Ij P77 Cornell UnlversHy Library KD 2051.P77 1888 A digest of the law <>' P,?'J,!}Sf,?!ilii}|,|i'l|Sli||| 3 1924 022 343 838 Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/cletails/cu31924022343838 A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, WITH AN INTEODIJCTOEY ESSAY ON CODIFICATION BY FREDERICK POLLOCK, BABEISTEE-AT-LAW, M.A., HON. LL.r. EDtlir., PEOFESSOE OF OOMMOIT LAW IN THE INNS OF OOUBI, LATE FELLOW OF TBINir? COLLBOE, OAMBEIDaE. FOURTH EDITION. LONDON: STEVENS AND SONS, 119, OHANCEET LANE, 1888 LONDON : PEINTED BT 0. F. EOWOETH, GEKAT NKW STBBET, FETTEB LANS — B.C. INTRODUCTION. The present work was undertaken, in the first place, in •order to supply the want of a concise work on the" Law of Partnership : and if this were aU, it would be needless to say much by way of introduction. But the form I have adopted invites, if it does not demand, some words of explanation ; the adoption of it, moreover, commits the writer to certain opinions on matters of much wider range ■and importance than the subject actually handled. Those opinions are stUl far from being established, and one who ■attempts to exemplify them in practice is in some sort "thereby bound to set forth his understanding of them, and to bear his part, however slight it may be, in their justifi- •cation. My desire has been to follow to the best of my power the example set by Mr. Justice Stephen in his ■* Digest of the Law of Evidence,' and repeated by him in the yet more weighty and difficult work of a ' Digest of the Criminal Law,' which has since been made the foundation of a Draft Code. This being said, it is almost superfluous to say that I agree with him in thinking the Indian Codes a desirable model for the exposition of English law, by authority if possible, but if and so far as that is too much to hope for, then by private endeavour ; and that I Kkewise agree with the reasons which he has given for that opinion both in the introduction to his 'Digest of the Law of Evidence' and on various other occasions. Some of those reasons, however, I may without «2 iv INTRODUCTION. presumption try to restate in my own way, this being a ■ topic on wMch repetition is certainly not vain in the sense of being needless ; and it seems also proper, in addition to this general statement, to explain why the subject of' Partnership has appeared to me a specially fit one for an experiment of this kind. The method of stating the law in general propositions- accompanied by specific illustrations was introduced into Indian legislation by Macaulay, though not brought into- operation till many years afterwards, and to him the merit of the invention is chiefly if not wholly attributable.^ It seems to me the greatest specific advance that has been made in modern times in the art called by an ingenious writer " the mechanics of law-making." We should by no means underrate the gradual improvements of detail, the introduction of orderly arrangement and cutting down of prolix and slovenly drafting, which have made recent Acts of Parliament comparatively readable ; but Macaulay's invention stands on a different level. It is an instrument of new constructive power, enabling the legislature to com- bine the good points of statute-law and case-law, such as. they have hitherto been, while avoiding almost all their respective drawbacks. Case-law gives particular instances and concrete analo- gies, from which general rules may be inferred ^ith more or less exactness, and their application to new instances predicted with more or less certainty; but it does not, strictly speaking, lay down general propositions beyond ' Traces of the idea may bo found in Bentham. He proposed to give in the body of a Code a running accompaniment of authorita- tive reasons and explanations, which might have dealt more or less in specific instances ; and such instances do occur in the ' Specimen of a Penal Code' (Works, vol. i.). But this amounts at most to a very vague foreshadowing of the Anglo-Indian method. Compare Mr. Whitley Stokes's 'Anglo-Indian Codes,' Oxford,_1887, p. xxiii. INTRODUCTION. v the limits wMck happen to be determined by the precise facts of each case. Every decided case does within those limits affirm a general proposition, with the help of the fixed understanding by which our Courts are governed, that similar decisions are to be given on similar facts. It involves, namely, the decision of all future cases exactly like it, and also of all such as, though not exactly like it, may be in the opinion of the Court so nearly like it that they ought to follow its analogy. The investigation of the likeness or unHkeness of the facts of different cases for this purpose is often a matter of great difficulty and nicety, •tind the power of forming a judgment on such questions can be acquired only by legal training and experience. Thus the framework of case-law consists of the statement -of a great number of sets of facts, together with the legal results which have been decided to follow from them : the .generahties which make it possible to state the law in a connected form are supplied by a process of discussion, linference, and comment carried on partly by the judges themselves in dealing with the cases, partly by private text-writers. The inspection of such a work as Fisher's -Digest, or perusal of the reported judgments in any cur- rent case in the Court of Appeal, will give in a short time, even to a lay reader, a much better notion of the manner in which English case-law is constructed than can be given hj any description. In the result, our Enghsh case-law, or any other system developed in substantially the same manner, has the great advantage of being full and detailed, ■and of preserving the memory of the remedies administered to the practical needs of men's afPairs in a record rich in •experience and fruitful of suggestions. But there is no ..security for completeness, and imperfect security for con- -sistency. While in some departments no possible scrap ■of mint or anise or cummin seems to remain unnoted, in ■others we may still wait for authority to give a certain vi INTRODUCTION. answer on the greater matters of the law; we have de- cisions of the most elaborate minuteness on the construc- tion of documents, and questions of substantive princij)le which are both important and elementary remain in an un- settled condition. And the system of graduated authority, an excellent one as far as it goes, which makes the decision of a Court of Appeal binding on all Courts below it, and the decision of the Court of final appeal binding on all other Courts and on itself,' does not prevent co-ordinate and conflicting decisions from standing side by side for an indefinite time. Case-law, moreover, is intelligible and accessible only to experts, and to them only with an ex- ' Even ■when a decision is afiBrmed on appeal by reason only of the House of Lords being equally divided, the decision remains binding on the House of Lords itself in subsequent cases. This happened in the case of B. v. MilKs, 10 01. & P. 534, -which -was afterwards expressly recognized as binding in Beamish v. Beamish, 9 H. L. C. 274 (see at p. 338) : see also Bright v. Hutton, 3 H. L. C. at pp. 388, 391 ; Attorney-Oeneral v. Bean and Canons of Windsor, 8 H. L. C. 369, 391 ; Lord Blackburn in Houldsworth v. Citij of Olasyow Banlc, 5 App. Ca. 335 ; and Lord Selbome in Caledonian Bailway Co. v. Walker's Trustees, 7 App. Ca. 275. However, even a Court of ultimate appeal may reconsider questions -which the non- appearance of a respondent has formerlj' compelled it to determine ex parte. This -was done by the Judicial Committee in the eccle- siastical appeal of Midsdale v. Clifton, 2 P. D. at pp. 277, 278, 305 307. It also seems doubtful whether the rule applies to criminal law (but see B. v. O-ltjde, 1868, L. E., 1 C. C. E. 139). And the Supreme Court of the United States does not hold itself bound by its o-wn decisions {The Legal Tender Cases, 12 AVall. 457, 554, 570). But the peculiar functions of that Coui-t in relation to the federal Con- stitution have to be taken into account. It is really a political as- well as a j udicial power. The Court of Appeal in England generally holds itself bound- by the decisions of Courts of equal authority (the Court of Appeal itself as existing since the Judicature Acts, the Court of Appeal in Chancery, or the Exchequer Chamber) ; but it has held itself not bound by the result of a case where the Court, was equally divided : The Vera Cruz (No. 2), 1884, 9 P. Div. 96. The policy of the course taken by the House of Lords in Beamish- T, Beamish seems open to discussion. INTRODUCTION. vii penditure of thouglit and labour often utterly dispro- portionate to the end in view. Statute-law, on the other hand, gives general proposi- tions in definite terms, but is seriously deficient in omit- ting to give particular instances, which in our present system are wholly left to be filled ia afterwards by judicial de- cision, so far as occasions may present themselves. Nor is it to be supposed that this want exists only in the peculiar circumstances and habits of English or EngHsh-born Juris- prudence, or is felt only by English lawyers. Such a suppo- sition, if entertained at all, may be corrected by a moderate acquaintance with the lioman commentaries on the Edict, which are partially preserved in the Digest, or stUl better the various modeiai editions and expositions of the French Codes. The closely-packed volumes of the ' Codes An- notes ' present us, in fact, with a French counterpart of Fisher's Digest ; the chief points of contrast being that in the French work the decisions of the Courts and the opinions of text-writers, being of equal importance, are indiscriminately mixed up, and further that, inasmuch as neither decisions nor opinions (however highly esteemed) have any binding authority, and the number of Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction is far greater than with us, there is apparently no Hmit whatever to the amount of confiict that may arise. So that, whereas on simple questions the law of France is in general easier to be known than the law of England, yet on a complicated question, which for this purpose means any question on which experts may reasonably differ in their way of construing or supplement- ing the Code, the law of France must be, as it appears to me, almost infinitely more difficult to ascertain than the law of England, or, strictly speaking, not capable of being definitely ascertained at all. This state of things, it may be said, is in great measure due to carelessness and omis- Viii INTBODUGTION. sions on the part of the original framers of the Codes, want of subsequent revision, and other causes which the Erench legislators might and ought to have foreseen. And this, indeed, is the case ; nevertheless I think that on a com- parison of the 'Codes Annot^s' with the Anglo-Indian Acts it is impossible to resist the conclusion that if the French Codes, the text being even as it now is, had been accompanied by a moderate number of authoritative illus- trations, an immense amount of discussion and litigation would have been saved. To come back nearer home, one is strongly tempted to consider how great improvements might have been efEected in most of our Acts of Parliament, from the Statute of Frauds downwards, by a judicious use of the Anglo-Indian method. It would have diminished, at any rate, the risk of elaborate enactments almost fresh from the Queen's Printers being pronoimced, when they came to be applied to existing facts, to be explicable on no other hypothesis than that they were intended to puzzle tlie Court of Queen's Bench ; but this is a topic on which it is hardly safe to enlarge, lest one should unadvisedly speak of the wisdom of the Legislature more lightly than beseems an English citizen and servant of the law. This much, however, I may say, that the style peculiar to parliamentary drafting (though now to a great extent abandoned), which contrives mth singular infelicity to be at the same time crabbed and nebulous, may be regarded as the natural fruit of English legal minds working in fetters, scrupulously anxious to cover all the eases which occurred to them, but debarred from distinctly pointing them out ; having a specific meaning, but being forbidden to express it in a specific form. The method of the Indian Codes escapes these evils on both hands by combining the virtues of general enactments with those of specific decisions. The illustrations, being INTRODUCTION. is ■of equal authority with the text, serve as a commentary to fix its meaning and as a guide in its practical application. It is, likewise, I think, a point of no small importance that lay this system the function of case-law is distinctly recog- nized, and its results may he from time to time emhodied in the law itself. In the successive revisions which, as Mr. Justice Stephen has pointed out, are indispensahle to teep a Code in efficient working order, not only such ■defects as experience has shown to exist in the text may he amended, but cases decided since the last revision may he given as fresh iLLustrations if they are deemed important and instructive enough; or if, on the other hand, any ■decision has put on the te'xt of the law a construction ■opposed to the inttention of the Legislature, that construc- tion may be expressly negatived in the same form. Here in England the absence of any such provision makes the statute-law' yet more unwieldy and obscure than pure ■case-law, if not actually misleading. Lawyers know, of course, but I doubt -if it is commonly known among lay- men, that the Hevised Statutes do not contain the whole law, nor anything like it, even on those subjects which Parliament has most expressly and, on the face of the Acts, exha-ustively dealt with. The law regulating the form to be observed in the sale of more than ten pounds' worth of goods is to be foimd, apparently, in the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds. But is it really there ? Nothing of the kind; most of it is in the accumulated decisions of two centuries on that section, and if Ave wish to know the present state of things we must go to the text-writers, and thence to the reports to which they refer us. So, even if we take much later instances, the law of ■pubhcans' licences consists not of the Licensing Acts, but ■of the Licensing Acts together with several decisions of the Court of Queen's Bench. The law which determines X INTBODUGTION. the qualifications of voters consists not of tlie Eef orm Acts^ but of the Eeform Acts together with a great number of decisions of the Court of Common Pleas. The Salmon Fishery Acts, of which the first is less than a generation old, are already, in Cromwell's inimitable phrase, an ungodly jumble. If we paid any systematic attention to these matters, we should have a series of annual amending and supplemental Acts to bring the statutes of general pubho importance, and especially those with which laymen have most to do, such as Acts relating to public health, local government, and the like, into accordance with the rfeal state of the law as settled by the cases decided upon them. This, which of itself would be an improvement of exceeding value, might be effected quite apart from any larger scheme of codification or consolidation ; and it might also very well be done, though not so well, without- the Anglo-Indian use of illustrations.^ The complete re- vision of the Eules of Court in 1883 is an example of the sort of work that we need in many other departments. And the quiet acceptance of this work, really nothing less than the re-casting of a code of civil procedure at the hands of a committee of the judges, goes to show that the difficul- ties of delegating legislative power under our parliamentary constitution are perhaps not so great after all as we have been wont to think. Although I am strongly of opioion that the Anglo- Indian Codes furnish us in their general method and design with a pattern which we should do Avell to follow, it must not be supposed that I hold them to be perfect in ' The plan of tlie New York Commissioners, wliicli was to furnish, the text of the Code with simple references to decided oases, seems to me only apt to perpetuate the inconveniences of existing statute- law. The law would still be contained not in the Code, but in the- Code and many other books. INTRODUCTION. xi execution. They are indeed far better than any other work of the kind that I have seen. . It is hardly needful to mention the French Codes, which do not even aim at exactness of drafting, and are perhaps most fairly to be judged by regarding them as concise Institutes. The Commercial and Penal Codes of Germany, and the more recent Swiss Federal Code of Obhgations, are much nearer to what codes ought to be, and deserve on many accounts to be studied by English lawyers ; still there is to English eyes something unfinished about the workmanship, and in the German Penal Code there is a great deal more of de- liberate vagueness than we could now admit. The Italian Codes are modelled on the French,^ and therefore share their defects, though they have improved on them in details. One serious attempt has been made, elsewhere than in British India, to codify English law : I mean the draft Civil and Penal Codes of the State of New York. These were prepared and published many years ago, and remaia unexecuted projects in their own State, where they have led to a chronic controversy ; they have been sub- stantially adopted in California, but it is stated that the Calif omian Courts " go on much as before, citiag decisions, even from other States, and basing their judgments upon them." The draftsmen of the New York Penal Code had the Indian Penal Code before them ; the framers of the Indian Contract Act, on the other hand, were able to con- sult the draft Civil Code of New York, and made such use of it as they thought desirable, which in my opinion was far too much. In this case no minute comparison is needed to show the great superiority of the Anglo-Indian work. The weakest parts of the Contract Act are those in which the influence of the New York Code is most apparent. For the rest, that Code in its own birthplace has hithertO' ^ I believe tMs does not apply to the new Penal Code prepared for the wliole kingdom. xii INTRODUCTION. failed to become law, notwithstanding the persistent efforts of its promoters. And I feel bound to add that special examination of almost any part of the Code does not tend to remove the prejudice thus engendered. It seldom reads like the work either of good lawyers or of good draftsmen. An ingenious American writer, himself (imlike many of the New York school) an advocate of codification, has said of the New York draft that " as a codification of the existing unwritten law it has almost no value, and this mainly because absolutely necessary details, the very matters that make a good code so much to be desired, are .sacrificed to an illusory brevity."' The Indian Codes, then, are the best models yet produced ; at the same time they are by no means faultless. It is easy to see various points in which they are capable of improvement, though it must be remembered that for the purposes of Indian administration labour and ingenuity would not improbably be thrown away in working them up to the refined exact- ness which is an English lawyer's ideal. The defects, however, so far from being inseparable from the method, Are mostly due to a want of thoroughness in carrying it out in particular instances. Thus one finds that statements of the law have been adopted word for word from English reports or text-books which are open to verbal criticism, •or sometimes to more substantial objection ; and it is occasionally difiicult to see whether it was or was not intended to alter existing English law. This last difiiculty may be a practical one even in India (though I under- •stand that in the High Courts there is a rather strong presumption against departing from the English autho- rities), and it would be very necessary to guard against it in any work of the same kind undertaken for England. 1 Iloury T. Terry, ' The Leading Principles of Anglo-American Law,' PhiladelpMa, 18S4, p. 640. INTRODUCTION. xiii Questions of the like sort have indeed often arisen in this country -when there has been a series of similar statutes dealing with the same or similar topics in the same general manner, but mth Yariations of language. In fine, I look upon the Indian Codes as exhibiting the type of what we should aim at by an example not to be merely copied, but to be followed and improved upon. If we could only determine that this should be done; if Enghsh people were once brought to perceive that this work is of national interest and importance, and its omission discreditable ta our national intelligence, I believe it would be a quite practicable undertaking, and that within no unreasonable compass of time, to make the laws of England, or so much of them as concerns men's common afPairs and duties, as- good in form as they now are in substance, and as con- spicuous an example of order and clearness as they now are of the contrary. It is quite possible that exaggerated notions may b& entertained in some quarters of the benefits expected by the advocates of codification, and it is not impossible that some of the small mmiber of persons who think codification worth working for do in fact expect too much from it. People who plead for giving a trial to an unfamiliar remedy are always in some danger of proclaiming their remedy as a panacea, and are pretty sure in any case to be accused of it. I^ow there are evils of hardship, expense,, and uncertainty, which are due to the present form of the- law, and which codification may abate, and has in fact abated in other coimtries even under circumstances of disadvantage. But there are other drawbacks and difii- culties inherent in the very nature of legal aifairs, which, codification certainly cannot remove, although it may possibly mitigate them to some extent. Apart from all questions of form and procedure, the complexity and. XIV INTRODUCTION. novelty of men's dealings will always give rise to a certain number of really difficult cases. And I do not see how these are to he prevented under any system from arising or from being difficult. There are cases, Hke Dalton V. Angus,^ which, if not easy in themselves, have their difficulties vastly exaggerated by the formless con- dition of our authorities. But questions such as had to be decided in Charter v. Charter,^ Sollins v. Fowkr,' or Roiin- son v. MoUett,^ must be hard to deal with even if we had the best of possible codes. The skilled imagination of the draftsman who devises the illustrations may anticipate many future cases, but it cannot be all-exhaustive. There is no magic in the name or form of a code to make the legislator's foresight consummate. A good code, however, would do this : it would enable one to discover with in- finitely less trouble than at present whether a given case were really difficult or not. Our present system has made easy cases difficult by throwing difficulties in the way of this preliminary inquiry. An English layman is, as a rule, helpless before the simplest legal question : he has to go to a lawyer to be told that it is simple. An English lawyer can see at once that some questions are simple ; as to others he can generally make a fair guess, by a sort of trained instinct, whether there is anything serious iu them, but he may have to spend a good deal of time in research before he can be sure even of this. And this kind of trouble and uncertainty, which often gives a factitious importance to matters that are small in themselves, would be vastly diminished, if not altogether removed, by any systematic arrangement of the law. ' 6 App. Oa. 740. » L. E. 7 H. L. 364. ^ Ih. 757. ♦ 11. 802. JNTRODUOTION. xv So then, an objector may say, codification is to make ■easy cases easier, and leave the difficult ones as they are ; but is that after all worth doing ? Assuming for argu- ment's sake that the objection may be fairly stated in this form, the reply is that easy cases are beyond comparison the more numerous in practice. The solid business of justice consists in giving effect to plain and settled rights, and the first thing to be secured is that such rights may be readily ascertained and speedily enforced. If this is thoroughly accomplished the doubtful ones will almost iake care of themselves. Men's attention is fixed on the one curious or difficult case — and this is true of the public as well as of lawyers and students — and they forget the ninety and nine which are straightforward, and where no doubt is possible after the facts are ascertained. The consideration here put forward will go far to explain why the French Codes, and codes framed in close imitation of them elsewhere, have notwithstanding all their defects been productive of great benefits in practice. At the same time it is not altogether true that difficult ■cases would be left as they are, for a well-planned codifica- tion of any important branch of the law would remove many existing occasions of difficulty. Questions which in framing a code it would be impossible to pass over are Tiow unsettled, either because the point has not distinctly arisen or, which is a commoner and more troublesome case, because it has arisen and has been evaded, thus becoming surrounded with uncertain and more or less conflicting ■dicta. Such questions would have to be dealt with and reduced to certainty one way or another, and a consider- able amount of possible dispute would thus be cut short. To this extent codifying would involve substantive legis- lation ; and for this reason I cannot agree with those who speak of codifying the law just as it stands. When one xvi INTRODUQTION. comes to think what it really means the thing is seen to be impossible. There are parts of the law which^ if codified as they stand, would be the laughing-stock of mankind ; it is only the obscurity of their present form which enables them to exist at all. It seems to- me a distinct advantage to be claimed for codification that it would drag into the Kght a number of petty anomalies and absurdities (and some, perhaps, that ar& not petty), and compel us to get rid of them. Parliament could not stultify itself by passing Acts of which several sections declared the law to be doubtful, while others laid down things merely ludicrous. Consider a few simple instances from the law of contract. How would the rule in PinnePs Case^ look in a code? It would run something like this : " The person entitled to the performance of a contract may . . . accept instead thereof any satisfaction he thinks fit : provided that he cannot accept in satisfaction of any sum of money the payment of any less sum at the same time and place and in the same manner at and in which respectively the original sum was payable." That is, if A. owes B. £100, and B. accepts £75 in money in satisfaction of the whole at the same time and place at which the £100 are payable, A. is not discharged from the remaining £25 ^nthout a release Tinder seal ; but if A. gives and B. accepts a pair of gloves, a canary, or a peppercorn in satisfaction, the whole debt is 1 5 Co. Eep. 117. This rule, wliicli the House of Lords aflarmed with reluctance in Foaies v. Beer, 1884, 9 App. Oa. 605, is not a case of anomaly, but of the extreme application of a principle in circumstances to which it is not appropriate : it applies the doctrine of consideration to the discharge as well as to the formation of con- tracts without regard to the consequences. It is not strictly fair, therefore, to call it "one of the mysteries of English Common Law" (per Jessel, M.R., 19 Ch. D. 399). INTRODUGTION. xvii discharged : and if the Indian method were adopted some such instances as these would be given as illustrations. Could this possibly stand ? The sale of goods, again, is one of the commonest transactions of Hfe, and default in payment by the buyer is an event by no means unheard of. Tet nobody knows to this day what is the precise extent of an unpaid vendor's rights when he keeps or has re- sumed possession of the goods. Could Parliament be expected simply to put the doubt on record ? Again, the question of contracts made by correspondence could not be satisfactorily disposed of without an exercise of real legislative power. It would be only too easy to multiply examples. Any one who has had much to do with English law can probably call to miiid some such curiosities in the subjects with which he is most familiar : in our crimiaal law there are several, mostly of statutory creation, which are truly amazing. An authentic codification, therefore, woidd involve amendment; and if a codifying Commis- sion were appointed, it would be necessary to give power to the Commissioners to suggest such changes as they should think indispensable. Ample opportunities should of course be given for the public explanation and dis- cussion of proposed amendments, say, before a select committee: after which they might, if further security were thought desirable, be specially submitted to Parlia- ment, and the Commissioners might be directed by pro- visional and temporary Acts to embody them in the Code. The draft Crimiaal Code prepared by Mr. Justice Stephen, and revised by a judicial Commission, has not yet made sufficient progress before Parliament to throw much light on the best way of working out these details. It is past reasonable doubt, however, that the difficulties are matter of detail and can be overcome. It is not material that is wanting, or the means of criticism, or competent workers, p. i xviii INTRODUCTION. All these are at hand. The things needful are the will to resolve on the undertaking and two or three guiding minds to organize its execution. Meanwhile statements of the law just as it is in a codified form may he good not only for present use, but to call distinct attention to the points where amendment is needed. Another aspect of codification which deserves to be specially considered is its probable effect on text-books. I do not see any reason for thinking that it would make them superfluous ; and I doubt L£ it would greatly diminish their extent. So far as one can guess from Contiuental and Anglo-Indian analogy, and from the one English example of Judge Chalmers' Digest of the Law of BOls of Exchange, they would tend to assume the shape of commentaries on the Codes, or on considerable portions of them, and there vould be fewer detached books on special subjects. This, it appears to me, would be a distinct gain to both writers and readers, for nothing is more trouble- some to a lawyer, whether in reading or in writing, than the manner, at once wasteful and fragmentary, in which the field of legal study is covered by existing books. We have a mmiber of treatises overlapping one another in aU directions, and yet letting many things entirely or almost entirely fall through : so that a book like Williams' ' Notes to Saunders' Reports,' which is a collection of references and discussions on all sorts of topics strung together without even the pretence of arrangement, fulfils at present an important function, inasmuch as there is always some chance of finding things in it which other books omit. Not abolition, but transformation of text- books would be the result of a code. There would stiU be plenty of room for exposition, and some, I doubt not, for discussion. A good deal of the space which is now perforce devoted to a laborious and often barren collection INTRODUCTION. xix ■of authorities would be left free for rational explanation, and especially — ^though this hope may seem too sanguine — for a comparative and historical treatment which might be •a powerful instrument of training in exact thought, and might raise the study of the law to something Kke its former rant as part of a liberal education. We might •even cease to regard " jiirisprudence " as a kiad of mysteiiovis knowledge so hopelessly separated from the law of England as to require a distinct course of reading. Hereia I do not wish for a moment to underrate the merits and utOity of legal text-books of the present type ; for which, having regard to existing conditions, one cannot l)e too thankful. In fact, it is only the text-writers who make our present state at all tolerable. So much is this the case that, if reports go on multiplying unchecked, the leading text-books will come to be freely cited as authority ; there are already signs of a tendency that way, and it may be seen in a much more developed stage in the United States. Thus we may find ourselves at no very distant time drifting into a condition much like that of •ancient Eoman^ and modern Continental jurisprudence, and driven to seek authority in a mass of mixed decisions •and opinions of uncertain relative value. It would then remain to be seen whether even the most inflexible sup- j)orters of the beautiful flexibility of uncodified law might not choose codification as the lesser of two evils. From this it would be natural to turn to the subject of reporting, which is one that needs to be considered in. connexion with the working of a code, and has in. fact been xmder consideration in India. But the questions involved are too extensive to be dealt with here. There is a general feeling, I believe, that the present system is '^ I.e. before Justinian. 62 XX INTRODUCTION. not satisfactory, though some improvement is apparent of late years by reason of the increased authority and pre- dominance of the Court of Appeal. I may refer to Mr. Justice Stephen's ' Minute on the Administration of Justice in British India' (published by authority, Cal- cutta, 1872, pp. 39 — 46) for some reflections on this matter which may be no less pertiaent for England. The general topic of codification can hardly be dismissed "without noticing one or two current delusions about it, for so I fear they must be called. One is that the French Codes will serve as a model for imitation, or as a repre- sentative case for criticism. Of this no more need be said than I have already had occasion to say in the fore- going pages. The principal lesson to be learnt from the French Codes is that even a very defective code is far better than none. Another belief which leads to a good deal of confusion, though it is of less practical importance, is that the work effected by Justinian's commissioners on the vast and unmanageable mass of Roman law was a codi- fication in the modern sense. This belief is so strangely wide of the facts that one feels almost bound to produce specific evidence that it exists. It may be met ■s^ith in several places where one is surprised to find it. Some time ago a reviewer whose general intentions were very just and laudable, but whose illustrations from Roman law showed more zeal than knowledge, observed, in the course of a paper advocating a Ministry of Justice, that Tribonian himself could not codify English law as it now stands. There is certainly no reason to think that he cotdd, seeing that he did not in fact codify Roman law ; nor can we suppose that the idea of codification, as we now understand it, was ever present to his mind. Again, the Introduction to the New York Civil Code speaks of the Code of Justinian (meaning presumably the whole Corpus Juris) as one of' INTRODUCTION. xxi the greatest achievements of human genitis. Surely the Commissioners must have imconsciously attributed the genius of the great Roman lawyers whose work is em- bodied in the Digest to the compilers who so handled that work as to show themselves in many places incapable of understanding it. The real nature of Justinian's re- arrangement of the law may be shown by an imaginary parallel. Let us suppose a Eoyal Commission charged to prepare an edition of Blaokstone adapted to the existing state of the law, a Digest similar in plan to Fisher's (which for this purpose we may assume not to exist), but consisting wholly or chiefly of extracts taken bodily from the Re- ports, and not including modem Acts of Parliament, and a separate Digest arranged in the same manner and con- taining the substance of the Revised Statutes. The revised Blackstone would roughly correspond to the Institutes, which are a modernized edition of Gaius; and in like manner the Digest of case-law would correspond to the Pandects or Digest of Justinian, which are a compilation from the more or less authoritative treatises that practi- cally held a place analogous to that of reports in English jurisprudence, and the Digest of Statutes would corre- spond to Justinian's Code, which is a compilation of im- perial rescripts and constitutions. The parallel holds, of course, only in outline ; Grains is far superior to Black- stone as a systematic legal writer, while on the other hand the arrangement of Fisher's Digest is beyond comparison more orderly and convenient than that of the Pandects or the Code. But the general resemblance is suificient for the purpose of illustration. Now let us further suppose that these three works, when complete, are annexed by way of schedule or reference to a Grovemment Bill with -an exceedingly pompous preamble, which in due course becomes an Act and confers on all of them the force of xxu INTBODUGTION. law. "We must add that our imaginary Act would (still with much barbarous pomp of language) absolutely forbid not only the citation of any earlier reports or text-books, but the publication of any commentary whatever on the new collection. It should be hardly needful to point out that such a proceeding would not be codification ; and it is hardly possible to imagine either that anything of the- kind should at this day be proposed, or that, if it were proposed, all persons having a moderate' acquaintance with law and legislation would not with one accord denounce it as too crude a project to be seriously entertained. The foregoing remarks may be considered to apply to the setting forth of the law by private writers, in so far as advantages similar to those which are claimed for authentic codification would be attaiaable, if the claim is well founded, by the adoption of the same form in text-books.. There must naturally always be a great gulf between an authentic text and a private exposition; the latter can only suggest with more or less diffidence what the authentic text, if there were one, woidd be like. But the resulting qualifications, grave as they are, can easily be supplied, and I forbear to dwell on them. I -noU only call atten- tion to Mr. Justice Stephen's remark ^ that, whatever may be thought of the use of illustrations in a code, it is dbvi- ously desirable in an experimental application of the method by private hands, inasmuch as the reported cases, given as illustrations are, iE correctly stated by the writer, authoiitative, whereas the general propositions of the text are not. It remains^to say something of the reasons and principles, which have guided me in this particular work. The law of Partnership is in many ways a specially convenient ' Introduction to ' Digest of tlie Law of Evidence.' INTRODUCTION. xxiii subject for the treatment here adopted. It has in common with the law of Evidence the qualities of being of modem growth, homogeneous, and for the most part well settled. It is remarkably free from anomalies and technicalities, and has been singularly fortunate in the rational character of its development, by which it has earned an almost com- plete freedom from statutory interference. It has been otherwise with the law of Companies, which I have left apart as now depending almost entirely on statute law, and being in great measure already codified in the Com- panies Clauses Consolidation Act and the Companies Acts (of which last, by the way, several sections have long been in need of re-draftiag), besides other enactments affecting only special classes of companies. It would be possible to prepare a consolidated edition of the Companies Acts, showing the effect of the decisions upon them by suggested modifications in the text ; but the task would be a very laborious one, and almost certainly not worth the labour. The law of Partnership proper, on the other hand, lies- within a moderate and manageable compass. This asser- tion may seem strange to the reader accustomed to Lord Justice Lindley's two goodly volumes. But it will be found that, after allowing for the parts of those volumes given to the law of Companies, and for those which deal with topics bearing on the law of Partnership in their special applications, but not forming part of it, such as- Agency, the remainder would be a book of no such great size. This brings me to another reason for choosing the form of a Digest which presented itself to me with great force : I mean the extreme difficulty of writing a book in the ordinary form on the law of Partnership, which should in substance be otherwise than an abridgment of Lord Justice Lindley's. As it is, his work has throughout been the guide and foundation of my own. Without it xxiv INTRODUCTION. the toil would have been many times multiplied and the harvest precarious. I have everywhere given references to Lord Justice Lindley's book, not merely by way of ac- knowledgment (a tribute which is at best imperfect), but also for other reasons. First, it is a necessary part of the plan of this work to give only a selection of authorities ; and it seems well that a reader desiring fuller information should be enabled to put himself, with as small loss of time as may be, in the way of knowing everything that is to be known. Thus I have some hope that this book, in addition to whatever other uses it may have, may be of some service in acting (to speak with astronomers) as a finder to Lord Justice Lindley's larger and more powerful instrument. Moreover, I have in several places deliber- ately cited his book as my sole and sufficient authority. There are in most branches of the law, and especially in this, clear elementary propositions, never doubted and constantly acted upon, for which it is nevertheless hard to find any reported case exactly in point. There axe others, again, for which no definite authority can be produced save a Nisi Prius case from Campbell or Peake. Now it does seem to me that the twice and thrice revised opinion of a living Judge, though technically not authority, is substantially worth at least as much as a summing up delivered at "Westminster or GuildhaR -^ith little or no consideration, and at a time when the subject was in its infancy ; and I have ventured to frame my references on this assumption. Where tliere is nothing to be gained by looking out a case in the book at large, it is surely desirable, if possible, to avoid citing it at aU. I have also made considerable use of the Indian Contract Act, the last chapter of which treats of Partnership, and has adopted, as it appears to me, all that is of solid value in the corresponding title of the New York Civil Code. INTROBTJOTION. xxv This chapter, however, is by no means so full as other 'parts of the Act, and is somewhat unequal ia execution ; and, owiag to I know not what accident in the framing of it by the Indian Law Commission, there is an almost entire ^absence of illustrations. Any one who cares to make the •comparison will see that I have thought it needful to go much more into detail. It will be understood that I am far from assuming to criticize the Indian Act on its own ground, since it is an open question whether the kind of completeness which Englishmen require iu a statement of English law be necessary or desirable for Anglo-Indian purposes. Following Mr. Justice Stephen's example, I have aimed ^t fixing the limits of the subject-matter so as to exclude ■all merely collateral topics. Thus the capacity of persons to become partners is not different from their general ■capacity for contractiug ; that question, accordingly, is left aside as belonging to the general law of contract. In the ■same way the manner in which the existence of a partner- ship may be proved belongs to the law and practice of evi- dence ; nor has it been expressly stated that no particular form is required for the contract of partnership, as the law of contract in its modem shape assumes throughout that no special form is needful where none is expressly prescribed. So, agaia, the general principles of agency are not entered upon, though they are the foundation of the special rules which determine a partner's authority as •agent of the firm. Eor the like reason nothing is said of fraud as a cause for rescinding the contract of partnership, the liability to rescission on this ground being one to which it is subject in common with all other contracts, and which m this application presents no peculiar features. In the third part of this Digest, entitled 'Of Procedure and Admiaistration,' I have relaxed these limits on grounds xxvi INTRODUCTION. of practical convenience, but have endeavoured not to lose sight of them, and have abstained, for instance, from stating rules which are simply part of the general law of Bankruptcy. The whole of the third part, however, may be regarded as supplemental and provisional. Elsewhere many readers will probably think I have included too Kttle; my own impression, speaking with regard to the form and method here chosen, is that I have sometimes included too much. The full, discursive, exhauBtive treat- ment of the subject, which is amply provided in the standard work already spoken of, would be out of place in a Digest. I have thought it desirable, however, to add a certain amount of commentary ; and it seemed better on the whole to insert this matter in order as it was called for than to relegate it to an appendix. The illustrations are taken from decided cases, with only one or two excep- tions, and those of so simple a kind as to be obviously free from risk. Lastly, I would express a hope which is bolder, perhaps^ than any I have yet put forward. Mr. Justice Stephen has said, and as I believe with perfect truth, that " the only thing which prevents English people from seeing that law is reaUy one of the most interesting and instructive studies in the world is that English lawyers have thrown it into a shape which can only be described as studiously repulsive." And this is not mere theoretical opinion ; for,, as he fui'ther tells us, Indian experience has actually shown " that when law is divested of all technicalities, stated in simple and natural language, and so ai-ranged as to show the natui-al relation of the different parts of the subject, it becomes not merely intelligible but deeply interesting to educated men practically conversant with the subject- matter to which it relates." The subject-matter of the present work is one in which many important interests are INTRODUCTION. xxvii inyolved, and -with which many educated men are practi- cally conversant. I have endeavoured, so far as possible, to state the law in simple and natural language, to di- vest it of technicality, and to exhibit the different parts of the subject in their natural relation. It is, I trust, not irrational to hope that a work of this kind may be sufficiently intelligible, and to some extent interesting and useful, to men of business who axe not lawyers. Bentham's saying notwithstanduig,i I do not think it possible iu a land of ancient and complex civilization to make every man his own lawyer; but I do believe it possible to put within every man's reach, not iadeed a full knowledge, but a knowledge clear, sound, and exact, as far as it goes, of the laws he lives under and has to do with in his own daily business. If within its own limited sphere the present attempt fails to contribute anything towards that end, I am persuaded that the failure is due not to an aim beyond reason in the intention, but to my own shortcomings in the performance. Since the last foregoing paragraph was first written and published (and I purposely let it stand in its original form) much has happened to show that codification of English law, and in some cases codification by private enterprise, is both possible and practicable. How far it 1 " Every man his own lawyer ! — Behold in this the point to aim at." — ^Papers on Codification, No. viii, Letter 4. Bentham's view is really the negation of law as a science. In our own time Ihering has pointed out, much more philosophically, that law has indeed to justify itself by common sense in the last resort, but untrained and inexperienced common sense cannot therefore take the place of law. Common sense wUl not even make a man his own ploughman or his own shoemaker. xxviii INTRODUCTION. shall be accomplislied, and how soon, depends partly on the leisure and temper of the House of Commons, partly on the desires and interest of the puhlic. I am hound to say that the indifference of the public at large to the whole matter does not seem to have sensibly diminished of late years. On the other hand, the Bills of Exchange Act (in the full title of which the word " codify " is for the first time used by Parliament) shows that codification of a particular branch of law can be carried through when a strong body of competent and interested persons have agreed to demand it. Somewhat has been done, too (though as yet with no definite result), as regards the Law of Partnership itself. A fuller account of this attempt is given in the Appendix. There has been no legislation to take account of since the date of the last edition ; but there have been decisions of considerable importance. Some of them suggest the reflection that the consequences of Kendall v. Hamilton (see p. 31 of the present edition) are by no means exhausted. F. P. J 3, Old SauAEE, Lincoln's Inn, December, 1887. ( xxix ) TABLE OF CASES. PAOE Adam v. Townend . 127 Adamson, Sx parte . 141 Agace, Ex parte . . 50 Airey i;. Borham . 73,111 Akliurst V. Jackson . 110 Alder v. Fouracre . . 82 Alderson v. Pope . . 48 AUen V. L. & S. W. E. Co. 58 Anonymous (2 K. & J.441) 90, 91 ArundeU v. Bell . . 108 Ashworth v. Munn . . 67 V. Outram . 86 Astle V. Wriglit . . Ill Atkins, Ex parte . . 149 Atkinson v. Mackreth. . 52 Att.-Gren. V. Hubbuck . 67 Atwood V. Maude Austen v. Boys 92, 111, 112, 113 . 108 B. Backhouse v. Hall . . 24, 25 Badeley v. Consolidated Bank . . . . 14, 32 Baird's Case ... 36 Bank of Australasia v. Breillat 39,40,42,45,46 of England Case . 65 Banks v. Gibson . . 109 Barber, Ex parte . . 62 Barfield v. Lougbborough 97 Baring's Case ... 55 Bate, Ex parte . . 156 Baxter i;. West . . 92 Bayley v. Manchester, &c. Eailway Co. . . 57 Beckett v. Eamsdale 31, 154 PAGE. Bentley v. Craven . . 82 Bignold V. Waterhouse . 47 BUborougb v. Holmes . 34 Binney v. Mutrie . . 123 Bisbop v. Countess of Jersey ... 55 Blain, Ex parte . . 80 Blair v. Bromley . . 53, 54 Blisset V. Daniel . . 73, 76 Bluck V. Capstick . . 113 Bolingbroke v. Swindon Local Board . . 58 Bonbonua, Ex parte . 42' Bond V. Gibson . . 42 Brettel-v. WiUiams. . 43 Brice's Case ... 94 Brown V. De Tastet . 75, 115, 121 -V. Leonard Buckley v. Barber . Bucknal v. Eoiston . Bullen n. Sharp Bullock V. Crockett . Burdon v. Barkus . Burgess v. Burgess . Burmester v. Norris Bury V. Allen . Butchart v. Dresser Butcher, Ex parte . 64 49 98 104 T 111 70,71 19- 42 111 96, 98 136 Oambefort & Co. v. Chap- man 32: Campbell v. MuUett 67 Carr v. L. & N. W. E. Co 27 Carter v. Whalley . 29,94 Castell, Ex parte 143. Chandler, Ex parte . 32, TABLE OF CASES. PAGE Oheesman v. Price . . 92 Childs, iJe ... 86 Chippendale, Ex parte (German Mining Com- pany's Case) . . YO, 71 Churton i». Douglas . 104,105, 106, 107, 108 Clark V. CuUen V. Leach Clayton's Case Cleather v. Twisden Clegg V. Edmondson Clements v. Hall ■ V. Norris . 33 Collinge, Ex parte . Const V. Harris 61, 62 Cook, Ex parte V. Collingridge Cookeon ■;;. Cookson Coomer v. Bromley Cooper V. Prichard . Cope V. Evans Couldery v. Bartrum Coventry v. Barclay Cox V. Hickman . 7 V. Willoughby Craven v. Edmondson Crawshay v. Collins V. Maiile 5, 64, 78, 85 Croft V. Pike . . .100 129 79 34, 94 55, 56 81 82 74 147 73, 74 148 106 78 56 55 22 155 62 30,48 78 97 115 D. Darby v. Darby . 66, 102 Darlington, &c. Banking Go., Ex parte . 36,40,45 Davison, Be . . . 32 Dawson v. Beeson . . 105 Dean v. MacDowell . 84 Dear, Ex parte . 136, 137 Delhasse, Ex parte . . 11 Devaynes w. Noble 33,54,55,94 Diokin, Ex parte . 132, 157 Dickinson v. Valpy. . 41 Du Boulay v. Du Boulay 20, 21 Dundonald (Earl of) c. Masterman . . . 57 Dunne v. English . . 83 Dutton V. Morrison . 138 E. Ebbs V. Boulnois . Edmonds, Ex parte. V. Eobinson. England v. Curling Esposito V. Bowden. Essel V. Hayward . Essex V. Essex Eyre, Ex parte F. PAOE 131 147 114 5, 61 89 90 78 53 Earquhar v. Hadden 68 Fawcett v. 'Wliitehouse 82 Featherstonhaugh v. Fen wick . . 79, 80 Flockton V. Bmming . 119 Fox V. Clifton . . 27, 30 V. Hanbury . 96, 101 Eraser v. Kershaw . 96 Freeland v. Stansfeld . Ill French v. Styring . 2 G. Gallway (Lord) v. Mathew 48 Garland v. Jacomb . . 47 German Mining Com- pany's Case . . 70, 71 Gillett V. Thornton . . 78 Ginesi v. Cooper & Co. . 105 Glassington v. Thwaites . 83 Gordon, Ex parte . . 147 Grain's Case ... 35 Gray v. Chiswell . . 138 Grazebrook, J-'x parte . 148 Greatrex v. Greatrex . 76 Green r. Beesley . . i Griswold o. Waddington. 89 Hall V. Barrows . . 106 Hamil v. Stokes . . no Hammond, Ex parte . 159 Harman v. Johnson . 54 Harris, Ex parte 142, 143, 144, „ . 150, 151 Harrison t;. Jackson . 43 TABLE OF CASES. PAGB Sarrison v. Tennant . 90, 92 Hay's Case ... 83 Hayman, Ex parte . 28, 145 Heath v. Sansom . . 29, 96 Heilbut V. Nevill . . 45 Helmore v. Smith . . 86, 87 Hendriks v. Montagu . 22 Hendry v. Turner . . 95 Hinds, Ex parte . 64, 144, 152 Hodgson, Be . . 31, 154 HoUoway v. Holloway . 20 Holme V. Hammond 8, 12, 37 Honey, Ex parte . 157, 158 Hort's Case ... 35 Houlton's Case . . 94 Ide, Exparte . . 128, 129 -Jackson v. Litchfield . 127 Jennings v. Baddeley . 91 V. Hammond . 17 Jones V. Foxall . 120, 122 V. Lloyd . . .86, 91 - — • V. Noy ... 90 K. Kelly V. Hutton . . 75 Kemptner, Exparte . 68 Kendal v. Wood . . 46 Kendall v. Hamilton . 31 Kewney v. Attrill . . 88 KUshaw V. Jukes . . 8 King V. Chuck . . 79 Knox V. Gye . . 82, 122 L. Labouchere v. Dawson 105, 107 Lacey v. HiU, 51, 138, 142, 144, 147, 150, 152, 153 Lacy V. Woolcott . . 97 Langmead's Trusts, Me, 101, 103 Lawson v. Bank of London 22 Leaf V. Coles ... 90 Leary v. Shout . . 92 FAas Lee i'. Haley ... 21 ■V.Page . . .112 Leggott V. Barrett . . 105 Levieson v. Lane . . 46 Levy V. Walker 19, 104, 105 Lewis ?;. Eeilly . 47,97,98 Limpus V. General Omni- bus Co. ... 57 Llewell3Ti v. Rutherford. 107 Lodge and Fendal, Ex parte . 144, 150 V. Prichard, 135, 137, 138 London Financial Asso- ciation V. Kelk . . 2 Lyon V. Haynes . . 95 V. Knowles . . 2 V. Tweddell . 93, 114 M. M'Kenna, Exparte (Bank of England Case) . 65 Mackenzie, Exparte . 130 Manchester and County Bank, Exparte . . 157 Marsh v. Keating . . 53, 56 Martyn v. Gray . . 27, 28 Massam-y.Thorley'sCattle Pood Co. ... 20 Maude, Exparte . . 148 Maughan v. Sharpe . 19 Mellersh v. Keen . . 86 Merchant Banking Co. of London v. Merchants' Joint Stock Bank . 19 Metcalf V. Bruin . . 25 Mills, Ex parte . . 13, 14 Mollwo, March & Co. v. Court of Wards . 4, 6, 26 Moiley, Ex parte . 136,137 Munster v. Cox . 126, 129 1;. Eailton . 126 114 Mycock V. Beatson . N. Nanson v. Gordon . . 147 Natusch V. Irving . . 74 Neilson v. Mossend L:on Co 80 Nerot V. Burnand . . 63 TABLE OF CASES. Nottingham, Ex parte Nowell V. Nowell . 0. Oakford v. European and American Steam Ship- ping Co. Owen, Ex parte PAOE 145 124 33 Padstow Assurance Asso- ciation Page?;. Oowasjee Eduljee Parker, Ee . . . V. McKenna Parsons v. Hayward Pawsey v. Armstrong Payne v. Hornby . Pearson v. Pearson . Pease v. Hewitt Philps, Ex parte Pickering v. Stephenson 17 102 155 83 . 78, 79 5 103, 104 . 105 . Ill . 131 74 Plumer v. Gregory . 52, 53, 54 Plummer, Be . . . 155 Pooley V. Driver . 3, 9, 10 Potter V. Jackson . . 123 Poultoni>.L.&S.W.E.Co. 58 Quarman v. Burnett . 29 E. Bead v. Bailey, 139, 142, 144, 160, 151, 152, 154 Eeade v. Bentley . . S Eidgway v. Clare . . 135 Eobinson, Ex parte. . 93, 95 V. Anderson . 69 V. Ashton . 65 Eolfe V. Flower 34, 35, 137, 155 Eoss V. Parkyns . . 8 Eowe V. Wood . . 72 Eowland & Crankshaw, Re .... 2% Euffln, Ex parte . . 68 Eussell V. Eussell . . 77 S. PAGE St. Aubyn v. Smart . 53 Salting, Ex parte . . 141 Sargood's Claim . . 71 Scarf V. Jardine . . 34 Scott V. Eayment . . 5 V. Eowland . . 109 Seixo V. Provezende . 22 Shaw V. Benson . . 17 Sheen, Ex parte . . 145- Sheil, Ex parte . . 14 Sheppard, Ex parte . 155- ShirreiS v. Wilks . . 47 SiddaU, iJe ... 17 Sillitoe, Ex parte . 146, 148- Simpson, Re . . . 136 V. Chapman 115, 121 Sims V. Brutton . . 55 Singer Manufacturing Co , V. Loog 22: V. Wilson . 22 Skipp V. Harwood . . 101 Sleech's Case . . .33, 94 Smith I'. Anderson . . 17 V. Everett . . 108 V. Smith . . 65 V. Winter . . 96, 97 Societe Generale de Paris )'. Geen . . . 155 South Wales Atlantic Steamship Co., iJe . 16 Stables v. Eley . . 29- Stead V. Salt . . 43, 44, 50' Steel V. Lester . . 2 Steiglitz i'. EggLnton . 43: Steward ;•. Blakeway . 5, 64 Stocken v. Dawson 101, lOa Stone, Ex parte . . 159 , Re. . . . 14 Stroud . . Gwyer . . 120 Swire v. Eedman . . 33 Syers r. Syers . . 9, 10' Taylor, E.v parte . 13. Tennant, Ex parte . 7 Thomason i\ Erere . 97 Topping, E.r parte . 147 Travis v. Milne 121 Troughton v. Hunter 94 Tuff, Re . 145. TABLE OF CASES. Turner v. Major Turney, Ex parte V. PAOE 109, 116 . 156 Venables v. Wood . . 8, 9 Vernon v. Hallam . 105, 107 Vyse V. Foster, 115, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122 W. "Waddell's Contract, Be Wakeman, Be. Walker v. Hirsch V. Mottram V. Eooke 131 149 5 105 129 66 64 92 Walton V. Butler Waterer v. Waterer Watney v. Wells Wedderbum v. Wedder- bum . . 63, 107, 116 West V. Skip . . 101, 104 PAGE Westcott, Ex parte . . 149 Whetham v. Davey . 87 Whinoup V. Hughes . 110 Wliitoombe v. Converse . 124 Whit-well V. Arthur . 9()' Wiokham v. Wiokham . 50 Willetti;. Blanford..ll5, 117, 118 Williamson, Ex parte . 71 V. Barbour . 51 Wilson V. Johnstone 111, 112 V. Whitehead . J> Wood V. Woad . . 76 Woodbridge v. Swann . 96 Worcester Corn Exchange Co 72 Yates V. Dalton Finn Yonge, Ex parte Yorkshire Banking Co. v. Beatson Young, Ex parte 40 . 115, 116 143, 149, 152 39 126 ( XXXV ) TABLE OF CONTENTS. PART I. ®j&e ©ontract of ^artncrsjbtj). CHAPTEE I. Who are Partners. AET. PAOE 1. Definition of partnership 1 Distinction between partnership and common ownership or sharing gross returns 4 2. Sharing profits as evidence of partnership : rule in Cox v. Hickman ......... 6- 3. Act to amend the Law of Partnership, 1865 : person advancing money for share of profits . . . . !> 4. Agent remunerated -by share of profits . . . .11 5. Widows or children receiving share of profits . . .11 6. Seller of goodwill receiving share of profits . . .11 7. Creditor receiving share of profits postponed in case of debtor's insolvency 12 Exclusion of such creditor from competing with others is absolute 13 8. Number of partners in ordinary partnership . . .14 Extraordinary partnerships (companies) . . . .15 CHAPTEE II. Of the Firm. 9. What is a firm 18 10. Use of firm-name 18 11. Exclusive right of firm to trade name . . . .18 Use of names in general 19' Foreign laws as to firm-names 20 Trade name and trade mark 21 The firm not a person in law 23 Law of Scotland 23- c2 xxxvi TABLE OF CONTENTS. AUT. . . PAGE V2. Continuing guaranty for or to firm not binding after change in firm, unless contrary intention appears (Mercantile La-w Amendment Act, 1856) . . .24 Evidence of contrary intention -" CHAPTER in. 0/ Persons who are liable as Partners. 13. Persons liable by holding themselves out as partners What amounts to " holding out " .... The rule applies to administration in bankruptcy But not to bind deceased partner's estate . Liability of retired partners ..... 26 27 28 28 28 CHAPTER IV. Of the Lialility of Partners for Partnership Delta, and the Authority of Partners to hind the Firm. 14. Liability of partners for debts of firm . . . .30 The rule in Kendall v. Hamilton 31 lo. Liabilities of outgoing and incoming partners . . .32 Test of liability of now firm 35 Novation 35 16. Power of partner to bind the firm ..... 36 Exception where there is neither apparent nor real authority 37 General limits of partner's authority 37 IT. Implied authority of partners, and especially of p£u:tners in trade 38 Special instances : negotiable instruments . . .40 Borrowing money .42 Sale and pledge . 42 Purchase 42 Receipt of payments and releases 43 Servants .43 Where authority not implied : deeds . . . . .43 Guaranties 43 Submission to aibitration 44 17a. Limited power of directors in numerous partnerships . 44 18. Use of credit of firm for private purposes . . . .44 Whether reasonable belief in pai-tner's authority makes a difference 4G 19. Restriction of partner's authority by notification . . 48 Whether restrictive agreement among partners, though notified, sufiicient without coaming . . . .48 'JO. Admissions and representations by partners . . .49 21. Notice to a partner when notice to the firm . . .50 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXX Vll CHAPTER V. Of the Liability of Partners fur Wrongs. -ART. 22. Liability of partners for wrongs in partnership business . -23. Fraud or negligence in conduct of partnership business . 24. Misapplication of property in the hands of the firm . Eeasons of the liability : doctrine of agency -23. Improper employmentof trust funds in partnership business Cannot be said to create partnership liability FAQE 52 52 53 56 58 59 CHAPTER Vr. Of the Rtlations of Partners to One Another. -26. How terms of partnership may be varied . 27. What is partnership property .... 28. Property bought with partnership money . 29. Conversion of land held as partnership property -30. Conversion of joint into separate estate, or vice versa 31. What is a partner's share . 32. 'Presumed equality of shares •33. Eight to indemnity and contribution . This right independent of agency -34. Eight to take part in business . -35. Duty of attending to business . -36. Power of majority .... -37. Change in nature of business needs consent of all 38. Introduction of new partner needs consent of all -39. 'Custody of books 40. Expulsion allowable only under express power . ■41. Retirement from partnership for a term only by consent 42. Retirement from partnership at wiU . 43. Partnership continued over after end of term Neilson, v. Mossend Iron Co. -44. Partners must act for common advantage . 45. Partners must not make undisclosed profits Doctrine of agency 46. Partners must not compete with the firm . 61 62 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 73 73 74 75 76 77 77 78 80 80 81 82 83 ' N.B. — The rules in Articles 32—39 are subject to any speoial agree- ment between the partners. xxxyiii TABLE OF CONTENTS. PART II. CHAPTEE VII. Of Dissolution and its Consequences. AET. PAGE- 47. Dissolution by retirement of partner 8j- 48. Dissolution by bankruptcy, &c. 80 49. Dissolution by death 88 50. Dissolution by assignment of partner's share in partnership at will 88 51. Dissolution by business of partnership becoming unlawful. 80- 52. Causes for judicial dissolution 89- Dissolution may be at suit of lunatic partner . . .91 Misconduct of partner as ground for dissolution ^ . .91 53. Eights of creditors against apparent members of firm . 9.5 54. Eight of partners to notify dissolution . . . .94 55. Continuing authority of partners to wind up affairs . . 95- CHAPTEE Vni. Rights of Partners after Dissolution. 56. Application of partnership property . Nature of partner's right as lien .... Against whom available Confined to partnership property at date of dissolution 57. Sale of goodwill Eights of purchaser thereof Nature and incidents of goodwill .... 58. Eestraining subsequent use of partnership name 59. Apportionment of premiums ..... Unsettled state of this Joctrine Eule in Atwood v. Jilaude ...... 60. Defrauded partner's lien where partnership contract re soinded for fraud 61. Account of profits after dissolution in certain cases . 62. Purchase of outgoing jiartner's share Claims against continuing partners qua executors or trustees UN Such cluims must bo distinct 121 Double or mixed claims for profits and interest not allowed 121 122 12;i. Surviving partner, as such, is not trustee C3. Distribution of assets on final settlement lOO- 101 102 103 104 104 106 108 10J>- 112 11. ■> 114 114 117 TABLE OF CONTENTS. PART III. ^roccliure anU aDminigttatton. CHAPTER IX. Procedure in Actions ly and against Partners. -AET. PAQB ■64. [Order XVI. r. 14 (No. 136)] Actions in name of firm . 125 65. [Order VII. r. 2 (No. 43)] Discovery of partners' names in actions by firm 126 66. [Order IX. r. 6 (No. 53)] Service of writ in action against firm 127 67. [Order Xn. r. 15 (No. 85)] Appearance of partners . . 127 -68. [Order XLII. r. 10 (No. 588)] Execution upon judgment against firm 128 CHAPTEE X. Procedure in Bankruptcy against Partners. •69. Consolidation of proceedings under joint and separate petitions 130 70. Creditor of firm may petition against one partner . .130 71. Court may dismiss petition as to some respondents only . 130 72. One trustee for property of partners separately bankrupt . 131 73. Creditor of firm may prove in separate bankruptcy for purpose of voting 131 74. Dividends of joiut and separate properties generally de- clared together 132 75. Actions in names of trustee and solvent partners . .132 CHAPTER XI. Administration of Partnership Estates. 76. General rule of administration: joint and separate estate . 134 Dicta stating the rule 136 Provisions of Bankruptcy Act, 1883 137 Rule of Indian Contract Act 138 Discrepance between the legal and the mercantile system. of administration 138 Law of Scotland 139 Law of France, Switzerland, and Germany . . . 140 77. Cases where joint creditors may prove agaiust separate estate 141 xl TABLE OF CONTENTS. AET. PAOE; 78. Where joint estate may prove against separate estates or estate of minor firm 1^1 79. Partners must not compete with creditors (subject to special exceptions) • ^'^^ Loan to firm by wife of partner ^■i^- The exceptional right of proof in cases of fraudulent con- version considered ; judgment in Lacey v. Hill . . 1 oO' Creditor's right against estate of deceased partner . .154 80. Eights of joint creditors holding separate security, or con- versely IJJ- 81. Double proof allowed on distinct contracts with firm and with its members severally lo" 82. Effect of separate discharge of partner .... lo9- Appendix. Partnerships Bill, 1883 162- Limited partnership clauses of Partnership BUI, 1880 . . ISl REFERENCES, ETC. Eeferences to the Law Journal are now supplied for cases in the- Superior Courts of Common Law down to the commencement of the Law Eeports. All modern cases decided by Superior Courts, are also dated. The consecutive number of the volumes of the- Law Journal (N.S., Chancery and Common Law Series) for a given legal year, i.e. Michaelmas term to Michaelmas term, may be found by subtracting 30 from the year of the century in which that legal year begins. To find the corresponding- volume of the Weekly Eeporter, subtract 51. Lindley on Partnership (4th edition, 1878) is cited by the author's- name alone. The Indian Contract Act (IX. of 1872) is cited by the abbreviation I. C. A. I have sometimes referred to my own book on "Principles of Contract" (4th edition, 1885) for the fuUer explanation of matters belonging to that general subject rather than to the- Law of Partnership. Matters of practice and procedure which occur incidentally in the facts of the cases cited as Illustrations have been tacitly adapted to the present state of the law. A DIGEST LAW OF PARTNEESHIP. PART I. Cfie Contract of ^^artncrsfitp. CHAPTEE I. Who are Partners. 1. Paetnership is the relation which subsists ^^^v- 1- Art. 1. between persons who have agreed to share the „ , . . , Definition of profits of a business carried on by all or any of partnership. them on behalf of all of them. Illustrations. 1. A. agrees with B. to carry the mail by horse and cart from Northampton to BracMey on the following terms : B. is to pay to A. £9 per mile per annum, and A. and B. arc to share the expenses of repairing and replacing the carts, and to divide equally the money received for conveying parcels, and the loss consequent on any loss or damage thereof. A. and B. are partners.' 2. A., the owner of a vessel, employs B. for some time as skipper, and then agrees with B. that B. may take the vessel 1 Green v. Beesley (1835), 2 Bing. N. 0. 108. THE CONTRACT OF PARTNEBSEIP. Chap. I. Art. 1. Proposed de- finition ex- plained. •where he likes, and engage the crew and take cargoes at hia discretion, paying to A. one-third of the net profits. A. and B. are probably partners in the adventure.' 3. A. and B. are owners in common of a race-horse, and agree to share its winnings and the expenses of its keep, A. having the management of the horse and paying all expenses in the first instance. A. and B. are not partners as to the horse. It is doubtful whether they are partners as to the profits that may be made by its employment.' 4. A. and B., tenants in common of a house, and desiring to let it, agree that A. shall have the general management, and provide funds for putting the house in tenantable repair, and that the net rent shall be divided between them equally. A. and B. are not partners.' 5. A., the proprietor of a theatre, lets the use of it to B., who provides the acting company and takes on himself the whole management, A. paying for the general service and expenses of the theatre. The gross receipts are divided ec[uaUy between A. and B. A. is not a partner with B., and is not answerable for any infringement of dramatic copyright in the performances given by B. under this arrangement.* 6. A., B., and C. agree to purchase "on joint account" the X. estate, " each paying one-third of the cost and each having one-third interest in it," and to form a new company to deal with the property. This agreement does not constitute a partnership between A., B., and C The definition of partnership given by the Indian Con- 1 Steel V. Lester (1877), 3 C. P. D. 121, see judgment of Lindley, J. " French v. Styring (1SJ7), 2 0. B. N. S. 3o7; 26 L. J. C. P. 181. 3 Per "Willes, J., 2 C. B. N. S. at p. 366. But if they furnished the house at their joint expense, and then let portions of the house as lodgings, they might well be partners. Letting a house is not a business, but letting furnished rooms is. * Lyon V. Knowles (1863), 3 B. & S. 5o6 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 71. ' London Financial Association v. Kelk (1884), 26 Ch. D. 107, 143. WHO ABE PARTNERS. ■tract Act, s. 239, is Kent's definition {Oomm. iii. 23) in a Chap. I. more concise form, and runs as follows : — ^^^' ^' Partnership is the relation which suhsists between per- -sons who have agreed to combine their property, labour, or ■skill in some business, and to share the profits thereof between them. Kent's definition was criticized by Jessel, M.E.., in Fooley v. Driver (1876), 5 Ch. D. at p. 472, on the ground that there may be partners who do not contribute any property, labour, or skill, as where a share is given to the "widow of a former partner. " Whether or not the associa- tion requires that one or more of the partners shall con- tribute labour or skill, or what they shall contribute, is a question which may be considered as subsidiary." The •definition now proposed is intended to meet this criticism by avoiding reference to the partners' contributions to the common fund. At the same time a partner's share is not the less his property because it may have been given to him for the purpose of being used in that way, and even given out of the share of another partner. On the other liand, division of profits, as we shall immediately see, is not ■a sufficient though it is a necessary test of the existence of ■a partnership. A man may in sundry ways take a share , of the profits of a business without having such a share in the business as will make him a partner. He will not be a partner unless he has a direct and principal interest in the business, or, as expressed in Cox v. Sicltman (art. 2, illust. 1), unless the business is conducted on his behalf. A number of other definitions of partnership are collected from various English and other sources at the beginning of Lord Justice Lindley's work. It is there said that most of them are, with reference to English law, too wide, as including corporations and joint-stock companies which are not subject to the ordinary law of partnership. But it b2 THE CONTBACT OF PARTNERSHIP. Chap. I. Art. 1. What is not partnership : common ownership. seems hardly satisfactory to say that the memhers of suck hodies are not partners at all ; for the analogy of partner- ship law does apply to them for some purposes, and those not unimportant ones ; as, for instance, when ques- tions arise as to the power of majorities to hind dissenting members. And on the whole it seems hest to follow the example of the Indian Act, and, instead of excluding these associations from the category of partnerships, treat them as "extraordinary partnerships " regulated by special legis- lation.'- The nearest approach to a definition which has been given by judicial authority in England is the statement that " to constitute a partnership the parties must have agreed to carry on business and to share the profits in some way in common ;" ^ where " profits " means the excess of returns over outlay. This principle at once excludes several kinds of transactions which at first sight have some appear- ance of partnership. Among its appHcations, exemplified in the cases above cited as illustrations, are these : — The common ownership of any property does not of itself create any partnership between the owners ; moreover, there may be an agreement as to the management and use of the propertj^, and the application of the produce or gains derived from it, with- out any partnership arising.^ On the other hand, there may be a part ownership mthout partnership in the pro- 1 I. C. A. s. 266 ; see Art. 8, below. " Mollwo, March & Co. v. Court of Wards (1872), L. E. 4 P. C. at p. 436. 3 Illustrations 2, 3, and 6: — Lindley, i. 20, 24, o8. As to part owners of ships (the most common and important case), see Lindley, i. 66; Maude and Pollock on Merchant Shipping (4th Ed.), 100;. Maclachlan on Merchant Shipping (2nd Ed.), 90, 102; Smith, Merc. Law (8th Ed.), 191 ; Kent, Com. iii. 154, loo ; and Story on. Partnership, eh. xvi. passim. WHO ABE PARTNERS. ^erty itself, together with a real partnership in the business Chap. i. of managing it for the common benefit.^ ^^^' ^' The sharing of gross returns, with or without a common Sharing gross interest in property from which the returns come, does not ^^ "™^' •of itself create any partnership.^ It is practically more important to exclude from the definition these relations more or less resembHng it at first sight than to make the ■definition a£Srmatively complete. Even an agreement to Agreement to bear a definite share of loss as well as take a definite share and loss. •of profit is not necessarily a partnership, for the purpose of .giving either party the rights of a partner as against the •other, though an unqualified agreement to share profit and loss is very strong evidence of partnership.' The remedy of specific performance is generally not Specific per- ■applicable to an agreement to enter into partnership : for partnership " it is impossible to make persons, who will not concur, carry '^°^ "^^^ ^' ■on a business jointly for their own common advantage." But where such an agreement has been acted on, the execu- tion of a formal deed recording its terms may be ordered by way of specific performance if necessary to do justice l)etween the parties.* Scottish writers make a difference between partnership " Joint ad- iproper and " joint adventure," which is thus defined in Bell's Principles, art. 392 :— Joint adventm-e or joint trade is a limited partnership, confined to a particular adventure, speculation, course of ' Illustration 2 :— Cockburn, C. J., 2 0. B. N. S. 363 (1857) ; •■cp. Crawshay v. Maule (1818), 1 S^wanst. at p. 523 ; Steward v. Makeway (1869), 4 Ch. 603. ■'- must. 5. ^ Walker v. Hirsch (1884), 27 Cli. Div. 460 ; Pawsey v. Armstrong (1881), 18 Oh.. D. 698, cannot no-w be relied on; see the remarks of tlie Lords Justices on it in Walker v. Hirsch. * England Y. Curling (1844), 8 Beav. 129, 137; Scott y. Rayment .(1868), 7 Eq. 112. THE CONTRACT OF PARTNEESHIP. Chap. I. Art. 2. Sharing pro- fits only evidence of partnership. trade, or voyage ; and in wliich the partners, either latent or known, use no firm or social name, and iaciir no respon- sibility beyond the limits of the adventure. I do not find that the incidents of a " joiat adventure," as far as it extends, can be distinguished from those of partnership; but, whatever the importance of the distinc- tion may be, it is not met with in the English authorities.^ "We may compare with " joint adventure " the " association en participation" recognized by French law (Code de Comm. 47 — 50). But this seems to include transactions wHch, according to our rules, are not partnerships at all, such as the purchase of goods on common account to be divided among the associates. See the collection of autho- rities in the Codes Annotes. In the same way soeiete is a wider term than om' "partnership." It covers such matters as the sharing of benefit derived from the common use or enjoyment of anything by owners or tenants in common. 2. The receipt of a share of profits, or of a payment contingent upon or varying with profits, is relevant but not conclusive to show the existence of a partnership. Whether a partnership does or does not exist in any particular case depends on the real intention and contract of the parties as shown by the whole facts of the casc.^ ' Lord Eldon seems to have denied it. ;> Dow, at p. 'J29. 2 Molhvo, March ifc Co. v. Court of Wards (187L'), L. E. 4 P. 0. 419, 435. " Participation in profits is not now conclusive evidence of the existence of a partnership, Lut it is one of the circTimstances, and a very strong one, which are to be taken into consideration for the purpose of seeing whettier or not a partnership exists." Per- Cotton, L.J., G Ch. ]). at p. 31 j. WHO ABE PARTNERS. Illustrations. Art's 1. A trader is indebted to several creditors, and they enter Riiie in Cox\. into an arrangement with him hy which the trade is to be Siclman, and conducted under their superintendence, and they are to be tions. gradually paid off out of the profits. These creditors do not thereby become partners of the debtor in his trade, or liable for the debts of the concern: for "the real ground of the liability," where such liability exists, "is that the trade has been carried on by persons acting on his behalf;"' and in the ease of such an arrangement as this, the trade is not carried on by or on account of the creditors. The test of liability is not merely whether there is a participation of profits, but whether there is such a participation of profits as to constitute the relation of principal and agent between the person taking the profits and those actually carrying on the business.^ 2. 0. H. becomes security for £10,000 for his son W. H., on "W. H. becoming a member of Lloyd's. "W. H. agrees in writing with C. H. that, among other things, S. and no other person shall underwrite in the name of W. H. ; that 8. shall be paid £200 a year and one-fifth of the net profits of under- writing ; that C. H. may withdraw his security on notice, and S. shaU thereupon cease to underwrite for W. H. ; and that one half of the net profits, after deducting the share of S., shall, together with the sum of £25 per annum, be considered as owing and be paid to C. H. by W. H. Under this agree- ment C. H. is not a partner but a creditor of W. H.' 1 Cox V. Hickman (1860), 8 H. L. 0. 268, 306 (the leading case which put the law on its present footing). - Lord Wensleydale in Cox v. Hickman (1860), 8 H. L. 0. at pp. 312-3; Blackburn, J., in Bulkn v. Sharp (1865) (Ex. Ch.), L. E. 1 0. P. atpp. 111-12 ; Oleasby, B., lb. at p. 118 ; and further on the effect of Cox v. Hickman, Bramwell, B., lb. at p. 12*7, and Lindley, i. 39. ■> Ex parte Tennant (1877), Ch. Dir. 303. Compare Bullen v. Sharp (1865) (Ex. Ch.), L. E. 1 C. P. 86, a somewhat similar case, where there was no actual division of profits. THE CONTRACT OF PABTNEBSEIP. Chap. I. 3. A partnership is entered into for a term certain, and it is provided by a clause in the articles that if a partner dies before the end of the term his representatives shall during the rest of the term receive the share of profits he would have been entitled to if living : a partner having died, his share of profits is paid from time to time to his executors under this agreement ; the executors do not thereby become partners.' 4. The business of an underwriter is conducted by A. in the name of B., and A. receives a fixed salary and one-fifth of the profits, subject as to this one-fifth to be wholly or partially refunded in the event of unexpected losses becoming known after the division of profits in any year. The contract between A. and B. is not one of partnership, but of hiring and of service.'' 5. A creditor, J., makes an agreement with his debtors, T. and W., by which the sum due to him is to be paid out of the profits of a building speculation to be executed by T. andW., J. furnishing that part of the materials which belongs to his own trade ; and after payment of the debt, and paying for these new materials, the surplus is to belong to T. and "VV. J. does not become a partner of T. and W., and is not liable for the price of goods ordered by them for the purpose of being used in the building.' 6. A., a publisher, agrees to publish at his own expense a book written by B., and to pay to B. half the net profits, if any, as ascertained by a certain conventional method of taking accounts. It is doubtful whether this does or does not constitute a partnership between A. and B. ;* but B. is not ■ Holme V. Hammond (1872), L. E. 7 Ex. 218. ' Boas V. Parhyns (1875), 20 Eq. 331. 3 Kilsliaw V. Juices (1863), 3 B. & S. 847 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 217. * In Beade v. Bentley (18o8), 4 K. & J. 6o6, Lord Hatherley, then V.-O. Wood, seems to have thought tho " half -profits " contract did create a partnership. Lord Justice Liudley (On Partnership, i. 21, note q) thinks otherwise. So did the Court in the Scotch case of Vcnahhsy. Wood, there cited by him (see next note); but there, even if there had been a pai-tnership, it was very difficult to make out that the debt sued for was a partnership debt. WHO ABE PARTNERS. 9 liable to a paper-maker for paper supplied to A. for the Chap. I. general purposes of A.'s publishing business, and used for ■^'^^- 3- printing B.'s book.' The following special provisions were added in 1865, by the Act to amend the Law of Partnership (28 & 29 Vict. c. 86), sometimes cited as Bovill's Act •} 3. " The advance of money by way of loan Act to amend - . Law of Part- to a person engaged or about to engage m nership: as any trade or undertaking upon a contract in advancing writing^ with such person that the lender shall Xre'of™ receive a rate of interest varying with the ^^° profits, or shall receive a share of the profits arising from carrying on such trade or under- taking, shall not of itself constitute the lender a partner with the person or persons carrying on such trade or undertaking, or render him responsible as such." ' Venahhs v. Wood (1839), 3 Eoss, L. 0. on Commercial Law, 529 ; •cp. Wilson V. Whitehead (1842), 10 M. & W. 503 ; 12 L. J. Exch. 43. ' This Act is stated in Lord Justice Lindley's work (p. 43) to haye been passed " in order to remove the difficulties which it was felt might be created by the decision in Cox v. Hickman." It appears, however, by reference to the Parhamentary reports and papers of the time, that the Act, as taken up by the Government of the day and finally passed, was the residue of an attempt to intro- duce a system of limited partnership intended to correspond to the ■Continental societS en. commandite. It is also clear that the real extent and effect of Cox v. Hickman were not at the time suspected by ■any one. ^ That is, a signed contract {Pooley v. Driver (1876), 5 Ch. D. at p. 468), showing on the face of it that the transaction is one not of partnership, but of loan : Syers v. Syera (1876), 1 App. Ca. 174, per Lord Chelmsford. 10 THE CONTRACT OF PAETNERBHIP. Chap. I. Illustrations. ^^^' *■ 1. A., the proprietor of a music-hall, signs and gives to B.^ in consideration of an advance of £250, a paper in the follovr- ing terms: "In consideration of the sum of £250 this day- paid to me, I hereby undertake to execute a deed of co- partnership to you for one-eighth share in the profits of th& 0. music-hall, to be drawn up under the Limited Partnership Act of 28 & 29 Vict. c. 86." This is not a contract for a share of profits within the Act, but constitutes a partnership at will, in which, as between A. and B., B. is to share profit without being liable for loss.' 2. B. & Co. are traders in partnership. A. lends money to- the firm on a contract in writing, under which B. & Co. agree, among other things, to repay the loan at the end of the partnership, to conform to the partnership deed, which is to be open to A.'s inspection, and to pay annually on account of profits a definite share of net profits during the continuance of the loan. The agreement also contains a provision that in the event of A.'s bankruptcy B. & Co. may pay ofE the loan and determine the agreement, a provision for settlement of accounts at the end of the partnership, and paj-ment of the loan and stipulated share of profits out of assets, subject to the refunding by A. of any sum not exceeding the amount of the original advance which may appear to have been overpaid on account of profits, and an arbitration clause. The agree- ment expressly purports to be for an advance by way of loan under the provisions of 28 & 29 Vict. c. 86. This transaction is merely colourable as a loan, and is not within the Act, and A. is liable as a partner for the debts of B. & Co." 3. A., B., and C. enter into an agreement in writing, expressly referring to 28 & 29 Vict. c. 86, and reciting that A> and B. have agreed to become partners in a certain business, and have requested C. to lend them £10,000 to be invested in it. The agreement declares that the money is advanced by C. to A. and B. by way of loan under the 1st section of the Act, and such advance shall not be considered to make C. a ' Syers x. Sijers (18T6), 1 App. Ca. 1Y4. 2 l^uoky v. Drioer (1870), 5 Ch. D. 4J8. WHO ARE PARTNERS. H partner. This sum of £10,000 appears by the agreement to chap. I. be, and in fact is, the whole capital of the business. ^''^- ^- By other clauses of the agreement 0. is entitled to inspect the books and receive a copy of the annual account, and to share profits in a fixed proportion, and has the option of demand.ing a dissolution of the partnership and conducting the liquidation of the business in certain events. C.'s capital invested in the business is not to be withdrawn tiU. the termi- nation of the partnership. Under this agreement C. is a partner with A. and B.' 4. "No contract for the remuneration of a As to agent remunefated. servant or agent oi any person engaged m any by share of trade or undertaking by a share of the profits of such trade or undertaking shall of itself render such servant or agent responsible as a partner therein, nor give him the rights of a partner." 5. " No person being the widow or child of As to widows the deceased partner of a trader, and receiving deceased part- by way of annuity a portion of the profits share of ° made by such trader in his business, shall by fmuity.^ reason only of such receipt be deemed to be a partner of or to be subject to any liabilities incurred by such trader." 6. " No person receiving by way of annuity As to seUer of or otherwise a portion of the profits of any ceiving share business in consideration of the sale by him of the goodwill of such business, shall by reason only of such receipt be deemed to be a partner 1 Ex parte JDelhasse (1877-8), 7 Ch. Div. 511. 12 THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP. Chap. I. Art. 7. Creditor re- ceiving share of profits to be postponed to other creditors for value in case of hank- luptcy, &c. of or be subject to the liabilities of the person carrying on such business." 7. "In the event of any such trader as aforesaid being adjudged a bankruiDt, or taking the benefit of any Act for the relief of insolvent debtors, or entering into an arrangement to pay his creditors less than twenty shilHngs in the pound, or dying in insolvent circumstances, the lender of any such loan as aforesaid shall not be entitled to recover any portion of his principal, or of the profits or interests payable in respect of such loan, nor shall any such vendor of a goodwill as aforesaid be entitled to recover any such profits as aforesaid, until the claims of the other creditors of the said trader for valuable consideration in money or money's worth have been satisfied."' "Whether the Act adds to Cox V. Hick- man, QU. It is by no means certain that this Act really adds any- thing material, except the disabilities imposed by s. 5, to what had abeady been decided in Cox v. Hickman.^ In any case the special provisions of the Act, even if to some extent superfluous, are not to be taken as in any way detracting from the generality of the principle there laid down.' "When this Act was introduced and passed, it was assumed by the most competent persons, including some of 1 28 & 29 Vict. c. 86, ss. I— 5. The -n-ord "persoa" in the Act includes a partnership firm, a joint-stock company, and a cor- poration : s. 6. See comments in Lindley, i. 44-7. = 8 H. L. 0. 208 (1860). 3 See Holme v. Hammond (18'72), L. E. 1 Ex. at pp. 227, 232. WHO ABE PARTNERS. IS the Lords who had taken part in the decision of Cox v. chap. i. Hickman,^ that it would make a material change in the '^" law ; but after the exposition and discussion of Cox v. Siekman^ in recent cases, it is difficult to say what, if anything, the Act really adds to the effect of that case. It has been suggested that, whereas Cox v. Hickman^ decides only that sharing profits is not conclusice evidence of partnership, and leaves it to be dealt with as a question of fact whether this is sufficient evidence in any case, the Act goes a step further, and prevents it from being alone sufficient in any of the classes of cases dealt with.^ On the other hand, the cases above cited show that the Act will afford no protection to attempts to combine the rights of a partner and of a lender by contracts for nominal and merely colourable loans. There must be not merely an advance to the business, but a loan to a real debtor who is personally liable.' With regard to a creditor who has lent money in con- Exclusion of sideration of a share of profits, the Act excludes him ing profits absolutely and according to its literal terms from com- tior-with^^'^" petina: with other creditors. It does not matter whether others is . . , . J. absolute. they were or were not creditors during the continuance of the loan, nor whether they were creditors in the business or not. Nor can such a creditor prove his debt in the bankruptcy until aU the other creditors are paid.* But if, during the same time, he has lent other sums at a fixed rate of interest, he may recover those sums like any other creditor.^ If it were sought to evade this prohibition and make the > 8 H. L. C. 268 (1S60). 2 1 Sm. L. 0. (9tli Ed.) 909 ; 5 Oh. D. 485 ; 7 Oh. Div. 531. 3 See, in addition to the cases already cited, Badeley v. Consoli- dated Bank (1886), 34 Oh. D. 536. * Ex parte Taylor (1879), 12 Ch. Div. 366, 379. 5 Ex parte Mills (1873), 8 Oh. 569. 14 THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP. Chap. I. Art. 8. Act an instrument of fraud, by advancing a small sum in consideration of a large share of profits, and a large sum at fixed interest, the lender would probably be treated as a partner.' The operation of s. 5 is not excluded by lending money for fixed interest and a sum equal to a specified share of profits, and calling that additional sum a salary.^ This express postponement of the creditor receiving a share of profits is in truth a clumsy way of putting him approximately in the position of a true limited partner, or commanditaire in the French termiuology. For some reason which I have never been able to understand, people in this country seem to find almost invincible diflS.culty in grasping the conception of a partner with limited liability who, being a true partner, is not a creditor of the firm at all, so that there can be no question of his competing with creditors in respect of his capital. Yet the position of a shareholder in a limited company (which is essentially the same thing) is now quite familiar. Hence the very imperfect success of Bovill's Act, and the failure of other attempts in the same direction. It is to be observed that the oth section of the Act "does not deprive the lender of any security he may taie for liis money;" if he has taken a mortgage, for instance, his rights as mortgagee are not affected,' and he may enforce any such secm-ity by way of foreclosure or sale.* Limit to number of partners in an ordinary part- nership. 8. An ordinary partnership may consist o£ any number of persons not exceeding ten, ' Ex parte Mills (1S73), S Oil. at pp. JT4— 6. = Re Stone (188G), 33 Ch. D. 541. ' Lindley, i. 4o ; Ex parte Shell (18V7), 4 Ch. Div. 789. * Badeley v. Consolidated Bank (1886), 34 Ch. D. 536. WHO ARE PARTNERS. -where the business of the partnership is bank- chap. i. ing, and not exceeding twenty where it is any — ^^— ■other business. A partnership consisting of any greater number of persons (hereinafter called an extra- ordinary partnership) must either be a. Registered as a company under the Companies Act, 1862, or I. Formed in pursuance of some other Act of Parliament or of letters patent, or c. A company engaged in working mines within and subject to the jurisdiction of the Stannaries.^ Extraordinary partnerships are governed by the several statutes, instruments, laws, and customs which are specially applicable thereto respectively. At common law there was no limit to the number of persons who might enter into partnership, and it is the better opinion ^ that there was nothing to prevent them from dividing the capital into transferable shares and acting as a joint-stook company ; but there were always great practical inconveniences about this. A partnership not complying with the conditions of the Companies Act is now illegal, and the members of such an association would be unable to enforce any claim arising out of the partner- ship dealings, although they would be individually liable for the debts of the concern to a creditor who had dealt 1 Companies Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89), s. 4. " Lindley, i. 191, 195. 15 16 THE CONTRACT OF PARTNEB9HIP. Chap. I. with the firm without notice of the state of things making- '— — its business illegal.' Associations carrying on that which at common law would be a partnership business, but exceeding the number- of ten in the case of banking, and twenty in the case of any other business, and complying with the law by coming within one of the special categories laid down in the Com- panies Act, may be called extraordiaary partnerships. They are governed by special rules of law, for the most part statutory, which we shall not here enter upon. Th& statutes, however, are to a considerable extent founded upon the principles of ordinary partnership law, so that they cannot be sufficiently understood without a knowledge- of those principles. Of the kinds of extraordinary partnerships above speci- fied, the class [a) are necessarily corporations, the associa- tion being made an artificial person with rights and duties distinct from those of the natural persons who at any given time are members of it. The class {b) are generally but not necessarily^ incorpo- rated. The class (c) are in no case incorporated, but are ordinarjr partnerships modified by local custom, and since 1869 by statute also.' It may be useful to note here that there are associations which, though not partnerships, yet exist for the acquisi- tion of gain by their members within the meaning of the 1 Sse Lindley, i. 196, 199. A creditor -n-ho has notice, e.g. a solicitor -n-lao has rendered professional services in forming and carrying on tlie association, knowing the number of members to- exceed twenty, cannot recover : Me S. IVales Atlantic Steamship Co. (187o-6), 2 Ch. Div. VGS. = By 7 Wm. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 73, the Crown may establish com- panies by letters patent without incorporation. » The Stannaries Act, 32 & 33 Yict. c. 19. WHO ABE PARTNERS. 17 Companies Act, and are therefore unlawful if not regis- chap. i. tered: for example, a mutual marine insurance associa- ^ ' ' tion,^ or mutual benefit ^ or loan ' society. On the other hand societies may be formed for such purposes as invest- ment of money, or buying property and re-selling it to the individual members, which are neither partnerships nor for the acquisition of gain on a common account ; and such societies do not need registration even if the number of members exceed twenty.* 1 Padstow Assurance Association (1882), 20 Cli. Div. 137. 2 Jennings v. Hammond (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 225. ' s Shaw v. Benson (1S83), 11 Q. B. Div. 563. 4 Re Siddall (1885), 29 Ch. Div. 1 ; cp. Smith v. Anderson (1880), 15 Ch. D. 247. P. 18 •THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP. CHAPTER II. Of the Firm. Chap. II. Art. 9. The firm. Partners may adopt firm- name and use it in all part- nership affairs. Exclusive right of firm to trade name. 9. " Peesons who have entered into partner- ship with one another are called collectively a firm."^ 10. The business of a firm may be carried on under any name, not distinctly purporting to be a corporate name, which the partners think fit to adopt for that purpose, subject to the condition mentioned in the next following article. The name so adopted is the name of the firm, and all acts done and instruments executed in that name by a partner or other person duly authorized thereto are binding on all the part- ners.^ 11. Where a particular name under which a business is carried on by any person, firm, or company has become associated with and appro- priated to that business, no other person may carry on a like business under the same name, ' I. C. A. s. 239. - As to tlie authority of partners to bind tie firm, see Arts. 17- 21, below. OF THE FIRM. 19 ■or a name only colourably differing therefrom, chap. ii. in a manner calculated to deceive customers by '- — '- — - leading them to believe that they are dealing with such person, firm, or company as first mentioned.^ Grenerally speaking, every man is by the law of England 'Wlat use o£ names is iree to call himself by wnat name he chooses, or by different lawful. Tiames for different purposes,^ so long as he does not use this liberty as the means of fraud or of interfering with -other substantive rights of his fellow-citizens. And this •extends to commercial transactions as well as to the other affairs of Hfe : " Individuals may carry on business under any name and style they may choose to adopt." '^ The style of the firm need not and often does not express the name of any actual member of it. It may contain, and often does contain, other names, or no individual names at •all. On the other hand, although no man is to be pre- vented from carrying on any lawful business in his own name by the mere fact of his name and business being like another's,* yet the mere fact of the name itself being his own does not give him any right or licence to do so 1 See the authorities cited in tlie foUowing notes. This article is inserted here for convenience, though it obviously belongs, pro- perly speaking, not to the law of partnership, but to that sub- division of the general law of ownership which has to do with •copyidght and other analogous rights. 2 See the note in 3 Dav. Conv. pt. i. 357 — 362. Strictly speak- ing, this does not apply to names of baptism. The same or greater ireedom existed in the Eoman law, which allowed a change of nomen, prcenomen, or cognomen alike. C. 9, 25, de muiat. nom. 1. 3 Per Erie, C.J., Mavghan v. Sharpe (1864), 17 C. B. N. S. at p. 462 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 19 ; and see remarks of Jessel, M.E., in Merchant Banking Co. of London v. Merchants' Joint Stock Bank (1878), 9 Ch. D. 560 ; Levy v. Walker (1879), 10 Ch. Div. 436, 445. * Burgess v. Burgess (1853), 3 D. M. G. 896. c2 20 THE CONTRACT OF PARTNEESHTP. Chap. II. Art. 11. Assumption of corporate name. Foreign laws as to trade names. witli sucli additions or in such a manner as to deceive the- public, and make them believe they are dealing with some- one else.^ It is said to he an offence against the prerogative of' the Crown for private persons to " assume to act as a cor- poration." But it is hy no means clear how it can be punished (though possibly the Queen's Bench Division may have jurisdiction to punish it by fine).^ And at all events the use of a description such as " Company," which by common usage is applicable to incorporated and imin- corporated associations alike, does not amount to the offence- in question.' The laws of Continental states are much more strict and definite as to the use of trade names. In France the style of a commercial firm [raisoii socia/c) must contain no- other names than those of actual partners.* In Germany it must, upon the first constitution of the firm, contain the name of at least one actual partner, and must not contain the name of any one who is not a partner ;5 but when the name of the firm is once established in conformity with ' Holloway v. Ilottoway (1850), 13 Beav. 209; Jfassam \. Tlwrlty's Cattle Food Co. (1880), 14 Ch. Div. 7-lS. " The attempt to estabKsh a gtiild or " communa " -without -war- rant -^'as formerly puniahable by fine. Madox, Hist. Ex. i. o62, gives several instances from 26 H. 2. Many of these " adulterine guilds," as they are called, in London and Middlesex; the burgesses of Totnes and of Bodmin ; and Ailwin the mercer and other to-svns- men of Gloucester, -were amerced in considerable sums on this account. See Stubbs, Const. Hist. i. 418. It can hardly be said,, however, that these bodies " assumed to act as corporations " in tha modern technical sense. 3 Liudloy, i. 182. * Code de Commerce, 21. For the French law as to the use o£ family names generally, see Du Boulay v. Du Boulay ( 1 869), L. E. 2 P. 0. 430. Haudclsgesetzbuch, 17. OF THE FIRM. 21 "these rules, it may be continued notwithstanding an Chap. ii. assignment of the business, or changes in the persons '- — .' — who are partners for the time being, subject to certain ■consents being given.^ But although " in this country we do not recognize the Exclusive absolute right of a person to a particular name to the names analo- •estent of entitling him to prevent the assumption of that pe^Wn tode name by a stranger," yet " the right to the exclusive use mark. •of a name in connexion with a trade or business is familiar to our law."^ This right is analogous to, but not identical with, the right to a trade mark proper. The right of the possessor of a trade mark in the strict sense (which is now 'Subject to statutory conditions under the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883, 46 & 47 Vict. c. 57), is i;o prevent competitors from trading on his reputation, and passing oil their wares as his own by means of copies or •colourable imitations of the visible sign or device which he has appropriated to his business ; and the right of the possessor of a trade name stands on the like footing. " The principle upon which the cases on this subject pro- ceed is not that there is property in the word, but that it is a fraud on a person who has established a trade, and •carries it on under a given name, that some other person ■should assume the same name, or the same name with a slight alteration, in such a way as to induce persons to •deal with him in the belief that they are dealing with the ^person who has given a reputation to the name." ' The right to a particular name may likewise be infringed May be in- f rinsrecl by ■circuitously by means of a trade mark fitted to bring goods means of trade ^ Handelsgesetzbucli, 23, 24. " Bu Boulay v. Du Boulay (1869), L. E. 2 P. 0. 430, 441. ■* Giffard, L.J., in Lee v. Haley (1869), 5 Ch. at p. 161. The ■same principle has been acted on by the Courts of France : Sirey, Codes Annotes, on Code de Commerce, 18, 19, no. 46 of note. 22 THE CONTRACT OF PABTNEBSHIP. Chap. II. into the market under a deceptive name. In sucli a case- ^''^- "■ the first appropriator of the name has his remedy no less- marks apart j|^ -f ^j^ ^^^^ j^a,d heen directly adopted by his rival, tromminnge- _ r, i, ment of trade and it is no answer to his complaint to say that there is no- KioL such j)hysical resemblance between the trade marks as would deceive a customer of ordinary caution. The trade- mark complained of may be free from offence in its primary character and oifice as a visible symbol ; but that will be no excuse for a breach of the distinct duty to respect the trade names as well as the trade marks of other- dealers.i And it is immaterial whether there be any fraudulent intention or not.^ Whether Where a name of incorporation is such as to be, if used a-aSlt^cor- ^9^ trading purposes, an infringement of an existing trade poration for ^ame, it is doubtful whether an action can be maintained trading in its corporate against the corporation for trading in its corporate name, the name or whether the only remedy is not against those persons, fri^gement'of individually who procured that name to be given.' But existing trade g^^gj^ an action, it is submitted, may well lie. For though name. . it may be true that the corporation has no power to trade- under any other name than its proper name of incorpora- tion, yet it is in no way bound to trade at all ; and if it has a name under which it cannot trade ■without interf ering- with other persons' rights, that is its misfortiuie, but can surely make no difference to their rights. ' Seixo V. Provezende (1865), 1 Cli. 192. The leading authorities- on this and the aUied subject of trade marks are collected in Cojw v. Evans (1874), 18 Eq. 138 ; see too the explanations and distinctions, given in Singer Mtumfacturing Co. y. }Vilson (18TG), 2 Ch. Div. at pp. 441 seq., by Jessel, M.B., and S. C. in C. A. ib. 451 seq.; and further, on the subject generallj', per Lord Blackburn, Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Loog (1882), S App. Ca. 29. 2 JlendriU v. MonUiyu (1881), 17 Ch. Div. 638. 3 Lairson v. Bahlc of London (1856), 18 C. B. N. S. 84; 25 L. J.. C. r. 188. OF THE FIRM. 23 There can te no trade name unless in connexion with Chap. ii. an existing husiaess. A man cannot appropriate a name for this purpose hy the mere announcement of his intention '^° ^^^? ^ !: ' name without to trade under it.^ actual busi- It may be proper to mention here that the law of I'lrm not re- England knows nothing of the firm as a body or artificial ^_S^?\ ^ person distinct from the members composing it,^ though son. the firm is so treated by the universal practice of merchants and by the law of Scotland. In England the firm-name may be used in legal instruments both by the partners themselves and by other persons as a collective description of the persons who are partners in the firm at the time to which the description refers : ^ and under the Rules of the Supreme Court actions may now be brought by and against partners in the name of their firm.* An action between a partner and the firm, or between two firms having a common member, was impossible at common law, and it has not yet been decided that it is possible since the Judicature Acts ; but Lord Justice Lindley's opinion is in favour of such actions being now maintainable, and pro- bably in the firm-names.^ Nevertheless the general doctrine that " there is no such thing as a firm known to the law"^ remains in force. In Scotland, on the other otherwise in hand, the firm is a "separate person" ; not only can it Scotland. sue and be sued in the " social name," but it may sue and be sued by its own members, and firms having one or more members in common may sue each other.' 1 Lawion v. Bcmh of London (1856), 18 0. B. N. S. 84; 25 L. J. O. P. 188. 2 Lindley, i. 207. 3 Ih. 208-9. * Order is. r. 6, etc. ; Arts. 64 — 68, below. 5 i. 212, 469. 6 James, L.J., Ex •parte Corhett (1880), 14 Oh. Div. at p. 126. ' Bell, Pr. of Law of Scotland, § 357; Second Eeport of the 24 THE CONTRACT OF PARTNEBSEIP. Chap. II. Art. 18. Guaranty for or to a firm not binding, as to events happening after a change in the consti- tution of the firm, unless contrary in- tention appears (Mer- cantile Law Amendment Act). 12. "No promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another made to a firm consisting of two or more persons, or to a single person trading under the name of a firm, and no promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of a firm consisting of two or more persons, or a single person trading under the name of a finn, shall be binding on the person making such promise, in respect of anything done or omitted to be done after a change shall have taken place in any one or more of the persons constituting the firm, or in the person trading under the name of a firm, unless the intention of the parties that such promise shall continue to be binding notwith- standing such change shall appear either by express stipulation or by necessary implication from the nature of the firm or otherwise."* This affirms common law. This enactment of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, is believed to have only affirmed the result of previous decisions.^ The Indian Contract Act has a similar and more concisely worded provision (s. 260) : — " A continuing guaranty given either to a firm or to a third person in respect of the transactions of a firm is, in Mercantile Law Commission, 18, 141. "Where the firm, name is merely descriptive and impersonal, however, as " The Carron Iron. Company," some of the members must be joined by name in the action. ' 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 4. " Backhouse v. ffall (1865), 6 B. & S. 507, 520 ; 34 L. J. Q. B. 141, per Blackburn, J. 2 Wms. Saund. 821 ; Lindley, i. 214. OF THE FIRM. 25 ilie absence of agreement to the contrary, revoked as to Chap. ii. future transactions by any change in the constitution of ^ ' " the firm to which, or in respect of the transactions of which, such guaranty was given." An intention that the promise shall continue to be Evidence of binding, notwithstanding a change in the members of the ^arantyshaU :firm, cannot be inferred from the mere fact that the continue. primary liability is an indefinitely-continuing one ; as, for example, where the guaranty is for the sums to become due on a current account.^ Such intention may appear " by necessary implication from the nature of the firm " where the members of the firm are numerous and frequently changing, and credit is not given to them individually, as in the case of an unincorporated insurance society.^ ^ Backhouse v. Hall (1865), 6 B. & S. 507, 520 ; 34 L, J. Q. B. 141., '' See Melcalfy. Bruin (1810), 12 East, 400. 26 THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP. CHAPTER III. Chap. III. Art. 13. Persons liable by "bolding out." This rule a branch of estoppel. Of Persons who are liable as Partners. 13. Every one who by words spoken or written, or by conduct, represents bimself, or who allows himself to be represented, as a partner in a particular firm, is liable as such partner to any one who has on the faith of any such representation given credit to the firm, whether the representation was or was not made or communicated to the particular person so giving credit by or with the knowledge of the apparent partner making or allowing the representation.* " "Where a man holds himself out as a partner, or allows others to do it, he is then properly estopped from denying- the character he has assumed, and upon the faith of which creditors may be presumed to have acted. A man sa acting may he rightly held liable as a partner by estoppel."^ The rule is, in fact, nothing else than a special application of the much wider principle of estoppel, which is that if any man has induced another, whether by assertion or by conduct, to believe in and to act upon the 1 Cp. I. C. A. 245, 24G. ^ Per Our., Mollwo, March .t Co. v. Court of Wards (1872), L. E.. 4 P. 0. at p. 435. "HOLDING OUT." 2T existence of a particular state of facts, lie cannot te heard, Chap. iii. Art 13 as against that other, to deny the truth of those facts.' It '- — '- — out.' is therefore immaterial whether there is or is not in fact, or to the knowledge of the creditor, any sharing of profits. And it makes no difference even if the creditor knows of the existence of an agreement between the apparent partners that the party lending his name to the firm shall not have the rights or incur the liabilities of a partner. For his name, if lent upon a private indemnity as between the lender and borrower, is stiU lent for the very purpose of obtaining credit for the firm on the faith of his being responsible ; and the duty of the other partners to indem- nify him, so far from being inconsistent with his liability to third persons, is founded on it and assumes it as un- qualified.^ To constitute "holding out" there must be a real What lending of the party's credit to the partnership. The use "holding of a man's name without his knowledge cannot make him a partner by estoppel.' Also the use of his name must have been made known to the person who seeks to make him liable; otherwise there is no duty towards that person.* There may be a " holding out" without any direct communication by words or conduct between the parties. One who makes an assertion intending it to be repeated and acted upon, or even under such circumstances that it is likely to be repeated and acted upon by third persons, will be liable to those who afterwards hear of it and act upon it. " If the defendant informs A. B. that 1 For fuller and more exact statements, see Carr v. London and North Western Railway Company (1875), L. E. 10 0. P. at pp. 316, 317 ; Stephen's Digest of the Law of Evidence, Art. 102. 2 Lindley, i. 48. 3 Ih. 50; Fox V. Clifton (1830), 6 Bing. 776, 794. « Lb.: MartynY. Gray (1863), 14 C. B. N. S. 824. !8 TEE CONTRAQT OF PABTNERSHIP. Chap. III. he is a partner in a commercial establishment, and A. B. Art 13 '- — '- — informs the plaintiff, and the plaintiff believing the defendant to be a member of the firm supplies goods to them, the defendant is liable for the price." If the party is not named or even if his name is refused, but at the same time such a description is given as sufficiently identifies the person, the result is the same as if his name had been given as a partner.^ Doctrine of The rule as to "holdina: out" extends to administration "holding . out "applies in bankruptcy. If two persons trade as partners, and tion in^bank^' ^^J goods on their Credit as partners, and afterwards both Tuptcy. become bankrupt, then, whatever the natm-e of the real agreement between themselves, the assets of the business must be administered as joint estate for the benefit of the creditors of the supposed firm.^ It does not The doctrine of "holding out" does not extend to bind apply to bind ■a deceased the estate of a deceased partner where, after his death, the estate. business of the firm is continued in the old name ; and whether creditors of the firm know of his death or not is immaterial. " The executor of the deceased incurs no lia- bility by the continued use of the old name."^ liiability of A partner who has retired from the firm may be liable nerr on the principle of "holding out" for debts of the firm contracted afterwards, if he has omitted to give notice of his retirement to the creditors. But he cannot be thus liable to a creditor of the firm who did not know him to be a member while he was such in fact, and therefore cannot be supposed to have dealt with the firm on the I Per Williams, J., Martyn v. Gray (1863), li 0. B. N. S. at p. 841. ■ Re Rowland and Crankshaw (1866), 1 Cli. 421 ; Ex parte Hay- man (1878), 8 Ch. Div. U. ^ Lindley, i. 52, 404. "HOLDING OUT." 29> faitli of having his credit to look to.^ This is the meaning chap. iii. of the saying that " a dormant partner may retire from a '^ ' ' firm without giving notice to the world." ^ There is one reported case ^ in which a retired partner Principle of •^ '■ "holding was held liable for damage done by a cart belonging to out" not ap- the firm, on which his name still remained. But to make fiabmty in a man liable in tort as an apparent partner seems to *°'^*' involve confusion of principles. Liability by "holding out" rests on the presumption that credit was given to the firm on the strength of the apparent partner's na,me. This has no application to causes of action independent of contract : when, as in the case referred to, a carriage is run into by a cart, there can be no question of giving credit to the man whose name is on the cart. 1 Carter v. Whalley (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 11. 2 Heath v. Sansom (1832), 4 B. & Ad. 1*72, 1*77, per Patteson, J. On the subjects of tMs and of the preceding paragraph, see further Art. 53 below. 3 Stables v. Elej/ (1823), 1 C. & P. 614. Por the true principle, see Quarman v. Burnett (1840), 6 M. & W. at p. 508, where it is observed that a representation by holding out " can only conclude the defendants with respect to those who have altered their condi- tion on the faith of its being true." 30 TEE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP. CHAPTEE IV. Of the Liahility of Partners for Partnership Belts and the Authority of Partners to hind the Firm. Chap. IV. 14. Every partner is liable jointly with the -^^: — '- — other partners for all debts and obligations in- partuers for curred while he is a partner and in the usual debts of firm. o , n i • t • i course or the partnership business by or on behalf of the firm ; and after his death his estate is also severally liable for such debts and obligations, so far as they remain unsatisfied, but subject to the prior payment of his separate debts.^ The individual partner's liability for the dealings of the firm, whether he has himself taken an active part in them or not, is of the same nature as the liability of a principal for the acts of his agent, and is often treated as a species of it.^ "Each individual partner constitutes the others his agents for the purpose of entering into all contracts for him within the scope of the partnership concern, and consequently is liable to the performance of all such con- tracts in the same manner as if entered into personally by himself." 3 ' Altered from I. C. A. 249. ■ See Cox V. Hickman (1860), 8 H. L. C. at pp. 304, 312. 3 Per Tindol, C. J., ia Fox v. Cli/ton (1830), 6 Bing. at p. 776. LIABILITY AND AUTHORITY. 31 Tke limitation of the liability to things done in the Chap. iv. ■usual course of business will be presently spoken of under '- '- the correlative head of the partner's authority to bind the inn. It used to be stated that partnership debts are ioint and '^^ liability not joint and several ; but it has been decided by the House of Lords in seyeral. Kendall v. Hamilton^ that they are joint only, except as to the estate of a deceased partner. The facts of that case "were in substance these : A. and B., ostensibly trading in partnership, borrowed money of C, for which C. sued them and obtained judgment, but the judgment was not ■satisfied. Afterwards C discovered that D., a solvent person, had been an undisclosed partner with A. and B. at the time of the loan as to the adventure in respect of w^hich it was contracted. The law being settled that a judgment recovered against some of divers joint con- tractors is, even without satisfaction, a bar to an action against another of them alone, C.'s action was maintain- able against D. only if D.'s liability for the loan was several as weU as joint. It was held that there was no real authority for the supposed peculiarity of partnership debts as regards living partners ; that the several liability of a deceased partner's estate was not an effect of the supposed rule, but a special and somewhat anomalous favour to creditors ; and that in this case the debt was not joint and several, and C.'s action was barred. In the ease of a deceased partner's estate it does not matter in what order the partnership creditor pursues his concurrent remedies, provided the two following conditions are substantially satisfied : first, he must not compete with the deceased partner's separate creditors; secondly, the surviving partner must be before the Court.^ 4 App. Oa. 504 (1879). Be Eodgaon, Beckett v. Bamsdale (1885), 31 Cli. Div. 177. 32 THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP. Chap. IV. Art, 15. The rule in Kendall v. Hamilton does not affect the- position of a surety for a partner's debt, for he does not merely stand in the creditor's place as against the principal debtor, but has further distinct rights.^ And the rule of course does not affect such liabilities of partners as are on the special facts both joint and several. For example, where partners have joined in a breach of trust there are separate causes of action as well as a joint one, and a judgment against the partners jointly does not of itself bar subsequent proceedings against their separate estates.^ Where judgment has been recovered against one partner,, sued in the firm-name, on bills given in the firm-name for the price of goods sold, this judgment, though unsatisfied, is a bar to a subsequent action against the other partner for the price of the goods, the cause of action being sub- stantially the same.^ Liabilities of outgoing- and incoming partners. 15. A partner wlio retires from a firm, or the estate of a partner who dies, does not thereby cease to be liable for partnership debts contracted before his retirement or death,* and a person who is admitted as a partner into an existing firm does not thereby become liable to the creditors of the firm for anything done before he became a partner:® but a retiring partner may be discharged from any existing liabilities, and an incoming partner may become 1 Badeley v. Consolidahd Bank (1886), 34 Ch. D. 536, 556. = Re Davison, Ex parte Chandler (188-1), 13 Q. B. D. 50. •< Camhefort .f- Co. t. Chapman (1887), 19 Q. B. D. 229. " Lindley, i. 439, 44J. » lb. 389 ; I. C. A. 249. LIABILITY AND AUTHORITY. 33 subject thereto, by an agreement to that effect chap. iv. between the members of the new firm and the creditor. Such agreement as last aforesaid may be either express or inferred as a fact from the course of deahng between the creditors and the new firm.' Illustrations. 1. A., B. and C. are partners. D. is a creditor of the firm. A. retires from tke firm, and B. and C, either alone or together with a new partner, E., take upon themselves the liabilities of the old firm. This alone does not afltect D.'s right to obtain payment from A., B. and C, or A.'s liability toD. 2. A partnership firm, consisting of A., B. and C, enters into a continuing contract with D., which is to run over a period of three years. After one year A. retires from the firm, tating a covenant from B. and C. to indemnify him against all liabilities under the contract. D. knows of A.'s retirement. A. remains liable to D. under the contract, and is bound by everything duly done under it by B. and C. after Lis retirement from the firm.^ 3. A., B. and C. are bankers in partnership. A. dies, and B. and C. continue the business. D., E. and E., customers of the bank at the time of A.'s death, continue to deal with the bank in the usual way after they know of A.'s death. The firm afterwards becomes insolvent. A.'s estate remains liable to D., E. and E. for the balances due to them respectively at the time of A.'s death, less any sums subsequently drawn out.^ ' Lindley, i. 443. ^ Oakford v. European and American Steam. Shipping Company (1863), 1 H. & M. 182, 191. See also Swire v. Redman (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 536. 3 Devaynea Y.Noble, Sleech's Case (1816), 1 Mer. 539, 569; Clayton's Case (1816), ib. 572, 604. P. J) 34 THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP. Chap. IV. In tte last case put, one customer, D., discovers that ■^'^*- ^^- securities held by the bank for him have been sold without his authority in A.'s lifetime. Here A.'s estate is not dis- charged from being liable to make good the loss, for the additional reason that D. could not elect to discharge it from this particular liability before he knew of the wrongful sale.' 4. A. and B. are bankers in partnership. C. and D. are admitted as new partners, of which notice is given by circular to all the customers of the bank. A short time afterwards A. dies. Two years later B. dies, and the business is still continued under the same firm. The bank gets into difficulties, and at last stops payment. Depositors in the bank whose deposits were prior to A.'s death, and who knew of his death, and continued to receive interest on their deposits from the new partners, and have proved in the bankruptcy of C. and D. for the amount of their deposits, cannot now claim against A.'s estate, for their conduct amounts to an acceptance of the liability of the new partners alone.^ 5. A. and B. are partners. F. is a creditor of the firm. A. and B. take C. into partnership. C. brings in no capital. The assets and liabilities of the old firm are, by the consent of all the partners — but without any express provision in the new deed of partnership — transferred to and assumed by the new firm. The accounts are continued in the old books as if no change had taken place, and existing liabilities, including a portion of F.'s debt, are paid indiscriminately out of the blended assets of the old and the new firm. F. continues his dealings with the new firm on the same footing as with the old, knowing of the change and treating the partners in the new firm as his debtors. The new firm of A., B. and C. is liable to F.=' 6: A. and B. are partners. A. retires, and B. takes C. into partnership, continuing the old firm-name. A customer who deals with the firm after this change, and without notice of it, may sue at his election A. and B., or B. and C, but he cannot sue A., B. and C. jointly, nor sue A. after suing B. and C* 1 Clayton's Case (1816), 1 Mer. oT9. - Bilborowjli v. Holmes (1876), 5 Ch. D. 255. = Rolfe V. Flower (1865), L. E, 1 P. C. 27. ^ Scarf y. Jardine (1882), (H. L.) 7 App. Ca. 345. LI A BIL IT Y AND A UTHORITT. 35 To determine whether an incomino; partner has hecome Chap. iv. . Art. 15. liable to an existing creditor of the firm, two questions T , -i -J J Test of lia- have to be considered : — i,mty of new 1st. Whether the new firm has assumed the liability to fi'^™- pay the debt. 2nd. Whether the creditor has agreed to accept the new firm as his debtors, and to discharge the old partnership from its liability.^ Novation is the technical name for the contract of substi- Novation. iuted liability, which is, of course, not confined to cases of partnership. As between the incoming partner and the ■creditor, the consideration for the undertaking of the liability is the change of the creditor's existing rights. An agreement between the old partners and the incoming Mere agroe- partner that he shall be liable for existing debts will not of partners can- itself give the creditors of the firm any right against him; "otiTtion!'^ '''* ior it is a general rule that not even the express intention of the parties to a contract can enable a third person for whose benefit it was made to enforce it.^ An incoming 3)artner is liable, however, for new debts arising out of a •continuing contract made by the firm before he joined it ; as where the old firm had given a continuing order for the supply of a particular kind of goods. ^ There is in law nothing to prevent a firm from stipula- ting with any creditor from the beginning that he shall look only to the members of the firm for the time being ; the term nocation, however, is not properly applicable to such a case.* 1 Rdfe V. Flower (1865), L. E. 1 P. C. at p. 38. "- Principles of Contraot, 201. s Lindley, i. 391. * This is involved in IlorVs Case and Orainh Case (18Yo), 1 Ch. d2 36 TEE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP. Chap. IV. 16. Each partner who does any act necessary Art. 16. , - . p^ for or usually done m carrying on business oi Power of •' n !■ ^ • ^ ^ • iiartner to the kind Carried on by the firm oi which he is. bind the firm. a member, binds his partners to the same extent. as if he were their agent duly appointed for that purpose ; ^ unless he has in fact no authority to act for the firm in the particular matter, and is not known to the person with whom he is dealing to be a partner.^ " Generally speaking, a partner has full authority to> deal with the partnership property for partnership pur- poses."" " Ordinary partnerships are by the law assumed and presumed to be based on the mutual trust and confidence of each partner in the skill, knowledge, and integrity of every other partner. As between the partners and the- outside world (whatever may be their private arrange- ments between themselves), each partner is the unlimited agent of every other in every matter connected with the partnership business, or which he represents as partnership business, and not being in its nature bej'ond the scope of the partnership."* Except where The exception in the event of the partner having na Div. 307, wliere the deed of settlement of an insurance company- contained a power t(i transfer the business and liabilities, and a. transfer made under that power was decided to be binding on the policy holders. As to the misuse of the term novation, see per James, L. J,, at p. 322. ' Slightly altered from I. C. A. 2j1; see Lindley, i. 236. = Lindley, i. 237. ^ LordWostbury in£x;)a)7f Darlington, &c. Banking Co. (ISG-i), 4D. J. S. JSl, o.S.). * James, L. J., in Eaird's Case (1870), 5 Ch. at p. 733. LIABILITY AND AVTHORITT. 37 -authority, and also not appearing to the other party to Chap. iv. have it, is not established by any direct decision. But it was said in a recent case by Cleasby, B., that partnership ^^renTnor" •does not always, and especially does not in these circum- "^f^l autho- "stances, imply mutual agency. " In the common case of a partnership, where by the terms of the partnership all the capital is supplied by A., and the business is to be carried on by B. and C, in their own names, it being a stipulation in the contract that A. shall not appear in the business or interfere in its man- agement ; that he shall neither buy nor sell, nor draw nor accept bills ; no one would say that as among themselves there was any agency of each one for the others. If, indeed, a mere dormant partner were known to be a partner, and the limitation of his authority were not known, he might be able to draw bills and give orders for goods which would bind his co-partners, but in the ordi- nary case this would not be so, and he would not in the slightest degree be in the position of an agent for them." ^ The acts of a partner done in the name of a firm will What kind of not bind the firm merely because they are convenient, or biud the firm, prudent, or even necessary for the particular occasion. The question is, what is necessary for the usual conduct of the partnership business ; that is the limit of each partner's general authority : he is the general agent of the firm, but he is no more. " A power to do what is usual does not include a power to do what is unusual, however urgent."^ Whether a particular act is " necessary to the trans- action of a business in the way in which it is usually carried on" is a question "to be determined by the nature ' Cleasby, B., in Holme v. Hammond (1872), L. E. 1 Ex. at, :p. 233. - Lindley, i. 238. 38 THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP. Chap. IV. Art. 17. of the business, and by the practice of persons engaged in it."^ This must once have been a question of fact in all cases, as it still would be in a new case. But as to a certain number of frequent and important transactions, there are well understood usages extending to all trading- loartnerships, and now constantly recognized by the Court ; these have become in effect rules of law, and it seems best to give them as such, and this we proceed to do. In other words, there are many kinds of business in which it is so notoriously needful or useful to issue negotiable instru- ments, borrow money, and so following, in the ordinary course of affairs, that the existence or vaKdity of the usage is no longer a question of fact. But there is no authori- tative list or definition of the kinds of business which are "trades" in this sense. Thus it is hardly possible to- frame a statement which shall be quite satisfactory in form. Implied au- thority of partners in trade as to certain trans- actions. 17. Subject to the limitations expressed in the three next following articles, every partner- may bind the firm by any of the following acts : a. He may sell any goods or personal chattels of the firm. h. He may purchase on account of the firm any goods of a kind necessary for or usually employed in the business carried on by it. c. He may receive payment of debts due to- the firm, and give receipts or releases for them. d. He may engage servants for the partner- ship business. ' Lindley, i. 239. LIABILITY AND AUTHORITY. 39 If the partnership is in trade, every partner ^Y^'}7- may also bind the firm by any of the following acts: e. He may accept, make, and issue bills and other negotiable instruments in the name of the firm.' /. He may borrow money on the credit of the firm. g. He may for that purpose pledge any goods or personal chattels belonging to the firm. h. He may [probably] for the like purpose make an equitable mortgage by deposit of deeds or otherwise of real estate or chattels real belonging to the firm. The general powers of partners as agents of the firm are summed up hy Story in a passage which has been adopted by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Coun- cil: 2— " Every partner is in contemplation of law the general and accredited agent of the partnership, or as it is some- times expressed, each partner is prcepositus negotiis societaiis, and may consequently bind all the other partners by his 1 Cp. the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, s. 23, and Chalmers' Digest of the Law of Bills of Exchange, 3rd ed., p. 59 sqq. Where the firm name is also the name of an individual member of the firm ■who does not carry on any separate business, a bill of exchange, drawn, accepted, or indorsed in that name is presumed to be a partnership bill, and if the other partners are sued on it the burthen of proof is on them to show that the name was signed as that of the individual partner and not as that of the firm : Yorkshire Banking Co. V. Beaison (1880), 5 C. P. Div. 109, 121. ^ Story on Agency, § 124; Bank of Australasia y. Breillat (1847), 6 Moo. P. 0. at p. 193. 40 THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP. Chap. IV. Art. 17. acts in all matters whicli are within the scope and objects of the partnership. Hence, if the partnership be of a general commercial nature, he may pledge or sell the partnership property ; he may buy goods on account of the partnership ; he may borrow money, contract debts, and pay debts on account of the partnership ; he may draw, make, sign, indorse, accept, transfer, negotiate, and pro- cure to be discounted promissory notes, bills of exchange, cheques and other negotiable paper in the name and on account of the partnership." The particular transactions in which the power of a partner to bind the firm has been called in question, and either upheld or disallowed, are exhaustively considered by Lord Justice Lindley (i. 264 — 297). A certain number of the leading heads may here be selected by way of illustra- tion. The distinction between the powers of partners in trading and non-trading firms is perhaps not quite clear on the authorities, but it is believed that the existing practice and understanding are correctly represented by the state- ment in the text. Negotiable instruments. Authority to bind the Finn implied. The power of binding the firm by negotiable instruments is one of the most frequent and important. In trading partnerships every partner has this power unless specially restrained by agreement.^ In the case of a non-trading partnership those who seek to hold the firm bound must prove that such a course of dealing is necessary Exception as or usual in the particular business. In the case, again, of 1 Lindley, i. 2G6, Bank of Australasia v. Breillat (1841), 6 Moo. P. 0. at p. IW; Ex. parte Darlington, &<:. Banking Company (1864), 4 D. J. S. at p. 585. Brokers and commission agents are not traders within the meaning of this rule, Yates v. Dalion (1858), 28 L. J Ex. 69. LIABILITY AND AUTHORITY. 41 an association " too numerous to act in the way that an chap. iv. Art 17 ■ordinary partnership does,"^ whose affairs are under the exclusive management of a small number of its members — *° du-eotors of o numerous in other words, an unincorporated company — the presump- associations. "tion of authority does not exist either for this purpose or in the other cases where partners have in general an implied authority ; for the ordinary authority of a partner is founded on the mutual confidence involved, in ordinary oases, in the contract of partnership ; and this confidence is excluded when the members of the association are personally unknown to one another. In such a case those who are mere shareholders have no power at all to bind the rest, and the directors or manag- ing members have no more than has been conferred on them expressly or by necessary implication in the consti- tution of the particular society.^ But since the Com- panies Acts this rule is not likely to have much practical application. It seems indeed a not untenable suggestion that the fixing of the number of twenty by the Companies Act, 1862, as the superior limit of an ordinary partnership must be taken as a legislative declaration that no smaller number can be considered " too numerous to act in the way that an ordinary partnership does." The general tiim and policy of the Act, it might be urged, was to leave no middle term between an ordinary partnership and a company regularly formed under the Act. In point of -fact, however, associations of seven or more persons who do not mean to act as partners in the ordinary sense will almost always seek to be registered as limited companies ; and the question here started is perhaps merely curious. 1 3 D. M. G. 477 (1854). 2 Dickinson v. Valpy (1829), 10 B. & 0. 128, and other authorities referred to in Lindley, i. 267 ; Principles of Contract, 129. 42 TEE CONTRACT OF PAETNEE8HIF. Chap. IV. Art. 17. Borrowing money. Sale and pledge of pai-tnership property. Purohase. Every partner in a trading firm has an implied autho- rity to borrow money for the purposes of the business on the credit of the firm.i The directors of a numerous, association, according to the rule above explained, have no such authority beyond what may have been specially committed to them.^ Every partner has implied authority to dispose, either by way of sale or (where he has power to borrow on the credit of the firm) by way of pledge, of any part of the goods or personal property belonging to the partnership,^ unless it is known to the lender or purchaser that it is the intention of the partner offering to dispose of partnership property to apply the proceeds to his own use instead of accounting for them to the firm.* A partner having power to borrow on the credit of the firm may probably give a valid equitable security, by deposit of deeds or otherwise, over any real estate of the- partnership.^ But a legal conveyance, whether by way of mortgage or otherwise, of real estate or chattels real of the firm, cannot be given except by all the partners, or with their express authority given by deed.' A partner may buy on the credit of the firm any goods of a kind used in its business, and the firm wUl be bound,, notwithstanding any subsequent misapplication of them by that partner.'' This power extends to non- trading partner- ships.' 1 Banh of Australasia v. Breillat (18-17), G Moo. P. C. lo2, 194. "- Burmester v. Xorris (ISol), 6 Ex. 796 ; 21 L. J. Exch. 43. ' Lindley, i. 295. * Ex parte Bonhonus (1803), 8 Ves. 540. » Lindley, i. 278, 284. Bond V. Gibson (1808), 1 Camp. 185. ' Lindley, i. 291. LIABILITY AND AUTHOBITY. 43; Payment to one partner is a good payment to the firm,^ Chap. IV. Art 17 and by parity of reason a release by one partner binds the firm, " because, as a debtor may lawfully pay his debt to andreiease°by one of them, he ought also to be able to obtain a discharge °^s partner. upon payment."^ " One partner has implied authority to hire servants to Servants. perform the business of the partnership," and probably also to discharge them if the other partners do not object.^ Authority to hind the Firm not implied. One partner cannot bind the others by deed without ex- Deeds, press authority (which must itself be under seal),* and where the partnership articles are under seal, the fact of their beiug so does not of itself confer ,any authority for this purpose.^ One partner cannot bind the others by giving a guaranty Guaranties.. in the name of the firm, even if the act is in itself a reason- able and convenient one for effecting the purposes of the partnership business, unless such is the usage of that par- ticular firm, or the general usage of other firms engaged in the like business : ^ in other words, there is no general im- plied authority for one partner to bind the firm by guaranty, but agreement may confer such authority as to a particular firm, or custom as to all firms engaged in a particular business. In the latter case, however, the force of the custom really depends on a presumed agreement among the partners that the business shall be conducted in the usual and customary manner. ' Lindley, i. 215. ^ Best, C. J., in Stead v. Salt (1825), 3 Bing. at p. 103. 2 Lindley, i. 296. « Steiglitz v. Egginton (1815), Holt, N. P. 141. 5 Harrison v. Jackson (1797), 7 T. E. 207. « BretUl V. Williams (1849), 4 Ex. 623; 19 L. J. Ex. 121. 44 THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP. Chap. IV. Art. 17a. Submission to arbitration. Limited power of managers in numerous partnerships. Partner using ■credit of firm for private purposes. It is not competent to one member of a partnership to bind the firm by a submission to arbitration.^ [17a. Where the members of a partnership are too numerous to act as partners in the ordinary way, and it is provided by the con- stitution of the partnership that its affairs shall be conducted and controlled only by a limited niimber of its members (hereinafter called di- rectors), there no members of tlie partnership, not being directors, can bind the others by their acts, and the directors can bind the others only vpithin the scope of the authority conferred on them expressly or by necessary implication in the constitution of the partnership.^]] Apart from the Companies Acts, this is undoubted law ; but, as above suggested, it is perhaps doubtful whether an association of this kind would now be recognized as differ- ing in any respect from an ordinary partnership. 18. Where one partner pledges the credit of the firm for a purpose apparently not connected with the partnership affairs, whether the trans- action itself is or is not of a class within his apparent general authority, the firm is not bound, unless he is in fact specially authorized by the other partners [or, perhaps, unless the party dealing with him had reasonable ground for believing him to be so authorized.] ' stead V. Salt (1S2J), 3 Bing. 101. = See Note 2, p. 41, above. LIABILITY AND AUTHORITY. 45 The passage already partly cited from Story (Art. 17, Chap. iv. p. 39, above) continues as follows : '- — ^ - " The restrictions of this implied authority of partners to hind the partnership are apparent from what has heen already stated. Each partner is an agent only in and for the business of the firm ; and therefore his acts beyond that business will not bind the firm. Neither will his acts done in violation of his duty to the firm bind it when the other party to the transaction is cognizant of or co-operates in such breach of duty."^ Persons who "have notice or reason to believe that the thing done in the partnership name is done for the private purposes or on the separate account of the partner doing it,"^ cannot say that they were misled by his apparent general authority. Por his authority presumably exists for the benefit and for the purposes of the firm, not for those of its individual members. The commonest case, indeed the only case at all common, to which this principle has to be applied, is that of one partner giving negotiable instruments or other security in the name of the firm to raise money (to the knowledge of the person advancing it) for his private purposes or for the satisfaction of his private debt.3 " The unexplained fact that a partnership security has been received from one of the partners in discharge of a separate claim against himself is a badge of fraud, or of such palpable negligence as amounts to fraud, which it is 1 Story on Agency, § 125 ; Bank of Australasia v. Breillat (1847), 6 Moo. P. 0. at p. 194. 2 Ex parte Darlington, &c. Banldng Co. (1864), 4 D. J. S. at p. 585. 3 See the cases referred to in the next note, and Heillut v. Nevill (1869—70), L. E. 4 0. P. 354, in Ex. Oh. 5 C. P. 478. 46 THE CONTBACT OF PARTNERSHIP. Chap. IV. Art. 18. Whether the creditor may be entitled as against the firm by reasonable belief in the partner's ■authority. incumbent on the party who so took the security to remove, by showing either that the partner from whom he received it acted under the authority of the rest, or at least that he himself had reason to believe so." ^ " If a person lends money to a partner for purposes for which he has no authority to borrow it on behalf of the partnership, the lender having notice of that want of authority cannot sue the firm." ^ " When a separate creditor of one partner knows he has received money out of partnership funds, he must know at the same time that the partner so paying him is exceeding the authority implied in the partnership — that he is going beyond the scope of his agency; and express authority therefore is necessary from the other partner to warrant that payment."^ It is doubtful whether a separate creditor thus taking partnership securities or funds from one partner is justified even by having reasonable cause to believe in the existence of a special authority ; the opinion has been expressed by Cockburn, C. J., that he deals with him altogether at his own peril.* But it may happen that the other partner whom the separate creditor seeks to bind has so conducted himself as to give reasonable ground for supposing there is authority ; and where he has done so, he may be bound 1 Smith, Merc. Law, -13 (9th. ed.), adopted by Keating and Byles, JJ., in Leviesoii v. Lane (1862), 13 C. B. N. S. 278 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 10; by Lord Westbury, in Ex parte Darlington, ifcc. Banking Co. (1864), 4 D. J. S. at p. 58o ; and by Cockburn, C.J. (subject to a doubt as to the last -svords, see below), in Kendal v. Wood (1871), (Ex. Cb.) L. E. G Ex. at p. 248. ■ Bank cf Austnihtsia v. Breillat (1847), 6 Moo. P. C. at p. 196. 3 Montague Smith, J., in Kendal v. Wood (1871), L. E. 6 Ex. at p. 2:)3. * L. E. G Ex. 248. LIABILITY AND AUTHORITY. 47 ■on tke general principle of estoppel. The rule is stated chap. iv. "witli this qualification or warning by Blackburn, J., and " L_. Montague Smith, J.^ Another special application of the foregoing rule was Instances of made in a case where two out of three partners gave an rujef acceptance in the name of the firm for a debt incurred before the third had entered the partnership. This was held not to bind the new partner, for it was in effect the same thing as an attempt by a single partner to pledge the joint fund for his individual debts.^ Again, if a customer of a trading firm stipulates with one of the partners for a special advantage in the conduct of their business with him, for a consideration which is good as between himself and that partner, but of no value to the firm, the firm is not bound by this agreement, and incurs no obligation in respect of any business done in pursuance of it.' The same principle applies to the rights of persons "taking negotiable instruments indorsed in the name of the firm. Where a partner authorized to indorse bills in the partnership name and for partnership purposes indorses a Ibill in the name of the firm for his own private purposes, a holder who takes the bill, not knowing the indorsement io be for a purpose foreign to the partnership, can still recover against the other partners, notwithstanding the unauthorized character of the indorsement as between the partners ;* but if he knows that the indorsement is in fact not for a partnership purpose he cannot recover.' 1 L. E. 6 Ex. at pp. 251, 253. ' Shirreffr. WUks (1800), 1 East, 48 ; see per Le Blanc, J. 3 Bignold v. Waterhouse (1813), 1 M. & S. 255. * Lewis V. Reilly (1841), 1 Q. B. 349. = Garland v. Jaconib (1873), (Ex. Ch.) L. E. 8 Ex. 216. 48 THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP. Chap. IV. 19. All or any of the partners in a firm may '■ — '■ — ffive notice that the firm will not be bound by Efeectof *= 1-1 notification acts, or bv somo class of acts, done m the name that firm will ^ , not be bound of the firm bj any one or more of the partners ;. partner. and if such partner or partners as last aforesaid deal in the name of the firm in any matter comprised in the notice with any person to whose knowledge the notice has come, the firm is not bound thereby. Eestriotive It is clear law that if partners agree between themselves. inoperative if that the apparent authority of one or more of them shall no no e . -^^ restricted, such an agreement is inoperative against persons having no notice of it. " Where two or more persons are engaged as partners in an ordinary trade each of them has an implied authority from the others to hind all by contracts entered into accord- ing to the usual course of business in that trade. . . . Partners may stipulate among themselves that some one of them only shall enter into particular contracts, or that as to certain of their contracts none shall be liable except those by whom they axe actually made ; but with such private arrangements third persons dealing with the firm without notice have no concern."^ Effect of There are dicta to the effect that a creditor who deals notice: semhle, .,i , l s l\, n i_- i_- j there must be '^^''h ^ partner as agent oi the firm, having notice of a. adistmot restrictive stipulation among the partners themselves, cannot hold the firm bound ;- and this view is adopted in » Lord Cranwortli, ia Cox v. Hickman (1860), 8 H. L. C. at p. 304. 2 Lord GiiUwai/ v. Mathew (1803), 10 East, 264; Aldersony. Pope^ 1 Camp. 404, n. LIABILITY AND AUTHORITY. 49 the Indian Contract Act, which enacts (s. 251, Exception) chap. iv. that ^'- ^- "If ithasheen agreed hetween the partners that any restriction shall be placed upon the power of any one of them, no act done in contravention of such agreement shall bind the firm with respect to persons having notice of such agreement." But it is contested by Lord Justice Lindley, who points out that an agreement between the partners that certain things shall not be done is quite consistent with an inten- tion that if they are done the firm shall nevertheless be answerable. All that the agreement necessarily means is that the transgressing partner shall indemnify the firm, not that the firm shall not be liable. There should be not merely a restriction of authority as between the partners, but a distinct warning to third persons dealing with the firm that if the forbidden acts are done the firm will not answer for them. If a partner tells a third person that he has ceased to be a partner, but his name is to continue in the firm for a certain time, this is not a disclaimer of responsibility, but means that he will be responsible for the debts of the firm contracted during the specified time;^ and the cases seem closely parallel. The undoubted pro- position that no agreement among partners, whether known or not to third persons, can avail to limit the amount of their liability for the debts of the firm, is also to some extent analogous." The rule has been stated in the text above in a form intended to express Lord Justice Lindley's opinion. 20. An admission made by one partner con- Admissions cerning the partnership affairs is relevant tationsof ^ partners. ^ Brown v. Leonard (1820), 2 Chitty, 120. 2 Lindley, i. 332. 50 THE CONTRACT OF PARTNEBSEIP. Chap. IV. against the firm, and a representation made by ^ '- — one partner to any person concerning the partnership affairs has the same effect as against the firm, and so far as concerns the civil rights and liabilities of the partners, as if it had been made by all the partners.' Explanation. — This does not apply to a repre- sentation made by one partner as to the extent of his own authority to bind the firm.^ An admissioa made by a partner, though relevant against the firm, is of course not conclusive;' for an admission is not conclusive against the person actually making it. A definition of the term admission, and refer- ences to authorities on this subject, will be found in Mr. Justice Stephen's Digest of the Law of Evidence, Art. 15. Hepresentations, however, may be conclusive by way of estoppel, or under some of the rules of equity which are in truth akin to the legal doctrine of estoppel, and rest on the same principle. The qualification of the rule above given by way of explanation is advisedly so given, as not being a real exception. Its necessity is obvious, for otherwise one partner could bind the firm to anything whatever by merely representing himself as authorized to do so. 21. Notice to one [acting ?] partner of any matter relating to partnership affairs is notice to the firm, cxcejit in the case of a fraud upon ' Wichham v. ]Vickluim (18oo), 2 K. & J. 47S, 491. = K.r jiarle Aipn-f (179'-'), 2 Cox, 312. ' Stead V. Salt (1N20), 3 Bing. at p. 103. LIABILITY AND AUTHORITY. 51 the firm committed by or with the consent of chap. rv. •' Art. 21. that partner.* It is doubtful -wliether a firm is to be deemed to have notice of facts known to a partner before he became a member of the firm.^ 1 Lindley, i. 287 ; Jessel, M. E., in WilliamsonY. Barhour (1877), 9 Ch. D. at p. 535 ; cp. Lacey v. Hill (1876), 4 Ch. Div. at p. 549. ^ Jessel, M. E., uhisup.: — "It has not, so far as I know, been .teld that notice to a man who afterwards becomes a partner is notice to the firm. It might be so held." e2 53 THE C'ONTBAGT OF PABTNEESHIP. CHAPTEE V. Chap. V. Art. 22. Liability of partners for ■VPTOBffS. !Fraud, &a. in conduct of partnership business. Of the Liability of Partners for Wrongs. 22. Every partner is liable jointly with his fellow-partners, and also severally, for all sums- and damages which the firm, while he is a partner therein, becomes liable for under either of the two next following articles.^ The cases in question are, as will immediately appear, those where a fraud or wrong is committed by one pai-tner in the course of the business of the firm. It has once been held that in a suit to recover from one partner money which had been misapplied by another all the partners were necessary parties ; ^ but this appears to have been a solitary and unconsidered decision, and it has since been expressly dissented from.^ 23. Where loss or injury is caused to third persons, or penalties incurred, by the wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the firm, the firm is liable thei-efor to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act.* 1 Lindloy, i. 373. = Aa-inson v. Machnth (1866), 2 Eq. o'O. ■' rUimrry. Gregory {\8'i), 18 Eq. 621, 627. ^ Lindloy, i. 298. LIABILITY FOR WRONGS. 53 Explanation. — For this purpose partner in- chap. v. Art. io4. eludes an agent or servant of the firm. 24. Where any money or property of a MieappHoa- "' _ •' . ^''^ °^ money third person is received by one partner, acting or property _ ■■■ . . received for or vpithin the scope of his ordinary apparent in custody of authority in partnership affairs, and is mis- applied by that partner,^ and where any money or property of a third person being as such in the custody of the firm is misapplied by any partner,^ the firm is liable to make good the loss. Explanation. — Money is deemed to be in the custody of the firm when it has been paid to any agent of the firm, or paid or credited to the account of the firm with any person, in the ordinary course of business, or under such circumstances that a partner using ordinary diligence in the partnership affairs would be aware of such payment or transaction.^ Illustrations. 1. A., B. and C. are partners in a bank, 0. taking no active part in the business. D., a customer of tlie bank, deposits \ securities with, the firm for safe custody, and these securities I are sold by A. and B. -without D.'s authority. The value of the securities is a partnership debt for which the firm is 1 Blair v. Bromley (1847), 2 Ph. 354. = St. Auhyn v. Smart (1868), 3 Ch. 646; Flumer v. Gregory (1874), 18 Eq. 621. •i Marsh v. Keating (1834), 2 01. & F. 250, 289. It may be ■doubted whether this explanation is really necessary. See note on this case, p. 56, below. 54 THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP. Chap. V. liable to D. ; and C. or Lis estate is liable whether he knew of" ■^''''- ^*- the sale or not.' 2. A. and B. are solicitors in partnership. C, a client of the firm, hands a sum of money to A. to be. invested on a j specific security. A. never invests it, but applies it to his own { use. B. receives no part of the money, and knows nothing of the transaction. B. is liable to make good the loss, since receiving money to be invested on specified securities is part of the ordinary business of solicitors.' 3. If, the other facts being as in the last illustration, C. had given the money to A. with general directions to invest i it for him, B. would not be Hable, since it is no part of the ordinary business of solicitors to receive money to be invested at their discretion.' 4. J. and W. are in partnership as solicitors. P. pays- -<^ £1,300 to J. and W. to be invested on a mortgage of specified real estate, and they jointly acknowledge the receipt of it for- that purpose. Afterwards P. hands over £1,700 to"\Y. on his. representation that it will be invested on a mortgage of some real estate of F., another client of the firm, such estate not being specifically described. J. dies, and afterwards both, these sums are fraudulently applied to his own use by W. W. dies, having paid interest to P. on the two sums till within a short time before his death, and his estate is insolvent. J.'s estate is liable to make good to P. the £1,300, with interest from the date when interest was last paid by "W., but not the £1,700/ 5. A. and B., solicitors in partnership, have by the direction of C, a client, invested money for him on a mortgage, and. have from time to time received the interest for him. A. receives the principal money without directions from C., and without the knowledge of B., and misapplies it. B. is not liable, as it was no part of the firm's business to receive the principal money; but if the money when repaid had been ' Devaynes v. Noble, Clayton's Case (181G), 1 Mer. at pp. oTl2, o79^ 2 Plair v. Jtromley (1847), 2 Ph. 3o4. a Ilarman v. Jvlinson (1853), L> E. >!c B. 61 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 297. * Phimtr \. Gregory (1874), 18 Eq. 621. LIABILITT FOR WRONGS. 55 passed througli the account of the firm, B. would protably be chap. V. liable.^ A'^t. 24. 6. A., one of the partners in a banking firm, advises B., a customer, to sell certain securities of B.'s wbicli are in the custody of the bank, and to invest the proceeds in another security to be provided by A. B. sells out by the agency of the bank in the usual way, and gives A. a cheque for the money, -which he receives and misapplies without the know- ledge of the other partners. The firm is not liable to make good the loss to B., as it is not part of the ordinary business of bankers to receive money generally for investment.^ 7. A customer of a banking firm buys stock through the agency of the firm, which is transferred to A., one of the partners, in pursuance of an arrangement between the partners, and with the customer's knowledge and assent, but not at his request. A. sells out this stock without authority, and the proceeds are received by the firm. The firm is liable to make good the loss.^ 8. A customer of a banking firm deposits with the firm a box containing securities. He afterwards authorizes one of the partners to take out some of these and replace them by certain others. That partner not only makes the changes he is authorized to make in the contents of the box, but makes other changes without authority, and converts the customer's securities to his own use. The firm is not liable to make good the loss, as the separate authority given to one partner by the customer shows that he elected to deal with that part- ner alone and not as agent of the firm.* 9. A., one of the partners in a bank under the firm of M. and Co., forges a power of attorney from B., a customer of the bank, to himself and the other partners, and thereby procures a transfer of stock standing in B.'s name at the Bank ' Sims V. Brutton (1850), 5 Ex. 802 ; 20 L. J. Exch. 41 , as cor- rected by Lord Justice Lindley's criticism, i. 309 ; cp. Cleather v. Twisden (1883), 24 Ch. D. 731 ; Cooper v. Prichard (1883), 11 Q. B. Div. 351. ^ Bishop V. Countess of Jersey (1854), 2 Drew. 143. ^ Devaynes v. Noble, Baring's Case (1816), 1 Mer. at pp. 611, 614. * ExparteEyre (1842), 1 Ph. 227; cp. the remark of James, V.-C, 7 Eq. 516(1869).. 56 THE CONTRACT OF PABTNER8HIP. Chap. V. of England. Tlie proceeds of tlie stock are credited to M. and ^^^- ^- Co. in their pass-book with another bank, but there is no entry of the transaction in M. and Co.'s own books. The other partners in the firm of M. and Co. are liable to B., because it is part of the ordinary business of bankers "to sell, through their broker, stock belonging to their customers, and to receive and remit the proceeds" [and because they might by the use of ordinary dUigence have known of the payment and from what source it came].' 10. W. and J. are solicitors in partnership. A., B. and C, clients of the firm, have left moneys representing a fund in which they are interested in the hands of the firm for invest- ment. After some delay a mortgage made to W. alone is, with the consent of A., B. and C, appropriated as a security for this fund. W. realizes the security, and misapplies the money without the knowledge of J. The firm is not liable, as A., B. and C. dealt with "W. not as solicitor but as trustee, and the breach of duty did not happen while the money was in the hands of the finn.^ But if there were facts showing that A., B. and C. dealt with W. as a member of the firm, and the matter of the investment was treated as the business of the firm, the firm would be liable.' Ground of The general principle on whicli the firm is held to be ^' liable in cases of this class may be expressed in more than one form. It may be put on the ground " that the firm has ill the ordinary course of its business obtained posses- sion of the property of other people, and has then parted 1 Marsh v. Keating (1834), 2 CI. & F. 250, 289 ; see Lord Justice Lindley's note, i. 312, from which, the words in quotation marks are taken. If his comment is right, as it clearly is, one can hardly see what the knowledge or means of knowledge of the partners had to do with it ; but the point is treated as material in the opinion of the judges. The truth is that the rule as above given, by which the ordinary course of business is the primary test of the firm's liabiHty, was developed only by later decisions. '^ Coomer v. Bromley (18j2), 5 De G. & Sm. 532 ; and see a fuller account of the case in Lindley, i. 310. 3 Cleather v. Twiaden (1883), 24 Ch. D. 731. LIABILITY FOR WRONGS. 57 "with it without their authority ; " ^ or the analogy to other Chap. v. Art 24 cases where the act of one partner binds the firm may be '. — '. — ) brought out by saying that the firm is to make compensa- tion for the wrong of the defaulting partner, because the other members " held him out to the world as a person for ( •whom they were responsible."^ The rule given in Art. 23 is in fact only a special case Greneral test of the wider rule to the same effect which is one of the of agency, most familiar and important parts of the law of agency. The question is always whether the wrong-doer was acting as the agent of the firm and within the apparent scope of his agency. If the wrong is extraneous to the course of the partnership business, the other partners are no more liable than any other principal would be for the unautho- rized act of his agent in a like case. The proposition that a principal is not liable for the wilful trespass or wrong of his agent is for most purposes suificiently correct ; but a more exact statement of the rule would be that the prin- cipal is not liable if the agent goes out of his way to commit a wrong, whether with a wrongful intention or not. On the one hand, the principal may be liable for a manifest and wilful wrong if committed by the agent in the course of his employment, and for the purpose of serving the principal's iaterest in the matter in hand ;^ he is also liable for trespass committed by the agent under a mistake of fact, such that, if the facts had been as the agent supposed, the act done would have been not only lawful in itself, but within the scope of his lawful authority : * on ' Lindley, i. 306. " Per James, Y.-C, in Earl of Dundonaldy. Masierman (1869), 7 JEq. at p. 517. 2 Limpus V. General Omnibus Co. (Ex. Ci. 1862), 1 H. & 0. 526. * Bayley y. Manchester, &c. Railway Co. (Ex. Ch. 1873), L. E. 8 C. P. 148. 58 THE .CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP. Chap. V. the other hand, he is not liable for acts outside the agent's ^^^' ^^' employment, though done in good faith and with a view to serve the principal's interest.' Special cases Cases to which it has been sought, ^\iil\ or -s^ithout of misapplica- . . t . i, tion of client's success, to apply the principle stated in Art. J4 nave partner. ^ °^'^ generally arisen in the f oUoT^ing manner. Some client of a firm of solicitors or hankers, reposing special confidence in one member of the firm, has intrusted him with money for investment : this has sometimes appeared in a regular- course in the accounts of the firm, sometimes not. Then I the money has been misapplied by the particular partner j in qu.estion. "When it is sought to charge the firm mth L making it good, it becomes important to determine whether the original transaction with the defaulting partner was in fact a partnership transaction, and if it was so, whether the- duty of the firm was not determined before the default. The illustrations above given will show better than any further comments of a general kind how these questions are- dealt with in practice. Improper 25. If a partner, being a trustee, improperly of trust emplo3'S trust moneys in the business or on tlie 1 PouUon\. L. & &. W. R. Go. (1867), L. E. 2 Q. B. 534; Allen v. L. tfc 8. W. R. Co. (1870), L. E. 6 Q. B. 65; BoUngbrokey. Swindon Local'Board (1874), L. E. 9 C. P. 575. It is by -no means easy to assign the true ground of an employer's liability for his servant's unauthorized or even forbidden acts and defaults. Perhaps the master's duty is best understood if regarded not as arising from the relation of principal and agent, but as a general duty to see that his business is conducted -witli reasonable cure for the safety of other i^eople, analogous to the duty imposed on o-wners of real pro- perty to keep it in a safe condition as regards persons la-wfully passing on the high-way, or coming on the property itself by the Q-wner's invitation. This vie-w, -which I have endeavoured else-whera to defend, has more distinct countenance from both English and American authority than might be expected. But the subject is toa largo to d-noll upon hero. LIABILITY FOR WRONGS. 50 the partnership, no other partner is liable therefor to the persons beneficially inte- account of the partnership, no other partner is chap. v. Art. 25. in moneys for rested/ unless he either knew of the breach of partnership trust or with reasonable diligence might have \ known it. In either of the last-mentioned cases the partners having such knowledge or means of knowledge as aforesaid are jointly and seve- rally liable for the breach of trust.^ ^ This article is inserted liere for conyenience, Lut does not Liability of properly belong to the law of partnership. For, since only breach of those partners are liable who are personally implicated in n^^reaUyT the breach of trust by theu' own knowledge or culpable partnershiiD. ignorance, it can hardly be said that the firm is liable, or that the indiYidual partners are liable as partnets. They are only joint wrong-doers, to whom the fact of their being in partnership has furnished an occasion of wrong-doing. The case is not reaUy analogous to that of money being received in a usual course on the credit of the partnership ) and misapphed : as may be seen by putting the stronger ; case of all the partners robbing a customer in the shop, or cheating him in some matter unconnected mth the busi- ness, and crediting the firm with the money taken from him. Here it is obvious that the relation of partnership is not a material element in the resulting liability. Some- thing will be said in another j)lace, however (on Art. 62, ' We still want a convenient term of art to replace the harsh and cumbrous cestui que trust. Trustor -was long ago suggested by- Mr. Humphreys, but it has not found favour, perhaps because it might be taken for the creator of the trust rather than the person having the benefit of it. The Indian Trusts Act has adopted "beneficiary."' « Lindley, i. 311. ■60 THE CONTRACT OF PAETNERSHIP. Chap. V. below), of a special kind of claims against partners as '- — '- — trustees or executors of a deceased partner wMcli have often raised difficult and complicated questions. Compare the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, s. 67: "If a part- ner, being a trustee, wrongfully employs trust-property in the business or on the account of the partnership, no other partner is liable therefor in bis personal capacity to the beneficiaries, unless he had notice of the breach of trust." By the interpretation clause, s. 3, "a person is said to have notice of a fact either when he actually knows that fact or when, but for wilful abstention from inquiry or gross negli- gence, he would have known it, or when information of the fact is given to or obtained by his agent under the circum- stances mentioned in the Indian Contract Act, 1872, s. 229 " {i. e. in the course of the business transacted by bim for the principal). MUTUAL RELATIONS. 61 CHAPTEE YI. Of the Relations of Partners to One Another. 26. Where the mutual ri^lits and duties of <'?^p- Y^- ^ Art. 26. Terms of partners have been determined by a special contract between them, the contract may be partnersUp ' *' may be varied rescinded or varied by the consent of all the °t^j ^r con- •' sent of all partners, but not otherwise. partners. Such consent may either be expressed or inferred from an uniform course of dealing.^ Illustrations. 1. It is agreed between partners that no one of them, shall draw or accept bills in his own name without the concurrence of the others. Afterwards they habitually permit one of 1 Slightly altered from I. 0. A. 252 ; Const v. Harris (1824), Turn. & E. 496, 517 ; Lindley, ii. 820. "With respect to a partner- ship agreement, it is to be observed, that all parties being competent to act as they please, they may put an end to or vary it at any moment; a partnership agreement is therefore open to variation from day to day, and the terms of such variations may not only be evidenced by writing, but also by the conduct of the parties in relation to the agreement and to their mode of conducting their business: when, therefore, there is a variation and alteration of the terms of a partnership, it does not follow that there was not a binding agreement at first. Partners, if they please, may, in the course of the partnership, daily come to a new arrangement for the purpose of having some addition or alteration in the terms on which they carry on business, provided those additions or altera- tions be made with the unanimous concurrence of all the part- ners": Lord Langdale, 'ii..'R.,m. EnglandY. Curling [ISH), 8 Beav. 129, 133. '62 TEE CONTRACT OF PAUTNERSHIP. Chap. VI. them, to draw and accept bills ia the name of the firm without ^ • such concurrence. This course of dealing shows a common consent to vary the terms of the original contract in that respect.' 2. Articles of partnership provide that a valuation of the partnership property shall he made on the annual account day for the purpose of settling the partnership accounts. The valuation is constantly made in a particular way for the space of many years, and acted upon hy all the partners for the time being. The mode of valuation thus adopted cannot after this course of dealing be disputed by any partner or his repre- sentatives, though no particular mode of valuation is pre- scribed by the partnership events, or even if the mode adopted is inconsistent with the terms of the articles.^ 3. It is the practice of a firm, when debts are discovered to be bad, to debit them to the profit and loss account of the current year, without regard to the year in which they may have been reckoned as assets. A partner dies, and after the accounts have been made up for the last year of his interest in the firm, it is discovered that some of the supposed assets of that year are bad. His executors are entitled to be paid the amount appearing to stand to his credit on the last account day, without any deduction for the subsequently discovered loss.' Variations It is an obvious corollary of the rule here set forth that when assented . . . . to binding on persons claiming an interest in partnership property as rew-eseuta- representatives or assignees of any partner who has assented tives. expressly or tacitly to a -variation of the original terms of partnership are bound by his assent, and have no ground to complain of those terms having been departed from.* Partnership 27. TliB partners in any firm are owners in property. coniinon [or jonit owners without benefit of 1 Lord Bldon in Const v. ILtrrh (1824), Turn. & E. at p. 523. "• Comdi-i/ V. Barchiji (1864), 3 D. J. S. 320. = Ex parte Barber (1870), 5 Ch. 687. * Gunst V. Harris (1824), Turn. & E, at p. 524. MUTUAL RELJ TIONS. 63 survivorship?] of all property and valuable ^•''■p-^^- interests originally brought into the partner- ship stock or acquired, whether by purchase or -otherwise, on account of the firm, or for the purposes and in the course of the partnership business. Such property ar^d interests are -called partnership property.^ Explanation. — The legal estate in land which is partnership property is held and devolves according to the general rules of the law of real property, but in trust, so far as necessary, for the persons beneficially interested in such land under this article.^ Exception. — Where co-owners of an estate or interest in land, not being itself partnership property, are partners as to profits made by the use of the land, and purchase other land out of such profits to be used in like manner, the land so purchased belongs to them, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, not as partners, but as co-owners.^ Illustrations. 1 . Land bought in tte name of one partner, and paid for by the firm or out of the profits of the partnership business,* is prima facie partnership property." 1 Altered from I. 0. A. 253, sub-s. 1. s Lindley, i. 643. 3 See Illustration 6. * Nerot V. Burnand (1827), 4 Euss. 247 ; 2 Bli. N. S. 215. 5 Wedderburn v. Wedderburii (1856), 22 Beav. at p. 104 ; Lindley, i. 647. 64 THE CONTRACT OF PABTNEBSHIP. Chap. vr. 2. One partner in a firm buys railway shares in Ms own ^^^- ^"^^ name, and without the authority of the other partners, but with the money and on account of the firm. These shares are partnership property.' 3. The goodwill of the business carried on by a firm, so far as it has a saleable value, is partnership property.' 4. A. and B. take a lease of a colliery for the purpose of working it in partnership, and do so work it. The lease is partnership property.' 5. A. and B., being tenants in common of a colliery, begin to work it as partners. This does not make the colliery partnership property.' 6. If, in the case last stated, A. and B. purchase another colliery, and work it in partnership on the same terms as the first, the purchased colliery is not partnership property, but A. and B. are co-owners of it for the same shares and interests as they had in the old colliery.* 7. ~W., a nurseryman, devises the land on which his busi- ness is carried on and bequeaths the goodwill of the business to his three sons as tenants in common in equal shares. After his death the sons continue to carry on the business on the land in partnership. The land so devised to them is partner- ship property.^ 8. A. is the owner of a cotton-miU. A., B. and C. enter into partnership as cotton-spinners, and it is agreed that the business shall be carried on at this mill . A valuation of the mill, fixed plant, and machinery is made, and the ascertained value is entered in the partnership books as A.'s capital, and he is credited with interest upon it as such in the accounts. 1 Ex parte Hinds (1863), 3 De G. & Sm. 603. ' Lindley, i. 653. See more as to goodwill in Chap. viii. below. Art. o~. 3 Lindley, i. 651 ; Craicshayx. Muide (1818), 1 Swanst. 495, 518, 523. A fortiori, where the colliery belongs to A. alone before the partnership : Surdon v. BnrJuis (1862), 1 D. F. J. 42. " Implied in Steward v. Blahwiii/ (1869), 4 Ch. 603; though ia that case it was treated as doubtful if there was a partnership at all. 5 Wtitercr v. Waierer (1873), 15 Eq. 402. MUTUAL RELATIONS. 65 During the partnership the mill is enlarged and improved, Chap. VI. ■and other lands acquired and buildings erected for the same ^^^- ^^- purposes, at the expense of the firm. The mill, plant, and machinery, as well as the lands afterwards purchased and the buildings thereon, are partnership property ; and if, on a sale of the business, the purchase-money of the mill, plant, and machinery exceeds the value fixed at the commencement ■of the partnership, the excess is divisible as profits of the j)artnership business.' 28. Unless a contrary intention appears by Property express agreement or by the nature of the partnership transaction, property bought with money belonging to the firm is deemed to have been bought on account of the firm. Illustrations. 1. L. and M. are partners. M., having contracted for the •purchase of lands called the T. estate, asks L. to share in it, which he consents to do. The purchase-money and the amount of a subsisting mortgage debt on the land are paid ■out of the partnership funds, and the land is conveyed to L. and M. in undivided moieties. An account is opened in the books of the firm, called "the T. estate account," in which the ■estate is debited with all payments made by the firm on account thereof, and credited with the receipts. The partners build each a dweUing-house at his own expense on parts of the land, but no agreement for a partition is entered into. The whole of the estate is partnership property.^ 2. Land is bought with partnership money on the account of one partner, and for his sole benefit, he becoming a debtor to the firm for the amount of the purchase-money. This land is not partnership property.^ 3. [One of two partners expends partnership moneys in ' Bolinson v. Ashton (18Yo), 20 Eq. 25. ■^ Ex parte U'Kenna [Bank of England C'ase)(1861), 3 D. F. J. 645. =* 3 D. P. J. 659 (1861); Sirdth-Y. Smith (1800), 5 Yes. 189. P. F 66 THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP. Chap. VI. Art. 29. Description of interest of partners in partnership property. buying a ship, -which is registered in his name alone. The- ship is not partnership property.'] It is not quite clear whether the interest of partners in the partnership property is more correctly described as a tenancy in common or a joint tenancj' without benefit of' survivorship, biit the difference appears to be merely verbal.^ It Avill be obsers'ed that the acquisition of land for- partnership purposes need not be an acquisition by pur- chase to make the land partnership property. Land coming to partners by descent or de-^ise will equally be partnership property, if, in the language of James, L.J.,, it is " substantially involved iu the business.''-' Conversion into personal estate for some purposes of land held as partnership property-. 29. Where land has become partnership- property, it is treated as bet-«^een the partners- (including the representatives of a deceased partner), and also as between the real and personal representatives of a deceased partner, as personal and not real estate, unless a con- trary intention appears either by express- agreement or by the conduct of the partners.* This is really involved in the foregoiag article, but is of 1 Walton V. Butler (1861), 29 Beav. 42S. This case as reported seems to go beyond the other authorities : but the facts are very briefly given, and there may have been circumstances -n-hich do not appear. 2 Lindloy, i. 660. It follo-ws in theory that if one partner's interest is forfeited to the Cro-wn, the -whole property of the firm is forfeited : lb. 661 ; Blackst. Comm. ii. 409. •* Id Eq. -100 ; see Illustration "i to Art. 27. < Lindley, i. 667—670 (on the balance of authorities, -which sea- there collected) ; Kindersley, '^'.-C, Darby \. Darbij (1856), 3 Dre-w. 49J, oOO ; and see 4 Ch. 609 (1869). MUTUAL RELATIONS. 67 Bucli importance as to call for a separate statement. The Chap. VI, Art 30 rule may now be taken as well settled, but has not been '. — L^ established without controversy. On this, however, it seems needless to dwell here. Ample materials for the critical and historical investigation of the subject will be found in Lord Justice Lindley's work by the reader who desires to pursue it further. The application of this rule does not affect the character of any property for the purposes of the Mortmain Act of 9 Greo. 2} But a deceased partner's share in land that has become partnership property is liable to probate duty, even if that partner's will purports to deal with it as realty.^ 30. Partners may at any time by agree- Conversion of ment between themselves convert partnership separate , . , , , 1 J r> estate, or con- property into the several property oi any one verseiy, by or more of the partners, or the several property partners. of any partner into partnership property. Such conversion, if made in good faith, is efBectual not only as between the partners, but as against the creditors of the firm and of the several partners.^ Exception. — If the firm or the partner whose separate estate is concerned becomes bankrupt or is insolvent after any such agreement and 1 Ashworth v. Mimn (IS'S-SO), 1 j Oh. Div. 363. 2 Att.-Gen. v. Hulbuck (1883-4), 10 Q. B. D. 488; 13 Q. B. Dir. 275. ' Lindley, i. 654; Campbell v. MuUett (1818-9), 2 Swanst. at pp. 575, 584. As to what will or may amount to conversion, see the, judgments in Att.-Oen. v. Hubbuck, supra, especially that of Bowen, L.J. f2 68 THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP. Chap. VI. before it is completely executed, the property Art. 31. . 1 1 IS not converted. Illustration. A. and B. dissolve a partnership wliicli has subsisted between them, and A. takes over the property and business of the late firm. A. afterwards becomes bankrupt. The property taken over by A. from the late partnership has become his separate estate, and the creditors of the firm cannot treat it as joint estate in the bankruptcy.^ What is a 31- '^^^ sliare of a partner in the partner- partner's g]^ip property at any given time is the propor- tion of the then existing partnership assets to which he would be entitled if the whole were . realized and converted into money, and after all the then existing debts and liabilities of the firm had been discharged.* Illustration. P. and L. are partners and joint tenants of offices used by them for their business. P. dies, having made his ■wiU, containing the following bequest : "I bequeath all my share of the leasehold premises .... in which my business is carried on .... to my partner, L." Here, since the tenancy is joint at law, " my share " can mean only the interest in the property which F. had as a partner at the date of his death — nameh-, a right to a moiety, subject to the payment of the debts of the firm ; and if the debts of the firm exceed the assets, L. takes nothing by the bequest.* > Lindloy, i. 657 ; E.r parte Kemj>(ner (1860), 8 Eq. 286. ^ Ex parte Riiffin (1801), 6 Yes. 119; see also the Illustrations to Art. 76, below, where more complex cases are given. The questioa whether partnei'ship property has been converted into separate pro- perty occurs in fact chiefly, if not exclusively, in the administration, of insolvent partner's estates. ■> Lindley, i. 661. * Farquhar v. Iladdm (1871), 7 Ch. 1. MUTUAL RELATIONS. 69 Unless any different agreement appears, the chap. vi. interests of partners in the partnership pro '- — ^ . . ^ , , . . Kules as to perty and their mutual rights and duties m relations of . partners in relation to the partnership are determined absence of 1 • 1 ^^ • • ^ special agree- by the rules stated m the following articles ment. numbered thirty-two to thirty -nine inclusive. 32. Subject to the right of each partner to Presumed be credited in account with the firm Avith the shares. amount of capital actually brought in by him, and with the amount of any indemnity he may be entitled to under the next following article, the shares of all the partners are presumed to be equal ; and all the partners are entitled to share equally in the profits of the business, and must contribute equally towards the losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sustained by the partnership.^ Illustration. A. and B., solicitors, carrying on business separately, are jointly retained to defend certain actions. This they do, con- ducting different parts of the business. Unless any different agreement is proved, the profits of the whole business are equally divisible between A. and B.- The form in which the rule is here expressed is deter- Form of the mined by the usual mode of keeping partnership aooounts, equality of in which the firm is treated as a fictitious person distinct ghares^^ ^ from its members, and the capital brought in by each member is a debt due to him from the firm. In a mercan- tile view the debts of the firm to individual partners for ' Lindley, i. 615, 801 seq. ' Bohinson v. Anderson (1855), 7 D. M. G. 239. 70 TEE CONTRACT OF PABTNEBSEIP. Chap. VI. Art. 88. Otherwise expressed in Indian Act. Eight of partner to indemnity and contribu- tion. capital and advances must be allowed for, as well as its debts to outside creditors, in order to ascertain the amount of its divisible property : and it is only to tbe available property of the firm as thus ascertained that the presump- tion of equal interest as between the partners applies. The Indian Contract Act (s. 253, sub-s. 1) gives the rule in a less artificial form : — " The share of each partner in the partnership property is the value of his original contribution, increased or diminished by his share of profit or loss." It then goes on (sub-s. 2) to lay down the rule as to sharing profit and loss to the same effect as here given. This last rule is independent of the shares of capital originally contributed by the partners ; and it is founded on the consideration that it is impossible for the Court to set a proportionate value on the ser-^ices of each partner where there is no express agreement, since the worth of a particular member to the firm may depend on many things besides the amount of capital brought in by him.^ 33. Every partner is entitled to be indemni- fied in account w^ith the fii'm for payments made and j)ersonal liabilities incm-red by him — a. In the ordinary and proper conduct of the business of the firm f h. In or about anj-thing necessarily done for the preservation of the business or pro- perty of the firm.' Actual payments and advances so made ' Lindley, i. 676. ' Lindley, i. 759 seq. 3 Mx parte Chippendale {Oerman Mining Company's Case) (1853), 4 D. M. G. 19; Bitrdon v. Barkus (1862), 4 D. P. J. 42, 51. MUTUAL RELATIONS. 71 carry interest at the rate of five per cent, per chap. vi. Generally speaking, every partner is the agent of the Tliis right is ■firm for the conduct of its business (Articles 16 — 20, of agency, above), and as such is entitled to indemnity on the ordi- nary principles of the law of agency. But the rights of a partner to contribution go beyond this: he may charge the firm with moneys necessarily expended by him for the preservation or continuance of the partnership concem.- This right must be carefully distinguished from the power -of borrowing money on the credit of the firm, of which it is altogether independent.^ It arises only where a partner has incurred expense which under the circumstances, and having regard to the nature of the business, was absolutely necessary, a,nd the firm has had the benefit of such -expense ; as where the advances are made to meet imme- diate debts of the firm (which is the most frequent case), or to pay the cost of operations without which the business -cannot go on, such as sinking a new shaft when the -original workings of a mine are exhausted.* The total amount recoverable is not necessarily limited by the nominal capital of the partnership, for the expendi- ^ture on existing undertakings cannot be measured by the •extent ■ of the capital.' On the other hand, the limit of Limit of con- -contribution may be fixed beforehand by express agree- be fixed by ment among the members of a firm, and in that case no ^'o'^eement. partner can call upon the others to exceed it, however great ' Ex parte Chippendale (1853), 4 D. M. G. 36, 43 ; Sarcjood's ■daim (1872), 15 Eq. 43. ^ See note 3, last page. -• 4 D. M. G. 35, 40 (1853). * Burdon v. Barkus (1862), 4 D. F. J. 42; Ex parte Williamson s{ 1869), 5 Ch. 309, 313 ; and the other cases cited in Lindley, i. 766, n. ' Ex parte Chippendale (1853), 4 D. M. G. at p. 42. 72 THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSEIP. Chap. VI. may have been the amount of his own outlay on behalf of ■ '■ — '- — the firm.' This' has nothing to do with the obligations of the partners to third persons, and accordingly does not affect the rule that " as to the rest of the world," unless the particular creditor has agreed to look only to some particular fund, " each partner is liable for the whole- amount of the debts 6i the partnership."^ This duty imposed on the firm to indemnify any one of its members against extraordinary outlaw's for necessarj^ piu'poses is one of a class of duties quad ex contractu which are recognized by the law of England onlj' very sparingl}' and under special circumstances. It is outside the rules of' agency,' and has still less to do with trust ; real analogies are to be found in salvage and average. Kightof 34. " Each partner has a rio'lit to take part in partner to . . take part in the management of the partnership business."^ business. ■*■ Although it is the rule, in the absence of special agree- ment, that " one partner cannot exclude another from an equal management of the concern," ^ yet it is "perfectly competent," and in practice very common, " for partners to agree that the management of the partnership affairs, shall be confided to one or more of then- number exclusively of the others;"" and in that case the special agreement must be observed. ' Worcpsler Corn Exchange CompaiiTj (lSo3\ 3 D. M. G. 180. - Lindley, i. 3T(). ' The Lord Justice Tiu-ner, ho-n-ovcr, seems to assume an implied: authority : 4 D. lir. G. 40. * 1. C. A. 2o;!, sub-s. 3. " Kowe V. U'vod (18L>:2), 2 Jac. & W. at p. 5dS. " Lindlej', i. 041. MUTUAL RELATIONS. 7a 35. " Each partner is bound to attend dili- Chap. vi. . . Art. 35. gently to the business of the partnership, and ■ is not entitled to any remuneration for acting gratuitous diligence in in such business. ^ partnershiij business. This rule, like the preceding, may he, and often is, departed from hy express agreement. The second hranch of it does not prevent a partner from recovering compensation for the extra trouhle thrown upon Mm hy a co-partner who has disregarded the first hranch hy wilful inattention to husiness.^ 36. Where differences arise as to matters in Power of majority to the ordinary course of the partnership business, decide difEer- they are to be decided by a majority of the partners f but the decision must be arrived at in good faith for the interest of the firm as a whole, and not for the private interest of all or any of the majority, and every partner must have an opportunity of being heard in the matter. This rule extends to powers conferred on a majority of the partners by express agreement.* 37. No change can be made in the nature Change in of the partnership business, or the place vs^here business requires con- sent of all. ' I. C. A. 253, sub-s. 4 ; Lindley, i. T1'4. ° Airnj V. Borham (1S61), 29 Bear. C20. ' Verbally altered from I. 0. A. 253, sub-s. 5. * Const V. Harris {\i2i). Turn. & E. 496, 518, 525; Blissety. Daniel (1853), 10 Ha. 493, 522, 527. See the section "Of tbe Powers of Majorities," Lindley, i. 598 — 609. THE CONTRACT OF PARTNEBSFIIP. Chap. VI. Art. 38. it is carried on, except with the consent of all the partners.* This is one of the rules of partnership law which apj)lies equally to companies ; and in that application it is of great importance. " The governing body of a corporation that is in fact a trading partnership cannot in general use the funds of the community for any purpose other than those for which they were contributed. "^ But it would not be relevant here to pursue this subject farther. New partner not admitted Tvithout con- sent of all. Assignment of share of profits. 38. "No person can be introduced as a partner without the consent of all those who for the time being are members of the firm."^ This is given by Lord Justice Lindley as " one of the fundamental principles of partnership law." The reason of it is that the contract of partnership is presumed to be founded on personal confidence between the partners, and therefore not to admit of its rights and duties being trans- ferred as a matter of course to representatives or assignees. A jjartner can indeed assign or mortgage to a stranger his interest in the profits of the firm ; and the assignee or mortgagee will thereby acquire " a right to payment of what, upon taking the accounts of the partnership, may be ^ Natuscli V. Irving, Lindley, i. 601; Const v. II and B. for a fixed term provides that " in case either of the said partners shall depart this life during the said co-partner- ship term" the surviving partner shall purchase his share at a fixed value. A. and B. continue their business in partner- ship after the expiration of the term. This clause is still applicable on the death of either of them.* ' Lindley, i. 221-2, -who thinks it not necessary ; Crawshay v. Mauh (1818), 1 Swanst. at p. 508. See further as to notice of dissolution. Art. 4'7, below. 2 I. 0. A. 256 (slightly altered) ; Lindley, ii. 823. " Parsons v. Hayivard (1862), 4 D. F. J. 474. * Essex V. Essex (1855), 20 Beav. 442 ; Cox v. WiUoughhy (1880), 13 Ch. T). 863. Coolcson v. Coolsvti (1837), 8 Sim. 529, must h& considered as not being law on this point. In Tates v. Finn (1880), 13 Ch. D. 839, it incidentally appears that Hall, V.-C, took a different view of some similar clause, but, the case being reported mainly for other points, the terms of the clause and the judge's reasons are not given. MUTUAL RELATIONS. 79 2. Articles for a partnersMp for one year contain an arbi- Chap. VI. tration clause, and the partnership is continued beyond the ^^^- ^^- year. The arbitration clause is stiU binding.' 3. A. and B. are partners for seven years, A. taking no active part in the business. After the end of the seven years B. continues the business in the name, on the premises, and ■with the property of the firm, and without coming to an account. The partnership is not dissolved, and A. is entitled to participate on the terms of the original agreement in the profits thus made by B.^ 4. Partnership articles provide that a partner ■wishing to retire shall give notice of his intention a certain time before- hand. If the partnership is continued beyond the original term, this provision does not hold good, as not being con- sistent ■with a partnership at -will.^ 5. A. and B. enter into partnership for seven years, under ■articles ■which empower either partner, if the other neglects the business, to dissolve the partnership by notice, and purchase his share at a valuation. They continue in part- nership after the seven years. This power of dissolution on special terms can no longer be exercised, as either party may now dissolve the partnership at will.* The same rule has been substantially acted upon in the Where ... ,. Ti;i •• business con - case 01 a bnsmess being contmued by the surviving part- tinned by ners after the death of a member of the original firm ; ^ pa^™^ the Court inieired as a fact from their conduct that the tusiness ■was continued on the old terms ; but it is probably safe to assume that here also, if there were nothing more than a want of evidence to the contrary, a continuance on the old terms would be presumed. 1 OiUettY. Thornton (1875), 19 Eq. 599. 2 Parsons v. Hayward (1862), 4 D. P. J. 474. ^ FeatherstonJiaugh v. Fenwick (1810), 17 Ves. at p. 307. ^ Clark y. Leach (1862), 32 Beav. 14; ID. J. S. 409; see the M. E.'s Judgment, 32 Beav. 21. 5 King v. Chuck (1853), 17 Beav. 325. «0 THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP. Chap. VI. Art. 44. In the Scottish appeal of Neilson v. Mossend Iron Co} the House of Lords held that a clause providing for the optional retirement of any partner on special terms " three months before the termination of this contract," was not applicable to the partnership as continued after the expiration of the original term. But this decision was on the construction of " a strangely and singularly worded article" (per Lord Selborne, at p. 304). Lord Watson affirmed the general rule that " when the members of a mercantile firm continue to trade as partners after the expiry of their original contract without making any new agreement, that contract is held in law to be prolonged or renewed by tacit consent, Or, as it is termed in the law of Scotland, by ' tacit relocation.' The rule obtains in the case of many contracts besides that of partnership ; and its legal effect is that all the stipiilations and conditions of the original contract remain in force, in so far as these are not inconsistent with any implied term of the renewed contract." In this case, however, time was of the essence of the condition (pp. 308, 311). Partners must act for ■common advantage. 44. " Partners are bound to carry on the business of the partnership for the greatest common advantage, to be just and faithful to each other, and to render true accounts and full information of all things afEecting the partnership to any partner or his legal re- presentatives." ^ This is a fundamental rule for which it would be idle to cite specific authoritj-. 11 App. Ca. 298 (1886). I. C. A. 257. MUTUAL RELATIONS. 81 Where written partnership articles are entered into, a Chap. VI. •clause to this effect is almost always inserted. There is no " ! ■doubt, however, that the obligation of uberrima fides is incidental to the nature of the partnership contract, and the only object of expressing it on these occasions is to remind the partners of the duties imposed on them by the general law. The same remark applies to several other things which are usually expressed in such instruments. The practice is not altogether consistent with the general principles of conveyancing, but appears in this case to be reasonable and useful. 45. -Every partner must account to the firm Partners must for any benefit derived by him from a trans- private gain . • ix, i I,- 1 by partner- action concerning the partnership. ship trans- This rule applies to transactions undertaken after a partnership has been dissolved by the death of a partner, and before its affairs have been completely wound up, either by any surviving partner or by the representatives of the deceased partner. Illustrations. 1. A., B. and C. are partners in trade. C, without the knowledge of A. and B., obtains for his sole benefit a renewal of the lease of the bouse in which the partnership business is carried on. A. and B. may at their own option treat the renewed lease as partnership property.* It would [probably] make no difference if C. had given notice to A. and B. that he intended to apply for a renewal of the lease for his own exclusive benefit.' ' I. C. A. 258 (sHghtly altered). " Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick (1810), 11 Yes. 298 ; I. 0. A. 258, Illust. a. ' Glegg v. Edmondson (1857), 8 D. M. G. Y8V, 80V. P. G 82 THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP. Chap. VI. 2. A., B., 0. and D. are partners in the business of sugar ■*'^'^- ^^- refiners. C. is the managing partner, and also does business- separately, with the consent of the others, as a sugar-dealer. He buys sugar in his separate business, and sells it to the firm at a profit at the fair market price of the day, but -without letting the other partners know that the sugar is his. Tha firm is entitled to the profit made on every such sale.^ 3. A., B. and 0. acquire the lease of certain works for the purposes of a business carried on by them in partnership, A. conducting the transaction with the former lessees on behalf of the firm. The former lessees, being anxious to find a responsible assignee and get the works ofi: their hands, pay a premium to A. A. must account to his partners for the money thus received.^ 4. One of two partners in a firm which held leaseholds for the purposes of the business dies. The lease expires before the affairs of the firm are completely wound up, and the surviving partner renews it. The renewed lease is partnership pro- perty.'' 5. A member of a firm agrees to take a lease in his own name, but in fact for partnership purposes, and dies before the lease is executed. His representatives cannot deal with the lease without the consent of the surviving partners.* Parallel rule The general principle is one of those which the law of in agency. , partnership takes from agency, considering each partner as agent for the firm ; or it is perhaps better to say that it is established in both these branches of the law on similar grounds. The rule that an agent must not deal on his own accoimt or make any undisclosed profit for himself in 1 Sentley v. Craven (18d3), 18 Beav. 15. = Fawcett v. miUchouse (1829), 1 Buss. & M. 132. 3 Ckmenis v. Hall (ISd"), 2 De G. & J. 173, 186. The surviving- partner is sometimes called a trustee or quasi trustee of the part- nership property. But this use of the term is at least doubtful ; see Lord Westbury's remarks in Enox v. Oye (1871-2), L. E. o H. L. G7d. * Adhr V. Fouracre (1818), 3 Swanst. 489. MUTUAL RELATIONS. 83 tlie business of his agency is a stringent and universal Chap. VI. one.^ . \ \ 46. "If a partner, without the [knowledge Partner must and] consent of the other partners, carries on withfii-m. any business competing or interfering with that of the firm, he must account to the firm for all profits made in such business, and must make compensation to the firm for any loss occasioned thereby." ^ This is an elementary rule analogous to the last. It follows that no partner can, without the consent of the rest, he a member of another firm carrying on the like business in the same field of competition ; and i£ that con- sent is given, he is limited by its terms. And if special knowledge is acquired by him as a member of the one firm, he must not use it for the benefit of the other and to the prejudice of the first. And this equally holds if several members, or even all the members but one, are common to both firms. If A., B., 0. and D. are the proprietors of a morning newspaper, and A., B. and C the proprietors of an even- ing newspaper for which the types and plant of the morn- ing paper are used by agreement, D. may restrain A., B. and C. from first publishing in A., B. and C.'s evening paper intelligence obtained by the agency of the morning paper, and at the expense of the firm of A., B., C. and D.* 1 Story on Agency, §§ 210, 211 ; Parker v. McKenna (18'74), 10 Ch. 96 ; Hay's Case (1875), lb. 593 ; Dunne v. English (1874), 18 Eq. 524. ^ I. 0. A. 259 (the words in 'brackets seem superfluous, for there cannot be consent without knowledge) ; Lindley, i. 579. " g-lassington v. Thwaites (1822-3), 1 Sim. & St. 124. g2 84 THE CONTBAGT OF PARTNERSHIP. Chap. VI. An express covenant in partnership articles not to '■ — '- — " engage in any trade or business except upon the account and for the benefit of the partnership," has been held to add nothing to the duty already imposed by law. It does not entitle the firm to an account of profits against a partner who has engaged in an independent trade not within the scoj)e of the partnership business, and who derives no advantage ia it from his position as a partner or by the use of any property of the firm.^ ' Dean v. MacDowell (1877-8), 8 Ch. D. 345. CAUSES OF DISSOLUTION. 85 PART II. Wt^t iSissolutioit of i^artntrisDijJs;* CHAPTEE YII. Of Dissolution and its Consequences. Where there is no agreement to the contrary chap. vii. between the partners, the dissolution of a '- — '- — partnership takes place in any of the events specified in the four following articles : — 47. If any partner gives notice to the other Dissolution of n 1 • • • T 1 1 partnership or others of his intention to dissolve the partner- by retirement ship, the partnership is dissolved as from the date of the notice. " Where no term is expressly limited for its duration, and there is nothing in the contract to fix it, the partnership may be terminated at a moment's notice by either party. By that notice the partnership is dissolved to this extent, that the Court will compel the parties to act as partners in a partnership existing only for the purpose of "winding up the affairs."^ The dissolution takes place as from the date of the notice, and without regard to the state of mind of the 1 Crawshay v. Maule (1818), 1 Swanst. at p. 508. 86 DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS. Chap. VII. partner to whom the notice is given. Insanity on his part ^'^*- ^^- does not make it less effeotual.i Qf insanity as a special ground of dissolution when the partnership is not at wiU we shall speak presently. A valid notice of dissolution once given cannot be withdrawn except by consent of all the partners.^ Where a partnership has been entered into for a fixed term, the partnership is at the end of that term dissolved " by effluxion of time " vsdthout any further act or notice, except in the cases mentioned in Art. 43, above. By bank- 48. The aKenation of any partner's share ^rtner. "' ° by Operation of law dissolves the partnership. Illustration. If a partner becomes bankrupt or is outlawed, or if his interest in partnership property is taken ia execution and purchased by a stranger, the partnership is thereby dis- solved.' Execution for As to taking property of the firm in execution for a separate'debt. partner's separate debt, see Lindley,* and Helmorc v. Smith (1).^ Before the Judicatm-e Acts it was an ex- 1 Mellersh v. Keen (1859), 27 Beav. 236; Jones x. Lloyd (IST-i), 18 Eq. 265. • Jones V. Lloyd (1874), 18 Eq. at p. 271. ' Lindley, i. 220. Before January 1, 1883, if a female partner married -without settling her share ia the partnership to her separate use, the partnership was dissolved (but see Lindley, i. 85, and Ashworth V. Outram, 1877, 5 Ch. Div. 023). Re Childs (1874), 9 Ch. 508, shows that, for administrative purposes at least, a wife entitled for her separate use to a share of the profits of her husband's business may be considered as his partner. The Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. o. 75), ss. 1, 2, seems to make it clear that the marriage of a female partner would not now dissolve the partnership. ' Vol. i. 692. » 35 Ch. Div. 436 (1887). CAUSES OF DISSOLUTION. S7 tremely clumsy process. The course provisionally sug- Chap. vil. gested by Lord Justice Luidley corresponds, I believe, " with the recent practice at Judges' Chambers,^ but further amendment is wanted. The codifying BiU of 1882 pro- posed to deal with the matter by empowering the Court or a judge, on the application of any judgment creditor of a partner, to make a charging order on his share in the assets, to direct accounts and inquiries, and do whatever might have been done if the charge had been created by the partner himself, including a dissolution at need. I ■am permitted to state that this clause ^ had Lord Justice Lindley's approval. It is to be noted that the execution of a writ of fi. fa. The mode of ■against partnership property does not of itself dissolve the partnership; but dissolution is the inevitable consequence of an undivided interest in partnership property being acquired under such a writ by a stranger. Therefore there is not a dissolution by operation of law where a solvent partner buys the debtor's share, and pays for it out of assets of the firm ; though it remains undecided what would be the effect of his buying it with his separate money.' " What the sherifE has got to sell is not the share and interest of the execution debtor in the partnership, but the share and interest of the execution debtor in such of the chattels of the partnership as are seizable under a fi. fa. The unfortunate purchaser from the sheriff has to find out what he has reaUy had assigned to him, and that he can only do by a partnership account; there is no other method of proceeding. That does involve practically the dissolution of the whole concern. Now, what makes ' See Whetham v. Davey (1885), 30 Ch. D. at p. 519. '' Clause 41 ; see the BiU reprinted in Appendix below. ' Eelmare v. SmitJi (1887), 35 Ch. Div. 436. 88 DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS. Chap. VII. Art. 49. this particular case easy is this: when the sheriff sold under the fi. fa. he sold to the continuing partner, the solvent partner, who did not pay the purchase-money to- the sheriff out of his own money, but paid for what he purchased out of the assets of the partnership. In point of law, the necessary result of buying this share with the- funds of the concern is that there was no dissolution at aU."^ Where judgment has been given in an action in the Chancery Division for the dissolution of a partnersliip,. and a receiver appointed, and afterwards a creditor re- covers judgment against the firm in an action in the Queen's Bench Division, the judgment creditor can obtain, by applying in the Chancery action, a charge for the debt and costs on the partnership money in the hands of or coming to the receiver, undertaking to deal with the charge according to the order of the Court. ^ By death of partner. By assign- ment of part- ner's share in partnership at will. 49. The death of any partner dissolves the- partnership.^ Explanation. — In the absence of any previous- agreement to the contrarj-, the partnership is- dissolved, in any of the cases mentioned in the three foregoing articles, as bet-\veen all the- members of the firm, and not only as to that partner who retires, or who dies, or whose share becomes alienated. 50. If any partner assigns or incumbers his interest in the property or profits of the firm,. ' Lindley, L. J., 30 Ch. Div. at p. 447. 2 Eewney v. Attrill (1886), 34 Ch. D. 34o. 3 Lindley, i. 231. CAUSES OF DISSOLUTION. 89> the partnership not being for a fixed term, the chap. vii. partnership is thereby dissolved.^ 51. A partnership is in every case dissolved By business .of partnership. by the happening oi an event which makes it becoming unlawful for the business of the firm to be carried on, or for the members of the firm to carry it on in partnership.^ Illustrations. 1. A. and B. charter a ship to go to a foreign port and receive a cargo on their joint adventure. War breaks out between England and the country where the port is situated before the ship arrives at the port, and continues until after the time appointed for loading. The partnership between A. and B. is dissolved.^ 2. A. is a partner with ten other persons in a certain business. An Act is passed which makes it unlawful for more than ten persons to carry on that business in partnership. The partnership of which A. was a member is dissolved. 3. A., an Englishman, and domiciled in England, is a partner with B., a domiciled foreigner. War breaks out between England and the country of B.'s domicil. The partnership between A. and B. is dissolved.' 52. The Com't,® or in the case of a partner Causes for becoming lunatic the Lord Chancellor,® may partnership by the Court.. ' See on Art. 38, above. 2 Lindley, i. 232 ; I. C. A. 255. ' See Esposito v. Bowden (1S57), 7 E. & B. 763 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 17. ' Griswold v. Waddington (1818) (Supreme Court, New York), 15 Johns. 57 ; 16 ib. 438. ' All causes and matters for the dissolution of partnerships or the taking of partnership accounts are assigned to the Chancery Division (subject to Eules of Court or orders of transfer) by s. 34 of the Judicature Act, 1873. Lunacy Eegulation Act, 1853, 16 & 17 Vict. c. 70, s. 123. Art. 52. ■90 DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS. Chap. VII. dissolve the partnership at the suit of a partner in any of the follovping cases : — 1. When a partner is found lunatic by in- quisition, or is shown to the satisfaction of the Court to be of permanently unsound naind.^ 2. When a partner, other than the partner suing, becomes in any other way perma- nently incapable of performing his part of the partnership contract.^ 3. When a partner, other than the partner suing, becomes liable to a criminal prosecu- tion.® 4. When a partner, other than the partner suing, so conducts himself in matters relating to the partnership business that it is not reasonably practicable for the other partner or partners to carry on the business in partnership with him.* 5. When a partner, other than the partner suing, the partnership being for a fixed term, assigns or incumbers his interest in the property or profits of the firm.® 1 Lindley, i. 224-7 ; Jones v. Noy (1833), 2 M. & K. 125 ; Anon. (1855-6), 2 K. & J. 441 ; Xeo/y. CoUs (1851), 1 D. M. G. 171. It is ■well settled that lunacy does not of itself 'work a dissolution. 2 WhitiuellY. Arthur (1865), 35 Beav. 140. 3 Essel T. Ilayioard (1860), 30 Beav. 158. * Harrison v. Tennant (1856), 21 Beav. 482. 5 Art. 38, above. CAUSES OF DISSOLUTION. 91 6. Wten the business of the partnership can chap. vii. ^ ^ Art. 52. only be carried on at a loss.^ It is to be observed that the right of having the partner- Dissolution at •,•-,.■,■,.,-, n , 1 ■ • suit of pai'tncr ship dissolved m the case oi one partner becoming insane of unsound is not confined to his fellow-partners. A dissolution inay ™J^'l- be sought and obtained on behalf of the lunatic partner himself ; and this may be done either by his committee in lunacy under the Lunacy Regulation Act, or, where he has not been found lunatic by inquisition, by an action brought in his name in the Chancery Division by another person as his next friend. In the latter case, the Court may, if it thinks fit, direct an application to be made in Lunacy before finally disposing of the cause.'* It is rather difficult to fix the point at which acts of a What conduct partner tending to shake the credit of the firm and the ground for other partners' confidence in him become sufficient ground ^^^° "^ '°°" for demanding a dissolution. The fact that a particular partner's continuance in the firm is injurious to its credit and custom is not of itself ground for a dissolution where it cannot be imputed to that jpartner's own wilful miscon- duct. In a case where one partner had been insane for a time, and while insane had attempted suicide, this was held not to be a cause for dissolution, although it was strongly urged that the credit of the firm could not be pre- served if he remained in it.' On the other hand, conduct of a partner in the business carried on by the firm and its predecessors, though not in the actual business of the existing firm, which was calculated to destroy mutual con- ' Jennings v. Baddeley (1856), 3 E. & J. 78 : "if the purposes of tlie partnership cannot be carried into eflect with any reasonable prospect of profit ; " per Cotton, L. J., 13 Ch. Div. at p. 65. = Jones V. Lloyd (1874), 18 Eq. 265. 3 Anon. (1855-6), 2 E. & J. 441, 452. 92 DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS. Chap. VII. fidence among the partners, has been held sufficient ground. ^ — '- — for a dissolution.^ Actual malversation of one partner in the partnership affairs, such as failing to account for sums received,^ is groimd for a dissolution ; so is a state of hostility between, the partners which has become chronic and renders mutual confidence impossible, as where they have habitually charged one another,' or one partner has habitually charged another,* with gross misconduct in the partnership affairs. In At wood \. Maude^ Lord Cairns said : — " It is evident . . . that in every partnership . . . suck a state of feeling may arise and exist between the partners as to render it impossible that the partnership can continue with advantage to either ; " and he added that, when it is. admitted that this state of feeling does in fact exist, it becomes immaterial by whom a judicial dissolution of the partnership is sought. If this dictum could be accepted to. its fuU extent in the absence of positive authority, sub- section 4 of the foregoing article might be put in a broader and simpler form to this effect : — " When the relations between the partners or some of them have become such that in the judgment of the Court a continuance of mutual confidence is thereby rendered impossible." Dissolution by order of the Com-t takes effect as from the date of the judgment, unless ordered on the ground of a specific breach of duty giving the other member or mem- ' Harrison v. Temiant (I806), 21 Beav. 482. 2 Cheesman v. Price (1S6J), 3d Beav. li'2. 8 Saxler v. West (1860), 1 Dr. & Sm. 173. < Wafney v. WeUs (1861), 30 Beav. 06 ; Leary v. Shout (1864), 3a Beav. 5S2. ' 3 Ch. at p. 3V3 (1868). CONSEQUENCES OF DISSOLUTION. 93 bers a right to dissolve the partnership, in which case alone Chap. Vll. Art 53 it may relate back to that event.^ ! '. . 53. The riffhts of a creditor of a firm against Eights of ° ° creditors its apparent members are not affected by any against , apparent dissolution or change in the firm of which that members of T T 1 • firm. creditor had not notice.^ An advertisement in the London Gazette is equivalent to notice as to creditors vi^ho were not in fact customers of the firm before the time of the dissolution or change.^ Exceptions. — The estate of a partner who dies/ or who becomes bankrupt/ or of a partner who, not having been known to the creditor to be a partner, retires from the firm,^ is not liable for partnership debts contracted after the date of the death, bankruptcy, or retirement re- spectively. Illustrations. 1. A. and B., partners in trade, agree to dissolve the part- nership, and execute a deed for that purpose, declaring the partnership dissolved as from the 1st of January; hut they do not discontiuue the business of the firm or give notice of the dissolution. On the 1st of February A. indorses a bUl in the partnership name to C, who is not aware of the dis- solution. The firm is liable on the bill.' 1 Lyon V. Twedddl (1881), lY Ch. Div. 529. 2 Lindley, i. 406; I. 0. A. 264. ^ Ih. 415, 416. « Ih. 404. 5 IK 405. « lb. ^ Ex parte BoUnson (1833), 3 D. & Ch. at p. 388, per Lord Brougham. 94 DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS. Chap. VII. Art. 64. 2. A bill is drawn on a firm in its usual name of tlie M. Company, and accepted by an autborized agent. A. waa formerly a partner in tbe firm, but not to tbe knowledge of B., tbe bolder of tbe bill, and ceased to be so before tbe date of tbe bill. B. cannot sue A. upon tbe bill.' 3. A. is a partner witb otber persons in a bank. A. dies, and tbe survivors continue tbe business under tbe same firm. Afterwards tbe firm becomes insolvent. A.'s estate is liable to customers of tbe bank for tbe balances due to them at A.'s deatb, so far as tbey still remain due, and for otber partner- sbip liabilities incurred before A.'s deatb ;^ but not for any debts contracted or liabilities incurred by tbe firm towards customers after A.'s death.' In tbe case of liabilities of tbe firm which have arisen after A.'s deatb, it makes no difference that at tbe time when tbe partnership liability arose tbe customer believed A. to be still living and a member of the firm.* Eight of partners to notify disso- lution. 54. On the dissolution of a partnership, or retirement of a partner, any partner may publicly notify the same, and may require the other partner or partners to concur for that purpose in all necessary or proper acts, if any, which cannot be done without his or their con- currence. 5 In Troughton v. Hunter^ it appeared to be the practice of the London Gazette Office not to insert a notice of dis- solution unless signed by all the partners ; and the defen- 1 Carter v. Whalletj (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 11. = DevaynesY. Kohle [iSlG), 1 Mer. 529; Sleech's Case (1816), at p. 539; Clayton's Case (1816), at p. 572. 3 Brice's Case (1816), lb. 022. * HouUon's Case (1816), lb. 616. The judgment itself in this case is not reported ; but it appears by the marginal note and the context that it foUowoil Brice's Citse. » 18 Boav. '170 (1854). CONSEQUENCES OF DISSOLUTION. 95 dant, who had. refused to sim a notice, was decreed to do Chap. vii. . . . Art 66 all things necessary for procuring notice of the dissolution .1 — '. — . to be inserted in the Grazette. A retiring partner may he ordered to sign a notice of dissolution for insertion in the Gazette, even if no other specific rehef is claimed.^ 55. After the dissolution of a firm, the Contmumg authority of authority of each partner to bind the firm, and partners for . „ , purposes of the other rights and obngations of the partners, winding-up. continue notwithstanding the dissolution so far as is necessary to settle and liquidate existing demands, and to complete transactions begun but unfinished at the time of the dissolution,^ but not otherwise.. Exception. — The firm is in no case bound by the acts of a bankrupt^ partner, except as to any other partner who may be liable under Art. 13.* Illustrations. 1. A. and B. are partners. A. hecomes bankrupt. B. gives acceptances of the firm as a security for an existing partnership deht to C, who knows of A.'s bankruptcy. C. indorses the bills for value to D., who does not know of the bankruptcy. D. is entitled to rank as a creditor of the firm for the amount of the biUs.^ 1 Hendry v. Turner (1886), 32 Ch. D. 355. ^ Liadley, i. 412, with slight verbal alteration: Lyon v. Haynes (1843), 5 M. & Gr. 504, 541. ' Bankruptcy relates back to the completion of the act of bank- ruptcy on which a receiving order is made : Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 43. * Lindley, ii. 1134, 5 Ex parte EoUnson (1833), 3 Dea. & Oh. 376, and 1 Mont. & A. 18. •c)6 DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS. Chap. VII. 2. A. and B. are partners. A. becomes bankrupt. B. Art. 5 5. continues to carry on the trade of the firm, and pays partner- ship moneys into a hank to meet current bills of the firm. The bank is entitled to this money as against A.'s trustee in bankruptcy.' 3. A. and B. are partners in trade. A. becomes bankrupt. The solvent partner, B., but not other persons claiming through him by representation or assignment, may, notwith- standing the dissolution of the partnership wrought by A.'s bankruptcy, sell any of the partnership goods to pay the debts of the ■firm,'' and the purchaser will be entitled to the entire property in such goods as against A.'s trustee in bankruptcy.^ 4. A. and B., sharebrokers in partnership, buy certain railway shares. Before the shares are paid for they dissolve partnership. Either of them may pledge the shares to the bankers of the firm to raise the purchase-money, and may authorize the bankers to sell the shares to indemnify them- selves.'' 5. A. and B., having been partners in a business, dissolve partnership, and A. takes over the business and property of the firm. If A. gives negotiable instruments in the name of the old firm, then (subject to the rights of creditors of the firm stated in Art. 53) B. is not bound thereby,' unless he has specially authorized the continued use of the name for that purpose." 6. Partnership articles provide that, before each division of profits, interest shall be credited to both partners on the amount of capital standing to the credit of their respective accounts. This alone does not authorize the allowance of interest, in the event of a dissolution, for the interval between. ' Woodhridge v. Swann (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 633. 2 Fraser v. Kershaw (1856), 2 K. & J. 496. The authority to sell is "personal to him in his capacity as partner :" p. 501. ' Fox V. Hanhury (1776), Cowp. 445. * Butchart v. Dresser (1853), 4 D. M. G. 542. ' Heath V. Sanson (1832), 4 B. & Ad. 172. « Smith V. Winter (1838), 4 M. & W. 454. CONSEQUENCES OF DISSOLUTION. 97 the dissolution and the final settlement of the partnership Chap. VII. accounts.' ■^'^*- ^^' 7. A., B. and 0. are partners. A. and B. commit acts of bankruptcy, and afterwards indorse in the name of the firm a bill belonging to the partnership. The indorsee acquires no property in the bUl.^ 8. A. and B. are partners. C. is a creditor of the firm; A., having committed an act of bankruptcy to the knowledge of C.,' pays O.'s debt. This js an unauthorized payment as against the firm, and if the firm afterwards becomes bank- rupt, C. must repay the money to the trustee of the joint estate.* 9. A. and B. are partners. A. commits an act of bank- ruptcy, and afterwards accepts a bill in the name of the firm for his own private purposes, which comes into the hands of a holder in good faith and for value. B. is liable on the bill, as A. and B. were ostensibly partners with the assent of B. when the acceptance was given.^ 10. [A. and B. being partners, draw a biU payable to the order of the firm. They dissolve partnership, and A. indorses the bill in the name of the firm, but for his own purposes and without B.'s knowledge, to C, who knows of the dissolution of the firm, but does not know that A.'s indorsement is not for a partnership purpose. B. is liable on the indorsement.^J 1 BarfieU v. LougMorough (18Y2), 8 Ch. 1. " Thomason v. Frere (1808), 10 East, 418. 3 If 0. had not notice of the act of bankruptcy, he would be pro- tected by s. 49 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883. » Craven v. Edmondson (1830), 6 Bing. 734. 5 Lacy V. Wookott (1823), 2 D. & E. 458. n Lewis V. Beitty (1841), 1 Q. B. 349 : "It is perhaps doing no violence to language to say that the partnership could not be dis- solved as to this bin, so as to prevent it from being indorsed by either defendant in the name of the firm," Lord Denman, C. J., at p. 351. But it is difficult to admit the correctness of the decision : see Lindley, i. 409, 413. The earlier case of Smith v. Winter (1838), 4 M. & "W. 454 (not cited in Lewis v. Beilly), assumes that autho- rity in fact must be shown for such a use of the partnership name even for the purpose of hquidating the affairs of the firm. P. H 98 DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS. Chap. VII. 11. [A., B. and C. are partners in a woollen miU. A. ^^- ^^- dies, and B. and 0. continue the business. D., the owner of the mill, distrains for arrears of rent which were partly due in the lifetime of A. B. and 0. agree with D. that he shall take the partnership fixtures and machinery in satisfaction of the rent, and re-let them to B. and C, the transaction being in fact a mortgage. This does not affect A.'s interest in the fixtures and goods comprised in the conveyance, and D. is not entitled to the entire property in them as against A.'s exe- cutors.'] 12. A. and B. are partners. A. files a liquidation petition, and a receiver of his property is appointed. B. is stUl entitled to get in the partnership assets, and to use for that purpose the name of the trustee in A.'s baukruptcy, on. giving him an indemnity.^ On this subject the language of the Indian Contract Act (s. 263) is more general. It says : " After a dissolution of partnersliip, the rights and obli- gations of the partners continue in all things necessary for winding up the business of the partnership." And Lord Bldon spoke more than once of a partnership after dissolution as being in one sense not dissolved imtil the affairs of the firm are wound up.* Lord Justice Lindley shows, however (i. 411 — 414), that a more guarded statement is at least desirable. He points out that the strongest case on the subject is (with the doubtful exception of Lcicis \. Reillij, Illust. 10, above) ButcJiart v. Dresser (Illust. 4) ; and this decides at most " that in the event of a dissolution it is competent for one ' Buckley v. Barher (1851), 6 Ex. 164 ; 20 L. J. Exoh. 114. This decision is not consistent with the general current of authorities, and is probably wrong. It is expressly dissented from by Lord Justice Lindloj' (i. G()6), who further states that it was disapproved in an unreported case by James, L.J. a Em parte Owen (18,S4), 13 Q. B. Div. 113. ^ Swanst. 508 (1818), see on Art. 47, above; 2 Euss. 337, 342. CONSEQUENCm OF DISSOLUTION. 99 3)artiier to dispose of tlie partnership assets for partnership chap. vil. purposes." Paulus incidentally mentions the rule as exist- ! ! ing in some such limited form ia the Roman law : — " Si vivo Titio negotia eius administrare coepi, inter- mittere mortuo eo non debeo ; nova tamen inehoare necesse mihi non est, Vetera explicare ac conservare necessarium •est ; ut accidit, cum alter ex sociis mortuus est."^ ' D. 3, 5, de negot. gesft. 21, § 2, h2 100 DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS. CHAPTEE VIII. Chap. VIII. Art. 56. Rights of partners as to application of partnership property. Rights of Partners after Dissolution. 56. " Every partner lias a right," as against the other partners in the firm and all persons claiming through them in respect of their interests as partners, " to have the property o£ the partnership applied in payment of the debts and liabilities of the firm," and to have the surplus assets after such payment " applied in payment of what may be due to the partners respectively after deducting what may be due from them as partners to the firm ;" ^ and for that purpose any partner or his representatives may, upon the termination of the partnership, apply to the Court to wind up the business and affairs of the firm.^ Illustrations. 1 . One of the partners in a firm becomes bankrupt. All debts due from him to the firm must be satisfied out of his share of the partnership property before recourse is had to such share for payment of debts due either to any of the- partners on his private account or to any other person.' 1 Lindley, i. 679, 680. 2 Common practice ; compare I. C. A. 265. 3 Croft V. Pike (1733), 3 P. "Wms. 180; and see Ch. xi. Art. 76-79^ belo-w. MIGHTS OF PARTNERS. 101 2. A creditor of one partner in a firm on a separate account Chap. VIII. Tinconnected witli the partnership takes Ms share in the part- ^^^- ^^- nership property in execution. He is entitled at most to the ^amount of that partner's interest after deducting everything then due from him to the other partners on the partnership ■account ;^ but in such deduction debts due to all or any of the other partners otherwise than on the partnership account are not to be included.^ 3. A. and B. are partners, having equal shares in their business. A. dies, and B. continues to employ his share of the partnership capital in the business without authority, thereby becoming liable to A.'s estate for a moiety of the profi-ts.^ A.'s estate is entitled not only to a moiety of the ■partnership property, but to a lien upon the other moiety for ■the share of profits due to the estate.* 4. A. and B. are partners. The partnership is dissolved by agreement, and the agreement provides that B. shall take over the business and property of the firm and pay its debts. B. takes possession of the property and continues the business, but does not pay all the debts, and some time afterwards mortgages a policy of assurance, part of the assets of the late partnership, to C, who knows the facts above mentioned, and also knows that .the policy mortgaged to him is part of the partnership assets. A. or his representatives may require any part of the partnership property remaining in the hands of B. to be applied in payment of the unpaid debts of the firm, but they have no such right as to the policy mortgaged to C. Here C. claims through B. not as partner, but as sole owner, and is not bound to see to the application of his money.* The general rule has been thus stated : that " on the Nature of the -dissolution of the partnership all the property belonging OT^uii-lien. --1 Wut v. Ship (1749), 1 Ves. Sen. 239, 242; per Lord Mansfield, iFox V. Hanhury {111&), Oowp. at p. 449. 2 Shipp V. Harwood (1747), 2Swanst. 586; Lindley, i. 682. ' See Art. 61, below. * Stocken v. Dawson (1845), 9 Beav. 239. = Be Langmead's Trusts (1855), 20 Beav. 20 ; 7 D. M. G. 353. 102 DISSOLUTION OF PABTNEBSHIPS. Chap. VIII. to the partnersMp shall he sold, and the proceeds of the- ^'^*- °°- sale, after discharging all the partnership dehts and lia- bilities, shall be divided among the partners according to- their respective shares in the capital."' The right of each partner to control within certain limits the disposition of the partnership property is a rather peculiar one. It exists during the partnership, and when accounts are taken and the partners' shares ascertained from time to time, its existence is assumed, but it comes into fuH play only in the event of a dissolution. It belongs to a class of rights known as equitable liens, which have nothing to do with possession, and must therefore be care- fully distinguished from the possessory liens which are familiar in several heads of the Common Law. The possessory lien of an rmpaid vendor, factor, or the like, is a mere right to hold the goods of another man until he makes a certain payment ; it does not, as a rule, carry with it the right of dealing with the goods in any way.^ Equitable lien, on the other hand, is nothing else than the right to have a specific portion of property dealt with in a particular way for the satisfaction of specific claims. Against The lien, or quasi-lien,' as it is sometimes called, of each able. partner on the partnership properiy is available against the other partners, and against all persons claiming an interest in a partner's share as such. We have already seen that an assignee of a pai'tner's share takes it subject to all claims of the other partners (Art. 38). But a pm'- chaser or pledgee of partnership property from a partner, unless he has notice of an actual want of authority to dis- pose of it, is entitled to assume that his money will be 1 Darhy v. Darhy (18o6), 3 Dre-w^. at p. o03. " On the still unsettled question of an unpaid vendor's rights in. this respect, see Page v. Cvwasjee Eduljee (1866), L. E. 1 P. 0. 145. a To 13ouv. ;i86 (1858). RIGHTS OF PARTNERS. 103 properly applied for partnership purposes, and may rely Chap. VIII. on the disposing partner's receipt as a complete discharge.^ ! — '. — Likewise the individual partners cannot require a judg- ment creditor of the firm to pursue his remedy against the partnership property hef ore having recourse to the separate property of the partners ;^ for, as we have seen above (on Art. 11, p. 21), English law does not recognize the firm as having rights or liabilities distinct from those of the individual partners, and a judgment agaiast a firm of partners is nothing else than a judgment against the partners as joint debtors, and is treated like any other judgment of that nature. There seems to be nothing to alter this in the Rule of Court now in force as to judgments against partners in the name of the firm.^ Creditors, on the other hand, have no specific rights against any pro- perty of the firm except such as they may acquire by actually taking it in execution.* During a partnership the hen in question attaches to all Applies only partnership property for the time being. Upon a dissolu- prc^^ty at ^ tion it extends only to the partnership property existing as ^^^ °* ^sso- such at the date of dissolution. Therefore, if one of two partners dies, and the executors of the deceased partner allow the survivor to continue the business of the firm, there will be no lien in their favour on property acquired by him in this course of business in addition to or in sub- stitution for partnership property ; and in the event of the surviving partner's bankruptcy, goods brought into the business by him will belong to his creditors in the new business, not to the creditors of the former partnership.^ ^ Langmead's Trusts, see Illust. 4, above. ' Lindley, i. 541, 700. ' Eules of the Supreme Court, Order XLII. r. 10 (No. 588); Art. 68, below. * Stoclcen V. Dawson (1845), 9 Beav. 239. 5 Payne v. Eornly (1858), 25 Beav. 280, 286-7. 104 Chap. VIII. Art. 67. Sale of good- will on disso- lution. Bights and duties of vendor and purchaser of goodwill. DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS. It is probable, however, that a surviving partner who insisted on carrying on the business against the will of the deceased partner's representatives would be estopped from showing that property in his hands and employed in the business was not part of the actual partnership assets.^ 57. On the dissolution of a partnership every partner has a right, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, to have the goodwill of the business sold for the common benefit of all the partners.^ Explanation. — Where the goodwill of a busi- ness, whether carried on in partnership or not, is sold, the rights and duties of the vendor and purchaser are determined by the following rules in the absence of any special agreement ex- cluding or varying their effect : — a. The purchaser alone may represent himself as continuing or succeeding to the business of the vendor.' h. The vendor may nevertheless carry on 1 THs is given as the general rule in Dixon on Partnership, 493, and the rule in Payne v. Hornby as the exception ; and a dictum of Lord Hardwicke's is there cited {West v. Sl-ip, 1749, 1 Yes. Sen. at p. 244), that the lien extends to stock brought in after the determina- tion of the partnership. But this dictum relies on an old case of Bucknal v. Roiston (1'709), Pre. Cli. 2So, which was a. case not of partnership at all, but of a continuing pledge of stock in trade : from which the partner's lien is expressly distinguished in Payne v. Hornhy. * Lindley, ii. 860. In other words, the goodwill, and therefore also the firm-name, is part of the partnership assets : Levy v. WaJker (1879), 10 Ch. Div. 436, 446. " Churion v. Douglas (1859), Johns. 174. EIGHTS OF PARTNERS. 105 a similar business in competition with the chap. viii. , , , -^ - „ , Art. 67. purchaser, but not under the name oi the former firm, nor so as to represent himself as continuing or succeeding to the same business.* c. The vendor may publicly advertise his business, and solicit the customers of the former firm.^ d. The sale [probably] carries the exclusive right to use the name of the former firm.^ It is doubtful whether the purchaser may use it without qualification if it consists only of the name of the vendor or of any other person who by such use would be exposed to be sued as an apparent partner in the business.* e. The foregoing rules apply to the sale by a retiring partner, or a surviving partner, 1 Churton v. Douglas (1859), Johns. 174. ' Labouchere v. Dawson (1872), 13 Eq. 322, laid down a contrary- rule ; but this, after being materially qualified in Leggott v. Barrett (1880), 15 Cai. Div. 306 (overruling Ginesi v. Cooper & Co., 1880, 14 -Oh. D. 596), was disapproved by a majority of the C. A. in Pearson V. Pearson (1884), 27 Ch. Div. 145; and Stirling, J., in Vernon v. Hallam (1886), 34 Ch. D. 748, treated Lahoucliere v. Dawson as overruled. See also Walker v. Mottram (1881), 19 Ch. Div. 355. A partner who has been expelled under a provision in the articles is not restrained from carrying on the same business on his own account, or soliciting customers of the old firm : Dawson v. Beeson (1882), 22 Ch. Div. 504. =" Levy V. Walker (1879), 10 Ch. Div. 436. * Churton v. Douglas (1859), Johns, at p. 190. But the tendency ■of what was said in Levy v. Walker is decidedly towards leaving it ior the vendor in such a case to protect himself against this incon- venience by special conditions. 106 Chap. VIII. Art. 57. DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS. or the representatives of a deceased partner to continuing or incoming partners, or to any- other purchaser of the business of the firm, of his or their share or interest in the good- will of the business carried on by the firm.^ Illustrations. 1. A., B. and C. have carried on business in partnership under the firm of A. and Co. A. retires from the firm on the terms of the other partners purchasing from him his interest in the business and goodwill, andD. is taken in as a new partner. B., C. and D. continue the business under the firm of "B., 0. and D., late A. and Co." A. may set up a similar busi- ness of his own next door to them, but not under the firm of A. and Co.° 2. One of several persons carrying on business in partner- ship having died, the affairs of the partnership are wound up by the Court, and a sale of the partnership assets, including the goodwill, is directed. The goodwill must not be valued on the supposition that any surviving partner, if he does not himself become the purchaser, can be restrained from setting^ up the same kind of business on his own account ;' for " no Court can prevent the late partners from engaging in the same business, and therefore the sale cannot proceed upon the same principles as if a Court could prevent their so engaging."* Nature and The term goodwill is a commercial rather than a legal incidents of ■ -i r* i j_ xi rv • n i t • " o-oodwill." one, nor is its use confined to the attairs oi partnership firms. It is well understood in business, but not easy to ' The rules are in fact established mainly by decisions on partner- shiiJ cases. ^ Ghurton v. Douglas (1859), Johns. 1V4. = Hall V. Barroioa (1863), 4 D. J. S. at p. Id9. * Lord Eldon's decree in Cvok v. Collingridge (1825), given in 27 Beav. 456, 459. The declarations and du-ections there inserted con- tain an exposition of the nature and legal incidents of goodwill to- which there is still little to add in substance. RIGHTS OF PARTNERS. 107 define. It has been described as " the benefit arising Chap. vili. from connexion and reputation," ^ "the probability of the '. — '— old customers going to the new firm " which has acquired the business.^ That which the purchaser of a goodwill actually acquires, as between himself and his vendor, is the right to carry on the same business under the old name (perhaps with such addition or qualification, if any, as may be necessary for the protection of the vendor from UabUity or exposure to litigation under the doctriae of "holding out "), and to represent himself to former customers as the successor to that business. Unless there is an express agreement to the contrary, the vendor remains free to compete with the purchaser in the same line of business ;' he may publish to the world, by advertisements or other- wise, the fact that he carries on such business ; and it seems to be now settled, though for some years it was held other- wise, that he may even specially solicit the customers of the old firm to transfer their custom to him.* But he must not use the name of the old firm so as to represent that he is continuing, not merely a similar business, but the same business. " Tou are not to say, I am the owner of that which I have sold."' Probably the purchasers of the business might successfully object even to his carrying on a competing business in his own name alone, if that name had been used as the name of the late firm and had become 1 Lindley, ii. 859. s Lord Eomilly, M.E., Labouchere v. Dawson (18Y2), 13 Eq. at p. 324; and see Llewellyn v. Rutherford (1875), L. E. 10 0. P. 456; Wedderhurn v. Wedderlurn (1855-6), 22 Beav. at p. 104. 3 Churton v. Douglas (1859), Johns. 174. •* Pearson v. Pearson, 27 Ch.. Div. 145 ; Vernon v. Hallam, 34 Ch.. D. 748 ; see p. 105 above. * Churton v. Douglas (1859), Jolins. at p. 193. 108 DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS. Chap. VIII. part of its goodwill. ^ Tliese rights of vendors and L: — : — purchasers of goodwill clearly belong to the province of law, and are capable of legal definition : I have accord- ingly tried to state them distinctly in the exj)lanation annexed to the last article, but for the reasons already indicated I have not sought to define the term goodwill itself. Croodwill does It was formerly supposed that on the death of a partner vive."^™" ™ ^ ^™^ t^® goodwill survived — ^that is, that the surviving partners were entitled to the whole benefit of it without any express agreement to that effect. But it is now perfectly settled that this is not so.^ It seems that in the business of solicitors goodwill ia the ordinary sense does not exist.^ The same reasons might apply to any other busiuess depending on personal and confidential relations, and wholly or mainly indepen- dent of local connexion. Right of 58. After a dissolution each of the partners partners to •jiTTir> i- restrain use of m the uissolved. hrm or his representatives may name. [probably], in tlie absence of any agreement to the contrary, restrain any other partner or his representatives from carrying on the same business under the partnership name until the affairs of the firm have been wound up and the partnership property disposed of.* ' Churton v. Doughs (1SJ9), Jokns. at pp. 197, 198. As to the right to the exclusive use of a trade name, see Art. 11, above. ' The notion of the good-will surviving is expressly contradicted, for instance, in Smith \. Everett (1859), 27 Beav. 446. " See Austen v. Roys (1858), 2 De G. & J. 626, 635 ; Arundell v. Bell (C. A. 1883), 31 W. E. 477. * Lindley, ii. S()2. BIGHTS OF PARTNERS. 109 This is maintained by Lord Justice Lindley, notwith- Chap. vili. Art. S9. standing a certain amount of apparent authority to the con- trary,^ as a necessary consequence of the principle stated in the last article. If any partner who may require it has a right to have the goodwill sold for the common benefit, it cannot be that each partner is also entitled to do that which would deprive the goodwill of all saleable value. There is express authority to show that while a liquidation of partner- ship affairs is pending one partner must not use the name or property of the partnership to carry on busiuess on his own sole account, siuce it is the duty of every partner to do nothing to prejudice the saleable value of the partnership property until the sale.^ This question does not in any case affect the independent right of a late partner who is living and not bankrupt to .restraia the successor to the business from continuing the use of his name therein so as to expose him to the risk of being sued as an apparent partner.' After the affairs of a dissolved firm are wound up every partner is free to use the firm-nsime in the absence of agree- ment to the contrary.* 59. Where one partner has paid a premium Apportion- to another on entering into a partnership for a pre^Li in 1 Banhs v. Qibaon (1865), 34 Beav. 566, looks at first sight like a direct authority contra. But there it appears that the assets of the firm had been divided by agreement between the late partners and the aSairs of the firm wound up before the suit was brought. The goodwill, in fact, had ceased to exist, the partners having practically waived the right of having its value realized. Thus the decision is not inconsistent with Lord Justice Lindley's reasoning or with the proposition given in the text. 2 Turner v. Major (1862), 3 Giif. 442. 3 Scott V. Rowland (18Y2), 20 W. E. 508; see, however, note 4, p. 105, above. * Per James, L.J., Levy v. Walker, 10 Ch. Div. 445 (1879). 110 DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS. Chap. VIII. Art. 59. certain oases where part- nership pre- maturely dissolved. fixed term, and the partnerskip is dissolved before the expiration of such term otherwise than by the death of a partner/ there, subject to any special agreement between the partners, the Court may order the premium or a pro- portionate part thereof to be repaid. In fixing the proportion of the premium to be returned, the Court has regard to the conduct of the partners, the terms of the partnership contract, and the length of time during which the partnership has continued. Illustrations. 1. A. and B. enter into a partnership for five years, on the terms of A. paying a premium, of £1,050 to B., £500 imme- diately, and the rest by instalments. In the second year of the partnership term, and before the whole of the premium has been paid, A. is adjudicated a bankrupt on the petition of B. B. is not entitled to any further payments on account of the premium, the partnership having been determined by his own act, and he may retain only so much of the part already paid to him as the Court thinks just.' 2. A. and B. enter into a partnership for a term of years, A. paying a premium to B. Long before the expiration of the term B. becomes bankrupt. It has been held that B.'s estate is entitled to the whole premium, because A. bought the right of becoming his part- ner subject to the chance of the partnership being pre- maturely determined by ordinarj- contingencies, such as death or bankruptcy ;* 78. ' See Lindloy, i. T3; Wtincup v. Hughes {1811), L. E. 6 C. P, - Hamil v. Stokes (ISIT), 4 Pii. 161, and better in Dan. 20. " Akharst v. Jackson (1818), 1 Swanst. 85. No stress is laid on the fact that at the commencement of the partnership A. knew that B. was in embarrassed circumstances, which is the only point on RIGHTS OF PARTNERS. Ill And also that B.'s estate must return or give credit for a Chap. VIII. proportionate part of the premium, as the bankruptcy which *•• ' ■determined the partnership was B.'s own act.' 3. A. and B. enter into partnership for fourteen years, B. paying a premium to A. In the course of the same year ■differences arise, there is a quarrel in which, in the opinion of the Court, A. and B. are both to blame, A. excludes B. from the business and premises of the partnership, and B. sues A. for a dissolution of partnership and return of the premium. A. is entitled to retain only so much of the premium as bears the same proportion to its whole amount as the time for which the partnership has actually lasted bears to the whole term first agreed upon.- 4. A. and B. are partners for a term of fourteen years, B. having paid a premium of £600 to A. At the end of seven years of the term B. gives notice of dissolution to A., under a power contained in the partnership articles, on the ground of A.'s neglect of the business ; and B. claims to have the premium apportioned on the principle of the last illustration. B. is not entitled to the return of half the premium, but only "to such allowance as the Court thinks proper on a general estimate of the case.' 5. A. and B. enter into partnership for fourteen years, A. paying a premium calculated on two years' purchase of the net profits of the business. The partnership is dissolved within two years in consequence of mutual disagreements. No part of the premium is re-payable.* which the case can be distinguished from FreelandY. Stansfeld; see Atwood V. Maude (1868), 3 Oh. at p. 372. 1 Freeland v. Stansfeld (1852-4), 2 Sm. & G. 479. " Bury V. Allen (1844-5), 1 Coll. 589 ; the proportion to be returned or allowed for was calculated on the same principle in Astle v. Wright (1856), 23 Beav. 77 ; Pease v. Hewitt (1862), 31 Beav. 22; Wilson v. Johnstone (1873), 16 Bq. 606. 3 Bulloch V. Crockett (1862), 3 Giff. 507. There not quite seven years of the term had in fact elapsed, but the Court allowed only £100 to the partner who had paid £600 premium. The same rule of unlimited discretion as to the amount to be returned was acted upon in Freeland v. Stansfeld, supra, * Aire^J v. Borham (1861), 29 Beav. 620. 112 DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS. Chap. VIII. Art. 59. Discrepancy of authori- ties: rule proposed in Wilson V. Johnstone. 6. A. takes B. into partnership for seven years, knowing- him to be inexperienced in the tusiness, and requires Mm oa that account to pay a premium. After two years A. calls on B. to dissolve the partnership on the ground of B.'s incom- petence, and B. sues A. for a dissolution and the return of an apportioned part of the premium. B. is entitled to the return of such a part of the premium as bears the same proportion to the whole sum which the unexpired period of the term of seven years bears to the whole term.' 7. A. and B. enter into partnership for fourteen years, A. paying a premium. In the fourth year disputes arise, and a dissolution of the partnership by consent is gazetted. No agreement is made at the time of dissolution fer the return of any part of the premium. A. cannot afterwards claim to have any part of it returned.'' It will be seen from the illustrations that no definite rule- can be given which will reconcile the existing authorities. In Wilson v. Johnstone,^ Wickens, V.-C, gave his opinion as to what the rule ought to be on principle. He considered it applicable only to a " premature dissolution by the Court as distinguished from premature dissolution by contract " (this is hardly consistent with the practice as shown in th& reported cases, for in several of them the partners were agreed that there must be a dissolution, and the return or apportionment of the premium was the only matter in dis- pute) : but in the event of a dissolution by the Court the partner who had paid the premium was entitled, he thought, as of right to the retm'n of a part of it proportionate to the time by which the intended term had been shortened, the premium being ti-eated " as if it were an aggregate of yearly payments made in advance " (here the weight of authority is decidedly in favour of this mode of calculation) ; • Atwood V. Maude (1868), 3 Oh. 369. - Lee v. Page (1861), 30 L. J. Oh. 857. = 16 Eq. 606 (1873). BIGHTS OF PARTNERS. 113 Tinless, indeed, the dissolution were caused by liis own gross Chap. Vlll. Art 59 misconduct (being something more than simple breach of '- — '. — ■duty) in the affairs of the partnership, or he had otherwise ;shown an intention to repudiate the partnership contract altogether.^ On the other hand, i£ we might take the rule simply Rule as given, from the judgment in Atwood v. Maude^ still the latest juaude. ■case on the subject in a Court of Appeal, the latter part of it might stand thus : — ■ " The Court will order the repayment of the premium, ■or such proportionate part thereof as it thinks just, having Tegard to the terms of the partnership contract and to the length of time during which the partnership has continued ; unless the dissolution is, in the judgment of the Court, wholly or chiefly due to the misconduct of the partner who paid the premium ; or unless the partnership has been dissolved by an agree- ment in which no provision has been made for a return of any part of the premium. In the absence of special reasons to the contrary, the pro- portionate part to be returned is a sum bearing the same proportion to the whole premium as the unexpired part of the partnership term originally contracted for bears to the Tvhole term." One cannot help regretting that in deciding Aticood v. Maude^ the Court did not take occasion to overrule expressly some of the former cases. It is now understood, however, that the terms of dissolution are a matter of judicial dis- cretion for the judge who hears the cause, and that his ' In Bluch V. CapsUck (1879), 12 Oh. D. 863, where the premium. 3)ayable by tlie partner in fault was still unpaid, payment of it was ordered. "■ 3 Oh. 369 (1868). , P. I 114 Chap. VIII. Art. 61. Kights of defrauded partner where partnership dissolved for fraud. Hight of out- going partner in certain cases to share profits after dissolution. DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS. decision will not be interfered with by the Court of Appeal except for strong reasons.' This kind of relief must be sought at the same time with the dissolution of partnership itself. After decree^ such an application is admissible only on special grounds.^ 60. Where a partnership contract is re- scinded on account of the fraud of one party to it, the partner defrauded is entitled to a lien on the surplus of the partnership assets, after satisfying the partnership liabilities, for any sum of money paid by him for the purchase of an interest in the partnership property, and is also entitled to stand in the place of the creditors of the firm for any payments made by him in respect of partnership liabilities.^ 61. Where any member of a firm has died or otherwise ceased to be a partner, and the surviving or continuing partner or partners carry on the business of the firm with his capital or assets, without any final settlement of accounts as between the firm and the out- going partner or his estate, there, in the absence of any special agreement to the con- trary, the outgoing partner or his estate is entitled, at the option of such partner or his representatives, to such share of the profits made since the dissolution as the Court may I Lyony. T wed deJl {ISSl), IT Cli.Div. o'ld. • Edmonds v. Rubinson (188 j), 29 Ch. D. 170. » Mycock Y. Beaison (ISTQ), 13 Ch. D. 384. EIOHTS OF PARTNERS. 115 find to be attributable to the use of his capital chap. viii. or assets, or to the amount of such capital or assets with interest thereon at 5 per cent.^ Explanation. — How far the profits made since the dissolution are attributable to the outgoing' partners' capital is a question to be determined with regard to the nature of the business, the amount of capital from time to time employed in it, the skill and industry of each partner taking part in it, and the conduct of the parties generally.^ There is no fixed rule that the profits are divisible in the same manner as if the partnership had not ceased.^ Illustrations. 1. A., B. and C. are partners in a manufacture of machinery. A. is entitled to tkree-eightlis of the partnership property and profits. A. tecomes bankrupt, and B. and C. continue the business- without paying out A.'s share of the partnership assets or settling accounts with his estate. A.'s estate is entitled to three-eighths of the profits made in the business from the date of his baniruptcy untU the final liquidation of the partnership affairs.* 2. A. and B. are partners. The partnership is dissolved by consent, and it is agreed that the assets and business of ^ Liadley, ii. 976, 983. Per Lord Cairns, Vyse v. Foster (1874), L. E. 7 H. L. at p. 329 ; Tates v. Finn (1880), 13 Oh. D. 839. * Turner, L. J., in Simpson v. Chapman (1853), 4 D. M. G. at pp. 171, 172, following and approving Wigram, V.-C.'s, exposition in Willttt V. Blanford (1841), 1 Ha. 253, 266, 272. 3 Brown v. De Taatet (1821), Jac. at p. 296. Indeed, the pre- sumption appears to be in favour of apportioning profits to capital without regard to the proportions in which they were divisible during the partnership. Yafes v. Finn (1880), 13 Ch. D. at p. 843. 4 Graivshay v. Collins (1826), 2 Euss. 325, 342—345, 347. l2 IIG DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS. Chap. VIII. the firm shall be sold by auction. A. nevertheless continues to carry on the business on the partnership premises, and with the partnership property and capital, and upon his own account. He must account to B. for the profits thus made.' 3. A. and B. trade in partnership as merchants. A. dies, and B. continues the business with A.'s capital. B. must account to A.'s estate for the profits made since A.'s death, but the Court will make in B.'s favour such allowance as it thinks just for his skill and trouble in managing the business.^ 4. A., B. and C. are merchants trading in partnership under articles which provide that upon the death of any partner the goodwill of the business shall belong exclusively to the survivors. A. dies, and B. and C. pay or account for interest to his legatees, upon the estimated value of his share at the time of his death, but do not pay out the capital amount thereof. The firm afterwards make large profits, but the nature of the business and the circumstances at the time of A.'s death were such that at that time any attempt to realise the assets of the firm or the amount of A.'s share would have been highly imprudent, and would have en- dangered the solvency of the firm, so that A.'s share in the partnership assets if then ascertained by a forced winding-up would have been of no value whatever. Under these circum- stances the profits made in the business after A.'s death are chiefly attributable, not to A.'s share of capital, but to the goodwill and reputation of the business and the skill of the surviving partners, and A.'s legatees have no claim to parti- cipate in such profits to any gi-eater extent than the amounts already paid or accounted for to them in respect of interest on the estimated value of A.'s share.' 5. The facts are as in the last illustration, except that the articles do not provide that the goodwill shall belong to surviving partners. The deceased partner's estate is entitled to share in the profits made since his death and attributable to goodwill in a proportion corresponding to his interest in 1 Tiirutr V. Major (l.S(i2), 3 Giff. 442. ' 2(j'OT«»iv.Z)e2'«s«(*(1821), Juc. 284, 290; cp. i'uies v. -Ftnn (1880) 13 Ch. D. 839. " U'i.ddertiuriix. irceWccii/rn (18od-6), 22 Beav. 84, 123 124. BIOETS OF PARTNERS. 117 the value of the goodwill itself as a partnership asset. The Chap. VIII. evidence of experts in the particular business wiU be admitted, ^^^- ^^- if necessary, to ascertain how much of the profits was attribu- table to goodwill.' 6. A. and B. are partners, sharing profits equally, in a business in which A. finds the capital and B. the skill. B. dies before there has been time for his sMU in the business to create a goodwill of appreciable value for the firm. A. continues the business of the firm with the assistance of other stilled persons. B.'s estate is [probably] not entitled to any share of the profits made after B.'s death. 7. The other facts being as in the last illustration, B. dies after his skill in the business has created a connexion and goodwill for the firm. B.'s estate is [probably] entitled to a share of the profits made after B.'s death.^ 62. Where by the partnership contract an Exercise of , . . . , . . , • • option to pur- option IS given to surviving or continuing ohase out- partners to purchase the interest of a deceased fer's^Btare. or outgoing partner, and that option is duly- exercised, the estate of the deceased partner, or the outgoing partner or his estate, as the case may be, is not entitled to any further or other share of profits; but if any partner assuming to act in exercise of the said option does not in all material respects comply vrith the terms thereof, he is liable to account for subsequent profits under the last preceding article.^ Illustrations. 1. A., B. and C are partners under articles which provide that, on the death of A., B. and C. or the survivor of them 1 See 22 Beav. at pp. 104, 112, 122 (1855-6). ° These last two cases are given by Wigram, V.-C, in his judg- ment in WilhU V. Blanford (1841), 1 Ha. at p. 271. 3. Vyse V. Foster (1874), L. E. 7 H. L. at p. 329. 118 DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS. Chap. VIII. Art. 62. Claims against surviving or contimiing partners as executors or trustees. may continue the business in partnership -with A.'s represen- tatives or nominees, taking at the same time an increased share in the profits ; and that, in that case, B. and C. or the survivor of them shall enter into new articles of partner- ship, pay out in a specified manner the value of the part of A.'s interest taken over, and give certain security to A.'s representatives. B. dies, then A. dies. C. carries on the business without pursuing the provisions of the articles as to entering into new articles, or paying out the value of the part of A.'s interest which he is entitled to acquire, or giving security. 0. must account to A.'s estate for subsequent profits.^ 2. A., B. and C. are partners under articles which provide that in case of the death of any partner the value of his share shall be ascertained as therein provided, with an allowance in lieu of profits at the rate of 5 per cent, per annum upon his share of the capital, and that the moneys found to be due to his executors shall be taken in full for the purchase of his share, and shall be paid out in a certain manner by instal- ments extending over two years. A. dies. B. and C. ascer- tain the amount of his share, and pay interest thereon to his representatives, but, acting in good faith for the benefit of the persons interested, they do not pay out the capital within the two years. This delay in making the complete pajTuent out is not a material non-compliance with the terms of the option of purchase, and B. and C. cannot be called upon to account to A.'s estate for profits subsequent to A.'s death.' The reader who is already acquainted with the cases now cited by way of iUustration ya\l perceive that several of them have deen designedly simplified in statement. It often happens that a partner in a firm disposiag of his interest in it by will, and not desii-iag the affairs of the firm to be exposed to the interference of strangers, makes his fellow-partners or some of them liis executors or trus- tees, or includes one or more of tliem among the persons • WiUett V. Blanford (1841), 1 Ha. 253, 264. 2 Vijse V. Foiter (1874), L. E. 7 H. L. 318. RIGHTS OF PARTNERS, 119 appointed to tliose offices. If, having done this, he dies Chap. Vlll. Art 62 while the partnership is subsisting, there may arise at the '- — '■ — toations. same time, and either wholly or in part in the same persons, two kinds of duty in respect of the testator's interest which are in many ways alike in their nature and incidents, but must be nevertheless kept distinct. There is the duty of the surviving partners as partners towards the deceased partner's estate ; and of this we have just spoken. There is also the duty of the same persons, or some of them, as executors or trustees towards the persons beneficially iute- rested in that estate ; and this is determined by principles which are really independent of the law of partnership. The nature of these complications and the distinctions These dis- to be observed may be exhibited by some further illustra- further illua- tions. 3. A. and B. are partners. A. dies, having appointed B. his sole executor, and B. carries on the trade with A.'s ■capital. Here B. is answerable to A.'s estate as partner, and A.'s executor, if he were a person other than B. himself, would be the proper person to enforce that liahiHty. B. is also answerable as executor to the persons beneficially interested in A.'s estate for the improper employment of his testator's ■assets. 4. A., a trader, appoints B. his executor and dies. B. enters into partnership with 0. and D. in the same trade, and •employs the testator's assets in the partnership business. B. gives an indemnity to C. and D. against the claim of A.'s residuary legatees. Here C. and D. are jointly liable with B. to A.'s residuary legatees, not as partners, but as having knowingly made themselves parties to the breach of trust ■committed by B.' 5. A. being in partnership with B. and 0. appoints B. his •executor and dies. B. and C. continue to eniploy A.'s capital in the business. B. is Hable as executor to account for the Flockton V. Sunning (1868), 8 Oh. 323, n. 120 DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS. Chap. VIII. profits received by himself from the use of A.'s capital, but;. ^^- ^^- not for the whole profits received therefrom by the firm.' 6. A. and B. are partners in trade. A. dies, having' appointed C. and D. his executors, and authorized them to. continue his capital in the trade for a limited time. On the expiration of that time C. and D. do not withdraw their testator's capital, but leave it as a loan to the firm, B. and E., the then members of the firm, knowing the limit of the- authority given by A.'s will, and knowing the fund to belong- to A.'s estate. B. and E. are not liable to render to the persons interested under A.'s will an account of profits sinca the time when A.'s capital ought to have been finally with- drawn, inasmuch as C. and D. themselves are liable to A.'a legatees only to make good the amount of the capital with interest." 7. If the other facts are as in the last illustration, but B., one- of A.'s executors, is himself a member of the firm, C. and D., the other executors, are still not accountable for any share of profits.' B. cannot be charged as executor with a greater share of profits in respect of his testator's capital than he has actually received,* and it is doubtful whether he can be- charged with profits at all.' 8. A., B. and C. are partners in a bank which is carried on upon the known private credit of the partners, and with little or no capital. A. dies, having appointed C. and D. his- executors. At the time of A.'s death his debt to the bank on. his private account exceeds his share in the assets. B. and C. take D. into partnership, and continue the business without paying out A.'s share. C. and D. ai-e not accountable as executors for any share of the profits since A.'s death, as A^ really left no capital in the business to which such profits could be attributed, and D. entered the partnership and shared the profits not as executor, but on his own private- ' Per Lord Cairns, L. E. "i H. L. 33-1 (1874). "• Stroud V. Owyer (1860), 128 Beav. 130. 1 Tj/sc V. J^os n for purpose of partners oi tne firm, or any oi them, may prove voting. his debt for the purpose of voting at any meeting of creditors, and shall be entitled to vote thereat."^ > Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), s. 111. ° Ih.s. 112. When a trustee of the joint estate is duly appointed, the separate estates also vest in him at once : Ex parte Philps (1874), 19 Eq. 256; Re WaddelVs Contract {\9,1&), 2 Oh. D. 172; and see Ebbs Y. Boulnois (1875), 10 Oh. 479. 3 lb. sched. 1, rule 13. As to the distribution of the estates, see further, Articles 76-79, below. k2 132 PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION. Chap. X, Art. 74. Dmdends of joint and separate pro- perties. Actions by trustee and solvent part- ners. 74. "(1.) Where one partner of a firm is adjudged bankrupt, a creditor to whom the bankrupt is indebted jointly with the other partners of the firm, or any of them, shall not receive any dividend out of the separate pro- perty of the bankrupt until all the separate creditors have received the full amount of their respective debts. (2.) " "Where joint and separate properties are being administered, dividends of the joint and separate properties shall, subject to any order to the contrary that may be made by the Court on the application of any person in- terested,^ be declared together ; and the ex- penses of and incident to such dividends shall be fairly apportioned by the trustee between the joint and separate properties, regard being had to the work done for, and the benefit re- ceived by each property."^ 75. " Where a member of a partnership is adjudged bankrupt, the Court may authorize the trustee to commence and prosecute any action in the names of the trustee and of the bankrupt's partner ; and an}- release by such partner of the debt or demand to which the action relates shall be void ; but notice of the application for authority to commence the action shall be given to him, and he may show cause • See Ex parte Dickin (1875), 20 Eq. 767. ' Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 59. BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE. 133 against it, and on his application the Court chap. x. Art. 7o. may, if it thinks fit, direct that he shall receive his proper share of the proceeds of the action, and if he does not claim any benefit therefrom he shall be indemnified against costs in respect thereof as the Court directs." ^ 1 lb. s. 113. 134 procedvue and administration. CHAPTER XI. Chap. XI. Art. 76. General rule of administra- tion as to joint and separate estate. Administration of Partnership Estates. 76. In the administration by tlie Higli Court of Justice of the estates of deceased partners and of bankrupt and insolvent partners, the following rules are observed : — The partnership property is applied adjoint estate in payment of the debts of the firm/ and the separate property of each partner is applied as separate estate in payment of his separate debts. After such payment tlie surplus, if any, of the joint estate is applied in pajTuent of the separate debts of the partners, or the sm'plus, if any, of the separate estate is applied in payment of the debts of the firm. Illustrations. 1. A. and B. are in partnership. A. dies, and his estate is administered by the Court. Both A.'s estate and B. are solvent. Here A.'s separate creditors and the creditors of A. and B.'s firm may prove their debts against A.'s estate and be paid out of his assets pari passu and in the same manner. ' That is, to persons other than partners : see Art. 79. AD2IINISTBATI0N OF ESTATES. 135 The payments thus made to creditors of the firm must then Chap. XI. he allowed hy B. in account with A.'s estate as payments ■^'^''- '''^- made on hehalf of the firm, and A.'s estate will be credited accordingly in ascertaining what is A.'s share of the partner- ship property.^ 2. The facts being otherwise as in the last illustration, A.'s ■estate is insolvent, and the creditors of the firm proceed to recover the full amount of their debts from the solvent partner, B. Here B. will become a creditor of A.'s separate estate for the amount of the partnership debts paid by B. beyond the proportion which he ought to have paid under the partnership contract.^ 3. If B. is also insolvent, the creditors of the firm must resort in. the first instance to the partnership property, and ■can only come against so much of the separate property of the partners as remains after paying their separate creditors re- spectively : and the same rule appHes if both A. and B. have •died before the administration takes place.^ 4. A. and B. are partners. A. dies, and B. afterwards becomes bankrupt. M., a creditor of the firm, proves his -debt in B.'s bankruptcy, and receives some dividends wliich satisfy it only in part. A.'s estate is administered by the 'Court, and M. proves in that administration for the residue of his debt. Separate creditors of A. also prove their debts. M. has no claim upon A.'s estate until all the separate creditors •of A. have been paid.^ 5. A. and B. are partners under articles which provide that, in the event of A.'s death during the partnership, B.'s interest in the profits shall thenceforth belong to A.'s representatives, B. receiving a sum equivalent to his share of profits for six months, to be ascertained as therein provided, and the amount of his capital. A. dies, having appointed B. his executor. B. carries on the business for some time, and then becomes a liquidating debtor. The partnership property existing at the •date of A.'s death is not converted into A.'s separate property 1 Ridgiuay v. Clare (1854), 19 Beav. at p. 116. 2 Ibid. = /J. at pp. 116, 117. ^ Lodge v. Prichard (1863), 1 D. J. S. 610. 136 PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION. Chap. XI. by the provisions of the partnership articles, and such pro- ^'^'^- ''^- perty, so far as it is still found in B.'s hands at the time of liquidation, is applicable in the first instance as joint estate tO' pny the creditors of the firm.' 6. A. and B. are partners for a term, A. not having brought in any capital, but receiving a share of the profits as a working- partner. The partnership deed provides that, if A. dies, during the term, his representatives shall receive only an ap- portioned part of his estimated share in the profits for the current half-year. A. dies during the term, and B. afterwards, becomes bankrupt. Here B. takes the partnership property subject to the right of A.'s estate to be indemnified against the partnership debts, and the property of the firm of A. and B., so far as it is found still existing in B.'s hands, must be- first applied to pay the creditors of the firm.' , 7. A., B., C. and 1). are partners for a term under articles- which provide that the death of any one of them shall not dissolve the partnership, but the survivors or survivor shall carry on the business, and the share of the deceased partner- shall be ascertained and paid out as therein provided. A. and B. die during the term, and afterwards C. and D. become- liquidating debtors. Here, as the interest of a deceased partner wholly passes to the survivors on his death under the- special and exceptional pro-visions of the partnership articles, the creditors of the original firm of A., B., C. and D. have- no right to have the property of that firm, so far as it is found still existing in the hands of C. and D., applied in payment of their debts in preference to the creditors of the new firm of" C. and D.^ Dicta laying This rule has been repeatedly laid down in its general down the rule. „ , , , i ■, . , -, lorm as a well-established one. ' Ex parte Hlorlry (1873), 8 Ch. 102G. Compare E.x parte Butcher (1880), 13 Ch. 3)iv. 4Gd, a similar case, in which this dooisioni was folio-wed. = Ex parte Dear (ISTO), 1 Ch. Div- J14. ' Re Simpson (1874), i) Ch. J72. This was a peculiar case. The- last throG lUustnitions really belong to Art. 30 (which see) as much as to this ; but it seemed on the whole more convenient to give- thom liorc. ADMINISTBATION OF ESTATES. 13T " Upon a Joint tankruptoy or insolvency, the joint estate Chap. xi. is tlie fund primarily liable, and the separate estate is only '- — '- — brought in in case of a surplus remaining after the separate creditors have been satisfied out of it."^ "The joint estate is to be applied in payment of the joint debts, and the separate estate in payment of the separate debts, any surplus there may be of either estate being carried over to the other ; " and this appHes to the administration of estates in Equity as well as in Bank- ruptcy.^ " The joint estate must be applied first in payment of joint creditors, and the separate estate in payment of separate creditors, and only the surplus of each estate is to be applied in satisfaction of the other class of creditors." ^ And now it is declared by statute in the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 40, sub-s. 3 : " In the case of partners the joint estate shall be applic- able in the first instance in payment of their joint debts, and the separate estate of each partner shall be applicable in the first instance in payment of his separate debts. If there is a surplus of the separate estates it shall be dealt with as part of the joint estate. If there is a surplus of the joint estate it shall be dealt with as part of the respec- tive separate estates in proportion to the right and interest of each partner in the joint estate." 1 Rolfe V. Flmver (1866), L. E. 1 P. C. at p. 48. ^ Lodrje v. Prichard (1863), 1 D. J. S. at pp. 613, 614, per Turner, L.J. The Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, s. 10, assimilates the rules of administration of deceased persons' estates to those ' ' in force tor the time being under the Law of Bankruptcy with respect to the estates of persons adjudged bankrupt:" apart from this enactment, however, the practice was already so settled on the point now in question. 3 Ex parte Dear (1876), 1 C'h. Div. at p. 519, per James, L.J.; Ex parie Morley (1873), 8 Ch. at p. 1032. 138 PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION. Chap. XI. The subject was also carefally considered by Lord ^'"'" ''^' Eomilly in Ridgwaij v. Clare} The rules there laid down by him for the various cases which may occur have been given above in the form of illustrations. Ruieof Indian The Indian Contract Act (s. 262) gives the rule as Oontraot Act. „ ,, toiiows : — " Where there are joint debts due from the partnership, and also separate debts due from any partner, the partner- ship property must be applied in the first instance in pay- ment of the debts of the firm ; and if there is any surplus, then the share of each partner must be applied in pajTuent of his separate debts or paid to laim. The separate pro- perty of any partner must be ajipUed first in the payment of his separate debts, and the surplus (if any) in the pay- ment of the debts of the fiiin." This section is general in its terms, and not confined to the administration of part- ners' estates by the Com-t. It seems intended to cover the doctrine of partners' lien, to which we have given a distinct place (Art. 56, above). The rule The rules of administration as between the creditors of empirical and doubtful in the firm and the separate creditors of the partners have been settled, and adliered to after much hesitation in tlie earlier cases, as " a sort of rough code of justice," ^ and as an empuical way of dealing with a pressing necessity, rather than as being reasonable in themselves.' They 1 19 Beav. Ill (1SJ4). - Per James, L.J., Laceji v. Hill (1872), 8 Ch. at p. 4-14. ^ " It is extremely difficult to say upon what the rule in bank- ruptcy is founded:" per Lord Eldon, (Iraxj v. Chiswell (1803), 9 Ves. at p. I'JG; to the liko effect in Ihitton v. Morruon (1810 — 1), IT Yes. at p. 211; see, too. Lodge v. Prichard (1863), 1 D. J. S. (ill), per Turner, L.J. Story (on Partnership, §§ 377, 382) says that it "rests on a foundation as questionable and unsatisfactory as any rulo in tho whole system of our jurisprudence :" Kent, on the other hand (Comm. iii. Go), thinks it on the whole a reasonable ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES. 139 give, in fact, results altogether at variance with the mer- Chap. xi. ■cantile system of settling the accounts of a firm, whicli '- — ^ — proceeds upon the mercantile conception of the fii-m as a person distinct from its partners. On the mercantile plan Mercantile the debts of the partners to the firm, as ascertained on the ^fnigtration. ■ordinary partnership accounts, are payable on the same footing as their other debts ; and if this rule were applied lay the Court, the joint estate might prove against the ■separate estate of any partner in competition with the separate creditors for the balance due from him to the firm. The creditors of the firm would thus be in a far better position than they are at present. As it is, the partners may have considerable separate property, and be largely indebted to the firm, and yet their separate creditors may be paid in full, while the creditors of the firm get hardly •any thing. 1 The law of Scotland does treat the firm as a separate Law of person, and so far agrees with the usage of merchants ; but on the point now before us it differs from the mer- cantile scheme of accounts as well as from the law of .England. The rule is, that " upon the sequestration of ■co-partners their separate estates are applicable to the pay- ment pan passu of their respective separate debts, and of one. Lord Blackburn lias all but said tbat it was invented merely to save trouble. " The reason was, I take it, not ujaon the groimd "that there was a right in the private creditors to be paid out of the separate estate, or a right in the joint creditors to be paid out of the .joint estate, for I do not think that there was any such rule ; but it was said the rule was to be adopted, partly, at least, on the ground ■of convenience in administering the bankruptcy law. It was thought that the administration of the bankruptcy law could not be conveniently carried out if the estates were to be mixed. Whether that was a right notion or not I do not know : " Head v. Bailey (1877), 3 App. Ca. at p. 102. ' See the extract from Cory on Accounts given in Lindley, ii, 1167. 140 PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION. Chap. XI. SO much of the partnership debts as the partnership estate- Art 76 • r • '. '. is insuihcient to satisfy. The creditor m a company [i.e., partnership] deht, in claiming upon the sequestrated estate of a bankrupt partner, must deduct from the amount of his claim the value of his right to draw paj-nient from the company's funds, and he is ranked as a creditor only for the balance."! This is less favourable to partnership cre- ditors than the mercantile rule, though more so than the English rule, and it is more complicated in working than either. The English rule was preferred to the Scottish by most of the persons and bodies who returned answers to- the Mercantile Law Commission ; whereas, on the other matters of difference between the partnership law of the two countries, the opinions given were almost unanimous in favom- of the law of Scotland. In France no express directions on this point are given by the Civil or Commercial Code. The prevailing opinion seems to be that the creditors of the firm have a prior claim on the partnership property, and may also come upon the separate property in competition with the sepa- rate creditors : ^ and this is the rule expressly adopted by the Swiss Federal Code of Obhgations, Ai'ts. 566 and 568. The German Commercial Code (Ai-t. 122) makes the joint estate (Gresellschaftsvermdgen) applicable in the first instance to pay the debts of the fii-m : the rights of joint and separate creditors respectively against the separate estates are left to be dealt -VNith by the mimicipal laws- (Landesgesetzeu) of the several German States. ' Second Eeport of Mercantile La-w Commission, Appendix A,, p. 99. It must be remembered that in Scotland the firm can be bankrupt -vvitliout the partners being bankrupt. - Troplong, Droit Civ. Expl., Contrat de la Societe, torn. 2, nos> 807 — 8G3 ; Sircy, Codes Anuotes, on Code Civ. ISGi, nos. 10 — 12. ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES. 141 77. Notwithstanding the last foregoing chap. xi. ■ T T" f»i/^ !• Art. 77. article, a creditor of the nrm may prove his Exceptional debt in the first instance against the separate rights of estate of a partner ii the debt has been incurred certain cases. by means of a fraud practised on the creditor tors of firm by the partners or any of them.^ against sepa- rate estate. Illustration. A. and B., trading in partnership, induce C. to accejit "bills of exchange to a large amount by representing them as •drawn to meet purchases of cotton on the joint account of A. and B.'s firm and C. The cotton has never been really bought. A. and B. become bankrupt. C. is entitled to prove at his election against the joint estate or the separate ■estates.^ There were formerly two or three other exceptions to Other _ this rule, of a doubtful and capricious kind, which are abrogated, now understood to be tacitly abolished by sect. 40 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883. They were stated in preceding editions of this book. 78. Notwithstanding Article 76, the trustee Where joint of the joint estate of a bankrupt firm may prove against separate estates or ': estate of 1 Ex parte Adamso7i (1878), 8 Ch. Div. 807, diss. Bramwell, L.J. "i™orfirm. The principle seems to be this : the creditor may proceed at his election against the joint estate for the partnership debt, or against the separate estates for the equitable UabUity to restore the money obtained by fraud. This Uabihty constitutes a provable debt, being treated apparently as a hquidated duty quasi ex contractu. And the right seems to be the same against the separate estate of a partner personally innocent of the fraud; Ex parte Salting (1883), 25 Ch. Div. 148, -where the point was not decided, as the partner had given a separate guaranty. 2 Ex parte Adamson (1878), 8 Ch. Div. 807. 142 PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION. Chap. XI. prove ^ against the separate estate of any partner^ ^^^^— or the joint estate of any distinct firm com- posed of or including any of the partners in the principal firm, debts arising out of either of the following states of fact : — 1. Where that partner or distinct firm has dealt with the principal firm in a business carried on by such partner or distinct firm as a separate and distinct trade, and the principal firm has become a creditor of such partner or distinct firm in the ordinary way of such dealing : ^ 2. Where that partner has fraudulently converted partnership projoerty to his own use^ without the consent or subsequent ratifi- cation of the other partner or partners/ Illustrations. 1 . A., B., C, D. and E. are bankers in partnership at York, and A., B., C. and D. are bankers in partnership at "Wake- field. A balance is due to the York firm from the "\Yakefield ^ That is, on behalf of the creditors of the firm. "- Lindley, ii. 1201. 3 n. 1198. * The comparison of Ex parte Harris (1813), 2 T. & B. 210, and 1 Eose, 437, with Ex parte Tonge (1814), 3 Y. &B. 31 ; 2 Rose, 40, and the judgment of Jessel, M.E., in Lacey \. Hill (1876), 4 Ch. 1>. 537, affirmed in the House of Lords, noni. Read v. Bailey (1877), 3 App. Ca. 94, seems to give this as the true form of the rule. For further remarks see on Art. 79 below. Lord Eldon's own terms, several times repeated in Ex parte Harris, arc "knowledge, consent, privity or subsequent approbation." I have ventured to act on Sir G. Jessel's intimation in Lacey v. Hill that fewer words would probably have done as well. ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES. 143'. firm on account of dealings between tlie two banks in tbe Chap. XI. ordinary course of banking business. The York firm, and __^^^1^^_ therefore also the Wakefield firm, becomes bankrupt. The trustee of the York firm may prove against the estate of the "Wakefield firm for this balance.' 2. A. and B. become partners from the 1 st of January. Under the articles all partnership moneys are to be paid into their joint names at a particular bank, and each partner may draw out £50 a month for his own use. An account is opened at the bank in the joint names of A. and B., and partnership moneys are paid into it. On the 1st of February A. draws out £550 instead of £50 without the knowledge of B., and the firm shortly afterwards becomes bankrupt. The trustee of the joint estate may prove against A.'s separate estate for £500.^ 3. A. and B. are partners under articles which provide that money received by either of them on the partnership account shall be paid monthly into a certain bank, and that each partner may draw out £50 per month for his own use. A. is the acting partner, and with the knowledge of B. pays the moneys received by him on the partnership account into his private account at his own banker's, and B. himself pays some partnership moneys into A.'s account. A. draws on the partnership funds so standing to his own account beyond the amount permitted by the articles, and also retains other partnership funds in his hands, and applies them to his own use without ever paying them in. The firm becomes bank- rupt. The trustee of the joint estate cannot prove against the separate estate of A. for the moneys drawn out in excess or not paid in, as B. has by his conduct allowed A. to have the sole dominion over the partnership funds, and must be taken to have consented to the unlimited exercise of that dominion.' 4. [A. and B. are partners, A. being the sole acting partner. A. pays out of the partnership property private debts of his 1 Ex parte Castell (1826), 2 Gl. & J. 124. 2 Per Lord Eldon, Ex parte Harris (1813), 2 V. & B. at p. 214. 3 Ex parte Harris (1813), 2 V. & B. 210, and less fully in 1 Eose, 437. "The necessary eflect of the transaction being to give the dominion over the whole fund to one . . . the other must be taken. to have consented to that dominion :" 2 V. & B. at p. 215. 144 PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION. Chap. XI. own and other debts for which, under the provisions of the ATt. 79. partnership articles, not the firm but A. separately is Uable. The firm afterwards becomes bankrupt. The trustee of the joint estate cannot prove for the amount of these debts against the separate estate of A., since A.'s conduct does not amount to a fraudulent conversion of partnership property to his own use.'] 6. A., B. and 0. are partners in a bank, A. being the sole managing partner. The articles contain clauses against over- drawing. A. draws large sums from the funds of the bank by means of fictitious credits and forged acceptances, and thereby conceals from B. and C. (who trust A.'s statements without making further inquiry) the fact that he has over- drawn his private account in contravention of the partnership articles. A. dies, and shortly afterwards B. and C. become bankrupt. The trustee of B. and C.'s joint estate may prove against A.'s estate for the amount of the partnership moneys misappHed by him." Euie against 79. Where the joint estate of a firm or the partners in Separate estate of any partner is being adminis- •competition . withcreditors. , ^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ Feudal (1790), 1 Yes. Jr. 166, and see 2 V. & B. 211, n., and Cooke's Bankrupt Laws, o30, 8th ed. The opinion of the Court was at first the other wliv, and the case has been considered one of great hardship ; see the judgment in Exi parte Yonge (1814), 3 V. & B. 31, 34 ; 2 Rose, 40. It is difficult to understand the real grounds of the decision from the report itself ; but it must now be taken that the case was one o£ the same class as Ex parte Harris (1813). See the comments on it in the judgment there, 2 V. & B. at p. 213, and Ex parte Hinds (1849), 3 De G. & Sm. at p. 61o, and by Lord Blackburn in Read v. Bailey (1877), 3 App. Ca. at p. 103, who deals with it thus: " I collect that in that case the dormant partner had, by deed, given the acting partner who carried on the business the amplest authority to invest the money in any way he pleased, and he pleased to invest it by lending it to himself, to pay his private debts. That was a very wrong thing indeed ; it was, as Lord Eldon afterwards expressed it, an abuse of his authority — a most improper use of his authority • — but he did act upon the authority." = Lacey v. Hill (1876), 4 Ch. Div. J37, affirmed in the House of Lords, nom. Read v. Bailey (1877), 3 App. Ca. 94. ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES. 145 tered, no partner in the firm may prove in com- chap. xi. ' ^ -^ ^ Art. 79. petition with the creditors of the firm either against the joint estate of the firm^ or against the separate estate of any other partner^ until all the debts of the firm have been paid. Explanation. — This rule applies to a person who, not being in fact a partner, has, by hold- ing himself or allowing himself to be held out as a partner, become liable as such to the creditors of the firm generally,^ but not to one who has so become liable to some only of the creditors.* A married woman who lends money out of lier separate property to a firm of which, her hushand is a member can (if the loan is really and not colourably a loan to the firm as distiact from the hushand ia person) prove against the joiat estate like any other creditor. Sect. 3 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, cannot he extended so as to put her in the position of a partner, and bring her within this or an equivalent rule.' Exceptions. — Partners may nevertheless prove Exceptions in . . a -I r- ^ special cir- agamst the joint estate of the firm or the sepa- cumstances. rate estate of a partner, as the case may be, for 1 Lindley, ii. 11S7. ^ lb. 1202. ■* Ex parte Hayman (1878), 8 Ch. Div. 11. « Ex parte Sheen (1877), 6 Cli. Div. 235. In the one case there is an ostensiMe partnership apparent to the public, in the other only circumstances creating at most a liability towards particular persons. 5 He Tuff, Ex parte Nottingham (1887), 19 Q. B. D. 88. P. L 146 PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION. Chap. XI. debts which have arisen under any of the fol- ■ ^ lowing states of fact : — 1. Where two firms having one or more members in common, or a firm and one of its members, have carried on business in sepa- rate and distinct trades and dealt with one another therein, and the one firm or trader has become a creditor of the other in the ordinary way of such dealing : ^ 2. Where the separate property of a partner has been fraudulently convei-ted to the use of the firm,^ or property of the firm has been fraudulently converted to the use of any partner,^ without the consent or subsequent ratification of the partner or partners not concerned in such conversion : * 3. Where, having been bankrupt, a partner has been discharged, and has afterwards become a creditor of the firm^ [or of another partner^]. Illustrations. 1. A., B. and C. are partners under articles Trhieh provide that, if any partner dies, his share shall be taken by the surviving partners at its value according to the last stock- taking, with interest at 5 per cent, on its amount in. lieu of ' Lindley, ii. 1191, 1203. ^ Per Lord Eldon, Kx parte Sillitoe (1824), 1 Gl. & J. at p. 382. » Lindloy, ii. 1198. * SeoNote 4, p. 142, above. ' Lindley, ii. 1190. ° This case -would presumably foUow the analogy of the other. ADMimSTBATION OF ESTATES. 147 profits up to the day of his death, and shall he paid out by Chap. XI. instalments. A. dies, and after his death, and before the ascertained value of his share has been paid to his executors, 3. and 0. become bankrupt. A.'s executors cannot prove against the joint estate of the firm for the amount due to them in respect of A.'s share till all other debts of the firm ■contracted during A.'s lifetime are paid.' 2. If, the other facts being as in the last illustration, all ■debts of the firm contracted in A.'s lifetime have been paid before the bankruptcy, A. 's executors may prove for the full amount ; for here they are not competing with any creditor of A.^ 3. A. and B. are partners. The partnership is dissolved by agreement, A. giving B. a bond for £10,000 and interest, and B. transferring to A. aU. his interest in the partnership. A. and a third person, C, also covenant to pay the debts of the firm. A. becomes bankrupt. B. assigns his separate property to trustees for the benefit of the creditors of the £rm. The trustees under this assignment cannot prove the bond debt against A.'s estate until all the debts of the firm are paid, or unless the creditors of the firm accept the assign- ment of B.'s property as payment in full and release the joint liability of A. and B.^ 4. A. and B. are partners. The firm becomes bankrupt. Before the bankruptcy A. is indebted to B. upon a contract independent of the partnership. It is known that there will be no surplus of A.'s separate estate after satisfying his separate debts, whether B.'s debt is admitted to proof or not. B. may prove his debt against A.'s separate estate, as he does not thereby compete with any creditor of the firm.* It is doubt- ful whether he might so prove it if A.'s separate estate were solvent.* ' Nanson v. Gordon (1876), 1 App. Oa. 195, affirming s. c. nom. Ex parte Gordon (ISW), 10 Oh. 160. 2 Ex parte Edmonds (1862), 4 D. F. J. 488. The fact that th» joint debts had been paid appears by the head-note. s Ex parte Collinge (1863), 4 D. J. S. 533. * Ex parte Topping (1865), 4 D. J. S. 551. « Zacey v. Hill (1872), 8 Ch. 441, 445. l2 148 PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION. Chap. XI. 6. A. and B. are traders in partnership, A. being a dormant ^'^- "^^^ partner. Ttey dissolve the partnership by agreement, and B. takes over the business of the firm, and is treated by its creditors as their sole debtor. On the dissolution an account is stated between A. and B. which shows a balance due to A. Afterwards A. sues B. for the amount, the action is unde- fended, and A. signs judgment for the debt and costs. Some time after this B. becomes bankrupt. A. can prove this debt in B.'s bankruptcy, because the partnership debts have been converted into the separate debts of B., and B.'s debt to A. on the account stated is a purely separate debt.^ 6. A. and B. are partners. A. also carries on a separate trade on his own account, and in that trade sells goods to the firm of A. and B. The firm of A. and B. becomes bankrupt. A. may prove against the joint estate for the balance due on the dealings between A. in his separate business and the firm of A. and B.^ 7. A., B., C. and D. are bankers in partnership under the firm of 0. & Co. A. and B. are ironmongers under the firm of A. & Co. A. and B. indorse in the name of A. & Co. bOls remitted to them by C. & Co., and procure them to be dis- counted on the credit of this indorsement ; they also draw bills in the name of A. & Co. for the use of C. & Co. The firm of C. & Co. becomes bankrupt. A. and B. cannot prove against the joint estate for the balance due to them on these transac- tions, as their dealings with 0. & Co. were not in the course of their separate trade, but only " for the convenience of the general partnership." ^ The same rule applies even if A. & Co. are bankers.* 8. A., B. and C. are bankers in partnership. C, the managing partner, becomes bankrupt. A balance is due from him to the firm on the partnership account, and he has also obtained large sums of money on bills drawn and in- dorsed by him in the name of the fii-m, and applied the money 1 Ex parte Grazihrook (183:2), 2 D. & Oh. 1ST ; see the explanation in Lindley, ii. l-Oo. » Ex parte Cook (1831), Mont. liiS. » Ex parte Si!l/toe (1824), 1 Gl. & J. 37-1. « Expiirte Miiiiile (18G7), 2 Ch. 550. ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES. 149 to his own use, and A. and B. have been compelled to take Chap. XI. up the bills. A. and B., having paid all the debts of the firm ^^- '^^- ■existing at the date of the bankruptcy, may prove in O.'s bankruptcy for the amount thus received and misapplied by him.' 9. A. and B. are partners under articles which provide that, if A. dies during the partnership, B.'s share in the business shall belong to A.'s' representatives. A. dies during the partnership, having appointed B. and others his executors. B. is the sole acting executor, and continues the business. He receives income of the separate property of A., and em- ploys it in the business without authority. A.'s estate is insolvent, and is administered by the Court. B. becomes bankrupt, and the joint estate of the late firm is administered in the bankruptcy. The receiver of A.'s estate may prove in the bankruptcy of B. for the moneys misapplied by B. as A.'s •executor.^ 10. A firm becomes bankrupt. One of the partners obtains his discharge, and afterwards takes up notes of the firm. He may prove for their amount against the joint estate.^ 11. 0. and K. are partners under the firm of 0. & Co. C, without K.'s knowledge, procures G. and W. to establish a business under the firm of W. & Co., W. being the manager and holding himself out as a principal, and G. a trustee for •C., who is the only real principal. Dealings take place be- tween the firms of 0. & Co. and W. & Co., and the firm of W. & Co. becomes indebted to the firm of C. & Co. for goods sold and money lent in the ordinary course of business. These ■dealings are not known to K. Both 0. & Co. and W. become bankrupt. Here C. & Co. cannot prove against W.'s estate, inasmuch as there is not any real debt.* 1 Ex parte Yonge (1814), 3 V. & B. 31, and 2 Eose, 40. = Ex parte Westcott (18'74), 9 Ch. 626. 3 Ex parte Atkins (1820), Buck, 4*79. 4 Be Wakeham (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 43. This is a singular case. As between 0. and W. there was no real contract m.aking W. liable to pay, since C. knew all the facts ; as between K. and W. there jnight have been a contract by holding out if K. had known of the transactions at the time, but he did not ; neither could K. get the benefit of .'s ostensible contract by ratification, for there was -nothing to ratify. 150 PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION. Chap. XI. Art. 79. Principles of exceptional right of proof where pro- perty has been wrongfully converted to the use of the firm or of a partner. Fraud in strict sense need not be proved. The exceptional right of proof in cases where there has been a wrongful conversion of partnership property to the- use of one partner or vice versa is established by compara- tively early authorities which settle the principle, but are not very clear in their language, and leave sundry questions open as to the limits of the rule. It is somewhat unfortu- nate that Ex parte Lodge and Fendal^ acquired the reputa- tion of being a leading case on the subject ; for the facts are not stated in sufficient detail, and the ultimate decision is nowhere fully reported. The real leading case appears rather to be Ex parte Karris^ which was in fact so treated in Lacey v. Hill? In this last case the whole question is dealt -n-ith, and especially the judgment of Sir Gr. Jessel, then Master of the Eolls, greatly lessens the difficulty of giving a complete- and exact statement of the law. The points specially considered were the following : — First, what is a fraudulent conversion of partnership property to a partner's separate use^ within the meaning- of the rule? A wilfully dishonest intention, or conduct, which, in the language of Lord Eldon, adopted by Jessel, M.E.., amounts to stealing the partnership property,, is generally found to be present in these cases, but it need not be proved in every case. " It is not," said Sir Gr. Jessel,* " necessaxy for the joiafr estate* to prove more than, in the words of Lord Eldon,® that this overdrawing was for private purposes, and %vithout > 1 Ves. Jr. 166 (1790); see Note 1, p. 144, above. 2 2 V. & B. 210 (1813). ■■* See Note 2, p. 144, above; 4 Cb. Div. o37 ; nom. Read v. Bailey (1877), 3 App. Ca. 04. * Everytbing bare said is equally applicable, of course, to tbe- converse case, wbicb, bowever, is in practice very rare, if indeed it occurs at all. 5 4 Cb. D. at p. 543. « Ex parte Harris (1813), 2 V. & B. at p. 214. ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES. 151 the knowledge, consent, privity, or sutseqiient approbation Chap. XI. of the other partners. If that is shown, it is prima facie a '. — '. — , fraudulent appropriation within the rule." Hence it would appear that the term fraud is used for the purposes of this rule in the wide sense formerly given to it by Courts of Equity. Lord Blackburn puts the question ia a slightly different way : " "Was this debt in respect of which the claim is sought to be made upon the separate estate contracted by the authority, expressed or implied, of the firm, though that authority might have been abused in contracting it, or was it done by fraud, without any authority, by an absolute fraudulent conversion of the property of the firm ? " ^ It is said, agaia, that a mere excess in degree of an act authorized in kind, such as an overdraft entered in the books without concealment, is not fraud withia the meaning of the rule.^ These remarks do not seem to agree with the proposition laid down by Sir Gr. Jessel in its full extent; it was not necessary to define the point, as in the case before the Court the fraud was gross and elaborately concealed. Next, what wiU amount to imphed authority ? It must Consent or be admitted that one partner may give assent by conduct ^^ ^ \j as well as by words to the uncontrolled and unlimited conduct: ■^ _ _ question of exercise of dominion over the partnership funds by the constructive other, and that a general assent so given may have the same effect as regards the other partner's dealings with the funds as if those dealings had been severally and specially authorized. So much is established by the decision in & parte Harris.^ But a distinct question remains, whether the doctrine of constructive notice applies > 3 App. Ca. 104 (1877). ' Lord Cairns, 3 App. Ca. 99 (1877), and James, L.J., 4 Ch. Div. 553 (1876). » 2 V. & B. 210 (1813). 152 PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION. Chap. XI. Art. 79. 1 Decision in Lacey v. Sill that doctrine of construo- tive notice is not here applicable ; to these cases ; in other words, whether means of know- ledge on the part of the partner defrauded are equivalent to actual knowledge. If he might have discovered the misappropriation of partnership funds by using ordinary dihgence in the partnership affairs, can he be deemed to have assented to the misappropriation ? or (which seems a better way of putting it) is he estopped from saying that the misappropriation was not consented to or ratified by him ? There is some show of authority in favour of an afiSrmative answer. Lord Eldon said, in Ex parte Yonge^ "If his partners cotdd have known that he [the acting partner] had applied it to his own purposes from their immediate or subsequent knowledge upon subsequent dealing, their consent would be implied : " a dictum which, though far from lucid, seems in its most natural reading to lay down the doctrine that constructive notice or means of knowledge will have the same effect as actual consent or a ratification by words or conduct founded on actual knowledge. And in the much later case of Ex parte Hinds,^ the judgment of the Commissioner, from which Knight Bruce, V.-C, did not dissent, proceeds without hesitation on this doctrine. The case was finally disposed of, however, on the ground that there was in fact no con- version at all, the investment in question, though unautho- rized, having been made on the partnership account. The contrary doctrine, on the other hand, was distinctly and positively laid down by Sir Gr. Jessel in Lacey v. Hill,^ and does not appear to have been contested on the appeal to the House of Lords, the result of which was to affirm the decisions below in all points.* There must be, he said ' 3 V. & B. at p. 36 (1814). = 3 De G. & Sm. 613, 616—7 (1849). = 4 Ch. D. o37 (1876). « Rtad V. Bailey (1877), 3 App. Ca. 9^. ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES. 153 in effect, a real consent or acquiescence ; and acquiescence chap. XI.. means, not the existence of facts whicli may be said to '- — '- — amount to constructive notice, but standing by with know- ledge — actual knowledge — of one's rights, both in fact and law. Neither can the result aimed at by the theory '^°'^ *^a* <>* - estoppel by of constructive notice be obtained in another way by negligence, putting it on the ground of estoppel by negligence. A person who has committed gross fraud — or his creditors who stand in his place — cannot be heard to complain of the negligence of the person defrauded in not finding out the fraud sooner. The language of the judgment leaves room for the suggestion that this does not apply to a case where there is not actual fraud in the strict sense, a stealing of the partnership funds ; so that in such a case it may ■ still be arguable that means of knowledge will do. But there is hardly room for a distinction of this kind when the misappropriation such as to give a right of proof is once established. Absence of concealment and facilities for discovery by the other partners are material, if at all, rather on the preliminary point whether the dealing was indeed fraudiolent, as in the case put in the Court of Appeal of overdrafts being truly entered in the books in the usual way. It was further argued in Lacey v. Sill that, in order to establish the right of proof against the separate estate, it was necessary to show that the separate estate (that is, the fund available for the separate creditors) had been actually increased by the sums misappropriated. This argument, apparently a novel one, found no favour vidth the Court. A man's separate estate is increased by any increase of his private means ; increasing his own means out of the part- nership estate, whatever he does with the funds so taken, is in fact increasing his separate estate. " Whether the separate estate has in the result been increased or not — 154 PROGEDUBE AND ADMINISTRATION. Chap. XI. whether at the time of the proof it is larger than it other- ^^- ''^^ wise would have been or not— is a matter which does not concern the application of the rule, and it is sufficient that at one time the separate estate was increased when th& property was thus fraudulently converted and taken for the purpose of one partner." ^ The Court has nothing to do with tracing the subsequent fate of the sums misap- propriated : if in any particular case they could be traced and identified in a specific investment, the right of the joint estate would be of a difierent kind ; there would be a case, not for proof, but for restitution.^ Ordinary _ It will be remembered that apart from these special tors against rules a partnership creditor is always entitled to a remedy ner^restate!'' against the estate of a deceased partner concurrently with his right of action against any surviving partner, but subject to the prior claim of the deceased partner's separate creditors; and that it is immaterial in what order these remedies are pursued if the substantial conditions of not competing with separate creditors, and of the surviving partner beiag before the Court, are satisfied in the pro- ceedings against the deceased paj±ner's estate.' Double proof It will also be observed that where a joint Kability and where distinct ^^g ^^ more separate liabilities axe created in different causes oi -"^ action. rights in the course of the same transaction, there is no rule against the concurrent enforcement of both. Trustees of a settlement paid money for the purpose of a specific investment to a firm of solicitors in which one of the trustees was a partner; that firm misapplied the money and became bankrupt ; the new trustees were admitted to ^ Lord Cairns, 3 App. Ca. 100 (1877). 2 4 Oh. Div. 543. ' Re Hodgson, Beckett v. Ramsdale (1885), 31 Ch. Div. 177, and see Art. 14 above. ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES. 155- prove both against the separate estate of the defaulting Chap. xi. trustee in respect of his breach of trust, and against the ^ — '- — joint estate of the firm in respect of their contract to invest or restore the money (these being distinct and independent obligations), without deciding whether the contract of the firm was not of itself joint and several.^ 80. Any creditor of a firm holding a seen- Eights of joint creditors- ritj lor his debt upon separate property o± any holding- partner may prove against the joint estate of security, or the firm, and any separate creditor of a partner holding a security for his debt upon the pro- perty of the firm may prove against that part- ner's separate estate, without giving up his security : provided that the creditor must in no case receive in the vphole more than the full amount of his debt.^ Explanation. — Representations niade to a creditor by the partner or partners giving him a security that the property on vphich the security is given is separate, or is the property of the firm, as the case may be, do not affect or extend the application of this rule.^ Illustrations. 1. A., B. and C. are partners, and open a banking account ' Be Parker, Ex parte Sheppard (188*7), 19 Q. B. D. 84. 2 lie Plummer (1841), 1 Ph. 56, 60; Eolfe v. Flower (1866), L. E. 1 P. C. at p. 46; Lindley, ii. 1183, 1213. For the general rule as to the treatment of secured debts in bankruptcy, see 11. 1181, and Schedule 2 to the Bankruptcy Act, 1883 ; also Couldery v. Bartrum (1880— 1), 19 Ch.Div. 394; Societe Generale de Paris y. Geen (1883), 8 App. Oa. 606. ' See Illustration 4. 156 PROGEDUBE AND ADMINISTRATION. Chap. XI. withD. The bank makes advances to tlie firm on tlie security ^"^^- ^°- of the joint and several promissory note of A., B. and 0. Afterwards A. gives the bank a mortgage of separate property of his own to secure the balance then due and future advances to a limited extent. The firm becomes bankrupt, being at the time indebted to the bank beyond the amount covered by the promissory note and mortgage respectively. After realizing the mortgage security, D. may prove against the joint estate upon the promissory note for the balance of the debt.' 2. A. is in partnership with liis son, B. They execute to a partnership creditor, C, a joint and several bond for his debt, and A. also gives 0. an equitable mortgage on land which is his separate property. The partnership is afterwards dis- solved. A. dies intestate, and B. becomes bankrupt. The partnership debts and A.'s other debts are of such an amount that, apart from this mortgage debt, A.'s estate would be in- solvent. Here C. may prove his debt in B.'s bankruptcy without giving up his security, as B. has no beneficial interest in the mortgaged estate, and C.'s security is therefore not on B.'s estate.' 3. A. and B. are partners. The firm keeps a banking account with C. & Co., with whom A. likewise keeps a separate account. A. deposits with the bank the title-deeds of separate property of his own, to secure the balance of account due or to become due from him, either alone or together with any one in partnership with him. The firm of A. and B. becomes bankrupt. Both the account of the firm and A.'s separate account are overdrawn. C. & Co. may prove against the joint estate for the whole balance due from the fitrm to the bank, and apportion the proceeds of the security on A.'s property between the balance due from the firm and that due from A. as they think fit, allowing for what comes to them under the proof against the joint estate.^ C. & Co. may also prove against A.'s separate estate for the residue of A.'s separate ' Ex parte Bate (1838), 3 Deac. 358. = Ex parte Turney (1844), 3 M. D. & D. 576. ^ For this purpose they may apply to the Coart to have a dividend declared first on the joint estate under s. 59 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883 : see Art. 74, above. ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES. 157 debt to them, after deducting the apportioned part of the chap. XI. proceeds of the security.' ^^^- ^^- 4. A. and B. are partners. A. is a shareholder in a bank incorporated under the Companies Acts, which by the articles of association has a lien on the shares of every shareholder for debts due to the bank from him either alone or jointly ■with any other person. A.'s shares are in fact, but not to the knowledge of the bank, partnership property. The firm of A. and B. becomes bankrupt. The bank cannot treat these shares as A.'s separate property for the purpose of its lien, and cannot prove against the joint estate for the balance due from the firm of A. and B. without deducting the value of the shares.^ 81. "If a debtor was at the date of the Double proof allowed on receiving order liable in respect of distinct distinct con- contracts as a member of two or more distinct firms, or as a sole contractor, and also as mem- ber of a firm, the circmnstance that the firms are in whole or in part composed of the same individuals, or that the sole contractor is also one of the joint contractors, shall not prevent proof* in respect of the contracts against 1 Ex parte Dichin (1875), 20 Eq. 767. "-Ex parte Mancliester and County Bank (1876), 3 Oh. Div. 481. The reason is, according to Mellish, L.J. (at p. 487), that the question is not between the partners and the secured creditor, but between the secured creditor and the other creditors of the firm, so that the principle of estoppel does not apply. James, L. J., doubted as to the principle, and Baggallay, J. A., preferred to rest the decision on the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act as to secured creditors. ^ The statutory right to prove carries the right to receive divi- dends, and is in no case merely formal : see Ex parte Honey (1871), 7 Ch. 178. 158 PEOGEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION. Chap. XI Art. 81. Chap. XI. the properties respectively Kable on the con- tracts." ^ In cases not included in the foregoing rule a creditor to whom a firm is liable, and to whom its members are also severally liable for the same debt, must elect whether he will proceed as a creditor of the firm or as a separate creditor of the partners.^ Illustrations. 1. A., B., and others are partners in a firm of A. & Co. A joint and several promissory note is made and signed by A. & Co., by A. and B. separately, and by other persons. After- wards the firm of A. & Co. becomes bankrupt. Here the contract of the firm and the separate contracts of A. and B. contained in the same note are distinct contracts ■within the above rule, and the holder of the note may prove against and receive dividends from both the joint estate of the firm and the separate estates of A. and B.' 2. A. & B. are partners. They borrow a sum of money for partnership purposes from C, and C. settles the debt upon certain trusts by a deed in which A. and B. jointly and severally covenant with D. to pay the sum. The deed does not show that A. and B. are partners or that the debt is a partnership debt. The firm becomes bankrupt. Here it may be shown by external evidence that the joint contract of A. and B. in the deed is in fact the contract of their firm, and D. may prove against the joint estate of the firm in respect of the I Bankruptcy Act, 1SS3 (46 & 47 Vict. c. o2), Sched. 2. Art. 18. ''■ This was the old general rule, which is now practically reduced to an exception of no great importance; Lindley, ii. 1208, 1212. The cases cited as illustrations will show that the Court is iaclined to give a liberal application to the modem enactment. » Ex parte Honey (1871), 7 Ch. 178. ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES. 159 joint covenant, and against the separate estates of A. and B. Chap. XI. in respect of their several covenants.^ -^''''- ^^- 82. Where the discharge of any member Effect of , . « . T .,...,. separate dis- 01 a partnership firm is granted to him m his charge of separate bankruptcy, he is thereby released from the debts of the firm as well as from his separate debts.^ Ex parte Stone (ISYS), 8 Ch. 914. Ex parte Hammond (1873), 16 Eq. 614. 161 APPENDIX. In 1879, at the request of Mr. Sampson Lloyd, then member lor Plymouth, I drew a Bill for the consolidation and amend- ment of the law of partnership. The objects of this Bill were : — 1. To codify the existing law, for which the present work served as an outhne. 2. To introduce a system of limited partnership correspond- ing to partnership en commandite. 3. To introduce general registration of firms. In 1880 the Bill passed a second reading, and was in a general way approved by the Board of Trade on condition of the plan for a general registration of firms being dropped, which accordingly was done by means of amendments on a committal pro forma: but there was no time for further progress. In 1882 the BiU, thus amended, was again brought in, and was referred to a Select Committee, which reported the con- solidating part with amendments, but declined to proceed with the part relating to limited partnerships. The Bill went into committee of the whole house, where many further amendments were proposed, and some agreed to : but on the whole little way was made, and the BiU again dropped. The consolidating part alone was again introduced, with the amendments formerly adopted at various stages, in the Session of 1883; but this time it did not come to a second reading, the debate standing adjourned on a Wednesday, and never being resumed : ultimately the Bill was withdrawn. In 1884 a BiU for general registration of firms, being the abandoned part of the Partnership BiU of 1 879 — 80, with some additions and variations of detail, was separately introduced. This is the part which the original promoters of the BiU cared most for. PersonaUy I never cared much for it, and P. M 162 APPENDIX. I now tliink it a mistake, though limited partnerships, if recognized by law, would certainly have to be registered. One or more of these Bills have, I believe, been introduced in subsequent sessions, but there has not been further debate on them in Parliament. It is thought convenient to reprint here the consolidating BiU of 1883, with a few explanatory notes, and also the limited partnership clauses of the Bill of 1880. These last are doubtless capable of much improvement, as the experiment of drafting provisions for the establishment of commandite partnership in an English form was all but untried. But, inasmuch as the matter seems as far as ever from coming to anything practical, I have not thought it worth whUe to give any more consideration to it at present. PAHTNEESHIPS BILL (1883). Aeea2<^gement of Ciaxtses. Preliminary. Clause. 1. Short title. 2. Commencement of Act. 3. Extent of Act. 4. Interpretation of terms. 5. Application of Act. PaetI. Of Partners and their liability and authority in respect of Partnership Dealings. 6. Partnership defined. 7. Part ownership not to create partnership. 8. Sharing of gross returns not to create partnership. 9. Sharing proiits not necessarily partnei-ship. 10. Payment out of profits not to create partnership. As to person advancing money for share of profits. As to agent remunerated by share of profits. As to widows or children of deceased partners receiving share of profits as annuity. As to seller of goodwill reoeiv- iag share of profits. 11 12 13 U 16. 17. 18. Clause. 16. Seller of goodwill receiving share of profits to be post- poned to other creditors for value in case of bankruptcy, &c., of buyer. What is a firm- Number of persons in a firm. Choice of finn name. 19. Revocation of continuing gua- ranty by change in firm. 20. liability of partners. 21. Liabilities of outgoing and in- coming partners. 22. Persons liable by "holding out. ' ' 23. Partners bound by acts on be- half of firm. 24. Power of partner to bind the firm. 25. Special powers of partners. 20. Special powers of partners in certain firms. 27. Partner using credit of firm for private purposes. 2S. Efi:'eot of notification that firm will not be bound by acts of partner. Admissions and representations of partners. Notice to acting partners to be notice to the firm. 29 30 PARTNERSHIPS BILL (1883). 163 "Clause. ■31. Liability for -wrongs joint and several. -32. Liability of the firm for -wrongs. -33. MisappUoation of money or property received for or in custody of the firm. -34. Improper employment of trust propertyforpartnership pur- poses. Pabt II. The relations of Partners to one another. -35. Terms of partnership may be varied only by consent of all partners. -36. Partnership property. -37. Property bought with partner- diip money. 38. Conversion into personal estate for some purposes of land held as partnership pro- perty. 39. Conversion of joint into sepa- rate estate, or conversely, by agreement of partners. 40. What is a partner's share. 41. Procedure against partnership property for a partner's separate judgment debt. 42. Rules as to interests and duties of partners, subject to special agreement : 1. Presumed equality of shares. 2. Eight of partners to indemnity and contri- bution. 3. Eight of partners to take part in business. 4. Dutyof gratuitous dili- gence in partnership business. 6. Po-wer of majority to decide diEEerences. 6. Admission of new part- ners. 7. Change in nature or place of business. 8. Custody and inspection of partnership books. 43. Partner cannot be expelled un- less under express power. 44. Eetirement from partnership for a term only by consent. 45. Eetirement from partnership at wiU. Clause. 46. Where partnership for term is continued over, continuance on old terms presumed. 47. Partners must act for common advantage. 48. Partners must not mate private gain by partnership transac- tions or by means of partner- ship connection. 49. Partner must not compete with firm. Pabi III. The Dissolution of Partnerships and its consequences. 50. Dissolution by expiration or notice. 51. Dissolution by bankruptcy, death, &c. 52. Dissolution by illegality of partnership. 63. Dissolution by the Court. 54. Eights of creditors against ap- parent members of firm. 65. Eight of partners to notify dis- solution. 66. Continuing authority of part- ners for purposes of winding- up. 57. Eights of partners as to appli- cation of partnership pro- perty. 58. Sale of good-will on disso- lution. 59. Eight of partners to restrain use of partnership name. 60. Peculiar rights in special cases of dissolution : apportion- ment of premium in certain cases where partnership pre- maturely dissolved : lien on assets where partnership dis- solved for fraud. 61. Eight of outgoing partner in certain cases to share pro- fits made after dissolution. 62. Exercise of option to purchase outgoing partner's share. 63. Eetiring or deceased partner's share to be a debt. 64. Eule for distribution of assets on final settlement of ac- counts. Pabt IV. 65. Eepeal of 28 & 29 Vict. e. 86, and 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 4. m2 164 APPENDIX. A BILL to consolidate and amend the Law of Partnerships. Be it enacted by the Queen's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and. Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as foUows : Preliminary. Short title. 1. This Act may be cited as the Partnership Act, 1883. Commence- 2. This Act shall commence and come into force on the- ment of Act. ^^^ ^^^ ^^ January one thousand eight hundred and eighty- four. Extent of Act. 3. This Act shall not extend to Scotland. Interpreta- ^' '^^ ^^^ ^"^^ ^^ following words and expressions are used tion of terms, in the following senses, unless a different intention appears- from the context : " Court " includes every Court, judge and magistrate havings jurisdiction in the case. " Business " includes any trade, occupation, or profession. "Person" includes any body of persons corporate or un- incorporate. " Writing " includes print, and "written " includes printed. "Land " includes hereditaments, corporeal and incorporeal, of any tenure. Application 5. This Act shall not apply to any company or association, of Act. ^.j^^j^ ig_ (o.) Registered as a company under the Companies Act, 25 & 26 Vict. 1862, or any other Act of Parliament for the time- being in force and relating to the registration of joint-stock companies ; or (b.) Formed or incorporated by or in pvirsuance of any other Act of Parliament or letters patent or Eoyal Charter j or (c.) A company engaged in working mines within and subject to the jurisdiction of the Stannaries. PARTNERSHIPS BILL (1883). 165 PAET I. Of Partners, and their liability and authority in respect of Partnership Dealings. 6. — (1.) Partnership is the relation which subsists between PartnersMp "persons who have agreed to carry on business and share profits defined. in some way in common.' (2.) In deciding whether a partnership does or does not Question of • exist in any particular case, the Court shall have regard to te'dedd^ W the true contract and intention of the parties as appearing true intention from the whole facts of the case. °* P^^*^""- 7. Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, or part ownership, Part owner- . shall not of itself create a partnership as to anything so held Lgf+e'lajw-. •or owned, whether there is or is not a partnership between nersMp. the tenants or owners as to any profits made by the use ' thereof. 8. The sharing of gross returns shall not of itself create Sharing of a partnership, whether the persons sharing such returns have ^t'^'^^reate -or have not a joint or common interest in any property from partnership, which or from the use of which the returns are derived. 9. The receipt of a share of the profits or of a payment Sharing ■ contingent upon or varying with the profits of any business neoesa^aSy shall not of itseK make the person receiving the share or partnership, payment a partner with the person carrying on the business. 10. The receipt of a debt or other liquidated amount by Payment out instalments or otherwise out of the accruing profits of any toCTeSemrt- business shall not of itself make any person receiving the nership. • debt or sum a partner in the business. 1 The definition was altered in Committee to this fon^, which appears to me vag^e and clumsy. The words "in some way in common" add nothing to the meaning. Such language may become a judge who wishes to disclaim formal definition. It is not fit for the Legislature. Moreover it is not clear whether or not the words apply (whatever the intended effect of their application may be) to the words "carry on "business " as weU as to "share profits." 166 APPENDIX. As to person advancing money for share of profits. 11. The advance of money by way of loan to a person engaged or about to engage in any business upon a contract in writing with that person that the lender shall receive a rate- of interest varying with the profits, or shall receive a share of the profits arising from carrying on the business, shall not of itself constitute the lender a partner with the person or- persons carrying on the business or render him responsible as such. As to agent remunerated l>y share of profits. 12. A contract for the remuneration of a servant or agent of any person engaged in any business by a share of the profits of the business shall not of itself render the servant or agent responsible as a partner therein, nor give him the rights of a partner. As to -widows or children of 13. A person being the widow or child of a deceased partner, and receiving by way of annuity a portion of the ners receiving profits made in the business in which the deceased person shareofprofits -^^s a partner, shall not by reason only of such receipt be deemed to be a partner in the business or to be subject to any liabilities incurred therein. As to seller of good-will receiving share of profits. 14. A person receiving by way of annuity or otherwise a portion of the profits of any business in consideration of the sale by him of the goodwill of the business shall not by reason only of the receipt be deemed to be a partner of or be subject to the liabilities of the person carrying on the business. Seller of good- ■vvill receiving share of profits to he postponed to other creditors for value in case of bank- ruptcy, &c. of buyer. 15. In the event of any person to whom money has been advanced upon such a contract as aforesaid, or any buyer of a goodwill in consideration of a share of the profits of the business, being adjudged a bankrupt, entering into an arrangement to pay his creditors less than twenty shillings in the pound or dying in insolvent circumstances, the lender of any such loan as aforesaid shall not be entitled to recover anything in respect of his loan, and the seller of the goodwill shall not be entitled to recover anything in respect of the shai-e of profits contracted for, until the claims of the other- PARTNERSHIPS BILL (1883). 167 creditors of the borrower or buyer for valuable consideration in money or money's worth have been satisfied.' 16. Persons who have entered into partnership with one What is a another are called collectively a fiim, and the name under ™'' which their business is carried on is called the firm-name. 17. A firm may consist of any number of persons not Numterof exceeding ten where the business of the partnership is ^^° "^ banking, and not exceeding twenty where it is any other business.* 18. Subject to all statutory and other rules of law for the Choice of protection of trade marks, trade names, and rights incident to ™™-iiame. the goodwill of any business, partners may carry on their business under any firm-name they think proper. 19. A continuing guaranty given either to a firm or to a EeTocation of third person in respect of the transactions of a firm is, in the contmiung '^ ^ ' guaranty by absence of agreement to the contrary, revoked as to future change in transactions by any change in the constitution of the firm to ^™' which, or in respect of the transactions of which, the guaranty was given. 20. Every partner in a firm is liable jointly with the other Liability of partners for all debts and obligations incurred while he is a P^^'^sre. partner and in the usual course of partnership business by or on behalf of the firm ; and after his death his estate is also severally liable for such debts and obligations, so far as they remain unsatisfied. 21. — (1.) A partner who retires from a firm does not thereby Liabilities of cease to be liable for partnership debts contracted before his pi^^go^g and ■*■ incoming retirement. partners. (2.) A person who is admitted as a partner into an existing firm does not thereby become liable to the creditors of the firm for anything done before he became a partner. 1 Clauses U — lb are re-enactment of 25 & 26 Vict. c. 86. ' Companies Act, 1862, s. 4. 168 APPENDIX. (3.) A retiring partner may be discharged from any existing liabilities, and an incoming partner may become subject thereto, by an agreement to that effect between the members of the firm as newly constituted and the creditors. (4.) Such agreement as mentioned in the last sub-section may be either express or inferred as a fact from the course of dealing between the creditors and the firm as ne-wly consti- tuted. Persons Hable 22. — (1.) Every one who by -words spoken or -written or by by^ '^'holding: conduct represents himself, or who knowingly suffers himself to be represented, as a partner in a particular firm is liable as such partner to any one who has on the faith of any such representation given credit to the firm, whether the repre- sentation has or has not been made or communicated to the particular person so giving credit by or with the knowledge of the apparent partner making or suffering the representa- tion. (2.) Provided that where after a partner's death the part- nership business is continued in the old firm-name, the con- tinued use of that name or of the deceased partner's name as part thereof shall not of itself make his executors or admin- istrators estate or effects liable for any partnership debts contracted after his death. Partners 23. Acts and instruments relating to the business of the on'beh^ of ^^"^ ^'^'^ ^^^^ ^^^ executed in the firm-name, or in any other firm. manner showing an intention to bind the firm, by any person thereto authorized, whether a partner or not, shall be binding on all the partners. Provided that this section shall not affect any general rule of law relating to the execution of deeds. Power of 24. Subject to the provisions of this Act the acts of every biQd"ae firm. P^^*^^'-' ^^^ ^oes any act necessary for or usually done in carrying on business of the kind carried on by the firm of which he is a member shall bind his partners to the same extent as if he were their agent duly appointed for that pur- pose ; unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority PABTNEESEIP8 BILL (1883). 169 to act for the firm in the particular matter, and the person with -whom he is dealing (a.) knows that he has no authority, or (6.) does not know him to be a partner. 25. Suhiect to the provisions of the last section, every part- Special nOTT^^TS Ox ner may bind the firm by any of the following acts : partners. (a.) He may sell any goods or personal chattels of the firm. (J.) He may purchase on account of the firm any goods of a kind necessary for or usually employed in the busi- ness carried on by it. (c.) He may receive payment of debts due to the firm, and give receipts or releases for them. (rf.) He may hire and engage servants and agents for any purposes of the partnership business for which servants or agents are necessarily or usually em- ployed. (e.) He may draw cheques on the bankers of the firm in the firm-name. 26. In addition to the powers mentioned in the last fore- Special going section, and subject as therein mentioned, every member partners in of a partnership carrying on business of a kind in which any certain firms, of the following acts is usually done, may bind the firm by the same respectively : (a.) He may draw, accept, indorse, make, and issue bills and other negotiable instruments in the name of the firm. (b.) He may borrow money on the credit of the firm. (c.) He may for the purpose of such borrowing or of secur- ing an existing debt pledge any goods or personal chattels belonging to the firm. (d.) He may for the like purposes make an equitable mort- gage by deposit of deeds or otherwise of real estate or chattels real belonging to the firm.' ' On the last revision of the BUI this clause was framed as it now stands, in order to get rid of the formal distinction hetween trading and ■other partnerships. And now that the enumeration of "traders" has disappeared from the Bankruptcy Act of 1883, the amendment would be not only convenient bat necessary. Tet ak unwaiy reader might infer that it is always an open question of fact ■inhat is usual in the par- ■tioular business, which is not the case. 170 APPENDIX. Partner using credit of firm for private purposes. 27, Where one partner pledges the credit of the firm for a. purpose apparently not connected with the partnership affairs, the firm shall not be bound, unless he is in fact specially authorised by the other partners ; but this section shall not affect any liability which may arise from any other partner having so conducted himself as to give reasonable ground to the party dealing with the partner first mentioned for believiag him to be so authorized. Effect of noti- fication that firm will not "be bound by- acts of partner. 28. AU or any of the partners in a firm may give notice that the firm will not be bound by acts, or by some class of acts, done in the name of the firm by any one or more of the partners ; and if the partner or partners last aforesaid deal in the name of the firm in any matter comprised in the notice- with any person to whose knowledge the notice has come, that dealing shall not be binding on the firm. Admissions and repre- sentations of partners. 29. An admission made by any partner concerning tha partnership affairs shall be relevant against the firm, and a representation made by any partner to any person concerning the partnership affairs shall have the same effect as against the firm, and so far as concerns the civil rights and KabUities of the partners, as if it had been made by all the partners : provided that this section shall not apply to a representation made by one partner as to the extent of his own authority to bind the firm. Notice to act- ing partners to be notice to the firm. 30. Notice to any partner who habitually acts in the partnership business of any matter relating to partnership affairs shall be deemed to be notice to the firm, except in the case of a fraud upon the firm committed by or with the con- sent of that partner. Liability for 31. Every partner shall be liable jointly with his co- wS'several'* pai'tners and also severally for everything for which the firm while he is a partuer therein becomes liable under either of the two next following sections. Liability of the firm for -wrongs. 32. Whore by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the firm, loss. PARTNERSHIPS BILL (1883). 171 or injury is caused to any person not being a partner in the firm, or any penalty is incurred, the firm is liable tberefor to the same extent as tbe partner so acting or omitting to act. 33. — (1.) Where any money or property of a third person Misapplica- is received by one partner, acting within the scope of his real o^^propOTty ^ or apparent authority in the partnership affairs, and is mis- received for or applied by that partner, and where any money or property ^J'lBrm.''*' of a third person being as such in the custody of the firm is misapplied by any partner, the firm shall be liable to make good the loss. (2.) For the purposes of this section money shall be deemed to be in the custody of the firm when it has been paid to any agent of the firm, or paid or credited to the account of the firm with any person, in the ordinary course of business, or under such circumstances that a partner using ordinary dili- gence in the partnership affairs would be aware of the payment or transaction. 34. If a partner, beiag a trustee, improperly employs Improper em- trust property in the business or on the account of the partner- trustproperty ship, no other partner shall be liable for the trust property to for partner- the persons beneficially interested therein unless he ^ ^ ^^^ (a.) Kjiew of the breach of trust, or {b.) With reasonable diligence might have known it. In either of the last-mentioned cases the partner or partners having such knowledge or means of knowledge as aforesaid shall be liable for the breach of trust as if he or they had been a trustee or trustees of the misapplied trust property, and jointly and severally if more than one. PAET II. The relations of Partners to one another. 35. Where the mutual rights and duties of partners have Terms of part- been determined by a special contract between them, the con- ^ereJup may tract may be rescinded or varied by the consent of all the by consent of partners. aU partners. The consent required by this section may either be express or inferred from a habitual course of dealing. 172 APPENDIX. Partnership property. 36.— (1.) The partners in any firm are tenants or owners in common of all property and rights and interests in property originally brought into the partnership stock or acquired, whether by purchase or otherwise, on account of the firm, or for the purposes and in the course of the partnership business. Such property, rights, and interests are called in this Act partnership property. (2.) Provided that the legal estate or interest in any land which is partnership property shall devolve according to the nature and tenure thereof, and the general rules of law thereto applicable, but in trust, so far as necessary, for the persons beneficially interested in the land under this section. (3.) "Where co-owners of an estate or interest in any land, not being itself partnership property, are partners as to profits made by the use of that land, and purchase other land out of the profits to be used in like manner, the land so purchased shall belong to them, in the absence of an agree- ment to the contrary, not as partners, but as co-owners for the same respective estates and interests as held by them in the land first mentioned at the date of the said purchase. Property 37. Unless a contrary intention appears by express agree- mr^rshi^ iKieJit or by the nature of the transaction, property bought money. with money belonging to the firm shall be deemed to have been bought on account of the firm. Conversion, into personal estate for some purposes of land lield as partnersMp property. 38. "Where land has become partnership property, it shall be treated as between the partners (including the representa- tives of a deceased partner), and also as between the heirs of a deceased partner and his executors or administrators, as personal and not real estate, unless a contrary intention appears either by express agreement or by the conduct of the partners. Conversion of 39. Partners may at any time by agreement between ]omtmtosepa- themselves convert partnership property into the several conyersely, by property of any cne or more of the partners, or the several ugreement of property of any partner into partnership property. Such conversion, if made in good faith, shall take effect partners. PARTNERSHIPS BILL (1883). 173 not only as between the partners, but as against the creditors of the firm and of the several partners. Provided that if the firm or any partner whose separate estate is afEected by any agreement for conversion becomes bankrupt or is insolvent after the agreement is made and before it is completely executed, the property shall not be converted. 40. The share of a partner in the partnership property at What is a any time is the proportion of the then existing partnership ^^^ "^ ^ assets to which he would be entitled if the whole were realised and converted into money, and after all the then existing debts and liabUities of the firm had been discharged. 41. — (1.) After the commencement of this Act a writ of Procedure execution shall not issue against any partnership property nera^ppro-" except upon a judgment against the firm. perty for a (2.) The High Court of Justice, or a judge thereof, may, ^e^^ate^dg- on the application by summons of any judgment creditor of a ment debt, partner, make an order chargLug that partner's share in the partnership assets with payment of the amount of the judg- ment debt and interest thereon, and may by the same or a subsequent order direct all accounts and inquiries necessary or proper for ascertaining the value of the share so charged, and give all other orders and directions (including, if necessary, an order for dissolving the partnership and all directions incidental thereto) which might have been given if the charge had been made in favour of the judgment creditor by the partner. (3.) A summons imder this section shall be served on all the partners. (4.) Provided that every order for sale or foreclosiire made under this section shall include liberty for the other partner or partners to purchase or redeem the charged share. (5.) For the purposes of this section, the terms " firm " and "partners" shall include every unincorporated company and association formed for purposes of gain, and the members thereof; and "writ of execution" shall include writs of fieri facias, elegit, sequestration, and attachment, and all subse- quent writs that may issue for giving effect thereto. 174 APPENDIX. Rules as to interests and duties of part- ners subject to special agreement. Presumed ■equality of shares. Bight of part- ners to in- •demnity and contribution. Plight of part- ners to take part in busi- ness. Duty of gra- tuitous dili- gence in partnership business. Power of majority to decide •differences. Admission of new partners. Change in nature or place «f business. 42. The interests of partners in the partnership property and their rights and duties in relation to the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement between the partners, by the following rules : (1.) AH the partners are entitled to share equally in the capital and profits of the business, and must contribute equally towards the losses whether of capital or otherwise sustained by the partnership : (2.) The firm must indemnify every partner for and against payments made and personal liabilities incurred by him — {a.) In the ordinary and proper conduct of the busi- ness of the firm ; or, (5.) In or about anything necessarily done for the preservation of the business or property of the firm; and as to actual payments or advances, with interest at the rate of five per cent, per annum from the date of the payment or advance : (3.) Every partner may take part in the management of the partnership business : (4.) Every partner must attend diligently to the business of the partnership, and shall not be entitled to any remuneration for acting in such business : (5.) All differences which arise as to matters in the ordinary course of the partnership business shall be decided by a majority of the partners ; provided that the decision must be arrived at in good faith for the interest of the firm as a whole, and not for the private interest of all or any of the majority, and that every partner must have an opportunity of being heai-d in the matter. This proviso extends to powers conferred on a majority of the partners by express agreement : (6.) No person may be introduced as a partner without the consent of all existing partners : (7.) No change may be made in the conduct or regulation of the partnership affairs without the consent or authority of a majority of the partners, and no change may be made in the nature of the partnership business or the place where it is carried on without the consent of aU. existing partners : PARTNERSHIPS BILL (1883). 175 •(8.) The partnership hooks shall be kept at the place of Custody and business of the partnership (or the principal place, if mapectiraiof there is more than one), and every partner may have books, access to them, and may inspect and transcribe the same, or any of them, when he thinks proper. 43. No majority of the partners can expel any partner Partner oan- Tinless a power to do so has been conferred by express agree- uniea^/^^er :ment between the partners. express Where such power is conferred, it may be exercised only in P"^^''- good faith with a view to the benefit of the firm, and the partner whom it is sought to expel must have an opportunity •of being heard. 44. Where a partnership has been entered into for a fixed Retirement "term, no partner can retire from it during that term, except ^^^^^^ ji™ with the consent of all the partners, or in the exercise of an only by con- option previously conferred by express agreement. ^ 45. Where no fixed term has been agreed upon for the Eetirement ■duration of the partnership, any partner may determine the *F°™ partner- partnership at any time upon giving express notice of his in- tention so to do to aU the other partners. Where the partnership has originally been constituted by •deed, a notice in writing, and signed by the partner giving it, shall be sufficient for this purpose. 46. Where a partnership entered into for a fixed term is Where part- oontinued after the term has expired, and without any express ^^'^^'^P ^°^ ^ , J r term is con- new agreement, the rights and duties of the partners shall tinued oyer, remain the same as they were at the expiration of the term, co"t™i^ai"=e •' ^ .'on old terms BO far as consistent with the right of any partner to determine presumed. the partnership at will. A continuance of the business by the partners or such of them as habitually acted therein during the term, without any settlement or liquidation of the partnership affairs, shall be presumed to be a continuance of the partnership. 47. Partners are bound to carry on the business of the Partners must act fo mon i tage. partnership for the greatest common advantage, to be just '*°* for com 176 APPENDIX. Partners must not make pri- vate gain by partnership transactions or by means of parbiership connection. and faithful to each other, and to render true accounts and full information of all things affecting the partnership to any partner or his legal representatives. 48. Every partner must account to the firm for any benefit derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any transaction concerning the partnership, or from any use by him of the partnership property, nam.e or business, connection. This section shall apply to transactions undertaken after a partnership has been dissolved by the death of a partner, and before the affaii's thereof have been completely wound up, either by any surviving partner or by the representatives of the deceased partner. Partner must 49. If a partner, without the consent of the other partners, with fim?*^ carries on any business competing or interfering with that of the firm, he must account for and pay over to the firm aU profits made by him in that business. Dissolution by expiration or notice. PAET m. The Dissolution of Partnerships, and its consequences. 50. A partnership shall be dissolved— (a.) If entered into for a fixed term, by the expiration of that term : (6.) If entered into for a single adventure or undertaking, by the termination of that adventure or undertaking : (c.) If entered into for an undefined time, by any partner giving notice to the other or others of his intention to dissolve the partnership. In the last-mentioned case the partnership shaU be dissolved as from the date of the communication of the notice. Sunicf ^ ^]' ®?^''1 ^?. ''''^ agreement between the partners, every A^X^' Pai-tnership shall be dissolved by any of the foUowing events: (a.) The alienation of any pai-tner's share by bankruptcy or otherwise by operation of law : PABTNERSHIP8 BILL (1883). 177 (5.) The death of any partner : (c.) In the case of a partnership not for a fixed term, if any partner assigns or incumhers his interest in the partnership property or profits. 62. A partnership shall in every case be dissolved by the Dissolution by happening of any event which makes it unlawful for the partnership business of the firm to be carried on or for the members of the firm to carry it on in partnership. 53. On application by a partner the Court may decree a Dissolution by- dissolution of the partnership in any of the following cases : e our . (o.) "When an acting partner is found lunatic by inquisi- tion, or is shown to the satisfaction of the Court to be of permanently unsound mind, in either of which cases the application may be made as well on behalf of that partner by his committee or next friend as by any other partner : (J.) When a partner, other than the partner suing, becomes in any other way permanently incapable of perform- ing his part of the partnership contract : (c.) When a partner, other than the partner suing, is con- victed of any crime or becomes liable to a criminal prosecution : {d.) When a partner, other than the partner suing, wilfully or persistently commits a breach of the partner- ship agreement, or otherwise so conducts himself in matters relating to the partnership business that it is not reasonably practicable for the other partner or partners to carry on the business in partnership with him: (e.) When a partner, other than the partner suing, assigns or incumbers his interest in the property or profits of the firm : {/•) When the business of the partnership can only be carried on at a loss : {g.) Whenever in any case circumstances have arisen which, in the opinion of the Court, render it just and equit- able that the partnership be dissolved. p. N 178 APPENDIX. Eights of creditors against apparent members of firm. 64. The rights of a creditor of a firm against its apparent members shall not be affected by any dissolution or change ia the firm of which the creditor had not notice. An advertisement in the London Gazette as to a firm whose principal place of business is in England, and in the Dublin Gazette as to a firm whose principal place of business is iu Ireland, shall be deemed to be notice as to creditors who were not in fact customers of the firm before the date of the dis- solution or change so advertised. Provided that the estate of a partner who dies, or who becomes bankrupt, or of a partner who, not having been known to the creditor to be a partner, retires from the firm, shall not be liable for partnership debts contracted after the date of the death, bankruptcy, or retirement respectively. Bight of partners to notify disso- lution. 55. On the dissolution of a partnership or retirement of a partner any partner may publicly notify the same, and may require the other partner or partners to concur for that pur- pose in aU necessary or proper acts, if any, which cannot be done without his or their concurrence. Continuing authority of partners for purposes of ■winding-up. 56. After the dissolution of a partnership the authority of each partner to bind the firm, and the other rights and obligations of the partners, shall continue notwithstanding the dissolution so far as may be necessary to settle and liquidate existing demands, and to complete transactions begun but unfinished at the time of the dissolution, but not otherwise. Provided that the firm shall in no case be bound by the acts of a bankrupt partner, but this proviso shall not affect the liability of any person who has represented himself or knowingly sufitered himself to be represented as a partner. Eights of 57. On the dissolution of a partnership every partner shall partners as to i^e entitled, as against the other partners in the firm, and all application of , . . , , , , , . „ , . partnership persons claiming through them m respect of their interests as property. partners, to have the property of the pai-tnership applied in. payment of the debts and liabilities of the firm, and to have the surplus assets after such pajanent applied in paj-ment of what may be due to the partners respectively after deducting what may be due from them as partners to the firm ; and for PARTNERSHIPS BILL (1883). 179 that purpose any partner or Ws representatives may upon the termination of the partnership apply to the Court to wind up "the business and afEairs of the firm. 58. On the dissolution of a partnership, every partner Sale of good- shalL be entitled, in the absence of any agreement to the \aiaon. contrary, to have the goodwill of the business sold for the common benefit of aU the partners. 59. After a dissolution, every partner in the dissolved firm Eight of or his representatives may, in the absence of any agreement je^uirTuse of to the contrary, restrain any other partner or his repre- partnership sentative from carrying on the same business under the firm- '^*'"^- name until the affairs of the firm have been wound up, and the partnership property disposed of. 60. — (1.) Where one partner has paid a premium to another Peculiar on enterina: into a partnership for a fixed term, and the "glits"! ^ . '^ . . special cases partnership is dissolved before the expiration of that term of dissolution: otherwise than by the death of a partner, the Court may Apportion- order the repayment of the premium, or of such proportionate ^um°in^CT"- part thereof as it thinks just, having regard to the terms of tain cases the partnership contract and to the length of time during ^gj.g^J'^'^ " which the partnership has continued ; unless prematurely dissolved, (a.) the dissolution is, in the judgment of the Court, wholly or chiefly due to the misconduct of the partner who paid the premium, or (h.) the partnership has been dissolved by an agreement containing no provision for a return of any part of the premium. (2.) "Where a partnership contract is rescinded on the ground Lien on assets of the fraud of one of the parties thereto, the defrauded party '^^lere part- T 1 ii>i 1- nership dis- shaU be entitled to a lien on the surplus of the partnership solved for assets, after satisfying the partnership liabilities, for any sum fraud. of mpney paid by him for the purchase of an interest in the partnership property, and shall also be entitled to stand in the place of the creditors of the firm for any payments made by him in respect of the partnership liabilities. n2 180 APPENDIX. EigMof out- 61.— (1.) Where any member of a firm has died or otherwise going partner geased to he a partner, and the surviving or continuing partner oasefto'share Or partners carry on the business of the firm with its capital profits made qj assets without any final settlement of accounts as between after dissolu- ^^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^^ outgoing partner or his estate, there, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, the outgoing partner or his estate is entitled at the option of himself or his repre- sentatives to such share of the profits made since the dissolu- tion as the Court may find to be attributable to the use of" his capital or assets, or to the amount of his capital or assets with interest thereon at five per cent, per anmmi. (2.) In determining how far the profits made since the- dissolution are attributable to the outgoing partner's capital, the Court shall have regard to the nature of the business, the amount of capital from time to time employed in it, the skiU and industry of each partner taking part in it, and the conduct of the parties generally. 62. Where by the partnership contract an option is given to surviving or continuing partners to purchase the interest of" a deceased or outgoing partner, and that option is duly exer- cised, the estate of the deceased partner, or the outgoing- partner or his estate, as the case may be, shall not be entitled to any further or other share of profits ; but if any partner assuming to act in exercise of the aforesaid option does not in all material respects comply with the terms thereof, he shall be liable to account for subsequent profits under the last preceding section. 63. The amount due from surviving or continuing partners to an outgoing partner or the representatives of a deceased partner in respect of the outgoing or deceased partner's share shall, subject to any agreement between the partners, be a simple contract debt accruing at the date of the dissolution or death. Exercise of option to purchase out- going part- ner's share. Retiring or deceased partner's share to be a debt. Rule for dis- 64. In settling accounts between the partners after a assete'on final dissolution of partnership, the following rules shall be- settlementof observed (subject as to the payments to partners to anv accounts. .s * " x- j agreement) : PARTNERSHIPS BILL (1883). 181 («.) Losses, including losses and deficiencies of capital, shall be paid first out of profits, next out of capital, and lastly, if necessary, by the partners individually in the pro- portion in which they were entitled to share profits : (J.) The assets of the firm, including the sums' contributed by the partners to make up losses or deficiencies of capital, shall be applied in the following manner and order : 1. In paying the debts and liabilities of the firm to persons who are not partners therein : 2. In paying to each partner rateably what is due from the firm to him for advances as distinguished from capital : 3. In paying to each partner rateably what is due from the firm to him in respect of capital : 4. The ultimate residue, if any, shall be divided among the partners in the proportion in which profits are divisible. PAET IV. Repeal. 65. Upon and from the commencement of this Act — Repeal of (1.) The whole of an Act of the session of the twenty- 28 & 29 Vict, ■eighth and twenty-ninth years of her Majesty, chapter eighty- I'g &'2o Vict. six, intituled " An Act to amend the law of Partnership ; " ^- 97, o. 4. (2.) Section four of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, shall be repealed in so far as the said enactments re- spectively are applicable to England and Ireland, but without prejudice to any agreement made or any right acquired or liability incurred before the commencement of this Act. The limited partnership clauses of the Bill of 1880 (not proceeded with by the Select Committee in 1882) were as follows : — PAUT IV. 0/ Limited Partnerships.'^ 64. — (1.) A limited partnership is a firm containing one or Definition > more limited partners as hereinafter defined. limited ■■^ partaersmp., ' This, of ootiTse, ought to be " any sums," or "the sums, if any." 2 Compare Code de Commerce, Book 1, Title 3 ; Allgem. Deutsches 182 Constitution and registra- tion. Limited part- nership not properly registered to be general. Limited part- ner not en- titled to take part in the business. APPENDIX. (2.) A limited partner is a partner whose liabHity for the- debts and obligations of the firm is Umited to a certain amount which he has contributed or undertaken to contribute to the partnership property. _ . (3.) From and after the commencement of this Act limited partnerships may be formed in the manner and subject to the conditions by this Act provided and declared. 65. A limited partnership must contain one or more general partners, and must be registered under this Act. Its firm- name must not contain the name of any limited partner. 66. If a partnership is not registered under this Act every partner therein shall be deemed to be a general partner. 67. A limited partner shall have no right to take part in the management of the partnership business except as an agent or servant of the firm under an express authority from the general partner or partners ; and he shall have no autho- rity to bind the firm save by acts done in the course of such agency or service as aforesaid. Limited part- ner not en- titled to vote in ordinary partnership affairs. 68. A limited partner shall not be entitled to a voice or vote in the decision of matters relating to the ordinary course of the partnership business ; but no change in the nature or principal place of the business or in the firm-name may be made without his consent. Introduction of new partners. Limited part- ner may deal ■withfirm, &c. with consent of general partners. 69. The consent of the limited partner or partners, or a majority of them if more than one, shall be needful for the introduction into the firm of any new general partner, but not of any new limited partner. 70. The consent of the general partner or partners only shall be required to exempt a limited partner from liability Handelsgesetzbuoh, Book 1, Title 2, " Von der Kommanditgesellschaft ; " and Title 26 of the Swiss Federal Code of Obligations. American statutes, on the subject may be seon in Troubat's work on Limited Partnership. (The Law of Commandatnry and Limited Partnership in the United States. By Francis J. Troubat. Philadelphia, 1863.) PABTNEESEIPS BILL (1883). 183 to account to the firm for any benefit derived by him from a transaction concerning the partnership. 71. A limited partner, unless employed as an agent or Limited part- servant of the firm or restrained by express agreement with "^f ^^-^hthe the general partner or partners, shall not be bound to abstain firm, from exercising upon his own account any business competing or interfering with the business of the firm. 72. — (1.) Every limited partnership must be entered into Duration for a fixed term, and may not be dissolved by agreement of °^ limited -, L , . . „ , 1 nil partnersmp. the partners before the expiration of that term unless all the partnership debts are paid, or unless all the unpaid creditors of the firm consent to the dissolution. (2.) The dissolution of a limited partnership contrary to this section shall render the limited partners liable as general partners for all' existing debts of the firm. 73. The death of a limited partner, or the alienation of his Death, bank- interest in the partnership by the operation of law, shall not ^ij^ted" ' dissolve the partnership as between the surviving or continuing partner not to partners. &Z!^^^^^ 74. The general partner or partners only of a Hmited General part- partnership shall be liable to be made bankrupt in respect of ?}^™ °^y the dealings or liabilities of such partnership. banfa-uptoy The term "general partners" for the purposes of this *?^ ^^'t'l^'^" section includes a limited partner who has become liable as a general partner under any provision of this Act. 75. When and so soon as a limited partnership has been Contributions duly registered, and after the expiration of the time, if any, partners upon the expiration of which the contribution of any limited partner or any part thereof is payable, his contribution or such part thereof as aforesaid, or such part thereof respectively as for the time being remains unpaid, shall become and be a debt to the firm, and any limited partner making default in payment thereof respectively at the proper time may be sued therefor in the name of the firm by the general partner or partners. 184 APPENDIX. Limited part- 76. A Umited partner shall not during the continuance of ner's share ^j^g partnership draw out or receive back any part of his out to him " contribution under the name of interest, profits, or otherwise during term. howSOever. Limited part- 77. If at any time when the partnership capital is dimi- rece?ve profits wished below the amount contributed by the limited partner or interest or partners, any limited partner receives interest or profits on d^Snished.^^ his share, he shall be liable as a general partner for aU partnership debts contracted in the time during which the partnership capital has been so diminished as aforesaid : Provided that nothing in this section shall bind a limited partner to repay any interest or share of profits received by him on the footing of an annual or other regular account made and acted upon in good faith and with reasonable belief in its accuracy. General pro- 78. — (1.) Every limited partner shall be liable for the toapplywhere "^^^^^ and, obligations of the firm in like manner as a general not excluded partner, except so far as his liabilitj' is limited or varied by hy this part, this Act. (2.) The rights and duties of the members of a limited partnership towards one another shall be determined by the Xjrovisions of Part Two of this Act, and the manner and con- sequences of the dissolution of a limited partnership by the provisions of Part Three of this Act, so far as the nature of the case admits, and the said provisions are not as regards limited partners excluded or varied by this Act. ^Xulara^f ^^' ^^S'^^'^^^^^^T^ «* ^ limited partnership under this Act registration. ^^^^ t® effected by sending by post or delivering to the registrar a statement in writing containing the following particulars : — (a.) The firm name. (J.) The nature of the business. (c.) The place or places of the business. {d.) The fun name, usual residence, and other occupation, if any, of each partner. (e.) The term for which the partnership is entered into. PARTNERSHIPS BILL (1883). 185 ■(/.) A statement that the partnership is limited and the description of every limited partner as such. {g.) The sum contributed or to be contributed by each limited partner, and whether paid or to be paid in cash, or how otherwise. (A.) The amount already paid up in respect of such contri- bution, and the date or dates at which the residue, if any, is payable. The statement shall be signed by each partner in the 3)resence of a witness. The registration shall be subject to the same conditions «,s to payment of fees and "otherwise as if the partnership were a company under the Companies Acts not having a ■capital divided into shares. 80. — (1.) A limited partnership renewed or continued by Re-registra- agreement of the partners after the expiration of the regis- ^'^°\°^ limited. '^ '^ ^ ^ partnership tered term shall be registered as if it were a new firm. on renewal. (2.) Per the purpose of registration any capital of a limited partner remaining in the business shall be deemed to be con- tributed by him to the new firm, and may be reckoned as or towards his contribution. 81. If a change occurs in the constitution of a limited Eegistration partnership, the members of the firm as re-constituted shall, ? ^^"S^^ within one month, notify the change to the registrar by a statement sent by post or delivered to him. 82. If the firm-name of a limited partnership is changed it Re-registra- shall be registered as if it were a new firm, and the statement *1?2°° ''"■^S^ sent or delivered to the registrar shall mention the former name of the firm as being abandoned by it, as well as the particulars required for a new registration. 83. For the purpose of making the statements required by Forms, this Act, the forms in the second Schedule to this Act' or forms to the like eilect may be used, and i£ used shall be sufficient. 1 The first Schedule, as the Bill then stood, was a description of "traders" copied from the Bankruptcy Act of 1869. See note on j>. 169 above. 186 APPENDIX. SECOND SCHEDULE. FoEMS OF Statement. A. On Registration of Limited Partnership. The firm-name is The business of the firm is It is intended to carry on the business at The term of the partnership is years from the day of 18 . The partnership is limited. The limited partners are the undersigned A. B. and C. D. The particulars of the contributions of the limited partners are as f oUows : Names of Amount of con- Amount When residue limited partners, tribution and paid up. payable, whether payable in cash or how otherwise. We the undersigned desire to constitute a limited partner- ship in accordance with the above particulars : Names, Addresses, and Descriptions of Subscribers. 1. John Jones, of &e., merchant. 2. John Smith, of &c., carpenter. 3. Thomas Green, of &c., grocer. Dated the day of 18 . Witness to the above signatures, Samuel Weller, 10, North Street, Westminster. PARTNERSHIPS BILL (1883). 187 B. Notice of change in constitution of limited partnership. Registered We the undersigned [the members of the limited partnership as reconstituted^ hereby give notice that on the day of 18, the folio-wing change took place in the con- stitution of the limited partnership registered by the name of & Co., that is to say : * A. B. retired from the firm. * C. D. became a member of the firm. firm-name &Oo. * As tte case may be. Description of New Member, j- t As upon an original regis- Full name. Usual residence. Other occupation, tration. description, and additions, if any. (Signed) C. Notice of change of registered Firm-name. {In addition to Form, A.) The persons now registering are the persons who heretofore ■carried on business under the registered firm-name of & Co., which is abandoned as from the date of this notice. Registered firm-name &Co. INDEX. The figures in thick type refer to the numhers of the Articles in the text. Actions by and against partners in name of firm, 64, 125 by firm, discoyery of partners' names in, 65, 126 against firm, service of writ in, 66, 127 appearance of partners in, 67, 127 between a partner and a firm since Judicature Act, 23, 12& Admissions of partners, wben binding on the firm, 30, 49 Adyhnttjiie joint, 5 Agency of partner for the firm, 16, 36, 37, 82 right of partner to contribution independent of, 71 principle of, applied to liability of firm for wrongful acts of partners, 57 Agent remuneration of, by share of profits, 4, 11 Ageeement restrictive, between partners, inoperative if not notified, 4& Aebithation one partner cannot bind firm by submission to, 44 Assets of partnership, final distribution of, 63, 123 Assignment of share of profits, dissolves partnership, 50, 88 Bank number of partners in, may not exceed ten, 14 190 INDEX. Bankettptcy creditor who has lent money for share of profits postponed in, 7, 12, 13 doctrine of holding out applies to administration in, 28 of firm or partner, effect of, on agreement for conversion of property, 30, 67 of partner dissolves partnership, 48, 86 bankrupt partners' estate not liable for subsequent debts of firm, 53, 93 bankrupt partner has no authority to bind the firm, 55, 9o adjudication and process against firm in, 129 Procedure against Partners in : consolidation of proceedings imder joint and separate petitions, 69, 130 petition against one partner by creditor of firm, 70, 130 petition may be dismissed as to some respondents only, 71, 130 one trustee to be appointed of estates of partners in same firm, 73, 131 of one partner, creditor of firm may prove in, for purpose of voting, 73, 131 dividends of joint and separate properties to be declared together, 74, 132 actions by trustee of bankrupt partner together with solvent partners^ 75, 132 Bankruptcy Act of 1883 as to administration of partnership estates, 137 : see Joint aot) Separate Estates. eflect of separate discharge of partner in, 82, 159 Bills of Exchange Act, 1882.. 39 Books partnership, custody of, 39, 75 BoERO'wiNCJ Monet authority of partners in trading firm, 17, 39, 40 42 Bovill's Act, 9, U Commandite partnership in, 9, 14 Companies distinguished from ordinary partnerships, 4, 41 Companies Act, 18G2..41 partnerships unlawful under, 15 INDEX. 1!)1 'Competition of partner ■with firm, 83 Conversion of real estate being partnership property, 29, 66 of partnership property into separate property, and vice versa, 30,67 fraudtilent, of partnership property, 78, 79, 142, 146, 150 COBPOEATION assumption of corporate name, whether punishable, 20 ■whether corporation may trade in its corporate name where the name infringes a trade mark, 22 Ckeditor receiving share of profits, postponed till claims of other creditors for value satisfied, 7, 12 Ckeditoes notice of dissolution to, 93 joint and separate, 31, 134, 138, 155 of partner exceeding his authority, 18, 45 •CUSTOMEES dealing •with old, by vendor of business, 105 Death dissolution of partnership by, 49, 53, 88, 93 Debts partnership, not joint and several, 30 : see Joint AND SepabAte Estates. • Deed partner cannot bind firm by, ■without express authority, 43 Dieectors of numerous partnerships, limited authority of, 17a, 44 DiSCOVEET of individual partners in action by firm, 65, 126 Dissolution oi' Paetneeship by retirement of partner, 47, 85 by liankruptoy, &c., 48, 86 by death, 49, 88 by assignment of share in partnership at will, 50, 88 192 INDEX. DissoLTJTioisr OF Paetneeship — continued. by the partnership business becoming imlawful, 51, 89 by the Court for lunacy, misconduct, &c., of a partner, 52, 89' what misconduct is ground for, 91 rights of creditors against ostensible partners not affected by,. 53, 93 right of partners to notify, 54, 94 authority of partners after, 55, 95 application of partnership property upon, 56, 100 sale of goodwill upon, 57, 104 use of partnership name after, whether it can be restrained,. 58, 108 premature, apportionment of premium on, 59, 109 on what principle apportionment to be made, quaere, 112 — 114 on ground of fraud, effect of, 60, 114 profits after, right to account of, when capital improperly re- tained in business, 61, 114 final distribution of assets upon, 63, 123 Estate of deceased partner, nature of its liability, 31 Estoppel liability by " holding out" depends on principle of, 26 Execution on judgment against partners in name of firm, 68, 127 against partnership property for partner's separate debt, 86 Exbcutoes of deceased partner, duties of surviving pM'tners who are, 1 18 Expulsion of partner, 40, 76 FlEJI definition of, and use of firm name, 9, 10, 18 exclusive right of, to trade name, 11, 18 is not a person in law, 23, 128 actions by and against partners in name of, 23 64 68 125 129 guaranties given for or to, 12, 24 liability of partners for debts of, 14, 30 assumption of debts by new, 15, 32, 35 authority of partners as agents of, 16, 36 seq. INDEX. 193 Pnui — continued. cases where acts of one partner do not bind, 43 not bound by attempts of partner to use partnership credit for private purposes, 18, 44 — 47 effect of notice that acts of partner does not bind the, 19, 48 how far bound by admissions of partners, 20, 49 liability of, for fraud, &c. of partner in course of partnership business, 23, 52 liability of, for money or property of third persons misapplied by partners, 24, 53 grounds of the liability in such cases, 56 change in, does not affect rights of creditors without notice, 53,93 not bound by acts of bankrupt partner, 55, 95 judgment creditor of, not bound to resort first to partnership property, 102 Eules of Court as to partners suing and being sued in name of, 64 seq., 125 judgment against partners in name of, 68, 127 not recognized as distinct person by Eules of Court, 128 creditors of, their limited right to prove in separate bank- ruptcy of partners, 73, 131 creditors of, their exceptional right to prove against separate estate in certain cases, 77, 141 creditors of, double proof by, against joint and separate estates in case of distinct contracts, 81, 157 Peance law of, as to name of firm, 20 as to administration of partnership estates, 140 Peatjd in conduct of partnership business, liability of firm for, 23, 52 defrauded partner's lien when partnership dissolved for, 60, 114 conversion of partnership property to partner's separate use by, 78, 79, 142, 146, 150, 151 Gazette, Loitdon effect of notice of dissolution in, 93, 94, 95. GEEMAfTY law of, as to name of firm, 20 as to administration of partnership estates, 140 P. o 194 INDEX. Goods implied auttority of partner to buy in usual course of busi- ness, 42 Goodwill as to seller of, receiving share of profits, 6, 11 sale of, on dissolution of partnership, 57, 104 nature and incidents of, 106 does not " survive," 108 does not exist in solicitor's business, 108 "Geoss Eetuens" the sharing of, does not necessarily create a partnership, 5 GtrAKANTT continuing, to or for firm, revoked by change in firm unless there is contrary intention, 12, 24 one partner cannot generally bind firm by, 43 " Holding Out" liability as partner by, 13, 26 ■what amounts to, 27 the rule applies to administration in bankruptcy, 28 ■ • does not bind deceased partner's estate, 28 • does not apply to wrongs independent of contract, 29 liability of retired partner by, 28 Illegality of partnership business dissolves the partnership, 51, 89 Indemnity right of partners to, 33, 70 Indian Contract Act effect of notice under, that firm will not be bound by acts of partner, 49 as to presunied equality of shares, 70 on authority of partners after dissolution, 98 as to joint and separate debts of partner, 138 Interest allowed on advances properly made by partners, 70, 71 allowed at option instead of profits on capital improperly retained in business, 61, 114 mixed claims for profits and interest not allowed, 121 INDEX. 195 Joint and Sepabate Estates rules for administration of, 76, 13i aeq. general rule : the joint estate primarily liable for debts of firm, the separate estates for separate debts, 76, 134, 137 principle of this doubtful : difference between legal and mer- cantile rule, 138, 139 partners must not compete mth creditors, 79, 14-1 Exceptional Rights of Proof: by creditors of firm against separate estates, 77, 141 by joint estate against separate estates or estate of minor firm, 78, 141, 142 by partners against joint estate or separate estates of other partners, 79, 144 by wife of partner, 144 principles of the exceptional right in cases of fraudulent conversion, 150 seq, "Joint Adtenttire," 5 Judgment. See Execution. Land being partnership property, how held, 27, 62, 63 when it becomes partnership property, 65, 66 treated as personalty as between partners, 29, 66 Lien of partners on partnership propertj', 56, 100 to what property it applies, 103 of defrauded partner on assets when partnership dissolved for fraud, 60, 114 Limitation, Statute of operation of, against claims of deceased partner's representa- tives, 122 Lunacy as ground of dissolution, 52, 89 lunatic partner himself may sue by committee or next friend for dissolution, 91 Majoeitt power of, to decide differences, 36, 73 expel a partner, only by express agreement, 40, 76 o2 196 INDEX. Marriage of female partner, does not now dissolve partnership, 86 Married WoMAif may prove against joint estate for money lent to husband's firm, 145 Mercantile Law Amendment Act as to changes in firm after date of guaranty, 24 Money received by firm, misapplication of, 34, 53 property bought with partnership, 28, 65 Name law as to use of, in business, 18, 19 of firm, use of, after sale of goodwill, 57, 58, 105, 107, 109 Negotiable Instruments partner in trading firm may issue, in name of firm, 17, 39, 40 given in name of firm without authority, when firm not liable on, 45, 46, 47 Notice of partner's want of authority, 19, 48 to partner, when notice to the firm, 21, 50 of dissolution, effect of, 53, 93 ■ duty of partners to concur in, 54, 94 question of, in cases of fraudulent appropriation of joint estate by one partner, 151, 152 Notation on assumption of partnership debts by new firm, 35 cannot be effected by agreement among partners without cre- ditor's assent, 35 Option to purchase outgoing partner's share, 62, 117 Partners persons advancing money in consideration of share of profits &c., not necessarily, 3, 9 : see Profits. ' number of, limited in ordinary partnership, 8, 14 persons liable as, by " holding out," 13, 26 when retired pai-tner may bo so Kable, 28 liability of, for debts of firm, 14, 30 INDEX. 197 Partners — continued, liabilities of outgoing and incoming, on change of finn, 15, 32—35 power of, to bind the firm as agents, 16, 36 implied authority of, 17, 38 attempts by, to use credit of firm for private purposes, 18, 44 may restrict authority of any partner by notice, 19, 48 semble, not by mere agreement known to the creditor, 48 admissions by, effect of, 20, 49, 50 notice to, when notice to firm, 21, 50 liability of, for wrongs committed in course of partnership business, 22, 23, 52 misapplication of third person's property by, 24, 53 test of firm's liability for wrongful acts of, 57 improper employment of trust funds by, 25, 58, 59 continuance of business by surviving, presumed to be on old terms, 43, 78 misconduct of, as ground for dissolution, 90, 91 : see Dissolu- tion. authority of, after dissolution, 55, 95, 98 : see DissoLtrTlON. lien of, on partnership property, 56, 100 its nature and extent, 101 — 103 right of, to account of profits made after dissolution with capital improperly retained, 61, 114 purchase of shares of outgoing, under option in articles, 62, 117 claims against continuing, qua executors or trustees, 118 surviving, not trustees for deceased partner's share, 122 may sue and be sued in name of firm, 64, 125 so suing, must disclose names on demand of defendant, 65, 126 so sued, service of writ upon, 66, 127 appearance of, individually, 67, 127 judgment against, in name of firm, execution upon, 68, 127 separate debts of, execution against partnership property for, 86 proceedings in bankruptcj' against, 69 seq., 130 : see Bank- BTJPTCY. administration of estates of, 76, 134 seq.: see Joint and ■ Separate Estates. fraudulent conversion of partnership property to their private use by, 78, 79, 141, 142, 144—146 must not prove in competition with creditors of firm, 79, 144, 145 ■effect of separate discharge of, in bankruptcy, 82, 159 19S INDEX. PaeTNEES — continued. delations of Partners to one another, 61 seq. terms of partnership variable only by consent, 26, 61 conversion of partnership into several property or vice versa,. 30, 67 shares of, in partnership property, 31, 68 presumed equal, 32, 69 right of, to indemnity, 33, 70 • to take part in business, 34, 72 duty of, to attend to business, 35, 73 power of majority among, to decide difierences, 36, 73 consent of all necessary for change of nature or place of business, 37, 73 for introduction of new partner,. 38, 74 right of, to inspect books, 39, 7.3 none can be expeUed save under express power, 40, 76 retirement from partnership, when allowed, 41, 42, 7 1 duty of, to act for common advantage, 44, 80 to account to firm and not make undisclosed profits, 45, 81 ■ not to compete with firm, 46, 82 Estate of Deceased Partner : cannot be made liable on doctrine of "holding out," 28 duty of, to surviving partners, 81 not liable for subsequent debts of firm, 53, 93 when entitled to share of subsequent profits, 61, 62, 114, 117 claims of, against surviving partners subject to Statute of Limitation, 122 administration of : see Joixt akd Separate Estates. Partnership definition of, 1, 1 — 3 distinct from common ownership, 4 and from sharing gross returns, 5 rule in Cox v. Hickman, 7, 12 Act to amend Law of, 3 — 7, 9—12 number of members limited by Companies Act, 8, 14 debts, liability of partners for, 14, 30, 31 property, power of partners to dispose of, 17, 38, 39 : see Paet- NERSHip Property. improper employment of trust moneys in, 25, 58, 121 terms of can only be varied by consent of all the partners, 26, 61 INDEX. 109 V&B.rwEBSKIS— continued. business, riglits and duties of partners in relation to, 32—39, 44—46,69—75, 80—83 business, differences as to matters in, to be decided by majority unless otherwise provided, 36, 73 business, nature or place of, not to be changed without consent of all partners, 37, 73 books, custody of, 39, 75 retirement of partners from, 41, 42, 77 continuance of, after lapse of term, 43, 78 how dissolved, 47 sej., 85 : see Dissolution of Paetnersiiip. Paetnership Property what it is, 27, 28, 62—65 customary valuation of, binding, 62 treatment of land which is, 29, 66 conversion of, into several property of partners, 30, 67, 76, 134 ■what is share of partners in, 31, 68 execution against, upon judgment for partner's separate debt, 86 rights of partners as to application of, 56, 100 creditors of firm have no specific right against, until taken in execution, 103 execution against, upon judgment against partners in name of firm, 68, 127 fraudulent conversion of, to partner's private use, 78, 79, 142, 146, 150 rights of separate creditors holding security upon, 80, 155 Part-cwnership distinguished from partnership, 2, 4 Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883 . . 21 Premium paid on entering partnership, apportionment of, on premature dissolution, 59, 109 Proeits no partnership without division of, 3 but sharing profits is not conclusive evidence of partnership, 2, 3—6 statutory rule as to persons advancing money in consideration of share of, 3, 9 this protects only bona fide loans, 9, 12 as to agent remunerated by share of, 4, 11 widows or children of partners receiving share of, 5, 11 200 INDEX. Profits — continued. as to seller of goodwill receiving share of, 6, 11 creditor receiving share of, postponed to others, 7, 12 rule as to sharing of, by partners, 32, 69 assignment by partner of share of, its eflect, 74, 75 partners must account for, to firm, 45, 81 after dissolution, right to account of, 61, 62, 114, 117 claim for such account must be distinct and single, 121 Peoof rights of, in administration of partnership estates : see Bank- KTiPTCY ; Joint and Sepaeatk Estates. Peopeett partnership, conversion of, 30, 67, 76, 135 Eegistbation under Companies Act, 15, 17 Eepeesentation made by partner, effect of, 20, 50 Eetieement of partner from partnership for a term, 41, 77 at will, 42, 77 partnership dissolved upon notice by one partner of his, 47, 8» Eetuens gross, sharing of, 5 EUIBS OE COTOT as to actions in name of firm, 64, 125 discovery of partners' names in action by firm, 65, 126 service of writ in action against firm, 66, 127 appearance of partners, 67, 127 execution upon judgment against firm, 68, 127 do not recognize firm as a distinct person, 128 Sale of partnership property by partner, 42 ScoTLAiro law of, as to "joint adventure," 5 treats the firm as a person, 23 as to administration of partnership estates, 139 INDEX. 'iOl Security rights of joint creditor holding separate, or separate creditor holding joint, 80, 155 Sepaeate Trade between a partner and the firm, 78, 79, 142, 146 Servants authority of partner as to hiring and dismissal of, 43 Shares in partnership, presumed equality of, 32, 69 may be made transferable by express agreement between partners, 75 Specific Performance of partnership contract, not generally granted, 5 SlTB-PAETNERSHIP creation and effect of, 75 SuRYXViNG Partners ■ continuance of busiaess by, presumed to be on old terms, 78 duty of, to representatives of deceased partner, 61, 62, 114, US are not, as such, trustees, 122 Switzerland law of, as to administration of partnership estates, 140 Torts. See Wrongs. Trade Mark relation of, to trade name, 21 Trade Names use of, and exclusive right to, 18 foreign laws as to, 20 cannot exist apart from actual business, 'I'i Trading Partnerships, 17, 38 — 43, 169 Trust breach of, by partner employing trust funds in partnership business, 25, 58 Trustees mixed duties of partners who are, 118 surviving partners, as such, are not, 122 ^('-' INDEX. Unlavful, partnership dissolved on business becoming, 51, 89 Valuation of partnership property, firm bound by accustomed mode even against articles, 62 WrDOW of deceased partner, receiving share of profits, not HaWe for partnership debts, 5, 11 WnsDiNG-irp of business by the Court, 56, 100 : see Goodwill; Joint and Sepabatb Estates. Wrongs doctrine of " holding out " not applicable to, 29 liabiUty of partners for, 2S, 23, 52 PMNTED BY C. F. EOWOBTD, GKEi.T NEW SIBBET, FETTEE LANE, E.G. January, 1888. OP LAW WORKS PUBLISHED BT STEVENS AND SONS, H9, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON, "W.C. 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AVERAGE, — Hopkins' Hand-Book of Average, to which is added a Chapter on Arbitration. — Fom-th Edition. By Maklet Hopkins, Esq., Author of "A Manual of Marine Insurance," &c. Demv8vo. 1884. 'U.ls. " The work is eminently practical, and exlubits the results of practical expei-ience in every branch of tlio subject witli wlilch it deals, and the book may properly find its place in the libroi-y of eveiy lawyer who occupies himself with ships and shipping." — Lav: Journal, '*,* All standardLaw Worksare kept in Stock, in lawcalfand other bindings. 119, CHANCERY LAiTE, LONDON, "W.C. AVE RAG E — continued. Lowndes' Law of General Average, — English and Eoreign. Eourth Edition. By Bichabti Lowndes. Author of "The Law of Marine Insurance," &o. Royal 8vo. 1888. 1?. 10s. BALLOT. — Fitzgerald's Ballot Act. — With an Introduction. Forming a Guide to the Procedure at Parliamentary and Municipal Elections. Second Edition. By G-eeald A. R. Eitzqbeaid, M.A., Esq., Bar- rister-at-Law Fcap. 8vo. 1876. , 5s. 6d. BANKING. — Walker's Treatise on Banking Law. — Second Edition. By J. D. Wai/Kee, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Demy 8vo. 1885. 15s. BANKRUPTCY,— Chitty's Index, Vol, \.—ri(ie "Digests." Haynes' Lectures on Bankruptcy; originally deUvered before the members of the" Liverpool Law Students' Association. By John F. Hatnes, LL.D. Royal 12mo. 1884. 5». Lawrance's Precedents of Deeds of Arrangement between Debtors and their Creditors j including Forms of Resolutions for Compositions and Schemes of Arrangement under the Bankruptcy Act, 1883. Second Edition. With Introductory Chapters. By G-. W. Laweance, M.A.,Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Svo. 1886. 7s. 6rf. '* "Win be of much use to the practitioner, "—iaiw Quarterly Review, Apuil, 1886. " A small but useful collection of precedents by a draftsman very familiar with the subject." — Law Journal. Rigg's Bankruptcy Act, 1883, and the Debtors Act, 1869, with the Rules and Forms belonging thereto, and the Bills of Sale Acts, 1878 and 1882, Edited with a Commentary. By James McMuLLENRiGG-,Esq.,Barrister-at-Law. Royal 12mo. 1884. Ws.&d. Williams' Law and Practice in Bankruptcy, — Comprising the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, the Bankruptcy Rules, 1886, the Debtors Acts, 1869, 1878, and the Bills of Sale Acts, 1878 and 1882. Fourth Edition. By R. Vauohan WniiAMS, W. Vaitohan Williams, and EdwaedWm. Hausell, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. Roy. Svo. 1886. 28s. " The volume is brought quite up to date, and we can recommend it as a safe and useful guide to practitioners."— iaw Quarterly Review, January, 1887. " Is a work of authority, and it expounds the principles affecting bankruptcy ijurisdiction, lays down the law, and supports all propositions by decided cases, which are digested with neatness and accuracy. In this fourth edition the author and editors liave brought everything up to the date of publieation, and the edition will sustain, if not increase, the reputation of its predecessors." — Law Times. BILLS OF EXCHANGE,— Chalmers' Digest of the Law of Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes, and Cheques, Third Edition, containing the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, with commentary thereOli. By His Honour Judge Chalmees, Draughtsman of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, &c. Demy 8to. 1887. 16s; , '* Each section having appended to it illustrations in the nature of short statements of decided cases. These are prepared with that skilful conciseness of which the learned judge is a master." — Law Times, July 2, 1887. " This excellent work is unique. As a statement and explanation of the law, it wnl be found singularly useful." — Solicitors' Journal, October 8, 1887. BILLS OF SALE,— Fithian's Bills of Sale Acts, 1878 and 1882. With an Introduction and Explanatory Notes showing the changes made in the Law with respect to BiUs of Sale,' together with an Appendix of Precedents, Rules of Court, Forms, and Statutes. Second Edition. By Edwaed William Fiitttatt, Esq., Barrister-at- Law. Royal 12mo. 1884. 6s, " The notes appear thoroughly reliable." — Law Times. *,* All standard Law Works are kept in Stock, in law calf and other bindings, A 2. STEVENS AOT) SONS' LAW PUBLICATIONS. BOOK-KEEPING,— Matthew Hale's System of Book-keeping for Solicitors, containing a List of all Books necessary, -with a compre- hensive description of their objects and uses for the purpose of Drawing Bills of Costs and the rendering of Cash Accounts to clients ; also showing how to ascertain Profits derived from the business ; with an Appendix. Demy 8vo. 1884. 5». 6(i. " We think this is by far the most sensible, useful, practical little work on solicitors' book-keeping that we have seen." — Law Students' Journal. BUILDING SOCIETIES,— Wurfzburg on Building Societies,— The Acts relating to Building Societies, comprising the Act of 1836 and the Building Societies Acts, 1874, 1875, 1877, and 1884, and the Treasury Regulations, 1884 ; with an Introduction, copious Notes, and Precedents of Rules and Assurances. By E. A. WuitTZBnEG> Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Royal 12mo. 1886. 7«. &d. " Mr. Wurtzburg's work is clearly and sensibly done/* — Ijaw Quart^ly Seview.^ ** The work presents in brief, dear, and convenient form the whole law relating to Building Societies." CANALS, — Webster's Law Relating to Canals : Comprising a Trea- tise on Navigable Rivers and Canals ; and including all Legislation to the close of the last Session of Parliament, together with the Pro- cedure and Practice in Private Bill Legislation ; with a coloured Map of the existing Canals and Navigations in England and Wales. By RobeetGt.Wbestbe, LL.B., Barrister-at-Law. Demy 8vo. 1885. 11. \s. CARRIERS, — Browne on Carriers, — A Treatise on the Law of Carriers of Goods and Passengers by Land and Water. By J. H. B. Bbowhe, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. 8vo. 1873. 18s. Carver's Treatise on the Law relating to the Carriage of Goods by Sea, — By Thomas Gilbeet Caevee, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Royal 8vo. 1885. 32s. " A careful and accurate treatise."— Zaw Quarterly Review, No. 5. " There can be no question that Mr. Caiverhas produced a sound and useful treatise on the branch of mercantile law upon which he has set himself to write."— iaio Journal. •'Part I. deals with the Contract, Part H. with the Voyage, tnd Part HI. with the Delivery. All three subjects are treated with consummate care, added to a literary skill of no mean order The work has the rare merit of being within the Ijnuts of a student's capacity, and at the same time useful to the Admiraltv nracti- taoner." — Law Timee. CHAMBER PRACTICE,— Archibald's Practice at Judges' Cham- bers and m the District Registries in the Queen's Bench Division, High Court of Justice i with Forms of Summonses and Orders. Second Edition. By W. E. A. ARCHIBALD, Esq., Bar- rister- at-Law, and P. E. Vizakd, of the Summons and Order De- partment, Royal Courts of Justice. Royal 12mo. 1886. 16j " Cannot fail to be of the greatest service to practitioneis."— SoKators' Journal In Its present form it is undoubtedly a valuable handbook of the practice in the SSll^'"'^ Division Chambers, before either a jury or mastS, ot bS^a dStrict "Sl^f/-- • • 1 The work, as a whole, seems tioroughlycomplete."-i<,«,r™M; ♦^-hw"*^ " ^^' many forms of summonses and ordirs of much use to the pSS^ btioner. The commenta on the law are in general clear and trustworthy .'C-^^ou^^ CHANCERY, and Vide "Equity." Daniell's Chancery Praotice,-The Practice of the Chancery Division sU^ T^? 7^ °*- ^v'*'^ ^^ ""^ *PP^^ therefrom, being the Sixth Edition of DanieU'8 Chancery Practice, with alteration! and additions, and references to a companion Volume of Forms. Bv L Field E. C, Dura, and T. Ribton, assisted by W. H. Upjohn! Barriaters-at-Law. 2 vols, in 3 pai-ts. Demy 8vo. 1882-84 6^ 6s grla?S '' *° ^' ItTs1;Ztt™1Pr-5°*V''°'"^ ™ l""™ esamik'eVid^^ of f^tte'^Ltice.■^--•5icS.T;"f J* ''P™f^^^^ to t^ concise and cir^ul dige°st Di^iion."^la;^?™ ™'"'''' ""* i"^^»BaWe guide to the practice of the Chancery V All standard law TForh arc kept in Stock, in law calf and other bindings. 119, CHANCERY LAKE, LONDON, W-C. CHANCE RY— continued. DanieM's Forms and Precedents of Proceedings in the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice and on Appeal there- from. Fouith Edition. With Summaries of the Rules of the Supreme Court, Practical Notes and References to the Sixth Edition of "Daniell's Chancery Practice." By Chaeles BumraT, B.A. Oxon., a Chief Clerk of the Hon. Mr. Justice Chitty. RoyalSvo. 1885. 2l.l0s. " Mr. Bumey appears to have performed the laborious task before him with great ' success."— iato Journal. " Many of the chapters haye heen revised by persons specially qualified to deal with their contents."— iato Quarterly Seview, July, 18S5. Morgan's Chancery Acts and Orders,— The Statutes, Rules of Court and General Orders relating to the Practice and Jurisdiction of the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal. With Copious Notes. Sixth Edition. By the Right Hon. George Osboene Moeoau, one of Her Majesty's Counsel, and E. A. WuETZBTnia, Barrister-at-Law. Royal 8vo. 1885. 11. 10s. "This work we have had in constant use for the last few weeks, and we have no hesitation in sayin_^ that the present state of the Harmonious Whole, so far as relates to the Chancery Division, is made to appear as intelligible as under the circumstances can reasonably be expected." — Law Quarterly Jieviewj July, 1885. Peel's Chancery Actions. — A Concise 'Treatise on the Practice and Procedure in Chancery Actions under the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883. Third Edition. By Sydney Peel, Esq., Barrister- at-La-w. Demy 8vo. 1883. 8s. &d. " The book will give to the student a good general view of the effect on Chancery practice of the Judicature Acts and Orders." — Solicitors* Journal. CHARITABLE TRUSTS.— Mitcheson's Charitable Trusts.— The Jurisdiction of the Charity Commission ; being the Acts conferring such jurisdiction, 1853 — 1883, vsdth Introductory Essays and Notes on the Sections. By Riohaed Eemttnd Mitchbson, M.A., B.C.L., Barrister-at-Law. Demy 8to, ■ 1887. 18s. " A very neat and serviceable hand-book of the Law of the Charity Commissioners." — Law Journalj August 13, 1887. " The cases appear to have been very carefully noted up, and the introductory portion of the work comprises very useful chapters on ' Charitable Uses * and the ' Cy-pr&s ' doctrine. . . We can congratulate Mr. Mitcheson on his valuable produc- tion." — Law TimeSf August 6, 1887. CHARTER PARTIES.— Carver.— r»aiton Melhuish Habdinoham, Consulting Engineer and Patent Agent. Royal 12mo. 1881. mt, 2s. 6d. Sebastian's Digest of Cases of Trade Mark, Trade Name, Trade Secret, Goodwill, &c., decided in the Courts of the United Kingdom, India, the Colonies, and the United States of America. By Lewis Boyd Sebastiakt, B.C.L., M.A., Esq., Barrister-at-Law. 8vo. 1879. U. Is. " A digest which will be of very great value to all practitioners who have to advise on matters connected with trade marks," — Solicitors* Journal. %* All standard Law Works are Teept in Stock, in law calf and other bindings. 30 STEVENS AND SONS' LAW P UBLICATIONS. TRADE MARKS— continued. Sebastian on the Law of Trade Marks,— The Law of Trade Marks and their Eegistration, and matters connected therewith, including a chapter on Goodwill. Together with The Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883, and the Trade Marks Eules and Instructions thereunder ; Eonns and Precedents ; the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862, and other Statutory enactments ; The United States Statutes, 1870 — 81, and the Elides and Forms thereunder ; the Treaty with the United States, 1877. Second Edition. By Lewis Botd Sebastian, B.C.L., M.A., Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Demy 8vo. 1884. 11. U. *' A complete and exhaustive treatise on its subject, and is indifipenfiable to prac- titioners who have to deal "with this branch of law." — Solicitors' Journal. " Mr. Sebastian has written the fullest and most methodical book on trade marks which has appeared in England since the passing of the Trade Marks Eegistration Acts."— Trade Marks. TRAMWAYS. — Bazalgette and Humphreys.- F«fe "Local and Municipal Government." Sutton's Tramway Acts of the United Kingdom; with Notes on the Law and Practice, an Introduction, including the Proceedings before the Committees, Decisions of the Referees with respect to Locus Standi, and a Summary of the Principles of Tramway Rating, and an Appendix containing the Standing Orders of Parliament, Rules of the Board of Trade relating to Tramways, &c. Second Edition. By Henet Sutton, B.A., assisted by Eobeet A. Bennett, B.A., Barristers-at-Law. Demy 8vo. 1883. 15s. " The book is exceedingly well done, and cannot fail not only to be the standard work on its own subject, but to take a high place among legal text-books."— iau> Journal. TRUST FUNDS. — Geare's Investment of Trust Funds. — By Ebwaed Aextndel Geaee, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Royal 12mo. 1886. 75. 6d. " The work is wiitten in an easy style, it can very well be read by all trustees, whether they are lawyers or not ; and if they will take our advice, and invest their money here before they invest other people's elsewhere, they may be spared much trouble in the future."— TSe Jurist, January, 1837. TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES.— Godefroi's Digest of the Principles of the Law of Trusts and Trustees.— By Henet Gtodeeeoi, of Lincoln's Inn, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Demy 8to. 1879. 11. Is. VENDORS AND PURCHASERS.-Clerke and Humphry.- n* "Sales of Land." . Dart's Vendors and Purchasers.— A Treatiseon the Law and Prac- tice relating to Vendors and Purchasers of Real Estate. By the late J. Henet Daet, Esq., one of the Six Conveyancing Counsel of the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division. Sixth Edition. By William Babeee, Esq., one of Her Majesty's Counsel, Riohaed BuEDON Haldane, and William Robeet Sheldon, both of Lincoln's Inn, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. 2 vols. Royal 8to. 1888. 31. 15s. {Nearly ready.) Turner's Duties of Solicitor to Client as to Sales, Purchases, and Mortgages of Land,— By Edwasd F. Tuenek, SoUdtor Lectui-er on Real Property and Conveyancing, and one of the Assistant Examiners for Honours to the Incorporated Law Sooiefcv for 1882-3. Demy 8vo. 1883. 10s M &« «&o Conveyancing. — "Turner," ." His lectures lu'e full of thought and accuracy, they are lucid in exposition and SXo^tiSS!"'-^irU°5r'''^^''"^ ^ '"- workslatti-activ^ S St^fe a^^ an^trp^rti^c^^trl^'S^:?^;— pt^si^g^^^^^^ \* All standard Law TForks are kept in Stock, in law calf and other bindings. 119, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON, W-C. 31 WILLS. — Theobald's Concise Treatise on tlie Law of Wills, — Third Edition. By H. S. Theobaid, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Royal 8vo. 1885. 11. 10s. "A book of great ability and value. It bears on every page traces of care and sound judgment. It is certain to prove of great practical usefulness." — Solicitors' Journal. Weaver's Precedents of Wills,— A Collection of Concise Precedents of "Wills, with Introduction, Notes, and an Appendix of Statutes. By Chaei.es Weaveb, B.A. Post 8vo. 1882. 5s. WINDING UP.— Palmer's Winding-up Forms.— A Collection of 580 Forms of Summonses, AfBdavits, Orders, Notices and other Forms relating to the "Winding-up of Companies. "With Notes on the Law and Practice, and an Appendix containing the Acts and Rules. By ' Fbauois Beaotoet Palmee, Esq., Barrister- at-Law, Author of " Company Precedents," &o. 8vo. 1885, 12s. WRECK INQUIRIES,— Murton's Law and Practice relating to Formal Investigations in the United Kingdom, British Posses- sions and before Naval Courts into Shipping Casualties and the Incompetency and Misconduct of Ships' Officers. "With an Introduction. By "Waltee Mtjeton, Solicitor to the Board of Trade. Demy 8vo. 1884. 11. is. WRONGS.— Addison, Pollock, Shearwood,— Fi& "Torts." Ball.— "Leading Case?," vide "Torts." A large Stock, New and Second-hand. Ftices on application. Executed in the best manner at moderate prices and with, dispatch. The Law Reports, Law Journal, and all other Reports, bound to Office Patterns, at Office Prices. The Publishers of this Catalogue possess the largest known collection of Private Acts of Parliament {including Public and-^ Local), and can supply single copies commencing from a very early period. For Probate, Partnership or other purposes. LIBRARIES PURCHASED. STEVENS AND SONS, 119, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON, -W.C. STEVENS AND SONS' ANNOUNCEMENTS OP NEW WORKS AND NEW EDITIONS. Browne and Theobald's Law of Railway Companies.— Being a Collection of the Acts and Orders relating to Railway Companies, ■with Notes of all the Cases decided thereon, and Appendix of Bye- Laws and Standing Orders of the House of Commons. Second Edition. By J. H. Balfoub Beowni;, one of Her Majesty's Counsel, and H. S. Theobald, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Eoyal 8vo. {Nearly ready.) Bullen and Leake's Precedents of Pleadings, with Notes and Rules relating to Pleading. Fourth Edition. By Thomas J. Bxtllen, Esq., Special Pleader, and Cieil Dodd, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Part II. (In the press.) Chitty's Index to all the Reported Cases decided in the several Courts of Equity in England, the Privy CouncU, and the House of Lords., "With a Selection of Irish Cases, from the earliest period. Fourth Edition, wholly revised and reclassified by Henet Edwabd HiEST, B.C.L., M.A., of Lincoln's Inn, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. (Vol VI. in the press.) Dart's Vendors and Purchasers. — A Treatise on the Law and Practice relating to Vendors and Purchasers of Real Estate. By the late J. HeSet Daet, Esq., one of the Six Conveyancing Counsel of the High Court of justice. Sixth Edition. By Wiluam Baebee, Esq., one of Her Majesty's Counsel, Riceasd Bubdon Haujane, and William Robeet Sheldon, both of Lincoln's Inn, Esqrs., Barristers- at-Law. 2 vols. Royal 8vo. (Nearly ready.) Macnamara's Digest of the Law of Carriers of Goods and Pas- sengers by Railway, Road and Internal Navigation. — By W. H. Maonamaea, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. (In the press.) Palmer's Company Precedents. — Eor use in relation to Companies subject to the Companies Acts, 1862 to 1883. Arranged as follows : — Agreements, Memoranda and Articles of Association, Resolutions, Notices, Certificates, Prospectus, Debentures, Policies, Private Companies, Writs, Petitions, Judgments and Oi-ders, Winding-up, Reconstruction, Amalgamation, Arrangements, Special Acts. With Copious Notes. Fourth Edition. By Peancis Beatt- roET Palmbe, Esq., Bairister-at-Law. (In preparation.) Phillimore's Ecclesiastical Law of the Church of England. — Second Edition. Edited by Sir Waltee Geo. Feask Pbillimobe, Bart., D.C.L., Chancellor of the Diocese of Lincoln. (In preparation.) Pitt-Lewis' County Court Practice. — Third Edition. By Geoeqe Pitt-Lewis, Esq., one of Her Majesty's Counsel, assisted by H. A. De CoLYAE, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. 2 vols. (Vol. II. in the press.) Shirley's Selection of Leading Cases in Criminal Law.— By W. S. Shielbt, Esq., M.P., Barrister-at-Law. (In preparation.) Smith's Compendium of Mercantile Law,— Tenth Edition. By John Maodonell, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. ' (In the press.) Thring's Lawand Praoticeof Joint Stock and other Companies.— By Lord Theing, K.C.B. Fifth Edition. By James Meadows Rendel, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. (In the press.) STEVENS AND SONS 119, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON, W.C. BTEyBSrS AND SO NS, 119, OHiNOBRY LANE, LONDON, W.O, Addison's Treatise on theLaw of Contracts.— ^i^^itA Edition. By HORACE SMITH, Esq., BarriBter-at-Le-w, Recorder of Lincoln. Author of " The Law of Negligence," &o. Royal 8vo. 1883. (1600 pp.) Price 21. 10s. cloth. Arnould on the Law of Marine InsvLrance.— Sixth, Edition. By DAVID MACLACHLAN, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. 2 Vols. Royal 8vo. 1887. Price 31. cloth. Archbold's Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases.— With the Statutes, Precedents of Indictments, &c., and the Evidence necessary to support them. Twentieth Edition, including the Practice in Criminal Proceedings by Indictment. By WILLIAM BRUCE, Esq., Barrister-at-Law, and Stipendiary. Magistrate for the Borough of Leeds. Royal 12mo. 1886. Price 11. lis. 6d. cloth. Woodfall's Landlord and Tenant— With a full collection of Precedents and forms of Procedure ; containing also a collection of Leading Propositions. Thirteenth Edition. By J. M. LELT, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Boval 8vo. 1886. Price 38s. cloth. Theobald's Law of Wills.— A Concise Treatise on the Law of Wills. Third Edition. By H. S. THEOBALD, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Roval 8vo. 1885. Price 11. 10s. cloth. ^ "A work of great ability and value. It bears on every page traces of care and sound judgment."— (SoZiators' Journal. Harris' Hints on Advocacy — Conduct of Cases, Civil and Criimnal. Classes of Witnesses and suggestions for Cross-Examining them, &c., &e. By BICHARD HARRIS, Barrister-at-Law, of the Middle Temple and Midland Circuit, Eighth Edition. Royal 12mo. 1887. Price 7s. ed. cloth. " Well worth the study of a young practitioner at the bar."— Sir F. Pollock, Bart., Law Quarterly Review, April, 1887. Carver's Law of Carriage by Sea.— A Treatise on the Law relating to the Carriage of Goods by Sea. By THOMAS GILBERT CARVER, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Royal Svo. 1885. Price 11. 12s. cloth. Castle's Treatise on the Law of Rating.-5eco»cZ Edition. By EDWARD JAMES CASTLE, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Demy 8uo. 1886. Price 25s. cloth. "A correct, exhaustive, clear and concise view of the law." Laio Times. Daniell's Practice of the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice, and on Appeal therefrom ; being the Sixth Edition of Daniell's Chancery Practice, with alterations and additions, and References to a companion m4T,?,?^?S''?fTT,r?;?^T^^°^'"^° EIELD, EDWARD CLENNELL DUNN, ajid THEODORE RIBTON, assisted by WILLIAM HENRY UPJOHN, Esqrs Bar- nsters-at-Law. 2 Vols, in 3 parts. Demy Svo. 1882-84. Price 61. 6s. cloth. Daniell's Chancery ToTma— Fourth Edition. Forms and Precedents of Proceeding in the Chancery Dirision of the High Court of Justice and on Appeal therefrom. Fourth Edition. With Summaries of the Rules of the Supreme Court, Practical Notes and References to the Sixth Edition of " Daniell's Chancery Practice. By CHARLES BURNEY, B.A. (Oxon.), a Chief Clerk of the Hon. Mr. Justice Chitty. Royal 8vo. (1260 pp.) 1885. Pnce 21. 10s. cloth. Chitty's Archbold's Practice of the Queen's Bench Division of the High (3ourt of Justice, and on Appeal therefrom, to the Court of Appeal and House of Lords in Civil Proceedings. Fourteenth Edition. ByT. WILLES CHITTY assisted by J. St. L. LESLIE, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. 2 Vols. Demy Svo 1885' Pnce 31. 13s. Gd. cloth. Chitty's Forms of Practical Proceedings in the Queen's Bench Division of tbo High Court of Justice: with Notes containing the Statutes, Gules and CafCS relating Uiereto. Tweietb Edition. By THOS. WILLES CHITTY, Esq., Barristor-at-Law. Demy 8to. 1883. Pi-ice 11. ISs. cloth. Wurtzburg's Building Societies— The Acts Relating to ?ci'i'^'3.^',"',i!'i'''^^?°'"P,"'''"K ^^^ ^"^ °^ 1836, and the Building Societies Acts, 1874, 18/0, 18//, Ibhl, and the Treasury Regulations, 1884; with an Introduction, w?i'f,V,'?r,,,T,'\f '^"H, ''Opedents of Rules and Assurances. By EDWARD ALBERT WURlZBUliG.Lsq., Bamstor-at-Law. i?oi/al 12mo. 1886. Price 7s. 6d. cloth. ,* All Standard Law Works are kept in stock, in law calj and other bindings.