be 19 00 BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME PROM THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND THE GIFT OF Stlenirg m. Sage 1S91 Cornell University Library DC 242.H81 1900 Waterloo :a narrative and a criticism /b 3 1924 024 320 115 The original of tliis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31 9240243201 1 5 WATERLOO WATERLOO A NARRATIVE AND A CRITICISM BY E. L. S. HORSBURGH, B.A. queen's college, oxon. aXV ^ TOL fxkv ravra deujv iv yowaffL /ceirat SECOND EDITION METHUEN & CO. 36 ESSEX STREET W. C. LONDON I 900 J) PREFACE. I MADE an attempt a year or two ago to put before an audience at the Royal Institution a narrative of the Campaign of 1815, together with an abstract of the volume of evidence which eighty years has accumulated around the events of the four days over which it extended. It was then suggested to me that the expansion of my lectures with a view to publication might serve a useful purpose, notwithstanding the fact that the literature upon the subject which already exists would fill a good- sized library. The works of Charras, Clausewitz, Siborne, Chesney, Ropes, and many others, are well known to all students of military history, but owing either to their length or to their severe and technical style, they are but little read by the general public. The present volume, based upon a close study extending over many years of all the available authorities, claims, within a reason- able compass, to present the conclusions of experts upon controversial points, to suggest solutions to problems about which experts are in conflict, and to give a concise and faithful narrative of events. I have to thank Captain H. de Gruchy of Oswestry, Salop, for the opportunity so kindly VI PREFACE afiforded me of examining several interesting pg-pers and pamphlets from the pen of Marshal Grouchy, many of which were presented to Captain de Gruchy's father by the Marshal him- self. Among these documents, however, there was none not already known to critics of the campaign. Amid the mass of conflicting evidence and diversity of view which surrounds and obscures the subject I have endeavoured to pick an independ- ent path, and have, it is hoped, supported every statement of an opinion by abundant evidence drawn from the official records and from the best English and foreign treatises. Two years ago, when the substance of these pages was delivered in the form of lectures, none of the three brilliant soldiers — Lord Wolseley, Lord Roberts, and Sir Evelyn Wood — had yet begun to publish those remarks upon the campaign which have recently appeared in the Pall Mall Magazine. I should have hesitated before presum- ing to undertake a subject which had already engaged the attention of such authorities upon the art of war, but when once undertaken, there was no option but to proceed with it. Moreover, the appearance of the Pall Mall Magazine articles has not perhaps rendered such a little book as this entirely superfluous. All students of Waterloo must find pleasure in acknowledging the value of Col. Maurice's work upon the campaign. His articles in the United PREFACE vii Service Magazine are by far the most scholarly contributions to the subject made by an English- man in recent times. It was the dictum of one of Oxford's most brilliant scholars and critics — the late Thomas Clayton, dear to The Spectator, and still living in the affectionate memory of his friends — that " every gentleman should know at least one campaign by heart." This was his epigrammatic way of com- mending the study of military history to his friends. It is a study which presents to the student all the charm which an abstruse problem offers to the mathematician, a new force to the scientist, a disputed text to the scholar. There is undoubtedly a disposition among English people to-day to know all that is to be known about the final overthrow of England's greatest antagonist, and it is with the view of at once gratifying and stimulating the very legitimate curiosity which exists about Waterloo that the following pages have been written. E. L. S. H. June, 1895, NOTE TO SECOND EDITION In this new edition errors have been corrected, a note has been added as an Appendix, in which I abandon the theory that Wellington personally- interviewed Blucher on the night of June 17th, and an Index has been compiled. I have to acknowledge the kindness of many correspondents who have supplied me with valuable suggestions as well as with many corrections as to small points of detail. More especially I would acknow. ledge the assistance I have received from the late Mr Ropes of Boston, U.S.A., whose elaborate study of Waterloo still holds the field among English authorities ; from Mr Archibald Forbes on the matter of Wellington's ride to Wavre; from the Rev. Canon Evans of Poole; and from General Sir John Coxe, K.C.B., whose remarks upon technical points of strategy and tactics have been of great value. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. TAGE INTRODUCTORY . . . . . . I-IO CHAPTER II. I. Character and strength of the French, Prussian, and Anglo- Dutch armies. — II. Remarks on their commanders and their subordinates . . . .11-24 CHAPTER III. THE SCHEME OF OPERATIONS . . . 25-30 CHAPTER IV. I. Napoleon's order of movement and the passage of the Sambre. — II. The Prussian dispositions. Zieten's corps retrogrades on Fleurus. — III. Wellington's dis- positions in view of the French advance. — IV. Further progress of the French left and centre. — V. Ney and the occupation of Quatre Bras. — VI. Concentration of the Anglo-Dutch Army. — VII. Summary . . 31-49 CHAPTER V. THE MORNING OF JUNE i6tH. I. Wellington and his army on the morning of the 1 6th j his statements to BlUcher ; their value. — II. Blilcher's stand at Ligny. — III. Advance of the French right on Ligny. — IV. Attitude and conduct of Ney on the morning of the l6th, — V. Ney's dispositions before Quatre Bras. — X CONTENTS PAGE VI. Napoleon on the morning of the i6th ; his general plan of campaign as distinguished from his particular plan for the day ; modiiication of his morning plan to suit the circumstances of the afternoon. — VII. Respec- tive dispositions of Blilcher and Napoleon for the battle of Ligny ; Napoleon's plan of battle ; positions and numbers of the forces engaged .... 50-84 CHAPTER VI. THE BATTLES OF THE i6TH. I. The Battle of Ligny.— II. The Battle of Quatre Bras.— III. Napoleon's delay in beginning battle. — IV. The D'Erlon Episode. — V. Summary , . . 85-114 CHAPTER VII. THE I7TH OF JUNE — (WELLINGTON AND NAPOLEON). I. The Line of Bliicher's Retreat. — 11. Wellington's deter- mination to Retreat. — III. Position of the French Army on the morning of the 17th ; delay at Quatre Eras and on the Right. —IV. The Retreat on Waterloo.— V. The position at Waterloo ; Wellington's dispositions. VI. Views and expectations of Wellington in standing at Waterloo.— VII. Anticipations of Napoleon in taking position. — VIII. Summary . . , ■ 115-143 CHAPTER VIII. GROUCHY'S march on THE 17TH AND i8tH OF JUNE, HP TO THE OPENING OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. I. Grouchy despatched in pursuit of the Prussians.— II. Arrangements and instructions which governed his march.— III. Grouchy at Gembloux ; the two versions of the 10 P.M. despatch.— IV. Grouchy's determination to advance on Wavre.— V. The sound of the Cannonade at Waterloo — VI. General criticisms and observations on Grouchy's movements . , . 144-175 CONTENTS xi CHAPTER IX. THE MORNING OF THB BATTLE. PAOZ I. Napoleon's Formation in Order of Battle on the l8th. — II. Wellington's Formation. — III. Analysis of the Duke's Force and Position. — IV. Delay in beginning the Battle. — V. Napoleon's Despatch to Grouchy before the Battle. — VI. Prussian Movements on the Morning of the i8th ..... 176-196 CHAPTER X. THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. I. Napoleon's general plan and the attack on Ho\igomont. — II. D'Erlon's infantry attack. — III. First appearance of the Prussians at St Lambert. — IV. Observations on Napoleon's conduct of the battle and on the diificulties of ascertaining the facts. — V. The attack on La Haie Sainte. — VI. Cavalry charges on the British right and centre. — VII. The battle with the Prussians around Planchenoit. — VIII. The charge of the Imperial Guard. — IX. Wellington's advance and rout of the French. — X. LoTJau at Planchenoit protects the line of retreat for the main army. — XI. Pursuit of the French by the Prussians ..... 197-245 CHAPTER XI. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. (FRENCH SIDE.) Napoleon's delay in beginning the battle. — II. His methods of attack at Hougomont and La Haie Sainte. III. D'Erlon's formation in columns of attack. — IV. Ney's employment of the cavalry. — V. The expediency xii CONTENTS PAGE of retreat at various periods of the battle.— VI. The attack by the Imperial Guard. -VII. Napoleon's physi- cal condition at Waterloo.— VIII. Napoleon's generals at Waterloo 246-272 CHAPTER XII. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. (WELLINGTON AND BLUCHER.) I. Wellington's Defence.— II. Colville's Division at Hal.— III. BlUcher's Co-operation ; could it have been earlier or more effective ? . . . • 273-289 CHAPTER XIII. THE FOREIGN TROOPS WITH WELLINGTON AT WATERLOO. I. The King's German Legion.— II. The Hanoverians.— III. Brunswick Contingent— IV. The Dutch-Belgians 290-302 CHAPTER XIV. GROUCHY AT WAVRE. Grouchy follows the Prussians to Wavre — Receipt of Na- poleon's 10 A.M. despatch — Grouchy confirmed in his design of attacking the Prussians — Prussian dispositions at Wavre — The battle at Wavre on the 1 8th — Receipt of Napoleon's I P.M. despatch — Its effect on Gtouchy's dispositions — Early morning of the 19th — Thielemann's determination to attack — Success of the French on the 19th — Grouchy receives the news of Waterloo — Deter- mination to retreat on Namur — Grouchy's conduct of the retreat — Conclusion .... 303-310 Appendix ...... 311-312 Index ...... 313-324 CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY. The reappearance of Napoleon in the early spring of 1815 was to all Europe as if the Devil were unchained. It is indeed as the Arch-Fiend, in various aspects, that he is presented to us in numerous contemporary caricatures. Few things are more extraordinary than that concentration of European hatred which, in the early part of this century, was focussed upon a single individual. The passions he had roused, the fear and detestation with which he was regarded, had accomplished the apparently impossible. They had brought about, if only for a moment, a real European union. The eighteenth century is strewn with the remains of Definitive Treaties, Leagues, and Sanctions. The incurable jealousies among the great powers had played Napoleon's game in 1805, in 1806, and in 1809 no less effectually than his own victories, but the European union which a century had failed to effect was accomplished by five years of Napoleonic domination. The coalition of 18 14 marched against one man, to the cry of " War to the Emperor, peace to the nation." The methods of the French Revolution had taught 2 WATERLOO the crowned heads of Europe the value of specious cries, and "Peace to the cottage, war to the palace," was now parodied against its authors. But the coalition of 1814 was not merely an as- sociation of crowned heads and governments. It was a coalition of peoples. It had been the peculiar work of the French Revolution to rouse the spirit of nationality in Europe. " The Genius of Freedom," which Goldsmith had seen in 17s S "entering France in disguise," had seized upon the French people. From France it pene- trated far and wide, and everj^where, in the early flush of revolutionary enthusiasm, the French were received as deliverers, carrying to down-trodden and oppressed peoples the unknown blessings of "Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality." Fired at first by genuine sym- pathy for the oppressed, the French were nearly as good as their watch-words; but human nature is stronger than watchwords, and aggrandisement, if it be easy, is irresistible. Napoleon was not the author of the infamous policy which enslaved nations while pretending to liberate them, but he was an apt pupil in that school. In his treatment of Venice in 1797 he bettered his teachers, though later he far outdid his own early efforts by his policy in Northern Italy, in the German States, and in Spain. Such a policy brings with it its own retribution. " Quisque suos patimur manes',' and the spirit of nationality, once invoked, can hardly be allayed. INTRODUCTORY 3 In Napoleon we see the victim of poetic justice, a conqueror conquered by the weapons he had him- self thrust into his enemies' hands. The familiar name given to the battle of Leipsic — " The Battle of the Nations " — is not only a commentary upon some of the most important aspects of the French Revolution, — it also expresses the net result of Napoleon's career. The European unity which Napoleon's own mistakes had produced was not, however, proof against success. To overthrow Napoleon was its only object, but that accomplished, forthwith the old international jealousies reappear. After Napoleon's first abdication the Congress of Vienna had to reconstruct Europe. Each power had its own separate interests to secure ; each feared the aggrandisement of the other. The epigram of Talleyrand — "Le Congrfes danse, mais ne s'avance pas" — points to the fate of coalitions when their main purpose has been effected. No sooner did the Congress get to business than it got to quarrelling, and it seemed as if open hostilities between the negotiating powers could scarcely be averted. It was at this moment that Napoleon landed from Elba, and the reappearance of the common danger drew the coalition to- gether again in order to avert it. It is beyond the purpose of this investigation to relate the personal or political details pf this adventurous quest — how a majority of the French people acquiesced in Napoleon's reinstatement — 4 WATERLOO how the army rushed to his standard — how the generals who had been sent against him rallied to his cause — how the Bourbon King, Louis XVIII., so newly established, fled to Belgium — how, in three weeks from the time of landing, Napoleon was once more in possession of the Tuileries. The fact was that the Bourbons "had learned nothing and had forgotten nothing." They thought that to put back the hands of the clock was to put back the march of time, that to ignore the Revolution and all the new forces and ideas which it had stirred up was to make it as though it had never been. Thus the Bourbon princes, Louis XVIII. and Charles of Artois, were utterly out of touch with the new lines of thought which twenty years of Revolu- tion had established, utterly behind the times which they were called upon to control. More- over, Louis XVIII., disguise it how he might, was a foreign-made Sovereign. He was imposed upon France, not freely chosen of the French people. In the nature of things there could be little sympathy between the France of 1 8 14 and a Bourbon of 1789; while equally in the nature of things, Napoleon, so long as he lived, could scarcely fail to have a strong hold on France. In spite of the conscription, in spite of the heavy weight of his taxation, in spite of the blood and treasure which he squandered, France could not forget that in her hour of turmoil it was Napoleon INTRODUCTORY 5 who had given her what she chiefly needed — repose ; that it was Napoleon who, in the great years of European war, had given her what she chiefly craved — glory. He also brought to the situation a prestige with which no Bourbon could vie ; with his personality was associated the splendour of continued victories and of territorial aggrandisement ; to him attached the recollection that, while he ruled, France had gained a position of preponderance in Europe such as she had never known under any Bourbon — not even under Louis XIV. Though it was perhaps natural that the Bour- bons should fly and that Napoleon should be received, yet the real difficulty was to maintain permanently the position thus easily acquired. Looking at Napoleon's chances, it may perhaps be said that they were desperate from the outset He found himself confronted once more by Europe in arms. Unity succeeded discord in the councils of the Congress of Vienna, An Anglo-Dutch army of over 100,000 men was already in Belgium, co-operating with a Prussian army even larger. Of the great powers, Russia, Austria, Spain, of the lesser powers, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, and the minor German States required but a short period to enable them to put armies into the field pro- portionate to their European status. In course of time Napoleon would have to reckon with about three-quarters of a million of men, irrespective of those already arrayed against him. 6 WATERLOO His first step, therefore, after his re-establish- ment, was to negotiate for peace. "A noble arena," he declares in his letter to the allied Powers, " is now opened to sovereigns. I will be the first to descend into it. After having exhibited to the world the spectacle of great combating, it will be sweeter henceforth to exhibit no other rivalry but that of the advantages of peace, no other strife but that of the felicity of nations." Such negotiations, however, were hollow to the core. No one can have been more convinced of their futility than the Emperor himself Europe had already sufficient experience of what Napoleon, firmly seated upon the Imperial throne, meant for her ; she was already sufficiently versed in the value of Napoleonic assurances. Apart from this, Napoleon's hold over France had always been based upon military success. A continued series of great military achievements had alone main- tained him even in his season of unlimited power ; it was impossible to maintain a position intrinsi- cally weaker without victories even greater than those of the past. Yet as a move in the game of politics his pacific negotiations were shrewd and strengthening. Their rejection seemed to throw the onus of the renewal of hostilities off his shoulders on to those of the allies, and he was able to pose as the defender of the Liberties of France against the foreign enemies who would dictate to her both a policy and a king. It is from 1814 and 18 IS that the Napoleonic legend dates. The INTRODUCTORY 7 hopes which the French people so long con- tinued to entertain of the Imperial house, the easy confidence with which they permitted themselves to be gulled in 1851, alike take their origin from the days when Napoleon the Great put off the rdle of conqueror for that of « Liberator." The issue then could be decided only by war, and the question for Napoleon was whether the ensuing campaign should be conducted on offen- sive or defensive principles. Though his military career had been mainly an offensive one, yet the campaigns of 18 14, which closed it, had dis- played him as a master of defensive tactics. A definite invasion of French territory by hostile forces presented certain political advantages were he to permit such an invasion to take place. It might be possible thereby to rouse the national spirit of France in a way that would recall the days of '92 and '93. The cry of " La Patrie en danger " might work the same wonders as it had worked then, and delay would offer further facili- ties to his talents as a diplomatist. Napoleon did not forget that he was the son-in-law of the Emperor of Austria, and he perhaps imagined that Austria would show the same tardiness to combine against him as she had shown in 1813. With delay the European coalition might break up — in any case he might foment the jealousies, conflict- ing interests, and mutual fears of the Powers which had played his game in the past, and 8 WATERLOO might play it now. Was it wise to precipitate hostilities when so much might be gained by evading them ? But, on the other hand, delay, whatever its ad- vantages, was impossible. The odds against him were so enormous that his only hope of reducing them lay in promptly defeating his enemies seriatim and at once. It is doubtful if France would have submitted herself voluntarily to another invasion. To test her endurance again was to court a second fall, while prompt success in offensive operations would render her attach- ment to the Imperial cause doubly secure. If startling victories could be gained at the outset over enemies already in the field, the effect upon enemies not yet in the field might be incalculable. If only England and Prussia could be routed, it was at least doubtful whether Austria and Russia would continue the contest. In estimating the military position of Napoleon and the allies respectively, just before the Waterloo Campaign began, it is evident that, however for- midable in appearance were the forces already in the field to oppose him, there were on the other hand many chances in his favour against them. War waged by armies acting in combination can never present that unity of action and singleness of purpose which a sole commander can bring to bear upon the conduct of his operations. And yet never in warfare are unity of action and singleness of purpose more essential than in the INTRODUCTORY 9 direction of a combined movement, such as Wellington and Blucher had agreed upon. Napoleon was one, and uncontrolled. All the resources of France could be moved by the absolute power of his single will, and his army, however inferior in numbers, was infinitely more coherent than the armies opposed to him. Napoleon was a keen student of the campaigns of Frederick the Great, and doubtless had before his mind that crisis in the Seven Years' War, when his master in the military art was con- fronted by a situation not dissimilar to his own. Just as supreme military genius, acting alone, had gained the advantage then over a cumbrous and ill-assorted coalition, so genius now, equally unimpeded, might secure similar results. Thus a determination to adopt offensive tactics might prove decisive of the issue. While Napoleon's main plan and its general details would be preconceived, prearranged, and certain, the operations of the allied commanders must depend on his movements. While it might be rash for them to concentrate in expectation of attack on any given point, it might on the other hand be fatal not to do so. There was no cer- tainty that, take what step they might, it would not be fraught with disaster. Moreover, the allied lines of communication offered so many alter- native points of attack, each holding out such solid advantages to an enemy, that the element of uncertainty must be regarded as an important lO WATERLOO factor in the situation, a factor undoubtedly operat- ing in favour of Napoleon. It was, therefore, with good hopes of success that Napoleon resolved upon an offensive campaign. Having spent two months in reorganising the military forces of the country, and having posted all his available troops in convenient positions on the Belgian frontier, on June I2th he left Paris to conduct in person the campaign of Waterloo. CHAPTER II, I. Character and strength of the French, Prussian, and Anglo- Dutch armies. — II. Remarks on their commanders and their subordinates. Of the three armies in the field on the 15th June 1 81 5, the French was unquestionably superior to that of either Wellington or Blucher. The superiority consisted not so much in numerical force as in the quality of the troops. The first step towards a proper comprehension of the campaign is to know the respective efficiency of the troops engaged in it, and for this purpose an examination of the composition of the three armies must necessarily preface an account of the work which they were called upon to perform. I. — The French Army. Napoleon brought to the field* five corps of infantry, four cavalry corps, and the Imperial • 1st Corps. D'Erlon, 19,939 2nd Corps. Reille, .... 24,361 3rd Corps. Vandamme, . 19,160 4th Corps. Gerard, . . . 16,000 6th Corps. Lobau, 10,465 Imperial Guard, .... 20,884 1st, 2nd, 3rdi 4th Cavalry Corps. Grouchy, 13,784 Miscellaneous, .... 3,500 These are Charras' figures. Gourgaud says, 115,500. 128,093 12 WATERLOO Guard, making a total of rather more than 128,000 men, with 344 guns. Little complaint could be made as to the quality of these troops. It is true that, during Napoleon's absence in Elba, the army was undergoing a process of reorganisation, and that Napoleon himself had occupied the brief period since his return in moulding this work of re- construction to his own advantage. The army, therefore, was to some extent in a transition state, and had other circumstances rendered such a course possible, Napoleon would doubt- less have delayed the campaign until this work of reorganisation was completed. But while admitting that Napoleon had commanded better armies than this one, on the whole he must have regarded himself as fortunate in being able to collect so numerous a force, and of such excellent quality. The Peace had brought back into France a large body of veterans who had been confined in the various prisons of Europe, and it was of these that Napoleon's Waterloo army was largely composed. In all the ranks there was scarcely a man who had not served before. The troops were well-trained, well-tried, and efficient. But the value of troops is in a large measure dependent on the officers who command them. Napoleon himself was commander-in-chief. The advantage which his presence in the field gave to his side has been variously calculated. A contemporary estimated his absence as worth THE FRENCH ARMY 13 40,000 men to his opponents, and with this estimate the Duke of Wellington agreed. "Yes,"* said the Duke, "Bonaparte was certainly the best of them all, and with his prestige, worth 40,000 men." Certainly his personal presence was of immense value, though perhaps not to be exactly calculated in round numbers. It is often said that Napoleon was not himself at Waterloo — that physical in- capacity made it impossible for him to exhibit his true qualities as a leader, and it is undoubted that he had become increasingly subject to strange fits of lassitude and depression, which seized him even in the heat and excitement of an engage- ment. This is a matter deserving of attention, and further reference will in due course be made to it, but the rapidity, readiness, skill, and resource which he displayed throughout the campaign, give conclusive proof that when his strange malady was not actually upon him, his eye was not dim, nor his natural force abated. Of his lieutenants, Ney, Duke of Elchingen and Prince of Moskowa, played by far the most active part throughout the campaign, but Ney only joined the army on the 1 5th June, when the advance on Belgium had already begun. He was therefore strange to his command and to his subordinates, and was, moreover, lamentably deficient in staff- officers. Considering the importance of the posi- tion allotted to Ney — he was given the command * The Croker Fapeis, edited by Louis Jennings, M.P., iii. 276. 14 WATERLOO of the left wing — disadvantages more trifling than these were capable of exercising an important in- fluence upon the conduct of the campaign. Far more serious, however, was a certain want of harmony between the views of Ney and Napoleon as the campaign proceeded. Each commanded throughout the i6th and during part of the 17th June an independent force acting in combination with the other. Perfect unity of plan, perfect harmony of mind, should have existed between the commanders. This was not the case, and despite the personal bravery repeatedly displayed by Ney, even to the point of reckless- ness, a considerable share of Napoleon's failure must be laid at his door. Napoleon's chief of the staff was Soult, Duke of Dalmatia. It is odd to find in this position a man who for years had held independent command. In the Peninsula Soult had been Napoleon's second self, and had frequently met the Duke of Wellington on equal terms of com- mand. But whatever his skill as a responsible leader, in his new position as chief of the staff he failed to display that activity and capacity which might have been expected of him. Davoust, who had been for so many years Napoleon's lieutenant in North Germany, was a man of great initiative, skill, vigour, and re- solution. He was probably a better soldier than either Soult or Ney. Napoleon, however, refused to avail himself of Davoust's services on this THE FRENCH ARMY 15 campaign, for he considered it essential to leave as Governor of Paris, during his absence, a man of tried capacity in civil as well as military affairs. It may well be doubted if this decision was a wise one, for on many occasions during these momentous days, the dominating force and energy of Davoust might have been exhibited to the lasting advantage of the Imperial cause. Not only was Davoust absent, but Napoleon was further weakened by the loss of Berthier, his former well-tried chief of the staff, who had now joined his fortunes to those of Louis XVIII., and of Marshal Mortier, the Commander of the Imperial Guard, who was seized with illness as the campaign opened. Lannes was dead. Massdna, gorged with wealth, thought only of preserving it, and his cautious trimming between the Bourbons and the Empire was rewarded by the undisguised mistrust of both. Murat was at Naples. It must be admitted that more perhaps depended on Napoleon's personal activity and control than was usual in his campaigns, for he was wont to rely upon his lieutenants not merely for obedience, but for co-operation — for an intelligent insight into the full meaning of his plans — and co- operation such as this was not forthcoming in the Waterloo Campaign. In command of the cavalry, and very shortly to be raised to the more responsible position of commander of the right wing, was the Comte de Grouchy, Marshal of France, a man whom an evil 1 6 WATERLOO destiny has doomed to be regarded as the scape- goat of the campaign, the author of all the disaster which brought it to a close. Grouchy could boast of thirty-five years' service in the cause of France. Appointed second lieutenant in the regiment La Fhre in 1780, when he was only fourteen years old, he was a captain four years later, and for the three years immediately preceding the Revolution he held a commission in the " Gardes du Corps " of the king. On the outbreak of the Revolution he gave immediate evidence of his political sympathies by resigning his post in the King's Guards and taking service in the army as newly organised by the Constituent Assembly. When the monarchy was overthrown. Grouchy served the Republic, and when, by a decree of the Convention, nobles were excluded from holding commissions in the Republi- can armies, he at once enlisted in the ranks, de- claring with much spirit that he could not be debarred from shedding his blood, as a private soldier, in the interests of his country. The reaction which followed the death of Robespierne proved favourable to Grouchy, and he was restored to his command, being gazetted General of division at the same time as Mass^na, Soult, and Moreau. In the wars of La Vendue he rendered conspicuous services against Stoflflet and Charette, and being here associated with General Hoche, Grouchy from the first conceived an unbounded admiration for the personal and military qualities of that best servant THE FRENCH ARMY 17 of the Republic. As second in command under Hoche he played an important part in the expedition to Ireland in 1796, and it was certainly through no fault of his that that enterprise had so grotesque and disastrous an issue for France. He watched the rise of Napoleon with suspicion, and was not included in the list of officers who accompanied the Egyptian expedition of 1798. He was thus available for service against the Austrians in Italy, where, as second in command to Joubert, he exhibited considerable talent both in the field of diplomacy and of war. At Novi he fought desperately, was badly wounded and made prisoner, nor did he return to France until after Marengo had been won by Napoleon, now first Consul of France. Profoundly suspicious of the Napoleonic dispensation, he had even from his place of captivity protested against the coup a!Hat of Brumaire, which he regarded as the enslave- ment of the Republic. Upon his return to France he attached himself as firmly to Moreau as he had previously attached himself to Hoche. But notwithstanding his distrust of the Consular system, his undoubted military capacity secured him the position of Inspector-General of Cavalry, and from this time Napoleon, though regard- ing Grouchy's political principles with suspicion and dislike, never failed to find him high employ- ment in his successive campaigns. He was at Ulm in 1805. He commanded the cavalry at J6na in 1806, he received the Grand Cross of Bavaria B 1 8 WATERLOO for his gallantry at Eylau, and the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour upon the battle- field of Friedland. In 1808 he was Governor of Madrid, and covered the retreat of the French army when King Joseph evacuated the capital, but like Talleyrand, Caulaincourt, and all far-sighted politicians, he dissented strongly from Napoleon's Spanish policy, nor did he hesitate to express the dissatisfaction which he felt. He obtained his re- call from Spain in order to serve in Italy under Prince Eugene, and his skilful manoeuvres, which brought him with his army over the Italian frontier on to the field of Wagram, secured a due recogni- tion when he was appointed Commander of the Iron Crown, Colonel-General of the Chasseurs, and a Grand Officer of the Empire. In the Russian Campaign of 1 812 he contributed to the victory of the Moskowa. He covered the retreat of the army from Moscow, holding a position of peculiar trust and dignity as commander of the " escadron sacri" that squadron in which all the private soldiers were officers of the grand army, and whose special mission it was to guard the person pf the Emperor. In 181 3 he declined the commands which Napoleon offered him, for he judged the cause of the Emperor to be now dissociated from the cause of his country, but after the disasters of that year, when he saw France threatened by invasion, he proffered his sword for the defence of the frontiers, and wels once more appointed to the command of the cavalry. In the campaign which THE PRUSSIAN ARMY 19 followed he conspicuously proved his worth, and it was in return for a series of brilliant services rendered " in other circumstances, and notably at Friedland, at Wagram, and on the plains of Champagne," that he was named Marshal of France in April 181 5. This summary of the chief events in Grouchy's military career, brief though it is, is nevertheless somewhat out of proportion to the notices con- tained in these pages of the other commanders in Napoleon's Waterloo army. But Grouchy looms so large in the history of the campaign, that a peculiar — even if misplaced — interest attaches to him. To the public, not only in England but in France, he is known by a single episode in his career, by his association with Napoleon's over- throw at Waterloo. A somewhat wider know- ledge of the man explains the conduct of Napoleon in committing to Grouchy so great a weight of responsibility in the campaign, and also enables us to form a sounder judgment as to Grouchy's own fitness for the task imposed upon him. II. — The Prussian Army. The Prussian army consisted of four * grand corps, numbering in all over 124,000 men. Of Ropes' Estimate. Chesney's Estimate. 1st Corps. Ziethen, . 32,692 About 31.000 2nd Corps. Pirch, 32.704 *» 32,000 3rd Corps. Thielemann, 24,456 i> 24,000 4th Corps. Billow, 31,102 19 30,000 Non-combatants, . 3,iao Total, . . 124,074 117,000 20 WATERLOO these nearly 12,000 were cavalry. There were 312 guns. Most of these troops had served before, and may be regarded as efficient soldiers. Some of them were animated by something of Blucher's enthusiasm against Napoleon, but some, on the other hand, had served under the Emperor in his campaigns of 181 1 and 18 12. These men had come under his spell, and their fidelity when acting against him was doubtful. As a fact, however, the Prussian army maintained its cohesion well throughout the campaign, and no dangers arose from the disaffection of any con- siderable number of the troops. The commander- in-chief. Marshal Prince Bliicher, was a dashing officer, who dated his military experience from the Seven Years' War. He had commanded against Marshal Macdonald with success at the Katzbach in 181 3, but had sustained a succes- sion of defeats on the French frontier in the campaign of 18 14. As a strategist he was defective and old-fashioned as compared with Napoleon or Wellington, but he was heartily beloved by his men, who appreciated his pluck and daring, and he was ably served by his chief of staff, Gneisenau, on whom fell much of the responsibility for the conduct of affairs. Gneisenau worked out upon the field the plans which he had developed in the study. He was the Moltke of 1815. A master of detail, he never allowed detail to master him at the expense of general principles. To him has been assigned THE ANGLO-DUTCH ARMY 21 the credit, perhaps on insufficient grounds, of the decision,* after Ligny, to conduct the retreat on a line parallel with that of the British Army — thus maintaining communications with Well- ington, though sacrificing the Prussian base at Namur, — a decision which practically decided the fate of the Campaign. The Corps Commanders were steady, sterling soldiers, who knew their duties and discharged them well — BUlow, indeed, had exercised inde- pendent command successfully at Dennewitz in 1813 — and there existed between them a spirit of co-operation and good-feeling which was to exercise important effects upon the issue of Waterloo. III. — The Anglo-Dutch Army. The Anglo-Dutch Army i" was a heterogeneous collection of British, Germans, Dutch-Belgian, Brunswick, and Hanoverian troops, all under the command-in-chief of the Duke of Wellington. * See page 117. Ropes* Estimate. t British Force, . 31,253 King's German Legion, 6,387 Chesnesr's Estimate- Prince of Hanoverians, Dutch-Belgians, Brunswickers, Nassauers, Engineers and non- 1 combatants, i IS.93S 29,214 6,808 2,880 1,240 1st Corps. Orange, 2nd Corps, Reserve. Wellington, Cavalry. Lord bridge, . Artillery and Engineers, Lord Hill, Duke of Ux- 25,000 24,000 21,000 14,000 10,000 93.7«7 94,000 22 WATERLOO The Duke called it "the worst army that had ever been got together," and indeed it was un- reliable as regards each component part. The British contingent did not include, except to a very small extent, those troops who had served with such credit in the Peninsula, for they had not yet returned from the seat of war in America. The Dutch-Belgians and Brunswickers were of doubtful loyalty, and of as doubtful value in the field. The men of the King's German Legion were iit to rank with the British contingent, but there were very few of them, and of the British contingent only a small number had served before. The army in the field numbered in all about 94,000 men, of whom 14,500 were cavalry. There were 196 guns. The burden of controlling this motley force fell solely upon the shoulders of the Duke of Wellington. He assumed all the responsibility, but his powers were absolute. His confidence in himself was great though quiet, and he neither asked for advice nor allowed it to be offered. He was of the school which holds that genius consists in the capacity for taking pains, and from the first beginning of his military career he had studied the art of war in its minutest details. "One must understand," he said, "the methanism and power of the individual soldier — then that of a company, a battalion, or brigade, and so on — before one can venture to group divisions and move an army. I believe I owe THE ANGLO-DUTCH ARMY 23 most of my success to the attenti6n I always paid to the inferior part of tactics as a regimental officer. There were few men in the army who knew those details better than I did. It is the foundation of all military knowledge." He had practised his principles of warfare in India and in the Peninsula with eminent success, and though he had never met Napoleon, he had beaten with ease all the French marshals who had been sent against him. If Napoleon's absence was equiva- lent to the loss of 40,000 men, the Duke of Wellington's presence was certainly worth much. Sir William Fraser relates a story, which is not, it is hoped, beneath the dignity of history, to illustrate the Duke's value in terms of men. A sentry in the Peninsula was keeping guard for a detachment of troops exposed in a position of great danger. The Duke unexpectedly appear- ing, the sentry cried out, "God bliss your crooked nose! I'd rather see it than 10,000 min." Possessed of the absolute confidence of the allied sovereigns, of his officers and men, and with a corresponding confidence in himself, it was certain that even with his unpromising materials the Duke would make a bold stand for victory. He was a master of defensive as Napoleon was of offensive tactics, and a contest between them under conditions favourable to the development of the highest powers of both was certain to afford a military spectacle of more than ordinary interest. 24 WATERLOO The force commanded by the Duke was, how- ever, entirely inadequate to the task of destroying Bonaparte. Nor was such a task ever assigned to it by the Allied Powers or undertaken by Wellington. The duty of defeating him lay with the two allied armies acting in combination. Just as the hopes of Napoleon lay in frustrating this combination, so the hopes of the allies were dependent upon maintaining it. Of the other commanders in the Anglo-Dutch army it is unnecessary to speak. None held any independent position of command such as that occupied by Ney or Grouchy in the French army. Their duties were to obey orders, and this, with the Duke in command, they were willing and prompt to do. No particular military capacities have ever been claimed for the Prince of Orange or for the Duke of Brunswick. Lord Hill was a sound divisional officer. Lord Uxbridge a dashing cavalry leader ; Sir Thomas Picton, though un- fortunately out of favour with the Duke in 1815, was worshipped by his men and very capable in the handling of them. CHAPTER III. THE SCHEME OF OPERATIONS. Napoleon's plan of campaign was necessarily dependent upon the positions occupied by the allied armies. The Anglo-Dutch forces lay in cantonments around Brussels, extending westward to Ghent, Oudenarde, and Tournay; southward to Nivelles and Mons. Wellington's base of supplies was Ostend, a port which offered him favourable means of communication with the fleet and with England. The Prussian base was Namur, but the cantonments of the Prussian army, extended far beyond that point — to the westward as far as Charleroi, southward to Dinant and Rochefort, and eastward to Liege. The distance from Namur to Ghent is 70 miles, from Namur to Brussels about 40 miles, from Tournay to Li^ge more than 100 miles ; and thus at the outset we are struck by the wide extent of country covered by the allied troops, and the extreme length of their lines of communication. As a consequence of this, rapid concentration in the event of a surprise or any other emergency would be difficult. A skilful and energetic opponent might force a general engagement upon 25 26 WATERLOO either or both of the allied armies before half their troops could be rallied to the field, thus affording a chance of cutting the communications on which they were dependent for any combined operations, or of defeating each in detail before any concentration in force could be effected. Moreover, in the event of such a contingency, it was probable that the defeated army would retire upon its base. Now the bases of the Anglo- Dutch and Prussian armies were divergent Every step towards Ghent and Ostend would take Wellington further away from Namur : every step towards Namur would take Blucher further away from Ghent and Ostend. Thus, in the event of defeat, there would be small chance of combining again, and the loss of combination involved the loss of the campaign. But, on the other hand, so many alternative routes, as lines of attack, were open to Napoleon, that any premature concentration on the part of the allied generals might be fatal. He might attempt to intervene between the two armies by marching direct upon Brussfels, and this was very much the course which he actually adopted, or he might attempt to sever the communications between Blucher and his base by marching towards his right or those between Wellington and his base by marching towards his left. This latter course was the one which the Duke consistently maintained to the end of his life would have been, strategically speaking, the THE SCHEME OF OPERATIONS 27 most advantageous for Napoleon to adopt. This may or may not be so, but in any event three things are clear. 1. That the allied line was dangerously extended. 2. That to concentrate within a more limited circuit of ground, until the line of attack was definitely declared, was perhaps more dangerous. 3. That the situation offered to Napoleon several alternative courses, the uncertainty as to which of them he would take being a distinct source of disadvantage to the allied generals. It has often been stated that Napoleon's plan was to separate the allied armies : it should rather be said that his object was to annihilate them in detail. The situation of Bliicher's forces, nearer by some miles to the French frontier than the army of the Duke of Wellington, rendered it probable that the Prussians would be the first to concentrate upon news of Napoleon's advance. The character of Prince Blucher rendered it probable — though by no means certain — that, once concentrated or even partially concentrated, he would fight The scattered dispositions of the Anglo-Dutch army in their cantonments rendered it improbable that they could be concentrated in any efficient force in less than two days. A strong detachment from the main French army could at any rate hold them in check, while Napoleon was disposing of the Prussians — and the Prussians once out of the way, he could then turn his uninterrupted attention upon Wellington. Thus there were very good chances 28 WATERLOO that, with secrecy and rapidity combined, Napoleon might be able to fall upon the Prussian army, with a force little inferior to it (perhaps an even greater force if the Prussian concentration was only partially effected), and cripple it severely, if not annihilate it altogether, before any support could be rendered by its Anglo-Dutch allies. If these possibilities were realised, the Prussian army would be either incapacitated for further service in the campaign or separated from its allies, for it was fairly presum- able that, if defeated, it would retreat in the direc- tion of its base, leaving Wellington's army entirely unsupported. Thus a movement direct upon Brussels by the main chauss^e from Charleroi offered to the French many advantages over the alternative lines of attack. An advance by the right or by the left, with a view of cutting off either Well- ington or Blucher from their respective bases, might undoubtedly have secured great results, but one result must inevitably have been to bring the allied armies together. Together they would have numbered nearly 23o,cx)o men, to whom Napoleon could oppose little more than half that number. Whatever advantages he might gain would quickly be recovered from him, and he would find himself compelled to accept battle, in a position probably not of his own choosing and against enormous odds, whereas his actual plan offered him a distinct prospect of engaging the allies separately with forces in each case superior or very little inferior to their own. THE SCHEME OF OPERATIONS 29 Napoleon's design, as just stated, is not quite the one with which he is commonly credited. The general supposition is that his scheme was first to separate and then to fight. We have the authority of Wellington and Bonaparte himself for stating that his scheme really was to fight first, believing that separation would naturally follow. It is true that Napoleon's line of march, straight up the Charleroi-Brussels road, seems to indicate an in- tention of getting between the armies. Hence it has been assumed that he intended to operate in the space between them, and to seize crucial points in their line of communications, but "the space intervening between two armies cannot be an object of operation. It would be very unfor- tunate if a commander like Bonaparte, having to do with an enemy of twice his strength, instead of falling upon the one half with his united force, were to light on the empty interval and thus deal a blow in the air. . . . Borfaparte chooses therefore the direction between the two armies, not in order to separate them by wedging himself between them, but because he might reasonably expect to find Blucher's force in this direction and to fall upon it, either united or in separate corps."* One further fact may be stated in support of this view of Napoleon's general idea. Had he desired to seize the crucial points in the allied line of communication with a view merely to separate them, he would, as a glance at the map will show, have seized Sombref and Quatre Bras. * Clausewitz. Dei Feldzug von 1815. Kap. 22. 30 WATERLOO Not only did he not occupy Sombref, but he took good care "above all not to occupy Sombref."* Neither was Quatre Bras occupied on the first day of the campaign (iSth June), though it would have been easy, and for other reasons very advisable, to occupy it. The essential thing was that BlUcher should fight with his communications with Well- ington open. It was probable that he could be induced to fight, for he would have hopes of being supported ; but with his communications closed, it was probable that he would withdraw, to concen- trate again in a position more favourable to com- bined operations.-f- The occupation of Sombref " would have caused the failure of all (Napoleon's) movements, for then Marshal BlUcher would have been obliged to make Wavre the place for the concentration of his army, the battle of Ligny would not have taken place, and the Prussian army would not have been obliged to give battle." The truth of Napoleon's own statements, parti- cularly after the event, is of course open to doubt, but where his subsequent statements tally with his action at the time, there is no reason for treating them with suspicion. Having now considered the numerical force, calibre, and moral of the three armies, the strategy which Napoleon determined to adopt, the position of the allies in their cantonments, and the general plan of operations which the Emperor hoped to carry out, we are able to proceed to the campaign itself. * liapoleoa. Correspondence. f ^bid. CHAPTER IV. THE ISTH OF JUNE. Napoleon's order of movement and the passage of the Sambre. — II. The Prussian dispositions. Zieten's corps retrogrades on Fleurus. — III. Wellington's dispositions in view of the French advance. — IV. Further progress of the French left and centre. — ^V. Ney and the occupation of Quatre Bras. — ^VI. Concen- tration of the Anglo-Dutch Army. — VII. Summary. Napoleon had ordered the concentration of his troops around Charleroi, and in the early days of the month of June the various corps of which his army was composed broke camp and marched to the rendezvous. By the 14th the concentration was effected skilfully, silently, and with great rapidity. Military critics are agreed as to the magnitude of this operation and the ability with which it was directed. Chesney calls the arrange- ments " simple in theory, but a mighty problem to work out in practice." It is certain that at the beginning of the campaign, at any rate, Napoleon exhibited no falling-off from his own high standard of military science. The army thus concentrated, Napoleon left Paris on the 12th, and was at Beaumont on 3« 32 WATERLOO the 14th. He now issued to the troops his famous manifesto, in which he calls upon them to remem- ber the glories of the past, the unequal odds under which at J6na and Montmirail he beat " these same Prussians, to-day so arrogant," and the horrors of the English prisons. He reminds them that the coalition is insatiable, but that like madmen, they are blinded by a moment's prosperity. If they enter France it will be but to find a tomb. Perils and hardships have to be encountered, but with constancy all will be well. "Pour tout Frangais gut a du cceur, le moment est arrive de vaincre ou de pMr." From Beaumont on the same day Napoleon issued his " order of movement," in which, with great detail, he explained the order of march for the morrow. The precise hour at which each corps was to move, the disposition of its baggage, and its situation relative to the rest, is here carefully pointed out. The 1st and 2nd corps, under D'Erlon and Reille respectively, forming the left wing of the army, were to advance, the one at 2.30 A.M., the other at 3 A.M., upon Marchienne-au-Pont and Thuin. The 3rd and 6th corps, forming the centre, were to march at 2.30 A.M. upon Charleroi. The 6th corps was to support the 3rd, while the Young Guard was to follow the movements of the 6th. The 4th corps, which constituted the right, was also ordered to advance upon Charleroi at three o'clock, thflugh, by a later order, it was to cross the THE 15TH OF JUNE 33 river at Chitelet some way to the right. It was to take care to direct its movement in line with that of the 3rd corps, so as to arrive in front of Charleroi as nearly as possible at the same time as that corps, and the Commanders of the three leading columns, Reille, Vandamme, and Gerard, with Pajol, commanding the ist Cavalry Corps, were to be in constant communication one with the other, so as to arrive before Charleroi en masse. Accordingly, in the early morning of the i Sth, the movement thus prescribed was begun. The left advanced at the appointed hour, and at Thuin fell in with the Prussian outposts. These fell back beyond Charleroi, and the bridge across the Sambre at Marchiennes was by ten o'clock in the hands of the French. The advance of the centre column was delayed and thrown into some confusion by the fact that Vandamme did not get his orders. He was to have started at 2.30 A.M., but, as a fact, he did not set out till 7 A.M. Pajol's cavalry, therefore, which was at the head of the column, found itself unsupported, and it was not until the afternoon that the error was fully rectified. This contretemps, however, did not prevent the capture of the bridge at Charleroi before noon. The right, under Gerard, moved more slowly. Its start was delayed by the fact that some of the divisions composing it had not yet been fully concentrated. When at length its march began, C 34 WATERLOO fresh confusion arose by the defection to the enemy of Bourmont, who commanded the leading division. Gerard did not, therefore, reach the river till late in the afternoon, and certainly did not cross it till evening— perhaps one half of his corps did not cross until the early morning of the i6th. But, on the whole, due allowance being made for errors in execution and for accidents, Napo- leon's order was effectively carried out upon the 15th. Before proceeding to trace the movements of the columns further we must pause to examine the positions of the allies and their movements consequent upon Napoleon's advance. II. At 2.30 A.M. on June iSth, the hour of the French advance, the allied armies were still in their cantonments. The first Prussian corps (Ziethen) was at Charleroi and beyond it at Fontaine-l'Ev^que, Marchiennes, and Thuin, and therefore was the first to come into collision with the enemy. Blucher was at Namur, and upon receipt of information that the French were in motion, he immediately gave orders for the con- centration of his army in the neighbourhood of Sombref. A glance at the map, however, will show that this concentration could not be effected completely in less than forty-eight hours, for Biilow, with the 4th corps, was at Li^ge, and the distance between Li6ge and Sombref is about THE 15TH OF JUNE 35 fifty miles. Thus Napoleon's hopes of confronting the Prussian army before it was fully collected seemed in a fair way to be realised. The 3rd corps (Thielemann), cantoned on the Meuse around Dinant, and the 2nd corps (Pirch) at Namur were equally in positions of isolation as regards Ziethen. Consequently, while concentration was in process, it rested upon Ziethen and upon Ziethen alone to resist the advance of the French army in force. Ziethen's corps consisted of less than 33,000 men, and was thus wholly inadequate for purposes of effective resistance. Its only course was to fall back, which it did, upon Sombref, thus taking up its part in the general movement for concentration. This retrograde movement by a corps in the face of an army was an operation of extreme delicacy and attended by great risks. Ziethen was equal to his responsibilities, and though, perhaps, he may be accused of some degree of negligence in not destroying the bridges at Marchiennes and Chatelet, yet in the conduct of the retreat itself he was never at fault, and his operations on this occa- sion are cited as a model for future commanders to follow under similar circumstances.* Fortune certainly favoured him materially in the failure of G6rard, with the French 4th corps, to fulfil his part in the general movement. Had Gerard come up upon Ziethen's left fiank while the centre column was pressing him in front, his orderly withdrawal would certainly have been impossible, • Sir E. Hamley. " Art of War." 36 WATERLOO and his whole corps might have been put hors de combat for the rest of the campaign. It is impossible to over-estimate, in the study of campaigns, the importance of apparently trifling details. Speculation on what might have been is, in a sense, an empty amusement, but, on the other hand, it may be legitimately indulged in for the purposes of illustration. G6rard's delay was partly due to Bourmont's defection, but it was due much more to the fact that his corps was not properly concentrated at the moment prescribed for its advance. Some of the divisions were half-a-day's march behind time. Had Gerard been properly concentrated, he might have reached the river in line with the centre column " d, la hauteur du 3"" corps" as Napoleon put it. Thus situated, he would have been in a position to fall on the flank of Ziethen's retreating force. This movement might have destroyed an entire Prussian corps, discomposed Blucher's whole scheme of concentration, and perhaps rendered the battle of Ligny impossible. Such speculations are useful if they serve to emphasise the fact that, on the loss of half-a-day's march somewhere between the 7th and 14th of June, depended the chance of destroying one-fourth of the Prussian army. Illustrations of the same essential principle in war, the importance of minute detail in the conduct of a campaign, will be multiplied in the course of this study. As it was, the concentration of the Prussian THE 15TH OF JUNE 37 army — always excepting Billow's corps — was duly effected in the neighbourhood of Sombref in the course of the 1 5th and early morning hours of the i6th of June. III. Wellington's army was also in its cantonments at the moment of the French advance. No con- centration whatever of the Anglo-Dutch troops had taken place up to the iSth, Napoleon was thus allowed to cross the river, to advance his columns, and to interpose between the allies practically without any opposition from the Anglo-Dutch army. Hence arises the story that the allied generals were taken by surprise. It has, however, already been explained that the Duke of Wellington acted upon a deliberate principle. He determined to maintain his position round Brussels, because upon Brussels the Netherlands depended. He covered a wide extent of ground by his dispositions, because he was uncertain what Napoleon's line of attack would be, and because he was desirous of being prepared for any event. Whether he was wise in his policy of delay is one matter, whether he was taken by surprise by Napoleon's rapidity is another. There is sufficient to account for delay without the theory of surprise. The Duke consistently maintained that his action was right. Critics are now almost unanimous in holding that he was wrong : "in place of waiting to see where the blow actually fell, the armies should have been instantly put in motion to assemble 38 WATERLOO Nor was this the only error. The h'ne of canton- ments occupied was greatly too extended." * The plan of combination between the two sec- tions of the allied armies was also very loosely de- fined. We have seen that from his knowledge of the man, Napoleon expected that Blucher would accept battle, even with no definite assurance of support from Wellington, and this, at Ligny, Blucher actually did.f On the other hand, it was most improbable that Wellington would stand against the French without definite assurances of support from Blucher. It is obvious that neither should have risked a decisive engagement — unless posi- tively compelled to do so — without the support of the other. And yet no agreement to this effect had been come to beforehand, and at the outset of the campaign the armies were so placed that they could not help each other even if they would. The ultimate results should not blind us to the defects of those who won the victory, and great as the Duke of Wellington's genius undoubtedly was, there is an unpleasant spice of truth — as far as this campaign, at any rate, is concerned — in Napoleon's dictum, that " La Fortune a fait plus pour lui qu'il tia fait pour elk" It was about three o'clock in the afternoon of the * Sir J. Shaw Kennedy. But, on the other hand, premature concentration on Wellington's part towards his left would exactly play Napoleon's game if he were advancing by way of Mons to cut the Duke's communications with his base of supplies. t Further detail on this point will be found in c. v. § 2, p. 57, THE 15TH OF JUNE 39 iSth that the Duke received information that the French were in movement, and had attacked Ziethen before Charleroi. This was all the news which he received up to ten o'clock in the even- ing of that day. These reports, however, led the Duke to issue a Memorandum for the movements of the army. Orders were given to concentrate the troops in certain situations, such as Ninhove, Grammont, Braine-le-Comte, Nivelles, and Enghien — all of them well to the westward of Napoleon's line of advance, while later orders, supplementary to these, definitely ordered the 3rd division of British Infantry to Nivelles, where the Prince of Orange was to have already collected his 2nd and 3rd divisions. These orders show us the Duke still doubtful whether Napoleon's attack on Charleroi was not a feint, and still maintaining his troops in such a position as to admit of ready concentration south-west of Brussels in the event of the main attack being directed towards his right. IV. In the meantime the leading French columns had pressed steadily forward beyond the river. The centre, which was under the immediate con- trol of the Emperor in person, passed through Charleroi in the afternoon, drove the Prussians from the position they had taken up at Gilly, and by night-time was bivouacked to the south of Fleurus — " maitres de toute la position de Fleurus," as the bulletin of the day states. 40 WATERLOO The progress of Gerard upon the right has already been traced, and the effects of his partial failure demonstrated. The operations of the left have been traced up to the fulfilment of Napoleon's first orders. The bridge at Marchiennes had been seized, and the Prussian outposts at that point and at Thuin driven in. Further orders were now given to Reille to cross the river, to take position on the Brussels road, and to advance on Gosselies. D'Erlon, with the ist corps, was to support him and second his operations. Later orders to D'Erlon were more emphatic, — he was to join himself to the and corps at Gosselies. These instructions Reille proceeded to obey, and it was while he was moving on Gosselies that Marshal Ney, who had arrived at Charleroi a few hours before, took command of the whole left wing, composed of the corps of Reille and D'Erlon. He promptly carried the advance still further to Frasne, driving Prince Bernard of Saxe- Weimar's brigade back to Quatre Bras, and a body of Prussians which had been stationed at Gosselies, to Fleurus. D'Erlon, however, with the ist corps, was by no means so active in executing his instruc- tions. At the moment when the 2nd corps was bivouacked at Frasne, D'Erlon, far from support- ing it, was not yet entirely across the river. In fact, there now began that system of delay, for it can be characterised by no milder term, on the part of the ist corps, which was to have THE 15TH OF JUNE 41 such a serious effect upon the operations of the next day. V. Marshal Ney, who, at the eleventh hour, was entrusted with a capital command, possessed a reputation second to none as a brilliant and daring leader. Few people recognise him under his Imperial title of Marshal " Prince of Moskowa." Everyone knows who is meant by "the bravest of the brave." It would be untrue, in view of the services which he rendered in this campaign, to say that he was half-hearted in Napoleon's cause, but certainly his adherence to it was tardy, and it is obvious from his conduct in the campaign that his reliance upon the judgment of his chief was no longer implicit. He was, moreover, under a disadvantage, from the fact that he joined the army late, and that he was deficient in staff officers, as already stated. But most of all, perhaps his reputation has suffered from the fact that the first orders he received from Napoleon at Charleroi were verbal orders, and so no authoritative documentary evidence is before us whereby we may test exactly how far he obeyed his instruc- tions and how far he disregardefl them. At the very outset of the campaign a controversy meets us upon the subject of Ney's action on the isth. It has been seen that, immediately on assuming his command, he pushed on the pursuit of the Prussians from Gosselies to Frasne, but it is con- tended that this was not enough, that Quatre Bras 42 WATERLOO was his true objective point that evening, that he had been ordered to seize it, that no difficulties in- terposed to prevent him, and that yet he refrained from carrying out his instructions. The stern fight for the possession of Quatre Bras which occupied the following day is pointed to as a com- mentary upon his negligence the evening before — an effect of wilful disobedience, a cause, or part of the cause, of subsequent disasters at Waterloo. This question takes us back to Napoleon's general plan of campaign. Quatre Bras and Sombref are the two points on the Nivelles-Namur road by which communications were maintained between the allied armies. It has been seen that to seize both these points of communication was no part of Napoleon's general plan. He indeed "took good care not to occupy Sombref," for reasons already stated. Why, then, should he desire to occupy Quatre Bras ? If the occupation of Sombref was likely to prevent Bliicher from fighting because his communication with Well- ington would be cut, logically the occupation of Quatre Bras would have had a like effect. If, in view of an engagement with the Prussians, Napoleon's only demand upon his left wing was that it should prevent Wellington from bringing assistance to Blucher, Ney, at Frasne, on the night of the 15th, was sufficiently near to Quatre Bras to ensure his occupying Wellington on the following day. If, however. Napoleon expected that Ney should not only occupy Wellington, but THE 15TH OF JUNE 43 should be able to detach a reinforcement to the assistance of the main army in the coming battle with the Prussians, the question of the occupation of Quatre Bras on the 15th assumes another aspect. Ney in possession would be in a much stronger position than Ney trying to gain posses- sion. Comparatively few troops would be suffi- cient to hold the place already won, and the surplus might then readily be detached along the Namur road in order to take the Prussians on the flank at the crisis of the morrow's battle. The advantage of such a manoeuvre might more than compensate for any possible disadvantage which the occupation of Quatre Bras might imply. If Bliicher, as a direct consequence of that occupa- tion, should determine not to fight — his logical and wisest course — then the Emperor's whole plan was dislocated ; but if he were true to his character,* he was sure to fight, if only his com- munications at Sombref were undisturbed, and in this event a French detachment marching from Quatre Bras along the Namur road would take Blucher in flank and rear at the moment when he was heavily engaged with Napoleon on his front, and thus the defeat of the Prussians would be rendered certain and decisive. The occupation of • I am unable to accept Herr Delbriick's view, expressed in his "Life of Gneisenau," and emphasised in the " Preussische Jahrbuch^ Nov. 1894, that Bl'lcher yielded unhesitating and absolute obedience to Gneisenau throughout this campaign. This view, if accepted, would oblige us to leave Bliicher's own personality entirely out of account. But Delbriick's whole article is audacious rather than conclusive. 44 WATERLOO Quatre Bras was therefore worth risking, and Ney was certainly expected to occupy it. The argu- ment thus far does little more than prove that, if there were strong reasons for not occupying the place, there were reasons equally strong for doing so. It does not help us to a decision respecting the instructions which Napoleon gave to Ney. And, indeed, to argue this point of instructions is like beating the air, for there is only one single piece of contemporary documentary evidence which is of service in guiding our views. This is the bulletin of the army for the isth June, published in the Moniteur upon the i8th June. In this bulletin it is stated amid a large mass of information as to the positions of the army, that Ney's headquarters that evening were at Quatre Bras. Here is a statement strictly official, drawn up long before any controversy was raised, and therefore entirely impartial — a paper, moreover, which is undoubtedly authentic — and which seems to be conclusive. It is inconceivable that such a statement could have been made if orders to occupy Quatre Bras that evening had not been given. All the hearsay evidence of after years, which with so much toil has been raked together for the purpose of exonerating Ney and sup- porting the facts as put forward by his family, is as nothing when compared with this one written piece. We are therefore forced to the con- clusion that Napoleon's verbal orders to Ney on the iSth were to occupy Quatre Bras, and that Ney THE 15TH OF JUNE 45 neglected to fulfil these instructions, being content that his vanguard should lie at Frasne.* Apart from the fact that it shows Ney in a hesitating and cautious mood — not entirely confi- dent in the soundness of the Emperor's judgment — the matter in truth has not that importance which has been attributed to it. So long as the position was in the hands of the French before Wellington had time to move to the support of Bliicher, it mattered little whether it were seized on the i Sth or early on the i6th. Therefore we need feel no surprise that, as far as the manoeuvres of the first day went, the Emperor was entirely satisfied. The dilatoriness of D'Erlon with the ist corps, and of G6rard with the 4th, was, of course, to be regretted, but, with this exception,! "all the Emperor's manoeuvres had succeeded in accord- ance with his wishes." VI. While the French troops were in bivouac, confidently awaiting the morrow, and resting * The argument in the text has been directed as far as possible to the question of Ney's instructions, and whether he fulfilled them or not. The argument of Clausewitz, which is very forcible, is directed to the strategy of the movement on Quatre Bras, and on strategical grounds he shows that Napoleon expected far more from Ney than the Marshal could possibly accomplish. We hava not, however, to deal at present with the abstract question as to which of the two, Napoleon or Ney, was in the right according to the theory and practice of war, but are concerned only with Ney's orders, and how far he fulfilled them. The more general bearings of the case will be discussed in the next chapteri t N. Correspondence, 46 WATERLOO after a hard day's march, in the Anglo-Dutch army all was astir, and the troops were rapidly concentrating upon the points specified in the Duke's orders. But these points — Ninhove, Grammont, Braine- le-Comte, Nivelles, Enghien, etc., were far away from Quatre Bras, which was to be assaulted next day by the French, and it was necessary, therefore, for the Duke to issue still further orders to direct his various divisions to concentrate there. Every- one knows that this concentration was effected, as far as it was effected at all, in a very straggling sort of way — that the troops were not at Quatre Bras massed to withstand the enemy at the moment when the attack began, but that some were there, and that others kept arriving all through the afternoon, until at last a very respect- able force was collected upon the field, though not amounting to much more than three-eighths of the Duke's whole available strength. These facts certainly confirm the opinion, already quoted, that the English line of cantonments was " much too extended," and they also fend to create an impression that the Duke must have delayed con- siderably in issuing those supplementary orders which resulted in a partial concentration on Quatre Bras. It is indeed difficult to fix upon the exact time when his determination so to concentrate was arrived at. There is evidence to show that all was settled, and the orders despatched, before the Duke went to the Duchess THE 15TH OF JUNE 47 of Richmond's ball that night, but if this was so, why did the troops arrive so tardily? The Duke's own words to Lord Bathurst are : " In the meantime I had directed the whole army to march on Les Quatre Bras," but this expression is very indefinite. Judging only by the way in which the troops arrived upon the field on the afternoon of the i6th, it may be strongly inferred that the Duke's orders for concentration at Quatre Bras were not issued till after he returned from the ball, shortly before leaving Brussels, between seven and eight o'clock in the morning. There are indeed two orders to Lord Hill, dated "Brussels, June i6th," which seem to contradict the assertion that the Duke had "directed the whole army to march on Les Quatre Chemins." Being dated "Brussels," they must have been written before the Duke left the city — that is, early in the morning — and they direct Lord Hill " to move the 2nd division of infantry upon Braine-le-Corhte immediately," whither the cavalry had already been ordered, and " the first division of the army of the Low Countries, and the Indian brigade ... to Enghien." Now these orders do not indicate an intention of concentrating at Quatre Bras, but are rather in harmony with the orders of the evening before, which seem to mark Nivelles as the point fixed upon in the Duke's mind. The whole matter is compli- cated by the fact that no definite orders to con- centrate at Quatre Bras are anywhere to be 48 WATERLOO found ; we have to rest upon the Duke's assertions and reports, and upon that evidence which is better even than written orders, the fact that in course of time troops to a considerable number did put in an appearance there. It is difficult, however, to escape the conviction (i) that the Duke was badly served by his intelligence de- partment on the isth, for he did not receive any but the barest news till the evening; (2) That, misconceiving Napoleon's plan, the concentration at Quatre Bras was perilously delayed, and was indeed in the nature of an after-thought, orders for concentration elsewhere having already been issued. It is certain that on the night of the iSth-i6th June, the only troops actually at Quatre Bras in position to oppose Ney were the brigade of Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, 4000 strong, and that they were there, not as a con- sequence of the Duke's orders, but in direct opposition to them, the Prince of Orange having been instructed on the iSth, "to collect his 2nd and 3rd divisions (of which Prince Bernhard's brigade" formed a part) at Nivelles " — ^a point six miles to the westward of Quatre Bras. VII. Summarising the operations of the iSth, we find— I. That Napoleon, with the French centre, had driven the ist Prussian corps before him, and THE 15TH OF JUNE 49 taken position to the south of Fleurus, ready for an engagement with Bliicher next day: that owing to accidents the centre was not supported by the right in such a manner as Napoleon had directed and hoped, but that by night-time the right was collected and in position, — that the left, under Ney, had, as far as the 2nd corps was concerned, acted with energy, driving Prince Bern- hard from Frasne, and occupying that position, though it is questionable whether Ney should not have pushed still further, and occupied Quatre Bras, — that the first corps was unaccountably slow in its progress, and entirely failed to fulfil its instructions to support and join itself to the second. 2. That three out of the four Prussian corps were in course of concentration in the neighbour- hood of Sombref, Biilow being at such a distance that he would require, reckoning from midnight of the iSth, at least twenty-four hours to join the main army. 3. That the Duke of Wellington, only hearing the news from the front in the evening, issued orders for the concentration of his army in the neighbourhood of Nivelles — only 4000 troops being at Quatre Bras, and those by accident — but that subsequent orders were issued, though copies are not forthcoming, some time in the night or early morning of the i6th, directing a concentration on Quatre Bras. CHAPTER V. THE MORNING OF JUNE i6TH. Wellington and his army on the morning of the i6tb ; his state- ments to Blttcher ; their value. — II. Blucher's stand at Ligny, — III. Advance of the French right on Ligny. — IV. Attitude and conduct of Ney on the morning of the i6th. — V, Ney's dispositions before Quatre Bras. — VI. Napoleon on the morn- ing of the i6th ; his general plan of campaign as distinguished from his particular plan for the day ; modification of his morn- ing plan to suit the circumstances of the afternoon. — VII. Respective dispositions of Blucher and Napoleon for the battle of Ligny; Napoleon's plan of battle; positions and numbers of the forces engaged. The Duke of Wellington rode out of Brussels be- tween seven and eight o'clock in the morning, but before leaving he had received from his Deputy Quarter-Master-General, Sir W. De Lancey, a Memorandum purporting to state the actual situa- tion of the army at seven o'dock A.M. Fortified with this information, the Duke rode to Waterloo, passed Picton's brigade, which was halted there, and had not yet received orders to advance, and arrived at Quatre Bras about ten o'clock. Having surveyed the position, he despatched a letter to so THE MORNING OF JUNE 16TH 51 Blucher, giving him information as to the situation of the army. " Oa the heights beyond Frasne, June 16, 1815. 10.30 a.m. "My dear Prince, — My army is situated as follows : — "The Corps d'Arm^e of the Prince of Orange has a division here and at Quatre Bras, and the rest at Nivelles. "The Reserve is in march from Waterloo to Genappe, and will arrive at noon. " The English cavalry will be at the same hour at Nivelles. " The corps of Lord Hill is at Braine-le-Comte. " I do not see much of the enemy in front of us, and I await news of Your Highness and the arrival of troops in order to decide my operations for the day. " Nothing has appeared on the side of Binche, nor upon our right. — Your very obedient servant, " Wellington." A comparison between this document and the Memorandum of Sir W. De Lancey shows that Wellington, in giving information to Blucher, de- pended almost implicitly upon the Memorandum. It becomes a matter of the first importance there- fore to see if the situation of the army really was what Sir William's "Disposition" and Wellington's letter to BlUcher stated it to be. The text of the Memorandum is therefore sub- 52 WATERLOO ioined, and notes attached to each paragraph, with a view of estimating its accuracy. (Black print denotes the document ; small print, notes.) DISPOSITION OF THE BRITISH ARMY AT SEVEN O'CLOCK a.m., i6th JUNE. 1st Division. Had arrived at or moving on Braine- le-Comte, marching to Nivelles and Quatre Bras. By the supplementary orders of the previous evening, lo P.M., June isth, the first division (Cooke's) was to move from Enghien upon Braine-le-Comte. It arrived there at 9 a.m., halted till noon, awaiting orders. Cooke, on his own respon- sibility, ordered the advance to Nivelles ; arrived there at 3 P.M. Thence ordered to Quatre Bras, a seven miles' march ; came up about 7 P.m. 2nd Division. Braine-le-Comte, marching to Nivelles. The 2nd division (Clinton) by 10 p,m. orders was to move from Ath to Enghien. These orders only arrived at 10 A.M., i6th ; division reached Enghien at 2 P.M ; Braine-le- Comte at 12 (midnight). Thus the 2nd division was no- where near Quatre Bras on the day of the battle. 3rd Division. Nivelles, marching to Quatre Bras. By the 10 p.m. orders the 3rd division (Alten) was "to contmue its movement from Braine-le-Comte upon Nivelles." It arrived at Nivelles at noon. 4th Division. Oudenarde, marching to Braine- le-Comte. The 4th division (Colville) ordered (10 p.m. orders) upon Enghien. From Brussels to Oudenarde was at least 40 miles, the orders therefore would arrive about S a.m. THE MORNING OF JUNE 16TH 53 Oudenarde to Enghien 40 miles, and on to Braine 55. This division was quite unavailable for service at Quatre Bras, and probably was not reckoned upon by the Duke for that action. 5th Division. Beyond Waterloo, marching to Genappe. The 5th division (Picton) left Brussels about 5 a.m. Waterloo is ii-miles distant. It certainly was not "march- ing to Genappe " at 7 a.m., for it did not leave Waterloo till I P.M. 6th Division. Assche, marching to Genappe and Quatre Bras. The 6th division (Cole's) was at Assche, 7 A.M. No orders for it on isth. 5th Hanoverian Brigade. Hal, marching to Genappe and Quatre Bras. This brigade (Vincke) was situated as stated. It may have been marching as stated. 4th Hanoverian Brigade. Beyond Waterloo, to Genappe and Quatre Bras. This brigade (Best) came up together with Picton's division about 3 p.m. It was at or close to Waterloo at the hour stated. 2nd Division, ) f ™y^°J f At Nivelles and 3rd Division, f Countries. I ^^^^^^ ^''aS- These divisions (Prince of Orange) were ordered, at 10 P.M. on the iSth, to collect at Nivelles. The 2nd division (Perponcher) was at Quatre Bras, but the 3rd (Chassd) only reached Nivelles about noon. 54 WATERLOO .St DWisio^ Indian) AS;"'{*'^t°2S|«S; Bngade, j countries ( Enghien. 1st Dutch-Belgians (Bylandt) and 7th Dutch-Belgians (Anthing, or the Indian Brigade), were situated as stated, and perhaps were so marching. Major-General DOrnberg's Brigade and Cum- berland Hussars, beyond Waterloo, march- ing to Genappe and Quatre Bras. These troops had been ordered on i Sth " to march upon Vilvorde, and to bivouac on the high-road near to that town." They had to come from Mons, 45 miles. They could not have reached Vilvorde, much less be "beyond Waterloo," at 7 a.m. Remainder of the Cavalry, Braine-le-Comte, marching to Nivelles and Quatre Bras. The 10 P.M. orders of the isth had directed the Cavalry on Enghien. These orders received at 6 A.M. on the i6th. At 7 A.M., therefore, these troops were still close to their cantonments at Ninhove, and did not reach Quatre Bras till the fight was over. Duke of Brunswick's Corps. Beyond Waterloo, marching to Genappe. The Duke of Brunswick's contingent arrived shortly after Picton's division to the support of Prince Bernard's Brigade at Quatre Bras. It left Brussels at 5 a.m. Nassau. Beyond Waterloo, marching to Genappe. Kruse's Nassau contingent did not arrive to take part in the action. The Nassauers engaged were a part of Prince Bernard's Brigade. Kruse's division could not have been "beyond Waterloo," therefore, at the hour mentioned. THE MORNING OF JUNE 16TH 55 It should now be clear, and reference to the maps will make it clearer still, that the Duke of Wellington's army was by no means situated as the Duke stated that it was in his letter to Blucher. Doubtless he had a right to expect that his chief-of-stafif would supply him with correct information, and to this extent he was justified in his announcements to the Prussian leader ; but, at the same time, very little reflection was required to demonstrate to him convincingly that in some particulars it was erroneous even in the case of those troops which were nearest at hand, and whose movements and position were therefore capable of the most accurate definition. To take one example only, the Duke had himself passed Picton's division at Waterloo as he rode to Quatre Bras. It was halted therfc to await orders to march either on Quatre Bras or Nivelles as the Duke, from his observations at the front, might decide. It was not moved for- ward from Waterloo till about noon. Nevertheless, the Duke informs Bliicher that at 10.30 "the Reserve (of which Picton's division was a part) " is in march from Waterloo to Genappe, where it •will arrive at noon." The same kind of criticism may be extended to most of the other statements in the Duke's letter. We can, therefore, scarcely be surprised if Gneisenau, who never cordially trusted the Duke of Wellington, believed that it was his intention deliberately to deceive the Prussians as to his ability to support them in 56 WATERLOO the coming battle in order to induce them to fight, and so hold the French in check while the Anglo- Dutch concentration was being effected.* Such a course of conduct is entirely foreign to the Duke's character, nor has any evidence, other than the Memorandum, been brought forward to support it, but it was not unnatural or improbable that such a suspicion should be entertained, especially in the mind of one not cordially disposed to the Duke. There cannot be a doubt that Wellington was himself deceived by Sir W. De Lancey's Memo- randum. Serious consequences might have followed from the mistake. The Duke himself determined to stand at Quatre Bras under the impression that a sufficiency of troops would be upon the ground in time. Had he known the real state of the case, he probably would have come to a different de- cision, for at no time during that engagement were there forces enough on the field to withstand Ney's united command, and of course Wellington could not reckon upon the accident, which, as will be seen, kept that force disunited, one-half of it being altogether unavailable for the battle. Thus, from too confident reliance upon mistaken information, the Duke ran the risk of a serious defeat at Quatre Bras ; while Bliicher, at Ligny, was induced to hope for assistance from his ally, which, in fact, it was impossible to render. In view of the charges still made by Prussian authorities against the Duke of Wellington, a * Delbruck's "Life of Gneisenau," published 1880. THE MORNING OF JUNE 16TH 57 separate section must be reserved for a more par- ticular consideration of the matter from a Prussian point of view. Having surveyed the front at Quatre Bras, Wellington rode over to Bry for the purpose of holding personal communication with Bliicher. Baron Muffling, the Prussian attach^ on the Duke's staff, and Gneisenau were present at the interview. Miiffling has given an account of what took place, and it appears that the Duke reiterated the statements of his letter. The ques- tion arose as to the support to be rendered by the Anglo-Dutch army to the Prussians in the coming engagement, and the Duke, it is said, undertook to come if he were not himself at- tacked. It is evident that he expected nothing serious from the French upon his own front, for as he left Bliicher he said, " I will overthrow what is before me at Frasne, and will direct myself on Gosselies," thus clearly indicating that he either entirely misconceived the strength of the French under Marshal Ney, or else that he was confident of finding practically his whole army at Quatre Bras upon his return from the interview. The Duke then rode back to Quatre Bras, where, upon his arrival at three o'clock, he found the battle already in progress. II. We must now trace the movements of the Prussians upon the i6th up to the time when 58 WATERLOO the battle of Ligny began, reserving the con- sideration of the engagements for a separate section. Shortly after dawn Ziethen was under orders to march, and he withdrew from Fleurus to take up position at St Amand. The 2nd corps moved up to support the ist, and occupied a position behind it Thus these two corps formed the Prussian right and centre. The 3rd corps took position later in the day, extending from Sombref to Baiatre, and formed the left of the Prussian army. These movements were on the point of completion when the Duke of Wellington came over to Bry, and they lead to the conclusion that Blucher had already determined to stand his ground, before any personal consultation with the Duke had taken place. This fact has an im- portant bearing upon another vexed question of the campaign. Did Wellington promise to sup- port Blucher in the battle of Ligny, and did Blucher fight relying upon that promise .' * There can be no doubt that help was expected, and that Wellington expected to be able to render it. The conversation which took place between him and Blucher at Bry ran chiefly upon the direction from which that help should come, and we have heard Wellington declaring his intention of overthrowing whatever was before him, and promising to come " if I am not attacked myself." But all this does not constitute evid- * See Appendix. THE MORNING OF JUNE 16TH 59 ence to prove that Bliicher would not have taken position for battle at all but for Wellington's assurance. If so, why did he not gain the assur- ance before taking position ? There is no docu- ment of either the isth or i6th conveying any such assurance. The Duke's letter of 10.30, already quoted, may have given rise to an ex- pectation of assistance, but it could have done no more. It is reasonable to suppose that after his defeat Bliicher would have alluded to Welling- ton's failure to redeem his promise, had such a pro- mise been actually made, and that he would have felt some personal resentment against Wellington as the man who had played him false and exposed him to disaster, but it is notorious that no such feelings existed in Bliicher's mjnd, and no such allusions appear in his report, The whole arrangements, in fact, were of a piece with that loose system of combination under which the allies had acted all along. They were to act together, bufe the terms of their co- operation and the methods of effecting it had never been defined. At the same time, it would appear to be ex- treme rashness on Bliicher's part to engage the enemy with one whole corps of 30,000 men absent from the field, and with no assistance to count upon from his ally, — to oppose his 80,000 men to what he supposed to be Napoleon's whole force. Bliicher was, however, of an impulsive character, apt to mistake hopes for realities, and 6o WATERLOO there is no doubt that he both expected the arrival of his missing corps in time to take part in the battle, and also some degree of assistance from the Duke of Wellington. This being so, he was perhaps justified in determining to fight rather than to retreat still further in the face of the enemy, and thus disspirit his troops at the very opening of the campaign. III. We now come to the operations of the two wings of the French army on the morning of the i6th. Dealing first with the right and centre, whose movements involve little subject for controversy, and which were under Napoleon's more immediate control, we find that upon the morning of the 1 6th, the Emperor wrote a letter from Charleroi to Marshal Grouchy, entrusting him with the command of the 3rd and 4th corps, "as com- mander of the right wing" of the army. This letter could not have been written later than eight o'clock A.M. To these troops were added the cavalry of Pajol, Milhaud, and Excelmans, and with them Grouchy is directed to advance forthwith to Sombref— the cavalry and the 3rd corps (Van- damme) leading— the 4th corps (Gerard) to follow immediately, though by a different road, in order to avoid any crowding (encombrements) at Fleurus, whither the Emperor was about to direct the Reserve. Napoleon expresses his intention of attacking the enemy if at Sombref, or even if it THE MORNING OF JUNE 16TH 61 was to be found as far back as Gembloux, in order that it might be cleared out of the way. He would then be able with no loss of time to combine his operations with those of the left wing, and be free to march on Brussels next morning, or pos- sibly the same evening. He concludes by telling Grouchy that he has no reason to expect, from reports to hand, that the Prussians will be able to oppose to him more than 40,000 men. These movements Grouchy proceeded to effect, the Emperor himself with the Guard coming up to Fleurus before one o'clock, and the left wing was promptly formed in order of battle, in accordance with Napoleon's plan of attacking the enemy wherever he should find him. The 6th corps (Lobau), numbering rather more than 10,000 men, seems to have been strangely neglected in Napoleon's orders. It had bivouacked the evening before close to Charleroi, and, indeed, was not across the river. It was allowed to remain there throughout the morning of the i6th, no orders for its advance being despatched till the battle of Ligny had actually begun. Eventually it was directed to move to the support of Napoleon, but only arrived on the field as the battle was ending, and it took no active part in the engage- ment. Thus Napoleon, apparently with delibera- tion, refused to avail himself of the services of 10,000 men, whose prompt interposition at a critical moment might have been of inestimable value. It is even stated by Charras that Lobau 62 WATERLOO was left a discretion as to which wing of the army he should follow, though eventually in- structed to attach himself to the right and centre. Several inferences maybe drawn from Napoleon's conduct in respect to this corps. Taken together with the statement to Grouchy, that the Prussians could not oppose to the French more than 40,000 men, it may be regarded as an indication that Napoleon, being deceived as to the strength of the enemy which he was about to meet, neglected to bring up Lobau because he supposed he would have no use for him, or that, as is more probable, at a moment when his whole army was engaged against the allies, the Emperor may have thought it prudent to retain a reserve of 10,000 fresh troops which he might employ as occasion should direct, in case of disaster on either wing. Further allusion will be made to this matter in discussing the battle of Ligny itself ; for the moment it is sufficient to note that throughout the morning of the i6fih the 6th corps was in bivouac near Charleroi. IV. The movements of the left wing, under Ney, now demand attention, and with them considerable con- troversy is associated. After conducting the operations of his wing until the close of the ijth, the Marshal returned to the Emperor's headquarters, where, over supper, a lengthy interview took place. Whatever inay have been the exact tenor of Napoleon's earlier THE MORNING OF JUNE 16TH 63 verbal instructions as to the occupation of Quatre Bras, there can be no doubt that Ney reported at this interview what he had actually done — that Quatre Bras had not been occupied — that only his advance columns had got as far as Frasne, and that D'Erlon was scarcely yet across the river. If Grouchy was present at this interview, this must be the occasion to which he refers when he says that he had himself heard Napoleon * " blame Ney for having suspended the movement of his troops upon the iSth, instead of keeping himself to the execution, pure and simple, of his instructions, which ordered him to march on Quatre Bras." None the less the blame, if blame there was, can- not have been very severe, nor can it have inter- rupted the friendly relations existing between Ney and his master. It may be assumed that Napoleon gave the Marshal an outline of the operations he proposed for the day which was about to dawn, for upon his departure we find Ney conferring with Reille at Gosselies, and ordering him to set out as soon as he could, and get his troops together at Frasne. This may or may not have been in con- sequence of Napoleon's instructions. No written instructions reached Ney till after 10 A.M., and it was not till an hour later that Reille actually moved forward from Gosselies, We have there- fore to consider whether, in the absence of definite written instructions, Ney was fulfilling his duty in " Observations by Grouchy on Gourgaud's Narrative (Fliila- delphia, 1818). 64 WATERLOO remaining quiescent during the early morning hours of the i6th. If, throughout this campaign, nothing more was expected from such commanders as Ney and Grouchy than a blind adherence to the letter of their instructions, then it will not be difficult to justify in the main their entire course of action ; but, as has been said. Napoleon looked to his immediate subordinates for co-operation as much as for obedience. He took them* very completely into his confidence, explained to them his hopes and projects in terms very different from those of peremptory command, and expected, and had much right to expect, as full an appreciation of the spirit as of the letter of his instructions. Assuming that a certain latitude was allowed to Ney over and beyond his formal orders, it cannot be main- tained that, even on abstract grounds, the Marshal was justified in adopting a course of inaction from sunrise until eleven o'clock A.M. For there was definite work to be done, left over from the day before, to which the instructions of the day before, in the absence of others, clearly applied, and this work was to collect the tardy corps of D'Erlon, and bring it up to the support of Reille. Here there can be no question as to orders. Every order given to D'Erlon on the day before was to the effect that he was to keep close to Reille, "vous prendrez des positions qui vous rapprocheront de Reille— pour appuyer Reille et le seconder dans ses operations — Vintention est que THE MORNING OF JUNE 16TH 65 vcyus ralliez voire corps . . . pour joindre le 2"" corps, d'apres les ordres que vous donnera M. le Marichal, prince de la Moskowa " (Ney). Nor can there be any question that these precise orders had not been carried out. We left the ist corps at Marchiennes, upon the Sambre. There it remained throughout the remainder of the i Sth, three of its divisions bivouacking on the north bank of the river, but one division, at evening time, had not yet come up, and so was not across the Sambre that day. The work of Ney, therefore, was clear. If there were no fresh instructions from the Emperor, there were the incompleted instructions of the day before to fulfil. The first communication which passed between Napoleon and Ney shows the anxiety of the former upon this very matter. He wishes to know " if the first corps has operated its movement, and what is this morning the exact position of the ist and 2nd Corps d'Arm/e." The Emperor had to learn that, far from seconding, supporting, or join- ing Reille, at 6 A.M. in the morning the whole of the 1st corps was not yet across the river, and no part of it was more than a short march in advance of Marchiennes. There is no intention here of fixing upon Ney the original backwardness of this corps. His responsibilities did not begin till five o'clock in the evening of the isth, but from that moment he was bound to use every effort to con- solidate his force, for as long as it was disunited it B 66 WATERLOO was ineffective for the full execution of the task assigned to it. At the same time it is impossible to attribute Ney's inaction to any natural dilatoriness or want of energy. We may presume that he was acting on general principles, and must look at each part of his conduct in relation to the whole. Upon the i6th, while the battle of Quatre Bras was in progress, in spite of precise instructions to the contrary, Ney proposed to keep half his available force in reserve at Frasnes. It may therefore be inferred, with very considerable probability, that throughout there was a deliberate intention on Ney's part to keep the ist corps well in the rear, in order that it might act as a reserve to his wing, ready to support him in the event of disaster to the 2nd corps. In his judgment such a course was safe and prudent. It was such a course as Napoleon himself adopted in regard to the 6th corps. We must not quarrel with Ney for having a judgment of his own. It has been specially claimed for Napoleon's generals that they were expected to co-operate with their master, not merely to obey blindly. But when Ney, on his own judgment, ventured deliberately to follow a course opposed to his instructions from head-quar- ters, it is certainly not unfair that he should be called upon to bear the responsibility for any ill effects which followed from such a determination. The first instructions of the i6th sent to Ney from head-quarters have already been alluded THE MORNING OF JUNE 16TH 67 to. They evince Napoleon's anxiety to know exactly how it stood with the ist corps. In this first letter, which arrived about 6 A.M., there is, it is true, no word about Quatre Bras, no suggestion that it is to be occupied immediately, much less any precise orders to that effect. But then in this letter there are no orders at all, , It is a letter conveying and demanding information. Ney is told that Kellermann's cavalry has been directed on his wing, and is asked for informa- tion as to the position of his own force; and the answer to the question, why no definite in- structions were given to seize Quatre Bras, is that Napoleon wanted definite information before he could issue definite instructions. Early in the morning Napoleon wrote a letter to Ney, similar in character to the letter to Grouchy already referred to. In this letter the Emperor is extremely confidential ; he details his own plans and the instructions given to Grouchy, declares his intention of attacking the enemy and clearing the road as far as Gembloux. There, according to events, he will decide upon his future course. Ney is to be ready to march on Brussels the moment Napoleon's decision has been arrived at. He may even arrive at Brussels at seven o'clock the next morning. To effect this purpose Ney is to dispose his troops in front of and around Quatre Bras, extending a division to Marbais to be in touch with the battle on the right, and these dispositions are to be so made 68 WATERLOO "that at the first order, your eight divisions can march rapidly and without obstacle to Brussels." Following immediately upon this letter came the formal orders from Soult, in which he is instructed to take position at Quatre Bras. It is clear from the tone of these orders that little resistance was looked for from the side of Brussels, and that the movements of the i6th, as far as the left wing at any rate was concerned, were expected to be as leisurely and unopposed as these of the day before. But it was not long before news reached head-quarters of the real state of the case. Soult had heard of masses of troops on the side of Quatre Bras. He therefore writes again to Ney with supplementary instructions " Reunite the corps of Counts Reille and D'Erlon, and that of the Count of Valmy (Kellermann), who is this instant starting to join you ; with these you should beat and destroy any hostile forces which may present themselves." How far Ney was from carrying out these instructions is seen in the orders of the following day. In them Soult was instructed to say, " The Emperor has seen with pain that you did not yesterday reunite the divisions. They acted in isolation, and consequently you suffered losses. If the corps of D'Erlon and Reille had acted together, not an Englishman of the force which attacked you would have escaped." Ney's first duty, therefore, on the morning of the i6th, was to hasten the progress of D'Erlon's THE MORNING OF JUNE 16TH 69 dilatory corps, and to join it to the corps of Reille, but throughout the day the two corps remained disunited, with consequences disastrous to both wings of the French army. Not only did Ney fail to consolidate his force, but he also neglected to occupy Quatre Bras early on the morning of the i6th. Admittedly, it would have been easy to occupy it at any time up to noon or one o'clock, for Ney's force, if combined, amounted to more than 40,000 men, while the ground was held only by a part of the Prince of Orange's divisions, no English reinforcements beginning to arrive till after two o'clock Various considerations may be put forward to account for this. First of all, the Marshal was assuredly unaware how small was the force in oc- cupation of Quatre Bras, for, owing to the nature of the ground, it was difficult to gain precise intelligence, or to form accurate estimates. More- over, he had not merely to reckon with the enemy actually upon the ground, but with those hostile forces which were hurrying to the scene of action. Wellington, he knew, was rapidly concentrating his army, and the French left wing was in danger of being confronted at any time by 80,000 men. Caution, therefore, was the first essential in face of such a possibility, for it was only by extreme caution that 40,000 men could manoeuvre to any advantage in face of double their numbers. In the second place, Ney's own force actually in hand was by no means so strong as it was made 70 WATERLOO to appear on paper. Not only was the ist corps far behind, but one division of the 2nd — that of Girard— had been detached from the left wing, and was operating in support of Grouchy near Fleurus. Reille's corps was thus weakened for Ney's purposes by about 5000 men, and so, instead of 40,000, he had not, in the absence of D'Erlon and Girard, 25,000 men available for an immediate advance. Again, an immediate movement on Quatre Bras would, as the map plainly shows, throw Ney con- siderably to the front of the main army ; but it was an essential principle of the general scheme of operations, that the two wings should advance simultaneously, and should keep as far as possible la mime hauteur. Hence it is urged by Clause- witz and others, that Ney was right in timing his forward movement to keep pace with that of Napoleon, and that it would have been an act of inexcusable rashness to outstrip the movement of the main army. " Ordered as he was to advance tite baissh along one road, could he tell whether, when at last he raised his head and eyes, he would not find himself outflanked by hostile columns on the right, and above all on the left, and pinned to the ground he stood on ? . . . What general has ever been asked to advance with 40,000 men along a single road into the very midst of the enemy's forces ? " * Forcible as these considerations are, they do • Feldiugvon 1815. Kap. 36, THE MORNING OF JUNE 16TH 71 not excuse Ney. The quotation from Clausewitz ends with a question which is almost in the form of a challenge. Both question and challenge are met by a reference to Ney's instructions. He was ordered to advance on and beyond Quatre Bras with the force entrusted to him, and events were soon to prove that, had he concentrated his corps, and obeyed his orders, he would not have had to face these problematical dangers. When, as has been said, he assumed the right to an independent judgment, he assumed the responsibility for its consequences, and if those consequences were dis- astrous, the blame must in justice fall upon him. The formal instructions to Marshal Ney, to which allusions have been made, were as follows : — "Charleroi, i6thjune 1815. " M. LE MARfiCHAL, — The Emperor orders you to put in movement the 2nd and ist Corps ePArm^e, as well as the 3rd Cavalry Corps, which has been put at your disposal, in order to direct them upon the intersection of the roads called Les Trois Bras (Quatre Bras), where you will cause them to take position. . . . His Majesty desires, if there is no obstacle, that you should establish one division with cavalry at Genappe, and he orders you to carry another division towards {du cdti de) Marbais. , . . "Due DE DaLMATIE." 72 WATERLOO Ney's dispositions, however, were by no means such as were prescribed. Reille uas still at Gosselies at 10.15 A.M., for he wrote to Ney from that place, announcing that information had arrived to the effect that the Prussians were forming at St Amand, and that as a consequence he should postpone his own movement until the receipt of further orders. It was not till nearly noon that the 2nd corps left Gosselies, and in due course it was formed up for action at Quatre Bras. The 1st corps was still in the neighbourhood of Marchiennes and the river at 1 1 A.M. According to D'Erlon's own statement, it was not till between II and 12 A.M. that he received his marching orders — namely to take position at Frasnes, with three of his four divisions, and to direct the fourth on Marbais. D'Erlon was engaged in executing this movement when the battle began at Quatre Bras, and he reached Frasnes about S P.M. Kellermann's dragoons were posted at Frcisnes and Liberchies, where also were the divisions of the Guard commanded by Lef^bvre-Desnouettes and Colbert. Thus, at 2 P.M., at which hour the engagement at Quatre Bras began, Ney had only Reille's three divisions in position. The bulk of his force was in reserve at Frasnes, or engaged in marching on that point, and this notwithstanding his precise instruc- tions to " reunite the corps of D'Erlon, Reille, and that of the Count de Valmy (Kellermann)." THE MORNING OF JUNE x6TH Ti> VI. " I have adopted as a general principle of this campaign the division of my army into two wings and a reserve." In conformity with this announce- ment, made to Ney in his morning letter of the 1 6th, Napoleon wrote to Marshal Grouchy invest- ing him with the command of the right wing, which was to consist of the 3rd and 4th corps, and of the cavalry corps of Pajol, Milhaud, and Excelmans. The 6th corps and the Guard made up the reserve, which was under the immediate direction of the Emperor in person. The reserve formed the centre of the army, and was so disposed as to be able to support the operations of either wing, according to circumstances. It could also be strengthened by reinforcements detached from either wing, as occasion might require. The left wing numbered about 40,000 men, the right wing nearly 50,000, the reserve rather more than 29,000 men. Such being the general principle underlying Napoleon's dispositions, it is necessary to examine the particular plan of operations which the Emperor sketched out for the day of the i6th, for it is of the first importance to recognise clearly the distinction between the general plan govern- ing the campaign as a whole, and the particular plan governing the operations of a single day.* * The failure to recognise this distinction invalidates the argu- ment wliich Clausewitz applies to this part of the subject. 74 WATERLOO Nor is this the only distinction which it is essential to have in mind. The march of events upon the morning of the i6th was destined to produce important modifications in the scheme of operations as originally laid down for the day, so that in the morning we see a set of instruc- tions issued to meet the situation as Napoleon conceived it in theory; in the afternoon the dis- positions and instructions were based on the actual facts of the case as learned from practical experi- ence and observation. It is from the morning letters to Ney and Grouchy that we are able to grasp Napoleon's first ideas of the situation which confronted him. In the letters to Ney, Napoleon informs the Marshal of his intention to attack the Prussians if he meets with them, and to explore the road as far as Gembloux. This done, he will decide upon his future movement, and the instant his decision is made, Ney is to be ready to march on Brussels. " I will support you with the Guard, which will be at Fleurus or Sombref, and should wish to reach Brussels to-morrow morning." Therefore {done) Ney was to dispose his troops partly in front of Quatre Bras at Genappe, partly around that point, and partly at Marbais, a point midway between Quatre Bras and Sombref The object of placing a division at Marbais, as Soult makes clear to the Marshal, was that it might be ready to support either Grouchy at Sombref or Ney himself at Quatre Bras according to circumstances, and to THE MORNING OF JUNE 16TH 75 explore the roads in all directions, but particularly in the directions of Gembloux and Wavre, The letter to Grouchy instructs him to march with the right wing to Sombref. "If the enemy is at Sombref, I wish to attack him. I even wish to attack him at Gembloux, and to seize that position, my intention being, after making myself acquainted with these two positions, to march this night and operate with my left wing against the English. Lose not a moment therefore. . . . Communicate constantly with Gerard, so that he may be able to assist you in attacking Sombref, if it be necessary. . . . All the information which I have is to the eflfect that the Prussians cannot oppose to us more than 40,000 men. "As soon as you have made yourself master of Sombref, it will be necessary to send forward an advance guard to Gembloux to reconnoitre all the roads which converge on Sombref, at the same time that you will establish your com- munications with Marshal Ney." The first point to which these letters draw our attention is Napoleon's uncertainty in regard to the Prussian army. He proposes to attack the Prussians " if he meets with them." He ^ an- ticipates no difficulty in occupying Sombref — indeed, his objective point is rather Gembloux than Sombref. Evidently, in his opinion, the Prussians were far from being fully concentrated. If Ziethen from Charleroi were supported by Pirch from Namur, that was about the extent of 76 WATERLOO the force which Bliicher would have to oppose to him, and so he persuaded himself that he had to deal only with some 40,000 men, against whom, using Grouchy's force alone, he could place 50,000 in the field. He is also quite at ease on the subject of the the Anglo-Dutch army. No resistance to Ney at Quatre Bras is expected. The march on Brussels would be unimpeded, for the Emperor proposes to arrive there "to-morrow morning." The results of the i6th, according to Napoleon's ideas in the morning, would be the occupation of Genappe, Quatre Btas, Gembloux, and Sombref, the overthrow of such Prussian corps as had effected a concentration, and the disappearance of all obstacles to an uninterrupted march on Brussels. At the moment when the Emperor was tran- scribing these confident anticipations to his lieu- tenants, Blucher was rapidly concentrating three- fourths of his army at and about Sombref, and Anglo-Dutch troops to the number of 25,000 men were pressing hastily on Quatre Bras to support Prince Bernhard in the defence of that position. Conclusions very unfavourable to Napoleon have often been drawn from a comparison of his intentions with the true facts of the situation. He is accused of exhibiting arrogant self-confidence in combination with an almost wilful self-deception. But the case is capable of quite another interpreta- tion, for the contention is, to say the least, tenable, that on general principles of strategy his judg- THE MORNING OF JUNE 16TH 77 ment of the situation was a correct one. That judgment was based upon knowledge which in the main was accurate. He knew that the concentra- tion of the Prussian army was by no means com- plete, and on general principles he was justified in assuming that Gembloux, or even Wavre, was the point on which that concentration would be made. Gembloux was nearer to Namur than Sombref, and was nearer for Biilow in his march from Li^ge. In fact, while concentration at Sombref was sure to be partial, at Gembloux it might have been complete. He also knew that Wellington was not in any proper sense of the word concentrated at all. His own arrangements excluded the possibility of any effective support being at present given by Wellington to Blucher or by Blucher to Wellington, and therefore, in Napoleon's opinion, it would be the height of im- prudence in either of the allied commanders to risk a general engagement upon that day. To do so would be to play into his hands — for he could oppose to the Prussians on the -one hand a force which, even if inferior in numbers, was yet, by superiority in military qualities, capable of inflicting upon them a severe defeat, while on his left wing Ney could certainly hold in check, if not entirely overthrow, any force which Wellington, in the backward state of his concentration, might be able to put into the field. Could he suppose, in default of actual observation, that his enemies would thus play his game for him ? But even if 78 WATERLOO they did, his general plan for the day was not thereby invalidated. On the contrary, much of it would still hold good in spite of the altered state of affairs, and the result would be more decisive than he had at first ventured to anticipate. In- stead of merely inflicting a check upon his adver- saries, the chance would be offered him of disposing of them both in the course of a single day. It was about lo A.M. when Napoleon began to entertain suspicions that his movements for the day would not be so uninterrupted as he had at first supposed. At that hour he learned " that the enemy was displaying masses of troops on the side of Quatre Bras," and it was then that he impera- tively ordered Ney to unite his corps, and with his forces thus consolidated, to beat and destroy all the hostile forces which might display themselves. He then proceeded in person to Fleurus, and upon his arrival he learned that the Prussians, according to all appearances, were taking position in force with a view to a general engagement. He was not inclined to credit these reports, and it was not until he had himself inspected the Prussian position that he was convinced of Bliicher's intention to stand and fight. From the vantage ground of a windmill a little in front of the town he was able to observe the whole disposition of the Prussian army, and it taught him in a moment all that he needed to know. Instead of 40,000 men, he saw before him three-fourths of Bliicher's force. From its extended line he could read the Prussian THE MORNING OF JUNE 16TH 79 general's intention of reaching forward one hand to Wellington upon his right, and the other to Billow coming up upon his left. Convinced that neither Wellington nor Biilow could render any assistance, Napoleon at once formulated his plans, so as to gain the utmost possible advantage from the imprudence of his adversary, and the plan of attack which he now developed was of a character to result in the complete overthrow of the Prussian army. We now turn to the examination of this plan, which was to govern the operations of the French army throughout the remainder of the day. Napoleon's earlier schemes, communicated in the morning to Grouchy and to Ney, liiay be dismissed from our minds, except in so far as they were still partially applicable to the new situation. His movements, far from being entirely dislocated by Blucher's unexpected demonstration in force, were only rendered the more vigorous and the more decisive, and with marvellous skill he adapted all the essential features of his original design to serve the purposes of the unlooked-for opportunity which was now before him. Bliicher, as Napoleon expressed it, was " taken en flagrant d^lit" and it only remained to mete out to him the punishment due to his rashness and temerity. With the Prussians in force before him, and with masses of troops displaying themselves at Quatre Bras, there was no longer a question of occupying, practically without resistance, Quatre Bras and 8o WATERLOO Genappe on the one hand, and Sombref and Gembloux on the other. Manoeuvres were to give place to action, and the problem before Napoleon was how to make action most decisive against one, if not both, of the enemies he was about to meet. The first essential was to prevent the allied armies from rendering each other any support. For this purpose his original plan was still efficient. The left wing would hold Wellington in check at Quatre Bras, while the right and the reserve would contain Bliicher. The division which Ney had been ordered to post at Marbais would not only intervene directly between the allies, but could be utilised with crushing effect against one or other of them, as circumstances might direct. All anxiety on the score of a junction between the allies being removed, it remained to determine, should it prove impossible to secure a decisive triumph on both wings, against which of the opposing armies the main effort was to be directed. Every consideration pointed to the Prussian army as the true point of attack. Any conspicuous success gained against the 90,000 men then on the ground would involve the demoralisation of the whole Prussian contingent ; it would retire in con- fusion upon its base, thus separating itself, with every step in retreat, further and further from its ally ; nor, even when reinforced by Billow's addi- tional 30,000 men, would it be in a position for several days to assume an offensive attitude, and THE MORNING OF JUNE 16TH 81 in the meantime Napoleon could dispose of Wellington at his leisure. Moreover, the very dispositions of the Prus- sians, in order of battle, exposed them to such a defeat as that upon which Napoleon calculated ; while in the case of Wellington only a small portion of his troops could possibly be on the ground at Quatre Bras, and any success gained over him then could only be of a partial and indecisive character. The main idea, therefore, in Napoleon's mind in drawing up his plans for the afternoon of the i6th was this, that the main business of the day rested with him and with the right wing at Ligny, Sombref, and St Amand, while the duty of Ney was first to contain Wellington, and then to second Napoleon's operations against Bliicher. It was this main idea that Ney, as we shall see, entirely failed to grasp. VII. The Emperor's plan of battle against Bliicher was governed altogether by the dispositions of the old Marshal himself. These were by no means such as to secure the approval of the Duke of Welling- ton. He was at Bry while the Prussians were being placed in position, and expressed to Sir Henry Hardinge his opinion that "if they fight here, they will be damnably mauled." Exposed along the hill slopes to the full fire of the enemy's artillery, their superiority in numbers was likely F 82 WATERLOO to be more than counter-balanced by Napoleon's superiority both in skill and position. The Prus- sian army had been drawn up in order of battle, with its right extending as far as Wagnel^e, its centre at Ligny, and its left reaching in a south-easterly direction from Sombref to Tongrines £ind Balatre. The inferences from this formation clearly were that the Prussian right were endeavouring to keep open the communications with Wellington, and that the Prussian left was similarly employed in relation to Biilow and the town of Namur, If this were so, the left could take no very vigorous part in the coming engagement, for its operations must necessarily be confined to the immediate neigh- bourhood of the main chaussie to Namur. It would therefore be sufificient to occupy the Prus- sian left by false demonstrations, while the main effort was directed against the right or the centre, or both simultaneously. Having inferred that the Prussian left might be comparatively neglected, Napoleon had yet to decide whether he should direct his full force upon the right, or confine himself to an endeavour to break the Prussian centre. Either alternative oifered some special advantages. By attacking the right, he would be drawing nearer to his own left wing, and, moreover, would, if successful, be forcing the Prussians away from their allies. By breaking their centre he would be in a position to roll up the Prussian army upon its wings, and to effect its total ruin. The fertile genius of the THE MORNING OF JUNE 16TH 83 Emperor was equal to devising a combination which, if properly carried out, would secure the advantages of both these courses. His plan was to demonstrate in strength against both points, but more especially against the right. As a result, Bliicher would detach his reserve in increasing numbers to the support of his menaced wing. At the favourable moment the French reserves would be launched against the centre, thus denuded of its full complement of defenders, and the Prussian line would be utterly broken. Simultaneously with this movement, a detachment of 10,000, or even possibly 20,000 men, would arrive from Ney, and would take the Prussian right in flank and rear ; penetrated in the centre and outflanked upon the right, general confusion would overtake the whole army, and it would be, if not annihilated, at least crippled by a blow from which it would take long to recover. Such was Napoleon's scheme for the conduct of the battle of Ligny. It remains to see how far he was able to execute it. The first step towards its execution was to secure the co-operation of Ney. To this end a despatch was sent to the Marshal, dated Fleuru-s, 2 p.m. "The intention of his Majesty is that you should attack what troops are before you, and that, after having vigorously driven them in, you should fall back on us, in order to assist in surrounding the (Prussian) corps, of which I have just spoken." At 3.15 P.M. another despatch followed, more 84 WATERLOO specific in its terms, and much more vigorous in its language. " At this moment the engagement is very pro- nounced. His Majesty desires me to tell you that you should manoeuvre at once, so as to en- velope the enemy's right, and fall a bras raccourds, upon his rear. This army is lost if you act with vigour. The fate of France is in your hands. "So hesitate not a moment to execute the move- ment which the Emperor orders, and direct your- self upon the heights of Bry, and St Amand to assist in a victory perhaps decisive. The enemy is taken en flagrant dilit at the moment when he is seeking to form a junction with the English." In the meantime the French army was formed up for the attack. In front of St Amand were posted the three divisions of Vandamme's 3rd corps. Girard's division was in reserve, with the cavalry of the 3rd corps (Domon) upon the left. The three divisions of Gdrard's 4th corps, with its cavalry (Maurin), were in front of Ligny. Grouchy, with Pajol's and Excelman's cavalry — soon to be supported by one of" Gerard's divisions — observed the Prussian left. The Imperial Guard, with Milhaud's cuirassiers, were in rear of Gerard and Vandamme, in reserve, while Lobau's 6th corps was at Charleroi, from whence it was ordered to move on Fleurus. The total French force, exclusive of Lobau, was about 68,000. The Prussians numbered about 20,000 more. CHAPTER VI. THE BATTLES OF THE i6TH. I. The Battle of Ligny— II. The Battle of Quatre Bras— HI. Napoleon's delay in beginning battle — IV. The D'Erlon Episode — V. Summary. The battle of Ligny began about half-past two in the afternoon and lasted until after nightfall. The first attack was by Vandamme upon the village of St Amand. It was followed within half an hour by G6rard*s attack upon the village of Ligny. Throughout the afternoon the contest for these positions was carried on with desperate fury on both sides. The houses both in Ligny and St Amand were for the most part built of stone, and stood each in its own little plot of ground, which contained a garden, perhaps an orchard, and some out-buildings. The Prussians had taken full ad- vantage of every means of defence. From crenel- lated walls, from every window, from the shelter of each bush and tree, a furious fire was poured in upon the advancing French, and bloody hand- to-hand contests went on in the streets. As often as the French secured possession of one or 8s 86 WATERLOO other of the villages, so often did Blucher send in reinforcements to drive them out again, and in this way, as Napoleon had foreseen, his reserves were being rapidly exhausted. The Emperor on his side as resolutely refrained from putting in fresh troops. Gerard, Vandamme, and Girard fully understood that they were to expect no support until Napoleon judged the decisive moment to have arrived, and thus it is estimated that, after three hours' fighting, io,cxx) fewer troops had been employed on the French than on the Prussian side. In this fact lay the real secret of Napoleon's ultimate success, and the knowledge that Lobau was advancing with 10,000 additional troops gave Napoleon ample confidence that the issue would be favourable to himself In the meantime Grouchy, upon the French right, was engaging Thielemann's corps. Here the struggle was less intense, for it was Grouchy's business to demonstrate rather than to attack in earnest. It was sufficient if he continually menaced Bliicher's communications with Namur, for as long as they were threatened it would be impossible to draw upon the Prussian left wing for support to the right and centre. By five o'clock all Bliicher's troops were engaged. Amand-la-Haye was in the hands of Girard, but the division of Pirch and the cavalry of Jiirgas were now joined to Ziethen's division in an en- deavour to recover it. Vandamme held St Amand, THE BATTLES OF THE 16TH 87 though hotly pressed by superior forces : Gerard was in possession of Ligny, though his corps had suffered fearfully in the struggle, and he was desperately in need of succour. Napoleon judged the crisis to have arrived. It was now 5.30 P.M. Moving forward the guard from their station in front of Fleurus, he put him- self at their head and directed them against the Prussian centre. Scarcely had this movement of his reserve begun than it was arrested. A report from Vandamme informed the Emperor that a strange corps had appeared upon his left, and seemed as if about to take him en revers. In view of this demonstration it was essential to take instant measures to ascertain its meaning, and in the meantime the advance of the guard in force was suspended. In due course it was discovered that the strange troops upon the left were the ist corps of the French army under Count D'Erlon advancing to the support of Napoleon. Apparently, therefore, Ney had fulfilled his in- structions. The plan of battle which the Emperor had devised was answering his anticipations point by point. The violence of Girard's and Van- dammne's attack had deceived Bliicher into the supposition that his right was the vital point : his centre had been weakened to strengthen his forces at Wagnelde and St Amand — all his reserves were now employed in action, and this was the moment when his centre was to be attacked by the full 88 WATERLOO force of the Imperial Guard, and when 20,000 fresh troops under D'Erlon were about to take him simultaneously in the flank. But this was precisely the moment when Napo- leon's star began to wane. For it was not until 7.30 P.M. that he learned definitely that the strange corps was D'Erlon's, and not a reinforcement coming to the assistance of BlUcher. Consequently the suspended move- ment of the Imperial Guard was not resumed until after a lapse of two hours. It was during this interval that the 3rd and 4th corps suffered most severely at Ligny and St Amand, and the delay cost Napoleon several thousand men. At 7.30 the day would soon be over, and instead of four hours in which to complete the defeat of the Prussians, scarcely two remained before dark- ness set in : the delay therefore rendered the vic- tory less complete, and the pursuit of the defeated enemy less vigorous. But more important still, it was not in accordance with Ney's instructions that D'Erlon's corps was advancing to the field. On the contrary, his movement was in direct opposition to them. Before the ist corps had time to render any assistance in the battle in progress before its eyes, a peremptory order from Ney at Quatre Bras recalled it to his side, and as a result neither at Ligny nor at Quatre Bras did it fire a shot. The fourth section of this chapter will be devoted to an investigation of this deplorable blunder and its consequences. Here it can only be noted in re- THE BATTLES OF THE 16TH 89 gard to its immediate effects upon Napoleon's dispositions and the issue of the battle of Ligny. At the moment when Vandamme perceived the unknown corps upon his flank, he was at the end of his resources. Blucher in person was rallying the scattered division of Pirch, which had been sent to the support of Ziethen, but had retired be- fore the furious onslaught of the French infantry. One of Vandamme's divisions was forced to give way, and St Amand-le-Hameau and St Amand- la-Haye once more fell into the hands of the Prussians. Napoleon therefore, while suspending the general advance of the Imperial Guard, none the less moved forward Duhesme with the Young Guard to the support of his shattered left This timely reinforcement re-established the battle on that wing. Gerard in the centre in the meanwhile was performing prodigies of valour. Alone with his two divisions, for one had been withdrawn from him to the support of Grouchy, he held his own against twice his numbers, and still clung to Ligny with indomitable tenacity. At last the time arrived when Napoleon could with safety advance his reserves, and Friant's and Morand's battalions of the Imperial Guard marched straight on the Prussian centre. Weakened as it was by the with- drawal of so many brigades to the right, the centre first wavered and then gave way. An attempt to turn the French column upon its flanks was frus- trated by Milhaud's cuirassiers. Blucher, at last recognising his deception, strained every nerve to 90 WATERLOO re-establish his line, but without effect. He was himself thrown from his horse, and a charge of cavalry passed over him, only, however, with the effect of inflicting severe bruises upon the tough old veteran. The French Grenadiers and Chas- seurs soon crowned the heights of Bry and Bussy upon which the Prussians had stood : Vandamme debouched from St Amand, driving the Prussian right before him : Grouchy met with equal success against Thielemann. To maintain the contest further was impossible, for the Prussians were in retreat throughout the length of their line. All that remained was to withdraw in as good order as the circumstances permitted, and favoured by the darkness which had now set in, and by the blunder which had robbed Napoleon of his rein- forcements from Ney, Bllicher was enabled to retire from the field with an army defeated indeed and exhausted, but none the less capable, when joined by the absent corps of Biilow, of rendering a good account of itself in the subsequent opera- tions of the campaign. II. — The Battle of Quatre Bras. The action at Quatre Bras began about half-an- hour before the battle of Ligny — that is to say, about two o'clock P.M. It will be remembered that Ney had failed to carry out his repeated instructions to reunite the force under his command. D'Erlon was not yet at THE BATTLES OF THE 16TH 91 Frasnes, and it was Ney's intention, when he arrived there, to keep him in reserve at that point. Keller- mann's dragoons were at Frasnes and Liberchies, while of Reille's four divisions of infantry, one, that of Girard, had been withdrawn for service at Ligny. Thus, when the engagement began, Reille's three divisions — Bachelu, Foy, and Jerome, with Pird's cavalry, alone were in position facing the enemy, and even of these Jerome was not actually in readiness until three o'clock. The part which had been assigned to Ney was to keep Wellington in check, so as to prevent any assistance from the Anglo-Dutch army moving to the support of Blucher. But in view of the backward state of Welling- ton's organisation, a force of over 40,000 men was more than sufficient to effect this purpose. Ney, therefore, with a part of his force, was to manoeuvre towards his right, in order to come up upon the Prussian right at Ligny, and crown the victory which Napoleon there hoped to gain. To accomplish this he was to sacrifice all ideas of a brilliant success on his own wing. This would come later, when Napoleon, having overthrown the Prussians, had joined his forces to those of Ney, as he purposed doing at the first opportunity. To contain Wellington with one part of his force, and to assist the Emperor with the other, would be productive of results which might prove decisive of the campaign — results more far-reaching than an absolute victory over the Anglo-Dutch army 92 WATERLOO could entail. " It may be," said Napoleon to G6rard, as the battle of Ligny was beginning, " that the fate of the war will be decided to-day. If Ney efficiently executes my instructions, not a cannon of the Prussian army will escape. It is taken en flagrant d^lit." With such views on the part of Napoleon, the action at Quatre Bras began, but Ney regarded his task in a somewhat different light. Ignorant of the number of troops the Duke of Wellington would be able to bring against him, and fully aware that every moment the number was increasing, Ney determined to proceed with the utmost caution. He kept a strong reserve behind him in case of need, and throughout the engagement he was more intent upon his own position than upon the position of the Emperor at Ligny. For this there is much excuse, but still the results of the i6th were far less decisive than they might otherwise have been. Quatre Bras is situated at the junction of the main road from Brussels to Charleroi with the main road from Namur to Nivelles. A 'little to the south of the latter, and to the west of the former, was the Bois de Bossu, a wood which, as well as the village of Quatre Bras, was held by Perponcher's division of Dutch - Belgians, under Prince Bernhard of Saxe Weimar. No other troops— of the whole of Wellington's army — were present at two o'clock, when the engagement began. Ney drew up two of Reille's divisions— THE BATTLES OF THE 16TH 93 those of Bachelu and Foy — on each side of the Brussels-Charleroi road in such a manner that that road bisected his centre. They were supported by Pirn's cavalry, while the division of Jerome, upon its arrival, took position on the right. No orders were sent to Kellermann to bring up his cavalry from Frasnes and Liberchies till the afternoon was well advanced. The battle of Quatre Bras was a series of charges, on the right and left, for the possession of the Bois de Bossu and the village at the cross roads. Great credit is due to the Dutch-Belgians, who, though only 9000 strong, had yet held these positions undismayed by the proximity of such vastly superior forces. The first French attack was directed against the Dutch-Belgians alone, but at about 2.30, Sir Thomas Picton's division began to come up, and throughout the afternoon reinforcements of English and Hanoverian troops were arriving. This arrival in isolated detach- ments was, however, especially at first, a source of great danger to Wellington, and the cause to a large extent of the very severe losses which his troops suffered, for it was possible for the French to charge the English regiments while they were forming, and before they were prepared for the attack — notably this was so in the case of the 42nd Highlanders, two companies of which were pierced by the French lancers and overwhelmed while in the act of falling-in. Picton's division was largely made up of Highland regiments, the 94 WATERLOO 3rd battalion of the Royal Scots, the 28th North Gloucestershire regiment, and the ist battalion of the 95th regiment, composing Kemp's brigade, form- ing the English left, while Pack's brigade, composed of the 44th, 79th, and 92nd Highland regiments, constituted the right. The Duke of Wellington was present in person almost from the beginning of the action, and exposed himself fearlessly. He was for a considerable period with his staff just in front of the 92nd regiment, which lined the ditch immediately in front of the Namur road and from that spot he directed the movements of his force and watched the fierce charges of the French Cuirassiers. One such charge swept the ground on which he had been standing only five minutes before. Picton's division was in turn supported by the Brunswickers, who arrived about three o'clock and were posted on the left. The Duke of Bruns- wick, their commander, displayed conspicuous per- sonal gallantry, but fell, pierced by a musket ball, about seven o'clock in the evening. In the mean- time repeated charges and counter-charges were being made upon the Bois de Bossu, and when- ever the English were successful in expelling the French and debouching on to the open ground beyond, they were met by the fierce onset of the French cavalry before they could form, and were in turn driven back. Detachments of the French cavalry also manoeuvred round the wood to their left, and thus were in position to charge the English the moment they emerged from the wood upon the THE BATTI:ES of the i6TH 95 open ground. Affairs were in a critical situation as the evening wore on, for the French had gained the Bois de Bossu, and had passed beyond it to the main road. It was now that the English Guards arrived, having marched from Enghien since 3 A.M. that morning. They immediately formed and forced the French to retire. It was a tremendous struggle — the French attempting to again outflank the English, but being met in their attempt by the 3rd battalion of the Guards, which had skirted the wood and was drawn up in hollow square upon its extreme western edge. When evening closed the cross roads and the wood were still in the occupa- tion of our troops. Upon the French right and English left the fight was no less deadly. Ney soon discovered that his dispositions were insuffi- cient to effect his purpose — so by five o'clock he had ordered up one brigade of Kellermann's dragoons from Frasnes. These plunged des- perately and at once into the thick of the fight for Quatre Bras : but fresh reinforcements were now arriving to the Duke in quick succession. Halkett's brigade and Kielmansegge's first Hano- verians came up about six o'clock, followed by Cooke's division about seven, and it was clear that the French were outnumbered, and could only gain the contested positions by the arrival of fresh troops. Such support was momentarily expected, for Ney had already despatched orders to D'Erlon to bring up the ist corps to take part in the battle. To his dismay he learned that the ist corps had 96 WATERLOO been turned ofif the road at Frasnes to attach itself to Napoleon's main army by a march on Bry. No chance, therefore, remained of re-estab- lishing Kellermann's dragoons, which, notwith- standing the impetuosity of their onset, were repulsed between six and seven P.M. But even in this repulse we can trace the determined obstinacy of Ney only to employ a part, not the whole, of the troops entrusted to him. For but one brigade of Kellermann's heavy cavalry had been ordered up to the front. The other brigades were still maintained at Frasnes and Liberchies. Had Kellermann been in force, with his four brigades together, it is more than probable that the French operations on their right would have been crowned with success, even without the support of D'Erlon's divisions. As it was, not only did the Bois de Bossu and the cross roads remain in the hands of the Anglo-Dutch army, but it was able to occupy an advanced position beyond Quatre Bras — the French, when darkness set in, retiring to Frasnes. Such was the action at Quatre Bras, when rather more than 53,000 men on both sides were engaged. Nearly 9000 in all fell in the battle, or about one in six. Wellington had collected altogether upon the field about 31,000 men — not one-third of his total available force ; and the bulk of these had arrived in detachments as the engagement pro- ceeded, peculiarly exposed to disaster while in process of formation. These facts and figures are THE BATTLES OF THE 16TH 97 an eloquent commentary upon the Duke's note to Blucher, written in the morning, and to which full reference has already been made. How completely misinformed he was of the real whereabouts of his troops, the progress of the battle was to make abundantly clear. However much the Duke is to be praised — and very justly praised- -for his cool and spirited conduct of the fight, for the most part against superior numbers and troops of very superior calibre to his own — nothing but censure can be extended to arrangements which left him exposed to such chances at so critical a moment. For it is sufficiently evident that the Duke's success depended upon chances which he had no right to count upon, and which, in fact, he did not count upon. Every account of the battle of Quatre Bras, contemporary or critical, goes to emphasise the desperate character of the struggle, the doubt of victory, the half-expectation of defeat. If this was so when Ney had only 22,(X)0 men engaged, can it be denied that the Duke would have experienced a severe defeat if 43,000 men had been brought against him ? And this was the force at Ney's disposal had he cared to avail himself of it The. fatal procrastination which allowed D'Er- lon's corps to remain so far behind Reille, the vagaries of D'Erlon, who, when called upon, was not to be found, the over-caution which maintained three out of Kellermann's four brigades in reserve throughout the action, all these were chances on G 9,8 WATERLOO which the Duke could not by any possibility calculate, and yet it was to these chances that he owed his success. III. — Napoleon's Delay on the morning of the i6ih. It has been seen that the engagement at Ligny did not begin until 2.30 p.m., and that at Quatre Bras until about two o'clock. Thus, for purposes of active fighting, the morning hours were entirely thrown away. It was broad daylight at 3.30 A.M. The troops were not in position before Quatre Bras or Ligny until— putting it at the very earliest — 1.30 P.M. Napoleon therefore allowed at least ten hours to elapse before undertaking any directly offensive operations. This delay has excited much criticism and con- troversy, and every writer on the campaign has made it the subject of his attention. Some see in it a large part of the cause of Napoleon's subse- quent failure, and censure him severely for his in- activity ; others regard it as inevitable, — the result of his situation and the nature of things \ others, again, throw the responsibility for it upon Ney, or upon Gerard, or upon some other of Napoleon's lieutenants. Amid so many conflicting opinions it is difficult to feel assured that any conclusion is thoroughly sound and final : any explanation must necessarily be based to a large extent upon con- jecture. None the less a brief review of the circumstances THE BATTLES OF THE 16TH 99 upon the i6th may help to the formation of a correct judgment. Napoleon began the day under an entire mis- apprehension as to the intentions of his opponents. His plan of action was communicated to the com- manders of his wings about 9 A.M., and we have seen that it was based upon the supposition that no serious resistance would be offered that day by the allies to his operations on either side. Neither Wellington nor Bliicher could be concentrated in force, and until their concentration was completed, or in a fair way to completion, Napoleon judged that they would not be rash enough to risk an engagement which might prove decisive of the campaign. Therefore, as far as the i6th was con- cerned, he would have to deal, on the right wing, with perhaps 40,C)CX3 Prussians at the most, while Ney, on the left, would have before him only such troops as Wellington could hastily muster from Brussels. With these views, which on all general principles of strategy he was justified in entertaining, he limited his own operations for the day to the occupation of Genappe and Quatre Bras by Ney, and of Gembloux and Sombref by Grouchy. To accomplish these objects, in view of the fact that little resistance was expected, there was no need of haste. The afternoon would amply suffice for their complete fulfilment. The morning would give to his soldiers the opportunity for that repose which they imperatively needed, and thus refreshed, loo WATERLOO they would be the more efficient for the work of the afternoon. It was not until Napoleon actually saw the Prussians forming at St Amand, Bry, and Sombref that he could believe in the extent of his own good fortune ; but having realised it, he lost no time in getting his army into position for immediate action. It is claimed for the explanation here suggested that it possesses at least the merit of simplicity. It answers both to the facts of the situation and to the documentary evidence of the Emperor's ideas and intentions. It is not, however, the explana- tion usually put forward, and hence it may be well to glance for a moment at the opinions on the subject expressed by such experts as Clausewitz, Ropes, and Chesney. Clausewitz considers that, in the nature of things, it was impossible to begin the attack upon the Prussians at Ligny until the afternoon. " The troops," he says, " had attacked the Prussian out- posts as early as 4 A.M. on the isth, had prob- ably been marching, therefore, the greater part of the night, and had spent the whole of the iSth right into the night in fighting, or, at any rate, under arms or on the march, consequently it was impossible that an attack on Blucher at Sombref . . . should ensue in the early hours of the 16th. " Could the real tactical encounter of the two main forces have taken place on the forenoon of the i6th, it would have been a monstrous mistake to delay it, for Blucher was still concentrating, as THE BATTLES OF THE 16TH loi Bonaparte knew; and seeing that the total Prussian force was so very superior to the 7S,ooo men whom he could employ against it, it was of the utmost importance to give battle before they were all united. . . . But the French troops needed time to rest, to get their provisions, to cook, and, finally, to concentrate. All this could not be accomplished in a short summer's night."* Clausewitz thus attributes the delay to the fact that a soldier's powers of endurance are limited, and the Duke of Wellington endorses this opinion. Ropes thinks that Napoleon's delay was the result of Ney's failure to seize Quatre Bras, and to consolidate the corps under his command, " The backwardness of D'Erlon's corps not only deferred the forward movement of the left wing, it seems to have delayed the advance of the main body. Until Napoleon could be sure that Ney, with the large force that had been assigned to him, was in march on his left ... he seems to have been unwilling to move upon Blucher, . . . He postponed his own forward movement upon Fleurus and Sombref until Ney could move simul- taneously upon Quatre Bras." f Chesney considers that Napoleon was alone to blame for Ney's want of concentration and failure to occupy Quatre Bras, and he judges that the cause of delay on the morning of the i6th is to be found in the fact that " Napoleon had no idea that * Feldzug v$n, 1815, Kap. 25. + " The Campaign of Waterloo," ch. ix. I02 WATERLOO three-fourths of the Prussian army was collected in his front As he was aware beforehand how their army was cantoned, and judged Bliicher still to be near Namur, it follows that he believed him- self in contact with their extreme right, which, unsupported, must needs give way and open his path to Brussels. Chesney therefore agrees with the view ex- pressed in the text as far as Napoleon and the Prussians are concerned, but he differs in regard to the responsibilities of Ney upon the left. lY.— The UErlon Episode. It is much easier to estimate the effects of D'Erlon's wanderings upon the issue of the two battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras, and upon the campaign as a whole, than to penetrate the mystery which attaches to his movements. The facts, however, up to a certain point are clear. D'Erlon, in obedience to Ney's instructions, was marching his corps from Marchiennes and Gosselies to Frasnes. Before reaching Frasnes, Durutte, who commanded the leading division, received further orders to direct his march on Quatre Bras. On arrival at Frasnes, however, an aide-de-camp met Durutte at the head of the column, and gave him instructions to march im- mediately to the support of Napoleon at Ligny. The 1st corps accordingly turned off the main chaussee to its right, and in due course appeared THE BATTLES OF THE 16TH 103 upon the flank of the armies engaged around St Amand between 5 and 5.30 P.M. Scarcely had it arrived when peremptory orders from Ney recalled it to Quatre Bras. The ist corps, therefore, spent the day in marches and counter- marches, but rendered no assistance in either battle, for it did not reach Quatre Bras until the battle was over. The mystery attaching to these proceedings begins when we endeavour to discover by whose order the ist corps was turned aside to march on St Amand. If by Napoleon's order, why were his movements disconcerted by its approach, why did he not keep D'Erlon with him to operate upon the Prussian flank, instead of allowing him to march back again to join Ney ? The fact being established that D'Erlon's move- ment was directed in obedience to the order of somebody, the question as to who gave the order is narrowed down within three alternatives. It was either Ney, or Napoleon, or some one else. It certainly was not Ney, for that Marshal was firmly convinced from the first that the order was given by Napoleon. In his letter to the Duke of Otranto, dated Paris, June 26th, 1815, Ney writes — " The battle (of Quatre Bras) became general, and victory was no longer doubtful, when, at the moment that I intended to order up the first corps of infantry, left by me in reserve at Frasnes, I learned that the Emperor had disposed of it with- out advising me of the circumstance. The shock 104 WATERLOO which this intelligence gave me confounded me." There is a tone of genuine astonishment about this letter which is an evidence that it expresses Ney's honest convictions, and his attitude of per- sonal indignation against Napoleon, which was strongly marked on the morning following the battle of Quatre Bras, is another indication that his letter to the Duke of Otranto was not the outcome of an afterthought But Ney's convictions, however sincere, are not conclusive upon matters of fact. There is further evidence, in support of his opinions, which is entitled to be carefully weighed. In his "Etudes sur Napoleon" (Paris, 1841), Lieut-Colonel Baudus, attached to Soult's staff during the Waterloo campaign, says, that when the battle of Ligny was at its height, " Napoleon called me and said, 'I have sent an order to Count D'Erlon to direct his whole corps on the rear of the right of the Prussian army. Go and carry the duplicate of this order to Marshal Ney.' " Baudus then goes on to say that both the Emperor and Soult urged upon him to insist with Ney that nothing was to prevent the execution of this order. " Tell him," said Napoleon, " that the important affair is here." If, therefore, we believe Baudus, there is no longer a doubt about the matter. It was Napoleon who sent the order to D'Erlon. But are we justified in implicitly relying on the THE BATTLES OF THE 16TH 105 statement of Baudus ? 1841 is twenty-six years after the battle of Waterloo, and in twenty-six years a man's memory may well become untrust- worthy about great events, much more about matters of minute detail. Moreover, the narrative bears a sufficient resem- blance to the facts as we know them from official documents to justify the suspicion that Baudus was confused between the truth and his recollec- tions of the truth. No form of error is more common or more misleading. The order which Baudus carried was, he tells us, a duplicate. The original order, then, had been previously despatched. Now, at 3.15 p.m., when the engagement at Ligny was en ce moment tris prononci, an order was sent to Ney which has already been quoted. In it the Marshal was told that the fate of France was in his hands — that he was to lose not a moment in executing the move- ment which the Emperor ordered. There is a suspicious similarity between the terms of the order and the terms in which Baudus was entrusted with his mission. It is, at any rate, by no means improbable that Baudus was not the bearer of a further order in duplicate, but was carrying the duplicate of the 3.15 P.M. order. In the 3.15 order there is not a word about D'Erlon's corps. Ney was instructed to direct a detachment on the heights of Bry and St Amand, but what particular troops he was to detach is not specified. The order was general in its tenor. io6 WATERLOO The Baudus order, if it ever existed, was par- ticular. If, therefore, we accept the supposition that Baudus, twenty-six years after the campaign, was confused in his recollections, his testimony to the effect that Napoleon was directly responsible for D'Erlon's movement falls to the ground. In addition to this it is significant that no such order as that which Baudus asserts that he carried is in existence. Even if the duplicate has been lost, we might expect to find some traces of the original. Copies, moreover, would have been made before the order was despatched, but not a vestige of the order, its duplicate, or the copies of it has ever been discovered, nor was any allusion to these alleged orders made in the official despatches of the following day. Ney strenuously denied that any order of the kind ever reached him, and his denial carries as much weight as Baudus' assertion. In fact, the evidence in favour of the latter's narrative is not such as to carry conviction with it. It is certainly more credible that Baudus mixed up in his own mind an acknow- ledged order to Ney with an alleged order to D'Erlon, particularly as this supposition does not for a moment impugn his good faith, than that orders in duplicate, of which, probably, there were copies, should entirely disappear without having been received, and that both commanders — he who wrote them and he to whom they were written — should be confounded at an incident which, on the THE BATTLES OF THE 16TH 107 supposition that the orders were sent and received, must have occurred in conformity with the calcula- tions of both. According to D'Erlon's own statement, written in 1829, it was General Labddoyire, Napoleon's aide-de-camp, who showed him a pencil note which he was carrying to Marshal Ney, enjoining the 1st corps to march on Ligny. Lab^doyfere also informed D'Erlon that he had taken upon himself to communicate this intelligence to Durutte at Frasnes, and that the change of direction had already been made. Colonel Heym^s, however, chief of Ney's staff, says that it was not General Labddoyfere but Lieu- tenant-Colonel Laurent who instructed the ist corps to bend their march on St Amand, and once more we are met by a conflict of personal testimony. If the chief aide-de-camp of the Emperor was carrying a pencil note to Ney, it is legitimate to infer that the Emperor had sent him with the note. No such inference can be drawn from the presence of Laurent, for he was, comparatively speaking, an obscure member of the staff. There are two facts, however, which, apart from all other considerations, seem to prove conclusively that Napoleon did not order D'Erlon's change of movement. The first is the surprise which the Emperor exhibited when the ist corps appeared. At the most critical moment of the battle of Ligny he suspended an operation whicL' was designed io8 WATERLOO to be decisive, lest he might be taken on his flank by a hostile force. If he was expecting D'Erlon, could he have mistaken him for a moment for a hostile force ? The second fact is Napoleon's neglect to employ D'Erlon when on the field. When, in obedience to Ney's imperative order, the ist corps marched back again to whence it had come, Napoleon made no effort to retain it From this we may infer that he considered it as a part of Ney's wing, not of his ; as subject to Ney's orders, not to his, and, therefore, as altogether outside his own sphere of operations. Would he have so regarded the matter if he had himself summoned D'Erlon to his side .' Whether, when the corps had arrived. Napoleon would not have done better to use it himself, is another question not bearing on Napoleon's re- sponsibility for the incident. The point, however, for the sake of convenience, may be referred to here. La Tour d'Auvergne, whose treatise on the campaign is for the most part luminous and careful, states that the Emperor " reiterated his orders to D'Erlon " (to take the Prussian army ci revers) indicating to him again the direction, so as to " avoid all indecision." He does not, however, produce any evidence for this statement, which is directly contrary to the account of the matter given by D'Erlon and Durutte, who, of all people, were likely to know the truth as to this particular. THE BATTLES OF THE 16TH 109 The Emperor then did not employ D'Erlon at Ligny, either because of the lateness of the hour, or through uncertainty as to the state of Ney's operations on the left, or because he supposed that D'Erlon already had his definite instructions from Ney. At the moment also his attention was wholly directed to the movement of his guard. This question is almost as difficult a one as the mystery of D'Erlon's appearance, but, as it is impos- sible to do more than guess at the motives which actuated Napoleon, the problem is not capable of a thoroughly satisfactory solution. It was, however, undoubtedly an error, consider- ing that the corps was on the field, and could scarcely be back with Ney in time to render any assistance upon the left, not to employ it at Ligny, where it might have proved very useful. The arguments which have been applied to the incident as a whole point to a definite conclusion — the conclusion that neither Napoleon nor Ney ordered the oblique movement of D'Erlon's corps. It must then have been somebody else who did it. It was probably an officer from the headquarters' staff, either Lab^doy^re or more probably Laurent, who, knowing the tenor of the orders he bore, took it upon himself to change the direction of the march of the columns. From D'Erlon's sub- sequent statement in 1829, we may judge that he shared this opinion. " Had General Lab^doyfere," he says, " a mission to change the direction of my column before no WATERLOO having seen the marshal ? I do not think so ; but, in any event, this circumstance alone was the cause of all the marches and counter-marches which paralysed my Corps d^Arm^e during the day of the 1 6th." With one more quotation from the official de- spatches, the matter may be dismissed. In a letter addressed to Ney from Fleurus next morning, Napoleon says — " The Emperor has seen with pain that you did not yesterday unite your divisions. They acted in isolation, thus you experienced losses." If the corps of Counts D'Erlon and Reille had been together, " not an Englishman of the corps which attacked you would have escaped. If Comte D'Erlon had executed the movement on St Amand,* which the Emperor ordered, the Prussian army would have been totally destroyed, and we should have made perhaps 30,000 prisoners." In this passage Napoleon hits the true mark. Though Ney was assuredly not responsible directly for the D'Erlon blunder, yet had he in the morning consolidated his command in accordance with repeated instructions the blunder could not have occurred. Whoever was responsible for the mistake, its effects were in every way disastrous. At Ligny Napoleon's victory was delayed, and by delay it was rendered far less decisive than it • I.e., the movement ordered in the despatches sent to Ney at 2 P.M., and more especially 3.15 p.m., on the i6th. THE BATTLES OF THE 16TH iii would otherwise have been. The Imperial Guard broke the Prussian centre at Ligny about eight o'clock P.M. But for the uncertainty caused by D'Erlon's appearance this would have been done about 6.30. The daylight would have sufficed to push the Prussian retreat severely, and to ascertain its direction beyond possibility of error. As it was, the retreat was conducted in good order, and its direction was not thoroughly known to Napoleon thoughout the remainder of the campaign. That steady, solid movement to the northward which reconnected Blucher's communications with Wel- lington would have been frustrated, and it was this movement which won the battle of Waterloo. Much more disastrous would the Prussian defeat have been had D'Erlon been called upon to par- ticipate in the final struggle at Ligny. At Quatre Bras the co-operation of the ist corps would have ensured a victory over Welling- ton. It is impossible to doubt this in view of what Ney actually accomplished with only 20,000 men engaged. It is a simple problem in propor- tion. If Ney, with 20,000 men, could hold Welling- ton in check for seven hours, what could he have done with 40,000 .' And had Wellington suffered at Quatre Bras a severe reverse, he could scarcely have adopted, on the following day, that policy of reculer pour mieux sauter which, at Waterloo, was crowned with such decisive success. Time would have been necessary for the reorganisation of his army. 112 WATERLOO and an engagement such as Waterloo would have been postponed, perhaps indefinitely. For the Prussian retreat northward was conducted on the supposition that Wellington would stand and fight the French at Mont St Jean. The Prussians would assuredly have retired on their base but for the prospect of an immediate engagement, in which they might co-operate. Thus, with D'Erlon either at Quatre Bras or at Ligny, the whole future of the campaign would have been other than it was. This is not to say that Napoleon would have succeeded ultimately, but undoubtedly a heavy reverse on either point would have rendered the prospects of the allies far more gloomy than on the evening of the i6th they actually were. In attempting, as we have done, to estimate the eflfects of the absence or presence of 20,000 men, who might have been employed on either wing, we run some risk of falling victims to an unconscious confusion. We may end by imagining them em- ployed on both wings at once, and drawing con- clusions from premisses which are obviously absurd. This danger, it is hoped, has been avoided. And yet, perhaps, some such employment of D'Erlon's corps was not so impossible as at first sight appears. Let us split the corps in halves, allowing 10,000 men to Ney to support his battle at Quatre Bras. This brings Ney's effective force to over 30,000 men. It is by no means impossible that with this number Ney might have gained a real success. THE BATTLES OF THE 16TH 113 The remaining 10,000 might, according to Napo- leon's 3.15 order, have been despatched upon St Amand and Bry. Coming up with a full knowledge of their mission, and at the crisis of the battle, this manoeuvre might have effected all that Napoleon anticipated from it. This, of course, is speculation, but it was not impossible to materialise this specu- lation into a fact. It was this that Napoleon ordered and expected, and such a disposition of D'Erlon's corps was most in conformity with the actual situation which confronted each wing of the French army. V. — Summary. The i6th of June was perhaps the most eventful day in the history of the campaign, and also the most important in the effects which it exercised upon the ultimate issue. The hour of five o'clock in the afternoon marks the turning-point when the fortunes of Napoleon began to decline, and the prospects of the allies to grow bright ; and yet the honours of the day rested, on the whole, with the Emperor. Instead of a day of mere manoeuvres, he had been enabled to strike a heavy blow against three-fourths of the Prussian army. He had, in his own opinion, rendered it incapable, at any rate for some days, of taking any further part in the campaign ; he had kept the allies asunder while maintaining his own position in strength between them. H 1 14 WATERLOO Wellington, out of his whole army, had only succeeded in bringing to the field about one-third of its effective force, and, far from overthrowing whatever was in front of him, and directing himself on Gosselies, his utmost endeavours had only suc- ceeded in gaining him a few yards more ground than his troops had occupied the evening before. But, on the other hand, no decisive success had been gained by the French at Quatre Bras, and the Anglo-Dutch still interposed between them and Brussels. At Ligny the Prussians had been suffered to retreat in good order, and by with- drawing northward on Wavre, towards Wellington and their own reinforcements, they were more formidable after defeat than they had been before, for they had succeeded in veiling from Napoleon both their direction and their intentions. Thus, by the very fact of his success, the Em- peror was filled with a confidence that was at once misplaced and delusive, and from it all his sub- sequent false moves in the campaign took their origin. CHAPTER VII. THE 17TH OF JUNE, (WELLINGTON AND NAPOLEON.) I. The Line of Blucher's Retreat — II. Wellington's determination to Retreat — III. Position of the French Army on the morning of the 17th ; delay at Quatre Bras and on the Right— IV. The Retreat on Waterloo — V. The position at Waterloo ; Welling- ton's dispositions — VI. Views and expectations of Wellington in standing at Waterloo — VII. Anticipations of Napoleon in taking position-^VIII. Summary. I. After the battle of Ligny the Emperor rested upon his victory. " The Prussian army has been put to rout," he writes to Ney on the 17th. "General Pajol is pursuing it on the roads to Namur and Li^ge." This letter was written about 8 A.M., twelve hours after the fight was over. Yet during these hours Napoleon had made no attempt to pursue the Prussians, except, early in the morning, to send out Pajol with a division of his cavalry. Pajol's reports, no doubt, suggested the tone of confidence in which the Emperor wrote. The . facts, however, were widely different from these confident suppositions. The Prussian army had not been put to the rout After the battle, ii6 WATERLOO Ziethen's corps retired in good order on Tilly, a village about two miles due north of Bry. Pirch's corps continued to occupy Bry until after mid- night, when it followed Ziethen. Thielemann's corps remained in occupation of Sombref until ordered to retire on Gembloux, while Biilow, after marching all day, arrived at Sauveni^res in the early hours of the morning. Within six hours after the battle the Prussians were better con- centrated than before. Nor was it the Prussian army which Pajol was pursuing on the roads to Namur and Li^ge. More than io,doo men who had taken part in the battle deserted when the battle was over, and made their way along the Namur road. In addition to these there were plenty of stragglers and wounded men, as is always the case after a hot engagement, who had drifted away from the main body, and would naturally be making their way towards the Prus- sian base. The prisoners captured by Pajol's cavalry were from these straggling detachments. As for the main body, it entirely escaped observa- tion, and was every moment interposing a greater space between itself and the French army. The very measures, therefore, which Napoleon took added to his deception, and he whose success had so often depended upon neglect of the strict rules of war, could hardly be brought to believe that his enemies had imitated his example, and for the purposes of greater ultimate advantage, had de- termined to risk the loss of their base. The THE 17TH OF JUNE 117 risk, indeed, was very great. The Prussian soldiers carried with them but very scanty rations, and by a retreat northwards it became doubtful how soon fresh supplies could be brought up. The ammuni- tion, too, was a source of anxiety, for all that Blucher had with him had been exhausted at Ligny, and he was in ignorance as to whence or when fresh supplies would be forthcoming. Nothing can exceed the pluck and daring of a determina- tion arrived at in the moment of disaster, to court privations, hunger, and fatigue, if only the com- munications with the Anglo-Dutch army might be maintained. The chief credit for this determination must be given to Gneisenau, Blucher's chief-of-staff. The Marshal himself had been severely bruised and shaken in the course of the battle of Ligny. His horse fell dead upon him, and two successive cavalry charges passed over his prostrate body. No sooner was he rescued than he was on horse- back again, though now over seventy years of age, but he was in no condition to conduct the further operations of his force, and this duty therefore fell to Gneisenau. It may be doubted what that General really meant by directing the line of Ziethen and Pirch's corps on Tilly. It is a fundamental rule in war that a defeated army retreats upon its reinforce- ments, and Biilow's columns, as yet wholly unem- ployed, were heading fast towards Gembloux. It may therefore have been that Gneisenau con- ii8 WATERLOO sidered a northerly line of retreat was, in any event, a good direction to take, as tending to con- centrate the army, and that this decision by no means committed him to following this line further when once his immediate purpose was accom- plished. Be this as it may, in the course of the night each corps of the Prussian army was under orders to march on Wavre, — Ziethen and Pirch by way of Gentinnes and Mont St Guibert, Billow and Thielemann by way of Walhain. II. The Duke of Wellington received no news of his allies until about nine o'clock on the morning of the 17th. The Prussian commanders have been blamed for neglect in this respect, but it appears that, immediately after Ligny, information had been sent to Wellington informing him of the result of the battle, but that the officer who carried the despatch had been wounded, and so was unable to deliver it. Certainly the receipt of communica- tions of such importance should not have been made contingent upon the chance disasters which might occur to an individual aide-de-camp. It is un- necessary, however, to discuss here the serious consequences which this want of information might have involved;, for the present it is sufficient to note the fact that, at 10 A.M., the Duke's army, now powerfully reinforced, though not even yet completely concentrated at Quatre Bras, was still THE 17TH OF JUNE 119 in position at and beyond that point, completely isolated, and exposed, without prospect of support, to the conjoint attack of both wings of the French army. There was no alternative but retreat. It was an unpleasant necessity, and liable to expose the Duke to much ill-natured criticism. He was mindful of the persistent misrepresentation which had followed him throughout the Peninsula campaigns, and he evidently expected the same kind of thing now. His composure, however, was quite undisturbed, and his decision was arrived at with singular promptitude. " Old Blucher," he said to Captain Bowles, " has had a damned good licking, and gone back to Wavre, eighteen miles. As he has gone back, we must go too. I suppose in England they will say we have been licked. I can't help it ; as they are gone back, we must go too." " He made all the arrangements for retiring," says Captain Bowles, "without moving from the spot on which he was standing, and it certainly did not occupy him five minutes." The retreat was immediately begun, and by evening the Duke's army was in position at Waterloo. in. We may now return to Napoleon and consider his movements in relation to these operations. His general plan of action had been sketched in his letter to Grouchy of the previous day. " My intention is, after having defeated the Prussians, to I20 WATERLOO set off this night, and to operate with my left wing, which Marshal Ney commands, upon the English." This was written when he expected but little resist- ance from the Prussians, but the fact that resistance had been in force, and had been protracted, did not necessarily affect his general design. It was not now possible " to set off this night " but there was nothing to prevent his setting off quite early in the morning. Eventually he did proceed on exactly the lines he had himself laid down the day before. We have therefore — as no new plans had to be devised, nor any important changes introduced into those already existing — merely to consider the rea- sons which induced Napoleon to delay his move- ment on the morning of the 17th. The question must be examined from two sides — his delay in ascertaining the facts about the Prussian retreat, his delay in attaching himself to Ney for offensive operations against the English. In regard to the first point, two hours of the battle of Ligny having been lost by the unexpected ap- pearance of D'Erlon, darkness intervened to prevent any efficient and vigorous pursuit of the Prussians.* Nor at a later time was a pursuit in force practic- able. Napoleon had not to deal with the Prussians alone. He must, in fulfilment of his plan, operate promptly against the English. For this purpose he required to keep his troops well in hand, and also, not to exhaust those who were comparatively • The Prussians, however, did not allow darkness to prevent their vigorous pursuit of the French after Waterloo, THE 17TH OF JUNE 121 fresh, and on whom he relied to defeat Wellington. Hence any pursuit of the Prussians must be en- trusted to those who had borne the brunt of the fight at Ligny — that is, to the troops of Vandamme and Gerard, composing the 3rd and 4th corps. These men were thoroughly exhausted. Not only had their ranks been thinned by severe losses— it is estimated that 12,000 French fell at Ligny— not only had they fought with great persistency and fury for eight hours, but they had sustained the fatigues of a long march begun in the early morn- ing of the I Sth, and only ended by the order to form in line of battle on the i6th. There are limits to the soldier's powers of endurance, and those limits may well have been reached by the time Ligny was over. We do not, therefore, blame Napoleon for failure to pursue energetically and in force. We blame him for not observing the line of the enemy's retreat. A small cavalry detachment was despatched in the wrong direction, — why was no reconnaissance made on the roads to Tilly and Gembloux .' The fatigues of the soldiers can be no excuse here, for Napoleon had plenty of cavalry upon his right wing which had only been slightly engaged. Instead of detaching Pajol and Excelmans on the Namur road, why should not Excelmans have explored towards Wavre ? It is perfectly clear that both Napoleon and Soult were so certain, on abstract grounds of reasoning, that the Prussians had gone in the direction which ought in theory to have been taken, that they did 122 WATERLOO not think it worth while to explore the roads in any other direction. Two hours more daylight on the 1 6th would have rendered such a misapprehen- sion impossible. In regard to the second point, why did Napoleon delay to attach himself to Ney, and immediately begin operations against the English .' Here again the fatigues of the soldiers cannot be alleged as an excuse. The Emperor at no time proposed to utilise for his attack upon Wellington the troops of Vandamme and G6rard. Apart from these he had the Guard. The Guard had certainly been employed at Ligny. They had fought with conspicuous valour from seven o'clock until perhaps 9.30, but throughout the afternoon they had been spectators of the scene, and a few hours' rest were sufficient to recruit their energies. He also now had the 6th corps of Lobau, which had not been employed at all, and on his left wing there was D'Erlon, none of whose 20,000 men had fired a shot. He had, therefore, 50,000 troops, exclusive of those who had fought at Quatre Bras, to which may be added three divisions of Kellermann's dragoons, and Lefbbvre-Desnouette's division of the cavalry of the Guard, which Ney had not employed, with which to attack the Anglo-Dutch army on the 17th. Wellington, at Waterloo on the 1 8th, could only oppose about 68,000 men to the French army. Before Quatre Bras, on the 17th, the rivals would have been fairly equally matched in point of numbers, and Wellington THE 17TH OF JUNE 123 would have been quite overmatched in point of quality. Napoleon's delay, therefore, must be accounted for on other suppositions than that his troops were fatigued and his forces inadequate. Napoleon's personal fatigue, however, was one factor in the situation, his want of information was another. It is to these causes that his delay may be attributed. The amount of work which the Emperor had got through since the opening of the campaign was enormous. He had personally superintended every- thing. He had to lay down the movements for Ney upon the left, for Grouchy on the right, and himself to lead the reserves. We see him supping with Ney at midnight on the iSth, and again astir a few hours later. On the i6th he must have been twenty hours in the saddle. His capacity for dis- pensing with sleep is proverbial, but none the less, when Ligny was over, he was terribly exhausted. Critics are sometimes apt to regard military affairs as if they were conducted by pieces on a chess- board. Armies are composed of men, and it is a man, subject to human weakness, who leads them. It may be true that to issue a few orders would not have taken much time, nor have added materially to Napoleon's fatigue, but this leaves out of consideration not only the physical but the mental lassitude which ensues upon the completion of some great piece of work — ^the dis- inclination to face even the smallest tasks which refer to the execution of another. It was but 124 WATERLOO human nature that Napoleon should be content to leave matters as they were till next morning, when he could undertake the new work before him with energies renewed and mind and body refreshed by some hours of undisturbed repose. But it cannot be denied that had he been more than man — had he been able to dispense with that much-needed rest — a great opportunity was before him, never to present itself again. But he was unaware of the fact, — his intelligence was at fault.* Ney had sent no information upon the con- clusion of the action of Quatre Bras of how things had gone with him that day. Early in the morning we find Soult writing to Ney under the supposition that his force was only now concen- trated, and demanding exact information as to the position of his divisions, " and of all which is pass- ing in front of you." As late as twelve o'clock this information had apparently not arrived. " His Majesty awaits your reports with impatience," Soult writes at that hour. The fact was that Ney was bitterly exasperated by the Emperor's sup- posed withdrawal of D'Erlon's corps from the operations at Quatre Bras, and it would seem that he expressed it by reserving information of what had passed and was passing upon his front. But all this time the opportunity was slipping away — the enemy were retreating. Had Napoleon known that the allied army was still before Quatre Bras, * For the whole subject of Napoleon's physical condition in the campaign, see Chapter XL, § vii, and note. Also see page 145. THE 17TH OF JUNE 125 isolated from Prussian support, exposed to an immediate attack, it is impossible to imagine that he would have hesitated to march at early morn- ing for the purpose of overwhelming it. Had this been done, say at 6 or even 7 A.M., it does not appear that anything could have saved Welling- ton from destruction. But in the absence of in- formation from Ney, Napoleon was justified in assuming that the English had withdrawn in the night, for he could not know that the news of Blucher's defeat would not reach Wellington till nine o'clock in the morning. The blame for his inaction does not rest wholly upon the Emperor's shoulders. Ney must share the burden, in that he failed to display either initiative or activity at a time when, from a leader of his reputation, both might well have been expected. Napoleon then contented himself on the morn- ing of the 17th with recruiting the energies of himself and his troops, and by writing a letter to Ney, the contents of which have already been alluded to. He blames the Marshal's want of concentration on the day before. To avoid the possibility of any such misfortune in the future, very precise instructions are given. " The Emperor hopes and desires that your seven divisions of infantry and the cavalry shall be well together, and that together they should not occupy one league of ground, so as to have them well in hand and employ them at need." In the same letter the Emperor declares his intention of moving to 126 WATERLOO his left by the Namur-Nivelles route. This would avert the possibility of an attack upon Ney by Wellington's troops, for they would immediately be exposed to destruction from such a flank move- ment by Napoleon ; whether Ney should himself attack was left to his own judgment. "The in- tention of his majesty is that you should take position at Quatre Bras, as you have been ordered to do " (the day before), " but if that is impossible, report at once and in detail, and the Emperor will move, as has been described ; if, on the contrary, there is only a rear-guard, attack it and take position." Considering the temper and disposition of Ney on the morning in question, no very vigorous action was to be looked for from him, but it may be doubted if any was required beyond the prompt despatch of news to the Emperor's head- quarters. As he read over his instructions, he may well have fdt that they conveyed to him orders to remain as he w£is until Napoleon could join him. It is true he was to take Quatre Bras, but it was recognised that he might be outnumbered there. He was to act according to circumstances, and he was to be the judge of the circumstances. Some hostile criticism has been levelled against Ney for not having attacked the Anglo-Dutch army himself on the morning of the 17th. Such a proceeding would certainly have been rash, though it might well have been successful. It scarcely follows, as some of Ney's defenders have asserted, that the order — THE 17TH OF JUNE 127 " If there is only a rear-guard, attack it " — con- stitutes proof positive that if there was more than a rear-guard he was not to attack it In the one case there could be no doubt about the matter ; in the other, Ney was to do what he thought best. If Napoleon had marched promptly by his left to the support of Ney, there could have been no time for hesitation or delay, but as it was, to attack with weakened forces troops which had just been strongly reinforced, might seem a mad and senseless pro- ceeding. At the same time, it must be remembered that Ney had been reinforced too. He had now D'Erlon's corps of 20,000 men, in addition to the 15,000 who remained of Reille's corps after the engagement of the day before. He had at his dis- position three untouched brigades of Kellermann's dragoons, and Leffebvre-Desnouette's cavalry. He could put into the field in the early hours of the 17th at least 15,000 more men than were mustered when the action of the i6th was ended. Should he not have risked his now consolidated force against Wellington, even though the latter was now ^consolidated also, and outnumbered him by perhaps 10,000 men ? Moreover, he had upon his right the main French army. A true comprehen- sion of the situation must have made clear to him that he had only to apply for assistance to get it. Had he informed Napoleon at night or even early in the morning of the facts, a strong detachment could have arrived- upon his right in three hours, and by eight o'clock Wellington might have been 128 WATERLOO fully engaged, with every prospect of prompt success for the French. We have evidence that Napoleon's co-operation in such an attack would have been immediate. When at length he heard what the actual situa- tion on Ney's front was, he immediately de- spatched a corps of infantry and the Imperial Guard to Marbais, at the same time writing to the Marshal instructions " to attack the enemy at Quatre Bras in order to drive them from their position, while the corps at Marbais would second his operations." Can there be a doubt that the same action would have been adopted many hours earlier if the facts had been known earlier ? We may admit that Ney was right in not risking an engagement against a superior force, but this ad- mission does not excuse him for not taking vigorous and immediate steps to secure adequate reinforce- ments in order to effect so vital an object as the overthrow of the only enemy now remaining in the field. But whatever might have been, the fact remains that the morning of the 17th was wasted, and the grand opportunity lost. Hearing nothing from his left, and being satisfied with the completeness of his own success upon the right. Napoleon deter- mined to devote the day to the recuperation of his army. " La journh d'auj'ourd'kui" he says, " est n^cessaire pour terminer cette operation" — which operation is not distinctly specified, whether his own movements or Ney's, though, from the context THE 17TH OF JUNE 129 it may be judged that he refers to Ney's seizure of the position at Quatre Bras — "pour computer les munitions, rallier les militaires isoUs etfaire rentrer les cUtachements" Thus it is that we see the Emperor, on the morn- ing of the 17th, chatting with his generals on in- different subjects, recalling incidents of the early days of the Revolution, and, with the exception of the one letter to Ney, taking no step to hasten or direct the movements of his wings. At noon, however, he was active once more. He then set about preparing to move upon Marbais, with a view to forming a junction with Ney and prosecuting a vigorous attack upon the English by his left, and about the same hour he entrusted to Marshal Grouchy the task of following up the retreat of the Prussians with 33,000 men, a commission which has been the subject of eighty years of controversy and recrimination, and which marks a crisis in the history of the campaign. IV. It was about one o'clock when Napoleon put himself at the head of his columns to march by the main chauss^e to the support of Marshal Ney. He took with him the Imperial Guard and the 6th corps of Lobau, all of them comparatively fresh troops, for they had taken no very prolonged part in the engagement at Ligny — indeed, Lobau had not been employed at all. I I30 WATERLOO At Marbais he picked up the infantry and cavalry which had been despatched to that point earlier in the day, and appeared upon the flank of his left wing with over 30,000 men. Upon his approach Ney put his men in movement, the forces thus united pursuing the enemy who had been in process of withdrawal from Quatre Bras for now at least four hours. Napoleon must have perceived at last, with feelings of bitter chagrin, the oppor- tunity which had presented itself to him in the early morning, and which he had omitted to grasp. If his general movement had begun earlier, the united French army, over 71,000 strong, would have appeared against the English army in a position of isolation, and only 45,000 strong. There is small wonder that he should have felt indignant with Marshal Ney, not because he had not himself attacked the English, but because he had refrained from sending information which would have enabled Napoleon to seize the chance offered him. " They have ruined France," he said to D'Erlon, whom he found in advance of Quatre Bras. Perhaps he was thinking of his order to Ney the previous afternoon — "The fate of France is in your hands," Perhaps already he had a pre- monition of coming disaster. At two o'clock he was a different man to the Napoleon who at eleven o'clock was talking politics to his generals, pleased with the operations of the past and con- fident about the future. Instead of a holiday march he now had serious work before him, and THE 17TH OF JUNE 131 the due execution of it depended chiefly upon his own exertions. The pursuit, however, was now urged with as much vigour as the fact that Wellington had already been four hours in movement would permit. It was impossible to approach the English main army ; its march was entirely unimpeded, except " by fatigue, dust, heat, and thirst " — ^but the rear guard, which was made up of the cavalry led by Lord Uxbridg?, supported by one division of infantry, had some smart skirmishes with the French vanguard. In one of these, at Genappe, the 7th Hussars were ordered to charge the head of the French column. Opposed to them were Lancers, strongly backed by Cuirassiers, and strengthened on each ilank by strong bodies of cavalry. The ground was heavy, and the horses of the Hussars were leg-weary and jaded. Under such conditions the order was injudicious. Several English officers and over forty men were killed, and reflections were subsequently cast upon the regiment which were thoroughly undeserved. It was at the moment of this reverse that the 1st Life Guards were brought up and ordered to charge. Their weight and impetuosity carried everything before them, and the temporary check was speedily repaired. No second effort on the part of the English Guards was necessary, for "though we were to have given them another chat^e of the same sort," writes an officer of the 2nd Life Guards, "they thought it prudent not to 132 WATERLOO expose themselves to our weight a second time." On the other side, the French Guards, marching at the head of the pursuing column, with six pieces of horse artillery, kept up a murderous cannonade against the English cavalry whenever the oppor- tunity permitted. Throughout the afternoon the rain fell in torrents from a murky and thunderous sky — the air was heavy, hot and sultry — the fatigues and exhaustion of the soldiers were excessive, but on each side there was the same strict obedience to orders, the same discipline, the same high courage exhibited under most depressing circumstances. In the meantime, at Brussels, all was confusion and alarm. The news soon spread that the Duke of Wellington was in retreat before Napoleon in person, that the Prussians had been decisively defeated, and that the French would be in the city in a few hours. The Belgians were in no con- dition to distinguish between retreat conducted for the purposes of better resistance and complete and hopeless rout. The dead and wounded were now arriving from the rear, and among these there was carried through the city, in the course of the day, the body of the ill-fated Duke of Brunswick,* whose chivalrous oath never to sheathe his sword until he had expiated the outraged manes of his father was to be fulfilled only by his own death. Each straggler brought news more alarming than the last, and the only hope of safety seemed to lie in prompt flight. Heartrending scenes were witnessed * The Duke of Brunswick's father had fallen at Auerstadt, 1806. THE 17TH OF JUNE 133 in the streets, as wounded soldiers staggered to their homes in the hope — often a vain one — of dying surrounded by the care and affection of their own families. A greater contrast could scarcely be exhibited between the Brussels of the i6th, full of unreasoning hopes and boasting confidence, and the Brussels of the 17th, stricken by a panic as unreasoning as its previous elation. As the evening closed the Anglo-Dutch army took up its position with a view to a battle on the following morning. The field of Waterloo had already recommended itself to the skilled eye of the Duke of Marlborough, during the campaigns of the War of Succession, as eminently suitable for the purposes of a general engagement ; and before the campaign of 18 1 5 opened, it had been surveyed by order of the Duke of Wellington, as being the spot where, if put to it, he would take position for the defence of Brussels. The little village of Mont St Jean, where Wellington placed his head-quarters, is situated at the junction of the high roads which lead from Nivelles arid Charleroi to Brussels. In front of it was rolling ground, affording excellent cover to troops drawn up for purposes of defence, while behind it was the village of Waterloo, about two miles distant upon the Brussels road, just where it emerges from the Forest of Soignes. The village of Braine-la- Leude lay to the west, affording cover for the right 134 WATERLOO of an army posted at right angles to the main road, while the hamlets of Merbe Braine on the right, of Papelotte, Frischermont, and Smohain on the left, were available to afford still further pro- tection. In front of the right were the chateau and grounds of Hougomont, lying a little off the Nivelles road and towards the Brussels turnpike. The estate of Hougomont consisted of a house, chapel, farm buildings, a wood, a garden, laid out in the Dutch fashion with parallel walks and high thick hedges, and was surrounded by an orchard. A mile to the southward of Mont St Jean, lying upon the west side of the main Brussels road, was the farm of La Haie Sainte, situated in the hollow just where the road begins to ascend towards La Belle Alliance. On the other side of the road, against La Haie Sainte, was a quarry, and the turnpike just about this point had been cut through the ground, leaving high banks upon either side. For pur- poses of defence the whole position could be turned to account most effectively, and as he retreated the Duke threw troops both into Hougomont and La Haie Sainte in order with the one to guard his right, with the other his centre. The villages to his left were also occupied. VL Such dispositions on the night of the 17th clearly indicated Wellington's intention of standing to meet the enemy, and it must now be considered what justification he had for thus accepting a battle THE 17TH OF JUNE 135 against a superior force when possibly the whole destiny of the campaign depended upon his deter- mination. It has been seen that the Duke did not receive information from Blucher as to the results of the battle of Ligny and his subsequent movements until about nine o'clock on the morning of the 17th. He had already been made aware by a patrol party which he had sent out that the Prussians were in retreat, but he could have no accurate knowledge of their intentions until he heard from Blucher. Upon receipt of news, his decision was prompt to fall back for the express purpose of maintaining communications with his allies, at the same time despatching a letter to BlUcher, informing him of his resolution to stand at Waterloo if he could be assured of Prussian support to the extent " of one or more corps, as might be necessary," * but that otherwise he would fall back upon Brussels. We may assume that this letter w£is despatched at the earliest possible moment, but, none the less, a reply to it could not by any possibility have been received before 3 P.M. As a fact, Blucher at that hour was in no position to give positive assurances. He was deficient in ammunition, though the train was, as it happened, upon the road, nor was he yet aware of the precise positions of his 3rd and 4th corps; marching, as they were, upon the extreme right by way of Gembloux and Sart- ^-Walhain. The ammunition reached Wavre at * Despatch to Lord Bathurst, June 22, 1815. 136 WATERLOO 5 P.M. News of Thielemann and Bulow arrived just before midnight. It thus becomes a ques- tion as to the hour when Bliicher sent an answer to Wellington assuring him of the sup- port which had been requested. It may have reached the Duke on the evening of the 17th. It may have reached him only on the morning of the 1 8th. In any event, it is clear that the Duke's retreat was based upon his confidence in Bliicher, not upon any exact assurances, and that upon the strength of that confidence he took up position at Waterloo. Chesney tells us that " Wellington, before deciding to fight on his chosen ground next day, had had the full assurance of hearty support from Bliicher," and in confirmation of this statement, he quotes an extract from Bliicher's letter, that "he would march with his whole army to join him, but on condition that if the French delayed to attack, the allies would give them battle on the 19th," but Chesney makes no reference to the hour when this letter was received, and, as a consequence, his contribution towards a proper estimate of the Duke's conduct is of stnall value. The point is this — Was there sufficient likelihood of Prussian support being forthcoming to justify the Duke in risking a battle without positive assurance of such support ? A reference to the battle of Ligny may be of use in consider- ing this question. There, entirely unsupported by his ally, Bliicher had suffered a reverse. He had taken position in the hope of assistance from THE 17TH OF JUNE 137 Wellington, but without the certainty of it. That assistance it was impossible to afford, and in default of it Blucher had been defeated. Just as the Duke was unaware of the nature of the resist- ance he was himself to meet with at Quatre Bras, so he, and Blucher too, were unaware of the strength of the force which had been despatched to occupy the Prussians and separate them from the English. Grouchy's troops were estimated by Blucher at 10,000 or 1 1,000 men ; as a fact they were three times that number ; exactly the same circumstances, therefore, might intervene to keep the allies apart at Waterloo as had actually kept them apart during the engagements of the i6th. It must be remembered, too, that though the Prussians did arrive, it was not until between four and five in the afternoon of Waterloo, when the battle was four hours old. Had Napoleon begun the battle of the i8th at 6 or 7 A.M., it would have been in progress at least nine hours before the Prussians arrived, and it is, to say the least, improbable that Wellington's miscellaneous force could have held their own, unsupported, for any- thing like that time. The conclusion must be that the Duke's decision was marked by a boldness which closely resembles rashness; and supposing, as some critics maintain, that he received no as- surances from Blucher whatever until the morning of the 1 8th, it will be difficult to deny that his conduct can only be justified by its success. There is the strongest evidence to prove that the 138 WATERLOO Duke himself was fully sensible of the risks he was incurring, for, after his troops had taken position, the pickets posted, and all arrangements made, Wellington rode over to Wavre in order to inter- view Bliicher, " that I might learn from his own lips at what hour it was probable he would be able to join forces with us the next day." The story of this night ride has been most circumstantially told by so trustworthy a witness as the DuTce of Wel- lington himself, who related it to Mr Pierrepont in 1833, and to Mr Justice Coltman in 1838. It also iippears in Lockhart's " Life of Napoleon." * Those who assert that the Duke had no personal interview with Bliicher from the time he met him at Bry, on the morning of the i6th, until they greeted each other at Genappe, at the close of the battle of Waterloo, have to contend with this story of the Duke himself, attested by independent witnesses at different times. Such a ride was cer- tainly not unnatural in the very critical circum- stances in which Wellington found himself. We may, therefore, believe the Duke when he says — " However, I saw him (Bliicher), got the informa- tion I wanted from him, and made the best of my way homewards." Very possibly it is to this in- terview that he refers when he says, in his despatch to Lord Bathurst, that " the Marshal had promised * In addition to the interesting pages devoted by Mr Ropes to this matter, the reader is referred to an article by Mr Archibald Forbes in the Pall Mall Magazine for August 1894 — " Copen- hagen, and other Famous Battle-horses." See Appendix II. THE 17TH OF JUNE 139 me ... he would support me with one or more corps." Some time, therefore, in the course of the night the Duke — by letter, or by personal inter- view, or by both — received from Blucher a definite assurance with regard to his co-operation on the morrow. Confidence was converted into certainty, and whatever may have been the Duke's misgiv- ings throughout the 17th, as he conducted the retreat and took up his situation for the night, they must have been dispelled before morning dawned. It was then in full and clear reliance upon Blucher and Prussian assistance that the Duke stood his ground on the i8th June. VII. Napoleon took up his position for the night partly in front of the Anglo-Dutch army upon the high ground about La Belle Alliance and partly at Genappe. His one fear was that the enemy might escape him and continue its retreat through the Forest of Soignes upon Brussels. With BlUcher retreating upon Brussels from Wavre, the two armies would be concentrated in force in front of the city, and Napoleon's situation thereby rendered most critical. This was the course the Emperor afterwards insisted would have been the right one for the allied commanders to take under the cir- cumstances, and though he had no apprehensions from the Prussians, he was much afraid that the Anglo-Dutch for their part were adopting it. In the " Relation fidile et ddtaillde," published in the 140 WATERLOO year after the battle, it is stated that the French were astonished that the English had not only maintained their evening position, " but were pre- pared to defend it," while Napoleon exclaimed — "Enfinje les tiens — ces Anglais ! " He had pushed forward his cavalry detachments in order to assure himself that the enemy was really standing, and his pickets were stationed as close to the British lines as possible in order to inform him if any attempt to withdraw should be made in the night. The Emperor himself at nightfall retired to quarters at Caillou, about three miles from Mont St Jean, and it was not until the following morning that his troops occupied the positions in which they were to fight during the day. VIII. The events of the 17th of June were of the utmost importance in relation to the issue of the campaign. It was a day of manoeuvres, whereas the 1 6th was a day of action, but the final victory of the allies was more dependent upon the manoeuvres than on the actions. Want of complete and accu- rate intelligence is perhaps the most noticeable feature of the day, whether we regard the move- ments of Ney, of Napoleon, of Wellington, or of Blucher. Ney knew not or neglected the oppor- tunity which Wellington's isolated position at Quatre Bras afforded him. Wellington was thus isolated because he knew not the results of Ligny THE 17TH OF JUNE 141 and the line of the Prussian retreat Napoleon, owing to the remissness of Ney, knew not that by joining his centre to the left wing early in the morning he could overwhelm the Anglo-Dutch, cut off as they were from all chance of support from their allies ; and equally was he unaware of the true line of march adopted by the Prussians, owing, in the first place, to an over-sanguine estimate of his victory of the day before, and in the second to his own neglect in omitting to send reconnoitring parties in any other directions than the one he wrongly assumed the Prussians to have taken. Bliicher marched on Wavre, unaware of the exact situation of two of his four corps, ignorant of the situation of his ammunition trains, and trusting that Wellington would adopt a line of retreat parallel to his own, rather than knowing with any certainty that such a line was actually being taken. Wellington withdrew from Quatre Bras towards Brussels, and took position at Mont St Jean, trusting, from the nature of the case, that the Prussians would support him, if he stood his ground, not with any sure intelligence that he would be so supported. He was also misin- formed as to the force the French were bringing against him, for he supposed that Napoleon had mus- tered his whole army, with the exception of some 10,000 or 11,000 men, whereas 33,000 men had been detached to follow the Prussians, and Girard's division of 3000 men had been left at Ligny. The movements of Grouchy were equally characterised 142 WATERLOO by uncertainty, as will be seen, but this was in the nature of things, for he had been specially sent forth to obtain information, and his mission would have been useless had certainty already existed. Uncertainty implies hesitation and delay, and hence the 17th was a day of delays. Ney delayed his attack upon Quatre Bras until Napoleon could join him. Napoleon delayed joining him until he received information from Ney. Wellington de- layed his retreat until he received information from Blucher, while Grouchy's march was delayed through over-confidence that the Prussians were disposed of, and was ultimately despatched through a growing feeling of uncertainty as to whether it was really so. The responsibility for this state of things has been apportioned first to Ney, who, smarting with a sense of indignation against the Emperor for withdrawing, as he wrongly supposed, the ist corps from his com- mand, attributed his ill-success at Quatre Bras to Napoleon, and, as if in revenge, deliberately sacrificed his chances of converting repulse into victory. Responsibility also directly attaches to Napoleon himself, and to Soult, his chief-of- staff, for neglecting simple and feasible precautions, and wasting precious moments until it was too late to redeem them. On the Prussian side alone do we see, on the 17th, time being placed to the best account, and the time thus gained was to prove the ultimate cause of the brilliant success at Waterloo. THE 17TH OF JUNE 143 When at last the French and Anglo-Dutch troops were put in motion, we see on the one hand a retreat most skilfully conducted and a pursuit as vigorously pressed as the nature of the ground, the weather, and Wellington's dispositions would permit At the close of the day we find one army in position, ready to fight at Mont St Jean — another at Wavre ready to support it in a decisive engagement — Grouchy, far from the main French Army, far from the Prussians, and further still from the English ; while the Emperor is congratulating himself that he has but one enemy to deal with, and that it is now before him, certain to be destroyed on the morrow by his superior force, his more skilful manoeuvres, and loftier military capacity. CHAPTER VIII. GROUCHY'S march on the 17TH AND i8TH OF JUNE, UP TO THE OPENING OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. I. Grouchy despatched in pursuit of the Prussians — 11. Arrange- ments and instructions which governed his march — IH. Grouchy at Gembloux ; the two versions of the 10 P.M. despatch — IV. Grouchy's determination to advance on Wavre — V. The sound of the Cannonade at Waterloo — VI. General criticisms and observations on Grouchy's move- ments. I. At the beginning of the campaign Grouchy had been invested with the command of the cavalry upon the right wing, but upon the morning of the 1 6th, a letter from the Emperor, dated Charleroi, reached the Marshal, informing him of his appoint- ment as commander of the right wing in its entirety. " My intention is that, as commander of the right wing, you should take the command of the 3rd corps commanded by General Vandamme, of the 4th corps commanded by General G6rard, and of the cavalry corps of Pajol, Milhaud, and Excelmans, which ought not to be far short of 50,000 men. My intention is that all the Generals should take directly their orders from GROUCHY'S MARCH 145 you. They will take mine only when 1 shall be present in person." The confidence which Napoleon thus exhibited in Grouchy was not misplaced upon the i6th. His operations at Ligny were marked by vigour and resolution, and he continued to personally superintend the charges of his cavalry against the Prussians until a late hour at night. The Emperor himself withdrew from the field a little after eight o'clock in the evening, and gave orders that Grouchy should join him at Fleurus. It was not until after 11 P.M. that the Marshal's duties permitted him to obey these orders. On reach- ing the Emperor's headquarters Grouchy was in- formed that the Emperor w£is in bed ill, and had given strict instructions that he was not to be disturbed. Soult would not take upon him- self the responsibility of issuing any orders during Napoleon's retirement, and as a consequence the Marshal withdrew in a state of cruel uncertainty as to the action he ought to pursue. He, in common with Vandamme and all Napoleon's lieutenants, expected that the retreating Prussians would be instantly pursued. It was ever Napoleon's habit to follow up success to its furthest limits — but without instructions it was impossible to take the necessary measures. Still Grouchy, on his own initiative, despatched cavalry reconnaissances under Excelmans and Pajol in the direction of Gembloux and Namur, while to Pajol was added Teste's division of infantry. K 146 WATERLOO At daybreak Grouchy again betook himself to Fleurus, but was unable to see the Emperor or to get any instructions at so early an hour. At last he was informed that the Emperor would visit the battle- field of yesterday as soon as he was up, and that he would see Grouchy and give him his orders there. It was not until twelve o'clock at the earliest, and more probably towards i P.M., that Napoleon's plan in regard to the Prussians formulated itself. He then called Grouchy to him and put him iti command of the two corps of Vandamme and G6rard, of Teste's division of infantry detached from its own corps, the 6th, and of a part of Pajol's and Excelman's cavalry. The whole amounted, as nearly as possible, to 33,000 men with 96 guns. With them Grouchy received verbal orders, which were, he assures us,* to this effect — " Put yourself in pursuit of the Prussians, complete their defeat by attacking them as soon as you shall have joined them, and never lose sight of them. I am going to reunite the troops which I lead to the corps of Marshal Ney, march against the English and fight them if they stand on this side of the Forest of Soignes. You will correspond with me by the paved road which leads to Quatre Bras." The tone of these instructions was scarcely applicable to the situation as it existed. Had Grouchy received them the night before, upon the * "Fragments Historiques,'' par le G^n^ral Grouchy, Paris, 1829. " Le Mar&hal de Grouchy," par le G^ndral de division Senateur Marquis de Grouchy. Paris, 1864. GROUCHY 'S MARCH 147 conclusion of the battle of Ligny, no doubt could have entered his mind as to what he was intended to do. He would have had the enemy just in front of him, and there would have been no possi- bility of the Prussians deceiving him as to their line of retreat. But now they had fourteen hours' start They had been lost sight of, and the time when he would come up with them was a matter of mere conjecture. No one knew exactly which way they had gone. No wonder, therefore, that Grouchy received his command with misgivings and remon- strances. He pointed out that the troops entrusted to him were not expecting to march that day — they were the corps on whom the brunt of the battle of Ligny had fallen, — that some time must elapse before they were ready to start, that the Prussians had already gained many hours upon any pursuit that might be made, and that conse- quently he would not be in a position to harass their retreat or hinder the dispositions which they had already determined upon. He even ventured to point out the strategical disadvantages which might follow from detaching so large a con- tingent from the operations of the main army. "In a word, I conjured him to authorise me to follow him." Napoleon's reply was to reiterate his commands, and Grouchy proceeded to make the necessary arrangements for his march. To understand Napoleon's conduct at this junc- ture we must forget the facts and remember only his suppositions. He supposed the Prussians to 148 WATERLOO have adopted their natural line of retreat towards Namur. Thus they would be separating themselves from Wellington, and were no longer to be feared so far as the next day's battle was concerned. It was possible that they still contemplated further intervention in the campaign, and to effect this pur- pose they had two courses open to them, — to direct their march parallel to the main Brussels-Charleroi road, and so maintain communications with Wel- lington, or else they might attempt to return upon the French as they moved towards Brussels and take them in flank or rear. The first contingency had obviously, from all the evidence which we have, not even crossed Napoleon's mind at mid-day on the 17th, and his measures were in no way directed to meet it. The second contingency was probably to some slight degree present to his thoughts when he despatched Grouchy in pursuit, but he was dominated by the idea that the Prussians were retreating on Namur. In this event their fourteen hours' start was a matter of slight import- ance. It was only of importance if they had adopted the first course — viz., to effect a concen- tration with the allied army further north, and of this Napoleon had no suspicion. He therefore despatched Grouchy in full confidence that he would come up with the enemy somewhere on the Namur road, that he would complete their over- throw, and effectually check any attempts they might be inclined to make to return upon the march of the main French army. GROUCHY'S MARCH 149 The Emperor's delusion was still further strengthened by the arrival at Fleurus of a battery of eight pieces which Pajol had captured from the enemy upon the Namur road. This piece of evidence seemed convincing as to the line the Prussians were taking, and contributed more perhaps than anything else to throw dust in Napoleon's eyes. II. Grouchy accordingly left the Emperor's presence to make arrangements for his march. Though still far from reassured as to the prospect before him, he none the less proceeded to his task with promptness and energy. Vandamme was ordered to get ready to advance without delay, and to proceed with his corps to Point-du-Jour, a spot where the road from Gembloux joins the main chaussie from Namur to Quatre Bras. Gerard's corps was ordered to follow up Vandamme. It was not, however, till about 3 P.M. — according to documents published by Gerard himself — that the 4th corps began to move, and this despite Grouchy's personal exertions to expedite its march. At about 3.30 P.M. he received reports from Pajol and Excelmans— the one informing him that the Prussian retreat was by St Denis and Leuse, so as to gain the high road from Namur to Li^ge— the other that the enemy was massed at Gembloux. These despatches were almost immediately fol- lowed by a letter from Napoleon himself. It was I50 WATERLOO dated " Ligny, le 17 Juin 1815, vers trots heures" and ran as follows : — " Betake yourself to Gembloux with the cavalry corps of Pajol, the light cavalry of the 4th corps, the cavalry corps of Excelmans, the division of General Teste, of which you will have special care, as it is detached from its army corps, and the 4th corps of infantry. " You will explore in the directions of Namur and Maestricht, and you will pursue the enemy ; explore his march and instruct me as to its movement, so that I may penetrate what it is intending to do. " I am carrying my headquarters to Quatre Bras, where the English still were this morning. Our communication then will be direct by the paved road of Namur. (Here follow instructions as to the occupation of Namur, should Grouchy find it evacuated by the enemy.) " It is important to penetrate what Blucher and Wellington intend to do, and if they propose to reunite their armies to cover Brussels and Li^gef in trying the fate of another battle. In any case keep your two corps of infantry constantly unitid in a league of ground ; occupy every evening a good military position, having several avenues of retreat. Place intermediate detachments of cavalry to com- municate with headquarters. " Dictated by the Emperor, in the absence of the Major-General, to the Grand-MarshcU Bertrand." * * The text of this Document has been translated literally from Pascallet, in whose biography of Grouchy it first appeared in 1842, t There is no warrant for Mr Ropes' reading " or Liige." GROUCHY'S MARCH 151 Several reasons make it necessary to produce this order practically in full, chiefly perhaps because it was the only despatch received by Grouchy from the Emperor until the afternoon of the next day. Here are the instructions which governed his whole march. He had no others of any kind whatever until he reached Wavre on the after- noon of the 1 8th. The document assumes additional importance from the fact that for many years it was suppressed by Marshal Grouchy. Until it appeared in 1842 he always asserted that he acted under Napoleon's verbal orders only, and that no written instructions whatever were sent to him except those despatched from the field of Waterloo. It also gives us the first indication of doubt in Napoleon's mind as to the real direction of the Prussian retreat. His suppositions on the siibject have already been stated, and he did not for a moment contemplate any movement on Bliicher's part towards a concentration with Wel- lington. In Bertrand's order, sent off about three o'clock, we see the first glimmerings of such a suspicion in Napoleon's mind. The fact was that after Grouchy's departure the Emperor had received information that a strong body of Prus- sians had been seen at Gembloux. This might mean anything. It did not necessarily destroy the theory that they were retreating on Namur, though to Namur from Ligny vid Gembloux was certainly a circuitous route. They might, as Pajol reported, 152 WATERLOO be seeking the high road from Namur to Louvain by way of Gembloux. They might be halting there in order to concentrate, and, if unmolested, effect a movement on the flank and rear of Napoleon's army ; or they might be at Gembloux with a view to marching northward on Wavre, in order to keep open their communication with Wellington. It was then of the first importance that Napoleon " should be able to penetrate what the enemy was intending to do," and this was Grouchy's mission. In any event Gembloux was a good place to make for, and hence he is speci- fically instructed to betake himself there. In accordance with these instructions. Grouchy made all haste to reach his destination. But his progress was necessarily slow. Heavy rain began to fall about 2 P.M., and soon the rough and narrow country roads were converted into quag- mires by the march of his troops through the drip- ping weather. Vandamme, it is true, reached Gembloux towards 7 P.M., and pushed forward some considerable distance beyond the town, but Gerard's corps did not enter into its bivouacs till 10 P.M., and to advance further at that hour, after such fatigues and in such weather, was out of the question. In and around Gembloux, therefore, the Marshal encamped for the night. He could not advance Vandamme while leaving Gerard at Gem- bloux, for his orders to keep all his troops well together within a league of ground were precise. Certainly he had not got far, for from Ligny to GROUCHY'S MARCH 153 Gembloux is scarcely eight miles as the crow flies, but it is difficult to see how, in the circumstances, he could have got farther. III. From Gembloux that evening Grouchy de- spatched a number of letters which betray an activity which can only be described as feverish. There are two to Gerard, one to Vandamme, one to Excelmans, one to Pajol, — an important de- spatch to the Emperor dated 10 P.M., and an equally important one (which cannot be found) at 2 A.M. on the i8th. These letters indicate a due sense of the importance of his mission, and in them he repeatedly urges upon his corps commanders the necessity of expedition. Vandamme is to put himself in motion before 5 A.M. Gerard's cavalry is to set out " ct la petite pointe du jour," and his infantry is to follow up Vandamme at 8 A.M. Pajol is to start " d la pointe dujour." But it is with his letter to Napoleon that we are chiefly concerned, for it is clearly an answer to the Bertrand despatch, and shows us how Grouchy interpreted the obliga- tions which that document laid upon him. Unfor- tunately there are more versions than one of this letter, the generally received text differing in many important particulars from that given in the Grouchy memoirs, and in the apology for Grouchy written by his son in 1864. The versions, however, agree in this, that Grouchy 154 WATERLOO first informed the Emperor of his own position, then of what he had learned about the Prussians. " It appears, from all the reports," he says, " that the Prussians, having arrived at Sauvenieres" — a village three miles north-east of Gembloux — " divided into two columns. One must have taken the road to Wavre, passing by Sart-^-Walhain ; the other column appears to be directed on Perwez. One may perhaps- infer that one portion is going to join Wellington, and that the centre, which is the army of Blucher, is retiring on Li6ge." He is sending forward Excelmans with six squad- rons on Sart-^-Walhain and three on Perwez, and will act according to the reports which he may re- ceive, " but if the mass of the Prussians are retiring on Wavre, I shall follow them in that direction, so that they may not be able to gain Brussels, and so as to separate them from Wellington." * The salient difference in the two versions is to be found in this last clause. In the received text Grouchy announces that if he marches on Wavre, it will be for the purpose of preventing the Prussians from gaining Brussels, and of separating them from Wellington. Now he did march on Wavre, but did not accomplish either of these purposes, nor did * This clause in the Grouchy version runs : — " Si j'apprends que de fortes masses Prussiennes se portent sur Wavre, je les suivrai dans cette direction et les attaquerai d^s que je les aura! jointes." In the ' received ' version the clause runs in the original : — " Si la masse des Prussiens se retire sur Wavre, je la suivrai dans cette direction, afin qu'ils ne puissent pas gagner Bruxelles, et de les s^parer de Wellington." GROUCHY'S MARCH 155 he take the best means to secure their accomplish- ment. In the Grouchy version, he says his march on Wavre, if made at all, will be for the purpose of attacking the Prussians there as soon as he shall have joined them. This is precisely what he did do on the following day. If Napoleon received the Grouchy version, he certainly sanctioned, as we shall see later on, the precise action which Grouchy took upon the i8th. If he received the other version, his sanction was given to Grouchy's intentions as expressed in that version — he sanctioned his design of following the Prussians, with a view to separating them from Brussels and from Wellington. Which version, then, are we to accept ? On this question must depend, to some extent, the judg- ment which we shall form as to Grouchy's conduct as a whole, and the matter is therefore deserving of close attention. But as in this chapter we are concerned chiefly with the narrative of Grouchy's march, it will be better not to interrupt that nar- rative more than is absolutely necessary in order to discuss debatable points. The main arguments on both sides are therefore appended in the form of a note,* and it must be for the reader to decide which version he will receive as the true one. * The weight of critical authority is all on the side of what we have called "the received version." Gerard, after citing it in his "Demi^res Observations," published in 1830, adds the follow- ing words : — " Certifi^ conforme & I'original, qui nous a ixi xkaas par I'Empereur Napoleon et qui est entre nos mains. "^Sign£ : 156 WATERLOO From Grouchy's despatch to the Emperor at lo P.M., from Gembloux, we gather that at that hour he was still uncertain as to the line which the Prussians had taken, and as to the intentions with which they were marching. But during the next few hours he received further information, which he immediately communicated to the Emperor in a letter, dated Le Gdn^ral Gourgaud." Gourgaud, therefore, is the ultimate surety for the veracity of the received version. Almost all critics accept it as the true one. On the other hand, the security of Gourgaud is not good. He wrote in the interests of Napoleon, and notoriously falsified facts. He tells a story about two despatches, sent by Napoleon to Grouchy the night before Waterloo, containing precise instructions for his operations next day. Almost all critics agree that this story is purely mythical. Critics, therefore, are inconsistent. They cannot be allowed to treat one unsupported statement of Gourgaud as absolute truth and to discard another as absolute falsehood. Napoleon notoriously falsified letters and bulletins to suit his interests. His interest was as great in maintaining the received version as Grouchy's in maintaining his version. Neither Grouchy nor Napoleon is entitled to absolute confidence, but the balance of confidence rests rather with Grouchy. The author of the Grouchy " Memoirs " says he copies the letter from the original, which is under his eyes. [But Grouchy sup- pressed the Bertrand orders for twenty-seven years, and may have been capable of altering a document.] Gourgaud says the same thing of the received version : which of the two are we to believe? Grouchy's son quotes the version of the " Memoirs," and says all the documents which he quotes are either in his own hands or in the archives. Some which be quotes as being in the archives are certainly not there. Gourgaud's set purpose was to whitewash Napoleon, and to throw all the responsibility of his defeat on his Marshals, especi- ally on Grouchy. On the whole, I am inclined to think that Grouchy's version is quite as likely to be the true one as Gourgaud's version, and, if anything, to give the preference to Grouchy's, GROUCHY'S MARCH 157 Gembloux, 2 A.M., June i8th. This letter is not in existence, but Soult's reply to it, dated from the field of Waterloo at 10 A.M., sufficiently discloses its contents. Grouchy had discovered that two Prussian columns had marched by Sauveniferes and Sart-^-Walhain, and he was now convinced that the Prussian retreat generally was upon Brussels. "The movement of Blucher's army," he writes to Pajol at day-break, " appears to me pronounced upon Brussels ; " and it was with this idea firmly fixed in his mind that he issued his final orders for the operations of the day. These orders were to march on Wavre. IV. A natural process of reasoning brought the Marshal to adopt Wavre as his first point of destination. The road from Sart-4-Walhain to Brussels is almost direct, and passes through Wavre. The Prussians, therefore, must, in their movement on Brussels, go to Wavre. There, or beyond that town, Grouchy's force would come up with them. If Blucher stopped at Wavre, the French would engage him there ; if he pursued his march on Brussels, the French would either follow him up or would march by their left from Wavre to St Lambert, so as to join operations with the main army of Napoleon. The idea that Blucher, arrived at Wavre, would leave there a portion of his force to detain Grouchy, while detach- ing the major part of it to join operations with 158 WATERLOO Wellington in the coming battle, never seems to have occurred to the Marshal. He was wedded to a fixed idea — that the junction between Wellington and Blucher would take place in front of Brussels, on the other side of the forest of Soignes, and to prevent this, or at least to hinder it materially, an immediate march on Wavre was the best course to pursue. Grouchy's operations, therefore, on the i8th June, were from the first conducted under a serious but rooted misapprehension, and it was this fact which caused him to be useless throughout the day — use- less to Napoleon, and useless against the Prussians. Notwithstanding his letters of the evening before, addressed to his corps commanders, urging the necessity of speed, and prescribing very early hours for their start, his force was not in move- ment from Gembloux until many hours after sun- rise. Much recrimination has passed between the generals upon this point, and the mists of contro- versy have obscured the question as to who was responsible for the delay. Excelmans, with his dragoons, started at 7.30, Vandamme at 8, and Gerard at the same hour. The columns moved on Wavre by way of Sart-4-Walhain. Grouchy preceded his troops, and was at Walhain * before his advance-guard arrived. There he gathered all the information he could, and at eleven o'clock * A distinction must be made between Sart-a-Walhain and Walhain. A reference to the map makes this clear. GROUCHY 'S MARCH 159 wrote a letter to the "Emperor, detailing his im- pressions as to the intentions of the Prussians. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd corps of Bliicher, he says, are marching in the direction of Brussels. Two of these corps have passed Sart-4-Walhain on the right, and amounted to 30,000 men at least. A corps coming from Li^ge (Bulow's) had effected its junction with those who fought at Ligny. The Prussians were designing to make a stand against the troops which were pursuing them, or else to unite themselves with Wellington, " a project an- nounced by their officers, who, with their usual assurance, pretend only to have quitted the field on the i6th, so as to operate their junction with the English army on Brussels. "This evening I shall be massed at Wavre, and shall thus find myself between Wellington — whom I presume to be in retreat before your Majesty — and the Prussian army." The letter closes with repeated demands for further instructions. This despatch had scarcely been sent off at II o'clock on the morning of the eventful i8th when Colonel Loriere, Gerard's chief of the staff, announced to Grouchy and to Gerard, who had reached Walhain in advance of his corps, that he heard in the west the roar of artillery fire. The generals, surrounded by their staffs, proceeded at once to ascertain the character of the engage- i6o WATERLOO ment which was apparently in progress on the left. At first, through the drizzling rain and heavy atmosphere, they were inclined to interpret what they heard as a skirmish of advanced guards, but very soon they were unmistakably convinced that a general action was in progress. There was little difficulty in fixing the situation of the battle- field. The plateau of Mont St Jean was marked out as being the scene of the combat. What, then, under these fresh conditions, was the right wing of the French army to do .' Gerard impetuously urged the imperative duty of marching to the sound of the cannon. The Prussian march had now definitely narrowed itself down to one of two alternatives, — either they were marching on Brussels or else were moving to join forces with Wellington at Mont St Jean. In either event, prudence and policy alike suggested the ad- visability of joining the Emperor as quickly as pos- sible, for if the Prussians were moving on Brussels, they might be regarded as a negligable quantity in the battle at Waterloo. If, on the other hand, they were advancing to join Wellington, Grouchy, by marching on the cannon sound, would be most advantageously disposed to stop them, to hinder them, or to diminish the effects of their junction in the event of its having been accomplished. Grouchy, however, thought otherwise. Un- doubtedly the tone of authority adopted by Gerard predisposed the Marshal to disregard his counsels, but he had solid objections to urge to the GROUCHY'S MARCH i6i course proposed. He had, first of all, his instruc- tions. Napoleon's verbal instructions were precise and definite in their terms. He was to pursue the Prussians, never lose sight of them, and attack them as soon as he had come up with them. He was now close upon their heels, and proposed to attack them at once. The sounds of battle at Mont St Jean created no new situation. It was exactly what Napoleon himself had anticipated at the time when he despatched Grouchy in pursuit of the enemy. "I am going," he said on the field of Ligny, " to attack the English if they stand on this side of the Forest of Soignes." They were stand- ing there and the Emperor was attacking them, If the Emperor had intended to modify his instruc- tions in any way he would have done so ; he had not done so, therefore his original instructions still held good. It was not for a subordinate to carry out operations of inspiration, but to carry out the operations prescribed by his superior. Moreover, there were serious practical difficulties in the way of G6rard's plan. Balthus, who com- manded Gerard's artillery, considered it almost impossible to carry the guns over the muddy lanes and marshy ground, by which alone the Emperor was to be approached, in time to render any service in a battle to be fought at Mont St Jean that day. It was indeed doubtful if the troops themselves could accomplish so long and difficult a march before the day would be practically over. They certainly could not arrive before six o'clock, L 1 62 WATERLOO assuming that their progress, at the rate of three miles an hour, would be quite unimpeded by the enemy.* But was it at all likely that it would be unimpeded ? The Prussians were 90,000 strong. The French right wing only numbered 33,000. If it were to commit itself to a flank march while go,ooo of the enemy were massed within a few miles of it, was it to be supposed that the Prus- sians would fail to avail themselves of their oppor- tunity .' Half Blucher's force would be sufficient to detain them indefinitely, while with the other half he might march unimpeded on Mont St Jean. Such, and much more, were the arguments that passed in this momentous colloquy. Gerard endeavoured to break the resolution of his chief by proposing that he should march with his corps to the sound of the cannonade, while Grouchy with the rest proceeded on Wavre. Such a suggestion the Marshal was bound by his orders to reject. His instructions were formal to keep his corps together within a league of ground. His determina- tion, whether for good or evil, must apply to the whole force under his command, and his deter- mination was to march, according to his original purpose, on Wavre, and to engage the Prussians there. An hour before the discussion arose, Napoleon was replying to Grouchy's 2 A.M. de- spatch. His letter is dated from the field of * For distances and calculations based theieon, see pages 171, 172. GROUCHY'S MARCH 163 Waterloo at 10 o'clock A.M. In it there occur the following phrases : — " The Emperor charges me to acquaint you that his Majesty is about to attack the English army, which has taken position at Waterloo, near the Forest of Soignes. Accord- ingly {ainsi) his Majesty desires that you should direct your movements on Wavre, so as to ap- proach us, to put yourself in touch with our operations, and to bind our communications, pushing before you those corps of the Prussian army which have taken this direction, and which may have stopped at Wavre, where you ought to arrive as soon as possible." No wonder that Grouchy congratulated himself when he received this letter at four in the afternoon, that he had decided to follow his own counsels, and had refused to be guided by the advice of G6rard. Yet from the moment of that decision Grouchy ceased to be a factor in the campaign of Waterloo. VI. The intention, so far, has been to put before the reader the more important facts connected with the first twenty-four hours of Grouchy's march. It has, however, been impossible, without en- croaching unduly upon the narrative, to state the whole of the facts, or to examine them with the minuteness and care which they deserve. The present section, therefore, will be devoted to a 1 64 WATERLOO critical examination of Grouchy's conduct during the period referred to. It must be admitted that Grouchy was tardily despatched, and for this Napoleon alone is to blame. Mr Ropes contends that, as commander of the right wing at Ligny, it was the duty of Grouchy to send out reconnaissances during the night which followed the battle in order to ascertain the direction of the Prussian retreat, whether he received instructions to do so or not. He did send out such reconnais- sances upon his own responsibility. Pajol explored the Namur road ; Excelmans proceeded as far as Gembloux. No detachment, it is true, was sent along the road leading due north by Gentinnes, G6ry, and Mont St Guibert to Wavre, and had this been done great results might have followed, for this was the line that Bliicher and Gneisenau had actually taken. But strategical reasons seemed to render investigation in this direction unneces- sary, and if Grouchy was in error here, the Emperor, when he could be prevailed on to exert himself, made no sort of effort to rectify that error. The question that first presents itself is. Ought Napoleon to have detached Grouchy at all ? If he was to be detached, would not 10,000 men have been as effective, as a corps of observation, as a force of over 30,000.' How could Grouchy seriously attack and hold in check a force which was nearly three times as great as his own ? If the enemy was in a state of demoralisation after de- feat, to observe them and to prevent them from GROUCHY'S MARCH 165 rallying was all that was required. Some 10,000 men would have been adequate for this purpose. If, on the other hand, the enemy was retreating in good order, and was falling back upon a fresh corps which had taken no part in the battle — and Napoleon knew that Biilow's corps was close at hand — ^how could some 30,000 men be an adequate protection to the French main army from all further interference on the part of the Prussians ? All that Napoleon really required was that the Prussians should not intervene in the coming battle against Wellington. If, therefore, he had concen- trated his force instead of dividing it, and marched along the main road to Brussels against the allied army, he might easily have detached Grouchy at Genappe, or even at a point still further north, to manoeuvre towards the right with better hopes of accomplishing his object, than by despatching him on a vague mission, under every circumstance of disadvantage, which must of necessity break off effective communications between himself and a third part of his total strength. The next point which meets us is Napoleon's total failure to make Grouchy acquainted with his own intentions, and of the information which he had gained as to the movements of the enemy. Except a vague intimation that he intends to fight the English should they venture to stand and meet him, it is not until an hour or so before the battle of Waterloo begins that Napoleon tells his 1 66 WATERLOO lieutenant that a battle is imminent. There can be no clearer proof than this that he began the battle without athought of being assisted in it by Grouchy's contingent. Certainly he had no thought that the Prussians would assist Wellington, and yet he had information on this point which, had it been com- municated to Grouchy, would have been most useful in guiding that Marshal's movements and disposi- tions. In his first letter of the 1 8th Napoleon says — " You only speak of two Prussian corps. . . Yet reports say that a third column, which was pretty strong, has passed by G^ry and Gentinnes, directing its march on Wavre." Here is a piece of informa- tion of priceless value in indicating the ultimate intentions of Blucher, and yet it is withheld from Grouchy until the eleventh hour, until the oppor- tunity of profiting by it has long since passed away, and the natural inferences to be drawn from it are entirely ignored by Napoleon himself. Grouchy's only mission, in fact, is to find out what the enemy is intending to do ; Napoleon has knowledge on the point which, by itself, could enable him to form conclusions more correct than any which, without that knowledge, Grouchy could form, yet not only does he refuse to act upon the intelligence which he possesses, but by withholding it from Grouchy prevents that Marshal from acting upon it either. Again, with the exception of the Bertrand order, which can be characterised as nothing else than a roving commission, no instructions whatever were GROUCHY'S MARCH 167 sent to the right wing throughout the remainder of the 17th, or until 10 o'clock on the morning of the 1 8th. No attempt was made to keep communica- tions with Grouchy open, no reconnaissances were sent in his direction on taking position for the battle which was imminent. Vague expectations, indefinite hopes held Napoleon's mind to the ex- clusion of vigorous measures and active precau- tions, and instead of two wings of a single army- acting in concert and mutually supporting one another, we have two separate armies acting independently of each other's operations, and one of which drifts aimlessly for want of the knowledge, instructions, and assistance which the other could in large part supply. The Grouchy mission, indeed, exhibits in Na- poleon a strange and unwonted mixture of confid- ence and apprehension. Either the Prussians were still formidable or they were not. If they were, no measure of precaution, even the slightest, ought to have been omitted to render them harmless. Every route should have been promptly explored, if by any possibility the Prussians might have taken it. Every indication of their intentions should have been duly weighed and transmitted without delay from one wing to the other. And when circum- stances pointed, in however small a degree, to the possibility of their junction with Wellington for the purposes of the coming battle, Grouchy should not have been left to follow his vague ideas of what was required of him, but should have been 1 68 WATERLOO instructed decisively and without possibility of mistake as to what he was to do. If the Prussians were not formidable, there was no need to detach the right wing from the main army at all. Grouchy moved on Gembloux in obedience to his orders, and as a consequence of the general belief that the enemy was retreating by way of the Meuse. The Prussian columns therefore, which were marching on Wavre by way of Mont St Guibert, were left unmolested, for their very exist- ence upon that route was entirely unsuspected. But thus a considerable detachment of the enemy was allowed to interpose itself between the two French wings. Clausewitz thinks that Grouchy might have been expected to explore this line of march with a portion of his troops, while yet pro- ceeding with his main force by Gembloux; but this criticism ignores Napoleon's orders, that the whole of Grouchy's force was to be kept well to- gether within a league of ground. By the terms of his instructions, the Marshal may defy criticism until the time when he learned at Gembloux that Blucher's march was on Wavre and towards the Dyle river. He had made up his mind on this point by 3 A.M. on the i8th, and his orders for the day were therefore the result of the certainty he had acquired. Was his determination to march on Wavre by Sart-cl-Walhain in correspondence with Blucher's movement towards the Dyle ? The answer to this question must depend upon GROUCHY'S MARCH 169 the meaning to be attached to Bliicher's move- ment. A mistake very commonly made is to suppose that the Prussian general could have no other object in view, when he concentrated his army at Wavre, than that of co-operating with Welling- ton at Waterloo ; but his action admits of another interpretation, for he might merely be marching by way of Wavre on Brussels. Grouchy had no in- formation that Wellington had taken position at Waterloo — he supposed him to be in retreat before Napoleon. Having no knowledge that a battle was about to take place, he could have no know- ledge that the Prussians were marching to take part in it. "He thought the Prussians," says General Hamley, in his treatise on the operations of war, "if they were really moving on Wavre, intended to join Wellington at Brussels. And were they so moving, he, by marching to Wavre, would threaten decisively their communications with their base by Louvain, and so either prevent the execution of their project or render it disastrous." In fact, the fatal error of Napoleon again confronts us. A line to Grouchy that the English were in position intending to fight would have poured a flood of light upon the nature of Bliicher's dispositions, but Grouchy was deliberately left to make a choice between conjectures, and for want of the infor- mation at Napoleon's disposal, he conjectured wrongly. Grouchy's movement on Wavre, therefore, was in response to what he supposed Bliicher's inten- I70 WATERLOO tions to be, but it was entirely useless in view of the plan which Blucher was actually adopting. The alternative to reaching Wavre by Sart-i- Walhain was to reach it by the Dyle; and, as matters turned out, Grouchy ought in any event to have taken this direction. If by chance the Eng- lish were standing to fight, then Bliicher's move- ments were certainly suggestive of an intention to join them. By marching towards his left, Grouchy would at any rate be putting himself in a position to thwart these designs ; by marching towards his right he was tending, if anything, to facilitate them. Either road would bring him to Wavre, but the one would bring him nearer to the Emperor, the other would take him further away. This seems so obvious to us now that we are apt to overlook the strong reasons which influenced Grouchy's decision. He was still in bondage to the original error. He imagined that the real danger from the Prussians lay upon his right, not on his left ; he was full of his own mission, not of Napoleon's necessities, and regarded himself as altogether outside the scope of the main operations of the army; he thought himself at liberty to execute his mission in the way that seemed best to him, without reference of any kind to the movements of the Emperor. But the matter assumes quite another aspect when once Grouchy became convinced that a general action was in progress on his left. If up to this point Bliicher's retreat seemed pronounced upon GROUCHY'S MARCH 171 Brussels, now the idea that it was not so ought to have forcibly borne itself in upon him, and in face of the bare possibility of some Prussian help being rendered to Wellington it was Grouchy's obvious duty to concentrate all his energies on the single purpose of preventing such assistance from being given. How this could best be done was now the only question. Should he march straight upon the sound of the cannonade .' The only object in doing so was to join the Emperor, and to come up to him as a reinforcement while the battle was in progress. The question therefore hinges almost entirely on distances. The variety of estimates given as to the simple matter of the distance from Sart-4-Walhain to the field of Waterloo, and of the time which it would take Grouchy to cover that distance, is one of the most surprising things in the history of the cam- paign. Authorities range between two hours, which is the least estimate, and nine hours, which is the largest. The matter of distance, however, can be authoritatively decided. To march from Sart-4- Walhain to Flanchenoit necessitates crossing the river Dyle. It could only be crossed at Moustier and by bridges further north of that point. Now the distance from Sart-^-Walhain to Planchenoit vid Moustier was, by the only available roads, as nearly as possible eighteen miles. To decide the matter of time M. Quinet induced two friends of his to traverse the whole journey on 172 WATERLOO foot It took them five and a half hours. Thus they walked at a rate of a little more than three miles an hour. An army corps could not advance at anything like that rate, more particularly when the state of the roads is taken into account. Two miles an hour is a fair rough estimate for the march of an army corps under such circumstances as then prevailed. Grouchy's leading columns would therefore have debouched on Planchenoit at 9 P.M., assuming that he started from Sart-^- Walhain at twelve.* This calculation is based entirely upon the assumption that his march would have been unim- peded by the Prussians. Such might have been the case, but at the same time it is most improbable that it would have been so. If the Prussians disputed the passage of the river, it is clear that Grouchy could not arrive on the field of Waterloo that night. If they did not do so, he could not arrive until the battle was over. But it is urged with great force and much weight of authority that if he could not arrive himself, he might have prevented the Prussians from arriving. To accomplish this would have been to accomplish * Mr Ropes has been at great pains to show that Grouchy was not at Sart-^-Walhain but at Walhain or Walhain St Paul when the sound of the cannonade at Waterloo was heard. He has cer- tainly established this point conclusively. This brings Grouchy a mile nearer to Planchenoit, But the point is not where Grouchy was, but where his troops were, and his troops at 11.30 a.m. had not yet reached Sart-4-Walhain, much less Walhain St Paul, GROUCHY'S MARCH 173 all that was necessary, for without the intervention of the Prussians, Napoleon was assured of victory over the English. Here we enter the realm of pure conjecture. It is, of course, possible that if Grouchy had displayed himself in force, the march of Biilow would have been stopped, and, as a consequence, that of Pirch, who was following up Biilow. The mere appearance of an unexpected corps (D'Erlon's) had done much to influence the battle of Ligny on the i6th. The mere appearance of Biilow at St Lambert did much, as will be seen, to influence the issue at Waterloo. But is it probable that the whole Prussian force marching on Napo- leon's flank would allow itself to be stopped by so comparatively slight an obstacle as Grouchy's con- tingent ? * It is at least equally probable that a detachment of Prussians would have been employed to detain Grouchy, while the main body continued its movement towards the battle. In this Ciise, Grouchy's march on Planchenoit would have been altogether ineffectual, except perhaps to involve himself in the common ruin. But in addition to the practical issues depending upon Grouchy's decision, there is an abstract strategical question involved — whether it is not, on general principles, the duty of a corps, detached from the main body, to march in the direction where heavy flring indicates a critical engagement? The authority of Clausewitz must * Bliicher was under the impression that Grouchy had only 10,000 or 11,000 men with him. 174 WATERLOO carry great weight as to this point. After re- ferring to this contention as a dictum "hastily fabricated," he says — "This principle can only hold good in those cases when the commander ot a separate column has been placed by circum- stances in a position of doubt, when the originally clear and definite character of his task has been clouded by uncertainties and contradictions, which are so frequent in actual war. I admit that a com- mander so placed, instead of standing still doing nothing or wandering vaguely about, would do better to hasten to his neighbour's assistance if heavy firing suggests that he needs it. But to expect of Grouchy that he should trouble himself no further about Blucher, but march off to where another portion of the army was engaged with another enemy, would be contrary to all theory and practice. That General G6rard really gave such advice at noon on the i8th at Sart-i-Walhain only proves that, where there is no responsibility, consideration is apt to be hasty." * The matter might be allowed to rest here were it not that Grouchy's alternative policy was productive of nothing. To continue his march on Wavre, and to engage the 16,000 men or so whom Blucher had left there, was the equivalent to that " standing still doing nothing or wandering vaguely about" which Clausewitz condemns. The argu- ments which applied against the march on Plan- • Feldxug von 1815, Kap. sa GROUCHY'S MARCH 175 chenoit applied in an equal degree against the march on Wavre. It was most improbable that the whole Prussian force would allow itself to be detained from its fixed purpose in order to oppose Grouchy at Wavre. And all the force which was not detained there would be available to march on Waterloo. Was it not better to run some risk in order to be of some possible use, than to run prac- tically the same risk without the chance of being of any use at all ? It cannot be shown with any degree of conclusiveness that Grouchy, by marching to the sound of the cannonade, could have exercised any appreciable influence on the battle of Waterloo. It is clear that he exercised no influence upon events by the course which he actually adopted. We are thus brought back to the point from which we started — that Grouchy's mission was from the first a mistake — that Napoleon despatched him on a vague and ill-calculated errand — and that, although perhaps a general of great intuitive genius might possibly have so dealt with the diffi- culties and chances of the position as to make them his instrumehts in achieving success for his chief, yet from no general could such results be looked for with any degree of confidence, from few could any results be looked for at all. CHAPTER IX. THE MORNING OF THE BATTLE. I. Napoleon's Formation in Order of Battle on the iSth — II. Wellington's Formation — III. Analysis of the Duke's Force and Position — IV. Delay in beginning the Battle — V. Napo- leon's Despatch to Grouchy before the Battle — VI. Prussian Movements on the Morning of the i8th. I. It has been seen that Napoleon's one fear was that Wellington might escape him, and that the stand at Mont St Jean was not really intended as an offer of battle. The astonishment of the French when they found that the English had not only taken position, but were prepared to defend it, has been noted. Should not this very fact, that the English were standing, have suggested considera- tions to Napoleon's mind as to the causes which had induced Wellington's determination .' In- stead of that overweening confidence which is expressed in the exclamation, " Enfin j'e lestiens, ces Anglais .'" should he not rather have gathered from what he saw before him that the English had taken position in reliance upon some support not yet apparent? Wellington's caution was well I7« MORNING OF THE BATTLE 177 known to Soult from experience, and to Napoleon from report, and it was inconsistent with this caution that the Duke should deliberately, and with alternatives to choose from, risk his all upon an unequal contest. The very fact that battle was accepted should of itself have sufficed to forcibly suggest the truth about the Prussian move- ments, even if this were the first indication that his previous surmises were incorrect. But, as we have seen, when the Emperor dictated to Ber- trand his orders for Grouchy, doubts had already risen in his mind as to the intentions of the Prus- sians. Unable to discard the strong and con- vincing impression that they were hors de combat, yet the Bertrand order clearly shows that a sus- picion of the truth was struggling with his precon- ceived impression. This being so, he might well be convinced by Wellington's attitude that the Prussians were near, especially when we consider Grouchy's despatches addressed from Gembloux, which explicitly warned him that one Prussian column, at any rate, was on its way to Wavre, only ten miles distant from Mont St Jean. But nothing is more clear than that the idea of the intervention of the Prussians in the coming battle did not enter Napoleon's mind. Not- withstanding Wellington's attitude of defiance, notwithstanding the doubts which he himself evidently entertained on the day before, in spite of Grouchy's information on the morning of the i8th. Napoleon made ready for the contest with a light M 178 WATERLOO heart, seeing before him the prospect of a victory as decided and undisturbed as any which he had ever won. As early as one o'clock on the morning of the 1 8th Napoleon was in the saddle, closely examining the enemy's position, and satisfying himself that Wellington was standing for battle. There was a moment later in the morning when he suspected that the Anglo-Dutch army was making ready to withdraw, but a closer examination showed him that the suspicious movement was one of preparation, not of retreat, and being satisfied upon the point, he said to D'Erlon, " Order the men to make their soup, to get their pieces in order, and we will de- termine what is to be done towards noon." He then proceeded to take up his own position, his whole available force being upon the ground at 8 A.M. The Emperor established his headquarters at La Belle Alliance, a little inn upon the side of the main Brussels road, about a mile and a half from Wellington's quarters at Mont St Jean, and about half a mile from La Haie Sainte, The rising ground to the right hand and to the left gave him a commanding position, and would enable his cavalry and infantry charges to be made down-hill. On each side of the road he drew up his army in two lines, the reserve forming a third, making La Belle Alliance the centre. On the right the first line consisted of D'Erlon's ist corps, 20,000 strong, and burning to redeem, by gallant deeds, its previous inactivity. Alix's division formed its left, resting MORNING OF THE BATTLE 179 on the Charleroi road, the division of Donzelot rested upon Alix, Marcognet on Donzelot, and Durutte's formed the extreme right opposite to the hamlets of Smohain, Papelotte, and La Haye. The cavalry of the ist corps observed these hamlets, being posted to the right of Durutte's infantry. The 3rd corps of Milhaud's heavy cavalry and Jacquinot's light cavalry acted as a support to the whole line. Eighty pieces of artillery were posted partly in front of the line, and partly between and on the flank of the sup- porting cavalry. The left wing consisted of the 2nd corps, with the exception of Girard's division, which had been left behind at Ligny. The three remaining divi- sions numbered about 13,000 men, and were posted upon the left of the Brussels road, Bachelu's divi- sion forming the right, Foy resting upon it, and Jerome Bonaparte resting upon Foy. It extended from La Belle Alliance to beyond Hougomont. Pirn's cavalry continued the line upon its extreme left, and it was supported, as a whole, by Keller- mann's 4th corps of heavy dragoons. The reserve consisted of Lobau's 6th corps (with the exception of Teste's division, which was with Grouchy), together with the cavalry corps of Domont and Subervie, detached the one from Vandamme's division, and the other from Pajol. Lobau, therefore, with allowance for additions and subtractions, had about 10,000 men under his com- mand. He formed behind the centre, the infantry i8o WATERLOO resting on and across the Brussels road, the cavalry to the right. In rear of Lobau came the Imperial Guard, I9,0CX) strong, their infantry posted near the farm of Rossomme, with their artillery upon their jflanks. The main road divided them into two equal parts. They were drawn up in six lines, four battalions in each line, and thus they presented a formation in column, two columns on each side of the road, each column containing six battalions, the reserve artillery of the Guard, consisting of i2-pounders, being in the rear. The horse Grenadiers and dragoons of the Guard, with their artillery in the centre, were drawn up in rear of Kellermann's cavalry supporting the left wing, while in rear of Milhaud's cavalry support- ing the right wing were drawn up the light horsemen of the Imperial Guard, consisting of Colbert's Lancers and Lef^bvre-Desnouette's Light Dragoons, The total force amounted to close upon 72,000 men, the infantry numbering nearly 49,000, the cavalry about 15,700, and the artillery about 7300, with from 240 to 246 guns. n. The position taken up by the Duke was looser than, but in many respects similar to Napoleon's. About a thousand yards from Mont St Jean the road from Ohain crosses at a right angle the main Brussels road. The Ohain road defined the MORNING OF THE BATTLE i8i English position. Its point of junction with the main ckauss^e marked the English centre, with La Haie Sainte immediately in front of it, not 300 yards away. The course of the Ohain road for rather more than a mile on each side of the Brussels road is along the top of a gentle ridge. Along this ridge the army was posted. Its slopes afforded protection, while from its crest an unin- terrupted view was obtained of all the enemy's movements. The front was also well covered, as has been already seen, by the hamlets of Smohain, Fapelotte, and others on the east, and on the west by Hougomont. The English left consisted of the 5th British division, under command of Sir Thomas Picton, the 6th British division com- manded, in the absence of Sir Lowry Cole, by Sir J. Lambert, and the 2nd division of Dutch-Belgians under Perponcher. The 6th division formed the right of the left wing, and rested upon the main Brussels road. It was composed of the 4th Regi- ment of Foot, or the King's Own — veteran soldiers who had just returned from the war in America, and who had scarcely reached the field in time — and of the 27th, 40th, and 8ist regiments. They had fought under the Duke in Spain, and consti- tuted that " Spanish Infantry " of which he used to talk sometimes as having been present at Water- loo. Resting upon the 6th division came Kempt's 8th British Brigade and Pack's 9th or Scotch Brigade. With Pack were the ist Royal Scots, a part of the 42nd Highlanders, the 44th and the 1 82 WATERLOO 92nd Highlanders; with Kempt were the 79th Highlanders, the pSth Royal Rifles, and the 28th and 32nd Regiment. Best's 4th Hanoverian and Vincke's Sth Hanoverian brigades supported Pack,- and continued the line, the centre of which was covered by Bylandt's Dutch-Belgians, who were drawn up in a very exposed position in front of the Ohain road, and in front of, not behind, the slope. " They were," says Sir J. Shaw Kennedy, " directly exposed to the fire of the greatest battery that was on the field, and singly exposed to the first onset of the French attacking columns." Such a formation affords a reasonable amount of excuse for the conduct of some of the Dutch-Belgian troops at the outset of the battle. Perponcher's troops continued the line to the left, while Prince Bernhard of Saxe- Weimar's brigade occupied the hamlets of Smohain, Papelotte, and La Haye. Vivian's cavalry were posted on the extreme left, with the cavalry of Vandeleur upon their right. In rear of the first line stood the Union Brigade or 2nd cavalry brigade of Sir W. Ponsonby. It con- sisted of the 1st Royal Dragoons, the Scots"Greys, and the 6th Inniskillen Dragoons. Its formation particularly attracted the attention of Napoleon, as he observed his enemy's movements in the morning. " Regardez ces chevaux gris," he said, as he watched the Scots Greys, " Qui sont ces beaux cavaliers? Ce sont de braves troupes mais dans un demi-heure je les couperat en pieces" The right wing was formed on the ground MORNING OF THE BATTLE 183 between the two high roads from Charleroi and Nivelles, running for about 500 yards at right angles to the Charleroi road, and then inclining as it follows the bend of the Ohain road, to the south- west. Opposite the south-western extremity, where the Ohain road meets the road from Planche- noit, lies the Chateau of Hougomont. Welling- ton's right front, therefore, lay in a semi-circular situation from Hougomont to the main road. It consisted of Alten's 3rd British division and Cooke's 1st division, with Byng's brigade occupy- ing Hougomont. Alten's left rested upon the main Brussels road, and his division consisted of Sir Colin Halkett's brigade, the 2nd brigade of the King's German Legion under Ompt^da, and Kielmansegge's ist Hanoverian brigade, partly in the first, partly in the second line. Maitland's 1st brigade of Cooke's division, which had been severely handled two days before at Quatre Bras, was formed next to Halkett. It consisted of the 2nd and 3rd battalion of the ist Guards, or Grena- dier Guards, as they were subsequently called. Notwithstanding the hot work it had been called upon to perform at Quatre Bras, Maitland's brigade was to be put to even further proof in the coming battle, for upon it the charge of the French Imperial Guard was in a great measure to fall. Mitchell's brigade, detached from Colville's division, which was at Hal, rested its left on the Nivelles road, with Chass6's Dutch-Belgians beyond it, extending as far as Braine-la-Leude. The line was supported 1 84 WATERLOO in the rear by Lord Edward Somerset's heavy cavalry resting close upon the main Brussels road, while the Dutch-Belgian cavalry were still further to the right. The reserves were placed en potence, to the rear of the extreme right of the English army. They occupied a plateau formed by a second ridge behind that on which the first line of the army was drawn up, and owing to the undulating character of the ground at that point, it was possible to com- pletely conceal from view the troops there stationed. These consisted of the and division under Sir Henry Clinton — comprising the Light Brigade, Colborne's 52nd, the 71st, and the Rifle Brigade (95th Rifles). With them was the ist King's German Legion and the 3rd Hanoverian brigade. Their situation en potence enabled them to be used either as reserves or for a flank movement, hence their value in such a position, having regard to the defensive character of the Duke's operations, can scarcely be over-estimated. They also tended to consolidate the English right into a compact but very manageable mass. With Clinton behind, and with Hougomont in front, the right wing was certainly prepared to resist, with every chance of success, the hottest attacks which could be made upon it. The troops of the Duke of Brunswick, now com- manded by Colonel Olfermann, were posted close to the little hamlet of Merbe-Braine, but two battalions in the course of the day were moved up MORNING OF THE BATTLE 185 to strengthen the right above Hougomont, where they distinguished themselves by their desperate bravery. The Duke of Wellington originally posted in Hougomont the 2nd brigade of Cooke's division, commanded by Sir J. Byng, comprising three, afterwards increased to seven, companies of the Coldstream regiment, four companies of the Guards, and a battalion of the Nassau regiment. These were reinforced as occasion required, for the importance of the possession of Hougomont was very clearly recognised on both sides. Immedi- ately the troops had taken their posts, the work of crenellating the walls of the chateau, chapel, and garden was begun, and before morning they bristled with muskets to be fired by un- seen defenders upon the advancing French. The Nassauers acted as sharp-shooters in the outlying wood, the light troops of the Guards held the orchard, while the Coldstream companies and the 3rd Guards held the house, out-buildings, garden, and chapel. The farm of La Haie Sainte was by no means so extensive as the estate of Hougomont, but relatively its occupation and retention was of equal importance. It was held by a portion of Omptdda's King's Germans — the 2nd light battalion under Major Baring — but these troops needed to be con- stantly reinforced throughout the day, for the position fronted the very centre of the English line, and was subjected to the first and fiercest attack of the enemy. Sir J. Lambert's lOth British 1 86 WATERLOO brigade was specially employed as the day wore on for the defence, and afterwards for the re- occupation of La Haie Sainte, when it had been taken by the French, and the regiments composing this brigade — the 4th, 27th, and 40th — ^won eternal glory at the cost of 830 men out of a total effective force of 2000. The total force under arms engaged at the battle of Waterloo under the command of the Duke of Wellington was 6t,(&\, of whom 49,608 were in- fantry, 12,408 were cavalry, 5645 were artillery, with 156 guns. This force was made up as follows : — in. British King's Germans ... Hanoverians Brunswickers Nassauers Dutch- Belgians ... Total Infantry. Cavalry. Artillery. Total. Guns. iS,i8i 3.301 10,258 13,402 5.843 1.997 866 3'.'20S 2967 526 46s 510 1177 23.991 5.824 11,220 S.962 2,880 17,784 18 12 16 32 49,608 12,408 5645 67,661 156 Examining this table, it may be remarked that the number of British soldiers engaged was little more than one - third of the whole ; and that even including the King's Germans, who were as reliable as the British, the strength on which the Duke of Wellington could implicitly depend did MORNING OF THE BATTLE 187 not amount to a half of the whole army. The Dutch-Belgians, who, next to the British and King's Germans, numbered the largest division of the whole, were suspected of being lukewarm in the cause on which they were engaged, and though by no means, as a whole, open to those charges of cowardice and inefificiency which have been so freely brought against them, it must yet be ad- mitted that, as soldiers, they did not rank very high, and that their doubtful loyalty made them, to some extent, an unknown factor in the situation at the time when the battle began. The same re- marks apply in general to the Hanoverians, Bruns- wickers, and Nassauers, for the conspicuous valour which they actually displayed, and which, perhaps, has scarcely been sufficiently realised by chroniclers of the battle, was not to be confidently looked for from troops whose political temper was uncertain, and whose military calibre was of doubtful quality. The Duke's slight superiority in infantry — a superiority of about 650 men — was more than com- pensated for by his inferiority in cavalry — an in- feriority of no less than 3300 men. Considering the important part which this arm was to play in the battle, the deficiency in cavalry was likely to have very serious results, especially when coupled with a similar deficiency in artillery and guns, Napoleon bringing to the field 1600 more artillery and about go more guns. Numerically, however, the forces were fairly evenly matched, and the Duke made up in position for any disadvantage he 1 88 WATERLOO was under as to numbers. The strength of his posi- tion lay in its suitability for purposes of defence. The right wing was by far the stronger of the two, for not only did Hougomont protect its centre, but a larger proportion of troops was concentrated in line and in reserve upon that side. In this disposi- tion the Duke was actuated by two motives — first, that under no circumstances should Napoleon be able to turn his right wing by any open or veiled movement upon the flank ; and, secondly, because he was expecting the Prussians to come up upon his left, and could thus afford to leave it compara- tively weak until that support should arrive. The function of the right wing was to hold its own with- out expectation of assistance, beyond that to be afforded by its own reserve, throughout the entire day ; that of the left wing to hold its own, tem- porarily, till assistance arrived, and this it would probably be able to do, owing to the strength afforded it by the little hamlets which lay immedi- ately in its front. In a similar manner the centre was protected by La Haie Sainte, and thus, before Napoleon could reach the line of battle at all, it was necessary for him to make himself master of strongly occupied positions on the left, the centre, and the right. There were, however, 18,000 men belonging to Lord Hill's and corps, whom the Duke might have employed at Waterloo, but of whose aid he de- liberately deprived himself. Colville's division, consisting of the 4th and 6th British Brigades MORNING OF THE BATTLE 189 and the 6th Hanoverian brigade, Anthing's divi- sion and the first Dutch-Belgians, under Prince Frederick of Orange, had, in the general orders issued by the Duke before the retreat from Quatre Bras, been directed on Hal. " The brigades of the 4th division at Braine-le-Comte are to retire at daylight to-morrow morning upon Hal. . . . Prince Frederick of Orange is to occupy with his corps the position between Hal and Enghien, and is to defend it as long as possible." On the 18th these troops remained in their positions between Hal and Tubize — at a distance of about ten miles from the battlefield — nor were they called upon at any time during the day to take part in the battle, though they could have been brought up in less than four hours. On such a critical occasion, outnumbered by his antagonist, and,* as he erroneously calculated, outnumbered by three to two, the Duke has laid himself open to severe criticism at the hands of both English and foreign military experts for these dispositions. The matter, as it lies outside the narrative of the battle, will be dealt with in a subsequent chapter. It is enough to say here that the Duke would not have thus denuded himself of so material a portion of his force unless he had * Under the impression that Grouchy had only about 10,000 men with him, and ignorant that Girard (3000) had been left at Ligny, the Dulie should have calculated Napoleon's army as nearly 99,000 strong. He himself had rather more than 66,000, or a proportion of two to three igo WATERLOO seen strong — even though we naay consider them insufficient — reasons for so doing. The armies were in position early in the morn- ing, but several hours were yet to elapse before the battle actually began. We have now to con- sider the manner in which the Emperor employed these hours, and the motives which led him to delay, for as the attacking party he had the option of beginning the fight at any time that seemed good to him. IV. It has been seen that when Napoleon was ex- amining the English position about eight o'clock in the morning, in company with Count D'Erlon, he gave instructions to that General to order the men to make their soup, and to get their pieces in order, and " we will determine what is to be done about noon." It is evident, therefore, that he was in no hurry, and that he had no idea that the issue of Waterloo depended very largely upon moments. He saw before him the opportunity for, which throughout the campaign he had been working. His opening moves had all been directed to secure the chance of meeting Wellington, unsupported by his Prussian ally, and the chance, as he supposed, was now before him. It offered him the practical certainty of success, for his force was superior in numbers to that of his opponent; the quality of his soldiers was superior to that of the Anglo- MORNING OF THE BATTLE 191 Dutch soldiers ; retreat was for them, he presumed, if not impossible, at any rate difficult and hazard- ous, because of the forest through which they must withdraw. The Prussians were occupied by his army under Grouchy, and, therefore, were not to be reckoned with. Everything pointed to the certainty of a great victory, which seven or eight hours would amply suffice to secure. There were therefore no reasons for hurry, and several reasons for delay. The rain had fallen heavily all night, but the weather cleared in the morning. A few hours' bright, hot sunshine would do something towards drying the sodden ground and making it fit for the operations of artillery. Considering the superiority of the French in this arm, and the great use to which Napoleon always put it in his battles, this in itself was a sufficient ground for delay, supposing there were no very urgent neces- sity for haste. Accordingly he determined to modify his original intention of attacking the enemy at nine o'clock, and to use the interval in reviewing his army, and in exhibiting a great spectacle of military pageantry before the eyes of his opponents. The sight would be likely to produce a disspiriting effect upon such of the Anglo-Dutch divisions as had at some time them- selves served under the Emperor's banner — who were still in awe of his military genius and his reputation for invincibility, and who, perhaps now hesitating between their fears and their loyalty, might under the influence of a splendid military 192 WATERLOO display be led to desert their ranks and join his own. The review was over about half-past ten, and when it was ended Napoleon dictated a despatch to Grouchy, and then proceeded to for- mulate his plan of attack for the battle, which was to begin as soon as it had been communicated to the divisional commanders. The despatch to Grouchy is written in a tone of easy confidence as to the general situation of affairs. It is dated — " In front of the Farm du Caillu, "the iSth of June, at lo a.m." After acknowledging Grouchy's last report from Gembloux, and calling attention to a third Prussian column advancing on Wavre by G6ry and Gen- tinnes, it proceeds — " The Emperor charges me to inform you that at this moment his Majesty is about to attack the English army which has taken position at Water- loo, near the forest of Soignes; thus {amsi) his Majesty desires that you should direct your move- ments on Wavre, so as to approach us, put yourself in touch with our operations, and connect com- munications, pushing before you the corps of the Prussian army which have taken this direction and which may have stopped at Wavre, where you are to arrive as soon as possible. MORNING OF THE BATTLE 193 " You will cause the enemy's columns which are upon your right to be followed by some light corps, so as to observe their movements and pick up their stragglers. Instruct me immediately as to your dispositions and your march, as well as of the news which you have of the enemy, and do not neglect to connect your communications with us. The Emperor desires to have news of you very often. "The Duke of Dalmatia." This despatch was the first that Grouchy received from Napoleon since the Bertrand order of the day before. In Gourgaud's narrative of the campaign, written at St Helena, and in Napoleon's "M^moires pour Servir," &c. there is, it is true, a story of an order sent in duplicate to Grouchy in the course of the night, informing him that an engagement was imminent, and instructing him as to the part he was to play in it. But the story may be summarily dismissed as a fabrication. " The two officers sent by Napoleon," says Quinet, "were never seen by Grouchy. No one has ever been able to give their names. The orders they are asserted to have carried are not to be found registered on the staff-records. What is still more to the purpose, in the despatches which followed, Napoleon made no mention whatever of these orders of the night. He does not even refer to them, contrary to his invariable custom." This criticism admits of no answer. The 10 A.M. despatch, in fact, is, upon the face of N 194 WATERLOO it, an answer to Grouchy's 2 A.M. letter from Gembloux, and although we may read in it some uncertainty as to the Prussian movements and a strong desire for information, it is quite impossible to read into it any real apprehension as to the issues of the coming battle being affected by Prussian intervention. Though the facts which it contains were known to Napoleon ten if not twelve hours before, he only thought it worth while to inform Grouchy of them as the engagement was about to begin. The despatch was written at leisure, was sent off at leisure, and was conveyed leisurely to Grouchy, for he did not receive it till after four in the afternoon, when he was definitely committed to his action at Wavre. Taking this letter in conjunction with the other circumstances which have been related, it is clear that the Emperor contemplated the coming battle, and formulated his plan for the conduct of it, with a mind at ease both as to Grouchy and as to the Prussians. VI While Napoleon was consuming the morning in delay and suffering a golden opportunity to slip from him, Blucher was profiting by the inactivity of his rival. The four corps which constituted his army were concentrated at and around Wavre before midnight on the 17th, and were in readiness to move to the MORNING OF THE BATTLE 195 support of Wellington at any early hour on the i8th. Billow was to head the advance, for he had not yet been employed in action, and consequently might be expected to display more energy and prompti- tude than troops which, in addition to the fatigues of severe marches, had undergone the strain of a general engagement. Biilow was to be followed up by Pirch with the 2nd corps, and the duty of these commanders was to take Napoleon on the flank, their ultimate destination being Planchenoit, by way of St Lambert. The 1st and 3rd corps, under Ziethen and Thielemann respectively, were to march first on St Lambert, and stiriking off from there in a northerly direction, to come up upon the rear of the English left by the Ohain road. If, however, Grouchy's force should display any activity before Wavre, Thielemann's corps was to remain behind in order to detain the French and to secure for the rest of the Prussian army an unmolested march. In conformity with these arrangements, Biilow was in motion at break of day from Dion-le-Mont, where his corps had bivouacked the night before. Dion-le-Mont is some two miles east of the town of Wavre, and it was certainly a faulty arrange- ment that the column which was to lead the advance in the morning should have been stationed for the night on the extreme left instead of on the extreme right of the army. It took many hours for the 4th corps to reach the town of Wavre and 196 WATERLOO to get clear of it, and accordingly Bulow's leading division did not reach St Lambert until noon. There a halt was made for three hours in order to allow the rear divisions to come up, and it also happened that Ziethen's columns had to cross the road on which the and and 4th corps were ad- vancing. It was not, therefore, until 430 P.M. that BUlow debouched upon the field of Waterloo. Pirch and Ziethen did not leave Wavre till noon, reaching their positions upon the field a little after 7 P.M. Thielemann's 16,000 were left behind to engage throughout the afternoon the very superior force of Marshal Grouchy, CHAPTER X. THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. I. Napoleon's general plan and the attack on Hougomont — II. D'Erlon's infantry attack — III. First appearance of the Prussians at St Lambert — IV. Observations on Napoleon's conduct of the battle and on the difficulties of ascertaining the facts — V. The attack on La Haie Sainte — VI. Cavalry charges on the British right and centre — VII, The battle with the Prussians around Flanchenoit — VIII. The charge of the Im- perial Guard — IX. Wellington's advance and rout of the French — X. Lobau at Flanchenoit protects the line of retreat for the main army— XI. Pursuit of the French by the Prussians. Such were the dangers which were gathering on Napoleon while he, all unconscious of them, was reckoning only with the army in front of him. To cope with Wellington he formulated a plan at once simple and comprehensive, a plan which, if efficiently executed, must be productive of de- cisive results. His design was to break the enemy's centre and gain possession of Mont St Jean. If successful, the Anglo -Dutch army would be broken in 197 198 WATERLOO halves, and the road to Brussels open to the French. To prevent Wellington from concentrating all his attention upon the point which w£is specially menaced, the attack was to be general all along the line, and was to be so evenly sustained that the Duke would have difficulty in deciding where his danger particularly lay. With these views Napoleon drew up his Order of Battle, which contained his general plan, as well as the measures which were to'be taken to execute it. "When once the whole army shall be drawn up in order of battle, at one o'clock P.M. as nearly as possible, at the moment when the Emperor shall give the signal to Marshal Ney, the attack will begin for the purpose of gaining possession of Mont St Jean." The road to Mont St Jean was, however, blocked for the French by the two positions of Hougo- mont and La Haie Sainte. It was necessary to occupy them both, and as the former lay quite close to the French lines it was to be attacked first. The prompt occupation of Hougomont would, moreover, assist the Emperor's projects in several ways. From it, when once in possession, his troops could operate directly on Mont St Jean, and also a demonstration in force upon the posi- tion would be likely to divert the attention of the English commander from his centre, and so facili- tate the French operations upon that point. THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 199 Accordingly, about 11.30 A.M., as a preliminary to the main battle, Jerome's division of Reille's corps was sent forward against Hougomont to the sound of a general cannonade by the artillery, which was posted in advantageous positions all along the line. As the columns moved down into the hollow ground below them two brigades of artillery attached to Cooke's division opened fire, and so accurate was the range of the English nine- pounders that many of Jerome's men were killed and wounded before they reached the outskirts of the position against which their attack was directed. But soon a battery was brought to bear upon Cooke's guns, and under its cover the French succeeded in gaining possession of the wood. But every step of the way was most desperately con- tested. The defence of the wood had been en- trusted to some Hanoverian troops of the line and a battalion of Nassauers, and it was not until Jerome put in Soye to assist the brigade already engaged that the Hanoverians and Nassauers gave way. The buildings of Hougomont, the walls sur- rounding the garden, the chateau itself and the chapel, were held by Lord Saltoun with four light companies of the Coldstream Guards and two companies of the 3rd Guards. To these Welling- ton quickly added three more companies of the Guards and a Brunswick battalion. By the nature of the place it was capable of being stubbornly 200 WATERLOO defended, for the thick hedges and high walls gave cover to the defenders, from which, themselves unseen, they could pour destruction on their assail- ants. Against the main position, therefore, the attack of the French was unavailing. They dis- played heroic courage and resolution, but even more necessary than these was artillery to beat down the defences of the place. It is strange that Jerome should have attempted, at such cost of life and time, to take by assault a position which could easily have been demolished by either artillery or siege appliances. Yet there was a moment when the impetuous valour of the French seemed as if it would carry everything before it. A few companies of the ist light infantry succeeded in reaching the northern en- trance of the ch&teau, and a sub-lieutenant, Legros, penetrated within the courtyard. As, with his hand- ful of men, he advanced against the open door of the building. Sir James Macdonald, with a ser- geant and corporal of the Guards, hurled himself against it. The door was shut in the face of the French ; Legros and his companions were all of them killed. In view of the desperate resistance offered by the English, Reille ordered Foy's division to sup- port Jerome. But the character of the engagement was not materially altered, the advantage continu- ing to rest now with one side now with the other. Throughout the buildings remained in the hands of the Guards. THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 201 At last eight howitzers were brought to bear upon the chateau and its out-buildings, which were soon in flames ; but still the high walls of the garden served as a protection, and when the flames drove them to seek shelter in the garden the Guards maintained themselves there. And thus Hougomont was attacked and defended throughout the entire day. Originally designed to be a preliminary attack, subsidiary to the main operations, it became in itself a main operation to which other movements were subsidiary. The stanza of Thackeray's " Ballad of the Drum " applies with telling force to the defence of Hougo- mont — " At noon we began the fell onset, We charged up the Englishman's hill ; And madly we charged it at sunset — His banners were floating there still." II. Though foiled in his attack upon Hougomont, and disappointed of his expectations there. Napo- leon determined that the grand attack which he had fixed for one o'clock should none the less proceed. It was to be made under the general orders of Marshal Ney, who was instructed to make the first movement upon the enemy's left and centre with the 1st corps under Count D'Erlon. D'Erlon's men were smarting under the reproach 202 WATERLOO of having been so far useless in the campaign, and were burning to redeem their reputation. In their hands, the attack was likely to be conducted with extraordinary vigour and impetuosity. At one o'clock, or a little later, the order reached D'Erlon to advance. Already, since 11.30, a battery of eighty pieces of artillery, posted in front of the French line, had been playing upon the English left front, dealing havoc among the Dutch-Belgians, who, as has been seen, were stationed in a very exposed position in front of the road behind which the English line extended. So heavy a fire would, it was expected, have the effect of demoralising the British left and centre, and of weakening its power of resistance when the French infantry attack should be made in force. Each of the four divisions of D'Erlon's corps, with the exception of one brigade, specially de- tached against La Haie Sainte, were formed in columns. Each column consisted of the various battalions composing the division. Each battalion was drawn up in three ranks. There were thus three times as many ranks as there were battalions in the division. The battalions were separated from one another by a distance of five paces. The arrangement will probably be best under- stood by means of a diagram. It will be observed that this formation was very unwieldy for purposes of attack. The overthrow of the leading battalions would involve in confusion THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 203 those behind. No room was afforded for deploying in line, and similarly there was no room for forma- tion in squares in the event of the enemy's cavalry charges rendering such an operation advisable. There were no advant^es, except perhaps that of weight, to counterbalance these disadvantages, and moreover, the formation was one not usually employed. The charge, however, of such a body of men, 20,000 in number, was likely to prove, from mere weight and impetuosity, exceedingly formid- able. To resist it there were drawn up, as has been seen, Bylandt's Dutch-Belgians in front, with the Sth British Division behind under Picton. The attack would chiefly fall upon the brigades of Kempt and Pack, that is to say, upon the ist Royal Scots, the 42nd, 44th, and 92nd High- landers, the 79th Highlanders, with the 9Sth Royal Rifles and the 28th and 32nd English Regiments. Behind them were the cavalry of the " Union Brigade," the Royals, the Scots Greys, and the Inniskilling Dragoons, and thus it was largely upon the infantry and cavalry of Scot- land that there fell the burden and the glory of repelling the first great and general attack made by Napoleon upon the day of Waterloo. D'Erlon was supported in his advance by a considerable body of Cuirassiers, though his was essentially an infantry attack. A more generous measure of cavalry support, in which arm Napo- leon's superiority over Wellington particularly lay, would undoubtedly have rendered the movement 204 WATERLOO more effective. Scarcely had D'Erlon's charge traversed the intervening ground between his posi- tion and the enemy than the Dutch-Belgians broke and fled. Exposed as they had been to the fire of the French battery, this was scarcely surprising, and the charge of cowardice urged so frequently against them will scarcely bear examination when their exposed situation and their political temper are fairly taken into consideration. The duty of repelling the French charge now fell upon Pack's Highland Regiments. These troops had suffered severely at Quatre Bras, but their courage and spirit were unimpaired, and taking up their line in rear of a cross-road, the bank of which served to some degree as a protection to them, they pre- pared to meet the enemy's advance. Formed up in squares, they met the shock with invincible de- termination not to yield an inch, and when at l&st the enemy began to give way before the deadly volleys poured in upon their front, with fixed bayonets the Scotch brigade rushed upon the right flank of the column, and the fight was waged hand-to-hand with desperate bravery on both sides ^the muskets almost muzzle to muzzle, and the colours of the 32nd Regiment being for a moment in danger. It was now that Kempt's Brigade was ordered to charge, an order conveyed by the voice of Sir Thomas Picton, who was shot down and killed at the moment of uttering it. D'Erlon's men resisted with the greatest steadiness and de- termination, but, unable to deploy, and huddled to- THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 205 gether in unwieldy masses, they were forced to give ground, Mi^ile the Highlanders and English Regi- ments rushed over the bank of the road in pursuit. There was, however, great danger of the British being taken in the flanks by the immense masses who composed D'Erlon's right and left columns, and to avert this disaster Lord Uxbridge ordered up the Union Brigade of heavy Dragoons, commanded by Sir William Ponsonby. The Highland infantry opened out its ranks to let the Dragoons pass, some of the g2nd in their enthusiasm seizing the stirrup-leathers of the horses that they might be carried along to share in the glories of the cavalry charge. The shriek of the bagpipes contended with shouts of "Scotland for ever," and above all, the roar of artillery, and the cries of the wounded, combined to make a music in harmony with the wild rush of battle which now began. The Greys were directed against the centre columns, and nothing could stand against their impetuosity. The Eagle of the 4Sth Regiment was captured, and the enemy fled in confusion up the incline, down which they had just charged, to regain their original positions. In the meantime the Royals were equally active upon the French left columns, and not to be outdone by the Scots Greys, the Eagle of the lOSth Regiment was captured by Sergeant Styles. On this side the enemy offered a less determined resistance. Num- bers threw down their arms, and the Inniskilling Dragoons, sweeping them upon the flank, those 2o6 WATERLOO who were not killed were taken prisoners, to the number in all of between 2000 and 3000 men. The rout of D'Erlon's columns was, however, to some extent checked by the French Cuirassiers, who formed to receive the charge of the heavy brigade, and the effect of the British success was also materially diminished by the fact that enthu- siasm carried it beyond the limits of discretion. The British cavalry followed their beaten enemy almost up to their lines, sabring the gunners and disabling many guns ; thus they fell victims in great numbers to the cavalry of Milhaud, which took them in a position of isolation. Sir William Ponsonby, getting separated from the Royals, was killed by a detachment of Polish Lancers, and when eventually, after three-quarters of an hour of dreadful carnage, the remains of the regiments engaged were collected under cover of a small wood to the left, it was found that the Royals were almost completely destroyed, and of the Inniskillings and Scots Greys scarcely one-half remained. To cover the pursuit of the broken British cavalry, the Light Dragoons of Vandeleur were advanced from the left, and they handled severely some of the French infantry still in the hollow between the contending lines. They then advanced against the pursuing Lancers and Chas- seurs. Durutte's column, however, which had not shared in the general rout of D'Erlon's corps, directed a heavy fire from a protected position behind a ridge upon the advancing light troops, THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 207 with such effect that they were compelled to withdraw and reform slightly to the right of their original position. Three out of the four French columns had, how- ever, been thrown into confusion, and the main attack, which, if successful, would have broken the English line and surrendered Wellington's central position into the hands of the enemy, had failed. It failed partly because of its unwieldy formation, partly because it was not efficiently supported by cavalry, but cWefly because of the steadiness and splendid pluck of the troops opposed to it. The least wavering at the moment when the French were upon the crest of the British position, and the battle would have been compromised, if not lost. At any rate, a great measure of success would have been won by the French, which, coming at the very beginning of the engagement, would have animated them for further efforts in proportion as it would have dispirited the British for further resistance. In fact, D'Erlon's charge was critical in the extreme. The Duke of Wellington regarded it as the most serious attack made during the day, and though its repulse must not be taken as absolutely decisive of the general issue, yet its influence upon the final victory can scarcely be over-estimated. In the meantime, while the Highlanders were re- pelling the attack of the centre columns^ Quiot was assailing La Haie Sainte, which was held by Baring with the light troops of the King's German Legion. 2o8 WATERLOO The ground in the neighbourhood of the farm was intersected by sand-pits, from which the riflemen could keep up an unseen and deadly fire upon the French should they occupy the walls. The King's Germans resisted desperately, but none the less the French occupied the orchard, and were press- ing up to the buildings, driving the riflemen to seek refuge from their rifle-pits among their own ranks. At this moment a reinforcement was de- spatched by the Duke to the support of Baring, who, thus strengthened, sought to regain the orchard and garden which had been lost. The French Cuirassiers now dashed in, and were carry- ing all before them, when Lord Uxbridge ordered the advance of the Household troops under Lord Edward Somerset, consisting of the ist and and Life Guards, the Royal Horse Guards Blue, and the 1st Dragoons. The impact of the opposing bodies of cavalry was terrific, the troops engaging hand-to-hand, the steel clashing and flashing upon helmets, casques, and cuirasses. The French were compelled to give way, the Household troops in hot pursuit, until the high road, off which La Haie Sainte stands, was choked with a seething mass of horses and of men, penned in between the high banks on each side. In such a situation it was difficult to recognise friend or foe. Many of the Life Guards fell victims to the fire of the French infantry gathered on the banks above, while the British artillery was sending in a heavy fire upon the serried masses of the enemy gathered in the THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 209 high road. La Haie Sainte, however, was for the time relieved, and the repulse of D'Erlon's left by this operation was made even more complete. in. This great general movement, beginning between I and 1.30, was not over till 3 o'clock. While pre- parations for it were being made, and before D'Erlon had advanced from his position. Napoleon had seen upon his right some troops advancing by way of St Lambert. He believed them, or affected to believe them, to be the troops of Grouchy advanc- ing to his support, and seems at first to have had no apprehension that they were the advance guard of the Prussian army. He was at the moment writing a despatch to Grouchy, which is dated, "The Field of Waterloo, June 18, i P.M.," and he therein acknowledged the receipt of Grouchy's letter of 2 A.M. " You have written this morning at two o'clock that you would march on Sart-^- Walhain. Your design, then, is to move on Corbaix or Wavre. This movement is conformable to his Majesty's arrangements, which have been made known to you. However, the Emperor orders me to tell you that you should constantly manoeuvre in our direction, . . . and be always prepared to fall upon any of the enemy's troops which may endeavour to annoy our right and crush them. " At this instant battle is engagied* on the • Grouchy read " gagnie " instead of " engag&." O 210 WATERLOO line before Waterloo. The enemy's centre is at Mont St Jean. Manoeuvre, therefore, to join our right," This letter serves to illustrate the confusion in Napoleon's mind relative to Grouchy's march. When he sees troops at i P.M. at St Lambert, he imagines them to be Grouchy's, though at the moment he is writing to Grouchy, supposing him to be directing his march from Gembloux by way of Sart-^-Walhain and Corbaix or Wavre. Assum- ing that the Marshal started from Gembloux at 4 A.M., an eight hours' march could not have brought his leading columns to St Lambert by noon. Again, the directions to manoeuvre towards the right of the main body are repeated twice over, conveying the impression that there was some uneasiness on the Emperor's part lest his previous instructions should not have been sufficiently precise. When, therefore, he saw the strange troops at St Lambert, he ought to have been certain that they were not Grouchy's, or, at any rate, he should have had so much doubt upon the subject as to justify the detachment of a con- siderable body of men from his own right to observe their movements, and, if necessary, impede their progress. Instead of this he merely sent a part of Domont's and Subervie's light cavalry, amounting to about 2400 men, to act purely as a corps of observation. In a very short time a Prussian hussar was brought in as a prisoner, and it was found that he was the bearer of a despatch THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 211 from Biilow, announcing the arrival of his corps at St Lambert, 30,000 strong, and asking Wellington's instructions as to the disposition of it. Napoleon immediately added a postscript to his letter to Grouchy, which ran thus — " P.S. — A letter, which has just been intercepted, tells that General Biilow is about to attack our flank. We believe we see this corps on the heights of St Lambert, so lose not an instant in draw- ing near and joining us in order to crush Biilow, whom you will catch red-handed {en flagrant Mity The divisions of Lobau's 6th corps, about 7000 men, were now detached in support of Subervie's cavalry, and thus the force which was to have sup- ported D'Erlon found itself, at the moment when it was wanted for that purpose, actively engaged on quite another part of the field. This letter, addressed to Grouchy, could have no influence upon his movements. It is an indication that Napoleon needed his assistance sorely, but is in no way an indication that Grouchy could have come. Had that Marshal, very early in the morn- ing, directed himself upon the Bridges of the Dyle he might have been to some extent within touch of the main army by the afternoon, but he had adopted a different course, believing that by marching direct upon Wavre he was best fulfilling the Emperor's intentions, and by the time the I P.M. despatch reached him, at a late hour in the evening, he was fully engaged with Thiele- 212 WATERLOO mann's corps, and could not abandon that en- gagement, even with the strongest inclination to do so. Still, even without Grouch/s assistance, the Emperor had an opportunity, which he entirely let slip, of delaying the Prussian advance materially. The ground between St Lambert and the battle- field was intersected by the Lasne stream and its various tributary rivulets, and was rendered pecu- liarly difificult by the heavy rains of the preced- ing days. The Prussian march had already been arduous, and its last stages were to be more arduous still. A comparatively small body of men detached as far as the main stream could have easily occupied 30,000 men for a very considerable time, even if insufficient to stop their progress altogether. The artillery could have been thrown into confusion before Biilow could place it in posi- tion, and the weary Prussian soldiers, knee-deep in mud, would have been ill-fitted to break their way through troops refreshed by food and sleep, and animated by a due sense of the importance of their mission upon the main operations of the day. The Anglo-Dutch left was originally weak, and Wellington was in no position to detach a portion of it to take the French marching to the Lasne in flank and rear. Instead of adopting a plan which could scarcely have been more disastrous than that actually adopted, and which offered, at any rate, very fair chances of delaying the Prussians, the Emperor allowed them, practically unchecked, to THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 213 take position in the field, and limited his own movements to detaching 10,000 men to oppose them only when actually in position. The Prus- sians were descried at i, were recognised by 1.30, but were not upon the field, ready to begin, till 4.30. Why were they permitted a period of three hours in which to move unmolested without any serious attempt being made to impede their advance ? IV. But in the interval between the repulse of D'Erlon's corps and the active intervention of the Prussians, the battle continued to rage along the whole line, and two episodes between the hours of three and six conspicuously demand attention. The first is the renewed attack by the French on La Haie Sainte, and their eventual occupation of it. The second is the great cavalry charge under the command of Ney, which offers many points 01 analogy with D'Erlon's grand infantry charge a few hours before. Having described these movements and their effects, it will then be time to relate the story of the Prussian attack, and the final scene of all, the advance of the Imperial Guard and its overthrow, involving the overthrow of the whole army. But there is one fact which must be noticed in regard to all the movements of the battle, — that they were conducted outside the immediate control of the Emperor in person. One of the first effects 214 WATERLOO of the Prussian advance, as soon as it was recog- nised, was that Napoleon's attention was almost exclusively directed to meeting it. The orders to Lobau to prepare to meet this flank attack, the careful observation of his movements which led to the despatch of the Young Guard as a reinforcement, the consequent repulse of the corps of Billow, all this closely engaged the Emperor till six in the afternoon, and the movements of the battle in front were left to the conduct of Marshal Ney. If those movements were brilliant or were faulty, it is to Ney that the credit or the blame is chiefly due; and brilliant as they un- doubtedly were, it must be acknowledged that they are not altogether beyond the reach of hostile criticism. This fact of the absence of Napoleon from the main battle is duly noted in almost every account, whether contemporary or otherwise, but the natural inference from it is seldom drawn with sufficient force. From three o'clock in the after- noon we must regard the action at Waterloo as two battles and not as one, requiring two com- manders and not one, demanding their presence in very different parts of the field, and rendering any superintendence by one of them over the opera- tions of the other practically impossible. Any further description of these two battles, which were taking place at the same time upon the same field, must be prefaced by a remark, which is doubtless of general application to all battles, but which, in a special degree, applies to the engagement at Waterloo. It is almost impossible THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 215 to be sure that any view of the fight is absolutely correct. This uncertainty arises not from any lack of materials, but from the multiplicity of materials by which the subject is overlaid. The ultimate testimony must of necessity be that of those who were present on the occasion, and in the multitude of eye-witnesses there is confusion. To the common soldier, fighting in the ranks, everything outside the little circuit of his own operations is chaos. His impression of the whole is distorted by his experience of a very small part, and at the moment of a general victory, he may be under the impression that -defeat stares him in the face.* Even the regimental officers know little beyond that which immediately concerns them, and their narratives must be received with the greatest caution. And with the generals in com- mand, and even with the general-in-chief, it is much the same. On matters of detail they speak with many and with contradictory voices, and yet it is on details that campaigns are lost and won. The relations of eye-witnesses, in short, are in a large degree untrustworthy, but it is from such relations alone that descriptions of battles are compiled. The fierce excftement of the fray annihilates time and space, and hence discrepancies, which are little short of grotesque, invalidate the evident on which, perforce, we must form our judgments. A simple illustration of this may be * See Conan Doyle, " A Great Shadow " ; and Erckmann Chatrian's "Waterloo." 2i6 WATERLOO found in the various statements given by those most competent to speak with authority as to the time when the action began. Contemporary letters say, " towards eleven " or " about half-past eleven." Wellington says, "at about lO." Alava, the Spanish attachd on Wellington's staff, says " at 10.30." "Towards noon," says Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian attach^. " About i," says Alten, and Ney corroborates his statement. "About noon" is the statement of Napoleon. When there are such variations of opinion about a matter open to the accurate observation of all, we must expect to find even greater discrepancies as to the occurrences which took place in the heat of action, and so it is that in reference to the occupation of La Haie Sainte by the French, we have the testimony of eye-witnesses to the effect that it took place at 2 o'clock, at 3.30, about 5 o'clock, while Lord Wolseley is convinced that it was about 6 P.M. Thus, in attempting to describe the defence and capture of this important post, we are met at the outset by difficulties and doubts exactly where certainty is the first essential, for the hour at which La Haie Sainte was captured by the French is the very governing point of subsequent criticism. If the French were in possession of the place before their grand cavalry charge began, Ney is open to the imputation of neglecting to profit by all the opportunities which the position afforded for the support of that charge. If, on the other THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 217 hand, the charge was made before the occupation, it is obvious that La Haie Sainte could not be used as a support to the French cavalry. The Duke of Wellington, of all men on the field, was likely to know best when the place was taken. Writing to a correspondent two months after the battle, he says, " This (position) they got, I think, at about two o'clock. ... At about two in the afternoon, as I have before said, they got pos- session of the farm-house on the high-road, . . . and they then took possession of a small m«und on the left of the high-road going from Brussels, immediately opposite the gate of the farm, and they were never removed from thence till I com- menced the attack in the evening." * Yet, if this be true, it implies that La flaie Sainte was seized by D'Erlon's left column, which, as a fact, was driven back by the charges of the Household troops. A non-commissioned cavalry oflficer, who was engaged in the action round the farm, declares that it fell into the hands of the French "soon after five o'clock." Critics are as much at variance as eye-witnesses, and this being so, it is well to walk circumspectly through the details of Waterloo, and to temper judgment with some amount of prudent doubt as to whether it all was as we suppose it to have been. " In an action such as Waterloo," says Quinet, " it seems that the * The Duke, believing the battle began about lo, means to say that La Haie Sainte was captured when the fight had been in progress about four hours. 2i8 WATERLOO most decisive incidents should to-day be known with sufficient exactness to make mistake impossible, and it is the contrary which is the case. However superficially one enters into the history of that day, it is astonishing to see how many obscurities and contradictions still remain, how many un- certainties in the relation of important events. Did such a phase of the battle precede or follow another phase ? Was such a village taken ? or such a farm occupied? At what moment was it lost or regained ? Each narrative differs on each of these points, and yet it is on the inter- connexion of causes and effects that the real character of a battle depends. Throughout these hundred days there is a chronology which is implacable. Invert it for a moment and every- thing escapes you." M. Quinet then proceeds to give a most vivid description of the fight. His chronology — so im- placable — adapts itself to his glowing picture, and not a sign betrays the man who, a few pages before, has so clearly warned us that when we think we know, then, perhaps, we are most mist&ken. " The history of a battle," wrote the Duke of Wellington, six weeks after Waterloo, " is not unlike the history of a ball. Some individual may recollect all the little events of which the great result is the battle won or lost, but no individual can recollect the order in which, or the exact moment at which, they occurred, which makes all the difference as to their value and importance." THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 219 But as to the hour when La Haie Sainte was occupied there are certain probabilities which must be taken into account, and it is certainly more incredible that Ney, in possession of the farm, should have neglected to use it in support of his cavalry charges than that he was not in possession of the place at the hour when the charges were made. The statements, too, of Sir J. Shaw Kennedy, who was throughout the battle upon the English right centre, and of Heym^s, who was Ney's chief-of-staff, and therefore close to him all day, should carry more weight on such a point than even the testimony of the Duke himself, whose mind was occupied with the direction of the whole action, and who, while repelling an attack, would probably be oblivious of time. These officers state that it was after the cavalry charges that La Haie Sainte fell. Though with much diffidence and hesitation of judgment, we may conclude, with strong probability of being correct, that there was no fixed and formal in- terval between the one operation and the other;, that the attack on La Haie was contemporaneous, at any rate to some extent, with the charges of the cavalry ; that both movements were cheered on and stimulated by the enthusiasm of Ney, and that the moment the farm was seized, he made use of it to the best advantage as a point dappui against the English centre. Just as the attack on Hougomont is a distinct phase of the battle, though it went on all day and at times blended 220 WATERLOO with other movements, so the atack upon and capture of La Haie Sainte is a distinct phase, though other operations in the battle were being carried on side by side with it, V. The repulse of D'Erlon's columns was followed up by a tremendous cannonade from each side, and by the descent of clouds of skirmishers into the hollow ground between the positions. Further operations against Wellington's left were im- possible until the French right wing had some time allowed it to re-establish itself, especially as the reserves which might have supported it in its renewed attack were now needed for the battle on the flank. Moreover, there still stood, immediately fronting the allied centre, the stronghold of La Haie Sainte, occupied by Baring's Hanoverians, now reduced to a mere handful of men. It was then, to the roar and thunder of the cannonade, that Ney collected first of all such infantry as might be efficient for his purpose. There were but few of these, for the right had not yet recovered from its repulse, the left was too hotly engaged at Hougomont, the reserves were marching to confront BUlow. He had to rely upon D'Erlon's left division, or such part of it as was available, and upon two battalions of Donzelot's division, which had already suffered severely. With these La Haie Sainte was vigorously beset The garden and orchard were carried at the first assault, THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 221 but no sooner were the French in possession than Baring's Hanoverians drove them out. Again they returned to the attack, and seized the ground once more, the Hanoverians retreating step by step and contesting every inch of the way. As they advanced within the protecting walls of the building, a deadly fire was poured in upon the French from the crenellated walls, and from scaf- foldings erected hastily for purposes of cover and defence, but the undaunted enemy pressed on up to the very muskets as they protruded, seeking to snatch them from the hands of the besieged. In the meantime Baring was sorely in need of rein- forcements and ammunition. The last was hard to obtain, for ammunition was running short all along the line, and the road which would bring it to La Haie Sainte was full under fire of the French batteries. Each shot, therefore, was carefully hus- banded and aimed with deadly effect. Help at length arrived in the shape of some Nassauers, but the besiegers, now as five to one, were ham- mering upon the main doors, which opened on to the high-road, with axes and crowbars, while the gates on the western side were being forced in the same manner. In addition to the work of defence, the defenders were called upon to extin- guish the flames which were blazing up in the farm buildings. The great camp kettles of the Nassauers served as buckets, and under a constant stream pouring from them the flames were extin- guished ; but, the work of active resistance being 222 WATERLOO for a brief space intermitted, the Hanoverians and their supporters were unable to check the rush of the French upon the eastern door. It was broken in, and La Haie Sainte was in the hands of Ney, Baring and his little band retreating under fire upon the main position. At once great masses of men poured in through the open doors and took up their positions immediately under the ridge which defined the British line. By this time it must have been between five and six o'clock, when Wellington was hard put to it to find men to resist the cavalry attack. Accord- ingly the Sth and 8th battalions of the King's German Legion were advanced down the ridge in order to check the fire from La Haie Sainte. A small body of Lord Edward Somerset's cavalry was sent in support of the 5 th, so that regiment suffered but slightly, but the Sth battalion was terribly mauled, losing more than half its men and its colours. But, on the side of the French, the cost of gain- ing and maintaining the position was enormous. Two thousand of their men were reported to have fallen in the operations at and around La Haie Sainte, though these figures probably represent the total number, French and allies, who fell there. In any case the French loss was enormous, and what was more serious, to a large extent unneces- sary. For here, as at Hougomont, the impetuous ardour of the French blinded them to considerations of prudence. A hand-to-hand attack, however THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 223 gallant, against an enemy defended by stone walls is never economical of time or life, and time and men were, at this juncture, what Napoleon chiefly required. If, instead of trying to carry La Haie Sainte by assault, the walls had first been demolished by artillery, the capture of the place must have been more easily effected and at much less cost. The French justly pride themselves upon their ilan in the field, but reckless impetu- osity dissociated from wise precaution, unquestion- ably cost them dear upon the field of Waterloo. However, La Haie Sainte was won, and general success began to attend upon the French right. The troops of Donzelot and Marcognet, now resting on La Haie Sainte, were engaging Kempt, Pack, and Bylandt, while Durutte was successful in driving Prince Bernhard of Saxe- Weimar from Fapelotte and making himself master of that position. VI. While the French were gaining these advantages upon the right, Ney in the meantime was organis- ing a grand cavalry movement upon the allied right-centre. The infantry of Reille's corps should have occupied the space intervening between Hougomont and La Haie Sainte, but it was already so fully engaged at Hougomont that no part of it could be spared for operations else- where. Lobau's divisions, which might have sup- 224 WATERLOO ported Reille, were already moving against the Prussians towards Planchenoit. Accordingly this space was unoccupied, and a considerable gap left in the French line of attack between these two positions. Shortly after 3 P.M. Milhaud's Cuirassiers were ordered to take position upon this open ground. With them were the light cavalry of Lef^bvre- Desnouettes and Kellermann, and Guyot's dragoons were also advanced forward in support The attack was heralded by thunders of artillery from the French batteries, which maintained a continuous fire, while Ney was receiving the cavalry squadrons which defiled in the hollow on the left of La Haie Sainte. To avoid the cannonade, which was dealing serious destruction in his ranks, the Duke of Wellington withdrew his troops from the summit of the ridge and formed them in squares en ^chiquier upon the sloping ground behind it The artillery alone were left upon the crest, and an incessant fire was poured in upon the advancing cavalry until the gunners were compelled to abandon their guns and take refuge in the pro- tecting British squares. Cuirassiers and lancers dashed up the slope, and soon held the summit of the ridge, which a moment before had been the allied position, but their task was only now begun. In front of them were the infantry of Alten's and Cooke's divisions, formed in impenetrable squares, constituting two lines — seven squares in the first line, six in the second — each resting upon the other THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 225 as the spaces on a chess-board. The redcoats of the English guards alternated with the dark uni- forms of the Hanoverian and King's German Legion. All alike, as the flashing torrent broke upon them, held ilrm as if rooted to the ground, " pouring in a deadly fire of musketry from the lines and of small shot from the guns posted at the corners of each square." The ground was heavy from the recent rains, and this took off something from the impetuosity of the French charge, but none the less it was tremendous in its intensity and earnestness, and the fate of Europe at this crisis hung trembling in the balance. The short stern order "Close up the ranks" mingled with the sharp rattle of the musketry and the fierce shouts of "Vive I'Empereur," and if a breach was made, at once the ranks were closed and the serried front remained, still impenetrable. And now the French horsemen, exposed to the pitiless fire, front and flank, of the allied squares, began to fall into confusion. They had gained the plateau, but there was no supporting infantry to maintain it. Herein lay the cause which rendered the cavalry charge ineffectual. Unsupported by infantry there was no alternative between breaking the line and retreat, and the line could not be broken. Ney recognised the inevitable and sounded the rally. At once the Duke of Wellington seized the favour- able moment, and while the French were still in disorder they were charged by the allied cavalry under Somerset. As they descended the slope, P 226 WATERLOO Wellington's artillerymen at once sprang from the protection of the squares to their guns, which still crowned the ridge, and directed a heavy fire upon the discomfited mass below. The danger, however, was only averted for a moment. Though the cuirassiers had failed, Lef^bvre Desnouettes still commanded two thousand sabres, while the heavy dragoons under Kellermann and Guyot remained untouched. Ney promptly put himself at the head of the lancers and charged the pursuing cavalry of the allies, which paid the penalty of an over-rash impetuosity by fearful losses, and by a forced retreat behind the English lines. And now, refreshed by a short breathing space, cuirassiers and lancers once more invaded the plateau, nerved for an effort more strenuous than before. The attack was characterised by all the features of the former one, and the result was the same. The want of infantry was fatal to success, unless the squares could be broken. "Infantry!" said Napoleon bitterly, in answer to Ney's urgent request, " where can I get them from ? Would you have me make them ? " It is at this juncture of the battle that we can first form an estimate of the influence of the Prussian advance. Had Lobau's ten thousand men been now available, to hold the plateau which the cavalry had won, there can be no doubt that Wellington's line would have been broken and that he would have experienced a disastrous defeat. But Lobau was now holding Planchenoit against Biilow, and failing his or other support, THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 227 these repeated cavalry charges ought not to have been made. The issue, however, was now definitely committed to the touch of cavalry, and every available man was called upon for a supreme effort. Even the brief respite between the attacks was charged with destruction, for the artillery fire from the English position kept plunging in upon the ranks below, cutting deep pathways through them. Inaction was as fatal as action, and the English squares must be broken. Accordingly Guyot and Kellermann were ordered to support the remnant of Milhaud's and Lefebvre's men, and for two hours cuirassiers alternated with dragoons in desperate assault against the allies. The Duke of Wellington had anticipated these renewed onsets by reforming and materially strengthening his position. Chass6's division of light infantry was drawn in from Braine La Leud and formed behind the Brunswick contingent: two brigades of Clinton's division were brought up from around Merbe Braine and posted upon the right flank : Maitland's guards, together with Mitchell's brigade of Colville's division, hitherto stationed in the rear as a reserve, were brought forward to the front, while Vincke's Hanoverian brigade was moved across the Charleroi road in support of Alten's division, which had especially suffered from the repeated charges of the French. The resources of each army were now employed to the full, and each was resolute for victory. If the Duke's position were forced, the day was lost. 228 WATERLOO His left was barely holding its own, and unless Ziethen's column arrived soon, it must give way. Hougomont was in flames ; the centre was menaced by the full force of Ney's cavalry, and Billow's corps was held by Lobau. No further reserves were to be had. "Tell him," said the Duke to Halkett's request for relief, "that we must stay where we are while one man remains alive." Disaster at any one point meant disaster everywhere, while successful resistance to Ney meant victory all along the line. Delay in win- ning implied for the French ultimate defeat, for Ziethen's arrival must soon re-establish the allied left, while the co-operation of Pirch, who was rapidly marching to support Biilow, would render the main Prussian attack irresistible. Ney was ignorant of the near approach of the Prussian reinforcements, but none the less he con- ducted the attack with more than his wonted ardour. The allied squares were beset on every side. "The cavalry surrounded us," wrote the Duke to Beresford, " as if it had been our own." The Duke himself, with the Prince of Orange and several other general officers, sought safety within the squares, and animated the men with stirring words of encouragement. " Stand firm, 95th," he cried; "think what Ihey will say of this in England!" A few isolated cavaliers succeeded in penetrat- ing the position, and turned to charge it en revers. To a man they fell victims to their heroic temerity. THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 229 The allied cavalry were once more brought into play, but were soon reduced to a force less than that of an ordinary regiment. The Cumber- land Hussars turned and fled ; not a man of them responded to Lord Uxbridge, as he called them on to the charge. Omptdda was killed, Alten seriously wounded, and scarcely a staff oflicer was left to carry the Duke's orders. Still the squares stood unbroken, and the force of the attack was wearing itself away. The French loss was as great as ours, if not greater; only the prompt support of infantry could render effective such success as had been attained. It was now that, having relieved Lobau at Planchenoit, Na- poleon determined to advance the remaining battalions of the Imperial Guard — his last reserve — to clench the work that through so many hours his cavalry had been doing upon the plateau of Mont St Jean, and it was now, too, that upon the extreme left of the allies was heard the sharp rattle of musketry, which announced to Welling- ton that Ziethen had debouched upon the open ground, and was joining his forces to those of Prince Bernhard, to drive the French from Papelotte. VII. The Prussian dispositions on the morning of the 1 8th have already been shown. Between twelve and one Billow's corps was observed by the Emperor, and two squadrons of light cavalry were 230 WATERLOO despatched to watch it An order was sent to Grouchy to manoeuvre towards his left, so as to join forces with Napoleon, and catch Biilow en flagrant d^lit. Later still, Lobau's corps was moved upon Planchenoit, so as to guard against an attack from the rear, which, if successful, would cut Napoleon's communications and close his line of retreat. But while thus taking precautions against Biilow, the Emperor by no means realised the full gravity of his situation. He knew nothing of Pirch, who was already well forward from Wavre to support Biilow. He knew nothing of Ziethen, who was marching under cover of wood and un- dulating ground to co-operate directly with Wel- lington's left He believed that he had before him an isolated corps, which would be taken between two fires — Grouchy's and his own — and which would consequently soon be annihilated, thus rendering his victory on that day even more de- cisive than he had anticipated. Lulled by such false hopes, he omitted to intercept the Prussians at the passages of the Lasne, and allowed them to deploy, practically unmolested, upon the open ground beyond the wood of Paris towards Plan- chenoit Billow's difficulties, however, were very great His men had been marching since early morning, his divisions were not together, and the ground was so heavy as to be almost impassable for artillery. It was not, therefore, until 4.30 that two of Biilow's four divisions were in position, together with their cavalry, under Prince William THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 231 of Prussia ; these, however, promptly joined action with Lobau, and the flank attack was vigorously begun. Lobau's command numbered rather less than 10,000 men, and consisted of two brigades of cavalry under Domont and Subervie, and two divisions of infantry under Simmer and Jeannin. Teste's divi- sion, which formed a part of the 6th corps, was with Grouchy. Billow's force was nearly three times as great, though of very inferior calibre. At first able to hold his own, and indeed to gain some success over the Prussians, yet when Billow's corps was consolidated, disparity of numbers compelled Lobau to retreat. This he did, in close order and with admirable steadiness, upon Planchenoit. Here he took position, determined to sacrifice the last man for the protection of the rear of the main army. Napoleon now despatched to his assistance eight battalions of the Young Guard, and these troops held the village, enabling Lobau to cover the entire flank of the main army, his right resting on Planchenoit, his left in touch with Durutte's division in and about Papelotte, a movement which had the effect of separating Biilow from Wellington, and which might have been decisive of the battle, but for the appearance of Ziethen later on in the day. And now this battle on the flank was carried on with desperate determination on both sides, but with doubtful fortunes almost to the end. Bliicher's artillery, posted most advantageously upon the high ground which overlooked the field, poured a 232 WATERLOO shower of shot and shell upon Planchenoit and its defenders. Under cover of this cannonade the Prussians vigorously assaulted the village, but were repulsed by the Young Guard. A second assault was more successful. Overpowered by numbers, the French were driven out, and several Prussian batteries were successfully posted in such close proximity to the main chaussie that Napoleon's reserve around La Belle Alliance was threatened by their shot. Three additional battalions were at once moved forward by the Emperor to the sup- port of the Young Guard, and this timely rein- forcement once more established the fight. Plan- chenoit was again invested by the French, the Prussians being driven from the village at the point of the sword, and rolled back as far as Maransart. The advantage thus won was followed up by Lobau upon the left, who, engaging Bulow's remaining divisions, forced them also to retire in considerable confusion. The danger from the Prussians seemed now to be over. So long as the French held Planchenoit, Napoleon's position could not be turned, and while Lobau continued to pre- sent a steady front along the entire flank of the main army, any active co-operation with Wel- lington on the part of Biilow was impossible. But the real danger remained unseen. It was about seven o'clock that two divisions of Pirch's corps — some 15,000 strong — came up to the support of BUlow, and about the same hour, or a little later, Ziethen's columns effected a junction with Wei- THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 233 lington's left. The arrival of these reinforcements turned the day against Napoleon. So far the intervention of 30,000 Prussians had but post- poned his victory. They had, it is true, occupied the entire corps of Lobau, as well as several batta- lions of the Imperial Guard, which had been de- stined to support the earlier attacks upon the allies, but in their main object, to turn the Em- peror's position and take him at once in flank and rear, they had entirely failed ; it even seemed as if they would be involved in the defeat which threatened to overtake the army of Wellington. But, reinforced by Pirch and Ziethen, the Prussians by mere weight of numbers became irresistible, and a battle which for eight hours had waged with indomitable steadiness on both sides, but on the whole with advantage to the French, was in an hour converted into a deplorable rout, into total ruin at the very moment when success seemed imminent. VIII. At the moment when Napoleon judged the crisis of the battle to have arrived, he determined, as at Ligny, to put in the Imperial Guard, or rather those battalions of the Guard which still remained at his disposition. Among the many glorious deeds which shed lustre upon the allied army upon the 1 8th June, there still remains to be related perhaps the most 234 WATERLOO glorious deed of all, when splendid gallantry and fine soldiership combined to repulse an attack made by the flower of Napoleon's armies, troops whose mere intervention in an engagement had hitherto been regarded as an assurance of victory. The infantry of the Guard were all picked sol- diers, distinguished by length of service and bril- liant achievements. The Old Guard (Grenadiers) consisted exclusively of those who, in addition to distinguished exploits, could show twelve years' service in the army. Every member of the Middle Guard (Chasseurs) had served eight years, and of the Young Guard at least four years. Each of these corps of Guards contained eight battalions, with about 500 men to each battalion. At the beginning of the campaign of Waterloo the total muster of the infantry of the Guard was about 13,000 men.* Of this number, however, only a small propor- tion was available for the final attack upon Wel- lington, Duhesme's eight battalions were already • Young Guard — Duhesme, . . , 38CXJ Middle Guaid — Morand, . . . 4250 Old Guard — Fiiant, .... 4420 Artillery — 320 men with 16 guns to each corps. (Gourgaud). But Gourgaud under-estimates Morand and Duhesme. The official statement of the chief of the staff of the Imperial Guard is — Duhesme, ..... 4283 Morand, . . • . . 4603 Friant, • . . . . 4140 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 235 engaged at Planchenoit, and to these had been added one battalion of Grenadiers and two of Chasseurs under Morand. Thus eleven out of twenty-four battalions were fully occupied with the Prussians, and of five other battalions two were dis- posed between Planchenoit and the main chaussie, one near Caillou, and two at La Belle Alliance. Thus but eight battalions were available for the final charge, numbering, when allowance has been made for losses at Ligny, at the most 3500 men, and probably little more than 3CXX). These were formed by Napoleon himself in columns of battalions, with a front of two companies in three ranks. As there were four companies to a battalion, the front of the column would consist of between seventy and eighty men — "about seventies in front," says Captain Powell of the English Guards. Halting in the dip by La Haie Sainte, the Em- peror addressed his invincible bodyguard in a few stirring words, and then entrusted them to the hands of Ney, who led them in person against the English position. The point of attack for the head of the column was that part of the ridge just behind which Maitland's Guards were lying down With drums beating and colours flying the French infantry moved steadily forward, " as if on parade," and reaching the foot of the ridge, dashed impetu- ously up it, seeing no enemy to contest their pro- gress. Scarcely, however, had they reached the ridge, when the British Guards sprang to their feet, and from a front of 450 men, four deep, so deadly 236 WATERLOO a volley was poured into the advancing column that it suddenly stopped, as if from the impact of an irresistible mass, then wavered and fell into con- fusion as the front ranks dropped under the British fire, and finally, when Lord Saltoun opportunely gave the word to charge, fled down the hill, hotly pursued by our Household troops. The rear bat- talions of the Imperial Guard were not, how- ever, involved in this overthrow. They, as the advance column proceeded, inclined, according to Maitland's account, towards their own left, and proceeded in a line parallel with that of the lead- ing battalions, and thus, as the English Guards charged down the hill, they found themselves ex- posed upon their flank to what they imagined to be a second column of the Imperial Guard, though, in reality, it was a part of the original column, de- flected from the prescribed line of advance.* Thus menaced upon their flank, the English Guards withdrew to their original position behind the crest of the ridge. In the meantime the rear battalions of the Im- perial Guard were advancing independently of their routed comrades, towards that part of the * This seems to be the true soUition of the problem which has vexed all writers upon the Battle of Waterloo from that time until now, and which will doubtless continue to vex the critics of the future — viz.. Were there two separate columns of Guards or only one ? The solution, as given in the text, is simple ; it fairly recon- ciles much conflicting testimony, and it embodies Maitland's idea of what he saw himself. No other theory can pretend to harmonise all the facts to the same degree. THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 237 British line which was held by Adam's Brigade, recently called up from their station in reserve at Merbe Braine. The brigade consisted of the 2nd battalion of the 95th Rifles, the 5 2nd Regiment, under Sir John Colborne, and the 71st, under Sir Thomas Reynell. As the enemy's column ad- vanced, Colborne, on his own initiative, ordered his regiment to move directly forward to its front, and when its left at the foot of the slope was, in line with the leading company of the French column, by a skilfully executed movement, the regiment was formed in line four - deep so as to flank the French column. The position thus assumed by Colborne was hazardous in the extreme, for the regiment was entirely unsupported — detached, in an exposed position, from the main army, liable to be rendered powerless for offensive purposes by a charge of cavalry, liable also to very rough handling from the French artillery if at that time any batteries had been mounted against them. But the fatal error in the French dispositions for this last attack was now made apparent. The batteries which accompanied the Imperial Guard were rendered useless by the deflection of the rear battalions from their true line. There were no other batteries to do duty for them, and the left of the column was consequently entirely unsupported either by cavalry or artillery. Under these circum- stances Colborne's advance was not a desperate act of rashness but an inspiration of genius, 238 WATERLOO which knows how to seize the chance which the moment offers, and the claim of the S2nd — that their movement was decisive of the battle — must be allowed. For the Imperial column, thus taken on the flank, halted in its advance. " Then as many files as possible, on the left of each company of their leading column, faced outwards," and a furious musketry fire was exchanged, by which the gallant 52nd suffered severely, but which, on their own admission, simply overwhelmed the French (une attaque trh vive, qui nous icrasd). The light troops followed up their fire by a charge, before which the French infantry broke and fled, the companies immediately exposed to the attack in a state of complete confusion — the rear battalions withdrawing in fairly good order towards their position in front of La Belle Alliance. IX. It was now eight o'clock. About half an hour earlier, distinct above the din pf the main battle, there rose the roar of some new firing upon the extreme left of the allies. It could indicate nothing but the arrival of a reinforcement to one side or the other. If it were Grouchy, all was well for Napoleon — and indeed the rumour circulated that it was Grouchy, arrived in the nick of time — but if it were a fresh detachment of Prussians, then Napoleon's chance was gone. It was not Grouchy, but Ziethen with his corps of 20,000 men THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 239 and 32 guns, who, debouching from the woods around Chain, now at length, after incredible exer- tions, came to take his stand by the side of Kempt's hardly-pressed division. Ziethen's lead- ing battalions, under Steinmetz, after a brief mo- ment of confusion, when friends were mistaken for foes, joined the troops of Prince Bernhard of Saxe- Weimar, and they together renewed the assault against Papelotte, which, since the first irruption of the Prussians, had become the pivot of the French position, for upon it Durutte's right and Lobau's left respectively rested. The place had been gallantly forced by Durutte two hours before, and as gallantly held against all efforts to retake it ; but now, borne down by force of numbers, the French were compelled to retire, and thus the right of the main army and Lobau's position on its flank were simultaneously turned. Confusion rapidly spread all along the line. Marcognet, Quiot, and Donzelot, holding the crest from Papelotte to La Haie Sainte, were compelled to cease their attack in order to act on the defensive. The brigades of Lambert, Pack, and Kempt, animated with fresh courage by the arrival of the Prussians, drove the French down the slope, while Ziethen's guns, which now crowned the crest, carried destruction into their ranks. At this moment the cavalry brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur, no longer needed as reserve upon the left, were brought over to the centre, and their charge completed the distress of the French infantry. Many of the battalions broke 240 WATERLOO and fled, all semblance of discipline or of resistance was lost, and their line of flight, crossing as it did the retreat of the routed Imperial Guard, paralysed all the efforts of the latter to rally, and completed the panic and confusion. This was the moment chosen by the Duke of Wellington to order a general advance all along the line. His work was now accomplished, and the Prussians might well have been left to complete the victory, but the Duke had no desire to relin- quish to his allies the full glory of dealing the last and crowning blow. The advance, therefore, was made by the whole allied force, on front and flank concurrently, and with overwhelming effect. The 5 2nd followed up their advantage over the Guard by an impetuous advance, which drove everything before it. " Well done, Colborne ! well done ! Go on, don't give them time to rally," was Welling- ton's greeting to his intrepid lieutenant. Exposing himself freely, the Duke was often in a position of imminent danger, but no remonstrances would induce him to retire, " until I see those fellows go." Lord Uxbridge, as he rode by Wellington's side, had his leg shot off, but the Duke himself and his good horse " Copenhagen " seemed proof against every danger, and remained unscathed throughout the day. It is needless to dwell further on the last de- sultory efforts of the French main body to rally from the disasters which had overwhelmed them. Such of the battalions of the Imperial Guard as THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 241 still retained any organisation did ail that was possible, but nothing could now retrieve the de- moralisation which prevailed. The Emperor him- self was at last compelled to seek safety within one of the squares of the Guard, and thus sheltered he abandoned the field, passing through the wreck of his army along the great chauss^e, through Genappe to Charleroi, scarcely drawing bridle. From Charleroi a letter was sent to Grouchy to announce the issue of the day. This was Napo- leon's last military despatch. It is with a con- fession of hopeless and irreparable failure that the great warrior sinks down from the sphere of active affairs into the dull, pitiable obscurity of captivity and exile. X. Great as was the overthrow of the French, it would have been even more complete but for the heroic resistance of the 6th corps and of the Guard at Flanchenoit. Biilow had signally failed in his attack against these gallant troops, and had been compelled to withdraw to some distance beyond his first position. Lobau, with his left resting on Fapelotte, his right on the battalions of the Guard in possession of Flanchenoit, completely covered the French main battle, and from five o'clock until after 7 P.M. relieved it from all anxiety in regard to the Prussians. The appearance of Ziethen, how- ever, changed the situation, for his successful attack on Fapelotte at 7.30 had the effect of turning the Q 242 WATERLOO French left and flank simultaneously, and almost at the same moment Pirch, with 15,000 fresh troops, came up to the support of Biilow. The situation of Lobau was now critical in the extreme. Turned upon the flank, attacked by 40,000 men in front, his own men by comparison a mere handful, the main army behind him utterly demoralised and in retreat, none the less he contested stubbornly and with a deliberate courage little less than sublime every foot of ground which the Prussians won. For he recognised to the full the responsibility which now lay upon him. He alone interposed between the Prussians and the French line of retreat, and if he failed retreat would be cut off, the army would be turned in rear as well as in front and flank, and scarcely a man could escape from the field. The fate of the army, the Emperor, and for aught he knew, of France, rested upon Lobau at this supreme moment of the day, and splendidly he did his duty. Dusk had given away to darkness, only illuminated by the blazing ruins of the village he had held so well, before Lobau retired from Planchenoit, but by that time the rear of the flying army had cleared that point, and comparative safety was assured. Still steady and in good order he took position on the high road to close the line of flight and block pursuit, and thus the gallant remnant of the 6th corps and of the Young Guard had to bear the full fury of the combined advance of the allies. THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 243 Many deeds of splendid daring were done at Waterloo, but none can excel for coolness, courage, and devotion, the heroic resistance of Lobau. XL The battle was over, the enemy in full retreat, and Wellington now felt that his share in the day's operations was done. His troops were in posses- sion of the ground on which, in the morning Napoleon's lines had stood, and were thoroughly exhausted by the excessive labours of the day. The task of further pursuit was therefore sur- rendered to Blucher, and it was a peculiarly con- genial one. There was in Blucher a depth of concentrated and venomous hatred against Napo- leon and the French, nourished by years of de- feat and humiliation, and the sentiments of the commander were fully shared by the men. Not a moment of respite was granted to the panic-stricken army, huddled together in pell-mell flight within the limits of a single road. Darkness was no protection to the vanquished, for the struggling moonlight lent its aid to the victors, rendering concealment impossible. At Genappe there was biut one bridge across the Dyle, and this was thickly blocked with artillery waggons and surging masses of men too hopelessly disorganised to think of fords or other means of passage. The Prussian batteries, posted on the high ground above, poured destruc- tion among the mass, and confusion became de- 244 WATERLOO spair. There Lobau was made prisoner, Duhesme of the Young Guard died of his wounds, and Ney, reserved for an even more bitter fortune, barely escaped. Beyond Genappe to Quatre Bras, ghastly with its unburied corpses in the moonlight, from Quatre Bras to Frasne the work of vengeance was carried on, until even revenge yielded to exhausted nature, and the drama of Waterloo closed. So ended the greatest battle of our modern epoch — great by virtue of the military skill, courage, and tenacity which distinguished all the actors in it; greatest perhaps for the unparalleled career which thereby was brought to an end. An obscure Belgian village, till then unknown, has become the centre of the admiration of the world, and to it the eyes of all succeeding generations of Eng- lishmen, Frenchmen, and Prussians will be turned when they desire to think on the stuff of which their forefathers was made. "All is lost but honour," said Francis at Pavia. Frenchmen, when they think of Waterloo, may still find consolation in the same reflection, for of glory they won full measure ; while Englishmen and Pruisians may add to their pride in a hard-fought battle splen- didly won the thought that that success was due, not to the single arms of either, but to the well- planned and skilfully-conducted co-operation of both. The day of petty jealousies and acri- monious prejudice about Waterloo has gone by. We admit that without the timely intervention of the Prussians the battle would have gone against THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 245 us, though to admit this detracts in no way from the gallantry which throughout the long day op- posed unflinching resistance to a vastly superior army. Prussians admit that but for this unflinch- ing resistance their intervention would have come too late, without detracting in the smallest degree from the stubborn constancy of BlUcher, by which all the immense difficulties of the march from Wavre were overcome. Instead of tending to divide the great Teutonic nations of the North, the recollection of Waterloo should serve to unite them as they were united then, should serve to remind them of the common origin of both, and strengthen the ties of kinship by the ties of a common glory. CHAPTER XI. critical examination of the battle of waterloo. (French side.) . Napoleon's delay in beginniDg the battle — II. His methods of attack at Hougomont and La Haie Sainte — III. D'Erlon's formation in columns of attack — IV. Ney's employment of the cavaliy — V. The expediency of retreat at various periods of the battle— VI. The attack by the Imperial Guard— VII. Napoleon's physical condition at Waterloo — VIII. Napoleon's generals at Waterloo, The losses in the battle of Waterloo were very heavy. In round numbers, 203, 49, 99 5 bis point of con- centration, 30 ; headquarters at Namur, 30, 102 ; and Gneisenau, 43, and note, 117 ; Wellington's letter to, 51, SS; expects assistance at Ligny from Wellington, 56, 57, 59, 311, 312 ; Wellington's inter view at Bry vvith, 57 ; his de- termination to stand at Ligny independent of Wellington, 58, 59, 76, 78; Napoleon's plan against at Ligny, 77, 79 ; his dispositions at Ligny, 81 83 ; and battle of Ligny, 85 90; retires from Ligny, 90; reconnects communications by retreat on Wavre, iii, 117, 313 3M INDEX 119; Wellington receives news of BlUcher's retreat, 119, 125, 13s, 142; Wellington requires assurances from, 13S; Welling- ton stands on strength of BlUcher's assurances, 136, 137, 139 ; Wellington's supposed interview with, 138; supposed to be retreating on Brussels, 139. 151. «S4. IS9. 260; Grouchy deceived by Bliicher s movements, 157, 158, 166, 169, 170 ; his movements on Water- loo, 194, 195, 245, 285 ; hatred of Napoleon, and pursuit after Waterloo, 243 ; Napoleon hopes to overwhelm Wellington and Bliicher together, 233, 260 ; his hesitation on morning of Waterloo, 287, 288 ; energy of his movements later, 288, 289; leaves Thielemann to oppose Grouchy at Wavre, 305. Bois de Bossu, position at Quatre Bras, 92, 94, 5, 6. Bonaparte, see Napoleon. Booth's "additional particulars," 278. Bourbons, 4, 5. Bourmont, defection of, 34, 36. Bowles, Capt., on Wellington's retreat from Quatre Bras, 119. Braine-le-Chiteau, 282, 3. Braine-le-Comte, 39, 46, 47, 189, 276. Braine-la-Leud, 133, 183, 227, 297, 299. Brialmont, cited, 252, Brunswick, Duke of, 24, 94. Brunswickers, 2i, 22 ; at Quatre Bras, 94 J at Waterloo, 184, 199, 227, 295, 296. 301- Brussels, 25, 28, 37, 39, 47 ; pro- posal to march on, 67, 74, 76 ; consternation at, 132 ; supposed withdrawal of allied army to cover, 150, 154, 198, 283, 288. Bry, Wellington's interview with Blticher, 57, $8, 81, 138. Billow, commands Prussian 4th corps, at Li^ge, 34, 49, 77, 79, 80 ; reaches Sauveni^res, 116; retires to Wavre, 118, 136 ; joins the retreating force, 150, 173; heads Prussian ad- vance to Waterloo, 195, 196, 211, 212, 214, 220, 226, 228- 232, 241, 260, 262, 282, 285, 288, 30s, 306- Bussy, seized by the French at Ligny, 90. Bylandt's Dutch-Belgians at Waterloo, 182, 203, 223, 297, 298. Byng's division at Waterloo, 183, 185. Cabanas, Dr, on Napoleon's malady, 268. Cambridge, Duke of, Alten's re- port to, 291, 292. Caillou, In, 140, 193, 235. Cavalry charges (Ney's), at Waterloo, 224 et seq.; failure to use efifectively, 25 1 et seg. Charleroi, 31-34, 3974i> 241, 280. Charleroi-Brussels chaussie, 29, 93 ; bisects positions at Water- loo, 183, 241, 297. Charles, Comte d'Artois, 4. Charras, estimate of Napoleon's army, 1 1 ; on Lobau at Ligny, 61 ; cited as to D'Erlon's forma- tion, 251. Chass6's Dutch-Belgians, 183, 227, 297, 299. Chatelet, 33, 35. Chesney, cited, 31 ; on delay at Ligny, 100, loi ; on Bliicher's assurance of support, 136 ; on the cavalry charges, 252 ; on Wellington's 1842 memoran- dum, 278 ; on Hal troops, 281. INDEX 3^5 Clausewitz.cited, as to Napoleon's plan of campaign, 29 ; on Ney and Quatre Bias, 45 (note), 7O1 7I1 73 ! on delay in begin- ning Ligny, 100 e( seg. ; on Giouchy's movements, 168, I73> 174; °^ Napoleon at Waterloo, 262. Clinton's division of reserves at Waterloo, 184, 227, 291, 292. Colbert, commands division of Guards, 72 ; at Waterloo, 180. Colbome, Sir John, commands 52nd regiment : his flank attack on Imperial Guard, 184, 237, 240, 264, 293. Coldstream Guards, at Hougo- mont, 185, 199. Cole, Sir Lowry, commands 6th brigade absent from Waterloo, 181. Coltman, Mr Justice, on Well- ington's supposed ride to Wavre, 138. Colville's division at Hal, 183, 188, 275, 281, 282, 294. Co-operation, want of, between Napoleon and his marshals, 266, 270, et seq. Cooke's division at Quatre Bras, 95; at Waterloo, 183, 184, 199, 224. "Copenhagen," The Duke's horse, 138, 240. Corbaix, 209, 210. Cumberland, The, Hussars, 229, 294, 295. D. Dalmatia, D. of, see Soult. D'Aubrem^'s Brigade of Dutch- Belgians, 297. Davoust, 14. De Ghigny, 298, Delay in beginning Ligny, 100, loi ; Waterloo, 137. Delbrlick, Prof., on Wellington and Ligny, 311, 312; his life of Gneisenau, 43 (note). Dennewitz, 21. D'Erlon, commands 1st corps, 1 1, 32, 40 ; dilatoriness of, 45, 63, 64, 68, 72 ; deflected from his line of march, 87 ; effects of this, 88 et seq., 95-97, 102- II3> '73; Baudus' account, 104, 105; remarks of Napoleon to, 130; Napoleon's instruc- tions to, before Waterloo, 178, 190 ; his formation and attack at Waterloo, 201-209, 249- 252, 265, 298; Ney and D'Erlon at Waterloo, 256, 27 1. Dinant, 25, 35, 310. Dion-le-Mont, 195, 286, 288. "Disposition," Sir Wm. de Lancey's, analysis of, 52-54, 56, 287. Ditmers' brigade of Dutch- Belgians, 297. DoUaert's Dutch - Belgian cavalry, 297, 298. Domont's cavalry at Waterloo, 179, 210, 231. Donzelot, divisional commander under D'Erlon, 179, 220, 223, 239, 296. Doyle, Conan, 215 (note). Domberg, commands cavalry. King's German Legion, 291, Du Caillon, see Caillon. Duhesme, commands Young Guard at Flanchenoit, 234, 244. Duplat, commands brigade. King's German Legion, 291, 292. Durutte, divisional commander under D'Erlon, deflected in his march, 102, 103 ; at Waterloo, 179. 206, 223, 231, 239, 293. Dutch- Belgians, 22 ; at Quatre Bras, 93; at Waterloo, 182, 3i6 INDEX 184, 187, 189, 202, 203, 223, 261, 296, et seg. ; and see Prince Bemhard of Saxe-Weimar, D'Aubrem6, Dornberg, Dol- laert, Ditmers, Ferponcher. Dyle, Blucher's retreat on, 168; true line of Grouchy's advance, 170; bridges over, 171, 211, 243. 304- Elba, 3, 12, 255. Enghien, 39, 46, 47, 95, 189, 276. Erckmann Chatrian, cited, 215, (note). Estorff, commands Hanoverian cavalry, 294. Excelman's cavalry, 60, 73;makes reconnaissance in pursuit of Prussians, 121, 14S, 164. Eylau, 18. Fleurus, 39, 40, 49, 58 ; Emperor reaches, 61, 78 ; despatch to Ney from, 83, 84 ; Napoleon's position during Ligny, 87 ; captured guns arrive, 149. Fontaine-l'Eveque, 34. Forbes, Mr Archibald, article on Duke's ride to Wavre, 138. Forces at Waterloo (French), 180; (Wellington's), 186, 187. Foy, divisional commander under Reille, 91, 93; at Waterloo, 179, 2CX>. Eraser, Sir Wm., anecdote of Wellington, 23. Frasne, 40-42, 45, 49 ; Welling- ton's letter to Bliicherfrom, 51, 57, 63 ; D'Erlon reaches, 72 ; Ney retires to after Quatre Bras, 96 ; retreat through, 244. Frederick the Great, 9. Friant, commands battalion, Im- perial Guard, 234. Friedland, 18, 19. Frischermont, hamlet, covering Wellington's left at Waterloo, 134- Gembloux, 61 ; Napoleon will attack Prussians at, 67, 74-76, 99) 149; Prussians at, 151; Grouchy ordered to, 152 ; de- spatches from, 153, 156, 177, 194, 210. Genappe, 51, 53-55 ; skirmish during retreat on Waterloo 131 ; BUicher and Wellington at, 138, 165 ; retreat through, 241, 243, 244, 308. Gentinnes, Ziethen retires on Wavre by way of, 118; Na- poleon's failure to pursue to, 164, 166, 192. Gerard, commands 4th corps, 33, 60 ; failure in timing his ad- vance, 35, 36, 40, 45; to assist Grouchy at Sombref, 75 ; attacks Ligny, 85-89 ; Na- poleon's remarks to at Ligny, 92 ; attached to Grouchy's pursuit, 121, 146, 149, 152; Grouchy's instructions to, 153 ; urges an advance on Waterloo, 160-162; Clausewitz on, 174; his corps at Wavre, 306, 307. German Legion, 21 , 22 ; at Waterloo, 183, 207, 222; strength of, 281, 301. G^ry, Prussians retreat unmo- lested on, 164, 166, 192. Ghent, 25, 26. Gilly, 39. Girard, 70; his division left at Ligny. 91. 179- Gneisenau, 20, 55, 57 ; organises retreat on Wavre, 117 ; and Wellington, 287, 288. Goldsmith, Oliver, 2. INDEX 3^7 Gosselies, 40, 41, 57 ; conference between Ney and Reille, 63; Reille moves from, 72. Gourgaud, General, estimate of French army, 11; his narra- tive, 63 (note) ; and Grouch/s despatches, IJS (note) ; cited on Imperial Guard, 234 ; as to French losses, 246, 253 ; on Napoleon's marshals, 271 ; on Napoleon's supposed despatch to Grouchy, 193. Grouchy, biographical notice, 15- 19 ; commands right wing of French advance, 60, 61, 73, 144 ; Ney's instructions to, 61, 67> 75) 1 19 ; on Napoleon's instructions to Ney, 63 and note; position at Ligny, 84, 86, 90; insistant to pursue Prussians, 145, 146, 164, 269 (note) ; entrusted with pursuit of Prussians, 129, 146, 148; Napoleon's confidence in, 144, 145 ; instructions given to, 146 ; reluctance to under- take the mission, 147, 149 ; Bertrand's despatch to, 150 ; despatch and general instruc- tions criticised, 151, 153 ; in- structions by Grouchy to his corps commanders, 153 ; reply to Bertrand despatch, 153 ; doubts as to instructions re- ceived by, 154, 156 and note; misapprehensions as to line of Prussians' retreat, 157, 158, 168-170 ; demand for instruc- tions, 159 ; urged to advance on the gun-fire at Waterloo, IS9» •1631 171-175 ; impolicy of Grouchy's mission, 165 ; kept in dark by Napoleon, 165-167, 194 ; Wellington and Blucher ignorant of Grouchy's force, 189 (note); Napoleon's despatch to Grouchy from Waterloo, 192, 193 ; BlUcher leaves Thielemann at Wavre to oppose, 195, 196, 288 ; second despatch to Grouchy from field of Waterloo, 209-212 ; instruc- tions to Grouchy on appear- ance of Prussians at Waterloo, 230, 260, 261 ; possibility for Napoleon of retreating on Grouchy's force, 258 ; Grouchy and the battle of Wavre, 303, 310. Grammont, 39, 46. Guyot's dragoons at Waterloo, 224, 226, 227, 253. H. Haie - La - Sainte, see La Haie Sainte. Hal, Colville at, 183, 189 ; Wel- lington's dispositions at criti- cised, 27s ei seq. Halkett's brigade at Quatre Bras, 95 ; at Waterloo, 183, 228, 292, 293. Hamley,Gen.,cited as to Prussian movements, 169 ; as to troops at Hal, 281. Hanoverian troops at Waterloo, 186, 187, 220, 292-294. Hardinge, Sir H., with Welling- ton at Bry, 81. Haye, La, see La Haye. Hiymes, Col., Ney's chief of staff; account of D'Erlon in- cident, 107, 219, 254. Hill, Lord, 21 ; Wellington's in- structions to, 47, 51 ; com- mands at Hal, 188. Hoche, 16. Hougomont, position covering Wellington's right at Waterloo, 134, 179, 181, 183, 18s, 188 ; attack on, 198-200, 219, 220, 223, 228 ; criticism of attack on, 248, 249, 261, 274, 297. 3i8 INDEX I. Impetial Guard at Ligny, 89, 122 ; position at Waterloo, 180; Napoleon's determina- tion to employ, 229, 233-238, 240, 261 et seq., 300. Indian Brigade, 47 ; at Hal, 189. Jacquinot's light cavalry at Water- loo, 179. Jeannin's division of infantry at Planchenoit, 231. Jfoa, 17, 32, 253, 267, Jerome Bonaparte.divisional com- mander under Reille at Ligny, 91 ; at Waterloo, 199, 200. Joubert, 17. Jiirgas, commands division of Prussian cavalry at Ligny, 86. K. Katzbach, 20. Kellermann's cavalry, attached to Ney, 67 ; at Frasne, 72, 91, 93 ; at Quatre Bras, 95, 96, 127 ; at Waterloo, 179, 224, 226, 227. Kempt's brigade at Quatre Bras, 93 ; at Waterloo, 183, 292, 297, 301. Kennedy, Sir J. Shaw, 38 (note) ; cited as to position of Dutch- Belgians, 182 ; as to attack on La Haie Sainte, 219; on troops at Hal, 281 ; on By- landt's position, 298. Kielmansegge's Hanoverians at Quatre Bras, 95 ; at Waterloo, 183, 292, 297, 301. King's German Legion, see German Legion. King's Own at Waterloo, 181. Kruse's Nassauers, 297, 300, 301. L. La Belle Alliance, Napoleon's headquarters, 134, 139, 178, 23s, 238. La Haie Sainte, position cover- ing Wellington s centre, 134, 178, 181, 18s, 186, 198, 202, 207, 208, 213 ; time of attack on, 216-224, 233; attack criticised, 249, 261, 274, 292. La Haye, hamlet covering Well- ington's left, 179, 261, 293. La Tour d'Auvergne, on D'Erlon incident, 108 ; cited, 304. Lab^doy^re, Gen., aide-de-camp to Ney, on D'Erlon incident, 107, 109. Lambert's brigade at Waterloo, 181, i8s, 239. Lancey, Sir Wm. de, his " Dis- position," 50, S'j J« "Dis- position." Lannes, 15. Lasne stream, 212, 230. Las Cases, 268 (note). Laurent, Lt.-Col., said to have deflected D'Erlon's march, 107, 109. Leeke's History of S2nd regi- ment cited, 295. Lef%bvre-Desnouettes,commands division of the Guards, 72, 122, 127 ; at Waterloo, 180, 224, 226, 227. Lefol's division at Wavre, 306. Legros, sub-lieut. at Hougomont, 200. J Leipsic, 3, 254. Lens-le-Saunier, proclamation of, 256. Leuse, supposed line of Prussian retreat, 149. Llvy, Arthur, on Napoleon's marshals, cited, 270. Liberchies, Guards posted at, 72. INDEX 319 Li^e, 34, 150 ; Prussians thought to be retiring on, 154, 159. Ligny, 36, 56, 58 ; Wellington's promise to support BlUcher at, SSetseg., 136, 311, 312; posi- tions at, 84 ; Battle of, 85 ; Girard left at, 358. Limal, 307, 309. Lobau, Comte de, commands 6th corps, 1 1 ; acts as reserve at Ligny, 61, 62, 86, 129 ; at Waterloo, 179, zil, 214, 224, 226, 228, 230 ; at Flanchenoit, 231-233, 239, 241, 242, 244. Lockbart's Life of Napoleon, 138. Lori^re, Col., Gerard's chief-of- staif, 159. Losses at Waterloo, 246 et seq. Louvain, possible line of Prussian retreat, 152, 169. LUneberg battalion, at La Haie Sainte, 292. M. Macdonald, Sir James, at Hougo- mont, 200. Macdonald, Marshal, 255. Maestricht, Grouchy to pursue towards, 150. Maitland's brigade at Waterloo, 183, 227, 23s, 236, 299, 300. Malady, Napoleon's, influence of, on campaign, 124, 267, 269. Maransart, 232. Marbais, 67, 74, 80, 1 28- 1 30. Marchienne-au-Pont, 32-35, 40, 65. Marcognet, Divisional Com- mander under D'Erlon, 179, 223, 239, 293. Marlborough, D. of, 133. Marengo, 17. Mass^na, 15, 16. Memorandum, Wellington's, for movement of army, 39. Memorandum of 1842 (Well- ington's), 277. Merbe Braine, 134, 184, 227, 237. 29S- Metternich, 270. Meuse, 35 ; supposed line of Prussian retreat, 168, 260. Milhaud's cavalry division, 60, 73 ; at Ligny, 89 ; at Waterloo, 179, 206, 224, 227. Mitchell's brigade, 183, 227. Moniteur, buUetin of the army, 44. Monsj 25, 280, 281, 283. Monsieur, troops under, 255. Montmirail, 32. Mont St Jean, 133, 160, 161, 176, 180, 197, 198, 2I0._ Morand, commands battalion of Imperial Guard, 89, 234. Moreau, 16, 17. Mortier, Marshal, 15, 266. Moskowa, 18. Moskowa, Prince of, see Ney. Moustier, bridge across Dyle, 171, Muffling, Baron, 57, 311. Murat, 15. N. Namur, 21, 25, 26, 34, 35, 43, 86 ; supposed line of Prussian retreat, 148, 150; Grouchy to occupy, 150, 151 ; Grouchy retreats on, 308-310, Napier's battery and charge of Imperial Guard, 300. Napoleon, escapes from Elba, I, et seq, ; his hold on France, 4, 5 ; forces against him, 5 ; nego- tiations in 1815, 1816; offen- sive or defensive policy, 7, 8 ; chances in his favour, 9, 10; his army for the Waterloo cam- paign, II, 12; his personal value, 12, 13 ; his malady, 13, 267 (and note) et seq. ; Na- 320 INDEX poleon and Ney, 14, 63, 64- 66,71,92, 1 10; Napoleon and Grouchy, lj,eiseg., 144, 145; his plan of campaign, 25 , ei seg, , leaves Paris, 31 ; manifesto to the troops, 32 ; order of move- ment, 32 ; hopes to take Prus- sians unawares, 35 ; his dictum on Wellington, 38 ; passes Charleroi, 39 ; his orders to Ney, 41, et sej. ; summary of operations on 15 th June, 48, 49; moves against the Prus- sians on the i6th, 60, 61 ; his conduct as to Lobau's corps, 61, 62 ; invests Grouchy with command of right wing, 73 ; plan of operations for l6th, 73, et seq, ; his judgment of the situation, 76, 77 j he plans the complete overthrow of the Prussian army, 78, 79, 81 ; plan of battle at Ligny, 81, et seq. ; Napoleon at Ligny, 86, 87 ; crisis of Ligny, 87 j ad- vances his reserves, 89 ; delay before Ligny, 98, et seq. ; Napoleon and the D'Erlon episode, 104, 105, et seq. ; honours of the 1 6th June rest with him, 113 ; fails to pursue the Prussians 115, 116, 1 20, 121 ; concentration of his force with Ney, 120, 122, 123, 130; ignorance of Ney's movements, 124, 125, 128, 141 ; his delay on the 17th, 128, 129 ; com- missions Grouchy to follow the Prussians, 129, 146, T48, 164; indignation against Ney, 130, 142 ; pursuit of Wellington, 131, 132 ; position at Waterloo 139 ; letters to Grouchy, 149, 166, 192, 209, etseq., 304, 306; Grouchy's despatches to Napo- leon, I net seq., and note 159 ; Napoleon and the Grouchy mission, 167, 169, 175, 210; formation at Waterloo, 176 et seq. ; delay in giving battle, 190, 191, 194, 247; plan of battle, 197, 198 ; Napoleon and appearance of Prussians at Waterloo, 209, 212, 230 ; Napoleon on the hour when battle began 216 ; need of time and men, 223, 226 ; reinforces Lobau, 231 ; Puts in the Uld Guard, 233 ; last despatch, 241 ; his wasteful methods at Hougo- raont and La Haye Sainte, 248, 249 ; responsibility for D'Erlon's formation, 250, 251; his faults at Waterloo, 252, 253. 258, 259, 262-266; The St Helena relation, 276, 277 ; Napoleon on Wellington's re- treat, 279. Nassau regiment, at Hougomont, 185, 187, 199, 221, 297. Nassauers at Waterloo, 296, 297, fired on by Prussians, 299. Ney, His position at opening of campaign, 13, 14 ; commands the left, 41 ; his orders from Napoleon, 41 ; question of occupation of Quatre Bras, 42, 44, 49; his attitude to- wards Napoleon, 45 and note; Ney's force and move- ments on Quatre Bras, 59, 62, 63 ; fails %o concentrate his force, 63, >i, 72, 90, 91, no, 125 ; Napoleon's instructions tOi 7i> 73 > expectations from,, 74, 81, 104, loj ; Ney and the D'Erlon incident, 87, 88, 97, 102, 104, 106-108, III, 112; letter on, 103; not re- sponsible for, 109; Ney and battle of Quatre Bras, 92 et seq. ; responsibility for Na- poleon's delay on t6th, 98, loi, 130, 141 ; for delay on INDEX 321 17th, 122, 123, 126 ; Ney's actions after Quatre Bras, 126- 128, 142 ; Napoleon joins Ney, 129 ; leads cavalry charge at Waterloo, 213, 216, 223, 225, 226, 228, 253 ; com- mands front attack at Water- loo, 214 ; on time of beginning battle, 216 ; at La Haie Sainte, 219, 220 ; leads attack of Im- perial Guard, 235 ; his reck- less impetuosity at Waterloo, 254 ; biographical sketch, 254, 256 ; and D'Erlon, 256, 271. Ninhove, 39, 46. Nivelles, 25, 39, 42, 46-49, 51, 280. Novi, 17. O. Ohain, 239, 287. Ohain road, 180, 181 ; Dutch- Belgians and the, 182, 183, I9S, 298. Olfermann, Col, , commands Brunswickers, 184. O'Meara, Napoleon to, 250, 271. Ompt^da commands King's German Legion at Waterloo, 183, 18s, 229, 291, 292, 297. Orange, see Prince of. Osnabriick, brigade (Halkett's) at Waterloo, 292, 293. Ostend, 25, 26. Otranto, Duke of, 103. Oudenarde, 2J. P. Pack's brigade at Quatre Bras, 93, 94; at Waterloo, l8l, 202, 203, 223, 239. Pajol, 33 ; attached to Grouchy's command, 60, 73; pursues Prussians after Ligny, 115, 116, 145, ISO, 157, 164; in- structions to, 153, 157 ; at Wavre, 307. Papelotte, hamlet covering Well- ington's left, 134, 181, 223, 229, 231, 239, 261, 297. Pascallet, biographer of Grouchy, 150 (note). Perponcher's division of Dutch- Belgians at Quatre Bras, 92 ; at Waterloo, 182. Ferwez, Prussian column retiring on, 154. Picton, Sir Thos., 24; com- mands 5th division at Water- loo, 181, 203, 204, 293, 297. Picton's division, S3 - SS ; at Quatre Bras, 93. Pierrepont, Mr, story of the Duke's ride, 138. Pirch, commands 2nd corps of Prussians, 19, 35, 75 ; his corps at Ligny, 89, 312 ; re- tires on Gentinnes, n8, 173 ; advance to Waterloo, 195, 196, 228, 230, 232, 242, 262, 286. Pirn's cavalry at Waterloo, 179. Planchenoit, 171-174, 183, I9S, 224, 230-232, 241, 261. Point-du-Jour, Vandamme or- dered to advance to, 149. Polish Lancers, 206. Ponsonby, Sir Wm., at Water- loo, 182, 20s, 206. Powell, Capt., on attack on Im- perial Guard, 23s. Pozzo di Borgo, Russian attach^ at Waterloo, 216. " Preussische Jahrbuch," Herr Delbriick's article in, 43 (note). Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Wei- mar, his;; brigade at Quatre Bras, 40, 48, 49, 76, 92 ; at Waterloo, 182, 223, 229, 239, 297, 299. Prince of Orange, 21, 24, 39, 48, SI, 228, 301. 322 INDEX Prince Frederick of Orange at Hal, 189, 276. Prince William of Prussia com- mands Billow's cavalry, 230. Prussian army, concentration of, 37 ; promises of support of at Waterloo, 136 et seq., 287 ; movements, 177 ; advance on Waterloo, 209-213 ; Napoleon surprised by, 260 ; co-opera- tion of at Waterloo, 285, 288, 289; to cutprouchy's retreat, 310. Q. Quatre Bras, its strategic posi- tion, 29, 30, 40, 44, 46-50; Prince of Orange at, 51, 56, 57 ; not occupied by Ney, 62, 76, 79-81 ; battle of, 90-98 ; strategical importance of, 92 ; Napoleon concentrates with Ney at, 130, 150; retreat through, 244 ; Brunswickers at, 2^, 308. Quinet, cited as to Grouchy's march, 172, 179, 193, 217, 218 ; cited on D'Erlon's for- mation, 250. Quiot, commands half a division under D'Erlon at Waterloo, 179, 207, 239, 296. Regiments at Waterloo, 181-184, 203. Reille, commands 2nd corps, 1 1, 32 ; ordered to advance on Gosselies, 40 ; want of support between Reille and D'Erlon, 68 ; weakened by Girard's de- tachment to the right, 70; at Waterloo, 199, 200, 223, 253, 264. Reynell, Sir Thos., commands 71st at Waterloo. Rixensart, wood of, 307, 309. Rochefort, 25. Rocroi, 310. Ropes, W., cited, 19, 21 ; as to delay at Ligny, 100, 150 ; cited as to Grouchy's move- ments, 164, 172 ; as to Billow's movements, 288 ; on Bylandt's position, 298. Rossomme, 180. Russian campaign, 254, Saltoun, Lord, commands Cold- streams at Hougomont, 199, 236. Sambre, 33, 309. Sart-i-Walhain, 135, 157-159, 168, 1 70; distance from to Waterloo, 171, 172, 209, 304- Sauveniires, Billow reaches, 116 Prussians at, 157. Simmer's division of infantry at Planchenoit, 231. Smohain, hamlet covering Wei lington's left, 134, 179, 181 293- Soignes, Forest of, covers Wei' lington's retreat at Waterloo, ?33. 139, 1581 i6ii 279- Soissons, 310. Sombref, its strategical impor- tance, 29, 36, 34, 35, 37, 42, 43> 49i 58 ; Grouchy directed to advance on, 60, 75, 99, 100. Somerset, Lord Edward, com- mands heavy cavalry, 184, 208, 222, 225. Soult, Napoleon's chief-of-staff, 14, 16 ; order to Ney to seize Quatre Bras, and to concen trate his force, 68, 71 ; de- ceived as to Prussian retreat^ 121 ; declines responsibility, INDEX 3^3 14S ; replies to Grouchy's des- patch, 157, 192, 193 ; should have known Wellington's char- acter, 177 ; on Ney's move- ments at Waterloo, 253. Soye detached against Hougo- mont, 199. "Spanish Infantry" at Waterloo, 181. St Amand, 58, 100. St Denis, supposed line of Prussian retreat, 149. St Helena, narrative, 193, 276. St Lambert, 157 ; effects of BUlow's appearance at, 173, 195, 196, 209, 210, 260, 288. Steinmetz, commands Ziethen's advance, 239, 299. Styles, Sergeant, 205. Subervie's cavalry at Waterloo, 179, 210, 211 ; detached from Pajol, 231. Tactics, Napoleon at Ligny, 82, 83, ei seq. Teste, commands an infantry division in the campaign at- tached to Pajol, 14s, 146, 150, 179, 231 ; his division at Wavre, 307, 309, 310. Thackeray's "Ballad of the Drum," 201. Thielemann, 19, 35 ; engj^ed by Grouchy at Ligny, 86, 90, 312; holds Sombref, 116 ; retires on Wavre, 118, 136,280; BlUcher's instructions to, 195, 196; at Wavre, 212, 288, 305, et seq. Thuin, 32-34, 40. Tilly, Ziethen retires on, 116. Tongrines, Prussian left at Ligny extends to, 82, Tournay, 25. Trip, 298. Tubize, 189, 283. U. Ulm, 17. Uncertainty, element of, in con- ducting campaign, 140, 143. Union Brigade at Waterloo, 182, 202, 205. Uxbridge, Lord, commands rear guard in retreat on Waterloo, 131 ; orders charge of Union Brigade, 205, 2o8, 229, 240, 294. V. Vandamme, leads 3rd corps, 33, 60 ; attacks St Amand, 85, 86, 90 ; attached to Grouchy's pursuit of the Prussians, 121, 146 ; reaches Gembloux, 152 ; Grouchy's orders to, 153, 158, his corps at Wavre, 304, et seq, Vandeleur's cavalry at Waterloo, 182, 239. Van der Smissen's battery and charge of Imperial Guard, 300. Van Merlin, 298. Vicenza, D. de Napoleon to, 270. Vienna, congress of, 3, 5. Vieux, For6t, 297. Vincke's Hanoverian Brigade, 182, 227, 293. Vivian's cavalry at Waterloo, 182, 239. W. Wagram, 18, 19, 268. Wagnelee, Prussian right at l6th June, 82. Walhain, distinguished from Sart-k-Walhain, 158, and note, 172; Gerard reaches, 159, 303. Waterloo, 42, 133 ; Wellington stands at, 135, 136, 176 ; Grouchy and, 169, 175, 192; Lobau at, 243, 244, 245 ; Na- poleon's despatch to Grouchy from, 304. 3^4 INDEX Wavre, Prussian retreat on, 30, 75, 136, 151, IS4. 168, 170; Grouchy directed on, 192 ; Prussians at, 194, 286 ; Grouchy at, 209, 211, 303; battle of, 304, et seq. Wellington, Duke of, estimate of Napoleon's value in field, 13 ; his army, 21 ; position and qualifications, 22-24 > his re- lation to Bliicher, 26-30 ; was he surprised by Napoleon, 37- 39, 280 ; orders concentration, 46, 48, 49, 69 ; leaves Brus- sels, 50 ; communicates with BlUcher, 51 ; is deceived by De Lancey's disposition, 52- 57 ; interview with Blucher at Bry, 57, 81 ; promises of sup- port to Blucher, 58, 59, 311, 312 ; is held in check by Ney, 79, 81, 91 ; his army at Quatre Bras, 92, 93 ; battle of Quatre Bras, 94 - 98, 1 14 ; and D' Erlon's blunder, ill; retreat from Quatre Bras, 118, 119, 131, 132; Napoleon's oppor- tunity against, 122, 125 ; Ney and Wellington after Quatre Bras, 127 ; takes position at Waterloo, 133,180, et seq. ; re- liance on Bliicher's support, 1361 139; story of Wellington's ride to Wavre, 138, 313; and BlUcher after Quatre Bras, 150- 152. 154. I5S> 158, 159; Napo- leon and Wellington's stand at Waterloo, 176, 177, 190; pos- sibilities of junction between Wellington and Bliicher, 160, 165, 168, 169, 260; his army at Waterloo, 1S6, ei seq ; his disposition of forces at Hal, 188, 189, 275-285; Welling- ton and the conduct of the battle of Waterloo, 198, 199, 207, 208, 222, 224, 228, 297 ; on time of beginning Waterloo, 216 ; on attack on La Haie Sainte, 217, 218; and arrival of Prussians, 231, 233, 248, 305 ; order to advance, 240 ; Wellington's conduct of Water- loo criticised, 273, et seq. ; his line of retreat from Waterloo, 279 ; Gneisenau's distrust of, 287. Wolseley, Lord, cited, 216 ; on Napoleon's illness, 269 (note) ; and Herr Delbriick, 311. Young Guard, 32 ; at Ligny, 89 ; reinforces Lobau at Planche- noit, 214, 231, 232, 234, 242. Ziethen, 19, 34, 35 ; retreating force, 36, 39, 58, 75; his corps at Ligny, §6, 89, 312 ; retires on Tilly, 116; BlUcher's in- structions, 196, 229, 230-232, 238, 239, 241, 262, 286, 299. TURNBULL AND SPEARS, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH. A CATALOGUE OF BOOKS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS OF METHUEN AND COMPANY PUBLISHERS : LONDON 36 ESSEX STREET W.C. CONTENTS PAGE FORTHCOMING BOOKS, . 2 rOBTRY, ... 9 BELLES LETTRES, ANTHOLOGIES, ETC. , . ID METHUEN's standard library, . II ILLUSTRATED AND GIFT BOOKS, . 13 HISTORY, . . 14 BYZANTINE TEXTS, . . • 15 BIOGRAPHY, ..... 16 TRAVEL, ADVENTURE AND TOPOGRAPHY, . . 17 NAVAL AND MILITARY, . . 18 GENERAL LITERATURE, 19 PHILOSOPHY, .21 THEOLOGY, , • • 21 FICTION, . . .26 BOOKS FOR BOYS AND GIRLS, . 35 THE PEACOCK LIBRARY, . 35 UNIVERSITY EXTENSION SERIES, - 35 SOCIAL QUESTIONS OF TO-DAY • 3^ CLASSICAL TKAHSLATIONS, . 37 EDUCATIONAL BOOKS, ... 3/ FEBRUARY 190Q February 1900 Messrs. Methuen's ANNOUNCEMENTS Travel, Adventure and Topography THROUGH ASIA. By SVEN Hedin>. With 300 Illustrations from Photographs and Sketches by the Author, and 3 Maps. Second and cheaper Edition in 16 Fortnightly Parts at is. each net ; or in two volumes. Royal %vo, 20s. net. An extract from a review of this great book, which The Tim,eshs& called 'one of the best books of the century,', will be found on p. 17. The present form of issue places it within the reach of buyers of moderate means. THE BOER STATES. A History and Description of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. By A. H. Keane, M.A. "With Map. Crown Svo, 6s, This volume aims at giving, in a form suitable for permanent reference, an accurate account of the Two Boer States as constituted before the present war. The subject is treated under two main divisions — Land and PEOPLE-^-the former geographical and descriptive^ the latter historical and ethnographic. The book is written in the interest neither of Boer nor Briton, and all political topics are dealt with from the standpoint of the onlooker. In the first part much attention is paid to the natural resources of the Country. Historical events close with the Kruger-Milner Conference, June i8gg, THE STORY OF THE BOER WAR. With Maps, Plans, and Portraits. In Fortnightly Parts. Quarto, \s, each. This important work will be commenced in parts immediately, and will give a complete and connected account of the military operations in South Africa from the declaration to the end of the present war. Such a work, relating in a lively, accurate, and intelligible manner the events of a war which is stirrmg the British people as no events hSve stirred them since the Indian Mutiny, is certain to meet a cordial reception. Each part is well illustrated with plans and portraits. History and Biography A HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF CYPRUS. By John Hackett, M,A. With Maps and Illustrations. Demy 8m. 12s.. 6d. net, A work which brings together all that is known on the subject from the introduction of Christianity to the commencement of the British occupation. A separate division deals with the local Latin Church during the period of the Western Supremacy. Messrs. Methuen's Announcements 3 HISTORY OF EGYPT, from the Earliest Times to THE Present Day. Edited by W. M. Flinders Petrie, D.C.L., LL.D., Professor of Egyptology at University College. Fully Illus- trated. In Six Volumes. Crown Svo. 6s. each. Vol. VI. Egypt under the Saracens. By Stanley Lane- Poole. Theology ST. PAUL'S SECOND AND THIRD EPISTLES TO THE CORINTHIANS. With Introduction, Dissertations, and Notes by James HonoHTON Kennedy, D.D., Assistant Lecturer in Divinity in the University of Dublin. Sometime Donnellan Lecturer, etc. etc. Crown Svo. 6s. THE SOUL OF A CHRISTIAN. By F. S. GRANGER, M.A., Litt.D. Crown ivo. 6s. Zbe (Xbutcbman's Mhle General Editor, J. H. Burn, B.D., Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Aberdeen. Messrs. Methuen propose to issue a series of expositions upon most of the books of the Bible. The volumes Vfill be practical and devotional rather than critical in their purpose, and the text of the authorised version will be explained in sections or paragraphs, virhich vifill correspond as far as possible with the divisions of the Church Lectionary. The volumes will' be produced in a very handy and tastefiil form, and may be obtained in cloth or leather bindings. THE EPISTLE OF PAUL THE APOSTLE TO THE PHILIPPIANS. Explained by C. R. D. Biggs, B.D. Fcap. Svo. IS. 6d. net; leather, 2s. 6d. net. Hbe Cburcbman's Xibrarg Edited by J. H. Burn, B.D. EVOLUTION. By F. B. JEVONS, Litt. D., Principal of Hatfield Hall, Durham. Crown Svo. 3^. 6d. a:be XibratB ot 2)evotion Pott Svo. Cloth 2s. ; leather 2s. 6d. net. NEW VOLUME. A GUIDE TO ETERNITY. By Cardinal Bona. Edited with an Introduction and Notes by J. W. Stanbridge, B.D., late Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford. Messrs. Methuen's Announcements Classical THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE. Edited, with an Introduction and Notes by JoHN BuRNET, M.A., Professor of Greek at St. Andrews. Demy %vo. lt,s. net. This edition contains parallel passages from the Eudemian Ethics, printed under the text, and there is a full commentary, the main object of which is to interpret difficulties in the light of Aristotle's own rules. THE CAPTIVI OF PLAUTUS. Edited, with an Introduction, Textual Notes, and a Commentary, by W. M. LlNDSAY, Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford. Demy 8vo. los. bd. net. For this edition all the important MSS. have been re-GoIlated. An appendix deals with thfe accentual element in early Latin verse. The Cohuhetitary is very full. ®£fOTd Classical Quests Crown Zvo. Messrs. Mbthuen are about to publish in conjunction with the Clarendon Press a series of classical texts edited by competent scholars from the best MSS. The first volumes are : — THUCYDIDIS HISTORIAE, Libri I.-IV. By H. Stuart Jones. Paper Covers, 3J. Litnp Cloth, 3^. td. PLATONIS OPERA, Tom. I. (Tetralogiae I.-II.) By J. Burnet. Paper Covers, Sj. Limp Cloth, ds. LVCRETI CARI D£ RERVM NATVRA. By C. Bailey. Paper Covers, 2s. bd. Limp Cloth, y. CORNELII TACIT! OPERA MINORA. By H. FURNEAUX. Paper Covers, is. fid. Limp Cloth, 2s, AESCHYLI TRAGOEDIAE CUM FRAGMENTIS. By A. SiDGWiCK. Paper Covers, y. Limp Cloth, y. 6d. Sport Zbe XlbratB ot Sport THE ART AND PRACTICE OF HAWKING. By E. B. MiCHELt. With three Photogravures by G. E. Lodge, and other Illustrations. Demy Svo. los. 6d. A complete description of the Hawks, Falcons, and Eagles used in ancient and modern times, ^th' directions foi: their training and treatment. It is not only a historical account, but. a complete practical guide. General Literature TENNYSON AS A RELIGIOUS TEACHER. By Charles F. G. Masterman, M.A. Crown Zvo. 6s. Messrs. Methuen's Announcements 5 AN ANTHOLOGY OF IRISH VERSE. Edited by W. B. Yeats. Crown %va, gilt top. zs. 6d. Revised and enlarged edition. ' An attractive and catholic selection.' — Times. A HANDBOOK OF NURSING. By M. N. OXFORD, of Guy's Hospital. .Crown Sve. y. 6d. This is a complete guide to the science and art of nursing, containing copious instruction both general and particular. Methuen's Standard Library THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE. By Edward Gibbon. Edited by J. B. Bury, LL.D., Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin. In Seven Volumes. Demy Svo, gilt top. 8i. 6d. each. Crown Svo. 6s. each. Vol. VII. The cbncluding Volume of this Edition. THE HISTORY OF THE LIFE OF THOMAS ELLWOOD. Edited by C. G. Crump, B. A. Crown &io, gilt top. 6s. THE EARLY POEMS OF ALFRED, LORD TENNYSON. Edited, with Notes and Introduction by J. Churton Collins, M.A. Crown Svo. 6s. An elaborate edition of the celebrated volumes which was published in its final and definitive form, in 1853. This edition contains a long Introduction and copious Notes, textual and explanatory. Scientific and Educational THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF SCENERY. By J. E. Marr, Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. With numerous illustra- tions and diagrams. Crown Svo. 6s, An elementary treatise on geomorphology — the study of the earth's outward forms. It is for the use of students of physical geography and geology, and will also be highly interesting to the general reader. EDUCATIONAL REFORM. By Fabian Ware, M.A. Crown Svo. zs. 6d. An attempt by an expert to forecast the action and' influence of the New Secondary Education Act, with suggestions for useful developments. THE STORY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE. By Emma S. Mellows. Crown Svo. y. 6d. The history of English literature told in a simple style for young students. It is particularly rich in biographical detail and contains a considerable number of illustrative extracts. THE CONSTRUCTION OF LARGE INDUCTION COILS. By A. T. Hare, M.A. With numerous diagrams. Demy Svo. 6s. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MILLINERY. By Miss Hill, Registered Teacher to the City and Guilds of London Institute. With numerous diagrams. Crown Svo. 2s. 6d. [Text-books of Technology 6 Messrs. Methuen's Announcements EXPERIMENTAL CHEMISTRY. By W. Prench, M.A. Part I. With numerous diagrams. Crown 8vo. is. ()d. [ Text-books of Technology LACE-MAKING IN THE MIDLANDS, PAST AND PRESENT. By C. C, Channer and M. E. Roberts. With i6 full-page illustrations. Crown %vo. 2s. 6d. THE METRIC SYSTEM. By Leon Delbos. CrownZvo. 2s. A theoretical and practical guide, for use in elementary schools and by the general reader. A SOUTH AFRICAN ARITHMETIC. By Henry Hill, B.A., Assistant Master at Worcester School, Cape Colony. Crown Svo. 3s. (sd. This book has been specially written for use in South African schools. A KEY TO STEDMAN'S EASY LATIN EXERCISES. By C. G. BoTTiNG, M.A. Crown 8zio. ss. net. Zbe movels of Cbarlee ©icftens With Introductions by George Gissing, Notes by F. G. Kiiton, and Illustrations. Crown Svo. Each Volume, cloth t,s. net, leather 41. 6rf. net. The first volumes are : THE PICKWICK PAPERS. With Illustrations by E. H. New. Two Volumes. NICHOLAS NICKLEBY. With Illustrations by R. J. Williams. Two Volumes. BLEAK HOUSE. With Illustrations by Beatrice Alcock. Two Volumes. OLIVER TWIST. With Illustrations by E. H. New. One Volume. ITbe JLtttle XlbtatB With Introductions, Notes, and Photogravure Erontispieces. Pott Svo. £ach Volume, cloth is. 6d. net. ; leather 2s. 6d. net. NEW VOLUMES. THE EARLY POEMS OF ALFRED, LORD TENNYSON. Edited by J. C. Collins, M.A. IN MEMORIAM. By ALFRED, LORD TENNYSON. Edited by H. C. Bkeching, M.A. MAUD. By ALFRED, Lord Tennyson. With Introduction and Notes by Elizabeth Wordsworth. A LITTLE BOOK OF ENGLISH LYRICS. With Notes. MESSRS. METHUEN'S ANNOUNCEMENTS 7 PRIDE AND PREJUDICE. By Jane Austen. With an Introduction and Notes by E. V. Lucas. Two Volumes. PENDENNIS. By W. M. Thackeray. With an Introduction by S. GwYNN. Three volumes. EOTHEN. By A. W. Kinglake. With an Introduction and Notes. CRANFORD. By Mrs. Gaskell. With an Introduction and Notes by E. V. Lucas. THE INFERNO OF DATSTTE. Translated by H. F. Cary. With an Introduction and Notes by Pagbt Toynbee. JOHN HALIFAX, GENTLEMAN. By MRS. Craik. With an Introduction by Annie Matheson. Two volumes. A LITTLE BOOK OF SCOTTISH VERSE. Arranged and Edited by T. F. Henderson. Fiction THE GATELESS BARRIER. By LuCAS Malet, Author of 'The Wages of Sin. ' Crown 8vo. 6s. AN OCTAVE. By W. E. NORRIS. Crown 8w. 6s. a volume of eight stories. THE PLUNDERERS. By MORLEY ROBERTS, Author of ' The Colossus,' etc. Crown &vo. 6s. CEASEFIRE. By J. Maclaren Cobban. Crown 8vo. y.dd. A stirring story of the Boer War of 1881, including the siege of Potchefstrom and the defeat of Majuba. THE DESPATCH RIDER. By Ernest Glanville. Author of ' The Kloof Bride. ' Crown 8vo. 6s. A highly interesting story of the _present Boer War by an author who knows the country well, and has had experience of Boer campaigning. FOR RIGHT AND ENGLAND. By Hume Nisbet. Crown 8vo. 6s. A story of the Transvaal War of 1899. 8 Messrs. MethUen's Announcements MARVELS AND MYSTERIES. By Richard Marsh, Author of The Beetle.' Crown %vo, 6s. MIRRY-ANN. By Norma Lorimer, Author of ' Josiah's Wife.' Crown ivo. €s. THE STRONG GOD CIRCUMSTANCE. By HELEN Ship- ton. Crown 8vo. 6s, AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY.. By ESMi Stuart. Crown Svo. 6s. A SON OF THE STATE. By W. Pett Ridge. Author of 'MordEm'ly.' Crown %vo. 3s. 6d!. THE INCA'S TREASURE. By Ernest GlaInville, Author of ' The Kloof Bride.' Crown 8vo. y. 6d. ^be IRoveKst a monthly series of new novels by popular authors at Sixpence. Each Number is as long as the average Six Shilling Novel. Numbers I. to VII. are now ready, and No. VIII. will be : — PRISONERS OF WAR. By BoYSON Weekes. A CATALOGUE OF Messrs. Methuen's PUBLICATIONS Poetry Rttdyard Kipling. BARRACK-ROOM BALLADS. By Rudyard Kipling. 6yd Thousand, Crown Svo. 6s. Leather, 6j. net. 'Mr. Kipling's verse is strong, vivid, full of character. . . . Unmistakeable genius rings in every line.' — Times. ' The ballads teem with imagination, they palpitate with emotion. . We. read them with laughter and tears ; the metres throb in our pulses, the cunningly ordered words tingle with life ; and if thisbe not poetry, vJhat is f '—Pall Mall Gazette. Rudyard Kipling. THE SEVEN SEAS. By Rudyard Kipling. 55/A Thousand. Cr. Svo. Buckram, gilt top. 6s. Leather, 6s. net. * The Empire has found a singer ; it is no depreciation of the songs to say that statesmen may have, one way or other, to take account of them.' — Manchester Guardian. 'Animated through and through with in* dubitable genius.' — Daily Telegraph. "Q." POEMS AND BALLADS. By "Q." Crown Svo. ^s. 6d. 'This work has just the faint, ineffable touch and glow that make poetry.' — Speaker. "Q." GREEN BAYS: Verses and Parodies. By "Q." Second Edition. Crown 8Wi 3J. 6d. E. Maokay. A SONG OF THE SEA. By Eric Mackay. Second Edition. Fcap. 800, 5J. 'Everywhere Mr. Mackay displays himself the master of a style marked by all the characteristics of the best rhetoric' — Glole. A H. Ibsen. BRAND. A Drama by Henrik Ibsen. Translated by William Wilson. Third Edition. Crown Zvo. 3J. 6d. * The greatest world-poem of the nineteenth century next to "Faust." It is in the same set with " Agamemnon," with " Lear," with the literature that we now instinctively regard as high and holy.' — Daily Chronicle. A. D. Godley. LYRA FRIVOLA. By A- p. Godley,, M.A., Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford. Third Edition. Pott Zvo. zs. 6d. 'A pretty and witty little book.' — Pall Mall Gazette. ' Combines' a pretty wit with remarkably neat versification. . . . Every one will wish there was more of it. — Times. A. D. Godley. VERSES TO ORDER. By A. Dj Godley. Crown Svo. 2s. 6d. net. 'A capital specimen of light academic poetry.' — St. James's Gazette. James Williams. VENTURES IN VERSE. By James Williams, Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford. Crown Svo. y. 6d. 'In matter and manner the book , is 'admir- able.' — Glasgow Herald. J. G. Cordery. THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER. A Translation by J. G. Cordery. Crown Svo, ys. 6d. 2 lO Messrs. Methuen's Catalogue Belles Lettres, Anthologies, etc. E. L. Stevenson. VAILIMA LET- TERS. By Robert Louis Steven- son. With an Etched Portrait by William Strang. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Suciram. 6s. ' A fascinating hook.'— .standard. ' Full of charm and brightness.' — Spedtaior. ' Unique in Literature. — Daily Chronicle. CWyndham. THE POEMS OF WIL- LIAM SHAKESPEARE. Edited with an Introduction and Notes by George Wyndham, M.P. Demy 8va. Buckram, gilt top. los. 6d. This edition contains the ' Venus,' * Lucrece, ' and Sonnets, and Js prefaced with an elaborate introductibn of over 140 pp. 'We have no hesitation in describing Mr. George Wyndham's, introduction as a masterly, piece of criticism, and all who loVe our Eli^hethkn literature will iind a very garden of delight in it. ' — Spectator. W. E. Henley. ENGLISH LYRICS. Selected and Edited by , W. E. Henley. Crown 8vo. Gilt top. y. 6d. * It is a body of choice and lovfely poetry.' — Bin^H^Tiaih Gazette. Henley and Whibley. A BOOK OF ENGLISH PROSE. Collected by W. E. Henley and Charles Whibley. Crown Svo. Buckram, gilt top. 6s. ' Quite delightful. A greater treat for those not ^vel^ acquaihted witli pire-Restora- tion prose could not be imagined.' — A tkenceutfi. H. C. Beechlng. LYRA SACRA : An Anthology of Sacred Verse. Edited , by H. C. Beeching, M.A. Crown Svo. Buckram, 6s. *A charming selection, Which maintains a lofty standard of excellence.' — Titnes. "Q." THE GOLDEN POMP. A Pro- cession of English Lyrics. Arranged by A. T. QuiiiLER Couch. Crown Svo. duckram. 6s. *A delightful volume: a really golden " Pomp." 'Spectator, W. B. Teats. AN ANTHOLOGY OF IRISH VERSE. Edited by W. B. Yeats. Revised and Enlarged Edition. Crown Svo. 3J. 6d. . 'An attractive and catholic selection.' — Tijfies. S. W. Steevens. MONOLOGUES OF THE DEAD. By G. W. Steevens. Foolscap Svo. jr. 6d. ' The .effect is sometimes splendid, some- times bizarre, but always amazingly clever.' — Pall Mall Gazette. W. M. Dixon. A PRIMER OF TENNYSON. By W. M. DixON, M.A. Cr. Svo. zs. 6d. ' Much sound and well-expressed criticism. The bibliography is a boon,' — Speaker. W. A. CTaig:ie. A PRIMER OF BURNS. By W. A. Craigie. Crown Svo. zs. 6d. ' A valuable addition to the literature of the poet.' — Times. L. Magnus. A PRIMER OF WORDS- WORTH. By LAURIE Magnus. Crown Svo. zs. 6d. ' A valuable contribution to Wordsworthian literature.' — Literature. Steme. TH£ LIFE AND OPINIONS OF TRISTRAM SHANDY. By Lawrence Sterne. With an In- troduction by Chaeles Whibley, and a Portrait. 2 vols. yj. ' Very dainty yolumes are these ; the paper, type, and light-gl-een binding are all very agreeable to the eye.' — Globe. edhgteve. THE COMEDIES OF William congreve. with an Introduction^by G. S. Street, and a Portrait. 2 vols. ys. Morier. THE ADVENTURES OF HAJJI BABA OF ISPAHAN. By James Morier. With an Introduc- tion by E. G. Browne, M.Aj and a Portrait. 2 vols. js. Walton. THE LIVES OF DONNE, WOTTON, HOOKER, HERBERT AND SANDERSON. By Izaak Walton. With an Introduction by Vernon Blackburn, and a Por- trait. 3J. 6d. Messrs. Methuen's Catalogue II Johnaon. THE LIVES OF THE ENGLISH POETS. By Samuel Johnson, LL.D. With an Intro- duction by J. H. Millar, and a Por- trait. 3 ■vols. loj. 6d. Bums. THE POEMS OF ROBERT BURNS. Edited by Andrew Lang and W. A Craigie. With Portrait. Second Edition. Demy Svb, gilt top, 6s. 'Among editions in one volume, this will take the place of authority.' — Times. F. Laagteidge. BALLADS OF THE BRAVE ; Poems of Chivalry, Enter- prise, Courage, ahd Constancy. Edited by Rev. F. Langbridge. Second Edition. Cr. S-voi 35. 6d. School Edition, zs. 6d. ' A very happy conception happily carried out. These "Ballads of the Brave" are iutellded to suit the real tastes of boys, and will suit the taste of the great majority.' ^Spectator. 'The bdok is full of splendid things.' — World. Methuen's Standard Library Dante. LA COMMEDIA DI DANTE ALIGHIERI. Edited by Paget Toynbee, M.A. Crown Zvo. 6s. This edition of the Italian text of the Divine Cdmedy, founded on Witte's ininor edition, carefully revised, is issued in commemoration of the sixth century of Dante's journey through the three king- doms of the other world. 'A carefully-revised text, printed with beautiful clearness.'— G/aj^aw Heritld. Gibbon. THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE. By Edward Gibbon. A New Edi- tion, Edited with Notes, Appendices, and Maps, by J. B. Bury, LL.D., Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin. In Seven Volumes. Demy Zvo. Gilt top. 8j. 6d. each. Also Cr. 8vo. 6s. iach. Vols. I., II., III., IV„ V., and VI. ' The time has certainly arrived for a new editionofGibbon's great work. . . . Pro- fessor Bury is the right man to under- take this task. His learning is amazing, both in extent and accuracy. The book is issued in a handy form, and^ at a moderate price, ahd it is admirably printed.' — Times. ' At last there is an adequate modern edition of Gibbon. . . -. The best edition the nineteenth century could produce.'— Manchester Guardian. Olbe TKIlotftB of Sbaftespcare General Editor, Edward Dowden, Litt. D. Messrs. Methuen have in preparation an Edition of Shakespeare in single Plays. Each play will be edited with a full Introduction, Textual Notes, and a Commentary at the foot of the page. The first volume is : HAMLET. Dowden. Edited by Edward Demy Zvo. y. 6d. 'An admirable edition. ... A comely volume, admirably printed and produced, and containing all ^that a student of • Hamlet ' need require.' — Speaker. ' No previous edition known to us contains so much information in so agreeable an outward form.* — Daily Chronicle. ' Fully up to the level of recent scholarship, both English and German. — Academy. ITbe movela of Cbarles Utcftcns Crown %vo. Ecu:h Volume, cloth y, net; leather 41. 6d, net, Messrs. Methuen have in preparation an edition of those novels of Charles Dickens which have now passed out of copyright. Mr. George Gissing, whose critical study of Dickens is both sympathetic and acute, has written an 12 Messrs. Methuen's Catalogue Introduction to each of the books, and a very attractive feature of this edition will be the illustrations of the old houses, inns, and buildings, which Dickens described, and which have'' now in many instances disappeared under the touch of modern civilisation. Another valuable feature will be a series of topographical and general notes to each book by Mr. F. G. Kitton. The books will be produced with the greatest care as to printing, paper and binding. The first volumes are ; THE PICKWICK PAPERS. With Illustrations by E. H. New. Two Volumes. ' As pleasant a copy as any one could desire. The notes add much to the value of the edition, and Mr. New's illustrations are also historical. The volumes promise well for the success of the edition.' — Scotsman. Vaz Xfttle Xlbrarg ' The volumes are compact in size, printed on thin but good paper in clear type, prettily and at the same time strongly bound, and altogether good to look upon and handle.' — Outlook, Poll Svo. Each Volume, cloth is. 6d. net, leather 2s. 6d. net. Messrs. Methubn intend to produce a series of small books under the above title, containing some of the famous books in English and other literatures, in the domains of fiction, poetry, and belles lettres.. The series will also contain several volumes of selections in prose and verse. The books will be edited with the most sympathetic and scholarly care. Each one will contain an Introduction which -will give (i) a short biography of the author, (2) a critical estimate of the book. Where they are necessary, short notes will be added at the foot of the page. Each book will have a portrait or frontispiece in photogravure, and the volumes will be produced with great care in a style uniform with that of ' The Library of Devotion.' The first volumes are : VANITY FAIR. By W. M. Thack- eray. With an Introduction by S. GWYNN. Illustrated by G. P. JACOMB Hood. ' Three Volumes. * Delightful little volumes.' — Puhlishers' Circular. * Charming little volumes with an admir- able introduction,' — Star. THE PRINCESS. By Alfred, Lord Tennyson. Edited by Elizabeth Wordsworth. Illustrated by W. E. F. Britten. 'Just what a pocket edition should be. Miss Wordsworth contributes an accept- able introduction, as well as notes which one is equally glad to get.' — Guardian. Z\iz Xfttle ©uiDes Pott Svo, cloth 3J. ; OXFORD AND ITS COLLEGES. By J. Wells, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Wadham College. Illus- trated by E. H. New. Third Edition. ' An admirable and accurate little treatise, attractively illustrated.' — World. ■ * A luminous and tasteful little volume.'— Daily Chronicle. leather, 3^. dd. net. CAMBRIDGE AND ITS COL- LEGES. By A. Hamilton Thomp- son. Illustrated by E. H. New. * It is brightly written and learned, and is just ^uch a book as a cultured visitor needs.' — Scotstnan. Messrs. Methuen's Catalogue 13 SHAKESPEARE'S COUNTRY. By B. C. WiNDLE. F.R.S., M.A. Illus- trated by E. H. New. ' Mr. Windle is thoroughly conversant with his subject, and the work is exceedingly well done. The drawings, by Mr. Edmund H. New, add much to the attractiveness of the volume.' — Scois- tnan. ' One of the most charming guide books. Both for the library and as -a travelling companion the book is equally choice and serviceable. '-7-^ cflK^««y. *A guide book of the best kind, which t^es rank as liteTSitnie.'— Guardian. Illustrated and Gift Books PhU May. THE PHtL MAY ALBUM._ 4/0. 6s. This highly interesting volume contains 100 drawings by Mr. Phil May, and is repre- sentative of his earliest and finest work. ' There is a laugh in each drawing.' — Staruiard. A. H. Millie. ULYSSES; OR, DE ROUGEMONT OF TROY. De- scribed and depicted by A. H. Milne. Small quarto, 3J. 6d, The adventures of Ulyssesj told in humor- ous verse and pictures. * A delicious bit of fooling.' — Queen. * Clever, droll, smart.' — Guardian. Edmund Selous. TOMMY SMITH'S ANIMALS. By EDMUND Selous. Illustrated by G. W. Ord. Fcap. Svo. ss. 6d. A little book designed to teach children respect and reverence for animals. 'A most fascinating little natural history book.' — Lady. ^A little book which calls for more than praise; it is one to be grateful for.' — kf^m-ld. *A quaint, fascinating little book: a nur- sery classic' — AtheneEunt. S. Baxing Govad. THE CROCK OF GOLD. Fairy Stories told by S. Baring Gould. Crown Zvo. 6s. ' Twelve delightful fairy tales.'— Fund. M.L. Gwynn. A BIRTHDAY BOOK. Arranged and Edited by M. L. Gwynn. Demy Zvo. iss. 6d. This is a birthday-book of exceptional dignity, and the extracts have been chosen with particular care. The three passages for each day bear a certain relation to each other, and form a repertory of sententious wisdom from the Best authors living or dead. John Bunyan. THE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS. By JOHN Bunyan. Edited, with an Introduction, by C. H. Firth, M.A. With 39 Illustrations by.R. Anning Bell. Crown 8vo. 6s. 'The best "Pilgrim's Progress.'" — Educational Times. F. D. Bedford. NURSERY RHYMES. Witli many Coloured Pictures by F. D. BEflroRD. Super Royal 8vo. 5J. ' An excellent selection of the best known rhymes, with beautifully coloured pic- tures exquisitely printed.' — Pall Mall Gazette. S. Baring Gould. A BOOK OF FAIRY TALES retold by S. Baring Gould. With numerous Illustra-. tions and Initial Letters by Arthur J. Gaskin. Second Edition. Cr. %vo. Buckram. 6s. ' Mr. Baxing Gould is deserving of grati- tude, in re-writing in simple style the old stories that delighted our fathers and grandfathers.' — Saturday Review. S. Baring Gould. OLD ENGLISH FAIRY TALES. Collected and edited by S. Baring Gould. With Numerous Illustrations by F. D. Bedford. Second Edition, Cr. Zvo. Buckram. 6s. 'A charming volume.* — Guardian, S. Baring Gould. A BOOK OF NURSERY SONGS AND RHYMES. Edited by S. Baring Gould, and Illustrated by the Bir- mingham Art School. Buckram, gilt top. Crown Svo. 6s. H. C. Beeching. A BOOK OF CHRISTMAS VERSE. Edited by H. C. Beeching, M.A., and Illus- trated by Walter Crane. Cr. Svo, gilt top, y. 6d. An anthology which, from its unity of aim and'high poetic excellence, has a better right to exist than most of its fellows.' — Guardian, 14 Messrs. Methuen's Catalogue Hinders Petrie. A HISTORY OF EGYPT, FROM THE Earliest Times TO THE Present Day. Edited by W. M. Flinders Petkie, D.C.L., LL.D., Professor of Egyptology at UniversityCollege. 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