MEMOIRS OF 
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 1870 - 1873 
 
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 Cornell University Library 
 DC 344.A3 
 
 Memoirs of M. Thiers. 1870-1873 / 
 
 3 1924 028 228 264 
 
B Cornell University 
 9 Library 
 
 The original of this book is in 
 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924028228264 
 
MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 1870— 1873 
 
 Translated by 
 F. M. ATKINSON 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 JAMES POTT & CO. 
 
 1916 
 
I\,ya8l1 
 
 (AH rights restrved) 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 M. Thiers in London 7 
 
 A Diplomatic Journey 23 
 
 Negotiations for an Armistice 66 
 
 The Peace Preliminaries 102 
 
 Presidency oe the Republic 117 
 
 Appendices 333 
 
 Index 377 
 
MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 M. THIERS IN LONDON 
 
 SEPTEMBER, 1870 
 
 [M. Thiers, in his tour of the European capitals on behalf of France, 
 came to London in the first place. Here follow his letters to 
 M. Jules Favre, taken from the latter's " Histoire du Gouverne- 
 ment de la Defense Nationale." They form an integral part of 
 these Memoirs, though not included in the French arrangement.] 
 
 London, ISth September, 1870. 
 
 Mon chbk ancien Collegue, — I set out yesterday 
 evening as I had promised you, and was, I think, 
 the last person to use the Northern Railway, for the 
 engineer officer charged with the task of cutting 
 communications told me that he had waited for me 
 to pass before blowing up the bridge at Creil. 
 
 I reached London at seven in the morning, and 
 finding no lodging anywhere, so great is the number 
 of foreigners here, and especially French, I was 
 obliged to stay at the Embassy, where, thanks to 
 M. Tissot, a kind of camping-place has been got ready 
 for me. I have had an opportunity of observing, 
 while receiving various people this morning, that 
 public opinion is moving in our favour, and even 
 that the news of my arrival had given a distinct 
 fillip to men's minds, a circumstance that has reassured 
 me a little as to the usefulness of my mission, which, 
 to my mind, was very doubtful. So much the better, 
 I am told, the Ministers will be obliged to declare 
 themselves. The Times itself has changed its tone 
 
8 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 for the better. M. Tissot having placed himself fully 
 at my disposal, I made use of his services to inform 
 the English Cabinet of my arrival in London. Pre- 
 cisely at noon Lord Granville came to see me, wishing 
 to spare me the trouble of going to the Foreign 
 Office. Our conversation was lengthy and on my side 
 urgent, but always very friendly. It is impossible 
 to recount its inevitable repetitions. I give you here- 
 with a summary as accurate as possible. 
 
 First of all I took pains to prove, by an exact account 
 of the events leading up to the war, that France had 
 not desired this war, that the Chamber itself had not 
 desired it, and had only yielded to the pressure of the 
 Imperial power, which it could never resist, and that 
 on the last day especially, the 15th of July, it had 
 only allowed itself to be drawn in by a most cul- 
 pable falsehood with regard to a pretended insult to 
 France. 
 
 My account seemed to dispel more than one erroneous 
 impression in Lord Granville's mind, for he appeared 
 to think, from what the agents of the Empire had told 
 him, that at heart France had desired war, and that 
 the dynasty had merely taken the initiative. I think 
 I have convinced him upon this point. On this occa- 
 sion we touched on a matter that preoccupied us a 
 little when I left Paris : an intrigue of the Bonapartes 
 towards setting up the Empire again upon the head 
 of the Prince Imperial under the regency of the 
 Empress. Lord Granville treated this as a chimera 
 that could not be realized, and beneath any one's atten- 
 tion. Information I have received from other quarters 
 proves that there is nothing serious in it, that the 
 Imperialist refugees here do not themselves believe in 
 it, and are taking no steps in the matter. For the 
 
M. THIERS IN LONDON 9 
 
 moment they are frightened and inert. Bonapartist 
 intrigue, if it exists, would be much more likely in 
 the Prussian camp. Lord Granville told me that the 
 Prussian Court, not wishing, or appearing not to wish, 
 to treat, would perhaps use this as a pretext, alleging 
 that in its view the Imperial Government alone had a 
 regularly constituted character, that the new Govern- 
 ment was the outcome of a popular movement, that 
 it had no legal being, and that in treating with it they 
 might find themselves treating with nobody. 
 
 This objection, which Lord Granville did not offer as 
 his own, gave me an opportunity of saying that the 
 Chamber might have seized the power if it had had 
 sufficient decision ; but that through its hesitation it 
 had left the way clear for a popular movement, that 
 from this movement had sprung the present Govern- 
 ment ; that it was idle and dangerous to arg ue a bout 
 its origin, and that we shouldlook to its actions, which 
 were excellent. (Lord Granville several times nodded 
 approval of my assertions.) I added tha t at the 
 moment the Republic was everybody^ accepted Govern- 
 ment"; that since it brought despair to no party because 
 it did not finally realize the idea of any, it suited aU^for 
 the present ; thaFreasohable men were united in main- 
 taining - ^, because, to the merit of not exasperating 
 party feeling it added that of being at the moment the 
 veritable Government of National Defence, for all 
 parties could rally to the common defence, without 
 the vexation of feeling that they were working for an 
 opponent ; that finally it was in the hands of honour- 
 able men of the best aims, who had till now directed 
 all their efforts to the maintaining of order; that for 
 my own part I held this opinion, since I was in London, 
 and prepared to go elsewhere to persuade all the 
 
10 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 European Courts that for France and for Europe 
 the best thing to do was to help the present Govern- 
 ment of France. 
 
 Lord Granville fully accepted all I said on this matter, 
 and if he had paused upon it it was as an objection, 
 not on the part of England, but of Prussia seeking 
 pretexts not to treat. He even asked me why the 
 next Constituent Assembly had not been summoned as 
 quickly as possible. I replied that the nature of the 
 circumstances of the moment made it impossible, and 
 in any case he seemed in this to wish to prove that he 
 spoke not for himself but for Prussia, whose ill-will we 
 have to neutralize. 
 
 At length we came to present circumstances, and I 
 asked what England was willing to do; I asked it in 
 the most urgent manner, reminding him of our forty 
 years' alliance, our brotherhood in arms in the Crimea, 
 and the loyalty of our behaviour during the war in 
 India. I asked if England would refuse all support 
 at a moment when the madness of the fallen 
 Government had left us disarmed before a Power 
 that in no way disguised its passion for aggrandize- 
 ment. 
 
 Hereupon Lord Granville uttered many expressions 
 of affection for France, and tried with the utmost 
 gentleness to evade my importunities. He reiterated 
 continually that England would be eager to come to 
 our aid, but that not wishing to go so far as war, since 
 at the moment she had not the means, she exposed 
 herself, if she insisted in the name of the neutral 
 Powers, to the displeasure of Prussia, who would not 
 hear of their intervention, and thenceforward she 
 would harm rather than help our cause. As I rejoined 
 that by keeping to this she would do nothing, abso- 
 
M. THIERS IN LONDON 11 
 
 lutely nothing, and that she would fall from her high 
 place by allowing the greatest revolution of modern 
 times to take place without her and in spite of her; 
 he defended himself by saying that the Germans, on 
 the contrary, complained that she was doing too much 
 on our behalf, and that she was wholly partial to 
 France. I answered that without doubt in her situa- 
 tion one was exposed, whatever one did, to accusation 
 from both sides, but that of the two complainants one 
 must needs be right ; that this was clearly France, for 
 she was not the conquering Power seeking to change 
 the face of Europe, and that nevertheless it was only 
 Prussia that was given a free hand, and that simply 
 to do nothing was the greatest possible partiality to 
 her. "Besides," I added boldly, "do you know what 
 they say everywhere in France? That your Queen is 
 so dominated by family affections, and that in this 
 affair the Cabinet is influenced by her." 
 
 " I am profoundly devoted to my Sovereign," answered 
 Lord Granville, " but I am a Minister of England, and 
 my country's will is the only one I consult." 
 
 In London it is thought that Lord Granville is in- 
 fluenced by the Queen's maternal feelings ; but I must 
 say that he seemed to be guided chiefly by a policy 
 of inertia, which consists in avoiding all considerable 
 affairs. In other days England would have shuddered 
 with indignation at the idea of allowing so great a 
 revolution as was accomplishing itself under our eyes 
 to be fulfilled without taking a part in it proper to a 
 great Power. To-day, while recognizing that Prussia is 
 becoming formidable, she prefers to shut her eyes and 
 ears rather than to see it or hear it said. She is vexed 
 and troubled ; but the idea of a great war dismays her, 
 and the thought of taking a step that might meet with 
 
12 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 a rebuff and offer her the alternative of enduring an 
 affront or taking up arms, dismays her almost as much 
 as war itself. I said so just now to Mr. Gladstone, my 
 interview with whom I shall recount to you in the 
 course of this dispatch ; I said to him: " England, which 
 once was angry when Napoleon told her that she was 
 exclusively a maritime Power, leaving her legitimate 
 role when she took part in continental affairs, England 
 to-day acknowledges that he was right, for certainly 
 she is doing as he wished, and leaves the Continent to 
 itself without venturing to have an opinion on what 
 takes place there." Mr. Gladstone said nothing and 
 preserved a grieved and uncomfortable silence. 
 
 Yet public opinion is awaking little by little, the 
 old English pride is murmuring, and would break out 
 if Parliament was assembled. But there is no one 
 in London except Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, 
 who have been brought here on account of my 
 presence and my errand. Ministers, therefore, do as 
 they please, and yield to this inertia, displaying annoy- 
 ance when they are shown what they are permitting 
 to happen. 
 
 For the rest, personally I can only felicitate myself 
 upon the way they received me, and the interest they 
 express in France. When I said to Lord Granville 
 that after all this interest came to nothing, he replied 
 that they had done something, that they had made 
 themselves our intermediary in transmitting to Prussia 
 a communication equivalent to a proposal to treat, 
 and that we must wait for the answer. I replied 
 that this was a very small matter, that without doubt 
 we must await this answer, but that it was of no 
 more importance than the request (I did not yet 
 know the answer, which has arrived) ; that something 
 
M. THIERS IN LONDON 13 
 
 else was needed, and something that would give more 
 character to England's intervention. He replied that 
 doubtless if there was anything useful to be done 
 (apart from any thought of war) he would not reject 
 it, but that he was sure that the intervention of 
 neutrals in this affair was supremely disagreeable to 
 Prussia, and that much better conditions would be 
 obtained by negotiating direct with her than by 
 importing neutrals into the matter. "And why," he 
 added, "would not M. Jules Favre confer directly 
 with Count Bismarck? What objection could he have 
 to such a step?" 
 
 Recalling then what you had told me, that you 
 were prepared to brave every danger, every distress, 
 in order to visit the Prussian Headquarters, I replied, 
 without binding you in any way, that while I did 
 not know what resolve you might take I nevertheless 
 did not believe that you would be opposed to such 
 a step, but that we must beforehand assure ourselves 
 of a favourable answer and a reception befitting the 
 representative of France ; that England would have 
 to be the intermediary of this proposal by recommend- 
 ing it strongly, and thus guaranteeing its faithful 
 accomplishment. 
 
 Thereupon Lord Granville said he would consider 
 it and consult Mr. Gladstone upon it. I then re- 
 quested him either to convey a letter from me to 
 Mr. Gladstone, asking for an interview, or to ask it 
 for me by word of mouth. He replied that it was 
 unnecessary to write, and that he would give me an 
 immediate answer. A quarter of an hour after I 
 received a word from Lord Granville announcing that 
 Mr. Gladstone would visit me at six o'clock. 
 
 At six o'clock, then, Mr. Gladstone came to the 
 
14 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 French Embassy, where I told you I was established. 
 I found him grave, friendly, gentle, but profoundly 
 saddened by events in Europe. " The answer we were 
 expecting has come," he said ; " here it is, read it." 
 I need not reproduce it since it is in your hands. This 
 answer, you may imagine, made me shudder. In 
 affecting to be unable to treat with the French Gov- 
 ernment, because it would be incapable of exacting 
 obedience, Count Bismarck lets it be seen what he 
 would demand. Mr. Gladstone and I were both very 
 careful not to say a word of the conditions insinuated 
 rather than expressed in this reply. I would not, of 
 course, have wished to bring them under discussion. 
 I confined myself to saying that the present Govern- 
 ment would be obeyed by the troops as by the civilians 
 so long as it would demand nothing of them that could 
 offend their patriotism. We then immediately went 
 back to the idea mentioned this morning by Lord 
 Granville as the most practicable, that M. Jules Favre 
 should visit the Prussian Headquarters. " When they 
 are face to face," he said, " it will no longer be asked 
 whether they can or cannot treat." " Yes," I replied, 
 " but I cannot answer for M. Jules Favre ; I can only • 
 say one thing: he has often declared to me, that in 
 order to bring about an honourable peace he would 
 be ready to brave the greatest dangers, or if not 
 dangers, the most extreme annoyances, and especially 
 that of visiting the enemy's Headquarters. We must 
 accordingly await his answer. But this is not all : 
 England must come away from her inertia, she must 
 herself propose the suggested interview, and claim 
 it as a thing due to Europe and the whole of 
 humanity." " Without doubt," said Mr. Gladstone, 
 "England will become the intermediary for this pro- 
 
M. THIERS IN LONDON 15 
 
 posal." "Intermediary, yes," I replied, "but she cannot 
 confine herself to the part of a mere messenger ; she 
 must speak as befits her greatness, her dignity, the 
 lofty sentiments she professes. Bearing this message 
 of peace, she must claim its acceptance as a duty 
 towards humanity, revolted at the blood poured out 
 by two great civilized countries." " Yes," said Mr. 
 Gladstone, " Lord Granville will say that." " That 
 is not enough," I added. " England must not keep to 
 the language of a pastor preaching charity ; she must 
 speak in the name of Europe, must express the feeling 
 of Europe upon what is taking place at this juncture. 
 England," I added further, " must say that humanity 
 desires peace, but she must also say a word on the 
 nature of that peace, and add that shedding of 
 blood must be brought to an end, by means of an 
 equitable and lasting peace, which should deal the 
 balance of Europe no more blows than it has already 
 endured." 
 
 Mr. Gladstone said, "Yes, Lord Granville shall say 
 that." I insisted and obtained that he should be still 
 more decided, repeating with the utmost fervour that 
 if England did not speak as a European Power, she 
 would abdicate before the whole world, and in presence 
 of the blood that would flow under the walls of Paris, 
 in presence of the colossus that would rise up in the 
 centre of Europe, she would seem to say that it matters 
 little to her, and to shut herself up in her insular 
 position to let the bloodshed go on and Europe manage 
 for herself as best she can. 
 
 It was eight in the evening ; I begged Mr. Gladstone, 
 who was about to rejoin Lord Granville, to ask him for 
 another interview for me before midnight, and at any 
 hour he wished. Lord Granville was dining in town. 
 
16 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 I then wrote an urgent letter to him (you see all the 
 importunities called for by the situation, that one 
 would never employ for one's self), asking him to see 
 me again. Broken with fatigue, for I had spent the 
 last forty-eight hours in going to and fro, or in travel- 
 ling, I bade one of our young attaches to stay on guard, 
 and to come and wake me if an answer arrived. It 
 came only this morning, and explaining his last night's 
 silence by a dinner at Holland House, and his receiving 
 my letter too late, Lord Granville announces his visit 
 for eleven o'clock. I am expecting him, and shall add 
 the details of the interview to this dispatch. 
 
 Wednesday, 14th September, 11 a.m. 
 
 I have just seen Lord Granville again. I found him 
 still more friendly than yesterday, but still afraid of 
 compromising England by going too near the con- 
 flagration that is devouring the centre of the Continent. 
 He told me he had written to Lord Lyons on the 
 step that M. Jules Favre might take by going to the 
 Prussian camp, which England would support with 
 all her power. He first of all asked me if M. Jules 
 Favre would take this step, especially after yester- 
 day's reply from Prussia. To this I answered as I 
 did yesterday, that I thought M. • Jules Favre was 
 prepared for the most painful sacrifices in the 
 interests of a speedy and honourable peace, but that 
 I could not make in his name a pledge for which I 
 had no authority. I then went back to our con- 
 versation of yesterday, and again I urged that Eng- 
 land in asking that M. Jules Favre should be received 
 in the Prussian camp, and honourably received 
 should not play the part of mere messenger, a part 
 
M. THIERS IN LONDON 17 
 
 too lowly for her; and I urged that the English 
 Cabinet should recommend, in the name of humanity, 
 the stopping of this dreadful bloodshed, and in the 
 name of the general interest, a peace that should not 
 inflict on the balance of power in Europe more loss 
 than it had received. I added that Mr. Gladstone 
 had approved this double recommendation in the 
 name of humanity and in the name of the balance 
 of Europe. 
 
 Lord Granville here appeared to be still anxious 
 not to thrust his finger into machinery that might 
 seize the finger, then the arm, then the whole body. 
 He did not say no, but he desired to consult with 
 Mr. Gladstone, whom he had not seen yesterday 
 evening, and I have to meet him at the Foreign 
 Office at half-past four. 
 
 My credentials being on the table, and bearing the 
 address of Lord Granville, he said to me : " I think 
 this packet is for me." "Yes, my lord, it is for you. 
 It is my credentials, which I did not present to you 
 yesterday, since I was so eager to enter upon affairs." 
 He smiled as he said that such formalities were 
 superfluous at the moment ; he opened the packet, 
 read it, and added : " I receive it, though strictly I 
 should not, as our Government has not recognized 
 yours. But you see that in reality our relations are 
 just as they would be if this recognition had taken 
 place." 
 
 I had intended this very day to take up the question 
 of recognition, and I seized the opportunity that offered 
 itself. " My lord," I said, " you continually speak of 
 moral support, as material support is out of the 
 question; but here is a way of affording the French 
 Government a powerful moral support, to recognize 
 
 2 
 
18 MEMOIKS OF M. THIERS 
 
 it." "Without doubt," replied Lord Granville, "you 
 see by our relations with you that we act precisely 
 as we should towards a recognized Government ; but 
 so far nothing has given the Government established 
 at Paris on the 4th of September a fixed character, and 
 we should fear to go too far and too hastily in 
 recognizing it. If to-morrow, for instance, a shock 
 overthrew it, what sort of figure should we cut ? Oh ! 
 if any vote had given your country an opportunity to 
 sanction the new Government, we should not hesitate. 
 But why put off the elections so long ? " I repeated 
 that circumstances had prevented holding them sooner, 
 that their result was assured ; that they would return 
 a majority of Conservative-Liberals, disposed, like 
 myself, to uphold the present Government ; that if it 
 was such a manifestation that England desired before 
 recognizing the French Government, she might recog- 
 nize it instantly, for the Government would be as 
 indispensable in a month's time as it is to-day. " Yes," 
 answered Lord Granville, "but a shock? Who can 
 answer for that ? " "The shock," I rejoined, "depends 
 more on Europe than on us ; if the Moderate Govern- 
 ment now in charge of affairs is not properly treated, 
 if it is driven, or allowed to be driven to extremity, 
 no one can answer for what might happen." This 
 brought up again all the points already discussed, and 
 I did not insist. But Lord Granville did not seem 
 wholly opposed to recognizing us. I am to see him 
 again at the Foreign Office at half-past four. 
 
 A. Thiebs. 
 
M. THIERS IN LONDON 19 
 
 Wednesday, 14th September, 1870. 
 
 I have just left the Foreign Office after seeing Lord 
 Granville for the second time to-day. He showed me 
 your reply to Count Bismarck's communication, 1 which 
 reply I find here on my return to the Embassy. It 
 is excellent. Lord Granville wholly approves it. After 
 a few minutes' talk on this subject he told me of his 
 conversation yesterday with Mr. Gladstone. I had 
 foreseen that he would retract something of the con- 
 cessions Mr. Gladstone had made yesterday, and I 
 wished to regain them, but in vain, and the following 
 are the final resolutions of the English Cabinet. If 
 at a moment, which it is for you to select, you think 
 it useful to confer with Count Bismarck at the Prus- 
 sian camp, England will be your intermediary, will 
 convey the expression of your desire to the Prussian 
 camp, and will strongly recommend it as the simplest 
 way of placing the belligerents in a position to explain 
 themselves and come to an understanding, and will 
 express in the name of humanity the prayer that we 
 may speedily see the end of this bloodshed, and calm 
 
 1 Bismarck inquired: "What guarantee is there that France, or at 
 this moment the troops of Metz and Strassburg, will recognize the 
 arrangements into which we might enter with the Government at 
 present existing in Paris, or with those which will probably succeed it ? " 
 
 M. Jules Favre replied as follows : 
 
 " The guarantees properly demanded by Count Bismarck can be 
 furnished from both a political and military standpoint. From the 
 political point of view, the Government of National Defence will sign 
 an armistice and will at once convene an Assembly which shall ratify 
 the treaty of peace agreed upon by the Prussian Government and 
 that of France. From the military point of view, the Government 
 of National Defence offers the same security as a regular Government, 
 since the Minister of War is obeyed in all the orders he gives. All 
 that may be agreed upon in an armistice would therefore be punctually 
 carried out without any delay." 
 
20 MEMOIRS OP M. THIERS 
 
 restored in Europe by a peace equally honourable 
 for both sides. 
 
 I was about to begin my remonstrances afresh, when 
 Lord Granville stopped me, saying : " Do not insist 
 further. You have already made us change our plans, 
 you are forcing us to do more than we meant, for 
 we intended to be merely intermediaries without 
 supporting any solution ; but to make us recommend 
 a peace which should not inflict more harm upon the 
 balance of Europe than it has already sustained is 
 to make us enter into the negotiation and take sides 
 for one solution against another. I do not know 
 if later we may not have to go further; but to-day 
 we are going a step beyond the bounds we had set 
 for ourselves. Be satisfied with this, and do not ask 
 us to do what we cannot do." 
 
 I let it be seen that I was sad, unsatisfied, discon- 
 tented with an old alliance that ended in so little help 
 in our great danger; but I did not wish to run the 
 risk of irritating without gaining anything. I certainly 
 believe I have conquered their inertia to some extent, 
 that I have moved them, but without drawing them 
 out of their obstinate abstention. I told them they 
 were behaving to-day as France did in 1866. They 
 feel this is the case ; but to throw themselves boldly 
 into present danger to prevent a greater one in the 
 future is beyond the courage of Europe at the moment, 
 and we must admit that the state of unpreparedness 
 of all the Powers explains their inertia, without justify- 
 ing it. All I shall have obtained will be that Lord 
 Lyons will find somewhat less hindrance to his good- 
 will for us. 
 
 ****** 
 
 I am convinced that they would prefer keeping me 
 
M. THIERS IN LONDON 21 
 
 here to letting me go to Saint Petersburg. This is 
 a reason for not delaying my departure. However, I 
 think it best to await your reply to my present 
 communication. 
 
 Thank you for to-day's dispatch. I am happy even 
 in the midst of so much distress to know that Paris is 
 so right-minded and so well disposed. 
 
 With renewed assurance of my regard and esteem, 
 
 A. Thiers. 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOURNEY 
 
 Urged by the telegrams I receive from Paris to leave 
 London in order to go to Saint Petersburg, I decide to 
 take my passage, on Sunday the 18th of September, 
 1870, upon the steamboat that runs between England 
 and Russia; but at the moment of my departure 
 there arrives the Desaix (the old Prince-Jerdme) with 
 Commandant Bruat, detailed to bring me to the 
 Dunes, where the Solferino and the fleet have been 
 ordered to come to meet me. 
 
 We reach the Dunes at break of day, in a heavy 
 fog. After waiting and hunting about for several 
 hours and not catching sight of any ship, we make 
 for Cherbourg, where we find the Solferino and the 
 fleet, their orders having been countermanded when 
 I had reported my intention of going by passenger 
 steamer. 
 
 On Admiral de Gueydon's telling me that with the 
 large ships of his command he could not escort the 
 Solferino as far as the point where I should be 
 beyond reach of the Prussians, I resolve to go to 
 Russia overland. 
 
 Travelling all night we arrive at Tours on Tuesday, 
 September 20th, and stay at the Archbishop's palace, 
 a part of which had been placed by the Archbishop 
 
24 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 at the disposal of M. Cremieux, the delegate from the 
 Government of Paris. We resume our journey the 
 same day. 
 
 On our way, the railway-stations are thronged with 
 the people of the neighbourhood, who all come to tell 
 me how ardently they pray for peace. We pass Mont 
 Cenis (Wednesday the 21st), and during the night we 
 reach Turin, where we only pause for a few hours. 
 
 Thursday the 22nd, at six in the morning, we set 
 out for Vienna. A wonderful day. As we cross 
 Lombardy we see the lovely lake of Garda, Verona, 
 the towers of Maximilian. From Mestre, where we 
 must wait for the train, we go to spend the evening 
 in Venice, more abandoned than ever. 
 
 On the night of the 22nd we cross the Julian Alps 
 in a terrific north-east wind, and come into Styria. 
 Wild aspect. Going down into the valley, the country 
 is rich and the inhabitants prosperous. Wide expanse 
 of meadows. One of the richest and most happy dis- 
 tricts to the eye that I have ever seen. The Save and 
 the Drave issue from it to run into the Danube, and 
 the Soemmering shows as a long outwork of the Alps, 
 rising up to separate Styria from Austria and Vienna. 
 
 At length, at 11 p.m. on Friday the 23rd, we arrive 
 at Vienna, where we find the French legation waiting 
 in the station. I go to the Hotel Cour dAutriche. 
 
 Saturday morning, September 24th, I have a con- 
 ference with Count Beust. 
 
 Tall, with a certain claim to good looks, always 
 smiling, subtle, intelligent, among all the men I 
 have known the one who has the least air of believing 
 what he says, readily admitting Austria's former blun- 
 ders, forgetting only the one he led her into when 
 he brought her, by bringing Saxony, to interfere with 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOURNEY 25 
 
 Danish affairs, Count Beust, whom I had previously 
 met, but whom I failed to recognize, received me 
 most cordially. With him, as with the other per- 
 sonages I had seen during the previous six days, I 
 began by a very clear account of the declaration of 
 war, and I showed that it wa9 not France that had 
 willed it; that the Government itself had only acted 
 in submission to the Bonapartist party, on which lay 
 the sole and entire responsibility for this fatal war. 
 
 I then said that in the circumstances the Republic 
 was the one form of government possible, and for 
 a period that no one could estimate, if it understood 
 how to conduct itself. 
 
 "Now," I added, "we must see what the Powers 
 can do for us : if they realize how greatly it is to 
 the interest of Europe not to leave Prussia free to 
 do what she pleases, and whether they are not, each 
 in what concerns herself, about to make the same 
 mistake as Napoleon III made after Sadowa." 
 
 Here Count Beust interrupted me in order to express 
 his views on the past, and I listened with a silent 
 attention that sometimes embarrassed him, for he 
 was asking himself whether I approved his narration 
 and his comments or not. But to make what he said 
 to me quite clear, I must explain the situation of the 
 political parties in Austria. 
 
 Count Beust is the subject of attack from nearly 
 everybody. He is accused of being deep in the 
 intrigue that helped to bring about the present war. 
 The Emperor would have wished to be revenged, the 
 army shared his feeling, the nobility too : the Austro- 
 Germans were inclined the same way before the 
 latest Prussian victories. Our Ambassador, M. de 
 Gramont, had fostered these feelings as far as he 
 
26 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 could, and Count Beust, seeking to conciliate both Paris 
 and Vienna, had showed no sign of opposing them. 
 The Hungarians had, on the contrary, made almost 
 unconditional objections. 
 
 "When Germany is threatened with fresh invasions 
 from Prussia," they had said, "it will be time enough 
 for us to meddle with the affair." 
 
 They had declared as much to M. de Gramont; and 
 so to-day they assert that if Count Beust had only 
 spoken as decidedly, Europe would not be in the 
 throes of war. 
 
 Count Beust was clearly seeking to defend himself 
 against this reproach. According to him, the war had 
 been a mere piece of insanity. Doubtless the Emperor, 
 the army, Austria even, wished to have their revenge, 
 but they did not want it quite so soon. The country 
 saw its material prosperity in process of rebirth. 
 
 " We are beginning to have more ease ; buildings are 
 rising from the ground, as you see," said Count Beust, 
 " but our finances still need time to re-establish them- 
 selves. Our army is being reorganized ; we too, like 
 the Prussians, will be able to have a million soldiers ; 
 but we have not completed our reorganization, and 
 if our first line army is complete and in being, the 
 army that is to be made up of our whole people is 
 not yet in existence. For all these things time is 
 essential. I have at various times said so to M. de 
 Gramont : I was of opinion that he had understood 
 that this country could not be an effective ally for 
 some years. It seems that M. de Gramont announced 
 that we would mobilize a hundred and fifty thou- 
 sand men towards the Silesian frontier. If we had 
 done so, what difficulties we should have had with 
 Hungary and Russia ! As soon as we disclosed our 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOURNEY 27 
 
 feelings in the matter, the Russians said: "If you 
 intervene, you will oblige us to intervene as well, 
 and that will not be the way to help France. Leave 
 it to us, and we will bring our influence to bear 
 upon the King of Prussia." 
 
 Coming back to the origin of the war, Count Beust 
 satirically cited this instance of Bonapartist infatua- 
 tion : 
 
 "Imagine," said he, "that at the very moment 
 when we heard the news that war was declared, the 
 French Government asked us to inquire and to 
 inform them without delay whether the declaration 
 had arrived in Berlin, for, they asserted, they were 
 ready to invade Germany on the same day. A fort- 
 night later, not a shot had been fired ! Hearing you 
 reiterate that you were ready, we counted upon 
 immediate and decisive action. The Prussian press 
 always said that in such a war they must expect 
 reverses at the outset, but that by persevering they 
 would triumph. Judge our astonishment, then ! " 
 
 Count Beust then spoke of every one's amazement at the 
 news of our earliest reverses : the Hungarians, though 
 full of sympathy for us, less than ever disposed to 
 intervene ; then among the Austro-Germans those who 
 were favourable to us losing confidence in us, and those 
 who had not already avowed their preference for the 
 Prussians no longer hiding it, since they could explain 
 it by a certain pride of kinship ; nearly all the Press, 
 won over by Count Bismarck, and the Court itself, whose 
 wishes and sympathies were with us, no longer, in 
 prudence, venturing to do anything that might bring 
 the storm upon Austria. 
 
 What Count Beust did not say, is that, after having 
 begun to take up arms, they turned again to lay them 
 
28 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 down. They have bought, in the meantime, about thirty 
 thousand horses for the cavalry; more for the artillery; 
 the army has been brought out of the wretched con- 
 dition imposed upon it by the necessities of the budget ; 
 but they dare not make any use of it for fear of the 
 Prussians and the Russians. While the English, 
 thinking themselves sheltered from the storm, because 
 they look on it from the shore, wish to keep out of war, 
 the Austrians on the contrary clearly see the danger 
 that threatens Europe, but they fear they will bring it 
 on themselves if they intervene to lay it. That is what 
 makes this a very delicate question to treat of with 
 them. I only touched the subject therefore with the 
 greatest circumspection and without dwelling upon it, 
 when Count Beust broached it himself. 
 
 " We feel this danger," said he ; " but what can we 
 do? It is all in the hands of Russia." 
 
 " The Hungarians being for us and the Austro- 
 Germans against us," I answered, "would it not be 
 difficult for you, even if the Russians showed the 
 example, to adopt a decided attitude in our favour ? " 
 
 " We will not be behind them," replied Count Beust. 
 " I am very much attacked at the moment, but when I 
 propose that Austria shall do something that is her 
 plain duty to herself, I do not doubt that I shall be 
 listened to." 
 
 He then went on to insist that Italy should take sides 
 with us ; he thought that this, by making the Prussians 
 uneasy as to the disposition of other neutrals, would 
 give the latter more weight. He came back to this 
 several times. With regard to the Republic, he said the 
 apprehensions of Austria were now somewhat allayed. 
 
 I arranged with him to stop at Vienna on my way 
 back from Russia. I begged him to lay my homage at 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOURNEY 29 
 
 the feet of the Emperor, from whom I shall request the 
 honour of an audience on my return. 
 
 " You must come back," said Count Beust, " to let us 
 know what the Russians mean to do ; we shall then 
 be in a better position to bring into line with them 
 the conduct you look for from us." 
 
 Immediately after my interview with Count Beust 
 I saw Count Andrassy. 
 
 Count Andrassy is a man of some fifty years, tall, 
 with a face full of character and a piercing eye. My 
 first impression of him was a favourable one. 
 
 From the first, with him as with all the others I have 
 conversed with, I spoke of the misfortunes of our 
 country. 
 
 " What an unforeseen course of events ! " he said. 
 "Who would have, believed that such reverses could 
 come on the French army, always so heroic, even at 
 this moment still heroic ! " 
 
 After these signs of interest on his part, I explained 
 the reason of our reverses in the field, which I wished 
 very much to make clear, especially to one to whom, 
 as a Hungarian, affairs of war certainly came home 
 more than to anybody ejlse. 
 
 Count Andrassy then desired to prove to me at once 
 that he had not been implicated in the intrigue that had 
 helped to bring the war about. What he said, which 
 was slightly inclined to accuse Count Beust, though 
 without mentioning him by name, was specially 
 aimed at Metternich and M. de Gramont. 
 
 "For a long time," he said, "I watched certain 
 tendencies appearing among us. Those who dreamed 
 of taking revenge for Prussia's success were numerous 
 (Andrassy never named or indicated the Emperor). I 
 did not blame this feeling, but I fought against it. 
 
30 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 "I have always maintained that we were not a 
 German nation, but a European nation placed upon 
 the borders of all nationalities and composed of all; 
 that we must not adopt a policy of rancour, but one 
 of equilibrium, in a word, of common interest, and 
 only to intervene when the interests of Europe 
 absolutely demanded it; that this was my own 
 deliberate opinion and that of all my Hungarian 
 fellow-citizens. On every occasion when I have seen 
 the idea of war for the sake of war beginning to 
 peep out, I have fought against it, and I have had 
 to fight against it in Count Beust himself (an allusion 
 to the latter's hatred of Bismarck). When I saw 
 that M. de Gramont was being egged on, I resisted, 
 though the best way to gratify him was to decry 
 Prussia and to declare that we must before long 
 make war on her. 
 
 " For my own part, I explained myself very freely 
 and fully to M. de Gramont. I told him I had two 
 motives for putting off the war, which might perhaps 
 one day be unavoidable ; the first, to give Austria 
 time to re-establish herself ; the second, to wait till 
 we had right on our side against Prussia. 
 
 "As for the first of these motives, I maintained 
 that for some years Austria would not have either 
 her forces or her finances in a proper state of 
 preparedness. 'Austria,' said I, 'is an ally whom 
 you cannot do without, of whom you will have the 
 very greatest need, but who will be of no service to 
 you whatever if you involve her too soon.' As to 
 being in the right, that is of no less importance. 
 The Hungarian people does not wish to serve mere 
 hatred, but the moment will come when Prussia will 
 put herself in the wrong ; she will put out her hand to 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOUENEY 31 
 
 Baden, Wiirtemberg, Bavaria. Then all our Austro- 
 Germans will be justly angry, our Hungarians will 
 have an interest in supporting them, all Europe will 
 approve our action, and Austria-Hungary joined with 
 France will be at once and completely victorious." 
 
 Count Andrassy thus set forth precisely the policy 
 I have always upheld. Then continuing : 
 
 " I said to M. de Gramont : ' Do not be deluded ; 
 whoever promises you the support of Austria is 
 deceiving you. Your Government should know this 
 and must not be ready to count on this support ; it 
 will be found wanting.' We must not then be accused 
 of deserting you, for we have promised nothing. 
 And if certain persons at Vienna have spoken other- 
 wise, they were wrong to do so. In any case, after 
 what I have said, there can be no further illusion. 
 I quite suspect that Metternich, whose career is ended, 
 did not tell the whole truth at the Court of the 
 Tuileries, but he will have to bear the penalty, and 
 that Court with him. 
 
 "M. de Gramont's conduct was no surprise to me. 
 It was calculated to please his Government, and even 
 before your visit, my dear M. Thiers, I conceived affairs 
 to be as you have explained them to me." 
 
 So much said, we considered the actual situa- 
 tion. 
 
 " We are not in a position to make war," said 
 Count Andrassy. " We are, however, prepared to some 
 extent, but that would not be enough : far from it. 
 The Austro-Germans have yielded to the glamour of 
 success, a certain number of them, at any rate. They 
 are divided. Our Hungarian compatriots are not : 
 they all deplore the misfortunes of France ; but what 
 can be done?" 
 
32 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 I then came back to the idea of not lagging behind 
 Russia, if Russia declared herself. 
 
 "Yes," said Count Andrassy, "if Russia declares 
 herself, we shall not leave her to stand alone ; but 
 she cares no more for the idea of co-operating with 
 us than we with her ; if she speaks in the name of 
 European interests, we will speak too. You have 
 excellent chances of winning a hearing. All Europe 
 honours your conduct and your political acumen. 
 Your country could not do better than make you its 
 representative. You did not follow your Government 
 in its policy of barren and disloyal agitation with 
 regard to the Poles. That is to your credit. The 
 Russian nation is friendly to France, and if this feel- 
 ing triumphs over the Emperor's weakness for his 
 uncle you will obtain something from Russia. We 
 shall follow her lead, without, of course, committing 
 ourselves to war, but we will show that we still 
 count for something in the world. Visit us here on 
 your return ; we shall receive you as a friend and as 
 a great patriot." 
 
 I then took leave of Count Andrassy, and at half- 
 past eight on the same evening, September 24th, I 
 set out for Saint Petersburg. 
 
 On the 25th, from Oderberg to Cracow we skirted 
 Prussian territory — a beautiful country, and well 
 cultivated, as long as we were in Silesia. Entering 
 Poland, wooded sand dunes appear in wide plains to 
 the horizon. Arrived in Warsaw on the 25th at 
 evening. At the station a silent, sympathetic crowd, 
 all with heads uncovered. Deep interest among the 
 Poles and Russians for France ; the first time the two 
 populations are united in sympathy. 
 
 In spite of very great fatigue, we gave up the idea 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOURNEY 33 
 
 of sleeping in Warsaw, so that we might reach Saint 
 Petersburg on Tuesday morning instead of Tuesday 
 night. 
 
 The whole night of Sunday the 25th and all day 
 on the 26th we spent travelling. Tuesday the 27th, 
 in the morning, in delicious weather, hardly even 
 chilly, I arrive in Saint Petersburg, having journeyed 
 day and night without a break except in Vienna, 
 where I spent twenty hours. I find M. de Gabriac 
 at the station. He tells me that Prince Gortchakow 
 thinks I must be too tired to go to see him, but 
 that he is at my service. I send him word that I 
 will be with him at two o'clock, at Tsarkoe Selo. 
 
 At the hour indicated, I presented myself at Prince 
 Gortchakow's house. He lives in a pavilion of the 
 palace, with only a door to pass in order to be with 
 the Emperor. I had known the Chancellor before, 
 when he was simply the Minister at Stuttgard. He 
 was then lean, modest, reserved. I found him now 
 full of health, confident, having acquired the habit of 
 domination since he had held Europe in check in the 
 deplorable Polish business, so imprudently stirred up 
 by the broken dynasty ; he had grown ripe, in a word, 
 with long years of uninterrupted and successful power. 
 I have never had a more cordial reception. My 
 accurate foresight of the course of events, my oppo- 
 sition to the war were assets the value of which in 
 the eyes of foreign Courts I could now perceive. 
 
 The Prince told me he had shut his doors to every- 
 body, that the Emperor was hunting, and that he 
 could devote himself to me. 
 
 Once again, as in London and in Vienna, I began my 
 recital of what had occurred, in order to prove that it 
 was not France on whom lay the guilt of the war. 
 
 3 
 
34 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 He listened attentively, and I touched upon the 
 events of 1866 in recounting the mistakes made by 
 the Empire. 
 
 "Allow me," he said, "to add something to your 
 narrative. In 1866, when I perceived that the Ger- 
 manic Confederacy was about to be left to perish, I 
 wrote to Paris that, as guarantors of the constitution 
 of this Confederacy, we were prepared to denounce 
 those who should take up arms to destroy it ; and 
 the only reply was blank silence." 
 
 I remembered the blunder, which was partly Baron 
 Budberg's, for at that moment he had to some 
 extent shared in the mistakes of the Court of the 
 Tuileries. 
 
 From those responsible for the war we passed to 
 the question that was preoccupying every one in Russia 
 — the question of the Republic. Prince Gortchakow, 
 who has the sagacious and lofty mind of a true 
 statesman, and who likes to show himself free from 
 prejudices, avowed to me that the Republic caused 
 him no apprehension and that he knew of good 
 republics. 
 
 "Yes," said I, "it is a republic that is your best 
 friend to-day, and perhaps there will soon be two of 
 them in your affection: at least that is my wish." 
 
 He replied, smiling : 
 
 " I should greatly wish it ; but here we ask whether 
 with you the Republic is a really serious thing, and 
 you cannot assure us that it will exist for long." 
 
 The Russian Chancellor seemed to be specially pre- 
 occupied by the elements of instability in any rela- 
 tions that might be entered upon with the French 
 Government. I repeated then to the Prince that this 
 Government, born of necessity, was not the triumph 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOURNEY 35 
 
 of one party over another, and if it did not satisfy- 
 all, it was the despair of none. Besides, for the 
 greater part it was made up of clever and moderate 
 men. 
 
 Hereupon the Prince declared that he found what 
 M. Jules Favre said and did most satisfactory. But 
 he repeated once more : 
 
 " Negotiating with this Government, can we hope to 
 achieve something solid? How long will it exist?" 
 
 "The Government is sincere," I replied, "and I 
 affirm that the next elections will place the reins 
 of government in moderate hands. Treating with 
 us to-day, then, you may rest assured that our 
 agreements would stand; and if it should happen 
 one day that I should no longer be your inter- 
 locutor, you would find in my successor the same 
 way of thinking." 
 
 " Ah ! if it were you ! " exclaimed the Prince. 
 "But it will be you; I like to hope so." 
 
 He told me then that our reverses had greatly 
 astonished Europe and distressed those who could 
 not without grave disquiet view the portentous 
 aggrandizement of Prussia. It is feared that France, 
 heretofore so great, may never again be capable of 
 any manifestation of energy. 
 
 I immediately gave him, with regard to our armies 
 and the most recent military operations, the details 
 necessary to explain our reverses and to convince 
 him that France, as soon as she should be wisely 
 ruled, would recover her place in Europe. I then 
 cited the army of Metz, and he agreed with me 
 that where the soldiers have been well led they 
 have displayed all their ancient quality. 
 
 The true facts with regard to our political and 
 
36 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 military position having been established, I entered 
 upon the examination of our present difficulties. I 
 told the Chancellor that it would be very fitting 
 for Russia to put herself at the head of the Powers 
 to arrest Prussia's ever-increasing ambition, that 
 Russia's lead would be followed by all the neutral 
 countries, and that without the necessity of having 
 recourse to war this unanimous and determined 
 attitude would be enough to preserve the balance 
 of Europe. 
 
 "Let your Sovereign," I said, "but speak for us 
 with an insistence that means his determination to 
 be heeded." 
 
 " Menaces ! " cried the Prince, " the Emperor 
 will employ none. When one makes a threat, one 
 must be ready to strike the blow. Our ideas do 
 not move that way ! Already the Emperor has 
 spoken on your behalf; he will speak again, even 
 though he has already gone as far as possible on 
 this path. It is to him you owe the Ferrieres inter- 
 view and the admission of the idea of an armistice." 
 
 Here the Prince was mistaken, for it was England 
 who at my instance had asked and obtained for 
 M. Jules Favre an interview with Count Bismarck. 
 
 Prince Gortchakow added that there were two ver- 
 sions of this interview: that of M. Jules Favre and 
 that of Count Bismarck ; that he did not take the 
 latter's account for gospel; but that if only Strass- 
 burg, Toul, and Verdun had been asked for as 
 hostages, and no mention of Metz or Mont-Val^rien, 
 he regretted that the proposal had not been accepted, 
 since it was a way of gaining time, and perhaps of 
 appealing to a congress, which might have been the 
 salvation of France and of Europe. 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOURNEY 37 
 
 I replied that, like him, I did in fact regret the 
 rejection of the armistice, but that I explained it 
 to myself by the bitterness of having to give up 
 Strassburg at the moment when it was defending 
 itself so magnificently, and also by the twistings 
 and turnings of Count Bismarck. 
 
 " Yes," replied the Chancellor, " that is possible, 
 and I fully understand; but I regret it. Now you 
 are both of you out of your reckoning." 
 
 Now to get more closely to work with him, I 
 spoke of an alliance. I said that I was fully em- 
 powered to propose it ; that both in the present 
 and for the future we retained enough strength and 
 wealth to make us such an ally as could not be 
 met with twice, an ally most of all against Germany, 
 now so nearly formidable, and I set forth the pic- 
 ture of Europe on the morrow. 
 
 " We have always been promised this alliance," he 
 replied ; " General Fleury spoke to us of it constantly, 
 and we never saw it come to pass. But I believe 
 you, I know you are a man of your word ; however, 
 to-day is not the moment to conclude it. Later we 
 will take measures for uniting France with Russia ; for 
 the moment, let us consider the question of how to save 
 her from the evil case in which she finds herself." 
 
 " But," I insisted, " time presses, and brooks no delay. 
 To save her an immediate effort is needed, and if you 
 were boldly to take the lead, Austria, England, and 
 Italy, who only need the encouragement of your 
 example, would follow you, and in the face of a 
 Europe inspired by you Prussia would show herself 
 much more moderate." 
 
 " Ah, collective action, collective action ! " exclaimed 
 the Prince. " I understand you, but we don't wish for 
 
38 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 that. It would only serve to irritate Prussia, which 
 does not admit of the intervention of neutrals in the 
 present war, and we should lose the very real influence 
 we enjoy at Berlin." 
 
 Still I insisted very warmly. Our conversation had 
 lasted more than two hours, and we deferred it until 
 another day. 
 
 " You are here," said the Prince ; " we shall await 
 the development of events ; for till they are more in 
 relief it is impossible to do anything effective. You 
 will see the Emperor. To-morrow I shall ask him for 
 a day and an hour. You and I, we are both much of 
 an age ; but you are the more vigorous, and I am 
 sure that you would find it agreeable to go over the 
 palace. Give me your arm and let us go round." 
 
 For more than an hour the Prince showed me the 
 splendours of Tsarkoe" Selo, and talked to me of his 
 master's character and the might of Russia. I took 
 leave of him overwhelmed by his friendly behaviour. 
 
 Wednesday, the 28th. — While awaiting my audience 
 with the Emperor, which has been appointed for 
 to-morrow, I am to visit the Hermitage. During the 
 day we hear of the capitulation of Strassburg. 
 
 On Thursday the Emperor, who had come to Saint 
 Petersburg, received me in the Winter Palace. As 
 soon as I entered, he gave me his hand, saying he 
 was delighted to receive me in his Empire, and made 
 me sit beside him. 
 
 The Emperor, who is simple and natural in manner, 
 and expresses himself with ease in French, led me at 
 once to the matter that brought me to Russia. 
 
 "M. Thiers," he said, "if we had been listened to, 
 if you yourself had been listened to, we would not 
 be in the presence of this terrible war that is rending 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOURNEY 39 
 
 and horrifying Europe. I have had recounted to me 
 your explanations of the origins of this war: they 
 interested me very profoundly." 
 
 He then invited me to lay before him freely every- 
 thing I might think useful for him to know. 
 
 Not having to tell him who were the real authors 
 of the war, I explained to him how the present Govern- 
 ment was formed, 'and I was advised that details on 
 this point would be valuable. 
 
 The Emperor listened attentively, and when I had 
 said that this Government, born of necessity, was the 
 only possible one, that it was moderate, and that it 
 would become more moderate still if it were supported, 
 he replied : 
 
 "As for myself, I have no objection to make to a 
 republican form of government. And that too does 
 not concern me, and concerns only France. I only fear 
 men given to disorder, and most of all, the instability 
 that is so little of an inducement to treat with a 
 Government." 
 
 To reassure him with regard to this danger of 
 instability, I repeated what I had already told Prince 
 Gortchakow : that the coming elections would most 
 certainly give a majority of moderates, and that, even 
 if modifications were to take place later in the Govern- 
 ment, these modifications would involve no change in 
 its policy. 
 
 "So you have no uneasiness about the maintenance 
 of order?" asked the Emperor. 
 
 " No, sire ; and the proof that my confidence is 
 justified is the calm that rules in Paris, in very grave 
 circumstances." 
 
 " So much the better," went on the Emperor ; " but 
 now, let us come to the situation at the moment." 
 
40 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 I enumerated then the various enterprises of Prussia, 
 from the despoiling of Denmark to her intentions, 
 now boldly announced, of dismembering France, and 
 I asked His Majesty if he could without perturbation 
 see arising in the centre of the continent in the place 
 of the old peace-loving Germany a conquering Power 
 extending from the Sound to the Danube, even to the 
 Inn ; for she would not respect Denmark for long, 
 would presently reduce Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and the 
 Duchy of Baden to the same condition as Saxony, and 
 would thus unite forty millions and more under the 
 sceptre of a Germanic Emperor, who would certainly 
 be proclaimed before many months had passed. 
 
 Only touching very delicately on the danger that 
 might threaten the Russian Baltic provinces, and on 
 Prussian aims with regard to the German provinces 
 of Austria, I asked the Emperor if, in order to arrest 
 such an overflowing ambition, he would not consider 
 it prudent to oppose the action contemplated against 
 France, and thus to make a faithful ally of this France, 
 which under a good Government would speedily recover 
 all her former might. 
 
 His Majesty having listened seriously, interrupted me 
 with some emotion : 
 
 " I know, M. Thiers, how grave a matter for Europe, 
 and for my Empire, is the creation of such a power 
 as you describe. I should most gladly obtain such an 
 alliance with France, an alliance for peace, not for 
 war and conquest " (and the Emperor emphasized these 
 last words). " Show me the way to help you ; I shall 
 gladly adopt it. Already I have intervened, and with 
 warmth ; I intervened spontaneously, and before you 
 had invoked my good offices ; I have spoken with no 
 uncertain voice, believe me. I will do so again; but 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOURNEY 41 
 
 I can neither go so far as war, nor the threats that 
 lead to war ; for above everything my duty is to 
 my own country. Like you, I am convinced of the 
 need of peace, and a peace that France can accept, 
 and Europe can ratify. I have said this, and will 
 say it again ; in a word, I shall do everything that 
 lies in my power ; but as for war, you must not ask 
 it of me." 
 
 I hastened to reply that I asked not for war, but 
 for good offices, effective in the interest of all Europe ; 
 good offices that in no way could make Prussia decide 
 to run the risks of another war, most of all with 
 such a Power as Russia. 
 
 " I have given my word," said the Emperor ; " you 
 may rely upon it." 
 
 He was visibly moved, and I had come to the 
 point that must not be overpassed. Besides, the 
 Emperor was on the point of setting out for Tsarkoe 
 Selo. He took leave of me with the same cordiality 
 as he had shown at the beginning of the interview. 
 
 Scarcely had I returned when Prince Grortchakow 
 arrived to call on Mme. Thiers, and to find out my 
 impressions. 
 
 "What did you think of my Emperor?" 
 
 " As the best and most upright of meik, and I believe 
 I should become friendlier to the idea of personal 
 government if I was called on to serve such a man." 
 
 The Chancellor's face beamed at this praise of his 
 master. He then wished to know if I was satisfied. 
 
 "I am, most assuredly; but I have a great deal to 
 say in answer to the Emperor's remarks upon the 
 subject of war. It is not war I ask for, merely firm 
 and clear language on the part of the neutral Powers. 
 
 " I am always told that they have spoken, that 
 
42 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 they will speak again ; but something more effective 
 is wanted." 
 
 "What?" replied the Prince. "War? — we cannot 
 make war." 
 
 "Then Europe is going to emulate France's be- 
 haviour in 1866." 
 
 "Not quite; for in 1866 a word would have been 
 enough to stop Prussia, and to-day it would need a 
 great war." 
 
 "No," I rejoined; "if the whole of Europe spoke 
 out definitely, even without threats, she would in- 
 fluence the behaviour of Prussia." 
 
 "Prussia has no intention of paying any heed to 
 neutrals," replied the Prince. "She would only give 
 way before neutrals if they were in arms, and they 
 will not go so far as that. Nothing now can be of 
 any avail but what we say as a friendly Power, from 
 which she cannot refuse a recommendation or a word 
 of advice. We shall strongly condemn and reprove, 
 and we shall beforehand invalidate any peace that 
 might be imposed on unjust terms, and that, we 
 think, is no little thing." 
 
 Always accepting what was promised me, I tried 
 to get some explanation from the Prince with regard 
 to Austrian affairs. I asked why he was opposed to 
 the armaments of this Power. 
 
 "You do not wish to take action," I said, "but at 
 least do not prevent others from doing so. Why do 
 you stand against Austria's arming herself? By this 
 you are in reality allying yourselves with Prussia 
 against us. I understand that when he might have 
 feared the entry of the French into Berlin, the 
 nephew might well have come to his uncle's assist- 
 ance. But to-day it is Paris that is threatened ; it 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOURNEY 43 
 
 is, then, the time to turn your shield, to leave Austria 
 free to succour Paris. You say at heart you are our 
 allies, but your behaviour contradicts your words ! " 
 
 " You are touching," replied Prince Gortchakow, 
 "upon one of the most delicate of subjects, one of 
 the hardest to approach. ... It involves a pledge of 
 the Emperor's with which we must not clash. Let us 
 leave the subject, I beg you ; it is impossible to 
 handle it profitably at this moment. Besides, we are 
 not depriving you of anything. When the Austrians 
 make out that we are keeping them from arming, 
 by ourselves threatening to arm, it is merely a 
 pretext, for under no circumstances would they 
 arm." 
 
 " Well, then," I replied, " leave them free ; in 
 this way you will confound them." And, carrying 
 audacity still further, I added, "If I were Chancellor 
 of Austria, I would not trouble in the matter; I 
 should arm, and defy you to make war on me ! " 
 
 Embarrassed, the Prince confined himself to replying 
 that that would depend on the frontier towards which 
 the Austrian mobilization might be directed. 
 
 This reply convinced me that the veto of Russia 
 was simply admonitory, and that if the Austrians 
 were to disregard it they would be in no danger. 
 Afterwards the Prince complained bitterly of Count 
 Beust's inconsistency, and allowed me to perceive 
 very keen feelings of resentment, which went back 
 to the Crimean War and the refusal to heed him. at 
 that time. 
 
 Leaving this delicate subject, I led him to speak 
 to me of the Italians. He assured me, in very precise 
 language, that they might do all they had a mind 
 to without any opposition from Russia. 
 
44 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 " Ah ! if you had the smallest success," the Prince 
 continued, " how everything would arrange itself. 
 Do not go away ; you would seem to be dissatisfied, 
 and that would be tactless. Besides, Petersburg is 
 well worth seeing. As for myself, I live in Tsarkoe 
 Selo ; you will find me there when you please. Come 
 to see me, and we shall in this way be always in 
 a position to seize the opportunity if circumstances 
 give birth to one." 
 
 Next day, September 30th, I spent the morning at 
 the Hermitage and the afternoon at Tsarkoe Selo, 
 where we had afterwards a very interesting evening 
 with the highest personages in Russia. On Saturday, 
 October 1st, I dined at Tsarkoe Selo with M. de 
 Gabriac. 
 
 Sunday, October 2nd. — I went back at nine o'clock 
 in the morning to Tsarkoe Selo. I had an appoint- 
 ment with the Heir-Apparent at half-past ten, and 
 with the Grand Duke Constantino at one. 
 
 When I arrived, I was brought into the presence 
 of His Imperial Highness. The young Prince came to 
 me holding out his hand, and with an air of complete 
 sincerity expressed his pleasure in seeing me, a feeling 
 on which I had counted, for I knew that the Prince 
 was wholly French in sympathy. 
 
 He is a handsome, manly young man, intelligent 
 and resolute. I spoke to him quite frankly. When I 
 told him that my urgent representations were met 
 with the fear of war, and that I did not admit that 
 Russia, by speaking out with a proper firmness, would 
 expose herself to war: 
 
 "War," he answered proudly, "I should be glad to 
 know who would dare to make war on us ! For my 
 own part, I should not hesitate to communicate our 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOURNEY 45 
 
 opinion to Prussia, and I am certain that without 
 declaring war on her I should oblige her to heed it." 
 The Prince promised to repeat to his father what 
 I had just said, allowing modestly that he had very 
 little influence because of his youth. 
 
 As I was leaving the Prince's quarters, a chamberlain 
 came to inform me that the Tsarina would like to see 
 me, and would receive me next day, Monday. 
 
 The hour of my rendezvous with the Grand Duke 
 Constantine having arrived, I went to the Paulowski 
 Palace, where he lives. After a few minutes' waiting 
 in a library that might almost have been French, I 
 was brought in to him. 
 
 He made me be seated, told me that he had time 
 at my disposal, and at once led me to speak of the 
 principal aim of my mission. 
 
 I insisted then, more than when with the Tsarevitch, 
 on the necessity of paying for an alliance with France 
 by an immediate service. 
 
 The Prince did not contradict me. "The whole of 
 Russia," said he, "is full of sympathy for you and 
 of the opposite feeling for Prussia. We must not 
 forget, however, what is the prevailing trend of ideas 
 to-day among us. We think we should dream, not of 
 aggrandizing the Empire, but of civilizing it, and I 
 have come to the conclusion, in the exercise of my 
 duties in the State, that under this head there is an 
 immense amount of work to be done. Much has 
 been done already : the serfs have been given their 
 liberty, we are busy with railways, and all these 
 things involve heavy expenses. At the moment, a 
 war would be a total interruption of this policy, and 
 all men of intelligence would be profoundly affected." 
 
 Taking me by the hand, the Prince added : " I have 
 
46 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 very little influence in affairs. In the Imperial Council 
 over which I preside we only deal with legislation, 
 and the Emperor does not allow us to go beyond 
 our prescribed functions ; but I can speak of any 
 subject with Prince Gortchakow, and I shall not fail 
 to bring before him what you have just said." 
 
 In my last interview with the Chancellor, I had 
 seen that he was troubled over the silence of the 
 Court at Berlin, which had made no answer to his 
 last instances on behalf of peace. Our common friend, 
 M. de Jomini, had already said to me : 
 
 "You have no idea to what lengths we have gone, 
 and we have no answer ! " 
 
 Before returning to Saint Petersburg, I accordingly 
 determined to call on Prince Gortchakow. He came 
 to me eagerly, and as though he had good news for 
 me. He seemed, so to speak, almost gay. 
 
 " We have heard from Berlin," said he. " They 
 are beginning to feel the burden of the war, and 
 would not be displeased to bring it to an end. We 
 must seize this opportunity to make peace." 
 
 The Prince was completely changed, radiant with 
 hope. On the advice he had given me, and relying 
 on the protestations of regard addressed to me on 
 every side, I proposed to him that he should ask the 
 Emperor to mediate. 
 
 " Do not speak of that," he hastened to reply. " Our 
 Emperor is too modest to allow himself to be tempted 
 by the greatness of such a part beyond the bounds 
 within which he wishes to remain ; but we shall be 
 your intermediaries, without so much ceremony, and 
 we will do our very best in the matter. You will 
 bring your Government to reason, we the Prussians, 
 and we shall in the end bring them together." 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOURNEY 47 
 
 " I cannot attempt anything from here," I said. 
 "First I would have to communicate with the 
 Government of Paris and know definitely what I can 
 propose." 
 
 "Yes, most assuredly," replied the Prince. "This 
 is what must be done: the Emperor himself will ask 
 for safe-conducts for you, and then everything will go 
 smoothly. We shall make the peace by our own 
 two selves ! " 
 
 The Chancellor appeared delighted with this idea. 
 The project, however advantageous it might be for 
 us, since the negotiations would be opened by Russia, 
 none the less called for ripe reflection. I said, there- 
 fore, to the Prince : 
 
 "I always like to sleep on my resolutions, and I 
 ask you to allow me to put off my answer until 
 to-morrow. I shall come back, and we will examine 
 the whole matter closely." 
 
 " You are right," said he. 
 
 He shook hands with extreme satisfaction, and I 
 came away. 
 
 Next day, Monday, as had been agreed, I went 
 again to Tsarkoe' Selo to pay my visit to the Tsarina, 
 and was presented to the young Danish princess 
 destined one day to be Empress of Russia. 
 
 Seeing her so gentle, so agreeable, with a shyness 
 full of grace, and comparing her with her husband, 
 I was struck by the contrast shown in this union 
 of weakness and strength. She thanked me for my 
 efforts on behalf of Denmark in 1866, reminded me 
 that her brother, then in Paris, had come to see me, 
 expressed good wishes for France, and gave me an 
 incommunicable impression of goodness and charm. 
 
 I arrived at Prince Gortchakow's at half-past two, 
 
48 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 and stayed until half-past five. I found him alone, 
 still very cordial, but not so happy as the day before. 
 He had in his hand a packet of dispatches from 
 London and Tours, and said to me : 
 
 "Come, let us read them together." 
 
 He reads very well, in a clear, strong voice, with 
 a pleasant Russian accent. He read first of all one 
 from Baron Brunnow. 
 
 "It is excellent for me," I said to him, "but really 
 one might imagine it an English voice." 
 
 "You are right," he answered. 
 
 Baron Brunnow approved England's inaction, and 
 thought Russia should imitate her. Then came two 
 telegrams from Tours — from M. Okouneff, friendly 
 but grave : Paris could not, he said, defend herself, 
 and Tours presented an aspect of hopeless disorgani- 
 zation. 
 
 "Well," I said, "all these people make me think 
 of a coterie deaf to any way of thinking but their own, 
 and falsifying everything. These two Russian ministers 
 are certainly not malign, but they have accustomed 
 themselves to view French affairs from the dark side, 
 and they paint everything black. There is, alas ! only 
 too much that is black in our affairs, but there are 
 also brighter hues in the picture, and to my mind here 
 is a proof that it is most difficult for a prime minister 
 to have precise information if he does not continually 
 test and rectify the reports of his agents." 
 
 " Without doubt," replied the Prince ; " we should 
 always mistrust those who send us reports in writing." 
 
 At length we came to our business of the day before. 
 
 " I have considered everything you said to me yester- 
 day," said I, " and I understood that your latest news 
 from Berlin seemed more satisfactory to you. Would 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOURNEY 49 
 
 it be indiscreet to ask you whence and from whom 
 it reached you, and if it would be possible for me 
 to have it in extenso ? " 
 
 The Prince answered with some embarrassment. 
 
 " It must suffice you to know that this news, which 
 is beyond suspicion, establishes the fact that in Berlin 
 there is felt the need of putting an end to the war ; 
 and it would be well to bring about fresh negotiations 
 as a result of this excellent disposition. I should be 
 glad if you, who are a sensible man and a patriot, 
 should have the honour of raising your country out 
 of the abyss into which she has been cast. I confess 
 that I have forebodings. I distrust fortune, and above 
 all I distrust the Prussians. It would be better to 
 bring the business to an end at once than to expose 
 yourselves to fresh reverses, which your enemy would 
 cruelly abuse. The Prussians want to keep Strassburg 
 and Metz — that is to say, Alsace and Lorraine. By 
 taking advantage of this opportunity you might 
 perhaps save Lorraine. The more you hold out the 
 more you will increase your losses. It would, then, 
 be better to give way now. This would only be a 
 sacrifice which might be merely temporary, and from 
 which you may one day recover, if the opportunity 
 should arise for seizing back what you had lost." 
 
 These things, though said in a friendly way, were 
 bitter to hear. 
 
 " Prince," I said, " these are sacrifices too cruel to 
 be endured. It is possible that it might become 
 necessary to resign ourselves to them, but we must 
 first of all know the true condition of affairs, which 
 I cannot believe to be as desperate as you think. In 
 any case, it would be essential to judge for oneself, 
 on the actual spot, and to know also the opinion of 
 
 4 
 
50 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 those who are responsible and in whom is vested the 
 burden and the power of deciding. 
 
 " As for me, I had the fullest powers in the case of 
 a real, immediate co-operation, which would have 
 entailed the making of engagements ; but I have no 
 powers whatever to treat of peace." 
 
 " That," said the Chancellor, " is why yesterday 
 we both were of opinion that you ought to go to 
 Versailles." 
 
 Here he rose, and moving to his desk he read a 
 paper written with his own hand. It was a tele- 
 gram from the Emperor to the King of Prussia 
 asking for safe-conducts for me. I give it from 
 memory, since Prince Gortchakow was unwilling that 
 I should take a copy. 
 
 Here is the gist of it : " M. Thiers is here. He is 
 both wise and moderate ; he alone can get France to 
 make the concessions necessary for peace. Send him 
 safe-conducts." 
 
 I objected to this wording. 
 
 " To begin with," I said, " you give me the role of 
 negotiator for peace, a role that has not been assigned 
 to me, and further, I seem to admit that my country- 
 men are wrong not to be willing to make concessions. 
 Now what are the concessions they refused ? The 
 surrender of Alsace and Lorraine ? Well, I am with 
 them there ; we need not speak of it. Present me 
 merely as what I am, as a man of common sense, 
 who having seen the internal condition of his 
 country and knowing the feeling of Europe, might 
 perhaps find a way of bringing both sides together, 
 if he were authorized to enter Paris and to leave 
 again." 
 
 "Very well," said the Prince, "but the object of 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOURNEY 51 
 
 your entry and your leaving must be expressly stated, 
 and this object can only be peace." 
 
 I consented to this, provided it should be clearly 
 understood that I was not taking on myself the 
 quality of negotiator of peace, which I was in no way 
 entitled to ; that the telegram asking for safe-conducts 
 for me should be held back until the word should 
 come from me ; that, if when I reached Tours I 
 found the Delegation disposed to reopen negotiations, 
 if I thought it would be desirable to confer with 
 M. Jules Favre and his colleagues shut up in Paris, 
 I could then give the signal agreed on, and the 
 telegram would be dispatched, and that if the safe- 
 conducts were sent, I should use them to go imme- 
 diately to Paris. 
 
 The impression I had from these long days of 
 conversations was that the Chancellor desired peace, 
 that his sovereign desired it no less than he did, and 
 that they would both exert every effort to obtain 
 moderate conditions for us. They wished to serve us, 
 in compliance with the feeling in Russia, without 
 giving up their friendly relations with Prussia, because 
 of engagements we knew of, and perhaps others of 
 which we knew nothing. 
 
 Next morning, October 4th, we started for Vienna. 
 As we were very tired, we stopped at Warsaw on the 
 6th. During the day visited the Chateau de 
 Villanof, which had belonged to Sobieski. On the 7th 
 we go on our way for Vienna, where we arrive at 
 daybreak on the 8th. Again I saw Counts Beust, 
 Andrassy, and Potocki, and on the Sunday I was 
 received by the Emperor Francis Joseph. 
 
 The Emperor greeted me very kindly ; he expressed 
 his grief for France's- misfortunes, and his desire to 
 
52 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 be able to help us. I had not seen him since 18( 
 I found him grown thin, aged, profoundly sad. 
 appears that he is eaten up with cares. The triump 
 of Prussia and the dislocation of the monarchy plun 
 him in despair. 
 
 I then saw Count Beust and Count Andrassy. Th 
 told me again that, in the present divided mind 
 the country, Austria could not adopt a strong unai 
 mous attitude in our favour ; and that on the oth 
 hand her preparations are too inadequate for her 
 expose herself to reprisals from Prussia and tl 
 attacks of Russia by declaring war. And so Cou 
 Beust would have the Italians be first to take actio 
 and he is urging them to do so. 
 
 " Our territory shields them," he said, " as far i 
 Switzerland. To enter their country ours would ha^ 
 to be crossed. We are, then, their allies of necessit 
 and I should be glad if an attempt was made to it 
 upon them, for war would be declared in fact, wit 
 out my having to declare it myself. The interventi( 
 of Italy is the only way to make the war universj 
 If it becomes universal, you are saved." 
 
 He furnished me then with arguments to draw 
 the Italians. 
 
 We agreed that he should preserve his attitude 
 favour of common action ; and if the English, for& 
 by Parliament, found that nothing but such acti< 
 was possible, perhaps the Russians in the end wou 
 join in it. In the meantime, we would take advanta 
 of whatever the latter might do by themselves, ai 
 Count Beust does not deny that this may have excelle 
 results, especially in case of a success under the wa 
 of Paris. 
 
 We asked each other also why the Russians she 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOUKNEY 53 
 
 themselves so strongly opposed to any collective 
 action on the part of neutrals. Count Potocki and 
 Count Andrassy believe, perhaps rightly, in a secret 
 agreement in virtue of which Russia, in order to 
 settle the Eastern question to her own advantage, 
 may have ensured the concurrence of Prussia by 
 guaranteeing them against such collective action. 
 
 Count Andrassy then asked me if we had taken 
 any engagements with the Russians. 
 
 " I could understand it," he said, " for in your 
 dangerous situation you would be within your right ; 
 but for us the union of France and Russia in the East 
 would be our ruin." 
 
 I answered that in Saint Petersburg I had been 
 given the most positive assurances of an active inter- 
 vention in favour of France, whose engagements with 
 regard to Russia would be subordinated to the effec- 
 tiveness of this intervention. 
 
 To sum up, Austria, best of all disposed toward us, 
 is impotent, England thinks she has no interest in 
 taking our side, and Russia is held back by her engage- 
 ments to Prussia. The Italians are left ; I shall see 
 what they can do. 
 
 Wednesday, October Uth. — I leave Vienna for 
 Florence, and arrive in the evening of Wednesday the 
 12th. . . . Great crowd in the station. Marked signs of 
 sympathy. Long conversation with M. Senard, our 
 Envoy Extraordinary at Florence. He thinks I shall 
 not be able to obtain anything. I share his fears, 
 without giving up my intention to make a supreme 
 effort. 
 
 Thursday, October 13th. — In the morning, my first 
 interview with Marquis Visconti-Venosta. The same 
 day, at four o'clock, a long conversation with the King, 
 
54 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 who during my stay at Saint Petersburg had sent me 
 an invitation to come to see him. 
 
 After depicting the situation exactly, I spoke to him, 
 modifying it a little to make it more acceptable, of 
 the military operation which the Government of Tours 
 had, in its letters, charged me to propose to him. This 
 intervention seemed to attract him, and perhaps if he 
 were free he would attempt it ; but he fell back upon 
 his Ministers and the Parliament. I asked him to 
 bring me into contact with his Ministers and a repre- 
 sentative of the Army. He consented, and sent for 
 General Cialdini, who is at the moment the most highly 
 esteemed general in Italy. 
 
 Saturday, October 15th. — Conference at the house of 
 Marquis Visconti-Venosta, the Foreign Minister, with 
 Signors Lanza, the President of the Council, Sella, the 
 Minister of Finance, Ricotti, Minister of War, General 
 Cialdini, M. Senard, and myself. 
 
 I made the greatest efforts to convince them, without 
 succeeding, their decision being made beforehand. To 
 begin with, I reassured them with regard to their fear 
 of pressure from outside, for I had it from Prince 
 Gortchakow that he would not oppose the arming of 
 Italy. As for Austria, I know from Count Beust 
 that she would view this arming with feelings of satis- 
 faction, and that, besides, the Austrian states com- 
 pletely enveloping Italy, they would be a protection to 
 her, and she would thus be sheltered from any danger 
 of attack. The prudent and supposed wise counsels 
 from London and Saint Petersburg were then concerned 
 with dangers of which Italy could not speak seriously. 
 To the objection raised on the grounds of expense, I 
 took it upon me to reply by the offer of a subsidy, an 
 offer I was convinced would not be repudiated. 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOURNEY 55 
 
 As for the danger of a conflict with the Prussians, I 
 said there was no question of their going to face them 
 on the plains of Champagne. Out of the two hundred 
 and ninety thousand Italian troops, highly organized, 
 according to the very positive details given by our 
 military attach^, only one hundred thousand would be 
 detached. From Turin to Chambery the Italians and 
 the French are in a regular granite trench, sheltered 
 from any attack. From Chambery to Lyons, where 
 they would find an encampment of fifty thousand 
 French, the Italians would be covered by the fortifica- 
 tions of Lyons, as strong as those of Paris, and the 
 camp of Verona. So far, then, nothing to fear. No 
 one contested this. I added that this army of a 
 hundred and fifty thousand men would have a consider- 
 able effect on the Prussians, already wearied by the 
 sieges of Metz and of Paris, and that it might decide 
 them to make an honourable peace with France, who 
 desires it. Supposing that he were to follow the course 
 of the Sa6ne, Victor Emmanuel would be covered by 
 the Sa6ne itself, by the Jura and the neutrality of 
 Switzerland, and advancing towards Haute-Saone, he 
 would find about ten thousand men at Langres, twelve 
 thousand at Besanqon, thirty-five thousand at Belfort. 
 Threatening without invading Southern Germany and 
 the army blockading Metz, without risking an en- 
 counter he would draw to him a part of the German 
 forces and would in this way relieve Paris or Metz, 
 which might see their sieges raised; and peace would 
 follow, peace that we should owe to the Italians, 
 at no risk to them, for if they were to fall in 
 with too great masses of the enemy (and that 
 would in any case mean that Paris or Metz was 
 freed) they would easily, sheltered by Langres, 
 
56 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 Belf ort, Besancon and the Saone, regain the impregnable 
 camp of Lyons. 
 
 No one made us, M. Senard and myself, anything 
 but the feeblest answers. The most serious was that 
 it would be going too far to take steps without the 
 Parliament, which could not be got together before a 
 month's time. I replied that the King, taking advan- 
 tage of his popularity, might presume to take action 
 without waiting for Parliament to meet. But that 
 would involve a change in the Cabinet, for the 
 Ministers of the day have taken neutrality as their 
 political platform, and they are not willing to resign 
 for the sake of France. 
 
 I tried to awaken their gratitude, but very circum- 
 spectly. " France," I said, " is perishing through having 
 brought about the unity of Italy, which provoked the 
 formation of a united Germany. While helping Italy 
 we reserved Rome for ourselves, for reasons of state, 
 and Italy takes advantage of the moment when we are 
 overwhelmed by our foes to ravish Rome from us. And 
 to crown all, when France asks for help that would 
 save her, from Italy who could give it without risk, 
 Italy refuses ! " 
 
 I spoke also of the future Will Prussia leave Europe 
 at rest after this war ? Who knows whether the unity 
 of Italy can continue without our support ? Our only 
 answer was a prodigality of protestations of friendship 
 and of regret that they could not help France. 
 
 Sunday, October 16th. — Visits from the Ministers. 
 Fresh conversations. Before writing my report for the 
 Government, I inform M. de Chaudordy of my conver- 
 sations with the King and his Ministers in a private 
 letter which he will read to the members of the 
 Delegation, without placing in the archives. In this 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOURNEY 57 
 
 letter I also recommend that General Bourbaki's and 
 General Montauban's offers of service should not be 
 refused. I regret the delay in the elections. I had 
 done everything in order to obtain them ; they had 
 been promised and announced everywhere, and if they 
 had taken place Europe would have recognized the 
 Government the very next day. 
 
 Tuesday, October l&th. — Departure for France. The 
 Minister of Justice and the Minister of Public Works 
 accompanied me to the station with Signor Eatazzi. 
 
 Wednesday, October IQth. — Reached Suze, Wednesday, 
 19th. . . . Pass Mont Cenis. . . . We are at Macon at 
 one o'clock in the morning. A special train to Moulins, 
 via Chagny. (I had been telegraphed to from Tours 
 not to come by sea, and not to pass through Nevers, 
 but by Moulins, Montlugon, Poitiers.) The special train 
 cannot go beyond Montchanin. 
 
 Thursday, October 20th. — Leave Montchanin at half- 
 past six for MontluQon, by ordinary train. All along 
 the way, the mayors and chief people come to thank 
 me for what I am doing for France. We reach 
 Tours at two in the morning on Friday, October 21st. 
 M. de Chaudordy is waiting for me at the station. 
 Two hours' conversation with him. 
 
 Friday, October 21st. — Great numbers of visitors : 
 Admiral Fourichon, M. Glais-Bizoin, all the Diplomatic 
 Corps. M. Gambetta and M. de Chaudordy tell me that 
 Lord Lyons came several times to ask what news I 
 was bringing ; that the English are preoccupied by the 
 dread of allowing themselves to be forestalled and 
 outstripped by Russia, and that my arrival will decide 
 them to do something very marked. We agree that it 
 is most useful to arouse the feeling of emulation in 
 England. I go to the session of the Government, 
 
58 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 where MM. Cr^mieux, Gambetta, Glais-Bizoin are 
 present. 
 
 After giving an account of my mission, I set forth 
 the serious question of reopening negotiations, and 
 what was agreed with Prince Gortchakow in the matter. 
 At this point M. de Chaudordy arrives. He reports 
 the contents of a dispatch from the British Cabinet, in 
 which England, on her own initiative, proposes to each 
 of the belligerents an armistice, to enable France to 
 elect and convoke a Constituent Assembly. It is fully 
 established that England has acted of her own accord, 
 not at the instance of France. The Council is almost 
 unanimous in its satisfaction. M. Gambetta holds aloof. 
 M. de Chaudordy says that it is in emulation that 
 England takes the same path as Russia. We proceed 
 to deliberate. It is admitted, without dispute, that the 
 English proposal should be accepted with thanks. But, 
 they said presently, we must certainly accept Russia's 
 proposal too, and not depend solely on England. I read 
 the draft of the telegram I had brought from Russia, 
 which is to be sent by the Emperor Alexander to the 
 King of Prussia, to ask for safe-conducts for me to go 
 to Paris, and from Paris to the Prussian Headquarters, 
 if the Government of Paris thinks fit. The telegram is 
 in these terms : 
 
 " M. Thiers has shown himself moderate, and has 
 appeared to appreciate the situation justly. Direct 
 contact with him might perhaps offer the possibility of 
 shortening a struggle whose end you, myself, and 
 Europe equally desire. Would you be disposed, if the 
 appropriate circumstances should come about, to grant 
 him a safe-conduct to enter Paris and to leave it 
 immediately, and thus to create the chance of relations 
 being entered into with your Headquarters ? " 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOURNEY 59 
 
 Question the first : Should I go first of all to the 
 Prussian Headquarters? 
 
 No ; I must first go to Paris to inform and consult 
 the Government, and, if they are of opinion that I 
 should go to Headquarters, I must go. 
 
 With the unanimous assent of all four voices, it is 
 decided to telegraph to Saint Petersburg asking for 
 the safe-conducts. 
 
 Question the second : According to the English pro- 
 posal, which is to be the basis of future negotiations, 
 the armistice is meant to facilitate the election of a 
 Constituent Assembly. What is the mind of the 
 Government on this point? 
 
 MM. Cr^mieux, Glais-Bizoin, Fourichon vote form- 
 ally that this basis be adopted. 
 
 " If the whole of France, including Paris, is free to 
 vote, there is no longer any reason for not having 
 recourse to universal suffrage." 
 
 M. Gambetta thinks that an Assembly is of no value 
 towards bringing the war to an end. He adds that 
 he will nevertheless fall in with the opinion of his 
 colleagues at Paris and in Tours, if the Government 
 of Paris shares that of the Delegation of Tours, and 
 adopts the proposal to conclude an armistice in order 
 to convoke a Constituent Assembly. 
 
 The question of the armistice to permit of the con- 
 vocation of a Constituent Assembly is put to the vote. 
 It is carried by three voices. M. Gambetta is alone in 
 opposing this convocation. I shall inform the Govern- 
 ment of this posture of affairs, if I am able to go to 
 Paris. The conditions of the armistice remain to be 
 examined, but cannot be determined beforehand. 
 There is, however, one that can be fixed on the spot : 
 this is that Paris is to be revictualled ! Otherwise, Paris 
 
60 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 might be taken by armistice. This is received with the 
 liveliest approval on the part of M. Gambetta. Before 
 we separate, it is decided that the minutes of this dis- 
 cussion shall be put in writing and sent to me signed 
 by the members of the Delegation. 
 
 At Tours, great agitation of deputies asking to have 
 the elections. Among them M. Grevy is extremely 
 ardent. I try to calm them by announcing that the 
 elections would probably take place speedily, but with- 
 out disclosing our plan to them. I recommend them 
 to hold together in harmony. 
 
 Saturday, October 22nd. — The English having spoken, 
 their proposal is quickly known to the public. I receive 
 a visit from Lord Lyons. He is glad to see that I am 
 supporting the English proposal. I tell him I have 
 from my side worked to the same end, and add, without 
 going into any details, that I had provided myself on 
 my way with the means of success, and that safe-con- 
 ducts had been asked for me. Lord Lyons thinks that 
 I am the only person to carry through such a negotia- 
 tion, and says he will telegraph to London and ask, on 
 his side also, for safe-conducts for me. I thank him, 
 and accept. 
 
 The evening of the same day I learn that an attack 
 is intended towards Beaugency. I find this unwise; 
 for on the one hand, if we are beaten, we may draw 
 the enemy on Tours, and on the other hand, we are 
 putting ourselves in flagrant discord with a proposal 
 for an armistice. I beg Admiral Fourichon to inform 
 M. Gambetta of my apprehensions. The latter is 
 strongly dissatisfied. He says that in his view the 
 projected negotiations are nothing, and so forth. Then 
 he grows calmer, and assures me that there is no ques- 
 tion of engaging in battle between Orleans and Tours. 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOUENEY 61 
 
 Sunday, October 23rd.— If there was any idea of 
 attacking from the Orleans side, there is none now. 
 
 Monday, October 2ith.— Meeting at the Archbishop's 
 palace, where the Government sits. M. Gambetta 
 expounds the military situation. I discuss it, and give 
 certain advice. It is recognized that no attack should 
 be made at the present moment, but that we must 
 make a really good army before we think of fighting. 
 
 After, on the question of the armistice, we discuss 
 what is to be done if the Prussians ask that the electors 
 of Alsace and of Lorraine will not be called upon. It 
 is agreed that we must oppose such an exclusion ; but 
 we must not ourselves raise the difficulty. If we say 
 nothing, we shall in nowise have recognized Prussian 
 pretensions, and their refusal to summon the electors 
 of Alsace and Lorraine will be an act of violence on 
 their part. 
 
 In the press something has been said of a peace 
 supposed to be signed by Bazaine. If this is the case, 
 if the truth is that the Marshal has confined himself 
 to stipulating certain peace conditions for France, the 
 examination of these conditions will be referred to 
 the sovereign people. 
 
 Tuesday, the 25th. — News is brought to me of the 
 capitulation of Marshal Bazaine. 
 
 At half -past eleven I go to the Archbishop's palace 
 to inform the Delegation of this great blow that has 
 fallen upon us. M. Gambetta feels it more terribly 
 than his colleagues, for this capitulation seriously 
 compromises the military situation, for which he 
 claims the responsibility. He is shattered by it. 
 
 After futile dissertations on Marshal Bazaine's action, 
 which cannot be properly weighed as long as we do 
 not know the determining circumstances, I read them 
 
62 MEMOIRS OP M. THIERS 
 
 a letter M. Cochery had just brought me from the 
 Bishop of Orleans, and my reply sent off immediately 
 by the same messenger: 
 
 " In this letter," I said, " the Bishop of Orleans has 
 sent me on, from the Prussian Headquarters at 
 Versailles, safe-conducts sent him for me, on behalf 
 of Count Bismarck, by General Baron von der Tann, 
 commanding the Bavarian Army at Orleans. Count 
 Bismarck then would seem to wish to bring me to 
 Versailles before I see the Paris Government; and if 
 it is the case that Count Bismarck has conquered the 
 military element in the person of Marshal Bazaine, 
 perhaps in me he hopes to conquer the civilian element. 
 I have therefore returned these safe-conducts to the 
 bishop, informing him that I could not avail my- 
 self of them, and that I was awaiting others which 
 would allow me to go first to Paris to ask the 
 Government to give me the necessary powers to con- 
 clude an armistice. It is only when I have been 
 invested with these powers that I will be allowed to 
 go to the Prussian Headquarters at Versailles. It 
 was with this intention that the neutral Powers, and 
 especially Russia, procured these safe-conducts for me." 
 
 M. Gambetta, after reading the bishop's letter and 
 my reply, rose and said to me : 
 
 "M. Thiers, you are correctness itself; your letter 
 cuts Count Bismarck's ruse at the very root, and he 
 will not be able to derive any advantage from it." 
 
 Once more we approach the examination of the 
 military position, so terribly aggravated by the sur- 
 render of Metz. 
 
 " We had two pivots," said I, " Metz and Paris. Now 
 we have but one, and the defence of Paris has no 
 support. We must create a fresh one with the army 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOURNEY 63 
 
 of the Loire ; but it is a difficult matter, and the month 
 this armistice would give you is more than ever 
 indispensable." 
 
 M. Gambetta recognizes this, though it costs him 
 something to do so, for the armistice involves the 
 necessity of convoking the Constituent Assembly. 
 
 " You have talked of two armies," I added : " one, 
 the army of the Loire, the other, the army of the 
 East. Doubtless it would be all the better if you 
 could assemble two of sufficient strength, and it could 
 have been done if Victor Emmanuel had sent us a 
 hundred thousand men. But lacking this help, what 
 you can do in the east will be no great matter. Leave 
 at Besancjon, Belf ort, Langres, and Lyons good garrisons 
 that will hold the enemy busy in sieges, and bring 
 everything that can keep the field to Tours. Bring 
 together in your army of the Loire the many elements 
 of resistance that are held back, in the centre and 
 the north, by the mania of local defence. Make this 
 army strong in numbers and quality, and above all 
 be careful not to split up into several sections the 
 forces you manage to assemble. If you can arrive 
 at a hundred and fifty thousand men, you will then 
 have something the enemy will have to reckon with, 
 and Paris will no longer be destitute of support. Once 
 you have got your army together, take care not to 
 risk it in a battle which you might lose. Put your 
 men into camp, accustom them to face the enemy in 
 skirmishes, never in a general engagement. Further- 
 more, do not take it on you to move on Paris with 
 flags flying. You must in a fashion steal to Paris. 
 The enemy will not set up a long cordon of investment : 
 but he will make huge entrenched camps round Paris 
 to act as bases for the columns whose task will be to 
 
64 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 prevent all attempts at provisioning the city. Organize 
 a good spy service. If one of these camps gives the 
 chance, try to seize it. Such a success would open your 
 way to Paris, and you would be able to join hands 
 with the garrison. Outside this way of working, as 
 delicate as it is difficult, there is no chance for anything 
 but disaster. We have still to hear what has become 
 of Marshal Bazaine's army, what freedom of action 
 it has retained, and what can be done with it." 
 
 M. Gambetta approves these counsels, calling them 
 invaluable directions, and recognizes that in order to 
 follow them the armistice is indispensable. 
 
 "Since that is your opinion," said I, "write it, and 
 I will take your letter to Paris." I insist, and every one 
 insists with me. Impossible to extract a word from 
 M. Gambetta. At length, urged to answer, he says: 
 
 " I have written to Paris ; I will send you a copy of 
 what I have written." 
 
 I go back to my lodging ; M. Spuller brings me this 
 copy. It is of no significance whatever. 
 
 Wednesday, October 26th. — A great diversity of news 
 about Marshal Bazaine. The established opinion is 
 that he has not yet capitulated, but that he will in 
 the end. The Government sits. M. Gambetta recovers 
 confidence, and sends me a dispatch contradicting the 
 news of the surrender of Metz. 
 
 M. Okouneff visits me, to show me a telegram from 
 Prince Gortchakow announcing the assent of the King 
 of Prussia to the Emperor Alexander's request with 
 regard to sending safe-conducts. 
 
 " Accordingly," runs the telegram, " M. Thiers has 
 only to ask for the safe-conducts necessary to enable 
 him to go to Paris." 
 
 Thursday, October 27th. — M. Okouneff comes to tell 
 
A DIPLOMATIC JOURNEY 65 
 
 me that the King of Prussia is disposed to grant a 
 satisfactory armistice. 
 
 At midnight, M. Cochery arrives from Orleans with 
 the safe-conducts, this time drawn up in terms that 
 permit me to make use of them. 
 
 Friday, October 2%th. — I set out for Paris, passing 
 through Orleans. 
 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE 
 
 Friday, October 28th, 1870.— Leave Tours with M. Paul 
 de R^musat and M. Cochery. We reach Orleans. 
 Most sympathetic reception at the bishop's palace. 
 A visit from General von der Tann. He telegraphs 
 to Versailles in order that the advanced posts may 
 facilitate our entry into Paris. 
 
 Saturday, October 29th. — We start, in the bishop's 
 own carriage. A young Bavarian officer accompanies 
 us. Everywhere, hideous traces of the war — burned-out 
 villages, torn-up roads. Great difficulty in pursuing 
 our journey. We arrive at Arpajon very late. Dread- 
 ful quarters littered with officers and soldiers. We 
 have supper with Prince Wittgenstein, the Russian 
 military attache in Paris. 
 
 Sunday, October 30th. — We are on our way well 
 before daybreak. The horses refuse to go farther. We 
 go a long way on foot. At length a gun team is sent 
 to us. We pass through numerous bodies of troops on 
 the march, and get to Versailles at nine o'clock. My 
 fellow-travellers go with the Bavarian officer to the 
 German staff-office. There they meet Count Moltke, 
 who asks if I will not see Count Bismarck. On their 
 report, fearing to annoy the Chancellor by not going 
 to see him, I pay him a visit of a few minutes. 
 
 " I must not talk to you except to tell you that I 
 must not talk to you," I said to him. 
 
 He approves of my scruples. Count Moltke comes 
 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE 67 
 
 to tell me that all arrangements are made to pass me 
 through the outposts. Count Bismarck walks down 
 the street with me and confirms the news of the 
 capitulation of Metz. An officer, Herr von Winterf eldt, 
 is told off to accompany me. About two o'clock we 
 come to the bridge of Sevres, the last outpost. Sevres 
 is deserted. The manufactory is riddled with balls 
 from Mont-Vale>ien, still firing at this very moment. 
 The Prussian soldiers are behind a barricade built in 
 front of a bridge. We go forward. Numbers of officers 
 surround us, showing every sign of respect. The white 
 flag of truce is waved, and a trumpet sounded. One 
 of these officers, in the uniform of the hussars, goes 
 forward. I shudder to see him expose himself in this 
 way. At length the white flag makes its appearance 
 on the opposite bank. A boat is cast off, and draws 
 near. I cross the Seine. I am announced. The post 
 turns out, and I go to the French Headquarters estab- 
 lished in the Bois du Boulogne, in the beautiful house 
 of the Rothschilds. From there to the Foreign 
 Ministry. Arrive at five o'clock. Interviews with 
 MM. Jules Favre and Picard, and General Trochu. My 
 friends arrive : Mignet, Saint-Hilaire, Calmon, Piscatory. 
 
 The Government is summoned for ten o'clock at 
 night, at the Foreign Ministry. They assemble there. 
 Present : General Trochu, the President, MM. Jules 
 Favre, Picard, Ferry, Emmanuel Arago, Garnier-Pages, 
 Jules Simon, Rochefort, General Le Flo, the Minister 
 for War, Adam, the Prefect of Police, and a member 
 whom I do not know. 
 
 Nothing definite was known about Metz, and they 
 were ignorant, not merely of the details, but even of 
 the results of my late mission to the principal European 
 Courts. 
 
68 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 I tell them for certain that Metz has capitulated, and 
 that the Marshals and a hundred and seventy-three 
 thousand men have been made prisoners. This news 
 fills every one with consternation. 
 
 I then announce that England and Russia advise the 
 two belligerent Powers to sign an armistice whose 
 declared object will be the convoking of a National 
 Assembly, in order to invalidate Prussia's contention 
 that she does not know whom she can negotiate with. 
 
 As for the military situation, I say that the members 
 of the Government must know how much longer Paris 
 can hold out. As for what concerns the provinces, I 
 know the army of the Loire is eighty thousand strong. 
 From what I am told by the authorities at Tours it will 
 soon be a hundred to a hundred and ten thousand men, 
 who, like the troops in Paris, have taken advantage of 
 the time that has elapsed to train and organize ; but 
 could this army, in its present condition, take the field ? 
 No one, not even M. Gambetta, ventures to think so. 
 In twenty-five days (if we get them by an armistice), 
 this army, augmented by the forces in the North, and 
 by what could be taken from the East, might perhaps 
 amount to a hundred and fifty thousand men ; but it 
 has not the confidence that victory gives. In any case, 
 it would have to deal with a hundred and fifty or two 
 hundred thousand Prussians set free by the capitulation 
 of Metz. I think, therefore, that the provinces might 
 draw off a part of the enemy, without achieving the 
 relief of Paris, and without preventing it from falling 
 through hunger. 
 
 Another factor in the situation remains to be con- 
 sidered: the internal Government of France. This 
 Government at the moment is practically non-existent. 
 Under the influence of circumstances, and ideas of 
 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE 69 
 
 decentralization, there is a frittering away of power 
 and resources. Our first interest should be to re- 
 establish the unity of this power and the concentration 
 of these resources. For instance, at this moment, at 
 Tours a loan of two hundred and fifty millions is being 
 raised at the usurious rate of 7| per cent, without the 
 Government of Paris having been consulted. 
 
 I sum up as follows : 
 
 The armistice proposed by the neutral Powers cannot 
 be refused without offending them ; it is indispensable 
 to permit of the election and convocation of an 
 Assembly; it would afford our provincial armies the 
 means of increasing their numbers and organizing in 
 the best way possible ; it would obtain a revictualling 
 Paris cannot do without ; and finally, the armistice 
 would give satisfaction to the country, which desires 
 to be called on to take up once more the direction of 
 its destiny. 
 
 I add that at Tours all were unanimous in recog- 
 nizing the military value of the armistice (four votes 
 out of four) ; that upon the political question, that is 
 to say, on the convocation of an Assembly, there were 
 three voices for, and one (that of M. Gambetta) against, 
 and I end by saying that Russia and England, having 
 asked for safe-conducts to allow me to enter Paris to 
 make the report that had just been heard, the Govern- 
 ment must make up its mind without delay, for I have 
 to meet the Prussian officers at four o'clock next after- 
 noon at the Sevres outposts. 
 
 After this account of affairs, several members speak. 
 
 Nearly all support the idea of an armistice. They ask 
 
 what its conditions will be, and insist on the necessity 
 
 of the revictualling. 
 
 I answer that this is the absolutely essential condi- 
 
70 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 tion, otherwise, as I said before the Delegation at 
 Tours, " Paris would be captured with the armistice." 
 
 Questions are next asked whether the elections will 
 be free and uncontrolled, and if Paris will be allowed 
 to hold them. 
 
 I reply further that the whole of France will share 
 in the elections ; that as for Paris, I venture to think I 
 shall succeed by making them an absolute sine qua non 
 in case of dispute. 
 
 " Will they be possible, too, in Alsace and Lorraine ? " 
 
 The majority of the members present would not, at 
 any cost, have this point raise a difficulty that might 
 wreck the armistice ; besides, we must avoid prejudging 
 in the armistice the question of the cession of territory. 
 If we could make use of a general expression to include 
 the whole of France, without mentioning such and such 
 a province expressly, I should be disposed to content 
 myself with it. 
 
 This opinion is adopted. "We also discuss the length 
 of the armistice. Finally we decide on these three 
 conditions : 
 
 An armistice in order to hold the elections. 
 
 A revictualling proportioned to the duration of 
 the armistice. 
 
 Freedom of the elections throughout the whole 
 of France. 
 
 The question of the internal condition of France 
 and the necessity of making provision for it comes 
 up several times. General Trochu speaks at great 
 length, energetically and effectively, upon this subject. 
 The armistice seems to him indispensable from a 
 military and political point of view. From the mili- 
 tary aspect he thinks it so useful, if we obtain the 
 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE 71 
 
 revictualling, that he doubts whether the Prussians 
 would consent to this condition. Politically, he is 
 persuaded that without the speedy meeting of an 
 Assembly, social dissolution in France is imminent. 
 He complains of M. Gambetta, but without attacking 
 him personally, and reproaches him with being too 
 much obsessed with the interests of his party. 
 Especially he criticizes the loan of two hundred and 
 fifty millions raised without the knowledge of the 
 Government of Paris, and calls it an act of usurpa- 
 tion. This vehement speech ends the discussion. 
 
 From this moment the members occupy themselves 
 only with drawing up a resolution. Some would wish 
 to have all the conditions stipulated for the armistice 
 published, which according to them would silence all 
 objections. I answer, and M. Jules Favre with me, 
 that this would make any negotiation impossible, for 
 the Prussians would not allow conditions to be dic- 
 tated to them publicly. This argument is accepted, 
 and M. Jules Favre is given the task of formulating 
 instructions for the French negotiator conformably 
 with the decisions just arrived at by the Government. 
 
 There will besides be printed in the Gazette a few 
 lines to announce my arrival, the result of my mission, 
 and the steps I am about to take to obtain an armi- 
 stice to open the gates of Paris for its revictualling 
 and to allow all France to elect an Assembly. This 
 announcement will be followed by another, distinct 
 from the first, to make known the capitulation of 
 Metz, which is still doubted. 
 
 Next day I spend an hour in our home, which I 
 had left two and forty days before, and I return to 
 the Foreign Office, where M. Jules Favre hands me 
 my powers as negotiator. I see again Barthelemy- 
 
72 MEMOIES OF M. THIERS 
 
 Saint-Hilaire, Mignet, Vitet, Piscatory, Calmon, Bocher, 
 d'Haussonville, de Lasteyrie. 
 
 They tell me there is great disturbance in Paris, 
 and that the Hotel de Ville is threatened ! The 
 Government had denied that Metz had fallen, and 
 the contradiction administered by events is a triumph 
 for Felix Pyat and the revolutionaries. The armistice 
 is not understood. Ill-disposed persons say that M. 
 Thiers comes to impose it on behalf of Prussia. 
 M. Ferry fears trouble during the day. 
 
 We lunch, interrupted continually by people bring- 
 ing news and by telegrams urging M. Jules Favre 
 to come to the H6tel de Ville. He goes off, arranging 
 with me that if he has not come back I shall take 
 my departure at two o'clock. 
 
 At two, as no one has returned, I set out with 
 M. Roger, who has procured a safe-conduct for the 
 gates of Paris. On our way we see General Ducrot, 
 who gives me his chief of staff and an escort of 
 excellent volunteer horse. About four o'clock we are 
 at the bridge of Sevres — the trumpets had sounded 
 already; the two flags of truce were hoisted. We 
 cross the Seine in gusts of wind and rain. The 
 Prussian officers were punctual to their hour. Herr 
 von Winterfeldt accompanies me, as on the previous 
 day. At six o'clock we reach Versailles. Herr von 
 Winterfeldt leaves me and returns a moment later to 
 congratulate me, from Count Bismarck, on my return 
 without any mishap, and to ask what hour will suit 
 me to-morrow. I choose noon. At this moment the 
 guns of the forts make themselves heard with extreme 
 violence. 
 
 November 1, 1870. — I had entered Paris Sunday, 
 October 30th. I had left again on the 31st. On the 
 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE 73 
 
 1st of November, as soon as I have risen, I write to 
 Mme. Thiers a letter with a note for the Government 
 of Tours, a missive which I hope to have dispatched 
 to Tours as a simple family letter. 
 
 Precisely at noon I am at Count Bismarck's house 
 in the Rue de Provence. He receives me immediately. 
 His face has a very changed expression from the time 
 I knew him first, but his eyes are still keen and 
 intelligent, and I ask myself if the gentleness he 
 displays in my presence is the effect of age or de- 
 liberately meant to make me forget what took place 
 at Ferrieres. He hastens to say that Mme. Thiers 
 must be reassured as to my journey and my health, 
 for he has sent a dispatch to von der Tann, instruct- 
 ing him to inform her of my safe return. This 
 thoughtfulness deprives me of any excuse for sending 
 my letter. 
 
 We at once enter upon the great subject we are 
 to treat of together. I tell the Chancellor 'that I 
 have received from the Government sitting in Paris 
 the necessary powers to conclude the armistice pro- 
 posed by the neutral Powers, which has for its main 
 object the convocation of a National Assembly with 
 which peace could be discussed. 
 
 Count Bismarck does not reject the idea of an 
 armistice; but he objects to the proposal emanating 
 from neutrals, for he has never admitted their in- 
 tervention in this war; and taking, for example, the 
 English proposal, to which the other neutrals have 
 rallied, he says that the English dispatch expatiates 
 at great length on considerations of humanity, but 
 comes to no precise conclusion. 
 
 I answer that the proposal addressed to France 
 is precise and clear. I should be surprised if the 
 
74 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 proposal that has been made to Prussia is less so ; for 
 the rest, it is certain that the four neutral Powers — 
 England, Austria, Italy, and Russia — advise us to 
 conclude an armistice, and that is the subject which 
 I have come to discuss with him. 
 
 Count Bismarck leaving these preliminary reserva- 
 tions, we pass to the discussion of the armistice. He 
 pretends that he accepted the idea at Ferrieres, that 
 he would have been willing to arrange one then, which 
 would have spared much bloodshed ; that he continues 
 to-day to be willing, but that an armistice being 
 extraordinarily in our favour, we must expect military 
 advantages to be exacted in return, and that we 
 might, for example, be asked to give up one of the 
 Paris forts. 
 
 I reply at once that such a condition is inadmissible, 
 for it would be giving up Paris ; that we must forgo 
 any further negotiation if this were to be insisted 
 upon. I say this so finally that Count Bismarck 
 confines himself to repeating that pledges will never- 
 theless be exacted, and, failing a fort, it will be 
 something else. He then dwells on the purpose of 
 the armistice, viz. on the convocation of the Assembly. 
 
 " The motive is excellent," he said, " and perfectly 
 agreeable to us, but is it agreeable to the Govern- 
 ments of Tours and of Paris ? Originally the elections 
 were ordered ; then they were suspended, then ordered 
 again, and finally suspended indefinitely. If they are 
 ordered now, will they take place at Lyons, at 
 Marseilles, at Toulouse?" 
 
 " There has been a fluctuation," I replied, " and that 
 is not surprising, since the Government felt all the 
 agitations of an immense city undergoing siege. How- 
 ever, in point of fact, the Government desires to have 
 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE 75 
 
 them. The chief objection they have met in the heart 
 of the Government arose from the fear that there 
 could be no election either in Paris or in the depart- 
 ments in the hands of the enemy. This fear once 
 abolished by the armistice, the objection disappears, 
 and far from meeting with opposition, the convocation 
 of an Assembly will but fall in with one of the most 
 pronounced wishes of public opinion. Possibly there 
 will be selections that will not please us Moderates, 
 but the majority will be Liberal and Conservative 
 and attached to a policy of reason and justice." 
 
 Count Bismarck then said : 
 
 " We do not ask anything better than to deal with 
 a proper body representing France and a Government 
 with which we can treat authoritatively ; but we have, 
 if necessary, the choice between the restoration of 
 the Empire, a Republican Government, and even a 
 monarchy other than that of the Bonapartes." > 
 
 " What ! " I exclaimed. " The choice ? " 
 
 " Yes," went on Count Bismarck, " you know, doubt- 
 less, that the Emperor Napoleon has summoned to 
 him the Marshals and other heads of the army who 
 are our prisoners. They have answered the summons, 
 the Empress has joined them, and they are deliberating 
 at this moment. Our two or three hundred thousand 
 prisoners might be formed into an army for them, 
 they might summon the Senate and the Corps Legis- 
 latif, and declare the Government sitting at the Hotel 
 de Ville null and void." 
 
 " What ! " said I. " The Empress, who has informed 
 us, by Prince Metternich, that she wished to keep aloof 
 from all intrigue, who would not listen to General 
 Boyer? . . ." 
 
 "The Empress," rejoined the Chancellor, "do not 
 
76 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 trust her ! We have had messages from her in quite 
 the opposite sense, and I could show them to you." 
 
 I replied that in any case he was too much a states- 
 man to lend himself to such ridiculous combinations ; 
 that he ought to be fully aware that France would 
 never, at the hands of a few generals, an enemy's 
 prisoners, and finally at the hands of the [enemy him- 
 self, accept a broken-down dynasty that had plunged 
 her into the depths. 
 
 " I am not," I added, " a party man, and if the Bona- 
 partes had granted a sufficient measure of freedom, 
 and followed a reasonable policy, I would not have 
 served them, but I should not have fought against 
 them ; but after the calamities they have drawn upon 
 France, no one would uphold them." 
 
 " I know," said Count Bismarck, " that you are not 
 a party man, but a Frenchman solely attached to his 
 country, and I understand your feelings. Besides, I am 
 myself of the opinion that in order to treat of peace, an 
 Assembly elected by the nation is better than a restora- 
 tion of the Empire. I merely desired to let you see 
 that we had a choice, that failing the Government 
 at the Hotel de Ville, we could find others to set their 
 names to a peace." 
 
 We then returned to the subject of the armistice. 
 " You will doubtless also demand," said Count Bis- 
 marck, " that during the armistice Paris should be fed." 
 " Count, it is beyond dispute the regular usage of 
 war, and tbe rule of armistices, to arrange matters 
 so that the belligerents should in no way have impaired 
 their respective positions at the end of the armistice." 
 " I quite agree," he replied ; " but to provision Paris 
 for thirty days, or even for fifteen, will be immensely 
 difficult." 
 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE 77 
 
 "I know it will, since I have helped to carry out 
 a provisioning that will hold you many months longer, 
 and I know the means of increasing it." 
 
 He objected that when this provisioning was effected 
 the neighbourhood of Paris was teeming with every 
 kind of food ; but that now all was exhausted. Requi- 
 sitions now brought in nothing, and Count Moltke 
 only fed the army from distant markets. Besides, there 
 were no railways now. Count Bismarck doubtless 
 wanted to discover if we had definitely settled our 
 ways and means of revictualling the city. 
 
 As for the necessary quantities, I told him they were 
 already determined in a memorandum which I would 
 send him. The provisions would enter in by three or 
 four railway termini, commissaries of both nations 
 would keep the tally, and there would be no false 
 reckoning on either side. As for the railways, the rails 
 were there, we had the locomotives, they would be 
 made neutral and returned whence they came, after 
 delivering the trains of provisions. 
 
 "You will give me your memorandum," said 
 Count Bismarck, " and we shall go into it. Since the 
 quantities depend on the length of the armistice, we 
 must know how many days you would need." 
 
 I spoke of a minimum of twenty-five days. He 
 thought a cessation of hostilities for forty-eight hours 
 would be enough for the ballot. 
 
 I replied that it would, indeed, be enough for the 
 ballot ; but the preparations for the elections, the 
 convocation of the Assembly, and the settlement of its 
 powers would call for a minimum delay of five and 
 twenty days. 
 
 " Be it so," said the Chancellor ; " but the place where 
 the Assembly will meet is a serious matter. At Paris 
 
78 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 it could not deliberate in peace, and if in the end it did 
 not come to an understanding it would be cut off and 
 in no position to govern." 
 
 I acknowledge these difficulties, and Count Bismarck 
 added that perhaps he would ask for something on 
 this head to be embodied in the conditions of the 
 armistice. 
 
 After touching all these points, I thought I had 
 attained my end in a single meeting, when Count 
 Bismarck said further that he would have to take the 
 opinion of the military staff on these different 
 questions, who would doubtless demand a price 
 for the sacrifice imposed upon their army by an 
 armistice so advantageous for us. 
 
 He then opened the question of the freedom of the 
 elections, and assured me that we should have more 
 than under any form of government, but that he did 
 not wish to have any elections in Alsace nor in 
 German Lorraine. 
 
 "Ah, as to that, no, no," I replied. "The armistice 
 is not the treaty of peace ; never will we allow a 
 question of territory to be prejudged in an armistice." 
 
 The Chancellor was struck by the fire of my reply. 
 
 "We do not want to prejudge this question," said 
 he, "but if it is not to be prejudged against you, it 
 must not be prejudged against us either." 
 
 "Do not let us say any more about it," I 
 answered ; "on this head I have positive instructions." 
 
 The reservations Count Bismarck had just made with 
 regard to Alsace and Lorraine having given me the 
 opportunity to broach the territorial problem, I said 
 to him : 
 
 " The latest victories of the German armies will add 
 to the Northern Confederation Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, 
 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE 79 
 
 the Grand Duchy of Baden. After so great an 
 increase of territory what interest could Germany 
 have in seizing a few square leagues and a few 
 thousands of subjects from us, and so inflicting a 
 wound on the very heart ,of France that we should 
 never forgive?" 
 
 Count Bismarck replied that the Germans regarded 
 the acquisition of a part of French territory as 
 a matter of pride and a question of security. They 
 had not forgotten the conquests of Louis XIV, and 
 wished to guard against future incursions on the 
 part of France. Territorial acquisitions, such as Metz 
 and Alsace, for example, would satisfy these two 
 feelings. And hereupon he repeated the supposed 
 historic dissertation, so often published by the German 
 press, on the insatiable ambition of France. 
 
 " Prussia," I replied, " less than any other Power can 
 have any right to reproach France with her conquests. 
 France, the Gaul of olden days, has always been a 
 great Empire. She has her territory from Nature 
 itself, not by war or diplomacy ; and the necessary 
 and legitimate conquest of her natural frontiers was 
 never inspired by the ambition of aggrandizement. 
 But you Prussians, on the contrary, from the 
 Grand-Elector to your King to-day, you have only 
 lived by taking something from some one. You were 
 a million and a half in the time of the Grand-Elector. 
 Half a century after you were brought by Frederick 
 the Great up to ten or twelve million subjects ; you 
 reach fifteen millions by the partition of Poland, 
 eighteen to nineteen millions in 1815 ; in the past six 
 years you have gone on from twenty to thirty 
 millions, for the Northern Confederation will be 
 nothing but a compound of prefectures under your 
 
80 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 King ! And it is you who dare to reproach us with 
 our spirit of conquest, and our ambition ! But indeed, 
 Count, one must imagine oneself dreaming, when one 
 hears such an accusation in your mouth ! " 
 
 " Well, let it be as it may," said the Count ; " but 
 all that would fade away if we had no territorial 
 safeguards, if we had not the fortresses of Metz and 
 Strassburg in our hands to cover us." 
 
 " These places are something, without a doubt," said 
 I. " And yet, does starting from ten leagues nearer or 
 farther make any great difference to invasions. If a 
 long and formidable frontier like the Rhine is a 
 safeguard, a few leagues added to the Palatinate will 
 be no protection against the implacable feelings you 
 will leave in our hearts. You have therefore more 
 interest in policy to give us back those places than 
 you have strategic interest in keeping them. However 
 that may be, I repeat that I have neither the power 
 nor the will to sign an armistice in which the solution 
 of these matters would be prejudged." 
 
 Count Bismarck then asked me if, in order to avoid 
 a prejudgment, we would not find it possible to adopt 
 a middle way, which would be to choose leading men 
 from the occupied provinces without having recourse 
 to a formal convocation of the electors. Clearly what 
 he wished was to avoid all election disturbances in 
 Alsace and Lorraine. I accepted this proposal, and 
 I took upon myself to draw up a memorandum to 
 this effect. 
 
 Count Bismarck having repeated that he would 
 have to consult the military authorities upon the 
 placing of the armies during the armistice, and the 
 importance of the provisioning I had stipulated for, 
 we arranged a meeting for next day at noon. 
 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE 81 
 
 I left the Chancellor with a little hope, for he 
 seemed desirous of bringing into existence, through 
 the elections in France, a Government with which he 
 could treat. We then went, with my two companions, 
 MM. de R^musat and Cochery, to wander about the 
 park and look again upon the places that had witnessed 
 our ancient greatness. We came upon Prussians 
 moving along the alleys on horseback, and French 
 people, too, who questioned me sadly with their eyes. 
 
 In the afternoon, the Count came to ask me to put 
 off my visit next day until two o'clock instead of noon. 
 The King was to assemble the military chiefs to talk 
 over the project of the armistice, and this conference 
 would not end before two o'clock at least. 
 
 November 3rd. — At two o'clock I was at the Chan- 
 cellor's. I found him irritable, not so calm as the 
 day before. 
 
 "I have just been discussing the question of the 
 armistice with the King and the Staff," he said. 
 "There will be many difficulties still to solve. As 
 for the elections in Alsace and Lorraine, what we 
 agreed upon yesterday is accepted. You will have 
 permission yourselves to choose in these provinces 
 leading men to complete your Assembly. On the 
 other points, have you prepared a formal document ? " 
 
 "Here it is," I replied, "in the form of questions, 
 followed by the indicated answers. With these 
 elementary details to go on we can very speedily 
 draw up an agreement ready to be signed by both 
 of us." 
 
 He read the preamble. 
 
 "Bases of an agreement to put an end to loss of 
 life, in conformance with the desire of the neutral 
 Powers. . . ." 
 
 6 
 
82 MEMOIRS OF M. THIEES 
 
 At these words, " the neutral Powers," Count 
 Bismarck looked at me with an air that declared 
 that these Powers did not exist as far as he was 
 concerned. I said : 
 
 "I will delete the words, but the neutral Powers 
 will none the less exist, and will not cease to count 
 in Europe." 
 
 The Chancellor continued: 
 
 " Article 1. — Cessation of hostilities. Convocation of 
 an Assembly." 
 
 No comment, except that a date is to be fixed for 
 the elections so as not to waste the time of the 
 armistice uselessly. 
 
 " Article 2. — Duration of the armistice : twenty-eight 
 days." 
 
 " It was to be twenty-five," said the Chancellor; " this 
 is an inconvenience : it increases the quantity of pro- 
 visions to be brought into Paris. "We shall see." 
 
 " Article 3. — The choice of place where the Assembly 
 is to meet." 
 
 "As we have already agreed," remarked Count Bis- 
 marck, " it must not meet in Paris. Let us continue." 
 
 "Article 4. — Freedom of the elections." 
 
 Nothing to remark, after the solution already indi- 
 cated on this point. 
 
 "Article 5. — Military operations during the period 
 of the armistice." 
 
 My wording was not acceptable to the Chancellor. 
 
 " It would hamper the German army," he said. " We 
 will trace a line of demarcation outside which the 
 belligerents shall be masters of their movements." 
 
 He had already traced this line in red pencil on a 
 map. According to him, a hundred and sixty thousand 
 men, set free by the fall of Metz, were pressing for- 
 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE 83 
 
 ward to occupy Rouen, le Havre, and Normandy. They 
 would only stop on the day the armistice was sealed. 
 Our interest, then, was to sign it as soon as possible. 
 
 "Articles 6 and 7. — Revictualling of Paris." 
 
 Upon this head, serious difficulty. 
 
 " You ask too much of us," said Count Bismarck. 
 " If we granted you what you ask you would last 
 out two months longer, and we should be forced to 
 remain here for the winter, for we do not wish to 
 destroy Paris. We wish to wait for the exhaustion 
 of your stores. Accordingly, this article is to be modi- 
 fied. If you were willing to surrender a fort I would 
 let you have provisions, but you would still say I am 
 demanding Mont-Val^rien ! " 
 
 " No," I replied ; " provisions and no fort, otherwise 
 no armistice." 
 
 Without insisting further Count Bismarck comes to 
 the last article, relating to the third party as arbiter. 
 He will not consent that a third party should be 
 chosen from among the neutrals. 
 
 Next there was the question of the fleets, which I 
 had not mentioned in my draft. Count Bismarck 
 wished ours to have their limit fixed at the estuary 
 of the Seine. 
 
 " What ! " said I, " have Dieppe, Boulogne, Dunkirk 
 ceased to be ours? The sphere of our fleet will be 
 limited by Calais Straits." 
 
 As to the German fleet, whose position Count Bis- 
 marck did not know, it was agreed that it should stay 
 wherever it was at the time. 
 
 At this point Count Bismarck spoke to me of the 
 thirty-five merchant ships that we had taken, and 
 whose captains had been made prisoners. That, he 
 said, was an intolerable abuse of force. The Germans 
 
84 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 had therefore taken in our towns forty citizens whom 
 they were equally holding as prisoners in Germany. 
 
 "And you have violated the law of nations," I said. 
 " This law, which you cannot be ignorant of, since 
 it arises out of international customs and treaties, 
 authorizes the making prisoners of the crews of ships 
 held lawful prize, but not the non-combatant inhabi- 
 tants of occupied towns." 
 
 He pretended then that the Prussians, never having 
 recognized prize law, could not admit the decrees of 
 the law of nations on this head. Then, at the end 
 of his arguments, he fell back upon the francs-tireurs, 
 accusing them of atrocities, and of having killed a 
 relation to whom he was greatly attached. 
 
 " That is their law of nations," he cried : " that's 
 the law of nations according to the French army!" 
 
 At the word, I rose to go, and I said to the 
 Chancellor : 
 
 " I have taken pains to avoid importing any bitter- 
 ness into our painful discussions, and I am astounded 
 that you should utter in my presence, with reference 
 to the French army, a reproach that is not deserved 
 and that I cannot consent to listen to." 
 
 He became calm then and assured me that he had 
 no intention of insulting the French army, but that 
 he regretted that it should admit such persons into 
 its ranks, which made it responsible for their actions. 
 
 "It is possible," I said to the Count, "that there 
 may have been excesses committed on both sides, and 
 I reprobate them all alike. In all cases, if there 
 have been deeds of violence, they would be more 
 excusable in the invaded than in the invaders. 
 Guerillas have always been recognized, and every 
 means is justifiable to defend one's country." 
 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE 85 
 
 I had sat down again when I saw the Count was 
 on the defensive once more. He then took up a 
 paper from the table and said to me it was an 
 abominable proclamation that had come from Tours. 
 It was, in fact, ridiculous, relating to the surrender 
 of Metz, and couched in terms of extreme violence, 
 possibly calculated by M. Gambetta to make the 
 armistice impossible. 
 
 "You cannot imagine," said Count Bismarck, "the 
 difficulties these violent explosions create for me. 
 How after this sort of thing can I procure the sign- 
 ing of armistices ? " 
 
 Coming up to me then and taking me by the hand : 
 
 " Pray forget," he said, " my hasty expressions ; 
 they are provoked by all the difficulties I have to 
 face, and I cannot wholly control them." 
 
 Seeing him so much softened, I spoke of an incident 
 that had surprised me. The Prussian prefect of 
 Versailles had on the 31st of October directed the 
 President of the Civil Tribunal to administer justice 
 in the name of Napoleon III. I pointed out to Count 
 Bismarck that this showed an inconsistency, since, at 
 the very moment, he was treating with a representa- 
 tive of the French Republic. When he replied that 
 he had not recognized this Government, I asked him 
 if he had not given up the thought of coming to 
 terms with the Bonapartes. He then said expressly 
 that he found the Cassel intrigues ridiculous and trivial, 
 and that if he had to choose a party, outside Prussia, 
 he would be with the Bourbons. 
 
 Taking advantage of this tone of confidence and 
 cordiality he was adopting towards me, I questioned 
 him as to the terms of the capitulation of Metz. He 
 showed it to me and translated it. It dealt only 
 
86 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 with military matters and only arranged the fate of 
 the army. Then he came back to talk of his pre- 
 ference for the Bourbons. 
 
 According to him, the proper thing would be to 
 form a good Government by uniting the party of the 
 Comte de Chambord and that of the Comte de Paris. 
 He had in his possession, he said, a letter sent him 
 by the Bishop of Orleans to be forwarded to the 
 right address. He had been too scrupulous to read 
 it, but as it was open and as the bishop was a friend 
 of mine, he offered it to me to read. 
 
 " I am too scrupulous, also, to take notice of it," I 
 replied. 
 
 " So, but you guess what it may contain. It is, 
 most probably, on the lines of this linking up of the 
 Bourbons of which I have just spoken to you. What 
 are the Orleans princes doing ? If you have any 
 message to send them, I am at your service." 
 
 " I thank you, Count, and I would not hesitate to 
 trust you, if there was any reason. I look upon the 
 Orleans princes with respect and affection, but I think 
 they would be wrong to do anything imprudent, and 
 to be willing at this juncture to behave as claimants 
 to the throne. My conduct, solely inspired by the 
 interests of France, has always been loyal. It will 
 be the same towards the Republic. I have told its 
 heads that if they gave us a wise and well-ordered 
 Government we should accept it ; that otherwise we 
 should return to our preferences. We shall be faith- 
 ful to this promise. To-day the Republic allows 
 Legitimist, Republican, and Orl^anist to fight side by 
 side in defence of their country ; let us take advan- 
 tage of this. Later we shall see. There are certain 
 symptoms which indeed make one apprehensive lest 
 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE 87 
 
 the Republic of 1870 may follow the example of the 
 Republic of 1848. In that case the return of the 
 Orleans princes might be useful to France. But 
 to-day I have nothing to send to them, and I thank 
 you for your confidence." 
 
 We then returned to our discussion of the armistice. 
 
 "We are agreed upon nearly all points," said the 
 Count ; " but as the revictualling must needs prolong 
 the resistance of Paris, the military authorities will 
 not consent, and without them I am powerless." 
 
 I then said calmly but decidedly, that if he thought 
 the refusal of the military authorities was final, it 
 was better to say so frankly and to break off a 
 negotiation that must come to nothing. I was ready 
 to inform my Government of the fact and to leave 
 Headquarters. 
 
 Count Bismarck found that I was in too great haste 
 to abandon all hope of coming to terms. He would 
 see the King again, and perhaps we might agree in 
 the end if, for example, I would abate my demands 
 in the matter of the revictualling. 
 
 " Give me until to-morrow," said he, " and at noon 
 I will give you a final answer." 
 
 It was clear that the Prussians did not consider 
 that the political advantage accruing to them from 
 the convocation of an Assembly would counterbalance 
 the military advantage we should derive from the 
 revictualling of Paris. Perhaps, too, they had con- 
 sented to embark upon negotiations merely in order 
 not to alienate the neutral Powers, and without ever 
 having had any intention to grant the armistice. 
 
 Next day precisely at noon I was at the Chancellor's 
 house. He seemed preoccupied, and began by asking 
 if I had news from Paris. When I answered in the 
 
88 MEMOIRS OF M. THIEES 
 
 negative, he then told me the Commune had been 
 proclaimed, and that MM. Dorian, Delescluze, Felix 
 Pyat, and perhaps Blanqui, made up the new 
 Government. 
 
 My distress at this news was very great. I had 
 many times uneasily asked myself what had been the 
 result of the disturbance that had manifested itself at 
 the moment of my leaving Paris. Count Bismarck 
 read me his information ; it agreed with my fears 
 sufficiently to justify them all. I wished, however, to 
 have more certain news ; and accordingly I proposed 
 to the Count to send one of my secretaries to the out- 
 posts at the bridge of Sevres, to discover what had 
 occurred. He welcomed the idea, and I dispatched 
 M. Cochery immediately. 
 
 " If the revolution is a fact," said he, " the negotia- 
 tions will ipso facto be broken off. If not, we shall 
 take up our task again ; there must be some truth in 
 all this, and that will be enough to lessen greatly the 
 political value of the point we are discussing. Let us 
 put it aside until we are better informed. Your envoy 
 will be back in the evening. You will let me know 
 what he has heard, and we shall act accordingly.'' 
 
 "If the news of this revolution is confirmed," I 
 replied, " I shall ask your permission to leave to- 
 morrow." 
 
 "Yes, we shall give you every facility." 
 
 Our sitting, which like the former ones should have 
 been for several hours, was very much curtailed. And 
 so, seeing Count Bismarck disposed to talk, I led him 
 to speak of 1866 and of all he had done at that time, 
 which was so glorious for him. I took him in this way 
 on the human side, and he yielded to the temptation. 
 
 First of all, he told me that at Biarritz he had 
 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE 89 
 
 obtained nothing whatever, though he had made every 
 suggestion that could engage Napoleon III to conclude 
 an alliance. The Emperor had appeared convinced 
 that Austria would gain the day, and determined to 
 join with her to crush Prussia, or else with Prussia at 
 a price for his help. He had calculated badly. 
 
 After Sadowa, the attitude of Napoleon III, and the 
 fear of a coalition between France, Austria, and the 
 little German states* had decided him to make the 
 peace of Nikolsbourg. The King opposed it with 
 indignation and called it cowardly ; he would have 
 liked to destroy Austria. Count Bismarck thought it 
 too soon for that. 
 
 " We could not " — these are his exact words — " have 
 filled the empty space from Prague to Constantinople." 
 
 He had had violent scenes with the King. 
 
 " I owe him my malady," said he ; " one day when he 
 had come to see me in my bedroom, he so exasperated 
 me that I leaped out of bed and locked myself in my 
 dressing-room, and refused to come out till he had 
 gone." 
 
 He had, in a fashion, driven him out of his wits. He 
 told me, further, that he kept in his family papers a 
 copy of the Treaty of Nikolsbourg on which the King 
 had written with his own hand: 
 
 "I sign, vanquished by the violence of my Prime 
 Minister." 
 
 Prussia was lost, he said, if he had not put an end 
 to the war, and he added : 
 
 " Monarchy makes one a republican ! " 
 
 He was persuaded that in 1866 a single demonstra- 
 tion on the part of France would have altered every- 
 thing. Von der Goltz, far from seconding him as I had 
 believed, had run counter to him, obstinately desiring 
 
90 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 to keep at peace. To make the King Emperor, he will 
 wait until Bavaria takes the initiative. It is clear that 
 Count Bismarck is speculating on Hungary. She " will 
 fill the empty space from Prague to Constantinople." 
 He would like to make her a kind of intermediate 
 empire, after taking all the German peoples for him- 
 self. He has all this in his dreams. 
 
 Six o'clock in the same evening. — I am waiting. 
 M. Cochery does not come back. What a curious 
 thing ! this Paris, from whose very heart any piece of 
 news once spread with the speed of light, is now so 
 closely shut that a revolution in her midst can be 
 several days old without being known ! 
 
 A quarter to eight. — At last M. Cochery is here. He 
 has made his way into Paris and heard everything. 
 The members of the Government of National Defence 
 were for some hours the prisoners of the Commune, 
 whose followers had taken the Hotel de Ville by 
 surprise. The National Guard, rallied by M. Picard, 
 drove off the rioters. M. Pyat and some others are, 
 they say, arrested. 
 
 I go to see Count Bismarck and announce the victory 
 of order over disorder. He seems none too well satis- 
 fied with the news. Might he be regretting the loss of 
 an easy way of breaking off our negotiation? 
 
 " Yesterday," I said, " you had promised to make a 
 last attempt with the King and the military staff to 
 obtain an armistice with a reduced revictualling. 
 What have they decided ? " 
 
 " They will not permit a revictualling even on a 
 reduced scale, unless you give them an equivalent 
 return." 
 
 "But what equivalent?" 
 
 "Give up the revictualling, or surrender a fort." 
 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE 91 
 
 "In both cases, it is the surrender of Paris you 
 demand," I exclaimed. " How could you have entered 
 upon this negotiation with the idea that we should 
 accept such terms ? " 
 
 " Yet you ought to have foreseen them." 
 
 " We had seen that the advantage to you to be 
 able to treat of peace immediately with a regularly 
 constituted Government, was fully as great as our 
 advantage in the revictualling of Paris." 
 
 " As a matter of fact, we were fully disposed to make 
 sacrifices in the hope of arriving at a speedy peace ; 
 but the outbreak in Paris and the Tours proclamation 
 have forced us to give up this hope." 
 
 I determined then to leave Versailles, and to 
 announce to the Government of Paris that negotiations 
 were broken off. 
 
 Before we separated, Count Bismarck said that, in 
 the interests of both of us, to avoid making statements 
 that would have to be corrected later, as had happened 
 with M. Jules Favre, we might agree beforehand as to 
 the statement we should each publish. 
 
 I replied that I should make my statement from my 
 French point of view, that he would make his from 
 his Prussian standpoint, that we should communicate 
 them to each other, and in this way avoid contradictory 
 accounts. 
 
 I went home and put off till next day the drafting 
 of my account of this negotiation, undertaken in some 
 hope and so unexpectedly broken. 
 
 November ith. — Next day, after long reflection, filled 
 with the feeling that it would be regrettable to break 
 off finally without a last effort to obtain the elections, I 
 asked Count Bismarck to receive me. I told him that in 
 order to profit by the friendly disposition he had more 
 
92 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 than once showed in the matter of electoral freedom 
 in the occupied provinces, I should like to propose to 
 the Government of Paris to hold these elections under 
 armistice, without revictualling, since this condition was 
 categorically rejected, or even without an armistice ; 
 but for this, it would be necessary that when he went 
 to Paris to announce the refusal of the revictualling, 
 M. Cochery should be allowed to bring the members 
 of the Government to the outposts where I would go 
 to confer with them. 
 
 Count Bismarck accepted this proposal ; he gave the 
 proper orders, and M. Cochery started on his mission. 
 
 I then had the idea of risking a step that might have 
 decisive results. If it was useful to form an Assembly, 
 by means of an election, it was not less useful to have 
 some idea of the peace this Assembly would be called 
 upon to conclude. I wished then to press Count 
 Bismarck to disclose his inmost thought on this matter. 
 
 " Well ! " I said, " if we were to offer to treat with 
 you at once, without holding you for two months 
 before the walls of Paris, what would you ask 
 from us ? " 
 
 "A great deal, and a great deal more still," he replied, 
 "if you wait until hunger reduces Paris to surrender 
 like Metz. The two hundred thousand men who were 
 investing the latter place are coming to us ; you will see 
 your country overrun to the coast, and France will be 
 ruined up to the Loire. Better for you, then, to treat 
 without delay. To-day we should ask Alsace (Haut- 
 Rhin and Bas-Rhin) ; as for Lorraine, not a very great 
 slice around Metz." 
 
 "And Metz?" 
 
 " If you treat at once, I promise to do my best with 
 the King to have it given back to you." (At this I 
 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE 93 
 
 felt an immense relief that I took great pains to 
 conceal.) " There remains," he went on, " the question 
 of indemnity. You have cost us a great deal of money; 
 so we will exact two budgets." 
 
 "Two budgets? What do you mean by that? You 
 mean two Prussian budgets ? " 
 
 " No, two French budgets." 
 
 " Impossible ! Never ! " 
 
 Count Bismarck, struck by the energy of my reply, 
 perhaps felt he had gone too far. I showed him then 
 that our budgets only reached two milliards, because 
 of the insane expenditure of the late Government, that 
 the real budget was only some fifteen hundred millions, 
 which would still bring two budgets to three milliards, 
 and that France would never be in a position to pay 
 this sum. 
 
 He seemed to be giving way, and I thought I could 
 guess that two milliards, with Alsace and part of 
 Lorraine, without Metz, might be the conditions of a 
 peace signed immediately. I then felt redoubled 
 energy to do my duty, and increased desire to make 
 the Government of Paris hold the elections at once, 
 without the revictualling of the city, with the armistice 
 or even without it. 
 
 I left Count Bismarck, promising to come back to see 
 him during the evening ; and I spent my afternoon in 
 working to finish my account of the negotiation, which 
 I was to read to him. 
 
 The same evening, November 4th, at half -past eight, 
 I handed him my note. Before reading it, he began to 
 speak again of the intrigues of the Court of Cassel ; he 
 recounted the capitulation of Sedan, the attitude of 
 Napoleon III, his meeting with the King ; he was 
 inexhaustible on the subject of the King, the Prince 
 
94 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 Royal, Moltke, the Court, the people at Court, etc. 
 (I shall relate all this in another place.) 
 
 At midnight he was still talking, without so much as 
 an eye cast on my work. At length he took it up and 
 read it very closely. 
 
 We were agreed on all the facts, but he said, with 
 a little temper, that he objected to our making 
 our fundamental position the reproach against him 
 of having opened negotiations with the intention of 
 refusing the revictualling or else demanding the sur- 
 render of one of the Paris forts. 
 
 As I did not want to embitter our reports, fearing 
 lest it might make peace more difficult in the future, 
 I proposed to say simply that we had not been able 
 to agree on the question of the revictualling, and that 
 this was the reason for the fresh rupture. This he 
 accepted. 
 
 We parted, arranging a meeting for the next day 
 on my return from Sevres. 
 
 Saturday, November 5th. — Precisely at eight o'clock 
 in the morning I was on my way to the bridge of 
 Sevres. Arrived at the Prussian outposts, the series 
 of formalities imposed upon bearers of flags of truce 
 had to be gone through again. As these were lengthy, 
 I had time to see the houses of the lower town, open, 
 abandoned in a disorder that made me think of 
 Pompeii, overwhelmed in full life and activity by a 
 sudden catastrophe. 
 
 The boat I was waiting for at length came and 
 ferried me across to the French outposts. M. Cochery, 
 who had come to meet me, had told me beforehand 
 that I should only find M. Jules Favre and General 
 Ducrot at the rendezvous. Through fear of rousing 
 the populace of Paris neither M. Picard nor General 
 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE 95 
 
 Trochu had come. The insurgents had been put down, 
 and the Government seemed to lack the courage of 
 its victory. 
 
 I was little disposed to be explicit before General 
 Ducrot, who was not a member of the Government, 
 and whose character was little known to me. How- 
 ever, to refuse to speak in his presence was a serious 
 thing, for it would have been an insult to an officer 
 whose merit as a soldier inspired confidence. I decided 
 then to describe the position of affairs before him. 
 
 I began by recounting my efforts to obtain an 
 armistice with the revictualling of Paris, the refusal of 
 the German Staff to allow any revictualling unless we 
 gave up a fort, and the rupture of the negotiations upon 
 this refusal. I then said that in spite of this rupture 
 the elections might still be held in two ways, either 
 under armistice without revictualling or without the 
 armistice ; for in each case Count Bismarck had 
 promised to give every possible facility. 
 
 On the first question, of an armistice without revic- 
 tualling, my two hearers exclaimed that it would be 
 impossible to get the Parisians to accept it, since it 
 would fan their revolutionary passions to a tre- 
 mendous flame. 
 
 " I agree that it is difficult," said I, " but, in the end, 
 where would be the difference between the elections 
 held with an armistice without revictualling, and those 
 held without an armistice ? In the first case, they will 
 be prohibited from fighting for a month, and will live 
 upon their supplies ; in the second case, they will 
 consume the same quantity of food and will not fight 
 either, unless you take the offensive, for the Prussians 
 
 seem determined to await the surrender of Paris 
 
 t 
 
 through famine, rather than to win it by force. The 
 
96 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 great advantage of the armistice would be to stay the 
 march of the two hundred thousand men who are on 
 their way from Metz ; le Mans, le Havre, Amiens, the 
 whole of Normandy and Picardy would be saved from 
 invasion. These are the provinces into which all our 
 stocks of cattle and provisions of every kind have been 
 dispatched ; the quantity is enormous ; their seizure 
 would enrich the enemy and be nothing short of 
 ruinous for us. To facilitate the elections and save so 
 much wealth are advantages not to be despised." 
 
 "Without doubt," said General Ducrot, "but we 
 should lose the advantage of being able to give battle ! " 
 ■ " If you could give battle and win it, I should have 
 nothing to say, but still, there can be no real victory 
 unless the blockade is broken, that is to say unless we 
 could immediately march on a point where supplies 
 have been concentrated which could be brought freely 
 into Paris. Now this point could only be Normandy, 
 and the two hundred thousand troops from Metz are 
 already on the march to seize it ! " 
 
 General Ducrot's only answer was to assure us 
 again that it would be impossible to get the people of 
 Paris to accept an armistice without revictualling, and 
 M. Jules Favre repeated his declaration. 
 
 " Confine yourselves, then," said I, " to the announce- 
 ment that, the revictualling not being granted, the 
 armistice has been refused." 
 
 And I went on to the second question, of holding the 
 elections without the armistice. 
 
 " I believe that peace, if actually concluded, would cost 
 us Alsace, part of Lorraine, and two milliards, a cruel 
 price ; but if you wait until Paris surrenders through 
 exhaustion you will be reduced to signing a still more 
 grievous peace. I carry out my duty to my own con- 
 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE 97 
 
 science in laying the situation before you, it is for you 
 to do yours. You can choose between a well-calculated 
 resistance, which is ended the moment it becomes more 
 hurtful than useful, and the resistance of despair, 
 carried to a point where total ruin is preferred to 
 surrender. I absolutely deny that you have any right 
 to choose the latter alternative. Only France has the 
 right to decide this choice, for her fate depends on the 
 fate of Paris. Your duty, then, is to appeal to France." 
 
 " We are completely of your opinion," exclaimed both 
 my interlocutors ; " we must immediately hold the 
 elections without armistice." 
 
 I then said that if there was not to be an armistice, 
 I was authorized by Count Bismarck to give them the 
 following information. The Prussian Generals would 
 have orders to allow the elections, and to afford the 
 utmost freedom for them throughout the occupied 
 territory. Only in Alsace and Lorraine, in order to 
 prevent any election disturbances, the French Govern- 
 ment would be able to select certain leading men, who 
 would be left free to attend the Assembly when it met. 
 Certain facilities of communication would be granted, 
 and one or two persons would be allowed to leave Paris 
 to go and issue orders at Tours. The Assembly would 
 meet wherever it might please, but preferably not in 
 Paris. 
 
 M. Jules Favre undertook to lay these proposals 
 before the Government of Paris, whose answer M. 
 Cochery was to bring me next day at Versailles. 
 
 We regained the bridge at Sevres, and at four 
 o'clock I was in Versailles. 
 
 The same evening I went to tell Count Bismarck of 
 the incidents of the day. I told him that in all likeli- 
 hood the Government of Paris would not accept an 
 
 7 
 
98 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 armistice without revictualling, and that it would be 
 more disposed to hold the elections without the 
 armistice. Our conversation was brief, and I carried 
 away the impression that Count Bismarck was pre- 
 occupied by the effect, on the minds of the neutral 
 Powers, of this second rupture of negotiations for 
 the armistice. 
 
 Sunday, November 6th. — I am waiting for M. 
 Cochery. He arrives at last about noon, and brings 
 me an envelope containing two dispatches — one 
 asking me to break off all negotiations and leave the 
 Prussian Headquarters, the other addressed to the 
 Delegation at Tours. 
 
 I go accordingly to Count Bismarck's house to notify 
 him of the Government's decision putting an end to 
 the negotiation. 
 
 After expressing to me his regrets, more or less 
 sincere, he repeated that he was always ready to 
 concede full freedom for the elections, without an 
 armistice. 
 
 We took leave of each other, and he announced 
 that he would come to make his adieus in the course 
 of the evening, which he did, expressing the hope 
 that he would before long see me again to arrange 
 peace between our countries. 
 
 Monday, November 1th. — Greatly preoccupied by the 
 fact that M. Jules Favre, from his dispatch, appeared 
 not to have put before the assembled Government 
 the question of holding the elections without the 
 armistice, making use of the facilities promised by 
 Count Bismarck, and considering it a mistake to reject 
 this proposal, I determined to leave M. Cochery at 
 Versailles, with the mission to go to Paris and formally 
 propound the question at the Hotel de Ville. 
 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE 99 
 
 Count Bismarck, to whom I had spoken of this plan, 
 showed himself ready to further it, and all being 
 settled with M. Cochery for him to act accordingly, I 
 left Versailles on Monday, November 7th, at half -past 
 six in the morning. 
 
 The way was less difficult than on my previous 
 journey. Everywhere the people flocked round in the 
 villages, asking for news and expressing an eager 
 longing for peace. We got to Orleans pretty early, 
 where the Bishop greeted us with his accustomed 
 kindness. We saw a great many people there. 
 
 Next day, November 8th, as we were on the point 
 of departing, General von der Tann came to express 
 his regrets at the failure of the negotiations. He 
 told me a battle was imminent, that there had been 
 a cannonade all day long, and that we would have some 
 trouble to get clear of the outposts. When we got 
 to the outposts we found M. de Villeneuve, of the 
 Geneva Cross, who had preceded us in the morning 
 and announced our arrival. A detachment of chasseurs 
 a pied had come to meet us, and we passed from the 
 Bavarians to the French. At five o'clock we Were in 
 Tours. 
 
 All who were rational and sincerely patriotic, more 
 bent on the interests of France than on those of a 
 party, came to express their regret at the breaking off 
 of the negotiations, and their gratitude as well. The 
 majority of the Government were distressed that the 
 armistice had fallen through ; M. Gambetta alone was 
 perhaps not altogether sorry that the man he con- 
 sidered the head of the moderate party had failed 
 to succeed in his mission ; but he regretted, for the 
 sake of the army of the Loire, to be deprived of the 
 twenty-five days of the armistice. 
 
100 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 November 9th. — Battle of Coulmiers. A success of 
 excellent moral effect for the army. I should have 
 preferred that it should have been won elsewhere. 
 Orleans is a point too dangerous and too challenging 
 for the Prussians, and will bring on an immense 
 effort on their part. We must without doubt hold 
 up against it, but in holding up we expose ourselves 
 to be turned and hemmed in. 
 
 On November 12th or 13th, we hear of Russia's repu- 
 diation of the treaty of 1856. Count Bismarck goes 
 hand in hand with Russia so far as is needed to keep 
 the support of Saint Petersburg. All the diplomatists 
 here have lost their bearings. I advise the Govern- 
 ment not to write, for already they had thought of 
 a note, and to confine themselves to a verbal answer 
 to give Russia to understand that there are relations 
 to be kept with everybody ; that in the meantime we 
 shall range ourselves with whoever shows himself 
 most helpful to France. 
 
 From the 15th to the 20th November. — Public opinion 
 coming forward more and more every day in favour 
 of the elections, the Government begins to think of 
 them. M. Gambetta alone opposes. They think of 
 sending M. Glais-Bizoin to Paris in order to inspire 
 a resolution to this end. They ask Count Bismarck 
 for a safe-conduct for him, and hope to obtain it. 
 
 M. Cochery has come back to Tours four or five 
 days after I left Versailles. Count Bismarck, who 
 had seemed disposed to allow him to go to Paris, 
 had sent him to Moltke. That was on the 7th, the 
 second day before the Battle of Coulmiers. It was 
 natural that Moltke did not wish him to enter Paris 
 at such a moment, for fear lest he might bring with 
 him some intelligence that would have made it possible 
 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE 101 
 
 to arrange a sortie of the besieged, in concert with 
 the forward movement of the army of the Loire. 
 Moltke, while refusing to allow him to go into Paris, 
 offered to send him back by the East and through 
 Switzerland. M. Cochery refused. Confined to his 
 quarters for three days, he was liberated upon an 
 order of the Crown Prince and sent back via 
 Montereau. 
 
 And so M. Cochery has not been into Paris, and 
 the question of holding the elections without an 
 armistice has not been laid again before the Govern- 
 ment of National Defence. 
 
THE PEACE PRELIMINARIES 
 
 Starting from Bordeaux during the evening of 
 February 19th, to go to treat with Count Bismarck 
 upon the terms of peace, I made my first visit at 
 Versailles on Tuesday, February 21, 1871. M. Barthe- 
 lemy-Saint-Hilaire very kindly accompanied me. 
 
 I arrived at Count Bismarck's house at a quarter- 
 past one. On his chimney-piece stood two bottles 
 carrying candles, playing the part of candlesticks. 
 Count Bismarck, coming to meet me, says : 
 
 " It was not you upon whom such a task should have 
 fallen ! I do not know if France has done well by 
 you; but I know she did enormously well by herself 
 when she entrusted her destinies to you." 
 
 Before entering upon the subject we had to treat 
 of, I wished to answer his complaints about the still 
 unexploded mines that were in existence all around 
 Paris. I said that the military engineers, the civil 
 engineers, and the fleet engineers had made mines 
 and planted torpedoes pretty nearly everywhere; 
 that there was the greatest difficulty in finding them 
 again, and that I had given orders to have them 
 looked for and unloaded, in the interests of public 
 safety and in deference to the principle of the 
 armistice. 
 
 Immediately after we went on to the question of 
 the armistice and its extension. 
 
 He began by flatly refusing any extension. He said 
 
 102 
 
THE PEACE PRELIMINARIES 103 
 
 that our preparations for war were going on, witness 
 the class of 1871 which at that moment was joining 
 the various regiments. And as I had asked powers 
 to send away the men of the garde mobile mustered 
 in Paris, he added that these mobiles would go to 
 reinforce the armies, which would aggravate the 
 danger to the Prussians in case hostilities were taken 
 up again ; that the German army was ready to con- 
 tinue its operations to bring the business to an end 
 at once. 
 
 What our enemies are everywhere doing falls in 
 with this declaration. Everywhere, in fact, they are 
 crushing the country under levies which they exact 
 without respite. With two armies, each of a hundred 
 or a hundred and fifty thousand men, one of which 
 would march on Bordeaux, the other on Lyons, they 
 would willingly bring the war to an end and obtain 
 their terms as soon as possible. 
 
 I protested loudly that from to-day, Tuesday, to 
 Thursday, the end of the armistice, was only forty- 
 eight hours, and that a treaty of peace is not to be 
 made in forty-eight hours. 
 
 Count Bismarck answered that to draw up the 
 treaty was impossible without five or six weeks of 
 continuous consultation on the single point of the 
 new line of frontiers ; but that it was possible to 
 set down in a preliminary treaty the fundamental 
 conditions of peace, and this would not call for more 
 than forty-eight hours; for as regards the two 
 essentials, the question of territory and the question 
 of an indemnity, opinions in both countries must have 
 been formed. 
 
 I replied that preliminaries, however abbreviated 
 they might be, demanded time ; that I declared it 
 
104 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 impossible to conclude them in forty-eight hours, and 
 that I would not have any share in such violent 
 procedure. That I could understand it if our good 
 faith were under suspicion, and we were supposed to 
 have any idea of war in the background ; but that 
 no one could doubt my desire to make peace, if it 
 was not made unacceptable for us ; that the work of 
 summoning the new Assembly, its meeting, its con- 
 stitution had been carried out with unprecedented 
 celerity; that everything had been hurried over; 
 that I had myself done everything to avoid losing a 
 single minute ; that forming a Cabinet, especially in 
 a situation so grave as ours, with so many different 
 parties, was a most difficult task; that I had accom- 
 plished it in two days ; that I had introduced the 
 new Cabinet to the Assembly and an hour after 1 
 was on my way, travelling by night so as to get to 
 Paris sooner ; and scarcely had I arrived when I wrote 
 to Versailles to ask for an appointment to which I 
 was exactly punctual, although I had charge of all 
 internal affairs (a heavy charge in the present state 
 of our country) ; and that if I was thirty years 
 of age instead of seventy-two I could not do more; 
 that in face of conduct so clearly loyal, and I would 
 even dare to say, devoted, to shut us within so narrow 
 a ring of hours was an intolerable oppression to 
 which I would not submit, let the consequences be 
 what they might. 
 
 I had spoken with so much fire that Count Bismarck, 
 much affected, embarrassed rather than vanquished, 
 said to me: 
 
 " I am not the master. I am reproached with being 
 too weak ; the campaign against me that injured me 
 so much at Prague is begun afresh ; they say I am not 
 
THE PEACE PEELIMINARIES 105 
 
 capable of the task of reducing you to terms. In a 
 word, I have a formal command from the King not to 
 prolong the armistice and to fix the preliminaries 
 between now and Thursday." 
 
 I replied that it was surprising that he, the author of 
 Prussia's greatness, should not be the master. 
 
 " It is none the less as I tell you," he answered. " I 
 must therefore leave you to go and take the King's 
 commands." 
 
 Although I preserve a definite order, as much as I 
 can, in my discussions, we were led at this point to 
 speak of the entry of the Prussians into Paris. 
 
 " What ! " I asked. " To satisfy your pride you would 
 lay yourselves open to a catastrophe? I say catas- 
 trophe, for if Paris were sacked we should without 
 doubt be the sufferers, but you would be dishonoured, 
 and after such a tragedy no peace would be possible. 
 
 " But you will never take any but your own point of 
 view," went on Count Bismarck. " If you have to reckon 
 with the dignity of the people of Paris, I, too, on my 
 part have to reckon with the honour and glory of the 
 Prussian army, and to see that no one will be able to 
 say, as your newspapers do every day, that this army, 
 having come to the gates of Paris, did not dare to 
 enter the city." 
 
 Then attending to the letters published by General 
 Trochu, he added that the King was deeply offended 
 that he, a soldier king, should have been warned 
 against the danger of a pistol shot. 
 
 I tried to eliminate the King's pride from the affair 
 by saying that there was no personal danger to him, 
 and that, on the contrary, we should make it in a 
 fashion a point of honour not to avenge ourselves by 
 assassination; but that some fanatical persons might 
 
106 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 fling themselves on the Prussian soldiers, and that then 
 there would be a chaos in which they would lose many- 
 men, and Paris might perish. 
 
 " We should know how to repel them without sack- 
 ing the city," said Count Bismarck. 
 
 However, realizing the weak side of his pretensions, 
 he suggested to me as an expedient capable of recon- 
 ciling all claims, to allow them, by way of a guarantee 
 for the settlement of the treaty of peace, to occupy a 
 quarter in the heart of Paris — the Champs Elys^es, for 
 instance. 
 
 I pointed out that such an occupation, by reason of 
 its duration, might be still more dangerous than a 
 brief appearance of the Prussian army in Paris. 
 
 Count Bismarck did not insist, and as I felt where 
 his difficulty lay, I said that if he wished I would 
 speak to the King about it (for I desired to see him 
 to present my respects to him), and that I would try to 
 address myself to his heart and make him understand 
 how little his honour was involved in this entry into 
 Paris. 
 
 Somewhat anxious, Count Bismarck said to me : 
 
 " Without doubt you must see him, but do not press 
 him too much. Kings, you see, are not accustomed to 
 lives as toilsome as ours. At his age we must be care- 
 ful of his strength. Besides, he does not like talking of 
 affairs unless his Ministers are present." 
 
 I trembled to broach the question of the conditions of 
 peace ; however, it must be done. 
 
 " Let us come now to the great question," said I to 
 the Count. 
 
 " I have already told you my mind on the matter," 
 he replied. (At these words I hoped he would not 
 ask much more than in November.) " I do not wish 
 
THE PEACE PEELIMINARIES 107 
 
 to jockey you, it would be unbecoming. I might speak 
 of Europe, as they do on your side, and demand in her 
 name that you should give back Savoy and Nice to 
 their rightful owners. I will do nothing of this kind, 
 and will only speak to you of Germany and France. 
 I already asked you for Alsace and certain parts of 
 Lorraine. I will give you back Nancy, though the 
 Minister for War wants to keep it ; but we shall keep 
 Metz for our own security. All the rest of French 
 Lorraine will remain yours." 
 
 Count Bismarck looked at me to guess what I was 
 thinking. Mastering my emotion, I answered coldly : 
 
 " You had only spoken of the German portion of 
 Lorraine." 
 
 " Certainly, but we must have Metz ; we must have 
 it for our own safety." 
 
 " Go on," I said, waiting to know the whole extent of 
 his exactions before I should answer. 
 
 Count Bismarck then opened the question of money. 
 
 " When I saw you in November," he said, " I men- 
 tioned a sum to you. That cannot now be the same 
 figure, for since then we have suffered and spent 
 enormously. I had asked you for four milliards : to- 
 day we must have six." 
 
 " Six milliards ! " I exclaimed. " But no one in the 
 whole world could find them. It was the soldiers who 
 suggested these figures to you ; it was no financier." 
 
 The cold, determined, even scornful tone of my reply 
 put Bismarck out of countenance. 
 
 " I listened without saying a word," I said, " but you 
 are not to think I admit your demands : Alsace, Metz, 
 a French city, six milliards, all that — it is out of the 
 question ! We will discuss these terms, and to discuss 
 we must have time ; let us extend the armistice." 
 
108 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 If I had uttered a word implying an absolute 
 refusal of any cession of territory, it was immediate 
 rupture, war, disaster on disaster. I confined myself 
 therefore to refraining from accepting the claims put 
 forward, at the same time without giving the idea that 
 I rejected them. 
 
 " I will not jockey any more than you," I said finally, 
 " but I shall let you know my terms . . . and then, if 
 you demand impossibilities, I shall withdraw and leave 
 you to govern France." 
 
 With these words in his ears Count Bismarck left me 
 to go to the King to ask for an extension of the armis- 
 tice. It was granted until midnight oh Sunday, and 
 Count Bismarck informed me that the King would 
 receive me next day. 
 
 Wednesday, February 22nd. — I went on Wednesday, 
 the 22nd, to pay another visit at Versailles. 
 
 Arriving at one o'clock precisely, I went to the King's 
 quarters, at the Prefecture. He received me at once. 
 I had not seen him for more than twenty years. Our 
 interview lasted a considerable time. He laid special 
 stress on the entry of his army into Paris. 
 
 I gave the King all the arguments against this idea. 
 I was careful to avoid the suggestion of an attempt on 
 his life ; but I insisted on the possibility of a collision 
 that might bring about the sacking of Paris, from 
 which Prussian honour would have to suffer grievously. 
 
 He answered for the discipline of his army, but made 
 no promise, saying that this army, so devoted to its 
 King and to Germany, must be considered, and that to 
 forbid it the right of entry into a capital it was proud 
 to have reduced to surrender, was very hard. 
 
 From the King's quarters I went to those of the 
 Crown Prince. He touched with me on the conditions 
 
THE PEACE PRELIMINARIES 109 
 
 of peace to which we would be resigned to submit, with 
 a delicacy and kindliness, at least in appearance, that 
 gave me some hope. 
 
 I spoke to him of the entry into Paris. 
 
 He replied in a strain little differing from the King's, 
 and I left him to go to Count Bismarck. 
 
 The day was stormy. We left generalities ; and the 
 necessity of arriving precisely at facts gave rise to 
 hot discussions. 
 
 Knowing that it would be useless to try to recover 
 what was already lost, I reserved my efforts to save 
 what perhaps could still be saved, and I declared that 
 we would not give up any part of Lorraine. Metz 
 especially, which Francois de Guise disputed from 
 Charles V, was the subject of a lengthy discussion on 
 my part. I reminded Count Bismarck that in November 
 he had promised to have it given back to us. 
 
 "What was possible in November," he replied, "is no 
 longer possible to-day, after three months' bloodshed." 
 
 And he added that if we were resolved not to 
 consent to surrender Metz, it would be useless to 
 continue the negotiation, and we must break off at 
 once. 
 
 " We shall see," I replied, " whether we shall have to 
 break off; but let us go on to the other points." 
 
 Count Bismarck then, with some signs of embarrass- 
 ment, began to remind me of the sum of six milliards 
 mentioned the previous day, and described it as very 
 modest, since, he said, the mere cost of the war came 
 to four milliards. 
 
 I showed him that this was utterly impossible ; that 
 in France, where expenditure was all the time heavier 
 than in Prussia, the cost of the war in itself only came 
 to about two milliards, which we found enormous ; and 
 
110 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 that if this year we were faced with a deficit of three 
 milliards, it was because to the two milliards cost of the 
 war there must be added at least a milliard for bridges, 
 broken-down tunnels, roads to be repaired, necessary 
 indemnities, railway transport, and finally, the loss of 
 at least one-third of the year's taxes ; that in no case 
 could it be brought up to four milliards ; with six 
 milliards there would be at least three milliards 
 of profit for Prussia, which would turn the war 
 indemnity into a mere financial speculation. 
 
 Count Bismarck replied that the war had cost more 
 in Prussia than in France, because they had had to 
 bring everything from Germany. 
 
 I replied that we also had immense transport opera- 
 tions, and that besides, the Prussians had seized on all 
 the resources of our soil, and what they had taken 
 possession of on the spot was ample equivalent for all 
 the cost of their transport. 
 
 The Count seemed to set particular store by the 
 money. He declared, with some temper, that the figures 
 on which the indemnity had been calculated came to 
 him from Prussia ; that on this occasion he was only a 
 mouthpiece, etc. ; and that he could not settle anything 
 before telegraphing to Berlin. 
 
 It was agreed then that he should telegraph, and that 
 when he received the answer from Berlin, he would 
 send special envoys to treat with me on this point. 
 
 This incident terminated our interview. 
 
 Thursday, February 23rd. — We have been visited 
 by MM. Henckel and Bleischroder, Count Bismarck's 
 financial representatives, who repeated to us all he 
 had said. The discussion only dealt with the means of 
 procuring the six milliards demanded by Prussia. 
 
 We have proved to them that this financial operation 
 
THE PEACE PRELIMINARIES 111 
 
 was impossible; that so huge a sum could never be 
 obtained from European capitalists. 
 
 M. Bleischroder, more straightforward than 
 M. Henckel, understood this and almost agreed. 
 
 The same evening. — First meeting of the Commission. 
 The fifteen members being all present, I gave them a full 
 account of the negotiations. I was greatly affected, 
 and the Commission with me. It is true we were to 
 keep the greater part of Lorraine, but Metz was lost ! 
 
 I left them in my own uneasiness with regard to the 
 eastern frontier, and especially with regard to Belfort, 
 the most important point of this frontier. 
 
 As for the financial question, I said that six milliards 
 had been demanded of us, and that I would not give 
 this sum. All agreed that it was excessive ; all with 
 one accord thought and said that while resisting we 
 must none the less sign the peace, for nothing could 
 be more disastrous than to start the war again ; and 
 the Commission expressed the greatest confidence in us. 
 
 Friday, February 2ith. — This has been, assuredly, 
 the most animated and most dramatic day of this 
 grievous negotiation. 
 
 M. Kern, the minister of the Helvetian Confedera- 
 tion, a most worthy man, and of the best intentions 
 towards France, came to talk to us of our communi- 
 cations with Switzerland and the need of preserving 
 them. He exaggerated our interests in the matter, 
 for on this side the great interest lies in the military 
 frontier and Belfort above all. I advised him to go 
 without delay to Count Bismarck, and speak to him 
 of what was on his mind. He did go, and as soon as 
 he returned to Paris he came to tell us that he had 
 been very badly received and even rudely. 
 
 "What are you coming here for?" Count Bismarck 
 
112 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 had said. " What are you trying to meddle in ? 
 This is a question that is to be settled between 
 France and us ; and you neutrals are not to meddle 
 at all with it. We have laid down our conditions ; 
 they are irrevocably fixed, and we shall -not alter 
 them. If they are not accepted, the war will begin 
 again." 
 
 M. Kern was completely dismayed, and he told us 
 there was no hope, and that we must make haste 
 to draw France from the pit into which she had 
 fallen. 
 
 This report was hardly encouraging, and we set 
 out, M. Jules Favre and myself, in a very uneasy 
 mind. We were determined to present a kind of 
 ultimatum, to hold fast to it, and to make an end, 
 since the armistice expired at midnight on Sunday. 
 
 We found Count Bismarck very ill, but sufficiently 
 calm, to all appearance. 
 
 Coming back to the question of territory, we spoke 
 of Metz before everything else, Metz, the city that 
 was French par excellence. 
 
 Count Bismarck told us that he considered it highly 
 impolitic to drive France to despair, and that he had 
 opposed Count Boon's project of seizing two-thirds of 
 Lorraine, that we were to lose only a very small 
 fraction of it, but that there was no possibility of 
 leaving Metz to us. 
 
 "In Germany," said he, "they accuse me of losing 
 the battles Count Moltke has won. Do not ask me 
 for impossibilities." 
 
 It was evident that the decision on this head was 
 irrevocably fixed, and that we must reserve our 
 energies to save the eastern frontier. 
 
 We next went on to the question of the money. 
 
THE PEACE PRELIMINARIES 113 
 
 I feared that Count Bismarck might take his stand 
 upon his sum total of six milliards, and refuse to 
 abandon it. He told us, calmly enough, that he had 
 telegraphed to Berlin, that they had again insisted 
 afresh on the amount of expenditure incurred, on 
 the widows and orphans whose pensions we were 
 intended to pay, on the maintenance of the prisoners, 
 on the necessity of giving the southern states their 
 share ; but in the end that they had stopped at a 
 total of five milliards, from which they would make 
 no deduction. 
 
 I perceived that on this point a rupture would 
 probably be the result of discussion. Count Bismarck 
 was inflexible. I promised myself that later I would 
 cause all the requisitions in money levied by the 
 Germans up to that moment to be entered in this total. 
 
 And then, upon the question of Belfort, I entered 
 upon a struggle that I shall remember as long as I live. 
 Belfort, Belfort is the eastern frontier ; in fact, if the 
 Prussian troops can come by Verdun and Metz, the 
 South German troops will always come by Belfort, 
 especially if the neutrality of Switzerland is violated. 
 I spoke, then, of Belfort. 
 
 Count Bismarck said at once that this fortress was 
 in Alsace, and that it was decided that the whole of 
 Alsace should be transferred to Germany. Throughout 
 two hours, now with menaces, now with entreaties, I 
 declared that I would never let Belfort go. 
 
 " No," I cried, " I will never surrender both Metz 
 and Belfort. You mean to ruin France in her finances, 
 ruin her on her frontiers ! Well, take her, administer 
 the country, levy the taxes ! We shall retire, and you 
 will have to govern her in the eyes of the whole of 
 Europe, if Europe permits." 
 
 8 
 
114 MEMOIES OF M. THIEKS 
 
 I was desperate. Count Bismarck, taking my hands, 
 said to me : 
 
 "Believe me, I have done all I could; but as for 
 leaving you part of Alsace, it is quite impossible." 
 
 " I sign this very instant," I rejoined, " if you give 
 me Belf ort. If not, nothing ; nothing but the last 
 extremities, whatever they may be." 
 
 Beaten, exhausted, Count Bismarck then said to me : 
 
 " If you will, I shall make an effort with the King ; 
 but I do not believe it will succeed." 
 
 Immediately he wrote two letters, which he 
 dispatched, one to the King, the other to Count 
 Moltke. 
 
 " I ask Moltke," said he, " for we must get him on 
 our side ; without him we shall obtain nothing." 
 
 Half an hour passed. Every sound of footsteps 
 in the antechamber made our hearts leap. At length 
 the door opens. We are told that the King is out 
 of doors, and that Count Moltke also is not at his 
 house. The King will not come back until four o'clock : 
 no one knows when Count Moltke will return. We 
 decide to wait, for to go away without having settled 
 the question would be to lose. 
 
 Count Bismarck leaves us to go to dinner, and we 
 pass an hour, M. Jules Favre and I, in inexpressible 
 anxiety. Count Bismarck appears again. The King 
 has come back, but does not wish to decide without 
 having seen Count Moltke. Count Moltke arrives. 
 Count Bismarck leaves us to go and talk with him. 
 Their conversation seems very long to us. Count 
 Bismarck returns, satisfaction in his face. 
 
 " Moltke is on our side," said he ; " he will turn the 
 King." 
 
 A fresh wait of three-quarters of an hour. Count 
 
THE PEACE PRELIMINARIES 115 
 
 Bismarck is sent for, who goes to find out what 
 Count Moltke reports. After a long talk with him 
 he at length comes back, and, his hand on the key 
 of the door, he says to us : 
 
 "I have an alternative to propose to you. Which 
 will you have, Belfort or the abandonment of our 
 entry into Paris?" 
 
 I do not hesitate for a moment, and with a look to 
 M. Jules Favre, who divines my feeling and shares it : 
 
 "Belfort, Belfort!" I cried. 
 
 The entry of the Germans into Paris must needs be 
 a cruel blow to our pride, a danger to us who held 
 the reins of government ; but — our country before 
 everything ! 
 
 Count Bismarck rejoins Count Moltke, and at length 
 brings us the definite concession of Belfort, on con- 
 dition that we will give up four little villages on 
 the confines of Lorraine, where eight or ten thousand 
 Prussians are buried. We respect this religious regard 
 of the monarch for his soldiers. 
 
 We had left Paris at eleven in the forenoon ; we 
 leave Versailles at half-past nine at night, having 
 saved Belfort for France. 
 
 From ten o'clock until midnight we hold a sitting 
 of the Commission. We relate everything to them, 
 and receive their thanks for our efforts. 
 
 Saturday, February 25th. — The bitterest day of my 
 life ! The preliminaries of peace were to be signed. 
 
 These preliminaries had been badly drafted by the 
 Germans ; but had they even been drafted more 
 clearly, they would still have given rise to difficulties 
 of interpretation ; for it is when one is obliged to 
 come to an exact understanding of a clause in order 
 to execute it that unforeseen and unavoidable dis- 
 
116 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 agreements occur. Count Bismarck was in a hurry, 
 because the King was himself in a hurry to leave ; 
 he wanted to rush everything, little caring about a 
 wording he was certain he could turn to his own 
 advantage, ill besides, and mastered by his temper 
 worthy of a savage. 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 
 
 On February 17, 1871, at Bordeaux, the National 
 Assembly, by an almost unanimous vote, had in- 
 vested me with the executive power of the French 
 Republic. On May 24, 1873, at Versailles, this same 
 Assembly having given a majority in favour of a 
 measure that I could not accept, I resigned the power 
 I had received from it. 
 
 I am about to recount the principal acts in which 
 I took part, in the government of France, between 
 these two dates. 
 
 At the moment when I accepted the burden of 
 power, at Bordeaux, I was far from thinking that 
 we ought to renounce all hope of one day re-estab- 
 lishing Monarchy in France; but such an enterprise 
 seemed to me doomed to certain failure if it were 
 attempted in the position in which we then found 
 ourselves. The three sovereigns who had followed 
 one another — Charles X, Louis Philippe, Napoleon III 
 (especially this last, not having been willing to accept 
 the strictly constitutional system of England) — had 
 alienated independent minds and shaken the royal 
 power. 
 
 For a long time I had said to myself, "If Royalty 
 refuses to cross the Channel with us, it will drive 
 France to cross the Atlantic." And so, while regret- 
 ting that our princes had not fully carried out, as 
 it is in England, the constitutional form of monarchy 
 
 117 
 
118 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 adopted by France, I was not surprised that the 
 march of events had made a new trial of a Republic 
 inevitable. 
 
 This result, which I had foreseen, from the mistakes 
 of the preceding Governments, was when we met at 
 Bordeaux an indisputable fact that could not be 
 escaped ; for, even supposing that the various mon- 
 archical parties had been able to agree among them- 
 selves on one of the three pretenders to the crown, 
 the greatest cities in the South were in revolt and 
 Paris in the hands of two hundred thousand fanatics, 
 and these towns would never have opened their gates 
 to a king chosen at Bordeaux. 
 
 Even in Bordeaux, where at that time we only had 
 two regiments, incomplete in numbers and not very 
 reliable, to oppose to twenty thousand Republican 
 National Guards, all tinged with fanaticism, the 
 Assembly was so far from being able to attempt to 
 restore the Monarchy, that it could not have managed 
 to take the power from the grasp of M. Gambetta 
 without the energetic intervention of M. Jules Simon 
 and the other delegates of the Government of National 
 Defence, expressly sent from Paris to ensure the 
 regularity of the elections. 
 
 Besides, the Assembly so clearly recognized the 
 necessity of acknowledging the Republic de facto, 
 that it entrusted me with the supreme power, with 
 the title of Head of the Executive of the French 
 Republic — a title which provoked no protests from 
 the Royalists. Neither did they protest against my 
 language when, at the sitting of February 19, 1871, 
 I declared from the tribune in set terms that I accepted 
 power to exercise it in the name of the Republic until 
 the day when, the task of restoring the nation having 
 
PRESIDENCY OP THE REPUBLIC 119 
 
 been accomplished, France would be called upon to 
 pronounce on her future destiny. 
 
 The Monarchist parties then looked for nothing from 
 me but the re-establishing of peace and order. Prance 
 and Europe also counted on the same thing. And so, 
 less than an hour after the vote that placed me in 
 power, the ambassadors of England, Austria, and Italy 
 came to inform me of the official recognition of the 
 new Government by their Cabinets, which had acted 
 in concert to give me this sign of their confidence. 
 Their example was followed, a few days after, 
 by Russia, Switzerland, Portugal, Belgium, and 
 Turkey. 
 
 On the 18th of February, 1871, I presented to the 
 Assembly the Ministry I had just formed, which was 
 made up as follows: M. Jules Favre, for Foreign 
 Affairs; M. Picard, Minister for the Interior; 
 M. Dufaure, for Justice; General Le F16, for War; 
 Vice-Admiral Pothuau, of Marine ; M. Lambrecht, for 
 Commerce ; M. de Larcy, for Public Works ; M. Jules 
 Simon, for Education. Finance was reserved for 
 M. Ponyer-Quertier, not then in Bordeaux, whose 
 acceptance was only known later. 
 
 The armistice concluded on the 28th of January, 
 1871, between the King of Prussia and the Government 
 of National Defence, in order to allow France to elect 
 an Assembly to pronounce on the question of peace 
 or war, terminated on the 21st of February. 
 
 On the 19th, after accepting from the Assembly 
 the mission of going to discuss the preliminaries of 
 peace with the Chancellor of the German Empire, I 
 left Bordeaux for Paris, whence I proceeded to 
 Versailles on the 20th of February. 
 
 I have preserved, in notes taken after each of my 
 
120 MEMOIES OF M. THIERS 
 
 conferences with Count Bismarck the memory of this 
 negotiation in which Belfort was all I could save 
 from the demands of the conqueror. On the 26th 
 of February, the interests of France obliged me to 
 sign the preliminaries of peace. 
 
 I took advantage of this journey to come to an 
 arrangement with the Bank of France and to obtain 
 fresh advances from it ; for there was no longer 
 anything coming into the Treasury, as the Prussians 
 were collecting the taxes of the North as far as the 
 Loire, while the local administrations in the South 
 were disposing almost at their own pleasure of 
 the resources brought in by the collectors-general. 
 
 After this I went to Bordeaux, where the Assembly 
 perceived the necessity of approving the preliminaries 
 of peace I had just signed, without giving themselves 
 up to discussion and imprudent speeches. 
 
 I had left Paris in an alarming state. 
 
 M. Jules Favre wrote to me immediately after my 
 departure, saying that if I did not bring back the 
 Government to the city he would resign, and all his 
 colleagues with him ; for the revolutionary party in 
 Paris was becoming more and more difficult to 
 control, and pretended that we were staying in Bor- 
 deaux so as to proclaim a monarchy there. It was 
 daily becoming more difficult to exercise the power 
 of the State from so far off, and a prompt decision 
 on the point was essential. 
 
 It was on this occasion that differences of opinion 
 began to display themselves among the various parties 
 in the Assembly. The Right, troubled over the 
 disquieting state of Paris, would have wished not to 
 leave Bordeaux, where they also hoped to have greater 
 freedom to follow their real inclinations. At the very 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 121 
 
 most they consented to go as far as Orleans. The Left, 
 inspired by the opposite motives, would gladly have 
 gone to Paris. 
 
 By way of compromise, I thought for a moment of 
 proposing Fontainebleau as a temporary seat for the 
 Assembly; but reasons relating to military order 
 changed my intention, and fortunately so. I saw that 
 if Paris should rise, as we could not but fear, the 
 troops detached to guard the Assembly would be 
 missing from the army that would march to quell the 
 insurrection. This consideration led me to prefer 
 Versailles to Fontainebleau, as it was only four leagues 
 from the capital, and dominated it completely by 
 means of Mont-Valerien. 
 
 From Versailles, it was an easy matter to go to the 
 help of the army; if the latter were forced to give 
 way, it would find a point d'appui close at hand and 
 very solid. I proposed Versailles, therefore, though 
 naturally without giving the reasons for my preferring 
 it. I was obliged to intervene strongly between the 
 Right and the Left to make them adopt this solution 
 of the difficulty. 
 
 To the Right I explained the absolute necessity of 
 governing Paris from the nearest possible point, and 
 to the Left I said very sharply that honesty would 
 not allow me to promise the Assembly complete safety 
 in Paris. In the end I convinced both, and obtained 
 that the Assembly and the Government should' transfer 
 to Versailles on the 20th of March. 
 
 I have already, in my deposition on the insurrection 
 of the 18th of March, made before the Parliamentary 
 Commission of Inquiry, related the principal events 
 of this period. To-day I shall complete that account 
 by certain details which will display the difficulties of 
 
122 MEMOIES OF M. THIERS 
 
 every kind I had to surmount in re-establishing order 
 in the capital. 
 
 The first and greatest of these difficulties was to 
 disarm the populace, which was holding four hundred 
 and fifty thousand muskets (this was the total number 
 given up), and had taken possession of an immense 
 quantity of both siege and field artillery. To carry out 
 this perilous operation we had barely eighteen thou- 
 sand dispirited troops, partly demoralized by the 
 revolutionary ferment in the midst of which they 
 had lived during the siege. General Vinoy, a cool and 
 intelligent officer, was in command. 
 
 We settled with him, after having discussed the 
 matter in Council, that he should try, on the 18th of 
 March, in the morning, to get hold of the field artillery 
 parked by the Parisians on the heights of Belleville and 
 Montmartre. 
 
 On that date, by five o'clock in the morning, General 
 Vinoy had occupied these positions and had made 
 himself master of the artillery without striking a blow. 
 But on this occasion he failed in that keen vigilance 
 that brings success in war. The guns once taken, he * 
 should have put to the teams at once and brought them 
 away, drawing up his troops in the rear so as to assure 
 the success of his operations. 
 
 Hurrying up during the night from Versailles, I 
 reached the Staff Office, in the Louvre, where I found 
 the general. He was, he told me, absolutely free from 
 anxiety. I did not share his feeling of security. As 
 long as our guns were not taken away, and the troops 
 stayed idly round them, there was always the fear of 
 having them surrounded by a hostile crowd. Before 
 long, as a matter of fact, aides-de-camp came to warn 
 us that there were very ominous groups forming about 
 
PRESIDENCY OP THE REPUBLIC 123 
 
 the guns, and that it would be most difficult to advance 
 in Paris, with a thousand or twelve hundred horses 
 dragging artillery, through a mass of the populace, 
 packed and irritated. 
 
 I urged General Vinoy to go at once to the threat- 
 ened place, and I went to the Foreign Ministry, where 
 I had summoned the members of the Government. 
 
 There I learned that my fears were being realized ; 
 our troops, masters of the guns, could not fetch them 
 off, drowned as they were in the floods of an excited 
 multitude. At this news, trouble of mind and con- 
 fusion of opinions were speedily at the highest pitch, 
 even in the Council. General Vinoy, having sought in 
 vain to get to the central scene of insurrection, had lost 
 his usual coolness. It seemed to me then that the 
 wisest step to take was not to attempt, for the 
 moment, to bring away the guns, but to withdraw our 
 troops in good order, without a conflict, and to rally 
 them on the left bank of the Seine. General Vinoy 
 at once issued orders to that effect. 
 
 While awaiting the execution of this manoeuvre, and 
 at the advice of the Council, who thought the National 
 Guards might be of some assistance to us, the drums 
 were bidden sound the g4n4rale to bring them together. 
 If by this means we could collect twenty or even fifteen 
 thousand men prepared to act with us, we could add 
 them to the regulars, and thus having thirty thousand 
 men at our disposal, we would give battle. 
 
 While the drums went out through the Paris streets, 
 a continually increasing seditious crowd, armed with 
 muskets that had imprudently been entrusted to them 
 during the siege, swept into the Champs Elysees and 
 the Place de la Concorde. 
 
 At two in the afternoon we were still awaiting the 
 
121 MEMOIRS OP M. THIERS 
 
 return of the troops General Vinoy had recalled. At 
 last they appeared. I went to meet them, towards 
 the head of the Pont de la Chambre des Deputes, 
 emerging from which I saw, on horseback, General 
 Faron, who had brought his division off safely. Modest, 
 gentle, heroic, he had opened a passage through the 
 insurgents, even carrying off several guns in spite of 
 them. The other divisions, less deeply engaged than 
 General Faron's had been, came one after the other to 
 rally along the Seine, with their divisional artillery, 
 and our stout Vinoy, having speedily recovered his 
 coolness, was ready to carry out any orders he might 
 receive. By that time it must have been four o'clock. 
 All the vigorous and trustworthy element in the 
 National Guard having already left Paris to go and rest 
 after the fatigues of the siege, barely six hundred men 
 had responded to the g6n4rcde. We could, therefore, 
 use only the army for any action, and the army was 
 eighteen thousand strong no longer, for two or three 
 thousand men at least, set to guard distant posts, had 
 not been able to rejoin us. In these conditions, to 
 attack the insurrection would have laid us open to a 
 certain check ; the insurgents would throw up barri- 
 cades, and we would never be able to reduce them. 
 
 On the other hand, were we to stay in Paris and do 
 nothing, the moral infection would lay hold of the 
 army, which would not be long before abandoning us. 
 Retreat on Versailles was, therefore, forced upon us. 
 At Versailles we could encamp the army, reinforce it, 
 raise its spirits, and in this way presently bring it back 
 a hundred to a hundred and fifty thousand strong. 
 
 I made up my mind at once to this course ; but in 
 the Ministry there were three men of the Fourth of 
 September — MM. Jules Favre, Jules Simon, and Picard 
 
PRESIDENCY OP THE REPUBLIC 125 
 
 — whom it was hard to convince that this retreat was 
 necessary. Accordingly I decided the matter myself, 
 and had orders sent to General Vinoy, about six in 
 the evening, to recross the bridges, under cover of 
 his artillery, and to retire on Versailles by way of 
 Sevres on the one side, and by Saint-Cloud on the 
 other. I left MM. Jules Favre, Jules Simon, and Picard 
 hesitating whether to follow me or no, and, escorted 
 by some light cavalry, I bade adieu to Paris. 
 
 Reaching Versailles about the end of the day, I 
 sent for the mayor, M. Rameau, and asked him for 
 bread, meat, and straw, to feed and lodge the troops, 
 and thanks to his intelligent and patriotic energy, 
 all was speedily got ready. 
 
 It was in this wretched night that news was 
 brought to me of the assassination of General Clement 
 Thomas and General Lecomte, the two earliest victims 
 of the Paris insurrection. 
 
 Our soldiers arrived on March 19th, in good order, 
 without having been disturbed by the insurgents. I 
 had them settled, well provided with victuals, under 
 canvas in the camp of Satory. 
 
 In a week, through the recuperating influence of 
 camp life, upon which I counted, these troops recovered 
 the smartness and military spirit they had lost during 
 their stay in Paris. Presently, rallying stragglers, 
 and a regiment that had remained shut up in the 
 Luxembourg Gardens, calling up all the troops that 
 remained from the North to the South of France, I 
 managed in a fortnight to bring the strength of our 
 forces up to nearly fifty thousand men, mustered at 
 Versailles. 
 
 I have not always obtained justice from the National 
 Assembly; but this time the fortunate retreat from 
 
126 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 Paris, and the swift and solid concentration of the 
 remains of our army won me unanimous praise, and 
 MM. Jules Favre, Jules Simon, and Picard, who had 
 rejoined us, themselves proclaimed that I had taken the 
 wisest course. The Government then was rallied like 
 the army. 
 
 At the same time, in spite of this general approval, 
 the Assembly had nominated a Commission of fifteen 
 members, ostensibly to help me with its counsels, but 
 in reality to keep watch over my actions. Agitated, 
 uneasy, devising scheme upon scheme, they would 
 perhaps have prevented me from retaking Paris if 
 I had allowed myself to be guided by them. 
 
 During the fortnight that I spent in restoring the 
 soldiers' spirits and increasing their numbers, the 
 insurgents, in possession of Paris, had on their side 
 taken the forts on the left bank of the Seine, which 
 were not occupied by the Prussians : we had been 
 obliged by the necessity of concentrating the garrisons 
 at Versailles, with the exception of Mont-Valerien. 
 We could then foresee that the insurgents would make 
 an attempt on the position of Chatillon on our right, 
 and another towards Neuilly, which would give us 
 the opportunity of inflicting a check upon them, and 
 to make the army definitely take sides with us, since, 
 according to the malcontents of the Assembly, their 
 disposition was doubtful. 
 
 We arranged with General Vinoy, who summed up 
 the situation very accurately, to post one division 
 about Chatillon, another at Neuilly, keeping the bulk 
 of our forces between Versailles and Neuilly, to direct 
 it to whatever point was most seriously threatened. 
 
 In the morning of the 2nd of April, Mont-Valerien 
 having observed a troop moving on Chatillon, and a 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 127 
 
 much greater crowd upon Neufily, everything was 
 on foot. General Pell£, a brave man if ever was one, 
 seized Chatillon, which at first had been occupied, 
 and though seriously wounded, put the attackers to 
 the rout. 
 
 Reassured by telegraph as to this side, I hastened 
 to send to General Vinoy's help the troops kept as 
 reserve at Versailles and at La Bergerie, in the 
 direction of Villeneuve-l'Etang ; an imposing force 
 was thus mustered on the slopes of Mont-Yal6rien. 
 The insurgents were allowed to clear the bridge of 
 Neuilly, and deploy in the plain. The cavalry, at once 
 hurling itself on them with the utmost determination, 
 forced them to re-enter Paris. 
 
 All this was carried out with rare presence of mind 
 and vigour by General Vinoy, who in these days of 
 the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th of April decided the future 
 behaviour of the army by engaging it irrevocably 
 against the insurrection, and by making it at all points 
 victorious. From that time it was no longer the object 
 of doubt ; but it still remained to bring it to break 
 into Paris. All my efforts were directed to bring 
 about this great result as quickly as possible. 
 
 The forces at our disposal at this moment were in- 
 sufficient to undertake the siege of Paris. For that 
 it was necessary that they should be brought up to 
 a hundred and fifty thousand men, at the least. With 
 no little trouble I got Count Bismarck to give us back 
 some hundred thousand prisoners, and as he could 
 not send .them to us by the railways, which were 
 already choked up by the German troops returning] 
 to their homes, he sent them to the Hanoverian ports,) 
 where I had them fetched by all the ships procurable 
 at Brest and Cherbourg. 
 
128 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 The Bank of France advanced the Treasury the 
 necessary money to furnish arms and equipment for 
 them. Hastily I collected rifles, uniforms, and provi- 
 sions at Cherbourg, at Cambrai, at Dijon, three points 
 upon which our soldiers, as they turned into France, 
 were directed, there to be incorporated under the 
 command of Generals Ducrot and Clinchant. At the 
 same time, thanks to the activity of Captain Krantz 
 of the navy, the ports of Brest and Cherbourg sent 
 us a powerful siege artillery, with a considerable 
 stock of ammunition. 
 
 In thus making ready for the struggle with the 
 Commune, I was the real champion of order, and I 
 showed the army it .could depend on me, its oldest 
 friend and most constant upholder. And so all the 
 generals had come to offer their assistance : Douay, 
 Frossard, Montaudon, de Ladmirault, Bataille, du 
 Barail, Marshal Canrobert, and finally Marshal 
 MacMahon. This last general, healed of the wound 
 he had taken at Sedan, had settled at Saint-Germain. 
 He had a private reason for showing trust in me. 
 At the moment of the Fourth of September, when 
 a rumour was widely spread that he had just been 
 wounded, perhaps mortally, seized with patriotic 
 emotion, I sent him my card with a brief message 
 written upon it. He had thought himself ruined in 
 the public regard after Reichshoffen and Sedan. This 
 sign of sympathy from a statesman with whom he 
 had no relations had comforted and encouraged 
 him. 
 
 He had come then to visit me at Versailles, and had 
 displayed a modesty and simplicity that greatly im- 
 pressed me. At this moment, he said, all honest folk, 
 especially the heads of the army, owed me their help ; 
 
PEESIDENCT OF THE REPUBLIC 129 
 
 and without actually offering his, he added that of 
 all those whom I might ask to serve nobody could 
 refuse. My welcome encouraged him to come again, 
 and he did actually come again, and made the journey 
 from Saint-Germain to Versailles several times to come 
 to the Presidence. 
 
 As I have said before, everything was being got 
 ready for the siege of Paris. Every morning at the 
 Presidence we held a kind of council, made up of 
 Captain Krantz, chief of staff to Vice- Admiral Pothuau, 
 the Naval Minister, General Valaze\ Under-Secretary 
 for War, M. Sanson, Divisional Inspector, with General 
 Borel, the head of the General Staff, M. de Franque- 
 ville, the Director-General of Railways, and lastly 
 General Appert, who was in command of the military 
 district of Versailles. 
 
 In this council a report was made to me of what had 
 been done during the previous twenty-four hours, and 
 we decided on what was to be done during the day. 
 Thanks to the help of these intelligent, energetic, and 
 loyal men, I was able, within six weeks, to muster 
 at Versailles a solid army of a hundred and forty 
 thousand men or thereabouts, and to bring up beneath 
 the walls of Paris a numerous siege artillery with a 
 thousand rounds for each gun, an unprecedented 
 supply for attacking a fortified place. 
 
 As a result of their increase in strength I was obliged 
 to divide our forces into two armies : an active army 
 and a reserve. The reserve army, formed of three 
 divisions, had for special duty to guard the seat of 
 the Assembly and the Government, and to watch over 
 the safety of both. The active army, divided into five 
 corps, was more particularly intended for the opera- 
 tions to restore order. 
 
 9 
 
130 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 Generals de Ladmirault and de Cissey, whom I had 
 received with every consideration when they had 
 come to offer us their services, had been each given 
 command of an army corps. So with General 
 Clinchant, who had organized the troops mustered at 
 Cambrai, and who had distinguished himself with the 
 army of the East, under General Bourbaki, for smartness, 
 coolness, and common sense. I very soon had 'cause 
 to congratulate myself upon choosing him. Another 
 corps was assigned to General Douay, a former aide- 
 de-camp to the Emperor, a spirited officer and most 
 assiduous in his duties. Lastly I set General du 
 Barail at the head of the cavalry corps. 
 
 General Vinoy had up to this time shown himself 
 a vigorous commander at the head of the army of 
 Paris ; but his rank was not high enough to make it 
 possible to put both the active army and the reserve 
 army under his authority. Even supposing in capacity 
 he was equal to the Marshals at our disposal, he would 
 not have had the necessary prestige to dominate so 
 many different characters and deserts. I invested him 
 therefore with the functions of the Grand Chancellor 
 of the Legion of Honour, still leaving him at the head 
 of the army of reserve, in which post, when all the 
 corps would be acting together, he would be under the 
 orders of whatever commander - in - chief I might 
 appoint. 
 
 Marshal MacMahon, who had not ceased to come to 
 see me, but always without voicing any wish, seemed 
 to me indicated by his rank for this supreme command. 
 I offered it to him, but he replied to my proposal that 
 he was a beaten man, and his nomination could only 
 give rise to criticism. 
 
 "Beaten?" said I. "Everybody has been beaten, 
 
PRESIDENCY OP THE REPUBLIC 131 
 
 unfortunately ! And as for criticisms, it is for me to 
 answer them." 
 
 The Marshal did not persist. His consent was 
 instant. He asked for General Borel as his chief of 
 staff, an officer long accustomed to serve under him, 
 I had agreed to this, when next day General Borel 
 came to see me, and whether sent by his chief or of his 
 own accord he told me he thought it would be difficult 
 to get the Marshal and General Vinoy to work in 
 harmony, because they detested each other ever since 
 the taking of the Malakoff, each thinking that on that 
 occasion they had not been treated according to their 
 deserts. 
 
 " I must cut you short," I replied. " General Vinoy 
 has commanded the army most ably, and I will not 
 sacrifice him to any one. By treating both the Marshal 
 and the General well, by bringing them together, by 
 making them feel the interest of the State, and, if 
 necessary, the authority of the Government, I shall 
 bring them to render most useful service." 
 
 And I succeeded in this with an ease that surprised 
 me, and led me to think that General Borel had 
 exaggerated the difficulty. 
 
 In this distribution of the strength of the army 
 among chiefs of approved worth, 1 should have liked to 
 be able to find a command for General Changarnier ; 
 but his age, his feeble health, and above all, his 
 pretensions, had not allowed it, for he looked for 
 nothing less than a marshal's baton. 
 
 As I could not promote to this supreme rank the 
 generals who had just distinguished themselves 
 pre-eminently in the bloody battles of the recent war 
 against the foreigner, how could I have raised an officer, 
 meritorious without doubt, but who had not served 
 
132 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 for twenty-five years, and who had never held any 
 high command before an enemy? I could only, as a 
 token of my esteem and my personal friendship, send 
 him the grand cordon of the Legion of Honour, 
 which I did with expressions which ought to have 
 touched him. He considered this distinction below his 
 deserts, and refused it in an impertinent letter. All 
 parties were agreed in recognizing the absurdity of 
 his behaviour. 
 
 After the concentration of our forces and their sub- 
 sequent division into various army corps, it remained 
 for us to devise, with the commanders of these corps, 
 a plan of attack. 
 
 The Prussians occupied the north and the east of the 
 perimeter of Paris, from the bridge of Asnieres up to 
 Aubervilliers, in the plain, and up to Romainville and 
 Rosny on the eastern heights. As possible points of 
 attack, then, we had only the southern forts : Mont- 
 rouge, Vanves, Issy, and the edge of the Bois de 
 Boulogne. 
 
 While I was on the Council of Defence, which was 
 formed in the later days of the Empire, I had been 
 very much exercised by the danger to which Paris was 
 exposed through her insufficient fortifications on the 
 side of Saint-Cloud and Meudon. 
 
 I pointed out this weak quarter to the generals. 
 They recognized that from Saint-Cloud and Meudon 
 considerable results could be obtained against the 
 stronghold. It was proposed to arm these positions 
 with twenty cannon. I demanded a hundred. To con- 
 struct a battery of importance it was reckoned a month 
 would be needed. This was too long a delay. I had 
 heard the wealth and intelligence of M. Jules Hune- 
 belle, a contractor for public works, very highly spoken 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 133 
 
 of. I had him sent for. He got a thousand workmen 
 together and the famous battery known as the Mon- 
 tretout was finished in a week. This honest man did 
 not force us to pay for the work like a usurer, but 
 like a true patriot. 
 
 The point upon which the efforts of the attack were 
 to be concentrated being thus settled, the different 
 corps were disposed around the precincts as follows : 
 the first corps, under General de Ladmirault, a little 
 to the left of the Point-du-Jour, at Courbevoic and 
 at the Pont de Neuilly ; the fourth corps, under 
 General Douay, in the Bois de Boulogne, opposite the 
 Point-du-Jour; the second corps, under General de 
 Cissey, took up its position on the left bank of the 
 Seine, before the forts of Issy and Vanves; General 
 du Barail, with all the cavalry forming the third corps, 
 had for his task to beat up the plain from the south 
 and drive back the insurgents if they tried to come 
 out by Montrouge, as they had done at the time of 
 their attack on Chatillon repulsed, on the 2nd of May ; 
 finally, behind, in the camp of Satory, General Clin- 
 chant with the fifth corps, and General Vinoy with 
 the old army of Paris, acted as reserve for big occa- 
 sions. The whole made up, as I have said, a hundred 
 and forty thousand men actually under arms, with a 
 very numerous field and siege artillery. 
 
 The attack on the enclosure from the side of the Bois 
 de Boulogne was only possible after the reduction of 
 the fort of Issy, whose fire would have enfiladed our 
 trenches and been excessively troublesome. I pro- 
 posed to batter it with sixty and even eighty heavy 
 guns. 
 
 Except General de Berckheim, every one was doubtful 
 whether this unusual concentration of means of attack 
 
134 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 could bring the advantages upon which I reckoned — 
 that is to say, silence the fire of the besieged garrison, 
 make their position untenable, open a breach without 
 the assistance of a breaching battery, and allow the 
 besiegers to break into the fort without undergoing 
 the dangers of an assault. 
 
 On the 26th of April the attack opened with forty 
 and afterwards sixty pieces. Towards the sixth day, 
 every piece (only two of which had been put out of 
 action) had fired three to four hundred rounds, which 
 proved that our provision had by no means been ex- 
 cessive, as had been pretended at first. During this 
 unceasing cannonade General de Cissey, without losing 
 any time, had boldly opened his trenches, which, under 
 cover of the guns, were driven with astonishing speed 
 up to the very foot of the walls. At length on Tuesday, 
 the 9th of May, our soldiers, seeing the fort was abso- 
 lutely silent, turned it, and finding the gate open, 
 perceived that it was abandoned. 
 
 Thus, in accordance with my expectation, by dint of 
 artillery alone, our soldiers had succeeded in getting 
 hold of the fort, without having had either to open 
 a breach or to expose their lives in an assault. The 
 news of this put an end to the rumours which evil- 
 wishers were spreading about our supposed daily 
 defeats, and the impossibility of the final success of 
 our enterprise. 
 
 While I was devoting my days, and my nights very 
 frequently, to preparing the means of subduing Paris 
 by force, without neglecting those that might occur of 
 penetrating into the city without violence, I was not 
 spared parliamentary embroilments. One day in par- 
 ticular M. Mortimer-Ternaux, one of the most restless 
 of the Orleanists in the Assembly, questioned me 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 135 
 
 on the communications I had held with the Paris 
 Commune. 
 
 Now these communications were as follows: 
 
 Many persons, sometimes very excellent people too 
 (the courageous and honourable Schcelcher was one of 
 them), would have liked to obviate the punishment that 
 awaited the members of the Commune, among whom 
 they counted misguided friends of their own ; others 
 were afraid lest the Republic should be carried away 
 into a civil war. Both these parties, seeking for a way 
 to put an end to the struggle with the insurrection, 
 came to tell me they hoped to persuade the heads of 
 that insurrection to yield, if I did not make conditions 
 too severe for them. I made the same reply to all. 
 
 " Do you come in the name of the Commune ? I 
 have no ears for you ; I do not recognize belligerents." 
 
 "No," they would answer, "we come in our own 
 names, to prevent the shedding of blood. Assure the 
 heads of the Commune that their lives will be spared, 
 and promise us that the army will not enter Paris ; on 
 these conditions we promise to have the struggle 
 brought to an end." 
 
 " I have no conditions to accept and no engagements 
 to make. The reign of law will be established in Paris 
 absolutely, and the guilty, whoever they may be, shall 
 be submitted to that law. As for the army, in France 
 it is everywhere at home ; it will enter Paris in a body 
 and will plant the tricolour where the red flag has 
 flown. Paris will be as much obedient and submissive 
 to the power of the State as a hamlet of a hundred 
 inhabitants." 
 
 Such invariably was my reply. 
 
 To these well-wishers who came and went were 
 added the representatives from the large towns : 
 
136 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 mayors or municipal councillors from Lyons, Marseilles, 
 Grenoble, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Nantes, etc., etc. They 
 held Paris to blame, they said, and would give up all 
 idea of joining her if I would assure them that I was 
 not the instrument of a plot hatched in the Assembly to 
 do away with the Republic. 
 
 For these my reply was as plain and outspoken as 
 for the former. I told them that doubtless there were 
 in the Assembly members who favoured the restoration 
 of the Monarchy ; but there was no plot to overthrow 
 the existing Constitution, that in any case if there 
 were such a plot I would not lend myself to carry 
 it out. 
 
 They withdrew fully persuaded of my good faith ; 
 to that conviction I owed the inaction of the great 
 towns — that is to say, the safety of France and society ; 
 for if we had been forced to detach fifteen or twenty 
 thousand men from the army of Versailles in order 
 to restrain Lyons, Marseilles, Toulouse, Bordeaux, we 
 should never have got into Paris. 
 
 It was in these circumstances that on the 11th of 
 May M. Mortimer-Ternaux questioned me as if I had 
 betrayed the cause of order, while I was wearing myself 
 out in efforts to defend it. 
 
 Indignant at so much ingratitude, I answered the 
 question harshly, and demanded an immediate vote 
 of confidence, which I obtained by five hundred votes, 
 even though my heat had provoked the Assembly to 
 some displeasure. 
 
 The taking of the fort of Issy by General de Cissey, 
 which happened on the 9th of May, having delivered us 
 from the fire that would have spoiled our principal 
 attack from the side of the Bois de Boulogne, it had 
 become possible to begin this attack. A council of war 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 137 
 
 was held on this subject on the 12th of May at the 
 Pr^sidence. There were present: Marshal MacMahon, 
 Generals de Ladmirault, de Cissey, Vinoy, Le Brette- 
 villois, Clinchant, du Barail, Douay, de Courville (of 
 the Engineers), Princeteau (of the Artillery). 
 
 There were no two sides to take as to the manner of 
 attacking. The regular and classic methods of a siege 
 were to be used ; that is to say, we should open a trench 
 in the Bois de Boulogne, before the gates of Auteuil, 
 Saint-Cloud, the Point-du-Jour, which was to fall 
 to General Douay on the right. At the same time 
 General de Ladmirault would on his left bombard 
 Neuilly and l'Etoile, and General de Cissey, seizing the 
 fort of Vanves as he had the fort of Issy, would begin 
 his approach works against the part of the circuit 
 that fell to his charge. It was fully understood that 
 the great battery of Montretout would continue its 
 fire against the circuit, as much to protect General 
 Douay's approach works as to destroy the means of 
 defence. 
 
 Unfortunately, a regular attack by trenches must be 
 slow, too slow to please the Assembly, and specially 
 Prince Bismarck, who threatened to take action himself 
 if we did not move more rapidly. For that reason we 
 had thought of buying entrance through one of the 
 gates of Paris. Every day somebody came to offer us 
 a gate for one or two millions. The go-betweens of 
 these bargains always said they were sent by the 
 principal leaders of the Commune. Greed brought 
 them, but the fear of being shot by the insurgents 
 prevented their ever coming to a definite proposal, 
 which could not prevent some members of the 
 Assembly from pretending that with five hundred 
 thousand francs I could enter Paris without striking 
 
138 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 a blow, but that I wanted the glory of taking it by 
 force of arms, were I to sacrifice never so much 
 precious life. 
 
 Once only was a plan that seemed feasible suggested 
 to me by a very bold fellow who went in and out of 
 Paris every day. I promised the reward after the 
 service was done, and everything was arranged for, 
 I think, the night of the 13th of May. 
 
 At midnight, General de Ladmirault stole down into 
 the Bois de Boulogne by Courbevoie and noiselessly 
 took up a position close to the gates of la Muette and 
 Auteuil. General Douay at the same hour left his 
 trenches and posted himself near the Passy gate. 
 Carefully selected troops of police, followed by engi- 
 neers, were to come up to the gate that had been 
 indicated and promised to us, and the moment it was 
 opened they were to fling themselves through it, over- 
 power the post, then divide half to the right, half to 
 the left, to go and seize the two neighbouring gates 
 and open them to the army. 
 
 The whole of Vinoy's reserves were put in motion. 
 There were eighty thousand men hidden in the Bois 
 without any one having heard the slightest sound. 
 The weather was clear, but cold. I spent the night 
 in the Bois with General Douay, waiting for the 
 signal. We waited in vain. 
 
 At four o'clock the Marshal, who was at the cedar 
 between the two lakes, sent word to me that as the 
 day was drawing near, he thought he ought to order 
 the retreat, fearing lest his troops might be riddled 
 with grapeshot as they withdrew. I approved, and 
 the retreat was achieved in good order ; we did not 
 even have a man wounded, though before daybreak 
 some volleys of grape had been fired at us. 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 139 
 
 I went back to Versailles, arriving at seven in the 
 morning. Very little was known of this adventure. 
 None the less, a report went about that we had lost 
 heavily in a night attack. 
 
 As for those who were to sell the gate that was 
 not delivered, they pretended that one of them had 
 been shot, that all of them narrowly escaped the 
 same fate, and that it was no fault of theirs if the 
 siege of Paris had not ended that night. 
 
 There was another way to penetrate into Paris by 
 surprise, which we went into carefully with the 
 Marshal, so great was our desire to avoid blood- 
 shed. The Prussians were witnesses to our efforts, 
 and showed themselves disposed to further them. 
 Established at Saint-Denis, they held the railway 
 that ended at this part of the circuit of Paris, and 
 offered to hand it over to us. But as we could not 
 consent to accept the help of the foreigner to re- 
 establish order at home, we had to keep to the plan 
 of attack by main force agreed upon in our council 
 of war on the 12th of May. 
 
 The very day of our bootless vigil in the Bois de 
 Boulogne, General Cissey informed me that he had 
 just made himself master of the fort of Vanves, and 
 that, delivered now from the fire of Vanves and of 
 Issy, he was about to attack the circumvallation 
 immediately so as to make a breach in it. This 
 new success won us an increase of confidence from 
 the Assembly. 
 
 Every day of this week, from the 14th to the 21st of 
 May, I passed my time now in the batteries of Montre- 
 tout, now with those of General de Cissey, where the 
 danger, thanks to the superiority of our guns, was not 
 very great. We could see, at the end of the week, that 
 
140 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 the walls would shortly be accessible, and it was agreed 
 that on Sunday, the 21st of May, we should assemble 
 in council of war at Mont-Valerien to fix the day for 
 a general assault. 
 
 I left Versailles, then, on Sunday, the 21st of May, 
 at three in the afternoon, to go to Mont-Val6rien. 
 Already I was at the base of the slope leading to the 
 fort, when an officer, coming up at the gallop, told me 
 that General Douay would not be with us, as he was 
 engaged in entering Paris. 
 
 Filled with this unexpected news, I made my horses 
 go quicker, and reaching the fort, I found the Marshal 
 and General de Ladmirault already informed of it, the 
 latter seeming at ease, though perhaps a little vexed 
 not to be the first to enter Paris. As for the Marshal, 
 who never left the telescope directed upon the Point-du- 
 Jour, he suddenly exclaimed : 
 
 " We are repulsed ! " 
 
 His words moved me extremely, and I ran to one of 
 the telescopes to see with my own eyes what was going 
 on. I did actually see, at the gate of the Point-du-Jour, 
 soldiers coming out, but calmly, in no hurry, with 
 nothing that seemed like flight. Captain Krantz, who 
 had a very sure eye, and who also had a telescope, 
 answered : 
 
 "Those fellows are not in flight. We are not re- 
 pulsed ; but they are carrying out some manoeuvre that 
 we cannot understand from here." 
 
 These words, which tallied with my own impression, 
 were speedily confirmed by the movements of other 
 soldiers obviously proceeding towards the door ; it was 
 impossible then to believe in a check. Joy came back 
 to my heart and all our hearts, including General de 
 Ladmirault's. 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 141 
 
 A quarter of an hour after all doubts were at an end. 
 We saw what might have been two long black snakes 
 winding along in the folds of the ground, present their 
 heads at the gate of the Point-du-Jour, through which 
 they entered. It was a division from General Douay's 
 corps, which, master of the circumvallation, was 
 entering in two columns. 
 
 The fire from Montretout had demolished the Point- 
 du-Jour gate, the debris of which and of the drawbridge 
 had filled the ditch in a way that made a practicable 
 passage. All firing from the fortress had ceased: our 
 soldiers, always daring and inquisitive, jumping up on 
 the breastwork of the trenches, had seen a man on the 
 abandoned rampart waving a handkerchief. 
 
 This was the famous Ducatel who, animated by an 
 honest and courageous zeal, had gone forward thus far 
 and was signalling to our soldiers the possibility of 
 entering. The men had run to the broken gate and 
 had penetrated within the fortifications, passing over 
 the broken timbers of the drawbridge. The General 
 had entered with them, and finding some deserted field- 
 guns, he had sent to fetch shells for them. This was 
 the explanation of the movements to and fro of the 
 soldiers going in and out, which had made us so uneasy 
 for a moment. 
 
 It was time to leave Mont-Val^rien in order to dis- 
 patch the whole army through the gate General Douay 
 had just opened. This was a matter for the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief. We arranged with the Marshal then 
 that he should go without delay and put himself at the 
 head of De Ladmirault's corps and Douay's, while I 
 should go to Versailles to send him all Vinoy's and 
 Clinchant's troops and to pass General de Cissey, who 
 also had made a practicable breach in the fortifications, 
 
142 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 the order to enter Paris and occupy the quarters on 
 the left bank. 
 
 Arriving at Versailles, where I had been preceded 
 by the news of our success, I informed General de 
 Cissey of the events of the day and the orders of 
 Marshal MacMahon. At the same time, with the 
 commissary Sanson and Captain Krantz, I gave and 
 superintended the carrying out of the order to trans- 
 port sufficient provisions and straw for the soldiers' 
 temporary camp. After dining with my family and a 
 few friends who shared my joy, I slept a little. At 
 two in the morning of Monday, the 22nd of May, I set 
 out once more for Paris, where I entered at three 
 o'clock by the Point-du-Jour gate. On the way I had 
 passed lines of wagons full of stores for the army. 
 
 Moving off to the left, I met the columns of our 
 troops entering by the Auteuil and the Passy gates, 
 and I saw the Marshal preparing to establish his head- 
 quarters on the heights of the Trocadero, from which 
 he could easily send help towards any point that might 
 be threatened. 
 
 We were a little afraid of falling into a trap at the 
 Trocadero : the immense stock of powder stored in the 
 cellars of Passy, they said, might blow up the whole 
 advanced division of the army. Ducatel declared that 
 nothing of the kind need be feared, and to prove his 
 sincerity he marched some paces in front of General 
 Douay. Our uneasiness only came to an end when we 
 learned that General Douay was safe and sound, and 
 had seized the Trocadero without striking a blow. 
 We heard also that General de Ladmirault, having 
 reached the Arc de Triomphe in the Etoile, was 
 engaged in the Champs Elysees. His difficulties were 
 to begin in the Place de la Concorde, all the exits to 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 143 
 
 which were barricaded with masonry. On his side, 
 General de Cissey, operating on the left bank, was 
 penetrating into the Faubourg Saint-Germain. 
 
 From this moment there only remained a barricade 
 war throughout the whole of Paris, during which I 
 had little to do but watch over the comfort of the 
 army while it was shedding its blood for France. I 
 decided therefore to return to Versailles. 
 
 It was still night when I had entered Paris. As I 
 left the city day was breaking. I was passing through 
 the Bois de Boulogne, now a mere heap of broken 
 rubbish, when I saw coming towards me a confused 
 crowd of men and women of every age, in the strangest 
 costumes; they were held in check by soldiers, who 
 were driving them before them. These were insur- 
 gents who had been taken prisoner and were being 
 brought to Versailles. Their faces still displayed the 
 fury of the fight, the despair of defeat. Ruin and 
 hate ! — that is all that civil discords leave behind 
 them. 
 
 As soon as I arrived at Versailles I went to inform 
 the Assembly of the army's entry into Paris. During 
 the sitting of May 22, 1871, they unanimously testified 
 their satisfaction and gratitude in the following 
 resolution : 
 
 " The Assembly declares that the land and sea forces, 
 and the Head of the Executive Power of the Republic 
 have deserved well of their country." 
 
 The anxieties of the siege were followed by those of 
 guarding and maintaining the prisoners, whom it was 
 urgently necessary to place at a distance from the 
 scene of the struggle. We expected from forty to fifty 
 thousand of them, criminal for the most part, but even 
 so to be humanely treated. I had enclosures got 
 
144 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 ready in the dep6t at Satory, in the barracks, in the 
 orangery of the Chateau de Versailles, covered as far 
 as possible, and straw, bread, and water were brought 
 into them ; there we shut in these poor people, sur- 
 rounded with guns to keep them in order ; for there 
 was not a soldier left in Versailles, all having been sent 
 to Paris except about a thousand gardiens de la paix 
 and a battalion of picked gendarmes charged with the 
 safety of the Assembly. 
 
 When I think of the almost superhuman efforts 
 demanded of me by the struggle against the insurrec- 
 tion and its consequences, when I compare my devotion 
 to the task of restoring order with the scanty gratitude 
 since shown me, I find once more confirmed the 
 philosophic precept that the satisfaction of doing well 
 is, in this world, the only certain reward for duty done. 
 
 The struggle against the Commune, from the entry 
 of the army into Paris, resolved itself into a suc- 
 cession of street fights, in which the army, con- 
 tinually undergoing point-blank fire without any 
 chance to return it before clearing the barricades, 
 took furious vengeance on the vanquished, as soon 
 as they were in its grasp. I issued most severe 
 orders in the endeavour to restrain the soldiers' 
 wrath, and the Marshal on his part did all he could 
 to prevent bloodshed. Unhappily, this street battle 
 lasted a whole week, from the 21st to the 28th of May ! 
 
 On the first date we occupied the Faubourg Saint- 
 Honore, the Place Vendome, and the Place de la Con- 
 corde ; the barricades here being taken in the rear. 
 Ladmirault's corps, on the left, rolled along the ram- 
 parts up to Montmartre, which, also taken in the rear, 
 offered hardly any resistance. On the right, de Cissey's 
 corps swept over the Faubourg Saint-Germain as far 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 145 
 
 as the Pantheon: in this quarter the struggle was 
 heavy, and cost several heads of the insurrection their 
 lives. 
 
 Suddenly a terrible sight struck the whole army, 
 and all the honest and peaceable population left in 
 Paris, with blank amazement and horror. Tremen- 
 dous flames shot up from the Tuileries, the Palais- 
 Royal, the offices of the Legion of Honour, the Cour 
 des Comptes, the H6tel de Ville, the Ministry of 
 Finance. The insurgents, in their criminal rage, 
 seeing Paris falling through their hands, wished to 
 leave us nothing but ruins. They had dashed paraffin 
 over the walls and on the inside of all these public 
 monuments, and set them on fire as they were forced 
 to withdraw before the army. The Louvre and its 
 priceless collection only escaped destruction through 
 the devotion and courage of their keeper, M. Barbet de 
 Jouy, aided by a few of the attendants who stood man- 
 fully by their post. Barely another hour and many 
 of the greatest works of human genius would have 
 been lost for ever. 
 
 In the midst of these dramatic scenes every day 
 increased our cruel anxiety as to the fate of the 
 hostages. The Archbishop of Paris, Monsignor Darboy, 
 M. Deguerry, the Cure of the Madeleine and the best 
 of men, President Bon jean and Grustave Chaudey, 
 Republican guards and gendarmes, a great number 
 of priests, Jesuit fathers and Dominican fathers, had 
 been seized by the insurgents, put behind lock and 
 key and proclaimed hostages. 
 
 We had often been approached with the proposal 
 to exchange the notorious Blanqui, legally held in 
 a State prison, against some of these hostages, if 
 we wished to save them from certain death. The 
 
 10 
 
146 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 proposal and the threat were so monstrous that I 
 could neither accept the one nor believe in the other. 
 
 One day, however, among the letters addressed to 
 the Government, there was one which Monsignor 
 Darboy had written in the agitation of the most 
 cruel anguish to implore me to consent to this 
 exchange. I was deeply moved, shaken by this 
 letter. The Ministerial Council, to which I com- 
 municated it, nevertheless remained inflexible ; for, 
 said they, besides the scandal that would arise from 
 the bargain, the creation of such a precedent would 
 entail one of the gravest dangers. If we were to 
 embark upon this course, the most infuriated of the 
 Communards would lift their hands against all the 
 most distinguished people left in Paris to effect an 
 exchange for the worst malefactors. 
 
 In these painful circumstances I thought it my 
 duty to have recourse to the Committee of Fifteen, 
 which, as is already known, had been instituted by 
 the Assembly to help the Government, at need, in 
 the business of the insurrection, and I asked its 
 advice, after laying before it a full account of the 
 situation, and reading it the letter from the Arch- 
 bishop of Paris as well as letters from other unfor- 
 tunates who had fallen into the hands of the most 
 implacable partisans. 
 
 The Committee was greatly affected by the read- 
 ing of these letters, especially that of Monsignor 
 Darboy. Nevertheless, they were unanimous in de- 
 claring that it was impossible to accept the proposed 
 bargain, and their reasons were, the same that had 
 decided the Council as a whole. 
 
 This double unanimity put an end to my hesitation, 
 but not to my anxiety. I was still buoyed up by the 
 
PEESIDENOY OF THE EEPUBLIC 147 
 
 hope that the gaolers of the unfortunate hostages 
 would shrink from the execution of so great a crime, 
 or that we might perhaps arrive in time to prevent it. 
 
 In the meanwhile I gave back threat for threat, 
 and declared that the heads of the murderers would 
 answer for those of their victims. It is easy to 
 understand, when such pledges remained in such hands, 
 with what dolorous interest I watched the prolonging 
 of this struggle, which followed from day to day, 
 going to the different posts of the army and marshals' 
 staff quarters. 
 
 On Friday, the 26th of May, we were very close upon 
 the final deliverance of Paris from her oppressors, 
 so rapid had been the army's progress. Unhappily, 
 as the insurgents retired before us they always took 
 the hostages with them and shut them up in prisons 
 farthest away from our sphere of action — that is to 
 say, near Belleville and Charonne. 
 
 On Saturday evening, May 27, we were at the foot 
 of these heights, and on Sunday morning the naval 
 brigade at the head of the attack carried the last 
 barricades with irresistible dash. 
 
 Alas ! penetrating into the prison of la Roquette, 
 they found the hostages there no longer! The in- 
 surgents had murdered them : Gustave Chaudey on 
 the 23rd of May, at Sainte-Pelagie ; Monsignor Darboy, 
 President Bon jean, M. Deguerry, and three other 
 priests, on the 24th of May, at la Roquette. 
 
 At the same time we learned that at another point 
 in Parish in the Rue Haxo, ten priests or members 
 of religious orders, thirty-five gendarmes, and two 
 other prisoners had been put to death. After the 
 burning of Paris, the massacre of the hostages ! The 
 Commune had kept its word. 
 
148 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 The struggle once over, we had to see about open- 
 ing the city gates, which had been militarily shut 
 as in the siege by the Prussians, re-establish com- 
 munications by rail, bring in provisions, carry away 
 the wounded, bury the dead outside the walls, facili- 
 tate the return of the various authorities, of all the 
 heads of commerce and industry, in a word restore 
 to its place everything that had been violently torn 
 from its place, and bring back order and life to 
 this great body overthrown from head to foot. 
 
 Under the orders of clever M. Alphand, who for 
 twenty years had been in charge of the public works 
 of Paris, thousands of workers swept away the bar- 
 ricades, restored the thoroughfares, and as far as 
 possible effaced all the vestiges of insurrection. We 
 took advantage of the overthrow of demagogy to 
 order a general disarming of the people. 
 
 This order, carried out without resistance, brought 
 50,000 rifles into our hands ! . . . I also had the can- 
 'nons seized, and of these we found about two thousand, 
 (part of which were put back in the forts, another 
 part on the square of the Chateau, at Versailles, 
 and the rest returned to the arsenals. At the same 
 time I was occupied with the question of the prisoners 
 shut up at Versailles, where it was impossible to keep 
 them any longer, in places that were both cramped 
 and hard to watch over. 
 
 I formed the plan of sending them to different 
 parts, and having them kept under guard in hulks, 
 as the English had done already with prisoners of 
 war. \ 
 
 Thanks to the diligent labours of Captain Krantz, 
 in a few days the old warships at Cherbourg, Brest, 
 Lorient, were anchored and arranged so as to accom- 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 149 
 
 inodate nearly 40,000 prisoners. We sent down all 
 the clothing, of poor quality but clean and whole- 
 some, which had been bought for the troops in the 
 recent war; with this we clad these ragged fellows. 
 We gave them the same rations as our sailors them- 
 selves, and on certain occasions, when we had fears 
 of typhus, they received wine and coffee. The English 
 Press, always very well informed, declared that greater 
 humanity had never been exercised towards greater 
 criminals. 
 
 All minds were tranquillized, and Paris, into which 
 foreigners were coming in great numbers, seemed 
 born again. However, bent as we were beneath the 
 weight of our misfortunes, we could not think of 
 giving fetes. One only, for the army that had be- 
 haved so admirably, was natural and justified. I mean 
 a great review. Besides, the recent and extraordinary 
 success of the loan of two milliards, with which I 
 had just been occupied, and the reawakening of French 
 industry had brought back hope to every heart. This 
 review, then, could only confirm these happy omens. 
 Fixed for the 12th of June, and several times put off 
 on account of bad weather, it was held at length 
 on the 29th of June, precisely a month after the 
 taking of Paris. 
 
 The army that took part in this review counted a 
 hundred and twenty thousand men, not yet in new 
 uniforms, but in real war equipment, their bearing 
 confident and proud from having forced the walls of 
 Paris that had defied the Prussians. Never had a 
 hundred and twenty thousand men been seen 
 assembled for a military fete. They were drawn up 
 in the Longchamps racecourse, in the Bois de Boulogne, 
 in a fashion terraced on the huge slope that rises, in 
 
150 MEMOIKS OF M. THIERS 
 
 front of the race stands, right up to the edge of the 
 wood. The infantry were massed in the centre, and 
 a numerous artillery and something like fifteen thou- 
 sand horse were placed along the front and supported 
 the wings. 
 
 I took my place with the ministers in the central 
 pavilion of the racecourse, with the President of the 
 National Assembly on my right. The seats on the 
 right were occupied by the deputies, and on the left 
 by the Diplomatic Corps and the chief functionaries of 
 the State. Satisfaction beamed on every face, like 
 the joy of a convalescent in a sunny day. And I 
 myself at that moment found the burden I carried 
 not so heavy as usual. 
 
 Marshal de MacMahon galloped down the front of 
 the troops ; then, surrounded by a large staff in 
 campaigning array, he came and took up his position 
 before the central pavilion. The march past then 
 began. That army, which had been called un- 
 disciplined, that was thought incapable of manoeuvring, 
 marched by with admirable precision and in perfect 
 step. At every moment the spectators, carried away 
 by enthusiasm, broke into wild cheering, especially 
 when there passed a regiment that had won special 
 mention in the war. 
 
 The hour advanced, for a march past of a hundred 
 and twenty thousand men is a lengthy operation, and 
 we must make haste. The guns then went off in 
 close order at the trot, the cavalry at the gallop, with 
 General du Barail at their head, and all these rapid 
 movements, carried out in concert, presented a mag- 
 nificent spectacle. The Marshal then came to salute the 
 benches of the Assembly and the Presidential party; I de- 
 scended to shake him by the hand, and the fete was over. 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 151 
 
 Returning to Versailles, I brought all the heads of 
 the army together at a great dinner. The greater 
 part of the Assembly, without distinction as to right 
 or left, came to the reception that followed. Every- 
 thing then went off in the best possible fashion on 
 this good day for France. 
 
 Although order was restored and the demagogy 
 reduced to impotence, we could not disband the army 
 of Paris, and that for three important reasons : it 
 was essential to remain strong at all times in face of 
 the revolutionary party, as the only way of keeping 
 it in awe ; we had also to keep an imposing force 
 before the Prussians, if we wished to escape from 
 the position in which we had been recently, that of 
 a nation reduced to yield on every occasion ; finally 
 this army of Paris was the beginning of the permanent 
 formation with which I intended to lay the chief 
 foundation of our military reorganization. 
 
 The army of Paris remaining intact, it was but just 
 that the supreme command should still be in the 
 hands of Marshal de MacMahon, as the reward of the 
 services he had just rendered. It was this considera- 
 tion of justice that prevented me for the moment 
 from yielding to my desire to offer a command to 
 General Canrobert, whose intelligence and loyalty I 
 fully appreciated. General Borel, when I told him 
 of my intention, appeared to doubt whether his chief 
 would accept, which astonished me a little. The 
 Marshal afterwards came to see me, doubtless having 
 been apprised of my conversation with General Borel. 
 Laying aside his extreme reserve, he opened the sub- 
 ject that was on his mind, and thanked me for my 
 arrangements with regard to him ; but the position 
 I had made for him ceased, he thought, to be justi- 
 
152 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 fied after the taking of Paris ; it was a burden 
 upon the State ; it would be attacked ; in a word it 
 was better for him to retire. All this was said 
 modestly and with the same attitude as the day on 
 which I had made him the proposal to place him at 
 the head of the army. 
 
 I gave the Marshal the reasons I have enumerated 
 above, assuring him that they would be universally 
 approved. He appeared touched at my insisting and 
 did not persist in refusing. 
 
 It still remained to give the other chiefs of the 
 army the rewards they had right to look for from 
 the Government ; then we should have to put the 
 insurgents of the Commune on their trial, and above 
 all to give the Prussians money so as to get them 
 out of our territory as quickly as possible. 
 
 But before occupying myself with these various 
 matters, I had to make a very necessary change in 
 the composition of the Ministry. M. Picard could no 
 longer hold the portfolio of the Interior. Continually 
 complaining of the Press, which was very severe upon 
 him, he made it a cause of quarrel with M. Dufaure, 
 the Minister of Justice, who, he said, did not defend 
 him simply to keep on good terms with the news- 
 papers ; and he had in the end exasperated his 
 colleague to such a point that I had several times to 
 intervene so as not to be exposed to receive the 
 resignation of a man like M. Dufaure. General Le 
 F16 could not be kept in the War Office either. This 
 excellent officer would have commanded a division 
 to perfection, but as an administrator he was less 
 useful. 
 
 I have never been able, without regret, to sever 
 myself from men who have worked with me, and 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 153 
 
 especially to sever myself from them without in- 
 demnifying them. I nominated M. Picard Governor 
 of the Bank of France ; but he preferred the less 
 arduous post of French Minister in Brussels. General 
 Le F16 was well satisfied to accept the Russian embassy. 
 I must next think how to replace the two departing 
 Ministers. M. Lambrecht passed from the Ministry of 
 Commerce to that of the Interior. At Bordeaux I 
 had entrusted him with the portfolio of Commerce, 
 after an acquaintance that went back fifteen years 
 and had taught me to appreciate him. He belonged 
 to a wealthy and important family in the North. 
 Grave and gentle in character, he was infinitely 
 distinguished in every way, endowed with unusual 
 powers of reason, and the greatest political tact, and 
 he would have spared me many difficulties if he had 
 lived. M. Victor Lefranc took his place at the Ministry 
 of Commerce. A Republican of long standing, a witty 
 and copious speaker, and knowing how to make 
 friends, he was at this time much liked in the 
 Assembly. 
 
 The vacancy at the War Office still had to be filled. 
 I had to bear in mind very varying needs in matters 
 concerning the highest places in the army. Generals 
 de Ladmirault and de Cissey, after distinguishing them- 
 selves at Metz, had displayed high military qualities 
 during the siege of Paris. Not being able in the 
 present circumstances to make them marshals, I sought 
 other means of rewarding their services. I summoned 
 General de Cissey to the War Office, and General de 
 Ladmirault was named Governor of Paris, the second 
 post in the Army. General Montaudon received the 
 command of the 1st Corps, a position he had deserved 
 by his singular bravery. The 2nd Corps, now vacant, 
 
154 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 fell to General Bataille, an intelligent, energetic officer, 
 a good man to employ in war. General Valaz^, no 
 less deserving, went back to Rouen at his own request, 
 to command the division there ; lastly, Captain Krantz, 
 whose brains as well as his energy had proved most 
 useful to us, was promoted to be rear-admiral. 
 
 After the reconstruction of the Ministry, the arrange- 
 ments were made for the trial of the forty thousand 
 insurgents guarded in the hulks at Brest and Cher- 
 bourg. It was said that, as the prisoners were taken 
 en masse, many of them were the victims of mistakes ; 
 and there was no lack of deputies from all parties 
 to bring forward claims that were sometimes well 
 founded. 
 
 We sent then to Brest and Cherbourg sixty Com- 
 missioners and several members of the Military Bar, 
 charged to examine all these claims and to let us 
 know all cases of mistakes they might find proven. 
 As a consequence of their report we were able to 
 take out of the hulks and set at liberty some ten or 
 twelve thousand prisoners, adjudged less deeply com- 
 promised than the rest. 
 
 There were still thirty and some odd thousands left. 
 It was impossible to grant them an amnesty; that 
 would have been against all human conscience, since 
 beyond doubt those responsible for the massacre of 
 the hostages were among this number. Failing an 
 amnesty, there were only two courses to be taken — 
 either to transport them in a body, without a trial, 
 to some distant colony, or else to try them all one 
 by one. 
 
 As for transporting them in a body, an extraordinary 
 law would be needed ; for it was a matter of inflicting 
 punishment on accused persons without establishing 
 
PEESIDENCY OF THE EEPUBLIC 155 
 
 their guilt. As for trying them individually, it 
 involved the inconvenience of tossing back into the 
 streets of Paris all — and they would be a great many 
 — whose guilt might not, for lack of evidence, be 
 proved. But this latter alternative had the immense 
 advantage of being in accordance with the common 
 law, and since we desired to restore respect for the 
 law it was proper to begin by respecting it ourselves. 
 And so the Council was unanimous in the opinion that 
 all the prisoners should be sent before a military court, 
 the only one competent to know all the truth of the 
 insurrection. Twenty-two councils of war were there- 
 fore set up in the division of Paris, and many officers 
 were selected from among the most capable to set on 
 foot and maintain the criminal prosecutions. 
 
 This matter put in order, we had to think of that 
 which was becoming the most urgent of all : I mean 
 the question of finance. In the execution of the peace 
 preliminaries signed at Versailles the Prussians had 
 very urgently pressed us to conclude the final treaty 
 without delay. It was their right, and our interest. 
 If by the preliminaries of Versailles we had obtained 
 the evacuation of Paris and all the left bank of the 
 Seine from the forts to Alencjon, le Mans, Tours, and 
 the southern part of the C6te d'Or, the German army 
 was still occupying the forts on the right bank of 
 Seine, at Paris, as well as Normandy, Picardy, Flanders, 
 Champagne, Franche-Comte, and Burgundy. We had, 
 then, the greatest possible interest in determining and 
 fulfilling, as quickly as possible, the conditions which 
 would allow us to decrease this huge occupation. For 
 this reason M. Jules Favre, Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, and the Minister of Finance, M. Pouyer- 
 Quertier, were sent to Frankfort, where they signed 
 
156 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 the formal treaty of peace on the 10th of May, 1871, 
 with Prince Bismarck and Count von Arnim. 
 
 In the treaty it was stipulated that of the five 
 milliards of the indemnity three could not be demanded 
 before the 2nd of March, 1874. The first two would be 
 paid on the following conditions of maturity : 
 
 1. Thirty days after the defeat of the Commune: 
 half a milliard, immediately followed by the evacuation 
 of the Somme, Seine-Inferieure, and the right bank 
 of the Eure. 
 
 2. On the 31st of December, 1871, a milliard, with 
 the evacuation of the Oise, Seine-et-Oise, Seine-et- 
 Marne, and the Paris forts on the right bank. 
 
 3. Finally, on the 1st of May, 1872, a fourth half 
 milliard would free the departments of the Aisne, the 
 Aube, the C6te d'Or, the Haute-Saone, the Jura, and 
 Doubs. 
 
 The German army would continue to occupy the 
 six departments of the Marne — Haute-Marne, Ardennes, 
 Vosges, Meuse, Meurthe-et-Moselle, and the district of 
 Belfort — as a pledge for the last three milliards still 
 to pay. 
 
 Still five hundred thousand strong, this army was 
 to refrain for the future from all requisitions, or 
 levying of taxes, and would be maintained at the 
 expense of the French Government at certain agreed 
 rates. Its strength would be gradually reduced in 
 proportion to the restoration of order and the fulfil- 
 ment of our obligations. 
 
 To these stipulations were added all the customary 
 ones regulating the lot of the inhabitants of the 
 annexed territory. Furthermore, it was agreed that 
 the section of the eastern railway that lay within the 
 departments annexed to Germany should become the 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 157 
 
 property of the German Government against a sum 
 of three hundred and twenty-five million francs, to be 
 deducted from the second instalment of five hundred 
 millions. 
 
 Lastly, by the terms of Article 6 in the peace 
 preliminaries signed at Versailles on the 26th of 
 February, 1871, our soldiers who were detained as 
 prisoners in Germany should have been sent back 
 at once and in full numbers immediately upon the 
 ratification of that treaty. In spite of this express 
 stipulation Count Bismarck had only sent them back 
 little by little and with a deliberate slowness. Our 
 negotiations at Frankfort obtained that this return 
 of the soldiers should be more in conformity with 
 our rights. 
 
 This treaty, which had been greatly discussed, was 
 an immense relief to us : but it obliged us to pay 
 fifteen hundred million francs in 1871 — that is to say, 
 within eight or nine months. It was necessary, then, 
 to attempt without any delay a first trial of our credit 
 by raising a loan without precedent in its dimensions, 
 as well as by the difficulty of the circumstances in 
 which it was undertaken. 
 
 To further its success, I resolved to ask the 
 Assembly to decide to make it by public subscription 
 and in 5 per cent, stocks. Public subscription was a 
 method of borrowing whose popularity with capitalists 
 had already been proved many times by experience ; 
 and it was matter of common knowledge that the 
 rate of 5 per cent, would be the most suitable for 
 the small investor. Besides, 5 per cent, offered the 
 borrowing administration no distant opportunities of 
 an advantageous repayment, while giving lenders a 
 considerable remuneration between the price of this 
 
158 MEMOIRS OP M. THIERS 
 
 repayment and the price of issue. As for the issue 
 price, it could only be fixed on the eve of the opening 
 of the lists and in accordance with the state of the 
 money market at that moment ; but I calculated that 
 it would mean not less than 6 per cent, interest on 
 the money actually invested. 
 
 For these reasons, on the 6th of June, 1871, I laid 
 before the National Assembly the draft of a law 
 authorizing the Government to raise by public sub- 
 scription a loan of two milliards five hundred million 
 francs in 5 per cent, stocks. 
 
 The five hundred millions, added to the two milliards 
 of war indemnity payable in 1871, were meant to pay 
 the interest due or falling due on this indemnity, and 
 to cover the expenses of the subscription as well as 
 all other necessary expenses of the operation. 
 
 To enjoy so great a credit, and in the not very 
 distant future a still greater credit, it was necessary 
 to describe on what guarantees we thought ourselves 
 justified in relying. When I subscribed at Versailles 
 to the financial demands of Germany I knew that 
 France was well able to carry the increased burdens 
 laid on her by war and defeat ; and before asking a 
 credit of five milliards on her behalf I had studied and 
 recognized as solid the bases upon which the equi- 
 librium of her receipts and her expenditure could be 
 established. 
 
 The Empire, before its last disasters that had become 
 ours, had brought us to a financial state in which the 
 receipts rose to about two milliards, to cope with more 
 than two milliards of ordinary expenditure. That 
 meant a deficit. To conceal this and give us an appear- 
 ance of prosperity by showing an excess of receipts 
 over expenditure no account was taken either of 
 
PEESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 159 
 
 departmental expenditure, which should have figured 
 in the ordinary budget, or of other charges that were 
 wrongly carried on the so-called extraordinary budget. 
 If these tricks, planned to create belief that the situa- 
 tion was better than it was in reality, were discarded, 
 we might calculate the receipts and the normal expendi- 
 ture of France before the war as about two milliards. 
 
 I had taken these figures as the starting-point of 
 our future budgets. From the declaration of war to 
 the signing of peace the public debt had increased 
 by about eight milliards, the interest on which must 
 be added to the two milliards of normal expenditure 
 before the war. 
 
 Here are the details of this increase in the public 
 debt, both in capital and in interest : 
 
 Wak Expenditure. 
 
 1. Magne Loan raised under the Empire at the beginning 
 
 of the war 
 
 2. The Tours Loan 
 
 3. Contribution of the Departments for the mobilized 
 
 troops and stocks 
 
 4. Loan from the Bank of Prance at 1 per cent. 
 
 5. To be paid to the Eailway of the East for the value of 
 
 the part of the line ceded to Germany ... 
 
 6. War Indemnity at 6 per cent 
 
 7. War Indemnity at 5 per cent 
 
 Total 
 
 It was proper to add to these three hundred and 
 fifty-six millions of interest a strong sinking fund, 
 if we did not wish our credit to be crushed by the 
 vastness of the debt that would weigh upon us as 
 a capital sum. I boldly determined to ask for two 
 hundred millions for a sinking fund. 
 
 There were, then, five hundred and fifty-six millions 
 
 Millions of Francs, 
 
 Capital. 
 
 Interest. 
 
 u 6 
 
 800 
 
 30 
 
 210 
 
 15 
 
 ea 
 
 200 
 
 10 
 
 ... 1,500 
 
 15 
 
 of 
 
 
 325 
 
 16 
 
 ... 2,000 
 
 120 
 
 ... 3,000 
 
 150 
 
 ... 8,035 
 
 356 
 
160 MEMOIRS OP M. THIEES 
 
 of taxes to strike in order to balance receipts with 
 expenditure, except perhaps a reduction might be 
 made under some heads in the budget, a reduction 
 whose dimensions could not as yet be estimated. 
 
 Never before had such an increase of burden been 
 imposed upon a nation at a single stroke ; but as this 
 increase was the condition of our resurrection, I 
 hesitated the less in taking it as the basis of my future 
 proposals to the Assembly, that I had assured myself 
 by a very careful examination of all our taxation that 
 it was not beyond the strength of France. 
 
 This examination had proved to me that the fees 
 of ^registration and stamps could be doubled without 
 any fear of exhausting this source of revenue. By 
 imposing an increase of 30 to 50 per cent, on the 
 duty on sugar, wines, coffee, alcohols, and 20 per cent, 
 in the case of tobacco, there would be no danger of 
 decreasing the great consumption of these articles. 
 The postal service could endure without any incon- 
 venience the same surcharge of 20 per cent. ; a 
 duty on railway transport would be most fruitful, 
 and its collection very simple if it was made by the 
 company's employees. 
 
 These various surcharges or creations of taxes had 
 the advantage of producing no new inconvenience, in 
 their shape, and no noticeable increase in the cost of 
 collection. For this reason I preferred them to new 
 taxes whose mere novelty would have made them 
 vexatious and not very productive. I meant, then, to 
 reject all innovations, except the tax on railway 
 transport and on paper, which have been successful, 
 and the tax on matches, which so far has hardly 
 brought in as much as we expected. 
 
 These various resources, which might be valued at 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 161 
 
 three hundred and fifty millions, were still about two 
 hundred millions less than the budget needed. The 
 Left had its method all ready for establishing the 
 balance of the budget — an income-tax. 
 
 This tax would be the fairest of all, if there were 
 any sure way of calculating the means of each tax- 
 payer, but for this valuation we have only the 
 declaration of the taxpayer himself, too insecure a 
 foundation to build a tax upon, or else an inquisition 
 into private fortunes by Treasury officials, an odious 
 and arbitrary method. An income-tax would be a 
 tax full of discord, and the experience of England 
 and Italy in the matter is not conclusive, as the 
 conditions in which it is established in each country 
 are very different from those in which it would be 
 established in France. I was, then, resolved to resist 
 it with all my energy, and the Council readily yielded 
 to my views. 
 
 I looked upon it also as very imprudent to load the 
 land with fresh burdens. Land is the eternal drudge : 
 it pays for all local follies and those of Governments 
 as well. A tax on salt, easy to collect it is true, would, 
 like the land tax, have been endured by the country 
 people. But it was wise not to exhaust in advance 
 these last resources, for one can never be sure that 
 fresh mistakes may not bring about new extremities. 
 
 Income-tax, any increase of the taxes on landed 
 property and on salt, being removed from my fore- 
 cast, there remained only raw materials to bring us in 
 the two hundred millions still needed to balance our 
 budget. This tax, which for a long time had yielded 
 considerable sums without being burdensome, had 
 only been abolished when M. Rouher, captivated by 
 the theories of Free Trade, had tried to suppress all 
 
162 MEMOIES OP M. THIERS 
 
 taxes on foreign goods. Without inconveniencing 
 those on whom it fell, without increasing the costs of 
 collection, it could bring in perhaps two hundred 
 millions. Upon this head there was no element of 
 the unknown to fear, since the experience of gener- 
 ations guaranteed the reality of the results on which 
 we reckoned. We had only to fear the resistance 
 of the great manufacturers, a resistance which I had 
 resolved to combat with all my power so as to raise 
 the fortunes of the State once more. 
 
 On these bases it was possible to strike the budget 
 without too many fiscal innovations, without too 
 heavy sacrifices, and with a strong sinking fund. 
 There was still a burden to foresee and to set down 
 outside the budget : expenditure which I made the 
 foundation of what has been called, on my suggestion, 
 the liquidation account. This account had nothing 
 in common with the old budget extraordinary of the 
 Empire. I need only carry under this head expendi- 
 ture which once made would not be repeated, such 
 as the repairing of our strongholds, the replacing of 
 war material that had been lost or spent or grown 
 obsolete, the maintenance of the army of occupation, 
 and indemnities for certain localities that had been 
 damaged by the war, such as Paris, for example. 
 The debit side of this account might be calculated at 
 four or five hundred millions, and the assets at two 
 hundred, actually consisting of stocks held by the 
 State, and the balance of the estimated expenses of 
 the loans. We had at least three years to meet 
 these expenditures ; it was easy to leave them to 
 the floating debt without calling upon our credit. 
 
 Our financial position for the future was therefore 
 reassuring, if the Assembly was willing to take the 
 
PEESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 163 
 
 path I would point out to it. It was reassuring also 
 for the present ; for the taxes, which after our 
 defeats had been collected by the Germans, or abused 
 by being spent uselessly, to-day were coming regularly 
 and intact into the Treasury. Lastly, industry, which 
 since the restoring of order had been springing up 
 afresh, was bringing public prosperity back with it. But 
 there was still a great uneasiness in many minds, for the 
 day of meeting the war bills was much dreaded. 
 
 My speech before the Assembly on the 20th of 
 June, 1871, on behalf of the law authorizing the loan 
 of two milliards proposed by the Government, calmed 
 these anxieties. It had a great effect upon the 
 Assembly, and particularly on the world of finance. 
 Relying on the calculations, the forecasts, and the 
 considerations I have given above, I showed that 
 supposing a reduction of a hundred and fifty to two 
 hundred millions in expenditure feasible, our next 
 budgets would carry four hundred and fifty millions 
 (including, it is true, two hundred millions for the 
 sinking fund) more than the two milliards of normal 
 expenditure shown by the last budgets of the Empire. 
 I would therefore have to ask the Assembly for 
 nearly four hundred and fifty millions of new 
 resources ; we could certainly obtain this by increas- 
 ing several existing taxes and taxing raw materials, 
 for I absolutely rejected a tax on income. 
 
 Within the four corners of this budget, and in case 
 of urgent need, we could have recourse to the floating 
 debt now reduced to six hundred and fifty millions, 
 the lowest figure it had reached for thirty years, or 
 to the Bank of France, whose patriotic help in the 
 critical circumstances through which we were passing 
 I took some pains to signalize. 
 
164 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 The clearness and straightforwardness of my ex- 
 planations convinced the Assembly, who at the same 
 sitting, and without a dissentient voice, voted for the 
 law authorizing Government to contract a loan of 
 two milliards by public subscription, in 5 per cent, 
 funds, and two hundred and twenty-five millions 
 over and above to defray the cost of the operation. 
 
 The time granted by the Treaty of Frankfort for 
 paying the first five hundred millions of the indemnity 
 was to expire on the 30th of June. The vote of the 
 National Assembly authorizing the loan being given on 
 the 20th, we had barely ten days left to enable us to 
 meet our obligations. I did not doubt that the loan 
 would be covered with a wide margin ; but the 
 Financial Minister, M. Pouyer-Quertier, a man of very 
 uneven temper, by turns excessively confident or 
 anxious without any reason, as the moment came 
 near for the test, had hours of extraordinary agitation 
 which sometimes, I confess, he infected me with. 
 Without any fear of mistake, we could reckon on the 
 public subscription rising to a milliard, for already it 
 had covered, and more than covered, loans of eight 
 hundred millions. But it had never been tried for two 
 milliards, and if we failed, "what a catastrophe ! Our 
 credit would be ruined, and with it our deliverance 
 brought to naught. For this reason I accepted the 
 proposal, made by the most powerful banking houses 
 in Paris, to guarantee the second milliard for a com- 
 mission of twenty odd millions. The rate at first 
 appeared excessive ; afterwards, on calculating what 
 it would cost the bankers to procure the half milliard 
 or whole milliard not subscribed, if the loan was not 
 wholly covered, I found the claim less exaggerated. 
 This combination had a still further advantage : it 
 
PEESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 165 
 
 gave the bankers a direct interest in our success. We 
 were about to give battle with our allies well satisfied, 
 and subscribers, encouraged by their example, would 
 come boldly forward. 
 
 There was only one other point to settle, the price 
 of the issue. When great companies issue capital, 
 this price is determined by the demand. On the con- 
 trary, when a public subscription is opened, no bidding 
 is possible, and it is the Government that fixes the 
 issue price, from the current interest for capital in 
 the money market at the moment of the operation. 
 A close study of this market and the opinion of men 
 most competent to judge led the Government to think 
 that it would be proper to offer interest at about 6 
 per cent., which brought the issue price to eighty-two 
 and a half. 
 
 Decided between M. Dutilleul, the Directeur du 
 mouvement general des fonds, M. Pouyer-Quertier, 
 and myself a few hours before the printing of the 
 Journal Officiel, the figure was not known to any one 
 before the distribution of this gazette, which at the 
 same time, the 23rd of June, announced the opening 
 of the subscription lists for June 27th. Every- 
 thing had to be improvised. The Finance administra- 
 tion had not yet been transferred to Paris, on account 
 of the burning of the official building by the Com- 
 mune. Hastily the " direction de la mouvement des 
 fonds " was installed in the house of the Minister of 
 State under the Empire, that is to say, in the Louvre, 
 and the wickets for the subscription were set up in 
 the Palace of Industry. The Finance Ministry camped 
 where it could. 
 
 On the 26th all was more or less ready, and from 
 early morning on the 27th subscribers flocked to the 
 
166 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 wickets. Their eagerness was not to be compared 
 with what they displayed the following year for the 
 loan of three milliards ; but already it was very great 
 and showed perfect confidence in the general situation. 
 From hour to hour we had most reassuring news, 
 and though I had never entertained any serious doubts, 
 I was profoundly satisfied at having a proof that 
 France, if carefully governed, would find the necessary 
 resources to raise herself again. 
 
 Before the end of the day the Paris subscription 
 had overpassed the sum of two milliards five hundred 
 thousand, and the wickets were then shut. Next day 
 to this total was added one milliard two hundred and 
 fifty millions subscribed in the provinces, and one 
 milliard one hundred and three or four millions in 
 foreign countries, which brought the sum offered by 
 capitalists to France up to four milliards eight 
 hundred and ninety-seven millions : more than two 
 and a half times the amount asked for ! An excellent 
 beginning to reassure us for the appeals we should 
 still have to make, and before very long, to both 
 French and foreign capital. 
 
 The loan was to be paid in sixteen equal monthly 
 payments, starting with July, and the first payment 
 exacted as guarantee had yielded three hundred and 
 twenty-three millions ; anticipated payments from sub- 
 scribers who wished to pay in advance, at a discount, 
 raised the amount to eight hundred and forty-seven 
 millions, in the month of July, and four weeks later, 
 with the August payment, the Treasury had received 
 a total sum of one milliard three hundred and four- 
 teen millions. For the country it was a marked 
 triumph of its wealth, its patriotism, and the proof 
 of the high confidence it reposed in the Government. 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 167 
 
 Henceforth there was no uneasiness as to the pay- 
 ments to be made to the Prussians. The first of these, 
 fixed at five hundred millions, having been made on 
 the 15th of July, the departments of the Somme, 
 Seine-Inferieure, and the Eure were on the 22nd of 
 the same month freed from foreign occupation, and 
 the towns of Rouen, Amiens, and Evreux sent me the 
 most touching messages of gratitude. 
 
 Europe was struck with the marvellous rapidity 
 with which we rose up again after our disasters. 
 Here I should say a word as to the disposition of the 
 Great Powers towards us. 
 
 Russia, though always held by the affection of the 
 Emperor Alexander towards his uncle, now become 
 Emperor of Germany, began to find a cause for dis- 
 quiet in the developing power of her neighbours. 
 Neither did she forget her old jealousy of England, 
 kindled afresh every day by events in Central Asia. 
 She therefore looked upon France as a useful and 
 probable ally in the future. 
 
 As for Prussia, I was very excusably sinning in 
 occupying myself in organizing the army; but as I 
 was paying punctually, while keeping order and not 
 encouraging rancour in France, the German Govern- 
 ment was only exacting on the question of proper 
 securities for the full payment of our debt. 
 
 As for Austria, the Emperor, his family, and the 
 army applauded our efforts and wished the recovery 
 of France, which might one day be a necessary 
 counterpoise to Prussia. But we could not win the 
 sympathy of the Hungarians, who reproached us with 
 our friendly relations with Russia, nor that of the 
 Austro-Germans, who naturally, through pride of 
 kinship, ranged themselves with our conquerors 
 
168 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 Besides, the ruling minister in Austria, Count Andrassy, 
 was favourable to Prussia. 
 
 In England, the nation, just and friendly, would 
 not have liked to see Prussia become so great, nor 
 France so weakened : it watched our regeneration 
 therefore with deep interest ; and if Mr. Gladstone and 
 Lord Granville had no great leanings towards us, 
 they were none the less determined not to allow any 
 fresh violence in Europe on the part of the Prussians. 
 
 Lastly, Italy, knowing that I had taken my own 
 view, regretfully indeed, of Italian unity, was grateful 
 to me for pursuing a firm and friendly policy towards 
 her that alone perhaps could hold her back on the 
 slope towards an alliance with Prussia. We were, then, 
 looked upon as a Power to be reckoned with. 
 
 Not to interrupt my outline of the Government's 
 financial schemes, schemes approved by the Assembly 
 on the 20th of June, and sanctioned by the confidence 
 of the subscribers to the loan on the 27th of the 
 same month, I have said nothing of the sitting of the 
 8th of June, in which two questions of no little 
 political interest had been settled : one with regard 
 to the abrogation of the laws of 1832 and 1848, which 
 had exiled the elder line of the Bourbons and the 
 Orleans princes ; and the other which concerned the 
 ratifying of the elections at which the departments 
 of la Manche, Haute-Marne, and the Oise had sent the 
 Prince de Joinville and the Due d'Aumale to the 
 Assembly. 
 
 The Orleans princes, immediately upon the Fourth of 
 September, had hastened back to France, inspired by 
 patriotism certainly, but also to take advantage of 
 the chances the fall of the Empire might offer for the 
 return of their dynasty. I would have preferred this 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 169 
 
 family to any other, if I had thought a monarchy 
 possible at the moment. But Republicans and Legiti- 
 mists, together a great majority in the Assembly, 
 would have opposed it, and any attempt I might have 
 made to assist this restoration would, on my part, 
 have been not only a want of loyalty towards Legiti- 
 mists and Republicans, but also the violation of my 
 duty to Prance, for my mission was to bring peace to 
 her by preventing party conflicts. I did not hesitate, 
 therefore, as far as lay with me, to discourage the 
 aspirations of the Orleans princes, aspirations they had 
 manifested by asking for the abrogation of the laws 
 condemning them to exile, and the ratification of their 
 elections. 
 
 The avowed partisans of the princes in the Assembly 
 were numerous. The monarchist Right Centre, which 
 only accepted the conservative Republic for want of 
 something better, was not sorry to have a chance of 
 casting a monarchist vote ; the Legitimists, thinking 
 of a possible fusion of the two lines, did not wish to 
 offend the Orleans princes by voting against them ; 
 lastly, the Moderate Left itself, out of respect for its 
 principles, found that the title of Prince was no reason 
 that could be allowed to invalidate the choice of uni- 
 versal suffrage. It was clear that with this disposition 
 among the parties, the Assembly would vote for the 
 abrogation of the exiling laws and the ratifying of the 
 elections. 
 
 The sitting of the 8th of June, 1871, in which these 
 questions were to be discussed, naturally attracted 
 a great number of curious onlookers, and when the 
 Commissioners had made their reports I asked leave 
 to speak. 
 
 I declared that I could not share the favourable 
 
170 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 disposition of a great number of the members of 
 the Assembly towards the conclusions of these reports. 
 The Republic, I said, charge of which I had accepted, 
 was and must be in my eyes the public peace, which 
 might well be compromised if at this juncture we 
 allowed the representatives of dispossessed or broken 
 Governments to reside in France, most of all if we 
 allowed them to exercise political rights. 
 
 Under all the preceding forms of government, I 
 had upheld this opinion, and to-day the members of 
 the Constituent Assembly of 1848 knew the price 
 France paid for refusing to listen to my advice on this 
 point. At the same time, as the Orleans princes 
 had assured me that they would not appear in that 
 Assembly, and would not justify any of my apprehen- 
 sions, I believed I might give up my opposition to 
 the proposed law. 
 
 The findings of the reports being immediately put 
 to the vote, by a great majority the Assembly 
 abrogated the exiling laws of 1832 and validated the 
 two elections. 
 
 After this vote, the Government had to concern itself 
 with the numerous elections needed to complete the 
 Assembly, in which one hundred and seventeen seats 
 were vacant through deaths, resignations, and most 
 of all, multiple elections. The troubles of civil war, 
 now in one province, now in another, had not allowed 
 these vacancies to be filled as they arose. But since 
 these difficulties were past, the Government summoned 
 the electors. At the same time it decided not to inter- 
 pose in the elections : in the first place because it had 
 no interest in so doing, its popularity in the country 
 being still unimpaired ; then because many members 
 of the Cabinet, who in the days of the Empire had 
 
PEESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 171 
 
 protested against official candidatures, feared lest they 
 should be accused of inconsistency if they allowed a 
 Government of which they formed part to interfere 
 in electoral contests. 
 
 For myself, outside such procedures as those of the 
 Empire during the time of official candidatures, I did 
 not admit that a Government should remain indifferent, 
 idle, dumb, in the midst of a crisis so grave for a free 
 country as that of a general or even a partial election. 
 At the same time, since there was no pressing need for 
 us to play an active part, I issued orders to the prefects 
 at the opening of the period of the elections, not to 
 interfere with the canvassing of the candidates. They 
 obeyed the order whole-heartedly. 
 
 The voting took place on the 2nd of July, and the 
 chosen candidates, almost without exception Moderate 
 but still Republican, gave the impression that France 
 accepted the Republic if order was assured. This 
 tendency of public opinion met with apparent resigna- 
 tion among the Monarchists in the Assembly, and filled 
 the Republicans with hope. 
 
 The latter, after the abrogation of the exiling laws, 
 also wished to have their success ; and as the last 
 elections had reinforced them with a round hundred 
 votes, they dreamed of having the Republic formally 
 proclaimed. 
 
 Already before the taking of Paris they had asked 
 me to insist on this proclamation. 
 
 " I cannot," I had replied, " submit a proposal of such 
 importance to the Assembly, at a moment when the 
 menace of the insurrection might hamper the freedom 
 of its deliberations. Besides, the present condition 
 of things, though it bears the name of a Republic, is 
 still merely a Government of order and security, to 
 
172 MEMOIKS OF M. THIERS 
 
 which every party can give its adherence without sacri- 
 ficing its own opinions. On the eve of an assault that 
 must be desperate and bloody, we must not tell our 
 generals and officers, who are not all Republicans, that 
 they are mounting the breach to lay the foundations 
 of the Republic Leave them the satisfaction of the 
 thought that if they expose themselves to death, it is 
 for the welfare of society, and not to ensure the 
 triumph of a party." 
 
 The failure of this attempt on the part' of the Left 
 was known, and the Moderate section of the majority 
 was grateful to me for it. But after the last election 
 and its manifestations, it had become difficult wholly 
 to turn a deaf ear to these fresh solicitations of the 
 Republicans. Without going so far as the proclamation 
 of the Republic, many Moderate members of the 
 Assembly recognized the necessity of giving the execu- 
 tive power certain guarantees of duration and stability, 
 which it needed in order to undertake or to finish the 
 great matters it had in charge. With this thought 
 they laid before the Assembly, on the 12th of August, 
 1871, a proposal which took the name of its promoter, 
 M. Rivet. 
 
 This proposal, without binding the future by an 
 untimely proclamation of the Republic, without impair- 
 ing the sovereignty of the Assembly, tended simply to 
 strengthen the executive power and give the country 
 more security. But the Assembly insisted on seeing in 
 it an intention of encroaching on their rights, and it was 
 under the sway of this notion, whether pretended or 
 sincere, that they nominated the committee that was to 
 report upon the Rivet proposal. 
 
 This report was entrusted to M. Vitet. He drew it up 
 in terms excellent for me ; but his findings could only 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 173 
 
 be inspired by the feeling of the majority of the 
 committee. At the same time, he cleverly held out 
 against their uncompromising attitude, and did not 
 absolutely reject the proposal. 
 
 The two great divisions of the Assembly, the Left 
 and the Right, the party of the Republic and the 
 Monarchical party, in a long and heated discussion all 
 but came to a decisive conflict, as though it were a 
 matter of solving immediately and for ever the great 
 question of the government to be given to France. 
 Happily, MM. Leon de Malleville, Ricard, Rivet, Picard, 
 and myself on the one side, and MM. Casimir Perier 
 and Vitet on the other, succeeded in soothing these 
 ardours of the Left and the Right. 
 
 To begin with, the proposal to give me the title of 
 President of the Republic was adopted. The problem 
 of how long my powers were to continue was a delicate 
 one to solve. A very happy solution was arrived at, 
 which was that their duration was to be the same as 
 that of the Assembly itself. If it had been less, they 
 would have seemed to fix a date to be rid of me ; if 
 longer, the Assembly would have been acting ultra vires 
 in legislating for a time when it would no longer be in 
 existence. 
 
 The Organists on the Committee would have wished 
 to paralyse my influence on the Government by hin- 
 dering my access to the tribune ; but the Assembly 
 sanctioned my right to take part in all parliamentary 
 debates, on the sole condition that I should inform the 
 President, by a message, of my intention to avail 
 myself of this right, and in a word affirmed anew my 
 responsibility to itself. 
 
 These decisions were made at the sitting of the 
 9th of August, 1871, at which I was present. After two 
 
174 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 speeches from the Right, M. Picard had made it felt 
 that in the face of services rendered and still to be 
 rendered, the duty of all was to rally to my augmented 
 powers ; and it was with this in mind that a majority 
 of four hundred and ninety-one voices to ninety-four 
 accepted the Rivet proposal, modified in the way I have 
 described. 
 
 To sum up,|this form of Constitution would confer on 
 the head of the State the title of President of the 
 Republic ; it fixed the term of his power by making it 
 coeval with that of the Assembly; lastly, by a new 
 arrangement it made the President's participation in 
 parliamentary debates more formally authenticated 
 than ever in the past. 
 
 Immediately after this vote I established, by a 
 decree, a Vice-President of the Ministerial Council, 
 to satisfy those who believed it would be a useful 
 measure. He would preside over the Council if the 
 President of the Republic should be prevented from 
 attending, and if by the latter 's death the supreme 
 power should be vacant, he would inform the Assembly 
 what steps to take under the circumstances. 
 
 Shortly before the voting upon the Rivet Constitu- 
 tion, a change had come about in the Ministry. 
 M. Jules Favre, an acrid speaker, but excellent at heart, 
 in whom, by some strange phenomenon, violent speech 
 was joined to the greatest sweetness of nature, 
 wished to leave us, and to my great regret had 
 left us on the 22nd of July, 1871. For some time 
 he had been affected by the attacks of which the 
 men of the Fourth of September were the object. They 
 came from Bonapartists and Organists and Legiti- 
 mists alike, who never forgave them, the one party for 
 having opposed the Empire, the others for opposing 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE EEPUBLIC 175 
 
 the restoration of royalty. And yet M. Jules Favre's 
 character, so kind, so lofty, his generous devotedness 
 when he signed the capitulation of Paris and the Peace 
 itself, without hesitating over his inconsistency in 
 adding his name to mine at the foot of the Treaty of 
 Versailles — all these considerations might well have 
 imposed silence upon the parties. It was not so, and 
 before a last attack, which struck against what was 
 dearest of all to him, his children, he resigned, in order 
 to be unhampered in the prosecution he meant to 
 bring against his slanderer. 
 
 Of three men of the Fourth of September who were 
 part of the Ministry, two, MM. E. Picard and Jules 
 Favre, had resigned of their own accord before the 
 attacks of their political opponents. M. Jules Simon 
 alone remained, and all the efforts of the Monarchists 
 were now united against him. However, he was strong 
 enough to defend himself, thanks to his profound 
 cleverness and his singular capacity, and I was deter- 
 mined not to abandon him. For the present I had 
 only to find a successor to M. Jules Favre. 
 
 Having conceived some hopes of persuading 
 M. de R6musat to emerge from the retirement in 
 which he had lived for the past twenty years, I sent 
 his son to find him at the Chateau de Lafitte, his 
 family seat, a modest and delightful house within 
 sight of the Pyrenees, which was a kind of harbour 
 of refuge for the tranquil, pensive philosophy of its 
 owner. M. Paul de Remusat brought back his father, 
 who at our urgent request consented, on the 2nd of 
 August, 1871, to become Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 Then, as now, France could have no more worthy repre- 
 sentative to act with foreign Powers. Grand-nephew 
 of M. de Vergennes, grandson of M. de la Fayette, of 
 
176 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 noble manners, noble in mind and heart, living with 
 perfect content and comfort on a moderate fortune, 
 endowed with an intellect of the widest scope and freest 
 play, a man of prodigious culture, often subtle to pro- 
 fundity, M. de Remusat, a little sceptical by dint of 
 seeing things under all their aspects, but not to be 
 shaken in his good and great principles of thought and 
 action, an unflinching Liberal, an ardent patriot, a wise 
 politician, sometimes rather mocking, but with a gentle 
 and amiable mockery, was precisely the right person 
 to win favour from the aristocratic society of foreign 
 Courts for a well-ordered Republic. 
 
 Every one approved this choice, and after a few 
 conversations with M. de Remusat, the diplomatists 
 loved him as a man and appreciated his talents. He 
 was a real increase of strength to the Cabinet. 
 
 The end of September was approaching. The 
 Assembly had now been sitting for eight months 
 without a break in the midst of continual agitations. 
 It was worn out, and the heat of the season added 
 still further to its mental fatigue. After passing most 
 urgent taxes, those that gave grounds for no objec- 
 tion, and represented nearly three hundred and sixty 
 millions, the Assembly had no reason to deny itself 
 a few days' vacation. It prorogued itself then from 
 the 17th of September to the 4th of December, 1871, 
 leaving the country in a better situation than any 
 one would have dared to hope for at the outset 
 of its career, and full of confidence in the future, 
 which only flie extremists of the parties failed to 
 share. 
 
 This was the first time the Government found itself 
 deprived of the imposing entourage of the representa- 
 tives of the nation. It might seem a good opportunity 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 177 
 
 to try some seditious enterprise, and the Bonapartists 
 were, it was rumoured, about to take the stage. 
 
 The Empire, painfully endeavouring to rebuild its 
 reputation, had just had unlooked-for assistance from 
 Marshal de MacMahon. In his evidence before the 
 commission appointed by the Assembly to inquire into 
 the acts of the Government of the Fourth of September, 
 the Marshal, interrogated upon the capitulation of 
 Sedan, had taken particular pains to defend the 
 Emperor and to declare himself solely responsible for 
 the events of that day. 
 
 The Bonapartist publicists at once laid hold of this 
 testimony to exculpate the Emperor, and from this 
 moment their language became very audacious. 
 Doubtless, they said, it was wrong to make war with- 
 out sufficient preparation ; but who never made a 
 mistake? According to them, the greatest part of 
 our misfortunes were to be blamed upon the persons 
 responsible for the Fourth of September; and those 
 who, like myself for example, had been strangers to 
 the Empire and the Fourth of September, and only 
 occupied themselves in remedying the mistakes of 
 both, would share all this responsibility, unless they 
 immediately recalled the Emperor, or at least the 
 Prince Imperial. 
 
 While talking in this way, the Bonapartists multi- 
 plied their comings and goings from Paris to Chisle- 
 hurst, peddled the sayings, true or false, of the exiled 
 family, and thanks to these tricks, had spread the 
 belief that the Emperor would presently attempt a 
 descent on some point on the coast, and try, like his 
 uncle at Grenoble, to gain over the army. 
 
 I had no fear of such a danger, neither as far as 
 the army was concerned nor the Emperor, whom I 
 
 12 
 
178 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 knew by sure report to be quite incapable of attempt- " 
 ing this adventure, as much on account of his health 
 as through lack of means ; he even disapproved, I had 
 been assured, of all this agitation of his party, which 
 was hindering my efforts to restore the army and the 
 finances of France. At the same time, since a Govern- 
 ment can be the dupe of incredulity as well as of 
 credulity, I recommended all the maritime, military, and 
 civil authorities of the coastal departments to redouble 
 their vigilance. This precaution was unnecessary, 
 thanks to the prudence or rather the impotence of 
 the Court of Chislehurst. 
 
 But the Prince Napoleon, who lived in Switzerland, 
 whence he radiated towards Belgium, and especially 
 towards Italy, was much less circumspect. Every- 
 where he showed himself, by his speeches, what he 
 had always been : a witty, uncurbed individual, but 
 erratic, acting always for himself, never for his party, 
 which indeed never depended on him. Nevertheless, 
 the Bonapartists secured his election as a member of 
 the Council-General of Corsica, and wanted to make 
 him President, and relying on the example of the 
 validated election of the two Princes of Orleans, 
 Prince Napoleon addressed himself to our consul at 
 Geneva, to ask permission to go to Corsica in the 
 exercise of his rights as Councillor-General. I 
 sent word that he might go, but only to be present 
 at the session of the Council-General ; that the 
 slightest disturbance, whoever caused it, would be put 
 down at once with the utmost severity. 
 
 Everything happened as I had foreseen. The rowdy 
 fellows who had flocked to Ajaccio, Corsicans and 
 others, did not dare to make the demonstration they 
 had planned ; Prince Napoleon was not even elected 
 
PEESIDENOY OF THE REPUBLIC 179 
 
 as President of the Council-General, and soon after 
 this check he started for the Continent again. 
 
 If I have recounted at some length this return of 
 audacity on the part of the Bonapartists, it is to 
 make certain later events more readily understood. 
 
 At this time something happened as grievous as 
 unforeseen. On the 8th of October, 1871, M. Lam- 
 brecht, whom I had left the previous evening with 
 every appearance of health, succumbed to an affection 
 of the heart which had given no reason to expect 
 so rapid a development. In him I lost a friend, a 
 colleague gifted with uncommon political judgment, 
 and that exquisite tact which is the first indispensable 
 qualification for a Minister of the Interior. Firm in 
 good sense, courageous at need, and always honourable 
 and upright, like myself he only attached himself 
 to his country's interests. A tinge of melancholy, 
 arising from the malady with which he knew he 
 was stricken, added still more to his natural distinc- 
 tion. He was universally regretted. 
 
 The whole Council shared my grief and my per- 
 plexity, for it was by no means easy to replace such 
 a co-worker. I thought of my friend M. Casimir 
 Perier. Already at Bordeaux I had wished to bring 
 him into the Cabinet ; but regarding the situation 
 as too confused, and the right paths hard to discern, 
 he had not accepted my proposal. Now the moment 
 had come for him to take up public business. As 
 he had the taste for it, I renewed my offers. I 
 appreciated his courage, his absolute integrity, his 
 lively, open mind, a real talent in writing, and wide 
 practical knowledge of affairs. I proposed him to 
 the Council, which unanimously approved, expressing 
 the hope that my offer would be accepted. It was 
 
180 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 accepted after many explanations, which M. Casimir 
 Perier, always most careful when it was a question 
 of pledging his name, insisted upon. The choice 
 met with general approbation, for M. Casimir Perier 
 was justly regarded as a Liberal by the Liberals, as a 
 Conservative by the Conservatives, and had not yet 
 incurred the displeasure of the Right for having loyally 
 followed a policy independent of any party, a policy 
 with which my honour was involved. 
 
 The Cabinet, uniting at the same time MM. 
 Dufaure, de Remusat, Casimir Perier, Jules Simon, 
 contained the best political names in the country, 
 and formed, with General de Cissey, Vice-Admiral 
 Pothuau, M. de Larcy, and M. Victor Lefranc, the 
 greatest Ministry that could be composed under exist- 
 ing circumstances. 
 
 The prorogation of the Assembly had naturally 
 inspired ministers also with a desire to have a vaca- 
 tion. I alone could not take any, having to devote 
 every moment to a pressing and very difficult experi- 
 ment, the camping of the army. 
 
 The corps I had kept, after the taking of Paris, 
 as types of our coming military organisation, were 
 five in number, some in barracks in Paris, the others 
 under canvas and in the open at Vincennes, Courbe- 
 voie, Saint-Germain, Versailles, Satory, Meudon. At 
 the approach of winter it was becoming urgent 
 to replace this camping out by warm and healthy 
 barracks for at least eighty thousand men. 
 
 Those who have not administered a great state 
 in all its departments cannot know all that an army 
 needs in time and care of every kind, especially when 
 it is to be put in a winter camp. It is not merely 
 a matter of providing dwellings that will be healthy, 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 181 
 
 clean, and keep the men from heat or cold, according 
 to the time of year ; these dwellings must yet be 
 laid out in a certain order, must form cities in which 
 traffic must be easy, in streets passable not only to 
 individuals, but to artillery wagons and commissariat 
 carts. They must be provided with light, abundant 
 water distributed, kitchens set up, many fireplaces, 
 with extreme precautions against outbreak of fires, 
 cleanliness and hygiene must be carefully watched 
 over, schools are to be installed, recreation-rooms 
 and churches opened, and for the officers quarters 
 must be arranged with enough conveniences to 
 ensure that camp life does not entail needless expense 
 for them. I might go on for ever if I were to mention 
 the innumerable details to which even the head of 
 a state is sometimes obliged to descend if he intends 
 that nothing is to be neglected or forgotten. 
 
 Every day in the afternoon I drove out, now to 
 Satory, now to Meudon or Vincennes, in short to all 
 the places occupied by the troops, and, accompanied 
 by the officers in command, I examined the construc- 
 tion works on the barracks, and assured myself that 
 the orders given had been carried out : for an order 
 over which a strict eye is not kept is an order given 
 in vain. In this way I reached the desired result. 
 The officers and the soldiers, seeing how deeply I 
 was occupied with them, were full of confidence in 
 my care of them. 
 
 Barely had the cold season set in when all were 
 already at home in the camps. There were advan- 
 tages for military instruction and the military spirit, 
 and beyond all for their health. The soldiers, well 
 fed, well clothed, country lads for the most part, 
 enjoyed this way of living, and the permanent camp, 
 
182 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 which in principle had been greatly criticized, met 
 with no further objections or opposition. After 
 this experiment, I began to see the modifications 
 which would have to be made in this system, the 
 extent to which it should be employed, the way in 
 which anything burdensome in it should be distributed 
 over the different sections of the army, and I believe 
 that before long I should have made it simple and 
 fruitful of excellent results. 
 
 These very diverse affairs had not turned me aside 
 from the most essential of all, which was to pay off 
 the Prussians so as gradually to push back to the 
 frontier the area of occupation. 
 
 From the 1st of June to the end of September the 
 Germans had received fifteen hundred millions, and 
 in accordance with the Treaty of Frankfort, the area 
 of occupation was reduced to twelve departments. 
 Six of these, the Aisne, the Aube, the Cote d'Or, 
 Haute-Saone, Doubs, and Jura, would be evacuated 
 at latest on the 1st of May, 1872, after the payment of 
 the fourth half milliard ; the other six, the Ardennes, 
 Marne, Haute-Marne, Meuse, Meurthe-et-Moselle, the 
 Vosges and the district of Belfort, were to remain 
 in the hands of the Germans until the final payment 
 of our ransom. 
 
 From the month of August 1871 I had begun 
 to dream of forestalling the payment due on the 
 1st of May, 1872 ; for, thanks to the payments in 
 advance on the loan, the Treasury was already in 
 a position to pay the fourth half milliard. But from a 
 financial point of view there would have been a grave 
 danger in attempting this operation so close to the 
 moment when we had just transferred to Germany 
 fifteen hundred million francs within four months. 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 183 
 
 A wise scheme had enabled us to procure two 
 milliards, but the transferring of so great a sum out 
 of France depended upon very delicate operations, 
 and so much the more difficult as being without 
 precedent. If we had wanted to pay only in gold, 
 the country would have been despoiled of its coin- 
 age and a dangerous monetary situation would have 
 been provoked. 
 
 We had accordingly applied ourselves to giving 
 the Germans only as little of our specie as possible, 
 and the greater part of the fifteen hundred millions 
 we had just paid over to them was made up of bills 
 payable in Germany, which we had obtained by 
 purchase in the principal European markets. But 
 these continual purchases having forced up the 
 foreign exchange, the precious -metals, which we had 
 avoided sending directly to the German Treasury, 
 none the less were leaving France, and a money 
 crisis was always to be feared. In order to prevent 
 it, I decreased the purchases of foreign bills, thus 
 it is true depriving myself of the principal means of 
 meeting the fourth half milliard, and in consequence 
 of reducing the area of occupation by six new depart- 
 ments before the 1st of May, 1872. However, I had 
 hopes that very keen and active interests that were 
 acting for several months both at Berlin and at 
 Paris would afford the opportunity of achieving this 
 evacuation before it was due. 
 
 The pure Alsatians were genuinely inconsolable at 
 being severed from France ; but the Swiss and the 
 numerous Germans in the south, who had been 
 attracted to Mulhouse by that town's industrial pros- 
 perity, tried to profit by recent events. Not content 
 with having obtained, by a recent ordinance, the 
 
184 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 freedom of the German market, they dreamed of 
 keeping as long as possible the freedom of the French 
 market as well, which according to the Treaty of 
 Frankfort was to be closed to them in September 
 1871. If this dream was realized, Alsace, bitterly 
 stricken in its patriotic feelings, would have a kind 
 of recompense in the increase of its wealth, and Prince 
 Bismarck, in order to win over this newly annexed 
 province by a fresh favour, was disposed to obtain for 
 it the longer period asked for by the manufacturers. 
 On our side we did not ask anything better than to 
 make this concession, if in return we were granted 
 an antedated evacuation. 
 
 To open negotiations upon this matter, Prince 
 Bismarck sent Count Harry von Arnim to Paris, as a 
 Minister Charge d' Affaires, the only title under which 
 he could, at the moment, represent his Government in 
 France, since we ourselves had at Berlin only a Charge" 
 d'Affaires, the very distinguished M. de Gabriac. 
 Count von Arnim was not accredited as Ambassador to 
 us until some months later. As negotiator of the 
 Treaty of Frankfort, he was in every way marked out 
 to hold this post ; but because of his morose nature it 
 was not a very fortunate selection for Paris, where 
 the victor should have been represented by the sunniest 
 and most affable person they could find. 
 
 Immediately on arriving, 24th of August, Count von 
 Arnim opened the negotiations. Our aim was the 
 immediate evacuation of the six departments due on 
 the 1st of May, 1872. We were asking the German 
 Government to accept, in place of the territorial pledge 
 of these departments, the financial guarantees it might 
 think necessary ; and to hasten its consent to this 
 substitution of guarantees, we would then show our- 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 185 
 
 selves disposed to continue beyond the 1st of 
 September, 1871, under conditions to be agreed upon, 
 the favourable treatment granted to Alsatian indus- 
 tries for sending their products into France. 
 
 Unfortunately, our manufacturers were unwilling to 
 concede this favourable treatment to the Alsatians 
 unless with reciprocity for French goods to enter 
 Alsaee. That was asking for free entrance, or at a 
 reduced tariff, of all French goods into Germany 
 through the open door of Alsace-Lorraine. This con- 
 dition of absolute general reciprocity, which had been 
 imposed upon the French negotiators by a decision of 
 the Assembly, could not possibly be accepted by 
 Germany, and made an agreement on the question of 
 excise almost impossible. 
 
 Great difficulties arose also on the question of the 
 financial guarantees. Of the first two milliards of the 
 whole indemnity we still had to pay, on the 1st of May, 
 1872, five hundred millions, to which would be added 
 on the 1st of March, 1872, the interest of the three 
 milliards making up our ransom, a total of six hundred 
 and fifty millions. As guarantee for this sum, the 
 German Government demanded the signature of 
 France, backed by the first banking houses of 
 Germany, France, and England. It insisted, moreover, 
 that these bills should be negotiable at the will of the 
 German Treasury. 
 
 The French bankers and the French Government, 
 however secure was their solvency, rightly refused to 
 accept this condition, which exposed them to the 
 possibility of seeing their signatures cast into 
 circulation unexpectedly, before they could have 
 made any preparations to meet such tremendous 
 engagements. 
 
186 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 Faced with these difficulties, I determined to send 
 
 J I. Pouyer-Quertier to Berlin, to make every effort to 
 , olve them by addressing himself to the Chancellor 
 /direct. M. Pouyer-Quertier had relations with Ger- 
 (many that might be useful, and when he had gone 
 ' there to negotiate the final treaty of peace, he had 
 been well received by Prince Bismarck. He had even 
 been persona grata with the latter. He went to Berlin 
 in the early part of October, and Count von Arnim 
 was not long in following. 
 
 On the question of the guarantees, Count Bismarck 
 began by insisting anew that the bills backed by the 
 bankers should be negotiable when and as he pleased. 
 I telegraphed a formal refusal to accept this condition, 
 which from the financial and political point of view 
 alike exposed us to serious difficulties. The Chancellor 
 then offered to bind himself not to negotiate the bills 
 except in case of a change of Government, which was 
 to say, in case of my retirement. 
 
 However flattering this mark of confidence in me, 
 I refused this solution, which would have imposed 
 me upon the National Assembly by the threat of 
 dangerous financial pressure, if they had wished to get 
 rid of me. 
 
 M. Pouyer-Quertier, seeing these awkward points, 
 went more to the heart of the matter. Our solvency, 
 as we were every day proving, was as sure as our good- 
 will to pay. Henceforward there was nothing to be 
 gained by taking precautions against us, precautions 
 which besides the difficulties they raised had the 
 inconvenient result of costing us millions that must go 
 not into the Prussian Treasury, but simply into the 
 bankers' coffers. Would it not be better to display 
 confidence in us by being satisfied to accept month by 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 187 
 
 month up to the following spring the fourth half 
 milliard in successive payments, which we were offering 
 because we were in a condition to make them? 
 
 Prince Bismarck readily understood that a prudent 
 policy counselled that instead of taking precautions 
 suggested by mistrust, he ought on the contrary to 
 give us a mark of confidence, which would be a great 
 help to the French Government in carrying out its 
 obligations. He went one morning, therefore, to 
 M. Pouyer-Quertier, without previous warning, and 
 found him at table with his Berlin friends. 
 
 He took him apart, announced that he was giving up 
 bankers and their demands, that there would be no 
 more question of bills negotiable or not negotiable, and 
 that they would be satisfied with my signature for the 
 fourth half milliard, which would be paid by fixed 
 instalments fortnightly, beginning from the 15th of 
 January up to the 1st of May, 1872. The one condition 
 attached to this concession was, that until the full 
 payment was made the evacuated departments would 
 only receive the number of French troops necessary 
 for the preservation of order. A very considerable 
 advantage was coupled with this restriction : the army 
 of occupation would be reduced to fifty thousand men. 
 
 M. Pouyer-Quertier hastened to inform me of these 
 important stipulations in a series of dispatches, the 
 last of which, dated the 11th of October, 1871, is 
 couched in the following terms : 
 
 "... At noon I went to see the Emperor; he 
 received me most kindly and told me that the German 
 Government had every reason to congratulate 
 themselves upon the punctuality with which France 
 was carrying out her engagements ; that it was on 
 
188 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 account of this punctuality that his Government was 
 waiving the financial guarantees that had originally 
 been asked for. 
 
 "He was happy to order an immediate evacuation 
 of the stipulated territories, in return for a simple 
 promise to pay the fourth half milliard in eight 
 instalments from January to the 1st of May. 
 
 "He expressed all his admiration for the results 
 obtained by M. Thiers' Government, the only one 
 rational and possible in the present condition of affairs 
 in France. 
 
 "He found the task enormous, yet not beyond the 
 energy and patriotism of the President. 
 
 "He eagerly desires the complete evacuation of 
 France by his troops, and also desires that we may. 
 be able to find financial combinations to hasten it as 
 much as possible. Germany will gladly do all she can 
 to help. 
 
 " The question of the customs did not seem to me 
 to preoccupy him to any extent. 
 
 " I have asked for an amnesty for the prisoners who 
 remain in Germany, and who have been sentenced for 
 other than misdemeanours of war. 
 
 "With the exception of professional thieves and 
 murderers (not a very numerous class) he has allowed 
 me to hope that all the others will speedily be 
 released. 
 
 " POUYER-QUERTIEK." 
 
 I replied by a full consent to the proposed conditions 
 and profound thanks to the Emperor and the 
 Chancellor. 
 
 With the financial question M. Pouyer-Quertier had 
 settled the question of the customs of the annexed 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 189 
 
 provinces. In accordance with the decision of the 
 Assembly the French Government proposed to allow 
 manufactured goods to enter free from Alsace- 
 Lorraine from the 1st of September to the 31st of 
 December, 1871, to impose one-fourth rate from the 
 1st of January to the 1st of July, 1872, a half from 
 the 1st of July, 1872, to the 1st of July, 1873, on con- 
 dition of reciprocity for French goods going into 
 Alsace-Lorraine. 
 
 The German Government, which, I repeat, refused 
 absolutely to accept this condition of general recipro- 
 city for French products, only consented to a reciprocity 
 limited to products employed by local industries in 
 Alsace-Lorraine. 
 
 After lengthy discussions, M. Pouyer-Quertier was 
 obliged to waive the clause anent general reciprocity, 
 and Prince Bismarck on his side, in return for this 
 concession, consented to reduce by a period of six 
 months the favour accorded for Alsace-Lorraine, by 
 limiting its duration to the 1st of January instead 
 of the 1st of July, 1873. 
 
 The two conventions, relating one to the financial 
 guarantees, the other to the system of customs for 
 the annexed provinces, were signed at Berlin on the 
 12th of October, 1871 ; and the evacuation, with a view 
 to which they had been concluded, began immediately 
 after in the six departments which were to be freed 
 the first. 
 
 The Assembly was not sitting, but the country signi- 
 fied to me in the most marked manner its joy and 
 gratitude on this occasion. I did not wish to claim 
 all the merit of this success for myself, and I proposed 
 to the Council, which approved, to raise M. Pouyer- 
 Quertier to the rank of Grand Officier in the Legion 
 
190 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 d'Honneur, at one stroke passing over all the inferior 
 grades to this high distinction. 
 
 Good M. Pouyer-Quertier was moved even to tears 
 by this honour. He might well be proud of it, having 
 thoroughly deserved it by the skill and vigour with 
 which he had conducted and brought this difficult 
 negotiation at Berlin to a successful conclusion. 
 
 Count von Arnim came back shortly after M. Pouyer- 
 Quertier, and I thought it right to give him the best 
 possible welcome. He had served us well during this 
 negotiation. I received him therefore with the 
 greatest distinction, and had the salons in which we 
 had influence thrown open to him. 
 
 I was thus putting in practice the instructions 
 previously given to the functionaries of the depart- 
 ments under German occupation, among whom many, 
 seeking vulgar popularity, had been rude to the Prussian 
 officers. I had directed the prefects of these depart- 
 ments to accept and return any polite attentions that 
 might be shown them by the heads of the army of 
 occupation, and particularly General Manteuffel's 
 dinner invitations ; I had repeated to all of them that 
 the slightest offence to the pride of the heads of this 
 army would expose the people to the harshest treat- 
 ment. 
 
 Before long I had reason to congratulate myself 
 upon these provident instructions. The Prussian 
 generals, very susceptible gentlemen, living in the 
 midst of an enemy populace, were on the other hand 
 very sensitive to the least friendliness, to which they 
 responded with good treatment for the inhabitants ; 
 but they became intolerable if we were not as polite 
 to them as they were to us. General Baron von 
 Manteuffel, a cousin of the former Prime Minister of 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 191 
 
 the same name, was at their head — one of the most 
 distinguished minds of all his nation and one of the best 
 men I have ever known. Commander-in-Chief of the 
 army of occupation, he ended by winning the affection 
 of the whole population of Nancy, where his head- 
 quarters were. 
 
 When he had come to Versailles, he had accepted 
 the hospitality I offered him at the Presidence. 
 All who had occasion to converse with him were 
 touched by his ideas, as lofty as they were generous, 
 and charmed by his fine, brilliant, cultivated mind. 
 After the peace was signed, I had given orders to show 
 every attention to his nephew, the son of the former 
 Minister, who had fallen ill at Clermont (Oise). Appre- 
 ciating this kindness on my part, he showed his 
 gratitude in a thousand friendly acts for the French 
 prisoners. 
 
 We very soon became fast friends, and directly there 
 was any serious collision between German soldiers and 
 the inhabitants, he interposed and ended by amicable 
 arrangements conflicts that might easily have resulted 
 in sentences of imprisonment or penal servitude, or 
 even in heavy exactions upon our villages. 
 
 I had chosen as Commissioner Extraordinary at 
 the headquarters of the army of occupation Count 
 Saint- Vallier, a young diplomatist of the greatest 
 distinction, intelligent, not very robust, impressionable 
 to the highest degree, working himself to death almost 
 in devotion to his task, and also a friend of General 
 Manteuffel. I could never tell what great services 
 this friendship rendered us. 
 
 The question of lodging the troops in occupation was 
 the one that most frequently gave rise to difficulties. 
 To spare the inhabitants the presence of foreign 
 
192 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 soldiers in their families, we had decided to put the 
 German soldiers into barracks at the State's expense, 
 especially in the six departments that were to be the 
 last occupied. 
 
 The departments next to these, impatient to see the 
 departure of the foreigners installed among them, 
 hardly left us time to finish the barracks as soon as 
 the day fixed for the evacuation had come. On their 
 side the German officers constantly complained of the 
 unhealthiness of these newly built barracks ; one day 
 they even abandoned them, to billet themselves on 
 the inhabitants by military authority. These were so 
 many opportunities for violence and brawls. 
 
 I spent many hours writing, and issuing orders to 
 put an end to these troublesome incidents, and I 
 always found Count Saint- Vallier and General 
 Manteuffel before me with the same intention. It 
 can, then, be understood how much I valued the friend- 
 ship of General Manteuffel, a friendship I shall 
 continue to cultivate as long as I live. 
 
 One of the visits he paid me at Versailles gave rise 
 to two disagreeable incidents. I had asked him to 
 come to see me. He arrived twenty-four hours earlier 
 than I expected him, and precisely on the day I was 
 to have a great dinner-party of deputies and generals. 
 Certainly General Manteuffel was in no way out 
 of place in this assembly ; everybody had the good 
 taste to give him a suitable welcome, and M. de Merode, 
 who was placed beside him, was delighted with his 
 conversation. General Ducrot alone, before we sat 
 down, expressed to me his regret at having to dine at 
 the same table as a Prussian general. I was not 
 responsible for the meeting, since I myself had been 
 taken by surprise by General Manteuffel's arrival. 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 193 
 
 "It is for the greatest interests of the State," 
 I said to General Ducrot, " that we should behave 
 with propriety towards a personage who has a right 
 to our regard as much on account of his official 
 position as for his own worth. However, if you cannot 
 endure to meet him, I shall leave you at liberty to 
 withdraw." 
 
 And the General took advantage of my permission 
 to leave the Pr^sidence. 
 
 Marshal MacMahon, too, who no more than General 
 Ducrot could ever forgive the Prussians their victories, 
 could not control his feelings, and refused his hand 
 to General Manteuffel, who before leaving Versailles 
 had come to pay him a visit. 
 
 General Manteuffel went at once to the Minister for 
 War to give him to understand, with all propriety, that 
 such an occurrence could not be passed over without 
 explanation. The Marshal had the good sense to make 
 amends ; for in him the tried soldier could afford to 
 stoop a little without loss of countenance ; he only 
 pressed that the affair should be kept from me, and 
 General de Cissey, very tactfully, mentioned it to me 
 only when the impression made by this scene was 
 almost wholly forgotten. 
 
 The close of this year, 1871, was marked by the 
 beginnings of a monetary crisis which gave me a 
 very anxious moment. To prevent this crisis I had 
 recommended the diminishing of purchases of bills 
 on Germany. But M. Pouyer-Quertier had not watched 
 these purchases with sufficient attention, and M. 
 Dutilleul, the directeur du mouvement general des 
 fonds, whose chief care was to contrive means of 
 paying Germany while displacing specie as little as 
 possible, had continued to accept all the exchange 
 
 13 
 
194 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 bills offered to him. He had received from the 
 Bank of Paris, in particular, two hundred millions' 
 worth. The exchange on London, which regulates 
 all the rest, consequently went up considerably, 
 which entailed a rush of precious metal to that 
 city. From one single port, in one single day, some 
 eighty millions in gold left France for England. And 
 so the dearth of gold and silver money soon began 
 to hamper the daily transactions in the markets and 
 the retail houses. 
 
 For the first time since the re-establishment of peace, 
 the payment of our ransom became a source of embar- 
 rassment to the public at large. As soon as I was 
 informed I renewed the order to suspend the purchase 
 of bills, in order to bring down the exchange and stop 
 the export of specie. 
 
 This first remedy, good for the future, was not 
 enough for the present. We had recourse then to a 
 measure at an ordinary time questionable, but at the 
 present moment legitimate, which was to create 
 temporarily, and under the guarantee of certain houses 
 of great credit, a kind of emergency paper money, 
 confined to local use. We were in this merely 
 imitating the action of certain managers of great 
 works. These, in short, lacking actual cash, pay their 
 men vouchers of twenty, ten, five, two francs, and 
 even one franc, after arranging with the tradesmen, 
 bakers, butchers, wine sellers, etc., to pay off these 
 vouchers in amounts of a hundred, five hundred, or a 
 thousand francs. 
 
 This method having succeeded, it became the type 
 of a more general measure which was immediately 
 effective. We authorized certain great banking houses, 
 such as the Comptoir d'Escompte and the Societe 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 195 
 
 Gene'rale, to issue each a certain quantity of these 
 small notes, provided they deposited with estab- 
 lishments of high credit, placed under State control, 
 recognized securities to an equivalent amount as a 
 guarantee. 
 
 ~ The refusal to buy bills brought down the rate of 
 exchange, at the same time as the premium on gold ; 
 the thousand franc note, which had lost no less than 
 thirty francs of its face value, began to recover; and 
 the small notes, widely put into circulation, ended 
 the complaints of the public. In this way terminated 
 the monetary crisis, which might easily have grown 
 serious. 
 
 What disturbed me more than this monetary crisis 
 was the sudden persistent drop in the price of the 
 loan. Issued at eighty-two and a half, at first it 
 had moved steadily upward and had reached ninety- 
 six in November : one moment it had been thought 
 likely to go to par. 
 
 This undue rise, due to the small investors repre- 
 sented by the Bank of Paris, had been opposed by a 
 syndicate of bankers who, in turn had forced the 
 price down. If this downward movement had been 
 carried too far, and especially if it had gone below the 
 issue price, it would have involved a real disaster for 
 the great mass of small investors, the consequence 
 of which would have been to compromise the success 
 of the next loan. 
 
 I was greatly absorbed in this matter of the price of 
 our public funds, when I learned that the Bank of 
 France, by selling its stocks on the Bourse, was one 
 of the chief causes of this fall. 
 
 At once I summoned the Board of the Bank of 
 France, or rather a committee of the most influential 
 
196 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 members of the Board, among whom were MM. Mallet 
 and Davilliers, men of conspicuous honesty and excel- 
 lent common sense. 
 
 They explained that the Bank was selling off its 
 stocks to get back its notes, which offered it a double 
 advantage : first in raising the value of the note by 
 making it less common in the currency, and secondly 
 by putting these notes at the disposal of the Bank, 
 which, having reached the legal limit of its issue, would 
 soon be forced to draw upon its gold reserves in order 
 to meet the exchange. 
 
 I answered that the value of the note was already 
 rising in consequence of the drop in the exchange, and 
 that this rise would become more apparent every day as 
 gold became more plentiful, that besides, if they wanted 
 to raise the value of their notes appreciably by with- 
 drawing them from circulation, they would have to 
 withdraw a capital of at least a hundred millions, 
 which would necessitate the sale of five or six millions 
 of stock. So considerable an operation could not fail to 
 bring about an immense drop in the price of the loan, 
 perhaps below the issue price, which would be a real 
 catastrophe. 
 
 These arguments being unanswerable, the Board 
 recognized that they could not persist in selling stock. 
 
 We next proceeded to examine what would have to 
 be done to cope with the difficulty arising from the 
 scarcity of notes. Under the Empire, the Bank of 
 France had authority to issue fifteen millions in 
 notes. After the declaration of war, this authority 
 was raised to two milliards four hundred millions, 
 an increase of nine hundred millions, to-day almost 
 exhausted, representing the specie taken from circula- 
 tion to pay the instalments of the indemnity. We 
 
PEESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 197 
 
 might calculate at four hundred millions the specie 
 that would still be exported from France to complete 
 our foreign payments. It would therefore be neces- 
 sary to raise the note issue of the Bank of France to 
 two milliards eight hundred millions. 
 
 It was consequently agreed that the Bank would 
 cease to sell its stocks, and that the Government, as 
 soon as the Assembly should meet, would bring 
 forward a measure to raise the note issue to two 
 milliards eight hundred millions. If before this 
 became law the Bank should reach the present limit 
 of two milliards four hundred millions, it would 
 meet the needs of the exchange with its gold reserve. 
 
 In this way both the monetary crisis and that 
 which would have followed on a drop in the price of 
 the loan below issue price were averted; 
 
 During the last three months of this year, 1871, we 
 had been occupied with difficulties arising from affairs. 
 They were soon to be complicated by those for which 
 individuals were responsible. 
 
 The important session of 1871-2 was about to open, 
 and the deputies were beginning to arrive. They 
 say that during vacation-time deputies steep themselves 
 again in the feeling of the country, and that they return 
 to their labours inspired by the same dispositions as 
 their electors. That was not the case when the Assembly 
 came back to Versailles. 
 
 It is certain that no Government ever had the 
 approval of the country to the same extent as we 
 had. The great majority of the middle class, the com- 
 mercial classes, the country people, without declaring 
 themselves for a Republic in so many words, said " We 
 are for the Government of M. Thiers." This saying came 
 to us from all quarters. 
 
198 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 But in the Assembly, among the Monarchists^ only 
 the Moderates were disposed to uphold the Govern- 
 ment, because they had been impressed by its popu- 
 larity, and furthermore because they perceived the 
 impossibility of restoring the monarchy, at any rate 
 for the present. 
 
 One section of the Assembly, then, arrived much less 
 influenced by the general satisfaction of the electors 
 than might have been imagined, and a very disturbed 
 existence was in prospect for us for the year 1872, on 
 which we were about to enter. 
 
 The session was opened on the 4th of December, 1871, 
 and I read my presidential message in the sitting of 
 the 7th, after the preliminary labours of the Assembly, 
 which had re-elected M. Gre^vy as its President and 
 M. Martel as its chief Vice-President. 
 
 In this message I gave a full account of the position 
 of affairs. To begin with, I recalled the fortunate 
 results of our policy, which after assuring the financial 
 present and prepared the financial future of France, 
 had reduced the number of departments under foreign 
 occupation from forty to six. I then entered upon the 
 most difficult part of the message : the outline of the 
 Government views upon the reorganization of our 
 military forces. 
 
 There reigned at this time in France one of those 
 ideas that sometimes take hold of men's imaginations 
 and dominate them irresistibly. It was believed that 
 our reverses were due to the fact that our army was 
 not organized in the same way as the Prussian. Uni- 
 versal compulsory service, sending the whole nation 
 into war, was the only thing, they said, to bring back 
 to France the power she had lost. Such was the 
 opinion of the Left as well as the Right — in a word, the 
 
PEESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 199 
 
 opinion of everybody, except some very few men of 
 unusual good sense. 
 
 The inevitable consequence of calling to the colours 
 all the men liable to be chosen by lot is the reduction 
 of the period of service to two years or three : for the 
 more men called up, the less time can they be retained, 
 if the finances of the country are not to be ruined. Con- 
 vinced that real soldiers cannot be turned out either in 
 two or in three years, I declared my opinion on this 
 subject in set terms. And so the message, religiously 
 heard so long as I said nothing about military reorgani- 
 zation, evoked some murmurs when I touched on this 
 question. At the same time it was approved, as much 
 for what it contained as for its evident sincerity. 
 
 Before discussing plans dealing with recruiting the 
 army, the Assembly had to consider the not less press- 
 ing matter of the new taxes. Already it had voted 
 three hundred and sixty-six millions by surcharging 
 nearly all the old taxes to the utmost point ; it remained 
 still to find, at the least, two hundred and fifty millions 
 in new taxes in order to meet the six hundred and fifty 
 millions which, according to the last reckoning of the 
 war expenditure, must still be added to the normal 
 expenditure expected by the budgets before 1870. 
 
 The Commission charged with the examination of the 
 law revising the budget for the financial year 1871 had 
 proposed, through M. Casimir Perier, who presented its 
 report, to obtain these two hundred and fifty millions 
 by a tax, not on income, but on incomes — that is to say, 
 upon four particular kinds ofj income, viz. (1) income 
 from various French and foreign shares, except the 
 Rentes and other French public funds ; (2) pensions, 
 official emoluments, public or private salaries ; (3) in- 
 terest upon' credits of every possible kind; (4) the 
 
200 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 net profits of banks, of industry, of commerce, law 
 officials, etc. 
 
 Already this report had been given to the Assembly 
 on the 31st of August, 1871, and the discussion, then 
 postponed until after the vacations, opened on the 
 22nd of December. M. Pouyer-Quertier, in the name of 
 the Government, rejected all these taxes except that on 
 shares, which he had himself introduced in his budget 
 bill for 1872, presented to the Assembly on the 9th of 
 December, 1871. 
 
 Following M. Pouyer-Quertier, M. Germain in his 
 turn attacked the tax on these returns, for which he 
 proposed to substitute an income-tax in the full sense 
 of the word. M. Teisserenc de Bort, a modest and well- 
 informed person, replied with an excellent speech. 
 
 M. Wolowski, with his usual fluency, let himself go 
 to prove that an income-tax was the most natural of 
 taxes in a moment of distress, and, to support his con- 
 tention, quoted the example of England, where this 
 tax, he claimed, was finally and firmly established, 
 without any element of arbitrariness. His ardour and 
 exaggeration proved only one thing : that the spirit of 
 a system, in its mistakes, is nearly as violent as the 
 party spirit. 
 
 After him I addressed the House (at the sitting of the 
 26th of December, 1871), and was heard with profound 
 attention. The Assembly waited with a favourable 
 mind for the blow I was about to strike at revolu- 
 tionary finance. 
 
 My task then was easier than it was to be some days 
 later, when I had to support the tax on raw materials. 
 At first I applied myself to showing clearly the funda- 
 mental difference between the financial system of 
 France, a continental country, and that of England, 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 201 
 
 an island country, where a great proportion of all 
 goods of general consumption, arriving by sea, pass 
 through the customs, and where all spirits, being made 
 in immense establishments, offer great facilities for the 
 collection of duties. 
 
 Under such conditions, I said, nearly all the revenues 
 of the Treasury are indirect revenues that do not 
 burden landed property. In France, on the contrary, 
 almost all objects of general consumption are produced 
 by the soil, and in consequence taxation is of another 
 kind. Objects of consumption not passing through the 
 customs are here much less frequently taxed than the 
 land which produces them. 
 
 I proved this very carefully, insisting on the strict 
 justice which since 1789 had presided over the distribu- 
 tion of taxation in France. I proved that among us the 
 propertied and leisured classes bore at least two-thirds 
 of the public burdens, and the populace less than a 
 third. In England, before the income-tax, it was in a 
 contrary proportion. It was natural, then, that in 
 times of difficulty acquired wealth should have been 
 called upon to come to the help of the British 
 Treasury. 
 
 This demonstration produced a real sense of relief in 
 the Assembly. It had been said for so long that the 
 proletariat paid nearly everything and the rich almost 
 nothing. Loud signs of approbation came from three- 
 fourths of the Assembly, which felt, at this moment, 
 that I was a true Conservative. 
 
 I went on to explain why the income-tax in England 
 was less arbitrary than it would of necessity be in 
 France. To establish it in England, land, rents, and 
 professional profits had been adopted as the basis, 
 because since none of these sources of income were 
 
202 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 taxed, they could bear fairly high levies. But in France, 
 if we turned to the land, it could show that already it 
 pays its heavy share through the land-tax and the extra 
 hundredths ; in the same way rents and professional 
 profits carry the property-tax and the tax for licences. 
 There would remain, then, for an income-tax in France 
 only one basis, wealth presumed and valued by political 
 rancours and passions. 
 
 Lastly, to prove the dangers of arbitrariness in the 
 incidence of income-tax, I went back to olden times, and 
 with Vauban's Dime Royale in my hand, I showed that 
 the tallies had been simply an income-tax arbitrarily 
 struck ; I cited the passages of this famous book where 
 Vauban, with the eloquence of the most straightforward 
 of men, inveighed against the iniquity of this tax, and 
 I asked what it would become in our days of trouble 
 and faction, since already under the peaceful royal days 
 of Louis XIV it had provoked so just a wrath. 
 
 The effect of my speech was decisive. There was 
 still a little skirmishing. My friend M. Rouveyre, and 
 M. Wolowski, also my friend (for all called themselves 
 my friends), again began some unfortunate attempts, 
 which were not well received, and in the end the Assem- 
 bly, wearied and convinced, irrevocably condemned by 
 a great majority the principle of an income-tax. 
 
 After this vote the Commission, foreseeing that the 
 same fate would befall the various taxes which together 
 made up what they called a tax upon returns, with- 
 drew their scheme. 
 
 Three days later, on the 29th of December, I had 
 again to address the Assembly in the discussion of 
 the Government measure presented on the 9th of 
 December, 1871, to authorize the Bank of France to 
 increase its issue of notes by four hundred millions. 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 203 
 
 I Have already said that the limit of the issue of 
 these notes, raised on the declaration of war to two 
 milliards four hundred millions, was almost reached 
 by the end of 1871, and that it was most urgent that 
 it should be extended up to two milliards eight hundred 
 millions ; if not, the Bank would soon find itself 
 reduced to one of two things : either to refuse dis- 
 counting business, or to fall back upon its metallic 
 capital, which is, and should remain, in its vaults as 
 the guarantee of its notes, and the foundation of the 
 confidence reposed in it throughout the world. 
 
 There was, then, no time to be lost, and the intro- 
 duction, on the 9th of December, of the measure 
 authorizing the Bank of Prance to raise its issue 
 immediately to two milliards eight hundred millions 
 would have to be followed, without any delay, by the 
 report of the Committee, the public discussion, and 
 finally the taking of the vote upon it. But by a 
 singular inconsistency the Assembly, which was not 
 ill-disposed to the scheme, had appointed to the 
 Committee members of the contrary opinion to 
 examine it. Among these hostile members, in par- 
 ticular, was M. Bocher, a friend and adviser of the 
 Orleans princes, and M. Buffet, since called upon to 
 play a conspicuous part. 
 
 M. Bocher, a former prefect, subtle, an agreeable 
 person, clever in affairs, a clear and sometimes a 
 brilliant speaker, originally very modest in his pre- 
 tensions, had, little by little, grown more ambitious. 
 M. Buffet, a man of dry intellect, reducing every- 
 thing to formulas of political economy, didactic in 
 speech, but industrious, serious, exact, had all the 
 external qualities that captivate Assemblies. Both 
 displayed themselves, in this discussion, as little gifted 
 
204 MEMOIES OF M. THIERS 
 
 with understanding in finance as evilly intentioned 
 towards the Government. 
 
 According to them, to extend the note issue of the 
 Bank of France to two milliards eight hundred millions 
 was to create paper money, to engrave the die for 
 assignats. As soon as it was ready to hand, we would 
 flood the country with milliards in paper. The one 
 proper way of dealing with the difficulty, they said, 
 would be to raise a loan of fifteen hundred millions, 
 with the help of which the State would pay its debt 
 to the Bank of France, which would then be in a 
 position to resume its payments in specie. 
 
 Several times I visited the Committee to oppose 
 this scheme of a loan, the danger and even the impossi- 
 bility of which I showed them. On each occasion I 
 reduced my opponents to silence ; but barely had I 
 left them than they took up their thesis about 
 assignats and a loan, and time was passing without 
 arriving at any conclusion. 
 
 The obvious aim of the Committee was to drag 
 matters on and on so as not to make the report we 
 needed before the Assembly. We had now reached 
 the 27th of December, and at any moment the Bank, 
 which was upon the very edge of the two milliards 
 four hundred millions, was exposed to the danger of 
 no longer being able to undertake the discounting of 
 bills, which was always very heavy at the end 
 of the month, and especially in the closing days 
 of December. 
 
 Urged by the necessity, I begged the Assembly to 
 compel the Committee to make its report. The Com- 
 mittee asked for more time, alleging that the subject 
 was too serious, too difficult to be dealt with so hastily. 
 So much ill-will made me indignant. 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 205 
 
 Addressing the House with the utmost heat, I said 
 that such a report could be written in a few hours, 
 that it would be sufficient even to make it orally, 
 and that in a sitting of two hours I could under- 
 take to exhaust the subject and reduce the whole 
 question to the utmost degree of clearness. 
 
 The Chamber, comprehending the urgency of the 
 matter, the frivolity of the Committee's objections, 
 and its malice as well, insisted on the immediate 
 presenting of the report. This was at last done, on 
 the 29th of December. 
 
 Before the Assembly, M. Germain and myself 
 annihilated the Committee's arguments. I said that 
 I had no need to be taught the dangers of paper 
 money, I who had passed judgment so severely upon 
 all who in other days had had recourse to this expe- 
 dient in order to ward off the financial troubles of 
 the State ; that to compare the present difficulty to 
 those that it had previously been attempted to solve 
 by an issue of assignats was to misrepresent the 
 truth. 
 
 When the State, I said, creates paper money for 
 its needs, it enters inevitably on the path to ruin ; 
 but to-day the State has no need. All its services are 
 secured by its actual receipts. The present embarrass- 
 ment weighs only upon commerce, and arises from 
 the fact that the exceptional movements in specie, 
 occasioned by our foreign payments, have impoverished 
 our monetary circulation. The notes for whose issue 
 we ask authority are called on to supplement the 
 insufficiency of the circulation. Lastly, they are not, 
 as were the assignats, exposed to depreciation, since 
 they will have their equivalent in metal in the vaults 
 of the Bank of France. 
 
206 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 I then showed the absurdity, the incomparable 
 madness of the proposal to repay what the State 
 owed to the Bank of France by means of a loan of 
 fifteen hundred millions, interest on which must be 
 paid at the rate of 6 per cent., while the Bank was 
 satisfied with 1 per cent. Furthermore, this loan 
 would make utterly impossible that which we should 
 have to issue the following year, in order to complete 
 the payment of the war indemnity, and to achieve 
 the freedom of our territory. 
 
 M. Germain had most brilliantly opened this dis- 
 cussion which my speech brought to an end. Our 
 opponents, constrained to realize the impossibility of 
 doing anything but what the Government proposed, 
 endeavoured to mask their defeat by reducing the 
 four hundred millions we had asked for by one 
 hundred ; but the Assembly gave them to us by a 
 very large majority, and at the same time authorized 
 the Bank of France to issue small notes of ten and 
 five francs, which would serve the needs of petty 
 transactions, and would allow the withdrawal from 
 circulation of the notes for one and two francs issued 
 by other houses. Facts before long proved that 
 the Government was in the right. 
 
 Barely had the law been passed on the night of 
 the 29th of December, when the very next day 
 demands for discount facilities came in a rush. With- 
 out this law, the Bank would have been reduced either 
 to violate the legal limit of its issues, or to surrender 
 a part of its precious metal reserve. Furthermore, 
 the value of the bank-note rose and all monetary 
 embarrassments disappeared. 
 
 The Assembly, having taken a few days' vacation, 
 from the 30th of December, 1871, to the 6th of January, 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 207 
 
 1872, met again to deliberate upon the budget of 
 1872, presented tbe previous month. 
 
 In this budget the Government had proposed to 
 impose a tax on personal property which would yield 
 about thirty-seven millions. The discussion of this 
 tax, opened on the 6th, was still proceeding on the 
 8th of January. I then interposed in the debate, and 
 at my request the Assembly decided first to examine 
 all the proposed taxes, and not put them to the vote 
 until after this scrutiny of comparison. 
 
 Following this procedure, we came to the discussion 
 of the tax on raw materials, as it had been presented 
 to the Government on the 11th of the preceding June, 
 in the bill to amend the budget for 1871. 
 
 The discussion of this tax brought to the tribune the 
 manufacturers, who were interested in preventing its 
 acceptance. Most of them spoke of what they knew, 
 and spoke well ; but they reasoned badly under the 
 influence of their frightened interests. They were 
 nevertheless heard with, in a way, a favouring ear, 
 because it was difficult to disentangle the truth from 
 the error in their speeches. The Lyons people went 
 beyond all the others in their forebodings of ruin, 
 although they represented the wealthiest of our 
 industries, and the one least touched by our plans. 
 
 L\ was time for the Government to intervene ; and 
 on the 13th of January I made a speech, to the satisfac- 
 tion of the Assembly, which was beginning to grow 
 uneasy under all these threats of universal ruin. 
 
 At the outset I gave a rapid sketch of our financial 
 position, reminding them that after surcharging our 
 existing taxes with all they could bear, asking from 
 personal property a round thirty millions, we still 
 had to find one. hundred and ninety millions of new 
 
208 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 resources to balance our budget. The idea of an in- 
 come-tax having been cast aside by the Assembly, the 
 only thing possible was to re-establish the tax on raw 
 materials, which had been done away with by the 
 Empire. 
 
 From past experience, we knew for certain the yield 
 we could look for from this tax. Its collection would 
 involve no new expense ; the customs, which already 
 collected three or four hundred millions, would under- 
 take to recover another hundred or two hundred, 
 practically without increased cost to the Treasury. 
 To unprejudiced minds these two considerations would 
 have been enough to justify the Government proposal. 
 
 It remained to estimate the weight of the tax, the 
 dangers it might entail for industry. Now, the proposed 
 tax had this great advantage : that it was split up 
 among manufactured objects, so much so that it would 
 be hard to discern who might have paid it, the pro- 
 ducer or the consumer ; and to support this contention 
 I gave incontestable and convincing figures. I said 
 again that when the demand for an article is thoroughly 
 established, the increase in cost of its raw material 
 cannot injure its sale, if this increase is not excessive ; 
 and to prove this assertion I cited three recent experi- 
 ments which were fresh in every one's memory. 
 
 Transitory causes, among others the American Civil 
 War and silkworm disease, had sent up the prices of 
 cotton, of wool, and of raw silk ; yet the consumption of 
 the manufactured article had shown no diminution. 
 Much less, then, could the few centimes we proposed 
 to add to the prices of raw materials injure the pros- 
 perity of the industries that used these materials. 
 
 When I left the tribune, the members pressed round 
 me, and I was assured that I had carried the day. 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 209 
 
 Unfortunately, M. Grevy did not put the question to the 
 vote as soon as the discussion was ended. Satisfied 
 with our victory, which doubtless he did not imagine 
 would be compromised by his postponing its proclama- 
 tion, he put off the voting to the next sitting — that is 
 to say, from Saturday the 13th to Monday the 15th 
 of January. 
 
 In this interval, the vanquished rallied and tried a 
 new line of opposition. They pretended that we could 
 only impose a tax on raw materials if, by way of 
 compensation to our manufacturers, we taxed at the 
 same time foreign goods made with these materials ; 
 but as these taxes were forbidden by commercial 
 treaties, the Powers to whom we were bound by these 
 treaties would certainly not authorize us to establish 
 them. Therefore, according to our opponents, the tax 
 we proposed was impossible. Never had any one 
 behaved with such blatant anti-patriotism ! 
 
 All our commercial treaties contained a clause of 
 incontestable clearness, and until this day uncontested, 
 which provided for the case of our needing to impose 
 a tax on raw materials. In these various treaties it 
 was laid down, in language that differed from one to 
 another but in each case corroborating and explaining 
 one another, that if France came to tax certain raw 
 materials, foreign goods made of these materials 
 would, on entering France, pay a compensating duty. 
 The meaning, then, was obvious. If, for example, the 
 French weaver of a cotton fabric was obliged by a tax 
 on cotton to pay twenty centimes a pound more for his 
 material, to re-establish an equality in the conditions 
 of foreign competition it was quite equitable to lay a 
 compensating duty of twenty centimes on competing 
 goods. 
 
 14 
 
210 MEMOIES OF M. THIERS 
 
 The common sense and force of this stipulation which 
 appeared in all the treaties had never been in doubt, 
 and England had recently interpreted it in the same 
 way as ourselves. The date when our treaty of 1860 
 with England would expire was approaching, and we 
 had had to confer with that Power as to our commercial 
 policy. We had shown the most conciliating disposition, 
 the least reactionary from a commercial point of view. 
 "We had consented not to touch the treaty of 1860, 
 except for a slight increase of from 3 to 5 per cent, 
 on linen, woollen, and cotton threads and fabrics. 
 With this condition, the duties on iron, coal, chemicals, 
 earthenware, glass, and a great many other articles 
 were to continue as they were. 
 
 Entering at the same time upon the question of raw 
 materials, we had said that, applying tbe clauses of the 
 treaty, we should lay upon these materials a tax which 
 would lead to the establishing of compensating duties 
 remaining to be fixed. 
 
 The reply had been, and with no objection raised, 
 that when these compensating duties had been fixed, 
 they would be added to the increases we had already 
 asked for, and that a decision would be made upon the 
 total, not upon the compensating duty solely, the 
 legitimateness of which no one denied, but on the 
 increases asked for in the case of linen, woollen, and 
 cotton thread and fabrics. Lord Lyons, the English 
 Ambassador at Paris, always sensible and straight- 
 forward, had even said to me in one of our earliest 
 conversations on this subject : " The treaty is so clear 
 as to the compensating duty itself, that you need only 
 enact it and we could have nothing to say." 
 
 Not one of us (by that I mean the Ministers of 
 Finance and of Commerce, the Director-General of 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 211 
 
 Customs, and lastly myself) — not one of us, I say, had 
 any doubt as to France's right to tax, not manufactured 
 articles, but raw materials. And I said as much from 
 the tribune, expressing my astonishment that the 
 rights of France should have been called in question 
 by Frenchmen in their own country, when they were 
 not contested abroad. " But, perhaps," I added, " they 
 will be contested to-night or to-morrow, as soon as 
 what has been said from this tribune is known." 
 
 And in fact the very same evening M. Kern, the 
 Swiss Minister in Paris, a most scrupulous defender of 
 the interests of his own people, went to the Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs to lay before him objections which he 
 had never before raised on a subject which had never- 
 theless been under discussion for a considerable time. 
 
 This obstinate debate went on for several days, with 
 great violence on the part of the regular partisans of 
 the income-tax, in coalition with the manufacturing 
 aristocracy. Even good M. Feray was brought 
 upon the scene, one of our political friends, but who 
 had been excited to such a point that he was barely 
 recognizable. 
 
 M. Pouyer-Quertier spoke in his turn ; by his 
 enthusiasm, his warmth, his lively gestures, and a well- 
 chosen theme he produced a very great effect, and 
 we could think our cause won afresh ; but the Lyons 
 folk were moving heaven and earth. They sent to the 
 tribune M. Lucien Brun, a talented lawyer, an ardent 
 Legitimist, who at this juncture acted more through 
 electoral than from party interest. It had been said, 
 and not without reason, that only the big manu- 
 facturing class shrank from taking up its share of the 
 sacrifices imposed on the country. M. Lucien Brun 
 protested against this accusation. He was empowered, 
 
212 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 he said, to bring a declaration from a hundred and 
 sixty-five big manufacturers of Lyons who, with other 
 French manufacturers, undertook to find a sum of one 
 to two hundred millions, by taxing themselves in pro- 
 portion to the volume of their business. This declara- 
 tion, made at the last moment, read and commented 
 on with heat, was certain to have its effect upon 
 certain Legitimists who, as great landowners, were on 
 our side. 
 
 It was a decisive moment. I mounted the tribune 
 once more, and directly challenging M. Lucien Brun, 
 I asked him who were the signatories of this declaration 
 of his, and what sort of undertaking did they offer? 
 Would they pay a hundred or two hundred millions 
 into the Treasury every year? If they undertook to 
 do this, what guarantees did they propose, and of 
 what financial or commercial value ? Would their 
 signature be good, as good as what the State must 
 expect from its receipts ? Obviously their private 
 fortunes were not enough to guarantee the annual 
 payment of such a sum ; they must, then, inform us 
 from what spring of riches they proposed to draw in 
 order to honour their word. And as this spring did 
 not exist (for it would have been discovered before), 
 their offer was worthless and unworthy of such a 
 serious object. 
 
 This was an embarrassing attack, but like a lawyer 
 accustomed to opposition, M. Lucien Brun mounted 
 the tribune again to affirm both the high repute and 
 the solvency of the signatories to the declaration. 
 
 I replied that affairs of state were not dealt 
 with in this way, and that the Bank of France, for 
 example, would not on allegations of this kind advance 
 millions if we asked for them. 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 213 
 
 This effrontery on the part of the coalition of 
 interests angered a considerable number of deputies ; 
 everybody was weary, and the ballot was asked 
 for. 
 
 Two questions were put to the House. The first, 
 moved by M. Marcel Barthe, proposed to accept in 
 principle the tax on raw materials as an addition in- 
 tended to establish the equilibrium of the budget : a 
 committee would then be appointed to determine the 
 tariff of the tax. According to the second, moved by 
 M. Feray, the principle, instead of being admitted, 
 would merely be held in reserve, and a committee on 
 tariffs would be instructed only to have recourse to 
 taxing raw materials if it was absolutely impossible 
 to discover other sources of revenue. 
 
 I mounted the tribune to declare that I would never 
 accept any other wording than that of M. Marcel 
 Barthe ; that in the present condition of the country 
 it needed to be ruled by a strong will ; that if I gave 
 way to a shameless coalition of selfish interests, I 
 should be unworthy of the weight of responsibility 
 laid upon me ; and finally I asked that the principle 
 of the tax should be adopted in the wqrds of the 
 question as put by M. Marcel Barthe. 
 
 The Assembly understood the gravity of the situation. 
 The Left, which in the hope of making an income-tax 
 inevitable had pronounced against the tax on raw 
 materials, began to regret their attitude. The Right, 
 notwithstanding its sympathy for M. Lucien Brun, 
 feared lest the check on the taxation of raw materials 
 might make an income-tax inevitable, a tax which it 
 looked on as purely revolutionary; but the manu- 
 facturers of every shade of party, the Organists 
 delighted to have the chance of giving the Govern- 
 
214 MEMOIRS OP M. THIERS 
 
 ment a shake, many of the Centre, inspired by electoral 
 interests — all these were against us. We took the vote, 
 and, contrary to expectation, a majority — a weak 
 majority it is true — rejected M. Marcel Barthe's motion 
 and adopted that of M. Feray. 
 
 The Assembly rose, surprised and uneasy. A great 
 number of those who had just set their electoral 
 interests above the public interest pressed about me 
 to tell me that I must not be offended by this vote, 
 that it was without political significance, and that 
 after all if it did not terminate in the adoption of 
 the tax on raw materials, neither did it reject this 
 tax. What did a simple verbal distinction matter? 
 
 I gave a fairly rude reception to these people of no 
 pride who, when their own interests were safe, had 
 no thought for the dignity of those whom they advised, 
 and I went back to the Pr^sidence, disgusted to see that 
 mercantile calculations, party passions, the spirit of 
 system, had caused the true interest of the country 
 to be ignored in such a way, especially in the difficult 
 circumstances in which we were placed. I was also 
 deeply wounded that the Assembly, as a body, should 
 so little appreciate the devotion I gave to the service 
 of Prance. 
 
 I had held power for a year, and I had a right to 
 feel proud when I compared the state in which I 
 had received France with that in which I was about 
 to leave her. My colleagues had met ; while realizing 
 the great difficulties my retirement might cause, they 
 did not venture to ask me to sacrifice myself and 
 remain in power. M. Dufaure, however, emphasized 
 the importance of the work of freeing our territory, 
 which I had begun and would leave unfinished. I 
 replied that I had done half of it, and that from 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 215 
 
 most unworthy motives I had just been deprived of 
 the means of finishing it. 
 
 Next day, the 20th of January, 1872, I sent my 
 resignation to the President of the National Assembly. 
 Although the Assembly expected it, after what I had 
 said the previous day, it was profoundly moved on 
 hearing this communication. 
 
 In the ranks of the Left, those who had voted 
 against M. Marcel Barthe's motion blamed themselves 
 for following an impulse whose consequences they 
 now felt acutely. The members of the Right and 
 the Right Centre, having as yet found no one to 
 take the place of power in case it was left vacant, 
 broke out into reproaches against those among them 
 who had just prematurely provoked a crisis in the 
 Government. 
 
 Those alone who were so short-sighted as to set 
 the interests of their party above those of France 
 felt a real joy, which they did not seek to hide. 
 When they were asked by whom they proposed to 
 replace me, they dared not yet pronounce the name 
 of the Due d'Aumale, and timidly put forward that 
 of Marshal de MacMahon. But they could not, as yet, 
 say anything that would allow them to hope that he 
 would accept. For if the Marshal had about him 
 ambitious persons devoid of prudence, he had also a 
 friend full of discretion, M. de Melun, deputy of the 
 North, a stranger to ambition of any kind, who 
 advised him, as I was told, to keep the high 
 position to which M. Thiers had raised him. 
 
 After a vain attempt on the part of the Left Centre, 
 which begged me most urgently to withdraw my 
 resignation, after an evening spent in comings and 
 goings of the Left, both Centres, and the Moderate 
 
216 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 Right, they resolved to make the Assembly vote on 
 a motion whose mere wording would morally oblige 
 me to retract my decision. This motion, which was 
 carried almost unanimously, was couched in the 
 following terms : 
 
 "Considering that the Assembly, in its resolution 
 of yesterday's date, confined itself to holding a ques- 
 tion of economics in reserve, that its vote can in no 
 way be regarded as an expression of lack of con- 
 fidence and hostility, and would not imply a refusal 
 of the support it has always given to the Government, 
 
 "The Assembly hereby makes a fresh appeal to the 
 patriotism of the President of the Republic and refuses 
 to accept his resignation." 
 
 The Committee of the Assembly was directed to 
 convey this resolution to me. The words " the 
 Assembly makes a fresh appeal to the patriotism of 
 the President of the Republic " made a refusal on 
 my part, if not impossible, at least extremely difficult. 
 
 I was perplexed for a moment, for I was already 
 taking some pleasure in my own mind in the idea of 
 devoting myself, in my leisure, to a book that I 
 should have liked to finish before my death, and 
 which now perhaps I shall never be able to finish. 
 The fear that the country's interests might be com- 
 promised by the prolonging of this crisis which I 
 had not provoked, but which it depended on me to 
 bring to an end, was the one thing that decided me 
 to waive my determination. 
 
 I therefore gave the Committee of the Assembly 
 an amicable reception, and declared that in spite of 
 the difficulties of my task, I resumed it since they 
 made it my duty. 
 
 "In face of this fresh appeal to my patriotism," 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 217 
 
 said I to the President of the Assembly, " I cannot 
 return a refusal. You may thank the Assembly on 
 my behalf for this mark of confidence, and tell it 
 that I shall vow myself afresh without reserve to my 
 country's service." 
 
 We took leave of each other — they satisfied, I 
 regretting my vanished leisure, which I had caught 
 a glimpse of for a moment, though I was consoled 
 by the thought of continuing the work of freeing our 
 territory. 
 
 In Prance, as outside France, there was great satis- 
 faction, not unmixed with apprehensions in the minds 
 of people of discernment, who saw an evil presage in 
 this first rupture. 
 
 The keen agitations of these last days were followed 
 by a lull, during which no one would have cared to 
 attack the Government, which the friends of the 
 Orleans princes themselves despaired of overturning. 
 Only the Bonapartists continued to keep up the 
 struggle. One of them had resigned his seat in the 
 Assembly in order to have elected in his stead M. 
 Rouher, whose friends announced his coming appear- 
 ance in the tribune as a great event and the opening 
 of a new era. As for M. Rouher, he let every one say 
 what they pleased, showed himself little, and spoke 
 little ; barely did he address a few words to the fifteen 
 or twenty deputies who still avowed themselves 
 partisans of the Empire. 
 
 We were now in the month of February. The 
 Assembly was waiting until the committee instructed 
 to find some tax to substitute for that on raw material 
 should have succeeded in its task. But this search 
 must needs be in vain, for the budget committee 
 had exhausted all its skill in the same search, and 
 
218 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 the new committee could not succeed where the 
 former one had failed. It had only to confess its 
 powerlessness, after which, for want of anything 
 better, the tax on raw materials, mutilated, less 
 simple, and especially less fruitful, would be voted 
 as necessary. 
 
 While the committee on taxation was exhausting 
 itself in barren efforts, I was carrying on negotiations 
 in London to bring England to conclude an arrange- 
 ment with regard to the commercial treaties, 
 which had become difficult to obtain for several 
 reasons. To begin with, England, having found an 
 unexpected support in the Assembly, was in no hurry 
 to listen to our proposals, hoping that her cause 
 would carry the day in Paris without her having to 
 take any steps in the matter; furthermore, we were 
 feebly supported in London by the Due de Broglie, 
 our Ambassador. 
 
 To help him in his task, I had sent him M. Ozenne, 
 the General Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce, 
 a gentleman well versed in all questions of commercial 
 treaties and tariffs. But M. Ozenne had speedily 
 come to Versailles to tell me that instead of seconding 
 him, of putting him in touch with the right people, 
 our Ambassador had left him to go alone, saying that 
 commercial treaties were outside his sphere, and thus 
 countenancing the idea that it was all a matter of 
 opinions peculiar to M. Thiers, and that he had no 
 share either in the latter's enthusiasm or his 
 responsibility. 
 
 And so in London as in Paris, the questions of 
 tariffs and taxes, upon which depended the financial 
 equilibrium of our credit, and by consequence our 
 freedom, moved with the utmost difficulty. 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 219 
 
 But these were not the only difficulties to occupy 
 us at this moment (February and March 1872). Public 
 opinion, excited against Marshal Bazaine, was accusing 
 him of treason. 
 
 The Marshal had, it is true, committed the gravest 
 of strategic blunders. After winning a battle which 
 allowed him to disengage his army, he should have 
 evacuated Metz without losing a moment, and by 
 some marches to the rear escaped the danger of 
 being surrounded, while through fear that he would 
 be blamed for abandoning Metz, he shut himself up 
 in the fortress, allowing a wall of iron to be thrown 
 around him that it had later been impossible for 
 him to break through. That is what was then known 
 with any certainty of his conduct. That is why I 
 had resolutely replied to those who demanded that 
 I should give him up to the rage of the crowd : 
 
 "No, I will not fling the country into a disturbance 
 like that aroused in 1815 by a trial of bitter memory, 
 and I shall only submit the Marshal to the judgment 
 of his peers if he demands it himself." 
 
 The Marshal consulted the Minister for War and 
 myself as to what he should do ; but when he had 
 learned that the Government would not take any 
 responsibility in answering this request, in the 
 end he yielded to the outcries of public opinion, 
 and, in a letter which I made public, demanded a 
 trial. 
 
 Then, and not till then, did the Government make 
 a decision in pursuance of which it sent the Marshal 
 before a Council of War, a decision couched in the 
 following terms : 
 
 "Marshal Bazaine having demanded a trial," etc. 
 
 I gave orders that a convenient abode, near 
 
220 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 Versailles, should serve him as a prison. He is still 
 there now as I write. 
 
 At the same time General Trochu desired to insti- 
 tute proceedings against a journalist who had violently 
 attacked him. I knew the General's qualities and 
 his defects ; I knew that at Chalons he had promised 
 too much to the Emperor Napoleon III, and that 
 on the Fourth of September he had too little held to his 
 promises ; that during the siege of Paris he had not 
 understood how to use the resistance of that strong- 
 hold for the safety of France, and had directed that 
 resistance badly. I knew all this, but I also knew 
 that everybody had made mistakes in that cruel year, 
 that none the less the General remained a gallant 
 soldier, a noble heart, a brilliant mind, a lofty and 
 very engaging character. 
 
 I regarded as profoundly to be regretted recrimi- 
 nations which after our misfortunes could only dis- 
 credit us in the eyes of Europe, and I disapproved 
 of all the prosecutions set on foot by these retro- 
 spective animosities. This one of the General's against 
 the Press immediately roused the whole of the Im- 
 perial faction, to which the former Governor of 
 Paris was an object of hatred. I had not to meddle 
 with the affair, and I did not meddle with it; but 
 it was my duty to observe the movements of a society 
 I sought to pacify. I tried sometimes, when the 
 occasion offered, to set an example of the forbear- 
 ance that so many Frenchmen owed to each other at 
 that time. 
 
 So it was that, talking with Marshal de MacMahon 
 of the judgment that had just been delivered in the 
 affair of General Trochu, I expressed the regret 
 that the sentence on the journalist had been so 
 
PEESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 221 
 
 light, that it seemed a reprimand to the General. 
 Marshal MaoMahon, laying aside his customary 
 reserve, rejoined : 
 
 " Believe me, President, this judgment is a good 
 thing for the army, it is a lesson for it. It must 
 understand that a man ought not to be the Emperor's 
 General in the morning and a General of the Republic 
 at night on the same day." 
 
 And the following day, talking over this conver- 
 sation with General de Cissey, he added to what he 
 had said to me the previous day these words, which 
 the General reported to me verbatim : 
 
 " As for me, having received the command from 
 M. Thiers, I will not go to take M. Thiers' place as 
 President. Say so to him in order that he may not 
 believe the absurd sayings that are being put about." 
 
 Another and not the least serious cause of trouble 
 at this moment was the affair of the contracts. On 
 the 3rd of March, 1871, the Government had asked 
 and obtained from the Assembly the appointment of 
 a committee to investigate all the purchases sanc- 
 tioned by the different official departments since the 
 18th of July, 1870, to meet the needs occasioned by 
 the war. The Assembly then ordered an inquiry into 
 the acts of the Government of National Defence and 
 into the causes leading to the insurrection of the 
 18th of March. These two latter inquiries, the one 
 presided over by M. Saint-Marc Girardin, the other 
 by Count Daru, were directed towards a purely 
 political end : the opening up of grievances against 
 those members of the Assembly who had taken part in 
 the revolution of the Fourth of September, and against 
 those who were held to have been more or less 
 avowedly among the promoters of the Commune. On 
 
222 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 the contrary, in calling for an investigation of con- 
 tracts the Government had been influenced by no 
 political prejudice. It had merely wished, in the in- 
 terest of our finances, to examine the conditions and 
 the fulfilment of the contracts that were sanctioned 
 by the administration under exceptional circumstances. 
 The committee nominated for this purpose was pre- 
 sided over by the Due d'Audiffret-Pasquier. 
 
 M. d'Audiffret-Pasquier has imagination, felicity of 
 language, a real though uneven talent as a speaker, 
 and an excessively versatile mind. The affair of 
 these contracts was an opportunity for him to show 
 his qualities and his defects. An irreconcilable enemy 
 of the Empire, which he had always opposed, no less 
 hostile to the men of the Fourth of September, especi- 
 ally to M. Gambetta, he directed the labours of the com- 
 mittee in accordance with his own passions. Carried 
 away with his accustomed fervour, he often undiscern- 
 ingly fell upon the innocent as well as the guilty. 
 He came in this way to accuse General Susane, the 
 Director of War Stores, one of the most upright men 
 in the whole administration, a man of frank and 
 blunt character, a very distinguished officer, and highly 
 esteemed by everybody. 
 
 The General, in face of this attack on his honour, 
 answered M. d'Audiffret-Pasquier by an abusive letter, 
 and an impudent one, since it was addressed to the 
 president of a committee appointed by the Assembly, 
 which took up the cause of its representative, and 
 I was forced to interfere in order to keep the 
 affair from becoming more serious. I was asked to 
 dismiss the General. On no account would I have 
 been willing to sacrifice this honest man and excellent 
 servant to the State ; but I got him to resign his 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 223 
 
 post as Director of War Stores, in which, working 
 hard and loyally, he had had nothing but trouble ; 
 I put him back on the Artillery Board, of which he 
 had previously been a member, and where he would 
 find otium cum dignitate. By means of this satis- 
 faction to the Assembly's claim, without injury to 
 General Susane, everything was smoothed over. 
 
 M. d'Audiffret, continuing his campaign against the 
 Imperial administration, made his first appearance in 
 the tribune with a speech on the contracts, which 
 proclaimed an orator. His success was very marked, 
 even among the Radicals, who rejoiced to see the 
 blows they thought themselves exposed to diverted 
 to fall upon the Empire. 
 
 The attack that fell upon the fallen regime was a 
 rude one, but easy to repulse, so shaky was the logic 
 of its assailant. M. Rouher, whose friends every day 
 promised and bragged of his coming debut, could not 
 let slip this opportunity for speaking, and the day 
 for the reply to the Due d'Audiffret-Pasquier being 
 fixed, curiosity ran high among the benches to which 
 all the Bonapartist public had thronged. 
 
 Speaking before the Versailles Assembly for the 
 first time, M. Rouher, once a Minister in power, had 
 become a Minister impeached, bearing the weight of 
 all the mistakes of a regime of which he was the 
 most deeply compromised representative. It was a 
 dangerous position for him, and he presented him- 
 self like one conscious of the danger. A vigorous and 
 sensible reasoner, when he showed up all the short- 
 comings of the committee, he had the advantage of 
 it, yet without obtaining the applause of the Assembly. 
 But very soon, by a premature resumption of assur- 
 ance, by a few tactless justifications, he raised one 
 
224: MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 of the most violent storms in the Assembly that I 
 have ever witnessed. Assailed with invectives, even 
 insults, for half an hour he presented, in the tribune, 
 the spectacle of a terrible punishment, well deserved 
 but cruel. For my own part, though assuredly I could 
 not congratulate myself on his behaviour to myself, 
 I was seized with pity. I demanded, though it is true 
 vainly, that the agony should be brought to an end. 
 Dominated by the fury of these attacks, M. Rouher was 
 forced to endure them to the very end, and thence- 
 forward we never saw him recover from this defeat. 
 At this time, too, was raised the question of the 
 representative body of the nation making its abode 
 in Paris. Since order had been re-established, this 
 question had frequently come up in our minds, and 
 every time it was touched upon, directly or indirectly, 
 in conversation or from the tribune, it had been the 
 theme of hot discussion. At Versailles, the Assembly 
 believed itself safer than in Paris against popular 
 violence, and freer to give itself up to its monarchist 
 tendencies. And so all attempts to bring it to the 
 capital had only resulted in irritating without con- 
 vincing or moving it. It was then highly impolitic to 
 renew the attempt, which did not prevent young 
 Count Duchatel, the distinguished and very liberal 
 son of the former Minister, from making the formal 
 proposal that the seat of the Assembly should be 
 transferred to Paris. As it was not an urgent proposi- 
 tion, and as it required only to be sent before a 
 committee, we might have expected that this would 
 be ordered. M. Casimir Perier was of his opinion, and 
 had pledged himself strongly in the matter. For my 
 part, not being convinced like him of the certainty 
 of success, I communicated my doubts to him, very 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 225 
 
 circumspectly ; but he did not share them, putting too 
 much trust in friends who urged him forward without 
 having determined to support him. 
 
 The event very soon justified my fears. M. Duchatel's 
 motion for the transfer of the Assembly from Versailles 
 to Paris having reached the agenda, M. Casimir Perier 
 supported it in the tribune with great skill, in a simple, 
 short, and forcible speech. But the Centres and the 
 Right, encouraged in their opposition by a member 
 of the Left, M. C6zanne, refused even to accept the 
 Duchatel motion for consideration. If M. Casimir 
 Perier had not obtained what he asked, he had 
 certainly won a personal triumph by his speech. 
 
 I drove him away from the sitting in my carriage 
 to talk with him alone, and first of all, about this 
 awkward contretemps, and I parted from him in 
 hopes that I had decided him against giving his 
 resignation. Unfortunately, I had not convinced him. 
 Irritated against his friends who had deserted him 
 in spite of their solemn promises, he came to announce 
 to me his irrevocable determination to leave the 
 Ministry. It was not an easy matter to replace one 
 so considerable and so highly esteemed as M. Casimir 
 Perier. The Ministry for the Interior could only be 
 held by a man who, while a Republican, would reassure 
 the Conservatives. I chose M. Victor Lefranc, a witty, 
 ingenious individual, who had on occasion managed 
 to please the Centres by his engaging personality 
 and his easy talent, without becoming an object of 
 suspicion to the Republicans in whose ranks he had 
 been born and had never ceased to live. With the 
 goodwill of his colleagues he passed from the Ministry 
 of Commerce to that of the Interior, and the Chamber 
 was not displeased at this change. 
 
 15 
 
226 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 His successor in the Ministry of Commerce was 
 M. de Goulard, who had already represented the 
 Government in the negotiations of Brussels and of 
 Frankfort, in which he had displayed tact and 
 savoir-faire. 
 
 Easter was approaching, and the Assembly, which 
 had been sitting from December to the end of March, 
 wished to have a vacation in order to attend the 
 General Councils, as a new law had instituted two 
 sessions for these Councils, one in April, the other in 
 August. The vacation was settled to last from the 
 30th of March to the 22nd of April. 
 
 Paris had just had a set-back in the resolution of 
 the Assembly refusing to transfer itself to the city. 
 I wished to give it a kind of compensation by spending 
 my days at the Elys^e, for I went back to Versailles 
 every night, as the Permanent Committee, an offshoot 
 of the Assembly and sharing its prejudices, pretended 
 that I had no right to leave Versailles, its legal 
 domicile. Though this exaction had no serious founda- 
 tion, I resigned myself to it. 
 
 I took advantage of these appearances in Paris to 
 invite to dinner at the Elysee, followed by a reception, 
 first the Diplomatic Corps, which was very assiduous 
 in its visits to the Pr^sidence ; then in succession, the 
 municipal authorities, the representatives of the great 
 and the middle commercial classes, the magistrature, 
 the most distinguished men in letters, science, and art. 
 These receptions had an excellent effect, and I may 
 say that if sometimes I had unpleasantness where 
 the Assembly was concerned, from the country in 
 general, and from Paris in particular, I had only 
 testimonies of sympathy. 
 
 At the end of April I resumed, at Versailles, in the 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 227 
 
 midst of party agitations, the most difficult tasks, 
 and especially that of effecting the final evacuation 
 of our territory. Although accepted in theory by the 
 Prussians, I could only ensure its execution, as will 
 presently be seen, by a most laborious negotiation. 
 And at the same time, in the Assembly itself, we were 
 about to have to take up the reorganization of the 
 army. 
 
 The reorganization of our military forces was at 
 the moment occupying the whole country, eager to 
 resume its rank in the world. Europe also was 
 paying close attention to what was about to be done 
 in France on this question. 
 
 Among the foreign Powers, several were ready 
 to applaud our military resurrection, as they had 
 applauded our financial resurrection. The Berlin 
 Cabinet, on the contrary, was beginning to take 
 alarm, and observed us with unconcealed preoccupa- 
 tion. They said that the adoption by France of 
 compulsory service would be the signal for a new 
 war, and the Emperor shared this fear, which Count 
 von Arnim, his Ambassador in Paris, did all in his 
 power to instil into the mind of his Government and 
 fellow-countrymen. The army, then, was a French 
 and European question at the same time. 
 
 I have already said how many false notions 
 upon the causes of our misfortunes had been the 
 offspring of those misfortunes. The great majority 
 of the French, among Republicans as much as among 
 Monarchists, was persuaded that the Prussians had 
 conquered us because their military organization was 
 founded upon universal and compulsory service. I 
 was far from sharing this opinion. We had been 
 conquered because : 
 
228 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 1. The war had not been prepared for. Never, in 
 any time, in any country, had a war been undertaken 
 with less means to make war. We had not two 
 hundred and fifty thousand men to put in our fighting 
 line ; our artillery in quantity and in quality was 
 deplorably inferior to that of the Prussians ; our 
 magazines were empty ; the stronghold of Metz, 
 which was to be the pivot of our operations, was 
 not even armed; and finally, we had no settled 
 alliances. 
 
 2. To our insufficient means were joined incom- 
 petence in handling troops. Fifteen days had been 
 spent on a line fifty leagues long, without making 
 a single movement ; the army had been split up into 
 five corps that could not help one another, and the 
 right wing, posted without support on the other side 
 of the Vosges, could not fail to be swept away, 
 however heroic its resistance. Only by going strongly 
 forward with a mass of two hundred and twenty 
 thousand men, and on condition that they left thirty 
 thousand on the crest of the Vosges to guard its 
 right, could our army have discomfited the Prussians, 
 cut their lines and flung their troops into an 
 irretrievable disorder. 
 
 3. Even with all these mistakes, all would not have 
 been lost if, after the disaster of Reichshoffen, we had 
 adopted the course, a grievous one no doubt, of 
 abandoning Metz, and making two or three marches 
 in retreat to escape the danger of being surrounded, 
 instead of remaining where we were and giving the 
 Germans time to envelop us with five hundred thou- 
 sand men, and every facility for taking all our cadres 
 at one single stroke, and with them all means of 
 remaking an army. After this disaster the height of 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 229 
 
 stupidity had been reached in marching on Sedan 
 instead of falling back on Paris. 
 
 Such were the real causes of our misfortunes and 
 not a pretended superiority of organization in the 
 Prussian army resulting from universal and compulsory 
 service. On the contrary, this system of filling up the 
 ranks by sacrificing the quality of the soldiers to 
 their numbers is a source of weakness rather than 
 of strength to an army. 
 
 This theory is not mine only, but also that of 
 Marshal Bugeaud, of real soldiers and statesmen, 
 expert in these things, who one and all declare that an 
 army of soldiers who know and love their profession 
 is by far superior to a more numerous army which 
 includes only men insufficiently penetrated with the 
 military spirit. 
 
 The first thing we ought to take in hand with a 
 view to the recruiting of the army was, in my opinion, 
 to base this recruiting on certain principles which, 
 while procuring the necessary number of men, would 
 above all assure us of their quality. To ask for an 
 army of fifteen or eighteen hundred thousand men 
 denotes a complete ignorance of these difficult questions 
 in those who speak in this way. Nine hundred thou- 
 sand men, or a million, are enough for the safety of 
 France, and besides it is all her budget can endure. 
 Now, a million men on a war footing supposes five 
 hundred thousand on a peace footing. To embody 
 them in their units demands not less than one hun- 
 dred and fifty regiments of infantry, forty of artillery, 
 and seventy-two of cavalry; and these units, if they 
 are to be given a substance that will not leave them 
 in the condition of hollow lifeless skeletons, will entail 
 an expenditure of five hundred millions. 
 
230 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 For all these men to become real soldiers, one, two, 
 three years' service is not enough. Not in so short 
 a period can we obtain passive obedience from them, 
 and inspire them with the religion of the flag and the 
 contempt of death — indispensable conditions for victory. 
 Such self-abnegation can only spring up and take 
 impregnable root in men's minds by dint of long 
 association with minds themselves penetrated by it. 
 
 In the same way non-commissioned officers are not 
 made in less than three years, and after spending three 
 years in making them, it is not exorbitant to demand 
 two years " to enjoy them," as a certain general, a man 
 of sense and intelligence, once phrased it. 
 
 But if the universal compulsory service of Prussia 
 is bad for France, because it would reduce men's stay 
 with the colours to too short a period, their system 
 of regional or provincial armies gives them a real point 
 of superiority over us which I did my utmost to take 
 from them, and which I will have the merit of taking 
 from them if the permanent formations of army corps, 
 which I brought into existence, are retained. 
 
 In Prussia soldiers from the same province serve 
 together, commanded by officers from their home 
 country ; their material is close beside them, a very 
 great advantage for the change from peace to a war 
 footing. But in this way they have whole army corps 
 made up of Westphalians, of Silesians, of Pomeranians ; 
 and if a similar system were practised in France, we 
 should have army corps of Parisians, of Burgundians, 
 of Provencals, etc., which would run the risk of 
 compromising or even destroying our unity, the 
 greatest element in the might of France, and giving 
 civil war opportunities it has not had since 1789. 
 
 Without adopting the Prussian system, we might 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 231 
 
 attain a speed in mobilization not less than hers by 
 means of what I called permanent formations, which 
 consist in the existence before war time, not of regi- 
 ments, but of complete army corps. 
 
 In this way, with nine hundred thousand men on 
 a war footing, serving for five years and encadrtis as 
 I have just explained, so as to give, on a peace footing, 
 five hundred thousand men divided among army corps 
 organized permanently, I was certain of procuring for 
 France the greatest military power she had ever 
 possessed. But for that we would need a war budget 
 of five hundred millions. This budget, thanks to an 
 increase granted me already by the Assembly, I had 
 nearly obtained, and I hoped with perseverance to 
 bring this annual increase up to a hundred millions. 
 
 While preparing this scheme of military reorganiza- 
 tion which I wished to submit to the Assembly for 
 sanction, I was busily studying the actual condition 
 of the army. In order to become better acquainted 
 with it than through mere official information I had 
 got into direct correspondence with the colonels of all 
 branches of the service, and demanded frequent reports 
 from them. This plan had very great advantages. It 
 let the colonels know that the higher authorities had 
 their eyes upon them, which obliged them to keep 
 watch over everything in their regiments; and it 
 allowed us to estimate the merit of each officer. I 
 found, besides, in these reports, which I read regularly, 
 though it was a lengthy task, invaluable hints upon the 
 spirit of the army, the progress of its education, the 
 condition of its armament, equipment, etc. 
 
 There was one measure especially to which I attached 
 very great importance. In the days before the war 
 we had allowed regiments to be divided up into 
 
232 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 battalions, half-battalions, sometimes even into com- 
 panies at the pleasure of the various towns, which all 
 wished to have a garrison large or small so as to help 
 the octroi. The consequence was the impossibility of 
 training the men and the annihilation of all military 
 spirit. Another inconvenience was that certain regi- 
 ments, sent to do garrison duty a hundred or a hun- 
 dred and fifty leagues away, were entirely separated 
 from their depots, which made it very difficult for their 
 colonels to keep them under inspection. Lastly, and 
 above all, the artillery being split up into isolated 
 batteries, the regiments of this arm had batteries 
 almost in every corner of France. I wanted to put an 
 end to these dislocations, and already I had obtained 
 some improvements in the matter; however, in 
 May 1873 this work of concentration was far from 
 finished. 
 
 I was also engrossed in the question of fortresses, 
 war material, the system of supplies, the permanent 
 formations, and the great experiment in encampment, 
 which had given such remarkable results at Versailles 
 that I had established two new camps, one at Avord, 
 near Bourges, the other at Ruchard, near Tours. 
 
 While I was busy over the reorganization of our 
 military forces, the Assembly gave a committee charge 
 to draw up a digest of proposals on the recruiting 
 system of the army. The majority of this committee, 
 composed of forty-five members, generals, economists, 
 financiers, lawyers, at first wanted to adopt the 
 Prussian system in all its details, without omitting 
 anything ; then, as I had foreseen, it finished by divid- 
 ing, and wiser ideas found support in it. 
 
 One of its members, M. de Chasseloup-Laubat, who 
 had been chosen to draw up the report of its proceed- 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 233 
 
 ings, was a suave, experienced man, but perhaps lacking 
 the full courage of his good sense. Two soldiers, also 
 on the committee, Generals Ducrot and Chanzy, after 
 showing themselves strongly opposed to my ideas 
 at the outset, had been brought round to them by the 
 consideration of the period of service. Two years,* 
 three years had not seemed enough to them, and they 
 had rallied to the five years' service which I had taken 
 as the foundation of the whole system. 
 
 Once this point was reached, the cause of the proper 
 organization of the army was won. As soon as they 
 were willing to keep men with the colours for five 
 years, the whole class could not be called up, and on 
 this point the Prussian system was discarded. And 
 since, besides, there had never seriously been any ques- 
 tion of adopting the territorial system of army corps, 
 we were going back to the old French organization ex- 
 cept for certain modifications seen to be necessary. But 
 to win the reality of things we had to sacrifice words. 
 M. de Chasseloup-Laubat advised me to this effect, and 
 I did not hesitate to follow his advice. It was agreed, 
 then, that the words " compulsory service " should be 
 set at the head of the law, but that the principle would 
 be applied in the following way : 
 
 The annual draft eligible for military service, or not 
 by law exempted, being about one hundred and fifty 
 thousand men, would be obliged to serve, without 
 exception, if the Government should judge it necessary; 
 but the Government would be free to take in only 
 seventy-five thousand men each year. Under these 
 conditions compulsory service presented only advan- 
 tages, among others that of relieving the Government 
 from the necessity of voting the law of the contingent 
 year by year. There was only one objectionable 
 
234 MEMOIRS OF M. THIEES 
 
 feature in it : the suppression of military substitution, 
 instead of which volunteer service of a year was intro- 
 duced, which consisted of authorizing, under certain 
 conditions, volunteers to serve only for one year, 
 provided they paid for their own keep — a bastard 
 institution which none the less might prove very 
 fruitful for the army budget. 
 
 Unhappily, the bases of this agreement, arrived at 
 between the committee on the army and the Govern- 
 ment, were discussed before the Assembly starting 
 from the month of March on till the month of June, 
 precisely at the moment when we had come to negoti- 
 ations with Germany for the evacuation of our 
 territory. 
 
 Immediately after the convention of the 12th of 
 October, 1871, which had fixed for the 1st of May, 1872, 
 the payment in full of the first two milliards, I had 
 arrived at the certain conviction that even before this 
 we might perhaps occupy ourselves profitably in paying 
 the last three milliards. The reports I received from 
 Nancy and from Berlin, besides, made me hope that the 
 Emperor and the Chancellor would be disposed to 
 listen favourably to proposals from us on this subject. 
 
 According to the third article of the Versailles 
 preliminaries, the Emperor, in the matter of the pay- 
 ment of the last three milliards, might substitute for 
 the territorial guarantee, consisting in the occupation 
 of part of French territory, a financial guarantee, if it 
 was offered under conditions recognized as sufficient 
 for German interests. 
 
 Before speaking of this substitution, we thought it 
 wise to convince Germany that we had both the will 
 and the means to pay. Our creditors, very eager to 
 have our money, would so much the more easily enter 
 
PEBSIDENCY OF THE EEPUBLIO 235 
 
 upon the path laid down in the peace preliminaries, 
 and we would have fewer entreaties to make. Accord- 
 ingly M. de R&nusat and myself, who invariably 
 consulted together, had said to Count von Arnim in 
 January 1872, when he had just been accredited as 
 Ambassador in Paris, that we would consider negotiat- 
 ing this serious business after the payment due on the 
 1st of May, and at the same time I instructed 
 M. de Gontaut Biron, whom we had just sent to Berlin 
 as Ambassador, to speak to the same effect. 
 
 It was for financial as much as diplomatic reasons 
 that we had deferred opening these negotiations until 
 after the payment of the first two milliards, for it 
 was proper to terminate this operation before embark- 
 ing upon another. But as our abundant resources 
 made it possible for us to pay in March what 
 was due only in May, there was no longer any reason 
 to delay moving in the matter until this date, and we 
 were about to do so wben Count von Arnim announced 
 to us on the 27th of February that he was starting for 
 Rome. His absence was to last only for two weeks. 
 
 When he took leave of me I told him to hasten back, 
 as we were awaiting his return to speak of the engage- 
 ments we still had to fulfil, and at the same time I 
 informed M. de Gontaut of my conversation with 
 Count von Arnim, warning him that I was waiting 
 for the latter's return to Paris before opening negoti- 
 ations. 
 
 M. de Gontaut had arrived in Berlin at the moment 
 when General Manteuffel was there also, summoned 
 by the Sovereign to receive the order of the Black 
 Eagle. The General having made use of this occasion 
 to reassure the Emperor and the Chancellor upon the 
 internal condition of France and on the disposition 
 
236 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 of the Government, M. de Gontaut had been well 
 received at the Court, but coldly enough by Count Bis- 
 marck, who put himself about very little for foreign 
 diplomats when they were merely men of the world. 
 
 Our first news, then, from our Ambassador was 
 reassuring. But immediately after the coming of 
 Count von Arnim, who had gone to Berlin first, 
 before Rome, their friendly attitude gave way to the 
 most violent feelings of hostility towards Prance. 
 The war party, with Count Moltke at its head, after 
 having for a moment effaced itself before the peace 
 party, to which the Emperor and the Chancellor 
 were attached, had resumed a strong influence over 
 public opinion. 
 
 Our schemes of military reorganization, imprudently 
 discussed in the Assembly, exaggerated and misrepre- 
 sented by the Press, and also the intention attributed 
 to us of asking for the immediate evacuation of our 
 soil in exchange for payment made before it fell due, 
 had been sufficient to arouse all the susceptibilities 
 and fears of Germany. And this hostility, sad to relate, 
 found a basis in letters sent from Paris to Berlin by 
 Frenchmen, who represented the evacuation as the 
 greatest blunder. It would be, they said, the signal 
 for the immediate dissolution of the existing Assembly, 
 followed by the election of a Radical Assembly — in 
 other words, the general disturbance of Europe. 
 
 Carried away by all these exciting causes, the war 
 party demanded that they should hurl themselves at 
 once on France before she should have reorganized 
 her military strength. This opinion was being loudly 
 expressed, especially in the higher ranks in the army, 
 although Count Moltke showed himself reserved upon 
 this point in the presence of our representative. 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 237 
 
 The Emperor, who was anxious above all things to 
 be paid by France, would very gladly have seen 
 negotiations opened to bring about this result, but 
 not being insensible to the argument that war might 
 recur in no distant future, he feared to dispossess 
 himself of the occupied territory before finishing the 
 fortifications he was constructing in Lorraine, in 
 Alsace, and along the whole of his new frontiers. 
 These were also Count Bismarck's feelings on the 
 subject. 
 
 M. de Gontaut kept me informed of this state of 
 ideas. The same intelligence coming from Nancy, from 
 General Manteuffel, always friendly and always well 
 informed as to the Emperor's mind, I understood that 
 the one way to avoid the most serious difficulties was 
 to inform Berlin, without waiting for Count von Arnim 
 to return to Paris, of our intention to open negotiation 
 in the matter at once. 
 
 I sent to General Manteuffel, and I directed M. de 
 Gontaut to say in Berlin that our offer to pay in 1872 
 a debt due only in 1874 proved how little disposed 
 we were to make war. On the eve of war we should 
 not be so mad as to fill their Treasury at the expense 
 of our own. 
 
 M. de Gontaut was to seek every opportunity to 
 inform Prince Bismarck, not only that we were eager 
 to free ourselves from our debt, but that we left to 
 him the selection of the financial combination which 
 would be most agreeable to him to guarantee this 
 payment ; that we only asked him, in his turn, to 
 explain his views as to the method and the time for 
 the restitution of territory due to us. 
 
 Unfortunately, Count von Arnim, now returned from 
 Rome to Berlin, was interested in not allowing us to 
 
238 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 open a negotiation the discharge of which he wished 
 to reserve for himself on his return from Paris, and 
 he managed to persuade M. de Gontaut not to approach 
 this subject with the Chancellor, who, besides, rudely 
 enough affected to avoid meeting with diplomatists. 
 
 It is true that at this time Prince Bismarck was very 
 much occupied with his struggle against the particu- 
 larism of the Catholics. After having conquered the 
 resistance which the federal party had from all time 
 opposed to the attempts towards the unification of 
 Germany, he thought he perceived this resistance 
 springing up anew in the opposition of the Catholics 
 to a Protestant Empire, an opposition similar to that 
 of the Protestants to the Catholic Empire of Charles V. 
 This last difficulty, and the refusal of the war party 
 to evacuate the French territory, a refusal that made 
 impossible any negotiation for a payment in advance 
 of the three milliards, were perhaps sufficient to 
 explain why Prince Bismarck avoided seeing our 
 Ambassador, and kept Count von Arnim in Berlin. 
 
 However that may be, after delays that had taken 
 up the whole month of April, Count von Arnim 
 presented himself at Versailles in the beginning of 
 May. 
 
 I received him most cordially, and I noticed that he 
 eyed me very attentively, to assure himself, doubtless, 
 whether all he had been told of my health was true. 
 Count von Arnim was charged by his Government 
 to convey their utmost confidence in me, personally, 
 but to express extreme distrust with regard to the 
 situation, a distrust that extended to all parties alike. 
 In Berlin they were uneasy about my health, and 
 feared the possible consequences of my retirement. 
 
 Count von Arnim, then, in a fashion, wished to defend 
 
PEESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 239 
 
 his Government against the rumours that had filled 
 the English papers, in consequence of which it might 
 have been thought that war was imminent. We should 
 see in these rumours only Stock Exchange manoeuvres. 
 This was the only real truth : Prince Bismarck was 
 powerful, but not the master. His influence with the 
 Emperor was great without being always decisive. 
 Now, the Emperor had been inspired with very serious 
 misgivings. 
 
 "Were not these misgivings, perhaps," I said to 
 Count von Arnim, " aroused by our armaments ? 
 Possibly some one has told you that I am preparing 
 a formidable army?" 
 
 " No," he replied ; " I am and always have been kept 
 informed by you with complete candour." 
 
 " I want to restore to France," I continued, " the 
 rank she ought to hold, and without a real army one 
 has no rank. But I want peace also ; I have promised 
 and I will keep my word." 
 
 "My Government," repeated Count von Arnim, 
 "trusts to your word; I have orders to tell you so." 
 
 He then explained his position with regard to the 
 negotiations that were about to open. According to 
 his instructions he was to omit nothing to bring it 
 to a speedy termination ; and he asked us, therefore, 
 not to be too exacting at the outset upon the question 
 of the evacuation of our country. After a first con- 
 cession from the Emperor another might follow; but 
 if we asked for all we should be granted nothing. 
 
 " Make us," he said, " a definite, positive offer ; I shall 
 send it to Berlin, and you shall have an answer before 
 long." 
 
 I took care not to seem resigned to piecemeal and 
 successive evacuations, and I answered that I would 
 
240 MEMOIES OF M. THIERS 
 
 not delay to send him the definite and positive proposal 
 he asked for. 
 
 On the 5th of May, as I had promised, I dispatched 
 to the German Embassy a note relating to the payment 
 of our debt and the evacuation of our territory. In 
 this note we made the following declarations : 
 
 1. That we were disposed to pay the three milliards 
 still owing by means of a loan of this sum raised at 
 one operation, and whose total would be paid direct 
 to the Prussians, at intervals as short as the payment 
 of the subscribers' instalments and the state of the 
 money market would allow. If any other scheme 
 would suit Prussia better we were ready to entertain 
 it, provided it was practicable. 
 
 2. That, our obligations once fulfilled, we asked 
 how Germany would fulfil hers — that is to say, the 
 restoration of the territory occupied by her. We 
 pointed out, besides, that we were two years in 
 advance of the date on which we had engaged to 
 pay, without ever suggesting that in our opinion 
 this sacrifice should entail, on Germany's part, a 
 corresponding anticipation of the time of evacuation 
 of our territory. 
 
 This document, dispatched to Count von Arnim by 
 the intermediary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
 remained unanswered for two or three days. 
 
 Count von Arnim had without doubt consulted 
 Berlin by telegraph. When these few days had 
 elapsed, he sent us a memorandum, not harsh, but 
 cold and intricate, replying, in answer to our note, 
 that the forestalling of our payments was merely 
 apparent, for in order to pay the enormous sum of 
 three milliards by 1874, we should have begun our 
 instalments long before the present moment. This 
 
PEESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 241 
 
 meant that they did not consider themselves as 
 obliged, by our pretended anticipation, to anticipate 
 the time of evacuation. 
 
 While I was having an answer to this tardy ob- 
 jection prepared by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
 I received from Count von Arnim a note couched in 
 curious terms, which mysteriously requested me to 
 give him an appointment to see me. This was the 
 15th of May. I replied immediately accepting the 
 rendezvous, and Count von Arnim kept it most punc- 
 tually. 
 
 He began, with genuine embarrassment, by asking 
 me to preserve absolute secrecy. 
 
 " Our negotiation is not progressing," he said, " and 
 I have come to propose a way of advancing it more 
 rapidly. With your loan scheme you need too much 
 time for payment. Here is the plan that would 
 be proper to adopt : 
 
 " 1. A milliard, in a loan by lottery that would 
 immediately be placed in Germany, perhaps in a 
 month. 
 
 "2. A milliard in foreign values, to be collected 
 by bankers and deposited in the hands of Prussia 
 immediately, which would answer to the famous 
 financial guarantees. 
 
 " 3. A loan of a milliard in 5 per cent, stock, equally 
 deposited direct in the Prussian Treasury." 
 
 Count von Arnim did not say, but left it to be 
 understood that, in consideration of these operations, 
 Prussia would consider herself as sufficiently secured 
 to take part in a speedy and satisfactory negotiation, 
 without saying in what particular it would be satis- 
 factory for us. At the same time he begged me not 
 to let it be known that this plan came from him, 
 
 16 
 
242 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 and finally spoke to me of the financier Henckel, 
 asking me to help him in society in Paris by preventing 
 the recurrence of certain disagreeable manifestations 
 of which he had been the object. 
 
 I gave a sufficiently obliging answer to these 
 requests, but I made inquiries regarding Henckel. 
 I soon discovered that he was a friend of Count von 
 Arnim's, and the rival in finance of Bleiichroder, 
 who was said to be in Bismarck's confidence. 
 
 Seeing at once that the rivalries of business magnates 
 might complicate the negotiation, I was on my guard. 
 The day after Count von Arnim's visit I received 
 a visit from Herr Henckel, who had let me know by 
 one of his friends that he desired an opportunity for a 
 conversation with me. 
 
 He painted the situation in very dark colours ; 
 spoke of Berlin's misgivings as most grave, most 
 disquieting, assuring me, however, that they were 
 not directed towards me, and announced himself as 
 the friend of Prince Bismarck, whom he was shortly 
 to see and of whom he would presently give me news. 
 
 From his way of talking I perceived that he was 
 the author of Count von Arnim's scheme. 
 
 I saw the latter gentleman again. I declared to 
 him that every plan was the same to me so long as 
 it was possible, that I was ready to add to my 
 previous proposal the one he had suggested, leaving 
 his Government free to choose between them ; and 
 on May 17th I sent him a second proposal entirely 
 in accordance with his views. 
 
 We remained for several days with no answer, 
 trying to divine the reason for this inexplicable silence 
 on the part of the Prussian Government, and the 
 reserve in which Count von Arnim and Henckel 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 243 
 
 secluded themselves, when the rumour of what was 
 passing in Berlin fell upon our ears. 
 
 Herr Henckel, returning from Silesia, had told an in- 
 termediary whom |he employed with me, that things 
 were going badly ; that Count Bismarck had fallen into 
 a violent rage on receiving the dispatch in which the 
 French Government gave him to understand that it 
 proposed to begin paying the three milliards only 
 from the month of March in 1874; that according 
 to him this was contrary to the text and to the 
 spirit of the treaties ; gave grounds for assuming an 
 intention not to adhere to the treaties, and that there 
 was nothing left for him but to mobilize the Prussian 
 army. 
 
 I suppose that Herr Henckel had exaggerated the 
 gravity of the situation, but I did not doubt that 
 there was some truth in what he had said of Prince 
 Bismarck's ill-humour at the thought of a delay 
 in paying the indemnity, as well as the hostile disposi- 
 tions manifested by the militsiry faction as soon as 
 they had a complete and immediate evacuation 
 mooted. This would explain the temper of the one 
 and the threats of the other at receiving our first over- 
 tures. I was confirmed in this idea by an interview 
 I granted Herr Henckel on the 24th of May. After 
 recalling the very hostile disposition of the Prussian 
 Government, he said that all this storm came solely 
 from our not having been explicit. 
 
 " What ? " said I. " I wrote twice : the first time 
 I offered three milliards at 5 per cent, payable in 
 thirty months; the second time, to fall in with 
 German wishes (I did not say it was at Count von 
 Arnim's suggestion), I proposed three milliards as 
 follows : one milliard in a lottery loan, a milliard in 
 
244 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 5 per cent, stock, and a milliard in foreign values, 
 adding at the same time that if these proposals were 
 not suitable, I would accept others, so long as they 
 were practicable. I made, then, two successive pro- 
 posals ; I have had no reply, and yet you say I am 
 not explicit enough ! I cannot understand ; I can see 
 nothing through these clouds ! Can you have some- 
 thing behind all this? Can you be thinking of 
 making war upon us? Do you wish another nego- 
 tiator than myself?" 
 
 "No," exclaimed Herr Henckel, " there is no question 
 of such a thing. The whole difficulty comes from 
 your not mentioning the evacuation in your pro- 
 posals." 
 
 " But it is not our part to speak on this subject. 
 France is pledged to pay ; she offers the payment. 
 Germany is obliged to evacuate ; it is, then, for her 
 to say when and in what way she means to fulfil 
 her obligation." 
 
 " So," replied Herr Henckel, " but I know the lie of 
 the land, and I assure you that you must open the 
 question of the evacuation, and that you will then 
 be listened to." 
 
 He then took from his pocket a paper, wbich he 
 read to me. It was somewhat confused and un- 
 finished, and I could discern in it that they reserved 
 to themselves the right of evacuating the fortresses, 
 and especially Belfort, only at the latest possible 
 moment. He added that he would finish it next 
 day, and would send it to me that I might judge it 
 better as a whole. I agreed. 
 
 I then asked him if Count von Arnim was apprised 
 of our interviews. He replied that he knew of them, 
 and as I desired to see Count von Arnim to bring 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 245 
 
 him to be more explicit, he undertook to let him 
 know that I would expect him next day, the 25th of 
 May, at the Elys^e. 
 
 Next day, before leaving Versailles, I received 
 Herr Henckel's note. It contained a scheme of piece- 
 meal and successive evacuations, corresponding to 
 payments successive in the same way, and reserving 
 the evacuation of the fortresses until the very last. 
 Thus was confirmed the apprehension that M. de 
 R&nusat and I had always had, that we should not 
 be able to obtain complete evacuation before the 
 end of our payments. 
 
 Count von Arnim was waiting for me at the Elys^e 
 at the hour appointed. I told him I knew from the 
 document Henckel had just sent me, the bases on 
 which negotiation would be possible. I would 
 resign myself to an evacuation by successive instal- 
 ments, but I did not wish on any consideration that 
 there should be any question of confining the territorial 
 guarantee exclusively to any particular places, while 
 taking good care not to name any, in order to avoid 
 any discussion on the subject of Belfort. 
 
 Count von Arnim, this time eager to act, offered 
 himself to transmit my proposals to his Government, 
 and promised to have a speedy answer. Fearing the 
 obscurity native to German versions, I invited him 
 to come next day to the Pr^sidence to luncheon, to 
 communicate his dispatch to me before sending it, and 
 he accepted. 
 
 Next day he came to read it to me. It was far from 
 clear, as I expected, and he consented to join it to a 
 note which I sent him, after having a copy made. In 
 this note I reproduced the financial scheme extolled by 
 Henckel and Count von Arnim, and I accepted the 
 
246 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 principle of successive evacuations. I wrote at once 
 to the same effect to M. de Gontaut. 
 
 Believing that I had thus brought the negotiation on 
 to solid ground, where it would be easy to make it go 
 forward, I awaited with some confidence a favourable 
 answer from Berlin, when, on the contrary, once more 
 one piece of the worst possible news followed 
 another. 
 
 That which General Manteuffel sent me from Nancy 
 on the 27th of May was disturbing to this extent, that 
 he did not look on a resumption of the war as im- 
 possible. A letter from our Ambassador in Saint 
 Petersburg also gave a picture of the state of Germany 
 that was most alarming for France. 
 
 These manifestations of hostility on the part of the 
 German nation, were they not stirred up in order to 
 frighten us, to make us more plastic in the negotiations 
 we were pursuing? I could not believe that the 
 Emperor or anybody else wished to reply by a war to 
 the offer to pay in 1872 what was not legally due till 
 1874. The whole of Europe would protest against such 
 an infamy. 
 
 But a word uttered in Berlin and re-echoed through- 
 out the whole of Germany, filled me with fear — 
 Belfort. In Bavaria, in Wiirtemberg, in Baden, men 
 never spoke of Belfort without blaming Prince Bis- 
 marck because he had given it up to us, and said quite 
 openly that they would never give it back. This 
 saying, repeated even as far away as Rome, had 
 found echoes in France. A more disturbing matter 
 was that an important member of the Federal Council 
 had said to M. de Gontaut : 
 
 " The military party is beaten ; we will treat with you 
 about the evacuation ; but as for Belfort, we will give 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 247 
 
 it back at the latest possible moment, and in the last 
 extremity." 
 
 This language meant clearly that in order to get our 
 money they would begin to give back our territory 
 piece by piece, but that at the last moment Belfort 
 would be the difficulty. 
 
 I talked of my anxiety to M. de R^musat, who shared 
 it. 
 
 " A formidable question may arise in a year or two," 
 said I. " Will an infamy like the refusal of England to 
 restore Malta to us perhaps be attempted on the 
 subject of Belfort ? I do not think they will dare it, in 
 the face of all Europe. Nevertheless, we must foresee 
 everything, and I could not for my part accept this 
 treason, if our conquerors wished to impose it on us." 
 
 "Nor would I accept it either," answered M. de 
 Remusat. 
 
 " France alone," I continued, " will have the right to 
 decide the question. What we must do is from 
 henceforth to put her in a position to find another 
 reply to it than mere resignation." 
 
 I informed the Minister for War of what was on our 
 minds, and of my design, and in the utmost secrecy we 
 took in concert the steps the situation demanded. Not 
 long after, we were assured that from 1873 France 
 would be able to enforce respect for her treaties if 
 any one wished to violate them. 
 
 In the midst of these preoccupations, the discussion 
 of the military law was dragging on in circumstances 
 little calculated to calm the fevered spirits on the other 
 side of the Rhine. 
 
 The Bishop of Orleans, addressing the House in the 
 interest of the religious schools, had found an 
 opportunity in this discussion to make a violent 
 
248 MEMOIES OF M. THIERS 
 
 outburst against Prussia. After the Bishop of Orleans, 
 it was General Trochu's turn, who obstinately 
 supported the three years' service, contrary to the 
 opinions he had previously expressed in his book 
 on the French army. He spoke with talent, even 
 brilliantly, and greatly stirred the passions of the Left. 
 
 On the 8th of June, 1872, I addressed the Assembly. 
 In a ripely studied speech, I defended the principle of 
 compulsory service as the committee had accepted it, 
 that is to say, modified by the power left in the hands 
 of the Government to take only the half of any class. 
 I showed the Assembly that since this power allowed us 
 to make the period of military service sufficiently long, 
 our army would soon be numerous enough and strong 
 enough to master every violence from within as well as 
 from without, and to give France back her position in 
 the world. 
 
 With regard to our recent misfortunes I spoke of 
 the Emperor of Germany, and said that by seconding 
 instead of being jealous of the men of high talent in his 
 entourage, he had in a way made one man of them all, 
 and so given another Frederick the Great to Prussia. 
 
 If such a eulogy of our conquerors had not been 
 skilfully introduced and interwoven into the texture of 
 the speech, it would never have been tolerated ; but the 
 passage was listened to in profound silence, and with 
 no signs of disapprobation. The Assembly understood 
 my aim, and was satisfied that the disagreeable effect 
 of the preceding speeches should be effaced, without 
 itself being compromised. 
 
 The five years' period of service was adopted, and 
 this vote brought the whole discussion to an end, to 
 the great advantage of the country. 
 
 Furthermore, affairs in Berlin were tending to 
 
PRESIDENCY OP THE REPUBLIC 249 
 
 become calm. Bleiichroder, Prince Bismarck's banker, 
 had said that the Chancellor rejected the lottery loan — 
 the deposit of securities — and cared only for a loan of 
 the same kind as had succeeded for the two milliards. 
 
 We had replied that we, too, preferred the simple 
 means that had already been employed successfully ; 
 and Bismarck, thus informed of our intentions, put the 
 matter clearly. 
 
 According to him, our payments were to be accepted 
 in the manner previously adopted. In return we were 
 to be granted a gradual evacuation, or immediate if we 
 could pay the three milliards in one instalment. By 
 candid behaviour towards us the hate that divided our 
 two countries would not be embittered. Then, to 
 escape the opposition he met with at Court, both 
 on the subject of the negotiations he advised them to 
 open with France and on the religious question, Prince 
 Bismarck had retired to Varzin, where he was resting, 
 while at the same time threatening the opponents that 
 were hampering his plans. 
 
 At Berlin there were various conferences between 
 the Emperor and his principal Ministers, especially his 
 Finance Minister, Count Camphausen, and his Minister 
 for War, Count Roon, and the Prussian proposals, freed 
 from all that had appeared unacceptable, and simplified 
 from a financial point of view, were dispatched to 
 Count von Arnim at Paris. Von Thile, who took 
 the place of the absent Bismarck as Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs, informed M. de Gontaut and said : 
 
 " You may be easy in your mind. His Majesty the 
 Emperor desires peace, and means to second your 
 Government in its labours. He has just sent Count 
 von Arnim instructions which will assuredly hasten 
 the termination of this important business." 
 
250 MEMOIRS OP M. THIERS 
 
 The war party was obviously vanquished, and we 
 now had only to await the notifications whose coming 
 had been announced. 
 
 At last, on the 14th of June, 1872, Count von Arnim 
 sent me a summary of the conditions in accordance 
 with which the Cabinet at Berlin was willing to 
 negotiate. I proposed that he should come next after- 
 noon to the Elysee Palace. He arrived punctually, 
 and under the beautiful trees in the garden we went to 
 confer with each other upon the German scheme. 
 
 " Well," said he, " we are practically agreed. You 
 wish to pay, we to evacuate your country ; so that little 
 or nothing can stand between us. As for war, you 
 may be fully convinced that it is not desired. The 
 Emperor, Prince Bismarck, and the politicians are in 
 the ascendant, they desire peace and will prevail. This 
 is the moment to put the seal upon it by an agreement 
 which will establish the parallel progress of the 
 evacuation and the successive payments of the 
 indemnity." 
 
 I replied that I, too, wished for peace, that everybody 
 in France wished it also, but that it depended on the 
 conditions that were to be laid down to make it possible 
 and lasting. I then expressed once more the desire 
 that Berlin would accept my proposals of the 24th of 
 the preceding May, aiming at obtaining in 1872 the 
 evacuation of two departments against the payment of 
 a half milliard, and in 1873 the evacuation of the other 
 four departments immediately upon our handing over 
 to the German Treasury fifteen hundred millions in 
 specie and the same amount in financial guarantees. 
 
 Count von Arnim stopped me here : 
 
 "I must let you know the truth without evasion. 
 I can be easy with regard to the first part of the 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 251 
 
 evacuation; I have sufficient powers for that, and I 
 will immediately give over to you Marne and Haute- 
 Marne for a half milliard paid presently ; then two 
 other departments after the payment of fifteen 
 hundred millions, or possibly only a milliard; but to 
 evacuate all on the conditions you offer is impossible ; 
 for the Emperor's mind is irrevocably fixed on this 
 point. He does not wish to make war on you, but 
 he wishes to keep territorial guarantees in case you 
 might happen to leave power. However, when two 
 milliards have been paid, I believe you will get him to 
 give up the two last departments in consideration of 
 bankers' guarantees." 
 
 These determinations, which I already knew, being 
 thus confirmed, I no longer hesitated to reckon upon 
 them, while doing my utmost to take out of Germany's 
 hands, after a short delay, the greatest possible part of 
 our territory. I asked, then, that the departments of the 
 Marne and Haute-Marne should be evacuated imme- 
 diately in consideration of five hundred millions down 
 (we had them in securities secretly purchased in the 
 German markets, and in offers of cash from the Bank 
 of France) ; I asked for the subsequent restoration of 
 the Vosges and the Ardennes after the payment of a 
 milliard or fifteen hundred millions in the spring or 
 during the year 1873 ; and finally, in 1873 or 1874 we 
 would give solid financial guarantees for the third and 
 last milliard, and would receive in return the remain- 
 ing departments, and with them Belfort. 
 
 In all this Count von Arnim showed himself easy. 
 We agreed that I should put a draft convention in 
 writing and send it to him next day at Versailles. 
 
 Returning to the Pr^sidence, I wrote out, without 
 mentioning the lottery loan, which I knew had been 
 
252 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 rejected by Prince Bismarck, a scheme exactly in 
 accordance with what had been agreed at the Elys6e 
 Palace. It was approved by the Council, and finally 
 sent by M. de Remusat to Count von Arnim. 
 
 The latter, after reading it, made a few objections, 
 without pressing them. 
 
 At the same moment, Henckel, Count von Arnim's 
 confidant, sent me a memorandum, saying if I was 
 willing to adopt its essential clauses, I would forestall 
 difficulties on the part of Berlin. 
 
 Finally, on Tuesday the 18th of June, Count von 
 Arnim brought M. de R&nusat a new draft, and 
 confessed with some embarrassment that on some 
 points it differed from our conversation at the Elysee 
 Palace. To begin with, after having agreed that the 
 second phase of the evacuation, that which was to free 
 the Ardennes and the Vosges, should take place after the 
 payment, of a milliard and half, he now spoke of two 
 milliards. He had, besides, suppressed the first article 
 of our scheme in which there was clearly expressed the 
 reciprocity of obligations of Prussia and of France. As 
 to reducing the numbers of the troops in occupation, 
 and the consequent reduction in the expense of main- 
 taining these troops, he held out in a way that was 
 remarkable, but no longer surprising to us, since the 
 Germans had displayed the utmost obstinacy several 
 times already in the discussion of their smallest 
 pecuniary interests. 
 
 I went into this new scheme with M. de Remusat, 
 and we adopted a new version which contained a 
 preamble reproducing the gist of our first article that 
 had been suppressed, without mentioning direct pay- 
 ment by the subscribers to the loan into the Berlin 
 Treasury, because this payment could not be carried 
 
PEESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 253 
 
 out ; once again we asked that the evacuation of the 
 Ardennes and the Vosges should follow on payment 
 of fifteen hundred millions ; the date of 1875, taken 
 as the time of final payment, was only indicated as 
 the latest permitted, and we reserved the right to 
 anticipate this period if our resources allowed ; finally, 
 we submitted the reduction of the army of occupation 
 and the cost of its maintenance to the Emperor's 
 pleasure. 
 
 To sum up, this draft of agreement presented the 
 advantage of allowing us either to delay the full pay- 
 ment of our debt until the 1st of March, 1875, if our 
 financial system obliged us, or to obtain the total 
 evacuation of our territory in 1873, in case we might 
 have at this date the means of paying in cash or in 
 financial guarantees accepted by the Prussian Govern- 
 ment. Some subordinate clauses were joined to the 
 preceding, among others that which forbade the two 
 contracting parties to execute any works of fortifica- 
 tion in the occupied departments. This clause was 
 aimed at Belfort, where the Prussians were construct- 
 ing works, in spite of their declaration to the contrary. 
 Finally, speaking of the two departments to be 
 evacuated last of all, Meurthe and Meurthe-et-Moselle, 
 I had expressly mentioned the Belfort district. 
 
 This fresh defining of our right made it almost 
 impossible to put any disloyal intention into action. 
 Doubtless there was no such intention, but the great 
 majority of the French people believed in its existence. 
 
 This new scheme, after having been submitted to 
 and 'approved by the Council, was sent to Count von 
 Arnim on the 18th of June, 1872. 
 
 On the 19th M. de Remusat received a letter from the 
 Ambassador of Germany desiring certain explanations. 
 
254 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 I sent M. de R^musat to give them by word of mouth. 
 He did not find him, and asked him to come to see me 
 next day. 
 
 Count von Arnim wished to know why, in our draft, 
 there was no longer any mention of direct payment by 
 the subscribers to the agents of the Prussian Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 I replied that, as the loan was to be raised by public 
 subscription and not through a syndicate of bankers, 
 direct payment into German hands by subscribers 
 scattered over all quarters of the globe was impractic- 
 able ; and that, besides, each section of territory was 
 only evacuated after payment had taken effect ; 
 Prussia therefore had no interest in the retention of 
 this clause. 
 
 Count von Arnim comprehended this ; he only 
 expressed one regret, that he would be obliged to 
 give Berlin explanations as to this change. 
 
 On the question of the evacuation of the Ardennes 
 and the Vosges after the payment of fifteen hundred 
 millions only, he said he would plead our cause, but 
 feared he would not be successful. As for the article 
 relating to the reduction of the army of occupation 
 and the cost of its upkeep, he accepted this hypo- 
 thetical wording : 
 
 " In case the army of occupation should be reduced, 
 there would also be a reduction in the cost of its 
 maintenance." 
 
 He added that he thought it certain that fifty 
 thousand men would not be left in two departments, 
 and that the expenditure would therefore necessarily 
 be reduced. 
 
 Finally, on the question of reoccupation in case 
 we failed to carry out our engagements, he asked 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 255 
 
 for what reasons we wished to apply this clause only 
 to a failing in our financial engagements. 
 
 By this wording we had desired to circumscribe and 
 define the right of reoccupation by the Germans, in the 
 fear of giving them an opportunity to meddle in our 
 affairs, and especially to refrain from evacuating 
 Belfort, on the pretext that we had not kept such or 
 such an engagement. I did not say so to Count von 
 Arnim, so as not to inspire him with an idea he had 
 never had, and I extricated myself from an awkward 
 moment by agreeing to substitute for the words 
 financial engagements the words engagements under- 
 taken in this present agreement, the latter phrase having 
 the same meaning as the former, though in different 
 terms. 
 
 M. de R^musat introduced the changes agreed upon 
 into the last French version, which, immediately sent to 
 Count von Arnim, was dispatched to Berlin. 
 
 On the 27th of June, the German Ambassador 
 received from Berlin and addressed to the Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs the final draft of the agreement, en- 
 tirely conforming to that which we had proposed, except 
 as regards the evacuation of the Ardennes and the 
 Vosges, which the Germans still placed as conditional 
 on the payment of two milliards, and not of fifteen 
 hundred millions as Count von Arnim had allowed us 
 to hope. 
 
 This agreement was signed on the 29th of June, 1872, 
 by Count von Arnim and by M. de R&nusat, for whom 
 I had wished to reserve the pleasure of sealing with his 
 signature this considerable step taken along the path 
 of freedom for our territory. Next day I presented the 
 agreement to the Assembly, to which I explained that 
 the periods 1873, 1874, 1875 fixed for the payments were 
 
256 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 optional for us, and guaranteed us against exactions 
 that might forestall our means of paying, without 
 limiting our right to pay and secure the evacuation 
 before these periods matured, and that our liberation 
 depended only on our credit, which was now greater 
 than ever. 
 
 The Assembly, which ought to have been grateful 
 to the Government for these successes, persisted, on 
 the contrary, in its hostility towards it, and in order 
 to display this took for a pretext the fact that the 
 departments of the Nord, the Somme, and C6te d'Or 
 had just elected three very pronounced Republicans : 
 M. Deregnaucourt, a wealthy manufacturer, and MM. 
 Barni and Paul Bert, distinguished professors. 
 
 Though this choice could not be looked on as a 
 menace to public order or to society, the Monarchist 
 section of the Assembly was none the less disturbed by 
 these three elections, in which they pretended to 
 discern the complicity of the authorities with the 
 revolutionaries. They wanted without fail and at once 
 to call upon the Government to explain itself as to 
 which side it meant to take. 
 
 The Moderates, however, and particularly the Right 
 Centre, showed themselves more reserved. These 
 elections, said they, were of no more significance 
 than those of the previous year which had sent a 
 hundred Republicans to the Assembly. No doubt it 
 was very glaring, but the Government was far from 
 having favoured them, and it was difficult to point out 
 ways of resisting so as to conquer so general a trend of 
 opinion ; the wisest added that moderation was perhaps 
 a more effective means than violence. 
 
 These arguments, not being to the taste of those to 
 whom they were addressed, were regarded by them as 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 257 
 
 confessions of weakness. Accordingly, they wished to 
 make their protests heard. To avoid challenging the 
 Government from the tribune, which on their part 
 would have meant calling for the system of official 
 candidates for which they had so bitterly blamed the 
 Empire, they decided upon an application which some 
 among them were to make to me. 
 
 I might have refused to receive them, but this would 
 have been insulting, and I preferred to hear what they 
 had to say. The selection of my visitors indicated 
 the spirit of the application. They were the Due 
 d'Audiffret-Pasquier, General Changarnier, MM. Saint- 
 Marc- Girardin, Batbie, Depeyre, de Cumont, de Kerdrel, 
 the Due de la Rochefoucauld-Bisaccia, and the Due de 
 Broglie, who had in the previous April resigned his 
 post as Ambassador at London. 
 
 On the morning of the day on which they presented 
 themselves at the Presidence M. Vitet was breakfasting 
 with me, and I invited him to be present at the inter- 
 view. He accepted, and his presence was welcomed by 
 my visitors. I gave them the most courteous possible 
 reception, and invited General Changarnier, who had 
 seemed to me to make himself sponsor for the rest, 
 to begin. 
 
 The General at once explained the motive for their 
 visit. It was inspired, he said, by the desire to direct 
 my attention to the last elections, to have an explana- 
 tion with me in the matter, and to inquire as to the 
 course the Government intended to adopt in order to 
 save the country from the perils that threatened. 
 
 After the General, whose tone in any case was 
 affectedly mild, other members of this deputation 
 that had no mandate but its own, spoke to the same 
 effect, to justify their uneasiness. 
 
 17 
 
258 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 Having heard them attentively, I replied that two out 
 of these three elections had taken place in departments 
 administered by prefects, MM. Seguier and de Guerle, 
 who were not suspected of any love for the Republican 
 party ; and that for the third the defeat of a moderate 
 Republican by an advanced Republican was due to the 
 Conservative party, which had split the vote. 
 
 These facts were so indisputable that there was 
 nothing so say by way of answer. The Due de 
 Broglie, in measured but somewhat acrid tones, said 
 that it was not the behaviour of the prefects they 
 found fault with, but that perhaps the general attitude 
 of the authorities was not wholly innocent of the 
 recent electoral results ; that I had a great and 
 legitimate influence on the country, and that the 
 electors, wishing to please me, thought, no doubt 
 wrongly, that they were succeeding by choosing such 
 candidates. 
 
 I replied clearly that having accepted the charge of 
 the Republic, and meaning to keep it faithfully, I had 
 no right to oppose the election of Republicans ; that to 
 ask any other behaviour of me was to wish to have me 
 depart from my avowed and constant role ; that I had, 
 besides, no way of estimating the degree of republi- 
 canism in various candidates, nor of controlling the 
 vagaries of universal suffrage. I had merely the con- 
 viction that the impartial policy pursued by the 
 Government was more apt to inspire electors to choose 
 properly than the opposite policy. 
 
 My reply, precise, clear, and firm without sharpness, 
 shut the Due de Broglie's mouth, and he assumed 
 thenceforward an attitude of affected coldness. 
 
 Others of my visitors having manifested their 
 anxieties for the future with greater cordiality than 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 259 
 
 my first interlocutors, I told them that, in my opinion, 
 to escape from our serious if not alarming situation 
 the organization of a Conservative Republic was a 
 safer means than the re-establishment of Monarchy, 
 which was made impracticable by the rival claims of 
 three dynasties. 
 
 "By a few wise laws," I said, "let us entrust the 
 legislative power to two Chambers ; let us give the 
 Upper Chamber and the Executive together the righ* 
 to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies ; let us then make 
 an electoral law guaranteeing universal suffrage, as 
 far as possible, from its own impetuousness, and iri 
 these conditions I am persuaded that the Government 
 will be sufficiently armed against the worst enter- 
 prises of demagogy.'' 
 
 I was not the only one to speak during this interview ; 
 but if my interlocutors did not accept the efficacy of 
 the means I thought proper for safeguarding the 
 future, they proposed no others. And yet they were 
 every one, in fidelity to their memories of the past, 
 partisans of a restoration of Monarchy. 
 
 Leaving me, they went back to the Assembly, where 
 members awaited the result of their action with 
 curiosity. They had to agree that they brought noth- 
 ing very new, for what I had said to them was precisely 
 what the Moderates were saying every day. The' 
 Extreme Right, irritated by the failure of its action, 
 declared that since anything was to be expected from 
 a blind and powerless Government, nothing was left 
 but to break away from it ; and the same evening 
 M. Saint-Marc-Girardin, in order to provoke this rupture, 
 inspired an article in the Journal des D6bats which 
 reproduced our interview with very inaccurate details. 
 
 Next day, in the Assembly, I addressed myself to 
 
260 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 M. Saint-Marc-Girardin, and before M. Vitet, who was 
 as much offended as myself, I accused him for the 
 untruth of the article in question. He excused himself, 
 laying the blame on a correspondent whom he had not 
 had time to inform more accurately. 
 
 The desired effect was obtained, and the Right, taking 
 a step farther on the path of hostilities, without carry- 
 ing the Right Centre with it for the present, pretended 
 that M. de Larcy, its representative on the Ministerial 
 Council, could no longer remain there. M. de Larcy 
 resisted, but was beaten and came in real distress to 
 tell me. 
 
 I endeavoured to keep him, showing him the blunder 
 his political friends were making in gratuitously de- 
 priving themselves of a representative in the Cabinet. 
 He agreed, but persisted in his determination tMrough 
 fear of being excommunicated by his party. 
 
 I regretted his loss as a man and as a minister, and 
 as I did not care to put any one in his place, I amalga- 
 mated the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry 
 of Commerce, which was held by M. Teisserenc de Bort, 
 whose energy and capacity would be enough to deal 
 with this increased work. In this way the gap was 
 promptly filled. 
 
 These difficulties, little or great, fortunately did not 
 succeed in disturbing the country ; the time had there- 
 fore arrived to begin the vast financial operation of the 
 loan of three milliards to pay off the war indemnity. 
 As the month of August was approaching, and the 
 Assembly was disposed to take its summer vacation in 
 order to attend the second session of the General 
 Councils, I did not wish it to break up before passing 
 the taxes which, by establishing the equilibrium of the 
 budget, would strengthen our credit ; I had consequently 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 261 
 
 had the vital question of raw materials brought up 
 again. The discussion had once more taken the same 
 line as in the month of January. The whole survey of 
 possible taxes was repeated, including the income-tax, 
 which once more I managed to have rejected, to admit 
 merely a tax of some thirty millions upon personal 
 property and a new surcharge on licences. 
 
 These poor resources being far from sufficing for our 
 needs, the committee which the Assembly had, on the 
 19th of the previous January, directed to propose new 
 tariffs for the tax on raw materials, was obliged 
 to comply. After sufficient trouble I obtained its 
 report, which I supported from the tribune, and 
 which was adopted by a very large majority at the 
 sitting of the 26th of July. 
 
 But this tax, which might have yielded one hundred 
 and eighty millions, had been reduced to ninety-three 
 millions. The balance of the budget was thus obtained 
 with great difficulty. 
 
 The tax on raw materials, as far as its collection 
 went, was subject to the success of our negotiations 
 with the various Powers to whom we were bound 
 by commercial treaties, which postponed this collec- 
 tion until 1873. The budget for the current year, 
 1872, could do without it, as the expenses of the new 
 loan were only to fall upon the next year. We had 
 even contrived a surplus, in 1872, to meet the delays 
 that would occur in the yield of the new taxes through 
 the difficulties of their first establishment. No service 
 was in difficulties, the advanced evacuation was certain, 
 and the task of calming agitated passions was making 
 visible progress. 
 
 It was in these encouraging circumstances that, on 
 the 15th of July, 1872, the Assembly passed the law 
 
262 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 which gave the Government authority to borrow by 
 means of a public subscription in 5 per cent, stocks 
 the sum of three milliards five hundred millions, three 
 milliards of which represented the debt to Germany, 
 and five hundred millions were to be set aside for the 
 costs of the loan. These costs, which included, with the 
 expenses for purchasing exchange bills and for trans- 
 ferring the money to Germany, the interest on the 
 capital up to the payment in full of the debt, would not 
 absorb the whole of the amount provided for, and there 
 would be a surplus left, perhaps five millions, which I 
 intended to place to the sinking fund. 
 
 It was permissible to ask ourselves if we should 
 find still three milliards available among the body 
 of capital, especially so soon after our loan of two 
 milliards. 
 
 I did not doubt the confidence that would be inspired 
 by an investment at 6 per cent, on the security of the 
 ledger of France, and this confidence was not long in 
 showing itself by the overwhelming demand for the 
 loan. Many foreign bankers had come to Paris to 
 ask for the greatest possible share, not merely in the 
 subscription, but also in the subsidiary profits of which 
 the subscription might be the opportunity. Before 
 this eagerness on the part of the capitalists it was 
 unnecessary to have the loan guaranteed, as we had 
 done for the first two milliards. But there was another 
 precaution to take in order to facilitate our payments 
 in Germany: this was to secure bills drawn on that 
 country. 
 
 M. de Goulard, who had taken M. Pouyer-Quertier's 
 place at the Ministry of Finance, gave M. Dutilleul 
 directions to arrange for this dperation with the 
 banks. They engaged, in return for a fixed premium 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 263 
 
 of twenty-five millions, to procure us seven hundred 
 millions in bills on Germany. 
 
 On our side we had secretly brought up about four 
 hundred and fifteen millions in such bills ; and finally 
 we reckoned on receiving about three hundred and 
 fifty millions more, representing the subscriptions 
 to the loan that would be made on foreign stock 
 exchanges. We were therefore assured of fifteen 
 hundred millions in foreign bills, or half the whole 
 of the amount to be paid out of France. 
 
 Besides, as the banks, through their treaty with us, 
 were interested in seeing that the exchange rate was 
 not raised against us, we had less reason to fear a 
 scarcity in specie such as had followed the payment 
 of the first two milliards. 
 
 Furthermore, precautions were taken against the 
 risks of a financial crisis. For example, the law 
 authorizing the loan had also raised from two 
 milliards eight hundred millions to three milliards 
 two hundred millions the limit of the issue of notes 
 by the Bank of France. We had, besides, handed 
 over to the Bank to be coined some thirty millions of 
 bar silver we had procured from the Hamburg Bank 
 in exchange for its paper known as bancos de 
 Hambourg, of which we held a great quantity among 
 our bills on Germany. 
 
 If these measures were not enough to prevent a 
 financial crisis, at least we could say, with Bossuet, 
 that we had taken out of Fortune's power all that 
 could be taken from her by dint of counsel. But 
 they were enough, and the success of our financial 
 operations was complete. 
 
 The eagerness displayed in France and abroad to 
 subscribe to the loan allowed me to raise the issue 
 
264 MEMOIES OF M. THIERS 
 
 price of the stock above the ninety-two and a half 
 which had been fixed for the earlier loan. By a 
 decree of the 20th of July I made it ninety-four 
 and a half, with a first payment fourteen and a half 
 francs more than had been demanded in 1871. The 
 complete payment for the stock was to be made 
 in twenty monthly instalments, beginning with the 
 1st of September. These conditions were unani* 
 mously approved, and every one agreed that no one 
 could display more resolution in defence of the 
 interests of the State. 
 
 By the evening of Sunday, the 28th of July, the 
 day fixed upon for opening the subscription lists, 
 already we knew that the most sanguine hopes were 
 surpassed, and the next day, when all telegraphic 
 communications had been compiled, we learned that 
 the financial world had offered us forty-four milliards, 
 or nearly thirteen times the amount asked by France ! 
 
 The great number of subscriptions from foreign 
 countries gave us the three hundred and odd millions of 
 bills on which I had counted to complete our means 
 of paying our debt abroad. 
 
 By the first guarantee payment, and the anticipatory 
 payments of subscribers, we could realize a sum of 
 eleven hundred millions, which, with the resources 
 already in the Treasury, allowed us to pay the first 
 half milliard at once, and to secure the evacuation 
 of the departments of Marne and Haute-Marne. From 
 that moment I saw with delight the possibility of 
 obtaining the liberation of our territory for 1873. 
 
 The Assembly prorogued itself from the 4th of 
 August to the 11th of November. On the 5th of 
 August, by physician's orders, I left Paris to go to 
 Trouville, where I had chosen a house looking over 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 265 
 
 the whole gulf of the Seine, from le Havre to the 
 cliffs of Calvados. 
 
 I was followed by the Minister for War, his executive 
 staff, the principal members of the Artillery Board 
 and the Commissariat, with whom I meant to occupy 
 myself directly and with my own eyes with the 
 question of war munitions and stores, and many 
 other matters from which I had been heretofore kept 
 by the presence of the Assembly. The guns with 
 which we were to carry out artillery experiments 
 had been transported to Trouville, and with them 
 the officers and men capable of serving them. 
 
 Before describing in detail these experiments and 
 their consequences in the remaking of our war 
 material, I wish to recall or to indicate briefly the 
 chief results already attained in our task of reorganiz- 
 ing the military power of France. 
 
 Shortly after the defeat of the Commune, I had 
 instituted a Superior Council of War, presided over 
 by the Minister for War and composed of twenty-four 
 members, among whom were the two Marshals, de 
 MacMahon and Canrobert, Generals de Ladmirault, du 
 Barail, Forgeot, de Berckheim, Deligny, several 
 Commissary-generals, a member of the Cour des 
 Comptes, and an Inspector of Finance. 
 
 This Council, made up of experts, had, after very 
 serious discussion, approved of the principal provisions 
 of the recruiting law, later sanctioned by the vote 
 of the Assembly. It had subsequently adopted my 
 scheme for permanent formations, which consisted 
 in creating and maintaining in time of peace as in 
 time of war twelve army corps of three divisions, 
 with their complement of officers, magazines, and 
 stores under their hand, having only peace effectives 
 
266 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 in the ranks, but in a position to rise to war strength 
 in a few days. 
 
 Together we had appointed the following stations 
 for these corps : four would be at Paris and Versailles ; 
 two in the East, with Chalon for their centre ; one at 
 Lille ; two on the Loire at Bourges and at Tours ; 
 one at Lyons ; one between Toulouse and Bordeaux ; 
 and one at Marseilles, where the African troops would 
 be mustered. This distribution was aimed at facili- 
 tating a rapid concentration of our forces towards 
 the East. 
 
 But there was one question of immense importance, 
 that of works of fortification, which according to the 
 law could only be decided by a special commission 
 whose views would, so to speak, be final. 
 
 This Commission included ten or twelve members, 
 among them Marshal de MacMahon, Generals Frossard, 
 de Rivieres, de Courville, Forgeot, de Berckheim, 
 Ducrot, and Chanzy. 
 
 I put before them the following proposals : 
 
 To construct certain new works on the East, to 
 strengthen Besancon and Langres ; 
 
 To raise a huge network of defence works at 
 Belfort, allowing us to make an entrenched camp 
 of this stronghold ; 
 
 To perfect the fortifications of Verdun and the 
 fortresses of the Meuse and the Ardennes ; 
 
 And above all to create a powerful military centre 
 at Chalons. 
 
 I said that by creating there, between Paris and 
 Bordeaux, a Paris without population, which could 
 contain immense quantities of provisions and stores, 
 and two or three hundred thousand men, resting on 
 almost impregnable works, a march upon the capital 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 267 
 
 would be almost impossible, for any invading army 
 that should neglect this obstacle would have on its 
 flank or in its rear the two or three hundred thousand 
 men entrenched in this outwork of Paris. I looked 
 on the creation of this place as likely to be the 
 safeguard of Paris in the future. 
 
 I wished to have another work at Rouen to protect 
 Paris, in case of an invasion of Flanders and Picardy, 
 and to secure its provisioning if a siege was expected. 
 But I was most of all eager for the carrying out 
 of my project for Chalons, and the Commission 
 adopted it unanimously. That for Rouen, not so 
 obviously useful, was also adopted in spite of some 
 opposition. 
 
 For Paris, General de Rivieres, of the Engineers, 
 had devised a scheme of works that would have cost 
 more than a hundred millions, and which was un- 
 necessary since Paris, even as it was, had held the 
 Prussians for four months. It would have sufficed 
 to add to the existing defences four or five forts, at 
 Saint-Denis, at the confluence of the Seine and the 
 Marne, at Hautes-Bruyeres, at Chatillon, at Montre- 
 tout. Paris would thus have become impregnable, 
 and these works would have cost thirty millions. 
 
 But General de Rivieres held to his plan, which 
 received the approval of the Marshal, though General 
 Frossard and General de Berckheim had shown its 
 uselessness. I joined myself to the latter two, and 
 the majority of opinions was on our side. Neverthe- 
 less, the matter was not yet settled when I left the 
 Pr^sidence. 
 
 Thus, at the time of my coming to Trouville several 
 of the essential matters with regard to the re-estab- 
 lishing of our military forces had been considered 
 
268 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 and most of them settled. I had reserved the question 
 of our war material, to make it the principal object 
 of my studies while I was at Trouville. 
 
 First of all our attention was fastened upon possible 
 improvements in the rifle and in the gun. As for 
 the rifle, I left it to General Douay, the creator 
 of the school for marksmen at Vincennes, to see 
 about correcting its shortcomings. 
 
 As for the artillery, which the recent war had 
 equally shown to be inadequate, the difficulties we had 
 to overcome were infinitely greater. The substitution 
 of the percussion fuse for the time fuse was an 
 important improvement and easy to carry out, but 
 the inferiority of our fire in comparison with that of 
 the Prussians came also from the shape of our pieces, 
 their way of loading, and chiefly from the metal of 
 which they were made. 
 
 On the unanimous advice of the generals and officers 
 of land artillery and naval artillery, one of the most 
 distinguished among whom was General Frebault, the 
 system of loading by the breech was adopted. This 
 system, it is true, was only possible with steel guns, 
 and ours were all made of bronze. Happily we had at 
 the head of our armament works at Tarbes an officer 
 of exceptional merit, Colonel de Reffye, who had found 
 a way to fit movable steel breeches to bronze guns. 
 I summoned him to Trouville, where he brought 
 several of his converted pieces. The trials we made of 
 them proved their excellence both for range and 
 accuracy. It was consequently decided that our 
 artillery should be transformed in accordance with 
 this system, which would place at our disposal from 
 fifteen hundred to eighteen hundred pieces of 7 for 
 1872, and two thousand four hundred pieces of i for 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 269 
 
 1873. Without any doubt it would suffice to restore 
 our divisional artillery and our reserve artillery. 
 Colonel de Reffye, having been decorated Commander 
 of the Legion d'honneur on the very ground where the 
 trials were made, was sent back to Tarbes to begin his 
 manufacturing without delay. 
 
 The employment of bronze, which we had in 
 abundance, meant a saving in money for us, and 
 especially a still more precious saving in time ; but 
 the qualities of steel had not escaped me. Accordingly, 
 it was settled that by way of experiment some guns 
 should be forged of the latter metal at Creusot, where, 
 as our officers averred, they had succeeded in producing 
 a steel superior to Herr Krupp's in the Rhine pro- 
 vinces and Mr. Firth's in England. 
 
 In any case, if we did not succeed in forging an 
 infallible metal, it appeared certain that we could do 
 away with the danger of bursting by binding the 
 inner tube of the gun with forged iron. 
 
 These matters pertaining to war material being 
 settled, I directed my attention to the administration 
 and maintenance of the troops, including the soldier's 
 rations, which I improved. In particular we discussed 
 the advantages and disadvantages of the service corps. 
 The advantages seemed considerable, from the point of 
 view of the convenience of having men always at hand, 
 and the excellent quality of the supplies they provide 
 for the corps ; but they deprive the fighting strength of 
 at least twelve thousand men, and their work costs 
 more than the general stores. 
 
 On this point I gave a long hearing to a very well- 
 known manufacturer, M. Godillot. He would under- 
 take, he said, to keep the stores of twelve army corps 
 always full, so that in case of a sudden campaign we 
 
270 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 could from one day to the next clothe and equip eight 
 hundred thousand men! That would be an immense 
 help in accelerating mobilization. I was shaken by 
 this consideration, and resolved to submit the question 
 to the Superior Council of War. 
 
 The time of my vacation was not therefore lost as far 
 as affairs went. 
 
 I received numerous visits at Trouville. First one 
 from M. de Vogue ; he was coming back from Con- 
 stantinople, and told me he had had no little trouble to 
 save the Sultan from the lightnings of the Court of 
 Rome over the Armenian business. M. de Gontaut 
 came after him. Everything, he said, was placid in 
 Germany, and the final evacuation of the territory now 
 depended solely on the rapidity of our payments. 
 
 My friend Prince Orloff was also among my visitors. 
 No one could be more amiable, or simpler, or more 
 sensible with less pedantry than Prince Orloff. I had 
 a very lively affection for him, equal to his for me. 
 He was at Berlin at the moment of the meeting 
 between the three Emperors of Austria, Russia, and 
 Germany, a meeting that stimulated the curiosity and 
 the imagination of politicians to the highest degree. 
 
 As far as France was concerned I heard most 
 accurately, from M. de Gontaut and from Prince Orloff, 
 of the intentions of the Emperors of Russia and 
 Austria. Scarcely had he arrived in Berlin when the 
 Emperor Alexander had sent for our Ambassador to tell 
 him that if there had been any plot whatever to be 
 hatched in Berlin against France, he would not have 
 come, and Prince Orloff was charged to confirm this 
 speech to me. 
 
 The Emperor Francois-Joseph had given the same 
 assurance to our Ambassador, which did not prevent 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 271 
 
 the Legitimist and Bonapartist newspapers from 
 pretending that the main object of the Berlin meeting 
 was to sanction, by the signature of the Emperor 
 Alexander, the treaty that had torn Alsace and 
 Lorraine from us. 
 
 In reality, the three Emperors were not sorry to 
 show their unity, both to England, which had not been 
 invited to this meeting, and to the trouble-mongers 
 of every country — Germans, Austrians, Spaniards, 
 Russians, or others. The German Emperor had also 
 arranged the meeting of the sovereigns of Russia and 
 of Austria with intent to make them forget their mutual 
 resentments, and to bring about a reconciliation from 
 which he would have nothing to fear, since it was his 
 own achievement. 
 
 To this information sent by M. de Gontaut, Prince 
 Orloff added more interesting details, which only he 
 had been able to discover, thanks to his intimacy with 
 all the important personages of Saint Petersburg — 
 details that proved the sympathy of the Russian nation 
 for us, and its desire to see our power completely 
 re-established. The Khiva Expedition was starting just 
 at this moment. It had been preceded by an explana- 
 tion between Russia and England. The latter, re- 
 gretting the part she had played at the denuncia- 
 tion of the Treaty of Paris, had shown herself 
 extremely distrustful and very exacting towards 
 Russia in the matter of guarantees, to such a degree 
 that the Emperor Alexander, usually so pacific, had 
 uttered threats which, indeed, had not moved England. 
 Prince Orloff went so far as to say to me : 
 
 " We shall fight, if we must, with or without allies." 
 
 I took particular care to throw no fuel on this fire. 
 While expressing every interest for the greatness of 
 
272 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 Russia, I said to Prince Orloff that the moment did 
 not seem to me opportune for settling by war the great 
 Asiatic conflict that is always threatening to break 
 out between Russia and England. To-day everybody 
 wished for peace, and France in particular, doomed as 
 she was to bend all her resources to the payment of 
 her debt to Germany, could only think of freeing her 
 territory from foreign occupation. 
 
 The Prince asked nothing, but he was too intelligent 
 not to understand and not to profit by what I said. 
 Count Schouwalow, sent to London on this occasion, 
 passed through Paris, where I spoke with him to the 
 same effect as to Prince Orloff ; and he went on to end, 
 by a betrothal between a daughter of the Emperor 
 and an English prince, a conflict which at the outset 
 had looked very serious. 
 
 It was also during my stay at Trouville that I had 
 some anxiety over my three milliard loan. It would 
 be a mistake to fancy that an operation of this 
 nature is terminated when the subscription lists are 
 closed. One must still follow it with keen attention 
 for months, and be ready to stand by it in case of 
 need. 
 
 The payment of the subscriptions was made with 
 uncommon alacrity. We had received twelve hundred 
 millions and a half, and deducted from this sum five 
 hundred millions paid direct to the Germans, which 
 with the two milliards already written off repre- 
 sented the half of our debt. 
 
 But the September instalment, the first since the 
 floating of the loan, was about to fall due, and the 
 approach of this settlement, extraordinary for the im- 
 mense size of the sums involved, preoccupied the 
 market in public funds to such an extent that people 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 273 
 
 were asking whether speculators would be able to 
 borr6w the necessary amounts to carry over to the 
 following month ; if not, they would be driven to sell 
 at any price, and the stock would fall to an alarming 
 figure. 
 
 I have never had anything to do with what is 
 called the world of business, but I have always ob- 
 served it attentively, because it is a considerable 
 section of the public, and when one is governing one 
 must take it into account. In the present case I did 
 not hesitate to take into consideration the very deep 
 anxiety that ruled on the Stock Exchange. 
 
 At all periods we were careful not to leave public 
 funds to themselves, even when the loans were placed 
 in the hands of great companies of finance, interested 
 in handling them to the best advantage. With much 
 more reason, when we proceeded by means of a public 
 subscription and no one was responsible for the loan, 
 the Government would have been much to blame if 
 it had not sought means of averting an imminent 
 financial crisis, the consequences of which might go so 
 far as to jeopardize the liberation of our territory. 
 
 And what, indeed, was the amount of the help the 
 market needed in order to prevent this crisis? An 
 advance of fifty millions was sufficient, the figure 
 indicated by the Stockbrokers' Union ; and the Treasury 
 had about seven hundred millions at its disposal out 
 of the first instalment of the loan ! 
 
 Accordingly I wrote to M. Teisserenc de Bort, the 
 temporary Minister of Finance, and I summoned him 
 afterwards to Trouville to talk over this matter ; for I 
 could not address myself to a wiser, more enlightened, 
 or more upright counsellor. Like myself, he was of 
 opinion that under these exceptional circumstances 
 
 18 
 
274 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 we ought to keep up the price of the funds, and do 
 it obviously, openly, so as to avoid all suspicion of 
 any clandestine operation. The Treasury would ad- 
 vance to the Company of Stockbrokers, who would 
 be responsible for repayment, the sum of fifty millions 
 to be lent for carrying over. This operation would be 
 advantageous both for the State credit and the 
 Treasury. Our intervention was only to take effect, 
 however, at the last possible moment, and only if the 
 price of carrying over went beyond fourteen centimes, 
 which would answer to 8"85 per cent, interest. 
 
 The stockbrokers, according to our instructions, 
 having made no mystery of the help eventually prom- 
 ised by the Government, people were reassured, and 
 when the critical day arrived the carry-over prices fell 
 almost at once. The rate of fourteen centimes was not 
 even reached, and the Treasury had no need to inter- 
 vene. The mere announcement of the Government's 
 intention had been enough to bring Stock Exchange 
 transactions back to normal conditions. 
 
 I had spent the month of August and a great part 
 of September at Trouville, surrounded by signs of 
 sympathy from the people of all the neighbouring dis- 
 tricts. The principal towns had invited me to pay 
 them a visit : Cherbourg, Caen, Lisieux, Honfleur, le 
 Havre, etc. The last-named town was sufficiently 
 near Trouville to enable me to accept its invitation. 
 
 The eve of the day on which I was expected there, 
 we saw several cruisers flying the British ensign 
 arrive in the roadstead. The English Government 
 had sent them, by way of courtesy, to escort me to 
 Cherbourg, where they thought I was going. Before 
 entering the harbour of le Havre we passed in front 
 of these vessels to return their salute, and again in 
 
PRESIDENCY OP THE REPUBLIC 275 
 
 the evening when we left on our way back to 
 Trouville. 
 
 The next day, the 19th of September, I returned 
 to Paris. I took up my abode at the Elys^e, where I 
 received, as I had done before, all the persons who 
 deserved to be distinguished among the various sec- 
 tions of the population of Paris. 
 
 During this short absence some troubles had been 
 stirred up against me, as much by the Legitimists as 
 by the Radicals and the Bonapartists. The Legitimists 
 in La Vendee had organized pilgrimages, which they 
 advertised in their papers. These unusual movements 
 of crowds preceded by banners, marching in procession 
 and singing canticles, provoked counter-demonstra- 
 tions. At Nantes, for example, in spite of all the 
 precautions taken by the prefect, M. Doniol, a gentle- 
 man of wisdom and prudence, the pilgrims were 
 greeted, on their return, with hisses and hostile cries. 
 
 This was a most regrettable attack on the liberty 
 of conscience, but by what means could it have been 
 prevented? None the less the Royalist papers made 
 it a pretext for attacking the Government with the 
 utmost violence, as though the Government on its side 
 would not itself have had a right to complain that, 
 by political as much as religious demonstrations, the 
 pacification it had with so much trouble brought to 
 men's minds had been compromised. 
 
 On their side the Radicals were agitating. I had 
 stopped their campaign to demand in addresses the 
 dissolution of the Assembly ; they had submitted with- 
 out too much complaint ; but to console themselves for 
 this constraint they wished to hold certain banquets, 
 and M. Gambetta, not wishing, he said, to make any 
 difficulty for the Government, approached M. Victor 
 
276 MEMOIRS OP M. THIERS 
 
 Lefranc to know whether this would be allowed or 
 forbidden. The Minister replied that he would not 
 tolerate any public banquet, adding that while he 
 could not legally oppose private banquets, he never- 
 theless disapproved of them as against the interests 
 of the Republic. M. Gambetta then assured him that 
 his language would be irreproachable. 
 
 At Chamb^ry there was a first attempt to hold a 
 banquet, which was prevented by the police, because 
 it presented the features of a public meeting ; but at 
 Grenoble M. Gambetta, amid the enthusiastic plaudits 
 of his friends, made his famous speech upon the new 
 social strata, which produced so bad an effect and 
 stirred the wrath of the Conservative party. 
 
 Thus on the one hand the hooting of the pilgrims 
 at Nantes, on the other the virulence of the Grenoble 
 speech became grievances against the Government, 
 which the Royalists accused of being the accomplice 
 of the democratic party in all its violence and the 
 Permanent Committee announced that it would make 
 this matter the subject of questions in the Assembly. 
 I went on the 10th of October, 1872, to the sitting of 
 the Committee, over which M. Grevy presided. My 
 presence controlled the most agitated, who spoke of 
 nothing less than the immediate summoning of the 
 Assembly. M. de Bisaccia demanded explanations on 
 the important matters that were exciting the anger 
 of his friends. I addressed them at once, and gave 
 them the clearest possible explanations on every point. 
 
 The campaign that had been announced against the 
 Assembly, to obtain its dissolution, had been stopped, 
 I said, at its very beginning, by means that went to 
 the very limit of the law, if they did not go beyond 
 it. At Nantes, as elsewhere, proper steps had been 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 277 
 
 taken to safeguard the freedom of the pilgrimages ; 
 the bishop himself admitted it; but no precaution 
 could prevent whistling and hooting. 
 
 Upon this point the Committee did not insist fur- 
 ther. M. de Broglie himself, whom I had welcomed 
 at Trouville, where he had come to see me with the 
 prefect of his department on matters relating to his 
 election, M. de Broglie recognized that we had scrupu- 
 lously observed all our engagements and that there 
 was no reproach that could be addressed to us. This 
 testimonial was not without its effect, and the Com- 
 mittee's ardour began to slacken. 
 
 There remained the affair of M. Gambetta's speech 
 at Grenoble. I expressed the greatest disapproval of 
 the tendencies shown in this speech, particularly the 
 doctrine of social strata, so contrary to the essential 
 principle of the French Revolution, which allows of 
 no distinction between citizens except the degrees of 
 their merit, and I had no trouble in proving how 
 baseless in my case was the reproach of being M. 
 Gambetta's accomplice. 
 
 M. Grevy, with a few contemptuous words on the 
 subject of these childish accusations, gave the Com- 
 mittee to understand that it was taking too much on 
 itself by adopting towards the Government an attitude 
 that could only belong by right to the Assembly. 
 
 After Legitimists and Radicals came the turn of the 
 Bonapartists in the person of Prince Jerome Napoleon. 
 Since his excursion to Corsica he had not been heard 
 of, till on the 11th of October I learned that he had 
 just arrived with Princess Clotilde and their children, 
 in Melun, and from there had gone to Millemont 
 to M. Maurice Richard, the former Minister of 
 the Emperor. 
 
278 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 I summoned the Council and put the affair before 
 them. Evidently the Prince, after recognizing the 
 previous year the Government's right to object to 
 his presence in France, was to-day repudiating this 
 right and wanted to put our force to the proof. Our 
 right, however, was founded on the law of forfeiture, 
 twice passed by the Assembly ; if we allowed this law 
 to fall into abeyance with regard to Prince Napoleon, 
 we could not invoke it against Napoleon III, who was 
 being urged to land in France. 
 
 These arguments were not contradicted, and the 
 sentence of expulsion, having been agreed upon, was 
 communicated to the Prince, who at first displayed an 
 intention of resisting ; then perceiving that his resist- 
 ance was useless, he returned to the Swiss frontier 
 in a special train placed at his disposal. Princess 
 Clotilde, whom I had informed that there was no 
 objection to her remaining in France, did not wish to 
 be separated from her husband, and went with him. 
 
 After these affairs, which caused a certain amount 
 of anxiety to the Government without disturbing the 
 peace of the nation at large, we still had to occupy our* 
 selves with the loan for the October settlement on the 
 Bourse— less troublesome, however, than in September. 
 
 The carrying over was still hung up (an expression 
 of a language that is foreign to me, but which I use 
 to be understood), and it was necessary to put into 
 the market capital which would naturally reach the 
 point where it would be most serviceable ; for it is 
 with capital as with water, you have only to increase 
 the mass to have it rise to the soil you wish to 
 fertilize. 
 
 To furnish the money market with the resources 
 it lacked, I had the idea of discounting the seven 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 279 
 
 hundred millions of bills which the banks were to 
 hand over to us for the discharge of our debt to 
 Germany. 
 
 Wise and clever M. Dutilleul, whose opinion in 
 these affairs had the most weight with me, because 
 I was sure that he would not advise anything irregular, 
 M. Dutilleul approved of my plan ; for it was but fair 
 to return to circulation, where it was needed, a part 
 of the capital that we were locking up in consequence 
 of the payment of the loan instalments. 
 
 We therefore informed the banks which were 
 obtaining bills for us that we had at their disposal 
 the money they might need, and there was not one, 
 even among the most powerful, that did not eagerly 
 take advantage of our offer. About a hundred millions 
 were thus, by drawing on the Treasury, restored to 
 the market, and during the few days that preceded 
 and followed the October settlement money was 
 plentiful. Yet in spite of this help, carrying over 
 took place at a fairly high rate, which proved how 
 necessary was the step we had taken. 
 * While we were thus without a crisis passing through 
 the two critical moments of our financial operations, 
 subscribers to the loan were making haste to pay us, 
 and by the help of our bills we were acquitting our- 
 selves of our debt to Germany without any pinch to 
 ourselves. 
 
 To these fortunate results were added rich harvests 
 of every kind, especially in wheat and fodder, and as 
 the rest of Europe had not been equally favoured, 
 our commodities went to England to pay for the bills 
 we had received from the banks. Lastly, thanks to 
 the small notes of the Bank of France which had been 
 put in circulation, there was not even the appearance 
 
280 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 of the money embarrassment that had disquieted 
 us the previous year. 
 
 Unhappily, this co-operation of circumstances favour- 
 able to the accomplishing of our patriotic task was 
 neutralized by the agitations of the political parties. 
 Some months before the session that was about to 
 open, the Advanced Left had pretended that the only 
 mandate given by the electors to the deputies was to 
 make peace, and that peace being made, the Assembly 
 ought to dissolve. The majority had properly re- 
 plied to this species of summons that, besides the 
 mandate to make peace, the Assembly had also 
 been charged with the task of giving France a Con- 
 stitution, and that, furthermore, even if peace was 
 signed, it would only be completed after the carrying 
 out of the conditions upon which it was concluded — 
 after the payment of the indemnity and the evacuation 
 of the territory. As our punctuality of payment made 
 this evacuation certain for 1873, it was concluded 
 from this that the Assembly would first have to come 
 to definite resolutions in the matter of the Constitution. 
 The system under which we were living, created by 
 what was called the Pact of Bordeaux, consisted of 
 one sovereign Assembly, with an executive derived 
 from and responsible to that Assembly. Such a system 
 could only be temporary ; its continuance was only 
 desired by the extreme parties ; the Extreme Left, 
 because one sovereign chamber was in accordance 
 with its revolutionary principles ; the Extreme Right, 
 because it hoped to find, in the weakness of a tem- 
 porary system, facilities for restoring Monarchy. 
 Such was, besides, the conduct recommended by the 
 Count de Chambord to the Legitimists who had 
 visited him at Lucerne. 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 281 
 
 On the contrary, the Left Centre and the Left 
 wanted definitely to organize a Conservative Republic, 
 entrusting me with the Presidency for a period of 
 more or less duration. The Right Centre itself, 
 hoping that I would give myself up to it, consented 
 to this organization, and wished to offer me the 
 Presidency for life. 
 
 Whatever were the intentions of the various parties, 
 my duty was to point out to the Assembly the danger 
 to which it would expose the country by leaving 
 behind it public powers insufficiently organized, and 
 to propose the means of averting this danger. 
 
 Personally I did not wish for too long a period as 
 President, still less a term for life. It did not suit 
 me to give myself over indefinitely to politics, as I 
 desired to spend my last years in a repose that only 
 the interests of the State had brought me to abandon ; 
 and it did not suit me either to play the part of a 
 little bourgeois usurper taking advantage of the 
 unhappy times to impose himself upon France. I was 
 at the head of the Government through my patriotic 
 devotion, with a sense of the honour involved, which 
 I freely avowed; but I was not an official tenacious 
 of his place, and I had no mind to hand myself over 
 to any one in return for a few years of power. 
 
 My ruling principle was the most conservative in the 
 world. I had no fear of future elections ; but since the 
 unforeseen always finds a place in political affairs, I 
 desired that during this session, which would probably 
 be its last, the Assembly should pass conservative 
 measures that we should perhaps not obtain from its 
 successor. 
 
 Such were the views of the Government. I outlined 
 them in a message which the Council unanimously 
 
282 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 approved, and which I took to the Assembly on the 
 13th of November, 1872. I meant to read it myself, to 
 invest it with more formality and weight. 
 
 I began by depicting the prosperity of the country, 
 proving by official figures the activity of its trade, 
 which for this year had surpassed the most prosperous 
 year of the Empire by seven hundred and eighty- 
 seven millions. The Bank of France had seen its 
 reserve mount from six hundred to nine hundred and 
 fifty millions ; we were on the point of reaching an 
 equilibrium in our budget, and our payments to Ger- 
 many were taking place punctually and without any 
 financial crisis. 
 
 Apart from the material side of things, I said that a 
 great quiet was falling upon the passions roused by 
 our military disasters and our internal troubles, and 
 that Europe saw with a sympathetic eye the recon- 
 struction of our forces. All this part of the message 
 was heard with the utmost attention and obvious 
 satisfaction in the Centres. 
 
 At length I came to the political part, and attention 
 redoubled. Addressing myself to the Left, I said that 
 the stability of a Government could only be assured by 
 maintaining public order; and my severe language, 
 which should have been applauded especially by the 
 Right, was only applauded by the Left, eager to prove 
 that it did not take my words as conveying blame to 
 itself. These words : " The Republic will be Conservative 
 or it will not exist," were drowned in plaudits from the 
 Left Centre and the Left, and the Right Centre, 
 embarrassed, not venturing to join the Left, which it 
 appeared unhappy to see animated by such proper 
 sentiments, was silent, and preserved an attitude which 
 it should have left to the Extreme Right. 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 283 
 
 I quote this part of the message taken from the 
 Officiel, so that all may judge whether it would be 
 possible to use more conservative language. 
 
 " We have just informed you accurately, gentlemen, 
 of the actual situation of the country, and we have laid 
 especial stress upon its financial and commercial 
 position, because that is what has most importance 
 with regard to our credit, and because our credit, along 
 with our army, which is being reorganized with 
 remarkable rapidity, constitute the two elements of our 
 power. Thus, after a most unhappy war, after the 
 most terrible of civil conflicts, after the crumbling of a 
 throne that had been believed solid as a rock, France 
 has seen all nations eager to offer her their capital, 
 her credit better established than ever, eight milliards 
 paid off in two years, the greatest part of these sums 
 transferred to foreign countries without disturbing our 
 circulation, the bank-note accepted everywhere as cash, 
 the taxes, though increased by a third, paid without 
 crushing the taxpayer, financial equilibrium re-estab- 
 lished, or about to be, two hundred millions set aside 
 for the sinking fund, and industry and commerce 
 increasing by more than seven hundred millions in one 
 single year! These results, which we would not venture 
 to submit to you if they were not a striking proof of 
 the vitality of the country — to what, gentlemen, do we 
 owe them ? We owe them to one cause, and one only, 
 the energetic maintenance of order ! (Hearty assent 
 from a great number of benches.) Yes, it is order that 
 has brought it about that on the morrow of a foreign 
 war, on the morrow of a civil war, with foreign troops 
 occupying our soil, with the ruins of our towns still 
 smoking, it is, I repeat, order, strongly maintained, that 
 has permitted France to produce as much and to 
 
284 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 command as much credit as in the most prosperous 
 moments of her existence. (Applause from the same 
 benches.) 
 
 " I do not fear to repeat it, gentlemen : if you had 
 not enjoyed absolute order, this war, unexampled in 
 reverses, this cruel dismembering of our territory, 
 these tremendous burdens that seemed beyond our 
 power to bear, this throne fallen beneath the 
 weight of its mistakes, this ancient monarchy under 
 which we were wont to live suddenly vanished, this 
 new frame of a Republic, which in the ordinary course 
 agitates men's minds — all this, coming suddenly upon us, 
 all this pouring at once upon our surprised and rav- 
 aged country, all this might have become irretrievable 
 disaster! With the preservation of order, on the 
 contrary, our workshops were reopened, men's hands 
 resumed their busy activity, foreign capital, far from 
 avoiding us, sought us out again, calm has come back 
 with work ; and already France raises her head again, 
 endures her unconsolable griefs without forgetting 
 them, and, still more astounding ! a form of govern- 
 ment which, as a rule, disturbed her profoundly begins 
 little by little to enter into her habitual life ..." 
 (Acclamations of assent from the Left and the Left 
 Centre.) 
 
 A voice on the right : " No ! no ! " 
 
 The President. — " . . . does not prevent her from 
 returning to life, to hope, to confidence, confidence she 
 inspires in others as she feels it in herself. (Renewed 
 and hearty assent on the Left.) 
 
 " And since I am coming now inevitably to burning 
 questions of the moment, I will say to those who have 
 long given their faith to the Republic, as the ideal 
 of government most in harmony with the thought 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 285 
 
 and the most appropriate to the progress of modern 
 societies, I will say to them, ' It is you who should most 
 passionately pray for order . . . ' ( " Hear ! hear ! " 
 " Excellent ! " from the Left. Exclamations and 
 ironical laughter on the right.) ' For if the Republic, 
 already twice essayed without success, can succeed this 
 time, it is to the preservation of order you will owe it.' 
 ("Very true!" "Well said!" from the Centre and the 
 Left.) 
 
 " Let this then be your task, your daily care ! If the 
 exercise of certain rights that belong to free peoples 
 may disturb the country, learn to renounce them 
 voluntarily, and make in favour of the public safety a 
 sacrifice that will above all benefit the Republic. If it 
 could possibly be said that order is not equally in the 
 interest of everybody, I would venture to assert that it 
 is your essential interest, and that when we work to 
 maintain it, we are working for you, almost more 
 than for ourselves." (Movement of approbation among 
 the Left Centre.) 
 
 M. de Belcastel. — " It is France we must work for." 
 
 The President. — " Gentlemen, events have given us the 
 Republic, and to go back to its causes in order to 
 discuss and judge them would to-day be an undertaking 
 as dangerous as useless. The Republic exists ..." 
 
 A voice on the right : " No ! no!" 
 
 Baron Chaurand. — "We said the opposite at Bordeaux!" 
 
 The President. — " Gentlemen, have the goodness not to 
 interrupt ! You have no right to make personal replies 
 to a message to the National Assembly." ( " True ! " 
 "Well said!") 
 
 The President. — " I ask members of all views to wait 
 and not to be in a hurry to blame or to approve. 
 
 "I resume. 
 
286 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 " The Republic exists ; it is the legal Government 
 of the country ; to desire otherwise would be a new 
 revolution and the most to be feared of all. Let us 
 not waste our time in denouncing it ; but let us employ 
 our time in imprinting upon it the characteristics 
 that are desirable and necessary. A Committee 
 appointed by you, some months ago, gave it the 
 title of Conservative Republic. Let us adopt this 
 title, and try above all to see that it is deserved. 
 (" Hear ! hear ! ") 
 
 " Every Government must be conservative, and no 
 society could live under a Government that was not. 
 (General assent.) The Republic will be conservative, 
 or it will not exist." (Sensation.) 
 
 A voice from the Left Centre : " Hear ! hear ! We 
 accept ! " 
 
 The President. — " France has no mind to live in con- 
 tinual alarms ; she desires to be able to live in peace, 
 so that she may work to maintain herself, and to 
 meet her enormous burdens; and if she is not given 
 the calm which she absolutely needs, whatever be 
 the Government that may refuse her this calm, she 
 will not endure it long ! (" Hear ! hear ! Well said ! " 
 from a great number of benches on the Left and the 
 Left Centre.) Let no one delude himself ! It may 
 be imagined that, thanks to universal suffrage, and 
 so backed by the power of the mass, a Republic could 
 be established that would be the creature of a single 
 party ! That would be a work to endure only for a 
 day. 
 
 " But the mass itself needs repose, security, work. 
 (" Hear ! hear ! ") It may live for a few days on agita- 
 tions, but not long. (Renewed and numerous signs 
 of assent.) After inspiring fear in others, it takes 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 287 
 
 fright at itself, it flings itself into the arms of an 
 adventurer, and pays with twenty years of slavery 
 for a few days of a disastrous licence. (" Hear ! hear ! " 
 Prolonged applause from a great many benches.) 
 
 " This it has often done, as you know ; and do not 
 imagine that it is not capable of doing so once again. 
 A hundred times it will re-embark upon this sad 
 and humiliating voyage from anarchy to despotism, 
 from despotism to anarchy, filled with shame and 
 calamity, in which France has met with the loss of 
 two provinces, a tripled public debt, the burning of 
 her capital, the ruin of her greatest monuments, and 
 that massacre of hostages which one would have 
 deemed impossible ! (Deep emotion.) 
 
 "I conjure you, gentlemen, not to forget these 
 conditions, so terribly bound together : first a Republic 
 in agitation; then a return to a power that is called 
 strong because it is uncontrolled, and with the absence 
 of control, ruin certain and irreparable. (General and 
 hearty assent.) 
 
 "Yes, let us break the fatal chain that binds these 
 disastrous conditions to each other, and let us calm 
 instead of stirring up ; let us make the necessary 
 sacrifices to the security of all, let us even make 
 sacrifices that seem excessive, and above everything 
 let us not turn our eyes towards the reign of a party 
 . . . (" Hear ! hear ! ") ; for the Republic is a misnomer, 
 if instead of being the Government of all it is the 
 Government of a party, whatever may be that party. 
 (Bravos and applause from a great many benches.) 
 If, for example, you mean to represent it as the 
 triumph of one class over another, at once you 
 estrange from it a part of the country, first one part, 
 and then the whole. (" Yes ! yes ! " " Hear ! hear ! ") 
 
288 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 " The Revolution of 1789 was made to abolish classes, 
 that there should be in the nation only the nation 
 itself, the nation united, living all together under one 
 and the same law, carrying the same burdens, enjoying 
 the same advantages, in which, in a word, every man 
 should be rewarded or punished according to his 
 works. (" Hear ! hear ! " and applause from the Left.) 
 
 " Acting in this way, the Republic of 1789 established 
 the existence of all upon the basis of true social 
 justice; and its principles swept over the whole 
 world, because they were nothing else than this social 
 justice proclaimed and applied . . . (Renewed applause 
 from the Left) for the first time in the world's history. 
 And it is because it had this signification that it was 
 possible to boast of the tricoloured flag that it would 
 go the whole world round. Long, in the wake of a 
 conqueror, it moved in victory among the nations of 
 Europe ; but its material works have perished, while 
 its spiritual achievements remain and are the most 
 solid glory of France, far more than victories that 
 by the chance of mere force pass from one flag to 
 another. (Movement on the benches.) As for myself, 
 I do not understand, I do not accept the Republic 
 save as it should be, the Government of the nation, 
 which having long and faithfully left to an hereditary 
 power the direction of its destinies, but not having 
 found success, through mistakes that are impossible 
 to judge to-day, at length resolves to rule herself, 
 alone, through her own representatives freely chosen, 
 wisely selected, without question of party, or classes, 
 or birth, seeking them neither above nor below, 
 neither on the right nor the left, but by that light 
 of public esteem in which characters, qualities, defects 
 portray themselves in lines impossible to misread, 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 289 
 
 and choosing them with that freedom that is only 
 enjoyed in the bosom of order, calm, and security ! 
 (Bravos and loud applause from the Left.) 
 
 " Two years passed under your eyes, under your 
 influence, under your control, in almost unbroken calm, 
 may give us hopes for founding this Conservative 
 Republic, but only hopes ; and — let no one forget 
 this — the smallest mistake would suffice to make this 
 hope vanish before an afflicting reality. (Movement 
 and murmurs on the Right.) 
 
 "Permit me to add a last reflection. It is not 
 France alone that the Republic needs to inspire with 
 confidence, it is the world. Vanquished though she 
 is, France has not ceased to attract, to fix upon herself 
 the eyes of the nations, which take alarm or are 
 reassured according to what passes within her borders ; 
 and this uneasy attention is but a homage paid to 
 her influence on the peoples of the world. Sometimes 
 we hear it said, 'France is isolated.' And most fre- 
 quently it is with those who say so merely an illusion 
 of their pride. Foreign Governments have in other 
 days had a weakness for interfering in the internal 
 affairs of their neighbours ; cruel experience taught them 
 their lesson, and now they no longer think of doing 
 so. But they are masters of their own good opinion, 
 and no one can do without the good opinion of others. 
 Man needs the esteem of his fellows, and nations have 
 need of the esteem of other nations. (" Hear ! hear ! ") 
 A day comes, too, when one needs support, moral 
 support at the least, and one only finds it if one has 
 deserved it. (Assent.) 
 
 " Foreign Governments are to-day sufficiently en- 
 lightened to see only France herself in France. If 
 she is orderly, it is to the advantage of all ; if she 
 
 19 
 
290 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 is not merely orderly, but strong, it is to the advantage 
 of those who desire a true balance among the Powers 
 of the universe. Now I dare to affirm that the 
 efforts France has put forth, for now nearly two years 
 past, have won her an esteem many tokens of which 
 she has already received. And it is not to this party 
 or that party, to this man or that man, that these 
 tokens have been addressed, but to France, to France 
 alone, and the conduct she is displaying to repair 
 mistakes she did not make, but which she is expiating 
 because she allowed them to be made. (Loud and 
 widespread applause.) 
 
 " Well, then, I declare it, because my duty is to keep 
 my eyes fixed on Europe, France is not isolated, and 
 on the contrary it only depends upon herself to be 
 surrounded by trusty and useful friends. Let her be 
 peaceful under the Republic, and she will estrange no 
 one. Let her be agitated under a tottering monarchy, 
 and she will see chaos opening around her under one 
 form of government as well as under another. (Loud 
 approval on the Left. Prolonged interruption.) 
 
 "Gentlemen, we are coming to a decisive moment. 
 The form of this Republic has only been a provisional 
 form dictated by the course of events, resting upon 
 your good sense and on your unity with the power 
 you have temporarily selected ; but all minds look 
 to you, all ask themselves what day . . . (murmurs 
 on the Right), what form you will choose to give to 
 the Republic that conservative strength it cannot do 
 without." 
 
 M. de la Rochefoucauld, Due de Bisaccia. — "But we do 
 not want it ! " 
 
 M. le Vicomte de Lorgeril. — " And the Pact of Bordeaux ? " 
 
 The President. — " It is for you to choose both. The 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 291 
 
 country, in giving you its powers, gave you the clear 
 mission to save it, by procuring for it peace first of 
 all, after peace, order, and with order the re-establish- 
 ment of its powers, and finally a regular form of 
 government. You announced it thus, and now it is 
 for you to fix the order and the time of these various 
 sections of the work of salvation entrusted to you. 
 (" Hear ! hear ! " " Quite so ! " from the Right.) Heaven 
 f orf end that we should put ourselves in your place ! 
 But on the date you have fixed, when you have chosen 
 some from among you to meditate upon this great 
 work, if you desire our advice we shall give it to you 
 loyally and boldly. (Exclamations and murmurings 
 on the Right.) Until then count upon our profound 
 attachment to the country, to you, to this thing so 
 beautiful and so dear to our hearts that was before us, 
 that will be after us — France, which alone merits all 
 our efforts and all our sacrifices. (Loud and widespread 
 applause.) 
 
 "A great and momentous session is opening before 
 you ; it will be neither deference, nor co-operation, 
 nor devotion, nor determination, on our part that 
 will be lacking in the success of your work, which 
 may God bless and make complete, and above all, 
 lasting, which has not yet been granted to us since 
 the beginning of the world ! " (Long acclamations 
 and repeated applause on the Left Centre and the 
 Left.) 
 
 Although this language was as moderate and as 
 conservative as possible, the Extreme Right contained 
 themselves with much difficulty. 
 
 As soon as I had finished reading, M. de Kerdrel 
 claimed to speak, and was greeted with much whisper- 
 ing from all sides of the Assembly, uneasy as to what 
 
292 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 he was about to say. The Right seemed decided to 
 show no further consideration, and the Right Centre 
 itself, Monarchist in the depths o f its heart. wa.a martf 
 to allow itself to be carried away, though it perceived 
 how dangerous a conflict with the Executive might 
 be. M. de Kerdrel, in a tone full of consideration for 
 me, said that the message inviting the Assembly to 
 enter upon the path of constitutional development 
 deserved on this account to be most carefully 
 examined. He therefore asked that a committee 
 should be appointed to present to the Assembly a 
 draft answer to the Message. 
 
 Not fearing the investigation of the Government's 
 views, I hastened to declare that so far from fearing 
 the light we sought it, and that the Cabinet associated 
 itself with M. de Kerdrel's proposal. After my declara- 
 tion no hesitation was possible ; it was decided that a 
 committee should be appointed to draw up a report 
 on this proposal. 
 
 Such was the first act of a policy, the aim of which 
 was to delay as much as possible the moment when 
 France would be sheltered from the rivalry of parties 
 by the stability of the institutions I proposed to give 
 her. 
 
 In considering the motives which had inspired this 
 Message, it will readily be understood how much the 
 reception given to it shocked me. I gave counsels 
 of political prudence, I asked for measures of social 
 preservation, and I was accused of not being conserva- 
 tive enough ! If I had not had before me the un- 
 finished work of the liberation of the territory, I 
 would have resigned the power to this Assembly 
 which was sacrificing the present and certain interest 
 of the country to chimerical hopes. 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 293 
 
 Incidents could not fail of being plentiful along this 
 path into which the majority had thrown itself, and 
 on the 18th of November, General Changarnier — 
 always in a hurry to provoke crises from which he 
 always emerged disillusioned, his friends never taking 
 any account of his pretended services — General 
 Changarnier mounted the tribune to develop an attack 
 seemingly directed against M. Gambetta, but in reality 
 against the Government, on his notorious Grenoble 
 speech. He was sufficiently rude to M. Gambetta, 
 and accused the Government of weakness and lack 
 of decision. 
 
 M. de Broglie then summoned me, not very politely, 
 to repeat before the Chamber the words I had spoken 
 before the Permanent Committee with regard to the 
 Grenoble speech. He would be glad, he said, to hear 
 me once more, with the same fervour, the same 
 accent, combat the socialist doctrines of that speech. 
 
 Members were generally disgusted with this im- 
 pertinence of a novice in parliamentary life, who was 
 putting questions upon his conservative principles 
 to one who, for forty years, had been the constant 
 opponent of anti-social doctrines. 
 
 I went to the tribune, and after criticizing the 
 rudeness of M. de Broglie's summons, which I per- 
 emptorily refused to answer, I said that in this quarrel 
 picked with the Government there was only one 
 serious question, that of confidence, and I demanded 
 that it should be settled that very moment. This 
 challenge troubled our opponents, who would not 
 have liked so decisive a step. But they had provoked 
 it, I insisted, and we turned at once to the often 
 lengthy agenda before the Assembly. 
 
 It being impossible to go on with the business 
 
294 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 without further notice, I supported the following 
 motion proposed by M. Mettetal : 
 
 " The Assembly, confident in the energy of the 
 Government, and reprobating the doctrines put 
 forward in the Grenoble speech, passes to the business 
 of the day." 
 
 Of six hundred members present, there were only 
 three hundred and seventy-nine votes cast, two 
 hundred and sixty-three for and one hundred and 
 sixteen against. It was clear that the Assembly was 
 allowing itself to be carried away by the coa lition of 
 Monar chist parties . We were thus entering upon a 
 period of conflicts no longer possible to avert, and 
 which the Kerdrel Committee, with a majority hostile 
 to the Government, was to continue. 
 
 While waiting until this committee should be pre- 
 pared to hear me, I had to occupy myself with a 
 sufficiently serious consequence of our loan. England 
 was threatened with a money crisis as the result of 
 her share in our financial operations. She had sold 
 us a great number of her bills on Germany, and as 
 the inevitable consequence of these sales, the rate of 
 exchange went up in Berlin, in Frankfort, in Hamburg, 
 precious metals were being sent out from London to 
 these places. Our neighbours then found themselves 
 exactly in the position in which we had been after 
 our first loan. 
 
 To put an end to this movement, the Bank of 
 England had put up its discount rate from 4 to 
 7 per cent., and would not have failed to carry 
 this progression to the point where balance would 
 have been established between the discount and the 
 exchange rates. It was the beginning of a financial 
 crisis which, extending to all the money markets of 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 295 
 
 Europe, would have become a serious danger, especially 
 for ourselves, whom it surprised in the midst of 
 settling our loan and our payments. Our interest 
 was to do away with this danger as soon as 
 possible. 
 
 To this end the Bank of France, which at the same 
 moment had eight hundred millions in specie at its 
 disposal, was prepared to advance one hundred or 
 two hundred millions to the Bank of England, and 
 would have authorized it with a justifiable feeling of 
 national pride. I even disclosed our willingness to 
 Lord Lyons ; but the Bank of England did not wish 
 to ask us for this service. All the same we came to 
 its aid indirectly. 
 
 We had set up a financial office in London, under 
 M. de Maintenant, a very clever and honest inspector 
 of finance. This office was to receive the payments 
 of the very numerous English subscribers to our loan, 
 and in return to deliver the scrip and pay the coupons 
 to the foreign creditors of France. The funds thus cen- 
 tralized came to about two hundred millions, deposited 
 in the Bank of England, whence we were to draw 
 them in order to pay Germany ; we preferred to delay 
 this operation, so as not to increase the embarrass- 
 ment of the Bank of England by depriving it of these 
 two hundred millions ; and shortly after, thanks to this 
 considerate behaviour on our part, and to the arrival 
 of gold from Australia and from America, the dis- 
 count rate fell in London, and the danger of a 
 European financial crisis was averted. 
 
 On the 22nd of November, 1872, I went with M. 
 Dufaure before the Kerdrel Committee. The points on 
 which its president, M. d'Audiffret-Pasquier, asked us 
 for an explanation were as follows : 
 
296 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 1. The committee thought that, on the 18th of 
 November, by speaking from the tribune of the 
 Grenoble speech as a mere incident, I had not 
 blamed it with sufficient severity. 
 
 2. The committee wished to know how the new 
 institutions could be reconciled with the Pact of 
 Bordeaux. 
 
 3. Finally, what, according to our idea, were these 
 new institutions that were to be given to France ? 
 
 To these three questions, put in the most courteous 
 terms, I answered clearly and firmly. 
 
 I said, first of all, that the reproach that I showed 
 too much indulgence for the doctrines of the Grenoble 
 speech needed no reply. Everybody knew what 
 I thought of the Radical doctrines, and how I had 
 fought the formidable insurrection they had provoked. 
 The true ground of debate lay elsewhere. It was in 
 the spirit of the Message, which part of the Assembly 
 found too republican. 
 
 What, then, I asked, were my motives for speaking 
 as I did? Everybody immediately before the Message 
 blamed the temporary principle, even those who 
 to-day refuse to give it up. If I had associated 
 myself with this feeling, nearly universal in France, 
 it was because it responded to the need of taking 
 precautions against the possible advent of a Radical 
 Chamber, and with it Socialism. Against this danger 
 I saw only one means of resistance ; to create an 
 Upper, that is to say a Conservative, Chamber, and 
 a solidly established Executive, sharing with the Upper 
 Chamber the right to dissolve the Chamber of 
 Deputies. This organization would have to be com- 
 pleted by a wise electoral law. With these conditions 
 I judged that there was nothing to fear from the 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 297 
 
 future national representation. I had already the 
 previous year told the members of the Assembly 
 who had come to discuss their forebodings as to our 
 political future, and I took nothing back to-day. 
 
 They asked me again how these proposals could 
 be reconciled with the Pact of Bordeaux. 
 
 In the simplest and most straightforward manner 
 I told them. At Bordeaux I had promised to keep 
 the Republic faithfully ; to-day it was just as I had 
 taken it into my charge on the first day, without any 
 alteration. And yet there was a difference : on the 
 day when it was entrusted to me, the country 
 was disorganized, while to-day it was completely 
 reorganized in its finance, its army, its administration. 
 Did the Pact of Bordeaux mean that we were never 
 to get away from temporary and provisional things? 
 Assuredly not, for at Bordeaux I had said, with the 
 approval of the Assembly, that when our noble 
 wounded (that is to say France, then vanquished, 
 beaten down, covered with blood and desolation) was 
 restored to health, it could then decide upon its own 
 destiny. The end of the provisional regime was 
 then foreseen in the very wording of the Pact of 
 Bordeaux. That is why I had proposed to the 
 Assembly to prepare a number of laws proper to 
 assure the future destiny of the country against the 
 dangers that would result from the prolonging of the 
 provisional regime. In what was this foresighted step 
 contradictory to the Pact of Bordeaux? On the 
 contrary, it was its confirmation. 
 
 "Those very same people," I added, "who run to 
 Antwerp or to Chislehurst, offering the crown to 
 their selected princes, are also asking to abandon the 
 provisional regime, and if we were to accept the 
 
298 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 solutions they pursue, they would never accuse us of 
 breaking our word." 
 
 Besides, I did not ask that the Republic should be 
 proclaimed as the final system of government. I 
 merely said, in order to respect every one's suscepti- 
 bilities : " Let us confine ourselves to organizing the 
 Republic now existing in such a way that it will be 
 conservative as long as it is the Government of the 
 country, the Assembly remaining the sovereign judge 
 of the methods I propose to attain this end. A 
 Government that had neither views nor a voice on 
 so serious a subject would be the most culpable and 
 the most pusillanimous of governments." 
 
 Such were my answers, to which no rejoinder was 
 offered. The committee, through its president, con- 
 fined itself merely to thanking us for our explanations, 
 and chose M. Batbie to make its report, which he 
 read to the Assembly on November 26, 1872. 
 
 In a style full of bitterness for the Left and of 
 feigned deference for me, he depicted the present 
 condition of France in the darkest colours ; he said 
 that, in such a situation, the irresolute policy of the 
 Government should give place to a fighting policy, a 
 wretched phrase that was to have a long re-echoing, 
 and ended by requesting that a committee of fifteen 
 members, nominated by the official departments, 
 should be enjoined to lay before the Assembly a bill 
 upon the responsibility of Ministers. 
 
 The Keeper of the Seals was the first to reply. His 
 clear, decided, vigorous speech brought the debate 
 back to the question. Looking to the public interest, 
 the Government, he said, had proposed to the Assembly 
 to take certain constitutional measures proper to 
 assure the immediate future of the country. In 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 299 
 
 reply to this proposal the committee demanded a 
 fresh settlement of the question of the responsibility 
 of Ministers. Although this settlement might bring 
 about a decrease of the influence of the Head of the 
 State in Parliament, the Government did not oppose 
 its submission to the Assembly, on condition that the 
 constitutional measures asked for in the Message 
 should also be submitted. And therefore M. Dufaure 
 moved a counter resolution in the following terms : 
 
 " A committee of thirty shall be nominated in the 
 official departments, in order to present to the National 
 Assembly a bill to regulate the assignment of the 
 public powers and the conditions of the responsibility 
 of Ministers." 
 
 The Reporter then demanded that this counter 
 resolution should immediately be put before the 
 committee, which was allowed, and the Keeper of 
 the Seals and myself went to uphold it before them.. 
 But the Legitimists wanted an immediate and com- 
 plete rupture. They prevailed in this, and at seven 
 in the evening the Reporter went to the tribune to 
 announce that, the committee and the Government 
 persisting in their respective resolutions, the question 
 could only be decided by the Assembly. 
 
 A night sitting was demanded. I declared that I 
 wished to speak, and that I would only speak the 
 next day, which I did immediately the sitting of the 
 29th of November was opened. 
 
 M. Batbie had described at great length what he 
 called the army of disorder, accusing the Government 
 of lacking firmness in dealing with it. Then he had 
 been tactless enough to avow that the majority was 
 dissatisfied at hearing the Left applaud the President. 
 
 I replied that no doubt there existed an army of 
 
300 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 disorder almost everywhere in Europe, but that no 
 one had fought it more strenuously than myself on 
 every occasion when it had threatened society by 
 insurrection, by strikes, by socialist theories. In all 
 these occurrences, particularly in 1848 and in 1871, 
 I had set myself, not without peril, against the assaults 
 directed against social order, and I had averted them 
 by persuasion or repulsed them by force. 
 
 It was said again that we left religion unprotected, 
 regardless of the fact that, under the Empire, I had 
 defended the power of the Church of Rome against 
 the insensate policy of nationalities. 
 
 It was pretended that the signs of approval to-day 
 lavished upon me by the Left proved that I was no 
 longer opposing the theories and the systems I had 
 formerly reprobated. 
 
 Now these signs of approval were to be explained 
 in a very different manner. 
 
 At Bordeaux I had solemnly promised to preserve 
 the Republic ; upon the insurrection of Paris, in order 
 to prevent the rising of the greatest towns in France, 
 I had pledged myself not to lend a hand to any restor- 
 ation of Monarchy. I kept my word, fulfilled my 
 pledges. That was why the Left testified its approval. 
 
 Then, addressing the Right, I said that if the 
 Monarchy, recognized at Bordeaux as impossible, was 
 now become possible, I might be told that as I alone 
 had given this pledge it was for me to retire and leave 
 the Assembly free to re-establish the Monarchy. In 
 that case I should retire. But if there was no agreement 
 among all the various parties to decree the crown to 
 one of the three claimants, the Republic, recognized as 
 necessary last year at Bordeaux, was so still to-day; 
 and I added that in proposing to make it Conservative 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 301 
 
 by means of laws which I would submit to discussion 
 in the Assembly, I merely obeyed the dictates of 
 loyalty, the force of circumstances, and the most vital 
 interests of public peace. 
 
 Coming finally to the theme of Parliamentary 
 Government which the committee pretended to 
 strengthen, I asked if anything could be more parlia- 
 mentary than the regime under which we were living, 
 which obliged the Head of the State to submit all 
 his acts to the approval of the Assembly. Certainly 
 it would have been much more easy for me never to 
 oppose myself to its will ; but I would thus have failed 
 in my essential duty ; for the Assembly being sovereign 
 and uncontrolled, its power would have been of all the 
 most to be dreaded. 
 
 When I had returned to the Government bench, 
 many deputies came to congratulate me, and my 
 colleagues told me that they were delighted with the 
 situation I had just created for the whole Cabinet. 
 
 After a sufficiently lengthy interruption, the dis- 
 cussion was taken up by M. Ernoul. It was not, he 
 said, a matter of the Republic or of the Monarchy, but 
 of the freedom of Parliament, compromised by 'the 
 greatness of my position, which meant that when I 
 was present the Assembly was no longer free. He 
 averred that, far from wishing to attack my power, 
 it was sought to make it independent of crises in the 
 Ministry, and he finished by recalling the concluding 
 lines of my History of the Empire, in which I had 
 pointed out the danger of giving up the country to one 
 man, whoever it might be. 
 
 I asked M. Ernoul at once if in good seriousness 
 he was applying to me phrases that were applied to 
 Napoleon, the absolute master of France and of nearly 
 
302 MEMOIRS OF M. THIEES 
 
 all Europe. Was it not perceived how misplaced was 
 this pretended comparison between the unlimited 
 power of the great despot and my authority, precarious, 
 limited, and contested day by day? 
 
 Finally, to end this long debate, only the essential 
 points of which I have indicated, I declared that 
 behind all the theoretical questions that had just been 
 debated there was a question of confidence in the 
 Government, a question which I begged the Assembly 
 to answer. 
 
 It answered by adopting the counter resolution of 
 the Keeper of the Seals by three hundred and seventy- 
 two votes to three hundred and thirty-five, a majority 
 of thirty-seven. 
 
 At any other time such a majority would have 
 seemed in my eyes insufficient ; but at the point we had 
 reached we must needs be content with it. 
 
 This vote was greeted with satisfaction by public 
 opinion ; but the Right Centre, upon which thence- 
 forward depended the Government's majority, proved 
 on November 30th how fragile had been that it had 
 given us the day before. It was on the occasion of the 
 addresses that nearly all the General and Municipal 
 Councils had sent me to approve what was called the 
 policy of the Message. I had, though without much 
 success, done all I could to discourage these mani- 
 festations, because they amounted to a censure of the 
 disposition displayed by the Assembly. Nevertheless 
 we were blamed for them, and the Minister for the 
 Interior, M. Victor Lefranc, questioned upon these 
 addresses, was defeated by a hostile order of the day. 
 The same evening he brought me his resignation. 
 
 The malcontents of all parties in the Assembly 
 pretended that M. Victor Lefranc was merely the mask 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 303 
 
 of M. Calmon, the Under-Secretary of State for the 
 Interior : a most ill-founded reproach, for M. Victor 
 Lefranc had in his ministry all the authority that was 
 implied in his functions ; but it is true that M. Calmon 
 exercised a very vigorous supervision over the holders 
 of prefectures and sub-prefectures, an important part 
 of the Government. The son of the former Director- 
 General of Registration, who had been a very consider- 
 able personage, and highly considered under earlier 
 regimes, M. Calmon, a man of clear and decided mind, 
 firm, pre-eminently a man of order, was also an adminis- 
 trator of the greatest merit. Like us he desired the 
 Republic to be conservative, and endeavoured to incul- 
 cate the same idea throughout the administration. 
 That sufficed to make him the target for the attacks of 
 the Right in the Assembly. 
 
 Faced with these difficulties, I proposed to M. de 
 Remusat and M. Dufaure a combination consisting of 
 transferring M. de Goulard from the Ministry of 
 Finance, in which he was not specially essential, to the 
 Ministry for the Interior, in which he would have the 
 advantage of pleasing the two centres by his amen- 
 ability. I would next call the Prefect of the Seine, 
 M. Leon Say, a man of incontestable worth and of 
 sound liberal opinions, to the Ministry of Finance, and 
 M. Calmon would replace him in the Prefecture of the 
 Seine, where he would render immense service. There 
 was still one Ministry to dispose of, the Public Works, 
 which was held provisionally by M. Teisserenc de Bort, 
 the Minister of Commerce. For this post I thought of 
 M. de Fourtou, a young deputy who appeared to have a 
 certain political insight along with the gift of speech. 
 
 This combination, adopted and approved of by the 
 Council, was announced in the Official Gazette on 
 
304 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 December 7, 1872, and was well received by the 
 Assembly and the public. And my complaisance to- 
 wards the Assembly, manifested by this change in the 
 Ministry, and more particularly by the selection of 
 M. de Goulard for the Ministry of the Interior, had 
 so great a success with the Right that we could believe 
 that we had made peace with it. 
 
 A few days later the Right again had reason to feel 
 keen satisfaction, this time over the petitions for the 
 dissolution of the Chamber. 
 
 It seemed a favourable opportunity for a great 
 display of Republican and anti-Republican passion. I 
 did not go to the sitting, in order to leave it for 
 M. Dufaure to speak, as he was set on measuring 
 himself with M. Gambetta, whose intervention in 
 the debate was announced. 
 
 This encounter took place and was extremely hot. 
 M. Gambetta, very downright and incisive in his 
 manner, having displayed a certain arrogance towards 
 the Chamber, M. Dufaure called him strongly to 
 order and moderation, and roused the greatest 
 enthusiasm in the centres, which were delighted to 
 have this vigorous talent at their service for a moment. 
 A majority of nearly five hundred votes to two hundred 
 (it is true that this was against dissolution) declared 
 itself in a way that made it possible to believe that the 
 majority of earlier days was reconstituted. But at 
 what price could it be held together? 
 
 The famous Committee of Thirty, created by the 
 vote of November 29th, had just been elected after 
 lengthy discussions. It was merely a doubling of 
 the Kerdrel Committee, to which had been added 
 fifteen new members, with a hostile majority as usual. 
 M. de Larcy had been nominated president. This 
 
PEESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 305 
 
 choice of a former colleague who had always remained 
 a friend was, they said, a sign of goodwill which the 
 Committee had wished to give me. 
 
 On January 1, 1873, the customary receptions were 
 held at Versailles, as in 1872, with a great crowd of 
 deputies of every shade of opinion ; for even the Right, 
 which since the last change of Ministry and the 
 speech of M. Dufaure affected to be satisfied, did not 
 fail to come to the Pr^sidence. 
 
 The Diplomatic Corps also came to assure me of the 
 friendly sentiments of which the European Cabinets 
 had already given me proof in our negotiations relating 
 to the commercial treaties. 
 
 With England the compensating duties, consequent 
 on the imposition of a tax on raw materials, which 
 had been declared impossible of acceptance of our 
 neighbours, had just been agreed to in a new treaty 
 substituted for that of 1860, a treaty which assured the 
 return of a hundred millions indispensable to balance our 
 budget. To attain this result I had been obliged to set 
 the interest of our finances above that of our mercantile 
 marine, by provisionally abandoning the application to 
 England of our new law of super-tax on shipping. I 
 had still another motive for giving way on this point. 
 I reckoned that as soon as England accepted the 
 compensating duties, Belgium and Italy would accept 
 them in their turn, since they could no longer cite the 
 example of England to justify their opposition. And 
 our treaty once signed with that Power, Belgium 
 hastened to sign a similar one, and Holland showed 
 an intention of following suit. As for Italy, she was 
 of no very great importance to us as far as raw 
 materials were concerned, except for raw silk and 
 hardly at all for manufactured silk. We had, there- 
 
 20 
 
306 MEMOIKS OF M. THIEKS 
 
 fore, only a very little interest in obtaining compensat- 
 ing duties on this last commodity. Besides, the Cabinet 
 of Sella-Lanza, weakened by the internal difficulties 
 springing from the law relating to the religious houses, 
 was neither disposed nor prepared to enter upon a 
 discussion concerning Italy's commercial system. He 
 asked us to be satisfied for the moment with a conven- 
 tion by which, accepting the principle of compensating 
 duties, he engaged to transform this convention into 
 law during the course of the year. 
 
 We owed this pledge to the goodwill of King Victor 
 Emmanuel, who was satisfied with France's policy 
 towards Italy, and therefore disposed to make con- 
 cessions likely to facilitate relations between his 
 Government and ours. Accordingly, when the Pope 
 complained to us of some difficulty emanating from 
 the Italian Government, I addressed myself to the 
 King through M. Visconti-Venosta, and I obtained all 
 right and possible satisfaction until the famous modus 
 Vivendi between the Papacy and Royalty had been 
 discovered and had been accepted by the Holy Father. 
 With Spain our relations were equally good, in spite 
 of some trouble caused by the fall of the Savoy 
 dynasty on the other side of the Pyrenees. King 
 Victor Emmanuel had allowed his son Amadeus to 
 accept the crown of Spain, an error similar to King 
 Leopold's in authorizing his son-in-law Maximilian to 
 accept the throne of Mexico. The young King Amadeus, 
 courageous and intelligent, who, in order to follow in 
 his new country the excellent examples of King 
 Leopold and King Victor Emmanuel, allowed his 
 subjects to govern themselves, had gone too far in this 
 path when he chose Republican Ministers such as M. 
 Zorilla and his friends. And so after King Amadeus, 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 307 
 
 had reigned three years, a Republic came to be pro- 
 claimed in Madrid. 
 
 I had been loyal towards King Amadeus, opposing 
 the Carlist attempts against his authority as much as 
 I could. I say " as much as I could," because on the 
 Spanish frontiers I was not always obeyed by certain 
 prefects, who had no more republicanism than the 
 mere word. I maintained an equally loyal attitude to 
 the Spanish Republic, and if I was a little tardy in 
 recognizing it, it was merely to wait until the Govern- 
 ment de facto should have acquired the characteristics 
 of a Government de jure. I simply promised my best 
 services to M. Olozaga, the representative of this 
 Government in France, and I kept my word through 
 all the affairs to which the Carlist insurrection gave 
 birth upon our frontier. I pointed out to him, at the 
 same time, the grave difficulties to which the Spanish 
 Government would expose itself if it disturbed 
 Portugal, which at the moment was seriously alarmed. 
 Happily, in eloquent M. Castelar we found a Minister 
 of the greatest ability and wisdom, our relations with 
 whom were excellent, and the Cabinets of Europe 
 were very grateful to us for our behaviour at this 
 juncture. 
 
 Abroad, then, our affairs were going as well as 
 possible; but at home I had to seek some way of 
 putting an end to the difference that had arisen 
 between the Government and the Committee of Thirty, 
 a difference that held the attention both of our own 
 and foreign countries ; \Jermany especially, which held 
 to the idea of settling her accounts with us, was 
 uneasy at what might be a cause of trouble in France, 
 and Count von Arnim, as often as I met him, asked me 
 what point the work of this Committee had reached. 
 
308 MEMOIRS OP M. THIERS 
 
 And so from the month of January I had several times 
 attended its sittings, in order to spur it on to finish 
 its report. 
 
 " The Assembly," I had said to one of the members, 
 "has charged you to present to it a scheme for the 
 organization of the responsibility of Ministers and a 
 scheme of organization for the public powers. In 
 my opinion the responsibility of Ministers is already 
 adequately established by existing laws, and what you 
 are looking for under this name is a means of weaken- 
 ing my influence on the deliberations of the Assembly 
 by forbidding me the tribune. I am nevertheless 
 disposed to show myself as conciliatory as possible 
 on this point, provided that you at the same time 
 occupy yourselves with the second part of your 
 task." 
 
 Following my observations, the Committee of Thirty 
 at length decided to divide itself into two sub-com- 
 mittees, which should each examine a part of the 
 resolutions before it. 
 
 As I have said, I lent myself to everything desired by 
 the sub-committee that was to concern itself with the 
 responsibility of the Ministers. Its members were, 
 they said, so far from any intention of limiting or 
 cramping my freedom of action that they wished to 
 ask a right of suspensive veto for me, allowing me 
 to resist the headstrong impulses of a single Assembly, 
 and if they aimed at curtailing my right to take part in 
 the debates from the tribune, it was chiefly for the 
 sake of my own dignity, to withdraw me from the 
 violence of those debates. They did not find that I 
 was sufficiently safeguarded from them by the article 
 of the Rivet Constitution, which obliged me, on each 
 occasion when I wished to speak, to inform the 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 309 
 
 Assembly by a message ; and they proposed new for- 
 malities to make access to the tribune more difficult 
 for me. 
 
 Thus, directly I should announce by message my 
 intention of intervening in any debate, all discussion 
 should cease, and I could only speak in the next sitting. 
 When I had been heard, I should withdraw without 
 discussion, and the sitting would again be suspended. 
 I would be replied to at the next sitting. And as I 
 could not be deprived of the right to reply in turn, 
 I pointed out to them that discussions would in this 
 way be exposed to the risk of becoming everlasting 
 and losing themselves in absurdity, if some day a 
 mischievous President, without fear of hearing Cato's 
 quip on Cicero applied to himself — habemus consulem 
 facetum — wanted to go on indefinitely making trips 
 from the Pr^sidence to the Assembly. 
 
 When the Committee unfolded all these devices before 
 me, I could not prevent myself from calling them, 
 laughingly, chinoiseries, a word that stuck to the work 
 of the Thirty. I accepted them all the same, in a spirit 
 of conciliation. For at the same time as I was taking 
 part in these discussions, I was preparing the basis 
 of a new and last convention with Germany, to ensure 
 the final liberation of our territory. 
 
 The fourth milliard was to be paid on the 1st of May 
 following (1873), and the departments of the Ardennes 
 and the Vosges would thereupon be evacuated, that is 
 to say nearly a year before the period fixed by the 
 convention of 29th of June, 1872. There would then 
 remain only the Meuse, Meurthe-et-Moselle, and the 
 territory of Belfort to be liberated, the last pledges 
 for the fifth milliard, payable 1st of March, 1875. 
 
 Happily our abundant resources gave me the cer- 
 
310 MEMOIRS OF M. THIEES 
 
 tainty that we would be able to anticipate this date, 
 and pay the fifth milliard in the year 1873, without 
 having recourse to financial guarantees, and I arranged, 
 in co-operation with M. de Roussy, the Directeur- 
 General de la Comptabilite publique, and M. Dutil- 
 leul, Directeur du Mouvement General des Fonds, the 
 following scheme : 
 
 Immediately after the payment we were about to 
 make, on the 1st of May, of the five hundred millions 
 completing the fourth milliard, we would offer 
 Germany to pay the fifth and last milliard in four 
 equal instalments, on the 1st of June, 1st of July, 1st of 
 August, and 1st of September, 1873. 
 
 Unfortunately, the twenty-five thousand men who 
 would withdraw from the Ardennes and the Vosges on 
 the 1st of May, when the fourth milliard would be paid, 
 would go to join the twenty-five thousand that already 
 occupied Meurthe-et-Moselle and the Meuse, and would 
 crush these two departments under the burden of fifty 
 thousand German soldiers until the 1st of September. 
 To prevent this painful necessity, as well as to avoid 
 the expense of providing quarters for the troops, I 
 resolved to propose to Prussia the evacuation of all 
 four departments at once on the 1st of July. The 
 Meuse, Meurthe-et-Moselle, and Belfort would in this 
 way be free two months sooner, but by way of com- 
 pensation the Ardennes and the Vosges would be two 
 months later than our conventions allowed. This 
 measure seemed an equitable one, and I arranged a 
 meeting with Count von Arnim in Paris on the 
 4th of February, to propose it to him. 
 
 "I have considered our resources," I said to him. 
 " On the 1st of May next, at the latest, you will have 
 received the fourth milliard in full, and from that date 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 311 
 
 you are to restore us two departments. How do you 
 expect to set about this evacuation ? " 
 
 "The simplest thing," replied Count von Arnim, 
 "would be to send the twenty-five thousand men 
 occupying these departments back to Germany. But 
 our army would be reduced by so much, and our poor 
 General Manteuffel would think himself dishonoured 
 if he no longer had fifty thousand men under his 
 command." 
 
 Count von Arnim, who loathed General Manteuffel, 
 never let an opportunity slip for uttering his antipathy 
 in malevolent speeches. 
 
 I said then that if the withdrawal of the twenty-five 
 thousand men was not possible, the simplest thing 
 would be to carry out the total evacuation of all four 
 departments at the same time, and I explained the 
 scheme set forth above. He found it acceptable. 
 
 " Only," he said, " you are asking credit for five 
 hundred millions, since we should be evacuating all we 
 hold two months before being fully paid, and it will 
 perhaps be insisted that on your part you should leave 
 a pledge in our hands until the full discharge of the 
 debt." 
 
 He then expatiated on a theme he had often treated : 
 the difficulty of getting the King to evacuate the 
 territory he held, as he was persuaded that the 
 departure of the Prussians would immediately be 
 followed by a revolution in France. 
 
 After this interview, on the 10th of February, I 
 wrote to Nancy so that General Manteuffel should 
 know of our plans and lend us his concurrence. 
 
 Our proposals reached Berlin and were satisfactory 
 to Count Bismarck ; but it was difficult to make them 
 agreeable in the eyes of the Emperor, who would have 
 
312 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 liked to make no concession before an agreement had 
 been reached between the Government and the Com- 
 mittee of Thirty. 
 
 Fortunately, this agreement was near at hand, 
 thanks to my acceptance of the scheme of the law on 
 the responsibility of Ministers. It remained only to 
 get the Committee to add to this draft the one 
 demanded by the Assembly, upon the organization of 
 public powers, and they determined to charge the 
 Government with presenting this. 
 
 From this moment, union between the Government 
 and the majority was regarded as re-established, which 
 facilitated our negotiations with Germany. On March 1st 
 M. de Gontaut announced to me by telegraph that the 
 Emperor would accept our proposals as to the payment 
 of the last milliard, but that he wished to keep Belfort 
 until September as pledge for the final clearance of 
 our debt. 
 
 Immediately Count Bismarck informed him of this 
 condition, M. de Gontaut had hastened to declare that 
 the intention to keep Belfort until September was a 
 mark of distrust that would antagonize and alarm 
 public opinion in France, and on March 3rd I received 
 an identical communication from General Manteuffel, 
 by the intermediary of M. de Saint- Vallier, who also 
 had addressed the very same protestations to the 
 General. 
 
 Our two representatives to the German Government 
 thus expressed the feelings which they knew animated 
 me. To sever Belfort from the territories to which it 
 was joined by the actual wording of the treaties, and 
 to reserve it as the last pledge for our debt, made the 
 fate of this fortress depend on an accident or some 
 subtle interpretation of texts. 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 313 
 
 Accordingly, when Count von Arnim came officially 
 on behalf of Count Bismarck to inform me of the 
 conditions imposed upon the evacuation, I declared to 
 the Ambassador of Germany that the clause in which 
 his Government asked to retain the fortress of Belfort 
 until September was unacceptable. 
 
 Count von Arnim, who expected my objections, 
 granted that this clause was regrettable, that he would 
 not have himself cared to propose it to me, and he took 
 the greatest pains to persuade me that it concealed 
 no dishonest arrikre-pens6e on the part of either the 
 Emperor or Count Bismarck. Of his own accord he 
 promised to interpret my objections to Berlin. In 
 displaying this good disposition Count von Arnim was 
 perhaps sincere, since he had an interest of pride in 
 signalizing his mission to Paris by the conclusion of a 
 treaty definitely settling all matters between France 
 and Germany. 
 
 This conversation allowed me to hope that the 
 Belfort clause was not irrevocable, and, like me, M. 
 de Remusat was of opinion that by discussion we 
 might perhaps arrive at getting rid of it. But hardly 
 had we come to join forces on the subject, when M. 
 de Saint- Vallier added to his previous communication 
 the summary of a dispatch from Count Bismarck to 
 General Manteuffel, in which the acceptance of this 
 clause was expressly represented as the sine qua non of 
 the evacuation of the last four departments in July. 
 
 This determination, which Count von Arnim had not 
 indicated as firmly decided upon, obliged us to accept 
 Prussia's conditions, since a refusal on our part would 
 have exposed us to the loss of the benefit of the evacua- 
 tion of the four departments from July 1st. But we 
 could yet hope that by accompanying our acceptance 
 
314 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 with certain reserves, the negotiation would be 
 prolonged, and that in this way Count Bismarck, 
 impatient to make an end, would in the long run make 
 us some concessions. 
 
 I therefore sent Count von Arnim, on March 8th, a 
 draft agreeing in nearly all particulars with the pro- 
 posals he had communicated to me. 
 
 The same day Count Bismarck, having sent for M. de 
 Grontaut, had intimated his dissatisfaction at our delay in 
 replying to his proposals, which, according to him, were 
 very advantageous to us. He considered it a success to 
 have got the Emperor to sanction them, and could not 
 imagine that we should have any serious objections to 
 make on the score of Belfort. As he had written to 
 Count von Arnim, these conditions were for us to take 
 or leave, and if we did not accept them, they would fall 
 back upon the terms of the convention of the 29th of 
 June last. At the end of this interview the Chancellor 
 had allowed him to understand that, possibly before 
 the complete payment of the last milliard, if circum- 
 stances permitted, we might obtain some mitigation of 
 these conditions. 
 
 On March 9th, a dispatch from M. Gontaut informed 
 me of this conversation. I replied to him the same 
 day, that I had already sent Count von Arnim a draft 
 in which I accepted the Belfort clause, but that I 
 accepted only with regret and on condition that it was 
 drawn up exactly in the terms of which I sent him a 
 copy. Then, by a postscript, and to mark more clearly 
 the value I attached to having Belfort restored to us at 
 the same time as the last four departments, I said that 
 if Count Bismarck would consent to accept only a small 
 part of our debt in notes of the Bank of France, we 
 would be in a position to pay in full on August 1st. In 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 315 
 
 that case the evacuation could be delayed until that 
 date, and agreeably to the treaties the Germans would 
 withdraw simultaneously from the four departments 
 and from Belfort. In this way I avoided opposing an 
 absolute refusal to the Prussian proposals, while at 
 the same time not giving them a definite assent. 
 
 The next day I received from M. de Saint- Vallier the 
 official text of the Prussian proposals ; it differed, on 
 points, from that which Count von Arnim had commu- 
 nicated to me. M. de Saint- Vallier pointed out to me 
 at the same time several modifications he thought 
 prudent to make in the periods for evacuation laid 
 down in these proposals. I telegraphed immediately to 
 him that I would have accepted the text he sent me if 
 I had known it earlier, but that I had already sent to 
 Count von Arnim and addressed to M. de Gontaut a 
 draft falling in with the proposals of Prussia. I author- 
 ized him, however, to request General Manteuffel to 
 communicate to Berlin my preference for the Nancy 
 text, except for the modifications deemed necessary on 
 the subject of the periods of the evacuation. 
 
 On March 11th M. de Gontaut brought my answer of 
 the 9th to Count Bismarck, who showed himself still 
 very much displeased with Count von Arnim, having 
 had from him no definite answer on the part of the 
 French Government, and very much annoyed at having 
 to discuss the conditions attached to my acceptance of 
 the Prussian proposals. He again protested that there 
 was absolutely no arrihre-'pensie on the subject of 
 Belfort, and said, with a smile, that if the treaty was 
 not punctiliously observed by the Germans, he engaged 
 to go and deliver himself as a prisoner in Paris. Then 
 he added, abruptly : 
 
 " Are you very anxious to recover possession of 
 
316 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 Belfort a little earlier? Is it the occupation of this 
 fortress that torments you ? Leave us another material 
 pledge until the full payment, Toul or Verdun, for 
 example. We shall then evacuate Belfort at the same 
 time as the four departments." 
 
 When I sought by temporizing to overcome Prussia's 
 insistence I never expected to succeed so speedily or 
 so completely, and the offer to substitute Verdun 
 for Belfort was almost unhoped for. Nevertheless, 
 M. de Gontaut almost let it escape him, by answering 
 Count Bismarck that he would have to ask for fresh 
 instructions from his Government to cover this point. 
 
 The same evening, in a telegraphic dispatch, he gave 
 me an account of his conversation with Count 
 Bismarck, and informed me of the offer to substitute 
 Toul or Verdun for Belfort as the last pledge for our 
 ransom. This news filled me with joy, for neither 
 Toul nor Verdun could be the object of suspicious 
 coveting on the part of the Germans. M. de Remusat 
 shared my satisfaction, and we hastened, on the 12th 
 of March, to enjoin upon M. de Gontaut to accept the 
 substitution of Verdun for Belfort. 
 
 At the moment when the dispatches relating to 
 this substitution were being exchanged between Paris 
 and Berlin, the Emperor, in the speech from the 
 Crown at the opening of the Reichstag, had spoken 
 of the fortunate re-establishment of everything in 
 France, hinting at a speedy evacuation of French 
 territory in return for the payment of the war 
 indemnity in full. This speech produced a great effect 
 at Berlin and in Paris, both alike interested in a 
 speedy settlement of the difficulties pending between 
 the two States. 
 
 By the 14th of March we had come to an agree- 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 317 
 
 ment on all the details of the convention. But Count 
 Bismarck, as he confessed afterwards, regretting that 
 a desire to convince us of his straightforwardness had 
 brought him to offer us the substitution of Verdun, 
 sent word to me by M. de Gontaut that if I con- 
 sented to give up this substitution, the convention 
 could be signed at once ; that if not, it would be 
 necessary to increase the Verdun garrison, place at 
 least two stations between that fortress and Metz, 
 and establish a military road — formalities which 
 would delay us considerably. 
 
 To this new proposal I replied by telegram at 
 five o'clock in the evening of the 14th. 
 
 " I hold absolutely to the substitution of Verdun 
 for Belfort. . . . The difficulty of the stations is no 
 difficulty. I have consented to it. . . ." 
 
 Then, fearing lest Count Bismarck might make a 
 last effort to withdraw his concession of Verdun, I 
 telegraphed anew to M. de Gontaut on the 14th, at 
 six o'clock in the evening : 
 
 "I hold absolutely to the substitution of Verdun 
 for Belfort. . . . Such a definite engagement cannot 
 be repudiated. As for the two stations, I consent to 
 them. As for the numbers of the garrison I am 
 willing to increase them. . . . Regarding payment, 
 I will lend myself to any demand. But for Verdun 
 I insist, and you will insist upon it. . . . Hold fast, 
 and you will win. . . ." 
 
 Count Bismarck, informed of my reply during the 
 evening, put off signing the convention until next 
 day, the 15th of March. What I had foreseen happened. 
 
 At two o'clock M. de Gontaut was waiting for 
 Count Bismarck for the signing of the convention. 
 The Chancellor came punctually, not yet to sign, but 
 
318 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 to make a last attempt to take back the concession 
 he had made, alleging the Emperor's displeasure at 
 having to give way on this point. The perusal of 
 my repeated orders put an end to the Chancellor's 
 insistence. He went back to tell the Emperor of the 
 failure of his attempt, and returned at five o'clock 
 to the French Embassy, where at length he signed 
 the convention. 
 
 This day M. de Gontaut was giving a concert at 
 which the Emperor had promised to be present with 
 all the Court. I, too, desired to associate myself from 
 afar with this festivity, recommending the Ambassador 
 to wear the Grand-cordon de la Legion d'honneur, 
 which I had sent him the day before, with the 
 approval of the Council, to mark the share he had 
 taken in this negotiation. The Emperor and the 
 Empress, who, as they had promised, had come to 
 the Embassy, were very eulogistic to France and very 
 cordial to her representative. 
 
 Some hours before, M. de Gontaut had announced 
 the signing of the convention to me. In allowing 
 him to append his name to a document of such impor- 
 tance, I had, he wrote, obtained for him an honour 
 that should have gone to M. de Remusat, and the 
 high distinction the Government had added to that 
 honour seemed to him more than he deserved. How- 
 ever, weighing up his services I had thought it right 
 and proper to accord him this distinction. 
 
 This convention of the 15th of March, the crown- 
 ing of our common labours and the end of my principal 
 task, overwhelmed France with joy, and the Assembly, 
 associating itself with public feeling, declared for the 
 second time, on the 16th of March, that I had deserved 
 well of the country. 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 319 
 
 The session, beginning on the 11th of the preceding 
 November, had been sufficiently toilsome to make us 
 feel the necessity of bringing it to a close. The 
 Assembly and the Government being at one on this 
 point, it was agreed to break up until the beginning 
 of April ; but before that date a very serious trouble 
 was stirred up over the municipality of Lyons. 
 
 The situation of this town had become disturbing 
 enough ; M. Cantonnet, the Prefect of the Rhone, 
 having been unable to agree with M. Barodet, the 
 Mayor of Lyons, asked that in order to put an end 
 to this conflict the Central Mayoralty should be 
 suppressed. I should have preferred to try, by a 
 system of electoral sections as in Paris, to get a 
 Moderate majority in the Municipal Council. In case 
 of failure, it would always have been possible to 
 propose the suppression of the Central Mayoralty by 
 a general law applicable to all the great towns. 
 
 " By taking other measures," said I, " we run the 
 risk of making M. Barodet the great man of Lyons, 
 and through not wanting to have him as Mayor of 
 Lyons, we shall have him its representative in the 
 Chamber." 
 
 I did not know how truly I spoke. 
 
 The peaceful solution I proposed could not satisfy 
 certain Conservatives in the Assembly. Those in 
 particular who represented departments neighbouring 
 that of the Rhone were in haste to extinguish a fire 
 of agitation that burned too near themselves ; and 
 M. de Goulard, wishing to satisfy them, asked the 
 Assembly to suppress the Central Mayoralty of Lyons. 
 
 The inhabitants of Lyons defended themselves at the 
 tribune, at great length, but with method and clearness, 
 by the mouth of one of their deputies, M. Ferrouillat. 
 
320 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 M. Le Royer, a former magistrate, respectable, but 
 cold and severe, also spoke for them with no little 
 talent. The discussion at one moment became very 
 keen, and M. Le Royer having described the too 
 frequently repeated arguments of the Committee as 
 lumber, roused the inflammable temper of the Marquis 
 de Grammont, who called out: 
 
 " That is insolent ! " 
 
 The word roused both sides of the Assembly. M. 
 Le Royer then stopped, and said with the utmost 
 coolness : 
 
 "... I am waiting for the word to be withdrawn 
 or rebuked by the President as it deserves." 
 
 M. Grevy, who, tired out by the debate, was not 
 following very attentively, was as though waked up 
 suddenly, and seeing that he must take command of 
 the situation if it was not to cause a duel between 
 the two interlocutors, called M. de Grammont to order. 
 The Right protested violently at this. M. de Grevy 
 appeared not to notice this scene ; but at the end of 
 the sitting he rose and addressed the House. 
 
 " My conduct," said he, " appears not to be approved ; 
 it is even strongly blamed by the hostile demonstrations 
 of the Assembly. . . . 
 
 "I have neither asked nor sought the duties with 
 which you invested me. I have always fulfilled them 
 to the best of my ability, with all the justice and 
 impartiality of which I am master. Since I do not find 
 in return from you, gentlemen, the justice to which I 
 think I am entitled, I shall know what remains for me 
 to do." 
 
 After these words, deliberate or no, the vacancy in 
 the Presidency of the Assembly was to be expected 
 next day. Accordingly, all who sought peace and 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 321 
 
 unity did their utmost to prevent this affair from 
 going further, and told M. GreVy that by resigning he 
 would weaken the Government. That he understood ; 
 but he was too deeply engaged by his own words to go 
 back upon his resolve, and the next day he sent his 
 resignation, couched in terms so acid that it was 
 difficult to answer such language by re-election. 
 Nevertheless, he was re-elected by four hundred votes. 
 His friends again wished to persuade him to be 
 satisfied with this majority ; but his inflexibility made 
 all their urging in vain. 
 
 We chose, therefore, for his successor M. Martel, who 
 had every claim to the sympathy of the Assembly ; but 
 M. Buffet, our opponents' candidate, had the majority 
 and took up the function of managing our debates. 
 
 Such was the first serious consequence of this Lyons 
 law, without reckoning that the suppression of the 
 Central Mayoralty of that town made, as I had too 
 clearly foreseen, an embarrassing individual of 
 M. Barodet. 
 
 Finally, in the closing days of this session we had the 
 affair of Prince Jerome Napoleon, who appealed against 
 the expulsion to which he had been condemned some 
 months before. The committee charged with investi- 
 gating this appeal found that it deserved to be taken 
 into consideration, and laid before the Assembly a 
 report in which, without blaming the Government, it 
 raised doubts as to the legality of the expulsion of 
 which Prince Napoleon complained. 
 
 I was not present at the sitting in which the dis- 
 cussion on this report opened. It was M. de Goulard 
 who spoke first. He showed himself very firm on this 
 occasion, put the Cabinet question in excellent terms, 
 and got the Assembly to adopt a motion of confidence, 
 
 21 
 
322 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 but with a majority of only fifty-six! This vote, 
 compared with the crushing majority which had twice 
 pronounced the fall of the Bonapartes, proved that 
 the alliance of the Legitimists with the Imperialists 
 was accomplished. 
 
 An incident of this kind foreshadowed others graver 
 still. It showed how fragile was our alliance with the 
 Thirty, since the Due de Broglie and his friends, after 
 having promised fidelity in return for our complaisance 
 towards their work, had voted against us on this 
 question. The fact of a Due de Broglie patronizing 
 a Bonaparte, in order to gain the shelter of the 
 Imperialists, showed also to what compromises the 
 party spirit will sometimes carry politicians. 
 
 The satisfaction with which the treaty of the 15th of 
 March, 1871, had been received in France, and the 
 declaration of the Assembly that I had deserved well 
 of the State had procured me all these distresses, all 
 these defections of the present moment. 
 
 The Assembly broke up on the 8th of April, 1873, 
 and I came to Paris, to spend there in the Elysee 
 Palace the period of this vacation, which was to be 
 about six weeks. 
 
 I had first of all to settle our programme of work 
 with the Ministers, who all wished to go far from 
 Paris to take their repose. Their leave having been 
 so distributed that the whole Council should never be 
 absent at the same time, we agreed to meet twenty 
 days before the return of the Assembly, so as to 
 prepare the laws relating to the Constitution. We 
 then fixed for the 27th of April the eight elections that 
 were to be held for the seats that had become vacant. 
 One of these elections, very important already because 
 it concerned Paris, was the most important of all 
 
PEESIDENCY OP THE REPUBLIC 323 
 
 because of the circumstances in the midst of which 
 it was to take place. 
 
 The treaty of the 15th of March had produced a 
 great impression, and the public, in its gratitude, very 
 rightly associated M. de Remusat' s name with mine. 
 The mayors of Paris, to satisfy this feeling which 
 they shared, would have liked our Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs to become their representative in the Assembly, 
 and they proposed this on the day on which they came 
 to Versailles to congratulate me on the liberation of 
 the territory. 
 
 M. de Remusat was not a deputy, because he had not 
 wanted to be; but at this moment he was certainly 
 pre-eminently worthy to receive the mandate that was 
 offered to him. We both welcomed the feeling that 
 had inspired this idea, without caring to bind ourselves 
 by a definite acceptance before the apparent goodwill 
 of the public should become certain. 
 
 A few days after, the proposal of the mayors seemed 
 to be unanimous, when the Radicals interposed, 
 irritated at not having been consulted about an election 
 in which the city they regarded as their proper 
 electoral domain was interested, and in his newspaper 
 M. Gambetta made no delay in showing himself hostile 
 to the candidature of M. de Remusat. However, this 
 hostility would have given way before the enthusiasm 
 of the Liberals if the Conservatives, in suppressing the 
 Central Mayoralty of Lyons and its holder, had not 
 allowed the Extreme Left to propose the election 
 of M. Barodet in Paris as a protest against that 
 suppression. 
 
 Before this opposition we thought we ought to 
 reserve any decision. But as soon- as our hesitation 
 was known, the Conservatives reproached us with 
 
324 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 abandoning the party of order, who could only accept 
 M. de Remusat as candidate. 
 
 "You will hand Paris over to M. Gambetta," they 
 said. "Support us and we will give you the most 
 active co-operation." 
 
 As for the frankly Legitimist sheets, Orleanist and 
 Bonapartist, they went so far as to accuse us of want- 
 ing to favour the Radicals by giving them a success 
 that it only depended on ourselves to take from 
 them. 
 
 So as not to deserve such a reproach, M. de Remusat, 
 with my approval and that of the Council, consented 
 to stand, and we prepared to support his candidature 
 with all the influence we could honourably make use 
 of. We saw all the members of the municipal body, 
 and a great number of men of importance in commerce 
 and industry. I found them zealous, even ardent, 
 understanding perfectly that this election in Paris 
 would give us great moral force and prestige. 
 
 The Left at this juncture behaved with as much 
 resolution as restraint ; but its zeal on behalf of 
 M. de Remusat chilled that of the Moderate Right, 
 which should, on the contrary, have rejoiced to find 
 allies, through their common interests, without having 
 to sacrifice their own opinions. 
 
 Sunday, the 27th of April, was the day fixed for the 
 election ; from the morning there was an extraordinary 
 concourse of electors at the booths, and during the 
 whole of the day appearances were in favour of M. de 
 Remusat. The first figures that we knew made us hope 
 for success ; but towards ten o'clock at night the news 
 became less favourable, and at eleven the Prefect of 
 Police announced to us that M. de Remusat had only 
 polled one hundred and thirty-five thousand votes 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 325 
 
 against one hundred and eighty thousand cast for 
 M. Barodet. 
 
 The Monarchists exaggerated the importance of this 
 ballot to give more verisimilitude to their denunciation 
 of the progress of Radicalism, which, according to them, 
 had become irresistible through our fault. The depart- 
 mental elections, seven in number, in which they had 
 only succeeded in getting two of their candidates 
 elected, furnished them with a fresh pretext for 
 attacking the Government. 
 
 We devoted the days that followed, before the 
 resumption of the session, to preparing the law of 
 the Constitution which the Assembly had directed us 
 to present to it, and which, by a wise organization 
 of public powers, was to guarantee France from an 
 excess of democracy. 
 
 The discussion of the foundations of our future 
 institutions had been learned and profound, the draft- 
 ing of M. Dufaure was perfect, and the Council showed 
 itself unanimous upon these grave questions. But 
 this harmony was to be short-lived. 
 
 M. Jules Simon, by his astute behaviour, had so far 
 triumphed over all the attacks of his enemies, though 
 in educational matters he had set on foot certain 
 reforms that were open to criticism. In the Adminis- 
 tration des Cultes, on the contrary, he had obtained 
 favour at Rome, so much indeed that the Papal Nuncio 
 was his warmest advocate. Nevertheless, those who 
 should have been disarmed by this patronage persisted 
 in seeking to drive him out of the Council, in which 
 they had an ally, M. de Goulard. The latter, at their 
 instigation, very soon adopted an attitude of such 
 pronounced hostility to his colleague, that M. Jules 
 Simon tendered me his resignation. 
 
326 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 At first I refused to accept it ; however, on the eve 
 of the return of the Assembly, seeing it was impossible 
 to re-establish harmony in the Council without parting 
 with either M. de Goulard or M. Jules Simon, I decided 
 to accept the latter's resignation. I determined, in 
 order to compensate the Left for his going, to replace 
 him by M. Casimir Perier, who was willing to accept 
 the portfolio of the Interior, and I hoped to satisfy the 
 Right by keeping M. de Goulard in the Cabinet, in the 
 Ministry for Education, and transferring M. de Fourtou 
 from the Public Works to the Ministry of Religion. 
 
 M. Jules Simon, having approved of this combination, 
 resigned his portfolio with complete disinterestedness, 
 and refused to accept the Italian Embassy, which I 
 offered him. 
 
 Although less disposed than M. Jules Simon to make 
 us concessions, M. de Goulard accepted my proposals, 
 and M. Casimir Perier consented to take the portfolio 
 for the Interior. But when I spoke to him of the 
 composition of the Ministry, he refused to be in it 
 with M. de Goulard. 
 
 His name, his character, his courage being likely to 
 restore to the Cabinet the strength it was losing 
 through the retirement of M. Jules Simon, I yielded, 
 and informed M. de Goulard of what had taken place. 
 He left me without hiding how deeply he was wounded, 
 aud immediately sent me his resignation. 
 
 During the day M. Casimir Perier, who had listened 
 to the counsels of his friends, gave up his prejudices 
 and went to M. de Goulard to get him to withdraw 
 his resignation, which I had just received. He found 
 him inflexible, and his disappointment at not succeeding 
 made me afraid for a moment that it might decide him 
 to resign ; but he felt that he could not leave us when 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 327 
 
 our enemies were preparing to attack us, and with 
 an outburst that touched me profoundly, M. Casimir 
 Perier declared himself ready to defend the Moderate 
 policy that we had adopted. If all these concessions 
 I was making thus in the interests of this policy could 
 not assure its triumph, we should have at any rate 
 a strong and worthy Ministry to support it. 
 
 We agreed, then, with M. Casimir Perier to complete 
 the Cabinet by calling M. Berenger to the Public Works 
 and M. Waddington to the Ministry of Education. 
 These two deputies had all the necessary aptitudes 
 for directing the ministerial departments entrusted 
 to them. 
 
 There was complete harmony among all the members 
 of the Ministry. The constitutional laws were read 
 in the Council to the new Ministers, and the outline 
 of principles drawn up by M. de Remusat had their 
 entire approbation. They found in it the expression 
 of a frank and reconciliatory policy, which inspired 
 no regret for having associated themselves with it. 
 
 On the 18th of May I went to Versailles before the 
 Assembly, which was to meet on the 19th. Taking 
 stock of the gravity of the whole situation, I told 
 myself that my essential task was accomplished, since 
 the liberation of our territory would be complete 
 and final in some months, on the 1st of July, 1873. 
 Without doubt I could be deprived of the joy of 
 presiding over the festival of liberation, but I could 
 not be deprived of the honour of having put an 
 end to the foreign occupation, long before the date 
 arranged by the treaties. 
 
 As to the constitutional laws, I certainly was anxious 
 that they should be accepted, since they were calcu- 
 lated to consolidate the work of raising up France 
 
328 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 again, the work I had nearly finished. But if I was 
 shipwrecked in this last venture, what I had already- 
 done was enough to allow me to enter proudly upon 
 a well-merited repose. 
 
 As soon as the Monarchists knew of the new 
 rearrangement of Ministers they attacked it violently. 
 The Government, said they, by expelling from the 
 Cabinet men of the Right Centre to replace them by 
 men of the Left Centre, was moving towards the Left 
 itself. They must no longer hesitate, for if they let 
 this occasion pass it would become impossible to 
 retrieve the power from those who were about to 
 make use of it in order to dismiss the Chamber and 
 make or allow detestable elections. 
 
 What emboldened them most in this campaign was 
 the hope, if not the certainty, of having found some 
 one to take my place. The announcement, more or 
 less confirmed, of the Marshal's acceptance made a 
 great impression on the dubious. "By the Marshal," 
 they were told, "we shall have the army with us; we 
 shall make ourselves masters of the elections " ; " we 
 shall make a Monarchy," said the Legitimists, "with 
 the Comte de Chambord," " a stadtholderate with the 
 Due d'Aumale," said the Organists. As for the Bona- 
 partists, they counted upon a Marshal of the Empire 
 to evict all pretenders in favour of the Prince Imperial. 
 
 How much foundation was there in this assertion? 
 I did not know. 
 
 The morrow of my return to Versailles, the very 
 day the Assembly was to meet, the Marshal presented 
 himself the first of all at the Providence, with an 
 air so kind, so friendly, so affectionate, that he seemed 
 to me to wish to protest, by his attitude, against the 
 language of his friends. 
 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 329 
 
 To their first approaches the Marshal had answered 
 that he would under no circumstances consent to 
 take the place of one who had shown him the utmost 
 consideration. But they had insisted, representing 
 to him that France was in danger, that it was his 
 duty not to abandon her; and his refusal seeming 
 less determined before these new importunities, they 
 had hastened to repeat everywhere that the Marshal 
 would accept the power. 
 
 Finally, in the last days before the return of the 
 Assembly, a friend of the Marshal, from whom I have 
 the tale, having asked him if it was true that he 
 had decided to accept the Presidency, he had replied 
 that he had no ambition for it, but that he would not 
 see France left without a Government if M. Thiers 
 were to retire. 
 
 From that time the Right had come to an under- 
 standing with M. Rouher, and had obtained from him 
 the promise of twenty or thirty Bonapartist votes 
 if it was decided to bring in the Marshal and not the 
 Due d'Aumale. This compact concluded, the Due de 
 Broglie, on the very day of the reopening t the 19th 
 of May, 1873, placed in the hands of the President 
 of the Assembly, in the names of three hundred and 
 twenty members of the Right, a demand for inter- 
 pellation, couched in the following terms : 
 
 " The undersigned, convinced that the gravity • of 
 the present situation calls for a Cabinet at the head 
 of affairs whose firmness shall be reassuring to the 
 country, demand permission to question the Ministry 
 upon the last modifications that have taken place in 
 its ranks, and upon the necessity of ensuring that 
 a resolutely Conservative policy shall prevail in the 
 Government." 
 
330 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 On the 23rd of May, 1873, the day fixed for dis- 
 cussing this interpellation, M. de Broglie, in the midst 
 of the universal preoccupation, mounted the tribune 
 and reproached us with calling ourselves Conservatives 
 without persuading any one, and with living as pro- 
 teges of the Radicals. 
 
 According to the law of the Thirty, I could not 
 address the House until the following sitting, after 
 asking permission in a message. 
 
 M. Dufaure replied that the Government had in 
 no circumstances incurred the reproach brought 
 against it of favouring the Radical party, and that 
 it was, on the contrary, in order to prevent the dangers 
 to which this party would expose France that the 
 Chief of the Executive Power and the Ministry had 
 drafted the bill laid before the Assembly on the very 
 day of its reopening, a bill tending to organize the 
 existing Republican system on Conservative lines. 
 
 After this speech my message asking permission 
 to address the House was laid before the Assembly; 
 they decided to give me the next day, the 24th of 
 May, and I began my speech as soon as this day's 
 proceedings opened. 
 
 I do not care to give any summary of the speech 
 I made on this occasion; those who are interested 
 in these debates will find it in the Official Report 
 of the sittings of the Assembly. I was not interrupted 
 even one single time, in spite of all that was keen 
 and even rude in my language. They had no wish 
 to compromise anything by imprudent incidents. 
 
 Always in conformity with the law of the Thirty, 
 no one replied to my speech, and the President ter- 
 minated the sitting after deciding that the Assembly 
 should meet again at two o'clock. 
 
PEESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 331 
 
 At this sitting it was forbidden for me to speak. 
 The orator who addressed the Assembly was 
 M. Casimir Perier, whose speech I sum up as follows. 
 
 " M. de Broglie has pretended," he said, " that the 
 last modification in the Ministry, the entrance of 
 MM. Casimir Perier, Waddington, and Berenger into 
 the Council, is a concession made by the Government 
 to the Radicals. I do not think 1 need to demonstrate 
 how much my acts, my words, my whole life protest 
 against such an allegation, equally false as regards 
 my colleagues. Not only does the latest modification 
 in the Ministry not announce a step forward for 
 Radicalism, but on the contrary the new Ministers 
 bring to the Cabinet an incontestable force for the 
 defence of Conservative ideas. The interpellation 
 of M. de Broglie is therefore without justification." 
 
 This protest remained unanswered : such was the 
 order. The Assembly at once proceeded to vote upon 
 the various proposed orders of the day. That of 
 M. Ernoul, presented in the name of the signatories 
 to the interpellation, was adopted by a majority of 
 sixteen votes, three hundred and sixty to three 
 hundred and forty-four. It ran as follows : 
 
 " The National Assembly, considering that the form 
 of Government is not in discussion ; that the Assembly 
 is in possession of constitutional laws presented to 
 it by virtue of its decisions, and to be investigated 
 by it; but that from to-day it is of importance to 
 reassure the country by ensuring that a resolutely 
 Conservative policy shall prevail in the Government, 
 regrets that the recent modifications in the Ministry 
 have not given Conservative interests the satisfaction 
 they had a right to expect," etc. 
 
 The House rose at once, and was dismissed until 
 
332 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 eight o'clock in the evening. I could not accept 
 M. Ernoul's motion, to which I replied by sending 
 my resignation. It was known* already that the 
 Marshal would accept the Presidency of the Republic. 
 He was elected by three hundred and ninety-one votes. 
 Next day I hastened to make preparations for my 
 departure, and to return to Paris after an absence 
 of three years, during which I had governed with 
 moderation and firmness, in the ways of rectitude, 
 sustained by the confidence of France and the esteem 
 of Europe. 
 
APPENDICES 
 
 APPENDIX No. 1 (v. page 7). 
 M. Jules Favre to M. Thiers. 
 
 Ministers 
 
 DBS 
 
 Affaires Etrangeres. 
 Cabinet. 
 
 September 11, 1870. 
 
 MON CHER ANCIEN COLLEGUE, 
 
 Allow me to thank you from the bottom of my 
 heart, in my own name as much as in the name of the 
 members of the Government of National Defence, for the 
 sacrifice you are so good as to make by accepting the mission 
 I am happy to entrust to you. You have not counted its 
 fatigues or its dangers, you have given ear only to your own 
 patriotism. You will have your reward in the proud con- 
 sciousness of accomplished action. You will, I am confident, 
 restore peace to the world, and your name, already illustrious, 
 will be immortal as the name of one of the benefactors of 
 humanity. It will be equally dear to the defenders of liberty, 
 it is for the sake of liberty you are devoting yourself. Right 
 is on your side ; and the banner you mean to bear to London, 
 Saint Petersburg, and Vienna is that upon whose folds the hand 
 of God has written In hoc signo vinces. 
 
 For my own part, in the midst of my sorrows I shall keep 
 a lively memory of this day, which can add nothing to my 
 friendship for you, but which increases the burden, which 
 my heart holds lightly, of my deepest gratitude. 
 
 Pray accept the assurance of my respectful and sincere 
 affection. 
 
 Jules Favre. 
 
 333 
 
334 MEMOIES OF M. THIERS 
 
 APPENDIX No. 2 (v. page 62). 
 Monseigneur Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans, to M. Thiers. 
 
 EVECHE D'ORLEANS. 
 
 OBiaSANS, October 23, 1870. 
 
 Monsieur, Tres Illustre et Bien Excellent Ami, 
 
 I bless God for the knowledge that you are in our 
 vicinity ; it is the one ray of light in our melancholy horizon. 
 
 I will not speak of our own particular position. It is 
 nothing in the great general posture of affairs. 
 
 Although you alone might rescue France from this dread- 
 ful invasion and this anarchy that threatens us, it is so difficult 
 that God must indeed be your help. 
 
 When you have discovered a ground upon which honest 
 men can find footing and come to an understanding, may 
 they all join with you to choose not merely the roadstead, 
 but the harbour of which you have so often spoken to me. 
 
 M. Cochery will give you news about us. The general, 
 Baron von der Tann, who commands here, has displayed the 
 utmost eagerness and obligingness in giving the necessary 
 safe-conducts, of which M. Cochery is the bearer. He ex- 
 pressed the keenest delight, as well as the generals present 
 at his quarters, on learning that you intended to go to the 
 Headquarters at Versailles, where your coming is very eagerly 
 expected and desired by the King and by Count Bismarck. 
 
 He said he had the honour of your acquaintance at Dieppe, 
 when he was there with the late King of Bavaria. 
 
 He told me, too, that he had already issued orders so that 
 you would find relays on the whole journey, from here to 
 Versailles ; and in these circumstances you will allow me 
 to offer you my carriage, which is really good and comfortable 
 for travelling. 
 
 It goes without saying that if you decided to pass through 
 Orleans (which would give me infinite pleasure), my house 
 would be your own, and in it you and the ladies, who will 
 
APPENDICES 335 
 
 allow me to mention them here, will find a real repose and 
 absolute freedom. 
 
 Pray accept the sincere homage of my most cordial and 
 devoted respects. 
 
 © Felix, 
 Eveque a" 'Orleans. 
 
 P.S. — It is absolutely certain and evident that the whole of 
 the Bavarian and Prussian armies here desire peace. 
 
 APPENDIX NO. 3 (v. page 62). 
 M. Thiers to Monseigneur Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans. 
 
 Tours, October 24, 1870. 
 
 Monseigneur, 
 
 I am deeply touched by your unfailing kindness 
 to me, and I thank you with all my heart. I thank also 
 General Baron von der Tann, for his extreme courtesy ; but 
 the safe-conducts sent to me are not precisely what I look for 
 and what I need in order to continue my difficult mission. 
 You are doubtless aware, Monseigneur, that Russia, England, 
 Austria, and Italy have put before the belligerents the principle 
 of an armistice that would give France time to convoke a 
 National Assembly. I have accepted this mission, the sequel 
 and continuation of that which I have been engaged upon 
 for the past six weeks, to come to Tours, then to go to Paris 
 to lay the proposal of the neutral Powers before the Govern- 
 ment from which I had received my mandate. But this 
 way of proceeding supposes that having come to Tours and 
 received the necessary powers from the delegation sitting 
 there, I shall go to Paris to have those powers confirmed. If 
 I acted otherwise, I should be presenting myself at the 
 Prussian Headquarters without a sufficient mandate, and I 
 could do nothing of any value. There would be a further 
 irregularity in this procedure. His Majesty the Emperor of 
 
336 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 Russia was good enough to ask from Saint Petersburg for safe- 
 conducts from His Majesty the King of Prussia to enable me 
 to enter Paris and leave again immediately in order to present 
 myself at the Prussian Headquarters, and there negotiate for 
 the proposed armistice, if I am authorized in Paris to do so. 
 
 It is a reply to this request supported by the British 
 Cabinet that I must await, and I should be very happy to 
 receive it through Baron von der Tann, and then to 
 pass through Orleans. If it is understood in this sense, and 
 if I am permitted to enter Paris and to leave it in order to 
 go at once to Versailles, I wish that it may be by way of 
 Orleans, and with the facilities Baron von der Tann is so 
 good as to offer. I should be most grateful to him if he will 
 in this way help me to accomplish a difficult mission, -which 
 I am taking up through love of my country and the burning 
 desire for a peace that will bring to an end a cruel and 
 distressing slaughter between two great nations. 
 
 I beg you, Monseigneur, to convey my answer to Baron 
 von der Tann, and to accept once more the expression of my 
 unfailing affection and respect. 
 
 A. Thiers. 
 
 APPENDIX No. 4 (v. page 64). 
 M. Gairibetta to M. Thiers. 
 
 Bepubliquf. Frak<;'Aise, 
 
 LlBEBTfi — ESALITfi — FRATERNITE. 
 
 GOUVEBNEMENT 
 DE LA 
 
 Defense Nationals. 
 
 Tours, October 25, 1870. 
 MONSIEUB ET ANCIEN COLLEGUE, 
 
 I have the honour, at your request, to forward a copy 
 of various passages from a dispatch I addressed yesterday, 
 October 24th, to my colleagues of the Government of the 
 
APPENDICES 337 
 
 Republic, relating to the proposal for an armistice made 
 simultaneously to Prussia and to France by England and the 
 neutral Powers. 
 
 "... What you are now cognizant of permits me to give 
 a brief summary of the discussions that have taken place in 
 the Council. Three main questions have come up for 
 discussion. 
 
 " First : Is M. Thiers to be authorized to return to Paris ? 
 On this point the Council was unanimous, with the reservation 
 that M. Thiers should not visit Headquarters on the way. 
 
 " Secondly : What view is to be taken of the proposal for 
 an armistice? We were of opinion that M. Thiers should 
 submit it to you with his support, on condition that the armistice 
 should be for at least twenty-five days, with revictualling : 
 our interest in insisting on this is obvious. 
 
 " Thirdly : Must we hold an election ? You will see by 
 the minutes which M. Thiers will lay before you that my 
 three colleagues were for the affirmative, while I declared 
 myself for the negative. 
 
 " The reasons are set forth elsewhere. 
 
 " We must accept no truce proposed to us unless it offers us 
 an advantage from the military point of view." 
 
 Such is the opinion I have expressed to my Government. 
 Since you were present at our deliberations, you are in a 
 position to repeat to my colleagues that under the conditions 
 recounted above, I regard the proposed armistice as very 
 advantageous from the military point of view. For this reason 
 I joined my colleagues at Tours in authorizing you to report 
 the proposal and at the same time to recommend it. 
 
 Pray accept the expression of my fullest respect and con- 
 sideration. 
 
 LUioN Gambetta. 
 
 22 
 
338 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 APPENDIX No. 5 
 M. Gambetta to M. Thiers {v. page 64). 
 Republique Franchise, 
 
 LlBEBTE — ESALITE — FKATEBNITE. 
 
 GOUVERNEMENT 
 DE LA 
 
 Defense Nationale. 
 
 Tours, October 26, 1870. 
 
 Monsieur et Ancien Collbgue, 
 
 I hasten to send you a copy of a dispatch that has 
 reached me during the night, addressed to me by the general 
 commanding the fifteenth military division of Nantes, General 
 Mazure, in whom I have every confidence. 
 
 The general writes me as follows : 
 
 " Received from absolutely unimpeachable source in which 
 have absolute faith, letter from which extract follows. 
 
 " ' Metz, October 19, 1870. 
 
 "■'We are not downhearted yet, we eat horsebeef only, we 
 have still a little bread, no sickness ; the army in excellent 
 heart. The situation must of necessity resolve itself within a 
 few days one way or another. We shall have a hard try at 
 breaking through. Out of my forty-eight guns I can only 
 handle twelve now, the horses belonging to the others have 
 been eaten. These forty-eight guns make up the general 
 reserve for the army, and the divisional artillery is not so 
 much weakened. However that may be, it seems to me to 
 be in the utmost degree urgent to make an attempt to help 
 Bazaine to free himself and prevent a disaster the consequences 
 of which would be incalculable.' 
 
 " I have purposely underlined certain words whose effect 
 I do not venture to pronounce upon." 
 
 Furthermore I have received from the sub-prefect of 
 Neufchateau a dispatch that came from Metz at seven o'clock 
 
APPENDICES 339 
 
 in the evening of Sunday, October 23rd. Unfortunately this 
 dispatch is in a cipher the key to which has been mislaid, and 
 I am waiting for the bearer, whom I have sent for to Tours, 
 in order to have some explanations. 
 
 Pray accept the expression of my fullest respect and con- 
 sideration. 
 
 Leon Gambetta. 
 
 APPENDIX No. 6 ' (v. page 119). 
 Gomte Beust to Prince Metternich, at Bordeaux. 
 
 Vienna, March 3, 1871. 
 
 * * * * * 
 
 In my dispatch of the 20th of February I had already 
 informed your Highness that we wished to make haste to 
 recognize the new Government, in order to give France a 
 proof of our friendly sympathy. 
 
 Subsequent events merely confirm us in this resolve. Ac- 
 cordingly, without awaiting for the arrival in Vienna of an 
 official representative of the French Republic, I send you 
 herewith the letters by which his Imperial and Royal 
 Apostolic Majesty accredits you as his Ambassador Extra- 
 ordinary to the French Republic. 
 
 In presenting these letters to the Chef du Pouvoir Executif, 
 your Highness will be good enough to convey to him on 
 our behalf how profoundly the King-Emperor, our august 
 master, and his Government desire to maintain the most 
 cordial relations with France. This sentiment is far from 
 being altered by the present circumstances. We ascribe too 
 great importance to France's holding her accustomed rank 
 among European nations to refrain from expressing to her, 
 in an hour of trial, our signal regard and unchanging friend- 
 ship. 
 
 ***** 
 
 1 Archives Dyplomatigues, 1871-3 (1 and 2), page 43. 
 
340 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 M. Thiers, I repeat, can therefore wholly count upon our 
 good dispositions to him personally no less than towards the 
 country he governs. . . . 
 
 Be so good as to express yourself in the sense of this 
 dispatch, which your Highness may also read to M. Thiers as 
 well as to M. Jules Favre. 
 
 Believe me, etc., 
 
 Beust. 
 
 APPENDIX NO. 7 (v. page 172). 
 
 DRAFT OF A LAW 
 
 Presented to the National Assembly, August 12, 1871, by 
 MM. Rivet, Leon de Malleville, Picard, de Tocqueville, 
 de Pressense, Duvergier de Hauranne, etc. 
 
 THE ASSEMBLY. 
 
 Considering that it is essential, in accordance with the will 
 of the country and to satisfy the most urgent interests of 
 industry and credit, to give new guarantees of duration and 
 stability to the established Government. 
 
 DECREES : 
 
 Article 1. 
 M. Thiers shall exercise, under the title of President of the 
 Republic, the functions laid upon him by the decree of the 
 17th of last February. 
 
 Article 2. 
 
 His powers are prolonged for three years. 
 
 At the same time, if during this period the Assembly 
 should think fit to dissolve, the powers of M. Thiers, bound 
 up in those of the Assembly, should not continue further than 
 the time necessary to constitute a new Assembly, which in 
 turn would be called upon to legislate upon the executive 
 power. 
 
APPENDICES 341 
 
 Article 3. 
 
 The President of the Republic is charged with the promul- 
 gation of the laws. 
 
 He oversees and ensures their putting into execution. 
 
 He has drafts of laws presented to the Assembly by Ministers. 
 
 Envoys and Ambassadors of foreign Powers are accredited 
 to him. 
 
 He resides at the place where the National Assembly sits, 
 is lodged at the expense of the Republic, and receives a salary 
 provided for by the budget. 
 
 Article 4. 
 
 He presides over the Council of Ministers, the members of 
 which he nominates and dismisses. 
 
 He appoints a Vice-President in the Council. 
 
 In cases where he is absent or prevented from attending, 
 the Vice-President takes his place in presiding over the Council 
 and in the exercise of his other functions. 
 
 Article 5. 
 Diplomatic agents, commanders of land and sea forces, and 
 all magistrates and functionaries of the higher grades are 
 nominated or dismissed in the Ministerial Council. 
 
 Article 6. 
 
 All acts of the executive power shall be countersigned by a 
 Minister. 
 Ministers are responsible to the Assembly. 
 
 APPENDIX NO. 8 (v. page 240). 
 
 Proposals made to Prussia. 
 
 Versailles, May 5, 1872. 
 Count von Arnim has desired to have a summary of the 
 proposals I have made to him in order to establish a definite 
 basis for negotiation, and I hasten to send him this summary. 
 
342 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 The two Powers, France and Germany, have two engage- 
 ments to fulfil : the one, to pay the agreed war indemnity, 
 the other to evacuate that portion of French territory she 
 still occupies. France is ready, on her side, to carry out 
 faithfully and completely the engagements entered into, and 
 even to anticipate them in point of time, since the period 
 fixed by treaty for the payment of the second part of 
 the indemnity is May 1874, and she offers to begin to pay 
 in the course of the present year 1872. 
 
 As for the financial means to be adopted, that which seems to 
 her the most natural is that which has already been successful, 
 and which France now offers the Prussian Government, but 
 she would adopt another if this Government preferred, stipu- 
 lating only that it should be practicable. The French Govern- 
 ment, then, would open a loan of three milliards, in which 
 all the bankers of Europe would be allowed to participate, 
 without exclusion or preference, and which would be payable 
 at the smallest possible intervals. 
 
 The condition laid upon these bankers would be that they 
 should pay into the Prussian Treasury the sum of three 
 milliards within a time solely determined by the strength of 
 the European market. 
 
 The French Government does not think it possible to 
 obtain from this market more than one hundred millions a 
 month, without producing a financial disturbance that it is 
 in the interest of both Powers to avoid. 
 
 On this basis the whole of the sum agreed upon could not 
 be realized in less than thirty months ; but it would certainly 
 be realized within this time, unless under extraordinary 
 circumstances independent of the wishes of the French 
 Government, and with regard to which the treaty to be drawn 
 up might establish precautions wholly reassuring for the two 
 contracting parties. 
 
 This is the offer of the French Government for the dis- 
 charge of the obligation on its side, it being always fully 
 understood that if another procedure recognized as practicable 
 should be preferred by Prussia, France would offer no 
 objection. 
 
 It is now for the German Government to inform France how 
 
APPENDICES 343 
 
 it proposes to undertake the evacuation of French territory, 
 the necessary sequel to the payment of the war indemnity. 
 
 In the interests of the two contracting parties, for whom 
 it is in the highest degree important to suppress all causes 
 of conflict, and to calm all national passions, it would be 
 desirable that the evacuation should be speedy and as complete 
 as possible. This would respond to the behaviour of France, 
 which offers to discharge her obligations, both in full and as 
 promptly as the difficulties of a colossal financial operation allow. 
 
 If the German Government, inspired by a prudence which 
 would seem to us to have scanty foundation, wished to divide 
 the evacuation, the financial operation must then be divided, 
 and we should accomplish in two parts what under every 
 aspect would be better done in one. 
 
 Whatever the solution adopted by the two Governments, it is 
 important that a speedy conclusion should be arrived at, for 
 the prospect of a loan inevitable and near at hand weighs upon 
 the credit of Europe as a whole and injures business through- 
 out the world. The French Government, immutably determined 
 in its intentions, not merely for a durable peace, but for a 
 calming of the mind of the nation, promises to bring to these 
 negotiations the most conciliatory dispositions, and further- 
 more, the sincere desire for arriving at a prompt and satisfactory 
 conclusion. 
 
 The President of the French Republic, 
 A. Thiers. 
 
 APPENDIX No. 9 (v. page 240). 
 
 Reply of Count von Arnim to the proposals made to Prussia. 
 
 Ambassadb 
 
 Imperials 
 
 d'Allemagne 
 
 en France. 
 
 Paris, May 7, 1872. 
 The question of the evacuation of the territory is essentially 
 bound up in the declaration formulated in the Versailles pre- 
 liminaries, announcing that His Majesty the Emperor of 
 
344 MEMOIES OF M. THIERS 
 
 Germany will be disposed to substitute for the territorial 
 guarantee a financial guarantee, if the French Government 
 should offer one that could be considered as safeguarding the 
 interests of the Empire. 
 
 It follows therefore that the equivalent of the occupation 
 of French territory should be a financial guarantee offered by 
 France. 
 
 The minute of His Excellency the President of the French 
 Republic appears in a certain degree to alter the ground in this 
 question. 
 
 He offers to anticipate the payment of the three milliards due 
 on March 3, 1874, by monthly payments of one hundred 
 millions, to begin during the year 1872 and to continue for 
 thirty months. 
 
 Even supposing that an agreement could be come to on this 
 basis, it is not misplaced to point out that in all probability 
 the monthly payments could only begin on the 1st of September, 
 1872, so that the three milliards would not be fully paid up 
 until the 15th of March, 1875, or a full year after they were due. 
 
 Now if on the one hand there is an anticipation of part of 
 the debt, on the other there would be a delay of twelve months. 
 In other words, one milliard eight hundred millions would 
 be paid before, one milliard two hundred millions after they 
 were due. It is not easy to see how a modification of the 
 system of territorial guarantee established by the Versailles 
 preliminaries could be compensated for by the method of 
 payment proposed by the French Government. 
 
 That is not all. 
 
 Germany has only a secondary interest in receiving the 
 three milliards before they are to fall due. Now the Govern- 
 ment of the Empire will carefully refrain from burdening 
 France in the sense of anticipatory payments, fearing lest it 
 might by its action embarrass the financial dispositions of 
 France. The French Government therefore, if it desires to 
 hasten on the evacuation of the territory in accordance with 
 the Versailles conditions, ought to declare in precise terms the 
 nature of the guarantee it intends to offer as an equivalent of 
 the territorial guarantee. 
 
APPENDICES 345 
 
 The evacuation could not be brought into relation with 
 anticipatory payments, which have no importance save as they 
 will make it easier to find a valid guarantee for the part of 
 the debt whose discharge is deferred until the time it 
 becomes due. 
 
 Arnim. 
 
 APPENDIX No. 10 (v. page 241). 
 Count von Arnim to M. Thiers. 
 
 Pabib, May 15, 1872. 
 
 Monsieur lb President, 
 
 I must have a little conspirator's talk with yon 
 without the newspapers crying out the details on every roof. 
 If you can receive me to-morrow, about noon, I shall come 
 to Versailles either by rail, or riding. 
 
 Pray accept my assurance of the profound respect with 
 which I have the honour to be your most humble and obedient 
 servant. 
 
 Arnim. 
 
 P.S. — To give myself an air of mystery, I shall enter by 
 M. de Remusat's side door. 
 
 APPENDIX No. 11 (v. page 241). 
 
 M. Thiers to Count von Arnim. 
 
 Vebsailles, May 15, 1872. 
 
 MON CHER COMTE DARNIM, 
 
 It is very difficult, alas ! to escape those evil eyes 
 served by wicked tongues that we call newspapers. Never, 
 indeed, have I known the Press more abject than to-day ; and 
 yet our interviews are most legitimate, and I will say, patriotic, 
 since both you and I are serving our countries to the best of 
 
346 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 our ability. I cannot guarantee that these ill witnesses will 
 not catch you on the way, but you will be received at the hour 
 you mention, and as little as possible will be known of this 
 new interview. 
 
 Pray accept the renewed assurance of my feelings of pro- 
 found consideration and sincere friendship. 
 
 A. Thiers. 
 
 APPENDIX No. 12 (v. page 242). 
 
 M. Thiers to Count von Arnim. 
 
 Versailles, May 17, 1872. 
 MON CHER COMTE D'ARNIM, 
 
 I add to a dispatch from the Cabinet in reply to your 
 first note a confidential letter which will perhaps a little 
 advance our difficult task. I cannot conceal from you that 
 your note, to which the Cabinet has just drawn up the enclosed 
 reply, seemed to me merely an act of obstruction, and I would 
 be glad to arrive at a positive knowledge of your intentions ; 
 for if we are not to come to terms this year, the public must 
 know it, so as to put an end to the expectation of a coming loan, 
 which is paralysing our credit and the credit of Europe ; and 
 if, on the contrary, we are to treat, we ought to take advantage 
 of the fact that all the capitalists are prepared to employ their 
 capital usefully, and to have our funds resume their upward 
 movement. 
 
 This consideration leads me to join to our first proposal 
 another, more definite and, if I am well informed, more in 
 accordance with the wishes of your Government and of the 
 German capitalists. 
 
 What is constantly spoken of among you is the financial 
 guarantees, which should be the exact equivalent of the terri- 
 torial guarantees that would be relinquished by the evacuation 
 of our territory. 
 
 I had originally offered a loan of three milliards, a plain loan 
 at 5 per cent., to be paid within the shortest possible time, 
 
APPENDICES 347 
 
 that is to say, in thirty months, the amount to be paid direct to 
 the Prussian Government by the European bankers. I have 
 been told that this arrangement was not enough for you, that 
 you would prefer to add to one ordinary loan at 5 per cent, 
 bringing in a milliard within a very short period, another loan 
 of a milliard by a lottery, which, I am assured, would 
 immediately be covered in Germany ; and finally that, having 
 obtained two milliards by this double method, you would wish 
 to receive the third milliard in foreign securities of recognized 
 stability. These three operations, of course, would be in 
 reality one and the same, undertaken by all the European 
 bankers, whose help would be invited, and ought, during' 
 the course of the year, to set us free of our engagements to 
 Germany. 
 
 It would follow from these arrangements that the dis- 
 charge of our debt being in full and almost immediate, the 
 evacuation of our territory should be equally complete and 
 carried out as soon as payment is effected. 
 
 I have already told you that on our side what would meet 
 the wishes of the German Government would also satisfy us. 
 I repeat the same assurance, with two reservations : the con- 
 sent of the Chamber of Deputies, and the practicability of 
 realizing the methods proposed. 
 
 As for the first loan of a milliard by the means already put 
 to the proof, a loan at 5 per cent., issued on the Paris 
 Exchange, we can see no objection. As for the lottery loan, it 
 had been suggested to us last year, and we had considered it 
 out of keeping with the established ways of high credit. But 
 since we know that it is very much to the mind of German 
 lenders, whose help would be invaluable to us since they 
 would pay actually in Germany, we would not refuse. Finally, 
 as to the deposit of foreign securities for the third milliard, we 
 have always been doubtful whether it would be possible to 
 procure them. But we would agree to this also, if the affair 
 was shown to be practicable by a solid offer on the part of 
 foreign capitalists. 
 
 These proposals, though departing from our usual ways, and 
 though in part seeming doubtful of success, would be accepted 
 
348 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 by us if, I repeat, they were at the same time practicable and 
 sanctioned by the National Assembly, which would probably 
 set up no obstacle. 
 
 Here, my dear Count, is what I venture to suggest in order 
 to make you, as you seemed to wish, a proposal more definite 
 and more in accordance with the views of your Government. 
 Look, examine, send to Berlin and persuade them to answer, 
 in order that we may either put off for this year the financial 
 operation that all Europe is expecting, or set them afoot before 
 the summer, when, as a rule, all financial operations are 
 paralysed. 
 
 Pray accept once more the assurance of my most affectionate 
 esteem and friendship. 
 
 A. Thiers. 
 
 APPENDIX No. 13 (y. page 245). 
 *T '- Henckel Donnersmwck to M. Thiers. 
 
 May 24, 1872. 
 
 Monsieur le President, 
 
 I have the honour herewith to address to you my 
 personal ideas, which you have invited me to send to you, 
 upon the subject of an arrangement between France and 
 Germany for the last three milliards. 
 
 In case you should consider it important to ask the consent 
 of the German Government for a loan a loterie, I take the 
 liberty of reminding you that the Government would be 
 obliged to submit their authorization to the German Reichstag, 
 which will shortly be prorogued for almost a year. 
 
 Pray accept the expression of my most respectful sentiments. 
 
 Henckel DonnersmA3K. 
 
 1. France engages to pay to Germany by the 1st of February, 
 1873, at the latest, the sum of one milliard of francs. As soon 
 as this sum has been actually received in the Treasury of the 
 German Empire, the evacuation by the German troops of the 
 
APPENDICES 349 
 
 departments of Marne and Haute-Marne shall take place within 
 the next fifteen days. 
 
 2. France engages to pay to Germany by . . . the last two 
 milliards, either in specie and negotiable securities (in accord- 
 ance with Article 7 of the Treaty of Frankfort of May 10, 
 1871), or by guaranteeing their payment by the deposit of 
 securities, other than French, that are at the time quoted on 
 all the European exchanges. Germany shall accept these 
 securities at 20 per cent, below the current quotation, reserving 
 the right to reject such securities as may not offer sufficient 
 guarantee. 
 
 As soon as these last two milliards are paid or the securities 
 guaranteeing their payment have been deposited, the whole of 
 France shall be evacuated by the German troops, except the 
 fortresses of Belfort, Toul, and Verdun, which shall remain in 
 the hands of the German troops until full actual payment shall 
 have taken the place of the deposited guarantees. 
 
 3. Until actual payment has been completely effected, for 
 which Germany consents to an extension of time until May 1, 
 1875, the departments occupied to-day by Germany shall be 
 declared neutral, except fortified places which may have a 
 garrison of one thousand men in each. 
 
 France engages to construct no fortifications in the evacuated 
 departments so long as full payment has not taken the place 
 of the deposited securities and so long as the three milliards 
 have not been received in full by the German Treasury. 
 
 4. France shall negotiate a loan in order to carry out her 
 engagements to Germany, and engages to stipulate conditions 
 that shall establish that all moneys paid upon the loan shall 
 be paid direct to the German Treasury. 
 
 APPENDIX No. 14 (v. page 245). 
 
 Minute sent to Count von Arnitn by M. Thiers. 
 
 May 24, 1872. 
 A loan of three milliards opened with the assistance of all 
 European bankers, part in a lottery loan, part in 5 per cent. 
 
350 MEMOIES OF M. THIERS 
 
 Government funds, part in foreign securities, accepted by the 
 German Treasury, and guaranteed by France. 
 
 In return, after the payment of the first half milliard, the 
 Emperor of Germany would evacuate two of the six French 
 departments he occupies ; after the payment of the third half 
 milliard, the Emperor of Germany would evacuate two out of 
 the four departments still occupied ; and finally after the 
 payment of the sixth half milliard in foreign securities, 
 accepted by the Emperor of Germany, the last two French 
 departments would be evacuated by the German troops. 
 
 It is fully understood that if these arrangements were not 
 recognized by European bankers as practicable, new disposi- 
 tions would be sought, and in any case, arrangements would 
 be made to begin during the present year the carrying out 
 of this great operation, consisting on the side of France in 
 the speediest possible discharge of her debt, and on the side of 
 Germany in the gradual evacuation of French territory. 
 
 If these proposals were not agreeable to the German 
 Government, we would endeavour to modify them so as to 
 come to agreement with that Government. 
 
 A. Thiers. 
 
 APPENDIX No. 15. (v. page 246). 
 M. le Comte de Saint-Vallier to M. Thiers. 
 
 Nancy, May 27, 1872. 
 
 Monsieur le President, 
 
 I should have been glad to avoid writing to you at 
 the moment when you have to undergo the burden of the 
 discussion on the question of the army ; I should have desired 
 to wait a few days, but circumstances do not permit. 
 
 For a week General Manteuffel and von Treskow fre- 
 quently have repeated to me that their news from Berlin was 
 not good, that misgivings as to France's reservations and secret 
 projects seemed to increase, that letters and newspapers 
 agreed in representing us as burning to begin the war again, 
 
APPENDICES 351 
 
 that people were readily repeating that our proposals for the 
 payment of the three milliards were not serious and that 
 we were merely seeking to lull Germany's vigilance to sleep, 
 to gain time by making unacceptable offers. The military 
 element was active, and the immediate circle of the Emperor 
 William did not hide that the sovereign was a prey to grave 
 preoccupations. 
 
 I answered this uneasiness by the declarations you had 
 authorized me to make ; I affirmed with all my power the 
 loyalty and fixity of your resolution for peace ; my inter- 
 locutors did not contradict, but always returned to the charge 
 soon after with new disquieting information. Unfortunately, 
 for the fortnight since I left Versailles, I have had not a 
 single indication of the progress of the pourparlers begun with 
 Count von Arnim ; the preoccupations and fatigues caused 
 by the debates in the Assembly have prevented you and 
 M. de Remusat from informing me of the position of affairs 
 and what I should say. I left you after having had two 
 conversations with Count von Arnim of which I have not 
 preserved a good impression, and at the moment of my 
 departure, this Ambassador was requesting an audience of 
 you for the next day. Since then I have no information, 
 which prevents me from refuting as decidedly as would be 
 desirable the alarming rumours brought to me by the German 
 generals. 
 
 This morning I found General Manteuffel more moved and 
 more troubled than usual : he answered my inquiries by 
 telling me he had received an unpleasant letter from Count 
 Moltke, that this letter was confidential and that he could 
 only impart its tenor to me if I would undertake to keep 
 strictly for you and for myself what he should tell me of it : 
 " Especially," said he, " if you write of it to M. Thiers, take 
 care that Count von Arnim may never suspect that I give 
 you any knowledge of letters so confidential as this ; it would 
 be injurious for everybody, and for myself, my position would 
 be compromised." After this preamble to which I replied 
 by promising absolute discretion on your part and on mine, he 
 confided to me that Count Moltke recommended him to take 
 
352 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 certain military precautions and to be on his guard, as the 
 likelihood of a resumption of hostilities on the part of France 
 seemed to be increasing ; according to Count Moltke we had 
 not made serious proposals for anticipating the payment and 
 the liberating of our territory ; all would be confined to con- 
 versations and an exchange of views ; sure information received 
 in Berlin would hardly leave it open to doubt that the appetite 
 for revenge is growing in the French people and even in the 
 heart of the National Assembly ; that universal compulsory 
 military service is on the point of being voted and immediately 
 put into execution ; that the French Government is actively 
 engaged in military preparations ; that the French army is 
 already much finer, stronger, and more formidable than it was 
 before our crushing reverses ; that we are increasing it day 
 by day ; that little by little we are bringing back from Africa 
 our surest and best tried troops, and that even in the last few 
 days two fresh regiments have arrived from Algeria. 
 
 After making this communication, General Manteuffel added 
 that personally he was still not without faith ; but that he 
 greatly feared that time was being lost and that on both sides 
 distrust and irritation were being permitted to spring up ; 
 he persists in believing that it is not with Count von Arnim 
 in Paris, but only at Berlin that a speedy result can be 
 attained. He pretends to know that M. de Gontaut has never 
 asked Bismarck directly and personally his preference as to 
 the method of negotiation to be adopted, as you had instructed 
 him to do. 
 
 I hasten to send you these items of information and these 
 confidences ; I could not, I confess, hear them without replying 
 that these unjust suspicions, this constant and incurable 
 mistrust were calculated to discourage our loyal purpose, and 
 that it seemed as though it was desired to drive us beyond 
 our patience by these continual accusations. You alone, 
 Monsieur le President, can appreciate the importance of this 
 communication, and judge whether there is any reason to be 
 seriously disturbed by it, or whether it is merely a ruse of 
 Count Bismarck's to screen more effectually real negotiations 
 proceeding between you at the moment. I should be happy, 
 
APPENDICES 353 
 
 in any case, to know, were it only by a single word, the 
 true posture of affairs ; I should make no use of the informa- 
 tion beyond what you might think opportune. 
 
 Pray accept, Monsieur le President, the homage of the 
 respect with which I have the honour to be Your Excellency's 
 most obedient and devoted 
 
 Saint-Vallier. 
 
 P.S. — Distrust is so much the order of the day in Berlin, 
 that their preoccupations are concerned with Russia as much 
 as with us ; officers of the General Staff are sent to the Russian 
 frontier, the fortresses of Eastern Prussia are put in a state of 
 defence ; emissaries are everywhere scattered in Russia as in 
 France before the late war. 
 
 APPENDIX No. 16 (v. page 246). 
 General Le Flo to M. de Remusat. 
 Ambassade de France. 
 
 Saint-Petersbourg, May 23, 1872. 
 
 Cher Monsieur de Remusat, 
 
 At the moment when the toilsome negotiations are 
 beginning at Paris and at Berlin for speedier financial and 
 territorial liberation of our unhappy and well-beloved country 
 it is especially useful, in my opinion, to keep you well 
 informed on everything that is taking place in Germany, upon 
 the feelings manifested towards us there and upon the state of 
 public opinion. M. de Gontaut leaves you nothing to desire 
 on this head ; I think it none the less my duty to convey to 
 you the rumours that are current here. Now it is certain that 
 all the reports of the Russian agents in Germany agree in 
 representing that country as animated by the worst possible 
 disposition and given over to an agitation very hostile to us ; 
 it is no less certain that people there publicly express a 
 rancorous regret not to have overthrown us sufficiently, 
 sufficiently tormented us, and that the necessity of a new war 
 is there loudly proclaimed. They should, they say, take 
 
 23 
 
354 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 advantage of France's temporary weakness, the instability of 
 her Government, the ruin of her finances, the insufficiency of 
 her war material, and in short, of the moment when her army 
 is not yet reorganized, to resume a struggle that under such 
 conditions would call for but moderate efforts on the part of 
 Germany and would ensure her fifty years of peace and 
 security. And do not imagine it is the professors, students, 
 bourgeois, and subalterns who use this detestable language ; 
 it is repeated in the highest circles, and even here by Prince 
 William of Baden, with unheard-of brutality. I know this 
 from an exalted member of the Diplomatic Corps to whom the 
 Prince made his confidences, who was indignant at them and 
 came to let me know. I was very much humiliated, for I had 
 been completely duped by this Prince, who had done me the 
 honour to call on me the day after his arrival in Saint Peters- 
 burg and at my return visit had showed himself courteous, 
 modest even to a kind of humility, and had left me with an 
 excellent impression of him. They say indeed that he is very 
 stupid ; but no stupidity, however great, could explain such 
 duplicity ; and from the speech of this Duke as of those who 
 come back from every corner of Germany, we cannot but infer 
 that the worst possible feelings continue to be harboured 
 there against us. Are these feelings natural, are they the 
 result of the nightmare of revenge that pursues these people 
 whose astonishing victories have not yet sufficiently reassured 
 them, to whom continually, whatever we do or say, we are a 
 source of fear ; or are they factitious and inspired by a policy 
 that seeks to make out of this odious agitation a fulcrum and 
 an argument for resistance in the negotiations that have just 
 opened ? Both hypotheses may be true. The official world of 
 Saint Petersburg does not believe in Prince Bismarck's good 
 will to treat in all seriousness, and it is thought that he will 
 avail himself specially of these strange rumours about our 
 supposed formidable armaments, which are current throughout 
 the whole of Germany, and which he himself pretends to 
 believe : M. d'Oubril's dispatches prove as much. And as I 
 speak of M. d'Oubril, on the Exchange the day before yester- 
 day a rumour was spread to the effect that he had written that 
 
APPENDICES 355 
 
 in a conversation with the Chancellor of the German Empire, 
 the latter had said to him that men's minds in France were in 
 such a state that he would not venture to guarantee peace 
 more than six months' duration. The authenticity of this was 
 strongly asserted, nevertheless I only take it with a grain 
 of salt. However that may be, it seems to me indisputable 
 that the trend of opinion in Germany is strongly against us, 
 and this makes me regret that the discussion of our military 
 law is down for so early a date ; this discussion might entail 
 some embarrassments. The trial of Marshal Bazaine, too, falls 
 at an awkward moment, from the same point of view. It was 
 written, it seems, in the destiny of this fatal individual that he 
 would spare his country no disaster and no vexations ; but we 
 must now leave it to justice alone to speak. 
 
 Le Flo. 
 
 Adieu, cher Monsieur de Remusat, etc. 
 
 APPENDIX No. 17 (v. page 250). 
 
 Count von Arnim to M. Thiers. 
 
 Ambassade 
 
 Imperiale 
 d'Allemagne 
 
 en France. 
 
 Paris, June i, 1872. 
 
 Monsieur le President, 
 
 I have the honour herewith to hand to you a summary 
 of the conditions upon which they are prepared in Berlin to 
 negotiate upon the payment of the three milliards and the 
 evacuation of the French territory. 
 
 While placing myself at your disposal for any further 
 explanation you may wish, I take this opportunity to repeat to 
 you, Monsieur le President, the expression of the profound 
 consideration with which I have the honour to be Your 
 Excellency's very humble and obedient servant, 
 
 Arnim. 
 
356 MEMOIRS OF M. THIEES 
 
 I had forgotten to say that the Imperial Government does 
 not think it admissible that a lottery loan should be quoted on 
 the German exchanges. 
 
 Pray accept, Monsieur le President, the renewed assurance 
 of my profoundest consideration. 
 
 ARNIM. 
 
 Summary op the Conditions proposed by Germany. 
 
 1. France shall pay to Germany one milliard by February 1, 
 1873 ; a second milliard by January 1, 1874 ; the third milliard 
 by March 2, 1875. 
 
 2. Germany shall evacuate the two departments of Haute- 
 Marne and Marne after the payment of the first milliard ; the 
 departments of the Ardennes and the Vosges after the payment 
 of the second milliard. The two departments of the Meurthe 
 and the Meuse, as well as Belfort, shall remain under occupa- 
 tion until the payment of the third milliard. 
 
 3. France not paying the third milliard until twelve months 
 after it is due, she shall deposit in the German Treasury nego- 
 tiable securities other than French, declared acceptable and 
 sufficient by the Imperial Government as guarantee for the 
 payment of the third milliard. 
 
 4. The territory evacuated under this arrangement shall be 
 declared neutral from a military point of view. France under- 
 takes not to assemble considerable bodies of troops in this 
 territory, and she shall construct neither fortifications nor 
 entrenched camps in it. 
 
 It is fully understood that these restrictions cease when the 
 third milliard is paid. 
 
 5. The Emperor of Germany reserves to himself the right 
 to reoccupy the evacuated departments, in case of the non- 
 fulfilment of the engagements entered into by France. 
 
 6. The interest of 5 per cent, stipulated in the Treaty of 
 Versailles shall be paid at the intervals agreed upon, and on 
 such sums as have not been paid into the German Treasury. 
 
APPENDICES 357 
 
 APPENDIX No. 18 (v. page 252). 
 
 Draft of a Convention proposed to Germany oy the 
 French Government. 
 
 June 15, 1872. 
 
 Between the Parties. . . . 
 It has been agreed as follows : 
 
 Article 1. 
 The President of the French Republic, undersigned, pledges 
 himself to fulfil to His Majesty the Emperor of Germany as 
 promptly as possible the engagements under Article 7 of the 
 treaty of May 10, 1871, and in return H.M. the Emperor of 
 Germany pledges himself to evacuate French territory as soon 
 as the war indemnity stipulated in the said treaty shall be 
 paid in full. 
 
 Article 2. 
 The sums still due to the Empire of Germany shall be 
 discharged by means of a loan contracted by France which 
 shall impose upon the contractors of the said loan the obliga- 
 tion to pay direct to the German Treasury the sum of three 
 milliards at intervals as short as can be arranged without 
 going beyond the resources of the money market. 
 
 Article 3. 
 As soon as the sum of one half milliard is paid, that is to 
 say, in the two months following the conclusion of the present 
 convention, H.M. the Emperor of Germany pledges himself 
 to evacuate the French departments of Marne and Haute- 
 Marne. 
 
 Article 4. 
 The second and third half milliards shall be paid in the 
 course of the year 1873, and upon the complete payment 
 of the second half milliard the departments of the Ardennes 
 and the Vosges shall be evacuated by the German troops. 
 
358 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 Article 5. 
 The fourth half milliard shall be paid as far as possible in 
 the concluding months of the year 1873, and as soon as this 
 payment is executed H.M. the Emperor of Germany pledges 
 himself to evacuate the departments of the Meurthe and the 
 Meuse, with the fortress and territory of Belfort, provided 
 the full amount of the fifth and sixth half milliards is 
 furnished in securities approved by him, or in guarantees 
 from bankers recognized by him as solvent. 
 
 Article 6. 
 
 Prance shall always have power to anticipate the period of 
 discharging her debt, and, as soon as she has paid in full the 
 three milliards still due, to claim the immediate and complete 
 evacuation of her territory. 
 
 Article 7. 
 
 The interest of 5 per cent, stipulated for the sums still to 
 be paid on account of the war indemnity shall cease in 
 proportion to the payment of the aforesaid sums. 
 
 Article 8. 
 
 It is agreed that the maintenance of the German troops 
 actually occupying the six departments enumerated above — 
 maintenance which has been laid upon France — shall cease 
 in accordance with their successive withdrawals in the pro- 
 portion of one-third for each two departments evacuated. 
 
 Article 9. 
 
 Until the liberation of French territory is complete, the 
 territories of the six departments evacuated in succession 
 shall be neutralized, and must receive neither any mass of 
 troops (other than such as may be necessary for preserving 
 order) nor works of fortification ; and H.M. the Emperor of 
 Germany pledges himself, on his part, not to raise upon the 
 territory at present under occupation any work other than 
 those at present existing. 
 
APPENDICES 359 
 
 Article 10. 
 It is fully understood that H.M. the Emperor of Germany, 
 if the financial engagements entered into were not completely 
 fulfilled, would be empowered to reoccupy those of the six 
 departments mentioned above that corresponded to the un- 
 fulfilled part of France's engagements. 
 
 Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. 
 de Remusat. 
 
 APPENDIX No. 19 {v. page 852). 
 Note sent by Henckel Donnersmack to M. Thiers. 
 
 June 17, 1872. 
 
 Between. . . . 
 It has been determined as follows': 
 
 Article 1. 
 France shall pay the three milliards of francs still due to 
 Germany under the Treaties of Versailles of February 26, 1871, 
 and of Frankfort May 10, 1871, at the dates indicated below : 
 
 One milliard of francs, by February 1, 1873 
 
 The second milliard of francs, by January 1, 1874 
 
 The third milliard of francs, by March 1, 1875 
 
 Article 2. 
 
 In order to fulfil her engagements, France shall negotiate 
 a loan of three milliards to be paid within the shortest possible 
 period, and impose upon the subscribers or the negotiators of 
 this loan the obligation to pay direct to the Treasury of the 
 German Empire the sums they will have undertaken to 
 furnish. 
 
 Article 3. 
 
 The German troops shall, as soon as the payment of one 
 half milliard has been completed, evacuate the departments of 
 Marne and Haute-Marne ; as soon as the payment of the 
 
360 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 second milliard is completed, the departments of the 
 Ardennes and the Vosges, except the canton of Belfort ; as 
 soon as the payment of the third milliard is completed, 
 the departments of the Meuse, the Moselle, Meurthe-et-Moselle, 
 and the canton of Belfort. 
 
 Article 4. 
 
 The payment of two milliards being completed, France 
 reserves to herself the right to offer Germany, under Article 3 
 of the Treaty of Versailles, financial guarantees in lieu of the 
 territorial guarantee. 
 
 Article 5. 
 
 The evacuated departments shall be declared neutral from 
 the military point of view, until the payment of the three 
 milliards has been accomplished in full. Until then France 
 shall have in them only the number of troops necessary for 
 the maintenance of order, and undertakes not to establish any 
 entrenched camp, not to construct any new fortifications and 
 not to enlarge any existing fortifications. In case of the non- 
 execution or infraction of the terms laid down in this article, 
 the evacuated departments may be reoccupied by the troops of 
 H.M. the Emperor of Germany. 
 
 Article 6. 
 All conditions established by the Treaties of Versailles and 
 Frankfort that are not modified by the present convention 
 remain in force, as well as the foregoing stipulations with 
 regard to the method of payment. 
 
 Article 7. 
 France is authorized, upon giving notice one month before- 
 hand, to pay at any time into the German Treasury sums on 
 account of the payments stipulated in Article 1 of this con- 
 vention, in which case these sums cease to bear interest from 
 the day on which payment is made. 
 
 Article 8. 
 Payment of interest upon the amount remaining due shall 
 be made on the 2nd of March in each year. 
 
APPENDICES 361 
 
 APPENDIX No. 20 (v. page 252). 
 
 Draft of a Convention proposed by the German Government. 
 
 June 18, 1872. 
 
 Between. . . . 
 
 It has been determined as follows : 
 
 Abticle 1. 
 The remaining sums due to the Empire of Germany on 
 account of the war indemnity shall be discharged by means 
 of a loan raised by France, which shall impose upon the 
 contractors of the said loan the obligation to pay direct to the 
 German Treasury the sum of three milliards. 
 
 Article 2. 
 Fifteen days after the sum of one half milliard shall have 
 been discharged, which shall be within two months of the 
 ratification of this present convention, or earlier if possible, 
 H.M. the Emperor of Germany undertakes to evacuate the 
 French departments of Marne and Haute- Marne. 
 
 Article 3. 
 
 The second and third half milliards shall be discharged 
 during the year 1873. 
 
 The fourth half milliard shall be discharged by the 1st of 
 March, 1874. 
 
 The payment of the fifth and sixth half milliards shall be 
 completed by the 1st of March, 1875. 
 
 Article 4. 
 After the full discharge of the fourth half milliard, the 
 departments of the Vosges and the Ardennes shall be evacuated 
 by the German troops. 
 
362 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 The departments of Meurthe and Meuse as well as the 
 fortress of Belfort shall be evacuated on the payment of the 
 fifth and sixth half milliards. 
 
 The French Government always reserves the right of 
 furnishing after the discharge of the fourth half milliard 
 securities or bankers' guarantees, which by virtue of the 
 pertinent clause of Article 3 of the Versailles preliminaries 
 shall be substituted for the territorital guarantee, if they are 
 accepted and recognized by Germany as sufficient. 
 
 Article 5. 
 As Article 6 of the draft of June 14, 1872. 
 
 Article 6. 
 As Article 7 of the same. 
 
 Article 7. 
 As Article 8 of the same. 
 
 Article 8. 
 As Article 9 of the same. 
 
 APPENDIX No. 21 (v. page 252). 
 Draft of Convention proposed by the French Government. 
 
 Jvme 18, 1872. 
 
 Between His Majesty 
 
 and the President of the Republic 
 
 It being recognized that, for the maintenance of a solid and 
 final peace, the time has arrived for arranging, on the one side, 
 for the evacuation of French territory, and on the other for 
 the discharge of the war indemnity stipulated in the peace 
 preliminaries signed at Versailles on the 26th of February, 
 
APPENDICES 363 
 
 1871 , and by the final peace treaty of May 10, 1871, the follow- 
 ing conditions have been determined : 
 
 Article 1. 
 The sums remaining due to Germany on the war indemnity 
 shall be discharged by means of a loan contracted by France, 
 the proceeds of which, to be three milliards, shall be paid at 
 the times hereunder laid down. 
 
 Article 2. 
 Fifteen days after the sum of one half milliard shall have 
 been discharged, which shall take place within two months 
 of the ratifying of the present convention, or earlier if it be 
 possible, His Majesty undertakes to evacuate the French 
 departments of Marne and Haute-Marne. 
 
 Article 3. 
 
 The second and third half milliards shall be discharged 
 during the year 1873 ; the fourth half milliard is to be dis- 
 charged on March 1, 1874. 
 
 The fifth and sixth half milliards may be left undischarged 
 until March 1, 1875, if financial circumstances have not per- 
 mitted them to be paid before. 
 
 Article 4. 
 
 After the discharge in full of the third half milliard, the 
 departments of the Ardennes and the Vosges are to be 
 evacuated by the German troops. 
 
 The departments of Meurthe and Meuse, as well as the 
 fortress of Belfort, shall be evacuated after the payment of the 
 fifth and sixth half milliards. 
 
 The French Government always reserves the right of furnish- 
 ing after the discharge of the fourth half milliard securities or 
 bankers' guarantees, which, by virtue of the pertinent clause 
 of Article 3 of the Versailles preliminaries, shall be substituted 
 for the territorial guarantee, if they are accepted and recognized 
 by Germany as sufficient. 
 
364 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 Article 5. 
 France shall always have power to anticipate the period of 
 discharging her debt, and as soon as she has paid in full the 
 three milliards completing the war indemnity, to claim the 
 immediate and total evacuation of her territory. 
 
 Article 6. 
 The interest of 5 per cent, stipulated for the sums still 
 to be paid shall cease in proportion to the payment of the 
 aforesaid sums. 
 
 Article 7. 
 As the German troops in occupation are to decrease in 
 number with the successive reductions of the occupation, 
 the cost of maintaining the said troops shall be reduced pro- 
 portionately with their number. 
 
 Article 8. 
 Until the liberation of the French territory is complete, 
 the territories of the six departments evacuated in succession 
 shall be neutralized, and must receive neither any mass of 
 troops (other than such as may be necessary for preserving 
 order) nor works of fortification ; and H.M. the Emperor of 
 Germany pledges himself, for his part, not to raise upon 
 the territory at present under occupation any work other 
 than those at present existing. 
 
 Article 9. 
 It is fully understood that H.M. the Emperor of Germany, 
 if the financial engagements entered into were not completely 
 fulfilled, would be empowered to reoccupy those of the six 
 departments mentioned above that corresponded to the un- 
 fulfilled part of France's engagements. 
 
 Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, 
 De Remusat. 
 
APPENDICES 365 
 
 APPENDIX No. 22 (v. page 253). 
 
 Count von Arnim to M. de Bemusat. 
 
 Ambassadb 
 
 imperiale 
 
 d'Allbmagne 
 
 en France. 
 
 Pabis, June 19, 1872. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 Having read the draft convention you were good 
 enough to send me yesterday, I have the honour to present 
 to you a few observations arising from it. 
 
 The first Article makes no mention of the obligation to 
 be laid on the contractors of the loan to pay the Bum 
 of three milliards direct to the Treasury of the Empire. 
 
 This clause, contained in the confidential proposals of the 
 President of the Republic, was maintained in the first draft 
 convention. 
 
 I suppose it is omitted by mistake from the new draft. 
 
 As for Article 4, I have already had the honour to convey 
 to you that my Government did not think it possible to accede 
 to the request that the departments of the Vosges and the 
 Ardennes should be evacuated after the payment of the third 
 half milliard. 
 
 Between Articles 6 and 7 it would be proper to insert an 
 Article stipulating that payments not exceeding one hundred 
 millions should be announced fifteen days, those exceeding 
 that amount one month, before the date of payment. 
 
 I have already had occasion to inform Tour Excellency 
 that Article 7 has been in advance judged inadmissible by 
 the Imperial Government. 
 
 It is in order to forestall any misunderstanding that I repeat 
 this declaration. 
 
 Article 9 only mentions " financial " engagements whose 
 non-fulfilment would give H.M. the Emperor the right to 
 reoccupy the evacuated territories. 
 
366 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 I suppose that here it is merely a question of a mistake 
 easily corrected in the final version. 
 
 Pray accept, Monsieur le Ministre, the renewed assurance 
 of the very high consideration with which I have the honour 
 to be Your Excellency's most humble and obedient servant. 
 
 Arnim. 
 
 APPENDIX No. 23 (v. page 255). 
 Count von Arnim to M. de Bemusat. 
 
 Ambassade 
 
 Imperials 
 
 d'Allemagne 
 
 en France. 
 
 Pabis, June 27, 1872. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 I have the honour to send you herewith a draft 
 convention which I am authorized to sign. It does not 
 essentially differ from that which you were good enough 
 to communicate to me. 
 
 The one difference of any importance is in regard to the 
 evacuation of the two departments of the Vosges and the 
 Ardennes, in which, as I have had the honour to inform you 
 already, I cannot accede to the request of the President of the 
 Republic. 
 
 At the same time this is a detail whose importance should 
 not be exaggerated. 
 
 Pray accept, Monsieur le Ministre, the renewed expression 
 of the high consideration with which I have the honour to 
 be your most humble and obedient servant. 
 
 Arnim. 
 
APPENDICES 367 
 
 Convention of June 29, 1872. 
 
 Count Harry von Arnim, Ambassador 
 
 of H.M. the Emperor of Germany in France. 
 
 Stipulating on behalf of the German Empire on the one 
 part, 
 
 On the other part M. 
 
 Stipulating on behalf of the French Eepublic, having 
 agreed upon the times and the method of payment of the 
 sum of three milliards due from France to Germany, also 
 upon the gradual evacuation of the French departments 
 occupied by the German army, and having mutually exchanged 
 their powers, found good and in due form, have determined 
 as follows : 
 
 Article 1. 
 France engages to pay the said sum of three milliards at 
 the times following : 
 
 1. One half milliard of francs two months after the exchange 
 of ratifications of the present convention ; 
 
 2. One half milliard of francs on the 1st of February, 1873 ; 
 
 3. One milliard of francs on the 1st of March, 1874 ; 
 
 4. One milliard of francs on the 1st of March, 1875 ; 
 France may, however, anticipate the payments due on 
 
 February 1, 1873, March 1, 1874, and March 1, 1875 by partial 
 payments which shall be of not less than one hundred millions 
 but which may comprise the whole of the amounts due at 
 the times above indicated. 
 
 In case of anticipatory payment, the French Government 
 shall advise the German Government one month in advance. 
 
 Article 2. 
 The conditions of the third paragraph of Article 7 in the 
 peace treaty of May 10, 1871, as well as those of the separate 
 protocol of October 12, 1871, remain in force for all payments 
 made under the preceding Article. 
 
368 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 Article 3. 
 
 His Majesty the Emperor of Germany shall cause his troops 
 to evacuate the departments of Marne and Haute-Marne fifteen 
 days after the payment of one half milliard. 
 
 The departments of the Ardennes and the Vosges, fifteen 
 days after the payment of the second milliard. 
 
 The departments of Meuse and Meurthe, as well as the 
 canton of Belfort, fifteen days after the payment of the third 
 milliard and of the interest that may remain to be paid. 
 
 Article 4. 
 After the payment of two milliards, France reserves the 
 right to furnish Germany, for the third milliard, financial 
 guarantees which, conformably with Article 3 of the Versailles 
 preliminaries, shall be substituted for the territorial guarantees, 
 if they are accepted and recognized as sufficient by Germany. 
 
 Article 5. 
 The interest of 5 per cent, on the sums indicated in 
 Article 1, payable from March 2, 1872, shall cease in propor- 
 tion as the said sums are discharged, either on the dates fixed 
 by the present convention or before these dates after the 
 previous notice stipulated for in Article 1. 
 
 Article 6. 
 In case the number of the German troops in occupation 
 should be decreased when the occupation is successively 
 reduced, the cost of maintaining the said troops shall be 
 reduced in proportion to their number. 
 
 Article 7. 
 
 Until the liberation of the French territory is complete, the 
 departments successively evacuated conformably with Article 3 
 shall be neutralized from a military point of view, and must 
 not receive aDy masses of troops other than the garrisons 
 necessary for the preservation of order. 
 
 France shall not raise any fortifications in these departments, 
 and shall not extend the existing fortifications. 
 
APPENDICES 369 
 
 His Majesty the Emperor of Germany undertakes for his 
 part not to raise any work of fortification in the occupied 
 departments other than those at present existing. 
 
 Article 8. 
 His Majesty the Emperor of Germany reserves the right to 
 reoccupy the evacuated departments in case of the non-fulfil- 
 ment of the engagements entered into in the present con- 
 vention. 
 
 Article 9. 
 
 The ratifications of the present treaty, by His Majesty the 
 Emperor of Germany, on the one part, 
 
 On the other, by the President of the French Republic, 
 
 Shall be exchanged at Paris, within ten days, or earlier if 
 possible. 
 
 In which faith . . . 
 
 APPENDIX NO. 24 (v. page 273). 
 
 M. Thiers to M. Teisserenc de Bort. 
 
 Trouvillb, Wednesday morning, 
 August 28, 1872. 
 MON CHER COLLEGUE ET AMI, 
 
 I have indicated the settlement of September 1st as a 
 grave moment for our colossal loan. It is certain that in this 
 unparalleled operation speculation plays a considerable part, 
 and that speculation at every settlement goes through a critical 
 time, and that if the cost of carrying over become dear, the 
 crisis may become serious. I have already persuaded M. 
 Rouland to be lax with regard to loans on securities. I am 
 told that this is not enough, and that, though everything 
 promises favourably, another form of assistance is necessary : 
 this would be the funds of the Treasury placed at the disposal 
 of the Exchange. 
 
 But how ? M. Joubert, a most intelligent financier, who has 
 given us valuable advice on more than one occasion, thinks we 
 might come to an understanding with the Company of Stock- 
 brokers for this purpose. At other times, and for less respect- 
 able motives than inspire us to-day (the success of a colossal 
 
 24 
 
370 MEMOIES OF M. THIERS 
 
 loan made necessary by our misfortunes), recourse has been 
 had to means of this nature. 
 
 Look into it, examine, confer with M. Dutilleul, make up 
 your mind and let me know by telegraph what you have 
 decided. You must consult M. Moreau, the Syndic of the 
 Stockbrokers, and M. Alphonse de Rothschild, and learn all 
 you can before deciding, but it is on Saturday you must move. 
 So you have not a moment to lose. 
 
 Cordially yours, 
 
 A. Thiers. 
 
 APPENDIX No. 25 (v. page 274). 
 
 Minute by M. Teisserenc de Bort sent to M. Thiers. 
 
 Minute. 
 
 When entrusting me with the temporary charge of the 
 Ministry of Finance in the month of August, 1872, the 
 President of the Republic had drawn my attention to the diffi- 
 cult situation that might arise on the Bourse at the moment of 
 the settlement at the end of the month. The new colossal loan 
 of three milliards was about, for the first time, to come down 
 with all its weight upon this settling day. Certain signs 
 indicated that a considerable part of this loan was floating, that 
 is to say, in speculators' hands. Were the money reserves on 
 the Exchange equal to sustaining so heavy a load ? And if 
 money were to be lacking, to what disturbances, what dangers, 
 what catastrophes would not our Stock Exchange, our credit be 
 exposed ? 
 
 The resources placed by the Bank at the disposal of the 
 public by means of advances on securities appeared wholly 
 inadequate ; it was necessary to have recourse to something 
 prompter and more effective. The President of the Republic 
 in a letter of August 28, 1872, informed me of his decisions, 
 which he charged me to execute. 
 
 I employed the two days I had before me in collecting the 
 opinions of the highest authorities in the banking world, in 
 consulting with the Syndic of the Stockbrokers, the directors of 
 our great credit houses. No one had a very clear idea of the 
 
APPENDICES 371 
 
 needs of the Exchange, no more than of the resources that 
 could be counted upon, but there was universal anxiety. 
 Every one was agreed besides in recognizing that in a situation 
 so serious and so full of unforeseen elements, the State could 
 not stand aloof ; that a crisis would be disastrous, and would 
 immediately degenerate into panic, and would strike a deadly 
 blow at the credit of France. 
 
 The intervention of the Treasury to avoid such a calamity 
 was then perfectly justified, provided that this intervention 
 should take place only as a last resort and under the pressure 
 of a fully demonstrated necessity. 
 
 We had to avoid the rock of a premature, untimely inter- 
 vention which would have discouraged the efforts of private 
 enterprise by misleading the calculations of speculators ; which 
 would have withdrawn capital seeking a high rate of remunera- 
 tion from investments carried over not only for this settlement 
 but for subsequent settlements also. 
 
 It was in view of these divers interests that, with the 
 sanction of the President of the Republic, I fixed at fourteen 
 centimes the carrying-over figure after which the Treasury 
 should be empowered to begin making advances. 
 
 This carry-over price gave an interest of 5^ per cent., 
 which was in no way excessive at the moment. Fortunately 
 it was not reached. The Exchange was able to satisfy all 
 needs, and the moral effect of the Government's resolution 
 was enough to restrain the carry-over figure between the limits 
 of twelve and thirteen centimes which it did not overpass. 
 
 APPENDIX No. 26 (v. page 325). 
 
 Draft of a law for the organization of public powers, presented 
 by M. Thiers, President of the Republic, and by M. 
 Dufaure, Keeper of the Seals and Minister of Justice, 
 at the sitting of May 19, 1873. 
 
 Akticle 1. 
 The Government of the French Republic consists of a 
 Senate, a Representative Chamber, and a President of the 
 Republic, Head of the Executive. 
 
372 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 Article 2. 
 
 The Senate consists of two hundred and sixty-five members, 
 French subjects, of thirty-five years of age at the least, 
 enjoying all their civil, political, and family rights. 
 
 The Representative Chamber consists of five hundred and 
 thirty-seven members, French subjects, of twenty-five years 
 of age at the least, enjoying all their civil, political, and 
 family rights. 
 
 The President of the Republic must be of forty years of 
 age at the least, and enjoy all his civil, political, and family 
 rights. 
 
 Article 3. 
 
 The Senate is nominated for ten years and is renewed by 
 one-fifth every two years. 
 
 The Representative Chamber is nominated for five years 
 and is completely renewed after the fifth year. 
 
 The President of the Republic is nominated for five years ; 
 he may be re-elected. 
 
 Article 4. 
 
 Each of the eighty-six departments of France nominates 
 three senators ; the district of Belfort, the departments of 
 Algeria, the islands of Reunion, Martinique, and Guadeloupe, 
 nominate one each. 
 
 Elections are decided by the direct vote of all the electors 
 in the department, the district, or the colony, and by ballot for 
 the departments of France. 
 
 Article 5. 
 Only the following are eligible for the Senate : 
 
 1. Members of the Representative Chamber ; 
 
 2. Former members of the Legislative Assemblies ; 
 
 3. Ministers and ex-Ministers ; 
 
 4. Members of the Council of State, the Court of Cassation, 
 and the Court of Exchequer ; 
 
 5. Presidents and ex-Presidents of the General Councils ; 
 
 6. Members of the Institute ; 
 
APPENDICES 373 
 
 7. Members of the higher Council of Commerce, of Agri- 
 culture, and of Industry ; 
 
 8. Cardinals, Archbishops, and Bishops ; 
 
 9. Presidents of the two Consistories of the Augsburg 
 Confession with the greatest number of electors, and the 
 twelve Consistories of the reformed religion with the greatest 
 number of electors ; 
 
 10. The President and the Grand Rabbi of the central 
 Consistory of the Jews in France ; 
 
 11. Marshals and Generals of Division, Admirals and Vice- 
 Admirals on active service or in the reserves, Governors of 
 Algeria and the three great colonies who have held office for 
 five years ; 
 
 12. Prefects in active service ; 
 
 13. Mayors of towns of above one hundred thousand 
 population ; 
 
 14. Officials with ten years' service as directors in the 
 central ministerial administrations ; 
 
 15. Retired magistrates who have been attached to the 
 Court of Cassation, to the Courts of Appeal, or have held 
 the office of President of a civil tribunal. 
 
 Article 6. 
 Those indicated as eligible in paragraphs 1, 4, and 12 of 
 the preceding Article shall, within fifteen days following the 
 elections, declare whether they intend to accept senatorial 
 functions. Silence will be accepted as refusal ; acceptance 
 will entail the necessary resignation of the offices they were 
 holding. 
 
 Article 7. 
 Each of the three hundred and sixty-two divisions of Prance, 
 including the district of Belfort, nominates one representative. 
 Divisions whose population exceeds one hundred thousand 
 shall elect one representative for each hundred thousand 
 inhabitants, any fraction beyond to count as a hundred 
 thousand. 
 
374 MEMOIRS OF M. THIERS 
 
 No change can be made in the distribution save by virtue of 
 the quinquennial census and by a law. 
 
 Two representatives are assigned to each of the departments 
 of Algeria, and one to each of the six colonies of Reunion, 
 Martinique, Guadeloupe, Senegal, Guiana, and French India 
 (Indo-China). 
 
 Article 8. 
 Representatives are elected by the direct vote of all the 
 electors of the arrondissement. An arrondissement that is to 
 nominate more than one representative shall be divided into 
 as many sections as it has representatives. The sections shall 
 be composed by grouping cantons together. They can be 
 determined and altered only by legislation. 
 
 Article 9. 
 
 The President of the Republic is nominated by a Congress 
 composed as follows : (1) Of members of the Senate ; 
 (2) Members of the Representative Chamber ; (3) A delegation 
 of three members chosen by each of the General Councils of 
 France and Algeria in their annual session in the month of 
 August. 
 
 This Congress shall be presided over by the President of the 
 Senate. 
 
 Article 10. 
 
 When there is occasion to nominate the President of the 
 Republic, the President of the Senate shall within eight days 
 convoke the Senators, the representatives, and the members of 
 the General Councils appointed. 
 
 Their meeting shall take place within fifteen days at the 
 furthest. 
 
 The President of the Republic shall be nominated by the 
 majority of votes. 
 
 The President of the Senate shall notify the President of the 
 Republic elected and the President of the Representative 
 Chamber of the nomination. 
 
APPENDICES 375 
 
 ASSIGNMENT OF PUBLIC POWEKS. 
 
 Article 11. 
 
 Legislation belongs to the two Chambers and the President 
 of the Republic. 
 
 The two Chambers share alike in the formulation of the 
 laws. At the same time, laws relating to taxation are submitted 
 in the first instance to the Representative Chamber. 
 
 The Senate may be constituted a court to try actions against 
 the President and the Ministers, and the Generals in command 
 of the land and sea forces. 
 
 Article 12. 
 Each Chamber is the judge of the eligibility of its own 
 members and of the regularity of their election, and can alone 
 receive their resignation. 
 
 Article 13. 
 
 Senators and Representatives can at no time be either accused 
 nor tried for the opinions they may have expressed in the 
 Chamber to which they belong. 
 
 They cannot be arrested on any criminal charge except in 
 flagrante delicto, nor prosecuted unless and until the Chamber 
 of which they form part has authorized the prosecution. 
 
 Article 14. 
 
 The President of the Republic promulgates the laws when 
 they have been passed by both Chambers. He oversees and 
 ensures their execution. 
 
 He negotiates and ratifies treaties. No treaty is finally 
 valid until approved by both Chambers. 
 
 He has the prerogative of pardon ; amnesties can only be 
 granted by legislation. 
 
 He disposes of the armed forces without having power to 
 command in person. 
 
 He presides over national ceremonies ; envoys and am- 
 bassadors of foreign Powers are accredited to him. 
 
376 MEMOIRS OP M. THIEES 
 
 The President of the Republic and the Ministers are indi- 
 vidually and collectively responsible for the actions of the 
 Government. 
 
 Article 15. 
 
 When the President of the Republic considers that the 
 interest of the country demands the renewing of the Repre- 
 sentative Chamber before the expiration of its normal term, he 
 shall request the Senate for authority to dissolve it. This 
 authority can be given only in secret committee and by a 
 majority of votes. It must be given within eight days. 
 
 The electoral colleges are to be convoked within the three 
 days following the notification to the President of the Republic 
 of the Senate's vote in the affirmative. 
 
 TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. 
 
 Article 16. 
 
 When the National Assembly shall have by vote determined 
 the date of its breaking up, the President of the Republic shall 
 convoke the electoral colleges for the election of representa- 
 tives, and further for the election of Senators, so that the 
 two Chambers may be constituted on the same day as the 
 dissolution takes place. 
 
 The powers of the President of the Republic shall continue 
 until the notification of the voting of the Congress that shall 
 have elected the new President. 
 
 The President of the Republic, 
 A. Thiers. 
 
 Keeper of the Seals, Minister of Justice, 
 J. Dupaure. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Alencon, 155 
 
 Alphand, M., 148 
 
 Alsace, Alsatians, 49, 50, 61, 70, 78- 
 81, 92, 93, 96, 97, 107, 113, 114, 
 183, 185, 237,| 270; -Lorraine, 
 185, 189 
 
 America, 295 ; Civil War, the, 208 
 
 Amiens, 96, 167 
 
 Andrassy, Count, 29, 31, 32, 51-3, 168 
 
 Antwerp, 297 
 
 Armenia, Armenian, 270 
 
 Armistice, 19, 36, 37, 58, 59, 60-3, 
 65, 68-78, 80-3, 85, 87, 90, 92, 
 93, 95-9, 101-3, 105, 107, 108, 
 112, 119 
 
 Army of the East, 63, 130 
 
 Arnim, Count von, 156, 184, 186, 190, 
 235-45, 249-55, 307, 310, 311, 
 313, 315 
 
 Asnieres, Bridge of, 132 
 
 Assembly, Constituent, National, 10, 
 19, 58, 59, 63, 68, 69, 71, 73-5, 
 77, 81, 82, 87, 92, 97, 104, 117- 
 21, 125, 126, 134, 136-8, 143, 
 144, 151, 157, 158, 162-4, 168, 
 169, (of 1848) 170, 171-4, 176, 
 177, 180, 185-7, 189, 197-204, 
 206-8, 213-18, 221-7, 231, 232, 
 234, 236, 248, 255, 256, 259, 
 261, 264, 265, 275-7, 278, 280- 
 2, 285, 291-4, 297-304, 308, 
 309, 312, 318-23, 325-31 
 
 Audiffret-Pasquier, Due d', 222, 223, 
 257, 295 
 
 Aumale, Due d\ the, 168, 215, 328, 
 329 
 
 Australia, 295 
 
 Austria, Austrians, 24-6, 28, 30, 31, 
 37, 42, 43, 52-4, 74, 89, 119, 
 167, 271 
 Army, 25, 26 
 Cabinet, 119 
 Court, 27 
 Emperor Francis Joseph, 25, 26, 
 
 29, 51, 167, 270, 271 
 German provinces of, 40 
 Nobility, 25 
 Press, 27 
 Austria-Hungary, 31 
 Austro-Germans, 25, 27, 28, 31, 167 
 Auteuil, 137-8, 142 
 
 Bataille, General, 128, 154 
 Batbie, M., 257, 298, 299 
 Baden, Duchy of, 31, 40, 79, 246 
 Bank of France, 120, 127, 153, 163, 
 
 194-7, 202-4, 206, 212, 251, 263, 
 
 279, 282, 295, 314 ; Board of, 195 
 Barail, General du, 128, 130, 133, 137, 
 
 150, 265 
 Barodet, M., 319, 321, 323, 325 
 Barthelemy-Saint-Hilaire, M., 67, 72, 
 
 102 
 Bavaria, Bavarian, 31, 40, 78, 90, 
 
 246 ; army, 62 ; outposts, 99 
 Bazaine, Marshal, 61, 62, 64, 219 ; 
 
 army of, 64 ; capitulation of, 61, 
 
 64, 68 
 Belfort, 55, 56, 63, 111, 113, 114, 115, 
 
 120, 156, 182, 244, 246, 247, 251, 
 
 253, 255, 256, 309, 310, 312-17 
 Belgium, 119, 178, 305 
 King Leopold of, 306 
 Belville, 122, 147 
 
 377 
 
378 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Berckheim, General de, 133, 265-7 
 
 Berenger, M., 327, 331 
 
 Berlin, 27, 38, 42, 46, 48, 49, 110, 113, 
 184, 186, 187, 189, 234-40, 242, 
 243, 246, 248-50, 252, 254, 255, 
 270, 271, 294, 311, 313, 316 
 Cabinet, 227, 250 
 Court, 46, 236, 318 
 French Embassy at, 318 
 Treasury, 252 
 
 Besaneon, 55, 56, 63, 266 
 
 Beust, Count, 24-30, 43, 51, 52, 54 
 
 Bisaccia, Due de la Rochefoucauld-, 
 257, 276, 290 
 
 Bismarck, Count (afterwards Prince), 
 13, 14, 19, 27, 30, 36, 37, 62, 66, 
 67, 73-93, 95, 97-100, 102-16, 
 120, 127, 137, 156, 157, 184, 
 186-9, 234-9, 242, 243, 246, 249, 
 250, 252, 311-18 
 
 Blanqui, M., 88, 145 
 
 Bleischroder, M., 110, 111, 242, 249 
 
 Bocher, M., 72, 202 
 
 Bois de Boulogne, 67, 132, 133, 136-9, 
 143 
 Longehamps racecourse, review on, 
 in the, 149 
 
 Bonapartes, Bonapartists, 8, 9, 25, 27, 
 75, 76, 85, 174, 177-9, 217, 223, 
 275, 277, 322, 328, 329 
 
 Bonjean, President, 145, 147 
 
 Bordeaux, 102, 103, 117-20, 136, 153, 
 179, 266, 285, 297, 300 
 Pact of, 280, 296, 297 
 
 Borel, General, 129, 131, 151 
 
 Bourbaki, General, 57, 130 
 
 Bourbons, the, 85, 86, 168 
 
 Bourse, the, 195, 278 
 
 Brest, 127, 128, 148, 154 
 
 Broglie, Due de, 218, 257, 258, 277, 
 293, 322, 329-31 
 
 Brunnow, Baron, 48 
 
 Brussels, 153, 226 
 
 Budberg, Baron, 34 
 
 Buffet, M., 203, 321 
 
 Burgundy, Burgundians, 155, 230 
 
 Calais Straits, 83 
 Calmon, M„ 67, 72, 303 
 
 Cambrai, 128, 130 
 Camphausen, Count, 249 
 Canrobert, Marshal, 128, 151, 265 
 Casimir-Perier, M., 173, 179, 180, 
 
 199, 224, 225, 326, 327, 331 
 Cassel, Court of, 85, 93 
 Castellar, M., 307 
 Central Asia, 167 
 Chagny, 57 
 Chalons, 220, 266, 267 
 Chamber, the French, 8, 9, 205, 
 
 225, 259, 293, 296, 304, 319, 
 
 328 
 Chambery, 55, 276 
 Chambord, Comte de, 86, 280, 328 
 Champagne, 55, 155 
 Champs-Elysees, 106, 123, 142 
 Changarnier, General, 131, 257, 293 
 Chanzy, General, 233, 266 
 Charles V, 109, 238 
 Charles X, 117 
 Charonne, 147 
 
 Chasseloup-Laubat, M. de, 232, 233 
 Chatillon, 126, 127, 133, 267 
 Chaudey, M. Gustave, 145, 147 
 Chaudordy, M. de, 56-8 
 Cherbourg, 23, 127, 128, 148, 154, 
 
 274 
 Chislehurst, 177, 297 ; Court of, 178 
 Cialdini, General, 54 
 Cissey, General de, 130, 133, 134, 
 
 136, 137, 139, 141-4, 153, 180-92, 
 
 221 
 Clement Thomas, General, 125 
 Clinehant, General, 128, 130, 133, 
 
 137, 141 
 Clothilde, Princess, 277, 278 
 Cochery, M., 62, 65, 66, 81, 88, 90, 
 
 92, 94, 97-101 
 Commune, the, 88, 90, 128, 135, 137, 
 
 144, 146, 152, 156, 165, 221, 265 ; 
 
 massacre of hostages, 105, 147 ; 
 
 M. Thiers' communications with, 
 
 135 ; trial of insurgents, 154, 
 
 155 
 Constantine, the Grand Duke, 44, 45 
 
 Paulowski, Palace of, 45 
 Constantinople, 89, 90, 270 
 Sultan of, 270 
 
INDEX 
 
 379 
 
 Corsica, Corsioans, 178, 277 
 Counoil-General of, 178-9 
 
 Coulmiers, Battle of, 100 
 
 Councils : General, Ministerial, 
 Municipal, Superior, of War, of 
 Defence, 58, 122, 123, 132, 146, 
 155, 161, 174, 179, 189, 226, 
 253, 260, 265, 270, 278, 281, 
 302, 303, 318, 322, 324, 327, 
 331 
 
 Courbevoie, 133, 138, 180 
 
 Courville, General de, 137, 266 
 
 Cremieux, M., 24, 58, 59 
 
 Creusot, 269 
 
 Darboy, Monsignor, 145-7 
 Deguerry, M., 145, 147 
 Denmark, 40, 47 
 
 Danish affairs, 25 ; Princess, 47 
 Departments of the — 
 
 Aisne, 156, 182 
 
 Ardennes, 156, 182, 251-5, 266, 310 
 
 Aube, 156, 182 
 
 Cdte d'Or, 155, 156, 182, 256 
 
 Doubs, 156, 182 
 
 Eure, 156, 167 
 
 Haute-Marne, 156, 168, 182, 251, 
 264 
 
 la Manche, 168 
 
 Marne, 156, 228, 251, 264 
 
 Meurthe, 253 
 
 Meurthe-et-Moselle, 156, 182, 253, 
 309, 310 
 
 Meuse, 156, 182, 266, 309, 310 
 
 Nord, 256 
 
 Oise, 156, 168 
 
 Eh&ne, 319 
 
 Seine-et-Marne, 156 
 
 Seine-et-Oise, 156 
 
 Seine Inferieure, 156, 167 
 
 Somme, 256 
 
 Vosges, 156, 182, 228, 251-5, 309, 
 310 
 Douay, General, 128, 130, 133, 137, 
 
 138, 141, 142, 268 
 Ducatel, 141, 142 
 Duchatel, Count, 224, 225 
 Ducrot, General, 72, 94-6, 128, 192, 
 193, 233, 266 
 
 Dufaure, M., 119, 152, 180, 214, 295, 
 
 299, 303-5, 325, 330 
 Dutilleul, M., 165, 193, 262, 279, 
 
 310 
 
 Elysee, Palace, the, 226, 245, 250, 
 252, 275, 322 
 
 Empire, the, 8, 34, 75, 76, 132, 158, 
 162, 163, 168, 170, 171, 174, 177, 
 196, 208, 217, 222, 223, 257, 282, 
 
 300, 328 
 
 Empress, the (of the French), 8, 
 
 75 
 England, English, 10-16, 18, 19, 23, 
 28, 36, 37, 52, 53, 57, 58-60, 68, 
 73, 74, 117, 119, 148, 161, 167, 
 168, 185, 194, 200, 201, 209, 218, 
 247, 271, 272, 279, 295, 305 
 
 Bank of, 294, 295 
 
 Cabinet, 8, 11, 17, 19, 58, 119 
 
 Government, 17, 274 
 
 Parliament, 12, 52 
 
 Press, 149 
 
 Prince, 272 
 
 Queen of, 11 
 
 Treasury, 201 
 Ernoul, M., 301, 331,332 
 Europe, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 25, 
 26, 28, 31-3, 35-7, 39-42, 50, 
 56-8, 82, 107, 113, 119, 167, 168, 
 220, 227, 236, 246, 247, 279, 282, 
 290, 295, 300, 302, 332 
 
 Faubourg Saint-Honore, 144 
 
 Favre, M. Jules, 7, 13, 14, 16, 19, 35, 
 36, 51, 67, 71, 72, 91, 94, 96-8, 
 112, 114, 115, 119, 120, 124-6, 
 155, 174, 175 ; his Histoire du 
 Gouvernement de la Difense 
 Nationale, 7 
 
 Ferrieres, 36, 73, 74 
 
 Ferry, M., 67, 72 
 
 Flanders, 155, 267 
 
 Fleury, General, 37 
 
 Florence, 53 ; Conference at, 54 
 
 Fontainebleau, 121 
 
 Forgeot, General, 265, 266 
 
 Fourichon, Admiral, 57, 59, 60 
 
 Fourtou, M. de, 303, 326 
 
380 
 
 INDEX 
 
 France, the French, 7, 8, 10-12, 19, 
 20, 25, 27, 31-3, 35, 36, 39-41, 51, 
 53, 55-9, 61, 70, 71, 73, 75, 76, 
 79, 81, 86-9, 93, 97, 99, 100, 102, 
 107-13, 115, 119, 120, 135, 136, 
 143, 151, 138-61, 168-71, 173, 
 175, 178, 183-5, 187, 194, 198, 
 200, 201, 209, 211, 214, 215, 217, 
 220, 227, 229-32, 236, 237, 239, 
 242, 244, 246-50, 252, 262, 265, 
 270, 272, 278, 280, 281, 283-92, 
 296-8, 300, 301, 307, 311-13, 
 316, 318, 322, 325, 327, 329, 330, 
 332 
 Franche-Comte, 155 
 Frankfort, 155, 157, 226, 294 
 
 Treaty of, 156, 157, 164, 182, 184 
 Frdbault, General, 268 
 Frederick the Great, 79, 248 
 French Army (forces, soldiers, troops), 
 29, 84, 124, 130, 134, 138, 140, 
 145, 147, 149, 180-2, 199, 229-34 
 Cabinet, 104, 170, 176, 179, 180, 
 
 260, 292, 321, 326-9, 331 
 Fleet, 23, 83 
 Outposts, 94, 99 
 Press, 105, 152, 220, 236, 271, 275, 
 
 324 
 Eevolution, the, 277, 288 
 Treasury, the, 120, 163, 166, 212, 
 264, 274, 279 
 Frossard, General, 128, 266, 267 
 
 Gabriac, M. de, 33, 44, 184 
 Gambetta, M., 57-64, 68, 69, 71, 85, 
 99, 100, 118, 222, 275, 293, 304, 
 323, 324 
 Gazette, The Official, 71, 303 
 Germain, M. , 200, 205, 206 
 German Army (forces, troops), 55, 82, 
 103, 113, 127, 155, 156, 191, 192, 
 310 
 Emperor, 167, 187, 188, 227, 234- 
 7, 239, 248-51, 253, 270, 271, 
 311-14, 316, 318 
 Empire, 117 
 Empress, 318 
 Federal Council, 246 
 Fleet, 83 
 
 German (continued) — 
 Government, 157, 167, 184, 185, 
 
 187, 189, 227, 312, 313 
 Press, 79 
 Reichstag, 316 
 Staff, 81, 95 
 States, the little, 89 
 Treasury, 183, 185, 237, 250 
 Germanic Confederacy, Northern Con- 
 federation, 34, 78, 79 
 Emperor, 40, 41 
 Germany, Germans, 11, 26, 27, 37, 
 40, 56, 79, 83, 84, 90, 107, 108, 
 110, 112, 113, 115, 156, 158, 182, 
 183, 185, 186, 228, 234, 236, 238, 
 240, 241, 244, 246, 252, 255, 262, 
 263, 270-2, 279, 282, 294, 295, 
 307, 309, 311-13, 315, 316 
 Gladstone, Mr., 12-15, 17, 19, 168 
 Glais-Bizoin, M., 57-9, 100 
 Goltz, von der, 89 
 Gontaut-Biron, M., 235-8, 246, 249, 
 
 270, 271, 312, 314-18 
 Gortchakow, Prince, 33-9, 41-4, 46-8, 
 
 50, 54, 58, 64 
 Goulard, M., 226, 303, 304, 319, 321, 
 
 325, 326 
 Government, the French, 9, 10, 14, 
 17-19, 25, 27, 31, 32, 34, 35, 39, 
 46, 57, 87, 97, 121, 123, 126, 131, 
 146, 152, 156, 158, 163, 170, 176, 
 177, 185, 189, 197, 198, 204, 206, 
 207, 213, 217, 219, 221, 222, 233, 
 243, 248, 249, 256, 257, 262, 273, 
 275, 276-8, 281, 292-4, 298, 299, 
 302, 303, 307, 312, 315, 316, 318, 
 319, 321, 325, 328-31 
 Imperial (the late), 9, 10, 93 
 Of France, 68, 117 
 Of National Defence, 9, 19, 90, 101, 
 
 118, 119, 221 
 Of Paris, 18, 19, 24, 47, 58, 59, 62, 
 
 68, 71-6, 91-3, 95, 97, 98 
 Of Tours, 54, 61, 64, 73, 74, 99, 100 
 Gramont, M. de, 25, 26, 29-31 
 Grand Elector, the, 79 
 Granville, Lord, 8-20, 168 
 Grenoble, 136, 177, 276, 277, 293, 294, 
 296 
 
INDEX 
 
 381 
 
 Grevy, M., 60, 198, 209, 276, 277, 
 
 320, 321 
 Guise, Francois de, 109 
 
 Hamburg, 294 ; Bank of, 263 
 Henokel, M., 110, 111, 242-5, 252 
 Hermitage, the, 38, 44 
 Holland, 305 
 Hunebelle, M Jules, 132 
 Hungary, Hungarians, 26, 27, 30, 31, 
 90, 167 
 
 Imperial, Prince, the, 8, 77, 328 
 Imperialists, 322 
 
 Indemnity, 93 ; amount of, 107, 109, 
 113; matter relating to, 155-67, 
 182-5, 193, 197, 234, 235, 237- 
 56, 264, 272-4, 279, 282, 309, 
 310 
 Issy, 132, 133, 136, 137, 139 
 Italy, Italians, 28, 37, 43, 52-6, 74, 
 119, 161, 168, 178, 305, 306 
 Cabinet, 56, 119, 306 
 Government, 306 
 King Victor Emmanuel, 53, 55, 56, 
 
 63, 306 
 Parliament, 54, 56 
 Unity of, 168 
 
 Joinville, Prince de, 168 
 Journal des Debate, 259 
 Journal Officiel, 165, 283 
 Jura, the, 55, 156, 182 
 
 Kerdrel, M. de, 257, 291, 292 
 
 Committee, 294, 295, 304 
 Kern, M., Ill, 112, 211 
 Kiva Expedition, the, 271 
 Krantz, Captain, 128, 129, 140, 142, 
 
 148, 154 
 Krupp, Herr, 269 
 
 La Bergerie, 127 
 
 La Muette, 138 
 
 La Boquette, Prison of, 147 
 
 Ladmirault, General de, 128, 130, 
 
 133, 137, 138, 140-2, 144, 153, 
 
 265 
 Lambrecht, M., 119, 153, 179 
 
 Langres, 55, 63, 266 
 
 Lanza, Signor, 54 
 
 Larcy, M. de, 119, 180, 260, 304 
 
 Le Brettevillois, General, 137 
 
 LeF16, General, 67, 119, 153 
 
 le Havre, 83, 96, 265, 274 
 
 le Mans, 96, 155 
 
 Lecomte, General, 125 
 
 Lefranc, M. Victor, 153, 180, 225, 276, 
 
 302, 303 
 Legion of Honour, 130, 132, 145, 269, 
 
 318 
 Legitimists, 86, 169, 174, 211, 212, 
 
 275, 280, 299, 322, 328 
 l'Etoile, 137 ; Arc de Triompe in, 
 
 142 
 Loire, the, 92, 120, 266 ; Army of, 63, 
 
 68, 99, 101 
 London, 7-9, 12, 33, 48, 54, 60, 194, 
 
 218, 272, 294, 295 
 Foreign Office in, 8, 17-19, 23 
 French Embassy in, 7, 14, 19, 257 
 Lorraine, 49, 50, 61, 70, 78, 80, 81, 92, 
 
 93, 96, 97, 107, 109, 111, 112, 115, 
 
 237, 270 
 Louis Philippe, 117 
 Louis XIV, 79, 202 
 Louvre, the, 145, 165 ; State Office at, 
 
 122 
 Lucerne, 280 
 
 Luxembourg Gardens, the, 125 
 Lyons, 55, 63, 74, 103, 136, 207, 212, 
 
 266, 321; camp of, 56; Central 
 
 Mayoralty of, 319, 321, 323; 
 
 municipality of, 319 ; inhabitants 
 
 of, 319 
 Lyons, Lord, 16, 20, 57, 60, 209, 295 
 
 MacMahon, Marshal, 128, 130, 137- 
 42, 144, 150-2, 177, 193, 215, 220, 
 221, 265-7, 328, 329, 332 
 
 Madrid, 307 
 
 Maintenant, M. de, 295 
 
 Malakoff, taking of the, 131 
 
 Malta, 247 
 
 Manteuffel, General Baron von, 190-3, 
 235, 237, 246, 311-13, 315 
 
 Marne, the Biver, 267 
 
 Marseilles, 74, 136, 266 
 
382 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Martel, M., 198, 321 
 
 Metternioh, Prince, 29, 31, 75 
 
 Metz, 36, 49, 58, 67, 72, 79, 80, 82, 85, 
 92, 93, 96, 107, 109, 111-13, 153, 
 219, 228, 317; army of, 19, 35; 
 capitulation of, 62, 64, 67, 68, 71, 
 terms of, 85 ; siege of, 55 
 
 Meudon 132, 180, 181 
 
 Mexico, 306 ; King Maximilian of, 306 
 
 Mignet, M., 67, 72 
 
 Moltke, Count, 66, 77, 94, 100, 112, 
 114, 115, 236 
 
 Monarchy, Monarchical, Monarchists, 
 52, 75, 89, 117-19, 136, 171, 173, 
 175, 198, 227, 256, 259, 280, 290, 
 292, 294, 300, 301, 325, 328 
 
 Mont-Valerien, 36, 67, 83, 121, 126, 
 127, 140, 141 
 
 Montaudon, General, 57, 128, 153 
 
 Montchanin, 57 
 
 Montlucon, 57 
 
 Montmartre, 122, 144 
 
 Montretout battery, the, 133, 137, 139, 
 141, 267 
 
 Montrouge, 132, 133 
 
 Mortimer-Ternaux, M., 134, 136 
 
 Moulins, 57 
 
 Mulhouse, 183 
 
 Nancy, 107, 191, 234, 237, 246, 311, 
 
 315 
 Nantes, 136, 275, 276 
 Napoleon III, 25, 75, 85, 89, 93, 117, 
 
 130, 177, 220, 221, 277, 278 
 Napoleon Bonaparte, 12, 301 
 Napoleon Prince Jerdme, 178, 277, 278, 
 
 321 
 National Guard, the Republican, 90, 
 
 118, 123, 124 
 Neuilly, 126, 127, 137 ; Pont de, 133 
 Nevers, 57 
 
 Nikolsbourg, Treaty of, 89 
 Normandy, 83, 96, 155 
 
 Okouneif, M., 48, 64 
 
 Olozaga, M., 307 
 
 Orleans, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 99, 100, 
 
 121 ; Orleanists, 86, 134, 173, 174, 
 
 202, 213, 328 
 
 Orleans (continued) — 
 
 Bishop of, 62, 86, 99, 247, 248; 
 palace of, 68 
 
 Princes, 86, 87, 168-70, 178, 217 
 Orloff, Prince, 270-2 
 
 Paris, Parisians, 8, 15, 18, 21, 23, 26, 
 34, 39, 42, 43, 47, 48, 50-2, 55, 
 58, 59, 62-6, 68-72, 75-7, 82, 
 83, 87, 88, 91, 92, 95-8, 100-6, 
 109, 111, 115, 118-21, 123-5, 
 127, 132, 134-7, 139, 142-5, 
 149, 155, 180, 184, 218,, 224-7, 
 229, 230, 235-8, 249, 262, 264, 
 266, 267, 272, 275, 310, 313, 315, 
 316, 319, 322-4, 332 
 Army of, 130, 133, 151 
 Burning of, 145 
 Capitulation of, 175 
 Entry of Prussian Army into, 105, 
 
 106, 108, 109, 115 
 Evacuation of, 155 
 Foreign Ministry at, the, 67, 71, 123 
 Forts of, 74, 90, 94, 134, 156 
 German Embassy at, 240 
 Headquarters at, French, 67 
 H&tel de Ville, 72, 75, 76, 90, 98, 
 
 145 
 Insurrection of, 121-47, 221, 227, 
 
 300 
 Bevictualling of, 59, 69-71, 76, 77, 
 
 87, 90-6, 98 
 Siege of, 55, 124, 129-42, 153, 220 
 Treaty of, 271 
 Paris, Comte de, the, 86 
 Passy, 138, 142 
 Picard, M., 67, 90, 94, 119, 124-6, 
 
 152, 153, 173-5 
 Picardy, 96, 155, 267 
 Piscatory, M. , 67, 72 
 Place de la Concorde, 123, 142, 144 
 Place Vendome, 144 
 Point du Jour, 133, 137, 140-2 
 Poitiers, 57 
 
 Poland, Poles, Polish, 32, 33, 79 
 Pont de la Chambre des Deputes, 124 
 Pouyer-Quertier, M., 119, 155, 164, 
 
 165, 186-90, 193, 200, 211, 262 
 Pope, the, 306 , 
 
INDEX 
 
 383 
 
 Portugal, 119, 307 
 
 Pothuau, Vice-Admiral, 119, 129, 180 
 
 Potocki, Count, 51, 53 
 
 Prague, 89, 90, 104 
 
 President of the Republic, title of, 
 adopted, 173, 174 
 
 Prussia, Prussians, 10-13, 16, 23, 
 25-30, 35-8, 40-2, 45, 46, 49, 
 51-3, 55, 56, 61, 67-9, 71, 72, 
 
 74, 79, 81, 83-5, 87, 89, 95, 100, 
 103, 105, 109, 110, 120, 126, 132, 
 139, 148, 149, 151, 152, 155, 167, 
 168, 182, 227, 228, 230, 240, 241, 
 248, 252, 254, 267, 268, 310, 313, 
 315 
 
 King of, 27, 50, 58, 64, 65, 79, 80, 
 81, 87, 89-93, 105, 108, 114, 116, 
 119, 311 
 Prince-Eoyal, Crown, 94, 101, 108 
 Prussian camp, 9, 16, 19 
 Court, 9, 94, 249 
 
 Government, 19, 242, 243, 253, 254 
 Headquarters, 13, 14, 58, 59, 62, 
 
 87,98 
 Outposts, 94 
 Press, 27 
 
 Treasury, 186, 241 
 Pyat, M. Felix, 72, 88, 90 
 
 Kefiye, Colonel de, 268, 269 
 
 Reichshoffen, 128, 228 
 
 Bemusat, M. de, 175, 176, 235, 245, 
 
 246, 252-5, 303, 313, 316, 318, 
 
 323, 324, 327 
 Bemusat, M. Paul de, 66, 81, 175, 180 
 Bepublic, Bepublicans, 9, 25, 28, 34, 
 
 75, 85-7, 89, 117, 118, 135, 136, 
 169-73, 176, 197, 221, 225, 227, 
 258, 276, 282, 284-90, 297, 298, 
 300,301; Conservative-, 259, 286, 
 289, 301 ; of 1848, 87 ; of 1789, 
 288; system, 320 
 
 Bhine, the, 80, 247; Bas-, 92; 
 
 Haut-, 92 ; provinces, 269 
 Eicard, M., 173, 177 
 Bicotti, Signor, 54 
 Eivet, M., 172-4 
 
 Constitution, the, 174, 308 
 Rivieres, General de, 266, 267 
 
 Borne, 56, 235-7, 246, 325; Church 
 
 of, 300 ; Court of, 270 
 Boon, Count, 112, 249 
 Bouen, 83, 154, 167, 267 
 Bouher, M., 161, 217, 223, 224, 329 
 Boussy, M. de, 310 
 Boyalist, Boyalists, 118, 276 ; Press, 
 
 275 
 Bue Haxo, the, 147 
 Bussia, Bussians, 23, 26-9, 32, 34, 
 36, 38, 41, 43-5, 47, 48, 50-3, 
 57, 58, 62, 68, 69, 74, 100, 119, 
 167, 271, 272 
 Baltic Provinces of, 40 
 Emperor Alexander, 32, 33, 36, 38- 
 40, 43, 46, 47, 58, 64, 167, 270, 
 271 ; daughter of, 272 
 Imperial Council, 46 
 Tsarevitch, the, 44, 45 
 Tsarina, the, 45, 47 
 
 Sadowa, 25, 89 
 Saint-Cloud, 125, 132, 137 
 Saint-Denis, 139, 267 
 Saint-Germain, 128, 129, 180; Fau- 
 bourg, 142, 144 
 Saint-Marc Girardin, M., 221, 257, 
 
 259, 260 
 Saint-Pelagie, 147 
 Saint-Petersburg, 21, 23, 32, 33, 44, 
 
 46, 53, 54, 59, 100, 246 ; Winter 
 
 Palace at, 38 
 Saint- Vallier, Count, 191, 192, 312, 
 
 313, 315 
 Sanson, General, 129, 142 
 Sa6ne, the, 55, 56 ; Haute-, 55, 156, 
 
 182 
 Satory, camp of, 125, 133, 144, 180, 
 
 181 
 Savoy, 107 ; dynasty of, 306 
 Saxony, 24, 40 
 Schouwalow, Count, 272 
 Sedan, 93, 128, 177, 229 
 Seine, the, 67, 72, 83, 123, 124, 126, 
 
 133, 155, 265, 267; Prefecture 
 
 of, 303 
 Sella, Signor, 54 
 Senard, M., 53, 54, 56 
 Senate, the, 75 
 
384 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Sevres, 67, 94 ; bridge of, 67, 72, 88, 
 
 94 ; outposts, 69 
 Silesia, Silesians, 32, 230, 243 ; fron- 
 tier, 26 
 Simon, M. Jules, 67, 118, 119, 124-6, 
 
 175, 188, 325, 326 
 Spain, Spaniards, Spanish, 271, 306 
 Garlists, 307 
 
 Government, Bepublioan, the, 307 
 King Amadeus, 306, 307 
 Strassburg, 36-8, 49, 80; army of, 
 
 19 ; capitulation of, 38 
 Stuttgard, 33 
 
 Switzerland, Swiss, 52, 55, 101, 111, 
 113, 119, 178, 183, 278 
 
 Tann, General Baron von der, 62, 66, 
 
 73,99 
 Teisserenc de Bort, M., 200, 260, 273 
 Thiers, Madame, 41, 73 
 Thiers, M., 31, 50, 58, 64, 72, 215, 
 218, 221, 329 
 Government of, 188, 197 
 Message to the Assembly, 281-92, 
 
 296, 299, 302 
 Thile, von, 249 
 Times, The, 7 
 Tissot, M., 7, 8 
 Toul, 36, 316 
 Toulouse, 74, 136, 266 
 Tours, 23, 48, 51, 57, 59, 60, 63, 
 66, 68, 69, 73, 85, 97, 99, 100, 
 155, 232, 266 
 Archbishop of, 23 ; palace of, at, 
 
 23, 61 
 Delegation de, 51, 56, 59, 60, 61, 
 70,98 
 Trocadero, the, 142 
 Trochu, General, 67, 70, 95, 105, 220, 
 
 248 
 Trouville, 264, 265, 267, 268, 270, 
 272-5, 277 
 
 Tsarkoe Selo, 33, 38, 41, 44, 47 
 Tuilleries, the, 145; Court of, 31, 
 
 34 
 Turin, 24, 55 
 Turkey, 119 
 
 Valaze, General, 129, 154 
 
 Vanves, 132, 133, 137, 139 
 
 Vauban, 201 ; Dime-Royale of, 201 
 
 Verdun, 36, 113, 266, 316, 317 
 
 Verona, 24, 25 
 
 Versailles, 50, 62, 66, 72, 85, 91, 97- 
 9, 100, 102, 104, 108, 115, 117, 
 119, 121, 122, 124-9, 136, 139- 
 44, 148, 151, 155, 157, 158, 180, 
 191-3, 197, 218, 220, 223-6, 
 232, 234, 238, 245, 251, 266, 305, 
 323, 327, 328 
 Chateau de, 144, 148 
 German Staff Office at, 66 
 Peace Preliminaries signed at, 157 
 Treaty of, 175 
 
 Vienna, 24, 26, 28, 31, 33, 51, 53 ; 
 French Legation at, 24 ; Hdtel 
 Cours d'Autriche, 24 
 
 Villeneuve-l'Etang, 127 
 
 Vincennes, 180, 181, 268 
 
 Vinoy, General, 122-7, 130, 131, 
 133, 137, 138, 141 
 
 Visconti-Venosta, Marquis, 53, 54, 
 306 
 
 Vitet, M., 172, 173, 257, 260 
 
 Waddington, M., 327, 331 
 War Expenditure, Table of, 159 
 Warsaw, 32, 33, 51 
 Winterfeldt, Herr von, 67, 72 
 Wittgenstein, Prince, 66 
 Wolowski, M., 200, 202 
 Wiirtemberg, 78, 246 
 
 Zorilla, M., 306 
 
 UNWIN BROTHERS, LIMITED, THE GRE8HAM PRESS, WOKING AND LONDON