..,■_■;,, ^A, "*^;i^i 1 . f.-f. :'?7PT'g."j.i ■T'-'^ f^Vl'^s. (^mmll WinxvmU^ ptmg A.(.a-S..7.... 3336 Cornell University Library U102 .W56 A course of instruction in (''■s eleinenls olln 3 1924 030 719 425 « Cornell University B Library The original of tliis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030719425 A COURSE OF INSTRUCTION IN THE ELEMEiSTTS OP THE ART AND SCIENCE OF ¥AR. FOR THE USE OF THE CADETS OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY. BY J. B. WHEELER PBOFESSOB OF HILITABT EHGIHEEBINO IN TBB ITHITED STATES MILITABT ACADEKT. AND BBEVST COLONEL UNITED STATES ARMT. NEW YORK: D. VAN NOSTEAND, PUBLISHER, 23 MURKAY STREET & 27 WARREN STREET. 1879. COTTBIOIIT BT D. VAH NogTBASD, 1S7& " Misfortune loill certainly fall tifon the land where the ntiealth of tlie tax-gatherer, or tlie greedy gambler in stocks, stands in public estimation above the uniform of the brave man who sacrifices his life, health, or fortune tc the defence of his country "—\]OM\Tn^ PREFACE. HiSTOEY is the basis upon which the principles of the ji " science of war " are founded, A correct knowledge of history is only acquired by syste- matic and methodical study ; the study of that part relating to the operations of war should be preceded by a general knowledge of the theory of war. The design of this book is to give instruction, in the ele- ments of the-" art and science of war" to the Cadets of the United States Military Academy, so that they, having ac- quired a general knowledge of the theory of war, may be able to prosecute systematically and methodically their future/ studies of military history. The plan of the book required brevity and condensation. The constant endeavor has been to state principles and rules intelligently and concisely as possible. It may be objected that the different subjects discussed are too cursorily treated. The opposite course would have required volumes. The portions of the text relating to the grand operations of war, are believed to be in conformity with the views held VI PREFACE. by the great masters of the art, and are drawn from the writ- ings and expressed opinions of Napoleon, Archduke Charles, Frederick the Great, etc. For a general and particular dis- cussion of these operations, the student is referred to the works of Jomini, of H;imley, etc. The parts relating to minor operations are drawn from many professional works upon these subjects and the Army Kegulations of 1863. , The reader is referred to a book called " The Lessons of War, etc.," compiled and arranged by Lieut.-Colonel F. J. Soady of the English Eoyal Artillery, for a good summary of military literature, up to the date of its publication. J. B. W. U. iS. Military Academy, West Point, N. T. TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. DEFINITION OF THE ART OP WAR. iLRTICLE. PAGB a Definition of War 5 5. War, a Science and an Art 7 8. Divisions of the Art of War 8 CHAPTER II. STRATEGY. 11. Definition of Strategy 11 17. Bases of Operations 13 36. Selection of a Base , IS 28. Secondary Bases 19 30. Lines of Operations 20 39. Lines of Retreat 23 40. Lines of Communications 33 41. Strategical lines 38 43, Safety of lines of Communication 23 44. Objective Points 34 47. Strategical Fronts 35 48. Strategical Points 26 CHAPTER III. PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. 53. Definition of term " Campaign," 39 60. Selection of an Objective , SI 64. Selection of a Theatre of Operations 33 66. Selection of a Base of Operational 34 VIU TABLE OF CONTENTS, ARTICLE. PAGE 67. Selection of Lines of Operations 34 Example illustrative of selection of Theatre and Line of Oper- ations 38 CHAPTEK IV. COMPOSITION OF AN ARMT. 73. Definition of term " Army," 45 74. Organization of an Army 45 75. Four Arms of Service 46 76. A Company, its Composition 46 79. A Battalion, its Composition . 48 80. A Regiment, its Composition 48 83. Brigades and Divisions, how organized and how commanded . 50 84. Army Corps 50 87. General Staff of an Army 51 89. Proportion of the four arms in a Modern Army 53 90. How an army is to be kept in a fighting condition, and how it is to be supplied 54 95. How Recruited 56 96. Military Forces of the United States 57 97. Regular Army of the United States 57 100. Militia-of the United States 58 103. United States Volunteers 58 104. Composition of the armed forces of the United States 60 106. Congress raises, supports, governs, and regulates armies of the United States 61 Formation of Tuoops. 107. Definition of the term " Formation " 61 108. Formation used by Infantry 63 109. Formation used by Cavalry 63 in. The Artillery unit. 64 113. The formation used by Engineer Troops 64 CHAPTER V. MAKCHES. 113. Definition of the term " March " '. 65 114. Different kinds of Marches 65 115. Route Marches in general 66 TABLE OF OONTENTS. IX auticlk. page 116. Ordinary Route Marches 67 117. Forced Route Marches 67 118. Route Marches by Rail 67 119. Example of Route Marches 68 130. Example of forced Route Marches 69 121. Forced Marches by Rail 69 133. Strategical Marches I 70 138. Example of Strategical Marches 73 139. Tactical Marches,. 72 131. Other kinds of Marches 73 132. Marches of Concentration.^ 74 133. Manoeuver-Marches : 74 134. Flank Marches 75 Execution of Marches. 185. Arrangements of a march belong to Logistics. 75 136. Celerity and safety to be considered 76 Knowledge of the Roads is necessary to the Officer who ar- ranges the Details of Marches 78 141. The pace adopted by the Head of the Column 79 143. Rules prescribed for marching in General Craufurd's light di- vision in the Peninsular War of 1809 80 143. Order of march for troops making a Forward Movement 86 145. Examples of Order of March of a Division of Infantry 87 151. Order of March when near the Enemy 91 155. Caution to be observed in marching through Woods 93 158. When marching through a Defile 94 160. The passage of a Bridge by a Column making a Forward Movement 97 162. March through Defiles when occupied by an Enemy. , 98 163. The passage of a River by a Column making a Forward Move- ment 99 165. Order of March in a Flank Movement. . , 100 172. Order of March of several Columns t 105 173. Order of March in Retreat 107 178. Remarks upon the direction of Marches 113 183. " " Diversions 114 184. " ' Combined Marches 116 185. " " Retreats '..117 188. " " Parallel Retreats 119 189. " " Pursuits 130 X ^ TABLE OF COXTENTS. CHAPTER VI. BATTLES. ABTICLE. PASS 192. Definition of Battles and Combats 134 194. Dispositions for Battle 136 195. Line of Battle 127 196. Order of Battles 138 197. Parallel Order of Battle. ...'... l39 198. Oblique Order of Battle 129 201. Concave Order of Battle 133 303. Convex Order of Battle 133 204. Other Orders of Battle 133 305. Object of an Order of Battle. 133 306. Employment of the different Arms in Battle 134 208. Remarks on the Lines of Battle 136 209. Manner of fighting a Battle 137 210. Demonstrations 143 211. Example of fighting a Battle 143 212. Remarks upon this Example 147 214. The order sent by General Scott to his Division Commanders before the Battle of Cerro Gordo in 1847 150 215. Extract of Order sent by Napoleon to Murat in 1805 153 CHAPTER VII. POSITIONS. 217. Definition of the term " Position " 155 318. Classes of Positions 156 319. Components parts of a Military Position 157 220. Heights and Slopes 157 231. Woods 160 333. Rivers, Marshes, etc 161 223. Villages 161 234. Requisites of a Good Position 163 336. Its Extent 163 236. Its Communications 164 226. Its Command 165 236. The Shelter it promises 165 336. The Obstructions it offers 165 236. Where the Flanks of a Position should be 165 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XI t. AItTICL:B. PA6K 226. Its Lines of Retreat 166 226. Its Healthfnlnesa 166 227. The Form of a Position 168 229. Influence of the Ground 169 230. Situation of a Position with respect to its Line of Retreat. . . . 171 231. A position in Woods 172 232. Distribution of the Arms of Service , 174 234. Art of selecting Positions , 177 237. The practice of Philopoemen , 179 CHAPTER VIII. ATTACK OF POSITIONS. 238. An Army making a Forward Movement 181 240. Enemy in Position 182 242. Keconnoissance of the Enemy's Position 184 243. Selection of Point of Attack 185 246. Influence of Strategical and Tactical Considerations 189 250. Attack upon the Centre of a Position i- 193 251. Attack upon the Flank of a Position 194 252. Diversions, their Advisability, and when 196 253. Attack upon a Height 198 254. General Remarks as to an attack upon a Position 199 CHAPTER IX, DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS. 256. Definition of the term " Defensive Operations " 202 257. Object of Defensive Operations 203 258. Advantages and Disadvantages of these 203 259. Plan of Defence 204 263. Lines.of Defence 206 263. Lines of Torres Vedras 207 264. Defence of Mountains 208 268. Defence of Rivers 213 269. Disposition of tie troops to defend a River 215 274. Passage of a River, when defended , 219 275. Passage of the Hydaspes by Alexander 221 S76. Passage of the Po by Bonaparte in 1796 223 Xll TABLE OF COSTEHTTS. CHAPTER X. ADVANCED GUARDS AND OUTPOSTS. AHTICLE. PAGE 879. Advanced Guards, object of 226 280. Order of March of an Advanced Guard of a column of two Companies Infantry 228 284. Order of March of Advanced Guard of a regiment of Infantry. 330 28C. Patrols 233 287. Defensive Patrols 333 288. Offensive Patrols 233 289. Flanking and Connecting Patrols 335 290. Outposts 236 291. Nomenclature used for Outposts 236 293. Arrangement of the Outposts 387 294. Visiting and Reconnoitering Patrols 244 298. Principles involved in arranging a system of Outposts 248 300. Number of troops employed in Outpost Service ~ 250 CHAPTER XI. DETACHMENTS, CONVOYS, ETC. 304. Definition of the term " Detachment " 252 305. Different kinds of Detachments 353 306. Precautions to be adopted v?hen serving on Detachment Duty. 254 308. Convoys 256 309. Mixed Detachments are used as Escorts for Convoys 256 311. Important points to be considered by the Commander of a. Convoy before starting 357 313. Order of March of the Wagons 259 315. Example of a Convoy of Artillery 360 317. Order of March of a Convoy 263 319. Duties of an Escort to a Convoy 364 320. Parks. 265 321. Method of Attacking a Convoy 266 333. Defence of a Convoy 368 333. Convoys of Prisoners 269 335. Example of a successful Attack upon a Convoy of Prisoners. . 37C TABLE OF CONTENTS. xiii CHAPTER XII. - AMBUSCADES AND SURPRISES. ABTICLE. PAGB 327. Definition of Surprise 371 329. Surprises , 37.= 330. How Surprises are effected 273 333. Surprise of a Military Post 275 383. Surprise of a Convoy 376 384. Ambuscades .- 277 335. Precautions observed in Ambuscades 377 336. Positions offering Opportunities for Ambuscades 278 337. Attack made by a party when in Ambuscade 279 338. Security of those in Ambuscade 280 CHAPTER XIII. RECONNOISSANCES. 340. Definition of the term " Reconnoissance " ; 281 341. Topographical Reconnoissances 281 343. Example of how a Topographical Reconnoissance should be made 383 346. Descriptive Memoir to accompany the Topographical Sketch. 287 349. Itineraries, and how Made " 389 350. Armed Reconnoissances, their Object 293 351. Different kinds of Armed Reconnoissances 293 353. Secret Reconnoissances ' 293 359. Open Reconnoissances , 296 362. Other Classifications used for Reconnoissances 397 364. Requirements of a Reconnoitering Officer 398 CHAPTER XIV. FORAGING, PARTISANS, ETC. 365. Definition of the term, " Foraging " 801 366. How it should be executed 301 369. Foraging parties protected by Escorts 303 370. Partisans 305 371. Partisan Detachments, their Composition 306 XIV TABLE OF CONTEXTS. CHAPTER XV. CAMPS, BIVOUACS, CANTONMENTS, ETC. ARTICLE. PAGK 37a. Definition of tlie terms, " Camps, Bivouacs, etc " 308 373. Camps 309 375. Castrametation 310 .S78. Bivouacs 313 379. How Bivouacs are Formed 313 380. Winter Quarters 314 381. Cantonments 314 383. Advanced Posts 315 385. Example of the Cantonment of Troops 316 CHAPTER XVI. MODERN WARFARE. 386. War is not an exact Science 317 387. Great Principles of War not to be violated 318 388. Principles of the Science of War Invariable 318 389. Chance a small Factor 319 390. Principles the Foundation of Success 319 391. Application of Modern Methods 320 393. Modifications fit subjects of Study 330 393. Railroads and Military Roads 320 394. Gen. Sherman on the use of Railroads 331 395. Movements made Practicable by Railroads 333 396. Facilities by Signalling and Telegraph. 333 397. Arms of Precision 823 398. Changes in modes of Warfare by use of Modern Arms 333 399. Proportion of Arms of Service 324 400. Effect upon the Soldier produced by Modern Warfare 325 AET im SCIENCE OF WAR. CHAPTER I. DEFINITION OF THE ART OF WAR. 1. Differences often arise between nations and states and grow into disputes which can not be settled by peaceful measures. Military force may then be employed and the resulting contest is known as '•' war." 2. Wax has therefore been defined to be "a contest be- tween nations, states, or parts of states, carried on by force." Wars are classified in various ways. They are classified from the nature of the military operations employed in their prosecution ; into offensive or defensive wars : from the end to be attained ; into wars of conquest, wars of independence, etc. : from the causes producing the war ; into wars of in- surrection, religious wars, etc. : from the general locality iu which they are waged ; into American, African, European, etc. Other classifications than these are also used, being based on the nature and object of the war. The subdivisions and classifications employed are gener- ally of so marked a character that the reader will easly per- ceive the reasons governing their use by the writer. 6 AET AND SCIEXCE OF WAR. 3. The classification into defensive and offensive wars is the only one that will be used in this treatise, since its object is to discuss only the general principles and rules applicable to all wars after they have begun, without regard to the causes which produced them or the end for which they may bo waged. Any military movement, having for its object an attack upon the enemy, is termed an offensive operation. Any military movement, having for its object the await- ing of an attack by the enemy, is termed a defensive opera- tion. A war in which the military operations are offensive is therefore termed an offensive war; if the operations are defensive, it is a defensive war. Hence, a war carried on in an enemy's country is gener- ally an offensive war; and a war carried on in one's own country to resist the attacks of a foreign enemy or to repel an invasion, is a defensive one. A war may, however, in a military sense be essentially offensive, while at the same time in a political sense it is defensive. That is, a nation or state may, in order to defend its rights, take the "ojSensive," while its opponent, who incited the war and who is the real offender, may from policy or interest confine itself to strictly defensive operations. 4. "Whether the war be an offensive or a defensive one, the art of properly employing and of rightly directing the movements of armies, so as to bring the war to a successful termination, becomes one of the greatest importance. It is this art, and the principles on which it is founded, that are now to be considered. DEFIKITION OF THE AUT OF WAR. 7 5. War is both a science and an art. All investigations which have for their object the determination of the great principles which should govern a general in conducting his military operations ; all analyses which are made to show the limportant and essential features which characterize a cam- paign or a battle, and comparisons made with other cam- paigns and battles ; all deductions and formations of rules which are to be used in military operations ; all these belong to the " Science of War." The practical application of these great principles and rules belongs to the "Art of War." 6. In the science of war as well as in the other physical sciences, the facts must precede theory ; and although the number of known facts is steadily increasing, the number of general principles upon which the theories of the science are based, is constant, if not decreasing. These general principles are deduced by a close and critical examination of such methods of waging war as have been adopted by those great generals who are known as emi- nent in their profession. 7. It is evident then that an intimate connection exists between military history and the science of war. Napoleon said, " Aleicander made eight campaigns ; Han- nibal, seventeen, one in Spain, fifteen in Italy, and one in Africa; Caesar, thirteen, of which eight were against the Gauls and five against the legions of Pompey ; Gustavus Adolphus, three ; Turenne, eighteen ; Prtace.-Eiig4ne of Savoy, thirteen ; Frederick, eleven, in Bohemia, Silesia, and on the banks of the Elbe, The history of these eighty- four campaigns, written with care, would be a complete i! AUT ASD SCIENCE OF WAR. treatise on the art of war. From this source, the principles which ought to be followed, in offensive as well as defensive warfare, could at once be obtained." To these campaigns, are to be added the battles and cam- paigns of Xapoleon. Jomini, an eminent writer on military art, says, '•' Correct theories, founded upon right principles, sustained by actual events of wars, and added to accurate military history, will form a true school of instruction for generals. If these means do not produce great men, they will at least produce generals of sufficient skill to take rank nest after the natural masters of the art of war." The sources of all treatises on the " Art and Science of War " are to be found in the military histories narrating the events and results of the battles and campaigns just enu- merated. General Divisions of the Art of War. 8. The Art of- War is divided into several distinct parts or branches. Jomini gives the following, 1. Statesmanship in relation to war, 2. Strategy. 3. Grand Tactics. 4. Logistics. 5. Engineering. 6. Minor Tactics. As the object of this treatise is to allude only to the prin- ciples and rules common to all wars, the first subdivision may be omitted for the present, and the following classifica- tion may be used, viz : DEFINITION OF THE ART OF WAB. 9 1. Strategy. 2. Tactics. 3. Engineering. 4. Logistics. 9. These branches of the Science of War may bo defined as follows : Strategy. — The science of directing masses of troops with promptitude, precision and clearness, upon those points the possession of which is of great importance in military operations. Tactics, — The art of executing the designs of strategy. Engineering. — The art of disposing troops, and making arrangements of obstacles, by means of which an inferior force may successfully resist the attacks of a superior force ; and also the art of overcoming and removing all obstacles placed in the way by an opposing force. liOgistics. — The art of moving and supplying armies. 10. The best tactical combinations may produce no de- cisive results, if the movements of the army previous to a battle were not strategical ; a fault in tactics may be the cause of the loss of a battle, of a strategical position, or of a strategical line. Battles have been lost and even entire campaigns have failed, in consequence of neglect in the branch of engineer- ing, or through some fault committed by the engineer. And even when there has been success jn these three branches, an army may be powerless to seize an advantage with- in its grasp, or to follow the enemy after securing a victo- rious result, from the want of transportation or from a failure in supplies. 1* 10 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. These four branches of the Science and Art of War are therefore intimately connected, and a knowledge of them is essential to the staff-officer, as well as to the general officer who directs the moTcments of the army. Jomini says that "familiarity with all these branches is not essential in order -to be a good infantry, cavalry, or ar- tillery officer ; but for a general or staff officer, this knowl- edge is indispensable." CHAPTER 11. STEATEGY. 11. Definitions. — Strategy has been defined to be tho Bcience of directing, with promptitude, precision and clear- ness, masses of troops to gain possession of points of impor- tance in military operations. The object of strategy is to so direct these masses that upon reaching any designated point, the army shall have a better position than that held by the enemy, or shall have such a position as will force him to change his position, or shall be supei'ior to him in numbers, or shall have some de- cided advantage over the enemy, in case of a conflict. 12. If two armies, when brought face to face, have kept their lines of communication protected and are both. ready, to poncentrate for action, it is evident no strategical object has been attained by either of them. If, however, one of the armies has been so directed that it has gained a position which forces its opponent to retire or to fight at a disadvantage, it is evident that one of the objects of strategy has been attained. 13. A movement of an army is therefore said to bo "strategical," when by its means there are concentrated at a given point troops superior in numbers to those of the enemy ; or, at this point, there is gained a position by which the enemy's communications with his base are cut or threat- 12 ART AXD SCIENCE OF WAR. ened while those of the army are secure ; or, a position is gained by which the forces of the enemy are separated or are prevented from acting in concert, 14. Strategical operations are directed to attain one or more of these objects ; and the line followed by an army in an operation of this kind, is called a " strategical line." The area of country or territory in any part of which the hostile forces can come into collision, is termed the "thea- tre of war." There may be employed in a given theatre of war several armies or only one. If there are several armies, but each acting independently of the others, or if there is only one, the particular portion of the territory in which each acts is termed the "theatre of operations" for that army. 15. A theatre of operations of an army may be defined to be all the territory it may desire to invade, and all that it may have to defend. Where several armies are employed, acting in concert, the theatre of operations of each army depends upon the movements of the other armies, and the theatres of operations of each army in this case are usually designated as "zones of operations;" although this term is also applied to those three divisions of a theatre of operations lying directly in advance of the centre and flanks of a front of operations. Whatever is true for a theatre of operations of an army acting alone is equally true for the theatres of operations of several armies acting separately, and is also applicable to the whole theatre of war, 16. To make our statements definite, suppose a single army acting in an independent theatre of operations. STEATEGT,, 13 A general with such an army under his command propos- ing an advance towards the enemy will have three things to consider. These are as follows, 1. The place from which the army is to start. 2. The point to which the army is to go. 3. The roads or routes hy which the army is to move in order to reach this point. The first, or place of starting, is termed " the base of operaticns." The second, the point to be reached, is called the "ol- jective point," or simply "the objective." The third, the roads or routes used by the army in reaching the objective point, is termed the " line of opera- tions." The portion of the theatre of operations in front of the successive positions occupied by the army as it advances, is known as the "front of operations." Bases of Operations. 17. A base of operations is the section or portion of coun- tiy, adjoining the theatre of operations, in which the sup- plies and reinforcements for an army may be collected, from which an army moves to take the offensive, and upon which it falls back if obliged to retreat. As it is diflBcult and per- haps dangerous to collect all the supplies necessary for an army at one point, it is usual to select several points so situ- ated as to provide in the best manner for a proper* distribu- tion of the depots of supplies. These points should be safe from any sudden attack of the enemy ; they should therefore 14 ART AND SCIEKCE OF WAE. occupy strong positions, well fortified, and should be con- nected by good communications. A wide river, not fordable, with both sides fortified, is generally regarded as the best kind of base. A base of this description forms a strong line of defence in case the army has to defend itself, is secure from any sudden attack from the enemy, has good communications with the different points, and can be easily kept supplied. 18. The base of operations for an army invading an enemy'scountry is in general that part of the frontier sepa- rating the army from the theatre of war. The base of operations for an army defending its own country is generally the capital and the country surround- ing it. Where one of the contestgjits has control of all the navi- gable waters separating the two countries, a portion of the enemy's own country in which there is a good harbor, which may be held and kept supplied, is frequently used as a base of operations for the invading army. This was the case in the war with Mexico in ISi?, when General Scott captured Vera Cruz and made yse of it and the surrounding country as a base of operations in his inva- sion of Mexico. 19. The selection of the locality of the base will depend greatly upon the plan of campaign. Assuming that the locality is fixed, a good base must fulfil the conditions already mentioned, viz : the depots of supplies, magazines, etc., must be so located as to be secure from any sudden attack of the enemy; these depots must be so situated that they can be kept supplied and connected by good communications ; and STRATEGY. 15 the base must form a good line of defence to be used by the army if required. 20. The advantages of a base depend greatly on its extent and form. A base of considerable extent possesses advantages greater than those of a base more contracted. The longer it is, the greater will be the number of roads leading from it towards the enemy's positions, thus giving a choice of line of opera- tions ; and a choice of lines of retreat if obliged to fall back. A contracted base, as that of a single harbor, restricts the army to a single line of operations, and this line becomes more precarious as its length increases. The enemy getting pos- session of it will succeed in cutting off all supplies and rein- forcements, and will embarrass, if not entirely cripple, the in- vading army. Hence, an army beginning with a contracted base should extend its base as soon as possible, by occupying, as it ad- vances, other strong points, and strengthening them by fortifi- cations. The depots of supplies should be distributed in the best manner, extending them behind the flanks of the army as widely as may be consistent with their safety. 31. The base may have a straight direction ; it may be broken, or have an angular shape ; or it may have a curved direction. 22. Straight bases. If the base is straight it may be par- allel to the enemy's base, or it may be inclined thereto. If the base is straight and parallel to that of the enemy, and of the same extent, neither contestant has an advantage over the other. If one is of greater extent, that army with the greater base will have a choice between a greater number 16 AET AND SCIENCE OF WAK. of lines of operations, and will have greater freedom of move- ment. If the base is oblique to the enetny's front, and is of suflBcient extent, it may be possible to turn some of the posi- tions occupied by the enemy and force him to retire, abandon- ing the ground in his advance. This may be seen by an examination of Figure (1). Fig.l If an army, as M, has for its base the line CD, parallel to the enemy's front E, and of extent equal to that of his base, AB, any movement made to get on the flank or rear of E would result in exposing M's own line of communications with its base, CD, and no particular advantage would be gained. If the base was oblique as shown by the line CP, then an army, as M, could place itself with safety in a posi- ' tion, as N, threatening the left flank of the army, E, and its communications with its base, AB. STRATEGY. 17 . 23. Angular base. If the base is angular, the angle may be towards the enemy or away from him, If it is salient, an enemy who advances, as at EE, (Pig. 2), beyond the salient Fig.2 A, would have his" communications threatened from A, and would also be liable to a flank attack. A base of this form is weak at the salient. The smaller the angle at A, or the farther this front is advanced beyond B and 0, the weaker will the base be. The salient must therefore be strengthened, and made perfectly safe. A base of this form is, however, more favorable for an army acting on the defensive than for one acting offensively. For an army acting within the angle, BAG, can move from one part of the line to another, to reinforce any part of the line, more quickly than one on the exterior can. 24. If the base instead of being salient is drawn back be- hind B and 0, that is forms a re-entrant, it will be more favor- able for an army acting offensively than for an army acting defensively. For an army proceeding from a base, of this form, can threaten or seize the communications of its opponent Ivithout exposing its own. A favorable example of this kind of base is seen in Fig. (3). 18 AKT AXD SCIESCE OV WAK. Let ABDF represent the field of operations ; and suppose the side AF to be closed by insurmountable obstacles, and the sides AB and BO to be under the control of the army M, which has advanced from the side AB. It is seen that the army M can occupy safely a new position as N, threatening the enemy's Flg.3 flank and rear, and in case of defeat has a safe line of retreat toC. Bases of this form are generally termed "double bases," and have the advantage of giving two lines of retreat widely apart, either of which may be used. 25. Curved bases. Bases may be curved in form, either convex or concave towards the enemy. Curved bases arc simply modified forms of angular bases, and possess the advantages of the latter in proportion to the degree of con- vexity and concavity they may have. 36. Selection of base. The direction or the general form of the base, exercises therefore a considerable influence STRATEGY. 19 npon military operations, and this must be duly considered in making a plan of campaign. The choice of form of base will, as it is seen, be influ- enced by the kind, offensive or defensive, of the war to be undertaken. So, also, with the extent of base. Some proportion must exist between the length of base and the length of the line of operations. In the case of a straight line as a base, military writers have assumed that these lines will be correctly proportioned to each other when the straight lines, drawn from the ob- jective point to the extremities of the base, form with the base itself an equilateral triangle. The advantages of an extended base have been mentioned. In case of a retreat, the base is to form a line of defence ; as a long line of defence is necessarily weak, there must be a limit to the exten t of the base. 27. The bases thus far considered have been those estab- lished in the beginning of a campaign and from which the first advances are made. These bases are known as "pri- mary bases." 28. Secondary bases. An army carries with it ammu- nition only sufiBcipnt for one battle, and but a few days' supply of food. Other supplies of ammunition and provisions must be brought from the base ; and as an army advances, the diiBBculty of keeping it supplied increases. Unless some addi- tional provision be made for its supply, the army can not advance and is then said to be " tied to its base." As the necessary supplies can not be obtained in the theatre of operations in sufficient quantities for the daily 20 AKT AND SCIEKCE OF WAK. needs of an army, depots and magazines must be organized near the army from which these supplies can be procured. The same precautions which were recommended, for establishing a primary base, should be observed in establish- ing these second points, which together form what is known as a "secondary base." Napoleon said, " It is necessary for an army marching to the conquest of a country to have, at every five or six days' march, a fortification or an intrenched position upon the line of operations, in order to collect there supplies of provisions and ammunition, to organize its trains, and to make it a centre of operations," etc. 29. Although prudent to establish successive bases of operations fulfilling all the conditions given for primary bases, it does not follow that an army should stop in the middle of a successful advance for such a purpose. It would be sufiBcient to leave detachments of troops to hold important points, to strengthen these points by fortifications, and to keep open and guard the communications in rear. Under the protection of these detachments depots of supplies could be established, although they might not have the relative position or requirements demanded of such points on a primary base. Iiiues of Operations. 30. The roads or routes by which an army moves from its base towards its objective point have been designated by the term " line of operations." Lines of operations are classified from their number ; into single, double, or multiple lines : from their positions with respect to the lines of operations of the enemy ; into interior or exterior lines : and from their position with respect to STRATEGY. 21 each other ; into convergent or divergent lines : other classi- fications are sometimes used descriptive of the nature or other quality of the line. 31. Single line of operations. An army moving in a given direction with all its parts united, or with those parts so situated that they can be readily joined when required, is said to use a "single line of operations." Sometimes this liue is called a simple line. A single line of operations does not mean a single road, but embraces all the roads or routes taken by the fractions of the army for the purpose of reaching a common point of concentration; the condition being imposed, that these roads shall not be so far apart, or have intervening such obstacles, that the different parts of an army will be pre- vented from uniting at any given time which may be appointed. 33. Double and multiple lines of operations. When there are obstacles intervening between the roads or routes passed over by an army, or the roads are so far apart as to prevent the parts of the army from being readily united, the army is then said to employ "double" or "multiple" lines of operations. 33. Interior lines of operations. If these lines are within those employed by the enemy, they are known as " interior " lines. 34. Exterior lines of operations. If these lines are out- side of the lines employed by the enemy, they are called " exterior " lines. 35. Convergent lines of operations. If these lines of operations start from points some distance apart, approach 22 ART AXD SCIENCE OF WAR. each other, aad meet at some point in advance, they are called "convergent." Sometimes the term "concentric" is em- ployed to designate them. 36. Divergent lines of operations. These lines are the reverse of convergent lines, as they continue to separate, or the distance between them to widen, as the army advances. The term " eccentric" is also applied to them. 37. Accidental lines of operations. Lines of operations are sometimes employed, different from those proposed in the original plan of campaign. To these lines the term " acci- dental " is applied. It does not follow that their adoption is a matter of accident, as might be inferred from their name. They are frequently the result of a change in the original plan, which probable change was foreseen and provided for. 38. Temporary lines of operations. Sometimes an army in making a movement employs a line which deviates from that adopted in the general plan of campaign. As soon as the movement is completed the original lines are resumed. Such line adopted for such movement is termed a " tempo- rary line." The term "maneuver line'" is also applied to it. 39. Lines of retreat. The roads passed over, as the army advances, are ordinarily the roads taken when the army retires or is driven back. In the latter case they are known as " lines of retreat " and are " single," " double," " diverging," etc., according to their number and position. 40. Ijines of communication. The term '.' lines of communication" is applied to all the practicable routes and roads connecting the different parts of an army occupying the theatre of war. Therefore, as the army moves from its base, the lines of operations become lines of communication, and STEATEQT. 33 since these " lines of operations " are generally the longest and most important lines of communication, it is to them that the simple term "communications" generally refers. All the routes used by the trains employed in provision- ing an army, form a part of the communications. The most important, safest and most conyenient of these routes, all other things being equal, will be the central one, or the one leading from the centre of the army back to the base. This particular route is sometimes designated as the "line of sup- plies." 41. Strategical lines. The lines followed by an army iu making a strategical movement are called " strategical lines." Temporary lines of operations, or maneuver lines, there- fore, are strategical lines. Lines of operations are important stragetical lines. And in general, lines connecting two or more strategical points, which lines can be used by an army, and which allow of easy communication between these points, are "strategical lines." A base of operations is therefore a strategical line. 42. Safety of a line of communication. So vast is the amount of ammunition consumed in a battle by the mod- ern fire-arms, that it is almost impossible, as has been before stated, for an army to carry with it more than enough for a single battle. If, after a general engagement, it is found that the enemy has possession of the army's communications with its base, it may be simply an impossibility to continue the contest, or it may be necessary to abandon to the enemy a large portion of country which it was desirous to retain. Thus Napoleon, after the second day's battle at Leipsic, had so reduced his 24 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. BQpply of ammunition as to be obliged to withdraw to his de- pots at Erfurt, losing his line of communication with Torgau. The roads forming the communications of an army are more or less filled with trains carrying forward supplies of every description, and trains returning filled with sick and wounded. Detachments of men and numbers of stragglers are scattered along the route, many of them going to the rear. All these fall into the hands of the enemy upon his getting possession of the roads. In addition to the loss of supplies, means of transporta- tion, etc., caused by the seizure of the army's communica- tions, and which are severely felt, there is another consequence to be considered. This is the effect produced by closing the natural line of retreat of the army. Hence, the reasons for insisting upon the great importance of protecting the lines of communications of an army. 43. A long line of communication is more diflScult to protect than a short one. Napoleon's Kussian campaign illustrates the danger attendant upon a long line of com- munication. As he advanced on Moscow, two corps of the Russian army moved, one from Finland, the other from the south, to strike his line of communications. Their junction was to be made where this line crossed the Beresina, a branch of the Dnieper. The execution of this plan nearly resulted in the capture of Napoleon, and certainly caused the great disasters of that famous retreat. Objective Points. 44. The point to be reached or gained by an army in ex- ecuting a movement, has been termed the "objective point.'- There are two classes of objectives, viz : natural and acci- STRATEGY. 25 dental. The term geographical is frequently used to desig- nate the first of these. 45. A natural objective may be an important position, strong naturally, or made so by fortifications, the possession of which gives control over a tract of country, and furnishes good points of support or good lines of defence for other mili- tary operations. Or, it may be a great business centre, or a capital of the country, the possession of which has the efEect of discouraging the enemy and making him willing to sue for peace. 46. Accidental oljectives are dependent upon the mili- tary operations which have for their object the destruction or disintegration of the enemy's forces. These objectives are sometimes called " objective points of maneuver." The position of the enemy determines their location. Thus, if the enemy's forces are greatly scattered, or his front much extended, the central point of his position would be a good objective point, since the possession of^t would divide the enemy's forces, and allow his detachments to be attacked separately. Or, if the enemy ha^his forces well supported, a good objective would be on that flank, the possession of which would allow his communications with his base to be threatened. It is well to remark that the term " point " used in this connection is not to be considered merely in its geometrical sense, but is used to apply to the object which the army desires to attain, whether it be a position, a place, a line, or even a section of country. 47. Strategical fronts. The portion of the theatre of war in front of any position occupied by an army as it 36 AET AND SCIENCE OF WAK. advances, is termed the "front of operations." That part which is directly in front of the army, or which can be reached in two or three days, forms simply a " front." When the whole extent lying between the two hostile armies is con- sidered, the term " strategical front " is applied. 48. Strategical Points. Every point of the theatre of war, the possession of which is of great importance to an army in its military operations, is a "strategical point.'' These are points which an army acting on the offensive strives to gain and the army on the defensive strives to retain. The importance of a strategical point depends sometimes upon its natural or geographical position, and at others upon its positioii with reference to the enemy's forces. 49. There are, therefore, as in objectives, two classes, viz. : Natural or Oeographical, and Accidental. These are sometimes designated as permanent and tem- porary strategical points. 50. Those strategical points whose possession insures suc- cess for a military operation are known as " decisive strate- gical points," or simply "decisive points." The capital of a country is a natural or geographical strategical point, and is frequently a decisive one. Any point which is strong naturally, or made so by arti- ficial means, and which commands the roads or routes inter- secting the theatre of war, or whose possession gives control of a tract of country, is a " natural strategical point." A point whose possession will give an advantage over the enemy, causing him to fight at a disadvantage, or retreat,* is an " accidental strategical point," since it is frequently de- STEATEGT. ?7 pendent upon the positions of the contending forces at a particular time. It is generally a "decisive" point, for its possession insures success for the military operation with which it was connected. 51. Natural strategical points are few in a country which is open and comparatively level. Fortified places and large cities are the most common in this case. The possession of a large city, which contains large supplies and is the centre of trade and commerce, would be of advantage to the invad- ing army, and hence a good strategical point. In broken, hilly and mountainous countries there will be found many natural strategical points. Such are the points at which several roads or lines of communication meet ; at which good positions are found commanding the passes through mountains ; or commanding the crossings of streams which are not fordable, etc. Hence, any position, strong naturally, or made so by for- tifications, which commands the junction of any system of roads, railroads, or other communications ; or commands a navigable stream or its crossings ; or commands the roads leading through passes over mountain ranges ; or commands and gives control over a tract of -country, rich in population and supplies ; any one of these is a natural strategic point, whose possession is of great importance to an army operating in its neighborhood. A simple redoubt controlling a route may be a decisive strategical point for a particular operation. Thus a redoubt in the Montenotte pass in Bonaparte's campaign in Italy in 1796, frustrated the Austrian movement and_ enabled Bona- parte to succeed in his operations. Also, in 1800, Fort Bard 28 AET AKD SCIElirCE OF WAK. in the valley of Aosta, came very near having a decisive ac- tion upon the military operations of Napoleon and defeating his plan of campaign. 52. Objectives therefore, are or should be " decisive strate- gical points." CHAPTER m. PLAN OF CAMPAI&N. 53. The term " campaign " is used to designate the time employed by an army in the field to accomplish a given ob- ject. 54. Before a war is begun, or any military enterprise is undertaken, the object to be attained must be selected, and all the movements which are to be made by the army for the purpose of getting possession of this object must be fixed in advance as accurately as possible. These movements are made in accordance with some scheme, to which the term, " general plan of the war" is ap- plied. This " general plan " comprises the selection of the principal objects to be gained, the general combinations which are to be made for their attainment, and all the neces- sary preparations and arrangements to carry the combina- tions into effect. 55. Political considerations aa^" military policy" exer- cise considerable infiuence in the selection of the objects to be attained, and affect materially the proposed combinations. AH considerations, not political, and not belonging to diplomacy or strategy, which infiuence military operations, ire classed under the general head of "military policy." As for example, the kind of military system in use by the enemy ; the character and ability of the enemy's generals ; the char- 30 AET AKD SCIENCE OF WAE. acter of the executive; the possible influence of some particu- lar cabinet oflBcer, or of cabinet councils ; the character of the masses of the people living iu the enemy's country ; the degi-ee of attachment felt by these masses for their form of govern- ment ; the financial resources of the enemy, etc. , would exercise an influence upon the plans to be formed, and would frequent- ly decide the kind of war to be waged. 56. The " general plan of the war " is a project conceived and determined upon by a government after consultation with its military authorities. This plan may require the use of only a single army and a single campaign ; or it may require many armies and many campaigns for its fulfilment. 57. In either case each army will require a plan of opera- tions for each campaign. This plan of operations, designated as "the plan of campaign," will have for its aim some object whose possession forms a part of the "general plan." A " plan of campaign " comprises the selection of an ob- jective ; the selection of routes over which the army is to march ; the determination of the movements by which the objective is to be reached ; and all the arrangements to be made for providing the army with the necessary supplies during the time it is employed. 58. The formation of the " general plan " is the act of the government ; the formation of " the plan of campaign " is, or should be, the act of the general entrusted with its execution. 59. Assuming the plan of campaign to be intended for an army engaged in an offensive war — that is, for an army which is to move forward into the enemy's country — ^the attention of the student is particularly directed to four essential things, which are as follows : PLAK OF CAMPAtGK. 31 1. The selection of an objective. 2. The selection of a " theatre of operations." 3. The selection of a base. 4. The selection of "lines of operations." 60. I. Obtjective. The first thing to be considered in forming a plan of campaign is the selection of an objective. This selection is made by the general who is to command the army during the campaign, unless it has already been chosen by some higher authority. Sometimes there is no choice, the objective being deter- mined by the nature of things already existing. Thus in the case of a war waged for the purpose of quelling an insurrec- tion or crushing a rebellion, the objective would be the armed forces wherever they might be. In case the war was waged for the purpose of adding to a country's territory, the objec- tive would be the coveted portion ; and the plan would be to march into this part, drive out or crush all armed resistance, occupy and hold the disputed territory. An example of the latter class is seen in the wars of Fred- erick, waged by him to obtain possession of Silesia. The duration of such wars would depend upon the abilities of the contestants to carry on the struggle. In the case of a war waged for a less definite purpose than either of those named, such as where a nation has gone to war to redress some wrong or to avenge an insult, the object of the general plan will be to show a superiority of strength, and the objective of a campaign will be the acquisition of some material guarantee as an evidence of this strength. This material guarantee may be an important sea-port ; 32 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAE. an important centre of trade ; the capital of the country ; a fortified place, etc. The capital is always an important point to seize, as the occupation of the seat of government by a hostile power is so ruinous in its effect upon the nation, that almost any sacrifice made by the state is regarded as less hurtful than the presence of the enemy in its capital. The seizure of the city of Mexico by General Scott, in 1847, is an example. And at a later date, the capture of Paris by the Germans, in 1871. In both of these cases the possession of the capital by the invading forces formed the objective of the general plan, and also the objective of par- ticular campaigns ; and this objective having been acquired, the war, in each instance, was virtually at an end. 61, The actual possession of the capital is not, however, always the end of the war, and is not always sufficient to make the enemy sue for peace. So long as the enemy can raise armies and use them effect- ively, the possession of the capital forms only a part of the general plan. The invader, in addition to seizing the capital, must show such a degree of superior skill and strength that the defenders, in order to save their armies from disintegra- tion and ruin, will be willing to submit to the terms proposed by the victorious foe. 63, The objective selected for attainment in a campaign may be and most generally is natural, although it may be accidental. The kind of war and the general circumstances attending each case will influence the general in making his selection. He will endeavor, however, to select an objective which shall be a " decisive " one.- PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. 33 G3. The objective selected will oftentimes be attained only by gaining positions and strategical points, which form what are generally known as " secondary objectives." The possession of these latter marks the ending and beginning of successive epochs or periods of a campaign. The general principles, directing the operations of an army in attaining its principal objective, apply equally to all the movements which have for their object the possession of any of these secondary objectives. G4. II. Theatre of operations. Usually, but not al- ways, the selection of the objective has the effect of fixing the selection of the theatre of operations. Even where there is but a single object to be attained, the theatre of war will contain portions of country which are more or less favorable for the operations of an army, or in which the operations will have a more or less decisive influence upon the results of the cam- paign. 65. The selection on military grounds alone will be based upon the following considerations, viz. : 1. The convenience and the security of the base. 2. The nearness of the base to the objective. 3. The number and the kind of communications leading from the base to the objective. 4. The topographical features of the country through which the army must move to reach the objective. The effective use of the different arms of the military ser- vice is greatly dependent upon the natural features of the ground upon which the troops are to be employed. A country which is open is more suitable for the move- 2* 34 ART AKD SCIENCE OF WAR. ments of a cavalry force than one which is wooded, or inter- sected by ravines or other obstructions. A firm soil, good positions and good roads, are necessary for an effective use of artillery. Any kind of country can be used by infantry. The choice between an open country or an obstructed one for in- fantry will depend upon circumstances. If the army consists principally of infantry and the enemy is superior in cavalry, a hilly or woo(Jed region is to be preferred ; but if the army is superior to the enemy in cavalry and artillery, an open country would be selected, etc. The topographical features of the country through which the army is to move, will therefore, have a great influence in determining the selection of a theatre of operations whenever there is a choice between several theatres. 66. III. Base of operations. The selection of the part of the country from which an army is to draw its supplies and to receive its reinforcements, and the selection of the theatre of operations are dependent upon each other. The selection of the theatre of operations usually fixes the base ; and the converse. The general in selecting, his base of operations will duly consider the relative effects of form and extent which have ali'eady been mentioned. 67. IV. Iiines of operations. The theatre of operations affords generally a choice of lines of operations, as there are frequently several routes which can be used by the army in moving forward from its base towards the objective. PLAK OF CAMPAIGN. 35 As for example, in the campaigns of the late war with the Confederacy, advances were made upon Richmond, from the line of the Potomac Eiver and Chesapeake Bay, along different lines of operations at different times. One was by the way of Alexandria, Centreville, Warrenton, and Cul- peper. Another was by the way of Acquia Creek and Fredericksburg. Another was by the York Eirer, White House, and the Chickahominy. Another was by the James River and Harrison's Landing. And another was by the James River, City Point and Petersburg. All these were used on different occasions and were se- lected at the time of using for reasons which were satisfac- tory to those planning the campaign. 68. It has been stated that the causes influencing the selection of the theatre of operations and the base of opera- tions are mutually dependent on each other. So is the se- lection of the lines of operations influenced by the causes governing the selection of the base and theatre. The three are mutually dependent, and are to be considered together. The selection of the lines of operations is especially de- pendent upon the "number and kind of communications leading to the objective." The heavily loaded wagons following an army soon cut up and render the ordinary country roads almost impassable, and make it an extremely difiScult thing to supply an army unless the distance between the depots of supplies and the troops is very short. Good roads are therefore essential, and they must be prac- ticable for all arms of service and their trains. Railroads which are in good repair, and are supplied with sufficient 36 ART AXD SCIENCE OF WAE. rolling stock, and streams which are navigable, form excel- lent lines of communication and are to be used in preference to ordinary roads when the distances are great. Turnpikes or macadamized roads are next in value to railroads. 69. Good roads are essential not only for the supply of an army, but for the prompt execution of strategical move- ments and tactical maneuvres. Col. Hamley says that "the march of the troops and artillery becomes, on bad roads, so slow and uncertain that all the calculations, on ■which, a gen- eral bases a combined operation, are liable to be falsified ; and the rapidity necessary for a movement intended to surprise or foil an adversary is lost, so that the design is foreseen and frustrated by the enemy." He gives several examples of the rates of travel on good and bad roads, and the ill results flowing from using the latter. One of these examples given by him is that of Napoleon following Wellington, and Grouchy following Blncher, after the battle of Ligny and just before that of Waterloo. Both Napoleon and Grouchy left the field of Ligny on the after- noon of the 17th of June, 1815. Napoleon, with seventy-five thousand men marching on the paved high-roads, reached Waterloo, a distance of seven- teen miles from Ligny, the same night. Grouchy, -with thirty thousand men marching along the country roads, had great difficulty in reaching, by ten o'clock that night, Gembloux which was distant only five miles from Ligny. This example illustrates the difference in the rate of march of an army over good and poor roads. PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. 37 The recent war of the United States with the Southern Confederacy presents many examples of operations paralyzed, and plans defeated, in consequence of the miserable state of the roads over which the armies had to march. 70. The selection of the objective, the theatre, base, and lines of operations, hdlVing been made, the general can now, complete his plan of campaign. It is supposed that he is to command an army that is well organized, in good discipline, properly supplied, and not inferior in numbers to those opposed to him. To make his plan complete, he must know the probable resistance he will meet in striving to reach his objective. This resistance, so far as the enemy is concerned, may be approximately estimated, if he can ascertain the probable numbers and kinds of troops which the enemy will bring against him, the degree of discipline existing among them, and the character of the general who is to command them. The knowledge of these three things will materially affect and in many cases materially modify his strategical combinations. A movement, which may be made with impunity in the presence of undisciplined troops, would be a very rash one in the presence of good troops. A faulty movement made in safety in the presence of troops commanded by a slow, hesi- tating and exceedingly cautious general, would result in disaster if made in their presence when commanded by a quick and able general. These things fully considered, the supply department well . organized, the depots and magazines established, the proposed movements well considered, the plan of canapasign is com- 38 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. plete and the operations are begun. The thing to be observed is that every thing connected with the proposed movements should be considered and arranged in advance as far as practicable, and as far as human foresight will admit ; and nothing, or as little as possible, should be left to chance, 71. Yet, notwithstanding the arrftogements made and plans proposed, there are an infinite number of circum- stances occurring constantly, which tend to, and do, modify the plan conceived by the general. The most important of these are the topographical features of the country, the influence of climate, the kinds of troops opposing the move- ments, and the genius of the general in command of them. A knowledge of the solution of previous military prob- lems, and a knowledge of military geography, are both essen- tialto any one who desires to make a plan of campaign which should carry with it success. Example illustrative of a selection of theatre and line of operations in forming a plan of campaign. The Campaign of Bonaparte in Italy, in 1800, ending with the battle of Marengo, may be taken as an example in which a choice was made in selecting the theatre and lines of operations for a campaign. In 1800, Austria and France were at war. Austria had two large armies actively employed in hostilities ; one num- oered about one hundred and fifty thousand men, under the command of the Austrian General Kray, and the other, about one hundred and twenty thousand men under Gen- eral Melas. The army under Kray was posted with its PLAN OF CAMPAIGN". 39 left near Constance in Switzerland, its right in the defiles of the Black Forest near Strasburg, and its centre at Donau- Eschingen. This latter place is about twenty-five miles north of SchafEbausen and is the junction of the main roads leading from the Ehine into the valley of the upper Danube. Genei'al Kray holding this position, could observe all the roads crossing the Ehine upon which the French might be expected to move in case of an attempted invasion of Austria. Making this his principal object, Kray acted on the defensive. The Austrian army under M61as was in Korthern Italy, about to take the ofEensive, with the object of gaining pos- session of Genoa and Nice, then in the hands of the French ; and then crossing the river Var, to march upon Toulon. It is seen that these two armies were separated by Swit- zerland and were not in supporting distance of each other. Nevertheless, communication with each other through the Tyrol was possible in case of necessity, after a short delay. France had opposed to these armies, troops in Holland, along the lower Rhine, in Switzerland, and in Italy. This was the condition of things in March, 1800, a short time after Bonaparte's accession to the position of First Con- sul. He, Bonaparte, having failed in his negotiations for peace, determined to act offensively against both of these armies. He consolidated the armies in Switzerland and on the Rhine into one, to be known as the "army of the Ehine," increased its numbers to one hundred and thirty thousand men, and placed it under the command of General Moreau, •with instructions to attack Kray. He sent Massena to Italy to take command of all the 40 AET AND SCIENCE OF WAll. French troops in that country, with instructions to hold Ge- noa to the last extremity. It is well to remark that no reinforcements were sent to this French army in Italy, and that this army was in need of supplies of every description. He, Bonaparte, then organized a third army which was to be known as the "army of the reserve," with which lie pro- posed to act against the Austrians, as soon as the proper time for action had arrived. The campaign of this "army of the reserve " is the example taken to illustrate the subject under consideration. Bonaparte's Plan. He selected Northern Italy as the theatre of operations for " the army of the reserve," and determined that as soon as he had heard of Moreau having defeated Kray, or having driven him back upon Ulm and Katisbon, that he would march the army under his command into Italy, place it between the army of Melas and its base, and thus having possession of Melas' communications, force the Austrians to raise the siege of Genoa which they had begun, and force them to fight a battle to regain these com- munications. Position of the Austrian armies. In the beginning of May, 1800, Kray's army was to all practicable pui-posesin the position already described ; but had Moreau directly in his front, threatening to turn the right flank of his position. The army of Melas had moved forward in pursuit of its objects and, at this time, had its right, south of the Apen- nines, threatening a crossing of the Var, and its left besieging Genoa. It also guarded all the passes through which the principal roads lead from.France to Italy across the Apen- nines. The front of the army of Melas may be said to have PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. 41 extended along the whole of the Italian frontier of France, its left resting on Genoa. It will be seen then that all the lines of communication and retreat for the army under M61as, leading to Mantua and Verona, pass through the space lying between Milan and Piacenza. If Bonaparte could place his army in this space, while the Austrians were still occupying the position just described, he would be able to cut their communications, and force them to concentrate against him. In doing so, the Aus- trians would be forced to raise the siege of Genoa, and to abandon their attempted invasion of Prance by crossing the river Var. Northern Italy having been selected as the theatre of operar tions, Bonaparte now selects this country between Milan and Piacenza as the objective of the campaign in this theatre. The next, is to select the line of operations. The map shows that Northern Italy is divided by the Apennines and the river Po, into three unequal portions, through all of which, roads lead from the French frontier to the country between Milan and Piacenza. The narrowest one of these three portions is that lying between the Mediterranean Sea and the Apennines, which from its width and mountainous character was peculiarly fitted for the operations of a force composed principally of infantry, inferior to the enemy in artillery and cavalry, and inferior in numbers. As Bonaparte's army was inferior to the Austrians in numbers, and inferior also in artillery and cavalry, it would seem that this portion would be the one he would select by which, to move to the relief of Genoa. 43 AKT AXD SCIENCE OF WAK. His objections to this selection werd, that supposing he was successful in pusliiug the Austrians back after he had crossed the river Var, they, as they retired from position to po- sition, would be constantly reinforced, and could at the same time keep up the siege of Genoa. And finally, if defeated before Genoa, they could retreat and find shelter under the fortifications on the Mincio and Adige. He would also fail, by this movement, to place his army in the rear of the Aus- trian army, while they were occupying the position just de- scribed. This portion was therefore rejected as not suitable. The middle portion lying between the Apennines and the river Po, possessed good roads, but also contained the strong fortifications of Coni, Turin and Alexandria, all in the hands, or under the control, of the Austrians. His objections to this portion were, that supposing he had crossed the Apennines and advanced against the Austrian forces, the fortified places would enable the Austrians to hold him in check long enough to allow time for the Aus- trian army to concentrate its scattered forces. Approaching as he would the Austrian centre, the concentration would be more easily effected, and any point more easily reinforced, than if he moved against either of the flanks of their posi- - tion. The Austrians having possession of the passes of the Apennines, could also delay the French advance upon Genoa and could still prosecute the siege. This portion was there- fore decided as not suitable for the execution of his plan. The third portion lies between the river Po and the Alps. The narrow passes of the Alps, through which the rugged, difficult, and bad roads were carried, the deep snows on the mountains, etc., all seemed to make imprac- PLAX OF CAMPAIGN. 43 ticable an approach of an army in that direction from France. For this reason, there were bat few fortifica- tions and but few troops in this portion. If Bonaparte could get his army over the Alps without M61as knowing of the movement, there would be no hinderance to his marching directly to the space he proposed to occupy, and to seize the communications of Melas with his base on the Mincio, thus carrying out that part of his plan of operations. Moreover, if Moreau was successful in pushing back Kray to Ulm, reinforcements from Moreau's army could be sent across Switzerland and used to strengthen the Army of the Ee serve, before Kray could know of it. The Austrians having no fears of an army descending into Italy by crossing the Alps, had guarded but weakly the roads leading from France into this portion of Italy, trusting to the natural difficulties of the roads as affording suificient protection. Bonaparte, disregarding these difl&culties, determined, , that as soon as he heard of Moreau's success, he would cross the Alps, place his army in this third portion of Italy, and proceed to execute the plan already mentioned. On the 11th of May, Kray's army had been forced back upon Ulm, and on the 13th Bonaparte put his army iu motion. He crossed the main body of his army by the Great St. Bernard Pass. The reinforcements from Moreau crossed the Alps by the St. Gothard Pass. A knowledge of the difficulties of this march, of the means adopted to overcome these obstacles, of the serious ob- struction offered by the little fort at Bard, guarding the 44 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. viilley of the Aosta, etc., is essential to a complete under- standing of this campaign, but it isnot necessary to have this knowledge so far as the subject now under consideration is concerned. The crossing of the Alps was effected, and in thirteen days from the time of starting, Bonaparte and his army were in northern Italy. Guarding with strong detachments the crossings of the Ticiuo, Bonaparte marched his army to the space between Milan and Piacenza and seized the roads leading from the Austrian front to Verona and to Mantua. He was too late to relieve Genoa, Massena having been obliged to surrender, but the delay of the Austrian s before Genoa, caused by Massena's obstinate defence, gave Bona- parte time to place his army in the rear of the Austrians. The Austrian army was forced to fight in order to regain its communications. The battle of Marengo, which was the result, was a victory for the French, and was followed by the surrender of Genoa, and the evacuation of Italy by the Austrians. Other examples of a choice made in the selection of theatres and lines of operations are to be met with, when reading the history of campaigns made by famous generals. CHAPTER IV. COMPOSITION OF AN AKMY. 72. The term army is applied to a collection of armed men, arranged in organizations and paid by a government. The term is restricted in its use to those armed forces whose sphei-e of action is on land. The composition of an army is fixed by the government and usually differs in time of war, from what it is in time of peace. 73. An army should, however, in time of peace, have its parts so composed that if the necessity arises it could, in a short time, be readily placed on a war footing; or, as it is frequently expressed, "mobilized." An army, thus mobilized, should be capable of executing the tasks that are to be imposed upon it. It must be so or- ganized that the whole must obey a single will; the will of a commander who directs its movements and causes the whole to act for the attainment of a common purpose. The army must be so constituted as to bind together the general who commands and the common soldier who exe- cutes, if the whole is to act as a unit and in accordance with the wishes of the commander. 74. Its organization may be said to be begun by group- ing those combatants who have the same mode of action. These groups are known as "arms of service." 46 ART AKD SCIENCE OF WAR. An arm of service may be defined to be " a union of com- batants having the same mode of action." 75. There are four of these arms in modern armies, viz. : Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers. These four arms form the principal part of a mobilized army, and as they, or their representatives, are always formed into a line of battle to resist the attack of an enemy, or to make an attack, they are generally known as the " line of the army" or "troops of the line," to distinguish them from other bodies of men who form parts of an army. These arms are sub-divided into fractions, for the purpose of instruction and of supply. The unit for instruction and the unit for supply may be the same or different. The unit of supply, as a general rule, is constant, and is also usually the unit of instruction in discipline. The unit of instruction in tactics will depend upon circumstances, and upon the kind of movements which the commander desires to make. 76. The common unit for the four arms, for supplying the men's wants and for instruction in discipline, is the "company." This unit receives, at other times, other names, depending upon circumstances. For instance, a lattery of artillery is the same as company; the term squadron of cavalry frequent- ly means a company, etc. A company consists of a given number of men command- ed by a commissioned oflBccr who has the rank of captain. Two, sometimes three and even more, commissioned offi- cers of a grade below that of captain are appointed to assist the captain in the discharge of his duties. These officers have the grade of lieutenant. Their number and the number of men forming a company are fixed by law. COMPOSITION OF AK AEMY. 47 A certain number are selected from the men, and ap- pointed non-commissioned officers with the rank of sergeant or of corporal. These non-commissioned officers are used to instruct the men in their military duties and in discipline. 77. The number of men and officers forming a company is usually greater in time of war than in time of peace. Ex- perience has fixed upon a minimum of one captain, two lieu- tenants, four sergeants, four corporals and sixty-four private soldiers for the proper number to form an efficient company of infantry in time of peace. A company of this size is divided into two equal parts called platoons, each of which should be under the especial charge of a lieutenant. The whole company should be divided into four squads of equal numbers, and each squad placed under the charge of a non-commissioned officer, who should be held responsible for the cleanliness of the men of his squad, not only as to their persons, clothing and arms, but also as to their tents or quarters. It will be easy with a company thus organized to instruct the soldier in "minor ta,ctics" as far as the "school of the company;" to discipline him and teach him strict obedience to orders from all superior authority, and to supply his neces- sary wants. 78. By the addition of fifty men to this organization the company will have sufficient strength for active field service. With this number of men added to the company, the captain will then have as many under his command as one man, on foot, can attend to while executing the movements demanded by modern tactics. A greater number might be added, form- 48 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. ing larger companies, but such large companies would neces- sitate the mounting of the captain on a horse so as to enable him to execute properly his duties. Larger companies are not expedient, unless the captain is mounted; their size can be excused only on account of deficiency of numbers of good oflBcers, or on the score of economy. The company, with its size based on the theory that it mnst not be larger than one man on foot can thoroughly com- mand in person, is the unit of discipline. 79. Two or three or more companies form a battalion. Four, and at the outside, five companies placed in line form, in these times, so extended a line that a single person in im- mediate and personal command of them will find diflBculty in making himself heard and understood by the men through- out the entire line. For this reason the battalion should not, as a rule, contain more than four companies. The battalion is the tactical unit, both for instruction in tactics and in the execution of its movements. The battalion is sometimes made a unit of administration, and forms a com- plete organization under the command of a commissioned officer of the grade of major or lieutenant-colonel. 80. The more usual rule is to increase the number of companies so as to have enough to form at least two battalions, and with these companies to form the organization known as a regiment. The regiment is always an administrative unit and is commanded by a commissioned oflScer who has the grade of colonel. The colonel is charged with the proper ad- ministration of the supplies for the regiment, and with pre- serving good order and promoting military discipline. He takes every opportunity to instruct both the officers and men COMPOSITION OF 4N AEIIY. 49 in the principles and details of all movements that ought, in any case, to te made by a battalion. He sees that the company officers do their duty, that the men are satisfied, and that the regiment Is in an efficient state. Upon the organization of a regiment, the company officers are assigned to companies, and each company is designated by a letter of the alphabet. Upon the recommendation of the captains, the colonel appoints the non-commissioned officers of the companies. He appoints an adjutant from the lieutenants of the regiment, and a non-commissioned stafE from the enlisted men to assist him in his duties. He selects from the lieutenants, a quarter-master, who receives his ap- pointment from higher authority. 81. The elements of organization for the other three arms of service are practically the same, being that of a company or similar body of men under the command of a captain, and these units grouped together into a battalion or regimental organization for administrative purposes. The number of men in a company is different for the dif- ferent arms, a larger number being required for a company of engineers than for a company of infantry, etc; • The num- ber for each arm. should be fixed by practical experience, and should be sufficient to allow of thorough instruction in all the duties wbich the men may have to perform in time of war. 83. This sub-division into companies and into regiments is most essential for instruction in discipline. Discipline is an indispensable condition for the existence of a good army. It imparts cohesion and flexibility to the armed mass. With- out discipline an army is only an armed mob over which a 3 50 ART AND SCIEKCE OF WAR. commander would have no control, and upon which ho could not rely in the execution of his plans. The discipline of an army greatly depends upon the cap- tains and upon the colonels. If they are ofiBcient, the com- panies and regiments become real units, and the army, under the command of an experienced general, obeys a single will. 83. AYhen the army is to be mobilized the regiments are brought together and organized into brigades and divisions. Two or more regiments form a brigade; two or more brigades form a division, A general oflScer of the grade of Brigadier-general is as- signed to the command of a brigade, and one of the grade of Major-general to the command of a division. These divisions and brigades may be composed entirely of one arm, or they may be composed of troops belonging to all four of the arms. 84. The division is the unit of organization and adminis- tration of a mobilized army, and is also the tactical unit of tlie general in command. When the army is very large, three or four divisions are joined together and form an army corps. The officer, com- manding an army corps, should be of a higher grade than he who commands a division. This grade, in the U. S. army, would be that of Lieutenant-general. An army corps is most generally composed of all arms of service, and is, to all intents and purposes, an army complete in itself. Two or more army corps, or armies, would be under the command of the general, or of a ••'general-in-chief." 85. It is to be observed that the functions of general offl- COMPOSITIOSr OF AN ARMY, 51 cers are to command armies, or fractions of an array greatet than a regiment, when mobilized. In time of peace, when the regiments are not formed into brigades or divisions, but are distributed over districts of country, the function of tlie general is to command the troops in these districts, which are then designated by the terms "military departments," or "geographical military divisions." 86. A general in command of an army, or of one of these districts, cannot attend in person to all the duties which such a command imposes. He ninst therefore have persons to assist him. These assistants form the " slaff" ot the gen- eral. Their duties are to transmit the orders of the general, either verbally or in writing, to those for whom they are intended ; to make condensed reports of the numbers, of the positions, and state of the different parts of the army ; to make inspections of the troops, their quarters, etc. ; to supply the troops with shelter, fuel, etc. ; to supply them with arms and ammanitjon, clothing, food, etc. ; to provide them with medical and surgical attendance, hospital com- forts, and to care for their health ; to supei'vise the legal proceedings arising from infractions of military law and dis- cipline, etc. ; to pay them their wages, etc. 87. This great variety of duties makes it -necessary to employ a large number of assistants, and to divide the labors among them. Hence, there has arisen an organization, forming an es- sential part of every army, known as the General Staff, and divided into corps and departments to which are as- signed special duties. In some cases, the term "general staff "is limited to 53 ART AND SCIEXCE OF WAK. include only those officers who are uped by the general to communicate his orders, and to inform him of the general and particular conditions of the troops ; and the term " staff department" or "supply department" is used to include those oflBcers whose duties are confined to distinct branches of service having for their object the supply of troops. 88. When an army is mobilized, or when a general is placed in command of troops occupying a given district of country, commissioned oflBcers belonging to these corps and departments are ordered to report to the general in com- mand. He assigns these oiBcers to the head-quarters of the army or district, or to divisions, or brigades, as he may think fit, unless this distribution has already- been regu* lated by the War Department, The senior in rank of each corps or department is usually assigned to duty at the commanding general's head- quarters. If the army is one of any gi'eat size, the general ordi- narily attaches to his head-quarters a representative of the three arms, of artillery, cavalry and engineers, giving them the position of staff-oflBcers with the name of "chief of artillery," '■' chief of cavalry," etc. They are required to keep the general informed of the state of supplies, and whatever concerns their particular arm, in a similar manner to that required of the other officers of the staff. The general also appoints from the subordinate oflBcers belonging to his command, a certain number of aids-de- camp. These oflBcers are ex-officio, adjutant-generals, and receive orders only from the general himself. They are con- fidftntial oflBcers, who are supposed to be used only in delicate and diflBcult duties where they may in a degree represent COMPOSITION OP AX ARMY. 53 the general. Hence, they are entrusted to deliver verbal orders which cannot be entrusted with propriety to enlisted men or to the ordinary means of communication. It is supposed that their knowledge is' sufficiently com- prehensive to enable them to understand the object and pur- pose of the general's orders, and to modify them in an emer- gency or to return in time to the general for new instructions. 89. Proportion of Arms of Service. The mass of a modern army is composed of infantry. The amount of cav- alry will dep.end upon the topographical features of the country, being in some cases as much as one-fourth of the infantry, and in others as little as one-tenth. The amount of field artillery depends upon the character of the country. There would be ordinarily two guns to every thousand men.) The amount of heavy artillery, or number of siege-batteries, which enter the composition of an army, will depend to a great extent upon the plan of campaign and the probable uses for which they may be intended. The cir- cumstances of the case in each campaign will therefore decide as to the proportion to be employed. The number of engineer troops will depend both on the nature of the country and on the probable amount of work which will be required from this class of troops. Each divis- ion should contain at least one company of engineer troops. It is usual, if there be none, to detail one or more companies of infantry to act as engineer soldiers ; they are designated as '• pioneers." These engineer troops, or troops acting in that capacity, marching in the advance, make the roads practicable for Uie command by repairing them, removing obstructions, etc. 5* ART AND SCIENCE OF WAK. At the crossings of streams, where bridges are to be made, or where existing bridges are to be repaired to an extent lo- quiring more knowledge of bridge construction than that usually possessed by the pioneer, another detachment of troops belonging to the engineer arm is brought forward to do the work. These troops are known as pontoniers, and have special charge of bridge construction for the army. They may be divided into two parts : one, to have charge of construction of temporary bridges, especially floating and trestle bridges, and construction of ferries; the other, to have charge of repairs of bridges which have been broken or injured by the enemy, and where quick repair is of impor- tance to the army's movements. These troops charged with bridge construction usually form a part of the reserve and are only attached to a division under peculiar circumstances. There should be also in the reserve, several companies of sappers and miners ; their num- ber, like the heavy artillery, being dependent upon the nature of the campaign. 90. The army, as a machine, is now ready to be used by the general. The next step is to keep it in a condition so that it can be used; iu other words, to preserve the fighting condition of the army. The discipline and drill have been cared for, and with the organization just sketched out, the general can move the whole mass as a unit iu accordance with his will. 91. How the army shall be kept in this condition, is the next question. The army can be kept ready for use only by supplying all the actual and necessary wants of the soldier, and by keep- COMPOSITION OF AN AIIMY. 55 / ing him in comfort and good health. To do this, there must be ammunition, food, clothing, shelter, medicines, surgical attendance, hospital comforts, etc., provided for his use. Also a good system of recruiting must be adopted, by means of which the natural losses due to sickness and death may be made good. 93. The supplies furnished to the soldier being so varied in their nature, it is easy to see how natural has been the formation of separate departments for these special purposes. Thus, in the United States army, the Department of Ordnance provides the supplies of ammunition; the Subsist- ence Department supplies food; the Quartermaster's Depart- ment provides clothing, fuel, quarters, tents, forage, etc.; the Medical Department provides surgical attendance, med- icines, etc. The oflQcers, in charge of these departments of a mobilized array, should receive their orders direct from the command- ing general, and be directly responsible to him for the effi- ciency of their departments. 93. The transportation of the munitions, equipments, provisions, hospital supplies, tents, engineering tools, bridge equipage and boats, baggage, cooking utensils, etc., neces- sary for the use of an army moving against an enemy, requires the use of large numbers of wagons and a great number of draught-animals. These accompaniments to the army re- ceived from the Romans the name of impedimenta, for the reason that they hindered the movements of the army. In recent wars, by reason of the immense number of men employed, and in consequence of the bad roads along which the wagons moved, the difficulties of supplying the troops 56 ^ AKT AXD SCIEITCE OF WAR. promptly and in abundance, were greatly increased ; and the ■wagon trains were in truth impedimenta. 94. These supply departments form important parts of the composition of a modern army, and the method of exe- cuting the duties assigned them constitutes an important branch of the "science and art of war." 95. Nothing has been said, so far, as to the means of raising the requisite numbers of men, with which and from which the army is to be formed. The men required for use in an army in time of peace are supplied in different ways in different countries. The two principal methods are volun- tary enlistment, and conscription. Voluntary enlistment ex- plains Itself. Conscription is where the man is selected by lot from a list of all pei'sons liable for military service in a given locality. Tlie former is the method adopted by the United States Government. The details of this method of procuring men for the army are entrusted to '•' the Eecruiting Service," conducted by the Adjutant-General of the Army under the direction of the War Department. Eecruits may be enlisted into special arms of service, into special organizations, or into the gen- eral service ; in the latter case, they are afterwards assigned to such arm and organization as the head of the recruiting service may direct. The recruits received at a " rendezvous " are sent as soon as practicable to the "recruiting depdt" where they are kept until sufficient numbers are gathered together for assignment. They are then assigned to an arm and to a regiment, and upon reaching the regiment are distributed among the com COMPOSITION OP A5r Alt.MY. 57 paiiies under the orders of the commandi;i!^ oflBcer of the regiment. 96. Military Forces of the United States. The military forces of the United States consist, at the present time, of the Regular Army of the United States, and the Militia of the different States. 97. Regular Army. The regular army of the United States consists of twenty-five regiments of Infantry, ten regi- ments of Cavalry, five regiments of Artillery and one battal- ion of engineer soldiers ; the total number of enlisted men not to exceed 25,000. It is also provided with a corps of Adjutant Generals ; of Inspector Generals ; of Quarter-masters ; of Subsistence ; of Engineers ; of Ordnance ; a Medical Corps ; a corps of Pay- masters ; a chief Signal OflBcer ; a Bureau of Military Jus- tice ; a number of chaplains ; a force of Indian scouts ; the oflBcers on the retired list ; and the professors and cadets of the United States Military Academy. 98. In command of these, there are eleven general offi cers, viz. : one General, one Lieutenant-General, three Ma- jor-Generals and six Brigadier-Generals, with the proviso tliat the offices of General and of Lieutenant-General shall cease when vacated by the present incumbents. 99. The student is referred to the United States Army Register for a tabulated statement of the organization of the llegular Army of the United States, and for a table showing the Organization of Kegiments and Companies. It is un- necessary to insert these tables in this book, for at present ihey may be simply regarded as variable quantities, possess- ing a given value only for a limited time. 58 ART AND SCIEXCE OF WAR. Penuriousness and over-scrupulousness urged forward bj local interests or party spirit seem to be tbe reasons control- ling all plans suggested for the improvement of the present organization, rather than a desire to watch over and preserve snch an army as will be of service to the country in the future. Therefore, any organization authorized by law and experi- ence existing at the time of writing these lines may be so en- tirely changed by legislation before the year ends, as not to be recognizable to a pains-taking student ; and it is better to refer him for the details of such organization to the current literature of the day. 100. Militia. The laws of the United States require the enrollment into the militia of all able-bodied males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years, excepting those which are exempted by the laws of the United States, or may be exempted by the laws of the different States. The militia of each State is required to be arranged into companies, battalions, regiments, brigades and divisions, as the legislature of the State may direct, and it shall be subject to military duty and shall serve a definite time. These organizations are to be ofiOxjered by the respective States, the grades and number of ofiicers being named in the laws requiring the enrollment. The militia may be or may not be uniformed ; and, except in especial cases, are not paid for their services. 101. There have been, however, found in every State, even where the militia is not uniformed, bodies of men, voluntarily associated together for military exercises, wearing a uniform, bearing some characteristic name, and frequently obtaining some special privileges. GOMPOSITIOIT OF AN AEUY. 59 These men are engaged in business operations which pre- vent their leaving home but for a short time, and as a rule receive no pay for their services. Although militia, they are distinguished from the general militia by the terra " volunteer." 103. The Constitution of the United States has given the power to Congress to provide for calling " forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." Congress, by legislation, has given the President the authority to call forth the militia under certain exigencies, as has been frequently done. When called into actual service 'of the United States, the militia receive pay from the government and are subject to the Rules and Arti- cles of "War. The militia is therefore a part and parcel of the army of the United States, although,in common use,the term is limit- ed to mean the regular army alone. 103. Volunteers. There is another class of troops not belonging to the regular army, nor to the militia, which have been raised by Congress and employed by the government. These troops are known as " volunteers," and must not be confounded with the militia formed into volunteer companies. When a sudden emergency demands, these volunteers are employed by authority of Congress, which gives the President the power to call for Tolnnteers, limiting the number to be employed, and defining the proportions of the arms of service which they are to represent. As a rule the numbers of vol- unteers are proportioned among the States according to their population, and complete organizations of companies, battal- ions and regiments, are formed in each State and oflBcered by the Governor of the State. 60 ART AXD SCIEXCE OF WAR. These organizations, when received into actual service of the United States, are arranged into brigades and divisions by the United States ofiBcers, and are commanded by general ofl&cers who, with their stafE-officers, receive their appoint- ments from the United States. This makes an essential difference between them and the militia. And although these organizations assume the names of the States in which they volunteered for service, they are truly United States and not State troops, nor militia. They are troops raised by Congress, and although the company and regimental officers have been usually appointed by the gover- nors of States, it is a permission granted, not a right yielded by Congress, to allow the officers to be appointed in that manner. Hence, when employed by the government, they form a part of the army of the United States, and in organization, rights, etc., have the same privileges as the organizations of the regular army. 104. The army of the United States may then be said to be composed of the Regular Army, whose commissioned officers hold commis- sions for an indefinite period, and whose non-commissioned officers and privates enlist or engage to serve the United States for a definite period ; Volunteers, whose commissioned officers, non-commis- sioned, officers and privates have volunteered to serve the United States for a definite period ; Paid Militia, whose officers, non-commissioned officers and privates, are enrolled according to law and are subject to military duty for a definite period. COMPOSITION OF A>r AKMY. 61 105. It will be observed that both the regular army and the volunteers serve the United States voluntarily, and that the militia, when the emergency comes, have no option in the matter, but if liable to duty, must serve in the army ^^•hfcn called forth. 106. Congress' raises, supports, governs, and regulates armies in the United States. Raising is the means used to collect and to organize the troops ; Supporting is the system of administration em- ployed ;. Oovernm.ent is the formation of the military hie- rarchy, with rules for rewarding and punishing ; and Regu- lations are the means of determining precisely the rights and duties of every individual in the army and of deciding upon the systems of tactics to be practiced. Formation of Troops. 107. The term "formation " is applied to that particular arrangement of the troops composing any unit, when this lat- ter is ready for battle, or is prepared to execute a movement. That portion of the formation on the side towards the enemy is called the "front;" the side opposite to the front is termed the " rear ;" the lateral extremities are called Any row of soldiers placed parallel to the front is called a '"'raw/k;" a row perpendicular to the front is called a "file;" the number of ranks measures the " dejdh" of the formation. Troops drawn up so as to show an extended front, with slight depth, are said to be " deployed;" when the depth is considerable and the front comparatively small, they are eaid to be in a "ployed" formation. 62 AET A.-SD SCIKXOE OF WAR. The extent of front which a battalion of infantry should have when drawn up in line was defined, when it was stated that the battalion organization should not be so great as to prevent the voice of the commanding officer from being heard by the men on the extremities. This extent of front will fix the proper number of men for a battalion. A distance of one hundred and fifty, and even as great as two hundred yards has been assumed to be the length of a suitable front. With a front of two hundred yards, and an allowance of one pace for each man, there would be a few over two hun- dred and fifty men in a single rank, and five hundi-ed in two ranks. The number of companies to form such a bat- talion can be easily determined. 108. The formation in two ranks is the one used by infantry on parades and in line of battle. In an actual engagement, it rapidly becomes a single rank. Since a single rank would not be strong enough to resist a vigorous attack of the enemy, or it would not, at least, be safe to trust to it, a line formed of two ranks must be near at hand to support the single rank, or to receive the attack when this rank is driven back. The attack in masses of great depth, or columns, may be said to have been abandoned. Still, in order that an attack shall be successful, all other things being equal, a preponder- ance of fire, and therefore of numbers of men must be brought to bear upon the position to be taken. Since it is not expedient to expose troops under fire when drawn up in formations of a greater depth than two ranks, it becomes essential that the formation be so arranged that it COMPOSmOK OF AN AKMY. 63 3an, nnclcr such circumstances, pass rapidly from a deep form- atiou into a thin line^ or as known in minor tactics, pass quickly "from column into line." 109. Cavalry is governed by the same general rules laid down for infantry. The tactical unit of cavalry cannot ha'^e so great a front as that for infantry, because of the noise produced by the horses and by the rattling of the arms, which drown the voice of the commander. A length of about one-half of that determined for the battalion is ordinarily taken as a sujtable one for the front of the tactical unit of cavalry. Cavalry is drawn up in two ranks. One rank is all that is effective as far as the offensive is concerned ; the second rank being most useful in pushing the front rank forward and filling the vacancies caused by casualties. 110. It would seem that if, for the same front, the depth of ihe formation vary, the effect produced by it would be proportional to the mass. This is not the case, as it is simply impossible for the whole body to act as a compact mass. The question then returns- to the use of cavalry in its most general sense. Upon this use the formation de- pends. The modern fire-arm renders a charge of a mass of cavalry upon a firm body of infantry a matter of impracticability. Cavalry to be effective must dismount and fight on foot, as long as the enemy makes resistance worthy of the name. The enemy in a disorganized condition, or retreating, can be effectively annoyed by cavalry. As sentinels, patrols, as couriers, or advanced guards, on reconnoissance, etc., cavalry performs an essential part ; and its formation of two ranks 64 AKT AND SCIENCE OF AVAR. offers many and great conveniences for the movements to be made. 111. The artillery unit is sometimes styled a iattery. A battery generally consists of six pieces, although sometimes four only are employed. Twelve yards are allowed to the front of each piece. The number of guns in the battery and this distance for each gun will determine the length of front for a battery. The number of men, generally from twenty to thirty for each piece, will determine the total number foi a company. Each piece should have its own caisson, which takes its place about fifty yards behind its gun. Irregularities of ground may ba employed to vary this distance between the caisson and gun. 113. The formation of engineer troops follows the general rules laid down for infantry. The men being used in small detachments by themselves or detached in charge of o4her troops, the same reasons for their formation, when in the dis- charge of their regular duties, do not apply. But as they may have to defend themselves, or even to act with others on the offensive, they will be for the time acting as infantry ; hence the formation of two ranks, and the extent of front should be the same for them as for the other troops. CHAPTER V. MAECHES. 113. The movements by which a body of troops is con- ducted from one place to another are termed inarches. They should be well directed and should be ordered so as to conduct the troops to their destination with the least amount of privation arid fatigue compatible with the object to be attained. The direction of a march, and the details of its execution are the two important points which should be considered in the ordering of any march. As the success of many military operations depends almost entirely upon their execution, marches form an im- portant element in the " art of war. " The art of directing properly a march belongs to " Strat- egy ; " the art of arranging the details of its execution is a part of "Logistics." Different kinds of Marches. 114. Marches are of three kinds : 1. Marches made at a distance from the enemy and where ;t is not necessary to take precautions to guard against an cittack, known as route marches ; 3. Marches made in the theatre of operations arid where G6 AI!T AXD SCIKN'CE OF WAU. the enemy may at any moment make liis sudden appearance, called strategical marches ; 3. Marches made in the immediate vicinity of the enemy and so near, that they may be observed by him, called tac- tical marches. Route Marches. 115. Koute marches are used by troops both during war and in peace. They are used in peace to conduct a body of troops from one station or post to another. They are used in war for the purpose of assembling the fractions of an army on its base of operations ; of conducting troops through a district or country where there is no enemy ; etc. The health, comfort and convenience of the troops are the principal things to be considered in arranging the details of their execution. When the body of troops to be moved is large it should be sub-divided into smaller bodies, and these detachments sent by different roads. The detachments following any one road should be sent at intervals so as not to interfere with each other, and so arranged that the detachments will aiTive successively at their destination. Caution must be taken to prevent the crossing of the columns on the march, as then one would have to wait to allow the other to pass. Tire delay caused to the waiting column would be irksome in the extreme, and might be a source of trouble, as no body of troops will willingly halt to let another column pass unless special provision be made for the case. Since, in executing marches of this kind, there is no MARCHES. C7 danger to be expected from an enemy, the precantions taken' in the other kinds of marches to guard against attack, are not observed. There are thi-ee kinds of route marches, according to the manner in which they are made, viz : Ordinary route marches, forced route marches, and marches by rail. 116. Ordinary route marches are those made along ordinary roads and when the length of the march in any one day is not greater than twenty miles. Twenty miles is a long march, especially if the body of troops is large, and this distance is taken as the limit for an ordinary march. If the distance marched in any one day is greater than twenty miles the march is forced. 117. Forced marches are extremely exhausting upon the troops and should not exceed thirty miles per day, although greater distances have been overcome by good troops. The number of forced marches made in succession must be few, only two or three, even for the best of troops. They are used but rarely in time of peace and then only under pressing circumstances. They are much used in war, when a rapid concentration of troops is to be made ; when a strate- gical combination is to be effected ; etc. 118. Route marches by rail are employed both in peace and in war. This kind of march includes all those in which the troops do not actually march but are transported bodily to their destination. Eailroads have become in recent years the great factor in rapid and cheap means of moving troops, and the term "rail" is therefore applied to this method of conducting troops froni one place to another. OS ART AND SCIENCE OF VTXll. Tliis metliod is of especial service when the time given to the troops to reach their destination is short, and the distance is great. It is especially used in the case of assembling armies, and forwarding the reserves and recruits to the theatre of war. The late war in the United States ; the war in 1859 in Italy ; the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 ; etc., all furnish examples. Examples of Route Marches. 119. Example of ordinary route marches. The marclies made by the several corps of the French army in 1805, by which this army was assembled upon the Ehine, may be taken as an example in point. There were seven corps distributed as follows : the first corps commanded by Bernadotte was in Hanover ; the sec- ond, commanded by Marmont, was encamped near Utrecht, in Holland ; the third, fourth, fifth and sixth, commanded by Davoust, Soult, Lannes, and Ney, respectively, were in camps on the English' Channel in the vicinity of Boulogne ; the seventh corps, under Augereau, was at Brest. Napoleon issued the orders of march on the night of the 27th of August, 1805, at Boulogne. The first and second corps were to reach Wurtzburg in Bavaria, on the 37th of September.. The third, fourth, fifth and sixth corps were to reach the Rhine on the 24th of September. The seventh corps, having much further to march, was to, reach the Ehine two weeks later. The march of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth corps was begun on the 29th of August, by starting the first division of each corps on that day. The second division of each MARCHES. 69 corps followed on the next day, (30th) and the third divis- ion on the next or third day. These four corps inarched along three difEerent routes. The third, corps followed the route passing through Cassel, Lille, Luxembourg, Deux-Ponts, and terminating at Man- heim. The fourth corps followed the route through St. Omer, Ctimbrai, MSzieres, Vei-dun, Metz, and teripinating at Spire. The fifth and sixth corps, the fifth in advapce, passed through La Fere, Eheims and Nancy. At this latter- place, the corps separated, the fifth went to Strasburg^md the sixth to Lauterbourg. The distance was made in twenty-four m^'ches, the four corps reaching the Khine on the 24th of September. They were marched, as it is seen, on three different routes, each corps being divided into three divisions, and following each other on three successive days. By this arrangement, all crossings of columns were avoided; the great natural routes were followed ; the marches for each day were of proper length ; and the detachments arrived in succession and without interference at their desti- nation. 120. Example of forced route inarches. If these marches had been arranged so that any of them exceeded twenty miles in length for any one day, the march for that day would have been a, forced one. 121. Forced marches by rail were frequently used in the late war in the United States. The transfer in seven days of the eleventh and twelfth corps under General Hooker, from the Potomac to Chattanooga in Tennessee, in 1863 ; and the transfer of the twenty- third corps under General Schofield, ■^0 AET AND SCIENCE OF WAR, from Tennessee to the city of Washington in 1865, are good examples. 122. Strategical Marches. In marches of the second class, the comfort and convenience of the troops must be made secondary to that of seenrity, as the enemy may make his appearance when least expected. Precautions must be taken to guard against surprise and the troops be so moved as to he always ready to receive an attack. To guard against surprise, the column slionld be pre-, ceded by a body of troops whose duty will be to search and thoroughly examine the country in front and on the flunks of the line of march, and give warning to the main body of the presence, or the approach, of the enemy, if he should be discovered. This body of troops marching in advance of the main body is called the advanced guard. 123. To move the troops so as to be ready at all times to receive an attack, three general conditions must be observed. They are as follows, viz : 1. The different arms of service should have such posi- tions on the line of march that they will support, and not interfere with, each other ; 2. The formation of the column of march should be of such a nature that by short and simple movements the line of battle can be quickly formed ; ' 3. That the strictest, and even severe discipline should be enforced. 124. The positions on the line of march of the different arms will depend upon the nature of the country. A quick formation of line of battle necessitates marching MARCHES. 71 the troops in compact order and on as large a front as the roads will admit. Strict discipline is necessary to prevent the men from falling out of the ranks and from unnecessary defiling and stepping aside to avoid, muddy places in the road ; the former producing straggling, and the latter delays in the progress of the column, frequently serious and always annoying in their effect. 125. These marches of the second kind, being made in the theatre of war, near an enemy whose position isnot exactly known, have in general for their object the comple- tion of some strategical combination. For this reason they are designated,- "strategical marches." They are used to conduct an army to a position from which an attack can be made on the enemy, or to a position iu which the army can remain and receive an attack ; in other words, to a position immediately in the presence of the enemy. Strategical marches are either ordinary or forced march- es, and are used' principally to mass troops at some stated point on the theatre of operations before the enemy can make arrangements to prevent it or can prepare counter-movements to weaken or nullify the effect of the movement. 126. Secrecy, celerity, and good order are therefore indis- pensable requisites for success in marches of this kind. Secrecy is necessary to prevent the enemy from, discov- ering the object of the movement. Celerity is necessary for success, as even a slight delay will oftentimes render useless the proposed movement. Good order is essential to celerity, and especially so if it becomes necessary to make any change in the direction of 72 ART AXD SCIEXCE OF ^XX^R. the march. Without good order, for which strict discipline is necessary, any modification of plan or change of direction would probably he accompanied by confusion, from which delays would follow, and probably a favorable opportunity for the execution of the plan would be lost. 127. The great difference between a route march and a strategical one, is the amount of precaution taken to guard iigainst surprise. No precautions are taken in a route march because no enemy is near ; precautions are taken in a strate- gical march because the enemy may make his appearance at any moment. In matters of detail in the execution of these marches, there is no difference between the two kinds, excepting so far as regards the precautions taken to guard against surprise. 128. Examples of strategical marches. The march of the army of the Keserve in 1800, already alluded to in a previous article, is a good example. Also the march of the French army in 1805, from the Rhine to Donauwerth is another. 129. Tactical marches. Since these marches are made very near the enemy, greater precautions are required to guard against an attack than are necessary in strategical marches. The different columns are marched on as'large fronts as the roads and the nature of the country will admit ; in com- pact order ; and are all in supporting distance of each other. The object is to so march the columns that they can be quickly deployed, and that the line of battle thus formed should contain the effective strength of the army making the movement. Each column is preceded by an advanced guard, MARCHES. . 73 whose duty is to give timely notice of the presence of the enemy, so as to prevent the heads of the columns being attacked before the deployments can be made, and also to prevent the enemy from pushingin between any two of the columns. Each column, as it arrives near the position to be occu- pied, from which an. attack on the enemy is to be made, or in whieli the army is to await an attack, is broken into several small columns, and these subdivisions are moved by as short lines as possible to the places they are to occupy. The col- umns are preceded by engineer troops or pioneers, who clear the roads of obstacles, repair the bad places, and make the routes practicable for those who follow. 130. Tactical marches differ from route and strategical marches in one material particular, and that is in the number and sizes of the wagon trains accompanying the troops on the march. Both in route and strategical marches, the troops are cumbered, with long and nn\yieldy wagon trains carrying the baggage and supplies of the army, whereas in a tactical march there are none, or the trains are reduced to a minimum. Since the enemy may attack the moving col- umns at any minute, everything is sacrificed to the impor- tant one of being ready to fight at a minute's notice, and the army carries with it only supplies enough for two or three days, and little or no baggage. Everything not essential for feeding the troops and not necessary for fighting is therefore left behind the army while it is making a tactical march. Other Classifications of Marches. 131. Besides these three kinds of marches which are based upon the position of the enemy, writers use various 74 ART ASTD SCIEXCE OF TV'AK. other classifications basedj upon the object to be attained, or upon the direction of the march, or upon some other charac- teristic feature of the march. These are known as marches of concentration, maneuver-marches, retreats, flank-marches, etc. 133. Marches of conceatration. The marches which are made by several bodies of troops, starting from points separated from each other, for the purpose of bring- ing these troops together at some stated place, are termed '•' marches of concentration." The place of concentration may be distant from, or it may be near to the enemy, and the marches made to reacli it, may be ordinary or forced. Forced marches are much used in concentrating troops, especially before a battle. Many examples are given in mil- itary history. Friant's division of Davoust's corps marched over eighty miles in forty-eight hours in 180S, to join Napoleon in the battle of Austerlitz. Craufurd's brigade marched, so Napier says, sixty-two miles in twenty-six hours, to join Wellington at Talavera, in 1809. Napoleon marched an army to the relief of Dresden, in 1813, by forced marches of over thirty miles a day for three consecutive days. The marches of the different corps of the Army of the Potomac on the 30th of June and the 1st of July 1863, by means of which the army was concentrated at Gettysburg, are good examples of march- es of concentration.. The Sixth Corps under General Sedg- wick made on this occasion a march of over thirty miles. 133. Maneuver-marches. Marches are sometimes taade by which an army gains a position, the possession of MARCHES. 75 which compels the enemy to leave the position he is occupy- ing. If these marches are under the observation of the enemy, they are termed, '•' maneuvers ;" but if made out of his sight, they are called " maneuver-marches." The movements of the different corps of the French army in 1805, from the time they crossed the Ehine until they crossed the Danube, were " maneuver-marches," since by their execution, the Austrian position at Ulm was turned and was no longer tenable by the Austrian army. 134. Flank inarches, etc. An army marching directly towards a position occupied by the enemy is said to make a march to the front. If it marches away from the enemy, it makes a retrograde movement or a retreat. If it marches parallel or obliquely to the enemy's position, it makes a flank march. A march to the front would be used in case an attack on the enemy was to be made ; a retreat would be used, if the intention is to avoid the enemy ; and a flank march would be used, if it is desired to tnrn the enemy's position or attack him on the flank. Remarks on the Execution of Marches. 135. The art of arranging the details of a march is a part of Logistics. The simple movements of troops, like that of forming into line of battle from a column formation, or the converse, or a change of position in the actual presence of the enemy, form g, part of Tactics. He who directs a march should be a master of logistics.; The direction of a march being given and the point to be reached being known, it is the part of logistics to arrange 76 AET AND SCIENCE OF WAR. the details for making it. It becomes the part of logistics to regulate the sizes of the columns, and their composition ; to furnish itineraries of the routes ; to fix the halting and camping places ; to make arrangements for supplying the troops on the march ; to provide means of communication between the moving columns ; to order precautionary meas- ures to guard against disaster ; to make the necessary ar- rangements so as to ensure the arrival of the troops at the stated point at a fixed hour, and at the same time to spare the men as far as possible unnecessary fatigue and privation. ' !136. Celerity and safety are the two things to be consid- ered in arranging the details of a march. Good roads are necessary for the first, and rapidity of deployment is an es- sential of the second. As there are usually several roads practically parallel to each other leading forward in the general direction of the march, celerity is obtained by marching columns on each road. Since the roads differ but little from each other in width, the front of the different columns will be about the same and the rapidity of deployment of each column will depend upon the length or depth of the column. 137. The number of columns will depend upon the size of the army, and upon the number of roads practicable for use and their distance apart. The line of battle,' when formed, should be free from gaps and this condition fixes its extent. The front of march, when near the enemy, should not as a rule be greater than twice the length of line of bat- tle ^; for if it is greater, when the line is formed, large gaps will be found, through which the enemy might penetrate. MARCHKS. 77 I Constant communication must be kept open between the difEerent columns, so that no delay or confusion may prevent the whole army acting together as one body, if any general movement is to be made. Tills condition of keeping open the communications -will prevent the use of a road which is separated from the others by an impassable obstacle. Dividing an army into corps or divisions and marching these sub-divisions on separate roads gives greater mobility to the army and in addition keeps the enemy uncertain as to the point of attack. The strength of a column on any single road will depend upon the number of sub-divisions into which the main body is divided and upon the nature of the road. Experience has determined a superior limit to the numbers marching on a single road, this number being about thirty thousand.. General McClellan, in one of his reports, mentions the diflBculties of using a single road. He says, '"'If I had marched the entire army (about 100,000 men) in one col- umn along the banks of the river instead of upon five differ- ent parallel roads, the column with its trains would have ex- tended about fifty miles, and the enemy might have defeated the advance before the rear could have reached the scene of action." 138. An advanced guard precedes each column when the march is in the neighborhood of the enemy. The strength of this guard varies with circumstances, but as a general rule, is between one-tenth and one-fifth that of the main column. Its distance from the main body is at least equal to the length of the column, so that in falling 78 ART A.XD SCIENCE OF WAE. back, the time taken for it to reach the head of the column will be sufiBcient to have allowed the rear divisions of the main column to have reached the head and formed into line. The main column is followed by the baggage wagons and general trains. These should not under any circumstances be mixed with the troops, as they would seriously interfere with the movements of the latter in the event of an engage- ment occurring. 139. A body of troops, called the rear guard follows the general train. Its duty is to escort the baggage, arrest maraxiders and deserters, and drive along stragglers. Advancing towai'ds the enemy, there is not much dan- ger of attack, and hence it is smaller than the advanced guard, not more than half its size. If the column is retreat- ing, then the rearguard is made much stronger. 140. An officer, who has to arrange the details of the marches of several columns, should have full knowledge of all the roads traversing the field of operations. He should know everything about the roads, viz., where they lead, how wide, how long, whether sunken or raised, level or hilly, stony, muddy or sandy, macadamized, paved, or dirt roads, etc. He should know whether they pass through villages,' open or wooded country, cultivated or waste lands, through marshes, swamps, etc. He should know at what points they would be commanded from positions which the enemy might occupy, the general nature of the country adjacent to the roads, and how it is affected by rainy and dry weathei", the possibility of obtaining materials for repairs to the road, and under certain emergencies the feasibility of making new roads. He should especiallly know the positions of the ridges MARCHES. Id of the hills and directions of the streams, and of the latter, the means of crossing them, whether by fords, bridges, or ferries. He should knowas to the practicability of obtain- ing supplies for men and animals in the country through which the march is to be made, and the best places for camp- ing or bivouacking the troops. In fact, everything which will exercise an influence on the celerity and safety of the march should be known and studied with care. For it is only by extreme and close attention to these details that he is enabled to arrange and time the marches, so that columns moving on different roads will arrive at the stated point at a given time, and without interfering with each other. The details being arranged, the orders issued for the march, its execution is greatly dependent upon the third con- dition before named, viz., good order or military discipline. This third condition is in the pi'ovince of tactics. 141. A thing, seemingly of little importance, but in reality affecting very materially the execution of a march, is the pace adopted by the head of a column. This pace should be a regular one and rather slow. Irregularity of pace is found to be very fatiguing to those some distance behind, and a quick pace soon strings out the column beyond its proper length. Infantry should march, not including the halts, about two and one-half miles an hour. At this rate, allowing for the necessary halts, it will take ten hours for a column to march twenty miles. This time of ten hours fixes the limit of the greatest ordi- nary march, already named as twenty miles long. 80 ART AXD SCIENCE OF WAR. Moving at a walk, cavalry marches at about three miles an hour. By increasing the gait to a trot, cavalry moves at about five miles an hour, and can keep this gait for several hours. Forced marches are, however, even more severe upon cavalry than upon infantry. Frequent halts should be made to allow the men to rest. An uninterrupted march should not be more than one hour long, unless by extending it a few minutes, a more favorable halting place can be reached. Description of the Rules observed in a March to the Front. ■ 142. The following description of marching a body of troops, as given by Colonel Leach, of the British army, in de- scribing the march of General Craufurd's division of Welling- ton's army in Portugal in 1809, will illustrate the details just mentioned. The division having formed in rear of the leading battalion, at whole, half, or quarter distance, or in close column, and the baggage being assembled in rear of it, the march was commenced with pre- cisely the same regularity as would be observed by a regiment or regi- ments moving in or out of a garrison town ; the bands playing, the light-infantry with arms sloped, and those of the riflemen slung over the shoulder, the officers with swords drawn, and exact wheeling distances of the sections preserved, and perfect silence observed. After having proceeded a short distance in this manner, the word of command, ' March at ease,' was given by the general at the head of the leading battalion, and this was passed quickly on to the rear from company to company. The captains, instead of continuing at the head of their companies, dropped back to the rear of them : the reasons for allotting this station to them was, that they might see any MARCHES.- 81 men of their respective companies who attempted to leave the ranks without leave. The officers and non-commissioned officers preserved the wheeling distances. The soldiers now carried their arms in any manner most convenient. Some slung them over their shoulders, (most of them, indeed, preferred this mode as the least fatiguing ) others sloped them, and many trailed them, and they constantly Changed from the right hand or right shoulder to the left. While some lighted their short black pipes, others sung or amused their comrades with stories and jests, as is usual on those occasions. Although allowed to prosecute the march in this easy and unrestrained manner, a heavy penalty, nevertheless, awaited the man who quitted the ranks without permission from the captain or officer command- ing his company. The captains were always provided with tickets bearing their own signature, on each of which was written, ' The bearer has my permission to fall out of the ranks, being unable to proceed with the regiment.' Any soldier found on the line of march by the rear guard, withctat a ticket, was liable to be punished for disobedience of orders ; and, as no difficulty was ever experienced by men who were sick, or knocked up, in procuring this certificate of inability to keep up with their regiments, such offenders certainly merited punishment. If a soldier wanted to fall out of the ranks for a few minutes only, he was required to ask leave of the captain to do so, and, moreover, to take off his knapsack, and to give it, together with his musket, in charge of the men of his own section, to be carried by them until he rejoined them. This was an admirable order, and it operated in two ways ; first, the soldier was enabled, not being encumbered with either knapsack or musket, more speedily to overtake the column on its march ; and secondly, if he loitered unnecessarily on the way to rejoin his comrades, who were doubly burdened with his arms and pack, he would be certain to incur their displeasure. About once in every hour and a quarter or half, a halt was or- dered, and ten or twelve minutes allowed for the men to re^t. When 4' 83 AET AND SCIEXCE OF WAB. practicable, this was done on ground near which there ■« as water ; but it is almost unnecessary to add, that very frequently it was not possible to And such favorable spots. Preparatory to those temporary halts, the word of command, ' Attention ! ' was given at the head of the leading regiment, and passed on rapidly (as already stated) from company to company. Upon this, the captains moved, quickly from the rear of their com- panies to the front ; the arms of the soldiers were regularly shoul- dered or slung ; perfect silence was observed ; the pipes were in- stantaneously put out of sight, either in the haversacks or elsewhere; the dressing and the wheeling distances of the sections were cor- rectly kept ; and in an instant there was a magical change from ap- parent irregularity to most perfect discipline and order. On resuming the march after those halts, the troops observed the same extreme regularity during the first hundred or two of yards, as I have already described. The words ' March at ease ' being again given, they returned to the song, the story, and the tobacco-pipe. On approaching rivulets or shallow pieces of water, which it was necessary should be passed, neither officers nor soldiers were allowed to pick their way through, nor was the smallest break or irregularity permitted to exist in the ranks ; but the column marched through by half sections, sections, or sub-divisions, (according to the width of the ford,) preserving the same order as if moving along a road. That this regulation was, on some occasions, too rigidly enforced, I have never heard disputed ; still, the object at which it aimed, viz. that of expending as little time as possible on each day's march, so as to give the soldiers time to take their rest, to construct huts in the bivouac, to wash their linen, to mend their clothes or shoes, to draw their rations, and to cook their meals, that they might be fresh for whatever fatigues happened to be in store for them, was indis- putably a most desirable one. Those who have campaigned know, that in advancing to attack an enemy, or in retiring before one, the passage of rivers in the line MARCHES. 83 of march, even if so deep as to reach their middles, anil under the fire of an enemy also, are expected to be crossed by the troops with- out a greater derangement taking place in their order of march than the obstacles which they are in the act of encountering, must neces- sarily produce in a greater or less degree. With a detachment consisting of a few hundred men, at a dis- tance from an enemy, and with ample time before them to get over their day's march, it would appear that this order might well be dis- pensed with ; but with a division of four or five thousand men, the case is widely different. Let it be supposed that it has arrived at a stream which admits of being passed by sections, subdivisions, or even by companies ; and that, instead of proceeding straight through it in this manner, every soldier is permitted to pick his way across in any manner ho may think proper, and to break off from his place in the ranks — what a vast loss of time would this occasion ! When would the rear of the column have effected its passage ? Surely the patience of those belonging to the front, centre, and rear of this body of four thou- sand soldiers, would be pretty well exhausted long before the oppo- site bank was gained by the whole, and the march resumed. In the rugged and mountainous districts which the army so fre- quently traversed in the Peninsula, it encountered various defiles and other obstacles, which precluded the possibility of their being passed except by a very small number of men at a time ; and the following mode was therefore adopted by each company in making its way along. The first company of the leading battalion, as soon as it had disentangled itself from the defile, or broken ground, was directed to march forward, perhaps about a quarter of a mile ; there to pile arms, and the men to rest. The head of the next company, when it had cleared the defile, halted about thirty or forty yards on the other side, until all the men belonging to it came up in succession. This done, the captain moved it forward independently until it joined the leading company, where it piled arms. Thus, each company, as 84- ART ASD SCIENCE OF WAK. soon as it had cleared the obstacles, was brought up en masse, and at a regular pace, without reference to those in its rear. By those means that most unmilitary exhibition of file after file running on, like a string of wild geese, to catfh those in their front, was entirely avoided. Few things tend so effectually to fatigue and irritate soldiers who are already jaded, as that of trotting on, bending under the weight of pack, belts, and musket, to overtake those who continue to march on in their front. When the division was about to perform a march not in the im- mediate vicinity of an enemy, the following arrangements were made either for bivouacking or quartering it, (as the case might be,) so that no time should be lost after it had reached its destination. A staff -officer, accompanied by the quartermasters of the division, or (if other duties at that moment were required to be performed by the quartermasters) by a subaltern of each regiment, preceded the troops on horseback, so as to arrive long before them at the ground on which they were to halt for the day, or at the town or village in which it was intended they should be quartered. A whole street, or part of one, (as circumstances admitted,) was allotted by the staff-offlcer to the quartermasters for each of their regiments, who immediately divided the street into equal portions for the different companies, reserving a house or two for the staff of the regiment. A sergeant of every company of the division being sent forward so as to arrive long before the troops, and being told by his quarter- master how many and what buildings were set apart for his own people, again subdivided the houses into four equal parts for each of the sections. In the event of any noise or disturbance taking place, whether by day or by night, the probabilities were, that the officers belonging to the companies where such irregularities were going on, would certainly hear it, and as instantaneously put an end to it. MARCHES. 85 If, then, the division marched into a town, each company was by its sergeant conducted to the houses allotted to it ; in which they were established in a very few minutes. It rarely happened, there- fore, that the soldiers were kept waiting in the streets for any length of time, as has too often been the case. Should it, on the other hand, have been intended to bivouac the division, instead of putting it into houses, arrangements of a similar nature were adopted, by sending forward officers and sergeants to take up the ground ; by which means each company marched at once up to its own sergeant, on whom they formed in open column. The rolls were immediately called ; the men first for duty were warned for guards, (also inlying and outlying pickets, if near the enemy,) for fatigue duties, to draw the rations, to procure wood for cooking if none was near at hand, to go for water if no river flowed near the encampment, etc., etc. This done, and the alarm-post, or place of general assembly, hav- ing been pointed out to every one, the men were dismissed ; the arms piled, the cooking immediately commenced, and all further parades were dispensed with for the day, except a roll-call about sunset. Parties to procure forage, whether green or dry, were sent out in charge of an officer as soon as the troops were dismissed. A corporal and three privates of every company, mounted guard at nightfall, whenever the division was encamped. The particular duty expected from the sentinels of these company guards was to keep an eye to the baggage animals belonging to their officers, (which were picketed to the trees or fastened in some other manner,) and to prevent them from breaking loose. After the establishment of those little guards, but few instances occurred of whole troops of noisy mules, horses, and asses, chasing each other round and through the camp or bivouac, and galloping over the faces and bodies of the soldiers while they were asleep. Independent of their utility in this way, every company in the 86 AKT AND SCIEK-CB OF WAR. division, having its own sentinel, was sure to be instantly apprised of any alarm during the night from the pickets in front ; and they were enabled, also, to communicate to their respective companies, without the least delay, any orders arriving at the camp. Those only who have witnessed it can thoroughly understand with what uncommon facility and dispatch the division could sud- denly get under arms, form in column of march, load the baggage, and proceed on the route chalked out for it. Order of March of a Body of Troops making a forward Movement. 143, The difEerent arms should, as has already been stated, occupy such positions in the line of march that they can readily support and not interfere with each other, in any of the movements to be made to meet the enemy. The rela- tive proportions of the difEerent arms and the nature of the country will determine the " order of march." It would, for instiance, be objectionable to place large bodies of cavalry at the head of a column moving in a broken and wooded country, for the reason that cavalry not being able to act advantageously in a country of this nature would, upon meeting the enemy, be obliged to fall back. This retrograde movement would cause delay, produce confusion, and might result in throwing the infantry into disorder. The artillery, as a rule, should march in the midst of the other troops, but if there is a probability of suddenly meeting the enemy, a battery should be placed at the head of the column, so that by its fire the enemy may be kept at a distance during the first deployments. 144. The order of march, in an average countr}-, of a divis- ion composed of four brigades of infantry, four batteries of MAECHKS. 87 artillery, one regiment of cavalry, two companies of sappers and pioneers, one company of pontoniers, and the usual army trains, will be about as follows : 1st. The advanced guard. 2d. A small detachment of cavalry. 3d. A battery of artillery. 4th. A brigade of infantry. 5th. Two batteries of artillery. 6th. Two brigades of infantry. 7th. The remaining cavalry. 8th. The wagon train. 9th. The rear guard. 145. To make this more definite, we will suppose the brigades numbered from one to four, and each brigade to be composed of four regiments. The strength of the division, not including staff officers and persons employed in the medical, commissary and quartermaster departments is sup- posed to be about as follows : 16 regiments of infantry of 750 men each. .12,000 men. 1 regiment of cavalry 1,200 4 batteries of field artillery of six guns each . 600 2 companies of sappers and pioneers of 150 men each 300 1 company of pontoniers 150 Total 14,350 146. As the country is supposed to be open and to offer no material obstruction to the movements of the different arms, the advanced guard will contain troops of all arms of service. We will suppose it to be composed as follows : 88 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. One company of sappers and pioneers ; Four companies of cavalry ; One battery of six pieces ; and Two regiments of infantry. The order in which this guard marches will be described hereafter. The distance of the advanced guard from the bead of the main body has been taken to be about equal to the length of the column of march of the main body. The length of the " column in route " of the main body will be about equal to the extent of the line of battle Of the entire division, and this for a division of this strength will be about three miles. Therefore, the advanced guard will be separated from the main body by a distance, at least, of three miles. 147. The main body marches as follows : 1st. Two companies of cavalry. One of these is in ad- vance of the other, and distant from it about three-fourths ,of a mile. 2d. A company of sappers and pioneers. 3d. The rest of the 1st brigade. 4th. One battery of artillery. 5th. The 2d brigade. 6th. The remaining batteries of artillery. 7th. The 3d brigade. 8th. The 4th brigade, excepting one regiment detached to form the rear guard. 9 th. The rest of the cavalry, excepting the portion de- tached to accompany the rear guard. 10th. The wagon train, composed of baggage wagons. MAECIIES. 89 wagons carrying supplies of ammunition, comfpisgary, medi- cal, and quartermaster stores, and the bridge equipage. 11th. The rear guard. The compositi(?n of this guard varies according to circumstances. Besides ppUecting strag- glers and preventing marauding, the rear guard performs a function similar to that of the advanced guard, and that is, to prevent an enemy from approaching the polumn without being perceived. This condition require^ that the rear guard should be some distance from the rear of the column, so as to give timely notice of the approaoJn of the enemy. In the case under consideration, the rear giiard is assumed to be composed of one regiment of infantry a^4 two compa- nies of cavalry. Its distance from the rear qf the main col- umn, not considering the length of the wqgon train, would not be less than one and one-half miles. The pontoniers march with the bridge equipage which forms the rear of the wagon train, excepting wl^en a river is to be crossed diying the day's march. In this latter case, it takes the position at the head of the wagon train, for that day only, resuming its place in rear when the command has all crossed the river. 148. It would seem that the pontoniers and the bridge equipage should always be in front and even march with the advanced guard. But this would be a bad arrangement, as the train would interfere with the mobility of the advance guard, wh^se movements should be prompt and free from en- cumbrance. Also, in case of a reverse happening to the advanced guard, the bridge equipage would be lost and the army would be deprived of a most important accessory for future operations. 90 AliT AXD SCIEXCE OP IVAR. The sappers and pioneers of the advanced guard can make all necessary arrangements for crossing small streams. The pontoiiiers are therefore to be employed only in repair- ing broken bridges of some extent, or in laying a bridge over rivers of some importance. In the latter case, the bridge train can be moved to the front while the army is halting, as it will have to do. The best place therefore for the bridge train is the one selected in rear of the troops. 149. Each regiment changes its place in the brigade and the brigades change places with each other, so that the posi- tion at the head of the brigade, and the position at the head of the column, are occupied successively during the march. 150. The wagon train will be long, its length depending upon the quantity of supplies to be carried. It will be, if the march is one of concentration, composed of two general parts, viz., the brigade trains, and the general supply train. The following order is usually foUowc^ for a brigade train, viz., 1st, ammunition; 2d, hospital stores and bag- gage ; 3d, cooking utensils and cooked rations ; and 4th, the general baggage. The baggage of the different regiments should never be mixed but kept separate. The different wagons should be marked in a plain and conspicuous manner showing their contents, and to what brigade and division they belong. The general train is composed of wagons carrying the reserve ammunition and ordnance supplies ; commissary and quartermaster stores ; and the bridge equipage. The order of their march is as just named ; the ammunition train lead- ing and the bridge train forming the rear. MARCHES. 91 Order of Maich when near the Enemy. 151. When distant from the enemy, it is not unusual to allow the brigade trains to follow their respective brigades. But when there is danger of his sudden appeai-ance they should be placed in rear of the troops, as has been de- scribed. When near the enemy, further precautions should bo taken and the order of march must be so arranged as to allow of the troops forming into " line of battle " in the promptest manner. 153. As soon as the approach, or the presence, of the enemy in force is made evident, the advanced guard should form for battle and its commander should send a report, if possible a written one, to the general in command. The general, as soon as he receives this report, halts the head of the column and closes it in mass. He closes the wagon train into a compact body or has it parked, as circum- stances may require, in some place in rear, out of the way of any movements he may wish to have made. He sends reinforcements to the advanced guard and rides quickly forward to examine the position occupied by it, and to examine the country in and near his front. He then de- cides if the enemy is to be attacked and how the attack is to be made, or whether he will take up a position and await the attack of the enemy. ■ 153, The main body as soon as the columns are closed in mass continue their forward movement, moving so as to read- ily form into line of battle wjien required. Supposing the country to be open, the forward movement, after the columns ft3 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. are closed, for a division, composed as the one just described, would be sottifething like that shown in Fig. 4. The two l-egiments of the Ist brigade and the company of sappei's and pioneers marching at the head of the column, Fig. 4. + + + +++«4- I . ++++++ si ^^ 3«- " m J: espJiU...^. ^r;±] were sent fdtward to support the advanced guard^ as soon as the report of the enemy's approach was received. The two companies of cavalry in advance of the main body accom- panied the ^fenerai in his ride to the front. The 3d brigade as soon as it was closed in mass moved to the right of the road and took a position about one thousand j'ards froni the leading battery, as sliown in the %Hre. The MAIiCHES. ^ 93 3d brigade took a similar position ou the left. The batteries were massed on the main road and followed closely by the 4th brigade and the rest of the cavalry. The whole then moves forward to the position which is to be occupied, ready to be deployed into line in a veryfeAv minutes. 154. The general method of marching when advancing, towards the enemy has been described, but with the supposi- tion that the country was open and no obstacle in the way. In practioe, the country will not be open, and obstacles will be met. The principal obstacles will be rivers and defiles ; and instead of the country being open and free from obstruc- tion, the column will have to advance through large tracts of wooded country. An allusion to the rules to be observed in marching in these cases will be briefly made. Marching through Woods. 155. A column should not enter a thickly wooded tract until it has been thoroughly examined both in front and on the sides to such a distance as to remove all apprehension of an unexpected attack by a large force of the enemy. In this case, the infantry must do the scouting, as the cavalry can make but slow progress through woods. If the wood is of small extent, the advanced guard does not pass through until the scouts have reached the other side ; but if of considerable extent, the delay would be too great, and, in this case, a halt of half or quarter of an hour is made, while detachments follow each other to the front, and serve as successive reinforcements to the leading de- tachment. If the wood is occupied by the enemy, skirmishers are 94 AET AITD SCIENCE OF WAK. sent forward, who gradually creep up on the flanks, under such cover as they can find, to the outskirts. The artillery follows at a suitable distance, takes a central position, fires obliquely, and forces the defenders to take refuge in the denser parts. Thus, the skirmishers are enabled to get cover behind the outer fringe of trees. When this is accomplished, and the advanced guard is in possession of the skirts of the wood, the enemy cannot hold his position long, unless abatis have been made. This species of obstacle cannot be of very great extent, and may be the more easily turned, as the wood itself conceals the movement. The enemy, once set in mo- tion, should be vigorously pressed by the skirmishers, sup- ported, if practicable, by small columns. If the entire wood can be turned, the cavalry, which can be of no use in the in- terior, may make a circuit to threaten the communications of the enemy, and hasten hi^ retreat. When the forest has been well swept by the fire, cavalry may be sent along the road at a gallop, to dasli upon the retiring enemy as he de- bouches into the open ground, and thus change his retreat into a rout. Marching through a Defile. 156. Any passage through which troops march and which compels a line to ploy into column, or a column of march to diminish its front is termed a defile. Hence, any narrow passage through which troops can only pass in column or by a flank is a defile. A ford, a bridge, a road through a mountain pass, etc., are examples of defiles. They may be divided into two classes, viz : those which confine the col- umn to a limited space, and are accessible only at their ex- MARCHES. 95 fcremities, such as a ford, a bridge, a road in a mountain gorge bordered by inaccessible heights, etc. ; and those which, while they confine the troops to a limited space, are accessible also on their flanks, as a road in a narrow valley bordered by heights which are easily ascended, etc, 157. A defile may be or may not be occupied by the enemy. If it is not occupied, but the enemy, as far as we know, may suddenly appear, the following precautions should nevertheless be taken by the column on the mai'ch in passing through it. The advanced guard halts as soon as it arrives at the defile, and sends a detachment of infantry to pass through. This detachment throws out flankers and thoroughly scouts the entire defile. When it reaches the opposite extremity, or farther end, one half of the detachment is deployed as skirmishers and the other half divided into small bodies who thoroughly examine the ground in front, to ascertain if the enemy is near. Other detachments of infantry follo\^ and take position before the outlet of the defile. These detachments being united and having possession of the outlet of the defile, tlie artillery, cavalry and wagons of the advance guard are sent through. The cavalry are then thrown forward in advance of the infantry and are made to thoroughly examine the country beyond. If the flanks of the defiles are accessible they must b^ ijijioroughly examined and watched until the whole command has passed. The artillery and wagon train do not enter the defile until it is known to be perfectly safe. If the defile is short and held by the enemy, but not Ofi ART AND SCIENCE OF WAH. in force, the duty of tlie advanced guard is to take possession of it. 158. If a defile is accessible on its flanks, there may be two conditions. One, in which the heights on each side are equal in elevation, and the other, where the heights on one side command those on the other. In either case, the heights .are first seized and a column pushed through the defile with artillery in advance. The seizure of the heights will render untenable any position in the defile. When one height commands the other, it will be sufiScient to get possession of the higher side, as its possession will render the lower one useless for the enemy. It will be wise, howetfer, and prudent to seize both sides and thus get complete possession of the pass. Having obtained full possession, the defile is passed with the precautions already desd-lbed. 159. These remarks apply particularly to defiles accessi- ble on the flanks, not held by the enemy or held by small numbers. With slight modifications they apply to all defiles, as a road through a marsh, a road leading through a village with narrow streets, a road leading thi-ough a wood, etc. A great point to be observed, is to get possession of and hold all lateml roads or means of communication, by which the enemy might attempt to attack the column in flank when in the defile. Passage of a Bridge. 160. A bridge is a short defile and the remarks already made about marching through a defile apply to them. But MARCHES. 97 as they are so frequently met in the march, a special allusion is made to them. If no enemy be visible, the precautions taken are the same as those given for a defile not occupied by the enemy. The leading detachment of the advanced guard which is of cavalry halts near the bridge and does not attempt to cross until the ground on the opposite side is thoroughly examined. This examination is made by a part of the cavalry who cross the bridge at a rapid trot, and then divide into three groups ; one of which moves carefully along the road, making the cii'cuit of houses, gardens, and clumps of trees, while the other two groups go to the right and left, exploring as they go. "When, after a few minutes, no enemy is discovered, the. leading detachment crosses the bridge, and rapidly rejoins the groups which are on the other side. The main body of the advanced guard having halted at some distance from the bridge until this examina^ tion of the other side was made, now moves forward and crosses the bridge at a quick pace and in close order. It is a good plan to'leave an interval between the artillery and thei troops before and after, and to pass that over at a trot. As soon as the advanced guard is safely over, the com mander makes a report of the fact to the commanding gen- eral. When the main body comes up, it may pass with- out delay. If the communication established by the bridge is an important one, the advanced guard should not move forward until the main body has come up, because the enemy might permit the passage by the advanced guard, and dispute that of the main body. In such a case, it should prepare to resist any attack the enemy might make, 98 y ART AND SCIEXCE OF WAU. before the arrival of the main body, taking advantage of the features of the ground to strengthen its position. 161. If the bridge is short and is held only by a small force, it may be possible for the advanced guard to carry it, if a quick and firm attempt be made. In this case, artillery is brought up and a strong cross fire is brought to bear on the ground on the opposite side of the river in front of the bridge. Skirmishers line the bank, keeping up a sharp and murderous fire on the opposite bank. Under this combined artillery and musketry fire, the enemy are driven from their positions and upon their retiring, a de- tachment of infantry rushes across the bridge, deploying as skirmishers as soon as they reach the opposite side. This de- tachment is immediately supported by a second, and this by a third. The artillery now ceases fire, forms into columns, passes the bridge quickly and takes position where it can fire on the retreating enemy. The movement has now succeeded, and is followed by the passage of more infantry and cavalry, the latter moving out and threatening the flanks of the retiring enemy. The army coming up can cross without in- terference. March through Defiles occupied by the Euemy iu Force. 162. It has been urged that precautions should be taken to pass through a defile, even if no enemy is apparently pres- ent. Disasters have so often occurred from rashly entering a long defile even when following a retreating enemy, that the precautions already named are always insisted upon, if the enemy be anywhere in the neighborhood. MAECHES. 99 If a defile is held by an enemy in force, it will be found a diflBcult and bloody task to dislodge him — so difficult in fact, that it is far wiser to turn his position, if possible. There are cases, where it may be necessary to force a pas- sage, whatever may be the cost. The general remarks appli- cable to the cases where the defile was held by a weak force are also applicable to this case. A front attack which shall succeed is almost impossible. The only chance of success is to take the enemy in flank, or to engage his attention at one point, and in the meantime break through the position he has taken at some other point. Passage of Rivers ou the March. 163. The most serious of the obstacles encountered on a march is an unfordable river, with its bridges broken down, and the enemy in possession of the opposite bank. To pass such an obstacle always occasions loss of time, which will be proportional to the difficulties attending the attempt. If the column has a bridge train, it will answer for the passage of streams of moderate size ; but when the river is very broad, it may become necessary to collect the boats of the country and other materials for building a bridge. 164. A passage is made either by a stratagem or by force, or of tener still by both together. The attempt should not be made until an examination of the river has been made to dis- cover the most favorable point. This point will usually be one where the bank is higher than on the other side, and at the same time envelopes it, on account of a bend in the river. The neighborhood of an afEluent is convenient, as it offers facilities' for collecting in safety and floating down the bridge maleri- 100 AET AXD SCIENCE OF WAR. als. A thickly wooded bank and a wooded island enable the preparations for passage to be made out of sight of the enemj'. EfEorts should be made to keep the, plans secret, and to deceive the enemy. Preparations are sometimes made at a place where no passage is intended, and, when every thing is ready, a sudden move is made to the real point. At dawn, batteries, posted upon commanding points, cross their fire on the opposite shore, and drive off or under cover all who may be there. Marksmen may also be very useful in assisting the artillery, if the stream is not too wide. At the same time, the boats descend the affluent where they have been concealed. They are filled with soldiers, and rapidly moved across the river, where the men disembark as fast as possible, and secure the best cover they can, to enable them to hold their ground. The artillery gives all the aid it can render while the boats are carrying over other loads of infantry. There is a double advantage in these successive trips of the boats, the first sol- diers thrown over being incited to strenuous efEorts by having their retreat temporarily cut off, and still having the hope of speedy re-enforcement. The position of the attacking force gets constantly better until they feel strong enough to push the enemy back and drive him from the river. The artillery ceases firing as soon as its fire might be dan- gerous to the troops on the other side, and shifts its position to another, where it may still be effective if it be necessary. When things are in this condition, the bridge might be commenced, but troops should continue to cross in the boats. Field-works are at once begun, to cover the bridge and secure its possession. This is a prudential measure which should never be omitted. MARCHES. 101 It is better to build the bridge above the affluent, so as not to expose it to dangerous shocks from boats which might get loose and float down the current. When the bridge is fin- ished, the artillery, the cavalry, and the remainder of the in- fantry pass over. Order of March of a Body of Troops while making a flank Movement. 165. The flank of a column, as a rule, should not be ex-, posed to an attack from the enemy ; and in the marches to the front which have been the only ones considered in the previous pages, no exposure of a flank was made. But there are times when an army, or a part of an army, must make a flank march, and run the risk of exposing its flank in order to gain some great advantage. For example, take the case of a corps or division, which could eflEect a junction with the main body, either by making a wide detour at a distance from the enemy, or by marching parallel to the enemy's front and not very far from him. Suppose that it is extremely important that this junction should be made in the least possible time. Under these circumstances, the general takes the risks and makes a "flank march," 166. As the greatest danger to which the column is ex- posed is that of being attacked in flank during the march, a strong detachment should be thrown out on the side next the enemy, to move along in a direction parallel with the column, and sufficiently near to keep up a constant commu- nication with it. The advanced guard usually becomes the flank detach- 102 AET AND SCIENCE OF WAB. ment on a flank march, but it will be well, since the chances of attack are greater, to increase its strength so that it should be able to hold its ground against any serious effort of the enemy. The flanking detachment should have its advanced guard, rear guard, and flankers, each of these sending out groups and single men in every direction, to avoid surprise. This detachment should be careful to occupy all defiles and to watch all roads by which the enemy might appear, until the main body had passed. A small advanced guard should precede the main body ; the ordinary rear guard will follow the main body, but nearer than usual. The baggage becomes, in a case like this, more of an en- cumbrance than usual. It may be sent to~ join the army by a circuitous route, at a distance from the enemy, or may move on that flank of its own column which is safest against attack. 167. This order of march is shown in Fig. 5, in which M shows the position of the enemy ; A, the main body, with its. advanced guard, a, and rear guard, a'; B, the flank detachment with its advanced guard, I, rear-guard, V, and flanking de- tachment, b". The dots indicate position of scouts in front, rear, and on the flank of the detachment nearest the enemy. In flank marches, it is particularly necessary to have ac- curate information as to the character of the road, and the obstacles to be surmounted, for the least delay might prove fatal, if unexpected. 168. If possible the march should be concealed from the enemy, keeping him in ignorance of the movement until completed. This can not always be done, as he is on the MARCHES. 103 alert to observe any movements which may be made. Under no circumstances should the flank detachment be omitted, as by its skilful use the enemy may be kept in doubt for some F:o. 5. D ++++++++++ + + + + + + + + + ■'• time as to the particular character of the march, whether it is to the front, to the rear, or to a flank. If this detachment meets the enemy, it makes a show of resistance and develops the strength of the opposing force. In the meantime the main body moves steadily forward, and, when it has passed sufficiently far, the detachment leaVes the position it had held, and retires rapidly, taking, if neces- sary, a direction different from that of the main column, and subsequently rejoining it by a detour. The enemy will not follow it very far, as he exposes his own flank to the troops which have already passed. 169. When the body of troops, making the flank march, is large, as a corps composed of severiil divisions, there should 104 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. be several columns, if the nature of the country will admit of it. These columns should be in supporting distance of each other, as required in a march to the front. The column at the greatest distance from the enemy should be also farthest to the front, the others being thrown back in echelon so as to afford mutual support. If the enemy attacks the first col- umn, he is liable to a flank attack from the others ; if he attacks the last column, those in front are in close supporting distance of it. When several columns are to march in this way by the flank, it may be necessary to make roads to enable them to preserve the proper distances. It was formerly a very com- mon thing to make roads for tiie numei-ous columns of an army as they approached the field of battle ; but in later times, it is seldom done, since armies are moved with greater rapidity and ease. 170. This order of march is shown in Eig 6, in which MM show the position of the enemy; and B, and D, the three divisions of a corps, moving on parallel roads, in echelon, and in supporting distance of each other ; E, the wagon train following the farthest division, D, or taking some road still more distant from the enemy ; ^, the flank- ing detachment of the division, B. This detachment is subdivided and marched like the flanking detachment, B, shown in the last figure. Each of the divisions move with their usual advanced and rear guards. 171. Plank tactical marches were frequently employed by Frederick the Great, to gain a position favorable for an at- tack on an enemy's wing. On such occasions, he formed his MARCHES. 105 army in two columns of companies at full distance so that by wheeling the companies to the right or left, he formed at once a line of battle facing the enemy. Approaching the enemy with this formation, and when near him, he changed the direction of his march, making the flank movement, pro- FiG. 6. i, "'^'-^ E + + + *.!■(-+ + + + + ■--<■ + + + + ++ + 4.^+- tected by the advanced guard and hidden from view by some inequality of the ground. Then by a simple wheel of the companies, his line of battle was formed, and was oblique to the genei'al line occupied by the enemy. At the battle of Leuthen, he moved forward in four col- umns, the two interior ones being composed of infantry, and the exterior ones of cavalry. When he changed direction to make the flank march, the four columns formed two, which by a wheel of the companies formed into two lines of battle. This order of march is shown in Fig. 7, in which A, B and R are the advanced guard, the main body in four columns, and the rear guard, in the direct march to the front, 5* 106 ART AST) SCIKJICE OF WAR. When the direction of the march is changed, A takes the po- sition A' ; the forward half of B forms the column B', the rear half of B forms the column B", and E takes the position Fio. 7. I '^ I > HBJiMillQ/ A ,^ r- ;;'— "-^.'■■^■"IIDOOnilllll.' DWOnODOlSlDBIIIDBIlllllMOIKtlllilOOOIlOOODII.' HODDtlU.'' tf f ^ f V I I § I ..ggiioiDiu/ ■ i 1 i „. E'. The two lines of battle, 1st and 2d, with infantry in the centre and cavalry on the flanks, are formed by wheeling the companies to the left. Order of March of several Columns. 172. The order of march of a single column has been con- sidered. That of several columns does not differ in principle from the order prescribed for a single column. As each col- umn is liable to being attacked separately, the same precau- tions for its safety should be taken as if it were isolated and alone. Each column should have its advanced and rear guards and take all the precautions to guard against surprise. Independently of the advanced and rear guards of each column, the columns themselves should have such an order that one of tliem should be a general advanced guard for the MAKCHES. 107 others, etc. Thus, suppose a corps oi five divisions, or an army of five corps making a forward movement. Three of the divisions or corps, as the case may be, march on three parallel roads, in supporting distance of each other, and the heads of the columns on the same general line. The fourth division or corps precedes these three bodies and acts as a general advanced guard. The fifth follows in the rear, acting as a rear guard, and becomes the reserve. If the country is open and offers no obstruction to the movements of the columns, they must be kept in supporting distance of each other. If the enemy is scattered or at a dis- tance, or obstructions prevail, like large rivers, and give secu- rity against sudden attack, the columns need not be so near to each other. Their relative positions should be preserved, however, so that in case of necessity, a concentration in due time can be effected. Order of March in a Retreat. 173. A general may withdraw his forces, and march in a direction away from an enemy for the purpose of taking up a better position ; or for the purpose of hastening to the de- fence of some other point of more importance ; or to reach a point where he can replenish his supplies ; or having lost a battle or failed in an operation, he may withdraw his army to recruit it- and to save it. The latter are known as retreats, while the others are known as retrograde movements. Retrograde movements require only the ordinary precautions in the order of march which have been recommended for forward move- ments. 108 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. Eetreats require greater precautions, as the safety of the troops is involved to a greater degree. 174. It is diflBcult for an army to retreat in presence of an active enemy, especially when it has been defeated, but if compelled to do so, it stubbornly contests every foot of ground until a position is reached where a stand maybe made during the remainder of the day. The general should take advan- tage of the first opportunity to collect his scattered troops, cause them to take some food and rest, while he arranges the order of march and organizes a rear guard. As soon as the commander has determined to retreat, he should order the officer having charge of the train of wagons to move ofE at once on the route indicated to him, and to push along as rapidly as possible. The road may thus be cleared to some distance to the rear. The essential thing in a retreat is to get the start of the pursuing enemy and keep it. Forced marches become necessary, and they must often- be made at night. Night marches are not objectionable in such circumstances, as there is little or no danger of the re- treating army falling into an ambuscade. On the other hand, the pursuing army has that danger to apprehend, and must be proportionally circumspect. The necessary incon- veniences and fatigue accompanying night marches must be expected and endured, for safety has become the paramount consideration. Sometimes a movement to the rear may be concealed from the enemy by lighting the camp fires as if to spend the night, and leaving a few men to keep them burning, while the army passes off quietly. The detachments thus left behind MARCHES. 109 may set off just before daylight and readily rejoin the main body. When a start is gained in this way, it is important to keep it, even at the sacrifice of some of the wagons if they move too slowly. 175. The order of march is the same as for a forward movement, only in an inverse order. The rear guard of the forward movement is the advanced guard of the retreat, and the advanced guard of the forward march is the rear guard of the troops. The Tvagon train and troops occupy the same positions but are faced about to the rear. The strength of the rear guard will vary according to cir- cumstances. As a rule, it will be stronger than the advanced guard for the same column while making a forward move- ment. Taking the division .already given as an example, one entire brigade would be taken for this service, or about one- fourth of the whole force. It will be composed of all arms, and especially be provided with good artillery, as this arm can be used to a great advantage to keep the enemy at a dis- tance, making him deploy, thus consuming time in the pur- suit, and allowing the retreating forces to keep on the march without halting. The rear guard when first organized should be formed from the best troops of the command and from those who have suffered least, since the duty imposed on them is ex- tremely fatiguing, and on account of the difficulty of chang- ing them, they may have to be the rear guard during the whole march. On a retreat, the rear guard is divided into three parts : 110 AKT AND SCIENCE OF WAK. its main body, which keeps together as much as possible ; the rear detachment, which sends word of the approach of the enemy, and gives time to make arrangements to receive him ; and an intermediate detachment, to keep up communi- cation with the army, and occupy defiles which are to be passed. In addition, there are small detachments who march parallel to the main body on the flanks. In an open country the rear guard marches in several columns so as to allow of rapid deployment. The rear de- tachment is composed of light artillery and the best cavalry of the army. If this detachment becomes engaged with the enemy and finds itself outnumbered, it retires at a gallop and forms behind the infantry, which has had time to deploy. 176. In a broken country, and especially through defiles, the rear guard will have to march in a single column, ex- cepting the flank detachments, who as long as it is practica- ble move parallel to the main body. The rear detachment will in this case be composed of infantry ; the cavalry and artillery taking positions in the leading portion of the rear guard. Great precautions are taken in marching through defiles and every effort is made to make such points a hindrance to the enemy's advance. The main body as it passes through a defile leaves a detachment to keep possession of it until the detachment marching between the main body and the rear guard reaches the defile. Care' is taken to hold all roads or communica- tions, by means of which the enemy could attack the rear guard in flank and cut off a portion of it from the rest. As soon as the defile is passed, it may be obstructed, as in the MARCHES. Ill case of a bridge by destroying it. The difBculties iu the way of pursuit are thus materially increased. The main duty of the rear guard is to prevent the enemy from pressing too closely the main body. 177. The commander of the rear guard must therefore bo on the lookout that he is not surprised, and under no cir- cumstances, if he can prevent it, allow the rear guard to be forced back upon the main body. He will therefore be often placed in most trying positions if the enemy is active, and to be equal to the emergency, he musb himself possess firmness, activity, and be a thorough tactician. General Dufour, in speaking of the commander of the rear guard, says : " He should possess the confidence of his men and the respect of his enemies. If there is no post more dangerous than that of commanding the rear guard, there is certainly none more honorable. Marshal Ney acquired an imperisha- ble fame by his conduct as chief of the rear guard of the French army in its sad and terrible retreat from Moscow. For several weeks successively he was fighting the enemy every day, and more than once engaged in hand to hand con- flicts, like a simple grenadier. Soldiers will never forget the glorious deeds of that heroic spirit, who was the last to leave the hostile soil, after enduring, with a few brave comrades, all the dangers and privations poured by cruel fortune upon the heads of that famished and shattered army which entered Kussia in such imposing array but a short time before." 112 AIIT AND SC'ifiXCE OF WAR. Remarks on the Direction of Marches. 178, It has been already stated that it is the part , of strategy to direct, and of logistics to execute a march ; that a march should be well directed in order to insure success. The movements of troops to the front in the theatre of war are made with one of two objects in view ; to occupy a position which may be of advantage in the operations under- taken, or to make a junction with other bodies of troops at points which may be designated. Thus, if the enemy occu- pies a long extended line, so long as to render it difficult for him to reinforce quickly any portion of it which may be sud- denly attacked, a well directed movement would be one made against any isolated part with the object of defeating that part before reinforcements could Arrive ; then moving rapidly against another part, do the same thing with that ; and con- tinue these movements until the enemy is entirely defeated or withdraws from his position. 179. All other things being equal, the centre of this line would be the first part attacked ; for the reason, that if suc- cessful in defeating the centre, the enemy's line would be broken and his wings separated from each other by this successful result. Each of these wings, being in this way isolated, could be attacked separately and each might be defeated before it could receive assistance from the other. This success against the centre would also in all proba- bility cause the wings to retire along divergent lines of re- treat. This divergence, increasing the farther the troops MARCHES. 113 wont to the rear, would continue to separate the wings and ■would increase the difficulties of their reunion. Moreover, the difficulties in the way of uniting the wings would be in- creased by the interposition of the successful attacking force, who, being between the two wings, would be moving on inte- rior lines of operations and would be able to make a choice as to which body should be attacked. The movements of Bonaparte, in Italy in 1796, against the Austro-Sardinian army •which was spread out along an extended line, are splendid examples of ■well-directed movements against the enemy, and illustrate the remarks just made upon the advantages of an attack upon the centre. 180. If, instead of being extended over a long line, the enemy should be in a concentrated position, a movement against his centre would not be advisable, as a rule. A movement against the enemy's flank to turn his posi- tion, or one by which he is induced to separate his forces, is to be preferred. The movement of Napoleon in 1805, by which he placed his army in rear of the Austrian army at Ulm, is an example of turning the enemy's position. 181. To induce a division of his forces requires that the enemy should be threatened ■with a double attack, by forces advancing towards both flanks. The enemy is induced by this double attack to divide his forces to meet it, and soon as lie has done so, is taken at a disadvantage, by the attacking forces making a rapid concentration and defeating the por- tion nearest to them. The success of such movements ■will depend upon the possibility of making, a quick junction of the dividing forces 114 AET AST) SCIEXCE OF WAR. used in the threatened double attack when the favorable opportunity is offered. A movement of this kind requires a division on the part of the attacking forces, and the use, generally, of flank marches. It is evident that it is only under favorable cir- cumstances that such movements can be made. For example, suppose an army posted on one side of an unfordable river and having possession of all tlie crossings. Suppose an enemy should appear on the opposite side, and between the points occupied by two bodies of the army posted along the river. They would feel no particular ap- prehension at this appearance of the enemy, for these bodies by making flank marches on the roads parallel to the river, can be easily united at any time. If it is necessary to drive him from his position, troops can be crossed over the river both on his right and left, and demonstrations made on points of his line distant from his centre. If he should weaken the centre to resist these attacks, this can be turned against him, by having one or both of the columns to sud- denly recross the river, to concentrate, and then to over- whelm the isolated portion nearest to them. To cross the river, to concentrate the columns, and to attack with success fractions of the enemy, require that the movements be well directed, well executed and no time wasted. The importance of secrecy, celerity and good order in 'strategical marches will now be recognized. 182. Diversions. A body of troops, detached and sent to a distance, for the purpose of making some demonstration or movement not expected by the enemy, executes what is called a diversion. It is a mevement which is beyond sup- MARCHES. 115 porting distance of the main body. The troops are therefore for the time separated from the army and are required to act independently. For example, suppose an enemy to be occupying a strong position which it is necessary to take by force. A strong position can scarcely ever be carried, if the enemy is vigilant, by a direct front attack, unless his attention be attracted in other directions. To attract his attention in other direc- tions and to deceive him as to the real point of attack, a body of troops is sometimes detached and sent by a circuit- ous route to his rear. As soon as it reaches its position, an attack is made simultaneously, both in front and rear, and often proves successful. This detached movement is a diversion. Bodies of troops are oftentimes detached from the army, and are moved by circuitous routes to seize some position commanding a part of the enemy's line ; or to occupy some point from which the enemy's line of retreat may be threat- ened ; or to take some place, the occupation of which will be detrimental to the enemy's operations. Such independent movements are " diversions." 183. It is a maxim, that a general should never divide his forces in the presence of the enemy, excepting after a victo- ry, and even in this case, he should exercise due caution. This maxim forbids the use of diversions, since they divide the army and weaken it by just so many troops as are detached to make the diversion. Diversions, for various other reasons, are objectionable and unadvisable; They weaken the main body ; complicate the plans of operations; distract the attention of the general 116 AKT AND SCIEXCE OF WAE. from the main object of the campaign ; increase the chances of accident ; and too frequently are sources of disaster. There are, however, circumstances in which they are al- lowable, such as where it is necessary to deceive the enemy as to the real point of attack, or when the forces in hand are greatly superior to those of the enemy, etc. Diversions, even in these cases, are dangerous, for the reason that the troops making them, being separated and not receiving support from the main body, are liable to total defeat if they are repulsed. 184. Combined marches. When the movements of the divisions or corps are made independent of each other, but having the same object in common, they are known as combined marches. They are arranged with the intention of having the several columns arrive at a given position but coming from different directions. It would be a great risk to select the point of concentration within an area controlled by the enemy, and a plan made with this intention would be faulty. Each column, until it came within supporting dis- tance of the others, would be a detached force and exposed to the dangers of being overwhelmed before support could reach it. History records many disasters to detached columns when moving near the enemy, and also mentions many cases in which brilliant results were obtained by them. The for- mer exceed the latter so greatly in number that military writers, as a rule, condemn the independent action of detach- ments, either to effect a diversion or to make a combined march. Nevertheless, the temptation to use diversions and combined marches is so great in consequence of the brilliant MARCHES. 117 results which follow when the movement is successful, that they will be frequently employed in the future, as they have been in the past. The general ordering them should how- ever remember the danger to which he exposes the detach- ment as well as the main body, and refuse to divide his forces in the presence of the enemy, excepting under exceedingly favorable circumstances, or from weighty reasons which jus- tify his departure from rules based on experience and com- mon sense. 185. Retreats. Retrograde movements should, as it has already been stated, follow the rules given for move- ments to the front or to the flank. The general principles governing the direction of marches to the front, therefore apply to retrogade movements. The' direction becomes particularly important when the march is a retreat. It has already been mentioned how important it is in a. retreat to get the start of the enemy and to keep it. "Whether this start shall be obtained by means of a forced march, or whether the retreat shall be conducted slowly by short and well ordered marches, is a question of execution, and circumstances must decide which shall be adopted. But whether the retreat shall be by a single line ; whether it shall be by parallel or converging lines, with a common point of arrival ; whether it shall be by moving along diverg- ing roads, the masses separating further and further from each other as they retreat, are questions of direction which require careful consideration, and these questions enter the domain of strategy. All things being equal, a single line of retreat is best. 118 ART AXD SCIENCE OF >VAK. as the whole force can be held in hand to fight the enemy. This single line of retreat does not exclude the use of parallel roads when these roads are sufiSciently near to each other. Where the troops, at the beginning of the retreat, were widely separated, the use of parallel lines, or lines converging to a common point, is to be advised, for by their use the forces of the retreating army may be more easily united at some point in the rear. The use of divergent lines of retreat is not to be recom- mended, although they have the advantage of misleading the enemy and of making him doubtful as to the best line to take in the pursuit. The use of divergent lines divides the army, and exposes the isolated bodies to the danger of being sur- rounded and destroyed. 186. Jomini says " There are two cases in which diver- gent retreats are admissible, and then only as a last resource. First, when an army has experienced a great defeat in its own country, and the scattered fragments seek protection within the walls of fortified places. Secondly, in a war where the sympathies of the whole population are enlisted, each fraction of the army thus divided may serve as a nucleus of assembly in each province ; but in a purely methodical war, with regular armies, carried on according to the principles of the art, divergent retreats are simply ab- surd." 187. General Dnfour says, " Eemain united, therefore, in a retreat, still more than in an offensive movement, even if your motions are thereby retarded, for the first considera- tion is safety. March in as good order as circumstances per- mit, or at least keep together ; still present an imposing front MAECHES. 119 to the enemy, and, if he pursues too rashly, make him pay the penalty for so doing ; have the boldness to turn upon him if he gives a fair opportunity or marches negligently. More honor is sometimes derived from a well-conducted retreat than in a battle gained, where chance often enters so largely. " Marshal Massena's retreat, in Portugal, in 1809, is av. excellent model for imitation. He knew how to take advaa\ • tage of all the accidents of the ground to retard the pursu.it of the English. He never gave up a position until it wu just about being turned, and then he fell back to another at some distance further on. His columns retired slowly, afforded mutual support, and kept out of each other's wsiv, deploying and fighting whenever the enemy pressed them too closely, or where the ground was favorable for defence. Again they fell back, moving towards a common point in tho rear, keeping always near enough for mutual assistanco. Nothing, said an eye-witness, could exceed the skill there displayed by Massena." 188. Another strategical consideration enters the question of direction, and that is, whether the retreat should be ma(?<> parallel to the frontier, or perpendicularly to it and toward? the interior of the country. Parallel retreats are often to be preferred for the reason that they divert the enemy from a march into the heart of the country and force the enemy to remain in his own territory. Parallel retreats are not always practicable. They must depend for their success upon the position of the fortified plases, the configuration of the frontier, the kind of roads. 120 ART AXD SCIEKCE OF WAR. and the practicability of keeping open the communications leading to the base or to the great depots, so that they can be used at any time by the retreating army. The retreat of Frederick the Great in 1798, from Olmutz, is an example of a parallel retreat. Being obliged to aban- don the siege of Olmutz which he had undertaken, and to withdraw from before that place, Frederick retreated by roads parallel to the Silesian frontiers, thus going towards Saxony, instead of taking the direct line leading to Neisse in Silesia, which appeared to be the natural line of retreat. By using this parallel line of retreat, he kept the war in Bohemia, and relieved Silesia of the burdens and annoyances which follow the movements of armed hostile forces over any country. 189. Pursuits. The essential features of a pursuit do not difier from those of a forward movement. The differ- ence is in the enemy ; in the forward movement, it has been supposed that he is ready to make an attack or to receive one ; in the pursuit, it is supposed that he is trying to avoid an attack. If the enemy retreats in good order, keeps his corps in supporting distance of each other, and offers no chances of flank attacks, the army in pursuit mast keep together, follow closely, and seize the first favorable opportunity to attack. Attempts should be made to gain the flank of the retreat- ing enemy, while a part of the army presses closely in rear. In this way, any position he occupies can be turned and he will be obliiged to leave it and fall back. The pursuit of the French army in its retreat from Mos- cow in 1813 is an example. In this pursuit, which may be MAKCHES. 121 called a "parallel pumiit," General Kutusof, in command of the Russian forces, instead of following the same road as the French army, where he would have suffered much from want of provisions, and would have had continued combats with strong rearguards, moved alongside the long column of the enemy, attacking whenever he could, throwing his forces into the gaps occasioned by the length of the road, by the cold, and by the sufferings of the French. This wise conduct- on the part of the Eussian general greatly increased the losses and demoralization of his enemy. If the enemy retreats in disorder, as is oftentimes the case after a severe battle, the defeat should be vigorously followed by an active pursuit, and every effort be made to increase their disorder and to prevent their rallying. Under such circumstances a division of the pursuing forces can be made without apprehensions of danger and the mobility of the pursuing columns increased. Care should be taken to separate the different divisions and corps of the retreat- ing army as much as possible, and when separated, under no circumstances, if possible, drive them into positions by means of which they can effect a junction. A fault of this latter kind lost the battle of Waterloo to Napoleon. Marshal Grouchy, who had been directed to pursue the Prussians after their defeat at Ligny,. should have gained their right, and separated them from the bridges of the DylCj which were their communications with the English army ; instead of that, he pushed them towards Wavre, where they crossed the river, and came up at the decisive moment to the aid of their allies on the field of Waterloo. Grouchy, who should at all hazards have barred the way, or 6 l2.-i ART AXD SCIENCE OF WAR. lit least have reached the field of battle simultaneously with them, only followed them up, and did not make his appear- ance until it was too late. 190. When tlie pursuing forces have outstripped the re- treating enemy, there are two courses which may be taken ; either to close the way, or to leave the road open, the pursu- ing forces taking a position on the flank. If the retreating forces are strong and under a deter- mined commander, it would be better to attack them in flank than to close the way of retreat. For they would rather attempt to escape than fight, and in so doing will suf- fer severely. If the way is closed, they will try to break through and the result might be more disastrous to the pur- suers than to the pursued. Jomini says, "It is generally better to direct the pur- suit upon the flank of the retreating columns, especially when it is made in one's own country and where no danger is incurred in moving perpendicularly or diagonally upon the enemy's line of operations. Care must, however, be taken not to make too large a circuit ; for there might then be danger of losing the retreating enemy entirely." Also, he says, "A pursuit should generally be as bold and actively executed as possible, especially when it is subsequent to a battle gained ; because the demoralized army may be wholly dispersed if vigorously followed." 191. All agree that the flank and not the rear of a re- treating enemy should be the point to attack. Since infan- try can hardly march fast enough to overtake a retreating column and manoeuvre on its flank, the reliance must be on cavalry and horse artillery. Artillery may be made to play MARCHES. 133 an important part, by its taking good positions, and opening fire on the masses of the enemy, throwing them into confu- sion. If cavalry overtaking the enemy should find opposed to it a strong line of infantiy, it should not attack, but manoeuvre to turn its position and attack in flank, if any be made. CHAPTER VL BATTLES. 192. The encounters between two armies, resulting from an attempt of one of the armies to attain an object while the other opposes the attempt, are known as battles. A battle is defined to be " a general action in which all of the divisions of an army are, or may he eoigaged." The term combat is applied to an action when the en- gagement is a partial one and its influence is not decisive upon the general result. Battles are fought between armies only; they are frequently the sole objectives of campaigns; combats are fonght between parts of armies, and are fre- quently the results of accidental meetings of the hostile forces. Battles are therefore not to be considered as isolated facts, but they are to be considered as the events which result from strategical movements or a system of well-conducted marches. It has been said that "marches when conducted properly and in accordance with strategical principles, prepare the way to success ; battles decide it ; and pursuit renders it complete." 193. Battles may be arranged into three general classes ; defensive, offensive, and mixed battles. BATTLES. 125 In a purely defensive buttle, an army chooses a position in which to await the enemy and there to give battle with no other end in view than to hold this position, and repulse tho enemy. In a purely offensive battle, an army seeks the enemy and attacks him wherever he is to be found. A mixed battle is a combination of these two. The most common case of this last class is that in which a position is selected beforehand where the army awaits the attack of the enemy and at a suitable moment moves from it and attacks the assaulting columns. This case is sometimes known as a " defensive-offensive" battle. Which of these classes is to be preferred depends upon circumstances and is to be decided by the commanding gen- eral at the time of fighting the battle. All other things being equal, an offensive battle offers the greatest advantages, as it permits a general to choose his point of attack and gives him time to make all the prepara- tions that he may deem necessary. Where the ground is favorable and the troops are in good condition, the third class, the offensive-defensive battle offers peculiar advantages, since, the assaulting columns being ex- hausted by their first efforts are not in the best condition to repel the attack of an army rushing forward from its position. In some cases, the general has no option in the matter, but must adopt one or the other, without delay. An exam- ple of this case would be where a general would without hes- itation fight an offensive battle which had for its object to prevent the junction of two armies, or to crush a detach- ment, etc. 136 ART AND SCIEKCE OF WAR. A purely defensive battle can hardly ever be recommended. Jomini says, ''A general wbo waits for his enemy like an auto- maton, taking no other measures than valiantly fighting him, will invariably succumb, because he will be well attacked." Napoleon writing to Bernadotte expresses a similar opin- ion. He says, "He who acts solely on the defensive, does nothing but run risks." No general rule can be given, how- ever, which can be applied to all cases of this nature. The moral as well as the physical influences form an important factor in the problem which the general has to solve, and these are frequently not all known even when the time to choose has arrived. Another class of battles is sometimes given ; these are chance or unexpected battles, which generally arise from the unexpected meeting 6f armies on the march. In their details, they will fall into one of the classes already named. 194. Dispositions for battle. Mobility and firmness are the essential requisites to be observed in arranging the troops to give battle. Troops drawn up in deep masses arc wanting in mobility and are easily thrown into confusion if the. ground is broken or they are exposed to the fire of the enemy. Troops drawn up in a single line of slight depth will or- dinarily occupy a front too much extended, and this line will want firmness either to attack or to resist an attack. Any forward movement made by a line of this kind will cause it to waver and even break, leaving intervals through which the enemy might penetrate. To satisfy these conditions of mobility and solidity, it is usual to draw up the troops in two lines with a reserve. BATTLES. l■i^ The battalions of the first line are deployed ; those of the second line and reserve are in ployed formations. The second line is drawn up parallel to the first line and far enough in the rear to be sheltered from the fire of the enemy when the first line is engaged. The troops are formed in columns of battalions by divisions, so as to allow of quick deployment into line. The reserve is in rear of the second line and the troops composing it are drawn up in columns of battalions. As the reserve is not to form an immediate part of the line engaged in battle, its position and the forma- tion of the troops composing it are such as to allow it to be promptly brought to any point which has become weakened and requires to be strengthened, or, to such plaice where it may fall quickly upon any weak part of the enemy's line. Its position will therefore be farther from the second line than the latter is from the first, generally just outside of close cannon range of the enemy. 195. The positions occupied by the troops when ready to give battle form what is known as " the line of battle." A. line of battle may be continuous or broken. In tho former case, the fractions of the army are placed with the troops deployed so as to form practically a continuous line, or the heads of the columns may only be. on a line, but drawn up in such formations that they may be quickly deployed into a continuous line when required. In the latter case, or broken line of battle, some of the fractions, as brigades, divisions, etc., are separated by the nature of the ground so that it is not practicable to form upon it a continuous line. This arrangement is sometimes known as a line of battle ■with intervals. 128 ART AU-D SCIESrCE OP WAR. Ic follows that, in a line of battle of this Idnd, the dif- ferent corps or divisions, being separated from each other, can not give that mutual aid and assistance which is so essential to success. It is therefore an arrangement which is not to be recommended except under peculiar circum- stances. When used, it is more generally employed for a defensive, than for an offensive battle, and especially under the circum- stances where it becomes necessary to give a great extent to the line of defence. Although the fractions on the same line can not come to each other's assistance, great care is taken to have the reserve so placed that it may have free and easy access to all parts of the line. Orders of Battle. 190. The position which the hostile lines of ■ battle have with respect to each other during a battle is termed the "order of battle." These various positions which they may have with each other may be reduced to four principal ones, viz: parallel, oblique, concave, and convex. Therefore all the orders of battle may be considered as belonging to one of these four forms, or to modifications of them. A line drawn parallel to the front of a " line of battle," will mark the general direction of the front occupied by an army, and the position of the two lines thus drawn parallel to the fronts of both armies will give the general direction of the "lines of battle" with respect to each other, and will designate the " order of battle." The names given to the orders are the same as those given to the positions of the lines BATTLES. 129 parallel to the fronts, viz : parallel, oblique., concave and convex orders. 197. Parallel order of battle. Suppose the two hostile arniies drawn up in lines of battle practically parallel to each other, and suppose the two armies to approach each other, or one to remain stationary while the other attacks, the attack in either case being simultaneous and of equal vigor throughout the whole line ; this case would bo an example of the " parallel order of battle." This order of attack is equal in strength and in weakness, is the most simple, and is used most by those not skilled in the "art of war." If it results in success, the victory will be complete ; if it fails, the defeat will be decisive. All other things being equal, victory will remain with the army most powerful in numbers and discipline. This was the order of battle most frequently used by the Ancients. 198. Oblique order of battle. If the general direc- tions of the lines of battle are inclined toward each other at the moment of collision, the term " oblique order "of battle " is used to designate the character of the attack. Suppose two hostile armies approaching the same point as 0, (Fig. 8) from opposite directions. Suppose the army E moving from P to take the position E'; and the army A coming from B to take the position A'. If the army A' attacks E', the lines of battle being inclined as here indicated in the figures, it is manifest that the attack belongs to the " oblique order of battle." Or, if the army, E^ remained stationary in position at 0, (Eig. 9.) while the attacking army A takes the position A A' 6* 130 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. and begins the battle, this will also be an example of the " oblique order of battle." In Pig. 8, the attacking force may have reached this posi- tion at A' by a flank march, gaining ground to the right, and then facing toward the enemy, moved into this position oblique / \ Fig. 9 to that of the enemy. This was the plan of Frederick the Great at the battle of Leuthen. Inducing the Austrian commander to think that he was to be attacked upon his right, Frederick made a flank march and moved his column so as to occupy an oblique position on the Austrian left. Then wheeling into line, he moved for- ward against the Austrian line, took it in flank, drove it back and followed his success so closely that he was able to beat the Austrian army in detail. In Fig. 9, the right wing is reinforced and pushed fox- ward to engage the enemy's left, while the left wing is held BATTLES. 131 back. Techniciilly, the right is thrown forward, while the left is refused. In a case of this latter kind, the right is made as strong as possible and the left is reduced as much as can be without incurring too much risk. The attacking army, having placed more troops upon the right than the enemy has there to oppose them, may succeed in outflanking the enemy and de- feating his left wing before he can support it with fresh troops. An attack on one wing and refusing the other, will there- fore give a case of the "oblique order of battle." 199. General Dufour says, " If the enemy can be kept in a state of uncertainty, up to the last moment, by false attacks, and by a skillful direction given to the columns of attack ; if these columns are promptly deployed and only ad the moment when the action is about to begin, the enemy will have no time for counter-manoeuvres or for sending suf- ficient supports to the wing attacked, and will proliably be defeated. Art may thus supply the want of numbers ; and a small army, well commanded, may defeat a large one, whose commander has not known how, or has not been able, to mass his forces at the decisive point. " This art of handling troops is in our day much more im- portant than with the ancients, because our lines are much more extended. The troops drawn from parts not attacked, to support those that are, cannot sometimes come up soon enough, to check the confusion ; and the battalions are over- thrown one after another by the attacking wing of the army." 200. The oblique order of battle resulting from either the movement indicated in Fig. 8, or from a wing strongly rein- 132 ART as;d science of war. forced, as shown in Fig. 9, gives to the assailant the advan- tages alluded to by General Dnfour. In both of these cases, the assailant gains a position such that he can form his line of battle so as to overlap that of his opponent, and envelop the enemy's forces composing the wing attacked. A vigor- ous attack is then possible upon both flank and rear of this wing, and this attack must be successful unless other troops have been brought forward in time to resist it. There is another advantage in the use of the oblique order of attack, and that is, in the case of a repulse. In this event the re- pulsed wing may fall back under the protection of the troops in its rear, and as the wing retires, more and more of the troops in rear will be brought into action, the front of battle increases, and the progress of the pursuing enemy may be checked. 301. Concave order of battle. If the attack is made simultaneously on both wings, and the centre is refused, it is plain that the attacking army will assume a line of battle which will be concave towards the enemy's line. 302. Convex order of battle. If the attack is made in the centre of the enemy's line, refusing both wings, the general direction of the line of battle of the attacking army will be convex towards the enemy's line and the term " con- vex order of battle" is applied to it. 203. Circumstances will decide when either of these two orders of battle will be used. All other things being equal, neither would be used in preference to the oblique. If the attacking army possesses a decided superiority in numbers, the concave order, obtained by a simultaneous attack on both wings and refusing the centre, might be em- BATTLES. 133 ployed. It is evident tliat, even in this case, mutual assist- ance could not be given by the troops making the attacks, and it would possess all tlie defects of a division of forces upon the field of battle. This order of battle was used, so it is said, by Hannibal when he won his great victory over the Eomans at Cannae. The convex order of battle has been frequently used, and possesses the advantage of producing great results when the attack is successful. It possesses the disadvantage of select- ing as a point of attack the strongest part of the enemy's line, and in case of a repulse, the failure is apt to be followed by great disaster, if the enemy makes a vigorous counter-attack. 204. Other orders of battle. Other orders of battle are named by military writers. Their names will generally describe the direction of the hostile lines of battle and the particular formation adopted by the attacking army. Some of the most common of these are as follows : the parallel order reinforced in the centre ; the parallel order reinforced upon one wing or upon both wings ; the parallel order with a crotchet ; order of battle by echelon ; etc. 205. Object of an order of battle. The order of battle is determined by the general commanding the attack- ing army who has for his object one of three things, viz : to push the army on the defensive out of its position ; to obtain possession of tlie lines of communication leading to the de- fensive army's position ; or to overwhelm this army or part of it and destroy it. It will be seen then that the object of the order of battle is to effect one or more of these, and the choice of the order is influenced by its object as well as by the nature of the ground and other causes. 13i ART AXD SCIEXCE OF WAK. Manner of Conducting a Battle. 206. Employment of the different arms. A mat- ter of the greatest iraportsince in a battle is the proper em- ployment of the arms of service composing the army. The relative proportions of the arms and the positions they should occupy in oi'der that the greatest efiBciency can be obtained from them, greatly depend upon the nature of the country where they are to be employed. But whatever be these pro- portions and whatever the kind of country, the principle must be observed, that the different arms should be so posted on a field of battle that they shall as far as possible afford mutual defence and support to each other. 207. Infantry is the arm which bears the brunt and de- cides the battle. This arm must therefore be considered first, in any arrangement which leads to fighting a battle. The combinations of the other arms must be made subor- dinate to that selected for the infantry, but at the same time, these combinations should have for their ends the most effective use of the arms and mutual support to each other. Artillery is an arm which exercises a powerful influence on the fate of a battle ; so powerful, in many cases, when properly directed, as to share equally with the infantry arm the credit of having won the battle. It should be posted in or opposite to the intervals between the brigades or divisions of the first line. Placed in such positions, its movements will be free and unimpeded by other troops. In addition, it will have no infantry or cavalry in its rear to be annoyed by the^rtillery fire of the enemy, which BATTLES. 135 will bo concentrated upon the batteries as soon as they are seen or begin firing. Good positions are essential for the effective use of artil- lery. Such positions are found when from them the artillery can cross its fire upon, or thoroughly sweep by its fire, the ground over which the enemy must advance in approaching the army in position. Salient and retired points of the line of battle will therefore be pl3,ces to be occupied by artillery. The great object to be attained in posting the artillery, is to so place it as to annoy and harass the enemy the most, and inconvenience the movements of our own troops the least. The artillery will direct its fire upon masses of the en- emy's infantry and cavalry in preference to his artillery, for the purpose of throwing these bodies into confusion and retarding any movements which they are desirous to make. If the enemy is in line, the artillery will be thrown for- ward and will endeavor to take positions from which it can pour an oblique or enfilading fire on the enemy's line. Such fire is extremely effective in forcing the enemy to change his position. These movements will certainly develop an artillery fire from the enemy upon the batteries making them. In this case the enemy's batteries must be silenced or forced to retire, which can be done by concentrating and bringing to bear upon them a greater number of guns. Good judgment must be exercised in this concentration, or the expected results may not be realized. Cavalry is either kept in mass with the reserve, or in rear of the wings, or on the flanks of the line of battle. In these 136 ABT AND SCIENCE OF WAR. latter positions, it can be useful in outflanking the enemy's line, and in watching the movements of the enemy if they should attempt to extend their line or to envelop either wing. Under no circumstances is it advisable to place cavalry in either the first or second lines mixed in with other troops. Because if obliged to leave its position in line, wide intervals will be left through which the enemy might penetrate and attack the remaining troops in flank and rear. Engineer troops are placed in the reserve and in rear of the second line, ready to be thrown to the tiortt to remove any serious obstacle in the way of the advancing troops or to erect obstacles in the way of an approaching enemy. They are usually armed as infantry to defend themselves if sud- denly attacked, and being thus armed are liable to be thrown into the line of battle to strengthen a weak point or carry a strong position. If the battle is to be a defensive one, the engineer troops are actively employed along the whole front of the first line in laying out and constructing lines of ob- stacles to oppose the enemy's advance. To them are as- signed that most difficult of all duties, the quiet prosecution of manual labor, while exposed to the fire of the enemy. 208. Remarks on the lines of battle. Wherever it is practicable, two lines and a reserve should be used. In an offensive feattle, the first line brings on the action. The second line is intended to support the first, and the re- serve is intended to supply the want of strength which may be developed at any point in the line of battle, or to take ad- vantage of a weak place in the enemy's line. The distances between the lines and the reserve depend BATTLES. 137 upon circumstances. In foggy, smoky weather and in broken country, where cover for the troops can be easily obtained, the distances are not so great as they must be if the weather is clear and the ground free and unobstructed. For this latter case, it may be assumed that the distance between the first and sf^cond line should not be less than three hundred yards, and of the reserve from the second line, from 1,000 to 1,500 vards. It is generally recommended to keep the second line as near the first as possible, so as to be able to give assistance quickly when it is needed. Experience does not agree with this recommendation, but on the contrary teaches, that the second line should be kept as far from the first as it can be, and yet, kept close enough to support it at the right moment. The fact is, that there is great danger, if the two. lines are too near together, of the second line yielding to the rush of the enemy which follows the successful breaking or defeat of the first line. The reserve should occupy such a position in rear as will best shelter the troops from the fire of the enemy's cannon, and at the same time it should be near enough to support any point of the line which is in danger of giving way, and near enough to. take advantage of any weak place in the enemy's line. The reserve should not be brought into action in the beginning of a battle, nor in fact, so long as the troops already fighting are able to do the work assigned to them. 209. Manner of fighting a battle. Battles have occurred, arising frequently from the unexpected meeting of two armies, in which both parties took the offensive. As a rule however, in a battle, one party is the assailant, while 138 ART AXD SCIEXCE OF WAE. the other is the assailed ; that is, one makes an attack while, as a rule, the other takes up a position to receive it. The assailant having determined upon fighting a battle, marches his column forward in the direction of the enemy until he is in position to form his lines of battle ; he arranges the order of battle ; and then moves forward and attacks the enemy. The march of the columns forward is executed in accordance with the general principles already laid down. [Arts. 129 and 153.] When the columns are near enough to the enemy, that is, as near as prudence will admit, the first line is deployed ; the second line is formed in rear of the first, as previously described ; and the reserve is moved to the place it is to occupy. The deployments should be made outside of the range of the enemy's cannon, and if possible, out of sight of the enemy. This is done to prevent loss of life and confusion in the ranks which are certain to follow, if masses of troops are manoeuvered within range of the enemy's artillery. Manoeu- vers, as a rule, cannot be executed in range of the enemy's fire except under cover. The ground immediately in front of an enemy's position, may be divided, from the character of the fire to which the troops may be exposed, into three zones of fire, viz : 1st, the near zone, or zone in which the aim of small arms is accu- rate ; 2d, the middle zone, or zone in which the effect of small arms is indeed deadly but the aim is inaccurate ; and 3d, the outer zone, or zone without the range of small arms but with- in that of artillery. Eange is here assumed to be the effective range of the BATTLES. 139 arm and to be accompanied with some degree of accuracy in the firing. Up to 300 yards, if the day is clear and bright, a dis- tinct aim can be obtained on any part of a man's body. From 400 to 600 yards, the face of a man can not be distin- guished, but his head and body can be easily seen. The dis- tance of 600 yards may then be taken as the limit within which an accurate aim can be taken on a single man by the ordinary soldier, and may therefore be taken as the limit of aimed fire of small arms, or limit of the near zone. The figure of a man, from 600 to 1200 yards, becomes so .confused to the sight that at the latter distance, 1200 yards, lines of troops can hardly be distinguished from masses. Within these limits, 600 to 1200 yards, the aim at a single individual will be inaccurate, and the fire of small arms may be considered practically as unaimed. These distances may therefore be taken as the limits of the middle zone. From 1200 to, 3000 yards may be considered as the limits of the third zone, or zone of artillery fire, within which the fire of artillery is dangerous, but within which the fire of small arms may be disregarded so far as the movements of troops in line are concerned. Upon reaching the exterior limit of the outer zone, the assailant deploys a strong force of artillery and opens a fierce fire upon the enemy's line. Moving forward this artillery and keeping up the fire, it will be possible in most cases to deploy the first line at a distance of about 2000 yards from the enemy. A strong line of skirmishers is then thrown forward and it will have no difficulty in getting within 1000 yards of the 140 AKT AND SCIENCE OF WAR. enemy's first line, or that near his line of skirmishers, if there be any thrown out in advance of his main position. At this distance, the firing by the skirmishers is apt to begin and to be kept up while the line steadily advances,. No great difficulty to this advance will be met. until the limits of the first or near zone is reached. Having reached this limit, the skirmishers can no longer advance except under coyer, or if there is no cover, by running forward a short distance and seeking shelter by lying flat on the ground. A man in quick time passes over 86 yards in one min- ute ; in double quick time, he passes over 109 yards in the same time ; at a quick run, the distance passed over is in- creased. Knowing the rapidity of firing, the soldier can estimate the distance he can pass over between the discharges. To supply the losses caused by the enemy's fire and to in- crease the volume of musketry fire, the skirmish line must be strengthened at this stage of the action. The skirmish line having been strengthened by men from its supports makes an effort to approach nearer the enemy and drive him from his position. These forward attempts are all made by "rushes." A rush is an advance made by the men running a short distance, say fifty or sixty yards, and getting quickly under cover, or if there is no cover, sheltering themselves as well as they can by lying flat on the ground. When the hostile lines are not more than from 300 to 150 yards apart, the battle is at its height and these lines will roll forward and backward according to the amount of resistance offered. At this stage of the battle, the whole first line will proba- bly have been absorbed in the skirmish line, forming a con- BATTLES. 141 tinuous single rank, and the firing will be a continuous and incessant rattling of musketry, accompanied by discharges of artillery. Any signs of weakness now shown by the enemy are im- mediately followed by a rush of this dense line of- skirmishers, every man cheering as he runs forward, and the whole line followed by the second line, which at this period has been deployed and in many parts of the advance forms a portion of the first line. The signs of weakness in the enemy are shown by a de- crease of firing, caused by an exhaustion' of ammunition ; by the enemy retiring from his position, caused by the inability of reinforcing the skirmishers, or by some threatening move- ment upon the flanks ; by his retreating to take a position farther in rear, etc. The enemy upon beginning to fall back is followed quickly and pressed vigorously to pi-event his taking a new position and continuing the fight. If successful in this latter, the battle is ivon. It is now that the skill of the general by the exercise of which he is made to reap great results from his suc- cess is made evident. If he is quick and energetic, a tactician, and skilful, he turns this opportunity to account and achieves other successes, which are even of greater importance than winning the battle ; if he is not equal to the occasion, he may not only lose what he has already gained by his success but more. It is well to remark that in these days of breech- loading arms, and the ground comparatively free and unobstructed, it will be impossible to bring up troops in close order to the front ; they can advance with success only in open order. 14a AR± AND SCIENCE OF WAH. Volley firing will therefore be impracticable by the assaulting line, although it may be used to a limited extent by troops acting on the defensive. Fig, 10 Enemi/'t TAne ]<]<;. g tpttA B "tfttftl ^ |lmiff> ° ^o go" 1000 vol. 310. Demonstrations. Movements are frequently made upon the field of battle having for their object to BATTLES. 143 deceive the onemy. These movements are known by the gen- eral name of "demonstrations." To be effective, they should show in their execution a strong probability of militai-y success, but under no circum- stances should they endanger the success of the main opera- tion to which they are only accessory. These demonstrations consist frequently of feints or false attacks made by the advanced guard or by detached bodies to deceive the enemy with respect to the real point to be at- tacked. 211. Example of fighting a battle. A particular case is taken to illustrate the remarks just made relative to the preliminary movements made by an assailant in fighting a battle. The position of the two lines of battle and the re- serve, at the beginning of the battle, is shown in Kg. 10. In this case the armies are supposed to be about equal in numbers, and the ground upon which they are drawn up, i? considered as free and unobstructed in any way. The army making the attack is supposed to be composed of four divisions of infantry, four regiments of cavalry, six- teen batteries of field artillery of six guns each, and eight companies of engineer soldiers. This does not include the staff, the pontoniers, and those employed in the supply de- partments. Each division of infantry is composed of two brigades of five regiments each. Each regiment can bring into action, 750 men. The army will under these suppositions contain about the following numbers, viz : 144 ART AND SCIENCE OP WAK. 4 divisions of infantry 30,000 men. 4 regiments of cavalry 4,800 " 16 batteries of artillery 2,400 " 8 companies of engineer soldiers 1,300 " Total 38,400 men. The country is supposed to offer no obstructions to the movements of the different arms, and offers no particular advantages for a defensive position. The general command- ing the army moving to attack has therefore his choice of the points of attack on the enemy's line. In this case, he proposes to make a general forward move- ment, threatening the entire line of the enemy ; to make a vigorous attack upon the enemy's centre and left ; and under cover of this strong attack, to reinforce his right, outflank the enemy's left, and ti'y and crush it. To carry out this plan, he proposes to form his line of battle of the 1st, 2d, and 3d divisions of infantry, and have them drawn up, so that the brigade of the second line form- ing a support to the brigade in the first line shall belong to the same division with it. With each brigade is assigned a battery of artillery, mak- ing six batteries that accompany the three divisions. He takes the 4th division for the reserve. The remaining ten batteries of artillery and two regiments of cavalry are at- tached to the reserve. One regiment of cavalry is left with the train and ammu- nition wagons. Eight companies of the remaining regiment of cavalry are attached to the 1st division and the remaining four companies attached to the 3d division, to be used by BATTLES. 145 the generals in command of these bodies as necessity may require. Two and possibly four of the engineer companies accom- pany the first division, taking position in rear of the second line. The remaining companies are attached to the reserve. The plan of battle is communicated to the generals com- manding the divisions the night before the battle is to be fought. In addition, a general order announcing the general plan of battle, the positions to be occupied, and directions to be taken by the divisions if successful, is sent to the division commanders, who proceed at once to take the necessary steps to comply with its provisions. Under this order, the divisions move to the front at the time designated, the artillery is thrown forward, opening fire upon the enemy's line as soon as they are in efEective range, and the first line is deployed. Skirmishers are thrown for- ward and the battle is opened. The arrangement of the lines and position of the reserve at the termination of the deployment are shown in Pig. 10. An examination of the figure shows that the general com- manding the 1st division has deployed his first line with a front of four regiments and placed four regiments in closed columns in rear of these for his second line. He has taken a regiment from each of the brigades, to form a small reservcj and placed them behind the second line. With this small reserve, the engineer companies attached to the 1st division are found, although not indicated on the figure. Since the attack in force is to be on the enemy's centre and left, the general commanding the second division forms his first line in echelon, as shown in the figure, strengthen- 7 146 AKT AND SCIENCE OF WAR. ing his right by placing a regiment in rear of the regiment on the right. The second brigade is formed into a line as shown in the figure. The general commanding the 3d division forms his line in echelons, the regiments being 100 yards or so in front of each other. His second brigade is in column in rear and not formed into line. These deployments are made under cover of the fire of the batteries of the three divisions thrown forward in front of the line as indicated. The battery on the left is supported by the cavalry attached to the 3d division. The cavalry at- tached to the first division is placed behind the second lino or thrown out on the right of the first line. The i-eserve drawn up in closed columns has been moved to its position behind the centre of the first division, and ia well in hand for the work it has to do. The general seeing that his plans have been executed and judging that the time has arrived to make the turning movement upon the enemy's left, sends the six batteries forming the right column of the reserve to reinforce the batteries on the right of the first di- vision, and two batteries from the left column to reinforce the batteries on the left of the first division. As soon as these batteries have advanced far enough to clear the way, the right brigade of the reserve and the regiment of cavalry adjacent to it are moved to the right and front. At the same time, the brigade in column in rear of the right of the third division is drawn closer to the reserve, taking position oppo- site the centre of the second division. Under a heavy fire from the eight batteries on the right of the first division, and the four batteries on its left, the brig- BATTLES. . 147 ade detached from the reserve reaches its position on the right. If the enemy has not extended his line in that di- rection, nor sent troops to meet this attack, there will be no serious resistance offered, and in a short time this brigade and cavalry vrill have swept around the left flank of the enemy's line. While this movement of turning the enemy's left is in progress, the whole line keeps up a vigorous attack and en- deavors to gain ground to the front. The centre regulates its movement forward upon that of the right, although if circumstances favor it, this attack of the centre may become the main one. An attack on the centre necessarily entails great losses upon the assaulting forces, but unless it is a strong and vigorous attack, the enemy can not be held fast and he will avoid the effect of the turning movement on the left, either by retreating in time, or i>y attacking the troops making the flanking movement. Gaps in the flrst line should be filled by the troops of the second line, and all disconnected movements by which gaps may be caused should be studiously avoided. 212. Remarks. The foregoing will give an idea of the method recommended for handling troops in action. The problem to be solved by the general is, how to cover an ex- tended front with a line of troops which shall be long enough for the purpose, not too weak at any point, and yet strong enough to overcome any resistance it may meet, by the intensity of its fire. This is the problem which both parties have to solve, both the assailant and assailed, and its solution is greatly affected by the nature of the ground. A defensive battle is ordinarily fought by an army when 148 ART AND SCIEKCE OF WAK. it is weaker than that of the enemy and when it has no option in the matter. An army weaker in numbers would not wait to be at- tacked in open ground, but would retire to some place which would be favorable for defence and would attempt by the superiority of the position to supply its numerical inferiority. A reference will be made in a future article to positions suit- able for defence. If, however, an army should be caught in an open country and attacked as has been described, the general in command would, as far as pogsible, apply the general principles laid down for the attack, to the defensive arrangements which he would make to thwart the enemy's plans. He would draw up his forces in two lines and a reserve, and place the latter in the best position from which it can move quickly to the threatened point of attack. He would place cavalry on both flanks to watch and prevent any turning movements which may be attempted, and employ his engineer troops in the con- struction of entrenchments along the front and fortifications on the flanks to strengthen his position. The attack having been made, and the plans of the assailant fully developed, the general may find it advantageous to make a counter- attack, or fight a defensive-offensive battle, instead of being satisfied with a purely defensive battle. As a rule, the defensive-offensive battle should be chosen, but circumstan- ces actually existing at the time of the conflict can only determine in the mind of the general which would be the better. 313. It may happen that the assailed, having taken the oSensive, may be successful on one part of the field of battle, BATTLES. 149 although the assailant has been successful in his plans on another part of the field. As for instance in the case just described, in which the assailant making the turning movement on his right has been successful. Let it be supposed that the assailed has executed the same movement at the same time on the assailant's left. Here we have a case where both are successful, and in this event the one who can handle his troops the best and act the most quickly in this new state of affairs will probably win the battle. If pursuit were made at once upon the retreating wing, the pursuers may be attacked in rear and flank by the troops of the enemy's line which have not left their positions and the success already achieved be turned into disaster. It therefore follows that a general having been successful in the turning movement, should immediately make a vigorous flank and rear attack, if the enemy's line still holds the ground, and then follow this by a general pursuit. It will be suflBcient at first to follow the retreating forces closely by cavalry and artillery, supported by a brigade or two of infantry. Then having learned the condition of things along the whole line and having ascertained that the enemy's forces are generally retiring from their positions, the general will pursue with all his available forces. In pur- suit, he observes the general principles already given for pur- suits, following the enemy closely, endeavoring to separate their corps and divisions from each other, attacking them on the flanks, cutting them ofE from their supports and supplies and obliging them to surrender. It will be seen that two extremes are to be avoided in be- 150 ART AKD SCIESrCE OF WAK. ginning a pursuit ; one extreme is too great caution and the other is rashness. The former causes delays which may pre- vent the success already obtained from producing any decisive result, and the latter producing inconsiderate promptness and an unwise contempt of danger may change partial success into grave disaster. A good example of this latter is seen in. the famous battle of Naseby, fought in 1645, between Charles I. and the parlia- mentary forces, in which Prince Eupert defeated the troops . in his front and pursued them vigorously. But Cromwell, who had defeated the royalists immediately in his front, did not pursue, but turned oa those that were still fighting, took them in flank and rear and entirely routed them. If Prince Rupert had pursued the course of Cromwell, he would probably have changed the character of the battle and given to the king a victory, instead of what he did get, a crushing defeat. 314. Remark has been made of a general order sent to the division commanders announcing the plan of battle and giving directions as to what is to be done. A good example of such an order is to be seen in the gen- eral order issued by General Scott, the evening before his at- tack on the Mexican army under Santa Anna, in position on the heights of Cerro Gordo, in 1847. The American army was encamped at Plan del Rio, and the Mexicans about one- half mile in rear of a height known as Cerro Gordo, from which the battle received its name. The distance between the camps, measured on the road known as the " National Road," was between four and five miles. The road leading to the Mexican position was ascending and wound through BATTLES. 151 high hills, the crests of which were intrenched and garrisoned by the Mexicans. The most important of these heights was the one known as " Cerro Gordo," which commanded the approaches in all directions, and formed the strongest point of the enemy's position. The left of the Mexican army rested on Cerro Gordo and the right on a precipice overhang- ing an impassable ravine which forms the bed of the stream flowing through Plan del Rio . Threatening the enemy's front. General Scott proposed to turn the enemy's left and attack him in rear. This order, a copy of which is here given, was sent to his division commanders for their instruction and guidance, the day before. Head-Qtjaktbes of the Akmy, Plan del Rio, AprU 17, 1847. GENERAL ORDERS, No. 111. The enemy's whole line of entrenchments and batteries will be attacked in front, and at the same time turned, early in the day to- morrow — ^probably before 10 o'clock, a. m. The second (Twiggs') division of regulars is already advanced within easy turning distance towards the enemy's left. That divis- ion has instruction to move forward before daylight to-morrow, and take up position across the national road in the enemy's rear, so as to cut off a retreat towards Jalapa. It may be reinforced to-day, if unexpectedly attacked in force, by regiments — one or two — ^taken from Shields's brigade of volun- teers. If not,' the two volunteer regiments will march for that pur- pose at daylight to-morrow morning, under Brigadier General Shields, who will report to Brigadier General Twiggs on getting up with him, or to the General-in-chief, if he be in advance. The remaining regiment of that volunteer brigade will receive instructions in the course of this day. 152 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAB. The first division of regulars (Worth's) will follow the movemen* against the enemy's left at sunrise to-morrow morning. As already arranged, Brigadier General Pillow's brigade will march at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning along the route he has care- fully reconnoitered, and stand ready, as soon as he hears the report of arms on our right, or sooner, if circumstances should favor him, to pierce the enemy's line of batteries at such point— the nearer to the river the better — as he may select. Once in the rear of that line, he will turn to the right or left, or both, and attack the batteries in reserve, or, if abandoned, he will pursue the enemy with vigor until further orders. Wall's field battery and the cavalry will be held in reserve on the national road, a little out of view and range of the enemy's batteries. They will take up that position at nine o'clock in the morning. The enemy's batteries being carried or abandoned, all our divis- ions and corps will pursue with vigor. This pursuit may be continued many miles, until stopped by darkness or fortified positions, toward Jalapa. Consequently, the body of the army will not return to this encampment ; but be fol- lowed to-morrow afternoon or early the next morning by the bag- gage trains of the several corps. For this purpose, the feebler offi- cers and men of each corps will be left to guard its camp and effects, and to load up the latter in the wagons of the corps.. A commander of the present encampment will be designated in the course of this day. As soon as it shall be known that the enemy's works have been carried, or that the general pursuit has been commenced, one wagon for each regiment and battery, and one for the cavalry, will follow the movement, to receive, under direction of medical officers, the wounded and disabled, who will be brought back to this place for treatment in general hospital. The surgeon general will organize this important service, and BATTLES. 153 designate that hospital as well as the medical officers to be left at it. Every man who marches out to attack or pursue the enemy will take the usual allowance of ammunition, and subsistence for at least two days. By command of Major General Scott. H. L. BCOTT, i A. A. A. General. The plan of battle thus sketched out in the foregoing order was successfully executed. The Mexican army, was defeated, losing many killed, wounded and prisoners. 315. Another good example, illustrating this subject of giving directions on the eve of a battle as to what should be done, is found in the following extract from Napoleon's orders sent from Augsburg to Murat near Ulm, and dated the 12th of October, 1805. "En attendant (I'arriv^e du Maeechal Soult), faites Jeter nn pont sur le Danube le plus prSs possible de votre ligne, vis-d-vis d'AIbeck, de maniSre que le corps qui est ^ Albeck se trouve en communication et 116 avec le reste de I'Armee, et que si I'ennemi agissait trop vivement, ou se trou- vait oblig6 de se r6fugier sur la rive gauche, je puisse, dans le jour menie, tomber dessus. Ordonnez aux GSneraux de faire I'inspection de's armes et des cartouches, de rSunir tout leur monde, tout ce qui serait d^tache aux bagages ; de ren- voyer les bagages et les voitures au delEi de Burgou parquer dans les prairies, de sokte qu'il k't ait eien daks les GEANDS CHEMiNS. DSsignez I'emplacement oii doivent se mettre les reserves d'artillerie des Corps d'armSe des Mar6- chaux Lannes et Net et de la reserve de cavalerie. Assurez- vous que les reserves des trois Armies contiennent assez de 154 AET AND SCIENCE OF WAE. cartouches et qu'elles n'ont pas 6t6 glides par la pluie. Voyez 6galement k designer le lieu des Grand Ambulances pour chacun des Corps d'arniSe. Que le premier Chirurgien de chaqne Corps d'arm6e, un M6decin, un Commissaire des guerres et des gendarmes y soient 6tablis. Prenez des mes- ures pour qu'il y ait du pain, du vin, et m^me des lits pour les blesses de la journ§e. Je ne parle pas des ambulances qui doivent suivre la ligne h quatre cents toises en arridre tout au plus. Ceci n'est pas nne echaufiour^e, ce n'est pas m^me I'attaque d'une colonne pendant qu'elle marche ; c'est celle d'une Arm^e qui peut 6tre plus nombreuse que vous ne croyez, et du succfis de laquelle dependent les plus grand t6- sultats. J'y serai de ma personne. Faites arranger mon Quar- tier g6n6ral on vous le croirez le plus convenable. Je partirai d6s que j'aurai donnS mes ordres pour ma droite. Je serai demain au Quartier g6n6ral que vous m'aurez marqu6." 316, The student will find many other examples, in read- ing the reports of battles and campaigns, in which the par- ticular plan of battle is described and in which minute direc- tions are given to the subordinate generals, as shown by these orders of General Scott, and in these directions given to Murat. When the general has definite plans, it is highly probable that definite instructions will be given ; where his plans are confused, or he has none, definite instructions are apt to be wanting, or so worded as to be of little service to those receiving them. Many examples of the latter case may be found by the reader, and the latter must duly consider all the circumstances, before he can fully decide as to the causes which produced them. CHAPTER VII. POSITIONS. 217. Tpe possession of a point of either strategical or tactical importance having been acquired,- the step next in order is to place the troops in such position that they may be able to offer their greatest amount of resistance to all efforts made by an enemy to dislodge them. Troops, when thus posted, are said to be " in position." And, in gene- ral, troops are considered to be " in position " when they are so placed that they can quickly assume the formations suita- ble for making or repelling an attack. The term "position" is generally used by military writers to denote the ground occupied by, or which is to be occupied by, a body of troops when an attack is to be made or to be repelled. Since the degree of resistance offered by a body of troops will vary with the character of the ground upon which they are placed, it is essential that the commanding general should know the features of the ground composing the position which he proposes to occupy. This knowledge is essential to him in order that he may be able to post his troops so that the different arms may act most efficiently, that these arms can afford mutual support to each other, [Art. 206], and so that the troops may be sheltered wholly, or in part, from the missiles of the enemy. 16C ART AND SCIENCE OF WAB. Moreover, the simple occupation by a body of troops of a point possessing strategical or tactical advantages is not enough. It must be occupied so as to give the defenders all the chances of success in case they are attacked by an enemy of equal, or even of superior strength. These chances can not be secured, if the troops are not posted so as to fulfil the conditions just given and also to have all the advantages which the nature of the ground supplies. 218. Classes of Positions. Positions are generally classed into strategical or tactical, and into offensive or defensive positions. A position which is occupied for the purpose of holding a strategical point, or of aiding a strategical combination or movement would be designated as a strategical position. One occupied to keep possession of a tactical point or aid a tactical movement would be called a tactical position. A position occupied for the purpose of threatening the enemy with an attack on his rear or flank would be designa- ted as an offensive position. A position occupied immediately in front of an enemy, barring his advance and in which the defenders await his attack would be an example of a defensive position. Primarily, all positions occupied by troops are defen- sive. The other names used to describe them are descrip- tive of the strategical, tactical, or offensive qualities pe- culiar to them, in addition to their defensive ones. Other subdivisions may be used in their classification based up- on some peculiar quality which distinguishes them from each other, as natural and artificial, permanent and tem- porary, etc. The name given will generally convey to the POSITIONS. 157 reader the characteristic quality of the position under con- sideration. In this chapter, defensive positions are the ones con- sidered, although they may possess, in addition, the other qualities named. Component Farts of a Military Position. 219. The accidents of the ground which compose a mili- tary position are the crests of heights, the slopes approaching to or leading from tliese crests, the woods, rirers and streams, marshes, villages, open and cultivated fields, etc. The kind of country, as level, hilly, or mountainous, or as open and cleared, or wooded and broken, will have an influence both on the number and the relative sizes of these accidents of ground. A brief allusion will first be made to the advan- tages that these natural features of the ground may afford to troops when occupying them. 330. Heights and slopes. The line of battle should have a general direction nearly perpendicular to the line of operations, and in a level country would be governed as to its location by the presence of obstacles found in the vicinity, or the practicability of supplying their place by artificial ones if natural ones did not exist. Earely is a large level space to be found in campaigning. Even the prairies of our country are undulating. The sur- face of the country over which an army marches will be roll- ing, hilly, or mountainous, as a general rule, and the level surface will be the exception. When the swells of the ground have their lengths in a direction perpendicular, or nearly so, to the line of opera- 158 ART AXB SCIEKCE OF WAK. tions, the line of battle will be established along the crest of one of these rolling surfaces. The troops, when thus placed, will occupy the highest part of the ground. In consequence of their elevation, they overlook the ground over which an enemy must advance to attack them ; they will have an in- creased range of fire ; they, can, by retiring a short distance, screen themselves from the enemy's fire ; and by falling back a short distance, can make movements along the right and the left of the line, without being seen by an enemy occupy- ing the lower ground in front. This command over the ground in front and the screen offered by the crest to shelter the troops and hide their movements form the great advan- tages of posting troops along the crest. The crest should however, never be commanded within cannon range by any ground which the enemy can attain. Slopes. The approaches to the crest of heights are by slopes which may be either gentle or steep. When these slopes are gentle, the fire from the crest can be made an effective one by reason of its " grazing " action. Especially will it be so with artillery fire when properly directed. "When the slopes are quite steep, the fire will be a plung- ing one and will be apt to pass over the heads of the attack- ing troops. Especially will this be the case with the fire of artillery. The term, crest, is here used to designate the position of the line along which the troops are posted when occupying high ground. This line is rather an indefinite one, but nev- ertheless can be approximately found. It is the line which separates the ground of the defence' from that which may be POSITIONS. 159 used by the enemy in an attack. It is the line separating the upper surface of the height from the slopes up which the enemy must advance, and receives its name fi'om its analo- gous position to the exterior crest of a parapet. It is the line at which the assailant must be checked, for if he takes it, he will then be the master of the. high ground. Let VOP, (Fig. 11), represent a cross-section made at some point by a vertical plane perpendicular to the general Fig. II. length, of tne position. The intersection of the slope OV with the ground of defence, OP, is at 0, and is therefore a point of the crest. Supposing the height of the musket above the ground when brought to an aim. by a man in a standing position, to be represented by the perpendicular distance, AD, it is plain that the slope OBV, will be swept by a fire from troops posted at A, and that troops posted in rear of A, will be more or less protected from the fire of an enemy on the slope, OV, until he reaches the point, B. 160 AET AND SCIENCE OF WAE. It is evident from the figure, that a man standing at A, would have only his head and shoulders exposed to an enemy at V, while the enemy in all positions on the slope VB, would be exposed • to the man at A, And, by falling back a few paces from A, or by crouching down, the men could be en- tirely hidden from the enemy on the slope BV. 231. Woods. Large wooded tracts are of frequent. occur- rence in our country, and in the future as in the past, will form important parts of military positions. Woods offer many advantages tg those who defend them and many disadvantages to those who attack troops posted in them. Besides affording cover to the defenders, they conceal the line of battle from the assailant's sight. This advantage is at the same time a detriment because the defenders are not able to see their own line. When this is the case, it often happens that the line wavers and retires before the enemy, when there was no necessity for it. A wood offers great facilities for withdrawing an army in the presence of a superior force, without the latter dis- covering the movement until too late. A strong skirmish line is placed along the edge of the woods, and all the ap- pearances of an obstinate resistance are made. The heavy baggage, artillery, and wagon trains are all sent to the rear and quickly followed by all the troops excepting the skirmish line. The skirmishers are then withdrawn quietly, at night if convenient, and are hurried to rejoin the retiring army. The enemy follows slowly and with great caution over the ground of which he is ignorant, and by the time he finds the Woods empty, the skirmishers are miles away. POSITIOKS. 161 This ignorance of the ground immediately in front of the woods, and the concealed position of the line to be attacked, are the principal disadvantages to a successful advance on the part of the assailant. The edge of the woods forms in this case a line analogous to the crest of the height. It is the line at which the assail- ant must be checked, for if he gets possession of it, he can profit by ihe cover which the wood affords, and continue to push his advance by the same means that have enabled him to get so far. 322. Rivers, marshes, etc. TJnfordable streams, or streams with marshy and soft banks, impassable marshes, or similar obstructions, offer considerable hindrance to an enemy's advance over a ground containing them ; in some cases the hindrance is so great as to render a position located behind them nearly impregnable. Slopes which are very steep, or precipitous, are also serious obstructions to an enemy's advance. Caution should be taken however, not to regard any ob- stacle as insurmountable ; although nearly impassable, as a deep marsh or an unfordable stream may be considered, it is not absolutely so. The fault of so considering them, has in many cases been the cause of defeat of an army and the loss of the position held by it, ' 223. Villages. Villages have In many European wars formed an important part of military positions. When com- posed of buildings not easily knocked down or set on fire by the enemy's missiles, they furnish shelter for the troops and with a little labor can be converted into defenses of consid- erable strength. In addition to the cover they furnish the 162 AKT AXD SCIENCE OF WAK.- troops, villages are useful to mask the movements of troops, by concealing them from the enemy's view. Requisites of a Good Position. 224. The existence of the foregoing natural features, in the vicinity of the point to be held, does not necessarily imply that there is a good military position at that point. In order to form a good position, these accidents of the ground must be so disposed, and so situated with respect to each other^ that all the requisites for a position may be bad. Thus, a marsh may be so situated that it might be used as an obstruc- tion to the enemy's advance, and at the same time the ad- vantages it affords as an obstruction may be entirely neutral- ized by its becoming a hindrance to the free movements of the defenders along their own line. A good position may be defined to be one which affords a battle-field favorable to those occupying it, and unfavorable to those striving to dislodge the defenders. The requisites of a good defensive position may be enunciated as follows : 1. Its extent should be proportional to the number of effective troops occupying it. 2. It should have free and easy communications through- out its whole extent, so as to allow unimpeded movements of troops in all directions, and as far as possible, have these movements concealed from the enemy's view. 3. It should be so situated as to overlook the ground over which the enemy has to advance and be so disposed that this ground and the approaches to the position can be thor- oughly swept by the direct and cross fires of the defence. POSITIONS. 163 4. The natural features of the ground should conceal the defenders and shelter them from the assailant's fire, at the same time not interfering with the efiective fire of the de- fence, 5. Where natural obstructions exist, they should be in front of the position. 6. The flanks of the position ^honld be placed so as to rest on etrong points, and should be made secure from assault and safe against being turned. 7. The position should Jiave ample and safe lines of retreat, 8. The position should be in a healthy locality, and near wood and water, 225, Offensive positions require in addition to the fore- going, the following : 1. That there should be means of egress, termed debouches, from the position to the front, and these should be ample and practicable for all arms, 2. And that these debouches should connect with good roads leading into the territory occupied by the enemy. 226, The reasons for these conditions may be stated briefly, as follows : 1st. Extent of position. A close and well-sustained fire upon all points along the front of a position, is neces- sary for its good defence. This can only be effected by post- ing the troops so as to form a continuous or unbroken line along the entire front. The number of effective troops that can be used to form this line being known, it will be an easy matter to estimate the extent of this line and therefore that of the position with respect to its length of front. If the 1C4 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAE. front of the position be longer than this estimated length of line, it will be manifestly impossible to open a close and uni- form fire alpng the whole front. Some portions will have a weaker fire than others, a thing which will be inadmissible, unless these weak portions are strengthened in some way. A line too long for the number of troops who are to occupy it, would therefore be weak. If its length be shorter than the line of battle, the defect is not so serious as in the former case, but the result will be to have troops remaining idle during the contest. Hence, the ex- tent of position should be proportional to the number of troopis; The extent as regards the depth should be proportioned to the amount of space requisite for posting a second line of troops and the reserve. In many cases, room for the wagon trains, ambulances, etc., must be duly considered. 3d. Free communications. The number of troops posted on a line should be no more than the number required for its defence. If it becomes necessary to strengthen a weak point during the contest, it is essential to have good and easy communications which can be used by the troops for this purpose. If these communications are wanting, it may happen, that a body of troops at one point of the line being thus prevented from going to the assistance of another body when hard pressed at another point, may be compelled to remain idle spectators of an unequal contest which would likely termi- nate in a defeat bringing disaster upon all. These communications are then necessary to fulfil the condition already given as applicable in all cases, that the different arms shall mutually support each other. POSITION'S. 165 3d. Command. The great advantages of commanding ground, for a defensive position, have been sufficiently dis- cussed. 4th. Shelter. It is essential that troops be sheltered from the enemy's fire, as far as may be practicable. Where natural shelter does not exist, it must be supplied by the construction of "hasty entrenchments " or of stronger field works, if there is time. 5th. Obstructions. These should be in front, as in that position they impede an enemy's advance ; if in rear, they may compromise the safety of the defenders in case they find it necessary to retire from the position. 6th. Fleinks. The flanks should, if practicable, rest on strong natural obstacles, such as an unfordable river, a wide marsh, or similar obstruction, so that the troops occupying this part of the line will be able to resist any ordinary assault of the enemy and therefore secure the army in its position against a successful flank attack. These obstrncr tions will also force the enemy to make a wide detour if he tries to turn them. The flanks therefore should always rest on strong points ; natural ones, if they be present, or if there are none, upon artificial ones which may he improvised by means of the art of fortification. It is well to state that the value of these strong points is only relative, and greatly depends upon the number of troops composing the line of battle. If the number of troops be small, a slight obstacle on the flank will frequently serve, in case of an attack at that point, to hold an assailant in check long enough to allow other dispositions being made by which the enemy's plan may be frustrated ; if the number of troops 166 AKT AKP SCIEKCE OP WAR. is large, the obstruction, if slight, will in all probability not delay the enemy long enough, and will therefore fail to save the flank from defeat, and the line from the disasters which may follow. 7th, liiues of retreat. The great importance of hav- ing ample and secure lines of retreat has been mentioned in Art. 42. These lines are important in degree according to the numbers that are to use them. If the lines of retreat lead through a broken country, they will be probably few in number and contracted in size. A large body of troops using lines like these and being vigor- ously pressed by. a pursuing enemy, might meet with great disaster ; while if the body of troops is small, the inconve- niences of their contracted size would not be felt, and it is probable that the broken country would offer many positions available for a small force, which might be occupied by the retiring body to stop the pursuing enemy and compel liim to move with circumspection. 8th. Healthfuluess of position, etc. There is no necessity in dwelling upon the importance of this requisite. It is an especially important one, when the position is to be occupied for any length of time. 337. Form of position. The form of the front of a position depends upon the features of the ground. It may be straight, angular, or curved ; most generally the latter, when following the direction of the crests of the heights. When curved, the line of battle will be concave or convex toward the enemy. The concave form is the better, when the length of the line of battle is limited and there are troops enough to dq,- posmoxs. 1C7 fend it throughout with equal strength, since a strong and converging fire can then be brought upon all parts of the ground in front. The convex form is better than the concave, when by reason of want of natural advantages, or number of troops, some parts of the line are weaker than others. Iii a position of this kind, it becomes necessary to move troops from one part of a position to another, either to concentrate a superior force on a point which is threatened, or to reinforce a point which develops a great weakness. To effect these objects, the troops can move by chords of the arcs which the enemy has to use, and will therefore move on interior lines, while he moves on exterior ones. Excepting so far as it facilitates these movements, the convex is not a good form for a defen- sive position. 238. Positions actually employed in campaigns, seldom or never possess all the requisites named for a good position. The greater the number of these requisites that can bo had for any piece of ground, the better will the latter be adapted to a military position. The locality being chosen, the general in selecting his po- sition will make the best use of all the advantages afforded by the ground and will supply the requisites which are want- ing by a judicious posting of his troops and by a free use of '•entrenchments." His first care will be the location of the flanks, endeavor- ing to rest them upon some obstacle, such as a wide marsh, an unfordable river, a steep and precipitous hiU, etc. The farther an obstacle of this kind extends to the rear of the line, the more favorable will be the location for the flanks. 168 AET AND SCIENCE OP WAK. A village in rear of a flank makes, when properly garri- soned, a strong support for this part of the line, because the garrison can attack the enemy in flank if he attempts to make a flank attack on this part of the line without first taking the village. The flaftks being established, the line of battle is formed on the high ground joining them and in rear of any obstruc- tions which would be of service to afford cover to the troops, or would be useful in making difficult an approach to the line from the ground in front of it. Marshes, streams of water, ravines, and broken ground generally, when met with by an assailant upon the ground over which he has to pass to reach the position, have the advantage of obstructing his advance by breaking up his lines and sepa- rating his troops from each other. The general's next care, after having formed his line of bat- tle, is to shelter his troops from the enemy's missiles, and then to strengthen the weak points of the line. Cover for troops exposed to fire has been for a long time considered so important as to be almost a matter of absolute necessity. Napoleon I. said that " the natural positions which are generally met with, can not without the aid of art protect an army from the attacks of a superior force." Kecent wars confirm this saying of Napoleon. General Sherman says, " It was one of Prof. Mahan's maxims, that the spade was as useful in war as the musket, and to this I will add the axe." And again, he says, " On the ' defensive,' there is no doubt of the propriety of fortifying," etc. The line of battle marked out, and the shelter for the troops begun, the general proceeds to an examination of the posiTiosrs. 169 remaining requisites of a position. Tlie relative value of these will depend upon circumstances surrounding him at the time he selects the position. If there is sufficient time beforehand, the general will select a position that will combine strategical with tactical qualities. And even when he is not at liberty to make this combination, he will unite the offensive properties of the ground with the defensive ones. Circumstances, as has been stated, may cause him to vary the order and even the degree of importance of the requisites named, for a good position. As for instance, when he may have to occupy an extent of position greater or even less than is suitable for the force he commands ; or when the extent is not so important as free- dom of action ; or where he may be obliged from the necessi- ties of the case to form his line in front of an obstacle in- stead of placing it behind the obstruction ; etc. He will however supply the requisites named as far as- possible so as to make the best of the ground upon which he' has to post his troops, keeping in view the number of troops- at his disposal, the proportions of the four arms composing his command, and the main object to be attained by fighting a defensive battle in this position. 229. Influence of the ground on the general form of a position. It was stated in Art. 205, that the choice of the order of battle was frequently influenced by the fea- tures of the ground ; and in Art. 227, that the f orni of front taken up by a body of troops to defend a position was also in- fluenced by the same features. To illustrate the latter case more fully, let it be supposed that an enemy is approaching a piece of ground -as that . 8 ' 170 ART AXD SCIENCE OF WAE. -marked E in Fig. 12, and their further approach is to be re- sisted by troops who have possession of the ground at A. Fig. 12.. The topographical' features of this piece of ground are represented in the cut. A wide unfordable stream is on the left, and steep, broken, and wooded hills on the right. The plateaus of E and A are separated by a small stream with marshy banks crossed by two stone bridges near its mouth. The main roads, practicable for all arms, cross this stream over the bridges ; one of the roads makes a bend passing through the village, V, from which a branch road leads to the river, which is here crossed by a ferry. Two common country, or ordinary dirt roads cross the small stream higher up by means of fords and unite on the plateau, E. The pla- teau, A, has a slight command over that of E, and the hill at B commands the one in front of it. Following the principles ali-eady given, the line of battle assumed by a body of troops to defend this position against POSITIONS. 171 an enemy coming from B, would be along the crest of the high ground whose general direction is parallel to the road from B to V. The right -flank would rest on B, and the left of the line would be drawn back after reaching the most salient point of the high ground and be kept either, on the high ground, or extended until it reached the river, or pro- longed until it rested on the village. Circumstances would decide which of these three positions would be the best one. The village would be occupied by a suflBcient force to hold the crossings in its vicinity. The features of the ground are so combined as to make this a strong position, requiring possibly only a single line of battle to defend it. A strong reserve however should be formed, and might be kept near the hill where the roads meet. The enemy would find it a difficult matter to dislodge troops from this position, if they have been well posted, so long as there were enough of them to occupy the line of battle. 230. Situation of a position with respect to its line of retreat. The direction of the line of battle with respect to that of the line of retreat is a thing of essential importance, and very materially affects the strength of a po- sition. In the previous examples, the line of battle has been supposed to have been perpendicular, or nearly so, to the line of retreat. Take an example in which this is not the case. Let the ground, A B, (Fig, 13), be a line of heights whose general direction makes an obtuse angle with the line of retreat of an army occupying this high ground. If the line, RL, be the line of retreat, this position is a strong one, for reasons evident to the reader. If XY be the 172 ART AXa ECIEXCE OF WAR. line of retreat, the position is a weak one, because the enemy as he approaches, if he form's upon the line EF, could over- lap the left flank at A and subject it to all the disasters of Fig. 13. an enveloping flank attack. Or, he might form along th6 line CID ; by this movement, he secures his line of retreat by the wing CI and can make the attack on B the main one. If he is successful in this main attack, he will dislodge the army from its position at B, and cut it off from the line of retreat through Y. It is plain that neither of these plans of attack would be successful, if the line of retreat was through E, or by a line perpendicular to AB. 331, Position in -woods. Positions in which woods form a part have their fronts modified by the form of the wooded tracts. Woods also influence the method of posting troops for the purpose of defending a position. Let the woods, (Fig. 14), be the part of a position. This POSITIONS. 173 tract represented, is supposed to be of the usual growth met in the different parts of our country, to be practically free from brush and undergrowth, to offer no serious obstacle to a single horseman^ but impassable for artillery. The ground is undulating, free from ravines, and traversed bj- roads as shown ; two of these roads being practicable for all arms ; the third, a common country road. Fig. r4. The edge of the wood is the line upon which the enemy must be checked, or the position will be carried. This deter- mines the front of the position for this part of the line. To defend this wood with a brigade of infantry, and one battery of artillery, a strong skirmish line should be placed along the edge of the woods as shown by the dots in the fig- ure. This skirmish line should be supported by a strong line of troops, deployed as indicated by the small blocks in the cut. The skirmish line and supports should number at least one half of the effective strength of the brigade. 174 AET AND SCIEIfCE OF WAR. The rest of the brigade, excepting a small reserve of a few companies, should form a second line of battle. This line may be deployed, or formed in columns as indicated in the figure. Two guns, with a company of infantry as a support, are placed near the forks of the road. The remaining guns with the reserve are placed near the outlet to watch the flanks of the woods in rear. The flanks of the second line throw out a skirmish line to connect with the skirmishers of the first line, for the purpose of thoroughly watching the ground on the flanks. The roads should be blocked near the entrance of the woods, and the timber along the edge of the woods be " slashed ;" care takpn to have these obstructions so placed as not to afford cover to the enemy. A large reserve is not necessary in a wooded position, for reasons that are plain ; it is better to use the men in the be- ginning of the action by strengthening the first line of battle. 232. Distribution of the sLrms of service. The arms are, or should be, so distributed along a position as to afford mutual support to each other. The main line is composed of infantry and artillery, but principally of infantry, as this arm constitutes the bulk of the army and is the main dependence of the general. Infantry forms the main portion of the line of battle, "bears the brunt, and decides the battle." It can use all kinds of ground, but will be most effective in its action when occupying a commanding ground with steep approaches. It would probably be better to say, that positions of this kind can be defended by a less number of infantry, than to say that infantry is more effective in such places. POSITIOKS. 175 The engineer troops should be distributed along the line at the weak points or wherever the position is to be strength- ened by field works. In case of atlack, they act as infantry in repulsing the enemy, if they can be of more service in this capacity than by continuing their labors as engineer soldiers. Cavalry, to be effective, must be able to move freely, which requires that the ground shall be firm and free from obstructions. Cavalry will therefore play a secondary part in a defensive battle, and should not be posted in the first line of battle. The cavalry should be massed and kept with the reserve to be used as the exigencies of the case may require. If the fianks should not rest on strong points, as has been recommended, strong detachments of cavalry posted in rear of the flanks as supports would be advisable. It may also be used as supports to other weak points, if there is danger of the enemy breaking through the line, but in that case, care must be taken to see that the ground is suitable for its action. The artillery requires for its effective action, a firm ground and one free from obstructions. It should be so placed that the ground in its front will slope gently toward the enemy. It is therefore distributed along the front of a position, occupying those places where the nature of the ground will afford the most and best advantages for its effect- ive action. A plunging fire of artillery is, as a rule, not effective, but it is nevertheless recommended to place a few guns on the highest points so as to have a plunging fire on the ground in front of the position. This kind of fire produces a demoral- 176 ART AND SCIEXCE OF WAR. izing effect on the enemy's troops, and prevents their being massed within its range. It would seem that guns placed on such commanding points would present, too fair a mark to the enemy's fire. It is true that they present a fair mark, but as they are in this situation free from the effects of a ricochet fire, they will only suffer from direct shots which hit fairly. The guns are not massed in great numbers when occupy- ing a defensive position, for the reason, that if a part of the line is attacked where the guns are not massed, the effect expected from the fire of the large number brought, together is not produced. The method recommended for the distribution of the artillery is to place the guns on the strongest parts and arrange them to cross their fire in front of the weakest points. Care is taken to so place the batteries that they can be moved quickly to the rear and thence to any point of the position. This condition will require the ground to possess firmness of soil and freedom from obstructions, as already mentioned. There are generally with the army, two kinds of guns, the field and the siege gun. The former can be moved easily wherever the horses can go ; but the latter, being quite heavy, can move but slowly. These heavy guns should be so placed that while producing the best effect, there will be no trouble in removing them in case the line of battle is drawn back. It is usual to protect the heavy guns by a parapet ; from this fact, they are frequently designated as "guns of position." The guns should, before the action begins, be masked from the enemy's view ; this may be done either by drawing them back for a short distance until hidden by the ground, posiTioxs. 177 Of by deploying a line of infantry in front of them. Neither infantry nor cavalry should be posted behind a battery when in position, for the reason already given. [Art. 207.] 233. A strong reserve comprised of all four arms, capable of offensive as well as defensive action, should be formed and kept in readiness. They should be placed so as to be able to move quickly to any point of the position. The army having taken a defensive position, is sapposed to await the attack of the enemy who chooses his point of attack. The general defending the position does not know exactly at what point the attack is to be made. . He will, all other things being equal, place his reserve in a central position, as it is from such a point that he can move it more quickly to all points of the line. A general may occupy the ground and so post his troops that an enemy who attempts to dislodge him, must attack the position at the point presenting the most favorable features for defence. A general who does this is not only master of the position, but is master of the art of war. 234. Art of selecting positions. The art of select- ing a position, as has been shown, consists in choosing a piece of ground so that its irregularities, unevenness, and nature o£ surface, shall offer obstructions to an enemy's advance over it, and at the same time not interfere with the eflBciency of the defence. In other words, it consists in selectijig a battle- field which is favorable to defence and at the same time un- favorable to him who attempts to dislodge its defenders. An ofiBcer, who wishes to master this art, must first acquire a thoroughly practical knowledge of the tactics of all arms ; must know the different ranges of fire ; must learn 8* 178 ART ASTD SCIESCE OF WAR. the fitness of the different kinds of ground for manceuvering troops ; and understand the principles of field engineering. And since the exigencies of war rarely permit a person to study leisurely the nature of the ground upon which the troops are to be posted, the oflBcer who practices this art, must prepare himself so as to be able to judge immediately, from his first and rapid examination of the ground, as to its suitability for a position. This power of judging instantly, upon the first inspection of the ground, as to its fitness for a position, and of deciding quickly what is best to be done, is called the " coup d'osil militaire," and is considered by military writers to be a natu- ral gift. All agree in the opinion, however, that this power may be acquired by any intelligent officer who will study the subject, reflect upon what he learns, and practice the art whenever opportunity offers. 335. There are many such opportunities to be found for its practice in peace as well as in war. Many will remember the vivid description of the advantages offered by a defensive position, and the imaginary contest which followed, as given in a story by a popular writer : " See there — ^look," cried he, as his thin, attenuated fin- ger pointed to the pass. " "What a ravine to defend ! The column, with two pieces of artillery in the road ; the cavalry to form behind, where you see that open space, and advance between the open files of the infantry ; the tirailleurs scat- tered along the ridge, where the furze is thickest, or down there among those masses of rock. Sacristi ! what a volume of fire they'd pour down. See how the blue smoke and the ring of the musket would mark them out as they dotted the POSITIONS. 179 mountain side, and yet were unapproachable to the enemy ; and think then of the rolling thunJer, of the eighteen-pounders shaking these old mountains, and the long, clattering crash of the platoon following after, and the dark shakos towering above the smoke ; and then the loud ' Viva !' I think I hear it." This was supposed to be the utterance of a soldier to his boy companion and friend, to whom he was teaching the art of war, upon reaching a piece of ground which he thought suitable for a defensive position. 236. The constant practice of examining the ground with a view to defend it against an enemy, and the habit of think- ing how the troops should be posted upon it, go far to famil- iarize an officer with the application of this portion of his profession. This practice and habit are common to all diligent stu- dents of the military art, and are especially commented upon in many histories, when nari'ating the lives and characteris- tics of the great generals of the past. 237. The Eoman historian,- Livy, in writing about Philo- pcemen, a celebrated Greek general, says : " Philopoemen was possessed of an admirable degree of skill and experience in conducting a march and choosing his [position] station ; having made these points his principal study, jiot only in times of war, but likewise during pea,ce. Whenever, in trav- elling he came to a defile where the passage was difficult, it was his practice, first, to examine the nature of the ground on every side. "When journeying alone, he meditated within himself ; if he had company,' he asked them, 'If an enemy should appear in that place, what would be the proper method of proceeding ; what, if they should attack him in front > 180 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAK. what, if on this flank, or on that ; what, if on the rear ? for he might happen to meet them while his men were formed with a regular front ; or when they were in the loose order of march, fit only for the road.' He would proceed to exam- ine, either in his own mind, or by asking questions, ' What ground he ought to choose ; what number of soldiers, or what kind of arms (which was a very material point.) he ought to employ ; where he should deposit the baggage, where the soldiers' necessaries, where the unarmed multitude ; what number and what kinds of troops he should appoint to guard them ; and whether it would be better to jirosecute his march as intended, or to return by the way he came ; what spot, also, he should choose for his camp ; what space he should enclose within the lines ; where he could be conveniently supplied with water ; where a sufficiency of forage and wood could be had ; which would be his safest road for the next day and in what form should the army march ? In such stu- dies and inquiries he had, from his early years so frequently exercised his thoughts, that on any emergency of the kind occurring, no expedient that could be devised was new to him." [Liv. Book xxv. chap. 38.] Plutarch alludes to the same characteristics, and also says of him (Philopoemen), " Of all other books he was most devoted to the commen- taries of Evangelus on military tactics, and also took delight, at leisure hours, in the histories of Alexander, etc." This practice of the great Greek general is earnestly re- commended to all military students who desire to attain pro- ficiency in the " art of war." CHAPTER VIIL ATTACK OF POSITIONS. 238. Ak army making an advance movement in the enemy's territory may meet the enemy under one of the three following circumstances, viz : 1. The army while advancing may be attacked by the enemy in force ; 2. The army may find the enemy occupying a position and in it awaiting an attack from the invader ; 3. The army may find the enemy falling back, that is, making a retrograde movement. 239. If the army has marched with proper advance guards and has observed the precautious alluded to in Arts. 152 and 153j the attack, in the first case, wiU not be a surprise and the commanding general will have sufficient time to choose a position in which he can post his troops. This position, as shown in the last chapter, will be a good one, if it enables him to accept battle with advantage ; and will be a poor one, if he has to fight at a disadvantage. It frequently happens when the general learns of the immediate presence of the enemy, that the ground in the neighborhood of his army does not afford the necessary requisites for a good position. When this is the case, it will be prudent for him, if he can do it, to fall back before the enemy's approach until he finds ground possessing favorable features for' defence, and there 183 ART Alfl> SCIENCE OF WAR. take up a position in which to await the enemy's attack. The fact of an attack in force being made by an enemy would indicate either superiority in numbers on his part, or of poor marching, or bad handling, of troops on the part of the ad- vancing army. An enemy waiting in position to be attacked, as considered in second case, might be regarded as an evidence of inferiority of numbers on the enemy's part, or if equal or superior in numbers, to a want of confidence in his troops. An enemy retiring as the army advances, would be gen- erally considered as an evidence of inferiority, either in numbers, discipline, or armament, etc., on the part of the enemy, Ijut not always. The retrograde movement might be the result of military policy, the enemy having some ulterior object in view which would be productive of greater disaster to the advancing army than any which might be inflicted by earlier resistance. The general commanding an advancing army, when in doubt as to the real reason of the enemy's retreat, should proceed cautiously, else he might place his army in sucTi a situation that it could not be extricated without great diffi- culty and possibly then, only with disaster. 240. An enemy in position. An enemy takes up a position for one of two things, viz : either to repel an attack which he expects will be made upon him, or simply to defend a position which he wishes to retain. In the first case, the position is ordinarily abandoned as soon as the danger of attack has passed, or the contest for the position has been decided. In the second case, the posi- tion is retained because it contains a point of importance in ATTACK OF POSITIOXS. 183 the military operations, and it is therefore occupied as long as the point retains its importance. As for instance, the position near Gettysburg, taken up by General Meade in July, 1863, to repel an attack expected from General Lee, and which was abandoned by General Meade as soon as General Lee retreated, is a good example of the first case. The second case requires no example to illus- trate it. The attack upon troops in position, or more particularly, upon those positions occupied by an army acting defensively with the object of opposing an enemy's advance, will form the subject of this chapter. 241. Two general methods are used by an army to neu- tralize the advantages gained by an enemy in position. One method is to force the enemy to withdraw from his position ; the other is to detach a force from the main body of sufficient strength to watch him and to prevent any interfei'cnce with the army's operations. The latter method is practicable only when there is a great superiority of force on the part of the invader. When there is an equality in numbers, or the difference is too slight to admit of detaching a sufficient force, the former course must be adopted. There are two means which may be used to force the enemy to withdraw from or to yield aposition. These means may be used separately, or they may be combined. One method is to attack the enemy and drive him out by main force ; the other is to manceuver the army so as to gain for it a position, which will render the one occupied by the enemy untenable, or useless for the purposes intended. 184 ART AKD SCIEXCE OF WAK. The latter method is referred to in Art. 133, under the head of mancBuver marches. 243. Reconnoissance. The general commanding an advancing army, having been informed of the enemy's near presence, goes quickly to the front [Art. 152] to examine the ground over which his troops must pass to reach the enemy, and to determine as far as possible the kind of position occu- pied by the enemy's troops. He has all the approaches lead- ing directly to the enemy's position, and those leading to its extremities from both flanks, carefully reconnoitered. He places himself on high ground, if there be any near, from which he can see as much as possible of the surrounding country ; he notes particularly those features of the ground which may be utilized as a cover for his troops while advan- cing, and particularly those features which might hinder in any way their advance or stop them within close range of the enemy. As a rule, those features of the ground which would if undefended afford cover to an attacking force, would be occu- pied by the enemy and thus be made serious obstacles to the advancing troops. Care must be taken to ascertain if such points are occupied or not, so that if they are not defended, the advantage may be taken of their favorable qualities, and the oversight of the enemy turned to his disadvantage. To remove any doubts in his own mind, as to what points may be occupied by the enemy, the general may find it necessary to make demonstrations along the front of the position by means of which he makes the enemy show himself. Caution should however be observed in making these demonstrations, not to excite the enemy's fears for the safety of any particular ATTACK OF POSITIONS. ^ 18o point, which point it might be possible to carry by making a strong attack upon it. It will not be a very diflBcult thing to obtain by these means a fair estimate of the enemy's strength and to ascer- tain the nature of the ground in front of a position, if the country is an open one. It will be very difficult to do this, if the position is in a wooded and broken country ; and the as- sailant, as he advances to the attack, will then be forced to grope bis way over ground of the nature of which he is ignorant. The reconnoissances made by the general himself, and under his instructions by intelligent officers chosen for the purpose, will enable the general to select his point or points of attack. The points to be attacked should have such a relation to the position, that when taken by the assailant, the enemy would be forced to retire. Points of this kind, that is, points whose possession controls the position, and in which the strength of the position lies, arc known as key-points. Determination of the Point of Attack. 243. A general, when selecting the point on which the main attack is to be made, will keep in view the object of inflicting the greatest possible injury upon the enemy with the least pos- sible loss to his own troops. He will therefore try to deter- * mine the point or points whose possession will give him some- thing more than the occupancy of the enemy's position. He will therefore consider the points to be attacked, not only with respect to the position occupied by the enemy, but also with respect to the general situation and circumstances of the enemy and of his own army. 186 ART AXn SCIE2!-CE OF WAE. If the object to be attained is simply to get possession of the position, and the nature of the ground occupied by the enemy is the only consideration needed to determine the points to be attacked, then it is evident, from what has been already stated, that a height, a wood, or a village occupied by the enemy are points which must be taken to get possession of the position. General Dufour says of heights, — "In fact, a height is often the key of the battle-field, and should be the point upon which the first and great attack should be made, because such a point may give a command- ing view and fire over all the surrounding ground. ,At the same time it serves as a screen, behind which new dispositions for attack may be arranged, and from the high ground a rush may at any moment be made upon the enemy below." He quotes Frederick the Great as ha^-ing said, " Always attack the mountain or highest ground occupied by the enemy, for if you force that position, all other points will fall into your possession ; troops are always more vigorous and orderly in the first stages of an engagement. Do not, therefore, waste time and blood upon points of minor impor- tance, and afterwards proceed with disordered and decimated battalions to attack the principal points of the enemy's posi- tion, where the greater part of his force will by this time be massed by the course of events if not by design." He also says of villages and woods, as follows, " The possession of a large village, with stone houses, is always a great advantage on the field of battle, because it may be very easily put in a defensive state, and is a kind of fortifi- cation. Such a village becomes often a point around which the most severe fighting is seen. ATTACK OF POSITIOXS. 187 " A wood presents similar advantages. It covers and masks the artillery ; it is easily held by skirmishers ; cavalry cannot approach it. A wood protects the flank of a line which rests on it, and the position of the latter can not be held until the former is carried." So far as the mere features of the ground are considered, it will not therefore be a difficult matter to determine the points which control it. A careful study of the ground in front of an enemy's position, with reference to the facilities offered for an attack, and with respect to its strength for defence, would enable the general to choose the point or points which he must gain in order to control the ground and would determine in his mind the feasibility of a successful attack. 344. The control of a position is in the hands of him who retains possession of the key-point This point contains the strength of the position and forms the object which the gen- eral wishes to gain. It does not follow however that this key- point is the strongest point of the enemy's line, although it should be. Eelying on its natural strength, or ignorant of its true value, or from other causes, the enemy may not have suf- ficiently defended it to resist the impetuous and strong attack which the assailant makes to carry it. Thus, the centre of a line of battle, without regard to the kind of ground on which it is placed, has the property of being the strongest part of the line, because it can be reinforced from either flank in half the time that would be required to reinforce one flank by troops from the other. It can be readily seen that if the line of battle is too much spread out, the centre may become so distant from its wings, and so thinly formed that 188 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAK. it will become the weak, instead of being the strong pdini of the line. So with positions, the key points may becoma weak points of the line, if the enemy "neglects to defend them properly ; and, to find out these weak points, should be one of the objects demanding the assailant's attention. 245. The capture of a position from an enemy by a suc- cessful attack is an important thing, but should be regarded only as a part of the object to be attained. It is possible that an enemy, finding that. he could no longer hold his position, and after inflicting greater loss on the assailant than any that he had suilered, might retire to some new position equally as good as the one from which he had withdrawn. The general, in examining the ground to determine the point of attack, will also look into the possibilities of cutting ofE the enemy from his line.of communications ; or of fixedmg him to take some new position in which he will meet ather disasters than the mere loss of position ; etc. At the same time, he must consider the effect of failure on his own part, and be cautious about exposing his own communications or compromising his line of retreat. For if he should fail in his attack, the enemy might by an ofEensive movement, made at the right time, succeed in bringing disaster and possibly defeat by cutting the army off its line of communications, etc. These considerations should exert a great- influence upon the general in selecting the point of attack. They are often so various and so opposed to each other, that they render " the determination of the point of attack," a problem which requires a mind of no common order to solve correctly. Kules can not be deduced which will apply to all the cases, ATTACK OF POSITIONS. 189 although in many instances the general rules already given will solve the problem. 246. Influence of strategical and tactical con- siderations. The various and opposite considerations which have just been mentioned are generally classed as either strategical or tactical, taking their name from the results which they strive to obtain. When both the strategical and tactical considerations coin- cide in pointing out the same object to be gained, the deter- mination of the point of attack is easily made. When they are opposed to each other, which frequently happens, the prob- lem is not so easy, and its correct solution requires the exer- cise iu many cases of a mind of the highest order of geniua. FiK.I5. 247. To explain, the above classification, and to show how these considerations may, or may not agree, a hypothetical case will be taken. Suppose an army moving forward from some point as F, (Pig. 15), should find an enemy in position with his line extending from A to B. The right of the 190 ART AND SCIENCE OF VTXn. enemy's line rests on high ground at A and his left on an nnfordable river or behind a marsh which is practically im- passable. The general direction of the position is oblique to the line of retreat, A C. Tactical considerations will point out the high ground, at A, as the main point of attack, because the capture of this point will give control of the position, AB, occupied by the enemy. Strategical considerations will point out the high ground. A, as the main point of attack, for the possession of the point A, while the enemy occupies the line AB, will give control of the line of retreat AC. This then would be an example in which both the strate- gical and tactical considerations agree, and there will be no doubt as to what is the key-point of the position. The as- sailant, if he succeeds in carrying the high ground ab A, would obtain command of the position, and besides cutting the enemy off from his line of retreat A C, would throw him back on an impassable river or other obstacle. The enemy occupying the position AB, has rested his flanks on strong natural points, as recommended in Art. 334, at the same time he has weakened his position by forming his line of battle oblique to his line of i-etreat, as shown in Art. 230. The flank at B is perfectly secure from assault and in no danger of being turned ; the flank at A has a commanding position and may be considered safe against any ordinary assault. The whole position is however a faulty one, for the reason that the assailant, if successful, reaps great advantages ; if ATTACK OV POSITI01f$. 191 unsuccessful, he retires without other disaster than a simple repulse. A better position for the defence would be that indicated by the dotted lines from A to D. In that case, the general direction of the position would have been nearly perpendicular to the line of retreat, the left flank would have rested on the height at A, and the right flank could have been strengthened by being reinforced at D. If then the position were attacked at A, the key^point, the assailant would have to move forward to do this with the marsh at his back ; if it were attacked at D, the defence would meet with no serious disaster as long as he held A, and the assailant could not envelop D without uncovering his line of retreat through F ; and in either case, if the assail- ant was successful, the line of retreat of the defence would not be imperilled. 248. As another example, suppose the enemy to have Fig.16. occupied a position as AB(Fig. 16). In this example, the left flank rests on an impassable obstacle, while the right is on open ground. The line of retreat is sup- posed to be along CD, nearly parallel to the impassable obstacle on the left. Strategical considerations would designate B as the point of attack ; for if successful, this wing would be driven back n-^ 192 AET AND SCIENCE OF WAR. and the enemy would be cutofE from his line of retreac. An attack on B has the defect of placing the assailant between the enemy and the impassable obstacle, which latter might be the cause of disaster if the attack fails. Tactics would there- fore designate A as the point of attack, if an assault is to be made. An attack on the enemy in this position is not to be recommended, because if successful in forcing back the wing from A, the enemy is neither driven back on the impassable obstacle, nor does he lose his line of retreat. If for other reasons, the battle niust be foiight, tlie tacti- cal would be considered more important than the strategical considerations and the attack should be made on the point A. A better course than fighting would be to attempt by manoeu- vers to induce the enemy to leave this position. If the enemy had been posted so as to have both his flanks resting upon impassable obstacles, and the line of retreat practically perpendicular to his position, there would have been nothing gained strategically by attacking one wing rather than the other. The considerations governing the selection of the point of attack would have been entirely tactical. 249. From what precedes, it will be perceived that those considerations having for their object other results in addition to the gain of the position are termed strategical. Those having for their object the possession of the position and a complete defeat of those defending it are known as tactical considerations. These latter are sometimes divided into grand tactical, and tactical. Thus the former is applied to those consid- erations, springing from the configuration of the position and ATTACK OF POSITIONS. 193 its neighborhood, which would lead to inflicting severe losses by breaking up or capturing the enemy's forces after he has retired from the position ; while the latter is more particu- larly applied to the considerations based on the nature of the ground. The selection of the centre of the line as the main point of attack when evidences are such as to convince the assailant that he can succeed in piercing it, and then selecting the wings in succession to defeat, would be a case in which the considerations were " grand tactical." When the nature of the ground is such that promptness and unity of action may or may not be secured by the assail- ant, the considerations springing from these causes would be designated as simply "tactical." This last is the least im- portant of the three and generally yields to the others when there is an antagonism between them. Although but one point, which has been designated the key-point, is usually selected for the main effort of the assail- ant, the whole line must nevertheless be more or less threat- ened with attack, so as to prevent the key-point from being reinforced. XTnity and promptness of action are extremely essential for this purpose and hence '•' tactical " considerations have great weight in selecting the points of attack. 250. Attack upon the centre. Although the centre is the strongest part of a line of battle, there may be circum- stances making it advisable to direct the main attack against that point. Suppose for example, that a height is in the centre of this line. In such a case, if a decisive result is desired, the most vigorous efforts should be made to carry the high gi'ound, the possession of which is equivalent to a con- 9 194 AKT AND SCIENCE OF WAE. trol of the field. An advantage obtained by attacking one wing would amount to nothing so long as the enemy held the high ground, and it would be necessary at last to drive him away from that part, or else retire from the contest. Therefore, however perilous this attack may be, there is no time for hesitation ; the attempt must be made as the only possible chance for success, unless the position can be turned ; in which case it would be better to manoeuver than to fight. If the attack is made, the best troops should be selected for that purpose, and every possible pains taken to insure success. The attack on the centre, which is the exception when the enemy is well concentrated, becomes the rule when his army is much spread out, and the different corps of it are too far apart. By making simple demonstrations upon the ex- tremities of his long line, and pressing vigorously upon the centre, it will almost surely be broken, and the two wings will be separated. It will be practicable under such circumstances, if time is used to good advantage, to envelop and destroy the wings in succession, or else oblige them to retreat upon diver- gent lines. An attack on the centre is also the best course to follow when the enemy's line of retreat is through a defile in rear of his centre. In this case, a successful attack will result in separating the wings, and forcing the centre back upon the defile, which latter result will be very apt to be accompanied by a serious disaster to the enemy's troops, hurried in confu- sion and disorder into the nan-ow passages of the defile. An attack on the centre may often be advisable when the enemy has both his flanks resting on secure points. 251. Attack upon the flank. The attacking force, if ATTACK OF POSITIONS. 395 sufficiently numeroHS or well handled, maybe able at times to attack one, or even both, of the flanks of a position so as to completely envelop the point of attack. When this can be done, success is almost certain for the assailant, since the lines of battle as usually formed are defenceless against flank attacks unless the wings rest on strong and secure points. Success in an attack of this kind is alluded to in Aft. 200, when referring to the advantages derived from the oblique order of battle. A flank attack is only practicable when made with great precautions and under cover of natural obstacles which con- ceal the movements from the enemy. Generally, no time should be wasted in making turning movements, since such movements can be easily avoided by the enemy when he learns of them in season, and may be made dangerous to the assail- ant who tries them. Flg.l7. • General Dufour, by the following example, illustrates this turning movement effected by skillful handling of the troops. 196 ART AND SCIEXCE OF WAK. The assailant inarches in two columns, A and B (Fig. 17), towards the centre of the enemy's line. The column A marches either at full or half distance, while the column B marches closed in mass. The latter column conceals part of its colors, and makes such dispositions as will lead the enemy to suppose that the two columns are both equal in numbers. The two columns appearing to the enemy to be of equal size, he will be in doubt as to where the principal attack is to be made. He will nstturally expect the attack to be in front and will not be undeceived until the deployments are made and the attack developed. This movement will be greatly facilitated if the features of the ground admit of bodies of troops moving forward without being seen by the enemy. 253. Diversions. Diversions are, as a rule, considered unadvisable [Art 183], Those made by sending a strong detachment, by a circuitous route, to fall on the enemy's flank or rear, while the main force attacks in front, belong in a measure to attacks upon the flank and will be briefly alluded to here. Movements of this kind are wrong in principle ; and military history presents striking instances of their failure in practice. The topographieall features of the immediate theatre of operations can alone determine whether to risk turning movements. When the field of operations is in a very broken or obstructed country so that such a movement may be concealed during the time necessary to perform it, the risk will be less, but the chances are still against it. As an example of such a case, let us suppose, an enemy moving for- ward from Q, or occupying a position as that at X (Pig. 18). An army as M having its base of operations at P may ATTACK OF POSITIOXS. 197 take advantage of the natural features of the country to ma- nceuver against the flank of the enemy at X. A detachment would be left at S, sufficiently strong to hold the enemy in check long enough, if he moved forward to attack, for the main hody, M, to move around the height, m, and take up its position on the enemy's flajik and rear. A detachment would be sent to occupy the height, m, as indi- cated in the figure. The army having gained the position at M, would force the enemy to retire from his position at X, or compel him to accept battle under disadvantageous circumstances. The main body, if repulsed, could retire and take up its old position at S with safety, as the two detachments &im and S would secure it during the movement from any attack in flank or rear. This example is here designated as a " diversion," although it is more fairly a turning movement, or flank attack. It is easily seen that turning movements may become diversions, and vice-versa. 198 AET AND SCIENCE OF WAR. The evident objection to all turning movements is that the assailant exposes himself to a similar attack in making the movement; and therefore if success is to be expected, these movements ought to be attempted only when the feat- ures of the ground offer favorable opportunities for their execution. Frederick the Great owed most of his victories to success- ful flank attacks ; they were successful because he was able to conceal the preliminary movements, and because his op- ponents manoeuvered with great slowness. 253. Attack of heights. Great stress has been laid on the attack of heights when these heights form part of the position. An attack on a height can be successful, only when the height can be easily ascended and when there is room on the top for the troops to extend their formations. If the height is quite precipitous, making the ground difficult to climb, or if the approaches to it lead through defiles, or are so narrow as to force the attacking troops to move over the ground in columns or with small fronts, the attack will in all probability fail of success. A position, with a height of this kind, should therefore be turned, and no attempt be made to take it by force. But as has just been stated, the turning movement to be successful must be favored by the ground, so that the enemy will have no opportunity to attack the troops in flank or rear while making the movement. It may sometimes happen that the enemy may occupy a position in which the high ground occupied by him has its general direction perpendicular to his line of battle, as that shown in Fig. 19. ATTACK OF POSITIONS. 199 Flg.l9. Here, the enemy occupies the position from C to D. One flank rests upon open and comparatively level ground ; the other upon the high ground. The attack would be made on the enemy's left and in the manner shown in the figure. 254. Remark. It has been laid down as a rule [Art. 236] that a close and well sustained fire upon all points along the front of the position is necessary for its good defence. This fire should be that of infantry. Similarly, it is ne- cessary, in the attack of a position, that the attacking troops shall be able to form a continuous line of infantry along the front which is to be attacked. The troops should, in advancing to the attack, have such formations as will admit of a continuous line of infantry being quickly formed. It does not follow, however, that to do this, the heads of the columns should move on the same gen- eral line. The echelon formation is the one ordinarily used by the advancing columns. A simultaneous attack along the whole line is rarely made, but instead, only one point is selected upon which the main attack is to be directed. The possession of this point gives decisive results and allows others to be taken, and finally gives possession of the position. Secondary points, the fewer 200 ART AND SCIEXCE OF AVAR. the better, may be selected for attack, either to distract the enemy's attention from the main attack, or to gain them because their possession gives aid to the main attack. Points, in advance of a position and offering advantages either for defence or for ofPence, should be seized. The pos- session of these points gives strength to the attack, since it establishes the " line of attack " very near, or possibly within, the position occupied by the defence. Any attack by the defence made to regain possession of these points must be made under many disadvantages. These points are particu- larly important when found on the flank or rear of a position, and having been gained, should be made strong and con- nected by a safe line of communication with the main army. Positions strong by nature and strengthened by fortifica- tions can not be carried by assault, so long as the defence is at all vigilant and effective. Threatening manoeuvers by means of which the enemy may be made to withdraw from his position will be almost the only way to force him to leave a strong position. 355. Circumstances may however require that an attempt shonld be made to carry a strong position by force, even when the enemy is vigilant. Under these circumstances, the point of main attack is determined, as has already been described ; that is, it is chosen after a careful reconnoissance of the enemy's whole line, and after a due consideration of the strategical and tac- tical advantages which enter into the question of selection. The arrangements are then made for the attack and should be subject to the following conditions, viz : 1. The dispositions of the troops should be such that the ATTACK OF POSITIONS. 201 enemy will be kept up td the last moment in ignorance of the main point of attack. 2. That the dispositions will be such as to allow of a united and vigorous attack being made at the right time. 3. That this atta,ek when madB should be strongly sup- ported. 4. That the dispositions of the troops will be such as to readily allow the general to refuse any portion of his line, or act defensively with success, in case of a counter-attack by the enemy. 9* CHAPTER IX. DEFENSIVE OPEKATIONS. 356. Military movements made with the object of await- ing an attack by an enemy are designated as defensive op- erations, to distinguish them from those movements which are made with the object of attacking an enemy. The main object of defensive operations may be solely to repel any attack which an enemy might make and thus pre- vent his advance ; or the object may be, not only to prevent the enemy's advance, but to attack him whenever there is a favorable opportunity which promises success. Movements of this latter kind are known as '•' defensive- offensive," and are the characteristic operations of an active defence. Movements of the former kind are characteristic of the defence known as passive. Jomini asserts that a passive defence is always pernicious ; that an active defence may accomplish great successes. 257. Object of defensive operations. The main object to be attained by defensive operations is that of pro- tecting a country or some particular portion of country threatened with invasion by an enemy, or of protecting a body of troops or even an army against any attacks which may be made by an enemy. Offensive movements when made by an enemy would in- dicate upon his part a superiority of some kind and a desire DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS. 203 to bring matters to a prompt issue. The natural end aimed at by the defence under these circumstances would be to repel any attack if it were practicable to do so, and to retard the enemy's advance by every possible means which can be employed. 258. Advemtages and disadvantages attending defensive operations. An army acting offensively knows what is to be done and enjoys therefore the power of con- centration. On the other hand, the army acting defen- sively is ignorant of where his adversary proposes to attack and is obliged to await the development of the enemy's plans ; the defence is therefore committed in a great measure to the policy of scattering of forces. This scattering of his forces is necessary in order that the approaches leading to those points which may be of import- ance to the enemy can be watched and guarded, and that those points near which the defensive forces should be concenti-ated whenever the plan of the enemy is discovered may be occu- pied. The scattering of troops over an extended front of opera- tions is a serious disadvantage to the defence, if they can not be quickly concentrated where needed. When the forces are numerous, this scattering possesses its advantages especially in the facilities it allows of subsisting the troops. The forces are under these circumstances more easily supplied than when concentrated and acting offensively, as it allows of the sup. plies being collected at many and at more convenient points for their distribution. Their distribution when thus col- lected at various points will not require the cumbrous and immense trains which are found necessary when an army moves forward from its base of supplies. 204 AKT AlfD SCIEXCE OF WAK. Defensive operations carried on in an army's own territory possess many advantages. Tlie principal ones are as follows : the population is friendly and every inhabitant may be relied upon to give correct information of the enemy's movements when observed; the army can accept battle in positions care- fuHy examined beforehand, and in many cases, in positions prepared in advance of the conflict ; the army can move in any direction and is not confined to any one line of opera- tions ; it can, in consequence of being in its own country, use any space not actually occupied by the enemy as a base of operations ; it can, in consequence of its freedom of move- ment, threaten the enemy's lines of retreat, and overwhelm detachments of the enemy which have been left to guard points of importance to the invader ; etc. An army fighting upon its own territory causes necessarily great injury to the inhabitants, but this disadvantage is more than compensated for by the advantages of fighting in a country which is well known, of being near all its supplies, and of being so situated that it can act offensively whenever it desires. 259. Flan of defence. The plan which is to be fol- lowed in defensive operations is known as the plan of defence. The formation of a plan of defence should be similar to that prescribed for the "plan of campaign." That is, the general plan may be the act of the government, but the par- ticular plan of defence should be the act of the general who is entrusted with its execution. The main objects to be considered in devising a plan of defence may be briefly stated to be as follows : DEFEXSITE OPERATIOXS. 205 The selection of the points at which resistance to the enemy's advance should be made ; the selection of the points to which the troops should retire in case of reverse, and of the routes to be pursued ; the disposition of the troops while expecting the enemy's appi'oach ; the manner of anticipating him, wherever he may come ; the indication of points for concentration, as soon as his plans are developed ; the method of supporting the troops in advance, and those in observation, by central reserves ; the designation of points to be fortified ; the designation of the bridges, roads, etc., to be destroyed, if the troops are obliged to fall back ; the selection of means of communication, such as telegraphs, signals, etc. ; and a due consideration of all operations which can be serviceable in retarding the enemy's progress, and of movements which can be made a source of annoyance to the enemy and yet com- promise in no way the safety of the defence. The natural features of the country will modify and ma- terially affect the plan of defence and to such a degree as to render it almost impossible to give rules which will be appli- cable in many cases. Certain general principles, the fruit of experience, should control the arrangements and details of any plan of defence. Among the most important of these principles which should exercise their influence upon a plan of defence are the fol- lowing : It is important that care be taken not to scatter the troops too widely. That the approaches should be guarded and defended ; but this is only necessary for the most important ones. That care be taken to post the troops so that they can be 306 AKT AND SCIEXCE OF WAR. easily and quickly concentrated upon such points as are likely to be attacked. That the strength of the forces and the movements made by them be concealed from the enemy as much as possible. That as a preference, those positions offering the greatest facilities for the effective use of the arm in which the army is strongest or superior to the enemy, should be occupied. 260. Attention to the first and second of these principles, as here given, will avoid long and weak lines of defence, which are easily broken at almost any point which the enemy may select. If the enemy should advance by any of the approaches which are considered as unimportant, an effort must be made to oppose him. The defensive troops occupying an inner position and moving along interior lines, ought to be able to anticipate the enemy at any point which he may threaten, especially so if the third principle has been duly observed. 361. Occupation of points immediately in front of an enemy is not always necessary for the purpose of opposing his advance. Points situated upon his flank and held in force can be used for this purpose, because if he ventures to pass them, he exposes his line of operations. He is therefore com- pelled either to leave detachments to watch such points, oir to leave his direct route and attack them. If he attacks them, he is compelled to fight on ground selected by the defence and on ground which has been so prepared, by fortifying or otherwise, as to add to the resistance offered by the defence. 263. Iiines of defence. Lines of defence are simply positions of great extent ; too great to form upon them a DEFBXSIVB OPERATIONS. 207 continuous line of troops throughout their entire length. They are classified into strategical or tactical, into permanent or temporary, natural tiv artificial lines, etc., according to the qualities peculiar to them. The requisitps named as being necessary for a good position are the same for a defensive line, excepting as to difference in degree arising from the greater extent of the line of defence over that of a position. A range of mountains, a desert, a river of considerable width, or a connected system of obstacles forms a natural line of defence, since by defending the passes, the crossings, or defiles, through and over which an enemy has to pass, his ad- vance can be arrested. A natural defensive line may be strengthened by fortifica- tions, and when this line is the frontier of acountry, it is usually so strengthened. The entire defensive line may be formed of fortifications adapted to the ground, and in this case the line is an artificial one. The most celebrated example of artificial lines mentioned in history is that of the Chinese walls. Traces of Roman walls are still seen, which were constructed for a similar purpose. Those of Torres Vedras are however the most im- portant of artificial lines known in modern warfare, and have the advantage over the others, in having accomplished the purpose for which they were intended. 263. Lines of Torres Vedras. These were artificial defensive lines established by the Duke of Wellington to pre- vent the approach of the French upon Lisbon in 1810. Alison says : " The lines of Torres Vedras on which the English engineers were engaged for above a twelve-month. 208 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. * * * consisted of three distinct ranges of defences, one within another, which formed so many intrenched positions, each of which must be successively forced before the invading force could reach Lisbon." He then describes them and their location, saying "The first which was twenty-nine miles long extended from Alham- bra on the Tagus to Zezambre on the sea-coast, etc." This first line "consisted of thirty redoubts placed on a ridge of heights, on which were mounted in all, one hundred and forty guns ; the great redoubt of Sobral in the centre, on which were mounted forty-five pieces of heavy cannon, was perched on an eminence that overlooked the whole exterior lines, and from which signal posts communicated over their whole extent ; an admirable road, running along the front of the position enabled one part of the army to communicate rapidly with the other ; etc." The English army was able to move quickly by this road from one pari of the line to another, and keep their move- ments hidden from the enemy's view. Although there was no natural obstacle of importance in front of this line, the French, unable either to force the line or to turn the position, were compelled to retire. Defence of Mountains. 264. Suppose the line of defence to be along a mountain jange. The defence to be made to oppose an enemy's advance must be either an active or a passive one. In case of an active defence, the best disposition of the , troops is tjj place the main body near some central point, or DEFEXSIVE OPERATIONS. 209 where the main passes meet, and to guard each of the main passes by a strong detachment. These detachments occupying the passes should be strong enough to offer a vigorous resistance to the enemy, sufficient to hold him. in check and to force him to disclose his plan. As soon as the plan is discovered and the main point of attack is known, the main body advances to this point to oppose the enemy. The detachments in the passes are with- drawn to join the main body, or they may be sent by cross-roads if there be any, to act upon the flanks and rear of the enemy. Flank and rear attacks, which have before been con- demned, are here considered as advisable. The nature of the ground, the great advantages to be gained by them, and the fact that they are made by troops who are familiar with the country, all combine to favor this method of attack. Flank attacks under these circumstances do not materially weaken the main force and are attended frequently with great success. If a flank attack should fail, no great disaster will follow, since from the nature of the country the detachment can easily fall back upon its supports. The invading force ad- vancing along the valleys is spread out usually for some dis- tance and takes considerable time to collect his troops together to attack. By the time these troops can. reach the high ground occupied by the detachment, the latter can get away and avoid being enveloped. If a detachment acting on the flank or rear of the in- vading force should succeed in getting possession of a pass, or of a position on high ground, by which the line of opera- tions is interrupted, the invader must dislodge it before 210 AET A.TSD ECIEXCE OF WAB. advancing further or must suffer the inconveniences and con- fusion incident to the loss of his communications. 265. Circumstances may require that the defence of the general line should be a passive one. In this case, when the point of main attack is known, the detachments join the main body, and the whole force takes up a position immediately in front of the invader to oppose his advance. Good positions are not numerous, but many will be found that will offer many favorable features for a passive defence. A position across a valley, along which the enemy advances, will be a good one, if it is not too long, and if it is on higher ground than that occupied by the enemy. A position of this kind can not be easily turned, by reason of the flanks resting upon precipitous hills. To turn a position of this kind, the enemy would have to make wide detours, using roads leading through other valleys. If however the enemy has reached the highest ground of the valley, he will be occupying higher ground than that oc- cupied by the defence, and a position across a valley in this case would not be so good. Positions in a valley have often the disadvantage of being cut in two by the stream which flows through the valley, and, if the stream is not fordable, it may prevent the wings from supporting each other. Thus the enemy may attack one , wing with superior numbers, and drive it back ; then threaten the other in flank and oblige it to retire also. Such positions, to be serviceable to the defence, should afford free communications between the different parts of the defensive line, while those of the enemy are diflBcult or im- possible. With this view, the bridges in front of the position DEFENSIVE OPEEATIOKS. 311 should be destroyed, while those along the line and in rear of the position should be retained and new ones even con- structed. 266. The general plan of defence, whether an active or a passive one, as has been stated, is to retard the enemy in the narrow valleys by detachmfints, and attack in force or make the greatest resistance with the main body, wherever the enemy shows the greatest numbers. Since the advancing columns, confined by the nature of the country to narrow valleys, have room only for a small fi'ont for deployment, and have to advance against troops placed on higher ground and practically screened from fire, it is an easy matter for a much smaller body of troops to hold in check an advancing column, if the position occupied by these troops is not easily turned. To show how it is possible for a smaller force under these circumstances, to resist successfully a much larger force, the example given by General Dufonr will be used. Suppose an enemy, numbering 30,000 effective men to be marching upon M (Fig. 20), by three roads leading through the mountain passes, a, h, and c. Two of these roads unite at /before reaching M. The enemy is supposed to have a force of 10,000 men on each of the three roads. Suppose the defensive army to contain only 19,000 men. They may or not have been divided into three equal parts, but if so, the time has arrived for concentration; 3,000 men, well posted, can check 10,000 in each valley, or at least delay them long enough for the general's purpose. The general will, therefore, post three detachments, a, h, c, each of 3,000 men, in these valleys, and with 10,000 men will 212 AET AND SCIESCE OF WAK. take up a position near /, where two of the roads meet. If the valley on the right is most accessible, he will strike his first blow there. He will inform the commander of the de- tachment at b of his intentions, ordering him to maintain his position firmly, w^hile he joins the detachment at c, and fights a battle. He will have 13,000 against 10,000 of the enemy's- Fig. 20 forces, and the result cannot be Tery doubtful, especially if the ground favors his operations. If the enemy retires with- out fighting, the news should be proclaimed far and wide, but the general must not engage in a pursuit by which he would be removed too far from his central position at /, which is now the important point ; he will, on the contrary, after a show of pursuit, return to his former position, to manceuver from it as circumstances may justify or require. If the enemy fights and is beaten, the detachment at c should be sent in pursuit, while the main body hastens to 5, to fight again with a similar superiority of forces. If successful in defeating the enemy on this road, or in befeNsive operations. 213 making him retire, the detachment at h should follow the enemy, while the main body proceeds to a. A similar supe- riority of forces is again brought to bear upon the enemy, who is either beaten or retires. The main body, with the detach- ment at a, pursues this third column of the enemy and upon driving it back, may succeed in gaining the flank of the other two, who would have to continue their retreat. 267. If, on the contrary, the enemy does not advance along several roads, as has been supposed in the , foregoing example, but advances by a single road, with a view of pene^ trating into the interior of the country, his forces will indeed be concentrated, but he can not use them eflSciently for want of room to handle them. The defence, in this case, should prepare to meet the enemy at the mouth of the valley. Such a position and order of battle should be selected that the enemy will be enveloped as he debouches, and be exposed to strong cross-fires. Courage and firmness are especially neces- sary at this juncture, for if the defensive army is beaten in this position, with the ground favoring it so much, it will not probably be successful elsewhere. Defence of Rivers. 268. Wide rivers, and especially those which are not ford- able, form good defensive lines, when their course makes an angle with and intersects the line of operations of an enemy. A river is more easily crossed than a range of mountains, and for this reason, a defensive line formed by a river is not considered so easy to defend as one formed by a mountain range. Thus the river Tic! no in Italv, which has on more than 214 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAK. one occasion been used as a defensive line, is crossed by six good roads between Turbigo and Pavia, a distance of only thirty-six miles ; while the western slope of the Italian Alps has only the Mount Cenis road which is practicable for an army. It would be easier to prevent an enemy's approach by this single road than to stop him when he can use six. The ease with which bridges can be constructed over a stream, compared with the labor of building practicable roads through a mountainous country, makes the task of defending a river more difficult than defending a range of mountains. On the other hand, wide rivers, and especially those which are unfordable, are generally met with in fertile and populous districts, and in such countries, good roads running parallel to their course and not far distant from the banks are usually to be found. These roads afford good communications be- tween the detachments which are posted so as to watch the river, and they diminish the chances of these detachments being surprised by flank and rear attacks. These roads there- fore, add gi'eatly to the ease of defending a river. The great expense of constructing permanent bridges over wide streams has the eflEect of making the roads, on both sides of a river, converge as they approach it and merge into a few main roads. These main roads cross the river by bridges or by ferries, and may be considered for defence as analogous to the main roads leading through the narrow valleys of a moun- tain range. They differ in principle, so far as their defence is considered, only in the matter of the length of the defiles through which they have to pass. Hence, the general principles observed in the defence of a mountain range apply equally to the defence of a river. DEFENSIVE OPERATIOXS. 215 2G9. Disposition of the troops. The main body of the defensive army should occupy some' central point, from which the troops can be quickly marched to oppose the enemy wherever he may attempt to cross the river. Detachments should be posted near to and along the river, so as to keep a constant watch upon the stream and prevent any surprise. Patrols passing between these detachments should keep up constant communication between them and watch every part of the river. If the defence is to be a passive one, all bridges and ferries should be destroyed ; if an active one, some of the bridges should be preserved, so that the defence can cross the river at these points at any time that it is desired. In either case, whether a bridge is to be destroyed or not, the point of crossing should be fortified and well defended by a strong detachment of troops. If the bridge is to be pre- served, there must be constructed on the side of the river oc- cupied by the enemy, a field-work, known as a "tete-de- pont," or bridge-head. The construction of this class of works is described in treatises upon field-fortifications. Besides these points of crossing where bridges and ferries were used, there are other points offering advantages to the enemy, for the construction of temporary bridges. These points must be watched. Some of these points are those where the river makes a bend which is convex towards the enemy's side. Points like these afford the enemy the advant- age of enabling him to place batteries so as to cross their fire on and in front of the ground on which his leading troops are first landed. [See B, Fig. 31.] Other points favorable for this purpose of constructing 216 AKT AXD SCIENCE OF -VVAE. temporary bridges by the enemy are those v/here the river is divided into several arms by islands, which may be used to conceal the preparations made for crossing the river f also the mouths of tributary streams, by means of which the enemy may bring from the interior, boats and other materials for bridges. At these points, batteries should be placed in such a way as to sweep the opposite banks and the adjacent ground with their fire. When there is not time to erect the necessary field- works, rifle-pits and shelter trenches should be built, and so located as to envelop the space on the river's bank in which the leading troops must land. 370. An enemy surprised in the act of constructing a bridge is at a great disadvantage. The few troops, who have passed in boats, are not in sufficient numbers to force their way forward, and make room for the army, which is still on the other side, to follow and deploy in line of battle, even if it were practicable for it to do so under the converging fire of the defence. An enemy is also in a perilous condition, if a portion of his forces have crossed, and the defenders succeed in breaking the bridges, and thus cutting his army in two. Evei-y effort should therefore be made to do this. If large boats, filled with stones, and heavy rafts constructed of trunks of trees, be sent down the stream,, there is great probability, if the cur- rent is rapid, that some of them will strike and break the bridges. 271. Flank and rear attacks are not so easily made in de- fending a river as when defending a mountain range. The reasons are plain. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS. 217 Still, there are times whon these can be made and they ought to meet with success. For example, suppose the river shown in Fig. 31, to be taken as a defensive line. The ene- my's line of opei-ations is from E, to M. Fig. 21 The enemy arriving at A, and preparing to cross the river at that point, may be held in check by a force on the opposite side. In the meanwhile, if there is a good road leading from D to E, a detachment may be sent to cross the river at D, and made to operate against the flanks and rear of the enemy. In case of a repulse, the detachment can fall back to D, cross the river, and can retire by the road from D to K, without any danger of being intercepted by the enemy. 272. It is very important that the defence should not be deceived by the enemy's demonstrations so as to allow him to cross the river before timely notice can be given to the army. All suspicious movements should be close.ly watched, and care taken to distinguish feints from real movements. Notwith- standing all the precautions which may be taken, the defence may be surprised and may find the enemy's whole force on the same side of the river with him before he is ready to oppose the movement. In this case, as the assailant is usually much 10 218 ART Ali>D SCIENCE OF WAR. stronger, the defensive army must retire to some position in the rear, or make a counter movement ; that is, to cross the river at some other point and begin offensive movements by attacking the enemy's line of communications. This latter course would be practicable in a case like that shown in Fig. 21. The enemy crossing at A, or B, preparatory to moving against M, would have his advance arrested probably, by the defensive force crossing at D and threatening the line of com- munications through F. It is well to call attention to the importance of the differ- ence of height in the two banks of a stream at any point selected for a crossing. If the bank on the enemy's side is higher than the other, it will give him command over the ground on the opposite side and offers a more favorable spot for crossing. If otherwise, he can not command the ground, and the spot will be unfavorable for his purpose. 2.73, It is extremely dangerous to attempt the passage of a river defended by an active force. But because it is so, that is no reason for spreading out the troops on too long a line to defend it. The enemy will either divide his forces or concentrate them. In the former case, he will occupy a large extent of country and will not give much cause to fear a forced passage over the river. In the latter case, the defence must be con- centrated opposite, to him and every effort made to learn of his movements. The defensive troops are considered to be suflBciently concentrated when the different bodies are in supporting distance of each other. » Sometimes the defenders withdraw designedly from the river, in order to entice the enemy across, and then return DEFEXSIVE OPEEATIOXS. 319 before his whole army is over and in position. The general who retires in this way is only justified in so doing by the character of the ground, whichpermits him, upon his return, to occupy a good offensive position, while the enemy is crowded and unable to deploy his forces. Unless these are the circumstances of the case, he runs the risk of a defeat if the enemy should succeed in passing over enough force to. hold him in check until the main body has crossed, Whei'e the river is not more than five hundred yards wide,- and the bank on the enemy's side commands the ground on the opposite side, the defence can not prevent the construc- tion of a bridge over the stream, if the enemy is superior in artillery. The defence must in such an event follow the sug- gestion made in Art, 369, to erect field works as close to the head of the bridge as he can and arrange them so as to bring a strong converging fire upon the space where the troops of the enemy must first land. Passage of Rivers. 374. The method adopted by an army to cross a river in the presence of an enemy hardly belongs to the subject of defensive operations. But as the defence of a river depends greatly upon how and at what points the enemy proposes to cross over, it will not be considered out of place to allude again briefly to this subject in this place. (Art. 163. ) A line of defence behind a river is simply a strong posi- tion. To break through or turn a position has already been described. A river may or may not be turned, but when it can be, this method is to be preferred. To break through the defensive line may however be the only alternative. 220 ART AXD SCIENCE OP WAK. A passage of an army over a river in the presence of an enemy is a hazardous operation and is efEected either by force or by stratagem, or by a combination of them both. It is hardly ever a successful operation, unless the enemy is de- ceived as to the exact point where the crossing is to be made. For, even if the crossing is effected, a good disposition of the defensive troops, as shown in the last article, will render the passage a thing of no use. The crossing of General Burnside at Fredericksburg in 1862 is a good example. The general locality of the crossing to be made, will de- pend u|)on the line of operations and the plan of campaign ; the particular spot for the crossing will be determined by the local peculiarities of the place. A bend in the river, convex towards the army about to cross, as shown at B, in Fig. 21 ; an island, behind which bridges may be constructed and all preparations made out of sight of the defence ; a smaller stream emptying into the river on the same side with the offensive army and near the point of passage, in which the boats can be assembled and prepara- tions made out of sight of the defence ; all these localities, when accompanied with banks higher on the side of the of- fence than on the side of the defence, possess the local peculi- arities favorable for construction of a temporary bridge; These points are sought by those seeking to cross, and are watched carefully by those striving to prevent the passage. [Art. 269.] The best location is one which combines one or more of these local peculiarities with a weak defence. It is essential also that the. ground on both sides at the point of crossing should allow of the troops being manoeuvered easily. The first body of troops thrown across should be strong DEFEirSIVE OPERATIONS. Z'Zl enough to overcome all resistance at that point and should take up a position to hold the ground it has gained. Other bodies of troops should be hurried over to reinforce those already in position, and the means of crossing the river in- creased. The success of the operation will depend upon the ability of the assailant to increase his numbers on the opposite side faster than the defence can bring troops from other points to resist him. Military history gives many examples of an army's cross- ing a river when it was actively defended. Hannibal's passage of the Ehine in his march from Spain to Italy; the passage of the Hydaspes by Alexander the Great ; Bonaparte's passage of the Po at Piacenza in Italy in 1796 ; Moreau's passages of the Khine in the same year ; Na- poleon's passage of the Danube, using the island of Lobau, in 1809 ; the passage of the Ticino by Louis Napoleon in 1859 ; General Hooker's, passage of the Kappahannock and Eapidan in 1863 ; are some of the noted examples illustrative of the means used and the methods adopted by generals to cross a river by an army in the presence of an enemy. 275. The passage of the Hydaspes by Alexander the Great. The river Hydaspes is a tributary to the Indus, and is celebrated particularly for its passage by Alexander in the presence of a defensive army commanded by Porus. Plutarch says " that the two armies were separated by the river Hydaspes. on whose opposite bank, Porus kept continu- ally his elephants in order of battle, with their heads, towards their enemies, to guard the passage ; etc," giving Alexan- der's own letters as authoritv. 223 AET AND SCIEXCE OF WAE. Alexander encamped opposite to Porus ; collected large supplies of food ; and gave out the information, that he pro- posed to remain in camp until the waters subsided, as the n'ver was full to overflowing, caused by the melting of the snows, rain, etc. Alexander caused noises and clamors to be raised daily in his camp, and demonstrations to be made along the bank as if desirous to cross the river. These were done to deceive the enemy- as to his real intentions. There was, about eighteen miles above the Grecian camp, a rocky bluff covered with timber, and in the middle of the river, opposite to the bluff, there was an island covered with woods. This point was selected by Alexander as the one which he would use for the purpose of crossing the river, because the wooded bluff would hide the approach of his troops to the river ; the island would conceal the passage from the shore to it ; and it would reduce the distance to be crossed when the troops were exposed to view, to one half of the width of the stream at any other point. Alexander then marched a force of six thousand foot troops and five thousand horsemen to this point, reaching it about dark. Favored by stormy weather, he began the passage during the night and reached the island without being discovered. Upon leaving the island, his crossing was observed, and the enemy notified. This point being weakly defended, no serious opposition was made to his passage. Porus, learning of Alexander's crossing, divided his forces ; one half being left to watch the Greeks immediately in his front ; the other half being marched out to give battle DEFENSIVE OPERA'J'IOJirS. 233 to the forces who had just crossed under Alexander. The half sent to resist Alexander was defeated ; this repulse was quickly made known to those remaining in front of the Grecian camp ; the Greeks at this point then passed the river without serious opposition ; and the combined attack of the two columns resulted in a defeat to Porus. 276. Passage of the river Fo, by Bonaparte in 1796. In the armistice made with the Sardinians, by which Bonaparte obtained possession of the fortified places of Coni, Alexandria and Ceva, he demanded the surrender of Valenza (Valencia) and the privilege of crossing the Po at that point. He knew that this latter demand would be immediately made known to the Austrian commander and would cause the lat- ter to concentrate his attention upon that portion of the river in the vicinity of Valenza. To still further mislead him, as to what point would be selected for crossing, Bonaparte dis- tributed his troops and made feints as if he desired to cross the river near that place. Under cover of these demonstrations, Bonaparte march- ing himself with the advanced guard, moved rapidly to Pia- cenza (Placentia) and arrived there early on the morning of the 7th of May. He had no bridge equipage, and had there- fore to depend upon the resources of the country for the means to be used in crossing the river. The ferry-boat used at this point, and a few boats collected as he descended the river; were his only means of crossing. They were sufficient to carry across about nine hundred men at each trip. Lannes, with the advanced guard, was sent across as soon as they reached Piacenza. He found only two squadrons of 224 AKT AND SCIEIirCE OF WAK. mounted men to oppose him and had no difficulty in making the landing. The troops were ferried over as fast as they could be car- ried, and by 2 p. M., the entire advanced guard was across the river, and a bridge was being constructed for the rest of the army. In about thirty-six hours more, the bridge was com- pleted and the principal portion of Bonaparte's army was safely established on the northern bank of the river. Napoleon, in speaking of this passage of the Po at Pia- cenza, remarked that if he had had a good ponton equipage " th.at the fate of the Austrian army would have been sealed ; that the necessity of passing the river by successive embarka- tions saved it." An examination of the map of Italy will show that this selecticin of Piacenza as the point of crossing, enabled Bona- parte to place his army in rear of the Austrian army and to turn the defensive line of the Ticino river, which could have been used by the Austrians if he had forced a crossing above its mouth. 377. It will be observed, that in both of these cases, the success of the operation hinged greatly upon the concealment of the point of crossing from the enemy until the very mo- ment of its execution. This then is the general rule, viz : to select a favorable point for crossing ; to choose one which is weakly defended ; and to conceal all movements rel.iting to the crossing, until the moment of its execution. CHAPTER X. ADVANCED GUAEDS AND OUTPOSTS. 278. MiLiTAKT writers place usually under the head of '•' Minor Operations of War," the composition, formation and duties of advanced guards ; the esiablishment and duties of outposts ; the methods of marching detachments ; the best ways of, and precautions to be taken in escorting convoys ; and all those military operations which are adjuncts of the great movements made by armies in the field. Although these branches are classed as "minor opera- tions," it must not be understood that they are to be regarded as unimportant. The reverse is the case ; the success of the grand operation is in a great measure dependent upon the iaithfuL execution of the minor ones. Failure in these minor operations has, again and again, been the cause of failure of the grand operation, and a source of disaster to the main army. An acquaintance with their object and a knowledge of how these minor operations should be executed are even more important to the young officer than a knowledge of the great operations of war. "With these latter, he may possibly have but little to do ; but with the minor operations, it is highly probable that in many cases he may have to bear the entire responsibility for their success or failure. 226 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. Advanced Guards. 379. Every column when marcBing in an enemy's territoiy should be preceded by a body of troops, called an advanced guard. [Art. 132.] The main object of an advanced guard is to prevent a sur- prise by the enemy. It is the particular duty then of the advanced guard to thoroughly examine the country in front and on the flanks of the line of march, and to give timely notice to the main body of the presence of the enemy. The advanced guard should march at such a distance in front of the main column, that the time required for this guard to form a line of battle and to fall back slowly and in order as the . enemy advances, •will give time enough to the column, after learning of the enemy's approach, to get into position and be ready for the enemy when the advanced guard has joined the main body. [Art. ISl^.] The composition and strength of the advanced guard will depend upon the kind of country over which it marches, upon the particular season of the year in which the march is made, and even upon the state of the weather. The composition of the guard will be as a rule, similar to that of the column which it precedes. Its strength may be as small as one-tenth of the main body and even as great as one-third ; being much greater under those circumstances where it may have to seize and hold im- portant points against a superior force ; where it may be ex- posed to serious attacks by an enemy ; etc. The size of the guard varies also with the column, the greater the latter, the larger is the advanced guard. ADVANCED GUARDS AND OUTPOSTS. 227 Figi 22, Ordar cf march qftioo companies qfl}\fantrv. } guard. body Fig. 23, Order of march qf an tzdvanced guard qfa regim£7it. SD^achiaent t A b 6 m \ hody / SiBodo/i 228 ART AlfD SCIENCE OF WAR. 280. Order of march of an advanced guard. The general object is to search the ground, in front and on the flanks, which is in dangerous proximity to the lilie of march, and in doing this, the commander of the guard should be careful to keep the different subdivisions in supporting distance of each other. To illustrate the method of marching used, it will be sup- posed that the troops on the march are infantry, and the en- tire force consists of two companies, each one hundred men strong. One platoon, or one-fourth of the entire force, is detailed as the advanced guard. The order of march of this column, with its advanced and rear guards, is shown in Fig. 22. The advanced guard is divided intx) three parts, viz : 1. The head of the advanced guard, or the leading de- tachment ; 2. The support, or reserve of the leading detachment ; 3. The main body of the guard. The leading detachment consists of two non-commissioned ofiScers and twelve privates. This detachment sends forward on the road at a distance of one hundred and fifty or two hundred yards, a non-commissioned officer and two men, and on the right and left, as indicated in the figure, groups of two men each. Following this detachment, at a distance from two hundred to two hundred and fifty yards, marches the support consist- ing of a lieutenant or sergeant and a squad of twelve men. This squad sends out upon the right and left of the road, groups of two men, each, as shown in the figure. These groups with those of the leading detachment form a skirmish ADVANCED GCAKDS ASD OUTPOSTS. 229 line of about six hundred yards long, and are able to examine carefully all the ground in their front which might conceal parties of the enemy. The main body of the advanced guard, consisting of the rest of the platoon, and commanded by a commissioned offi- cer, follows the support at a distance of about three hundred yards and precedes the head of the main column at a distance of about four hundred yards. This part of the guard sends out small flanking detachments ; these throw out flankers, who keep up communications with the skirmishers and watch carefully all the ground on the flanks by which an enemy might advance. In this particular example, it throws out only one detachment ; the detachment for the other flank coming from the main column. This is easily done in this case by reason of the nearness of the head of the main column. 381. The advanced guard, in the preceding example, has been supposed to be composed entirely of infantry. The same division into three parts, similar arrangements for searching the ground as the column advances, and the same proportions as to the numbers in the different detachments, would be used, if the guard were composed entirely of mounted troops. The only difference would be in the dis- tances between the detachments. Thus, if mounted, the leading group would precede the leading detachment about three hundred yards, and the detachment would precede the support by a distance of about five hundred yards. The main body would follow the support at about this same dis- tance. The distances are governed by the consideration that it is necessary for the supports to be always in sight of the detachment which is to be supported. 23C AKT AND SCIENCE OF WAK. 383. There should never be less than three men in the leading group, for the reason, that if there be a height in the immediate front, one of the three men should go forward and look over and beyond it. This precaution should never be neglected in an enemy's country, even if the height is distant as much as two thousand yards. The same rule applies to lateral heights as well ; these being ascended by one of the men in the group nearest the hills. If there is reason to suspect the presence of an enemy in the immediate neighborhood, care must be taken by the man reconnoitering the hill to proceed with great caution, as it is as important not to be seen by the eneniy, as it is impor- tant to see him if he is there. 283. The preceding case applies also to a march through a comparatively open country. If the country is broken, or much obstructed, modification should be made in the order of march to suit the case. Suppose that the road enters a wooded tract, showing a front of about a mile. The foremost group should be rein- forced by six men, and with the two lateral groups extended into a line, with intervals that will enable them to see each other, and yet see whatever is concealed between them. This line should then move forward and scour the wood. [Art. 155.] Whenever the main column halts, the advanced guard does the same. If there are any heights within five or six hundred yards, in front or on the flanks, the groups nearest them should proceed to examine them without delay, while the command is halted. 284. Order of march of advanced guard of a AIJVAXCED GUARDS AND OUTPOSTS. 331 regiment on the march. The subject may be furtlier illustrated by considering the column of troops on the march to be a regiment of infantry, and its advanced guard to be composed of two companies, each one hundred men strong. The guard, as before, is composed of three parts ; the leading detachment or head, the support, and the main body (Fig. 33). The leading detachment is divided into two squads. The leading squad would furnish the three groups of skirmishers in the advance, and the other squad, the groups on the right and left of these. The support would send out a flanking detachment to keep open the communication with the skirmish line on the flank. The main body would send out flanking detachments as shown in the figure, and would march about six hundred yards in advance of the head of the main column. 385. The preceding examples explain siifSciently the order of march of an advanced guard, and although in these ex- amples the troops are all supposed to be of one kind, this supposition does not affect the general arrangement, nor does it change the object, of an advanced guard on the march. Advanced guards for large columns are seldom composed of a single arm ; they are composed of all arms of service, the proportions of these being dependent upon the nature of the ground and expected service of the guard. If it is expected that the advance should have to make an obstinate resistance, it should be composed of all four arms. If the guard is to march over an open country, a large proportion of cavalry is required ; if the country is a wooded or a broken one, infan- try is necessary. If many obstructions are to be removed, or 232 ART AXD SCIEXCE OF AVAR. repairs to the roads are to be made, a strong force of engineer troops should accompany the guard. The nature of the country and the kind of service it is expected to perform will therefore decide as to the- proportions of the arms to be used. In general, the "leading detachment"' will be composed of cavalry, and the " support " will be of infantry. Artillery should march in rear of the support or with the main body of the guard. The engineers should march with the support ; an oflBcer of that arm should accompany the leading detachment. The order of march of the advanced guard, alluded to in Art. 146, would be in conformity with the above arrangement. Patrols. 286. A patrol is a detachment which is employed to obtain information respecting the enemy's movements and position, and relating to the nature of the country over which the army has to move, and to keep open the communications between the different portions of a command. Patrols are generally composed entirely of cavalry; al- though they are sometimes composed of infantry and cavalry ; and in very much broken and obstructed ground, it might be necessary that they contain only infantry. They are divided, from the nature of the service in which they are employed, into defensive, offensive, flanking patrols, etc. 287. Defensive patrols do not contain more than eight men, and frequently only three. The duty of patrols of this class is not to fight, but to obtain information of the enemy and of the country in front of the line of march. The smallness of their numbers enables patrols of this class to more easily escaj^e detection. To aid in this, they ADVANCED GUARDS AXU OUTPOSTS. 233 ride singly when near an enemy ; this is also done, so that in case of a surprise they will not all be captured. They keep silence and communicate with each other by signs. They take advantage of all hedges, thickets, woods, and undulations of the ground along the roads to conceal themselves from sight, and in this way to see everything, without being seen. They should explore ravines and woods and never pass a dike, a hedge, a wall, or a field of tall grain, without seeing .whether there is any thing concealed. They should yisit houses in which the enemy might be concealed, one of the men enter- ing alone, while the others remain outside to give the alarm, if necessary. In like manner every spot should be examined where an enemy might be hid. As soon as they discover a body of the enemy, they should halt and conceal themselves, while one of the number goes back and gives the information to the commanding officer of the detachment to which they belong. Patrols of this kind precede the advanced guard. They do not use their arms unless they fall into an ambuscade, or they are on the point of being captured, and then they must give notice of the enemy's presence in the best way they can. 288. Offensive patrols contain a greater number of men than the defensive ones. They should be strong enough to effect the purpose for which they were sent. Their object is, like that, of the preceding case, fo obtain information aind not to fight. They should march as secretly as possible and be kept out of sight wherever it is practicable. They should march, with advanced and rear guards and use flankers. The recon- noitering officer rides in advance with the group that leads. It is often necessary, so as to obtain more exact informa- 234 AET AND SCIEXCE OF WAE. tion, that prisoners should be taken. This should be done by cutting ofiE any small detachment or patrol of the enemy which may be discovered, or^if this can not be done, by at- tempting to surprise one of the enemy's small outposts. If the patrol, after discovering the enemy, should not be able, from the position it has reached, to obtain suflBcient in- formation respecting him, it is advised to try and take quickly some other point from which it may probably be able, to get the required information. Patrols as a rule should return by a different road from that they used in going out ; as by this course, they will run less risk of being surprised, and will probably be able to col- lect more information of the enemy and of the country. Patrols should never halt and feed where they can be seen, but always in some concealed place, guarded by sentries who are themselves hidden from sight. The most intelligent soldiers and the best horses should be selected for patrols ; white horses and those inclined to neigh should not be used, especially for defensive patrols. The officer in command of an offensive patrol has a very important duty to discharge. Since the main object is in- formation to be acquired, he must make diligent inquiries as to the enemy ; when he was seen ; where seen ; what kind of troops ; what roads ; etc. He should verify this information by cross^questioning and by his own observations. He should remember in making his report, that incomplete reports are worse than none, since they mislead and entail faulty disposi- tions of troops ; and that false reports are deserving of severe punishment and disgrace. The orders given to patrols, either offensive or defensive. ADVANCED GUARDS AND OUTPOSTS. 235 and all information that has been obtained should be commu- nicated to the men, so that if anything happens to the com- mander, the duties may still be performed and the informa- tion gained may not be lost. A place of meeting should be appointed for each day, so that, in case of a dispersion of the patrol, or any of the men should lose their way, the stragglers may get' together again. Marshal Marmont says, " When one is far from an enemy strong enough to deliver battle, and is marching upon him, it is necessary to occupy, with advanced guards and light troops, at least a space of a long march all round the army, to be informed of his movements, and modify our own." [Col. Hamley.J !N"apoleon made great use of light cavalry for this purpose. In other words, he sent patrols of cavalry all over the country for several marches in advance of his army. Light cavalry was much used in this way during the Franco-German war of 1870-1, so much so, as to form the important feature of that struggle. It was so effectively used as to save, in a great measure, the main columns of the army from the hard work incident to outpost duty. 289. FlanMng and connecting patrols require but little explanation ; the name explains their uses. They march on the flanks of a column or in the intervals between the troops. In the former, the object is to watch the position and the movements of the troops and to notify them of the presence of the enemy ; in the latter, to keep up a constant communi- cation between the bodies of troops, so that the intervals may be preserved, and to notify the detachments of the move- ments in operation. 23(i ART AND SCIENCE OF WAB. Outposts. 290. The term, '' outposts ," is used, at the present time, to designate the particular detachments of troops and the method of arranging them, by means of which an army when in bivouac, in camp, or in cantonment, is protected from surprise by an enemy. Outposts therefore perform, for an army at- rest, a service similar to that performed by the advanced and rear guards, and by the flanking patrols, when the army is marching. The object of a system of outposts is two-fold ; Ist, to watch the enemy, so as to be able to give notice of his ap- proach ; and 2d, to stop the enemy, so as to give the army BuflBcient time to take up a position for defence. The first of these requires- that all possible approaches to the ground occupied by the main body should be carefully watched. This is effected by surrounding the part to be watched with a chain of sentinels, so placed that nothing can cross this line without being seen by the sentinels. The second requires that the detachments should bear such relations to each other, and be so placed, that a small number may be able to cheek successfully the advance of a large force for a certain period of time. This latter purpose is effected by placing the detachments in advantageous posi- tions and in defensive relations with each other. 291. Nomenclature. The nomenclature used in this article is taken from the Army Eegulations and from the practice of the armies of the United States during the recent wars. There is quite a confusion of terms in the works of mili- ADVAKCED GUARDS AND 0DTP0ST8. 237 tary writers on this subject, and a clear distinction between the terms is not made even in the United States Army Eeg- ulations. The arrangement of the detachments should be made in accordance with the general principles already laid down for defensive positions. In a good system of outposts there will always be found three lines, at least. An outer line, or line of sentinels ; a second line, or line of svpports to this outer line, which will be designated as the line of pickets ; and a third line, or line of reserves, which will be designated as the line of grand guards. The term, "picket," as used by the regulations, applies to the standing details made from the regiments and brig, ades for outpost duty. Eemembering this difference, the sec- tions relating to " Grand Guards and other Outposts " and those for " the Picket," are plain. 293. Arrangement of the Outposts. The kind of troops, the strength of the detachments, and the positions to be occupied by the 'detachments, in establishing a line of outposts, depend upon the natural features of the country, upon the character and the strength of the enemy, and upon the kind of position occupied by him. So variable are these, that no general rules can be given which will apply in all cases. The detail for outpost duty is made in the usual manner of making details for guard duty. This detail is assembled at guard-mounting in rear of the guard and is inspected by its commander. The ordinary strength given by the army regulations for a detail from a regiment of ten companies for outpost service is 338 AFtT AXD SCIEXCE OF WAK. one lieutenant, two sergeants, four corporals, one musician, and forty privates. The details for this duty from the dif- ferent regiments of a brigade are combined into one body, which is known as the " grand guard" of the brigade. This guard having been formed should be conducted to its post by the " field officer of the day," guided by a staff officer who accompanied the general in his reconnoissance. The extent of ground, to be watched is then pointed out to the commander of the guard, who makes preparations to place his men in such positions that they can watch thor- oughly this ground in his front and on his flanks. These flanks may rest on secure natural points, or they may have to be connected with the detachments sent forward from the contiguous brigades for a similar purpose. It is usually recommended, that the commander, upon reaching the point selected as the post for the grand guard, and after posting a sentry in front of his guard, should pro- ceed at once to reconnoitre the ground in his front. The usual practice, in our recent wars, was to take a part of the guard, move forward, and establish a line of sentries between the given points marking the extent of front to be watched. Then, after establishing the line, tlie ground was carefully reconnoitred and the line corrected, as circumstan- ces required. How this line should be established, and how the ground should be occupied, may be shown by the following example. Suppose the ground to be practically open and unob- structed, (Fig. 24,) and the grand guard to be composed of four regimental details. This will give a force of four lieuten- ants, twenty-four non-commissioned officers, four musicians ADVANCED GUARDS AND OUTPOSTS. 239 and one hundred and sixty privates for the " grand guard " of the brigade. This guard should be^ commanded by a cap- tain detailed for the purpose. The guard having arrived at Its post, is divided into two, or into three equal parts ; or it Fig. 24 may be divided into unequal parts, according to circumstan- ces. The division, in this particular case, is supposed to be into three equal parts. One of these subdivisions is used to furnish the pickets and sentries ; the other two, to form the grand guard. This grand guard takes post at G- ; one subdivision being held in readiness to take arms at a moment's notice, the other being allowed the privilege of "rest." The subdivision, fronji which the pickets and sentries are furnished, may be moved forward in a body to establish the pickets, p, p, p, and sentry posts, s, s, s, etc., or it may be sub- divided at once and the smaller bodies moved by the shorter lines to the places they are to occupy. The posts of the sentinels as s, s, s, etc., should be placed 240 AET AND SCIENCE OF WAR. in sight of each other, and near enough together to prevent any person crossing the line without being seen by the sen- tries. These distances will vary with the nature of the ground and with the kind of troops used for sentinels, being much greater for cavalry, when the ground is open and un- obstructed, than for infantry posted on the same kind of ground. The pickets, p, p, p, etc., should be placed at convenient distances in the rear, and in sight of the, sentries. If a sen- try can not be seen by its picket, an intermediate sentinel should be placed so as to be easily seen by both. Sentinels when mounted are known as " vedettes." Sentinels or vedettes should always be in pairs, oV even in groups of a greater number, so that one can leave to make a report and the other may remain to watch the enemy. The sentry posts are numbered in order, beginning on the right for each picket. The pickets are numbered in the same manner, beginning on the right. Hence post or sentry No. 1 of picket No. 1, would be the group of two men on the right ; and post No. 2, of picket No. 3, would designate the group on the extreme left, as shown in the figure. The sentries are relieved, as a general rule, by the pickets every two hours ; in some cases they are relieved hourly, especially at night. The number-of sentries and reliefs will determine the number of men for a picket. In the particular case taken as an illustration, the pickets on the right and left are the supports of two sentry posts, each containing two sen- tinels. The proper strength for these pickets, so that they can relieve their sentinels every two hours, will be, at least, one non-commissioned officer and eight privates for each picket. ADVANCED GUARDS AKD OUTPOSTS. 241 The strength of the centre picket, for a simihir reason, ought to be one commissioned officer, three non-commissioned officers and at least twelve privates. The pickets are relieved by the grand guard everv eight Fig. 25 Scale:K inch to 100 yards hours, when practicable, and are notified beforehand as to the hour of relief and by whom they are to be relieved. The grand guards are relieved by fresh details from the main body. This relief may be daily, but not always, ftnd notice of it should be given beforehand. 242 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAK. 293. As a further illustration of the distribution of the outposts, let an example be taken which shows the natural features of the ground. Take an example like that shown in Fig. 25. The sketch shows the ground to be undulating, traversed by roads, dotted with small tracts of timber, and inhabited. The high ground at G, is supposed to be some twenty feet higher than that at H, and some sixty or seventy feet higher than the ground near A. The woods are supposed to be the natural growth so frequently found in this country. A farm house, with its usual outbuildings and fences, although these latter are not shown on the sketch, occupy the high ground at G. The main roads are practicable for all arms of service ; the other i-oads are the common narrow roads found in the country, practicable for infantry and cavalry, but quickly cut up by heavy i^agons and artillery. The ground is generally open and unohstructed, excepting by the ordinary fencing, and by the woods which are indicated upon the sketch. The high ground at G, has been designated as the post of the grand guard. The enemy may. be expected from the directions indicated by the arrows. The extent of ground to be watched and defended by this guard is from A to B, and then from B around to the right to some point in front of G. The grand guard is supposed to be composed of infantry. It is seen at a glance, provided that the distance of the senti- nels from the pickets is not too great, that a line of sentinels must be placed along the skirt of the woods near B, so as to be able to see on the other side, if the enemy approaches from that direction. ADVANCED GUARDS AND OUTPOSTS. 243 Throwing f orwai'd a picket to the point near the forks of the road in front, from which the two common country roads branch , it will be not more than four hundred yards from the skirt of woods, and not more than five hundred yards from the post of the grand guard at G. It will therefore be practicable to put sentinels in the outer skirt of this wood. Five posts would be enough to observe the front from A to B ; it will be supp'osed that as many more will be re- quired upon the right flank. One of these posts should be near A ; the one next to A, would be near the junction of the country road with the main road ; two wopld be placed in the skirts of the wood and near the main roads, so that both roads could be watched from them ; one would be placed in the skirt of the woods and near the point where the country road leaves it, and would be connected with a post placed on the right of the brook and near the skirt of the wood, on that side. This latter post might be supplied from the picket on the hill at H. This would be decided by its nearness to the picket and the ease of crossing the brook. Supposing the pickets to furnish an equal number of sen- tries, their size would be determined as in previous case and both be equal in numbers. Instead therefore of dividing the guard into three parts, it would probably, in this case, be divided only into two ; one part forming the grand guard, the other being used to furnish the pickets and sentries. 294. The posts of the sentries on this outer line form the outposts from which the name is derived for the entire service. These posts may be so connected as to allow of the intervals between them being regularly walked over, or " patrolled " by the sentries. This is sometimes done, when 244: ART AXD SCIEXCE OF WAE. the enemy is in position and when he is quite near. In this case, the posts instead of being occupied by two men, are oc- cupied by several ; a sentinel is posted a few yards in advance of each group, and walks his post as in ordinary guard duty. When there is doubt about the enemy's position or ap- proach, defensive patrols are sent out to reconnoitre tiie ground in front of the outposts and to try and find the enemy. The grand guard and pickets send out patrols to test the watchfulness of the outposts. This class of patrols is known as rounds or visiting patrols, and that class which is sent to examine the country is known as reconnoitering pa- trols. 295. Enough has been said to explain the object and use of outposts, and how the detachments should be distributed to best accomplish the purposes intended. The second ex- ample shows how the arrangements adopted for a level site may be modified when the ground is irregular, and possesses obstructions of any kind. A body of troops marching in an enemy's country should upon halting, immediately establish its outposts. The troops for the outposts in front are furnished in this case by the advanced guard. The "leading detachment" furaishes the line of outposts ; the " support" furnishes the line of pickets; and the "main body" of the guard be- comes the grand guard. If the advanced guard is so far in advance as to run some danger of being crushed, a "reserve support" is sent for- ward from the main column and posted in supporting dis- tance and in a good position for defence, as a support to the ADVAXCED GUARDS AND OUTPOSTS. 245 gi'and guards. This reserve is called, by French writers, the picket. The rear guard furnishes troops for outposts in rear of the column. The flanks are protected hy the patrols, or by outposts sent from the main column. These troops on outpost duty are afterwards relieved ac- cording to circumstances. . 396. The Army Regulations are expli'cit upon the subject of outpost duties. A few of the important rules laid down by the regulations, are as follows, viz : '•' The sentinels and vedettes are placed on points froni which they can see farthest, taking care not to break their connection with each other or with their posts. They are concealed from the enemy as much as possible by walls, or trees, or elevated ground. It is generally even of more ad- vantage not to be seen than to see far. They should not be placed near covers, where the enemy may capture them. "A sentinel should always be ready to fire ; vedettes carry their pistols or carbines in their hands. A sentinel must be sure of the presence of an enemy before he fires ; once satis- fied of that, he must fire though all defence on his part be useless, as the safety of the post may depend on it. Sentinels fire on all persons deserting to the enemy. " If the post must be where a sentinel on it can not com- municate with the guard, a corporal and three men are de- tached for it, or the sentinels are doubled, that one may com- municate with the guard. During the day the communica- tion may be made by signals, such as raising a cap or hand- kerchief. At night sentinels are placed on low ground, the better to see objects against the sky. " On the approach of any one at night, the sentinel 34:6 AET AND SCIENCE OF WAR. orders 'Halt!' If the order is not obeyed after once repeated, he fires. If obeyed, he calls, ' Who goes there f If answered 'Bounds' or ' Patrol,' he, b-a^s, 'Stand! Ad- vance one with the countersign.' If more than one advance at the same time, or the person who advances fails to give -the countersign or signal agreed on, the sentinel fires, and falls back on his guard. The sentinel over the arms, as soon as his hail is answered, turns out the guard, and the corporal goes to reconnoitre. When it is desirable to hide the position of the sentinel from the enemy, the hail is replaced by sig- nals ; the sentinel gives the signal, and those approaching the counter signal. " The commandants of grand guards visit the sentinels often; change their -positions when necessary; make them repeat their orders ; teach them under what circumstances and at what signals to retire, and particularly not to fall back directly on their guard if pursued, but to lead the enemy in a circuit. " Sentinels will not take orders, or allow themselves to be relieved, except by an officer or non-commissioned officer of their guard or party, the officer of the day, or the command- ing officer; in which case the orders will be immediately notified to the commander of the guard by the officer giving them." "At night, half the men of the grand guard, off post, watch under arms ; while the rest lie down, arms by their side. "Patrols and rounds march slowly, in silence, and with great precaution ; halt frequently, to listen and examine the ground. The rounds consist of an officer or non-commis- sioned officer, and two or three men. ADVANCED GUARDS AND OUTPOSTS. 247 " When patrols are sent beyond the advanced posts, the posts and sentinels should be warned. " On their return, commanders of patrols report in regard to the ground and every thing they have observed of the movements of the enemy, or of hjs posts, and the command- ant of the grand guard reports to the field-officer of the day. "Bearers of flags are not permitted to pass the outer chain of sentinels ; their faces are turned from the post or army ; if necessary, their eyes are bandaged ; a non-commis- sioned officer stays with them, to prevent indiscretion of the sentinels. "The commandant of the grand guard receipts for dis- patches, and sends them to the field-officer of the day or general of brigade, and dismisses the bearer ; but if he has discovered what ought to be concealed from the enemy, he is detained as long as necessary. " Deserters are disarmed at the advanced posts, and sent to the commander of the grand guard, who gets from them all the information he can concerning his post. If many come at night," they are received cautiously, a few at a time. They are sent in the morning to the field-officer of the day, or the nearest post or camp, to be conducted to the general of the brigade. All suspected persons are searched by' the commanders at the posts." Absolute silence is enjoined and smoking is strictly pro- hibited in the outposts and pickets. 297. All officers in command of grand guards, pickets, patrols, etc, must make written reports of everything which occurs. It is rarely admissible to send a verbal report, as few soldiers can be trusted to deliver them correctly. 248 ART AKD SCIENCE OF WAR. These reports should be exact ; should state the number of picket, or patrol, etc., and the exact time of dispatching it. When possible these reports should state how strong the enemy is, what direction he was moving, whether bIowIj or fast, and where he was when seen.. Exaggeration must be avoided. Particular care must be taken to write the report legibly, especially as regards names. It is advised to read the con- tents of the message to the bearer, so he can speak intelligibly of its contents, in case it may be necessary to question him. The importance of outpost duty can not be over-estimated. The outposts have been termed "the eyes of an army." A military writer says, " An oflBcer in command of an out- post should invariably act as if the safety of the whole army depended upon his individual vigilance, and he should im- press the same feeling of responsibility on the mind of every one of his sentries." 298. Outposts should, as before stated, conform to all the principles which control the selection of defensive lines. One of these principles is that the line should be defended by at least three lines of troops whenever it is practicable. It is in accordance with this principle that there is found in a sys- tem of well arranged outposts at least three lines, viz : an outer line, a line of supports, and a line of reserves. The outer line has for its object to thoroughly watch the ground in its front. The object of the others is plain. These lines are shown in the examples just given to illus- trate this particular subject. Although three lines are recom- mended, it often happens that there are not so many, and again, that there are more. ADVAKCED GUARDS AXD OUTPOSTS. 249 "Where the defence requires but few men and the main object is simply to watch the ground, the number of lines is reduced to two, viz : a line of pickets and a line of sentinels. " If the enemy is quite near, and it is absolutely necessary, if he approaches in force, that he shall be stopped at the outer line, the number of lines is increased. The groups of two are increased in number to eight or nine men each, and the line formed by them is known as the line of outposts. This line throws forward a cordon, of sentinels, or an outer line, to watch every part of the ground. Sometimes the natural features of the ground make it necessary to place the whole system of outposts so far in front of the main body that prudence requires another line of supports to be posted between the grand guards and the main body, — ^in other words, there may be five distinct lines of troops in position between the enemy and the camp or resting place of the main body. It is seen that the proximity of the enemy and the natural features of the country, combined with the defensive neces- sities of the position, decide the number of lines which should be used. 399. The natural features of the ground will decide the question as to the kind of troops which should be used. In some cases, the line of sentinels should be of cavalry ; in others, it should be of infantry. The vedette, or mounted man, has a decided advantage over the foot soldier in many cases. He can see further by reason of his greater elevation ; he can escape capture more easily by means of the swiftness of his horse ; he can by this means give information much more quickly to those in rear ; etc. The advantages of the foot soldier are more evident 250 AKT AND SCIENCE OF WAB. when the ground is much broken, when secrecy is essential, and when concealment of the person is necessary. 300. The number of men to be employed upon outpost service varies with the nearness of the enemy, the features of the country, and with the 'strength and composition of the body furnishing the troops for the service. The strength of the detail as prescribed by the army regu- lations for a regiment of ten companies has been mentioned. The number of men to be furnished by a brigade under ordi- nary circumstances can be easily estimated. It will be found, however, that a small column requires a number larger in proportion to its strength than a large body. In the former, one-fourth to one-third is often required ; when under the same circumstances, only one-sixth would be necessary for the latter. 301. No exact rule can be laid down for distances. The general principle to be observed is that the supports shall always be in sight of those who are to be supported. In ordinarily open country, infantry sentries should be posted on a line, from two hundred to two hundred and fifty yards in front of the line of outposts or pickets from which they are detailed, and the groups of sentinels should be placed from one hundred to one hundred and fifty yards apart. Vedettes may be placed from four hundred to five hundred yards in front of the line of pickets, and may be from six hundred to one thousand yards apart, if the weather is fine, so as to admit of their- seeing each other. These distances are only approximate under favorable circumstances, being changed to greater or smaller, as necessities may require. The officer selecting the stations for pickets, the places for the out- ADVANCED GUARDS AND OtJTPOSTS. 251 posts, and posts for sentinels, must keep in view the object of the duty and must exercise his good sense. • 302. Enough has been said to explain the nature and duties of outpost service. There are many works by military writers upon these special subjects to which the student is referred for important details and many useful hints. As every officer performing active duties in the field is liable to this kind of service, the young officer would dp well to read these works as soon as he can. CHAPTER XL DETACHMENTS, CONVOYS, ETC. 303. A detachment is a body of troops sent to perform a special duty, and separated from the main column or com- mand of which it forms a part. This separation is only temporary. " Troops are on de- tachment only when sent out temporarily to perform a special service." [U. S. Army Kegulations.] ' The troops employed on detachment duty are either in- fantry, or cavalry, or both of these arms. Hence, there are three kinds of detachments, viz ; Infantry, Cavalry, and Mixed. Detachments are generally small bodies of troops when compared with the strength of a brigade, and are formed generally by brigades furnishing each their quota, detailed from the respective regiments, and the whole as- sembled at some convenient point. Large bodies of troops composed of all arms of service, and even entire organizations such as brigades or divisions are sometimes detached from the army to perform a special service of a temporary nature. In the wide sense of the word, such bodies are detachments, but are not so considered in the limited meaning of the regu- lations just quoted. 304. The special service to be performed by a detachment is generally beyond the immediate support of the main body. The nature of the service may be to seize and hold some point DETACHMENTS, COKVOTS, ETC. 353 the possession of which is necessary to the success of some operation undertaken by the main body; or it may be to attack, or to protect a convoy, areconnoitering party, a forag- ing party, etc. The strength of a detachment and the kind of troops of which it is to be composed, will depend upon the nature of the service, upon the time required to perform the service, the kind of enemy, and the nature of the country in which the movement is to be made. The Army Eegulations prescribe how a detachment shall be formed from a brigade, from different brigades, and how the details from the regiments for detachment duty shall be made. The same orders and authority, by .which a detachment is formed, appoint its commander. The commander of a detachment should be selected on account of his fitness for the duty, and because of his good sense. 305. Kinds of detachments and vrhen used. De- tachments are known as infantry, cavalry and mixed, according to the kind of arm of which they are composed. Infantry detachments possess the advantage of being moved with but little noise, of being easily screened from an enemy's observation, and of being able to march for several days without requiring other supplies than those which they carry with them. Cavalry detachments make more noise than infantry, and are obliged to hunt for forage for their horses in a very short time after starting upon any expedition. They possess the quality of , celerity in an open country, a quality extremely essential in many cases. S54 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAK. Mixed detachments partake of the advantages and disad- vantages of both the other kinds. A detachment composed of both arms possesses more coherence and stability in its formation, and is more capable of defensive action than either of the others alone. Hence, the first kind would be used when secrecy is an important consideration to be observed and the nature of the country is only fitted for the movements of that 'class of troops. The second would; be used when celerity is the chief consideration. The third would be used where defen- sive action is the principal thing to be considered. 306. Precautions to be adopted. The commander generally receives written instructions for his guidance. If the duty is a very important one, he would most probably receive additional directions from the general in person. It should be the duty of a commander of a detachment, before starting, to thoroughly acquaint himself with the object to be attained by the special service, and after starting, he should try and execute his instructions to the very letter. The commander, having assumed command of the detach- ment, should review it and make a thorough inspection of its condition, and see for himself that the troops are properly equipped and fully provided with all that is necessary. In forming his order of march, he should consider the nature of the service to be performed, the features of the ground, the kind of troops, and how to follow the rules laid down for marching troops and for observing the precautions necessary to guard against surprise. The commander, as a rule, will march at the head of the main column, although he will frequently go forward and join the advanced guard. DETACHMENTS, CONVOYS, ETC. 355 for the purpose of giving such iustructions as may be neces- sary, and of seeing the kind of country in his front. He will occasionally allow the entire column to move past him, so thE£t he can see and may correct any defects in the order of march. The greatest caution must be taken, when the detachment is obliged to pass through a defile, to prevent the detachment from falling into an ambuscade. If possible to do so, the detachment should avoid defiles by going around them, when there is any reason to fear that an enemy is near, because the smallness of numbers of the detachment does not allow of a defile, especially when long, being carefully reconnoitered and occupied as it should be, to insure a safe passage. This precaution is especially necessary when the detacli- ment is composed of cavalry alone. 307. When different detachments meet, they are to be considered as one while they serve together, but this does not prevent their separation, if the commander of any one of them considers it necessary that he should do so, for the purpose of carrying out the instructions under which he is acting. A commander of a detachment, upon his return from a special service, should at once report to the authority from which he received his instructions. 308. Detachments are used more often for escorts than for any other kind of duty. Escorts are of various kinds : escorts to accompany an individual or small party ; such as escorts of honor, of bearers of dispatches, etc. ; escorts to convoys ; escorts to reconnoi- tering ofiBcers, etc. 256 AKT AND SCIENCE OF WAK. Escorts of honor and of a similar nature must move ac- cording to the wishes of those whom they accompany. The safety of the persons of those who are escorted is the princi- pal thing considered. Other escorts move with the same ob- ject in view ; viz., the safety of the thing or things escorted. Convoys. 309. The most important of the escort duties is that per- formed by a detachment detailed to protect a convoy. A convoy is a train of wagons employed in transporting military supplies from a base of operations to an army in the field, escorted by an armed force. The same terra is applied also to a train of wagons, or a body of prisoners, sent back to the base of operations under the charge of an escort. The supplies sent forward may be ammunition, subsis- tence, money, etc., or a combination of them all. The value of the things transported and the difficulty of defending, a train from capture, when attacked, make the escort of a con- Toy a most important and arduous duty. Convoys are usually exposed only to attacks from com- paratively small bodies of troops, or from bodies of guerillas. Small in numbers, these bodies may succeed in eluding the observation of the army in front, or by means of forced marches and wide d6tours, may succeed in getting in rear of the army. Guerillas or partisans are to be expected in a country in which the inhabitants are all hostile to the in- vading force. 310. Mixed detachments are useful as escorts for convoys, because of the " defensive action " which may be required from them ; infantry, because this arm can fight on any kind of ground, and in case of need can use thp wagons for dc- DETACHMENTS, COJfVOYS, ETa 357 fensive purposes ; cavalry, because its celerity enables it to be used to give timely warning of an enemy's approaob, carefully reconnoitre the ground in front and flanks, and ta move up and down the length of the train and keep the wagons closed. The strength of an escort for any particular convoy de- pends upon the features of the country through which the train has, to pass ; upon the value of the articles to be trans- ported ; and ppon the probabilities of an attack by an enemy. 311. Before starting on the journey, the commander of an escort for a conv'oy of importance should know the following, viz : Ist. The length of journey ; that is, the distance he has to march, from the point of starting until -he reaches the place of destination of the convoy. 2d. The condition and kind of roads over whicli the train has to travel. 3d. The number of pack animals and wagons which are to form the train. 4:th. The nature of the articles to be transported and how they are to be distributed throughout the train. 5th. The kind of troops and the number composing the^ escort. Gth. The position of the enemy, and particularly at what points the enemy may be expected to be near enough to at- tack the convoy. He should know the distance to be travelled, so that he can estimate, the time necessary to perform the journey, and so thab he may be able, if it be necessary at any time,' to hasten or retard the march of the convoy. 358 AUT AXD SCIEXCE OF WAR. He should know the condition and kind of roads, so that he can estimate the length of a day's march, and be able to arrange the order of march in accordance. He should know the number of wagons, and the nature of the articles to be transported, so that he can see that the wagons containing the most valuable articles are placed in the least exposed positions ; so that he can know where the wagons containing the most inflammable articles are placed, and where those containing articles most liable to deteriorate from exposure are to be found. He should know the kind and number of troops forming the escort, so that he may be able to distribute them in the most advantageous manner. He should know where the enemy is, and where he may be expected to attack the convoy ; at what points he may ex- pect an ambuscade ; at what points the convoy may halt with safety, etc. These things should be known, so that in the neighborhood of these places, he can redouble his vigilance and make the necessary arrangements to prevent the loss of any part of his train. 312. The great length of the train of a convoy is the prin- cipal source of weakness for the defence, since the number of troops sent to escort it are few in number compared with its length. The length of a train is approximately determined by allowing a distance of twelve yards for each wagon drawn by four horses or mules. The distance between the wagons should never exceed four paces. It is possible to shorten a train, when the roads are good DETACHMENTS, CONVEYS, ETC. 259 and are wide enough, by making the wagons move in double file. The roads of this country will very rarely allow such shortening. 313. Order of march for the vragons. The Army Eegnlations requii-e that the wagons carrying the most im- portant and valuable contents should be placed in the train at those points where there is the least prospect of danger. When the danger is equal on all sides, this position would be near the middle of the train. These regulations also prescribe that the wagons contain- ing ammunition shall occupy the first place, or the part near the head of the train ; then, those containing the subsistence stores shall follow next ; then, those containing military stores in general ; and finally the sutlers' wagons, if there be any. This arrangement is the one to be followed when there is no reason to expect an attack in any one place more than another. When the number of wagons is large, it is usual to form them into four or more divisions, and assign to each division a small body of infantry as a special escort. 314, A convoy on the march should halt every hour for a few minutes to allow the animals a rest for breathing, to ad- just the harness, etc. A convoy should make but few long halts, and when made, if there is any apprehension felt about the enemy, the halts should only be in places which have been carefully reconnoitered, and are fit for defence. The head of a convoy should move regularly and slowly so as to prevent gaps being formed in the line of wagons. On good roads in a comparatively level country, the rate of 260 ART AND SCIE2S-CE OF WAK. travel ought to be from two and a half to three miles an hour ; on good roads in a hilly country, the rate wonldnot be more than two miles an hour. On bad roads, no estimate of the rate can be made with accuracy. If for any purpose, a wagon is obliged to halt, it must fall out of the line, and not be allowed to enter it until the rear wagon of its section has passed. The line should be kept well closed ; the leading wagons slackening their pace, to allow the others to come up, if retarded by any obstacle. If a wagon breaks down, it should be immediately re- moved to one side of the road and repaired ; when repaired it takes its place in rear of the division to which it belongs ; if it can not be repaired, the load is taken out, and this load, with the parts of the wagon which may be useful in repairs to other wagons, should be distributed among the empty or partially loaded wagons which are usually kept in rear for this purpose. 315. Example of moving a convoy of artillery. A good example of moving a large convoy is given by J-ervis in his " Manual of Field Operations," when discussing the movement of artillery by roads difEerent from those taken by the army. He says, "though the artillery is of course escorted by a certain number of infantry or cavalry, it cannot be looked upon in any other light than that of a convoy." In this particular case, the convoy of artillery was obliged to make a forced march from Koenigsberg to Tilsit, a dis- tance of nearly eighty-five miles. The convoy consisted of ninety-nine guns, which with their wagons, etc., formed a train of about two hundred and fifty carriages. DETACHMEKTS, CONVOYS, .ETC, 2&X The movement was made as follows, viz : the convoy was divided into eight sections, starting one after the other. The first left Koenigsberg at two o'clock in the afternoon, made a march of nine miles, formed on one side of the road, halted and fed their horses. The other sections followed in succes- sion and iifter passing the first, halted on the side of the road, one after another, with intervals of two thousand or three thousand paces between them. When the eighth section had passed the first, this latter resumed its march. and continued on, until it reached the place of Jialting for the night, at a distance of about twenty-four miles from Koenigsberg. . Each section took up its line of march when the section next to it had passed. By this arrangement, the whole convoy in seventy-two hours from time of starting, had reached its destination. This example is quoted by military writers as a good illusr tration of a forced march by a convoy. 316. The march of an artillery convoy of the Austrians in 1805, in the retreat from Ulm to Egra, in Bohemia, is given as an example of the opposite kind in its result. This convoy was retreating and was constantly being harassed by the enemy. It consisted of over three hundred carriages, marched in a single column, never halting, and continuing its progress day and night. Forage to the horses, rations for the men, rand time to eat them, were all neglected. The consequence was, that the horses dropped along the road from exhaustion, the guns and carriages were abandoned one after another, and after a march of : eighth days, a miserable remnant of seventeen carriages entered Egra. 263 AET AND SCIBXCE OF WAR. 317. Order of march of a convoy. The train is usu- ally divided into four sections of an equal number of wagons in each. The wagons move generally in single file ; they move in double file if the road is wide enough for three, and when the train can march in this order for at least an hour. All the precautions taken to guard a column in march against a surprise should be redoubled for a convoy. The order of march will be about as .follows, viz : An advanced guard composed of cavalry should precede the convoy some distance, say from two to five miles, and should carefully reconnoitre the road in front and the country on the flanks, paying particular attention to the lateral.roads. As an enemy might escape the notice of this detachment and succeed in placing himself in ambush, in the interval between it and the convoy, a second advanced guard should be used. This second guard should precede the head of the convoy only a few hundred yards, that is, near enough to be in sight and hearing of the head of the convoy. This second advanced guard, by means of scouts and flankers, thoroughly examines the ground as it goes along. 318, Since a convoy is exposed to an attack in rear, it is necessary to have a rear guard. This may be composed en- tirely of cavalry, or it may be mixed. The remainder of the escort consisting principally of in- fantry should be divided into three parts, in the proportions of one-half, one-third and one-sixth. , The largest subdivis- ion should march at the head of the convoy ; the next largest in the centre, or between the second and third sections of the train ; and the remaiaing subdivision marches in rear of and just behind the train. DETACHMENTS, COXTOTS, ETC. 263 A detachment of pioneers should march with the second advanced guard, for the purpose of repairing the road or bridges when necessaiy. The troops should be by no means scattered along the whole length of the convoy, because, in case of surprise, every part would be equally weak to resist attack. There should, however, be a few men detailed to march along the sides pf the road, and compel the drivers to keep their places and dis- tances. Order on the march is one of the most important things. The drivers are generally ready to cut loose their horses and take to flight at the first appearance of danger, and at all times apt to be very negligent. They should, therefore, be kept in a rigid state of discipline, and carefully watched. When the number of troops will admit of it, each wagon should be under the guard of a soldier, or at least of one man to three wagons. If neither of these arrangements can be made, each section may be i)laced under the charge of four or five horsemen, who will keep in constant motion along the line, to see that all goes on well. It is recommended to divide the body marching at the head of the convoy into two parts, bearing the proportions of two to one. The larger subdivision should act as a flying column or reserve, while the smaller remains always at the head of the convoy. This reserve has been placed, in the foregoing order of march, at the head of the convoy, but its real place is where it can be most effective. It will march wherever the greatest danger is to be apprehended, and should be commanded by an energetic and. fearless officer. 264 AKT AND SCIENCE OF WAR. 319. Duties of an escort. The duty of an escort is to guard the convoy against surprise and to defend it from cap- ture or injury. The commander of the escort may be the commander of the convoy, but not necessarily. When there is an officer in charge of the convoy, separate and distinct from the com- mander of the escort, the former should be consulted by the latter, as to the hours of departure, of halting, of parking, and as to the order of marching, as well as to the plans of taking all precautions against accident. Officers accompanying a convoy, but not belonging to the escort, can not exercise any authority over the latter excepting by consent of the commander of the escort. If these oflELcers are junior to this commander, they may be assigned to duty with the escort in the defence of the convoy, if its comman- der wishes it. The commander of an escort should give full and deBnite instructions to those under him ; especially to the commanders of the advanced guard, of the rear giiard, of the subdivisions marching at the head, centre, and tail of the convoy, and particularly, to the commander of the reserve. He should remind these officers of the rules to be observed in marching ; of the principles by which they should be guided in emergencies ; and mention to them the precautions necessary to be taken to guai:d against surprise. These things being observed, and the duties of the ad- vanced and rear guards being property performed, the first part of the duty of an escort, that of guarding the convoy against surprise, will be accomplished. In order to perform the second part of this duty, the com- mander should explain to these officers what course each DETACHiTENTS, CONVOYS, ETC. 365 should pursue in case of attack. He should consult with them as to the proper measures to be taken under such cir- cumstances, and inform them as to the points and the nature of the country where the convoy runs a risk of being attacked. He should explain to the next person in rank, the desti- nation of the, convoy, the route to be travelled, and the dis- positions he thinks best to make in case the convoy is at- tacked. 320. Parks. The term, "park," is extended in its meaning by military men to include not only a space en- closed, but the whole of the objects occupyihg-the^ enclosed space. Thus, they speak of a park of artillery, a park o wagons, an engineer park, etc. When a wagon train halts for any length of time, like that for a night, the wagons are all brought together and are said to be parked. The place of halting, when there is any danger to be apprehended, should be selected for its safety and ease of defence. There should be space enough to bring all the wagons together and form them into a defensive line. The approaches should be- guarded, and watched by defensive patrols. The advanced and rear guards are used to form the outposts of the park. The main body of the escort should be posted near the wagons so as to be able to make an active defence, in case of attack. Plapes for parking which will combine these advantages, can not always be obtained. Any open space having good communication with the main road and of area sufBcient to hold the. wagons will generally have to sufl5ce. An open field is oftentimes used. If however this field is a piece of culti- 12 266 AET AND SCIENCE OF TVAK. vated ground, it may be so difficult a thing to get the wagons back again upon the road, especially in wet weather, that the park had better be made upon and along the main road. Where the area is sufficient, and the approaches are easy from all sides, it is recommended to enclose the space by the wagons, so as to form a circular line of defence. Sometimes a square or a rectangle will be a better shape. The line should conform to the features of the ground, and to the rules laid down for all defensive lines. The wagons may be drawn up in a single, or they may be in a double line. Wagons with poles are drawn up so as to have these latter extending outward ; carts with shafts, have these latter turned inwards. 331. Attack upon a convoy. An attack upon a con- voy is a comparatively easy and safe operation, and may be made with a force inferior in strength to the escort ; as the latter is obliged, for the safety of the convoy, to act on the defensive. It will usually be best to attempt a surprise, ehoosing points which are favorable to ambuscades. The manner of conducting the attack will depend upon its object, whether it is to capture the entire convoy, to cut ofE a part of it, or simply to delay its march. In the first case, the escort must be beaten and dispersed, while a detachment is sent to secure the convoy. In the second, an attack may be made on one point with the view of drawing the main body of the escort to the defence of that point, while a detachment attempts to cut off the part of the convoy from which the escort has been withdrawn. In the last case, the convoy should be fre- quently threatened with attack, to force it to halt and park DETACHMENTS, COITVOTS, ETC. 267 for defence ; the roads obstructed, bridges broken down, and everything done to hinder its progress. Infantry should form a part of the attacking force, since cavalry alone is rarely successful. If the convoy succeeds in parking and forming a good de- fensive line, an attack upon it will hardly be successful unless the defence is lai-gely out-numbered, or the attacking force uses artillery. In this latter case, if there is no artillery, the assailants should appear to give up the intention of attacking and move away ; then make an attack as soon as the convoy resumes its march, or places itself in a position which offers a chance of success. The best time to attack is when the convoy has entered a defile, or has begun to ascend ■ a steep hill, or when it has commenced to park, or when a halt has been made for some purpose. The attacking force is divided usually into three parts ; one of which attacks the main body of the escort, another attacks those near the wagons, and the remaining portion acts as a reserve. The great object of the attack is to defeat the escort and separate it from the train. A few men should be detailed to rush upon the train, cut the traces, disable the animals, and to capture and if necessary, to kill the drivers. If the attack is successful, a detachment is sent to drive the wagons off or to destroy them, as the case may be ; the main body keeping ■well together to prevent the rallying of the escort. 333. Defence of a convoy. A convoy may be at- tacked at its head, on the flanks, or in rear. The attack may be single or it may be double. If the head of the con- 268 > AET AKD SCIENCE OF WAE.: voy is alone threatened by the enemy, the commander of the escort immediately reinforces the advanced guards which ai*e combined and prepares to repulse the enemy. If the tail is threatened, he reinforces the rear guard and takes measures to repel any attack which may be made. The rear guard will be able to add materially to its resistance by blocking the roads as the train passes, breaking down bridges etc ; expedients which can not be used when the attack is in front. Flank attacks are more serious and greater efforts have to be made to resist them. The commander in this case as- sembles the greater part of his force upon. the side threatened by the enemy. If the road is wide enough, he doubles the wagons and moves the train forward as fast as he can so as to reach some good defensive position, parking the wagons only in the last exti-emity. These are the recommendations when the attacking force is inferior in strength to the escort. If. the attacking force is superior, the wagons must be parked at once ; all ap- proaches to the convoy barricaded, and every effort made to repulse his attack. If no reinforcements are to be expected and it is evident that resistance will be unavailing, it may still be possible to save some of the wagons by sacrificing a part of the convoy. When it is evident that even this can not be done, it is recom- mended to destroy the convoy to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy. DETACHilENTS, COXVOTS,. ETC. 26,9 Convoys of Prisoners. 323. The rules laid dbwu for convoys in general, apply equally to this particular class. The particular difference between ordinary convoys and those of this class, is that in the former, the things convoyed are passive, and in the latter, they are^tive. The precautions to be taken,- besides those already named are those necessary to guard against the escape of the pris- oners. It is advised to inform the prisoners, before starting, that any insubordination on their part will meet with quick and severe punishment. The prisoners should "be formed into detachments, eacft under the command of an officer. They should be marched in ranks of twos, or of fours, or other convenient formation, and not allowed to leave ranks for any purpose. Any pris- oner who should attempt to leave the ranks without permis- sion, or to escape, or shows signs of insubordination, must be knocked down at once, or shot. The wants of the prisoners should be attended to, their wounded cared for, and their feelings respected. As long as they are quiet, they should be well treated, but it would be well to make them keep silence and even prevent them from speaking to each other, when marching. Convoys of this class halt, for the night, in those places which afford conveniences for securely confining the prisoners. 3M. If a convoy of prisoners is attacked, the different detachments of the prisoners are removed to safe points, and made to lie down. A part of the escort guards them and threatens to shoot any one who stands up. 370 AKT AKD SCIENCE OF WAR. The defence of a convoy of this kind, from the nature of things, is a much more diflBcult task to perform than that met in the others, although the principles of attack and de- fence are the same. Care must be taken to have a strong and eflScient escort for such convoys. 325. Example of a successful attack upon a con- voy. After the disastrous battle of Jena, a regiment of Prussian hussars retreated to Erfiirt. Lieutenant Helwig, of this regiment, learned that the French, in sending their prisoners to Mayence, were marching a column of eight thousand prisoners towards Erfurt, convoyed by a small escort. The lieutenant obtained permission to attack this convoy and to attempt a delivery of the prisoners. With eighty troopers he proceeded to the defiles near Eichrodt, through which the road from Eisenach to Gotha passes, and occupied a position concealed from the French, and from which he could easily debouch upon the main road. He sent a non-commissioned ofi&oer in disguise to Gotha to obtain all the information he conld get concerning the convoy. The convoy consisted of eight thousand prisoners, as has just been stated, and was escorted by only four companies of infantry, which, although posted in a proper manner, were too weak to defend so large a convoy. Lieut. Helwig divided his troop into three sections and charged the escort. Many of the hussars were killed ; but the difficulties of defending the convoy without abandoning the prisoners were too great ; the nature of the ground was favorable to the use of cavalry ; the escort were compelled to retreat, and the prisoners escaped. CHAPTER XII. AMBUSCADES AKD SUEPRISES. 326. Ambuscades and surprises are military apera- tions haTing for their object an attack made suddenly and at a time when the enemy is not ready to resist it. A surprise is any attack suddenly made upon a force not in readiness to receive it. If effected by a body of troops concealed and lying in wait until the force attacked reaches them, the surprise is known as an a7nbuscade. Good and reliable troops, secrecy, and a thorough knowl- edge of the natural features of the ground where the attack is to be made are the essentials to success in operations of this kind. 337. A body of troops in position may be surprised ; on the march, it may fall into an ambuscade. Ambuscades and surprises can not be successful against troops who perform properly the duties assigned to the ad- vanced and rear guards, and flankers on the march, and to the outposts when in position. But since these duties are performed frequently in a neg- ligent manner, or by reason of smallness of numbers in an imperfect way, or for some reason performed incompletely, there are times when these operations may be successful. It is, as a rule, only practicable to ambuscade small bodies or 273 AET AlfD SCIEKCE OF WAR. detachments of troops. Surprises are always practicable when the troops are negligent and the officers in command are inefficient. Surprises and ambuscades are operations executed most generally by detachments, and are the' ones considered in this chapter. If a large body of troops is used in an opera- tion of this kind, the movement is apt to fail because of the difficulty of concealing the manoeuver. Surprises. 328. Precautions and conditions to be observed. The first of the conditions requisite to ensure success, is that the force making the surprise should be strong enough to render success probable ; the second, that the movement be sudden and secret ; and third, that the enemy's position and approaches to it be accurately known. The kind of troops will depend upon the kind of position occupied by the enemy and the nature of the country and distance to be traversed by the detachment. If the position is an open one, and not intrenched, cavalry may be the principal arm. If the position is intrenched and a strong one, the main force will be of infantry — cavalry being used to cover the retreat of the detachment and to make prisoners of those who escape from the position. Where material obstructions such as palisades, stockades, etc,-, . are to be overcome, a body of pioneers or engineers carrying the proper tools should form a part of the detachment. If the attack is to be a double one, cavalry would be used for the attack in rear, as it can, by reason of its quicker movements, get close to the enemy more suddenly and un- AMBUSCADES ASD SURPEISES. 373 expectedly than infantry, and if repulsed, get away more easily. 3^9. Hovr a surprise should be carried out. The success will greatly depend upon the secrecy with which all the preparations have been made and on the rapidity with which the surprise is effected. . All possible means should be used to secure the condi- tion of secrecy. The orders making the details and assem- bling the troops should be given at the shortest notice consis- tent with their execution. To secure quickness of movement the troops will carry with them nothing but their arms and the necessary quantity of ammunition. Darkness, foggy weather, rain, snow-storms, imperfect execution of outpost duties either from negligence or from previous exhaustion of the men ; all these tend to conceal the approach of the attacking force and to facilitate the execu- tion of the surprise. Winter is a favorable time, as the enemy's sentinels and outposts will then, in all probability, be less on the alert, and more disposed to keep under such shel- ters as they can procure. The night is a good time for the attack, since the strength of the attacking party can not be seen and the attack appears much more sudden and powerful than it really is, especially if it be a double one. Midnight is the best time to attack when the detachments are small, as they must effect all they desii'e to do and be off before daybreak. A few hours before daylight is the best time for large detachments as the dawn of day will be favora- ble to their retreat ; by which time they will have been able to effect their purposes. 12* 274 ART AND SCIENCE OF -WAIl. Firing increases the confusion and adds to the effect of the surprise. If the object is to gain possession of a small post, capture a picket, or some object similar in nature, it will be better to carry out the enterprise as quietly as possible, or the noise of the firing may have the effect of bringing as- sistance to the party surprised. 330. The detachment sent to make a surprise should ad- vance as much under cover as possible. The troops should be kept well together ; the greatest order and silence should be observed. Instead of the ordinary precautions of an ad- vanced-guard and flankers, reliance should rather be placed upon a few active and intelligent scouts, to gain timely notice of any movement on the part of the enemy. If the detachment meets a patrol of the enemy, the effort must be made either to capture it or avoid it and with- out noise. Vedettes and sentries should be surprised, if possible, before they can fire their pieces. 331. It is recommended to divide the detachment into sev- eral parts, each of which should be organized so as to have its own reserve to support it when the attack is made, and when possible to have one of these parts held back as a reserve for the entire detachment. A place of assembly should be select- ed and told to the men in case the attack fails. The retreat after a repulse should be conducted with the same prompt- ness as the advance. Time must not be lost in waiting too long for all the detachments to come in at the rallying point, as the safety of the whole command might be compromised. The object of a surprise is to do as much damage as possible to the enemy, with a force quite small in proportion to that which might resist it, if time is allowed for the AMBUSCADES AND SURPRISES. 275 defence to assemble. To ensure united action, every man of the attacking party should have his particular duty assigned him. The particular service assigned will depend upon the general object to be attained, whether it is to capture some supe- rior oflficer, to spike pieces of artillery, to capture a convoy, etc. It is always considered an important matter to carry off the captured arms or render them unserviceable ; to dam- age military stores and make them useless ; to cripple the enemy in every way possible in the short time allowed. Sur- prises must make quick work ; and as soon as the object has been attained, the troops should be rallied, a rear guard es- tablished, and the retreat begun. 332. Surprise of a post. A post is considered to be an isolated position, occupied by a small detachment for the purpose of guarding some particular point which is of im- portance to an enemy. In this ease, the post is supposed to be a small village garrisoned by an infantry detachment, and not intrenched. It is supposed that the attacking party has been able to reach the neighborhood of the village without detection, and has made the necessary arrangements to make the attack. The attacking party will be divided into three portions. The first division is selected to make the surprise, and for this purpose may be subdivided into three or more parts, One of these subdivisions has for its duty to surprise the guard ; another subdivision has for its duty to capture the officer commanding the post ; a third, to control the streets and to keep the defence from collecting, etc. The second of the principal divisionashould be of cavalry, and has for its duty to dash through the streets and occupy 276 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. the roads leading out of the place and to stop all persons at- tempting to leave the village. This division should send out patrols upon the roads, on the side towards the main body of the enemy to watch and to check any advance which the enemy may make towards the village, for the assistance of the surprised party. The third of the principal divisions forms the reserve ; remains at the entrance of the village ; keeps possession of the lines of retreat ; gives assistance when necessary ; takes charge of prisoners, etc. The ofiBcer in command of the attacking force will go to that point, the possession of which was the main object to be attained by the surprise. The men should all know, in advance, the plan of attack, and should be warned as to the dangers to be expected. They should be cautioned against separating from each other, and notified as to the lines of retreat and place of assembling in case of failure of the attack. 333. Surprise of a convoy. The attack upon a con- voy has been mentioned in the preceding chapter, and the example there given of an attack upon a convoy of prisoners, is an example of an attack combined with surprise. As in other sui-prises, double or multiple attacks are to be preferred when practicable ; as for example making the attack simultaneously upon the head, upon the rear, and upon the flank of the convoy. The general rule to be fol- lowed in these operations is to arrange the attack that it shall be strongest on the weakest points of the convoy. Success will depend greatly upon the judicious selection of the ground upon which the attack is to be made. AMBrSCAIJES AND SURPRISES. 277 The other general rules laid down for attacks are equally applicable for surprises. If the surprise is joined with an ambuscade, the success is almost certain. Ambuscades. 334. Any position will afford the opportunities for an ambuscade, when it is so situated that a body of troops oc- cupying it can lie in wait and be hidden from view until the enemy is so close that an attack upon him will be a surprise. Very broken country is well fitted for such positions. It is almost impossible for large bodies of troops to fall ; into an ambuscade excepting through the culpable negligence, or ignorance of the ofiBcer in command of them. It is possi-. ble for small bodies, when they are negligent in marching, or when they fail to take proper precautions against surprise. An ambuscade fails as soon as notice of it is given, and must always be discovered if the advanced guards and patrols perform their duties properly. The object of an ambuscade is not only to surprise the enemy but to cut off his retreat. In prepa;ring an ambuscade, those places are to be sought where the enemy cannot deploy easily ; where he is obliged to move in a long, narrow column ; where, on account of local difficulties, disorder may be expected to occur ; where the troops are separated by obstacles, etc. The rules laid down for surprises apply equally to ambus^ cades. 335. Precautions to be observed in ambuscadesi. The position for an ambuscade must be so situated that the force to be surprised must pass close to it ; it must afford facilities for concealing the troops who occupy it ; afford facil- 278 ART AND SCIESCE OF 'VVAB. ities for offensive action ; and must allow an easy retreat from it. Secrecy with respect to the position is as essential for suc- cess, as secrecy of the march to occupy it. Night is the best time for marching, so as to arrive at the place before daylight. It is a good plan to take, at first, another road, in order to mislead the inhabitants pf the country, who may be in the'interest of the enemy. All evidences of the presence of troops should be effaced and if possible, the position should be occupied from the rear, so as to leave no signs in front by which the enemy might be led to suspect that anything was wrong. The troops, while in concealment, must keep perfectly quiet, light no fires, and each soldier should remain in the place assigned to him, whether standing, sitting, or lying ; he should not move, nor hold his weapons in such a position as to-reflect the rays of the sun. In the daytime, a portion of the troops may sleep, if they have long to wait, because the enemy is visible at a distance, and there is ample time for preparation ; but at night, every man must be on the alert, to seize the favorable moment for rushing upon the enemy, when the signal is given. 336. Woods, hills, rocks, ravines, etc., all afford positions which may be utilized in ambuscades. But positions which are not so remarkable as to attract the attention and excite the suspicions of the enemy are the best. Thus meadows covered with tall grass, fields of growing grain, plains with gentle undulations, etc., often afford the necessary conceal- ment of the troops, and deceive the enemy by making him think that an ambusqade was not possible. AMBUSCADES AND SURPRISES. 279 The defeat of Minucius, the master of horse of Fabins Maximus, by Hannibal, is given by General Dufour to illus- trate this case. '•' Between the two camps was a hill whence either could greatly annoy the other. Hannibal determined to seize it first, but suspecting that Minucius, proud of a former suc- cess, would not fail to present himself, he had recourse to a stratagem. Although the plain commanded by the hill was generally level and open, Hannibal had observed several un- dulations and hollows, where some men might be hid. He accordingly distributed among them, in small bodies, five hundred horse and five thousand foot. Minucius marched up to defend the hill, without perceiving the troops in am- bush, who took him in flank and rear ; he was completely defeated." 337. The attack. The detachment is divided, as in the case of a surprise, into several bodies, with special duties to perform, and each should be informed precisely what it has to do, in order to avoid confusion and to have concert in the attack. The infantry, placed as near the road as possi- ble, fire a single volley and then rush upon the enemy, utter- ing loud shouts. The cavalry, posted at a greater distance, makes a circuit, in order to close the way both in front and rear. The party in ambush should not attack until the sig- nal is given ; it should not stir on account of a few shots, which may be accidental. The commander is the sole judge of the moment for action, and it is for him to give the signal. Too much impatience may cause the operation to miscarry. If the attack is a failure, the same course is followed as that prescribed for a surprise. 380 AKT AND SCIENCE OF WAE. 338. When occupying a position selected for an ambus- cade, a detachment must provide for its own security by posting intelligent sentinels in such manner that although concealed, they shall be able to detect the approach of the enemy when at a considerable distance. At night, the senti- nels must depend upon their sense of hearing. If the ambuscade can not be carried out because the posi- tion has been discovered, or if the enemy is too strong, the best thing for the detachment to do is to make an imme- diate retreat. 339. If ordinary precautions are taken there is not much danger of a body of troops being drawn into an ambuscade. Still it is possible that this may be the case. General Du- four says, "After an engagement, the enemy may often be drawn into an ambuscade by a feigned retreat. This ruse is well known, but still it succeeds, because an enemy who believes himself victorious, and wishes to profit by his success, does not always take all the precautions usual in an ordinary march; and, moreover, people are made presumptuous by good fortune." CHAPTER XIII. EECONNOISSANCES. 340. A reconnoissance is a cursory survey of a tract of ground, made for the pui'pose of obtaiaing some partic- ular information. Military reconnoissances have for their object to obtain all necessary information of the natural features of the ground and to obtain all possible information of the enemy, as to his position, strength, etc. Reconnoissances having for their object merely an exam- ination of the natural features of the ground, are known as topographical, to distinguish them from those made for the purpose of obtaining information relative to the enemy. This latter kind, since they can be executed only under the protec- tion of an armed escort, are classed as armed reconnois- sances. A military reconnoissance is often an armed as-well as a topographical one ; that is, it may have both objects in view, viz : information concerning the enemy, in addition to that relating to the natural features of the ground. Topographical Reconnoissances. 341. Reconnoissances of this class are for the purpose of acquiring a thorough knowledge of the ground and of pro- curing that particular information concerning its natural 283 AET AXO SCIEXCE OF WAE. features which can not be obtained from even the most com- plete maps. A general, before he makes his plans, must know the natui'e of the soil, the condition of the roads, the state of the bridges, the width and depth of the streams, the ascents and descents of the surface, the density and size of the woods, etc., of the tract of country in which he has to operate ; and these things are not to be found upon the maps. Hence, the necessity of topographical reco.nnoissances by means of which this infotraation is procured. Eeconnoissances of this class may be made near the enemy, or distant from him. In the former case, the element of danger enters the problem and must be duly considered. Excepting this element, the execution of the reconnoissance is alike under both circumstances. 343. An accurate map can be produced-only from an ac- curate survey. A sketch made from a reconnoissance is not therefore ex- ■ pected to be an accurate one, but it is indispensable that, as far as it goes, it should be correct. The problem of a military reconnoissance of the topo- graphical class, consists in making, in a very short time, a cor rect survey of a given portion of ground, without instruments or only with those simple contrivances that can be easily carried on the person. • A perfect representation of the ground, by means of the conventional signs employed by draughtsmen in the con- struction of maps, can only be made by those who have bestowed much study upon the subject and have had a good deal of practice ; things not to be expected of the ofiS- EECOS-XOISSASCES. 283 cer who is generally charged with the duties of a recon- noissance. In making the sketch, an oflBcer ordinarily employs a simpler system of signs than is used by draughtsmen and adds to the sketch a descriptive memoir. The manner of making the survey, that is, the methods of determining distances, and of determining the relative posi- tion of objects, and of making a sketch embodying these re- sults, is a matter of " surveying ;" a subject with which it is supposed that all officers entrusted with the duties of a re- connoissance are familiar. How to determine the distances, the positions of the different objects, and how to represent these objects correctly on a proper scale upon paper, in the short time allowed, form the elements of the problem enga- ging the attention of the officer sent to make a reconnoissance. 343. Suppose the following example. A column is ap- proaching A, (Fig. 36), and is to move on to B. The maps show the position of A, the main road from A to B, the stream over which the road passes at F, and roads leading to D, and to G. The general orders an officer to proceed to A, and to make a reconnoissance of the tract of country between A and B, and to the right and left of the road, for a distance of from one and a half to two miles on each side, and to have the results of his reconnoissance ready by the time the head of the column reaches A. Suppose the officer at A, and provided with the ordinary instruments and materials for the work. These are usually as follows, viz., a good watch, a small compass in a wooden box, a protractor, a pocket level, note book, lead pencils, 284 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. colored crayons, sketching paper, small drawing board, and a few tacks. A reconnoitering glass is also a part of every officer's equipment. Ffg. 26. He makes inquiries as to the roads leading from A, and obtains all information he can of the surrounding country. All that he learns is entered in his note book. He takes one or more sheets of his sketching paper and stretches this paper on his drawing board, securing it by thumb tacks. He knows from his map the position of B, the general course of the stream between A and B, and the direction of its flow. These are sketched upon the paper, on. a convenient scale, generally about one inch to the quarter of a mile. He is now ready to commence his work. Starting from A, he proceeds directly to F, notes the time it takes EECOXXOISSAI?CES. 283 him to reach there and estimates the distance passed over. Upon reaching F, he examines the bridge, measures its width in the clear, and sounds the depth of the stream, noting the kind, height, and difference Of level of the banks. He pro- ceeds from F along the main road, estimating the distances passed over and noting all the features of the ground until he reaches B. He rides out to the right and left of B and examines the plateau on which B is situated, and then proceeds by the road leading to C, taking notes and plotting the work as he goes along. In descending the plateau, he verifies the diffeiv ence of level between the plateau and the lower level on which the road from F to C lies, which difference he ha4 estimated in proceeding to B. He finds by inquiry, where the roads from C lead, and makes an examination of tlie country near 0. He rides around the woods near C and ex- amines them, particularly as to their extent, and as to the practicability of going through them on horseback. He Ox- amines the path leading from C to the stream, then the marsh, and the road from C to F. He follows the same course with respect to the portion to the left. of the road and in front of D. At D, he examines the river, crosses the stream and proceeds to examine the country between D, E, Fj and A. In a similar way, the country to the right of A F is examined. In making his sketch, he can use the simple signs shown in the figure, or any which he may devise, or find to be easier to make, provided they can be understood. It is usual to note the distances in ti7ne j this is a matter of but little importance, for time and distance are convertible, 286 ART ASD SCIENCE OF WAR. and many officers prefer the distance being given rather than the time. The methods of estimating the distances and measuring the angles are laid down in works treating of field sketching. The rapidity of the pace, either of the horse or man, and the time occupied are the usual means of estimating distances. These distances should be checked occasionally by some of the methods proposed in works on " surveying." The angles are measured by the compass or by a pocket sextant. The back of the box of the compass is, when open, parallel to the north and south line (magnetic). The rim of the compass is graduated. Having sighted at the object along the open lid, and the needle being at rest, clamp the needle by means of the stop, and take the reading. This reading gives the angle with the magnetic meridian. Knowing the angles and distances, the object can be placed upon the paper at once with the protractor. Thus the sketch is made simultaneously with the reconnoissance. Having returned to A with the data thus collected, he should prepare other sketches at once from the one made, shortening the process very much by using the colored cray- ons to represent the natural features of the ground. Thus the stream would be drawn upon the sketch with a blue crayon, the roads with a brown or red one, the woods would have their boundaries marked with a green one, etc. 344. About the only modification of the usual methods of representing the natural features, as shown in the figure, is the one by which the plateau and the hills are represented. In the figure, the curves do not represent horizontal contours as is the usual case, and they are therefore drawn as broken REOONXOISSANCES. 287 lines to indicate this fact. They show the general direction of the bounding line of the upper surface, and the direction in which the tops of these surfaces slope. 345. A reconnoissanco can be made much more quickly by dividing the work between several ofiBcers. These officers using the same scale, can have their results all added together as soon as they have completed the reconuoissance. It facili- tates matters very much to divide the kinds of work ; while one measures a wood and plots its position upon the sketch, another examines it thoroughly; while one plots the road and crossing, another examines the stream, the character of its banks, ascertains its depth, etc. 346. Descriptive Memoir. , The sketch of a topo- graphical reconuoissance should always be accompanied by a descriptive memoir. This memoir is intended to convey that information re- lating to the natural features of -the ground, not expressed upon the sketch ; to express that information for which there are no conventional signs ; and to present those facts relative to the ground which become important by being considered in connection with the probable military operations to be un- dertaken. One of the principal objects of topographical reconnois- sances is to obtain information, from which descriptive me- moirs may be prepared and annexed to the general maps. These memoirs should explain all the details of the ground about which they are written, and supply what the map does not fully show. The sketch and the descriptive memoir will give to the general all the information relative to the ground that he 288 AET AIS'D SCIENCE OF WAB. desires to know, and save him the great labor of examining the ground in person. 347. The foregoing reconnoissance has been made under the supposition that no particular danger was to be appre- hended and that it was safe for the oflBcer to go to the points indicated. If it is supposed that the enemy's patrols are to be met, then it is necessary that an escort must accompany the recon- noitering officer or officers, and the usual precautions against surprise should be taken. Instead of moving to F and then directly to B, (Fig. 26) the officer would send patrols to examine D and E, and the country road leading to the right at least as far as the small stream shown in the figure. These patrols after examining the ground should be directed to proceed to join the main detachment at F; those on the left, coming by « the river road and examining the woods on their right, those on the right descending by the left bank of the main stream. The redbnnoitering officer having proceeded to F, sketch- ing the country as he moves along, waits at the bridge until the patrols join him. Crossing the river, and leaving a guard at the bridge, he proceeds directly to B, sending to the left and to the right, patrols which are to join him at B. Upon reaching the latter place, a patrol is sent forward a short dis- tance, while he hastens to sketch the plateau. As soon as he gets this information, he proceeds to C, as before, and the rest of the sketch is completed as previously indicated. He has by these means prevented any surprise and guarded against having been cut off by an enemy's patrol. 348. If the enemy's patrols should be quite near him, he EECONKOISSASCES. 389 may try to drive them back ; as soon as they retire, he hastens to complete his survey. Whether it is expedient to attack or to retire, can only be decided by his instructions and the cir- cumstances of the case. 349. Itineraries are reconnoissances made of the route passed over by a column of troops upon the march. They ai'e, or should be, made whenever a column of troops moves from one poini to another, not only for the information which may be thus acquired, but as a school of practice for the oflBcers of a command. The sketch, shown in Pig 27, explains the method which may be used and is based upon the methods employed in the preceding example. A note book with its pages ruled into squares, according to the scale required, is used instead of the sheet of paper. The left hand page is devoted to the sketch, while the right hand page is devoted to the remarks, or notes which should form the basis of a descriptive memoir, or report of the route passed over. The method indicated is easily followed. It might hap- pen that the tortuous windings of the road would carry the' representation too far to the right or to the left upon the page ; thus for instance, if the road instead of following the; general direction as indicated, followed the dotted line to D.. This however can be easily remedied by drawing a strong line; parallel to the bottom edge of the leaf, through D and begin- ning the sketch of the road at some point further to the left, as at F. The sketch cut in two along this line !P D, and put together so that F shall fall upon D, would make the plotting continuous. 290 ART AXD SCIENCE OF WAE. >ig. 27 J02£mal q/' March qf A' to Sfpursuant to S. O. JVo. from dbc. EBCONNOISSAXCES. 291 REMARKS. Note. A full and concise military deacription of the road and as much of the surrounding country as can be seen from it, should be given on this page of the note book and opposite to the particular positions described. Thus, "The road from A to the bridge is twenty feet wide through- out, good, rocky bed, practicable for artillery, in good condi- tion at all seasons of the year. A stone wall, three feet high encloses it on both sides. The grade is moderate, descending from A to the stream. It passes through a defile nearly one mile long, but this may be easily turned by going through the woods on the left, etc." To facilitate this description, it is well to mark on the sketch by the letters 6, c, etc., the beginning and ending of those parts of the road which are to be described, and make the note. Thus : " * to c, road quite steep and very muddy in wet weather, etc." 292 AKT ASD SCIEXCE OF WAE. To avoid this inconvenience, many itineraries are made by taking the middle vertical line of the left hand page as the road. Upon starting from A, the bearing of the road is taken and noted upon the sketch ; as soon as the road makes a change in its direction, a strong horizontal line is drawn and the new bearing is taken, with the bearings on all promi- nent objects in view. The disadvantage of this method rises from the necessity of plotting the different sections on a separate sheet of paper, although it possesses advantages worthy of consideration. Armed Reconuoissauces. 350. Armed reconnoissanccs are made particularly for the purpose of procuring information of the strength and the position of an enemy. When the ground in front of the enemy is not thoroughly known, the reconnoitering oflBcer adds to his duties that of a topographical reconnoissance. And even when the ground is known, he sketches in the natural features and locates, on and near these, the positions of the enemy as he observes them. An armed reconnoissance is then oftentimes, a topographi- cal reconnoissance, made in the immediate vicinity of an enemy in position, -with the additional purpose of ascertain- ing the strength of this enemy and the location of the points occupied by him. 351. Armed reconnoissanccs are of two kinds ; those made secretly throughout, and those made secretly but in an open manner, if it be necessary to do so, to obtain the neces- sary information. They may be classed as secret, or open EECOXXOISSANCES. 293 recoDDoissances, or like the patrols, into "defensive" and "offensive." 352. Secret reconnoissances. Secrecy is the element of reconnoissances of this kind. The oflBcer selected for this duty should combine intelligence and shrewdness with bravery. He should be told exactly the duty required and the point near which he must go to get the necessary infor- mation. He would take but a few men with him so that he may be better able to elude observation of the enemy. The remarks upon defensive patrols, (Art. 287) apply to a secret reconnoitering party ; it is a defensive patrol with extended duties, although it contains as a rule a greater number of men. 353. The detachment should be composed of about twenty picked men and at least three trusty non-commissioned ofiB- cers who, in case of need, might take the place of oflBcers. A knowledge of the language of the enemy, will help them greatly in attempting those ruses, by which a quick wit ex- tricates its possessor from critical situations. In every ease it is necessary for some of the pai-ty to speak the language. Two guides should be obtained,, who are mounted, if the de- tachment is of cavalry, and who are always watched by men de- tailed for that purpose. They should not be permitted to com- municate with each other, as they might concert some plan for the destruction or injury of the party. Silence should be observed at all times, and especially during the night time. 354. The detachment moves cautiously ; it is not of suffi- cient numbers to have an advanced guard, but is preceded by a group of scouts, and one of these is in front of the others. Two or three flankers are necessary on each side. 294 AKT AND SCIENCE OF WAB. If the scouts report the presence of a body of the enemy, the party turns to one side and tries to avoid it, by riding behind a clump of trees, a rise in the ground, or in some other way. If discovery is unavoidable, the party will re- treat and try to get back to the protection of its own troops. 355. If the party is successful in keeping concealed and the column proves to be a strong one, the officer in command of the reconnoitering party should send at once two mounted men with notice to the general that the enemy is approach- ing. He should then cai'efully observe the enemy's column, estimate the number and composition of his troops, the kind and quantity of artillery, and the direction in which he is moving, and as soon as possible send this information to the general, or go himself with this information. His instruc- tions and the circumstances of the case will decide as to whether he sends or goes in person. 356. If no large body is seen and the party succeeds in eluding observation, the reconnoitering officer upon reaching his destination conceals the detachment behmd a clump of trees, a hill, an old wall, in a ravine or hollow, and, taking a few men whom he places along at intervals, he ascends to some place where he can see the enemy, being accompanied to that point by one of the guides and two or three men. He makes notes of what he sees, along with the explanations given him by the guide. If the positions of the enemy are in plain sight, he makes a sketch, which he should always do, even if -the drawing is very rough. . He must not permit himself to be satisfied with a mere glance, but examine every thing with coolness, and endeavor to gain exact information, even at considerable personal risk ; incorrect reports are wofse than EECoxsroissAsrcEs. 295 total ignorance in such matters. It requires experience to perform a duty of this kind satisfactorily. Many examples might be cited where incorrect information, made so either by inexperience or fear, has led to serious mistakes or great disasters. 357. As soon as the reconnoitering oflBcer is satisfied that he has fulfilled his instructions and obtained all the informa- tion for which he was sent, he withdraws his party and re- turns to make his report. This report is a written one and should be clear, simple, and as brief as possible. The object of the report is the im- portamt thing, and not the more or less elegant manner in which it is written. The officer should mention only those things of which he is certain ; his conjectures should be pre- sented with caution ; he should carefully avoid drawing upon his imagination for facts. 358.' The small reconnoissances made by patrols who adr vance a short distance beyond the line of outposts every morning to find out if the enemy has come nearer during the night, are examples of secret reconnoissances, although lim- ited in their extent. These reconnoissances form a special duty for which all the officers should be detailed in turn. They seldom remain out more than an hour, and in the mean time the grand guards and pickets are kept under arms. All the precautions prescribed for secret reconnois- sances are applicable to these. The commander should move with much circumspection, sending out scouts, advancingin silence, and under such covers as the country may affor-d, stopping often to listen and examine, giving the alarm if the enemy is met, and avoiding engagements with him. If the 236 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR. reconnoissance has a special object, at some distance, and it is necessary to know the result speedily, mounted men should be distributed along the route passed over, to form a contin- uous connection between the detachment and the outpost. 359. Open reconnoissances. This name is given to those reconnoissances in which the reconnoitering party is pushed through the enemy's line of outposts and made to occu- py a point from which the reconnoitering oflBcer can obtain the necessary information relative to the enemy's position. Such reconnoissances usually precede battles. By means of them the general ascertains the true condition of affairs, before giving his final orders ; he sees whether the corps of the enemy have the positions they have been reported to oc- cupy ; are in supporting distance of each other; are too much spread out ; have their wings supported, etc. Some- times the reconnoissance is made in order to discover L£ a single point is strongly occupied ; if a bridge has been broken ; if a defile is fortified ; if the enemy has cannon in a particular place ; if he holds a certain village ; if he is mov- ing along such and such a road after a defeat, etc. In some cases the reconnoitering party is less numerous, and com- posed of cavalry alone, in order that its march may be more rapid. But when the party is expected to have an engage- ment, it should be composed of all arms and commanded by an oflScer of experience. In the latter case, it is usually termed a " reconnoissance in force." 360. The "open reconnoissance" when made in the ordinary manner conforms in principle to the "offensive patrol." (Art. 288.) The object of such a reconnoissance is '•' to obtain information, not to fight" It is therefore con- KECONNOISSANCES. 29'/ ducted as secretly as possible consistent with the object t6 bo attained. But so long as the object of the reconnoissanee is not attained, the detachment should press forward, without fear of being compromised, as it is supposed to be strong enough to overthrow easily any body of troops it may prob- ably encounter. 361. A " reconnoissanee in force " must not permit itself to be stopped by any of the outposts or detachments of the enemy. On the other hand, it should drive these in and capture what prisoners it can, as they may give information of the kind desired. In addition, the success achieved by driving in the outposts, will force the enemy to deploy his line and show his strength. At this moment, the reconnoi- tering officer should look for a point where he can examine the ground, see the enemy's position, the number of his troops, and make notes of all the information desired. For this latter purpose, he makes a sketch of the enemy's position and locates the enemy's troops as be sees them. In driving in the outposts of the enemy, and in the heat of his success, the reconnoitering oificer must not lose sight of the object of his expedition, and become engaged so deeply as to be unable to withdraw. On the contrary, he must know how to stop and order a retreat, even in the midst of a successful engagement, when he has seen what he wishes. Prudence must here control courage, and coolness regulate the whole operation, since the object is to discover the plans, ascertain the position of the enemy, and not to inflict damage upon him at that time. Other Classifications of Reconnoissances. 362. The classification of reconnoissances into "armed" 298 ART AXn SCIEXCE OF. WAK. and "topograpTiical," based upon the particular kind of in- formation required, is the one used by most military writers. All military reconnoissances are more or less topographical in their nature, and during active operations are more or less "armed," that is, have in view information of the enemy. This classification does not fully satisfy the conditions which are to be expressed in many cases, and is therefore supple- mented by others based upon some characteristic expressive of the object to be attained, manner of obtaining it, etc. Thus, military writers speak of general, special, offen- sive reconnoissances, etc. 363. Eeconnoissances of a military nature are made during the time of peace as well as during war. When made during peace, they are more general in their nature and are made with a view of future operations. It is well to distinguish between knowledge of a country and knowl- edge of ground. The former includes not only the prin- cipal natural features of the country, such as rivers, marshes, woods, etc., but also the principal resources of the country, snch as forage, provisions, and military sup- plies in general. In the latter, a particular knowledge of the details 'of the surface is meant, so that it may be pos- sible to arrange and regulate the execution of the "minor operations" of war. Knowledge of a country can be ob- tained from mtips, aided by descriptive memoirs ; knowledge of ground can be acquired only by the special examination of it. 364. Requirements of a recounoitering officer. An officer selected to make a reconnoissance in the neighbor- hood of an enemy '•' should be known to be cool-headed and KECONNOISSAKCES. 2fl9 truthful; one who sees things as they are, and tells clearly and precisely what he has seen." Conciseness and precision of language should be cultivated and form the characteristic features of his report, whether it be made verbally or in writing. The report made by a reconnoitering officer should, be- sides being accurate, carefully distinguish the facts known to the officer by personal observation, from those learned from others. It is essential for accuracy that a reconnoitering officer should be able to form correct estimates of distances at a glance. This may be acquired by practice ; by constantly comparing known and measured distances with others and then verifying the. estimate made by an exact measurement. A good defensive position depends greatly upon its ex- tent. It is therefore important for the reconnoitering officer to know how many battalions in line would be required to occupy a given point. He must therefore know the length of the front and the space taken up by a battalion and its intervals, by a battery, by a company of cavalry, etc., to be able to judge of the value of a position with respect to its extent. , He should, know how to estimate correctly the length of a column of march ; he then can estimate the size of the body. He should know how long would be the average time for cer- tain bodies of troops to make certain movements, etc. The talent of judging distances and seeing the relations between various natural features of the ground, within eye- sight, are qualities necessary to a reconnoitering officer, and exist in every individual to a certain degree. They can be 300 AKT AXD SCIEXCE OF WAE. greatly improved by practice and should be cultivated ok all occasions. The recounoitering ofiBcer should kuow the length of his ordinary pace, the distance passed over in a unit of time, and the rate of the horse which he" uses. He should select some general standards of distances, so as to be able to guess the distance of an object from him with some degree of accuracy. Thus, he should learn how great a distance it is from him to some well known object that he can distinguish clearly, selecting a man, a horse, a man on horseback, a wagon, etc., being careful to estimate and meas- ure the distances - in bright as well as lowering weather, in daylight and twilight, with the face to the sun and away from it, etc. The diversified knowledge of an educated officer is often- times of use in reconnoissances. An acquaintance with geology for instance, will enable him to decide quickly as to whether the ground is boggy, gravelly, rocky, etc. ; what kind of roads are to be expected ; the probable resources of the country ; the facility with which field-works may be con- structed, etc. A good recounoitering officer is one who combines ac- quirements with ability, energy and courage. And when recounoitering the enemy, he should have a quick eye, a ready memory, and a good knowledge of the indications which tell the presence of hostile forces and afford an estir mate of their numbers. CHAPTER XIV. FOKAGING, PAETISANS, ETC. 365. It frequently happens in an active campaign that the necessary provisions and forage for the supply of the, troops can not be obtained from the depots and magazines ■which usually furnish them. In this event, the supplies must be obtained from the inhabitants of the country. These may be obtained by purchase from them, by the au- thorized agents of the quartermaster's and subsistence de- partments, acting under the instructions of the general, or they may be procured by force. The former method is to be preferred ; but the latter, on certain occasions, is absolutely necessary. This latter method of obtaining forage and pro- visions without consent of the owners, is termed foraging. 366. Foraging may be done in one of two ways ; either by obtaining the supplies directly from the inhabitants, requir- ing from each person a given quantity ; or by plundering, that is, taking it where it can be found. Where there are local authorities who can enforce their instructions, it is better to make a requisition for supplies upon these authorities and let them distribute the amounts to be furnished among the inhabitants ; the latter bringing the supplies to such points as they may be directed. In thinly populated countries, or in districts in which ihe 302 AET AND SCIENCE OF WAK. inhabitants are hostile, the requisitions must be enforced by the military themselves. 367. All foraging should be conducted under rigid rulea and under the. charge of intelligent and responsible officers. The district to be foraged should be reconnoitered as carefully as circumstances will allow, and an estimate made of the supplies it will furnish. Portions of this district should be allotted to certain troops, or should be selected to be visited in succession by foraging parties, so as to allow of the supplies being collected in. order and without waste. The neglect of this reconnoitering duty frequently causes considerable loss of supplies, and oftentimes dissatisfaction among the troops. Some of the troops obtain an abundant supply, while others are without any, because less fortunate in finding the necessary articles ; in consequence, unpleasant feelings arise, unnecessary fatigue is undergone in foraging, and other inconveniences are felt. And again some places are searched where there is not enough forage to pay for the trouble, and others are over- looked where there is a good supply. After having learned through the reconnoissance where the supplies are to be found, foraging parties should then be sent. Eesponsible and careful officers should accompany the men, and see that these latter do not plunder, ai'e not guilty of disorderly conduct, do not waste the supplies, and bring back the articles obtained. 368. All military men agree upon the principle that "soldiers should never be permitted to forage for them- selves," but that everything for their use should come to them through their proper officers. A different course pre- FOBAGIXG, PARTISANS, ETC. 303 vents a fair and. equal distribution of the supplies after they are secured, and causes the war to degenerate soon into wholesale brigandage. " Undoubtedly," says General Dufour, " the enemy should be made to bear, as far as possible, the burden of the war. But, on the other hand, leaving out of consideration the calls of humanity, self-interest requires that the non- combatant inhabitants of any country be treated in person and property with as much consideration as possible. By re- quiring an invaded country to furnish whatever supplies it can, without causing starvation to innocent non-combatants ; by exhibiting all the kindness and humanity possible, con- sistently with firmness and justice, provision is made for the future, and especially for the eventuality of a retrograde movement through the same country. By treating the in- habitants with justice and humanity, and giving them an equivalent for their property, many friends are gained, or, at least, their hostility diminished ; they will not fly at your approach ; they will give you bread for money, and give you shelter in their habitations." Experience proves that this course of treatment of the inhabitants is the best policy, and that there is ho one thing so destructive of discipline in an ai-my, as allowing soldiers to plunder the inhabitants of the country through which they are marching. 369. Escort. Foraging parties are protected by escorts. The general principles laid down for escorts used to protect trains of wagons, apply to escorts for foraging parties. The two important points to be observed are, first, that the forag- ing party should be warned in advance of the approach of the 304 ART AKD SCIENCE OF WAK. enemy, and second, that the disposition of the escort be such as to hinder the enemy from approaching too rapidly the place occupied by the foraging party. The defence and attack of a foraging party are both based on the same principles laid down for that of con- voys. If a detachment be detailed to be both the escort and the foraging party, it should be divided into two parts, viz : one to form the foraging party, and the other, the escort or guard. The commander of the party receives instructions where to go and what to procure. He makes the division of the detachment and proceeds at once to the designated place, taking all the precautions that he would when performing any other duty under similar circumstances, that is, when the ene- my is liable to appear at any time. Upon reaching the place to which he is sent, he first of all sends out patrols upon the approaches to the place, posts his vedettes, and arranges the rest of the escort to cover the foraging party in its operations. He then sends his foragers to gather the required articles. As soon as the duty is per- formed, he retires without delay, returning to his com- mand, and turning over the supplies collected to the proper officers. A place of assembly is appointed as soon as he arrives at the point of destination. If the " recall " is sounded, all the men collect at once at the place of assembly, whether the foraging is completed or not. Written receipts signed by the officer in command of the foraging party, or by some authorized officer who accompanies rOHAGIXGj PARTISAKS, ETC. 305 the foragers, should be given to the individuals from whom the supplies are taken. Partisans. 370. A partisan is an officer detached from his com- mand and sent with a body of ti'oops into a district of country to act independently and to harass the enemy there as much as possible. The term is also applied to the whole body act- ing under his oi'ders. The particular operations of partisan troops depend upon the natural features of the theatre of operations, as well as upon the nature of the war ; these operations enter into the general plan of the war, and are conducted under orders of the general-in-chief. ' A body of partisan troops sent into an enemy's country would have for its object to acquire information of the ene- my, the kind and location of positions, etc. This duty would be analogous to that of reconnoitering parties and patrols. In a defensive war, and especially in case of an invading army making a retrograde movement, they are used not so much for the purpose of acquiring information, as for an- noying and harassing the enemy. Thus, suppose in a defensive war that officers are detached and placed in command of bodies numbering from four to five hundred men who are all perfectly acquainted with the coun- try. Detachments of this size, passing around the flanks of the invading army, can appear in its rear and can harass the in. vader very greatly. He will be forced to leave strong garri- sons at' every point which has been selected as a depot of supplies or of which he desires to retain possession ; he will 306 ART AND SCIENCE OF WAK. have to guard strongly all his convoys ; he will have to usa great precautions to prevent the capture of stragglers, cap- ture of the convalescent left in hospitals, etc. The parti- sans knowing well the country and informed of everything, by the inhabitants, will have but little to fear, even when the enemy forms strong columns to pursue them. These columns, the garrisons left at the depots, the strong es- corts, all tend to weaken the effective force of the invading army. la addition, the couriers, the orderlies, the means of communication in general, are all liable to capture and in- terruption by the partisans, and in this way the enemy's designs are frustrated or may be discovered. 371. Partisan detachments are sometimes composed of different arms of service ; the cavalry is best fitted for the duties of partisans, because of its celerity and its ability to make long detours, thus in many cases effecting surprises and retiring quickly. These partisans are supposed to be troops detached from the main body of the army for this special duty. Sometimes, the citizens of a country band together and act as partisans; in this case they are known as guerillas. These latter when placed under the command of an army officer accustomed to war, and possessed with power to con- trol them, may possibly be of service. But as a rule, and especially when commanded by one of their own number, guerillas are terrible only to the non-combatants and the peaceful citizens. Experience proves that guerillas have ever been a scourge to their fellow-citizens, and the little service that, they have ever done which has proved beneficial to their country, has FOKAGING, PARTISANS, ETC. 30? been more than counterbalanced by the greater injuries that they have inflicted upon their own friends. The duties of a partisan, when well performed, are very hard, requiring great activity and great vigilance. Service of this kind is advantageously pursued only in mountainous and wooded countries ; vz open countries, regu- lar troops can soon destroy them. CHAPTER XV. CAMPS, BIVOUACS, CANTONMENTS, ETC. 373. Teoops at rest are said to be either in camp, "bivouac, or cantonment, etc., according to the following circumstan- ces, Tiz : In camp, when they are lodged in tents or in temporary huts ; In bivouac, when they have no shelter, excepting such temporary protection that may be obtained upon the spot ; In cantonment, when lodged in houses, or inhabited places for a given period of time, and ready to resume mili- tary operations at short notice. Barracks are permanent buildings erected for the use of troops, and are the quarters in which troops are lodged in time of peace or when occupying a permanent military post. Troops go into camp when it is probable that they are required to remain some time in the same place ; they go into bivouac, when they have no camp equipage, or when the enemy is very near and it is expected that they are to remain but a short time in the place ; they go into cantonments fre- (juently at the end of a campaign, or when active operations are temporarily suspended, to recruit their strength and to rest. CAMPS, BIVOUACS, CANTOKMENTS, ETC. 309 Camps. 373. The United States Army Eegulations define a camp to be any place in which the troops are established in tents, in huts, or in bivouac. It frequently happens that during active operations the troops go into camp expecting to stay only a few days, but circumstances may keep them in this place for weeks and even months. In this case, as soon as it is evident that the occupation is to be prolonged, and the troops ai"e without camp equipage, they should be made to build huts and con- vert the bivouac into a regular camp. Tents add greatly to the amount of baggage of an army, and for this reason, troops when on active service, are frequently encamped without them. Cajnps of instruction are established in an army's own territory for the purposes of instruction, or preparatory to mobilization of the army. Intrenched camps are established to cover a section of country or to deceive the enemy as to the strength of an army. 374. " Intrenched camps " and " camps on the march " are the two kinds of camps met with in active operations in the field. The former have for their object to defend a given position and for this purpose are strengthened by fortifications ; the latter have for their object to furnish a place in which the troops can rest, can receive their neces- sary supplies, and may not have to fight. Although in this latter case, the troops do not expect to fight, they must oc- cupy such positions that they can readily repel any attack which may be made upon the camp. 310 AET AND SCIEXCE OF WAS. Camps are therefore in reality " defensive positions," and the rules laid down for the selection of such positions are equally applicable to the choice of places for encamping. 375. Castrametation is the art of laying out camps, and of placing the troops so that the difEerent arms of the service shall afford support to each other in the best man- ner. A position for a camp should be on dry ground, with plenty of wood and water close at hand. The water should be of good quality and in sufiBcient quantity to last as long as the troops occupy the spot. It should be near enough to the -depots of supplies to allow of easy distribution of subsistence and forage to the troops. One of the first things to be at- tended to is the drainage, so that the water falling on the ground shall be rapidly carried away. Hence, the place for a camp is one that afEords a good defensive position, and at the same time possesses the quali- ties of healthfulness and of ease of supply. 376. The front of the camp of a regiment of infantry, or of a company of cavalry, should be equal in extent to the regimental or company front, so as to admit of the troops being easily manoeuvered. The camps are generally established on a single line, the tents or huts being aligned from one extremity of the camp to the other, as far as the nature of the ground will admit, and being arranged by companies in streets perpendicular to the front. If the army is formed in two lines, there are two camps, one in front of the other. The reserve has its particular camp. The artillery and engineers are usually encamped in OAMPS, BIVOUACS, OAXTOSTMENTS, ETC. 311 rear of the infantry ; the cavalry on the flanks in line with the infantry. 'No rules can be laid down for laying out camps that will be universal. The proper exercise of the art of encamping is to so place the troops, that they can quickly form line of battle on the position they are to occupy. The position of the enemy and the nature of the ground, regarded both in a military and a sanitary point of view, are the principal things to be considered in determining the choice of a camp. 377. A reconnoissance should always precede the estab- lishment of a camp. "When the enemy is not very near, it will only be neces- sary in establishing a camp oh the march, to look to the health and comfort of the men, the convenience of wood and water, the supply of subsistence and forage, and the facility of communications. A small detachment, called "a camping party," from each regiment, goes ahead to prepare the camp of the regi- ment. This camping party is under the command of the regimental quartermaster, and is used to mark out the places to be occupied by the different companies. (Pages 84 and 85.) Immediately upon the regiment's arriving on the ground, .the details for guards, outposts, fatigue, etc., are made and the camp-ground established. The posts of the sentinels are de'signated, the places for receiving supplies pointed out, and all the arrangements for police and service of the camp are made. The army regulations are quite explicit upon this subject and give diagrams illustrating the method of placing the 313 ART AND SCIEA'CE OF WAR. tents and forming the lines of a camp of a regiment of infan- try and of cavalry. When the camp is to be an intrenched one, the reconnois- sance must iaclude the defensive properties of the ground, and the best location for the field works. Bivouacs. 378. Troops, without camp equipage and when on the march, are obliged to go into bivouac. They are frequently compelled to bivouac if the enemy is quite near, even whern possessing the proper camp equipage. The same general rules laid down for camps are applica- ble to bivouacs. When on the march, and the enemy is not near in force, a greater latitude is allowed the bivouac than the camp, so that the men may take advantage of the natural features of the ground to obtain shelter. When near the enemy, the bivouac is arranged in all particulars like a camp, each body of troops being placed so as to quickly form on the line "of battle marked out. 379. The bivouac is formed as follows : A regiment of cavalry being in line of battle, in rear of the ground to be occupied, is broken by companies or pla- toons to the right. The horses of each subdivision are placed in a single row, and fastened to pickets planted firmly in the ground ; if near the enemy, they remain saddled all night, with girths slackened. The arms are at first stacked in rear of each row of horses ; the sabres, with the bridles hung on them, are placed against the stacks. The forage is placed on the right of each row of horses. Stable-guards watch the horses. CAMPS, BIVOUACS, CASTONMENTS, ETC. 313 The fires are made near the color line, twenty paces to the left of the row of horses. A shelter is made for the men around the fire, if possible, in which case, each man then places his arms and bridle against the shelter. The fires and shelter for the officers are placed in rear of the line of those for the men. The interval between the shelters should be such that the subdivisions can take up a line of battle freely to the front or rear. The interval between the companies mast be without obstruction throughout the whole depth of the bivouac. When it is permitted to unsaddle, the saddles are placed in the rear of the horses. The distance from the enemy decides the manner in which the horses are fed and led to water. An infantry regiment going into bivouac forms its line of battle and then breaks into companies, like when it goes into camp. The arms are then stacked, and the fires made. These fires are on the ground that would be occupied by the tents in camp, and are sufficient in number to allow one for every eight or ten men. If possible, shelters are constructed ; these are easily built in a wooded country. If liable to surprise, the infantry should stand to arms at daybreak, and the cavalry mount, until the return of the re- connoitering parties. The artillery can have no fixed rule for its bivouacs, being obliged to suit itself to localities; but, in no case, should the fires be near the park. The following is a good arrangement : 1st, a single row of fires for cannoneers and drivers ; 3d, the horses in four ranks ; 3d, the forage ; 4th, the pieces, caissons, and wagons, parked in rear, in two ranks. The officers have a fire to the front. 314 AET AND SCIENCE OF WAR. Winter Quarters and Cantonments. 380. The winter, as a rule, puts an end to active opera- tions of an army in the field during that season, as the enemy in this latitude, has no power or intention of undertaking any operation of importance during the inclement portion of the year. The troops are then put into quarters to recruit and to rest from the fatigues of the preceding campaign. These quarters are so located that the army can keep pos- session of the pointg already gained and that the troops occu- pying them can be near the new field of operations when the season admits of the re-opening of the campaign. Winter quarters, in order to admit of the easy supply of the troops, are more widely distributed than camps, and are analogous to the occupied points of a " defensive line." They should be, if possible, so arranged as to be perfectly secure, from all atteinpts to carry them, and so as to admit of an easy and quick concentration of the troops upon the key-point of the line, if at any time they are threatened by the enemy. 381. When these quarters are in inhabited places, the army is said to be in cantonments. An army may go into cantonments at other times than during the winter season. For instance, during an armistice, from extraordinary condi- tions of the weather, etc, or from causes which suspend temporarily the active operations in the field. Cantonments are regulated by the same principles as those laid down for winter quarters. The principle common to both is the distributing of the troops over as large an extent of country as possible, for the CAMPS, BIVOUACS, CANTONMENTS, ETC. 315 purpose of adding to their comfort and caring for their health, while at the same time care is taken not to endanger their safety. 383. Strong militarj' posts should be established in front of the line of cantonments upon the lines of approach which would be most probably used by the enemy, if he should sud- denly resume hostilities These posts are known as ad- vanced posts, and are supported by strong detachments posted between them and the general line of cantonments. Advanced posts are absolutely necessary for security when- ever the line of cantonments is not behind an unfordable river. If possible cantonments should be established behind a river, for the sake of greater security against attack. This is particularly necessary for winter quarters, which are gen- erally more widely distributed than cantonments. 383. A place of assembly should be designated beforehand, in view of the contingency of an attack. This point should not be too near the enemy. The different arms of the service should be so located as to afEord mutual support. The artillery is placed near the roads, so as to be able to move rapidly wherever needed ; it should be covered by the infantry. The cavalry may be placed wherever forage and water are most convenient, as the rapidity of its motions enables it to reach the place of assem- bly in time from any part of the cantonment. Care must be taken, however, not to station it where it may be easily sur- prised, as it is not so able to, repel a sudden attack as infantry. In each partial cantonment, there should be a place for the troops to assemble at a given signal, and all the usual 316 AET AND SCIENCE OF WAR. precautions for safety should be taken. Each regiment should have its place of assembly in case of alarm, each bri- gade, each division, and finally the whole army. The general-in-chief assigns the limits of their canton- ments to the divisions, the generals of divisions to the bri- gades, and the commanders of brigades post their regiments. (Army Eegulations.) 384. The communication between the different places of assembly should be open and free ; with this object, bridges should be repaired, roads improved and new ones made if necessary. If a river passes through the cantonment, it must be bridged ; and if there are deep ravines, diflBcult of passage, roads must be made for the passage of artillery. 385. A good example of cantonment of troops is seen in the disposition of the French troops in eastern Prussia and on the river Passarge, at the end of the campaign of 1806. CHAPTER XVI. MODEEN WAKFARE. 386. Fkom the nature of things, the science of war can not be an exact one. The results to be obCained by any mili- tary operation must depend greatly upon the motives as well as upon the actions of men, and these attributes of the hu- man being are necessarily variable quantities. In this want of exactness, the "science of war" is like all other branches of science. "No astronomer is able to pre- dict with certainty the place of a body in the heavens at any future time, nor even to tell exactly where it is at the time of his observation. But he is able to compute within some degree of approximation, the probable errors of his observa- tions, the perturbations and other causes of uncertainty in the body's future place, and thus fix the limits of error which he may safely rely upon and reach results of known value." So it may be with a master of the art of war, who know- ing the great principles upon which all successful operations must be based, making a due allowance for the probable errors of his own information, and giving a certain value to the uncertain elements which always enter and form a part of the conditions of every military problem, can estimate with some degree of correctness the results which should be ob- tained and the means by which they can be produced. SIS AET AXD SCIENCE OF WAR. 387. The element of uncertainty is ever present, and will be so, as long as man is the principal actor. This fact is so strongly impressed upon the minds of many persons that many of them go to the extreme in their views and consider war only as a game of " chance," and that success is a matter of good luck. This erroneous view of the art of war has been more than once the cause of defeat to those who, confi- dent of success, have disregarded the plain teachings of expe- rience, and rushed to a defeat which was inevitable from' the beginning. The great prindples of war are not to be violated with impunity. Certain disaster or failure must follow any mili- tary operation that violates the principles of war. "When neither of these has occurred, it will be found that the escape from failure was really due to a fault committed by the ad- versary. 388. The study of the '•' science of war " is to be pursued in the same way as that of any other of the branches of science. " A knowledge of its principles is not to be evolved out of man's inner consciousness." These principles are dis- covered by experience, and a careful study of the experience of others. A careful analysis of the effects produced by a series of military operations will enable the student to sepa- rate the principles from the details, to detect the incidental elements, and to distinguish the cause from the effect. The theories of the science are therefore based upon the acted past and not upon the imagined future. The principle, that the "elements of nature follow an invariable law," is held to be true in war as in the other physical sciences. That, all other things being equal, it is MODERN WAEFAEE. 319 held, that the same general results must always attend the same combinations of physical circumstances. 389. It is true that two military operations, identical in all outward appearances, have frequently produced results diametrically opposite. A close analysis will likely reveal incidental elements causing the diverse results. These incidental elements, better known as "chance," *ill always tend to make war an uncertain science. The question arises as to its importance in military operations and the steps to be taken to get rid of it. It is certain that " chance " as an element of a military problem can be made a very small factor, and as our knowl- edge of the science increases, it may be possibly eliminated entirely. The master of the "art of war" studies the science of war ■with a view to so thoroughly comprehending it, that he may from his knowledge thus acquired, be able to eliminate the elements of " chance " from any military operation of which he has the direction. 390. It has been stated previously that the number of general principles forming the groundwork of the science is constant. These principles were the foundations of the suc- cessful campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Napoleon, and other successful commanders of the past. They must be the basis for the successes of the future. Although these principles are constant, the execution of the rules deduced from them varies from one period tp another. So marked are these changes as to the methods of execution, that epochs or eras in the history of the " art of war " are based upon them. 320 ART AND SCIES-CE OF WAK. 391. The characteristic modifications at the present tim?, so great as to confer the name of '■' modern warfare" upon the methods used in executing the operations of war, are those resulting more particularly from the use of steam on land and water, the employment of signaling and telegraphy and the use of the modern fire-arms. 392. It would exceed the limits laid down for this book if an attempt were made to discuss the effects produced in the art of war by the use of railroads, telegraphs, and the modern arms. These modifications and innovations made by their use f orn^ a comprehensive subject, extremely interesting, highly important, and constantly changing. It mast, as a sub- ject, be classed as among one of the unceasing studies of a military man, to be studied by him as long as he practices or takes an interest in his profession. A brief allusion will be made to the general effects which may be produced by their use. 393.. Railroads. The effect of this class of roads can hardly be over-estimated. In all times, good roads have been considered as essential to success in many military operations. So important were good roads considered by the Komans, to carry on successfally their military operations, that one of the first things undertaken by this nation in their efforts to conquer a country was the construction of good military roads leading into the territory to be occupied. These roads were so well built, that traces of them are still to be seen. In the troubles of England with the Scottish Highlanders, the complete conquest of the latter was not effected until Eng- land had built good military roads through the Highlands. MODEES WAKI'AllE. 321 394. The facilities offered by railroads for transporting troops and materials of war are very great. They exceed those offered by good turnpike roads as much as the latter ex- ceed the common road. The use of railroads enables a general to concentrate and supply large bodies of troops with a rapidity which, a few- years ago, would have been utterly impracticable. The effect produced by their use in either offensive or de- fensive operations is easily seen by the student to be very great. As evidence, the words of General Sherman may be quoted. — " The value of railways is also fully recognized in war quite as much as, if not more so than, in peace. The Atlanta campaign would simply have been itnpossible without the use of the railroads from Louisville to Nashville — one hundred and eighty-five miles — ^from Nashville to Chaittanooga, one hundred and fifty-one miles- — from Chattanooga to Atlanta one hundred and thirty seven miles. Every mile of this " single track" was so delicate that one man could in a minute have broken or moved a rail, but our trains usually carried along tools and the means to repair such a break. '•' We had however, to maintain strong guards and garrisons at each important bridge or trestle, the destruction of which would have necessitated time for rebuilding. ... Our trains from Nashville forward were operated under military rules, and ran about ten miles an hour in gangs of four trains of ten cars each. Pour such groups of trains daily made one hundred and sixty cars of ten tons each, carrying sixteen hundred tons, which exceeded the absolute necessity of the army, and allowed for the accidents that were common and inevitable. But, as I have recorded, that single stem of rail- 322 ART AND SCIEXCE OF WAR. road, four hundred and sevenfcy-three miles long, supplied an army of one hundred thousand men and thirty-five thou- sand animals for the period of one hundred and ninety-six days, viz : from May 1 to Nov. 12, 1864. To have delivered regularly that amount of food and forage by ordinary wagons would have required thirty-six thousand eight hundred ■wagons of six mules each, allowing each wagon to have hauled two tons, twenty miles each day, a simple impossibility on roads such as then existed in that region of country. Therefore, I reiteratethat the Atlanta campaign was an im- possibility without these railroads," etc. 395. These remarks of General Sherman will convey to the mind of the student the great use of railroads in war, and how they render practicable movements which were impossi- ble without them. 396, Signalling and telegraphy. The improvements in the systems of signalling and telegraphy render communi- cations, as far as messages are concerned, a matter of ease, and enable a general to combine movements which a few years ago would have been impracticable. Thus,' General Sherman says, " Hardly a day intervened when General Grant did not know the exact state of facts with me, more than fifteen hundred miles away as the wires ran," Also, General Sherman says, "For the rapid transmission or orders in an army covering a large space of ground, the magnetic telegraph is by far the best, though habitually the paper and pencil, with good mounted orderlies, answer every purpose." He also alludes to signalling, and gives an instance of sending a message by the fiags over the heads of the enemy MODERN WAEfAEE. 3;23 who were between him and one of his detachments. But as a rule, he thinks in this country, the system of signalling is not so serviceable, by reason of intervening trees, the inter- ference caused by mists, fogs, etc., preventing the transmis- sion of the messages. 397. Arms of precision. Under this head are classed all arms which are rifled, whether small arms or cannon. The great advantages obtained by the use of modern arms are first, accuracy of fire ; second, increased range. and third, quickness of fire. The latter is vastly increased by the breech-loading weapon, and will be further improved when a suitable magazine-gun can be devised. 398. The introduction of modern arms has been the cause of great speculation as to the changes they will pro- duce in warfare. They certainly require that troops, as soon as they are within range, should be sheltered as much as possible to avoid being decimated. This will cause armies to avoid fighting battles in an open country, or on large plains. The battle-fields of the future will be selected on ground which permits the attacking force to get within close range without much exposure, on ground which will conceal turn- ing movements, and which will allow the second line and reserves to be screened from the enemy's fire. Theorists are apt to think that improvements made in arms will necessarily bring with them a corresponding change in tactics and even in strategy. This is not necessarily the case in tactics, and certainly not at all in strategy. General Sherman says, " The only change that breech-loading arms will probably make in the art and practice of war will be to increase the amount of ammunition to be expended, and 324 AET AXD SCIENCE OF WAR. necessarily to be carried along; to still further "thin out" the lines of attack, and to reduce battles to short, quick, de- cisive conflicts. It does not in the least affect the grand strategy, or the necessity for perfect organization, drill, and discipline." 399. Proportion of arms of service. It might be thought that these modifications would have an effect to alter the proportions of the arms of service composing an army. General Sherman says, "Modern wars have not materially changed the relative values or proportions of the several arms of service ; infantry, artillery, cavalry, and engineers. If anything the infantry has been increased in value. The danger of cavalry attempting to charge infantry armed with breech-loading rifles was fully illustrated at Sedan, and with us very frequently. So improbable has such a thing become that we have omitted the infantry-square from our recent tactics. Still, cavalry against cavalry, and as auxiliary to infantry, will always be valuable, while all great wars will, as heretofore, depend chiefly on the infantry. Artillery is more valuable with new and inexperienced troops than with vete- rans." He also says, "earth-forts, especially field-works, will hereafter play an important part in wars, because they enable a minor force to hold a superior one in check for a time, and time is a most valuable element in all wars." He therefore thinks that the proportions do not require change. Experience has shown to the writer, that there should be for an army serving in a country like that of the United States, a larger proportion of engineer troops than is usually given. The construction of field works, the repairs of MODERX WARFARE. 325 bridges, the mending of rouds, and the service of the bridge trains require, in time of war in this country, a larger number of this branch of service than is furnished by the proportions usually assumed. The intelligence and handiness of the men, serving in the volunteer organizations, prevented this lack of engineer troops from being severely felt in the late war. As civilization progresses and the army is recruited more from cities and towns, the more will be missed those men, so handy with the axe, so fertile in expedients, and so useful as pioneers, which the late war produced in abundance in the western volunteer regiments. Their place will have to be filled in the future with engineer soldiers who have been or- ganized and trained. 400. Effect upon the soldier produced by modem warfare. Modern warfare requires that a soldier should be brave, intelligent, possess presence of mind, should be active and be able to endure hardships uncomplainingly. These qualities are essential to him if he wishes to do his duty properly, and to be an efiScient soldier. The object of a war is to destroy the resources of cue enemy, in this way making him powerless and willing to accede to the demands of the government. This destruction is effected by battles and by "minor operations." Battle^ are directed hy generals; "minor operations" are conducted by the young officers, and form part of the duty of every officer and soldier in an army. A proper execution of this duty requires a certain amount of preparation. All the duties performed in peace are sup- posed to have a bearing on those to be performed in war, and 326 ART AKD SCIENCE OF WAK. an officer who executes correctly those entrusted to liim in peace, is apt to be the one who is efficient in war. Every soldier and young officer should thoroughly learn the duties of a soldier in the field, and should fit himself for the perfect discharge of those duties with which he may ex- pect to be entrusted. It is recommended that for this purpose, he should read and study works treating upon these military duties, and he should never be satisfied until he has acquired a thorough knowledge of them. In reading works upon military opera- tions, he should try and get a full and clear conception of the operations described, and should not be satisfied until he has done so. The maxim, " In peace, prepare for war," is peculiarly applicable to the young officer, who should make the best use of the time of peace, in order that he may be efficient in wa,r, combining with his theoretical studies all the practical instruction attainable. In this way, he may fit himself to meet the requirements demanded of him by " modern war- fare." THE EKT>.