer might react at once to the warmth, or might wait for the development of the percep- tion of heat; and the times naturally varied in accordance with his attitude. The following Tables III-V show the results obtained with the three other observers. Tabi,e III Observer R. Unit, i/^o sec. Affective discrimination times Sensible discrimination times Stim- ulus be s MV MV bs a 2 60 n d (U MV V 5 MV ba a 1 Hard Soft Rough Smooth Sharp Blunt Wet Dry Warm Cold 34-40 34-51 32-60 36-55 29-43 32-44 32-53 38-48 34-SS 46-74 36 42 39 44 36 40 40 40 52 2.7 2-5 4.1 3-5 2-5 3-3 3-2 3-5 3-2 4.1 37 41 40 43 32 37 38 43 41 50 2.8 3-0 4.1 3-5 2-5 3-6 3-5 3-8 4.0 I 3 2 I \ I 2 1 28-40 28-44 26-50 30-46 26-36 24-30 30-48 30-44 32-46 30-47 36 40 28 32 34 40 40 30 1-3 2.8 2.8 2.0 1.4 2.1 3-3 30 2.4 34 34 % 11 36 35 39 41 3-0 1-7 2-3 3-0 2.0 1.4 1.8 3-4 3-0 2-5 I 1 2 I 3 1 I 2 I I STUDY OP THB AFFBCTIVB PROCBSSBS Tabi,B IV Observer W. Unit, 1/50 sec. 191 Affective discrimination times Sensible discrimination times Stim- ulus 1 a 3 MV < MV 13 £ 1^ MV MV 1 Hard 44-60 48 4-3 48 5-1 2 30-44 36 4.0 .^8 4.6 I Soft 48-66 5« 4.8 59 6 28-38 ,S4 2.0 34 2.0 5 Rough 26-50 46 5-6 43 5 28-44 32 3-5 .34 3-5 4 Smooth 32-48 44 3-2 42 4.4 4 22-34 30 1.8 31 2.0 3 Sharp 34-50 3« 55 40 5-0 6 26-34 29 2.7 ,30 3-0 6 Blunt 38-60 42 8.1 49 7.0 2 34-48 38 4-5 41 4-5 2 Wet 36-54 46 6.1 47 6.1 3 30-46 38 4.0 39 4.2 2 Dry 38-60 46 4.8 44 50 4 30-46 44 6.6 39 7.6 4 Warm 42-69 54 9.0 55 9.4 2 38-60 50 7.0 49 6.4 4 Cold 42-62 58 8.8 59 9.2 2 40-44 42 2.1 43 2.1 2 Table V Observer C. Unit, i/so sec. Affective discrimination times Sensible discrimination times Stim- ulus 1 s MV s 1 MV M a 2 I a -a 3 MV (U S > MV bo 1 Hard 84-130 99 15 -o io8 12.7 3 40-70 54 6.7 55 6.8 I Soft 54-108 82 22.0 85 17.4 3 46-66 58 50 56 5-1 2 Rough 66-150 84 28.0 106 21.3 3 58-90 68 9.4 69 9.0 .") Smooth 86-102 81 6.4 89 4.0 2 58-66 60 2-3 62 2.6 2 Sharp 58-114 76 15.0 80 15.0 2 32-54 50 5-6 46 6.0 4 Blunt 54-106 84 28.8 103 28.4 4 48-72 60 7.0 60 7.0 3 Wet 66-98 80 9-9 81 II. 2 2 52-74 62 6.9 60 7-4 2 Dry 98-148 90 9.1 94 9-5 4 46-60 52 4.0 54 3-6 2 Warm 84-108 89 9.8 88 9.0 3 74-94 81 4.8 84 4-5 2 Cold 82-152 84 18.0 103 18.6 I 62-90 79 7-7 77 8.3 2 The general results are the same as those of Tables I and II. In all three Tables, however, there are many more 'wrong' reactions than we obtained with G and P; it must be remem- bered that these two observers had had prolonged special practice in work upon the affective processes, while R, W and C were new both to the problem and to the particular method of reaction. It is striking that the absolute times given by C obviously fall into the same class as those of G and P, while the times given by the two woman-observers R and W are, throughout, shorter. Thus, if we average the averages, for the sake of a rough comparison, we find: 192 NAKASHIMA Sensory Affective G 56.8 73-5 P 62.2 78.9 C 62.3 93.7 R 35.3 40.2 W 37-8 52.2 There was no difEerence, that we could discover, in the nature of the 'wrong' reactions as given by C on the one hand and R and W on the other; practically all of these reactions were due to the observer's omission to move his finger down upon the stimulus, or to his making the touch upon the stimulus surface so light that the pendulum was not released. The sole point of difference that we could find was this : that C took the dif&culties of manipulation easily and in a matter of course way, whereas R and W were a little afraid of the apparatus, and braced themselves anxiously for its management. It is possible, then, that they hurried over the reaction, and made it cognitive rather than discriminative. The time required for the cognition of a color is, for instance, considerably less than that required for the discrimination of two colors (Wundt, Phys. Psych., iii, 1903, 456, 458). If this interpretation is correct, we have shown, though unintentionally, that the cog- nitive as well as the discriminative reaction may be applied to the affective processes. We had required no introspections during the course of the experiments; the observers were simply asked to follow to the best of their ability the instruc- tions given. When questioned at the end of the work, how- ever, and when confronted with a careful analysis of the cognitive and the discriminative attitudes, R and W inclined to the view that they had, in fact, reacted cognitively. At all events, the important thing is that the affective averages are without exception the larger. The stimuli hard and dry, which in the sensible discriminations were contrasted with soft and wet were apprehended by all observers in the affective discriminations as smooth. Since this change in ap- prehension destroyed the parallelism of the two halves of our Tables, we made some additional experiments (21 valid reactions with P and G, and 18 with R, W and C) in which these stimuli were contrasted with a rough. The results are shown in the following Table. DiscRiMiNATrvE RSACTiows To Smooth Observer Stimulus Range Median MV Average MV G Hard 52-64 60 4.7 59 5-4 Dry 50-64 58 4.2 60 48 P Hard 44-54 50 4.1 47 4.9 Dry 46-58 50 4.8 51 6.2 R Hard 32-40 36 2.8 37 2.8 Dry 35-44 38 1-7 39 2.8 W Hard 41.56 45 4-3 46 4.0 Dry 36-52 44 5-0 43 5.0 C Hard 57-71 ?5 3-1 63 3-0 Dry 55-71 62 3-1 60 s-5 STUDY OF THB AFFBCTIVE PROCESSES 1 93 If we compare these times, first, with the times for smooth in the preceding Tables, we observe that G and P show a slight shortening, presumably due to practice; R and C give practically the same val- ues as before; W gives a somewhat longer reaction, due (in her own belief) to the persistence of the connection between 'smooth' and the kid-leather feeling of the earlier series. If, secondly, we substitute them in the previous Tables for the sensible discrimination times under the headings hard and dry, we find that the difference between the two types of reaction is somewhat lessened for hard in the cases of G, W and C, lessened to o in the case of R, and somewhat increased in the case of P; while the difference for dry is somewhat lessened in the cases of R and C, increased in that of P, and left unchanged in those of G and W. It is, of course, entirely possible that affective reactions, had they been introduced into this supplementary series, would again have given uniformly longer times. On the general question of the time-relations of sensory and affective arousal, two opinions are a /rjor? possible. Since feeling is readily and regularly 'expressed' in movement, it might be maintained that the movement which registers the appearance of an affective process in consciousness should oc- cur at least as quickly as that which indicates the appearance of a sensation. Since, on the other hand, affection lacks the attribute of clearness, it might be maintained that a longer time must elapse than in the case of sensation before the move- ment of response is made. The experiments performed in the Harvard laboratory tell directly, those just described tell indi- rectly, for the second hypothesis. Or at any rate they show that, whether the reaction movement itself be performed more quickly or more slowly, the formation of an affective conscious- ness requires a longer time than that of a sensory consciousness. A full discussion of the question would here, where we are dealing only with indirect evidence, be out of place; it will be given in a later paper. What we have proved in the present Section is that the method of reaction is applicable to the affec- tive processes pleasantness and unpleasantness. The affective discrimination times are, as we have said, times of the same general order, and show the same sort of variability, as the sensible discrimination times. It remains only to add that there was no single case, in the reaction experiments, when the affection appeared first in consciousness, as the herald of the connected sensory quality {cf. pp. i8i f. above). When- ever the observer reacted to affection, he reacted to a pleasant or unpleasant cutaneous perception.