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A SYSTEM 
 
 MORAL SCIENCE 
 
 LAURENS P. HICKOK, D.D., LL.D. 
 
 REVISED 
 WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF 
 
 JULIUS H. SEELYE, D.D., LL.D., 
 
 PRESIDENT OF AMHERST COLLEGE. 
 
 BOSTON, U.S.A.: 
 PUBLISHED BY GINN & COMPitWTf; 
 
 1889. 
 
A^-^oAG S"^ 
 
 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year i88ci. by 
 LAURENS P. HICKOK, 
 In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington 
 
 Phesswokk by GnniJg S; Go., Boston. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 SCIENCE subjects all the facts it uses to a controlling 
 law, and by this law binds all its facts into an orderly 
 system. No elements, however abundant, can become a phi- 
 losophy without their determining principle. 
 
 Moral Science must conform to this condition, and, more- 
 over, must find its prmciple withm the spiritual part of man's 
 being. Nature, through all her successions, can reach no 
 absolute rule, and can bind relatively only, according to her 
 connections as found in experience. Her highest appeal is 
 to self-interest, and can never awaken the feeling of spiritual 
 worthiness. With such consequences, it is prudent to take 
 such a direction; for the great revolving wheel wiU crush 
 those who cross its course. But the spiritual is the supernat- 
 ural; and nature must be for this, not this for nature. The 
 moral law is above nature, not taken from nature. The vir- 
 tuous man must say, " I am thus, and I live thus, because this 
 only is worthy of my spiritual being ; " not at all, " I stand 
 here and do this, because otherwise the ongoings of nature 
 would torment me." 
 
 The following work has been prosecuted under the full con- 
 viction of such a twofold demand. Only expediency, and not 
 
IV PREFACE. 
 
 morality can be, if the ultimate rule of life be taken from 
 natural consequences, and not from spiritual imperatives j and 
 with such spiritual rule there cannot even then be science, 
 and in this a system of morals, unless all the elements used 
 are bound up in it. But while the steady design has been to 
 attain and keep prominent the spiritual principle, and also to 
 combine all the parts in this principle, there has been no 
 anxiety to exhaust all the facts which belong to the field of 
 morals, nor is there the pretension that even all the important 
 facts have been here gathered and classified. A wide occasion 
 still remains for extending the application and circumscription 
 of the principle, though it is with great confidence assumed, 
 that the principle here applied will be found adequate to de- 
 termine every virtue, and to detect every vice, and to give to 
 them their proper arrangement in a system of morals. The 
 science is incomplete, not in its principles, but only in not 
 collecting every fact. 
 
 Very httle regard has been paid to questions of casuistry. 
 The principle being given, and plain instances of its applica- 
 tion, all has been effected that is profitable. To take com- 
 plicated cases, and resolve doubts whether such ambiguous 
 facts come within the principle, would give little instruction of 
 general use. Ninety-nine such cases of doubt might be cor- 
 rectly solved, and yet the hundredth would have its own 
 peculiarities not at all touched in any former solution. The 
 good sense of every man must do this work for him as best 
 it may, by his own application of the principle to the case, 
 and not by any rules which can be taught him, and which he 
 may lay up in memory for use on common occasions. With- 
 
PREFACE. V 
 
 out the wit to apply, the rules would be wholly useless ; and 
 with that, the man will do very well without any scholastic 
 rules. He will ordinarily solve, the original doubt easier than 
 he can settle just what other cases are like the present. 
 
 This System of Moral Science is designed as a Text-Book 
 for College study. The aim has been to make it as concise as 
 clearness would admit ; and this has been connected with the full 
 persuasion that no labor of the teacher can give to the student 
 a dispensation from close thought and hard study, if he would 
 attain to any adequate apprehension of the groundwork of 
 moral science, and comprehend the completeness of the sys- 
 tem. The kindness of Dr. Tayler Lewis is gratefully acknowl- 
 edged for important suggestions made in the process of its 
 preparation. It is published in the belief that something like 
 it is greatly needed. 
 
PREFACE TO THE REVISED EDITION. 
 
 SUCH was the Preface to the first Edition of the Moral Sci, 
 ence, in its original form, and it is put here in its present 
 connection as appropriately as it was then. A quarter of a 
 century has since passed, within which the System of Mora] 
 Science has been widely taught and studied, and its use con- 
 tinues still undiminished. There occurs, however, good occa- 
 sion for a revision of the work, making some additions to it, 
 transpositions of some parts, and giving to others a clearer 
 mode of expression. The ultimate Rule of right has been 
 deemed obscure to some, and thought to involve a self-contra- 
 diction by others, but it is now so presented as scarcely to 
 admit of partial or mistaken apprehension. There has been a 
 more complete consideration of the general questions of the 
 state and of state authority, with more particular reference to 
 punishment, property, taxation, representation, religion, and 
 education ; and the claims of morality in such matters have 
 been more explicitly stated and apphed. Old and New Tes- 
 tament views of domestic slavery have been put in connection 
 with what reason teaches, and as the institution is now abol- 
 ished in our Government, the whole may the more effectually 
 minister to Universal Emancipation. With these considerable 
 alterations, the still unchanged principle runs through and 
 unites the whole work as before, and thus with a different 
 Book there yet is not a different System of Moral Science. 
 
 Amhekst, Mass., 1879. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 — « — 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. The Special Province of Moral Science . . 13 
 CHAP. I. Different Theories of the Ultimate Rule in 
 
 Morals 23 
 
 CHAP. II. The Ultimate Rule of Right 30 
 
 CHAP. III. The Essential Attributes of the ultimate Right 32 
 
 CHAP. IV. General Method 38 
 
 FIRST PART. 
 
 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 I. The Essence of all Virtue 41 
 
 II. There are many Particular Virtues 43 
 
 I. DUTIES TO MANKIND. 
 
 CHAP. I. I. Personal Duties. Self-control 45 
 
 General Maxim. Bear and Forbear. 
 Particular Maxims. 
 
 1. Do thyself no harm 46 
 
 1. Maiming 46 
 
 2. Self-torture 47 
 
 3. Suicide 48 
 
 4. Self-defence 48 
 
 2. Keep your body under 49 
 
 1. Intemperance 50 
 
 2. Licentiousness 51 
 
 3. Ambition 52 
 
 4. Covetousness 52 
 
 vii 
 
vni CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 3. Hule your own spirit S3 
 
 1. Servility 54 
 
 2. Vanity 55 
 
 3. Jealousy 56 
 
 4. False Honor 57 
 
 5. Gambling 58 
 
 THAP. II. I. Personal Duties. Self-culture 58 
 
 General Maxim. Secure a complete self-development. 
 Particular Maxims. 
 
 1. Grow in Stature 59 
 
 1. Diet 60 
 
 2. Dress ■ 61 
 
 3. Exercise 62 
 
 4. Cleanliness 63 
 
 2. Grow in Practical Knowledge 63 
 
 1. Stupidity 65 
 
 2. Heedlessness 66 
 
 3. Rashness 67 
 
 4. Credulity 67 
 
 5. Skepticism 68 
 
 6. Destiny 68 
 
 3. Grow in Rational Wisdom 69 
 
 1. Taste TO 
 
 2. Science 70 
 
 3. Morality 71 
 
 CHAP. III. II. Relative Duties. Kindness 72 
 
 General Maxim. Do good to all men as ye have opportunity. 
 Particular Maxims. 
 
 1. Owe no man any thing 73 
 
 1. Honesty y^ 
 
 2. Reciprocity 75 
 
 3. Monopoly ye 
 
 2. Give to the Poor y6 
 
 1. Charity yy 
 
 2. Obduracy yg 
 
 3. Sentimentality yg 
 
CONTENTS. IX 
 
 PAGE, 
 
 3. Be ye thankful 79 
 
 1. Gratitude 80 
 
 2. Insolence 80 
 
 3. Peevishness 81 
 
 CHAP. IV. II. Relative Duties. Respect 82 
 
 General Maxim. Honor all men. 
 Particular Maxims^ 
 
 1. Be ye courteous 83 
 
 1. Arrogance 84 
 
 2. Scorn 84 
 
 3. Ridicule 85 
 
 4. Vulgarity 86 
 
 2. Deal justly with all men 87 
 
 1. Assaulting 88 
 
 2. Defrauding 88 
 
 3- Lying 89 
 
 3. Sustain thy neighbor's good name 90 
 
 1. Slander 91 
 
 2. Libel ' 92 
 
 3. Censoriousness 93 
 
 4. Be obedient to Government 94 
 
 1. Subjection 95 
 
 2. Tribute 96 
 
 3. Service 96 
 
 II. DUTIES TO OTHER THAN MANKIND. 
 
 CAK$. V. I. Duties to Nature 97 
 
 General Maxim. Use but not abuse nature. 
 Particular Maxims. 
 
 1. Not wantonly to mar nature 98 
 
 2. Convert nature to thy use 99 
 
 3. Beautify and perfect nature 99 
 
 4. Explore nature scientifically 100 
 
 5. Use nature as a discipline in virtue lOO 
 
X CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGB. 
 
 CHAP. VI. II. Duties to God loi 
 
 General Maxim. " Worship God." 
 Particular virtues. 
 
 1. Reverence I02 
 
 2. Godly Fear I03 
 
 3. Humility 104 
 
 SECOND PART. 
 
 POSITIVE AUTHORITY. 
 
 I. Occasion for Positive Authority 107 
 
 II. Peculiarity of Authority 109 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 CHAP. II. 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 FIRST DIVISION. 
 
 CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 
 
 The State iii 
 
 The State requires a government 115 
 
 The rectitude of State authority 121 
 
 I. The point in which sovereignty should be 
 
 placed 121 
 
 II. The lines within which sovereignty should 
 
 act 125 
 
 Rewards and punishments 130 
 
 1. The meaning and ground of punishment .... 130 
 
 2. The righteousness of punishment 132 
 
 3. The degree of punishment 133 
 
 The position of the citizen in reference to 
 
 THE Government 137 
 
 1. In some respects beyond civil interference . . . 137 
 
 2. No right to evade civil law 140 
 
 3. No right to sympathy against law 141 
 
 4. The citizen can stand on mere legality 141 
 
 5. The citizen may righteously expatriate himself . . 143 
 
 6. Merit or demerit is as the sanction of law .... 144 
 
CONTENTS. XI 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 CHAP. VII. The position of the Government in reference 
 
 TO THE CITIZEN I46 
 
 The Government can be satisfied with nothing but obedience to 
 
 its laws 147 
 
 Sec. I. Judicial Oaths 148 
 
 Sec. II. Property 155 
 
 Sec. III. Taxes and Imposts 160 
 
 Sec. IV. Representation 163 
 
 Sec. V. Religion 163 
 
 Sec. VI. Education 166 
 
 Sec. VII. Internal Improvement 170 
 
 Sec. VIII. Commerce 171 
 
 Sec. IX. Posted Arrangements 1 73 
 
 Sec. X. Prohibitory Laws 173 
 
 Sec. XL Sumptuary, Sanitary, and Poor Laws . . 175 
 
 Sec XII. Weights, Measures, Currency, Interest . 177 
 
 Sec. XIII. Revolution 181 
 
 CHAP. VIII. The position of a State in reference to others 184 
 
 1. The Sovereignty of each State is independent ... 184 
 
 2. International regulations rest on Pure Morality . . 185 
 
 Sec. I. Comity of Nations 187 
 
 Sec. II. Treaties 188 
 
 Sec. III. Alliances 190 
 
 Sec. IV. Confederations 190 
 
 Sec. V. Republics 192 
 
 Sec. VI. War 195 
 
 Sec. VII. A Congress of Nations 197 
 
 SECOND DIVISION. 
 
 DIVINE GOVERNMENT. 
 
 CHAP. I. God's Being and Communion with Man .... 200 
 
 CHAP. II. End of Divine Legislation 203 
 
 CHAP. III. The Process of the Divine Administration in 
 
 Justice .' . . • 207 
 
 CHAP. IV. The Process of the Divine Administration in 
 
 Grace 218 
 
xu 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 CHAP. V. Process in Grace for sustaining authority . . 223 
 
 CHAP. VI. Process in Grace for stronger Influences ro 
 
 Loyalty 229 
 
 CHAP. VII, General Result from a Gracious Administra- 
 tion 237 
 
 THIRD DIVISION. 
 
 PARENTAL GOVERNMENT. 
 
 CHAP. I. The Family 241 
 
 CHAP. II. Marriage 245 
 
 Sec. I. The Authority for the Marriag* Institution . 248 
 
 Sec. II. Breach of Marriage Promise 249 
 
 Sec. III. Polygamy 250 
 
 Sec. IV. Incest 251 
 
 Sec. V. Divorce 253 
 
 CHAP. III. Duties of Parents 256 
 
 CHAP. IV. Duties of Children 264 
 
 CHAP. V. Duties of Brothers and Sisters 267 
 
 CHAP. VI. Duties of Servants 272 
 
 Sec. I. Voluntary Servitude 272 
 
 Sec. II. Involuntary Servitude 274 
 
 1. The Nature of Domestic Slavery 276 
 
 2. Righteous Domestic Slavery , 277 
 
 3. Unrighteous Domestic Slavery 281 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 THE SPECIFIC GROUND OF MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 MORAL SCIENCE must be preceded by a familiarity 
 with Mental Science. Without an accurate and some- 
 what profound knowledge of the human mind, there will be 
 no clear discernment of the ground on which a system of 
 morals can rest, and thus no attainment of any stability for 
 the attempted science. Let us, therefore, as a direct and in- 
 telUgent introduction to the field we are now to explore, gain 
 a clear apprehension of some of the foundation facts in mental 
 philosophy. 
 
 Man is compounded of the animal and the rational being. 
 These are so intimately blended, that they together make one 
 existing man, yet the animal can always be distinguished from 
 the rational being, and each can be apprehended in its own 
 peculiar operation without any confusion. 
 
 The animal part of human nature finds the end of its 
 activity in the gratification of its constitutional appetites, as 
 is evident from the fact that it rests in the attainment of such 
 gratification until some new craving of nature returns. The 
 appetites may be originally of greater or less variety, and 
 may be more or less refined by cultivation j but, in every 
 case the end of animal appetite is the same. Happiness is 
 its highest law, and whether the life be mortal or immortal, 
 it is the life of the brute only. 
 
 The rational part of man's being owns quite a different law 
 
 13 
 
14 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 and finds quite a different end. Its impulses are no prompt- 
 ings of an appetite, but the urgency of a requirement. The 
 animal is impelled by a craving, the rational is inspired by a 
 claim. The difference between these two is very broad. A 
 craving is always going out towards something it can get ; a 
 claim is ever rising towards something it can give, or can be. 
 A craving seeks a self-gratification; a claim requires a self- 
 surrender, perhaps a self-sacrifice. The self which the crav- 
 ing seeks is not found, but is lost in the very process of its 
 seeking ; while the self which the claim surrenders is not lost, 
 but is found in its very surrender. The animal has thus no 
 true self, and is incapable of self-possession or self-direc- 
 tion ; while to the rational belong the prerogatives and respon- 
 sibilities of a free person, knowing itself and determining 
 itself. In this knowing of itself is the knowledge also of 
 what is due to itself, and thus of its own law, — a law not laid 
 upon it from without like that of the animal, but written 
 within, and thus a self-law, whose authority is both revealed 
 and justified in the light of what the personal self sees to be 
 due to reason alone. This personal, rational self, knowing 
 itself, and thus possessing or having itself, is under the per- 
 petual imperative to behave; and while the craving of the ani- 
 mal is intermittent, the rational needs no rest, and its claim 
 knows no cessation. 
 
 Such is humanity; not all animal, and thus wholly the 
 brute; not all spiritual, and thus altogether an angel; but 
 both in one, — spirituality incarnate. We can never say of 
 mankind, they are sense or spirit; but must ever affirm, 
 that man is sense araa^ spirit. "The law in the members," 
 and "the law of the mind," are perpetually interworking 
 through all humanity. 
 
 And now it is quite clear that the ground of morality 
 must lie altogether within the sphere of man's rational and 
 spiritual being. To the animal nothing can ever be due. 
 
THE GROUND OF MORAL SCIENCE. IS 
 
 No conception of owing anything, or of that which ought to 
 be, can begin, or end, except with what is rational. The 
 animal has no law save happiness ; but this law laid upon the 
 animal from without, carries with it no explanation, and reveals 
 no ground for itself. All that we can possibly learn from its 
 highest generalizations is ever how to satisfy a craving, and 
 never how to fulfil a claim. Why the animal should be happy 
 requires a farther answer than that thus it was made to be ; 
 for to this answer the question, why it was thus made, at once 
 repeats itself; and to this all the happiness conceivable, or all 
 the adaptations thereunto could give no reply. A spiritual 
 excellency must be apprehended, that may command for its 
 own sake, and find something due to itself in the conscious 
 right of its own intrinsic dignity, or we can find no possible 
 ground for morality. 
 
 But even the rational spirit of man is not all ethical. A 
 deeper analysis of the human mind must be effected, or we, 
 shall not attain to the province of pure morality, nor be able 
 to give a completed science. The spirit attains other neces- 
 sary and universal principles than such as control in morals, 
 and we must be able fully to distinguish each in its own 
 grounds, or it will not be possible for us, as ethical philos- 
 ophers, to determine our proper position. 
 
 I. Man, as rational, has the capacity to apprehend the 
 necessary and universal principles which determine Beauty, 
 and can thus apply the rules of Taste in the fine arts ; and 
 hereby he introduces himself into the province of Esthetics. 
 
 The word form may be used in reference to any thing which 
 can be limited and brought within definite circumscription. 
 When only the Umit is regarded, without respect to that which 
 is limited, it is known as pure form. We may thus have pure 
 form as mere shape iii space, or, in the degrees of intensity, 
 pure form also as mere tone in sound. The blending of 
 forms in space by colors gives figure, and the blending of 
 
1 6 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 forms in sound gives tune. We may thus modify colors 
 in outline to represent any figure, and modulate tones to 
 represent any tune; and when only the form, without any 
 regard to that which fills it, is apprehended, we shall have 
 pure figure or pure tune. 
 
 Now, certain forms of figure or of tone fitly express cer- 
 tain sentiments. We cannot tell why this is so. Indeed, the 
 attempt to tell it would be a palpable absurdity, for we could 
 only tell it in words, and the words themselves are forms. 
 But we accept the truth that every sentiment has its expres- 
 sive form in some shape or sound appropriate to itself; and 
 the pure form, when presented, is at once apprehended as the 
 expressive representation of the living sentiment. And herein 
 is determined the entire sphere of the Beautiful. Not at all 
 the matter contained in the form, but the pure form itself, 
 which only the mind's eye and not any organ of the sense can 
 apprehend, is the Beautiful. Nor is all pure form, but only 
 such as gives expression to some rational sentiment, to be 
 apprehended as beauty. The pure form, which represents 
 some emotion of a living being, is an aesthetic object ; and no 
 form, that does not express sentiment, can be of any signifi- 
 cancy in the fine arts. With this full comprehension, the only 
 adequate and complete definition of beauty is rational senti- 
 ment expressed in form. When the sentiment thus expressed 
 is carried up to an emotion of the supernatural and the divine, 
 the Beauty also rises and loses itself in the Sublime. 
 
 Here is the province of art. The sculptor gives some 
 living expression in the shaped outline of the statue ; the 
 painter blends his colors into more complicated forms upon 
 the canvas ; the bard throws his entrancing sounds of song 
 upon the ear ; and we apprehend the Beautiful in them all, 
 solely because we have here the living forms in which beauty 
 is. Nature, also, in her thousand shapes and sounds, is per- 
 petually expressing some touching sentiment, and thus throw- 
 
THE GROUND OF MORAL SCIENCE. 1/ 
 
 ing beauty all about our paths. Not because nature is an 
 imitation of some higher copy, nor from any surprise and de- 
 light that art should be found to imitate nature so well, but, 
 both in nature and art, solely because the mind's eye catches 
 the pure form which is expressive of some rational sentiment, 
 do we awake to the consciousness of the Beautiful or the 
 Sublime. 
 
 The rational spirit can itself create its own pure forms, which 
 shall express the rational emotion more fuU and perfect than 
 can be embodied in any media of natirre or of art ; and thus 
 the cultivated genius has his own absolute ideal Beauty, as 
 the highest and purest conception of the rational sentiment in 
 any particular case ; and this he makes his ultimate criterion to 
 judge of any representation in nature or art, and becomes the 
 critic, measuring and estimating every actual form of beauty 
 that he finds, and pronouncing it fine or faulty, as it agrees or 
 fails to agree with this absolute ideal. 
 
 The eye and ear are the only organs which give the percep- 
 tions that take on these pure living forms, and hence the sight 
 and the hearing are the only senses that can be recognized in 
 the fine arts. But even these organs are of use, only as they 
 may give the phenomenal matter which takes on these pure 
 forms, and so far only has sense at all any part in beauty. 
 The pure form itself is only for the mind's eye, and therewith 
 the bodily organ has nothing to do ; and it is whoUy by the 
 rational part of man also, that the pure ideal is discerned in 
 which lies the absolute Beauty, and by whose application he 
 criticises all forms of beauty which art or nature may anywhere 
 present to either eye or ear. The absolute Beauty is only in 
 the reason, and all outer beauty is judged and determined by 
 this. It is so far of sense, that its pure forms can only find 
 their expression in some objects of sense ; but the Beauty 
 itself is nothing that the sense gives ; for if the pure form any 
 way express the living sentiment, the taste is quite indilferent 
 
I 8 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 what material object it may be that represents it. That material 
 will be the most desirable which will obtrude itself the least 
 upon the mental vision, and leave the pure form in the most 
 unhindered manner to express the living sentiment. 
 
 We have in this the field of Esthetics, which no merely 
 animal eye or ear can enter, inasmuch as it is reason in her 
 freedom which creates the ideal Beauty, and cares nothing for 
 the material part, except merely that it may communicate and 
 preserve the pure living form which is put upon it. This fac- 
 ulty is of the rational part of man, and has an intrinsic excel- 
 lency which controls the animal appetite for its own end, and 
 will not permit that its beauty should be bartered for bread or 
 any sensual gratification. But though controlling the sense for 
 its own higher end, yet can it not rise to the dignity of an 
 ethical imperative. It controls by taste and not by duty; its 
 retributions are disgust and loathing, not remorse and despair. 
 Its ugUness is not that of vice, and its deformities are not the 
 debasement of guilt. It fills an important province in the 
 domain of the reason, but is wholly separated from morality. 
 
 2. Man, as rational, has the capacity to apprehend Truth, 
 and to apply necessary and universal principles in science, 
 and thus to introduce himself into the field of pure Philosophy. 
 
 All possible diagrams may be constructed in pure space. 
 In these diagrams, skillfully arranged, a succession of intuitive 
 steps may be taken which shall lead out from axioms to the 
 most remote demonstrations. So, also, in the mind's passing 
 from point to point along a mathematical line, it may attain 
 the apprehension of succession in pure time. As this intel- 
 lectual agency is contemplated as standing in the successive 
 points, and thus giving so many instants, or, as moving from 
 one point in the line to the next, and thus giving so many 
 moments, all possible pure periods, and in these, all possible 
 pure numbers may be attained. Such pure numbers may be 
 skilfully arranged, in such a variety of ways, as to indicate the 
 results of all arithmetical processes. 
 
THE GROUND OF MORAL SCIENCE. I9 
 
 In this maxiner a pure geometry and a pure arithmetic are 
 possible ; and the whole field of mathematical truth lies open. 
 This does not rest upon the experience in sense, but the intel- 
 lect works out its own figures and numbers, and the mind's eye 
 sees the consecutive steps and apprehends the ultimate con- 
 clusion. Because man can thus use pure space and pure time, 
 he can see in his pure constructions necessary and universal 
 truth, and thereby aflSrm not only what is, but what any ex- 
 perience must be. The sense has, here, no more relevancy 
 than in the fine arts. The pure mathematical figures may be 
 filled by some matter, just as the pure hving forms of beauty 
 may be ; yet the reason regards the matter filling the pure 
 forms as of no importance, and uses it only to retain or com- 
 municate the intuitions, while the entire science lies only in the 
 pure figures of the. mind's own construction. 
 
 And so, also, the phenomena given in sense must be coimec- 
 ted in determinate places in space, and determinate periods 
 in time, or they cannot come into any order of experience. 
 They are else a mere rhapsody of appearing and disappearing 
 visions. And such determined order of connection cannot 
 be effected by the senses. The reason must give the notion 
 of permanent substance in which the phenomenal qualities 
 2«here, or they could not be determined to their places in 
 the connections of universal space : and must also give the 
 notion of perduring cause to which the phenomenal events 
 a//here, or they could not be determined to their periods in 
 the connections of one successive time : and must, fiirther, 
 give the notion of action and re-action through which all 
 passing events ^r^here, or they could not be determined as 
 contemporaneous in one and the same time. The reason de- 
 termines, not so experience is, but so, if there be any experi- 
 ence in space and time, it must be. With these pure notions 
 of substance, cause, and counter-causation, as connecting all 
 possible phenomena of the sense, the whol? field of pure 
 
20 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 physics lies open to us in which the sense has no more im- 
 portance than in aesthetics and mathematics. The qualities 
 and events constituting a nature of things may be given in such 
 connection ; but whether actually given or not, the philosophy 
 is valid. 
 
 Not then at all in the animal, but only in the rational part 
 of our being, is the field for mathematical and philosophical 
 truth. And this province is also entirely distinct from the 
 field of beauty, though both these belong to the region of the 
 rational, — the field of the beautiful being limited to rational 
 sentiment, and the field of the true being confined to rational 
 principle. In this realm of truth, from the pure love of science, 
 man may fi-eely subject the animal appetites and refuse to pros- 
 titute philosophy to any craving of pleasure. He may also 
 withdraw all attention from art, and fully devote himself to 
 science. But while, thus, science is clearly discriminated fi-om 
 the province of taste, it still does not come within the field of 
 morality. The excellency of science, far transcending animal 
 happiness, is still other than the excellence of virtue. 
 
 3. The Beautiful and the True would be impossible, if the 
 reason which they express were not other and more than sen- 
 timent or principle. Reason knows itself, and in knowing itself 
 it also determines itself, and is thus a person. In this true self- 
 knowledge, in this true personality, is the only adequate disclos- 
 ure of reason. 
 
 Man as rational thus knows himself. He knows himself as 
 rational, as spiritual, and thus as possessing an intrinsic excel- 
 lence and dignity which Js above all price. There is something 
 reverent and awful in his own being, in whose light he finds 
 himself at the same time a sovereign proclaiming a law, and a 
 subject acknowledging the obligation of obedience thereunto. 
 The law is written upon his inner being, and requires him to 
 do what is due to reason, and for no other reason than that it 
 is reason which requires it. The Shekina in his own bosom 
 
THE GROUND OF MORAL SCIENCE. 21 
 
 compels respect for its majesty and authority, and he feels 
 bound, alone by himself, to sacrifice appetite, and subdue 
 sense, and subject the body to the worthiness of the spirit. 
 He is often made conscious how terrible is the retribution 
 which comes from within him, in the sense of his own degra- 
 dation and conviction of personal debasement, when he has 
 bowed his soul as a bond-slave to some appetite of the flesh. 
 This discernment is wholly spiritual and not sensual. The ani- 
 mal nature cannot in the least participate therein. The author- 
 ity itself is wholly in and of the spirit, and it uses the sensible 
 world only as worthy to be subdued and subjected to its own 
 ends. It does not want nature that it may represent its own 
 pure forms within it, like beauty; nor, that it may study its 
 own necessary connections in it, as philosophy; but that by 
 its use of it, it may make the spirit itself more worthy. It is 
 competent to stand in itself, an everlasting law of life, when 
 flesh and sense shall cease, and this mortal shall put on im- 
 mortality. 
 
 Here, then, is a ground upon which we can rest our science, 
 and here exclusively is the field of Morals. This field we are 
 now to explore. Knowing our precise position, we can precisely 
 determine our Moral Philosophy, and therein possess a science 
 fi-om necessary principles, and not a guess from general conse- 
 quences; 
 
SYSTEM OF MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 DIFFERENT THEORIES OF THE ULTIMATE RULE IN MORALS, 
 
 " "IT THERE there is no law there is no transgression;" 
 V V and for the same reason, where there is no law there 
 is no obedience. Law, thus, is essential to all moral action, 
 inasmuch as without it there can be no ethical obligation ; no 
 merit nor demerit, no punishment nor reward. The faculties 
 of moral agency constitute mere capacity for praise or blame, 
 but except some rule be applied, no occasion is given for calling 
 forth this capacity into the attainment of any moral character. 
 The first inquiry for Moral Science is, therefore, after an ulti- 
 mate Rule of life, under whose imperative, moral character may 
 be formed and estimated, and from the authority of which, 
 justification or condemnation may be pronounced. 
 
 Such a rule must be apprehended by the subject, and thus 
 promulgated to the conscience, and must be so universal that 
 it may come home in its convictions to the consciousness of the 
 race, otherwise there can be no valid ground for a comprehen- 
 sive science of Morals. Where, then, is the source of a univer- 
 sal OUGHT, which shall press upon the entire conscience of 
 humanity ? 
 
 Widely different and very conflicting theories have been here 
 advanced; and as this is so fundamental for the science of 
 morality, the system has of course received its whole character 
 
 23 
 
24 SYSTEM OF MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 from its foundation-principles. It is in fact a history of Moral 
 Science, to give a history of the ultimate rules which have been 
 adopted as the ground-work of the many systems which have 
 been elaborated. This wide diversity in reference to the very 
 ground of Moral Science might seem very discouraging to any 
 expectation of a final general agreement, and even to be taken 
 to indicate that all morality is itself very uncertain, since those 
 who study it most contradict each other in their philosophy. 
 But there is much relief m the fact, that the diversity has been 
 mainly in reference to what has been made a matter of specu- 
 lation, and not in reference so much to the matter of fact as to 
 what is right ; and more especially is discouragement removed, 
 when it is known that former discussion has not been useless. 
 Many of these conflicting theories have had their day, and are 
 now numbered among the things that were, with neither teacher 
 nor disciples. A few only now divide the great mass of ethical 
 writers, and the prospect is the more hopeful that the truth shall 
 ere long shine forth too clearly to permit of any radical dis- 
 crepancy. 
 
 It will help us in fixing our convictions of what is the ulti- 
 mate Rule in morals, if we pass in cursory review some of the 
 more prominent theories which have been advanced by either 
 ancient or more modern philosophical moralists. We wiU give 
 these in the most concise statement practicable, without any 
 attempt at confirmation or refutation, and leave them by merely 
 specifying their distinctive authors. The simplest statement of 
 the theory is all we need for the present design .: and for the 
 more convenient presentation, we may classify theni as theories 
 which put the ultimate Rule in something external to the mind, 
 and those that find the ultimate Rule in something within the 
 mind itself. We shall thus have two classes, which may be 
 termed, 
 
 I. Objective theories of the Ultimate Moral Rule. 
 
 II. Subjective theories of the Ultimate Moral Rule. 
 
DIFFERENT THEORIES OF THE ULTIMATE RULE. 25 
 
 Under the class of Objective theories we may put : 
 
 1. The Authority of the State. Man must live in civil so- 
 ciety, and this cannot be sustained without political regula- 
 tions. The state, through its constituted authorities, legislates, 
 and to this the citizen is bound in unquestioning obedience. 
 The conservation of the public welfare would be impossible, if 
 any subject were permitted to question and resist the civil 
 authority. The man is not to go back of the law and judge of 
 it by some imaginary standard ; the civil authority is ultimate, 
 and the citizen has nothing to do but obey. The whole duty, 
 where the st^te has legislated, is to read the law and act ac ■ 
 cordingly. Hpbbes. 
 
 2. The revealed Will of God. What God wills is ultimate, 
 simply becauge he wills it. When this is revealed to man in 
 any way, there is no higher rule by which it can be judged ; 
 but that God has so willed, is in that, and on that account, 
 final. If the position be taken that there must be some prin- 
 ciple for the direction of the Divine Will, it is answered that 
 God can have no superior sovereign to his will, but this may 
 make and unmake principles, and create moral truth as well as 
 natural existences. All moral truth originates in the Divine 
 will ; and it is thus, solely because God wills thus. Des Castes 
 
 and Dymond. 
 
 3. Something inherent in the Nature of Things. This admits 
 of several modifications, in accordance with what it is in the 
 nature of things, that is put as the ground of the ultimate Rule, 
 (a.) One will say, that there is a fitness in things themselves, 
 which lies at the basis of all obligation. There is a "fitness " 
 in returning gratitude for a favor, — in the payment of an hon- 
 est debt, — in love and honor towards a parent, and homage 
 towards God. This " fitness " in one to be accompanied by the 
 other, is the ultimate ground of obligation, where there is the 
 one to do also the other. Dr. s. Clarke. (3.) In all things there 
 is a truth, and this seen confers obligation to be regarded and 
 
26 SYSTEM OF MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 treated as it is. It is " true " that man is not a post, and this is 
 a valid reason why he should not be treated as a post. It is 
 " true " that he is a rational being, therefore deal with him as 
 such. The Rule is founded in "the truth" of things; all dis- 
 obedience is somewhere acting out a lie. wollaston. (f.) There 
 are certain relations between things, in which is found the ulti- 
 mate Rule. The " relation " of parent and child — of bene- 
 factor and beneficiary — of the state and the citizen — of the 
 Creator and creature, is itself the ultimate Rule for the duties 
 enforced. We need only to know the relations, and the duty is 
 seen in them and made up from them. Dr. Wayland. (</.) There 
 is a beauty in the union and consent of one mind or heart with 
 the great whole of being, and whiclv may be termed good will 
 to being in general, and in this moral beauty is the essence of 
 true virtue. The consent and agreement of heart with being 
 in general is conditional for the beauty, and the love to being 
 in general is not for the beauty in the being, but the love is to 
 the being and the beauty is inherent in such love ; and thus the 
 beauty of benevolence or of love to being in general, is the 
 essence of all true virtue. Pres. Edwards. These may all mean 
 much the same thing ; ' but whatever be understood, they all 
 agree that the ground of the rule is seen in the nature of things. 
 4. TTie highest Happiness. This assumes that happiness is 
 the only good, and that whatever tends to this is right, and the 
 design to secure this is virtuous. The ultimate Rule of all 
 action must be found in this tendency to promote happiness. 
 The general theory of highest happiness has its modifications 
 constituting distinct systems, (a.) A purely selfish system in 
 which pleasure is put as the chief good, and personal enjoyment 
 the only virtue. Inasmuch as the future is altogether uncertain, 
 the highest wisdom is found in making the most of the present, 
 and thus it takes the form of the old perverted Epicurean 
 maxim, "live while you live." (b.) The modifying of all our 
 appetites and desires so as to keep " the golden mean," neithei 
 
DIFFERENT THEORIES OF THE ULTIMATE RULE. 27 
 
 loo lax nor too intense in any inclination. Moderation is the 
 great virtue. The highest happiness, and thus the highest 
 virtue, is by keeping in the midst between two extremes. 
 Aristotle. (^.) It may take apparently a more religious aspect, 
 and assume future eternal happiness as the highest good, and 
 thus denying present gratification for the endless happiness of 
 heaven. Paley. (^.) Taking the general conception of utility, 
 and referring this to the public, and making the ultimate 
 Rule to be "the greatest good of the greatest number." 
 Bentham. (^.) Putting all under the name of Benevolence as 
 the highest good, inasmuch as it blesses both giver and re- 
 ceiver. Man is so made that he finds his highest happiness 
 in promoting the highest happiness of others, and thus benefi- 
 cence is the highest rule of life. Pres. Dwight and Dr. Taylor. 
 
 All the above find the highest rule of life in some source 
 external to the mind, and have regard to some object which 
 it is deemed makes the strongest claim upon man, and which 
 is thus the measure of all right as itself the ultimate. 
 
 Under the class of Subjective theories, we have : 
 
 1. A natural susceptibility to Pride, gratified by Flattery. 
 Man has many impulses, but among the strongest is that of 
 pride, which induces to self-denial in other things that it may 
 find more than its equivalent in the praise that is returned, and 
 the whole of virtue is found in the vanity that is satisfied by 
 flattery. The many are thus cunningly enslaved by the design- 
 ing few, who, to reward their patient service and devotion, have 
 invented such terms as loyalty, patriotism, heroism, virtue, 
 religion, etc., and apply them in flattering distinctions to such 
 as are the most subservient and obsequious. Praise is given 
 in barter for freedom, and all moral virtue is but " the offspring 
 of flattery begotten upon pride." Mandeville. 
 
 2. An inner reciprocal Sympathy. All we know of other 
 men, is by referring what we may deem their experience to 
 some similar experience of our own, and finding a sympathy 
 
28 SYSTEM OF MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 between us. Just so in morals. We change places in thought 
 with the actor, and if we deem that we should approve of the 
 act as a spectator, we affirm it to be right; and if we should 
 not so sympathize with it, we affirm it to be wrong. In refer- 
 ence to another's act, we must imagine ourselves to be the 
 actors and him the spectator, and accordingly as it would meet 
 or oppose his sympathy, we affirm the act to be right or wrong. 
 Thus the apprehension of the rule is never direct, but through 
 this reflex sympathy; and there must be an imagined reci- 
 procity between the actor and the observer of the action, or 
 neither of them could affirm any right or wrong in the action. 
 The capacity to such inner reciprocal sympathy is the sole 
 ground and possibility of morality. Adam Smith. 
 
 3. An inner Sense, which gives Moral Distinctions. This 
 has its various modifications. (a.) Amid the other senses 
 with which man is endowed and which give material qualities, 
 he has a distinct and specific sense which apprehends moral 
 distinctions. This perceives a right and wrong as the organic 
 senses perceive colors, sounds, etc. This moral sense is each 
 man's source of all obligation, and to him his measure of all 
 virtue. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. (^.) Virtue and vice in the 
 abstract are nothing, and like all other qualities have their 
 existence only in the percipient. There is thus a universal 
 sentiment, by reason of the original conformation of all minds 
 by one Divine Creator, which approves certain intentions and 
 affections, and disapproves certain others. This universal sen- 
 timent, from an original conformation of the human mind, is 
 the ultimate source of all moral truth, and in this is the ultimate 
 Rule of life. It is a mark of the Divine Wisdom and Benev- 
 olence that the human race has been made with such con- 
 formity of moral sentiments, that substantially the same things 
 are approved and disapproved through all generations. Dr. Brown. 
 (f.) An inward revelation as a warning voice, which, though 
 sounding in us is not of us, makes itself to be felt as an awe 
 
DIFFERENT THEORIES OF THE ULTIMATE RULE. 29 
 
 and fear of Deity ; and which thus becomes a conscience in 
 all human bosoms, and lies at the source of all morality. An 
 external revelation may also be given as another form of the 
 same admonition ; but this inward awe of the Deity, awakened 
 by this warning voice, and before which we find the whole 
 carnal mind shrinking and retiring, is that which first originates 
 imperatives in the consciousness, and involves all that is moral 
 or religious in the human race. The divinely-awakened rever- 
 ence and awe of the Supreme Being, first wakes the moral life, 
 and this finds its rule in any form of God's commandments. 
 
 F. SCHLEGEL. 
 
 4. An immediate Intuition. This view supposes the human 
 mind in its rational endowment to have an intuition higher 
 than the immediate perceptions of sense, and which higher 
 intuition immediately apprehends universal and necessary prin- 
 ciples in their own light, and among others such also as belong 
 to moraUty. The organs of sense have no connection with this 
 higher intuition, either directly or remotely, since no reflection 
 upon what is perceived by sense — combining, abstracting, or 
 comparing — can give these necessary principles. The Reason 
 is the organ for their apprehension, and this immediately be- 
 holds them. The Ought is thus immediately seen by the 
 reason, and needs and admits of no other explanation than 
 that it is so seen in its own light. The reason sees the right, 
 and that is ultimate and conclusive. The phraseology and 
 application may differ somewhat in different writers, but all of 
 this theory hold substantially to this, that the ultimate right 
 is a dry and pure rational intuition, seen and not felt, — an 
 intellectual object, and not a sentiment or a feeling, — and that 
 this intuitive beholding of the right is its highest aifirmation. 
 It is not right, because of this or that ; it is immediately seen 
 to be right, and that is the end of it. The right is ultimate 
 in its own intuition, and there cannot be a further explanation 
 when the last is reached. Cudwokth, kant, and coleridgs. 
 
30 SYSTEM OF MORAL SCIEN'CE. 
 
 The review of these varied theories, and what has been 
 already attained in the determining of the particular field of 
 Moral Science, will now enable us the more readily and intel- 
 ligently to apprehend the ultimate Rule of Right, when the true 
 ground in which it must lie shall be set fully before the mind. 
 Without a detailed examination of these theories, this will at 
 once correct what is erroneous, and fill out what may be in- 
 complete in any of them. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE ULTIMATE RULE OF RIGHT, 
 
 As our first inquiry in Moral Science is for an ultimate rule 
 of right, let us start the inquiry with a clear view of what we 
 mean by an ultimate rule. Nothing is ultimate where there is 
 any thing beyond. An ultimate, therefore, is not simply the 
 last p oint our thoughts can reach because they are too feeble 
 to go farther ; rathe r is it the tr uly last, on which our thoughts 
 _j^t_when they reach it, because they see that there is noth- 
 ing farther. No factj therefore, can ever be_ultimate ; for a 
 fact Js_jomething_made, and of course beyond it is its maker. 
 An u ltimate is unm ade. It could never either begin or cease _ 
 jLa_6e. It knows no past nor future, but only ever is. The 
 limitations of space are also as little beyond it as are those 
 of time. It is ever)rwhere as well as,„everyK]i£n. 
 
 An ultimate, therefore, has its ground only in itself, and the 
 light which reveals it is altogether its own. It is both self- 
 suppOTting and self-evident. It rests upon itself, and the 
 thoughts that reach it rest because itself rests. 
 
 But nothing is thus ultimate — nothing is at the same time first 
 and last, and the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever — but 
 
THE ULTIMATE RULE OF RIGHT. 3 1 
 
 csaspn. Reason al one supports and decl ajres_ and is the all- 
 suffideaLvouchfir fnr itseif- We are always seeking for reason"-^ 
 and while we never rest till the self-sufficient reason is found, 
 when this is found we never seek for any thing beyond. It 
 would be impossible and absurd for us to ask why any three 
 points must be in the same plane, or why it is impossible for 
 a thing to be and at the same tim^ not be, or to ask a reason 
 why a man should do right, since each of these statements is 
 a statement of reason itself, and is therefore self-sufficient and 
 final. To seek for any thing beyond reason would be to seek 
 a reason for reason, which would be the absurdity of seeking 
 for precisely what we already have. Reason must be the inspi- 
 ra;tion and the end of all our seeking. That this is so appears 
 as soon as we note that the question why, which really voices 
 all our inquiry respecting any thing, simply means, what is the 
 reason for the thing. 
 
 An ultimate rule, therefore, must be a reasonable rule. In 
 other words, it must conform to re ason, must be worthy of 
 reason, and must reveal its reasonableness in its very statemerit. 
 BuffhiFTiliot true ofUny of the riiles wEich have been adduced 
 in the previous chapter. None of these rules can be justified 
 by its bare statement. Why the authority of the state, the re- 
 vealed will of God, the nature of things, the highest happiness, 
 or any of the subjective rules that were named should require 
 our obedience, could only be shown by showing the reason on 
 -which it is supposed to rest. Unless the rule is reasonable it 
 has no authority, and if it is reasonable its authority is beyond 
 dispute. The same is true of every rule that could be named. 
 We inquire for its reasonableness as the ultimate foundation for 
 its authority, and when this is found, and only when this is 
 found, we rest. 
 
 The rule, therefore, by which all other rules must be deter- 
 mined is the only ultimate rule. Let us start, then, with that 
 wherein all these other rules must end. We can 9,5k for uoth- 
 
32 SYSTEM OF MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 iiig more, we can be satisfied with nothing less ; the reasonable 
 rule is the right rule, and it is right for no other reason than 
 that it is reasonable. 
 
 We use the term right as a_substantive an^ as an adjective. 
 Its exact equivalent as a substantive is reason, and as an adjec- 
 tive is reasonable. The ultimate rule of right is the ultimate 
 rule of reason, and as a rule must be a rule of action, and a rule 
 of right a rule determinative of right action, or the action that 
 ought to be, the simple and sufficient statement of the ultimate 
 rule of right is that a reasonable being ought to act reasonably. 
 This is a rule self-evident and self-sufficient, needing no other 
 ground to support itself or reveal itself than itself. This is 
 the true ultimate ; and as all other rules must come to it for 
 their test, we take it at the outset, and direct all our inquiries 
 by its determinations. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE ULTIMATE RIGHT. 
 
 We may now unhesitatingly make the following summary 
 statements. 
 
 Man is a reagonable being, and the highest claim that can 
 possibly be made upon him is that he a ct in a way worthy 
 of Jiis rational endowment. As a reasonable being hejgiaas 
 himself, for reason, js .jhe true_and s ole self-knower ; and in 
 this self-knowledge he knows that the claim_af_ieason upon 
 his^ personal conduct transcends all__other claims. It is the 
 consciousness of this claim, it is the recognized presence of 
 an authority which he can neither dethrone nor delude, and 
 which is inalienable from himself, which gives to every man a 
 sense of awe when forced to stand alone with his own spirit. 
 
ATTRIBUTES OF THE ULTIMATE RIGHT. 33 
 
 It is as if another and a divine self scanned and judged every 
 thought and purpose of the active self, and announced the 
 irreversible sentence of self-justification or self-condemnation. 
 Ma n is thu s a law unto hhnself, and has his judge and execu- 
 tive inseparable from himself. We may call this law and 
 authority, the c laiin of reason, or constraint of conscience, or 
 i nner voice of Go d : the true meaning is all the same, that 
 everyjnaii_is consciously bound, to_ do.tha|„aiid that only which 
 t he rational spirit that has be en g iven him sees, in its own 
 rational ity, to be due to reason. _ Herein is the ultimate rule 
 of" riglit, "which both includes and measures all human rights 
 and obligations. It is beyond all deductions from experience, 
 and is itself determinative of what experience itself should be. 
 It is amenablejo no outer interference, and admits into itself 
 no oth er con si de ration, than that it behoqv es spirit tQ,, act 
 wort hy of its spir ituaUtv. which is but the inner claim _o,f reason 
 i tself to act r easonably. The ultimate authority binds univer- 
 sally and absolutely, for no other reason than that it is reason. 
 
 With this precise intuition of the ultimate Right, it is of 
 further importance that we apprehend as distinctly some of the 
 attributes which it possesses. 
 
 I. It js simple. By this is meant that it is wholly uncom- 
 pounded, and thus incapable of any analysis. 
 
 This is manifest from the genesis of the_conception itself. 
 We do not attain it fi-o m any gener alization, nor by any pro- 
 cess of degrees which by an accumuktion at last constitutes 
 i;ight. We may pass in our analysis of mind from the appetite 
 oPthe animal to the imperatives of the rational within us, and 
 in the rational may also pass through the sphere of taste and of 
 philosophy up to that of morals ; but we do not carry along 
 with us any conceptions which, in their last complexity, be- 
 come the conception of the right. We leave each law, of 
 happiness and of beauty and of physical truth, in its own 
 sphere, and only as we come into the sphere where reason 
 
34 SYSTEM OF MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 knows itself, and is conscience, do we find the law of right ; 
 and here it stands in its own simplicity as seen by the eye of 
 reason itself. 
 
 This is further seen in the impracticability of all analysis 
 of it. No intellectual process can de compose it and show its 
 parts. It may be said, as it has been, that for any action to 
 be~ right, there must be, i. Understandi ng, 2. Free-will, 
 3. Tmden cy to universal hap piness, 4. T endency to the ind i- 
 vidual happiness; but, though this should be admitted to be 
 a true ^analysis of right action , it is manifestly a mistake to 
 suppose it an analysis of rgg4 / itsejf . The very first ingredient 
 — an understanding — is of no possible use, but as it is con- 
 ditional for already p^ei^ ceiving the right, iiesides, tiow know~ 
 that it would be n ot right to hol d to responsibility without 
 such assumed elements? The very attempt at analysis con- 
 victs itself of cairyingalong with it the still simple conception. 
 
 2. The ultima te right is immutable. Ultimate truths are not 
 the prod uct of power, but must themselves con dition all exe r- 
 tionsofpower. Power does not make the principles by whicli 
 all power must be judged. No possible power can make it 
 right that God, or angel, or man, should act unworthy of their 
 spiritual excellency. Mutability of the ultimate right is thus an 
 impossibility . ~ 
 
 And still more, to conceive of any change involves the alter- 
 native, either that it changes to somewhat that it is not and 
 should not be, and thus changes firom a right to that which is 
 not right ; or, that it changes to somewhat that it is not and yet 
 should be, and thus that there was another right determining 
 how the ultimate right should be changed. Mutability of the 
 ultimate right is thus an absurdity. 
 
 3. The ultimate right is univ ersal^ As in relation to all 
 ultimate truth, no one can appropnate it and say of it, t his is 
 my truth ; but that same truth wiU also be truth for every mind 
 that looks into the same ground, so, eminently of the ultimate 
 
ATTRIBUTES OF THE ULTIMATE RIGHT. 35 
 
 moral right, it is the same to all. In reference to all factg_pf . 
 sense, ever^^manlg, experience i5.Jji8_ ojvn measure. His own 
 s ensation is his ultimate ru le. The taste of wine, the size of the 
 moon, the sound of a trumpet ; these are what they are to me, 
 and by his own pecuharity of organs all these may be very 
 different to another man. But not thus with rational intuitions. 
 Axioms in mathematics, principles in philosophy, rights in 
 morals, are the same to aU minds, when seen in the same 
 grounds. It has sometimes been objected, to the reproach of 
 ethical science, that quite contradictory actions have been 
 deemed right in different ages. The Spartan may have ap- 
 proved of theft, while other people approve of honesty. But 
 the Spartan approved of theft only when it was done so adroitly 
 as to escape detection, and in this only as perfecting the man 
 in the deceits and stratagem of war, which was looked upon as 
 the highest glory of man. The same perverted view, looking 
 into the same ground, would give to all the Spartan justification 
 of theft. But never will there be approbation where the act is 
 viewed in its own light, as the taking by one man that which 
 is not his, from another who owns it. Such an act is unworthy 
 of reason, and is thus an indignity to the man robbed, and a 
 debasement in the thief; in which light it can receive from all 
 only reprobation. And so with all moral obligations whatever, i 
 when followed up to the ultimate principle of debasing the 
 rational spirit, no man can violate the obligation without re-( 
 morse. 
 
 That the ultimate rule is un iversal, appears further in this, 
 that the dmactgr even of the Supreme Bginj; may be deter- 
 mined by it. Were right determined _by. the -yvill of .God, then 
 that will itself would be undeterm ined in its moral chaxacten^ 
 But God himself permits and makes the appeal to the ultimate 
 principle, determinative of his own action. "Shall not the 
 Judge of all the earth do right? " "Are not my ways equal? " 
 God perfectly knows his own excellency as Absolute Spirit, ancj 
 
36 SYSTEM OF MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 that which it behooves him to do, and has thus the same Rulf 
 of right that is everywhere applicable. We have thus in a 
 universal rule an occasion for a universal system of morals. 
 
 A few particulars may be here noticed ; some, as direct 
 inferences from what has been already gained. 
 
 1. Right s can never dash with each other. Reason is ever 
 at on e with itself, whether viewed in the personality of the 
 Absolute Spirit, or in^jthat of the. finite spirit. That which is 
 due to the rational spirit is ever the meas ure of obligatio n, and 
 thus all ethical claims must necessarily adjust themselves in 
 complete harmony, through the ever concurring and according 
 rights of rational personahties. The finite as truly debases itself 
 in all conflict with the absolute, as would the absolute in all 
 subjection to the finite. Reas on can never de B:K.its£lf and put 
 forth unreasonable claims ; and hence no rights, of any number 
 or degree of rational beings, can come into any collision with 
 each other. The one rule maliesjilljightsjiarmonize. 
 
 2. T he animal can poss ib ly possess n o ri^ ts. So far as we 
 have any knowledge of animals, they are only individual exam- 
 ples of a species. They give no evidence of self-determination, 
 of freedom, of personality, and thus they show nothing which is 
 peculiarly their own. In them the species appears, through 
 them the species is continued, and when they have sufficiently 
 subserved these ends of the species, they are cast aside and left 
 to perish. Individuals in the animal world appear simply as 
 passive objects upon which the species exerts its power, and 
 who fulfil its design without any purpose or agency of their 
 own. They have, therefore, no rights, and can have no obli- 
 gations. Appetites belong to them, but not imperatives. 
 
 3. It is desirable here to note so me of the distinctions in . 
 mental facts which ar e use d in moral science. 
 
 This self-kn owledge of the^ spirit, or the consciousness of its 
 own ^^piritual _excellency, awakening i n man's rgiji-''"'''' riahir& 
 an imperative towards that which is due to his own intrinsic 
 
ATTRIBUTES OF THE ULTIMATE RIGHT. 37 
 
 digni ty, and which moves in complacency for obedience and 
 in remorse for disobedien ce, is conscien ce. The capaci ty, from 
 this i mperative of conssigjice to resist the impulses of appetite, 
 and thus to possess an inherent spring to an alternj.tive when 
 the animal good allures, is moral azency. This causal ity nf . 
 re ason to act even against the cravings_ of appetite, and thus 
 from the law of what is worthy of itself as ultimate end, i s will 
 {liberum arbitriuni), and which wholly differs from animal will 
 {brutum arbitrium) , that can only go out in executive acts after 
 strongest appetite or highest happiness. When the will keeps 
 in subjection every colliding appetite, and is thus regnant over 
 the whole animal nature, i t is free-will; when it yields to the 
 animal impulse, so as to make the gratification of appetite, or 
 highest happiness, its ultimate end, and thus puts the whole 
 executive agency under the domination of sense, it is a n en- _ 
 slaved will. When thi.s capacity of will goes out towards either 
 alter native of happiness or o f worthiness as ultima te end, it is_ 
 choice . When this choice of ultimate end is in reference to the 
 highest ge neralization of all human action, and thus the whole 
 voluntary capacity is disposed either towards the end of the 
 sense or the end of the spirit, i.e., happiness or worthiness, 
 Mammon or God, it is t he moral disposition, givi iig perma nent 
 r goral charac ter. This differs wholly fro m cons titutional bias, 
 sometimes calledjiatural jdisposition, and which results from 
 p hysical temperament only ; having no moral character in itself, 
 except only in i ts constraint and subjection . When this agency, 
 fixing upo n its object as end, is contemplated solely as_a subjec- 
 ti ve state, a nd not as goin g forth into overt action, it is prefer- ,. 
 ence ; -a nd when th is hasr^sgect jtQjabjects^ beyond our reach, it 
 is wish . In all these cases, the mental fact is peculiar in its 
 own being, and the word should be carefully used as expressing 
 its own precise meaning. The system is intelligently appre- 
 hended, only when its elementary thoughts are distinct, and the 
 terms in which they are expressed are made precise. 
 
38 SYSTEM OF MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 CHAPTER rV. 
 
 GENERAL METHOV.. 
 
 The way is now prepared for a Definition and general Method 
 of Moral Science. Morals {moralis) and Ethics (efliKos) both 
 alike refer to that which p ertains to the manners and co nd uct 
 of persons. Amo^l_act_is^a personal act, the act of a person 
 for a ike£-will- An act without freedom, an act necessitated, is 
 no moral act, and an agent without a free will is no moral agent. 
 The sphere of morality and the sphere of freedom are not only 
 co-extensive, they are identical. If a man is capable of virtue, 
 if it is possible tor mm To do a deed of heroism or of right, 
 he is free, or, conversely, if he is free he is capable of virtue. 
 
 Moral Science is the science of moral action. Precisely de- 
 fined, it is t he systematic application of the mor al rule to all 
 conceptions of moral conduct. 
 
 The moral rule, or ultimate rule of right, we have already 
 seen to be that a reasonable bemg ought to act reasonably, or, 
 as it might otherwise be stated, that all voluntary ac tion should _ 
 be held subordin ate to the digni ty of the rational spirit ,J^t 
 "state of the will as permanent disposition, and the specific acts 
 of the will as it goes out into executive operation, are all to be 
 determined by this ultimate rule of life. Thus al l bodily ag ency 
 which is voluntary, the organs of sense and of speech and the 
 members of the body, together with all the mental faculties 
 which the will may control, lie within the provmce _ot ethics^ 
 and may be brought undeL-the^determinations of Jhe_Rule of 
 right. Inasmuch as this ultimate rule is necessary and univer^ 
 sal, and no result of any generalization of experience, so the 
 system which it binds up within itself will be of no partial 
 application, but will determine how all moral experience should 
 
GENERAL METHOD. 39 
 
 he, wh ether it any where be actually so found or not. We thus 
 
 do not found ouFmorals upon experience, but bring our system 
 t o determine experience. 
 
 The application of this ultimate rule must be our work, 
 throughout, in the building up of our moral system ; but this 
 admits o f two as pects, which give two very distinct Parts to 
 moral science. 
 
 Where the ultimate rule is itself di rectly applied to th e suba— 
 ject, and is e xpected to co ntrol for its own sake, and in its own 
 light solely, so that the maiToBeys^ aiid holdT'all things in sub- 
 serviency to the end of the spirit, fr om a direct insig ht into 
 wha t reason- requires, we have the n the imp qrtantJPart of Pure 
 MoRALTTY. Nothing in this part acts as motive , but the sole 
 consideration of the claims o f spiritual excellency ; and the 
 obedience of the maiTis purely fynrri a rpg^rd to what is due 
 to ratio nal dign ity. This is the first to be studied ; and will be 
 found to be a comprehensive and clear province, where from 
 the intuitions of the reason alone, a wide portion of human 
 duty and responsibility may be imperatively determined. 
 
 When the ultimate rule is applied to determine why and how 
 far anntJTfr ma y, control me . and thus brings a foreign constraint 
 upon my action through the expressed will of a sovereigSTTre- 
 shall have the no less important Part of P osnivE Authority. 
 This will next demand a full investigation, and present some of 
 the most interesting and important methods of applying the 
 ultimate rule to moral action. The two will exhaust the whole 
 field of Moral Science. 
 
 Pure Morality, controlling the entire man for virtue's sake, 
 and in its own light, admits of no varied form in the application 
 of the ultimate rule, and hence this First Part of our work wiU 
 not present any occasion for a division of its leading motive. 
 The doing of the right, for the right's sake, is everywhere the 
 only causality to action which is recognized in it. But Positive 
 Authority applies its constraints in varied forms, and must be 
 
40 SYSTEM OF MORAL SCIENCE. 
 
 considered under corresponding divisions. The obedience may 
 be sought through the influence o f pains and pena lties, and 
 thus the subject be viewed as wholly servile ; and such will 
 give the division of mere Leealitv .' While again, the motive to 
 obedience may be solely affection and reverence for the sover- 
 eign, and thusjiKliQ]]^L.£Qrdial j and this will give the further 
 division of '■j}-r"f<kf'' T^y^ty 
 
 Mere Le gality will introduce us to the consideration ol _Polit- 
 ical^Qmizmn^nf, and the mor al pr inciples that must determine 
 its action ; and complete Loyalty wiUintroduce to the consider- 
 ation of the Divine Governmen t, and the ethical considerations 
 which must be found in its administration. These two, Leglit^ 
 and Loglt^ with their motives of hope and fear fo r the on e, 
 and of simple faith and love for~the other, admit of a most 
 pecuUar and interesting combination in their action, upon cer- 
 tain subjects, to indu£e-jofe^dience ; and which will introduce 
 a third division to our study, under the form of Family Govern- 
 ment . In these Divisions will be exhausted the whole part of 
 PosmvEAuTHORiTY, and thus the entire field of Moral Science, 
 
 We have, then, our General Method Miy before us, viz : 
 
 I. Pure Morality. 
 II. Positive Authority. 
 
 1. Legality, in Civil Government. 
 
 2. Loyalty, in the Divine Government. 
 
 3. Both Legality and Loyalty, in the Parental Government. 
 
FIRST PART. 
 
 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 THE ESSENCE OF ALL VIRTUE. 
 
 V IRTUE is heroism or personal worthiness, as the etymol- 
 ogy of the word discloses. In jts attainme nt and pres- 
 ervation al LJmperatives are ^satisfied. The ultimate right, 
 inclusive of all rights, is the right of a rational being to act 
 worthy of its rationality, and submission to the constraint of 
 this right is the great duty which involves all other duties. 
 When the good will fixing itself upon this, and, in a perma- 
 nent disposition, holds aU other volitions in subserviency to 
 this, there is the comprehensive character of the purely virtuous 
 man. 
 
 But this essential virtue may be said to have its conditions 
 in several particulars. 
 
 I. There must be pure-mindedness. There can be no double- 
 end, and no double-dealing to gain the end of virtue. That I 
 may be worthy, I must know what worthiness requires and must 
 be moved to the end of worthiness alone. If any thing else 
 mingle and blend in the motive, it must so far debase and 
 degrade and make me to be unworthy. This pure simplicity of 
 heart and guilelessness of spirit is the most lovely trait in every 
 virtxious character. The clear, calm, fuU eye, and the whole 
 countenance serene and sweet in fi-ank sincerity, is but the 
 diffiised light of a pure mind through the windows of its tem- 
 porary tabernacle ; and this is still but a faint reflection of the 
 
 41 
 
42 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 glowing splendor of the spirit itself, shining out that it may 
 know and approve its own glory. As no countenance can be 
 fair except as brightened by candor, so no soul can be lovely 
 and worthy, no character can be virtuous, which has not a 
 pure-hearted simplicity and sincerity. 
 
 2. TTiere must be decision. The most pure-hearted sincerity 
 will want the dignity and manlmess of^virtue, without the firm 
 resolve_.andJtlie strong will to carry the^ honest i ntention into_ 
 .execution. Tbe_iQyeliness_ pf^virtiie is in its purity; but the 
 strength _and_dignity^of virtue is in its manly valor. The coun- 
 tenance of virtue is not only light with its calm^eye and open 
 brow, but its lip is firm and its look steady. Every rising ap- 
 petite that would debase the spirit, in its passionate gratification, 
 is held back with a determined grasp ; and a tight and steady 
 curb is put upon the entire animal nature. The triumphs of 
 human virtue never terminate here in a complete conquest. 
 The conflicting appetites of the animal, though restrained, still 
 exist ; and the loose' rein, thrown upon the neck for a single 
 hour, may be th^ signal for their waking in untamed wildness, 
 and plunging vpXo the most ruinous excesses. There must be the 
 element of a strong will, or all virtue is essentially defective. 
 
 3. There must be indep endence. That is not virtue which 
 waits on another's help, or follows only another's example. 
 Alone and single-handed, deserted and derided by the multi- 
 tude, the virtuous man has still an eye just as clear, a brow 
 just as calm, a look just as steady, and a step just as firm in 
 the way of duty, as when the path is trodden by thousands at 
 his side. What others may think, or say, or do, is nothing to 
 him. The worthiness of his own spirit is to be sust ained ; and 
 the clear conviction of what that demands, and the complacency 
 which that imparts, hold him steadfast no matter where the 
 multitude are gouig. He speaks his own word, holds up his 
 own hand, stands on his own feet, and disdains that another 
 should lead or drive him, without his own firm conviction of 
 the rightness of the course. 
 
THE ESSENCE OF ALL VIRTUE. 43 
 
 II. 
 
 THERE ARE MANY PARTICULAR VIRTUES. 
 
 All virtue is, in general, one ; and js_ pure-minded, decided, 
 a nd independ ent. But this is also consistent with there being 
 many particular virtues, in the pursuit of many subordinate 
 ends. The one great end, and in this the one comprehensive 
 virtue, is the attainment by every man of the highest spiritual 
 worthiness. This is the complete virtue, and gives perfection 
 to the moral character. But this is not secured in any one 
 single act, and o nly through a perp etual course of action ; and 
 this course of action not directed in the pursuit of any partic- 
 ular object, but, as occasion may call, in the attainment of 
 many objects. The one great end will demand the attainment 
 of the proper object at the proper time. 
 
 So neither is ma n the subject of one p articul arjright or im- 
 perative ; but he has many rights and many duties, and therein 
 he has occasion to exercise himself in many virtuous deeds. 
 Thus, to attain the highest virtue, man will be required to 
 exhibit, each in its proper time, the virtues of veracity, honesty, 
 rharityj te mperan ce, frugality, etc. ; nor cQuld^_t he compr ehen- 
 sive virtue be attained, except in the attainment at the proper 
 tim ^ of the particular vir tues. Pure morality will in this way 
 include as many particular virtues, as the one grand end of 
 morality may at various times call forth. 
 
 In looking to the varied objects to which the action of man 
 may have reference, we may classify according to some natural 
 peculiarities, and thus arrange our order for considering the 
 particular virtues. 
 
 A comprehensive Method may here be given, which will at 
 
44 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 one view disclose the order of investigation that will be pursued 
 in the Part of Pure Morality : 
 
 I. DUTIES TO MANKIND. 
 
 1. Personal Duties. 
 
 a. Self-control. 
 
 b. Self-culture. 
 
 2. Relative Duties. 
 
 a. Kindness. 
 
 b. Respect. 
 
 II. DUTIEtJ TO OTHER THAN MANKIND. 
 
 1. Duties to nature. 
 
 2. Duties to God. 
 
I. DUTIES TO MANKIND. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 I. Personal Duties. S elf-contr ol. 
 
 BY personal Duties are meant such as belong to one's self, 
 and are revealed in each man as due to his own being. 
 Inasmuch as I am a rational person, and my ultimate law of 
 action is that which requires me to act worthy of this high 
 endowment, there are many duties to myself beside the duties 
 to others which the same law of reason will disclose. The 
 ultimate Rule of the highest worthiness of reason will demand 
 from myself the highest attainable perfection in all things ; and 
 will apply negatively, — that I avo id all inj uryby self-control ; 
 and also positively, — that I secure all practicable improvement 
 by self-culture. The first, under the virtue of self-control, will 
 occupy the present chapter. 
 
 A moral Law is a rule imposed u pon a m an ; a moral Maxim 
 is a rule adopted by a man. Pure morality may make a certain 
 maxim to be law, in the sense that it imposes upon the man 
 the duty to adopt the maxim ; but it is known as maxim, not 
 from its being imposed by morality, but only from its being 
 voluntarily adopted by the person. Inasmuch as we are now 
 to consider the duties which man owes to himself, we are vir- 
 tually determining the maxims which every man should propose 
 to himself in the regulation of his own conduct, and the most 
 conclusive and consistent way of grouping the particular duties 
 together, will be found by this appHcation of the several distinct 
 
 45 
 
46 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 maxims which morality would make it incumbent on every man 
 to adopt. Under the maxim will be appropriately classified the 
 duties, and we shall use the maxim indiscriminately for both 
 commanded duties and forbidden offences, and thus take occa- 
 sion to introduce the virtues or the opposite vices, as con- 
 venience' may dictate. 
 
 The grand maxim for this virtue of self-control, is, " Bear 
 AND Forbear." It will comprehensively embrace all the vir- 
 tues included in self-control, although there will be an advan- 
 tage in breaking up the general maxim into several less general, 
 but which will each still include many duties. 
 
 I. " Do thyself no harm.^' By this maxim, morality would 
 
 guard all bodily members and all mental faculties. The physi- 
 
 1 cal constitution is, throughout, adapted to the grand end of 
 
 i the spirit, and it is, therefore, a reasonable requirement upon 
 
 ! each man to preserve, as far as lies within his power, his entire 
 
 constitutional nature inviolate. All over-taxing and straining any 
 
 member or faculty ; all enervating habits and careless neglect, 
 
 which leaves the body or mind to suffer ; all injurious methods 
 
 of dress or diet, or general regimen, which bring any violence 
 
 to nature ; or, in fine, any acting or withholding to act, which 
 
 weakens, deranges, or paralyses any portion of the human 
 
 system, are forbidden in this maxim, and are to be excluded 
 
 as vices reproachful to man's spiritual dignity. All excessive 
 
 indulgence, and all engrossing attention to business or study, 
 
 whereby the physical powers become debilitated or disordered, 
 
 are in Hke manner here prohibited. But besides these general 
 
 applications of the maxim, we may introduce several specific 
 
 topics of excluded vices or included virtues which we will now 
 
 more fully particularize. 
 
 ' I. Maming. By this is to be understood any bodily injury 
 
 ' or dismemberment which lames or disfigures the person. 
 
 The polling of the hair, clipping of the beard, or paring of the 
 
 nails, may be demanded by comeliness or cleanliness, and the 
 
PERSONAL DUTIES. 47 
 
 neglect subject to great inconveniences ; and decay may make 
 it salutary to remove a tooth, and disease to amputate a limb ; 
 and in all such cases the maiming may be a virtue, as really 
 dignifying and not debasing the man. But whatever mars the 
 human constitution, or would be a disgrace to the person in the 
 circumstances, is forbidden. A man might lose his hair or a 
 tooth, in the above view, with no disparagement to his moral 
 character; but one who should shave off the hair or pull the 
 teeth for a r^ard, would necessarily incur an indignity which 
 morality would condemn. 
 
 Among more barbarous people, the practice of disfiguring 
 and scarring the body, or terribly distorting and maiming it, is 
 by no means uncommon ; and any lingering habits of such 
 violence, for forcing a more fashionable shape, or attaching 
 artificial ornaments, are offences both against a pure civilization 
 and a pure morality. Emasculation, for purposes of improving 
 the voice, adapting one's self to serving in a seraglio, or from a 
 mistaken view of repressing occasions of temptation, is a most 
 vicious degradation of manhood, and abhorrent to all moral 
 sentiment. 
 
 2. Self-torture. All penances, mortifications, fastings, and 
 rigid austerities, by which health is undermined and the con- 
 stitution weakened, are condemned by a pure morality as a 
 vicious indignity to the person and an unwarranted invasion of 
 the constitutional integrity. Superstition often exacts that which 
 morality forbids ; bu t a true piet y never d emands immoralities. 
 It always e xalts,_a nd in nothin g^debases humanity. Constitu^ 
 tional nature may never righteously be violated for purposes of 
 spiritual discipline. The Saviour's announcement of the law 
 of the Sabbath, is the divine example for all Christian ordinances, 
 that it is made for man, not man for it. It is never to be pushed 
 in its strictness to man's physical injury. Mercy, as a regard to ^ 
 constitution al welfa re^Js_Jiigher_thim_sacrifi^ The fasts and 
 self-denials,, that true Christianity enjoins, will rather invigorate 
 than enfeeble the human system. 
 
48 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 3. SuigpE. The highest immorality against this maxim is 
 suicide. In this the violence to constitutional being reaches 
 to its utter destruction. Man^duty isJo_cherishand_ereserve 
 life, not to destroy it. The instinct of nature is strong towards 
 the preservation of life, and to guard against and ward off what- 
 ever may tlireaten it, so that the act of the suicide is most shock- 
 ingly unnatural. It is sometimes asked, has not the man the 
 right to withdraw himself from the contests or the tedium of 
 life, when life itself becomes a burden? The answer is a most 
 decided negative, when the ultimate end of life is truly appre- 
 hended. This end is not happiness, and thus permission for 
 voluntary release when misery becomes unavoidable, but spirit- 
 ual worthiness, and which may be gained and preserved in any 
 position, and in none more fully than amid disappointments, 
 afflictions, and bereavements. The claim is, to stand up in 
 manly dignity and preserve the entire person, body and soul, 
 in fuU integrity, keeping the spirit brave and pure while the 
 flesh suffers, and not cowardly to fly the post providentially 
 assigned because disasters multiply. 
 
 4. Self-defence . If I am to restrain my own hand from 
 self-injury, it is my duty to ward off injuries to myself from 
 other sources. The man would be immoral, who should unre- 
 sistingly allow foreseen dangers to come upon him. This is 
 quite clear, when the danger threatened is from nature, or from 
 a wild beast. No violence done to nature, or to an animal, 
 invades any rights which can lie in nature or an animal ; and 
 when this violence is in self-defence, my duty to myself de- 
 mands it. There is no difficulty in self-defence where no rights 
 are invaded. 
 
 But when attacked by a person, may I defend myself by 
 assaulting and disabling him? The dictate of pure morality 
 seems plain in the affirmative. If I only disable in self-defence, 
 I may ever afterward regret that necessity as a misfortune ; but 
 if it has gone to the extent of taking life where this was neces- 
 
PERSONAL DUTIES. 49 
 
 sary to shield my own, I shall not feel debased by it ; nor does 
 the common judgment of men condemn me. The courts ex- 
 cuse a homicide required by self-defence. This is not because 
 I, if assailed, have any right to punish the assailant. Tojiepel 
 a wrong and to r equite a wro ng are two very different matters, 
 and my o nly right when^ttacked js the righ^to repel the attack 
 only so far as this may be requisite forjnv- awn defence. When 
 this is done, the assailant has no right to complain, nor I any 
 reason to feel self-degradation. It would have been unworthy 
 of me to have passively assented to the injury, and allowed my 
 own rights to have been wantonly and wickedly destroyed. The 
 general maxim, " Bear and forbear," does not exclude the right 
 of self-defence. 
 
 But is not Christianity against it? "Forgive your enemies." 
 " Resist not evil." " If one take your cloak, give him also your 
 coat;" "if he smite on one cheek, turn to him the other also." 
 The full prohibition here is of revenge. Vengeance is the 
 Lord's, not for any man. Where the injury is inflicted, let God 
 avenge, not yourself. Rather let the injury be repeated, than to 
 retaliate. Forgive him ; do him good ; "heap coals of fire on 
 his head." This will melt and subdue, rather than vengeance. 
 The whole spirit of Christianity looks at injuries in this aspect, 
 and pure morality would do the same. Even in strict self- 
 defence, the least blending of retaliatory vengeance would be 
 unworthy of me, and thus an immorality. But self-defence 
 may be, an d s hould be. w ithout revenge. The disabling of the 
 assailant must be done solely to save myself, not to take ven- 
 geance on him ; and with that spirit, even to the extent of 
 taking life to save my own, Christianity as well as morality will 
 justify it. 
 
 2. " Keep your body under^' To permit the gratification of 
 any appetite to become an end of life, is to allow the flesh 
 to tyrannize over the spirit and bring it into a most unworthy 
 bondage. No want, however craving, may rule over an impera- 
 
50 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 tive in man's spiritual being. The indulgence of such want 
 would be a vice, not merely as inducing injury to the consti- 
 tution and thus violating the former maxim, " do thyself no 
 harm," but here, as a direct affront to the spbit, and immoral 
 because unmanly. It would be the man prostituting the pre- 
 rogatives of his humanity, and living like the animal. No 
 tyranny is more degrading than when carnal appetite gets its 
 domination over the reason, and the man sells himself in bond- 
 age to the flesh. There is no act so base that such a man may 
 not do, and no vice so vile that such a man may not practice. 
 This maxim excludes : 
 
 I. Intemperance. This more directly applies to an exces- 
 sive indulgence in eating and drinking, though the term prop- 
 erly includes all immoderate gratification. Stimulating and 
 pampering the appetite for food and drink, and then permitting 
 this to control as an end in life, to the exclusion of spiritual and 
 moral claims, is a most shameful degradation. We do not need 
 to look at it in the light of the evils it entails upon the man, and 
 his family, and the community; sufficient for its deep con- 
 demnation as an immorality, when we see the baseness and the 
 vileness of a spirit which consents to forego and sacrifice its 
 own high prerogatives, and discard its claims to rightful sov- 
 ereignty, that the body may be surfeited with riotous living. 
 
 In the case of strong drink another appetite is awakened, 
 more raging and insatiate than the strongest thirst. The diffu- 
 sion of the alcohol through the system awakens a wild but 
 pleasurable excitement, and ultimately an uncontrollable desire 
 to perpetually repeat the intoxication. The languor and col- 
 lapse of the system after the debauch is an insufferable pain to 
 the drunkard, and nothing allays it but increased measures of 
 the same stimulant, so that he is driven to the cup" by an intol- 
 erable torment, as well as allured by anticipated gratification, 
 and before these raging passions the spirit has sunk, hopeless 
 of all recovery of its rightful dominion. A more pitiable, and 
 
PERSONAL DUTIES. 5 I 
 
 at the same time a more contemptible condition among men, 
 cannot be found, than that of the confirmed drunkard. The 
 use of the stimulant, in the most moderate degree, is a door' 
 opened upon this frightful abyss, and thus all use is dangerous ; 
 and the most stringent reasons must be found for its being tasted, 
 or it becomes an immorality. To tempt the dangerous way, by 
 occasional convivial indulgence, is already a spiritual indignity 
 that no pure-minded man would bear. 
 
 2. Licentiousness. This includes all illicit indulgence of the 
 sexual passion, though every unlawful gratification is properly 
 licentious. The perpetuation of the race depends upon this 
 constitutional inclination, and hence the necessity and the be- 
 nevolence of its deep and universal implantation in human na- 
 ture. The consequences depending could not be safely left to 
 weak impulses ; but this very necessity, in the nature of the 
 case, induces the greater danger of spiritual degradation and 
 debasement from it. Hence God, in nature, has surrounded it 
 by the many checks and safeguards of the native modesty and 
 precious estimate of virtue in the pure, the public disgrace and 
 self-reproach which attaches to the impure, the most inveterate 
 and loathsome diseases which foUow in its train, and the debas- 
 ing of every refined sensibility which follows on the loss of 
 sexual virtue. By the positive institution of marriage, God has 
 also tempered and regulated the sexual propensity, and tran- 
 quilized its impulses, so that, even in the necessity for its 
 strength, it may be held by every one in legitimate subjection to 
 the dignity of the spirit. Only in regulated marriage is sexual 
 intercourse consistent with virtue, while all forms of fornication, 
 seduction, prostitution, and adultery, are vices that terribly de- 
 grade and debase the immortal spirit. We look not now to the 
 physical evils attendant upon licentiousness, and which greatly 
 aggravate its immorality; but the conscious vileness of the 
 spirit of the debauchee is his own perpetual monitor of the 
 viciousne'ss of his practice. The presence of virtue and purity 
 is a perpetual reproach to him. 
 
52 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 3. Ambition. This, when understood in a bad sense as a 
 vice, includes an inordinate desire for power aiid_control over 
 the actions of other men. To seek power and attain it for the" 
 e'rids of spTfitual worthiness, if it be called ambition, is a virtue. 
 It becornes'a'vIcewEenlKe power is desired as a lust of agran- 
 dizement, or as a mea ns of ministe ringJto_any_p.ther con stitu- 
 
 tional appetite. It is the putting of the false dignity and honor 
 of popular distinction in the place of that which truly dignifies 
 and ennobles the spirit. It is thus the same vice as before ; 
 putting under the spirit and not the body. 
 
 The consequences of inordinate ambition have been always 
 dreadful in the world : o ppressio n, cr uelty , war, a nd b loodshed - 
 But the great vice in the eye of pure morality, is the exceeding 
 degrad ation of the ambitious man. In the midst of all his 
 proud triumphs, and the servile homage and flattery he is re- 
 ceiving, his own spirit is conscious that it could not come into 
 the presence of a truly glorious and dignified soul, without a 
 sense of self-contempt and conscious unworthiness. None of 
 his honors will bear uncovering in the presence of his own 
 spirit. When he must retire alone and commune with his own 
 conscience, he knows that he is not only naked and empty, 
 but debased and unworthy. He has not pursued such ends as 
 give spiritual dignity, but he has discarded these ends for sensu^ 
 ous cravings, and gained only vanity and self-abhorrence before 
 his own judging and awardingjpirit. 
 
 4. .CovETOusNESS. A man may covet any possession, but 
 the term applies to an avariciousdisposition, seeking inordinate- 
 ly to amass wealth. It need not be dishonest in attaming, but 
 it is putting wealth, however attained, as the end of the active 
 
 life and not the worthiness of the spiritual character. WealtlT* 
 may consist in any possessions of property, but more especially 
 in rnpney as the representative of all property. In the avari- 
 cious desire for money, the baseness of covetousness more spe- 
 cially manifests itself It comes to transfer its idolatry, firom 
 
PERSONAL DUTIES. 53 
 
 the objects which might minister to sensual appetite to that 
 which is only their r epresentative ; and ultimately to that, not 
 as the representative of any thing it means to take in exchange 
 for it, but for the,.gQldit5glf, and sordidly hugs the treasure, not 
 in any anticipation of coming enjoyment, but solely in the ava- 
 ricious lust of possessing money^ 
 
 How debasing is this vice may always be seen in its effects, 
 jt swallows up and absorbs all other, emotions. The miser lives 
 and feels only in his gold. Want and misery in any form may 
 present themselves, but his heart is callous to all distress. He 
 denies himself aU the comforts of life, and barely subsists in the 
 use of the plainest necessaries that he may daily add a little 
 more to his large accumulations. He not only loses all noble- 
 ness of spirit, but more than almost any other vicious man loses 
 the apprehension of what real spiritual diemity is. The volup- 
 tuary, whether the drunkard or the debauchee, often feels a 
 keen disgust of his pleasures, and to the ambitious man there 
 come times when the unsatisfying nature of all that he has 
 gained gives him bitter mourning, but the miser never seems 
 Jo feel his realj getchedness. The inner light has so nearly 
 gone out, that he seems to have lost all consciousness of his 
 degradation in the loss of all apprehension of what is due to 
 his spirit. His reverence is gong ,; his sense of self-respect 
 is gone; iiis moral shame „js. gone, and his whole_se3itient.~ 
 being has beco me almost as torpid as_the gold he jrotsMpSi . 
 This is the ultimate goal of avarice, and discloses how detest- 
 able a vice it is. i , 
 
 3. Rule your own spirit. The spiritual in humanity is de- 
 graded whenever it submits to have en ds imposedTupo n it, and 
 yields itself blindly to the dictat es of another . Setf^possession 
 and self-direction are essential to virtue; and the obligation, 
 to take upon himself the control of his own conduct, is inalien- 
 able from man. No one can rightfully give up this responsibility 
 to another, and no one can rightfully assume it for another. 
 
54 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 The true dignity of man's spiritual being can be sustained in 
 no other manner than by his proposing to himself the ends 
 of reason, and resisting to the last extremity all interference 
 with this inalienable prerogative. There can be no question 
 allowed as to whether he may not live longer, or avoid more 
 care, by allowing his spirit to be ruled by some other agency 
 than himself; the assent to such dictation is A-ien unciation 
 of the p rerogatives of personality and c onsentin g to becom e 
 a_tiiing, and thereby an attempt to abdicate the authority of 
 his own rationality, than which nothing can be more debasing. 
 It is man renouncing his manhood, and voluntarily taking the 
 place of the animal, to be used by others. 
 
 The submission to the claims of a righteous debt, complying 
 with the conditions of a contract, or yielding to the demands 
 of righteous authority, is no renunciation of the control over 
 my own spirit ; for in each case I see the rule which binds 
 my conscience, and which it would be unworthy of myself to 
 disregard. But to sacrifice the authority and integrity of my 
 spirit, by allowing circumstances, or other persons to impose 
 their own ends upon me, would be feloniously to destroy my 
 moral self, and make it better for me not to have been born. 
 Better not to have had the rights and responsibilities of a 
 person, than in having them basely to surrender and alienate 
 them. 
 
 This maxim stands opposed to : 
 
 I. Servility . This includes not only the assent to be a 
 slave and obey a master who regards only his own ends, but 
 all mean submission and cringing or fawning sycophancy. To 
 put myself so under the control of a military leader, that I can- 
 not comply with the claims of morality and religion ; or, to sur- 
 render my soul to the keeping of any minister of religion, that 
 he may direct my faith and determine all my devotional service, 
 which I only blindly adopt from him ; or, to yield myself to a 
 master, who consults his own pleasure and uses me only for his 
 
PERSONAL DUTIES. 55 
 
 purposes ; all these would be openly renouncing my manhood 
 and giving away my personality, and would be most severely 
 condemned by morality. 
 
 But much more comprehensively, this maxim excludes very 
 many unworth-V-e xhibitions of a slavish spirit among multitudes 
 who would claim the dignity o f freemen. Many shrink from 
 known duty before the opposition of power, or a perverse public 
 sentiment; others yield to custom, and follow the fashion in 
 matters of a moral bearing, and thus renounce their own judg- 
 ment for the caprices of the multitude; and others identify 
 themselves with some party, and give up opinion and practice, 
 measures and influence, as the party may direct. Private judg- 
 ment is renounced, and personal responsibility discarded, and 
 men thus become the mere drift-wood on the current which 
 others are controlling. 
 
 Servility, al so, often takes the form of hypoc risyj_whi ch con- 
 ce als real convic tions, or makes pretence of such as it has not, 
 and dare not stand out in open acknowledgment of its honest' 
 sentiment ; it shows itself in cowering be fore arrogance, in 
 flattery to get favor, in ostent atious humility to proc ure praise, 
 and gra tuitous self-disparagement to induce^ undeserved coin- 
 mendat ion ; and in all cases manifests a want of manliness and 
 dignity highly derogatory to a rational spirit. The man does 
 not rule himself, but he allows other things to rule him. He is 
 a mere trimmer and time-server, or a mere tool in the hands of 
 others, with no self-decision and manly independence. 
 
 2. Vanity. This, as the name imports, is mere self-infla tion ; 
 ma king large a ssumptions and speaking " greatjwelling words," 
 when the real character is empty of all solid attainments. It 
 abundantly manife sts a want of self -possession, and consents to 
 exchange that self-complace ncy which a spirit that rules itself 
 worthily acquires, for that self-conceit which se lPlffliorance 
 induces. ' -— — ~ — _- 
 
 This also appears in divers forms. Persons may over- 
 
$6 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 value^particular qualifications or possessions, and show a false 
 pri de in their be auty or strength, their talents or station, their 
 dress or equipage, while disre garding all o bligation to attain 
 such real excellences as would adorn and ennoble. There is 
 often exhibited with such a t hirst for popular appla use, which 
 is most reproachful to all true worth, by thrusting themselves 
 forward on all occasions ; obtruding upon public notice in most 
 conspicuous positions, and ma king lofty pretensionrptmrring 
 conversation upon themes _which will give promiitence.. to their 
 deeds^_or_occasion to gratify a perpetual egotism ; and a boast- 
 in g demean or, which vaunts of their success and parades their 
 possessions, despising the unfortunate and throwing contempt 
 upon all their competitors. It is in one respect more unfortu- 
 nate than most vices. The vain man carmot refrain firom his 
 perpetual ostentation, and yet he can nowhere show himself 
 jwithout exposing his emptiness. It necessitates the contempt 
 due to all destitution of worth and dignity. 
 
 3. Jealous y. This term is used here to cover a wide region 
 of vicious manifestations among mankind of a spirit selfishly 
 greedy for its o wn indulgence, an d malevolently av e rse to al l_ 
 enjoyment by . others. It may have other names of envy, ha- 
 tred, malice, revenge, etc., according to the different circum- 
 stances of its exhibition and degrees of intensity. 
 
 We not seldom find those who habitually dwell upon their 
 own wants and woes, and magnify their own misfortunes and 
 affiictions, and set over against their poverty and hardships the 
 abundance and enjoyment of others, and thus keep themselves 
 in a perpetually peevish discontent and petulant complaining. 
 Their fretfulness drives away all comfort, their murmuring ex- 
 cludes all gratitude; and they cannot enjoy what they have, 
 because some one has received so much more ; nor sympathize 
 with any other's distress, because their sorrows have been so 
 much greater. Such a temper ripens on to a more gloomy and 
 sullen discontent. It broods over real ills or imagined injuries. 
 
PERSONAL DUTIES. 57 
 
 and thus nurses a spirit of misanthropy and malevolence, which 
 either rankles in secret hatred, or comes out in fits of anger 
 and revenge. The evils to himself and others abundantly show 
 the vice of a jealous temper, and the inveteracy of such a habit, 
 once formed, testifies that " greater is he that ruleth his own 
 spirit than he who taketh a city." 
 
 4. False-hon or. When a man looks steadily at his own 
 spiritual_being, and completely knows himself, he will have a 
 true estimation of what is real dignity and worth. In the appre- 
 hension of what is the intrinsic excellency of humanity, he-will 
 see at once what is due to himself, and what is due from him- 
 self to others. True honor will be found in that course which 
 secures the highest spiritual worthiness. But when a man turns 
 off the eye fromJliS-rational spirit, and looks out upon popular 
 opini on and pu blic estima tion, and deems that to be honor 
 which gives him reputation among the multitude, he has come 
 to an estimate of personal dignity m ost fa lse and really degrad- 
 ing. His honor is not worthi ness, but ^ popular" repu te ";" his 
 standard is not that which requires in ward excellen cy, but that 
 which foll ows hu man opinio n ; and instead of ruling his own 
 spirit, the conventional maxims and factitious customs of the 
 society where he may happen to dwell will rule him. 
 
 This is a gr eat im morality, and leads to many enormities. 
 The man soon becomes most morbidly sensitive t o the applic a- 
 tion of the outer s tandard, since he has no clear apprehension 
 of the sta ndard withjp ; and he is jealous and resentful, arms 
 himself to protect his false dignity, and challenges his friend 
 and meets him in deadly combat, to keep himself in counte- 
 nance with the society about him. He kills his friend, or lets his 
 friend kill him, for public reputation ; but he has no courage to 
 face public o ginion for inw ard worthiness' sake . The whole 
 immorality of the quick, fiery, resentful, duelling spirit, so rife in 
 some portions of society, is best seen in this very point. The 
 honor which defers to a popular and perhaps perverse estima- 
 
5 8 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 tion, instead of standing by the standard of what^the wo rthiness 
 of the spirit requires, is the spirit's ^«atest indignity. 
 
 JT^Gambung. This is the risking of one's possessions upon 
 chance. It is the ahandnnment of wisdom, and the acceptance 
 of an is sue, which the gambler not only cannot foresee , but 
 res pectine; w hich he has no convictio n that it will be rationally 
 determined. He sets aside his reason, he goes upon a guess 
 which h as no foundation, or even proceeds without a guess, and 
 thus besides blindly risking a possession, which he has no right 
 to own except with the obligation to use it wisely, he blindfolds 
 himself where his first and clearest duty is to see. It is un- 
 worthy of reason thus to do, for it is the surrender of the self- 
 possession and the self-control of which reason can only be 
 unreasonably deprived. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 r. Personal Duties. Self-culture. 
 
 It is not a sufficient fulfillment of our personal duties that 
 we control ourselves from all that will induce harm ; we are 
 morally bound to advan ce to as hig h adegr ee of perfection as 
 is^ttSLinable, and improve ourselves in all things as we ha ve 
 opportunity. This perpetual and complete self-culture of every 
 bodily and mental faculty is due in the right of our own spirit- 
 ual being, and it is unworthy of any man to neglect any por- 
 tion of his person which admits of improvement. The general 
 maxim is, — Secure a complete self-development. The moral 
 force of the maxim appears in the following considerations. 
 
 Every germ expands to maturity thr ough the energizing of an 
 inner vital force, and no unfolding fi:om'the~oii Si(Te shmiTinTe^ 
 called a development. Each living germ has its own rudimental 
 
PERSONAL DUTIES. 59 
 
 forms within it, and the Hving energy works, as occasion is 
 given, through these forms, and thereby induces a growth 
 according to the law within the subject itself. The conditions 
 being given, the whole growth takes an orderly and symmet- 
 rical progress to its consummation. Nothing new can be 
 inserted in the germ ; the vital force, the determining form, 
 and the rudimental elements are already given, and the culture 
 can be only outside appliances to occasion the development of 
 what is now within. 
 
 Plants and animals are subjected to such conditions as nature 
 throws around them, and must thus grow to maturity under a 
 necessity of both external and internal determinations. But 
 to man is giv en a capacity to superinten d himself the entire 
 dev elopment of body and mind. He can add nothing to the 
 ru diments alread y there, and can change none of the inner 
 forms through which the working of the vital force shapes the 
 growing product; yet can he supply fitting conditions, and 
 exclude such as are unfit, and perpetuate these through all the 
 process, and thereby bring o ut completely and in due propor- 
 tion all that has been given. And here applies the whole streiF 
 of the imperative in the above maxim. So se lect and apply th e 
 ou tward condit ions, that all which is gwgn jn^thg man^may be 
 pe rfectlv de veloped. A wilful or a careless neglect secures a 
 deficiency or a deformity, and this perpetuates itself in all sub- 
 sequent being, and beside the reproach of the perpetuated 
 physical deformity, there is an eternal debasement from the 
 moral delinquency. 
 
 This general maxim, which binds every man to the duty of 
 self-culture, may best be apprehended in its ethical claims, by 
 considering it as it divides itself into several other maxims less 
 general and yet including each many specific duties under 
 them. We shall here, as before, include promiscuously virtues 
 to be practiced and vices to be avoided. 
 
 I. " Grow in stature." This maxim includes the entire 
 
60 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 physical development of the man, and demands that he be not 
 allowed to grow up like the wild ass' colt, but under well-regu- 
 lated training and discipline that shall secure, as far as practi- 
 cable, a sound mind in a sound body. All the appliances 
 which experience and sound judgment have found to be salu- 
 tary should be induced, and all that is deleterious averted. 
 This is especially important in childhood and youth, where the 
 whole constitution is the most susceptible, and the impressions 
 made in it the most enduring. From a vicious neglect in this 
 respect, many children die in infancy, and many others drag 
 on a sickly, deranged, and deformed body through life, the 
 whole misery of which is chargeable to the culpable neglect 
 of their physical education. Much mental imbecility, inde- 
 cision, and irresolution, and even cases of mental derangement 
 and idiocy, find their cause in the treatment received in the 
 cradle. The whole type of the physical character shows ever 
 after the effect of the earliest applications to it. 
 
 The parent, it is true, must first and earliest stand respon- 
 sible ; but with the first dawnings of discretion and accounta- 
 bility, the child should be made to feel the importance, and 
 to act under it, of a careful regard to a healthy and orderly 
 physical development. Very early, responsibilities begin to | 
 rest upon the person himself, and any injury done to the health 
 or the constitution, by the child's presumption or carelessness, 
 is a vice as truly lying at his door as the consequences are 
 certain to enter into his experience. There is here embraced/ 
 a careful regard to : 
 
 I. DjEJ. The earliest nourishment which nature provides 
 from the mother, may be so vitiated as to give a perverted ap- 
 petite, a diseased constitution, or an early death. The whole 
 future experience of an immortal being very much depends up- 
 on its salutary sustenance and nourishment for the first months 
 of its existence. The carelessness or viciousness of the parents 
 may thus go down to the third and fourth generation of theii 
 
PERSONAL DUTIES. 6t 
 
 children. The mother may poison her own blood by her prac- 
 tices, or the child be fed on the milk of animals which has 
 been poisoned by their food, and no excuses of convenience or 
 interest can any more expiate the guilt than they can remedy 
 the mischief of the conduct. A misplaced tenderness and fond- 
 ness is also ruining many constitutions in their infancy and child- 
 hood, by an indulgence in crude fruits, confectionery, pastries, 
 and other so-called delicacies, and though pleasing to the child 
 in the indulgence, is to be terribly bitter in the subsequent ex- 
 perience. And through adult life, beside the indignity of pam- 
 pering appetite, and living only to eat and drink, there are the 
 certain consequences upon the constitution of what we eat and 
 drink ; and all unwholesome diet, all surfeiting and drunken- 
 ness, reaches and dishonors the spirit by deranging the taberna- 
 cle in which it dwells and the only organism through which it 
 can act. The imprudences and excesses in diet and drink 
 probably disfigure and derange more bodies and destroy more 
 lives, among the successive generations of mankind, than the 
 combined ravages of war and pestilence. 
 
 2. Dress. Nature clothes the animal for the climate where 
 it dwells ; but the unprotected body of man must be clothed by 
 his own care. His dress therefore belongs to his culture. He 
 needs dress both for th e protectionjjniisbody, and also for the 
 end s of comeliness and a dornment. Re ason expresses itself in^ 
 beaut y, and the rationa l spirit in its self-developmen t appropri- 
 ately clothes the body with a dress expressive of the moral per- 
 sonality which dwells within it. Dress thus becomes beauBluT,"' 
 and the body is niade more beautiful thereby. An unclothed 
 body would be as abhorrent to the taste of a well-developed 
 person as to his sense of modesty or comfort. But modesty 
 and comfort can never be sacrificed to fondness for fashion or 
 love of display without an immorality. While modesty will 
 always be compatible with the dress which is also comfortable, 
 fashion may often violate both ; and when it does either, no 
 
62 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 purely moral person will follow it. Dress is often so worn as to 
 cramp and deform the person, or made of so slight and frail a 
 texture as to fail of proper protection, and in each case the 
 duty of the maxim is violated. Elegance and taste are shocked 
 where modesty and comfort are sacrificed, and no fashion can 
 really make that dress becoming which belies the very ends for 
 which dress is worn at all. Protection to the person, good 
 tastc^ j,nd pure morality will always readily"c6 mbine "m the 
 same garment. ' ' 
 
 3. Exerc ise. To the young, life is ^ perpetual motion. 
 The necessary sleep is no sooner over than the increasing 
 activity again begins. Every constitutional faculty is aug- 
 mented and perfected in its own exercise. There is no healthy 
 and vigorous growth, in the animal constitution, without activity 
 and exertion. This becomes less impulsive and sportive as 
 age advances ; but so long as the spirit dwells in the body, it 
 will demand for its own sake that the body be used, and so 
 long as there is life in the body, will the weU-being of the body 
 demand action. An idle man or a slothful man will not long 
 remain a vigorous man. The child needs the air and the 
 sunshine, as well as the plant ; and the strongest constitutions, 
 the most hardy men, are those who have grown up in active 
 emplo)rment in the open winds of heaven. 
 
 A sedentary employment, a student's occupation, should be 
 regularly interrupted by periods of vigorous out-door exercise. 
 The culture of the mind is falsely sought by perpetual applica- 
 tion, and leaving the body through which it must act to enfeeble 
 itself in inaction. It will be no honor to the spirit, to plead 
 a perpetual devotion to its culture, if there is a neglect of the 
 bodily organs, through whose healthy functions alone the cul- 
 tivated spirit can come out in communion with man and nature. 
 A credulous or conceited application of some peculiar gymnastic 
 exercises, as well as dietetic observances, may be cherished and 
 practiced, and harm be done to the body by its unadaptedness, 
 
PERSONAL DUTIES. 63 
 
 as well as dishonor to the spirit by its foolishness ; but past a 
 doubt, many diseases and deaths had been precluded, and 
 many otherwise mortal disorders may now be removed by 
 judicious and regulated bodily exercise. It is better than 
 medicine ; it is really very much the efficient in many far- 
 famed methods of dealing with chronic diseases, combined 
 with a regard to regular sleep and diet. ^ 
 
 4. Cleanuness. Filthiness of person, dress^ and dwelling, 
 is a vice m itself, and a reproach and indignity to the spiritual 
 being of man ; but it also interferes with the health and per- 
 fection of the body. A refined sense might be repelled from a 
 dirty dress or dwelling, before its foulness had attained to such 
 a degree as to injure health or endanger life ; but many a lin- 
 gering disease is induced or aggravated, and many a death 
 hastened, by the foulness of the apartment in which the person 
 takes his food and sleep. The body, as well as the mind of 
 the child, will mature more perfectly, the more cleanly are its 
 habits ; and the life of no adult person can be passed in sloven- 
 liness and filthiness without debasement to the spirit and de- 
 triment to the bodily health and soundness. Cleanliness of 
 person and dress, and neatness in and about the dwelling which 
 is the home of a family, reward themselves in the refinement 
 and elevation they induce, and the buoyancy and vigor of 
 health they impart ; and no parent is fulfilling his moral duties 
 to himself or to his family who permits himself or them to be 
 habitually uncleanly. 
 
 2. G row in practical knowledg e. We restrict this maxim to 
 the cultivation of the faculty of judging according to the sense. 
 What this limited province is, may be apprehended from the 
 following considerations : 
 
 Animals learn from experience. They have found conse- 
 quences in certain connections, and have thus come to expect 
 their recurrence. They may thus become prudent in conduct 
 towards themselves, and kind in their actions towards others. 
 
64 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 But the animal cannot carry up its data to any higher point 
 than sensible experience. There is no capacity for apprehend- 
 ing necessary and universal truth ; no power to intuitively see 
 axioms and a priori principles ; and thus no capabihty to carry 
 its processes beyond the data given in sense. Its deductions, if 
 we may call them such, are all sensible and never strike their 
 root in reason, and while we ascribe to the animal knowledge, 
 we never assign it wisdom. If we apply the word wisdom to 
 any animal sagacity, it is always in the inferior sense of cunning, 
 and not that the animal can ever become the sage. If it ever 
 uses an understanding, it gives no evidence of ever making use 
 of reason. 
 
 Man, also, as participant in the animal faculties, has an un- 
 derstanding which judges from the data given in sense ; and as 
 his animal faculties, though the same in kind yet in many re- 
 spects superior in degree to the brute, can be made the more 
 comprehensive, so he can attain to greater knowledge. He can 
 observe more extensively, and deduce_gmeral_cQijseauences_ 
 more accurately, and thus attain to broader and more safe pru- 
 dential rules of action. And here come in the duties enforced 
 by the maxim, " to grow in knowledge." Man's spiritual worthi- / 
 ness demands that he make the most he may of his understand- ( 
 ing. The events transpiring around him are not mere floating 
 appearances, occurring and passing away with no important 
 bearings upon human interests, but that which has been is an 
 index how it may again be ; and thus nature is perpetually 
 teaching every man through his experience. An instructive 
 book is directly before him, and it is worthy of him that he 
 study therein daily, and gain practical knowledge. He is 
 bound to thus learn the way to do good to himself and others, 
 and how also from both himself and them to ward off evils. 
 
 It is by thus cultivating the faculty of judgment, that we 
 become pru_dent and skilful. This perpetual flow of events 
 passes on by us, throwing upon ourselves and others the com- 
 
PERSONAL DUTIES. 65 
 
 mingled good and evil which the current bears along, and as 
 we habituate ourselves to judge of what is coming from what 
 has passed, we know how prudently to direct our own conduct, 
 and how to propose that which is useful for others. This power 
 of practical consideration and ready tact to seize upon the 
 proper means in the right time, gives an executive skill which 
 we sometimes term wisdom ; but to mark our distinction of it 
 from the attainment of the cultivated reason, we call it worldly 
 wisdom ; a skiU_ui_sai ely and effectiv ely u sing j aturaToccur^ 
 rences. No man becomes thus worldly wise who does not 
 habituate himself closely to observe men and things, and keep 
 his eyes constantly open upon what is passing around him. A 
 clear, far-reaching foresight, is the result of careful discipline 
 and patient practice. To one it may come more readily and 
 more perfectly than to another, but a sound and safe judgment 
 is in all cases the product of careful and cultivated industry. 
 An endowment of native wit is essential to any cultivation, 
 but however richly endowed, the talent will lie hidden and un- 
 improved, if not put out to use. The maxim carefuUy practiced 
 will exclude : 
 
 I. S tupid ity. This as here used is not so much a defect of 
 nature as of moral energy ; for what is a natural defect, morality 
 does not recognize. By sensuality, laziness, or a torpid indiffer- 
 ence to consequences, occasioned by a phlegmatic temperament, 
 a man may so neglect all exercise of the judgment as to be- 
 come stupid and doltish. If the mind will not awake to ob- 
 servation, and habituate itself to draw conclusions from facts 
 when observed, the capacity of judging will become weak, and j 
 the man properly incur the name of a blockhead. Many a per- 
 son, with native faculty for much influence and usefulness, al- 
 lows himself to become a dunce in stupidity from his own sloth 
 and vicious indolence. Experience makes him no more worldly- 
 wise, for in his torpid forgetfulness he never draws any practical 
 conclusions from what has been. He habitually indulges his 
 
66 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 wants without knowing any thing how to direct or correct his in- 
 dulgence. Opportunities of good pass by, which he never sees, 
 and evils come thick upon him, which he had not anticipated. 
 The brute is often less stupid than such a man, and would both 
 avoid evils which come upon him, and gain benefits which he 
 never attains. This is stupidity in an extreme degree, but all 
 approaches to it are so far vicious as self- culture could avoid 
 them. 
 
 2. Heedlessness. This is rather occasional forgetfulness 
 than perpetual foolishness. The heedless man allows his atteii- 
 tion to be engrossed with the matter in hand, and so fixes his 
 mind upon a limited number of facts, that the wider stream of 
 events bring their conseqiiences to him quite accidentally. While 
 he was looking at - some things, and perhaps narrowly enough 
 estimating their connections, there were other things outside his 
 narrow vision which came unexpectedly, and of course to him 
 quite unpreparedly. To all, it may be true, that nature brings 
 consequences quite unforeseen, but when these are obvious to 
 an attentive mind, and only strike us suddenly because we were 
 busied with something more limited, we properly incur the 
 charge of heedlessness, however attentive we may have been to 
 something else. 
 
 This s hort-sigh tedness jnay be allowed to grow into a habit 
 of general carelessness, and which will induce all the evils of 
 stupidity ; but such absorption in any one thmg as to neglect 
 the consequences that must flow fi-om many other things, and 
 especially to put in operation a train of events ourselves, that 
 bring evil upon us on one side because we only observed the 
 connections on the other side, will manifest a want of self-cul- 
 ture that morality must decidedly condemn. Beside the smart 
 of the unexpected evil, there is the conviction of indignity and 
 ill-desert in our heedless subjecting of ourselves to its infliction. 
 A better culture of the judgment would have anticipated and 
 averted the evil, and it was a vice in us to have tolerated the 
 heedlessness. 
 
PERSONAL DUTIES. 6/ 
 
 3. Rashnes s. This differs from heedlessness, in that it is a 
 hardj^ daring of the consequences, seen or unseen. The man 
 is so inteiiFoira particular end, that though he may have abun- 
 dant occasion to anticipate evil consequences, he determines to 
 risk them, and recklessly persists in his course till the blow falls. 
 It is usually passion b linding the judgment, and the appetite 
 rushing on to gratification in the discarding of all prudence. 
 
 This is a deeper vice than heedlessness or stupidity, for it 
 manifests a more desperate depravity, that will gratify passion 
 at whatever expense. I t directly assaul ts the judgment, and 
 stifles it. It will not be controlled, and hence it will not be 
 warned. — 
 
 Nature may do its worst in its connected consequences, but 
 its own way the appetite will have. Its impulse is all that con- 
 trols, and the rule of expediency is contemptuously disregarded. 
 Here is both thejieglect ^seltcpntrol^ndJJiejyant of selG. 
 culture, in having allowed the domination of the appetite to 
 become so strong, and the dictates of the judgment to be so 
 inoperative. No one may thus make a mockery of all pru- 
 dence, and go on in defiance of all consequences without great 
 moral guilt. He refuses to know what he might and ought to 
 apprehend, and what he does know he recklessly disregards, 
 and greatly degrades his humanity. A phlegmatic man, in his 
 carelessness, will probably be stupid, and a sanguine tempera- 
 ment, in his carelessness, will probably be rash. 
 
 4. Credulity . The man of weak judgment is very liable to 
 be a credulous man. If his temperam ent is ardent, h e will be 
 hopeful ; and as he has no safe deductions from facts, he will 
 weakly take his anticipations from his wishes, and be vainly 
 expecting good when evil is near. He is conscious of his in- 
 capacity to deduce clear conclusions, and he fondly takes what 
 others say, as more probably true than any opinions he may 
 form. Oftentimes such a man indulges in idle speculations 
 and dreamy fancies, and empty castle-building in the air ; and 
 
68 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 this credulous conceit finds no check fi-om sober thought and 
 sound judgment, but his weak fancy runs riot without control. 
 The opposite to this is : 
 
 5 • Scepticism. There is a scepticism which is preliminary to 
 all true science, a cautious^ state of inind because the man 
 knows how readily human judgment is biased, and how easy 
 it is to come to "cohcliiiions from insufficient grounds. He 
 will not take on trust, but induces doubts for the sake of more 
 complete investigation and ultimately more thorough demon- 
 stration. But a weak understanding distrusts its own ability to 
 judge, and with a desponding or melanchoUc temperament, is 
 predisposed to distrust the judgments of others, and is thus 
 sceptical in all things. He doubts for no good reasons, but 
 sojely because doubt has been made more habitual to him than 
 belief, and he has not sufficient force of understanding to cure 
 himself of it. 
 
 Both of the above, the credulous and the sceptic, have a like 
 want of confidence in their own judgments, and are alike weak- 
 minded, and their difference arises only from varied tempera- 
 ment, or the action of opposite outward influences. They both 
 neglect the cultivation of their understandings, and bring great 
 dishonor upon their spiritual being, and are alike vicious in the 
 judgment of a pure morality. 
 
 6. Destiny. Quite akin to the last two, is that weak judg- 
 ment, which, having no confidence in its own opinions and 
 conclusions, flies to fixed fate and destiny, as determining all 
 things for the man blindly. It may be sombre, and all things 
 destined to be adverse ; or it may be bright, and all things des- 
 tined to be prosperous ; but in either case, the issue is expected, 
 not because any clear connection of cause and effect is seen, 
 but in the absence of all apprehended connection, a depend- 
 ence is place3~upon some mysterious destiny to^ worE"but all 
 results. There is no mounting to an absolnttT'spirit, who uses all 
 causality as his creature, and in his wisdom a})points the move- 
 
PERSONAL DUTIES. 69 
 
 ments of nature's causes as the indices of his own inteUigent 
 designs, and which w<yuld require clear and vigorous thinking ; 
 but the whole is an escape from all thought, and fondly or fear- 
 fully leaving all things in their own ignorance, to some fatuity 
 that determines its issues for them. , 
 
 This is t he vice of neg lecting self-culture_3j:id leaving the 
 understan ding in its -jKeakness. as in the former cases, and 
 equally a n indignity to that authority within, which enjoins such 
 a use of the faculty of judgment as to grow in knowledge by it. 
 
 3. Grow i n rational wisdom. By this maxim, it is intended 
 to express the obligation which morahty lays upon every man 
 to cultivate fee exercise of his reas.on. and directly to discipline 
 the spirit in all the Junctions, of its activit y. The result is a 
 much higher and purer cognition than any cultivation of the 
 judgment can alone attain. It is wisdom, emphatically ; that 
 knowing which is not a_rulej)f prudence to some further good, 
 but a direct knowing which is a gagd as end m itself^ It is the 
 consumm ation of self-culture. 
 
 The animal, whether in brute or man, has attained to its 
 ultimate point of cultivation, and reached the consummation 
 of its nature, when it is brought to apprehend and observe the 
 rules, of prudence and kindness as generalizations from experi- 
 ence. The faculty judging according to sense is the highest 
 endowment, and when that is fully developed the animal part 
 of our being is inaturely grown. 
 
 But man is also rational spirit, and in this is a far higher 
 endowment. This gives capacit y to apprehend n ecessary and 
 universal truth ; not general deductions from data given in 
 experience, but absoljite..princi£les^jwhich_must determine for 
 us ourex2erience itself. It is only in the possession of such 
 a faculty that man is capable of self-knowledg e, self-direction, 
 s elf-instruct ion, and self-aggrobation or remorse. The animal 
 can no where attain to it ; the human possesses^ it in the endow- 
 ment of a rational spirit. After what has before been shown, 
 
70 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 we need only cursorily look at the duty of self-culture in the 
 province of the rational spirit in its three grand functions of 
 operation : 
 
 1. Taste . Man can create his own pure forms which ex- 
 press for him living sentiment, and can thus in his mind's eye 
 apprehend every beauty. These created forms are to him per- 
 fect ideals, and he can recognize no outer beauty so perfect as 
 the patterns he has within himself. By these he judges of all 
 beauty in nature or art, and as he can intelligently apply his o^vn 
 ideal archet)rpes, he can intelligently criticise any copy in na- 
 ture or art. But this capacity to originate pure forms of beauty 
 may be greatly cultivated. By the study of beauty in nature, 
 and as expressed in the products of other artists, his own mental 
 eye becomes clearer, and more perfect ideals project themselves 
 before it as the creations of his own genius. He thus mounts 
 to a higher point of criticism ; and as an artist, rises to a higher 
 style of execution in his copies from his inner more perfect 
 patterns. 
 
 Thus is a man competent_to_£uLtiyate Ji^_tast£a, and to bring 
 himself and all that he may control more completely under its 
 dictates. He becomes the more refined, and makes all about 
 him to be more beautiful. Society thus adorns itself in the 
 elevation of its own members, the refinement of their pursuits, 
 and the elegance of their products. Such cultivation is a virtue. 
 It perfects what is in man, and makes him intrinsically more 
 excellent. Not because he is_happier, but_b£cause_tie js-highsr_ 
 in excellence, and more worthy the commendation. and_ accep t- 
 ance of reason. As an object of simple contemplation in the 
 end of the reason, he is thus a more dignified and excellent 
 being. 
 
 2. SgiEHCE. Man can attain to universal axioms, and carry 
 out his pure intuitions to necessaryconclusions in geometry; 
 and can rise to universal principles and carry out the necessary 
 connections in a nature of things, and attain to demonstrated 
 
PERSONAL DUTIES. 7 1 
 
 truths in philosophy ; and can thus cultivate a pure science in 
 mathematics and physics. He may thus commune, not with 
 nature only, but with the Creator of nature, in those principles 
 which were in the Divine Mind and which determined the 
 Eternal Wisdom when, ere creation was, He proposed that it / 
 should be. ( 
 
 Such attainment of truth, and the subjection of appetite tol 
 the st udy of it, elevates man, and he rises from animal happi- 
 ness, not alone toJ;Ji£_refinementjof_taste, but here also to the 
 dignity of science . He is so much the more a man as he has 
 cultivated and brought out his manly prerogatives. His pursuit 
 of science for th e end of philosophy itself, is a virtue. The 
 cultivation of his scienfiKc'reasbn has rendered him the more 
 excellent, and thus the more worthy of his own spiritual regard. 
 
 3. Morality. Man may know himself, and thus apprehend 
 what is due to himself, and thereby attain to an ultimate rule of 
 life forhis own direction. He may also carry out this liltimate 
 rule in its application to all men, and determine what is due 
 from each to each, and iirom one to all, and thus attain a uni- 
 versal science of morals. He may bring his own heart and life 
 under this ultimate rule, and strive to pursuade all men to fol- 
 low the purely right and good. To be such as the claim of his 
 spiritual excellency demands is his higjifist moral worth, and 
 therein is he worthy of his own acceptation and that of all other 
 moral beings, and in that position is his highest dignity. Mor- 
 ality is fulfilled, and virtue consummated, and reason satisfied, 
 when man has cultivated his spirit to its highest worthiness. 
 Here is the end of all self-culture. 
 
 The process of this growth in rational wisdom is the same in 
 all the three ways in which reason is revealed. Only reason can 
 speak to reason, and only a contemplation of the beautiful, the 
 true, and the good can quicken us to a keener apprehension of 
 the same. The ugly, the false, and the wrong can lend us no 
 light, nor lead us to any wisdom. They have no light, not even 
 
72 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 a light which can disclose themselves, and, incapable of self- 
 revelation, they are only revealed by the shining of the beautiful, 
 the true, and the good. It is only by the contemplation of 
 beauty, truth, and goodness that the true culture in Taste, and 
 Science, and Morality can be achieved. 
 
 CHAPTER nL 
 2. Relative Duties. Kindness. 
 
 We here contemplate man as in society, and seek for the 
 duties which one owes to another. He is one of the race with 
 other men, and the rule of life which each should adopt must 
 have reference to his relations with all. That which is reason- 
 able for one man cannot run counter to the universal reason for 
 all men, and thus no one may propose as end to himself that 
 which would not permit all other men to propose the same. 
 All countervailing, in any one, the universal rule of reason 
 would be setting up some other end for himself than the ex- 
 cellency of the universal reason, and thus dishonoring himself 
 in acting unreasonably. So deep in universal reason lies the 
 divine maxim, "whatsoever ye would that men should do to 
 you, do ye even so to them." 
 
 Under this head of relative duties we have, therefore, to find 
 and embody such maxims as each man should wish aU others 
 to adopt towards himself, and under these will be found what 
 every man should adopt towards all. This will give a universal 
 system of social moral duties. It will not be essential to par- 
 ticularize all that might be introduced ; the maxims will include 
 all duties, and several will be specified as examples of any 
 others. 
 
RELATIVE DUTIES. 73 
 
 If we contemplate man in his constitutional appetites as the 
 creature of wants, and thus finding an end in happiness, he 
 will find" occasion to render the same kind offices to others, 
 that he might, in like circumstances, wish should be rendered 
 to him ; and in this there will be the universal duty of Kiad;__ 
 ness. If we contemplate him in his intrinsic spiritual excellency 
 as the creature of rights, and thus with an end in worthiness, 
 he will find the obligation to regard others with the same respect 
 and reverence as his own spiritual excellency claims from them, 
 and in this there will be the universal duty of Respect. These 
 two will embrace all social duties. 
 
 We take in this chapter the comprehensive law of MudM^ 
 and give as its general maxim, "do good to all men as ye 
 HA VE OPPOR TUNITY." This will divide itself iHto^other-nraxrms 
 less general, under which may be noticed several specific 
 duties J including, as before, promiscuously, virtues commanded, 
 or vices prohibited. 
 
 I. " Owe no man any thing." ^ No man can stand entirely 
 independent of others. He must live in society, and be per- 
 petually receiving something from the community in which he 
 dwells, either as individuals or collectively. It would be un- 
 worthy of any man to discard all good offices from others, and 
 in a false pride of self-sufficiency determine to acknowledge no 
 obligations to his fellow-men which demand from him good 
 offices in return. Society is thus bound together by mutual 
 wants and interests, and no one may say to another, " I have 
 no need of thee " ; and the force of the maxim requires a re- 
 payment to individuals and to the commtmity of that which is 
 an equivalent, or at least that which evinces an acknowledgment 
 of indebtedness. It may be wholly impracticable to enforce 
 such returns of good deeds by any outward authority, or coer- 
 cive measures ; but the claims of morality are imperative that 
 we do that good to others which repays, or requites by an ac- 
 knowledgment, the good that has been done to us. This is not 
 
74 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 here put upon the ground of_ec| uitv alone , which would con- 
 strain from the sense of respect for the rights of others, but 
 rather on the gr ound of kind ness, as one way in which we are 
 bound to do good to our feUow-men. We are to pay them 
 what is due, not only as a matter of justice, but as one of the 
 ways of showing kindness. They need such returns ; it does 
 them good to receive, and morality thus requires it as within 
 the scope of human beneficence. The debt is paid with the 
 warm spirit of a sympathizing interest in their need. 
 
 I. Honesty. It is not only_unjust, but also^ unkind not to 
 be honest. Many a child of want has been left in suffering 
 when the honest debt paid would have relieved firom distress ; 
 and many a wealthy and powerful man has been put to great 
 inconvenience, because the service expected and paid for was 
 not rendered. In the most emphatic sense may it be said, that 
 morality demands the kindness which has already been made 
 obligatory by previous kindness received. 
 
 We may thus be iii debt for money, for labor, for kind deeds 
 or kind words ; a sympathizing look or a cordial smile may have 
 most touchingly obliged us ; and the law of kindness demands 
 that we repay the good deed by other good deeds in return. A 
 debt is thus incurred, by the reception of such favor, that can- 
 not be cancelled by any thing else save the same kmdness in 
 some manifested form of reply. Justice might be satisfied in 
 imparting some equivalent, but to the benevolent spirit which 
 had conferred the obligation, nothing could be an equivalent 
 that did not come warm with the exhibition of mutual good will. 
 Though a benefactor ask no return and urge no claim, it is not 
 honest in the beneficiary, if the opportunity is not sought to do 
 some good which shall unequivocally express his sense of obli- 
 gation for the kindness. Wlierever there is a debt, there is an 
 obligation from the received good that must be cancelled by 
 goodness, and the maxim will leave no moral man at rest until 
 it is paid. 
 
RfiLAttVE DUflES. 75 
 
 2. Recipr ocity. Not only will kindness be honest, and 
 render back the good deed by equal goodness, but it will show 
 itself open to be obliged, that its own benevolence may thereby 
 be the more stimulated and cultivated. We owe it to humanity 
 to st and ready an d invitm g to good deeds, as if we cherished 
 the opportunity to be under obligations to reciprocate the kind- 
 ness. It would be a cold world, that calculated its debt and 
 credit solely in the light of exact equivalent and a just balance ; 
 and still a shy and selfish world, that only owned its indebted- 
 ness after the good deed had been rendered ; but true kindness 
 stands at once out on the open ground of reciprocity, ready to 
 take and to give, yea rather ready to take in order that it may 
 give its own full-hearted joy expression in the quick reciproca- 
 tion of beneficence. It already partakes of a vice to be chary 
 and coy of proffered kindness, as if the heart were reluctant to 
 feel obligation, and would rather not have benefits than to be 
 holden to make kind returns. The law of kindness binds us to 
 be open to a reciprocity of good offices, and admit ourselves to 
 be debtors to humanity in encouraging good deeds, both by a 
 frankness in receiving and a readiness in repaying. 
 
 3. Monopoly. Under this are included aU ,g.ttempts to take 
 adv antage of others' nec essities Jot pers onal interest. It may 
 be an arranged and laboriously-executed plan to bring others 
 under the necessity, or the prompt and greedy seizing upon the 
 opportunity which providentially occurs. In either case there 
 is the same unkindness, though in the first there is the aggrava- 
 tion of overt selfishness to secure the unkind opportunity. 
 
 Morality condemns all such monopoly. It is not in the spirit 
 of kindness, and however the man may plead considerations of 
 equity, it is not strict honesty. Man's relation to man in society 
 is such, that there is due to t he whole a h igheLCOBsideialaon 
 than-to-the_pa!lial, and especia lly than to the individual ; and 
 he wrongs the community, when he robs them in any way to 
 advance an opposing interest in himself. He may take advan- 
 
^6 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 tage of his skill and foresight, and honestly obtain a fair re- 
 muneration for it, but not at the expense of being unkind to 
 humanity. 
 
 2. " Give to the poor." This includes more than honesty, 
 which always acknowledges some previous indebtedness and the 
 obligation from kindness to pay the debt, and deroands-xharijy, 
 which feels the imperative to give where there is no indebted- 
 ness. It originates indebtedness. It comes up solely from a 
 known want lii^nother, aii3~a' consciousness of ability in our- 
 selves to relieve. 
 
 The poor are not merely those who have little or nothing of 
 this world's wealth, but all or any who are in want. The rich in 
 money may in many cases be far poorer, have more distressing 
 wants, than those who beg their bread from door to door. If 
 there is any human want we know, and knowing can relieve, 
 there the maxim applies, and every one so able is morally bound 
 to adopt it as his own guide. It is not suificient that it be a 
 mere sentiment, or an inward preference which leads to no exe- 
 cution. A man may sincerely say to the poor, "be ye warmed, 
 and be ye filled," and truly wish it might be so, and yet not 
 himself actually give any thing to accomplish it. If they were 
 relieved at the expense of others' self-denial he would rejoice, 
 but his charity is a sentiment not strong enough to overcome 
 the purpose of selfishness within him. There must be not only 
 the wish but the executive will, or there will be no giving to the 
 poor. 
 
 It will, moreover, regard mankind as such, and not merely 
 some few men for whom we cherish a partial favoritism. With 
 no distinction of rank, fortune, place, or age ; the mere fact 
 that there is a man in want, whom we may reUeve, must be suf- 
 ficient to fix the obligation. All may in some way be reached 
 by the good offices of others, and the lower in society have 
 often the opportunity of imparting the most welcome favors to 
 the higher, and in such a case it is a more noble charity. Such 
 
RELATIVE DUTIES. yy 
 
 instances are the more affecting as they are less expected ; and 
 the good will which seeks to bless itself in doing good to others, 
 need not in any class of the community be a day without its 
 favored opportunity for full and effective exercise. And not 
 only the suffering which providences thrust before us, but that 
 unobtrusive misery, which cannot or would not express its wants, 
 is to be sought out and alleviated. Nor is this imperative ex- 
 hausted in making the sacrifice necessary to find and relieve the 
 destitute. Charity may itself be prodigal No man is allowed 
 to be charitable indiscreetly, and therefore no man should give 
 indiscriminately. Much almsgiving fosters want and augments 
 the misery it would relieve. Charity may encourage vice, idle- 
 ness, improvidence, habitual beggary, and horrible cruelty in its 
 prepared cases for moving public sympathy, and however kind 
 such an incautious donor may be, his duty has been unworthily 
 performed. AU injudicious charity, which overlooks its effect 
 upon its objects and the public, and gives from an excited sen- 
 sibility or to relieve itself from further importunity, is a weak- 
 ness and a vice, and the careless manner may degrade the giver 
 more than the giving elevates him. All are to seek out the 
 needy, to give for their relief, to guard against injudicious and 
 unsuitable benefactions, and thus show a kindness worthy of 
 their spiritual and rational excellency. To supply others at the 
 expense of what is due to himself, will never be a virtue in 
 any man. 
 
 I. C pARfTV. This involves the love of benevolence, a dis- 
 position that is pleased and rejoiced in seeing others made hap- 
 py by its hand. It thus delights indoing_go2dL_ It may not 
 approve of the moral character and conduct of those it relieves, 
 and may thus feel a deep moral aversion and repugnance to its 
 beneficiaries ; but it looks at them as sensitive beings, with wants 
 and sympathies kindred to its own, and reheves from suffering 
 and administers to happiness from the promptings of philan- 
 thropy. It is not satisfied with the acting out of its constitu- 
 
78 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 tional kindness; it cultivates and cherishes the spirit of 
 benevolence, and wouldTnaKeTfs heart niofelfompab^ionatfi and — 
 its hand nSofFopen to human wretChedn'essT It deems nothing 
 foreign to itself that is human, and thus makes every man a 
 brother and every sufferer an object of its sympathy, and relieves 
 so far as it may. It adorns and dignifies the man who appro- 
 priately practices it, and by common consent the world puts it 
 among the most exalted virtues. Because God does good, and 
 makes his sun to shine on the evil and unthankful, so the man 
 who does good in works of charity is named the Godlike. 
 
 ' 2. Obdu racy. This includ^Jhe_ stifling of natu£a],.,gj2n2Sfh^ 
 and the hM^enmg of the constitutional feehngs agains t huma n 
 want and misery. It must always spring from a perverse devo- 
 ti(ja_to— same object of gratification which interferes with the 
 working of kindness. Chanty gives away for others; but an 
 inordinate passion, that craves its expensive objects of gratifica- 
 tion, may demand the gifts for the poor to be expended upon 
 its own indulgence ; and in such an attitude the man will steel 
 himself against distress that courts relief. It may be an ava- 
 ricious inclination to amass and hoard wealth, and such a miserly 
 and sordid spirit will fast banish all feelings of pity, and choose 
 that the heart may grow hard lest the hand should open to 
 impart that which is so deeply coveted. 
 
 So the man who looks upon charity itself as administered to 
 others, with a selfishness and envy that grudges the gift as so 
 much bestowed upon others and diverted from himself, and 
 would chide and hinder the kindness which does not flow 
 towards his possession, will rapidly harden his heart, and care 
 only to depreciate another's sorrows and magnify his own need. 
 
 3. SEijiBffiNTALiTV. This is the excess of an imal sensibility 
 uncontrolled by judgment, and u nenlig;htened by reas on. The 
 natural susceptibility which is pained and weeps at-others' woes 
 is left to its own impulses, or perhaps quickened in sensibility 
 by habitual indulgence, and yet has no regulated action from its 
 
RELATIVE DUTIES. 79 
 
 direction to any intelligible and worthy ends. The mere luxury 
 of a soft sensibility is all that is sought, and the tragedy of fiction 
 and of real life are alike welcome as they alike kindle the same 
 emotions. An object of distress at once touches the feeling, 
 but the judgment is not at all consulted whether or how to 
 relieve, nor the conscience enlightened to any source of moral 
 obligation and claims of duty. The tears are as instinctive as 
 the noisy manifestations of animal sympathy in the distress of 
 a fellow brute, and the movement for relief, if any is made, is 
 equally destitute of all virtue. The whole feeling is a weakness, 
 and the morbid sensibility viciously excludes all control of the 
 spiritual over the animal nature. If we sometimes say of senti- 
 mentality, in contrast with unfeeling obduracy, that it is an 
 amiable weakness, we never suppose that the weakness is thereby 
 exalted to a virtue. Morality condemns this soft sentimentality 
 which is shocked at all suffering, and would interfere as readily 
 to save from the salutary retributions of righteous law, as from 
 the misfortunes of providential experience. 
 
 3. "Be thank ful." When any act of kindness has been done, 
 the reciprocal ^uty is thankf ulness. The same spirit of kind- 
 ness, which would give in charity, would in changed circum- 
 stances be thankful. Kindness is exhibited in__thanksg-iving. 
 To one who has received, there may often be nothing but 
 thanks left for him to give ; and in such a condition his cordial 
 gratitude may evince as real and as much kindness as the 
 other's benefaction. GiaJitu^e, grace, and cha rity have the 
 same root, and express originally llie ba,iiie idea. No one 
 would doubt the genuine charity of a heart truly thankful. 
 Put such a man where he can show kindness by giving, and 
 his charities will be as cheerful as has been his thankfulness. 
 It is thus the same grace at heart, and only showing itself in a 
 different form from the necessities of the condition. It is, 
 therefore, as truly the duty of the beneficiary to be thankful, 
 as of the man, who is able, to be charitable. It is the same 
 virtue of a cordial kindness in both. 
 
8o PURE MORALITY. 
 
 1. Gratitude ., By this is meant the possession of a disp o- 
 sition that ^ iHjExpr^ss thankfuhiess on a ll occasion s, of benefits 
 intended. The maxim bi nds the spir it, and not merely the 
 word and outward deed. Ingratitude of spirit is as unkind and 
 as debasing to humanity as uncharitableness. The habit of 
 unkindness is more rapidly gained through ingratitude than 
 through uncharitableness. Favors b estowed indicate a pos ition 
 of superior wealth and power, and the receiver is more liable to 
 indulge a false pride, and cultivate a spirit of mortified vanity, 
 and thus check the flow of reciprocal kindness in his gratitude ; 
 and this tendency in human nature should be sedulously watched 
 and guarded. An ungrateful spirit, in whatever way induced, is 
 a base spirit ; it violatesjhe law of kindness, and unfits itself in 
 any change of circumstances to be a charitable spirit. It shows 
 the person to be not only in a condi tion of w ant, which might 
 be of no moral moment, but to have fallen into much deeper 
 degradation by not keeping the contrpLof^_thespirit, and main- 
 taining its worthiness in all circumstances. 
 
 2. I nsole nce. "This manifests itself, not merely in the rich 
 and powerful by a haughty dictation and overbearing contempt, 
 but not seldom also in the poor by a rude and impudent and re- 
 proachful bearing towards those in a superior station. It is really 
 the same vice in both cases, and finds its r oot in a heart of un-. 
 kindness. Ingratitude in receiving favors very readily runs J o 
 insolence in demanding more, and qiierulous_cora2lainkig_that 
 the gifts are not better; and such impertinence soon renders 
 itself iiitolerable. The public contempt excludes all public 
 compassion for such impudence, however needy. 
 
 Habitual begging is sure to generate this spirit. It begins in 
 selfishness, and as it can have no true gratitude when favors are 
 given, it will be quite sure to manifest displeasure when the favor 
 sought is denied. There will be equal insolence in the impor- 
 tunity, and in the insult that follows refusal. Not only can no 
 habitual mendicancy cultivate a pious spirit, it is quite incom- 
 
RELATIVE DUTIES. 8 1 
 
 patible with a virtuous spirit. It directly promotes insolence, 
 and induces many other vices with it. 
 
 3. Peevishne ss. Here is the same unkind feeling manifest- 
 ing itself in another way, and perhaps in a somewhat lower 
 degree. W hatever bc donej the person, is hard to .please ; there 
 is always something not as it should be, and a disposition to 
 magnify it, complain of it, and treF about it. The temper is 
 soured ; the spirit, murmuring and repining, teases and chafes 
 itself by imagined slights or the magnified neglect of others ; 
 and the miserable person soon quenches all sympathy for the 
 misery, which h^ so perversely determines to make and to keep. 
 Such perpetual peevishness is perpetually annoying and in- 
 creasingly revolting. Every one sees in it the want of a kind 
 and benevolent spirit, charitable in giving and grateful in receiv- 
 ing, and can give no approbation to the moral character thus 
 represented. When kindness meets kindness with favors, the 
 charity awakens gratitude, and the grateful heart is always meek, 
 and always cheerful. To the sorrowing and destitute, the con- 
 trol of a kind and thankful heart keeps the spirit serene and 
 tranquil. Even suffering will have its patience. 
 
 The spirit of kindness will induce to the adoption and fulfil- 
 ment of the above maxims, and these will include the above 
 and other duties, and avoid the vices which might be drawn out 
 in greater detail. Sufficient has been done to illustrate the prin- 
 ciple in this part of morality, and there yet remains to present 
 the duties to mankind which are demanded by respect. 
 
82 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 2. Relative Duties. Respect. 
 
 We here view man not as a creature of appetite and want 
 merely, but more especially as possessed of a ration al dig nity 
 and spiritual excellency that in his own intrinsic being entitles 
 him to regard above the brutes that perish. The animal craves 
 he^ j the spiritual clainis respect. 
 
 All imp eratives originate in the spiritual part of man's being ; 
 and man's animal wants arelo be relieved by man, not because 
 the animal nature has rights and can make ethical demands, 
 but because his spirit has an intrinsic excellency which is de- 
 based if a man can, but will not help the needy. This claim 
 to respect must modify the manner of helping, as well as deter- 
 mine the duty to help. Those to whom we are to manifest our 
 kindness are human, and thus our charity must not be as when 
 thrown to brutes ; and those from whom we receive kindness 
 are human, and their charities are to be taken not as if snatched 
 from dogs. The charity must be accompanied and the favor 
 reciprocated with respect on both sides. The commerce in 
 giving and receiving is between rational beings, and 'the kind- 
 ness of the charity no more ennobles the one, than the kindness 
 of the gratitude must ennoble the other. A defect on either side 
 is not merely a want of kindness, but a debasing of the spiritual 
 personality, and to give with contempt or to receive wjth im- 
 pudence would be alike disrespectful to humanity and a re- 
 proach to both parties. All violation, in any way, of the spirit- 
 ual claim to respect in man, is necessarily connected with the 
 loss, of his own self-respect in the offer of the indignity. Mu- 
 tual respect amid all the communications of man with man, is 
 a universal imperative. 
 
RELATIVE DUTIES. 8$ 
 
 The general maxim is, " Honor all me n." Out of this com- 
 prehensive maxim there spring others less general, and which 
 have each many duties, as commanded virtues or forbidden 
 vices, included within them. 
 
 I. Beye courteou s. The import of this maxim is, that each 
 man should deport himself in a man ly way in all his intercourse_ 
 with other men. All men Tiave an intrinsic spiritual excellency 
 whichrrbliges each to demand of all others the tribute of a manly 
 respect. This is iior'tQ"'^~estiffiated by merely conventional 
 rules and customs which change with the place and the age, but 
 by that perpetual respect which the permanent possession of 
 rational dignity in the human race demands from all, and in all 
 ages. It is not punctilious regard to rules of etiquette j not 
 obsequiousness, nor flattery, nor dissimulation that smiles out- 
 wardly when there is inward contempt ; but a cordial recognition 
 of the rights and prerogatives of a man, and a full accordance of 
 them all in our whole bearing and demeanor towards men. If 
 such be withholden by others from us, and we be treated by 
 them quite discourteously, there is a courteousness of demeanor 
 still due to them inasmuch as they are men ; and our resentment 
 is to be tempered with a dignity and delicacy, which manifests 
 our own self-possession in observing what is due to humanity, 
 both in them and ourselves. It will exclude all rudeness, rash- • 
 ness, and insolence, in any condition or towards any man. A 
 vicious man, a criminally convicted man, a capitally condemned 
 man, in each case is still a man, and must be treated with the 
 consideration due to the possession of a rational spirit ; yea, an 
 abusive and insulting man may in no way make me to forget 
 what is due to him as a man, and that under the smart of 
 the insult, I should allow myself to treat him as a raging 
 animal. 
 
 I may show other and different tokens of respect to the 
 morally wise and virtuous, to the respectful and courteous, than 
 to the base and the insolent ; but in no case may I treat any 
 
84 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 man at all unmanly. I debase myself in such disrespect, and 
 am also guilty, of offering an affront to humanity. To insult 
 another who has insulted me, or to refuse him the courteous 
 recognition due to him as a man, is not only an affront offered 
 to him, but is a contempt placed upon myself, since I thus 
 acknowledge that my manliness is capable of being outraged by 
 one in whom I recognize no manliness. Such a treatment of 
 another does not spring from the self-respect of a truly digni- 
 fied character, but is an off-shoot of that self-conceit whose real 
 nature is a self-contempt. In so far as I recognize myself as a 
 man, I shall recognize and respect that which is spiritual in 
 all men. 
 
 1 . Arrogance. This is the ostentatious assurngtioij of supe- 
 riorimportance. Simply as a man, one has no prerogative 
 above another. If moral qualities make one more excellent 
 than another, this can never permit the virtuous to display their 
 virtue ostentatiously ; and if any adventitious circumstances place 
 one man in a higher position than another, that will never jus- 
 tify arrogance and assumed self-consequence. It is more and 
 better to be a man than to be a king ; and it is immoral, because 
 it is a disrespect to humanity, when one puts forth the arrogant 
 claim that his superior station makes him a superior man. The 
 truly noble and elevated man manifests such kindness and re- 
 spect for all other men in his dignity, that he inspire§_esJ££iS} 
 and love, and the highest honors are accorded,to.him~by his fel- 
 loW-men without any painful sense of their inferiQnty,_ His 
 greatness inspires revererice7'affli"his TOufteousJjearing, so tegj- 
 pers it towards all, that it becomes cordial respect and good- 
 will;"^ While an arrogant man, no matter how high his station, 
 will awaken only the feelings of contempt and reproach. This 
 arrogance is a vice, in that it denies the respect due to others, 
 and really brings upon the man who assumes it a^elf-reproach. 
 
 2. Scorn. This adds to the self-inflation of arrogance, a 
 ipanifested cpntempt and proud despising of others. ; In ^rrg- 
 
RELATIVE DUTFES. 85 
 
 gance, this contempt is rather implied, while the manifestation 
 is mainly confined to an osFentaHousUisplay of the person's own 
 fancied importance ; but in sc orn th e manifestation of the con- 
 tempt for another is_ made promme nt,~aHa~the-Tmdne~coTrsg'- 
 quenc e attached t o himself is rather implied in the indignity 
 and reproach with which the man tr eats another. Scornfulness 
 is thus a more direc t and gross breach of courtesy, and the more 
 odious vice. ~ It is an indignity to humanity to arrogate some 
 prerogative over it ; but it is a greater indignity to offer a direct 
 affront to_it. and m anifest an open contempt for it. Coleridge 
 has remarked that Shakespeare never makes a great character a 
 scomer. 
 
 Scorn is sometimes used in a good sense, as when we say, 
 " the man scorns to do a mean action," " he rejected the in- 
 famous proposal with scorn," etc. ; in which is represented the 
 ^ indig nan t rebuke of virtue , and the abhorrence it feels towards 
 vice; but more generally it is used in a bad sense, and"as abo've, 
 for the contemptuous disparagement of some other man, and 
 which is always condemned by pure morality. 
 
 3. ^Ridicule. This may include both_ arrogance and scorn- 
 fulness, and adds thereto thejnalidoiisiiess that would make the 
 sub|e ct an object of reproach to o thers. But while it goes be- 
 yond in overt acts to make co ntemptible to oth ers, it is applied 
 to awaken contempt o f not so stron g, a degree as scorning, but 
 rather that the victim may bejthe. obj ect o fjd erision . And this 
 it does, not by fair presentation of plain facts or serious defects ^ 
 that might truly be reproachful, but by ludicrous selections or 
 combinations designed to make the person a laughing-stock to 
 others. This may sometimes be in wantonness and not deliber- 
 ate maliciousness, but in any such exhibition there is a want of 
 courtesy which the obligations of mutual respect among man- 
 kind demand. 
 
 It is sometimes inquired if vice is not often ridiculous, and 
 .hus a proper subject of derision ; to which it may properly be 
 
86 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 replied, that nothing which sets vice in its true light as both 
 foolish and wicked is wrong. The Scriptures represent good 
 men and even God as treating wickedness with irony. — i Kings, 
 xviii. 27.— Prov. ;. 26. But in this is no discourtesy, for the manner 
 and the end are directed as a severe and terrible rebuke of 
 iniquity. For such higher end, when occasion calls, ridicule 
 may be legitimate. But this seldom occurs among men, and 
 the moral effect of serious expostulation and solemn rebuke is 
 ordinarily better than ridicule or satire. Its immorality is easily 
 determined in the attempt to traduce or defame, to subject 
 to reproach or derision, when contemplated solely as man 
 among men. No one has the prerogative to so exalt himself 
 above the common humanity that he may despise others, nor 
 to take any one from amid the ranks of mankind and make 
 him ridiculous to others. It is a discourtesy which common 
 respect for man forbids, and morality condemns. 
 
 4. Vulgarity. This is used here in reference Jo grossness 
 
 of language, or coarsened, and rudeness _X!f manner, in our 
 intercourse with men. The plainest man in the lowest walks of 
 life, and who can only use the homeliest phrases and manners, 
 will do this with a respectful deference and delicacy of spirit, 
 which evinces the essence of true courtesy in his regard toward 
 the man he addresses ; and when such a man feels respect, the 
 inward sentiment will at once raise his plainness above all vul- 
 garity. The man of vulgar bearing always evinces the absence 
 of proper respect for the persons with whom he is communing, 
 and thus the vulgar man is always voluntarily the discourteous 
 man. Let him raise his conception of the persons he addresses, 
 to the proper dignity and excellency of their spiritual being, 
 and whatever may have been his comparative culture or re- 
 finement, the inner respect for humanity will at once remove all 
 vulgarity and put in its place true courtesy. President Lincoln 
 was not bred in courts, but his sense of human worth and his 
 respect for man made him so well bred that at the great Gettys- 
 
RELATIVE DUTIES. 8/ 
 
 burgh celebration where the representatives of foreign govern- 
 ments and of our own were so largely gathered, it was said that 
 he showed himself as a gentleman, the peer of any one there. 
 
 All profanity is of course vulgarity, and obscenity is vulgarity 
 of a gross degree, which can be habitual in any one only in the 
 loss of all self-respect and all respect for the men with whom 
 he associates. It indicates a baseness of spirit fit for any de- 
 grading companionship in iniquity, and can hardly have been 
 attained except by a familiarity with low vices. 
 
 2. Deal justly with all me n. Man, in the excellency of his 
 spiritual being, has rights, and may demand that all these shall 
 be acknowledged and regarded by others ; and as all other 
 men have rights, so they may" in the saine~manner demand that 
 these shall be r^pected by him. In this is the foundation of 
 natural justice ; the mutual rights of a common spirituality of 
 being, giving equality of claims and reciprocity of duties. 
 Every man may thus demand from all others that which is just 
 and equal. To rob one of his right or defraud him of his due 
 is an indignity to his spiritual being, and this want of due re- 
 spect to his fellow-man debases his own spirit and makes the 
 robber unrighteous. The vice is seen, not directly in the loss 
 of the h appiness w hich has been occasioneS" by th"e" injustice, 
 for if this had been occasioned by the animal activity alone, 
 its loss of happiness would have involved no unrighteousness, 
 but it shows itself only in the indignity which has been done to 
 humanity. The defrauded man has been treated as if he had 
 no rights ; as if he were thing and not person ; and in this want 
 of respect morality finds the vice and applies the condemnation, 
 and the whole is brought home to the conscience of the unjust 
 man, in that his knowledge of his own spirituality convicts him 
 of conscious debasement in the indignity he has done to his 
 neighbor. In the invasion of his neighbor's manhood he has 
 debased his own. 
 
 Whatever, thus, becomes a right in any person, whether nat- 
 
88 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 ural or acquired in the ongoing of society where he dwells, is 
 his to keep and control, and with which another may not inter- 
 fere. Any invasion of another's right is this injustice, that it is 
 a violent discarding of his prerogatives of personality, and con- 
 temptuously holding him as a thing with no rights. Such 
 an act would sting your own soul with remorse, for you know 
 that in that indignity to him, you have wounded your_own 
 spirit andTmade-yotrrsrif unworthy .^ NtJ"' injustice c an so en- 
 rich in happiness,~tKaI~it "does not more surely impoverish in 
 unworthfness. No amount of gratification can compensate for 
 the perpetual stigma in baseness. Happiness may have been 
 enhanced, buTat the terrible price of perpetual self-contempt. 
 
 1. Assaulting. This includes all invasion of rights by a di- 
 rect attack upon the person or possessions of another. The 
 same'ethical'principle is violated in them all, and the guilt lies 
 in the indignity done to the personality, and its degree is to be 
 measured by that, and not the amount in which it may have inter- 
 fered with animal__enjoyment. It embraces all crimes of vio- 
 lence, and which would be too numerous to consider here in 
 detail; whether assaults upon property, as trespass, burglary, 
 theft ; or assaults upon chastity, as seduction and rape ; or as- 
 saults upon person, as battery or murder. The enormity of the 
 vice is measured by the dignity of the right invaded, and is thus 
 as the violation of the grandliiaS"rn7 " Honor all men." The 
 injustice is a want of respect ; an indignity to humanity ; and 
 the nearer to the excellency of the spirit stands the right which 
 
 ^ has been invaded, so is the personality the more dishonored and 
 Sthe vice of greater enormity. 
 
 2. Defrau ding. I here include all invasion of rights which 
 is made covertljror ^deceptively. AH cheating, double-dealing, 
 false-weights and measures, obtaining goods by false pretences, 
 violation of contracts, pledges, trusts, commissions, insurance, 
 etc., and thus frauds committed in any way for the purpose of 
 obtaining any thing which belongs to another. These all, again, 
 
RELATIVE DOXIES. 8g 
 
 come under the one principle of disrespect to the rights in 
 humanity, and an attempt to obtain possession in utter disregard 
 of such rights. It is not so heinous as a direct assault, though 
 it may attain fraudulently a greater pecuniary value, for it does 
 not so directly offer its indignity to the personality ; but its 
 immorality is truly in this, that it assumes to take from a man 
 as it would elude or cheat an animal. It discards jhe humanity ; 
 it ignores rights ; it uses man as a thing in nature, which may 
 be used in a delusive or perverse accommodation to your own 
 purposes without indignity. And in proportion to such disre- 
 spect and contempt of the prerogatives in humanity is the vice 
 of the fraudulent transaction. 
 
 3. Lying. A lie is a statement of one person to another, 
 which contradictsthe conviction of the person jiaking it. It 
 may be made by direct declaration, by equivocation, by delusive 
 gesture and signs, or, even by utter silence, in circumstances 
 where truth demands assertion or denial ; but, however effected, 
 it makes use of the power which a person has of communicating 
 thought in a way subversive of the very end for which that 
 power was given. It is thus a conscious and voluntary de- 
 thronement of that rational personality by which alone one is 
 capable of an interchange of thoughts with another; it is an 
 abandonment of one's own dignity, and a direct affront to hu- 
 manity itself. The liar is willing to declare himself to be no 
 man, and that others are not men. 
 
 The essential vice of lying, the ultimate turpitude of the 
 iniquity, is in this indignity to the rational spirit, whose impera- 
 tive it is that there be " truth in the inward part." Respect for 
 the rational being of others, and the integrity of your own spirit 
 in personal worthiness, demand perpetual veracity. 
 
 Questions of casuistry, in reference to the vice of lying, origi- 
 nate in wholly wrong conceptions of the ground of obligation to 
 veracity. If the duty of truth is to be seen only in its general 
 consequences, and this is obligatory only as greater happiness 
 
 -?' 
 
90 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 results from it, there may be many conditions supposed in which 
 it would at least be difficult to conclude that the greater good 
 would not result from the falsehood. Looking only at gratified 
 appetite, and not at spiritual worthiness, as the good to be at- 
 tained, it will not be difficult to multiply riikny most perplexing 
 cases, in which human judgment would be pretty sure to lie on 
 the side of the falsehood, unless it were to be conceived that 
 direct Divine interpositions would occur to change the antici- 
 pated general consequences. Yea, even in some false views 
 of religion, it may be decided that falsehood is more than 
 excused, and is even obligatory to a religious end. 
 
 But the grand principle for determining all such questions 
 of casuistry is not by any calculation of general consequences, 
 and judgment of greater happiness and unhappiness. Some- 
 where it is to be decided which course ought to be made the 
 most happy or unhappy. The Being who establishes the order 
 of nature, that gives out its measure of happiness in its general 
 results, must still have his higher principle determining where 
 the highest happiness ought to be. And this cannot be in some 
 necessity of his own nature, which decides that so it must be or 
 he shall be unhappy, for this would make it to rest only on what 
 that Being wflsA-it- should be, and not at all on what he sees 
 it oughiio be. To have any basis in morality, the ultimate test 
 must be one of worthiness and indignity. If a lie is ever to be 
 justified, it must be because there and then it is no indignity 
 to the deceived, and no degradation to the deceiver. All 
 spiritual being demands respect for its own intrinsic excellency ; 
 and unless you can find the human being to whom, in his con- 
 dition, it is no mark of contempt and indignity to deceive him, 
 morality will condemn the lie, and oblige the man to blush in 
 secret at the consciousness of his own baseness in telling it. 
 
 3. Sustain thy neighbor's good name. In reality there can be 
 no personal dishonor to a man except through his own deed. 
 It must be the man's own disposition which forms his character, 
 
RELATIVE DUTIES. 9 1 
 
 and this disposing of himself must be at his own responsibility. 
 But detraction and defamation may effect the estimation in 
 which he is held by others. The good name of a man in so- 
 ciety may be determined by our representation of him. His 
 true character may be belied, and his good reputation lost by 
 no fault of his own. He has the right not only to form his 
 own virtuous character, and possess his own conscious self- 
 respect and approbation, but the right also to his good name in 
 the estimation of his fellow-men. It is a great breach of re- 
 spect to humanity to detract from a good reputation among 
 men. 
 
 All reproach for physical infirmities or bodily deformity will 
 be a violation of the maxim of kindness, and thus a vice in the 
 case of him who so reproaches his unfortunate fellow-man ; 
 but this is not the vice which is induced by a violation of the 
 present maxim. Such reproaches do not reach to the moral 
 personality and take away the man's good name. The maxim 
 we here consider requires that we do nothing to detract from 
 a man's personal character, but that we sustain his good reputa- 
 tion by all proper methods. The adoption of it will exclude 
 many vices. 
 
 I. Slander. This may include all forms of detraction by 
 word of mouth. It ranges from petty scandal, that imputes 
 minor faults and failings, up to malicious slanders that aim di- 
 rectly at the foundation of the entire character. The tattler 
 and slanderer not only induce jealousies, suspicions, and angry 
 contentions in society, but the very act of tale-bearing and 
 detraction is vicious. One man has no right to be injuring the 
 good name of another, even by reporting that which may be 
 true of him, unless some grave interest of the public may de- 
 mand it. If a man is plotting mischief against society, or any 
 individuals in it, an exposure of his iniquity for the defence of 
 the community may be righteous. But no exposure can be 
 made by any, for the mere end of giving a bad reputation in 
 
92 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 public, even though the man may deserve it. Morality gives 
 him the right to the reputation he acquires, unless some higher 
 right come in and make it your duty to defend that, even at 
 the expense of an exposure of his unworthiness. To do this 
 for virtue's sake is not slander. . 
 
 The vice of slander appears directly in its disrespect to the 
 humanity in the person slandered. Spiritual worthiness is the 
 highest treasure, and without this the humanity had better never 
 have been raised above the animal being. And yet the reputa- 
 tion for this, the slanderer would wholly destroy. He would do 
 to him that indignity which is expressed in saying, that it were 
 better he were wholly the brute than such a man. And the 
 wantoimess or the malignity, that can so reproach another, sinks 
 the author to the deepest debasement. It is this conscious deg- 
 radation in the eye of the community, that makes the name of 
 the slanderer so despicable. His infamy becorhes quite as deep 
 as that to which he would consign his victim. The contempt he 
 manifests towards another, returns upon himself; and his de- 
 famation of another man, turns to be a true record against his 
 own soul. The slanderer is himself usually conscious of the 
 baseness of his course, and betrays it in the innuendoes and 
 covert insinuations he uses, and attempts to reach his end by 
 hints, suspicions, and dark surmises, when he would be ashamed 
 to avow his direct purpose, and stand fully out before his object 
 and take the consequences of his designed indignity to his 
 fellow-man. His deed is one for which manifestly his own spirit 
 condemns him. / 
 
 2. Libel. This writes or prints the slander, and publishes it. 
 The same principles apply, as before, and the offence is the 
 same, except as it may be aggravated by the^ greater notoriety 
 given. Whatever is thus published for purposes of detrac- 
 tion, or with a carelessness and recklessness of the rights of all 
 men to reputation, that sacrifices this to gossip orlf!ar.,gain, is 
 libellous, and strongly condemned by pure morality. It cannot 
 
RELATIVE DUTIES. 93 
 
 be justified by the conductors of the public press on the ground 
 of dealing in facts, retailing news, nor even of general benefit in 
 exposing depravity. The claim of the public to the facts must 
 have some specific ground in its own rights, in the circum- 
 stances, and such as makes the neglect to disclose, to be a 
 greater treachery and indignity to it, than the disclosure is of 
 disrespect to the exposed party ; and in such a case the publi- 
 cation is no libel, but a virtuous and manly fulfilment of duty in 
 the higher interests of humanity. When, precisely, the facts 
 come within such a principle, each man must judge in his own 
 case, and oftentimes with most distressing convictions of respon- 
 sibility on either hand. 
 
 A false st atemen t is libellous, for whatever . purposes made ; 
 for no man may malign an innocent person for any supposed 
 good end, and a true st atement is still libe llous, if not specifically 
 demanded by the higher rights of humanity; yea, the more 
 truth-the more libellous, for it destroys reputation the more, and 
 this when no public rights are to be subserved by it. Still, as 
 in all cases, so here, the claim of the public is higher than the 
 private, and no man has the right to a good reput ation falsely, 
 at the expense of public freedom and virtue. 
 
 3. Censorious ness. By this is meant the spirit of fault- 
 ' finding and suspicion of bad— mo-tiv-es-aad-inteni:, and which 
 exhibits itself in numberless ways of complaining and detracting, 
 and induces the habit of backbiting a nd petty defaming, when 
 no serious attack upon character and good name is attempted 
 or intended. It always looks upon the dark side of human 
 character, and suspects every man to be a knave that has not 
 pretty fully proved his virtue. 
 
 True respect for the spiritual being of man demands, that we 
 look upon the multitude of human faults and failings with as 
 lenient an eye, and speak for them as apologetic a word as 
 reason will allow. Inste ad of magnifying and aggravating 
 human pffences, it wguld goften and palliate~as"1f5~a3~circum- 
 
94 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 Stances will admit. Even vices and crimes wiU not be divulged, 
 and the wicked reproached for them, except as the rights of 
 humanity demand. Such a spirit will not allow itself to become 
 censorious, uncharitable, sarcastic and sour towards others, nor 
 be disposed to assail even the vicious tauntingly or scornfully. 
 
 If satire may sometimes be righteously applied in castigation 
 of human vices and follies, the virtuous satirist will not_ choose 
 that his position and vocation should make his spirit harsH" and 
 bitter towards the objects of hisucensure; but having chastised 
 them for^their good, he would still rather soothe, ^encourage, 
 and^xcuse, when that tenderer spirit may work them as much 
 good. A censorious spirit loves censure, and gratifies itself in 
 f ault-find ing, dist rusting , and m align ing, and has itself great 
 need of the forbe£u;ance_ajid apology it denies to others. A 
 spirit that " hopeth all things," is better than that which Tiabit- 
 ually fretteth itself against evil. Respect for man will induce 
 apologies rather than censures, and morality demands a chari- 
 table rather than a censorious judgment. 
 
 4. Be obedient to^ Cjxnernment. The manner of right author- 
 ity, as a source of obligation, is to receive an examination in a 
 subsequent Part of our work ; but we here consider it solely as 
 an existing fact with which man comes into connection, and in 
 reference to which he has duties declared directly in the man- 
 date of his own reason. We do not here inquire in what 
 respects patriotism may bind in subjection to civil government, 
 but in what respects is it a moral virtue to submit to the ordi- 
 nance of man. It is one part of our duty to mankind, in pure 
 morality, to be " obedient to the powers tliat be." 
 ' The majesty of civil authority, so far as we have now any 
 occasion to consider, is found in the rational dignity of h umanit y 
 itself, where mankind stand togetherin a collective capacity. 
 God may add his own revealed sanction to human government, 
 and thus lay under obligation "for the Lord's sake," yet is there 
 sn inherent excellency in righteous^ human authority which 
 
RELATIVE DUTIES. 95 
 
 demands respect for its own sake. Under whatever form of 
 sovereignty it may present itself, it is the official representation 
 of the public will in regard to its own rights, and if the spiritual 
 excellency of each man presents rights which in his own dignity 
 demand universal respect, much more must official state author- 
 ity which has, collected within itself, the right and dignity of 
 every citizen, demand a respectful recognition. If that man is 
 vicious who treats individual rights contemptuously, much more 
 is that man vicious who " despises governments." Not merely 
 that civil authority is useful, is it therefore^jteneralde j it could 
 not itself be useful, excepTas arbitrary tyranny, were it not first 
 in itself entitled to respect and reverence. The public person- 
 ahty speaks out in its governmental legislation, and the execu- 
 tive magistrate begrs the sword of the whole body politic, and 
 is official conservator of the rights and privileges of the entire 
 commonwealth, and has thus in its own right the claim of re- 
 spectful allegiance from every citizen. 
 
 Pure morality, thus, demands subroissipn to government and 
 obedie nce t o human law, not merely in a legal spirit which is 
 moved solely in the consideration of pains and penalties, but 
 "for consciejice_^ake." The government, being the true ex- 
 pression of the public will and the conservator of the public 
 rights, is venera ble in its^ authority, and all rebellion or disobedi- 
 ence is a contempt o f "dig nities," and thus a debasement of 
 the spiritoitherebel. His contempt of government is the 
 making of himself unworthy, and is thus a vice condemned by 
 morality. The important duties under this maxim of obedience 
 to government are : 
 
 I. Subjection. This is to be manif ested in obeying l aw ; 
 in cheerfully yielding to the prerogatives of the officers of gov- 
 emment ; in paying respect to aU official forms, and complying 
 with all its proclamatiSiisTrnd special orders. The whole de- 
 meanor is to be that of a peaceful, quiet, contented, law-abiding 
 citizen. All factions, mobs, riots, insurrections, lynch-law pro- 
 
96 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 ceedings, are not only political crimes, but vices condemned by 
 pure morality. All incendiarys peeches or publications. and all 
 illegal attem pts to coerce the g overnment m its political meas- 
 ures, are morally unworthy of every citizen. ~~~ " ~ 
 
 2. Tribute. If government exist it must be justained in 
 its expenses by_the citizens. The revenue may come frorn^ 
 varied ^sources, but in whatever way taxes are ^legally levied, 
 morality forbids all evasion of the public claim. All frauds on 
 the revenue^ laws, .secretion of ratable property, or embezzle- 
 ment of public money, are as much more immoral than the de- 
 frauding of a private person, as the dignity and rights of the 
 State exceed in their claims to respect those of the individual. 
 Tribute is as really due to the State, as the fulfilment of con- 
 tracts with individuals, and the things of Caesar are as truly to 
 be rendered as the things of God. 
 
 ^. Service.— Every man is bound to render that service to 
 the State which in his circumstances is legally demanded. He 
 may not shrink from official stations, or military duties when his 
 CQuiitr3Lcalls. He~must jucige if higher claims^ clash with the 
 commands of his country and responsibly act aocordin^j^Jsut 
 in a righteous call of his country to any service, no citizen may 
 hesitate and delay without becoming immoral. No government 
 can last which cannot control the services of its citizens. All 
 disrespect to the State is a disgrace to the man. 
 
II. DUTIES TO OTHER THAN MANKIND. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 I. Duties to Nature. 
 
 DUTIES to other than man must embrace all other being to 
 which man owes any obligation. This will include Nature, 
 both animate. and inanimate, and God. We assume that, with- 
 out a positive revelation, the existence of God would be known 
 from his works ; and this knowledge of the being of God would-' 
 impose its duties upon us in the light of our o^vn reason, and 
 thus in pure morality. Natural religion would bind to duties 
 from the motive of /ove or loyalty to the God of nature, but as 
 we here view the duties only in the light of man's highest worthi- 
 ness, we do not at all enter the field of natural theology, but 
 still keep within the field of pure morality. We only consider 
 what are the duties, out of regard to his own highest worthiness, 
 induced by adding to communion with his fellow-men commun- 
 ion with nature and with God. 
 
 1. D ttttfs to Natitbf.. 
 
 2. D uties to God. 
 
 Our acquaintance with other orders of being is dependent 
 upon revelation, and the intercourse of man with any other 
 finite beings than the human family, is too partial to admit of 
 any consideration in an ethical system. 
 
 In first considering our duties to Nature, we remark that no 
 portion of nature has any endowmento£^ationality, nor has 
 it any intrinsic excellenc3r_butonly a relatiye_ utility. It is 
 
 97 
 
98 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 means not end, and cannot thus bind in any duties for its own 
 ^aicel iTis for the use of such as have reason; a thing sub- 
 Riib servient to perso nalitv : and while used by persons, may 
 never be permitted to use them. Neither animate nor inani- 
 mate nature has an ^ righ ts, and can be controlled by nQ_£t hical 
 rules ; nor can either have any place in a moral system on its 
 'own account, since it can neither push obligations upon others 
 nor feel obligations imposed upon it. 
 
 But while for the sake of nature itself man can owe no duties 
 to nature, yet for his own sake many duties originate in his 
 connection with the world of nature around him. Nature has 
 a reflex ethical bearing upon man, and he owes many duties to 
 EinseK " which reigr Jajiat-ure. As rational spirit he is bound to 
 use nature rationally, not for any end in nature , but for the 
 gran d end of reason, and thus all of nature animate and in- 
 animate, that can in any manner be made subservient to the 
 ends of human dignity and worth, come within the sphere of 
 ethical science and are involved in the considerations of pure 
 morality. In the light of what is due to his own reason, man 
 may see many duties incumbent upon him in reference to his 
 treatment of nature. 
 
 The general maxim is : Use but not abuse nature, and this 
 will include the following maxims m particular. 
 
 I. Not wan *ptJ'v fc ■"l ar Nature. Nature, animate and in- 
 animate, is given into the hand of man so far as he can reach, 
 and he is permitted to use it in any way conformed to his own 
 ultimate end. He, as free cause, can affect nature and work 
 many ch anges in her suc cessions . But he is not permitted to 
 m ar th e face of nature, nor wa ntonly and useles sly to injure 
 anyjj^^^r^products, since nature is m ade reasmably . and he 
 cannot wantonly mar it without d^jng despite to r eason. 
 
 It is a disgrace to any man's spirit, if he has come to take 
 pleasure in the destroying of a crystal, or the defacing of a 
 gem ; if he can amuse himself by wantonly crushing a flower. 
 
DUTIES TO NATURE. 99 
 
 or laying desolate any portion of nature's works. He is there- 
 by fitting himself to engage in any ruthless undertaking. The 
 next step will bring him to be cruel, and to delight in worrying 
 and torturi ng sentient bemg s and destroying animal life. This 
 debases stiU further, and whentKe~man lias~"d5scended so low 
 that he can make animal-suffering his sport, and delight to 
 inflict pain upon any living thing in air or earth or water, he 
 has become not only an unsafe member of civil society, but a 
 reproach and disgrace to humanity. We very properly call him 
 inhuman. 
 
 There often appears a very early propensity to delight in 
 destruction, and to exert the power possessed in desolating 
 deeds ; but it is an early immorality, and the sad precursor of 
 coming enormous viciousness. 
 
 2. Csmje ri Nature to thy u se. Man may not wantonly mar 
 nature, yet must he directly use nature, that she may minister 
 to the high ends of his spiritual being . Natu re possesses no 
 product too sacre d for m an. All nature is for man, no t man 
 for j t. When reason requires, it is imperative upon him to use 
 any thing that nature puts within his reach. Mineral, vegetable, 
 animal, all are his j and over the whole realm of nature he is 
 enthroned in dominion. It is a virtue to use nature for his 
 worthiness in any way ; it is a vice to neglect to serve himself 
 of nature in any offered benefit. 
 
 3. Beautify and perfect Nature. It is now, as in Paradise, 
 man's duty "to dress the earth and to keep it." It is no longer 
 a paradise ; yet is it the "ctaty of man, by industry and taste, to 
 bring the whole earth as_ ne ar as_ p ossible a gain to the primeval 
 garden. A neglect to cultivate and adorn the earth and bring 
 upon it the beauty which it might possess, is very much akin 
 to that wanton mischief which would mar the beauty and good- 
 ness that it akeady possesses. Man uses nature ethically right, 
 only when he strives to bring her as much as may be tP sub- 
 serve his wants, his taste, and his morals. 
 
lOO PURE MORALITY. 
 
 4. Explore Nature scientificallyj . Universal nature in its 
 whole structure, the conformation of all its minute parts, and 
 the entire order of its development, .are as if there were 
 rationa lity in natureherself, putting and keeping he r laws in 
 perfect a nalogy with tJ jfiJawg and fwrns of reason iii"tEehuman 
 mind. Had nature herself been otherwise connected, she 
 would have been utterly unintelUgible. All her phenomena 
 must have been connected in their perm anent substances_a nd 
 succe ssJEe^ causes, or they could never_h^e_bgen._deteriiuiied, 
 by any mind, to their places in space nor the ir period s in time. 
 All objects of sense would have been at mere nap-hazara dance 
 of appearances. Nature does not det ermine r eas on to be as 
 it isj she must herself conform to reasonj gjj e mtelligible by 
 reason. 
 
 Here is the grand text-book for the reason of man to study. 
 When he has found the true law of nature in any of her thou- 
 sand departments, he will ever find it conformed to the de- 
 mands of reason, and the working without and the law within 
 will completely harmonize. In all departments of natural science 
 there are necessary and universal laws bin ding up all the p arts _ 
 in unity, and man is fulfiUing th°imr''rnitiv° ?f hi'i mirnl b^ing 
 when engaged^jn i'ri^?:^gttffrt-in<T^^Oagcjfyir|jr oni^ systeni atizing 
 whatever of nature" he can bring within his observation. He is 
 thus studying and more full y apprehending himself, as he studies 
 and apprehends the conformities of nature to himself. The 
 Absolute Reason has enstamped himself upon his works, and 
 the true interpretation of nature cannot contradict the eternal 
 truths of reason in the soul of man. He has little faith in 
 reason or God, who fears that truths in any department of God's 
 revealing shall contradict each other. 
 
 5. Use Nature as a discipline in virtue. Nature is no more 
 conformed to the reason of man in her philosophical order, than 
 she is in her ethical connections. She is everywhere as right as 
 she is beautiful and true. If the vice of man has not perverted 
 
DUTIES TO GOD. 101 
 
 the order of nature, she will be everywhere working out what 
 should be, and as it should be. If any thing works ethically 
 wrong, it will be found to have had its perversion through some 
 vicious interference. Thus the study of nature- in its ethical 
 connections is everywhere adapted to moral instruction and 
 discipline. Not because there is greatest happiness in certain 
 courses, and thus nature herself made the end of morality ; but 
 that greatest happiness comes in such.courses as it should, and 
 thus that nature herself is conditioned by morality. 
 
 And now man's highest dignity demands the perfection of 
 moral culture, and thus that he use nature as his schoolmastei 
 to bring him to virtue. All his wisdom may and should termi- 
 nate in righteousness. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 2. Duties to God. 
 
 It was a doctrine long ago held by Plato that there could ; ' 
 be ^yjmt hjf there we r e no OnH . A truth independent of God, 
 a truth which does not imply His absolute being and fulness is 
 not only impossible, but is in itself a contradiction, and thus no 
 truth, but a lie. The existence qf_Gfli_being apprehended, 
 there immediately arises the consciousness of moraL ohMsaiions 
 to Him. That the finite spirit and the Absolute Spirit exist to- 
 gether, is sufficient to impose duties upon the finite in pure 
 morality. 
 
 The general maxim inclusive of all these duties is, " Worship 
 God." The worship of which we here speak is^Jhat_moral_ 
 homag e which it is a man's virtu e to rend er to the Absolute^ 
 Spiritj^and whicla it would be^ a vice to withhold. We""ao~nof 
 bring in the facts of dependence and perpetual communications 
 
102 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 of good, which appeal t o the sentiment of l ove ; nor the facts q£ — 
 unb ounded fulness and goodness in God, which appeal to the 
 confidin g feeling of faith and h ope ; for these are the basis of 
 religwusjussbxi) and service. ^We'simply take the conception 
 of finite spirits, not merely as existing in society with each other, 
 but now as existing also in communion with God, the Absolute 
 Spirit ; and on the ground of int rinsic excellency of spiritual 
 bein g, there are the moral claims m the Absolute to a sp in't'ifl 
 adoration from the finite^ which pure mor ality alone can recog - 
 "mze^ §ucK~conimunrty of existence cannot be, but_thefimte 
 spirit will debase itself if it will not bow in prostrate homage 
 before the AbsblOK: —-^ 
 
 When the man stood alone in the sanctuary of his own spirit- 
 ual being, he found an authority, which he was conscious would 
 awaken the conviction of eternal infamy in himself not to re- 
 spect and obey ; and when he stood in the presence of other 
 spirits like his own, he was obliged to respect their rights, and 
 to know that it would be a perpetual degradation in himself to 
 trample on the least of those rights ; but now his eye sees the 
 absolute God, and the sphere of his morality greatly changes. 
 The claim to respect himself, and to honor the spirit of his fel- 
 low, becomes the claim to the profoundest homage in the pres- 
 ence of Jehovah. A much deeper infamy is incurred, in his 
 own sight, not now to fall prostrate and adore. The same con- 
 sciousness of what is due to spiritual excellency is here, but not 
 now solely in the light of finite attributes ; he is here amid the 
 glory that fills immensity and inhabiteth eternity ; and he deeply 
 feels that a refusal to worship in such a presence must be the 
 infamy of the second death. Of all immoralities, the greatest 
 is to be morally irreligious. 
 
 This maxim, to "worship God," includes many duties, among 
 the most considerable of which we here notice : 
 
 I. Reveren ce. This is purely a spiritual em otion. N oth- 
 ing but a spirit can experience it,^nd this only in the presence 
 
DUTIES TO GOD. IO3 
 
 of a sp irit. The animal may be made afraid, but never to re- 
 vere ; and man may be made afraid in the presence of an ani- 
 mal, but never there to feel reverence. The respect which man 
 is constrained to feel for the spiritual through all humanity, rises 
 in proportion to the attributes of rationality there ' disclosed ; 
 and in tHti prtilience of some'lioai-y sage, he mvoliTfflafilyTincov- ' 
 ers hi s head and bowsin ofeisance TTjut it is only before the 
 Absolute tha t.reverence is consummated ; and here, in the pres- 
 ence of God, th e finite soul knows that nothing should hinder 
 the complete sur render o f all that he is^ in humble consecrat ioii.^ 
 Unreserved homag e is due to God, and the profoundest rever- 
 ence is itself t he dignity o f the human spirit. No man is so 
 exalted as when utterly losing himself in his reverence for the 
 Deity. 
 
 2. G odly Fea r. This is other than simple reverence, though 
 reverence may always accompany it ; and we express the differ- 
 ence when we speak of reverential awe. There is a fear which 
 is altogether distinct from a constitutional apprehension of dan- 
 ger. The apprehension of great impending evil is a " fear that 
 hath torment." It is a most unwelcome emotion, and man 
 and beast shrink away from its experience. But g odly fear ha s 
 no pain, and excites no revuls ion in the presence of its object. 
 The most dreadful majesty is revealed ; a p-lnry tha^ is tf^rrihlc ; 
 the p lace is h oly, arid he puts off the shoes from his feet, and 
 even expresses himself by saying, " I exceedingly fear and 
 quake," and yet the man chooses to be there. He would with-\ 
 draw from this presence, and change this emotion, for no other) 
 possible place or feeling. His full confidence in this dreadful J 
 Being makes even his terrible greatness delightful. This awful 
 God is his father and his friend, and by so much the more as 
 his majesty is fearful ; is his protection delightful. That very 
 glory, which in its purity is to the wicked " a consuming fire," is 
 to him a defence and an honor ; and his own soul burns with 
 love aiid joy while he gazes with haly 'amazement. The fear 
 
104 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 that would else be insupportably tormenting, becomes by his 
 own congeniality of spirit with the object an adoring awe, which 
 i^ sublimely ennobling. 
 
 ' 3. HUMILITY ;;^ This, in its true meaning, is a virtue that pro- 
 porjiflas- itself relatively to the being tha t exercises it. To the 
 Absolute, there can be no place for hurhllity ; but to all finite 
 beings, humility is a duty and a virtue. It consists in the assent 
 of the spirit to take the precise position which is due to its own 
 prnTwHQpal in trinsic excellency . We speak not now of the 
 humility of a sinner, which must partake of shame and re- 
 morse, but the humility o^,^£iritudbeings in the presence of 
 the absolute Jehovah, as a,.,mnra1 virtue. Whatever grades of 
 spiritual life there may be from human to angel, and through all 
 the ranks of " thrones, dominions, principalities, and powers," 
 that is humility in each, which, in reverent adoration of the 
 Most High, cordially assents to its own place among the wor- 
 shippers, and the highest in this classified rank, while he casts 
 his crown before the throne and veils his face with his wings, 
 will be as truly virtuous in his humility as the lowest. The 
 righteous order would be as truly broken in the degradation of 
 the higher as in the undue exaltation of the lower ; and each is 
 truly humble and morally virtuous in his humility, when he bows 
 rejoicingly before God in the very place which his relative ex- , 
 cellency assigns to him. There is no pride, no self-conceit, but 
 the virtue of universal humility, in that world where God is too 
 great to be either proud or humble, and where all finite being 
 fills just the sphere of its own spiritual excellence with divine 
 adoration and praise. 
 
 In the foregoing Chapters we have applied the ultimate Rule 
 of right to the entire field of human conduct, so far as the 
 duties in this field can be determined by the direct application 
 of this Rule. The requirements of Positive Authority still 
 
DUTIES TO GOD. lOj 
 
 need to be considered, but our System of Moral Science as 
 embraced in Pure Morality, is now complete. We here close 
 this Part of our work by a few Aphorisms eUcited from the in- 
 vestigation. 
 
 1. Humanity can never escape from the collid in g influence s 
 of animal aMetites and spiritual imperatives. Sometimes ap- 
 petite and duty may fully accord ; sometimes an unruly appe- 
 tite may seem to be mortified ; but at no time can the animal 
 nature and the rational spirit be in combination, where there 
 will not often be " the flesh lusting against the spirit," and calling 
 for a constant watch and a strong restraint. Man's,.£i]licalJife. 
 must perpetually be militan t, and his highest worth can only be 
 gained in th at manly valor which alone conqu ers by a perpet^J. 
 confli ct. He should hav e the compl acency of perpetual mastery, 
 but he will never, in the flesh, have the ble ssedness of complete 
 coijjiiie^t. To find the serene bliss of heaven, he must drop 
 the animal tabernacle, and thus lose the conflicting " law in the 
 members." 
 
 2. V irtue cannot consist in habit. Man's ultimate rule de- 
 mands great care in forming habits, inasmuch as many actions 
 of his life will flow from habit, and have their effect upon him- 
 self and others ; hut nr> artinr) frnm mprf V| 3.] ;) it can constitute 
 vjrtiip. This involves w atchfulness and activity , valo r and con- 
 flict ; the good will striving and ruling. However long-contin- 
 ued and apparently confirmed the habit may be, it is not safe 
 trusting to it. An unwonted trial may at any hour come, and 
 the long habit at once be broken through. While the good 
 habit controls, it is not virtue ; and there is no security for any 
 day that it will still control. Habit is mere facility from frcr 
 quent repetjition ; virtue is constant victory firom stem p erpetual 
 conflict. 
 
 3. Casuistry is not in finding principles, but whether par- 
 ticular fact s come under the prtnctiles. 'i 'lie ultimate Rule is 
 clearliTIKe^lf-knowledge of reason.^ Its imperatives are di- 
 
I06 PURE MORALITY. 
 
 rect from what is due to the inherent excellency of the spirit. 
 The principles of pure morality are thus clear in their Own light, 
 when seen in their own ground. They stand in necessity, and 
 are^uniyfira^l. Moral Philosophy, as a science, has thus only 
 to deal with principles, and to set them out clearly in their true 
 grounds.^ ^ 
 
 But often real or supposed facts may be so ambiguous, and 
 terms may often be so equivocal, that the nicest discernment 
 may be needed to determine whether they come under the 
 principle or not ; and all such cases give rise to questions of 
 casuistry. 
 
 The science of pure morality has nothing to do with casuistry ; 
 though the apphcation of its principles in experience give occa- 
 sion for frequent and often very difficult questions of casuistry. 
 
 4. The following precise application of terms in morality may 
 be here given : All action under the constraint of the ultimate 
 Rule is duty : and all action against duty is t ransgression. A 
 transgression may be from physical weakness, and we thus term 
 it the ma n's infirmity . It may be through the man's careless- 
 ness, and we raJMt his friidf It may be deliberate and deter- 
 mined, and we th en call it his vi ce. There wiU be seen occasion 
 hereafter for the distinction of vice as against a purely moral 
 rule, and transgression of civil la w which is crime , and also 
 transgression of God's law which is sin. To the personal author 
 of the transgression we ^«g//!^ tlip ir^tf nt-ipr) , and term this his 
 guilt; and when we refer to the retribution with which guilt is 
 to be visited, we term the person to whom the guilt is imputed, 
 responsible. 
 
SECOND PART. 
 
 POSITIVE AUTHORITY. 
 I. 
 
 THE OCCASION FOR POSITIVE AUTHORITY. 
 
 A DIFFICULTY meets us in moral science the moment we 
 step beyond the province of pure morality. If the ulti- 
 mate rule of right be truly ultimate it must be universal ; why is 
 it not then all-sufficient, and how can there then be any other 
 province in moral science than that of pure morality ? 
 
 This difficulty is partly, not wholly removed when we remem- 
 ber that there are wrong-doers whom no constraint of the ulti- 
 mate rule can control. Pure morality requires that these should 
 not be left to their unbridled wills. It would be wrong if there 
 were no power above them by which they should be restrained 
 and constrained. P ositive authority is therefo rejighleausly de- 
 manded wherever there is any immorality. 
 
 But supposing there is no immorality? What if all are pure 
 and virtuous, is there then any occasion for positive authority? 
 At first view we might say no, for it might seem that pure mo- 
 rality should be ample for all the requirements of such a condi- 
 tion. But in fact we find in civil society that positive authority 
 instead of lessening actually increases in the extent of its exact-, 
 ions as man grows more upright. The more civilized, the more 
 virtuous a community becomes, the more laws it requires. In- 
 deed so essential is law to civilization, and so characteristic of 
 
 107 
 
I08 POSITIVE AUTHORITY. 
 
 it, that wherever man is found without law he is as Homer calls 
 him,i a savage. The progress to^abe tter state js artnally <;ppn^ 
 not in an increasing_ emancij ^ion from law^ut in an increag ing 
 subjectloiT thereto. That is not the best government therefore 
 which governs least, but that which enters most largely into tlie 
 wants, the interests, and the daily life of its subjects. This is 
 certainly true as an historical fact, and may help us in the ap- 
 prehension of the true principle. 
 
 The whole difficulty vanishes in the vision that finite wills are 
 fallible, and that individuals, however willing to act wisely, will 
 be constantly meeting with questions where their actions will 
 need to be determined by a higher wisdom than their own. 
 Such a need will ever give occasion for exactiy that control 
 over human character and life which positive authority repre- 
 sents. So long as men are finite they will need the guidance 
 of a government. 
 
 But while authority is another mode of constraining human 
 conduct than pure morality, it may by no means contradict or 
 subvert morality. Authority must conform to morality, and 
 this brings its consideration within the field of Moral Science. 
 The ultimate Rule of right must be so applied to all authority, 
 as to determine that it is not an immoral and vicious authority. 
 It is introduced as a necessary means of constraint where, 
 either from the wickedness or the weakness of the finite will, 
 pure morality will not admit of application, but as in no case 
 and for no reason may authority ever be used in conflict with 
 morality, all authority needs to be submitted to the rigid crite- 
 rion of the ultimate Rule. It must thus come within the field 
 or a pure moral science. It will not govern by morality, but it 
 must govern in full accordance with morality. 
 
 1 Iliad, ix. 62. 
 
THE PECULIARITY OF AUTHORITY. 1 09 
 
 II. 
 
 THE PECULIARITY OF AUTHORITY. 
 
 Authority, as brought within the province of Moral Science, 
 is a right to legislate . When thisjight promulgates its precepts 
 without revealing its own reas ons, and guards these precepts by 
 ^pains and penalties, without giving an account of its own 
 grounds of action to its subjects, it is termed Positive Au thori- 
 ty. The point in which this authority is vested is termed 
 Sovereignty. The same point of sovereignty is the source for 
 all legislative, judicial, and executive action in the government. 
 
 In pure moral ity the rule by which the subject is to be guided 
 r eveal s its reason in its own light ; but in positive authority the 
 subject is guided by a ruleVhose rM5(jn,_is_jiot-];evealed. In 
 pure morality the ultimate Rule shows the subject by its own 
 shining what he ought to do ; but in positive authority his duty 
 is reflected to him through the medium of an outward procla- 
 mation. In pure morality the subject justifies his conduct 
 through his knowledge of the ultimate Rule ; but in positive 
 authority his justification rests upon his faith in his sovereign's 
 will. In a word, the whole difference is the difference between 
 a d uty disclosed in the inwar d consciousness, and a duty de- 
 cla red through an outer comman d., in positive authority that 
 which is wholly out of me is made to have dominion over that 
 which originates within me, and the will of another is to be the 
 lord over my will. 
 
 The claim of positive authority always demands and should 
 ever receive the closest scrutiny ; for unless the authority be fully 
 legitimated in its morality, it becomes the most vicious and de- 
 testable tyranny. It is the whole business of this Second Part 
 of Moral Science to examine this claim, and to this we now 
 betake ourselves. 
 
1 lO POSITIVE AUTHORITY. 
 
 Positive Authority, as already found, has varied modes of 
 appl3ang its constraint to human conduct, and thus we need 
 to consider it under distinct Divisions. When applying pains 
 and penalties, or offering rewards, it appeals solely to hope and 
 fear, and the obedience so resulting is that of mere legality. 
 When applying the constraint of love and reverence for the 
 sovereign, and thus appealing solely to respect and regard for 
 the authority itself, the obedience induced is that of complete 
 loyalty. These may also be blended in one sovereignty, and 
 the government use both. The first is found in Civil Govern- 
 ment; the second in the Divine Government ; and the last in 
 Family Governments We shall examine each at large in its 
 own order. 
 
FIRST DIVISION. 
 
 CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE STATE. 
 
 EITHER authority is, and this makes the state, or the state 
 already is, and this makes its own authoritative govern- 
 ment. On the supposition of "Cas. first, there may be two posi- 
 tions assumed by different parties. One, that God commissions 
 some directly to govern, and their divine right gives authority to 
 government and establishes the state. The other, that each per- 
 son has the sovereignty over himself, and many such persons 
 coming together make a state and a government by compact. 
 
 The theory of divine right makes all civil government Theo- 
 cratic. God is the Supreme civil ruler, and the human magis- 
 trate is his vice-gerent. Such was the government of ancient 
 Israel. For special ends, not here necessary to detail, God pro- 
 posed to be the civil ruler as well as the tutelar Deity of the 
 Hebrews, and was formally accepted as such by the popular 
 voice. A constitution or platform of government was also pro- 
 posed and formally adopted, and a solemn ratification of the 
 whole and inauguration of the government occurred, as fully 
 given in Exodus', 19th Chap, to the 25th. All the subsequent 
 legislation given by God conformed to this original platform, 
 called " the Book of the Covenant," and which was kept in the 
 Ark, called hence " the Ark of the Covenant." God was hence- 
 
112 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 forth their constitutional King, and the human magistrate held 
 office and ruled under his appointment. 
 
 In this one instance only has God assumed such a relation. 
 And in this, he so sanctioned and regarded popular rights, that 
 he admitted the sovereignty of the Jewish people, and would 
 not himself take the civil rule over the nation except by their 
 express consent. Had the nation refused to accept the offer, it 
 would have been the sin of ingratitude and contempt of such 
 distinguished favor, but not the crime of rebellion against po- 
 litical sovereignty. Here, a thousand years before the time of 
 Pericles, is the most ancient and vaUd recognition of the rights 
 of popular freedom. We can better afford to lose all the exam- 
 ples of free institutions in Greece and Rome, than this one 
 divine acknowledgment of the sovereign right of a people to 
 determine their own form of government. The Divine Right 
 of Kings is not here found, except as God has himself been 
 popularly chosen as national ruler, and then as such adopted 
 King he commissions whom he will to stand in his name before 
 the people as the Lord's annointed. Since God has never 
 offered and been accepted thus by any second nation, no other 
 Kings than those of ancient Israel have so ruled by divine right. 
 
 The theory of a voluntary compact is a mere figment. Primi- 
 tive governments were not so established. No state ever thus 
 originated. Such a compact if made would pre-suppose an au- 
 thority already existing to which the terms of the compact would 
 need to (jonform in order to carry with them any obligation. A 
 compact of buccaneers for purposes of piracy would give no 
 authority to its decrees. An agreement to rob does not make 
 it right to rob. Moreover, if the compact were made according 
 to righteousness, it could not, on the supposition we are now 
 considering, put its laws upon any recusants, nor rightfully drive 
 away these non-complying persons. The compact could right- 
 eously bind no longer than the lives of the original contractors, 
 and the next generation must have its own option to perpetuate 
 
THE STATE. 
 
 113 
 
 the state or. not. Neither of these methods can make a state, 
 for neither of them can authoritatively carry themselves into 
 execution without already assuming the state itself to exist. 
 
 The second is the true position, that the state itself must 
 exist in order that any civil government may be. And yet the 
 state is in no sense a human product ; though found wherever 
 man is found, man no more makes the state than he makes 
 himself. It is a condition of life into which he is born, as he is 
 born into his manhood. He is by nature, as Aristotle terms 
 him, a creature living in states.^ 
 
 What then is the state ? It would be easy to term it the 
 source of law, the fountain of authority, the regulator of man's 
 relations to his fellow-man, and either of these statements would 
 be perfectly true, while no one of them would reach the full 
 truth we need. Our definition should tell us what the state is 
 in terms which contain its full explanation. 
 
 We approach such a definition if we note that the actual 
 relationship among men is that of reciprocity and inter-depen- 
 dence. Men are bound together as are the members of the 
 living body, wherein if one member suffer all the members 
 suffer with it, or one member be honored all the members 
 rejoice together. Every member of the human family is a 
 fellow-member of all the rest. Each has something to do for 
 every other, and all have something to do for him. No man 
 liveth unto himself, and no man dieth unto himself. No man 
 finds good in the evil of his fellow-men. No nation prospers 
 because another nation suffers adversity. The ill of one dis- 
 turbs, and, in its degree, destroys the well-being of all. Each 
 is so dependent upon all the rest, and all the rest are so 
 dependent upon him, that there can be no blessing nor 
 calamity, no deed -of virtue or of vice, no birth nor death, 
 though on another continent or in a distant isle of the 
 sea, but that brings its living influence to each one of us, 
 
 
114 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 and to every member of the race. The union of men is that 
 of an organism, wherein each part is at the same time the 
 means and end of all the rest. 
 
 This is not only true, but it is the most essential truth of hu- 
 man life. There is nothing so distinctively characteristic of a 
 man as these reciprocal relations to his kind. If we could sup- 
 pose him severed from these relations, he would be no longer a 
 man, as a hand cut off from the body would be no more a hand, 
 but only a compound of blood, bone, and muscle, going to de- 
 cay. The old saying, one man, no man, unus homo, nullus 
 homo, simply means that a man alone is not a man ; his man- 
 hood means his fellowship with other men. 
 
 But if the human family is thus connected, — connected as 
 an organism, — then the place, the work, the obligations of each 
 are fixed, and must be authoritatively declared by the principle 
 of the organism itself. But this is exactly what is done by the 
 state. All the obligations which the state imposes, the place 
 and work which it assigns, are nothing more nor less than the 
 most perfect reciprocity and interdependence among its sub- 
 jects requires. All the laws of the state do but express the 
 principle of this organic relationship among men. Civil law 
 only affirms what place and work and obligations belong to men 
 by virtue of the organic bond which holds them together. If 
 truly law, it does but represent and declare the principle of a 
 brotherhood of human hearts. If it attempts any thing other 
 than this, and seeks the good of one person or class, and not 
 the good of all, it is tpanny and not law. 
 
 All this prepares us for our definition of the ' *AP "" ^^^ f^" 
 gjiTiic Uni ty of Mankind . This definition explains and justifies 
 the authority of the state. The principle of human fellowship 
 and brotherhood is true and good in itself, for it is the principle 
 of love, and the sufficient reason for all the requirements of love, 
 and the all-sufficient ground for its authority is in the simple 
 truth that love is reason. 
 
THE STATE REQUIRES A GOVERNMENT. II5 
 
 Th e State is not - the— laws, jnor the rulers, nor the collective 
 body of the people ; for all these change while the state remains 
 the samo. The laws are but the mouthpiece of the state ; the 
 rulers do but express and execute its will, and laws and rulers 
 and peopk are all subject therettfito^, '"' ~ " 
 
 In this ideal "cOTicqptiori the state is one, and yet there are 
 actually many states, as we say that man is one while there are 
 many men. But as the individual man is a man only as the 
 universal manhood is mirrored and expressed in him, so the 
 individual state is a state, only as the universal state, the ideal 
 state, finds itself typified and actuaUzed therein. In other 
 words, a given community can only justify its claim to be a 
 state on the ground that the organic unity of mankind requires 
 its separate existence as such. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE STATE REQUIRES A GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Civ il govern ment is not the state any more than are a man's 
 words and actions the rnanhimseli^ As a mai?s words express 
 his thoughts, and his actions accomplish his will, so civil gov- 
 ernment should, and at its best e state does, onlyannQmice_aiML— 
 fulfil the idea and the requirements of t he state . But as a man's 
 words may be false and his actions contradictory, so a govern- 
 ment may belie the behests of the state, and, like a false man, 
 become a detestation and a curse. Yet, however perverse it 
 may be, and however liable to abuse, civil government is an 
 indispensable necessity for the state. The organic unity of 
 rflSnSid could 'iTorTH9'ririESWiy'"V(»fthout it. 
 
 This is seen in the light of the following particulars : 
 
 I . Matiy must be governed who cannot see what is politically 
 
Il6 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 right. The end of all political authority, and the ground of all 
 right to exercise it, is found in the requirement of the or^nic 
 umty of man. But if some minds cannot see this principle, or 
 how the facts come under it, and cannot thus be controlled by 
 it, this would not abolish the rights of the public, nor the claim 
 upon the state that the public peace remain unbroken. 
 
 Such subjects every state has, and is bound to control them. 
 Children in minority, and ignorant but well-meaning adults, need 
 the constant interpretation of their duty by the state through its 
 legitimate government. 
 
 2. Mam who see thei r duty i^iU jiot do it. No matter how 
 much enlightenment of the intellect there may be, a perverse 
 will loves darkness rather than light, and in the actual state of 
 human society upon earth, there are always those whom no 
 other constraint than that of pains and penalties can control. 
 Civil government is necessary, therefore, not only to declare 
 their duty to the well-disposed, but to secure its performance 
 from the ill-disposed. 
 
 3. There are many practical matters which only a govern^ 
 ment can settle. Society has many wants which cannot be 
 supplied fiom individual study and action, and can only be 
 established by governmental authority. 
 
 At what age shall a man be rendered civilly competent to 
 make contracts? What forms shall make contracts binding? 
 How shall property be regulated, exchanged, or transmitted by 
 hereditary descent ? How shall the litigation of human rights 
 be determined, and what shall be the forms of judicial decisions ? 
 Who shall be authorized Judges ? And what forms of electing 
 them? And how invest with their office? All these, and a 
 thousand other matters, must be regulated in some way in every 
 community ; the business of society could not go on a day with- 
 out it. There must be here some uniform order of operation, 
 and no one method settles its own expediency above all others. 
 Onljr governmental ^nthoritj^ can ^■vail here. The rights and 
 
THE STATE REQUIRES A GOVERNMENT. 11/ 
 
 peace of a community cannot be preserved without laws enforc- 
 ing such regulations by adequate sanctions. 
 
 Man is thus manifestly niade to be governed. Without posi- 
 tive law society cannot exist. It cannot be shown that even 
 holy beings can be kept holy without positive enactments ; and 
 in a community of depraved beings, the public freedom cannot 
 be safe an -hour without law. A state of anarchy is a state of 
 violence and wrong. Man, as a social being, is in his normal 
 condition only when under law. 
 
 That Positive Authority is precisely adapted to meet those 
 necessities which the nature of man in society creates, will still 
 farther appear in the following particulars : 
 
 It augments to the guilf y^ the dan gers of disturbing the pMie 
 freedom. Leavmg all the ethical restraints of duty and remorse 
 for its violation in_ full force, it goes further and threatens its 
 own positive punishments against transgression. There is the 
 strong probability at least, put before every one who would 
 invade the public freedom, that he will be detected, convicted, 
 and punished. This probability is proportioned to the virtue 
 and vigor of the state government, and by so much is the 
 danger of guilt enhanced and the wicked restrained. 
 
 / / adds all the influence of personality to ethical princip le. 
 Ethical principle is as much violated in criminal action as before 
 the law was declared, but in the law there is something more 
 than a principle. It represents all the i nterests,_ syHipathies, and 
 immuniti es of persotia iityi I'he crime is not against abstrac- , 
 tions and idealities, but against the real persons represented in 
 the legislation. It violates their will and invades their social 
 freedom and peace, and is an outrage to their sentiments and 
 feehngs, and thus an offence against sentient rational beings. 
 Thus law, as the expressed wiU and embodied sentiment of the 
 community, appeals to all that is kind, tender, and humane in 
 every subject that he should not selfishly violate it and thereby 
 adds much strength to ethical restraint. 
 
Il8 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 I I p uts the retribution be yond all ifiterposition fro m the crimi- 
 nal. If there were nothing but the pangs of remorse and 
 conscious self-debasement, the guilty might find many ways of 
 softening or stifling these retributions of pure morality. The 
 criminal would need only to cover his conscience by prejudices, 
 apologies, excited passions, or to keep his attention perpetually 
 absorbed in other interests. But here the injured public is the 
 executor and avenger of law, and all the interests and freedom 
 of the community press upon the state sovereignty to see that 
 the commonwealth receive no detriment. 
 
 The duty is made flain by the distinctde daration of the law. 
 Where ignorance might hesitate from its weak apprehension, 
 the law speaks clearly ; where practical principles are equivocal, 
 the law expresses them distinctly and definitely; where prac- 
 tice must have some standard, and which from the nature of 
 the case might be any one of many methods, the law directly 
 settles which and how. Statute law, thus, in all practical mea- 
 sures, gives clearness to duty beyond what the reason in pure 
 morality would supply. 
 
 The state must legislate, and by legislation it meets the want 
 of social freedom. 
 
 While the. state, as the organic unity of mankind, can never 
 be wrong, and the law as expressive of the requirements of this 
 unity must always be right, and always authoritative, yet govern- 
 ments and statutes, made by men, are not only often faulty but 
 are always fallible, and therefore never can be absolutely uni- 
 versal in their application. Civil government at the best is ever 
 liable to rneet with particular cases like the following where it 
 must waive what in general would be its undisputed right of 
 coercion. 
 
 I. Cases w here all civil penalty is imp otent . Providential 
 occurrences may throw tKe^citizen into circumstances, where 
 the danger wiE prompt to action as much or even more than 
 any threatening which the government might apply in counter- 
 
THE STATE REQUIRES A GOVERNMENT. 1 19 
 
 action. The government is here wholly paralyzed, and can only 
 pass by in inaction. Nature is stronger than a statute could be 
 made, and all legislation would be empty. When two ship- 
 wrecked men seize an oar, or are in a boat that can save only 
 one ; or when in any other condition a man is already in a 
 greater extremity than any threatening of the law can be to him, 
 the attempt to interpose civil law will be foUy. The question is 
 not for the claim of morality, or the demands of piety ; whether 
 conscience or God will condemn ; but solely, what can human 
 law do? 
 
 In all such cases the government excuses itself from any inter- 
 ference, and throws off all responsibility by admitting its own im- 
 potence. Its vaKd defence to all claim from public freedom, in 
 such cases, is in the standing-law maxim for the occasion, — 
 N'i'/-f<:^ify hfir nn l(f(iii. , This, however, does not apply to cases 
 of great personal hazard and recklessness in the exposure of 
 others. The engineer of a steam-engine may be more exposed 
 than any other man, but this is not a case where his carelessness 
 or recklessness would be beyond the reach of law. He may be 
 made to feel that, in addition to all the hazard of death by an 
 explosion, there may be the still additional hazard of penal law 
 if he escape the first danger. The cases where law fails are 
 where law at the time can add no stronger coercion than the 
 exigencies already existing. 
 
 2. Where civil law, in its general enactment, would ind uce 
 partici ilar injust ice and injury. Airteg'i()lUt!5S"must be more or 
 less general m lis iJlLluUuii «fiplication. There cannot be laws 
 designed and adapted to every particular case. Their particu- 
 lar application depends wholly upon the facts of each case as 
 coming within the general scope of the law. The general laws 
 of currency may liquidate a claim by a very depreciated value in 
 the coin ; a bargain in any kind of property may be legally en- 
 forced, even though the action of the government may have 
 very much changed the market price of the commodity. Not 
 
120 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 unfrequently, the very laws designed by the government for the 
 conservation of the rights of men and the public freedom, when 
 carried literally out in execution, would greatly violate equity in 
 particular cases, and be greatly oppressive to the citizen. The 
 government cannot legislate against itself, nor can it permit that 
 its legislatipn should be disregarded, but here the execution of 
 its own laws is a plain iniquity. 
 
 In such cases the government relieves itself from responsibil- 
 ity, and sustains its authority, by giving jurisdiction to courts of 
 equity. The statute law is left to all future use upon its proper 
 principle, but a higher principle of moral equity overrules the 
 particular case, and under well-known regulations the court of 
 chancery decides the case as the general statute would not. 
 The apology to law is the maxim, " The extremity of the law is 
 extreme injury.'' 
 
 3. Critical exigencies in the nation itself. A special distress, 
 a national calamity, the danger from hostile invasion or internal 
 insurrection, may throw a state into such critical exigencies as 
 no existing laws could meet, and the administration carried out 
 in its legal forms would jeopard the commonwealth. Various 
 expedients have been resorted to in such cases. A dictator has 
 been appointed for the occasion, with discretionary power. 
 The magistrate has set the law aside, and tg.ken the responsi- 
 bility to the state to act without law ; the general has declared 
 martial law, and subjected civil authority to military rule ; and 
 thus the nation may have been saved at the expense of discard- 
 ing its own legislative authority. When the state afterwards 
 reviews such violence done to its own laws, it apologizes for the 
 temporary usurpation or exercise of arbitrary power, by saying, 
 " the laws are silent_araid-ar^rm^ — 
 
 While thus the state has authority to legislate, and to coerce 
 by pains and penalties obedience to its legislation for the ends of 
 freedom, there are cases where either this is impracticable, or 
 where it would defeat the very end of law, and in such cases all 
 coercion is dispensed with. 
 
RECTITUDE OF STATE AUTHORITY. 121 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE RECTITUDE OF STATE AUTHORITY. 
 
 While government is a necessity for the state, and may right- 
 eously enforce its enactments, it by no means follows that every 
 government is necessary or righteous. We are not bound to 
 obey because some have assumed to command, nor because 
 they have acquired power to crush resistance. This power may 
 still be usurpation and tyranny. On the other hand, authority 
 m ay constrain c onscience as a duty without the application of 
 its power. Even wKeiTEhe ffghtness of the precept is not at all 
 apprehended, the naked will of sovereignty is enough to fix 
 obligation, but it must be sovereignty standing on right authority. 
 This is where the principles of moral' scTence" reach to the very 
 foundation of all civil government, and it is a matter of the 
 highest importance to determine the ground on which the recti- 
 tude of human authority, as it goes out in legislation, must 
 be made to stand. The consideration will demand two par- 
 ticulars : 
 
 I. The POINT EST which sovereignty should be placed. 
 
 II. The li nes within which soverei gnty _shoulr_acx>— .- 
 
 AU civil legislation must emanate from some point, and that 
 point must be deter mined by et hical principles, in order that the 
 behests of state sovereignty may reach the public conscience 
 and bind to obedience in its own right, and not merely because 
 of its power. 
 
 The first topic of inquiry is : Where shall the sovereignty 
 be placed ? 
 
 This inquiry must be answered in the light of the ultimate 
 end of all action i n civil authori ty. We need civil government 
 ?oleIy~that men may find themselves in a brotherhood of fellow* 
 
122 MERfi Legality. 
 
 helpers everywhere. All political action must be subordinate 
 to this end of the organic unity of men. It is thus manifest : 
 
 1. That the generai sovereignty i s in the state itself. Civil 
 government does not make the state, but the state ma kes the 
 government, and gives i t all its authority. The state is not only 
 wltHouta king, but before, above, and in order to all kingly pre- 
 rogative. No possible claims of a jure divino authority, in the 
 sense that God has made the governors and they make the state, 
 can be sustained by any ethical principle. God has not otherwise 
 ordained the powers that be, than by making men social, rational, 
 and free, and thus necessary to be governed ; and then in his 
 providence throwing them together where they must institute 
 such government, and be ethically bound to respect and obey it. 
 
 But while the state is thus the general depository of all sov- 
 ereign authority, this can only be exercised through the estab- 
 lishment and administration of civil government. Competent 
 officials must be provided and clothed with the authority of the 
 state sovereignty, and as thus authorized, they govern in the 
 name of the state. In this is found the occasion for the varied 
 forms of civil government prevalent in different ages and places. 
 Monarchies, Oligarchies, RepubUcs, Democracies, have been 
 instituted accordingly as the genius of the state has brought 
 out and executed its powers of sovereignty. 
 
 Without resting in the dictum, " that the form which is best 
 administered is best," we will look for the deeper principle on 
 which all forms must be administered, and thus that form which 
 can, in a given case, alone be legitimate. The least deviation 
 from the point of ethical right so far vitiates the sovereignty, 
 that as the less consistent it should remove and give place for 
 the more consistent ; but in practice, the infringement of the 
 organic unity must ever be estimated in determining upon any 
 forcible change of sovereignty. 
 
 2. Certain relations may indicate the probable p oi nt of right 
 sovereignly. I'he relation~or Creator and creature, parent and 
 
RECTITUDE OF STATE AUTHORITY. 1 23 
 
 child, might be an index of where we should look for the point 
 of sovereignty in the Divine and the Family Government. 
 From the relation alope we should doubtless conclude, that the 
 Creator is to govern the creature, and the parent to govern the 
 child. And in the same way, it might be a general index that 
 the relations between e xperienc e and inexperience, learning 
 and ignorance, age and yo uth, majority^and" minority, etCy 
 should give sovereignty to the former in each 'case. 
 
 But there is nothing in these relations which can do more 
 than indicate d priori probabilities. No one of them can be 
 an ethical ground out of which springs the right to govern. 
 If a Creator could be conceived who was malevolent, he would 
 from his creative agency have derived no right to enforce his 
 malevolent will. The father may become so imbecile, or be so 
 depraved, that though a father in his relation still, yet shall 
 he have no right to govern his own children. And so expe- 
 rience, and learning, and age, and the will of a majority may be 
 leagued with tyranny and altogether wrong in governing. The 
 inherent qualifications required in a righteous civil government 
 are only seen in the light of what the organic unity requires. 
 
 3. T here must be i)eculiar natural q ualifications. Where 
 there is natural incoHjpetency to attain the ends ot human gov- 
 ernment, there can be no right to the^place of sovereignty ; and 
 if assumed sovereignty be in that position, the duty is to abdi- 
 cate it at once. If in the state there be not found the posses- 
 sion of natural qualities for a perfect civil rule, then must the 
 government be so far imperfectT~~Att~civil government must, in 
 the natuYe of the cSgeppartake more or less of human imperfec- 
 tion ; but the ethical claim for the sovereignty is the highest 
 natural qualities attainable ; and this highest qualification attain- 
 able, though not perfect, will give a valid ground, so far as nat- 
 ural qualities are concerned, for sovereign authority in the 
 administration. 
 
 There should be the highest attainable intelligence to appre- 
 
124 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 hend the ends of government and the means for attaining them, 
 and the most efficient faculties to use these means in the attain- 
 ment of such ends. If from any failure of knowledge or power the 
 government fails of attaining its legitimate end, the sovereignty 
 is inherently in fault, and the right of every citizen is plain in its 
 demand that the sovereign administration be changed. Where 
 there is natural incompetency to govern, nothing can give an 
 ethical right to the place of sovereignty. 
 
 4. There must be the peculi ar moral qualifica tions. Com- 
 petency of natural faculty may be connected with moral quali- 
 fications so unfit or perverse as to vitiate all title to sovereignty. 
 The power that can govern well, but will not, can have no more 
 right to the place of sovereignty than that which is naturally 
 incompetent. The ethical claim is for the highest security of 
 attaining the end of government, and for this, moral no less than 
 natural qualifications are essential. 
 
 There must be the love of pu blic libe rty, p atriotism, be nevo- 
 len ce, righteousnesS j^jgaacityr-ajftd-in fine all the moral qualities 
 which secure that the natural competency shall be faithfully 
 applied. In a word, there must be se lf-forgetfulnes s and a 
 readiness to make all sacrifices_.ibt the publie. good. The 
 righteous rulenvTft~Trcif'?eek his own. His unwillingness to 
 contribute himself and his to the requirements of the universal 
 love and brothorhood, would vitiate his title to sovereignty as 
 truly as his inability to see what these requirements are. The 
 government may quite as well fail for incompetency as for 
 depravity. 
 
 It should be remarked here, that the perfect freedom and 
 execution of the public choice may not be attainable by any 
 human sovereign, inasmuch as still some subjects may transgress, 
 and each act of transgression is so far an interference with pub- 
 lic peace and -freedom; but the sovereignty has a valid moral 
 title when it possesses and exerts the highest attainable qualifi- 
 cations in the service of good government. Its title to sover- 
 
RECTITUDE OF STATE AUTHORITY. 1 25 
 
 . eignty is not vitiated by the offences and crimes which it could 
 not prevent. 
 
 And it should also be further remarked, that the characteristics 
 and condition of a community must be consulted to determine 
 where this highest qualification for sovereignty may be found. 
 In proportion to the intelligence and virtue of a people, the 
 action of sovereignty may be democratic, but in proportion to 
 the ignorance and depravity of the people is a popular govern- 
 ment the most destructive of pubUc freedom. Nothing is more 
 tyrannical than an excited passionate populace ; and, in such a 
 community, for the sake of the state, the sovereignty must be 
 removed from the people proportionally to their degradation, 
 and the government become monarchical. The point of sover- 
 eignty must be just where there is the highest natural and moral 
 qualifications for securing the requirements of the state. There 
 Morality must place it, and if any thing put the sovereignty 
 somewhere else, the right is so far perverted and discarded. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE RECTITUDE OF STATE AUTHORITY. 
 
 II. The Lines within which Sovereignty should act. 
 
 When the sovereignty is legitimate, it has still its sphere of 
 action, and* may legislate and administer its laws only within a 
 prescribed field o f jurisdictio n. Beyond the lines drawn by 
 certam clear "principles, the attempted action of sovereignty 
 becomes assumption and usurpation, and all allegiance to it is 
 nullified in its own wrong action. The principles by which the 
 lines are drawn for the right action pf sovereignty are a§ fpl- 
 Jpws : 
 
126 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 1 . The sovereignty may not attemp t a ction beyond its own ca, 
 pacity j or governing. When sovereignty attempts to legislate or 
 execute law beyond its capacity, it acts in blindness and weak- 
 ness, and most surely perverts its end and puts in jeopardy the 
 public good, by its own ignorant and imbecile attempts to sub- 
 serve it. Ignorant legislation and feeble, inconstant adminis- 
 tration are sure precursors of many oppressive burdens, and 
 ultimately induce anarchy. All things and all persons which 
 the sovereignty is competent to use in the service of the com- 
 munity are legitimately in its hand for this purpose, but what 
 it knows not how to use for this end it may not rightfully touch. 
 All ignorant tampering with the laws and blind experiments in 
 legislation, by any sovereign, and all crude attempts at reforma- 
 tion beyond his clear discernment, are as much morally forbid- 
 den to him as to any private citizen. The sovereignty is con- 
 ferred that it may wisely and not blindly administer the govern- 
 ment of the state. 
 
 2. Sovereignty may no t legislate beyond the subjects capacity 
 for obedience. In a realm of free wills there is no obedience to 
 law where there is no choi ce to obey. But there can be no 
 choice to obey and hence no righteous requirement of obedience 
 v^iere_theie-is jLO-afeilTty- to obey. No tyranny can be more in- 
 tolerable than a government demanding impossibilities ; and 
 such demands, if made, can impose no other obligation than 
 that of indignant resistance. 
 
 3. Itj qay not attempt the ex ecution of law beyond its p lain 
 promulgatio n. It is the busmess ot sovereignty to provide tor 
 the promulgation of its enactments, and it is stopped in execu- 
 tion righteously^wliwe the law has n ot been proclaime d. This 
 involves the intelli gible nature of the legislation , the language in 
 which the laws are communicated, and the manner of publica- 
 tion to thege^Je! Laws in themselves beyond the subject's 
 power of apprehension, or inadequately expressed, or imper- 
 fectly published, carry no binding force to the subject, and of 
 
RECTITUDE OF STATE AUTHORITY. 12/ 
 
 course the sovereign can in such cases righteously apply no 
 penalties for not observing them. The wUful or careless neglect 
 of the subject to ascertain what the published law is, must rest 
 upon his own responsibility ; but there must, previously to such 
 responsibility, have been the opportunity given by the sover- 
 eign for knowing his edicts. 
 
 4. It may n ot legislate in viola tion of ^ure morality. The 
 public good can consist only with public morality, and any civil 
 restraint against ethical claims would itself be tyranny. Sover- 
 eignty may often righteously legislate in matters indifferent to 
 morality, where pubHc practice must have some authorized and 
 fixed standards, and thus make that a matter of duty which be- 
 fore had no obligation ; but when civil authority attempts to 
 break over the barriers of moral right, and command any thing 
 which it would be unworthy of man to perform, it nullifies its 
 own authority by running against the ultimate test of all au- 
 thority, and can only provoke contempt and universal reproba- 
 tion from all virtuous beings. 
 
 5 . It m ay not legislate against Di vine Authority . The Di- 
 vine Authority is the authority oy]ie.,^bsolute_^Reasonj_^ and 
 there can be nothing reasonable or authoritative which conflicts 
 with its claims. The state therefore, which, as the organic unity 
 of mankind, is reason expressed in human fellowship, is and 
 must be ever in accord with reason, and no government or stat- 
 ute can express the real will of the state, or be righteous or obli- 
 gatory, which sets itself against a command of Absolute Reason. 
 In such an attempt of civil sovereignty, it is every man's duty 
 to respect the old, noble declaration of the primitive Apostles, 
 " Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto men 
 more than unto God, judge ye." Acts, iv. 19. God is the right- 
 ful sovereign of all sovereignties, " the King of kings and the 
 Lord of lords." 
 
 These principles, fairly applied, will give the true point of 
 sovereignty, and the lines within which it should act, either ^ 
 
128 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 legislator, judge, or executor of the law. The commands of 
 righteous sovereignty are binding upon every subject, and with 
 righteous authority, it may often be necessary to stand upon its 
 own sovereignty alone, and in the eye of the subject present 
 nothing else than the unequivocal declaration of its own will. 
 The public good often demands obedience to sovereign man- 
 dates, in which no other right is seen than the rightness of the 
 authority commanding, and the conscience of every subject is 
 bound by it. 
 
 There are some peculiarities in the action of sovereignty, de- 
 manded by consideratipns of pubKc freedom, the statement of 
 which may most appropriately be made in the closing of this 
 Chapter. 
 
 Division of the functions of sovereignty. In practical work- 
 ing, it is 15und~ expedient' To separate~tTie functions of sover- 
 eignty, and distribute the le gislativ e, the judicial, and the 
 executive, each into different hands. The imperfection of 
 Timnaiiity renders the legislator liable to a partial and undue 
 estimate of the laws of his own enacting, and that he should 
 regard them in some measure from his own share in the making 
 of them, and not solely from their bearing upon public freedom. 
 It is not safe that the legislator should be the judge of his own 
 laws, nor, for the same reasons, that the judge should execute 
 his own decisions. The bias of personal prejudice and private 
 interest is best excluded by separating these functions of sover- 
 eignty to different officials. 
 
 And then again, each one of these has in practice further 
 checks and balances imposed, in popular governments, for the 
 sake of securing the pubUc freedom better. 
 
 In the case of the legislative, there are, first, the con- 
 stituting of the same into two bodies, or houses. One a more 
 popular ifepresentation, and the pther standing upon a niore 
 
RECTITUDE OF STATE AUTHORITY. 1 29 
 
 general constituency, and all legislation necessarily receiving 
 the majority of votes in each. And, secondly, the interposi- 
 tion of a veto . To arrest and check rash and hasty legislation, 
 this power of putting a veto upon legislative enactments is in- 
 stituted under certain regulations, and ordinarily lodged in the 
 chief magistrate of the nation, who may refuse to give his sanc- 
 tion to particular bills which have already passed both houses. 
 When such veto is interposed, another deliberation of the legis- 
 lature is demanded, and usually a larger vote than a majority is 
 required for the final enactment of the vetoed law. When all 
 this is instituted and used for the greater security of the public 
 freedom, it is in full accordance with the imperatives of political 
 ethics. 
 
 In the case of the judiciary, thgr e_aEe, — first, courts of 
 
 app eal. In this way the decisions of one court are reviewed by 
 
 ano^er, and if found erroneous, the former decision is reversed 
 or set aside. Such appeals may be made to pass through cer- 
 tain forms, and the way lie open to several successive tribunals, 
 but the end of all is to be found in the greater security of the 
 public freedom. And, secotu^,.j:atiZis_of equity. The oper- 
 ation of general laws niay bring, in particulaTcases, a denial of 
 justice, or, indeed, great injustice. Courts of equity are estab- 
 lished for judging, under certain fixed principles, otherwise than 
 the arbitrary claims of law would demand. 
 
 In the case of the executive, there is granted the power of 
 pardon. The ends of freedom may sometimes be consistent 
 with, and perhaps frequently be best attained by, the pardon of 
 convicted criminals. If there has been any error in judgment, 
 or if it be deemed that the ends of justice, or which is the same 
 thing, the public freedom, may be as well subserved ; the power 
 of pardon is lodged ordinarily with some member of the execu- 
 tive, and sometimes with particular conditions and restrictions. 
 The remission of punishment consistently with the demands of 
 the organic unity, is the end to be attained in such a power, and 
 
130 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 should be so used only. It is always a responsible and a diffi- 
 cult matter to dispense pardons safely. 
 
 The whole adjustment and operation of the civil government, 
 must be solely in the light of what the organic unity of men 
 demands. That is the best government and those the best 
 statutes which will best bind individuals and nations together as 
 a brotherhood of fellow-helpers. The government which the 
 state requires is that which shall express the principle of the 
 state, and when this principle is expressed it has authority, not 
 because a monarch or a legislature has decreed it, or because 
 it has been adopted by the agreement of a majority, but be- 
 cause it is the voice of the original reason in man, which is, 
 says Richard Hooker,^ " laid up in the bosom of God," which 
 commands, says Cicero,^ "what ought to be done," which de- 
 clares, says Demosthenes,' "what is just and honorable," and 
 whose utterarlces, says Sophocles,'* " are not of to-day nft of 
 yesterday, and no man can tell when they came." 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 
 
 Rewards and punishments are technically termed the sanc- 
 tions of Law. They are the retributions annexed to the precept 
 by which the precept becomes a law. Both rewards and pun- 
 ishments are included as retributions, but the meaning of both, 
 and the idea at the basis of each may be best seen from a clear 
 view of the true doctrine of punishment. 
 
 I . The meaning and ground of punishment Literally pun- 
 
 1 Ecclesiastical Polity, I. iii. j,, ' Orat. i, cont. Aristog. 
 
 2 Po Legibus, i. 6. * Antigone, v. 456. 
 
REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. I3I 
 
 ishment means painj_it_^_pain inflicted upon the breaker of a 
 law by the giver of the law. ~ 
 
 Whenever the subject of a law breaks the law his will is 
 thereby brought in exact conflict with the will of his sovereign. 
 But since both these two wills cannot be maintained, one must 
 yield, which cannot be that of the sovereign, since if the sover- 
 eign yields, he yields his throne ; and if his sovereignty is just, 
 he becomes thereby unjust. Of course therefore he must make 
 the subject yield, which he can only do by inflicting upon him 
 as his sovereign's will what he could never choose as his own 
 will, and this he does by making him suffer. Suffering is the 
 one thing, the only thing which no' one could choose to ex- 
 perience for its own sake, and it is therefore the very means, 
 the true and perfect means by which the sovereign shall compel 
 the transgressor to acknowledge the supremacy which he had 
 chosen to refuse. By this suffering the transgressor is punished. 
 Suffering is thus the means and not the end of punishment. 
 The transgressor is punished not that he may suffer, but he is 
 made to suffer that he may thereby be punished. The end_of 
 punishme^t^s to assert the supremacy of the sovereig n, over the 
 su5f ectwho by his transgression had affirmed~hims£lf-supreme. 
 
 Punishment i s not retaliatio n, as though the subject had in- 
 jured the sovereign in a certain degree for which an equal 
 injury is returned to him. This would be the absurdity of 
 making one evil or injury cancel another. Moreover, the 
 action of the sovereign upon the subject in punishment is of 
 a wholly different sort from the action, of the subject upon the 
 sovereign in transgression. The transgression has not injured 
 the sovereign, but only the subject ; and the punishment is in 
 reality only the manifestation or expression of the injury which 
 the subject has wrought upon himself. In other words, the free 
 will of the subject maintains its normal freedom only in obedi- 
 ence to his righteous sovereign. Disobedience is the surrender 
 of freedom, " Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin," 
 
132 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 In the very transgression, whereby the subject affirms himself 
 a sovereign, he becomes in reality a slave. His freedom is 
 actually gone, though he does not yet know it ; and his punish- 
 ment manifests this to himself, and to all beholders. His choice 
 has become his destiny. J-' 
 
 2. T he ris hteou mess of ^^m.sfuneni. Punishment may there- 
 fore be defined as sove reign ty asserting itself oye r the trans- 
 gressor, and its righteousness is clearly seen in the righteousness 
 of the sovereignty which it asserts and vindicates. The require- 
 ments of the organic uni ty of rn ankiruL ar&-Bg-ht, for they are 
 the requirements of reason itself. The civil government which 
 embodies and executes these requirements is therefore right, 
 and the sanctions, — whether rewards or punishments, — 
 whereby such a government is maintained, must also be right. 
 The righteousness of the state and of its requirements, and their 
 execution, is the same righteousness throughout. It is the 
 righteousness of reason expressing and actualizing itself. 
 
 Hence the righteousness of punishment is not grounded in 
 its tendency to reform the transgressor. The reform of the 
 transgressor is of course important to the community of which 
 he is still a member, but beyond any good to any transgressor, 
 whether it be his reform, his freedom, his happiness, or his life, 
 is the one supreme good of the unimpaired supremacy of the 
 government on which every good of the community depends. 
 Moreover, if we think a moment, we see that the righteousness 
 of punishment must rest in something back of its tendency to 
 reform, for it could have no such tendency unless it were 
 righteous to start with. 
 
 Again if it be said that the threat of punishment will restrain 
 from crime, and we seek in this its justification, the immediate 
 and sufficient answer is that punishment cannot be right be- 
 cause it is threatened, but it can only bfi righteously Jiweatened 
 because itself is right. 
 
 SHUTarthS, it one claims that the infliction of punishment is 
 
REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 133 
 
 right only on the ground that it will restrain others from crime, 
 the question comes : Why then is one person punished rather 
 than another ? And if the answer be that the person punished 
 has transgressed, the question at once presents itself : What is 
 it in transgression which causes the transgressor to be selected 
 for punishment? To this there is no stable and self-sufficient 
 answer if we ignore that denial of a righteous sovereignty in 
 which the very core and marrow of transgression consists, and 
 that affirmation of the sovereignty which is the stable ground 
 and self-sufficient end of punishment. 
 
 3. The degree of punishment. There must be some measure 
 for the penalties ]amiexed~toIlaws ; and, on the one side, this 
 must not be so lenient as to invite the public contempt, nor, on 
 the other hand, may it be so severe as to provoke the charge of 
 cruelty and excite the horror and hatred of the community. A 
 number of considerations must come into the account, in order 
 rightly to estimate the degree of penalty which the sovereign 
 authority righteously requires. 
 
 (i.) The extent to which the vicious choice interferes with 
 th e public freedo m. As"tKe'~civTr aiilhoriTV Is to "nSntam the 
 freedom through which alone the organic unity of its subjects 
 has play, the heinousness of any crime must be measured by the 
 degree in which this freedom has been thereby violated. Petty 
 larceny does not so extensively conffict with this as midnight 
 robbery, nor the taking of property clandestinely as the taking 
 of life violently. The constraint against the greater crime must 
 be by the greater penalty, other things being equal. Hence, in 
 all cases of estimating the due degree of legal penalty, one item 
 to be carefully weighed isjt he enormity o fjhe^pfifencg against 
 the liberty of the people. The purpose to vindicate authority 
 must be proportioned to the importance of the"~Iaw, and this is 
 determined only ^n-IEe iig^i^£5a£^Qd_ oflin"civirauthg rity. 
 
 (2.) The strensih ^of(he cr imi nal choice is also to le es ti - 
 mated. Publicfreedom is themore endangered, the more de- 
 
134 MERE LEGALITV. 
 
 termined and inveterate is the choice_ in conflict with it. A 
 settled, long-ch erished puf^ gsetodo evil is more heinous than 
 the same act put forth under sudden temptation or high excite- 
 ment. Against the former there musF&'e "interposed ttie stronger 
 restraint. Whatever indicates the greater strength of the crimi- 
 nal choice will give an index also of the higher penalty which 
 must be put to guard against it. This may be seen in the rep- 
 etition of the offence, the surrounding restraints that have been 
 overcome, or the violent and outrageous manner of committing 
 the crime. Whatever determines the deeper depravity of the 
 criminal choice must also demand a corresponding degree of 
 severity in the penalty. 
 
 (3.) Tlie difficulty of detection must aho^be regarded. The 
 danger to the community is not always in th e direct propor tion 
 to the invasio n of the public freedom in t he_act itself. Some 
 crimes are, in their own nature, more difificult of detection than 
 others, and more impracticable to be guarded against by the 
 public. On this account there is the greater hazard from them, 
 in the stronger expectation of secrecy, or of non-resistance, and 
 thus the higher probability of impunity. This difference should, 
 as nearly as practicable, be counterbalanced by the greater de- 
 gree of penalty. Thus with the counterfeiting of the coin of 
 the country, forgery, perjury, etc. In the case of some aggra- 
 vated crimes, the penalty itself being death, there is a compen- 
 sation given for the difficulty of detection by a more liberal rule 
 for admitting testimony. In the case of rape, arson, etc., the 
 injured party may be a competent and sufficient witness, with 
 the corroborating circumstances. 
 
 (4.) Wlien the crime is directly against the sovereignty, the 
 highest Jienalties are _ xlemanded^. Sovereignty holds the con- 
 densed authority of the s tate in one point, and a crime against 
 this is the highest the state can know, or the subject can com- 
 mit. All other crimes are against individuals; but an offence 
 against the sovereignty, as such, strikes directly against the 
 
REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 1 35 
 
 authority of the whole, and would cleave down the pubHc free- 
 dom in the destruction of its only safeguard' at a single blow. 
 
 In this is the crime oihigh treason, and it should call forth 
 all the force of state authority to its utmost extent. The occa- 
 sion and circumstances of the crime, except as indicating the 
 desperate and determining choice of the traitor, cannot be taken 
 into the account. Whatever the occasion, this stroke direct at 
 the sovereignty involves the very existence of the government, 
 and must be met and overcome, if necessary, by calling out all 
 the resources of the commonwealth. It is a commitment in 
 which is at stake the existence of the parties. If one lives, the 
 other must fall ; and thus if the government would not consent 
 to its own destruction, it can have no other resource but the 
 destruction of its enemy. Here, the highest penalty is de- 
 manded, for the sovereignty is bound to sustain its own being 
 to the full extent of its power. 
 
 These are the principles to be applied in determining the 
 degree of penalty. It may often be difficult to give the exact 
 degree, and questions of political casuistry may arise, demand- 
 ing the highest political experience and wisdom ; but the true 
 course is to attain the right principles, and apply them as judi- 
 ciously as practicable. Criminal codes will demand frequent 
 revision ; the principles will last, the facts perpetually vary. 
 
 Sanctions which are completely within the interest of public 
 freedom can never, on one side, become weak and contempti- 
 ble, nor on the other, cruel and revengeful. All that is within 
 the reach of the state is given into its hand that it may be used 
 for the end of freedom in the maintenance of the organic unity 
 of its subjects, and the most severe penalties are righteous if 
 inflicted in subserviency to this end. Should it be objected that 
 capital punishment is no longer necessary to the administration 
 of a safe government, since the elevation in morals and patriot- 
 ism, and the degree of civilization attained, has secured that 
 milder penalties will sufficiently guard human life ; this might 
 
136 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 be an open inquiry for fair discussion and decision, whether in 
 the given circumstances such has become a matter of fact or 
 not. But the principle does not admit of question, whether, if 
 the organic unity or the pubhc freedom demand capital punish- 
 ment, the government has a right to threaten and inflict it. If 
 something may as securely sustain the pubhc freedom, the gov- 
 ernment may dispense with this and yet fulfil its end ; but if 
 nothing else will do, the state must use capital punishment, 
 since it must guard and maintain itself by any means practica- 
 ble. Life is not so sacred as that for which life is given, and if 
 the opportunity to attain the ends of human life cannot be 
 maintained but by the infliction of death upon such as disturb 
 it, the government of the state is bound, by its mission to 
 humanity, to inflict that extreme penalty. 
 
 It may be argued that sanguinary punishments tend to make 
 the people barbarous ; but in the one crime of murder, it is a 
 more important and probable opinion, that a disuse of capital 
 punishment will directly tend to demoralize the public. The 
 conviction that the murderer deserves to die must be met by 
 civil sanctions, or the very teachings and influence of the law 
 will be to lower the standard of pure morality, and deprave the 
 pubhc sentiment, by making the hfe of man less sacred in the 
 statute book than it is in natural conscience. 
 
 A general view of the nature and rectitude of State Authority 
 has now been attained, but a particular application may be 
 assisted by giving some prominent examples. We shall need 
 three Chapters, under the following captions : — 
 
 The position of the citizen- irLxeference to the government. 
 
 The position of the government in r eference to the citizen . 
 
 The position ot one state m reference to others. 
 
THE CITIZEN IN REFERENCE TO THE GOVERNMENT. 1 37 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE POSITION OF THE CITIZEN IN REFERENCE TO THE 
 GOVERNMENT. 
 
 While the state as the organic unity of mankind must always 
 be right, and its requirements always obligatory, civil govern- 
 ment will always be restricted in its rights by the rights of its 
 subjects, and it is important for us to note here, what the citizen 
 may claim, and what he may not claim, as against the govern- 
 ment to which he is amenable. 
 
 I. Every citiz en is in some respects quite beyond all inter- 
 ference' from civil authority. The grand originary right of all 
 rights is the Ireedom of every man to seek the attainment of his 
 high est worth of mor al character. It is in his capacity to attain 
 and maintain a moraTcEafacter, that man becomes a person and 
 is not a thing. 
 
 His right to pursue the choice of hisjughest -happiness is 
 always__siilgeryient to this, that in attaining his happiness he 
 should always suborduiate it to his righteousness. Freedom in 
 the pursuit of happiness is always to be controlled by what is 
 due to righteousness. This originary right can never be given 
 up T)y any~one, nor forcibly taken from another by any one, nor 
 even claimed as a sacrifice from any one for the freedom of all. 
 The state never can demand, and the government never should 
 demand, the immorality of its humblest citizen, as the price to 
 be paid for its political liberty. Inasmuch as civil authority ex- 
 ists only for the organic unity of its subjects, and as this can 
 never be found, but is always lost through unrighteousness, it fol- 
 lows that no high political sovereignty can at all lay its hand 
 upon the citizen's originary right to the attainment of his high- 
 est moral worth. 
 
 There are thus individual rights which lie quite above all 
 
138 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 righteous interference from the civil authority; against which 
 no statute should lift up its sanctions ; and for the sake of which, 
 if the operation of gen'eral statutes come in conflict, the gov- 
 ernment in its judicial capacity should declare the statute a 
 nullity and set aside its penalty. 
 
 Among such original rights, may be mentioned the follow- 
 ing : — 
 
 Equality in freedom. I may demand of the civil authority, 
 that it shall permit me to be as free as another, in my own right. 
 The state can never use its law, nor can it permit any citizen 
 so to use it, as to domineer over and oppress any individual. 
 A government which legislates against the many for the sake of 
 a few, or against any part of the community for the sake of 
 another, contradicts the very idea of the state, and is a tyranny 
 which has belied itself. 
 
 Unrestrained thoug:ht and beliefs Thought and belief have 
 not yet become choice, and as thought and faith, can never 
 come within the jurisdiction of the civil authority. No con- 
 servation of pubKc freedom demands any interference with 
 piisfate_thouglit and belief, and it is only as choices and pur- 
 poses are formed which go out in overt action after their ob- 
 jects, that the government has any power or right to interpose 
 and repress. 
 
 fre edom of conscien ce.' Pure morality and religious piety_ 
 stand quite beyond the jurisdiction~Bf Civir'sovereignty. My 
 right to my own self-approbation in both morals and religion is 
 beyond all other requirements, and were I to follow any other 
 requirement in opposition to conscience in either, I could 
 neither be virtuous nor pious. Not what the government im- 
 poses, but only what I myself propose, as ultimateend and aim, 
 can give to me either righteo usness or holmess. 
 
 Unrestrained action in all things^ noi^subversiue_of_ SiLJ^li^J^ 
 freedom. Freedom to wnte, print, or speak what I will, if I do 
 not therein invade the public freedom, is mine beyond the 
 
THE CITIZEN IN REFERENCE TO THE GOVERNMENT. 1 39 
 
 reach of all civil legislation. Tjie jpublic pro secutor must make 
 out the invasion of the public freedom in whaTr have uttered 
 to the world, and the choice going ouFin overt action to do so, 
 or therejs je^ithfiiLslander nor libel in any'caffiimunication I may 
 make public. Others are free to hear what I speak, or read 
 what I publish, as they please, and neither myself nor they can 
 come under any legal restraint, until the invasion of the public 
 freedom is first established. 
 
 To be held as innocent until le gally proved to be guilty. If the 
 end of government has not been hindered^'aiid thus" ho conflict 
 has come in the maintaining of the public freedom, the sover- 
 eignty has no penal claim upon any citizen ; and it is the right 
 of . all tp possess the immuniti es__of_the_ government until the 
 ch arge of violati oiuhas: been legally made and^proved. It is 
 the business of the government to arraign, try, and convict ; and 
 until convicted, every citizen may claim exemption from civil 
 penalty. 
 
 The sovereign as fully as the citizen has, the right to decide 
 for himself what cases come within his proper jurisdiction, and 
 where he may apply his pains and penalties in constraint of the 
 subject, and must exonerate or coerce accordingly. But the 
 principle, as given above, which allows some original rights 
 to the citizen beyond the reach of civil sovereignty, must be 
 admitted by all righteous government ; and if there come any 
 collision between the sovereign and the subject, it can only 
 be a question of casuistry whether the particular case comes 
 within the principle or not. In such unhappy_discrepancy of 
 origin al personal ri ght— and- claim of governmental authority, 
 the power of the sovereignty may for a while carry all things 
 its own way; but the appeal is to the ultiiiiate..s.tandaEd- of right 
 which involves the judgment of posterity and of God, and at 
 length, before this final tribunal, the assumption and oppression 
 of the sovereign is as surely and severely rebuked as the trans- 
 gression or rebellion of the subject. • The subject is justified, 
 
140 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 in all such collisions, in his resort to all legal preventions and 
 hindrances practicable, and the sovereign judiciary should set 
 aside all legislation which violates fundamental principles. 
 
 2. The^sudjectfms_^np MghtJ±jvade_law. From necessity, 
 inasmuch as human government must be made and administered 
 by fallible men, all political_regulatians, must have their imper- 
 fections. The eye of the sovereign cannot detect every crime, 
 nor his arm arrest and punish every transgressor. But this 
 defect is only in fact, not in principle. The sovereign has his 
 right to arraign and punish every dehnquent, and if any criminal 
 evade the law in its penalty which he has violated in precept, 
 it has been against ethical right, and a^moral vice Imjaeen 
 thereby added^to, a poUtical crime. 
 
 Wherever state authority reaches, there the majesty of sov- 
 ereignty is ; and no man may be permitted to put forth any 
 choice, which is not constrained by the law in harmony with the 
 pubUc choice. Just so far as this fails the organic unity is in- 
 vaded, and a wound to this is as fatal in one part of the state as 
 another. The organic unity is vital in every part, and the aegis 
 of sovereign authority must cover the whole or no portion can 
 be safe. The state itself, through all its organization of con- 
 nected choices and interests, rights and claims, is eye, ear, and 
 hand to detect and arraign every transgressor. And in every 
 subject, through all the body-politic, there is a nerve of political 
 sensation which carries up to the seat of sovereign authority and 
 redress the notice of any violence anywhere suffered. All un- 
 redressed wrong-doing remains as a festering wound in the state, 
 and creates so much disease and danger in the commonwealth. 
 No matter how clearly and effectually the criminal may have 
 evaded the law, he has left the virus of his crime working its 
 mischief in the political life of his country, and the evil is no 
 more sure in the state, than is the moral retribution in his own 
 conscious degradation. No secrecy of wickedness, nor any 
 successful resistance to law, has in any manner mitigated or 
 
THE CITIZEN IN REFERENCE TO THE GOVERNMENT. I4I 
 
 abolished the moral turpitude of the transgression. All evasion 
 of revenue laws, taxes, and regulations of the right of suffrage, 
 are breaches of morality, inasmuch as an ethical imp erative 
 S anctions every regulation of ri ghteous authority!.' 
 
 3. The criminal has no rig ht fo^ sym path y afuimt law. A 
 righteous subject of human government may sympathize with 
 human -misery, in all cases of its manifestation. It is an in- 
 dignity to his humanity to harden the heart and steel the breast 
 against any suffering. It is worthy of any man that he com- 
 passionate human sorrow, and even all cases of sin and guilt. 
 But while a righteous man may allow all the overflowings of 
 constitutional sympathy for the sufferings of a criminal rightly 
 punished, and would render himself inhuman if he looked on 
 the anguish of another with unfeeling indifference, yet may he 
 not permit this sympathy to m agnify itself against_th£-Jaw, and 
 prompt to any action ' that would withdraw from the full in- 
 flictionofjejialty, and leave the authority of law unvindicated. 
 This morbid compassion to the guilty is by no means uncom- 
 mon ; but it is always a criminal weakness in the man who 
 cannot control constitutional emotions by moral principle, and 
 includes within it a crimmal treachery to the state. 
 
 The criminal who stiffers under righteous penal retribution 
 has still all the rights of humanity, and may properly demand 
 that his punishment shall not be inhuman in kind or degree, 
 and that no innocent man shall look on his sufferings without a 
 feeling heart, but he has no right to appeal to any sympathy, 
 that he may through it secure a lighter stroke of penal justice. 
 The good man may pity all his sorrows, and yet rejoice most 
 righteously in the law which smites him. The criminal may 
 righteously take the solace of the good man's sympathy, but 
 should not wish to abate at all his loyalty to the law. 
 
 4. The citizen can stand aga inst all c laims of the civil gov:^ 
 e rnmentl on the ground gf^jofJ'J:^ legality. Legality implies 
 ojjedience to law throu^ithe constraint of its sanctions. Not 
 
142 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 fromvirtuoug regard to duty, from love to the sovereignt^j from 
 patriotic regard to freedom, nor from general _ benevolence to 
 mankind, but 'solely from the gooS^ffered or the evil threat- 
 ened. It is, ethically considered, a servile and mercenary 
 spirit; obedience from motives which give no moral virtue; 
 and yet the citizen can stand on this ground, and civil govern- 
 ment can make no further exactions. His whole political life 
 is thus justified. 
 
 The sovereign may wish every citizen to be virtuous, patriotic, 
 and even pious ; but he can do nothing as a sovereign to en- 
 force any thing but overt obedience, and can never question the 
 motive from which that obedience springs. MoraUty has its 
 sanctions to answer its ends, and Religion has its means to at- 
 tain its purposes ; but neither can have recourse to^state author- 
 ity for the- sake of making men either virtuous or pious. The 
 hand of civil authority is quite too clumsy to meddle with the 
 human conscience, and secure action from the pure love of vir- 
 tue or the holy love of God. The political sovereign, even 
 when he has fortified his authority by the full measure of all the 
 claims of morality and religion, and has thus made himself in 
 the eye of the sage and the saint to stand forth as a righteous 
 moral governor, does not rely upon moral and religious motives 
 to secure political obedience. He is set to guard the public 
 freedom, and constrain the execution of all individual choices 
 in harmony with the -choice of the whole, and for this purpose 
 he promulgates the public will in his preceptive -legislation, 
 and constrains to obedience by the application of legal sanc- 
 tions, and is obliged to be quite satisfied if either by hope or 
 fear he can keep what has been committed to his care un- 
 broken. 
 
 When, therefore, the citizen can vindicate his overt action 
 before the tribunal of his country, and no charge can be sus- 
 tained against him of any violation of public freedom, he may 
 with a bold face stand in the presence of his political sovereign, 
 
THK CITIZEN IN REFERENCE TO THE GOVERNMENT. I43 
 
 though at the very moment he must blush with the conviction 
 of his baseness before his own conscience, or tremble with fear- 
 ful forebodings before God. Civil government must stop at its 
 own standard; it sets out to conserve the pubUc freedom by 
 pains and penalties, and if it has secured the end by its own 
 means, it must ask no more. 
 
 5. The_citizen may righteously expatriate himself. That which- 
 makes any man a component element of a particular state 
 is the fact that, in the providence of God, the rights and inter- 
 ests, which call forth his choices and prompt to their execution, 
 lie commingled in the same community with others ; and the 
 freedom of the whole, in the choices of all demands that each 
 should be restrained for the sake of the whole. If a ship at sea 
 should lose all its officers, or a shipwrecked crew be cast upon a 
 desert island, this little community would then stand in the con- 
 dition of a state. The whole would have the right to restrain 
 and constrain each one for the freedom of all. 
 
 But this narrower relation must be always subject to the 
 broader one. The organic unity which binds the whole race 
 of men together, may as easily require the dissolution of any 
 particular community as its formation. The one universal state, 
 itself unchanged in its requirements or its ends through all the 
 generations, creates and destroys individual states as its own 
 ends determine, and when an individual person finds that the 
 interests of the universal state demand his separation from the 
 particular community where his lot may have been cast, that 
 community should leave him to obey these without restriction. 
 Generally, it will be wiser and safer to leave the determination 
 of this question to the judgment and the conscience of the 
 person himself, though special exigencies may occur where a 
 given state may find it necessary, not only for its own preserva- 
 tion, but for the widest interests of mankind, to keep its citizens 
 within its borders even against their will. But the ethical prin- 
 ciple, to which also the actual practice of modem states tends 
 
144 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 to conform, is soundly expressed in the Act of Congress,' wliich 
 declares that " the act of expatriation is a natural and inherent 
 right of all people." 
 
 If the theory of a state were that of a compact, it might be 
 said the social contract cannot be righteously severed without 
 an assent of both parties ; or, if it were patriarchal, it might be 
 said that one child could not leave the paternal dwelling rightly 
 without parental permission ; or, if it were government by divine 
 right, it might be said by the monarch, " I am the state," and 
 no vassal may leave without orders ; but on the true basis of 
 state existence and legitimate political authority, though the 
 sovereign may bind every conscience to obedience while within 
 the jurisdiction, yet can he bind no conscience to remain there 
 by the right of his authority alone. 
 
 6. The i nerit or demerit of^^A^jcitizen is determined in his 
 rdation to^the sanction of the la'wu- Desert, of legal reward is 
 merit, and desert of leg al penalty is demerit. If the law Is with- 
 out positive reward annexed to the precept, the consequential 
 security and immunities guaranteed in the protection of every 
 good government is a sufiScient reward, and those are implied 
 in the legislation itself, and this is expressed when it is said 
 of an obedient citizen, he deserves well of the state. 
 
 Merit is used with some modification of meaning. A citizen 
 may have come under the condemnation of the law, and subse- 
 quently do that which deserves the favor of the government, 
 and in this point of light he has the tnerit_of jumgf=uify-, — it is 
 fitting thatjie should be rewarded though he cannot make his 
 legaT demand for it. The same also applies when an innocent 
 citizen has done some signal service to the state for which no 
 law has offered a reward. Some heroic deed, some scientific 
 or literary work, some useful invention, may truly merit some 
 reward from the government, but for which the man has no 
 
 1 July 27, 1868. 
 
THE CITIZEN IN REFERENCE TO THE GOVERNMENT. 1 45 
 
 legal claim. On the other hand, when the citizen has complied 
 with some claim of the law in which there is an express stipula- 
 tion, he may then use the law itself and claim of the government 
 his reward ; and in this point of view he has the merit ^of con- 
 dignity. This may also apply to demerit, where the law claims 
 
 the penalty, and we term it condign yiViXa.^\yavzrA. The first 
 case is an instance of what is sometimes termed _an Jmper fect 
 j^i^^_while the last is a case of perfect right. 
 
 A citizen accused of crime, aiid legall}?^ arraigned, is called an 
 cj ccused crimin al, but this is not yet determinative of his guilt. 
 When he has been legally sentenced to punishment, he is called 
 a convict ed crimina l or a convict. When a citizen has be- 
 trayed a pe cuniary political trust, he is termedjf defaulter; and 
 should he be adjudgeSTto^^suffer legal penalty, he too would 
 in that case become a convict. If his tfustTias been some high 
 commission, as foreign ambassador, or officer of the army of 
 navy, and he has there sacrificed the liberties of his country, he 
 is known a^_a_fraitor„ _ A citizen who opposes by violence the 
 direct action of the state sovereignty, whether singly or in com- 
 bination, is ~ ji rebel. Should the rebel put himself upon the 
 ground of origi nal per sonal independence, and admit no gov- 
 ernment as a restraintupon his choices, and thus utterly disre- 
 gard all the rights of puplic freedom, h e becomes an nutlait). ^ 
 In the carrying of his choices out to execution against the 
 rights of all citizens, he is a_ robber ; and viewed as acting 
 against the_jighte_of all_stat gs, he is a f reebooter. When in 
 combination, many thus engage in practices orviolence, they 
 are known as banditti ; and when upon the high seas they 
 assault the flags of all naEio ns, they axe pirates. , 
 
 ~ A rebel may lawfully be restrained or destroyed by any citi- 
 zens of the government against which he rebels ; and all forms 
 of outlawry may be resisted and punished by any portion of 
 the human family, since the outlaw stands against the rights of 
 inankind. 
 
146 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN REFERENCE TO 
 THE CITIZEN. 
 
 Civil government we have seen to be the agency whereby 
 the state, as the organic unity of its citizens, noanifests^ and 
 maintains its will. This will is always righteous, and always 
 authoritative, since it only demands that contribution of each 
 for alIi_and_of all for eac h, whi ch the original reason in man 
 demands ; and for this demand thealF-sufficient reason TsTlhat 
 love, which is self-surre nder, or the leaving of oneself for 
 anoth er, is reason . The sole end of civil government is to 
 annoimcg and enforce this demand of reason ; but as there may 
 be often a difficulty in determiningwhat-iS'this demand, and thus 
 a liability on the part of the government, which at the best is 
 only an imperfect agency for the work committed to its charge, 
 to be mistaken, it is quite desirable for us here to notice how 
 in certain cases the position of the government in reference to 
 the citizen is determined by the application of our general 
 principle. It is true that this whole question is really a broad 
 question of casuistry, and might not improperly be altogether 
 omitted in a higher philosophical analysis. Having attained the 
 universal principle of political ethics, we might leave the par- 
 ticular facts to be brought within the principle, and each one 
 to be expounded according to the good sense and judgment of 
 the student. But this general principle is itself so broad that 
 to many it may seem quite vague, and thus incapable of definite 
 application to many practical cases. Indeed, its application, 
 in some of the higher matters of civil government, gives secon- 
 dary principles still so extensive, as often to be apprehended in 
 the light of fundamental truths of pohtical science. 
 
 For the two-fold purpose of attaining Kome of these more 
 
THE GOVERKMENT IN REFERENCE TO THE CITIZEN. 1 4/ 
 
 important political tnitljs, in tl^e central light of all political 
 morality, viz. : the organic ujii ty of all men _as_ ig f rT'l^p-'^-"f the 
 universal state, and their prgan ig unity, also as citizens of a par- 
 ti culajsta.i ;e, and of accustoming the mind tolnake the applica- 
 tion of this great ultimate principle to all cases, we shall extend 
 this Chapter over much more aground than has been done here- 
 tofore ; and shall give, in distinct Sections within it, an investi- 
 gation of the more prominent duties of the government, as 
 specimens for determining all its legitimate functions. 
 
 The preliminary remark, comprehensive of these, and of all 
 governmental regulations, is — that the government can he satisr 
 fied with nothing; but obedience to its Imm , An offence against 
 law, anywhere occurring, is a wound to the organism, and this 
 the state everywhere deprecates. The punishment of this offence 
 is not a;t all what the state wishes, rather than obedience and no 
 punishment ; but the punishment is to vindicate sovereignty 
 that it may still subserve the organic unity. The threatening, 
 and when the legal threat has failed, the executing, of the pen- 
 alty, have but one end, — th e securing th e leas t infraction of thp_ 
 public good possibl e to be attained by authority. Not punish- 
 isnmg oecause crime has been committed, as if that could satisfy 
 and was an equivalent forthe obedirace demanded, but punish- 
 ing that the _sovereignty ma^_ba.J3. aintained. and that wrong 
 may cea se, and the obedience of the citizen leave the public free- 
 dom henceforth uninvaded. The breach already made by crime 
 is as irremediable as the fact is unalterable ; a calamity which the 
 government can never redress, that it should not lament its oc- 
 currence. What the sovereign wishes is perpetual and univer- 
 sal obediencejgjiiajaw ; for in this way only can the" end for 
 which the civil authority has any right to act be attained. 
 
 In following out the consideration of the position of the gov- 
 ernment in reference to the citizen, by Sections, we will take up 
 the topics in the order of their more intimate connection with 
 the sustaining of the state authority, and then pass onward tg 
 
148 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 such as have a more direct and important bearing upon the in- 
 terests of the community. 
 
 Section I. Judicial Oaths. The Scriptures condemn all 
 swearing in our ordinary communications. " Again, ye have 
 heard that it hath been said by them of old time, thou shalt not 
 forswear thyself, but shalt perform to the Lord thy oaths. But I 
 say to you, swear not at all : neither by heaven ; for it is God's 
 throne : nor by the earth ; for it is his. footstool : neither by 
 Jerusalem ; for it is the city of the great King. Neither shalt 
 thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair 
 white or black. But let your commnications be yea, yea ; nay, 
 nay : for whatever is more than these cometh of evil." Matth. v. 
 33 to 37. " But above all things, my brethren, swear not ; neither 
 by heaven, neither by the earth, neither by any other oath ; but 
 let your yea be yea ; and your nay, nay ; lest ye fall into con- 
 demnation." James, v. 12. That these prohibitions extend only 
 to the practice of using oaths in communications between man 
 and man, is manifest from the context, the Jewish practice, and 
 especially the facts hereafter given. 
 
 The examples of good men and of God himself sanction sol- 
 emn oaths on serious and important occasions. In the case of 
 Paul : " For God is my witness, whom I serve with my spirit," 
 etc. Rom. i. 9. " Moreover, I call God for a witness upon my 
 soul, that to spare you I have not as yet come to Corinth." 
 2 CoE. i. 23. " For neither at any time used we flattering words, as 
 ye know, nor a cloak of covetousness ; God is witness." i Thess. 
 ii. 5. In the case of God : " I have sworn by myself, the word 
 is gone out of my mouth in righteousness, and shall not return," 
 etc. isA. xiv. 23. " For I have sworn by myselif, saith the Lord, 
 that Bozrah shall become a desolation," etc. Jee. xUx. 13. " The 
 Lord God hath sworn by himself, saith the Lord God of 
 Hosts ; I abhor the excellence of Jacob, and hate his pal- 
 aces," etc. Amos, vi. 8. 
 
 The Judicial oath is fully sanctioned* By the Jewish law ; 
 
THE GOVERNMENT IN REFERENCE TO THE CITIZEN. 1 49 
 
 "Then shall an oath of the Lord be between them both, 
 that he hath not put his hands to his neighbor's goods," etc. 
 Ex. xxii. II. " Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and serve him, 
 and shalt swear by his name." Deut. vi. 13. " Thou shalt fear 
 the Lord thy God, him shalt thou serve, and to him thou shalt 
 cleave, and swear by his name." Deut. x. 20. The Saviour's ex- 
 ample : " And the High Priest answered and said unto him, I 
 adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us whether thou art 
 the Christ, the son of God. Jesus said unto him, thou hast 
 said." Matth. xxvi. 63. Apostolic admission and divine example : 
 " For when God made promise to Abraham because he could 
 swear by no greater, he swore by himself," etc. " Wherein God, 
 willing more abundantly to show to the heirs of promise the im- 
 mutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath," etc. Heb. 
 vi. 13 to 17. " For those priests were made without an oath ; but 
 this with an oath, by him that said to him, the Lord swore and 
 will not repent," etc. Heb. vU. 20, 21. 
 
 The dictate of purej norality is precisely of the like purport. 
 It would be an indignity to humanity and a debasement of the 
 spirit, that ordinary conversation and daily communications of 
 man with man, by speech or writing, should be interlarded with 
 oaths. A man's character for veracity is more secure in public 
 estimation when his categorical declaration is all that he uses. 
 T he dignity of truth, m diaarilv. needs only the simple yea or 
 nay. But on the other hand, in extraordinary and solemn occa- 
 sions, where more is depending on the declaration, and special 
 confidence in it is demanded, there is no indignity to man in a 
 solemn and religious appeal to God for the truth of the declara- 
 tion given. It is to the honor of the human spirit that it 
 acknowledge its depen3ence ana~res'grasibility_ .before the Su- 
 preme Being, oir"all~pKjperj3;cCaSions, and such is precisely the 
 nature of an oath. If the occasion on which the oath is taken 
 be~proper for such acknowledgement, religion and morality can 
 have nothing to object to it, but would be both promoted by it. 
 
ISO MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 We have here no inquiry except in reference to the judicial 
 oath. And we remark in reference to it : 
 
 1. T he state needs its use. As the generations of men are or 
 have been, or as it is probable that the mass of mankind long 
 will be, it will be found impracticable to sustain civil govern- 
 ment without bringing in the religious considerations of depend- 
 ence upon God and, responsibility to him. The discarding of 
 all future retributions leads directl y to anarchy. But the defence 
 of judicial oaths does not need that we insist upon their necessity 
 for civil governments ; if by them the ends of government may 
 be better p romoted, this- is sufficient. 
 
 In many cases, from necessity, the ey e and the ha ad-Pf civil 
 sovereignty are ineffectual to detect and arrest. An appeal to 
 an Omniscient eye and an Omnipotent hand, in a way consist- 
 ent with the faith of the state and the citizen swearing, is an 
 immense a ugmentation of security for truth_and confidence in 
 the declaration; and by just such augmentation is the public 
 freedom the more secure. All that can so be gained to the use 
 of the state is needful for it, and what it uses directly to the 
 legitimate end of government, it rightly uses. Neither public 
 morality nor religion is in any way desecrated by this, but both 
 are sustained and promoted. They are used by the state to 
 purposes which both morality and religion approve. To deny 
 the right to employ oaths, and discard theirjjser-would fatally 
 weaken alh-jurisprudence. 
 
 2. Thg ^iaie^ J he adm inistrator of the nafh In whatever 
 way the oath may be lawful between man and man on private 
 or particular occasions, or in what way ecclesiastical judicatories 
 may resort to the oath for confirmation, is not here inquired. 
 In all cases where th e end is the conservation "f tVip p Tjlviu-__ 
 freedom, the state only is the rightfulguardiarr; aTid~the civil 
 
 _ agtHon ty alone should admiiiistefTHe^oath. As the state im- 
 posesthe oath/solhe person swearing must take the interpre- 
 tation from the state authority. The oath is binding secundum 
 
THE GOVERNMENT IN REFERENCE TO THE CITIZEN. I^I 
 
 animum imponentis. No other can determine for what or when 
 it is needed ; and as it is used in the interest of its own ends, 
 the state must decide in what way it is to be intergreted, to 
 subserveJts-owa-pTttposes. 
 
 But while the state imposes, and this makes it necessary 
 that the state should through its government be the interpreter 
 of the oaths it administers, and may insist that the citizen 
 swearing shall be held to its own meaning, yet is the govern- 
 ment bound to make jts .oath s, as well as its laws, plain t o the 
 ca pacity of_ those on whom they are imposed. If an old form 
 of the oath have an antiquated and obscure phraseology, and 
 one that involved a meaning in its original enactment which 
 could not in modem use be applied, yet inasmuch as the state 
 is a permanent agent, and exists the same while successive 
 legislatures come and go, its interpretation by declaratory acts, 
 or decisions of courts, or the explanation of the judge, is to be 
 that which the person swearing is to apprehend and bind him- 
 self to sustain. The ethical rule is, that the state, as imposing, 
 shall give meaning to its oath, and see that this meaning is 
 made plain to the one swearing, and that he feel bound to get 
 and conform to the state meaning. 
 
 3 . The oath may im ply a prayer for Di vine he lp, or an im- 
 fir/'ratinfi of Dmfnj' iti>ii!rpnnri> The usual phrase, "So help 
 you God," ita te Deus adjuvet, may imply conscious assump- 
 tion of 'increased responsibility and conscious frailty under 
 temptations and perverting influences, and thus an appeal to 
 God to add his help to sustain the enchanced responsibiKty ; 
 as, "maj^_Qd.-SO strengthen me, as in my sincerity I throw 
 myself upon his grace." Or, it may imply, as is more com- 
 mofl^ understood, the imprecation of Divine desertion if the 
 man prove false ; "so God help me only as I speak the truth." 
 
 In either case it is a solemn appeal to Omniscience and 
 Omnipotence specially to regard the entire agency of the man 
 ^ *Ws transaction, and bringing the whole directly before God. 
 
152 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 It excludes all levity and carelessness ; it precludes all fear 01 
 favor from man ; it renounces all pleas of interest or expedien- 
 cy ; and disclaims all palliations or excuses for falsehood. It 
 secures watchfdness, careful recoUec^Qji, definite statement, 
 and considerate expression. 
 
 4. Oaths are mainly of two kind s, — tes timony o r engagement 
 Oat hs ot testimon y i nvolve careful r ec ollection and a ssertion. 
 The assumed obligation is the whole truth, no more and no 
 less. To go beyond, and add that which exaggerates or miti- 
 gates, or in any way falsely colors ; to suppress and thus give a 
 garbled statement of an incomplete representation ; each alike 
 subjects to the crime of perjury. 
 
 Oaths of e ngagement bind to fidelity in the fulfilment of offi- 
 cial Junctions and committed trusts ; and involve a'^arefuT 
 apprehension of the ^iy irnposed, and a scrupulous fulfilment. 
 Sometimes a trust may have been of long standing, and passed 
 through generations of trustees, as in the case of incorporations ; 
 in which case the oath binds according to the intention of the 
 instrument. If changes have occurred making such execution 
 impossible, the permanent state, which is the regulator and 
 imposer of all oaths, must determine the manner in which the 
 trust shall be executed ; and this should be as nearly as it can 
 be judged the founder would have wished, in the changed cir- 
 cumstances. 
 
 5. The state ma y find two o bs tacles in impa sdu^-aatk*. Some 
 minds may question the lawfulness of oaths on moral or religious 
 grounds, and thus plead the right of conscience against the gov- 
 ernment of the state. This brings up the question already suf- 
 ficiently settled, viz. : that each must have the right of interpre- 
 tation and decision, and while the state decides to pursue its 
 own course, the citizen can only decline violating his con- 
 science, and leaving the case to the tribunals of his country, 
 and taking the penal consequences if they must come. 
 
 But ordinarily a real question of conscience wiU have in it 
 
THE GOVERNMENT IN REFERENCE TO THE CITIZEN. 1 53 
 
 SO much of humility, forbearance, and d iscr etion on on e side, 
 that it will call f orth respect and regard on th e other ; and some 
 compromise will be effected , by which both private con science 
 and public freed om will be subserved. In this case, the scru- 
 ples of the Quaker and Moravian, against taking judicial oaths, 
 are met by the expedient of a solemn affirmation, under the like 
 civil pains and penalties as an oath. The same safeguard to 
 liberty is thereby attained, for the meaning of a sole mn affirma^ 
 ti on, to a serious mind, brings up t he samej efere nce to etera aL 
 retributioiis, and induces the sa me careful recollection and 
 g uarded stat ement, and the civil magistrate visits a violatioa 
 with the same penalties. ,— — 
 
 At other times the state authority may meet at its tribunals, 
 citizens who believe in no future retributions, and acknowledge 
 the exist ence of n o Qso S.. If the belief of God and futurity be 
 other than the Christian, a Christian state can administer the 
 oath according to the_ faith--,ofLthe_jd.tness, and bring his con- 
 science under this arg umentedj obligaticmjo veracity, and then 
 leaye his testimony trij-prpiyp pr'^'^'^'i -prop ortioned to the eleva= , 
 tio n of the religious creed and the purity of its sanction s. An 
 oath on the Koran or the eastern Shasters, should not give 
 equal validity to the testimony as an oath on the Gospels, 
 though each may be made snbjer±-tQ- the same civil penalties 
 for perjury. But when there is no faith in the being of a per- 
 sonal Deity, or if a God be acknowledged there is still no belief 
 in any future retributions, the case is quite different. An oath 
 can to such be of no possible significancy, as a sanction to tes- 
 timony. There is either no God to swear by, or no regard to 
 the oath by God, if the being of a God be admitted. In all 
 such cases the administration of an oath would be wholly im- 
 pertinent. 
 
 There may be various opinions about the right course for the 
 state in its use of such citizens, either for testimony or trust, 
 but the principle is itself plain, viz. ; credit, in proportion to the 
 
154 Mere legality. 
 
 sanctions upon conscieace. The civil pains and penalties may- 
 be alike in each, but this cannot give equal validity to testimony. 
 In the nature of the case, the believer in future rewards and 
 punishments, distributed by a personal God, must feel claims to 
 veracity and iidelity which cannot be made to reach the con- 
 science of an atheist, or any rejector of future punishment for 
 sins committed in this life. Yet just in p roportion to the proper 
 validityjof_hisJestimony, may that of an atheist b^ desir able and 
 demanded by the state. The full fact of his. religious belief is a 
 fair matter of inquiry by the state, and his affinnatiQn,_witJiout 
 any oath,~is~to be estimated by the g-eater or less rest raint 
 which his religious faith would throw upon his conscience. _. Jf 
 all religion be discarded, his availability for any political use in 
 pthe state will be small indeed. Public confidence cannot be 
 very strong in the protestations of any man who has not the 
 guard of religious sanctions against the bias of selfish interests. 
 The freedom of the public can have only feeble guarantees in a 
 nation of infidels, and to the extent of the individual's destitu- 
 tution of religious obligation, must the state necessarily distrust 
 his testimony. 
 
 6. Oaths should be imposed only upon important oc casians.. 
 The oath is of no benefit to the state, exc ept as it q nirl^png.th'^ 
 conscieflee_and_thus strengthens the sense of mOT al obligat ion. 
 A nd it is an e vidence of the public sentiment in its favo r, that it 
 c omes to be used so frequently in cases ot testimony_and protn-_ 
 issory engage ments. The strong need of religious sanctions to 
 veracity and fidelity is universally felt, and the tendency is to in- 
 troduce them on every occasion. This too frequent imposition 
 of oaths tends directly to the destruction of the end proposed 
 by them. Instead of incteasing general religious obligation, 
 the oath becomes common and familiar, and really loses its 
 hold upon the conscience. Applied to unimportant and even 
 trivial cases, it becomes a mere civil formality, and awakens but 
 little serious reflection and caution in the r>ersoii who ha? re- 
 
THE GOVERNMENT IN llEFERENCE TO THE CITIZEN. 1 55 
 
 ceived it. Such effects are not to be chargeable to the impos- 
 ing of oaths by the state, as if necessary to the fact, but are the 
 consequences only of an improper administration of oaths. 
 
 The principle of using an oath only where its religious sol- 
 emnity will quicken the conscience in its sense of obligation,, is 
 the only one that can be given, and this must direct in the par- 
 ticular cases according to the soundest judgment. The state 
 destroys its own means of securing its ultimate ends, if it uses 
 the oath so frequently and so lightly as to weaken its religious 
 obligation upon the public conscience. •/- 
 
 Section II. Property. Some articles of property may be 
 transferred from place to place, used and consumed, and which 
 may thus be considered as merely appendages to the person, as 
 his dress or his instruments of labor, and these are known as 
 move able or personaL propertv. 
 
 Again there are other kinds of property which are immoveable 
 and cannot be made mere personal appendages, and which 
 from their permanency are property by special eminence, and 
 such property is tprmpH redj. estate. This is land and that which 
 is permanently attached thereto, as buildings and improvements. 
 
 One kind of prr^pprt^rjriay Vie pvrVipng^^r! ^"^ another, and 
 thisinducesjome standard_of_value, which may be a fair repre- 
 se ntative of the personal labor that the particular commodity 
 has cost. T his standar3 is m oney, and has its own value from 
 the amount of labor or difficulty with which it is , attained, and 
 is selected from other things for such use from its scarcity, im- 
 perishability, and easy divisibihty. Usually gold and silver are 
 taken for this purpose, which are hence called the precious 
 metals, while for small values, copper and nickel are used. 
 The coining affixes an authoritative- stamp, by which is certified 
 both the purity and gravity of the particular piece ; and in this 
 way different coins are made subservient to all the transfers of 
 property in buying and selling. By the use of money there is 
 effected in one ' transfer, with the greatest convenience, all the 
 
156 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 exchanges of the most complicated trade in barter. The 
 money, as bullion and as coinage, has an intrinsic value, and 
 this is always inversely as the quantity which is thrown into 
 circulation. 
 
 The^ight_to property lies in a man's right to the products 
 of his own labor. What a man produces is ethically1fl57 and 
 thus whatever he may make by his own powers is his property 
 by a natural right. To the doer belongs his deed. Irrespec- 
 tive of all civil legislation, a man might thus attain the natural 
 right to personal property, and so far as he could mingle his 
 own products with the soil, he would, by cultivating the earth 
 and building upon it, attain a natural right to real estate. A 
 community of such persons, as a state, would ethically be re- 
 quired in the civil legislation to regard such rights of property 
 as truly as all other personal rights, but its legislation should 
 accord with the following principles : 
 
 1. TTie state must have the so vereign control of all property. 
 It can never be right for a person to find profit in a labor which 
 inures to thejiar-ra of another. Neither, in the long run, can 
 this be possible. The organic unity which binds men in a 
 fellowship of reciprocal interdependence, does not permit the 
 welfare of any one to be gained except through the welfare of 
 every one. If one member of an organism suffers, all the mem- 
 bers suffer with it, or if any member be honored, all the members 
 rejoice together. Thus the natural right by which a man holds 
 his property as the product of his own labor is never absolute. 
 No rights of property can become ina lienable, like the right to 
 religion, reputation, conscience, etc., and tHus all rights of 
 property come under state control. The state alone must de- 
 termine in each case what the property of each citizen should 
 be. All right to property is thus in a social community resolved 
 into a state right. No man can call any property his own, 
 except as he holds it under the law of the country where it is. 
 
 2. The state must in all cases he considereji_as the supreme 
 
THE GOVERNMENT IN REFERENCE TO THE CITIZEN. 1 57 
 
 proprietor of the soil of the nation. Since the subsistence of 
 man is,^from the soil, the very existence of the community 
 might be imperilled, if the supreme ownership of the soil were 
 vested elsewhe re than in th e community itself. The territory 
 of a stateTnust therefore belong lifst~of~aIl''To the state itself. 
 This accords also with the historical fact.' The original owner- 
 ship of the soil was held by the community and not by the indi- 
 vidual rnembers thereof. These have derived their titles to 
 their lands only from the state, and each citizen as proprietor 
 still holds his land only under the supreme title of the state. 
 
 3. Thy; itnfi' m^ifst f olate all t ransfers and descent of prop- 
 erty. _ As it is not right for any man to hold property for fiis ' 
 own ends irres pective of the ends of others, as any man's 
 right to his property is subordinateTJTthrtight of all men to be 
 ser ved there by, — a man's property being bound by the law" of 
 the organism as truly as the man himself, — so all contracts, 
 bargains, bequests, deeds of sale and trust deeds, and all devises, 
 wills, and descent of intestate property, must be subject to the 
 control of state authority. There is no way of making property 
 contribute to the welfare of the community as truly as to the 
 wealth of the individual who holds it, unless the state has the 
 right to determine, between the holder and his contemporaries, 
 what power of transfer he shall have ; and also between the 
 holder and coming generations, what control his acts shall have 
 upon the world that shall be after him. Inasmuch as no one 
 generation can foresee what will be the need of all coming gen- 
 erations, so no one generation can have the right to control all 
 property for all coming generations, and no one man can have 
 the right to say what shall be the perpetual descent, manage- 
 ment, and use of his own estate. The state lives on in posterity, 
 and that must determine how far the living generation may 
 throw its choices down upon others. For the one great end of 
 all its generations, must the permanent state sovereignty regu- 
 late and settle all transfers and descent of property, and bind 
 righteously all the consciences of its citizens accordingly. 
 
158 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 4. The state must a lso re gulate the right of property wh ich 
 th e man ma y have in his own published thoughts. If any thing" 
 by natural right is a'man's own property, such must the product 
 of his own thinking be. But the man not only has a right 
 in the product of his own intellect, the public have also their 
 right in it. Every man is bound in the community to which 
 he belongs, and the state authority exists and acts legitimately 
 only for this very thing, to see that no man shall live for his own 
 ends, but as a means for the ends of all. The product of his 
 mind is not therefore all his own. 
 
 The truth he has discovered, the facts he has observed, or the 
 forces in nature which he has combined for new ends, were not 
 created by him, but were in being before his inventio n. He 
 ibund4hem^_and_had-h€-overio©ked'them they might have been 
 found by some, other student. The right of discovery is thus 
 ethically ajinnitedjighynj:he nature Unless other 
 
 reasons intervene, it woul d not be just that the discoverer an d 
 his heirs should h ave the endless monopoly of the things in- 
 vented. "The public has its rights in themfrom their original 
 and independent bein|;, separate from the consideration ^Twho 
 first discovered them. In the case, also, of such products as 
 axe the direct creations of genius, and which could have been 
 brought out by none but their author, the principle also still 
 applies to this as to all property, that nothing is so much a 
 man's own that it must not be held by the state subservient to 
 its own ends. T he, civilization of hu manity is higher than any 
 individual,. secular:,_or_ pecuniary interest, and the state must 
 liave the right to determine and use all means that may sub- 
 serve the ends for which its authority is holden. 
 
 But the government should always be careful to recognize 
 that the rights_of_the_state and the rights_of its individual citi- 
 zens can never be in conflict, and that the goo3~of all requires 
 a certain use and ownership of his products by him who has 
 produced them. The author and the inventor, like every 
 
THE GOVERNMENT IN REFERENCE TO THE CITIZEN. 159 
 
 laborer, has his rights which the state requires its government 
 to maintain. No person may appropriate the products of 
 another's thinking and observing to his pecuniary profit, nor 
 may the government come in and control them or give them 
 over to the pubKc, without full acknowledgement of the author's 
 right, and • compensation for it. While the state controls all 
 property and possessions, it could not interfere with any pos- 
 session, and alienate it to the pubKc use without a full equiva- 
 lent, since this would be to make one part of its organic body a 
 means without being at the same time the end of all the rest. 
 
 On such grounds the state for the public's sake may rightly 
 say just how far the author's copy-right or the inventor's patent- 
 right shall last, and then the public shall own what once was his. 
 Yet is there a strong tendency towards too little discrimination, 
 and too summary and arbitrary action in all regulations of copy- 
 right and patents. The interest of the public in appropriating 
 all new inventions and discoveries for its benefit, and the ready 
 combination of the many against the few, make it incumbent 
 Upon the government to guard with special care the interests 
 and rights of the discoverer. CiviKzation cannot avail itself of 
 new truths and inventions until they are attained and brought 
 out, and it is the duty of the government to strongly encourage 
 all scientific and artistic thinking. It will as effectually retard 
 social progress to discourage thought and invention, as to give 
 to inventors a monopoly of their products against the public. 
 The laws must regulate all property, but they must be scrupu- 
 lously exact between private and public rights, and while the 
 principles are plain between the author of new discoveries and 
 the people, the facts are often very partially and with great diffi- 
 culty subjected to them. 
 
 5. The government may never on its own account__use qny_ 
 i) roperty "•; n. m.(tnnpn/.y. THe~government can have no ends of 
 it"inwn yflfiiTf' in rlistinrtina_ Jrom the we lfare of itssubjectsr-- 
 It only exists for the sake of its subjects, ancj c^n therefore^ 
 
l6o MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 never come in as_a distinct corporation , and for itself on its own 
 account engage in business, and make exchanges of property, 
 with other corporations and individuals. Whenever, in order 
 to furnish itself with the means for its maintenance and enforce- 
 ment, the government is obliged to come into the market, and 
 buy and sell in competition with its own citizens, it is ever to 
 restrain itself by the principle of its own right to exist, viz. : the 
 ^owning no thing, and tr ansa cting n o business, except as the di- 
 rect_ageiit _of.ik§_S-tai§. .in-SJibserving the organic unity" of its 
 
 citizens. -^__ 
 
 Nothing can be more odious than that the strong arm of the 
 government should be thrusting itself into the movemeiits of ex- 
 change_andmercantile businfiss7~moho'poTizing by its wiSer 
 grasp the production or sale of merchantable commodities, and 
 rejoicing as a separate self in the gains it is making from its own 
 citizens. If the government have soldiers, or prisoners of war, or 
 criminals imprisoiled, whom it would employ in some branches 
 of productive labor for their own support, this should always be 
 regulated by the principle so to employ them that the whole 
 commonwealth may be benefited, and not that the government 
 as an independent corporation may be making money of its 
 own particular subjects. If the government have public lands 
 which it must bring into the market, it must regulate the sale, 
 not by the profits it can make out of the people as a monopoly, 
 but by such a disposition of them as shall best subserve the 
 organic unity of the people. The government has no right to 
 do any thing but with its single eye to this. 
 
 Section III. Taxes and Imposts. We have already noticed 
 that the individual ' per son hasTTCTlnalienable rig ht except that 
 to his own righteousness"] His labor[_his propertyjjiis liberty, 
 his life, are not_inalienably his. He may forfeit them by his 
 own act, or the state inay require them for its own needs, in 
 which case the individual yields them justly to the state. The 
 State may demand everything that belongs to a man, except 
 
THE GOVERNMENT IN REFERENCE TO THE CITIZEN. l6l 
 
 his manhood and his moral integrity, which he has no right ever 
 to surrender. 
 
 The truth of this is r eveal edjnjhe true theory of the state. 
 As the orga nic unity of it s citizens, the state requires from each 
 whatever each can render towards the well-being of all. But in 
 this welFBemg of all isj he only true good of each, and the 
 actual requirement which the_state makes is therefore not a 
 burd en but a "blessing . AH the enjoyment which a man "can 
 receive from his property comes from his jcannectiQn. with -so- 
 ciety. Cut off from all sociaPrelations, a man's wealth would 
 be worthless to him . In fact there could be no such thing as 
 wealth without society. Wealth is what may be exchanged, and 
 requires- for its very existence a community of persons with 
 reciprocal wants. Gold- and silver to any amount is not wealth 
 till it is put into the hands of some member of society, and 
 becomes a means wherewith he can serve others, and receive 
 some service from them in return. But not only are the enjoy- 
 ment and even the existence of wealth wholly a social creation ; 
 not only would they cease entirely if men were only individuals, 
 living each one alone or apart from others ; but in like manner 
 all social^prggi:ess_gives an increasing value to wealth, and a 
 man's possessions grow in worth as he grows in the intimacy 
 and perhaps also in the intricacy of his relations to his kind. It 
 is wise and right, therefore, for society to exact its due propor- 
 tion of these its products. Such exaction is taxation, respecting 
 which t he following princ iples appear : 
 
 I . Taxai iim should be reMtive lv proportione d to the ability of 
 th ose on whom it is laid. As the demands or~the state are 
 made only upon persons, taxation is, strictly speaking, laid upon 
 pei§ons_and nqt_u£on_prQperlat ; but it is generally laid upon per- 
 sons in pro portion to their pro perty, because their property may 
 generally ^be~supposed to measure their ability to render this 
 particular service which the state requires. This is not always 
 the case, for we have capitation or poll-taxes levied irrespective 
 
1 62 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 of property, or we have taxe s levied upon a per son in v iew of 
 his occupation or profession. But the occupation or protessioiT 
 is rated according to the ability which it_giyesjhe person to pay 
 the tax, and the poll-tax — which' is usually small — is puFupoh 
 the ground that every person lias some ability to give labor or 
 its equivalent products to the state. The easiest, simplest, and, 
 on the whole, the most equitable taxation is that which is pro- 
 portioned to the person's income on whom it is laid. 
 
 2. Taxatio n sh ould onlybeleined under due process of law. 
 The person taxed is ai^end as well as a Ineans m the organic 
 unity which embraces him, and the taxation laid Tiyorrtiim is as 
 much to be measured by what is due to him as by what the 
 whole body requires. Such a measurement is not easy. It re- 
 quires the greatest wisdom to adjust and apportion taxes so that 
 each and all shall be duly benefited thereby. Human s elfish- 
 ness in.ajnatLer of this sort is peculiarly liable to resist5ie~3e^ 
 mands_QjLthe organic unity, and human short-sightedness is just 
 as liable to fail In seeing' what these demanSTare. ' A govern- 
 ment therefore needs to procee3">itkJi3fi.greatest caution here. 
 It should avoid, of course, in this as in all matters, whatever is 
 
 ^^fitfiil--or-mbitr^j^_an(LJts-'Eirtife- procedure in the assessment 
 and collection of its taxes should be clear and open to every 
 ins2ection_o£jhe_persoa. taxed. He should not be liable to 
 any sudden -surprises ; he should not be singled out with any 
 dispropiJitionate- requirement ; he shouia~farow^usMvhat4s ex- 
 pected of him, and when, and why j and all this requires that 
 the whole method of taxation should not only be carefully 
 considered by the government, but should proceed upon defi- 
 nitely-stated laws. A person's ability to pay taxes is in part 
 proportioned to the clearness and precision with which the laws 
 respecting taxation are stated and followed. 
 
 3. The gove rnment can rightfully have no interest of^s— ama- 
 in taxation contrary io~ihe inierests~oJ its lubjecis. Civil gov- 
 ernment is not for its own sake, butTorTIie''saIce~of its su bjects. 
 
THE GOVERNMENT IN REFERENCE TO THE CITIZEN. 163 
 
 Its taxation is not to benefit itself, but to give it the means of 
 benefiting them. Taxation to enrich the government, or to 
 aggrandize any one person or class at the expense of another, 
 is unrighteous exaction and tyranny. 
 
 ■ Sectiow IV. — R e pivi.c)ilatio,'L.: r-'Y\\t government may make 
 no arbit rary requiremen ts ; it should have no wiU of its own, 
 but~sEouIdexpress qnjy.the^ univorsaljvill of the state. But this 
 univefsaT wiTl not only holds in its mandate every person be- 
 longing to the state, it also finds itself represented in every such 
 person ; he is a person only as in him is seen the light and 
 heard the voice of this universal will ; he is a free person only 
 as he obeys this will, and he is a citizen only as he is first a per- 
 son to whom this will assigns his place with other persons in the 
 organic unity of the state. The gov ernment is t hus as properly 
 the repr esentative of it s subjects as it is the representative 'of liie 
 state which is mirrored in" them, and should therefore readily 
 yield to them as their privilege, what they also might properly 
 claim as their right to have some direction by their own suf- 
 frages in its administration. Suffrage is in one sense a privilege 
 which the government confers, but it is as truly a right which a 
 free citizen might claim. ^^ 
 
 Section V. Religion. There has never been a nation with- 
 out some sort of religion, nor a civil government which religious 
 influences have not to a greater or less degree moulded. If 
 among any human family or tribe some observers have failed to 
 detect any religious faith, this has only been among the wildest 
 and rudest of the race, who are as destitute of nationality or 
 any thing like an organized government as of religion. As an 
 historical fact, nations and governments and religions have 
 "everywhere a connection, not only most intimate, but which 
 has thus far shown itself indissoluble. 
 
 If we look more closely into this historical fact, we find that 
 the conte gffiBg-e jgigent in their connection has ever been the 
 religious one. Nations and governments have not formed their 
 
164 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 religion, bu t their relipion has formed them. It is only by 
 their religion that they are ever brought into the relations of a 
 national hfe. If we should suppose that such relations could 
 originate in men's love of ease, or fear of danger, or instinct of 
 self-preservation, such a supposition ceases when we remember 
 that these sentiments are just as strong among savages where 
 there is no nationality as among the best governed nations. 
 Neither is the lust of conquest, nor the love of gain, nor inter- 
 est in art or letters or social refinement ever the source of na- 
 tional life, for all these pre-suppose the nation already started, 
 and are only found after its origin has been through some othei 
 means secured. Common descent will not make a nation of 
 savages, neither will any common interest create or preserve a 
 government. A nation finds its unifying bond, and a govern- 
 ment its vivifying power, only in religion. Religion is not the 
 flower, nor the fruit, but it is the living seed and root of all na- 
 tional and political growth. Any prominent changes in the his- 
 tory of any people or government are always found, when closely 
 scanned, to originate in prior changes of religion. 
 
 Nor is this historical fact without a clearly obvious reason. 
 The principle of_authgrity_which governments express has 
 n either sta .bility nor power save as it expresses and rests upon 
 an ultimate Divine aufhority. The finite will can only find its 
 regulative sovereignty in the Absolute Will, and people are rest- 
 less, and civil governments groundless, unless held by what, in 
 the last issue, is regarded as a Divine command. God's abso- 
 lute sovereignty is recognized by the human reason, and rever- 
 enced by the human will, even where the understandings and 
 actions of men theoretically deny or practically discard it. 
 
 It is not only true, therefore, that civil governments always 
 have had, they also always must have, some connection with 
 religion. To attempt to separate these two would be as un- 
 reasonable, as to succeed in such an attempt would be impossi- 
 ble. We only need to note the fact of this connection, and 
 
THE GOVERNMENT IN REFERENCE TO THE CITIZEN. 1 65 
 
 then inquire into the attitude which political morality requires a 
 civU government to take towards its religion. 
 
 1. Civil government should use re ligion as a means and not 
 as an end. To the individual religigiiJs_aii_end. He may not 
 use It as a means to any thing farther than itself, for there is 
 nothing farther which he can attain, or which he can even wish 
 to attain. Re ligion is a union with God ; and when this is found 
 there is perfect joy and perfect life, beyond which there can be 
 nothing better to be sought or gained. But this would have no 
 significance for civil government. Civil government uses relig- 
 ion as a means to the farther end which the government itself 
 is designed to subserve. The government is the mouthpiece 
 of the state. It exists solely to express the organic unity of its 
 subjects. All its machinery, its laws, its functionaries, as well 
 as its own existence, have no other justification or end than as 
 means to educate and perfect the citizens of a state into the 
 knowledge and enjoyment of their organic unity. A govern- 
 ment makes use of its religion for just this purpose. A people 
 wholly irreligious could not be governed, and a government 
 therefore seeks to extend the influences of its religion not at all 
 for the sake of the religion, but only that it may thereby be 
 aided in the better government of its people. Religion itself 
 is not an end of civil government, but only a means whereby 
 the government finds itself able to go forward and fulfil its 
 mission. 
 
 2. Civil G overnment shou ld leave the largest liberty to the_ 
 individual conscience in rel igion. The religion of no one of 
 its citizens can be indifferent to the state. Holding its citizens 
 as it does in the unity of an organism, the religion which will 
 most favor such a unity is of course the most favorable to the 
 state. The wisest government, therefore, will most clearly see 
 and most confidently rest upon the religion which most suc- 
 cessfully actualizes the conception of a brotherhood among 
 men, and will desire that all its subjects shall be actuated 
 
l66 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 thereby. But a wise government also sees that no outside 
 appKance like its own can ever secure the adoption of any 
 religion by a single individual. Religion has no meaning to 
 the individual, it becomes to him something quite other than 
 religion, unless he adopts it as an end; b ut an end can be 
 adopted bynojerson nor powerjor another. It must be self- 
 a3opted,Tfadopted at all ; and while a government may wisely 
 make provision for instructing its people in the religion which it 
 can best use as a means, it will also wisely leave them free to 
 choose the religion which commends itself best to them as an 
 end. Constraint of such a choice would be impossible and 
 absurd, and a wise government will not attempt it. 
 
 This does not of course imply that civil government should 
 tolerate any and every religious practice. Religious practices 
 may be as hostile as any other to the organic unity, and if a 
 man's rehgion leads him to a conduct subversive of the public 
 good, this conduct is not to be tolerated because we leave his 
 conscience free. 
 
 Section VI. Education . It is agreed on all hands that the 
 intelligence of its citizens is a matter of prime importance to 
 every state. Civil government, therefore, will have much to do 
 in reference to the education of its subjects. 
 
 I. It should establish and regulate a general system of educa- 
 _tion.. Strictly speaking there cilh be no such thing as a self- 
 education. No person ever makes any improvement in wisdom 
 or knowledge without some help from another. It marks the 
 truly organic connection and interdependence in human life 
 that neither the birth nor the growth of the mind is any more 
 possible than is that of the body through its own agency alone. 
 And this which is true of every individual of a community is 
 just as true of the community as a whole. No community ever 
 educates itself without outside aid. History gives us no in- 
 stance of an unenlightened people rising by its own. spon- 
 I taneous and self-directed efforts to an enlightened life. The 
 
THE GOVERNMENT IN REFERENCE TO THE CITIZEN. 167 
 
 efforts are always first kindled and then directed by some agency 
 from without. All upward impulses com e first from above. 
 
 Moreover it is a fact, however striking or strange, that neither 
 a person nor a people having begun a course of education, or 
 having 'carried it forward to any degree, can be safely left to 
 continue it unaided. However we may explain the fact, the fact 
 remains, that human nature has always shown an inherent ten- 
 dency to throw away its privileges, and can never be trusted to 
 maintain them. 
 
 The education of its citizens, therefore, so important to the 
 state, cannot safely be left to the citizens themselves. The gov- 
 ernment of the state must superintend and control this. How- 
 ever advanced in intelligence a people may be, their advancing 
 education will continually need governmental supervision and 
 control. This governmental supervision is actually exercised 
 in the greatest degree where the people are themselves the most 
 intelligent ; their intelligence, instead of relieving the government 
 from the necessity of continuing its charge of their education, 
 only making this necessity all the more apparent. The best 
 educated communities on the globe are those where govern- 
 mental direction in matters of education is most constant and 
 careful. 
 
 2. ^ This gov ernmental regulation will include^Jhe,higher as 
 well as the lower schools. As a rnatter of fact the higher schools 
 do n ot grow o ut of the lower, and do not rest upon these.; .but 
 
 the higher school is, in acnral occurrence, first, and the lower one 
 is not its_2reciusor-r-but4ts_pr£Kluct. There is no law of evolution 
 by which the common school grows up into the college, for, as 
 an historical fact, the college is first and gives birth to the com- 
 mon school. It is not by the lower education of the many that 
 we come to have the higher education of the few, but the exact 
 converse of this- is .the.jiniversal rule. The education of the 
 many is always dependent upon the education of the few. 
 It is no unseemly favoritism, therefore, when the govern- 
 
l68 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 ment levies upon all an educational tax for the support of schools 
 which only a few can attend. 
 
 3. Civil government should make adequate provi sion for the. 
 religious instruction of its subjects. The course of education 
 anywhere will have its direction and character ultimately deter- 
 mined by the religious life there prevailing. A religious quicken- 
 ing alwa^s_gE£cedes»and gives ,bitth_tQjhe ijntellectual quickeiung 
 of any people, and where the religious impulse grows weak, the 
 intellectual impulse also begins to decUne. It is quite as 
 important, therefore, for a government to attend to the basis 
 upon which all its educational structure must rest, as to attend 
 to the building of the structure itself. 
 
 But there is a deeper reason. The virtue of its subjects is 
 far more important to any government than their intelligence. 
 No amount of intelligence ever saved any people, and tlie 
 most costly educational system may be pregnant with pgril. 
 A people may be very intelligent, and yetjvery corrupt; and 
 wherever this is fomT37"There is a disease which is surely fatal 
 unless abated. A government maintains itself in permanent 
 power, not by the intelligence nor by the wealth or the number 
 of its subjects, nor by any extent of territory over which it 
 rules, but only by the virtue which reigns in its subjects' hearts. 
 But the virtueof_any people will never rise higher than their 
 religFous faith requires. Virtue is the fruit of religion, and 
 religion is its only root. Religious instruction is therefore nec- 
 essary to the moral'well-being of any people. Without it, any 
 people is morally dead. 
 
 If it be said that other agencies than those of civil govern- 
 ment may be safely left to furnish this instruction, the same 
 claim might just as well be made in reference to any kind of 
 instruction. But we have already noted that however well edu- 
 cated a people may be, they do not need any the less, but 
 in fact do receive all the more governmental supervision and 
 control in their educational affairs ; and in like manner, whatever 
 
THE GOVERNMENT IN REFERENCE TO THE CITIZEN. 1 69 
 
 the number of religious organizations, or whatever the degree of 
 religious culture anywhere found, both history and human na- 
 ture warrant the statement that for a government to be indifferent 
 to the religious instruction of its people, is the first step to a cor- 
 responding indifference on the part of the people themselves. 
 
 If it be said, as it often is, that religious instruction must im- 
 part the tenets of some particular faith, and that when civil gov- 
 ernment undertakes to do this, some other faith of its subjects 
 is liable to be outraged, this is undoubtedly true ; but if the gov- 
 ernment is to be kept from religious instruction for this reason, 
 it might be prevented, for the same reason, from ever going to 
 war, from all levies of taxes for the support of its army or navy, 
 from all police regulations, and indeed from punishment of 
 every sort ; for there are many people, honest and intelligent, 
 too, who have religious scruples against war, and are religiously 
 opposed to all its agencies ; and there are many, also, whose 
 honesty we need not question, who plead their conscientious 
 objections against all maintenance of law and order by force 
 or by penalty. No wise government will ever treat lightly the 
 religious scruples or conscientious convictions of any of its sub- 
 jects ; neither will a wise government yield to these when they 
 set themselves against any course which it has adopted for the 
 public good. To do so would be to abdicate its authority, and 
 acknowledge that it had no right to be. 
 
 A government may of course make mistakes — as has fre- 
 quently been done — respecting the religion which it teaches. 
 It would be a very great mistake for it to teach any other 
 religion than that which should best promote the organic unity 
 of its subjects. But when such a mistake is made, its evils are 
 to be rectified precisely like those of any other governmental 
 mistake, not by denying to the- government its authority, or 
 its right of judgment, but by bringing to bear upon it whatever 
 light that may reveal its error, and whatever power that may 
 change its course. 
 
I/O MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 The real difficulty in this whole question comes from con- 
 founding two things radically different. With civil government 
 religion is a means, with the individual conscience it is an end ; 
 when, therefore, these two come in conflict, we need not ask 
 which should yield to the other, for each should triumph on its 
 own ground. This distinction clearly apprehended, and the 
 principle at its base followed, would equally preserve civil gov- 
 ernment from religious indifference or religious persecution. 
 
 Section VII. In ternal improvement. The question with us 
 lwre_is jwi one_of^politi<^al economj, but ^f political mo rality. 
 Many things may hin der the expediency of a particular jaeasme. 
 of internal improvement, when on its own ground its morality 
 r night be unqu estionable. Having established the right ofX 
 government to make internal improvements, the expediency of 
 doing it in any particular case is then an open question to be 
 settled by the circumstances. 
 
 1. The government ma y have a broad field for legitimately 
 car t yin^^ forward a system of internal improvements. There 
 are many works of national beneiirtoo l!5a^'1or private' capital 
 to sustain; many where the national benefit would be great, 
 though the pecuniary income would not reward, and thus would 
 not enlist private enterprise ; many where the income would be 
 so remote in time, that a generation might pass away before 
 private capital would be brought to it ; and thus an eye watchful 
 for the public good might find much for the government to do 
 for the sake of its subjects, where private interest and enterprise 
 would find nothing to invite their attention. 
 
 2. The government has not the right to carry o ut its internal 
 improvement jn a cours£,,c^- partiality. One of the strongest 
 oTJjecSons to internal improvements on the part of the govern- 
 ment, is the partialitjr_it _encounters. Scarcely can any one 
 improvement be of juniyereal_equal^ benefit, and by as much as 
 it helps one part and not the other, it is the dishonest principle 
 of taxing the many for the benefit of the few. But this sweep- 
 
THE GOVERNMENT IN REFERENCE TO THE CITIZEN. 17I 
 
 ing objegtioiL proves far _too,jnu£h._ The navy and the army, 
 the forts and arsenals, in fine, all public works and institutions,- ( 
 and even the sessions of the legislature itself, may give their ( 
 benefits in quite unequal degrees to different portions of the ] 
 country. The objection is available thus far, that the carrying 
 out of the system must not be in a way o f favo ri tism , nor in a 
 manner that s hall operate unequally and thus partially. . If one 
 meaiure faSt-fiHL portion, an equal benefit should be secured 
 to other portions by othex.measures. If a break- water be made 
 in one place, a harbor may be improved, a river cleared, a ship- 
 canal dug, etc., in other places. The system, as such, must be 
 made to operate impartially. 
 
 3. T^e government should not prosecute int ernal improve^ _ 
 ments, as a monopoly, tn competition with, any of its subjects. 
 Here is another source ot oDjectibns to "aTT systenis"6f internal 
 improvements, that it at once introduces a government monop- 
 oly, and overpowers or excludes all private competition. To 
 this, in its broad extent, it may again be answered that it proves 
 too much. The same thing would exclude all possible mercan- 
 tile business transactions by the government. But it is a valid 
 objection to this extent, that the government shall not interpose 
 its action to the hindrance and discouragement of private enter- 
 prise. We have already seen how odious must be all govern- 
 ment monopolies, which rejoice themselves against the prosperity 
 of the citizen. The system of internal improvement must not 
 crush, nor supplant and exclude, piivate enterprize. A govern- 
 ment canal should not tax a private railroad, nor a government 
 river-improvement tax a private canal, for the sake of monopo- 
 lizing the transport. ><^' 
 
 Section VIII. C ommerce. Every state will have produc- 
 tions in one portion that must be oonsumed in another portion, 
 and thus necessarily an internal trade must spring up and extend 
 itself in any community. So also every state will need to ex- 
 change its productions with other states, or to buy theirs and 
 
172 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 sell its own, and thus foreign commerce must more or less 
 spring up in all nations. Peculiarity of production, and extent 
 of navigable rivers, and amount of sea-coast or facilities for 
 international land transport, will modify the nature and amoimt 
 of commerce, but all states will be called to attend more or less 
 to the operations of internal trade or foreign commerce. 
 
 1 . The authority of the state must be applied to the regulation 
 of commerce. The conflicting choices of interested tradesmen 
 will interfere with individual right and the public good in a 
 thousand ways, if left to execute themselves in the internal bus- 
 iness and exchange of the country in their own manner. In 
 many respects, trade may be left free not only from protective 
 duties, but free from all state legislation, and the mutual inter- 
 ests of buyer and seller will regulate their commercial negotia- 
 tions. But this is by no means universal. The nature of the 
 case, and especially the self-interest of the parties, will present 
 many instances, where the choices will not reciprocate, but 
 where collisions will be engendered. And this is especially so, 
 where the mutual interests of a common country are excluded 
 in foreign commerce. And such collisions with the citizens of 
 foreign states would at once provoke reprisals, private violence, 
 and national war. 
 
 No other agency can be brought in to regulate these mer- 
 cantile transactions, but the state sovereignty ; and in all cases 
 where public freedom is concerned, the state has a valid right 
 to interpose its authority, and bind the action and conscience 
 of its citizens. What else might be wholly indifferent, when 
 made a legal commercial enactment, is henceforth a moral obli- 
 gation upon every citizen. 
 
 2. The question of revenue, or protection to certain produc- 
 tions, is quite distinct from "the regulations of commerce." A 
 revenue may be raised otherwise than by duties on importations, 
 and certain products can be encouraged and protected other- 
 wise than by taxing the foreign article. To regulate commerce 
 
THE GOVERNMENT IN REFERENCE TO THE CITIZEN. 1 73 
 
 is, in its real meaning, to so control it that the collisions of 
 interest therein excited shall be suppressed and guarded from 
 disturbing the common freedom. Revenue and protection may 
 be made collateral with this, and the commerce may be so reg- 
 ulated that they shall be incidental to it ; and commerce may 
 also be regulated in various ways, with no regard to either rev- 
 enue or protection. That a state may regulate commerce is not 
 therefore a ground of inference, that it may do something else 
 wholly distinct from it. The question of the right to raise rev- 
 enue, or protect certain products, should be put upon the right 
 of a state, from the very existence of its sovereignty, to do all 
 that the end of the state demands, and not as an inference 
 from some. other right. 
 
 Section IX. Postal arrangements. The post-office depart- 
 ment has long been one of the prominent matters of govern- 
 ment arrangement in civilized nations. It has doubtless been 
 deemed to be, and to a great extent doubtless has been, a 
 necessary part of the public interest for the government to 
 control. It stands, however, on the same principle as all other 
 matters which come under the state authority. If private 
 choices cannot here be executed in their free operation without 
 trenching upon the freedom of the whole, then should they be 
 controlled by the government ; and if the regulation of the whole 
 postal system be necessary to the efficient operation of every 
 part, then has the government a right to assume the whole, and 
 exclude all private competition, and determine the way and 
 means of the entire correspondence of the country, by its own 
 sovereign enactment. 
 
 Section X. Prohibitory laws. Individual choices may de- 
 mand complete prohibition in many cases, on account of their 
 contradiction to the public freedom, and in all such cases the 
 government has the right to enact and enforce prohibitory laws. 
 The very end of state sovereignty is to guard the public freedom 
 against all particular encroachment, and if it has a right to be, 
 
1/4 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 and to do any thing, its right to restrain any thing which infringes 
 upon the public freedom is manifest. The plea of any man 
 that he has a right to use his own as he will, is wholly imperti- 
 nent. Nothing is a man's own in such a sense that he may 
 thereby violate the organic unity in which he is bound to other 
 men. His very life is forfeited, when his action puts the state 
 in jeopardy. 
 
 In all such cases, where individual passion or interest induces 
 some to disregard the public rights of man, and invade the free- 
 dom of the commonwealth by putting in jeopardy the property, 
 the morals, the health, or lives of others, by any occupation, 
 manufacture, or traffic, the state authority is righteously exerted 
 in effectually putting a stop to the whole business. This may 
 apply to houses of assignation and ill-fame, gaming establish- 
 ments, immoral speech or publications, manufacture and traffic 
 in hurtful drugs and ardent spirits, and the practice of carrying 
 concealed arms, or any thing else by which the public peace is 
 endangered. 
 
 I. The practice of government licenses in such cases is im- 
 moral. License to some men and prohibition of others, in the 
 same thing, must be on the ground that a promiscuous engage- 
 ment in that thing would be a public injury, while a regulated 
 engagement would be safe. Such cases may be, where particu- 
 lar knowledge and skill are requisite to public safety, as in the 
 case of licensed pilots, physicians, etc. ; or where municipal 
 regulations are necessary for general control, as in the case of 
 licensed porters, hackmen, and public carriers. Free compe- 
 tition may often regulate all such matters, but where the public 
 need such protection, the license is righteous. 
 
 But the government itself becomes a party to the immorality, 
 in licensing any to do that which at all times, and in all modes, 
 violates the public freedom. It deserts its trust in permitting 
 the public peace to be invaded, and adds to this delinquency 
 the positive vice of taking wages for public injuries. 
 
THE GOVERNMENT IN REFERENCE TO THE CITIZEN. 1 75 
 
 2. The government has the righteous control of both parties. 
 If the manufacturer be dangerous, and the user of the product 
 also ; if the seller and the buyer both contribute to the public 
 disturbance, they are both alike within the sovereign authority 
 to be restrained or prohibited. It is thus no apology for the 
 one to plead that he forces no individual ; he traffics only with 
 the willing ; they both force an injury upon the public, and 
 wound the freedom of the state, and it is the duty of the gov- 
 ernment to restrain the hurtful choices of them both. 
 
 3. It is righteous to make the hurtful products not only con- 
 traband but a forfeit. Where the article is itself pernicious, 
 it should have no protection from law. If in some uses only it 
 can be salutary, and in all others pernicious, the government 
 may righteously protect it as property in the one use, and make 
 it contraband or forfeit in the other. It may often be the most 
 expedient measure to preserve the pubhc freedom by a regu- 
 lated destruction of the pernicious product, and in all such ways 
 of protection the government has a righteous authority. It may 
 restrain the business by pains and penalties against those who 
 engage in it, or by officially destroying the injurious article. 
 
 4. Governmental interference is righteous only in cases of 
 real injury to freedom. As in all cases, so here, civil govern- 
 ment may cease to be the conservator of public liberty and 
 become the tjrant. It may prohibit the traffic in that which 
 really is not pernicious, but highly salutary. The Bible itself is 
 prohibited in many Christian countries. There may, thus, often 
 be much tyranny in prohibitory laws, and the individual duty 
 of obedience or disobedience is found only in a conscientious 
 regulation of the action by the higher law, and taking the con- 
 sequences. 
 
 Section XI. Sumptuary, sanitary, and poor laws. Under 
 certain stages of social advancement, it may be necessary that 
 civil government should regulate private expenses in food, dress, 
 equipage, and dwellings. But this must be for a rude and 
 
176 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 ignorant people, whose uncultivated habits and almost savage 
 manners demand the stimulant of stringent laws to start them 
 on the course of improvement ; or, for a weak and effeminate 
 community, which needs the hand of power to check their 
 prodigaUty and luxury. Sumptuary laws can hardly be de- 
 manded among an intelligent and virtuous population. 
 
 There may be much more occasion for sanitary regulations, 
 inasmuch as the mass even of an ordinarily intelligent commu- 
 nity may be very liable to neglect measures necessary for the 
 healing of the sick, and preventing the spread of disease. Laws 
 for cleansing, draining, and ventilating towns and cities, regulat- 
 ing the licenses of physicians, apothecaries, and surgeons, estab- 
 hshing public hospitals and quarantine regulations, are called 
 for, and for the present, at lesist, seem indispensable in the most 
 intelhgent communities. 
 
 The poor will be in every age of every nation. Misfortune, 
 sickness, and vice will multiply the creatures of want in every 
 community. The hand of private charity may not often be lib- 
 eral enough for a supply. Public choice would have the poor 
 relieved, but individual choice may not effect it ; hence the inter- 
 ests of public freedom demand the interference of state au- 
 thority to this end. It is thus probable that state-pauper 
 regulations will be long demanded in all nations. 
 
 The highest civilization determines what should be the public 
 choice, and thus what public freedom demands, and this the 
 state authority should strive to execute. Its sovereignty is legiti- 
 mately applied to such an end. 
 
 I. The government should make timely and adequate provi- 
 sions for the poor. That government has been unrighteously 
 negligent, which has not made provision for meeting effectually 
 all cases of extreme want that may arise. Sudden calamities 
 may bring wants beyond present supplies, but the general ar- 
 rangement should be constant for calling in supplies for sudden 
 emergencies and unusual distress. 
 
THE GOVERNMENT IN REFERENCE TO THE CITIZEN. 1 77 
 
 2. The government should leave all encouragement open to 
 private charities. The public choice would not hinder but en- 
 courage the application of private alms, and all voluntary acts 
 of benevolence. It would only make up for the poor what is 
 lacking from individual benefactions. State laws, in any way 
 discouraging private charity, would be both immoral and irre- 
 ligious. The poor-rate is not instead of charity, but a supply 
 for the deficiencies of charity. 
 
 3. The government should so legislate for the poor as to discour- 
 age idleness and vice. The idle should be made industrious, 
 and the vicious externally obedient to wholesome laws, as the 
 condition of receiving help. Distinctions may righteously be 
 made in the amount of comforts supplied for the poor, in a 
 way that shall promote virtue and industry ; and when the capa- 
 bility of self-support returns, the public assistance should be 
 withdrawn. Injudicious poor-laws may often become the great- 
 est promoters of poverty and idleness, and thus £tn oppressive 
 perpetuation of the evils they should have relieved. 
 
 Section XII. Weights and measures, currency and interest. 
 There is no natural standard of weights and measures which 
 may be applied to universal use. The pressure from gravity 
 is not uniform over the surface of the earth, and there is no 
 absolute representative of extension and capacity. Exchanges 
 and sale of products by weight and measure are so convenient 
 in society, that some general standard becomes a necessity, and 
 civil government only. can regulate and establish such standards 
 of weights and measures as shall become universally known and 
 authorized. There must be the specific material instruments 
 which give a determined weight or measure, and to these must 
 all such 'as are of public use be brought and compared, and 
 then officially sealed as approved by the state authority. The 
 government has the right to demand of all its subjects that they 
 regulate their commercial transactions by the use of its own 
 approved weights and measures. 
 
1/8 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 There is no more any standard of absolute value, than above 
 of weights and measures. The amount of labor which any 
 product may have cost cannot be such a standard, for labor 
 itself can only be estimated by its comparative products. The 
 amount of business-transfer demands a given amount of coin- 
 age-value, and an accumulation of coinage beyond the business 
 of any place cheapens its value in that place, and secures its 
 exportation to places of greater scarcity. The relative value of 
 the precious metals to other products, added to the value 
 accruing in the coinage, must determine the amount of circu- 
 lating currency necessary for the faciUty of transfers ; and other 
 things being equal, the scarcity of the metal, unless to an ex- 
 treme degree, is the more favorable, inasmuch as thus the 
 greatest values are transferred with the least bulk and weight. 
 Authority determines, by its coinage, what precious metals it 
 will make into money ; and this, as a legal tender, is the ultimate 
 legal means for cancelling all indebtedness. 
 
 The introduction of a paper currency is by promissory notes, 
 obligating to so much specie-payment, which notes stand thus 
 as the representative and voucher of so much coin-money ; and 
 such banking privilege must be regulated by the authority of 
 the state, and the amount of bank-stock and bank-circulation 
 be controlled by its legislation according to the commercial 
 wants of the community. This paper circulation may not, how- 
 ever, be put as the substitute for the current coin, but only as a 
 voucher for so much of it as is indicated on the face of the 
 note, and may not, therefore, become an ultimate standard of 
 value and a legal tender in liquidating debts. A forced paper 
 currency, by legal enactment, substitutes a mere voucher of 
 money for the money itself, and thus attempts to force the 
 shadow to effect the same results as the substance, thereby 
 cheating the public choice by giving it an empty name in the 
 place of the promised thing, and thus civil government becomes 
 a traitor to the freedom it is appointed to guard. A nation too 
 
THE GOVERNMENT IN REFERENCE TO THE CITIZEN. 1 79 
 
 poor to get credit except through immoralities is already beyond 
 self-redemption and recovery. 
 
 The inquiry whether morality permits the government to 
 regulate interest for money, is two-fold, viz. : Is any interest for 
 the use of money right ? and if it is, may the government inter- 
 fere and establish usury laws? The difficulty with the first 
 question is found mainly in the determination of the represen- 
 tative-character of money. If it be only a representative of 
 value, and not at all possessing any intrinsic value, why should 
 it be itself taxed, or made to command a price for its use, as if 
 its use had a real value ? The products which it represents have 
 their value, and they are rightfully taxed ; but why should their 
 mere representative be again taxed, when it is of no value in its 
 own use ? It is paying for the substance, and then paying over 
 again for it in its shadow. All the products of a country are all 
 its real wealth, and all the money of the country is only a rep- 
 resentative of the real value, and yet we are doubling the profit 
 by striving to use the property of the country twice over, — once 
 in the products and then again in the money which only repre- 
 sents these products. 
 
 But this perplexity, originating in a false principle, is removed 
 by removing the fallacy which occasions it. It is not true that 
 money is a mere representative and has no intrinsic value. It 
 has in itself intrinsic useful properties as money, and is thus an 
 addition to the wealth of a country in all its other valuable 
 products. We take first such products as are the necessaries of 
 life, the materials for the food, clothing, and shelter of the inhabi- 
 tants, and their intrinsic value is in their direct subserviency to 
 the necessities of mankind. But even such essential products 
 cannot subserve man's necessities, except in their distribution. 
 The grain in one portion of a country cannot feed those in 
 other portions, except as distributed to them. The means of 
 conveyance are as necessary as the food to be conveyed. The 
 ships and caual§ aqd j-ajlrgads and freight-trains cannot be eaten, 
 
l80 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 and yet the food cannot any more be eaten without them. 
 And thus with all the implements and utensils for raising grain, 
 and all the mills and machinery for preparing the grain to be 
 eaten, they become as necessary as the grain, and in this con- 
 nection have as truly an intrinsic value. They are all products 
 which have a valuable property, and all go to make the wealth 
 of a nation. The accumulation of such products, beyond the 
 demand made for them in the grain to be raised and distribu- 
 ted, would be valueless ; and in this sense they are the repre- 
 sentatives of the grain of a country ; but up to the demand the 
 grain makes for them, in its being grown, distributed, and manu- 
 factured, they are not mere representatives, but necessary prod- 
 ucts of intrinsic value for mankind, and enter directly into the 
 capital of the country. 
 
 Even so with the money of a nation. Attempt to bring to- 
 gether all these means for raising and distributing grain, without 
 so much money as shall give faciUty to the transfer, and the 
 intrinsic value of money will be made apparent. If all ex- 
 changes in building ships, canals, railroads, etc., must be made 
 through the repeated bartering of one heavy product for another, 
 the means for an extensive distribution of grain, and so also of 
 any other necessary of hfe, would be wholly unattainable. The 
 money which facilitates such distribution is itself as real prop- 
 erty as the farming implements or the wagons and freight-trains 
 by which the grain is transported to the consumer. It is as 
 morally right that it should be taxed, or that it should receive an 
 interest for its use, as any other product of value. 
 
 The answer to the second inquiry is direct from the very end 
 of the government. If the practice of loaning money is regu- 
 lated as naturally in the commercial operations of society, as 
 that of building, using and selling ships, railroad cars, etc., then 
 there will be no need of usury laws forbidding more than cer- 
 tain rates of interest. But if the possession of money give the 
 opportunity for taking an advantage of the nepegsities of g. busi' 
 
THE GOVERNMENT IN REFERENCE TO THE CITIZEN. l8l 
 
 ness man, and thus capital be found to oppress labor, as prob- 
 ably in its unhindered action it often will, then is it the right and 
 the duty of the government to interpose its authority and its 
 penalties for the defence of the oppressed laborer. The govern- 
 ment is bound, however, to so apply its usury laws, and all legis- 
 lation for defence against extortion, as not to aggravate the evil 
 it would cure, by making loans more difficult and more burden- 
 some in the end to be effected by the laborer. A law may often 
 aggravate the very grievance it proposes to cure. 
 
 Section XIII. Revolution. The state is distinct from its gov- 
 ernment. The forms of government may change ; dynasties rise 
 and pass away ; official administrators be forcibly displaced for 
 others ; but the one organic state continues through all these 
 changes. Revolutions, thus, take place in government, not in 
 the state. A state may be subjugated, annexed, annihilated, 
 but not revolutionized. When we speak of a revolution, we are 
 to understand a sudden and violent change in the point of sov- 
 ereign authority. Reforms may change, more or less suddenly, 
 important portions of the government and its administrative 
 functions, but it is not a revolution except as the entire place of 
 sovereign authority turns over. 
 
 I. Revolutions are justifiable when the public freedom de- 
 mands them. Reforms may be demanded in the same govern- 
 ment, from the changes in the people and their circumstances, 
 in order that the public choice may be more fully executed ; and 
 in al such cases the reform is righteous, and thus a true and not 
 a misnamed reform. But changes may also become so great in 
 a people or their circumstances, that no possible reform in the 
 government can reach the demand of public freedom ; but there 
 must be a complete revolution of the sovereignty in the govern- 
 ment itself. Wlien this is truly demanded by the end of all 
 government, then for liberty's sake a revolution is as righteous 
 as in the above case was the reform. That government which 
 cannot subserve the ends of public freedom to the greatest 
 
1 82 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 practicable degree ethically should give way to one that can ; 
 and if it selfishly resists, it should be put out by force. 
 
 But in the estimation of the public freedom, the evil to it in 
 the violence of the revolution itself must be included, as truly as 
 that which accrues from the present perversion and oppression 
 of sovereignty. If the evil to freedom is greater from the vio- 
 lence necessary to change the sovereignty, than that in its pres- 
 ent perversion, the time has not yet come for revolution. There 
 is oppression which lies as an immorality at the door of the gov- 
 ernment, but this cannot justify a greater oppression from any 
 one in correcting or expelling it. 
 
 2. // is the state only which has the right to revolutionize. 
 The only real authority for political government is the state. 
 Sovereignty is righteously of the state, and if it has become 
 wrongly placed, the state only has the right to determine when 
 and how to turn it over, and to what point. A Brutus may be 
 as truly a tyrant as a Caesar, if he be not executing the mani- 
 fested choice of the state. It is not any individual, nor any 
 combination of individuals, who can righteously revolutionize 
 their government ; if the nation does not go with them, they are 
 rebels in their attempts at subversion. 
 
 A portion of a state, a colony, may be oppressed by the other 
 portion, or the parent country, and seek to revolutionize in its 
 own independence ; and the same ethical principles apply. 
 That portion, which is to become a state by revolution, has in it 
 the right of independent sovereignty morally, if its cause be 
 just ; and it, not any individual or combination of persons, has 
 the right to revolutionize. 
 
 3. Individuals, or combinations of persons, begin the work 
 of revolutionary agitation at their peril. The state only has 
 the right to revolutionize, but the state in its whole social com- 
 munity cannot be expected at once to arouse itself, and in the 
 primary assemblies of the people assert its grievances, arrange 
 it3 manner of action against the tyranny, and go forth orderly 
 
THE GOVERNMENT IN REFERENCE TO THE CITIZEN. 1 83 
 
 and unitedly to put out the perverse sovereign and put in its 
 own. This would be the righteous method of revolution were 
 it practicable. 
 
 But some watchful patriots see and feel the oppression sooner 
 than others. They arouse others to sympathize with them ; the 
 agitation commences, — within the forros of law very probably, — 
 and then passes on to the more direct attacks upon the govern- 
 ment. The only righteous course for the true patriot, who aims 
 to revolutionize his government, is thus to call out the state to 
 the expression and execution of its own sovereign authority. It 
 is not for him nor his associates to assume the sovereignty, to 
 dethrone that which is, and put up another ; it is only to awake 
 the state to do it. And in attempting this work, they should all 
 know distinctly the position they assume. To them, the cause 
 may be good ; the call may be the real cry of the public free- 
 dom ; but if the state does not awake, and act, and take this 
 work into her own hands, then verily they may not usurp it. 
 And they attempt to so arouse the state at their own peril. 
 They assume the responsibility of the first step ; and if the state 
 awake and throw off her oppressors, she will probably hail them 
 as the saviours of her liberty ; or if she does not put forth her 
 sovereignty and make the political revolution, she will probably 
 act through her already existing government, and hang them on 
 the gibbet. Another alternative may still be, that what was 
 taken as the state does awake and struggle manfuUy against the 
 powers that be, but that the existing sovereignty is found too 
 strong and crushes all before it, and both the assumed state and 
 her heroes go down together. Thus it is that in revolutions the 
 successful agitator is the saviour of his country, and the success- 
 less one, a rebel. He takes the responsibility of the issue, and 
 posterity, the tribunal of ultimate ethical equity, will determine 
 whether he conquered or died as a patriot. 
 
 4. Those that resist a revolution take their position also at 
 their peril. It may prove that the sovereign whom they upheld 
 
184 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 will be cloven down by the state, and all his defenders with him. 
 They may act sincerely in sustaining the attacked government, 
 but they may be made to die with it. Thus in times of revolu- 
 tion all is peril, and all heads sit loosely on their shoulders. The 
 foundations of civil law and order are shaken, and we are made 
 to feel how fearful is a time of anarchy. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE POSITION OF A STATE IN REFERENCE TO OTHERS. 
 
 The boundaries of nations are fixed by many contingent 
 circumstances. Distinctions of race, colonial origin, conquest, 
 or arbitrary conventional regulation, may have determined the 
 people and the extent of country which shall be embraced by 
 one state, and thus the lines of its political jurisdiction. Many 
 state sovereignties are in this way cotemporary and some con- 
 terminous with each other. It is a natural consequence that 
 nations must have more or less intercourse, and it is important 
 to apprehend the principles in moral science which must con- 
 trol all international connection and communion. 
 
 I . The sovereignty of each state is independent. The progi'ess 
 of events in the ongoing of history, and not the application of 
 ethical principles, determines the distinct identity of nations. 
 We have, thus, no occasion for applying moral science to the 
 origin of nations and the determination of particular sovereign- 
 ties, but only to such sovereignties as already exist together. 
 
 But where we find an existing state, occupying a given terri- 
 tory, and inclusive of a specific population, and thereby sepa- 
 rating itself from all other communities in the responsibility of 
 guarding its own rights and conserving its own freedom, it 
 
THE STATE IN REFERENCE TO OTHERS. 1 85 
 
 should possess complete and independent sovereignty. Its 
 progress in civilization is to be directed by its own choice, and 
 its constraint of individual choices is to be determined by this 
 pubKc choice ; and thus in the preservation of its own freedom, 
 it must exclude all interference and discard all higher political 
 authority than its own. It is not a question of numbers, but of 
 independent jurisdiction ; and thus complete sovereignty knows 
 no great or small but only independent state existence, and 
 then its authority is as legitimate and supreme in a state of 
 small as of large population. Sovereignty is a unit and com- 
 plete in itself, and any extension or diminution of its area does 
 not alter its nature. Its power to execute may be in different 
 degrees, but its right is absolute in its own jurisdiction and not 
 a thing of degrees. Any interference from another state in its 
 own prerogatives must be resented as the highest insult, and 
 resisted to the last extremity. 
 
 One nation may be partially conquered by another, and made 
 tributary to it, but so far as this is the case, it ceases to be a 
 state ; its liberty is cloven down ; its sovereignty has departed ; 
 and its citizens rpust look to the state sovereignty which has 
 subjugated it for the protection of the public freedom. The 
 sovereignties have become adjunct, or rather the one has been 
 absorbed in the other. So long as the particular community 
 has its standing as a state among other nations, its sovereignty 
 is independent and absolute. 
 
 States may exist as separate from each other in a Republic, 
 but they are no longer sovereign states amid the nations ; the 
 true state, as such in its national indentity, is in the one repub- 
 lican sovereignty. 
 
 2. International regulations must thus rest upon the basis of 
 pure morality. It may be an ethical claim, in the right of uni- 
 versal freedom, that nations shall be restrained in their inter- 
 course with each other by some well-understood and mutually- 
 admitted regulations. National consent, by long precedent and 
 
1 86 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 practice, has given validity to many such regulations, and which, 
 as combined in written treatises, are known as the Law of 
 Nations. 
 
 But no political authority exists which can throw its restraint 
 over independent sovereignties. This code of national law 
 emanates from no sovereign legislative, and can be adminis- 
 tered by no political executive, and is thus no law as based 
 upon positive authority. It stands only as an appeal to the 
 public conscience of mankind ; that which is ethically due from 
 one nation to another in national community; and holds thus all 
 to the claims of each in the right of pure morality. The precept 
 can only appeal to that which is the highest worthiness of a 
 nation, — in the best sense, to the national honour ; and while 
 its end is the conservation of the liberties of nations, as national 
 law is for the conservation of public liberty in a state, yet can it 
 bring in no sanction of pains and penalties ; no judicial tribunal 
 nor executive administration ; nothing which can be termed 
 positive authority, that holds to obedience simply because it is 
 enacted. The only origin, and the only sanction, is the public 
 conscience. There will come the self-degradation of the state 
 which violates it ; and the public abhorrence, moral contempt, 
 and indignant condemnation, of all people towards it ; but if 
 there be not a violation of sovereignty, and an invasion of the 
 liberty of independent states, there is no way for the other na- 
 tions to inflict positive punishment for it. Jehovah only is the 
 sovereign arbiter of nations, and to him vengeance belongeth ; 
 other nations may conscientiously condemn and abhor, but they 
 have no jurisdiction authoritatively to arraign, convict, and punish. 
 
 With this end of universal freedom in view, and the appeal 
 only to the public conscience of mankind to attain it, we may 
 apply the principle in various ways, and determine what is the 
 righteous position of one nation to another in many particulars. 
 As in the last Chapter, so here, we will put the particulars under 
 different sections, and give some of the more important as ex- 
 amples for all. 
 
THE STATE IN REFERENCE TO OTHERS. 1 87 
 
 Section I. Comity of Nations. States stand to each other 
 in many ways as persons, and thus reciprocal respect and cour- 
 teous treatment should be manifested among nations. The 
 methods of manifesting this national civility are various, but 
 long habit and precedent have settled many customs which are 
 now demanded in the intercourse of states by the comity of 
 nations, and a disregard of such customs would be derogatory 
 to the civilization of the state which carelessly permitted it, or 
 a mark of disrespect and an insult to the nation to whom it 
 should designedly be exhibited. 
 
 Some of the methods of manifesting such national respect 
 and courtesy are the customary salutations of the national flag ; 
 the honor given to all accredited ministers, embassadors, and 
 plenipotentiaries, in their persons and the communications they 
 may make ; the usual forms of diplomatic intercourse and eti- 
 quette of courts ; and in the admission of the citizens of other 
 countries to travel or reside among them on equal conditions. 
 Special marks of honor may also be given by special national 
 salutes, the participation in the signals given of national rejoicing 
 or mourning, and in pubhc attention and honors paid to the 
 officers or statesmen who may be present from another nation. 
 
 Such acts of courtesy and comity are demanded by morality 
 among friendly nations, not only as they conciliate mutual good 
 wiU and strengthen the bonds of peace, but from the same rea- 
 son that respect is due from one person to another. Nations 
 are composed of persons, and a state itself in its sovereignty 
 may be said to have a personal character, and the intrinsic 
 dignity and excellency of moral personality ethically demands 
 tokens of respect and appropriate regard from all other persons. 
 It is as truly a disgrace and degradation to a state to disregard 
 these claims to national respect and honor, as it would be to an 
 individual to treat his fellows insolently and contemptuously. 
 The common sense of the world would mark such disrespect 
 with disapprobation, and the nation offending against the claims 
 
1 88 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 of general comity would lose much in its character and influ- 
 ence among aU civilized people. 
 
 Section II. Treaties. Various reasons in the intercourse 
 of nations demand specific treaties, which are of the nature of 
 national contracts between one state and another. If the claims 
 of political ethics be apprehended in the light of the organic 
 connection which binds all members of the human family to- 
 gether, and which as truly determines the relations of states as 
 of individuals, the general principles which should regulate aU 
 treaties between states would be easily found and applied, 
 though doubtless strongly condemning the frequent license 
 taken in national negotiations. Selfishness and all dishonesty 
 between nations is as truly an immorality and as highly deroga- 
 tory to the moral character of the offending party, as the like 
 iniquity between individuals. The Rule of right is as strict and 
 peremptory in its . imperatives upon states as upon persons. 
 These treaties may refer to commercial interests, boundary 
 questions, fisheries, colonial intercourse, articles of peace, and 
 indeed in reference to any mutual interests between different 
 states. 
 
 1. Each state is sovereign, and has equal rights as party in 
 the treaty. The stronger nation has no ethical prerogative over 
 the -weaker, but must come into the negotiation as an equal, 
 fully admitting all the rights of sovereignty in the entire transac- 
 tion. If one state has been beaten in war, weakened and crip- 
 pled by the army and navy of the other, so long as there is not 
 complete subjugation and thus the merging of one sovereignty 
 in the other, there is no right in the victorious nation to take 
 advantage of the weakness of its adversary, and impose hard 
 and oppressive conditions of future peace and amity. Power 
 no more gives right in a nation than in an individual, and the 
 dishonesty is the more dastardly which takes advantage of 
 weakness to wrong and oppress. 
 
 2. No treaty stipulations may involve any immoralities 
 
THE STATE IN REFERENCE TO OTHERS. 1 89 
 
 Whatever is against pure morality or the higher law of religion 
 is precluded ethically from all treaty stipulations. No matter 
 how apparently advantageous or expedient to one or to both 
 of the parties, the claims of morality or of a higher authority 
 cannot righteously be violated by either party. The treaty is 
 ethically a nullity so far as it includes unrighteousness. 
 
 3. Each party must have the right to withdraw from a treaty 
 of indefinite time, by giving suitabl? notice to the other. Na- 
 tional sovereignties are permanent, and in process of time the 
 treaty which has been mutually beneficial may become onerous 
 and unjust to one party. Equity demanded that at first one 
 nation should not wrong or oppress the other, and the same 
 imperative is constant. If the circumstances, therefore, have so 
 changed that the perpetuation of the treaty stipulation is in- 
 jurious, that party has the right to withdraw from it without 
 censure. This should not be done suddenly and arbitrarily, 
 but comity demands that it should be officially asked by the 
 one, and equity demands that it should be granted by the other. 
 
 If a time is stipulated for the treaty to run, such advantage 
 cannot be taken ; for the fixing of the time manifests that both 
 parties agreed to run the hazard of all changes until its expi- 
 ration, and thus have given up the claim which the changes of 
 circumstances would else have made equitable. If, however, 
 this lead to great oppression and injury, the benefited party 
 should not take the advantage. 
 
 4. A treaty has all the force of a law. The treaty is a stipu- 
 lation and agreement between two or more independent nations, 
 and is, therefore, binding in national honor and morality upon 
 all the parties. Each nation, thus, is bound to see that all its 
 subjects respect and fulfil the express terras of the treaty, and 
 without any further legislation, the ratification and promulgation 
 of the treaty becomes the law of the land in each nation in- 
 cluded by it. It has been for the freedom of each that the 
 treaty has beeij njade and ratified, and the citizen? of each are 
 
I go MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 as much bound by it, as by any positive legislation of their re- 
 spective governments. There is even added to the authority 
 upon its own citizens, the claims of honor and good faith 
 towards the other national party in the treaty, and hence a 
 treaty may be termed the highest law of the land. 
 
 Section III. Alliance. There may be occasion for two or 
 more states to combine in the prosecution of a national object, 
 and thus each attain by the co-operation of all what would else 
 be unattainable by either. Thus there may be aUiances in pros- 
 ecuting discoveries ; in carrying on any hazardous enterprise ; 
 in resistance to a common enemy ; and which may sometimes 
 lead to a mutual agreement, that the enemies or the friends of 
 each shall be so considered and treated by both, and hence made 
 an alliance both offensive and defensive. The contract ratify- 
 ing the alliance may sometimes be called a treaty, but we have 
 above confined the application of treaties to such contracts only 
 as include no combination of powers. The treaty of alliance 
 is rather a league, and includes the idea of mutual assistance. 
 This may sometimes be very extensive and almost universal 
 among civilized nations, as in the suppression of piracy or the 
 slave-trade. 
 
 The same principles apply here as in the case of all treaties 
 or contracts. 
 
 Section IV. Confederation. This applies more especially to 
 the league which may be formed by several smaller states, for 
 mutual convenience and safety. Internal jealousies and difii- 
 culties in separate administrations, or external dangers, may in- 
 duce a number of neighboring smaller states to band together 
 for their common advantage. The representatives of each 
 state, meeting in a council or congress, deliberate and decide 
 on matters of common interest, and their acts have all the 
 weight which the wisdom of the congress, and the moral influ- 
 ence of the combined public sentiment that they represent may 
 give tj them, within the sphere contemplated in the articles of 
 confederation. 
 
THE STATE IN REFERENCE TO OTHERS. I9I 
 
 1. Such a congress can exercise none of the prerogatives of 
 sovereignty. Each state still maintains its own independent 
 sovereignty, and is responsible for the public freedom of its own 
 citizens ; and the congress of delegates representing them has 
 nothing of sovereign authority over all or either. They cannot 
 properly legislate, and their acts are only advisory and recom- 
 mendatory measures, depending for their general observance 
 upon the interest which all feel in the confederation, and the 
 weight of moral character which it embodies. They can neither 
 levy taxes nor execute any laws, but all acts 'of sovereignty are 
 confined to each state within its own jurisdiction ; and any one 
 may at pleasure withdraw from the confederation, or refuse to 
 carry out the resolves of the congress, and there is no authority 
 to call to an account or to compel co-operation. 
 
 2. An army and navy for the common defence may be en- 
 trusted to it. The congress has no sovereign authority to raise 
 an army and support it, but it may apportion the propel 
 amount of men and military supplies to each state ; and when 
 the states have made their particular levies, they may commit 
 the whole to the more effective management and use of the 
 congress. According to the articles of agreement, the congress 
 may appoint general officers, direct the campaign, and call their 
 own officers to account ; and any thing may be committed to it 
 not inconsistent with the preservation of sovereignty in each 
 state. 
 
 3. If articles of war or peace are concluded by the confedera- 
 tion, there must be the sovereign assent of each state. The con- 
 gress may be the agent of the confederated states in appointing 
 plenipotentiaries for negotiation and conclusion of treaties, but 
 the full power of these ambassadors is derived from the common 
 consent of the state sovereignties, and the treaties formed are 
 ratified by their authority, and not that this congress has any 
 sovereign jurisdiction, or is other than an accredited agent of 
 each of these distinct sovereignties. 
 
192 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 The congress may, perhaps, in cases of urgent interest, some- 
 times exceed the articles of agreement and presume a tacit 
 consent of the states ; but it is on the same ground that under 
 special exigencies any agent may transcend his instructions, 
 subject to the subsequent approval or rejection of the principal. 
 They should in all critical cases consult the supposed intentions 
 of the states, but no case of their unauthorized responsibility 
 can bind the states. 
 
 Seci'ion V. Republic. A number of distinct independent 
 states may, for their common benefit, go much further than in 
 forming an alliance or. a confederation, even to the bringing of 
 themselves into one nation so far as all international intercourse 
 is concerned, and giving to this national government all the 
 powers of their individual sovereignty under a constitution, and 
 this constitution thus forms them all into one Republic, which 
 has as complete and undivided sovereignty in its sphere as that 
 of any single sovereignty among the nations. The republic be- 
 comes the sovereign nation, and acts legitimately as a sovereign 
 among nations ; and within the constitution has no more respon- 
 sibility to its own states than to any foreign state. What is not 
 given for national purposes may not be assumed, but lies still in 
 the authority of the several states for the adjustment and man- 
 agement of their own internal concerns, but what has been 
 given into the hands of the general government for the conser- 
 vation of public freedom, that it uses and applies in an uncon- 
 trolled and independent sovereignty. The entire states stand 
 in one republic, and that becomes a single and independent 
 nation, and has henceforth its own right to be and to act accord- 
 ing to the terms of its constitution. 
 
 I. States have the right to form such a republic. The free- 
 dom of the citizens of each state may be seen to be thus best 
 sustained, and thus each state is fulfilling its own duty to its citi- 
 zens in providing for the public freedom, by the institution of a 
 sovereignty^ which will more completely effect this than }t coh14 
 
THE STATE IN REFERENCE TO OTHERS. 193 
 
 in the exercise of its own single authority. Its citizens have the 
 right to the highest practicable measures of public freedom, and 
 it would itself be defeating the end of its own being, if it held 
 on to its own state sovereignty when that end could be best at- 
 tained in the sovereignty of a constitutional republic. A repub- 
 hc thus stands upon a sound ethical basis, when the public 
 freedom of each state is better conserved by its own defined 
 sovereignty, than it would be if those sovereign powers were still 
 left in the states. 
 
 2. A power of sovereignty lies in the Republic to enforce its 
 constitutional authority against either or all of the states. 
 The republic does not, like a confederation, stand upon the mere 
 moral force of public sentiment as expressed in the league, but 
 it has sovereign authority to raise armies, collect taxes, and en- 
 force its constitutional laws against any opposition from its own 
 members. If it can control sufficient force, from the well affect- 
 ed towards it, to subject to its laws any combination from one 
 or many states, it has the righteous authority so to da, and thus 
 to vindicate and defend its own rights of sovereigjityi r. ,.- 
 
 3. It must confine the exercise of authority "W^in a sfrict 
 construction of the constitution. What the states have given 
 to a repubUc, they must have fully expressed in the articles 
 which constitute it. The very natute,o(v|J\e,jv:prk,_"wJfere rnany, 
 states give up their own sovereignty to e.m$^^i§ a republican 
 sovereignty, determines that there will be cleajjiess and explicit-, 
 ness in stating what is granted, and thus advantage is not to 
 be taken of remote inferences, implications, and deductions. 
 What has been granted, it is the right of the general govern- 
 ment to use ; but that only has been granted which is plainly' 
 expressed, or is quite necessary to carry out the expressed pro- 
 visions of the constitution. Beyond this the republic has no 
 authority. Any other than a strict construction leads directly 
 to oppression. 
 
 4. Each state must by its own vote adopt the constitution. 
 
194 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 No matter how great a share, in the deliberations and conclu- 
 sions of the body forming the constitution, any state by its dele- 
 gation may have had, that imposes no obligation upon the 
 state, until the adoption of the constitution by its own sovereign 
 choice. Its sovereignty cannot be rightfully taken from it, and 
 transferred to a republic, but by its own free act. 
 
 5 . When the assent is once given, and the sovereign republic 
 constituted, no state has then the right of secession or nullifica- 
 tion except by a strict construction of the constitution itself. A 
 national sovereignty is thus constituted, and the public freedom 
 is entrusted to it, to the extent of the constitutional provision, 
 and a common interest is created which no separate part has a 
 right to disregard. If there is no express article regulating 
 nullification or secession, then is there no right in any to either ; 
 for the adoption of the constitution creates the republican sov- 
 ereignty indefinitely, and its right to exist perpetually and 
 forever, for the public freedom of all, is good and valid against 
 any of its component states. A constitution with, and one 
 without the rights of nullification or secession, are two very 
 different things ; and if the right is not plainly expressed, then 
 does it not exist, and those who have adopted it have vested 
 rights under it which no separate state can amend or disregard. 
 The public freedom, to the extent of the constitutional provi- 
 sion, is henceforth committed to the sovereignty of the republic 
 as fully and irreversibly as the entire public freedom is in any 
 independent nation, and the crime of treason attaches to all 
 armed resistance to it, as in the rebellion of any part of any 
 nation. 
 
 6. Each state is completely and independently sovereign, with- 
 in its own jurisdiction, in all things not granted in the general 
 constitution. The different states in a republic do not stand in 
 the same position as the different cities and towns in a state. 
 If these cities and towns have incorporated rights and munici- 
 pal prerogatives, they hold them from their ovva sta,t^ a,u.thority. 
 
THE STATE IN REFERENCE TO OTHERS. 195 
 
 and have in themselves no independent sovereignty. But the 
 separate states were originally sovereign, and instead of holding 
 their authority from the republic, they have themselves consti- 
 tuted the republic by putting away their own authority into it. 
 
 What is granted to the republic has now become an inde- 
 pendent sovereignty, as its own ; but what is not granted is 
 still in the hands of each state, and exercised by it at its own 
 pleasure, and upon its own responsibility. No sister state has 
 any right to interfere in the internal regulations of another, any 
 more than among independent nations ; nor is one state any 
 more responsible for what another does, than in the case of 
 wholly foreign states. 
 
 Section VI. War. Every sovereign state is responsible for 
 the public freedom of its members, and if this is invaded by 
 the disobedience or rebellion of its citizens, it has the right to 
 execute the penalty of the law disobeyed, and to crush the re- 
 bellion or any part by an armed force. The freedom of the 
 whole, and for all generations, is of more consequence than the 
 lives of a part in any generation. The freedom of the state 
 must then be maintained by it, even to the death of opposers 
 if necessary. 
 
 But sometimes the freedom of the state may be menaced 
 from without, and the force of the state may be called into 
 requisition against a foreign enemy to its liberty ; the action 
 then becomes war, and the morality of it needs to be de- 
 termined. 
 
 I. War is righteous in defence of the national freedom. The 
 life of no assailant of a nation's freedom is too sacred to be 
 cloven down in its defence. The state is responsible for the 
 end of its being, as a sovereign, to the full extent of all its re- 
 sources. Against a foreign enemy, it cannot maintain its rights 
 by law ; it can only resist his violence to the public freedom by 
 arms, and such resistance is defensive war. There can be no 
 question of weaker and stronger, for the weaker nation hke the 
 
196 MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 weaker man, when driven to fight for life, must resist and de- 
 fend as it may. It has no alternative but to go down if it must, 
 struggling for its liberties. The guilt is on the offender, the war 
 of defence is as righteous as the penal execution of law. 
 
 2. War is justifiable only as the ultima ratio. It is an ex- 
 treme alternative, terrible and horrible at the best, and to be 
 resorted to only in the last extremity. All countervailing meas- 
 ures should be first tried. War will itself, necessarily, more or 
 less abridge the freedom of the state, and such an abridgement 
 of freedom must not be incurred lightly. Commercial restric- 
 tions, and the application of other uncomfortable regulations, 
 complaint of grievances, protests, and negotiation should all be 
 tried before war, if there is any rational hope of preventing 
 this last resort, and only when war must come is it right to let 
 it come. • 
 
 3. In all war there must be guilt, at kast with one nation. 
 Two nations can so live together, and maintain the freedom of 
 their subjects, as not to make it necessary that one should en- 
 c(t)ach upon the liberties of another. That nation whose action 
 makes it necessary for another to fight in defence of its freedom, 
 is guilty of an immorality ; and if the other nation stand only on 
 the defensive, the whole guilt is with the former state. Both 
 may have guilt, one of them must have. 
 
 4. The necessity for war may all be removed by national 
 comity and equity. If there were no violation of national rights, 
 and thus encroachment upon national freedom, there would be 
 no occasion for war. Wars and fightings come from unlawful 
 lusts. Any influences which shall make the nations of the earth 
 regard courtesy and equity wiU exclude all wars. And so long 
 as insult and injustice prevail among the nations of mankind, 
 the occasions of war wiU remain. Each nation must stand its 
 own defender, and unrighteous encroachment must be resisted, 
 and may force to resistance unto blood. But elevation in 
 national character diminishes the occasions for national con- 
 
THE STATE IN REFERENCE TO OTHERS. 1 97 
 
 tention. Complete civilization, which is the perfection of 
 humanity in intelligence and virtue, will abolish all provoca- 
 tion, and thus all resort to war. 
 
 5 . Much might be done in prevention of war, at the present 
 day, by stipulated arbitration. In the body of some important 
 international treaty, pr by a separate treaty for the specific pur- 
 pose, nations might mutually stipulate, that in case of disagree- 
 ments and disputes the matter shall be deferred to some friendly 
 arbitration. An umpire may readily be found who shall be im- 
 partial, and: the prosecution of the claims of each before such a 
 mutually7Constituted tribunal would in most cases remove the 
 bloody interference of the sword. Even when war has done its 
 desolating work, negotiation must be resorted to for the ends of 
 peace, and if the reference can be made to an arbiter in which 
 each party has confidence beforehand, the horrors of war may 
 be wholly averted. The honor of each nation is preserved, for 
 the previous agreement establishes this mode of settlement ; the 
 peculiar principles of each government remain untouched, for 
 unless a war of political prppagandism be determined upon, 
 such principles do not engender national conflicts ; and even 
 the very use of such arbitration diffuses its civilizing influence 
 over the parties and the umpire. The modern movement 
 towards such an arrangement is eminently hopeful. 
 
 Section VII. Congress of Nations. Nations stand to each 
 other separate and independent. As in the case of unprotected 
 individual persons, the weaker is Uable to be oppressed and 
 injured by the stronger ; on this account it has been an inquiry 
 whether there might not be . instituted some general council or 
 congress of nations which should stand as an umpire between 
 sovereign states, and hold the balance of sovereign powers with 
 so much wisdom and steadiness as to preserve the peace and 
 liberty of the world. It may be worth the consideration, to 
 show what political ethics would determine about the morality 
 of such an arrangement. 
 
igS MERE LEGALITY. 
 
 1 . Such a congress of nations could have no force beyond the 
 particular states represented in it. Whatever were urged as the 
 motive to nations to be represented in the proposed congress, 
 each sovereign state would be at full liberty to accede to such a 
 proposition, or to reject it. As each state is sovereign in itself, 
 and at full liberty to refuse any such representation, so no meet- 
 ing of any council by any number of the representatives of 
 nations could at all affect the sovereignty of the nation not 
 represented. It would be as much its right to reject all its 
 resolutions, as to reject the offer of a representation there. 
 Nothing done in the congress could have any binding force be- 
 yond those states there represented. 
 
 2. Such a congress could not righteously be invested with 
 sovereignty. Whatever expediency there may be found in the 
 combining of the sovereignty of several small states into one 
 sovereign constitutional republic, it wiU not be found to con- 
 duce to the universal freedom of man, that all the sovereign 
 states of the world should be combined in one universal republic 
 of nations. Such is the limit of human faculties, that a univer- 
 sal administration of a government, which should make it its 
 end to conserve the public freedom of all mankind, would em- 
 brace so many and so profound matters of inquiry and exe- 
 cution, that no human political wisdom and skiU would be 
 adequate to it. A division into sectional interests and geo- 
 graphical localities would be necessary, and no human sover- 
 eignty controlling the whole would be competent to secure the 
 highest freedom. 
 
 But much more from the moral frailty of man would there be 
 an incompetency. The temptations to ambition and lust of 
 power would here be presented on so large a scale, that the 
 danger of universal tyranny would be far greater than the ra- 
 tional hope of universal liberty. A universal republic would 
 probably give less freedom to the race of man, than a distribu- 
 tion of monarchy through all the separate states. Any universal 
 
THE STATE IN REFERENCE TO OTHERS. 1 99 
 
 sovereignty, monarchical or republican, would be found incom- 
 petent to control all individual choices to the highest freedom 
 of the choices of all. The very end of civil government would 
 therefore righteously preclude the establishment of any univer- 
 sal sovereignty. 
 
 But if this congress of nations be desirable at aU, it is in the 
 same sense desirable that it embrace all. Whatever benefit it 
 may be hoped to possess can be extended only to those repre- 
 sented in it ; but that it may embrace all, it must not be an all- 
 embracing sovereignty, as this would more endanger than pro- 
 tect the freedom of the human race. Such a congress, thus, 
 may not govern the nations. 
 
 3. The congress could be only the agent of a confederation. 
 Acting for the best interests of those sovereign states represented 
 in it, and made their agent for the transaction of any common 
 business regularly entrusted to it, it might serve the purposes of 
 the confederation with no prejudice to their individual sov- 
 ereignty, and perhaps with much favor to their common free- 
 dom. According to the interest and confidence of the nations 
 represented in it, as an efficient agent for their purpose, and the 
 wisdom and impartiality of its deliberations and resolves would 
 be its success. Different and opposing interests might be 
 adjusted ; national alienations and antipathies precluded ; com 
 mon interests promoted ; war prevented ; and thus, in various 
 ways, the freedom of these confederated nations would be sub- 
 served. Morality would find nothing in such a measure to 
 condemn in principle, and if in practice it were found to work 
 well, morality would enforce its adoption. It might, without 
 ethical objection, be made an oecumenical poUtical council. 
 
SECOND DIVISION. 
 
 DIVINE GOVERNMENT. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 GOD'S BEING AND COMMUNION WITH MAN. 
 
 WE here assume the existence of a personal Deity. The 
 proof for the being and perfections of God belongs to 
 Natural Theology ; and though the foregoing portions of our 
 system of Moral Philosophy are conclusive in their obligations 
 upon an Atheist, yet if the researches of Natural Theology find 
 an existing personal Deity, our system of Moral Philosophy 
 cannot here terminate. We have to settle the moral questions 
 connected with the communion between such a personal God 
 and the race of mankind. 
 
 We take, then, the valid proofs of Natural Theology, that 
 there is a personal Deity of absolute perfections, and proceed 
 to the investigation of the moral questions thus presented. 
 
 This God made us and all things. He perpetually upholds 
 and supplies all being. We know him imperfectly, but still 
 really, and in many things adequately, to all the ends of our 
 moral and religious being ; and he knows us thoroughly, not 
 only our wants, but the thoughts and intents of our hearts. 
 And our first inquiry is for the manner of communion between 
 God and mankind. 
 
 This cannot be the communion of equals with equals. The 
 perfections of the Deity raise him above nature, and thus make 
 
GOD S BEING AND COMMUNION WITH MAN. 201 
 
 him to be supernatural not only, but also above all creatures 
 that are themselves rational and personal, and thus make him 
 to be contemplated as completely superhuman. Equality of 
 communion, as between man and his fellows, is impossible. 
 There can be no society in which God and man come together 
 on the ground of common sympathies, wants, rights, and obli- 
 gations. 
 
 Nor is it the communion of parent and child. In some re- 
 spects an analogy may hold between the parental relation, and 
 that of God to his creatures. But the analogon is in few points, 
 and in these to an inadequate degree. The child, by a process 
 of development, may become equal to the parent; but no 
 growth of the human brings it any nearer to an equality with 
 the divine. 
 
 The communion can in no other way be expressed than as 
 the absolute and the dependent God receives nothing from 
 man, and gives all to man. Whatever God is, he is in himself 
 independent and underived ; whatever man is, he derives from 
 God and depends upon him to continue. " In him he lives 
 and moves and has his being." The philosophical modes, by 
 which the absolute can come into any form of communication 
 with his creatures, are here no topic of consideration ; but the 
 communion in any way must still leave the Deity to be con- 
 ceived as absolute spirit, existing in complete personal perfec- 
 tion within himself, — the I am that I am ; and man, as 
 created finite spirit, having proper personality, but derived, 
 dependent, and accountable. 
 
 This communion of the absolute and the dependent will also 
 involve the relation of sovereign and subject. Inasmuch as there 
 is moral personality in each, there must be a moral communion ; 
 and the perfections of the Deity permit him to stand in no other 
 relationship to man than that of his rightful sovereign. God's 
 attributes and man's faculties involve the ethical behest of au- 
 thority on the one side, and of subjection on the other. It 
 
202 COMPLETE LOYALTY. 
 
 would be unworthy of God that he should stand to man in any 
 other attitude than that of sovereignty, and unworthy of man 
 that he should come before God, even in the most endeared 
 communion, but as his subject, "with reverence and Godly 
 fear." 
 
 Such communion as sovereign and subject introduces a pecu- 
 liar moral government. There must be some form of legislation 
 and executive administration. But it must in many things differ 
 from all civil polity. A Being of absolute sovereignty, legislating 
 and executing in his own right, will give to us a polity of wholly 
 another kind than that of civil legislation, and which we distin- 
 guish as a Second Division of Positive Authority, under the 
 head of Divine Government. 
 
 These positive commandments from God must constitute 
 man's religious duties, and religion has very generally been con- 
 sidered as belonging to wholly a different field from morality. 
 If the moralist detmnine only such duties as belong to man, 
 considered merely in his humanity, then is it left to the. divine 
 to determine what duties God has positively enjoined. The 
 fields of morality and divinity are thus quite distinct. 
 
 But we have contemplated Moral Philosophy, not as if teach- 
 ing any particular duties, but as systematizing the ethical princi- 
 ples which lie at the foundation of all duties. We have not 
 taken at all the province of the casuist, and determined what 
 facts come under the principles, and thus settled particular 
 cases of conscience ; we have taken Moral Philosophy as the 
 science of principles only, and thus have been solicitous in 
 attaining a complete system of ethical principles, which all 
 casuists may apply. In this, which is the true field of morality 
 as a science, we have the same occasion for examining the 
 Divine authority that we had for the civil sovereignty. We 
 want to know what is the valid ground of the Divine Govern- 
 ment, as truly as that which gives ^obligation to Civil Govern- 
 ment ; and in both we would leave the particular facts, which 
 
THE END OF THE DIVINE LEGISLATION. 203 
 
 may sometimes be difficult to settle whether they come within 
 the principles, to the casuist, be he either jurist or preacher. 
 We are seeking, not whether such a thing is commanded, but 
 the righteousness by which any commands may be given j and 
 in this point of view morality covers all authority, the Divine as 
 truly as the human; We want the test of a valid religion, as 
 truly as of a valid civil polity ; and to know how to determine 
 between a true religious worship and life, and superstitious 
 devotion and practice, as really as between the obedience of 
 patriotism and the servitude of tyranny. Wherein is the Chris- 
 tian religion ethically more valid than Mohammedanism or 
 Paganism? The Moral Philosophy is for the determination of 
 this valid authority ; not what are the particular duties enjoined 
 by it. 
 
 CHAPTER II, 
 
 THE END OF THE DIVINE LEGISLATION. 
 
 The valid ground of God's government we have already ap- 
 prehended in his intrinsic perfections. Such a being as God 
 possesses sovereign authority over his creatures in his own ab- 
 solute right. 
 
 But the process of the Divine administration must be directed 
 towards that end which is to be consummated by it ; and thus, 
 based upon the intrinsic validity of the Divine Authority, the 
 equity of God's government in its administration can be deter- 
 mined only in full view of the end at which it aims. We have 
 then, as a first inquiry, preliminary to all examination of the 
 process of God's administration of a moral government, to de- 
 termine the end which it behooves God to seek, in all his legis- 
 lation and administration of a moral government. In the 
 
204 COMPLETE LOYALTY. 
 
 distinct attainment of its specific end, we shall be able to avoid 
 many errors, absurdities, and sometimes very serious sceptical 
 difficulties, that have much troubled others. 
 
 1 . We cannot determine the specific end in legislation, as we 
 do God's ultimate end in creation. We contemplate God in 
 his absolute being, and then the only moving spring to the 
 going forth of creating energy must be found in himself. As 
 infinite excellence, his own intrinsic worthiness must have ethi- 
 cally determined what, and in what manner, to create. He 
 should so act in creating as to be worthy of his own accepting, 
 and this must determine all the work of creation. 
 
 This will still be ultimate end in the consummation of all his 
 works, yet as distinct and particular end, his legislation n.ust 
 come in to subserve some excellency, and attain some benefit, 
 in the created system itself. It must be to meet some exigency 
 induced by creation, and have a particular reference to the 
 constitution and nature of that which has been created. Not 
 like creation itself, springing at once into being from the inner 
 ethical behest, that so it must be to be worthy of God ; but 
 creation having taken place, so it must be governed to meet 
 the specific wants in its own constitution. We cannot stand 
 with only the absolute God in out contemplation, and find the 
 end in his own inherent dignity ; but we must stand with the 
 creation itself in our eye, and find the specific end in its wants. 
 
 2. The Divine legislation must have its end in the capacities 
 of man's religious being. As a spiritual being, man has capa- 
 cities for higher communings than any which human society 
 offers. As a creature, in his own constitutional being, there is 
 the necessary conviction of helplessness and dependence. He 
 neither originated, nor can he perpetuate, his own being. He 
 finds himself the creature of many wants, that from himself there 
 is no capacity to supply. With all his intellectual activity, he 
 still finds himself ignorant in many particulars of the highest 
 practical importance, and which nothing short of a revelation 
 
THE END OF THE DIVINE LEGISLATION. 205 
 
 from heaven can remove. He has spiritual susceptibilities to 
 reverence, gratitude, and love, above all that any presented 
 human excellence can awaken, and is truly a being fitted for 
 religious worship and service ; and he can never rest satisfied 
 until he apprehends a Deity whom he may confidingly praise 
 and adore. There is a deep want, even in the purest created 
 nature, for some revealed source of all excellence and dignity 
 in whom the spirit may trust, and before whom it may bow in 
 homage and religious devotion. The deepest want in the 
 human soul is a divinely appointed and authorized method of 
 appearing before God, and in confiding love and trust pouring 
 out the whole religious being in adoration, and receiving the 
 pledges of the Divine approbation and favor. Man may have 
 wherewithal to satisfy every other want of his being, but in the 
 absence of this, his soul will be wretched and his spirit desolate. 
 
 And now it is precisely in this interest that the Divine gov- 
 ernment is instituted. Man's religious being is the source of 
 all the need of God's legislation for him, and the end to which 
 the entire administration of his government over him is directed. 
 In some way the Divine administration must be made to reach 
 and include all that pertains to man's religious communion with 
 God, and direct the entire outgoings of his soul in humble 
 dependence and confiding worship. Man must commune with 
 his God, not as a social or political personality, but wholly in a 
 religious capacity. He wants no legislation from God as a 
 merely ethical or political sovereign, but solely as an adorable 
 Lord and Saviour, to be loved and worshipped while his authority 
 is revered and obeyed. 
 
 The end of the Divine legislation, thus, is the highest piety 
 of its subjects. Piety is the outgoing of man's religious being 
 to God in sacred communion, devotion, and worship. It in- 
 cludes and controls all the susceptibility to divine love, grati- 
 tude, and reverence. Every feeling and affection which can be 
 awakened in communion with God, and employed in his ser- 
 
206 COMPLETE LOYALTY. 
 
 vice, needs its direction according to his will, that it may thus 
 be the highest and purest piety ; and to this end all God's legis- 
 lation and administration will be directed. Man's highest ex- 
 cellency as a religious being will be directly and specifically 
 sought in the Divine government, and the entire administration 
 turned to the one end of fitting him the most perfectly for 
 Heaven, which is God's final home and reward for consum- 
 mated piety. 
 
 That this must be so is proved in the very necessities of the 
 case. It is ethically demanded that it should so be, and nothing 
 else can satisfy morality. Man has such a religious capacity, 
 and God only can legislate for it. The whole must come under 
 responsibility to law, and be subjected to a discipline that is held 
 in positive authority, and which can never be attained in pure 
 morality, nor mere legality, but solely in a government which 
 holds in complete loyalty, and induces obedience from pure love 
 to the sovereign. 
 
 Piety cannot be attained under the discipline of pure morality, 
 nor can it any the more be cultivated in mere legality. The 
 sole constramt in piety is complete loyalty, — the love of the 
 Lord that is served and worshipped. Co-action from any source 
 but love will exclude all genuine piety. Piety may look to the 
 recompense of reward ; but no reward will be worth any thing in 
 its sight except solely as the token of its Lord's approbation. 
 There may be the exercise of Godly fear : but it is a fear that 
 is awakened in love, and which dreads more than death its 
 Lord's displeasure. The whole moving influence in piety is 
 love to God, and all the constraint of law upon it is solely re- 
 gard for the will of the Sovereign Lawgiver. All piety is glad- 
 ness and joy ; for it obeys out of love to the Master and his 
 service. 
 
 Man perishingly needs such a discipline ; and no being but 
 God can legislate in such a way as to effect it. It behooves 
 him thus, as sovereign, to take the throne, and legislate and 
 
THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION IN JUSTICE. 20/ 
 
 administer a government in the sole end of piety, and to raise 
 man to the highest attainable religious service and worship, 
 through the pure influence of a. Divine love and loyalty. 
 
 As under the First Division of Authority, we found the end 
 of human legislation to be the highest freedom ; so now, under 
 this Second Division, we find the end of the Divine legislation 
 to be the highest piety. But an administration directed to the 
 ends of highest piety may go out in its process in two directions, 
 according to the moral characters of its subjects. There may 
 be an administration over completely righteous beings, and all 
 its process rnay be to the end of cultivating and preserving their 
 piety. Such may be termed an administration of justice. Or, 
 there may be an administration over these same beings when 
 they have become sinners designed to restore to piety, and to re- 
 ceive to the Divine favor without prejudice to the piety of such 
 as had not sinned. Such may be termed an administration of 
 grace. 
 
 The end in view is the same in each, — the highest piety; but 
 it is manifest that the process of administration, in the two cases, 
 must differ on the grounds of morality. Righteousness will de- 
 mand in each according to the peculiar principles of each ; and 
 it is the business of moral philosophy to find and bring into sys- 
 tem these specifically distinctive principles. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE PROCESS OF THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION IN 
 JUSTICE. 
 
 God is righteously the sovereign over man on the groundj)f 
 his absolute perfection, and in the'"iriterest oFTnan's highest 
 susceptibiii5g57h^"wili legislate for the end of piety. Both as 
 
208 COMPLETE LOYALTY. 
 
 the Lord to be worshipped and served, and as the searcher of 
 the human heart, and knowing what is in man, he alone can 
 adapt his legislation and its execution to the best attainment of 
 man's religious interest, and regulate the whole process of his 
 administration by what is ethically demanded in his own right 
 and man's religious wants. By keeping the great end of God's 
 administration in view, we shall be able clearly to determine 
 many ethical principles which must be appUed in the process 
 of the Divine administration. 
 
 We here fix attention only upon t hose principles w hich 
 stand in a government of equity, and which must control where 
 ii5 3pro\^sions o fgrace and' mercy have been made. It will thus 
 givethegener3"prmcipS of an"a3ministration of strict justice. 
 
 I. P ositive Authority must be made especially prominent. 
 Piety is the end of the Divine government, and tt;e_most essen-~ 
 Tial element of pie ty Ts"7^^ '^- By this is meant that cordial 
 confidence in GoS" which mduces jojrful obedience and worship. 
 It thus " works by love, punfiesTIie~h5aTtrandr'overcomes the~ 
 world." The cultivation of the strongest faith will be the 
 means "for attaining the highest__piety. 
 
 From the very constitution of man, in his finiteness, he must 
 often, through all his experience, be obliged to act where he 
 cannot estima te the general consequences of Jiis_conduct, nor 
 see the reasons m thmgs thernieTvesTwEyhe should do one 
 thing and not anotEefT" His "Ignorance and weakness are the 
 source of lTis_want, and they make it imperative that he should 
 commit himself confidingly to the direction of the will of God 
 in its admitted wisdom and benevolence. He should cultivate 
 the spirit of unquestioning obedience, in whatever way God dis- 
 closes his will, and make it to be abundantly sufficient for his 
 faith and practice, that he has a plain Divine declaration of 
 what God would have him to believe and to do. 
 
 This is not at all in disparagement of his reason, but from the 
 highest demand of his reason. He must take many things upon 
 
THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION IN JUSTICE. 2O9 
 
 trust, b oth of bel ie f and pr actice ; and it is the highest reason 
 to trust God's testimony and yield to God^sauthority. When 
 in the^lght oi his reason helias ibund the sourceof all truth in 
 the Absolute Reason, it is the highest worthiness of man to trust 
 himself unhesitatingly to the Absolute. God must do and com- 
 mand many things which the finite cannot comprehend, but 
 which in his finiteness he may know cannot be unreasonable, 
 since they come from the fountain of all reason. It is his dig- 
 nity, and thus his duty, to walk by faith, since he cannot walk 
 by sight, and since his faith has its ground in the absolute per- 
 fections of God. 
 
 In this very poi nt is the essence of piety, as distinguished 
 from moraU tv. Morality clearl^jeesthejiltenate _right, in see- 
 ing in the spiritual being what is due to his own excellence ; 
 and thus the conscience constrains to virtue in the very light 
 of reason itself. Piety learii&Jjie_jg norance and emptiness of 
 man, and the wisdom and fulness of God; and thus is con- 
 strained to unquestioning subm ission by a proper distrust of 
 self, and a livelylgithJin-God. Only by this cultivation of an 
 unshaken faith in God can the human soul be raised to the 
 highest elevation in piety. Piety is, throughout, a most intelli- 
 gent grace, for it most clearly apprehends its own weakness and 
 God's sufficiency, and thus most reasonably withdraws from self- 
 confidence to trust in God. 
 
 The Divine administration should, therefore, perpetually 
 adapt itself to such a want in man. It should cultivate an 
 unwavering confidence in the Divine declaration and character ; 
 and thus keep constantly prominent positive commandments, 
 which throw the force of simple authority upon man, and en- 
 join obedience, not because reason can see why, but only 
 because such is God's will. That God commands it is made 
 the only reason that man should obey it. The sole motive is 
 made to be in faith ; confidence that God commands nothing 
 which is not reasonable, and yet disclosing nothing in the com- 
 mand itself to show that it is reasonable. 
 
2IO COMPLETE LOYALTY. 
 
 The use of positive authority may find its expression in the 
 unqualified prohibition of the fruit of a particular tree, or the 
 unexplained injunction of the right of circumcision, or the in- 
 stitution of a broad ritual of positive ceremonies j but in many 
 ways, it may beforehand be determined, that God's administra- 
 tion will keep prominent and constant the use of positive com- 
 mandments, and discipline man to piety by cultivating his 
 simple faith in God's trustworthiness. 
 
 2. God^s ad ministratio?i must regard both virtue a nd free- 
 do tn for piety's sake. Piety cannotbe where^yirtue i&dScaraeH ; ^ 
 and hence God's legislaflonwill enforce all morality for the ends 
 of piety. Piety cannot consist with the disregard of human 
 rights and public freedom j and hence God's legislation will en- 
 force all social and political duties for the ends of piety. Piety 
 
 consists in the whole religiQus portion of our_being^ gojng out 
 
 habitually in iognyanaintimate.communioQwith God ; and this 
 
 is the highest life of humanity ; the deepest want of the soul ; the 
 gre atest dignity of an immortal but dependent spir it,^_God's 
 entire government regards th is as its great en d, and as this can- 
 not be without virtue and political integrity, so God commands 
 them, and punistes~thS'TOnt not only as vicious and criminal, 
 but as sinful, — a transgression not only of reason, and of hu- 
 rnan law, but of God's c o mman dments. In this sense, all im- 
 morality, or disobedience to righteous human law, is also impiety. 
 They become as really dishonorable to God as idolatry and 
 blasphemy. God will thus hold man to perpetual morality, and 
 civil allegiance, for the end of piety. 
 
 3. God's administration shquld_ especially guard those sus- 
 ceptibilities which most endanger piety. The animal appeti tes, 
 when left to their passionate impulses, not only collide with 
 man's ethical, but more~espeTria;Hy-with his religious interests. 
 All intemperance, and voluptuousness, and pruIeTnot only blunt 
 the sensibility-of the conscience, but they quite as effectually 
 render torpid the whole religious susceptibility. All reverence 
 
THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION IN JUSTICE. 211 
 
 and confiding dependence are lost in audacity and vain-confi- 
 dence, whenever the lusts of the senses prevail. A licentious 
 man will necessarily be an irreligious man. A debauchee is ever 
 a religious scoffer. 
 
 The Divine administration, therefore, should guard all those 
 appetites, especially, which so readily destroy the delicacy of all 
 religious feeling. God's legislation should control the occupa- 
 tions and pursuits of Ufe ; the manners and habits of mankind ; 
 the food and the dress, so far as they minister to the inordinate 
 passions of the race. Especially will the marriage relation be 
 held sacred, and all divorce and " putting away " be forbidden, 
 except where conjugal infidelity would itself tend to render 
 impious the virtuous party. Such legislation in God looks not 
 merely to purposes of public morality and of civil freedom, but 
 far more comprehensively, to the ends of religion and piety. 
 He would hold man back from all intemperance and licentious- 
 ness, that he might have pure piety ; a sweet trust in God ; a 
 joyful communion with him, and a spiritual worship. 
 
 4. The Divine ad ministration will enforce and jie gulati^.ivine 
 woxship' Piety must go out in many acts of religious devotion. 
 Private and public worship must be recognized ; for piety must 
 commune with God both in secret and openly. Religious 
 instruction must also be secured; for piety would offer an 
 intelligent service. God only can give the necessarily authori- 
 tative regulations for such religious services, and secure a consis- 
 tent and harmonious order of worship. God, therefore, must 
 directly legislate in matters of religion. The time, the manner, 
 and perhaps the place, for offering to him the public prayers and 
 praises, must be determined by him, at least in so general a 
 manner that man may thereby gain the knowledge of what shall 
 be acceptable in particulars. A religious ritual, more or less 
 extensive, must somewhere be propounded for man, with all 
 the authority of a Divine sanction. 
 
 A Sabbath, of perpetual and unjyersal obligation, is itself a 
 
212 COMPLETE LOYALTY. 
 
 want in the human constitution. Not merely as a rest from all 
 secular employment, and thus a relief and necessary relaxation 
 from physical engagements, and thereby salutary for both body 
 and mind ; but more especially_ a demand for the wants of 
 man's spiritual and immortal being ; an uninterrupted and un- 
 diverted' flowing out oC the religious ^_sceptibilities, in that very 
 communion which_ajia£is£a.and_strengthens__2ie'^ul for its 
 coming perpetual employment in heaven. The absence of a 
 perpetual Sabbath in God's legislation would seem a strange 
 oversight, in the att ainment of Jhe.jery^Mid_for which all his 
 government is administered. A Sabbath must be made for 
 man ; his piety cannot else be jp erfected ; his religious wants 
 cannot otherwise be satisfied. It is not that he may worship 
 God~i a a conM rrtmion every day alike. He has secular wants to 
 which he must attend, and in ministering to which he must also 
 thankfully and piously acknowledge God ; but his religious well- 
 being demands transactions and communications with this God 
 in a special and exclusive manner, when no secular cares shall 
 be allowed to intrude, and no sensual interests disturb. He 
 needs a regularly-recurring day of rest from all that is secular, 
 and an opportunity fully to absorb himself in that which is 
 sacred. 
 
 With a Sabbath there may also be expected the positive in- 
 stitution of all necessary religious ordinances for man's cultiva- 
 tion in piety. The church should be instituted as embodying 
 • the company of the pious; its officers and ordinances should 
 be officially established, and its general organization settled, to 
 hold on through all time. Man cannot say, in many things, 
 what his piety needs, nor what God will accept at his hands ; 
 hence God's own legislation must fix, at least, the general out- 
 lines of his visible kingdom and worship. 
 
 5 . Ilivine_legislation may affix the sanctions of positive pen- 
 alties^ Positive penakies might, at tirst view, appear inconsist- 
 ent with the end of Divine legislation for piety's sake. Piety is, 
 
THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION IN JUSTICE. 21 3 
 
 in its spirit, complete loyalty ; it obeys solely from love . Kow 
 then can it adinit ot the constraint of positive penalty? Obedi- 
 ence from, fear of t he pena lty cannot be piety. Does not, then, 
 the Divine admmistration, in its use of threatenings, expect 
 obedience from other motives than love, and consent to be 
 satisfied with something less than complete loyalty? 
 
 The following considerations will show that the use of pains 
 and penalties, in the Divine government, is still fully consistent 
 with its end in piety : 
 
 First. Penalty is of spryj ce to piety, even in its restraints- as 
 legality. It would be well for the sinner to be held back from 
 transgression by fear, though the law was not satisfied by any 
 such constr ained inn ocence, that other motives consistent with 
 piety might ^ome in an d induce a perpet uation ^conduct con- 
 formed to law from co mplete^ loyalty. Such constraint of the 
 wicked, from mere fear, would exclude the influence also of 
 their open transgression upon the righteous, and withdraw so"" 
 much of temptation from man, and thus find an end in the 
 direct interest of piety. " 
 
 Secondly. MaE£_dkectl3ia_£enalty is necessary for the sake 
 of piety, as a n ex pression of the Divine feeling. Law expresses™"" 
 the feeling of sovereig nty in no other m anner, ad equately , thaa, 
 ii> its sanctio ns. 'I'he whole emphasis given To the precept is in 
 the retribution, apgradgito it. In this only is the true index 
 of the sovereign will. Here is seen just how much God hates 
 disobedience, and though the_ dirgction_Qf_the- Divine will is 
 given in the precept, yet is Jts-intensity manifested- -only, in the 
 penalty. In the very penalty is made the exhibition of God's 
 regard for piety, by his'hatred of impiety ; aTid'thus:- an exhibi- 
 tion of the Divine character to the holy, that they may be the 
 more loyal, and love him as their sovereign the more on that 
 account. This is the very end that God seeks in the disclos- 
 ure of his judgments ; not that men should obey through slavish 
 fear, but that' they should read therein his hatred to sinj^and 
 
214 COMPLETE LOYALTY. 
 
 l-.enceforth serve him because he is a holy God, and demands 
 loyal obedience. 
 
 Thirdly. Piet y finds its prop er niptiveto obedience in the 
 very sanctions. The reward promise d to the pious is v aluecLby- 
 TEernm nothing^ojnuchjsjhat'irisan evidence of the appro- 
 batioiTof the Master they love ; and the punishment threatened 
 would"be in nothing so fearful, as that it was the index of God's 
 disapprobation and displeasure. To the loyal soul, it is thus 
 more" GSQ'^s'ctispleasufe'tharis dreaded, than hell ; more God's 
 approbation that is valued, thaft heay-en. All tTiat is seen in the 
 t'.u-eatened hell isTKislDivine wrath ; and all that is noticed in 
 the promised heaven is this Divine approbation. Sufficient to 
 the loyal' soul is it that God approves^and manifests the tokens 
 of his regard, and to him there is heaven in nothing else. He 
 can bear all sufffirings,..if God sustain by his approbation ; he 
 cares for no happiness, if God is not in it. " His favor is life, 
 and his loving kindness is better than life." 
 
 Thus in many ways are the Divine sanctions motives to pious 
 loyalty ; and their Divine intention proves that the end of the 
 Divine government is piety. ^ ' 
 
 6. The promised reward must' be equal and coetaneous with 
 the piety. If there is no specific promise of reward to obedi- 
 ence attached to certain precepts, still is this reward always im- 
 plied in the converse of the threatened penalty. " In the day 
 thou eatest thereof, thou shalt die," no more fully expresses a 
 threat, than it implies a promise, — in the day thou eatest not of 
 it, thou shalt live. To all piety there is the pledge of the Divine 
 approbation ; and this is the very reward which loyalty seeks, no 
 matter how manifested. 
 
 This is due to loyalty. It behooves God to show his favor to 
 all pious obedience. When there is piety, then must God ap- 
 prove of it. So long as there is piety, and so much as there is 
 of it, so constant and so great must God show his favor. The 
 pious, from the equity of the divine character, cannot fail of the 
 full reward for all their loyalty. 
 
THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION IN JUSTICE. 2X5 
 
 7. TTie sin of the subject may not admit of his annihilation. A 
 sin committed becomes a fact in the realm, and brings its neces- 
 sary influences with it. It is a new causality introduced by the 
 sinner, and perpetually working out its effects. Henceforth the 
 moral universe cannot be as if that fact of sin had not been. 
 Henceforth, therefore, it is due to the universe, and it behooves 
 God in his own righteousness, to manifest a mark, of disappro- 
 bation precisely equal to, and perpetually counteractive of, the 
 evil influences of that sinful fact. The fact admits of no anni- 
 hilation, and the consequences of the fact are themselves undy- 
 ing and perpetual ; and no coetaneous displeasure can do that 
 which is due to the universe, in this perpetual evil. That mani- 
 fested displeasure must go down parallel with the evil influences 
 of that sinful fact, both in the right of the moral universe and 
 of God ; and how shall that displeasure have its manifestation 
 in any annihilation of the sinner? Considerations come in, 
 connected with sin, which may not morally admit that the sinner 
 should ever cease to be, or cease from "being an object of the 
 Divine disapprobation. Terrible as is such a consideration, it 
 seems only the terror of strict ethical rectitude. If no provis- 
 ion of grace were made, the Divine administration could have 
 no corrective for sin, except perpetual disapprobation towards 
 the sinner. 
 
 8. Retribution must synchronize with the sin. We have already 
 seen that the reward must be coetaneous with the piety ; and 
 considerations come in with sin, which more especially admit of 
 no delay of punishment. The penalty expresses God's regard 
 for his law ; how much he hates disobedience to it. A time of 
 respite to the sinner is, in its continuance, a time of disregard 
 to law, and a plain contradiction to that feeling which the sanc- 
 tion to the law expresses. All that can ever demand the man- 
 ifested Divine disapprobation, does this at once upon the 
 conviction of the sin ; and if any delay be given, the law has 
 nothing to show why it may not forbear as well its threatened 
 
2l6 COMPLETE LOYALTY. 
 
 infliction forever. Why, after so long a delay, it might well be 
 said, bring up the punishment now? Such capricious punish- 
 ment would defeat the whole end of penalty in upholding piety. 
 
 9. An administration of justice can allow no room for par- 
 don. In civil legislation, there may often come in, from some 
 peculiar circumstances of the criminal, considerations which will 
 make a pardon as conservative of the end of public freedom, 
 as the execution of the punishment; and, in such a case, 
 pardon is morally righteous. It does not subvert the end of 
 the law. 
 
 But the end of the law, in the Divine government, is piety. 
 This is sustained in the most effective manner, only through the 
 precisely adequate penalty. The perfection of the government 
 secures perfect equity in the law, and in the conviction of the 
 sinner, and thus leaves no righteous room for pardon. Just the 
 righteous threatening has been appended, and just the amount 
 of guilt has been disclosed, and thus the penalty incurred must 
 be executed, or the ground at once falls away on which the law- 
 giver's reward for piety had been righteously placed. The law 
 regards the highest piety as end no longer, but has consulted 
 some other end in the pardon of the sinner. 
 
 With a penalty appended to law by perfect intelligence, and 
 the detection and conviction of guilt by complete omniscience, 
 there remains in full force the ethical claim for full infliction of 
 the penalty. Any remission would, so far, strike down the end 
 of piety which the law was designed to subserve. 
 
 10. The obedient can bring God under no obligation beyond 
 the due approbation of their piety. The whole end of the law is 
 fulfilled in love. It expresses God's love to piety. It is de- 
 signed to draw out pious obedience, which is the service of 
 love. It cancels all the claims of piety, iii the manifestations 
 of God's love toward the pious. If God's government has done 
 all that love to piety demands, both in the legislation and re- 
 warding approbation, it has done all that law and government 
 
THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION IN JUSTICE. 21/ 
 
 can do ; and now sovereignty can make the challenge to the 
 universe, and say what more could 1 have done for my king- 
 dom, that I have not done in it. 
 
 If any have sinned, they have done so under all the opposing 
 considerations which God as a sovereign in justice could pre- 
 sent. If any righteous have been disturbed by sinners, they 
 have had all the redress and assistance against the injury that 
 they can demand, in the witness of God's penal abhorrence of 
 the sin, and his retributive favor for their piety. Their piety 
 must have the approbation of all the good, as truly as the ap- 
 probation of their own consciences ; and when such is awarded 
 to them, they can ask God, in equity, for nothing more. The 
 most completp piety has been the servant's excellency, and not 
 for the sovereign's aggrandizement. All the homage rendered 
 to God has been his due, and has added nothing to him which 
 was not his in his own right ; and has moreover conduced to the 
 servant's highest well-being in the consummation of his own excel- 
 lence and dignity. In all this highest service and God's appro- 
 bation for it, it is his to thank God for the privilege of life and 
 action under such a government, not for God to thank him for 
 having performed his part so well in it. He has done to God 
 only what he ought to have done in equity, and has no claim 
 beyond the approbation already given. God has his claim to 
 perpetual gratitude, that he gave the subject his being, and 
 continues it under such an administration ; the subject has no 
 claims in equity for his piety, that have not already been can- 
 celled in the Divine favor. 
 
 Complete piety is thus perpetually a legal heaven ; a full re- 
 ward of bliss to all its worshippers ; the highest heaven to which 
 an angel can ascend ; and in that heaven spontaneous praise 
 and gratitude must ever flow on as due to God, and no arresting 
 of the onward stream of thanksgiving can occur, as if sometimes 
 God must reciprocate and the tide of gratitude flow back from 
 , him to his pious worshippers. That current of heavenly praise 
 
2l8 COMPLETE LOYALTY. 
 
 can never set but in one direction ; it is rightfully and forever 
 flowing out from each worshipping spirit perpetually toward the 
 throne, and received and absorbed by Him who sitteth upon it 
 as his righteous due forever and ever. 
 
 With these leading principles, which must ever determine the 
 process of an administration of God's government in justice, 
 we have sufficient for our direction, in their application to any 
 assumed system of religion, to decide what is of God, and what 
 is some profane invention or spurious addition from man. The 
 particular duties of a religion, which should be inculcated in an 
 admifiistration of pure justice, must be made out from the com- 
 mandments given, and which are no part of a system of moral 
 science ; but the principles by which we must determine the 
 divinity of such a religion are above made sufficiently plain. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE PROCESS OF THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION IN GRACE. 
 
 Let it be remarked here in general, that ethical science is 
 purely a system of ends. Pure Morality has its ultimate end 
 in the excellency of man's rational spirit, and constrains in 
 duty for the sake of the highest worthiness of reason alone. 
 But in other directions, other ends may be perceived which it 
 may be important to attain, but which may never be pursued in 
 conflict with the ultimate end of morality. The determination 
 how such ends may be attained in consistency with morality, 
 brings them all within the province of Ethical Philosophy. 
 
 Civil freedom is another end than morality, but this may not 
 be sustained at the expense of virtue. State authority, legislat- 
 ing for freedom's sake, must conform to pure morality ; and.the 
 
THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION IN GRACE. 219 
 
 determination how this may be so effected, brings the whole 
 science of jurisprudence as a system of ends in freedom, also 
 within the province of Moral Philosophy. 
 
 And so also is piety another end than morality, yet must not 
 piety be promoted in any conflict with virtue. The Divine au- 
 thority in the end of piety must accord with pure morality, and 
 the determination how this may be brings religion as truly as 
 jurisprudence within the province of Moral Philosophy. 
 
 And this holds true, not only in the Divine administration of 
 justice, but equally so in God's administration of grace. This 
 contemplates man as condemned by the law of justice, and 
 hopeless of all restoration to piety and favor by the mere action 
 of law, and seeks out a way of restoration and pardon for the 
 sinner, and thus keeps fully in view the end of piety. But these 
 provisions of grace may in no way contravene morality, and the 
 determination how grace may prevail, in consistency with all 
 the claims of equity, brings the Christian scheme of Redemp- 
 tion, still in the end of piety, within the province of Moral 
 Philosophy. 
 
 AH systems of ends must harmonize with morality, and thus 
 all come within Moral Science. 
 
 We now take up the Divine Administration in Grace, and 
 seek to determine how it must proceed in order to a complete 
 conformity with pure morality ; and in order to apprehend the 
 difficulty, and notwithstanding which, the practicability, also, of 
 such determined accordance, we shall need here to recapitulate 
 and bring under one view our past conclusions. 
 
 We have already seen how authority stands in complete con- 
 formity with morality. Sovereignty must have a righteous foun- 
 dation in its inherent qualifications for governing, and must then 
 go out within the lines of its own righteous jurisdiction, and in 
 this view authority itself will bind the conscience. The man will 
 degrade his rationality, and act unworthy of himself as a spirit- 
 ual being, if he violate the mandates of righteous authority. 
 
220 COMPLETE LOYALTY. 
 
 But authority is not needed simply in pure morality. That is 
 obedience for virtue's sake alone. The sole constraint is high- 
 est spiritual worthiness, and neither reward nor penalty can come 
 in as any coercion in the fulfilment of moral duty. Other ends 
 than morality are, however, found important. Man must live in 
 society, and society, through its interacting choices, becomes an 
 organic community known as a state, and the choices of each 
 must be constrained in harmony with the highest freedom of 
 choice in the whole, and hence the public freedom becomes an 
 important end to be attained, and which can only be subserved 
 by authority. If the selfish will not be restrained by purely 
 moral considerations, then it is perfectly in conformity with pure 
 morality that the state should restrain them, for its freedom's 
 sake, by pains and penalties. Obedience from mere legality 
 does not make the citizen virtuous ; it only answers the end of 
 freedom, and perseveres in political innocence. For freedom's 
 sake, authority may righteously act, and constrain by pains and 
 penalties. 
 
 So, again, man is dependent and helpless. In his very con- 
 stitution he finds the need for an absolute ground of trust and 
 confidence, — an all-perfect Being whom he may revere and 
 adore. No conformity to all the claims of pure morality, as 
 found in the imperatives which a knowledge of his rational 
 being awakens, can satisfy these higher wants of his religious 
 being. When the being of this absolute God is recognized, 
 there is apprehended at once, in his perfections, a valid ground 
 for righteous sovereignty, and a need that his authority direct 
 just how these religious susceptibilities of man's being should 
 go out in pious service and homage. The sanctions to his com- 
 mandments indicate his regard for piety and his abhorrence of 
 impiety, and these are designed to induce obedience from the 
 cordial approbation and love of just such a being. Such con- 
 straint from complete loyality is alone piety. Not as a hireling 
 or a slave, but solely with a loyal, trusting, loving heart, does any 
 
THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION IN GRACE. 221 
 
 obedience satisfy the Divine law. Legality may subserve public 
 freedom, but not piety; complete loyalty only can stand in 
 God's sight. This makes more than the highest worthiness of 
 the man, viewed in the fulfilment of all the claims of his rational 
 spirit alone ; even the fulfilment of all the claims of his reUgious 
 being, in obedience to an absolute sovereign from love. In- 
 asmuch as man now knows himself to be more than ethical, 
 even a religious being, so his very morality demands of him that 
 he should fulfil the claims of that higher nature and obey God 
 from love to him. A Divine government may thus righteously 
 use authority for the end of highest piety. 
 
 But the next step brings with it great difficulty of explication. 
 The administration of justice is precisely adapted, in the Divine 
 government, to every claim of pure morality. The law and its 
 sanctions are exactly adapted to reveal the character of God, 
 and throw the strongest influence upon man to induce obedience 
 and worship from pure loyalty, and thus in the highest degree 
 promote piety. But this administration has failed to secure 
 universal piety. Multitudes are not loyal, but rebellious. The 
 best government that could be administered in the end of 
 piety has proved inefficient ; and now, can any new provision 
 be made consistent with pure morality? Should not this ad- 
 ministration of justice go on, blessing all the pious that it may, 
 and punishing all the impious that it must? So, I suppose, all 
 finite intelligence must have affirmed. 
 
 The strongest objections to the Christian plan of redemption 
 apply just at this point. Among others less profound is the 
 weighty difficulty felt by Kant, in viewing Christianity as having 
 a common end with morality. If Christianity be judged in 
 reference to the sole end of pure morality, then is the difficulty 
 insuperable. For no motive may be allowed except the pure 
 love of virtue, and any introduction of substitution and atone- 
 ment is immoral. The kindness of benevolent sacrifice may 
 demand gratitude and love from the beneficiaries, but this can- 
 
222 COMPLETE LOYALTY. 
 
 not be accepted for the pure love of virtue. No pure love of 
 virtue in the substitute can stand for others, nor be vicarious for 
 theirs ; for pure morality demands personal virtue. An accept- 
 ance of any thing else is the subversion of immutable right, and 
 could only reflect at once immorality and unrighteousness upon 
 any government that should tolerate it. 
 
 An ingenious philosophical explanation is then attempted by 
 Kant, by which God may ethically accept one who has sinned, 
 and who must ever be imperfect, but it admits of no substitu- 
 tion. An Ideal of perfect humanity, he supposes, may induce 
 to the adoption of sentiments leading to our imitation of it ; and 
 these sentiments as permanently active, though only inducing a 
 perpetual process toward perfection without the finite ever being 
 able to complete it, may be accepted as comprehending in 
 them the principle of perfection. This adoption of the Ideal is 
 the man's faith in the Son of God. 
 
 But permanent perpetual progress in good does away no past 
 guilt ; no supererogation can do it ; no other person may do it. 
 It is a debt of sin and obligation to punishment, and the sinner 
 only can undergo it. No innocent being, how magnanimous 
 soever, can bear it for the guilty. The adoption of the new 
 sentiment is a self-crucifixion of the old man ; and this perpetu- 
 ated, in the perpetual willingness of the new man that there 
 should be such self-crucifixion, is a perpetual sacrifice that gives 
 the ground of hope for complete justification. This is Kant's 
 Gospel according to pure ethics. 
 
 But such a spurious Christian theory, as necessary to explain 
 away the intrinsic immorality of the Scripture atonement from 
 the point of view taken, finds no occasion from the true point 
 of view, viz. : that the end of God's government is piety, not 
 morality. Benevolent suffering may promote love, and even 
 kindle it anew, if lost ; and thus secure obedience through com- 
 plete loyalty. This, not pure morality, is the end of God's gov- 
 ernment, and readily admits of Christian substitutioii. But this 
 
THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION OF GRACE. 223 
 
 gracious administration owes still to morality the securing of 
 two distinct results. One is, the restoration to loyalty of so 
 many of the lost as shall compensate for the provision made ; 
 the other, the confirmation of the Divine authority in the pious 
 regard of all the obedient, at least as effectually in the grace of 
 redemption as could have been done in the justice of penal 
 execution. All through the Divine administration, either in jus- 
 tice or grace, the grand end is the highest piety in consistency 
 with righteousness ; and thus the authority of sovereignty must 
 be sustained on the one hand, and in such a manner as shall 
 most strongly constrain to piety consistently with morality on 
 the' other. In the gracious administration, the authority of the 
 old administration must still stand, though given up as the way 
 of securing piety ; and higher influences to love and loyal obe- 
 dience must be brought in, securing the return to allegiance of 
 many who would otherwise have remained incorrigible in their 
 rebellion. Without each of these, the end of piety and the 
 claim of morality cannot be sustained. We have thus to deter- 
 miue the process of a gracious administration, with these two 
 results in view : 
 
 How Divine authority may be sustained? 
 
 How stronger motives to loyalty may be introduced ? 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE PROCESS IN THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION OF GRACE 
 FOR SUSTAINING AUTHORITY. 
 
 The administration of justice failing in its end by the sin of 
 the subjects, and a new administration of grace introduced with 
 provisions for recovering the sinner to piety and the Divine 
 favor, it is yet necessary that the authority which iiistituted and 
 
224 COMPLETE LOYALTY. 
 
 administered the old government of justice should still be re- 
 spected and revered. That was a righteous government, con- 
 formed in all its parts to every moral claim, and thus worthy of 
 everlasting approbation. The same sovereign still reigns over 
 the same subjects, and only changes his administration, as in 
 the changed circumstances by sin he must, in order to attain 
 the unchanged end of piety ; and thus both for the conviction 
 of righteous condemnation, and also for the sustaining the 
 righteous claims to repentance and confession of the sin com- 
 mitted, the authority of the old form of government must, in all 
 its claims, be fully sustained as having been wholly righteous 
 and valid. Some of the principles which must be recognized 
 in the process of the administration of grace, for effecting this 
 vindication of authority, will here be given, and which must so 
 far determine, on ethical grounds, how the new administration 
 must be executed. 
 
 I. The principle of positive authority must be perpetuated. 
 The very end of piety demanded under the old administration, 
 that laws should be given in which no reason could be seen 
 from the nature of the case, but which rested their whole con- 
 straint for obedience upon God's authority alone. Nothing 
 could so effectually cultivate confidence and dependence upon 
 God, and love to his supremacy, as the throwing of the subject 
 upon the sole sentiment of loyalty, and demanding prompt obe- 
 dience where no other reason was given than that, " thus saith 
 the Lord." But under the new administration there is even a 
 stronger claim for this from the same source. Especially as a 
 sinner does the man's whole interest in a religious experience 
 turn upon his confidence in his sovereign, and demand such 
 influences as shall best inspire with faith and love. Precepts, 
 resting upon God's authority solely, must still be given. 
 
 But more particularly is this required, in order that the gra- 
 cious administration may in no manner weaken the authority of 
 that in justice. There is an ethical claim, in which it behooves 
 
THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION OF GRACE. 22$ 
 
 God for his own consistency of character, not in his grace by 
 any means to seem to discard his authority in justice. If the 
 gracious administration have no precepts resting solely on 
 authority, against which the sin and rebellion of the subject in 
 the former administration was directed, it would necessarily be 
 deemed a relinquishment of the whole principle of positive 
 authority, and stand out as a fair implication and tacit admis- 
 sion that God had grown wise by experience, and now saw the 
 inexpediency of introducing again that principle which had been 
 the occasion of so much disaster in the former method of legis- 
 lation. No such implication may at all be tolerated, and hence 
 the gracious legislation will also include the principle of positive 
 authority. The end of piety, consistency with morality, and 
 especially the vindication of Divine authority under the old 
 administration, all demand it. 
 
 2. The penalty of law must not be remitted except on some 
 ground of equivalent substitution. The design of the gracious 
 administration is to restore the sinner to piety and the Divine 
 favor. In some way, therefore, it must contemplate the remis- 
 sion of penalty. The infliction of penalty is, essentially, the 
 manifestation of Divine displeasure. The very element, which 
 gives to penal evil all its sting, is that it carries to the conscience 
 the conviction of God's abhorrence and displeasure. Penalty, 
 thus, must in some way be removed, or the Divine favor can- 
 not be restored, since restoration to favor would be the anni- 
 hilation of that very element which made the evil to be penal. 
 
 As penalty itself cannot be endured, and grace prevail, and 
 as penalty cannot be discarded, and leave the divine authority 
 without any sanction, some other sanction must come into its 
 place. The sinner is to be freed from penalty ; no other being 
 can bear it for him, inasmuch as the very essence of penalty is 
 Divine displeasure against the sinner punished, and no suffering 
 by another than the sinner can have this ingredient of Divine 
 displeasure; therefore something not punishment, but which 
 
226 COMPLETE LOYALTY. 
 
 Other than it is, yet to take the place of it, some substitute for 
 it, is yet to be provided. 
 
 And this substitute for penalty must be fully equivalent for it, 
 and sustain all the ends which it was designed to subserve as 
 well as the full penalty inflicted would do. The penalty was 
 meant to be an adequate expression of the sovereign's will, 
 manifesting how much he was pleased with piety, and dis- 
 pleased with impiety; and unless he designs to retract that 
 manifestation of his will, and discard the equity and validity of 
 the authority which has gone out in his legislation, he must put 
 something pf at least equal efficacy for that end in its place, 
 for the sake of which the penalty may be remitted. Any thing 
 not a full equivalent would so far impeach the sovereign's con- 
 sistency, as manifesting formerly too much regard to authority, 
 or now too little, and this would itself be fatal to all authority 
 as convicting it of immorality. 
 
 3. The estimate of this vicarious equivalent must be made 
 simply in reference to the end of piety. The Divine administra- 
 tion is not in the end of morality, nor of freedom, but solely of 
 piety. We are not at all to look here for that which will sub- 
 serve the ends of morality or of civil polity, but solely the 
 interests of religion in securing piety. If we were to seek for 
 any substitution in pure morality, we should be at once stopped 
 in its inconsistency. The constraint in morality is the pure 
 love of virtue, in the worthiness of character which obedience 
 secures ; and the alternative to this is that which alone can be 
 called penalty in pure morality, — my own unworthiness and 
 sense of moral degradation in my immorality. Here, no sub- 
 stitute for the penalty is conceivable ; for conscious disapproba- 
 tion and debasement are as necessary for my vicious action as 
 conscious approbation and dignity are for my virtuous action. 
 Such penalty neither can be nor ought to be changed. Any sub- 
 stitution here would be an ethical absurdity. We suppose no 
 such change ; we carefully discriminate, and attempt to intro- 
 
THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION OF GRACE. 227 
 
 duce no such substitution. Morality can admit of no changes 
 of duty or of penalty ; of no expiation or atonement. 
 
 When we seek for remission of punishment in civil govern- 
 ment, all we need is something to sustain the sovereign authority, 
 in the interests of public freedom, as well as the penalty ; and 
 if this can be found, righteous commutations of punishment, 
 and pardons of criminals may be effected with no detriment to the 
 commonwealth. Substitutions for human penalties need only 
 to be estimated in the interests of that freedom which they 
 were designed to sustain. 
 
 But the end of piety demands that all substitution be esti- 
 mated solely in the light of piety, and for the sustaining of 
 authority as bearing upon religious interest. The penalty may 
 have been the best possible sanction to law in its original enact- 
 ment, and sustained the ends of piety as, under mere law, 
 nothing else could ; but, when law has been broken and piety 
 become lost, if there is any substitute which will then sustain 
 law and subserve piety as well as the penalty, it may be taken. 
 But in estimating what it must be that is equivalent, the end in 
 view must not be as if it were in pure morahty, nor as if it were 
 in civil polity, but solely in the end of religion as sustained in 
 the authority of the divine government. We shall be greatly 
 assisted in a righteous estimate of the Christian atonement 
 when we have accurately distinguished the sole end which it 
 can or ought to subserve. 
 
 4. All hope of restoration to the Divine favor must rest on 
 the ground of this equivalent substitute. Were it supposable 
 that more than one thing could be an adequate substitution, yet 
 the fact that one had been instituted must necessarily exclude 
 all others. It is the sovereign's prerogative to affix sanctions to 
 law, and when penalty is to be remitted through a substitution, 
 the same considerations must make it the prerogative of the 
 sovereign to fix the substitute. Both penalty and substitute are 
 designed as adequate expressions of his will, and he alone is 
 
228 COMPLETE LOYALTY. 
 
 competent to settle what shall precisely express his regard for 
 piety. If the sovereign has not ratified the substitute in his own 
 appointment, there is no validity in it, and no confidence to be 
 put upon it ; and if he has ratified a specific substitute, no con- 
 fidence may be placed on any other. God cannot righteously 
 permit the sinner to determine what substitute he will rest his 
 confidence upon, any more than he may permit the sinner to 
 choose what penalty he will consent to suffer. The penalty must 
 be of God's imposing, and the substitute must be of God's in- 
 stituting ; and the sinner who presumes to rest his hope on any 
 other must forfeit all the advantages offered in the gracious ad- 
 ministration His presumption, in putting his own in the place 
 of God's revealed substitute for the penalty, must really aggra- 
 vate his condemnation, and augment the executed penalty. 
 
 All penances, ritual observances, self-righteous impositions, 
 a:nd substitutions of any kind for- the one grand substitute of 
 God's providing, must be not only vain but truly heaven-provok- 
 ing. We must see in that substitute God's own expression of 
 feeling, or we get no sanction to his law, nor support for his 
 authority, and of course nothing which ought to stand instead 
 of the literally-executed penalty. 
 
 5. Some manifestation of the Divine displeasure must be 
 made against sin, while the probation in grace is progressing. 
 The old penalty is forborne, and patience spares the condemned 
 sinner. A new trial on the footing of grace has commenced, 
 and if this trial eventuate in reformation and return to pious 
 loyalty, the old penalty is to be wholly abrogated, and the re- 
 formed sinner received into everlasting favor. 
 
 But while this delay lasts to give space for a new trial, and 
 holds back the stroke of the old penalty, it is due to God's 
 authority, and demanded in the end of piety, that God keep 
 up some manifested displeasure against the offence which has 
 subverted the end of the old administration. It will not be the 
 execution of the old penalty, for that is held in abeyance j but 
 
THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION OF GRACE. 229 
 
 it will be some form of suffering, in a curse which will mark his 
 displeasure against the sin, and at the same time conform to the 
 ends of recovery in the gracious administration. It will serve 
 as a discipline, and not stand out as a vindictive retribution. 
 
 This may come as some curse upon the ground, or upon man 
 himself in his sentient being, which shall last through all the 
 generations of the spared race, and under which the creation 
 shall groan and travail in pain from the beginning of sin on- 
 wards. The displeasure of God, and his abhorrence of the old 
 iniquity, may terribly admonish the subjects of grace through 
 their whole life of suffering and bereavement and sickness and 
 final death of the body ; yet it will not be in the penal infliction 
 of judgment without mercy, but a severe discipline in mercy, so 
 that all may remember the great fact that God terribly abhors sin 
 even while he makes provision to pardon it, and waits for his 
 spared subjects to turn from it. He chastises as a father ; he 
 admonishes as a teacher ; but he does not yet punish as a sov- 
 ereign judge and executioner. He waits to be gracious, though 
 his waiting is amid all the severe but salutary discipline which is 
 designed to bring back to piety. 
 
 In all the above principles, the new administration will keep 
 the vindication of the Divine authority out permanently before 
 mankind, for the end of highest piety. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE PROCESS IN A GRACIOUS ADMINISTRATION BY WHICH 
 STRONGER INFLUENCES TO LOYALTY ARE GIVEN. 
 
 The old administration of justice failed of its end in securing 
 piety, and the new administration is introduced for the end of 
 restoring multitudes to piety. There is no reason for this 
 
230 COMPLETE LOYALTY. 
 
 change of administration from justice to grace, if the latter 
 cannot secure the sinner's return to loyality. But surely all 
 such results may well be deemed hopeless, if in the new admin- 
 istration there be not provision made for higher motives and 
 stronger influences to love and obedience than the old adminis- 
 tration exhibited and exerted. That failed to secure perpetu- 
 ated piety, though beginning in loyalty ; the same measure of 
 influence cannot, therefore, be deemed adequate to restore and 
 confirm piety in subjects already rebellious. 
 
 There is, then, an ethical claim, if a gracious administration 
 be introduced, that it shall provide stronger influences to piety 
 than the old administration presented. That gave as strong an 
 exhibition of the sovereign's regard to piety as justice could 
 secure, but the failure of that may give occasion for presenting 
 new and higher motives than could at first have been possible. 
 Such occasions for subsequent higher gracious influences fore- 
 seen, justified the introduction of the first form of adminis- 
 tration, though it was well known to Omniscience that its 
 introduction would be followed by the failure of its own direct 
 end. But now in the introduction of the gracious legislation, 
 the wisdom and consistency of the sovereign can be vindicated 
 in no other manner than by introducing means of greater influ- 
 ence. The form of government ought not to change, if the 
 interests of piety can gain nothing. 
 
 We need, thus, to determine how the end of Divine legisla- 
 tion in piety may be reached through a more efficacious process 
 than any administration of justice could supply. The form of 
 justice must first be taken ; afterwards grace may come in, and 
 be more effective in the application of the following higher 
 motives : 
 
 I. 77ie benevolence manifested in the substitution itself. In 
 the administration of justice, every command and sanction was 
 in full conformity with morality, and thus all its motives to piety 
 fairly appealed to the conscience of the subject. Every sinner, 
 
THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION OF GRACE. 23 1 
 
 therefore, knows his desert of punishment, and that its infliction 
 would be righteous. But if just at the point when the arm is 
 upUfted to strike the terrible blow so consciously deserved, the 
 sovereign at his own expense effects a way for deliverance and 
 arrests the descending stroke of the executioner, nothing can 
 appeal more forcibly to the sinner to repent and return to 
 loyalty, than this melting kindness in the breast of offended 
 sovereignty. The sternness of authority changes to compassion, 
 and the vengeance of sovereignty relapses into the most benevo- 
 lent regard before the eyes of the rebels themselves. They see 
 presented a plan which fully sustains his own authority and 
 majesty, and which also includes the reformation, pardon, and 
 restoration of the guilty ; and in this benovolence there is alto- 
 gether a stronger influence to melt and reclaim the guilty than 
 in all the terrible preparation for the full execution of the legal 
 penalty. 
 
 Here is the yearning heart of kindness ; the tenderness of a 
 father ; and it works more powerfully upon the obdurate heart 
 and the stubborn will of the rebel, to melt in love and recover 
 to loyalty, than all the frowns and vindictive penal retributions 
 of offended sovereignty. 
 
 2. The influence of patience. In a government of justice 
 there is no place for patience. This is delay of infliction, when 
 the penalty has been incurred ; and such delay is injustice, un- 
 less some substitute for penalty be presented. On the giround 
 of an adequate substitution, patience may endure even to long- 
 suffering. And such delay of penal infliction not merely gives 
 time for reflection, and the working of conviction and self- 
 condemnation in the experience of the sinner, but it is itself a 
 strong motive to break off' from a course of sin, which has already 
 exhausted so much of the Divine forbearance. The reflection, 
 that Divine long-suffering has been so much abused, is a motive 
 of growing intensity to abuse no longer, but to confess and re- 
 turn and seek reconciliation. 
 
232 COMPLETE LOYALTY. 
 
 A wicked heart may use the occasion of patience to sin the 
 more determinedly, and " because sentence against an evil work 
 is not executed speedily, therefore, it may be the more fully set 
 to do evil." But this is a gross perversion and resistance of its 
 natural influence. The proper tendency is to shame for the 
 long abuse, and a discontinuance of it ; and this must be re- 
 sisted by a more desperate stubbornness of will, in order to be 
 overborne and discarded. "The goodness of God leadeth 
 to repentance," and especially goodness in the form of patient 
 delay of deserved punishment ; and that heart must be desper- 
 ately wicked which takes advantage of the very kindness that 
 spares, to sin the more determinedly against it. 
 
 3. The influence of offered pardon. A conviction of utter 
 hopelessness in sin induces sullen despair or malignant reckless- 
 ness. A state of mind is induced which will not admit of the 
 salutary reflection of ill-desert and well-merited retribution. 
 The agony of present punishment, and the fearful looking-for of 
 more fiery indignation, drives off all the preUminary conditions 
 of reformation, and shuts out the considerations which might 
 lead to a return of piety and loyal subjection. Hopelessness in 
 sin paralyzes all effort to escape from it. 
 
 But an administration of grace at once throws the light of 
 hope upon the sinner's condition. The way is open to return 
 to loyalty, and receive an entire amnesty for the past and per- 
 petual favor for the future. Such an offer of pardon, seen to be 
 both consistent and sincere, is an affecting motive to come in 
 confession, to ask for it, and gladly take it from the gracious 
 sovereign. Self-moved, God prepares the way for it, and makes 
 the proposal. Instead of vindicating his authority by judgment, 
 he provides pardon in his mercy. Misery may now be avoided, 
 and bliss secured ; the wrath of justice may be averted, and the 
 favor of grace gained; the pangs of conscience in its guilt may 
 be relieved, and the peace of self-approbation acquired ; and 
 such considerations must tend back to piety and allegiance 
 
THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION OF GRACE. 233 
 
 more strongly than any motives which justice and judgment 
 may offer. What the law could not do, because in its condem- 
 nation it works " concupiscence " and " death," the gracq 
 in the Gospel of the new administration may effect, through 
 its forgiving spirit. Hope takes away the suUenness of desper- 
 ation. 
 
 4. The inspiring appeal to personal worthiness and dignity. 
 The fact of man's conscious guilt does not destroy his con- 
 sciousness of rational faculty and religious endowment, nor 
 does it diminish the conviction, that his true dignity can be 
 attained only in the way of piety and obedience to God. The 
 most hardened rebel against the throne of heaven knows that 
 his suppression of all reverence and homage, and his withdraw- 
 ment of all trust and dependence, is really his degradation and 
 his shame. His ingratitude and contempt debase him. He 
 well knows that nothing can take from him this debasement 
 and shame, but returning allegiance, confidence, and love. 
 
 Confession of sin, contrition of heart before God, deep hu- 
 mility manifested in all ways of suitable expression, are becom- 
 ing to the sinner ; and it is a very false sense of human dignity, 
 and really nothing but the most contemptible self-conceit, to 
 stand out in sullen pride before the majesty of an offended 
 sovereign. Humility before God is man's honor; prostrate 
 adoration is the subject's dignity and glory, in the light of eter- 
 nal truth. Even angels are never more exalted than when 
 " covering their faces with their wings," they cry before the 
 Divine presence, "holy, holy, holy. Lord God Almighty." 
 
 The new administration provides for such return to allegiance 
 and homage, and gives occasion for God to confirm the manli- 
 ness and dignity of such restored loyalty, in his open approba- 
 tion and acceptance of it ; and surely such an influence must 
 be. highly arousing and inspiriting. It stimulates to renewed 
 struggles against all that debases man, more than the applica- 
 tion of legal severity can ever effect. Man was made to 
 
234 COMPLETE LOYALTY. 
 
 confide and v/orship, to serve and adore ; and if in his impiety 
 he has " cast off the fear of God and restrained prayer before 
 him," it is his shame ; and he can never recover his lost worthi- 
 ness till he comes back in confession and contrition, and owns 
 again his obligations of obedience. God's gracious interposi- 
 tion invites to such return, and appeals to all such sentiments 
 of true dignity and honor, and works more strongly to reclaim 
 to this manly dignity through all that is ingenuous and ennobling, 
 than any penal terrors can be made to effect. 
 
 5. The augmented manifestation of the Divine regard for 
 fiety. The sanction was designed as an adequate and exact 
 expression of God's regard to law, and the eiid of piety it had 
 in view. It said, as plainly as law could be made to speak, that 
 God desires piety in his subjects with a strength of feeling com- 
 mensurate with all the reward promised, and that he hates 
 impiety proportioned to all the penalty threatened. And when 
 the sin has been committed and the penalty incurred, the exe- 
 cution of this penalty in the view of all his subjects, whether 
 obedient or rebellious, is simply the confirmation of this regard, 
 in precisely this degree of intensity. The inflicted penalty only 
 confirms the precise diegree of feeling expressed in the threatened 
 penalty. 
 
 Moreover, while the actual infliction gives no augmented 
 manifestation of God's abhorrence of impiety beyond the 
 original threatening, so also this infliction can carry its influ- 
 ence for piety only to the spectator and not to the sufferer. To 
 the sinner punished, it is wrath without mercy. It is wholly 
 vindictive and not disciplinary. It may avail to restrain others 
 from rebellion, but can secure no reformation in the punished 
 sinner himself. As penal, it is not God's manifestation of 
 strong feeling for the sinner's recovery, inasmuch as that is 
 already a foregone conclusion, and hopeless of all realization 
 in justice. He is treated as wholly incorrigible, and the judg- 
 ment inflicted is in no evnectation of repentance and restora- 
 
THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION OF GRACE. 23$ 
 
 tion, but as a vindication of authority in the end of piety on the 
 behalf of others. 
 
 But in the provisions of grace, where the manifestation is 
 given that God himself makes sacrifices for the sinner's return 
 to just the extent of the manifested sacrifice in the substitution, 
 does God augment the expression of his regard for piety above 
 what is exhibited in the penalty; and this not merely before 
 those subjects who have remained loyal, but before and directly 
 in behalf of the guilty themselves. He really " magnifies " his 
 law in augmenting the expression of his regard for piety more 
 than the penalty threatened or inflicted could ; and this in the 
 most melting and effective method possible, by his own sacrifice 
 for the sinner's redemption. God thus commends his love to 
 the lost, and in this gives the highest possible influence for 
 loyalty. " Herein is love, not that we first loved God, but that 
 he first loved us." 
 
 And this influence is made to reach over the whole Divine 
 government, in its augmented force towards universal loyalty. 
 The already loyal see here the feelings of the sovereign towards 
 piety, with a strength and tenderness that no penal infliction 
 could ever manifest ; and the guilty themselves have the most 
 affecting appeal possible, to cease at once from all rebellion to 
 so much love, and become the loyal worshippers and servants 
 of their rightful Lord again. And thence onward, when restored 
 to piety and favor, the influence of this sacrifice in their redemp- 
 tion lasts, and stimulates their obedience in love and their songs 
 of praise for eternity. The feelings of God, shining through all 
 the scene of prepared and accepted substitution, act on the 
 universe of moral beings in favor of pious loyalty, as no legal 
 exhibitions of the Divine justice could ever equal. * 
 
 6. New institutions of ritual observances. For the cultivation 
 of piety, it behooves the Divine lawgiver, by positive enact- 
 ments, to institute religious ordinances and ritual observances, 
 by which the method of approach to God shall be regulated. 
 
236 COMPLETE LOYALTY. 
 
 and the general order of Divine worship promoted. This would 
 be ethically required under an administration in justice, and still 
 more especially under an administration of grace. As a sinner, 
 man will be less able to order his manner of approach to the 
 Deity acceptably, without Divine direction, than when holy. 
 Many things might seem to discourage and perhaps forbid 
 approach to God by the sinner, did not God himself invite to it 
 and direct in the manner that he would accept it. 
 
 A system of legislation in grace must thus continue positive 
 regulations in many things, and direct in reference to the times 
 and the order of worship, and also establish positive institutions 
 bearing upon the general culture of piety and the religious 
 instructions and discipline of its subjects. The manner of the 
 sinner's approach to God must necessarily differ from that which 
 was permitted to him in his holiness, and all ritual observances 
 must be modified from the nature of the substitution which is 
 made vicarious for penalty, and new regulations from God must 
 determine all these modifications. 
 
 They may be anticipated as of two varieties : such as are 
 designed to prepare the fallen race to apprehend and receive 
 the new administration in its clearness and completeness, and 
 such as are adapted to build them up on the foundation of the 
 substitution when actually laid and clearly apprehended. The 
 first will be typical and symbolical, teaching through shadows 
 which foretoken the coming substance ; and these will be mul- 
 tiplied, particular and precise, according to the darkness of the 
 human mind, and its incapacity to directly apprehend spiritual 
 realities. The second will be more direct, simple, and spiritual, 
 '.eaching the very nature and principles of the new dispensation, 
 ind corifesponding openly to the plain doctrines and duties of 
 the gospel system. One will be temporary, and only as a 
 schoolmaster to teach what is coming ; the other will last to 
 the consummation, and be adapted to the open vision of the 
 things in the new covenant, with all its promises and duties. 
 
GENERAL RESULTS OF A GRACIOUS ADMINISTRATION. 237 
 
 And now all these ordinances of grace will have a higher 
 meaning, and a stronger influence for piety, than any of the in- 
 stitutions of the old administration of justice. All the ritual 
 observances will embody those affecting manifestations of love 
 and mercy which are contained in the plan of substitution, and 
 will thus hold constantly forth to view the deeper regard for 
 piety expressed in the sacrifice the sovereign makes, and thus 
 the stronger motive to bring the rebel back to loyalty. Some, 
 as the Sabbath, may belong to both dispensations ; but in that 
 of grace it will be made to have a higher import, and speak of 
 sacrifice and substitution, and not merely of creation and provi- 
 dential supervision. Others will be wholly new, organizing 
 the body of reclaimed beUevers and worshippers, bringing them 
 into visible communion and fellowship, and giving to them all 
 " one Lord, one faith, and one baptism." In all ways, the new 
 ordinances will throw upon the heart a tenderer influence to 
 soften, and sweeter to win the sinner again to duty j and all 
 conspire to hold the reclaimed in perpetual loyalty, beyond what 
 all the force of law and justice could accomplish. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 GRAND RESULTS IN THE INTRODUCTION OF AN ADMINIS- 
 TRATION OF GRACE. 
 
 Some necessary conclusions, resulting from the provisions in 
 an administration of grace, stand out as permanent ethical prin- 
 ciples, and which should be here concisely stated. 
 
 I. The principles of grace do not subvert those of justice. 
 Legislation must commence with positive institutions, and ordi- 
 nances for piety on the ground of justice. Grace can only 
 come in when justice has failed in securing perpetual loyalty. 
 
238 COMPLETE LOYALTY. 
 
 The higher influences can only be introduced, when the sanc- 
 tions of law have been propounded, the precept violated, and 
 the penalty incurred. 
 
 But morality forbids that the substitution for penalty, and the 
 provisions for reclaiming to loyalty, should subvert equity and 
 justice. No means for reclaiming to piety may conflict %vith 
 immutable morality and righteousness. With these claims of 
 morality the administration of justice fuUy accorded, and thus 
 no gracious provisions can subvert the old administration. Its 
 principles are forever ethically sound and vaUd, and its subver- 
 sion is an ethical impossibility. The Divine government may 
 change its process from justice to grace, but may never deny its 
 valid authority in either. The sovereign may change his throne 
 and sceptre, but in taking the throne and sceptre of grace, he 
 does not demolish, but only for the occasion leaves unoccupied, 
 those of justice. The old administration is not subverted, the 
 new is only on occasion substituted for it. AU antinomian con- 
 clusions are wholly precluded by the true apprehension of the 
 equivalent substitution in grace. 
 
 2. The incorrigible sinner, under grace, is left to a "sorer 
 punishment." The penalty in justice has been held back in the 
 provisions of grace that there might be an opportunity for a 
 new trial and discipline in the end of piety. The whole reason 
 and aim of the new administration is recovery to loyalty, and 
 confirming all who are loyal. At no time has it released any 
 subject from the obligations of perpetual allegiance, or with- 
 drawn ultimately the old penalty, if a return to allegiance is 
 not gained. 
 
 If then, in any case, this provision of mercy through an 
 equivalent substitution fail to reclaim, the whole provision is 
 made useless ; the substitute wholly discarded ; and the sub- 
 ject continues, by his own stubbornness, still under the old 
 penalty. The new provision profits nothing to him, without a 
 return to piety. But this old penalty does not now stand in- 
 
GENERAL RESULTS OF A GRACIOUS ADMINISTRATION. 239 
 
 curred as when the sin was solely against law. There is the 
 superadded guilt of mercy rejected, grace despised, God's sac- 
 rifice reproached and dishonored. The impiety is far more dar- 
 ing and obstinate than that which slights God's will as expressed 
 only in his law. The condemnation must in the same way be 
 aggravated. The impiety is greatly augmented, and thus, ethi- 
 cally, the ultimate punishment is proportionally enhanced. 
 
 3. T%e one flan of gracious substitution must preclude all 
 further gracious interposition. We have seen that there may 
 be equivalent substitution for penalty, but we now show that 
 there can be no new substitution for the rejected vicarious sub- 
 stitute. An adequate substitution for penalty involves principles 
 which must make that one exclusive and ultimate. Penalty for 
 piety's sake may not be transmuted for something which may 
 itself have its substitute. In the one sacrifice of God rejected, 
 there " remaineth no more sacrifice for sin '' ; for such tamper- 
 ing with both justice and grace would take away all veneration 
 for either, and render all reclaiming of the sinner, and confirm- 
 ing of the righteous, the more hopeless. Mercy would become 
 a weakness, and grace capricious, and the plan to reclaim 
 would defeat its own end by destroying all its influence for piety, 
 and directly encouraging delay and perseverance in transgression. 
 
 One plan of substitution, both on the ground of the nature of 
 the sacrifice and of the influence upon piety, must exhaust the 
 gracious provisions of sovereignty, and exclude all further over- 
 tures of reconciliation. An ethical barrier would lie against 
 more than one equivalent substitution for legal penalty, inas- 
 much as both justice and grace would be thus degraded. 
 
 4. It must secure the permatient piety of the reclaimed. Mercy 
 should not rejoice against judgment, only to have judgment 
 again triumph over mercy. If God had not foreseen the results 
 which might be secured by such gracious interposition, there 
 would have been no wisdom in bringing in the gracious admin- 
 istration. If it did not secure that many should become again 
 
240 COMPLETE LOYALTY. 
 
 loyal, it would have behooved him not to have introduced it. 
 The end of piety would not thus have been promoted, but 
 hindered. 
 
 And if the perpetuation of such reformed sinners in their 
 loyalty were not secured, and their voluntary service of God 
 henceforth a certainty to God, the same ethical regard to his 
 own excellency must have prevented the entering on an ex- 
 pedient for piety's sake, which it was foreseen would only at 
 last mock the mercy that had adopted it. 
 
 Such are the leading Principles of all Divine legislation ; the 
 specific Duties, which might be determined from them, are bet- 
 ter found in the revealed commandments divinely proclaimed. 
 
THIRD DIVISION. 
 
 PARENTAL GOVERNMENT. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE FAMILY. 
 
 UNDER the head of Authority, Family Government is put 
 last, because it combines in itself both the legaUty and 
 loyalty which are distributively in civil and divine legislation, 
 and is on that account better examined after attending to them, 
 though its end is preliminary and preparatory to them both. 
 
 By the Family is meant those habitually resident in the same 
 dwelling ; including parents, children, and servants. It is the 
 most important institution in the social being of any community. 
 It is in some respects the foundation of the state, and the source 
 of that nurture and discipline which is to prepare for the duties 
 of this life and the retributions of eternity. 
 
 The Family is itself a distinct organic community, having 
 within itself its own separate rights, wants, and interests ; its 
 own authority, polity, and duties ; and society is not so much 
 an aggregation of individuals, as a composition of many distinct 
 families of blended sympathies and dependencies. The parents, 
 as the social head of the family, have the right of authority, and 
 the children and servants are in their respective stations the sub- 
 jects of this domestic polity. 
 
 The parental right to authority is not constituted in the simple 
 fact of the parental relation, but in the qualification from maturity 
 
 «4i 
 
242 LEGALITY AND LOYALTY. 
 
 of wisdom, natural affection, dignity, and honor, which is rela- 
 tively in the parent, and which best secures the attainment of 
 the ends of family- government.- If the parent be quite intel- 
 lectually imbecile, or very morally depraved, the government of 
 the household should come under a different guardianship. 
 But ordinarily the characteristics of the parental relation indicate 
 the possession of those attributes which will best attain the ends 
 of domestic authority. 
 
 The end of parental authority is two-fold, and designed to fit 
 the subjects of it for the two respective governments under 
 which it ultimately issues them, — the Civil and the Divine 
 legislation. The parent stands to the child, in an important 
 respect, both as the state and as God. The magistrate and the 
 Deity both govern the child through the parent, — in early years, 
 especially, almost wholly so ; and the parent is directly respon- 
 sible both to the state and to God for the administration of the 
 entire domestic polity, as it bears ultimately upon these two 
 sovereignties under which the family subjects are soon to be in- 
 troduced. The fulfilment of the duties, in the end of one, will 
 not compensate for any neglect in those which relate to the end 
 of the other. The nurture which trains for God will, it is true, 
 also prepare for the state, inasmuch as a loyal subject of God's, 
 government will necessarily be a good citizen ; but God will 
 excuse no parent, who has trained his child to legal obedi- 
 ence, if he has not also taught him loyally to obey God 
 from love. 
 
 There may be mentioned another end of family government, 
 in the peace of the family itself, while the members of it con- 
 tinue their residence together. This will really be of precisely 
 the same nature as the end of civil government. The family 
 is, in this view, a little state ; and the individual choices of its 
 members must be controlled by a regard to the righteous choice 
 of the whole, or, which is the same tiding, the family freedom. 
 The parent is bound to see that one member does not, in the ' 
 
THE FAMILY. 243 
 
 execution of his choices, encroach upon the rights, and thus 
 upon the freedom of another ; and must exercise his sovereignty 
 to preserve the freedom of all from the encroachment of 
 any. This regard to the end of the family freedom will be 
 fulfilled in mere legality. If the child keeps the family peace, 
 merely from fear, this will be all that the family, as such, can 
 demand ; and thus the securing of this comes wholly within 
 the same culture, that the preparation of the coming responsi- 
 bility to the state demands, — viz : mere legality. But the 
 consideration, that the child is also to be trained for God, will 
 oblige the parent to feel, that though obedience from fear may 
 secure the peace of the family, yet such culture only cannot 
 answer all the parental responsibility. The parent is bound to 
 insist on the child's obedience, not merely through fear, but also 
 to teach the child that he should obey from filial love. Legal- 
 ity, even in mere family interests, will not be enough ; the 
 parent must inculcate the principle of loyalty, and be satisified 
 only when he gets obedience from love. His responsibility to 
 the family and to the state could be all answered in securing 
 the legal obedience of fear or reward, but his responsibility to 
 God can be only answered by the nurture which seeks loyal 
 obedience from love. 
 
 Thus, this parental authority, in the end of family peace or 
 freedom, resolves itself into the same two principles ; and 
 whether we look at domestic authority, as in the end of family 
 peace, or as training for the state, or for the government of 
 God, it gives in all only the two ends of freedom and piety, — 
 the obedience of legality and loyalty. We may thus put the 
 three within the last two only. 
 
 It may be of interest to consider that obedience from filial 
 love, and the respect and reverence rendered to a parent which 
 is due to the dignity and authority of the parental standing, give 
 that which may be properly characterized as piety. .(Eneas had 
 the epithet of pious, from his reverent regard and care for hia 
 
244 LEGALITY AND LOYALTY. 
 
 father Anchises ; and the household deities, which the Latins 
 venerated and even adored, were but the shrines of their de- 
 parted ancestors. It is obedience from love ; reverence for the 
 dignity and majesty of rightful authority ; cordial response to 
 the claims of respect and veneration ; and is thus the essence 
 of religion. It becomes truly a worship, when the confidence 
 and reverence is directed to the Divine Spirit. But the truly 
 loyal spirit of a child fits for the transfer of allegiance from 
 a father's authority to God's ; and the spirit that has truly 
 obeyed a father, from love to his authority, is a pious spirit, 
 and in the first full view of God's authority and majesty will, 
 in cordial loyalty, bow down with reverence, and lovingly serve 
 and adore. 
 
 That the parental government has this two-fold end is quite 
 manifest, further, from the very nature of the case in the civil 
 point of view, and from God's direct revelation in the Divine. 
 Such is the direct bearing of all family authority and discipline 
 upon the interest of the state, that the parent ought ethically to 
 stand responsible to the law for his administration of this gov- 
 ernment. The citizen must come up into the state through the 
 family. No other guardianship for childhood and youth can 
 take the place of this training, in general, so well as the parent ; 
 and the infantile and youthful training must precede the adult 
 responsibiUties of the citizen, and the state take the consequen- 
 ces of the family training in the characteristics of its citizens, 
 from generation to generation ; the parent thus ought to have 
 the duties to the state in his design through all his culture ; and 
 the state ought, for the freedom of its perpetuated generations, 
 to guard the family authority, and hold its administration per- 
 petually subordinate and subservient to its higher claims. 
 
 The same train of argument would also show, from the nature 
 of the case, that God must hold the parental authority responsi- 
 ble to him for the training of its members j but we have abundant 
 declarations in the revelation he has made to this purport, and 
 to which the Christian moralist may go direct for the proof. 
 
MARRIAGE. 245 
 
 Taking these ends in combination, as that which is to be 
 attained in the institution of the family, and which is established 
 from the nature of the case, the claims of morality, and the rev- 
 elation of God ; we must in this light determine the principles 
 which lie at the foundation of all parental government, and the 
 duties embraced within the domestic relations. 
 
 These may all be included within the following topics : 
 
 1. Marriage. 
 
 2. The Duties of Parents. 
 
 3. The Duties of Children. 
 
 4. The Duties of Servants. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 MARRIAGE. 
 
 Marriage is the union of one man and one woman in ex- 
 clusive cohabitation for life. It is the source of all the do- 
 mestic relations, and must be determined, in its nature, rights, 
 and duties, by the grand ends of the domestic institution itself. 
 It is not a mere private and special agreement between the 
 parties, and thus only a particular contract ; its end and impor- 
 tance determine for it universal rules, and thus make it to be a 
 public institution, and so far as God has established it, a Divine 
 institution. It is indispensable to the continuance and eleva- 
 tion of human society, from generation to generation. 
 
 The ground for the institution of marriage is found in the con- 
 stitution of human nature. The spiritual life is so modified in 
 the sexes that neither is entire in itself. ' A state of celibacy is 
 a state of incomplete being, and the soul of neither the man 
 nor the woman is satisfied except as the two become blended 
 in one. The essential marriage tie is a spiritual union. The 
 
246 LEGALITY AND LOYALTY. 
 
 constitutional propensities, also, both of natural desire and social 
 affection, which find their end in the mutual intercourse of the 
 sexes, need to be regulated, chastened, and balanced by some 
 permanent ordinance. The marriage bond refines, directs, and 
 tranquilizes all these propensities, so that society is secured from 
 all the irregularities and disturbances of their passionate gratifi- 
 cation. Mutual confidence is imparted ; tenderness and sym- 
 pathy are induced ; feelings and interests become identified ; 
 and the husband and wife are no longer merely two persons of 
 different sexes, but conjunct in one spirit. A new charm is 
 added to life ; and while every joy is augmented in the mutual 
 participation, every sorrow also is softened in reciprocal support. 
 This balance to all constitutional propensity keeps its regulated 
 action upon the successive generations of youth who come up 
 under this influence ; their habits and expectations are formed 
 under it, and they look forward, with hopeful anticipation, to 
 such happy selection and union of kindred hearts as the most 
 interesting and important event in life. A national sentiment is 
 thus created and cherished which works perpetually in society 
 to give security and serenity to domestic hfe, and the opportu- 
 nity to attain the great ends of the family state, in the nurture of 
 their children for the duties of the state and the service of God. 
 
 These children are a common object of affection to the par- 
 ents, binding both in stronger conjugal attachment; and the 
 education and discipline of the child is also a matter of common 
 care and anxiety, awakening new sympathies and hopes ; and 
 thus the family institution comes to be the strongest, the dear- 
 est, the most effective spring to human activity that social Ufe 
 possesses. 
 
 But while the ground for such an institution is in the consti- 
 tution of human nature itself, the establishment and ratification 
 of it must be given in some pubHc ordinance. Nature lays the 
 ground and reveals the reason for marriage, but some positive 
 authority must legally ratify and guard it. When a selected 
 
MARRIAGE. 247 
 
 application of these desires and affections has been voluntarily 
 reciprocated by the parties, then must some acknowledged 
 authority interpose, and by some fonnal ceremony solemnize 
 the nuptials. The public have rights and interests in it as really 
 as the parties, and this official public ratification is necessary for 
 the public notification, the public assent, the perpetual public 
 regard ; and thus the preserved safety for all the parties in this 
 new relation. 
 
 For the greater prominence and emphasis, the particulars 
 which enter into this definition and description of the ground 
 and nature of marriage may be here more specially enumer- 
 ated : 
 
 1. 77ie sexual desires and affections must be exclusively 
 directed to one person. The choice which fixes upon the object 
 of conjugal affection must include one person of the other sex 
 alone. A true marriage can include the union of one man and 
 one woman only. 
 
 2. The choices must be reciprocal. Both must be each other's 
 choice ; that is, each must choose, and each choose recipro- 
 cally the other. No choice of one alone, however ardent, can 
 make "of the twain one." 
 
 3. // should be a free choice. Each party is a voluntary 
 agent, alike free to bestow or withhold these affections. The 
 conduct of one party may give a moral claim to esteem or 
 gratitude from the other, but nothing can lay the other under 
 obligation to conjugal affection, except a personal assent and 
 promise. All prudential motives should be regarded; but in 
 view of whatever motives, the asking and assenting must be 
 alike free. 
 
 4. The commitment must be for life. Inviolability is de- 
 manded, until death stop all exercise of earthly affection, or 
 remove its object. If any thing but death come in to sunder 
 the marriage bond, it has been over the broken marriage vow, 
 that knows no moral rupture but by death. 
 
248 LEGALITY AND LOYALTY. 
 
 5. There must be an official ratification. The leaving of 
 father and mother and cleaving to each other must be exhibited 
 in some public formal manner, in which the authority that estab- 
 lishes the ordinance is recognized as speaking out in ratification. 
 No private agreement can confer either the rights or the obliga- 
 tions of marriage. 
 
 With this extended statement of what marriage is, we proceed 
 to confirm it in the light of the ends of marriage. This will be 
 done in several distinct sections. 
 
 Section I. The authority which should settle the marriage 
 institution. There are public ends which forbid that marriage 
 should be a special contract between the parties alone, and thus 
 there must be some positive general regulations by authority 
 which shall make it a public institution binding upon society. 
 Whence, then, the authority on which the institution must rest 
 for its validity ? 
 
 One end is found in the interest of the state. The civil sov- 
 ereignty has the right to control marriage for the sake of public 
 freedom. No parties have the right to so cohabit as to disturb 
 the rights of the public. In order that family government and 
 discipline may be the most beneficial to the interests of the 
 state, the state may control marriage contracts the same as any 
 other ; and since, in the nature of the case, promiscuous and 
 unregulated cohabitation cannot consist with public freedom, 
 the state authority must make positive regulations for all mar- 
 riage unions. The authority of the state is valid against all 
 choices of the parties. 
 
 But provision is to be made for another end than civil free- 
 dom. Marriage should be as truly modified by a regard to 
 piety as to the ends of civil polity. God, so to speak, has inter- 
 ests in the results of family government certainly no less than 
 the state. He has the right to control marriage for the ends of 
 piety, as truly as the state has for the ends of fireedom ; and thus 
 the authority of both the state and God are good against any 
 
MARRIAGE. 249 
 
 choices of individuals. No persons have the right to so use 
 marriage as to compromit the interests of either liberty or piety. 
 The only difficulty, therefore, in the marriage institution, so far 
 as it becomes a question of morals, is in harmonizing the civil 
 and the Divine regulations. 
 
 And this case stands precisely like all matters of civil and 
 religious polity. The civil authority is not to be brought in for 
 the restraint or control of religious faith and conscience. It has 
 its own end, and thus its own jurisdiction. But God's end is 
 higher, and his authority supreme over all civil authority j and 
 when he legislates for piety's sake it is always " the higher law," 
 and binds the Christian nation in making laws and institutions. 
 If the nation disregard this higher law of God, the contest is 
 between the state and heaven ; and if individual conscience is 
 thus put between two conflicting authorities, it is bound not to 
 violate the Divine, but to take any penal consequences that it 
 must from the human. The ethical principle is, that God may 
 legislate, in marriage as in any other case, for piety's sake, over 
 the state. Civil authority is ethically a nullity when it contra- 
 dicts Divine authority. The institution of the Sabbath, or of 
 any sacrament, is precisely as the institution of marriage. As a 
 religious ordinance, it is wholly from God's authority, and civil 
 polity should conform to it in such a way that any citizen can 
 obey both. If thp state polity, in the estimation of the citizen, 
 conflicts with religion, he must obey God and let civil govern- 
 ment do what it will. 
 
 In reality, the two ends of freedom and of piety can never 
 clash. That family arrangement which subserves piety best 
 will also subserve liberty best. 
 
 Section II. Breach of marriage promise. A mutual prom- 
 ise of marriage, between a man and woman, is a betrothment 
 only, and not marriage. It is a promise, more or less sacred ac- 
 cording to the manner of making it, at some future time to 
 enter the marriage relation. It confers none of the rights, and 
 
250 LEGALITY AND LOYALTY. 
 
 imposes none of the duties of marriage. A breach of this prom- 
 ise is no violation of the marriage covenant. 
 
 In proportion to the interests involved, however, is such a 
 promise strongly binding. No parties are at liberty thus to 
 plight their troth, but upon the most serious and satisfactory 
 reasons. When done, it must bind the conscience under obli- 
 gations that only the most weighty considerations can justify in 
 seeking to dissolve. Specially is this the fact on the part of the 
 man, as the receding from the promise must probably affect the 
 woman the most severely. If affection has changed, or circum- 
 stances thrown great obstacles in the way, it may be a justification 
 for a mutual release ; but one party may not withdraw without 
 the consent of the other, righteously, except in the full convic- 
 tion that the consummation of the marriage, in that case, would 
 be an immorality, and only by all indemnity as far as practicable. 
 
 Section III. Polygamy. The original institution of marriage, 
 by God, was with the first of the human race, and united one 
 man with one woman. This may be seen, in the nature of the 
 case, to be the most congenial to humanity. The spiritual in- 
 completeness of sex demands that the husband and wife become 
 spiritually one, and no such blending in unity can l)e possible in 
 a marriage at the same time with more than one. The peace of 
 the family will be more secure, and the piety of the children bet- 
 ter promoted. This was the consideration that induced God to 
 institute marriage. He made one woman only, though he had 
 the residue of the creating spirit and might have made more ; 
 but he made one, "that he might seek a godly seed." Mal. u. is. 
 The re-enactment of the law of marriage, by Jesus Christ, is of 
 the same purport. " And he answered and said unto them, 
 have ye not read that he who made them, at the beginning made 
 them male and female. And said, for this cause, shall a man 
 leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife : and they 
 two shall be one flesh ? Wherefore they are no more two, but 
 one flesh. Wherefore what God hath joined together, let not 
 
MARRIAGE. 2$ I 
 
 man put asunder." Matth. xix. 4 to 6. And so also with the 
 Apostle : " Know ye not, brethren (for I speak to them that 
 know the law), that the law hath dominion over a man as long 
 as he liveth? For the woman who hath a husband is bound by 
 the law to her husband so long as he liveth ; but if the husband 
 is dead, she is loosed from the law of her husband. So then, if 
 while her husband liveth, she is married to another man, she 
 shall be called an adulteress ; but if her husband is dead, she is 
 free from that law ; so that she is no adulteress, though she be 
 married to another man." Rom. vii. i to 3. If polygamy was prac- 
 tised by the Patriarchs with God's permission, it still had no 
 Divine sanction ; God's legislation has been always against it, 
 even when for other reasons he has not enforced it. 
 
 The end of all human government, also, demands that one 
 man be united only to one woman. No nation has permitted 
 polygamy, but at the expense of many evils to the community, 
 and the sacrifice of many things vitally connected with the pub- 
 lic welfare. The true interests of the family, and through it the 
 true interests of the state, can be secured only by exclusive single 
 cohabitation. The state, therefore, as rigidly excludes polygamy 
 as does the revelation of God. Neither piety nor freedom can 
 be best subserved by it. The great fact in nature, that from 
 generation to generation the law of perpetuation in the human 
 race keeps the numbers of the sexes nearly equal, the slight ad- 
 vantage of numbers being on the male side, as the more exposed 
 to casualities, abundantly teaches what God ordains in marriage, 
 and what states should regard. Such a fact in nature makes the 
 political toleration of polygamy immoral. 
 
 Section IV. Incest. The law of God has prohibited mar- 
 riage within certain degrees of consanguinity. The Mosaic 
 code is given in Lev. xviii, 6 to 18. The general prohibition will 
 extend in the direct line of descent indefinitely, and in col- 
 lateral degrees of kindred to all such as are brothers or sisters 
 of the parents, or among brothers or sisters themselves. And 
 
252 LEGALITY AND LOYALTY. 
 
 this reaches to the same relations through marriage as by blood. 
 The much vexed question arising from the sixteenth verse, 
 whether a man may marry the sister of a deceased wife, need not 
 be here considered, as it is rather a question of casuistry in ref- 
 erence to whether the fact comes under the principle. In 
 other cases, beside those given in this chapter, God has regu- 
 lated or prohibited marriage, though not on the ground of 
 incest. An Israelite was not to marry a heathen, Deut. vU. 3; nor a 
 believer to marry an unbeliever, iCoe. vii. 39; 2C0R. vi. 14; and cer- 
 tain offices of particular sanctity modified the law of marriage. 
 
 Lev. xxi. 7, 13, 14: Ezek. xliv. 22; i Tim. iii. 2 and 12; Tit. 1,6. The nCW Tes- 
 tament, also, in a single case, refers to a case of incest with 
 pointed reprobation, i Cor. v. i. 
 
 In the laws of incest, two things are mainly regarded ; one, 
 the deterioration of the race physically, which is found to be the 
 fact when the parents are within certain degrees of near kin by 
 blood; the other is of a moral nature, and would repress all 
 sexual inclinations in such cases as from family connection 
 there must be daily intimate intercourse. On both of these 
 accounts the laws of incest have a basis in morality, and on the 
 last account they apply to relationship by marriage, where there 
 is no consanguinity. 
 
 Without exactly settling the line within which the marriage is 
 incestuous, other than by an application of the above reasons 
 for prohibiting such marriages, and observing that all nations 
 have had occasion for sucli legislation, though differing in the 
 degrees of kindred prohibited, we may apprehend that there is 
 the same ground for civil, as for Divine enactments, against 
 incestuous marriages. The state has important interests in- 
 volved as well as the church, and freedom as well as piety is 
 endangered by the union of parties of too near a relationship. 
 The practice would punish itself in its own consequences, but 
 civil polity and religion would be both injured, and thus pro- 
 hibition under positive penalties should be enforced. 
 
MARRIAGE. 253 
 
 Section V. Divorce. The considerations already given 
 show that marriage should not be viewed in the same ethical 
 light as private contracts. The freedom and the piety of the 
 race are so directly involved in the fact of marriage, that both 
 the state and God must legislate in the regulation of it. This is 
 of the highest necessity in reference to the right of divorce. 
 No matter how inconvenient and irksome the restraints in indi- 
 vidual cases, the end of public freedom and piety should be 
 nevertheless maintained. 
 
 The original intention of marriage, in its institution by God, 
 was manifestly designed for perpetuity, and to hold the parties 
 in union during Ufe. Hence the expression of unbroken 
 union, — forsaking all other, the dearest connections, and cleav- 
 ing to the wife, and the twain becoming one flesh. No divorce 
 was contemplated in this language, but by the death of one of 
 the parties. This is further confirmed by our Saviour's com- 
 ment. " Moses, because of the hardness of your hearts, suffered 
 you to put away your wives, but from the beginning it was not 
 
 so." Matt. xix. 8. 
 
 The permission in the Mosaic law, to divorce the wife under 
 certain regulations, is expressly put upon the perverseness of 
 man, and thus the civil law forebore to enforce the righteous 
 principle, since in that state of depravity the nation could not 
 bear it. The tyranny of the man, with his hard heart, would 
 have made the condition of the woman worse in perpetual 
 union than in regulated divorce. This was man's fault, and 
 thus no annulling of the marriage institution, as God had given 
 it, and as man ought to use it. And thus Christ cut short the 
 permission to divorce, and put marriage upon the original, and 
 the perpetually righteous foundation : inviolability but by death. 
 One cause only is admitted as a justification of divorce, and 
 that an abeady sundering the nuptial tie by the adulterous infi- 
 delity of one of the parties. " I say unto you, whosoever shall 
 put away his wife, except for fornication, and shall marry another, 
 
254 LEGALITY AND LOYALTY. 
 
 committeth adultery, and whoever marrieth her who is put 
 away, committeth adultery." Matth. x\x. g. Neither the state 
 nor reUgion could profit by legalizing the connection, and im- 
 posing an obligation of nuptial rights and duties upon one, 
 when the other went after fornication. Morality justifies such a 
 case of divorce on the part of the faithful, but this is the sole 
 reason that the end of piety can allow as an occasion for the 
 dissolution of the marriage bond. God has legislated emphati- 
 cally and finally in this matter, and to the eye of reason in the 
 best manner for the end of piety. 
 
 Civil society has also been regulated in this matter by the 
 state, and in various ways and for varied reasons the right of 
 divorce has been granted. Wilful desertion for a considerable 
 time, neglect to provide, great cruelty, flagitious crimes, imbe- 
 cility, and sometimes incorrigible contrariety of temperament 
 and disposition, have been made state reasons for divorce. The 
 ends of piety will always be found in full conformity with the 
 end of civil polity, and God's legislation in any matter, where 
 the same can apply to state purposes, will be a fair index of 
 what is most for public freedom, and thus the institutions of 
 God and of the state will be concurrent. The further the 
 state deviates in the law of divorce from the law of God, the 
 less will it subserve the end of state government, and the 
 only apology for the state not to adopt the law of God, must 
 l)e that which God gives for Moses' law, viz. : the depravity of 
 the people. 
 
 It may sometimes be that the state of public morals will not 
 bear such civil laws as would be demanded by the highest piety ; 
 and thus in divorce, as in the case of intemperance or slavery, 
 the state may be forced to endure the evil, which from the 
 strength of depravity it cannot repress. This will not justify 
 the political evil, but only throws the burden of responsibility 
 from the legislator on to the hard-heartedness of the commu- 
 nity. The inability to make and sustain the right law may 
 
MARRIAGE. 255 
 
 sometimes be the very occasion for perpetuating the political 
 immorality, and the state be in that desperate condition where 
 the sickness of the^ moral constitution will not bear the remedies 
 which are necessary for its recovery. There can then be no 
 other alternative but ultimate dissolution. In all cases, where 
 the political regulation admits practices at war with God's regu- 
 lations for piety, tlie duty of every good man is, never to avail 
 himself of the political license, but live up to the higher law, and 
 thus put and keep as much virtue into the political constitution 
 as possible. 
 
 When any cause makes the marriage union a hindrance to its 
 own end in freedom and piety, there may, by mutual consent, 
 or, in extreme cases, at the will of one party, be a separation 
 from bed and board ; but this will not open the way to another 
 nuptial engagement. So, also, where moral impediments ex- 
 isted before marriage, though not apprehended until afterwards, 
 the parties are justified in such separation, inasmuch as con- 
 tinued co-habitation would perpetuate the immorality. If the 
 immorality were of such a nature as to vitiate the legality of the 
 marriage union, then has the whole marriage been a nullity, and 
 must be treated as void. 
 
 Woman may be 'often much oppressed by an ill-assorted con- 
 nection, but an easy dissolution of the marriage bond will ulti- 
 mately far m'ore enslave and degrade the sex. When a pure- 
 minded woman allies herself to the man of her choice, it must 
 be with mutual pledges of eternal fidelity. Take away her con- 
 fidence that the union is indissoluble but by death, and the sol- 
 emn vow becomes only a base assent to temporary prostitution, 
 and the soul is not wedded though the body be surrendered. 
 An attempt to attain emancipation for woman from the hard lot 
 of an ill-assorted marriage, by an easy dissolution of the nuptial 
 bond, must augment the general evil. The husband and wife 
 must be one in sympathy, in will, and moral personality ; hold- 
 ing all interests and anxieties in perfect transparency to each 
 
256 LEGALITY AXD LOYALTY. 
 
 Other ; and any thing that contravenes this will necessarily de- 
 grade woman from the high sphere in which a righteous mar- 
 riage contemplates her. As long as the Christian ordinance of 
 marriage is maintained, woman cannot become a mere servile 
 and sensual appendage to man. If the state grant divorces 
 only in view of personal inconveniences, and special hardship, 
 overlooking the public end of marriage, the few will be relieved 
 at the expense of the many, and both man and woman become 
 morally debased. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 DUTIES OF PARENTS. 
 
 The whole family government is in the hands of the parents, 
 and they are directly responsible to the state and to God for the 
 manner in which they administer it. 
 
 The end of family government, in its bearing upon poUtics 
 and religion, indicates directly the duties imposed. The house- 
 hold is to be trained for the state and for heaven, and the par- 
 ents are charged with this responsible commission. The duties 
 ar£ mainly disciplinary. The family is but a nursery for higher 
 and broader spheres of action. In itaxe~T:o be planted the 
 seeds, and there are to be nurtured the germs, which are to 
 have their full development and bear their fruit in future years 
 and in other worlds. A regard is to be had for the peace and 
 freedom of the family, while its members continue in the pater- 
 nal mansion, and therefore much is demanded in securing a 
 quiet, orderly, and happy home ; but the subjects of the family 
 government are supposed to spend only the few years of early 
 life under its training, and then, as adults, come under the im- 
 mediate jurisdiction of the state for life, and through hfe and in 
 
DUTIES OF PARENTS. 25/ 
 
 eternity come also under the direct authority of God, and re- 
 ceive from him the retributions he shall award for personal 
 character and conduct. 
 
 The authority of the father and of the mother are concurrent, 
 and the members of the household are as much bound by the 
 separate commands of the one as of the other. There is no 
 difference of end , and no conflict of interest in the parentaTau-" 
 thority, but both concurln one eiia" and to~the advancement of 
 one interest. If, then, a ny collision of pa rental authority occur 
 between that of the father and that of the mother, it must arise 
 from the ignorance or the selfishness of one party, and not from 
 any legitimate contrariety in parental authority itself. In an un- 
 fortunate, and from some source, wrong clashing of commands, 
 there must of course be some ultimate sovereignty; and the 
 reason of the case, the law of the land, and tfie law of God, put 
 this supremacy of family sovereignty in the hands of the father. 
 In the case of separate commands, the children and servants are 
 bound to obey both, but in any direct contradiction of com- 
 mands, that of the man is paramount. The duties of each are 
 similar, inasmuch as the ends of each are the same and the au- 
 thority concurrent. The difference of duties is found only in 
 those things where the action of one can gain the common end 
 more effectually than the other. The marriage union supposes 
 that the authority will always be one, inasmuch as the husband 
 and wife in marriage become one. 
 
 It is in this view that the wife acts through the husband, in 
 those particulars where the agency of only one can be permitted. 
 In personal acts, involving personal merit and demerit, the hus- 
 band and wife are wholly separate, both in the law of the land 
 ■ and of God. One is not held responsible for the other, and, of 
 course, one does not act in the other. In all cases where one 
 only can act, the husband's action is alone known. Thus, in 
 the domestic priesthood, the husband and wife cannot each 
 offer the family sacrifice, but the wife acts in the public homage 
 
2S8 LEGALITY AND LOYALTY. 
 
 rendered by the husband. There are other cases in which the 
 rights and interests of the wife, as separate from her husband, 
 may make her conjunct, or her separate agency proper and im- 
 perative, according to circumstances. In the transfer of prop- 
 erty, which may involve her interests distinct from his, or in her 
 religious profession and communion, her separate voluntary act 
 may be ethically required. 
 
 The grand principle by which to determine all such cases is 
 that of the unity of the parties in marriage ; where one only 
 should act in view of the end of marriage, the wife is known as 
 acting only in the husband ; but where the end of marriage does 
 not demand this single action, the interest of the wife distinct 
 from the husband tolerates her separate action ; and where the 
 responsibilities of personality remain which cannot be merged 
 and lost in any union, the separate action of both is ethically 
 required. In this sense, even the union of marriage may lay 
 personal responsibilities upon the husband in relation to the 
 wife, which he only can sustain, and in this point of view he has 
 the ethical right to restrain the wife. He may be liable for her 
 debts, or for her injuries to others in slander or violence, and 
 should have a constraining authority ; and his duties as head of 
 the household, including both wife and children, must be modi- 
 fied by such responsibilities. The peace of the family, and the 
 political and religious ends of family government, cannot other- 
 wise be attained. 
 
 We have thus the principle of concurrent authority in the 
 family government, except in some extreme cases ; and this in 
 connection with the end of the family organization will deter- 
 mine parental duty. 
 
 The Duties of Parents may be comprised in the following 
 particulars : 
 
 I . Support and maintenance of th e children during their 
 minority. Infancy is helpless, and through the stages of child- 
 Eood, youth, and on to maturity, there is dependence upon 
 
DUTIES OF PARENTS. 259 
 
 parental support, though constantly diminishing in degree to the 
 period for manly independence to begin. Nature more spe- 
 cially throws the infant upon the mother, and thus claims from 
 her the chief support and care. The more special charge of the 
 father increases with the growing ripeness to maturity. The 
 parents are in this way both called, in their distinctive times 
 and degrees, to minister to the support of their children. 
 
 This support and maintenance is demanded, in view of the 
 end of the family state. If children do not find support from 
 others they must die, and neither the ends of patriotism nor 
 religion be attained. The parents are the natural providers for 
 the wants of their children ; and God's design, that they should 
 do this, is manifest in the constitutional impulses of parental 
 feeling. Those to whom God has given this natural affection, 
 and not strangers, should provide for the family wants. It is 
 only in the death or disability of the parents that the support of 
 the child should rest on the care of others. 
 
 The quality of the supplies, and the amount furnished, should 
 correspond in a degree with the parents' rank and wealth. It 
 would be an immorality for those parents who are poor and lowly 
 to attempt furnishing their children with the supplies of the rich 
 and elevated ; and it would be an equal immorality for the latter 
 to give to their children only such supplies as might come from 
 the former. Equality of condition can nowhere be permanently 
 maintained ; if all were alike to-day, they would again become 
 unlike to-morrow; and the support demanded by morality 
 must have regard to the circumstances of the parent. 
 
 2. Care should be taken to secure a healthy and vigorous 
 constituiion7~"W.3SiY weakly and sickly constitutions are heredi- 
 tary, and often the fault of one or both of the parents, as the 
 consequence of their own carelessness or vice. The direction, 
 thus, would demand of all persons to so regard their own health 
 that their children need not suffer by it. But the direct care for 
 healthy physical development is in reference to the children 
 
260 LEGALITY AND LOYALTY. 
 
 when born. The strongest may be made weak by a careless, 
 and the weakest may be made stronger by a careful parent. 
 Much of human imbecility, pain, and premature death, is the 
 immediate result of parental ignorance, negligence, or direct 
 wickedness. The child may be ruined in health by either too 
 much hardship or too much indulgence, and the parent is 
 bound to guard against all extremes. 
 
 It becomes, thus, the duty of all parents to attend to the 
 entire habits of hfe in their children. Their method of dress, 
 food, exercise, sleep, and all their employments, act upon the 
 physical constitution ; and if this be neglected in their indul- 
 gence or privation, it will necessarily suffer thereby. What- 
 ever weakens the constitution interferes with the right of the 
 state ; and though a sick man may be as pious as a healthy one, 
 yet he has not the occasion for doing so much for general piety, 
 and therefore the parent who has brought sickness and feeble- 
 ness upon his child, through his fault, has also interfered with 
 the claims of God. The end of family culture, both in politics 
 and religion, demands the securing of as robust and vigorous a 
 constitution as may be. The whole parental discipline should 
 be modified by such important considerations. 
 
 3. Mental cultivation. The mind has its own native^rudi- 
 ments, and such only can be made to develop themselves to 
 Their maturity. But this growth to maturity, of what is in the 
 mind, depends upon favoring outward conditions, and thus upon 
 the culture and discipline bestowed. Little can be done for 
 the good of the state, or the honor of God, by the ignorant and 
 weak-minded ; and the whole end of family government may 
 easily be defeated by a faulty or a neglected education. 
 
 The parents are at first directly responsible for the training 
 of the opening mental faculties of their children ; and then, in 
 more advanced stages, they are responsible for the instructors 
 employed and the advantages given. A thorough education is 
 not only a fortune to the child, but a price put into his hand 
 yyhereby he may serve both his country and his God. 
 
DUTIES OF PARENTS. 26 1 
 
 4, Habits of industry and ec onomy. Every child should be 
 made to know the value of labor, of time, and of money. With- 
 out this, he will habituate "Rimsell to squander them all, for no 
 profit to himself, his country, or religion. The most wealthy 
 parent sins against all these interests in allowing his child to 
 grow up in habits of indolence, dissipation, and prodigality. It 
 is not merely the danger to that child's own want and poverty, 
 from idle and dissolute habits, but the very end for which God 
 has given children to the parents is thus frustrated. They are 
 useless to the state and to the church, and neither man nor God 
 gets any good of them, except in setting them as a warning to 
 others. If the parents through fondness, carelessness, or too 
 busy occupation in other matters, have neglected to train up 
 their children in habits of industry and sobriety, they are guilty 
 of gross parental delinquency. 
 
 5. Counsel and assist ance upon their ind ependent entrance^ on 
 the business 0/ hje. There must be a period for minority to 
 
 "ceaieTand independent activity and business to begin. As this 
 period of full age approaches, parental care should be modified 
 to the growing experience and wisdom of the child, and he be 
 taught to rely more upon his own judgment, and avail himself 
 of his own resources. 
 
 But at this period of adult age, and entering upon the respon- 
 sibilities of his majority, the child has peculiar claims upon the 
 parent ; and whether son or daughter, the most prompt and ef- 
 fective assistance is here needed. Parental counsel can never 
 come under more affecting and encouraging circumstances. 
 
 Secular influence and pecuniary assistance should be granted, 
 especially to sons, as the parent can afford, and the condition 
 of the child needs. It is a violation of a moral claim, if, for their 
 own selfishness or indulgence, the parents withhold assistance 
 in this crisis of their child's history. A lavish provision and ex- 
 pensive outfit is not demanded in any case of such beginning 
 experience ; and, if bestowed, will pretty surely do more hurt 
 
262 LEGALITY AND LOYALTY. 
 
 to the child than good ; but the assistance should be such as 
 will encourage, and yet prompt to greater industry and frugality. 
 The boy passes into the man, and all the former discipline of 
 the parent, to prepare him for his place in society and his wor- 
 ship of God, is now to come forth in actual engagedness. As 
 he steps over the domestic threshhold, to go out among strangers 
 in the social world, he never more needs the parental blessing 
 and counsel ; and in his individual destitution of all accumulated 
 capital, he can be never more in want of judicious help from the 
 patrimonial resources. His influence for the state and for God 
 will thus be best subserved. 
 
 6. Over thejwhole period of minority there should be direct 
 training for the state. The parental duty towards the state is 
 not fulfilled by that culture and discipline which enables and 
 induces the child to take care of himself, and sends him out, or 
 sets him up in business, on his own account. This would be 
 acting as if the parent had no higher responsibility than the 
 animal, — merely to propagate his kind, and rear his offspring to 
 do the same, and then die. Man lives foijends beyond himself, 
 and thus beyond what would be gained in rearing up another 
 man merely that he should take care of himself. Society can- 
 not exist, and grow in moral and intellectual elevation, and thus 
 the race make progress from generation to generation, without 
 the state and the action of its sovereign authority. And such 
 state action can only be in constraint, except as the citizens are 
 intelligent and virtuous. No man helps his fellows in elevation 
 and refinement above his own standard ; and thus no man 
 works, in his place in the state, for any political profit, without 
 having already become himself enlightened and righteous. And 
 to train to this capability of service, for public freedom's sake, is 
 one great part' of the end for which the family organization exists. 
 
 Every parent is bound, thus, to keep his eye upon the state, 
 in all his government, and directly educate for its wants. This 
 is done by educating the child for his own highest interests, 
 
DUTIES OF PARENTS. 263 
 
 and also, so far as his regularity, industry, and frugality go, to 
 help the social world about him. But he must be trained to 
 patriotism other and higher than as his country is helped col- 
 laterally by his helping himself. His country's freedom is an 
 end of life, and he must be taught to make sacrifices for it. 
 Not to seek first his own, and his country only in benefiting 
 himself; but himself, a servant to his country, for his country's 
 sake. And with this patriotic spirit, he needs to have been 
 taught how he may advance his country in civilization and the 
 public freedom. He should know her constitution and her 
 laws ; her relation to other nations, and her past history ; and 
 no parent has done his duty as a parent to his child, if he has 
 not cultivated both this patriotic spirit, and the faculties which 
 are to carry it out in action through all his political life. The 
 family is bound to be directly subservient to the state. 
 
 7. There must alsobe^jdirect^training for God and heaven.^ 
 God has given"^ child into the parents' hand, as the highest 
 of all ends, to train in piety for his sake. The end of the family 
 is to teach the child reverence for God, and a sense of depen- 
 dence upon him, and direct prayer to him and worship of him. 
 The child may grow up irreverent and impious, but not without 
 the neglect and fault of the parent. If by both precept and ex- 
 ample the child from infancy is nurtured in true piety, the effect 
 will be seen in early years, and even to old age he will not 
 depart from the way he should go. 
 
 This is due, not only as thereby gaining the heavenly reward 
 to the child, and thus the prudential consideration of parental 
 care for the child's good ; but true piety is loyalty, — obedience 
 of God from love to God, — and thus such training is due in the 
 Divine right ; an end God instituted the family to attain ; and 
 therefore of every family where it is neglected, he may make 
 the righteous charge of direct robbery of his ovra right, and call 
 to account, for eternity, every parent whose child's piety has 
 been neglected. The family is God's ordinance for piety's sake, 
 
264 LEGALITY AND LOYALTY. 
 
 CHAPTER IV, 
 
 DUTIES OF CHILDREN. 
 
 The duties of parents will determine very much the duties of 
 children, inasmuch as they are mostly reciprocal. The authority 
 on one side is met by corresponding obligation on the other, 
 and for the same end that the parent should administer the 
 family government, should the child also be completely subject 
 to it. The duties of the parent terminate in the state and the 
 kingdom of God, and the obligation is clear and full upon the 
 family-head to train the children for meeting the claims and 
 responsibilities of both ; and in the same way the obligation is 
 upon the children to conform to this parental culture and con- 
 trol, and thus secure that the end in view shall, in their case, be 
 consummated. 
 
 A few instances of the more general and prominent duties of 
 children will be sufficient to be here noted, and all others will 
 be indicated thereby or included therein. 
 
 I. Prompt subjection to parental authority. This is unquali- 
 fied in reference to all commands that are within the parental 
 authority legitimately. The parent has the proper place of sov- 
 ereignty, and thus the right to command ; and when the com- 
 mandment is within the proper lines, nothing can release the 
 child from the obligation of subjection. 
 
 In the early years of childhood, this must be much more un- 
 questioned, in respect to the rectitude of the command, than 
 when advancing to maturity. The child is not competent, ex- 
 cept in extreme cases, to determine the consistency of the par- 
 ent's government ; and his conscience and conduct should, 
 except in such extreme cases, be controlled by the will of the 
 parent. When approaching nearer maturity, the judgment be- 
 
DUTIES OF CHILDREN. 265 
 
 comes more clear and sound, and the conscience more enlight- 
 ened ; and there may not unfrequently come up cases of 
 casuistry, in reference to the rectitude of a parent's command, 
 and thus also in reference to the morality of filial obedience, 
 which may occasion much doubt and perplexity. 
 
 The principle, in all cases, is seen in the end of parental gov- 
 ernment. What goes to the necessary peace of the family, or is 
 accordant with the rights of the state, and the claims of God, 
 will always be legitimately binding. But should the parent's 
 commands invade the rights of the family, the state, or God, they 
 are a nullity, and their fulfilment would be immoral. No child 
 may consciously deal a blow at the peace of the family, the lib- 
 erty of the state, or the purity of religion, because a parent 
 assumes to command him. But within parental jurisdiction, 
 parental authority is unqualified. It is not necessary that rea- 
 sons for the command be at all given ; the positive authority, in 
 the parent's will, is sufficient to hold the conscience. 
 
 The external obedience, which may be rendered from fear of 
 punishment, may keep the peace of the family from all disturb- 
 ance ; and this spirit of legality will also stand in the future rela- 
 tions of civil polity ; but this cannot meet the full claim to the 
 subjection of the child and obedience to the parent. There is 
 another and a higher end of piety to be attained, and this de- 
 mands a heart of loyalty. Filial piety is obedience to the father 
 from love, and religious piety is obedience to God from love, 
 and the child's duty is not done in any mere legality, but must 
 come upon the ground of complete loyalty. 
 
 2. A meek and docile spirit. The whole of parental duty is 
 not in exercising positive authority, and securing action by com- 
 mands ; much instruction is to be given, and a very varied dis- 
 cipline to be administered, which is not merely legal. Law 
 itself is a teacher as well as a commander. The end of patriot- 
 ism and of piety cannot be reached without much teaching, and 
 a varied, long-continued nurture. 
 
266 LEGALITY AND LOYALTY. 
 
 On this account, the duty of every child is to maintain per- 
 petually a teachable frame of mind. There must be the readi- 
 ness to gain knowledge, to know duty, and also to conform to 
 the truth known ; a mind soft and yielding, and thus freely sus- 
 ceptible to the plastic hand of parental discipline. A stubborn, 
 froward, unyielding spirit in any child, aside from all overt ac- 
 tion, is a gross immorality. The family peace must be often 
 disturbed, the end of the state cannot be subserved, and much 
 less the end of piety, by any hardness of heart or wilfulness of 
 disposition. Under the Jewish law, the punishment of a fro- 
 ward and stubborn son was terribly severe. Deut. xxi. is to 21. 
 The abhorrence of God towards such impiety, in all cases, is 
 not probably too strongly expressed in this case. 
 
 3. Respect and reverence. In the nature of the case, high 
 regard and honor are due to those from whom, under God, life 
 has been given and sustained. But the claim is not merely from 
 nature. The life is given, and the living being reared in the 
 family, that as a man he may be matured and fitted for the citi- 
 zen and the Christian. He must come to bow reverently be- 
 fore the sceptre of civil sovereignty, and religiously before the 
 throne of God. He is under the culture of the domestic insti- 
 tution, that he may there attain this higher preparation. 
 
 And nothing is a better disciphne for the perpetual respect 
 of the majesty of law, and the religious homage of Jehovah, than 
 that filial reverence and honor which is claimed of all the chil- 
 dren in the family toward their common parent. Even should 
 the parent be an unworthy member of civil society, it is still the 
 duty of the child to hold the parent in great honor, though 
 obliged to grieve for the degeneracy of the man. All neglect, 
 reproach, or contemptuous speech or look, directed towards a 
 parent, is most undutiful and immoral. The fruitful source of 
 much political evil, and prevalent irreligion, is in an irreverent 
 family. 
 
 4. Kind attention in sickness, and support in old age. Time 
 
DUTIES OF BROTHERS AND SISTERS. 267 
 
 brings round its changes, and a complete revolution is made in 
 the family relations. The sources of support, and the objects 
 of dependence, have reversed their standing to each other ; the 
 child has become a man, and the man has gone back to be a 
 child a second time. There is no nurture and discipline to 
 bring to maturity in second childhood, but a patient and affec- 
 tionate tending of the decrepitude which has passed maturity, 
 and a reverent watching of the dust which the remnant of vital- 
 ity yet keeps from crumbling. 
 
 With this change of condition, the duty of the children has 
 changed. They are now to manifest the filial piety they have 
 been taught, and to support those limbs which in their own 
 weakness had supported them. The duty of obedience in 
 youth is not more imperative than the soothing attention and 
 care of parents in their declining age. No man can be either a 
 good citizen, or a good Christian, who neglects the helplessness 
 and dependence of an aged parent. Even if remembered 
 neglect, on the part of the parent, be grievous, still the debt of 
 life and ancestral origin remain, and the child is vicious not to 
 pay. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 DUTIES OF BROTHERS AND SISTERS. 
 
 The difference of sex will in some degree modify the duties 
 of the children towards each other ; still the duties of brothers 
 and sisters are so nearly the same, that they may be embraced 
 within the same description, occasionally only demanding a little 
 peculiarity of application. 
 
 The parents are more directly responsible to the state, and to 
 God, for the manner of their action upon their children, and 
 the directness with which they apply their authority to the secur« 
 
268 LEGALITY AND LOYALTY. 
 
 ing of the ends of civil freedom and religion; but the same 
 ends are yet to be had in view in determining the duties of the 
 children of the same family, and each child must be held re- 
 sponsible directly to the parents, and ultimately to the state and 
 to heaven, for the manner in which he fulfils these fraternal 
 obligations. The peace and freedom of the family will be more 
 immediately in view, to the children, than the interests of the 
 state and religion ; yet in reahty all wiU be found not only to 
 harmonize together, but that each one must necessarily imply 
 the others. 
 
 1. Mutual affection and kindness. Neither man nor woman 
 can become good citizens of the state without having cultivated 
 an amiable temper, and an affectionate and kind disposition. 
 And unless this be cherished in the family circle, it is vain to 
 expect it first to spring up among the jarring interests and selfish 
 purposes of public society. And although the temper and the 
 example of the parents will do much to mould and form the 
 dispositions of the children, yet must very much also depend 
 upon the mutual influence which they exert upon each other. 
 Kindness begets kindness in return, and the reciprocal good 
 feeling and kind action, between the children of the same family, 
 perpetuates its peace and happiness. Every hour's indulgence 
 of a spirit of jealousy or envy, of anger or hatred, by any 
 member of the circle of children, brings its discomfort to the 
 whole family ; disquieting and grieving the parents, and provok- 
 ing to retaliation the other menbers. 
 
 The heart of each is thus to be cultivated, by his or her own 
 care and self-discipline, and its affections cherished directly and 
 constantly towards every brother and sister. A disregard of 
 this perpetual obligation is a great immorality. 
 
 2. A careful regard to each other's feelings and reputation. 
 The union of the marriage bond is the most cordial, constant, 
 and indissoluble of any relation in life. It is not the tie of blood, 
 but the commingling of personalities in union, from which all 
 
DUTIES OF BROTHERS AND SISTERS. 269 
 
 the relationships of consanguinity originate. The family, thus, is 
 made a unit; and as the husband and wife have become "one 
 flesh," so are their children participants in their blood, and 
 identical in the union. Emphatically, one member cannot 
 suffer, but every other member must suffer with it. The dis- 
 honor of one is an indignity to all, and a pang felt in one bosom 
 must shoot through every heart. 
 
 No wound can be so painful here as one inflicted by a 
 brother's or a sister's misdeed. An intended or a careless 
 wrong, from one within the fraternal circle, is far more intolera- 
 ble than the injuries or the insults of any without the family. 
 Moreover, all the regard to the feeling of others, and the tender 
 care of character and reputation, which is to mark our life amid 
 the duties of citizenship, and in the family of God, are to be first 
 cultivated and practised, in our intercourse with our brethren 
 and sisters, at the common home of us and them. 
 
 3. An acknowledged equality in domestic privileges and pre- 
 rogatives. From the very fact of greater age and experience, 
 an elder brother or sister may be justified in counselling and 
 directing the younger, and naturally such will exert a leading 
 influence upon the later-born children. But no disparity of 
 age gives any family superiority or domestic prerogative ; and 
 there should, on this account, be no assumption of authority and 
 participation in the parental control. All such usurpation will 
 beget the evils in the family which flow from unrighteous 
 authority everywhere. Resentment, pertinacious resistance, and 
 direct contempt, will spring up in the oppressed; and in- 
 solence, cruelty, and violence, will manifest themselves on the 
 side of the oppressor ; and in such a family there will never 
 cease to be disunion and dissension. 
 
 This is ever the duty of the elder to the younger, that in all 
 their counsel and direction they use only the moral influence of 
 their position, and not arrogate to themselves any of the prerog- 
 atives of the parental authority. There is no such authority 
 
2/0 LEGALITY AND LOYALTY. 
 
 legitimately, and all assumption of it is an injury and an 
 immorality. 
 
 4. All cases of collision should be referred to the parental 
 authority. Every community must have its supreme sovereignty, 
 or the members are left in anarchy. This must be placed in 
 some one known and acknowledged point. In the family, unless 
 very special reasons have come in, this sovereign umpire in all 
 controversy is in the parent. No other has the authority to 
 judge and decide in disputed family rights. The whole training, 
 for a future law-abiding spirit, is in this deference to parental 
 decision and execution. 
 
 In all collections of children, offences and collisions will occur. 
 This will not unfrequently be in the children of the same family. 
 Their common umpire is the parent ; and all disputed matters, 
 unadjusted among themselves, must come up confidingly to this 
 tribunal, and the decision be received with ready acquiescence. 
 Such an ultimate tribunal is not to be used by the child as a 
 matter of threatening, to deter or coerce a brother or sister to 
 his or her wishes, against which every parent should scrupulously 
 guard each child ; but the resort is righteously made only for 
 instruction and decision, and to the child this is final when 
 validly given. 
 
 5. All demoralizing example and influence must be sedulously 
 excluded. The nearness of the connection, and the constancy 
 of the intercourse among brothers and sisters, give necessarily 
 great consequence to all moral influences exerted. One vicious 
 member of a family very soon corrupts others, and very easily 
 leads astray, especially under the advantages of age and more 
 experience. All the ends of the family institution may be de- 
 feated and lost by the action upon others of one immoral 
 brother or sister. 
 
 The intercourse in the fraternal circle should thus be scrupu- 
 lously virtuous and pure. Especially should all the example and 
 influence of brothers with sisters be the most delicate, refined, 
 
DUTIES OF BROTHERS AND SISTERS. 2/1 
 
 and elevating. A poison instilled here not only goes through 
 the family, but out into society, and on into eternity. The con- 
 versation and reading, the amusements and diversions, the whole 
 communion within the domestic circle, should be as pure as it 
 is intimate and influential. 
 
 6. Their mutual duties, though modified, are not lost by their 
 dispersion from home. Successively they go out from the com- 
 mon paternal home to find them other homes and originate 
 other families in their own chosen connections. Though these 
 new homes may be at a distance from the old family dwelling, 
 and far from each other, they are still bound by strong ties, and 
 owe to each other many duties. The remembrances of the past 
 go with them, and these tender reminiscences still link them in 
 unity. They are to each other what no other persons on earth 
 can become. 
 
 There is thus the duty in each to cherish such remembrances, 
 to seek all favoring opportunities for repeated interviews, to 
 maintain frequent correspondence by letter, and to cease not 
 the habitual remembrance of each in prayer. They have gone, 
 separate, it may be, in society, and are in their own spheres 
 fulfilling to the state the duties to which, in the family, they have 
 been trained ; but as these duties were not the only end of 
 family government, so their performance will not finish all their 
 work. They will come together again before God, to exhibit 
 the issues of that parental culture which cherished their piety 
 and prepared them for heaven. 
 
 Great forbearance and self-control is demanded in all distri- 
 butions of the parental inheritance. Sad occasions here occur 
 for lasting heart-burning and perpetuated alienation, for which 
 no amount of wealth can be a compensation. A family that has 
 been united and happy around the family hearth may thus fall 
 into dissension about its ashes when its fires have gone out. All 
 such occasions for family alienation, given by any of the children 
 tlirough a spirit of selfishness or jealousy, is not only sadly dis- 
 astrous to all future fraternal peace, but flagrantly vicious. 
 
272 LEGALITY AND LOYALTY. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE DUTIES OF SERVANTS. 
 
 It is often essential to the ends of the family institution that 
 there be other inmates than the parents and children. In vari- 
 ous ways services must be performed by such as are taken into 
 the family for that purpose. These persons come thus to sus- 
 tain a pecuUar relation to the natural members of the family, and 
 their duties must be determined from the rights acquired by the 
 head of the household. We have, thus, belonging to the sphere 
 of morality under family government, the Duty of Servants to be 
 determined. 
 
 Servitude may be either voluntary or involuntary. These 
 distinctions give peculiarity to the servile relationship, and must 
 necessarily very much modify the ground of obligation and the 
 nature of the duties. We shall thus best apprehend the truth in 
 relation to both by considering each separately. 
 
 Section I. Voluntary Servitude. The whole service in this 
 rests wholly upon contract. It will include all such as come 
 within the family by personal agreement, or by indenture of the 
 parent or guardian. Hired servants, bound servants, indented 
 apprentices, etc., come under this division of voluntary servi- 
 tude. The principles which govern are the same as in aU ordi- 
 nary contracts, and need only to be simply stated to determine 
 the whole matter of duty. 
 
 I . The entire ground of claim is in the contract. Nothing 
 may be assumed which is not there specified, or fairly implied 
 in all the circumstances. Established custom may regulate 
 many things which will need no specification in the written con- 
 tract, but this must be on the ground that each party has under- 
 stood, and tacitly agreed to, all these matters of custom and 
 precedent. The whole act of claim and obligation was in the 
 
DUTIES OF SERVANTS. 27.3 
 
 ratifying of the agreement, and nothing back of that can be a 
 source of right or duty. 
 
 2. Each party must be alike free in making the contract 
 Whatever circumstances may make such an agreement desirable, 
 on either side, the party must be the one to decide to what ex- 
 tent it is desirable. In relation to the matter of agreement, they 
 come together as equals, and one as free to assent or dissent as 
 the other. Neither can be bound to any thing to which the free 
 assent has not been given. 
 
 3. Neither party can contract in violation of any previous 
 claims. Whatever obligations either may have been under to 
 the claims of others, these must be regarded in the making of 
 the contract. If any such higher and older obligations are con- 
 travened by the later contract, it is to this extent null and void. 
 
 4. The contract equally binds both. The master may no 
 more violate his stipulations than the servant. 
 
 5. No one has the right to contract to the known injury of 
 the other. Morality demands the same mutual respect, as men, 
 in making contracts as in all other human intercourse ; and 
 hence each is bound to respect the rights of the other. All 
 trick and deceit, all concealment and duplicity, which seek to 
 take advantage one of the other, are vicious and immoral. 
 Considering the wants and circumstances of both, each must 
 stand upon the ground of a fair and honest equivalent in the 
 bargain made. 
 
 6. A wilful breach of the contract on one side releases from 
 obligation on the other. If one has been injured by the viola- 
 tion of the contract, in the neglect ,or wrong-doing of the other, 
 he has not only a claim to redress by way of damages, but he 
 has the right to say whether the contract has not itself thus 
 become worthless to him, and that he may claim a full release 
 from it. He may take his option, to be indemnified in damages, 
 or in the annulling of the contract. 
 
 7. Neither party may take advantage of his own wrong-doing. 
 
274 LEGALITY AND LOYALTY. 
 
 A violation of the contract in any way, by one, leaves it solely 
 at the option of the other how to get his redress. The wrong- 
 doer cannot plead his breach of the contract to attain any 
 benefit on his part. 
 
 8. Neither party can bind his children beyond their minority. 
 The tie of consanguinity may lay claims upon a child after his 
 parents' decease, and thus more manifestly after the child's 
 majority in the parents' life-time. It may be incumbent upon 
 the child to do and sacrifice much to rescue a parent's charac- 
 ter and memory from reproach ; but this is from the permanent 
 ethical claim of blood-descent. The child would degrade him- 
 self in allowing the stain to rest on his ancestor. It cannot 
 originate in any contract the parent has made. The child, at his 
 majority, must have all the independent prerogatives of a man 
 that the father has, or one generation enslaves another. When 
 a new generation comes on, it must stand as free as the prede- 
 cessor in making its contracts ; and the people of the last 
 cannot be bound by the first, to be made either masters or 
 servants. A man may legally direct his property so as to bind 
 his heirs after his decease, but his children's servitude, or mas- 
 tership, must be of their own free controlling. 
 
 The above may be applied as the principles which are to 
 regulate in all cases of voluntary servitude, and which will 
 determine all specific duties and claims. The rights on each 
 side will, in these, be duly guarded, and the ethical claims of 
 each enforced. 
 
 Section II. Involuntary Servitude. This is where the per- 
 son is held to service without his consent, and thus no contract 
 is made. The will of one party is not consulted, but he is 
 under duress, and constrained to serve. Several such cases 
 may be named, as equitable compulsory servitude, but which do 
 not strictly come under the authority of the family. The state 
 is the controlling sovereign ; and if the service be rendered in 
 the family, it is wholly under the direction of the state authority. 
 
DUTIES OF SERVANTS. 2/5 
 
 1. The demerit of crime. Compulsory service may ethically 
 be demanded of the criminal, either as penalty for his crime, or 
 as contributing to his support while he is undergoing confine- 
 ment as a penalty. Principles of equity and humanity are to 
 determine the amount and kind of labor, and whether some 
 portion of the proceeds should not go to the comfort of his 
 needy family; but the state may rightfully enforce ■ labor and 
 service from the criminal, without regarding at all his own 
 consent. 
 
 2. Tlie claim of debt. One man has received that which 
 belongs to another, and as thus indebted, he is bound to render 
 a full equivalent. It might be considered in the light of a brok- 
 en contract, for when the debt was contracted there was, ex- 
 pressed or implied, the promise to pay. But in whatever way 
 bound, the creditor has now a righteous claim, and it may be 
 pressed to liquidation without regard to the will of the debtor. 
 If no other means of pay exist, his personal services may be 
 exacted. The creditor has the right, under the authority of 
 civil law, to coerce payment by compulsory labor. 
 
 3. The exaction of pauper labor. If the state is responsible 
 for the support of its poor members, it has also the right of 
 coercing their services against their consent, so far as these may 
 be made to minister to the diminution of the poor-rate. The 
 state may not make gain, and raise a revenue from their com- 
 pulsory labor, nor violate any claim of humanity ; but the state 
 may compel the idle and dissolute to labor towards their own 
 support. 
 
 4. Captives taken in war. The capturing power is bound, 
 on all principles of humanity and morality, to support in com- 
 fort the prisoners it has taken in war, who shall be unable to pay 
 for their own support. This, as in the case of pauper-labor 
 above, gives the right to coerce servitude to the extent of the 
 prisoner's support. Morality does not tolerate war and captivity 
 a§ a source of gain, and thus a right of possession and property 
 
276 LEGALITY AND LOYALTY. 
 
 in the prisoner ; but as bound to maintain while a prisoner, so 
 the nation may exact services of the prisoner to that end. 
 
 In all the above cases, the state may sell the services to indi- 
 viduals, and may thus give over the right to exact, to the extent 
 to which this right is possessed by itself. But in none of the 
 above cases is this exacted servitude any matter of family author- 
 ity. If the family have the service, it must be bought of the 
 state, and all right of control and coercion is only by state 
 transfer. 
 
 Under the head of Family Government, aside from the pa- 
 rental authority which commands and controls the child, and 
 exacts services without consent for the great ends of the family 
 institution, there is but one case of involuntary servitude which 
 can be contemplated, viz. : Domestic Slavery. This has many 
 more difificulties attending its consideration than any of the 
 above cases. The conflicting interests, prejudices,, political 
 party arrangements, and general pubhc excitement in reference 
 to its evils, and the different methods of redress, all have united 
 to complicate and embarrass the subject, and render it for the 
 present almost hopeless of any determination in wliich there 
 shall be harmony of conviction and action. And yet the great 
 principles of family government, and the ends to be subserved 
 by it, are as readily applied to domestic slavery as to voluntary 
 servitude or parental authority over children. So far as slavery 
 is a domestic institution, it must be determined, in its morality, 
 by the ends for which the family exists, and be justified or con- 
 demned accordingly. 
 
 I. The nature of domestic slavery. This is quite distinct 
 from all voluntary service, inasmuch as that is founded upon 
 contract, but this contemplates service without consent, — labor 
 from compulsion. A definition, which will embrace all modifi- 
 cations of domestic slavery, is the exacting of personal services 
 ■without consent. It controls without contract. It directs the 
 actionof the servant at the will of the master, and treats him 
 05 incapacitated from forming and executing his own choices. 
 
DUTIES OF SERVANTS. 2/7 
 
 2. The ground on which domestic slavery becomes righteous. 
 This absolute control over the service of another is completely 
 righteous, as a domestic arrangement, when it is kept fuUy 
 within the ends for which the family has been instituted. The 
 family is the nursery for man, to train him up for civil freedom 
 and piety. The race is to be perpetuated and nurtured from 
 generation to generation in lawful wedlock, and not through 
 promiscuous cohabitation, because thus the freedom and piety 
 of the race can be best promoted. It is this fact which gives 
 its ethical validity to parental authority ; and the same fact, 
 actually existing in any case, will give equal validity to the 
 authority of the head of the household as the master of his 
 slaves. So long as it is most subservient to their preparation 
 for the rights of citizenship, and the blessedness of heaven, so 
 long it will be their duty to be obedient to their master for 
 righteousness' sake. There is here one ground of subjection 
 to family authority, to the child and to the slave, and while 
 they both stand on that ground, the master's authority over his 
 slaver is as righteous as his authority over his child. 
 
 But this domestic arrangement of master and slave must 
 stand solely on this ground, of subserviency to civil freedom 
 and to pious worship, or it becomes an immorality. No man 
 has the right to lord it over his servant, and control his services 
 at his own pleasure, without regard to the choice of the servant, 
 except upon precisely the same principles that give him this 
 authority over his child. The child is born within the jurisdic- 
 tion of such authority, and thus comes naturally under the 
 principle ; the slave may or may not be so bom. But whether 
 born in the master's house, or bought with his money, the only 
 end that can ethically justify his control over him is, that he 
 sustain that relation, and exert that authority, solely to the end 
 of his preparation for state citizenship somewhere, and for 
 heaven. Not at all the consideration of the master's proiit or 
 pleasure, but the highest public freedom and piety, can alone 
 make domestic slavery stand square with the claims of morality. 
 
2/8 LEGALITY AND LOYALTY. 
 
 It is quite important here to see how the whole Jewish code 
 of legislation, on the subject of slavery, followed out this prin- 
 ciple. It never omitted the end of civil freedom, where that 
 was attainable ; and never, on any occasion, the end of piety. 
 It justified itself perpetually by keeping within righteous domes- 
 tic principle, and seeking the end for which the family itself 
 was instituted. 
 
 It recognized no right to slavery among the heathen. If a 
 slave fled from a Pagan master, and would dwell in the Holy 
 Land, there was the prohibition to deliver up the fugitive. 
 " Thou shalt not deliver to his master the servant who hath es- 
 caped from his master to thee : He shall dwell with thee, even 
 among you in that place which he shall choose in one of thy 
 gates where it liketh him best : thou shalt not oppress him." 
 
 Deut. xxLii. 15, 16. 
 
 It prohibited all Hebrew slavery except by contract. A He- 
 brew servant might be bought, but with such contract only to 
 the next coming year of release. " If thou shalt buy a Hebrew 
 servant, six years he shall serve, and in the seventh he shall go 
 out free for nothing." Ex. xxi. z. " And if thy brother, a Hebrew 
 man or a Hebrew woman, shall be sold to thee, and serve thee 
 six years, then in the seventh year thou shalt let him go free from 
 thee." Deut. xv. 12. If he became a perpetual servant, it was at 
 his own agreement. " And if thy servant shall plainly say, I love 
 my master, my wife, and my children ; I will not go out free : 
 Then his master shall bring him to the Judges ; he shall also 
 bring him to the door, or to the door-post : and his master shall 
 bore his ear through with an awl ; and he shall serve him for- 
 ever." Ex. xxi. s, 6. See, also, Deut. xv. i6, 17. 
 
 // permitted national Gentile slavery as a commutation for 
 death. The Canaanites were doomed to death, by God, for 
 their idolatry, after waiting for the filling up of their iniquity from 
 the days of Jacob. " But in the fourth generation they shall 
 come hither again, for the iniquity of the Amorites is not yet full." 
 
bUTlES OF SERVANTS. 27^ 
 
 Gejj. XV. i6. " And when the Lord thy God shall deliver them 
 before thee, thou shalt smite them and utterly destroy them : 
 thou shalt make no covenant with them, nor show mercy to 
 them." Deut. vii. 1, 2. " But of the cities of these people which the 
 Lord thy God doth give thee for an inheritance, thou shalt save 
 alive nothing that breatheth." Deut. xx. i6 to i8. By deceit some 
 of them made a covenant under which they were spared, but 
 were upon detection made perpetual national bond- men. "And 
 Joshua that day made them hewers of wood and drawers of 
 water for the congregation, and for the altar of the Lord, even 
 to this day, in the place which he should choose." Josh. ix. 3 to 27. 
 
 It allowed domestic slavery by purchase from Gentiles. This 
 was the only source of family slavery. " Both thy bond-men, 
 and thy bond-maids, which thou shalt have, shall be of the 
 heathen that are around you, of them shall ye buy bond-men 
 and bond-maids. Moreover, of the children of the strangers 
 that sojourn among you, of them shall ye buy, and of their 
 families that are with you, which they begat in your land, and 
 they shall be your possession." Lev. xxv. 44 to 46. Such as were 
 already in heathen bondage they might buy, but it was a capital 
 offence to kidnap. " And he that stealeth a man, and selleth 
 him, or if he shall be found in his hand, he shall surely be put 
 to death." Ex. xxi. 16. This transferred from Paganism to the 
 privileges of a true religion. 
 
 TTie slave was allowed full religious privilege. Circumcision. 
 " He that is born in thy house, and he that is bought with thy 
 money, must needs be circumcised ; and my covenant shall be 
 in your flesh for an everlasting covenant.'' Gen. xvK. 12, 13. The 
 Sabbath. " But the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy 
 God, in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor 
 thy daughter, thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy 
 cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates." Ex. xx. 10. The 
 passover. " But every man's servant that is bought for money, 
 when thou hast circumcised him, then shall he eat thereof," 
 
280 LEGALITY AND LOYALTV. 
 
 Ex. xii. 44 to 49. The temple service and sacred feasts. '' And 
 thou shalt rejoice before the Lord thy God, thou, and thy son 
 and thy daughter, and thy man-servant and thy maid-servant, — 
 in the place which the Lord thy God hath chosen to put his 
 name there." Deut. xvi. n. In solemn national covenant. "Ye 
 stand this day all of you before the Lord your God, — your 
 little ones, your wives, and the stranger that is in thy camp, 
 from the hewer of thy wood to the drawer of thy water, that 
 thou shouldst enter into covenant with the Lord thy God." 
 
 Deut. xxix. 10, 12. 
 
 If he was maimed by violence he was made free. " And if a 
 man shall smite the eye of his servant, or the eye of his maid, 
 that it shall perish, he shall let him go free for his eye's sake. 
 And if he shall smite out his man-servant's tooth, or his maid- 
 sei-vant's tooth, he shall let him go free for his tooth's sake." 
 
 Ex. xxi. 26, 27. 
 
 If he was killed outright by his master, the master was pun- 
 ished. " And if a man shall smite his servant or his maid with 
 a rod, and he shall die under his hand, he shall surely be 
 punished." Ex. xxi. 20. 
 
 The fact that if he survived the injury two or three days, the 
 master was not punished, " because he was his money," verse 
 twenty-first, — is the least easily reconciled with the general 
 principle, of any regulation given. The fact that he was " his 
 money," might indicate that it was not to be inferred that there 
 was the intent to kill ; and that in the uncertainty of the occa- 
 sion of the death, the whole matter was to be left to the 
 judgment of God. 
 
 It may not be certain, though it is probable, that the slave 
 had the same privilege of becoming a proselyte that any free 
 Gentile had ; and thus at his own option, as a convert, he would 
 come into all the privileges of an Hebrew of the Hebrews, and 
 go out of his bondage at the next year of release. It is prob- 
 able, also, that the Gentile as well as the Jewish slave had his 
 
DUTIES OF SERVANTS. 28 1 
 
 liberty at the jubilee. "Ye shall hallow the fiftieth year and 
 proclaim liberty throughout all the land, to all its inhabitants." 
 Lev. XXV. lo. All Jewish slaves were free every seventh year by the 
 special statutes before cited. Ex. xxi. 2; Dect. xv. 12: This really leaves 
 none but Gentile slaves to have the special benefit of the fiftieth 
 year freedom, for the Jewish slaves were already provided for in 
 the seventh year of release, and the Gentile slaves are manifestly 
 recognized as properly citizens and inhabitants in the above 
 transactions of Deut. xxix. 10, 12. The interpretation of Lev. 
 XXV. 45, 46, is thus to be a permission perpetually to make 
 bond-men of Gentile descendents in every generation, but not 
 that any one Gentile man and his children should be perpetual 
 slaves. Every slave was made free at the year of jubilee. 
 
 His whole training in a Hebrew family would be thus fitting 
 him for the rights and duties of a citizen. And under all cir- 
 cumstances, the Jewish law kept the great end of piety as fully 
 in view to the master for his slave, as to the father for his son. 
 Take the whole condition of a Pagan bond-man, and view him 
 as transferred by purchase to a Hebrew master, and how great 
 the change for the better, both politically and religiously ! 
 
 3. The ground on which domestic slavery becomes unrighteous. 
 The only end for which the master may hold slaves, morally, 
 has been given ; but it may often occur that one man may con- 
 trol the services of another, in fact, for quite another end. The 
 only one supposable is some private interest. The authority is 
 exerted for some personal gratification not for public freedom 
 nor piety. On such ground the domestic institution, as embrac- 
 ing slavery, is immoral, and all its authority an unrighteous usur- 
 pation. The particular definition of slavery, on the former 
 ground, would be — exacting service without consent, but solely 
 for the end of highest freedom and piety. The particular defini- 
 tion, on the latter ground, is — exacting service without consent, 
 for the master's own pleasure. The immorality of this form of 
 domestic slavery is made manifest in the usurpation and tyranny 
 
282 LEGALItV AND LOYALTY. 
 
 of the authority. Liberty of choice, in object and execution, is 
 every man's birthright ; restrained only by that which is due to 
 the same right in all. There is admitted no partial prerogatives ; 
 but as man, every one is alike free and alike restrained. All 
 men may do what they please, if only each one will regard, in his 
 pleasure, this same right in aU others, and restrain his choices 
 by the freedom of all. But the principle of this form of slavery 
 makes the individual pleasure supreme. One man gratifies his 
 own choice, and discards wholly the right of choice in another. 
 It annihilates the imperatives of morality in public freedom by 
 its own selfishness. 
 
 Still further, it overrides all the claims of piety. Piety can 
 only be in freely worshipping and serving God according to the 
 dictates of conscience. It is complying with the impulse of 
 man's spiritual being, in its conscious dependence, to go out in 
 reverence and confidence to God, according to the honest con- 
 viction of the claims that God makes. The end of all family 
 authority, beyond political freedom, is the cultivation of such 
 piety. But this form of slavery discards utterly all such claims, 
 moral and Divine, and puts the pleasure of the master above 
 conscience and religion. It assumes to do what morality 
 can never permit may be done. Responsibility to personal 
 claims of conscience is inalienable. Personality may not re- 
 nounce its prerogative and become a thing. The slave may 
 not consent to surrender it; the master may not arrogate to 
 assume it. One cannot give it, the other can not take it, without 
 guilt. Neither consent nor force can effect such a transfer. 
 Immutable morality still holds every man by the imperatives of 
 his own conscience ; and yet this form of the institution as- 
 sumes to accomplish all this ethical impossibility by the mere 
 contradictory pleasure of the master. No possible assumption 
 of authority can be more tyrannical or immoral. 
 
 All domestic slavery which controls the slave for the pleasun 
 of the master is most abhorrent to virtue. 
 
DUTIES OF SERVANTS. 28^ 
 
 It may also be important to see how the Christian Scriptures 
 view this form of domestic slavery. We have already examined 
 the Jewish law of the Old Testament, and found its provisions 
 agreeing substantially with the true ends of the family institu- 
 tion, and thus resting upon a moral basis. So slavery might be, 
 and be righteous. But the Christian Scriptures manifestly refer 
 to the latter form of slavery, where the services were controlled 
 at the will, and for the pleasure of the master. It was Grecian 
 and Roman slavery to which the Apostles allude, in the several 
 epistles to Christian Churches, which we shall examine. In 
 what light is this form of slavery regulated in the Gospel ? 
 
 // enjoins emphatically obedience to the master. "Servants, 
 be obedient to them that are your masters according to the 
 flesh, with fear and trembling, in singleness of your heart, as to 
 Christ ; Not with eye-service as men-pleasers ; but as the 
 servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart." 
 Eph. vi. 5to8. And to the same purport see Col. iii. 22 to 25. 
 " Let as many servants as are under the yoke count their own 
 masters worthy of all honor, that the name of God and his 
 doctrine be not blasphemed." i t™. vi. i. " Exhort servants to 
 be obedient to their own masters, and to please them well in all 
 things ; not answering again ; Not purloining, but showing all 
 good fidelity, that they may adorn the doctrine of God our 
 Saviour in all things." titus, h. g, 10. " Servants, be subject to 
 your masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but 
 also to the froward. For this is thank-worthy, if a man for 
 conscience towards God endure grief, suffering wrongfully. For 
 what glory is it, if when ye be buffetted for your faults, ye shall 
 take it patiently? but if when ye do well, and suffer for it, ye 
 take it patiently, this is acceptable with God. For even here- 
 unto were ye called because Christ also suffered for us, leaving 
 us an example that ye should follow his steps." i Pet. ii. 18 to 20. 
 This obedience was by no means required, on the ground that 
 the slavery was righteous, and the master's authority morally 
 
284 LEGALITY AND LOYALTY. 
 
 valid. It would be more prudent for the slave to obey, and 
 tend most to cultivate his piety. He was required to be obe- 
 dient, " not only to the good and gentle, but also to the fro- 
 ward " ; even obedient where cruelty and wickedness led to the 
 "buffeting" of the slave for "doing well." It was expedient 
 to obey ; just as when you cannot escape from a tiger, it is 
 expedient not to provoke him. It by no means justifies the 
 usurped authority. It was better for the slave to obey; and 
 especially it would serve to augment piety, and recommend the 
 religion of Him, who in his humiliation was smitten and " opened 
 not his mouth." 
 
 Jt requires masters to reciprocate the sa?ne spirit. " Do the 
 same things to them," — " forbear threatening," — " give to the 
 slave that which is just and equal." Eph. vi. 9; Col. iv. i. The 
 Christian master was no more to provoke a froward slave, than 
 the Christian slave was to disobey a froward master ; and the 
 wicked authority of the master is no more sustained by the 
 injunction in one case, than is the wicked spirit of the slave by 
 the injunction in the other. 
 
 A slave luas to take his freedom if he could. " Art thou 
 called being a servant ? care not for it ; but if thou mayest be 
 made free, use it rather. For he that is called in the Lord, 
 being a servant, is the Lord's freeman ; likewise, also, he that is 
 called, being free, is Christ's servant. Ye are bought with a 
 price ; be not ye the servants of men. Brethren, let every man, 
 wherein he is called, therein abide with God." i Coe. vii. 21 to 24. 
 The great thing was his Christian redemption; he need not 
 much mind his bondage to his master, compared with the 
 unspeakable prerogative in that he was now " the Lord's free- 
 man." Still, if he might be free, that was desirable. "Use it 
 rather." Fully condemning the relation as unrighteous, on the 
 part of the assumed authority of the master. Had it been on 
 the ground that the slave's culture in social and political duties 
 was best subserved by remaining in such a domestic arrange- 
 
DUTIES OF SERVANTS. 285 
 
 ment, and that his piety was there best promoted, — the only 
 ends that could justify the relation, — we should certainly have 
 had no such direction. It would have been as irrelevant to the 
 slave as to the child. Both ought to stay under the authority, 
 till the end of the cultivation has been attained. 
 
 When we add to all this the most affecting direction of Paul 
 to Philemon, in sending his fugitive slave Onesimus to him, 
 converted and pious, and expressly saying " not now as a slave, 
 but above a slave, a brother beloved " ; and also, all the general 
 principles of the Gospel bearing on this assumption to use one 
 man for another man's pleasure ; as in the parable of the good 
 Samaritan ; the golden rule ; the command to self-denial for 
 other's good, etc. ; we cannot fail to see that any form of 
 domestic slavery, which assumes to control the slave for the 
 master's pleasure, is as truly condemned by our Saviour as it is 
 abhorrent to humanity. 
 
 Slave emancipation had been effected in many cases by civil 
 authority, and in different states of the American Union, but in 
 the year 1863. slavery Was virtually abolished in the United 
 States by the proclamation of President Lincoln, as a war- 
 measure in suppressing the civil conflict then raging ; and the 
 growing spirit of benevolence, freedom, and humanity had been 
 since steadily at work for expelling slavery from all lands. It 
 does yet, however, widely prevail in the world, and the cause of 
 morality demands still the clear expression of its claims, and 
 especially the distinctions between justifiable and forbidden forms 
 of domestic servitude, -that the right and wrong of household 
 slavery may be everywhere fully apprehended. 
 
 It will not be difficult in any community, where the institution 
 of domestic slavery is established, to determine on which basis 
 it rests, and is supported and defended. The laws which define 
 and regulate it, the customs and habits engendered by it, the 
 practises constantly prevailing under it, will make patent the life 
 and spirit of the system ; and accordingly as it keeps within and 
 
286 LEGALITY AND LOYALTY. 
 
 subserves, or overrides and discards, the great end of the family, 
 will it be approved or condemned by the stern rule of immutable 
 morality. 
 
 Some individual cases of men there maybe, who fully conform 
 to the claims of morality and Christianity in the spirit and prin- 
 ciple of their domestic arrangement, both as to children, volun- 
 tary servants, and slaves, while the public institution of slavery, 
 as it is known in the law, sustained in the state, and practised 
 by the mass of families in the community, is utterly vicious and 
 immoral. The institution, as having its basis and support in 
 state authority, and controlled by laws which coerce the slave 
 to the master's pleasure, without coercing the master to the 
 legitimate ends of family government, may be wholly immoral, 
 and also wholly unchristian; and every family, which includes 
 slaves on such a principle, will also be vicious ; and yet, in such 
 a community, and under such a jurisdiction, it is possible that 
 families may be, where the involuntary servitude of their mem- 
 bers is wholly righteous and justified both by pure morality 
 and revealed Christianity. The head of the family may have 
 no other end than the elevation of the servant, and his prepara- 
 tion for heaven ; and the servant may, as a fact, be in the best 
 condition to improve his humanity and his piety of any to which 
 the master can introduce him ; and where these things are so, 
 the relation of master and -servant is as legitimate by morality 
 and Christianity, as is the relation of parent and child. 
 
 The law of the land may give to the master prerogatives and 
 authority over his servant, which he wcJUld by no means use ; 
 and it may fasten obligations and responsibilities upon him, in 
 reference to his servant, which he can never justify as ethically 
 binding ; and even hold the slave to alternatives, in the death 
 or misfortunes of the master, which both the master and the 
 servant disapprove and regret, but which neither have any 
 power to change ; yet if both master and servant are controlling 
 their own conduct by the ends pf all family government, they 
 
DUTIES OF SERVANTS. 28/ 
 
 may both be very- much pitied, under these imposed state 
 liabilities, but they can neither be morally nor scripturally con- 
 demned. With the parties, it is a righteous family arrangement, 
 and a virtuous connection of master and servant, though the 
 political aspect is that of unrighteous slavery. 
 
 A short summary of duties, in reference to all that may have 
 any connection with a system of slavery as here presented, may 
 be thus given : 
 
 I. In reference to the master. 
 
 1. The master is bound to relinquish, at once, all claim to 
 control his servant merely for the ends of his own interest or 
 pleasure, and immediately to renounce any assumed right to 
 interfere with the dictates of conscience. 
 
 2. He is bound to give to the slave the same freedom that he 
 himself possesses, so soon as the ends for which slavery may 
 righteously exist in the domestic institution have been attained. 
 These ends consist in the training of the slave for the duties of 
 the citizen and the Christian. 
 
 3. Where these ends are not yet attained, it is the duty of 
 the master to hasten fhem as directly and as diligently as 
 possible. 
 
 4. Until such attainment is secured, the master is bound, to 
 a proper degree, by the duties of household baptism, religious 
 nurture, and mental instruction, as really towards his slave as 
 towards his child. 
 
 5. Where the man faithfully fulfils such duties, the law of the 
 land may unrighteously coerce to the relationship of master and 
 slave, but it is the master's misfortune and not his sin. 
 
 II. In reference to the slave. 
 
 1. The slave must obey his master, for the sake of expe- 
 diency and prudence, where the commands do not clash with 
 the convictions of conscience. 
 
 2. The slave must suffer his injuries meekly and patiently, 
 though not bound to admit them to be righteous, 
 
288 LEGALITY AND LOYALTY. 
 
 3. He should keep the freedom of his conscience, and reso- 
 lutely refuse to violate its dictates even unto death. 
 
 4. He should seek and take his freedom by all means not 
 denied by prudence and conscience. 
 
 5. If running away is prospective of less evil than staying in 
 slavery, it is right to run. The laws which masters may make, 
 to restrain from flight, have no other moral force upon the slave 
 than that of prudential consideration. 
 
 HI. In reference to other persons. 
 
 1. All are bound to compassionate, benevolently to regard, 
 and to pray for both the master and the slave. 
 
 2. Every man in the community is bound to exert his in- 
 fluence, in a wise and prompt manner, and as occasion may 
 offer, both by speech and act, through the press and legislation, 
 to abolish the unrighteous system of slavery as soon as possible. 
 
 3. As opportunity occurs, all ought to enlighten, persuade, 
 and reprove the unrighteous slaveholder, but with neither railing 
 nor denunciation. 
 
 4. All should help the slave to regain his freedom in all ways 
 not criminal. The law of the land may bind the citizen where 
 it could not righteously restrain the slave. The one is legiti- 
 mately under authority, the other is not. 
 
 5. All should insist upon the right of free discussion, and the 
 application of general principles to practice, in the matter of 
 slavery as on every other topic. A man becomes a traitor to the 
 rights of humanity when he renounces his claims to free inquiry 
 and discussion. 
 
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