(Jorttell Ittiuersitg ffiihrarg Jlt^aca, New ^nrk BERNARD ALBERT SINN COLLECTION NAVAL HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY 'ism h- Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924024313078 Cornell University Library DC 153.M21 1898 V.I The influence of sea power upon the Fren 924 024 31 3 078 THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER Ul'OX THE FREXCII EEYOLUTION AND EMPIRE 1793-1S12 BY CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D. UNITED STATES XAYY AUTHOR OF "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA TOWER UPON HISTORY, 16GO-1783," ETC. in t\yo volumes Vol. L TENTH EDITION BOSTON LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY 1898 / - ■ I Copyright. ISOS By Captain A. T. Mahan John Wilson and Son, Cambridge. P E E F A C E. ^T^HE present work, like its predecessor, ^^ The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 10 60- 1783," is wholly a result of the author's connection with the United States Naval War Colletre as lee- o turer upon Naval History and Naval Tactics. When first asked to undertake that duty, the question naturally arose how to impart to the suh- ject of Naval History an aspect which, in this very utilitarian age, should not be open to the ready reproach of having merely archaeological interest, and possessing no practical value for men called upon to use the changed materials of modern naval war. '"' You won't have much to say about history," was then the somewhat discouracrins; comment of a o o senior ofiicer of his own service. In pondering this matter, it occurred to the author — whose acquaintance with naA^al history was at that time wholly superficial — that the part played by navies, and by maritime power generally, as a factor in the results of history, and as shaping the destinies of nations and of the world, had received 3V PREFACE. little or no particular attention. If this were so, an analysis of the course of events through a series of years, directed to show the influence of Sea Power upon History, would at least serve to imbue his hearers with an exalted sense of the mission of their calling ; and might also, by throwing light upon the 23olitical bearings of naval force, contribute to give the service and the country a more definite impres- sion of the necessity to provide a fleet adequate to great undertakings, lest, if an occasion should arise for what he has ventured to call " statesmanship directing arms," we should be found unprepared, through having no sufficient armed force to direct. In avowing this as the original, and, for a time at least, almost the sole motive of his work, the author practically confesses that he at the beginning had no scientific appreciation or reasoned knowledge of the naval history of the past. Upon giving this the at- tention required by his new duties, and collating the various incidents with the teachings of recognized authorities upon land warfare, he soon came to recog- nize that the principles which they claimed to be of general application in their own specialty received also ample and convincing illustration in naval an- nals ; although the development of the Art of War at sea has been slower, and is now less advanced, than on shore. This backward result has been due, partly, to uncertainties peculiar to the sea, and partly PREFA CE. Y to a contempt for the study of the past, and of its experience, as '' not practical," from which the naval profession has not yet wholly rid itself. Thus, in its course, the author's former work, without abandoning its first simple motive, ex- panded into an attempt to analyze the strategic conduct of the naval campaigns, as well as the tac- tical features of the various ]jattles — all too few — in which any clear tactical purpose was shown hy the commanders engaged. The cordial reception given to the work by his professional brethren, in Great Britain as well as at home, has been to him not only most gratifying, but wholly unexpected. Its chief significance is, however, not personal. The somewhat surprised satisfaction testified is virtually an admission that, in the race for material and me- chanical development, sea-officers as a class have allowed their attention to be unduly diverted from the systematic study of the Conduct of War, which is their peculiar and main concern. For, if the com- mendation bestowed be at all deserved, it is to be ascribed simply to the fact that the author has been led to give to the most important part of the profession an attention wdiich it is in the power of any other officer to bestow, but which too few actually do. That the author has done so is due, wholly and exclusivelv, to the Naval War Colleo-e, which was in- VI PREFACE. stitutecl to promote such studies. If further success attend his present venture^ it is his hope that this avowal may help to assure the long uncertain for- tunes of the College, to which, — and to its founder, Eear- Admiral Stephen B. Luce, — he gratefully ac- knowledges his indebtedness for guiding him into a path he would not himself have found. The term of this work is fixed at the year 1812 ; a date signalized by Napoleon's invasion of Russia, which wrecked his empire, — or at least gave the outward and visible token of the wreck, — and also by the outbreak of war between Great Britain and the United States. To the latter, as a subject of particular national interest, the author hopes in the near future to devote a special study. A. T. MAHAN. OCTOBEK. 1892. CONTENTS OF VOL. I. CHAPTER r. Introductory Outline of Events in Europe, 1783-1793. Page Prominence of the year 1793 , 1 Leading features and results of the war of 1778 ... , 2 Condition of the different belligerents at its termination ... 3 Success of the second Pitt as a peace minister ... . . 5 Advantage to Great Britain arising from his secure tenure of power 6 Desire of Western Europe for peace . 7 Causes of disturbance . . . .... . .7 Accession of Joseph II. to crown of Austria . . , 7 Commercial expansion of Austrian Netherlands during war of 1778 8 Question of the navigation of the Scheldt . . . ... 9 Wide-spread interests therein involved . . . ... 10 The Eastern Question, 1780-1790 .... 11 Change of relations between Great Britain and Russia from 1770 to 1785 12 Interests of France and of Great Britain in the Levant and Baltic ... . . . II Importance of Antwerp as a naval station . . 15 Interests of European States in Holland and the Netherlands . 16 Relations between Russia and France, 1780-1700 17 Preponderance of French influence in Dutch politics .... 17 Joseph II. drops the question of the Scheldt .... . . 18 Treaty of alliance between France and Holland, 1785 .... 18 Armed interference of Prussia in Holland, 1787 . . ... 19 British party regains ascendency in Holland, 1787 19 20 20 21 21 21 21 22 22 23 24 24 viii CONTENTS. Page Meeting of the Notables ia France, February, 1787 19 Turkey declares war agaiust Russia, August, 1787 . ... 19 Austria declares war against Turkey, February, 1788 . . .19 Great Britain and Holland proclaim a strict neutrality Consequent effect upon Russia's maritime projects . Sweden attacks Russian Finland, June, 1788 Defensive alliance between Great Britain, Prussia, and Holland JL / CO .... .... , Denmark attacks Sweden .... . Interposition of Great Britain and Prussia in the Baltic Significance of this action . . . Dawn of the modern Eastern Question . . ... Conflicting views of British statesmen about Russia, 1791 External influence of France paralyzed by home troubles . . Progress of the war in southeastern Europe . , . Renewed interference of Great Britain and Prussia in the Baltic 25 Meeting of the States- General in France, 1789 . Cessation of hostilities between Austria and Turkey, September, i.tOK) ... ...... . ..... ,dO Storming of Ismail by Suwarrow, Christmas, 1790 . . 26 Peace of Galatz between Russia and Turkey, August, 1791 . 27 General peace in eastern Europe, 1791 27 Progress of the Revolution in France, 1789-1791 28 Flight of the King, 1791 28 Declaration of Pilnitz, August, 1791 . 28 Significant coincidence of this date with Peace of Galatz . . 29 France declares war against Austria, April, 1792 ... 29 Disorders in Paris, June-September, 1792 30 Suspension of the King, August, 1792 30 Battle of Valmy, September 20, 1792 30 Meeting of National Convention, September 22, 1792 . . 31 Royalty abolished in France . . . . 31 Battle of Jemappes, November 6, 1792 31 The French occupy Austrian Netherlands and open the Scheldt 31 Decree of Fraternity, November 19, 1792 .31 Decree extending the French system with their armies, Decem- ber 15, 1792 . . 32 Strained relations between Great Britain and France .... 32 Execution of Louis XVI., January 21, 1793 . .... 32 Dismissal of the French minister by the British court .... 34 France declares war against Great Britain and Holland, Febru- ary 1, 1793 , . , . 34 COXTEXTS. IX CHAPTER II. The Condition of the Navies in 1793 THE FkENCH XaVY. AND ESPECIALLY OF Causes of the deterioration of the French navy after 1789 Ignorance of maritime conditions among French administrators Value of the lessons derivable from this experience Factors conditioning the effects of any form of military activity The gun the one sea- weapon of the period in question . . . . A ship is a mobile battery .... It is handled by an organic body, whose members are mutually dependent .... Necessity of special training to such an organization . Blindness of the French Legislature to these facts Rise and growth of insubordination in the navy . . . The disturbances in Toulon, 1789 ... Maltreatment of Commodore DAlbert de Rions Weakness of the National (Constituent) Assembly The Nootka Sound trouble between Spain and Great Britain, 1790 France prepares to support Spain . . De Rions ordered to command the Brest fleet . . . Mutiny in the Brest fleet ... De Rions leaves the navy His services and distinguished professional reputation . Disorders in the navy abroad . . . . . . Disastrous effects upon the French colonies Emigration of French naval officers > Reorganization of the navy by the Constituent Assembly, Previous measures of the monarchical government, 1786 Reorganization decrees of the Assembly, April, 1791 Essential spirit of this legislation . . , . The Second (Legislative) Assembly lowers the qualifications for ofiicers Naval officers in the Reign of Terror . ... Further legislation by Third Assembly (National Convention), Results of the successive measures ... Action of the Assemblies touching enlisted men Singular arguments based on equality of rights Extravagancies of the period . . 1791 Page as 38 39 39 39 4.J 41 41 42 43 43 44 45 45 45 4G 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 54 55 56 57 58 59 X CONTENTS. Page Direct results of these measures as shown in battle ... GO Indirect effects of the laxness of the Assemblies upon discipline 60 Mutiny in the Brest fleet, 1793 . . . . G2 Disorders in the Mediterranean fleet, 1792 ... .... 63 Deterioration of the material of the navy . . . . . 6-i Misery of officers and seamen .64 AVant of naval supplies and equipment ... ... .67 Effect of these disadvantages upon naval efficiency 68 Effect of naval inefficiency upon the general results of the war 68 Endarance and success of Great Britain due to her Sea Power . 69 Condition of the British navy in 1793 .... .69 Possesses a body of trained officers having a continuous tradition 69 Embarrassment of Great Britain for seamen 70 Condition and health of the crews . . .... 71 jNlutinies in the British navy. Plow characterized .... 72 Character of the material in the British navy . . . 73 Comparative force of the French and British navies .... 75 Numbers and condition of the Spanish navy .... , 75 Inefficiency of its officers and seamen 76 Navies of Holland, Naples, and Portugal 78 Of Turkey and the Baltic States 78 CHAPTER III. The General Political and Strategic Conditions, and the Events of 1793. France declares war against Spain, March 7, 1793 Character of the governments arrayed against France Mutual jealousy of Austria and Prussia Attitude of the smaller German States ]\Iilitary and naval situation of Spain . . . . Policy of Great Britain ... Attitude of Russia . Second Partition of Poland . . Course of Sweden and Denmark ... Internal dissensions and external dangers of Holland Dutch colonies . . . . . . Relations between Portugal and Great Britain . . Attitude of the Italian States ... .... 79 79 80 80 81 82 82 82 83 83 83 84 COXTEXTS. XI Page Extent and disorganization of the Turkish Empire ... 85 Strategic importance of the Mediterranean islands ... 80 Their political distribution . ... 80 Value of Malta and of Port Mahon .... . . .87 Corsica in the beginning of the French Revolution . ... 88 Internal commotions in France .... .... 89 Keverses in Belgium and treason of Dumouriez 89 Reorganization of the Committee of Public Safety ... 9U Revolt of Lyon against the Convention .... . . 9(3 Fall of the Girondists .... ... 90 Risings of their followers throughout France 90 Siege of Lyon by Conventional troops . . .... 91 Toulon delivered to the British and Spanish fleets 92 French reverses on the eastern and northeastern frontiers . . 9^^ Desperate state of France , 93 Mistakes of the allies 9-i Energy of the Convention and its commissioners . . . . 94 Effect upon the armies . . ... 94 Failure to attain similar results in the navy . . .... 95 Causes of this failure . 90 Naval unpreparedness of Great Britain in 1793 90 Difficulty in manning the fleet 96 Distribution of the British naval forces . 96 Military and naval problem before Great Britain ..... 97 Military value of insurrections in an enemy's country .... 98 Measures to compel the French navy to leave port 99 Difficulty of blockading French ports . . , 99 Maritime claims of Great Britain 100 Military character of Lord Howe ... 101 His views of naval policy 101 Proper strategic use of the British fleet . 102 Effects of inactivity upon a naval force . . 102 Successes of the French armies toward the close of 1793 . . 103 Disasters of the Vendean insurgents . 104: Fall of Lyon 105 The allies abandon Toulon, Dec. 19, 1793 105 Disadvantages of Toulon for the allies . . 106 End of the maritime year 1793 100 xu CONTENTS. CHAPTER IV The West Indies, 1793-1810. Page Present importance of the West India islands . . ... 109 Their value at the end of the eighteenth century ... . 109 Control of a maritime region dependent upon the navy . . . 110 Interests of Great Britain in the Caribbean Sea . . . 110 Condition of Haiti . . .111 Relation of Haiti to the routes of commerce . 112 INIistaken policy of the British in Haiti . . 113 Military and commercial value of the Lesser Antilles .... 114 Their political distribution in 1793 114 Naval weakness of Great Britain in that region 115 Expedition of Jervis and Grey in 1794 . , . .... 115 Capture of the French islands . . 115 The French retake Guadaloupe . . 116 Disastrous results to British possessions and commerce . . 117 Expedition of Christian and Abercromby, 1796 . . ... 117 Its successes . . .. . .... . .118 Criticism of British military policy in 1794 , . 119 Injury to Great Britain of Spanish and Dutch alliance with France ... . . . 120 Capture of Trinidad by the British . . ... . 121 Subsequent events in the West Indies . ... 121 CHAPTER y. The Naval Campaign of May, 1794, and Battle of the First of June. Distress in France in 1793 and 1794 .... ... Food supplies ordered from the United States . . . Ships of war sent to convoy them to France . . . . Squadrons of Nielly and Villaret sent to meet the convoy Determination of British government to intercept it Sailing of tbe Channel Fleet under Lord Howe . Howe meets the French fleet under Villaret Joyeuse, May 28 Partial engagement of May 28 . ... . . Manoeuvres of May 29 . . . ... Partial engagement of INIay 29 ... 122 123 123 124 125 125 126 127 129 130 COi\ TENTS. xiu Lord Howe breaks the French line Villaret loses the advantage of the wind Summary of the results of the two days' engagements Merits of Howe's tactics Strategic mistake by which Montagu's squadron was not on hand Events of May 30 and ol . . . Preparations for battle, June 1 Character of Howe's attack Opening of the battle Howe's flag-ship again breaks the French line General success of the first attack The contest between the " Vengeur " and the " Brunswick '^ Sinking of the " Vengeur " Results of the encounter Villaret's manoeuvre to rescue his crippled ships . Howe's manoeuvre to preserve his prizes Incomplete results of the British victory Physical prostration of Lord Howe ... . . Tactical analysis of the action . . . . Inferences deduced therefrom Conduct of the French captains . ... Study of the strategic conduct of the two admirals Howe's tactical success neutralized by strategic error . . Termination of the campaign •Safe arrival of the convoy at Brest .... Page 131 131 130 13.5 135 135 136 137 13S 139 140 140 143 144 145 146 147 147 149 152 153 155 160 161 101 CHAPTER YI. The Year 1794 in the Atlantic and on the Continent. Inaction of the British Channel fleet . . .... 162 Capture of the " Alexander," 74 . 162 Disastrous winter cruise of the French Brest fleet . . 103 Continued inactivity of the British Channel fleet . . . 164 Howe leaves the command afloat ... . . . 105 Succeeded by Bridport . . 105 Change in the British Admiralty 165 Little change of system . 105 Dangers incurred b}' faulty dispositions . . 166 Reign of Terror in France ... 107 Fall of Robespierre, July 27, 1794 1^7 Fiench successes on north-east frontier 10-S XIV CONTENTS. Divergent retreat of Austrians and Anglo-Dutch Conquest of Holland by the French . . . Establishment of Batavian Republic . . • Effect of this event upon the coalition . War between Great Britain and Holland . . . Fall of Dutch colonies , . ... French successes on the Rhine and in the Pyrenees Peace made -^'ith France by Prussia, Holland, and Spain Treaties of Great Britain with Austria and Russia . . Paoe 169 170 170 170 170 171 171 172 172 CHAPTER VII. The Year 1795 in the Atlantic and on the Continent. The year 1795 one of reaction in France . . . Reactionary measures . . Counter-revolutionary disorders Constitution of 1795 . . . ... . . Dissolution of the National Convention Six French ships-of-the-line transferred from Brest to Toulon Action between Villaret Joyeuse and Cornwallis .... Bridport's action off lie Groix .... ... French adopt policy of commerce-destroying and withdraw their fleets from the ocean .... Criticism of this decision Military conclusions derivable from Napoleon's naval policy Weakness of French military action in 1795 . . Serious reverses in Germany Suspension of arms in Germany ... Narrative shifts to the Mediterranean .... Summary of results in 1795 173 174 175 175 176 176 177 178 179 179 180 180 181 182 183 183 CHAPTER VIII. The Mediterranean and Italy. — From the Evacuation of Toulon in 1793 to the British Withdrawal from that Sea, in 1796, and Battle of Cape St. Vincent, in Febru- ary, 1797. — Austria Forced to Make Peace. Requirements of a base of operations ... 184 Policy and objects of Great Britain in the Mediterranean . . 185 Inadequacy of Gibraltar to these ends 185 CONTENTS. XV Advantages of Corsica as a base .... P^xpulsion of the French from Corsica . The crown of Corsica offered to the king of TJreat Biitaii Strained rekxtions between Paoli and the viceioy French Toulon fleet pnts to sea, in March, 171)5 . . Action with the British Mediterranean tleet, March 14 Lethargy of Adnniral Ilothani Losses in the two fleets French re-enforced by a detachment from Brest . Disturbances in Toulon . . Brush between the fleets off the Ilyeres Lslands . Military events in Italy, 1795 .... Difficulty of suppressing coasting trade along the Kiviera of Genoa .... . . Sluggish movements of the Austrian general Devins , Decisive defeat of the Austrians at the battle of Loano They retire across the Apennines ... . . Criticism of the management of the British navy Importance of Nelson's services . . . . Commerce-destroying by the French ... Admiral Jervis assumes command in the Mediterranean, and General Bonaparte in Italy .... ... Professional Characteristics of Jervis . . . . Disastrous results of Hotham's inactivity Share of the French flotilla in maintaining Boiia[)arte's commu nications . , . . . Bonaparte's Italian campaign of 17!)0 Sardinia forced to peace . .... Successive defeats of the Austrians . . Bonaparte occupies the line of the Adige, and blockades Mantua Political results of the campaign Naples abandons the Coalition, and the French occupy Leghorn Consequent effects upon the British lleet . Bonaparte's designs upon Corsica The British seize Elba . . . . Offensive and defensive alliance between Spain anarte advances through Carinthia into Austria . . . 23-1 Preliminaries of peace signed at Leoben, April, 1797 .... 234 Conditions, both open and secret . . 235 Austria treats alone, apart from Great Britain ... . . 235 Advantage to Great Britain from her Sea Power . . 236 Note, — incident of the mutinies of '1707 occurring in the fleet of Earl St. Vincent 236-239 CHAPTER IX. The Mediterranean in 1797 and 1798. Bonaparte's Egyptian Expedition — The Return of the British to the Mediterranean and the Battle of the Nile. — Great Britain resumes control of the Medi- terranean AND THE Second Coalition is formed. Negotiations for peace between Great Britain and France, 1790 The Th'itish envoy ordered to quit France Difficulties between the United States and France , Death of Catharine II. of Russia and accession of Paul I, Reactionary results of the French elections in 1797 . Coup d'fitat of September 3-4, 1707 . . Reactionary members exiled from France .... Renewed negotiations with Great Britain, 1797 The P)ritish envoy again dismissed Bonaparte's Eastern projects 240 241 242 243 243 244 245 245 246 246 CONTENl'S. XVI 1 Insidious treatment of Venice . . ... Nelson's expedition against 'J'eneriffe ... He is repulsed, loses his right arm, and returns to England Peace of Campo Forniio between France and Austria . Conditions of tbe peace ... Venice ceases to exist, and France acquires the Ionian island Bonaparte leaves Italy and returns to Paris Commands array intended to invade England Dilliculties of this enterprise . Tlie expedition to Egypt determined in its stead Absence of the I>ritish Heet from the Mediterranean in 1797 Nelson rejoins the fleet off Cadiz, Ajjril, 17!.)y Sent with three ships to watch the preparations in Toulon Bonaparte sails with expedition for Egypt, May 19, 1798 . Nelson joined by a re-enforcement of ten ships-of-the-line Bonaparte seizes Malta, and sails again for Alexandria Perplexity of Nelson as to the enemy's designs .... Pursues to Alexandria, but fails to find the French . . Cause of this disappointment .... Retraces his steps to the westward Bonaparte anchors off Alexandria, and at once disembarks troops Nelson anchors at Syracuse, and again sails for Alexandria . . Discovers the French fleet anchored in Aboukir Bay Indecision and Icthaigy of the French admiral Brueys Neglect of Bonaparte s orders . . ..... Description of Aboukir Bay ... Brueys's inadequate pre[iarations against attack . ... ('onq)arison with those made Liy Hood in a like position P.attle of the Nile . . Concentration iqion the head of the Frencli column (Grounding of tiie " Culioden " Arrival of the British reserve and concentration on the French centre ... Tlie French flag-ship blows up . . . . Oidy two French ships-of-the-line escape Discussion of Nelson's chums to the credit of this action Successes of Bonaparte in Egypt . Effect upon French troops of the battle of the Nile Effect of the battle upon foreign powers Aggressive action of France upon the continent of Europe Intervention in Switzerland and Rome . . . . . . Dissatisfaction of Naples and Austria . . Hostile attitude of Paul I. of Russia VOL. I. — b Page 217 249 250 250 251 251 252 252 252 253 251 256 250 250 257 257 2 58 259 259 200 200 201 201 202 203 203 204 205 200 208 209 270 271 271 273 277 277 277 278 279 280 281 xviii CONTENTS. Page Alliance between Russia and Austria -82 Effect of tlie tidings of tlje battle of the Nile 282 Influence of the battle in India 283 Nelson ordered to Naples 284 Blockade of Malta by the British . . 285 Disposition of the British Mediterranean fleet 286 llusso-Turkish attack upon the Ionian islands 286 Minorca captured by the British ... ... ... 287 ^lavitime results of the year 17D8 . 287 CHAPTER X. The MsDITEimANEAN FROM 1790 TO 1801. Bonaparte's Syrian Expedition and Siege of Acre. — The Incursion of the French Brest Fleet under Admiral BrUIX. — r>ONAPARTE's ReTURN TO FrANCE. — TlIE FrENCH LOSE Malta and Egypt. Bonaparte's hopes fioni the Egyptian expedition .... 288 Weakness of Egyptian institutions 289 Conquest of Upper Egypt . . 289 The Pasha of Syria advances against Egypt ... ... 290 Isolation of tlie French in Egy[>t . . 290 Coiisequi'iit embarrassment of Bona})arte 291 Bonaparte hears of the Turkish preparations against him . 292 Resolves to invade Syria .... . . 292 The French capture El Arish and advance to Acre . . . 293 Character of Sir Sidney Smith, commanding the British squad- ron off Acre 294 His naval and diplomatic mission to the Levant . .... 296 Annoyance thereby caused to Nelson and St. Vincent .... 297 Smith assumes command off Alexandria ... .... 298 Importance of Acre . 299 Smith arrives at Acre from Alexandria . 299 Captures a convoy with P>onaparte's siege train 300 Siege of Acre ... .... 300 Arrival of Turkish re-enforcements from Rhodes . . . . 301 Final assault by the French 302 They raise the siege and retreat to Egypt .... ... 302 Services of Sir Sidney Smith at Acre ........ 303 CONTENTS. xlx Page The French fleet of twenty-five ships-of-the-line, under Admiral Bruix, escapes from Brest . 304 Conduct of Lord Bridport ... 305 Excitement in Great Britain . . 306 Bruix appears off Cadiz, and enters the Mediterranean . . 307 Exposed position of the Britisli naval detachments . . . 308 Anxieties of Earl St. V^incent . ... . 309 Measures taken by him .... 301) Action of Nelson . . 310 Activity and sagacity shown by St. Vincent . . . . 311 The Spanish fleet leaves Cadiz and reaches Cartagena . 312 St Vincent's health fails, and he gives u[) command to Keith ., 312 Bruix eludes Keith's pursuit and joins Spaniards in Cartagena 313 The allied fleets pass the Straits and reach Brest . . 310 Keith pursues to Brest and then goes to Torbay Discussion of the French ol)jects in this cruise .... Conduct of the British admirals at the same time . The Turkish army lands in Aboukir Bay to attack the French It is destroyed by Bonaparte . . . Bonaparte quits Egypt and returns to France . . . . Criticism of the Egyptian expedition Absolute control of the IMediterraiiean by the British navy . Surrender of Malta ... Isolation of Egypt .... . . .... 330 Convention of El Arish for the evacuation of Egypt by the French . . . . 332 Ratification refused by Britisli government, because unauthorized 333 Abercrornby's expedition. Final loss of Egypt by the French . 331 Assassination of Kleber . . 334 CHAPTER XL The Atlantic, 1706-1801. — Tiik r.i:KsT Blockadks. — The French ExrEOiTroNS against Ihkland. The French resolution to dei)end upon commerce-destroying 335 Consequent effect upon naval war and upon the control of the sea 33G Resulting dispositions of French and liritish navies . . . 337 Inefficient character of the blockade of Brest 338 Conditions of the maritime problem before Great Britain stated 330 IMeasures proper to be adopted . . . ... 340 Mutual relations of the elements of a defensive system . . . 341 316 316 318 321 322 323 321 328 330 XX CONTENTS. Paqe Two aspects under which the military value of Brest should be considered .... 342 Description of the port and its surroundings . 342 Strategic importance of the winds . 344 Anchorages available to the British fleets as bases of operations against Brest 344 Theory of the Brest blockade 345 Fitness of the British bases relative to this theory 345 Policies of St. Vincent, Howe, and Bridport .... . . 346 Causes leading to the Irish expedition of 1796 347 Preparations for the expedition 348 Hoche appointed to command it 349 Villaret Joyeuse appointed to command the fleet . . 349 His distaste for the enterprise 349 He is superseded by Morard de Galles . 350 Inefliciency of the French navy at this time . 350 Departure of the expedition 351 Its dispersal on the night of starting .... 353 Reunion of the greater part of the ships .... . 354 Absence of the two commanders-in-chief . . . 354 The expedition reaches the coast of Ireland . . . 355 Mishaps in Bantry Bay .... 356 The ships return to France ... . . . . 357 Shipwreck of the '' Droits de 1' Homme " . . 358 Misfortunes of the ship carrying Hoche and Morard . 359 Inefficiency of the British dispositions against invasion . 360 Analysis of these dispositions . . 361 Consequent im[)unity of the French . 367 St. Vincent succeeds, in 1800, to the command of the Channel fleet 368 His strategic management of the general operations .... 369 His tactical dispositions to maintain the watch of the port . 371 Dependence of the admiralty upon the commander-in-chief 373 St. Vincent's provisions in case of the blockade being forced . 374 Decisive effects of the system introduced by him 375 Paralysis of Brest under this watch 376 Napoleon in consequence adopts Antwerp as his chief dockyard 377 Purposed expedition against Ireland from the Texel .... 378 Naval battle of Camperdown 378 Death of Hoche 378 The expeditions of 1798 against Ireland 379 Cessation of the attempts upon Ireland . . .... 380 LIST OP ILLUSTRATIONS. VOLUiME I. MArS AND BATTLE FLANS. Page I. MaiKjeuvres of May 20, 1704, Figures 1 and 2 . . . . 120 IL Man.iiuvrcs of May 29, 1704, Fig. 3 131 IIL Battle of June 1, 1704 137 IV. Ma]) of Nurlhern Italy 105 V. Bat tie of Cape St. Vincent 223 VI. Map of the Mediterranean . 257 VII. Coast Map, Alexandria to tlie Nile . 263 Vril. Battle of tlie Nile . , 26 7 IX. Map of Englisli Cliannel antl North Sea 335 X. Map of Brest and its Approaches 343 THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWEll UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY. Outline of Events in Europe, 1783-1793. THE ten years following the Peace of Versailles, Sep- tcmlier 3, 1783, coming between the two great wars of American Independence and of the French Revolution, seem like a time of stagnation. The muttering and heav- inir which foretold the oncome of tlie later struti'^'le were indeed to be heard by those whose ears were open, long ])efore 1793, Tlie opening events and violences whicli marked the political revolution were of earlier date, and war with Austria and Prussia began even in 1792 ; but the year 1793 stands out with a peculiar prominence, marked as it is by the murder of the king and queen, the beginning of the Reicrn of Terror, and the outlireak of hostilities with the great Sea Power, whose stubborn, relentless purpose and mighty wealth were to exert the decisive influence upon tlic result of the war. Untiring in sustaining with her gold the poorer powers of the Continent against rlie common enemy, dogged in bearing up alone the burden of the war, when one by one her allies dropped away, the year in which Great Britain, with her fleets, her commerce, and her money, rose against the French republic, with its VOL. I. — 1 I IN TROD UC TOR Y. conquering armies, its ruined navy, and its bankrupt treas- ury, may well be taken as the beginning of that tremendous strife which ended at Waterloo. To the citizen of the United States, the war whose re- sults were summed up and scaled in the Treaty of Ver- sailles is a landmark of history surpassing all others in interest and importance. His sympathies are stirred by the sufferings of the many, his pride animated by the noble constancy of the few whose names will be forever identified with the birth-throes of his country. Yet in a less degree this feeling may well be shared by a native of Western Europe, though he have not the same vivid im- pression of the strife, which, in so distant a land and on so small a scale, brought a new nation to life. Tliis indeed was the great outcome of that war ; but in its progress, Europe, India, and the Sea had been the scenes of deeds of arms far more dazzlino; and at times much nearer home than the obscure contest in America. In dramatic effect nothing has exceeded the three-years siege of Gibraltar, teeming as it did with exciting interest, fluctuating hopes and fears, triumphant expectation and bitter disappoint- ment. England from her shores saw gathered in the Channel sixty -six French and Spanish ships-of-the-line, — a force larger than had ever threatened her since the days of the Great Armada, and before which her inferior numbers had to fly, for the first time, to the shelter of her ports. Rodney and Suffren had conducted sea campaigns, fouglit sea lights, and won sea victories which stirred beyond the common the hearts of men in their day, and which still stand conspicuous in the story of either navy. In one re- spect above all, this war was distinguished ; in the devel- opment, on both sides, of naval power. Never since the days of De Ruyter and Tourville had so close a balance of strength been seen upon the seas. Never since the Peace of Versailles to our own day has there been such an ap- proach to equality between the parties to a sea war. INTRODUCTORY. 3 The three maritime nations issued wearied from the strife, as did also America ; but the latter, though with many difficulties still to meet, was vigorous in youth and unfettered by bad political traditions. The colonists of yesterday were thoroughly fitted to retrieve their own for- tunes and those of their country ; to use the boundless re- sources which Divine Providence had made ready to their hands. It was quite otherwise with France and Spain ; while Great Britain, though untouched witli the seeds of decay that tainted her rivals, was weighed down with a heavy feeling of overthrow, loss and humiliation, which for the moment hid from her eyes tlie glory and wealth yet within her reach. Colonial ambition was still at its lof- tiest height among the nations of Europe, and she had lost her greatest, most powerful colony. Not only the king and the lords, but the mass of the i)eoplc had set their hearts upon keeping America. Men of all classes had pre- dicted ruin to the Empire if it parted with such a i)0sses- sion ; and now they had lost it, wrung from them after a bitter struii'ii'le, in which their old enemies had overljorne them on the field tliey called their own, the Sea. The Sea Power of Great Britain had been unequal to the task laid upon it, and so America was gone. A less resolute }teople might have lost hope. If the triumph of France and Spain was proportionate to their rival's loss, this was no true measure of their gains, nor of the relative positions of the three in the years after tlie war. American Independence ])rolited neither France nor Spain. The latter had indeed won back the Floridas and Minorca ; but she had utterly failed Jjciore Gibraltar, and Jamaica had not even been attacked. Minorca, as Nelson afterwards said, was always England's when she wanted it. It belonged not to this power or that, but to the nation that controlled the sea ; so England retook it in 1798, when her fleets again entered the Mediterranean- France had gained even less than Spain. Her trading 4 INTR OD UCTOR Y. posts in India had been restored ; but they, even more than Minorca, were defenceless unless in free communication with and supported by the sea power of the mother-country. In the West Indies she returned to Great Britain more than the latter did to her. " France," says a French his- torian, '' had accomplished the duties of her providential mission " (in freeing America) ; '• her moral interests, the interests of her glory and of her ideas were satisfied. The interests of her material power had been badly defended by her government ; the only solid advantage she had ob- tained was depriving England of Minorca, that curb on Toulon, far more dangerous to us when in their hands than is Gibraltar." ^ Unfortunately at this moment France was far richer in ideas, moral and political, and in renown, than in solid power. The increasing embarrassment of the Treasury forced her to stay her hand, and to yield to her rival terms of peace utterly beyond what the seeming strength of either side justified. The French navy had reaped glory in the five years of war; not so much, nearly, as French writers claim for it, but still it had done well, and the long contest must have increased the efficiency of its officers along with their growing experience. A little more time only was wanted for France, allied to Spain, to gain lasting re- sults as well as passing fame. This time poverty refused her. Spain, as for centuries back, still depended for her in- come almost wholly upon her treasure ships from America. Always risked by war, this supply became more than doubtful when the undisputed control of the sea passed to an enemy. The policy of Spain, as to peace or war, was therefore tied fast to that of France, without whose navy her shipping lay at England's mercy ; and, though the na- tional pride clung obstinately to its claim for Gibraltar, it was forced to give way. J MartiDj liistoire de France, vol. xix. p. 370. INTRODUCTORY. 5 Great Britain alone, after all her losses, rested on a solid foundation of strenfitli. The American contest bv itself had cost her ncarh' £100,000,000, and rather more than that amount had during;' the war lieen added to the national debt; but two 3'ears later this had ceased to increase, and soon the income of tlie State was ^Teater than the outu'o. Before tlic end of 178-3, the second William Pitt, then a young man of twenty-four, became prime minister. With ti'enius and aims siieciallv fitted to the restorative duties of a time of peace, the first of British finance ministers in the opinion of Mr. Gladstone,^ he bent his great powci's to fos- tering tlie commerce and wealth of the British peo])le. With firm Ijut skilful hand he removed, as far as the prejudices of the day would permit and in the face of much opposition, the fetters, forged by a mistaken policy, that hampered the trade of the Emjnre. Promoting the ex- chaiiLi'e of aoods with other iiations, simplifvinii' the collec- tion of taxes and the I'e venue, he added at once to the wealth of the jieople and to the income of the State. Al- though very small in amount, as compared with the enor- mous figures of later years, the ex}»orts and imports of Great Britain increased over fifty per cent between the years 1781 and 1702. Even with the lately severed colo- nies of North America the same rate of gain, as compared with the trade Ix'fore the war, held good ; while with the old enemv of his father and of Entrland, with France, there was concluded in 178G a treaty of commerce which was exceedingly liberal for those days, and will, it is said, bear a favoraljle comparison with any former or subsequent treaty between tlie two countries. " In the course of little more than three years from Mr. Pitt's acceptance of office as First Lord of the Treasury," says the eulogist of his dis- tinguished rival. Fox, ^' great commercial and financial re- forms had been effected. . . . The nation overcominsx its difiiculties, and rising buoyant from depression, began 1 Niuetfouth Century Review, June, 1SS7, p. 922. 6 INTRODUCTORY. rapidly to increase its wealth, to revive its spirit, and renew its strength." ^ Such was the home condition of the British people ; hut fully to appreciate the advantageous position to which it was rising, in preparation for the great conflict still unfore- seen, it must be remembered that all things worked to- gether to centre and retain the political executive power in the hands of Pitt. The feelings of the king, then a very real force in the nation ; the confidence of the people.^ given to his father's son and fixed by the wisdom of his own conduct and the growth of the moneyed prosperity so dear to the British heart ; the personal character of his only rival in ability, — all combined to commit the political guidance of the State to one man at the great crisis when such unity of action was essential to strength. Whether the great peace minister was equal to the wisest direction of war has been questioned, and has been denied. Certainly it was not the otfice he himself would have chosen ; but it was a great gain for England that she was at this time able to ffive herself whoUv to a sino-le leader. He took office with a minoritv of one hundred in the House of Commons, held it for two months constantly out-voted, and then dissolving Parliament appealed to the country. The election gave him a majority of over a hundred, — a fore- taste of the unwavering support he received from the rep- resentatives of the people during the early and critical years of the French Revolution, when the yet fluid opinions of the nation were gradually being cast and hardened into that set conviction and determination characteristic of the race. How different the state of France is well known. The hopeless embarrassment of the finances, hopeless at least under the political and social conditions, the rapid succes- sion of ministers, each sinking deeper in entanglements, the weak character of the king, the conflict of opinions, the ^ Lord .John Russell's Life of Fox, vol. ii, p. 137. IX TR OD UC TOR Y. 7 lack of sympathy between classes, all tending to the as- sembling of the Notaljles in February, 1787, and tlie yet more pregnant meeting of the States General, May 4, 1789, which was the beginning of the end. France was money- less and leaderless. But while the Western countries of Europe were by these circumstances disposed or constrained to wish for the con- tinuance of peace, restlessness showed itself in other quar- ters and in ways which, from the close relations of the European States, disquieted the political atmosphere. The Austrian Xetherlands and IIoHand, Puland and Turkey, the Ijlack Sea and the Baltic, became the scene of diplo- matic intriu'ues and of contlicts, wliich, while thev did not involve the great Western Powers in actual war, caused them anxietv and necessitated action. The Empress-Queen of Austria and Hungary, Maria Theresa, had died in 1780. Her son, the Emperor Joseph J I., came to the throne in the pi'ime of life, and with his head full of schemes for changing and bettering the con- dition of his d'tminions. In 1781, tlic weakness of Holland beinii' ])lainlv shown liv her conduct of the war with Great Britain, and the other countries having their hands too full to interfere, he demanded and received the surrender of the fortified towns in the Austrian Netherlands ; vrhich, under the name of the " barrier towns," had been held and garrisoned by Holland since the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, as a bridle upon tlie ambition of France. At the same time the circumstances of the 2;reat maritime contest, which during the American Revolution covered all the seas of Europe, impelled every neutral nation having a seaboard to compete for the carrying trade. Holland for a time had shared this profit with the nations of the North ; but when Great Britain, rightly or wrongly, forced her into war, the trade wliich had been carried on through Holland and her great rivers reaching into the heart of Germany, being denied its natural channel, sought a new one throu2:h the 8 INTRODUCTORY. Austrian Netherlands by the port of Ostend. The growth of the latter, like that of Nassau during the Civil War in the United States, was forced and unhealthy, — due not to natural advantages but to morbid conditions ; but it fos- tered the already strong wish of the emperor for a sea power which no other part of his dominions could give. This movement of Belgian commerce was accelerated by tlie disappearance of the British carrying trade. As in the days of Louis XI Y., before he had laid up his ships-of-the- line, so in the American War the cruisers and privateers of the allies, supported by the action of the combined fleets occupying the British navy, preyed ravenously on British shipping. In the days of the elder Pitt it had been said that commerce was made to live and thrive by war ; but then the French great fleets had left the sea, and British armed ships protected trade and oppressed the enemy's cruisers. Between 1778 and 1783 Great Britain was fully engaged on every sea, opposing the combined fleets and protecting as far as she could her colonies. " This unto- ward state of thino's reduced the Enc-lish merchants to difficulties and distresses, with respect to the means of carrying on tlicir trade, which they had never experienced in any other war. Foreign vessels were used for the con- veyance of their goods, and the protection of a foreign flag for the first time sought by Englishmen." ^ The writer forgot the days of Jean Bart, Duguay-Trouin, and Forbin ; we may profitably note that like conditions lead to like results. Thus, while America was struQ:G:linG; for life, and the contests of England, France, and Spain were heard in all quarters of the world, Netherland ships sliowed abroad on every sea the flag of an inland empire, and Ostend grew merrily ; but if the petty port and narrow limits thus throve, how should the emperor bear to see the great citv of Antwerp, with its noble river and its proud commercial 1 Annual llegistcr, vol. 27, p. 10. INTRODUCTORY. 9 record, shut np from the sea as it had been since the Treaty of Westphalia ? His discontent was deep and instant ; but it was the misfortune' of this prince that he took in hand more than his own capacity and the extent of his estates would let him complete. His attention being for the moment diverted to southeastern Europe, where Austria and Russia were then acting in diplomatic concert against the Porte, the question of Antwerp was dropped. Before it could be resumed, the Peace of Versailles had left Great Britain, France, and Holland — all so vitally interested in whatever concerned Belgium — free, though loath, to enter into a new contention. Matters having been for the time arranged with Turkey, the emperor again in 1784 renewed his demands, alleging, after the manner of statesmen, sev- eral collateral grievances, but on the main issue saying roundly that " the entire and free navigation of the Scheldt from Antwerp to the sea was a sine qua non^^ to any agreement. The arguments — commercial, political, or founded on treaty — which were in this instance urged for or against the natural claim of a countiy to use a river passing through its own territory, to the sea that washes its shores, are not here in question ; but it is im|)ortant to analyze the far-reaching interests at stake, to note the bearinir of this dispute upon them and so upon the general diplomacy of Europe, and thereby trace its intimate coimection with that Sea Power whose influence u|)on the course of history at this period it is our aim to weigh. Though modified in expression by passing events, and even at times superfi- cially reversed, like natural currents checked and dammed by contrary winds, these underlying tendencies — being dependent upon permanent causes — did nut cease to exist durino; the storm of the Revolution. Ever readv to resume their course when the momentary op|»osition was removed, the appreciation of them serves to explain a])parent contra- dictions, produced hj the conflicts between transient neces- sitv and endurino: interests. 10 INTR OD UCTOR Y. From that o'reat centre of the world's commerce where the Scheldt, the Meuse, the Rhine, and the Thames meet in the North Sea, near the Straits of Dover, there then parted two principal lines of trade passing through Euro- pean waters, — through seas, that is, along whose shores were planted many different powers, foreign and possibly liostile to each other. Of these two lines, one ended in the Baltic ; the other, after skirting the coasts of France and tlie Spanish peninsula and running the gantlet of the Barbary corsairs, ended in the Levant or Turkish Seas. The great Empire of Russia, wliich only made itself felt in the sphere of European politics after the Treaty of Utrecht, in 1713, had since then been moving forward not only its centre, which bore upon the continent of Europe, but also both its wings ; one of which touched and overshadowed the Baltic on the North, while the other, through a steady course of pressure and encroachment upon the Turks, had now reached the Black Sea. This advance had been aided by the fixedness with which France and England, through their ancient rivalry and their colonial ambitions, had kept their eyes set upon each other and beyond the Atlantic ; but the Peace of Versailles forced the combatants to pause, and gave them time to see other interests, which had been overlooked through the long series of wars waged, between 1739 and 1783, over commerce and colonics. It was then realized that not only had Russia, in the past half-century, advanced her lines by the partition of Poland and by taking from Sweden several provinces on the Baltic, but also that she had so added to her influence upon the Black Sea and over the Turkish Empire by successive aggressions, wresting bits of territory and establishing claims of interference in behalf of Turkish subjects, as to make her practical supremacy in Eastern waters a possi- bility of the future. The Western Question, as it may fitly be called, had been settled by the birth of a new nation, destined to 7.V TR on UCTOR Y. 1 1 greatness and preponderance in tlie western hemisphere ; the Eastern Question, phrase now so familiar, soon loomed on the horizon. Was it to receive a like solution ? Was a great nation, already close to the spot, to win a position of exce[)tional advantage for dominating in eastern waters as America must do in western ? for it must bo remembered that, althouirh the Levant was then onlv the end of a Euro- pean trade route, both the history of the past and the well understood possibilities of the future pointed to it as one of the greatest centres of commerce, and therefore uf human interest and political influence, in the world. The Levant and Egypt had then, and still keep, the same inter- est that is now being felt in the Isthmus of Panama and the Caribbean ; and it is hard to imagine a more threaten- ing condition of naval power than the possession of the Llack Sea and its impregnable entrance, by a vigorous nation, so close to the Eastern highway of the world. The position in 1783 was the more dangerous from the close alliance and respective abilities of the rulers of Austria and Russia ; the coohheaded and experienced Catharine, throuQ-h her influence on her weaker collea2;ue, directinu; the resources of Ijoth empires in a path most favorable to Russia. The tendency of Russian growth, and the historic events which marked its progress, were, of course, well enough known in EuLi'land lono; before; but there is a difference between knowinix facts and realizinsT; their full mean- ing. Circumstances alter cases ; and men's minds, when strongly bent one way, do not heed what is passing else- where. Hence, in 1785, we find the attitude of Great Britain toward Russia verv different from that of fifteen years earlier, when the empress and the Porte were at war. In 1770, British officers commanded Russian fleets and ships, and a British admiral had leave to take a place in the Russian Admiralty, with the promise of his home rank being restored to him. The Czarina sent a 12 INTRODUCTORY. fleet of twenty sail-of-the-line from tlie Baltic to the Le- vant. They stopped and refitted in Spithead ; Russian soldiers were landed and camped ashore to refresh them- selves ; English sergeants of marines were employed to drill them ; a Russian eighty-gun ship, flying the flag of an Ando-Russian admiral, was doclvcd in Portsmouth and cut down to improve her sailing qualities. Thus comforted and strengthened they sailed for the Mediter- ranean ; and, receiving further damage from the ])0or seamanship of their crews, they were again fitted at Port Mahon, — then an English dockyard, — -for action in the Levant.^ When, among the hard knocks of tlie two fol- lowing years, the Russians destroyed a Turkish fleet of fifteen ships-of-the-line in a port of Asia Minor, British lieutenants commanded the fire-ships, and a British com- modore the covering squadron. To us now, with our remembrance of Kars and Silistria, of the Crimea and Hobart Pasha, of Cyprus and Besika Bav, these thina's seem like a dream ; and the more so, tl]at the Mediterranean powers of the earlier day viewed the Russian approach with ill-concealed mistrust, and laid severe restrictions upon the use of their ports. But Tur- key then, though a good friend to Great Britain, was a vet better friend to France ; the Turkish alliance had been useful to the latter country by making diversion in her wars with Austria, Great Britain's natural ally ; the French were the favored nation by Turkish commercial treaties, and a naval war in eastern waters could not )3ut be injurious to their commerce. Difficulties about trade might even bring about a collision between France and Russia, which at least could do no harm to Great Britain at a time when her rival was known to be steadily building up her navy with a view to revenge past defeats ; just as now she is thought to be looking for a day of reckoning with Germany. The Baltic trade was also of immense 1 See Annual Ixegistor, 1769, pp. 2-4; 1770, pp, 27-41, 67, 71, 75. INTRODUCTORY. 13 value, and the friendship of Russia was necessary thereto. Altogether, in 1770, the Russian nation, notwithstanding the French leanings of the Czarina, was, upon the whole, the friend of Great Britain's friends, and the opponent of her enemies, — especially of the one traditional, or, as even Q'enerous Enu'lislimen used to sav, the natural enemv, France. Russia bore especially against Sweden, Poland, and Turkey ; and these it was the consistent aim of the best school of French statesmen to court and strengthen. But in 1785 a great change had taken place. The war of 1770 had planted Russia firmly on the Black Sea. The treaty of Kainardji in 177-1 admitted her trade freely to the Mediterranean, — a privilege which other trading na- tions, in the narrow spirit of the day, considered their own loss. Russian frigates had entered the Dardanelles on their way to the Black Sea ; and though the Porte, ter- rified at the consequences of its action, stopj»ed tliem at Constantinople, the move was none the less significant. Then there had come, in 1771, the partition of Poland, universally condemned as unrighteous nnd dangerous to the balance of power, though submitted to by the other States. If Great Britain, though restless over this, saw still some com})ensation in the injury done to France by the weakening of her allies, and hugged herself with the belief that her insular position made tlic continental bal- ance of less moment, she had had a severe reminder of Russia's growing strength and power to injure, in the Armed Neutrality of 1780. This unfriendly blow, aimed by a State she had looked upon as almost a natural ally, which she had so greatly helped but ten years before, and which had now chosen the moment of her direst straits to attack what she considered her maritime rights, proba- bly completed the alienation, and opened the eyes of Brit- ish statesmen to the wd"^ danger with which they were threatened by the position of Russia upon the Baltic and close to the Mediterranean. 14 INTRODUCTORY, France, also, had little less interest than England in tliis condition of things, and certainly felt no less. From the days of Henry IV. and Colbert, and even before, she had looked upon the Levant as peculiarly her own field, the home of a faithful ally, and the seat of a lucrative trade which was almost monopolized by her. Although so far foiled in India, she had not yet lost her hopes of overcoming and replacing the British hold upon that land of fabled wealth, and she understood the important bear- ing of the Levant and Egypt upon the security of tenure there. It need not then surprise us, in the great maritime war which we are approaching, to find Napoleon — for all his greatness, the child of his generation — amid all the glory and bewildering rush of his famous Italian campaign, planning conquest in Egypt and the East, and Nelson, that personification of the British sea power of his day, fight- ing his two most brilliant battles in the Levant and in the Baltic. Nor will we be unprepared to see an importance equal to that of Gibraltar and iMahon in former days, now attached to points like Malta, Corfu, Taranto, Brindisi, as well as to Sicily and Egypt, by the statesmen, generals, and admirals, whose counsels directed the military efforts of the belligerents. Many of these points had licretofore lain out of the field of action of the Western Powers, but the rising Eastern Question was bringing them forward. Nor was it in the Levant alone that questions vitally af- fecting tlie rival States awaited solution. The trade inter- ests of the Baltic, as the outlet through wliich great rivers and tlie products of immense regions found their way to the world beyond, made its control also an object of im- portance to both the chief parties in the coming struggle, ■ — to Great Britain who strove to drive her enemy off the sea, and to France who wished to shut out hers from the land. But, besides its commercial importance, the se- cluded character of the sea, tlie difficulty of the approach, — aggravated by the severe climate, — and the immense INTR OD UCrOR Y. 15 preponderance in strength of Russia over Sweden and Denmarlv, made always possible an armed combination such as that of 1780, which was in fact renewed in 1800, seriously threatening the naval supremacy of Great Brit- ain. Such a coalition it was vital to the latter to ]irevent, und most desirable to her enemy to effect. If formed, it was a nucleus around which readily gathered all other malcontents, dissatisfied with the harsh and overbearing manner in which the great Sea Power enforced what she considered her rights over neutral ships. The nearness of England to the Baltic made it unneces- sary to have naval stations on the way for the rcj^air or shelter of her shipping, but it was most undesiral)lc that the ports and resources of Holland and Belgium, lying close on the flank of the route, and doubly strong in the formidable outworks of shoals and intricate navi2,'ation witli which nature had protected them, should be under the control of a great hostile power. Jean Bart, and his fellow-privateersmen of a hundred years before, had shown the danger to British shipping from even the third-rate port of Dunkirk, so situated. Where Dunkirk sent squad- rons of frigates, Antwerp could send fleets of ships-of-the- line. The appearance of Russia, therefore, and her pre- dominance on the Baltic, made weightier still the interest in the political condition of the Low Countries which, for generations past, Great Britain had felt on account of her commercial relations with them, and through them with Germany ; an interest hitherto aroused mainly by the ambition of France to control their policy, if not actually to possess herself of a large part of their territory. She had to fear that which was realized under Napoleon, — the conversion of Antwerp into a great naval station, with free access to the sea, and the control of its resources and those of the United Provinces by a strong and able enemy. Great Britain, therefore, had in 1781 seen with just apprehension the aggressive attitude of Joseph II. toward IG INTRODUCTORY. the Dutch, and the fall of the " barrier towns." It is true that these fortresses had ceased to afford much protection to Holland, owing to her military decline, but the event emphasized her exposure to France ; while the power of ^lustria to defend her own provinces, or the Dutch, was notoriously less than that of France to attack, owing to the relative distance of the two from the scene, and the danger to troops, on the march from Austria, of being as- sailed in flank from the French frontier. Now, again, in 1784, she was forced to look with anxietv — less on ac- 7 V count of Austria than of France — upon this raising of the question of the Scheldt. There was little cause to fear Austria becoming a great sea power now, wdien she had held tlie Netherlands three fourths of a century without becoming such ; but there was good reason to dread that tlie movements in progress might result in increasing her rival's sea power and influence — perliaps even her terri- tory — in the Low Countries. All these things did come to pass, thougli not under the dying monarchy. It may be presumed that the wise Catharine of Russia, without in the least foreseeing the approaching French convulsion which shook her plans as well as those of other European rulers, realized tlie true relations between her country and the Western powers, when she so heartily sup- ported the emperor in his claim for the free navigation of the Scheldt. There was no likelihood then, as there is Uttle likelihood now, that Great Britain and France would act together in the Eastern Question, then too new to out- weigh former prejudices or to unite old enemies. If the contention of Austria were successful, Russia would se- cure a friendly port in a region naturally hostile to her pretensions. If unsuccessful, as things then looked, the result would probably be the extension of French influence in the Netherlands and in the United Provinces ; and French gain there meant gain of sea power, with propor- tionate loss of the same to Great Britain. The empress INTR OD UCTOR Y. 17 conid still reckon on their mutual antagonism ; while tlie British navy, and the way in which it was used in war, were more serious dangers to Russia than the French armies. Whatever her reasoning, there is no douht that at this time her policy was drawing closer to France. The Frencli ministers in the East mediated between lier and the Sultan in the unceasing disputes arising from the treaty of Kainardji. A commercial treaty on most fa- vorable terms was concluded with France, while that with Great Britain was allowed to lapse, and its renewal was refused during" many vears. Such were the am)jitions and the weighty solicitudes, well understood on all hands, which, during the eight years succeeding the emperor's demand for the opening of the Scheldt, underlay and guided the main tendencies of European policy, and continued so to do during the revolutionary wars. The separate events which group themselves round these leading outlines, u|) to the out- break of war in 179o, can only l»e hastily sketched. Notwithstanding tlie close famih' relationshii) between Louis XVI. and the emperor, the French government looked coldly upon the latter's action in the matter of tlic Sclieldt. The long-standinti- stru2'Qle in the United Prov- inces between partisans of (treat Britain and France was just now marked by the preponderance of the latter, and, consequently, of French inlhience. As Austria seemed re- solved to enforce her claims Ijy war, the king lirst offered his mediation, and, Avhen that was unavailing, told the emperor he would interpose by arms. His troops were accordinglv massed on the Beh'ian frontier. It was un- derstood that the king of Prussia, who was brother-in-law to the stadtholder, would act with France. Russia, on the other hand, proclaimed her intention to support Austria. Sweden, as the enemy of Russia, began to put ships in commission and enlist soldiers : while from Constantino- ple came a report that, if war began, the sultan also would VOL. I. — 2 18 IN TR 01) U C TOR W improve so good an opportunity of regaining what he had lately lost. While the quarrel about the Scheldt was thus causing complications in all quarters, an incident occurred upon the chief scene of trouble, which under such condi- tions might well have precipitated a general war. An Austrian brig was ordered to sail from Antwerp to the sea, to test the intentions of Holland. Upon passing the boundary she was fired upon and brought to by a Dutch armed ship. This happened on the 8th of October, 1784. Yet after all war did not come, owing to Joseph's volatile attention being again drawn from the matter immediately in hand. He proposed to the elector of Bavaria to take the Netherlands in exchange for his electorate. This transfer, which by concentrating the possessions of Austria would greatly have increased her weight in the Empire, was resisted bv the whole Germanic bodv with Frederic the Great at its head. It therefore came to naught ; but the slackening of the emperor's interest in his Scheldt scheme promoted, under French auspices, a peaceful ar- rangement ; which, while involving mutual concessions, left the real question substantially untouched. Its solution was not reached until the storm of the Revolution swept city and river into the arms of the French republic. This compromise was shortly followed Ijy a treaty of the closest alliance between France and the United Provinces, engag- ing them to mutual support in case of war, fixing the amount of armed ships or men to l:>e furnished, and prom- ising the most intimate co-operation in their dealings with other States. This agreement, which, as far as compacts could, established French preponderance in the councils of Holland, was ratified on Christmas Day, 1785. This treaty gave rise to serious and regretful considera- tion in Great Britain ; but the growing fiiuancial cmbari-ass- ment and internal distur];»ance of France were rapidly neutralizing her external exertions. The followinii; vears were marked by new combinations and alliances anions INTRODUCTORY. 19 States. In 1786 Frederic the Great's death took awav an important element in European politics. The quarrel be- tween the two factions in Holland had reached the verge of civil w^ar, when an insult offered by the French party to the wife of the stadtholdcr, sister to the new king of Prus- sia, led to an armed interference iiy this sovereign. In October, 1787, Prussian troops occu}jied Amsterdam and restored to the stadtholdcr iirivileffcs that had been taken from him. Even France had stronu'lv condemned the act of those who had arrested the princess, and advised ample satisfaction to be given ; Init, nevertheless, when the French party appealed for aid against the Prussian intervention, she prepared to give it and notified her purpose to Great Britain. The latter, glad again to assert her own inliu- encc, replied that she could not remain a quiet spectator, issued immediate orders for aua'mcntina' her forces bv sea and land, and conti-acted with Ilcsse for the su]»ply of twelve thousand troojis u])on dcniLind. The ra}iid success of the Prussians prevented any collision ; but Great Britain had the gratiiication, and France the mortification, of seeing re-established the party favoral)lc to the former. In Feljruary, 1787, the Assembly of Xotal;»les, which had not met since 1026, was opened by Louis XA^I. at Ver- sailles. But the most striking event of this year was the declaration of war against Russia Ijy Turkey, which deter- mined no longer to wait until its enemy was ready Ijefore engaging in an inevitable conflict. The Turkish manifesto was sent forth xVugust 21 ; Russia replied on the 13th of September. The emperor, as the ally of Russia, declared war against Turkey on the lOtli of February, 1788. Operations were carried on l\v the Austrians around Belgrade and on the Danube. The Russians, bent on extending their power on the Black Sea, invested Oczakow at the mouth and on the right bank of the Dnieper, — Kinburn on the left side hav- ing already been ceded to them by the treaty of Kainardji. 20 INTR OD UC TOR Y. The czarina also decided to renew in the Mediterranean the diversion of 1770, again sending ships from the Baltic. When the distance and inconvenience of this operation, combined with the entire lack of any naval station in the Mediterranean, are considered in connection with the close proximity of Russia to that sea in mere miles, there ^Y\\\ be felt most forcibly her tantalizing position with reference to commerce and sea power, to whose importance she has been keenly alive and to which she has ever aspired since the days of Peter the Great. It is difficult to understand how Russia can be quiet until she has secured an access to the sea not dependent upon the good-will of any other State. Notwithstanding the many causes of displeasure she had given to Great Britain, Catharine went on with her ar- rangements as though assured of the good-will and help before received. Pilot boats were engaged to meet the ships in British w^aters, and take them to British dock- yards. Under her orders, British merchants chartered eighteen large ships to convey artillery and stores after the fleet. All tliese arrangements were quietly frustrated by Pitt's ministry, which forbade seamen to serve in any for- eign ships; and, upon the ground that the nation was to be strictly neutral, made the contractors renounce their engagements. Catharine then turned to Holland, which also refused aid, pleading the same purpose of neutrality. This concert of action between the two maritime States forced Russia to abandon so distant an expedition and il- lustrated the advantage she would have oljtained from the emperor's claim to the Scheldt. It was at this time that the celebrated Paul Jones, who had distinguished himself by his desperate courage in the American Revolutionary War, took service in the Russian Navy and was given a high command ; but his appointment so offended the British officers already serving in the fleet, whom their government had foreborne to recall, that they at once re IN TR OD UCTOR Y. 21 signed. The Russians could not afford to lose so many capaljle men, and Jones was transferred from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Soon a fourth State took part in the contest. On tlie 21st of June, 1788, Sweden advanced her troops into Rus- sian Finland, and on the 30th war against her was declared by Russia. It now proved fortunate for the latter that she had not been able to get her tlect away from the Baltic, The lighting on land was there mainly confined to the north coast of the Gulf of Finland, while in the waters of the Gulf several very severe actions took place. These battles were fought not only between ships-of-thc-line of the usual type, but by large Hotillas of gunboats and gal- levs, and were attended with a loss of life unusual in naval actions. War being now in full swing throughout the East, Great Britain and Prussia drew together in a defensive treaty, and were joined by Holland also, under the new lease of power of the stadtholder and British party. The quota of troops or ships to be furnished in case of need by each State was stipulated. The allies soon had occasion to act in favor of one of the belligerents. Denmark, the 'hereditary enemy of Sweden, and now in alliance with Russia, took this oj> portunity to invade the former country from Norway, then attached to the Danish crown. On September 24, 1788, twelve thousand Danish troops crossed the frontier and advanced upon Gottenburg, which was on the point of sur- rendering when the sudden and unexpected arrival of the king, in person and alone, prevented. There was not, however, force enough to save the town, had not Great Britain and Prussia interfered. The British minister at Copenhagen passed over hastily into Gottenburg, induced the Swedish king to accept the mediation of the two gov- ernments, and then notified the Danish commander that, if the invasion of Sweden was not stopped, Denmark would be by them attacked. The peremptory tone held by the 22 INTRODUCTORY. minister swept away the flimsy pretext that the Danish corps was only an auxiliary, furnished to Russia in accord- ance with existing treaty, and therefore really a Russian force. There was nothing left for Denmark but to recede ; an armistice was signed at once and a month later her troops were withdrawn. The true sicrnificance of the alliance between the two Western Powers, to which Holland was accessory, is markedly shown by this action, which, while ostensibly friendly to Sweden, was really hostile to Russia and a di- version in favor of the sultan. Great Britain and Prussia, in consequence of the growing strength and influence of Russia in the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Continent, and to check her progress, followed what was then consid- ered to be the natural policy of France, induced by ties and traditions long^ antedating the existing state of things in Europe. Sweden then, and Turkey later, traditional allies of France, and in so far in the opposite scale of the balance from Great Britain, were to be supported by the demonstration — and if need were by the employment — of force. This was done, not because France was as yet less dreaded, but because Russia had become so much more formidable. It was again the coming Eastern Question in which, from the very distance of the central scene of action fi'om Western Europe, and from the character of the inter- ests and of the strategic points involved. Sea Power, rep- resented chiefly by the maritime strength and colonial expansion of Great Britain, was to play the leading and most decisive part. It was the dawning of the day, whose noon the nineteenth century has not yet seen, during which Nelson and Napoleon, Mohammed xili and Ibrahim Pasha, the Sultan Mahmoud and the Czar Nicholas, Napier, Stop- ford, and Lalande in 1840, the heroes of Kars, Silistria, and the Crimea, and of the Russo-Turkisli war of 1877, were to play their parts upon the scene. But in the years after the Peace of Versailles this was a ixrn OD uc tor y. 23 new question, upon which opinions were unformed. It was true that, to quote from a contemporary writer, '' Eng- h'lnd had had full leisure to ruminate u{)on, and sufficient cause to reprobate, that absurd and Idind policy, under the influence of which she had drawn an uncertain ally, and an ever-to-be-suspected friend, from the bottom of the ]>otli- nic Gulf to establish a new naval empire in tlie ^lediter- ranean and Archijtelago/' ^ These meditations had not been fruitless, as was seen by the consistent attitude of Pitt's ministry at this time ; but on the other hand, when it was proposed in 1701 to increase the naval force in com- mission, in order ''to add weight to the representations" '-^ beina: made bv the allies to the bellijxerents, — in order, in other words, to sup{)ort Turkey by an armed demonstra- tion, — Fox, the leader of the Whigs, said that " an alliance witli Russia appeared to him the most natural and advan- tageous that we could possibly form ; " ^ while Curke, tlian whom no man had a juster reputation for political wisdom, observed that " the considering the Turkish Empire as any part of the l)alance of power in Europe was new. The prin- ciples of alliance and the doctrines drawn from thence were entirely new. Russia was our natural ally and the most use- ful ally wc had in a commercial sense.'" ^ That these distin- guished members of the opposition represented tlie feelings of many su})porters of the ministry was shown l)y a dimin- ished majority, 93, in the vote that followed. The opposition, thus encourau'ed, then introduced a series of resolutions, the iiist of which lav in these words : " The interests of Great Britain arc not likely to be affected by the progress of the Russian arms on the borders of the Llack Sea."^ In the vote on this, the minister's majority again fell to eighty, despite the arguments of those who asserted that 1 Annual "Rei:;ister, 1788, p. 59. - King's Message, March 29, 1781. 3 Fox's Speeclies (London, 1815), vol. iv. p. 178. ^ Tarl. Hist., vol. xxix. pp. 75-79. ^ Aunual P^egister, 1791, p. 102 24 INTRODUCTORY. " the possession of Oczakow b}' the empress would facilitate not only the acquisition of Constantinople, but of all lower Egypt and Alexandria ; which would give to Russia the supremacy in the Mediterranean, and render her a formi- dable rival to us Ijoth as a maritime and commercial power/ ' After making every allowance for party spirit, it is evident that British feeling was only slowly turning into the chan- nels in which it has since run so stronolv. France, under the pressure of her inward troubles, was debarred from taking part with her old allies in the East, and withdrew more and more from all outward action. On the 8th of August, 17S8, the king fixed the 1st of May, 1789, as the day for the meeting of the States General ; and in November the Notables met for the second time, to consider the constitution and mode of procedure in that body, the representation in it of the Third Estate, and the vote by orders. They were adjourned after a month's ses- sion ; and the court, contrary to the judgment of the ma- jority among them, proclaimed on the 2Tth of December, 1788, that the representatives of the Third Estate should equal in number those of the two others combined. No decision was given as to whether the votes should be indi- vidual, or by orders. Oczakow was taken by the Russians on the 17th of De- ceml)er, 1788, and during the following year the Eastern war raged violently both in the Baltic and in southeastern Europe. Turkey was everywhere worsted. Belgrade was taken on the 8th of October by the Austrians, who after- wards occupied Bucharest and advanced as far as Orsova. The Russians reduced Galatz, Bender, and other places. Besides losing territory, the Turks were defeated in several pitched battles. The conduct of the war on their part was much affected by the death of the reigning sultan. The Swedisli war was in its results unimportant, ex- cept as a diversion in favor of Turkey. To keep it up as such, subsidies were sent from Constantinople to Stock- INTRODUCTORY. 25 holm. Great Britain and Prussia were oblio:ed a2:ain to threaten Denmark, in 17S0, to keep her from aiding' Rus- sia. The British minister, speaking for both States, ex- pressed their fixed determination to maintain the bahTnee of power in the Nortli. A defensive alliance was then formed between Russia and Austria on the one hand, and France and Spain on the other. The Bourbon kingdoms ))ledgcd tliemselves to a strict neutrality in the Eastern War as it then existed ; but if Russia or Austria were at- tacked by any other State, they were to be helped, — Austria, by an army of sixty thousand men ; Russia, by a fleet of sixteen ships-of-the-line and twelve frigates. The latter lU'ovision shows both the kind of attack feared by Russia and the direction of her ambition. On the 4th of May of this year, 1789, the States General met at Versailles, and the French Revolution thenceforth went on apace. The Bastille was stormed July 14th. In Octol)er the royal family were l^rought forcibly from Ver- sailles to Paris by the mob. The earlier events of the Revolution will hereafter be summarily related by them- selves, before going on with the war to which they led. It will here be enough to say that the voice of France was now silent outside her own borders. In 1790 the Eastern War was practically brought to an end. On tlie 31st of January a very close treaty of alli- ance was made between Prussia and the Porte, — the king liindintr himself to declare war at a set time ag-ainst botli Russia and Austria. The emperor died in February, and was succeeded by his brotlier Leopold, who was dis|,)Osed to peace. A convention was soon after held, at which sat ministers of Austria, Prussia, Great Britain, and the United Provinces ; the two latter acting as mediators because Prus- sia had taken such a pronounced attitude of hostility to Aus- tria. A treaty was signed July 27, by which the emperor renounced liis alliance with Russia. On September 20, he agreed to an armistice with Turkey; which, after long 26 INTR OD UC TOR Y. negotiation, was followed by a definitive peace, concluded August 4, 1791. The Russian conflict with Turkey languished during the summer of 1790. Active operations began in October, and continued during a season whose severities the Russian could bear better than the Turk. The final blow of the campaign and of the war was the taking of Ismail by Suwarrow, a deed of arms so tremendous and full of hor- rors that a brief account of its circumstances is allowable even to our subject. The town, which was looked on as the key of the lower Danube, was surrounded by three lines of wall, each with its proper ditch, and contained a garrison of thirteen thousand. Its population, besides the troops, was about thirty thousand. Owing to the season, December, Suwar- row determined not to attempt a regular siege, but to carry tlie place by assault, at any cost of life. Batteries were consequently put up in every available place, and as rapidly as possible, in order to prepare for and cover the attack. At five o'clock Christmas morning they all opened to- gether, and, after a furious cannonade of two hours, the Russians moved forward in ei2;ht columns. After a three hours struggle the assailants were forced back ; but Su- warrow, whose influence over his soldiers was unbounded, ran to the front, and, planting a Russian flag on one of the enemy's works, asked his men if they would leave it behind them. Throu2:h his efforts and those of the offi- cers, the troops returlied to the charge. The conflict, which must have resolved itself into a multitude of hand- to-hand encounters, lasted till midnight, when, after an eighteen hours fight, the third line of defence was carried and resistance ceased, though bloodshed continued through the night. It was computed at the time that thirty thou- sand Turks, including women and children, and some twenty thousand Russian soldiers died violent deaths dur- ing that Christmas day of 1790. Warlike operations con- INTRODUCTORY. 27 tiiiued during the spring, but iirelimiiiaries of peace be- tween Russia and Turkey were signed at Galatz on the 11th of August, 1701. This put an end to hostilities throughout the East, peace Imving been made between Russia and Sweden a year be- fore, on August 11, 1790. The time of attack liad l)een well chosen by the Swedish king, and had pubhc opinion in Great Britain approached unanimity, a powerful lever would have been put in her hands to break down the Rus- sian attack on Turkey by supporting the diversion in the North. The Russian and Swedish fleets were so evenly balanced that a small British division would have turned the scale, controlled the Baltic, and kept open the Swedish communications from Finhmd to their own coast. So far, however, was the nation from being of one mind that, as we have seen, the minister's majority steadily fell, and he probably knew that among those who voted straight, many were far from hearty in his support. Prussia also did not back Sweden as she should have done, after definitely embracing that policy, though she was both disconcerted and anii'ered at the iieace for which she had not looked. This irresolution on the part of the allied States limited their action to interposing between Sweden and Denmark, and prevented the results which might reasonably have been expected in the north, and yet more in the east of Europe; but it does not take from the significance of their attitude, nor hide the revolution in British statesmanship which marks the ten years now being treated. The tendency thus indicated was suddenly, though only temporarily, checked by the Revolution in France. The troubles that had been so long fomenting in that country had, after a short and delusive period of seeming repose, beirun aii-ain at nearlv the very moment that the Eastern Wtir was ending. This will be seen by bringing together the dates at which were happening these weighty events in the East and West. 28 INTRODUCTORY. It was on the Gtli of October, 1789, that the king and royal family were brought from Versailles to Paris, unwill- ing but constrained. After this outbreak of popular feel- ing, comparative quiet continued through the last months of 1789 and all of 1790, during which were fought in the East the most important battles of the war, both in the Baltic and on the Danube, including the bloody assault of Ismail. During this time, however, Louis XYI. under- went many bitter mortifications, either intended as such, or else unavoidably humiliating to his sense of position. In June, 1791, he fled with his family from Paris to put him- self in the care of part of the army stationed in eastern France under tlie Marquis de Bouille and believed to be thoroughly trustworthy. Before reaching his destination he was recognized, and brought back to Paris a prisoner. The greeting of the royal family was significant of the change that had passed over the people within a few years, and which their unsuccessful flidit had intensified. Thev were met by perfect silence, while some distance ahead of them rode an officer commanding the bystanders not to micover. Despite the distrust it felt, the Constituent As- sembly went on with the work of framing a constitution in which the king still had a recognized position, and which he formally accepted on the 14th of September, 1791. During that summer, peace was signed between Russia and Turkey, and a meeting was had at Pilnitz between the emperor and the king of Prussia, after which they put out their joint declaration that the situation in which the king of France found himself was an object of common concern to all the rulers of Europe ; that " they hoped this common concern would lead them to employ, in conjunc- tion with the two declaring sovereigns, the most efficacious means, relative to their forces, in order to enable the king of France to consolidate in the most perfect liberty, the basis of a monarchical government equally suitable to the rights of sovereigns and the welfare of the French nation." INTR on UC TOR Y. 29 The two princes ended by stating their own readiness to join in such united action with the force necessary to ob- tain tlie common end proposed, and that they would, mean- while, give orders to their troops to be ready to put them- selves in a state of activity. The close coincidence in date of the Declaration of Pil- nitz, x4LUgust 27, 1791, with tlie Peace of Galatz, signed August 11, is curious enough for passing remark ; the one formally opening the new channel of European interest and action, while the other marked the close of the old. The Declaration, however, was in the same line of effort that the new emperor had for some time been following. It met with a somewhat hesitating response. Russia and Sweden agreed to raise an army, which Spain was to sub- sidize ; but Great Britain, under Pitt, declined to meddle in the internal affairs of another state. The first National or, as it is conveniently called, Con- stituent Assemhiy, dissolved after framing a Constitution ; and the following day, October 1, 1791, the second Assem- bly, known as the Legislative, came together. The Decla- ration of Pilnitz had strongly moved the French people and increased, perhaps unjustly, their distrust of the king. Tliis change of temper was reflected in the Assembly. Strong representations and arguments were exchanged between the ministers of foreign affairs in xlustria and France, through the ambassadors at either court ; but in truth there was no common ground of opinion on which the new republic and the old empires could meet. The movements on either side were viewed with studied suspi- cion, and war was finally declared by France against Aus- tria, April 20, 1792. The first unimportant encounters were unfavorable to the French ; but more serious danger than that which threatened from without was arising within France itself. The king and the Assembly came into col- lision through the use by the former of his constitutional power of 7eto. The agitation spread to the streets. On 80 7 NTR OB UCTOR Y. the 20th of June a deputation from the mob of Paris ap- peared before the Assembly, and aslvcd permission for the citizens outside to defile before it, as a demonstration of their support. The extraordinary request was granted ; and an immense crowd pressed forward, of people of all ages, armed with weapons of erery kind, among which ap- peared a pike carrying the heart of a bull labelled an '^ Aristocrat's heart." From the Assembly the crowd went to the Louvre, and thence forced their way tlirouirh the palace gates into the king's presence. The unhappy Louis bore himself with calm courage, to which perhaps he, at the moment, owed his life ; but he submitted to put on the symbolic red cap, and to drink to the nation from a bottle handed him by a drunken rioter. Little was left in life for a king thus humbled, and his final humiliation was close at hand. Prussia had not loui? delayed to act in concert with the emperor, after France declared war. On July 26, a month after the strange scene in the Tiiileries, was issued an exposition of her reasons for taking arms ; and at the same time the Duke of Bruns- wick, commander-in-chief of the allied armies, put forth a proclamation to the French framed in such violent terms as to stir to the utmost the angry passions of a frantic and excitable race. On the 10th of August the Paris mob again stormed the Tuileries, the king and royal family tied for safety to the hall of the Legislature, the Swiss Guards were killed and the palace gutted. The Assembly then decreed the suspension of the king; and on tlie 13th of August the royal family was removed to the Temple, the last home on earth for several of them. On the 2d of September occurred the butcheries known as the September Massacres. To this date and this act is to be referred the great change in British feeling toward the Revolution. On the 20th the battle of Valmy, by some thought decisive of the fate of the Revolution, was won by the French. Though being otherwise far from a battle of INTR OD UCTOR Y. 3 1 the first importance, it led to the retreat of the alHed forces and destroyed for a time the hopes of the royalists. Two days after Valmy met the third Assembly, the National Convention of terrible memorv. Its first act was to decree the abolition of royalty in France ; but the power that swayed the country was passing more and more to the mob of Paris, expressing itself through the clubs of which the Jacobin is the best known. The violence and fanaticism of tlie extreme republicans and of the most brutal elements of the po|)uhice found ever louder voice. On the 19th of November the Convention passed a decree declaring, '^ in the name of the French nation, tliat they will grant fra- ternity and assistance to all people who wish to recover their liberty ; and they charge the executive power to send the necessary orders to the generals to give assistance tu such people, and to defend those citizens who have suffered, or may suffer, in the cause of liberty." It was denied by the French diplomatists that there was any intention of favorinj.': insurrections or excitiui^; disturbances in anv friendly country ; but such intention is nevertheless fairly deducible from the words, and when a motion was made to explain that they were not so meant, the Convention re- fused to consider it. Mr. Fox, the ardent champion of the Revolution in Parliament, spoke of this edict as an insult to the IJritish people. Meantime the battle of Valmy had been followed hy that of Jemappes, fought November 0. On the 14th tlie French army entered Brussels, and the Austrian Nether- lands were rapidly occupied. This was instantly succeeded by a decree, dated November 16, o|)ening the Scheldt, upon the express ground of natural right ; the boisterous young repul)lic cutting at one blow the knot which had refused to be untied by the weak hands of Joseph II. Decided action followed, a French squadron entering the river from the sea and forcing its way up, despite the protests of the Dutch officers, in order to take part in the siege of Aut- 32 INTR OD UC TOR Y. werp. This was a new offence to the British Sea Power, which was yet further angered by a decree of December 15, extending the French system to all countries occupied by their armies. The words of this proclamation were so sweeping that they could scarcely but seem, to those un- touched with the fiery passion of the Revolution, to threaten the destruction of all existino- social order. The British ministry on the last day of the year 1792 declared that " this government will never see with indifference that France shall make herself, directly or indirectly, sovereign of the Low Countries, or general arbitress of the rights and liberties of Europe." ^ While the Revolution was thus justifying the fears and accusations of those who foretold that it could not confine itself to the overturn of domestic institutions, but would seek to thrust its beliefs and principles forcibly upon other nations, the leaders were hurrying on the destruction of the king. Arraigned on the 11th of December, 1792, Louis XVI. was brought to trial on the 26tli, sentenced to death January IG, and executed January 21, 1793. This deed brought to a decided issue the relations between France and Great Britain, which, from an uncertain and unsatisfactory condition, had become more and more em- bittered by the course of events ever since the November decree of fraternitv. As far back as Aui^-ust 10, when the king was suspended, the British government had recalled its ambassador, who was not replaced ; and had persisted in attributing; to the French minister in London an ambic:- uous character, recognizing him only as accredited by the king who liad actually ceased to reign — by a government which in fact no longer existed. Points of form were raised with exasperating, yet civil, insolence, as to the position whicli M. Chauvelin, the minister in question, ac- tually occupied ; and his office was not made more pleasant by the failure of his own government to send liim new cre- ^ Annual Register, 1703 ; State Tapers, p. 118. INTRODUCTORY. 33 dentials. Papers written by him were returned by Lord Grenville, the foreign minister, because his claim to repre- sent the French republic was not recognized ; or, if ac- cepted, they were only received as unoliicial. The letters thus exchanged, under forms so unsatisfac- tory, were filled with mutual accusations, and arguments marked by the brisk vivacity of the one nation and the cool aggressiveness of the other; but starting as they did from the differing bases of natural rights on the one hand, and established institutions on the other, no airrcement was approached. The questions of the Scheldt, of the decree of fraternity, and of that extending the French system to countries occupied by their armies, were thus disputed back and forth ; and to them were added the complaints of France against an Alien Act, passed by Par- liament, January 4, 1793, laying vexatious restrictions upon the movements of foreigners arriving in Great Brit- ain, or wishing to change their abode if already resident. This act M. Chauvelin rightly believed to be sjiecially aimed at Frenchmen. Tt sprang from the growing ap- prehension and change of feeling in England ; a change emphasized by a break in the Parliamentary Opposition, a large number of wliom, in this same month of January, 1TU3, definitively took the step in which their great asso- ciate, Edmund Burke, had preceded them, broke their party ties, and passed over to the support of Pitt. The latter would seem to have become convinced that war was inevitable ; that the question was no longer whether a na- tion should exercise a right of changing its institutions, but whether a plague should be stamped out before it had passed its borders and infected yet healthy peoples. ThinG;s had come to this state when news reached Lon- don of the deatli sentence of the French kins:. J\I. Chauve- lin luid just received and presented credentials from the republican government. On January 20, the minister in- formed him that the king, under present circumstances, VUL, I. — 3 34 INTR OD UC TOR Y. did not think fit to receive them, adding the irritating words : " As minister of the Most Christian King, you would have enjoyed all the exemptions \Yhich the law grants to public ministers, recognized as such ; but as a private person you cannot but return to the general mass of foreigners resident in England." ^ On the 24th of Jan- uary, the execution of Louis XYI. being now known, Lord Grenville wrote to him : " The King can no longer, after such an event, permit your residence here. His Majesty has thought fit to order that you should retire from the kingdom within the space of eight days, and I herewith transmit to you a copy of the order which His Majesty has given me to that effect." ^ On the 1st of February, 1793, the French republic de- clared war against Great Britain and Holland. It was already at war with Austria, Prussia and Sardinia ; while Russia and Sweden were avowedly unfriendly, and Spain almost openly hostile. 1 Annual Register, 1793; State Papers, pp. 127, 128. CHAPTER II. The Condition of the Navies in 1793 — and especially of THE French Na\^'. BEFORE following tlic narrative of directly warlike ac- tion, or discussing the influence of the naval factor upon the military and political events, it is proper to ex- amine the relative position, strength, and resources, of the rival nations, particularly in the matter of Sea Power, — to weifi'li the chances of the strui>'o:le, as it were, before- hand, from the known conditions, — to analyze and point out certain reasons why the sea war took the turn it did, in order that the experience of the past may be turned to the profit of the future. First of all, it must be recognized that the problem to be thus resolved is by no means so simple as in most wars. It is not here a mere question of the extent, population, and geographical position of a country ; of the number of its seamen, the tonnage of its shipping, the strength of its armed fleet ; nor yet again, chiefiy of the wealth and vigor of its colonies, the possession of good and well-placed mari- time bases in different parts of the world ; not even, at first hand, of the policy and character of its government, although it is undoulitedly true that in the action of French governments is to be found the chief reason for the utter disaster and overthrow which awaited the Sea Power of France. It was because the government so faith- fully and necessarily reflected the social disorder, the crude and wild habits of thought which it was powerless to check, that it was incapable of dealing with the naval necessities of the day. The seamen and the navy of ^6 THE CONDITION OF THE NAVIES IN 1793, France were swept awaj by the same current of thought and feeling which was carrying before it tlie whole nation ; and the government, tossed to and fro by every wave of popular emotion, was at once too weak and too ignorant of the needs of the service to repress principles and to amend defects which were fatal to its healthy life. It is particularly instructive to dwell upon this phase of the revolutionary convulsions of France, because the result in this comparatively small, but still most impor- tant, part of the body politic was so different from that which was found elsewhere. Whatever the mistakes, the violence, the excesses of every kind, into wliich this popu- lar rising was betrayed, they were symptomatic of strength, not of weakness, — deplorable accompaniments of a move- ment which, with all its drawbacks, was marked by over- whelming force. It was the inability to realize the might in this outburst of popular feeling, long pent up, that caused the mistaken forecasts of many statesmen of the day; who judged of the power and reach of the movement by indications — such as the finances, the condition of the army, the quality of the known leaders — ordinarily fairly accurate tests of a country's endurance, but which utterly misled those who looked to them only and did not take into account the mighty impulse of a whole nation stirred to its depths. Why, then, was the result so different in the navy ? Why was it so weak, not merely nor chiefly in quantity, but in quality ? and that, too, in days so nearly succeeding the prosperous naval era of Louis XYI. Why should the same throe which brought forth the magnificent armies of Napoleon have caused the utter weakness of the sister service, not only amid the disorders of the Republic, but also under the powerful organization of the Empire ? The hnmediate reason was that, to a service of a very special character, involving special exigencies, calling for special aptitudes, and consequently demanding special AND ESPECIALLY OF THE FRENCH NAVY. 37 knowledge of its requirements in order to deal wisely with it, were applied the theories of men wholly ignorant of those requirements, — men who did not even believe that thev existed. Entirely without experimental knov;led^•e, or anv other kind of knowledge, of the conditions of sea life, they were unable to realize the obstacles to those pro- cesses by whicli they would build up their navy, and ac- cording to wliich they |troposed to handle it. This was true not only of the wild experiments of the early days of the Kei)uljlic; the reproach may fairly be addressed to tl^e great emperor himself, that he had scarcely any apprecia- tion of tlie factors conditioning; efficiency at sea ; nor did he seemingly ever reacli any such sense of them as would enalde him to understand why the French navy failed. "Disdaining," says Jean lion Saint-Andrt^, the Revolution- ary commissioner whose inhuence on naval organization was unbounded, ^' dUilahilnjj^ through calculation and re- flection, skilful evolutions^ perhaps our seamen will think it more fitting and useful to try those boarding actions in whicli the Frenchman was always conqueror, and thus as- tonish Europe by new }n-odigies of valor." ^ ''• Courage and audacity," says Captain Chevalier, "had become in his eyes the only qualities necessary to our officers." " The English," said Napoleon, " will become very small when France shall have two or three admirals willing to die."^ So commented, with pathetic yet submissive irony, the ill- fated admiral, Villcncuve, u}»on whom fell the weight of the emperor's discontent with his navy: '' Since his Majesty thinks that notliing but audacity and resolve are needed to succeed in the naval officer's callina', I shall leave nothinii- to be desired." -^ It is well to trace in detail the steps by which a fine military service was firoken down, as well as the results 1 Chevalier, INIar. Fran, sous la Kepublique, p. 49 - Nap. to Decres, Aug. 29, 1S05. 3 Troude, Eatailles Nav., vul. iii. p. 370. 38 THE CONDITION OF THE NAVIES IN 1793, thus reached, for, while the circumstances under which the process began were undoubtedly exceptional, the general lesson remains good. To disregard the teachings of expe- rience, to cut loose wholly from the traditions of the past, to revolutionize rather than to reform, to launch out boldly on new and untried paths, blind to or ignoring the difficul- ties to be met, — such a tendency, such a school of thought exists in every generation. At times it gets the mastery. Certainly at the present day it has unusual strength, which is not to be wondered at in view of the change and devel- opment of naval weapons. Yet if the campaigns of Ci^sar and Hannibal are still useful studies in the days of fire- arms, it is rash to affirm that the days of sail have no les- sons for the days of steam. Here, however, are to be considered questions of discipline and organization ; of the adaptation of means to ends ; of the recognition, not only of the possibilities, but also of the limitations, imposed upon a calling, upon a military organization, by the nature of the case, by the element in which it moves, by the force to which it owes its motion, by the skill or lack of skill with which its powers are used and its deficiencies com- pensated. It is indeed only by considering the limitations as well as the possibilities of any form of warlike activity, whether it be a general plan of action, — as for instance commerce- destroying, — or whether it be the use of a particular weapon, — • such as tlic ram, — that correct conclusions can be reached as to the kind of men, in natural capacities, in acquired skill, in habits of thought and action, who are needed to use such weapon. The possibilities of the ram, for instance, are to be found in the consequences of a suc- cessful thrust ; its limitations, in the difficulties imposed by any lack of handiness, speed, or steering qualities in the sliip carrying it, in the skill of the opponent in managing his vessel and the weapons with which he is provided for counter-offence. If these limitations are carefully consid- AXD ESPECIALLY OF THE FRENCH NAVY. 39 ercd, there will be little doubt how to answer the question as to the chance of a man picked up at hazard, untrained for such encounter except by years of ordinary sea-going, reaching his aim if pitted against another who has at least given thought and had some professional training directed to the special end. Now the one sea-weapon of the period of the French Rovulution was the gun ; the cold steel, the hand-to-hand fight, commonly came into play only toward the end of an action, if at all. In naming the gun, however, it can by no means be separated from its carriage ; using this word not merely in its narrow technical sense, but as belontrina' rightly to the whole ship which bore the gun alongside the enemy, and upon whose skilful handling depended placing it in those positions of advantage that involved most danger to the opponent and the least to one's self. This was tlic part of the commander ; once there, the skill of the gunner came into play, to work his piece with rapidity and accu- racy despite the obstacles raised by the motion of the sea, the rapid shifting of the enemy, the difficulty of catching sight of him through the narrow ports. Thus the skill of the military seaman and tlie skill of the trained gunner, the gun and the ship, the piece and its carriage, supple- mented each other. The ship and its guns together formed one weapon, a moving battery which needed quick and delicate handling and accurate direction in all its parts. It was wielded bv a livinor oro-anism, knit also into one Jjv the dependence of all the parts upon the head, and thus acting by a common impulse, sharing a common tradition, and having a common life, which, like all other life, is not found fully ripened without having had a beginning and a growth. It would be foolish, because untrue, to say that these things were easy to see. They were easy to men of the profession ; they were not at all easy to outsiders, apt to ignore difficulties of which they have neither experience 40 THE CONDITION OF THE NAVIES IN 1703, nor conception. The contempt for skilful manoeuvres was not confined to Jean Bon Saint-Andre, though he was unusu- ally open in avowing it. But the difficulties none the less existed ; neither is tlie captain without the gunner, nor the gunner without the captain, and both must be specially trained men. It was not to be expected that the man newly taken from the merchant vessel, whose concern with other ships was confined to keeping out of their way, should at once be fitted to manoeuvre skilfully around an antago- nist actively engaged in injuring him, nor yet be ready to step at once from the command of a handful of men shipped for a short cruise, to that of a numerous body which he was to animate with a common spirit, train to act together for a common purpose, and subject to a common rigorous discipline to which he himself was, by previous lialjit, a stranger. The yoke of military service sits hard on those who do not always Ijear it. Yet the efficiency of the military sea-officer depended upon his fit- ness to do these things well because they had been so wrought into his own personal habit as to become a second nature. This was true, abundantly true, of the single ship in fight : but when it came to the question of combining the force of a great many guns, mounted on perhaps twenty- five or thirty heavy ships, possessing unequal qualities, but which must nevertheless keep close to one another, in cer- tain specified positions, on dark nights, in bad weather, above all when before the enemy ; when these ships were called upon to perform evolutions all together, or in suc- cession, to concentrate upon a part of the enemy, to frus- trate by well combined and well executed movements attacks upon themselves, to remedy the inconveniences arising from loss of sails and masts and consequent loss of motive power, to provide against the disorders caused by sudden changes of wind and the various chances of the sea, — under these conditions, even one not ha vino; the AND ESPECIALLY OF THE FRENCH XAVV. ^1 knowledge of experience liegins to see that such demands can only be met by a body of men of special aptitudes and training, such as in fact has very rarely, if ever, been found in perfection, in even the most highly organized fleets of any navy in the world. To tliesc thinss the French National Assemblv was blind, but not because it was not warned of them. In trutli men\s understandings, as well as their inorah' and beliefs, were in a chaotic state. In the navy, as in society, the morale suli'ered first. Insubordination and mutiny, insult and murder, preceded the blundering measures which in the end destroyed the fine 2^ersonnel tliat the monarchy bequeathed to the French republic. This insubordination broke out very soon after the affairs of the Bastille and the forcing of the palace at Yersailles ; that is, very sooji after the powerlessness of the executive was felt. Singu- larly, yet appropriately, the first victim was the most dis- tinguished tlag-ofticer of the French navv. During the latter half of 1789 disturbances occurred in all the seaport towns ; in Havre, in Cherbourg, in B)-est, in Rochefort, in Toulon. Everywhere the town authorities meddled with the concerns of the navy yards and of the fleet ; discontented seamen and soldiers, idle or punished, rushed to the town halls with complaints against their officers. The latter, receiving no support from Paris, yielded continuallv, and tliiuQ-s naturallv went from bad to worse. In Toulon, however, matters were worst of all. The naval commander-in-chief in that port was Commodore D'Albert de Rions, a member of the French nobility, as were all the officers of the navy. He was thought the most able flag-ofticer in the fleet ; he was also known and lieloved in Toulon for his personal integrity and charitable life. After working his way with partial success through the earlier disorders, by dint of tact, concession, and his own personal reputation, he found himself compelled to send on 42 THE CONDITION OF THE NAVIES IN 1793, shore from the fleet two subordinate officers who had ex- cited mutiny. The men went at once to the town hall, where they were received with open arms, and a story be- fore prevalent was again started that the city was mined and would be attacked the day or two following. Excite- ment spread, and the next day a number of people assem- bled round the arsenal, demanding to speak with De Rions. He went out with a few of his officers. The crowd closed round and forced him away from the gates. He went toward his house, apparently his official residence, the mob hustling, insulting, and even laying hands on his person. Having reached his home, the mayor and another city offi- cial came to him and asked forgiveness for the two culprits. He refused for a long time, but at length yielded against his judgment, — sajdng truly enough that such an act of weakness, wrung from him by the commune on the plea of re-establisliing order, in other words of appeasing and so quieting the rabble, would but encourage new disorders and do irreparable wrong to discipline and the state. It proved also insufficient to arrest the present tumult. An officer coming to the door was insulted and attacked. A rioter rushed at another, who was leaning over a ter- race attached to the house, and cut his head open with a sabre. Then the windows were broken. The national guard, or, as we might say, the city militia, were paraded, but did no service. An officer leaving the house was at- tacked, knocked down with stones and the butts of mus- kets, and would have lost his life had not He Rions sallied out with thirty others and carried him off. The national guard now surrounded the house, forbid- ding entry or withdrawal, and soon after demanded the surrender of an officer whom they accused of having or- dered some seamen-gunners to fire on the mob. To He Rions's explanations and denials they replied that he was a liar, and that the officers were a lot of aristocrats who wished to assassinate the people. The commodore refus- AND ESPECIALLY OF THE FRENCH NAVY. 43 ing to give up his subordinate, the guards prepared to attack them ; thereupon all drew their swords, but the officer himself, to save his comrades, stepped quickly out and put himself in the hands of his enemies. Meanwhile, the city authorities, as is too usual, made no effective interference. Part of their own forces, the national guards, were foremost in tlic riot. Soon after, De Rions was required to give up another officer. He again refused, and laid orders upon this one not to yield himself as the former had done. " If you want another victim," said he, stepping forward, " here am I ; but if you want one of my officers, you must first pass over me." His manliness caused only irritation. A rush was made, his sword snatched from him, and he himself dragged out of the house amid the hoots and jeers of the mob. The national guards formed two parties, — one to kill, the other to save him. Pricked with bayonets, clubbed with mus- kets, and even ignominiously kicked, this gallant old sea- man, the companion of De Grasse and Suffren, was dragged through the streets amid cries of " Hano^ him ! Cut off his head!" and thrust into the common prison. Bad as all this was, there was yet worse. Any age and any country may suffer from a riot, but De Rions could get from the national authority no admission of liis wrongs. The assembly ordered an investigation, and six weeks later made this declaration : " The National As- sembly, taking a favorable view of the motives which animated M. D 'Albert de Rions, the other naval officers implicated in the affair, the municipal officers^ and the National Guard, declares that there is no ground to blame any one." ^ De Rions told his wrongs in words equally pathetic and dignified : " The volunteers," said he, " have outraged the decrees of the National Assembly in all that concerns the ridits of the man and of the citizen. Let us not here be considered, if you will, as officers, and I myself 1 Moniteur, Jan. 19, 1790, p. 82. 44 THE CONDITION OF THE NAVIES IN 1703, as the head of a respectable corps ; see in us only quiet and well-behaved citizens, and every honest man cannot but be revolted at the unjust and odious treatment we have undergone." ^ His words were not heeded. The Toulon affair was the signal for the spread of mu- tiny among the crews and the breaking-up of the corps of commissioned sea-officers. Similar incidents occurred often and everywhere. The successor of De Rions was also hauled by the mob to prison, where he remained sev- eral days. The second in command to him, a little later, was dragged to a gallows, whence he was only accidentally delivered. In Brest, a captain who had been ordered to command a ship on foreign service was assaulted as an aristocrat by a mob of three thousand people and only saved by being taken to prison, where he remained with nineteen others similarly detained. Orders to release them and prosecute the offenders were issued in vain by the cabinet and the king. " It was evident," says Cheva- lier, " that the naval officers could no longer depend upon the support of local authorities, nor upon that of the government ; they were outlaws." ^ " Thenceforth," says another French naval historian, " if some naval officers were found sanguine enough and patriotic enough to be willing to remain at their post, they but came, on account of their origin and without further inquiry, to the prison and to the scaffold." ^ In the fleets, insubordination soon developed into an- archy. In the spring of 1790 a quarrel arose between Spain and Great Britain, on account of the establishment of trading-posts, by British subjects, at Nootka Sound, on the northwest coast of America. These posts, with the vessels at them, were seized by Spanish cruisers. Upon news of the affair both nations made conflicting claims, 1 Chevalier, j\Iar. Fran, sous la Re'publique, p. 11. 2 Ibid., p. 12. * Gue'rin, Hi.stoire de la Marine, vol. iii. p. 156 (1st ed.). AND ESPECIALLY OF THE FRENCH NAVY. 45 and both began to arm their fleets. Spain claimed the help of France, in virtue of the still existing Coiirbon Family Compact. The king sent a message to the As- sembl}^ which voted to arm forty-live ships-of-thc-Iine. rv Albert de Rions was ordered to command the licet at Brest, where he was coldly received by the city authori- ties. The seamen at the time were discontented at certain new regulations. De Rions, seeing the danger of the sit- uation, recommended to the Assembly some modifications, which it refused to make, yet, at the same time, touk no vigorous steps to ensure order. On the same day that it confirmed its first decree, September 15, 1790, a seaman from a ship called the '' L(iopard," visiting on board another, tlie '' Patriote," used mutinous language and insulted one of the principal officers. The man was drunk. The case being reported to tlie admiral, he ordered him sent on board the flag-ship. This measure, though certainly very mih.l, called forth G:reat indig-nation among the seamen of the " Patriote." De Rions, hearing that mutiny was be- ginning, summoncMl before him a petty officer, a coxswain, who was actively stirring up the crew. He quietly ex- ]»lained to this man that the first offender had not even been punished. Tlie coxswain, being insolent, was sent back, saving, as he went, " that it belonG:ed to the strong- est to make the law ; that he was the strongest, and that the man should not be punished." The next morning the admiral went to the " Patriote," mustered the crew, told them that the first offender had not been punished, but that the conduct of the coxswain had been so bad that he must be put in confinement. The crew kept silent so far, but now broke out into cries of " lie shall not go." De Rions, having tried in vain to re- establish order, took his boat to go ashore and consult with the commandant of the arsenal. As he pulled away, sev- eral seamen cried out to her coxswain, " Upset the boat ! " Meanwhile a riot had broken out in the town against the 46 THE CONDITION OF THE NA VIES IN 1793, second in command at the dockyard, based upon a report that he had said he would soon bring the San Domingo rebels to order, if he were sent against them. This officer, named Marigny, one of a distinguished naval family, only escaped death by being out of his house ; a gallows was put up before it. These various outrages moved the Na- tional Assembly for a moment,, but its positive action went no further than praying the king to order a prosecution according to legal forms, and ordering that the crew of the L(iopard, which ship had been the focus of sedition, should be sent to their homes. D' Albert de Rions, seeing that he could not enforce obedience, asked for and obtained his relief. On the 15th of October this distinguished officer took his final leave of the navy and left the country. He had served at Grenada, at Yorktown, and against Rodney, and when the great Suffren, bending under the burden of cares in his Indian campaign, sought for a second upon whom the charge might fitly fall, he wrote thus to the minister of the day : " If my death, or my health, should leave the command vacant, who would take my place ? . . . I know only one person who has all the qualities that can be desired ; who is very brave, very accomplished, full of ardor and zeal, disinterested, a good seaman. That is D' Albert de Rions, and should he be in America even, send a frigate for him. I shall be good for more if I have him, for he will help me ; and if I die, you will be assured that the service will not suffer. If you had given me him when I asked you, we should now be masters of India." ^ It was a significant, though accidental, coincidence that the approaching Iiumiliation of the French navy should thus be prefigured, both ashore and afloat, both north and south, on the Mediterranean and on the Atlantic, in the person of its most distinguished representative. The inci- dents, however, though conspicuous, were but samples of what was croino^ on evervwhcre. In the West India colo- 1 Troude; Bataillcs 2sav. de la rrauce, vol. ii. p. 201. AND ESPECIALLY OF THE FRENCH NAVY. 47 iiies the revolutionary impulse transmitted from the mother-country had taken on a heat and violence of its own, characteristic alike of the climate and of the undisci- plined temper of the colonists. Commotions amounting to civil war broke out, and both parties tried to command the support of the navy, even at the price of inciting mutiny. Here the Leopard, afterwards the centre of the Brest mutiny, first inhaled tlic germs of disorder. In July, 1790^ the crew revolted, and deprived the captain of tlie command, to assume which, however, only one commissioned othcer was found willing. The commandant of the naval station at the Isle of France, Captain McXaniara, after once es- caping threatened death, was enticed ashore under promise of protection, and then murdered in the streets l;»y the colo- nial troops themselves. In the peninsula of India, Great Britain, being then at war with Tippoo Saib, undertook to search neutral vessels off the coast. The French commo- dore sent a frigate to convoy two merchant ships, and the attempt of the British to search them led to a collision, in which the French vessel hauled down her colors after losing twelve killed and fiftv-six wounded. The sia-nificance, however, of this affair lies in the fact that when the com- mandant of the division announced that another such aggression would be not only resisted, Init followed by re- prisals, the crews of two ships told him they would not fight unless attacked. The otificer, being thus unable to maintain what he thought the honor of the flag demanded, found it necessary to abandon the station. Things abroad thus went on from bad to worse. Ships- of-war arriving in San Domingo, the most magnificent of the French colonies in size and fruitfulness, were at once boarded by the members of the party uppermost in the port. Flattered and seduced, given money and entertain- ment, filled with liquor, the crews were easily persuaded to mutiny. Here and there an officer gifted with tact and popularity, or perhaps an adept in that deft cajoling with 48 THE CONDITION OF THE NAVIES IN 1793, words which so takes with the French people, and of which the emperor afterwards was so great a master, induced rather than ordered his ship's company to do their duty up to a certain point. As usual the tragedy of the situation had a comical side. Three ships, one of the line, anchored in San Domingo. The seamen as usual were worked upon ; but in addition two of the commanders, with several offi- cers, wei'c arrested on shore and, after being threatened with death, were deprived of their commands by the local assembly. The next day the crew of the ship-of-the-line sent ashore to protest against the deprivation, which, they observed, " was null and void, as to them alone (the crew) belonged the right to take cognizance of and judge the motives of their officers."^ An admiral on the United States coast was ordered by the French charge d'affaires to take his ships, two of-the-line and two frigates, and seize the little islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon near Newfoundland. A few days after sailing, the crews said the orders were nonsense and forced the officers to go to France.^ No captain knew how long he would be in his nominal position, or receive the obedience it claimed. " It was not so easy," says a French historian, speaking of the one who most successfully kept his dizzy height, " it was not so easy for Grimouard to leave Port-au-Prince with his flag-ship ; he had to get the consent of a crew which was incessantly told that its own will was the only orders it should follow. In fifteen months Grimouard had not taken a night's rest ; always active, always on deck, reasoning with one, coaxing another, appealing to the honor of this, to the generosity of that, to the patriotism of all, he had kept up on board a quasi-discipline truly phenomenal for the times." ^ Later on, this same man lost his life by the guillotine. Nothing more disastrous to the French colonies 1 Guerin, Hist. Mar., vol. iii. p. 195 (1st ed.). 2 Tronrle, Bat. Nav., vol. 2, p. 320. ' Guerin, vol. iii. p. 213. AXD ESPECIALLY OF THE FBEXCH NAVY. 49 could have happened than this weakening of the military authority, both ashore and atloat, for which the colonists were mainly answerable. The strife of parties, — at first confined to the whites, a very small minority of the popu- lation, — spread to the mixed bloods and the negroes, and a scene of desolation followed over all the islands, finding however its most frightful miseries and excesses in San DoniinQ'O, whence the Avhites were finallv exterminated. Such Avas the condition of anarchy in which the fleet was as early as 1790 and 1791, and to which the whole social order was unmistakably drifting. In the military services, and above all in the navy, where submission to constituted authority is the breath of life, the disappearance of that submission anticipated, but only anticipated, the period of ruin and terror which awaited all France. The weakness which prevented the executive and legislature from enforcing obedience in the fleet was hurrvinir them, along with the whole people, to the abysses of confusion ; the more highly organized and fragile parts of the state first fell to pieces under the shaking of the whole fabric. After what has been said, little surprise will be felt that naval officers in increasing numlx'i's refused to serve and left the country ; but it is a mistake to say on the one hand that they did so from pure motives of opposition to the new order of things, or on the other that they were forced by tlie acts of the first, or Constituent, Assembly. Botli mis- takes have been made. Emigration of the nobility and of princes of the blood began indeed soon after the storming of the Eastille, but large numbers of officers remained at- tending to their duties. The Brest mutiny was fourteen months later, and complaints are not then found of tlie lack of officers. After that event their departure went on with increasing rapidity. The successor of De Rions held his office but one week, and then gave it up. He was followed by a distin- guished officer, De Bougainville. Aided by a temporary VOL. I, — 4 50 THE CONDITION OF THE NAVIES JN 1703, return to sober ideas on the part of the government and the town authorities, this flag-officer for a moment, by strong measures, restored discipline ; Imt mutiny soon re- appeared, and, from the complaints made by him later on, there can be little doubt that he must have asked for his detachment had not the fleet been disarmed in consequence of the ending of the Anglo-Spanish dispute. In the follow- ing March, 1791, Mirabeau died, and with him the hopes which the court party and moderate men had based upon his genius. In April the Assembly passed a bill re-organ- izino' the navy, the terms of which could not have been acceptable to the officers ; although, candidly read, it can- not be considered to have ignored the just claims of those actually in service. In June occurred the king's unsuc- cessful attempt at flight. On the first of July a return made of officers of the navv showed that more than three- fourths of the old corps had disappeared.^ The result was due partly to royalist feeling and prejudice shocked ; partly, perhaps, to distaste for the new oi'ganization : but those familiar with the feelings of officers will attribute it with more likelihood to the utter subversion of discipline, de- structive to their professional pride and personal self- respect, and for which the weakness and military ignorance of the Constituent Assembly are mainly responsible. It is now time to consider the plans upon which that Assembly proposed to re-create the navy, in accordance with the views popular at that day. During the War of the American Revolution, the corps of naval officers had 1)ecn found too small for the needs of the service ; there was a dehciencv of lieutenants and junior officers to take charjre of tlie watches and o;un-divi- sions. A systematic attempt was made to remedy this trouble in the future. By a royal decree, dated January 1, 1786, the navy was re-organized, and two sources of supply for officers were opened. The first was drawn 1 Gueriu, vol. iii. p. 153. AND ESPECIALLY OP THE ERENCH NAVY. 51 wholl}- from tlic nobles, tlic youths composing it having to show satisfactory proofs of nobility before being admitted to the position of elevcs.^ as they were called. These re- ceived a practical and rigorous training especially directed to the navy ; and, so far as education went, there is reason to believe they would have made a most efficient body of men. The second source from which the royal navy was to be supplied with officers was a class called volunteers. Admission to this was also restricted, though extended to a wider circle. There could be borne upon its rolls only the sons of noblemen, or of sub-lieutenants serving either afloat or in the dock-yards, of wholesale merchants, ship- owners, captains, and of people living " nobly." These, though required to pass certain examinations and to have seen certain sea-service, were only admitted to the grade of sub-lieutenant, and could be promoted no further except for distinguished and excei)tional acts.^ Such was the organization with which, in 1701, a popular assembly was about to deal. The invidious privilege by which the naval career, except in the lower ranks, was closed to all but a single, and not specially deserving, class, was of course done away without question. There still re- mained to decide whether the privilege should in the future be confined to a single class, which should deserve it by o'ivinL!; all its life and energies to the career — whether the navy should be recognized as a special calling requiring like others a special training — or whether there was so little difference between it and the merchant service that men could pass from one to the other without injuring either. These two views each found upholders, but the latter pre- vailed even in the first Assembly ; those wlio wished a wholly military service only succeeded in modifying the original scheme presented by the committee. The new organization was established by two successive ^ See Chevalier, Mar. Frau. sous la KepuMique, pp. 20-23. 52 THE CONDITION OF THE NAVIES IN 1703, acts, passed on the 22d and 28th of April, 1790.1 Like the old, it provided two sources of supply ; the one from men spe- cially trained in youth, the otlier from the merchant service. The former began in a class called Aspirants^ three hundred of whom were in pay on board ships of war ; they were not then oiScers, but simply youths between fifteen and twenty learning their business. The lowest grade of officer was the Enseigne ; they were of two kinds, paid 2 and unpaid, the former being actually in the navy. The latter were in the merchant service, but susceptible of employment in the fleet, and, when so engaged, took rank with other enseujnes according to the length of time afloat in national ships. Admission to the grade of paid, or naval, enseigne could be had between eighteen and thirty, by passing the required examination and proving four years service at sea, no distinction being then made in favor of those who had begun as asjyirants or had served in the navy. Those passing for enseigne and wishing to enter the navy had a more severe and more mathematical exam- ination, while, on the other hand, those who returned to the merchant service had to have two years longer service, six in all, one of which on board a ship of war. All cn- seignes twenty-four years old, and only they, could com- mand ships in the foreign trade and certain parts of the home, or coasting, trade. By the age of forty, a definitive choice had to be made between the two services. Up to that time enscignes could pass for lieutenant, and there 1 The decree of April 22 is in the Moniteur of the 23d. That of the 28th is not; but it Avill he found in the " Collection Geucrale des Decrets rendus par I'Ass. Nat." for April, 1791. - The word ciUrcfcnu, here rendered "paid," is difficult to translate. Tlie dictionary of the French Academy explains it to mean an othcer kept on pay, without necessarily being employed. Littre says that an otHcer " nou entre- teiMi " i.s one not having a commission. Tlie word carries the idea of perma- nence. By the decree of April 28, " enseignes noii entretenus " liad nu p;iy nor military authority, except when on military service ; nor could tiiey wear the uniform, excejjt wlien so emphned AND ESPECIALLY OF THE FRENCH NAVY. 53 seems to have been no inducement to follow one branch of the sea service rather than the other, except this : that five-sixths of the lieutenant vacancies at anv one time were to be L^ven to those who had most service as ensciedition to Egypt : '^ Despite the difficulties concerning supplies, they were but a secondary object of my anxiety. To bring seamen into the service fixed it entirelv. I "'ave the commis- sioners of the maritime inscription the most pressing or- ders ; I invited the municipalities, the commissioners of the Directory, the commanders of the army, to second them ; and to assure the success of this general measure, I sent with my des])atches money to pay each seaman raised a month's advance and conduct money. The invet- erate insubordination of seamen in most of the western ports, their pronounced aversion to the service, making almost null the effects of the maritime commissioners, I sent a special officer from the port, firm and energetic," to second their efforts ; " at length after using every lawful means, part of the western seamen have repaired to this port. There are still many stragglers that are being pur- sued unremittingly." ^ The chief causes for this trouble were the hardships and the irregularity of pay, with the consequent sufferings to their families. As late as 1801, Admiral Ganteaume drew a moving picture of the state of the officers and men under his command. " I once more call your attention to the frightful state in which are left the seamen, unpaid for fifteen months, naked or covered with rags, badly fed, discouraged ; in a word, sunk under the weight of the deepest and most humiliating wretchedness. It would be horrible to make them undertake, in this state, a long and ^ Letter of the Onlonnateur de la Marine, Najac; Jurien de la Graviere, Guerres JIar. (4th ed. App.). VOL. I. — 5 66 THE CONDITION OF THE NAVIES IN 1793, doubtless painful winter cruise." ^ Yet it was in this con' dition he had come from Brest to Toulon in mid-winter. At tlie same time the admiral said that the oiiicers, receiv- ing neither pay nor table money, lived in circumstances that lowered them in their own eyes and deprived them of the respect of the crews. It was at about this time that the commander of a corvette, taken by a British frigate^ made in his defence before the usual court-martial the fol- lowing statement : " Three fourths of the crew were sea- sick from the time of leaving Cape Sepet until reaching Mahon. Add to this, ill-will, and a panic terror which seized my crew at the sight of the frigate. Almost all thought it a ship-of-the-line. Add to this again, that they had been wet through by the sea for twenty-four hours without having a change of clothes, as I had only been able to get ten spare suits for the whole ship's company." ^ The quality of the crews, the conditions of their life, and the reason why good seamen kept clear of the service, suf- ficiently appear from these accounts. In the year of Tra- falgar, even, neither bedding nor clothing was regularly issued to the crews.^ Surprise will not be felt, when human beings were thus neglected, that the needs of the inanimate ships were not met. In the early part of the war it is not easy to say whether the frequent accidents were due to bad handling or bad outfit. In 1793, the escape of six sail-of-the-line, under Admiral Van Stabel, from Lord Howe's fleet, is at- tributed to superior sailing qualities of the hulls and the better staying of the masts.'^ Tlie next year, however, the commissioner of the Convention who accompanied the great ocean fleet, Jean Bon Saint-Andre, tried to accoimt for the many accidents which liappened in good weather 1 Chevalier, Mar. Fran, sous le Consulat, p. 47. 2 Ibifl, p. 49. -'' Troude, ]5at. Nav., vol. iii. p. 337. * La Gravil're, Guerres Mar,, p. 51. AND ESPECIALLY OF THE FRENCH NAVV. G7 by charging the past reign witli a deliberate purpose of destroying the French navy. " This neglect," wrote he, '^ like so many more, Ijelonged to the system of ruining the navy by carelessness and neglect of all the parts com- posing it." 1 It was well known that Louis XVI. had given special care to the material and development of the service ; nor is it necessary to seek any deeper cause for the deterioration of such jterisluible materials than the dis- orders of the five years since he practically ceased to r^'ign. From this time complaints multiply, and the indications of the entire want of naval stores cannot be mistaken. To this, rather than to the neglect of the dockvard oBicials in Brest, was due the wretched condition of the licet sent in Decemljer, 1794, by the oljstinacy of the Committee of Public Safety, to make a mid-winter cruise in the Bay of Biscay, the story of whose disasters is elsewhere told.^ The expedition to Ireland in 179G was similarly ill-pre- pared ; and indeed, with the Bi'itish prei)onderance at sea hampering trade, the eml)arrassment could scarcely fail to grow greater. S})ars carried away, rigging parted, sails tore. Some ships had no spare sails. This, too, was a mid-winter expedition, the squadron having sailed in De- cember. In 1708 the preparation of Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition at Toulon met with the greatest dilTiculty. The naval commissioner showed much zeal and activity, and was fearless in taking upon himself responsibility ; but the fleet sailed for an unknown destinati(jn almost without spare spars and rigging, and three of the thirteen were not fit for sea. Two had been condemned the vear before, and on one they did not dare to put her regular Ijattery. In January, 1801, a squadron of seven sail-of-tlie-line left Brest under Admiral Ganteaume, having the all-important mission of carrving a reinforcement of five thousand troops to the army in Egypt. Becoming discouraged, Avhether rightly or wrongly, after entering the Mediterra- 1 Chevalier, Rep., p 132 ' See Chapter VI 68 THE CONDITION OF THE NAVIES IN 1793, nean, the admiral bore np for Toulon, where he anchored after being at sea twenty-six days. Here is his report of his fleet during and after this short cruise : " The ' Indivisi- ble ' had lost two topmasts and had no spare one left. The trestle-trees of the mainmast ^vere sprung and could not support the new topmast. The ' Desaix ' had sprung her bowsprit. The ' Constitution ' and the ' Jean-Bart ' were in the same condition as the ' Indivisible,' neither having a spare main-topmast after carrying away the others. Both the ' Formidable ' and the ' Indomptable,' on the night we got under way, had an anchor break adrift. They had to cut the cable ; but both had their sides stove in at the water-line, and could not be repaired at sea. Finally, all the ships, without exception, were short of rope to a dis- quieting extent, not having had, on leaving Brest, a single spare coil ; and the rigging in place was all bad, and in a state to risk every moment the speed and safety of the ships." ^ It will be unnecessary to quote more of these mishaps, in which lack of skill and bad equipment each bore its part ; nor need we try to disentangle the one cause from the other. Enough has now been said to show the general state of the French navy in the last ten years of the eighteenth century. The time and space thus used have not been wasted, for these conditions, which continued under the empire, were as surely the chief cause of the continuous and overwhelming overthrow of that navy, as the ruin of the French and Spanish sea-power, culminating at Trafal- gar, was a principal factor in the final result sealed at Waterloo. Great Britain will be seen to enter the war aUied with many of the nations of Europe against Prance. One by one the allies drop away, until the island kingdom, with two-fifths the population of France and a disaffected Ireland, stands alone face to face with the mighty onset of the Revolution. Again and again she knits the coalitions, 1 Chevalier, Mar. Fran, sous le Consulate p. 43. AND ESPECIALLY OF THE FREXCH JSAVY. 69 which arc as often cut asunder by the victorious sword of the French army. Still she stands alone on the defensive, until the destruction of the comljined fleets at Trafalgar, and the ascendency of her own navy, due to th.e inimenso physical loss and yet more to the moral annihilation of that of the enemy, enable her to assume the offensive in the peninsula after the Spanish uprising, — an offensive based absolutely upon her control of the sea. Her pres- ence in Portugal and Spain keeps festering that S{)anish ulcer which drained the strength of Napoleon's em})ire. As often before, France, contending with Germany, had Spain again upon her back. There still remains to consider Innefiy the state of the other navies which l^ore a part in the great struggle ; and after that, the strategic conditions of the sea war, in its lenoi'th and breadth, at the time it beaan. The British navy was far from being in perfect condi- tion ; and it had no such administrative prescri})tion upon which to fall back as France alwavs had in the reu-ulations and practice of Colbert and his son. In the admiralty and the dockyards, at home and abroad, there was confusion and waste, if not fraud. As is usual in representative gov^ ernments, the military establishments had drooped during ten years of peace. But, althougii administration lacked system, and agents were neglectful or dishonest, the navy itself, though costing more than it should, remained vig- orous ; the possessor of actual, and yet more of reserved, strength in the genius and pursuits of the people, — in a continuous tradition, which struck its roots far back in a great i)ast, — and a))Ove all, in a body of officers, veterans of the last, and some of yet earlier wars, still in the prime of life for the purposes of command, and steeped to tlie core in those professional habits and feelings which, when so found in the chief, transmit themselves quickly to the juniors. As the eye of the student familiar with naval history glances down the lists of admirals and captains 70 THE COXDITION OF THE NAVIES IN 179S, in 1793, it recognizes at once the names of those who fought under Keppcl, Rodney, and Howe, linked with those Arho were yet to win fame as the companions of Hood, Jervis, Nelson, and Collingwood. To this corps of officers is to be added, doubtless, a large number of trained seamen, who, by choice, remained in the navy under the reduced peace complement ; a nu- cleus round which could be rapidly gathered and organized all the sea-faring population fit for active service. The strength of C4reat Britain, however, lay in her great body of merchant seamen ; and the absence of so many of these on distant voyages was always a source of embarrassment when manning a fleet in the beginning of a war. The naval service was also generally unpopular with the sailor ; to whom, as to his officer, the rigid yoke of discipline was hard to bear until the neck was used to it. Hence, in the lack of any system similar to the French maritime in- scription, Great Britain resorted to the press ; a method wliich, though legally authorized, was stained in execution by a lawlessness and violence strange in a peoi)le that so loved both law and freedom. Even so, with both press- gang and free enlistment, the navy, as a whole, was always shorthanded in a great war, so that men of all nations were received and welcomed; much very bad native ma- terial was also accepted. " Consider," wrote Collingwood, " with such a fleet as we have now, how large a proportion of the crews of the ships are miscreants of every descrip- tion, and capable of every crime. And when those pre- dominate what evils may we not dread from the demoniac councils and influence of such a mass of mischief." ^ The condition of the seamen on board left much to be desired. The pay had not been increased since the days of Charles H., although the prices of all the necessaries of life had risen thirty per cent. The exigencies of the 1 Colliiigwoud's Correspon deuce, p. 48. (First Americau from fourth Loudon edition.) AND ESPECIALLY OF THE FRENCH NAVY. 71 service, combined with the fear of desertion, led to very close enforced confinement to the ship, even in home ports ; men were long unable to see their families. The discipline, depending upon the cliaracter of the captain, too little defined and limited by law, varied greatly in different ships ; while some were disorganized by undue leniencv, in others punishment was harsh and tvrannical. On the other hand, there was a large and growing class of officers, both among the sterner and the laxcr disciplina- rians, who looked upon the health and well-ljeing of tbe crew as tbe first of their duties and interests ; and better sanitary results have perhaps never been reached, certainly never in proportion to the science of the day, than under Jervis, Xelson, Collingwood, and their contemporaries, in tleets engaged in the hardest, most continuous ser\'icc, under conditions of munotonv and isolation o^eneralh^ un- favorable to health. Nelson, during a cruise in which be passed two years without leaving his ship even for another, often speaks with pride, almost Avith exultation, of tbe health of his crews. After his pursuit of Yilleneuve's fleet to the West Indies, he writes : "• We have lost neither officer nor man l)y sickness since we left the Mediterra- nean," a period of ten weeks. The number of men in his ships must have been near seven thousand. Both French and Spaniards of the fleet he pursued were very sickly. " They landed a thousand sick at jMartinique, and buried full that number durino; their stav." ^ Collinu'wood writes: " I have not let go an anchor for fifteen months, and on the first day of the year had not a sick-list in the ship — not one man." ^ And again a year later : '' Yet, with all this sea-work, never getting fresh beef nor a vegetable, I have not one sick man in my ship. Tell that to Doctor ." " His flag-ship had usually eight hundred men ; was, on one occasion, more than a year and a half without 1 Nelson's Dispatches, vol. vi. p. 480. 2 Colliugwuud's (."urrespiiDileuce, ])p. 205, 266. 72 THE CONDITION OF THE NA VIES IN 1793, going into port, and during tlie whole of that time never had more than six, and generally only four, on her sick- list." 1 Such results show beyond dispute that the crews were well clothed, well fed, and well cared for. Amid ship's companies of such mixed character, and suffering during the early years of the war from real and severe grievances, it was to he expected that acts of mutiny should occur. Such there were, rivalling, if not surpass- ing, in extent, those which have been told of tlie French navy. They also received intelligent guidance at the hands of a class of men, of higher educational acquire- ments than the average seaman, who, through drunken- ness, crime, or simple good-for-nothingness, had found their way on board ship. The feature which distin- guished these revolts from those of the French was the spirit of reasonableness and respect for law which at the first marked their proceedings ; and whicli showed how deeply the English feeling for law, duty and discipline, liad taken hold of the naval seamen. Their complaints, unheeded when made submissively, were at once allowed t(j ])Q fair when mutiny drew attention to them. The forms of discipline were maintained by men who refused to go to sea before tlieir demands were allowed, unless " the enemy's fleet should put to sea ; " ^ and respect to officers was enjoined, though some who were obnoxious for severity wore sent ashore. One very signal instance is given of military sympathy with obedience to orders, though at their own expense. A lieutenant, having shot one of several mutineers, was seized by the others, who made ready to hang him, and he stood actually under the yard-arm with the halter round his neck ; but upon the admiral saying he himself was responsible, having given orders to the officer in accordance with his own from the Admiralty, the seamen stopped, asked to see the orders, * ColliDijwood's C'liTPSpoiKlcnce, p. 208. 2 Breiitoa's Naval History, vol. i. p. 415. (Ed. 182:3.) AND ESPECIALLY OF THE FREXCII NAVY. To and, having satisfied themselves of their terms, abandoned their purpose. Captain Brenton, the naval historian, was watch-officer on board a ship that for many days was in the hands of mutineers. He savs, '' The seamen, Q'enerallv s])oakinod that, as his fleet was sicklv nineteen hundred men, he was coino- to Cartagena. The captain of the frigate said ' it was no wonder they were sickly for they had hccn si.vtij chn/s at sea.' This speech appeared to us ridiculous, for, from the circumstance of our having been longer than that time at 1 Guerres IMar., vol. i ]>. KU (note). - Xcls. Disj) i. 300-311. AND ESPECIALLY OF THE FRENCH NAVY. 77 sea do wc attribute our getting healthy. It has stamped with me the measure of their nautical abilities ; long may they remain in their present state." ^ In 17'Jo, when Spain had made peace with France, he wa*ote, '* I know the French long since offered Spain peace for fourteen ships- of-the-line fully stored. I take for granted not manned, as that would be the readiest way to lose them again." '• Their tleet is ill-manned and w^orse ofticered, I believe ; and besides they are slow." " From the event of Spain making jteace much may be looked for, — perhaps a war with that country ; if so, their lieet (if no better than when our allies) will ]je soon done for." "^ Captain Jahleel Erenton, a distinguished British officer of that day, being in Cadiz on duty before the war, sought and obtained permission to return to England in a Spanish ship-of-the-linc, the " St. Elmo," with the express object of seeing the system of their service. He says, " This ship had been selected as one in the best state of discipline in the Spanish navy to be sent to England. She was com- manded by Don Lorenzo Goycoclica, a gallant seaman who had commanded one of the junto ships destroyed before Gibraltar in 1782. I had, during this voyage, an oppor- tunity of appreciating Spanish management at sea. When the ship was brought under double-reefed topsails, it was considered superfluous to lay the cloth for dinner ; I w^as told by the captain that not one officer would be able to sit at table, all being sea-sick, but that he had ordered din- ner to be got ready in his own cabin for himself and me. It was the custom in the Spanish navy for the captain and officers to mess together in the ward-room. Wo had thenceforth a very comfortable meal together whenever the weather prevented a general meeting. As the safe arrival of this ship was deemed of great importance (she carried the Nootka Sound indemnity money), she had on board an English pilot to enable her to approach the coast 1 Nels. Disp., i. p. 312. 2 Hjij _ [i pp. 70, 77^ 241. 78 THE CONDITION OF THE NAVIES IN 1793, of England in safety. A few nights before our arrival at Falmouth, the ship, having whole sails and topping sails, was taken aback in a heavy squall from the northeast, and I ^vas awoke by the English pilot knocking at my cabin door, calling out, ' Mr. Brenton ! Mr. Brenton ! rouse out, sir ; here is the ship running away with these Span- iards ! ' When I got on deck 1 found this literally the case. She was 'running away' at the rate of twelve knots, and everything in confusion ; she was indeed, to use the ludicrous expression of a naval captain ' all adrift, like a French post-chaise.' It required some houi's to get things to rights." ^ Napoleon, in 1805, ordered Admiral Yilleneuve to count two Spanish ships as equal to one French ; and the latter certainly were not equal, ship for ship, to the British. It is only fair to add that he said of the Spanish crews, speaking of Calder's action, that tlicy fought like lions. Holland, first the ally and afterwards the enemy of Great Britain in the war, had fortj'-nine shi^Ds-of-the-line, but, owing to the shoalness of her waters, they were mostly of light burden ; many would not have found a place in a British line-of-battle. The frigates were also of small force. The condition of tlie ships being, besides, bad, the Dutch navy was not an important factor on either side.^ Portugal and Naples had, the one six, the other four, ships-of-the-line, which, during the early years of the war, offered a respectable support to the British Mediterranean fleet ; ^ but the advance of the Frencli under Bonaparte into the two peninsulas reduced these States to neutrality before the end of the century. The fleets of the Baltic powers and of Turkey played Jio part in the war which would, at this time, require a par« ticular consideration of their strength. ^ Life of Sir Jahleel Brenton. 2 James' Nav. Hist., vol, i. p. 54. (Ed. 1878). CHAPTER III. The General Political and Strategic Conditions, and the Events of 179;3. THE declaration of war against Great Britain was fol- lowed, on the part of the National Convention, Ijy an equally formal pronouncement against Spain, on the 7th of March, 1793. Thus was completed the chain of ene- mies which, except on the mountain frontier of Switzer- land, surrounded the French republic by land and sea. It is necessary to summarize the political and military condition, to take account of the strategic situation at tliis moment when general hostilities were opening, in order to follow intelligently the historical narrative of their course, and to appreciate critically the action of the na- tions engaged, botli separately and, also, — in the case of the allies, — regarded as a combined whole. The enemies of France were organized governments, with constitutions of varying strength and efficiency, liut all, except that of Great Britain, were part of an order of things that was decaying and ready to vanish away. Tliey belonged to, and throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars were hampered by, a past whose tradi- tions of government, of social order, and of military ad- ministration, were violently antagonized by the measures into which France had been led hy pushing to extremes the philosophical principles of the eighteenth century. But while thus at one in abhorring, as rulers, a movement whose contagion they feared, they were not otherwise in harmony. Tiie two most powerful on the continent, Aus- 80 THE GENERAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC tria and Prussia, had alternately, in a not remote past, sided with France as her ally ; each in turn had sustained open and prolonged hostilities with the other, and they were still jealous rivals for preponderance in Germany. They entered the present war as formal allies ; but were unable, from mutual distrust and their military traditions, to act in concert, or to take advantage of the disorganized condition into which France had fallen, and from which the despotism of the Convention had not yet raised her. Divergent lines of operations were imposed upon them, not by military expediency, but by the want of any unifying motive which could overcome their divergent ambitions. The smaller States of Germany followed the two great powers, seeking each from day to day its own safety and its own advantage in the troubled times through which Europe was passing. Several of them had associations with France as a powerful neighbor, who in the past had supported them against the overbearing pretensions of the great German monarchies. With the Convention and its social levelling they could have no sympathy, but when a settled government succeeded the throes of the Revolution the old political bias asserted itself against the more recent social prejudice, and these weaker bodies again fell natu- rally under French control. Spain under good government has, and at that crisis still more had, a military situation singularly fitted to give her weight in the councils of Europe. Compact and sym- metrical in shape, with an extensive seaboard not deficient in good harbors, her physical conformation and remote- ness from the rest of the Continent combined to indicate that her true strength was to be found in a powerful navy, for which also her vast colonial system imperiously called. Her maritime advantages were indeed diminished by the jog which Portugal takes out of her territory and coast line, and by the loss of Gibraltar. Lisbon, in the hands of an enemy, interposes between the arsenals of Ferrol and CONDiriOXS, AXD THE EVENTS OF 1103. 81 Cadiz, as Gibraltar does between the latter and Cartagena. But there was sreat comiiensation in the extent of her territory, in her peninsnhir formation, and in the difficult character of her only continental frontier, the Pyrenees. Her i)Osition is defensivelv verv stroni;' ; and whenever events make France the centre of European interest, as they did in 1793, and as the genius of that extraordinary country continually tends to make her, the external action of Spain becomes doubly interesting. So far as natural advantages go, her military situation at the opening of the French revolution may be defined by saying that she con- trolled the Mediterranean, and menaced the flank and rear of France hy land. Despite Gibraltar, her action was to determine whether the British navy should or shoidd m^t enter the Mediterranean — whether the wheat of Barljary and Sicily should reach the hungry people of southern France — whether the French fleet should leave Toulon — whether the French army could advance against the Ger- mans and Piedmont, feeling secure as to the country be- hind it, then seething with revolt. The political condition of Italy, divided like Germany into many petty States, but unlike Germany in having no ]towerful centres around which to gather, left to Spain, potentially, the control of the Mediterranean. These advantages were all thrown away by bad government and inelhcient military institutions. The navy of Spain was the laughing-stock of Europe ; her finances depended upon the colonies, and conse- quently upon control of the sea, which she had not ; while, between an embarrassed treasury and poor military administration, her army, though at first under res]>ectable leadership, made little impression upon the yet unorgan- ized levies of France, and an abject peace soon closed an ignominious war. The path of Great Britain, as soon as she had deter- mined to enter the war, was comparatively clear, being indicated alike by the character of her military strength VOL. I. — 6 82 THE GENERAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC and Ijy her history during the past century. Since the days of Charles IT. she had been at times the ally, at times the enemy, of Austria, of Prussia, and of Holland ; she had, in her frequent wars, found Spain at times neutral, at times hostile, in neither case a very powerful factor ; but, under all circumstances, France had been her enemy, sometimes secret, usually open. Steeped in this traditional hostility, both the British government and nation with single eye fastened upon France as the great danger, and were not diverted from this attitude of concentrated pur- pose by any jealousy of the more powerful among their allies. Spain alone might have been an unwelcome rival, as well as a powerful support, upon the watery plain which Great Britain claimed as her own dominion. Spanish ships of war were numerous ; but the admiralty soon saw that the Spanish navy, from the poor quality of its officers and men, could not seriously menace British preponder- ance upon the ocean, although at times it might be an awkward embarrassment, and even more so as a suspi- cious ally than as an open foe. The co-operation of tlie two navies, however, at the opening of the war effectually secured for the time the control of the Mediterranean and of the approaches to southern France. Russia, although declaring openly against the French Revolution, took no active part in the early military opera- tions, except by a convention made with Great Britain on the 25th of March, 1793, to interdict the trade of France with tlie Baltic in grain and naval stores, as a means of forcing her to peace. Russia was then busily engaged with her projects against Poland, and a few days later, on the 9th of April, 1793, an imperial ukase was issued in- corporating parts of that kingdom with the empire. This, with the Prussian decree of March 25, consummated the second partition of Poland, — the result of a series of ag- gressions by the two powers that had extended over the past two years, and the intermediate step to the final par- tition in 1795. CONDITIONS, AND THE EVENTS OF 1793. 83 The smaller European States trimmed their course as hest they could in the great convulsion which, far Ix'vond most wars, left little room for neutrality. Sweden and Denmark strove hard to keep out of the turmoil and to retain the commercial advantao-es reaiied Ijv neutral tlaa's in maritime wars. Their distance from the scene of the earlier strifes, and the peninsular position of Sweden, en- abled them long to avoid actual hostilities ; but the con- currence of Russia with Great Ijritain, in the latter's traditional unwillingness to concede neutral claims, de- prived the smaller Baltic powers of the force necessary to maintain their contentions. Holland, as of old, was divided between French and British parties ; l}ut the latter, under the headship of the Plouse of Orange, in 1793, held the reins of government and directed the policy of the State in accordance with the treaty of defensive alliance made with Great Britain in 1788. The ultimate policy of the United Provinces depended upon the fortune of the war. As France or her enemies triumphed, so vrould tlie party in the State favorable to the victor be retained in, or restored to, power. Neutrality was impossible to an open continental country, lying so near such a great con- flagration ; but, not to speak of the immediate dangers threatened by the attitude of the French Convention and its decrees of November 19 and Deceni]>er 15, Holland, with her vast colonial system, had more to fear from the navy of Great Britain, which had no rival, than from the armies of France M'hich, in 1793, were confronted l)y the most powerful military States in Europe. At this time the United Provinces held, besides Java and other possessions in the far East, various colonies in the West Indies and South America, the island of Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope. The last two alone Great Britain has finally retained ; but all of them, as years went by, passed by conquest into her hands after Holland, in 1795, became the dependent of France. 84: THE GENERAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC Portugal retained her traditional alliance with Great Britain, and so became a point of supreme importance when the secession of Spain to France compelled the Brit- ish navy to leave the Mediterranean. The formal con- nection between the two countries was for a short time severed by the genius and power of Napoleon ; but, at the uprising of Spain in 1808, the old sentiment, unbroken, resumed its sway, and Portugal became the base of the British army, as in an earlier day she had been the secure liaven of the British fleet. In northern Italy the extent of Piedmont and its con- tiguity to the Austrian duchies of JNIilan and Mantua gave the means of forming a powerful focus of resistance to their common enemy, the French republic, around which the smaller Italian States might feel- secure to rally ; but the sluggishness and jealousies of tlie two governments prevented the vigorous, combined action which alone could cope with the energy impressed by the Convention upon its men. In the centre of the peninsula, the Pope inevitably threw his immense spiritual influence, as well as such temporal power as he could exercise, against the revolution ; while, in the south, the Bourbon kingdom of the Two Sicilies, with its capital at Naples, was chiefly controlled by the queen, herself a sister of Marie Antoi- nette. The militarv stren^'th of this kinaxlom, like that of Spain, was rendered contemptible by miserable admin- istration, and was further neutralized bv its remoteness from the seats of actual war ; but the bias of the monarchy was undoubted. Like all weak and corrupt governments, it shuffled and equivocated under pressure and was false when the pressure was removed ; but, so far as it could, it favored the allied cause and was a useful base to the British fleet in the Mediterranean. In the eastern Mediterranean, the Turkish empire was not then the element of reco2:nized critical hazard to the whole European system which it has since become ; but its CONDITIONS, AND THE EVENTS OF 1703. 85 territorial limits were far wider than they now are. Ex- tending on the north to the Save and the Danulje, Turkey lield also beyond the river Wallachia and Moldavia to the banks of the Dniester, and, on the south, the present king- dom of Greece. The islands of tlie Archipelago, with Crete and Cyprus, also belonged to her. Syria and Egypt like- wise acknowledged the authority of the Porte, but in liuth the submission yielded was onlv nominal ; the former, under Djezzar Pasha, and the latter, under the Mame- lukes, were practically independent countries. At the out- break of the French Rcvohition Turkey had sunk to the lowest pitch of disorganization and impotence ; and her rulers, keenly feeling her condition and lier danger from Russia, sought to avoid entanglement in the trouljles of western Europe, from which their great enemy kept itself free. In this they were successful until Eonaparte, by his attack upon Egypt, forced them from their security and aroused Great Britain and Europe to their common inter- est in the East. The islands of the western Jlediterranean had not only the importance common to all members of that geograi)hi- cal family in naval wars, nor vet only that due to their *■' ■' *.■ t' intrinsic values. In so narrow a sheet of water each i>os- sessed an added strategic weiciht due to its nearness, either to some part of the mainland or to some one of the mari- time routes traversing the sea. Tlie influence thus ex- erted would fall naturally into the hands of Ihe nation which, l»y controlling the water, controlled the communi- cations of the island ; but tliis statement, thoudi generally true, is su1)ject to limitations. The narrowness of the belts of water, or, to use the military ])hrase, the shortness of the communications from land to land, made evasion comparatively easy. No navy, however powerful, can with certainty stop an intercourse requiring only a night's run, and which, therefore, can be carried on by very many small vessels, instead of having to be concentrated into S6 THE GENERAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC a few large ones ; and this was doubly true in the days of sail, when the smaller could have recourse to the oar while the larger lay becalmed. Thus the British found it impossible to prevent French partisans from passing into Corsica in 1796, when the victories of Bonaparte had placed the French army in Leghorn ; and at a later day the emperor succeeded, though with infinite trouble, in sending re-enforcements and supplies from southern Italy to his garrison in Corfu, upon which his far-reaching ge- nius hoped, in a distant future, to base a yet further exten- sion of power in the East. These instances, however, were but the exception, and on the small scale demanded by the other conditions ; for the garrison of Corfu was few in number, and the French found the Corsicans friendly. As the communications lengthened, the influence of Sea-Power asserted itself. It was found impossible to relieve Malta, or even to extricate the large vessels blockaded there ; and the French army in Egypt remained isolated until forced to surrender, despite the efforts, the uncontrolled power, and the strong personal interest of Bonaparte in the success of an occupation for which he was primarily responsible. So also the narrow strip which separates Sicily from Italy withstood the French arms ; not because it was impossible to send many detachments across, but because, to support them in a hostile country, with such insecure communications, was an undertaking more haz- ardous than was justified by the possible advantages. The political distribution in 1793 of the islands of the western Mediterranean was as follows. The most eastern, known as the Ionian islands, extending southward from the entrance of the Adriatic along the coast of Greece, from Corfu to Cerigo, were in possession of Venice. When the ancient republic fell before the policy of Bonaparte, in 1797, the islands p»assed to France and began that circula- tion from owner to owner which ended in 1863 with their union to Greece. Sicily formed part of the kingdom of COXDITIOXS, AND IRE EVENTS OF 1793. 87 the Two Sicilies. It became tlie refiipe of that monarchy from the arms of France, and, by its fertility and the use of its ports, was a resource to Great Britain throughout the Napoleonic period. Malta was still in the hands of the Knights of St. John. Of immense military importance, from its g-eographical ])Osition and intrinsic streno'th, its transfer, through the medium of France, into the hands of the greatest of nayal powers was due to Bonaparte. It is, perhaps, the greatest of Mediterranean strategic posi- tions, Egypt being rather interoceanic than Mediterra- nean ; but, being of scant resources, its utility is measured by the power of the fleet which it subseryes. Its fate when in the hands of France, the history of Port Mahon in the hands of Great Britain, naj^, eyen the glorious and successful resistance of Gibraltar, giye warning that the fleet depends less upon Malta than Malta upon the fleet. Sardinia gave its name to tlie kingdom of which Pied- mont, forming the Italian frontier of France, was the ac- tual seat, and Turin the capital. Amid the conyulsions of the period, the royal family, driven from the mainland, found an obscure refuge in this large but backward island. France could nottoucliit; Great Britain needed nothing but the hospitality of its harbors. In ]\raddalena Bay, at its northern extremity, Nelson found an anchorage stra- tegically well-placed for watching the Toulon fleet, and possessing that great desideratum for a naval position, two exits, one or other of which was available in any wind. The Balearic islands were in the hands of Spain. The maritime importance of the other members of the group was dwarfed by that of Minorca, which contained the harbor, exceptionally good for the Mediterranean, of Port Mahon. Like Malta, thoudi not to the same extent, the fate of Port Mahon depends ultimately upon the sea. The British took possession of the island in 1798, but restored it at the peace of Amiens. In the later hos- tilities with Spain, from 1804 to 1808, they appear not 8S THE GENERAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC to have coveted it. Maddalena Bay, though a less agreea- hie and convenient anchoracre than Malion, is far better fitted for prompt military movement, the prime requisite, in the clear and sound judgment of Nelson. Of the greater islands there remains to give account only of Corsica. This was a recent acquisition of France, received from Genoa in 1709, somewhat contrary to the wish of the people, who would have ])referred indepen- dence. They were certainly not yet assimilated to the French, and there existed among tliem a party tradition- ally well-inclined to Great Britain. The preponderance of this or of the other national preference would be decisive of the final political connection ; for if the British navy did control the surrounding sea, it was unable, as before said, entirely to isolate the island and so to compel an unwilling submission. On the other hand, France could not intro- duce any considerable body of troops, in the face of the hostile sliips; and her standard, if raised, would depend for support upon the natives. In 1793, there was at the head of affairs the old leader of the struggle for indepen- dence, Paoli, who had passed many years in exile in Eng- land and had been recalled to the island by the National Assembly ; but the excesses of the later days had shaken his allegiance to France, and the commissioners sent by the Convention into Corsica made themselves obnoxious to him and to the people. Denounced by the republicans of Toulon, Paoli was summoned to tlie bar of the Convention in April, 1793. The Revolutionary Tril)unal had then been constituted, the Reign of Terror was l^egun ; and Paoli, instead of complying, summoned the deputies from all the cities and communes of Corsica. These met in May and sustained him in his opposition ; the revolt spread through the island, and the Commissioners with their handful of adherents were shut up in a few of the coast towns. Amid these surroundings stood, in the spring of 1793, the terrible and awe-inspiring figure of the French Revo- CONDITIONS, AND THE EVENTS OF 1703. 89 lution. Tiie Corsican revolt ao-ainst the Convention re- fleeted but faintly the passions agitating that body itself, and which were rapidly dividing all France into hostile camps. The four months following the execution of the king were one long strife between the party of the Gironde and the Jacobins ; but the revolutionary fur}^ demanded an expression more vigorous and more concentrated than could be had from a contest of parties in a popular as- sembly. The Girondists, men of lofty sentiment rather than of energetic action, steadily lost ground in the capi- tal and in the legislative body, though retaining the alle- giance of the provinces, with which they were identified. Embittered words and feelings took material shape in acts as violent as themselves. On the 9th of March was de- creed the Revolutionary Trilnmal, the great instrument of the Terror, from whose decisions there was no appeal. On the loth of the same month, La Vendee rose for its long and bloody struggle in the royal cause. On the 18th, the Army of the North, which only four weeks before had invaded Holland, was signally defeated at Neerwinden, and its general, Dumouriez, the victor of Yalmy and Jemappcs, the most successful leader the war had yet produced, was forced to retreat upon France. On the 30th, he evacuated the Austrian Netherlands, the prize of the last campaign, and his army took positions within the frontiers, upon which the enemy advanced. On the 1st of A})ril, Dumouriez, long since violently dissatisfied with the course of the Convention, arrested the four commis- sioners and the minister of war that had been sent to his headquarters. The next day he delivered them to the Austrians ; and on the 4th, finding that the blind attach- ment of his army could no longer be depended upon, he completed his treason by flying to the enemy. While disorganization, treason, and fear were spreading throughout France, from the cai>ital to the frontiers, and seemed about to culminate in universal anarchy, an im- 90 THE GENERAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC portant measure was adopted, destined eventually to re- store discipline and order, though at the expense of much suffering. On the 6th of April the Committee of Public Safety was reconstituted. Composed previously of twenty- five members who met in open session, it was now reduced to nine, a more manageable body, who sat in secret. To it was given authority over the ministers, and it was em- powered to take all measures necessary for the general defence. The republic was thus provided with an efficient, though despotic, executive power which it had before lacked. The creature of the Convention, it was destined soon to become its master ; being, as a French historian has aptly termed it, " a dictatorship with nine heads." Time was still needed for the new authority to make itself felt, and the strife between the parties waxed more and more bitter. On the 15th of April the city of Lyon demanded permission to investigate the conduct of the municipality appointed by the Jacobin commissioners. The request, being denied, became the signal for civil war. On the 26th of May the " sections " of the city rose against the mayor. At the same time the scenes in Paris and in the Convention were becoming more and more tumultuous, and on the 31st the sections of the capi- tal also rose, but against the Girondists. After two days of strife in the streets and in the legislative halls, the Con- vention decreed the arrest, at their own houses, of thirty- two members of the party. Thus, on the 2d of June, 1793, fell the Girondists, but their fall was followed by the revolt of their pai'tisans throughout France. Marseille, Toulon, Bordeaux and Lyon all declared against the Con- vention ; and movements in the same direction were mani- fested in Normandy and Brittany. In the western prov- inces, however, the attempts at resistance were chilled among the republicans by the proximity of the royalist insurrection in La Vend(^e. They were forced to reflect that armed opposition to the Convention, even as muti- COXDITIONS, AND THE EVEXTS OF 1703. 91 lated by the events of June 2, was a virtual alliance with roj'alism. In Bordeaux, likewise, the movement, though prolonged for some weeks, did not take shape in vigorous action. Words, Jiot arms, were the weapons used ; and the Girondist representatives were forced to fly the very department from which they took their name. Tn the east and south conditions were far more threat- eninii:. The risinsr of the sections in Lvon had been followed by fighting in the streets on tlie 29th of May, and the triumphant party, after the events of June 2, re- fused to acknowledge the Convention. The latter sought to gain over the city peaceably ; but its overtures were rejected, a departmental army was formed, and the lead- ing member of the Jacoljin party formally tried and exe- cuted. The Lyonncse also stopped supplies being carried to the Army of the Alps. On the 12th of July a decree was issued to reduce the place by force. The troops of the Convention appeared before it in the latter part of the month ; but resistance was firm and well organized, and the siege dragged, while at the same time the departments of the south in general rejected the authority of the cen- tral government. The two seaboard cities, Marseille and Toulon, entered into correspondence with Lord Hood, com- manding the British fleet, who arrived off the coast of Provence in the middle of August, 1793. The party of the Convention, favored by that want of vigor whicli cliar- acterized most of the measures of their opponents, got possession of Marseille before the treason was consum- mated ; but in Toulon, which had long suffered from the violence of a Jacobin municipality, the reaction swung to the opposite extreme. A movement, beginning in honest disgust with the proceedings in Paris and with the conduct of the dominant party in their own city, insensiljly carried its promoters further than they had intended ; until a point was reached from which, before the savage spirit of the capital, it became dangerous to recede. Long identi- 92 THE GENERAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ficd with the royal navy, as one of the cliief arsenals of the kingdom, there could not but exist among a large class a feeling of loyalty to the monarchy. Submissive to the course of events so long as France had a show of govern- ment, now, in the dissolution of civil order, it seemed allowable to choose their own path. With such dispositions, a decree of the Convention declaring the city outlawed enabled the royalists to guide the movement in the direction they desired. The lead- ing naval officers do not appear to have co-operated will- ingly with the advances made to the British admiral ; but for years they had seen their authority undermined by the course of the national legislature, and had be- come accustomed to yield to the popular control of the moment. The news of the approach of the Conventional army, accompanied by the rush into tlie place of terror- stricken fugitives from Marseille, precipitated Toulon into the arms of Great Britain. The sections declared that the city adopted the monarchical government as organized by the Constituent Assembly of 1789 ; pro- claimed Louis XYIL king ; ordered the disarmament of the French fleet in the port, and placed in the hands of the British admiral the works commandino^ the bar- Ijor. Lord Hood undertook that the forts and ships should be restored unharmed to France, when peace was made. On the 27th, the British and Spanish fleets an- chored in the outer harbor of Toulon, and the city ran up the white flag of the Bourbons. There were in the port at the time of its delivery to the British admiral thirty shij;)S-of-the-line of seventy -four guns and upward, being rather more than one third the line-of-battle force of the French navy. Of these, seventeen were in the outer har- bor ready for sea. There were, besides, twenty-odd frig- ates or smaller vessels. While one of the principal naval arsenals of France, and the only one she possessed on the Mediterranean, was tluis CONDITIONS, AND THE EVENTS OF 1703. 93 passing into the hands of the enemy, disasters were ac- cumulating on her eastern borders. On the 12th of July, the fortified town of Cond^, on the Belgian frontier, sur- rendered. This was followed on the 2Sth by the capitula- tion of the first-class fortress of Valenciennes in the same locality, after six weeks of open trenches. These two prizes fell to the allied Austrians, British and Dutch, and their submission was followed by an advance of the com- bined armies and retreat of the French. Shortly before, on the 22d of July, Mayeuce, a position of the utmost importance on the Rhine, had yielded to the Prussians ; and here also the enemy advanced into the Vosges moun- tains and toward the upper Rhine, the French receding gradually before them. The great inland city of Lyon was at the same time holding out against the central govern- ment with a firmness which as yet needed not the support of despair. In its resistance, and in the scarce smoth- ered discontent of the southern provinces, lay the chief significance and utilitv of the British hold on Toulon. As a point upon which insurrection could re[>ose, by wliich it could be supported from without, Toulon was invaluable ; but with rebellion put down, surrounded by a hostile army and shut up to itself, the city would become a useless bur- den, unbearable from the demands for men which its ex- tended lines would make. Had La Vendee rested upon a Toulon, the task of the republic would have been well- nigh hopeless. Among these multiplied disasters, with the Sardinians also operating on the Alpine frontier and the Spaniards entering their country by the eastern Pyrenees, France was confronted in every rpiartcr by disciplined armies to which she could as yet oppose only raw and ragged levies. She found her safety in the stern energy of a legislature which silenced faction by terror, in her central position, which of itself separated from one another many of tlie centres of disturbance, and in the military policy of the 94 THE GENERAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC allies, which increased instead of seeking to diminish the dissemination of force which was to some extent un- avoidable. The Spaniards could not combine with the Sardinians, Toulon could not help Lyon, La Vendee had to stand apart from all the others ; but in the east it was possible for the Austrians, Prussians and British to direct against the foi'ces standing between them and Paris a combination of effort whicli, in the then condition of the French army, might have been irresistible. Listead of so doing, the Austrians and British on the northeastern frontier decided, early in August, to cease their advance and to separate ; the Austrians sitting down before Le Quesnoy, and the British undertaking to besiege the sea- port of Dunkirk. On the Rhine, the mutual jealousies of Austria and Prussia, and the sluggish movements of routine generals, caused a similar failure to support each other, and a similar dilatory action. The opportunities thus lost Ijy the allies, and the time conceded to the French, were improved to the full by the Committee of Public Safety and by the commissioners sent from the Convention to the head-quarters of every army. Men, for the most part, without pity as without fear, their administration, stained as it was with blood, was effectual to the salvation of France. From the min- ister in the cabinet to the general in the field, and down to the raw recruit forced from his home, each man felt his life to depend upon his submission nnd his activity. Li the imminent danger of the conntrv and the hot haste of men Avho worked not only under urgent pressure, but often with a zeal as blindly ignorant as it was patriotic, many blunders and injustices were committed ; but they attained the desired end of impressing the resistless en- ergy of the Convention upon each unit of the masses it was wielding. If ever, for good or ill, men had the single eye, it was to be found in the French soldiers of 1793, as they starved and bled and died that the country might CONDITIONS, AND THE EVENTS OF 1703. 05 live. Given time, — and the allies g-ave it, — units ani- mated by such a spirit, and driven forward l.»y such an impetus as the Committee knew how to im|)art, were soon knit into an overpowering organism, as superior in tem])er as they were in numbers to the trained machines before them. Where there was conscious life to feel enthusiasm or fear, the contagion of the rulers' temper caught ; );)ut the fiery spirit of the Convention could not possess the stately ships of war that floated in the ports of the republic, nor make them yield, to the yet unskilled hands of tlie new officers, the docile obedience which tlieir old masters liad commanded from those beautiful, delicately poised ma- chines. It was a vain hope to conjure victory at sea by harsh decrees,^ pitched in unison to the passions of the times, but addressed to men whose abilities did not re- spond to their own courage nor to the calls thus made upon them. To the inexperience of tlie officers was added the further difficulty of the indiscipline of the crews, that had increased to a ruinous extent during the four years' paralysis of the executive government. With the triumph of the Jacoljin party had now come a unity which, however terrible, was efficient. In September, 1793, in the nuitiny of the Brest fleet in Quiberon Bay, the seamen again pre- vailed over their officers, and even over the commissioner of the Convention ; l)ut it was the hist flagrant outburst. The past weakness of other authorities had jjlayed into the hands of the Mountain ; now that the latter was su- preme, it resolutely enjoined and soon obtained submis- sion. Years of insubordinati(jn and license had, however, sapped the organization and drill of the crews ; and the 1 For example, that auy oaptaiu surreuderiup; to a force less than ihrnhle his own shouM suffer on the support of the natives in a civil war. Such support can never relieve such expedi- tions from the necessity, common to all military advances, of guarding their communications while opei'ating on their front ; which is only another way of saying again that such expeditions, to be successful, must be capable of independent action adequate to the end proposed. Ris- ings, such as occurred in many quarters of France in 17U3, are useful diversions ; but a diversion is only a subordinate part in the drama of war. It is either a de- ceit, whose success depends rather upon the incapacity of the opponent than upon its own merits ; or it is an indirect use of forces which, from their character or po- sition, cannot be made to conduce directly to the main effort of the enterprise in hand. To enlarge such diver- sions by bodies of troops wliich might be strengthening the armies on the central theatre of war is a mistake, which increases in ever greater proportion as the forces so diverted grow more numerous.^ ^ "^I'lie T'oiiiDsular T\''aT, so l»rilliaiit in many of its features and iu the eml so tt'iiiiii|)liaiitly successful, lias sniiie aiial()i;-ies t<.) the smaller expediticms Iicre criticised, aud may be thoug-ht to rel'utc the remarks iu the text. The analoiry, however, fails in some ver)' decisive poiuts. Tlie lauding and base of operations at Lisbon were in tlie territor\' of an ally of long standing; the ])i'ojected advance was iiilo a country iu general insurrection against /cwt/^h Tiilc ; above all, tlie position i)Ositions off the French coast, and drawin^' the lines as closelv as the exio-encies of the sea and the law of nations would permit, li possible, in order to stop commerce by neutral vessels, a Idockade of the French coast, similar to that of the Soutliern Confederacy by the United States, would have been the most suitable measure to adopt ; but the conditions were very different. The weather on the coast of the Southern States is much more moderate : the heav- iest o'ales blow alona' shore, whereas, in the F.av of Biscav, they blow dead on shore ; and there was almost every- where o'ood, sometimes even sheltered, anchorage, which was not generally to be had on the coast of France. Fi- nally, while steam certainly helps both jiarties, the inside and the out, the latter prohts the more hy it, for he can keep in with the shore to a degree, and for a length of time, impossible to the sailing shi}) ; the necessity of gain- ino- an offin^T before a iialc comes on, and the hel])less drift- ing during its continuance, not existing for the steamer. Despite, therefore, the decisions <.tf the courts, that a 100 THE GENERAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC blockade was not technically removed when the ships maintaining it were driven off by weather, a blockade of the whole French coast does not seem to have been con- templated by the British ministry. Its offensive measures against French commerce were consequently limited to the capture of property belonging to French subjects, wlier- ever found afloat, even under neutral flags ; and to the seizure of all contraband goods destined to France, to whomsoever they belonged. Both these were conceded to be within the rights of a belligerent by the United States and Great Britain ; but the latter now endeavored to stretch the definition of contraband to a degree that would enable her to increase the pressure upon France. She claimed that naval stores were included in the cate- gory, — a position the more plausible at that time because, the French merchant ships being unable to go to sea, the stores must be for the navy, — and further, that provisions were so. Though these arguments were hotly contested by neutrals, the British navy was strong enough to over- ride all remonstrances ; and the dearth of provisions did force the Brest fleet out in 1794, and so led directly to the first great naval battle of the war. It cannot be considered a satisfactory result, nor one evincing adequate preparation, that the Channel fleet, to wliich belonged the protection of the approaches to the Channel, — the great focus of British trade, — to which also was assigned the duty of watching Brest, the chief French arsenal on the Atlantic, did not get to sea till July 14, and then only to the number of fifteen ships-of- the-line. A French fleet of similar size liad sailed from Brest six weeks before, on the 4th of June, and taken a position in Quiberon Bay, off the coast of La Vendue, to intercept assistance to the insurgents of that province. The command of the Channel fleet was given to Lord Howe, an officer of very high character for activity and enterprise in previous wars, but now in his sixty-eighth CONDITIONS, AND THE EVENTS OF 1703. 101 year. Ao'e had in no sense dulled his courai2;e, which was as steadfast and well-nigh as impassive as a rock, nor impaired his mental efficiency ; but it may be per- mitted to think that time had esaiiiierated and hardened a certain formal, unbending precision of action which dis- tinguished him, and that rigid uniformity of manu?uvre had become exalted in his eyes from a means to an end. This quality, however, joined to an intimate knowledge of naval tactics, eminently fitted him for the hard and thankless task of formincr into a well-drilled whole the scattered units of the fleet, which came to him unaccus- tomed, for the most part, to combined action. Lord Howe brought also to his command a strong pre- disposition, closely allied with the methodical tendency just noted, to economize his fleet, by keeping it sparingly at sea and then chiefly for i)urposes of drill and manoeuvre. Its preservation in good condition was in his eyes a con- sideration superior to taking up the best strategic position ; and he steadily resisted the policy of continuous cruising before the ports whence the enemy must sail, alleging that the injury received in heavy winter weather, while the French lay at anchor inside, would keep the British force constantly inferior. The argument, though plausible and based on undoul)ted facts, d(X'S not justify the choice of a ])osition clearly disadvantageous with reference to in- tercepting the enemy. War })resents constantly a choice of difficulties, and wlien questions of material come in con- flict with correct strategic disposition tliey must give way. The place for the British fleet, as reflection shows and experience proved, was Ijefore the hostile arsenals ; or, allowably, if such a position could be found, in a port flankiuG: the route alono; which the enemv must iiass. For the Channel fleet no such port offered ; and in keep- ing it at Spithead, far in rear of the French point of de- parture, Howe exposed himself to the embarrassment of their Q-ettimz- away while he remained in ignorance of the 102 THE GENERAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC fact until too late to intercept, and with imperfect knowl- edge in Avhat direction to follow. The only solution of the difficulty that tlie British government should have adopted was to maintain a reserve of ships, large enough to keep the necessary numhers of efficient vessels cruising in the proper station. The experience gained by such constant practice, moreover, improved the quality of the men more than it injured the ships. Historically, good men with poor ships are better than poor men with good ships ; over and over again the French Revolution taught this lesson, wliich our own age, with its rage for the last new thing in material improvement, has largely dropped out of memor}^ The embarrassment arising from the British fleet being in a Channel port received singular, perhaps even excep- tional, illustration in the French expedition against Ire- land in 1796. It has been said that that expedition would have succeeded in landing its force had it had steam ; it would be more just to say that it would never have come so near succeeding had the British fleet been cruis- ino- in the station which strate2:ic considerations would prescribe.^ There is also a certain indefinable, but real, deterioration in the morale of a fleet habitually in port, compared with one habitually at sea ; the habit of being on the alert and the habit of being at rest color the whole conduct of a military force. This was keenly realized by that great commander. Lord St. Yin cent, and concurred with his correct strategic insight to fix his policy of close- watching the enemy's ports. " I will not lie here," he wrote from Lisbon in December, 1796, " a moment longer than is necessary to put us to rights ; for you well know that inaction in the Tagus must make us all cow- ards." 2 Doubtless this practice of lying at anchor in the ^ For the strategic discussion of the British naval dispositions on the occasion of the Irisli Expedition of 1796, see Chapter XL 2 Brenton's Life of St. Vincent, vol. i, p. 295. CONDITIONS, AND THE EVENTS OF 1703. 103 home ports contributed to the impunity witli which French cruisers swept the approaches to the Channel during much of 1793 and 1794. The policy of Lord Howe combined with the crippled state of the French navy to render the year 1793 barren of striking maritime events in the Atlantic. In the in- terior of France and on her frontiers, amid many disas- ters and bloody tyranny, the saving energy of the fierce revolutionary tj-overnment was makim;' steadv headwav against the unparalleled ditllculties surrounding it. After the ill-judged separation of the British and xlustrians in Auii'ust, the latter had succeeded in reducinu' Lc C)uesnov, which capitulated on the lltli of September ; but there their successes ended. Carnot, recently made a mendjcr of the Committee of Public Safety and specially charged with the direction of the war, concerted an overwhelming attack upon the British before Dunkirk, and raised the siege on the 9th of September ; then, by a similar con- centration upon the Austrians, now engaged in besieging ]\Iaubcuge, he caused their defeat at the battle of Wattig- nies, October 16, and forced them to retreat from before the place. In the northeast, both the allies and tlie French went into winter quarters early in November ; but the prestii-'e of a resistance that a'rew everv dav more efficient remained with the latter. On the eastern frontier also, after protracted fighting, the year closed with sub- stantial success for them. The Prussians of the allied forces in that quarter retreated from all their advanced positions into Mayence ; the .Vustrians retired to the east bank of the Rhine. Each of the allies Idamed the other for the unfortunate issue of the campaign ; and the vet- eran Duke of Brunswick, commanding the Prussians, sent in his resignation accompanied with predictions of con- tinued disaster. At the same time the king of Prussia began to manifest the vacillating and shameless policy which made his country the byword of Europe during 104 THE GENERAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC the next twelve years, and betrayed clearly his purpose of forsaking the coalition he had been so forward in form- ing. On the Spanish frontiers, the fortune of war was rather against the French, who were embarrassed by the necessity of concentrating all the force possible upon the siege of Toulon ; the recovery of that port being urgently required for the national honor, as well as for the maritime interests of the republic in the Mediterranean. It was, however, in restoring internal submission and asserting the authority of the central government that the most substantial results of 1793 were attained. The resistance of the Yendcans, long successfully protracted through the blunders and lack of unity among the re- publican leaders, began to yield, as more concentrated effort was imparted by the reconstituted Committee of Public Safetv. After the battle of Cholet, October 16, the insurgents, routed and in despair, determined to leave their own country, cross the Loire, and march into Brit- tany. They traversed the latter province slowly, fighting as they went, and on the 12th of November readied Gran- ville on the Channel coast, where they hoped to open comniunications witli England. Their assault on the town failed, and as the hoped-for ships did not arrive, th.QY started back for La Ycndee ; but as a coherent body they never recrossed the Loire, and a pitched battle, fought December 22, at Savenay, on the north bank, completed their dispersion. The embers of the civil war continued to burn in La Vendee and north of the Loire during the following year ; but as a general insurrection, wielding large bodies of figiiting men, it had ceased to be formida- ble to the nation and wrought its cliief harm to the province which supported it. The great stronghold of resistance in the east, Lyon, fell on the 9th of Octoljer. Des])ite the disaffection which had existed in the south and cast, the commissioners of the government were a]jle, without opposition, to collect CONDI TTOXS, AXD THE EVEXTS OF 179 J. 105 round the city a body of men sufficient, first, to cut off its communications with the surrounding country, and, finally, to carry the works commanding the place. A spirit of discontent so feeble as to acquiesce tamely in the reduction of one of its chief centres gave no ho}»e of su|)port to any efforts made through Toulon bv the allied forces ; and the capitulation of Lyon showed that the port was not worth the cost of keeping, and at the same time released a large number of men to give activity to the siege. Toward the end of November, over twent\'- five thousand republican troops were collected round the place. On the night of the IGth of December, the forts on a promontory commanding the anchorage for fleets were carried by assault. A council of war among the al- lies decided that the 8hi})S could not remain, and that the garrison could not hold out with its communications to the sea cut off. It tlierefore determined to evacuate the place, and on the 19th the British and Spaniards departed. PJefore sailing, an attempt was made to destroy both thf dock-yard and all the French shi]»s that could not be taken away : but the danacr threatening from the commanding positions that had now fallen to the enemy was so great, the necessity for quick departure so urgent, and so much had consequently to be done in a very limited time, that the proposed destruction was but imperfectly effected. Of twenty-seven French ships-of-the-line still in Toulon, nine were burned and three accom})anied the retreat. Tlie remaining fifteen constituted the nucleus of a powerful force, and most of them appear in the fleet which went with Bonaparte to Eg\pt and was there destroyed Ijy Nelson in 1708.1 The loss of Toulon, after the extravagant hopes excited by its surrender, gave rise to much complaint in England. 1 Of the thirtv slii])S-of-tlio-line iu Toulon wln-n nccupioil hy the allios tliree or four had ])een sent to Rochefort without guus, carrying French prisoners whom it was incouveuient to keep 106 THE GENERAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC It is improbable, however, that its retention, even if feasi- ble, would have been beneficial. The expenditure of men and money necessary to hold a seaport surrounded by enemy's territory, and commanded by a long line of heights which had to be occupied, would have been out of proportion to any result likely to follow. The com- munications, being by sea only, would ultimately depend upon Great Britain as the power best able to insure them and most interested in a naval position ; and the distance to England was great. The utter lack of dependence to be placed upon local discontent, as an element in the usefulness of Toulon to the allied cause, had been shown by the failure to support Lyon and by the tame submis- sion made in the southern provinces to the petty Conven- tional army sent against them. The country, moreover, was in 1793 wasted by dearth ; and had there been in Toulon an allied force large enough to advance, it would have had to depend absolutely upon immense accumula- tions of food in the port. So great was the scarcity, that the French at one time thought of abandoning the siege on that account. In short, Toulon had, for the British, the disadvantage of great distance, far greater than Gib- raltar, without the latter's advantages of strategic position and easy defence ; and its occupation by them would have caused jealousy among the Mediterranean powers and introduced more discord into a coalition already mutually suspicious. From Toulon Hood retired to Hyeres Bay, a sheltered roadstead a few miles east of Toulon, where the end of the year found him still lying. Lord Howe took the Channel fleet into port in the middle of December, and there remained until the following May. Thus ended the maritime year 1793. KoTE (to page 98). The Peninsular AVar, in its inception, was justified, not because the odds were favorable, but because there was a •' fighting" chance of great results; just as there was at Toulon, CONDITIOXS, AND THE ErEXTS OF 17V J. 107 where the attempt failed. The distinguished liistorian of that war claims that the British wrought the work of delirerance ; and, after making every allowance for national prejudice, which in his case was certainly not undiscriminating, the general failure, except where the British arms were felt, may be taken to estalilish a fact which the disorganized state of Spain herself would alone render proba- ble. The course of war in the west of the peninsula, where the British were, shows conclusively the limitations imposed upon the military enterprises of a state having a relatively small army with a great navj^ Having landed in April, 18U!), WeUesley, notwitli- standing his genius and brilliant successes, notwithstanding the stuti.' of the peninsula, and notwithstanding, also, the immense length and difficulty of the Trench lines of comnmnication, was still, in ]\Iarch, 1811, shut up within the lines of Torres Vedras ; that is, he was simply holding on at LisV»on, unable to keep the country against the French. In external appearance, the military situation was just the same as at the beginning. The reasons for h(_>lding on were the same in character as in 1800 ; but the cliances of success had become distinctly greater, o\^dng to political and economical considerations, and to the extreme care and foresight by which the British leader had made his position round Lisl»on inexpugnable. Nevertheless, the retreat and ultimate disaster of the French were due to the military difficulties of their enterprise, well understood and carefully improved by Wellington, and to the unmeasured political combina- tions of the emperor, — not to the power of the British army in Portugal, which, though admirable in quality and leadership, was very inferior in numl>ers. In the last analysis it was the emperor's Continental System, directed against the Sea Power of England, which gave to the army nf England in the Peninsula the opportunity by which alone the weaker force can profitably assume the oifen- sive. It is not a lessening, but a heightening, of the merit of the •'Teat Englishman, to say that lie had the genius to foresee that the upportunity, though distant, must come, and the courage to hold on till it came. It is instructive to note the essential military resemblances be- tween the British invasion of the Peninsula, which was finally crowned with succe'ss, and Xa[>oleon's projected invasion of Eng- land, which came t.> nouglit. In the one case, a nay^- supreme on the ocean and a small military force ; in the other, an unrivalled army, and a navy^ very inferior because of its quality. In each, the chances were largely against success. In each, the enterprise, strictly offensive in character by the inferior force, hinged upon the occur- rence of the favt)rable opportunity, which it was the part of the of 108 THE EVENTS OF 1793. fence to contrive and of the defence to prevent. That there was, in both cases, a long waiting of nearly equal duration is a fortui- tous coincidence ; but the attitude of unremitting ^Yatchfulness and constant readiness, in a skilfully chosen position, is the distinctive characteristic imposed upon the inferior force which hopes to es- cape from a mere defensive postui'e, and, by striking a blow, to make itself felt in the lists of war. The opportunity never came to Napoleon, because the British leaders never took their eyes off his fleet, upon which his profound combinations depended as an arch upon its keystone. It came to Wellington l^ecause the emperor turned his attention from the Peninsula, of whose troubles he was w^eary, and opposed inadequate means and divided commands to a single alert enemy. CHAPTER IV. The West Indies, 1793-1810. AMONG the leading objects contemplated by the Brit- ish ministry in this war was the control of the East and West Indies, particularly of the latter, as among the most important sources as well as markets of British trade. In the present day, the value of the West India islands, and of all positions in the Caribbean Sea, is chiefly military or maritime ; due less to the commerce they maintain than to their relations, as coaling ports or fortified stations, to the commercial routes passing through that region. It is scarcely necessary to add that whatever importance of this character tliey now possess will be vastly increased when an interoceanic canal is completed. During the French revolution, however, the islands had a great commercial value, and about one fourth the total amount of British commerce, both export and import, was done with them. This lucrative trade Great Britain had gathered into her hands, notwithstand- ing the fact that other nations owned the largest and richest of the islands, as well as those producing the best sugar and coffee. The commercial aptitudes of the British people, the superior quality of their manufactures, their ex- tensive merchant shipping and ingenious trade regulations, conspired to make it the interest of the foreign colonists to trade with them, even when by so doing the laws of tJieir own governments were defied ; and to a great ex- tent the British free ports engrossed the West Indian trade, as well as that to the adjacent South and Central American coasts, known as the Spanish Main. 110 THE WEST INDIES, 1793-1810. In war, the control of a maritime region depends upon naval preponderance. When the opposing navies are of nearly equal strength, it is only by open battle, and by the reduction of one to a state of complete inferiority, that control can be asserted. If the region contested be small and compact, as, for instance, the immediate ap- proaches to the English Channel, the preponderance of the fleet alone will determine the control and the safety of the national commerce within its limits ; but if it be extensive, the distance between centres great, and the centres themselves weak, the same difficulties arise that are felt in maintaining order in a large and sparsely settled territory on land, as has till very lately been the case in our western Territories. In such circumstances the security of the traveller depends upon the government putting down nests of lawlessness, and establishing, at fitting stations, organized forces, that can by their activity insure reasonable safety in all directions. In the War of the French Revolution, it soon, though not immediately, became evident, that the British navy could everywhere preponderate in force over its enemy ; but it could not be omnipresent. The Caribbean Sea offered conditions peculiarly favorable to marauders, li- censed or unlicensed ; while its commercial value neces- sitated the preservation, and, as far as possible, the mo- nopoly, of so fruitful a source of revenue. The presence of hostile cruisers not only inflicted direct loss, wliich was measured by their actual captures, but, beyond these, caused a great indirect injury by the friction and delays which the sense of insecuritv alwavs introduces into com- mercial transactions. The ideal aim of the British min- istry was to banish the enemy's cruisers absolutely from the region ; but, if this was impossible, very much might be effected by depriving them of every friendly anchorage to which they could repair to refit or take their prizes, — in short, by capturing all tlie French islands. This would THE WEST IX DIES, 170J~1S10. HI put an end to the myriads of very small craft, which, Ijeing able to ls:eep tlie sea but for a few days, depended absolutely upon a near base ; and Avould greatly cripple the operations of the larger vessels Ijy throwing them, for supplies and refuge, upon the United States, which then extended a benevolent partiality to French cruisers and their prizes. The French islands had vividlv reflected during' the past four years the movements and passions of the mother- country ; but only in Haiti did the turbulence, extending through all classes of society until it ended in a servile insurrection, result in destroying the control of the home government. The disorder, amounting often to anarchy, which prevailed through the French part of the island, somewhat simplified the problem before Great Britain. It was the only base of operations to the westward then available for French cruisers ; and, though too large to admit the thought of conquest under the climatic condi- tions with the force that could be spared for such an attempt, it was possible, without serious opposition, to occupy many of the ports commanding the principal trade routes. Such occupation deitrived the enemy of their use, converted them into harbors of refuge for British com- merce, and made them centres for the operations of I'rit- ish cruisers. Unfortunately the government, misled ])y the representations of French planters who saw their property threatened with destruction, conceived the hope of an easy conquest, or rather transfer of allegiance in the colony. In pursuance of this idea, several places were taken into possession, being either delivered or cai)tured with an ease that showed how readily, in the then disor- ganized state of the island, most of the sea-ports could have been secured ; l)ut the motive being conquest, and not merely maritime control, the choice of ol)jectives was decided by political or military, instead of maritime, con- siderations. The expected local native support followed 112 THE WEST INDIES, 1793-lSlO. the general rule noted in the last chapter, and proved futile ; while yellow fever wasted the troops condemned to excessive exertion and exposure in so sickly a clime. Had simple maritime advantages guided the British counsels, it would have been sufficient to note that Ja- maica was the great centre of British interests in the western Caribbean ; that outward-bound ships, enterino- the Caribbean through the eastern, or Windward, Islands, ran down with the trade wind along the south side of Haiti, where were two liarbors, Aux Cayes and Jacmel, favorable as bases for privateers ; and that the homeward trade passed through the Windward Passage, between Haiti and Cuba, which was flanked by two Haitian ports, Tiburon to the south and Mole St. Nicolas on the north. These four were, therefore, particularly danger- ous to British trade, and consequently, so far as position went, particularly advantageous if in British occupation. It is true that the topographical conditions of the ground about a sea-port in an enemy's country may make the occupation very hazardous, except by the employment of more men than can be had ; as was the case at Mole vSt. Nicolas, where the fortifications of the place itself were commanded by the surrounding heights. Yet it re- mained in the hands of the British from 1793 to 1798; and it may be believed that their interests would have been well served by strongly garrisoning these ports.^ 1 The author is keenly aware that tliis polic}-, of garrisoning several some- what separated ports, is seemingly inconsistent with sound military principles as to concentration, as well as with what he himself has elsewhere said about tlie prujier dispositions for maintaining military control of a maritime regi(m. It is, therefore, well to explain that those principles and dispositions apply where the belligerent navies are so far equal as to create a real struggle. This was not the case in the French Kcvulution. Great Britain had undis- jiuted naval supremacy in the West Indies, and the (juestion before her was, not to beat the enemy's fleet, but to secure her own commercial routes. To this end it was necessary to disseminate, not concentrate her ships, and to provide them with convenient centres of refuge and supply along the routes. The case was analogf.ms to the police arrangements of a city. In ordinary quiet THE WEST INDIES, 170J-1S10. 113 At the least tliey would so Le lost to French cruisers. Instead of tills, with the idea of con(|uest, the wholly insuliicient forces sent were pushed down to the bottom of the bight of Gonaives, and the southern coast of the island was left in the enemy's hands. It is not de- sirable to give in detail the history of these petty mili- tary operations, nor of the civil commotions with which they were connected. Suificc it to say, that the course of events finally threw the government into the hands of a pure negro, Toussaint L'Ouverture. He continued to hold it till the Peace of Amiens, in 1802 ; and with him the British, in 1798, concluded a treaty by which they finally abandoned the island. Though the scheme of conquest had failed, their interference had opened the country to British trade and caused the loss of Haiti to France, by contributing to the rise of Toussaint, the negro most capable of leading his race. He still professed lidel- ity to the mother-country, but he acted as one possessing indejtendent power. The British, by the treaty, recognized the island as a neutral territory, and Toussaint, on his part, permitted them as well as neutral ships to trade with it.^ Fie also prohibited the sailing of privateers from ports of Haiti, as they seriously interfered with its com- merce.'-^ Under his strong and wise administration the prosperity of the island greatly revived, though without attaining the proportions of former days. The islands known as the Lesser Antilles, which ex- tend from Porto Rico in a southerly direction to Trinidad and form the eastern boundary of the Garibl.>ean, are, from tlieir small size, much more dependent than is Haiti or Cuba npon the control of the sea. Though the aggregate commercial value of the whole group was far inferior to times tlio police are distrilmtod to cope with individnnl offenders ; when a moh ii::\tliers and threatens tlie peace they are ci»ucentrated in large bodies. ^ I\I;icphersim's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. jt. 454. - Ardouiii, Etudes sur I'Hist. de Haiti, vol. iv. p. 45. VOL. I. — S 114 THE WEST INDIES, 1793-1810. that of the French part alone of Haiti, they had a distinct military advantage which made them, in that point of view and to the "West Indies, more important than Haiti itself. They were to windward of the whole Caribbean with reference to the trade winds, whicli blow unceasingly from east to west ; and hence were much nearer in time, that supreme factor in military combinations, to the great western islands than the latter were to them. The same circumstance of the trade wind threw them across the path of vessels bound from Europe to all parts of the Caribbean, and thus facilitated the intercepting of sup- plies essential to the support and industries of the islands, for much of which they depended upon the mother-coun- tries. The largest, by far, of these islands, Trinidad, belonged in 1793 to Spain, at that time the ally of Great Britain. Its nearness to the South American continent gave it, as a distributing centre, marked commercial advantages, of which the unenterprising Spaniards made little use ; but, as the trade winds blow from the north of east, it was not favorably placed for a naval station. The two next in size, and among the most fertile, Guadaloupe and Martinique, were French islands. Being in the centre of the chain and to leeward of none, except the outlying English Bar- badoes, they were admirably situated for military control, and the strategic advantage of position was supplemented by the defensive strength of Fort Royal (now Fort de France), the principal harbor of Martinique ; which was then, as it is now, ])y far the most powerful naval position in the eastern Caribbean. Besides them, France owned Santa Lucia, next south of Martinique, and Tobago. The military importance of these islands, combined with a distinct though minor commercial value, and the cxjie- ricnce in past wars of the injury done to British commerce by privateering based upon them, made their reduction advisable to Great Britain ; to whom belonii'cd most of THE WEST INDIES, 1793-1810. 115 the other Lesser Antilles as Trell as the trade of the Car- ibbean. One of the first acts of the war, Ijefore sending a vessel to the Mediterranean or increasing the Channel fleet, was to despatch a squadron of seven sail-of-the-line to the West Indies, where there were at that time, except a few small cruisers, but two fifty-gun ships, one at Ja- maica and one to windward, — a thousand miles apart. No fact shows more strongly how unprepared Great Brit- ain was for war than the naval destitution of this resion, at a time when France had three or four ships-of-the-line continually in her colonies. This British squadron sailed under the command of Admiral Gardner on the 21th of March, 1793 ; and there was a strong expectation that Martinique and Guadaloupe, which had hoisted the old royal standard of France upon learning the deposition of Louis XYL, would place themselves under British pro- tection. This hope was disappointed, they having already resumed their reiniblican allegiance, and Gardner returned to England in the fall, leaving a part of his squadron l)ehind. It was then decided to reduce the French islands by force, and on the 2(3th of November Sir John Jervis, after- wards Earl St. Vincent, sailed with a small force of shijis- of-war carrying seven thousand troops destined for this service. Reaching Barbadoes in January, the expedition apj)eared oft" Martinique on the 5th of February, 1794, and after a series of successful operations the island capitulated on the 22d of March. A detachment was next sent aa'ainst Santa Lucia, which was surrendered on tlie 1th of A]tril. On the loth of the same month the combined naval and military forces anchored off Guadaloupe, and on the 20th this island, with its off-lying dependencies, Marie-Galante, Dcsirade and the Saints, also suJjmitted. Tobago having been seized with slight resistance in April, 1798, Great Britain was now in possession of all the hostile Windward Islands, except the petty St. Martin, part of which belonged 116 THE WEST INDIES, 1793-1810. to France. A considerable detachment of troops was next sent to Mole St. Nicolas to assist the undertaking against Haiti ; a reduction of the force in the Windward Islands which led to disastrous consequences, felt throughout the war by the islands and commerce of Great Britain. For on the 3d of June, when the British commanders had departed leaving a garrison in Guadaloupe, there appeared off the coast a division of ships, two being frigates and the others transports, which had left France in April, before the loss of the colonies was known. Landing without opposition, they established themselves firmly and gained possession of half the island before Jervis and Grey could appear. The struggle continued with varying fortunes during the following six months, but the British contin- ually lost ground and wasted with yellow fever. This dire disease told likewise severely on the new French arrivals, but these found a native Creole population of nearly six thousand, the larger part of whom Avere faithful to the republic ; whereas their enemies, out of a total original force of seven thousand, had, besides losses in battle and by disease, been obliged to spare garrisons for the captured islands and a detachment to Haiti. These causes alone would seem sufficient to account for the recapture of the island ; but the utmost credit must at the same time be allowed to the French officers concerned, and especially to the commissioner of the Convention, Victor Hugues, who accompanied the expedition. This man, who had at Roche- fort filled tlie role of public accuser, wliich in Paris gained for Fouquier Tinville a hideous immortality, seems to have embodied in himself the best and worst features of the men of the Terror, whose fate he escaped by leaving France betimes. In his report to the Convention he boasted of having put to death twelve hundred royalists in Guada- loupe. This horror partakes doubtless of the evident exag- gerations discernible in the French accounts of a military operation which, not so adorned, would have been brilliant THE WEST IX DIES, 170J-1SIO. 117 enoiiQ'h. HiiQ'ucs's In-utalitv is iinrniestioiialtle, Ijut to it he joined the vigor, audacity, and unscrupulous determination to succeed which carried the French armies to victory in all parts. The Uritish were forced to evacvuite their last port ill Guadaloupe on the lOtli of I)ecember, 1704. Upon receiving news of Hugues\s success the Directory hastened to send re-enforcements, and on the Gth of Janu- ary, 1795, a nund^er of ships-of-war and transports reached Guadaloupe and landed tr(jo|)S variously stated at lifteen to twentv-iive hundred. Huiiues, who had meantime or- ganized a respectaljle territorial army, used tlie land and naval forces now at his disposal with great energy. Santa Lucia was rctalcen on the llJth of June, and insurrection forigines and old French inhalntants, to the Q'reat distress of the British. Xati<.>nal vessels and privateers, having once more a secure base of operations, swarmod throughout the seas and inliictcd great losses on the trade. All this disaster, which con- tinued throughout the year, arose from not having rpiite enough men in Guadaloupe to init Ilugues down before he had a foothold ; and the British government was now com- pelled to send a far larger force to repair in part an evil, which a smaller numljer, at the itrovier moment, would have wholly prevented. The disastrous result of tlie campaign of 1791 in Belgium and Holland, resulting in the conquest of tlie latter Ijy the French, the overthrow of the House of Orange, and the alliance of Holland with France under a republican gov- ernment, had both released the British troops employed on the Continent and thrown open the Dutch colonies to Brit- ish attacks. Sir Ralidi xVbercromby, who had distinguished himself in the recent operations, was appointed to the com- mand in the eastern Carilibean, and sixteen thousand troops were assigned to the expedition, which was to l)e con- voyed by eight ships-of-the-line under Admiral Christian. 118 THE WEST INDIES, 1793-lSlO. They were to have sailed in September for a campaign in the drier and cooler winter months ; but the usual diffi- culty in moving large bodies, particularly of sailing ships, delayed their departure until the loth of November. Two days later the Channel was swept by a gale of hurricane violence, which caused the loss of many ships and lives, and forced all that survived to return to Portsmouth, a single transport alone reaching the destination at Barba- does. On the 3d of Decemljer a second starlfwas made, but almost equal bad fortune was met. After battling the ocean for seven weeks, Christian and Abercromby returned to England with part of the convoy, the remainder finding their way by driblets to Barbadoes ; several, however, were taken by Hugues's cruisers. Abercromby then took passage in a frigate, reaching the island on the 17th of March, 1796 ; and was followed by the admiral, who arrived on the 21st of April with a fleet of transports. Santa Lucia was at once attacked, and on the 25th of May tlie French garrison capitulated. On the 11th of June, St. Vincent, and a few days later Grenada, which were in possession rather of insurgents than of enemies, likewise submitted. Prior to the arrival of Admiral Christian, Abercromby had sent a detachment of twelve hundred men ao-ainst the Dutch colonies on the mainland, Demerara, Essequibo, and Ber- bice, which surrendered without resistance in April and May, and were laid open to British trade. Great Britoin had now resumed tranquil possession of all the eastern islands, except Guadaloupe. The strong or- ganization which this had received from Hugues, and the re-enforcements that had been thrown in, indicated that prolonged operations would be needed to effect its sub- dual. The sickly rainy season was at hand, during which also hurricanes prevail, so that all reasons combined to postpone the attempt to the healthier months, — a decision which was amply justified Ijy the great mortality from yellow fever which ensued among the troops, despite all TUE WEST INDIES, i:9J-lS10. 119 the immunity from exposure that care and tlie cessation of campaigning could give. By the time that operations could begin, Spain had declared war against Great Britain ; and the })rospect of easily seizing her large and far more valuable islands diverted attention from Ouadaloupe. The latter continned throughout this and the following war, until 1810, a thorn in the side of British trade. The reca})ture of (iuadaloupe by the French, and th(j consequent evils, remaiii a })regnant warning against the folly of sending a boy to do a man's work ; but underlying that miscalcula- tion a}>pears to have been the fatal error of relying upon local support to troops inade(|uate Ijy themselves to the task before them. Desirous of doing many things at once, the British government easily accepted the assurances of a few royalists, as to the i)olitical dis}>ositions of a most excitable and changeable race and the re-enforcements that could be raised among them. It was an exact repetition of the blunder which led to the invasion of the Southern colonies during the American Revolution ; and the gist of the mistake is in the dependence upon unorganized forces to supplement the weakness of the organized force, which is not by itself alone sufficient to its undertaking. It will not be denied that at times a diversion under such conditions ma}^ be attempted, if it does not take away force needed for serious enterprises. Upon this ground may iierha|)S be justihed the attem|)tcd French invasion of Ireland in December, 1700, which, though on a somewhat larger scale, essentially resemlded the expedition of Jcrvis and Grey against the West Indies. It also depended upon a local rising in favor of an insufficient htrce, upon the supjiort of practically unorganized masses without military antecedents ; but it was undertaken at a period when the tide of affairs elsewhere was runnina; stronnlv in favor of France, and, whatever hopes may have been entertained of ])Ossible ultimate results, was essentially a diversion. The immediate aim was not a direct gain to France, but an 120 THE WEST INDIES, 1703-lSlO. indirect advaiitago, by accumulating enilnirrassments foi* (Ireat Britain. A state entirely inferior at sea could not count upon lasting militar}' control of a large island witli an alien population ; but it could hope that the insurrection of Ireland, concurring with disaster upon the Continent, might force a disadvantageous peace upou the arch enemj. The conquest of the smaller Antilles, on the contrarj-, was n<^t properly a diversion, but an oltject of real importance to a great British interest. It was feasible for the gi'eater naval power to take and liold them, being small ; and their tenure, by relieving the navy of part of its work, would have facilitated the protection of Jamaica and its trade, as well as the general control of the western Caribbean. Haiti was too large and too populated for conquest ; Ijut its power for injury could have been confronted with more substantial force had Guadaloupe remained a British trarrison. Tlie alliance of Spain and Holland with France much increased the difficulties of Great Britain, by throwing' open their colonial ports to French privateers. The exten- sive sea-coasts of Cuba and Haiti became alive with them. In 1807 it was estimated that there were from two to three hundred depending upon these two islands, and unfitted, from Hieir size, to go far from them.^ The number testis ties to the extent and value of British trade in that sea, although the privateer did not confine his depredations to the enemy, but preyed lawlessly on neutrals as well. The same authority illustrates the annihilation of French and Spanish commerce Ijy stating that not more than two or three British privateers were sailing fi'om Jamaica. General Abercromby went for a short time to Europe in the fall of 1790. Upon his return a strong military and naval expedition was sent against Trinidad, but did not meet the resistance expected from the size and importance of the island. It capitulated on the second day, February 1 Ai-cuunt of Jamaicaj Londou, 1808, pp. 51, 5:2. THE WEST INDIES, nuj-lSlu. 121 18, 171»7, and with it the S|)aniards Ljst four ships-of-thc- line. Thence AbercrMml)y moved, in Apiil, against Porto Kico ; but u})on reconnoitring, the defences were found too strong, and the troops were re-embarked after h_)sing two hundred men. Tins ended the colonial ex})editions in the West Indies for the first war. Quiet possession was taken of the Dutch colonies of Surinam and Curacoa in 1709 and 1800; and in 1801, when Sweden and Denmark became involved in hostilities with Great Britain, their West India islands were also given up without resistance, but no further fmlitini;' took i)lace. KoTE. As it does not eiitiiT into the autlior's pkiii to give in de- tail thi^. na\'al hist(jry after Ti-afal^ar, it may be well to state here, in brief, the .sub.sequent events in the AVest Imlics. At the Peace of Amiens in 1801, Great Britain restored all her West India con(|uests except the Spanisli Trinidad. AVhen war hrok(.^ out again in lS();j, Tohago, Santa Lueia, Demerara, Esse<|ui)io, and Ijerl)ice were at once seized Avithout clithculty, as was Siiriiiani in 1S04. There matters rested till 1807, wlien Curac^oa and the Danish islands fell, followed in 18()0 l»y j\Iartini(|ue, and in 1810 l)y (nuidaloupe. Spain having l)e- come again the ally of Great liritain in l80S, the latter had rmw n(j open enemy in the Caribliean; Imt the l"iig hahits of lawlessness left numerous pirates infesting Cuba, whom the wealv Spanish govern- ment failed to control. CHAPTER V. " The Xaval Campaign of jNIay, 1794, and Battle of the First of June. THE pressure of the allied armies upon all her froi> tiers, combined with the British mastery of the sea, had thrown France largely upon her own resources during the year 1793 ; while the distracted condition of tlie coun- try and a bad harvest had united to cause a scarcity of bread-stuifs, which threatened a famine, with all its con- sequences of sufferings to the army and the people, and inevitable increase of disturbance and sedition. The eyes of the government had therefore turned be- yond the sea to the United States, and its representatives there had been directed to accumulate a quantity of pro- visions to be shipped to France. It was intended to de- spatch these in a great convoy, to be protected on the voyage 1)y a force of ships-of-war ; while its approach to the shores of Europe would 1)6 covered by a sortie of the great fleet from Brest and Rochefort, to occupy the attention of, and, if necessary, forcibly to contest the con- trol of the sea with, the British navy. Experience had not yet corrected the sanguine confidence of the republi- can government, based upon the Avordy enthusiasm of the crews, nor taught it that, with the departure of the trained officers and the spread of license among the men, the navy had ceased to be the strong power which had faced Great Britain with success in the war of the American Revolu- tion. The very measures which had most contributed to destroy its efficiency became, in the excitement and ig- norance of the times, the sure gage of victory. BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUXE. 123 The convoying squadron of two sliips-of-the-line and three smaller vessels sailed from Brest for the United States in December, 17!Jo, under the command of Rear- Admiral Van Staljel, an active and judicious officer, (hi the 12th of February it anchored in Chesapeake Bay, and sailed again for France on the 11th uf April. The mer- chant ships under its charge numbered one hundred and tliirty,^ among them being many laden with produce from tlic French West India islands, which, not venturing to make the passage home direct and unattended, for fear of British cruisers, had collected at nam})ton Roads to await the time of sailing. It seems somewhat remarkable that the British government, Avhich was fairly well in- formed as to the designs of the French, should not have attempted to intercept the convoy at its port of departure. That is the point at which a great maritime ex]iedition, whether purely military or otherwise, can usually be most effectually watched ; and in this case the more so, be- cause, if the convoy had eluded the blockading squadron, the latter, few in number and homogeneous, could easily have outstripped the unwieldy multitude and again awaited it off its port of arrival. The success of this mass of mer- chantmen in esca]»ing the numerous enemies that attended it off the coast of France is a striking illustration of the uncertainties of commerce-destroying, and of the chances that favor the safe arrival of a body of ships when the enemy is in doubt as to their exact destination. The French minister to the United States, jM. Genet, had written home that he would forward a ])art of the convoy, under the care of two small ships of war, as soon as possible. "With the idea that these might have sailed before Van Stabel reached America, a force of five ships- of-the-line with some lighter vessels was directed to pro- tect their arrival. This squadron accordingly sailed fi'om Brest under the command of Rear-Admiral Xielly, on the 1 Truuile, Bat. Nav., vul. ii. p. .'320. 124 THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 17DA ij^, lOtli of April. ^ It had been preceded by a light division, whose mission was to meet the convoy and inform the otficer in charge that Nielly would await him a hundred Icao'ues west of Belle-Isle. Later news corrected the expectations based upon Genet's first despatches, and as the close approach of summer made it more easy for the British fleet to main- tain its position in the Bay of Biscay, and consequently increased the dangers through which the convoy must pass, the French government determined to send out all the available ships in Brest. On the 16th of May the great fleet, comprising twenty-five ships-of-the-line, one of which carried one hundred and twenty guns and three others one hundred and ten, sailed under the command of Rear-Admiral Villaret Joyeuse. A representative of the National Convention, charged with dnties resembling those of tlie representatives present with the armies in the field, embarked on board the flag-sliip, " La Montague." Tliis maQ-nificent vessel, called under the monarchv the " Etats do Bourgogne," now bore the name of the terri- ble party dominant in tlie National Convention. These were still the days of the Terror, and Robespierre had yet two months to live when the fleet sailed from Brest. The admiral's orders were to cruise in the same station that had already been assigned to Nielly, with whom he was expected to form a junction, and to protect the approach of the convoy at all hazards, but not to fight unless es- sential to secure that end, to wliich all other objects were subordinated. The time of waiting was to be utilized for fleet mancDenvres, in which the representative and ad- miral had too much reason to fear that the captains were unskilled. The anxiety of the French government about the con- voy, and the embarrassment which would be caused by its loss, were obvious incentives to the British authorities 1 Tr<;udo, Bat. Nav., vol. li. \\, 327. Jainos says May 6. AND BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE. 125 to do all in their povv^er to intercept it. The Channel fleet, so called from the ports upon which its operations were hased, had returned from its cruises of the previous year in December, and had since then remained at anchor, repairing and refitting for the next year's work. Its com- mander, Lord Howe, as has before been said,^ was averse from keeping the sea in winter with the heavy ships. Ac- cording to his system of warfare, the fleet should be an- chored at some convenient jjoint on the Channel coast, and depend upon frigates stationed before the French ports to bring it word of the enemy's movements. Had, however, the expected convoy in 1794 sailed from America as soon as it was expected to do, it would have reached its own ports before the British had left their anchors. On the 2d of May the Channel fleet, numbering thirt}^- four ships-of-the-linc and attended by fifteen frigates and smaller ships-of-war, sailed from Spithead. It had under its charge one hundred and forty -eight sail of merchant- men, bound to Newfoundland and to the East and West Indies. Upon arriving two days later off" the Lizard, a promontory near the south-west extremity of England and a hundred miles due north of the Island of Ushant, Howe detached eight ships-of-the-line to accompany the convoy to the latitude of Cape Finisterrc, on the north-west coast of Spain. After performing this service, six, under Ad- miral Montagu, were to cruise between Cape Ortegal and the latitude of Belle-Isle, to intercept the convoy from America. The width, over two hundred miles, of the belt of ocean to be covered liy these six ships with their accompanying frigates, taken in connection with the chances which night and fog might give the French convoy for passing unobserved, illustrates the comparative disadvantages of lying in wait at the supposed point of arrival, instead of at the known port of departure, for a body of vessels whose precise destination is in doubt. ^ See ante p. 101. 126 THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 1794, Howe, with the twenty-six ships remaining to him. steered directly for Ushant, reconnoitred Brest, and, hav- ing ascertained that the bulk of the French fleet was still in port, proceeded to cruise in the Bay of Biscay, moving backward and forward across the probable track of the expected convoy. On the 19th of May he again looked into Brest, and found that the French had sailed. The same evening a frigate from Montagu joined him, request- ing a re-enforcement, as the rear-admiral had learned from a captured vessel that Nielly's squadron was at sea, and that Van Stabel's force numbered four of the line. He consequently anticipated the possil)ility of falling in with nine ships-of-the-line, which would be too large a number for his own six to meet. As the frigate, of course, brought word where Montagu was to be found, Howe, knowing that the main French fleet was out, steered at once to join his suljordinate ; but ascertaining later, from passing vessels, that Villaret had been seen in a position and heading a course which would take him well clear of Montagu, he abandoned this purpose and went directly in pursuit of the enemy. The latter, by the in- formation he received, numbered twenty-six ships-of-the- line, precisely equalling his own fleet. A week, however, was to elapse before he found the French. On the morning of the 28th of May, the wind being then south by west, the lookout frigates signalled a strange fleet to windward. It proved to be that of Yillaret, then steering north-north-east, nearly before the wind, in three columns. At the time of this meeting, Howe was running back to the eastward with a fair wind, having actually gone a hundred miles west of the enemy's rendezvous without finding him. The French admiral stood on until he could recognize the British, and then hauled to the wind, intending to form his line- of-battle on the port tack, heading west or a little south of it. The inexperience of the ca})tains, of Avhom a large AND BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE. 127 proportion had no naval training and bad never com- manded ships in a fleet, led to a long delay and a poor formation. Lord Howe, on the contrary, soon had his fleet in manageable condition, pressing to windward in two columns on the port tack, and wuth a tlying srjuadron of four fast and handj seventy -four-gun ships well to the windward of the main body. The British fleet was now steering the same course as the French, to leeward, or north, of it, and at noon the distance between the main bodies was from nine to ten miles. The place of this first meeting was about four hundred miles west (and a little south) of the island of Ushant. There was a strong breeze and a moderately heavy sea. Villaret soon found that the slowness of the formation, to facilitate which many of his ships had to heave-to, ^ was causing the line to set gradually to leeward, toward the British. Four also of his fleet were sei)arated from the main body, being some distance astern and to wind- w^ard, two of them slightly disabled. To approach these, and at the same time keep the advantage of the wind, he determined to put the fleet on the other tack. At ten minutes before two in the afternoon the French ]»egan tacking in succession, and by quarter past three were all on the starboard tack, heading now east-south-east toward the separated ships. Meantime, tbe British flying squadron, acting independently of the main body, but under orders to attack the enemy's rear, kept forcing to w^indward, and at a little after three o'clock one of them was able to open fire, just before tbe rear French ships went about. The main body tacked between three and four o'clock, and being now on the same course as the French, cast-south-east, but entirely out of cannon-shot, carried a press of sail to overtake them. 1 A ship is said to he hove-to when some <>f the sail^ are so arranged as to move her ahead and others to force her astern, — the result being that she remains nearly in the same spot, but drifts slowly to leeward. 128 THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 1794, The ships of the flying squadron, being handled for the most part with vigor and judgment, fulfilled Howe's purpose of making an impression upon the reai- of the enemy's column. As soon as the attack became pro- nounced, one of the French one-hundred-and-ten-gun ships, the " Revolutionnaire," took the extreme rear, and upon her fell the brunt of the action, which lasted this day until after ten P. M. ; daylight, at that time of the year and in that latitude, continuing till nearly then. The British advanced ships were joined after some time by two more from the main body, so that the ''Revolutionnaire" had to encounter, first and last, some half-dozen hostile sev- enty-fours. No diagram of this day's fighting need be given. The reader has only to picture a long column of ships steering to the southward and eastward, its rear harassed by the repeated but irregular attacks of a superior hostile detachment. The " Revolutionnaire " was nobly fought ; and the concentration upon her, while eminently judicious, served to bring out vividly the advantage, which should never be forgotten, of one heavy ship over several smaller, even though the force of the latter may, in the aggregate, be much superior. The attacks this day made upon her were, from the nature of the case, not simultaneous. They resembled one of those elaborately combined move- ments in land warfare, whereby several separate columns are intended to be brought at the same time to the same point, but actually arrive one by one and are beaten off in detail. The result in the present instance was some- what more fortunate. As darkness fell, Howe called off all but two of the assailants, — one having already been driven off, — in order to form his line for the night. The " Revolutionnaire " remained in hot action with a small seventy-four, the " Audacious," alone ; for the comrade of the latter took no share. At ten p. m., having lost her captain and sixty -two men killed and eighty-six AND BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE 129 wounded, and with her mizzen-mast shot away, she wore out of action under charge of her fourth lieutenant, the three seniors having heen Ivilled or seriously hurt. Covered by the dark she passed to the northward, astern of the British iloet, her remaining masts falling soon after. The "Audacious" was so badly crippled that it took her lung to get clear of the French line, and she was unable to rejoin her own that night. Tlie next morning, iinding herself isolated and in [iresence of some enemy's sliips, she was forced to run before the wind and was perma- nently separated from the fleet. The two opponents passed within sight of each other the following day, but they w^ere in no condition to resume the encounter, and both reached port without further injury. During the short summer night the two fleets continued to run on parallel lines (May 29, Fig. 1. BB, FF,) soutb.- east by east, being about three miles apart, the French bearing south from the British. The latter appear to have gained somewhat upon their less practised adversaries, so that at six o'clock Howe, ever intent upon getting to wind- ward and thereby obtaining the ojiportunity to attack, directed his fleet to tack in succession (a), expecting tbat the van would on the new course i»ass near enough to the enemy's rear to exchange shots. After the evolution, the British were in column steering west (B'B'), the French still south-east by east. Villaret, seeing his rear threat- ened, wore his fleet in succession at quarter before eight (b), the van ships running down north-west by west (F'F') parallel to their previous course, toward the rear of their own column; upon reaching wbicli the leading ship hauled to the wind again (c), followed by each of the others in order. These two manceuvres brou2;ht both fleets once more heading in the same direction, following parallel courses and abreast each other ; the French still to wind- ward, but having lost much of the distance which sepa- rated them from their enemies. A few shots had been VOL. I. — 9 130 THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 179^, exchanged, as Howe expected, between the British van and the Frencii rear as the}' passed on o})posite tacks (Fig. 1, d). Toward ten o'clock the French head ships ran down toward the British van and opened fire at long range, their centre and rear keeping out of action (May 29, Fig. 2). The leading British ship, '^ CjBsar," failed to carry sail enough, though repeatedly signalled to make more ; and in consequence those astern of her had also to shorten sail, the flag-ship "Queen Charlotte" in particular being forced to leeward by the necessity of backing a topsail to keep in her station. At noon there was a brisk cannonade between the two vans. Dissatisfied with this partial en- gagement, which, by crippling some of his ships, might put out of his power to reach the enemy, Howe at noon sig- nalled to tack again in succession, and to pass through the French line. The " Caesar," which should have begun the manoeuvre, made no reply, and it was necessary to repeat the order. Shortly before one o'clock she wore instead of tacking. The ships between her and the admiral also went about ; but none, save the " Queen," of ninety-eight guns, second in the order, appears to have reached the hostile line, except at its extreme rear. She passed alone, and for a long time unsupported, along a considerable portion of the enemy's order, wdiich had now been re-established by the centre and rear bearing down to support the van (Fig. 2, a) ; but she was unable to break through, owing at first to the closeness of the French ships to each other, and afterwards to the injuries received from their successive broadsides. The " Caesar " kept so far from the wind as to neutralize the admiral's purpose ; and of the other van ships all went to leeward of the French line, none breaking through. So far, therefore, the general result was only to bring confusion into the British order without attaining the end which Howe desired. He therefore determined to set the exam]jlc, directed the flag-ship to be tacked (Fig. 2, b), and stood under a press of sail toward the -b h LrM AND BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE. 131 French line, closely followed by two others, the next ahead and next astern of him. The " Queen Charlotte;' which had been tenth in the British column, reached tlie enemy at a point not far in rear of Villaret's Hau'-ship, and ran along the line (Fig. 3) till she came abreast of the sixtli ship from the rear, astern of which she luffed throudi and gained to windward of the French (Fig. 3, a). One of her two followers passed through the second interval ( b) lie- hind that pierced by herself, and the other through tlie next (c), — that is, between the third and second vessel from the enemy's rear. The two remaining French ships, the " Indomptable " (I), of eighty guns, and the " Tyranni- cide" (T), of seventy-four, were not only far astern but to leeward of their line. They were therefore easily to be reached by several of the British, who gradually encircled them. With his rear thus for the third time threatened, and much more seriously than before, Villaret again made signal to wear in succession. The French van had by now become much separated from the rest of the fleet, and tlie leading ship was too disabled to go about. No other tak- ing the initiative, the admiral, like Howe, was forced to set the example. The " Montague " (M) wore out of line (d), and led down toward the two surrounded ships, with a signal flying to follow and form in her wake (F' F') without resrard to usual station. This movement of Villaret not only tended to release the " Indomptable " and " Tyranni- cide," but also threatened the "Queen" (Q), which had fallen to leeward disal>led. Howe, after getting to wind- ward and tacking (e), had endeavored to reach tlie " Terrible," of one hundred and ten guns, carrying the flag of the admiral commanding the French rear, winch had been astern of the point at which the '' Queen Char- lotte " broke the line ; but, while the " Charlotte " was putting about, the " Terrible " (Te) passed ahead and reached the centre of Villaret's column before Howe's ship 132 THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 1794, could come up with her. For every reason, therefore, but especiall}^ for the safety of the ''• Queen," it became impera- tive for the British admiral to reverse his course. He therefore wore (f), gathering round him by signal all vessels within reach, and again stood east, toward the threatened ships of the two parties, — running in a column parallel to, but to windward of, that of the French admiral. The " Queen," though much crippled, had, with her head to the eastward, passed astern of the two threatened French ships. These had suffered from the engagement, in passing, Avith the British van a few hours before, as well as with the flying squadron on the previous day ; and the injuries then received had doubtless contributed to place them in the exposed and dangerous position they now occupied. The " Leviathan," seventj^-four, attacked them to windward, the " Orion," of the same class, to leeward, and the latter was soon after re-enforced and replaced by the " Barfleur," of ninety-eight guns. No particular statement is given in the British narratives of other ships attacking these two, but several of those astern of the " Queen Charlotte," which could have reached no other of the French, lost killed and wounded, and it is probable that these shared in this encounter. The French accounts speak of their two vessels as " surrounded ; " and Villaret wrote that tlieir resistance "should immortalize tlieir captains, Dordelin and Lamesle." They came out of the engagement of the 29th of May with only their lower masts standing ; and the heavier of the two, the " Indomp- table," was in such condition that Villaret thought neces- sary to send her to Brest that night, escorted hy another of his fleet, which was thus dwindling piece-meal. For the moment, however, the French admiral's manoeu- vre, well conceived and gallantly executed, rescued the endangered ships. The " Queen Charlotte " and her im- mediate supporters, after first tacking, had barely reached AND BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE. 133 the rear of the French. As the latter continued to stand on, it was of course impossible for all the fifteen ships be- hind the British admiral to come up with them at once. In fact, the failure of the van to do its whole duty, com- bined with the remote position of the rear, — increased prob- ably by the straggling usually to be observed at the tail of long columns, — had resulted in throwing the British order into confusion. " As the ships arrived," wrote Lord Howe in his journal, " they came up so crowded together as afforded an opportunity for the enemy to have bred upon them with great advantage." (Fig, 3, G, R.) "The Brit- ish line was completely deformed," states one French au- thority. But, though disordered, they formed a large and dangerous body, all within supporting distance, — they had on their side the prestige of an indisputable, though par- tial, success, — they were flushed Mitli victoiy, and it wouh.l. appear that the French van had not yet come up. Vilhirot tlierefore contented himself with carrvino- off his rescued ships, with which and with tlie rest of his fleet he stood away to the northwest. It is desirable to sum up the result of these two days of partial encounters, as an important factor in the discussion of the campaign as a whole, which must shortly follow. On the morniuo- of Mav 28, the French immbered twenty- six ships-of-the-line ^ and were, when they first formed line, from ten to twelve miles to windward of the Britisli, also numberintr twenty-six. (.)n the eveniuQ' of INfav 2'.>, in consequence of Howe's various movements and the course to whicli Villarct was by them constrained, — for he acted purely on the defensiye and had to conform to the initiative of the enemy, — the French fleet was to leeward of the British. As Howe had succeeded within so short a time in forcing action from to leeward, there was every * Villaret had been juiued on the 19th of ^May hy a sliiii-nf-tlie-liue, '^vhieh had separated from Xielly's scjuadrou; this raised his furee from twentj-live tn tweutv-six. 134 THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 119 J^, reason to apprehend that from the windward position — decidedly the more favorable upon the whole, though not without its drawbacks — he would be able to compel a decisive battle, which the French naval policy proscribed generally, and in the present case particularly. Besides this adverse change of circumstance, the balance of loss was still more against the Frencli. On the first day the '' Revolutionnaire " on one side and the '' Audacious " on the other had been compelled to quit their fleets ; but the force of the latter was not over two thirds that of the former. By the action of the 29th the " Indomptable," of eighty guns, was driven from the French fleet, and the admiral thought necessary to send with her a seventy-four and a frigate. The " Tyrannicide," seventy-four, had lost all her upper masts ; she had consequently to be towed by one of her consorts through the next two days and in the battle of the First of June. If Villaret had had any ex- pectation of escaping Howe's pursuit, the presence of this disabled ship would have destroyed it, unless he was willing to abandon her. Besides the mishaps already stated, the leading ship, " Montagnard," had been so much injured in the early part of the engagement that she could not go about. Continuing to stand west, while the body of the fleet was running east to the aid of the " Indomptable " and " Tyrannicide," this ship separated from her consorts and was not able to regain them. To this loss of four sliips actually gone, and one permanently crippled, may be added that of the " Audacieux," one of Niclly's squadron, which joined on the morning of the 29th, but was immediately de- tached to seek and protect the " Revolutionnaire." On the other hand, the British had by no means escaped unscathed ; but on the morning of the 30th, in reply to an interroga- tory signal from the admiral, they all reported readiness to renew the action, exce[>t one, the " Caesar," which was not among the most injured. This ship, however, did not leave the fleet, and was in her station in the battle of tlie First. AND BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE. 135 The merit of Howe's conduct upon these two days does not, however, depend merely upon the issue, though for- tunate. By persistent attacl^s, frequently renewed upon the same and most vulnerable part of the French order, he had in effect brought to bear a large part of his own fleet upon a relatively small number of the enemy, the result being a concentration of injury which compelled the dam- aged ships to leave the field. At the same time the direc- tion of the attack forced the Frencli admiral either to abandon the endangered vessels, or step Ijy step to yield the advantage of the wind until it was hnally wrested from him altogether. By sheer tactical skill, combined with a fine display of personal conduct, Howe had won a marked numerical preponderance for the decisive action, which he now had good reason to expect from the advantageous position likewise secured. Unfortunately, the tactical gain was soon neutralized by the strategic mistake which left Montagu's squadron unavailable on the day of battle. Towards the close of the day the weather grew thick, and so continued, with short intervals of clearing, for the next thirty-six hours. At half-past seven the body of the French bore from the British flag-ship north-west, distant nine or iQ\\ miles ; both fleets standing very slowly to the westward and a little northerly, with wind from the south- ward and westward. DurinLC most of tlie oOth, none of the British fleet could l^e seen from the flag-sliip, but they all, as well as the French, kept together. On that day also, by a piece of great good fortune considering the state of the weather, Admiral Nielly joined Villaret with the three ships still under his command, as did also another seventy-four be- longing to the Cancale squadron. These four fresh ships exactly replaced the four disabled ones that had parted company, and again made the French twenty-six to Howe's twenty-five. About ten o'clock in the morning of May 31st, the fog lifted for a moment, allowing Howe to count twenty-seven 136 THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN GF MAY,. 1794, sail of his ships and frigates; and, after again shutting down for a couple of hours, it finally dispersed shortly after noon. The French were then seen hearing from west to north-west. The British made sail in chase and by six p.m. had approached to within about three miles. They were not, however, able to reach the position Howe wished — abreast the enemy — early enough to permit the intended general engagement, unless by a night action ; which for more than one reason the admiral was not willing to under- take. He therefore hauled again to the wind, heading to the westward in order of battle. The French had formed on a parallel line and were running in the same direction. During the night both fleets carried all the sail their masts would stand. In the morning the French, thanks to the better sailing of their vessels, were found to have gained somewhat on their enemies, but not sufficiently to avoid or postpone the battle, which they had been directed if possi- ble to shun. Yillaret therefore formed his fleet in close order, and stood on slowly under short canvas, which at once allowed irregularities in the order to be more easily corrected and also left the crews free to devote themselves exclusively to fighting the slii[)S. Howe, by carrying sail, was thus able to choose his position prior to bearing down. Having reached it and formed his line, the French being now hove-to to await the attack, the British fleet was also hove-to, and the crews went to l)reakfast. At twelve min- utes past eight it navain fillcd-awav bv sisi'-nal, and stood slowly down for the enemy (June 1, Fig. 1). The inten- tion being to attack along the whole line, ship to ship, advantage w^as taken of this measured approach to change tlie place of the three-decked sliips in the order, so that tliey should be opposed to the heaviest of the French. Lord Howe, who in the matter of drill was something- of a }»recisian, is said to have rectified the alignment of his fleet more than once as it stood down ; and, unless some such delay took place, it is difiicult to reconcile the rate of "rs i ^S "^J »s- •^ il ^ N. "- a —3 1— »„ -0 o ^ 5 ^ <= 1 — ^ oj ^ }— 5 X. > -^30 i 1 o vTi - : ;; :i- 0: < « y I • 1- S • . u. ': ; :: . ! lij ^ 2 ^ 5 i * H « I ° ■•' ' ' Si •" >" - i-, £ ^1 LU E T ? M .■""■■■--. ^ '""••■•■•• ^ ; h- 1 2 -* : __•; _•"■ , 1> ' ■ =fi ; C£ oj r. ^ ? .■ r " >:' ■ c — - >ll i ,' ji "", i •' ■■■'" \ \ 0= of . ■ ;'■*-, • ; - * ■ . 1 ; ^ ■ • . ."'-■'" *'"'■, '. ; O-o I i \ ^y-

A\er-deck hatteries; hut on the ^9th of IMay, the " <,)neeu Charlntte,' using lur Jee as well as her weather gnus as she Iiroke through the yreneh, line, had the lin\-er deck full of water. (.)ne of her officers, Tvieutenaut (afterwards .\dmiral) Codrington, heing knocked down liv the recoil of a gun and thrown to the lee .side of the ileck, could, when leaning on his left arm, barely keep his head out of water- (Life of Admiral Cudrington ) 138 THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 1794, as the French line was east and west, the approach was not perpendicular but in a slanting direction. At twenty minutes before nine, the formation was so accurate that Lord Howe shut the signal book with an air of satisfac- tion, as though his work as admiral was done and all that remained was to show the gallant bearing and ex- ample which had ever been associated with his name. The gesture was, however, premature, and eccentricities of conduct on the part of some captains compelled him again to open the book and order them into their stations. Shortly after nine o'clock the French van began firing. The British ship " Ciesar," on the left flank of her line, and therefore corresponding to the leader of the French, instead of pressing on to her station for battle, hauled to the wind and began firing while still five hundred yards distant, — a position inconsistent with decisive results un- der the gunnery conditions of that day. Lord Howe, who had not thought well of the captain of this ship, but had permitted him to retain his distinguished position in the order at the request of the captain of the " Queen Char- lotte," now tapped the latter on the shoulder, and said, " Look, Curtis, there goes your friend ; who is mistaken now ? " The rest of the fleet stood on. The " Queen Charlotte," in order to reach her position, had to steer somewhat more to the westward. Either the French line had drawn a little ahead, or some other incident had thrown this ship astern of her intended point of arrival. Her course, there- fore, becoming more nearly parallel to the enemy's, she passed within range of the third vessel behind Villaret's flag-ship, the " Montague," her destined opponent. This ship, the " Vcngeur," opened fire upon her at half-past nine. The " Queen Charlotte," not to be crippled before reaching her place, made more sail and passed on. The next ahead of the " Vengeur,'' the " Achille," also engaged her, and to this the '' Charlotte " replied at eight minutes AND BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE. 139 before ten. The assailant suffered severely, and her at- tention was quickly engrossed by the " Brunswick," the supporter of Howe's flag-ship on her starboard side, which tried to break through the line ahead of the "Achille." The '^ Queen Charlotte " (June 1, Fig. 2, C) continued on for the " Montague" (M). Seeing her evident purpose to pass under the stern, the captain of this ship threw his sails aback, so as to fall to the rear and close the interval. At the same moment the French ship next astern, the " Jacobin," increased her sail, most properly, f(jr the same object. The two thus moving towards each other, a col- lision was threatened. As the only alternative, the "-Ja- cobin " put her helm up and steered for the starboard, or lee, side of the " Montague." At this moment the " Queen Charlotte " drew up. Putting her helm hard over, she kept away perpendicularly to the " Montague," and passed under her stern, so close that the French flag brushed the side of the British ship. One after another the hfty guns of the hitter's broadside swept from stern to stem of the enemy, — three hundred of her crew falling at once, her ca|)tain among the number. The "Jacobin " having moved to the starboard side of the '' Montague," in the place the " Queen Charlotte " had intended to take, it was thought that the latter would have to go to leeward of both ; but, amid all the confusion of the scene, the quick eye of the gallant man who was directing her movements caught a glimpse of the '^ Jacobin's " rudder and saw it moving to change the ship's direction to leeward. Quickly seizing his opportunity, the helm of the British flag-ship was again shifted, and she came slowly and heavily to the wind in lier appointed place, her jib-boom in the movement just clear- ing the "Jacobin," as her side a few minutes before had grazed the flag of the '' Montague." The latter, it is said, made no reply to this deadly assault. The "Jacobin" fired a few shots, one of which cut away the foretopmast of tlie " Queen Charlotte ; " and then, instead of imitating the 140 THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 1791^, lattcr's movement and coming to the wind again, by which the Bi-itish ship would have been placed between his fire and that of the " Montague," the captain weakly kept off and ran to leeward out of action. By this time the engagement was general all along the line (Fig. 2). Smoke, excitement and the difficulties of the situation broke somewhat the simultaneousness of the shock of the British assault ; but, with some exceptions, their fire from van to rear opened at nearly the same time. Six ships only passed at once through the enemy's line, but very many of the others brought their opponents to close action to windward. In this, the first pitched battle after many years of peace, there were found the inevitable failures in skill, the more sorrowful shortcomings of many a fair-seeminoj man. To describe minutely the movemeuts of every ship would not tend to clearness, but to obscurity. For general impression of the scene at certain distinctive moments the reader is referred to the diagrams ; in which, also, an attempt has been made to represent the relative motions of the ships in both squadrons, so far as can be probably deduced from the narratives. (See Figs. 2 and 3.) There was, however, one episode of so singular, sio deadly, and yet so dramatic an interest, occurriug in the midst of this extensive melee^ that it cannot be passed by. As long as naval history shall 1)0 written, it must com- memorate the strife between the French ship " Yengeur du Peuple" and the British ship " Brunswick." The latter wont into action on the right hand of the " Queen Char- lotte ; " its duty therefore was to pierce the French line astern of the "Jacoliin." Tliis was favored by the move- ment of the latter to support the '' Montague ;" but, as the " I'runsw'ick " pressed for the widened gap, the " Achille " made sail ahead and thi-ow herself in the way. Foiled here, the "Brunswick" again tried to traverse the line astern uf the " Achille," but the " Vengeui'" now came up, AXD BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE. 141 and, as the '' Brunswick " persisted, the two collided and swung side to side, the anchors of the British ship hooking in the rigging and channels of the French. Thus fastened in deadly embrace, they fell off before the wind and went away together to leeward (Fig. 2, E). As the contact of the two ships prevented Ojiening the lower ports as usual, the British crew blew off the lids. The " Vengeur " having already been firing from the sidij engaged, hers were probaljly open ; but, owing to the hulls touching, it was not possible to use the ordinary sponges and rammers, with rigid wooden staves, and the French had no other. The British, however, were specially pro- vided for such a case with sponges and rammers having flexible rope handles, and with these they were able to carry on the action. In this way the contest continued much to the advantage of the liJritish on the lower decks, where the French, for the reason given, could use only a few of the forward and after guns, the form of a ship at the extremities causing the distance there between the combatants to be greater. But while such an inerpiality ex- isted below, above the balance was reversed ; the heavy carronades of the " Yengeur," loaded with langrage, and the superiority of her musketry, — re-enforced very })rob- ably by the men from the useless cannon below, — beating down the resistance of the British crew on the upper deck and nearly silencing their guns. The captain of the ''Brunswick" received tliree wounds, from one of which he afterwards died; and a number of others, both officers and men, were killed and wounded. This circumstance encourao-ed the " Vengeur's " commander to try to carry his opponent by boarding ; but, when about to execute tlie attempt, the approach of two other British ships necessi- tated calling off the men, to serve the guns on the hitherto diseno-aged side. Meanwhile the "Brunswick's" crew maintained an un- remitting fire, giving to their guns alternately extreme 142 THE NATAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 179^, elevation and depression, so tliat at one discharge the shot Avent lip through the " Vengeur's " decks, ripping them open, while at the other they tended to injure the bot- tom. The fight had thus continued for an hour when the '' Achille," with only her foremast standing, was seen approaching the " Brunswick" on her port, or disengaged, side. The threatened danger was promptly met and suc- cessfully averted. Before the new enemy could take a suitable position, half-a-dozen guns' crews on each of the lower decks shifted to the side on which she was, and in a few moments their fire brought down her only remaining and already damaged mast. The " Achille " had no far- ther part in the battle and was taken possession of by the British a few hours later. At quarter before one the uneasy motions of the two ships wrenched the anchors one after another from the " Brunswick's " side, and after a grapple of three hours they separated. The character of the contest, as described, had caused the injury to fall mainly upon the hulls and crews, while the spars and rigging, contrary to the usual result in so fierce an action, had largely escaped. As they were parting, the " Brunswick " poured a few final shots into the " Vengeur's" stern, injuring the rudder, and in- creasing the leaks from which the doomed ship was already suffering. Immediately afterwards the mizzen-mast of the British vessel went overboard ; and, being already well to leeward of her own fleet and threatened by the approach of the French admiral, she stood to the northward under such sail as her spars would bear, intending to make a home port, if possible. In this long and desperate con- flict, besides the injuries to be expected to hull and spars, the " Brunswick " had twenty-three of her seventy-four guns dismounted, and had lost forty-four killed and one hundred and fourteen wounded out of a crew of six hundred men.^ 1 A whimsical incident is told as occurring in this grim scene of slaugliter and destruction. " The ' Brunswick ' had a Uxrge figurehead uf the Duke^ with AND BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUXE. 143 Soon alter the dismasting of the " Achille," the British ship " RamiUies," commanded by the brother of the '' Bruns- wick's" captain, had been seen coming slo\Yly down toward the two combatants. She arrived Ijut a few moments lie- fore their separation, and, when tliey were far enough apart fur her fire not to endanger the '^ Brunswick," she also attacked the " Yengeur," but not long after left her au'ain in order to secure the " Achille/' This fresh onslaught, how- ever, brought down all the "' A^engeur's " masts except the mizzen, which stood for half an hour longer. The French ship was helpless. With numerous shot-holes at or near the water line, with many of her port lids gone, she was rolling heavily in the waves, unsteadied by masts, and tak- ing in water on all sides. Guns were thrown overljoard, pumps worked and assisted by bailing, Imt all in vain, — the "'Yengeur''' was slowly but surely sinking. At half-past one the danger was so evident that signals of distress were made ; but among the disabled or preoccupied combatants they for a long time received no attention. About six p.m., fortunately, two British ships and a cutter drew near, and upon learning the state of the case sent all their boats that remained unhurt. It was too late to save every survivor of this gallant fight, but nearly four hundred were taken off ; the remainder, among whom were most of the badly wounded, went down with their ship before the British boats had rea'ained their own. " Scarcelv had the boats pulled clear of the sides, when the most frightful spectacle was offered to our gaze. Those of our comrades who re- mained on board the ' Yengeur du Peuple,' with hands raised to Heaven, implored with lamentable cries the help for which they could no longer hope. Soon disappeared a laced hat ou. The hat was struck off by a slKjt duriug the battle. The crew of the ship seut a deputation to the quarter-deck to request that Captain Har- vey would be pleased to order his servant to give them his laced cocked-hat to supply the loss. The captain, A\ith great good-liumor, complied, and the carpenter nailed it ou the Duke's head, where it remained till the battle was finished." (Barrow's Life of lluwe.) 144 THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 1794, the ship and the unhappy victims which it contained. In the midst of the horror with which this scene inspired us all, we could not avoid a feeling of admiration mingled with our grief. As we drew away, we heard some of our comrades still making prayers for the welfare of their country ; the last cries of these unfortunates were : * Vive la Republique ! ' They died uttering them." ^ A touching picture of brave men meeting an inevitable fate, after doing all that energy and courage could to avoid it; very differ* ent from the melodramatic mixture of tinsel verbiage and suicide which found favor with the National Convention, and upon which the " Legend of the Yengeur " was based.^ Of the seven hundred and twenty-three who composed her crew, three hundred and fifty-six were lost; two hun- dred and fifty of whom were, by the survivors, believed to have been killed or wounded in the three actions. Long before the "Yengeur" and the "Brunswick" sep- arated, the fate of the battle had been decided, and the final action of the two commanders-in-chief taken. It was just ten o'clock when the British flag-ship passed under the stern of the " Montague." At ten minutes past ten the latter, whose extensive injuries were mainly to the hull, made sail in advance, — a movement which the " Queen 1 Official narrative of the loss of the " Veugeur," by the survivors. Troude, Bat. Xav., vol. ii. p. 355. - The speech of Barrere in the National Convention was as follows : " Im- agine the ' Vengeur' ship-of-the-line pierced with cannon shot, opening in all directions, and surrounded by English tigers and leopards, a, crew com- posed of wounded and dying men, battling against the waves and the cannon. All at once the tumult of the action, the fear of danger, the pain-stricken cries of the wounded cease ; all mount or are carried upon deck. Every flag, every pennant is hoisted. Cries of ' Vive la Eepubliciue ! ' ' Vive la Liberte' et la France ! ' are heard on all sides ; it is the touching and animated specta- cle of a civic festival, rather tlian the terrible moment of a shipwreck. For a moment they must have thought upon their fate. But no, citizens, our brothers thought no more upon that, they see only the English and their country. They choose rather to be engulfed than to dishonor her by a sur- render. They hesitate not an instant. Their last prayers are for liberty and for the Republic. They disappear." AND BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE. 145 Charlotte," having lost both fore and main topmasts, was unable to follow. Many of the French ships aliead of the " Montagne " had already given ground and left their posts ; others Ijoth before and behind her liad been dis- masted. Between half-past ten and eleven the smoke cleared sufficiently for Yillaret to see the situation on the licld of battle. Ships dismasted not ()nly lose their power of motion, but also do not drift to leeward as rapidly as those whose s})ars are up, but which are moving very slowly. In consequence, the lines having s^jmo movement ahead, the dismasted ships of both parties had tended astern and to windward of the battle. There they lay, British and French, [)cll- mell together. Of the twelve ahead of the French admiral when the battle began, seven had so()n run out of action to leeward. Two of these, having hauled to the wind on the other tack, were now found to be astern and to wind- ward of both fleets ; to windward even of the dismasted ships. Of the rest of the twelve, one, having lost main and mizzen masts, was unavoidably carried to leeward, and the remaining four were totally dismasted. Of these four, three hnally fell into the hands of the British. Of the thirteen ships astern of the " ^Montague," six had lost all tlieir masts, and one had only the foremast standing; the remaining six had their spars left in fairly serviceable con- dition, and had, some sooner and some later, retreated to leeward. Four of the dismasted shijjs in the rear, incliid- inir among them the "A^engeur," were captured bv the British. When Admiral Yillaret Joyeusc had recognized the situ- ation, as thus brietfy descril^ed, he directed the '^ Montagne " also to be headed to leeward, and made signals to gather the serviceable ships round the commander-in-chief. A column of twelve was thus formed (June 1, Fig. 3, F' F') on the starboard tack, standing, that is, to the eastward again, — the "Montagne" leading and the rear being VOL. I. ^ 10 146 THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 1794, brought np by the " Terrible," the flag-ship of the second in command, which had onlj^ her foremast left and was therefore taken in tow by an uninjured seventy-four. Yil- laret considered it imprudent, if not impossible, to get far enough to windward to interpose in favor of the dismasted vessels. He determined, therefore, to place himself to lee- ward of them, in such position as to receive and cover those that could run down to him, or which his frigates could reach and tow away. In this manner the " Scipion," the " Jemappes," and the •' Mucins," totally disabled, were restored to the French fleet between two and four o'clock. The last named had actually struck to a British ship, but had not been taken into possession. Villaret remained for some time, hove-to in this position, until satisfied that no more of the separated vessels could join him, and then made sail to the north-west (F" ¥'')} Lord Howe was unable to follow with his own ship the comparatively rapid movements of the French com- mander-in-chief. At eleven o'clock, however, a signal was made for those that could to close around the admiral, and the " Queen Charlotte " was with difficulty put on the other tack. Howe then led the column thus formed (B' B') to the eastward, a step that was necessary not only in order to cover dismantled British ships and se- cure the prizes, but also to relieve the " Queen," which was threatened by Villaret and in a critical situation. This ship, which had behaved with so much forwardness and gallantry in the British van on the 29th of May, liad on the First of June been stationed in the rear. The antagonist which she attacked went away rapidly to lee- ward ; and the '' Queen," following with unrelenting ar- ^ Tlic French accounts state that he remained until eight v.m., daring; all "vvliich time lie might have been attacked. The English on tlie contrary say that the whole French fleet was out of sight by quarter ]>ast six. Tlie ques- tion is not material, for it is certain that Villaret did remain for some time, and that he would not have been attacked had he staved louirer. AND BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE. 147 dor, found herself at the end of the engagement again between the lines, with a dismantled enemy, indeed, near by, but with her own mainmast gone and other spars tot- terins:. Eis-ht of Villarefs column cannonaded her as they passed, but without doing much harm, and Howe's approach extricated her. The escape of some of the French dismasted ships was severely criticised at the time, and there was also an opin- ion that Howe should have renewed the attack after gath- ering about him his less injured vessels. There can Ijo little question that more promptitude and energy would have secured some of the French that got away ; many competent eye-witnesses thought so, and much discontent was openly expressed in the fleet. It is more douljtful whether the admiral would have done well to order the attack renewed. Several captains had behaved indiffer- ently, either through lack of judgment or lack of nerve, and iha best were naturally among those whose ships, be- ing well-placed and hard-fought, were now out of condi- tion for fighting. A decisive practical reason for ceasing the action is to be found in Howe's physical condition. He was then sixty-eight years old ; and, although possessed of the calm, unworrying temper which bears responsibility lightly, he liad undergone great fatigue daring the live days of battle and chase, — his only resting-place from the time the enemy was encountered being an arm-chair. " When the report was brought to him," says the signal lieutenant, '' that the French fleet showed every symptom of determination to sustain a Ixxttlc, I watched his face wlicn he came to the quarter-deck t<> look at them ; it ex- pressed an animation of which, at liis age, and after such fatii^uc of mind and body, I had not thought it capable ; " but the reaction came possibly a little too soon for reaping the full fruits of the victory. '^ He went to bed," wrote the same officer, '' completely done up after the action of the First. We all mt round him ; indeed, I saved him 1^8 THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 1794, from a tumble ; he was so weak that from a roll of the ship he was nearl}^ falling into the waist. ' Why, you hold me up as if I were a child,' he said good-humoredly." ^ It is not surprising that, under such circumstances, he could not do all that a younger man might, nor that he yielded to the influence of his chief-of-staff, Sir Roger Curtis, a distinguished and gallant officer, but who appears to have been more impressed than was his superior by the disadvantao-os under which the British fleet labored. Many years later, Admiral Stopford, who commanded a frigate in the action, made the following statement, which he allowed to be published: " Having observed the 'Marl- borough' dismasted and surrounded by enemy's ships, I bore down and took her in tow, — which briuging me very near the ' Queen Charlotte,' I went on board for orders. The cool, collected manner in which I was received by Lord Howe, and the desire he expressed to get the ships set to rights to continue the action, showed that such was his in- tention ; and for the purpose of exonerating Lord Howe's memory from the charges I have heard alleged against him for not following up his victory, I think it right to state that, when standing on the ' Queen Charlotte's ' poop, close to Lord Howe, Sir Roger Curtis came up in haste and apparent perturbation, exclaiming, ' I declare to God, my Lord, if you don't assemble the fleet, they will turn the tables upon us.' I must confess that I did not see anything to warrant such an exclamation, except a French ship passing under the ' Queen Charlotte's ' stern and firing a few guns into her. The admiral and Sir R. Curtis then retired to another part of the poop, and nothing more was done."^ The responsibility of a commander-in-chief is not af- fected by the advice given him by any subordinate, how- ^ Life s-of-the-line to Spithead." (Alison's "History of Europe.") How an attack upon one half of the line is consistent with penetrating the same line at all points does not clearly appear ; l)nt the statement concerning Lord Howe's princi])le of action on the 1st of June is absolutely contrary to all the facts, although Alison had James's ])ainstaking work before him and refers to it freijuently. His statement is that of Jomini's " Guerres de la ]levolutii)n Fran<;aise ; '' but the latter author writes only as a military man, intrudnces naval niattors merely incidentally, and was doubtless misled in the scanty information attainable when he wrote. AND BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE. 151 (north-west) that was oljliquc to its own front as well as to that of the enemy. The issue in every other instance had been indecisive, — scarcely ever was a ship taken or sunk. But while in this respect different, the experience of previous engagements was otherwise repeated. That flank of the assailant which in column liad Ijcen the van came, as a whole, promptly and orderly into action, while delay and disorder, attended with imperfect execution, en- sued in tlie rear. This feature of simultaneous fleet at- tacks w^as emphasized Ijy the strenuous and brilliant efforts of three of the rear division, which prevented indeed a general failure there, but brought out all the more clearly how great the shortcoming w^ould have been ])ut for their exertions, unparalleled in former battles. The proportion of loss undergone in the different parts of the British col- umn gives a fair measure of the vigor displayed by each. This test is indeed most misleading as a means of compari- son between any two single ships. Instances can readily be chosen, from this very case, in which vessels skilfully placed and vigorously fought received less injury than others, which were badly handled and did little harm to the enemy ; but when an average is taken of many ships, the specific causes of error in different directions tend to balance each other, and if the general conclusion is con- firmed by the experience of other battles, it may be ac- ce})ted with much confidence. Now, on the First of June, taking the total number of casualties in the British fleet, it will be found that in every hundred men killed the eight van ships lost forty-three, and in every hundred wounded forty-one ; whereas tlie eight rear lost seventeen killed and twenty-two wounded, or ratlier less than half the proportion of the van. Nor does this tell the whole story, for four fifths of the entire loss of the rear fell upon the three vessels,^ leaving but eight killed and tliirty-three ^ Tt is a curiiius coincidence, thougli n»)t necessarily sii;;uificant, that the numl)er of men hit in each of tlicse ships was nearly tlie same. The " I\oki1 fc!uverei!2;n " lust liftv-four, the " <,>ueeu " fifty-fdur, ami the '" Olory " fifty-two. 152 THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAl\ 1704, wounded to be divided among the remaining five ; whereas, in the eight van ships, though there are marked individual differences, the loss is much more equally divided. The inference, were the truth not otherwise known, would amount almost to proof that the van ships went down in good order, attacked vigorously, and so afforded mutual support, whereas the rear, whatever the cause, did not impress themselves strongly on the enemy's line ; while the exceptional casualties of the three which did their duty well indicate a lack of support from the others, which also appears to be confirmed by the ascertained facts. When a result is thus reproduced in various battles, it cannot be attributed wholly to the fault of the captains. The exceptions to the rule on the First of June were not the rear ships which failed in gaining for themselves a fair share in the action, but those which succeeded in so doing. The cause of this usual result seems to be that the van ship is the pivot upon which the operation hinges, and in proportion as the distance from the pivot grows greater, irregularities become more frequent, while each one that occurs is propagated and increased, until at last, in a long line, an approach to disorder ensues. When this happens, the efficiency of each ship depends less upon her normal relations to the line than upon the initiative of her cap- tain ; and the differences between men, which had been controlled by the exigencies of the order, where it still existed, begin to tell. Short lines will suffer less than long ones from this cause ; whence it follows that in a long line new pivots, or points of departure for the order be- yond them, should bo provided. On the 1st of June the *' Queen Cliarlotte," by her steady action and the authority conveyed by the example of the commander-in-chief, served as such a pivot, and the conduct of the ships on her right was better than tliat of those on her immediate left, which were regulating their position liy the van.^ As it seems ^ Brcnton, in his naval liistorv of Great Britain, tells an amusing story of the captain of one of the ships a little to Howe's left, -which at once charac AXD BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JLWE. 153 probable, from the character of modern ships and Aveapons, that attacks will be made in a line of front, it is a matter of interest to naval officers to provide against this tendency to disorder and imperfect execution, which seems to inhere in the part of an order distant from the guide, or pivot. The French line, by awaiting Howe's attack, laid itself open to any combination he might see fit to make, but the plan actually adopted threw the burden of resistance ujion the individual captains, rather than upon the admiral. Whenever a ship was vigorously attacked by an enemy, her captain's task was simple, however arduous ; nor does tlierc seem to have been an instance of a French officer in this position failing to do his duty manfully. The supe- rior gunnery of the British at this time, however, generally beat down the resistance of the opponent, and the latter then bore up and ran to leeward, unless his masts had been shot away, or unless the assailant by piercing the line had barred retreat. Thus the ^' Mucins," seventh in the line, was engaged to leeward by the "Defence." She tried, therefore, to escape by passing to windward of the British " Marlborough," next ahead, but fell on board of her and there lost all her masts. This circumstance of inferior gunnery, together with the fixed idea of keeping the line closed, appear to have governed the movements of the French ships after the battle joined. Now the duty of keeping tlie line closed is most important and essential to mutual support, but it is not paramount to every other con- sideration, particularly when an action, as this inevitably must, had passed into a melee; but the French captains, having few other ideas on fleet-fighting, clung to this one in its simplest form, — that of following close upon the heels of the next ahead. Thus the leading ship, " Conven- tion," though not hotly attacked, wore out of the line and terizcs a type of officer and illustrates the above remark. He was, Breutuu says, so occupied ■u^ith preservin:^ liis station liy the azimuth compass that he lost sight of liis iuteuded aiitagouist, aud iu the suiuke never found him. 154 THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 179^, was closely followed by the " Gasparin," though the latter was vigorously engaged. The next five ships were hard pressed and fought manfully. The eighth, after a short engagement, ran to leeward and was followed by the three astern of her. This brings us to the twelfth, or nearly to the centre of the French line, and of the six that followed, down to and including the seventeenth, four were taken after a desperate resistance. The two that escaped were the flag-ship " Montague," whose career has already been told, and the " Jacobin," next astern of her. The eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth seem to have re- ceived little injury, but yet ran to leeward ; whether inde- pendently, or one following another, does not certainly appear. The remaining six suffered the fierce assault of the three of the enemy's rear, and four were reduced to such a condition that they must have been taken — and not two only of them — had the rest of the British division done their full duty. Although the French officers, lacking both experience and instruction in fleet warfare, failed to do all they might in the battle, distinct misconduct by doing what should not have been done appears only in two cases. The first was the captain of the leading ship, for whose act in forsaking his post in the van no good reason appears. The second and much more serious fault was committed by the captain of the " Jacobin." The course of this officer in making sail to close upon the flag-ship, when the intention of the " Queen Charlotte " to pass between the two became evi- dent, was perfectly proper. His keeping away, when col- lision with the " Montagne " threatened, was probably the only way of avoiding a disaster. Being thus forced to lee- ward of the line, he still retained the power of attacking the British ship to starboard, while she was, or should have been, engaged on the other side by the " Montagne." In- stead of using this opportunity, Captain Gassin kept off and ran to leeward. This fault, grave in any case, was espe- AND BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE. 155 cially blameworthy in the next astern oi* next ahead of the commander-in-chief. Those were posts of peculiar honor, held by heavy vessels, chosen with the special object of supporting their leader and strengthening the part of the order in which he was. For Captain Gassin, personally, there may have been many excuses ; but for the course of the ship, considered from a military and tactical point of view, no excuse whatever api)cars, for she suffered little in the fight. Tlie void caused by the "Jacobin" was filled by the ships astern of her pressing up, and this forward movement, being transmitted to the end of the line, was partly the cause why the rear British ships did not reach their numerical opposite in the French order. Some attention is due to the naval strateQ'v, to the ffon- eral conduct and results of this short maritime campaign, which covered only four weeivs, — from the IGth of May, when Yillaret sailed from Brest, to the 11th of June, when he again anchored just outside the port. In order to form a just opinion there must be considered the objects of each party, the forces at their control, and the measures pur- sued by them. The object of the French was to insure the arrival of the convoy from America. For this purpose they had at sea, at the first, two detachments, — one of five ships-of-the- line under Nielly, the other of twenty-five under Yillaret. The rendezvous for the two was the same, and the impor- tant point where their intended junction should take place was known to their admirals and unknown to the British. It may be again said that the instructions of the French government to its officers compelled the latter to avoid, if jDOSsible, any decisive engagement. The object of the British was twofold : to intercept the expected convoy, and to bring the French fleet to battle. The two might, and did, interfere with each other, — might, by divergence of interest, prompt a separation of the force. Of the two, fifrhtinc; the French fleet was indis* 15(3 THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 1794, putably the more important, and was doubtless so consid- ered by Howe, in accordance with the usual British naval policy, which aimed at the destruction of the enemy's org^anized force afloat. The ships at his disposal, includ- ing Montagu's squadron, amounted to thirty-two of the line. He was ignorant of the rendezvous of the French fleets and of the exact course that would be followed by tlie convoy ; but of both he could form approximate estimates. From the 4th of May, when Montagu's squadron first separated, until the 19th, Howe supposed the French to be in Brest. On the latter day his lookouts reconnoitred the port for the second time, and he then learned that they had sailed. The same evening he was joined by a frigate from Montagu, bearing a request for a re-enforcement. Fearing that his subordinate might fall in with Villaret's greatly superior force, Howe next morning made all sail to join him ; making a course of west by south, while the French had been steering west one-half south. On the 21st he fell in with and recaptured a number of Dutch ships, which had been taken by Yillaret on the 19th. From the logs of these ships, the position and course of the French fleet two days before was ascertained ; and Howe, conclud- ing that they would not go near Montagu, who was well to the southward, dismissed the latter from his mind and de- voted himself thenceforth to finding the enemy. This decision challenges criticism, because Montagu's orders were, if unsuccessful in finding the convoy, to abandon his cruise on the 20th and rejoin the admiral off Ushant. If he complied strictly with these instructions, he should not now have been very far from the main fleet. Montagu, however, had seen reason for delaying some days on his cruising ground, and while thus waiting retook some of the Dutch prizes taken hj Villaret and which had escaped recapture by Howe on the 21st. He then first learned of the French sailing, and at the same time that AND BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE. 157 Howe was in pursuit. Instead of making any attempt to rejoin his superior, or to take a position where he midit further the general oljjects of the cruise, he on the 24th or 25th of May bore up for England and anchored at Ply- mouth on the oOth. The British naval historian, James, says this was d(.)ne in compliance with the spirit of his orders. It would be more convincing to Ije told what was the letter of orders that could admit such a construction, and what tlie condition of his ships that could justify for- sakiuL!' the held of action with so strono- a detachment at such a critical moment. His decision, un whatever grounds made, seems not to have met the approval of the govern- ment, and orders were at unce sent for him to sail imme- diately, accompanied by all the ships-of-the-line ready for sea at Plymoutli. He accordingly did sail on the 4th of June with nine ships, and on the Sth reached the rendez- vous appointed by Howe off Ushant, which was also the station indicated by the last instructions of the admiralty to him. On the 3d of June, the day before he left, the '"Audacious" arrived, bringing the first tidings of the nieeting of the fleets on the 28th of Maj, in which she had been disabled. It appears from this account that neither Howe nor Mon- tagu attached sufficient importance to the concentration of the British fleet. Howe's immediate })ursuit might indeed be defended on the oTound of the necessitv to overtake Vil- laret, before he had effected his junction with Nielly ; Ijut, as both these admirals knew their rendezvous, while he did not, and as Villaret had three days' start, the chances all were that he would not come up before they met. x4Lctu- ally, one of Nielly's ships joined before Howe found him, another on the 20th, and the remainder on the 30th ; thus neutralizinix the advanta'j:es trained bv the fine tactical efforts of the British admiral on the 28th and 20th. Had Montagu's six ships, however, come u]), the full profit of the two previous days' fighting would have been preserved ; 158 THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 1794, and it is hard to over-estimate the effect which they would have had upon the results, even if maintained simply as a reserve. To these considerations may be added the risk of missing both fleet and convoy, by going in search of them, instead of simply taking a position near which they must pass, and there uniting the British fleet. That this was very possible is shown by the facts of the chase. " On the 27th, at 9 a.m., having got a few leagues to the north- ward of the latitude in which he had reason to think Yil- laret was cruising, Lord Howe bore up and ran to the eastward, with the wind on the starboard quarter." ^ The fleet had been running on this course, with a fair and ap- parently fresh wind for twenty-one hours, when the French were first seen in the south-south-east. Although no pre- cise data are at hand, it is reasonable to conclude from the above that Howe had gone over a hundred miles to the westward of the French rendezvous, which Yillaret had reached a week before.^ If in the meantime the convoy had appeared, as it perfectly well might, Yillaret would at once have sailed for Brest, and the British admiral would not improbably have lost both fleet and convoy. The question presented is purely strategic. It was cer- tain that the French fleet, if undisturbed, would meet the convoy ; therefore after it had sailed from Brest the two objects of the British were merged into one. There was no occasion thenceforth to remain divided into two detach- ments. For what point precisely the convoy would aim was not known, but Brest and Rocliefort marked the two extreme points of the coast line, between which it would prol)ably arrive. The a]:)proach of so large a body of ships, tied down to a common movement, is necessarily slow. It would be as ignorant of the point where the British would concentrate, as the latter were of the rendez- 1 Jamos, Nav. Hist., vol. i. p. 144. (Ed. 1S78.) 2 Troudo says that he reached his station on the 21st of May. Bat. Nav,. vol. ii. p. 330. AND BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE. 159 vous Avhere the different French detachments were to meet. Fast single ships, well scattered to the westward, might reasonably be expected to meet it and to return to their main body in time to warn this where to look for the prev. That there were no difticalties in this line of action will not, certainly, be contended ; but it was more sure and militarily sounder thus to concentrate the British force of thirty-two ships-of-the-linc in a well chosen position, and with adequate lookouts, than to lead it hither and thither in search of the enemy's whereabouts. It is a singular and instructive fact that from first to last not a single British ship appears to have laid eyes on the convoy from America. Ships both of commerce and war, belonging to other bodies, were taken and retaken in the Bay of Biscay ; but those coming from America wore invisible garments. The strategic aim of the French admiral, after he had been so unfortunate as to be found by the British fleet, was to draw it away from the rendezvous appointed for the convoy. Both his orders and the tactical condition of his fleet forbade the attempt to secure this by bringing the enemy to battle. When first met, the French were to windward, south of the British. If they had been north, with the same advantasfc of the wind, the situation would have been most satisfactory to them ; for the convoy was approaching from the west-south-west, and hy retreating to the northward and westward Tillaret would have led the enemy directly from the position endangering it. As things were, it was impossible t(.t steer to the northward without brin^-imj on the battle he had to avoid ; and if defeated where he then was, the victorious fleet would be left too near the convoy. YiHaret, tliorefore, kept the ad- vantaire of the wind and steered a west course, whicli di- verged slowly from the convoy's path, and, if long enough continued, would allow it to pass out of sight. The slow- ness of this divergence, however, dou])tless contributed to reconcile him to the loss of the weather gage on the 29th, 160 THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 1794, and immediately upon finding himself north of the enemy he went to the northward and westward during the two fol- lowing days.^ The result was eminently successful. It is stated by the latest French authorities ^ that on the 30th the convoy passed over the ground where the partial en- gagement of the 29th was fought. If so, it must have been under cover of the dense fog which then prevailed, as the fleets had not moved very far. It is impossible not to admire heartily the judicious and energetic measures by which Howe, on the 28th and 29th of May, succeeded in gaining the weather gage, while in- flicting, at the same time, a heavy loss upon the enemy. Whatever judgment may be passed upon his tactics on the 1st of June, — and in the opinion of the writer they were the best adapted to the situation and to tlie condition of his fleet, — it cannot be denied that those of the preceding days were well conceived, and, on the part of the admiral, vigor- ously and gallantly executed. But the strategic mistake, or misfortune, wherever the fault lay, by which Montagu's detachment was absent, neutralized the tactical advantage gained ; while the correct strategy of the French, which brought the two parts of their fleet within supporting distance of each other, restored the balance of strength. Thus was again confirmed the maxim of military writers, that a strategic mistake is more serious and far-reaching in its effects than an error in tactics. After the two fleets separated each made the best of its ^ Many years later Admiral Villaret was ft'overnor of Martiuique. AVhen that island was taken by the British in 1809, he went to England as ii pas- senger in ix ship commanded by Capt. E. P. Brenton. This officer in his naval history states that Villaret told him that Robespierre's orders were to go to sea, and that, if the convoy fell into Howe's hands, his head should an- swer for It. Therefore he avoided action so long, and endeavored to draw Lord Howe out of the track of the cunvoy. The loss of the ships taken was to him a matter of comparative indifference. " While your admiral amused himself refitting them, I saved my convoy, and I saved my head." 2 Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 337. Chevalier, Hist, de la Mar. Fran, sous la Rep., p. 144. AND BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE. IGl v/a.y to a home port. Lord Howe waited until the morn- ing of the 3d, securing and refitting his prizes and disa- bled ships, and readied Portsmouth on the 13th of June. Villaret Joyeuse went to Brest. On the morning of the 0th he fell in with Montagu's squadron, a little soutli of Ushant. The condition of the French, encumbered with injured ships, would have afforded an opportunity to a quick-moving fleet ; but two of the Ih'itish were exces- sively slow and the admiral did not dare approach a much superior force. Villaret pursued for a short distance, but, fearing to be drawn to leeward of his port in his crippled state, he soon gave over the chase. On the 11th of June, air his fleet anchored in Bertheaume roads, outside of Brest. Montagu, on the 10th, departed for England, a movement which finally closed tlie campaign on the part of the British. On the night of the 12th the French crews saw a number of lights in the Raz de Sein, the southern passage by which Brest is approached. They were those of the long-expected convoy. Admiral Van Stabel, fearing to find a hostile fleet before the usual and safer entrance, had steered for the Penmarcks, a rocky promontory thirty miles south of the port, and thence for the Raz de Sein. On the same day that Van Stabel made the land Montagu anchored in Plvmouth. Two davs later, June 14, the con- voy and the remnant of Yillaret's squadron entered Brest together. Thus ended the cruise, which was marked, indeed, by a great naval disaster, but had insured the principal object for which it was undertaken. VOL. I. — 11 J CHAPTER YI. The Year 1794 in the Atlantic and on the Continent. WHILE the British ships engaged on the 1st of June were refitting, Admiral Cornwallis, on the i^2d of the month, sailed in command of Montagu's division for a cruise to the westward, from which he returned to port on the 8th of July. With this short exception, hoth the Channel and the Bay of Biscay were left nnguarded until the 3d of September, when Howe again sailed with thirty- four ships-of-the-line, five of which were Portuguese, re- turning on the 21st to Torbay after a tempestuous cruise. The fleet remained in port until November 8, when the " Canada " seventy-four arrived with the news that her consort, the " Alexander," of similar force, had been cap- tured two hundred miles west of Ushant by a French di- vision of live ships-of-the-line, from wliich she herself had escaped by better sailing. The British at once put to sea, but, it is needless to say, failed to find the French ships, which had cruised with impunity during their absence ; and on the 29th the fleet anchored again at Spithead, a station so far to the eastward as to indicate little expecta- tion of interfering with any of the operations of the enemy from Brest. There accordingly it remained until the 14th of the following February. The protection of commerce was entrusted to squadrons of frigates, whose young and enterprising commanders did much service by capturing or dispersing the French forces of a similar character. The Committee of Public Safety determined to use the opportunity which was permitted them by the diligent care of the British admiral to economize his fleet. There THE YEAR 1704 I^ THE ATLANTIC. 163 were, at this time, in Brest and the other Biscay ports as many as forty-six ships-of-the-line, either afloat or building ; whereas in the Mediterranean, in consequence of the disas- ter at Touhjn, there were only fifteen. The Committee therefore decided to send six ships round, and Villaret Joycuse was directed to sail with the entire Brest fleet, thirty-five in all, for the purpose of escorting: this division clear of the Bay of Biscay ; after which he was to cruise for a fortnight against British commerce. The destitution of the Brest arsenal, however, still continued ; for, with the enemy's command of the Channel, the naval stores of the Baltic could reach Brest only by going north of the British islands, and then running the risk of cajiturc in the Atlantic by hostile cruisers. There had therefore been great difficulty in repairing the injuries received in the ac- tions with Lord Howe, as well as in equipping the ships not then engaged. When the orders were received, vivid remonstrances were made, and the condition of the vessels fully represented to the Committee as being entirely unfit for a winter's cruise. Many masts wounded in the battle could not be replaced, the rigging was in bad condition, the crews were untrained. Several of the ships it was proposed to send were old and worn out ; and so great was the dearth of provisions that only those for Toulon received enough for some months, the others for no more than four weeks. Robespierre had fallen five months ])efore, and the Reign of Terror was now over ; but the Committee were still unaccustomed to admit objections, and did not find in their limited knowledge of sea matters any reason for re- calling orders once given. On the 24th of December, 1794, the fleet began to leave Brest, and, in so doing, one of the largest, of one hundred and ten guns, was wrecked on a rock in the entrance. On the 29th the remaining thirty-four had cleared the harbor and anchored in the road outside, whence they sailed on the oOtli. On the night 164 THE YEAR 1791 /iV THE ATLANTIC of January 1, 1795, a furious gale sprang up, followed by a spell of violent weather. Two eighty-gun ships and a seventy-four foundered, the crews being with difficulty saved. Two yet larger, of one hundred and ten guns, had seven feet of water in the hold and would have been lost had the storm lasted for twenty-four hours longer. An- other seventy-four had to be run on the coast to save the lives of her people. In the midst of these difficulties, which caused the separation of the fleet, it was necessary to trans- fer provisions from the Toulon division to the other ships, an herculean undertaking, but imperative to keep the lat- ter from starving. On the 2d of February the greater part of the survivors again reached Brest ; but some had to scatter to other ports as the weather permitted. The Toulon ships returned with the rest. This midwinter cruise had cost the republic five ships-of-the-line ; it brought in one British corvette and seventy merchantmen as prizes. The stars, or rather the winds, in their courses had fought for Great Britain ; but in no wise did she owe any- thing to her own efforts. Not till the lltli of February did the Channel fleet put to sea, nearly a fortnight after the French had returned to Brest. Whatever may be said of the inexpediency of exposing the heavy ships to winter weather, it seems clear that the opposite system left the enemy at perfect liberty to combine his movements ; and that there was little likelihood of these being made known to the commander-in-chief in Torbay soon enough for him to follow efficaciously. Howe himself felt this, and, from instructions issued by him to Sir James Saumarez on the 15th of January, it would appear that this escape of the French roused him for a moment to contemplate the close watch off Brest, afterwards practised by Jervis and Corn- wallis.i This was the last occasion on which the veteran admiral actually went to sea in command of a fleet ; al- ^ Ross's Life of Saumarez, vol. i. p. 146. AND ON THE CONTINENT. 165 though, from an a])parent reluctance to tr}^ new men, the government insisted upon his exercising a nominal charge from quarters on shore. lie was now in his seventieth year and suffering from many infirmities. The command afloat devolved upon a man not much younger, Lord Brid- l>ort, one of the naval family of Hood, but whose career does not bear the impress of great aliility which distin- guished so many of its members. Immediately before tliis, general dissatisfaction had caused a change in the Admi- ralty, over which, since 1788, had presided Pitt's elder brother, the Earl of Chatham. He was succeeded, in December, 1701, by Earl Spencer, a more vigorous and efficient man, who remained First Lord until the fall of Pitt's administration in 1801. The new head, however, did not make any substantial variation of system, calculated to frustrate the enemy's naval combinations Ijy the strategic dispositions of the Brit- ish fleet. More activity was displayed l)y keeping a small squadron of half a dozen ships-of-the-line constantly cruis- ing in the soundings and to the westward, and the great Channel fleet was more continuously at sea during the summer months ; but the close blockade of Brest was not attempted, nor was Bridport the man to persuade the gov- ernment to the measures afterwards so vigorously, and in the main successfully, carried out by Lord St. Vincent, both as successor to Bridport in the Channel licet and sub- sequently as First Lord of the Admiralty. To this faulty policy contributed not a little the system of telegraphs, adopted in 1795, hy which communications were quickly transmitted from height to height Ix'twecn London and Portsmouth. This great improvement unfortunately con- firmed the tendency of the Admiralty to keep the Channel fleet at the latter jtoint, regardless of the obvious, but un- appreciated, strategic disadvantage of a position so far cast of Brest, with winds prevailing from the western quar- ters. To have the commander-in-chief just there, under 106 THE YEAR 1794 TN THE ATLANTIC their own hand, to receive orders from them, seemed much safer than to put him and his fleet in a central position whence he could most certainly intercept or most rapidly follow the enemy, and then to trust to the judgment of a trained and competent sea-officer to act as the emergency required. The plan came near resulting very disastrously when the French attempted to invade Ireland ; and would have done so, had not the elements again interfered to remedy the absence of the British fleet. " If," says Osier in his life of Lord Exmouth,^ from whom he probably re- ceived the idea, " if Lord Bridport (in 1796) had been waiting at Fahiiouth, with discretional powers, Sir Edward Pellew having liteen instructed to communicate directly with him, he might have sailed early on December 21st " (Pellew reached Falmouth from before Brest on the 20th) " and found the enemy in Bantry Bay, when perhaps not a ship would have escaped him. It is, however, to be re- membered that, as the destination of tlie French arma- ment was unknown to the last, the Admiralty might very properly determine that he should receive his final instruc- tions from themselves, and therefore would keep the fleet at Spithead (Portsmouth) for the convenience of ready communication." But why ! How could they in London judge better than a good admiral on the coast ? During the year 1794, now closing, the Revolution in France had been rapidly devouring its children. After the overthrow of the Girondists in June, 1793, the Terror pui-sued its pitiless march, sweeping before it for the time every effort made in behalf of moderation or mercy. The queen was put to death on the 16th of October, and her execution was followed on the 31st by that of those Girondists who had not deigned to escape from their accusers. Dissension next arose and spread among the now triumpliant party of the Jacobins ; resulting in March and April, 1794, in the trial and death of the H^bertists 1 Page 140. AND ON THE CONTINENT. 167 on the one side, and of Danton and his friends on the other. More and more power fell into the hands of the Committee of Public Safety, whose tokens to the world were Robespierre and his chief supporters, St. Just and Couthon, ruling the Convention which passively decreed their wishes, and, through the Convention, France. For three short months Robespierre now ai)peared as tlie master of the country, but was himself carried on and away by the torrent which he had done so much to swell. The exigencies and dangers of his position multiplied tlie precautions he deemed necessary to secure his authority and his safety ; and the cold relentlessness of his cliar- acter recognized no means so sure as death. On the 10th of June, by his sole authority, without the interven- tion of the Committee of Public Safety, he procured a decree modifying the procedure of the Revolutionary Tribunal, and suppressing the few clieeks that restrained its uncontrolled power. In the fourteen montlis preced- ing this decree l!256 persons had been by the tribunal con- demned to death ; in the six weeks that followed, until Robespierre himself fell, the executions were 1361.^ So extreme an access of fury betokened approaching exhaus- tion; no societv could endure the strain; the most violent and blood-thirsty, as well as the most timid, felt their own lives in danger. Citter opposition to the dicta- tor arose both in the Committee of Pul)lic Safety and in the Legislature. The doubtful struggle, between the prestige of his power and long continued success and the various passions of fear and vengeance animating his opponents, culminated in a violent scene in the Conven- tion on the 27th of July. For some hours the issue was balanced, but in the end the arrest and trial of Robespierre and lus chief supporters were decreed. The followins; day he, St. Just and Couthon, witli some others of lesser note, died on the guillotine. 1 jMartin, Hist, de France depuis 17S9, vul. ii. p 240. 168 THE YEAR 179^ IN THE ATLANTIC No immediate change in the form of government ensued. The Committee of Public Safety, reconstituted, continued to exercise the executive functions which nominally de- pended upon the Convention ; and the impulse which it had imparted to the soldiers and armies of France con- tinued for a time to carry them resistlessly forward. But the delirious intensity of the popular movement had reached its climax in the three months' unrestrained power of Robespierre, with whose name it has been ever associ- ated. Though the external manifestations of strength continued for a time unabated, the inner tension was re- laxino-. Weakness was about to succeed the streno'th of fever, to spread from the heart throughout the whole or- ganism, and, by threatening social dissolution, to prepare the way for concentrated absolute power. The onward swing of the French armies on the north- east still continued. The year 1794 had opened with the investment of Landrecy by the allies, and its surrender to them on the oOth of April. The French began their cam- paign with the plan, especially affected by Carnot in all his military combinations, of attacking at the same time both flanks of the allied Austrians, Dutch and English, con- centrating at each extremity of the line a force greatly superior to the enemy before it. As Jourdan, command- ing the French right, threatened the allied stronghold of Charleroi, he drew thither the greater effort of the allies, and Picbegru, on the left, found his task easier. Five times did Jourdan cross the Sambre to attack Char- leroi, and four times was he compelled to re-cross ; but on the fifth, before the allies could come up in sufficient force, the place capitulated, — the guns of the relieving force being heard just as the garrison was marching out. The following day, June 26, 1794, Jourdan fought and won the battle of Fleurus ; tlie Austrians retreating upon Nivclles towards the future field of Waterloo. The allies on both flanks continued to fall back ; Ostend and AXD OX THE COSTINEXT. 169 Nieuport, ports on the Xorth Sea facilitating communi- cation with England, were successively surrendered, and Brussels uncovered. On the 10th of July Pichegru en- tered Brussels and formed his junction with Jourdan. On the 15th the allies lost Landrecy, the first and only prize of the campaign. On the same day the French at- tacked in force the centre of the allied line, wh(jre the Anglo-Dutch left touched the Austrian right. The former being gradually turned fell back, and the xVustrians, find- ing their flank uncovered, did the same. From this time the allies retired in diveruent directions, the Anudo-Dutch northeast toward Holland, the Austrians eastward toward Coblentz ; thus repeating in retreat the unmilitaiy and ruinous mistake which had rendered abortive the offensive campaign of 1793, The French advance was now stayed ])y the Committee of Puljlic Safety, in deference to an emotion of patriotism, until the towns surrendered the year Ijefore should l)e retaken. On the 11th of August Le Quesnoy opened its gates, on the 27th Valenciennes, and on the 30th Conde. The siege corps now rejoined the armies in the field and the advance was resumed ; Pichegru following the British and Dutch toward Holland, Jourdan, l)y a series of Hank attacks which threatened the communications of the Aus- trians, forcing the latter from one position to another, until on the 5th Oct(jber they recrosscd to the east side of the Rliine, tlie French occupying Cotdentz and Bonn on the west bank. The advance of Pichegru was marked 1.)y less of battle and more of siege than that of Jourdan, but was alike successful. By the middle of October his army had reached the Rhine ; which in Holland divides into two brandies, the Waal and the Leek, Ijctwcen which the enemv lay. A month later thev had retreated bevond the latter, the French lieimr for a moment stopped Ijy the float- ing ice in the rivers ; but the winter was one of unusual severity, and early in January the waters were frozen 170 THE YEAR 179Jt IN THE ATLANTIC hard. On the 17th of January, 1795, the Prince of Orange left Holland for England, and on the 20th Pichcgru entered Amsterdam. The provinces and cities everywhere declared for the French, and a provisional re- publican government was established ; while the pursuit of tlie British troops was continued with unremitting dili- gence until they had escaped into German territory, wdience they returned, in April, to England. The occupation of Belgium and Holland by the French was in every way a matter of concern to the other Euro- pean powers. It threatened Great Britain in the North Sea, where her flank had previously been strengthened by the Dutch alliance, and compelled her at once to weaken the Channel fleet by a detachment of five ships-of-the-line to confront the Dutch squadrons. The merchants of Holland being among the great money-lenders of Europe, large revenues were opened to the needy French ; and the resources thus gained by them were by the same blow lost to the allies. Great Britain thenceforth had to bear alone tlie money burden of the war. But on the other hand the republican commissaries sucked like leeches the sub- stance of the Dutch ; and the sources of their wealth, commerce and the colonies, were at the same time threat- ened with extinction by the British sea power, whose immediate hostility was incurred b}^ the change in their political relations. Within a month, on the 9th of Feb- ruary, orders were issued to arrest all Dutch ships at sea ; temporary provision being made to restore neutral property found on board them, because shipped while Holland was an ally. Vigorous measures were at once taken for the seizure of the rich Dutch colonies in all parts of the world ; and before the year 1795 closed, there passed into the hands of Great Britain the Cape of Good Hope, Malacca, all the Dutch possessions on the continent of India, and the most important places in Ceylon ; the whole island submitting in 1796. Besides these, other AND ON THE CONTINENT. 171 colonies were taken in the farther East and in the West Indies. The Dutch navy remained inoffensively in its ports until the year 1797, with the exception of a small expedition that escaped from the Texel in February, 1796, prepared to retake the Cape of Good Hope. Unable to i^o through the English Channel, which was comjilctely under the enemy's control, it passed north of the Britisli Islands and eluded capture until Saldanha Bay, near the Cape, was reached. Upon hearing of its arrival the British admiral on that station sailed in pursuit, and, having a greatly superior force, received its instant surrender. The success that followed the French standards in Bel- gium and Holland during 1791 accompanied the less striking operations on the Rhine and in the South. At the end of the year the Austrians and Prussians had abandoned the west bank of the river, except Luxembourg and the very important fortress of Maycnce. Luxembourg also was closely invested, and capitulated in June, 1795. In the Pyrenees, the Spaniards were driven across the fron- tiers, and had, in the early autumn, established themselves in a strong entrenched camp at Figueras. On the 17th and 20th of November the French assaulted this position, and on the latter day drove the enemy from all their works round the place, forcing them to retreat upon Gerona. The garrison of Figueras, ten thousand strong, capitulated a week later, and the French then invested Rosas, which held out for two months longer ; but the resistance of Spain was completely broken, and the further events of the war in that quarter are unimportant. On the Italian frontier the year opened with substantial successes on the part of the French, who got possession of important mountain passes of the Alps ; but progress here was stopped, in May, by reverses attending the operations on the Rhine, causing troops to be withdrawn from tlie Army of the Alps. The belligerents rested in the same relative positions during the remainder of 1791. 172 THE YEAR 179^ IN THE ATLANTIC. The important political results of the French military successes in the campaign of 1794 were demonstrated and sealed by treaties of peace contracted in 1795 with Prussia, Spain, and Holland. That with the latter power was one not only of peace, but also of alliance, offensive and defensive. The principal naval conditions were that the United Prov- inces should furnish twelve ships-of-the-line, with frigates, to cruise in the North Sea and Baltic, and should admit a French garrison into the important seaport of Flushhig. This treaty was signed May 15, 1795. The Prussian treaty was concluded on the 5th of April. It stipulated, gen- erally, the surrender of Prussian possessions on the left bank of the Rhine, and by a later agreement established a neutral zone in North Germany under Prussian guarantee. The treaty with Spain was signed at Basle on the 22d of July. It maintained the integrity of the Spanish posses- sions in Europe, but provided for the cession to France of Spain's part of Haiti. On the other hand, Great Britain during the same year drew closer the ties binding her to her still remaining allies. An agreement was made in May with the emperor of Germany that he should provide not less than two hun- dred thousand men for the approaching campaign, while Great Britain was to pay a large subsidy for their support. This was followed by a treaty of defensive alliance, each government engaging not to make a separate peace. With Russia also was made a defensive alliance, and the czarina sent twelve ships-of-the-line to cruise with the British fleet in the North Sea. CHAPTER VII. The Year 1795 in the Atlantic and on the Continent. THE year 1795 was for France one of reaction and las- situde. The wave of popular ferment which had been rushing forward since the fall of the royalty, gathering- strength and volume, and driving before it all wills and all ambitions, crested and broke in July, 1794. Like the breakers of the seashore, a part of the accumulated mo- mentum was expended in a tumultuous momentary ad- vance, of increased force but diminishing depth, and then recession followed. The forward and backward impulses met and mingled, causing turmoil and perplexing cur- rents of popular feeling, but the pure republican move- ment had reached the highest point it was destined to at- tain. It had stirred France to its depths, and brought to the surface many a gem which under quieter conditions would have remained hidden from the eyes of men ; but, in the confusion and paralysis which followed, these were left stranded and scattered, waiting for the master hand which should combine them and set each in its proper sphere for the glory of France. The recoil which followed the death of Robespierre took shape in several ways, all tending at once to lessen the in- ternal vigor of the government, and to deprive it of means liitherto possessed for external effort. The revulsion to mercy provoked by his bloody tyranny was accompanied by sentiments of vengeance against the men who were, or were supposed to be, identified with his policy. The in- dulgence extended to those before proscribed brought them back to France in numbers, clamorous for revenge. These 174 THE YEAR 1795 IN THE ATLANTIC discordant sentiments, agitating the Convention as well as the people, the provinces as well as Paris, shattered that unity of purpose which had been the strength of the gov- ernment after the fall of the Girondists, and during the domination of the Jacobins. At the same time were re- voked the measures by which the Revolutionary Govern- ment, living as it did from hand to mouth, had provided for its immense daily necessities. The law of the Max- imum, by which dealers were forbidden to charge beyond a certain fixed price for the prime necessaries of life, was re- pealed. The paper money, already depreciated, fell rapidly, now that the seller could demand as much as he wished for articles of universal consumption. The government, obliged to receive the assignats at their face value in pay- ment of dues, sought to meet its difficulty by increased issues, wdiich accelerated the decline. At the same time, requisitions in kind having been suppressed, as part of the reaction from a rule of force, supplies of all sorts were with difficulty obtained. Distress, lack of confidence, abounded in all directions ; speculation ran riot, and the government, having relaxed the spring of terror, that most powerful of mo- tives until it becomes unendurable, found itself drifting into impotence. These various measures were not completed till near the end of 1794 ; and the evil effect was, therefore, not immediately felt in the armies, — whose wants were also in part supplied by liberal demands upon their new allies in Holland. Boissi d'Anglas, in a speech made Jan- uary 30, 1795, in the Convention, and adopted by that body as voicing its own sentiments, declared that the armies would demonstrate to Europe that, far from being ex- hausted by the three years of war, France had only aug- mented her resources. The year then opening was to witness to the emptiness of the boast, until Bonaparte by his military genius laid the Continent again at her feet. The internal history of France during this year, though marked by many and important events, can be briefly AND ON THE CONTINENT. 175 summed up. The policy of reconciliation towards the classes who had most suffered under Jacobin rule was pursued by the government ; but against the party lately dominant the reaction that set in was marked by many and bloody excesses. If in the North and West the insur- gent Yendeans and Chouans accepted the proffered pardon of the Convention, in the South and East the reactionary movement produced a terror of its own ; in which })er- ished, hy public massacre or private assasshiation, several thousand persons, many of whom had not been terrorists, but simply ardent republicans. In Paris, the Jacobins, though depressed and weakened by the loss of so many of their leaders, did not at once succumb ; and the tendency to agitation was favored in that great centre l)y the i)0v- erty of the people and the scarcity of food. On the 1st of April, and again on the 20th of May, the halls of the Con- vention were invaded l;>y crowds of men, women and chil- dren, demanding bread and the constitution of ITOo. On the latter occasion a member of the Convention was shot while endeavoring to cover the president with his body, and the greater part of the deputies fled from tlie hall. Those who remained, belonging mostly to the old Mountain, voted certain propositions designed to calm the people ; but the next day the crowd was driven out ]ty the national guard from some sections of the city, and the reaction re- sumed its course with increased force and renewed thirst for vengeance. The deputies who had remained and voted the propositions of May 20 were impeached, and the arrest was ordered of all members of the Committees which had governed during the Terror, except Carnot and one other. Tlie following month, June, the project for a new con- stitution was submitted to the Convention, and by it adopted on the 22d of August. It provided for an Execu- tive Directory of five members, and a Legislature of two Chambers ; the upper to be called the Council of the Elders, the lower the Council of Five Hundred. To this scheme 176 THE YEAR 1795 IN THE ATLANTIC of a constitution, the Convention appended a decree that two thirds of the new Legislature must be taken from the members of the existing Convention. The Constitution and the decree were submitted to the country in September. The Provinces accepted both, but Paris rejected the decree ; and the protest against the hitter took form on the 4th of October in the revolt of the Sections, — a movement of the bourgeoisie and reactionists against the Convention, which on this occasion fell back for support upon the party identified with the Jacobins. The defence of the Hall of Legislature and of its members was entrusted to Barras, who committed the military command to General Bona- parte, from whose skilful dispositions the assault of the Sections evervwhere recoiled. On the 26th of October the National Convention dissolved, after an existence of three years and one month. On the 27th the new Legislature be- gan its sittings ; and the upper council at once elected the Executive Directory. Among its five members was Carnot. On the sea the year 1795 was devoid of great or even striking events. On the 22d of February the six ships des- tined for Toulon, which had been driven back early in the month with the rest of the Brest fleet, again set sail under the command of Admiral Renaudin, and, although much delayed by heavy westerly winds in the Atlantic, reached their destination in safety early in April. Not an enemy's ship was seen on the way. The Channel fleet had gone back to Spithead as soon as Howe learned that the Brest fleet had returned to port after the disastrous January cruise ; while in the Mediterranean the British, now under Admiral Hotham, were at anchor in a roadstead of Cor- sica when Renaudin drew near Toulon. This made the French in the Mediterranean twenty to the British thir- teen. " What the new Lords of the Admiralty are after," Avrote Nelson, " to allow such a detachment to get out here, surprises us all." ^ 1 Nels. Disp., ii,, p. 32. AND ON THE CONTINENT. 177 Under the new admiralty small divisions of the Channel fleet continued to cruise to the westward or in the Bay of Biscay ; but not until the 12th of June did the main body, under Lord Bridp(>rt, put to sea. Ten days later, num- bering then fourteen sail-of-the-line, it fell in with Yil- laret's fleet of twelve ships close in with its own coast, about eighty miles south of Brest. This meeting was due to a succession of incidents which are worthy of narration, as showing the conditions of the war and the prostration of the French navy. The supplies of the squadron at Brest and L'Orient, as well as much of the local traffic of the country, were carried by small coasting vessels rather than by inland roads. A division of three ships-of-the-line was sent to protect a numerous convov comina' from Bor- deaux. On the 8th of June these vessels encountered the British division of five ships cruising in the Bay of Biscay, which took from it eight of the convoy before they could escape under the land. When news of this reached Brest, Villaret was ordered to take the nine ships that alone were then reaely for sea and join the other three. This junction ' was made, and on the 16th of June the twelve again fell in with the British five, which, after temporarily withdrawing, had returned to their cruising ground. Chase was of course given, and as two of the British sailed very badly there was a good }>rospcct that either they would be taken, or the rest of the division compelled to come down to their aid ; which, with the disparity of force, ought to result in the capture of the whole. The admiral, Cornwallis, be- haved with the utmost firmness and coolness ; but with such odds and the disadvantage of speed, no courage nor conduct can avert some disaster. The inefficiency and bad gunnery of the French saved their enemies. After a cannonade which lasted from nine in the forenoon of the 17th until six in the evening, one British ship had thirteen men wounded, and Yillaret abandoned the pursuit. Five days later Bridport's fleet was sighted, and the VOL. I. — 12 178 THE YEAR 1795 IN THE ATLANTIC French being inferior stood in for their coast, intending to anchor and await action under the island called Groix. The pursuit continued with light airs all daj'- and night; but at daybreak of June 23 the fastest British were within three miles of the slowest of the French, which opened fire at six A. M. All Villaret's signals could not bring his fleet into line, nor induce the undoubtedly brave, but ill-trained, men who commanded the faster ships to take station for the support of the slower. A desultory action continued till half-past eight, ending in the capture of three French vessels, the last hauling down her flag within a mile of lie Groix. Bridport then called his ships off. It is the opinion of French writers, apparently shared Ijy English critics,^ that if he had pursued energetically, the remainder of the enemy must either have been taken or run ashore to avoid that fate. As it was, Villaret was permitted to get into L'Orient without molestation, although to do so he had to wait till the tide served. Such was the extreme circum- s])ection characterizing the early naval operations of the British, until Jervis and Nelson enkindled their service with the relentless energy of spirit inspired by Bonaparte on land. Those to whom St. Vincent and the Nile, Alo;e- siras and Copenhagen, have become history, see with aston- ishment nine ships of capital importance permitted to escape thus easily from fourteen ; forgetting the hold tradi- tion has on the minds of men, and that it belongs to genius to Ojjcn the way into which others then eagerly press. How tlie admiralty viewed Bridport's action may be inferred from his retaining command of the fleet until April, 1800. The sliips that reached L'Orient had to remain till the win- ter, when they slipped back two or three at a time to Brest. The disaster at lie Groix, with some similar small mis- fortunes in the Mediterranean,^ accompanied as they were "^ Chevalier, Mar. Fran, sims la Rep. p. 216. Life of Adm. Codriugton, Tol. i. ])]>. 36, 37. ^ Hijii poul, Chap. VIIL, Martin's actiuus witli Hotham. AND ON THE CONTINENT. 179 by evidences, too plain to be any longer overlooked, of the inefficiency both of officers and men in the French fleets, determined the government to a]:)andon all attempt to con- test the supremacy of the sea. To this contributed also the extreme destitution, in the dockyards, of all sorts of stores for equipment or provision. With the English Channel and the forests of Corsica in the hands of Great Britain, the customary sources of supply were cut off ; and moreover the providing for the navy — not the most cher- ished of the national institutions — met with the same difli- culty as was experienced by other branches of the public service in the depreciation of the assignats, with which alone naval administrators could pay contractors. At the end of 1795 twelve hundred francs in paper were worth scarce twenty in gold. Having accepted naval inferiority as a necessary condition, the Committee of Public Safety resolved to maintain the great fleets in the [torts simply as a threat to the encmv, and to send to sea onlv small divi- sions to prey upon his commerce and to levy tribute upon his colonies. From the end of 1795 forward, this policy prevailed and was finally accepted even by the emperor after several attempts, fruitless through the incompetence of his sea- officers, to realize on the sea that employment of great masses in v^hich he so wonderfully excelled on land. The reluctance of his supreme genius to accede to this system of petty war may be accepted as testimony that on sea, as on shore, great results can only be expected by wielding great masses. Upon this conclusion history too has set its seal ; for the squadron and di\'ision warfare of the French navy, seconded thouuh it was by hosts ^f commerce- destroyers, public and private, produced practically no re- sults, had absolutely no effect upon the issue of the war. On the other hand, that Napoleon^ when convinced that ho could expect nothing decisive from his fleet, accepted tiie use of it as a means of harassment or of diversion, must 180 THE YEAR 1795 IN THE ATLANTIC be received as a weighty indication of the naval policy suited to the inferior power. To assume a menacing atti. tude at many points, to give effect to the menace by fre- quent and vigorous sorties, to provoke thus a dispersion of the enemy's superior force, that he may be led to expose detachments to attack by greater numbers, — such must be the outline of conduct laid down for the weaker navy. But that such a course may be really effective, — that the infe- rior may, as in some of Bonaparte's wonderful campaigns, become ultimately su})erior, — there must be at some fitly chosen point of the sea frontier a concentrated body of ships ; whose escape, if effected, may be the means of in- flicting a great disaster upon the enemy by crushing one or more of the exposed fractions of his fleet. Unless there be such a central mass, mere dissemination is purposeless. Inferiority carried beyond a certain degree becomes impo- tence ; nor will all the commerce-destroyers fancy can pic- ture restore the balance to the nation hopelessly weaker in ships of the line-of-battle. On land as well as on sea weakness was stamped on the military movements of the year 1795. Its diplomatic suc- cesses were due to the arms of 1794. Early in the year Pichcgru was removed from Holland to the upper Rhine, being succeeded by Moreau. Between the armies com- manded by these two lay that of the Sambre and Meuse, still under Jourdan, concentrated on tlie left bank of the Rhine between Dusseldorf and Coblentz. It was provided that, in case of tlie three armies acting together, the chief command should be with Pichegru. The removal of the restraint enforced by the Terror was evidenced in these Northern forces by the number of desertions during the severity of this unusual winter. In the army of Italy the case was even worse ; and the frightful destitution of the soldiers, made known a year later in Bonaparte's cele- brated proclamation upon taking command, led to even greater losses from the ranks. Toward the end of Janu- AND OX THE COXTIXEXT. ISl ary seventeen thousand men were detached from this army to Tuuhjn to take part in a projected invasion of Corsica. The expedition never sailed ; but such was the horror in- spired by the sufferings they had undergone that the hardi- est sohliers forsook their colors, and of two fine divisions not ten thousand men rejoined the army.^ Under such conditi(jns military operations could not Init be sluggish; the genius of a Bonaparte was need('d to su^)- ply the impetus which the emasculated centi-al government could no longer impart. The great Carnot, als<.), had been removed from the direction of the war, Mai-ch 4, 1705, under the law prescriljing periodic changes of mem})ers in the Committee of Public Safetv. The fall of Luxembourg, already mentioned, was oljtained only by the slow process of blockade. Not till September, when the season was nearly over, did the French armies move ; Jourdan and Pichegru being then directed to undertake a concerted in- vasion, from their widely separated positions, intending to form a junction in the enemy's country. Jourdan crossed the Rhine, advanced south as far as the Main, and invested Mayence, the Austrians retiring before him. Pichegru re- ceived the capitulation of ^lannheim, which opened its gates upon the threat of bombardment without receiving a shot. He showed no vigor in following this success, and Ins dilatory ill-combined movements permitted the Austrian general, CUairfayt, to concentrate his armies in a central position between the Main and Maimheim, parting the two French leaders. The new direction of war, either through folly, or from sharing the growing inetticiency of the gen- eral government, had failed to accumulate the sup])lies of all kinds needed by the masses thus gathered in a wild and impoverished region. Clairfayt combined a powerful move- ment against the destitute and suffering armv of Jourdan, compelling him to retreat and recross the Rhine. Leaving a corps of observation before him and holding Pichegru in ^ Jomiui, Guerres de la Rev., livre A"iii. p. 74. 182 THE YEAR 1795 IN THE ATLANTIC check on the south, he then hhiiself crossed the river at MajTnce and assaulted vigorously the lines on the left bank with which the enemy during the past year had sur- rounded the place. The blockading forces were driven back in divergent directions ; and the Austrians in increas- ing numbers poured into the countiy west of the river, sep- arating Jourdan from Pichegru. It was at this moment that the National Convention was dissolving and the Directory assuming the reins of govern- ment. Carnot became one of its five members. Impressed by the importance of retaining Mannheim, the loss of which was threatened bv the recent reverses, he sent urg-ent or- ders to Jourdan to move south to the support of his col- league, using his own judgment as to the means. It was too late. The mingled weakness and ignorance of the pre- ceding:: government had caused a destitution of means and an inferiority of force wholly inadequate to cope with the superior strategic position of the Austrian masses. Mann- heim, which had surrendered on the 20th of September, was regained on the 22d of November by the Austrians, who at once re-enforced the troops on the west bank, acting against Pichegru, while Clairfayt pushed further back the other French army. With this success his brilliant opera- tions closed for the year. The weather had become exces- sively bad, causing great sickness ; and on the 19th of De- cember he proposed an armistice, wliich Jourdan was only too glad to accept. The Austrians, who when the year opened were east of the Rhine, remained in force on the west bank, holding well-advanced positions based upon Mayence and Mannheim, — the two capital places for sustaining operations on either side of the river. The suspension of arms lasted until May 30, 1796, when the French, having given the notification required by the terms of the armistice, again crossed the river and began hostilities. But, although great and instructive military events followed this new undertaking, the centre of interest AND ON THE CONTINENT. 183 had Ijy this time shifted from the north and east to the Italian frontier of the repuljlic, where the successes of JJonaparte enchained it until the Peace of Campo Forniio dissolved the coalition against France. That dazzlim:' ca- reer had begun which ])ecomes, thenceforth nntil its close, the main thread of Freucli history, to which other incidents have to be referred, and by following which their mutual relations are most easil}' understood. We have reached tlierefure the period when a naval narrative reverts nat- urally to the Mediterranean ; for 13(,)naparte's Italian cam- paigns profoundly aftected the political and maritime conditions in that sea. Upon it also he next embarked for the extraordinary enterprise, condemned by many as chi- merical, and yet so signally stamped l»y the characteristics of his genius, in which he first came into collision with the Sea Power of Cirreat Britain, destined to ruin his career, and with the great seaman in whom that Sea Power found the highest expression it has ever attained. "Daring the year 1795," says the distinguished military historian of these wars, " France, after a twelvemonth of victory, came near losing all her conquests ; threatened with a dangerous internal reaction, she only with difficulty succeeded in freeing herself from emliarrassments and modifying the defects of her institutions. The next year we shall find her launched in a yet vaster career, by the great captain who so long presided over her destinies, who raised her to the pinnacle of glory by his victories, and thence plunged her to the abyss through disregard of justice and moderation." ^ 1 Jomini, Guerres de la Ke'v., livre ix. p. 341. CHAPTER VIII. The Mediterranean and Italy. — From the Evacuation op Toulon in 1793 to the British Withdrawal from that Sea, in 179(3, and the Battle of Cape St. Vincent, Feb- ruary, 1797. — Austria Forced to Make Peace. AFTER the evacuation of Toulon, on the 19th of Decern ber, 1793, Lord Hood had taken his fleet to Hyeres Roads, — an anchorage formed by the group of islands of the same name a few miles east of Toulon. There he re- mained during the greater part of January, revictualling his ships and considering what steps should next be taken to assure British interests in the Mediterranean. It is essential to a fleet, as to an army, to have always near at hand depots of supplies, upon which it can depend to replace the consumption of the limited stores carried on board, and to which it can resort for refit. The way from the depots to the fleet, or the army, technically called the communications, should be such as can most easily be de- fended by the armed force itself, without impairing its lib- erty in movements necessary to obtain the objects of the war. In other words, this depot, or base, should be near the scene of operations and, when practicable, so situated that the fleet, while actively engaged, interposes directly or in- directly between it and the enemy. Nearness was doubly important in the days of sailing ships, whose movements depended upon the fickle element of the wind ; for then a ship going in for refit not only took more time to perform the voyage, but also in returning made a heavier draft upon her resources, and consequently could remain a shorter period at the seat of war. THE MEDITERRAXEAN AXD ITALY. 185 Toulon, while securely held, served as such a base; al- though, being exposed to overpowering attack from the land side, its situation called for excessive expenditure of effort. Toulon was, however, now lost, and the British were thrown back ujion Gibraltar, at the very entrance of the Mediterranean, and nine hundred miles from the seat of hostilities, for a secure depot in which to land stores and a safe anchorage for transports and cri|)plcd ships-of-war. Although the possession of a strong })lacc, suited in itself for a Ijase, may decide the character of operations projected, logically the necessary operations should first Ije determined, and the clujice of the base be decided l)y them. In the Mediterranean, as elsewhere generally at this time, the policy of Great Britain ^vas to control the sea for the protection of commerce, and to sustain on shore the con- tinental powers in the war against France, — chietly hy money, but also by naval co-operation when feasible. To support the land warfare, her diplomatic negotiations strove to unite, in the general military effort, as many as possible of the small independent states into which Italy was divided, to promote among them miity of action, and to foster the sense of security, in taking a decided step against France, which they could only derive from the presence among them of a strong power, such as Great Britain showed in her lleet. Neither their traditions nor the character of their rulers enabled them to comljine strongly as equals ; nor, as has before been said, was there any one state so predominant as to give a nucleus around which the others could gather. The only possible centre was Great Britain, present as a power in her fleet. More- over, if unable, as she proved, to stir them up to positive, harmonious, concerted action, it was her interest to impose upon them a benevolent neutrality towards herself and her allies, and to deter them from inimical measures into which they might otherwise be impelled by the demands of the republic and their fear of the French army. Friendly 186 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY ports along the whole coast were essential for the security of her shipping and the promotion of her commerce. Finally, it must be added that the character of the shore between Nice and Genoa, interposing between the French and Austrian armies, particularly favored direct naval co- operation. The Maritime Alps and the Apennines, cominf>" down close to the sea, left but a single narrow, and yet long, line of communications along the beach, traversed by a very bad road, in many parts under fire from the sea.i This condition made the armies using that line chiefly dependent for supplies upon coasters, whose movements ships-of-war could harass and impede, — though not, when sailing vessels, entirely stop. Corsica, in its existing political conditions of revolt against France under the leadership of Paoli, appeared to offer the strategic situation which Hood was seeking. It was near and centrally placed with reference to the probable operations on shore ; San Fiorenzo Bay, which became the chief anchorage for the fleet, being equidistant, about one hundred miles, from Nice and from Genoa. Leghorn also, one of the greatest depots of British trade in the Mediterranean and the seaport of Tuscany, over which Great Britain wished to enforce her influence, was but sixty miles from Cape Corso at the northern extremity of the island. All the trade with northern Italy had to pass close to Corsica, and was consequently exposed to capture if the seaports remained in French hands; espe- cially as calms prevail around the island, facilitating the operations of row-galleys and neutralizing the powers of a sailing navy. Being an island, Corsica depended upon the control of the sea ; and, though its size and rugged surface precluded conquest, there was believed to be a disposition to accept the protection of Great Britain as the only means of dispossessing the French troops, who 1 L'horrihle route de la Cornicho sous le feu des cannonieres anglaises. — Jojiixi, Guerres de la Rev., livre x. p. 62. TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VIXCEyT. 18T still held the seaports of San Fiorenzo, Bastia, and Calvi. Sir Gilbert Elliott, who had been the Civil Commissioner of Great Britain in Toulon during the last month of its occupation, left ETyercs Bay early in January to confer with Paoli, who had proposed the annexation of the island to the British crown. His enthusiastic reception by the people and the assurances of the Corsican chieftain convinced him that the measure was sincerelv desired ; and in consequence of his representations. Hood, on the 24th of January, sailed from Hyeres with his whole fleet for San Fiorenzo Bay. The weather proving very tem[)estuous, and the three-decked ships, of which there were several, being ill-fitted to contend with it, the admiral was forced to take them to Porto Ferrajo in Elba, and to send against San Fiorenzo a detachment only. This appeared off the place on the Tth of February ; and after a series of com- bined operations, in which the navy bore a very conspicu- ous share on land, the French evacuated the town and works on the 19th of the month, retreating upon Bastia. The admiral then urged an attack upon Bastia ; but the general thought he could not spare enough men. Nelson, Avho had been blockading there for some time, strongly represented the feasibility of the enteri)rise ; and, after a sharp altercation between the two commanders-in-chief, Hood determined to undertake the siege with the navy and the troops who were serving on board as marines. The landing began on the 3d of April ; but the ])lace held out till the 21st of May, when it capitulated. Calvi was next taken in hand, the operations beginning on the 19th of June, and ending with its surrender on the 10th of Ausrust. The whole island was thus freed from the presence of French troops, — a result due almost wholly to the navy, although the army bore a share in the operations at San Fiorenzo and Calvi. To the determi- nation of Hood and the ardent representations of Nelson 188 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY was due that Bastia was besieged at all ; and, as thirty- five hundred regular troops then surrendered to an outside force of fourteen hundred seamen and marines, the opinion of Sir Gilbert Elliott that " the blockade of the port was the chief means of reducing it," can scarcely be disputed. At the siege of Calvi Nelson lost his right eye. Between the siege of Bastia and that of Calvi, the General Assembly of Corsica met, and on the 19th of June, 1794, tendered the insular crown to the king of Great Britain. With the successful issue of the military operations, this political act consummated the possession of the island. But, to quote the words of Elliott, the claim to Corsica rested upon superior force,^ and by that only could be asserted ; and this superior force the British government failed to provide. The love of the people for Paoli, and the period of anxiety through which he and they had passed, caused the connection to be eagerly de- sired, and accepted with demonstrations of the warmest delight ; but as security succeeded the sense of danger, the first-love between nations so radically distinct in tempera- ment and institutions was followed by the symptoms attending ill-assorted unions. Still, with prompt action and strong garrisons, the benefit of the foreign occupa- tion might have been manifest, dissatisfaction miglit have yielded to considerations of interest, and the island been retained. The British government acted slowly. Elliott had urged tliat authority should be sent him beforehand to take over tlie executive functions at once, as soon as the Act of Union passed ; instead of which, Paoli was left for four months in his old position, and developed a jealousy of his destined successor not unprecedented in the heads of states. This feeling, which he held with Corsican inten- sity, communicated itself to his followers ; and an inaus- picious division of sentiment already existed when, in Oc- tober, after an interval of four months, Elliott received his 1 Life of Lord Mintu, vol. ii. p. 274. TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT. 189 powers as viceroy. Paoli continued for a year longer to reside in Corsica, and up to the time of his departure ^yas a cause of trouble to the viceroy, and so of stren^rth to the partisans of France, who became numerous. During the year 179-1 the superior importance of the operations on the frontiers of Belgium and Germany, as well as in Spain, caused the French armies of Italy and the Alps to remain quiet, after some early successes which had placed in their hands the chief passes of the moun- tains and advanced their line on tlie coast as far as Vado, on the borders of Genoese territory. Early in 1T95 a force of eighteen thousand men was detached to Toulon for the invasion of Corsica ; but, although the French had in the port fifteen ships-of-the-line, they felt that neither the admiral nor the officers possessed the tactical skill necessary to handle the fleet in presence of an enemy of nearly equal force, if encumbered with a large body of transports. The case reproduced that of Conflans, when expected in 1759 to cover the Frencli invasion of England. As a rule, in combined military and naval expeditions the fleet and the armv should start toj2:ether ; but the tactical embarrassment of transports is indisputable. If the fleet cannot encounter the enemy successfully when not so ham- pered, it but encourages disaster to incur the meeting with tliem in company. Not improperly, in such a case of doulit, it was decided that the Toulon fleet should sail alone ; and, accordingly, on the 2d of March, 1795, Admiral Martin pat to sea with fifteen of the line, seven frigates, and five smal- ler vessels. Despite these respectable numbers, the efti- ciency of the force was poor. Out of twelve thousand officers and men on board the ships-of-the-line, seventy- five hundred had never before been to sea ; and Martin reported that, deducting officers and petty-officers, lie had but twenty-seven hundred seamen to man the fleet.^ Hood had gone home the previous November, expecting 1 Chevalier, Mar. Fran, sous la Rep., p. 174. 190 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY to return ; and the British were now commanded by Ad- miral Ilotham. The latter had cruised off Toulon for three weeks in mid-winter, on account of the indications of the French coming out, and after a succession of most violent weather returned to San Fiorenzo Bay on the 10th of Jan- uary. He sailed again, apparently about the 22d of the month, to cover a convoy expected from England, leaving in port the " Berwick," seventy -four ; which, through the carelessness of her ofticers, had been permitted to roll her masts overboard at her anchors. After some more hard cruising, the fleet put into Leghorn on the 25th of Feb- ruary, leaving still in San Fiorenzo Bay the " Berwick," the delay in whose repairs can only be attributed to the penury of naval resources. The presence of the fleet in Leghorn was probaljly necessary both for its own supphes and to remind the wavering Tuscany of the power of Great Britain at her doors ; but the " Berwick " incident served powerfully to illustrate the far-reaching effects of individ- ual carelessness and the impolicy of exposing small de- tachments not covered, directly or indirectly, by the main bodv. On the 7th of March the French fleet came in sidit of Gape Corso, and almost at the same moment discovered the " Berwick," which had only the previous day succeeded in leaving San Fiorenzo for Leghorn. Being still crippled, she was easily overtaken, and forced to surrender at noon. The following day Hotham in Leghorn learned that the enemy had sailed, and the next morning at dawn put to sea in pursuit. On the 11th the two fleets came in sight of each other, the French far south and to windward of the British, out of gun-shot, and thus continued during the 12th. That nin-ht one of the French seventv-fours lost a topmast and parted company, reducing tlieir numbers to fourteen. The followino; mornins: the '' Oa-L-a," an eiu'htv- gun ship, ran into her next ahead, losing both fore and main topmasts, and thus became the source of anxiety and danger which a crippled ship ever is in the fleet to which TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT. 191 she belongs. As she dro|.i)ecl out of the line, a British frigate ran close to her on the side encumbered ^vith the fallen spars, annoying her there for some time with com- parative impunity, and was then succeeded by Xelson in the " Agamemnon," who lumg about on Jier quarters until several ships bore down to her relief. During the night the " Sans Culottes," of one hundred and twenty guns, the heaviest vessel in the French fleet, dropped out of the line to leeward, and in the morning was out of sight. The " (^'a-Ira " was taken in tow l^y the " Censeur," seventy-four, and at daybreak tlicse two were some distance from, and to the north-east of, their fleet. Both parties were at this time much scattered from the irregularities of the wind ; but it shifting now to the north- west favored the British, and those nearest the separated ships speedily brought them to action. While this partial engagement was going on, both fleets shaped their course for the scene, the French intending to cover the " Cen- seur " and '' Ca-Ira " by passing between them and the British, but owino: to some misunderstandinii' this was not done. As the two vans went slowly by on opposite tacks, a sharp exchange of shots took place, in which the British, not being well closed up, were overmatched, and two of their number suffered severely ; but as the French allowed the enemy to interpose between them and the disaljled ves- sels, these were forced to surrender after a very gallant resistance, in which they lost four hundred men and were partially dismasted. Each fleet continuing its course in opposite directions, they soon separated and passed out of sight. The baffling character of the wind, combined with the indifferent sailing qualities of tlic British three-deckers, deprive this action of any special tactical significance ; and the very mediocre calibre of the two admirals was not calculated to overcome the difficulties they encoun- tered. The numerous accidents in Martin's fleet, and 192 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY the parting of the " Sans Culottes " at such a moment, show the indifferent character of the French captains, and probably justify the comment that Hotham owed his suc- cess to the initiative of the admirable officers under his command rather than to his own capacity. " I went on board Admiral Hotham," wrote Nelson, " as soon as our firing grew slack in the van and the ' (^a-Ira ' and ' Cen- seur ' had struck, to propose to him leaving our two crip- pled ships, the two prizes, and four frigates, and pursue the enemy ; but he, much cooler than myself, said, ' We must be contented, wc have done very well.' Admiral Goodall backed me ; I got him to write to the Admiral, but it would not do ; we should have had such a day as I believe the annals of England never produced." ^ " Ad- miral Hotham," says Chevalier, ^ '' showed great circum- spection. He probably did not appreciate the improvised fleets of the republic. To fight, there are needed ships in good condition, capable seamen, skilful gunners, and offi- cers accustomed to order, to military dispositions, and to squadron manoeuvres. These we did not have." " The enemy," wrote Nelson about the same fleet, a few months later, " are neither seamen nor officers." ^ The immediate consequence of this defeat was the abandonment of the projected expedition against Corsica. After the battle a gale of wind forced the British into Spezia and caused the wreck of the " Illustrious," sev- enty-four, which, from injuries received in the action, was not able to keep off shore. This, with the capture of the " Berwick," equalized the losses of the two fleets. The French anchored in Hyeres Bay, where they were rejoined by the " Sans Culottes," and on the 24th of March re- turned to Toulon. Admiral Renaudin's arrival from Brest ^ on the 4th of April raised the available force to nineteen or twenty ships-of-the-line ; to which the enemy 1 Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 26. 2 jyfar, Fran, sous la Eep., p. 186. 3 Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 50. * See ante, p. 176. TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VhXCENT. 193 could now oppose only thirteen of their own and two Neapolitan. But, although the British were very destitute of material for necessary equipment and repair,^ the supe- riority of organization, discipline, and officer-like training, allowed them little real cause for anxiety. In tlie month of May a Jacobin outbreak occurred in T(juIon. The gov- ernment had ordered Martin to take advantage of Renau- din's junction, and again to seek the enemy while thus superior. The mob raised the cry that as soon as the fleet sailed the enemies of the Revolution would enter the town and massacre the patriots. The seamen, except those be- longing to the Brest squadron, left their vessels, under pretext of deliberating on the dangers of their country, and took part in all the street demonstrations. An expe- dition was even set on loot against Marseille ; but the cen- tral government was getting stronger, or rather anarchy was becoming wearisome, and after a paltry engagement the Toulonese fell back upon their city and submitted. A great number of seamen, however, had deserted ; and the necessity of recovering them delayed the departure of the fleet, which finally put to sea on the Tth of June with sev- enteen ships-of-thc-line. The time for a favorable sortie was, however, past ; the British having at last received a laro;e re-enforcement. After partially rehtting in Spezia, ITotham took his fleet to San Fiorenzo, arriving there on the oOtii of March. On the 17th of April he sailed again for Minorca, where he hoped to meet a rc-enforcement and a much-needed con- voy ; but a succession of westerly winds caused the fleet to lose ground, instead of gaining, until the 27th, when it un- expectedly and most fortunately met a body of store-ships from Gibraltar. With these the admiral at once bore up for Legliorn, arriving there next day. Had the French in their own dockyards refitted as rapidly as the British did ^ " We caunot get another mast this side of Gibraltar." (Xels Disp., May 4, 1795 ) VOL. I. — 13 194 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY ill a foreign port, and gone to sea with the increase of strength that Renaudin brought, the}^ should have inter- cepted this important convoy, if they did not bring the fleet to action. The correspondence of Nelson, still a simple captain, testifies continually, in his own vivid style, to the critical state of the campaign at this moment. On the 8th of May Eotham sailed again for Minorca, and continued to cruise off that island until the 14th of June, when Rear-admiral Robert Mann joined him with a re- enforcement from England of nine ^ ships-of-the-line, mak- ing the British superior in number as In quality to the enemy. As a convoy was also expected, the fleet kept the same station until it arrived on the 22d, when the whole body sailed for San Fiorenzo, anchoring there June 29. On the 4th of July Hotliam sent Nelson with his own ship and some smaller vessels to co-operate on the Riviera of Genoa with the Austrian advance against the French ; but the detachment fell in with Martin's fleet, and had to re- turn to San Fiorenzo, being, says Nelson, '' hard pressed " by the enemy, wdio pursued until they saw the British fleet at anchor. The latter weighed as soon as possible, but did not come up with the French until the 14th, near the Hy^res Islands, where a trifling brush took place, resulting In the capture of the "■ Alcide," seventy-four, which imme- diately after surrendering caught fire and blew up. This small affair was the last in which Admiral Hotham was directly concerned. Hood had been definitively relieved of the Mediterranean command lieforc he could sail from England on his return ; and Hotham, weary of a burden to which he felt himself unfitted and had proved himself unequal, applied for relief, and struck his flag on the 1st of November, 1795. Prior to the naval brush off Hyeres, little had been done in Italy by the armies on either side. The French, whose forces were far inferior to those of the allies and in a state ^ James, vol. i. p. 297. Nelson says six. (Nels. Disp.,vol. ii. p 47. j TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT. 195 of great destitution, were comjjelled to stand on the defen sive over a very long line, of which the advanced post on the sea was at Vado. The Austrians had imposed u])on the Sardinians their own plan uf campaign, which was to strike the extreme right of the French at Vado, and then drive them back along the Corniche, while the Sardinians attacked on the other Hank tli rough the passes of the Apennines up to the Cul di Tende, where the Maritime Alps begin. The British fleet was to co-o|,»erate with tlie movement on tlie side of the sea, — a consideration which had much to do with determining the Austrian plan. l]y occupying Vado and the Riviera cast of it, the coasting trade heretofore carried on from the ports of Genoa and Tuscany to southern France would be stopped ; a matter of great consequence to the republic, as those departments only raised grain for three months' consumption and de- pended for the rest upon that which came from Barbary and Italy by way of Tuscany. With a British squadron at Yado, the populace of Provence, the navy at Toulon, and the army of Italy, would have to be supplied from the north of France by bad inland roads ^ Yado Bay was, moreover, the best anchorage between Nice and Genoa. Devins, the Austrian general, began his movement on the 13th of June, passing througli Genoese territory against the protest of that neutral government. The French re- sisted sturdily ; but the odds were too great, and by the end of June they had fallen Imck to a line extending from Boro-hetto on the sea to Ormea in the mountains, abandon- hio- Vado and the intermediate coast towns. Devins now called on Hotham for naval support, and the British ad- miral detached Nelson, as has already been seen, to give it; but the encounter with the French fleet delaying his arrival for some days served Devins with a pretext for inaction. He employed the mean time in fortifying his position and improving the roads in his rear. 1 Jomini, Guerres cle la Rev., livre viii. p. 75. 196 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY On the ITtli of July Nelson reached Genoa, took on board the British minister to that republic, and went to Vado, anchoring there on the 21st. He immediately conferred with Devins, who gave it as his opinion that the Austrians could not advance further until the French were compelled to retire by want of provisions, — a result he expected from the action of the navy. Nelson explained to the minister that the food supplies being carried in neutral vessels he was powerless to stop them ; for he liad stringent orders from the admiralty that no legal measures should be instituted against such, when arrested, until full particulars in each case had been sent to England and instructions had come back what to do. Meanwhile the cargoes, being perishable, would be spoiled. Such utterly inconsequent proceedings, though highly characteristic of the military action of cabi- nets, were most exasperating to a man of Nelson's temper, always prone to cut knots ; but, as he was pecuniarily an- swerable and a poor man, he could not disregard them on his sole authority. The British ministers to Genoa and Sardinia both concurred in advisino; him to carrv out Dev- ins's wishes ; and then Nelson, with the fearlessness of re- sponsibility he always showed, — and sometimes out of, as well as in, season, — issued orders to his frigates to take every vessel bound to France or to ports within the French lines, to whatsoever nation it might belong. At the same time the general also sent out small cruisers; and it is roundly asserted by Jomini that belaid a tax on all coasting vessels brought in by them, forcing them to pay for a pass- port and appropriating the proceeds to himself. The ut- most diligence, however, could not insure the interruption of a traffic carried on by very small vessels, having to make but short night runs close along a coast ; ^ and Nelson's or- ders, wliile doubtless productive of some results in stopping large vessels from Tuscany and Algiers, could not prevent 1 The effects were, however, very severely felt in France. (Corr. de Nap., vol. i., ppj. 65, 79, Q.'j.) TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VIXCEXT. 107 supplies getting in by Genoese coasters. The difficulty was increased by the fact that a number of the ports in rear of the French positions belunged to Genoa, and the inhab- itants depended upon hrr for food. To turn a deaf ear to their cries of suffering, and to prevent supplies landed there being used by the Frencli, were alike impossible. These considerations should have led Devins to regard naval co-operation simply as the efforts of a light fui'ce, competent to harass, not to destroy, the enemy's communi- cations ; and should have induced him to furce his own way, by early and vigorous action, while the French were inferior in numbers and Ijcfore their positions became too strong. Instead of this, he used the Sardinians and Brit- ish, not as allies, but as excuses for not moving ; action of one kind or another on their part was necessary befoi'o he could advance. Thus the summer slip}ted away, the French busily strengthening their lines and bringing up the army of the Pyrenees to re-enforce that of Italy, after peace was made with Spain. Nelson was full of projects to embark a corps of Austrians, who should seize and oc- cupy a coast position in rear of the French ; luit Devins only played with a proposition of which Jomini Sjieaks with scant respect, and which was certainly open to the oljjcc- tion that, if carried out with adequate force, it divided the Austrian army. Nelson, it is true, guaranteed its retreat to liis ships in case of need; but the Austrian, not unnat- urally, preferred a less uncertain line. The British ca|itain, who had at hrst felt respect for Devins's abilities, wrote on the ITtli of September that it had for some time appeared to him " that the general intended to go no further than his present position, and meant to lay the miscarriage of his enterprise against Nice to the non-co-operation of tlie British fleet and the Sardinian army." ^ Whatever his purj)ose, Devins did not advance, but quietly awaited the French attack. Early in Novemljer a severe illness caused 1 Nols. Disp., vol. ii. p. 84. 198 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY him to give up the cominaiid ; and on the 23d of the month the eneni}', under General Seherer, assaulted vigorously the centre of the allied position, where the Sardinians touched the Austrians. This point had always been weak, and af- ter a short struggle was forced. The original intention of Seherer had been to turn, after piercing the centre, against the Sardinians, as Bonaparte did in the following year; but a very heavy fall of snow in the mountains decided him to swing round to the right, drive the Austrians back upon the coast, and, if possible, anticipate them upon their line of retreat to the eastward. In this he was not entirely suc- cessful ; but the imminent danger forced the enemy to abandon all their line of works and fall back precipitately, with a loss of seven thousand men, killed, wounded and prisoners, besides their depots at Loano, Yado, and Savona. This action, which was a brilliant and decisive victory, is known as the battle of Loano. Bv the first of December the Austrians had recrossed the Apennines and were again in the positions from which they had set out the previous June. The military plan and execution of the campaign by the land forces scarcely falls within the scope of the present work. An advance by the armies of a coalition, whose re- spective troops and lines of operation are separated by a chain of mountains, even of the height of the Apennines, with difficult communication across them, does not present a comljination promising mutual support and probable suc- cess. To this disadvantage is to be added that of the long and narrow line by which all the Austrian supplies had to 1)0 forwarded ; and which any successful advance would make yet longer and more difficult. On the other hand, the Austrians counted much upon the help that could be extended by the navy of Great Britain, in whose interest the occupation of the shore line was nndertaken.^ By 1 The Austrian generals say, and true, they "were brought on the coast at the ex])ress desire of the English to co-operate Avitli the fleet, which fleet nor admiral they never saw. — Nds. Disp., vul. ii. p. 213. TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VIXCEXT. 199 their advance they controlled Yado Bay, — the l^est anclior- age between Villefranche (Xicej and Genoa ; and their presence imposed a restraint ii])on the latter republic, whose attitnde was largely determined by the comparative forces of the belligerents. Did then the British navy, un- der these circumstances, do all that it could have done to insure the success of the common cause ? The answer can scared v i.)e ves. Nelson, indeed, ex- f V 7 7 erted himself Avith the energy that never failed him ; but liis correspondence shows that he did not think the force assigned liim ecpial to its task. Could it then have been increased? Tlie answer again is scarcely douI)tfuL The British fleet of the line was slightly superior in numbers to the Frencli at Toulon, and far superior in tlie quality of its officers and men. It was doulitless embarrassed by numerous duties, — by those convicting interests whose divergence imposes the great test of capacity upon a gen- eral officer. The French fleet at Toulon, co-uperation with the Austrian advance, the protection of trade, the covering of Corsica, the political interests involved in controllin<>* the action of the small Italian states, — all these cares fell upon the British admiral. Of tliese, the French fleet was the most important ; but all other interests of Britain and her allies were better served by co-operation with the Austrian advance, — by victory in the field, — than by any dissemination of force for other purposes. A decisive Im- perial success would liave determined the policy of every state in the western Mediterranean and closed every })ort to French cruisers. In short, offensive action, and not the merely defensive attitude maintained through the campaign, was Iierc clearly indicated. Nelson intimates that the only course by whicli the navy could practically intercept the French communications was to enter the coasting ports and de- stroy the coasters. These little vessels defied detection on their voyages ; only by chasing them into their nests could 200 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY their wings be clipped. " A few days ago," he writes, " 1 scoured the coast between Monaco and Borghetto so com- pletely, that although I was only able to take one ship loaded with corn, yet I forced the others into the Bay of Alassio, where they are so completely under the protection of formidable batteries tltat not less thmi three sail-of-the- Une could attempt to take or destroy them. The number of vessels loaded and unloaded at those places is near one hundred, the greater part loaded with stores and corn for France." ^ Here was the strategic direction to be given to the British navy, after providing for the watch off Toulon. " You will now," wrote Nelson live years later to Lord Keith, " bear me out in my assertion, when I say that the British fleet could have prevented the invasion of Italy ; and if our friend Hotham had kept his fleet on that coast, I assert, and you will agree with me, no army from France could have been furnished with stores or provisions ; even men could not have marched." ^ If the fleet proved un- equal to this task, final condemnation was passed on the allied plan of campaign, which was not in its concep- tion characterized by sound military judgment. But Ad- miral Hotham, as Nelson said, had '' no head for enter- prise, perfectly satisfied that each month passes without any losses on our side." ^ Nelson never had under his orders any other ship-of-the-line than his own " iVga- memnon ; " and at the time of the decisive battle of Loano all liis little squadron had been taken away except two, so that French gunboats harassed with impunity the left flank of the Austrians.^ He himself at that critical mo- ment had to remain in Genoa with the '' Agamemnon," at the request of the Imperial minister, to prevent the crew of a French frigate then in ]:)ort, supported as it would have ^ Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 08 a. See also p. 110. 2 NpIs. Disp., June 6, 1800, 3 Tl.id., vol. ii., p. 64. * For Nelsoii's comi)laii-it.s about tlie force under hivS command, see ibid., pp. lOG-114. TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. J'lXCEXT 201 been by French partisans, from seizing Vultri, — an impor- tant point upon the Hne of retreat of thr Aiistrians, where a few resolute men could have stopped them until the pur- suing army came up. To him alone was therefore at- tributed the escajie of several thousand Im|:)erial soldiers, among whom was the commander-in-chief himself. ^ Prior to the battle Genoa had permitted French intrigues and armed enterprises of this character to be concerted, alni(.)st openly, in her territories. This she wouhl not liave dared to do, had the British navy been present in force on the coast, acting under such a commander as Nelson ; for the probabilities of final success would have been with the allies. In short, this campaign of the British fleet con- tributes another to the numerous lessons of history, upon the importance of having sufficient force at the decisive point and taking the offensive. It may be added that Hotham could better have spared ships to Nelson, if he had not thrown away his two oi)portunities of beating the Toulon fleet. While Nelson was co-operating with the Austrians as far as his force admitted, the British fleet was generally cruising off Toulon, returning from time to time to San Fiorenzo or Legliorn for reflt and stores. It was in this latter part ol the year 1795 that the Directory, as will be remembered, decided to abandon the policy of fleet-fighting and to enter upon that of commerce-destroying, directed against ex- posed colonies of the enemy as well as against his trade afloat. Two squadrons, numl)ering in all seven sliips-of- the-linc and eight smaller vessels, were ordered fitted out at Toulon, which was with difficulty done for want of seamen. Since the action of July off Ilyeres, nearly all the sailors in INIartin's fleet had deserted, disgusted with the bad food, scanty clothing, and constant disaster that were their portion. Enough, however, were at last gath- ered to man the ships selected ; and on the 14th of Sep- 1 Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. US. 202 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY tembci" six of the line and three frigates got away under the command of Captain Richery. It does not ajDpear whetlier the British fleet was then at sea or at San Fiorenzo ; but in either case it was at this port, and not until September 22d, that Hotham learned their escape. On the 5th of October this leisurely commander-in-chief sent Admiral Mann with six of the line in pursuit ; but the French, having so great a start, could not be overtaken. They passed the Straits of Gibraltar early in October, bound to the British possessions in North America. On the 7th of the month, when a hundred and lifty miles west of Gibraltar, they fell in with an enemy's convoy of thirty- one merchant ships from the Levant, under the protection of three seventy-fours. Richery succeeded in capturing one of the latter, which had lost a topmast, and all the merchant ships except one. Having so valuable a booty, he decided to escort it into Cadiz, where he anchored on the 13th and was soon after found by Mann, whose arrival prevented his departure to fulfil his original mission. At about the same time some French frigates in the Atlantic took eighteen ships out of a Jamaica convoy. The other Toulon division, of one ship-of-the-line and six smaller vessels, cruised in the Levant ; and, having made a number of prizes, returned safely to Toulon. Its commander. Cap- tain Ganteaume, though undistinguished by any great achievements, was throughout his career remarkably for- tunate in escaping the search of an enemy. It was he who commanded the flotilla on board which Bonaparte stole unseen through all the British cruisers, on his return from Egypt to France in 1790. These results, coinciding so closely with the adoption of the new policy of commerce-destroying, confirmed the government in favor of this course, to which the French have always been strongly disposed. They hoped from it, to use the words of a re[»resentative in the Convention, " to force the English to a shameful bankruptcy ; " what they TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. ViXCEXT. 203 obtained was the demoralization of their navy, the loss of the eontrol of the sea and of their own external com- merce, finally Napoleon's Continental System and the fall of the Empire. The battle of Loano, decisive of the campaign of 1795, is yet more distingnished as marking the entrance upon the scene of two of the most remarkable ligures in the war of the French Revolution. During the week after it was fought, Admiral Sir John Jervis, better known by his later title of Earl St. A^incent, arrived at San Fiorenzo, as the reu'nlar successor to Hood in the Mediterranean. During tlie winter Napoleon Bonaparte was chosen by the Directory to relieve Scherer in command of the Army of Italy. The career and character of the youthful republican general are too well known, have been too often described, to be attempted by the author, from whose inmiediate theme, moreover, they stand apart. The }>ersonality of the already aged admiral, whose iron hands stanii)ed liis own image on tlic British navy and fashioned it into the s]»lendid instru- ment with which the triumphs of Nelson were won, is, on tlie contrary, familiar to few except the students of naval history. Born in 1734, Sir John Jervis, when he assumed command of the I\Iediterranean fleet in his sixty -second year, had had no opi)Ortunity of distinguishing himself in the eyes of the world outside of the service to Avhich he belonged. With the members of that service, however, he had long been a marked man. The child of a poor though well-born family, he had in early life, under the ju'cssure of poverty, required of himself the same stern discipline and submission to the duty of the moment which he afterwards so rigorously exacted of others. Grave and unbendino: in his official relations, immovable as a rock wlien his determination was once formed, unrelentnig almost to mercilessness in suppressing insubordination, then rife throughout the British navy, he had the high- bred polisli of a man used to good society, and his de- 204 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY meaiior was courteous, and, when occasion demanded, even courtly, A traveller by land as well as hy sea, a constant and judicious reader, in a period when such habits were rarer than now among seamen, he was well informed in matters other than those relating merely to his profes- sion. Of the latter, however, he was a master. His ship was the model of the British fleet during the American Revolution, and his high reputation drew to her quarter- deck youths from the best families of England, when they could obtain interest to get there. Yet no man was ever less swayed, in an age Avhen social and political influence counted for so much, by any extrinsic claims of that char- acter. Personal merit first, after that a family claim upon the navy, that a father or brother had given his life for the service, — nay, the very friendlessncss of a deserving man, — such were the considerations that determined him in the use of patronage at his own disposal. Yet, with all these strong attributes, capable too of a tenderness which could mourn long and deeply the loss of a valued comrade, the rule of Jervis was one of fear rather than love. It is impossible to criticise adversely measures whose extreme severity was justified, if not imperatively demanded, by the appalling crisis of the mutinies of 1797 ; impossible to withhold admiration, not unmingled with awe, from the impressive figure of the chief who stood unmoved and unyielding amid the smothered discontent, revolt threatening from below, the enemy's coast in sight from the deck, knowing that in every other fleet the crews had taken the ships from tlieir officers, but determined it should not be so in the Mediterranean. Yet admiration is cpialified by the feeling that to the ruthless temi)er of the man the position was not wholly displeasing, — that he was in liis natural element when crushing opposition. A cap- tain, who with great personal courage had quelled a rising in his ship, dragging the ringleaders witli his own hands from among their followers, interceded on behalf of one of TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT. 205 the condemned because he had previously borne a good character. ''lam glad of it," replied Jervis ; ''hitherto we have been hanging scoundrels. Now men will know that no good character will atone for the crime of mutiny." In lesser matters, also, his tendency was to exaggerate re- straint as well as punishment. " Where I would take a penknife," said Nelson, " Lord 8t. Vincent takes a hatchet." With such characteristics, accompanied though they were by resolution and high professional accomplishments, it is not to Ije expected that the fire of genius will be found. Though not an ungenerous man, Lord St. Vincent lacked the sympathetic qualities that made Nelson at once so lov- able and so great a leader of men. Escaping the erratic tem})er and the foibles of his great successor, upon whose career these defects have left marks ever to be regretted by those who love his memory, Jervis fell short too of the inspiration, of the ardor, whicli in moments of difiiculty lifted Nelson far above the common pUine of mankind, and have stamped his actions with the seal of genius. But after Nelson, Jervis, though of a different order, stands first among British commanders-in-chief. For inspiration he had a cool, sound, and rapid professional judgment ; for ardor, a steady, unflinching determination to succeed ; and these, joined to a perfect fearlessness of responsibility sucli as Nelson also showed, have won for him a place in the first rank of those chieftains, whether sea or land, who have not received the exceptional endowments of Nature's favorites. In the one general action wliich Fortune per- mitted to him, the battle of Cape St. Vincent, he illus- trated these traits to a high degree ; as Nelson then also showed that faculty of quick appreciation and instant action, in which all the processes of thought and will blend into one overpowering conviction and impulse tliat lesser men never know. Whether we consider the vastly superior numbers then deliberately engaged, the tactics of 206 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY the admiral on the battle-field, or his appreciation of the critical position in which Great Britain then stood, Sir John Jerri s's conduct on that occasion must make the battle of Cape St. Vincent ever illustrious among the most brilliant sea-fights of all ages. To these powerful elements of his nature, Jervis added a capacity for comprehensive and minute attention to the details of discipline, order and economy, without which mere severity would become aimless and productive of none ])ut bad results. He was fortunate in finding among the Mediterranean captains an unusual number of men of consummate seamanship, energy and resources, in all the vigor of a prime still youthful, who were only waiting for a master-hand to combine and give direction to their abili- ties. With such a head and with such subordinates, the British Mediterranean fleet soon became a model of effi- ciency and spirit, which was probably never equalled in the days of sailing ships. Nelson so considered it; aud the old admiral himself bewailed its memory several years later, when commanding the Channel fleet, and complained testily of the " old women in the guise of young men," whom he found in charge of ships off Brest. As an ad- ministrator, when First Lord, the economy of Jervis be- came exaggerated into parsimony, and his experience of the frauds connected witli the dockyards of the day led him into a crusade against them, which was both well meant and necessary, but particularly ill-timed. It has consequently left a stigma of failure upon his administra- tion, which is due, however, not to his executive ineffi- ciency, but to a misapprehension of the political signs of the times. Absorbed in reform, and for it desiring quiet, he saw only peace while the dark clouds of war were gather- ing thick on the horizon. Therefore the British navy, well-worn by the first war, was not ready for that which followed it in 1803. Jervis's arrival in the Mediterranean was too late to TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. ViytEXT. -07 remedy tlie impending evils. It was a siniiular misfuiiune fur Great Bi'itain, that the interregnum Ijetwecn two such able men as Plood and Jervis should have coincided with the determination of the French to try the chance of battle with their Mediterranean fleet, and that the opportunities they lost should have fallen to so sluggish and cautious an admiral as Ilotham. '' To say liow niucli we wanted fjord llood on the 13th of July," wrote Nelson, ^' is to say, Will YOU liave all the French Meet, or no action ?" ^ Acce])ting this ojjinion in the light of Nelson's suljsequent achieve- ments, it may l)e permitted to think that, if not all the fleet, so many ships would have fallen as to have prevented the sailing of Richery's squadron and the consequent neces- sary detachment of Admiral ]\Iann ; while the loss of sea- men captured would have seriously crippled tlie operations of the flotilla, which from Toulon sup}ilied the Army of Italy with ammunition, artillery and stores. Light guns on mountain carria2:es could be carried along the Corniche ; but at the opening of Bonaparte's operations all heavy guns, and artillcrv outfits of all kinds, had to be taken bv sea from Nice to Savona.^ The demands of this flotilla neces- sitated the laying up of the fleet,^ — a matter of less consequence as the determination to resort to commei'ce- destroying had then been reached. The French navy there- fore became, through the flotilla, a very important part of Bona])artc's communications ; and it has already been pointed out that sailing ships could not l)reak up, though tliey might much disturb, the voyages of the smaller vessels employed on a diflicult coast, with batteries under which to take refuge. After the battle of Loano, Nelson, whose occupation on the Gulf of Genoa was f(^r the time over, went t(^ Leghorn to refit his shii>, then nearly three years in commission, 1 Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 6.3. ~ Comnieiitairo.^ de Na]i., vol. i. p. 112. 3 Chevalier, I\Iar. Fran, sous la Rep. p. 251. 208 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY Not till January 19, 1796, did he join Jervis, who since his arrival on the station had, for the most part, remained in San Fiorenzo organizing his fleet. The new admiral showed him the same confidence as his predecessors, and sent him at once to his old station, with a light division, to prevent any small number of men making a descent upon Italy. A predominant idea, one might almost call it a fad, in Nelson's mind, was the landing of a body of men from ships in rear of the enemy. As has been seen, he was forward to recommend such an attempt to Devins, promising to support it with his squadron ; and the intelli- gence concerning flat-boats and gun-boats prepared in the French ports suggested nothing to his mind so much as transporting troops to Tuscauy, in rear of the Austrians, while the main French army operated in their front. Like Bonaparte, Nelson recognized the resources which the plains of Piedmont, Lombardy and Tuscany would offer to the needy enemy. He called them a gold mine ; but he did not understand the weakness of the French in seamen, nor realize the improbability of Bonaparte's attempting such a use of his troops as would put them far out of mutual support and away from his own control. Certainly no indication of such a purpose is to be found in his corre- spondence or in the instructions of the Directory to him. On the contrary, he had strongly advised against a pet project of the Committee of Public Safety, early in 1795, to land an expedition in the papal states, — unless with control of the sea.^ Had the Austrians again advanced to the sea and oc- cupied Yado, Jervis would undoubtedly have supported them and harassed the French to a very important extent. Nelson gave express assurances on that point.^ Bonaparte, however, allowed him no opportunity. Leaving Paris on the 14th of March, 1796, the young general reached Nice ^ Comment, de Nap., vol. i. p. 71. ''■ Nels. Dii^p., vol. ji. p. 128. TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT. 209 on the 27th of the mouth. On the oth of April he mo^ed his headquarters to Albeuga, and on the Oth to Savona. On the 10th JJeauheu, the new Austrian general, began to move liis left wing l)y tlie pass of La iJoehetta, his right by that of Montenutte ; the junetion tu l>e formed at Savona. Quiclv as lightning, Lonapartc struek at once where the Austrian right touched the Sardinian left. l]low followed blow u})on the centre of the allies, and after six days' fighting their armies were definitively separated. Driving the Sardinians before liini in miremitting pursuit, Bona- parte on the 28th granted an armistice, by which three of the })rincipal fortresses of Piedmont were put into his pos- session and plenipotentiaries dispatched to Paris to treat for peace. This was concluded and signed on the loth of May. Sardinia abandoned the coalition, surrendered the co-unties of Savoy and Nice, and yielded other conditions favorable to France, — particularly in the boundary lines traced on the crests of tlie mountains, where the command- ing military positions were given to the republic. Thus the gates of Italy were forced ; and Austria, stripped of her ally on shore and cut oft^ from the British at sea, alone confronted Bona]>arte. The Fi-ench were now in tlie plains of Piedmont, with Lumbardy before them. Beaulieu, expecting an advance against Milan by the nortli bank of the Po, had withdrawn across that river, intending to dispute its passage. If forced, lie would cover ^lilan by falling back successively upon the lines of the Sesia and the Ticino, tributaries of the main stream. Bonaparte, however, was not the man to attack an enemy in front and force him Ijack along liis natural line of retreat to his proper base. Weigliing accu- rately the political and military conditions of tlie penin- sula, he had fixed his eye upon the line of the Adige as that which he wished to reach and hold, and which, under all the circumstances, he believed he could master. The Adige flows from the Tyrol south along the east shore of VOL. I. — 14 210 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY the Lake of Garda, then turns to the eastward and entei-s the Adriatic between the Po and Venice. Occupying it, the French army would cover all the valleys of the Po, lay tribute upon their resources as well as upon those of the small states south of the river, interpose between Austria and southern Italy, and isolate Mantua, the enemy's great stronghold. Making, therefore, a feint of following Beau- lieu by the methodical front attacks expected by him, Bonaparte pushed his main force stealthily along the south bank of the Po. On the 7th of May the advance-guard reached Piacenza, and crossed at once by boats. On the 9th a bridge was completed over the river, which at this point is fifteen hundred feet wide and very rapid. Beau- lieu's intended positions on the Sesia and Ticino were thus turned, and the Austrians necessarily fell back to the line of the Adda. On the 10th of May, just one month after Beaulieu began his forward movements, the bridge of Lodi, over the Adda, was carried ; and the Austrians again fell back to the Mincio, the outlet of the Lake of Garda, un- covering Milan. On the 15th Bonaparte entered Milan in triumph. Here he paused for ten days, and, after quitting the place, had to return to punish a revolt which broke out among the people ; but on the 30th of May the French crossed the Mincio, the Austrians retreating northward toward the Tyrol, along the east shore of the Lake of Garda. This retrograde movement left Mantua to itself. On the od of June Bonaparte's headquarters were at Verona, — a stronglj' fortified place bestriding the Adige, thus insuring an easy transit to either side of the river, and which de- rives further strategic importance from its topographical position. A number of spurs run south from the Tyrol alonoc the Lake of Garda and fall into the plain at Verona, which tlms stands at the foot of the valleys formed by them. On either side of this cluster of spurs lie the val- leys of the Adige and the Brenta, the two probable lines TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VIXCEXT. 211 by which an Austrian attack wouhl come. Verona, there- fore, was a central point with reference to any offensive movements of the enemy, and became the pivot upon which Bonaparte's strategy hinged. On the 4th of June Mantua was blockaded. Having now compassed his hrst objective, Bona|)arte passed temporarily from the offensive to the defensive, ceased his advance, and occujiied himself with assuring the line of the Adige and pressing the siege of Mantua. There remained only to realize the political advantages gained by his wonderful successes. The Duke of Parma had entered into a convention on the 9th of ilay, followed in the same course on the 17th by the Duke of Modena. On the 5th of Jane tlie Court of Na[)les, startled out of its dream of security, signed an armistice, withdrawing its troops from the coalition and its ships from the British fleet, — a precipitate al^andonment of the common cause as ill-judged as it was cowardly. At that very moment the French leader was writing, " I see but one means not to be beaten in the autumn ; and that is, so to arrange matters that we sliall not be obliged to advance into southern Italy." ^ The Pope still holding out, Bonaparte improved the time which the Austrians must need to prepare a new movement, by marching into the papal states a corps un- der Augereau, whom he followed in person. On the 10th Bologna was reached, and on the 24th tlie Pope signed an armistice. Coincidently with this advance, it was felt safe and opportune to send into Tuscany a division taken from the corps occupying Piedmont. This detachment en- tered Leghorn on the 28th of June, occupied the port de- si)ite the neutrality of Tuscany, drove out and broke up the great British commercial and naval interests centred there, and obtained a secure base for the intended attempt upon Corsica. The failure of the Austi-ians to reach the coast, and their 1 (?(>rr. de Xap., vol. i. j). 465. 212 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY subsequent retreat, of course put an end to any direct co- operation between them and the British fleet. Jervis was forced to confine himself to w^atching the Toulon ships, — an operation conducted in tlie same spirit and on the same system which he afterwards imparted to the Brest block- ade, and generally to that of all hostile arsenals. For over six months, from the beginning of April to the middle of October, he cruised with fifteen sail-of-the-line off the port ; the heavy ships remaining some distance from it, but near enough to support a light division of three sev- enty-fours, which kept just out of range of the batteries, about two miles from the entrance. By unremitting care and foresight, the ships on this arduous service were pro- visioned, watered and repaired on the spot, without goiug into harbor. Nelson, as the year before, was actively em- ployed in the Gulf of Genoa, harassing the coast commu- nications, and was on one occasion fortunate enough to capture a convoy with guns and entrenching tools for the siege of Mantua. In the Adriatic, a few frigates and a flotilla of small vessels were engaged in protecting the Austrian communications by way of Trieste. Admiral Mann, with seven ships-of-the-line, was still off Cadiz, in the station assigned him by Hotham to watch Richery. Besides these strictly military operations, ships were called for in every direction to convoy trade, to cover the passage of storeships, and generally to keep the sea safe for un- armed British vessels, whether traders or government transports, upon whom depended the supplies of the fleet and those of Gibraltar drawn from Barbary. Between thirty and forty frigates and smaller vessels were thus oc- cupied, and were found insufficient to meet the varied de- mands arising from the w^ide diffusion of British commerce and the activity of French cruisers. Bonaparte's rapid successes and w^ide flight of conquest materially affected the British fleet ; and the question of supplies became very serious with the ports of Tuscany TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VIXCEXT. 213 Naples and the Pope closed to its aid. Growiiio- s\-m})toms of discontent made the tenure of Corsica doubtful, with the French in Leghorn, and with Genoa toleratinu- their ni- trigues through fear of their armies. As earlv as Mav i^O *■' *■■ / immediately after entering ]\Iilan, Bonaparte liad sent agents to Genoa to concert risings in the island ; and in Jul}' he began to collect in Leghorn a body of Corsican refugees, at whose head he put General Gentili, also a na- tive. The threatening outlook of affairs, and the submis- sion of Tuscany to the violation of her neutralit\' bv the French, determined the viceroy of Corsica to seize Elba, although a Tuscan possession. Nelson, with a small squadron, appeared before Porto Ferrajo on the 10th of July, and to a peremptory summons received immediate surrender. Being very small, Elba was more immediately under naval control than Corsica, and to hold it required fewer troops. In case of the loss of the larger island, it would still assure the British a base in the Mediterranean and continued control, so long as their fleet could assert predominance over those of their enemies. Some doubt, however, was felt on this latter point. The attitude of Spain, far from cordial when an ally, had ])een cold as a neutral, and was now fast becoming hostile. The decrepit kingdom had a navy of over fifty sail-of-the- line ; and, although its discipline and efficiency were at the lowest ebb, the mere force of numljers might prove too much for even Jervis's splendid fleet of only twenty -two, — seven of which were still before Cadiz, a thousand miles from the main body off Toulon. Foreseeing the approach- ing danger, Jervis, about the time Elba was seized, sent Mann orders to rejoin him ; and accordingly, on the 29th of July, the blockade of Cadiz was raised. It was just in time, for on the 19th of August Spain, moved by the suc- cesses of Bonaparte and the French advance into Germany, — which had not yet undergone the disasters afterwards inflicted upon the sepaj'ated armies of Jourdan and Moreau 214 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY by the Arcliduke Charles, — had signed a treaty of offen- sive and defensive alliance with the republic. As soon as Mann's ships disappeared, Richery demanded the help of the Spanish fleet to cover his departure, and on the 4th of August sailed in company with twenty Spanish ships-of- tlie-line. These escorted him three hundred miles to the westward, and then returned to port, leaving the French to fulfil their original mission against British North America, after a detention of nearly ten months. Richery, who had been promoted to rear-admiral during this time, made his cruise successfully, harassed the fishing interests on the coasts of Newfoundland, captured and burned a hundred British merchant vessels, and got back to Brest in time to take part in the unfortunate expedition against Ireland, which sailed in December of this year. Admiral Mann, though a brave and good officer, showed bad judgment throughout this campaign. Apparently, to use Napoleon's expression, " II s'etait fait un tableau " as to the military and naval situation ; and to such a frame of mind the governor of Gibraltar, O'Hara, a pessimist by temperament, ^ prolmbly was a bad adviser. In his precipi- tation to join the commander-in-chief, he forgot the diffi- culty about stores and left Gibraltar without filling up. Jervis consequently was forced to send him back at once, with orders to return as quickly as possible. On his way down, on the 1st of October, he was chased by a Spanish fleet of nineteen sail-of-the-line under Admiral Lano-ara. His squadron escaped, losing two merchant vessels under its convoy ; but, upon arriving in Gibraltar, he called a council of captains, and, having obtained their concurrence in liis opinion, sailed for England, in direct disregard of the commands both of Jervis and the Admiralty. Upon his arrival his action was disapproved,^ orders were sent him 1 For O'lLira's characteristics, see life <)f Lord ^linto, vol. ii. pp. 190, 195. 2 See Nelson's Disp., vol. ii. p. 2.58, uote. The letter of the Admiralty to Admiral Mann may possess some interest as TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT. 215 to strike his flag and come ashore, and he appears never again to have been employed afloat; but, when it is re- membered that only forty vears had elapsed since Bvno; was shot for an error in judgment, it must be owned men had become more merciful. Mann's defection reduced Jervis's forces by one third, at a time when affairs were becoming- daily more critical. Not only did it make the tenure of the Mediterranean vastly more difficult, but it dei)rived tlie admiral of his cherished hope of dealing a staggering blow to the Spanisli fleet, such as four mouths later he inflicted at Cape St. Vincent. After meeting Mann, Langara was joined by seven ships from Cartagena, and with this increase of force appeared on the 20tli of October about fifty miles from San Fiorenzo Bay. Jervis had just returned there from off Toulon, having on the 25th of September received orders to evacuate Corsica, — an operation which promised to be difficult from lack of transports. On the 26tli of October Langara entered Toulon, where the new allies had then thirty-eight ships-of-the-line collected. During the summer months Nelson had blockaded Leg- horn, after its occupation by the French ; and this measure, with the tenure of Elba, seems to liave effectually prevented an example of the (.(ffieial correspniuleiu'e raltar, Avith tlie s([uailron nnder ynur emii- niand ; and I have their L()rdshi])s' commands to ai-([uaint you that tliey can- not I»ut feel the greatest rricrct that you slutuM have ht^-n induet-'d to return to Enii'laud with the squadron under your orders, under the eiroumstances in whieh you were |)laeed. I have their Lordships' further eitnimands to aci|uaint you that orders will be to sent to you, either liy this or to-morrow's post, to strike your tiag and come on shore. I am, &c., Evan Nepeax, Sccritan/ to the Adiniralty, Tucker's St. Vincent, vol. i. p. 216. 216 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY any large body of men passing into Corsica. On the IStli of September the little island of Capraja, a Genoese de- pendency and convenient refuge for small boats, was seized for the same object. On the 29th, however, Nelson re- ceived orders from Jervis for the evacuation of Corsica, the operations at Bastia being assigned to his special care. As soon as the determination of the British was known, discon- tent broke out into revolt. Gentili, finding the sea clear, landed on the 19th of October, pressing close down upon the coast ; and the final embarkation was only effected in safety under the guns of the ships. On the 19th Nelson took off the last of the troops, and carried them with the viceroy to Elba, which It was intended still to hold. Jer- vis held on at San Fiorenzo Bay to the latest moment pos- sible, everything being afloat for a fortnight before he left, hoping that Mann might yet join, and fearing he might arrive after the departure of the fleet. On the 2d of No- vember provisions were so short that longer delay was im- possible ; and the admiral sailed with his whole force, reaching Gibraltar, after a tedious voyage, on the 1st of De- cember, 1796. During the passage, in which the crews were on from half to one third the usual rations, Jervis received instructions countermanding the evacuation, if not yet car- ried out. If executed, Elba was still to be held. The policy of thus evacuating the Mediterranean admits, now as then, of argument on both sides. The causes for the vacillation of the British government are apparent. The first orders to leave everything, Elba included, were dated Auecust 31. Generals Jourdan and Moreau were then far in the heart of Germany ; and the archduke having but just begun the brilliant counter-move by which he drove first one, and then the other, back to the Rliine, the effects of this were in no wav foreseen. From Italv the latest possible news was of Bonaparte's new successes at Lonato and Castiglione, and the fresh retreat of the AustrianB. The countermanding orders, dated October 21, were issued TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. J'lNCENT 217 under the iiiflueiice of the archduke's su(2cess and of Wurmser's evasion of Bonaparte and entrance into Man- tua; whereby, despite repeated defeats in the field, the gar- rison was hxrgely increased and the weary work of the sie^e nuist be again begun. While Mantua stood, Bonaparte Could not advance ; and the Austrians were gathering a new army in the Tyrol. The British government failed, too, to realize the supreme excellence of its Mediterranean fleet and the stanch character of its leader. '' The ad- miral," wrote Elliott ^ on the si)ot, " is as firm as a rock. lie has at present fourteen sail-of-the-line against thirty- six, or perhaps forty. If Mann joins him, they will cer- tainly attack, and they are all confident of victory." The incident of Mann's conduct, under these circumstances, is full of military warning. It is within the limits of reason- able speculation to say that, had he obeyed his orders, — and only extreme causes could justify disobedience, — the battle of Cape St. Vincent would have been fought then in the Mediterranean,^ instead of in the Atlantic after the fall of Mantua, and would have profoundly affected the policy of the Italian States. With such a victory, men like Jervis and Elliott would have held on for further orders from home. " The expulsion of the English," wrote Bona- parte, " has a great effect upon the success of our military operations in Italy. We must exact more severe conditions of Naples. It has the greatest moral influence upon the minds of the Italians, assures our communications and will make Naples tremble even in Sicily." ^ In the opinion of the author. Sir Gilbert Elliott ex- presses the correct conclusion in the words following, which show singular foresight as well as sound political 1 Life of Lord Minto, vol. ii. p. 358. ^ This was Jervis's opinion. (See Life of St. Yiuceut by Tucker, V(.)l. i. p. 240; also Nelson's Dispatches, vol. ii. p. 204.) ■"^ Napoleon's Correspondence, vol. ii p. 76. See also geuerally pp. 73-80. The relief ol)tained by Bonaparte from the departure of the British crops out on every page. 218 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY judgment : '' I have always thought that it is a great and important object in the contest between the French re- public and the rest of Europe, that Italy, in whole or in part, should neither be annexed to France as dominion, nor affiliated in tlie shape of dependent republics ; and I have considered a superior British fleet in the Mediterranean as an essential means for securing Italy and Europe from such a misfortune." ^ Elliott's presentiments were realized by Napoleon at a later day ; the immediate effect of the evacuation was indicated by a treaty of peace between France and Naples, signed October 10, as soon as the pur- pose was known. In 1796 the British fleet had been three years in the Mediterranean, and since the acquisition of Corsica had effected little. What was needed at the mo- ment was not an abandonment of the field, but a demon- stration of power by a successful battle. The weakest eyes could count the units by which the allied fleets exceeded the British ; acts alone could show the real superiority, the predominance in strength, of the latter. That demon- strated, the islands and the remote extremities of the penin- sula would have taken heart, and a battle in the Gulf of Lyon had the far-reaching effects produced by that in Aboukir Bay. At the time of the evacuation the three most important factors in the military situation were, the siege of Mantua, the Austrian army in the Tyrol, and, last but not least, the British fleet in the Mediterranean. This sustained Naples ; and Naples, or rather southern Italy, was one of Bonaparte's most serious anxieties. Finally, it may be said that the value of Corsica to the fleet is proved by Nelson's preference of Maddalena Bay, in the straits separating Corsica from Sardinia, over Malta, as the station for a British fleet watching Toulon. Immediately upon reaching Gibraltar, Jervis received orders to take the fleet to Lisbon, in consequence of a dis- position shown by the allied French and Spanish govern- 1 Life of Lord Minto, vol. ii. p. 373. TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT. 219 mciits to attack Portugal.^ The limits of his command were extended to Cape Finisterre. Before sailing, he de- spatched Nelson up the Mediterranean with two frigates to bring off the garrison and stores from Elba, the abandon- ment of which was again ordered. On the IGth he sailed fur Lisbon, arriving there on the 21st ; but misfortunes were thickening around his fleet. On the 10th, at Gibral- tar, during a furious gale, three ships-of-the-line drove from their anchors. One was totally lost on the coast of Morocco, and another struck so heavily on a rock that she had to be sent to England for rei)airs. Shortly after, a third grounded in Tangiers Bay, and, though repaired on the station, was unfit for service in the ensuino- battle. A fourth, when entering the Tagus in charge of a pilot, was run on a shoal and wrecked. Finally, in leaving the river on the 18th of January, a ninety-eight-gun ship was run aground and incapacitated. This reduced the force with which he then put to sea to seek the enemy to ten ships-of-the-line. Nelson, his most eflicient lieutenant, was also nearly lost to him on that interesting occasion, when his fearless- ness and coup d\vil mainly contributed to the success achieved. Sailing from Oiljraltar on the 15th of Decem- ber, he fought on the 20th a severe action with two Span- ish frigates, which would have made a chapter in the life of an ordinary seaman, but is lost among his other deeds. His prizes were immediately recovered by a heavy Spanish squadron, but his own shii)s escaped. On the 2(jth he reached Porto Ferrajo, and remained a month. He was there joined by Elliott, the late viceroy of Corsica, who had been in Naples since the evacuation. General De Buro'h, commandino- the carrison, refused to abandon his post without specific orders from the government, and as 1 Tlic projert of forcing the entrnnce to the Tngus l\v a squadron from Brest had been o])enly discussed iu France. (Clievalier, Mar. Fran, sous la Kepublique, p. 25S.) 220 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY Nelson had only those of Jervis, he confined himself to emharking the naval stores. With these and all the ships of war he sailed from Elba on the 29th of January, 1797. On the 9th of February he reached Gibraltar ; and thence, learning that the Spanish fleet had repassed the Straits, he hurried on to join the admiral. Just out of Gibraltar he was chased by several Spaniards,^ but escaped them, and on the 13th fell in with the fleet. At 6 p. M. of that day he went on board his own ship, the " Captain," sev- enty-four, at whose masthead flew his broad pennant ^ during tlie battle of the following day. The meeting which now took place between the Spanish and British fleets was the result of the following move- ments. Towards the end of 1796 the Directory, encour- aged by Bonaparte's successes and by the Spanish alliance, and allured by the promises of disaffected Irish, determined on an expedition to Ireland. As the first passage of the troops and their subsequent communications would depend upon naval superiority, five ships-of-the-line were ordered from Toulon to Brest. This force, under Admiral Yille- neuve, sailed on the 1st of December, accompanied by the Spanish fleet of twenty-six ships, wliich, since October, had remained in Toulon. On the 6th Langara went into Car- tagena, leaving Villeneuve to himself, and on the 10th the French passed Gibraltar in full sight of the British fleet, driving before the easterly gale, which then did so much harm to Jervis's squadron and prevented pursuit. They 1 An exciting incident occurred during this chase. In the height of it a man fell overboard. A hoat was lowered and pieked him up ; but the enemy's ships were so close it became douljtful -v^-hetlier the British frigate could afford to await her return. Nelson, always generous to the verge of rashness, backed a topsail, saying "I won't let Hardy go,'' and succeeded in carrying him off. The anecdote gains in interest when it is remembered that Hardy, who was taken in tlie prize of December 20, had just been released from Spain ; and that, as captain of the flag-ship at Trafalgar, he was witness of Nelson's fall and death-scene. 2 The distinguishing flag which shows a commodore is on board the ship. TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT, ^yil did not, however, reach Brest soon enough for the expedi- tion. The Spaniards remained in Cartagena nearly two months, during which time Admiral Cordova took com- mand ; but under urgent pressure from the Directory ^ they finally sailed for Cadiz on the 1st of February, pass- ing the Straits ou the 5th with heavy easterly weather, which drove them far to the westward. They numbered now twenty-seven ships-of-the-line. Sir John Jcrvis, after leaving Lisbon on January 18, 1797, had convoyed to the westward some Portuguese merchant ships bound to Brazil, and then beaten back towards his station off Cape St. Vincent. On the Gth of February he was joined by a re-enforcement of five ships, which were sent from England as soon as the scare about Ireland had passed. With these fifteen he cruised off the Cape, knowing that he there must meet any squadron, from either the Mediterranean or the Atlantic, bound to Cadiz. At 5 a.m. of February 14, the frigate "Niger," which had kept sight of the Spanish fleet for some days, joined the admiral, and informed him that it was probably not more than ten or twelve miles distant, to the south- ward and westward. The wind, wliich had been strong south-easterly for several days, had changed during the night to west by south, enabling the Spaniards to head for Cadiz, after the weary Ijattling of the past week ; but this ^ A favorite project "with the Directory, as -with Napoleon, was to mass tlie French and Spanisli navies in one great hody ; as had several times lieen done under Lnuis XVI. during tlie American rievolution. Such a combi- nation was hoped for the Irish expedition of 179G; and, though too late for that purpose, the movement from Cartagena to Cailiz was regarded by tlie Directory as a step toward uniting the fleets. This was one of the ol>jects of Bruix's adventurous sortie from Brest in 1799, when he actually brought back to that port in his train fifteen Spanish ships, — nominal allies, actual hostages. The comliination at Trafalgar is well known. Later on the Em- peror sought to build up a patch-work fleet out of all the minor navies of the Continent, as he pieced together out of all the nations the immense army which was swallowed up in his Kussian enterprise. But here, as usually, a homogeneous body, centrally placed, triumphed over an incongruous Coalition. 222 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY otherwise fortunate circumstance became a yqyj dangerous incident ^ to a large, ill-officered, and ill-commanded body of ships, about to meet an enemy so skilful, so alert, and so thoroughly drilled as Jervis's comparatively small and manageable force. At daybreak, abotit 6.30, the Spaniards were seen, stretching on the horizon from south-west to south in an ill-defined body, across the path of the advanc- ing British. Their distance, though not stated, was prob- ably not less than fifteen to twenty miles. The British fleet being close hauled on the starboard tack, heading from south to south by west, while the Spaniards, bound for Cadiz, were steering east-south-east, the two courses crossed nearly at right angles. At this moment there was a great contrast between the arrays presented by the ap- proaching combatants. The British, formed during tlie night in two columns of eight and seven ships respectively, elicited the commendation of their exacting chief "for their admirable close order." ^ The Spaniards, on the con- trary, eager to get to port, and in confusion through the night shift of wind and their own loose habits of sailing, were broken into two bodies. Of these the leading one, as all were sailing nearly before the wind, was most to leeward. It was composed of six ships, the interval between which and the other twenty-one was proljably not less than eight miles. Even after the British fleet was seen, no attempt was for some time made to remedy this fatal separation ; a neglect due partly to professional nonchalance and in- efficiency, and partly to misinformation concerning the enemy's force, which tliey had heard through a neutral was only nine ships-of-the-liue.^ 1 The strin/rent exacti(;ns of the close-hauled line-of-liattle imposed upon a fleet, in the presence of an enemy, the tactical necessity of rectifying the order with any consideraldo change of wind, — an evolution whose difficulty increased in direct propnrtiun to the number of the sliips ; and in a more than geometrical progression, when they were badly drilled. ^ Tucker's Life of St. Vincent, vol. i. p. 255. ' James's Nav. Hist., vol ii. p. 37. BATTLE OF CAPE ST VINCENT FEBRUARY 14.1797. BRITISH, 15 5H1P3 5PANI5H,^7 WIND 1 W BYS. ■■ ^ ? ■ ■ . /■ P ■ / P ■Q s P o T m o f^^ r— J> COW - - -2. c> o V. ^1 CD ~ o -0 2 - ■'" 5 o :? T f. 3 5 " r. , - < S o t. > ? 2 o o ? S ^^ rr W; O > O n m V O < to tc O O cr- r" Z o O :3 o u"' m CP -> "^ -. ^ O *" r .- r?. rr (3 t> -^ X m :5 O < O Z s o n O — O ru o m m 5 o m 5 > ^ -7 3 --^ 3 C z z o 2 r IV. Z 0^ 3 -0 m ^ fn 5 -0 C T) O o o ■> «> o o o 05 -< - (^ ir. r" T) r: m 3> <-» -c z '^ O (^ ir. :S =t en •^ ™ o CI « o o < o a) (7 2 f" -n m . ^ CD OJ -( IT O z: o ?3 z > z C o ■a ■A z m 3 o 3- o rp O O ■_ < cc W* LP o 2 ;2 -0 CD C/l ■n -4 -*■ *■ CD r! OJ u< -< z o n O c 3 — z o TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT. 223 The weather being hazy and occasionally foggy, some time passed before the gradually approaching enemies could clearly see each other. At 9 a.m. the numljer and rates of the Spaniards could be made out from the masthead of the British fiag-shi}), so that they were then probably distant from twelve to fifteen miles. At half-past nine Jervis sent three ships ahead to chase, and a few minutes later supported them with three others. This advanced duty enaljled these six to take the lead in the attack, Aljout ten ^ the fosr lifted and disclosed the relative situ- O ations. The British, still in two columns, were lieadinii- fair for the gap in the Spanish order. The six lee ships of the latter had realized their false position, and were now close to the wind on the port tack, heading about north-north- west, in hopes that they could rejoin the main body to windward, which still continued its course for Cadiz. Jer- vis then made signal to form a sinale column, the flight- ing order of battle, and pass through the enemy's line. It soon became evident that the lee Spanish ships could not cross the bows of the British. For a moment thev wavered and bore up to south-east ; but soon after five of them re- sumed their north-west course, with the ap|)arent purjjose of breaking through the hostile line whose advance thev had not been able to anticipate.^ The sixth continued to the south-east and disappeared. The weather division of the Spaniards now also saw that it was not possible for all its members to effect a junction with the separated ships. Three stood on, and crijssed the bows of the advancing enemy ; the remainder hauled up in 1 Nelson's Narrative. Pispatches, vol. ii. ]>]). .340, .343. - James states that these .ships first came to the Aviml on tlie starlmanl taek, heading as did the Britisli, "as if iuteiidiiig to wesitlitT the wiiule Brit- ish rteet.'' The sui)erii>r speeil and weatherliness le that the movement, if made, was only t»ne of the successive vacilla- tions of men who had put themselvet^ iu a false ]>osition. (Vol. ii. p. 39 ) 224 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY increasing disorder to the northward, steering a course nearly parallel, but directly opposite, to the British, and passing their van at long cannon shot. At half-past eleven the " Culloden," Captain Troubridge, heading Jervis's column, came abreast the leading ships of this body, and opened fire. Sir John Jervis now saw secured to him the great desire of commanders-in-chief. His own force, in compact fighting order, was interposed between the frac- tions of the enemy, able to deal for a measurable time with either, undisturbed by the other. Should he attack the eighteen weather, or the eight lee ships, with his own fif- teen ? With accurate professional judgment he promptly decided to assail the larger body ; because the smaller, hav- ing to beat to windward, would be kept out of action longer than he could hope if he chose the other alternative. The decision was in principle identical with that which deter- mined Nelson's tactics at the Nile. The signal was there- fore made to tack in succession, in pursuit of the weather ships. Troubridge, anticipating the order, had already hoisted at the masthead his answering flag of recognition, rolled up after the manner of the sea, needing but a turn of the wrist to unloose it. Quick as the admiral's signal flew the reply fluttered out, and the " Culloden's " sails were already shaking as she luffed up into the wind. " Look at Troubridge," shouted Jervis, in exultation : " he handles his ship as if the eyes of all England were upon him ! and would to God they were ! " The rear of the Spaniards was just passing the " CuUoden " as she thus went round. Ship after ship of the British line tacked in her wake and stood on in pursuit ; while those still on the first course, south by west, interposed between the two Spanish divisions. Of these the lee, led Ijy a hundred-gun ship under a vice-admiral's flag, headed towards Jervis's flag-ship, the " Victory," the seventh in the British order, as though to go through the line ahead of her. The " Vic- tory " was too prompt ; and the Spaniard, to avoid colli- TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT. 225 sion, went about close under the British broadsides. In doing this he was exposed to and received a raking fire, which drove him out of action, accompanied by his con- sorts. The " Victory," which had backed a topsail a mo- ment to aim more accurately, then stood on and tacked in the wake of the " CuUoden," followed by the rest of the British column. It was now nearly one o'clock. The action so far had consisted, first, in piercing the enemy's line, cutting off the van and greater part of the centre from the rear ; and, second, in a cannonade between two columns passing on opposite parallel courses, — the Spanish main division run- ning free, the Ijritish close to the wind. Naval history abounds in instances of these brushes, and pronounces them commonly indecisive. Jervis, who had seen such,^ meant decisive action when he ordered the " Culloden " to tack and follow the enemy. But a stern chase is a long chase, and the Spanish ships were fast sailers. Some time must pass before Troubridge and his companions could overtake them ; and, as each succeeding vessel of the Brit- ish line had to reach the common point of tacking, from which the Spaniards were steadily receding, the rear of Jervis's fleet must be long in coming up. That it was so is proved by the respective losses incurred. It has, there- fore, been suggested that the admiral would have done well to tack his whole fleet, or at least the rear ships to- i^'ethcr, brino-im;- them in a bodv on the Spanish van. The idea is plausible, but errs by leaving out of the calculation tlie Spanish lee division, which was kept off by the British rear ships. Those eight lee ships are apt to be looked on as wholly out of the affair ; but in fact it was a necessary part of Jervis's combination to check them, during the time required to deal with the others. Admiral Parker, com- manding in the van, speaks expressly of the efforts made 1 Notably in Keppel's action in 1778, in wliich he bore a distinguished part. See Mahau's Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, p. 351. VOL. I. — 15 226 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY bj the Spanish lee division to annoy him, and of the cover- ine: action of the British rear.^ Thus, one by one, the British ships were changing their course from south by west to north-north-east in pursuit of the Spanish main division, and the latter was gradually passing to the rear of their enemy's original order. When they saw the sea clear to the south-east, about one o'clock, they bore up, altering their course to east-south-east, hop- ing to pass behind the British and so join the lee division. Fortunately for Jervis, Nelson was in the third ship from the rear. Having fully divined his chief's purpose, he saw it on the point of defeat, and, without waiting for orders, wore at once out of the line, and threw the " Captain," alone, in front of the enemy's leading ships. In this well- timed but most daring mo^e, which illustrates to the high- est degree the immense difference between a desperate and a reckless action, Nelson passed to the head of the British column, crossing the bows of five large Spanish vessels, and then with his seventy-four engaged the " Santisima Trinidad," of one hundred and thirty guns, the biggest ship at that time afloat. The enemy, apparently dashed by this act of extraordinary temerity, and as little under control as a flock of frightened sheep, hauled up in a body again to north-north-east, resuming what can only be described as their flight. 1 " When the ' Prince George ' tacked, the two three-deckers [of the Span- ish lee division] tacked after us, and which the rest of the enemy's rear were about to do; but the commander-in-chief, with the ships of [our] centre and rear, following close, covered us from their attach upon the rear of the ships with me, and obliged them to re-tack . . and effectually divided the enemy's fleet." (Sir William Parker's narrative of the conduct of the British van. Nel- son's Dispatches, vol. ii. p. 473.) The gallant admiral's style is confused, Init his meaning is clear enough after half a dozen readings. He must not be taken for the very distinguished officer of the same name, hut of the next generation. Both Parker and Nelson (Dispatches, vol. ii. pp. 340, 344) speak of the main Spanish division as " the van.'' In truth, when the "Culloden" inter- posed, the whole enemy's fleet were so nearly joined on the port tack as to seem in line, though disorderly and not quite connected. TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT. 227 Their momentary change of course had, however, caused a delay which enabled the British leaders to come up. Troubridge in the " CuUoden " was soon riy five hostile ships. TVitli every sail set he pressed aliead, passing between the " Captain " and her nearest enemy, brushing the latter at a distance of ten feet, and pouring in one of those broadsides of which lie used to assure his practised crew that, if they could fire three in five minutes, no vessel could resist them. The " San Nicolas," either intentionally or from the helmsman being killed, luffed and fell on board the " San Josef," a ship of one hundred and twelve guns, while the " Excellent," continuing her course, left the sTound as:ain clear for Nelson. The latter, seeing the " Captain " powerless for continued mana3uvre, 1 Nelsou's Narrative, Dispatches, vul. ii. pp. 341, 345. 228 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY put the helm to starboard ; the British ship came up to the wind, fetched over to the " San Nicolas," and grappled her. Nelson, having his men ready on deck, rushed at their head on board the Spaniard, drove her crew below, and captured her. The " San Josef," which was fast to the " San Nicolas " on the other side, now opened a fire of musketry ; but the commodore, first stationing sentinels to prevent the '' San Nicolas's " men regaining their deck, called upon his own ship for a re-enforcement, with which he boarded the three-decker and carried her also. On her quarter-deck, surrounded by his followers still hot from the fight, he received the swords of the Spanish oflicers. This dramatic ending to the distinguished part played by him, and the promptitude of his previous action, by which, while assuming a great responsibility, he saved the success of the day, have made Nelson the most striking figure in the battle of Cape St. Vincent ; or, as it is sometimes called, of St. Valentine's Day. This splendid movement of his genius in no way detracts from the credit due to the com- mander-in-chief ; as it was no lessening of Nelson's own fame that the leader of the van at the Nile conceived on the moment the happy thought of passing inside the French line. To Jervis alone belongs the honor of attacking such heavy odds, as well as of the correct and sufficient com- bination by which he hoped to snatch victory from superior numbers. He was happy, indeed, in having such a lieu- tenant, so right a man in so right a place, and at so critical a moment; but the whole responsibility and the whole original plan was his, and no man can take it from him. To him, too, was primarily due the admirable efficiency of his fleet, which removed from his enterprise the reproach of rashness to bestow upon it the praise of daring. A yet higher meed of glory is due to this bold admiral. As the dull morning light showed him the two fleets, he was heard to say, " A victory is very essential to England at this moment." Honor to the chief who can rise above his own anxieties TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT. 229 and his local responsibilities to think of the needs of his country, and who is willing to risk his own reputation to support her credit. Four Spanish ships were now in the possession of the British, and the great " Santisima Trinidad" was without fore or mizzen mast, — some said she had struck ; but the lee division of the enemy was at last coming up, and many of the weather were still uninjured. Jervis, therefore, about four in the afternoon formed his fleet in line on the star- board tack, interposing it between the enemy and his prizes. This ended the battle. It has been thought that further pursuit of a fleet so disgracefully beaten would have in- creased the British triumph ; but Jervis was not the man to risk a substantial success, securely held, for a doubtful farther gain. The victory essential to Great Britain was won ; the worthlessness of the Spanish nav}^ was revealed, — it could no longer be accounted a factor in the political situa- tion. In the opinion of the author, Jervis was right not to expose this, the great and attained result of Valentine's Day, to those chances of mishap that cannot be excluded from the operations of war. Among the numerous rewards bestowed for this action, the admiral was advanced to the peerage as Earl St. Vin- cent, while upon Nelson was bestowed the then distin- guished honor of Knight of the Bath. On the 20th of February he was made a rear-admiral. The captains of the fleet received medals, and the senior lieutenant of each ship was promoted. Jervis had well said that Great Britain was then in es- sential need of a victory; and never was one better timed for political effect. Deep gloom prevailed throughout the coun- try, and in every quarter the horizon was black with clouds, when, on the 3d of March, the bearer of the dispatches reached the admiralty. Since Bonaparte had seized the line of the Adige and cut off Mantua, three distinct attempts had been made by the Austrians in superior force to dis- 230 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY lodge him and relieve the city ; and in all three they had been beaten with heavy loss. The news "was but lately come that Mantua had capitulated, leaving Bonaparte free to assume the oficnsive and advance, as he shortly did. The British fleet had been forced to abandon Corsica and the Mediterranean. Peace negotiations, begun with the republic, had ended by the British envoy being peremp- torily ordered to leave France in forty-eight hours ; and although the government had not expected a favorable issue, the effect on the people was disheartening. Consols fell to 51, a depression greater than any reached during the American Revolution.^ Tlie expedition of the French against Ireland had indeed failed ; but so little share had the Channel fleet borne in their defeat, that tlie country was forced to ascribe to the direct interposition of Divine Providence a deliverance, which it would have preferred to see wrought through the instrumentality of the navy. That trusted arm of the national defence seemed palsied in every quarter. Finally, among the greater of many discourag- ing circumstances, specie payments were stopped by the Bank of England on the 26th of February, in obedience to an order of the government. The profuse subsidies paid to continental states, and the demands for coin to meet the ex- penses of the navy in all parts of the world, were the chief causes of a drain against which the bank directors had fre- quently remonstrated during two years as threatening ruin. To these causes fur scarcity was added at this time another, temporary in its character and arising in great part from loss of confidence in the navy's efficiency, — the fear, namely, of invasion. People had begun to call for and to hoard coin against an evil day. Such was the outlook as Jervis's cap- tain posted from Falmoutli, where he landed, to London, keeping tlie secret of his good news within his breast. The frigate which had borne him went on to Plymouth with the viceroy of Corsica, returning with his suite from his lost 1 Annual Kegister, 1797, p. 148. TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT. 231 principality. When they landed on the 5th of March, news had just reached the town of tlie suspension of cash payments, and, as they told of the i^reat achievement off Cape St. Vincent, people at first refused to believe that the tide had turned. They were expecting to hear of a junc- tion between the French and Spanish fleets, and an a})- proaching invasion. So great was the financial panic, Ihat fifteen guineas were with difficulty collected among govern- ment officials to pay the expenses of Elliott's journey to London.^ The revulsion was great, and was proved by the pro- fusion with which rewards w^ere distributed. The Spanish navy had been but a Lugbear, but as a bugbear it was great. The veil that covered its rottenness was stripped away, and at the same time were revealed to the nation, which feared it had no naval chiefs, the striking and brilliant figures of Jcrvis and Nelson. In vain did the Opposition, in the true spirit of faction, seek to turn men's eyes from the brilliant achievements of the warriors to the imbecility afiirmcd of the govenmient, which had opposed fifteen ships to twenty- seven. Thinking men realized that the administration could not be held responsilde for Mann's unauthorized re- turn at Christmas-tide, nor for the extraordinary series of misfortunes l)y which five more of the I\rediterranean lleet were in one short month incapacitated. They saw, too, that no popular government would have dared to replace Mann's ships so long as the fate of Ireland, then in the balance, was uncertain. But most men did not care to think. It was enough for them that fifteen British ships had daslied into the midst of twenty-seven enemies, liad collared and dragged out four of the biggest and severely handled the rest. It was enough to hear that the crew of one Bi-itisli seventy-four, headed by a man whom few out of the navy yet knew, had, sword in hand, carried first a Spanish eighty and then another of one hundred and twelve 1 Life of Lord jNIinto, vol. ii. p. 379. 232 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY guns. With such men to rule the fleet, and with Pitt at the helm of state, they thanked God and took courage. Specu- lation is often futile ; yet it is hard to see how the country could have borne the approaching crisis of the mutinies, on top of its other troubles, had not the fear of the Spanish navy been removed and the hope of better naval leaders been afforded. That the hope was well founded is no specu- lation. With St. Vincent began a series of victories and achievements which have thrown the great deeds of earlier years into undeserved obscurity. Immediately after the battle the Spanish fleet entered Cadiz, and Jervis returned to Lisbon to refit his ships. On the 31st of March, having received further re-enforcements, he left Lisbon with twenty-one ships-of-the-line and took position off Cadiz, where the Spaniards had twenty-six of the same class. After cruising for six weeks under sail, he anchored the fleet for a long blockade, and this disposition continued with little intermission for two years, — until May, 1799, when the successful sortie of Admiral Bruix from Brest, related in another place,^ and the consequent chase by the British blockading force, gave the Spaniards the opportunity to slip out. This tedious watching was un- fruitful in events of military interest ; but the burden of the commander-in-chief was increased by the spirit of mutiny, rife throughout the whole period, which triumphed temporarily in the Channel and North Sea fleets, and was by Jervis kept down only by a stern vigilance of which few but he were capable. Stamped out time and again by his unflinching energy, it was continually renewed by the fresh ships sent out from home, under officers of temper inferior to his captains, and with seamen who knew not yet by ex- perience the indomitable will which they sought to bend. Execution followed execution ; but never once did the old man's courage quail nor his determination falter. Seaman and officer alike were made to feel that while his flasf flew 1 See Chapter X. TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT. 233 his authority should prevail ; and with such backing the officers showed themselves incapable of the weaknesses too often manifested in the home ports.^ It is probable too that a strong nucleus of support existed among the crews that fought at St. Vincent, — due to admiration for the admiral himself, and for Nelson, Collingwood, Troubridge, Saumarez and others, who there distinguished themselves. While these various events were transpiring at sea, from the evacuation of Corsica to the battle of iSt. Vincent, Bona-' parte in Italy was still holding the line of the Adige and blockading Mantua. His posture therefore was essentially one of defence. The vigor and sagacity with which he re- sorted to offensive movements the instant the enemy drew down from the Tyrol to attack him, and the brilliant char- acter of the victories won by him, obscure to most the fact that he was really on the defensive ; holding on, amid risks and discouragements, to the conquests already made, and unable to attempt more until Mantua fell. The glories of Castigiione, Areola, Rivoli, conceal this crucial feature of his situation, and the consequently important bearing of the presence of the British fleet, encouraging the dispositions of Naples and the Pope, which were distinctly hostile to the French. Nothing less than Bonaparte's energy and genius could have grapi)led successfully with such a situation ; and his correspondence betrays his fear that, l)y the co-operation of the fleet, these dano:ers in the rear might become too great even for him. When Mantua capitulated on the 2d of Foliruary, Bonaparte turned first upon the Pope, whom he accused of violating the armistice concluded the previous June. His Holiness at once submitted, and on the 19th of February signed a peace, abandoning his right to his northern provinces, — Bolo,o:na,Ferraraand the Romagna, — and ceding to France, until the end of the war, Ancona, a good seaport on the Adriatic. 1 For a striking incident of St. Vincent's energy in suppressing mutiny, see note at end of this chapter. 234 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY On the 10th of March, having completed all the disposi- tions that seemed necessary to secure his rear, Bonaparte advanced against the Austrians. The young Archduke Charles, whom the campaign of 1796 on the Danube had revealed to Europe as gifted with military talents of a very high order, had been sent to oppose him ; but it was too late to resist on the plains of Italy, or even on the Italian side of the mountains. The French crossed the Taolia- mento on March 16, and pushed up through the gorges of that stream and of the Isonzo into the eastern Alps. On the 23d Trieste Avas occupied. The Archduke retired continuously, barely disputing difficult positions with the enemy. His mind was fixed not to fight until he had drawn the French far into Germany, and had collected his own resources, — a decision whose wisdom Bonaparte sealed witli his own commendation. " If the enemy had commit- ted the folly of awaiting me, " he wrote to the Directory, " I should have beaten them ; but if they had continued to fall back, had joined a part of their forces from the Rhine, and had overwhelmed me, then retreat would have been difficult, and the loss of the Army of Italy might entail that of the republic. We must not shut our eyes to the fact that, though our military position was brilliant, we have not simply dictated the conditions. " ^ Italy, too, was fer- menting behind him. The moral effect, however, of this unopposed advance through the mountains of Carinthia brouirht the House of Austria to terms ; and on the 18th of April preliminaries of peace were signed at Leoben, only sixty miles from Vienna. Though the formal treaty was not concluded until six months later, this transaction marked, for that time, the end of hostilities between Aus- tria and France, which had then lasted five years, — from April, 1792, to April, 1797. The preliminaries of Leoben stipulated a mutual cessation of hostilities between the republic and the emperor, and ex- 1 April 19, 1797. Napoleon's Correspondence, vol. ii. p. 655. TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VIXCEXT. 235 tended this provision to all the states of the German Em- pire, as well as to the particular dominions of the emperor himself. Austria surrendered definitively the Netherlands (Belgium), and "- recognized the limits of France as de- creed hy the laws of the French Repuhlic." In this phrase was imbedded the rock upon which negotiations with Great Britain sjdit. The republic, on its part, undert(jok to fur- jiish to the emperor at the final peace a ''just and suitable compensation " for the provinces he lost. The " suitable compensation," thus mysteriously alluded to, \vas defined in the '' secret preliminary agreements," contracted at the same moment. It was furnished by de- priving the republic of Venice, with which Bonaparte had reasons for serious discontent, of all its possessions on the mainland of Italy, as well as of Istria and Dalmatia on the east coast of the Adriatic. The provinces thus taken were divided : Austria receiving all east of the Oglio and north of the Po, with Istria and Dalmatia. The country between tlie Oglio and the Adda, previously owned by Yen- ice, was taken to constitute a new, independent republic ; into which were also incorporated all possessions of Austria west of the Oglio conquered by the French in the I'ccent cami)aign. This was to be known as the Cisalpine Repub- lic. Thus the hjrds of the Adriatic were shorn of their glory, and brought to the brink of the ])rccipice from wliich, six months later, at the final peace, the Corsican conqueror hurled them headlong. For the moment there were spared to them tbeir ancient city and the Ionian Islands; and the legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and tlic Romagna, taken from the Pope, were given to them, — a like transient possession. Such, in brief outline, were the principal terras of tlie preliminaries of Leoben. The great and significant feature does not ostensibly appear among the articles. Bona- parte, in diplomacy, had achieved the great end at which he aimed in liis j»lans of campaign. He had separated his enemies. '' The French Re|»ublic," wrote he, " in granting 236 THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY at Leoben preliminaries so advantageous to his Imperial Majesty, had as its principal end the conclusion of a sepa- rate peace with his Majesty, in order to be in a position to turn all its forces against England, and oblige her lo a prompt peace." He alone made and signed the prelimina- ries, and this quotation gives the strategy and policy of his life in a nutshell.^ The crucial fact at Leoben was that Austria then, as Sardinia a year before, treated alone, — • without her ally. This Great Britain, to her honor, abso- lutely refused to do in 1796, and as long as her ally stood by her. There is, of course, a great difference between the position of a state which finds a victorious enemy in the heart of its territories, and that of an island empire ; and great allowance must be made for Austria, even though the calm retrospect of history sees that she failed rightly to appreciate the extreme hazard of Bonaparte's situation. But this allowance merely emphasizes the important truth, that the imposing attitude maintained by Great Britain throughout this tremendous contest depended absolutely and wholly upon the control of the sea, — upon Sea-Power. Note, — It now only remains to be seen how, when insubordina- tion, and accompanied by villany of this magnitude, did make its open appearance, Lord St. Vincent dealt with it. A remarkable occa- sion will be mentioned, not indeed the first outbreak of mutiny, nor its last effort, but that one which excited the greatest sensation in the fleet, — that which came with most untoward circumstances, — that of which the enforcement of the penalty had, in Lord St. Vincent's opin- ion, the most salutary effect. No sooner had Sir Roger Curtis arrived, than applications came to the commander-in-chief for courts-martial on mutineers from three of those ships, — the "Marlborough,'' the "Lion," and the "Centaur." Selection will be made of the sequel to tlie " Marlborough." As the squadron approaclied, and before the request for a court- martial, tliis ship being known to the commander-in-chief to have been among the most disorganized at Spithead. had been ordered to take her berth in the centre, at a small distance from the rest of the 1 Napoleon's Correspondence, vol. iii. p. 34G. TO THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT. 237 fleet. It, however, had so happened that a very violent mutiny in her had broken out at Beerhaven, and again during the passage, which liad been suppressed by the othcers, but chieliy by the first lieutenant. The very object too of this mutiny was to protect the life of a seaman who had forfeited it by a capital crime. A court-martial on the prin- cipal nmtineers was immediately assembled ; and one was no sooner sentenced to die than the commander-in-chief ordered him to be exe- cuted on the following morning, " and by the crew of the ' Marlhor- oufjh' alone, no part of the boats^ crews from the other ships, as had been usual on similar occasions, to assist in the punishment," — his Lordship's invariable order on the execution of mutineers. On the receipt of the necessary commands for this execution, the captain of the "-Marlbor- ough," Captain Ellison, waited upon the connnander-in-<;hief , and re- ndndiug his Lordship that a determination that their shipmates should not suffer capital punishment had been the very cause of the ship's company's mutiny, expressed his cmiviction that the " ]\Iarl- l)orough's " crew would never permit the man to be hanged on Ijoard that ship. Receiving the captain on the " Ville de Paris' " quarter-deck, be- fore the officers and ship's company, hearkcuing in breathless silence to what passed, and standing with his hat in his hand o\'er his head, as was his Lordship's invarial)le custom during the whole time lluxt any person, whatever were his rank, even a common seaman, addressed him on service, Lord St. Vincent listened very attentivrly till the captain ceased to speak ; and then, after a pause, replied, — "What do yiMi mean to tell me, Captain Ellison, that you cannot command his ^Majesty's ship the OLirlborongh '? for if that is the case, sir, I will immediately send on board an oflicm- wlio can." The captain then requested that, at all events, the boats' crews from the rest of the fleet might, as always ha- Venice with the hope of continued national existence, and on the other treating with Austria fur her extinction and a division of the spoil, in which Fi-ance was to have the Ionian Islands and the Venetian navy,i — while Malmes- bury was negotiating at Lille, and the Directory was in bitter conflict with the Councils, — there was painfully sail- ing for England, crippled and suffering, the man who was destined to dispel the gorgeous dreams of Eastern achieve- ment which filled Bonaparte's brain, and to shatter the French navy, — the all-essential link which alone could knit together these diverse maritime possessions, the one founda- tion upon which stood the whole projected fabric of Medi- terranean control. During the wearing times of the Cadiz blockade, Lord St. Vincent, aware how much the listless* ness of such inactive service contributed to foment mutiny, endeavored ingeniously to contrive fighting to occupy the minds of the seamen. For that purpose, largely, he l.)om- barded Cadiz ; and for that purpose he sent Nelson, with a detached squadron, to seize the town of Santa Cruz in the Canary Islands by a sudden and vigorous assault, hoping 1 " Upport each other's demands and interests in the Con- gress ; where France wished to secure a certain line of the Rhine, and Austria to indemnify herself, at the expense of some German minor states, for the losses undergone hy the treaty. The salient features of this treaty were therefore the cession of Belgium ; the annihilation of Venice ; the settle- ment of the Cisalpine Republic as a powerful dei)endency of France ; the strengthening of the latter as a Mediter- ranean state by the gain of tha Ionian Islands ; and, finally, the loosing of her hands against Great Britain, which now stood witliout a strong ally in all Europe. Bonaparte justi- fied his action to his critics on these grounds, but especially on account of the necessity of dealing with Great Britain single-handed. '' When the Cisalpine lias the best military frontier in Europe, when France gains Mayence and the Rhine, wdien she has in the Levant Corfu, extremely well fortified, and the islands, what more would you wish? To scatter our force, in order that England may continue to take from us, from Spain, from Holland, our colonies, and postpone yet furtlier the restoration of our trade and our navy ? . . . Either our government must destroy the Eng- lish monarchy, or must expect itself to be destroyed by the corruption and intrigue of those active islanders. The present moment offers us a fine game. Let us concentrate all our activity upon the navy, and destroy England. That done, Europe is at our feet." ^ Thus did Bonaparte demon- strate that the scene of strife was to be transferred to the sea. The Directory at once ratified the Treaty of Campo Formio, and named Bonaparte one of throe plenipotentiaries to the Congress of Rastadt. The general remained in Italy for a month longer, organizing the new state, and distribu- ting the army with a view to support the interests of France, while withdrawing some thirty thousand men for the in- 1 Corr. de Nap., vol. iii. pp. 519, 520. 252 BONAPARTE'S EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. tended army of EDgland. On the 17tli of November he left Milan, and on the 25th arrived at Rastadt. He remained there, however, but a week ; and then, apparently at the call of the Directory,^ started for Paris, which he reached on the 5th of December. He was avowedly to command the army of England, and during the two following months his correspondence betrays no sign of any other purpose ; his orders to various subordinates, and especially to Berthier, his celebrated chief-of-sta£f, at the time commanding in Italy, abound with dispositions and instructions to transfer troops thence towards the Channel. Particularly significant of such intention were the orders sent from him to Admiral Brueys, commanding the French division in Corfu, to start for Brest,^ — a mission which would make his force inacces- sible for the Egyptian expedition. Too much stress, how- ever, cannot be laid upon such indications coming from so crafty a nature ; and the first intimation of a change of purpose has more the appearance of stripping off a mask than of awakening from a dream. " Make what efforts we will," wrote he to the Directory, on February 23, 1798, " we shall not for many years acquire the control of the seas. To make a descent upon England, without being master of the sea, is the boldest and most difficult operation ever attempted." ^ Most true, but not new. Nor was the veil under which he covered his change of attitude very difficult to pierce. On the 7th of February, 1798, he wrote to the Minister of War that he was about to visit the Chan- nel coast, near Dunkirk, sending Kleber and Desaix to Havre and Brest. On the 12th from Dunkirk he sends engineers to examine Boulogne, Etaples, Ambleteuse, and Calais, — ports on which he, five years later, based his more serious projects of invasion ; and at the same time two others are dispatched to Holland to demand help of various 1 Corr. de Nap., vol. iii. p. .597. 2 Ibid., vol. iii. p. 609 (Deo. U, 1797). 8 Ibid., p. 644 (Feb. 23, 1798). BONAPARTE'S EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 253 kinds. The very next day, Feljruary 13, he sends orders to Toulon, m the name of the Pireetory, not only to hold on to the ships ordered for Brest, hut to send despateh vessels in every direetiun to recall to Toulon all ships-of-\var cruising in the Mediterranean.^ Eeturning to Paris, he addressed a letter to the government, setting furth what needed to he done l.iy the month of Ajtril in order to make the attempt upon Great Britain even possiWe, — a long- array of requirements, which only he, if his heart were in the matter, was capable of accomplishing. lie concluded ])y saying there were but three ways of reaching England. One was by direct invasion ; the second, by an attempt upon Hanover and Hamburg, — the continental centres of her trade ; the last, Ijy an expedition to the Levant. On the 5th of March Bonaparte conununicated to the government a note containing the dis})Ositions necessary for an expedition to seize Egypt and Malta. The same day the Directory issued a number of decrees, constituting a commission on the Coast Defences of the Mediterranean, under cover of which the needed preparations were to be carried on, and dehning the various steps to be taken. The ships at Toulon were retpiircdto be ready for sea on the 4th of April. Admiral Brueys, who had iK'en unable to sail for Brest on account of want of |)rovisions, was on February 12 ordered to Toulon. lie arrived there with his squad- ron on the 2d of April, and was appointed to comnumd the naval part of the ex})edition,to consist of thirteen ships- of-the-linc with smaller vessels. All arrano:ements wei'O pushed with the greatest activity possil>le, though much retarded by the extreme want of naval stores, of provisions, and of money. Still greater difficulty was experienced from scarcity of sailors ; the inducements offered by priva- teers having drawn away almost all the seamen of the republic, and landed great numbers of them in British prisons, — a sad result of the much-vaunted commerce* ^ Corr. de Nap., vol. iii. p. 643. 254 BONAPABTE'S EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. destroying. Through all, the pretence of invading England was maintained ; and Bonaparte himself, to mislead opinion, stayed till the last moment in Paris. The Spanish fleet at Cadiz was, hy the urgent demands of the Directory, made to assume positions which threatened an approaching de- parture, in order to fasten St. Vincent's ships to the port and foster in British minds the easily aroused fear of an invasion of Ireland. But measures so extensive could not long escape comment and suspicion. The actual intentions of the Directory were kept so impenetrably secret that, after the expedition sailed, the senior naval officer at Tou- lon wrote to the Minister of Marine, " I know no more of the movements of the squadron than if it did not belong to the republic ; " ^ but it was not possible to conceal the patent fact that Marseille, Toulon, Genoa, Civita Vecchia, and Corsica were alive with hurried preparations for a great naval undertaking, whatever its destination might be. It was evident, therefore, that France was about to expose herself for a time upon the sea to the blows of Great Brit- ain, and the ministry determined not to let such an oppor- tunity slip. During the year 1797 no British fleet, and, with the rare exception of one or two scattered cruisers, no British ship- of-war, had entered the Mediterranean. The gathering of the Spanish navy at Cadiz, and of the greater part of the French in Brest, with the apparent design to invade Ireland or England, had dictated the concentration of the British navy before those two ports ; either immediately, as St. Vincent at Cadiz, or by the dispositions — less fitted to compass their purpose — of the Channel fleet, by which bodies of ships were gathered at points other than Brest, with the hope of combining them against any sortie from that port. Great Britain, during the time following St. Vincent's retreat from the Mediterranean, was in the posi- tion of a nation struggling for existence, — for so she felt 1 Jurien de la Graviere, Guerres Maritimes (4th ed.), vol. i. p. 350. BONAPARTE'S EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 255 it,^ — which had been compelled to contract her lines through loss of force, due to the gradual submission of her allies to her enemies. To this had further conduced the threatening attitude of the Dutch navy in the Texel re- quiring a strong North Sea fleet. To her other embarrass- ments had been added, in this year of distress, the extensive mutinies in the navy. Though appeased in some instances and quelled in others, the spirit which caused them still existed. Under these circumstances Bonaparte, in 1797, had met no naval obstacle to his plans for the control of the Mediterranean, which had, moreover, been so covert as to escape detection. Admiral Brueys had gone from Toulon to the Adriatic, remained there several months, and returned in peace ; and all minor naval movements went on undis- turbed. The destiny of Corfu was not revealed till the end of the year ; the purpose to get hold of Malta, seriously entertained by Brueys at the instigation of Bonaparte,^ never transpired ; and the talk about the army of England combined with the actual positions of the allied fleets to retain the British in the same stations. Toward the end of 1797 several circumstances occurred to relieve the pres- sure. In October Admiral Duncan inflicted upon the Dutch fleet, off the Texel, a defeat so decisive and com- plete as to throw it out of the contest for a long time. Of fifteen ships opposed to him, nine were taken. The con- dition of the French fleet in Brest, if not accurately known to be as bad as Bonaparte represented it,^ was still suffi- 1 So moderate a man as Collingwood wrote (Jan. 26, 1798) ; " The question is not merely who shall be conqueror, . . but whether we shall lie any longer a people, — whether Britain is still to be enrolled in the list of European nations.'' — Collingwood's Memoirs. ^ See Correspondence of Brueys with Bonaparte ; Jurien de la Graviere, Guerres Maritimes (Appendix, 4th ed.). 3 " There are fitting out at Brest but ten ships-of-the-liue, which have no crews, and are still far from being in condition to keep the sea. The expedition against England would appear not to be possible before next year." (Corr. de Nap., vol. iii. p. 644, Feb. 23, 1798.) The British Channel fleet at this time numbered forty-seven of the line, exclusive of six- teen in the North Sea, 256 BONAPARTE'S EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. ciently understood. No attempt had been made during the summer or winter of 1797 to renew the Irish expedition; and when the opening spring of 1798 permitted the Chan- nel fleet in a body to keep tlie sea, the ministry felt it safe to detach a force to the. Mediterranean. Sir Horatio Nelson sailed from England on the 10th of April, and joined the fleet off Cadiz on the 80th. Lord St. Vincent welcomed him gladly, and at once sent him with three ships-of-thc-line to the Mediterranean, to watch the impending armament, and, if possible, learn its destina- tion. Nelson left the fleet on tlie 2d of May, the day before Bonaparte quitted Paris. On the 17th, having been un- avoidably delayed at Gibraltar, he was in the neighborhood of Toulon, and captured a French corvette just leaving port ; from which he learned particulars as to the naval force of the enemy, but nothing as regarded its destination. On the night of the 20th, in a violent gale of wind, his own ship was dismasted and with difficulty saved from going ashore. By great exertions she was towed by her consorts into the San Pietro Islands, at the south end of Sirdinia, where she anchored on the 23d. On the 19th Bonaparte had sailed with the Marseille and Toulon divisions of the expedition. He was to be joined on the way by the detachments from Genoa, Corsica, and Civita Vecchia, — the total number of troops amounting to between thirty and thirty-five thousand. On the same day that Nelson parted from St. Vincent, May 2, the admiralty wrote to the latter that it was essential to send twelve ships-of-thc-linc into the Mediter- ranean to counteract the French armament ; and that to replace them eight ships had been ordered from England. A private letter from the First Lord, by the same mail, authorized St. Vincent to take his whole force for this object, if necessary, but hoped a detachment would be suffi- cient. In the latter case, while the choice of its commander was left to the admiral, it was intimated that Nelson, f— :^! ^ I BONAPARTE'S EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 257 though junior to two other flag-officers, was by all means the proper man. Jcrvis had alreadv made the same deci- siou; and now at once told off and i>reparedthe nine sliips- of-the-line, forming the inshore squadron of the blockade, to start the moment the expected re-enforcement arrived. Tbe junction of the latter with the main licet was made May 24, out of sight of the port ; and during tlie night Captain Troubridgc sailed with tlic inslujre ships, tlieir places being taken by vessels similarly pointed, so that no suspicion of the transaction might arise in Cadiz. On t]ie 7th of June Trouljridge j(jined Nelson, having picked n\) two more ships \)y the way ; so that the British were now thirteen se\'entv-foui\s and one of hftv ir'uns. By a very strange fatality, h(.>w(,iv('r, the frigates at llrst with Nelson had parted company the night his slii]) was dismasted, and had never rejoined. Troubridgc br(.)ught only one little Ijrig ; and, as it was inadmissible to scatter the sliips-of-the-linc, the Avant of lookout vessels seriously ali'ected all Nelson's mo\'ements in tlie long and harassing pursuit, covering nearly eight weeks, that lay before him. After leaving Toulon, Bona[»arte directed his force along the Gulf of Genoa, wliere, on the night of ^[ay 20, he ex- perienced tlic same gale that dismasted Nelson. Tlie next day the convo}^ from Genoa joined. Steering south along the east coasts of Corsica and Sardinia, the division from Corsica met him on the 2(:>th off the south end of the islaiul, but that from Civita Vecchia failed to appear. ITere the Frencli first heard that Nelson was in the Mediterranean with three ships, and o-xpected ten more. Bonaparte then continued (Ui for Malta, which he reached on the 0th of June, and found there the division from Civita Vecchia, thus bringing his whole force under his hand. The island was immediately summoned, and after a faint show of resistance cajtitulated on the 12th ; the French fleet and convoy, numbering f(^nr hundred sail, entering the port of La Yaletta on the 13th. Bonaparte remained the VOL. I. — 17 258 BONAPARTE'S EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. time necessary to secure his conquest temporarily ; then leaving a garrison of four thousand men, and notifying the Directory that at least four thousand more with ample sup- plies were needed, he sailed again on June 19 for Egypt. The British fleet, after its junction, was becalmed for several days. It then made the best of its way round the north end of Corsica, and thence south between Italy and the islands. Not till June 14, off Civita Vecchia, was probable information received that the French had been seen ten days before off the south-west point of Sicily, steering to the eastward, xis yet there was no certainty as to their destination, and Nelson had no light vessels for scouts. St. Vincent in his instructions had said, reflecting the ideas of the government, that the enemy's " object appears to be either an attack upon Naples or Sicily, the conveyance of an army to some part of Spain to invade Portugal, or to pass through the Straits with the view of proceeding to Ireland." The whole situation vividly illustrates the difficulty of pur- suit by sea, and the necessity of stationing and keeping the detaining force near the point of the enemy's departure be- fore he can get away. By whatsoever fault, certainly not that of Nelson or St. Yincent, the British fleet was a fort- nidit too late in entering the Mediterranean. It would have been yet more so, had the resources of the French dockyards answered to the spur of Bonaparte's urgency; but it is ill goading a starved horse. An easterly course, however, with a fresh north-west wind, indicated that neither Spain nor the Atlantic was the destination of the French armament ; and Nelson at once decided it must be Malta, to be used as a base of operations against Sicily. " Were I," said he, " the admiral of the fleet attending an army for the invasion of Sicily, I should say to the general : ' If you can take Malta, it secures the safety of the fleet and the transports, and your own safe retreat, if necessary ; ' 3Ialta is i7i the direct road to Sicily.''^ ^ Pausing 1 Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 35. BONAPARTE'S EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 259 a moment to communicate with Naples, he there heard, on the ITth of June, that the French had landed at Malta ; and pushing on, received off Messina the news of its sur- render. This was on the 20th, the day after lJona}»artc sailed from the island for Egypt. On the 22d, off Cape Passaro, the south-east extremity of Sicily, a vessel was spoken, from which Nelson gained the information of Bona- parte's departure, supposed to be for Sicily ; but he had meantime learned from Naples that the French had no in- tention of molesting any part of that kingdom. Utterly in the dark, and without frigates, he concluded, after weighing all the chances, that Egypt was the enemy's destination, and witli a fair wind and a press of sail shaped his course for Alexandria. On tlie 28th the fleet came off the port, and sent a boat ashore. No French vessels had been seen on the coast. Tliis remarkable miscarriage, happening to a man of so much energy and intuition, was due primarily to his want of small lookout ships ; and secondly, to Bonaparte's using the simple, yet at sea sulficient, ruse ^ of taking an indirect instead of a direct course to his object. This, however, in a narrow sea, with so numerous a l^ody of vessels, would not have served him, had the British admiral had those active purveyors of information, those eyes of the fleet, which are so essential to naval as to land warfare.- On leaving Malta, Bonaparte directed the expedition to steer first for Candia. After a week's quiet navigation he was off the south side of the island, and on the 27th of June was joined by a frigate from Naples, to tell him of Nelson, with fourteen sail, being off that port ten days before. At 1 ]Marm(Hit attributes the approach to Cainlia to a ■vvisli to give the slielter of the island to the uuiuerous coasters iu the couvoy. (^Memoires du Due de Kaguse, vol. i. p. 362.) - Bi.maparte in his preparations laid special stress on having enough small vessels. "It is indispensalile to have witli the squadron the greatest attaina- ble nuudier of corvettes nnd despatch A'essels. Send orders to all the ports for all sucli to join the fleet." — Corr. de Nap.,\v\. iv. pp. 79, SO. 260 BONAPARTE'S EXPEDITION TO EGYPT, this moment the British admiral had ah-eady outstripped his chase. On the 25th the two fleets had been about sixty miles apart, the French due north of the British, steering in nearly parallel directions.^ When Bonaparte knew that his enemy was somewhere near upon his heels, he again changed the course, ordering the fleet to make the land seventy miles west of Alexandria, and sending a frigate direct to the port to reconnoitre. On the 29th of June, the day Nelson sailed away from Alexandria, the light squadron signalled the coast, along which the fleet sailed till July 1st, when it anchored off the city. Deter- mined to run no chance of an enemy's frustrating his ob- jects, the commander-in-chief landed his army the same evening. If, in this celebrated chase, Nelson made a serious mis- take, it was upon his arrival at Alexandria. He had rea- soned carefully, and, as the event proved, accurately, that the French were Ijound to Egy]»t ; and had justly realized the threat to the British supremacy in India contained in such an attempt. Knowing the time when tlie French left Malta, as he did, and that they were accompanied by so groat a train of transports, it seems a fair criticism that he should have trusted liis judgment a little further, and waited off the suspected port of destination to see whether so cumjjrous a body had not been outsailed by his compact, homogeneous force. He appears, on finding his expecta- tions deceived, to have fallen into a frame of mind familiar to most, in which a false step, however imposed by the conditions under which it was taken, can be seen only in the light of the unfortunate consequences, and therein as- 1 This statement is hased on the pLato in tlie " Commentaires de Knpo- Icod/' vol. ii. p. 190. Tliere are evident inaccuracies in the British positions tliere given ('?..'/•. f'^ June 22, and in the approach to Alexandria) ; but that of the 25t]i seems prohalde. James states that on tlie ni.c;ht of June 22 tlie tracks of the two fleets crossed, but at a .sufficient interval of time to prevent a meeting, — tlie more so as a constant haze prevailed. (Nav. Hist., vol. ii. p. 177.) BONAPARTE'S EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 261 sumes the color of a fault, or at best of a blunder. '■'- His active and anxious mind," wrote Sir Edward Berry, who, as captain of the flagship, was witness of his dail}^ feel- ings, "would not permit him to rest a moment in the same place ; he therefore shaped his course to the northward for the coast of Caramania." ^ His one thought now was to get baclv to the westward, taking a more nortlierl}' course ()n the return, so as to increase the chance of in- formati(jn. The fleet accordingly stretclied to the north- ward until the coast of Asia Minor was made, and then beat back along the south shore of Candia, not seeing a single vessel until it liad passed that island. On the lOtli of July it reached Syracuse, whence Nelson wrote to the British minister at Naj^les that, having gone a round of six hundred leagues with tlie utmost expedition, he was as io-norant of the situation of the enemy as he had been four weeks ])efore. The squadron now filled with water, which was running short, and on the 24th again sailed for Alex- andria ; the admiral having satislied himself that the Frencli were at least neither in Corfu nor to the westward. On the 1st of August the minarets of the city were seen, and soon after the port full of shipping, with the French flag upon the walls, l)ut, to Nelson s bitter disappointment, no large sliips of war. At one in the afterntjon, however, one of his fleet made signal that a numljcr of ships-of-thc- linc were at anchor in Aboukir Bay, twelve or fifteen miles cast of Alexandria; and Nelson, promi)t to attack as Bona- parte had l.)een to disembark, gave 8lii)i»ery fortune, so long unkind, no chance again to balk him, but with a brisk breeze flew at once upon the foe. Neither by the character of the anchorage nor by its own dispositions was the French fleet pre]iared for iha ottack thus suddenly, and most unexpectedly, precipitated upon it. Two days after the army landed, the commander- in-chief gave Admiral Brueys explicit and urgent orders at 1 Narrative in Naval Chronicle, vol. i. p. 48. 262 BATTLE OF THE NILE. once to sound the old port of Alexandria, and, if possible, take his ships in there ; if not, and if Aboukir Bay would admit of defence at anchor against a superior force, he might choose a position there. Failing both, he was to go with his heavy vessels to Corfu.^ That and the other Ionian Islands were within Bonaparte's district, by the decree of April 12 making him commander of the Army of the East. In a much later dispatch, which Brueys did not live to receive, he explains that it was indis- pensable to preserve the fleet from serious injury until the affair in Egypt was settled, in order to check any movement of the Porte ; for, though the allegiance of the Mamelukes was but nominal, it was possible the Sul- tan might resent the French invasion. The justice of this cautious view was shown by the action of the Porte as soon as the destruction of the fleet became known. Brueys or- dered the necessary soundings, and the report which he received on July 18, a fortnight before the battle, was fa- vorable ; with good weather it was possible to take the ships-of-thc-line inside.^ The admiral, however, was an invalid, and of a temper naturally undecided ; unable to make a choice of difficulties, he hung on the balance and remained inactive, taking refuge in a persuasion that the British would not return. Bonaparte thought the same. " All the conduct of the English," wrote he on the 30th of July, " indicates that they are inferior in number, and con- tent themselves with Ijlockading Malta and intercepting its supplies." But the great soldier, prone as he always was to tempt fortune to the utmost for a great object, found in this opinion no reason for running unnecessary risks and 1 Corr. de Nap., vol. iv. pp. 27.'S-277. 2 In a chart of the old port of Alexandria, made in 1802 by Major Bryce of the Royal Engineers, attached to Ahercromby's expedition, it is said that not less than five fathoms Avill lie found throughout the middle passage. The directions add that heavy ships cannot get out unless with good weather for warping. This was Brneys's great objection to entering, and it was well taken ; but the alternative of destruction was worse. BATTLE OF THE XILE. 263 in the same breath insisted upon Alexandria or Corfu for the fleet. Brueys had taken his ships to Aboulcir Bay iM\ the 8th of July, and there remained. Ho had the orders of his commander ; but the latter, at a distance and absorbed in the cares of his operations ashore, could not communi- cate to his vacillating subordinate the impulse of his own energy. All the work of the squadron proceeded listlessly ; the belief that the British fleet would not return sapped every effort ; carelessness, indiscipline and insubordina- tion, among officers and men, caused constant comi)laint and trouljle. In such delusion and lethariiv went bv the priceless days which were passed by Xelson in unresting thought and movement, in " a fever of anxiety " i that scarcely allowed him to eat or drink. The Bay of Aboukir,^ in the western portion of which the French fleet was anchored, and where was fought the celebrated Battle of the Nile, is an open roadstead, extend- ing from the promontory of Aboukir, fifteen miles east of Alexandria, to the Rosetta mouth of the Nile. The dis- tance between the two extreme points is about eighteen miles. In the western part, where the French were lying, the shore-line, after receding some distance from Aboukir Point, turns to the south-east and continues in that direc- tion in a lono' narrow^ toniinc of sand, behind which lies the shallow Lake Madieh. North-east from tlie point is a line of shoals and rocks, rising at two and a half miles' distance into a small island, then liearing the same name, Aboukir, but since known as Nelson's Island ; beyond which the same stretch of foul ground continues for another mile and a quarter. Behind this four-mile barrier there is found fair shelter from tlie prevailing north-west summer wind ; but as, for three miles from the beach, there were only four fathoms of water, the order of battle had to be established ' Nelson's Dispatclips, vol. iii. p. 128. - See Coast Map, Alexandria to Rosetta, and Plan of the Battle of the Nile. 264 BATTLE OF THE NILE. somewhat beyond that distance. The north-western ship, which with the prevailing wind would be to windward and in the van, was moored a mile and a half south-east from Aboukir Island, in five fathoms of water.^ This was scant for a heavy vessel, but it does not seem that she was car< ried as close to the shoal as she might have been. As the van ship in the column, she was on one flank, and that the most exposed, of the line-of-battle, whose broadsides were turned to the sea. She should, therefore, have been brouo-ht so near the shoal as not to leave room to swing, and there been moored head and stern. So placed, the flank could not have been turned, as it actually was. This was the more necessary because the few guns established by Brueys on the island were so light as to be entirely ineffective, in range and weight, at the distance between them and the flank they pretended to strengthen. They were a mere toy defence, as futile as the other general dispositions taken. This being so, it would seem that the frigates might have been placed along the shoal ground ahead, where the enemy's ships-of-the-line could not reach them, and thence have supported the flank ship. From the latter, tlie line extended south-east to, and including, the eighth in the order, when it turned a little toward the beach ; making with its former direction a salient angle, but one very obtuse. The distance from ship to ship was about one hundred and sixty yards ; from which, and from the average length of the ships, it may be estimated that the whole line from van to rear was nearly a mile and three quarters long. In case of expecting attack, a cable was to be taken from ship to ship to prevent the enemy passing through the intervals ; and springs also were then to be put upon the cable by which each vessel was anchored,^ 1 Chevalier, Mar. Fran, sous la T\('pul)liquc, p. 365. - A sprinf,^ is a rope taken from the stern of n ship at anchor and fastened either to the ridinj^ f'al)]e or to an anchor snitahly placed, so as to turn the hruadsido in the direction wished. Owing to the boats being away to get BATTLE OF THE NILE. 'ZCj^ It will be instructive to a |»r(jf<'ssioiiul reader to compare the dispositions of Admiral JJrueys, in Aboukir Bay, with those adopted by Lord Hood in 1782, at St. Kitt's Island, wlien expecting an attack at anchor from a ^ery superior force.^ The com})arison is historicall}' interesting as well as instructive ; for it has l^een said that Xelson framed his own })lan, in the cogitations of his long chase, u})on Ilood's scheme for attacking the French Ueet under Admiral DeOrassc Avhile lying ^it the anchorage from which he hrst drove it, before occupying it himself. The parallel is quite complete, for neither at St. Kitt's nor Aljoukir was the ancliored fleet able to get substantial assistance from batter- ies. The decisively important points in such a disposition, as in any order of battle, land or sea, are — (1) that the line cannot be pierced, and (-) that the flanks cannot be turned. Hood thrust one flank ship so close to the shore that the enemy could not pass round her, and closed u}> his inter- vals.^ Brueys left tlie same flank — for in both cases it was the van and weather slii}) — 0})en to turning, with long s^jaces Ijctween the vessels. In his arrangement for the other flank, for the lee ships, Brueys was equally inferior. Hood threw his eight lee shi]>s at I'ight aniiles to the rest of the fleet, so that their l)roadsides completely protected the latter from enfilading (ire. Brue^■s simijlv bent his line a little, with a view of approaching the rear to shoal water. Failing thus to obtain a Are at right angles t*.) the principal line of l)attle, the rear did not contribute to strengthen tliat; while, not actually reacliing to shoal water, it re- mained itself in the air, if attacked by tlie enemy in watrr when Nolsou ;i.j)pf:iri'(l, to tlic failure <>[ many of tlicm to return, and to the rapidity with which tli(? attack was made, tlicsc jirccautioiis were not carried out. ^ iMalian's " Innuence of Sea-Power u])oii History," ])]). 4eVi-478. Tl.ites XVII [. and XIX. - Letter of DeOrasse to Keri,nicle!i, Jan. 8, 178."1. Hood " ranix^d liis ves- sels ill vorv close order (/res-srrrt'.<), and it >\as iin]iossihl(> to ])ass lietween the land and them, as I wislied." — Ker(j}ie/en's Gnerrr ]\[aritime ilr 1778, p. 259. ^^^ BATTLE OF THE NILE. preference. This was the more singular, as Brueys had expected the rear to be the object of the British efforts. " I have asked," he wrote, '' for two mortars to place upon the shoal on which I have rested the head of my line ; but I have much less to fear for that part than for the rear, upon which the enemy will probably bring to bear all their effort/' 1 Xclson, however, whether illumined by Hood's example, through that historical study of tactics for which he was noted, or inspired only by his own genius, had well understood beforehand that, if he found the Fi-ench in such order as they were, the van and centre were at his mercy ; and he had clearly imparted this view to his cap- tains. Hence, when the enemy were seen, he needed only to signal " his intention was to attack the van and centre as they lay at anchor, according to the plan before devel- oped," 2 and could leave the details of execution to his subordinates. The evening before the eventful first of August, as the British fleet expected to make Alexandria the next day,tlie " Alexander " and " Swiftsure" were sent ahead to reconnoi- tre. In consequence of this detachment, made necessary by the want of frigates, these ships, when the main body at 1 p.m.^ sighted the French fleet, were considerably to leeward, and did not get into action until two hours after their consorts. As soon as the enemy were seen, the British fleet hauled sharp up on the wind, heading about north-east, to weather Aboukir Island and shoal ; the admiral at the same time making signal to prepare for action, anchoring by the stern. 1 Letter of Brueys to Bonaparte, July 13, 1798; La Graviere, Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. p. 367. This is a somewhat singuhir example of following a rule, the principle of which is not grasped, The rear of a column of sailing ships under way was the weaker end, hecause less easily helped hy the van; l)Ut in a column of ships at anchor, head to wind, the weather ships were in- comparably more exposed, the lee having a very hard pull to get up to them. 2 Nnrrative of Sir Edward Berry. See Naval Chronicle, vol. i. p. .52. ^ James, ii. p. 177. The Vanguard's Journal, quoted by Sir Harris Nicolas, Nelson's Disp. vol. iii. p. 49, says 4 r. m. 5CALE OF MILES T«»ci' Ol THE ZlOLOUi P11.JTIHG riEir ,^- •«i'' .o»-^ ABOUKIR BAY. v ■■. LAKE MADIEH 3W1FTSURE ALEXANDER LtANDER BEUEROPMON. BATTLE AUGUST 1,1798. P0SITI0IN5 AT 8 P.M. ^ BRITISH 13 SHIP5 [Z> FRENCH 13 5HIPS WIND \ NNW REFERENCES BRlTliH 5H1PS THAT CAMEJ CTHE CULLODEN, ASHORE IMTO ACTION AFTER dRMl F JHt FRANKLIN.fiO I THE ORIENT, 120 BRITISH, DRIFTING OUT Of| ^ THE T0NNANT.,aO CENTRE OF THE FRENCH ORDER. ACTION DISMASTED | V. THE VANGUARD, NELSONS FL AO-SHiP. THt LINE ABC REPWE5ENT& THEPOSITION OF THE FRENCH ORDER OF BATTLE, DRAWN TO THE SCALE OP THE CHART, VV HI CH IT HAi SEEN NECES5ARV TO ENLARGE IN OB DE ft TO GIVE DETAILS . THE FRENCH SHIPS MARKED + WERE EITHER TAKEN OR DESTROYED IN THE BATTLE BATTLE OF THE NILE. 267 As they drew by the shoal, being in eleven fathoms, ^ Nelson hailed Captain Hood, of the " Zealous," and asked if he thought they were far enough to the eastward to clear it ; for the only chart in the tieet was a rough sketch taken from a captured merchant vessel, and no British officer knew the ground. Hood replied that he would bear up, sounding as he went, so that the other ships keeping out- side of him would be safe. Thus the fleet was piloted into action ; one ship, the " Goliath," being ahead of the '* Zeal- ous," but on her outer bow, and the admiral very properly al- lowing others to pass him, until he was sixth in the order, so as to be reasonably certain the flag-ship would not touch the bottom. Captain Foley of the " Goliath," still keep- ing the lead, crossed ahead of the French column, over the ground left open by Brueys's oversight, intending to attack tlie van ship, the " Guerrier ;" but the anchor hung for a mo- ment, so that he brought iip on the inner quarter of the sec- ond, the " Conquerant," while Hood, following close after, anchored on the bow of the '' Guerrier." These two British ships tlius came into action shortly before sundown, the French having opened fire ten minutes before. Five minutes later, just as the sun was sinking below the horizon, the foremast of the " Guerrier " went overboard. " So auspi- cious a commencement of the attack was greeted with three cheers by the whole British fleet." ^ The " Orion " followed with a much wider sweep, passing round her two leaders, between them and the shore, and anchored on the inner side of the fifth French ship ; while the " Theseus " Mdiich came next, brought up abreast the third, having gone between the " Goliath " and " Zealous " and their antao-onists. The " Audacious," the fifth of the British 1 The ships-of-the-line needed nearly five fathoms in smooth water, more if there was much sea. - James's Naval History, vol. ii. p. 184 (ed. 1878). In the main, the author has followed James in the details of this and other battles, though not without careful comparison with other sources of information accessible iu hitn. 268 BATTLE OF THE NILE. to come up, chose a new course. Steering between the " Guerrier " and the " Conqu^rant," she took her place on the bow of the latter, already engaged on the quarter by the " Goliath." These five all anchored on the inner (port) side of the French. Nelson's ship, the " Vanguard," coming next, anchored outside the third of the enemy's vessels, the '' Spartiate," thus placed between her and the " Theseus." The " Minotaur," five minutes later, took the outer side of the fourth, heretofore without an opponent; and the '-De- fence " attacked, also on the outer side, the fifth ship, already engaged on her inner side by the " Orion." Five French seventy-fours were thus in hot action with eight British of the same size, half an hour after the first British gun was fired, and only five hours from the time Brueys first knew that the enemy were near. This most gallant, but most unfortunate, man had passed suddenly from a condition of indolent security face to face with an appalling emergency. When Nelson's fleet was first reported, numbers of men were ashore, three miles or more away, getting water for the ships. They were recalled, but most of them did not return. Brueys still cherished the belief, with which indeed he could not have parted without despair, that the enemy would not brave the un- known perils of the ground with night falling ; nor could he tell their purpose until they had passed Aboukir Island and opened the bay. A hurried council of senior officers renewed the decision previously reached, to fight, if fight they must, at anchor ; but Brueys betrayed the vacillations of an unsteady purpose by crossing the light yards, a step which could have no other significance than that of getting under way. Still, he hoped for the respite of a night to make the preparations so long neglected. Little did he know the man whom England herself still hardly knew. Without a moment's pause, without a tremor of uncertainty, yet with all the precautions of a seaman, Nelson came straight onward, facing with mind long prepared the diffi- BATTLE OF THE NILE. 269 culties of navigation, the doubts and obscurity of a night action. Hurriedly the French rjrepare for battle; and, secure that the enemy will not dare go within the line, the batteries on that side are choked with the numerous encum- brances of ship economy, the proper disposal of which is termed " clearing for action." For half an hour Urueys was a heljih^ss and hopeless, tlioiigh undaunted, spectator of an overwhelming attack, which he had never expected at all, delivered in a manner he had deemed impossible upon the part of his order he thought most secure. Soon he was freed fi'om the agony of mere i)assive waiting by the 0[)portunity to act. The '• Cel- lerophon " and ''Majestic," both seventy-fours, anchored outside and abreast, respectively, of the Hag-ship '* Orient," of one hundred and twenty guns, and of the '' Tonnant," eighty, next astern. Darkness had just settled down upon the water as the arrival of these two ships completed the hrst scene of the tragedy ; and the British vessels, which were hghting under their white ensign,^ as mure easil}' seen at night, now hoisted also four lanterns, horizontally ar- ranged, whereby to recognize each other. iMeanwliile a wuful mishap had Ijel'allen Nelson's chosen brother-in-arms, Troulu'idge. His ship, the " CuUoden," had been some distance from the main body of the fleet when the latter rounded the shoal, aiul, doing lier own piloting, ran upon its outer extremity at a quarter before seven. There she stuck, despite all the efforts of her most able commander, until two o'clock the next morning, when the ^ Until after the mine })y one crushed, the British dropped down and engaged those in the rear, — but with a vigor necessarily diminished by the injuries they had themselves received, not ti> speak of the physical fatigue induced by the lalior and excitement i)f the previous iK.iurs. Nevertlieless the " Mercnre." when she hauled down her flag, had lost one hun- dred and five killed and one hundred and forty-eight wounded, and had Init six guns that could be used. The loss of the " Heureux " is not stated, but she had nine feet of water in her hold. (Chevalier, Mar. Fran, sous la Rep., pp. 376, 377.) 272 BATTLE OF THE NILE. the memorable disaster of Trafalgar. His inaction on this occasion has been sharply criticised, both in his own time and since. Upon the whole, the feeling of later French pro- fessional writers appears to be that his courage, though un- questionable, was rather of the passive than the active type ; and that in Aboukir Bay there was afforded him a real op- portunity and sufficient time to bring the rear ships into action, which he culpaljly failed to improve.^ Bonaparte, on the contrary, wrote to Villeneuve, soon after the battle, that *•' if any error could be imputed to him, it was that he had not got under way as soon as the ' Orient ' blew up ; seeing that, three hours before, the position Brueys had taken had been forced and surrounded." ^ Sucli was, in its main outlines, the celebrated Battle of the Nile, the most complete of naval victories, and among the most decisive, at least of tlie immediate course of events. In it the French lost eleven out of thirteen sliips- of-the-line^ and thirty-five hundred men, killed, wounded, or drowned ; * among them being the commander-in-chief and three captains killed, a rear-admiral and six captains wounded. The British loss was two hundred and eighteen killed — of which one captain — and six hundred and sev- enty-eight womidcd, among whom was the admiral him- self, struck in the head by a heavy splinter. The hurt, which he at first thought fatal, disabled him for the mo- ment and seriously affected his efficiency for some days. " I think," wrote he, four weeks later, " that if it had pleased God I had not been wounded, not a boat would have escaped." ^ 1 Jurien de la Graviere, Gnerres Maritimes, vol. i. pp. 228-230 ; Che- valier, Mar. Fran, sous la Repulilique, pp. 386-388. A letter from Villeneuve, justifying his inaction, is to he fonnd in the former work, p, 231, and in Troude, Batailles Navales, vol. iii. p. 121. '■^ Cnrr. de Nap., vol. iv. p. 520. ^ The two that escaped were captured hy Lord Nelson's squadron hefore July, 1800, when he resigned the Mediterranean command. * Chevalier, p. 38L 5 Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 10, BATTLE OF THE NILE, 273 The particular circumstances under which the British attack M-as undertaken, the admiraljle skill as well as conduct shown hy all the captains, and i\\Q thoroughly scientihc character of the tactical combination adopted, as seen in its execution, unite with the decisiveness of the issue to cast a peculiar lustre upon this victory of Nelson's. Lord Howe, inferior to none as a judge of merit, said to Captain Berry that the Battle of the Nile '^ stood unparal- leled and singular in this instance, that every captain dis- tinguished liimself/' 1 It has been disputed how far belongs to the admii-al the credit of the bold manoeuvre, whereby the leading ship, passing ahead of the French line, showed to her successors the open path through which the o|)era- tion of doubling on the enemy could be most effectually carried out. Into this discussion the author has no inten- tion of entering, beyond noting an omission in tJie full treatment of the question made by the careful and laborious editor of Nelson's corresi)ondence. Sir Harris Nicolas, who was not able to reach a decisiou.- In Ross's " Life of Ad- miral Saumarez " it is stated that, while discussiuo- the various modes by which the enemy might be attacked, Saumarez offended Nelson by saying that he " had seen the evil consequences of dou))ling ujion an enemy, especially in a night action ; '' and had differed with the admiral in the plan of attack, because '' it never required two English ships to capture one French, and that the damage which they must necessarily do each other might render them both unable to fight an enemy's sliii) which had not been en- gaged." ^ Saumarez's objection, tliough not without some foundation, was justly over-ruled ; but it coidd scarcely have been raised had Nelson never contemplated the pre- cise method of doubling employed, — a British ship on each 1 Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 84. " For this discu^siou see Nelsrtn's Dispatches aud Letters, vol. iii. pp. 62- 6.5 ; also App. ]1. 474. ^ Ross's Life of Saumarez, vol. i. p. 228. VOL. I. — 18 274 BATTLE OF THE NILE. side of a single enemy, — for in no other position could the risk of mutual injury have been serious. It is in entire keeping with Nelson's well-known charac- ter, that, after discussing all likely positions and ascertain- ing that his captains understood his views, he should with perfect and generous confidence have left all the details of immediate action with them. In the actual case he could not, without folly, have rigorously prescribed to Captain Foley what path to follow. Only the man on the " Groli- ath's" deck, watching the soundings, could rightly judge what must each instant be done ; and it was no less a transcend- ent merit in Nelson that he could thus trust another, than that, with falling night and unknown waters, he could reach the instant decision to attack an enemy of superior force, in an order which he must have supposed to be carefully and rationally assumed. In fact, however, the operation of doubling on the enemy, — in contradistinction to doubling the head of the line, — was really begun by Nelson himself ; for his ship was the first to anchor on the side opposite to that taken by her five predecessors. It was open to him to have followed them, for the same reasons that prompted Foley's action.^ Instead of that, he deliberately anchored outside the third French ship, already engaged on the in- side by the '' Theseus ; " thus indicating, as clearly as example can, what he would have those succeeding him to do. The first two French ships were already so engaged or crippled as to be properly passed. The fullest credit there- fore can be allowed to Captain Foley for a military decision of a very high order, without stripping a leaf from Nelson's laurels.^ 1 Nelson's Disp., vol. iii. ; Appendix, p. 474. Letter of Admiral Browne. '■^ The American novelist and naval historian, Fenimore Cooper, in the preface to tlio "Two Admirals," has attrilaited the whole tactical comhiua- tion to the captains, on the anthoritv of Ca])tain Ball of the "Alexander," speaking to the late Commodore Morris of tlie United States Navv, who in turn was Cooper's informant. This constitutes a perfectly respectahle oral tradition, citming through intelligent men of un(|uestioued integrity; but BATTLE OF THE NILE. 275 "The lioldness and skill of Admiral Nelson," says Cap- tain Chevalier, " rose to a height which it would have Ijeen difficult to surpass." ^ " The action of Nelson," said Napo- leon, '-'- was a des})erate action which cannot Ijc proposed as a model, but in which he displayed, as well as the English crews, all the skill and vigor possi))lc." - This sentence is susceptible of a double construction. The cond('ninatii:)n, if the words be meant as such, comes ill from the man who pushed on his desperate advance to Leoljcn in 17 UT, who at Marengo stretched his line till it Ijroke, and who in 1798 ventured the Mediterranean fleet and the Army of Italy on the Egyptian expedition, with scarce a chance in his favor, except a superstitious reliance ujjon a fortune which did not betray him. The arrangements of Brueys being what they were, the odds were with the British admiral. It has been said that, with better gunnery on the part of the French, disaster must have resulted to the attacking force ; and precisely the same criticism has been applied to Trafalgar.*"^ Now, putting out of consideration that Great Britain had at this date been for five years at war with France, and that British seamen had thus gained an when opposed to the c<>utemiK)rarv written statement of Captain Berrv, Nel- son's flag-captain, wht) hail tlie fullest op]ile ; l>ut that the whole Ixxly of (■a])tains were ins]nred to carry lete. During the month passed ].»y Erueys in indolent security, IJonaparte had advanced steadily in his })rojected conquest of Egypt. On the 21st uf July the battle of the Pyramids was fought, the next day Cairo suljniitted, and on the 2oth the g'eneral-in-chief entered the city. Reniainino- tliere a few days to repose his troops and secure his position, he departed again on tlie 7th of August to complete the con- quest of lower Egypt ; leaving Desaix to take care of Cairo and prepare the corps destined for the subjugation of the upper Nile. By the 12th of August the Mamelukes, still under arms in the Delta, had been driven into the Isthmus of Suez, whence they retired to Syria; and there, on the borders of the desert, Bonaparte received from Kleber the news of tlie disaster in Aboukir Bay. Under this tremen- dous reverse he showed the self-control of which he was always capable at need. The troops gave way to despair. '' Here we are/' said they, '' abandoned in this Ijarbarous country, without communication with home, without hope of return." ''Well,'' replied their general, "we have then laid on us the obligation to do great things. Seas wliich we do not command separate us from home ; l>ut no seas divide us from Africa and Asia. We will found here an empire." The magical influence he exerted over the soldiers, most of whom had followed him to victory in Italy, restored their courage, and French lightheartedness again prevailed over despondency. The blow, nevertheless, had struck home, and resounded through the four quarters of the world. The Mamelukes, Il)rahim Bey in Syria, and Mou- rad Bey in upper Egyi)t, cast down by tlieir reverses, were preparing to treat ; upon the news of Nelson's victory they resumed their arms. The Forte, incensed by the invasion of Egypt, but still hesitating, notwithstanding the pressure 278 THE CONSEQUENCES exerted by the ministers of Great Britain and Russia, took heart as soon as it knew that the French fleet was no more. Bonaparte had rightly warned Brueys that the preserva- tion of his ships was necessary to hold Turkey in check. The Sultan and his Pashas of Egypt and Syria rejected the French advances. On the 2d of September a memorial was sent to all the foreign ministers in Constantinople, ex- pressing the surprise of the Porte at Bonaparte's landing, and stating that a considerable force liad been despatched for Egypt to stop his progress. On the 11th of the month war was formally declared against the French Republic."^ Throughout the year 1798 the state of affairs on the continent of Europe had grown continually more threaten- ing. The politico-military propagandism of the Revolution had given birth to, and was now being replaced by, an ag- gressive external policy, to which the victories of Bona- parte gave increased vigor and extension. It became the recognized, if not the avowed, aim of French diplomacy to surround France with small dependent republics, having in- stitutions modelled upon the same type as her own, with all local powers merged in those of a central government.^ The United Provinces, in becoming a republic, had retained their federal constitution ; but in January, 1798, they un- derwent a revolution, promoted by the French Directory, which did away the provincial independence inherited from past ages. The Cisalpine Republic and Genoa had re- ceived a similar organization at the hands of Bonaparte. In many of the cantons of Switzerland there were discon- tent and disturbance, due to the unequal political condi- tions of the inhabitants. The Directory made of this a pretext for interference, on the plea of France being inter- ested both in the internal quiet of a neighboring country and also in the particular persons whose discontent was construed as evidence of oppression. French troops en- 1 Annual Repster, 1798; State Papers, pp. 267-272. - Martin, Histuire de France depuis 1789, vol. iii. p. 6. OF THE BATTLE OF THE NILE. 279 tered Switzerland in Januaiy, 1798. The canton of Berne fought for its privileges, but was easily subdued ; and a packed convention, assembled at Aarau, adopted for Switz- erland a centralized constitution in place of the old can- tonal independence. This was followed some months later, in August, 1798, by an offensive and defensive alliance between the Helvetian and Fj-ench repuljlics. The invasion of Berne had had another motive than the political preponderance of France in the councils of her neighbors. The revenue of the Directory still fell far short of the expenditure, and money was particularly wanted for Bonaparte's approaching expedition. Seventeen million francs were found in tlie Bernese treasury and appropri- ated. Eighteen million more were raised by requisitions, and other cantons were drained in proportion.^ The same motive contributed,- at the same instant, to the occupation of Rome, for which a more plausible pretext was found. In the papal states, as elsewhere throughout Europe, French agents had secretly stirred up a revolutionary movement. On the 28t]i of December, 1797, this party had risen in Rome, and a collision between it and the papal troops had occurred in the neiiiliborhood of the French embassv. General Duphot, who was then residing there, was killed while attempting to interpose between the combatants. The French ambassador at once left the city ; and the Directory, refusing all explanations, ordered Berthicr, Bonaparte's successor in Italy, to advance. On the 10th of February he entered Rome, recognized the Roman Re- public, which was proclaimed under his auspices, and forced the Pope to retire to Tuscany. It was owing to tliis occupation that a contingent of the Egyptian expedition embarked at Civita A^ecchia, as the most convenient point. Xeither Naples nor Austria ventured on overt action in behalf of the Pope ; but the dissatisfaction of both was extreme. Never under Bonaparte himself had French 1 MartiD, Hist, de France clepuis 1789, vul. iii. p. 9. - Ibid., p. 11. 280 THE CONSEQUENCES troops come so near to the kingdom of the Two Sicihes, whose importance to the common cause of the Continent, from its geographical position, was perfectly understood. But while the situation of Naples at the far end of the peninsula made it a serious danger to the flank and rear of the French, when engaged with an enemy in upper Italy, its remoteness from support, except hy way of the sea, was a source of weakness to a state necessarily dependent upon allies. This was especially felt in February, 1798, when the British fleet, after a year's absence, had as yet given no sign of returning to the Mediterranean, and the ships which accompanied Bonaparte to Egypt were still in Toulon. The latter would donbtless have been directed upon Naples, had Naples moved against Rome. The Bourbon kingdom there- fore swallowed its vexation, but drew closer to Austria; which, in addition to the affront offered to the Pope, had its own motives for discontent in the occupation of Switzer- land by the French, and in the changes introduced into the political complexion of the Continent by these aggressive actions of the republican government. The course of the Directory during the continental peace of 1797 and 1798 was closely parallel to that of Bonaparte four years later, which made impossible the continuance of the Peace of Amiens. With less ability and less vigor, there was the same plausible, insidious, steady aggression, under color of self-protection or of yielding to popular demand, which forced on the power of France at the expense of other states. An occurrence in Vienna at this moment came near to produce war and stop the Egyptian expedition. When Bonaparte entered Germany in April, 1797, the youth of Vienna had offered themselves in mass to defend the country. In April, 1798, the anniversary of the day was celebrated with a popidar demonstration, which the French ambassador resented by hoisting the tricolor. The crowds in a rage broke into and sacked the embassy.-^ So ^ Martin, Hist, de France depuis 1789, vol. iii. p. 16. OF THE BATTLE OF THE NILE. 281 great was the excitement over this affair that the troops iu Toulon and other ports were ordered not to embark, and Bonaparte himself was directed to go as plenipotentiary to Rastadt ; Ijut the emperor made explanations, and the inci- dent passed. Still, as a French historian savs, "'• things were getting spoiled between Austria and France/' ^ Russia at the same time was fairly forced from her atti- tude of reserve, maintained since the death of Catherine II., by the same policy which dro\'e the United States into the quasi war of 1798 with France.^ A decree of the French legislature had made lawful prize any neutral ship which had on board, not merely British property, but any goods of British origin, even though the property of a neutral. This was given a special application to the Baltic by a notification, issued January 12, 1798, that " if any ship be suffered to pass through the Sound with English commodi- ties, of whatever nation it may be, it shall be considered as a formal declaration of war ao:ainst the French nation." ^ Although immediately directed against Sweden and Den- mark, as the two countries l)ordering the Sound, this was resented by the Czar, in common with all neutral govern- ments ; and on the 15th of May, he " ordered twenty-two sliips-of-the-line and two hundred and fifty galleys to pro- ceed to the Sound, to protect trade in general against the oppression of the Directory."^ Once enkindled, the violent and erratic temper of Paul I. soon rushed into extremes ; and he received further provocation from the capture of Malta. When Bonaparte took possession of that island, he found there a treaty, just signed, by which the Czar stipulated a payment of four hundred thousand rubles to the Order, in which to the end of his days he preserved a fan- 1 Martin, Hist, de France depuis 1789, vol. iii. p. 24. 2 See post. Chapter XVII. 3 Annual Eegister, 1798; State Papers, p. 237. * Ibid. Martin, Hist, de France, vol. iii. p. 23. 282 THE CONSEQUENCES tastic interest. As a measure of precaution, the French general decreed that any Greeks in Malta or the Ionian Is- lands maintaining relations with Russia should be shot, and Greek vessels under Russian colors sunk.^ Hence the members of the Order in Russia made, in August, a violent protest against the seizure, throwing themselves upon the Czar for a support which he eagerly promised.^ He then drew near to Great Britain, and offered to aid Austria with troops. The emperor at first answered that nothing could be done without Prussia ; and the three governments then applied themselves to obtain the accession of this king- dom to a new coalition. On the 19th of May — the very day, it maybe observed, that Bonaparte sailed from Toulon — Austria and Naples signed a defensive alliance.^ The con- ferences at Rastadt, so far as the emperor was concerned, were broken off on the 6th of July, although those with the empire dragged on longer. The imperial envoy, Cobentzel, at once went to Berlin, where he entered into cordial rela- tions with the British and Russian plenipotentiaries. On the lOth of August a convention was signed between the two emperors, by which the Czar undertook to send thirty thousand troops into Galicia to support the Austrian army. Great Britain, as ever, was ready to help the cause with ships and money. Prussia refusing to join, the Russian en- voy took his leave, saying : " We will make war on France with you, without you, or against you." ^ On governments so prepared to be enkindled, yet hesi- tating before the prestige of French success and feeling the mutual distrust inseparable from coalitions, the news of the battle of the iSTile fell like a brand among tinder. The French fleet was not only defeated, but annihilated. The Mediterranean from the Straits to the Levant was in the power of the British navy, which the total destruction of its 1 Corr. (le Nap., vol. iv. pp. 226, 233. 2 Annunl Rei,'ister, 1798; State Papers, p. 276. 3 Martin, Hist, de France, vol. iii. p. 27. * Ibid. pp. 34, 25. OF THE BATTLE OF THE NILE. 283 enemy relieved from the necessity of concentration and al- lowed to disperse to every quarter where its efforts were needed. The greatest general and thirty thousand of the best troops France possessed, with numljers of her most jjrilliant officers, were thus hopelessly shut off from their country. After iha victory, conscious of its far-reaching im|)ort- ance, Nelson took measures to disperse the news as rapidly as liis want of small vessels would permit. The "• Leander " sailed on the 5tli of August with the first despatches for Lord St. Vincent off Cadiz, but was on the 18th captured Ijy the " Gcndreux," seventy-four, one of the two ships which had escaped from Aljoukir Bay. To i)rovide against such an accident, however, the brig " Mutine " had also Ijcen sent on the 13th to Naples, where she arrived on the 4th of September, bringing the first news that reached Europe, and which Nelson asked the British minister to sec forwarded to all the other courts. The captain of the '' Mutine" started the next day for England, Ijy way of Vienna, and on the 2d of October, 1798, two full months after the battle, reached London with the first acounts. Conscious of the effect which events in Egypt might have upon British infiuence in Lidia, Nelson also sent a lieu- tenant, on the 10th of August, to make his way overland through Alexandretta and Aleppo to Bomlmy. This officer bore dispatches to the governor, informing him both of the landing and numbers of Bonaparte's expedition, and also of the fatal blow which had just befallen it. The news was most timely. The French had been actively intriguing in the native courts, and Tippoo Saib, the son and successor of Hyder Ali, Sultan of Mysore, their former ally in the days of Suffren, had openly committed liimself to his father's policy. It was too late for Tii)poo to recede, and he was erelong embarked in a war, which ended in April, 1799, in his death at the assault of Seringapatam and the overthrow of his kingdom ; but on the other native states 284 THE CONSEQUENCES the striking catastrophe produced its due impression. In their operations against Tippoo the British were not em- barrassed by troubles in other quarters. " The consequences of this battle," sums up a brilliant French naval writer, " were incalculable. Our navy never recovered from this terrible blow to its consideration and its power. This was the combat which for two years de- livered the Mediterranean to the English, and called thither the squadrons of Russia ; which shut up our army in the midst of a rebellious population, and decided the Porte to declare against us ; which put India out of the reach of our enterprise, and brought France within a hair's-breadth of her ruin ; for it rekindled the scarcely extinct war with Austria, and brought Suwarrow and the Austro-Russians to our very frontiers." ^ Great Britain, the Sea Power so often and so idly accused of backwardness in confronting France, of requiring continental support before daring to move, was first to act. Long before news of the battle, be- fore even the battle was fought, or the alliance of Austria and Russia contracted, orders had been sent to St. Vincent to detach from Nelson's force to the support of Naples, hoping there to start the little fire from which a great mat- ter should be kindled. These " most secret orders " reached Nelson on the 15th of August.^ He had just dispatched to Gibraltar seven of the British fleet with six of the captured French vessels, the whole under charge of Sir James Saumarez. Setting fire to the three other prizes, he intrusted the blockade of Alexandria to Captain Hood, with three ships-of-the-line, and with the three then re- maining to him sailed for Naples on the 19th. From the wretched condition of his division ^ the passage took over a 1 Jurien de la Graviere, Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. p. 229 (1st ed.). ^ Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 10.5. ^ This division consisted of the "Vanguard," flag-ship, which had not had proper lower masts since she was dismasted immediately after entering the Mediterranean (p. 256) ; the " Culloden/' that had beaten heavily on Abon- OF THE BATTLE OF THE NILE. 285 month ; but on tlie 22cl of September he anchored in the bay, where the renown of his achievement liad preceded him. On his way, Nelson had been informed that a Portuguese squadron, commanded by the Marquis de Niza, had entered the Mediterranean to support his operations. At his re- quest this division, which had appeared off Alexandria on the 29th of August,^ but refused to remain there, under- took the blockade of Malta, until such time as the repairs of the British ships should allow them to do so. The na- tives of the island had risen against the French on the 26tli of August, and driven them from the open country into the forts of La Yaletta. Niza took his station off the port, about the 20th of September, and on the 24tli Sir James Saumarez appeared with his division and the prizes. The following day the two officers sent General Vaubois a sum- mons to surrender, which was as a matter of course re- fused. Saumarez went on to Gibraltar ; but before doing so gave the inhabitants twelve hundred muskets with am- munition, which materially assisted them in their efforts, finally successful, to deprive the cneni}- of the resources of the island. Nelson sent off British ships as they were ready, and himself joined the blockading force on the 24th of Oc- tober, though only for a few days, his presence being neces- sary in Naples. The garrison was again by him formally summoned, and as formally rejected his offc2\s. From that time until their surrender in Septemljer, 1800, the French were in strict blockade, both by land and water. In October of this year Lord St. Vincent went to live ashore at Gibraltar, both on account of his health, and be- cause there, IjcinGr the ereat British naval station of the Med- iterranean, he was centrally placed to receive information, to give orders, and especially to hasten, by his unflagging per- sonal supervision, tlie work of supply and repair upon which kir reef for seven hours during the battle ; and the " Alexander," both masts and hull in very had order. 1 Corr, de Xajt., vol. iv. p>. 660. 286 THE CONSEQUENCES the efficiency of a fleet primarily depends. The division off Cadiz, numbering generally some fifteen of the line, kept its old station watching the Spaniards, under the com- mand of Lord Keith, — one of the most efficient and active of the e-eneration of naval officers between St. Vincent and Nelson, to the latter of whom he was senior. Within the Mediterranean Nelson commanded, under St. Vincent. The blockade of Egypt and Malta, and co-operation with the Austrian and Neapolitan armies in the expected war, were his especial charge. He was also to further, as far as in him lay, the operations of a combined Russian and Turkish fleet, which had assembled in the Dardanelles in September, 1798, to maintain the cause of the coalition in the Levant. This fleet entered the Mediterranean in Octo- ber ; but instead of assuming the blockade of Alexandria and the protection of the Syrian coast, it undertook the capture of the Ionian Islands. All of these, except Corfu, fell into its power by October 10 ; and on the 20th Corfu, the citadel of the group, was attacked. Nelson saw this direction of the Russo-Turkish operations with disgust and suspicion. " The Porte ought to be aware," he wrote, " of the great danger at a future day of allowing the Russians to get a footing at Corfu." ^ "I was in hopes that a part of the united Turkish and Russian squadron would have gone to Egypt, — Corfu is a secondary consideration. . I have had a long conference with Kelim Effendi on the conduct likely to be pursued by the Russian Court towards the unsuspicious (I fear) and upright Turk. ... A strong squadron should have been sent to Egypt to have relieved my dear friend Captain Hood ; but Corfu suited Russia better." ^ At the same time Turkish troops, under the pashas whose good dispositions Bonaparte had boasted, swept away from France the former Venetian territory on the mainland, acquired by the treaty of Campo Formio. 1 Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 160. 2 Ibid., p. 204. OF THE BATTLE OF THE NILE. 287 While Bonaparte's Oriental castles were thus crumbling, through the destruction in Aboukir Bay of the foundation upon which they rested, — while Ionia was falling, Malta starving, and Egypt isolated, through the loss of the sea — the Franco-Spanish allies were deprived of another im})ortant foothold for maritime power. On the 15th of November Minorca with its valuable harbor, Port Mahon, was surren- dered to a combined British military and naval expe- dition, quietly fitted out by St. Vincent from Gibraltar. The year 1798 in the Mediterranean closed with these operations in progress. At its beginning France was in entire control of the land-locked sea, and scarcely a sail hostile to her, except furtive privateers, traversed its sur- face. When it closed, only two French ships-of-the-line tit for battle remained upon the waters, which swarmed with enemy's squadrons. Of these two, refugees from the fatal bay of Aboukir, one was securely locked in Malta, whence she never escaped ; the other made its way to Toulon, and met its doom in a vain effort to carry relief to the be- leaguered island. CHAPTER X. v/ The Mediterranean From 1799 to 1801. Bonaparte's Syrian Expedition and Siege of Acre. — The Incursion of the French Brest Fleet Under Admiral Bruix. — Bonaparte's Return to France. — The French Lose Malta and Egypt. AFTER the destruction of his fleet, Bonaparte resumed the task of subduing and organizing Egypt, which had by that misfortune become more than ever essential to his projects. In the original conception of his eastern ad- venture the valley of the Nile had borne a twofold part. It was, in the first place, to become a permanent acquisi- tion of France, the greatest of her colonies, — great not only by its own natural resources, susceptible as was believed of immense development, but also by its singular position, which, to a power controlling the Mediterranean waters, gave the military and commercial link between the eastern and western worlds. To France, bereft of the East and the West Indies, childless now of her richest colonies, Egypt was to be the great and more than equal compensa- tion. But this first ol;)ject obtained, though in itself a justification, was but the necessary step to the moi^e daz- zling, if not more useful, achievement of the destruction of the British power in India, and the creation there of an em- pire tril)utary to France. " Thus, on the one side Egypt would replace San Domingo and the Antilles ; on the other, she would be a step towards the conquest of India." ^ 1 Commentaires de Napoleon, vol. iii. pp. 19, 20. BONAPARTE'S SYRIAN EXPEDITION. 289 Measured by the successes of a few handfuls of British in the empire of the Moguls, the army brought by Bona- parte into Egypt was more than aljlc to suljdue that coun- try, and to spread far and wide the obedience to the French arms. Like the founders of the British Indian Empire, the French general f(jund himself face to face, not only with military institutions inc(»m})arcibly weaker and less cohesive than those of Europe, Ijut witli a civil society — if such it can be called — from which the element of mutual confi- dence, and with it the power of combined resistance, had disa})}>eared. The prestige of success, the knowledge that he could command the services of a body of men superior in numbers as in disci[ilined action to any aggregation of units that could be ke})t steadily together to oppose him, was sufficient to insure lor him the supremacy that con- centrated force will always have over diffused force, organ- ized power over unorganized. In military matters two and two do not make four, unless they are brought together in concerted action. Unfortunately, at the very moment of the most brilliant demonstration of his genius and of the valor of his troops, there had fallen upon one part of his command a reverse more startling, more absolute, than his own victories, and inflicted by a force certainly not supe- rior to the one defeated. The Orientals, who could count upon no suiHicient stay in men of their own race, now saw hopes of succor from without. They were not disappointed. Again a British naval captain, in the moment of triumph- ant progress, stopped the advance of Bonaparte. The autumn and early winter of 1798 were passed in the conquest and overrunning of up])er Egypt by Desaix, who left Cairo for this purpose on the 25th of August, and in the settlement of the affairs of the lower Nile upon such a basis as would secure quiet and revenue during the ab- sence of the commander-in-chief. An insurrection in Cairo in October, provoked partly by dissatisfaction with intended changes, partly by the rumor of the Porte having declared VOL. I. — 19 290 BONAPARTE'S SYRIAN EXPEDITION. war upon France, gave Bonaparte in quelling it an oppor- tunity to show the iron firmness of his grip, and afterwards to manifest that mixture of unrelenting severity towards the few with politic lenity towards the many, which is so well calculated to check the renewal of commotion. In Novemljer, when the weather became cooler, a detach- ment of fifteen hundred men was sent to occupy Suez, and toward the end of December Bonaparte himself made a visit of inspection to the isthmus, by which he must advance to the prosecution of his larger schemes. While thus absent he learned, through an intercepted courier, that Djezzar, the Pasha of Syria, had on the 2d of January, 1799, occupied the important oasis of El Arish in the desert of Suez, and was putting its fort in a state of defence.^ He at once i-e- alized that the time had come when he must carry out his project of advance into Syria, and accept the hostility of Turkey, which he had wished to avoid. The singular position of isolation in which the French in Egypt were placed, by the loss of the control of the sea, must be realized, in order to understand the difficulties under which Bonaparte labored in shaping his course of action, from time to time, with reference to the general cur- rent of events. Separated from Palestine by two hundred miles of desert, and by a yet wider stretch of barren sand from any habitable land to the west, Egypt is aptly de- scril:)ed by Napoleon himself as a great oasis, surrounded on all sides by the desert and the sea. The intrinsic weak- ness of the French navy, its powerlessness to command security for its unarmed vessels in the Mediterranean, had been manifested by the tremor of apprehension and uncer- tainty which ran through the officials at Toulon and in Paris, when, after the sailing of Bonaparte, they learned of 1 Of all obstacles that can cover the frontiers of an empire, a desert like that of Suez is indisputably the greatest. It is easy to understand that a fort at El Arish, which would prevent an enemy from using tl\e wells and encamp- ing under tlie palm-trees, would he very valuable. — Commentaires de Nctpo' lifon, vol. iii. p. 16. BONAPARTE'S SYRIAN EXPEDITION. :291 Nelson's appearance. The restless activity of the British admiral, and the frequent sight of his ships in different places, multiplied, in tlie imagination of the French author- ities, the nuniljers of hostile cruisers actually on the sea.^ A convoy of twenty-six large ships, for the completion of whose lading the expedition could not wait, lay in Toulon during the summer months, ready to sail ; Ijut no one dared to despatch them. From time to time during the outward voyage Bijnaparte sent urgent messages for their speedy de- parture ; Ijut they never came. If this fear existed and exercised such sway before the day of the Nile, it may be imagined how great was the in- fluence of that disastrous tidina's. Not onlv, however, did a moral effect follow, but the annihilation of the French fleet permitted the Britisli cruisers to scatter, and so in- definitely increased the real danger of capture to French ships. Surrounded Ijy deserts and the sea, the commander- in-chief in Ei2:vi't saw, on and bevond both, nothinti' but actual or possible enemies. Not only so, but l)eing in utter ignorance of the attitude of most of the powers as well as of European events, he could not know what bad effect might result from action taken l)y him upon imperfect in- formation. His embarrassment is vividly depicted in a letter dated December 17, 1798 : " We are still without news from France, not a courier has arrived since July (3 ; this is unexampled even in the colonies." ^ The courier men- tioned, leaving France in July, had reached Bonaparte on the 9th of September ; but the vessel whicli ])roughthim had been obliged to run ashore to escape the British cruisers, and only one letter from the Directory was saved.^ The next tidinu's came on the 5th of Februarv, wlien a Ragusan ship, chartered by two French citizens, succeeded in enter- 1 For a grapliic account of the anxieties of the French ofHcers in Toulon, illustrated hy letters, see -Turien de la Graviere's Guerres Alaritimes (4th edition), pp. 352-362. (Appendix.) " Corr. de Nap., vol. v. p. 276. 3 rbid., vol. iv., Letter to Directory, Sept. 8, 1798 (postscript). 292 BONAPARTE'S SYIITAN EXPEDITION. ing Alexandria. " The news," he said, " is sufficiently contradictor}^ ; but it is the first I have had since July 6." He then first learned definitely that Turkey had declared war against France.^ His troops were at that moment in the desert, marching upon Syria, and he himself on the point of following them. Up to that time Bonaparte had hoped to cajole the Porte into an attitude of neutrality, upon the plea that his quarrel was solely with the Mamelukes on account of injury done hv them to French commerce. On the 11th of December he had sent to Constantinople a M. Beauchamp, recently consul at Muscat, with instructions how to act in the two- fold contingency of war having been declared or not. At that time he expected that Talleyrand would be found in Constantinople as Ambassador of France.'^ The news by tlie Ramisan enlig-htened him as to the actual relations with Turkey ; but the disquieting rumors before received, coin- ciding with his ultimate purpose to advance upon India through Syria, had already determined him to act as the military situation demanded.'^ He had learned that troops were assembling in Syria and in the island of Rhodes, and divined that he was threatened with a double invasion, — by the desert of Suez and by the Mediterranean Sea. True to his sound and invaria1)le pohcy, he determined to use his central position to strike first one and then the other, and not passively to wait on the defensive until a simultaneous attack might compel him to divide his force. During the violent winter weather, which would last yet for six weeks or two months, landing on the Egyptian coast was thought impracticable."^ For that period, probably for 1 Corr. de Nap., vol. v. pp. 385, 391, 392. It is interestinf^ to note that by this mail Bonaparte seems first to have heard the word " conscript," applied to the system of which he later made such an insatiable use (p. 387). '^ Instructions pour le citoyen Beauchamp, Corr. de Nap., vol. t. pp. 260-263. 2 Commentaires de Napoleon, vol. iii. p. 24. * The roadstead of Abonkir is not safe in winter. It can protect a squad- BONAPARTE'S SYRIAN EXPEDITION. 203 longer, be could count upon security on the side of the sea. He would improve the interval by invading Syria, driviug back the enemy there, breaking up his army, and seizing his ports. Thus he would both shut the coast to the British cruisers off Alexandria, which drew supplies from thence, and make impossible any future invasion from tlie side of the desert, lie counted also upon the moral effect which success in Syria would liave upon the negotiations with the Porte, which he conceived to be in jjrogress.^ The first essential jtoint in the campaign was to possess El Arish, just occupied by the troops of Djezzar. Genrral Reynier advanced against it witli his division on the 5th of February, 1799. The Turks were by him runted and driven from the oasis, and the fort besieged. Bonaparte himself arrived on the 15th, and on the 20th the garrison capitu- lated. The corps destined for the expedition, numbering in all thirteen thousand men, having now assembled, the advance fi'om El Arish began on the 22d. On the 25th Gaza was taken. On the 3d of March the ai-my encamped before Jaffa, and on the 7th the place was carried l>y storm. A port, though a very poor one, was thus secured. The next day there entere. G.) The fleet then lay in Ahonkir Bay from :March 2 to March 8, hefore lauding could be made. 1 Corr. de Nap., vol. v. p. 402, where the reasons for the Syrian ex]ioditiou are given categorically, and can probably be depended upon as trutliful. 294 SIEGE OF ACRE. which, coasting the beach, slowly followed the advance of the troops. From Hayfa Bonaparte could see the roadstead of Acre, and lying there two British ships-of-the-line, the "• Tigre" and the " Theseus," both under the command of Sir Sidney Smith, the captain of the former; who, as ranking officer on the spot, represented the naval power of Great Britain, about again to foil the plans of the great French leader. Sir Sidney Smith, to whom now fell the distinguished duty of meeting and stopping the greatest general of mod- ern times, was a man who has left behind him a somewhat singular reputation, in which, and in the records commonly accessible, it is not always easy to read his real character. He was not liked by St. Vincent nor by Nelson, and their feeling towards him, though much intensified by the cir- cumstances under which he now came to tlie Mediter- ranean, seems to have depended upon their previous knowledge of his history. The First Lord, in assigning liim to this duty, felt obliged to take an almost apologetic tone to Earl St. Vincent. " I am well aware," he wrote, '' that there may perhaps be some prejudices, derived from certain circumstances which have attended this officer's career tlirough life ; but, from a long acquaintance with him personally, I think I can venture to assure your lord- ship that, added to his unquestioned character for courage and enterprise, he has a great many good points about him, which those who are less acquainted with him may not be sufficiently apprised of. I have no doubt you will find him a Tdry useful instrument to be employed on any hazardous or difficult service, and that he will be perfectly under your guidance, as he ought to 1)0." ^ In the concluding sentence Earl Spencer sums up Sir Sidney's real character, as far as it can be discerned in the dim light of the re- corded facts — or rather in the false lights which have ex- aggerated some circumstances and distorted others. He 1 Barrow's Life of Sir Sidney Smitli, vul. i. p. 244. SIEGE OF ACRE. 295 was bold and enterprising to Quixotism ; he was a most useful instrument ; but so far from having no doubt, the First Lord must have had very serious, if unacknowledged, douljts as to how far he would be under the guidance of St. A'^incent, or any one else, out of signal distance. A self-esteem far beyond what the facts warranted, a self- confidence of the kind Avhich does not ins[)ire conddence in others, an exaggerated view of his own importance and of his own services, which was apt to show itself in his bear- ing and wordSji — such seem to have been the traits that alienated from Sir Sidney Smith the esteem of his contem- poraries, until his really able, as well as most gallant, con- duct at Acre showed that there was more in him than the mere vainglorious knight-errant. His behavior even there has been distorted, alike by the malevolence of Napoleon and by the popular adulation in Great Britain, which, seiz- ing upon the brilliant traits of energy and valor he exhib- ited, attributed to him the whole conduct of the siege ; ^ whereas, by entrusting the technical direction of the de- fence to an experienced engineer, he made proof of a wis- dom and modesty for which few of his contemporaries would have f>;iven him credit. At this time Smith had re- ceived some severe snubbings, which, administered by men of the standing of St. Vincent and Nelson, could not be disregarded, and may have had a wholesomely sobering effect. The circumstances of his coming to the Mediterranean ^ The opinion of a French officer inrty l>e wortli qnotinc; "Althnnq-h every one knows wliat he is, I will nevertheless say a word about Sir Sidney Smith. He lia.s something at once of tlie kniL;lit and of the charlatan. A man of intelligence, yet liorilering upon insniiity, witli the aliility of a leader, lie hns tliought to honor his career hy often running absurd risks, without any useful end, but only to be talked about. Every one ridicules him, and justly; for in the long run he is wearisome, though very original." (Mcmoires du Due do TJaguse (]Marmont), vol ii p. .'"JO.) - The melof Sir Sidney Smith in tlie l>reach at Acre represents graphically the popular impression of his character. See frontis- piece to Barrow's Life of Sir Sidney Smith. 296 SIEGE OF ACRE. were as follows. Having been a prisoner of war in Paris for nearly two years, he escaped through the stratagem of a French royalist, Phi^lippeaux, about a week before Bona- parte left the city for Toulon.^ The incidents of his re- lease were dramatic enough in themselves, and, in common with all his adventures, were well noised abroad. He be- came a very conspicuous figure in the eyes of the govern- ment, and of the public outside the navy. In October, 1798, he was given command of the " Tigre," with direc- tions to proceed to Gibraltar and put himself under St. Vincent's orders. At the same time he was appointed minister plenipotentiary to the Porte, being associated in that capacity with his younger brother, Spencer Smith, who was already ambassador at Constantinople ; the ob- ject being that, with the diplomatic rank thus conferred, he should be able to direct the efforts of the Turkish and Russian forces in the Levant, in case the military officers of those nations were of grade superior to his. This some- what complicated arrangement, which presupposed in the Turks and Russians a compliance which no British naval officer would have yielded, was further confused by the in- structions issued, apparently without concert, by the For- eign Office to Smith himself, and by the Admiralty to St. Vincent. The latter clearly understood that Smith was intended to be under his command only, and that merely 1)70 formd ; ^ l)ut under no oljedience to Nelson, although his intended scene of operations, the Levant, was part of Nelson's district. Tliis view, derived from the Admiralty's letter, v\^as confirmed bv an extract from the Forei2;n Office instructions, communicated by Smith to Nelson, that " his (Smith's) instructs OILS will enable him to take the com- mand of such of his Majesty's ships as he may find in 1 Smith escapeil from Paris on tlie 25th of April ; Bonaparte k-ft Paris May 2; TS^'elson sailed from Cadiz on his great mission May 2, — a very singnlnr triple coincidenfe. - Brentou's Life of Lord St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 6 ; Barrow's Life of Sir Sidney Smith, vol. i. p. 236. SIEGE OF ACRE. 297 those seas (the Levant) unless, hy some unforeseen acci- dent, it should happen that there should be among them any of his Majesty's officers of superior rank." ^ Nelson, of course, was outraged. Here was intruded into his command, Avhere he had achieved such brilliant success, and to the administration of which he felt fully equal, a man of indifferent rt'])utation as an ofticer, thouo-h of un- questioned courage, authorized to act independently of his control, and, as it seemed, even to take his ships. He was hurt not only for himself, but for Troubridge, who was senior to Smith, and would, so Nelson thought, have done the duty better than this choice of the Government. Tlie situation when understood in England was rectified. It was explained that diplomatic rank was considered neces- sary for the senior naval officer, in order to keep in the hands of Great Britain the direction of combined opera- tions, essentially naval in character ; and that Smith had been chosen to the exclusion of seniors because of his rela- tionship to the minister at Constantinople, who might have felt the association with him of a stranger to be an impu- tation upon his past conduct. Meanwhile St. Vincent, indignant at what seemed to him Smith's airs, had sent him peremptory instructions to put himself under Nelson's orders. Thus, in the double character of naval captain and minister plenipotentiary to Turkey, Smith went up the Mediterranean; where he did first-rate service in the former capacity, and in the latter took some action of very doubtful discretion, in which lie certainly did not trouble himself about the guidance or views of his naval superiors. In compliance with orders from Lord St. Vincent, Nel- son in January sent Ti-onbrid<2-o with some Itomb-vessels to Alexandria, to boml)ard the sliipping in the port : after per- forming which service he was to turn over to Sir Sidney 1 Ne].«;on's Pispntches, vol. iii. p. 216. The Admiralty, upon remonstrance emphaticallj' denied any siiedi purpose. (Il)id., p. 335.) 298 SIEGE OF ACRE. Smith the blockade of Alexandria and the defence of the Ottoman Empire by sea, of which Nelson thenceforth washed his hands. ^ The bombardment was maintained during several days in February, doing but little harm ; and on the 3d of March Sir Sidney, having made his round to Constantinople, arrived and took over the command. Troubridge left with him the " Theseus," seventy-four, whose captain was junior to Smith, with three smaller vessels; and on the 7th sailed to rejoin Nelson. This was the day that the French stormed Jaffa, and the same even- ing an express with the news reached the " Tigre." Smith at once sent the '' Theseus " to Acre, with Ph^lippeaux, the French officer who had aided him to escape from Paris and had accompanied him to the East. Of the same age as Bonaparte, Phi^lippeaux had been his fellow-pupil at the military school of Brienne, had left France with the royalists in 1T92, and returned to it after the fail of E-obespierre. He had naturally, from his ante- cedents, joined the party of reaction ; and, after its over- throw in September, 1797, was easily moved to aid in Sir Sidney's escape from Paris. Accompanying him to Eng- land, he received from the Crown a colonel's commission. To the guidance of this able engineer the wisdom and skill of the defence was mainly due. Never did great issues turn on a nicer balance than at Acre. The technical skill of Ph^lippeaux, the hearty support he received from Smith, his officers and crews, the untiring activity and brilliant courage of the latter, the British command of the sea, all contributed ; and so narrow was the margin of success, that it may safely be said the failure of one factor would have caused total failure and the loss of the place. Its fall was essential to Bonaparte, and his active, far-seeing mind had long before determined its seizure by his squad- ron, if the British left the Levant. " If any event drives us ^ For NeLsoii's attitude until lie received orders (Feb. 1, 1799) from St Vinceut to take Smitli under liis orders, see DispatclieSj vol. iii. pp. 223, 224. SIEGE OF ACRE. 299 from the coast of Egypt," wrote Nelson on the 17th of December, 1798, " St. Jean (PAcre will be attacked by sea. I have Bonaparte's letter before me." ^ As the best port and the best fortress on the coast, Acre was the brida;ehead into Palestine. To Svria it bore the relation that Lisbon did to the Spanish Peninsular War. If Bonaparte advanced, leaving it unsubdued, his flank and rear would through it be open to attack from the sea. If it fell, he had good reason to believe the country would rise in his favor. '' If I succeed," said he at a late period of the siege, when hope had not yet abandoned him, " I shall find in the city the treasures of the Pasha, and arms for three hundred thou- sand men. I raise and arm all Syria, so outraged by the ferocity of Bjezzar, for whose fall you see the population praying to God at each assault. I march upon Damascus and Aleppo. I swell my army, as I advauce, by all mal- contents. I reach Constantinople with armed masses. I overthrow the Turkish Empire. I found in the East a new and great empire which shall fix my place in posterity." ^ Dreams? Ibrahim Pasha advanced from Egypt in 1831, took Acre in 1832, and marched into the heart of Asia Minor, which the battle of Konieh soon after laid at his feet ; why not Bonaparte ? Damascus had already offered him its keys, and the people were eager for the overthrow of the pashas. On the 10th of March Sir Sidney Smith himself left the blockade of Alexandria, and on the 15th anchored with the "Tio-re" off Acre. He found that much had already been done, by Phelippeaux and the " Theseus," to make the obso- lete fortidcations more fit to withstand the approaching sieo;e. Sendimxthe '' Theseus" now to cruise down the coast towards Jaffa, it fell to himself to deal the heaviest and most opportune blow to Bonaparte's projects. Some light coasters had sailed with a siege train from the Damietta 1 Nels. Disp., vol. iii. pp. 204, 205. 2 Mcniuires 'le Buurrienne, vol. ii. pp. 243-245. 300 SIEGE OF ACRE. (eastern) mouth of the Nile, which the British never had ships enough to blockade. On the morning of the 18th they were seen approaching Acre, under convoy of a small cor- vette. The '■■ Tigre " at once gave chase, and captured all but the corvette and two of the coasters. The cannon that should have been turned against the walls were landed and served to defend them ; while the jjrizes, receiving British crews, thenceforth harassed the siege works, flanking the two walls against which the attacks were addressed, and enfilading the trenches. The French, having by this mishap lost all their siege guns proper, had to depend upon field-pieces to breach the walls until the 25th of April, when half a dozen heavy cannon were received from Jaffa.^ This time was simply salvation to the besieged and ruin to the assailants ; for, in the interval, the skill of Phelippeaux and the diligence of the men under him prepared the place to withstand attacks which at an early period would have caused its fall. Into the details of this siege, petty in itself but momen- tous in its bearing upon events, it will not be expected that this work shall enter. The crucial incident was the capture of the siege train and the precious respite thus obtained. Orders were indeed sent to Rear-Admiral Perree to come as speedily as possible, with his small squadron of three frigates and two corvettes, to Jaffa and land guns ; but Alexandria was already blockaded, and, from the narrow- ness of the entrance, very difficult to leave in face of a foe. On the 5th of April, however, the blockading force had to go to Cyprus for water,^ and on the 8th Perree got away. 1 "The pioge of Acre lasted sixty-two days. There Avere two periods. The first from IMarch 19 to April 2.5, tliirty-six days, duriug which tlie artillery of tlie liesiegers consisted of two carronades, .32 and 24 pound, taken from British boats, and thirty-six field gnns. The .second period was from April 2.') to May 21, twenty-six days." (Commentaires de Kapoleon, vol. iii., p. 0.3.) "During tlie latter period tlie park was increased by two 24-, and four IS-pounders." (I])id, p. 82.) 2 Kelson's Dispatche.s, vol. iii. p. 351. SIEGE OF ACRE. oOl On the 15th he landed at Jaffa six ship's guns, and so much ammunition as left his little squadron with only fifteen rounds. He then received orders to cruise to the westward of Acre and interce})t the communications of the Turks with Candia and Ilhodes. Returning from tliis duty on the 14th of May, he was seen and chased hy the " Theseus." An accidental exphjsion on board the latter forced her to give over pursuit; but Perree, recognizing the danger of capture, and being sh(.)rt of water and supplies, determined to go to France, as his instructions allowed in case of necessit}-. On the ITth of June, when only sixty miles from Toulon, he met a British fleet, by which all fne vessels were taken. On the 4th of May, wlien the besieged and Ijesiegers had been mining, countermining, and daily fighting, for over six weeks — separated by but a stone's throw one from the other — a breach thought practicable by the French general was made, the mine for blowing in the countcj'scarp was finished, and a general assault was ordered for the 5th ; but the ensfineers of the besiea'cd countermined so industrious- ly that by daybreak they had ruined the mine before being discovered. This caused the assault to be postponed to the 9th. On the 7th, towards evening, some thirty or forty sail were seen on the western horizon. They bore the long expected Turkish succors from Rhodes ; whose commander even now had only been induced to approach by a peremp- tory exercise of Sir Sidney Smith's powers as British minis- ter. Bonaparte saw that no more time could be lost, and ordered the assault at once ; the weather being calm, twenty-four hours might still elapse before the re-enforce- ments could enter the place. Under a heavy fire from one side and the other, the attack was made ; and in the morn- ing the British seamen saw the French flag flying on the outer angle of one of the towers. It marked the high water of Bonaparte's Syrian expedition. On the 8th the assault was renewed. As the French columns advanced, the Turkish ships were still detained iu 302 SIEGE OF ACRE. the offing by calms, and the soldiers were being l^roiight ashore in boats, Ijut still far from the landing. Then it was that Sir Sidney Smith, seeing that a few critical moments might determine the success or failure of his weary struggle, manned the boats of his ships, and pulling rapidly asliore led the British seamen, armed with pikes, to help hold the breach till the troops could arrive. The French carried the first line, the old fortifications of the town ; but that done, they found themselves confronted with a second, which Phelippeaux, now dead, had formed by connecting together the houses and garden walls of the seraglio within. The strife raged throughout the day, with varied success in different quarters ; but at nightfall, after a struggle of twenty-four hours, the assailants withdrew and Acre was saved. On the 20th the siege was raised, the French retreating during the night. Upon the 25th they reached Jaffa, and on the 29th Gaza. Both places were evacuated ; and the army, resuming its march, next day entered the desert. On the 2d of June it encamped in the oasis of El Arish. The garrison of the fort there was re-enforced, the works strengthened with more artillery, and tlie place provisioned for six months. It was the one substantial result of the Syrian expedition, — an outpost which, like Acre, an invader must subdue before advancing. On the 7th, after nine days' march through the desert under the scorching heat of the June sun, the army re- entered Egypt. It had lost since its departure fifteen hundred killed or dead of disease, and more than two thou- sand wounded. The reputation of Sir Sidney Smith with posterity rests upon the defence of Acre, in which he made proof of solid as well as brilliant qualities. Bonaparte, who never for- gave the check administered to his ambition, nor overcame the irritation caused by sixty days fretting against an un- expected and seemingly trivial o])stacle, tried hard to decry the character of the man who thwarted him. " Smith is a SIEGE OE ACRE. 303 lunatic," ho said, " who wishes to make his fortune and keep himself always before the eyes of the world. He is a man capaljle of any folly, to wh<;)m no profound or rational project is ever to be attributed." ^ '' Sir Sidney Smith oc- cupied himself too much with the detail of affairs on shore, which he did not understand, and where he was of little use ; he neglected the maritime business, which he did understand, and where he had everythinc;- in his power." This accusation was supported by the circumstantial mis- statement that six big guns, with a large quantity of ammu- nition and provisions, were landed by Perrce, undetected, seven miles from Smith's ships.^ That there was a strong fantastic and vainglorious strain in Smith's character seems certain, and to it largely lie owed the dislike of his own service ; Ijut so far as appears, he showed at Acre discretion and sound judgment, as well as energy and courage. It must be remembered, in justice, that all power and all responsibility were in his hands, and that the result was an eminent success. Under the cir- cumstances he had to be much on shore as well as afloat ; but he seems to have shown Phelippeaux, and after the hit- ter's death. Colonel Douglas, the conlidence and deference which their professional skill demanded, as he certainly was most generous in recognizing their services and those of others. When the equinoctial gales came on he re- mained with his ship, which had to put to sea ; an act which Bonaparte maliciously attributed to a wish to escape the odium of the fall of the place. Whether ashore or afloat, Smith could not please Bonaparte. The good sense which 1 Corr. de Nap., June 26, 1799, vol. v. p. 617. 2 Commentiires de Napoleon, vol. iii. pp. 81, 82. It is only fair to say- that an attempt was made by Perre'e a few weeks later to land ammunition back of iMt. Carmel, wlien he was discovered and chased off. (Barrow's Life of Sir Sidney Smith, vol. i. p. 300.) Napoleon may have confused the two circumstances. His own correspondence (vol. v., pp. 517, 518) contradicts the landinc; near Acre. The guns were put on shore at Jaffa and thence dragged to Acre. 304 ADMIRAL BRUIX'S INCURSION defers to superior experience, the lofty spirit which bears the weight of responsibility and sustains the courage of waverers, ungrudging expenditure of means and effort, un- shaken determination to endure to the end, and heroic inspiration at the critical moment of the last assault, — all these line qualities must in candor be allowed to Sir Sidney Smith at the siege of Acre. He received and deserved the applause, not only of the multitude and the p-overnment, but of Nelson himself. The deeds of Acre blotted out of memory the exaggerated reports of the al- most total destruction of the Frencli fleet at his hands when Toulon was evacuated ; reports which had left upon his name the imputation of untrustworthiness. But, Avhatever the personal merits of Sir Sidney Smith in this memorable siege, there can be no doubt that to the presence of the British ships, and the skilled support of the British officers, seamen, and marines — manning the works — is to be attributed the successful resistance made by the brave, but undisciplined Turks. During the last days of the siege of Acre and while Bonaparte was leading his baffled army through the sands of the desert back into Egypt, the western Mediterranean was thrown into a ferment by the escape of the French fleet from Brest. This very remarkable episode, having led to no tangible results, has been little noticed by general his- torians ; but to the student of naval war its incidents are most instructive. It is scarcely too much to say that never was there a greater opportunity than that offered to the French fleet, had it been a valid force, by the scattered con- dition of its enemies on this occasion ; nor can failure deprive the incident of its durable significance, as illustrat- ing the advantage, to the inferior navy, of a large force concentrated in a single port, when the enemy, though su- perior, is by the nature of the contest compelled to dissemi- nate his squadrons. The advantage is greatest when the port of concentration is central with reference to the INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN. 305 enemy's positions ; but is by no means lost when, as was then the case with Brest, it is at one extremity of the theatre of war. It was a steady principle in the policy of Napoleon, when consul and emperor, to provoke dissemination of the British navy by threatening preparations at widely sepa- rated points of his vast dominions ; just as it was a purpose of the British government, though not consistently followed, to provoke France to ex-centric efforts by naval demonstrations, menacing many i)arts of the shore line. Tlie Emperor, however, a master of the art of war and an adept at making the greatest possible smoke with the least expenditure of fuel, was much more than a match in the game of deception for the unmilitary and many-headed body that directed the affairs of Great Britain. Although in 1799 the Channel fleet had attached to it as many as fifty-one ships-of-the-line,^ of which forty-two upon the alarm that ensued very soon got to sea,^ Lord Bridport had with him but sixteen when he took command off Brest, on the 17th of iVpril, relieving the junior ad- miral who, with eight or nine ships, had done the winter cruising. On the 25th Bridport looked into the port and saw there eighteen ships-of-the-Iine ready for sea. The wind being fresh at north-cast, the British admiral stood out until he reached a position twelve miles west-south-west of Ushant Island. The entrance being thus clear and the wind fair, the French fleet, numbering twenty-five of the line and ten smaller vessels, slipped out that night under command of Admiral Bruix, then minister of marine, who, by his close official relations to the government, was indi- cated as a proper person to fulfil an aj)parently confidential mission, for which his professional ability and activity eminently fitted him. Being bound south and the wind favoring, Bruix passed through the southern passage, known as tiie Passage du ^ Schomberg's Naval Chronology. Appendix No. 374. 2 Ibid. Appendix No. 376. VOL. i. — 20 806 ADMIRAL BRUIX'S INCURSION Raz,^ distant thirty miles or more from the spot where Brid- port had stationed his fleet, which consequently saw noth- ing, though it had great reason to suspect a movement by the French. At 9 a. m. on the 26th, however, a British inshore frigate caught sight of the enemy just as the last ships were passing through the Raz, and hastened toward her fleet. At noon she lost sight of the French, and an hour later, the signal being repeated from vessel to vessel, Bridport learned that the enemy were out. He at once made sail for Brest, assured himself on the 27th that the news was true, and then steered for Ireland to cover it from a possible invasion, sending at the same time warning to Keith off Cadiz and to St. Vincent at Gibraltar, as well as orders into the Channel ports for all ships to join him off Cape Clear. The whole south coast of England was at once in an uproar ; but the government, knowing how scat- tered were the vessels in the Mediterranean, had a double anxiety. On the 6th of May, five ships-of-the-line sailed from Plymouth to join St. Vincent. ^ The rest of the Channel fleet got off as fast as they could to Bridport, who, in spite of the reports from merchant vessels that had seen the French to the southward, and steering south, refused to believe that Ireland was safe. In this delusion he was con- firmed by a barefaced and much-worn ruse, a small French vessel l^eing purposely allowed to fall into his hands with dispatches for Ireland. On the 12th of May there remained in Plymouth but a single ship-of-the-line, and that de- tained by sickness among the crew, — "a circumstance scarcely ever remembered before." ^ Despite this accu- mulation of force, it was not till June 1 that Bridport detached to the southward sixteen sail-of-the-line,* of which twelve went on to the Mediterranean. * See map of Brest in next cliapter. 2 Naval Clironiele, vol. i. p, 537. 8 Tl.iil., p. 539. 4 It.id., vnl. ii. p. SI, Osier's Life of Lord Exmouth, p. 191. INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN. 307 On the morning of the 3d of May Admiral Keith, off Cadiz, was joined by a British frigate chased the day before by Bruix's fleet, of which she had lost sight only at 4 p. M. The next morning the French appeared, twenty-four ships to tlie British fifteen, which were to leeward of their enemy. The wind, that had been blowing fresh from north- west since the day before, rapidly increased to a wYicAq gale, so that though there were nineteen Spanish shi[)S in Cadiz and twenty-four French outside, the British re- mained safe ; and not only so, but by making it impossiljle for the French to enter without an engagement, prevented this first attempt at a junction. " Lord Keith," wrote St. Vincent, "has shown great manhood and aljility , his posi- tion having been very critical, exposed to a hard gale of wind, blowing directly on shore, Avith an enemy of su{)(,'rior force to windward, and twenty-two ships-of-the-line in Ca- diz ready to profit by any disaster that might have befallen him." 1 Bruix, who knew that his captains, long confined to port by the policy of their government, were not able to perform fleet manoeuvres in ordinary weather, dared not attack on a lee shore with a wind that would tax all the abilities of experienced seamen. ^ He therefore kept away ' Brentun's Life uf St. Viuceiit, vol. ii. p. 17. '^ "Admiral Bruix, l)eing able t<» rely more ou the devotion of hi.'^ (^niitnins tlian upon their exactitude and preeisiou in maiio'uvrinn', took pains hefore sailing to lay down the duties of a ca[)tain under all oircumstances ; carefully refrainiuti;, however, from makiui; a special application of tliese lessons to any one individual, that their selfdove might n<.»t lie wounded. This wisf pre- caution did not prevent new mistakes, whose conse(iuen<'es would have 1m ^en much aggravated ha camp to Admiral Bruix. La Gravicre, Guerres jMaritimes, vi>l. i. p. 373. Appendix, 4th edition.) The gunnery, apparently, was equally l»ai1. " I will cite only onr> fai-t to give an idea of the effects of our artillery. Wlien Admiral Bruix was liring- mg to Brest the French and Spanish fleets, at least nine liundred guns were fired in very fine weather at an Algerian corsair without doing any jiarm I d(i not believe that ever, in a comliat of that kind, was so mmh useless tiring done.'' (Article liy " an officer of marine artillery ; " ]Moniteur, 3 Fructidor, An 8 [Aug. 20, 1800].) 308 ADMIRAL BRUITS INCURSION again to the south-east, determining to lose no time, but at once to enter the Mediterranean ; and the following day Lord St. Vincent, gazing from the rock of Gibraltar through the thick haze that spread over the Straits, saw, running before the gale, a number of heavy ships which, from dis- patches received the day before, he knew must be French. The situations of the vessels in his extensive command, as present that morning to the mind of the aged earl, must be realized by tiie reader if he would enter into the em- barrassment and anxiety of the British commander-in-chief, or appreciate the military significance of Bruix's appear- ance, with a large concentrated force, in the midst of dis- positions taken without reference to such a contingenc3^ The lifteen shi^js off Cadiz, with one then lying at Tetuan, on the Morocco side of the, Straits, where the Cadiz ships went for water, were the only force upon which St. Vin- cent could at once depend, and if they were called off the Spanish fleet was released. At Minorca, as yet imper- fectly garrisoned,^ was an isolated body of four ships under Commodore Duckworth. Lord Nelson's command in the central Mediterranean was disseminated, and the detach- ments, though not far out of supporting distance, were liable to be separately surprised. Troubridge with four vessels was blockading Naples, now in possession of the French, and at the same time co-operating with the resist- ance made to the foreign intruders by the peasantry under Cardinal Ruffo. Nelson himself, with one ship, was at Pal- ermo, and the faint-hearted court and people were crying that if he left them the island was lost. Captain Ball, with three of the line, blockaded Malta, the only hope of subduins: which seemed to be by rieorons isolation. Far to the eastward, up the Mediterranean, without a friendly port in which to shelter, Sidney Smith with two ships, unsus- 1 Two months later Lord Keith, having succeeded vSt. Vincent in the com- mand, wrote to Nelson : " If Minorca is left without ships it will fall." (Nel- son's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 415, note.) INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN. 309 piclous of danger from tlic sea, was then drawing to an end the defence of Acre. Each of these British divisions hiv open to the immensely superior force which I3ruix brought. N(jt only so, but the duties of an important nature to which each of them was assigned were threatened Avith frustration. 8u lame a fleet as that of Bruix might, and according to the usual Frcncli practice ])r(jbabl\' would, have numerous troops embarlvcd.^ No amount of skill could rescue Troubridge's division fr(.)m such a disproportion of force, and with it would fall the re- sistance of Naples. Only flight could save the ships off Malta, and St. Vincent saw the blockade raised, the garri- son re-enforced and re-victualled ; as within his own mem- ory had so often been done for Gibraltar, in its famous siege not twenty years before. Duckworth's little squadron could not prevent the landing of an army which would sweep Minorca again into the hands of Spain, and the Brit- ish commodore might consider himself fortunate if, in so difficult a dilemma, he extricated his shii)s from a harbor always hard to leave. ^ Spain also had in Cartagena and Majorca a number of soldiers that C(juld be rapidly thrown into Minorca under cover of such a fleet. The British admiral instantly decided to sacrifice all other objects to the concentration of his fleet in such a position as should prevent the junction of the French and Spaniards ; against which the presence off Cadiz of Keith's squadron, though inferior in numbers to either, had so far efl:ectually interposed. He at once sent off dispatches to 1 Bruix did not have over a thousand troops with him, the pressure on the land frontiers hy the Second Coalition demanding: all the force that could he r.aii^ed to resist it ; hut the fleet carried twenty-hnir thousand seanieu or ar- tillerists, a force capahle hy itself of accomplisliino: much. The reputation of the admiral caused both othcers and men to flix-k to his flag. 2 " Port Mahon is a very narrow harbor, from which you cannot get out without great difliculty." (Collingwood's letters, August 18,1799) " Ship.s had better be under sail off Port Mahon than in the harbor." (Nelson's Dis- patches, May 12,1799.) 310 ADMIRAL BRUIX'S INCURSION all his lieutenants ; but the westerly gales that were driv- ing Bruix to his goal made it impossible to get ship or boat to Keith. This admiral was only reached by an indulgence from the Spanish officials, between whom and the British an intercourse of courtes}^ was steadily maintained. These granted to Admiral Coffin, who had been appointed to a post in Halifax, passports to proceed to Lisbon through Spain; and Coffin on the way contrived to get a boat sent off to Keith, with orders which brought him to Gibraltar on the 10th. To Nelson the earl wrote that he believed the enemy were bound to Malta and Alexandria ; and that the Spani> ards, whom he was forced to release from Cadiz, would descend upon Minorca. Nelson received this message on the loth of May. The day before, a brig coming direct from the Atlantic without stopping at Gibraltar had noti- fied him of the escape from Brest, and that the French had been seen steering south. On the strength of this he drew from Naples and Malta all the ships-of-the-line except one before each, directing a rendezvous off Port Mahon, where he would join Duckworth ; but when St. Vincent's letter came, he called them all in, leaving only frigates on each station, and ordered the heavy vessels to meet him off the island of Maritimo, to intercept the French between Sicily and Africa. He also sent to Duckworth to ask his help ; but the commodore declined until he could communicate with the commander-in-chief, from whom he had received orders to keep his division in readiness to join the main fleet when it appeared. St. Vincent's position, in truth, was one of utter and dire perplexity, li the French and Spaniards got together, he would have forty-four enemy^s vessels on his hands ; against which, by sacrificing every other object, he could only gather thirty until re-enforced by the Channel fleet, upon whose remissness he could hardly fail to charge his false position. To lose Minorca and Sicily, to see Malta snatched from his fingers when ready to close upon it, the French INTO THE MEDITERRAXEAN. 311 position ill Naples established, and that in Egypt so strength- ened as to become impregnable to either attack or reduction by want, such were the obvious probable consequences of Bruix's coming. Besides these evident dangers, ho very well knew from secret official information that the Spanish court were in constant dreud of a popular insurrection, which would give the French a pretext for entering the peninsula, — not, as in 1808, to impose a foreign king upon an unwillini'' nation, but to promote a chaniie in the uoverii- ment which the distress of the people, though usually loyal, would probably welcome. In March he had received a communication from the Spanish prime minister, asking that a British frigate might be detailed to bring remittances from the Spanish colonies to Gibraltar, to be afterwards conveyed into Spain. The reason given for making this re- quest of an enemy w^as that the want of specie, and conse- quent delay in public payments, especially to the soldiery, made revolution imminent. St. Vincent recommended his government to comply, because of the danger, in case of disturbances, that both Spain and Poi'tugal might fall under subjection to France.^ Fortunately, amid the conflicting chiims of diverse inter- ests, the path of military wisdom was perfectly clear to one understanding its principles. St. Vincent might be acri- tated by apprehensions ; but he knew what he must do, and did it. To eet his own fleet toirother and at the same time prevent the allies from uniting: theirs, was the first thinfr ; and the point of concentration indicated for this purpose should be one that would cover Minorca, if he arrived he- fore it was reduced. For Sicily, Malta, and all to the eastward, he must trust to the transceiident abilities of Nelson and his "band of brothers." ^ On the 12th, after two days of 1 Rrenton's St. Vincent, vol. i. p. 493. - " T hnd the happine,'?? to command a hand of hrother.';." (Nelson's Dis- patches, vol. iii. p. 230,) The best of his Nile captains were, for the most part, still with him. 312 ADMIRAL BRUIX'S INCURSION hurried preparations, the British fleet sailed from Gibraltar. On the 20th it reached Minorca, found it still safe, and was joined by Duckworth's division, raising the force to twenty ships-of-the-line. St. Vincent here received information that the French had on the 12th been seen north of Minor- ca, heading for Toulon. ^ Sending this news to Nelson he sailed on the 22d in pursuit ; but learning that the Span- iards after Keith's departure had left Cadiz, as he had expect- ed, he decided to cruise off Cape San Sebastian on the Span- ish coast. Seventeen sail of Spaniards had indeed reached Cartagena on the 20th ; but in the passage from Cadiz eleven had been partly or totally dismasted, and this cir- cumstance was sufficient excuse for not pi'oceeding to a junction, to which the policy of their court was but little inclined. On the 30th of May St. Vincent heard that the French had sailed again from Toulon, but for what purpose was not known. As it might follow the course of Bonaparte's ex- pedition, east of Corsica, and fall upon Sicily and Malta, he sent Duckworth with four ships to Nelson at Palermo, and four hours later was joined by the first detachment of five sail-of-tlie-line from the Cliannel,^ of whose nearness he doubtless had some intimation before parting with Duck- worth. With twenty-one sail he now stood south-west toward Barcelona, then north-east for Toulon. On the 2d of June, when seventy miles from this port, his health gave way altogether. He turned over the command to Keith and departed to Port Mahon. Keith continued steering to the northward and eastward. On the 5th of June he was joined by a small cruiser, which had seen the French fleet in Vado Bay the day before. Bruix had reached Toulon May 14, and sailed again on the 26th, taking with him twenty-two ships ; the others being left in port for repairs. He steered east, carrying 1 Nelson's Dispatches, toI. iii. pp. 366, 374. 2 See ante, p. 306. INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN. 313 supplies and a few recruits for the army of Italy. On the 4th of June he had anchored in Yado Bay. A detachment from the fleet threw tlie su[)plies into Genoa, and it Mould seem that Bruix there had an interview with General Moreau, then commanding the army of Italy. On the Gtli/ turning short round, he doubled on his tracks, following close along the coast of Piedmont and I^rovence to avoid the Britisli,^ passed again in sight of Toulon to obtain infor- mation,-^ and from there pushed on to Cartagena, where he anchored on the 22d ; thus making with the Spanish fleet the junction which had been frustrated before Cadiz. On the same day that Bruix turned. Lord Keith, who had also passed close along the French coast between Cannes and Nice,^ standing to the eastward, reached as far as Monaco. Then the wind shifted to the eastward, and he wrote as follows to Nelson : " Soon after I despatched the ' Telegraph ' " (the vessel which saw the French in Yado Bay} "last night, the wind came freah from the ^c/.yf, which is of course a fair wind for the enemy, if bound towards you " (by the east of Corsica) '' and a foul wind for me to follow them, which is unfortunate ; for, if my information was just, I had no doubt of overtaking them before they had left the coast of Italy ; . . . but tlie defenceless state of Minorca., without a fleet, the great force prepared (at Car- 1 Jurien de la Graviere, Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. p. 288 (4th edition) ; also James, Naval History, vol. ii. p. 264 (edition 1847). (.)ther authorities say the 8th. The reconcilement seems to be that Bruix did not take his fleet to Gej^oa, but only a detachment ; the main liody anchoring in Vado Bay. He would thus leave Genoa the 6th, Vado the 8th. 2 « ^Yq avoided the enemy by skirting very close, and under cover of foggy weather, the coasts of Piedmont and Provence." (Journal of Captain Moras, special aid to Bruix. La Graviere, Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. p. 376. Appendix, 4th edition.) 3 " In our passage before Toulon we learned the vexatious accidents which had happened to the Spanish fleet, and went to rejoLu them at Cartagena." (Ibid. Also James, Nav. Hist., vol. ii. p. 264.) * The British fleet was sighted off St. Tropez (Troude, vol. iii. p. 158); and fired upon by coast batteries near Autibes on June 6th. (James, Xav. Hist. vol. ii. p. 262). 314 ADMIRAL BRUIX'S INCURSION tagena) to attack it, added to my having so far exceeded my orders already, will oblige me to relinquish the pursuit, and return to the protection of that island. But I have detached to your lordship the ' Bellerophon ' and ' Power- ful ' (seventy-fours), which I hope will arrive in time, as I am confident the French are not thirty leagues hence at this }nome)it.^^ ^ Being close in with the shoi-e with an east wind, Keith could only stand oif on the port tack, and it would appear that he still clung to the hope of a shift favorable for reaching Bruix ; for on the 8th he was sixty miles south of Monaco, 2 not on the route for Minorca. There he re- ceived from 8t. Vincent, who, though relinquishing the immediate command of the fleet, retained that of the sta- tion, pressing orders to take a position off the Bay of Rosas. This was evidently intended to block the junction of the two fleets, though St. Vincent could not have known Bruix' s purpose to return. Keith did not obey the order ; but seems under its influence to have abandoned definitively his hope of overtaking the French, for he made sail for Minorca, and arrived there on the 12th. ^ Had he obeyed St. Vincent he could scarcely have failed to meet Bruix, for at the moment of receiving his letter the two fleets were hardly sixty miles apart, and both would have passed within sight of Cape San Sebastian, the natural landfall of vessels going from Toulon to Cartagena. 1 Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 379, note. This east wind seems to have been overlooked in the criticisms of Keith's conduct. " Cape delle Melle bore, on the 8th, N. N. E,, distant ninety miles. James, Nav. Hist., vol. ii. p. 262. •"' Lord Keith's biographer (Allardyce) say.s he determined "to take Minorca on Ids way to Kosas'' (p. le.'S); which was certainly -i- liberal con- strnotioii, though not beyond the discretion of an officer in Keith's position. To take Minorca on his way to Rosas, from his position on the 8th, was to go two hundred miles to the former and one hundred and fifty more to Rosas, when the latter at the moment was not two hundred distant. He was a few miles nearer Rosas than Minorca, when he took the decision which finally wrecked the cruise. INTO THE MEDITERRAXEAN. 315 Keith remained at Minorca but a few davs, durino- which St. Vincent turned over to him the command of the station as well as of the flcet.i He sailed again on the loth for Toulon ; but the British had completely lost trace of the French from the time that they surrendered the touch of them obtained on the 5th of the month. From the loth of June to the Gth of July - was jtassed groping blindly in the seas Ijetween Minorca, Toulon, and Genoa. On the latter date Keith regained Minorca, and there found the twelve ships-of-the-line which Bridport had detached from Ireland on the 1st of June, and which seem to have reached Port Mahon about the 17th of that month.^ Scarcely an hour after his arrival,"* information was received of the French having entered Cartagena. The ships that had accompanied Keith on the recent three weeks' cruise had to fill with water ; but on the 10th he started for the Straits of Gibraltar with thirty-one ships-of-the-line, on a stern chase — proverbially a long chase — after the allies, known to be bound to the westward. The latter, however, had a long start. Bruix, aware of the reluctance of the Spaniards, and secretly informed that in case of attack they could not be depended upon, hurried them away after a week's waiting, in virtue of stringent orders wrung from Madrid by the persistence of the French ambassador. On the 29th of June he sailed, having sixteen Spanish ships-of-the-line in company. On the 7th of July, just as Keith reached Minorca from his profitless cruise off Toulon, the allies were passing the Straits ; and it hap- pened, somewhat singularly, that the old Earl of St. Vin- 1 Brenton's L:fe of St. Viacent, ml. ii. p. 24. 2 It was duriug tliis time that Perree's squadron Avas captured. See ante, p. 301. 3 ^Mutineers belonc;inir: to tlie " Inipetueux," one of the division, were tried bv court martial in Tort :Mahicion, upon which the latter acted. M. Thiers, indeed, finds Bruix's cruise inexplicable on any other supposition, but he does not assert the fact.'-^ The feelings of the Directory towards that general were not strictly benevolent, and the ships carried neither troops nor supplies of importance ; but the destruction of Nelson's scattered detachments, coupled as that might have Ijeen with the victualling of Malta, would liave been a most worthy object, and one of very probable fulfilment. It is noteworthy that Nelson received his hrst news of Bruix's approach on the 12th of May, at Palermo, and on the 14th the French admiral entered Toulon. Now the distance from Gibraltar to Toulon is only one hundred and fifty miles less than that from Gibraltar to Palermo. Nelson could not have collected his ships in time to present a united front; and even could he, his whole force did not exceed ten or twelve to the enemy's twenty-four. As it was, Bruix's adventure, though daring in conception and active 1 Brenton's Life of St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 25. 2 Histoire de la Revolution, vol. x. p. 392, note. 318 ADMIRAL BRUIX'S INCURSION in execution, resulted merely in bringing back to France sixteen Spanish ships-of-the-line to be hostages for the continuance of the Spanish alliance, tottering under the adverse events of 1799 ; and this possibly was the great purpose of the Directory. If so, the excursion was politi- cal rather than military ; and hence an opportunity, of a kind which, when rightly improved, has always been most pregnant of military consequences — concentration opposed to dispersion — remains to us merely an impressive lesson of wdiat might have been, but was not. " Your lordship," wrote Nelson four years later to St. Yincent, *' knows what Admiral Bruix might have done had he done his duty." ^ '' The cruise of Admiral Bruix," says Captain Chevalier,^ "was well conceived, but failed through the weakness of our allies and the inexperience of our own officers and crews. . . . The Spanish squadron brought to Brest, the gage of an alliance then very tottering, was the only result of this campaign. It is impossible to have any illusion as to the extent of the services rendered by the fleet on the coast of Italy. A division of frigates would have done as much." The conduct of the British admirals in the Mediterra- nean, caught at so serious a disadvantage through no fault of their own, deserves to be considei^ed. Dispersed in a fashion that was perfectly proper and efficient under the previous conditions, the arrival of Bruix imposed concen- tration, with a consequent enforced abandonment of some positions. St. Yincent's first step was to order Nelson to concentrate in the neighborhood of Sicily, while he himself drew Keith and Duckworth together at Minorca. This ef- fected, the British would present two squadrons; one of twenty ships-of-the-line in the west, centring about Mi- norca ; the other, four hundred miles distant, of fifteen or 1 Nels. Disp., July 4, 1803, vol. v. p. 116. 2 Mar. Fran, sous la Rep. p. 415. INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN. 310 sixteen ships,i gathered off the Tvest end of Sicily to dis- pute the passage to Malta and Alexandria. This smaller division thus seems to have been much exposed ; but, in- dependently of its greatly superior efficiency to the French, it must ]}e remembered that St. Vincent, as soon as he reached Minorca, knew that Nelson was in no immediate danger, for the French had given him the go-by and gone to Toulon. Cruising therefore off Cajie San Sebastian, to intercept the junction of the Spaniards to the Frencli, he was in constant touch of Minorca, barely one hundred miles distant, and, at the same time, was as near to Nelson as were the French in Toulon, whether they went east or west of Corsica. Being only one hundred and twenty miles from Toulon, and in such a position that a wind fair for the French to sail was also fair to bring his lookouts down to him, he could hope to overtake them, — if not in time to save Nelson, yet with the certainty of finding the French so badly handled that they could scarcely esca|ie him. He no doubt reasoned as did Nelson to the ministry just before Trafalgar ; " I ventured without any fear \_\o predict] that if Calder [with eighteen ships] got fairly alongside their twenty-seven or twenty-eight sail, by the time the enemy had beat our fleet soundly, thoy would do us no harm this year." ^ Save Malta, which could not have maintained the twenty thousand men in their fleet for a month and was otherwise barren of resources, the French would have had no port to fall back on and would have been lost to the republic.^ Had St. Vincent cruised off Cartagena, where the Spaniards were, he would have been 1 Ten or twelve British, fimr or five Portu2:uese ; tlie former exceptionally well-ordered ships. (Xels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 365.) 2 Nels. Disp., vol. vii. p. 16. ^ To this must be added that, from conditions of wind and weather, iNIalta was very far from Toulon, much farther than Teen disputed whether this was a sudden determination not before entertained, as asserted by his secretary Bourri- enne ; or whether it represents a purpose gradually and naturally formed. Napoleon himself in later years attrib- uted his decision to information obtained from Phelippeaux in the trenches before Acre ; when the combatants, separat- ed by but a few yards, often exchanged words.^ It is, how- ever, certain that the thought had long been familiar to ^ The larger number is the estimate in Napoleon's Commentaries, which ordinarily exaggerate the enem^^'s forces. (Vol. iii. p. 107.) 2 Corr. de Nop., vol. v. p. 710. ' Commentaircs de Napoleon, vol. iii. p. 89. BONAPARTE'S RETURN FROM EGYPT. 323 him; for, in a letter to the Birectoiy as early as October 7, 1798, he had announced his intention of returning to Eu- rope in certain very })robable contingencies.^ The same message was repeated a few months later." In truth his keen military sagacity, resembling the most delicate yet most highly cultivated intuitions, had divined the misfor- tunes awaiting France at the time he learned bv the Rau-u- san ship that Naples had declared war and that all '^ the powers were arming. During his own Italian campaign, even after the British had left the Mediterranean, his mind had been preoccupied with the danger from Xa})les ; and he foresaw in Egypt the disasters that must result from an ex-centric movement of the Fi'cnch army in that quarter, if follo\Ted by any reverses in upper Italy. Bourrienne tells a story which illustrates vividly the superstitious vein in his character, as w^ell as the foreboding of evil that he had carried w' ith him int(} Syria. While before Acre, news was received that a Nile 1)oat named the ''Italy," in the employ of the French army, had after a gallant defence been ljl(>wn up hy her crew to avoid capture by the Aral^s. The inci- dent and the name made a strong impression upon Bona- parte. " My friend," said he to Bourrienne, "Italy is lost to France. All is over ; my })rescntiments never deceive me ; " nor could any argument rid his mind of this convic- tion, dependent rather upon his instinctive perceptions than upon a slight and fortuitous coincidence* So, when he read Sidney Smith's gazettes, he cried again : '' My presen- timent did not deceive me ! Italy is lost ! " ^ Admiral Gantcaume was directed to prepare rapidly two of the frigates which had fallen to France in her share of the spoil of Venice ; and the persons intended to accompany the general were quietly notified. After the defeat of the Turks at Aboukir, Sidnev Smith had resumed the blockade 1 Corr. de Xap., vol. v. p. 56. ^ n^id., p. 403 (Feb. 10. 1799) 3 See ante, p. 291. * Mem. de Jiuurrieuue, vol. ii. p. 238. ^ Ibid., p. 305. S24 BONAPARTE'S RETURN FROM EGYPT. of Alexandria ; but on the 9th of August he withdrew to Cyprus, probably for water. Taking advantage of the op- portunity, Bonaparte sailed, and after a tedious passage landed at Frejus on the 9th of October. One month later the Directory was overthrown and the supreme power in France passed into Bonaparte's hands. Thus ended, so far at least as the great designer was con- cerned, Bonaparte's Oriental Expedition ; an undertaking which has been freely stigmatized as a dream, marked by the eccentricities of its author's genius, not by his usual keen intelligence. A dream it was, it is true ; but not for its Eastern impossibilities, nor for its wide flights of imagin- ation, the faculty which Bonaparte possessed in so eminent a degree, without which he never could have conceived his extraordinary policy, and to which he usually joined a width and depth of practical wisdom which balanced his imagination and made possible the realizing of his visions. That it was no dream to rouse and combine the nations of the East under the headship of one man, witness the ca- reers of the adventurers who there, from age to age, have risen to empire ; and who certainly were not superior in genius, nor as leaders of men, to the great Corsican. Wit- ness, too, the motley host which he gathered under one standard, from all the highly organized nations of conti- nental Europe, for that other great Eastern expedition in which he wrecked his fortunes. The Egyptian enterprise and all its brilliant hopes definitively failed at Acre, in the march against Turkey through Syria ; and it failed, — why ? Because a British seaman, by his command of the sea and his support to the garrison, maintained the posses- sion of a place, to advance beyond which, unsubdued, would entail ruin. Forty years later an army, not of the superb soldiers of the French revolution, but of native Egyptians, led by Ibrahim Pasha, whom none will equal to Napoleon, undertook the same march, captured Acre, and had pro- gressed victoriously into the heart of Asia Minor when the BONAPARTE'S RETURN FROM EGYPT. 32o British navy again interfered and called a halt. How came it that a naval captain, with two ships-of-the-line and a few small vessels, controlled aljsolutely tlie far east of the Medi- terranean ? Because in Aljoukir Bav, nine months before, Nelson had destroyed the French fleet. That magnificent battle not only signalized the genius for war of the British admiral, but proclaimed aloud the existence of a powrr destined ever, and in all parts, to clip the wings of the coming emperor. Tlie Eastern enterprise of Bonaparte failed, not because of miscalculations as to what was possi- ble in that far East, which Western people so ill can under- stand ; but because he, to the end of his career, was never able rightly to appreciate the conditions of naval warfare. His perfect military insiglit was not mistaken in athrming that the principles of war upon the sea must be the same as upon land ; it was by the failure to comprehend the cir- cumstances to which the principles must be applied — the failure to realize the possibilities and the limitations of the naval warfare of his day — - that the general and the emperor were alike led into fatal miscalculations. The Nile and Trafalgar, each the grave of a great conception, proclaimed the same cause and the same effect : underlvino; each was the inability of Napoleon to understand what ships could do and what they could not, according to the conditions of the sea and the capacity of the seamen. There was, however, one radical falhacv underlvino: Bonaparte's Egyptian, or rather Oriental, exj^edition, — for in his mind it far outlea]>ed the narrow limits of the Nile valley, — and that lay in tlie effect he ex])ected to produce upon Great Britain. It is all very well to stigmatize, after Lanfrey's fashion, as the vagaries of a distempered fancy, the vast projects of Eastern conrpiest and dominion, which unquestional)ly filled his mind with dreams of a sweep to his arms rivalling that of Alex- ander and of the Roman legions. An extraordinarv, perhaps even an extravagant, imagination was one of 326 BOXAPAUTE'S RETURN FROM EGYPT. the necessary conditions of Napoleon's Avonderful career. That it should from time to time lead him into great mis- takes, and ultimatel}^ to his rain, was perhaps inevi- table. Without it, or with it in a markedly less degree, he might have died in his palace an old man and left his throne to a son, if not to a dynasty ; but also without it he would not liavc produced upon his own age and upon all subsequent history the effects which he has left. To it were due the Oriental visions, to which, regarded as a mili- tary enterprise, the present writer is certainly not ready to apply the word '' fantastic." But, as a blow directed against Great Britain, there was in them a fatal defect of concep- tion, due more to a miscalculation of the intellect, a pre- judice of his day, than to a wild flight of fancy. In the relations of India to Great Britain, Bonaparte, in common with all Frenchmen of his age, mistook effect for cause. The possession of India and of other colonies was to them the cause of British prosperity ; just as at a later time, and now, the wide extent of British commerce has seemed to many the cause of Great Britain's wealth and eminence among the nations. That there is truth in this view is not to be denied ; but it is the kind of truth com- patible with putting the cart before the horse, mistaking the fruit for the tree, the flower for the plant. There was less excuse for a Ijlunder of this kind in a quick-witted nation like the French, for they had l)efore their eyes the fact that thev had lonsz; owned some of the richest colonies in the world ; and yet the British had, upon their own ground, amid all disadvantages of position, absorbed the commerce of the AVest Indies, French as well as Spanish. In local advantages, Great Britain in the West Indies had not the tenth of what France and Spain had ; yet she so drank the wealth of the region that one fourth of her envied commerce then depended upon it. So in India ; Great Britain sucked the wealth of India, because of the energy and commercial genius of her people. Had Bona- BONAPAFITKS RETURN FROM EGYPT. 327 parte\s visions been realized and India dominated, Great Britain would not have been overcome. A splendid bough would have Ijeen torn from a tree, and, in falling, would have carried to the ground the fruit depL-ndina' from it : but not only was the amount of the frait exaggerated, Ijut the recuperative power of the root, the aptitude of the great trunk to throw out new branches, was nut under- stood. Had Bonaparte converted the rule of India from England to France, he would have embarrassed, not de- stroyed, British traffic therein. Like the banvan tree, a new sucker would have Ijeen thrown out and reached the soil in some new spot, defying efforts at repression ; as British commerce later refused to die under the far more searching efforts of the Continental System. The strength of Great Britain could be said to lie in her commerce only as, and because, it was the external mani- festation of the wisdom and strength of the British people, unhampered b}' any control beyond that of a government and institutions in essential sympathy with them. In the en- joyment of these blessings, — in their indejiendence and un- trammelled pursuit of wealth, — they were secured by their powerful navy ; and so long as this breastplate was borne, unpierced, over the heart of the great organism, over the British islands themselves. Great Britain was — not invul- nerable — but invincible. She C(.)uld be liurt indeed, Ijut she could not be slain. Herein was Bonaparte's error. His attempt upon India was strategically a fine conception ; it was an attack u])on the flank of an enemy whose centre was then too strong for him ; but as a broad effort of mili- tary policy, — •of statesmanship directing arms, — it was simply delivering blows upon an extremity, leaving the heart untouched. The same error pervaded his whole career ; for, with all his genius, he still was, as Thiers has well said, the child of his century. So, in his later years, he was beguiled into tlic strife wherein he bruised Great Britain's heel, and she bruised his head. 328 THE FRENCH LOSE EGYPT AND MALTA. Yet his mistake, supreme genius that he was, is scarce to be wondered at ; for after all the story of his career, of his huge power, of his unrelenting hostility, of his indom- itable energy, unremittingly directed to the destruction of his chief enemy, — after all this and its failure, — we still find men harping on the weakness of Great Britain through her exposed commerce. Her dependence upon trade, and the apparent slackening of the colonial ties, foretell her fatal weakness in the hour of trial. So thought Napoleon ; so think we. Yet the commercial genius of her people is not abated ; and the most fruitful parts of that colonial system existed scarcely, if at all, in those old days, when her commerce was as great in proportion to her numbers as it is now. To paralyze this, it must be taken by the throat ; no snapping at the heels will do it. To command the sea approaches to the British islands will be to destroy the power of the State ; as a preliminary thereto the British navy must be neutralized by superior numbers, or by superior skill. Like the furtive intrusion and hasty retreat of Bruix's fleet, the stealthy manner of Bonaparte's return to Europe proclaimed the control of the Mediterranean by the British nav}^, and foretold the certain fall of his two great con- quests, Egypt and Malta. His own personal credit was too deeply staked upon their deliverance, both Ijy his original responsibility for the expedition and by the promises of succor made to the soldiers abandoned in Egypt, to admit a doubt of liis wish to save them, if it could be done. His correspondence is full of the subject, and numerous efforts were made ; as great, probably, as were permitted by the desperate struggle with external enemies and internal dis- order in which he found France plunged. All, however, proved fruitless. The detailed stories of the loss of Egypt and of Malta by France have much interest, both for the military and unprofessional reader ; but tliey are summed up in the one fact which prophesied their fall: France had lost THE FRENCH LOSE EGYPT AXD MALTA. 329 all power to dispute the control of the sea. From February, 1799, when a small frigate entered La Valetta, to January, 1800, not a vessel reached the port. In the latter month a dispatch-boat got in, bringing news of Bonaparte's ac- cession to power as First Consul ; which event, though two months old, was still unknown to the garrison. On the 6th of February Admiral Perr^e, who had served on the Nile and in Syria to Bonaparte's great satisfaction, sailed from Toulon with the " Genereux," seventy-four, one of the ships that had escaped from Aboukir Bay, tliree smaller vessels, and one large transport. A quantity of supplies and be- tween three and four thousand troops for the relief of Malta were embarked in the squadron. On the 18th they fell in with several British ships, under Nelson's immediate command ; and after the exchange of a few shots, one of which killed Perr^e, the " Gtin<^reux " and the transport struck to a force too superior to be resisted. The other ships returned to Toulon. All further attempts to introduce relief likewise failed. During the two years' blockade, from September, 1798, to September, 1800, only five vessels succeeded in entering the port.^ The " Guillaume Tell," which had lain in Valetta harbor since the battle of the Nile, attempted to escape on the night of the 31st of March, being charged with letters to Bonaparte saying that the place could not hold out longer than June. The ship was intercepted by the British, and surrendered after a brilliant fight, in which all her masts were shot away^ and over a fifth of her crew killed and wounded. One of the vessels sharing in this capture was Lord Nelson's flag-ship, the " Foudroyant," but the admiral himself was not on board. Swayed by a variety of feelings, to analyze which is unnecessary and not altogether pleasant to those who admire his fame, he had asked, after the return of Lord Keith, to be relieved and granted a ^ Chevalier, Mar. Fran, sous le Consulat, etc., p. 16. ^ Nels, Disp. vol iv. p. 219, note. 330 THE FRENCH LOSE EGYPT AND MALTA. repose to which his long and brilliant services assuredly entitled him. He thus failed to receive the surrender of the last of the ships which escaped from the Nile, and to accomplish the reduction of Malta, whose ultimate fate had been determined by his previous career of victory. The island held out until the 5th of September, 1800. Nelson on the 11th of July struck his flag in Leghorn, and in com- pany with the Hamiltons went home overland, by way of Trieste and Vienna, reaching England in November, The story of Egypt is longer and its surrender was later, — due also to force, not to starvation. An army powerful enough to hold in submission and reap the use of the fertile valley of the Nile, could never be reduced like the port of a rocky island, blocked by sea and surrounded by a people in successful insurrection. Nevertheless, the same cause that determined the loss of Malta operated effectually to make Egypt a w^orse than barren possession. Bonaparte, though wielding uncontrolled sway over all the resources of France, found as great difficulty in get- ting news from his conquest or substantial succor to it as he had had, when in Egypt, to obtain intelligence from home. Unwearying official effort and lavish inducements to private enterprise alike proved vain. In the first week of September, 1800, the return of the '' Osiris," a dispatch- boat that had successfully made the round voyage between France and Egypt, was rewarded by a gift of three thou- sand dollars to the captain and two months' pay to the crew. This extravagant recompense sufficiently testifies the dif- ficulty of the feat ; and over seven weeks later, on October 29, Bonaparte writes to Menou, " We have no direct news of you since the arrival of the ' Osiris.' " This letter was to be entrusted to Admiral Ganteaume ; but three months elapsed before that officer was enabled by a violent gale to evade the British blockade of Brest. Appeals were made to Spain, and government agents sent throughout the south of France, as well as to Corsica, to Genoa, to Leghorn, to the THE FREXCH LOSE EGYPT AND MALTA. 331 Adriatic, to Taranto, when Italy after Mareniro as^ain fell under Bonaparte's control. Numerous small vessels, both neutral and friendly, were from every quarter to start for Egypt, if by chance some of them might reach their desti- nation ; but no substantial result followed. For the most part they only swelled the list of captures, and attested the absolute control of the sea by Great Britain. Kleber, the illustrious general to wdiom Bonaparte left the burden he himself dropped, in a letter which fell into the hands of the British, addressed to the Directory the following words : ^ " I know all the importance of the possession of Egypt. I used to say in Europe that this country Avas for France the fulcrum, by means of which she might move at will the commercial system of every quarter of the globe ; but to do this effectually, a power- ful lever is required, and that lever is a Navy. Ours has ceased to exist. Since that period everything has changed ; and peace with the Porte is, in my opinion, the only ex- pedient that holds out to us a method of fairly getting rid of an enterprise no longer capable of attaining the object for which it was undertaken."^ In other words, the French force of admirable and veteran soldiers in Egypt was uselessly locked up there ; being unable either to escape or to receive re-enforcement, they were lost to their country. So thought Nelson, who frequently declared in his own vehement fashion that not one should with his consent return to Europe, and who gave to Sir Sidney Smith most positive orders on no account to allow a single Frenchman to leave Egypt under passports.'^ So thought Bonaparte, despite the censure which he and his undis- criminating supporters have seen fit to pass upon Kleber. Six weeks before he sailed for Europe"* he wrote to the 1 iS'aval Chrunicle, vol. iii. p. 149. - Xapoloon's Conimeiitaries give Sept. 26, 1799, as the date of this letter, — only a niunth after Eouaparte sailed. (Vol. iii. p. 183.) 3 Nels. Disp. vol. iii. p. 296. ^ Juuo 2>>, 1799. Curr. de Xap. vol. v. p. 622. 332 THE FRENCH LOSE EGYPT AND MALTA. Directory : " We need at least six thousand men to replace our losses since landing in Egypt. . . . With fifteen thousand re-enforcements we could go to Constantinople. We should need, then, two thousand cavalry, six thousand recruits for the regiments now here ; five hundred artille- rists ; five hundred mechanics (carpenters, masons, etc.) ; five demi-brigades of two thousand men each ; twenty thousand muskets, forty thousand bayonets, etc. etc. If you cannot send us all this assistance it will he necessary to make ^^t'rtct' ; for, between this and next June, we may expect to lose another six thousand men." ^ But how was tliis help to be sent when the sea was securely closed ? Bonaparte and Kleber held essentially the same view of the situation; but the one was interested, like a bankrupt, in concealing the state of affairs, the other was not. Kleber therefore gladly closed with a proposition, made by the Turks under the countenance of Sir Sidney Smith, who still remained in the Levant, by which the French were to be permitted to evacuate Egypt and to be carried to France ; Turkey furnishing such transports as were needed beyond those already in Alexandria. A convention to this effect was signed at El Arish on the 24th of January, 1800, by commissioners representing Kleber on the one hand and the commander-in-chief of the Turks on the other. The French army would thus be restored to France, under no obligations that would prevent its at once entering the field against the allies of Great Britain and Turkey. Sir Sidney Smith did not sign ; but it appeal's from his letter of March 8, 1800,^ to M. Poussielgue, one of Kleber's com- missioners, that he was perfectly cognizant of and approv- 1 At the same time he made requisitions for clothing for cLmlile the nuiiiher of men actually in E,c:}'pt, notifyinc; the officers concerned that he did so to deceive Europe as to the strength of the army. Corr. de Nap. vol. v. p. 721. This has a significant hearing on the charges, made liy him against Klrlicr, of exaggerating his weakness. - Annual Register, 1800; State Papers, p, 225. It may be added the comniissiouers first met on board Smith's ship. THE FRENCH LOSE EGYPT AND MALTA. 333 ing the terms of an agreement in direct contravention of the treaty of alliance between Turkey and Great Britain, and containing an article (the eleventh) engaging his gov- ernment to issue the passports and safe conducts for the return of the French ,i which depended absolutely ujion its control of the sea, and which his own orders from his superiors explicitly forbade. The British government had meantime instructed Lord Keith that the French should not be allowed to leave Egypt, except as prisoners of war. On the 8th of January, over a fortnight before the convention of El Arish was signed, the admiral w^-ote from Port Mahon to notify Smith of these directions, which were identical in spirit with those he already had from Nelson. With this letter he enclosed one to Kleber, " to be made use of if circumstances should so require." This letter, cast in the peremptory tone proJj- ably needed to repress Smith, informed Kleber curtly that he had " received positive orders not to consent to any capitulation of the French troops, unless they should lay down their arms, surrender themselves prisoners of war, and deliver up the ships and stores in Alexandria." Even in this event they were not to be permitted to return to France until exchanged. The admiral added that any ves- sel with French troops on board, having passports " from others than those authorized to grant them," would be forced by British cruisers to return to Alexandria.^ Smith, knowing that he had exceeded his authority, had nothing to do in face of this communication but to transmit the let- ters apologetically to Kleber, expressing the hope that the enG'au'cment allowed l^v him would idtimatelv be sustained. In this he was not deceived. The British ca])inet, learning that Kleber had executed an essential |)art of his own agreements, under the impression that Smith had authority 1 For tlie convention of El Arisli, see Annual Register, 1800, State Papers, p. 217. - Allarilyce's Life of Lord Keith, pp. 226, 227. 334 THE FRENCH LOSE EGYPT AND MALTA. to pledge his government, sent other instructions to Keith, authorizing the carrying out of the convention while ex- pressly denying Smith's right to accede to it. Owing to the length of time required in that age for these communi- cations to pass back and forth, such action had been taken by Kleber, before these new instructions were received, that the convention never became operative. The French occu- pation lingered on. Kleber, being assassinated on the 14th of June, 1800, was succeeded by Menou, an incapable man ; and in March, 1801, a British army under General Abercromby landed in Aboukir Bay. Abercromby was mortally wounded on the 21st, at the battle of Alexandria ; but his successor was equal to the task before him, and in September, 1801, shortl}^ before the preliminaries of peace with Great Britain were signed, the last of the French quitted Egypt. The terms under which the evacuation was made were much the same as those granted at El Arish ; but circum- stances had very greatly changed. The battle of Marengo, Juno 14, 1800, and the treaty of Lun(^ville, February 9, 1801, had restored peace to the Continent; the French troops would not now re-enforce an enemy to the allies of Great Britain. Not only so, but since the power of Austria had been broken. Great Britain herself was intending a peace, to which the policy of Bonaparte at that time pointed. It was therefore important to her that in the negotiations the possession of Egypt, however barren, should not be one of the cards in the adversary's hand. No terms were tlien too easy, provided they insured the immediate departure of the French army. CHAPTER XI. The Atlantic, 1790-1801. — The Buest Blockades. — The French Expeditions Against Ikeland. ^ I ^HE decision taken by the French executive in the lat- -*- ter part of 1795, — after the disastrous partial en- counters of Martin with Hotham in the Mediterranean and of Villaret Joyeuse with Brid^jort in the Bay of Biscay, — to discontinue sending large fleets to sea, and to rely upon commerce-destroying, by single cruisers or small squad- rons, to reduce the strength of Great Britain, remained unchanged during the following years, and was adopted by Bonaparte when the Consular g(jveriimcnt, in 1799, succeeded that of the Directory. This policy was in strict accord with the general feeling of the Frencli nation, as well naval officers as unprofessional men, by which the action of the navy was ever sul)ordinated to other military con- siderations, to " ulterior objects," as the phrase commonly ran, — a feeling that could not fail to find favor and expres- sion in the views of the great director of armies who ruled France during the first fourteen years of this century. It amounted, however, simply to abandoning all attempt to control the sea. Consequently, whenever any enterprise was undertaken which required this to be crossed, resort was neccssarilv had to evasion, more or less skilfullv con- trivcd ; and success depended, not upon the reasonable cer- tainty conferred by command of the water, l>y the skilful massing of forces, but upon a balance of chances, which miglit be more or less favorable in the particular instance, but could never be reo:arded as reaching the degree of se- 336 THE ATLANTIC FROM 1796 TO 1801. curity which is essential, even in the hazardous combina- tions of the game of war. This formal relegation of the navy to a wholly inferior place in the contest then raging, was followed, under the embarrassments of the treasury, by a neglect of the material of war, of the ships and their equipments, which left France still at Great Britain's mercy, even when in 1797 and 1798 her Continental ene- mies had been shaken off by the audacity and address of Bonaparte. Thrice only, therefore, during the six years in question, ending with the Peace of Amiens in 1802, did large French fleets put to sea ; and on each occasion their success was made to depend upon the absence of the British fleets, or upon baffling their vigilance. As in commerce-destroying, stealth and craft, not force, were the potent factors. Of the three efforts, two, Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition and Bruix's escape from Brest in 1799, have been already narrated under the head of the Mediterranean, to which they chiefly — the former wholl}^ — belong. The third was the expedition against Ireland, under the command of Hoche, to convoy which seventeen ships-of-the-line and twenty smaller vessels sailed from Bluest in the last days of 1796. The operations in the Atlantic during this period were accordingly, with few exceptions, reduced to the destruc- tion of commerce, to the harassment of the enemy's com- munications on the sea, and, on the part of the British, to an observation, more or less vigilant, of the proceedings in the enemy's naval ports, of which Brest was the most im- portant. From the maritime conditions of the two chief belligerents, the character of their undertakings differed. British commerce covered every sea and drew upon all quarters of the world ; consequently French cruisers could go in many directions upon the well known commercial routes, with good hope of taking prizes, if not themselves captured. British cruisers, on the other hand, could And THE ATLANriC FROM i:r>6 TO ISOl. ooT French merchant vessels onl}^ on thru- own coast, for the foreign traffic of France in shii)S of her own was destroyed ; but the coasting trade, carried on in vessels generally of from thirty to a hundred tons, was large, and in the mari- time provinces took in great measure the [)lace of Innd car- riage. The neutrals who maintained such foreign trade as was left to the enemies of TJreat Ijritain, and who were often lialjle to detention from some infraction, conscious or unconscious, of the rules of international law, were natur- ally to be found in greatest numbers in the neighborhood of the coasts to wdiich they were bound. Finally, the larger proportion of French privateers were small vessels, intend- ed to remain but a short time at sea and to cruise in the Channel or among its approaches, where British shipping- most abounded. For all these reasons the British provided for the safety of their distant commerce by concentrating it in large bodies called convoys, each under the protection of several ships of war ; while their scattered cruisers were distributed most thickly near home, — in the English Chan- nel, between the south coast of Ireland and Ushant, in the waters of the bay of Biscay, and along the coasts of Spain and Portugal. There they were constantly at hand to re- press commerce-destroying, to protect or recapture their own merchantmen, and to reduce the coasting trade of the enemy, as well as the afulity of his merchants to carry on, under a neutral flag, the operations no longer open to their own. The annals of the time are consequently filled, not with naval battles, but with notes of vessels taken and retaken ; of convoys, stealing along the coast of France, chased, harassed and driven ashore, l)y the omnipresent cruisers of the enemy. Nor was it commerce alone that was thus injured. The supplying of the naval ports, even with French products, chiefly depended upon the coasting vessels ; and embarrassment, amounting often to disability, was constantly entailed l.iy the unflagging industry of the hostile ships, whose action resembled that which is told of vi>L. I. — 22 338 THE ATLANTIC FROM 1706 TO 1801. the Spanish guerillas, upon the convoys and communications of the French armies in the Peninsular War.^ The watch over the enemy's ports, and particularly over the great and difficult port of Brest, was not, during the earlier and longer part of this period, maintained with the diligence nor with the force becoming a great military undertaking, by which means alone such an effort can be made effective in checking the combinations of an active 0|)ponent. Some palliation for this slack service may per- haps be found in tlic knowledge possessed by the admiralty of the condition of the French fleet and of the purposes of the French government, some also in the well-known opin- ions of that once active officer, Lord Howe ; but even these circumstances can hardly be considered more than a pallia- tion for a system essentially bad. The difficulties were cer- tainly great, the service unusually arduous, and it was doubtless true that the closest watch could not claim a per- fect immunity from evasion ; but from what human efforts can absolute certainty of results be predicted ? and above all, in war ? The essential feature of the military problem, by which Great Britain was confronted, was that the hos- 1 "At jthe theatre last night I had a cuuversatiou with General Kilmaiue [commanding the division intended to send into Ireland]. He told rae the arsenals at Brest are empty ; and what stores they have in other ports they cannot convey thither, from the superiority of the naval force of the enemy, which kept everything Mocked np." (Wolf Tone's Jonrnal, June 16, 1 798 ) In 1 801 " the port of Brest lacked provisions. Tlie difficulty of getting the convoys into it decided the First Consul to break np the fleet there and send part to Rochefort. The 8])amsh admiral (who had come therewith Bruix in 1799) was invited to escort the divisinii. To equip the necessary ships, this officer liad to give them erpiipments taken from the others of Ids squadron, and couhl obtain provisions only for seventeen days. Baffled by the wiuds and by tlie constant ]iresence of the enemy, the ships did not sail." A roiiibiufd expedition against the Cape of Good Hope failed for the same reason, "The Ijjockade of the Dutfh ports was no less rigorous than that of the coast of France " •' At Brest, tliey lived from day to dav. Vilharet Joy- euse was ordered to go <.ut with ten French and ten Sj.anish ships to support tlie entry of convoys. He did not go, and received another mission." (Trouile. Bataillcs Xavales, vol. iii p. 222.) THE ATLANTIC FROM 1706 TO ISOl. oo9 tile fleets were divided, by the necessities of their adminis- tration, among several ports. To use these scattered divis- ions successfully against her mighty sea power, it was needed to comljine two or more of them in one larti-e body. To prevent such a combination was therefore the momen- tous duty of the British fleet ; and in no manner could this be so thoroughly carried out as by a close and diligent watch before the hostile arsenals, — not in the vain hope that no squadron could ever, Ijy any means, slip out, l)ut with the reasonable probability that at no one period could so many escape as to form a combination threatening the Em- pire with a crushing disaster. Of these arsenals Brest, ])y its situation and development, was the most important, and contained usually the largest and most efficient of the masses into which the enemies' fleets were divided. The watch over it, therefore, was of supreme consequence ; and in the most serious naval crisis of the Napoleonic wars the Brest '' block- ading " fleet, as it was loosely but inaccurately styled, by the firmness of its grip broke up completely one of the greatest of Napoleon's combinations. To it, and to its admiral, Corn- wallis, was in large measure due that the vast schemes which should have culminated in the invasion of England, by one hundred and hfty thousand of the soldiers who fought at Austerlitz and Jena, terminated instead in the disaster of Trafalgar. Yet it may lie said that had there prevailed in 1805 the system with which the names of Howe and Bridport are identified, and which was countenanced by the Admiralty until the stern Earl St. Vincent took command, the chances are the French Brest fleet would have taken its place in the great strategic plan of the Em]ieror. This far-reaching combination, so tremendous in its risks and in its issues that men have doubted, and always will doubt, whether Napoleon seriously meant to carry it through, was but the supreme example of the dangers to which^Great Britain was exposed, and from which her fleets 340 THE ATLANTIC FROM 1796 TO 1801. had to shield her. It was aimed, with the true insight of genius, directly at her heart ; and except from occasional as- sertions of the emperor, whose words can never be implicitly believed, there is really little cause for doubt that he was prepared to take many chances of ruin in order to execute an enterprise which, both in conception and details, was so clearly stamped with the characteristics of his intellect and temperament. But the widely scattered dominions of Great Britain offered many points, besides the British isl- ands themselves, to the blows of an enemy ; and her navy had to protect not merely the heart but the extremities, each and all of which were threatened, in proportion to their value and their means of resistance, when a hostile squad- ron was loose upon the sea. How, then, should this ser- vice be performed ? By dividing the fleet among the points threatened, and establishing the line of defence close before the region to be defended ? Not so should the true maxim, that the British navy was the first line of defence, have been interpreted. As in all military campaigns, the front of operations of a powerful fleet should be pushed as far towards the enemy as is consistent with the mutual support of the various detachments, and with secure com- munication with their base. By so doing, not only are the great national interests placed more remote from the alarms of war, but the use of the region behind the front of operations, in this case the sea, is secured to the power that can afford to maintain its fighting line close to the enemy's positions. Not merely to check great combinations threatening great disasters, but to protect as far as possible minor but important interests, and for the security of commerce itself, the true station for the British fleets, superior in temper if not in numl^ers to the enemy, was before the hostile ports and as close to them as miorht be. There, thousrh their func- tion was defensive, as in the last analysis that of the British Empire also was, they were ever ready, did opportunity THE ATLANTIC FROM 1706 TO ISOl. oil offer, to assume the offensive. " Every o|i])ortunity will be given to the Toulon squadron to put to sea," wrote Nelson, " for it is on the sea that we hope to realize the expecta- tions of our country," — a hope which it was given him to fulfil at Trafalgar, where the greater designs of Napoleon were forever crushed. This hope of Nelson's was, however, based upon a close watch of his port, to establish which by constant cruising befure it he avowed his purpose ; ^ and the enforced abandonment of this plan, from the crazy condi- tion of several of his ships, was the first cause of the per- plexities which pursued him through the campaign. Did an enemy's division escape, as from Toulon and at other times, the general policy was not invalidated by such occa- sional failure. The hrst line of defence had been pierced at a single point ; there still remained the other lines, the fortified ports and the soldiers behind them, or, in a maritime region like the West Indies, a detachment of sliips more or less adequate to contest the ground until re-enforced. A wisely co-ordinated system of defence does not contem- plate that every point is to hold out indefinitely, but only for such time as may be necessary for it to receive the su})- port which the other parts of the whole arc intended to supply. That the navy is the first line of defence, both in order and in importance, by no means implies that there is or should be no other. This forced and extravagant inter- pretation, for which naval officers have been lai'gely respon- sible, of the true opinion that a navy is the best protection for a sea frontier, has very much to do with that faulty strategy which would tie the fleet, whatever its power, to the home ports, and disseminate it among them. Navies do not dispense with fortifications nor with armies ; but when wisely handled, they may save their country the strain which comes when these have to be called into play, — when war, once remote, now thunders at the gates, and 1 Nelson's Disp., vol. v pp 300,306, 411, 498. 342 THE BLOCKADE OF BREST. the sea, the mother of prosperity, is shut off. This kindly office did British seamen for Great Britain in the days of Napoleon, and mainly through those close blockades of which St. Vincent set the pattern before Toulon in the Mediterranean,^ and afterwards before Brest, when he took command of the Channel fleet. The port of Brest, regarded as the principal hostile arse- nal round which must centre the operations of a great part of the British navy, has to be considered under two sets of conditions : 1st, as to its position, relatively to the British bases of operations and to points of British territory open to attack ; 2d, as to its own immediate surroundings, how far they facilitated the action of the French navy, and what dispositions of the British fleet were necessary in order best to impede that action. The former question is stra- tegic in its character, the latter tactical. At the end of the peninsula which forms the north- western extremity of France, there is a deep recess in the land, between two capes which lie nearly in the same north and south line, and are called Pointe St. Mathieu and Pointe du Raz. The former is the more northerly, and the distance separating the two is seventeen miles. A promon- tory making out from the bottom of the recess divides it into two bays of unequal dimensions, of which the southern is known as the Bay of Douarnenez and the northern as tliat of Brest. The entrance to the former is five miles wide and unobstructed, so that only partial shelter is ob- tained ; it gives, however, a safe though rough anchorage, even in westerly gales. The Bay of Brest, of smaller sur- face, is entered by a passage throe miles long and only one wide, called tlie Goulet. With such an approach, and further favored by the configuration of the surrounding land, perfect security is found there, as well as facility for carrying on the woi'k of a fleet, when it would be im- possible at the more exposed anchorage of Douarnenez. 1 See ante, p. 212. •• •^^v. Vj y '^" n ! ^ o .- < X o o ■ .A I, THE BLOCKADE OF BREST. 343 From the Goulet to Pointe St. Matliieu the distance is seven niil«-'s ; and immediately outside tho former are two open roadsteads, Bertheaiime to the north and Camaret to the south, frequently occupied by French ships prior to a final start on an expedition, or when waiting for a wind. Had these features constituted tiic wliole of the hvdro- graphic surroundings of Brest Harbor, the task of a British adnnral would have been simpler. A singular combina- tion of dangers conspired to force him, even in favorable weather, to a station much further from the coast, and at the same time tended to facilitate the exit of the French. From both Pointe St. Mathieu and P, — well named the '^ Indefatiga- lL)ie,'' — and the " Rcvolutionnaire." At noon the enemy were again sighted, and not long after, Pellew's vigilance was rewarded by seeing them get under way. Richery's two ships, " Pcgase" and "Pevolution." came through the Goulet 352 THE IRISH EXPEDITION OF 1796. towards noon, and all the expedition began at once to lift their anchors between two and three P. M. of the short winter day. Dispatching the " Revolutionnaire " to the ad- rairal, Pellew himself remained to watch the course taken by the enemy. The imperative need of the French being to escape meeting the British, and to reach Ireland with force undi- minished either by capture or straggling, Morard de Galles' first object was to avoid Colpoys's fleet. This was known to be in tlie direction of Ushant, having been seen on more than one occasion from the island, and by Richery when en- tering Brest. If the departure were unperceived, the uncer- tainty of the enemy as to the destination might be counted on to favor the further movements of the expedition. The French admiral therefore determined to use the advantage, inestimable to a naval port, which Brest possesses in a double entrance. Between the Pointe du Raz and the Chaussee de Sein ^ there is a channel known as the Passage du Paz. It is narrow, being less than three miles wide in one part, and is sown with dangers, formidable above all in the night season, during which it must be passed if the enemy were to be kept in ignorance ; but with a fair wind and good pilots the thing could be done. Morard de Galles therefore gave the order to the fleet to head, upon getting under way, for the Passage du Paz, and informed the cap- tains that, after clearing it, he intended to steer west for one hundred miles. Having provided for keeping the fleet to- gether so far, each commanding officer was also given a sealed packet, directing him what to do in case of separa- tion. It may be said here that these packets, — which were not to be opened unless in case of parting company, — directed to make Cape Mizen Head on the south coast of Ireland, near the entrance of Bantry Bay, the anchorage whence the landing was to be made. There the separated vessels were to cruise five days, waiting for orders. 1 See map of Brest, p. 343, THE IRISH EXPEDITION OF 1796. ooo At three o'cluck the whole fleet was under sail, the sun was sinking fast, the weather gloomy and squally ; and the vessels, unable to form from the inexperience of their officers, were running disorderly for the dangerous pass, the entrance to which, being fifteen miles from the anchor- au'e thev were leaving, could not be reached before dark. The flag-officers, except Richery, had quitted their own ships-of-the-line and gone aboard frigates, the two com- manders, Hochc and M(jrard de Galles, being together on board the " Fraternite." As night fell, the wind hauled to the southward, threatening to become foul, under which conditions the passage of the Raz would be impossible. Moved by the danger, and considering that Colpoys was not within sight, the admiral by signal countermanded his order, and directed the fleet to put before the wind and run out by the Iroise channel. In the confusion and growing darkness this order was not understood. Morard's own ship and half a dozen more, one only of which was of the line, obeyed ; but all the others continued for the Passage du Raz. Thus, at the very moment of starting, the two principal officers were separated from their command. In vain did Morard send a corvette to enforce his order by voice or by signal, — she was not understood ; and the confusion was increased by Pellew, who, attaching himself to the leading shi})S, kept on with them through the Iroise, and by burning rockets and 1»lue lights, and firing guns, rendered utterly incoherent the attempts of the French admiral to convey by similar means his meaning to his fleet. 1 In the midst of the turmoil the " Seduisant," of seventv-four fruns, ran on a rock which lies across the en- trance to the passage , and was totally wrecked, her guns and signals of distress adding to the uproar. ^ At half-})ast 1 Tn perfiirinin2: this audacious service Fellow was sninewhat favored by the fact that liisship was a Frcuch pri/e, easily mistakeu for one of the expe- dition. He kept close, often within half irun-sliot of tlie h-ading ship. - The greater part uf the " Scduisaut's " crew was saverokeii without trial l.y the Directory on the loth of Fchruarv, 1797, ivml wit^ not restoreil to tlie uavy uutil 1801, under the C'ou- pulate. Cniitaiu Chevalier's judii-uieut is that "lie desjiaireil too soou of the sueeess of the ex]>e(litinii, and hn-j^nt that he sliould liave been in- spired onlv hy the 'J:vent interests entrusted by aeeident to his hands." (Mar- Fran, snus la Kep.. I'p. oO'.i. 311.) - Chevalier. James makes the number captured to be seven. 358 THE IRISH EXPEDITION OF 1796. 13th she fell in with two British frigates, one the " Inde- fatigable," Pellew's ship. The two closed with her, and just before nightfall the French vessel carried away her fore and main topmasts. The wind was blowing hard from the westward, and her captain, fearing momentarily to meet enemy's ships of greater force and numbers, decided to run steadily for his own coast. At half-past five the " Inde- fatigable," whose sail power was untouched, drew up, and the battle began. An hour later her consort, the "Amazon," came within range. Through the long night, with a few intermissions at the choice of the uncrippled British frig- ates, the strife went on, — the embarrassed condition of the '' Droits de 1' Homme " being increased by the fall of her niizzen mast at half-past ten. The sea was running so high that the crews of the frigates fought up to their middles in water, while the ship-of-the-line could not use her lower tier of guns ; and at the end the " Indefatigable," the sole survivor of the conflict, had four feet of water in her hold. At half-past four on the morning of the 14th, land, for which a lookout had been anxiously kept, was suddenly seen. The two British ships were then holding positions a little ahead, and on either bow, of the '' Droits de THomme." Each hauled to the wind on its own side of the enemy ; the " Indefatigable" to the south, the "Amazon " to the north. All three were embayed in Audierne Bay, an unsheltered beach thirty-five miles south of Brest, between Pointe du Raz and the Penmarck rocks. By strenuous efforts the " In- defatigable," after wearing twice, cleared the latter by three quarters of a mile. As she passed them in broad daylight, the " Droits de I'Homme " lay on her side at the bottom of the bay, the surf beating over her. The " Amazon," whose situation had allowed too little time for skill to play, was also aground two miles to the northward. Here, however, the resemblance ceased. The trained and disciplined British crew o-ot safe to land. The unfortunate French ship, crowded to repletion with men for the most part wholly THE IRISH EXPEDITION OF 1796. 359 unaccustomed to the sea, bad had the further misfortune to take the bottom on a bank at a great distance from the beach. Three days of awful exposure, ^Yithout food or water, followed. Not till the 17th did the subsidence of the gale allow relief from shore, and oidy on the ISth did the last survivor quit the wreck. Out of thirteen hundred men on board her when the battle began, two hundred and sixty were killed and wounded, and twu hundred and seven- teen lost their lives through the wreck. The singular circumstance that, despite the first separa- tion of the fleet on the night of sailing, the disconnected units w^ere yet for the most part brought together and together reached the coast of Ireland, and yet that from this happy meeting the most important vessel of all, carry- ing the two commanders-in-cliief, was excepted, ci-eates a legitimate curiosity as to the movements of the "Frater- nite " during these critical days. On the 17th, this ship had with her tw^o frigates and one ship-of-the-line, — the '' Nes- tor." On the 20th the other frigates had disappeared, the " Nestor " alone remaining ; but it was found, from subse- quent examination of the logs, that had the fog which then covered the ocean lifted, the " Fraternite " would have been in sight of the main body, which then, under Bouvet, was steerins: north to make Mizen Head. That nitrht the '' Nestor " parted company. On the 24th of Decemljcr the "Fraternite" was pursuing her course for Bantry Bay, where the main body had already arrived, when a ship re- semljling a ship-of-thc-Iine was seen. As the stranger did not rei>ly to the signals made, the '^ Fraternite '' took tiight to the westward, and, finding herself outsailed, threw over- board some of her guns. During the night the pursuer was thrown off, and the frigate again sliaped her course for Bantry Bay ; but the same easterly gale which drove Bouvet from the anchorage was now 1)1 owing in her teeth. On the 29th Plochc and Morard fell in with tlie first of the expedi- tion they had seen since the '^ Nestor'' left them, and a sad 860 THE IRISH EXPEDITION OF 1796, meeting it was. One, the " Scevola," was sinking ; the other, the " Revolution," which had been badly injured by a collision in Bantry Bay, was saving the " Scevola's " crew. In the dangerous condition of the " Revolution,'* now having twenty-two hundred souls on board, with pro* visions for but eight days, and having learned the disjoersal of the vessels in Bantry Bay, Hoche and Morard determined to return. The two ships reached Rochefort on the 13th of January. Whether Hoche, with his military ardor, the high prestige of his fame, and the intense personal interest felt by him in the success of the expedition, could have triumphed over the material obstacles which defeated the lukewarm energies of Bouvet, may be questioned ; but it was certainly an extraordinary circumstance that, of the whole large body of ships, the one containing the two com- manders was almost alone in her failure to reach the Irish coast. From the preceding account, it is evident that the suc- cess or failure of the French landing depended entirely upon their ability to make the thirty miles intervening be- tween the entrance and the head of Bantry Bay. What- ever may be thought of their j^rospects of ultimate success in the conquest or deliverance of Ireland, — a matter of pure speculation, dependent upon many conditions rather political and economical than military, — it cannot be questioned that they had succeeded in crossing the sea and reaching almost their point of destination, not only de- spite the British navy but without even seeing it. On December 21st the bulk of the expedition was at the mouth of Bantry Bay. Not till the 22d did Colpoys, commanding the fleet watching, or rather detailed to watch, off Brest, know they had actually sailed ; and then he did not know in what direction. Bridport at Portsmouth received the news on the same, or possibly on the previous day, tlirough Pcllew's diligence and forethou^-ht. Not till the 31st of December was it known in London that the enemy had THE IRISH EXPEDITION OF 1796. 361 actually appeared off the Irish coast, and at that time Brid- port's fleet had not even sailed. Only continued bad weather, and that ahead, prevented the landing which even Bouvet would not have hesitated to make under better con- ditions. Had no other harm resulted, the capture of Cork, only forty-five miles distant, was certain. " We propose to make a race for Cork as though the devil were in us," wrote Wolfe Tone in his journal ; and how severe the blow would have been may be imagined, for in that place were collected stores and supplies to the value of a million and a half sterling, including the provisions for feeding the navy dur- ing the next year. Ireland was then the great source from which naval provisions were drawn. Such a failure on the part of the British navy, with its largely superior forces, can scarcely be called less than ig- nominious, and invites now, as it did then, an examination into the causes. The outcry raised at the time by panic and disappointment has long ceased ; but the incident af- fords a fruitful field for study, as to how far the dis- position of the Channel fleet conformed to a reasonable interpretation of the principles of war, as applied to the sea. It must be obvious to any one stopping to think, that, for a fleet charged with thwarting the combinations of an enemy's navy, there can be no point so well adapted as one immediately before the port from which the greatest frac- tion must sail. Once away, to an unknown destination, the position to be taken becomes a matter of surmise, of guess, which may be dignified b}^ the name of sagacity if the guess prove right, but which should not be allowed to cover the original fault of disposition, if it could have been avoided. To multiply instances would be tedious ; but reference may be made to two detailed elsewhere in this work, viz : Brid- port, upon the escape of Bruix in 1799,^ and Nelson after the escape of Villcneuve in 1805,- though in the latter case 1 vSeennt-p, p 3UG. - See post, (?hap. XVI. 362 THE IRISH EXPEDITION OF 1796. the admirars reasons for not cruising before Toulon were not only adequate, but imperative. A similar perplexity existed in the closing months of 17 96. The government and the admiral of the Channel fleet knew that a large expedition was preparing in Brest, and they had reason to fear the co-operation with it of the Spaniards. Opinion was somewhat divided as to the ob- jective ; according to reports industriously circulated by the French government, it might be Portugal the ally, Gibral- tar the outpost, or Ireland the dependency, of Great Britain. One thing only was certain, that the surest and largest component of the undertaking was in Brest. There sol- diers were gathering, and there also arms were being shipped largely in excess of the troops,^ pointing to a hope of co- operation by inhabitants at the point of landing. Such conditions dictated certainly three things : 1, a force before Brest superior to that of the enemy inside ; 2, inasmuch as the heavier ships must keep the channel open, against the danger of violent westerly gales, there should be an ad- vance squadron of handier vessels close in with the port, powerful enough to hold its ground if the enemy came out and to keep touch with him if he sailed ; 3, since Ireland was by far the most important of the interests threatened, the government should have indicated it to the admiral as the point to be covered, in case he did lose knowledge of the hostile fleet. The first of these provisions sums up the main strategic requirement, to effect which all other stra- tegic dispositions should conduce. The second is tactical in character, relating to the disposition of the force upon the GTOund to which strateQ:ic considerations assisrn it. The third presents the alternative, the second line of defence, upon which, in case the first is forced, the defending fleet falls back. 1 Parlinmpntarv ?Ti'storv, vol. xxxiii. pp. ll."!, 116. Wolfe Tone states that there were mi liuanl tiicships of the expedition 41,1 GO muskets. (Journal. Dec, 22, 170G.) .-> /■» o THE IRISH EXPEDITION OF 1796. oOo Colpoys's fleet of fifteen sail was certainly not superior to the French. It might be considered adequate to frus- trate the expedition, if met, but not sufficient to inflict tlie crushing blow that the policy and needs of Great Britain imperatively demanded. Moreover, a military body is not an inanimate object, like a rock, which once placed abides unchanged for years. It is rather a living organism, depend- ing on daily nourishment, subject to constant waste, and need- ing constant renewal. If to station a competent force before Brest met the chief strategic requirement, its maintenance there embraced a number of subordinate strategic provisions, which in terms of land warfare are called communications. Ships meet with accidents ; they degenerate by wear and tear ; they consume water and provisions, their crews diminish by illness and need rest by occasional returns to port. These communications were not threatened by the French; but they were open to injury by insufficient forethought and by excessive distance, and from both they suftered. A division like Colpoys's may be renewed in two ways. Either it may be relieved by a body of similar number and go home ; or it may be continually receiving fresh ships and continually sending old ones to the rear for rest. It need scarcely be said that the latter is by far the better, preserving a con- tinuity of life and administration which the former breaks. Not only so; but tlie other system presupposes a squadron in port equal to that cruising, a reserve equal to the body in the field,— a fantastic proportion, which sacrifices every principle of warfare, and divides the avaihible force into two masses, wliich do not even pretend to support but merely to replace each other. A fleet charged with duty like that before Brest needs to be fixed at the highest number tiie resources of the nation can supply and supported by a reserve so proportioned that, by a constant coming and going, no ship at the front should ever be suffering from an exhaustion, either of condition or of supplies, against which diligent human forethought could 364 THE IRISH EXPEDITION OF 1796. have provided. The station of this reserve is obviously a matter of the utmost importance. It should, of course, be as near as possible to the main body, and, for sailing ships, favorably situated with reference to prevailing winds ; for a head wind meant not merely the loss of time caused hj itself, but often the loss of an opportunity which passes with the time. Thus, on this very occasion, when the wind blew fresh from the eastward, fair to go from Portsmouth to Ireland, Bridport's ships were unable to use it, because they could not make the stretch of three miles from Spit- head to St. Helen's. Nor is the nearness of a dockvard a controlling condition for the reseiwe, though it may be admitted that dockyards should be placed with refer- ence to probable theatres of war. On the contrary, a yard is the last place to which to send an active ship. Naval officers knew then, as they know now, that ves- sels at dockyards become valetudinarians, whose doctors, like some others, flatter the ailments of their patients to increase their practice. An available reserve is one thing, a ship needing dockyard repairs quite another ; and no countenance should be given to any confusion of the two by keeping the reserve at, or close by, a yard. Properly, the reserve should be simply that portion of the active force which, for the benefit of the whole, is for a moment resting, but is ready at once to proceed. How very little the government of the day and the then admiral of the Channel fleet realized these principles, is evident by a few facts. The reserve was at Spithead, a roadstead over two hundred miles distant. It was equal in force to the division before Brest. "The government thought it the wisest plan," said its authorized defender in tlie Commons, " to separate the lieet into different divis- ions. One fleet was off Brest to watch the enemy and in- tercept the sailing of the expedition ; and another at home to relieve the fleet off Brest, if necessary, or to pursue the THE IRISH EXPEDITION OF 1790. 365 enemy, if he should sail" ^ When the French had escaped, Colpoys received the news December 22d. His orders did not cover the contingency, and in his uncertainty he first decided to keep his station ,2 than which nothing could be more satisfactory to the French, who had made a long cir- cuit to avoid that particular spot. Like all men in the dark, however, tlie admiral soon changed liis mind and concluded to go off the Lizard, a cape near Falmouth, where he might receive information.-'^ Here, in the entrance to the Chan- nel, he found several ships in want of necessaries, and the weather such that he could not provide them from others.^ This statement was disputed by the Admiralty, which, however, admitted that some of these ships had not water in abundance.'^ With a properly worked reserve, a few ships might have been short, — those, that is, whose turn was to go in next, — but it is evident that a very dispropor- tionate number were here affected ; for the explanation of these short ships being still out was, that Curtis's squadron of seven ships was to have relieved them, but had been de- layed for certain causes.'-* Whatever the reason, the impo- tent conclusion was that Colpoys, a good ofticer under a bad system, put his helm up and ran into Spithead, where he arrived December 31 st, more than a week after the French reached Eantry Bay. While the subordinate was thus Ijadgered by the inade- quate measures of his government and his chief, the latter was leisurely preparing to relieve liim off Brest. On the 21st or 22d, he was spurred up by news of the French sail- ino:, and rei)lied that in four davs he would be readv, — a truly handy reserve with the British Islands about to be invaded. On the 25t]i lie got under way, and demonstrated at once the fitness of S})ithead as a station for the reserve. i Dundas's Speech, ]\Iar. 3, 1797, Pari. Hist. veil, xxxiii. p. 12. 2 Il)ia., vol. xxxiii. 13. 3 iIhJ.^ vol. xxxiii. pp. 109, 111. * S]M?eeh nf Lord Alliemarle, iliid., p. 109. 5 S]teech of Karl Spencer, Fi^^■t Lurd of Admiralty, ibid., p. 111. ""■• Duudas, Tarl. Hist. vul. xxxiii. p. 13. S66 THE IRISH EXPEDITION OF 1796. Eight ships only succeeded in getting to St. Helen's that day, a sudden change of wind to south-east supervening ; *•' which, although favorable for his getting to sea, was di- rectly on the bows of the ships coming to join him from Spithead." ^ It was not thought prudent to sail with only eight ships, and through the delay of waiting for the others Bridport did not get away from St. Helen's (Ports- mouth) until January 3, 1797, — the day before the last of the French abandoned Bantry Bay, — when he sailed with fourteen of-the-line, a mass equal to Colpoys's division which had just returned. An inadequate force at the de- cisive point, inadequately maintained, and dependent upon a reserve as large as itself, but unready and improperly stationed, — such were the glaring faults of the strategic disposition. The tactical mistakes are equally apparent. The main fleet was stationed so far at sea as to derive no shelter from easterly storms. It contained several three-decked ships,^ whose poor sailing qualities exaggerated to the last degree the drift consequent upon bad weather. As a re- sult, at the critical moment, Colpoys, instead of being, ac- cording to St. Vincent's maxim, " close in with Ushant in an easterly wind," was over forty miles west of it, " work- ing up against a fresh east-south-east wind," ^ and the next day was driven to the northward by southerly weather. Under such conditions any look-outs in the " Iroise " were almost a vain show. It is of the essence of such a look- out, however, that it should not be driven from its post by a detachment so small that the enemy does not weaken himself by making it. Of what consequence in this way were three or four frigates, which the French could and should have driven off by a half dozen, backed by two sail- of-the-line ? Properly to watch Brest required a strong de- ^ James's Nay. Hist., vol. ii. p, 21. ^ Of fifteen ships four were of ninety-eight guns or over. (Schomberg's Nav. Chronology, vol. iv. p. 525.) 2 James, vol. ii. p. 20. THE IRISH EXPEDITION OF 1796. 367 taclmicnt of line-of-battle-ships of the medium class, which were handy and weatherly, and whose grip coukl only be loosened by Hghting. The correlative, however, of such a big detachment is the main body close up, ready to support it. Tiic whole theory hangs together. The advanced de- tachment close up, else it cannot watch ; big enough, else it cannot stay ; the main body also close up, else the advance guard is hazarded. Under all these circumstances it is not strange that the careful British chronicler, James, has to record that "■ dur- ing the three or four weeks the French ships were travers- ing in every direction the Irish and English Channels, neither of the two British tleets (Bridport's nor Colpoys'sj, appointed to look after them, succeeded in capturing a sin- gle ship ; " and " the principal losses by capture sustained by the enemy arose from the diligence and activity of a sixty-four-gun ship and four or five frigates, which, on the 29th of December, w^cre lying in the harbor of Cork." ^ Yet, after satisfying himself that tJie French had gone back to Brest, Bridport returned to Spithead, and the old system w^as resumed. In Parliament the ministry strongly maintained that they had done all that could ])e expected ; and the First Lord went so far as to say that even an inquiry would be considered an unmerited censure.- It is no more than just to note, in this slack and shift- less conduct of the war, the same sluggish spirit that, after making all allowances for the undeniable grievances of the seamen, was also responsible for tlie demoralization of dis- cipline in the Channel fleet, which soon after showed itself openly, — among the crews in the mutinies of 1797, and among the officers, at a later day, in the flagrant insubor- dination with which St. Vincent's appointment was greeted. Both show a lax hand in the chief naval commander ; for, while a government is responsible for its choice of the 1 James's Nav. Hist., vol. ii. pp. 20, 22. 2 Earl Spencer's Speech, Pari. Hist., vol. xxxiii. p. 115. 3G8 EARL ST. VINCENTS BLOCKADE OF BREST. latter, it must, especially in so technical a profession as the navy then was, depend upon him for the enforcement of discipline and for the choice of measures, at once prac- ticable and adequate, to compass the ends of the war. Upon him, more than upon any other, must fall the re- sponsibility of failure ; for he knows, or should know, bet- ter than the government, what the fleet can be made to do, what the state of discipline really is, and what his own ca- pacity to carry out the one and support the other. Only through him can the government act. When it disregards or overrides, without displacing him, mischief ensues ; but the correlative of the generous confidence and hearty sup- port it owes to him is, on his part, unceasing intense effort, or resignation. It is a relief^ and instructive, to turn to the methods of Earl St. Vincent. Having returned from the Mediterranean in August, 1799, he was chosen to succeed Bridport upon the latter's resignation in the following April. It is told that, when his appointment became known, one of the naval captains, at the table of the former commander-in- chief, gave the toast, " May tlie discipline of the Mediter- ranean never be introduced into the Channel fleet." If, as is said, the admiral (presumably Lord Bridport) suffered this to pass unrebuked, no words could depict more forcibly than the simple incident the depths to which his own dig- nity and control had sunk. ^ It is, perhaps, needless to say that St. Yincent met this temper witli the same unbending firmness that he had shown in his former command. It is not, however, in his discipline, but in his manage- ment of the Brest blockade, and the Channel fleet for the support of that blockade, that we are here interested. The force before Brest was largely increased, consisting at this time of never less than twenty -four sail-of-the-line, and, un- 1 TiK-k(»r's Life of Enrl St. Vincent, vol. ii. pp. 10 and 70; the latter refer- ence hpinij; to ii lettf-r from St. Yincent to the First Lord of the Admiralty. The incident occurred on board Bridport's tini^^-sliip, the " Eoyal George.'' EARL ST. Viy CENT'S BLOCKADE OF BREST. 369 til ordered by the Admiralty to be reduced, was maintained by St. Vincent at thirty. ^ The rendezvous, or central station round which the main body was to revolve, and where, if possible, it was always to be found, was changed from eight leagues west of Ushant to "well in with Ushant in an easterly wind." How the commander-in-chief understood this or- der is shown by his instructions to his second in command, when the fleet was for a time turned over to him. " I rec- ommend you in the strongest manner never to be farther than six or eight leagues from Ushant with the wind east- erly ; and if westerly to make the Saintes (Chaussee do Sein) as often as the weather will permit ; and when the wind is such as to permit the French to slip out of Brest, to stand in on the first of the flood so far as to see the in- shore squadron." '^ In another letter to the same he says : " The principle on which the squadron acts, with the wind easterly, is to wear . . . during the night, so as to be within a couple of leagues of Ushant at daylight." ^ So constant was this practice during the summer and early autumn months, while he himself remained on board, that in one hundred and twenty-one days there was but one, and then owing to fog, in which the main body did not commu- nicate by signal with the in-shore squadron stationed between Ushant and Brest.'^ To sustain the ships in the greatest and most constant efficiency, in other words to maintain the communications, his care and watchfulness are incessant ; and, though not expressly so stated, it is evident from the general tenor of his correspondence that the ships went in to relit and rest not in large numbers, but singly, or in small groups. " I am at my Vits' end," he writes, " to compose orders to meet every shift, evasion, and neglect of duty. Seven-eighths of the captains who compose this fleet are practising every 1 Tucker's Life of Earl St. Vincent, tmI. ii. p. 58. 2 Pnd., vol. ii. p. 13. 3 Ibid., p. 114. * Ibid., p. 24. VOL. I. — 24 870 EARL ST. VINCENTS BLOCKADE OF BREST. subterfuge to get into harbor for the winter." ^ A constant pressure is kept upon all officers of the fleet, and especially upon those stationed to supervise at the anchorages for re- littal and taking in stores, that vessels should lose no time aud should come back as full as possible. The time for remaining " in Pl3'mouth Sound or Cawsand Bay never ought to exceed six days, unless a mast is to be shifted, and in that event not more than ten days."^ "A thousand thanks are due you," he writes to Rear-Admiral Whitshed, *' for the pains you have taken to dispatch the ships which were necessarily sent into Cawsand Bay. Without such powerful aid, all my endeavors to fulfil the wishes of the Cabinet would be vain." ^ It was for this purpose he gave the order, so bitterly resented, that no officer, from the captain down, should sleep out of his ship, or go more than three miles from the beach. Throughout he strove, according to his own practice and that of Suffren and Nelson,^ to make the ships self-depend- ent, and to keep them out of the dockyards and on the station to the last moment. " Under the present impend- ing storm from the North of Europe," wrote he in January, 1801, " and the necessity there is of equipping every ship in the royal ports that can swim, no ship under my command must have anything done to her at Plymouth or Portsmouth that can be done at this anchorage."^ The question of wind and distance weighed heavily with him. Torbay and Cawsand Bay, an ancliorage in Plymouth Sound, were made the ordinary resorts of ships going in to refit ; and 1 Tucker's vSt. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 114. 2 Ibid, p. 80. 3 ihiti.^ p. 78. 4 8co Nelson's letter to Earl St. Vincent, Feb. 1, 1800. (Nelson's Dis- patches.) ^ Tucker, vol. ii. p.l21. Morlern sliips, so much more complex, are much more liable to derangement than thone of St. Vincent ; and, unless such pains as his are taken to make them self-sufticing, their officers and the dockyards ■u'ill make a heavier jects, aware only that the first line of defence is forced, but ignorant where the second will be assailed, is entitled to know precisely what the government considers the most important among the interests threatened. This decision is one for the states- man rather than the seaman. Not only, in 1796, was Ire- land distinctly the most vulnerable point, but the ministers had information, almost to certainty, that there was the enemv's aim. In 1800, as when Bruix escaped in 1799, circumstances 1 See post. Chap. XIII. 2 Tucker's St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 105. ^ Parliamentary History, vol. xxxiii. pp. 111-116. EAIiL ^T. ViyCLXrs BLOCKADE OF BREST. 375 were somewhat different. The disafleetion, or at least the disloyalty, of the Irish had been shown t(j be a broken reed for the enemy to lean on ; while in the Mediterranean the Freneh had acquired, in Ei/ypt and Malta, interests pecu- liarly dear to the First Consul. Those valuable possessions were in deadly straits, and the attempt to rtdieve them was more probable than another attack on Ireland. 8t. Vin- cent, therefore, wrote to the then head of the xVdmiralty, saying with perfect propriety that it became him, '' in the situation I stand at this critical period, to suggest to your lordship any ideas for the good of the public service," and suggesting that Sir James 8auniarez, commanding the in- shore squadron, should have specific orders that, '' if the combined fleets get out before I can return to the rendez- vous, he should in that case push for Cadiz with the eight ships-of-the-line stationed l^etween me and the Goulet ; for I," he added, '' shall have sufficient force to protect England and Ireland, without counting upon his eight sail." Such instructions completed the scheme ; precise, but not detailed, they provided for the second line, in case tlie careful pre- cautions for guarding the first were foiled. The dispositions adopted by St. Vincent remained the standard to which subseiiuent arrangements for watching Brest were conformed. From Commander-in-Chief of the Channel fleet ho became, in Fcl)ruary, isOl, First Lord of the Admiralty. In this position he naturally maintained his own ideas ; and, as has before been said, found in Corn- wallis a man admiral^ly adapted to carry them out. In May, 1804, the ministry with which he was connected re- signed ; but, although as an administrator he provoked grave criticism in many quarters, and in'obably lost reputa- tion, his distinguished military capacity remained unques- tioned, and the methods of the Brest blockade were too sound in principle and too firmly established to be largely modified. During the strenuous montlis from 1803 to 1805, when Croat Britain and France stood alone, face to face, 376 EARL ST. VINCENT'S BLOCKADE OF BREST. ill a state more of watchful tension than of activity, the Channel fleet kept its grip firm on the great French arsenal. Nelson's justly lauded pursuit of Villeneuve would have been in vain, but for the less known tenacity of Cornwallis ; which, by preventing the escape of Ganteaume, was one of the most potent factors in thwarting Napoleon's combina- tions. Wherever else the great naval battle which has immortalized the name of Trafalgar miglit have been fought, the campaign would have taken a different form but for the watch over Brest conducted on St. Vincent's lines. The result of this strict blockade and of the constant harrying of the French coasts from Dunkirk on the North Sea to the Spanish border, was to paralyze Brest as a port of naval equipment and construction, as well as to render very doubtful the success of any combination in which the Brest fleet was a factor. This result has been, historically, somewhat obscured ; for abortive attempts to get out oVj- tained no notoriety, while an occasional success, being blazoned far and wide, made an impression disproportioned to its real importance. When Ganteaume, for instance, in January, 1801, ran out with seven ships-of-the-line, — the blockading fleet having lost its grip m a furious north-east gale, — more was thought of the escape than of the fact that, to make it, advantage had to be taken of weather such that six of the seven were so damaged they could not carry out their mission. Instead of going to Egypt, they went to Toulon. The journals of the day make passing mention of occasional sorties of divisions, which quickly returned to tlie anchorage ; and Troude, in a few condensed sentences, under the years 1800 and 1801,^ vividly shows the closeness of the watch and the penury of the port. Remote from the sources of naval supplies in the Baltic and the Mediterra- nean, with tlic sea approaches to both swarmino; with en- emy's cruisers, and in a day when water carriapre, always 1 Batailk.s Xiivalos, vul. iii. pp. 187-190, 222, 223. EARL ST. VINCENTS BLOCKADE OF BREST. 377 easier and ampler than that by land, was alone adequate to the transport in sufficient quantity of the bulky arti- cles required for ship building and equipment, it became impossible to fill the storehouses of Brest. Partly for this reason, yet more Ijecause his keen military perceptions — at fault only when confr(.)nted with the tech- nical difficulties of the sea — discerned the dano-er to Great Britain from a hostile navy in the Scheldt, Napoleon de- cided to neglect Brest, and to concentrate upon Antwerp mainly his energies in creating a navy. In later years this prepossession may have partaken somewhat of the partial- ity of a parent for a child ; and he himself has said that there was a moment, during his receding fortunes in 1814, when he could have accepted the terms of the allies had he been able to bring himself to give up Antwerp. In close proximity to the forests of Alsace, Lorraine, and Burgundy ; able to draw from tlie countries bordering on the Rhine and its tributaries flax and hemp, and from the mines of Luxemburg, Namur and Liege iron, copper and coal, — the naval resources of Antwerp could be brought to her on the numerous streams intersecting those countries, and were wholly out of reach of tlie British. Many were the difficul- ties to ])G overcome, — docks to be excavated, ships to be built, seamen gathered and trained, a whole navy to be created from nothing; Itut the truth remained that the strategic position of Antwerp, over against the mouth of the Tliames and flanking the communications of Great Britain with the Baltic, was unequalled by any other single port under the emperor's control. The expedition against Ireland, thwarted by the elements in 1796, was never seriously renewed. It remained, to the end of his short life, the dream of Hoche. Transferred from the army of the Ocean to that of the Sambre and Jileuse, his career there was cut short by the preliminaries of Leoben. bv which Bonaparte extricated himself from the dano-ers of his advance into Carinthia. Sacrificed thus, as 378 EARL Sr. VINCENTS BLOCKADE OF BREST. he felt, to the schemes of a rival, Hoche supported with all the weight of his interest an expedition of fifteen thou- sand men, who, under the pressure of the Directory, were gathered in the Texel in the summer of 1797 for an inva- sion of Ireland under convo}^ of the Dutch nu.yy. Here again Wolfe Tone for two months fretted his heart out, waiting for the fleet to sail ; but, though the period seemed most propitious, through the mutinies in the British fleet and the cessation of hostilities on the continent, a peculiar combination of wind and tide were wanting to cross the bar, and that combination did not come. In October the Dutch ships-of-war, numbering sixteen small ships-of-tlie-line, put to seabv themselves, and on the 11th met the fleet of Admiral Duncan, of equal numbers but distinctly superior in broad- side force. The British, having the wind, bore down and attacked — passing when possible through the enemy's line, so as to cut off his retreat to the Dutch coast, then less than ten miles distant. The battle, known by the name of Camperdown, from a village on the adjoining shore, was fought with all the desperation that in every age has marked the meetings of the British and the Dutch. It closed with the defeat of the latter, who left nine ships -of- the-line and some frigates in their enemy's hands. This put an end to the Texel expedition. Hoche had died a few weeks be- fore, on the 18th of September; and with him passed away the strongest personal interest in the invasion of Ireland, as well as the man most able to conduct it. The following year, 1798, open rebellion existed in Ire- land, and the Directory undertook to support it with troops and arms ; but the equipment of Bonaparte's Egyptian ex- pedition aljsorbed the energies of the Ministry of Marine, and there was no Hoche to give the enterprise the develop- ment and concert essential to a great success. A small division of four frigates sailed from Rochefort on the 6th of August, carrying twelve hundred troops under General Humbert, who had served in the expedition of 1796 and EARL ST. VINCENTS BLOCKADE OF BREST. 379 shared the shipwreck of the Droits dc rHomme. This sr|uadron escaped oljscrvation, Umded its detachment on the 21st of the month, and returned safely to France ; but the small corps, unsupported Ijy regular troops, again de- monstrated the imprudence of trusting to the co-operation of insurgents. On the 8th of September Humbert was oblit-'cd to surrender with the bulk of his force. o A week later, before the news reached France, a ship-of- the-line, appropriately called the '' Iloche," and eight frigates, under the command of Commodore Bompart, sailed from Brest, carrying a second division of three thousand troops. Though they escaped the eyes of Bridport's vessels, if there were any in the neighborhood, by running through the Pas- sage du Raz, they were seen on September 17, the day after sailing, by three British frigates ; one. of which, after ascer- taining that the French were really going to sea, went to England with the news, while the others continued to dog the enemy, sending word to Ireland of the approaching danger as opportunity offered. On the 4th of October, in a gale of wind, the enemies separated, and the French com- modore then made the best of his way towards his destina- tion, in Lough Swilly, at the north end of Ireland ; but the news had reached Plymouth on the 23d of September, and when he drew near his port he found the way blocked by three British ships-of-the-line and five frigates, which had sailed at once for the insuro-ent district. An eno-an-ement followed, fought on the 12tli of October, under circumstances even more disadvantageous than that of mere numbers, for the " Hoche " shortly before the action had lost some of her most important spars. Of the little squadron, she and three frigates were compelled to surrender that day, and three more were intercepted later by British vessels, so that only two of the expedition regained a French port. The enthusiastic and unfortunate Irishman, Wolfe Tone, was on board the "' Hoche '' aud wounded in the action. He shortly afterwards committed suicide in prison. A 380 EARL ST. VINCENT'S BLOCKADE OF BREST. third French division had sailed from Rocheforfc on the very day the " Hoche " was captured. It succeeded in reaching Ireland ; but learning the fate of Bompart's squad- ron, returned without landing the troops. This was the last of the expeditions against Ireland that sailed from French ports. Other interests and other rulers combined with the pronounced naval ascendency of Great Britain to give a different direction to the efforts of the republic. END OF VOL. 1.